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A History of Future Crime: Prediction, Youth, and the Organisation of Suspicion in Criminology and American Society, 1900-1960

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A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Department of Philosophy

University of Durham

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A History of Future Crime: Prediction, Youth, and the Organisation of Suspicion in Criminology and American Society, 1900-1960

John Shepherd

Abstract:

This thesis explores the relationship between juvenile crime prediction and the human sciences in the United States during the early twentieth century. Modern predictive policing and risk assessment technologies have received increasing public attention for their discriminatory potential but are frequently presented as novel disruptions, as tools and methods without a history. This thesis addresses this oversight by offering an expanded view of historical crime prediction and its development from 1900-1960 by criminologists in collaboration with courts, school, clinics, correctional institutions, and welfare agencies. Meeting the shared practical concern of future crime and its anticipation in these settings, criminologists attempted to synthesise varied, conflicting, uncertain perspectives on children's futures into useable predictions and recommendations for practitioners. Working with the juvenile courts of Chicago and then Boston in the 1910s and 1920s child guidance collaborators William Healy and Augusta Bronner claimed prognostic authority to advise on a given delinquent's behavioural antecedents and expected trajectory but were, in practice, dependent on networks of official and familial informants, whose priorities and anxieties had to be accommodated. Subsequently, Harvard criminologists Sheldon and Eleanor Glueck used statistics to critique the failure of clinical psychiatric approaches and promote their own 'predictive instruments', tables quantifying and computing background factors to score criminal propensities and guide fallible decision makers. Using the Gluecks' archival research materials from 1930-1960, I then trace the assumptions, prejudices and negotiations which informed their prediction tables and their subsequent modification in practice. Through these episodes I reveal how crime prediction, by psychiatric expertise or actuarial quantification, organised widespread extant suspicions and provided various practitioners with technical validation of prior prejudices and expectations. In this way criminological crime prediction ultimately contributed to the further criminalisation of poor, urban, racially marginalised youth.

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Contents

Declaration	v
--------------------------	----------

Acknowledgements	vi
-------------------------------	-----------

Introduction: The Criminal, Past and Future	1
--	----------

The Criminal Type: Power and Construction.....	5
--	---

The Future Criminal: Surveillance and Uncertainty	10
---	----

The Criminal Child: Optimism and Pessimism.....	17
---	----

Criminal Data: Facts About the Future.....	24
--	----

Conclusions	32
-------------------	----

Chapter 1: Professional Criminology and Standards of Judgement	37
---	-----------

Criminological Research: Deciding What Matters.....	39
---	----

Criminological Practice: Deciding Who to Trust.....	43
---	----

Criminal Types: Measuring Bodies	48
--	----

Criminal Types: Measuring Intelligence	54
--	----

The Critique of Hereditary Criminality	62
--	----

Conclusion: Categories and Complexity.....	67
--	----

Chapter 2: Following the Delinquent's Story	71
--	-----------

Expertise and the Individual Delinquent.....	74
--	----

Mental Hygiene and Child Guidance.....	81
--	----

Stories and Secrets.....	85
--------------------------	----

Managing Expectations.....	95
----------------------------	----

Conclusions: 'The Spirit of the Community'	104
--	-----

Chapter 3: The Statistical Challenge to Clinical Crime Prevention	108
--	------------

Expertise on Trial: Leopold, Loeb, and Healy	109
--	-----

Crime Prevention as Public Health.....	115
--	-----

Diagnostics into Data	120
-----------------------------	-----

The Problem of Causation.....	131
-------------------------------	-----

One Thousand Juvenile Delinquents.....	137
--	-----

Conclusion: 'The Close of Another Chapter'	143
Chapter 4: 'Predictive Instruments' and 'Delinquency Areas'	146
Scoring and Judging	147
Planning Unraveling	157
Demarcating Delinquency	160
Demarcating Race and Space	165
Sharing Interests and Information in the 'Delinquency Area'	174
'Good Boys' and Criminals	183
Conclusions	188
Chapter 5: Unravelling Prediction.....	190
Negotiating the Home.....	193
Encoding Interviews	199
Projecting Delinquency	207
Disagreement, Coherence, and Quantification.....	216
Reweaving Factors.....	222
Conclusions	232
Chapter 6: The Proliferation of Prediction in Postwar America	235
Reception and Reaction	238
Practitioners and Prediction.....	251
The Armed Forces	254
Criminal Justice	258
The Clinic.....	262
The School.....	267
Conclusions	274
Conclusion	276
History and Dystopia	276
Crime Prediction and American Society, 1900-1960.....	279
Organising Suspicion	284

Bibliography..... 293

Archival Sources	293
Case Law.....	293
Published Primary Literature	293
Published Secondary Literature	299

List of Figures

Figure 1: One blank and one completed heredity chart, presented in William Healy's report for Committee 'A' of the AICLC on a 'system for recording data concerning criminals'	41
Figure 2: Cartoon by John T. McCutcheon, Chicago Daily Tribune, 4th August 1924: 1.	112
Figure 3: Blank form for recording information from JBF case records (Glueck and Glueck, One Thousand Juvenile Delinquents: 301).	121
Figure 4: Blank identification card for tracing JBF cases (Glueck and Glueck, One Thousand Juvenile Delinquents: 300).....	122
Figure 5: Draft punch card with appended factor list from JBF study (SGP, Box 24, Folder 9).....	123
Figure 6: Draft code index for punch card positions ('Code for Punch Cards', SGP, Box 24, Folder 10: 5)	128
Figure 7: Chart for tallying groups of causative factors into symptom complexes ('J.B.F. Causative Factors', SGP, Box 24, Folder 9)	135
Figure 8: List of background factors tabulated in One Thousand Juvenile Delinquents (Glueck and Glueck, One Thousand Juvenile Delinquents: 179-180).	149
Figure 9: Six factors used in the prediction table from One Thousand Juvenile Delinquents (Glueck and Glueck, One Thousand Juvenile Delinquents: 187).	150
Figure 10: Final prediction scores (Glueck and Glueck, One Thousand Juvenile Delinquents: 189). .	151

Figure 11: Illustration of scoring for adult male offenders (Glueck and Glueck, 'Predictability in the Administration of Criminal Justice': 320).	152
Figure 12: Rate map (left) and spot map (right) of delinquency in Chicago (Shaw, Delinquency Areas: 61, 66-67).	170
Figure 13: Draft sheet for numerically coding factors from psychiatric interviews in preparation for punch card entry ('Interview With Boy', ETSGP, Box 33 Folder 3: 4).	203
Figure 14: Part of a draft form for summarizing psychiatric impressions, following interview ('Psychiatric Report', Case 6, ETSGP, Box 33, Folder 3: 2).	204
Figure 15: Ink-blot, second plate of 10 in the Rorschach test (Hermann Rorschach (trans. Philip J. Keddy, Rita Signer, Philip Erdberg, and Arianna Schneider-Stocking), Psychodiagnostics (Hogrefe: Boston, MA: 2021 [1921])).	208
Figure 16: Record of responses to Rorschach plate II ('Notes on Recording', ETSGP, Box 33, Folder 1: 4).	209
Figure 17: Form for codification of personality traits evident in analysis of Rorschach test responses ('Rorschach Analysis of Traits', ETSGP, Box 33, Folder 2).	210
Figure 18: Five factors of the Social Prediction Table (Glueck and Glueck, Unraveling: 261).	228
Figure 19: Social Prediction Table with seven score-classes (Glueck and Glueck, Unraveling: 261)... ..	230
Figure 20: Social Prediction Table using four, three, and two score classes (Glueck and Glueck, Unraveling: 270).	231
Figure 21: The original publication of 'The Minority Report' by Philip K. Dick in science fiction magazine Fantastic Universe (January 1956).	277

Declaration

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Introduction: The Criminal, Past and Future

Crime prediction evokes the future, of specific criminals and their offenses but also of high technology and seemingly omniscient data-driven surveillance. In court, in prison, or in the community, the criminal is judged not only by the law but also by risk assessments, algorithms, software, and other tools which measure propensities, map risk, and advise for the sake of efficiency and public safety. Presented as the realisation either of 'rational' punishment and policing or of unjust, technologically determined dystopia these may seem to mark a breach with the past. New technologies present us with crimes uncommitted, criminals to be, and in doing so upset supposedly core values of fair and equal justice for individuals and acts proven by trial. And yet, the future criminal that emerges is somehow unsettlingly familiar, conditioned by fears, prejudices and stereotypes that stretch back into previous centuries: the poor, the urban-dwelling, the racially marginalised, the victim of poor parenting or education, and so on. Did 'data-driven' predictions create these suspicions or were they already there? And if our suspicions precede the technologies that ostensibly predict crime then what work is crime prediction actually doing in policing, criminal justice, and myriad other sites? It is the aim of this thesis to extend the boundaries of crime prediction backwards into history and outwards into wider society. If we are to understand and interrogate these suspicions, we must look before the tools and their predictions to the conditions and anxieties from which they emerged. Predictions have a past.

This is a history of disciplines, professions, institutions, and individuals coming together to decide which offenders deserved hope and which should be feared. Specifically, I am interested in twentieth-century expectations of juvenile delinquents and their potential criminal futures. By the 1900s, judges, correctional administrators, and new juvenile courts were increasingly required to judge propensities alongside guilt or innocence. Probation and parole on one hand and the indeterminate sentence on the other rested on a judgement of likely improvement under supervision and guidance, or danger and incorrigibility necessitating incarceration. With these and other emerging community therapeutics, criminologists, practitioners, and the public, hoping to salvage wayward youth while avoiding waste and protecting society, asked who or what could be trusted to judge future behaviour.

The discretion of even 'wise' judges had to be guided by specialists. By the 1920s criminologists, and especially psychiatrists, seeking more professional status, positioned themselves as expert advisors on a juvenile offender's past wrongs and future trajectory. Diagnosis and prognosis, following the models of child guidance and 'mental hygiene', would form the basis of scientific 'treatment' recommendations to 're-adjust' delinquents to healthy ideation, vocational ambitions, and family relationships in line with society's expectations. Underlying 'causes of crime' were varied and complex but still intelligible to 'the careful well-qualified diagnostician' who pieced together the facts of individual cases into coherent biographical narratives with discernible futures and points of intervention.¹ Soon, however, psychiatric experts would be called into question by statistics which indicated clinical failure and, by contrast, the predictive power of aggregated numbers. Going into the 1930s, prognoses of clinical crime prevention were joined by actuarial tables and 'predictive instruments' which combined numerous correlates of crime to score individuals and assign risk.

The authority of prediction shifted, at one time justified by personal experience and insight while at another derived from data and the patterns of aggregated cases. In 1915 we thus find child guidance pioneer William Healy (1869-1963) deriding contemporary psychometric tests, measures, and classifications:

The study of any human individual by a mere process of classification and registering results on tests without reference to the relationship of abilities or disabilities to environment, lacks in the common-sense elements which must be introduced into any investigation which would fundamentally deal in predictabilities, treatments, and preventions.²

Jumping ahead to 1950 we find criminologists Sheldon (1896-1980) and Eleanor (1898-1972) Glueck presenting tables of quantified social factors, percentage correlations and, thence, a very different method of scoring risk:

The resulting prediction table differentiates very sharply the likelihood of potential delinquency between those scoring under 250 and those scoring 250

¹ William Healy, 'The Problem of Causation of Criminality', *Journal for the American Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology*, Vol. 2 (6) (1912): 854.

² William Healy, *The Individual Delinquent: A Text-Book of Diagnosis and Prognosis for All Concerned in Understanding Offenders* (Little, Brown And Company: Boston, MA: 1915): 115.

and above. Those with a score under 250 have only sixteen chances out of a hundred (one and a half chances in ten) of becoming delinquent, while those scoring 250 and over have 79.1 chances in a hundred (eight in ten) of becoming delinquent.³

In charting the rise of one and then the other model of crime prediction many differences can be noted: the aforementioned shift from expertise to instruments; from individual specificity to regularities in a population; from chains of causation to causally agnostic correlates and later 'risk factors'; from 'common-sense' investigation and inference to routinised scoring. Both models, however, served the common purpose of organising suspicion. Any given offender prompted various claims of potential or peril, from the judge, family, and other associates, increasingly joined in the twentieth century by probation officers, police, teachers, charities, and other welfare agents. Underlying the above methods of crime prediction were reports, records, observations, and other information shared by or extracted from any number of these groups. These became the facts arranged and prioritised by the diagnostician, or the 'data' correlated and tabulated to provide apparently incontrovertible scores. Both sought to negotiate and contain various claims so that a coherent, authoritative, final decision could be reached on the case's future. My thesis, then, considers experts and instruments as they related to, drew on, validated, and were, in turn, modified by widespread anxiety surrounding the child's criminal potential.

Beginning in the 1900s, Chapter 1 will focus on the professional ambitions and interdisciplinary disputes of the newly formed American Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology. Responding to new probationary and indeterminate sentencing powers in criminal justice and corrections, these criminologists both promoted and contested the identification of criminal propensities, through the anthropometric measurement of criminal bodies and intelligence testing of 'defective' offenders. With the failure of these methods to isolate the criminal 'type', Chapter 2 explores the psychiatric, prognostic expertise of William Healy and Augusta Fox Bronner (1881-1966), working together in the juvenile courts of Chicago and then Boston in the 1910s and 1920s. Drawing on diverse official and community

³ Sheldon and Eleanor Glueck, *Unraveling* [sic] *Juvenile Delinquency* (Commonwealth Fund: New York, NY: 1950): 261.

informants, as well as the delinquent's 'own story', Healy and Bronner attempted to synthesise diverse antecedents into biographical narratives which explained wrongdoing and indicated future behavioural trajectories. However, psychiatric expertise remained open to competing assessments of the child's future and, in Chapter 3, I will introduce the statistical critique levelled at Healy and Bronner by Sheldon and Eleanor Glueck. Working with the Harvard Crime Survey from 1926-1934, the Gluecks produced figures of clinical failure and ongoing recidivism. Moreover, having come to doubt expert judgement, they subsequently sought to augment human assessments with statistical probabilities through their 'predictive instruments'. From here, Chapters 4-6 follow the inception, construction and reception of the Gluecks' prediction tables. Centring on their 1950 *Unraveling Juvenile Delinquency*, I move from the planning of this study and its negotiation of so-called 'delinquency areas' (Chapter 4) to the process of factorisation, codification, and computation which turned delinquents into data and produced 'objective' prediction tables (Chapter 5). Finally, I trace the postwar reception and implementation of these tables in various settings along with their accommodation and validation of various priorities and prejudices (Chapter 6).

Throughout these chapters I draw on a range of diverse historiographic and scholarly perspectives which have, however, remained somewhat disparate in their treatment of criminology and its history. Moreover, there has been remarkably little attempt to trace and synthesise the history of crime prediction specifically. Those few legal and criminological scholars who have worked to historicise contemporary crime prediction have, meanwhile neglected to integrate past methods and tools with broader social and institutional contexts which fostered this predictive service. By connecting past criminological researchers to wider networks of welfare, education, criminal justice, and others responsible for youth, this thesis reveals how widespread anxieties, suspicions, and prejudices in these sites informed the creation and use of psychiatric prognoses and probabilistic predictions in a shared project of pre-emptive surveillance. It also establishes the role of crime predictions in organising these perspectives and priorities to justify action and purportedly manage uncertain futures. Before continuing I will survey the varied scholarly perspectives which can clarify this approach to the history of crime prediction. Beginning with the Foucauldian construction of 'the criminal' through knowledge and power, I turn from histories of criminal classification and eugenics to

the contributions of surveillance studies on the significance of risk and information in policing more amorphous threats of future crime. I then examine how this threat has been discussed in histories of childhood and juvenile delinquency, wherein youth have alternately prompted both optimism and pessimism. Finally, I look to Science and Technology Studies along with the history of 'data', as perspectives through which to understand the organisation of actors and information in response to uncertain criminal futures.

The Criminal Type: Power and Construction

Michel Foucault's *Discipline and Punish* has become a paradigmatic text for most historians of criminology and delinquency. Even if the neatness of Foucault's historical narrative may be scrutinised, few in the history of criminology would wholly dismiss the utility of his approach to knowledge of and power over criminal and deviant subjects. Foucault posited a historical process by which early modern spectacular punishment and public torture were replaced with more discrete forms of discipline which established and enforced normative behaviour, exemplified by the prison regimen. This notion of discipline is joined by an understanding of criminology's role in discursively constructing a distinct criminal population imbued with undesirable traits and features. What a criminologist might view as a positivist project of understanding criminals and delinquents becomes, through a Foucauldian lens, a history of knowledge as power over the individual. In Foucault's words:

it is these shadows lurking behind the case itself that are judged and punished... They are judged by the interplay of all those notions that have circulated between medicine and jurisprudence since the nineteenth century... and which, behind the pretext of explaining an action, are ways of defining an individual.⁴

Modern criminal justice turns from the judgement of offences to the judgement of individuals, for which scientific and medical knowledge and expertise is constructed to classify people and their propensities. Prevention, correction, and humane 'treatment' are meanwhile reconceived by historians as part of a shifting balance of institutional and expert power.

⁴ Michel Foucault (trans. Alan Sheridan), *Discipline and Punish. The Birth of the Prison* (Penguin: London: 1991 [1977]): 17-18.

Iterations on this perspective can be found in Ian Hacking's discussion of 'making up people' in the human sciences. Hacking connects this 'making up' more specifically to quantitative, bureaucratic and institutional practices whereby experts generate knowledge to classify kinds of people. Here, however, Foucauldian perspectives on expert power are complicated by reflexivity revealed in 'how [classifications] affect the people classified, and how the effects on people in turn change the classifications'. The scientific search for 'definite classes defined by definite properties' is characterised instead by 'moving targets' resulting from the 'looping effect'.⁵ While elaborating on processes of classification and construction, Hacking can thus also provide welcome scope to consider the role of classified individuals in developing, modifying or challenging the kinds with which they are labelled, diagnosed and so on. Nevertheless, emphasis is placed not on the discovery of underlying types, but rather their construction through interactions between expert and subject.

The historiographic influence of such perspectives of knowledge, power and classification on histories of criminology can be readily discerned in the titles of such works where criminals are 'created', 'defined' and 'invented'.⁶ Most frequently these works focus on the insidious development of criminal typologies, in particular the broad notion of the 'born criminal' attributed to Cesare Lombroso (1835-1909), oft-purported 'father' of criminology. In his 1876 *L'Uomo Delinquente* (Criminal Man) Lombroso claimed to have found physical regularities across hundreds of prisoners, resulting in a taxonomy of murderers, thieves, rapists, and others based on 'jug ears' 'sloped foreheads', 'thick hair' and other craniometric or physiognomic features.⁷ These were apparently 'atavistic' criminals, evolutionary throwbacks who 'resemble savage and colored races' and were thus doomed to commit crime, in turn justifying their incarceration for the sake of 'social defence'.⁸ Through five editions from 1876-1897, Lombroso developed a broad typology from what was eventually termed the 'born

⁵ Ian Hacking, 'Making Up People: Clinical Classifications', *London Review of Books*, Vol 28 (16), 17th August 2006, <https://www.lrb.co.uk/the-paper/v28/n16/ian-hacking/making-up-people> (Accessed 27th September 2023).

⁶ Nicole Hahn Rafter, *Creating Born Criminals* (University of Illinois Press: Chicago, IL: 1997); Richard F. Wetzell, *Inventing the Criminal. A History of German Criminology, 1880-1945* (University of North Carolina Press: Chapel Hill, NC: 2000); Michael A. Rembis, *Defining Deviance. Sex, Science and Delinquent Girls, 1890-1960* (University of Illinois Press: Chicago, IL: 2011).

⁷ Cesare Lombroso (trans. Mary Gibson and Nicole Hahn-Rafter), *Criminal Man* (Duke University Press: Durham, NC: 2006 [1876-1897]): 50-57.

⁸ Ibid. 91-93.

criminal'. Working with collaborators Enrico Ferri, Raffaele Garofalo and others, Lombroso's *Criminal Man* would form the core of the 'Italian School' of what was variously called 'positivist criminology' or 'criminal anthropology'; empirical, deterministic, and convinced of their ability to classify criminal types.⁹ Scholars have understandably turned here to trace the roots of biological criminology and 'the history of our turning to the criminal body'.¹⁰ Moreover, the born criminal provides for historians a clear case of classification and control, exemplified in what David Horn calls the positivist 'hope and expectation that virtually any body part (or physiological response, or gesture, or utterance) could serve to differentiate individuals and to help estimate social risks'.¹¹

Tying into contemporary fears of physical, social and moral 'degeneration' and the corresponding imperative to preserve racial integrity and 'fitness', histories of the 'born criminal' also dovetail with the broader history of eugenics, wherein physical and mental disability or abnormality were targeted by hereditarian explanations of presumed social ills.¹² In *Creating Born Criminals* Nicole Hahn Rafter thus pointed to the period of 1875-1925 (incorporating both Italian criminal anthropology and the American eugenics movement) as the high watermark of 'eugenic criminology'. Like others drawing on Foucault, Hahn Rafter described 'how eugenic criminology represented criminal bodies and discursively brought them into being', in the process 'encoding' them with 'new signs of evil', namely the presumption of hereditary 'taint'.¹³ Subsequent historians further elaborated on the intersection of eugenics and criminology in particular institutional settings, where criminological classifications based on intelligence testing and medical diagnoses can be seen as a process of scientific othering along lines of class, race and gender. Michael Rembis has thus examined how young delinquent girls at the Geneva State Training School in Illinois were

⁹ Mary Gibson, *Born to Crime: Cesare Lombroso and the Origins of Biological Criminology* (Praeger: Westport, CT: 2002): 9-52.

¹⁰ Ibid. 2-8; David G. Horn, *The Criminal Body: Lombroso and the Anatomy of Deviance* (Routledge: New York, NY: 2003): 1.

¹¹ Ibid. 24-25.

¹² Stephen Jay Gould, *The Mismeasure of Man* (W.W. Norton & Co.: New York, NY: 1996 [Revised Edition]): 142-175; Daniel J. Kevles, *In the Name of Eugenics: Genetics and the Uses of Human Heredity* (University of California Press: Berkeley, CA: 1985): 42-112; Daniel Pick, *Faces of Degeneration: A European Disorder, c. 1848-1918* (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge: 1989): 109-154.

¹³ Hahn Rafter, *Creating Born Criminals*: 9.

examined and often permanently incarcerated on the grounds of eugenic fitness and their presumed irresponsibility. Of particular importance for Rembis are 'gender, generational, and class dynamics, which relied largely upon heteronormative notions of proper sexual activity, as they played themselves out not only in the creation of a scientific taxonomy of deviance, but also in the contestation that arose within and around the classificatory process'.¹⁴ Meanwhile, Miroslava Chávez-García has examined the racial othering of Mexican-American Youth through early-twentieth-century psychometric testing at Whittier State School for Boys, the Preston School of Industry and the Ventura School for Girls, all based in California. Again, this is an examination of how 'theories of delinquency, intelligence and heredity in the emerging fields of psychology, education, eugenics and criminology had criminalised, racialised, and pathologised incarcerated youths of colour, rendering them "defective delinquents"'.¹⁵

Whether called 'born criminals' 'defective delinquents', 'moral defectives', 'incorrigibles' or any other such term, criminology has, for these historians been defined by the search for a criminal 'type', frequently motivated by fear and prejudice. This is an important perspective which rightly highlights the role of criminological classification and expertise in targeting and typing marginalised individuals for confinement. However, the limitations of such an approach should be recognised for a broader history of suspicion and crime prediction. First and foremost, historians have questioned the lasting influence of biological and eugenic models, particularly the Italian School. On one hand, the purported significance of the Lombrosian born criminal may be complicated by earlier interests in physiognomy and phrenology whereby potential criminality was already popularly perceived in physical appearances, an approach which directly informed the Italian School.¹⁶ On the other hand, historians have pointed to the continual modification Lombroso's *Criminal Man* in response to criticism resulting in 'a heterogenous text , full of contradictions, inconsistencies and errors' in which the born criminal was increasingly obscured amongst myriad classifications.¹⁷ Moreover, the

¹⁴ Rembis, *Defining Deviance*: 6.

¹⁵ Miroslava Chávez-García, *States of Delinquency. Race, Science and the Making of California's Juvenile Justice System* (Berkeley, CA, 2012): 3-4.

¹⁶ Courtney E. Thompson, *An Organ of Murder: Crime Violence and Phrenology in Nineteenth Century America* (Rutgers University Press: New Brunswick, NJ: 2021): 132-155.

¹⁷ Horn, *The Criminal Body*: 5; Gibson, *Born to Crime*: 39-45.

international reception and uptake of Lombroso's theories and methods was evidently uneven and contested by established disciplines with their own varied claims to understand crime.¹⁸ Hahn Rafter also charted the decline of eugenic criminology and corresponding rise of dynamic theories of psychopathology by the interwar period. Thus, 'the sequence – from criminal anthropology through feeble-mindedness theory to psychopathy – was one in which the somatic territory of the born-criminal idea steadily shrank'.¹⁹

Aside from the historical status of particular theories, emphasis on the born criminal also encourages a view of criminology's history that is typologically and often institutionally bounded. Turning to the prediction of criminal behaviour we find a history characterised not by stable typologies but rather by the shifting boundaries of suspicion and risk. In fact, David Horn has interpreted the failure of criminal anthropology in just these terms. The lasting rationale of social defence against risk instead rests on 'a generalised suspicion, a construction of the social that has been linked, paradoxically, to the *inability* of criminal anthropology to isolate the criminal type'.²⁰ Hacking similarly commented on Lombroso's inconsistency with probabilistic and indeterminate understandings of the criminal: 'the criminal man, the atavistic throwback, had been completely discontinuous with normal people' whereas 'to abolish him was to [...] make crime a mere deviation from normality'.²¹ Knowledge and power over the criminal do not rest solely on the construction of distinct classifications, and types are, rather, extended by anxiety surrounding potential criminality immanent in an amorphous population. At the same time this requires that historians look beyond the segregated institutional populations and experts that have typically populated histories of criminology. While bearing in mind the threat of incarceration and its importance in demarcating a criminal or deviant population this thesis will also incorporate the pluralistic perspectives and suspicions of practitioners, officials and communities in constructing and negotiating potential criminality.

¹⁸ Peter Becker and Richard F. Wetzell (eds.), *Criminals and Their Scientists: The History of Criminology in International Perspective* (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge: 2006); Wetzell, *Inventing the Criminal*: 39-72.

¹⁹ Hahn Rafter, *Creating Born Criminals*: 167-168.

²⁰ Horn, *The Criminal Body*: 139.

²¹ Ian Hacking, *The Taming of Chance* (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge: 1990): 175.

The Future Criminal: Surveillance and Uncertainty

In contrast to the deterministic typologies traced by historians of criminology, modern criminal justice, policing, and crime prevention are pervaded by the language of risk, a development which has received comparatively little historical scrutiny. Assessments and tools have accordingly proliferated to anticipate and intercept future crime across individuals and locations. In the United States parole decisions were, by the end of the twentieth century, informed by a host of evaluations to discern potential danger to the public while, more recently, pre-trial risk assessment tools have promised to augment bail and sentencing decisions in line with criminal potential, even before guilt has been established.²² In turn these risk assessments draw on decades of criminological research into ‘risk factors’ claimed to be predictive of crime, including prior criminal history and antisocial behaviour, substance abuse, socioeconomic background, gender, age, and race.²³ Moreover, sentencing on the basis of apparent criminal potentialities is joined by predictive policing technologies, both increasingly utilising machine learning to generate predictions based on vast and continually accruing training data on crimes, arrests, and convictions in relation to myriad circumstantial factors.²⁴ Predictive assessments, algorithms and other software are commonly proposed and marketed on the grounds that they will increase transparency, impartiality, and objectivity. They have, understandably, also prompted serious concerns that they will entrench existing disparities in justice through direct (likely unconstitutional) discrimination on the grounds of socioeconomic, racial, and other background characteristics, or else the indirect targeting of these through ‘proxy’ factors.²⁵

²² Richard G. Kopf, ‘Federal Supervised Release and Actuarial Data (including Age, Race and Gender): The Camel’s Nose and the Use of Actuarial Data at Sentencing’, *Federal Sentencing Reporter*, Vol. 27 (4) (2015): 207-215; Anne Milgram, Alexander M. Holsinger, Marie Vannostrand and Matthew W. Alsdorf, ‘Pretrial Risk Assessment: Improving Public Safety and Fairness in Pretrial Decision Making’, *Federal Sentencing Reporter*, Vol. 27 (4) (2015): 216-221; ‘Where Are Risk Assessments Being Used?’, <https://pretrialrisk.com/national-landscape/where-are-prai-being-used/> (Accessed 27thth September 2023).

²³ Kopf, ‘Federal Supervised Release and Actuarial Data’: 207.

²⁴ Richard Berk and Jordan Hyatt, ‘Machine Learning Forecasts of Risk to Inform Sentencing Decisions’, *Federal Sentencing Reporter*, Vol. 27 (4) (2015): 222-228; Walter L. Perry, Brian McInnis, Carter C. Price, Susan C. Smith and John S. Hollywood, *Predictive Policing: The Role of Crime Forecasting in Law Enforcement Operations* (RAND Corporation: Santa Monica, CA: 2013).

²⁵ Sonja B. Starr, ‘The New Profiling: Why Punishing Based on Poverty and Identity is Unconstitutional and Wrong’, *Federal Sentencing Reporter*, Vol. 27 (4) (2015): 229-236; Bernard E. Harcourt, ‘Risk as a Proxy for Race: The Dangers of Risk Assessment’, *Federal Sentencing Reporter*, Vol. 27 (4) (2015): 237-243.

In a 2014 speech, then US Attorney General Eric Holder, praised ‘targeted data-driven reforms’ and the ‘smart’ allocation of resources through police and parole prediction while simultaneously warning of the ‘unintended consequences’ of ‘aggregate data analysis’, especially in the pre-trial context: ‘criminal sentences must be based on the facts, the law, the actual crimes committed, the circumstances surrounding each individual case, and the defendant’s history of criminal conduct. They should *not* be based on unchangeable factors that a person cannot control, or on the possibility of a future crime that has not taken place’.²⁶ Concerns for due process in light of data-driven risk assessment are, however, only one more recent aspect of this debate. Before the uptake of new predictive software and analytics, scholars were already critiquing a long-established shift towards risk and risk assessment.

Reflecting on criminological risk factor research, Stephen Case and Kevin Haines have pointed to the ‘unresolved paradoxes’ of the field. In particular they note the simplistic reduction of life experiences through factorisation and aggregation with a corresponding loss of both specificity and individual explanatory power in favour of supposedly ‘clear cut’ findings and recommendations.²⁷ Earlier, in his 2007 *Against Prediction*, Bernard Harcourt criticised past and present actuarial methods in law enforcement and criminal justice with three separate arguments: Firstly, Harcourt argues, the purported efficiency of predictive profiling is illusory and may undermine goals of crime reduction when ‘low-risk’ groups respond to decreased scrutiny and uneven deterrence.²⁸ Secondly, by consistently targeting characteristics deemed ‘high-risk’, prediction results in a ‘ratchet effect’ whereby marginalised groups are increasingly and disproportionately represented in the incarcerated population, with enormous, uncounted social costs for these communities. In this way, inequalities and criminalistic stereotypes are entrenched and if disproportionate arrests and convictions become data for

²⁶ Eric Holder, ‘Speech Presented a [sic] the National Association of Criminal Defence Lawyers 57th Annual Meeting and 13th State Criminal Justice Network Conference, Philadelphia, PA’, *Federal Sentencing Reporter*, Vol. 27 (4) (2015): 254.

²⁷ Stephen Case and Kevin Haines, *Understanding Youth Offending: Risk Factor Research, Policy and Practice* (Routledge: Abingdon: 2012 [2009]): 12-51.

²⁸ Bernard E. Harcourt, *Against Prediction: Profiling, Policing and Punishing in an Actuarial Age* (University of Chicago Press: Chicago, IL: 2007): 111-144.

subsequent actuarial tools their predictions will become self-fulfilling.²⁹ Thirdly, Harcourt points to the insidious bias of prediction upon notions of just punishment as new research and tools make legal officials ‘slaves of probability’.³⁰ ‘These technological advancements are, in effect, exogenous shocks to our legal system, and this raises very troubling questions about what theory of just punishment we would independently embrace and how it is exactly, that we have allowed technical knowledge, somewhat arbitrarily, to dictate the path of justice’.³¹

Criticisms of the consequences of actuarial tools for justice and society are compelling and Harcourt is certainly aware of the history behind such tools, however we can also question their presentation as ‘exogenous’ technical innovations. In fact, other strands of criticism increasingly point to the longer and broader socio-historical roots of prediction in older suspicions and prejudices. Avoiding technological determinism, Ruha Benjamin thus points to ‘discriminatory design’, emerging from the coproduction of technoscience and society.³² Andrea Miller’s examination of predictive policing software trialled and deployed in Atlanta’s historically black, economically marginalised ‘problem neighbourhoods’ similarly demonstrates how ‘digital technologies used to police and produce space emerge through historical confluences of place, racialised threat and the weaponisation of the built environment’.³³ Meanwhile, R. Joshua Scannell notes the unsettling implications of risk but also the telling expression of these fears in terms of technological, science fiction dystopias rather than past parallels:

For people of color, for women, for queer people, the state presumption of abjection has never been science fictional. Neither Jim Crow nor Zero Tolerance required the deployment of massive computational power. Bodies themselves did that work. It is the structure of American racial antagonisms rather than the advent of new technology that underwrites the biopolitics of actually existing America.³⁴

²⁹ Ibid. 145-171.

³⁰ Ibid. 189.

³¹ Ibid. 3.

³² Ruha Benjamin, ‘Introduction: Discriminatory Design, Liberating Imagination’, in Benjamin (eds.), *Captivating Technology: Race, Carceral Technoscience and Liberatory Imagination in Everyday Life* (Duke University Press: Durham, NC: 2019): 1-22.

³³ Andrea Miller, ‘Shadows of War, Traces of Policing: The Weaponization of Space and the Sensible in Preemption’, in Ibid. 98.

³⁴ R. Joshua Scannell, ‘This is Not Minority Report: Predictive Policing and Population Racism’, in Ibid. 120.

Technologies of prediction are thus reconceived as continuous with, rather than dislocated from, histories of discriminatory practices of exclusion. Indeed, the continuing adoption of risk assessment and predictive policing tools despite legal protest is suggestive of prediction's deeper roots in America's legal, social and cultural history. Rebecca Lemov has also pointed to fruitful work to be done on a 'history of PreCrime' (Invoking the science fiction dystopia of Philip K. Dick) while remarking that 'tools themselves cannot tell the story, tempting as it might be to turn to such a punctuated legacy of instrument-based determinism'.³⁵ Rather we must turn to the contingent, contextual anxieties and suspicions which seemed to necessitate, and were in turn reinforced by, new methods of crime prediction. Historical treatment of crime prediction, beyond the above, however, has been somewhat sparse. Charting the historical development of criminological risk factor research and actuarial tools has, thus far, largely fallen to researchers in law and criminology.³⁶ Amongst the most comprehensive and valuable of these is Harcourt's survey of actuarial parole prediction covering the interwar work of Chicago sociologists as well as the Gluecks to streamline predictive factors and scoring systems before turning to the proliferation of State and Federal tools in the later twentieth Century.³⁷ Here Harcourt describes a 'theory-practice divide' in which prolific research in the 1930s and 1940s is later followed by the official implementation of parole prediction, largely from the 1970s onward.³⁸ however, as will be seen, this circumscribed perspective of formal parole practice does not capture earlier predictive work variously based on discretion, clinical expertise and practical experimentation with prediction tables in courts, schools and other settings.

In embarking on a broader history of crime prediction this thesis draws on work already mentioned examining criminology's past classification of 'types' and 'defectives', reflecting contemporary classist, racist and gendered prejudices. Such classification and profiling is a continuous feature of predictive work, however, beyond discrete typologies we must further

³⁵ Rebecca Lemov, 'An Episode in the History of PreCrime', *Historical Studies in the Natural Sciences*, Vol. 48 (5) (2018): 639.

³⁶ Case and Haines, *Understanding Youth Offending*: 52-103.

³⁷ Harcourt, *Against Prediction*: 39-110.

³⁸ Ibid: 69.

incorporate perspectives on the specific importance of risk and uncertainty. Histories of statistical probability along with perspectives from surveillance studies can help in setting out the distinctive relationship of risk to the normal, to fear, to information, and to widening surveillance networks which I will now consider in turn. Hacking's *The Taming of Chance* provides a clear starting point in understanding what he termed a seeming paradox: 'the more indeterminism, the more the control'.³⁹ The growing bureaucratisation and quantification of society in the 18th and 19th centuries revealed regularities which, although probabilistic, seemed to suggest statistical 'laws' of society, sickness, behaviour and human nature. The enumeration of a 'crime rate' for instance fatalistically implied that a certain number of undetermined individuals within the population were bound to offend. As Belgian Statistician Adolphe Quetelet (1796-1874) thus remarked in 1832: 'Society prepares the crimes and the guilty person is only the instrument'.⁴⁰ In turn, statistical laws promised an opening for continual measurement and tuning by the state.⁴¹ For Hacking it is the concept of the 'normal' which, by the late nineteenth century, accounts for regularities and deviations, imbuing statistical probability with epistemological but also moral and political force:

The normal stands indifferently for what is typical, the unenthusiastic objective average, but it also stands for what has been, good health, and what shall be, our chosen destiny. That is why the benign and sterile-sounding word 'normal' has become one of the most powerful ideological tools of the twentieth century.⁴²

In turn the regulation or reaching of normal states, continuous with rather than distinct from the pathological and abnormal, seems to necessitate continual monitoring and modification. Writing on the rise of 'surveillance medicine' in the twentieth century, David Armstrong thus describes how the 'exile and enclosure' of the hospital has been succeeded by widening risk, defining 'a world in which everything is normal and at the same time precariously abnormal, and in which a future that can be transformed remains a constant possibility'.⁴³ Others writing on health and insurance industries also describe how risk and fear lead to increased management which, in turn, reveals new risks. Writing on the history of American life

³⁹ Hacking, *The Taming of Chance*: 2.

⁴⁰ Adolphe Quetelet, Quoted in Ibid. 116.

⁴¹ Ibid. 115-124.

⁴² Ibid. 169.

⁴³ David Armstrong, 'The Rise of Surveillance Medicine', *Sociology of Health and Illness*, Vol. 17 (3) (1995): 400.

insurance, Dan Bouk ties risk to processes of ‘financialization’. Anxiety surrounding the productive potential of life and death served the interests of insurance companies where, ‘in the bargain for economic security, insurance applicants allowed themselves to be made into commodified risks’.⁴⁴ Meanwhile, Robert Aronowitz, in his discussion of ‘risky medicine’ points to ‘autocatalytic cycles of risk production and reduction’ as the increased visibility and anxiety of potential ill health leads uncertain patients to seek assurance in pre-emptive interventions which in turn produce more anxiety.⁴⁵ In this thesis, expert and instrumental crime prediction will similarly be seen drawing upon and, in turn, fostering extant fears of potential criminality.

Literature in the field of surveillance studies has frequently tied new practices and technologies of policing and oversight to this association between risk and fear. In *Policing the Risk Society* Richard Ericson and Kevin Haggerty thus reconceived police functions through a model of ‘risk communications’. ‘Collective fear and foreboding underpin the value system of an unsafe society, perpetuate insecurity, and feed incessant demands for more knowledge of risk’ which is ‘always somewhere on the continuum of imprecise normality’.⁴⁶ This, Ericson and Haggerty argued, saw the police become ‘knowledge workers’ under pressure from other society-wide agencies and institutions to provide information on potential threats. The search for more perfect knowledge of risk, meanwhile, contributes to the proliferation of technologies, profiles and systems of classification as well as friction between them: ‘the meaning of risk varies with the communication system used by the institutions responsible for managing it, and the police are therefore in a complex ambiguous, shifting, and contradictory field of risk management in relation to other institutions’.⁴⁷ This perspective draws out two associated consequences of risk management: The desire for information and the widening scope of surveillance across society. Beginning with the first of these we may recall the ‘avalanche of printed numbers’ described by Hacking, which facilitated and then grew from

⁴⁴ Dan Bouk, *How Our Days Became Numbered: Risk and the Rise of the Statistical Individual* (University of Chicago Press: Chicago, IL: 2015): xxii.

⁴⁵ Robert Aronowitz, *Risky Medicine: Our Quest to Cure Fear and Uncertainty* (University of Chicago Press: Chicago, IL: 2015): 45-65.

⁴⁶ Richard V. Ericson and Kevin Haggerty, *Policing the Risk Society* (University of Toronto Press: Toronto: 1997): 6.

⁴⁷ Ibid. 4.

the discovery of statistical regularities and norms for management by bureaucracies.⁴⁸ Turning to the context of crime and security, meanwhile, an ‘avalanche’ of information is generated in the ambiguous search for potential wrongdoing which seems to require ‘perfect’ oversight.

On one hand, massed information, augmented by computer software and analysis, promises to reveal connections and possibilities, while, on the other hand, there is persistent anxiety surrounding the potential significance of information not gathered. Jennifer Gradecki, in her discussion of modern intelligence agencies, thus points to a mindset which regards all data as necessary pieces of a ‘mosaic’ which may eventually present a person of interest. Thus, the mass collection of data, incarceration of potential informants and analysis of old networks are all ‘underpinned by the logic of the mosaic metaphor... the belief that if agencies can collect enough information they can piece together a complete picture or superimpose that image to predict the future’.⁴⁹ Returning to predictive policing tools, similar concerns can be seen in Scannell’s analysis of ‘HunchLab’ software which assembles crime reports but also myriad seasonal, commercial and geographic data to map ‘predictive missions’ for patrol officers. Scannell thus points to the transformation of policed communities into ‘a field of criminogenic data’, accumulated through patrol and other interactions as ‘raw material for a seemingly limitless expansion of the carceral state’s datalogical paranoia’.⁵⁰

In turn, the search for more comprehensive information entails widening surveillance as new actors become responsible for generating and communicating knowledge of risk in pluralistic networks. Ericson and Haggerty, drawing on the work of Giles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, saw in this process ‘a convergence of what were once discrete surveillance systems to the point that we can now speak of an emerging “surveillant assemblage”’.⁵¹ This assemblage does not, however, imply a coherent programme of pervasive state oversight. Rather, others in

⁴⁸ Hacking, *The Taming of Chance*: 2.

⁴⁹ Jennifer Gradecki, *Operation Mosaic: The Impact of Visual and Linguistic Representation on Intelligence Practices* (Doctoral Dissertation: University of Buffalo Institutional Repository: 2019), <https://ubir.buffalo.edu/xmlui/handle/10477/79818> (Accessed 27th September 2023): 72.

⁵⁰ Scannell, ‘This is Not Minority Report’: 122.

⁵¹ Richard V. Ericson and Kevin Haggerty, ‘The Surveillant Assemblage’, *British Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 51 (4) (2000): 606.

surveillance studies have developed this model to explore how various state and private interests, as well as private citizens, may conduct surveillance for varied ends. This can include the 'social sorting' of individuals as potential criminals, customers, voters, workers and so on as well as the incorporation of surveillance and 'securitization' into mundane, 'everyday' objects and technologies.⁵² This does not diminish the potential for insidious and discriminatory surveillance, in fact these practices have both inclusionary and exclusionary motives. Rather this perspective of the surveillant assemblage reminds us that wide-ranging, pluralistic surveillance will also be characterised by friction, miscommunication and varying priorities.

Joined with histories of criminology, explorations of risk and perspectives from surveillance studies will be extremely valuable for this thesis' understanding of crime prediction. Rather than stable typologies, uncertainty surrounding individual futures and the ambiguities of 'the normal' have encouraged continual oversight and management. In turn, this drives the collection of information for pre-emption and widening participation in surveillance for this purpose. However, we should not assume that specific states, actors or technologies exert monolithic control over these networks, let alone the suspects they purport to monitor. Rather I will account for varied anxieties and then explain their contingent convergence around specific methods and expectations of crime prediction. In the case of this thesis, these anxieties have, more specifically, centred on the ambiguous potentialities of youth.

The Criminal Child: Optimism and Pessimism

Surveillance stretches out, albeit inconsistently, over a vast range of sites and targets. In order to delimit this scope for historical study I will focus on juvenile delinquency and the anticipation of criminality in youth. Childhood, in its relationship to future development, has been the subject of some of the most heightened anxiety for predictive monitoring and

⁵² David Lyon, 'Surveillance as Social Sorting: Computer Codes and Mobile Bodies', in Lyon (ed.), *Surveillance as Social Sorting: Privacy, Risk, and Digital Discrimination* (Routledge: Abingdon: 2003): 13-30; David Lyon, *Surveillance Studies: An Overview* (Polity Press: Cambridge: 2007): 1-7, 94-117; Katja Franko Aas, Helene Oppen Gundhus and Heidi Mork Lomell (eds.), *Technologies of InSecurity: The Surveillance of Everyday Life* (Routledge: Abingdon: 2009).

management in the twentieth century. Here the same tensions of normality and risk have led to both hope, in childhood purity or malleability, and fear, of childhood vulnerability, impulsivity and independence. The surveillance of juvenile delinquency and prediction of future criminality was underlain by shifting boundaries of optimism and pessimism for the child's future. Sally Shuttleworth has described the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century convergence of historical sciences, evolutionary theory, psychology and literature wherein 'childhood became the key to understanding the adult form, a crucial time which laid the foundations for the future'.⁵³ The romantic 'cult' of childhood purity was followed by concerns to control, protect, and prepare youth through new fields of pedagogy and child psychiatry supported by new sciences of child development, with competing recommendations to avert precocity, trauma or insanity.⁵⁴ As Shuttleworth argues, these discourses tell us more about adult priorities and anxieties than they do about actual children. Indeed, she notes the paradoxical 'disappearance' of childhood as an entity in its own right: 'Whether following the traces of parental influence or the unfolding of humanity's evolutionary history, psychologists were looking at childhood as a map to another alternative domain'.⁵⁵ In the prediction of delinquency, the study and surveillance of childhood similarly provides a reflection of the myriad expectations of judges, psychiatrists, teachers, parents and others.

In the nineteenth century, the adult expectation that criminality would follow poor upbringing was firmly established, albeit informal and unsystematic. American case law invoked these expectations to justify the state control and confinement of juveniles in lieu of their natural parents, ostensibly based on the medieval principle of *parens patriae* (parent of the nation). Later juvenile justice thus traced its legal legitimacy to the 1839 case of *Ex parte Crouse*. Mary Ann Crouse, on the complaint of her mother, had been committed to the Philadelphia House of Refuge in response to which her father filed a writ of *Habeus Corpus* against this unlawful imprisonment. The judge, however, upheld the commitment. The House of Refuge was 'not a prison but a school' whereby the state could supersede parents as *parens patriae* or 'common guardian of the community'. This was, moreover, justified by a prediction of future immorality:

⁵³ Sally Shuttleworth, *The Mind of the Child: Child Development in Literature, Science, and Medicine, 1840-1900* (Oxford University Press: Oxford: 2010): 2.

⁵⁴ Ibid. 1-12, 15-41, 131-150, 221-232.

⁵⁵ Ibid. 355.

‘the infant has been snatched from a course which must have ended in confirmed depravity and not only is the restraint of her person lawful, but it would be an act of extreme cruelty to release her from it’.⁵⁶

The Crouse precedent would be briefly challenged but ultimately upheld by the end of the nineteenth century.⁵⁷ As Stephen Schlossman argued, however, such judgements ‘simply gave legal expression to these conventional beliefs’ in the state’s right to intervene in cases of immoral or potentially harmful parenting and childhood. Above all this suggests ‘the necessity of understanding the law of juvenile justice more in terms of conscious social policy than obscure legal precedents’.⁵⁸ The central, continuous theme of Schlossman’s history of American juvenile justice is the widespread, ‘beguiling rationale that personal intervention and “love” were correctional panaceas and adequate responses to social ills’.⁵⁹ If *Ex parte Crouse* reflected wider fears of continued moral degradation, it also accorded with the promise that harmful parents could be replaced and that children, educated and cared for in controlled settings, would naturally mend their ways. Correction took place in reform ‘schools’, later reorganised as ‘families’, arranged on open plans of rural cottage life which would bring out children’s natural affection.⁶⁰ From the 1890s juvenile courts similarly looked to the judge as a wise, sympathetic father who would informally, albeit arbitrarily, guide delinquents and proscribe remedies separate from the ordinary procedures of criminal law, acting as ‘a benevolent judicial despot’.⁶¹ Writing in 1977, Schlossman emphasised ongoing continuity and the reiteration of common sentiments towards the improvable delinquent in his own day. However, the subsequent, decisive shift towards ‘get tough’ and ‘zero tolerance’ legislation in the 1980s and 1990s, with the resulting criminalisation and incarceration of swathes of marginalised, minority children, reminds us that juvenile justice remains

⁵⁶ *Ex parte Crouse*, 4 Whart. 9 (1839)

⁵⁷ *People ex rel. O’Connell v. Turner*, 55 Ill. 280 (1870); *In re Ferrier*, 103 Ill. 367 (1882)

⁵⁸ Stephen L. Schlossman, *Love and the American Delinquent: The Theory and Practice of ‘Progressive’ Juvenile Justice, 1825-1920* (University of Chicago Press: Chicago, IL: 1977): 17.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.* 189-190.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.* 33-54.

⁶¹ *Ibid.* 56.

contingent on adult perspectives. As Judith Sealander remarks of this trajectory, 'adult optimism created the juvenile court, adult fear changed it'.⁶²

In 1900 contemporary Americans (drawing on the phrase of Swedish reformer Ellen Key) looked forward to the new 'century of the child', in which child-rearing, health, and education would form the basis of progress.⁶³ This prompted regulation in parallel with aforementioned drives to gather information for classification and normalisation. Writing on the ultimate failure of this broad project, Sealander thus notes the transformation of the young into 'strings of measurable characteristics', 'points on a normal distribution, deviations from a population mean' for policy to fine-tune and improve, as well as the difficulty of quantifying childhood.⁶⁴ Amongst the themes Sealander notes across this history is the proliferation of expertise and divided bureaucracies.⁶⁵ This varied, uneven and frequently contested regulation of 'normal' childhood is mirrored in the history of psychiatry. In the mid-century residential treatment described by Deborah Doroshow, normality can be seen as both end and means of therapy within carefully constructed spaces built to mirror the middle-class home.⁶⁶ Outside of institutions, children and adults had earlier become targets of continuous 'readjustment' to societal expectations through the 'mental hygiene' movement, a professional expansion by which psychiatrists entered the wider community and, according to Gerald Grob, 'implicitly ignored or abandoned the institutionalized mentally ill'.⁶⁷ In parallel with compulsory education's drive to instil 'bonds of common understanding', 'appreciation of vocation' and other 'cardinal principles', school counsellors pursued mental hygiene and the 'exhilarating possibilities for a more effective, scientific, and socially progressive control of behaviour'.⁶⁸ Juvenile delinquents, meanwhile, became patients, referred to new child guidance clinics.

⁶² Judith Sealander, *The Failed Century of the Child: Governing America's Young in the Twentieth Century* (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge: 2003): 52.

⁶³ Ellen Key (trans. Frances Maro), *The Century of the Child* (G.P. Putnam's Sons: New York, NY: 1909).

⁶⁴ Judith Sealander, *The Failed Century of the Child*: 2.

⁶⁵ Ibid. 1-16.

⁶⁶ Deborah Blythe Doroshow, *Emotionally Disturbed: A History of Caring for America's Troubled Children* (Chicago University Press: Chicago, IL: 2019): 123-174.

⁶⁷ Gerald N. Grob, *Mental Illness and American Society, 1875-1940* (Princeton University Press: Princeton, NJ: 1983), p 166; Doroshow, *Emotionally Disturbed*: 9-34.

⁶⁸ Sol Cohen, 'The Mental Hygiene Movement, The Development of Personality and the Medicalization of American Education', *History of Education Quarterly*, Vol. 23 (2) (1983): 140; Sealander, *The Failed Century of the Child*: 187-221.

While the history of probabilistic prediction in criminology remains understudied, work on the child guidance movement provides this thesis with valuable insights into the interwar growth of psychiatric expertise and oversight over the potential delinquent, to be discussed further in Chapter 2. Margo Horn has discussed the Commonwealth Fund's Programme for the Prevention of Delinquency which, from 1922, established clinics in various American cities and formed the core of a new child guidance profession. Meanwhile, Kathleen Jones traces the history of the Judge Baker Foundation (JBF) in which William Healy and Augusta Fox Bronner, from 1917, provided the model for subsequent clinical practices. Both point to professionalisation and popularisation shaping the goals of child guidance. Beginning with the referral of juvenile court cases for therapeutic recommendations, Horn points to the professional imperative to show success by seeking more amenable target populations, increasingly treating non-criminal emotional and behavioural difficulties in children referred privately.⁶⁹ As she critically concludes:

The child guidance movement, shaped and constrained by professionalization, enhanced the status of mental health professionals, reinforced the middle-class family and conformity to middle-class standards of behaviour, and left out children in a great need of help.⁷⁰

Jones charts a similar trajectory in the JBF. She thus notes the popularisation of child guidance through advice literature on 'everyday' problems of childhood rebellion, temper, fears, fantasies or school and social failure. In this way 'the child guidance community set about popularizing the clinics and their professional staff by psychologizing all child-rearing issues, from toddler to adolescent and from minor transgression to major delinquency or unhappiness' wherein 'the troublesome child acquired an "everyday face"'.⁷¹

Mirroring the earlier discussion of risk and the gradation of normal into pathological, the association of 'ordinary' behaviour with incipient breakdown or criminality served surveillance and child guidance 'whose roles and services were in part justified by this broad

⁶⁹ Margo Horn, *Before It's Too Late: The Child Guidance Movement in the United States, 1922-1945* (Temple University Press: Philadelphia, PA: 1989): 1-50.

⁷⁰ Ibid. 186.

⁷¹ Kathleen Jones, *Taming the Troublesome Child: American Families, Child Guidance, and the Limits of Psychiatric Authority* (Harvard University Press: Cambridge, MA: 1999): 97, 91-119.

view of the at-risk child'.⁷² However, views of normal childhood broadly threatened by crime are complicated by, on one hand, varying judgements of different kinds of children and, on the other, ambiguities arising from definitions of 'normal behaviour'. These histories suggest that the turn to 'normal' childhood involves the exclusion of the 'abnormal'. The history of community child guidance for an increasingly middle-class clientele thus stands in contrast with aforementioned histories of incarceration and eugenic segregation of pathologised or 'defective' youth. Indeed, Chávez-García, in her discussion of Californian juvenile justice, notes the testing and classification which singled out 'normal' offenders for therapeutics and rehabilitation while disproportionately leaving youths of colour to be confined.⁷³ Juvenile courts, intended by middle-class reformers to meet the challenges of the modern city, meanwhile acted to 'correct', by persuasion or coercion, poor and foreign families. In Schlossman's words the court 'flunked parents, just as the public school flunked children' and 'in both instances the lower-class immigrant family was the principle victim'.⁷⁴ The 'treatment' of juvenile delinquents in line with expected norms of society, employment, behaviour and so on required modification or else exclusion of those who could not or would not accept these terms. Theo Di Castri considers problem behaviour theory (PBT), developed in the latter half of the twentieth century, in terms of settler-colonial assimilation. By emphasising 'social development' and a child's bonds to 'conventional society', such models link correction to conformity in the hopes of diverting youth from criminal justice to community programmes. Once again, however, problems are individualised while the terms of success are set by the norms of mainstream America:

For those youth who are in a position – materially, culturally or otherwise – to successfully assimilate themselves to the exigencies of neoliberal, settler colonial citizenship, these prevention programs have been proven effective... By contrast, for those whose problems – if taken seriously – would demand radical social change, the world's largest prison system remains all too ready to remove them from the settler polity's 'front stage' so that the show can go on.⁷⁵

⁷² Horn, *Before It's Too Late*: 42.

⁷³ Chávez-García, *States of Delinquency*: 47-70.

⁷⁴ Schlossman, *Love and the American Delinquent*: 58.

⁷⁵ Theo Di Castri, 'The Settler Colonial Roots and Neoliberal Afterlife of Problem Behavior Theory', *Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences*, Vol. 59 (2) (2023): 123.

The idealised normalcy which treatment was supposed to restore implied hope for some children while others were rendered incorrigible. In turn, the transition from delinquency to 'normal behaviour' was not always agreed or straightforward. In fact, the history of juvenile delinquency is characterised by diverse, changing perspectives on childhood independence, normal misbehaviour, adolescent rebellion, and so on, once again along lines of class, race and gender. Eric Schneider, writing on welfare and juvenile justice in Boston stresses the contrast between working class parents, who expected their children to work and support the family, and early-twentieth-century reformers 'extending the experience of a more dependent and sheltered adolescence across class lines'.⁷⁶ By the time of interwar child guidance, however, clinicians highlighted natural 'adolescent self-assertion' to be democratically negotiated by parents lest they stifle the child's emotional needs.⁷⁷ Nina Mackert has, meanwhile, noted post-war American ambivalence towards the delinquent, encapsulating both the threat of insecurity but also American values of independence and resistance to (communist) conformity. Fears of rising crime amongst white middle-class boys in particular saw their psychological characterisation as "'necessary" rebels as carriers of democratic rescue" in contrast to the continuing danger of marginalised offenders, activists and subcultures whose rebellious acts did not carry associations of heroic individualism.⁷⁸

In turn, uneven, shifting conceptions of normal childhood behaviour and misbehaviour point to the wide scope for disagreement on the child and their fate. Monolithic conceptions of childhood and normality, under historical analysis, give way to diverse, contested explanations and expectations. Jones in particular points to the numerous disciplines but also informants and officials whose cooperation was required for child guidance to function. Child guidance clinics coordinated psychiatrists, psychologists and social workers in a tripartite structure while ultimately responding to the needs of the juvenile court along with an increasing pool of private clients. Successful investigation, diagnosis and treatment, meanwhile, required the agreement of parents and varied correctional institutions, foster families, teachers and

⁷⁶ Eric C. Schneider, *In the Web of Class: Delinquents and Reformers in Boston, 1810s-1930s* (New York University Press: New York, NY: 1992): 166.

⁷⁷ Jones, *Taming the Troublesome Child*: 120-148.

⁷⁸ Nina Mackert, 'Danger and Progress: White Middle-Class Juvenile Delinquency and Motherly Anxiety in the Post-War US', in Heather Ellis (Ed.), *Juvenile Delinquency and the Limits of Western Influence, 1850-2000* (Palgrave Macmillan: Basingstoke: 2014): 207, 209-212.

vocational placements, not to mention the children themselves. Joining these historians of child guidance I will also be exploring ‘the problem of authority’ and the limits of specialist expertise in particular.⁷⁹ As well as the ambiguities of optimism and pessimism, normality and abnormality, which surrounded youth and their prospects we must also view juvenile delinquency and its prevention as both informed and complicated by shared but highly variegated anxieties and priorities. Crime predictions were made and defended amidst myriad other claims upon the child and their future.

Criminal Data: Facts About the Future

In the preceding discussions of surveillance, risk, and childhood we repeatedly find that the fears and expectations which motivate prediction were and are pluralistic rather than monolithic. Various groups and individuals coordinate or come into conflict while diverse kinds of information circulate in networks or ‘assemblages’ which reflect many disparate or complimentary goals and interests. Rather than ascribing knowledge and power to particular experts, theories, or technologies, I extend this pluralistic viewpoint by engaging with broader currents and tributaries of suspicion. Indeed, it soon becomes apparent that the history of twentieth-century crime prediction is not one of scientific discovery or sudden technological ‘disruption’. Somewhat ironically, many of the predictors and factors found and utilised by criminologists in fact appear predictable and conventional, in keeping with earlier fear and approbation of the poor, the foreign, the non-white, the subcultural, the urban youth, the inadequate parent, and so on. This is not to make criminology a simple follower of cultural trends. Rather I seek to distil the distinctive features of crime prediction and the work it actually did. More than an isolated hunch, crime prediction aimed to validate and organise these myriad suspicions so that decisions could be made and justified to various actors in the face of an uncertain future. A key question throughout this thesis is, thus, how successive criminologists leveraged their own claims upon the future in a society full of prediction. To answer this question, I draw on science and technology studies (STS) along with more recent histories of data to explore the ordering of power, people, and information across anxious networks.

⁷⁹ Jones, *Taming the Troublesome Child*: 3.

To understand the structure of the surveillance networks outline above we may initially return to Foucault, for whom discipline is pervasive beyond any defined centre of authority:

The power in the hierarchized surveillance of the disciplines is not possessed as a thing, or transferred as a property; it functions like a piece of machinery. And although it is true that its pyramidal organization gives it a 'head', it is the apparatus as a whole that produces 'power' and distributes individuals in this permanent and continuous field.⁸⁰

Discipline is thus continuous beyond the prison and not only controls offenders but also those responsible for supervising and evaluating them. The wide circulation of risk and information previously discussed is somewhat captured by Foucault's discussions of the 'uninterrupted play of calculated gazes' and the 'carceral archipelago'.⁸¹ However, his discussion of a seemingly continuous, coherent, pervasive 'power' is frequently at odds with the friction, plurality, and conflict which underlies surveillance. Instead, I use a more fruitful approach developed in the work of Bruno Latour, who traced the contingent construction of scientific facts across diverse 'actor-networks'.⁸² In particular, I draw on two processes discussed by Latour and subsequently explored in other STS and historical literature: inscription and translation. Following the transformation of the natural world into discrete facts, Latour describes how objects are successively 'inscribed' through a series of increasingly abstracted, authoritative signs, from material to experimental assay to instrumental read-out to tables and graphs and, finally, scientific papers and agreed facts.⁸³ If inscription provides a model of highly controlled fact construction, then translation, meanwhile, follows the subsequent rejection, preservation, or transformation of knowledge and objects across networks of practice:

[Translation] refers to all the displacements through other actors whose mediation is indispensable for any action to occur. In place of a rigid opposition between context and content, chains of translation refer to the work through

⁸⁰ Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*: 177.

⁸¹ Ibid. 293-308.

⁸² See Bruno Latour, *Science in Action: How to Follow Scientists and Engineers Through Society* (Harvard University Press: Cambridge, MA: 1987).

⁸³ Bruno Latour and Steve Woolgar, *Laboratory Life: The Social Construction of Scientific Facts* (Sage: London: 1979): 43-91; Bruno Latour, *Pandora's Hope: Essays on the Reality of Science Studies* (Harvard University Press: Cambridge, MA: 1999): 24-79.

which actors modify, displace, and translate their various and contradictory interests.⁸⁴

Through the lens of inscription I examine the efforts of criminologists to manage or efface complexity and distil coherent facts about the future. In turn, translation allows us to follow the contested practice of crime prediction, modified by varying priorities and suspicions.

While Latour's work has been traditionally concerned with bridging purportedly 'closed-off' laboratory research and the outside 'social' world, his concepts can apply just as well to the human sciences, criminology and the inscription or translation of predictions. Here, I draw from Lemov's *World as Laboratory*, which illustrates how the twentieth-century promise of 'human engineering' tried and failed to 'quantify and control the internal arena of the personal self' while simultaneously extending the 'laboratory imagination' to include the observation, regulation and careful choreography of society.⁸⁵ Interwar social scientists, for instance, 'embraced the real' to use Lemov's phrase, espousing the 'raw data' of social existence to ensure 'the rigorous observation and capture of real things'.⁸⁶ In turn the experimental conditions of studies in manufacturing provided the model for increasing supervision and measurement of productivity, behaviour and emotions.⁸⁷ Lemov's later case study of predictive policing, sees the return of tantalising promises that internal states and social problems can be studied, anticipated and controlled with massed 'raw data'. Psychiatrist Louis Jolyon West, attempting to establish his 'violence centre' at the University of California Los Angeles from 1968-1973, thus planned crime prediction around the centre's envisaged database. Integrating individual experiments and instances of violent behaviour, he refined a 'dangerousness quotient' in the hopes of predicting the conception and enactment of violence.⁸⁸ In West's ultimately failed violence centre, Lemov sees a harbinger of later 'data-driven' policing. Indeed, the increasing scale and pressure of data-collection seems to warrant both awe and fear, however, for both proponents and critics, data can be deceiving.

⁸⁴ Ibid. 311.

⁸⁵ Rebecca Lemov, *World as Laboratory: Experiments With Mice, Mazes, and Men* (Hill and Wang: New York, NY: 2005): 3-8.

⁸⁶ Ibid. 59.

⁸⁷ Ibid. 46-67.

⁸⁸ Lemov, 'An Episode in the History of PreCrime': 639-643.

Daniel Edler Duarte, in his analysis of the 'Crime Radar' phone application developed for the 2016 Olympics in Rio de Janeiro, thus seeks to avoid both the 'siren song of techno-enthusiasts' and generalised critiques of data-driven discrimination. Rather than determining good or bad outcomes, data and the technologies that organise them rest on contingent decisions and compromises. Duarte thus charts how crime reports were assembled, prioritised, and discarded before machine learning could begin. In turn, the resulting risk maps were evidently shaped by uneven levels of crime reporting. Hyper-vigilant middle-class neighbourhoods were designated by Crime Radar as red, 'high-risk' areas while gang territories and favelas marked by underreporting became green and 'low-risk', prompting the decision to overrule the algorithm and agnostically mark the latter zones grey.⁸⁹ Here, data collection merged with 'common sense'. Further, both may carry implicit assumptions and decisions regarding incipient crime which belie claims of efficiency, clarity, and objectivity:

Pre-Crime systems claim to simplify the complicated dynamics of criminal activity into seemingly straightforward inscriptions (hotspots), producing scientific knowledge on society and rendering crime more manageable and predictable. However Crime Radar does not simply organize information that is available out there or simply discover patterns and correlations or produce knowledge from dispersed information; it actively assembles certain profiles and relations to the detriment of others.⁹⁰

In following the inscriptions made by past criminologists to construct more powerful (or at least more persuasive) crime predictions, this thesis similarly questions, deconstructs, and historicises claims to 'raw data', looking, moreover, to the transformations implied by subsequent translation between other actors and institutions.

Prompted by the twenty-first-century turn to 'data-driven' solutions and corresponding fears of a 'data deluge' or 'overload' historians have both questioned and extended the category of 'data' across the history of knowledge. Indeed, we have already seen that the spread of surveillance is tied to the increasing generation and circulation of information for data-based

⁸⁹ Daniel Edler Duarte, 'The Making of Crime Predictions: Sociotechnical Assemblages and the Controversies of Governing Future Crime', *Surveillance and Society*, Vol. 19 (2) (2021): 199-215.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.* 212.

predictions. As others note, the Latin etymology of the term implies that data can be taken as 'given', the evidential basis of research, or amassed as 'a great sea of givens that may be subjected to statistical or other forms of analysis without ever having to look behind the curtain'.⁹¹ Yet, in history, data of crime or any other phenomena results from messy processes of construction and transformation. The ambiguity of being both 'given' and made seems apparent in Bruno Strasser and Paul Edwards discussion of what counts as 'data'. Data as a category can be tied to a moment of inscription as 'the closest thing to nature that is no longer "natural"' or 'the first transformation of nature' however this definition may change along with the evolving 'frontier between nature and knowledge'.⁹² Indeed, there may, in fact, be many transformations of the criminal and their offence into interviews, reports and so on before their condensation and quantification into statistical tables more conventionally regarded as 'data' of crime.

At the same time, historians, have sought to free 'data' from narrow technological or chronological perspectives. Computer databases are thus tied to earlier mechanical sorting through punch-card codification and, further, to the manual sorting of information slips or tables as standardised, numerical data, distinct from other forms of information.⁹³ Beyond this, others have extended the category of data to various paper forms and inscriptions with the goal of decentring digital technologies in favour of wider 'genealogies' of 'how data and data storage came to be central to social life and personal accounting'.⁹⁴ Responding to counter-arguments that 'the database before the computer' introduces presentist assumptions, David Sepkoski meanwhile argues that 'the true anachronism lies in the assumption – by modern practitioners as well as by historians – that there was something necessarily special about converting information to electronic format'.⁹⁵ The resulting

⁹¹ Soraya De Chadarevian and Theodore M. Porter, 'Introduction: Scrutinizing the Data World', *Historical Studies of the Natural Sciences*, Vol 48 (5) (2018): 553.

⁹² Bruno Strasser and Paul N. Edwards, 'Big Data is the Answer... But What is the Question?', *Osiris*, Vol. 32 (1) (2017): 330.

⁹³ Christine Von Oertzen, 'Machineries of Data Power: Manual Versus Mechanical Census Compilation in Nineteenth-Century Europe', *Osiris*, Vol. 32 (1) (2017): 129-150.

⁹⁴ Rebecca Lemov, *Database of Dreams: The Lost Quest to Catalogue Humanity* (Yale University Press: New Haven, CT: 2015): 12; see also Carla Bittel, Elaine Leong and Christine Von Oertzen (eds.), *Working With Paper: Gendered Practices in the History of Knowledge* (University of Pittsburgh Press: Pittsburgh, PA: 2019).

⁹⁵ David Sepkoski, 'The Database Before the Computer?', *Osiris*, Vol. 32 (1) (2017): 200.

perspective of information history, proposed by Sepkoski along with Elena Aronova and Christine Von Oertzen, is one which eschews teleology and instead sees data as ‘immanent to the practices and technologies that support it’.⁹⁶

Data, in historical perspective, thus become materially, technologically, and chronologically pluralistic. At the same time, this broadly inclusive view may risk ambiguity. Data have taken on many forms in the past but there are still meaningful distinctions to be made between types of information in twentieth-century criminology. The shift, charted in this thesis, from biographical case histories, diagnoses and prognoses to enumerated tables of correlated factors did indicate a significant change in the ‘data’ of prediction and their organisation. In motivating the perspective of data history, we must thus identify what made data distinctive. Here, I will briefly consider the significance of aggregation and its consequences for the individual; circulation, transformation and re-use; and the ultimate hope that data would resolve disagreement and allow trust in objective decisions.

Firstly, as Strasser and Edwards note, aggregation can explain how diverse objects form a dataset: diverse ‘tissue samples, plant specimens, rocks and molecules *become* data by being brought into a collection, that is into relationships with other objects and with a knowledge institution that considers them to represent nature’.⁹⁷ In turn, this aggregation can have consequences for human individuals represented in the database. Bouk notes that the history of nineteenth- and twentieth-century data collection has seen the increasing value of personal data, originally a by-product of aggregated statistics, which later accrued speculative value for the control or commodification of individuals.⁹⁸ People, thus ‘datafied’ and collected become ‘statistical individuals’ or (drawing on Ericson and Haggerty) ‘data doubles’ in the eyes of bureaucracies, researchers and other aggregators, just as a collection of objects may serve as a ‘second nature’. As these terms imply, however, data representations become separated

⁹⁶ Elena Aronova, Christine Von Oertzen and David Sepkoski, ‘Introduction: Historicizing Big Data’, *Osiris*, Vol. 32 (1) (2017): 7.

⁹⁷ Strasser and Edwards, ‘Big Data is the Answer...’: 331.

⁹⁸ Dan Bouk, ‘The History and Political Economy of Personal Data Over the Last Two Centuries in Three Acts’, *Osiris*, Vol. 32 (1) (2017): 85-106.

from the lives they are meant to represent and can instead take on lives of their own. In turn, the reduction, classification and collection of individual lives is complicated by diverse idiosyncrasies or active resistance. Bouk thus describes how African Americans challenged the fatalist discrimination of life insurers' aggregates of shorter lifespans and higher risk based on slavery-era statistics.⁹⁹ In Theodore Porter's history of asylum data, meanwhile, diagnostic ordering and classifications confront the irreducible ambiguity of madness.¹⁰⁰ Just as aggregated data prompts both the hope and fear of control over individuals, this thesis also looks to the imperfections of personal data and their dislocation from real lives and experiences.

The other side of aggregation is circulation and exchange. Following the perspectives of data history this thesis traces diverse sources of information and the conditions, or in Strasser's words 'moral economy', that facilitated data sharing.¹⁰¹ Scientific, corporate or other bureaucratic data collections may become focal points of negotiation, friction, or continuing cooperation.¹⁰² At the same time, collections that persist, travel or are passed on raise new prospects for re-use. This can include the reinterpretation or integration of existing datasets to produce new or modified scientific conclusions in combination or after many years.¹⁰³ The persistence of personal data especially prompts concern surrounding unforeseen re-uses, as with the 'surveillance creep' observed in fingerprint and DNA databases repurposed for police investigations and criminal convictions.¹⁰⁴ The various movements, transformations, modifications, and re-uses of criminal information discussed in this thesis can be viewed through the lens of what Sabina Leonelli calls 'data journeys'. This is, again, a 'relational' rather

⁹⁹ Bouk, *How Our Days Became Numbered*: 31-54.

¹⁰⁰ Theodore M. Porter, *Genetics in the Madhouse: The Unknown History of Human Heredity* (Princeton University Press: Princeton, NJ: 2018): 1-14.

¹⁰¹ Bruno Strasser, *Collecting Experiments: Making Big Data Biology* (University of Chicago Press: Chicago, IL: 2019): 1-27.

¹⁰² Elena Aronova, 'Geophysical Dataspace of the Cold War: politics and Practices of the World Data Centres in the 1950s and 1960s', *Osiris*, Vol. 32 (1) (2017): 307-327.

¹⁰³ Staffan Muller-Wille, 'Data, Meta Data and Pattern Data: How Franz Boas Mobilized Anthropometric Data, 1890 and Beyond', in Sabina Leonelli and Niccoló Tempini (eds.), *Data Journeys in the Sciences* (Springer: New York, NY: 2020): 265-283.

¹⁰⁴ Pamela Sankar, 'DNA-Typing: Galton's Eugenic Dream Realized?', in Jane Caplan and John Torpey (eds.), *Documenting Individual Identity: The Development of State Practices in the Modern World* (Princeton University Press: Princeton, NJ: 2002): 273-290; Dorothy Nelkin and Lori Andrews, 'Surveillance Creep in the Genetic Age', in Lyon, *Surveillance as Social Sorting*: 94-110.

than a static view of data which historicises and compares information through 'different stages of data movements, ranging from the planning that precedes data production to various ways in which data are mobilised and re-purposed, often with the goal of providing "actionable" knowledge'.¹⁰⁵ Indeed, the uses and implications of data change even as they are gathered and mobilised to provide a stable basis for claims and decisions. This invocation of 'actionable' knowledge points to the question of data and trust. The above historicisation and deconstruction does not change the fact that many practitioners have looked to data as a source of objectivity, as the evidential ground which connects them to reality and makes conclusions rational. Databases are created and deployed in response to scientific and public uncertainties wherein 'data hoarding seems to reflect more a growing distrust and insecurity about people, institutions, and memory'.¹⁰⁶ Data accrue lasting value as secure and impersonal bodies of fact, the common ground which safeguards rationality.

Crime prediction, meanwhile, demands that the state and its officers make decisions about uncertain future dangers and, in turn, these practitioners have sought trustworthy bases for decision making. Scannell astutely summarises the problem:

Here is the ontological wager: Probabilistic, uncertain results require the adjudication of the real. All is uncertain and ontologically unstable. But decisions must be made in the present to foreclose undesirable futures.

Data promises to produce this 'real' future, based on the patterns of aggregated past instances, to resolve and justify uncertain decision making. As illusory as this foreknowledge may be, its instantiation through data, as in our earlier discussion of risk, produces fear and seems to necessitate more surveillance, more policing, and more data. As Scannell continues: 'it drags the future and its volatility into the present and destabilizes the real. This engenders a constant state of crisis that demands the constant expansion and application of apparatuses of security'.¹⁰⁷ To move beyond this circular relationship between paranoia and surveillance, however, this thesis seeks to account for how and why trust has historically been placed in crime prediction and the data behind it. Turning to the Gluecks and their prediction tables in particular, I draw on Porter's *Trust in Numbers* which explores the rise of numerical objectivity

¹⁰⁵ Sabina Leonelli, 'Learning From Data Journeys', in Leonelli and Tempini, *Data Journeys in the Sciences*: 4-5.

¹⁰⁶ Strasser and Edwards, 'Big Data is the Answer...': 340.

¹⁰⁷ Scannell, 'This is Not Minority Report': 123.

in scientific and political cultures. Here, 'objectivity names a set of strategies for dealing with distance and distrust'.¹⁰⁸ The turn to quantification and statistics in particular is, Porter argues, tied to the shifting trust and distrust of personal knowledge and authority in different disciplinary and administrative contexts. Insecure experts and officials thus gather data to defend themselves and, in turn, foster a politics of quantitative 'neutrality' in which it is thought safer to let numbers decide.

Drawing on these perspectives this thesis follows the key shift in twentieth-century crime prediction, from personal discretion and expertise to numerical 'predictive instruments'. In the former, skilled professionals were expected to understand the offender and organise the facts of a case to judge or prognosticate. In the latter, personal subjectivity was (supposedly) controlled by scores and probabilities arising from aggregated cases and outcomes. This growing 'trust in numbers' was, however, not a linear, inevitable development. Attempts to measure and enumerate physical or mental criminal types foundered while interwar psychiatry resisted the generalising impulse in favour of individualised narratives which differed in important ways from the data aggregates to come. Even with the arrival of numerical prediction tables based on mechanical punch card databases, the discretion of users persisted. The authority of tables and experts has shifted contingently, and may continue to do so, as various actors seek to validate their suspicions and these suspicions, in turn, meet the uncertain future.

Conclusions

Historians have illustrated how institutional expertise and criminological knowledge have constructed 'the criminal' as a subject to be known and, thence, managed and disciplined. However, turning away from the criminal type and moving outside familiar institutional settings we find twentieth-century criminology characterised by the uncertainties of assigning risk and guiding judgements of future conduct. In turn, this points towards a broader history of information gathering and suspicion across the 'actor-networks' and 'surveillant

¹⁰⁸ Theodore M. Porter, *Trust in Numbers: The Pursuit of Objectivity in Science and Public Life* (Princeton University Press: Princeton, NJ: 1995): xxi.

assemblages' which coordinated myriad anxieties and interventions surrounding the as-yet uninstantiated, un-demarcated, potential offender. In the twentieth-century United States, these broad fears and preventative efforts can be traced through responses to juvenile delinquency and the shifting balance of optimism and pessimism towards youth potentialities. Acknowledging the shared fear of future criminality, the key question in this history of crime prediction is thus how criminologists leveraged their own predictions amidst other suspicions. In turn, across appeals to experience, specialist expertise, and eventually 'objective' tables of risk, I explore how predictions struggled to manage the expectations of others and had to accommodate various claims upon the child's future.

Throughout this thesis I will be referring to various forms of 'suspicion', used as a term of analysis rather than an actor's category. As indicated in the foregoing discussion, suspicion might encompass a wide range of scales, targets, and forms of pre-emptive thinking. This could include prejudices based on outward appearance as in racial discrimination or attempts to identify the 'criminal type'. Meanwhile, suspicion applied to youth might involve emotional entanglements of parental anxiety alongside prevailing cultural notions of childhood. On the other hand, the language of risk and its assessment suggests more systematic processes of information gathering and arrangement to control potential dangers and consequent losses to public and private agencies. All of these may, in turn, be variously applied at the level of the individual or the group, such as suspicion towards a particular physiognomy or an entire demographic; towards a specific 'problem child' or youth in general; towards those who are statistically differentiated from others or, conversely, grouped into a larger class of people. In the subsequent chapters we will see various actors following variously formal or informal methodologies, cognitive processes, prejudices or fears to judge people and their likely behaviour, tied to discrete processes of assessment and reporting or to suspicious states of mind, as in the work of police, social workers, and criminological researchers to uncover information. This thesis does not focus on any particular form or definition of suspicion but rather aims to show the plurality of sources which made up crime prediction. Each of the above forms of suspicion could imply potential crime and thus be incorporated into more authoritative psychiatric and statistical predictions. As such I will be using the deliberately broad term 'suspicion' to group and analyse these myriad, intersecting, sometimes conflicting

meanings of future criminality. 'Suspicion' in this thesis can thus refer to any demographic, socio-political, emotional, experiential, or administrative concept used to form or justify an expectation of future criminal behaviour, concepts which are subsequently organized into more coherent, more 'legitimate' methods of crime 'prediction'.

Beginning at the turn of the twentieth century, this thesis follows these attempts to organise these suspicion and guide judgement in psychiatry, statistics, and the various disciplines which coalesced around American criminology and crime prediction. Three persistent themes will recur throughout: The problem of synthesising eclectic criminological theories and approaches, the pluralism of information gathering and surveillance networks, and, consequently, the problem of providing decision-makers with clear, useful predictions on complex cases and their propensities. Two different pairs of criminologists with two different solutions to these problems of method and expertise will be at the forefront of this narrative: the diagnostic, child guidance approach of William Healy and Augusta Fox Bronner; and, later, the probabilistic, statistical methods of Sheldon and Eleanor Glueck. In following these researchers and practitioners I also follow shifting trust in experts and enumeration. At the same time, the stories of these criminologists are, at each stage, connected to wider networks of justice, corrections, health, education, welfare, and family across which information, prevention, and suspicion were negotiated.

My examination will, however, be necessarily limited in scope to the early- to mid-twentieth-century United States, moving from the inception of 'progressive-era' juvenile justice and therapeutics through their interwar and postwar applications. Of course, American criminology drew upon and fed back into wider international discourses on crime prevention. As will be seen shortly, early attempts to organise programmes of criminological research and practice emulated and modified European examples, including Italian criminal anthropology, the British eugenics movement, French intelligence testing, and German psychiatry.¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁹ For the international influence of criminal anthropology on early US criminologists see Nicole Hahn Rafter, 'Criminal Anthropology: Its Reception in the United States and the Nature of Its Appeal', in Becker and Wetzell, *Criminals and Their Scientists*: 159-182; For eugenics see Kevles, *In the Name of Eugenics*: 41-69; for intelligence testing see Gould, *The Mismeasure of Man*: 176-204; for German psychiatry see Richard Noll,

Subsequently, moving into the interwar period, American metropolises conversely became key centres of new sociological and psychiatric knowledge of crime and the criminal, disseminated back across the world. In the United Kingdom, for instance, practitioners tasked with unruly youth could, by the late 1920s, draw from ‘the American Model’ of child guidance while, following the Second World War, British parliamentarians worried about the spread of ‘American’ delinquency across the Atlantic through new subcultures and mass media.¹¹⁰ The later-twentieth-century proliferation of US-developed risk assessment tools and later crime prediction software further extended the international reach of American characterizations of both crime and its prevention. However, the creation of new prediction tables and the practical demands they responded to were, I argue, highly situated in the networks of health, welfare, education, and crime prevention which emerged in America between 1900 and 1960.

Though it may limit any larger analysis of transnational significance, a focus on local practice is necessary to follow the information, priorities and suspicions which circulated between new institutions and actors in America’s urban centres and which organized them in new programmes of surveillance and prediction. In this way crime prediction can be seen not only as a product of academic criminology but also as a development of the twentieth-century American state and its satellite institutions, increasingly expected to increase efficiency, monitor behaviour, and control risk. This history also forms a key prelude to the dramatic socio-cultural and political shifts of the 1960s, the subsequent proliferation of risk assessment tools and technologies, and the later-twentieth-century ‘wars on crime’.¹¹¹ By looking to the largely unexplored history of crime prediction from 1900-1960, this thesis shows how, together, American criminologists, court officials, social workers, teachers, and others earlier determined the targets of suspicion and constructed tables to justify pre-emption.

American Madness: The Rise and Fall of Dementia Praecox (Harvard University Press: Cambridge, MA: 2011): 36-108.

¹¹⁰ See John Stewart, ‘The Dangerous Age of Childhood: Child Guidance and the ‘Normal’ Child in Great Britain, 1920-1950, *Paedagogica Historica*, Vol. 47 (6) (2011): 785-803; Kate Bradley, ‘Becoming Delinquent in the Post-War Welfare State: England and Wales, 1945-1965, in Ellis, *Juvenile Delinquency and the Limits of Western Influence*: 227-247.

¹¹¹ See Elizabeth Hinton, *From the War on Poverty to the War on Crime: The Making of Mass Incarceration in America* (Harvard University Press: Cambridge, MA: 2016).

Chapter 1: Professional Criminology and Standards of Judgement

In the early twentieth century United States 'the problem of crime' was not the preserve of a single, unified criminological discipline. The criminal was, rather, the shared object of various practitioners and researchers who sought to coordinate and professionalise. In June 1909, Northwestern University hosted the inaugural meeting of the American Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology (AICLC). James W. Garner (1871-1938), editor in chief of the Institute's new journal, claimed that the conference was 'without precedent in the history of the United States', gathering roughly 150 delegates of various professional and scientific backgrounds and marking 'a new era in the history of American criminal jurisprudence'.¹ In turn, the new Institute would be the vehicle of a new professional, practical science of criminology:

Impressed with the advantages of uniting the efforts of lawyers, criminologists, sociologists and all others in the cause of a better criminal law, the conference resolved to effect a permanent national organization, to be known as the American Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology, whose purpose shall be to advance the scientific study of crime, criminal law and procedure, to formulate and promote measures for solving the problems connected therewith, and to co-ordinate the efforts of individuals and of organizations interested in the administration of certain and speedy justice.²

The new journal of the AICLC (JAICLC) was intended for a broad audience connecting practitioners, public officials, and private individuals to 'the allied fields of sociology, anthropology, psychology, philanthropy, etc.'³ Of 18 associate editors at the journal's inception, nine were judges, attorneys or law professors while 6 represented medicine, psychiatry and the above fields along with three bringing practical viewpoints from policing, prisons, and probation.⁴ Garner, a professor of political science, was succeeded by psychologist Robert H. Gault (d. 1972) as managing editor within two years. Through the first years of the journal we thus find pluralistic perspectives and disputes on the coming role to be played by criminology and various human sciences in modern courts and prisons. In this

¹ J[ames]. W. G[arner]., 'The American Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology', *Journal of the American Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology* (JAICLC), Vol. 1 (1) (1910): 3.

² Ibid. 5.

³ J[ames]. W. G[arner]., 'Plan of the Journal', *JAICLC*, Vol. 1 (1) (1910): 7.

⁴ Frontmatter, *JAICLC*, Vol. 1 (1) (1910): 1; Frontmatter, *JAICLC*, Vol. 2 (3) (1911): 1.

chapter I will use its reports, discussions, and articles to establish the major problems of theory and practice which faced the interdisciplinary field of American criminology. The problem of theory concerned streamlining various methods and approaches into a coherent research programme. The problem of practice concerned how the unstructured facts produced by these approaches could then be ordered and made useful for practical judgements of criminal character. In the pages of the JAICLC, contributors collated findings and possible solutions from across the country's criminal justice and correctional institutions, particularly the recently established juvenile courts of major conurbations. Many hoped that theory and practice would resolve around a stable 'criminal type' discovered through routine anthropometric or psychometric methods. While Lombrosian criminal anthropology seemed unable to reconcile contradictory evidence, intelligence tests were soon valued as potential administrative tools for use by courts and prisons in routinely differentiating between 'normal' offenders and dangerous defectives.

Pluralistic proposals for individual or social reform alongside eugenics could sometimes seem paradoxical. During the 1900s court and prison officials faced new imperatives to evaluate likely behaviour with an eye to both potential improvement under more lenient probation and parole or potential danger warranting indeterminate imprisonment. In turn, criminologists' 'humane' concern for the individual offender's needs ranged from rehabilitation to permanent segregation and sterilisation. These seeming contradictions reflected the 'progressive' politics of administrative and social reform from the 1890s to the 1910s, epitomised by the 'socialized' courts of Chicago. Tracing this history, Michael Wilrich describes progressivism as 'the rise of a pluralistic, issue-centered politics of social responsibility and an ideological commitment to professionalization, scientific rationalization, and administrative governance'.⁵ Preceding and then paralleling the efforts of the AICLC, Chicago's courts were thus rationalised and specialised, in keeping with the managerial model of the business corporation, while also becoming 'laboratories' for new paternalistic social policies.⁶ At one end of the scale, experiments with probation pursued the moral and economic goal of preserving the

⁵ Michael Wilrich, *City of Courts: Socializing Justice in Progressive Era Chicago* (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge: 2003): xxxviii.

⁶ Ibid. xxix, 29-58.

offender's family.⁷ At the other end 'defectives' were identified for eugenic segregation by the municipal court's 'psychopathic laboratory'.⁸ As will also be seen in the JAICLC, 'progressive' justice, valorising discretionary treatment, scientific expertise and the purported amelioration of social 'ills', did not necessarily preclude either of these approaches. Intelligence testing, targeting the supposedly incorrigible 'feeble-minded', promised to rationalise judgement, streamline the information required for evaluation, and create new roles for specialists. I will consider these and other hopes for the standardised classification of incorrigible criminals, as well as their failure to resolve individual complexities. Ultimately, criminal types based purely on anthropometric and psychometric categories could not be reconciled with the multiplicity of different cases and causes. Officials still required expert guidance to navigate the myriad facts and possibilities surrounding a given offender, however, this was increasingly deemed a task for individualised diagnosis rather than classification.

Criminological Research: Deciding What Matters

The first step in establishing a professional science of criminology was deciding on what information should be targeted and prioritised by researchers. The 1909 conference had identified several topics for investigation by special committees of the new AICLC, first and foremost among them 'an effective system for recording the physical and moral, hereditary and environmental conditions of offenders'.⁹ In turn the paucity of even basic statistics concerning American crime and criminals was highlighted in the first issues of the journal where uneven state and federal figures were immediately criticised.¹⁰ For the question of crime's annual increase or decrease, associate editor and sociologist Charles Elwood could only rely on the decennial census of prison populations, complaining that 'we have no statistics for the country as a whole since 1904 that are worth anything'.¹¹ To fill this gap, and hopefully provide a model for subsequent research, The AICLC organised two committees: Committee A for a system of recording data from criminals and an additional subcommittee

⁷ Ibid. 59-95.

⁸ Ibid. 241-277.

⁹ J[ames] W. G[arner], 'The American Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology': 4.

¹⁰ Louis N. Robinson, 'A Plan for the Reorganization of Criminal Statistics in the United States', *JAICLC*, Vol. 1 (1) (1910): 44-49.

¹¹ Charles A. Ellwood, 'Has Crime Increased in the United States Since 1880?', *JAICLC*, Vol. 1 (3) (1910): 378.


on statistics of crime. Their conclusions would highlight a wide range of potentially relevant data for explaining crime along with difficulties in streamlining this information for judicial and administrative use.

Committee A's report was published in July 1910, drafted primarily by William Healy of Chicago's Juvenile Psychopathic Institute (to be discussed in the next chapter), drawing on his consultations with numerous American authorities. Notable figures consulted included psychiatrists Adolf Meyer (1866-1950) and E.E. Southard (1876-1920), educational psychologists E.L. Thorndike (1874-1949) and Walter Dearborn (1878-1955) as well as a range of functional and experimental psychologists including G. Stanley Hall (1846-1924) and J.R. Angell (1869-1949). Institutional superintendents such as H.H. Goddard (1866-1957), and W.E. Fernald (1859-1924) were also consulted along with numerous court officials and physicians.¹² The resulting system thus combined the broad interests of a variety of practitioners into a single data collection 'schedule', each item relating to possible causal models for understanding crime.

The first section recorded family history, 'especially all aspects of heredity', including a model heredity chart produced by Goddard to record detrimental habits or congenital physical and mental conditions (Fig. 1). This was followed by facts about developmental history from conception through pregnancy and birth to infancy with habits and illnesses in childhood. The next section of the schedule was broadly termed 'environment' consisting of social investigations into home, family and neighbourhood conditions, acquaintances and leisure activities. Then a section on 'character' recorded school performance and behaviour at home, combining parent and teacher interviews with police and court records of delinquency and past offences. Subsequent sections, meanwhile, concerned anthropometric, medical and neurological examinations. 'Psychological examinations' would then measure 'native ability',

¹² 'Bulletins of the American Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology: Bulletin No. 2, January 1910', *JAICLC*, Vol. 1 (2) (1910): 84-85.

SYSTEM FOR RECORDING CRIMINAL DATA.
HEREDITY CHART, MODIFIED FROM THE ONE DEVISED AND
USED BY DR. H. H. GODDARD.




Explanation of Symbols.

○ No data.	♂ Usual biologic sign for male.
● Criminal.	♀ Usual biologic sign for female.
(N) Normal.	♂ Born.
(A) Alcohol—more than moderate drinker.	♂ Married.
(E) Epilepsy.	† Died.
⬤ Mental defective—all grades.	†♂ Tuberculous.
◐ Insane.	♂ Syphilitic.
◑ Grave sexual offender, male or female.	B Blind.
⊗ Miscarriage.	D Deaf.
(T) Confirmed runaway or tramp.	

88

SYSTEM FOR RECORDING CRIMINAL DATA.



These 11 children born within 18 years—most of them still quite young.

II.

DEVELOPMENTAL HISTORY.

Sources of information.

Conception: (a) during year previous to conception was father or mother sick; under special stress or excitement; given to excess of alcohol or drugs.
(b) any feeling of sexual aversion by mother toward father.
(c) was conception peculiar, e. g., father or mother intoxicated or drugged.
(d) did mother desire this child.

Pregnancy: (a) did mother have any disease during pregnancy—if so, full description is desirable.
(b) was abortion attempted.
(c) any pelvic disease or accident—such as uterine hemorrhage.
(d) any special worry or stress during pregnancy.
(e) any fright or shock.
(f) how much did mother have to work at that time.
(g) did mother have any so-called "maternal impressions"; if so, what effect does she think they had on her child.
(h) was child legitimate.

Birth: (a) was labor specially long or difficult: if so, from what cause.
(b) were instruments used.
(c) was it difficult to get baby to breathe and cry.
(d) was there any deformity, especially of head.
(e) weight or size at birth.

90

Figure 1: One blank and one completed heredity chart, presented in William Healy's report for Committee 'A' of the AICLC on a 'system for recording data concerning criminals'

('Bulletins of the American Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology: Bulletin No. 2, January 1910', JAICLC, Vol. 1 (2) (1910): 88, 90)

'degree of subnormality' and 'mental content', looking to the future development of standardised testing methods. Finally, a section on 'Psycho-analysis', pointed to Healy's own interest in interviews exploring offenders' own understandings of their behaviour¹³.

¹³ Ibid. 85-96.

Committee A's total schedule for data collection set out hundreds of questions to be asked, along with investigations into family history and background with the further expectation of anthropometric measurement, psychometric tests and, in the final section, a 'patient and mild' interview to record 'the individual's own words and peculiar expressions'.¹⁴ As a model for subsequent research it reflected both the ambitions and pitfalls of criminology's multidisciplinary effort to understand multicausal crime. Data collection had to variously serve three overlapping but broadly distinguishable explanatory models coexisting in American criminology, each of which represented different disciplines and priorities: Firstly, a biological or hereditary model which emphasised facts of bodily structure, developmental abnormalities and family histories or tests of mental and physical 'defect'; secondly an environmental model which emphasised poverty and the supposedly deleterious influence of urban life, recorded in philanthropic and social service investigations of local conditions; thirdly a psychological perspective which emphasised the dynamic motivations, and conflicts of the individual offender to be diagnosed and resolved in psychiatric interviews.

This plan of data was evidently unfeasible. Bringing together perspectives from dozens of specialists, its exhaustive items would require varying effort, training, and tact, ranging from the circumstances of conception to mental illness and venereal disease in the family. Moving back through the generations, family histories would become also increasingly obscure. Meanwhile, offenders, or those close to them, were expected to reveal past wrongdoing, specific associates, sexual habits and 'queer ideas about property, family, individual rights, religion, social institutions, etc.'¹⁵ Healy himself acknowledged:

It is plain at first sight that all the numerous details of this system can only rarely be ascertained in any single case. Moreover, the details themselves have by no means equal value. Some of them have been included simply because they may develop negative evidence against theories already held by experts to be absurd. One of the aims, indeed in compiling this system of records has been to include practically all the hypothetical foundations for the growth in the individual of criminal traits.¹⁶

¹⁴ Ibid. 96.

¹⁵ Ibid. 93.

¹⁶ Ibid. 85.

Healy earnestly proposed an eclectic approach to research that would include information frankly considered unavailable or useless. Meanwhile, John Koren, of the AICLC's Subcommittee on Statistics of Crime, indirectly criticised this 'hazy thinking' surrounding data collection. Routine entry by court clerks would at best be limited to immediate facts concerning the crime, sentence, and personal details of an offender.¹⁷ Koren later criticised the Committee A plan directly. While potentially of use to specialists, it was 'inconceivable' that such an elaborate plan could be implemented in courts, 'not only on account of the enormous amount of work required and the resulting prohibitive costs, but because it can only be handled successfully by specially trained persons'.¹⁸

The AICLC agreed that criminal data collection was a prerequisite for coordinated investigation and understanding but was caught between causes, disciplines, and the requirements of research and practice. The situation of early-twentieth-century American criminology calls to mind Bruno Latour's characterisation of nineteenth-century plans for health and hygiene before Pasteur identified the microbial targets of disease prevention: "If anything can cause illness, nothing can be ignored, it is necessary to act everywhere and on everything at once".¹⁹ 'Catchall' plans of research in criminology reflected a new, variegated discipline engaging with complex, widely disputed 'causes of crime'. Conversely, to fulfil their professional ambitions of practical service to criminal justice, criminologists would have to bring these causes and data into useful order. New imperatives for courts and prisons to judge the propensities of offenders brought new opportunities for criminologists to provide this specialist function as well as increased pressure to streamline these disparate methods.

Criminological Practice: Deciding Who to Trust

By the time the AICLC was formed in 1909, American courts, prisons, reformatories and other institutions of criminal justice and correction were widely expected to make regular

¹⁷ John Koren, 'Report of the Committee on Statistics of Crime', *JAICLC*, Vol. 1 (3) (1910): 417-437.

¹⁸ John Koren, 'Criminal Statistics in the United States (Report of Committee (3) of the Institute)', *JAICLC*, Vol. 2 (4) (1911): 570.

¹⁹ Bruno Latour (trans. Alan Sheridan and John Law), *The Pasteurization of France* (Harvard University Press: Cambridge, MA: 1993): 20.

judgements on the future behaviour of offenders. Informal assessments, depending on the experience of officials, or more rigorous measures based on expert evaluations were all prompted by legal innovations of probation, parole and indeterminate sentencing, wherein judgements of likely reformation or reoffending became crucial in deciding whether offenders would be committed indefinitely or released under supervision. In March 1912 Committee F of the Institute published a report on 'Indeterminate Sentence and Release on Parole', referring to such laws in ten states, the most recent in Minnesota. These laws provided that, rather than receiving definite prison terms from the court, convicted criminals (excepting certain offences) would receive an indeterminate sentence subject to release by a board of parole. These parallel legislative efforts prompted discussion in the JAICLC of how best to guide officials in the use of these powers. Parole boards, had to establish methods for evaluating cases, indicating the same kinds of information discussed by criminologists. The Minnesota law thus provided that the board 'may institute inquiries by correspondence, taking testimony or otherwise as to the previous history, physical or mental condition, and character of such prisoner'. Psychological, medical and background investigations would also be combined with regular observation of behaviour during imprisonment whereby the prisoner would be 'credited for good prison demeanour, diligence in labor and study and results accomplished, and be charged for derelictions, negligences and offences under such uniform system of marks or other methods as shall be prescribed by the board'.²⁰

Efforts at standardisation were, however, still accompanied by emphases on personal skill and judgement. The Minnesota law thus called for 'men of the highest and rarest combination of gifts, experience, judgement, patience, intuition and wisdom, combined with a willingness to undertake and carry on a mass of personal investigation, and the temper of an inflexible will capable of controlling and directing all sympathy'.²¹ These grand words on the needed qualities of parole board members nevertheless pointed to a wider emphasis on the importance of local experience in recognising the propensities of different cases. In an earlier editorial of the JAICLC, Arthur Towne had pointed to the ability of judicial discretion in determining suitability for probation as opposed to legislative codes. Relevant factors such as

²⁰ Albert H. Hall, 'Indeterminate Sentence and Release on Parole', *JAICLC*, Vol. 2 (6) (1912): 834.

²¹ *Ibid.* 837.

habits, family history, individual characteristics and surroundings would instead be 'learned and weighed much better by the local court than by a state legislature'.²² Aside from judges the role of the probation officer was also emphasised in understanding the offender. Warren F. Spaulding of the Massachusetts Prison Association thus noted that 'the policeman proves what the prisoner did; the probation officer must find out why he did it, what he really is and needs, and whether he is or is not likely to reform without punishment'.²³

Efforts to introduce standards and expertise in such judgements of propensity joined various discretionary models from state to state. In November 1912, the AICLC's Committee F reported on the national situation through a survey questionnaire of state parole boards. Responses covered systems of parole now enacted in 29 states as well as nationally in federal penitentiaries. The constitution of different parole boards varied but primarily consisted of appointees selected by the governor, including or working closely with the wardens of respective prisons, however, in five states and at the federal level a physician was specified as a board member. States also varied on which points to consider when granting parole. Minnesota, in keeping with the above legislation, referred to 'previous history; physical or mental condition; character; prison record'.²⁴ California more broadly considered 'antecedents, conduct as prisoner, length of time served, general character, habits and environment if released' while Illinois evaluated 'history, parentage, education, conduct in prison, ability to live orderly outside'.²⁵ Some states, the Committee found, left parole decisions entirely to the discretion of the governor as in Missouri where the constitutional power of pardon was now regularly extended to young and first-time offenders, or Oklahoma where prisoners were simply assessed on the basis of 'any points that may be thought proper by the governor'.²⁶ More commonly, parole boards referred to prisoners' industrial competence and attitude while in prison with six states also specifying that some outside employment be secured. Alongside more specific queries in some states, virtually all parole

²² Arthur W. Towne, 'Judicial Discretion Versus Legislation in Determining Defendants Suitable for Probation', *JAICLC*, Vol. 2 (5) (1912): 667.

²³ Warren F. Spaulding, 'The Treatment of Crime – Past, Present and Future', *JAICLC*, Vol. 3 (3) (1912): 378.

²⁴ Edwin M. Abbott, 'Indeterminate Sentence and Release on Parole (Report of Committee F of the Institute)', *JAICLC*, Vol. 3 (4) (1912): 557.

²⁵ *Ibid.* 552-555.

²⁶ *Ibid.* 557, 561-562.

boards referred to the offender's prison record in connection with some assessment of 'criminal character' (New York), 'trustworthiness' (Texas), 'probability of becoming a law-abiding citizen' (New Mexico), or other phrases broadly referring to the propensities of the individual.²⁷

However far these requirements were actually followed, probation, parole and the indeterminate sentence evidently required frequent formal or informal judgements as to which prisoners could be safely released and which presented a danger to society. While processes varied between states and institutions, decisions regularly fell to the discretion of judges, probation officers, wardens, chaplains, and other appointees or officials based on their experience across various cases. In this context, criminologists attempted to demonstrate their value as experts who were equipped to efficiently distinguish dangerous and benign offenders in service of criminal justice and society. Robert H. Gault, professor of psychology at Northwestern University, was elected as managing editor of the *JAICLC* from September 1911 after which he regularly editorialised on the value of criminological expertise and its integration in court procedure.²⁸ For 'the treatment of the degenerate criminal', he asked, 'would it not be far saner, universally, in such cases, to submit the problem to experts outside the pale of the court, who are competent to pass upon a question, lying definitely, as this does, within the science of psycho- or neuro-pathology?'²⁹

Criminological experts, Gault argued, carried a 'heavy burden' and would need to be wary of public scepticism towards 'treatment', balancing the needs of the offender with the safety of society and the demands of justice, ideally backed by secure, scientific methods: 'with respect to this probability they must be sure of their ground... The public must have no shadow of excuse for pointing them out as blind "sentimentalists"'.³⁰ Gault's editorials placed criminology in the service of society, bringing together data collection, research, and court practice. Referring to the Committee A Plan Gault wrote of:

²⁷ Ibid. 551-564.

²⁸ 'The Journal's New Managing Editor', *JAICLC*, Vol. 2 (3) (1911): 327-328.

²⁹ R[obert]. H. G[ault]., 'The Treatment of the Degenerate Criminal', *JAICLC*, Vol. 3 (5) (1913): 669.

³⁰ Robert H. Gault, 'The Degenerate at Large', *JAICLC*, Vol. 2 (6) (1912): 819.

immediate practical value to the judge who must sentence the defendant before the bar. To be of practical service to him it must supply him with exhaustive knowledge of the individual case, in order that through his sentence he may adequately protect society, while doing the best that is possible for the prisoner as an individual... The data supplied to the court by the laboratory experts will assist the judge in determining how he may best perform his protective service to society.³¹

At the AICLC's fourth annual meeting in 1912 Committee A recommended that 'laboratories' be established for these joint purposes of data collection and expert advisory. They would require medical experts, or else those 'proficient in the recognition of nervous and sensory disorders, with psychological training to execute the anthropometrical, medical and psychological examinations'.³² Harry Olson, chair of the committee and chief justice of the Chicago Municipal Court soon established a 'psychopathic laboratory' to serve his own court, despite initial difficulties finding sufficiently qualified personnel.³³ In November 1913 psychologist Victor V. Anderson was similarly employed by the Municipal Court of Boston. This hiring was, for Gault, 'a frank admission by the judges of that court of the need of an expert in matters of medicine and psychology in supplementation of its ordinary probation work'.³⁴ The following year, he referred readers to summer courses in clinical criminology and social work for prospective workers in new court laboratories. These included courses at Northwestern University, New York University and Harvard, as well as 'training courses in experimental, educational and social psychology for (among others) social workers in clinical criminology' run by Professor Lightner Witmer at the University of Pennsylvania.³⁵ Advertising the course Witmer noted that careers in these fields would be found for 'probation officers in connection with juvenile courts, as probationary visitors where the suspended sentence or the indeterminate sentence is a feature of criminal procedure'.³⁶

³¹ Robert H. Gault, 'Prospective Laboratories for the Study of Criminals', *JAICLC*, Vol. 3 (6) (1913): 826.

³² 'Proceedings of the Fourth Annual Meeting of the Institute', *JAICLC*, Vol. 3 (4) (1912): 601.

³³ *Ibid.* 601-602.

³⁴ Robert H. Gault, 'An Important Appointment in the Municipal Court of Boston', *JAICLC*, Vol. 4 (4) (1913): 481.

³⁵ Robert H. Gault, 'Clinical Criminology', *JAICLC*, Vol. 5 (1) (1914): 4.

³⁶ Lightner Witmer quoted in *Ibid.* 5.

Gault hoped that new specialists produced by these training programmes would serve courts and prisons and that these institutions would serve criminology in return as sources of cases and information. He thus highlighted the goal of research as well as practice, joined in 'the accumulation of a body of anthropological, psychological, neurological, and sociological data concerning criminals that will ultimately be of great scientific value in a field that has until now been too much neglected'.³⁷ Again, however, broad empirical research programmes would have to be balanced with the requirements of 'immediate practical service'. The range of potentially relevant data concerning the criminal created problems for any coherent plan of research as well as any attempts at rapid evaluation in day-to-day criminal justice. In the following sections of this chapter I will consider the hopes of reducing this complexity to routine procedures of measurement and classification, centring on the body of the born criminal or the 'defective' intelligence of 'feeble-minded' offenders. Along with their eugenic implications these typologies, especially those based on intelligence testing, presented a tantalising potential model for criminological service, in which standardised measures would quickly identify dangerous congenital criminals who could then be safely incarcerated to pre-empt future depredations. Anthropometric and psychometric approaches, their appeal to criminologists and the controversies they created, must thus be understood in relation to the administrative context of differentiating cases.

Criminal Types: Measuring Bodies

As alluded to in the introduction, the search for a biological 'criminal type' is commonly traced to the work of Cesare Lombroso in his 1876 *L'uomo Delinquente* (Criminal Man). American contemporaries also looked to Lombroso as a founding figure of empirical, scientific criminology. From his initial comparisons of 832 criminal bodies and skulls with the help of directors and physicians in the Italian prison system, he concluded that 'each type of crime is committed by men with particular physiognomic characteristics',³⁸ such as the large 'hawk-like' noses of murders or the soft skin and 'feminine' hair of arsonists. For Lombroso and his followers, a new justice system based on the expert identification and confinement of 'born

³⁷ Gault, 'Prospective Laboratories for the Study of Criminals': 826.

³⁸ Lombroso, *Criminal Man*: 51.

criminals' presented the only rational and humane solution to crime as a 'natural' phenomenon.³⁹

In the United States Lombrosian criminal anthropology joined other nineteenth-century notions of visible criminality and moral degradation. Popular phrenology had introduced new ways of 'knowing and seeing' the self and the stranger while later nineteenth-century legislation criminalised 'unsightly beggars' and stigmatised disabilities to be hidden from fearful public sight.⁴⁰ Indeed, as will be seen, judges in the 1910s sometimes boasted of their ability to tell apart 'defectives' at a glance. In her analysis of Lombroso's American audiences, Hahn Rafter notes how this aesthetic appeal of visible criminality was joined by the scientific appeal of objective measurement and expertise in the young discipline of criminology. Attracting proponents from diverse professional backgrounds in medicine, penology, charity and other social work, American Lombrosians were thus 'neophyte criminologists, amateurs who became overnight specialists in the field'.⁴¹ On the other hand as inconsistencies and counterexamples accumulated and as more established disciplines entered criminological discussions, many in the pages of the *JAICLC* questioned Lombroso and sought to distance their projects from his 'unscientific' methods. The inconsistent born criminal, now qualified by epilepsy, 'passion' and socio-economic factors in more recent editions, seemed increasingly useless as a target for straightforward practical classification. Tracing the criticisms and modifications of Lombroso's theory, Gibson notes that 'as the definition of the born criminal became increasingly elastic, criminal anthropologists gained ever widening discretion to label a variety of deviants as born criminals'.⁴² This elasticity, however, was also a source of confusion and criticism amongst Lombroso's American readership in search of scientific standards of judgement.

Following Lombroso's death in 1909, the attitude of American criminologists, particularly those contributing to the new *JAICLC*, was well-summarised by John Henry Wigmore's

³⁹ Ibid. 92.

⁴⁰ Thompson, *An Organ of Murder*: 100-131; Susan M. Schweik, *The Ugly Laws: Disability in Public* (New York University Press: New York, NY: 2009): 1-20.

⁴¹ Nicole Hahn Rafter, 'Criminal Anthropology: Its Reception in the United States': 170.

⁴² Gibson, *Born to Crime*: 26.

‘Memorial to Lombroso’, writing that: ‘many of his specific conclusions have since been doubted or disproved but his beneficent influence as the father of the modern methods and spirit has been universally conceded’.⁴³ Writing on Lombroso, American criminologists commonly claimed respect for his authority as a ‘founding figure’ while ultimately dismissing his central claims and theories. When the AICLC decided to translate and republish core texts of European criminology as part of its Modern Criminal Science Series, Lombroso’s work was naturally included. However, introducing the Institute’s 1911 translation of *Crime: Its Causes and Remedies*, Maurice Parmelee commented: ‘Strange to say, Lombroso seems to have been somewhat ignorant of biology, and especially the theory of heredity’. He cited particular confusion with the concept of criminal atavism and the indication that habits and acquired characteristics could be transmitted through heredity.⁴⁴ Still, Parmelee conceded that, despite his faults, Lombroso was ‘the great pioneer’ of ‘original and versatile genius and aggressive personality’ who began the ‘application of the positive, inductive methods of modern science to the problem of crime’.⁴⁵

In a 1912 review of Lombroso’s theories, Charles Ellwood also took issue with the overly-broad claims of criminal anthropology. Ellwood argued that ‘Lombroso makes a great mistake when he tries to extend the influence of the organic factor over the whole class of criminaloids’.⁴⁶ He criticised Lombroso’s use of epilepsy as a ‘master key’ for understanding criminal behaviour, possible ‘only by reason of his great extension of the definition of epilepsy’.⁴⁷ More broadly, Ellwood doubted the possibility of an overarching biological typology of criminals, pointing instead to socialisation in childhood. Lombroso thus failed to see ‘that criminal potentialities are normal in one sense to every individual and that the repressing of them is due to various social agencies’.⁴⁸ Even so Ellwood identified ‘one thing Lombroso’s work has definitely accomplished, and which will remain forever a monument to his name, and that is,

⁴³ John Henry Wigmore, ‘Memorial to Lombroso’, *JAICLC*, Vol. 2 (4) (1911): 491.

⁴⁴ Maurice Parmelee, ‘Introduction to the English Version’, in Cesare Lombroso (trans. Henry P. Horton), *Crime: Its Causes and Remedies* (Little Brown & Co.: Boston, MA: 1911): xxxi.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.* xxxii.

⁴⁶ Charles Ellwood, ‘Lombroso’s Theory of Crime’, *JAICLC*, Vol. 2 (5) (1912): 720.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.* 722.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.* 720.

that the criminal man must be studied and not simply crime in the abstract'.⁴⁹ Like Parmelee and Elwood, the criminologists of the AICLC memorialised Lombroso as a foundational figure while dismissing the substantive claims of his work.

As well as Lombroso's claims of biological roots, the anthropometric measures and methods of the Italian School were also doubted by American commentators. In a discussion of legislative efforts to establish laboratories to study 'the criminal, pauper and defective classes', attorney and anthropologist Edward Lindsey drew attention to the failure of other researchers to replicate Lombroso's claimed criminal types in comparative population studies where convicts showed 'no physical characteristics markedly different from their fellows'.⁵⁰ Healy, in his report for Committee A, included criminal anthropology but also viewed its measurements with scepticism and its theories as a dead end:

The high hopes of leaders of the anthropometric school of criminologists not having been fulfilled, especially with regard to our American population, the detailed work to be done in this field with the prospect of valuable results is, according to our best authorities, decidedly limited.⁵¹

Healy's reference here to 'our American population' likely referred to the work of anthropologist Franz Boas on apparent variations in physical structure between immigrant parents and their children reared in American cities. In 1911, Healy reviewed Boas' *Changes in the Bodily Form of Descendants of Immigrants* which significantly claimed that 'when these features of the body change, the whole bodily and mental make-up of the immigrants may change'.⁵² For Healy the suggestion of inconstant bodily features and types threw 'a very important side light upon the limitations of criminal anthropology'.⁵³

The AICLC's Committee G, tasked with investigating the relationship between crime and immigration, appears to have also adopted this rejection of anthropologically recognisable criminal types. Writing for committee G on protection from 'alien criminals' attorney Robert

⁴⁹ Ibid. 723.

⁵⁰ Edward Lindsey, 'The Bill to Establish a Criminological Laboratory at Washington', *JAICLC*, Vol. 1 (1) (1910): 108.

⁵¹ 'Bulletin No. 2, January 1910': 94.

⁵² Franz Boas quoted in William Healy, 'Review: Changes in Bodily Form of Descendants of Immigrants', *JAICLC*, Vol. 2 (3) (1911): 453.

⁵³ Ibid. 452.

Ferrari claimed that 'individual and racial differences rapidly disappear in the maelstrom of twentieth century life; and the world approaches one type'.⁵⁴ While suspicions were raised regarding the democratic competence and political influence of immigrant communities, on the subject of crime Ferrari claimed that 'the foreigner has been traduced and maligned'.⁵⁵ In their recommendations the AICLC's various committees thus pointed to the limitations and unreliability of classification based on the visible anthropometric and ethnic features of criminal anthropology.

Doubts surrounding the existence of a physically distinct criminal type coalesced in the international discussion of Charles Goring's *The English Convict*, published in 1913 as a refutation of Lombroso based on comparative measurements of 3000 convicted offenders with various samples of law-abiding people. Goring wasted no time in deriding 'the "facts" of criminal anthropology, gathered by prejudiced observers employing unscientific methods'. Lombroso's system of 'rough' anatomic observation appeared to the 'scientific critic' as merely the 'superstition of criminology' while Goring's own data compelled him to conclude that '*there is no such thing as a physical criminal type*'.⁵⁶ The JAICLC subsequently republished a series of Italian reviews of Goring alongside some of its own. The former first appealed to varying techniques of measurement. Lombroso's daughter Gina claimed that the English measures were 'not in any way comparable to the figures I have at hand' while Enrico Ferri noted that even physicians and psychiatrists 'do not have a sufficiently trained eye to detect stigmata of degeneration if they have not studied anthropological technique'.⁵⁷ The Italians then attempted to assimilate Goring's results to a broadly eclectic understanding of criminal anthropology. Ferri thus claimed that Lombroso had in fact accepted the 'bio-social origin of crime' while Gina thanked Goring for his contributions on the role of mental deficiency which had 'filled a real gap' and 'instead of being a blow to Lombroso's school, rather make for its

⁵⁴ Gino C. Speranza and Robert Ferrari, 'Crime and Immigration (Report of Committee G of the Institute)', *JAICLC*, Vol. 4 (4) (1913): 535.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.* 534.

⁵⁶ Charles Goring, *The English Convict: A Statistical Study* (H.M. Stationary Office: London: 1913): 18, 173.

⁵⁷ Gina Lombroso-Ferrero, 'The Results of an Official Investigation Made in England by Dr. Goring to Test the Lombroso Theory', *JAICLC*, Vol. 5 (2) (1914): 222; Enrico Ferri, 'The Present Movement in Criminal Anthropology Apropos of a Biological Investigation in the English Prisons', *JAICLC*, Vol. 5 (2) (1914): 226.

victory'.⁵⁸ A third Italian reviewer, Sante de Sanctis, similarly emphasised that 'the word "anthropology", in the phrase criminal anthropology, was always understood in its wide sense... as meaning the natural history of man, in his mental and physical aspects'. By contrast, he claimed, Goring had set up 'a man of straw': 'we all find it very easy to criticize the construction of an average physical type of criminal. Dr. Goring would not have insisted so much on that if he had known that Italian criminologists of the positive school have for some time abandoned that construction'.⁵⁹ These defenders of Lombroso, like Lombroso himself, steadily gave up or diluted the 'born criminal' to preserve the wider 'Italian School' of criminal anthropology.

Turning to the American reviews, only one by Paul E. Bowers, physician of the Indiana State Prison, was favourable to Lombroso.⁶⁰ For others the controversy surrounding the physical criminal type was, apparently, of little interest. Instead, they criticised Goring for overlooking the dynamic psychological and social factors in personality development.⁶¹ For psychiatrist William A. White, Goring's anti-Lombrosian effort was redundant: 'he has succeeded in demolishing the old idea of the born criminal as set forth by Lombroso, but such a concept did not need demolishing. It has ceased to have much life for some time past'.⁶² White now took Goring to task for his 'delusive' statistical methods which reduced human beings to categories of defect and heredity for 'mathematical juggling':

The difficulty with all such approaches to scientific problems is that the approaches are not sufficiently controlled by dynamic concepts. Some group of individuals is given a name, and forthwith the name becomes a thing, and the thing has clear-cut, rigid limitations and so is dealt with.⁶³

White's remarks reflected a growing dynamic perspective that would view offenders, or at least juvenile delinquents, through the 'interplay of action and reaction between what at their

⁵⁸ Ferri, 'The Present Movement in Criminal Anthropology': 225; Lombroso-Ferrero, 'The Results of an Official Investigation': 222.

⁵⁹ Sante de Sanctis, 'An Investigation of English Convicts and Criminal Anthropology', *JAICLC*, Vol. 5 (2) (1914): 230.

⁶⁰ Paul E. Bowers, 'Criminal Anthropology', *JAICLC*, Vol. 5 (3) (1914): 363.

⁶¹ H.D. Newkirk, 'The Sociologic Problem', *JAICLC*, Vol 5. (3) (1914): 353-357.

⁶² William A. White, 'Method and Motive From the Psychiatric Viewpoint', *JAICLC*, Vol 5. (3) (1914): 352.

⁶³ White, 'Method and Motive': 349.

focal points we term the individual and the environment'.⁶⁴ Even so, many still hoped that efficient measures and typologies would be found, moving increasingly from anthropometrics to psychometrics.

Criminal Types: Measuring Intelligence

Just as Goring turned from Lombroso's born criminal to the influence of mental defect and heredity on crime, American criminologists looked to intelligence testing and eugenics as new models for setting apart incorrigible offenders in courts, schools, detention homes and other institutions. Quantitative intelligence (later IQ) testing promised to differentiate American criminals in the early twentieth century, just as they subsequently promised to differentiate citizens and schoolchildren. This promise has, in turn, given way to critical historical study of these claims to measure innate ability which fallaciously turned correlated test scores into 'real' entities for discrimination. Perhaps the most famous of these is Stephen Jay Gould's critique of IQ and factor analysis from the creation of tests by American eugenicists, to Charles Spearman's 'general intelligence', and finally Herrnstein and Murray's *The Bell Curve*, throughout which 'objective' tests and scores are produced by prejudice and the error of reification.⁶⁵ Conversely, historians have shown how categories of mental disability became targets of political projects to 'other' and exclude, hidden behind professional, scientific procedures.⁶⁶

John Carson, meanwhile, considers the political motivation of intelligence testing in connection to republican democracy whereby scientific measurement was thought to reconcile principles of human equality with 'a justifiable basis for social distinctions'.⁶⁷ Twentieth-century America, in particular, took up tests as a way of sorting heterogeneous individuals into practical categories, work which brought 'professional opportunities for

⁶⁴ Ibid. 349.

⁶⁵ Gould, *The Mismeasure of Man*: 176-350.

⁶⁶ James W. Trent Jr., *Inventing the Feeble Mind: A history of Mental Retardation in the United States* (University of California Press: Berkeley, CA: 1994): 1-6.

⁶⁷ John Carson, *The Measure of Merit: Talents, Intelligence and Inequality in the French and American Republics* (Princeton University Press: Princeton, NJ: 2007): 2.

psychological testers, generating a group of professionals whose occupational identities were tied to using intelligence to make sense of the social world'.⁶⁸ Criminologists, similarly hoping that intelligence would straightforwardly sort the incorrigible from the accidental offender, tested their cases and contributed the 'defective' criminal to wider eugenic discourses on the 'menace of the feeble-minded' and the hereditary 'taint' of mental illness.⁶⁹

Returning to the AICLC, Committee A's 1910 plan of data collection identified new psychological tests as an important but unfinished development, hoping these would provide estimates of:

(a) Native ability, apart from school training or environmental factors. (b) if subnormal, degree of subnormality; if aberrant, type and degree of deviation. Both should be particularly estimated with reference to the educability and the possibility of the individual being a source of danger to the community.⁷⁰

'Subnormality' was equated with dangerousness, with new tests quantifying the extent of mental divergence and marking the point at which dangerous or irresponsible behaviour could apparently be expected. Soon researchers in the United States would be using the Binet-Simon scale for this purpose, translated and adapted by Henry H. Goddard, superintendent of New Jersey's Vineland Training School for the Feeble-minded. Originally developed by French educational psychologists Alfred Binet and Théodore Simon for use with struggling schoolchildren, the scale tested subjects on a series of items, increasing in difficulty to reflect normal ability at different ages. The limit of a child's ability to complete the items would thus reflect their mental age which, in comparison with chronological age, might indicate 'backwardness' or 'feeble-mindedness'.⁷¹ As well as applying the Binet-Simon Scale to New Jersey schoolchildren Goddard also carried out genealogical investigations of the feeble-minded at Vineland resulting in a eugenic study of one 'degenerate' family line, pseudonymously called 'the Kallikaks'.⁷² Indeed, having been consulted by Committee A in

⁶⁸ Ibid. 193.

⁶⁹ Trent, *Inventing the Feeble Mind*: 131-183; Porter, *Genetics in the Madhouse*: 251-280

⁷⁰ 'Bulletin No. 2, January 1910': 96.

⁷¹ Henry H. Goddard, 'Two Thousand Normal Children Measured by the Binet Measuring Scale of Intelligence', *The Pedagogical Seminary*, Vol. 18 (2) (1911): 232-259.

⁷² Henry H. Goddard, *The Kallikak Family: A Study in the Heredity of Feeble-Mindedness* (Macmillan: New York, NY, 1912): 33-49.

1909, Goddard had already supplied the AICLC with sample heredity charts for use in its data schedule, supposedly tracing the hereditary transmission of mental defect and criminality.⁷³

Criminological interest in intelligence scales and heredity charts thus reflected a number of assumptions surrounding the potential classification of criminal defectives: that there was a firm association between some form of feeble-mindedness or mental defect and criminal behaviour; that this defect was hereditary and precluded the reformation of the offender; and, that quantitative tools could reveal this defect and assist those handling delinquents and criminals. While all of these assumptions would be challenged in due course, for many contributors to the JAICLC mental defect and the tests for measuring it presented a promising alternative to anthropometrics. Mental measurement and classification would thence serve the aims of both criminal justice and eugenics, the latter consistently presented as 'humane' and, above all, scientific.

In September 1911 a report on 'criminals and defectives in Massachusetts' commented on a commission to the Governor which recommended, among other measures, the 'prevention of the birth of defectives and degenerates' to be achieved by extended custodial care but also marriage restrictions, sterilisation, mental examinations of prisoners and legal recognition of 'the dangerous class of defective delinquents'.⁷⁴ The following year a bill in the New York Legislature similarly proposed a new institution for feeble-minded delinquents, drawing on estimates that 1500 'mentally defective and semi-responsible' men passed through 'The Tombs' (Manhattan Detention Complex) each year and that 40% of inmates at the State's Reformatory in Elmira might also be defective. Here and in later reports on feeble-minded criminals, some were wary of such estimates. In this instance Orlando Lewis, of the New York Prison Association urged caution. Further standardisation was needed to avoid 'a most disagreeable and humiliating rebound in statistics and alleged percentages that have not been gained under conditions excluding so far as possible the chances of error'.⁷⁵ For many criminologists, however, fear of the feeble-minded was an opportunity. Subsequent studies of

⁷³ 'Bulletin No. 2, January 1910': 88-90.

⁷⁴ F.G., 'Criminals and Defectives in Massachusetts', *JAICLC*, Vol. 2 (3) (1911): 406.

⁷⁵ Orlando F. Lewis, 'The Feeble-Minded Delinquent', *JAICLC*, Vol. 3 (1) (1912): 11.

mental defectives, and escalating estimates of their proportion among offenders, joined eugenic rhetoric with calls to hire specialist testers throughout the machinery of criminal justice.

In September 1912 Goddard published his own perspective in the *JAICLC* on the relation of feeble-mindedness to juvenile delinquency. He began with an a priori argument based on his own estimate that 2% of school children were defective or feeble-minded. They were, he claimed, 'full of instincts and impulses' and, as a result, 'bound by their very nature to do things for which they must be called to account'.⁷⁶ Turning to statistics for Manhattan and the Bronx, Goddard pointed to a population of 404,546 public-school-children of whom 2%, or just over 8000, would be feeble-minded. In combination with figures of approximately 10000 juvenile court cases in these areas for the previous year Goddard implied that 80% of delinquents might be feeble-minded. Goddard supplemented this 'truly gratuitous assumption' with the figures of an unnamed 'philanthropic woman' of Newark, New Jersey, presenting mental examination results for 100 random cases from a Juvenile Detention home. According to these only one child had tested normal while 33 were mentally 'backward' and 66 feeble-minded (a mental age four or more years behind chronological age).⁷⁷

Though his own eventual calculations of feeble-mindedness amongst juvenile delinquents were lower, Goddard presented shockingly high estimates to emphasise the potential ignorance of courts regarding many, if not most, of the cases they handled. In particular, he alleged that the legal profession wrongly assumed that mental defectives were physically distinct and intuitively recognisable by appearance. For Goddard the 'wise and humane and just' solution was to appoint experts to the juvenile courts to carry out examinations of all cases using specialised mental tests and scales. This would identify a large, unrecognised population of feeble-minded delinquents for 'humane' confinement where their irresponsible natures could be managed:

In conclusion then; there seems to be every reason to believe that the matter stands thus: Twenty-five per cent at least of the children who come before our juvenile courts are feeble-minded. Therefore, it is incumbent upon every person

⁷⁶ Henry H. Goddard, 'The Responsibility of Children in the Juvenile Court', *JAICLC*, Vol. 3 (3) (1912): 366-367.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.* 467-469.

who is interested in the work of children to insist that every child who comes before the court shall be tested – by the Binet test until something better is evolved – and if he proves to be feeble-minded, he shall be provided for in an institution where he can be made happy and useful and cared for throughout life, rather than be sent to the reformatory for a few years or to a detention school for a few weeks and then be let out to commit misdemeanours again because he has no power of doing otherwise.⁷⁸

As others published results of Binet-Simon testing in the *JAICLC*, higher and higher estimates of feeble-mindedness amongst offenders became more common. Clara Harrison Town of the Friends Asylum for the Insane at Frankford, Pennsylvania set out four classes of delinquent: mentally normal, 'backward', 'moral imbeciles' and the 'great fourth group' of feeble-minded. Like others, Town assumed that a majority of all feeble-minded were criminals-to-be: 'the simple and appalling fact is that there are in the neighbourhood of 280,000 absolutely irresponsible individuals at large in our country. Can we doubt that they furnish a large quota not only of our juvenile delinquents but of all criminals?'⁷⁹ This increasing 'burden' would be solved by 'complete segregation of the whole class' which would 'put a stop to the rearing of large families of feeble-minded children and the perpetuation of bad stock'.⁸⁰ Paul E. Bowers also emphasised the determinism of defective heredity, presenting 100 habitual cases of his own and pronouncing that all were defective. Bowers concluded that 'habitual criminality may be said to be, even after environmental influences have been considered, an expression of a condition of psycho-physical pathology' and that, as such, 'the reformation of the chronic offender is a high-sounding illusion'.⁸¹

One of the most alarmist reports was contributed by William Hickson of the Psychopathic Laboratory of the Municipal Court of Chicago. Writing on 'The Defective Delinquent' in 1914, he provided results from mental tests of 245 cases from the Boys' Court, examined over the Laboratory's first two months. Of these 7.34% attained normal results while 8.16% were 'borderline' with the remaining 84.49% being 'distinctly subnormal morons'.⁸² For Hickson

⁷⁸ Ibid. 375.

⁷⁹ Clara Harrison Town, 'Mental Types of Juvenile Delinquent Considered in Relation to Treatment', *JAICLC*, Vol. 4 (1) (1913): 87.

⁸⁰ Ibid. 88.

⁸¹ Paul E. Bowers, 'The Recidivist', *JAICLC*, Vol. 5 (3) (1914), 414.

⁸² William J. Hickson, 'The Defective Delinquent', *JAICLC*, Vol. 5 (3) (1914): 399.

these results were 'revolutionary', explaining not only criminal behaviour but also large proportions of unemployment and marital unhappiness, as well as warranting the universal implementation of laboratory testing in courts:

I hope I have shown in a measure at least, what the true condition of affairs is, the importance of taking remedial measures at once, and also the importance of establishing psychopathic laboratories in connection with all the courts, which latter should be specialized to facilitate not only the work of the laboratory but the work of the courts themselves.⁸³

Hickson's purported mass of mental defectives necessitated new mental tests and procedures, and the experts who could apply them, to facilitate scientifically informed decision making in criminal justice. As well as eugenic concerns, these tests also responded to desires for quantitative objectivity and efficiency in managing cases and convicts. In his own application of 11 psychological tests, Guy G. Fernald, physician at the Massachusetts Reformatory, had written in 1913 on the 'extension and improvement of classification' in penological science. Tests would produce valid classifications and replace antiquated legal categories, the qualitative assessments of alienists, and any other form of personal judgement. Instead 'the computations of the science of mental measurement' would allow 'automatic arrangement in a series of subjects'.⁸⁴ Classification was, once again, focussed on the identification of the defective offender for 'treatment' and the protection of society through institutional segregation whereby 'their full development into social parasites and the propagation of their kind are prevented'.⁸⁵

The above authors used mental tests to produce an ever-increasing wave of feeble-minded criminals and thence demonstrate the value of these tools and their training in courts and prisons. However, rather than dominating the nascent criminological forum of the JAICLC, eugenic and quantifying imperatives were, in fact, questioned by those who valued reform, complexity and the 'wisdom' or 'sympathy' of officials. One of the most notable critics was editor Robert Gault who regularly cautioned the limits of heredity and mental tests in

⁸³ Ibid. 403

⁸⁴ Guy G. Fernald, 'The Recidivist', *JAICLC*, Vol. 3 (6) (1913): 871-872.

⁸⁵ Ibid. 874.

understanding offenders while instead pointing to necessary social reforms. In earlier editorials on 'race improvement through social inheritance', Gault had presented a modified eugenic view which emphasised the value of co-operative institutions and the proper education of 'those vigorous, adaptable individuals who are to make the social environment for tomorrow'.⁸⁶ In later editorials he sought to qualify or contend the particularly eugenic reports produced by the Municipal Court of Chicago and its branches. In November 1913 Chief Justice Olson claimed that approximately 50% of prostitutes passing through the Morals' Court were mentally defective or feeble-minded and that mental tests were necessary in public schools at the 5th grade to identify defective delinquents. Gault, meanwhile, responded that 'we are likely to commit a tragedy if we stand by the data of mental tests alone' in the judgement of 'prospective life histories'.⁸⁷ Delinquent careers, he argued, might instead be averted by firmer enforcement of truancy laws and more appealing vocational courses for juveniles. Similarly, after Hickson's aforementioned report that over 80% of Boys' court cases were feeble-minded, Gault contended that 'much of what appears as morosity at the chronological age of 20 is traceable to inexcusable social neglect'.⁸⁸ While doubting the extent of feeble-mindedness in Chicago's courts, Gault did not, however, challenge the need to control such cases where they supposedly existed. If 'discovered beyond the shadow of doubt' after accounting for social factors, Gault wrote that 'by a strong hand we must eliminate them by life-long segregation from the opportunity to do wrong to their neighbours'.⁸⁹

Few, if any, in the JAICLC challenged eugenics outright. Rather, Gault and others feared the overextension of mental testing and feeble-mindedness. The high stakes of permanent confinement along with inconsistent estimates and scores from testers suggested that the 'vague and elusive' category needed careful checking in light of different environmental conditions and the case's 'actual standard of life' as a member of society.⁹⁰ Moreover, while psychometrics appealed to many as a tool of convenience, others viewed reductive quantification and increasingly absurd percentages of mental defect with suspicion. Gault

⁸⁶ Robert H. Gault, 'Race Improvement Through Social Inheritance', *JAICLC*, Vol. 3 (2) (1912): 167.

⁸⁷ Robert H. Gault, 'Preventatives of Delinquency', *JAICLC*, Vol. 4 (5) (1914): 638.

⁸⁸ Robert H. Gault, 'The Laboratory in the Criminal Court', *JAICLC*, Vol 5 (2) (1914): 169.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.* 169.

⁹⁰ See also H.D. Newkirk, 'On the Diagnosis of Feeble-mindedness', *JAICLC*, Vol. 4 (2) (1913): 279; Charles E. Scelesh, in Bowers, 'The Recidivist': 418.

reminded readers that cases, observations and factors could be so variable and interconnected 'that they are not readily reducible to formulae', citing social and psychological phenomena as examples. In the same editorial he further implied that supposedly objective numerical tests of intelligence were now abused by inexperienced amateurs:

The tyro who has had little experience in dealing with individual cases cannot, at a single trial supply a reliable report upon the place of an individual on a scale of intelligence. In order that reports of high merit may be secured we must go to men or women of wide experience. The dissatisfaction with mental tests as a means of diagnosis is traceable to the fact that what the lay mind recognizes as palpable errors are often made by half-trained 'investigators', 'research directors', and even by men and women whose only qualification is that they have been 'trained' for six weeks in a psychological clinic.⁹¹

Training and experience remained necessary to balance the potential excesses of routinised testing and ensure that their results accorded with experience and 'common sense'. Another voice of caution was Augusta F. Bronner, now working with William Healy in Chicago. In November 1914 she published her 'research on the proportion of mental defectives among delinquents' based on work in the Juvenile Detention Home. Opening her report, Bronner hoped to address the 'great discrepancy between the general opinion of thoughtful and experienced observers such as judges, probation officers and teachers, on one hand, and statements made by some experimental workers on the other'.⁹² In particular she pointed to extraordinary estimates of feeble-mindedness amongst delinquents, some as high as 89%, as an indication of serious errors. Explaining these results she noted the Binet-Simon scale's upper age limit of 12 which rendered any discussions of adolescent and adult intelligence 'veritable nonsense'.⁹³ She also emphasised poor results created by the social setting of the examination, citing the offence taken by many to remedial tests and resulting disinterest, as well as heightened pressure in a judicial setting. In this context 'knowledge that one is to appear shortly before the judge creates such a state of mind as to vitiate all results'.⁹⁴

⁹¹ Robert H. Gault, 'Juvenile Delinquency and Mental Tests', *JAICLC*, Vol. 4 (3) (1913): 322.

⁹² Augusta F. Bronner, 'A Research on the Proportion of Mental Defectives Among Delinquents', *JAICLC*, Vol 5 (4) (1914): 561.

⁹³ *Ibid.* 562.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.* 562-563.

Bronner offered her own study of 505 delinquent boys and girls selected from the detention home across four months with the intention of separating the test from the trial context. Supposing that adequate school performance precluded feeble-mindedness, she first set school tests to be compared with chronological age and their highest grades according to school records. Having thus eliminated 270 cases as normal, the Binet-Simon test was then given to the remainder. Reporting on the whole group of 505, Bronner reported that approximately 90% were 'undoubtedly normal'.⁹⁵ These results may have directly contradicted those of other testers but, she reiterated:

These results are not contradictory to the common-sense experience of judges and others who deal with delinquent adolescents. Those who are familiar with these problems know from their own experience the number of adolescent offenders who are extremely bright and whose delinquencies arise so very often from causes other than lack of mental ability.⁹⁶

While proponents of testing espoused objectivity and standardisation, Bronner and her results turned back to the local experience and reasonable expectations of those who regularly worked with delinquents. Of course, lay and legal 'experience' could equally be expressed as prejudice towards 'obviously' defective cases. Hickson's report had cited Judge Scully of the Boys' Court who 'told me he could see without mental tests the subnormal nature of many of the boys he was dealing with'.⁹⁷ In any case, the push for measurement and mental classification was soon met by attempts to balance these results with 'common sense' which could account for individual idiosyncrasies, complexities and understanding which eluded quantification.

The Critique of Hereditary Criminality

Above discussions of mental testing and its dangers provided one facet of the reaction against crude schemes of mental classification. Another can be seen in attacks on the untenable notion of 'hereditary criminality'. Proponents of intelligence testing in criminology frequently

⁹⁵ Ibid. 565.

⁹⁶ Ibid. 567.

⁹⁷ Hickson, 'The Defective Delinquent': 398.

reported that offenders were predominantly 'subnormal', in turn making eugenic segregation a core approach to crime prevention. However, moving beyond segregation, Sterilisation for the purported reduction of defective criminal stock proved more contentious. Debate on this topic was initiated in the JAICLC by New York attorney Charles A. Boston, a previous commentator on medical privilege in courts who, in September 1913, published 'a protest against laws authorizing the sterilization of criminals and imbeciles'.⁹⁸ In particular, Boston targeted the 1907 Indiana sterilisation law which had since been used as a model by other states and which required that:

Every institution entrusted with the care of confirmed criminals, idiots, rapists and imbeciles, should appoint two skilled surgeons, in conjunction with its chief physician to examine the mental and physical condition of such inmates as may be recommended by the institutional physician and a board of managers; and if in the judgement of this committee of experts and the board of managers, procreation is inadvisable, and there is no probability of improvement in the mental condition of the inmate, it shall be lawful for the surgeons to perform an operation for the prevention of procreation, but not unless the case shall have been pronounced unimprovable.⁹⁹

For Boston, the first egregious feature of the legislation was the assertion, as part of state law, that 'heredity plays a most important part in the transmission of crime, idiocy and imbecility'. Here the legislature had 'accepted as established fact, the finest shading in the laws of heredity, which are not yet established as a fact in their very broadest outlines'.¹⁰⁰

Boston challenged the statutory assumption of hereditary criminality, citing arguments that mental and physical traits were not directly comparable. In turn he noted that the results concerning the heritability of intelligence were only verifiable statistically at the population level while 'these sterilization laws deal with individual cases; and they authorize probably ignorant boards of managers, probably ignorant, if not to say malicious, wardens and superintendents, and possibly, if not probably ignorant institutional physicians to select

⁹⁸ For American debates on medical privilege see Andreas-Holger Maehle, *Contesting Medical Confidentiality: Origins of the Debate in the United States, Britain and Germany* (University of Chicago Press: Chicago, IL: 2016): 18-26.

⁹⁹ Charles A. Boston, 'A Protest Against Laws Authorizing the Sterilization of Criminals and Imbeciles', *JAICLC*, Vol. 4 (3) (1913): 327.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.* 328

individual victims for the sacrifice'.¹⁰¹ His scientific doubts were then joined by legal and ethical arguments that 'the public welfare requires neither torture nor sterilization'.¹⁰² It is particularly notable, in light of criminological emphases on the objectivity and expert application of tests, that Boston instead claimed the selection of defectives was an arbitrary process:

Now we are confronted with a new flood of laws, which leaves the personal liberty and a part of the life of the individual and posterity to the arbitrary judgement and guess, if not the mere whim or caprice of possibly unskilled and unsympathetic judges, without any of the substantial safeguards, which we all regard as our greatest inheritance from the English constitution and the founders of our own nation.¹⁰³

For Boston the sterilisation laws facilitated both erroneous science and injustice.

Others contributing to the JAICLC primarily addressed Boston's first concern, increasingly criticising the notion that criminal behaviour was directly heritable. Contributors now warned against the conflation of hereditary mental defect and hereditary criminality, however, in separating these categories, many criminologists readily left others deemed 'feeble-minded' to the discretion of eugenic injustice. A response to Boston from physician Henry B. Hemenway thus argued that because there was 'practically no evidence that criminality is heritable' the sterilisation of criminals could not be considered a proper 'eugenic' measure whereas there was 'no question whatever as to the fact that certain mental defectiveness is transmissible by heredity'. The problem was thus, one of legislative conflation rather than injustice wherein 'sterilization laws should never combine these two classes of cases under one statute'.¹⁰⁴

This reasoning would be repeated in the AICLC's eventual report produced by Committee H on 'Sterilization of Criminals'. On the subject of whether criminality was heritable the committee concluded that 'it is necessary to quote only a few sentences to show that there is

¹⁰¹ Ibid. 330.

¹⁰² Ibid. 348.

¹⁰³ Ibid. 358.

¹⁰⁴ Henry B. Hemenway, 'Sterilization: Mr. Boston Criticized', *JAICLC*, Vol. 4 (5) (1914): 748-749.

as yet no agreement concerning the answer to this question'.¹⁰⁵ In one quotation Goddard now noted that it was a 'serious mistake' to bring criminality into the matter of sterilisation since theories of criminal heredity were now losing ground. Goddard stated that 'criminality is not born; it is made' but then claimed that the easiest 'material' for making criminals was feeble-mindedness, 'therefore if we could make our law apply to the feeble-minded and say nothing about the criminal, we would get under that head probably all of the criminals that need to be considered'.¹⁰⁶ Indeed while deferring on the issue of hereditary criminality, the committee was willing to accept that feeble-mindedness, epilepsy, alcoholism, and syphilis were heritable. For Committee H, these traits thus remained potentially acceptable targets of eugenics for the indirect reduction of criminality:

leaving aside the question as to whether or not sterilization is morally, socially or legally permissible to be considered later, it must be stated here that it is granted by most authorities that the sterilization of individuals possessed of the traits mentioned in the question, and in whose cases the defect would be heritable, would reduce the amount of criminality in the next generation.¹⁰⁷

Later discussing the sterilisation report at the sixth annual meeting of the AICLC in October 1914, Boston complained that, while dropping the notion of criminality as a directly heritable trait, the committee had tacitly accepted eugenic approaches to other traits, including the 'cold-blooded' and 'utterly arbitrary methods of cutting off reproduction'.¹⁰⁸

William Healy's contribution to the debate in 1915, working alongside Edith Spaulding of the South Framingham Reformatory for Women in Massachusetts, also preserved a qualified notion of indirect hereditary causation. Spaulding and Healy discussed 668 Chicago cases (out of a total 1000) for whom adequate information concerning heredity could be gathered, to ascertain whether the direct inheritance of criminality could be proven. They noted that, prior to June 1913, eight states had adopted statutes authorising the sterilisation of 'confirmed criminals' as a distinct category. However, they argued that criminality was only indirectly

¹⁰⁵ Joel D. Hunter, 'Sterilization of Criminals (Report of Committee H of the Institute)', *JAICLC*, Vol. 5 (4) (1914): 518.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.* 519.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.* 520.

¹⁰⁸ 'Proceedings of the Sixth Annual Meeting of the American Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology', *JAICLC*, Vol. 5 (5) (1915): 747.

‘transmissible’ between generations as a result of other physical, mental and social factors of inheritance and upbringing. They initially separated 245 such cases due to their mental deficiency or epilepsy (both taken as indirect causative factors). Of the remainder, 271 had no known criminal antecedents in previous generations while, in the other 152, Healy and Spaulding sought to demonstrate that other causes could account for criminal behaviour. These cases were divided into 8 classes of predominating factors accounting for criminality, including ‘neuropathic inheritance’, developmental, environmental, and emotional factors in varying combinations. This left only 15 cases with criminal forebears in which other causative factors remained inconclusive, possibly suggesting the direct inheritance of criminality. Concluding, they dismissed the category of hereditary ‘confirmed criminals’ but notably acceded to the indirect role of other heritable characteristics:

In the study of 1,000 cases we can find no proof of the existence of hereditary criminalistic traits as such... on the other hand, through studies of the eugenicists, and advances in medical and psychologic knowledge crime will be found indirectly related to heredity in ways most important for society to recognize. The underlying foundations of criminalism are the evils to combat. As existing apart from definite discoverable mental, physical or environmental causations of criminalistic behaviour, we may regard the idea of bare criminalistic traits, especially in their hereditary aspects, as an unsubstantiated metaphysical hypothesis.¹⁰⁹

In criticising the unsubstantiated metaphysics of criminal inheritance, Healy and Spaulding were not making anti-eugenic claims. Like others in the JAICLC, they dismissed the notion of ‘direct’ heredity while keeping categories of ‘indirect’ significance. Error lay not in the emphasis on heredity but rather in obscuring actual underlying causes.

This argument extended to a critique of the heredity charts, seen earlier in the plan of Committee A (Fig. 1) but now considered ‘no proof of the inheritance of criminality, no matter how many criminals they show’.¹¹⁰ A simple list of criminal forebears failed to account for causative factors for further investigation. One chart showing seven criminal family members was thus investigated and shown to represent ‘extremely bad home environment’, apparently

¹⁰⁹ Edith R. Spaulding and William Healy, ‘Inheritance as a Factor in Criminality: A Study of a Thousand Cases of Young Repeated Offenders’, *JAICLC*, Vol. 4 (6) (1914): 857-858.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.* 849.

dominated by an alcoholic mother with the family being regularly broken up or moved following the father's successive arrests.¹¹¹ In turn, a chart apparently demonstrating a boy's inheritance of criminal tendencies from 'wandering' forebears was elaborated on, noting his lack of supervision and contact with bad companions which, according to Healy, was corrected after a single interview with the child and his parents. For Healy and Spaulding, reliance solely on facts of heredity, conveyed by eugenicists through charts, thus resulted in an impoverished view of causation:

This case may represent several things – bad companions, perhaps some innate characteristics, much worry over his conduct, and a definite mental conflict. However, it shows no evidence of the existence of 'hereditary criminal instincts'. The case is a good example of the danger of interpreting causation of human behaviour from the bare symbols of a heredity chart.¹¹²

Through these debates heredity was broken up, from an overarching cause and schema of eugenic, criminal classification, into a series of indirect potential causes, varying across cases. No criminologist would outright discard mental tests. These tests, and the categories of 'defective', 'subnormal' and 'borderline' intelligence they apparently distinguished, remained a continuing feature of work with criminals and delinquents long after initial debates. Many could not accept 'feeble-mindedness' and intelligence tests as *the* model for criminological theory and practice. Rather, these procedures and concepts remained part of an expanding 'toolkit' as practitioners came to terms with the complex factors of the individual case.

Conclusion: Categories and Complexity

This chapter has provided a brief survey of the JAICLC's early years to illustrate the pressures of interdisciplinarity, information, and practical prediction facing the nascent discipline of American criminology. The above discourses on the born criminal or 'defective' must be viewed in the administrative context of criminal justice, as models for the measurement, classification and judgement of offenders and their future propensities. Though both would succumb to counterexamples and complexity, the criminal type, physically or mentally demarcated, initially promised to resolve varying perspectives on the multifaceted criminal

¹¹¹ Ibid. 851.

¹¹² Ibid. 854.

into a streamlined set of standardised protocols, identifying those thought congenitally predisposed or even predetermined to offend. Indeed, the failure of criminal anthropology and 'feeble-mindedness' as unifying models of 'criminality' left practitioners in search of new methods to augment these and efficiently dispose of cases. In the Municipal Court of Chicago's Psychopathic Laboratory, for example, William Hickson had trained volunteers for 'work according to standardized methods' including the Binet-Simon tests, performed by Mrs. Hickson.¹¹³ From 1914-1917 a total of 4447 cases were referred by judges expecting advice on the sentencing and commitment of mental and moral 'defectives'.¹¹⁴ Hickson had earlier tested and labelled the vast majority of his cases as 'morons' but by 1920 this categorisation was acknowledged as untenable:

Thorough testing of inmates showed that there were always some who were normal in intelligence, and yet highly mischievous, not to say incorrigible. This newer body of facts... negated in a way a theory which not long before had been announced as impregnable.¹¹⁵

In the meantime, however, mental defect had been superseded by 'emotional defect' through the psychopathic laboratory's regular psychiatric diagnosis of 'dementia praecox' to organise criminal cases, 'practically all of whom are subnormal in emotions'.¹¹⁶ Symptomatically varied, purportedly hereditary, and largely incurable, the Kraepelinian diagnosis of dementia praecox became, in historian Richard Noll's words, a "useful construct" for sorting (and institutionalising) diverse cases in early-twentieth-century American psychiatry.¹¹⁷ It likewise became for Hickson the new 'great causative factor, the *leit motif* of crime'.¹¹⁸ Amidst the busy courts of Chicago, insistence on a 'great causative factor' certainly made everyday practice more straightforward. Another psychiatrist writing of his coming visit to Chicago in 1916 referred to Hickson simply as the '3 minute dementia praecox man'.¹¹⁹

¹¹³ Hickson, 'The Defective Delinquent': 398.

¹¹⁴ William Hickson, *Report of the Psychopathic Laboratory of the Municipal Court of Chicago for the Years May 1, 1914, to April 30, 1917* (Chicago, IL, 1917): 7-8.

¹¹⁵ *Twelfth, Thirteenth and Fourteenth Annual Reports of the Municipal Court of Chicago for the Years December 2, 1917, to December 6, 1920, Inclusive* (Chicago, IL, 1920): 33.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.* 34.

¹¹⁷ Noll, *American Madness*: 99-100.

¹¹⁸ Hickson, *Report of the Psychopathic Laboratory*: 39.

¹¹⁹ Jau Don Ball to August Vollmer, 26th December 1916, Berkeley Police Department Records, 1909-1932, BANC MSS 72/227 c, Bancroft Library, University of California Berkeley, Box 2 Folder 16.

The flipside of Hickson's desire for unifying categories was William Healy's growing insistence on causal complexity. Working in the same city's juvenile court, Healy set out this perspective in the JAICLC's first issue:

In the face of such complex and obviously highly individualized phenomena a scientific inquirer is early forced to doubt the efficacy of investigating the causes of crime by any generalized method and by the same token he must question the system of treating the criminal through institutional life as such. In the study undertaken for our institute into the beginnings of criminality, although, of course we have ourselves been seeking viewpoints from which sweepingly to pierce the gloom which pervades the situation, we have grown by our very experiences extremely skeptical of generalizations concerning any portion of the subject. On the other hand, it seems to us that we get, by a fairly intensive investigation of the individual, his antecedents and his environment, familial, educational and otherwise, a quite unexpected degree of enlightenment upon the causative factors of his career.¹²⁰

Three published cases would later substantiate this individualised eclecticism. The first described 'a mentally normal, but backward and excessively nervous lad', expected by probation officers to become violent in the future. Healy described how more sympathetic inquiry revealed a skull fracture from age six and eye-strain, prompting difficulty with school studies and excessive irritation caused by the noise of city. He suggested improvement following appropriate medical provision in a peaceful environment. By contrast, the second case was described as 'a victim of heredity' based on moral 'weakness' in spite of good home conditions and the father's revelation of a family history of insanity and instability. Here, the prognosis and recommendation was pessimistic, indicating little chance of overcoming the 'hereditary taint'. Finally, Healy described a boy whose delinquency was initially unexplainable until, in an interview, he claimed to be set on 'becoming a bad man', revealing that his father had lied about the boy's dead biological mother. Here Healy explained the boy's wrongdoing as the result of repressed dissatisfactions of the mental 'hintergrund' to be untangled and reconciled.¹²¹ Healy's cases deliberately presented a range of causal models: a combination of

¹²⁰ William Healy, 'The Individual Study of the Young Criminal', *JAICLC*, Vol. 1 (1) (1910): 50.

¹²¹ *Ibid.* 850-854.

physical injury and disability with a poor environment; hereditary weakness and potential insanity; and repressed emotional conflict. Different causes would, however, vary from case to case, requiring intensive specialist investigation. As Healy concluded, 'cases and causes can and should be put into general categories, but ever will be needed the careful, well-qualified diagnostician for each separate case'.¹²² The Committee A plan we began with, presented those in search of uniform criminal data with a dizzying array of potentially relevant facts but Healy, its author, had constructed it to accommodate the above complexity: 'such work as this system represents no mere gathering of statistics, but aims directly at diagnosis, prognosis and remedy'.¹²³ Facts and futures, in Healy's subsequent work, would be organised not through crude standardised measures but through the personal expertise and insight of the diagnostician.

¹²² Ibid. 854.

¹²³ 'Bulletin No. 2, January, 1910': 85.

Chapter 2: Following the Delinquent's Story

Initial promises to guide judgement had rested on the overoptimistic hopes placed in measures of body and intelligence to identify a distinct hereditary class of dangerous 'defectives'. While anthropometry and intelligence testing failed to consistently pick out the criminal 'type', courts were already turning to advice from new psychiatric experts. In this chapter I will set out the model of diagnostic and prognostic expertise established and developed by William Healy in the juvenile courts of Chicago and Boston. Beginning in 1909 in Chicago's Juvenile Psychopathic Institute (JPI), Healy, later assisted by Augusta Bronner, examined and interviewed cases to guide sentencing and 'treatment'. This culminated with the 1915 publication of *The Individual Delinquent* as a practical diagnostic textbook. Then, in 1917, Healy and Bronner were invited to co-direct the new Judge Baker Foundation (JBF) in Boston, establishing the methods followed by other clinics in the interwar child guidance movement. Rather than search for physical or psychological markers of a distinct criminal type, Healy instead stressed the investigation of mental and behavioural antecedents specific to each individual. Criminality was understood biographically, traced back to earlier roots and followed into later life through delinquent 'trends', 'tendencies', 'careers' and so on. As Healy explained: 'the determinants of delinquent careers are the conditions of youth'.¹ In turn, original causes and developing tendencies indicated future criminal behaviour to be pre-emptively treated.

By locating the origins of criminality in childhood, Healy and Bronner drew on various earlier discourses on both the danger and promise of developing young minds. Following contemporary evolutionary debates, nineteenth-century child study and 'baby science' had searched for the recapitulation of human prehistory in infancy, wherein 'savage' children required education, training and civilisation for adult life.² Developing his notion of atavistic criminality, Lombroso had proposed that 'the most horrible crimes have their origin in those

¹ William Healy, *The Individual Delinquent*: 11.

² Sally Shuttleworth, *The Mind of the Child*: 181-206; Matthew Eddy, 'The Politics of Cognition: Liberalism and the Evolutionary Origins of Victorian Education', *British Journal for the History of Science*, Vol. 50 (4) (2017): 677-699.

animal instincts of which childhood gives us a pale reflection'.³ Meanwhile, in the United States, G. Stanley Hall's 1904 *Adolescence* pointed to the developing antagonism of 'gang instincts', 'reversion to nomadic lifestyle' and other rejections of civilised society in youth.⁴ Regarded as 'essentially antisocial, selfishness, refusing to submit to the laws of altruism', adolescence thus became, for Hall, 'the best key to the nature of crime'.⁵

Conversely, against the feared recapitulation of a savage past, Americans entering the twentieth century regarded the modern city as a source of temptations for youth in new immigrant and consumer cultures. Amidst the disruption of urban life, children became targets for emotional management whilst themselves finding 'opportunities for escape from worried guidance'.⁶ However, pessimism regarding the child's disruptive tendencies or influences was joined by the optimism that malleable youth could be corrected and saved from a criminal path. Nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century movements for juvenile reformatories, courts, foster care and therapeutics consistently returned to an idealised belief in improvement through love, familial structures and what Stephen Schlossman has termed 'affectional discipline':

Emphasis on persuasion and manipulation of children's native emotional resources, especially their capacity to receive and reciprocate affection; on strong maternal influences; on close, frequent and informal relationships between youngsters and exemplary authority figures; on isolated domestic settings in order to avoid perverse and worldly influences; this was affectional discipline.⁷

In their role as psychiatric advisors to juvenile courts, Healy and Bronner also returned to themes of unstable childhood and the promise of replacing 'abnormal' influences with wholesome relationships and ideals.

³ Lombroso, *Crime: Its Causes and Remedies*: 368.

⁴ G. Stanley Hall, *Adolescence: Its Psychology and its Relation to Physiology, Anthropology, Sociology, Sex, Crime, Religion and Education*, Vol. 1 (D. Appleton & Co.: New York, NY: 1904): 325-410.

⁵ Ibid. 405.

⁶ Peter Stearns, 'Historical Perspectives on Twentieth-Century American Childhood', in Willem Koops and Michael Zuckerman (eds.), *Beyond the Century of the Child: Cultural History and Developmental Psychology* (University of Philadelphia Press: Philadelphia, PA: 2003): 96.

⁷ Stephen Schlossman, *Love and the American Delinquent*: 53.

Across these intellectual trends, historians have noted not only new anxieties surrounding youth but also the frequently gendered contestation of child-rearing, child study and expert guidance. Sally Shuttleworth thus describes late nineteenth-century attempts to promote a 'disinterested' science of childhood over 'sentimental' maternal or literary accounts. At the same time, however 'upwardly aspiring male scientists... were in an uneasy relation of dependence upon parents and teachers to supply their data'.⁸ In Hall's case also, the American child study movement saw the denigration of interpretations by female baby observers, even as these women provided essential first-hand accounts, 'turning their duties to home and hearth into scientific assets'.⁹ Looking to child guidance and the JBF, I will follow Kathleen Jones in emphasising 'the problem of authority' as a central theme.¹⁰ Juvenile justice, even augmented by psychiatric guidance, was characterised by competing claims to the child's future from police, teachers, charities and parents as well as officials or experts. The 'leap of faith' that juvenile courts, parents and children shared identical interests in treatment was frequently met in practice by the reality of the court as 'a source of arbitrary punitive authority, and an arena for the evocation of hostile emotions on all sides'.¹¹ Beyond the court, charitable and welfare workers, upon whom correctional measures often depended, connected assistance with their own standards of moral improvement, just as often ignored by those they sought to improve. Writing on the 'web of class' formed by these agencies in Boston, Eric Schneider notes that by the turn of the twentieth century, 'reformers, like the police, the truant officer, or city inspectors, were simply part of the urban landscape to be negotiated'.¹² In the context of predicting criminality, we must ask how new experts like Healy and Bronner negotiated these interests to leverage their own authority over children's futures.

In this chapter I will discuss how Healy and Bronner used narrative in attempting to establish their explanatory and predictive authority regarding a given child's behaviour. Central to their diagnostic and prognostic technique was the elicitation of the child's 'own story', an opportunity to analyse underlying motives and conflicts while also constructing a

⁸ Shuttleworth, *The Mind of the Child*: 272.

⁹ Christine Von Oertzen, 'Science in the Cradle: Milicent Shinn and Her Home-Based Network of Baby Observers, 1890-1910, *Centaurus*, Vol. 55 (2015): 190.

¹⁰ Jones, *Taming the Troublesome Child*: 3.

¹¹ Sealander, *The Failed Century of the Child*: 22-23; Schlossman, *Love and the American Delinquent*: 188.

¹² Schneider, *In the Web of Class*: 142.

chronological narrative of delinquency, indicating both earlier causes and ongoing future trends. I will begin with the establishment of Healy's individual authority in the JPI of Chicago where he set out his method of studying the individual delinquent. From there I turn to published case histories of the JBF to discuss the predictive claims drawn from these 'stories' of delinquency. Evidently, however, such claims were often contested, and behind each story there remained myriad suspicions and hopes for the JBF to navigate in recommending proper adjustments. Ultimately, Healy's personal ability to synthesise the facts of a case into meaningful explanations and predictions remained dependent on the wider community which provided information, raised concerns and took on juvenile charges.

Expertise and the Individual Delinquent

Concurrently with the creation of the AICLC, Healy was beginning the work in Chicago that would establish him as an expert in diagnosing and treating delinquents. The JPI began work in 1909 with the financial backing of Ethel Sturges Dummer (1866-1954), juvenile reformer and wife of the Chicago banker William F. Dummer. In this way the JPI was an extension of earlier progressive child saving efforts in Chicago through Jane Addams' Hull House settlement, the Juvenile Protective Association (JPA) and the juvenile court movement. In a later memorandum, Dummer recalled how, as a member of the JPA, she had observed juvenile court cases in 1906 and was struck by 'those who again and again repeated one delinquent act with no apparent reason', thinking them 'abnormal' and requiring study by a 'skilled physician'.¹³ Calling for candidates to direct the institute in January 1909, she outlined a medical and psychological study 'to ascertain as far as possible in what degrees delinquency is caused or influenced by mental or physical defect or abnormality' and, thence to suggest and apply remedies. As this circular explained, the value of this inquiry would 'be measured entirely by the quality of the director'.¹⁴ However, replies from Hugo Münsterberg, Shepherd Ivory Franz, Adolf Meyer and other eminent psychologists and psychiatrists stressed the difficulty of finding the 'right man' with both medical and psychological training.¹⁵ On the

¹³ [Ethel Sturges Dummer], 'Mental Hygiene', N.D., Ethel Sturges Dummer Papers, 1689-1962, A-127, Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA (subsequently ESDP), Folder 578.

¹⁴ Circular from Mrs. W.F. Dummer, 2nd January 1909, ESDP, Folder 372.

¹⁵ Hugo Münsterberg to Dummer, 9th January 1909; Shepherd Ivory Franz to Dummer, 8th January 1909; Adolf Meyer to Dummer, 11th January 1909, ESDP, Folder 372.

recommendation of Meyer and William James (1842-1910), the position was offered in March 1909 to William Healy, then an assistant neurologist practising in Chicago. Directed by Healy, funded by Dummer for the next five years, and with future US Children's Bureau Director Julia Lathrop as president, the JPI represented the union of progressive child savers and medical-scientific expertise. However, as Jones notes, 'having made space in the child saving arena for psychiatry and psychology, child savers found themselves with less and less control over how the space was used'.¹⁶ By the time its research concluded and was incorporated into interwar child guidance, the JPI's pioneering work would be synonymous with the personal skill and insight of William Healy.

Born in 1869, Healy attended Harvard from 1893-1899 before obtaining his M.D. from the University of Chicago in 1900 and would go onto postgraduate study in Vienna, Berlin, and London before coming to the attention of Chicago's juvenile reformers.¹⁷ We have already encountered his eclectic approach to criminal data and the individual case in the previous chapter, however, like Dummer, he had earlier framed delinquency in the same terms of innate 'abnormality': In a 1908 letter to Lathrop he proposed that 'the problem of the delinquent, the backward, the degenerate, the mental defective, the unfit, is in certain phases pretty much all one and the same'. Keeping in mind the fundamental question of causation, Healy continued on the importance of establishing 'proper values of the various physical and mental stigmata'. Conversely, his proposal suggested doubts in the prevailing criminal typologies, hoping that the JPI would produce 'a work that may be as classical as that of Lombroso, that may be much more scientifically founded and a thousand times more practically beneficial'.¹⁸ From his plan of data and subsequent case studies in the JAICLC it is clear that Healy rapidly altered these views in favour of a dynamic approach.

A student of William James, Healy's eventual interpretations of misconduct, mental 'conflict', and the importance of ideation accorded with pragmatic contemporary understandings of

¹⁶ Jones, *Taming the Troublesome Child*: 61.

¹⁷ 'Healy, William', in John A. Garraty and Mark C. Carnes (eds.), *American National Biography*, Vol. 10 (Oxford University Press: Oxford: 1999): 458-459.

¹⁸ William Healy to Julia Lathrop, 4th April 1908, ESDP, Folder 578.

American psychotherapy, educational psychology, and 'mind cure'.¹⁹ Healy extended the influence of Meyer's 'common sense psychiatry' into the field of juvenile delinquency. Like Meyer he stressed causal plurality and understood mental health and illness as part of an ongoing adaptive process between organism and environment to be traced over time.²⁰ Conversely, Healy regularly avoided strict diagnostic classifications of mental disease and psychosis. Specifically citing Meyer in *The Individual Delinquent* he thus lauded his 'campaign against too ready naming of mental abnormalities, and, indeed, against the necessity of naming at all except when well-known disease processes or symptomatic pictures are found'.²¹

As well as dynamic influences from American psychiatry Healy also drew on distinctly psychoanalytic concepts, most notably the role of sexuality and the subconscious in mental conflict and criminal behaviour. His plan of criminal data produced for the AICLC in 1910 had included 'psycho-analysis' whereby the offender would be 'urged to give a direct narration of his own career and of the causes which led him into delinquency'.²² While his specific contacts during his European studies remain unclear, Healy subsequently cited the works of Richard von Kraft-Ebbing (1840-1902), Albert Moll (1862-1939), and Sigmund Freud (1856-1939).²³ As will be seen, combined American and European influences led Healy, and later Bronner, to organise their clinical work in Boston around dynamic, biographical analyses of underlying mental antecedents and their ongoing influence. Healy's JPI work showed a prototypical form of this approach. Dummer thus recalled an early 'astonishing case' of a girl's stealing, tried in the Chicago Detention Home while Healy sat to one side:

Dr. Healy asked: what do you think about just before you take something? The answer was: 'The name John. If I see it in my reading lesson I must take something'. Dr. Healy listened and there came to the child's conscious memory an experience which had apparently passed below the level of awareness; a condition which at the time Dr. Healy called the sub-conscious. A little boy had made suggestions to her which she had resisted, but she had gone with him to

¹⁹ Sonu Shamdasani, 'Psychotherapy, 1909: Notes on a Vintage', in John Burnham (ed.), *After Freud Left: A Century of Psychoanalysis in America* (University of Chicago Press: Chicago, IL: 2012): 31-47; Donald F. Duclow, 'William James, "Mind Cure" and the Religion of Healthy-Mindedness', *Journal of Religion and Health*, Vol. 41 (1) (2002): 45-56.

²⁰ For Meyer's theory of psychobiology see S.D. Lamb, *Pathologist of the Mind: Adolf Meyer and the Origins of American Psychiatry* (Johns Hopkins University Press: Baltimore, MD: 2014): 59-99.

²¹ Healy, *The Individual Delinquent*: 441.

²² 'Bulletin No. 2, January, 1910', p 96.

²³ See Healy, *The Individual Delinquent*: 247.

a store and stolen some fruit. The astonishing result of recalling the incident was the immediate cessation of the stealing habit.²⁴

As well as Healy's analytic approach, this case, thus presented, also pointed to growing emphasis in the JPI on his personal powers of sympathy and persuasion. With Healy's visit to the East Coast in 1912, giving a course at the Harvard Summer School, Lathrop informed Dummer of Healy's success with local academics and practitioners. A letter from Jessie Hodder, superintendent of the Women's reformatory at Framingham Massachusetts, thus described Healy's course as 'thrilling', swaying a class who were previously 'Vineland fed' (referring to Goddard's eugenic work in testing 'feeble-minded' inmates at the Vineland Training School). As well as Healy's personal 'magnetism' and 'fundamental religion', Hodder reported that 'he so impressed one with the value of his line of thought that one was simply carried along by one's common sense and reason'.²⁵ Whether reflecting the religious convictions of Healy (otherwise obscure in his other work) or Hodder's own experience, such language pointed to Healy's charismatic abilities as an interlocutor and as a promoter of 'common sense' diagnosis.

Healy increasingly became the face of the JPI but still relied on the assistance of a rolling staff of largely female volunteers, coming from various universities for experience with the Institute's growing caseload.²⁶ One of these, joining the JPI in September 1913, was Augusta Fox Bronner, having attended Healy's course at Harvard that summer. Previously working with educational psychologist Edward Thorndike at Columbia University Teachers' College, her doctoral dissertation had challenged the presumed link between mental test scores and female delinquency, a link we have already seen her challenging in the previous chapter.²⁷ Joining her experience with psychological tests with an overall dynamic outlook, she would accompany Healy from the JPI to the JBF, and in 1932 the two would eventually marry. Even so, emphasis in the JPI especially remained on Healy's purported skill with juvenile delinquents. Writing to him in later years, when her own interests in psychology had merged

²⁴ [Dummer], 'Mental Hygiene', ESDP, Folder 578.

²⁵ Jessie Hodder to Lathrop, 28th August 1912, ESDP, Folder 578.

²⁶ Healy to Dummer, 31st August 1914, ESDP, Folder 578.

²⁷ 'Bronner, Augusta Fox (1881-1966)', in Marilyn D. McShane and Frank P. Williams III (eds.), *Encyclopedia of Juvenile Justice* (Sage Publications: Thousand Oaks, CA: 2003): 37-38.

with spiritualism, Dummer went as far as to call Healy a 'mystic', remembering 'Augusta's telling me that when none of the staff could get at a boy's difficulties, they would say, 'wait for Dr. Healy'. Then in twenty minutes you would get the whole story'.²⁸ Whatever Healy's own personal ability with delinquents, his profile was further raised with the publication in 1915 of his *The Individual Delinquent*, which promoted the role of a sympathetic diagnostician in explaining cases and offering prognosis.

Based on an intensive study of 1000 cases from the Chicago Juvenile Court during the five years from 1909-1914, Healy introduced *The Individual Delinquent* with the main conclusion that every case would require individual study. Diagnosis could not be based on any overall theory or typology: 'when it comes to arranging data for the purpose of generalisation about relative values of causative factors we experience difficulty; it is not easy to see how any systemic order can be followed'.²⁹ Targeting the Italian School in particular, Healy lambasted those who sought fundamental understanding through seasonal and racial statistics, craniometry, psycho-physical measurements, alcoholism and so on, along with 'the elders who spoke so glibly of "the criminal" as a born type'.³⁰ However, this did not reduce the need for expertise. Rather, the problems of juvenile delinquency called for 'intelligent people, capable of understanding a human individual, and charged with a feeling of grave public duty'.³¹ For the sake of society officials required this specialist guidance from those who could understand the individual delinquent. For Healy this expertise would rest not on crude classification but on the ability of the diagnostician to synthesise meaning from the multicausal complexity of each case. Arguing against Lombrosian theories, he thus noted: 'any classification according to theories of epileptoidism or atavism or any other biological causation would end in the mere giving of a name; whereas a complete survey of the facts leads to the realisation of a many-sided etiology'.³² As well as the diagnosis of delinquent 'aetiologies', Healy pointed to the prognosis of future behaviour, explaining: 'the prime motive for our research into the beginnings and causative factors we have ever felt to be the

²⁸ Dummer to Healy, 12th January 1937, ESDP, Folder 581.

²⁹ Healy, *The Individual Delinquent*: 5.

³⁰ Ibid. 17.

³¹ Ibid. 6.

³² Ibid. 18.

establishment of scientific laws of predictability upon which all sorts of treatment could be rationally planned'.³³ With the failure of any 'systemic order' in arranging the facts of a case diagnosis and prognosis, explanation and prediction, would instead rest on the abilities of the examiner.

Moving from these principles of eclecticism and individualisation, book two of *The Individual Delinquent* presented almost 600 pages on various causes, including chapters on hereditary and environmental factors, developmental abnormalities, narcotics, mental conflicts, abnormal sexualism, and numerous chapters on mental 'defects', 'abnormalities' and 'peculiarities'. These latter terms encompassed a full range of conditions from 'mental subnormality' and 'major psychoses' to 'adolescent mental aberrations' along with 'abnormal social suggestibility', pathological lying and 'love of excitement and adventure'.³⁴ However, like other criminologists discussed in the previous chapter, Healy faced the problem of managing this multicausal complexity to prioritise factors and make useful recommendations. His solution was to place cases in chronological, biographical perspective, whereby past causes and later behaviour might be related to each other by the skilled examiner. Healy thus summarised his eclectic, temporal (and particularly 'Meyerian') perspective of personality:

A person is not fairly to be regarded merely as the soul and body of the moment. It is only our own temporal limitations which prevent us from seeing people as they really are – as products of the loom of time. Every individual is partly his ancestors, and partly the result of his developmental conditions, and partly the effects of many reactions to environment, and to bodily experiences, and even of reactions to his own mental activities. An ideal description of a human would refer each trait or condition to its proper source.³⁵

Biographical investigation of the case's whole history, rather than their present circumstances, would point to the onset of delinquent trends from which knowledgeable experts might discern the most significant causal antecedents. Even with his eclecticism, Healy pointed especially to the chronological primacy of mental antecedents and ideation, holding that 'whatever influences the individual towards offence must first influence the mind of the

³³ Ibid. 15.

³⁴ Ibid. xi-xvi.

³⁵ Ibid. 25.

individual'.³⁶ Diagnosticians thus need particular skill interviewing in confidence so that motives, conflicts, mental imagery, and other secrets from the past could be uncovered. Advising on this Healy stressed the value of sympathetic inquiry, warning against the 'brutal suspicion' expected of police and court interrogations and rather comparing his role to that of a family physician. Again, Healy maintained that, presented with 'intelligent interest' in their circumstances, delinquents and their families would cooperate. All of this was directed towards securing the boy or girl's 'own story' of their misconduct which, it was hoped, would reveal or corroborate a narrative of earlier established influences towards present and future delinquency.³⁷

I will further explore these methods, and the 'own story' in particular, when turning to JBF cases later in this chapter. For now, it should be noted that this turn from standardised measures to individualised diagnosis and prognosis brought with it an increased emphasis on individual expertise, namely the personal abilities of Healy as an interviewer and synthesist of causes and trends. This was brought into focus by the discussion surrounding Healy's imminent departure following the success of *The Individual Delinquent*. Writing in October 1915, he was 'astounded' by the reviews and sales of the book but also reported being 'crowded to the gunwales with work – always work' and hoped for 'more time for going further with fundamentals'.³⁸ By the summer of 1916 Healy had been approached by the Rockefeller Foundation as potential director of psychiatric work at Sing Sing prison or some other cross-agency prevention program in New York.³⁹ At the end of the year John Henry Wigmore (1863-1943) of Northwestern University sent out an appeal entitled: 'Shall Dr. Healy's work be lost to Chicago?' Outlining the situation, Wigmore described Healy's provisional acceptance of an offer from Boston which could only be countered if 'friends of the cause' could guarantee \$12,000 annually. With the end of Dummer's financial support the JPI had come under the county board prompting complaints of insufficient resources for assistants, less time for fundamental research and training, and the 'uncertainties of political

³⁶ Ibid. 28.

³⁷ Ibid. 33-67.

³⁸ Healy to Dummer, 4th October 1915, ESDP, Folder 578.

³⁹ 'Statement of Facts by Mr. Hunter As to the N.Y. Offer', June 1916, ESDP, Folder 578.

control'.⁴⁰ Indeed, Healy had previously described the 'miserable turmoil connected with the court' in 1911 when it faced investigation by a hostile city council president, in light of which he retained all JPI records in the Dummers' personal vault.⁴¹ Now Wigmore, having 'begged' Healy to hold off on accepting Boston's offer, hoped that a university endowment might permanently support and retain him. He thus summarised:

Chicago, through Dr. Healy's genius, has been 'put on the map' (as the phrase goes) in this field of human progress... Does Chicago care enough for this achievement to make the effort to hold it? Or must it be allowed to go East to Boston? It is a noble work in itself, helping to reduce crime and rascality in our midst. We need it here just as much as Boston does. It belongs here. Must we lose any good thing we have produced, just as soon as Boston or New York beckons?⁴²

The battle to preserve juvenile crime prevention in Chicago was understood as a battle to keep Healy himself. Having set out his methods of individual study, Healy was still thought to retain a personal ability to uncover causes and relate them to criminal acts and propensities.

Mental Hygiene and Child Guidance

In 1917 Healy and Bronner left Chicago for Boston as co-directors of the newly opened Judge Baker Foundation, named after the late juvenile court judge Harvey Humphrey Baker (1869-1915). The clinic was intended to continue Baker's unfinished plans of prevention, established through funds from his 'friends and associates' as a 'memorial' to this 'upbuilder of the juvenile court'.⁴³ Healy and Bronner were here expected to provide clinical services and sentencing recommendations for juvenile court cases to reach individualised plans of 'treatment'. Describing their work, they highlighted the value of unearthing the causal chains beneath outward delinquency to inform the court and its officers. In this way, Healy and Bronner claimed that the efficient, clinical prevention of delinquency was comparable to the scientific outlook of modern business or industry, achieving '*understanding of success or*

⁴⁰ John H. Wigmore, 'Shall Dr. Healy's Work be Lost to Chicago?', 18th December 1916, ESDP, Folder 578: 1.

⁴¹ Healy to Dummer, 26th July 1911, ESDP, Folder 578.

⁴² Wigmore, 'Shall Dr. Healy's Work be Lost...': 2.

⁴³ Roy M. Cushman, 'Harvey Humphrey Baker. Man and Judge', in *Harvey Humphrey Baker: Upbuilder of the Juvenile Court* (Judge Baker Foundation: Boston, MA: 1920): 1.

failure through analysis of the *causes* which lie beneath'.⁴⁴ As in other reforming courts of the progressive era, proponents of managerial efficiency and rationalization suggested employing experts to gather information, evaluate outcomes, and target causes so that court functions could be improved.⁴⁵ The JBF also drew on and contributed to the parallel development of the American 'Mental Hygiene' movement in its emphasis on community-based, preventative psychiatric intervention. Founded by Clifford W. Beers (1876-1943) in 1909, the National Committee of Mental Hygiene promoted non-institutional, out-patient care, in turn fostering the widening professional ambitions of psychiatrists. In 1917, in the first issue of the new journal *Mental Hygiene*, William A. White summarised the field's underlying principles. With 'the passing of insanity as a medical concept', psychiatrists were free to reconsider mental disorders, 'no longer hampered by arbitrary lines of division which begin or end at the door of the asylum'.⁴⁶ White outlined how, as conceived by mental hygiene, 'the individual is always endeavoring to bring about an adjustment between himself and his surroundings', whereas imbalance or tension led to 'maladjustment'.⁴⁷ Within this paradigm of 'maladjustment' the 'failures' inhabiting asylums, but also prisons, poorhouses and so on became medicalised targets for pre-emptive psychiatric management and reintegration. As White concluded: 'Mental hygiene is primarily addressed to preventing such failures wherever possible'.⁴⁸

Encompassing a range of organic, environmental and psycho-dynamic factors along with many individuals potentially in need of re-adjustment, mental hygiene was, according to historian Gerald Grob, 'so broad and inclusive that it aroused little opposition'.⁴⁹ At the same time, its increasing popularity following the First World War reflected both fear of internal instability and the hope of averting violent upheaval through individualised guidance. Peace was accompanied by demobilisation, increasing labour agitation and fears of violent upheaval. In Boston specifically, political and class divisions between the established middle-class and new working-class immigrant communities culminated in the police strike and accompanying riots

⁴⁴ William Healy and Augusta F. Bronner, 'The Work of the Judge Baker Foundation', in *Harvey Humphrey Baker*: 123.

⁴⁵ Wilrich, *City of Courts*: 29-58.

⁴⁶ William A. White, 'Underlying Concepts in Mental Hygiene', *Mental Hygiene*, Vol. 1 (1) (1917): 8.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.* 9.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.* 14.

⁴⁹ Grob, *Mental Illness and American Society*: 151.

of September 1919, followed by a flood of national commentary on potential Bolshevik revolutionaries or criminal gangs, barely kept in check by the law.⁵⁰ Set against fears of social upheaval were promises of scientific, psychiatric control and cohesion. Writing to Dummer in June 1918, Healy had hoped that 'the world can be immensely better' by studying 'the way the difficulties of mankind begin' to 'head them off somewhere near the beginnings'. He hopefully continued: 'even the prevention of war is to be found in early education, certainly nowhere else'.⁵¹

Broadly construed hopes for prevention soon produced further philanthropic interest in juvenile delinquency. In 1922, the Commonwealth Fund would begin its Programme for the Prevention of Delinquency, establishing a Bureau of Child Guidance in New York City followed by seven demonstration clinics in various cities to treat delinquent youth. By 1933 42 such clinics had been created across the United States. As Margo Horn notes, Healy, Bronner and other psychiatrists were closely involved in guiding the Commonwealth Fund's proposals towards their final emphasis on individualised therapeutics rather than social reform.⁵² In Boston the JBF provided the model for subsequent child guidance clinics in other cities and, before the eventual choice of a central bureau in New York, was considered as a centre for training those working with delinquents in the court or in 'the pre-delinquent stage'.⁵³ By establishing clinics and professional standards, child guidance promised to provide courts and other agencies with a useful diagnostic service, advising on treatment and likely outcomes in delinquent cases. As noted in the introduction, historians of the movement point to a shift over the 1920s from court referrals to 'normal' (i.e. privately referred, non-delinquent) youth with newly medicalised behavioural and emotional problems. In my examination of Healy and Bronner's methods in the JBF I will largely focus on work with delinquents, utilising case histories published after the Foundation's first five years to explore how they narrativised their cases to make causal and predictive claims.

⁵⁰ Jonathan R. White, 'Violence During the 1919 Boston Police Strike: An Analysis of the Crime Control Myth', *Criminal Justice Review*, Vol. 13 (2) (1988): 61-68.

⁵¹ Healy to Dummer, 6th June 1918, ESDP, Folder 579.

⁵² Horn, *Before It's Too Late*: 22-34.

⁵³ 'Report of Dr. William Healy and Dr. Augusta Bronner', N.D., ESDP, Folder 580.

Rather than taking these case histories of lives and ‘careers’ at face value, we must be aware of their organisational and rhetorical purposes. Firstly, the aforementioned plurality of cases and causes required chronological, narrative order arranged by the clinician so as to be legible to officials and clients. In turn, the facts of a biography or interview had to remain persistent, contributing to the JBF’s diagnostic authority through subsequent treatment, comparison and negotiation. In this way Healy and Bronner’s use of case studies once again had similar objectives to those identified by S.D. Lamb in Meyer’s records of the individual patient, utilising ‘the case history as a device by which to convert ephemeral experience into fixed clinical data that could produce new disciplinary knowledge’.⁵⁴ This tied in, secondly, to the case history’s role in persuasion. Published along with comments for interested practitioners, these case histories guided readers towards desired conclusions about the underlying causes, future propensities and success or failure in each case while frequently dismissing or disparaging contrary interpretations.

The JBF, combining psychological testing, social work, and medical-psychiatric examinations and interviews, had to actively produce diagnostic consensus from these distinct approaches to sway officials, parents and existing networks of youth care and correction. Jones has thus pointed to ‘rituals of diagnosis and recommendation’ at the JBF: standardised psychological tests aimed to foster an initial air of cooperation and scientific procedure; psychiatric interviews attempted to gain a child’s confidence and recognition of underlying problems; meanwhile, female social workers, as well as investigating home and neighbourhood conditions, publicly linked child guidance to the familiar, feminine values of earlier charity and child saving. As Jones argues, ‘the rituals allowed two relatively new professions, applied psychology and social work, and the new medical speciality of child psychiatry to speak to the local child-saving community with the voice of “child guidance”’.⁵⁵ Drawing from this perspective I will assess JBF case histories as attempts to leverage expert claims about the child, presented chronologically to connect antecedents with expectations of future

⁵⁴ Lamb, *Pathologist of the Mind*: 131; See also Ruth Leys, ‘Types of One: Adolf Meyer’s Life Chart and the Representation of Individuality’, *Representations*, Vol. 34 (1991): 1-28.

⁵⁵ Jones, *Taming the Troublesome Child*: 63, 62-90.

misconduct or improvement. At the same time, these cases also point to the wider networks and actors implicated in juvenile delinquency who might follow Healy and Bronner's story or make their own judgements of criminality and likely prospects.

Stories and Secrets

In January 1919, the JBF was approached by a New York correctional school with the case of 'William', aged 15 years and two months.⁵⁶ Known there for 'fabricating extensively', his committal followed years of delinquency beginning between the ages of six and seven: 'During all these eight years there have been outbreaks of stealing or other, subtler forms of dishonestly obtaining money'.⁵⁷ This was in spite of a 'comfortable' background with 'plenty of resources for a boy's wholesome upbringing'.⁵⁸ Even so, William's mother (a widow since the boy was eight) was 'a wreck nervously' from worrying about his behaviour while successive attempts to understand and correct the boy by the family, a clergyman, a lawyer, public and private schools as well as the court and probation officer had left them all 'baffled'. Having paid restitution for the boy's past thefts, his mother finally complained to the court herself in 1918 reporting that William had threatened her and, with a friend, had lied several times, extorting money to maintain a stolen automobile. In court the police called William "one of the worst" that had ever come to their attention; he was a "wild Indian" and would steal anything'. Following a warning from the judge and further thefts, specialists from a hospital for mental diseases decided he was 'neither feeble-minded, nor insane, but was a case of psychopathic personality', resulting in his commitment to the correctional school.⁵⁹ Now it was the JBF's turn to interpret this case.

In contrast to others' confusion the JBF claimed to see clear patterns in William's overall history of delinquency: 'many points in this narrative of objective facts can be left to the common-sense interpretation of the reader'. In particular, the 'clear-cut' point at which delinquencies began, along with subsequent patterns of both remorse and recidivism,

⁵⁶ In discussing these published case histories, I have retained the anonymized names given by the JBF.

⁵⁷ *Judge Baker Foundation Case Studies*, Series 1 (Judge Baker Foundation: Boston, MA: 1922-1923), Case 16: 2.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.* Case 16: 5.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.* Case 16: 8.

suggested underlying ‘disturbing experiences’.⁶⁰ After ruling out a variety of other causes, the case history turned to William’s ‘own story’. Around the age of seven, his mother, preoccupied with the father’s illness, had often sent William to stay with relatives where he recalled meeting other boys who discussed stealing, lying and sex. William’s delinquencies, the JBF claimed, had directly followed the development of these bad ideas and habits, exacerbated by another untold experience aged ten when an elderly man ‘gathered little boys down in a barn and drew for them pictures of bad things and told them stories about this’.⁶¹ The case history continued: ‘when well along in the interview, William was asked if he thought there was any connection between his bad sex ideas and his stealing, he thoughtfully replied, “it seems there is when it’s all brought round to me. I never thought about it before”’. Apparently, he went on to accept the JBF’s interpretation of his delinquent history: “‘I see now the cause. I didn’t see it before. It takes a load off my mind. It takes it out of my system telling it to you”’.⁶²

From this case history, published by the JBF as part of a series in 1923, we learn as much about the Healy and Bronner’s self-presentation as we do about William. Contacted by desperate officials from another state, they took on a case who had long baffled relatives, professionals and specialists. However, interviews uncovered a clear ‘narrative’ for ‘common-sense interpretation’. Amidst the confusion, the JBF provided not classification but ‘probable direct causations’ in an appended summary of its staff conference on William: ‘(1) Early unfortunate experiences concerning sex affairs and stealing with (2) Formation of dynamic association between these leading to (3) Much mental conflict with efforts at resistance and repression, but with renewed activity from time to time’.⁶³ These causes, joined by bad companions and inadequate adult understanding, led the JBF to recommend parole with supervision and ‘the help of an understanding man’ whereby ‘good mental content’ and ‘wholesome recreation’ would replace his ‘previous unfortunate ideation’.⁶⁴ William’s subsequent history, included alongside this case history, saw him twice run away from the correctional institution and then from a camp in the Adirondacks but, under the ‘wise’ management of ‘Mr. W.’ at this camp,

⁶⁰ Ibid. Case 16: 15.

⁶¹ Ibid. Case 16: 22.

⁶² Ibid. Case 16: 24-25.

⁶³ Ibid. Case 16: 26.

⁶⁴ Ibid. Case 16: 26-27.

his attitude apparently improved and he was returned to his mother with no complaints. Summarising, Healy and Bronner made the interview and own story the centrepiece of successful understanding, diagnosis and therapy: 'This particular study offers the picture of years of failure, despite the active interest of men in several professions, and then the revelation by the delinquent individual of himself to himself and to others, followed by well directed adjustments suited to his special needs'. In turn this suggested that similar understanding and success could have come earlier 'long before the boy seemed so definitely headed towards a criminalistic career'.⁶⁵ Narratives of delinquency suggested points at which influences and interventions might initiate or avert dangerous trends of behaviour.

Though others attempted to understand and 'correct' wayward youth, the 'own story' was thought to offer the JBF access to secret causes and trends. Commenting on this method in other cases Healy and Bronner pointed to 'a much richer psychology concerned with inner mental life, memories, ideations, imageries, etc., with their emotional backgrounds than is dreamed of during an ordinary examination'.⁶⁶ Gaining the child's confidence and cooperation was a matter of skill and personality, in keeping with Healy's earlier reputation. Though drawing on analytic concepts this was not psychoanalysis, being mostly limited to a single guided interview and largely eschewing dream analysis in investigating subconscious processes. There was, Healy and Bronner claimed, 'no fixed routine technic'. While covering similar subjects, lines of questioning had to be adapted to different children while the interviewer or analyst's gestures, intonations, facial expressions and personality traits were all 'subtleties which can hardly be described'.⁶⁷ Promoting this subtle autobiographical questioning and narrative-building Healy, Bronner and the JBF claimed privileged access to secret lives and inner conflicts unknown to ignorant adults.

In its published cases the JBF most commonly pointed to the hidden, connected influences of sexuality, companions, and modern city life. The case of 'John', referred in August 1919 after breaking and entering with a skeleton key, apparently showed 'a clear picture of the gradual

⁶⁵ Ibid. Case 16: 31.

⁶⁶ Ibid. Case 1: 29-31.

⁶⁷ Ibid. Case 5: 31.

establishing of an out-and-out delinquent career', citing his 'repetition of offence with distinct habit formation'.⁶⁸ However, behind the crimes, the JBF presented the delinquent and sexual influence of other boys. John frankly described these experiences, apparently exacerbated by long institutional sentences where homosexual relations were developed. Thus, the JBF proposed a causal chain: '(1) breakdown in morale at about 10 years undoubtedly the main factor in this case due to (2) unfortunate sex knowledge and experiences particularly involving homo-sexual affairs with (3) bad companions'.⁶⁹ The perceived moral failings of this boy were here matched by criticisms of counterproductive sentences. Noting that John took a 'professional attitude', spoke of 'serving my time' and had spent five years in correctional institutions by the age of 16, the JBF foresaw a future of hardened criminality.

When describing female cases, sexual activity was frequently a primary concern rather than a circumstance of other delinquency. Emily for instance, aged 15, had been referred from a training school on account of her running away, along with letters to boys showing 'considerable sophistication' but also 'much slang and suggestive allusions which show a preponderant sex interest'.⁷⁰ She had been sent there for 'evidence of immorality' and recalled meeting older boys through her school friends, explaining that 'she just did what all the other girls in the crowd did; they all did bad things with boys'.⁷¹ She blamed her 'crazy' mother who had accused the father of affairs and was described by others as 'hysterical' with 'an uncontrolled temper'. Focusing on these background circumstances and companionships, the JBF considered Emily 'socially untrustworthy at present' but a favourable outcome was expected with good training and placement. Later Emily was described pursuing 'better interests' in 'sentimental' rather than sexual writing under a 'vigorous' foster mother who assured her she was 'a girl of good common sense, ambitious and anxious to succeed'.⁷² Indeed, the JBF balanced anxiety towards young girls' sexuality with hopes for moral reform under interested adult guidance so that wholesome, normal interests and expression could be fostered: 'it is no longer generally believed that a girl's sex experiences ever demand

⁶⁸ Ibid. Case 6: 13.

⁶⁹ Ibid. Case 6: 25.

⁷⁰ Ibid. Case 15: 14.

⁷¹ Ibid. Case 15: 20.

⁷² Ibid. Case 15: 27.

wearing the scarlet letter, or that they, in and of themselves... preclude later success in meeting the standards of society'. Other 'immoral' girls were thus described not as incorrigible but as 'adolescent flare-ups', nevertheless requiring 'immediate checking, the establishment of good interests and tiding over the period of urge and instability'.⁷³

Girls considered unusually withdrawn conversely required socialisation in 'normal' feminine interests and companionships. 'Mildred', referred for guidance after failures in high school, was described as 'passive' and 'colorless' with particular attention to her 'unprepossessing' appearance.⁷⁴ Her interview apparently centred on her daydreams and fantasies, imagining experiences, companions, 'dances' and 'marriages' which were taken by the Healy and Bronner as evidence of a craving for affection. They recommended adult guidance to make Mildred more outgoing: 'some sympathetic older woman should take her in hand and show her how to care for her hair and scalp and how to dress her hair more becomingly'.⁷⁵ With only her father to care for her, the JBF subsequently arranged 'to have someone accompany Mildred on a shopping expedition'.⁷⁶ Such referrals raised, on one hand, the desire to foster 'normal', agreeable femininity as a condition of proper social relationships. On the other hand, such goals were in tension with the apparent dangers of precocity and, thence, 'immorality'. The interest and supervision of female role models was thus required to develop a 'wholesome' balance of interests.

Adult guidance was, however, in competition with the unseen, insidious spread of sexual ideas and behaviour amongst unsupervised youth. Claiming to have 'unearthed... such a situation a considerable number of times', JBF case studies described how 'starting in a small way it may grow until a group of considerable size is involved, with practices continued for months, quite unknown to those who have the children under their observation daily – parents, teachers, school principals'.⁷⁷ In one such case they pointed to a boy's own story as warning of sexual

⁷³ Ibid. Case 9: 31.

⁷⁴ Ibid. Case 4: 12-20.

⁷⁵ Ibid. Case 4: 25-26.

⁷⁶ Ibid. Case 4: 27.

⁷⁷ Ibid. Case 15: 19

conflict but also the unseen moral deterioration of a whole community's youth. 'Douglas', aged 12, was referred for apparently compulsive stealing at odds with his academic and extracurricular achievements. When interviewed he was asked to "'think hard – try to remember back and tell me what was the very first that you ever knew about stealing'". Much like the case of William, Douglas described conversations with a boy who stole from his father's shop while also talking about sex. Guided by the interviewer to consider specific 'mental imagery' connected with thoughts of stealing, Douglas eventually pointed to his search for suggestive advertisements in magazines and 'temptation' at bedtime: 'The boy suddenly bursts out, "It's that starts me thinking of stealing"'.⁷⁸ However, from the dynamic associations of an individual boy, the JBF soon outlined a web of sexual influences whereby Douglas 'gave the name of boy after boy who was considered to be immoral with girls' and reported that 'from what he has heard, most of the high school girls and the girls in the junior school are immoral'.⁷⁹ In the face of 'community conditions' which had 'tended to keep unfortunate ideation and conflict active' the JBF recommended either moving elsewhere or pushing for local betterment through education and supervision.⁸⁰

Aside from fears of adverse sexual influences from other youth, the JBF commonly cited delinquent tendencies arising from gangs or 'crowds'. 'Olaf', a case with 'no subtleties', was presented as just such an instance of 'failure, flanked by the records of comrades, most of whose careers have been equally disastrous'.⁸¹ Both on the streets and in correctional institutions, these friends apparently formed an infamous 'bad crowd' known for stealing and drinking together. Although Olaf was subsequently reported serving a reformatory sentence in the West, the JBF cited his positive traits of loyalty and leadership suggesting that 'continuance in delinquency might have been averted' by entirely separating his companions.⁸² The pernicious influence of 'street life' formed a persistent background concern in tracing these delinquent groups and individuals. Indeed, the JBF worried that families and schools fought a losing battle against the temptations of adventure, mass media and eventually vice in the modern city. Describing their troubling cases of young 'extreme runaways' they concluded that through begging, performing for money, or stealing 'they are

⁷⁸ Ibid. Case 5: 27.

⁷⁹ Ibid. Case 5: 36.

⁸⁰ Ibid. Case 5: 37.

⁸¹ Ibid. Case 8: 34.

⁸² Ibid. Case 8: 34.

able to obtain for themselves pleasures away from home which are greater than their satisfactions in home and school life', thence following the normal 'psychological law of pleasurable returns'.⁸³

Meanwhile these dangers were supposedly exacerbated for children unfamiliar with urban life and with 'maladjustments through immigration'.⁸⁴ Gregory, a 16-year-old Greek immigrant living in Boston, was referred after nine court appearances and complaints from various foster homes. Responding to interview questions he thought that 'a boy in the city learns much both good and bad, but particularly bad'. Wandering the markets it apparently 'wasn't very long before the boys in his neighborhood initiated him into "American Ways"'.⁸⁵ His own story provided the JBF with 'our first information of the beginnings of Gregory's stealing' but also showed changing trends as delinquencies 'dropped away' after removal from 'bad companions, street life, and other conditions' to foster homes.⁸⁶ Now they hoped to re-shape the personality of the immigrant youth. According to different foster parents, Gregory was argumentative and lazy, an attitude attributed to his father, who insisted on the boy's academic future and had himself been a political protestor before emigrating. At the same time, Gregory evidently argued against bigotry in his foster homes, describing one man in particular:

He made me mad. He called me a wop. He said the wops were no good, and then I would say that they were better than the English and that would get him mad. I used to keep it up just to get his goat and to have some fun.⁸⁷

The JBF, meanwhile, interpreted this as a response to feelings of personal inferiority and, even with the cessation of delinquency, they were 'not sure of the outlook because of boy's anti-American feeling and too ready acceptance of help'.⁸⁸ Overruling another doctor's concerns about a possible heart murmur, they recommended that Gregory find employment to develop greater responsibilities, subsequently working part time running errands for a florist and later enrolling in a six-week voyage with a navy school. Claiming success, the JBF pointed to 'the

⁸³ Ibid. Case 7: 24, 29.

⁸⁴ Ibid. Case 1: 35.

⁸⁵ Ibid. Case 1: 30.

⁸⁶ Ibid. Case 1: 31.

⁸⁷ Ibid. Case 1: 32.

⁸⁸ Ibid. Case 1: 35.

heading off of a delinquent career, the altering of certain personality traits that had unfortunate social implications, and the turning of the foreign born, even with aggressively foreign notions, in favor of American ideals'. The day had apparently 'been saved' not only from future crime but also from 'a personality that might have turned towards general anti-social and even anti-governmental action'.⁸⁹

In Gregory's case the prevention of delinquency was joined explicitly by the broader socio-political goals of child guidance: 'adjustment' for productive, placated adulthood, here entailing the Americanisation of an otherwise maladjusted, foreign, even dangerous personality. Meanwhile, in the case of siblings 'Stasia' and 'Stanley Andrews', the JBF pointed to inter-familial conflict between Polish immigrant parents and their increasingly independent children. Their mother had initially complained to a Polish settlement worker that 18-year-old Stasia was 'so strange in her behaviour that she was sure there must be "something wrong with her head"', continually arguing before moving out shortly after. Stanley, one year younger, was meanwhile reported as part of a bad crowd. The JBF decided to explain both as products of a 'family drama', played out by dysfunctional 'dramatis personae'.⁹⁰ The 'drama' they presented was one of frustration and antagonism, presided over by a sickly father who futilely asserted traditional patriarchal authority in spite of his failed business and humiliating turn to charitable agencies. Stasia's story thus brought out this resentment of her controlling, at times abusive father: 'he wants to be the king in the household; he wants to boss us all. I think it's because he's a failure, and he wants others to be, too, so that they won't be better than he is'.⁹¹ While Stanley was deemed by the JBF to be potentially psychopathic, on Stasia they concluded that 'the one member of the family who completely broke away seems to us the most normal of all'. As in other cases, these conclusions gained their force from a chronological, narrative presentation with the child's own story now joined by 'characters' of a familiar, family 'drama'. Summarising this case, the JBF wrote: 'we have attempted to give family portraits, 'close-ups', and then 'motion pictures' of what has been going on in this home where the drama has two main themes – the consequences of poverty and the desire for

⁸⁹ Ibid. Case 1: 41.

⁹⁰ Ibid. Case 17: 2.

⁹¹ Ibid. Case 17: 19.

domination'.⁹² With the language of narrative, theatre and even film, readers could be expected to draw out salient 'themes' of causation and their imagined outcomes. Conversely, narrativization also allowed for the reduction of these complex 'characters' to more legible, cinematic archetypes associated with expected failure or improvement. Lucy Wright, a field worker in Harvard's Social Ethics Department who also offered commentary on this case could thus conceive of Stasia 'later in life as the one child who may appreciate the tragedy of her parents' lives'. Having read the case history she noted that 'the consummate part of this record is in the stories, and particularly Stasia's – you feel the power, honesty and illuminating quality of it so tremendously, - and what this survey of her experience under skillful guidance may mean to her future'.⁹³

Certainly, the themes and trajectories of stories presented and constructed by Healy and Bronner through the JBF commonly tied parents to their children's delinquent behaviour. This could include excessive constraints upon youthful independence, as above, or, conversely, inadequate oversight. Even if parents were not active sources of emotional harm and conflict, 'probable direct causations' frequently included 'poor parental supervision' or 'control', practically as a matter of routine, alongside other antecedents. Even 'refined', 'well-meaning' mothers and fathers might be guilty of apathy or ignorance. Parents, the JBF stressed, neglected not only the social lives of young people but also their inner lives. For instance:

There is recognition of the strong influences that may be derived from companionship, but too little realization by almost every one that it is not enough to know who the companions are, but that there must be acquaintance with the specific experiences which are had in common. And often it is not so much what is actually done together as what is talked about; it is not so much the activities engaged in as it is the ideas derived from each other.⁹⁴

Whether or not this surveillance of activities and ideas was even possible, the JBF stood ready to give parents the assistance they needed. The dramatic revelations of the child's own story, synthesised by the JBF into a chronology of causes, could dispel adult confusion. Then, following diagnosis, family became central to recommendation and treatment, most commonly the child's placement with a different family apparently capable of meeting their

⁹² Ibid. Case 17: 32.

⁹³ Ibid. Case 17: 23.

⁹⁴ Ibid. Case 14: 9.

needs. This pattern was followed in 15-year-old 'Edward's case history. An only child, his father had deserted while his mother was described as 'headstrong, deceitful, and dishonest'.⁹⁵ After the extended family, with whom he lived, repeatedly reported his stealing from them, the JBF interview turned to the mother and Edward suddenly 'blurted out' that he knew his mother stole.⁹⁶ With this conflict identified the JBF warned against institutional commitment, citing the potential for 'grudge formation' and after various temporary homes he was placed with Mr. and Mrs. B, the latter of whom eventually reported a 'treasured' breakthrough where he confessed that 'he had never known what it was to have a real mother'. In turn, Mrs. B now filled this role: 'and in return for giving him her love she asked him to promise that he would do nothing which he thought she would not wish him to do. Very seriously the boy said, "By God, I will promise"'.⁹⁷ Satisfied with this emotional climax the JBF concluded that 'what he has all along needed, we see it now proved, is a mother substitute'.⁹⁸

Much of this will be familiar to historians of juvenile justice and child guidance. By stressing the therapeutic value of loving attention and frequently recommending foster placements to provide this attention, the JBF continued the aforementioned 'affectional discipline' of the nineteenth-century, so-called by Schlossman.⁹⁹ Others will recognise the emerging psychiatric discourses of 'mother blaming', subsequently consolidated in broader child guidance by explanatory models of both maternal neglect and 'over-protection'.¹⁰⁰ Meanwhile, for Schneider, child guidance can be seen as simply another iteration of earlier models of 'cultural reform', blaming individual failings and character in place of structural inequalities. Criticising the JBF in particular he argues: 'despite the changes in methods, the novelty of asking delinquents to explain themselves, and the extreme positivism exhibited by Healy and Bronner in their obsessive search for facts, when it came time to interpret their data, they applied the class and cultural standards they had inherited'.¹⁰¹

⁹⁵ Ibid. Case 20: 4.

⁹⁶ Ibid. Case 20: 19.

⁹⁷ Ibid. Case 20: 28.

⁹⁸ Ibid. Case 20: 29.

⁹⁹ Schlossman, *Love and the American Delinquent*: 53.

¹⁰⁰ Jones, *Taming the Troublesome Child*: 174-204.

¹⁰¹ Schneider, *In the Web of Class*: 175-176.

Certainly, the JBF owed much to its predecessors. Pre-existing judgements of the urban poor's personal moral failings reappeared in psychiatric concerns to 'adjust' individuals under materially, culturally and emotionally 'favourable' conditions and avert 'failure'. In turn, the JBF focused on the influence of parental figures as both cause and cure of delinquent tendencies. However, the narrativisation of delinquency, facilitated by the child's own story, connected this familiar content to Healy and Bronner's attempts to promote both explanatory and predictive authority. Against competing claims, they offered the delinquent's perspective, secured through the special confidence placed in them. However genuine the stories, the JBF thence pointed to the secrets of youth, experiences, motives and ideas that they could access while other adults remained ignorant. Finally, this temporal perspective seemed to allow both synthesis and prediction. Various facts were ascribed priority based on their chronological connection to delinquent behaviour or their apparent obviousness as key themes in the overall case history. Moreover, these stories pointed to the future possibility of continuing or modifying trends. Of course, these cases also displayed the JBF's concern to create and control such narratives. Turning to the presentation of parents, officials, and others in these case histories it becomes clear that many with their own priorities and expectations of the child might not follow the JBF's story.

Managing Expectations

'Richard', aged 16, was not an ideal case for the JBF. Arrested for robbery in December 1919, he was held in jail for two weeks before giving his correct name and age, whereupon he was identified as a runaway from an institution. Healy and Bronner, with less than a day to study him, quickly interviewed Richard and his father. The latter had apparently 'made every effort' to be companionable and 'never aroused Richard's resentment... even when he has "forced him to the wall and made him tell" what he has previously denied'. He now wondered "'if there is not something wrong with the boy's head'".¹⁰² With delinquencies going back to the age of 12, police classed him in 'the "snatch thief" variety', 'imbued with the desire to steal', seemingly 'just for the fun of it' and blamed those who excused him 'on account of his youthful

¹⁰² *Judge Baker Foundation Case Studies*, Series 1, Case 19: 5-6.

age and the respect in which his family name is held'.¹⁰³ The institution's parole officer saw an adult reformatory as the best place for him, stating that "There is no doubt in my mind that the boy is a born crook".¹⁰⁴ Richard, fearing reprimand from the superintendent, actually agreed that he should be sent to a reformatory. The JBF meanwhile decided that Richard was completely normal. In Richard's own story he denied any sexual experiences, "never went with a bunch", and maintained 'no ideas of stealing from moving pictures'.¹⁰⁵ The only clue singled out from this interview was Richard's description of his stealing:

"I go into a store with no intention of stealing. Perhaps I go in for something good. Maybe I want to buy a sheet of music, say for my sister, and the first thing I know, I grab something; I guess you'd call it an impulse." (This was spontaneous, the word "impulse" not having been used by the interviewer).¹⁰⁶

Conceding the need for further study, the JBF cautioned that 'his good mentality and good personality traits would seem to make the prognosis hopeful but his past record makes everything uncertain'.¹⁰⁷ Though Bronner dissented, the judge and institutional superintendent ultimately favoured the reformatory where Richard soon 'made a great effort to be paroled'. With his father's promise to employ and supervise him, Richard received parole after a year but, despite the JBF's offers of further study 'neither made any effort to obtain our services'.¹⁰⁸ Soon Richard left for Montreal with a stolen car and money and was last reported doing time in a Canadian prison. The JBF could only bemoan a case 'still unstudied and still unknown'.¹⁰⁹

In contrast to the previously discussed cases with seemingly confident diagnoses, Richard's pointed to competing explanations, expectations and ultimately the disregard of JBF recommendations and offers. The father, police and parole officer came to the JBF with their own accounts of background causes, mental abnormalities, and innate criminality. They also clearly evaluated which information the JBF might be most receptive to. Following Richard's release, his parole officer continually informed the JBF of his investigations into the family's

¹⁰³ Ibid. Case 19: 9.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid. Case 19: 12.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid. Case 19: 18-22.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid. Case 19: 18.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid. Case 19: 23.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid. Case 19: 24.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid. Case 19: 25.

criminality, citing criminal uncles and a cousin 'spoken of as immoral'.¹¹⁰ Richard himself offered the clue of his 'impulse' apparently spontaneously, however, Healy and Bronner did not consider whether he had drawn this terminology from other therapeutic contexts in his previous institutional sentences. In this and other cases informants and even delinquents themselves foregrounded such explanations for the experts. We can, of course only speculate on degrees of sincerity. In his interview, Richard had made a 'favorable impression' with 'a frank, open smile and an altogether friendly manner, talking apparently freely and seemingly thoroughly frank and unrepressed'.¹¹¹ It is notable, however, that in contrast to their cooperation during court proceedings Richard and his father simply ignored the JBF following release.

When disagreement or disinterest appeared in their case histories, the JBF naturally commented on these as signs of ignorance or inadequate oversight in contrast to their own expert attention. I have already noted the criticisms levelled at parents deemed responsible for their children's delinquency. Similar judgements, rooted in presumptions of middle-class respectability, were made on the reliability of parents' statements. One mother was thus 'a tastefully dressed, pleasant, refined, rather vivacious woman' whose account was judged 'very reliable because of her apparent open-mindedness and frank cooperation'.¹¹² By contrast, presenting another mother's perspective, the JBF decided it 'seemed probable that she was not altogether accurate', continuing that 'she made a pathetic figure – a short, thin, sharp-featured woman, poorly dressed and untidy'.¹¹³ the JBF's treatment recommendations sometimes criticised the 'weak attitude' of parents who hoped that their children might be returned prematurely from foster care. Conversely, some, unconvinced by the JBF's outlook, took matters into their own hands. For instance, one 'thoroughly exasperated father', after successive placements by the JBF, personally took his runaway son to court and had him placed in a church home for boys.¹¹⁴

¹¹⁰ Ibid. Case 19: 24.

¹¹¹ Ibid. Case 19: 16.

¹¹² Ibid. Case 5: 2-4.

¹¹³ Ibid. Case 7: 2.

¹¹⁴ Ibid. Case 7: 27.

Indeed, the JBF could not guarantee that foster homes would provide the individualised attention hoped for in their recommendations. Since the mid-nineteenth-century shift from institutional to family foster care of dependent or delinquent youth, concerns had been intermittently raised regarding the worrying potential for young boys' and girls' economic or sexual exploitation.¹¹⁵ The JBF similarly pointed in one case to an indifferent foster mother involved in the 'notorious profession' of 'baby farming'.¹¹⁶ Others, as has been seen, might view their charges with hostility or prejudice. Given the frequency with which the JBF recommended special attention under foster care, its failures were largely attributed to individual parents and the superficial estimations of social workers. Thus "'a good foster home", in ordinary social parlance' was taken to mean 'a home that is good from the standpoint of cleanliness, hygiene, and other physical features, as well as from the standpoint of morality' but did not guarantee 'special fitness for meeting any given individual's special needs or problems'.¹¹⁷

The JBF also showed frustration with allied institutions responsible for prevention. Schools were singled out as 'an agency that has the child present day after day perhaps for twelve years' but which still neglected 'the acquirement of information upon which to base judgement, better than mere conjectures, for the solving of the individual's problems'.¹¹⁸ Even so, teachers and principals offered their own perspectives. In the case of 'Tom', a young truant and beggar, blame was passed between the boy's home and his successive schools. One principal insisted on 'the mother's incompetency and lack of discipline' while a truant officer considered court involvement 'very little use because the fault was in the home'. In turn, two public schools and one parochial school claimed the others had been 'lax in their methods of discipline and could not manage the boy'.¹¹⁹ Though taken by the JBF as an indictment of uncoordinated and uninformed schools this exchange highlights the prior judgements of

¹¹⁵ Schneider, *In The Web of Class*: 72-90.

¹¹⁶ *Judge Baker Foundation Case Studies*, Series 1, Case 14: 7.

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.* Case 15: 3.

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.* Case 4: 11.

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.* Case 7: 14-16.

educators and school officials which shaped the JBF's intake and its information on a child's circumstances.

Police also encountered delinquents early and exercised discretion or aired their opinions. David Wolcott, offering a 'police-centred' history of juvenile justice, notes that 'daily contact with delinquents and their neighbourhood conditions encouraged police officers to believe that they had their own kind of experience and understood how to discipline boys better than did court officials'.¹²⁰ Indeed, police perspectives appear in several JBF cases. 15-year-old 'Jack' referred to the JBF in October 1918, arrived under escort by a police officer who called him 'the hardest young criminal in southern New England' and claimed that 'the strong arm of the law was the only thing of use in his case'. Though this officer's demand to remain present during the boy's interview was rejected, 'he remained in the waiting room and two or three times poked his head in the door to see if Jack had not escaped' before this fear was assuaged.¹²¹ Once again, the JBF presented this case to contrast other's failure with their own success illustrating how the police 'do very little that is constructive' and 'show very little in the way of friendship for the individual who is in trouble'.¹²²

Perhaps the most salient concern for the JBF, balancing the perspectives of parents, teachers, police, and court or correctional officials, was the perceived connection of unexplainable criminal behaviour to mental illness or 'defect'. Varied conceptions of mental abnormality formed a background to the process of diagnosis as those responsible for a child sought explanations and offered them to the experts. Notably the JBF attempted to push back against what they regarded as crude theories. Presenting the cases of 'three mentally defective girls' they were thus led to 'change our earlier expressed ideas that mentally defective girls "are potentially prostitutes" or that defective boys are almost necessarily delinquent or dependent'.¹²³ Nevertheless, these cases pointed to the suspicion still attached to those

¹²⁰ David B. Wolcott, *Cops and Kids: Policing Juvenile Delinquency in Urban America, 1890-1940* (Ohio State University Press: Columbus, OH: 2005): 122.

¹²¹ *Judge Baker Foundation Case Studies*, Series 1, Case 13: 2.

¹²² *Ibid.* Case 13: 5.

¹²³ *Ibid.* Case 18: 32.

considered 'subnormal'. 'Anne' was not a delinquent but had been referred for vocational guidance after mangling her foot in a factory machine. Reports of alcoholism, 'immorality' and larceny amongst other family members, however, prompted questions for the 'thoughtful reader' about 'eugenic problems'. Anne's family and her IQ of 71 seemed to warrant careful supervision even without any wrongdoing.¹²⁴ One relief worker, evidently unsatisfied with measures taken, tried to secure her commitment to an institute for the feeble-minded but was met by the mother's refusal. In any case, three years on Anne was steadily employed with no reports of delinquency. 'Nora', with an IQ of 56 and 'a family plainly degenerating' seemed to all a more serious case. She had been arrested for shoplifting but reports of her 'accosting' sailors placed her 'on the dangerous list'. Rather than intelligence, however, it was 'this girl's traits of character, particularly her easy going, friendly attitude and her suggestibility which lead us to look askance at her future'.¹²⁵ The JBF warned that institutional commitment would be necessary if 'sex interests' developed, but apparently she also gained regular employment with no subsequent trouble.

Meanwhile, in the case of 'Filipa', arrested with two others for shoplifting, the JBF was confounded by others' failure to recognise the 'defective'. While most considered her the 'brightest' of her delinquent friends the JBF tested her as 67 IQ and attributed the mistaken impression to her 'vivacity, self-confidence', 'good features' and posture as well as 'readiness and coherence in conversation'.¹²⁶ Here the JBF anticipated an impasse with the court:

We feel that on account of her mentality and developing tendency towards delinquency this is an institutional case, but it probably will not be easy to persuade others of this because of the good presentation she makes of herself. There probably will be difficulties arising in the future on account of her ready friendliness, attractive appearance and "smartness".¹²⁷

Filipa was subsequently given probation and special classes, despite her teacher's confusion, after which, reports of delinquency ceased. Indeed, in giving her own story she had promised

¹²⁴ Ibid. Case 17: 7.

¹²⁵ Ibid. Case 18: 25.

¹²⁶ Ibid. Case 18: 15.

¹²⁷ Ibid. Case 18: 18.

not to see her old companions and steal since, as she frankly acknowledged, she would then be “put away forever”.¹²⁸

Considering these ‘subnormal cases together the JBF reflected on the uncertainties of both identifying the ‘feeble-minded’ and predicting their futures. Filipa’s case exposed the ‘crude conception of feeble-mindedness which stands on the value of a snapshot diagnosis’, deriding judges who claimed to discern such cases by sight.¹²⁹ Elsewhere they criticised intelligence testing, noting that a test ‘confined to establishing an intelligence quotient very frequently does not and can not reveal aptitudes that are of the greatest importance for an individual’s welfare’.¹³⁰ The JBF thus continued the critique of ‘mental defect’ as an inadequate representation of individual circumstances. Commenting on the eugenic implications of Anne’s family, for instance, they concluded that ‘it is the complexity of a situation like this that stands in the way of any scientific student speaking of a single cause or main cause of such behavior’.¹³¹ Ultimately, the JBF acknowledged that despite their and others’ fears of the ‘defective’, these girls had not warranted the suspicion attached to them but had, rather, been adjusted for productive adult life:

It is on the basis of such outcomes that we have ourselves modified our earlier convictions; whereas not so long ago the prognosis for defective individuals, especially girls, was felt to be unfavorable outside of an institution, we have come to know that many are vocationally and socially educable, that they respond to ordinary stimuli, incentives and deterrents, much as do normal individuals, and that under suitable conditions they succeed in the community.¹³²

Controlling such views, however, was not a simple matter, and in prognosis and treatment the JBF’s outlook joined many others furthering or altering their recommendations. 9-year-old ‘Harry’, referred in 1917 by his frustrated foster mother, was known for setting fires and was subsequently examined as an uncertain case of incipient mental illness. Interview notes apparently indicated this with ‘ideas of stealing, ideas of sex affairs, his own habits, the girls’

¹²⁸ Ibid. Case 18: 16.

¹²⁹ Ibid. Case 18: 17.

¹³⁰ Ibid. Case 4: 15.

¹³¹ Ibid. Case 18: 7.

¹³² Ibid. Case 18: 29.

behavior, the boys' masturbation and talk, and ideas of fire' all 'jumbled, falling from his lips in close association'.¹³³ As with other cases the JBF recommended placement in the country to overcome 'pernicious ideation' but hesitated in their prognosis of mental development. Others subsequently came to their own conclusions. Harry's first foster family soon grew frustrated, concluding that 'the boy was not quite right mentally and that he had "all the earmarks of a criminal"'. The JBF, deriding this complaint, were 'at a complete loss' to say what these 'earmarks' might be in a 9-year-old.¹³⁴ His second placement, on a farm with the 'F.' family was more successful but many remained uncertain of Harry. One local teacher gave particular attention to him and 'thought he had many original ideas' while another made no progress and 'considered him mentally deficient'. Meanwhile, amongst other school children there was 'trouble on account of "his silly tongue"' and he 'was looked upon by them as a joke'.¹³⁵ By late 1919, the JBF raised a 'serious question of development of psychosis', however, Mrs F. who reported increasing difficulties, countered that Harry was free of 'nerves' and simply 'felt that he could stay there no matter what he said or did'.¹³⁶ With his placement in an institution for observation in March 1920 more perspectives were added in reports of 'moderate mental defect with pronounced psychopathic tendencies' and 'stormy years ahead'.¹³⁷ Harry later escaped on his third attempt and now got money from a passer-by who 'said he that he had a brother in an institution and he knew just how much a boy wanted to get away'. Having returned to the Fs he apparently behaved to avoid another commitment, leaving the JBF to speculate on Harry's possible 'defect in control' while conceding 'that the "stormy years" that were expected have not materialized'.¹³⁸

The language of 'diagnosis', 'prognosis', and 'adjustment' implied a coherent system of expert guidance but, beyond the JBF's examination room, perspectives and prospects fluctuated. Harry was regarded with frustration or with sympathy which might facilitate or interfere with his education, family adjustment and even escape. Considered a potential psychopath or a normal boy in need of discipline, Harry also made decisions to evade or return to the

¹³³ Ibid. Case 4: 18.

¹³⁴ Ibid. Case 14: 20.

¹³⁵ Ibid. Case 14: 21.

¹³⁶ Ibid. Case 14: 24.

¹³⁷ Ibid. Case 14: 25.

¹³⁸ Ibid. Case 14: 28.

supervision prescribed for him. Yet after years spent anticipating delinquency or mental breakdown none apparently came. In explaining and treating cases like Harry's the JBF found itself managing an array of adult expectations with varying success. Those who approached the JBF or offered information presented their own speculations on criminality, given added salience by the context of expert examination. We have already seen numerous cases in which parents, teachers, probation officers and other agents proposed psychological and psychiatric explanations of misconduct. Returning to the case of Douglas, for instance, this suggestion was raised in the immediate circumstances of the boy's arrest:

When the refined-looking and apparently much concerned mother arrived, she said that the boy had a "strange mania for stealing". She felt that she did not understand it at all. The agency visitor suggested a scientific study of the case and the mother said that she would gladly avail herself of any such opportunity for this.¹³⁹

Commenting on another group of cases, referred by 'fairly well-to-do' families without any court involvement, the JBF noted that these clients were wary of juvenile justice and would appeal sentences to correctional institutions. They were thus 'eager for relief in this situation, but they would not have availed themselves of the court, although the court is the agency for the treatment of delinquency appointed by the law'.¹⁴⁰

The JBF was one authority whose expertise might be of varying use to different people implicated in a child's ongoing or anticipated problems. Viewed in light of the preceding examples, claims to explain and predict the ongoing 'story' of a delinquent's behaviour can be viewed in line with other histories of child guidance and relief; negotiated by mothers who 'retained for themselves the right to dismiss the child guiders' suggestions';¹⁴¹ by families who variously sought out or ignored help depending on the balance of need against the strictures imposed by 'adjustment';¹⁴² by other professionals, agents and officials responsible for problem youth, with their own spheres of personal experience and insight to defend. In the disposition of cases and their ongoing treatment, recommendations might be challenged or

¹³⁹ Ibid. Case 5: 2.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid. Case 2 and 3: 3.

¹⁴¹ Jones, *Taming the Troublesome Child*: 194.

¹⁴² See Schneider, *In the Web of Class*: 1-14.

ignored, altering the trend of adjustment envisaged by the JBF. Rounding out their series of case histories with a story of success, they hopefully concluded:

In this case, discovery and exploration was the first step in treatment. Faith in diagnosis was the next step. But patience, too, was required to carry on the treatment in the face of discouragement.¹⁴³

As well as a conclusion, this was also a plea to a wider network of prevention.

Conclusions: 'The Spirit of the Community'

In 1928 Healy and Bronner published their evaluation of almost two decades of work with delinquents in Chicago and Boston. The time had come for 'a scientific study of outcomes of treatment', however, they forewarned readers of some 'distressingly poor' results.¹⁴⁴ Following up 920 Chicago cases seen from 1909-1914, 675 could be found of whom only 45%, barely an even proportion, were classed as 'successes'.¹⁴⁵ Figures told a particularly damning story of Illinois' correctional institutions with 70% of boys in this group committed later becoming 'failures'.¹⁴⁶ Particular attention was understandably given to 13 Chicago cases later convicted for murder. Here, despite Healy and Bronner's warnings, they now claimed, all of these 'careers' had been 'tragically extended' and, of course, 'in every case, such an outcome was preventable'.¹⁴⁷ By contrast they pointed to only one of their Boston cases leading to homicide. Reported as having an 'unstable nervous system' and 'unfortunate heredity' resulting in convulsions and fits of temper, he escaped from institutions, hospitals, the army and the navy, later writing that he was 'destined for the gallows' before eventually killing two people during a hold-up in the Mid-West. Even so Healy and Bronner pointed, once again, to a clear trajectory along which the future breakdown into crime could have been avoided: 'it is obvious that at several stages of his career measures for proper custody should have been taken that would have prevented the hideous disaster that this criminalistically unstable young fellow otherwise was almost bound to be involved in'.¹⁴⁸ In fact, this case aside, they

¹⁴³ *Judge Baker Foundation Case Studies*, Series 1, Case 20: 30.

¹⁴⁴ William Healy and Augusta Fox Bronner, *Delinquents and Criminals: Their Making and Unmaking. Studies in Two American Cities* (Macmillan Co.: New York, NY: 1928): 4, 9.

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid.* 27-29.

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid.* 68-85.

¹⁴⁷ *Ibid.* 39-40.

¹⁴⁸ *Ibid.* 44.

found hope in their Boston series. Pointing to 400 Boston cases from 1909-1914 along with 400 of their own from 1918-1919, they found that 21% and 26% respectively had adult court records.¹⁴⁹ In comparing their experiences of two cities, Healy and Bronner highlighted their expert predictions which had been heeded or ignored but would ultimately concede that successful prevention depended upon the interest and circumstances of a wider community.

Since moving to Boston, Healy had increasingly drawn contrasts with the apparently dire situation in Chicago. Writing to Dummer in 1920, Healy claimed that 'the Chicago situation does not afford anything like the equivalent of the Boston chance for knowing what can be accomplished, because so many more things are actually done here'.¹⁵⁰ Following agreement on the Commonwealth Fund's Programme for the Prevention of Delinquency in 1922 he called the Chicago situation 'appalling' by contrast.¹⁵¹ Dummer, still confident in Healy's power of persuasion, invited him back for the 15th anniversary of the Juvenile Psychopathic institute in 1924, hoping that, with Bronner, they could give Chicago 'a sound lecture on its maladministration and its stupidity'.¹⁵² Healy, however doubted 'whether we would be in good odor if we said what we really think'.¹⁵³ Now, in 1928, the JBF co-directors evaluated prevention in the two cities point by point. In Chicago juvenile court judges, elected on six-year terms, handled an enormous caseload of several thousand delinquents and dependents per year, facing long delays between complaint and hearing. In Boston, a permanently appointed juvenile court judge handled less than a thousand cases per year and could rely on numerous child welfare and placing agencies to assist probation officers in supervision. By contrast, Healy and Bronner pointed to Chicago's over-reliance on police discretion, citing over 15000 cases apparently disposed thus in 1919. Meanwhile Chicago's crowded detention home, receiving an average of 2780 juveniles per year for stays usually over a week long, raised the risk of 'moral contamination'. Instead, Boston was lauded for its emphasis on foster care, pointing to 6000 cases under placement by the State Department of Welfare with help from 16 child placing agencies in Boston.¹⁵⁴ Chicago appeared as a model of inefficient, heavy-

¹⁴⁹ Ibid. 59-67.

¹⁵⁰ Healy to Dummer, 8th March 1920, ESDP, Folder 579.

¹⁵¹ Healy to Dummer, 3rd May 1922, ESDP, Folder 580.

¹⁵² Dummer to Healy, 24th October 1924, Folder 580.

¹⁵³ Healy to Dummer, 27th October 1924, Folder 580.

¹⁵⁴ Healy and Bronner, *Delinquents and Criminals*: 183-198.

handed and ultimately counterproductive responses to juvenile delinquency while Boston was presented as an exemplar of sympathetic investigation and care of the offender across various agencies and families.

Healy and Bronner then turned to the ideological context of the community. Though difficult to define, they concluded that 'the good spirit of the community concerning child welfare' was 'inevitably proportionate to the feeling of responsibility on the part of adults' and would be expressed in 'personal service', private agencies, and 'favorable public opinion toward all good efforts in behalf of childhood and youth'.¹⁵⁵ This 'spirit', however, was also envisaged as one of shared, wholesome, American values. A comment presented from Joel Hunter, director of Chicago's Associated Charities, thus pointed to a population that 'came so fast, with so many different racial and cultural backgrounds that Chicago became and still is a city of people whose beginnings are elsewhere, without time to establish 'common interests with their neighbours'.¹⁵⁶ Conversely, a statement from J. Prentice Murphy of the Boston Children's Aid Society boasted of the 'high' character of officials in the city along with 'hard mouthed idealism' and 'traditions that go back to the social concepts of the early settlers'.¹⁵⁷ In more concrete terms, Healy and Bronner saw their Boston experience as evidence of the 'vital relationship' of community resources for recreational, educational, vocational, and, in particular, foster placement to the successful treatment of delinquency.¹⁵⁸ Healy had earlier established a personal reputation for expertise and insight into the dynamic individual delinquent but now turned to the importance of varied local networks of prevention. This was also seen in the case studies intended to showcase the JBF's expertise. However, from these it is clear that community 'spirit' often did not match the high standards envisaged by Healy and Bronner. Instead, various clients and informants approached the JBF with their own, frequently divergent, expectations and priorities which continued to shape ongoing treatment and outcomes. In this context the chronological, narrative presentation of cases for diagnosis and prognosis had a crucial role to play in convincing others to follow the delinquent's story

¹⁵⁵ Ibid. 191.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid. 192.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid. 194.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid. 211.

and prospects as viewed by the JBF. Cases of success and failure similarly served a didactic purpose in presenting warnings heeded or unheeded.

Consideration of the child's future understandably prompted a range of anxieties and imagined outcomes. The 'stories' presented by Healy and Bronner attempted to direct the imagination to particular antecedents and trends they saw in the developing child, forming a continuum between past and future. Reflecting on a case's history later invited speculation on what could be foreseen and what should have been done. Looking back in 1928, Healy and Bronner maintained that:

We find that many of the failures found by follow-up study were predictable and many of them actually predicted. Other individuals showed much promise but went on living under circumstances that were known to be inimical, circumstances that should have been altered, and the result was predictable, namely, inevitable failure.¹⁵⁹

From looking to the apparently clear trends of a case, targets for treatment and 'adjustment' were supposed to be obvious: 'in so many instances one can point exactly to what is needed'.¹⁶⁰ In fact, as has been seen, Healy, Bronner and the JBF frequently encountered disagreement with their diagnoses and prognoses. Many evidently did not follow the story they presented of a given case. Moving into the 1930s, the JBF would face further criticism from criminologists who doubted the purported success of clinical child guidance and, moreover, the ability of experts to pick out causes and futures of crime.

¹⁵⁹ Ibid. 223.

¹⁶⁰ Ibid. 222.

Chapter 3: The Statistical Challenge to Clinical Crime Prevention

As explored in the previous chapter, the authority of the JBF was not guaranteed. Healy and Bronner promoted their expertise but saw clearly that cooperation in prediction and prevention was conditional on the varying priorities of those around them. In fact, by the mid-1920s their clinical approach seemed under threat from public opinion and the investigations of statistically minded criminologists. From 1926 the JBF was studied as part of the Harvard Crime Survey, headed by Professor Felix Frankfurter (1882-1965). Amidst growing concerns for American criminal justice through the 1920s the JBF's clinical approach to reforming young delinquents attracted both derision and praise. Frankfurter and others hoped to prove the superiority of clinical methods through a follow-up study of Healy and Bronner's presumably successful cases. The researchers chosen for this task were Sheldon and Eleanor Glueck.

This marks the meeting of Healy and Bronner with the second criminologist pair of our narrative. Commencing their long career of collaboration in 1926, the Gluecks began with the same faith in clinical methods over antiquated legal procedure. Their collaboration with the JBF however would result in friction and doubt. Insisting on the statistical tabulations which would come to define their later comparative studies, the Gluecks and their assistants struggled to condense, codify and quantify clinical records. In turn Healy and Bronner grew frustrated with the breakdown of cohesive cases, syntheses and stories into disparate factors and reams of seemingly irrelevant data. The most significant struggle, however, surrounded attempts to preserve and then discard causal explanations of criminal behaviour. In the previous chapter we saw Healy and Bronner point to facts of apparently obvious causal significance for the delinquent's trajectory, causes which were then targeted for modification. The Gluecks, however, unsatisfied with diagnostic 'common sense', tried and failed to prioritise significant factors and establish causal significance statistically.

The results of the Gluecks' JBF study, published in 1934 as *One Thousand Juvenile Delinquents*, far from affirming diagnostic expertise, offered a statistical challenge to clinical criminology. The Gluecks' figures compelled them to conclude that the JBF and its methods had failed to

prevent subsequent offending. The statistical methods used to reach this conclusion had the added effect of casting doubt on, and simultaneously offering an alternative to, diagnostic judgement, replacing causes with correlates. I begin this chapter by outlining the public challenges which faced diagnostic experts like Healy and Bronner by the mid-1920s. From here I turn to the objectives of the Harvard Crime Survey and the promotion of the JBF by further medicalising crime as a pressing public health problem to be solved by scientific expertise. The remaining sections examine the labour, contestation, and consequences of turning diagnostics into data, as Healy, Bronner, and the Gluecks debated the relevance and significance of information being reduced to forms and punch cards. At stake was authority over causes and propensities, now shifting, through great organisational effort, away from Healy and Bronner's experience with the individual and towards the regularities of the dataset. In the process, case records of diagnosis and prognosis would be turned into the factors of probabilistic prediction.

Expertise on Trial: Leopold, Loeb, and Healy

The JBF study was planned and undertaken in a wider context of mounting criticism of criminal justice, fear of increasing crime, and pushback against 'soft' therapeutic methods. The 1920s were characterised in American public discourse by 'crime waves', organised crime, corruption, and the failed, unpopular regulation of morals, exemplified by prohibition. In the foregoing chapters we have followed the perspective of scientific, 'progressive' criminology, but these developments were increasingly matched by calls for swift, regular justice. As Wilrich notes, the 'feminine' sentiment of reformers was now contrasted with 'manly' justice, as in the 'tough' language of the Chicago Crime Commission, formed in 1919.¹ Healy experienced this pushback first-hand when called in 1924 to explain his two most infamous cases: Nathan Leopold (1904-1971) and Richard Loeb (1905-1936).

Alongside legendary defence attorney Clarence Darrow (1857-1938), Healy returned to Chicago to join a host of psychiatric expert witnesses in this latest 'trial of the century'. Leopold and Loeb, aged 19 and 18 respectively, had confessed to the kidnap and murder of 14-year-

¹ Wilrich, *City of Courts*: 281-312.

old Bobby Franks taking place on 21st May 1924. Self-proclaimed ‘supermen’ apparently attempting to commit the perfect crime, their attempt to avoid the death penalty became a media sensation. The premeditation of the murder, its gruesome, ‘cold-blooded’ character, and the perpetrators’ wealthy family backgrounds seemed to undermine any possible mitigation. Darrow, anticipating a harsh jury verdict, advised a plea of guilty so that clemency might be argued in sentencing. This meant forgoing a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity, and defence psychiatrists were likely happy to argue without reference to this crude, oft-criticised ‘knowledge of right or wrong’ test of legal responsibility.² Nevertheless, expert testimony on the mental condition of Leopold and Loeb still evoked the frequently mocked ‘battles of the alienists’ familiar to the public from other trials of the insane.³

Healy and three other psychiatrists appeared for the defence but formed just one part of the long proceedings from 21st July to final sentencing on 10th September. We are here concerned not with the intricacies of this well known, oft-recounted trial but rather its consequences for the perception of clinical expertise. The defence psychiatrists’ report pointed to ‘the unique coming together of two peculiarly maladjusted adolescents’.⁴ Both characterised as pathologically unemotional, their abnormal fantasy lives were presented intermingling and spilling into real crime. The psychiatrists uncovered Leopold’s childhood delusions in which he switched roles between imaginary king and slave.⁵ Loeb, on the other hand, even before the age of nine, was ‘filled with a curiously abnormal and criminalistic set of ideas and visions’, imagining and then acting out the role of ‘criminal mastermind’.⁶ In court, Healy testified that the case was ‘quite beyond anything in my experience’ but attempted a characteristic diagnosis of causes:

I have the boys’ story, told separately, about an incredibly absurd childish compact that bound them, which bears out in Leopold’s case particularly the thread and idea of his fantasy life. Loeb says the association gave him the opportunity of getting someone to carry out his criminalistic imaginings and

² See Daniel N. Robinson, *Wild Beasts and Idle Humours: A History of the Insanity Defence from Antiquity to the Present* (Harvard University Press: Cambridge, MA: 1996): 141-182.

³ For a prior example see the Thaw-White trial as recounted in Noll, *American Madness*: 153-158.

⁴ William A. White, William Healy, Bernard Glueck and Ralph Hamill, ‘Psychiatrists Report for the Defence (Joint Summary)’, *JAICLC*, Vol. 15 (3) (1924): 360.

⁵ *Ibid.* 361-372.

⁶ *Ibid.* 372-379.

conscious ideas. In the case of Leopold, the direct cause of his entering into criminalistic acts was this particularly childish compact.⁷

However, moving from the juvenile court to a sensational murder trial, diagnostic expertise became far less straightforward. A range of expert testimony pointed to delusions, repressive upbringing, nervous instability and even alleged conversations between Loeb and his teddy bear. These, along with the secret 'compact' revealed to Healy and other psychiatrists and especially the defendants' purported homosexual activity, became fodder for reporters. Both lawyers and the public derided confusing, vague notions of mental 'abnormality' and 'maladjustment'. While the defence psychiatrists emphasised the unique combination of these peculiar personalities to assuage 'widespread panic among the parents of young people', many worried or mocked that accounts of fantasy and delusion might extend to any child or criminal (Fig. 2). Experts for the prosecution (among them neurologist Hugh T. Patrick, assisted by Healy before the JPI's creation) argued that fantasies were normal features of mental development, with no evidence of mental disease.⁸ The defence's contention that Leopold and Loeb were 'mentally abnormal' certainly fell short of any legal definition of insanity or impulse. State's attorney Robert E. Crowe, questioning another defence psychiatrist, William White, therefore asked whether 'the intellectual man or the emotional man' was responsible for the murder. White, in keeping with a dynamic, integrated understanding of behaviour answered: 'well, you cannot split a man up that way into two parts. When the man acts he acts as a whole'. Crowe further questioned whether Loeb knew the difference between right and wrong when committing the murder and White attempted to answer:

[White]. He knew intellectually that the murder was proscribed by the law.

[Crowe]. Did he know it was wrong?

[White]. He had no adequate feeling towards its moral wrongfulness.

⁷ William Healy in, Alvin V. Sellers (ed.), *The Loeb-Leopold Case: With Excerpts from the Evidence of Alienists and Including the Arguments to the Court by Counsel for the People and the Defence* (Classic Publishing Co.: Brunswick, GA: 1926): 20.

⁸ Hugh T. Patrick, Harold Douglas Singer, Archibald Church, and William O. Krohn, 'Psychiatrists Called by the Prosecution', *JAICLC*, Vol 15 (3) (1924): 380-390.



Figure 2: Cartoon by John T. McCutcheon, *Chicago Daily Tribune*, 4th August 1924: 1.

[Crowe]. But did he have sufficient capacity to refrain from killing?

[White]. I don't know.⁹

Ultimately the sentence of Leopold and Loeb ignored the expert witnesses. Judge John R. Caverly stated that he felt 'impelled to dwell briefly on the mass of data produced as to the physical, mental and moral condition of the two defendants' but also conjectured that 'similar analysis made of other persons accused of crime would probably reveal similar or different abnormalities'. Careful analyses of life histories and other factors were valuable to

⁹ William White and Robert E. Crowe in, Sellers, *The Loeb-Leopold Case*: 17.

‘criminology in general’ but could not excuse these two defendants.¹⁰ Dissatisfied by psychiatry, Caverly fell back on youth (legally defined) ‘in accordance with the progress of criminal law all over the world and within the dictates of enlightened humanity’.¹¹ Rather than death, Leopold and Loeb, both under 21, were sentenced for life plus 99 years.

The expert witnesses were politely, but very publicly rebuffed. Criticism of their supposed motives nevertheless followed. A special issue of the *Journal of the American Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology* pointed to obvious partisanship whereby ‘the wealth of parents and the exploitation of the learning of psychiatrists [...] delayed into weeks a hearing which should have been concluded in two or three days’.¹² According to legal scholar John Henry Wigmore ‘Eminent scientists’ (referencing White’s testimony) had humiliated themselves by referring to ‘Babe’ Leopold and ‘Dickie’ Loeb in a transparent attempt ‘to emphasize the childlike ingenuousness and infantile naivety of the cruel unscrupulous wretches in the dock’.¹³ This infantilisation pointed to a more significant attack on the very idea of ‘sympathetic treatment’. Faced with two ‘cold blooded’ killers, sentiments of reform from prior decades became extremely uncomfortable. Editor Robert Gault now commented on the importance of establishing community ‘morale’ and ‘disapproval of the criminal behaviour that we all hate’. Collective retribution was now more important than understanding and treatment: ‘we have too much short-sighted attachment to the individual narrowly considered, and have not been wise enough to place him in his proper place of subordination to the spirit that makes an effective group’.¹⁴

Wigmore was especially damning. Experts for the defence had, he claimed, made the cardinal error of ignoring deterrence, citing newspaper stories of violent adolescents who reportedly now cited the Leopold-Loeb sentence: ‘These reckless dastards, it seems, “wanted money for our good times, excitement, clothes and fun”, and they don’t mind killing because they won’t

¹⁰ John R. Caverly, ‘Sentence of the Judge’, *JAICLC*, Vol. 15 (3) (1924): 392.

¹¹ *Ibid.* 393.

¹² Homer Cummings, in ‘A Symposium of Comments from the Legal Profession’, *JAICLC*, Vol. 15 (3) (1924): 399.

¹³ John Henry Wigmore, ‘Editorial: To Abolish the Partisanship of Expert Witnesses, as Illustrated in the Loeb-Leopold Case’, *JAICLC*, Vol. 15 (3) (1924): 341.

¹⁴ Robert H. Gault, ‘Editorial: Control By Morale’, *JAICLC*, Vol. 15 (3) (1924): 344.

hang'.¹⁵ Wigmore further lambasted the moral condition of interwar youth and the remedial 'terror' of possible execution:

As everyone knows, today is a period of reckless immorality and lawlessness on the part of younger people, at the ages of 18-25. It is more or less due to the vicious philosophy of life, spread in our schools for the last twenty-five years by John Dewey and others – the philosophy which worships self-expression and emphasizes the uncontrolled search for complete experience. Whatever the temporary cause of this behaviour may be, it is in special need of repression. The instances above quoted show that such persons *are* amenable to the threats of the criminal law. If that law has no threat for them, they will the less try to repress their nefarious antisocial actions.¹⁶

Turning on psychiatry, Wigmore, who eight years previously had begged Chicago to retain the 'genius' Healy, now maintained 'that the reports of the psychiatrists called for the defence, if given the influence which the defence asked for, *would tend to undermine the whole penal law*'.¹⁷ They offered 'deterministic' causal explanations to alleviate responsibility but had apparently forgotten the importance of punishment for 'social defence'. Dangerously expansive models of diagnosis might rather find 'natural' causes in any criminal's life history to justify the law's indulgence.

Though undoubtedly an exceptional case in Healy's career, the trial of Leopold and Loeb provided a fulcrum for moral panic and criticisms of therapeutic leniency towards amoral youth. Conversely, Ethel Sturges Dummer wrote to Healy on the 'strange article' of Wigmore, one of the earliest allies of their work: 'has he relapsed to a belief in hanging? Did the war change all of the ideals to which we had evolved?'¹⁸ Interwar calls for justice over treatment seemed to threaten the hopes of clinical criminology which now needed to be defended. The coming survey to prove the efficacy of treatment was well-aware of this context and the need make crime prevention not only scientific but convincing.

¹⁵ John Henry Wigmore, in 'A Symposium of Comments...': 402.

¹⁶ Ibid. 402.

¹⁷ Ibid. 403.

¹⁸ Dummer to Healy, 1st November 1924, ESDP, Folder 580.

Crime Prevention as Public Health

In the previous chapters we have seen how the problem of crime was medicalised by aspiring experts. The planning of the Harvard Crime Survey repeated this sentiment while bringing a subtle shift in the framing of clinical crime prevention from sympathetic diagnosis to public health necessity. The Survey was initiated by the Harvard Law School in 1926 under the direction of Professor Felix Frankfurter, head of the earlier Cleveland Crime Survey in 1922 which had targeted ‘politicized’ judges. A co-founder of the American Civil Liberties Union, subsequently adviser to Franklin D. Roosevelt and Supreme Court Justice, Frankfurter himself was firmly associated with progressive reform. In 1927 he publicly criticised the infamous death sentence of Italian anarchists Nicola Sacco and Bartolomeo Vanzetti, then being appealed in the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, as being a result of anti-immigrant prejudice and the ‘red scare’.¹⁹ Paralleling these concerns, the Harvard Crime Survey sought a more efficient, progressive, and scientific administration of justice. He later described its aims as ‘the development of scientific standards and methods regarding concerns of society that heretofore had been left largely to improvisation, crude empiricism and propaganda’.²⁰ This included the study of sentencing, probation, policing, social agencies and the offenders themselves.

Within this wider survey, the study of correctional institutions, offenders, and the JBF was entrusted to Sheldon and Eleanor Glueck, recent Harvard doctoral graduates in social ethics and educational psychology respectively. Born in Poland in 1896, Sheldon pursued a legal then social science career following service in the first world war.²¹ His brother, Bernard Glueck, was already known for his psychiatric classification of prisoners at Sing Sing in New York and had also given expert testimony alongside Healy for Leopold and Loeb’s defence. Sheldon meanwhile wrote his doctoral thesis on the inadequacies of medical jurisprudence in light of modern psychiatry.²² Eleanor, born 1898 in Brooklyn, had studied at the New York School of Social Work. Here, studying under Bernard Glueck (1884-1972), she met Sheldon and the two

¹⁹ Felix Frankfurter, ‘The Case of Sacco and Vanzetti’, *The Atlantic Monthly* (March, 1927): 409-432.

²⁰ Felix Frankfurter, ‘Foreword’, in Sheldon and Eleanor Glueck, *One Thousand Juvenile Delinquents: Their Treatment in Court and Clinic* (Harvard University Press: Cambridge, MA: 1934): xii.

²¹ ‘Glueck, Sheldon’, in Garraty and Carnes, *American National Biography*, Vol. 9: 128.

²² Sheldon Glueck, *Mental Disorder and the Criminal Law* (Little, Brown & Co.: Boston, MA: 1925)

were married in 1922 while at Harvard.²³ Subsequently they would point to the influence of Dr. Richard C. Cabot (1868-1939) and a 1925 seminar on follow-up studies to check the accuracy of cardiac illness diagnoses, suggesting the same effort be made to check 'the results of different kinds of organised professional effort to cope with various social problems'.²⁴ The Harvard Crime Survey gave them just this opportunity.

The Gluecks were responsible for follow-up studies of male and female convicts from the Concord and Framingham reformatories respectively and Juvenile Delinquents referred to the JBF, however, I will be focusing on the latter. In 1927, during the initial phases of the JBF study, Healy, Bronner, Frankfurter, and the Gluecks evidently shared a belief in clinical criminology, confidently presenting analogies with public health that reflected both rhetorical and methodological aims. In March 1927, Sheldon met with Frankfurter and lawyer Charles P. Howland to discuss the study's objectives. They agreed that the survey wanted 'to show that the present system of handling crime under present court proceedings... is a complete failure' and by contrast 'to show, through J.B.F. materials, why the system fails'.²⁵ As well as a source of illustrative material of judicial failings the JBF was also expected to emerge as an example of clinical success to be followed and adopted more widely. Sheldon later wrote that 'our chief object in making the J.B.F. study (so I gather from conversations with Howland and Frankfurter) is to establish the great practical, social value of institutions like the J.B.F. to lawyers and other powerful groups in the community'.²⁶ Medicalised language was deliberately stressed to promote the JBF and see off critics. Frankfurter thus emphasised that 'nothing will be more persuasive than the disease analogy'.²⁷ More specifically it was hoped that the appeal to public health and public protection from the danger of infectious criminality would counter growing hostility and political aversion towards therapeutic approaches:

²³ 'Glueck, Eleanor Touroff', in Barbara Sicherman and Carol Hurd Green (eds.), *Notable American Women: The Modern Period* (Belknap Press: Cambridge, MA: 1980): 278-279.

²⁴ Sheldon Glueck, *Lives of Labor, Lives of Love: Fragments of Friendly Autobiographies* (Exposition Press: Hicksville, NY: 1977): 34.

²⁵ 'Discussion of Harvard Law School Survey', 3rd March 1927, Sheldon Glueck Papers, 1916-1972, HOLLIS 601626, Harvard Law School Library, Historical & Special Collections, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA (Subsequently SGP), Box 24 Folder 10.

²⁶ 'Judge Baker Foundation Case Records', 11th October 1927, SGP, Box 24 Folder 10.

²⁷ 'Discussion of Harvard Law School Survey', 3rd March 1927, SGP Box 24 Folder 10.

There is a very large class of opinion set against a type of treatment that is regarded as ultra-merciful to the individual. That type of opinion is quite potent with the legislature. Need to show, through J.B.F. material why the system fails. Crime as an objective fact, is treated as a sole factor in the situation while J.B.F. material shows that crime is actually symptomatic; that the person is a diseased individual... that the offender may be a far more dangerous individual than his individual crime as known under the present system indicates him to be.²⁸

Responsive to perceived leniency, clinical crime prevention now evoked the dangers of both disease and judicial ignorance along with the consequent necessity of expert oversight and control. Healy echoed this sentiment by comparing crime to tuberculosis in his discussions with the Gluecks: 'The tb. analogy, with its hectic flush, recently was considered the most complete analogy of what is being attempted by the J.B.F. The court notices the flush – the fever and attempts to eliminate it without examination as to its source (the court may mistake the fever for sunburn merely)'.²⁹ Tuberculosis was a calculated comparison, calling back to successful legislation for the compulsory reporting of infection and public health supervision since the 1890s. As Fairchild, Bayer, and Colgrove note, such measures implemented in New York were shaped by politics of exclusion and suspicion as well as care, resulting in especially close supervision of immigrant communities and the “homeless, friendless, dependent, dissatisfied and vicious consumptives” who were “most likely to be dangerous to the community”.³⁰ The JBF and the Harvard Crime Survey now hoped to mobilise the combined fear of ill health and dangerous individuals around proven medical oversight. A later pamphlet for the JBF, produced in 1931 thus read:

A few decades ago society seemed helpless before such diseases as tuberculosis, just as it now seems helpless before crime, insanity and other forms of conduct disorder. But one by one, the major diseases are being brought under control... the effort to prevent behaviour disorders is comparable in every way with the public health movement – in aims and scope, in its emphasis on the child, and in the possible saving to society.³¹

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ 'Discussion of the Harvard Law School Survey', 5th May 1927, SGP, Box 24 Folder 10.

³⁰ Amy L. Fairchild, Ronald Bayer, and James Colgrove, *Searching Eyes: Privacy, the State, and Disease Surveillance in America* (University of California Press: Berkeley, CA: 2007): 45, 33-57.

³¹ 'Facts About the Judge Baker Foundation for the Guidance of Childhood and Youth' (1931), SGP, Box 90 Folder 8: 13.

In 1915 Healy had referred to the 'many sided etiology' of individual delinquency but now individualised diagnostic methods were subtly joined by the language of epidemiology and infection. In May 1927, at the same meeting where Healy raised the tuberculosis analogy, the failings of criminal justice were thus characterised:

1. Re-infection of offender through return to bad conditions
2. Infection of others by offender
3. Treatment not based on differential needs, e.g. F[eeble].M[inded].
psychotic, immoral, gang-homes.³²

Crime 'spread' through peers and companionships (as was commonly claimed in the case histories seen last chapter) but also through social and residential conditions. One term frequently repeated in survey material was 'centre of infection', appearing in reference to juvenile gangs and, more broadly, to 'street life' and various 'pernicious' leisure activities.³³ Once again sexual activity and the 'contagion' of immoral ideas and habits in unsupervised urban spaces were of particular concern. One boy, selected by Sheldon as 'a dramatic illustrative case for possible use later' had 'discussed activities frankly at J.B.F., which had been going on for years; - thefts, immorality with girls brought to a hut, homosexual practices since early youth'.³⁴ Indeed, Frankfurter had specified that illustrative case material should be gathered to 'indicate such characteristics as homosexuality, or other features which may be infectious'.³⁵

The fusion of 'immorality', 'illness', and 'infection' went well beyond rhetorical conceit. The methods of the JBF study attempted to compare aetiologies, outcomes and grouped causes and symptoms across a sample of young offenders. In October 1927 a report drafted by Sheldon outlined four hypotheses to be proven. The first hypothesis stated that adult and juvenile courts ignored an array of symptoms to focus on the criminal or delinquent act exclusively. Rather than considering only the most recent wrongdoing, the second hypothesis proposed that 'conditions, mental attitudes and conduct trends and habits intimately related

³² 'Discussion of the Harvard Law School Survey', 5th May 1927, SGP, Box 24 Folder 10.

³³ 'Code For Punch Cards', SGP, Box 24 Folder 9.

³⁴ 'Discussion of the Harvard Law School Survey', 5th May 1927, SGP, Box 24 Folder 10.

³⁵ 'Discussion of the Harvard Law School Survey', 3rd March 1927, SGP, Box 24 Folder 10.

to delinquency and criminality often appear at an early age'. Having identified potential delinquents the third hypothesis was that 'early recognition and scientific treatment of such conditions, attitudes and trends is more effective than the ordinary practice, in heading off a developing delinquent career'. The final hypothesis concluded that the present system of justice would be 'foredoomed to failure because treatment is not intelligently related to needs'.³⁶

More than a follow-up of JBF cases to check subsequent improvement or re-offending, these hypotheses required mining case records for prior antecedents, establishing aetiological significance, and evaluating court decisions in light of these. JBF recommendations for specific cases would thus be compared with the actual sentences decided by the Boston Juvenile Court in the hopes of demonstrating that the court failed when it ignored the experts. Sheldon described the 'striking possibility' that the carrying out of JBF recommendations might emerge as the primary differentiating factor between recidivists and non-recidivists.³⁷ Earlier he drafted hypothetical tables to illustrate the kinds of conclusions anticipated. One divided cases depending on whether JBF recommendations were followed or not, imagining recidivism rates of 25% and 75% respectively.³⁸ In another, Sheldon illustrated how 50 cases 'legally classified' as robbers might be subdivided into 35 cases of 'broken homes', 5 of 'mental def.' and 10 of 'psychopathic pers.', revealing the varied aetiology behind a common offence.³⁹ These goals, to prove particular aetiologies of crime which were invisible to court officials, shaped the later difficulties of the JBF study. Clinical expertise rested on firm causal connections that could be drawn between prior antecedents or signs and later behaviour. The causes of particular delinquency were, in turn, targets for remedial modification, intelligently linking, in the words of the survey plan, 'treatment' with 'needs'. Behind these plans, however the Gluecks and their assistants were, at that moment, struggling to establish any causal or aetiological significance, a struggle closely connected with emerging frictions between diagnostic 'common sense' and quantification.

³⁶ 'Progress Report of Projects Under the Guidance of Dr. Glueck', 15th October 1927, SGP, Box 24 Folder 10.

³⁷ 'Judge Baker Foundation Case Records', 11th October 1927, SGP Box 24 Folder 10.

³⁸ Sheldon Glueck to Ruth A. Beebe, 2nd May 1927, SGP, Box 24 Folder 10.

³⁹ 'Harvard Law School Survey', 28th April 1927, SGP, Box 24 Folder 10.

Diagnostics into Data

In their studies for the Harvard Crime Survey, the Gluecks developed the research methods and priorities that would persist throughout their subsequent criminological careers. Theirs was an approach to large samples of offenders (usually between 500 and 1000 cases) with an emphasis on intensive information gathering, follow-up, quantification and statistical comparison. *One Thousand Juvenile Delinquents*, presenting the results of the JBF study in 1934, would be organised around tabulated factors and percentage correlations. It is unclear what specifically motivated or influenced the Gluecks' quantitative, tabular approach but it was evidently well-established in 1927, as they wrangled with Healy and Bronner over the codification of cases. The 1000 JBF cases chosen for follow-up study would become targets of extensive data gathering, facilitated by existing case materials but also lengthy investigations tracing their activity in subsequent years. Standardised forms synthesised diverse case histories into a more controlled set of social, familial, physical, mental, and other factors (Fig. 3). While Healy and Bronner's follow-up of Chicago and Boston cases (discussed at the end of Chapter 2) relied on extant court records, the Gluecks now emphasised thorough investigations for any undetected offences, assembling ID cards for each case and working through police, institutions and successive residences across states (Fig. 4).⁴⁰

Ultimately, in the JBF and in subsequent studies, the Gluecks condensed information on background factors and subsequent behaviour onto punch cards for tabulation (Fig. 5). Developed by Herman Hollerith for the 1890 US census, these cards allowed for the storage, retrieval and computation of information by specialised tabulating machines, increasingly used by private businesses (particularly railroad and insurance companies) and state bureaucracies.⁴¹ Using a 12 Row, 80 column card introduced by the International Business

⁴⁰ Glueck and Glueck, *One Thousand Juvenile Delinquents*: 5-7.

⁴¹ JoAnne Yates, 'Business Use of Information and Technology During the Industrial Age', in Alfred D. Chandler Jr. and James W. Cortada (eds.), *A Nation Transformed by Information: How Information has Shaped the United States from Colonial Times to the Present* (Oxford University Press: Oxford: 2000): 129-135; Jon Agar, *The Government Machine: A Revolutionary History of the Computer* (MIT Press: Cambridge, MA: 2003): 143-199.

APPENDIX G											
SCHEDULE CARD											
(One-fourth actual size)											
No.	Name			Col.	J. B. F. No.						
PARENTS		Father		Mother		MARITAL CONDITION			OCCUPATION		
Nativity-Race						Legal Status			Father		Mother
Time in U. S.						Relationship					
Citizenship						PARENT-CHILD RELATIONS					
Religion						Father					
Age at Marriage						Mother			Home (Physical)		
Present Age						Foster Family			Neighborhood		
Education						ECONOMIC STATUS			Moral Standards		
AGENCIES INTERESTED											
Health				Relief and Family Welfare		Child Welfare		Correction		Other	
Physical		Mental									
FAMILY											
		PHYSICAL		MENTAL				FAMILY MISCONDUCT			
		Disease	Defect	Disease	Defect	Other Abnormalities		Court		Non-Court	
F.											
M.											
Sib.											
Oth. Rel.											
Birth		Siblings		Rgn.		J. B. F. Exams.		Informal Visits Initiated by			
Legitimacy						No. Date Age		O. Fam. J. B. F. Agent			
Household		Kurt's Exp.									
DEVELOPMENTAL PHYSICAL CONDITION						PRESENCE OF PHYSICAL DISEASE OR HANDICAP					
MENTAL AND BEHAVIOR CHARACTERISTICS											
Intelligence		Psychoses & Psychopathoses				Habits		Other			
Special Abilities		Personality Traits				Motivations					
Special Disabilities						Mot. Mech.					
						Adolesc. Instability					
Diagnosis of Prior Mental Examination (Date & Place)											
SCHOOL HISTORY						EMPLOYMENT					
Age	Grade	Reason for Leaving				Regular-part time		Age of First Employment			
						Regular-full time		Nature of First Employment			
Conduct and Attitude						Irregular-part time					
						Irregular-full time					
						Recent		Never Worked			
USE OF LEISURE						DELINQUENCIES PRIOR TO J. B. F.					
						Arrests		Present Offense			
						Sentences		Non-Court Delinquencies			
						Age of First Arrest					
J. B. F. CAUSATIVE FACTORS OF DELINQUENCY											
PROGNOSIS		RECOMMENDATIONS				CARRIED OUT			AGENCY		
						Yes No Partially					

Figure 3: Blank form for recording information from JBF case records (Glueck and Glueck, *One Thousand Juvenile Delinquents: 301*).

Name.....	Aliases.....	No.
Birthdate.....	Place.....	J. B. F. Exam.
Compl.....	Eyes.....	Hair..... Ht.
Parents.....	Address	
Sibs		
Date of arrest.....	Ct.	Disp.
Address	With	
Prior places of residence		
Places and dates of residence since J. B. F. Exam.		

Figure 4: Blank identification card for tracing JBF cases (Glueck and Glueck, *One Thousand Juvenile Delinquents*: 300).

P 1060			
0	0	0	0
1	1	1	1
2	2	2	2
3	3	3	3
4	4	4	4
5	5	5	5
6	6	6	6
7	7	7	7
8	8	8	8
9	9	9	9
0	0	0	0
1	1	1	1
2	2	2	2
3	3	3	3
4	4	4	4
5	5	5	5
6	6	6	6
7	7	7	7
8	8	8	8
9	9	9	9
0	0	0	0
1	1	1	1
2	2	2	2
3	3	3	3
4	4	4	4
5	5	5	5
6	6	6	6
7	7	7	7
8	8	8	8
9	9	9	9
0	0	0	0
1	1	1	1
2	2	2	2
3	3	3	3
4	4	4	4
5	5	5	5
6	6	6	6
7	7	7	7
8	8	8	8
9	9	9	9
0	0	0	0
1	1	1	1
2	2	2	2
3	3	3	3
4	4	4	4
5	5	5	5
6	6	6	6
7	7	7	7
8	8	8	8
9	9	9	9
0	0	0	0
1	1	1	1
2	2	2	2
3	3	3	3
4	4	4	4
5	5	5	5
6	6	6	6
7	7	7	7
8	8	8	8
9	9	9	9
0	0	0	0
1	1	1	1
2	2	2	2
3	3	3	3
4	4	4	4
5	5	5	5
6	6	6	6
7	7	7	7
8	8	8	8
9	9	9	9
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1	1	1	1
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3	3	3	3
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3	3	3	3
4	4	4	4
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6	6	6	6
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8	8	8	8
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3	3	3	3
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9	9	9	9
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4	4	4	4
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6	6	6	6
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8	8	8	8
9	9	9	9
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1	1	1	1
2	2	2	2
3	3	3	3
4	4	4	4
5	5	5	5
6	6	6	6
7	7	7	7
8	8	8	8
9	9	9	9
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3	3	3	3
4	4	4	4
5	5	5	5
6	6	6	6
7	7	7	7
8	8	8	8
9	9	9	9
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3	3	3	3
4	4	4	4
5	5	5	5
6	6	6	6
7	7	7	7
8	8	8	8
9	9	9	9
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1	1	1	1
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3	3	3	3
4	4	4	4
5	5	5	5
6	6	6	6
7	7	7	7
8	8	8	8
9	9	9	9
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4	4	4	4
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Figure 5: Draft punch card with appended factor list from JBF study (SGP, Box 24, Folder 9).

Subsequently an 80 column, 12 row Hollerith tabulation card would be used

Machines Corporation (IBM) in 1928, the Gluecks computed cases as a series of enumerated, punched factors.⁴² These techniques would recur throughout their later studies and predictive methods (further examined in chapter 5).

The aim of these forms and protocols was consistency. Before attaining their final outline, however, they were a source of great frustration in the early days of the study. In April 1927 Frankfurter evidently hoped for results by October that year to which Healy simply replied, 'one can't guarantee that it will be done in quite six months'.⁴³ By that time, Sheldon instead reported that:

⁴² Glueck and Glueck, *One Thousand Juvenile Delinquents*: 302-321.

⁴³ William Healy to Felix Frankfurter, 4th March 1927, SGP, Box 86 Folder 14.

Planning of this study has been exceedingly difficult both because its possibilities and limitations were not carefully thought out by us and Dr. Healy at the beginning and because of various complicating factors not necessary to mention... it took long to arrive at any agreement upon a statistical card; it will take a long time to solve certain basic statistical difficulties. Thus far but a small number of case-records have been transcribed by Miss Beebe and her assistant. It is hard to estimate how long this branch of the investigation will take but I can see no possibility of its completion before early in 1929.⁴⁴

The labour of actually analysing case records, entering information and organising follow-up inquiries fell to Miss Ruth A. Beebe (referred to above), a part-time social service worker at the JBF, now hired by the Harvard Crime Survey. She was assisted by Anne Stedman (a volunteer despite Beebe's appeals that she be officially employed) while further requests for volunteer staff would be directed to the Simmons School of Social Work.⁴⁵ In this sense the Gluecks' study of the JBF was in keeping with contemporary divisions of scientific paper-work, relying on a largely voluntary staff of women with social work backgrounds.⁴⁶ The work of finding, ordering and entering information could be long and arduous. Beebe, working with a Mr Weiss in the Court of Domestic Relations, described the family histories in court and other agency records as 'ponderous beyond compare and filled with all sorts of irrelevant material'. She also worried that Weiss was 'not wise to continue his work until one or two o'clock in the morning, which is apparently a common thing'.⁴⁷ In turn, menial data entry was joined by confusion and disagreement regarding the JBF information to be recorded. Writing to Sheldon at the end of July 1927, Beebe noted that analysis cards did not seem to be developing well 'partially due, I think, to our not knowing exactly what all the data was to be used for, - in other words, the entire scope of the study'. This, she wrote 'led to frequent changes in the information to be sought with a thorough testing of the new sheet form in every case'.⁴⁸ Changing requirements would be joined by changing standards and terminology up to early

⁴⁴ 'Progress Report of Projects Under Guidance of Dr. Glueck', 15th October 1927, SGP, Box 24 Folder 10.

⁴⁵ Beebe to Sheldon Glueck, 27th July 1927; 'Progress Report', SGP, Box 24 Folder 10: 8.

⁴⁶ For other examples see Von Oertzen, 'Science in the Cradle': 175-195; Dan Bouk, 'Women who Worked with Documents to Rationalize Reproduction', in Bittel, Leong and Von Oertzen, *Working With Paper*: 193-207.

⁴⁷ Beebe to Sheldon Glueck, 27th July 1927, SGP, Box 24, Folder 10.

⁴⁸ Beebe to Sheldon Glueck, 27th July 1927, SGP, Box 24, Folder 10.

1928 at least, when it was decided that 'all definitions should be restudied and discussed at the earliest opportunity'.⁴⁹

Like any research project, the JBF study faced problems of scope in deciding which data were relevant. Concerning the sample of cases to be studied a meeting in May 1927 noted that 'the original intention was to take 1000 cases and see what conclusions could be drawn, creating the divisions later'.⁵⁰ A revised selection program later suggested 1000 boys and 100 girls but the latter would ultimately be omitted as 'there were too few cases within the necessary period to treat statistically, and as girls present special problems'.⁵¹ The final sample for study comprised 1000 male juvenile delinquents, referred to the JBF from the Boston Juvenile Court from 1917-1922 to be followed up for subsequent behaviour in the five years following clinical recommendations, the follow-up period terminating at 1927.⁵² At the outset of study, however, deciding amongst various selection criteria, Sheldon simply informed Beebe that she should make a preliminary analysis of 50 cases to see how they 'shape themselves'.⁵³

Confusion surrounding the study sample reflected a background of ongoing disagreement and negotiation between Healy and Bronner on one hand and the Gluecks on the other. Initial desires to let the cases 'shape themselves' connected to hopes of comprehensive data collection which were, however, increasingly challenged by the Healy and Bronner's insistence on sticking to 'significant' information. The Gluecks' desire for comprehensive information was understandable in light of the study's stated aim to reveal complex aetiologies and might also provide empirical material for understanding outcomes. They discussed this need for background information with Healy and Bronner in their May meeting:

It will probably be necessary to study the two groups... to see if they are different as to important items such as: race, condition of home, age distribution, mental status, etc. for the presence or absence of a subsequent criminal record may be attributable more largely to differences as to these

⁴⁹ 'J.B.F. Study Discussion', 19th January 1928, SGP, Box 24 Folder 9.

⁵⁰ 'Discussion of the Harvard Law School Survey', 5th May 1927, SGP, Box 24 Folder 10.

⁵¹ Glueck and Glueck, *One Thousand Juvenile Delinquents*: 4.

⁵² Ibid. 5.

⁵³ Sheldon Glueck to Beebe, 10th May 1927, SGP, Box 24 Folder 10.

items than to whether or not – for instance – the recommendations made by the J.B.F. were carried out.⁵⁴

Indeed, the connection of such background factors, rather than treatment, to subsequent reoffending would ultimately become the central concern of the Gluecks' research. The widening scope of information to be mined from JBF case records, in this sense, would provide a dataset underlying later probabilistic prediction. For now, however, Healy and Bronner pushed back against the anticipated data deluge. In one discussion on the 11th July a series of these disputes included the range of behaviours to be recorded under 'sex' (including 'homosex', 'heterosex', 'sex communications' and 'other sex practices'), the more efficient recording of numerous social agencies involved in a case, and the recording of 'outstandingly good qualities', even if only under 'remarks'. Healy also emphasised the importance of including features of 'peculiar personality', even if not overtly psychopathic, which he saw as essential to completing 'character pictures' of the JBF cases.⁵⁵ In a meeting the next day, however, Healy shifted from defending 'peculiar personality' to dismissing information he evidently saw no value in:

Dr Healy opposed the use by the survey of any J.B.F. findings that are neither etiological factors nor probable causes of delinquency. He felt that there are many unimportant items on the survey sheets in their present form, and that it is a waste of time to enumerate details which cannot be used as the basis of tables.⁵⁶

Even if Healy felt sure he could distinguish between aetiologic significance and irrelevance, the purpose and scope of eventual tables was evidently not agreed. Bronner, meanwhile, compromised, recognising 'the need of assembling facts so fully that tables will not be restrained for lack of data'. But she warned that 'the earlier belief that the J.B.F. study would reflect a picture of the child and his environment should give place to an analysis of delinquent trends borne out by subsequent court contacts'.⁵⁷ As the eventual forms and tables of *One Thousand Juvenile Delinquents* indicate, a wide variety of background factors would ultimately

⁵⁴ 'Discussion of the Harvard Law School Survey', 5th May 1927, SGP, Box 24 Folder 10.

⁵⁵ 'Discussion of the J.B.F. Section of the Harvard Crime Survey', 11th July 1927, SGP, Box 24 Folder 10.

⁵⁶ 'Discussion of J.B.F. Section of Harvard Crime Survey, 12th July 1927, SGP, Box 24 Folder 10.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

be extracted from JBF records. Even so, Healy and Bronner still attempted to impress their own opinions of the most 'significant' facts. Indeed, these were their case records.

Problems of delimiting information were joined by problems of clarification. The records of the JBF, assembled by Healy and Bronner up to a decade ago for individualised diagnosis, were not self-evident data but rather contained implicit meaning and significance which could only be retrieved from the experts themselves. Despite prior experience in the JBF, Beebe and her assistant Stedman were directed to consult Healy and Bronner on any diagnostic or treatment decisions for the cases which seemed 'inadequate or obscure'.⁵⁸ In his progress report, Sheldon was also apparently wary or otherwise confused by psychiatric diagnoses, advising:

Psychiatrically, there are many "psychopathic personalities", and few persons suffering from well defined psychoses. We must watch our step with reference to the diagnosis 'psychopathic personality', because (1) it is doubtful whether this concept was clearly defined for all psychiatrists before they began their work and (2) even if it was, psychiatrists vary widely in the degree and symptoms of psychopathy which they require before tagging a patient 'psychopathic personality'.⁵⁹

Sheldon pointed to the same problem in the JBF material though he commented that 'Healy has a more clearly-conceived notion of what he means by the term than is usual'.

As well as uncertainty on certain psychiatric categories, it also appears that analysts found it particularly difficult to interpret the process of diagnosis and recommendation as recorded by Healy and Bronner. More specifically, it was often unclear why certain facts were of diagnostic significance and, hence, why certain treatments were recommended. By January 1928, Healy, was given a direct role in filling out certain parts of the data schedule to overcome this difficulty. In prioritising JBF treatment recommendations as 'major', 'minor' and 'other' it was noted that 'Dr. Healy agrees to pass on any doubtful cases'.⁶⁰ Meanwhile, the Gluecks reduced detailed prognoses for each case to a tripartite classification of 'good', 'fair' or 'poor' with the qualification that 'doubtful cases should be classed as fair, if Dr. Healy agrees'. A host of

⁵⁸ 'Discussion of the J.B.F. Section of the Harvard Crime Survey', 11th July 1927, SGP, Box 24 Folder 10.

⁵⁹ 'Progress Report of Projects Under Guidance of Dr. Glueck', 15th October 1927, SGP, Box 24 Folder 10.

⁶⁰ 'Recommendations and Selection (Summary of Earlier Statements)', 10th January 1928, SGP, Box 24 Folder 10.

possible 'causative factors', usually several per case, also required special procedures 'to ascertain how many terms Dr. Healy commonly uses in this connection' so that these could later be clarified and 'the number of the major factors, chosen by Dr. Healy, given especial prominence'.⁶¹ It is particularly notable that, rather than their 'factual content', these clarifications focused on points of clinical interpretation in the old case records, namely diagnostic judgements, prognostic expectations and attempts to form a treatment plan. As will be seen in the ultimately insurmountable problem of causal significance, transformation into statistical material threatened to sever factors from the diagnostic framework and personal judgement that originally gave them meaning in each case.

XVI XX MORAL STANDARDS. (Column 9 10-A)	
0	Good
9	Fair
X&2	Poor
X&2	3 Unknown

XVII. FAMILY PHYSICAL DISEASE OR DEFECT. <i>Handicap:</i> (Column 10 9) <i>(We must decide which diseases to count)</i> <i>So this at time of J.B. & contact?</i>	
0	4 Disease father
1	5 Disease Disease mother
2	6 Unknown Disease Unknown Disease - 1 or more siblings
3	7 Unknown mother father
4	8 Defect Unknown mother Unknown mother
5	9 Defect Unknown siblings Unknown siblings
6	X+1 Unknown father Defect father <i>Disease father and mother</i>
7	X+2 Unknown mother Defect mother <i>Disease father, mother and one or more</i>
8	X+3 Defect siblings <i>Defect father</i> <i>Handicap - father</i>
9	X+4 Unknown father <i>Defect mother</i> <i>Handicap - mother</i>
X&1	X+5 Unknown mother <i>Defect</i> <i>Handicap - siblings</i>
X&2	X+6 Unknown siblings <i>X+7</i> <i>Handicap father and mother</i>
	<i>X+8</i> <i>Handicap father, mother and siblings</i>
	<i>X+9</i> <i>Unknown if father, mother and siblings</i>
	<i>X+Δ</i> <i>Unknown if father, mother and siblings</i>

XVIII. FAMILY MENTAL DISEASE, DEFECT, OR OTHER ABNORMALITY. (Column 11)	
0	Father - mental disease
1	Father - mental defect
2	Father - other abnormality
3	Father - unknown
4	Mother - mental disease
5	Mother - mental defect
6	Mother - other abnormality
7	Mother - unknown
8	Siblings - mental disease
9	Siblings - mental defect
X&1	Siblings - unknown
X&2	Other ^{near} relatives mental disease
X&3	Other near relative's mental defect
X&4	Other near relative's other abnormality
X&5	Other near relative's mental condition unknown.

define near = aunts + uncles; grandparents.

Figure 6: Draft code index for punch card positions ('Code for Punch Cards', SGP, Box 24, Folder 10: 5)

A note by the item 'Family Physical Disease or Defect/Handicap' reads 'We must decide which diseases to count'. 'Moral Standards' seen above, would, with many other qualitative factors, be arbitrarily classed as 'good', 'fair', or 'poor', a tripartite classification seen throughout the Gluecks' subsequent research.

⁶¹ 'Revision of Schedule', 11th January 1928, SGP, Box 24 Folder 10.

Ad hoc attempts to seek clarification were, meanwhile, at odds with the Gluecks' drive to standardise data collection through punch-card codification. Each factor and its range of variables had to be reducible to single holes in a limited number of rows and columns on a punch card. The standardized materials of the Gluecks' JBF study thus formed part of a process of standardization and reduction, however, the copious handwritten notes found on them also show the ambiguities or active contestation of this process. As Christoff Hoffmann and Barbara Wittmann note, such writing activities can mark a key epistemic step 'from (potentially) ambiguous data to stable facts, and from provisional ideas to guiding concepts'.⁶² Various notes and tables attest to this process of stabilizing factors and conceptualizing their relative significance but also marked the difficulties of turning idiosyncratic, individual histories into a uniform dataset, re-organizing the paper inscriptions of a case to produce new knowledge across the series.⁶³ Handwritten notes make this tension visible in the numerous, frequently revised code indexes, intended to guide the subsequent completion of punch cards by specifying which factors occupied which columns, and which numbered holes should be punched for a given variable (Fig. 6).⁶⁴ Some factors were, evidently, better suited to enumeration than others, such as age and I.Q. ranges. Some presented reasonably clear categories for entry on the punch cards, such as legally defined offences. Others required somewhat arbitrary groupings to fit a wide range of possible values into consistent columns, including types of employment and numerous physical diseases. Qualitative judgements of behaviour, morality, neighbourhood conditions, and other such factors, were meanwhile turned into numerical values, once again by entering a variable of 'good', 'fair' or 'poor' (with an additional code for 'unknown'). For example, in the final code index used in the JBF study, the factor, 'moral standards of home' was assigned to column 22C on the punch card with four available rows for this factor's possible variables '9. Good 10. Fair 11. Poor 12. Unknown', joined in the same column by 'home: physical' (22A) and 'neighbourhood influences' (22B),

⁶² Christoff Hoffmann and Barbara Wittmann, 'Introduction: Knowledge in the Making: Drawing and Writing as Research Techniques', *Science in Context*, Vol. 26 (2) (2013): 203.

⁶³ See also Volker Hess and J. Andrew Mendelsohn, 'Case and Series: Medical Knowledge and Paper Technology, 1600-1900', *History of Science*, Vol. 48 (3-4) (2010): 287-314.

⁶⁴ 'Code for Punch Cards', SGP, Box 24 Folder 9; 'Code For Punch Cards', Box 24 Folder 10; 'Code For Punch Cards (Obsolete)' Box 24 Folder 9.

each with the same possible entries.⁶⁵ In this case a definition for 'moral standards' had been established by Beebe, Stedman and the Gluecks in a discussion of the 11th January 1928:

1. Good. Showing thrift, temperance and moral decency (as to sex).
2. Fair. Indifferent.
3. Poor. Encouraging delinquency either indirectly through the parents' bad example or directly, through teaching O[ffender] to steal, lie etc.⁶⁶

The above definition would eventually be altered to emphasise 'wholesome ideals' in 'good' homes while 'poor' homes would be more broadly defined as those 'in which there is immorality, alcoholism or other delinquency'.⁶⁷ Similar classifications would be used to rate parent-child relations, discipline, and leisure. The statistical methods of the Gluecks required that qualitative judgements of this kind and the complex information used to make them be abstracted into fixed categories to allow for entry onto punch cards and eventual statistical comparison. While conferring the appearance of objective, standardised data points the Gluecks' factors simply obscured the underlying human judgements of moral worth which informed the punches on a boy's card. In study meetings, on standardised forms, in clarifications, or in the point of data entry, at some point a judgement was made as to whether various factors rated 'good', 'fair', or 'poor'. At some point it was decided that a home showed 'wholesome ideals' or 'immorality', a decision now appearing as a single punched hole.

Reaching this point required great effort. More than initial problems of scope, negotiations between Healy, Bronner and the Gluecks reflected a deeper disconnect between clinical and statistical methodology. The latter required that various facts be condensed into a consistent dataset for tabulation. The former emphasised expert judgement of the individual case, an idiosyncratic process which conferred meaning and significance not easily translated into tables. Even as the Gluecks and their assistants successively revised the scope, terminology and protocols of data collection, Healy and Bronner attempted to direct the researchers towards the most significant facts, even making periodic, frustrated offers to simply write these in for each case. Written remarks, however, could not be preserved through processes of enumeration and tabulation nor, it seemed, could the clinical intentions behind specific

⁶⁵ Glueck and Glueck, *One Thousand Juvenile Delinquents*: 307.

⁶⁶ 'Revision of Schedule', 11th January 1928, SGP, Box 24 Folder 10.

⁶⁷ Glueck and Glueck, *One Thousand Juvenile Delinquents*: 326.

diagnoses, prognoses and recommendations. The most significant and lasting struggle was that of causal significance.

The Problem of Causation

The aims of the JBF study placed researchers in a somewhat difficult position. On one hand they were expected to reveal the complex aetiologies which led to acts of delinquency. The resulting study was thus hoped to 'give the reader some idea of the complexity of causation'.⁶⁸ On the other hand, they were tasked with demonstrating the JBF's ability to make sense of this complexity, successfully identifying and treating specific causes. As seen earlier this promotion of clinical expertise paralleled an attack on judges' supposed ignorance. As Sheldon summarised: 'The law seizes upon perhaps the least essential feature, the last act, instead of the fundamental thing which led up, over a period of years to the act'.⁶⁹ Problems arose, however, when the Gluecks themselves tried and failed to manage the causal complexity behind the criminal act. Eschewing the organising diagnostic judgement of Healy and Bronner in favour of a uniform dataset comparing discrete factors, The Gluecks attempted to statistically establish causal relationships and, thence, prove the JBF's ability to effectively modify and treat them.

One attempt was to tabulate emotional antecedents and compare them with later patterns of offending through 'material showing the early danger signals of delinquency and how they were overlooked or how "the twig was bent" or might have been bent'.⁷⁰ Beebe was thus tasked with combing available records for 'early danger signals', 'symptoms', signs of 'peculiarity' to be presented in tables showing the 'age of presence of danger signal of delinquency'. The next step, as Sheldon summarised, would be to relate these to later criminal acts in the hopes that patterns or relationships would emerge:

The above tables will prove that certain symptoms occur extremely early, but it will not prove that such symptoms are necessarily causative of or even related to subsequent delinquency and criminality. Therefore, the most typical

⁶⁸ 'Judge Baker Foundation Case Records', 11th October 1927, SGP Box 24 Folder 10.

⁶⁹ 'Discussion of the Harvard Law School Survey', 5th May 1927, SGP, Box 24 Folder 10.

⁷⁰ Sheldon Glueck to Beebe, 25th May 1927, SGP, Box 24 Folder 10.

offence of each of the groups (extremely irritable, suggestible, etc.) will have to be correlated with such factors of irritability, suggestibility, etc. For example: suppose that out of 100 who were found to be extremely irritable it turns out that the typical offence (that which occurs in their records most frequently) is say 80 of the cases is violent assault or murder as a result of anger. That would clinch the point of the relationship of the extreme irritability to subsequent conduct.⁷¹

These plans were, however, undermined by the scarcity of information on early emotions. Writing to Sheldon in October 1927, Beebe reported that she was going over 15 of the most recent JBF cases to determine whether the earliest ages of delinquent trends were indicated. Detailed information on this subject was, evidently, hard to come by even in the most recent records. Her preliminary conclusions were limited to recollections of particularly belligerent behaviour: 'the most definite thing I have found as yet is that a given tendency, - such as temper tantrums, - began "at a very early age"'. The ambiguous timeframe of 'early age' pointed to doubts surrounding information from parents. Beebe noted the JBF's own advice on the incompleteness and unreliability of such statements about early life. She also expected that it would be 'difficult to find... sufficiently full descriptions of offences as to the emotional reaction of the offender', owing to the fact that police and other legal or juridical authorities did not record such impressions.⁷²

The hoped-for connection between early emotions and later offences seemed uncertain. Sheldon's progress report that month noted with disappointment that 'the truth of it is that we are just beginning to keep records of the extremely early tendencies and it will be some time before the extent to which habits, trends, attitudes that frequently lead to anti-sociality in later life are noted at very early ages can be reliably measured'.⁷³ Information on early life had, of course, been included in the JBF's case studies and would be considered in *One Thousand Juvenile Delinquents*, but these observations were limited to outstanding acts of misbehaviour or delinquency recalled by parents or reported by schools. These included early anti-social behaviour such as truancy and running away in a large majority of cases as well as

⁷¹ 'Judge Baker Foundation Case Records', 11th October 1927, SGP, Box 24 Folder 10.

⁷² Beebe to Sheldon Glueck, 15th October 1927, SGP, Box 90 Folder 8.

⁷³ 'Progress Report of Projects Under Guidance of Dr. Glueck', 15th October 1927, SGP, Box 24 Folder 10.

smaller proportions of lying, disobedience, drinking and 'sex acts' traced back as early as six years old.⁷⁴ These early misbehaviours seemed to point to later offending and, in turn, the importance of early prediction and prevention, however, evidence of earlier wrongdoing did not satisfy hopes for the underlying causes of wrongdoing.

While information on early antecedents was scarce or unreliable, later JBF investigations, interviews and records pointed to a wide range of likely causes. But tabulating and comparing a uniform set of causes, recommendations and outcomes (again, within the constraints of a punch card) required prioritisation. Sheldon thus admitted to Beebe, 'it seems that the difficulties inherent in the 'complexity of causation' notion compel us to use the more or less artificial 'major symptom' and 'major need'".⁷⁵ To establish which factors were 'major' the Gluecks devised a plan to join clinical judgement with statistical regularities. Rather than tabulating causal factors individually across cases they hoped that regular clusters would allow the 'analysis of legal types into frequently occurring symptom-complexes'. This, they hoped, would reveal the complexity of factors in cases handled by the juvenile court while also offering a means of condensing an otherwise unmanageable range of specific causes. Simple possible groupings provided as examples of such 'symptom complexes' included 'broken home – poverty', 'broken home – psych. parents', 'broken home – alcoholic parents', 'broken home – feeble-minded' and so on.⁷⁶

Actual groupings into 'social psychiatric syndromes' might, however, include dozens of factors, in which the Gluecks recognised 'an extremely technical statistical question which has not been completely solved yet'. Healy and Bronner were first called on to delimit and prioritise causes, going over records and factors 'numbered in order of their importance in that particular case'. Common combinations would then have to be drawn out, with factors graded by relative rank and frequency to provide the final causal categories to be used and tabulated in all cases. This plan assumed that regular clusters of factors would produce the desired symptom-complexes. Still anticipating a large number of factors, Sheldon prepared

⁷⁴ Glueck and Glueck, *One Thousand Juvenile Delinquents*: 95-96.

⁷⁵ Sheldon Glueck to Beebe, 10th May 1927, SGP, Box 24 Folder 10.

⁷⁶ 'Judge Baker Foundation Case Records', 11th October 1927, SGP, Box 24 Folder 10.

instructions to further condense these: 'it is believed that since these combinations run more or less in patterns or syndromes, the number of such classes will not be too large but, say, 50. As this number is still unmanageable for statistical purposes, we shall have to resort to a number of principles of condensation'.⁷⁷ These 'principles' might include the combination of similar subcategories or elimination of those appearing less often.

For the remainder of 1927 Beebe applied this technique to 25 cases to establish causal categories with which to tabulate the remaining 975. A chart checking off types of factor for each case provided somewhat ambiguous results (Fig. 7). A total of 135 causal factors were noted across the cases with a promising mean of 5.4 per case, though these ranged from a single case with only one such factor to two cases with ten. The most common with 17 cases was Parent-Child Relations, followed by 'Misuse of Leisure' in 15 and 'Developmental' in 14. Some, notably including 'psycho-pathological condition', 'conflict' and 'immigrant maladjustment' were only checked off for one case each among the 25. In turn, the factors checked still accounted for a wide, sometimes contradictory range of purported causes. The category 'developmental' thus included a large variety of physical conditions and traits, the causal significance of which were not always clear. Case no. 10 showed 'late enuresis, poor nutrition, severe lisping' while case no. 13 was noted for 'severe head injury 3 years ago'. On the other hand, case no. 47 was reported for 'quiet slowness in talking, teeth suggest defective antenatal...'. The category of 'Poor Use of Leisure' was more consistent, almost uniformly noting 'bad companions' across 15 cases in combination with other more varying features such as 'street life', 'poor recreation' and 'sex teaching'. Meanwhile the most commonly cited category of 'Parent-Child Relations' saw the common judgement of 'poor home control', however, specific features of parental relations appear to have remained varied. Thus, case no. 48 reported 'M[other] Working, F[ather] quarrelsome, abusive, etc.' On the other hand, case no. 9 was listed showing 'much affection between M[other] + O[offender]' while case no. 13 was described having a 'Fam[ily] Influenced by M[other]'s delusions'. Other categories such as 'Personality Traits + Attitudes' included cases marked for 'suggestibility', 'Irritability +

⁷⁷ 'Progress Report of Projects Under Guidance of Dr. Glueck', 15th October 1927, SGP, Box 24 Folder 10.

The search for 'symptom complexes' to organise causal factors evidently foundered and by early 1928 authority over causes was passed back to the psychiatrists. In January new protocols set out that only two 'major causative factors' would be entered for each summary and 'should in every case be selected by Dr. Healy'. In turn, 'the substitution of numbers for factors – a convenient method if many items were to be listed – may be given up, and the major factors written in'.⁷⁹ While the myriad details of JBF case records and follow-up investigations were codified and tabulated, the question of causal significance resisted attempts at uniformity and enumeration. 'J.B.F. Causal Factors' retained a spot on the information form (Fig 3.2) for handwritten remarks but would not join the tables of *One Thousand Juvenile Delinquents*. On various undated code indexes these causal factors had remained blank 'to be filled in on the basis of experience' until, at some point, the entire section was cut from the punch cards.⁸⁰

Clustered around 1927 and 1928, these archival materials from the planning of the JBF study point to early aims and methodological disputes but unfortunately offer no insights into the later phases of research and follow-up in the 1000 cases. Even so, it is clear that, going into the 1930s, the Gluecks had developed an agnosticism towards supposed 'causes' of criminal behaviour. In 1933 Sheldon published an article in the magazine *American Mercury* titled 'On the Causes of Crime'. Like Healy in past decades, he criticised the 'dogmatism' perpetuated about feeble-mindedness or poverty as the root of crime. Whereas Healy had moved from general causes to individualised diagnosis, however, Sheldon remained doubtful even in individual cases. A hypothetical case was presented in which psychiatrists and sociologists attempted to synthesise an 'etiological' account of the criminality of offender 'A'. Sheldon argued that, even after a thorough analysis, the 'primacy' of any factor among many would remain uncertain:

Has A's criminality been caused by his drunkenness, or have both his alcoholism and his misconduct been caused by his psychopathic personality? Did A become a drunkard because he could not stand his family's miserable situation, or was its economic inefficiency the result of A's alcoholism? Or have both the

⁷⁹ 'J.B.F. Study Discussion', 19th January 1928, SGP, Box 24 Folder 9.

⁸⁰ 'Code For Punch Cards', SGP, Box 24 Folder 10.

alcoholism and criminality been caused by A's supposedly innate constitutional inferiority?'.⁸¹

The 'vicious action-reaction mechanisms' found across many cases like that of 'A' severed, according to Glueck, the straightforward causal relations which criminologists and clinical psychiatrists had previously posited. In clear reference to his own prior attempts, Sheldon concluded that 'it is very difficult, even by the use of refined mathematical statistics, to assign relative weights to different elements in the causation complex. And this is true even when we study the individual case with great thoroughness. The most we can talk about is probabilities'.⁸²

The Gluecks had embarked on the JBF study in 1927 with the hopeful intention of revealing aetiologies of crime and, in turn, proving that clinical experts could more effectively identify the relevant causes and remedy them. Now, after six years of study Sheldon recommended that, for now, criminological researchers and practitioners remain silent on the subject of causes:

Despite the researches of the past decade, it is in my opinion as yet premature to make any well-grounded statement as to the relative participation of these social and biologic factors in crime causation. This does not mean, however, that a reasonable knowledge of the mental and physical characteristics, as well as social background, of prisoners is as yet unavailable. It means only that the transition from a description of the *traits* of existing delinquents and criminals to conclusions as to *causation* cannot readily be made.⁸³

Very soon disappointment surrounding causes would be joined by disappointment surrounding outcomes.

One Thousand Juvenile Delinquents

In 1934, Sheldon and Eleanor Glueck published the results of their JBF study as *One Thousand Juvenile Delinquents: Their Treatment in Court and Clinic*, the first volume from the Harvard Crime Survey. The conclusions presented in this study differed sharply from the optimistic

⁸¹ Sheldon Glueck, 'On the Causes of Crime', *American Mercury* XXIX (August 1933): 434-435.

⁸² Ibid. 435.

⁸³ Ibid. 436.

hopes of 1927. Along with a thorough statistical survey of the circumstances of the cases, *One Thousand Juvenile Delinquents* set out to determine what recommendations had been made by the JBF in juvenile court cases, how far these recommendations had been followed, and whether these 'treatments' bore any relation to successful outcomes. In brief, the Gluecks' conclusions were highly disappointing, indicating that responses to delinquency by both court and clinic were largely uncoordinated and ineffective. Through this work the Gluecks not only pointed to the disappointing results of the JBF but also presented their underlying criticism of its clinical methods, drawing on their new doubts towards causal inferences. Instead, *One Thousand Juvenile Delinquents* prepared the ground for the Gluecks to make a case for their own scientific approach to crime and delinquency, an approach which was statistical, 'objective' and, apparently, predictive.

In the introduction they distinguished their approach from prior studies of clinical efficacy, including those made by Healy and Bronner themselves. 'Allowing of statistical treatment', their follow-up study would 'lend itself to a considerably more accurate appraisal of results than solely descriptive studies of courts and clinics, which are, perforce, somewhat impressionistic'.⁸⁴ The figures presented for recidivism amongst JBF cases were damning. Of 923 cases in which reliable follow-up records could be obtained, 798 were found to have been delinquent within five years of the JBF examination, a proportion of 88.2%.⁸⁵ Of these 568 had convictions for serious offences or felonies while 167 had multiple minor convictions for misdemeanours with a mean of 3.6 arrests across the whole recidivist group during the five-year post-treatment period.⁸⁶ One disappointment was the extent to which JBF cases had reoffended, the other was the extent to which the JBF and its recommendations had been ignored. Evaluating the 'cures' proposed, most concerned the delinquents' place of living, at home under probationary supervision, or in a range of foster homes, farms, military placements, institutions, and homes of relatives. An average of 2.9 other recommendations had been made per case, 2677 in all, ranging from improvements in familial or living conditions, health, schooling, vocational opportunities, discipline or the carrying out of 'other

⁸⁴ Glueck and Glueck, *One Thousand Juvenile Delinquents*: 3.

⁸⁵ Ibid. 151.

⁸⁶ Ibid. 152-153.

constructive work'. Turning to whether these treatment plans had actually been carried out, however the Gluecks found court sentences which sometimes followed the experts and sometimes ignored them, depending on convenience, feasibility, or intervening concerns and priorities. While the JBF had recommended home placements under probation in 47.3% of cases, the juvenile court had enforced this sentence in 66%. Conversely, the JBF's recommendations of other placements with foster homes, relatives, farms or the services were only followed by the court in 12.4% of cases, despite making up over a third of total recommendations made by the clinic. Of these the Gluecks noted in turn that the mean length of these placements was 6.38 months, though one fifth had not been carried out at all. Meanwhile, of 2246 other recommendations where outcomes could be verified, the Gluecks identified 56.3% which had not been carried out and 9.3% only partially implemented.⁸⁷

A variety of reasons were suggested to explain the regular failure to implement clinical recommendations. Legal and procedural complications meant that the juvenile court had no power to commit children directly to some institutions, most notably homes for the 'feeble-minded', without proper certification and consent, while the right of appeal to higher courts could also override clinical recommendations. Elsewhere the blame was placed on 'problem parents' who refused to cooperate, kept their children out of school and apparently 'coached' them to deceive the authorities. Here the Gluecks also complained of the 'difficulties imposed upon the judge and probation officers by ignorant or irresponsible parents or those with cultural standards different from those of the general population'.⁸⁸ Parents were regarded as potential accomplices while delinquents might also escape supervision by themselves. Assuming delinquents and their families did co-operate, there was, the Gluecks argued, no guarantee that clinical recommendations would be practicable. This was especially true of treatments which required the involvement or agreement of private agencies and institutions with placement agencies, farms and training schools frequently unable or unwilling to take on juvenile delinquents. Schools for the 'feeble-minded' were especially unwilling, owing to the feared disruption of institutional routine. Thus, the Glueck's claimed that probation officers had largely given up attempts to persuade such

⁸⁷ Ibid. 111-127.

⁸⁸ Ibid. 137.

institutions, noting that 'if, in their opinion, a boy should 'be treated as a delinquency problem rather than a mental deficiency problem' they can and do refuse to accept him'.⁸⁹ A similar attitude was cited among various charitable agencies. One such example was given in which an agency euphemistically stated, 'the boy whom you refer to us seems distinctly a public rather than a private charge'.⁹⁰ Finally, underlying this reluctance to take on court referrals, the Gluecks pointed to a frequent lack of resources to fully implement recommendations. While the limited funds of agencies and institutions informed their regular refusal of delinquent 'failures', the Gluecks felt that the small stipends offered to foster homes rarely ensured a quality environment. Under these circumstances, they concluded, 'when the probation officer is fortunate enough to find even an inadequate foster home, he is thankful for it because he hopes that it will at any rate be superior to the boy's own'.⁹¹

The state of 'treatment' was thus fraught by limited resources, conflicting priorities and, according to the Gluecks, 'ignorant' parents with 'different cultural standards'. This did not excuse the JBF. As well as the above complicating circumstances they also cited frequent 'unrecorded differences of opinion between court and clinic'.⁹² However, in contrast with their earlier belief in clinical efficacy, the Gluecks no longer contrasted ignorant judges with scientific experts:

It is not assumed that all the recommendations of the clinic were necessarily the wisest that might have been made in the cases involved. But it seems to be a legitimate inference that where so high a proportion of them... were not followed by the court there was something fundamentally weak in the recommendations themselves (or the judge at any rate seems to have believed so), or in the practices of the court, or in the relationship of the court and clinic to other agencies.⁹³

Again, this claim pointed back to the statistics of subsequent recidivism. In cases where no recommendations had been carried out, 95.4% of cases were subsequently found to be recidivists. But even in cases where all clinical recommendations made by the JBF had been fully carried out, 82.1% of cases were, nevertheless, found to be recidivists. A difference of

⁸⁹ Ibid. 142.

⁹⁰ Ibid. 138.

⁹¹ Ibid. 144.

⁹² Ibid. 131.

⁹³ Ibid. 131.

13.3% certainly carried some significance, however, the conclusion seemed 'inescapable', that the vast majority of all cases had 'failed', with or without treatment. More specific comparisons of outcomes to the length and kind of recommendation saw equally disappointing conclusions that the implementation of clinical advice 'made little difference' or had 'surprisingly little effect'.⁹⁴ Comparing the outcomes in cases with varying dispositions as to the delinquent's place of living, figures suggested that 'the clinical recommendations for the disposition of cases are no more effective than the dispositions made by the court'.⁹⁵ Tables and percentages led the Gluecks and their readers to disappointment: 'the major conclusion is inescapable, then, that, the treatment carried out by clinic, court, and associated community facilities had very little effect in preventing recidivism'.⁹⁶

Moving from statistics of failure to further criticism, the Gluecks took on an ambivalent attitude. On one hand this failure, 'like so many other institutions which appear highly promising in theory', reflected the 'the wishful belief that, given a juvenile clinic and court, considerable reduction of delinquency and criminality is assured'.⁹⁷ In this passage the Gluecks seemed to deride not only clinical criminology but the institutions of progressive justice which supported it. Elsewhere, however, they defended the spirit of scientific understanding and treatment. 'Greater humanitarianism in the treatment of wrongdoers, whose careers often reflect the pressures and pulls of forces hardly within their control' was, the Gluecks argued 'a social value not to be lightly abandoned'.⁹⁸ In concluding they thus proposed various improvements, further integrating court and clinic through joint staff conferences, a centralised child placing agency, regional councils of charitable agencies to coordinate intervention, and other reforms.⁹⁹ They had no qualms, however, in attacking clinical expertise.

⁹⁴ Ibid. 171-172.

⁹⁵ Ibid. 174.

⁹⁶ Ibid. 233.

⁹⁷ Ibid. 234.

⁹⁸ Ibid. 242

⁹⁹ Ibid. 242-291.

Continuing their critique of causation, and thence the aetiologies that were supposedly diagnosed and treated, the Gluecks argued that the value of clinical recommendations to the court was rarely, if ever, justified:

It is exceptional for the clinic to indicate why and how certain factors (e.g. poverty, drunkenness of father, the mother's going out to work) have been *causative* in any particular case. The mere presence of such factors in a situation should not be taken as necessarily indicating their etiologic significance. There are many boys who come of poor families and/or whose parents are drunkards and/or who suffer from other handicaps who, nevertheless, do somehow not become delinquent. The clinician should therefore do his utmost to determine the mechanisms of causation as they operate in the particular case, and should give the evidence in support of his conclusion that a certain factor or complex of factors is causal.¹⁰⁰

The failure of the JBF to justify its causal inferences was similarly linked with a failure to justify its proposed treatments. Thus, the Gluecks alleged that 'the clinic has very little specific evidence as to the *value* of any of the treatments it recommends for different types of offenders: its prescriptions are essentially based on an expectation and not proof'.¹⁰¹

How then were causation and the value of expert recommendations to be proven and justified? As in Sheldon's article on the causes of crime, the Gluecks' conclusions were doubtful. In a final section on the 'Limited Knowledge of Human Nature', the discipline of criminology was thrown into uncertainty. Echoing past commentators, the Gluecks pointed to 'the present impasse in the intelligence testing movement', struggling to distinguish nature from nurture. 'The measurement of emotional forces' was, meanwhile, 'even less developed than in the intellectual field'. In turn, psychiatry presented, for the Gluecks, a 'still less objective attack upon the problems of criminology'. Endocrinological researchers produced 'brilliant' lab work but had also 'greatly indulged in unwarranted claims and questionable inferences'. Finally, situational sociology provided 'a useful working concept' but not one with the specificity to provide useful, practical conclusions.¹⁰² After eight years of study in the

¹⁰⁰ Ibid. 255.

¹⁰¹ Ibid. 256.

¹⁰² Ibid. 282-283.

Harvard Crime Survey the Gluecks were full of doubt as to the scientific basis of criminology and the possibility of clinical treatment:

Other illustrations might be given of the imperfect state of the science and art of criminology. It is high time, therefore, that someone should ask these blunt questions: why should we assume that a large part of delinquency and criminality can be “cured” at all, with the methods at present available? May it not be that the fibre of criminality is much tougher than we have thus far believed and that its tangled roots lie deeper than we have over-optimistically assumed? Is it not time that the enthusiastic clinical criminologists stopped hunting for a pot of gold at the end of the rainbow they have constructed?¹⁰³

As will be seen in the next chapter, even as the Gluecks raised these doubts they presented their own statistical solutions for prediction and prevention.

Conclusion: ‘The Close of Another Chapter’

Having set out to prove the efficacy of scientific treatment, the Gluecks reached the altogether opposite conclusion, not only that the clinic had failed but that diagnostic claims could not be justified, at least not by personal expertise. One of the more surprising outcomes of this study was the magnanimity of the experts themselves, Healy and Bronner. In a 1935 paper they rather pointed to ‘the close of another chapter in criminology’. The ‘much easier and pleasanter’ belief in ‘well-intentioned efforts’ had been met by ‘cold, objective facts’.¹⁰⁴ They noted that others had suggested possible responses to the Gluecks: That the period from which cases were taken (1917-1922) was a bad one for the recently established court and clinic; that clinical referrals were bound to be more ‘difficult’; that it was unreasonable to expect a complete end to bad behaviour under probation. Healy and Bronner were, however, ‘quite willing to accept the facts’. Looking forward constructively to a new ‘chapter’ in developing more effective treatments and perhaps recognising that they were in unfamiliar statistical territory, they conceded: ‘We see no occasion to battle over figures’.¹⁰⁵ This spoke to Healy and Bronner’s long-standing empiricist commitments but also, more subtly, suggested a politely dismissive attitude towards the Gluecks’ statistical conclusions. In a

¹⁰³ Ibid. 284.

¹⁰⁴ William Healy, Augusta Bronner, and Myra E. Shimberg, ‘The Close of Another Chapter in Criminology’, *Mental Hygiene*, Vol. 19 (2) (1935), 208. Shimberg was a PhD student conducting research at the JBF.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid. 217.

review written in 1929, while the Gluecks' JBF study was underway, Healy had incidentally referred to the 'fashion of the day' for numerous percentages, standard errors, and 'superficial questionnaire facts' offered as 'a sop to the statistical Cerberus'.¹⁰⁶ The same year as he and Bronner announced 'the close of another chapter', Healy (collaborating with psychoanalyst Franz Alexander) released a new series of intensive case histories.¹⁰⁷ The next chapter of criminology, in their view, required even deeper analysis of the individual case, not the 'battle over figures' suggested by the Gluecks. Nevertheless, as the following chapters will show, the Gluecks' statistical methods joined powerful quantifying currents in American criminology and public life.

Punch cards, tables, and numbers, organised to defend clinical criminology, instead formed a powerful challenge to its authority. Statistics challenged the JBF most directly in measuring the extent of post-treatment recidivism, however, I have also sought to emphasise how enumeration of these factors seemed to rupture diagnostic and prognostic expertise. The data of *One Thousand Juvenile Delinquents* was drawn from records assembled by Healy, Bronner and their staff to explain an individual's misbehaviour, anticipate future problems and identify targets of treatment. Through this process various facts and events had been brought into chronological, narrative order by diagnostic judgement which purportedly could recognise the most significant causes and trends. Yet, in discussion with the Gluecks, Healy and Bronner were unable to guide the data which seemed to veer from aetiological significance into irrelevance, their causal judgements eventually relegated to a box for remarks that could not be tabulated. Meanwhile, processes of standardisation and codification turned the facts and trends of cases into discrete factors, severing the causal relationships in which they had been placed. The struggle to find causal significance in the clustering of myriad factors was a consequence of their dislocation from the diagnostic 'common sense' that formerly judged and prioritised them. When this struggle failed, the Gluecks instead turned to correlates as a more objective alternative to 'impressionistic' diagnoses. The Gluecks' study was not the end of clinical criminology. Healy and Bronner at least would continue their work at the JBF until their retirement in 1947. But this study, and others of the Harvard Crime Survey, were

¹⁰⁶ William Healy, 'Review: Domestic Discord, Its Analysis and Treatment', *Mental Hygiene*, Vol. 13 (2) (1929): 408.

¹⁰⁷ See Franz Alexander and William Healy, *Roots of Crime: Psychoanalytic Studies* (Knopf: New York, NY: 1935)

formative in the Gluecks' approach to information gathering and manipulation. At the end of the JBF study they had not been able to reconnect their factors and figures into causal relationships. Instead, they now recombined them to make probabilistic predictions.

Chapter 4: 'Predictive Instruments' and 'Delinquency Areas'

In this and subsequent chapters we turn from Healy and Bronner to the research of the Gluecks and from individualised prognoses to statistical probabilities. From 1930 the Gluecks produced successive follow-up studies on samples of offenders, including the titular 1000 juvenile delinquents, to extract factors and correlate them with outcomes. Using these correlated factors they created tables or 'instruments' by which to assign numerical risk scores, hoping that such quantification would direct and standardise judgement. The remaining three chapters of this thesis will follow the Gluecks and their prediction tables by examining the research materials and correspondence behind their most famous work, *Unraveling Juvenile Delinquency* (1950). An eclectic comparative study of 500 delinquent and 500 non-delinquent boys, *Unraveling* brought together disciplines, methods and information to create a comprehensive dataset, eventually comprising 402 factors covering socio-economic background, school history, familial relationships, health, bodily measurements, psychiatric interviews and Rorschach tests.¹ Once again, these factors were aggregated and codified on IBM punch cards for tabulation.² These tables of comparison might then reveal correlates with which to construct social, psychiatric and Rorschach prediction tables which, according to the Gluecks, could score children upon first entering school and discover potential criminals.³

Involving over 10 years of investigation by dozens of staff, the parallel threads of *Unravelling*, and diverse archival materials, from planning to investigation to publication and reception, make any straightforward chronological synthesis extremely difficult. As such I will be dividing my examination between three chapters tracing what were frequently parallel developments. In this chapter I will examine the planning and negotiation of the study. Then in chapter 5 I will provide a more detailed account of the information gathering, coding and construction of the three prediction tables based on social, Rorschach and psychiatric factors. Finally in chapter 6 I turn to the reception of *Unraveling* and proliferation of prediction in various

¹ Glueck and Glueck, *Unravelling*: 73.

² Ibid. 74.

³ Ibid. 257-271.

settings. For now, this chapter will outline initial principles and methods of the study and the assumptions which underlay the selection of cases from across Boston. Here the Gluecks sought to control their sample by matching individual delinquents with non-delinquents. Both of these groups were, however, also demarcated from wider urban society by the low-income 'delinquency area' upon which research and predictive interventions were targeted. Such choices focused criminological study upon particular urban youth while also shaping available information. Within the delinquency area the Gluecks negotiated various institutions and actors with access to children and records. These marginal youth were already under surveillance by schools, charities, social services, police, and other agencies, gathering information and forming suspicions which the Gluecks now organised into tools for prediction. Before continuing, however, it is necessary to briefly outline the Gluecks' predictive methods and contextualise their work in relation to contemporary American criminology and parallel efforts to score the concerns of society.

Scoring and Judging

At the end of *One Thousand Juvenile Delinquents* we saw the Gluecks call clinical criminology and its expert pretensions into doubt. In raising these doubts they also, as might be expected, introduced their own alternative to make decision-making truly 'objective': the 'predictive instrument'. These 'instruments' were tables of background factors and their percentage correlation with crime, against which individuals and their risk of offending could be compared and scored. In the process of investigating JBF cases the Gluecks had ended up with a wide range of background factors and their varying statistical relations to recidivism (Fig. 8). Even if definitive causal priorities and relationships could not be established, higher correlations might be pursued through aggregation: 'many of the factors in the careers of our young delinquents have an equally slight bearing on post-treatment recidivism. It is possible, however, that the massing of such small differences is significant'.⁴ From here the Gluecks brought together six factors with the highest coefficient of contingency into a single table (Fig. 9): Discipline of the juvenile by father, discipline by mother, school 'retardation' (referring to grades held back), school misconduct, age at first known misbehaviour, and time elapsed

⁴ Glueck and Glueck, *One Thousand Juvenile Delinquents*: 178-179.

between misbehaviour and clinical referral. Here the Gluecks applied a 'failure rate' method. By adding up the subcategories for each factor with the highest and lowest failure rate (percentage correlation with recidivism), respective upper and lower score limits were established after which individual cases could be scored by adding together the relevant percentages. Thus, 'unsound' discipline, more years 'retarded', truancy, earlier misbehaviour, and greater delays in referral gave a higher ('worse') score, while different judgements of these factors were more favourable. Finally, by scoring all cases and correlating these results with rates of recidivism, these scores could be connected to percentage chances of risk. In *One Thousand Juvenile Delinquents*, the final table (incorporating clinical recommendations) ranged from a low score of 406.6, with a recidivism chance of 40%, to a high score of 550, with a recidivism chance of 91.3% (Fig. 10).

Through the successive recombination of factors, the Gluecks turned disparate correlates into tools of prediction. 'A juvenile court judge', they claimed, 'can see that if he carries out the clinical recommendations in a case which scores 526 or over the chances for the reformation of a young delinquent still remain one in ten, but in a case with a score of 475 or less the chances rise to six out of ten'.⁵ The Gluecks' statistics eschewed causation in favour of correlation but, in doing so, also promised to replace psychiatric diagnoses with more secure, quantitative evaluations of future conduct. Tying the prediction tables to their critique of clinical prognoses, the Gluecks argued 'there can be no doubt that any instrumentality which makes possible an objectified approach to the disposition and treatment of cases of delinquency is an improvement over the much vaunted but emotionalised approaches based on 'personal experience' and "common sense"'.⁶ *One Thousand Juvenile Delinquents* was only the latest of these claims by the Gluecks to have augmented or even replaced human decision making.

⁵ Ibid. 190.

⁶ Ibid. 190.

TABLE XXXV

CATEGORIES OF FAMILY AND PERSONAL FACTORS IN WHICH REFORMATION IS HIGHEST⁵

Factor	Most favorable category	Mean square contingency coefficient
Color	White	.041
Nativity of offender	Foreign-born	.092
Nativity of parents	Of same foreign parentage	.092
Birthplace of father	Russia, Poland, or Lithuania	.125*
Birthplace of mother	Russia, Poland, or Lithuania	.124*
Time parents in United States	Ten years or less	.102*
Citizenship of father	Alien	.12*
Religion of parents	Hebrew	.12*
Age of youngest parent at marriage	Between 26 and 30 years	.087
Difference in age of parents at marriage	6 to 10 years	.139*
Age of youngest living parent at time of J. B. F. examination	31 years or over	.061
Education of parents	Little or no education	.044
Marital status of parents at time of J. B. F. examination	Married and living together	.059
Broken homes	None	.048
Age of child at time of first break in home	10 years or over	.071
Conjugal relations of parents	Good	.111*
Affection of father for offender	Wholesome	.13*
Affection of mother for offender	Wholesome	.10*
Discipline of offender by father	Sound	.233†
Discipline of offender by mother	Sound	.161†
Economic status of parents	Comfortable	.056
Occupation of father	Small shopkeeper	.094
Occupation of mother	Mother does not go out to work	.02
Home conditions	Wholesome or fair	.055
Neighborhood conditions	Favorable	.062
Family moral standards	High	.106*
Family known to social service agencies	No social service agencies	.077
History of mental disease or defect in family	None	.155†

⁵ For definitions of the factors see Definitions Index, p. 322; for all categories of each factor see Code-Table Index, p. 302.

Figure 8: List of background factors tabulated in *One Thousand Juvenile Delinquents* (Glueck and Glueck, *One Thousand Juvenile Delinquents*: 179-180).

Includes their 'most favourable categories' (those with the lowest percentage correlation with recidivism) and mean square contingency coefficients.

180

ONE THOUSAND JUVENILE DELINQUENTS

Factor	Most favorable category	Mean square contingency coefficient
Delinquency in family	No delinquency in family	.121*
With whom offender living at time of J. B. F. examination	Living with both parents (even if one a step-parent)	.042
Rank of offender among siblings	Offender third in rank	.026
Number of children in family	Families with four children	.053
Legitimacy of offender	Legitimate birth	.046
Age of offender at J. B. F. examination	13 or over	.026
Health of offender at J. B. F. examination	Poor	.071
Abnormal environmental experiences	None	.037
Age at earliest abnormal environmental experience	9 years or younger	.094
Prior institutional or foster-home experience	None	.11*
Intelligence	Normal or superior	.095
Mental condition	Adolescent instability	.098
Habits	No bad habits	.095
Use of leisure	Constructive or negative use of leisure	.072
Member of well supervised group	Member of supervised group previously and at present	.117*
Gang membership	Not a member of a crowd or gang	.028
Grade attained	Entered high-school	.109*
School retardation	None	.151†
Reason for leaving school	Graduation	.084
Conduct in school	No school misconduct	.206†
Regularity of employment	Regularly employed	.128*
Age at which began work	10 years or under	.071
Nature of first employment	Office boy or clerk	.061
Number of arrests prior to J. B. F. examination	None	.111*
Age at first arrest	Between 15 and 17 years	.061
Offense at J. B. F. examination	Burglary	.061
Offense for which sent to J. B. F. committed alone or with others	With three or more companions	.056
Presence of early misbehavior manifestations	No early misbehavior manifestations	.137*
Age of first behavior disorder	Between 15 and 16 years	.187†
Length of time between earliest onset of delinquency and first arrest	None	.149*
Length of time between earliest onset of delinquency and J. B. F. examination	Less than a year	.161†

TABLE XXXVIII

RATE OF RECIDIVISM IN SUB-CLASSES OF SIX SIGNIFICANT FACTORS

Factor and coefficient of contingency	Recidivism rate of sub-classes of factor
Discipline of juvenile by father (.233):	
Sound discipline	54.2
Fair discipline	83.6
Unsound discipline	91.1
Discipline of juvenile by mother (.161):	
Sound discipline	68.4
Fair discipline	80.9
Unsound discipline	90.8
School retardation (age-grade) (.151):	
Normal	78.4
Advanced	78.6
Retarded one to two years	88.1
Retarded three or more years	93.5
School misconduct (.206):	
None	72.4
Truancy or other misconduct	91.3
Age at first known behavior disorder (.187):	
15 to 16	61.1
13 to 14	84.3
11 to 12	84.8
Under 11	92.0
Length of time between onset of delinquency and examination of child by J. B. F. (.161):	
Less than one year	72.1
One to two years	82.4
Over two years	90.8

Figure 9: Six factors used in the prediction table from *One Thousand Juvenile Delinquents* (Glueck and Glueck, *One Thousand Juvenile Delinquents*: 187).

The sum of lowest and highest percentage correlations under each factor were added to produce lower and upper score limits. Then cases were given scores according to these factors

Recidivism score	Probable delinquency Percent	Probable non-delinquency Percent	Total Percent
406.6-475.....	40.0	60.0	100
476-500.....	40.0	60.0	100
501-525.....	83.3	16.7	100
526-550.....	91.3	8.7	100
C = .45			

Figure 10: Final prediction scores (Glueck and Glueck, *One Thousand Juvenile Delinquents: 189*).

The first of the Gluecks' studies under the Harvard Crime Survey to be published was their study of 510 adult male reformatory graduates in the somewhat misleadingly titled *500 Criminal Careers* (1930). As well as 'a damning piece of evidence' (in Richard C. Cabot's words), showing an 80% recidivism rate, this study also showcased the Gluecks's new tabulation and organisation of factors for prediction.⁷ They had published prediction tables for adult offenders based on this research a year earlier in 'Predictability in the Administration of Criminal Justice' for the *Harvard Law Review* where the Gluecks outlined the failure rate method for constructing 'prognostic instruments' and scoring cases. Here the Gluecks combined six background factors for scoring before sentencing: industrial habits (ranging from 'good' to 'poor' worker), seriousness and frequency of crime, prior arrests, prior penal experience, economic responsibility (whether they contributed to support parents and family), and mental abnormality. In turn these could be joined by up to seven post-sentence factors in judgements of parole or subsequent offending.⁸ Another table presented examples of scoring in seven cases ranging from lower to higher risk (Fig. 11). Seen applied to individual cases, predictions based on combined probabilities were used to justify effectively deterministic expectations of failure. Case six, for example, with a score after of 996 after repeated sentences was judged to have a 'nil' chance of success and, at best, a roughly 5% chance of 'partial failure'. In light of 'a nine and a half chance in ten of his continuing to be a

⁷ Richard C. Cabot, 'Foreword', in Sheldon Glueck and Eleanor Glueck, *500 Criminal Careers* (Alfred A. Knopf: New York: NY: 1930): vii.

⁸ Sheldon Glueck and Eleanor Glueck, 'Predictability in the Administration of Criminal Justice', *Harvard Law Review*, Vol. 42 (3) (1929): 309-314.

complete failure', the Gluecks grimly concluded that 'society must provide for wholly indeterminate, probably life-long, incarceration for men of the type of case six'.⁹

320

HARVARD LAW REVIEW

TABLE VII

ILLUSTRATIVE CASE CHART OF MEN WHO WERE POST-PAROLE
SUCCESSIONS, THOSE WHO WERE PARTIAL FAILURES, AND
THOSE WHO WERE TOTAL FAILURES

<i>Factors</i>		<i>Successes</i>			<i>Partial Failures</i>		<i>Total Failures</i>	
		1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Pre-Reformatory	Industrial habits	43	43	43	59	43	59	68
	Seriousness of crime	21	21	67	67	21	67	67
	Prior arrest or non-arrest	69	32	69	69	32	69	69
	Prior penal experience	47	47	74	47	47	74	47
	Economic responsibility	41	41	41	64	41	64	64
	Mental condition	60	60	75	75	87	87	60
	TOTAL I	281	244	369	381	271	420	375
Reformatory	Conduct in reformatory	30	30	30	70	30	70	70
	TOTAL II	311	274	399	451	301	490	445
Parole	Conduct on parole	No parole; served maximum sentence	30	77	77	30	77	30
	TOTAL III		304	476	528	331	567	475
Post-Parole	Industrial habits				66	66	92	92
	Attitude toward family				10	50	85	85
	Economic responsibility				53	53	85	53
	Type of home				44	44	86	44
	Use of leisure				81	81	81	81
	TOTAL IV				782	625	996	830

Figure 11: Illustration of scoring for adult male offenders (Glueck and Glueck, 'Predictability in the Administration of Criminal Justice': 320).

⁹ Ibid. 324-325.

Harsh sentences were supposedly justified by the certainty of 'instruments'. In a foreword to the article, legal scholar Roscoe Pound (1870-1964) connected the Gluecks' predictive methods to a present 'renewed quest for certainty' following 'overenthusiasm in the decades of progressivism' and the subsequent disappointments of probation and parole. For modern penal treatment, he wrote, 'let it once be made clear that probation laws may be administered with a reasonable assurance of distinguishing between the sheep and the goats, let it be shown that the illusory certainty of the old system may be replaced by a regime of reasonably predictable results'. Indeed, at times, the Gluecks seemed to imply a 'regime' of instruments in place of human judgement. Clearly aware of potential reactions against such an arrogation of authority, the Gluecks noted the dangers of 'blind' mechanical justice. The following long passage is worth quoting in full:

Prognostic devices such as those herein presented are not to be utilized blindly. It is not proposed thereby to convert judges completely into the rubber stamps they are sometimes partially compelled to be by detailed, legislative prescription of penalties to be imposed for various offences. If a physician, utilizing a prognostic instrument for various combinations of symptoms as an aid to treatment were to follow such a table blindly, he would soon find himself in trouble. Such a device could only furnish support to his experience and reason; it would not be a substitute therefor. Similarly a prognostic instrument of the kind herein devised would only aid the judge in performing his sentencing task much more intelligently than he does it today. It would not supercede the Judge.

But even if busy courts were, because of the pressure of business, to found their disposition of cases entirely upon failure rate tables, making no exceptions to suit individual peculiarities, the chances are all in favour of the conclusion that, in the long run, they would thereby do much more constructive work, from the points of view of both society and the offender, than they are doing today.¹⁰

The 'instrument' and its creators occupied an ambiguous position in relation to the authority of court officials. The Gluecks appealed to and accommodated judicial experience and authority before going on to suggest that instruments alone might still do a better job. At the same time, predictive instruments were presented as a solution to the present uncertainty of court procedure, invoking the insecurity of judges under public and legislative pressure. The

¹⁰ Ibid. 323.

crime surveys and commissions which characterised various American cities during the ‘crime waves’ of the 1920s had directly targeted judicial corruption and inefficiency. The Harvard Crime Survey’s initial aim to replace judicial ignorance with clinical expertise led the Gluecks to an alternative, distinctly quantitative solution. Prediction tables were thus a direct response to perceived judicial error, made all the more dangerous by the powers of probation by which courts might erroneously or ‘overenthusiastically’ release threats to the public. To draw on Porter, ‘trust in numbers’ here appears in relation to a situation of scientific, political and public distrust, in which ‘neutral’ enumeration provides security and satisfies democratic demands for impartial decisions: ‘Quantification is a way of making decisions without seeming to decide. Objectivity lends authority to officials who have very little of their own’.¹¹ Porter provides a contemporary instance of these dynamics in the 1930s rise of cost-benefit analysis to contain and resolve the politics of public spending disputes in New Deal government departments and ‘the American political context of systemic distrust’.¹² In the same period Bouk charts the growth of the American life insurance into ‘an enormous risk making system’ of humans and tabulating machines following the Social Security Act of 1935, transforming ‘individuals into statistical citizens, into state-produced risk’.¹³ In constructing a predictive instrument for female offenders in *Five Hundred Delinquent Women* (1934), the Gluecks themselves compared their methods to ‘that by which insurance companies, by knowing the facts as to the age, occupation, and health of an applicant for insurance can predict his probable life-span’.¹⁴ In presenting their solutions to judges and other practitioners in criminal justice, the Gluecks joined wider projects of enumeration to anticipate risks, justify decisions, and resolve doubt, all while avoiding waste and maximising gains.

In these early works the Gluecks referred to their tables for scoring criminal potential as ‘instruments’. In the following decades, as the Gluecks produced more tables and as more practitioners inquired about them, they were also variously referred to as ‘tools’, ‘devices’, ‘scales’, and so on. While such terms may evoke ongoing historical debates as to the status of

¹¹ Porter, *Trust in Numbers*: 8.

¹² Ibid. 149, 148-189.

¹³ Bouk, *How Our Days Became Numbered*: 209-236.

¹⁴ Sheldon Glueck and Eleanor Glueck, *Five Hundred Delinquent Women* (Alfred A. Knopf: New York: NY: 1934): 284.

‘paper tools’ or ‘paper machines’ in laboratory research and other fields of knowledge, the more salient implication for contemporaries was that prediction tables could provide an impersonal source of authority in practical decision making.¹⁵ Predictive ‘instruments’ and ‘tools’ suggested ‘mechanical objectivity’, following a pre-emptive calculus based on statistical correlates that notably obfuscated the role of humans who rated each factor.¹⁶ Ultimately the most common actors’ category was the arguably more modest, more descriptive ‘prediction table’, epitomised in the Gluecks’ most famous creation, the ‘Glueck social prediction table’. Perhaps intended to evoke the older ‘experience tables’ and ‘mortality tables’ of established life insurance companies, prediction tables similarly promised users a convenient means of scoring a given individual and thence placing them in relation to a wider series to judge possible outcomes in light of what the Gluecks elsewhere termed ‘objectified’ or ‘organized’ experience. As with predictive ‘instruments’, prediction ‘tables’ were presented as impersonal, providing, to use Alain Desrosières’ phrase, ‘things that hold’ to secure subsequent decision making.¹⁷ For the sake of consistency, I will (excepting alternate terms appearing in quotations) subsequently follow this more common contemporary usage and refer to ‘prediction tables’, to be discussed in more depth in chapter 5.

The Gluecks continued to publish their prediction tables in these and other works, eventually following up their adult and juvenile cases with more tables in *Juvenile Delinquents Grown Up* (1940) and *Criminal Careers in Retrospect* (1943).¹⁸ The Gluecks were, however, not the only ones attempting prediction. In their 1929 ‘predictability’ paper they pointed to the earlier work of Hornell Hart, as far as they knew the first to apply actuarial insurance methods in predicting recidivism.¹⁹ Hart had worked with Massachusetts reformatory records assembled by Sam B. Warner, comparing 66 background factors to produce a prognostic scoring system

¹⁵ For more on these terms see Ursula Klein, ‘Paper Tools in Experimental Cultures’, *Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science*, Vol. 32 (2) (2001): 265-302; Marcus Krajewski and Peter Kapp, *Paper Machines: About Cards and Catalogs, 1548-1929* (MIT Press: Cambridge, MA: 2011).

¹⁶ See Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison, *Objectivity* (Zone Books: New York, NY: 2007): 115-190.

¹⁷ Alain Desrosières (trans. Camille Naish), *The Politics of Large Numbers: A History of Statistical Reasoning* (Harvard University Press: Cambridge, MA: 1998): 9.

¹⁸ Sheldon Glueck and Eleanor Glueck, *Juvenile Delinquents Grown Up* (Commonwealth Fund: New York, NY: 1940); Sheldon Glueck and Eleanor Glueck, *Criminal Careers in Retrospect* (Commonwealth Fund: New York, NY: 1943).

¹⁹ Glueck and Glueck, ‘Predictability’: 300.

by 1923, however this would be superseded by the so-called 'burgess method' of parole prediction. Developed by Chicago sociologist Ernest W. Burgess (1886-1966) from 1927 to 1928, this study compared 3000 inmates resulting in a 21 factor test, later applied at Joliet Penitentiary from 1933 when paroling inmates. As Harcourt notes, through the 1940s and 1950s the refinement of actuarial parole prediction would become a periodic topic for doctoral dissertations on criminology, often from sociologists connected with the Chicago School.²⁰ However, the implication here and in subsequent criminology is that more cohesive sociological efforts in parole prediction ultimately consigned the Gluecks and their tables to insignificance.

Criminologists, John Laub and Robert Sampson connect the Gluecks' academic difficulties to their shifting rivalry with Edwin H. Sutherland (1883-1950) and the emerging sociological consensus he headed in mid-century American criminology. Trained in the University of Chicago, Sutherland would become head of sociology at Indiana University in 1935 and president of the American Sociological Association in 1939, in the meantime attracting numerous doctoral students including those working on actuarial parole prediction. Meanwhile, through successive editions, Sutherland's *Principles of Criminology* became a paradigmatic text for the field, developing an overarching theory of 'differential association' which explained criminality in terms of learned behaviours and motives within socio-cultural and intimate personal groups. By contrast, the Gluecks were atheoretical and eclectic in their multi-factor studies. Laub and Sampson note their academic isolation, Sheldon pursuing empirical criminological research as a law professor while Eleanor was consigned (almost certainly on the basis of gender) to the role of 'research assistant' at Harvard from 1930 until 1953, even as she co-directed huge research projects. Laub and Sampson thus view the Gluecks as outsiders, incompatible with growing 'sociological positivism'. While sharing their quantitative, actuarial methods with this particular positivist trend, the Gluecks resisted sociological theories of overall crime causation while entertaining competing psychiatric and even somatic models. Increasing attacks from Sutherland and his students thus, Laub and Sampson argue, 'aimed largely at extinguishing their interdisciplinary model so that sociology

²⁰ Harcourt, *Against Prediction*: 47-76.

could establish proprietary rights to criminology'.²¹ Indeed the reception of *Unraveling* in the 1950s would be marked by fierce disputes between the Gluecks and their sociological critics.

In understanding the trajectory of academic criminology this is a compelling argument but one constrained by a narrow focus on university disciplines. Debates over parole factors were, meanwhile, just one aspect of a wider field of prediction. The Gluecks were themselves more interested in juveniles and the early anticipation of delinquency before criminal careers could even begin, as explored in *Unraveling*. Beyond universities and prisons the Gluecks must be examined and understood in their relation to practitioners working in diverse contexts. If the Gluecks were academically isolated they were, nevertheless, practically and publicly integrated. Following in the footsteps of Healy and Bronner they navigated and enrolled schools, community and public agencies and a range of other observers and informants in wide networks of information gathering. As will be seen, such practitioners would later reach out to the Gluecks in search of predictive tools. reconstructed through research materials and correspondence, their research can be seen organising suspicion across American society.

Planning Unraveling

From the later 1930s, the Gluecks prepared for their most ambitious and ultimately most famous study. The plan was to compare 500 delinquent boys with 500 non-delinquent 'controls' on as wide a range of factors as possible to find out which were related to incipient criminal behaviour.²² More than a decade of research would be enabled by various funding bodies. In particular, the philanthropic Commonwealth Fund, gave generous support to for eight years of the Gluecks' study.²³ As noted in chapter two, the Commonwealth Fund had previously supported the national movement for child guidance as part of its Programme for the Prevention of Delinquency, investing considerable resources in new clinics while directing the creation of new child guidance professionals and shaping their target populations to

²¹ John H. Laub and Robert J. Sampson, 'The Sutherland-Glueck Debate: On the Sociology of Criminological Knowledge, *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 96 (6) (1991): 1404.

²² To preserve anonymity, I will be referring to the boys using their case numbers assigned by the Gluecks. Delinquent cases were numbered 1-500 while non-delinquents were numbered 501-1000.

²³ Glueck and Glueck, *Unraveling*: ix.

promote the success of this programme. The goals of the Commonwealth Fund thus accord closely with Lily Kay's analysis of the Rockefeller Foundation who, in response to the social and technological disruptions of urban-industrial capitalism, 'cultivated scientific and managerial elites in order to address the root causes of social dysfunction' and, thence, 'restructure human relations'.²⁴ Unfortunately evidence of direct influence on the Gluecks' research is not forthcoming, however, the goal of differentiating potential delinquents from the general population undoubtedly fit with broader philanthropic interests in 'social control', investing in the human sciences to maintain an unstable, modern, social order. It is also notable that the Commonwealth Fund's support for *Unraveling* coincided with what Kay identifies as waning philanthropic support for clinical psychiatry during the Great Depression, in favour of new visions of objective, experimentally grounded, 'molecular' science.²⁵ The Gluecks' task, meanwhile, was to create objective prediction tables applicable to all American children of elementary school age. The process of creating these predictive tools, and the data which underlay them, depended on both amassing and controlling a huge range of information. In keeping with earlier criminological researchers, the Gluecks worked with an eclectic range of material from various sources, interpreted by various experts and analysts. Describing the plan of research in *Unravelling* they referred to four interconnected levels of inquiry: socio-cultural, somatic, intellectual, and emotional-temperamental.²⁶ As a result the Gluecks would amass a large and diverse research staff.

Based on credits in *Unraveling*, by 1950 ten social investigators had been involved in visiting and reporting on the homes, schools and neighbourhoods of Boston, the correctional institutions of Massachusetts, and numerous other agencies for corroborating records. Six psychologists had administered psychometric tests, while eight women formed the study's secretarial staff. In addition, various researchers and specialists had been employed and consulted for specific phases of study: one psychiatrist-physician, two physical anthropologists, two Rorschach analysts, two statisticians, one statistical consultant and

²⁴ Lily E. Kay, *The Molecular Vision of Life: Caltech, The Rockefeller Foundation, and the Rise of the New Biology* (Oxford University Press: Oxford: 1993), 10.

²⁵ See Ibid. 27-57.

²⁶ Glueck and Glueck, *Unraveling*: 15.

finally an editorial assistant.²⁷ I will discuss these groups as they become relevant. The Gluecks, meanwhile constructed their plan of study with the express intention of carefully managing these varied perspectives to serve their overall dataset. As will be seen in the following chapter, this meant ‘insulating’ each phase of social, somatic, psychiatric and Rorschach inquiry by attempting to prohibit the sharing of results. Seen in continuity with earlier criminological efforts this was a new attempt to manage multiple disciplines and their multiple approaches to crime and criminal data. Echoing Healy and Bronner, the Gluecks stressed eclecticism, empiricism, and practical results as opposed to any single, abstract theory. Eleanor thus described the study in 1938 as ‘an eclectic approach to an analysis of crime causation’ before noting ‘how meagre the data are in this general field and how biased... the researches on causation have been’.²⁸ This reference to causation may seem puzzling in light of the JBF study in which causes were thrown into doubt. In fact, ‘causes’ for the Gluecks took on a significantly different meaning and value over the course of their research. In contrast to the specific causal chains and aetiologies explored by Healy and Bronner, the Gluecks came to understand causes in terms of high, albeit unspecified, statistical relationships between factors and outcomes. Often combining multiple factors as part of an amorphous ‘complex’ of ‘causal forces’, ‘influences’ and so on, this approach also put them at odds with sociological and other emphases on explaining crime via unified theory.²⁹

Another somewhat ambiguous legacy of Healy and Bronner in the Gluecks’ work was the individualistic emphasis on personal factors and the unique circumstances of a given case, as opposed to systemic accounts of crime. Again, however, individualisation was now qualified by statistics. Rather than a personalised diagnosis and prognosis the Gluecks pointed to the need for regularities to order interpretation and judgement. Having presented several cases in more detail as ‘a sheaf of lives’ in *500 Criminal Careers* they continued:

Hundreds of life histories of criminals might be sketched. They are all similar and all different; and that fact is the reason why we must have not only individualization, but individualization based upon *objectified* experience rather than deceptive ‘common sense’, and mere ‘consideration of the

²⁷ Ibid. viii.

²⁸ Eleanor Glueck to Elizabeth Hincks, 14th February 1938, Eleanor T. and Sheldon Glueck Papers, HOLLIS 601652. Harvard Law School Library, Historical & Special Collections (Subsequently ETSGP), Box 31 Folder 1.

²⁹ Laub and Sampson, ‘The Sutherland-Glueck Debate’: 1416-1419.

individual case'. *The points of difference, of uniqueness in the individual case cannot be safely determined without a careful evaluation of the case in light of the points of similarity in hundreds of other cases.*³⁰

'Causes' and 'individuals' were only meaningful in relation to the regularities of statistics. Probabilistic prediction tables aimed to organise both. In gathering hundreds of other cases for *Unraveling* the Gluecks took pains to select cases with particular traits and backgrounds in the hopes of a controlled, valid sample. In doing so they were also demarcating a target population for prediction.

Demarcating Delinquency

Preceding the collection and codification of information, delinquent and non-delinquent children had to be found and selected. Each delinquent was to be matched with a corresponding non-delinquent for particular characteristics to ensure comparable samples but also to foreclose certain conclusions. Approaches from anthropology, psychology, sociology, and other disciplines were valuable sources of information but also at risk of theoretical partisanship. The Gluecks thus sought to control factors associated with 'considerable claims', 'schools of thought' and 'widespread conceptions'. In *Unravelling* the Gluecks described how the 500 delinquents were matched with 500 non-delinquent 'controls' of equivalent age, general intelligence (IQ), 'national (ethno-racial) origin' and 'residence in underprivileged neighbourhoods'. On this last feature, responding indirectly to sociological theories of cultural or socio-economic causation, the Gluecks hoped that their matched comparisons would reveal 'why it is that even in regions of most adverse social conditions, most children do not commit legally prohibited acts of theft, burglary, assault, sexual aggression and the like'.³¹ In this way the Gluecks attempted to control and nullify features they considered controversial, 'naïve' or otherwise prone to bias. At the same time, in assembling and matching delinquent and non-delinquent samples by characteristics of personal, racial and social background, important decisions were being made to demarcate a target population within which to differentiate criminal threats.

³⁰ Glueck and Glueck, *500 Criminal Careers*: 83.

³¹ Glueck and Glueck, *Unraveling*: 14-15.

The initial selection of delinquent and non-delinquent samples was shaped by access to institutions and officials responsible for youth. Initial plans to study delinquents through a court setting led to a correspondence with Judge John Perkins of the Boston Juvenile Court and Kenneth Wollan, director of its Citizen Training Department, through the latter half of 1938. However, research plans evidently clashed with the court's corrective goals. Perkins explained to Eleanor Glueck that 'the main problem is how to do anything which does not interfere with our chief responsibility, that of trying to get the boys straightened out'.³² Years later, responding to her requests to supplement the eventual sample with court cases, he further stressed the need to avoid 'ulterior motives', citing the delinquents' ingrained suspicion of the court and the need to avoid 'anything which may make it more difficult to get their confidence'.³³

With the court insulating its own rehabilitative programs from criminological research, almost all delinquent cases would eventually be found amongst juveniles in Massachusetts' training schools, beginning with the Lyman School for boys and later moving on to Shirley Industrial School. Perkins, while not providing court cases, did make a 'sympathetic presentation' of the Gluecks' research to the board of trustees responsible for these institutions in February 1939 in his capacity as Chair.³⁴ A memorandum prepared by the Gluecks for the Board that month described the study's aims of differentiating delinquents and non-delinquents in 'supposedly crime-breeding conditions', predicting offenders' responses to peno-correctional treatment and constructing a 'detailed close-up picture of their life and activities' necessary 'to provide a thoroughly well-tested scientific basis for the disposition of offenders'.³⁵ A preliminary study at Lyman was soon approved, and by September 1939 a trial of 10 boys was planned to include psychiatric interviews, supplementary psychological tests, photographs for anthropometric measurement, elaborate physical examinations and a thorough social investigation. This was

³² John Perkins to Eleanor Glueck, 1st November 1938, ETSGP, Box 31 Folder 1.

³³ Perkins to Eleanor Glueck, 5th April 1945, ETSGP, Box 31 Folder 1.

³⁴ Eleanor Glueck to Perkins 28th February 1939, ETSGP, Box 33 Folder 7.

³⁵ 'Memorandum from Professor and Mrs. Sheldon Glueck Regarding Proposed Research into Crime Causation and Treatment', 29th February 1939, ETSGP, Box 37 Folder 7.

accompanied by a promise 'to carry the work forward without any embarrassment either to the Board of Trustees or to the Lyman School or to the families of the boys themselves'.³⁶

Indeed, while the court guarded its rehabilitative programmes from 'ulterior' research motives, the training schools negotiated to shield themselves from potential criticism in the Gluecks' study. Lyman, originally the State Reform School founded in 1848, was amongst the United States' oldest such institutions while Shirley had been established in 1908. At the commencement of the Gluecks' study both still supervised hundreds of adolescents. Boys were split between cottages and participated in farm work to support the schools alongside a varying curriculum of educational, vocational and religious activities during an average stay of 8-11 months. According to an annual report of 1940, Lyman's correctional program was based on principles of 'health, command of fundamental processes, worthy home membership, worthy use of leisure, vocational guidance, moral guidance, and good citizenship'.³⁷ Shirley similarly included maintenance, academic work, religious exercises and athletics in the 'thousand and one daily activities that may be utilized incidentally and indirectly in our program of character education'.³⁸ This picture of agrarian life and improvement was in keeping with older nineteenth-century plans for wholesome reformation but also belied recurring criticisms of institutional isolation, degradation and failure.³⁹ Training schools retained a contemporary reputation for harsh and demeaning discipline, corporal punishment and institutional regimen, later exposure of which would later prompt their rapid closure in Massachusetts in 1972.⁴⁰ Runaways were evidently common with Lyman's 1940 report noting that of its 355 charges 72 had been returned from an absence without leave while 93 were still absent.⁴¹ These implications of institutional failure would, in turn, shape the conditions of access.

³⁶ Sheldon Glueck and Eleanor Glueck to Charles Davenport, 13th September 1939, ETSGP, Box 33 Folder 7.

³⁷ 'Annual Report of Massachusetts Training Schools, Year Ending November 30, 1940', ETSGP, Box 33 Folder 7: 5.

³⁸ Ibid. 13.

³⁹ Schlossman, *Love and the American Delinquent*: 33-54, 105-123.

⁴⁰ Jerome G. Miller, *Last One Over the Wall. The Massachusetts Experiment in Closing Reform Schools* (Ohio State University Press: Columbus, OH: 1991): 16-22, 61-82.

⁴¹ 'Annual Report', ETSGP, Box 33 Folder 7: 8.

In proposing their study, the Gluecks were especially cautious to overcome the trustees' wariness of reformers and investigators. According to advice given in confidence by secretary Walter Bell, Charles M. Davenport, Director of the Board was noted for particular 'suspicion of surveys' dating back to an unpublished report on Lyman by Dr Miriam Van Waters for the Harvard Crime Survey which, if ever released, 'would completely jeopardize our work'.⁴² Training School officials were likely aware of the Gluecks' own previous involvement with the Harvard Crime Survey, including their critical evaluation of clinical child guidance in the Judge Baker Foundation. The Gluecks explicitly told the Board that the present study was not associated with this survey⁴³ while Perkins was later asked to "assure the Lyman School Authorities that this is in no way a study of Lyman School or the parole system". Eleanor further elaborated:

Sheldon and I will rarely go to the institution because we would not want any of the staff there or any of your board to gain the notion that we are interested in a study of the Lyman School as such. For our purposes it does not make any difference from what institution or court the boys happen to be from as long as they are really delinquent children.⁴⁴

The Gluecks were satisfied with the Training Schools as a source of cases who were 'really delinquent'. However, negotiating this access in line with the interests of juvenile justice and correctional officials consolidated a shift from earlier evaluations of Massachusetts' criminal justice and preventative machinery to the description and comparison of delinquent characteristics. The Gluecks' research would scrutinise juvenile differences while the institutions which purportedly cared for and improved them were shielded from criticism.

Turning to the non-delinquent sample, while embarking on their preliminary study at Lyman the Gluecks were in contact with Arthur Gould, superintendent of Boston Public Schools (i.e. state schools), who seemed 'very friendly' in responding to investigators.⁴⁵ Gould was initially approached regarding the study of delinquents' school records with assurances of confidentiality and no publicity.⁴⁶ By the end of 1939 the Gluecks had permission from the

⁴² 'Diary 2/13/40', ETSGP, Box 33 Folder 7.

⁴³ 'Memorandum from Professor and Mrs. Sheldon Glueck', ETSGP, Box 33 Folder 7.

⁴⁴ Eleanor Glueck to Perkins, 26th September 1939, ETSGP, Box 33 Folder 7.

⁴⁵ Memorandum 10th November 1939, ETSGP, Box 34 Folder 1.

⁴⁶ Sheldon Glueck to Arthur L. Gould, 14th November 1939, ETSGP, Box 34 Folder 1.

school committee and a letter of introduction from Gould for their 'thoroughly qualified investigators' to access approved delinquent records.⁴⁷ This interest eventually led to approval for sampling non-delinquent control cases from the schools, and by December 1940 plans were being made for selection of 100 cases in the William Blackstone School, the first of 13 schools eventually making up the non-delinquent sample. It was specified that 'only white boys whose ages are between 11 and 16, inclusive, will be considered'. Following the elimination of any delinquent boys, permission slips were sent home and followed up if necessary before embarking on physical exams, 'posture pictures', interviews and psychological tests, teacher evaluations and home visits. Here the Gluecks planned around their own controls of the sample as well as the requirements of the school, apportioning and limiting the time required of teachers and pupils, and the possibility that parents would refuse.⁴⁸ These features will be discussed in more detail when examining the Gluecks' negotiation of home and school settings. For now I will consider the demarcations and matchings that were made between delinquent and non-delinquent samples.

Compared to confidence in the delinquency of the training school boys, the non-delinquent school samples were subject to increased wariness of possible undetected or minor delinquents. As in the earlier child guidance movement, a level of 'normal' misbehaviour and rebellion was to be accepted. Responding to Eleanor's concerns that possible 'predelinquent' activities amongst the controls would prompt criticism, Sheldon's brother Bernard Glueck advised her that 'a one-hundred percent well behaved youngster is a distinct anomaly and suspect psychiatrically, if not from the point of view of delinquent conduct'.⁴⁹ Consulting with other researchers on the project in November 1939, Eleanor expanded on the uncertainty of 'non-delinquent' status:

In choosing them we find that although a boy does not necessarily have a court record, he is not necessarily free from what might be considered pre-delinquent activities, that is, he may have truanted from school or done freight riding, or street begging, etc. It is probably a fact that all children reared in slum

⁴⁷ Gould to Principals of Schools and Districts, 21st December 1939, ETSGP, Box 34 Folder 1.

⁴⁸ 'Plans For Study of Non-Delinquents', 6th December 1940, ETSGP, Box 31 Folder 2.

⁴⁹ Bernard Glueck to Eleanor Glueck, 16th November 1939, ETSGP, Box 33 Folder 3.

areas misconduct themselves in various ways but this does not necessarily mean that they are developing into criminals.⁵⁰

In their discussion of the non-delinquent sample the Gluecks thus made allowances for a certain level of misconduct mixed with a general suspicion towards juveniles from the social backgrounds they would target. As the study continued, the non-delinquent sample were subject to re-appraisal for cases appearing to show 'a continued pattern of misconduct'. A memorandum from early 1944 suggested 41 cases for review with two in particular noted as apparently 'real and persistent delinquents' undetected in the community.⁵¹ A memorandum the following year reported that 'of the non-delinquents, 32 have now been weeded out and classified as minor offenders' following re-examination of their histories for persistent offences.⁵² These 'minor' offenders were, according to the Gluecks, not classifiable in either the 'serious' delinquent group or the non-delinquent group. In comparison 11 delinquents were moved into this 'minor' category, five of them from a small supplementary group taken from outside the training schools. Indeed, there seems to have been less concern to qualify or modify the classification of institutional cases. Setting out earlier case selection policies it was simply noted that 'boys at the state correctional schools had been committed by the courts and were accepted as serious delinquents solely on the basis of their commitment'.⁵³ In selecting and distinguishing their two samples, the nuances of both allowance and suspicion towards 'non-delinquent' behaviour only rarely extended to the reconsideration of training school cases whose 'delinquent' status followed from legal disposition and their separation into an institutional population of 'serious' young offenders.

Demarcating Race and Space

With juvenile cases available from Lyman, Shirley and the public schools, the Gluecks and their staff worked to quickly select and investigate cases up to the final total of 1000 through the 1940s. Throughout this process they paid special attention to creating matched pairs

⁵⁰ Eleanor Glueck to Ernest G. and Anna Hartoch Schachtel, 13th November 1939, ETSGP, Box 33 Folder 1.

⁵¹ 'Memo on Selection of Delinquents and Non-Delinquents – 1/3/44', ETSGP, Box 31 Folder 3.

⁵² 'Minor Delinquents', 15th November 1945, ETSGP, Box 31 Folder 4.

⁵³ 'Case Selection', June 1946, ETSGP, Box 31 Folder 3.

according to the aforementioned criteria of age, IQ, ethnicity and area of residence, determination of which reflected various sources and priorities. Beginning with delinquent cases for later matching, rules for selection from September 1940 specified an age range of 10 years, 11 months to 16 years, 11 months and a minimum IQ of 65. Meanwhile the item 'color' simply specified 'must not be negroes' with residence limited to 'slum areas of Boston, Chelsea or Everett'.⁵⁴ For IQ the Gluecks could utilise numerous individual and group intelligence tests already applied in public and training schools but also doubted the accuracy of either these tests or those applying them. In *Unravelling* they pointed to frequent discrepancies between prior school or institutional tests and their own results, ultimately settling on matching based on the specialised Wechsler-Belvue tests applied by their own staff.⁵⁵ More consequential decisions surrounded the classification of ethnic identity and urban space.

One of the most striking, yet obscure, features of the study in determining and controlling 'racial' background was the complete exclusion of African Americans from the samples. Frustratingly, the Gluecks' surviving research materials are silent on the reasoning behind this decision, though some speculation will be offered shortly. 'Race', across their correspondence, memoranda and other forms, was instead used interchangeably with 'ethnicity', 'nationality' and so on to refer to a highly variegated set of immigrant communities and backgrounds while the unelaborated category of 'negroes' under 'color' would not be investigated. Thus, a memorandum of November 1939 on rules for establishing the 'racial origins' specified that cases would be classified starting from their parents' or father's country of birth. Rather than the US nationality of the boys and their families these procedures looked back to any foreign born-parent or grandparent to determine a single ethnic identity for each case. While the reasoning for excluding African American cases seems to have received no explanation or discussion in their research materials, the Gluecks evidently anticipated potential controversies relating to particular national backgrounds.

⁵⁴ 'Rules For Selection of List of Delinquent Boys to be considered in Study', September 1940, ETSGP, Box 31 Folder 3.

⁵⁵ Glueck and Glueck, *Unravelling*: 33.

Writing to Harvard anthropologist Earnest Hooton (1887-1954) for advice on these protocols for selection, Eleanor noted that 'in carrying out this research we want to avoid the complications and implications of the relationship of crime to nationality'.⁵⁶ One exception to the above rules was the classification of Jewish identity which ignored nationality, although by 1945, facing difficulty in matching Jewish cases, Eleanor again wrote to Hooton asking if they would be 'severely criticized' for instead pairing Jews by country.⁵⁷ Hooton's reply, however, discouraged this 'adventurous matching' suggesting that it would be exploited by 'envious critics'. There was, he argued 'something special about the heredity and environment of Jewish families that makes it difficult to equate them reasonably with non-Jews even of the same racial grouping'.⁵⁸ While matching to control the controversies they saw surrounding 'race', the Gluecks meanwhile decided that this process would not account for 'culture conflict arising out of the foreign birth of the parents' (contrasting with the US birth of their children), continuing that 'this being one of the factors which may be crime causative we naturally do not want to control it'.⁵⁹ While seeking to avoid the vaguely articulated 'complications' of race, the Gluecks still evidently viewed immigrant families as potential sources of conflict with American culture. With the eventual matching of all cases by 1947, 500 pairs of delinquents and non-delinquents were thus classified, whether by both parents or a single grandparent, in a variety of foreign groupings with only 39 of pairs of 'Old American Stock'. Meanwhile 128 pairs were classified as 'English Canadian, English, Scotch' followed by 123 Italian pairs and 95 Irish pairs along with smaller numbers of French, Slavic, Scandinavian, Germanic, and Jewish groupings. Notably there were also 17 'Near Eastern' pairings as well one Chinese pairing.⁶⁰ While specifying the non-inclusion of black cases under the terminology of 'color', the Glueck's plan of 'racial' or 'national' matching was also, evidently, not straightforwardly 'white'.

The decision to avoid studying African Americans is thus highly pertinent but also extremely ambiguous given the lack of any materials discussing it in detail. The racial contours of the Gluecks' project should be placed in the context of earlier racialised conceptions of crime.

⁵⁶ Eleanor Glueck to Earnest Hooton, 1st November 1939, ETSGP, Box 31 Folder 4.

⁵⁷ Eleanor Glueck to Hooton, 8th February 1945, ETSGP, Box 31 Folder 4.

⁵⁸ Hooton to Eleanor Glueck, 20th February 1945, ETSGP, Box 31 Folder 4.

⁵⁹ Memorandum, 3rd November 1939, ETSGP, Box 31 Folder 4.

⁶⁰ V. Atchley, 'Nationality of 500 Matched Cases', 20th May 1947, ETSGP, Box 31 Folder 4.

Historian Khalil Gibran Muhammad has explored statistical discourses on black criminality, continuing since the 1890 prison census which fed post-reconstruction-era fears of national crisis and racial upheaval.⁶¹ Subsequently, he argues, black Americans joining the 'great migration' to Northern cities from the Jim Crow South, met violent exclusion from local urban communities and were, in turn, criminalised by middle class white and black commentators, both fearful of poor Southern 'strangers' in their midst.⁶² Muhammad also notes the effective segregation of early-twentieth-century charities, welfare, crime prevention, and policing. These served European immigrant communities, who gradually shed criminal associations, while ignoring African Americans, who became synonymous with criminality. Thus: 'Thoughtful, well-funded crime prevention and politically accountable crime fighting secured immigrants' whiteness, in contrast to the experiences of blacks, who were often brutalised or left unprotected and were repeatedly told to conquer their own crime before others would help them'.⁶³

The Gluecks still approached foreign birth as a 'racial' distinction but, like earlier commentators, may have also viewed black offending as a distinct problem of culture or demographic change. Black juveniles were deliberately put at a distance. Thus, in one South End school a 'comparatively high colored population' was identified as a new factor to work around in selecting cases.⁶⁴ In a psychiatric interview, one delinquent similarly indicated awareness and avoidance of certain neighbourhoods increasingly demarcated by race, recalling an old Boys' club on Dudley Street before continuing, 'lots of colored kids down there now. Pretty tough. Lots of fighting'.⁶⁵ Whatever their unstated impressions of black delinquents, the Gluecks kept them out of their samples. Nevertheless, as will be seen in chapter 6, their finished prediction tables would eventually be turned on black communities, further contributing to their criminalisation.

⁶¹ Khalil Gibran Muhammad, *The Condemnation of Blackness: Race, Crime, and the Making of Modern Urban America* (Harvard University Press: Cambridge, MA: 2010): 15-87.

⁶² Ibid. 192-225.

⁶³ Ibid. 273.

⁶⁴ 'Rice School', 17th June 1941, ETSGP, Box 31 Folder 4.

⁶⁵ '[Case 6] Interview 1940-7-23', ETSGP, Box 33, Folder 3: 1.

Turning to the control of social background, cases were limited, as has been seen, to residents of underprivileged, 'congested' or 'slum' areas. Ostensibly an attempt to control and refute purely social causation, this in fact meant importing sociological concepts into the plan of study, namely the so-called 'delinquency area'. This term recurred throughout the Gluecks' research materials, but was first introduced by Chicago sociologist Clifford Shaw (1895-1957) in his 1929 *Delinquency Areas*. Here Shaw explained crime in terms of geographic, cultural and social patterns, radiating from low-rent, 'interstitial' zones in the inner city to more settled, peaceful suburbs. The inner city was, he claimed, 'disorganized' by industrial expansion and foreign arrivals and thence became criminogenic:

In short, with the process of growth of the city the invasion of residential communities by business and industry causes a disintegration of the community as a unit of social control. This disorganization is intensified by the influx of foreign national and racial groups whose old cultural and social controls break down in the new cultural and racial situation of the city. In this state of social disorganization, community resistance is low. Delinquent and criminal patterns arise and are transmitted socially just as any other cultural and social pattern is transmitted. In time these delinquent patterns may become dominant and shape the attitudes and behavior of persons living in the area. Thus the section becomes an area of delinquency.⁶⁶

Data for these conclusions came in the form of rate maps, of crime per population, and spot maps, arranging many thousands of cases and reports across Chicago (Fig. 12). In Shaw's techniques we can see the long lineage of crime mapping by researchers or by police which, in Andrea Miller's words, 'render risk atmospheric and diffuse, capable of saturating environments'.⁶⁷ 'Disorganization', in interwar cities, evoked the apparent socio-economic and ethnic chaos of urban 'zones', 'ghettos' and 'black belts' charted by Chicago sociologists (including Ernest Burgess) to map and explain crime, homelessness, suicide, mental disorder, and other social ills.⁶⁸ Through the 1930s the maps of researchers were joined by those of real estate and local government for public health and redevelopment, using the Real Property Inventory (RPI) to map housing quality and establish standards for evaluating both

⁶⁶ Clifford R. Shaw, *Delinquency Areas: A Study of the Geographic Distribution of School Truants, Juvenile Delinquents, and Adult Offenders in Chicago* (University of Chicago Press: Chicago, IL: 1929): 205-206.

⁶⁷ Miller, 'Shadows of War, Traces of Policing': 97.

⁶⁸ Matthew Smith, *The First Resort: The History of Social Psychiatry in the United States* (Columbia University Press: New York, NY: 2023): 63-105.

'substandard dwellings' and, conversely, 'healthful housing'.⁶⁹ Attempts to map criminality, much like attempts to score it, coincided with parallel private and state efforts to account for society.




Figure 12: Rate map (left) and spot map (right) of delinquency in Chicago (Shaw, *Delinquency Areas*: 61, 66-67).

The former charted rates of delinquency in per 1000 population, the latter mapped individual residences of offenders

Using a combination of maps, statistics and qualitative descriptions, the Gluecks and their social investigators attempted to demarcate the delinquency areas of Boston and its

⁶⁹ Edmund Ramsden, 'Realizing Healthful Housing: Devices for Data Travel in Public Health and Urban Redevelopment in the Twentieth Century', in Leonelli and Tempini, *Data Journeys in the Sciences*: 329-349.

surrounding communities. For instance, in 1937, when considering nearby Chelsea as a locale of study, the need for a 'delinquency map' and other data from the probation commission was raised.⁷⁰ A hand-written report meanwhile judged the poverty and 'backwardness' of Chelsea to ensure appropriateness for inclusion. Dwellings and their occupants were noted by the investigator, "'jerry-built" wooden structures ("rabbit burrows") fire traps, shabby prematurely old and delapidated... too cheap for respectability, filled naturally with the sort of people who can't get decent places to live or are content, or become content, with such conditions'. Chelsea was further described as 'racially... a pot', with the Irish names of many city officials receiving particular attention.⁷¹ In setting out their later delinquency areas, the Gluecks and their staff continued to rely on such description of 'unfavourable' urban settings defined by the presumed intersection of 'race', poverty and morality.

Describing the selection of Boston cases by area in December 1942 two sources were noted: The Boston Council of Social Agencies' catalogue of house numbers by census tract and a map of juvenile delinquency prepared by the Boston Health League. These were reportedly 'the determining factor in the selection of cases, so far as residence is concerned' with 'delinquency areas' classified as any with a delinquency rate of 10 or more per 1000 children.⁷² At the same time, this statistical definition was supplemented by 'discretion' when selecting by residential area. In a conference earlier that year Eleanor had confirmed that 'it will not be necessary that the boy live in a highly delinquent area, as described in the census tract book (over 10/1000) as long as the neighbourhood is known to be poor, i.e. congested and containing many unfavorable influences'.⁷³ Similarly, from the outset of selecting non-delinquents, schools were chosen in accordance with a map of appropriate delinquency areas, however, this was evidently confirmed by the opinions of social investigators, principals and other officials to ensure that new districts were 'well within our delinquency area'.⁷⁴ The statistical definition of a delinquency area was thus, ultimately checked, by social investigators' personal judgement of local conditions. Reflecting this combined statistical and

⁷⁰ 'School Study', July 1937, ETSGP, Box 31 Folder 1.

⁷¹ 'Chelsea', N.D., ETSGP, Box 31 Folder 1.

⁷² G[eorge] F. M[cGrath], 'Case Selection – Census Tracts', 4th December 1942, ETSGP, Box 31 Folder 3.

⁷³ 'Case Selection Policy', 3rd November 1942, ETSGP, Box 31 Folder 3.

⁷⁴ Eleanor Glueck to Gould, 18th April 1940; Box 31 Folder 4, 'Rice School', ETSGP, Box 34 Folder 1: p 2.

qualitative demarcation, 'a notebook set out delinquency rates and case distribution, largely across East and South Boston, Central and South End, Charlestown and Roxbury along with other locales but also included highly evocative general observations. Here the tracts were described in terms of a spreading 'delinquent territory' containing 'islands' of non-delinquency which, nevertheless 'are so completely surrounded by delinquent territory that their defences against the bad influences around them are inadequate'.⁷⁵ On one hand the delinquency area was given statistical and geographical definition; on the other, investigators pointed to the fluid influence of delinquency across the city's porous boundaries, supplemented by their own qualitative impressions of urban squalor and vice.

Indeed, as the study progressed, investigators had to adjust to the difficulty of cleanly demarcating Boston's delinquent spaces. Nor was the statistical delinquency rate a straightforward measure. As had been noted earlier by the Boston Council of Social Agencies in their report used by the Gluecks, this rate would not account for all kinds of offence and might vary with 'neighbourhood attitude toward police and delinquency' as well as 'police attitude toward the arrest of juveniles' and the presence of commercial or leisure outlets.⁷⁶ Later, in 1946, one social investigator wrote to Eleanor on discrepancies regarding one of their worst tracts with over 100 delinquents per 1000. Their information 'based on place of arrest rather than his residence at the time', had, however, given this largely commercial district an outsized delinquency rate, though he noted that it still accorded with definitions of a 'slum area'.⁷⁷ The delinquency rate did not necessarily provide a neat distribution of offenders but was also shaped by dynamics of both offending and policing, prompting investigators to fall back on qualitative judgments of an area's unfavourable features. In 1945 the tabulation of delinquency rates in each tract was thus joined by figures from the City Planning Board's Real Property Inventory. These included proportions of vacant, damaged and derelict properties in each tract as well as monthly rentals, crowding, unemployment and the proportion of

⁷⁵ 'General Observations', N.D., ETSGP, Box 31 Folder 3.

⁷⁶ 'Juvenile Delinquency in Boston', November 1938, ETSGP, Box 31 Folder 3.

⁷⁷ George F. McGrath to Eleanor Glueck, 29th November 1946, ETSGP, Box 31 Folder 3.

dwellings with tubs, showers and stoves, together with brief explanations of these features and their possible contribution to a delinquency area.⁷⁸

For cases living in tracts with a delinquency rate of less than 10 per 1000, investigators similarly had to justify why the area was really unfavourable. Residences in census tracts S-3 and V-3 both near Roxbury Crossing) had been excluded due to a low delinquency rate until November 1942 when it was concluded that 'they were now known to be sufficiently congested and contain enough unfavorable influences to be accepted'. S-3 was thus noted for its crowded dwellings and proximity to industry as well as the 'unfavorable characteristics' of the Roxbury. V-3 was accepted as delinquent area based on first hand judgement of residences and descriptions of its 'many cheap cafes and barrooms and street corner habitues'.⁷⁹ A later report on delinquent cases residing in non-delinquent areas again justified their inclusion by reference to poor local conditions as well as the porosity of delinquent influence between different districts. Cases 82 and 112 resided in a tract with low delinquency rates but were noted for their previous residences by which they were 'delinquent area "conditioned"'. Meanwhile delinquent cases in S-3 were once more connected to the nearby influence of Roxbury Crossing, 'the place of "hangouts", all effective allurements enticing boys with weak homes'. Another tract, home to four cases, prompted a return to the metaphor of a delinquent 'sea', noting 'this so-called non-delinq. Tract sticks out into the delinquent area like a peninsula washed by delinquent tides on three sides'.⁸⁰ Having determined to control the influence of social background on their study, the Gluecks and their staff were, nevertheless, in little doubt of the dangers of the 'delinquency area' which attached suspicion to delinquent and non-delinquent alike.

The work of matching and controlling cases along the above lines expressed the scientific objectivity so valued by the Gluecks, while at the same time ingraining particular demarcations between delinquency and society at large. Serious delinquents, sentenced by the courts and

⁷⁸ 'Delinquency Areas. Characteristics of and Degree of Delinquency by Census Tracts of Geographical Districts (With Explanation)', August 1945, ETSGP, Box 31 Folder 3.

⁷⁹ GFM, 'Case Selection – Census Tracts', ETSGP, Box 31 Folder 3.

⁸⁰ 'Delinquents in Non-Delinquent Areas', 21st December 1945, ETSGP, Box 31 Folder 3.

sequestered in the training schools were paired with non-delinquent counterparts in the public schools. Controlling these samples reflected anticipated criticisms of the study but also established a target population requiring differentiation and intervention. The sample was thus divided by connection to a variety of national, immigrant and 'racial' backgrounds with the conspicuous exclusion of black juveniles whether from ambivalence, expected controversy or desires for a 'normal', 'white' sample. In turn, all cases were located within 'delinquency areas' reflecting continuing suspicion and fear of urban spaces even as these features were 'controlled'. Assumptions of criminogenic urban space were not novel to the Gluecks' research. In fact, when moving into the schools, agencies and homes of these areas they encountered surveillance already underway. This was the 'web of class' described by Schneider, formed by Boston's various welfare agencies and negotiated by working class, marginal youth.⁸¹ By the 1930s, agency and school visitors, court officers and other charitable workers were familiar figures in what were now termed 'delinquency areas'. Together they formed networks of suspicion in which records and observations circulated, networks which the Gluecks now sought to access and exploit.

Sharing Interests and Information in the 'Delinquency Area'

The socio-cultural phase of research required the reconstruction of social and school histories for each case. Facts and observations ranging from residences, vital statistics, earliest misbehaviours, economic status, and family dynamics were pooled and checked with reference to an expansive range of information and informants by social investigators and secretaries. Still, they approached families and even teachers or officials with scepticism or outright suspicion, checking and corroborating statements against an expansive set of more trusted records. This apparent unreliability was to be countered by drawing on prior surveillance of marginal families in the underprivileged areas demarcated for study. Cases selected were referred to the Parole Department, Board of Probation, Juvenile Court, Social Service Exchange and Department of Mental Hygiene as a basis for ID cards and consolidated records which could confirm or refute the statements of a boy or his family. Reporting on investigations of the 10 selected from Lyman for preliminary study, the Gluecks noted that

⁸¹ Schneider, *The Web of Class*: 14.

‘these families are known to so many social agencies that a great deal of material can be secured about them without making too many visits to the home’.⁸² The long lists of public and private social agencies consulted throughout the research ultimately included 42 departments of public welfare, 14 state hospitals, 21 family societies, 11 visiting nurse associations and many other juvenile, immigrant and religious charities, and aid societies across Massachusetts and other states. Information required cooperation, particularly in the school and the home where investigators both interviewed and evaluated teachers and parents. Memoranda from the end of the study noted that, while more was initially expected from established social agencies, much information ultimately derived from interviews especially regarding the ‘genesis’ of misbehaviour.⁸³ In advising others on procedure for school visits, Samuel C. Lawrence, social investigator and long-time collaborator of the Gluecks, thus moved from the minutiae of educational and attendance reports to the etiquette of visiting and interviewing school staff.⁸⁴ The Gluecks and their researchers appealed to the interests and concerns informants held for their children or juvenile charges while also moving strategically in schools and institutions to maintain access and check statements regarded as irrelevant or untrustworthy.

As has been seen, access to training schools rested on assurances that the institutions themselves would not be studied or criticised. Organising the study in Lyman, Superintendent Charles A. Dubois was apparently ‘greatly relieved with this explanation’. Earlier in 1938 Eleanor had anticipated that some offer of treatment service would ‘obviously be necessary in order to have the interest and cooperation of the school and court authorities’.⁸⁵ Now, however, she told Dubois that ‘he is the expert and that we would not attempt to offer suggestions about the treatment of individual children, nor were we in any way concerned with the running of the institution’.⁸⁶ Somewhat unexpectedly, the Gluecks’ psychiatrists and psychologists were required to avoid treatment or ‘deep probing’ which might unsettle cases or impinge on the authority of schools, institutions and their staff. Dubois was later asked not

⁸² Eleanor Glueck to Perkins, 4th January 1940, ETSGP, Box 33 Folder 7.

⁸³ G[eorge F. M[cGrath], ‘Memo to Mrs. Glueck – Confidential Nature of Our Records’, 22nd April 1948, ETSGP, Box 31 Folder 2.

⁸⁴ S[amuel]. C. L[awrence]., ‘Our Work with Schools’, N.D., ETSGP, Box 31 Folder 6.

⁸⁵ Eleanor Glueck to Hincks, 14th February 1938, ETSGP, Box 31 Folder 1.

⁸⁶ ‘Memo Re. Talk with Mr. Dubois at Kendall House, February 27 1939’, ETSGP, Box 33 Folder 8.

to encourage the 'very enthusiastic assistants' to do any more than had been permitted by the wary trustees.⁸⁷ A small research staff was authorised within the training schools and worked across other phases and locales of the 10-year study: Physician-psychiatrist Dr Bryant E. Moulton undertook the physical examination and psychiatric interview while social investigator George F. McGrath coordinated case lists and other information. In turn, investigator Ralph W. Whelan assisted in the medical exam and photography with psychologist Henry C. Patey responsible for giving additional intelligence and educational achievement tests.⁸⁸

Meanwhile, in accessing public schools for delinquent records and non-delinquent subjects, the Gluecks appealed to Superintendent Gould's interest before securing formal permission. Wishing to hear more about Gould's 'experiences in influencing difficult children', they then requested a letter of introduction for school staff to 'save you and your office the annoyance of being constantly called on the telephone by school principals to ask whether they may give us data'.⁸⁹ In later correspondence they would describe this letter as an 'open sesame'.⁹⁰ Alongside securing formal permission the Gluecks also actively sought to identify and foster interest in delinquent youth amongst school officials. A report of July 1940 on school masters and personnel thus pointed to Florence M. Murphy of East Boston's Theodore Lyman District as 'very interested' and active in arranging free access to records. She had apparently suggested securing blanket permission from Gould while submaster Robert E. Pine showed particular interest having worked two years at the Shirley Industrial School and apparently prided himself on his 'ability to manage tough boys w/o force'. Master Francis J. Lyons of the Emerson district was also described as 'unusually helpful and interested' acknowledging that problem children 'puzzle him sorely' along with the distress 'that he knows so little about what to do with them'.⁹¹ Checking in at the beginning of 1941, two months into the initial study of non-delinquents, Principal Dorr of Blackstone School reported that he was 'happy to cooperate', continuing that the psychiatrist 'Dr Moulton and I have had some very interesting

⁸⁷ Eleanor Glueck to Charles A. Dubois, 11th October 1939, ETSGP, Box 33 Folder 8.

⁸⁸ Eleanor Glueck to Dubois, 13th September 1940, ETSGP, Box 33 Folder 8.

⁸⁹ Eleanor Glueck to Gould, 9th December 1939, ETSGP, Box 34 Folder 1.

⁹⁰ Eleanor Glueck to Gould, 16th October 1944, ETSGP, Box 34 Folder 1.

⁹¹ 'Public School Personnel Masters', 7th May 1940, ETSGP, Box 34 Folder 1.

chats on all sorts of subjects and I thoroughly enjoy his company'.⁹² Principals at subsequent schools also expressed interest alongside their own perspectives on the Gluecks' subject matter. In 1945 Charles C. Ruddy, giving access to the George T. Angell Special School, agreed that their approach was 'very sound' before offering his 'personal belief that the very core of the juvenile delinquency problem rests in the punishment to be given initial offenders', owing to juveniles' 'repeated experiences of "getting away with it"'.⁹³ Later that year, Lawrence reported to Eleanor that Principal Maloney of Quincy School was also 'unusually interested in the Glueck study' having previously taught at Concord reformatory, an experience he apparently enjoyed talking about.⁹⁴

As they extended their study across Boston's public schools the Gluecks encountered principals and officials with an interest in the problem of juvenile delinquency and its possible solutions who frequently referred to their own perspectives on crime prevention or to experiences in a wider network of state corrections. In return the Gluecks regularly assured them of the research's forthcoming 'important results available for school people, and others who have to cope with young offenders'.⁹⁵ Other schools, however, were more resistant to inquiries about past students. Parochial schools in particular were a cause of concern with McGrath raising the 'dilemma' of accessing records on delinquent cases in 1942 and his desire to avoid 'an opening for complaints' from the uncertain Monsignor Quinlan, Diocesan Supervisor of these schools.⁹⁶ As well as school records it was necessary to interview parochial school sisters 'to obtain a complete report on the boys' behaviour, particularly the nature of the first school misdemeanor'.⁹⁷ The following year access was granted with unspoken protections for the parochial schools. Quinlan himself would pass on all requests for information or interviews to acquaint staff with the Gluecks' research, while McGrath also noted that 'his office will be in a position to know the names of all boys we are interested in, although the Msg. did not mention this'.⁹⁸ While many principals viewed the Glueck study as

⁹² Eleanor Glueck to Eugene H. Dorr, 30th January 1940, ETSGP, Box 34 Folder 1.

⁹³ Eleanor Glueck to Charles C. Ruddy, 21st June 1945, ETSGP, Box 34 Folder 1.

⁹⁴ S[amuel]. C. L[awrence]., 'Noteworthy Teachers', 27th September 1945, ETSGP, Box 34 Folder 1.

⁹⁵ Eleanor Glueck to Thomas J. Sheahan, 26th February 1946, ETSGP, Box 34 Folder 1.

⁹⁶ McGrath to Ralph W. Whelan, 5th October 1942, ETSGP, Box 34 Folder 1.

⁹⁷ Whelan to McGrath, 15th October 1942, ETSGP, Box 34 Folder 1.

⁹⁸ G[eorge] F. [McGrath], 'School History of Parochial School Boys', 6th January 1943, ETSGP, Box 34 Folder 1.

an opportunity to share their experience in the problems of youth, others were evidently more wary of interest in their juvenile charges.

The competing interests of researchers, officials and cases were also reflected in the collection, exchange and control of information and findings. A willingness to share insights and discoveries was necessary to secure and maintain cooperation but might also threaten confidence in the study. Beginning in Lyman, superintendent Dubois was offered free access to any findings and particularly reports on 'anything from the boys which shows difficulties or dissatisfactions with the institution'.⁹⁹ In contrast, the Gluecks were advised to take 'great care' in working with the parole department, whose agents might act on information given in confidence and threaten the trust of subjects and their families.¹⁰⁰ McGrath later claimed that 'it was not long before word got around among the boys at the training school that we could be trusted' following assurances of confidentiality. Interviews were taken in confidence, but the expectations of other social agencies, that records on cases would be reciprocated, still prompted the sharing of second-hand information.¹⁰¹ For instance, the exchange of psychometric tests was a regular token of cooperation with Patey's Wechsler-Bellevue results provided to Lyman as well as Boston's Department of Educational Investigation and Measurement in exchange for other test scores and school records.¹⁰²

Communicating with Gould in the summer of 1940, Eleanor noted the 'splendid cooperation' of these departments in providing records for their Lyman Cases but some teachers evidently resisted the overtures of researchers. Eleanor's letter singled out a Miss Coveney, working in Boston's special classes, who was 'apparently not sure that the permission granted... applies to her'.¹⁰³ This dispute over cases in separate special classes was resolved by December but

⁹⁹ 'Memo Re. Talk With Mr. Dubois', ETSGP, Box 33 Folder 8.

¹⁰⁰ 'Diary 2/13/40', ETSGP, Box 33 Folder 7.

¹⁰¹ GFM, 'Memo To Mrs. Glueck', ETSGP, Box 31 Folder 2.

¹⁰² Eleanor Glueck to Ella Bresnehen, 23rd October 1940, ETSGP, Box 34 Folder 1; Eleanor Glueck to Bessie Pazeian 1st December 1945, Box 33 Folder 8.

¹⁰³ Eleanor Glueck to Gould, 10th May 1940, ETSGP, Box 34 Folder 1.

reflected the desire of teachers to protect their own sphere against outside researchers. Describing his visit to gather student records Lawrence reported:

Miss C[oveney] Felt they were confidential and not within the privileges granted us by the committee. When authoritatively assured that they were, she arranged to meet me by appointment then cooperatively went over the records with me for the list of such boys that I had then come across. She sat at her desk looking over the records, which she assured me would be all Greek to me alone.¹⁰⁴

This encounter reflected Coveney's assertion of her own claims to specialist expertise within the separate sphere of these special classes. While ultimately granting access, she made sure to oversee the consultation, framed by her own perspective on records she regarded as unintelligible to the visiting investigator. Agreements also had to be reached with special class teacher Louisa C. Thomas of the Lucy Stone School, with McGrath warning of a 'serious situation' if she was not consulted before accessing records.¹⁰⁵ Later instructions for the completion of school histories provided for Thomas' possible refusal, in which case 'it can be assumed that all special class children are doing poor work and this fact is all that needs to be known for coding purposes'.¹⁰⁶ The records of schools, social agencies and other organisations of provision and surveillance amongst the city's poor or troubled families provided powerful sources for criminological investigation but also set limits to be worked around for unavailable or sensitive information. In assembling the social, behavioural and educational histories of their cases, the Gluecks did not find an open field of data but, rather, had to navigate various pre-existing interests and aversions regarding information and cooperation. Information gained from the study might secure further assistance and access but, uncontrolled, might also threaten the confidence of cases. In turn, many were open to the prospect of both contributing and receiving insights into specific cases or the problem of delinquency in general. On the other hand, as in the parochial schools and special classes, some officials held claims to particular children which had to be accommodated.

¹⁰⁴ Samuel C. Lawrence to Eleanor Glueck, 13th December 1940, ETSGP, Box 34 Folder 1.

¹⁰⁵ G[eorge] F. M[cGrath], 'Procedure in Completing School History of Delinquent Boy', 15th July 1943, ETSGP, Box 31 Folder 6.

¹⁰⁶ G[eorge] F. M[cGrath], 'Directions for Completion of School History Form', 2nd February 1943, ETSGP, Box 31 Folder 6: 2.

Training schools and public schools granted access not only to records but also to staff with personal experience of the selected cases. For the Gluecks the value of these informants and their first-hand knowledge of a boy's character and behaviour was tempered by the desire to systematise and regulate their subjective responses. Forms and questionnaires were thus prepared to record and standardise these 'personality estimates'. The cottage masters, responsible for the boys residing at Lyman and Shirley were provided with a questionnaire 'intended to cover only the basic personality traits'. A series of statements or questions were given under different headings so that the words or phrases applying to a case could be underlined, while a space was left for the informant's own brief opinion. Among the items under 'posture and activity' cottage masters were asked to indicate whether a boy tired easily or seemed tireless. 'Sociability' covered a boy's engagement with peers or lack thereof while 'emotionality' asked if a boy was 'free and easy' or 'repressed'; 'adventurous', 'cautious' or 'contented'. Other sections similarly covered 'willpower', 'ethics', and 'judgement', as well a section on 'sensitivity' which asked if a boy was 'sensitive to nice things or crude in tastes' and 'roughneck or sissified'.¹⁰⁷ Providing statements to be underlined both appealed to desires for efficient, systematic responses from informants and specified the range of information desired. One typewritten response to such a form was phrased according to the terms provided above but also concluded 'I feel I know the boy as well as can be known for a boy of the above type'.¹⁰⁸ Again, the Gluecks and their researchers encountered informants eager to share their own experience or insights as well as the observations specified by the study.

Investigators in the public schools similarly moved from records to informants. Lawrence, advising other school visitors on his experience, began by pointing to the school's attendance, discharge and promotions cards which recorded school history. But he soon turned to the principal, teachers and other staff along with appropriate visiting hours, etiquette and lines of inquiry. Tact was necessary 'to interest master + teacher in our work and avoid all unnecessary annoyances to them for we will be going to them a long time and we need their help'.¹⁰⁹ The most important facts to ascertain concerned 'the beginnings of the boy's misbehaviour in

¹⁰⁷ 'General Personality Estimate', ETSGP, Box 33 Folder 3.

¹⁰⁸ '[Case No. 4] Posture:....', ETSGP, Box 33 Folder 3.

¹⁰⁹ 'Our Work With Schools', ETSGP, Box 31 Folder 6: 11.

school', especially truancy.¹¹⁰ Teachers were seen as an important source of historical information for further corroboration, while in cases with previous health concerns the school nurse could become 'a very important source of information re. boy and in follow-up cases, re. home and environment'. As well as behaviour and health histories, the teacher's interview also provided a 'size-up' of the case as well as 'intimate characteristics of & habits of pupil'.¹¹¹ Even so, sensitive information could, again, be circumscribed as a condition of cooperation. Planning the school investigation in mid-1940, Lawrence reported that 'the principal very strenuously objected to certain items and felt that other principals would likewise object'. These offending items, 'heterosexual activity', 'masturbation', and 'enuresis' were deleted but might still be noted if raised by the teacher themselves.¹¹² Evidently such observations were not considered worth jeopardising the study, especially given apparent ambivalence towards teachers' own interpretations. In his instructions for the completion of school histories, McGrath included the recording of a boy's 'outstanding problem' according to school officials but acknowledged that such opinions could not be coded for final tabulation and analysis. Meanwhile, turning to sections on reasons for 'retardation' and truancy, he noted that these were 'merely the school peoples' opinion... to be used for whatever it is worth'.¹¹³

Turning to teachers, the Gluecks' investigators and their forms drew a distinction between information which could be systematically recorded and opinion or conjecture of uncertain value. As in the training schools, a 'personality estimate' form was provided for teachers to comment on the non-delinquent cases, asking if the boy was energetic, relaxed, aggressive, tense, adventurous and so on. Teachers were to answer by 'underlining any traits which are present to a noticeable degree' or writing in an estimate, with space at the end to 'tell in a few words' about any outstanding characteristics or special problems. Following one enthusiastic teacher's long written comments under every section for case 506, early in the non-delinquent series, subsequent forms were altered removing extra space for such

¹¹⁰ G[eorge] F. M[cGrath], 'Directions for Completion of School History Form', 2nd February 1943, ETSGP, Box 31 Folder 6: 2.

¹¹¹ Lawrence, 'Public Schools – Boston Data, Obtainable Sources', June 1940, ETSGP, Box 31 Folder 6.

¹¹² 'Diary June 13 1940', ETSGP, Box 31 Folder 7. Enuresis referred to involuntary urination, primarily bed-wetting, which was considered by contemporaries to be a possible sign of troubled psychological and emotional development.

¹¹³ G[eorge] F. M[cGrath], 'Directions for Completion of School History Form', ETSGP, Box 31 Folder 6: 3.

extended answers.¹¹⁴ Meanwhile, 'general comments' at the end of roughly 200 questionnaires remaining amongst the Glueck's research materials point to a variety of teachers' responses to the study and their perspectives on the non-delinquent cases. Many, of course, left no comment at all or simply indicated that the boy was 'not a special problem'. Many framed their comments in terms of marks, completed work and classroom order, commenting on inattention, conversations with other pupils, recitations, and prospects for the remaining school year. Others pointed to conscientious and happy pupils. Numerous teachers, however, also included their own attempts to characterise, understand and explain disruptive or unusual behaviour with observations which might be of use to criminological researchers. Thus a teacher described Case 514 as 'a bundle of energy' with 'an attitude that shows poor home conditions'. They concluded that he was 'a problem boy in every room. He feels and acts as if "every man's hand was against him and his hand against every man's", to quote the Good Book'.¹¹⁵ Possibly the same teacher had also described case 506 as 'a bundle of energy', adding that he was a 'nervous type decidedly', while another pointed to case 541 as being 'not particularly likeable either as to face or character. Really a bully type. Very healthy + full of animal spirit'.¹¹⁶

The non-delinquent group still prompted teacher concerns or aversions which were reflected in the above judgements and passed on to visiting investigators. Other teachers looked to the peer group as a source of trouble as in case 529 identified as a potential problem who took 'interest in others who go against regular order'.¹¹⁷ Case 535's teacher similarly attributed his misconduct to the influence of 'potential trouble makers' who's company he preferred to that of 'better boys', while some went further in linking peer pressure to 'inadequacy' or 'inferiority complex'.¹¹⁸ Cases were not only singled out by teachers for potential misbehaviour. Along with many without comment there were those like case 617, 'a very quiet, unobtrusive boy, who causes no trouble, and calls no attention to himself in any way'.¹¹⁹ The Glueck's social investigators had conjectured that troublesome boys and incidents would be more frequently

¹¹⁴ 'Personality Estimate', ETSGP, Box 32 Folder 6, No. 506; Ibid. No. 508; Ibid. No. 513.

¹¹⁵ Ibid. No. 514.

¹¹⁶ Ibid. No. 506; Ibid. No. 541.

¹¹⁷ Ibid. No. 529.

¹¹⁸ Ibid. No. 535; Ibid. No. 693; Ibid. No. 618.

¹¹⁹ Ibid. No. 617.

remembered than good or unremarkable pupils.¹²⁰ Conversely, some teachers worried about students they viewed as unusually withdrawn. Case 522 was thus ‘almost too quiet for a boy’, who’s tenseness was apparently marked out to the teacher by a twist in his mouth.¹²¹ Some teachers adopted the language of the Glueck’s questionnaire to describe boys with a ‘shell’ around them.¹²² Commenting on boys regarded as disengaged, obnoxious or troublesome, teachers sometimes referred to perceived causes outside the school. Case 578 was thus ‘a problem more from lack of discipline at home’, while case 573’s irritating manner was excused on account of undernourishment.¹²³ In case 709 a teacher warned the investigators of a ‘sly and deceitful’ boy who’s recent behaviour ‘has been exemplary so that he may go to the movies again!’.¹²⁴ Such insights may have informed follow up investigations but did not fit with any systematic codification or treatment of data concerning the delinquents and non-delinquents. Nevertheless, teachers evidently approached the Gluecks’ researchers with a sense of their own privileged insight into the pupils they taught, their prospects, character and the likely causes of their troubles. Even concerning the non-delinquent group, teachers responding to Gluecks’ study were already making their own predictions of future personality and behaviour problems.

‘Good Boys’ and Criminals

The Gluecks and their research team secured records and opinions from school and institutional networks by fostering and enrolling shared interests in problem youth while simultaneously respecting varying spheres of authority. The negotiation of parental permission and cooperation will be examined in the next chapter when considering the home investigation. In homes, schools and institutions alike the Gluecks negotiated access, information, and authority but also the separation between their ‘good’ and ‘bad’ research subjects. Delinquent and non-delinquent youth required different strategies of investigation reflecting perceptions of the boy’s varying moral status and amenability. A poem found amongst research materials jokingly described the arduous process of matching boys from

¹²⁰ Lawrence, ‘Public Schools – Boston Data’, ETSGP, Box 31 Folder 6.

¹²¹ ‘Personality Estimate’, No. 522, ETSGP, Box 32 Folder 6.

¹²² Ibid. No. 709.

¹²³ Ibid. No. 578; Ibid. No. 573.

¹²⁴ Ibid. No. 704.

each group and how 'every criminal creature has been matched with some good little guy'.¹²⁵ But how did the boys themselves regard study? Unfortunately, their attitudes are obscure despite all of the reports, forms and interviews which surrounded them. According to one memorandum, winning the cooperation and interest of non-delinquent boys in particular was of 'paramount importance' to avoid losing cases.¹²⁶ Those who did drop out were characterised as 'extremely shy, sensitive' boys upset by the extra attention.¹²⁷ However, boys in the public schools could also raise suspicions as to the motives of researchers. McGrath thus described the need to 'supress misinformation and malicious rumor', citing one boy 'spreading a story around the neighbourhood that we were really interested in studying delinquents', selecting boys regarded as troublesome.¹²⁸ Incidentally such rumours may have been partly true. In December 1942 the Gluecks informed Principal Dacey of Timilty School that there was no reason why Dr. Moulton could not assist with 'a few difficult boys' as a sign of appreciation for the principal's 'interest and cooperation'.¹²⁹ Outwardly, however, the non-delinquent sample and their families were regularly assured that they were under study as 'good boys', wholly separate from the unseen delinquents.

Delinquent cases, sequestered in Lyman or Shirley, evidently viewed the study very differently in the training school context. A later memorandum recalled little trouble among these boys who 'considered us as somehow vaguely connected with the official administration and... were not too conscious of having rights in the matter'. Apparently this attitude was not encouraged. However, relying on reports from study personnel with scarce material from the delinquents themselves makes it difficult for historians to properly judge the extent of compliance, resistance or interest. Remarks on the humour of training school cases suggest that these boys viewed the study somewhat cynically, with the Glueck's researchers 'considered good naturedly as "bug doctors"'. Boys going for interview thus 'explained that

¹²⁵ 'The Matchmaking of Mrs. B. The Wonder Tale of the 'Project'', ETSGP, Box 31, Folder 4: 7.

¹²⁶ G[eorge] F. M[cGrath], 'Winning and Maintaining the Cooperation of the Boys', 1st April 1948, ETSGP, Box 31 Folder 2.

¹²⁷ G[eorge] F. M[cGrath], 'Maintaining the Interest of the Non-Delinquent Boys', 9th April 1948, ETSGP, Box 31 Folder 2.

¹²⁸ GFM, 'Winning and Maintaining...', ETSGP, Box 31 Folder 2.

¹²⁹ Sheldon Glueck to John Dacey, 22nd December 1942, ETSGP, Box 34 Folder 1.

they were going to be “bugged” (their sanity was going to be tested).¹³⁰ Institutional populations of young offenders, often with prior records and already known to other officials contacted by the Gluecks, likely encountered the criminological researchers as part of the wider networks seeking to supervise and interpret their behaviour. ‘Bugging’ the delinquents and, conversely, winning over the ‘good’ boys, these two samples encountered the study quite differently.

The split between delinquent and non-delinquent boys and the potential difficulties of maintaining cooperation was most clearly displayed in an early controversy surrounding the photographing of boys for study. As part of the somatic phase of study, photographs of each case were taken as a convenient and objective record for later anthropometric measurement and classification into ‘somatotypes’ of bodily morphology. For this purpose, inquiries to physical anthropologist Earnest Hooton had led them to Dr. William Sheldon (1898-1977) who saw the study as an opportunity to demonstrate the connections between mind and body. A 1940 article for *Time Magazine* described how, while completing his PhD in psychology, Sheldon had collected over 4000 nude photographs for measurement, becoming convinced of the whole body’s role in determining personality.¹³¹ Bodies (or rather their photographs) were rated on a seven point scale for ‘endomorph’, referring to ‘the soft fatty element’, ‘mesomorph’, referring to ‘the hard, strong, muscular element’, and ‘ectomorph’, referring to the ‘relative predominance of the skin’ in thin, lanky bodies.¹³² The inclusion of photography and somatotyping in the Glueck study reflected a wider contemporary enthusiasm for capturing and comparing bodies and personalities. Indeed, anthropologists Ernest Hooton and Carl Seltzer, respectively consulted and employed by the Gluecks, were concurrently involved in a Harvard study to photograph and classify ‘normal’ American graduates.¹³³ Standardised photographs appealed to these researchers as a stable series of data for objective communication and comparison, reflecting a longer history of

¹³⁰ GFM, ‘Winning and Maintaining...’. ETSGP, Box 31 Folder 2.

¹³¹ ‘Judging Mind By Body’, *Time* XXXVI (3), 15th July 1940: 52-53.

¹³² ‘Definitions’, ETSGP, Box 32 Folder 2.

¹³³ Anna G. Creadick, *Perfectly Average: The Pursuit of Normality in Postwar America* (University of Massachusetts Press: Boston, MA: 2010): 42-65.

photography's combined experimental, 'museological' (archival), and teaching functions.¹³⁴ Yet the circumstances of photographic procedure also served to further demarcate delinquent from non-delinquent. Historians such as Allan Sekula and Georges Didi-Hubermann critically note the role of photography and archival practices in constructing such typologies, 'crystalizing' the case into 'a tableau in which the type was condensed in a unique image, or in an unequivocal series of images'.¹³⁵ Most saliently, in the Glueck study, photography echoed the by now well-known procedures of criminal arrest and identification while, in turn, the subjecting of innocent non-delinquents to exposure and photographic capture roused protests in defence of children's modesty.¹³⁶

In 1940 photography briefly threatened the entire study. Planning public school work with Superintendent Gould, the Gluecks noted a 'misunderstanding' over the taking of nude 'posture pictures' at the end of May. This, the Gluecks assumed, did not concern their scientific value but rather the disapproval of parents and guardians.¹³⁷ As these discussions continued, however, controversy erupted the following month with the publication of a *Boston Post* article: 'Can't Photo Children in Nude Poses, School Board Denies Professor Glueck's Request'. The Gluecks, it was alleged, had made scandalous proposals to pose and photograph mixed groups of boys and girls together in classrooms, arguing that 'such exposure in this "modern world" could no longer be considered immodest'. Sponsors of the Massachusetts Child Council thought to be backing the study were also listed and implicated in the smear.¹³⁸ Reacting to the story, Sheldon Glueck wrote to editor Edward Dunn, accusing him of 'a breach of etiquette and in the second place a serious misstatement', refuting various details including the alleged inclusion of girls in the study.¹³⁹ The Gluecks wrote to others, describing the 'outrageous news

¹³⁴ Georges Didi-Hubermann (trans. Alisa Hartz), *Invention of Hysteria: Charcot and the Photographic Iconography of the Salpêtrière* (MIT Press: Cambridge, MA: 2003): 29-66; See also Andreas-Holger Maehle, 'The Search for Objective Communication: Medical Photography in the Nineteenth Century', in Mazzolini, Renato G. (ed.), *Non-Verbal Communication in Science Prior to 1900* (Leo S. Olschki: Firenze: 1993): 563-586.

¹³⁵ Didi-Hubermann, *Invention of Hysteria*: 48; Allan Sekula, 'The Body and the Archive', *October* (1986): 3-64.

¹³⁶ Jonathan Finn, *Capturing the Criminal Image: From Mug Shot to Surveillance Society* (University of Minnesota Press: Minneapolis, MN: 2009): 1-30; See also Beth Linker, 'Tracing Paper, The Posture Sciences, and the Mapping of the Female Body', in Bittel, Leong and Von Oertzen, *Working with Paper*: 124-139 on the negotiation of modesty in posture pictures.

¹³⁷ Eleanor Glueck to Gould, 28th May 1940, ETSGP, Box 34 Folder 1.

¹³⁸ 'Can't Photo Children in Nude Poses', *Boston Post*, 21st June 1940: 10.

¹³⁹ Sheldon Glueck to Edward Dunn, 1st July 1940, ETSGP, Box 34 Folder 1.

story' as a 'vicious design' to discredit their scientific undertaking. In fact, the story reflected real disagreements with Gould.¹⁴⁰ In late July Gould wrote to Eleanor, 'I, of course, would not allow myself to be associated in any way with this type of procedure'. Here he was explicit in his objection to the photographs, noting that 'their use in the study of the problem of delinquents is not apparent and the danger of spoiling an otherwise worthwhile study is considerable'.¹⁴¹ Having risked a breach with Gould and the public schools, the anthropometric photographs were eventually salvaged by a compromise in September. It was agreed that, following appropriate parental permissions, non-delinquent boys in the public schools could be photographed wearing trunks, despite William Sheldon's protests that 'much of scientific value would be lost by this procedure'.¹⁴²

Even following Gould's approval, these revealing photographs still caused problems amongst boys who were 'particularly sensitive about appearing in shorts in the presence of other boys'.¹⁴³ Arrangements were made for private rooms while schedules accounted for the separate photography of any cases with physical disabilities or abnormalities to avoid embarrassment.¹⁴⁴ Recalling one instance of agitation where a group of boys refused to undress, it was deemed generally preferable to take non-delinquent cases individually. Conversely, to overcome the pupils' objections, the physical examination and photograph were presented as an attempt 'to find any handicaps which may interfere with their ambitions', particularly stressing 'the matter of muscular development and growth' with which boys were thought to be most concerned.¹⁴⁵ Once again, attempts to persuade and accommodate non-delinquent cases were in contrast to the routine procedures delinquents experienced in the training schools. Given the controversy which surrounded photographs of school children, it is particularly notable that photographs of juvenile delinquents did not provoke similar objections. The compromise on trunks would not be reached until almost a year after preliminary examinations had begun at Lyman which apparently proceeded without incident. A later memorandum described how delinquent cases selected from Lyman were

¹⁴⁰ Eleanor Glueck to Herbert Parsons, 18th July 1940, ETSGP, Box 34 Folder 1.

¹⁴¹ Gould to Eleanor Glueck, 26th July 1940, ETSGP, Box 34 Folder 1.

¹⁴² Eleanor Glueck to Gould, 30th September 1940, ETSGP, Box 34 Folder 1.

¹⁴³ GFM, 'Winning and Maintaining...', ETSGP, Box 31 Folder 2.

¹⁴⁴ GFM, 'Maintaining the Interest of the Non-Delinquent Boys', ETSGP, Box 31 Folder 2.

¹⁴⁵ 'Procedures in Psychiatric Examination', 27th May 1943, ETSGP, Box 33 Folder 3.

taken in groups of 12 to the hospital basement where each boy 'fully undressed' for their medical examination and physique photograph.¹⁴⁶ The acceptance of juvenile nakedness in these institutions may have reflected their isolation, apathy or disciplinary practices. Describing his visit to Shirley in 1969, Jerome G. Miller, then Commissioner of Massachusetts Youth Services, would later recall the haunting discovery of solitary confinement and a 16-year-old 'nude in the darkness of his own tomb'.¹⁴⁷ While we can only speculate on such practices during Glueck's study 30 years earlier, the physique photographs nevertheless drew a line between the privacy of non-delinquents and the nakedness of their institutional counterparts.

Conclusions

In controlling their samples for scientific comparison, the Gluecks were also demarcating lines of suspicion that would underlie the following phases of study. Negotiating access to juvenile subjects for study, they settled on institutional populations as a convenient, isolated sample of 'serious' offenders, likely familiar with such inquiries. Access to children in the public schools, meanwhile, required tact and the ongoing maintenance of cooperation. Perhaps the most consequential decision made in planning the study, however, was the incorporation of the 'delinquency area' to organise case selection. Rather than controlling this sociological concept, the common assumption of cases' disadvantaged backgrounds would recur in social and psychiatric phases of investigation. The delinquency area was not controlled but, rather, targeted. A quote from Shaw's original study is particularly salient here:

The study of such a problem of juvenile delinquency necessarily begins with a study of its geographic location. This first step reveals the areas in which delinquency occurs most frequently, and therefore marks off the communities which should be studied intensively for factors related to delinquent behaviour.¹⁴⁸

The Gluecks followed just this plan of research, promising greater predictive discernment within an agreed area of particular risk. Indeed, these urban spaces had been under suspicion long before the Gluecks arrived. They and their staff were here met by ready-made

¹⁴⁶ 'Memorandum to Mrs. Glueck from G.F.M. Re. Procedures Employed in Arranging for the Study of Delinquents and Non-Delinquents', 1st April 1948, ETSGP, Box 31 Folder 2.

¹⁴⁷ Miller, *Last One Over the Wall*: 65.

¹⁴⁸ Shaw, *Delinquency Areas*: 10.

apparatuses of public and private surveillance. Their investigators entered a crowded field of interests and suspicions regarding youth individually or in general to be variously flattered, recorded or discarded. In this way the Gluecks integrated themselves into well-established networks of information sharing and supervision of marginal children and their families. The study, thus planned, set up an encounter between criminological researchers and the urban poor, an encounter that would be reflected in the tables of prediction this study produced.

Chapter 5: Unravelling Prediction

The decade-long study that produced *Unraveling Juvenile Delinquency* was structured as a massive system of data gathering and aggregation with the Gluecks at the top. Managing a large staff with diverse research interests and methodologies, their regulation of information gathering through forms, code sheets and, once again, punch cards aimed at bringing sources, perspectives and facts into coherence, forming the eventual uniform dataset of 402 comparable factors. Researchers, and the varying conclusions they might reach, were controlled by these recording practices but also by prohibitions on sharing results. As described in *Unraveling*:

no investigator was to have access to the findings of the other areas of the research... The internal consistency and validity of the findings, derived from a wide variety of sources and by several independent and divergent techniques, could then be determined by checking each set of data against the others and extracting the corroborative elements.¹

The decision to 'insulate' the various phases of study was strategic as well as methodological. The Gluecks were 'certain' of this approach at the outset of research in 1939.² On one hand their insistence on separation allowed them to retain control over the full dataset and the conclusions or connections that could be drawn from it. On the other hand, scientific appeals to validity through 'insulation' were also used to manage disagreement and particular researchers. As will also be seen, information could still be readily shared when the Gluecks felt it served their research plans. This structuring of the study reflected the Gluecks' outlook as eclectic criminologists, viewing various other disciplines as fields of potentially useful data. the Gluecks hoped to extract understanding and predictive utility from individually inadequate or biased perspectives, combining and transforming them into a mass of aggregated, quantitative, information.

The Gluecks' techniques of organising people and information connect to broader historiographies of earlier managerial and state control. JoAnne Yates described the rise of

¹ Glueck and Glueck, *Unraveling*: 17.

² Memorandum, 17th November 1939, ETSGP, Box 31 Folder 2.

‘control through communication’, ‘over employees (both workers and other managers), processes, and flows of materials’, in turn-of-the-century American management.³ Hierarchies of information gathering and interpretation have also been connected to conceptions of mechanical ‘neutrality’ in corporate and government bureaucracy.⁴ The Gluecks similarly desired, through forms and cards, a neutral body of ‘objective’, commensurable facts, even as they managed those who worked to produce these facts. At the same time these organisational techniques served to control and condense the myriad lives under study. These processes of managing personal information echo those described by Bouk in the creation by insurance companies of ‘paper people’ or ‘statistical individuals’.⁵ The resulting forms and figures may have implied a more stable existence, however, through such processes individuals and their information, in fact, became subject to change, transformation and manipulation. I also draw on Ericson and Haggerty’s analysis of modern ‘surveillant assemblages’ which has similarly attempted to chart our dislocated and ambiguous but ultimately instrumentalised existence as ‘data doubles’ across various bureaucracies:

While such data doubles ostensibly refer back to particular individuals, they transcend a purely representational idiom. Rather than being accurate or inaccurate portrayals of real individuals, they are a form of pragmatics: differentiated according to how useful they are in allowing institutions to make discriminations among populations.⁶

The 500 delinquents and 500 non-delinquents, presented in *Unraveling* as collections of factors, were likewise disaggregated and recombined for various discriminatory and predictive purposes.

To create such beings of ‘pure information’ required extensive effort. In charting these efforts here I have two principal aims. One is to historicise. Modern crime prediction, as described in the introduction, is closely connected with technologies, software, algorithms, databases, and so on which are purportedly made possible by computational power. Drawing on Jon Agar I instead point to organisational and informational structures in criminology which preceded

³ JoAnne Yates, *Control Through Communication: The Rise of System in American Management* (Johns Hopkins University Press: Baltimore, MD: 1989): xvi.

⁴ Agar, *The Government Machine*: 63-65.

⁵ Bouk, *How Our Days Became Numbered*: 55-88.

⁶ Ericson and Haggerty, ‘The Surveillant Assemblage’: 614.

electronic computers. Agar's work has explored the nineteenth-century 'civil service, cast as a general-purpose universal machine' as well as 'the important relationship between routinization of scientific work prior to computerization and the development of computerization'.⁷ Adopting this perspective is not to Whiggishly equate past and present criminology or imply a deterministic trajectory of technology but rather to place computerised crime prediction in its proper relation to prior factorisation and quantification as seen in the Gluecks' prediction tables. Indeed, this can serve as an antidote to the assumed newness and technical sophistication of modern crime prediction software while also pointing to the concealed biases, judgements and decisions which inevitably underlie these tools and datasets.

My second aim is deconstruction. Edler Duarte, discussing modern prediction software, notes the capacity of statisticians and crime mappers to 'present crime predictions as eminently technical and politically agnostic'.⁸ By looking backwards from finished tables to the circumstances of their creation we can, in Edler Duarte's words, 'uninvent' or, in the Gluecks', 'unravel' crime prediction. This will involve tracing the construction of the 'data' which underlay the final prediction tables. Here I draw on Latour's notion of 'inscription,' proceeding semiotically and materially from nature through successive abstractions to knowledge and ultimately 'facts'. In Latour's definition inscription refers to 'all the types of transformations through which an entity becomes materialized into a sign, an archive, a document, a piece of paper, a trace'.⁹ In the Gluecks' case I will be following the informants, interviews, forms, punch cards and tables used to make facts about juvenile delinquency and future crime. In doing so I will also recover the negotiations, compromises, disputes and ambiguities that underlay the 'stable' figures presented in *Unraveling*. Indeed, one purpose of these final inscriptions was to efface the contingencies and uncertainties beneath them. As Latour and Woolgar note, 'once the end product, an inscription is available, all the intermediary steps which made its production possible are forgotten'.¹⁰ Continuing the examination begun in the

⁷ Agar, *The Government Machine*: 3; Jon Agar, 'What Difference Did Computers Make?', *Social Studies of Science*, Vol. 36 (6) (2006): 870.

⁸ Edler Duarte, 'The Making of Crime Predictions': 202.

⁹ Latour, *Pandora's Hope*: 306.

¹⁰ Latour and Woolgar, *Laboratory Life*: 63.

previous chapter, we will therefore have to open the ‘black box’ of the Gluecks’ research to uncover and understand the messy construction of technical, supposedly neutral prediction tables.

In this chapter I will ‘unravel’ prediction by examining three points of information gathering: the home visit, the psychiatric interview and the Rorschach test. From these sources the Gluecks’ staff gathered and synthesised the data which would form the basis of social, psychiatric and Rorschach prediction tables. For reasons of scope I will not be examining all of the eclectic subjects of *Unraveling*. Other phases of the study examined the bodies, health, intelligence and wider background of the juveniles, however, these were not put to any predictive use, being deemed irrelevant, unreliable or impractical at the early ages for which prediction was planned.¹¹ Records of boys’ families, homes, personalities and responses to interviewers or testers will be examined along with the negotiations that preceded them and the codification that followed. I will then turn to the enumeration of these records which brought factors into coherence and allowed their re-combination in new prediction tables.

Negotiating the Home

As discussed in the previous chapter, the selection of cases from ‘delinquency areas’ of Boston set the stage for an encounter between researchers and the urban poor. The Gluecks’ social investigators proceeded from correctional institutions and public schools into homes to draw out pertinent data and judge a family’s emotional and moral situation. In this they followed decades of attempts by American researchers to capture social ‘reality’. As Lemov notes, desires for ‘raw data’ led researchers to make contact with, but also objectify, their marginal subjects. Interwar social science thus ‘started out seeking intimate personal contact with the poor, the suffering masses, and the dispossessed but ended in putting people at a distance as mere human material’, a process that was replicated in the Gluecks’ codification of poor homes and families.¹² Conversely, as Schneider notes, the poor of Boston were themselves, through decades of contact with reforming agencies, frequently aware of the uncertainty, and

¹¹ Glueck and Glueck, *Unraveling*: 258-259.

¹² Lemov, *World as Laboratory*: 66.

implicit negotiations attending any formal visit to the home. Accompanying interference, inspections, and moral expectations meant that 'an appeal to the social welfare network', Schneider argues, 'was an index of a person's desperation'.¹³ To counter suspicion, the Gluecks' social investigators prepared to exploit their ambiguous relations to public authorities, expert status, and any offer of information or assistance to get into homes and secure parental confidence.

Contact with homes and parents began with the selection of cases and negotiation of parental permission for inclusion in the study. For public-school children this permission had been required as one of the conditions set by the Boston School Committee. A draft permission slip of May 1940 briefly described a 'special opportunity... to find out about the health, development and ambitions of boys in Grade VII'.¹⁴ A later permission letter went into more detail describing 'the Harvard Study's' comparison of 'good boys' and others who had been in the courts. After briefly setting out the required physical examination, 'posture picture', and talk about 'interests and activities', the letter reiterated that 'every parent who gives permission for his boy to be studied is helping in the effort to learn more about good boys which in turn helps all of us to raise more of them'.¹⁵ Non-delinquent cases, the Gluecks reassured parents, were 'good' and, implicitly, not under any suspicion, however, further persuasion was frequently required. In finalising the first 100 non-delinquent cases to be studied in Blackstone School, 191 separate home visits were made by social investigators to explain and advertise the study.¹⁶ The difficulties of persuading parents without anything to offer prompted the decision to make brief reports available on their boys.¹⁷ Another memo remarked that 'this promise of giving them something in return for their cooperation [was] almost necessary to get them to agree', with a third of parents receiving such reports after the first 100 cases.¹⁸ In these the Gluecks and their staff were at pains to avoid 'strong statements that might arouse parents'. Instructions thus suggested limiting reports largely to test results,

¹³ Schneider, *In the Web of Class*: 9.

¹⁴ 'William Blackstone School', 29th May 1940, ETSGP, Box 34 Folder 1.

¹⁵ from Principal Sheahan, 4th February 1946, ETSGP, Box 31 Folder 2.

¹⁶ G[eorge] F. M[cGrath], 'Statistical Report Regarding the Selection of the First 100 Non-Delinquents and the Securing of Parental Permissions', 15th January, 1941, ETSGP, Box 31 Folder 3.

¹⁷ G[eorge] F. M[cGrath], 'Obtaining Parental Permissions From the Parents of Non-Delinquents', 1st April 1948, ETSGP, Box 31 Folder 2.

¹⁸ 'Promises Made to Parents of Non-Delinquent Parents When Obtaining Permissions', ETSGP, Box 31 Folder 2.

special abilities and general estimates of physical health while negative language and especially references to underweight boys were to be avoided. 'This report', the suggestions noted, 'is our final contact with the parents and we must be careful of reporting in such a way as not to have them again get in touch with us for a further explanation or controversy'.¹⁹

As in schools and institutions, cooperation was tied to the exchange but also control of information in response to the interests and aversions of parents toward outside investigators. Early suggestions for this phase of study had indicated the need to 'make the parents see that the additional attention which a boy will get by being included in our special study group will be to his and the family's advantage particularly of course on the medical side'.²⁰ As well as securing permission slips for the inclusion of non-delinquents, all cases required at least one parent interview. Beginning these visits to the homes of Lyman cases in late 1939, the boy's health history was noted as the easiest starting point for an interview while conversely inquiries about school or family histories aroused suspicion.²¹ In both securing permission and conducting interviews, medical inquiries were used to assure parents of the value of their cooperation while simultaneously shielding more sensitive lines of inquiry. Before even entering the home, however, investigators encountered resistance. After the commencement of preliminary study at Lyman, Lawrence had conducted the first home visit for case 3 where he was immediately confronted by a father who refused admittance, instead asking training school officials whether the study was compulsory.²² It is not clear if or how this dispute was resolved. A later memorandum claimed that social investigators encountered only one outright refusal, from a mother shouting down to the visitor and whose 'manner of speaking and... choice of words made it quite clear, that further work with her would be fruitless'.²³ Elsewhere, social investigator Ava Burrows referred to other difficulties connected to some home visits including the absence of a 'satisfactory informant' with a few 'hostile or suspicious' while others were referenced for 'personality' or drunkenness alongside other 'delicate' or 'difficult' situations.²⁴ Meanwhile a selection of 'incidents' reported by Burrows

¹⁹ 'Suggestions on Reports to be Made to Parents of Non-Dels', 3rd September 1941, ETSGP, Box 31 Folder 2.

²⁰ 'Diary 10/31/39', ETSGP, Box 31 Folder 6.

²¹ Memorandum, 17th November 1939, ETSGP, Box 31 Folder 6.

²² Memorandum, 2nd November 1939, ETSGP, Box 31 Folder 6.

²³ 'Method of the Social Investigation', 17th December 1946, ETSGP, Box 31 Folder 6.

²⁴ Mrs. Burrows, 'Difficulties', ETSGP, Box 31 Folder 6.

apparently referred more to dysfunctional home conditions than lack of cooperation. Visiting the home of Case 570 she reported arriving 'in the middle of one of the regular family rows' after which she noted the father's eating habits 'taking up the bones in his hand and eating the meat off while talking'. An argument between other parents apparently reflected incredulity towards researcher's interest in their son, with the father asking 'what the hell is she going to do take him to Harvard?'. Other such 'incidents' referred to a young sibling 'half dressed and dirty' while, in the home of case 637, Burrows drew attention to the mother's apparent lack of concern for a cockroach.²⁵

The 'difficulties' and 'incidents' associated by social investigators with the home visit combined parental wariness, reticence or hostility with the investigators' own judgements of hygienic, moral and emotional conditions amongst the urban poor. Such judgements were, moreover, embedded in the codified factors from which prediction tables would be constructed. Definitions provided for the coding of social history factors referred to the furnishings of the home ranging from 'bare necessities only' to 'tastefully decorated home', 'showing evidence of planning and a love of beauty'.²⁶ Other items set out 'evidence of cultural refinement' and 'self-respect of family', reflecting 'pride in occup[ation], in family name, in high opinion of friends and neighbours about them; or strong wish not to be dependent on others'.²⁷ Drawing on definitions from previous work in *One Thousand Juvenile Delinquents*, parents' behaviour were again judged in terms of 'good', 'fair' or 'poor' affection for the boy in question as well as 'overstrict', 'lax', 'erratic' or 'firm but kindly discipline'. Factors of discipline and affection would both ultimately feature in the social prediction table alongside 'cohesiveness of family group' defined as 'strong "we-feeling", cooperativeness, group interests, pride in the home, affection for each other, "all for one and one for all"'. Conversely an 'unintegrated' family was one in which 'home is just a place to "hang your hat"; self interest of the members exceeds group interest'.²⁸ The eventual quantification of these predictive factors would obscure their dependency upon qualitative judgements made by social investigators as to the dereliction and dysfunction of marginal homes they visited within the

²⁵ Mrs. Burrows, 'Incidents', ETSGP, Box 31 Folder 6.

²⁶ 'Social History Definitions – Code Index', September 1940, ETSGP, Box 31 Folder 7: 15.

²⁷ Ibid. 21.

²⁸ Ibid. 24-25.

‘delinquency areas’ marked out for study. The difficulty of securing parental cooperation was also presumed to be linked to their poverty or foreignness with McGrath noting that:

The families we were dealing with were in the lowest socio-economic level, many of the parents being foreign born. It is often difficult to convince such people of the value of research in human behaviour. They have a frequent fearful reaction to what they think might be exploitation or that we are making a ‘guinea pig’ out of their boy.²⁹

Similar frustrations were cited with regard to parents’ responses to questioning. Burrows reported that ‘many parents aren’t articulate enough to answer questions and too much interpretation on workers part conditions answers – Many of the foreign born go on and on using only the word “nice” to sum up the whole boy’.³⁰ Judgement of home conditions was thus joined by uncertainty towards parents and the information they provided, doubts supposedly confirmed by their class, foreignness, or wariness of investigators.

Entering the homes of delinquents and non-delinquents, social investigators developed strategies to secure cooperation and counter this perceived aversion, ignorance or unreliability. Upon entering the home, McGrath stressed the importance of ‘sincerity and interest in their boy’, offering mothers a frank and truthful introduction and explanation after reassuring them that their son was not in any further trouble.³¹ Another social investigator, Herbert Adelberg, offered a more cynical description, comparing his work with that of a door-to-door salesman. His ‘negative approach’, used for the parents of delinquents, instead played on uncertainty:

At this point the parent does not know if you are from the school, a parole officer or in what capacity... It sort of keeps them guessing for a while. Very often the reply is “what has he done now”, and this occurs while you are being ushered into the house. At this point I usually answered “nothing that I know of, we are making a study of the boys who have been at the State Training Schools, and you being a mother would certainly be anxious to help any child”.³²

²⁹ G[eorge] F. M[cGrath], ‘Memo – Obtaining Permissions from the Parents of Non-Delinquents’, 1st April 1948, ETSGP, Box 31 Folder 2.

³⁰ ‘Memo to Mrs. Burrows’, ETSGP, Box 31 Folder 6.

³¹ G[eorge] F. M[cGrath] ‘Procedure in Obtaining Family Interview for Social Investigation’, 7th June 1946, ETSGP, Box 31 Folder 6: 2.

³² Herbert Adelberg to Mrs. Bower, 2nd February 1947, ETSGP, Box 31 Folder 6.

Anxiety as to the visitor's purpose and the expectation of other officials or social workers, was combined with a sentimental appeal to motherly interest, often 'pinning' it to their own delinquent child. By contrast Adelberg proposed a 'positive approach' to non-delinquent families who were already aware of the study and 'had a certain amount of pride that their boy was picked'. Subsequently in 'setting the stage of the interview' with a parent, McGrath would 'let them do the talking', taking care to avoid notetaking since 'parents are much more cautious about what they say if they see you writing it down'. In light of this suspicion, the health history evidently became central to more covert information gathering. McGrath clearly distinguished his earlier informal conversation with the parent from the later recording of a boy's health history in which medical details could be acceptably written down. At the same time, however, this medical history could shield tangential inquiries into family history and other more sensitive topics. He thus reported that, in taking the medical history, he had 'been able to obtain information on the education, economic status, delinquency, alcoholism, mental retardation, and vital statistics facts of relatives of the boys in addition to the health facts'.³³ Adelberg similarly noted the openness of parents to medical questioning, apparently wondering 'if some illness or bump on the head could be the excuse for the boy's behaviour'. Meanwhile he pointed to a common 'guilt feeling which they wish to be relieved of' which might lead to details of family history and relatives or other 'pertinent information'.

Adelberg, in setting out his interview process, reiterated social investigators' suspicion and scrutiny towards the parents of delinquents in particular, which he again linked to 'guilt, rejection, their own failure and fears'. For him it was 'just as important to know why they are telling untruths as it is to know that they are'.³⁴ Though less analytic in his approach, McGrath similarly cast suspicion on the answers given by parents. Unreliability in the interview was to be countered by official records, drawing on aforementioned files from courts, institutions and social agencies to construct a small card covering a family's relevant criminal records, employment history, associates or other information. McGrath further advised that this card could be attached to the health history sheet for reference during the interview so as 'to talk

³³ GFM, 'Procedure in Obtaining Family Interview, ETSGP, Box 31 Folder 6: 2-3.

³⁴ Adelberg to Bower, 2nd February 1947, ETSGP, Box 31 Folder 6.

intelligently with the family and not be misled on important particulars'.³⁵ Again, the health history provided a means of covert inquiry and scrutiny into the statements of parents. In light of these strategies it is particularly notable that, in their final analysis, the Gluecks found no medical differences between their samples, concluding that 'the view that delinquents are in poorer health than non-delinquents receives no support'.³⁶ Gathering medical information did not provide any conclusions for understanding delinquency but, nonetheless had an important function in maintaining the confidence of families in the study while investigators probed for information of real interest.

In their encounters, the Gluecks' social investigators strategized around the presumed interests and inconsistency of parents as informants while concealing other inquiries or judgements required by the study. Adelberg thus summarised:

To accept the impressions of the parent is not accurate. To observe the little things she says is often very important. Most parents are truthful, some are evasive, very few are disinterested. Many lack understanding, more have hope for the future of the boy. The majority feel the boy is really a good boy.³⁷

It is, unfortunately, difficult for historians to evaluate the attitude of parents unmediated by social investigators' accounts. From these visitors' perspectives, parents were viewed with a varying mix of pity, aversion, suspicion but also interest in the facts they might reveal. Parents remained just one source of information to be corroborated and combined with many others, however, in the encounter between social investigators and the families of the 'delinquency area', we can see the implicit evaluations behind the records which subsequently standardised and quantified this information. Social 'data' was preceded by personal judgement in the tense negotiation and interrogation of family members and the places they lived.

Encoding Interviews

As in the Judge Baker Foundation study, described in chapter 3, the psychiatric phase of *Unraveling* presented similar tensions between diagnostic judgement and the Gluecks' desires

³⁵ GFM, 'Procedure in Obtaining Family Interview', ETSGP, Box 31 Folder 6: 1.

³⁶ Glueck and Glueck, *Unravelling*: 181.

³⁷ Adelberg to Bower, 2nd February 1947, ETSGP, Box 31 Folder 6.

for uniformity and quantification. Now with greater control over the information to be gathered, the Gluecks outlined two broad types of psychiatric inquiry in their plans: on one hand psychiatric interviews offered an overview of personality and another source of detail on a case's history to be corroborated or contrasted with other informants. On the other hand, the Gluecks sought systematic and objective procedures or tests by which to efficiently and reliably extract hidden personality traits. Writing to Bernard Glueck for advice in October 1939, Eleanor pointed to problems of scope and method accompanying the psychiatric phase of study. Lyman authorities had already prohibited excessive 'probing' of cases and apparently 'would have shunned a psychoanalytic psychiatrist', prompting a search for other means of in-depth examination. At the same time she noted the dependence of any psychiatrist on relevant social and historical detail but wanted 'to reduce to a minimum his drawing of interpretations from such other data'.³⁸ While Bernard pointed to the importance of the subject's 'spontaneous, unprovoked, natural expression of subjective elements', Eleanor worried about 'how to systematize the gathering and analysis of such data'.³⁹ For the Gluecks, consideration of the dynamic subject was ideally to be tempered by systematic procedures of data collection. Some procedures and tests were quickly dismissed as being of a "'so what?' nature".⁴⁰ Indeed, the Gluecks soon concluded that 'we cannot place much reliance on so-called "personality tests"; and that we must base our psychiatric studies of these children largely on guided interviews with them by a competent psychiatrist'.⁴¹ Conceding the personal insights and expertise of the psychiatrist, the Gluecks thus arranged for interviews conducted by Bryant E. Moulton, in addition to the Rorschach test to be discussed later.

As in other phases, the psychiatric interview approached delinquent and non-delinquent on different terms. A description of psychiatric procedures in May 1943 thus pointed to delinquents' acceptance of the interview 'as part of the school routine', beginning with a direct approach to known criminal activities with the aim of uncovering other misbehaviour. Confidence that such information would not be shared with other authorities was of

³⁸ Eleanor Glueck to Bernard Glueck, 3rd October 1939, ETSGP, Box 33 Folder 3.

³⁹ Bernard Glueck to Eleanor Glueck, 5th October 1939; Eleanor Glueck to Bernard Glueck, 9th October 1939, ETSGP, Box 33 Folder 3.

⁴⁰ 'III. Psychological ('Personality') Tests', 18th October 1939, ETSGP, Box 32 Folder 5.

⁴¹ Eleanor Glueck to Ernest Schachtel, 20th October 1939, ETSGP, Box 33 Folder 1.

paramount importance while attempts were made 'immediately to show them that they do not know the real causes' of their past actions. Interviewers thus attempted to foster delinquent interest in the interview as an opportunity for understanding and justification. Meanwhile, public school boys were approached indirectly, presenting the interview as an 'effort to determine what factors in their mental and physical make-up are likely to be assets or liabilities in looking forward toward a successful career'. Discussions of school progress and vocational ambitions thus moved onto their perspective of family attitudes, specific problems and the value of good behaviour, prompting self-comparison with other boys. Their non-delinquent status was, however, not explicitly disclosed to them for fear of putting 'real, but undetected, delinquents on the defence'. Instead, these cases were informed that some misbehaviour was expected and, like their delinquent counterparts, were assured that 'no reports are made, either to the school system or their parents which in any way concern their behavior'.

Psychiatric interviews thus depended on confidence but were consequently in tension with aforementioned interests of officials, teachers and parents in shared information. Indeed, the psychiatric interview presented the Gluecks with further opportunities to cross-check and corroborate the facts of various cases. Boys in the public schools were thus told of the study's interest in Lyman cases and 'encouraged to inquire about any of their acquaintances who have been committed and to discuss delinquent gangs in their neighbourhood'. The danger of quoting cases to each other was obviously noted but statements and stories from boys, living after all in the same 'delinquency areas', could still be covertly checked and scrutinised. The psychiatric interview thus had both a diagnostic and information gathering role. Given the brevity of interviews and wariness of unconscious probing (i.e. full psychoanalysis) without further treatment to resolve conflicts thus uncovered, interviewers' judgements of personality and parental attitudes were, especially in public school cases, 'usually a hunch'.⁴² The Gluecks later noted that the 'chief value of psychiatric [interview] is in rounding out, supplementing,

⁴² 'Procedures in Psychiatric Examination', 27th May 1943, ETSGP, Box 33 Folder 3.

confirming social investigation and giving picture of boy's conflict and conduct motivation, and also providing some data not included in other portions of the record'.⁴³

Psychiatric interviews provided yet another source of data, whereby dynamic personalities were ultimately reduced to a series of coded factors. Using different materials in the Gluecks' files we can move backwards from these factors to code sheets, proformas, and original interview notes, tracing what information was lost or modified in the process of inscription. The final coding sheet for entering interview information moved through 55 factors, each with up to 12 code numbers corresponding to the 12 spaces under each column of a punch card (Fig. 13). Factor 7 thus codified a case's regular play places ranging from their own neighbourhood (2) or home (4) to street corners (6), vacant lots (7), waterfronts (8) and playgrounds (9). Crossing over with the social investigation, this psychiatric sheet similarly codified several items concerning family relationships, including parental concern, emotional ties, discipline and family solidarity. Meanwhile, 28-29 (using two punch card columns) codified a range of misbehaviour manifestations including smoking (28-2), bunking out (28-5), truancy (28-8), auto theft, and other forms of stealing (29-1 to 29-5). Remaining sections covered the psychiatrist's judgement of stresses producing conflict, responses to conflict and items 41-43 for 'inherent personality traits' including stubbornness, extroversion, introversion, emotional stability, suggestibility, egocentricity and so on. At various points on this form, particularly when specifying or prioritising the reasons for a case's behaviour, the psychiatrist was required to provide specific judgements in writing, however, without any means of codification and punch card entry these qualitative psychiatric judgements were not carried into the final tabular analysis of *Unravelling*.⁴⁴

Turning to prior psychiatric materials we can see what nuances were lost in this process of inscription and enumeration. Psychiatric summary sheets for nine of the delinquents included in the preliminary study at Lyman remain amongst the Gluecks' research materials (Fig. 14). Many items on these forms, such as misbehaviour or psychopathology could be checked or

⁴³ 'Memorandum for Psychiatric Folder', 17th January 1947, ETSGP, Box 33 Folder 3.

⁴⁴ 'Interview With Boy', ETSGP, Box 33 Folder 3; Glueck and Glueck, *Unravelling*: 244-253.

marked with '+' or '-' symbols. Others left space for short comments but even these conveyed information that would be lost or modified in subsequent codification. Companionships were thus described as 'shifting' in one case while another was an 'individualist'.⁴⁵ One case's ambiguous attitude to paternal discipline prompted the comment 'critical but question the

Name		No.	
28-29. MISBEHAVIOR MANIFESTATIONS (Acknowledged by Boy)			
28. Truancy (8) Smoking (2) Drinking (3) Runaway from home (4) Bunking out (5) Gambling (6) Late hours (7) Stealing rides (9) Hopping trucks (9) Sneaking admissions (10) Begging (11) Destructive mischief (12)	29. Auto stealing (1) Impulsive stealing (minor (2), serious (3) Planful stealing (trivial (4), for big gain (5) Arson (6) Other (M (7), H (8), Sp (9)
30. Age misbehavior started (Boy's recollection) :			
31-32. STRESSES IN BOY'S ENVIRONMENT PRODUCING CONFLICT (Describe briefly)			
31.	36.	37.	32.
(a) Economic (1) (b) Material surroundings (2)	(f) Adults exc. pars. (6)	(g) Siblings (7)	(l) Religion (1) (p) Education (2) (s) Community responsibility (3) (t) Future prospects (4) (y) Aesthetic considerations (5)
33. (c) Health (3)	38. (h) Companions (8)	(j) Sexual identification (9)	
34. (d) Father (4)	(k) Sexual interests (10)		
35. (e) Mother (5)			
40. METHOD OF RESOLUTION OF CONFLICTS BY BOY (Keyed to STRESSES by letter)			
No significant stress (1) BY EXTRAVERSION OF AFFECT (4)	No particular trend (2) BY EXTRAVERSION OF ACTION (5)	Not determined (3) BY INTROVERSION (6)	Code
..... Sensual compensation Competitive compensation Internalized compensation	28*
..... Affective suggestibility Egoism Indecisive rationality	29*
..... Regression to instinctual levels Stubborn resistance Social withdrawal	30
			31*
			32*
			33
			34
			35
			36
			37
			38
			39
			40
			41*
			42*
			43*
41-42-43. INHERENT PERSONALITY TRAITS (Opposites indicated by —) (✓ if Contributes to dlqcy)			
41.	42.	43.	
..... Dynamic (+1, -2) Aesthetic (+1, -2) Conscientious (+1, -2)	
..... Adequate (+3, -4) Emotionally stable (+3, -4) Egocentric (+3, -4)	
..... Stubborn (+5, -6) Extraverted in feeling (+5, -6) Practical (+5, -6)	
..... Extroverted in action (+7, -8) Sensitive (+7, -8) Self critical (+7, -8)	
..... Adventurous (+9) Suggestible (+9, -10) <i>Aggressive (+9)</i>	
..... Intellectual (+10, -11) Sensuous (+11) — 12 Other (specify)	
..... Conventional (+12)			

Figure 13: Draft sheet for numerically coding factors from psychiatric interviews in preparation for punch card entry ('Interview With Boy', ETSGP, Box 33 Folder 3: 4).

⁴⁵ 'Psychiatric Report', ETSGP, Box 33 Folder 3, No. 3; Ibid. No. 4.

dyplasia 9?

Name: _____ (reverse side)

	Affect	Conation	Cognition
VIII. PRIMARY ENVIRONMENTAL PRESSURE FIELDS:			
Sustaining field	2	4	5
Social interrelationships field	2	5	4
Sexual (gynandropsychic) field	3	4	4?
Ethical responsibility field	2	2	2
Aesthetic field	2	2	3
Motivational Index	2	4	5
	2	5	4

IX. STRESSES IN BOY'S ENVIRONMENT PRODUCING CONFLICT

1. Economic	9. Sexual identification
2. Material surroundings	10. Sexual interests
3. Health	11. Religion
4. Father relationship	12. Education
5. Mother relationship	13. Community responsibility
6. Adults (except parents) <i>2 vaginal und.</i>	14. Future prospects
7. Siblings	15. Aesthetic considerations
8. Companions	

X. METHOD OF RESOLUTION OF CONFLICTS BY BOY (keyed to STRESSES by number)

PREDOMINANT TRENDS OF IMPULSE		
EXTRAVERSION OF AFFECT	EXTRAVERSION OF ACTION	INTROVERSION
Sensual compensation	Competitive compensation <i>1/2</i>	Internalized compensation
Affective suggestibility	Egoism	Indecisive rationality
Regression to instinctual levels	Stubborn resistance	Social withdrawal
Other	Other	Other

4 Reaction formation
6. Identification

XI. ASSETS AND LIABILITIES OF PERSONALITY AND TEMPERAMENT OF BOY

Assets	Liabilities
<i>Intellectual interests.</i>	Defensive over-compensatory attitude
<i>Desire for social approval.</i>	<i>Poor male identification pattern.</i>
<i>Good intelligence.</i>	<i>Poor prospect for family control.</i>
	<i>General poor resolution of conflict.</i>

XII. PSYCHIATRIST'S PROGNOSIS OF BOY'S ADAPTATION

Institutional life	Good
Supervised freedom	Doubtful unless carefully planned
Regimented life	
Complete freedom	Poor

XIII. PSYCHIATRIC CLASSIFICATION

Organic condition	Constitutional Deviations (Specify)
Organic disease	General inadequacy
Epileptic condition	Viscerotonic deviation ?
Traumatic condition	Somatonic deviation
Psychoneurotic	Cerebrotonic deviation
Psychotic trends	Marked liabilities of personality
Cycloid	Adolescent instability
Schizoid	Other (specify)
Paranoid tendency - <i>very slight.</i>	
No conspicuous mental pathology	

Figure 14: Part of a draft form for summarizing psychiatric impressions, following interview ('Psychiatric Report', Case 6, ETSGP, Box 33, Folder 3: 2).

Includes spaces for numbers, symbols, short remarks and even added categories. Precedes later codification (see Fig. 13)

adequacy' while elsewhere a dislike of school was accompanied by the judgement, 'feels inferior intellectually'.⁴⁶ As has already been noted the psychiatrists written comments as to assets, liabilities, causes and prognosis were also not amenable to later codification or tabulation.

Moving back to original interview, material becomes even more scarce, with longform notes apparently surviving for only two cases in the entire series. However, they remain valuable for their insights into the responses of the boys themselves. The interview was an opportunity to elaborate on a boy's life and behaviour but judging from these notes both delinquent voices and psychiatric perspectives were obscured by later inscription into quantitative materials. Case 30's interview covered a range of personal details: his favourite movies, pride in his rank as a sea scout, his grandmother's memories of Italy and his older sister's attempts to keep him away from local gangs. Giving his own account of the offence that led him to Lyman, he claimed that a passing drunk had dropped money which his friends then pressured him to take. Answering questions on delinquency and other factors, this boy regularly offered justifications or elaborations to the interviewer. He didn't go to church but offered that it might 'help me to stay away from crowd and from thinking there was no one else in the world except I'.⁴⁷ Answering on the sexual encounters of his gang he stated that 'if girls are good all the boys would protect them. If they are not good no boy would be seen with them'.⁴⁸ Asked if he was a good fighter he responded 'I guess you have to be. Don't have to do much if you are'.⁴⁹ In the context of the interview, taking place in a reform institution and framed as a chance to explicate past misbehaviour. The responses of this case at least were frequently couched in terms of conventional morality, whether genuine or for the interviewer's benefit.

In the other surviving interview case 6 offered more cynical or humorous answers. He frankly discussed gambling, truanting and stealing along with 'dirty stories' and masturbation apparently common at the Lyman School. Asked about church, this boy responded that it

⁴⁶ Ibid. No. 3; Ibid. No. 6.

⁴⁷ '[Case 30] Interview by NCP 1940-7-23', ETSGP, Box 33 Folder 3: 2.

⁴⁸ Ibid. 7.

⁴⁹ Ibid. 4.

would 'do me some good' since 'if a store is broken and you don't go to church you are under suspicion'.⁵⁰ Elsewhere, answering questions on employment, he explained to the interviewer that 'spending money is difference between stealing and no trouble. Doesn't pay to have cops find out that you have no way of getting money'.⁵¹ Citing the boy's awareness of suspicion and reputation, the interviewer described case 6 as 'extremely anxious to stand well with gang, girls, teacher or even with examiner', but also noted that 'his pretences of toughness do not ring true'.⁵² Some misbehaviours were rounded out by personal details of school and home life. Thus, under 'bunking out', the interview notes reported:

Has several lives. Slept in hallways of tenement houses. Got into trouble at school. After school followed with gang and forgot... to go home. No supper. Then he... stayed out till about 10:00 after which he was afraid father would give him a beating so he stayed out. Got beating next day. Should have gone home.⁵³

In subsequent forms and codifications (Fig. 13 and 14) narratives of behaviour formed in the interview would be disaggregated into separate factors. School record, gang membership, discipline and running away were all to be recorded but without any necessary relationship to each other. Codification thus extracted particular facts and features from the psychiatric interview which were originally offered as part of a conversation, narrative, explanation or justification concerning a specific case. As with the boys' own perspectives, the judgements of psychiatrists, which organised the interview and its results, were lost in the subsequent recording and aggregation of factors. For instance, case 6's interviewer concluded that 'practically all issues resolve to the one of recognition', stressing the boy's concern for reputation and social acceptance as a way of synthesising the preceding answers into an explanation of conduct.⁵⁴ Meanwhile, concluding the interview for case 30, the interviewer emphasised 'a curious admixture of noble and anti-social traits', evidenced by both conventional morality and gang loyalty, indicating the ambiguities of classification and prognosis.⁵⁵ Conversely, psychiatrists also judged what information was apparently not

⁵⁰ '[Case 6] Interview 1940-7-23', ETSGP, Box 33, Folder 3: 2.

⁵¹ Ibid. 4.

⁵² Ibid. 5.

⁵³ Ibid. 4.

⁵⁴ Ibid. 5.

⁵⁵ '[Case 30]', ETSGP, Box 33, Folder 3: 9.

pertinent as in case 30's reported 'tendency to blame all delinquencies on his lack of money – even when he has enough'.⁵⁶ Information which later appeared on standardised code sheets thus reflected the psychiatrists priorities and presumptions as well as the case's answers, all of which were originally offered, interpreted and prioritised in the exploratory or explanatory context of the interview.

Projecting Delinquency

Psychiatric interviews and the dynamic individuals they described presented opportunities for further corroboration of data as well as lingering ambiguities to be managed through successive inscription. The Gluecks' preference was evidently for the standardised, experimental objectivity they saw in the Rorschach 'ink blot' test, employed as an alternative means of probing their cases. These tests, interpreted by Rorschach analysts Ernest G. and Anna Hartoch Schachtel, impressed the Gluecks as a powerful 'instrument for diagnosis and treatment', claiming to extract hidden details of emotional life and personality.⁵⁷ Here the Gluecks followed broader contemporary interest in these 'projective' tests and their supposed ability to elicit psychological depth using routine procedures under experimental conditions. Lemov has thus pointed to these inkblot tests as part of a 'paperwork of the inner self' which fulfilled a desired need for 'penetration' not found in brief interviews or psychometric tests.⁵⁸ However, she also notes how desires for objective psychological probing met with 'the imperfections and ambiguities that arise in the search to find and extract secret information, in ever more various kinds, from various kinds of people'.⁵⁹ Having begun procedures at Lyman, Eleanor Glueck distinguished between the 'superficial level' of information retrieved in brief interviews and the more meaningful insights from Rorschach responses: 'in view of the fact that it would not be possible to have a psychiatrist spend a very great deal of time with a youngster... we cannot expect any very deep-set probing. And it is for this reason that we are relying upon the Rorschach test'.⁶⁰ The personality traits supposedly revealed by the Rorschach test were also reduced to codifications for punch card tabulation. Once again,

⁵⁶ Ibid. 10.

⁵⁷ Eleanor Glueck to Schachtel, 4th June 1945, ETSGP, Box 33 Folder 1.

⁵⁸ Lemov, *Database of Dreams*: 15-43.

⁵⁹ Ibid. 13.

⁶⁰ Eleanor Glueck to Schachtels, 8th January 1940, ETSGP, Box 33 Folder 6.

however, this process raised doubts over the reduction and disaggregation of various individual personalities into separate factors.

For this phase of study, the Gluecks collaborated with aforementioned Rorschach analysts Ernest G. and Anna Hartoch Schachtel, the former completing the work alone after Anna's death in 1944. Delinquents and non-delinquents were presented with a series of 10 plates showing a set order of monochromatic and coloured inkblot patterns (Fig. 15). An examiner then recorded their responses or remarks as well as time spent on each plate (Fig. 16). Instructions sent by the Schachtels insisted on avoiding anything which might affect the subject's unprovoked, spontaneous reaction to the unfamiliar inkblots, avoiding a tense atmosphere or leading questions. Finally, after responding to each plate, the case would be questioned by the examiner in the 'inquiry phase' to clarify uncertain or unusual responses, record the location of particular features seen in the inkblots and return to any plates which




Figure 15: Ink-blot, second plate of 10 in the Rorschach test (Hermann Rorschach (trans. Philip J. Keddy, Rita Signer, Philip Erdberg, and Arianna Schneider-Stocking), Psychodiagnostics (Hogrefe: Boston, MA: 2021 [1921])).

prompted silence or reticence.⁶¹ Having been recorded by the Gluecks' staff, these responses were sent to the Schachtels for analysis with evident personality traits subsequently codified (Fig. 17). The Schachtels, based in New York City, did not examine the cases themselves but instead received reports on Rorschach tests conducted by the Gluecks' examiners which they then analysed. As such the Rorschach phase of the study not only sought to extract inner personality but also transmit a comprehensive report for interpretation elsewhere.

Outlining these plans in October, the Schachtels clarified: 'what we are interested in above all is a verbatim record of everything the subject says and does during the test-period (including mannerisms of speech, slang, etc.) and-wherever there is occasion for doubt – an accurate description of where and how the subject has seen the things which he names in response to the ink-blots'.⁶² Verbatim records would ideally record all behaviour and




Figure 16: Record of responses to Rorschach plate II ('Notes on Recording', ETSGP, Box 33, Folder 1: 4).

Plate II can be seen in Fig. 15. Arrows indicate rotation of plate. The Schachtels provided this as a sample for future verbatim records from the Gluecks cases. Since this is the only such record, these were evidently not kept amongst the research materials for *Unraveling*.

⁶¹ 'Notes on Recording', 22nd November 1939, ETSGP, Box 33 Folder 1; 'Suggestions for Giving and Recording Rorschach Tests', 11th March 1940, ETSGP, Box 33 Folder 1.

⁶² Ernest Schachtel to Eleanor Glueck, 12th October 1939, ETSGP, Box 33 Folder 1.

Confidential

CODE

RORSCHACH ANALYSIS OF TRAITS

+	(1)	Trait is present
-	(2)	Trait is present
?	(3)	Doubtful
U	(4)	Unknown

Name:

Date:

Analyst:

No.:

BASIC ATTITUDES TO AUTHORITY
AND SOCIETY

1. Self assertion
2. Social assertion
3. Defiance
4. Destructiveness
5. Narcissistic trends
6. Submissiveness

FEELINGS OF INSECURITY, ANXIETY,
INFERIORITY, FRUSTRATION

7. General vague or tension feeling of insecurity and/or anxiety
8. Enhanced insecurity and/or anxiety
9. Not wanted or loved
10. Not taken care of
11. Not taken seriously or not counting
12. Not recognized or appreciated
13. Helplessness and powerlessness
14. Fear of failure and defeat
15. Resentment
16. Resignation
17. Masochistic trends
18. Depressive trends

KINDLINESS AND HOSTILITY

19. Average or good surface contact with others
20. Cooperation
21. Kindliness and trust
22. Difficulties in contact with others
23. Over-competitive attitude
24. Hostility
25. Suspicion
26. Isolation
27. Defensive attitude

55. DIAGNOSIS

SOME GENERAL QUALITIES
OF PERSONALITY

28. Emotional lability, impulsiveness
29. Self control
30. Compulsory trends (rigidity)
31. Extroversive trends preponderant
32. Introversive trends preponderant
33. Vivacity

INTELLIGENCE

34. Originality
35. Creativity
36. Banality
37. Power of observation
38. Realistic thinking
39. Unrealistic thinking
40. Common sense
41. Intuition
42. Phantasy
43. Over-verbalizing intelligence
44. Methodical
45. Confused, mixed up
46. Potential capacity for objective interests

DEPENDENCE AND INDEPENDENCE

47. Dependence on others
48. Stress on meeting other's expectation
49. Conventionality (in ideas, feelings, behavior)
50. Suggestibility
51. Spontaneity
52. Feeling of being able to manage his life

GOALS OF DRIVES

53. Receptive (oral) trends
54. Destructive-sadistic trends

56. PROGNOSIS

- Favorable (1)
- Favorable with qualifications (2)
- Unfavorable (3)
- Not stated (4)

COMMENTS ABOUT EFFECTIVE TREATMENT

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GLUECK RESEARCH

Figure 17: Form for codification of personality traits evident in analysis of Rorschach test responses ('Rorschach Analysis of Traits', ETSGP, Box 33, Folder 2).

responses on separate lines along with time elapsed and arrows to indicate any turning or manipulation of the plates. This separation of examiner and analyst attested to the perceived objectivity of Rorschach results and their reliable, unbiased interpretation at a distance. The Schachtels thus assured the Gluecks that “any other Rorschach expert of like training would arrive at the same interpretations to which they have come”.⁶³ By dividing this work between in-person examiners and remote analysts the Gluecks would later point to the apparent reliability of a ‘blind’ analysis in picking out delinquent cases. However, this assumed consistency depended on a comprehensive record with the Schachtels requesting ever more detailed information from their distant examiners. Writing in March 1941 on a series of unsatisfactory reports, the Schachtels insisted that, when recording a case’s responses, examiners ‘should always try to see them himself not only in outline but also with regard to color, movement, and shading, in the same way as the subject saw them’.⁶⁴ A verbatim report might be incomplete if examiners could not see properly, as the subject saw, and consequently missed details or clarifications for further inquiry. Subsequently Ernest Schachtel asked the Gluecks for examiners trained in giving and scoring Rorschach tests ‘since the records that I get very often lack data which are essential for scoring and interpreting the tests’.⁶⁵ Conversely, the effort of comprehensive reporting also prompted complaints from the examiners themselves. In April 1942 Eleanor wrote to the Schachtels on the disproportionate time and energy spent conducting and writing up the ‘inquiry’ section of an examination to clarify, explain and properly locate each response. She thus asked whether this information was ‘absolutely essential’ to which the Schachtels reiterated that ‘we have to know exactly what the subject saw and how he saw it’.⁶⁶

The time, effort and information of an examination depended on the response of each particular case. Unfortunately the detailed verbatim reports sent to the Schachtels do not remain amongst the Gluecks’ research materials, however, correspondence points to a range of both enthusiastic and resistant attitudes to the examination. Along with time spent in the

⁶³ ‘Memo for Rorschach Folder, January 1940, ETSGP, Box 33 Folder 1.

⁶⁴ Schachtel to Eleanor Glueck, 13th March 1941, ETSGP, Box 33 Folder 1.

⁶⁵ Schachtel to Eleanor Glueck, 22nd November 1945, ETSGP, Box 33 Folder 1.

⁶⁶ Eleanor Glueck to Schachtels, 23rd April 1942, ETSGP, Box 33 Folder 1; Schachtel to Eleanor Glueck, 27th April 1942, ETSGP, Box 33 Folder 1.

painstaking inquiry section, examiners pointed to 'a number of cases in which the giving of the Rorschach test is extending into several hours' with 'children who are very spontaneous and full of imagination'. As well as overburdening examiners with hours of responses, such cases might also escape school or institutional routine with the Gluecks noting that 'the authorities do not like us to take so much of the children's time'.⁶⁷ Other boys evidently approached the Rorschach test with wariness of the examination context. In a record discussed in 1949, one boy thus began examining the back of each inkblot card, looking at the examiner 'with an almost accusing, though pleasant air' before saying 'I know what you are doing'.⁶⁸ Elsewhere the Gluecks and Schachtels discussed cases who refused to provide answers. One such record without responses could not be used except for the obvious remark that this boy apparently is very resistant'.⁶⁹ In 1946, following up another case at a foster home in the hopes of more fruitful responses, examining psychologist Libbie Bower described 'a dark bedraggled looking youngster' who 'volunteered no conversation and most reluctantly held the plates'. Without any responses and with only some teeth grinding noted for two of the inkblots, Bower concluded that 'he was willful and stubborn and emotionally unresponsive'.⁷⁰

Hopes for a comprehensive, verbatim record remained in tension with the effort of examining and recording and with varying interest or hostility from the boys themselves. By not engaging with the examination these cases were understood as 'resistant', associating them with traits of delinquency picked out at the commencement of study. When setting out their expectations of delinquent attitudes and traits in October 1939, the Schachtels had begun with basic attitudes towards society and authority which they believed were most intimately connected to any transgression, regardless of content. Beginning with the child's inevitable confrontation with parental and later school authority, they proposed a distinction between healthy and directed 'self-assertion' and 'defiance', which they called 'the opposition of the weak and insecure'. Characterised by general, unspecific resistance to authority, criminal offences might thus be acts of defiance wherein 'the specific content of the offence... would be psychologically unimportant, whereas the 'abstract' defiance expressed by the offence

⁶⁷ Eleanor Glueck to Schachtel, 24th April 1941, ETSGP, Box 33 Folder 1.

⁶⁸ 'This Material Used In Unravelling Juvenile Crime – VGA 8/1/49', ETSGP, Box 33 Folder 2.

⁶⁹ 'Copy of Letter from the Schachtels – May 8, 1942', ETSGP, Box 33 Folder 1.

⁷⁰ Libbie Bower to Henry Patey, 18th January 1946, ETSGP, Box 33 Folder 1.

would be the essential feature'. In combination with destructive behaviour, these defiant acts would become increasingly associated with delinquency, in contrast to the productive expression of self-assertion.⁷¹ The Schachtels' hypothesised picture of a defiant, destructive, delinquent personality informed their approach to the Rorschach records they received but also suggested that such tests could reveal hidden delinquency. Discussing the tests in *Unravelling*, the Gluecks pointed to the separate examination and analysis of each case, in light of which they claimed it was 'significant... that the Rorschach analysts were able to distinguish delinquent from non-delinquent boys successfully on the basis of these undifferentiated protocols'. The Gluecks touted the accuracy of these 'blind' Rorschach analyses, but in doing so they seriously misrepresented both their final figures and the study which had produced them. Out of 361 delinquent and 374 non-delinquents they thus reported that 91% and 89% respectively had been correctly identified by the Schachtels, however, this high accuracy rating excluded 135 delinquents and 121 non-delinquents classified here as 'neutral'. In *Unravelling* high accuracy ratings thus required excluding roughly a quarter of those cases judged most uncertain, described as 'not sufficiently conclusive'.⁷² Furthermore, turning back to the archival record, the Gluecks' claims of a blind analysis of undifferentiated records is contradicted by available evidence.

The Gluecks' own research materials suggest that the Schachtels were, in fact, aware of which cases were or were not delinquent while the plan to differentiate these groups was shifting rather than systematic. In turn, this aspect of the Rorschach phase of study did not necessarily point to the accuracy of the Rorschach test as a projective instrument but, rather, to the Schachtels insistence on the wider context which informed any diagnosis. Early discussions of differentiating the cases were framed in terms of prognosis rather than identification of anonymous cases, offering the Rorschach as a means of predicting responses to educational, therapeutic, and institutional care. Ernest Schachtel thus noted that 'just as in any medical treatment, the prognosis depends to a great extent on the knowledge of the circumstances under which the individual is likely to live in the future and on the treatment he is going to

⁷¹ Ernest G. Schachtel, 'List of Attitudes, Trends, and Traits with Reference to the Presence or Absence of Delinquent Tendencies', October 1939, ETSGP, Box 33 Folder 1.

⁷² Glueck and Glueck, *Unravelling*: 217-218.

receive'.⁷³ Later shifting from these prognostic terms, in March 1943 Eleanor informed Ernest that she could 'already see that your comments as to whether a boy is delinquent or non-delinquent are going to be extremely valuable'.⁷⁴ His reply, however, remained couched in terms of prognosis and context: 'our estimate is the resultant of one constant, namely poor environment offering strong temptation to become delinquent, and one variable, namely the character structure of the boy'. Here he offered prognostic classifications from 'favorable' to 'unfavorable' while also setting out presumptions surrounding socio-economic context which underlay the 'delinquency area' the social investigation and now the Rorschach analysis: 'many of the boys designated as probably delinquent would not be so designated by us If we knew that they live in a privileged and sheltered environment'.⁷⁵

Having already examined and analysed hundreds of cases, attempts to differentiate boys on the basis of Rorschach tests began in 1943 ambiguously as either the identification of present delinquent status or the prognosis of future behavioural prospects. Contrary to the Gluecks' later claims, these cases were evidently not undifferentiated. In their correspondence on unclear or incomplete Rorschach records the Schachtels routinely referred to subjects in both samples by name and case number, based on which they could have identified delinquents, numbered from 1-500, and non-delinquents, numbered from 501-1000. Subsequently, in 1947, Ernest was sent a numbered case list, marking out 376 boys awaiting 'blind' classification as delinquent or non-delinquent.⁷⁶ Having been involved in planning the preliminary study at Lyman they were certainly aware that these first cases were in the delinquent sample. Indeed, Eleanor sent the Schachtels 9 interviews from these cases at the start of 1940 to check their value and reliability.⁷⁷ Subsequently, as will be discussed shortly, the Schachtels were sent other interview materials for comparison in cases where psychiatric and Rorschach opinions differed.⁷⁸ This is not to mention the verbatim records they required for analysis which could directly refer to institutional or school routine. Indeed, the Schachtels not only could, but did, infer delinquent status based on the circumstantial information they

⁷³ Schachtel to Eleanor Glueck, 8th June 1940, ETSGP, Box 33 Folder 1.

⁷⁴ Eleanor Glueck to Schachtel, 24th March 1943, ETSGP, Box 33 Folder 2.

⁷⁵ Schachtel to Eleanor Glueck, 31st March 1943, ETSGP, Box 33 Folder 1.

⁷⁶ 'Sent to Schachtel 3/14/47', ETSGP, Box 33 Folder 2.

⁷⁷ Eleanor Glueck to Schachtels, 8th January 1940, ETSGP, Box 33 Folder 6.

⁷⁸ Schachtel to Eleanor Glueck, 3rd December 1941, ETSGP, Box 33 Folder 6.

were sent. Writing to Eleanor in April 1941 Ernest thus compared the records of the different samples:

I imagine that especially the delinquent boys who are in a reformatory are likely to feel that they are being “examined”. I get this impression from the way in which they respond and from the fact that hardly more often than in one or two cases does the protocol mention any question on the part of the boy as to the purpose of the test.⁷⁹

Later claims of accurately identifying delinquent personalities based solely on ‘undifferentiated’ Rorschach records thus elided the content of these records and numerous other materials, all of which might also confirm a case’s delinquent status or institutional context, and which necessarily circulated to make these analyses possible. The successful differentiation of cases reported in *Unravelling* thus reflected judgements made by the Schachtels on cases they could very plausibly identify independent of their Rorschach interpretation, with a view to prognosis rather than present status. Moreover, all of this was underlain by assumptions of socio-economic influence. Clarifying his position in March 1946, Ernest thus reiterated:

Our procedure has been to include in our estimate the fact that the boys live in an environment stimulating delinquency, a fact which has nothing to do with their Rorschach records as such. Here it is likely that we would have been much more hesitant in assuming delinquency and would have classified as “neutral” a good many records if we had not considered the environmental factor, in addition to the Rorschach material. This may not have been a very good idea in the light of what I now see to be your purpose of this classification.⁸⁰

As in their separation of each phase of study, the Gluecks pointed to the insulation and isolation of the Rorschach test as an objective protocol which had independently revealed delinquent personality. Correspondence from the study itself, however, pointed to the interdependence of available information and context in estimates of possible delinquency. In this case the projection of delinquency onto Rorschach records was underlain by the guiding assumption of economically and, thence, morally poor environment, in addition to personality.

⁷⁹ Schachtel to Eleanor Glueck, 27th April 1941, ETSGP, Box 33 Folder 1.

⁸⁰ Schachtel to Eleanor Glueck, 24th March 1946, ETSGP, Box 33 Folder 1.

Disagreement, Coherence, and Quantification

As inquiries into the boys' personalities progressed, the Gluecks faced the worrying prospect of disagreement between researchers, in particular between Moulton's psychiatric judgements and those of the Schachtels. Concerned for the final presentation of their dataset the Gluecks increasingly controlled records and strategically favoured certain perspectives to promote coherence between these phases of study. In the study's later years quantification was used to synthesise results and, at least outwardly, resolve and contain disagreement or ambiguity. Such disagreements had, in fact, been anticipated, especially in light of the Glueck's apparent doubts surrounding Moulton's psychiatric reports. Moulton's aforementioned interviews and reports had been sent to the Schachtels in 1940 for their 'frank opinion'. They responded that 75-80% agreement might be expected between the phases.⁸¹ Here and in subsequent disagreements, the Schachtels provided various assurances and explanations for any discrepancies. The psychiatric interview, they claimed, would 'naturally' give different results owing to 'the patient's resistance against the unconscious material... whereas the Rorschach offers the possibility to see directly a good deal of the unconscious material'.⁸² This was apparently the case in several instances where Rorschach responses indicated conflicts between parent and child while interviews reported strong familial affection, reflecting, according to the Schachtels, the 'widespread myth that all parents love their children and vice versa'.⁸³ Other discrepancies were attributed to differing terminology. Reporting on four such cases in 1941, the Schachtels thus concluded that they 'would not have been designated as disagreeing if allowance had been made for the difference in definition... Beyond this formal viewpoint there is material agreement on the facts underlying the diagnoses'.⁸⁴

While the Schachtels readily attributed these discrepancies to methodological or terminological differences, Moulton was more inclined to view them as real disagreements concerning the boys' personalities. In 1943 Moulton sent a memorandum, citing first hand impressions of Lyman cases which seemed to contradict Rorschach diagnoses. Rorschach

⁸¹ 'Memo for Rorschach Folder', ETSGP, Box 33 Folder 1.

⁸² 'Excerpt from Letter of Schachtels Dated 1/29/40', ETSGP, Box 33 Folder 6.

⁸³ Schachtel to Eleanor Glueck, 19th November 1940, ETSGP, Box 33 Folder 6.

⁸⁴ Schachtel to Eleanor Glueck, 20th March 1941, ETSGP, Box 33 Folder 6.

analysis in case 85 thus pointed to prevalent introversion, while the boy's cottage report provided by Lyman staff described him as 'erect, purposefully active, tireless, an easy mixer, a leader'. Case 83, noted in the Rorschach test as not stubborn, was meanwhile described in the cottage report as aggressive and loud while Moulton also noted the boy's history of truanting despite warnings from a stern father. In case 74, Moulton also offered biographical and behavioural information to establish, in contrast to the Schachtels' analysis, that the boy was suggestible, recounting his prior stealing at the suggestion of adults along with descriptions of his anxiety for approval at Lyman.⁸⁵ Moulton readily disputed the conclusions of distant Rorschach analysts, drawing instead on his own impressions and those of Lyman staff as to a case's temperament, behaviour and past actions.

Discrepancies raised by Moulton, in turn, prompted attempts to 'insulate' the Rorschach phase from his complaints. Earlier, in 1941, Eleanor had thus informed him that:

It continues to be our strong feeling that from now on there shall be no further consultation of Rorschach materials either by you or Dr. Patey. I have talked this matter over last evening with Dr. Glueck and he is more adamant than ever about it. I know you will realize that procedures in this work have to be quite different from those carried on in a treatment clinic. This is a research enterprise which must be protected in every way possible and from our point of view the only way to do this is to absolutely insulate one set of data from another. We have no objection, however, to your occasionally asking for certain social data because we realize that psychiatric procedures occasionally entail such consultation of social data.⁸⁶

The control of information between researchers was strategic as well as scientific in line with the Gluecks' requirements. While cutting off Moulton from Rorschach tests which he held in doubt, they could not limit his access to social and other information, to which the psychiatric interview also contributed. Meanwhile, the Schachtels were subsequently given free access to psychiatric interviews where discrepancies required resolution. In 1944 Ernest was even surprised by a letter directly from Moulton, requesting the return of his interview notes.⁸⁷

⁸⁵ 'Comparison of Psychiatric and Rorschach Findings – by Dr. Moulton', 11th March 1943, ETSGP, Box 33 Folder 2.

⁸⁶ Eleanor Glueck to Bryant Moulton, 24th April 1941, ETSGP, Box 33 Folder 6.

⁸⁷ Schachtel to Mae Wallace, 1st March 1944, ETSGP, Box 33 Folder 6.

From 1947, the Gluecks turned to Ernest for a fuller comparison of disagreements between the Rorschach and psychiatric phases. 33 marked and 95 minor discrepancies were noted by Eleanor's estimation and resolving these conflicts was of 'the utmost importance' for the sake of the eventual monograph.⁸⁸ Later she hoped that Ernest's comparison would show the rarity of real disagreement or their connection to the 'superficiality of the psychiatric (non-analytic) approach'.⁸⁹ Accordingly, Ernest provided a report in August 1948, now on 74 cases of disagreement of which almost all were resolved, concluding that 'the apparent differences in diagnostic classification often may not be real, but merely differences in terminology'.⁹⁰ 19 cases of contradiction were thus resolved as mere differences in psychopathological definitions, such as the Rorschach test lacking an equivalent concept for 'constitutional inferior', used by the psychiatrist in some cases.⁹¹ Most frequently Ernest referred to psychiatric interview notes for these cases, now reinterpreted to corroborate diagnoses from the Rorschach record. For cases identified by the Rorschach test as neurotic, he thus pointed to fidgeting, finger-sucking, lisps, fatigue and 'childish air' as well as stated concerns for the future, self-criticism or family as evidence of neurosis overlooked by the brief interview. In another case reported as psychopathic by the Rorschach test where interviewers reported no pathology Ernest similarly reported that 'the material in P[sychiatric] interview makes it much more likely, to my mind, that this boy has marked pathological features than that he has none'.⁹²

Differences of interpretation were thus resolved by reference back to apparent agreement on the 'facts' of a case evident in both the Rorschach and interview materials. This required comparison of materials from two 'insulated' phases of study but, as research progressed towards completion and publication, it became imperative to synthesise these perspectives on personality so they could be presented as parts of a coherent dataset. With the codification

⁸⁸ Eleanor Glueck to Schachtel, 14th March 1947, ETSGP, Box 33 Folder 1.

⁸⁹ Eleanor Glueck to Schachtel, 30th April 1948, ETSGP, Box 33 Folder 1.

⁹⁰ 'Note on Differences Between Psychiatric and Rorschach Diagnoses', 12th August 1948, ETSGP, Box 33 Folder 6.

⁹¹ 'Constitutional Inferior' here referred to a broad but commonplace contemporary diagnosis of inborn psychopathic behaviour, introduced to American Psychiatry by Adolf Meyer to account for various cases apparently unable to adapt to society's demands, see Lamb, *Pathologist of the Mind*: 158.

⁹² 'Differences Between Rorschach and Psychiatric Diagnoses', ETSGP, Box 33 Folder 6.

of both Rorschach and psychiatric factors some of these disagreements might also be resolved by routine protocols. Instructions thus set out the necessary requirements for contradiction in the items 'stubborn', 'introvert-extrovert', 'intellectual' and 'conventional'. A contradiction for stubbornness thus only existed if psychiatric item 41 was coded 5 and Rorschach items 2, 3 and 27 were coded 2, or conversely if these Rorschach items were all coded 1 and the psychiatric item coded 6.⁹³ Such instructions did not account for the differing interpretations which may have attached to these items in the interview or analysis but once again aimed to synthesise factual content, while also pointing more broadly to the routinisation of coded information concerning personality.

From the outset of research, the Schachtels' written analyses of Rorschach examinations sent to them had been ultimately recorded on a single sheet listing 62 traits which could be marked with a '+', '-' or '?' (Fig. 17).⁹⁴ While accepting the necessity for arbitrary classification and divisions in an eventual statistical analysis, the Schachtels did attempt to qualify these forms. Thus, '+', '-' and '?' respectively indicated that a trait was present, absent or doubtful, however, they noted that 'these are no absolute statements', supposing that any trait might appear to some degree in all people.⁹⁵ This reduction of complex personality traits had also been identified as a possible misleading source of disagreement with psychiatric interviews. Responding to earlier concerns that checked Rorschach and psychiatric traits did not match up, the Schachtels reiterated that 'the isolation of single traits as required for statistical work is a distortion which has to be corrected'. Apparently inconsistent traits had to be considered in connection with the entire written analysis where they would 'receive their proper dynamic meaning'.⁹⁶ The Schachtels thus retained their own dynamic conception of each individual case, however, the codification of separate traits according to proscribed symbols and numbers resulted in confusion, especially surrounding the uncertainty of '?' along with the ad hoc introduction of a 'u' classification of traits. Clarifying in December 1947, Ernest explained that 'u designates those traits for which the Rorschach material offers no clues at all, whereas

⁹³ 'Code for Comparison of Certain Rorschach and Psychiatric Diagnoses of Inherent Personality Traits', ETSGP, Box 33 Folder 6.

⁹⁴ 'Rorschach Analysis of Traits', 7th February 1940, ETSGP, Box 33 Folder 1.

⁹⁵ Schachtel to Eleanor Glueck, 28th November 1939, ETSGP, Box 33 Folder 1.

⁹⁶ Schachtel to Eleanor Glueck, 19th November 1940, ETSGP, Box 33 Folder 6.

in the ‘?’ cases the material is suggestive without being conclusive’.⁹⁷ Even so the Gluecks were uncertain as to the tabulation of cases so classified alongside those marked as ‘definitely’ positive or negative. Giving the example of ‘cooperation’ they noted that 71% cooperative delinquents as compared to 96.7 cooperative non-delinquents appeared significant but did not account for over 20% of delinquents recorded as ‘?’ for this trait.⁹⁸ Eventually, to allow for meaningful inclusion in overall tabulations of Rorschach traits this uncertain classification was redefined from ‘doubtful’ to ‘slight or suggestive’.⁹⁹

The ambiguity of these supposedly distinct classifications became more pronounced as the Gluecks sought to introduce and corroborate new traits and personality types. Beginning in January 1945, they informed Ernest that they were now interested in adding new traits of ‘aggression’, ‘evasiveness’, ‘matter-of-fact’ and ‘alibi attitude’, along with various syndromes of traits to further differentiate the delinquent and non-delinquent samples. Following the death of Anna Hartoch Schachtel in 1944, Ernest’s tone in correspondence had become more frustrated. Tempering the Gluecks’ requests for new traits, further classifications of delinquency and comparisons with psychiatric material, he informed them that undertaking any re-analysis of cases, now on his own, would entail several years of work. However, it was hoped that some aspects of personality analysis could be routinised. ‘Ambivalence’, wavering between assertive and submissive strivings, was thus identified as a syndrome that might be assigned to cases on the basis of a regular protocol, wherever items 1, 2 and 3 (self-assertion, defiance and destructiveness) were marked ‘+’ or ‘?’ and item 6 (submissiveness) also marked ‘+’ or ‘?’.¹⁰⁰ Within two weeks, however, confusion arose surrounding contrary cases which Ernest nonetheless marked as ambivalent. He responded that the above instructions could not ‘operate with mathematical exactness’ but, rather, represented ‘the most probable expectations’ of this trait.¹⁰¹ The following year, responding to another ambivalent case which did not fit the protocol, he reiterated:

⁹⁷ Schachtel to Eleanor Glueck, 10th December 1947, ETSGP, Box 33 Folder 2.

⁹⁸ Eleanor Glueck to Schachtel, 8th January 1948, ETSGP, Box 33 Folder 2.

⁹⁹ Glueck and Glueck, *Unravelling*: 213-243.

¹⁰⁰ Schachtel to Eleanor Glueck, 18th January 1945, ETSGP, Box 33 Folder 1.

¹⁰¹ Schachtel to Eleanor Glueck, 31st January 1945, ETSGP, Box 33 Folder 1.

The deduction of ambivalence from traits 1, 2, 3, and 6 of the trait list is necessarily mechanical and does not work with mathematical accuracy. All we can expect from such a method is a reasonably probable expectation of accuracy... There will always be cases like the present one in which, for example, resentment and defensiveness do not seem to involve defiance, yet constitute, together with the submissiveness, an ambivalent attitude to authority.¹⁰²

Protocols derived from separate codified traits could not account for analysis of the dynamic individual case. Similar disputes arose with proposals to introduce new factors of aggression and evasiveness directly correlated with hostility and defensiveness respectively. Ernest responded that by such a procedure these new items would lose any specific meaning, merely adding redundant items to the trait list. Meanwhile, Eleanor's offer to tabulate 'internalization of authority' based on various combinations of submissiveness, defiance and self-assertion prompted another warning from Ernest. Once again accounting for varying dynamic personalities, this might exclude appropriate cases and include inappropriate ones. He thus noted that 'all that can be said for any such schema is that it will work with a fair degree of probable accuracy'.¹⁰³

As in the psychiatric interview, the codification of separate, distinct traits was in tension with what psychiatrists and the Schachtels saw as their more meaningful place in the whole dynamic personality, as interpreted and synthesised by the competent expert. Reacting first to the reduction of Rorschach analyses to a checklist of traits and later to the deduction and correlation of new factors, Ernest regularly aired his frustration with the artificial disaggregation and naïve recombination of personalities. The Gluecks by contrast, had been attracted to the Rorschach test as a means of directly and objectively extracting these hidden traits and now hoped to reap the reward of enumeration by proposing new correlations and connections across their dataset. As the study neared completion they asked Ernest for an abbreviated Rorschach protocol to secure only the five highly correlated factors they would use for predictive work.¹⁰⁴ Elsewhere they mentioned plans to carry out correlations across

¹⁰² Schachtel to Eleanor Glueck, 18th May 1946, ETSGP, Box 33 Folder 1.

¹⁰³ 'Memorandum of Conference with Dr. E.G. Schachtel in New York – April 3, 1947', ETSGP, Box 33 Folder 1; Schachtel to Eleanor Glueck, 22nd April 1947. ETSGP, Box 33 Folder 1.

¹⁰⁴ 'Memorandum For Conference With Dr. Schachtel, Friday, February 20, 3 P.M.', ETSGP, Box 33 Folder 1.

the study, 'relating Rorschach traits to somatotypes' and 'intercorrelating the Rorschach traits themselves in order to arrive at "character types"'.¹⁰⁵

Psychiatric interviews set out a narrative of misbehaviours and the possible reasons beneath them. Rorschach analyses attempted to synthesise complex combinations of assertion, submissiveness, aggression, or affection along with other traits. Both carried often unspoken presumptions as to the social and familial context of the cases they interpreted. The personalities and cases themselves, first inscribed through written reports then forms and codes now finally appeared to the Gluecks as a dataset of tabulated factors out of which new predictive tools could be constructed. In planning their construction, the Gluecks speculated on the comparison, equation and combination of numerous factors, regardless of any relationship which may have previously existed between them. With their dataset they might establish 'a "causation coin of the realm", so that judges, teachers and others can transpose a total delinquency-prediction-score based on a few of the most serious factors into a like total based on many less serious factors'.¹⁰⁶ 'Causation' here was not conceived in terms of a sequence of necessary relations but rather the numerical force of more or less correlated factors in combination. Enumeration made factors drawn from various sources work together in new tables which could then return to the court, school or institution to direct prediction and pre-emption.

Reweaving Factors

Published in 1950, *Unraveling Juvenile Delinquency* brought together over a decade of comparative research, conducted by social investigators, anthropologists, psychiatrists, psychologists, secretaries, statisticians and criminologists. Moreover, the Gluecks attempted to make these disparate approaches and insights work together as part of a useable model for the explanation and prediction of delinquency and crime. In a later autobiography, Sheldon Glueck explained the title of *Unraveling* as a reference to the 'perplexing problems of

¹⁰⁵ Eleanor Glueck to Schachtel, 19th October 1949, ETSGP, Box 33 Folder 1.

¹⁰⁶ 'Causation Study – Method of Predicting Delinquency (Not Recidivism)', 2nd October 1947, ETSGP, Box 33 Folder 4.

disentanglement of individual etiologic influences'.¹⁰⁷ The final work thus 'unravelling' delinquency into 402 separate factors of comparison and correlation, appearing across 353 tables presenting the percentages of similarity and difference between the delinquent and non-delinquent samples. In outlining the plans and procedures for each phase of study, the Gluecks assured readers that standards of information gathering, rechecking and corroboration allowed the objective statistical comparison of social, physical and mental categories. No claim was made for 'absolute perfection' in coding, punching and tabulating the factors but, 'in view of all the checks and rechecks applied at each stage of the process of assembling and classifying the data', the Gluecks pointed to final results which were 'accurately reflective of raw materials'.¹⁰⁸ Through enumeration these 'raw materials', the bodies, histories, personalities and circumstances of a given case, were rendered both more objective and more compatible, as correlates rather than competing causes.

Introducing the 500 delinquents, the Gluecks pointed to an average of 3.66 court appearances, with 65.6% first appearing before the judge for an offence against property (larceny, burglary or automobile theft). Across their court histories, most were charged with various thefts and burglaries while 32.4% had been charged with crimes against public order, 17% with running away, 16% with 'stubbornness', and smaller proportions of assault, arson, sex offences and drunkenness. However, while most first appeared in the juvenile court between ages 10 and 13, the Gluecks claimed that in the vast majority of cases misbehaviour had begun earlier, between 5 and 10.¹⁰⁹ Apparently 95.6% of delinquents had persistently or seriously misbehaved in school, compared to 17.2% of the non-delinquents.¹¹⁰ These instances of truancy, defiance, inattention, disruption, and other 'problem behaviour' were joined outside the school by reports that delinquents more frequently hung around street corners, kept late hours and ran away from home while 98.4% were friends with other delinquents (compared to 7.4% of non-delinquents).¹¹¹ Such statistics aimed to demarcate between the 500 'serious' delinquents and their innocent counterparts while also pointing to

¹⁰⁷ Glueck, *Lives of Labour, Lives of Love*: 88.

¹⁰⁸ Glueck and Glueck, *Unraveling*: 74.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.* 27-28.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.* 146-151.

¹¹¹ *Ibid.* 161-163.

longer histories of misbehaviour and the opportunity for early detection of 'deep rooted' tendencies.

The bulk of *Unraveling's* chapters presented statistics to further differentiate these samples. While controlling for residence in 'delinquency areas' (now 'underprivileged neighbourhoods') 55% of delinquents as opposed to 34.2% of non-delinquents were reportedly from 'blighted slum tenement areas'. In this vein, non-delinquent households had an average weekly income of \$9.88 compared to \$7.60 in delinquent households, these families also more often reported as being economically dependent.¹¹² Parents were compared on 'adequacy for marriage and parenthood', pointing to higher percentages of physical ailments, 'mental retardation', 'emotional disturbance' and criminality in the mothers and fathers of delinquents.¹¹³ Here the Gluecks turned from the outer context of social environment to compare the 'quality of family life', covering items such as 'cultural refinement', 'conduct standards' and cohesiveness between delinquent and non-delinquent families. Further distancing themselves from broad sociological theories, they thus stressed interpersonal dynamics within the family to distinguish their samples, arguing that 'without consideration of the under-the-roof culture there can be no explanation of the differential influence of similar neighbourhoods'.¹¹⁴

Turning to the boys themselves, the Gluecks dismissed differences in physical health but reported anthropometric comparisons showing the greater 'mesomorphy' of delinquents.¹¹⁵ Results from the Wechsler-Bellevue intelligence tests placed delinquents below non-delinquents for verbal intelligence but more closely on performance intelligence, apparently indicating delinquents' inclinations for 'practical' or 'concrete' over 'abstract' or 'symbolic' thinking.¹¹⁶ Meanwhile Rorschach results tabulated the marked or slight presence of various character traits. Thus 48.7% of delinquents, compared to 15.8% of non-delinquents, displayed

¹¹² Ibid. 79-86.

¹¹³ Ibid. 99-102.

¹¹⁴ Ibid. 116.

¹¹⁵ Ibid. 183-197.

¹¹⁶ Ibid. 198-207.

marked or slight 'destructive-sadistic trends', alongside higher delinquent percentages for 'emotional lability', 'extroversive trends' and others. Notably, Rorschach results pointed to various forms of mental pathology in around half of both samples noting 24.6% of delinquents and 35.8% of non-delinquents for 'neuroticism' while 16.9% of delinquents and 5.9% of non-delinquents were categorised as 'asocial, 'primitive', poorly adjusted, unstable'.¹¹⁷ Finally, the results of psychiatric interviews were tabulated to compare 'deep-rooted emotional dynamics', characterising greater proportions of delinquents as 'adventurous', 'aggressive', and 'suggestible' in addition to other dynamics and conflicts.¹¹⁸

Before moving onto prediction, the Gluecks attempted to return to the vexed question of crime causation. Myriad tables of correlation still left open the question of relative causal significance or 'etiologic' relationships and, having embarked on an 'eclectic study of causation', the Gluecks produced an equally eclectic conclusion. Their 'tentative causal formula or law' thus claimed:

The delinquents as a group are distinguishable from the non-delinquents: (1) physically, in being essentially mesomorphic in constitution (solid, closely knit, muscular); (2) temperamentally, in being restlessly energetic, impulsive, extrovertive, aggressive, destructive (often sadistic) – traits which may be related more or less to the erratic growth pattern and its physiologic correlates or consequences; (3) in attitude, by being hostile, defiant, resentful, suspicious, stubborn, socially assertive, adventurous, unconventional, non-submissive to authority; (4) psychologically, in tending to direct and concrete, rather than symbolic, intellectual expression, and in being less methodical in their approach to problems; (5) socio-culturally, in having been reared to a far greater extent than the control group in homes of little understanding, affection, stability, or moral fibre by parents usually unfit to be effective guides and protectors or, according to psychoanalytic theory, desirable sources for emulation and the construction of a consistent, well-balanced, and socially normal superego during the early stages of character development.¹¹⁹

The above 'causal law' thus summarised a variety of tabulated differences ranging through constitution, temperament, emotional attitudes, cognition, and parenting. Specific causal

¹¹⁷ Ibid. 215-243.

¹¹⁸ Ibid. 244-253.

¹¹⁹ Ibid. 281-282

relationships could only be hinted at, such as irregular growth patterns or psychoanalytic models as well as ‘the exciting, stimulating, but little controlled and culturally inconsistent environment of the underprivileged area’. In this sense The Gluecks grappled with the same multicausality encountered in the AICLC’s expansive data schedules 40 years earlier and, before that, by the ‘Italian School’ of criminology. Body, mind and environment all still remained as potentially significant causes of crime while, in turn, specific cases (often large percentages according to the Gluecks’ own tables) might be exceptions to any aspect of this ‘law’. Continuing their causal formula, the Gluecks thus included a caveat that, while some causes might predominate in certain cases, ‘in general the high probability of delinquency is dependent upon the interplay of the conditions and forces from all these areas’.¹²⁰ Any strict, law-like causal relationship was tacitly conceded in favour of a probabilistic balance of factors across populations and fields of study.

The Gluecks faced the same dilemma as Healy, Bronner and other earlier criminologists: how to manage numerous facts of varying relevance in making useful determinations of ‘criminality’ by which to decide on cases. In *Unraveling*, myriad factors were brought into coherence through a probabilistic interpretation of correlates as part of an overall ‘causal complex’. Having disaggregated and unravelled these factors into separate tables, enumeration and correlation also held the promise of ‘reweaving’ the ‘tangled skein of causation’.¹²¹ Future plans were put forward to intercorrelate somatotype, Rorschach and other datasets to establish ‘meaningful cross-relationships’.¹²² Most significantly, factors could be combined, as in the Gluecks’ earlier studies, to construct ‘predictive instruments’. Beginning a section on the prediction of delinquency, they thus proposed ‘the selection of potential delinquents at the time of school entrance or soon thereafter’ but also warned that reliance on ‘symptomatic’ behaviour alone was a ‘dubious procedure’. Pointing to the presence of misbehaviour manifestations in both delinquent and non-delinquent samples, the Gluecks doubted that teachers or even clinicians could distinguish between ‘pseudodelinquents’ displaying ‘normal’ rebellion or ‘growing pains’ and ‘true’ delinquents

¹²⁰ Ibid. 282.

¹²¹ Ibid. 272.

¹²² Ibid. 284.

destined for future long-term offending.¹²³ The earlier demarcation between 'serious' institutionalised offenders and their 'normal' public school counterparts (on the basis of legal sentences) was now reproduced in distinctions between 'normal misbehaviour' and 'deep rooted' propensities for crime. In their 'causal law' the Gluecks had thus claimed that such tendencies were 'deeply anchored in soma and psyche and in the malformations of character during the first years of life'.¹²⁴ Claims to predict delinquency rested on the apparent persistence of factors from screening in early life through to future behaviour, factors that would be missed by observers but which 'prognostic instrumentalities' might detect and measure. Three prediction tables were thus produced to score 'deeply rooted' social, Rorschach and psychiatric factors.

The Gluecks constructed these tables using the same 'failure rate' method as earlier prediction tables, discussed in Chapter 4. For the Social Prediction Table, five factors were now used: 'discipline of boy by father', 'supervision of boy by mother', 'affection of father for boy', 'affection of mother for boy' and 'cohesiveness of family' (Fig. 18). Amongst cases defined as receiving 'overstrict or erratic' discipline from fathers for example, 72.5% were in the delinquent group, compared to only 9.3% of those receiving 'firm but kindly' discipline. Meanwhile, under family cohesion, 96.9% of cases classified as 'unintegrated' were from the delinquent sample compared to 20.6% classed as 'cohesive'. Adding up the highest delinquent percentages from 'overstrict or erratic' discipline, 'unsuitable' supervision, 'indifferent or hostile' affection, and 'unintegrated' families produced a maximum score of 414 while the combined lowest percentages in each factor produced a minimum score of 116.7. The resulting social prediction table, based on classification on the above five factors thus facilitated the scoring of potential criminality ranging from a 2.9% chance for scores under 150 to a 63.5% chance for scores of 250-299 and ultimately a 98.1% chance for scores above 400. The same process produced a Rorschach prediction table using factors of 'social assertion', 'defiance', 'suspicion', 'destructiveness', and 'emotional lability'. Finally, the psychiatric

¹²³ Ibid. 257-258.

¹²⁴ Ibid. 282

prediction table based its scores on the whether cases were 'adventurous', 'extroverted in action', 'suggestible', 'stubborn' and 'emotionally unstable'.¹²⁵

SOCIAL FACTORS	WEIGHTED FAILURE SCORE
1. Discipline of Boy by Father ⁶	
<i>Overstrict or erratic</i>	71.8
<i>Lax</i>	59.8
<i>Firm but kindly</i>	9.3
2. Supervision of Boy by Mother ⁷	
<i>Unsuitable</i>	83.2
<i>Fair</i>	57.5
<i>Suitable</i>	9.9
3. Affection of Father for Boy ⁸	
<i>Indifferent or hostile</i>	75.9
<i>Warm (including over-protective)</i>	33.8
4. Affection of Mother for Boy ⁹	
<i>Indifferent or hostile</i>	86.2
<i>Warm (including over-protective)</i>	43.1
5. Cohesiveness of Family ¹⁰	
<i>Unintegrated</i>	96.9
<i>Some elements of cohesion</i>	61.3
<i>Cohesive</i>	20.6

Figure 18: Five factors of the Social Prediction Table (Glueck and Glueck, *Unraveling*: 261).

The prediction tables promised to enable the practical and efficient identification of potential delinquents based on numerically scoring a case on certain factors. However, they also effaced the decisions, judgements, compromises and assumptions which produced these factors and their associated scores. Presented as numerically objective instruments of evaluation, prediction tables still relied on earlier personal judgements to classify each case. As in earlier tables, a social worker would, at some point, have to decide whether a case received 'firm and kindly', 'overstrict' or 'erratic' discipline, while also judging whether a family was 'cohesive' or 'unintegrated'. The selection of factors themselves also reflected the decisions and priorities of the Gluecks and their researchers. Rorschach factors of social assertion, and particularly

¹²⁵ Ibid. 260-265.

defiance and destructiveness were noted by the Schachtels as traits of delinquency in 1939 before the study had commenced.¹²⁶ The social prediction table also reflected the Gluecks' preference for interpersonal dynamics over structural social factors. An earlier memorandum describing its creation thus stressed factors reflecting 'aspects of "family drama"' while deliberately omitting 'factors concerning the boy's relationship to the outer world' and other 'highly differentiating' factors concerning the employment and 'work habits' of parents.¹²⁷ In light of the Gluecks' prior enthusiasm for overall forces of correlation, this deliberate shaping of factors in the social prediction table appears as a point of incoherence. Ultimately their preference was for a personal, inter-familial framing of criminal behaviour. As will be seen, the Gluecks' social prediction table, while the most popular of their 'instrumentalities', would also prompt sociological incredulity at this conflation of social and familial factors. Conversely, as discussed in the following chapter, the table rooted predictions of delinquency in prevalent understandings of 'problem parents' and contemporary anxieties to maintain normative (white, middle-class) family values.

The prediction tables thus codified a variety of priorities and hidden evaluations while presenting their factors as neutral correlates to guide the fallible assessments of judges, teachers and clinicians. The long process of inscribing and enumerating these factors now allowed the Gluecks to combine them, producing percentages which could compel agreement on a child's future. Higher predictive scores rested on the aggregation of more variously distributed factors into new tables. From here the Gluecks pointed to the correlation of the social, Rorschach and psychiatric tables with each other. Only 49% of cases were correctly placed in a high or low risk score-class by all three tables but they instead pointed to 86.8% accuracy in two or three tables together. By contrast they claimed that, together, all three tables were 'incorrect' in only 2.4% of their cases.¹²⁸ Meanwhile, multiple score classes could be streamlined for greater efficiency. In its more expansive form the social prediction table was divided into seven score classes ranging from 150 or less to 400 or more with 50 point intervals in between indicating various percentage chances of delinquency (Fig. 19). However,

¹²⁶ E.G. Schachtel, 'List of attitudes, trends, and traits with reference to the presence or absence of delinquent tendencies, October 1939, ETSGP, Box 33 Folder 1.

¹²⁷ 'Prediction – Social Factors', ETSGP, Box 33 Folder 4.

¹²⁸ Glueck and Glueck, *Unraveling*: 267-268.

the Gluecks showed their readers how this table might be reduced to four, three and finally two score classes, giving 250 as single a cut off score above which cases had a 79.1% chance

PREDICTION OF DELINQUENCY 261

Table XX-2. Detailed Prediction Table from Five Factors of Social Background

Weighted Failure Score Class	Number of Delinquents	Chances of Delinquency (per hundred)	Number of Non-Delinquents	Chances of Non-Delinquency (per hundred)
Under 150	5	2.9	167	97.1
150-199	19	15.7	102	84.3
200-249	40	37.0	68	63.0
250-299	122	63.5	70	36.5
300-349	141	86.0	23	14.0
350-399	73	90.1	8	9.9
400 and over	51	98.1	1	1.9
TOTAL	451		439	

Figure 19: Social Prediction Table with seven score-classes (Glueck and Glueck, *Unraveling*: 261).

of delinquency. In this process a case scoring 250-299, originally given a more indeterminate 63.5% chance of delinquency, might be aggregated with higher scoring cases to achieve sharper differentiation (Fig. 20). Such a choice reflected a desire to provide clear numerical guidance in decision making contexts. As the Gluecks noted:

The choice of using a four, three, or two score-class table would depend entirely on the preference of those charged with carrying out the scoring. It would seem to us that for practical purposes it again makes little difference whether the chances of potential delinquency are six and a half in ten or about nine in ten, because a boy falling into either score class would have to be looked upon as a potential offender for the purposes of preventative therapy.¹²⁹

Objective statistical prediction rested on a probabilistic relationship between combined factors and delinquency, however, faced with decisions on the individual case, high percentage chances effectively determined a child's classification as potentially criminal.

¹²⁹ Ibid: 263-264.

Table XX-3. Four-Class Prediction Table from Five Factors of Social Background

Weighted Failure Score Class	Chances of Delinquency (per hundred)	Chances of Non-Delinquency (per hundred)
Under 200	8.2	91.8
200-249	37.0	63.0
250-299	63.5	36.5
300 and over	89.2	10.8

Table XX-4. Three-Class Prediction Table from Five Factors of Social Background

Weighted Failure Score Class	Chances of Delinquency (per hundred)	Chances of Non-Delinquency (per hundred)
Under 250	16.0	84.0
250-299	63.5	36.5
300 and over	89.2	10.8

Table XX-5. Two-Class Prediction Table from Five Factors of Social Background

Weighted Failure Score Class	Chances of Delinquency (per hundred)	Chances of Non-Delinquency (per hundred)
Under 250	16.0	84.0
250 and over	79.1	20.9

Figure 20: Social Prediction Table using four, three, and two score classes (Glueck and Glueck, Unraveling: 270).

Like earlier efforts in criminology *Unraveling* attempted to sort out the multicausal complexity of crime. In this context, enumeration not only conferred objectivity but also allowed factors and cases to work together as constitutive parts of a probabilistic prediction table created to guide decision makers. Taken alone, paternal discipline could not straightforwardly differentiate delinquent and non-delinquent, let alone provide a compelling, overall 'cause of crime'. 'overstrict' and 'erratic' discipline, initially tabulated separately, accounted for 311 delinquent cases, or 62.2% of the delinquent sample. But, presented together, in terms of delinquency within this subclass rather than as proportion of total delinquent cases, 'overstrict or erratic' discipline was given a weighted failure rate of 72.5%. Combined with other factors in a prediction table, this could produce scores, finally streamlined with other

score-classes, to assign a roughly 80% chance of criminality above the cut-off point. In this way, beginning with the myriad facts of 1000 cases, the Gluecks disaggregated over 400 separate factors which were then sorted, culled and re-aggregated to produce tables of risk management and future crime prevention. Allaying the likely fears of practitioners, they concluded that, rather than replacing the clinician, these tables were 'intended to help him see the individual in the perspective of organized experience with hundreds of other boys'. Prediction could not rest solely on the 'clinical hunch', while, conversely their 'device' could only 'furnish support to the clinician's reason and experience; it is not a substitute for either'.¹³⁰ On the other hand, the Gluecks reiterated that identical (mis)behaviour in youth may 'be symptomatic of two divergent roads of development'. One case might naturally adjust while the other was guided by 'deep rooted' factors down the road to 'true' delinquency and persistent criminality. This need for discernment underlay the Gluecks final appeal:

by identifying potential delinquents in order that remedial methods may be undertaken early, these instruments can be of fundamental aid to clinicians, school authorities, school counsellors, juvenile court judges, and others concerned with the behaviour problems of children.¹³¹

The Gluecks envisaged their prediction tables serving a wide field of practitioners who craved some means of predictive objectivity and efficiency.

Conclusions

In following the data of prediction from settings and informants to records, punch cards, and finally tabulated factors we can see the processes of transformation, abstraction and reduction commonly associated with Latourian notions of 'inscription'. This is all the more pertinent when recovering, as far as is possible from research materials, the human children, experiences, and circumstances, the 'raw material', that the figures of *Unraveling* were supposed to represent. As noted at the start of this chapter, however, the 'data doubles' produced by surveillance networks are not judged in terms of representation but rather by their utility, in this case for the prediction of crime and identification of dangerous individuals. In this lens the Gluecks' extraction and organisation of information from the feared

¹³⁰ Ibid. 269-270.

¹³¹ Ibid. 288.

‘delinquency area’ can be seen as another instance of control through the mundane power of routinised paperwork. Just as Latour noted in describing such accumulation in the natural sciences:

They all end up at such a scale that a few men or women can dominate them by sight; at one point or another, they all take the shape of a flat surface of paper that can be archived, pinned on a wall and combined with others; they all help to reverse the balance of forces between those who master and those who are mastered.¹³²

As well as paper records, however, in this chapter we have also seen the significance of enumeration in the Gluecks project of eclectic research and prediction. The numbers finally presented in *Unraveling*, it seemed, could contain and resolve the ambiguities and disagreements of diverse perspectives and suspicions. Separate factors and percentage correlations could combine into risk scores that seemed to compel certain future expectations and decisions.

In turn it is worth reflecting on the tabulation of these numbers and what these completed ‘prediction tables’ meant to the Gluecks and to the practitioners who subsequently used them. Taken together, the tables of factors and scores which collectively formed the ‘social prediction table’ (Figs. 18-20) made a visual and numerical connection between discrete factors and new overarching score classes of potential criminality. This long process of inscription, quantification and tabulation represented what Desrosières has called the ‘investment’ in particular, useful meanings while ‘sacrificing’ other, more ambiguous ones.¹³³ Christine Von Oertzen similarly notes how earlier German census tables not only simplified information but further ‘made empirical relationships in the social order evident and thus modifiable through intervention and reform’.¹³⁴ Simultaneously, the transformation of situated ‘facts’ into discrete ‘data’ allowed for the modification of the tables themselves to create or preserve these relationships. As seen above, the Gluecks’ five social factors and their correlates were a result of multiple reductions from earlier reports and then rearrangements

¹³² Latour, *Science in Action*: 227.

¹³³ Desrosières, *The Politics of Large Numbers*: 111.

¹³⁴ Christine Von Oertzen, ‘Datafication and Spatial Visualization in Nineteenth Century Census Statistics’, *Historical Studies in the Natural Sciences*, Vol. 48 (5) (2018): 569; see also, Desrosières, *The Politics of Large Numbers*: 16-44.

of the tabular data of *Unraveling* to produce (or 'reveal') the final correlates of criminality. The Gluecks were explicitly willing to make this 'sacrifice' trading, in their own words, the idiosyncratic 'sheaf of lives' for the 'organized experience' which the tables represented.

Tabular organization was necessary to secure practical decision making but also conferred an ambiguous ontological status to the future criminals and factors presented in these tables. Desrosières has described how, positioned between the values of science and those of the government, statistics have historically shifted between a language of models, for guiding state action, and a language of 'objectification', regarding social categories as 'real things' to be measured.¹³⁵ This slippage is further seen in alternating demands for guidance and critiques of statistical unreliability:

This formulation offers the advantage of allowing one to slip from one register to another, almost unconsciously, depending on the interlocutors and situations involved. In certain cases, things exist because people need them, and ask to be provided with things that are really there and that hold. In other cases, faced with criticisms as to the hypothetical and constructed nature of things, one can describe them as mental shorthands or expedient conventions.¹³⁶

Indeed, the Gluecks themselves moved between these registers within unravelling, alternately offering the prediction tables as mere 'guides' to the reason and experience of practitioners or as representations of the 'deeply rooted' characteristics leading to criminal behaviour. With the subsequent uptake of the social prediction table, factors and score classes remained open to modification so that they might be more usefully fitted to the needs of practice. Conversely, they suggested that there really were future criminals waiting to be identified. Of course, the numerical and tabular order of *Unraveling* was not the end. These prediction tables were made to be implemented. In the final chapter I will turn to the proliferation of prediction and the new ambiguities and transformations that came with predictive practice.

¹³⁵ Ibid. 1-15.

¹³⁶ Ibid. 138.

Chapter 6: The Proliferation of Prediction in Postwar America

For Sheldon and Eleanor Glueck, the release of *Unraveling Juvenile Delinquency* in 1950 marked the end of one effort and the start of another. Progressing from their earlier prediction of recidivism amongst the condemned they now promised their readers new prediction tables which could discern the potential criminal amidst an innocent juvenile population. However, this would require the participation of practitioners in applying and, the Gluecks hoped, validating the tables. But prediction did not proliferate in a vacuum. The reception and uptake or abandonment of the Gluecks' prediction tables must be seen within the broader trajectory of juvenile justice, health, welfare and correction, which had, since the beginning of the century, increasingly made assessment and prediction an ongoing part of American public and private life. As with the interwar mental hygiene movement, American criminologists emerging from the Second World War found renewed pressures for generalised prediction and therapeutics aimed at the potential delinquent. For historians, 1950s American society and culture in particular has been characterised by the post-war search for renewed security through normality. Anna Creadick, writing on this striving and struggling to be 'normal', thus charts the process whereby 'normality... emerged as a "keyword" of American culture, broadly disseminated through the increasingly porous domains of science, medicine and psychiatry and an increasingly nationalized popular culture'.¹ Like other contemporary experts the Gluecks, with their emphasis on familial relationships in the social prediction table, fed into discourses on the normal home in particular.

To use Elaine Tyler May's phrase, juvenile delinquency and its prevention formed one part of the 'containment', whereby 'public policy, personal behaviour and even political values were focused on the home', as families and professionals attempted to balance the democratic independence of youth with the order of middle-class family values.² For 'acting-out' delinquents and 'disturbed' children the normal home was considered therapeutic while broken, dependent, or otherwise deviant families were deemed pathological and

¹ Anna G. Creadick, *Perfectly Average*: 2.

² Elaine Tyler May, *Homeward Bound: American Families in the Cold War Era* (Basic Books: New York, NY: 1988): 14; Mackert, 'Danger and Progress': 199-223.

criminogenic, mirroring the Gluecks' codification and scoring of discipline, affection and cohesiveness.³ As Nina Mackert has shown, mothers themselves sought out but also reconfigured increasingly widespread advice literature and child-rearing magazines through which they 'inscribed themselves into the profound anxiety of motherhood'.⁴ To fuel this anxiety, professional and popular discourses on 'teenagers', 'beatniks', and 'unmarried mothers', pointed to the moral, sexual and often racialised threat of unsupervised youth subcultures.⁵

The social prediction table thus connected potential crime and its prevention to 'under-the-roof' factors of home, family, and emotional development. Conversely it also appealed to American institutions of increasing scale and complexity seeking to efficiently manage large populations. Here the social prediction table promised to 'make a priori separate things hold together, thus lending reality and consistency to larger, more complex objects' which, in turn, 'find a place in other constructs'.⁶ Following the upheavals of economic depression and then global conflict, greatly expanded federal, welfare, and military organizations took on responsibility for millions of Americans, organized through the increasingly authoritative, scalable language of statistics.⁷ In this context, prediction tables promised another scalable tool with which to efficiently pre-empt crime within large youth populations, as evidenced in various military, judicial, and educational interests in the Gluecks' predictive services. Moving from the reduced scale of a few inter-familial factors, the Gluecks attempted to leverage control over crime in general. Further, they offered their predictive scores to large scale institutions as a universal metric of criminal potential, thought applicable and efficient across varying cases and locales.⁸

³ Deborah Blythe Doroshow, *Emotionally Disturbed*: 123-148.

⁴ Mackert, 'Danger and Progress': 214.

⁵ Regina G. Kunzel, 'White Neurosis, Black Pathology: Constructing Out-of-Wedlock Pregnancy in the Wartime and Postwar United States', in Joanne Meyerowitz (Ed.), *Not June Cleaver: Women and Gender in Postwar America, 1945-1960* (Temple University Press: Philadelphia, PA: 1994): 304-331; Wini Breines, 'The 'Other' Fifties: Beats and Bad Girls', in Ibid. 382-408.

⁶ Desrosières, *The Politics of Large Numbers*: 236.

⁷ See Ibid. 188-209

⁸ For more on science and scalability see Bruno Latour, 'Give Me a Laboratory and I Will Raise the World, in Karin Knorr-Cetina and Michael Mulkay (eds.), *Science Observed: Perspectives on the Social Study of Science* (Sage: London: 1983): 141-169; Joseph O'Connell, 'Metrology: The Creation of Universality by the Circulation of Particulars', *Social Studies of Science*, Vol. 23 (1) (1993): 129-173; Jon Agar, '1/2 Idea No. 11: Scale', STS

Viewed somewhat outside this historical context, the Gluecks and their prediction tables have been primarily discussed by criminologists and legal scholars as a false start or dead end in the stories of modern parole prediction or criminological risk factor research. Case and Haines place the Gluecks at the start of the search for risk factors but conclude that ‘the Gluecks’ conclusions over-stepped the boundaries of the data’. They continue: ‘with their rudimentary measures of risk, inability to control for extraneous variables and their underdeveloped statistical techniques, the Gluecks could not hope to adequately understand the nature of the risk-factor-offending relationship’.⁹ For Harcourt, the Gluecks’ prediction tables are ultimately overshadowed by the parole prediction techniques developed by contemporary Chicago sociologists such as the aforementioned Burgess method and later Federal Salient Factor Score.¹⁰ Many of the earliest critical reviews of *Unraveling* were, indeed, by sociological rivals but also psychiatrists, judges and child welfare workers who feared the statistical reduction and invasion of their disciplines. However, modern evaluations of the Gluecks’ insignificance or ‘failure’ fail to consider the wider context of predictive practice in postwar America. The Gluecks’ correspondence, explored later in this chapter reveals the widespread, albeit uneven, uptake of their social prediction table by educators, clinicians, criminal justice and correctional officials, and others seeking predictive certainty. While Harcourt points to a lag in the formal adoption of actuarial prediction by state and federal authorities, this ‘theory-practice divide’ does not account for more pluralistic, piecemeal experimentation and implementation of the Gluecks’ methods in individual courts, schools, clinics, police departments, and even the US military across the 1950s.¹¹ This is not to say that prediction tables were implemented smoothly, effectively or consistently. In fact, their experiences attempting to apply and validate the tables reveal an uneven process of compromise, modification and often mixed or inconclusive results.

Observatory, 28th July 2021, <https://blogs.ucl.ac.uk/sts-observatory/2021/07/28/1-2-idea-no-11-scale/> [Accessed 30th April 2024].

⁹ Case and Haines, *Understanding Youth Offending*: 63-64.

¹⁰ Harcourt, *Against Prediction*: 47-76.

¹¹ *Ibid.* 69.

The varying reception and application of the Gluecks' prediction tables should be understood in terms of their ability to accommodate pre-existing priorities in these varied settings, wherein 'objective' scores and personal experience or judgement frequently blended. Though reviews of *Unraveling*, discussed in the first section of this chapter, indicated disciplinary and ethical concerns surrounding claims to predict future criminal behaviour, many also happily drew their own preferred conclusions from the Gluecks' eclectic mass of statistics. For the Gluecks themselves, reviews of *Unraveling* were the launching point for validation studies which might prove the accuracy of their methods. The remainder of the chapter will turn to examples of implementation in the military, the court, the clinic and the school. While not a complete historical treatment by any means, this survey allows us to examine contemporary interest in and expectations surrounding the Gluecks' tables as well as their adaptation to various notions of risk. In line with the aforementioned primacy of the home in popular and expert discourses, implementation centred on the social prediction table (eventually called simply the 'Glueck prediction table' by some) and its inter-familial factors. Its scores offered numerical validity to practitioners' notions of risky or inadequate home-life wherein the social prediction table thus increasingly aligned suspicion with the circumstances of economically and racially marginalised families.

Reception and Reaction

In 1951 William Healy, now retired from child guidance work in the Judge Baker Foundation, reviewed recent criminological texts including *Unraveling*. He commented: 'with the great issues of this torn and bewildered world commanding unlimited discussion during the last three or four years, it is remarkable to find so much attention given in many publications to our national problem of juvenile delinquency'.¹² Healy pointed to hundreds of articles and over a dozen recent books discussing the issue. His own psychoanalytic studies of offenders seemed to confirm that this problem would continue 'unless society cleans house in order to prevent so many ideas of delinquency from taking hold of our youngsters'.¹³ Turning to the Gluecks' latest book as one answer to this national and social concern, he conceded that

¹² William Healy, 'Review', *The University of Chicago Law Review*, Vol. 19 (1) (1951): 138.

¹³ *Ibid.* 147.

Unraveling was ‘the most scientifically conducted and extensive comparative research that has ever appeared in the field of delinquency’. But, for Healy, the Gluecks’ comprehensive statistical coverage was tempered by a disappointing lack of the causal or clinical insight that he and others hoped for: ‘From all of this much may be implied but very little is suggested by the Gluecks for the treatment of delinquents in general’. In concluding his other reviews Healy remained dissatisfied that ‘we have not come to grips with certain fundamental factors in the causation of delinquency’.¹⁴ Other scholarly reviews reflected this mixed reception of the Gluecks’ causal and predictive claims. While the overwhelming data of *Unraveling* appeared unassailable to many commentators, others criticised the crude statistical reduction of what they regarded as truly causal factors and dynamics. In this way, the Gluecks’ eclectic dataset could blunt as well as provoke criticism.

In 1951 *Unraveling* was the subject of two symposia of reviews, first in the *Harvard Law Review* (HLR) and later in the *Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology* (JCLC). The myriad fields covered by the Gluecks’ study required diverse responses from criminologists, psychologists, psychiatrists, sociologists, physical anthropologists, judges, educators, statisticians and others. This interdisciplinary treatment would provide a competent assessment while also furthering the Gluecks’ hopes for interest from practitioners and scholars in the predictive implications for their respective spheres. Introducing the JCLC’s symposium of eight reviews, Robert Gault, now in his 41st year as editor, noted that ‘few will be competent to review it in its entirety’.¹⁵ Felix Frankfurter, first of nine reviewers in the HLR’s symposium, similarly pointed to the necessary scrutiny of different approaches by their respective experts. Having organised the Harvard Crime Survey, under which the Gluecks’ initial researches had begun, Frankfurter, now a Supreme Court Justice, framed *Unraveling* as part of an ongoing, often arduous, process of research and reform. “‘Be not weary in well-doing” must be the habit of a progressive society’ and the Gluecks, in their multifaceted attack on delinquency had, he wrote, ‘greatly contributed to those forces of reason and feeling by which civilization is furthered’.¹⁶ Many

¹⁴ Ibid. 145-146.

¹⁵ Robert H. Gault, in Gault et al, “‘Unraveling Juvenile Delinquency”: A Symposium of Reviews’, *Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology*, Vol. 41 (6) (1951): 733.

¹⁶ Felix Frankfurter, in Frankfurter et al, ‘A Symposium on “Unraveling Juvenile Delinquency”’, *Harvard Law Review*, Vol. 64 (6) (1951): 1025.

disciplines, practitioners and readers had an interest in the Gluecks' wide-ranging conclusions but, at the same time, their study might also serve as an antidote to the biases of each. Frankfurter thus continued: 'we are dealing with problems overlaid by shibboleths and dogmas. Concerning everyone, they are assumed to be within everyone's competence'.¹⁷ The Gluecks' work spoke to a wide academic and professional readership and, in turn, promised to guide them with objective data and 'instruments'.

Many reviewers agreed that *Unraveling* presented a truly objective, evidence-based response to the pressing national concern of juvenile crime. Reviewing in *HLR*, New York magistrate and lecturer Morris Ploscowe praised the work's 'meticulous care' and 'thorough analyses' in furnishing 'fundamental data for the formulation of a practical and far-reaching program for the prevention of delinquency and crime'.¹⁸ A more cautious review from physical anthropologist C. Wesley Dupertuis left the Glueck's success to individual judgement but, nevertheless, claimed that 'no one can deny that they amassed a comprehensive array of pertinent facts which may be of inestimable value'.¹⁹ Similarly, clinical psychologist Robert Linder countered the expected disparagement of specific interpretations in *Unraveling* by pointing to its 'items of indisputable fact' free from 'the tacit hypothesis or the preconceived bias'.²⁰ For these and other commentators the Gluecks' tables constituted, at the very least, a body of objective facts from which truly scientific approaches might derive.

The Gluecks' wide array of statistics served to defend *Unraveling* by presenting readers with indisputable data out of which, conversely, many preferred readings could be drawn. Specialist reviewers, reading the work in light of their own professional and academic backgrounds, praised the empirical confirmation of their own models of crime. Continuing, the psychologist Linder thus pointed to *Unraveling* as 'eloquent confirmation' that delinquents were differentiated by 'a compulsion to act out and discharge where the rest of us suffer or create

¹⁷ Frankfurter, in *Ibid.* 1023.

¹⁸ Morris Ploscowe, in *Ibid.* 1027.

¹⁹ C. Wesley Dupertuis, in *Ibid.* 1034.

²⁰ Robert M. Linder, in *Ibid.* 1035.

symptoms from our disaffections'.²¹ Psychiatrist Marion E. Kenworthy similarly described an 'objective study' of multiple factors that ultimately underlined 'the validity of many of the theoretical formulations of which psychiatry has long been aware'.²² Henry Wyman Holmes, former Dean of the Harvard School of Education, meanwhile lauded the Gluecks' work in 'moving upstream', continuing that 'slum clearance and breeding for higher mentality would probably do more than anything else to prevent delinquency'.²³ Turning to the *JCLC* reviews, Sanford Bates, commissioner of the New Jersey Department of Institutions and Agencies, welcomed their intelligent attempt to interrupt the 'generally accepted cycle' of 'neglect at home – inattention at school – truancy – delinquency – crime – prison'.²⁴ Physical anthropologist Earnest Hooton, previously consulted by the Gluecks, now praised their 'willingness to consider man as a biological animal as well as a social being', a perspective 'almost, if not quite unique among "criminologists"'.²⁵ Even reticent reviewers could find vindication in the Gluecks' correlations. Thorsten Sellin thus commented somewhat ambiguously, 'it must strike the sociologist when reading... that the research of the Gluecks' has corroborated previous findings of sociological studies of delinquents and even of delinquency areas' (indeed, as previously noted, the 'delinquency area' underlay the planning and interpretation of research).²⁶ Having set out to avoid any theoretical or methodological bias, the Gluecks broad dataset was nevertheless acceptable to various disciplines, employing these theories and methods, as a source of objective statistical validation.

As the Gluecks had hoped, many saw the potential of their figures to validate decision making in juvenile justice, education and treatment. Planning the *HLR* symposium, book review editor Jerome Fatcher had reached out to Harvard statistician Edwin Bidwell Wilson for a review specifically concerning prediction. Noting that 'all the reviewers have commented on them' he stressed the 'vital need for an authoritative statement' on the prediction tables, 'perhaps the most important aspect of the Gluecks' task'.²⁷ The Gluecks were evidently very happy with

²¹ Linder, in *Ibid.* p 1035.

²² Marriion E. Kenworthy, in *Ibid.* 1030.

²³ Henry Wyman Holmes, in *Ibid.* 1039.

²⁴ Sanford Bates, in Gault et al, "'Unraveling Juvenile Delinquency": A Symposium of Reviews', 737.

²⁵ Earnest A. Hooton, in *Ibid.* 744.

²⁶ Thorsten Sellin, in *Ibid.* 742.

²⁷ Jerome Fatcher to Edwin Bidwell Wilson, 15th January 1951, ETSGP, Box 36 Folder 10.

Wilson's statement, informing him that it was 'exactly what is needed in order to open the way for a testing of the predictive devices in an atmosphere of open-mindedness, rather than one of resistance'.²⁸ In their minds the symposia were important opportunities to initiate the subsequent uptake of their new tables by various commentators and readers. However, Wilson's review remained notably cautious, arguing stringent requirements for reliably and regularly linking prior and later occurrences. Limited to known offences, the prediction of an individual's future criminal behaviour might, in fact, be forecasting 'whether he will have the offence pinned on him – rightly or wrongly'. The Gluecks' differentiation between confirmed delinquents and non-delinquents also did not guarantee the same discernment amongst school children earlier in life. Wilson further pointed to the individual consequences of applying measures based on probabilities for a population: 'In any particular instance, the phenomenon will or will not occur and in any particular instance great misfortune or injustice may arise from the application of the appropriate probability to the disposal of the case'. Methodological and ethical qualms were, however, deferred to future validation studies applying the prediction tables which would provide, in his words, 'the proof of the pudding'.²⁹

These lingering uncertainties surrounding prediction did not dissuade some reviewers. Linder thus argued that the Gluecks' tables were the 'practical instrumentation' needed to finally 'accept the challenge to "do something" about delinquency'.³⁰ In a similar vein, Holmes advised teachers to 'read and reread' *Unraveling* to 'undergird their intuitions and set general patterns for their observation of each individual'.³¹ In the *JCLC* former juvenile court judge Nochem S. Winnet now similarly questioned traditional, paternalistic conceptions of the judge as a 'wise and understanding father'. The Gluecks, he argued, had, instead, demonstrated that 'the determining causes of delinquency are not matters of intuition'.³² The implementation of the Gluecks' findings in courts was a matter of correcting judgement but also one of efficiency. As law professor George H. Dession thus argued in his review of *Unraveling*, the wastefulness of criminal justice was to be met with prediction and 'the strategic advantage of mobilizing

²⁸ Eleanor Glueck to Wilson, 1st February 1951, ETSGP, Box 36 Folder 10.

²⁹ Edwin Bidwell Wilson, in Frankfurter et al, 'A Symposium on "Unraveling Juvenile Delinquency"': 1040-1041.

³⁰ Linder, in Ibid. 1036.

³¹ Holmes, in Ibid. 1039.

³² Nochem S. Winnet, in Gault et al, "'Unraveling Juvenile Delinquency": A Symposium of Reviews': 748.

social intervention through relatively inexpensive and non-depriving out-patient therapy at this early stage'.³³ For the most positive reviewers, prediction promised to pay dividends in accuracy, efficiency and therapy. Still, Wilson's concerns were repeated by those who doubted whether the differentiation of delinquent and non-delinquent samples would carry over into other undifferentiated populations. As Justine Wise Polier of the New York Domestic Relations Court commented, the Gluecks' claims of prediction seemed 'based on a confusion between the significance of the ability to diagnose with great accuracy, and the ability to predict what will happen to a child in the future'.³⁴ Factors which seemed to mark out the delinquent group in adolescence might not be discernible, stable or relevant in the younger groups put forward for prediction. Despite the Gluecks' own claims that predictive factors were 'deeply rooted', they were still open to doubt without further validation studies to test the tables.

One of the sharpest critical reviews was written for the *JCLCL* symposium by John E. Anderson, Director of the University of Minnesota's Institute of Child Welfare. Anderson took issue with several of *Unraveling's* conclusions. The somatotype study presented 'no differences of practical moment', while the purported accuracy of the Rorschach test in identifying delinquents (after throwing out a significant number of 'neutral' cases) was disparaged as 'a curious bit of statistics'.³⁵ His most damaging criticisms, however, were directed at the prediction tables. Rather than employing objective correlations, Anderson noted that 'each of the predictive devices finally developed is, at one point or other, dependent on some intuitive interpretation of the child's responses, rather than upon scores independent of the examiner's personal judgements'. In turn they were likely (actually, as shown in Chapter 5) 'contaminated' by information and clues as to delinquent or non-delinquent status which could not possibly be excluded from social, Rorschach or psychiatric case material.³⁶

The apparent triumph of prediction was, according to Anderson, unfounded and illusory, misleading any reader 'not well trained in science, who is much impressed by the statistical

³³ George H. Dession, in *Ibid.* 758.

³⁴ Justine Wise Polier, in Frankfurter et al, 'A Symposium on "Unraveling Juvenile Delinquency"': 1036.

³⁵ Johnathan E. Anderson, in Gault et al, "'Unraveling Juvenile Delinquency": A Symposium of Reviews': 745-746.

³⁶ Anderson, in *Ibid.* 746.

data presented in the early part of this book'. For him, the Gluecks' prediction tables were merely 'manipulations of scores which were defined, selected, and elaborated from the group and then reapplied back to the group', producing a 'statistical artifact' in place of true prediction. It was, ultimately, 'anyone's guess' whether such scores would hold in comparable populations and 'pure speculation to assume they will hold for 6 or 7 year olds'.³⁷ This critique was of particular concern to the Gluecks. Writing to Gault on prospective reviews for the *JCLC* symposium in March 1951, Eleanor commented that 'the only one that frankly disturbs us is that of Mr. Anderson' apparently written 'in a spirit of contentiousness' without careful reading of the work. She unsuccessfully requested the inclusion of Wilson's *HLR* comments to 'place the discussion about the prediction tables on the kind of a basis on which we would like to see it' as well as 'to place into proper focus the disquieting statements made by Mr. Anderson'.³⁸ Wilson's cautious comments still pointed to the eventual 'proof of the pudding' through application of the prediction tables, whereas Anderson dismissed them outright as compromised artifacts of statistical manipulation. The Gluecks, hoping to launch the wider application and validation of their tables from these early reviews, could defer to future results but were evidently threatened by doubts levelled at the statistical bases of their new 'instruments'.

Further criticism of their statistical methodology arose from two poles of prior psychiatric and sociological interest in crime. On one hand, psychiatrists accused the Gluecks of presenting comprehensive but 'lifeless' material which abstracted away dynamic, individual motives and biographies. As well as overlooking the individual, sociologists accused the Gluecks of overlooking wider society and culture as determinants of criminal behaviour. Both critiques fastened on the apparent inability of the Gluecks' statistics to establish causal, let alone predictive, relationships between their myriad factors without these psychological or sociological frameworks. Gault, in his own psychological review opening the *JCLC* symposium, politely raised the unseen factor of 'delinquent ideation' as a dynamic, psychological precursor to wrongdoing. While the Gluecks relied on extensive data collections across institutions, Gault noted that 'many a subtle and probably powerful human behaviour factor never gets

³⁷ Anderson, in *Ibid.* 747.

³⁸ Eleanor Glueck to Robert H. Gault, 14th March 1951; 27th March 1951, ETSGP, Box 36 Folder 10.

into the eyes and ears of parents, nor into court and school records'. Statistical prediction might thus be undermined by hidden motives as well as accidents leading a child towards or away from the court, wherein 'delinquent' and 'non-delinquent' were, for Gault, both 'calculated risks'.³⁹ Franz Alexander, Director of the Chicago Institute for Psychoanalysis, similarly criticised *Unraveling* for the superficiality of its statistical approach, at best 'rediscovering' dynamics uncovered by earlier analytic studies of individual cases. For Alexander, the Gluecks' research only highlighted the superiority of intensive, individual case studies in revealing underlying dynamic causes of delinquency, summarising:

Personality cannot be split up into artificial units but must be studied in its totality, in the specific configuration of its constituent parts. The study of separate trends with pseudo-quantitative measurements may produce material which is suited for statistical treatment; however, it is more or less lifeless, artificial material. In the past, methods imitating the technique of other sciences have consistently failed in the field of psychology. These methods are not based on the fact so well expressed in the etymology of the word, "individual"; namely, that the individual is "indivisible", and can be adequately studied only as a whole gestalt.⁴⁰

As discussed in Chapter 5, the Gluecks disaggregated personalities and backgrounds into factors which could then be enumerated and combined for statistical and later predictive purposes. Here Alexander pointed to the loss of the individual in this process and, moreover, recognised it as an interdisciplinary imposition of new quantitative methods upon dynamic psychiatry. William Healy, who had collaborated with Alexander in psychoanalytic studies of selected offenders, had seen the Gluecks' statistical approach applied to his own cases in the Judge Baker Foundation two decades earlier.⁴¹ Together, their reviews now represented earlier, primarily psychoanalytic, interests in the dynamic individual offender whose criminal acts could only be reconstructed and explained by clinical psychiatric expertise and judgement. The Gluecks, attempting to augment unreliable judgements with numerical scores, were, in this perspective, unable to truly understand any one of their thousand cases atomised across hundreds of tables.

³⁹ Gault, in Gault et al, "'Unraveling Juvenile Delinquency': A Symposium of Reviews": 735.

⁴⁰ Franz Alexander, in *Ibid.* 753.

⁴¹ See Alexander and Healy, *Roots of Crime*; Glueck and Glueck, *One Thousand Juvenile Delinquents*.

Opposite these critiques on the overlooked individual, sociologists targeted *Unraveling* for ignoring society and culture. Following Edwin Sutherland's paradigmatic *Principles of Criminology*, these critics understood crime in terms of the theory of 'differential association' whereby 'systematic criminal behaviour is determined in a process of association with those who commit crimes, just as systematic lawful behaviour is determined in a process of association with those who are law-abiding'.⁴² In turn, regular patterns of proximity and association with criminal behaviour were thought to be grounded in the 'social disorganization' (poverty, cultural disunity, competition for resources) of particular urban areas. In contrast, the Gluecks' social prediction table utilized the familial and emotional factors of particular homes while conversely ignoring the lower income of delinquent homes and even the overwhelmingly correlated factor of 'gang membership' which seemed to confirm causal frameworks based on association or subculture. Evidently they anticipated sociological criticism and advised Gault to exclude a review by sociologist Donald R. Taft from the *JCLC* symposium. Eleanor requested that 'a legal-criminologic journal might at this stage in the status of our knowledge of crime causation, avoid the kind of prejudiced, one-sided presentation which Professor Taft makes', citing the 'natural resistance' of sociologists to contrary findings.⁴³ Nevertheless, Taft's comments would be published in a subsequent issue of the *JCLC* where he criticised the Gluecks' neglect of conditions and relationships outside the home, especially gang membership and delinquent inculturation.⁴⁴

The Journal of American Sociology also published joint articles by Sol Rubin and Albert J. Reiss criticising *Unraveling*. Rubin moved successively through 'illusions' in the plan, method, findings and interpretation of the study, citing the influence of institutional conditions on results for the delinquent sample and the 'hazardous surmise' of applying these factors to potentially delinquent schoolchildren. In particular, the Gluecks' social prediction table was lambasted:

In the prediction table based on "social factors" no account whatsoever is taken of extra-household social conditions. As to the "under-the-roof" environment,

⁴² Edwin Sutherland, *Principles of Criminology* (J.B. Lippincott Company: Chicago, IL: 1939 [1924]): 4.

⁴³ Eleanor Glueck to Gault, 7th December 1950, ETSGP, Box 36 Folder 10.

⁴⁴ Donald R. Taft, 'Implication of the Glueck Methodology for Criminological Research', *Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology and Police Science*, Vol. 42 (3) (1951): 300-316.

for specific social facts, interpersonal effects are substituted, without its being established that the interpersonal effects are, in fact, causes rather than, like delinquency, *effects*.⁴⁵

This preference for familial, home factors over structural social causes seemed, to sociologists like Rubin, arbitrary, as in the Gluecks' 'causal law' where physical, psychiatric, and familial correlates were included while outside social forces were excluded. In the absence of any 'theoretical criterion of significance', Reiss argued that results were interpreted by the Gluecks 'ex post facto' whereas statistical methods necessitated 'the assignment of equal value to all findings'. Like others, he criticised the 'cavalier treatment' of sociological factors, also pointing to the possible causal significance of gang associates in providing 'ego-ideals' or systematically controlling and teaching members of a delinquent group.⁴⁶ For these critics, much like the psychoanalysts, the Gluecks had eschewed sociological frameworks which would allow for causal understanding. Indeed, Rubin argued that these frameworks nevertheless pervaded *Unraveling*, evident in the facts of its underprivileged cases and in the circumscription of its prediction tables to poor and marginal youth: 'in place of a study which sought steadfastly to eliminate environmental factors as well as to eliminate them from a causal law *the force of social (or environmental) causation of delinquency proves irrepressible*'.⁴⁷

The Gluecks' aggregation of findings and factors from various disciplines also encroached on these disciplines, which saw in *Unraveling* a disregard for the causal and explanatory frameworks which made these approaches coherent and valuable. Claims of 'instrumental' prediction impinged on the expertise of those who, in previous decades, had established their own claims to the young offender. As well as these disciplinary battles there was also caution regarding predictive claims to reliably connect prior traits and future offending. The factors of adolescent, institutionalised offenders would have to be transposed onto other populations, locales and age groups with accompanying validation studies. Several commentators questioned the stability of supposedly predictive factors over time. Furthermore, the dependence of prediction upon this stability was also potentially in tension with the ultimate

⁴⁵ Sol Rubin, 'Unraveling Juvenile Delinquency I. Illusions in a Research Project Using Matched Pairs', *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 57 (2) (1951): 111.

⁴⁶ Albert J. Reiss Jr., 'Unraveling Juvenile Delinquency II. An Appraisal of Research Methods', *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 57 (2) (1951): 116-117.

⁴⁷ Rubin, 'Unraveling Juvenile Delinquency I.': 113.

goal of changing outcomes through therapeutic or community interventions. As Rubin summarised:

The base of the prediction tables is in the past. Their concept is continued uniformity of the process which brings a child to the point of difficulty. Without such uniformity between past and future, the prediction tables are invalid. The larger prevention effort, the more important prevention effort, is therefore at work to produce changes which will affect the basis of the prediction table. Environment is not static; normal social change will in time render the prediction tables less and less reliable. The psychological framework of prediction tables is condemnation of the community and its services to unvarying persistence to a current course.⁴⁸

Prevention still carried the optimistic prospect of progressive social change and community service which might undermine any attempt at reliable prediction.

Unraveling's eclectic conclusions thus garnered praise and criticism from various spheres of interest in young offenders. Some welcomed the numerical ordering of judgement. Others were wary of this imposition. Most sought to defend their own models of crime causation in light of the Gluecks' apparent validation or neglect. The prediction tables also raised difficulties in subsequent application to new factors, populations, and individuals. Looking back in 1960 the Gluecks offered a defence, but only for some of these critics. Looking back on 'ten years of *Unraveling Juvenile Delinquency*' they now characterised their detractors as 'fire-breathing chevaliers eager to do battle for that purest queen of the exact sciences, sociology, to which the authors of *Unraveling* allegedly did not pay adequate tribute'.⁴⁹ In turn, they accused sociologists of 'going off the deep end' by presumptively criticising objective anthropometric and Rorschach findings. Meanwhile, the Gluecks defended their institutional sample as a more useful comparison, between the 'unquestionably pathologic and the normal', whereby their tables could 'differentiate *true* prospective delinquents... from pseudodelinquents who display *similar external behaviour* but whose future is in fact more promising'.⁵⁰ In particular the Gluecks criticised their sociological rivals' models of delinquent culture and environment as inadequate explanations. 'Delinquency subculture', they argued,

⁴⁸ Ibid. 114.

⁴⁹ Sheldon Glueck, 'Ten Years of "Unraveling Juvenile Delinquency": An Examination of Criticisms', *Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology, and Police Science*, Vol. 51 (3) (1960): 284.

⁵⁰ Ibid. 288.

‘did not fall from the heavens’ but was rather ‘made... by delinquent people, and to attribute etiologic exclusiveness or priority to it is to reason in a circle’.⁵¹ Delinquent behaviour within any environment or culture, was, in their view, best explained by individual differences and reactions measurable by their tables. Using an analogy of 10 boys in a sinking boat, the Gluecks argued that individual differences (in swimming ability or physical health), rather than common environment (the water), would best differentiate those who survived and others who drowned. ‘Antisocial aspects of culture’ were, analogously, ‘only *potential* or *possible* causes’ depending on the different responses of ‘persons of varied innate nature and early parent-child relationships’ by which prediction would distinguish the individuals at risk.⁵²

Conversely, while presenting this view of individual differences rather than cultural and environmental determinants, the Gluecks do not seem to have addressed their psychoanalytic critics on the importance of dynamic personality in explaining wrongdoing. The specific causal chains which produced the ‘individual delinquent’ were for them superseded by the combined weight of factors. The Gluecks now wrote that “‘cause” (we would have preferred to use a less controversial term) involves a *totality* of conditions necessary to bring about the delinquency result’. At the same time these conditions could not be sequenced or prioritised, drawing on other exact sciences to justify a probabilistic perspective:

Nowadays even the physical sciences state their generalizations in terms not of absolute inevitability but only of high probability. The statistical method of comparing delinquents, as a group, with non-delinquents, is not designed to bring about any point-to-point causal sequence that will always hold good for each and every case. It is rather intended to disclose whether or not a group of boys having a certain cluster of factors in its makeup will much more probably turn out to be delinquent than a group not so loaded down.⁵³

For the Gluecks, predicting on the basis of group probabilities was truly scientific, in contrast to the arbitrary attribution of causal priority amongst factors. A statistical approach still carried the concern of individual error and injustice, but they held that likely benefits outweighed likely costs:

⁵¹ Ibid. 293.

⁵² Ibid. 301.

⁵³ Ibid. 297.

The “false positives” aspect of the problem is not a scientific one but an issue in social ethics and social policy. In this connection, it is very important to point out that mistakes in *not* spotting future *delinquents* can be very costly to society, while mistakes in assuming a few persons to be potential delinquents... who nevertheless ultimately turn out *not* to be delinquents can do little harm and might even do considerable good.⁵⁴

Pre-emptive suspicion was, for the Gluecks, justified by this calculus of preventative efficiency. Fears of the potential delinquent thus outweighed fears of potential injustice. Moreover, prediction was still presented as part of a beneficent therapeutic paradigm in which false positives would merely receive increased care.

Meanwhile, based on experimental applications of the tables over the past ten years, the Gluecks felt confident in their scientific validity and the low risk of error. Their 1960 retrospective thus presented critics of prediction with ‘proof of the pudding’ in 18 studies applying the social prediction table. Most of these had retrospectively scored known delinquents across various samples ranging from 100 Jewish boys to 57 ‘antisocial’ clinical cases, 150 unmarried mothers and 150 delinquents from upper income families, along with trials of the table in Japan and Strasbourg. Here they reported that ‘in some nine-tenths of the cases... the Glueck table would have correctly identified the boys at a very early age as potential persistent delinquents’.⁵⁵ Confirmation of the table’s scores in known offenders could not, however, validate claims of prediction. The Gluecks thus placed their hope in an ongoing ten-year study by the New York City Youth Board on 223 school children selected at school entrance in 1953. I will examine some of these ‘validations’ in more detail in the following section. Through these and other studies applying the tables, prediction moved from the cases of *Unraveling* to new populations and locales, testing on the basis of race, religion, gender and social background in various institutional, judicial and school settings. The academic reception of *Unraveling* and its prediction tables pointed to unresolved disciplinary disputes and questions on the ethics and reliability of evaluating future propensities. Striking a note of historical irony Rubin’s critique of the Gluecks had concluded that these tools had no future: ‘At best they have an ephemeral life as a subsidiary tool in a crime-prevention

⁵⁴ Ibid. 306.

⁵⁵ Ibid. 304.

program'.⁵⁶ Looking beyond the reviews however we can evaluate the spread, uptake and modification of the prediction tables by practitioners in search of security through prediction.

Practitioners and Prediction

Like the reviews of *Unraveling*, the spread and implementation of the prediction tables joined the Gluecks' desire to demonstrate and validate their tools with parallel demands for such tools in various fields responsible for problem youth. Summarising the Gluecks' studies in 1952, *The Survey*, a social work magazine, introduced their prediction of delinquency 'not by a crystal ball but by a new scientific tool that indicates which "bad boy" is just feeling his oats and which is a criminal-in-the-making'.⁵⁷ Eleanor closed this article with an appeal. The Gluecks were 'seeking opportunities to validate these tables' and had 'reason to think that they will stand the rigid test of application'.⁵⁸ Already she pointed to 'proof of the pudding' in two applications of the table to 100 boys in the ongoing Cambridge-Somerville Youth study and in a forthcoming study of 100 Jewish delinquents.⁵⁹ The latter, conducted by the Jewish Board of Guardians of New York in their residential treatment institution at Hawthorne-Cedar Knolls School, pointed to correct classification of the delinquents in 91 cases while also bringing the Gluecks into contact with subsequent long-time collaborator Selma J. Glick.⁶⁰ In 1954 Glick wrote to the Gluecks informing them of 30 inquiries regarding the table following this study, from schools, social agencies, penal institutions, students, psychologists and case workers. Among those she specifically cited were San Quentin Prison, the Chicago Board of Education, Denver Public Schools, the Youth Bureau of Detroit and the Welfare Council of Evansville, Indiana.⁶¹ Indeed, the Gluecks' own research materials are replete with follow-up requests from similar institutions and agencies, as well as insurance companies, clinicians, police and private citizens seeking information or copies of the Glueck tables, 'charts', 'scales', 'tests' and so on.

⁵⁶ Rubin, 'Unraveling Juvenile Delinquency I.': 114.

⁵⁷ Eleanor T. Glueck, 'Predicting Juvenile Delinquency', *The Survey*, Vol. 88 (1952): 206.

⁵⁸ Ibid. 208.

⁵⁹ Ibid. 207.

⁶⁰ Sidney Axelrad and Selma J. Glick, 'Application of the Glueck Social Prediction Table to 100 Jewish Delinquent Boys', *The Jewish Social Quarterly*, Vol. 30 (2) (1953): 127-136.

⁶¹ Selma J. Glick to Eleanor Glueck, 11th June 1954, ETSGP, Box 58 Folder 1.

The mixed reviews of *Unraveling* reflected various hopes, uncertainties and critiques of the Gluecks' predictive project, however, archival correspondence reveals a widespread interest from practitioners and the public. In line with post-war concerns for normal health and behaviour, the anticipation and scoring of potential delinquency enjoyed something of a popular reception. In March 1955 Eleanor wrote to Bishop Fulton J. Sheen, thanking him for describing the 'Harvard studies' to millions of viewers in his religious television program, *Life is Worth Living*. The Gluecks expressed their agreement that 'the root of delinquency rests in unwholesome family life' while Sheen, in turn, praised their 'profound research' by which 'popularization of such great problems can be done on television'.⁶² Conversely, other correspondence with the public reflected the Gluecks' wariness of popularisation. Replying to one letter, asking how 'a person who is not specially trained can determine who is likely to become a juvenile delinquent', one of the Gluecks' assistants stressed that their method required 'training and experience in social work' alongside thorough knowledge of the predictive factors and their definitions so that reliable ratings could be made.⁶³ Another request came in 1957 from Dr. W. M. Willey, president of the 'Optimist Club' of Bowling Green Kentucky, composed of 'about 25 young business and professional men'. Describing their schedule of 'youth appreciation, Halloween stay at home, Christmas theatre program, bicycle safety week', and other activities Willey now expressed interest in the Gluecks' techniques and asked for 'anything which might fit into our work – such as questionnaires tests – results etc'.⁶⁴ Again, Eleanor responded that prediction and treatment was 'a task for highly skilled professional social workers', writing that 'Professor Glueck and I hesitate to suggest that your organization add this particular project to your already numerous functions'.⁶⁵

The desire to implement prediction in wider public and practical contexts was thus counterbalanced by a desire to control the application of the tables within specific fields and

⁶² Eleanor Glueck to Fulton J. Sheen, 16th March 1955; Sheen to Eleanor Glueck, 13th April 1955, ETSGP, Box 58 Folder 1.

⁶³ Joseph McKeane to Sheldon and Eleanor Glueck, 25th October 1954; Richard E. Thompson to McKeane, 8th November 1954, ETSGP, Box 58 Folder 1.

⁶⁴ W.M. Willey to Sheldon and Eleanor Glueck, 8th December 1957, ETSGP, Box 58 Folder 2.

⁶⁵ Eleanor Glueck to Willey, 17th December 1957, ETSGP, Box 58 Folder 2.

professional settings. Amongst the many prediction tables produced by the Gluecks, some were deemed impractical owing to the scarcity of competent professionals. While *Unraveling* had set out three prediction tables (social, Rorschach and psychiatric) wider dissemination and validation in the 1950s was almost exclusively limited to the social prediction table, eventually known as the 'Glueck social prediction table'. In contrast to the uneven availability of psychiatric or Rorschach expertise, Eleanor wrote in 1954 that, 'as regards the social prediction scale, any competent probation officer or social worker can easily gather the data'. The purported ease of applying the social prediction table was, however, in tension with the worrying prospect of uncontrolled, amateur implementation. Responding to another request for prediction materials in 1957, Eleanor clarified:

We have deliberately never published a form because we have not wished to encourage the use of this table by persons who might not be competent to apply it. It seems much wiser as yet to limit its use to those who have a professional interest and special competence in the gathering and assessing of the required data.⁶⁶

While the social prediction table, along with its relevant factors, scores, and probabilities, was now published in *Unraveling*, only the Gluecks could clarify how to properly investigate, interpret and score factors for prediction. In their responses to such inquiries, they limited their assistance to those they deemed credible practitioners. Eleanor, in particular, effectively maintained sole authority over scoring and often directly oversaw approved validation studies and other implementations. Thus, the social prediction table, presented to readers as a convenient, ready-made tool to guide human judgement, in fact required skilled intermediaries, usually with ongoing assistance from the Gluecks themselves.

In this way, the Gluecks attempted to control the prediction tables in selective and piecemeal but also surprisingly varied settings, working through prisons, courts, police departments, schools and even the armed forces. In these different settings, prediction tables were envisaged as objective tools of efficiency in the screening, treatment or control of potentially troublesome populations. In practice, however, their use was tied to the priorities of an expanding range of actors, as well as the Gluecks themselves. On one hand the Gluecks

⁶⁶ Eleanor Glueck to Mildred Wood, 17th December 1957, ETSGP, Box 58 Folder 2.

regularly intervened to direct predictive work while on the other hand their table could be modified in response to new constraints and uses. If, using the terminology of Bruno Latour, the previous chapter traced the ‘inscription’ of prediction tables from various sources, the following analysis of their proliferation can be framed using two more Latourian terms. Procedures for interpreting and scoring factors were not self-evident, rather, interested practitioners approached the Gluecks as an ‘obligatory passage point’ to understand these new prediction tables. In turn, careful oversight (and Eleanor’s authority over scoring in particular) helped the Gluecks control these experimental applications and secure the validations they desired. However, the table also evidently remained open to some negotiation in order to maintain various new interests in practical prediction. The following section will thus also follow the ‘translation’ of prediction tables across various settings, examining ‘the work through which actors modify, displace, and translate their various contradictory interests’.⁶⁷ To examine these various interests in prediction and their modifications of the Gluecks’ tables I will begin by briefly surveying wartime and postwar applications of the Gluecks’ prediction tables in the military before turning to the experimental use of the social prediction table in criminal justice, clinical, and public-school settings. Limitations in space and available evidence prevent me from following any of these threads beyond the mid-twentieth century, while in many cases the ultimate fate of the prediction table remains unclear. Nevertheless, by following these practical cases we can examine the shifting purposes of criminological prediction and its new target populations.

The Armed Forces

Though little acknowledged in the Gluecks’ research materials, *Unraveling* had been produced in a wartime context. Beginning research on their delinquent cases, Eleanor wrote to Sheldon’s brother Bernard Glueck in October 1939 on the difficulty of settling into work given ‘the great turmoil in Europe’. Catastrophic conflict forced them to reflect on the relative significance or insignificance of delinquency research with Eleanor concluding, ‘if not for the fact that the project which we are now undertaking seems to be important we should find it impossible to go on at all’.⁶⁸ With the United States’ direct involvement in the war from

⁶⁷ Bruno Latour, *Pandora’s Hope*: 311.

⁶⁸ Eleanor Glueck to Bernard Glueck, 9th October 1939, ETSGP, Box 33 Folder 3.

December 1941, the Gluecks also worried about their research staff called up for service, while in 1944 Sheldon published on the expected trial and punishment of war criminals.⁶⁹ War caused disruption but also provided opportunities for predictive service. From 1940 medical and psychiatric screening of potential recruits was formalised through the Selective Service System devised by the American Psychiatric Association's Military Mobilization Committee.⁷⁰ Following inquiries from Captain Alexander Schneider and Lieutenant Cyrus LaGrone, the Gluecks' methods were also tested in a 1944 paper on the 'prediction of behavior of civilian delinquents in the armed forces'. Addressing 'the problem of predicting adjustment to army life' and 'of weeding out potential misfits', a prediction table developed for adult recidivists in the Gluecks' 1943 *Criminal Careers in Retrospect* had been applied to 200 soldiers in rehabilitation for military offences with prior criminal records.⁷¹ After scoring on five factors (education of parents, intelligence, age at first delinquency, age at first employment, and industrial skill) the Gluecks concluded that in 85% 'recommendation for induction into the army might wisely have been denied on the basis of the Glueck prediction scores alone'.⁷²

Though limited in scope, this study of soldiers provided the Gluecks with their earliest 'validation' and hinted at wider interests in applying criminological prediction to questions of military efficiency, manpower and security. Subsequently, Daniel Malamud, personnel consultant at the disciplinary barracks of Fort Knox, Kentucky, requested the Gluecks' assistance in the parole, restoration or continued incarceration of military delinquents, citing 'the lack of objective, rational and systematic bases for making such judgements'.⁷³ Based on the prior validation in 1944, the Gluecks recommended a prediction table and the following year Malamud informed them of its usefulness in 'borderline cases' where staff were previously uncertain: 'our experience was that the administrative staff derived a certain security from the quantitative score in cases which were difficult to come to a clear-cut decision on a clinical judgement basis alone'.⁷⁴ As in other administrative settings, the

⁶⁹ See Sheldon Glueck, *War Criminals: Their Prosecution and Punishment* (Alfred A. Knopf: New York, NY: 1944).

⁷⁰ Matthew Smith, *The First Resort*: 54-59.

⁷¹ Alexander Schneider, Cyrus LaGrone, Eleanor Glueck and Sheldon Glueck, 'The Prediction of Behavior of Civilian Delinquents in the Armed Forces', *Mental Hygiene*, Vol. 28 (3) (1944): 456.

⁷² *Ibid.* 467.

⁷³ Daniel Malamud to Sheldon Glueck, 5th November 1946, ETSGP, Box 58 Folder 2.

⁷⁴ Malamud to Eleanor Glueck, 11th November 1947, ETSGP, Box 58 Folder 2.

enumerated prediction table reassured those judging the uncertain future of a given case. Yet, in the military context the evaluation of soldiers' futures seemed to combine individual and national insecurities. An anonymous and undated memorandum on 'air force interest in the offender and delinquent projects' thus began with the striking premise that 'no nation is socially, economically, or politically mature until it has learned to use its marginal manpower in the development and protection of its way of life'.⁷⁵ The imperatives of the Second World War and subsequent Cold War demanded new economies and efficiencies of manpower, including potentially dangerous criminal and delinquent recruits, wherein quantified predictive measures might provide 'security' both for individual administrators and for the nation.

The Gluecks' interest in following up the 1000 cases of *Unraveling* from the late 1940s brought them into more continuous contact with the armed forces. In assessing subsequent conduct, they turned to various new or expanded sources of new military service information. The Selective Service Bureau of Massachusetts had collated the records of 1.6 million men registered for the draft, including those turning 18 between 1940 and 1947.⁷⁶ The Gluecks negotiated for access to these files along with those of the Veteran's Administration concerning the discharge, subsequent benefits, healthcare and re-adjustment of numerous delinquent and non-delinquent cases with military records.⁷⁷ By 1957 the Gluecks calculated that, of the 1000 boys studied for *Unraveling*, 640 had subsequently been in military service.⁷⁸ Turning to particular branches of the armed forces they hoped for further information on the reasons for discharge, any misconduct, and other details of service, specialisation, ratings or test scores.⁷⁹ Here they encountered differing military confidentiality codes. While the Navy, Marines and Coastguard were willing to overrule restrictions on 'information of a derogatory nature', the Army remained committed to 'long established policy precluding the furnishing

⁷⁵ 'Air Force Interest in the Offender and Delinquent Projects', ETSGP, Box 36 Folder 8.

⁷⁶ G[eorge]. F. M[cGrath]., 'Bureau of Selective Service Records', 11th February, 1948, ETSGP, Box 36 Folder 7.

⁷⁷ Sheldon Glueck to William Blake, 1st June 1949, ETSGP, Box 36 Folder 6.

⁷⁸ G[eorge]. F. M[cGrath]., 'Memo for Ford Report re: Service of Subjects in Armed Forces', 22nd May 1956, Box 36 Folder 6.

⁷⁹ 'Memo on Information Wanted from U.S. Army', 7th March 1950, ETSGP, Box 36 Folder 6.

of such information' on individual personnel.⁸⁰ Faced with the Army's continuing resistance to criminological inquiry, Eleanor complained that 'if they really understood the purpose of our work they would be only too glad to cooperate as it would provide them with an excellent brief screening test'.⁸¹ The Gluecks thus fostered the promise of military screening and behavioural prediction, hoping to thereby secure access to specific follow-up information.

This promise brought the Gluecks into contact with Lieutenant-Colonel Van H. Tanner, of the Air Force's Human Resources Research Institute. In 1953 Tanner conferred with the Gluecks to request some 'top level thinking' on the problem of assimilating servicemen with prior records of juvenile delinquency. He claimed that 20,000 men a month went AWOL while 42% in disciplinary barracks had previously been adjudicated as delinquents. These incarcerated servicemen were 'a distinct liability to the armed services not only because they are 'misfits' but because they cost the services some \$10,000 per man'. With his special access to military records, Tanner hoped that the Gluecks could use this data as 'a basis for building up knowledge about the best possible utilization of the potential reservoir of manpower among those with prior criminal records'. In exchange for developing an appropriate 'prediction device', Tanner promised to do the 'leg work' of securing military records on the cases from *Unraveling*.⁸² It is unfortunately unclear what became of this effort. According to a brief report on the 'army-prediction study' the following year, data provided by Tanner had provided 'a clear picture of the kind of adjustment each of our subjects has made to life in the service'. In turn it was expected that 'this portion of our work will result in a predictive device which would prove valuable to the armed forces' for classification, assignment and discipline.⁸³ However, lack of subsequent evidence means it is unclear whether such a 'device' was developed or discarded. In any case, the Gluecks' collaborations with the armed forces point to the expansive notions of security and insecurity which criminological prediction could accommodate. For their military contacts, predictive 'devices' promised to confer efficiency and economy to the mobilisation and management of personnel so that individual and

⁸⁰ Sheldon Glueck to Commandant, USMC, 15th February 1949; N.W. Sprow to Sheldon Glueck, 16th March 1949, ETSGP, Box 36 Folder 7; Edward Witsell to Sheldon Glueck, 20th August 1948, ETSGP, Box 36 Folder 8.

⁸¹ Eleanor Glueck to Austin MacCormic, 17th February 1950, ETSGP, Box 36 Folder 6.

⁸² Memorandum, 15th June 1953, ETSGP, Box 36 Folder 6.

⁸³ G[eorge]. F. M[cGrath]., Memorandum, 17th June 1954, ETSGP, Box 36 Folder 7.

international risks could be anticipated. While the fate of prediction in the armed forces remains unclear, the desire to both secure and streamline administrative judgements would be reflected in other settings.

Criminal Justice

The most immediately relevant settings for testing and ultimately applying the prediction tables of *Unraveling* were the courts, police departments and prisons which regularly encountered, managed and sentenced offenders. Two decades on from their initial proposals of a 'predictive instrument' to augment sentencing, the Gluecks had now published dozens of tables by which to assess chances of recidivism and improvement. However, formal adoption of these and other actuarial tools lagged with only Illinois penitentiaries instituting the competing Burgess method of parole prediction by the mid-century. The Gluecks' correspondence meanwhile suggests piecemeal and informal applications of their prediction tables from the latter 1940s as well as the problems they faced. Writing to the Gluecks in October 1945, psychiatrist Rudolph Schwartz hoped to apply their prediction methods to parolees at Sing Sing. While still cautious, pending further validation, the Gluecks were encouraged by results in the Armed Forces and assured Schwartz that their tables were 'accurate and ready for use'.⁸⁴ The following year, however, Schwartz reported that he was discontinuing their use based on a 'vast discrepancy in the prediction of success in your tables and the actual success reported by the parole board'. Of 245 parolees scored at Sing Sing, The Gluecks' tables predicted successes in 32% while the Parole Board reported a mean success rate of approximately 65-70% in the five years after release.⁸⁵ The Gluecks contested that the Board's definition of 'success' was unknown to them but would henceforth emphasise the experimental nature of their prediction tables.⁸⁶ Other requests came from the Maryland State Reformatory in 1947 and Elmira in 1948, the latter seeking 'prediction cards' for its newly formed reception centre which did not yet have its own research or statistics to follow in recommending sentencing or treatment.⁸⁷ The Gluecks' tables promised a ready-made

⁸⁴ Eleanor Glueck to Rudolph Schwartz, 17th October 1945, ETSGP, Box 58 Folder 2.

⁸⁵ Schwartz to Eleanor Glueck, 25th May 1946, ETSGP, Box 58 Folder 2.

⁸⁶ Eleanor Glueck to Schwartz, 29th May 1946, ETSGP, Box 58 Folder 2.

⁸⁷ Eleanor Glueck to N. Pashan, 14th February 1947; Glenn Kendall to Eleanor Glueck, 10th February 1948, ETSGP, Box 58 Folder 2.

advisory and administrative tool but in these early responses to correctional institutions, assurances of accuracy were strategically tempered by cautions against 'complete effectiveness' or compatibility with existing measures, procedures and therapeutics.

Following the release of *Unraveling*, prediction began to proliferate even without the Gluecks' mediation. Amongst law enforcement, for example, they instead heard of interest and even implementation after the fact. A letter in 1955 from the University of Southern California's Delinquency Control Institute for police and other practitioners thus informed Sheldon that 'your books are most popular among our police juvenile officer students' with some considering their application for deciding on release or referral to other agencies.⁸⁸ Later, in 1957, the Gluecks were 'delighted' to note a *New York Times* report on the New York Police Department's apparent adoption of the Social Prediction Table, 'a development about which we knew absolutely nothing'.⁸⁹ Though the Gluecks claimed that the NYPD were screening for 'true delinquents', the report in question is more ambiguous. A new 417-member Youth Division was described, bringing 'unified command, increased efficiency, added patrol and greater mobility in dealing with the activities and problems of misguided youth'. In particular the report emphasised the simplification of paperwork to free up resources and personnel. While previously officers 'used to spend as much as an hour typing detailed narratives of a case', now 'in ten minutes or less the check list will enable them to note such factors as the degree of "supervision", "affection" and "discipline" by the mother and father of the boy or girl involved, the family's "cohesiveness" and "moral tone", and so on'. While not named personally the Gluecks' social factors were evidently now codified in the NYPD's new Youth Division, chosen to streamline narrative case reporting into a check list of salient features. Their predictive use is less clear although the same article described the patrol of 'places where gang disturbances are likely' along with 'critical points' anticipated by officers such as South Bronx and Harlem.⁹⁰ Predictive factors promised more efficient paperwork but also joined the pre-existing experience and prejudices of officers who patrolled with their own notions of likely trouble spots, targeting marginalised neighbourhoods.

⁸⁸ Dan Pursuit to Sheldon Glueck, 4th May 1955, ETSGP, Box 58 Folder 1.

⁸⁹ Eleanor Glueck to Eveolyn Rexford, 29th March 1957, ETSGP, Box 62 Folder 7.

⁹⁰ Peter Kihss, 'Youth Crime Force Bolstered By Police', *New York Times*, 27th March 1957: 1, 24.

Few detailed conclusions can be drawn about police applications of the prediction tables without further evidence. More can be said of the Boston Juvenile Court (BJC) where the Gluecks attempted to validate their social prediction table. Writing to Judge John S. Conolly in February 1954, they hoped that the nearby BJC could be the site of 'pioneer work' applying their scale at the 'mouth of the hopper' with the expectation of 'a very useful instrumentality for juvenile courts in general'. The Gluecks reassured him that the items for scoring "happen to be factors which are relatively easily secured from already recorded sources" while only closed cases would be chosen so as not to interfere with court business.⁹¹ Like others, this 'validation' would thus be retrospective, scoring juveniles already sentenced as delinquents. Richard E. Thompson, assistant on several of the Gluecks' validation studies, culled data for the five factors from records of 100 closed cases while Eleanor remained responsible for scoring. Plans were made for more expansive application and after meeting with the Court's chief probation officer, Elliott Sands, in April the Gluecks indicated that 'later on we might wish to apply the scale to a group of girls and also to a group of Negroe boys'. Sands, in turn, hoped that they would eventually apply the social prediction table to current cases first appearing before the court.⁹²

While the extent of subsequent implementation is unclear, results on 100 cases were published in 1957, covering 50 boys sentenced by the BJC and 50 girls committed by local courts for custodial care. Using a social prediction score of 250 or over as a 'cut off point' for potential delinquency, Thompson pointed to correct score classifications for 46 boys and all of the girls. This was in spite of different distributions across the five factors from those used in the original table. Citing the greater number of absent fathers in the BJC caseload, paternal discipline was scored as 'lax' in 63% of boys and 75.6% of girls as compared to 26.6% in the delinquent sample of *Unraveling* while maternal supervision was correspondingly more suitable. Parental affection amongst the BJC sample was also more 'indifferent' or 'hostile' while families were apparently 'unintegrated' in 46.9% of boys and 76% of girls compared to

⁹¹ Eleanor Glueck to John Connolly, 15th February 1954, ETSGP, Box 62 Folder 10

⁹² 'Ford Diary', 8th April 1954, ETSGP, Box 62 Folder 10.

24.7% amongst *Unraveling's* delinquents.⁹³ For Thompson and the Gluecks, results from the BJC confirmed the effectiveness of probabilistic prediction even in highly varied cases where the final balance of factors would, nevertheless, produce a correct score. However, the Court study also points to the role of the social prediction table in validating judicial discrimination based on social class and background. Based on the subjective evaluation of interfamilial relations, the social prediction table consolidated contemporary notions of wholesome child-rearing in the normative nuclear family while single parents and their children were scored as greater risks. These underlying assumptions were also evident in the illustrative cases provided by Thompson. Describing a 14-year-old girl who scored 402, he reported:

Each of the parents went their own way, leaving the children largely to their own devices. The mother worked nights as a waitress at a café, and the children were left unsupervised because the father also worked at night as a cab driver. The children were poorly dressed and unclean when appearing at school. The mother herself was not careful about her appearance.

Picking out the discipline, affection and cohesion of a case, the social prediction table connected criminal propensities with the economic situation and precarious employment of both parents. The mother in particular was held responsible for failing to maintain both moral standards and outward appearances with the father claiming that 'she drank and was promiscuous' while a social worker even criticised her for walking around the house barefooted. Having appeared in court for failing to send their children to school, their daughter had blamed her quarrelling parents but was also now marked by the social prediction table as almost certainly a future delinquent.⁹⁴

In contrast, one boy who had been reported as accidentally stabbing another, had scored 179.9, well below the threshold for future offending. Without a prior record this boy was referred to the court's Citizenship Training Group while investigators described an apparently model, middle-class upbringing. His family lived in 'an attractive, well-furnished apartment that was kept spotlessly clean', complemented by various electrical appliances. The father was described as 'easily confused' but was, nevertheless, 'extremely disturbed and heart broken

⁹³ Richard E. Thompson, 'Further Validation of the Glueck Social Prediction Table for Identifying Potential Delinquents', *The Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology and Police Science*, Vol. 48 (2) (1957): 180-181.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.* 183.

over his son's first and only court appearance, and could not believe that his boy would commit such an "offence". His 'quiet, reserved' mother was also disturbed by the incident, describing the boy as a 'model son' who also helped at a local settlement house where he was well-liked by the director. Likewise, the boy's brother, a first-year law student described the case as 'a blow to the whole family'.⁹⁵ This boy, in court for stabbing another, was judged by investigators and apparently confirmed by the social prediction table as an 'accidental' offender based on his affluent, educated, concerned family. In a reversal of its predictive role, the table now pointed to this case and to one other already sentenced by the court as 'really non-delinquent', characterising their offences as 'accidents' or 'misunderstandings' based on the scoring of background factors. Here 'predictive' scores offered the classed and gendered presumptions of the court and its officers validation, differentiating between true and false delinquents by their favourable or unfavourable backgrounds rather than the offences they had committed.

The Clinic

The conclusion of *Unraveling* the Gluecks put forward their prediction tables not only as a guide for decisions but also diagnostic and therapeutic ones. Here and in their other publications they regarded prediction optimistically as the prelude to preventative care rather than immediate criminalisation. Accordingly, attempts to implement the social prediction table in clinical settings pointed to hopes that it might lead to effective, early treatment interventions for delinquents. As interwar mental hygiene, the Second World War had further bolstered the size and status of the discipline of psychiatry with Federal support following the foundation of the National Institute of Mental Health in 1949.⁹⁶ The fields of American psychoanalysis and child psychotherapy were, concurrently, also bolstered by incoming refugee practitioners from Europe.⁹⁷ Deborah Doroshow meanwhile points to the rejection, in these years, of custodial institutions in favour of the 'therapeutic milieu' of new Residential Treatment Centres where dependent, delinquent and other problem youth constituted a new

⁹⁵ Ibid. 184.

⁹⁶ Smith, *The First Resort*: 17-61.

⁹⁷ George Makari, 'Mitteleuropa on the Hudson: On the Struggle for American Psychoanalysis After the Anschluß', in Burnham (ed.), *After Freud Left*: 111-124.

population of 'emotionally disturbed' children.⁹⁸ Similar institutions were in contact with the Gluecks through the 1950s with prediction offered as a therapeutic aid but also often as a cost-saving measure. Indeed, desires to treat disturbed or delinquent youth were in tension with desires to protect therapeutic programmes from individuals deemed too dangerous, disruptive or costly. For Mildred Wood of the Sunny Ridge Home for Children, the Gluecks' social prediction table seemed an ideal 'screening device' 'since we do not intend to accept children for care who very probably will develop into serious delinquents'.⁹⁹ Similarly, in 1958, Robert Whitfield of the Chaddock Boys School wrote to the Gluecks on a recent meeting of administrators concerning the low rates of re-adjustment in their juvenile cases, many of whom were apparently beyond their resources: 'All of us recognize the trend in the institutional field of being asked to serve more disturbed youngsters and older youngsters'. Whitfield did not desire a therapeutic aid but rather hoped 'to use the "scale" as a very important tool in enabling all of us to cut down this waste of accepting youngsters we can't serve'.¹⁰⁰

Alongside validation studies in the Boston Juvenile Court, the Gluecks sought a clinical validation and follow up of the social prediction table in the local Douglas A. Thom Clinic and were in contact with its director, Eveolyn Rexford by the end of 1952. Offering long term psychotherapy to children and guidance to parents, the Thom Clinic emphasised the dynamic significance of parent-child relationships and resolution of conflicts in its case studies and reports.¹⁰¹ In 1953 the clinic saw 221 children with 132 ongoing treatment cases. Most were aged 6-9, privately referred for aggressive, passive, nervous and other behaviour along with learning difficulties and delinquency, treated alongside their parents who were also often regarded as neurotics acting out old familial conflicts.¹⁰² The Thom Clinic had been conducting its own five-year study of 45 delinquent cases since 1947. Pointing to this clinical experience, Rexford concluded that 'psychoanalytic psychotherapy can accomplish a re-distribution of

⁹⁸ Doroshow, *Emotionally Disturbed*: 1-8.

⁹⁹ Mildred Wood to Eleanor Glueck, 12th December 1957, ETSGP, Box 58 Folder 2.

¹⁰⁰ Robert Whitfield to Sheldon Glueck, 14th February 1958, ETSGP, Box 58 Folder 2.

¹⁰¹ See Kurt E. Rose and Margaret Shriver, 'Dynamic Significance of Mother Child Relationship in a Young Delinquent with Psychotic Mechanisms'; Eveolyn Rexford and Suzanne T. Amerongen, 'The Influence of Unsolved Maternal Oral Conflicts Upon Impulsive Acting Out in Young Children', ETSGP, Box 62 Folder 9.

¹⁰² 'Annual Report of the Director of the Thom Clinic for 1953', ETSGP, Box 62 Folder 8.

instinctual energy and a modification of ego defences leading to the renunciation of this form of acting out'.¹⁰³ However, as in other institutions, the Thom Clinic's therapeutic optimism was tempered by the need to manage caseloads through 'careful diagnostic procedures enabling us to choose more effectively those families who primarily need and can profit by psychiatric treatment and to recommend alternative measures to others'.¹⁰⁴ In subsequent correspondence on the application of the social prediction table to the clinic's delinquent cases Eleanor thus emphasised its 'especial value to you as a screening device at the point of intake'.¹⁰⁵ The application of prediction tables to a clinical caseload, however, would also reflect the new diagnostic priorities of psychoanalytic psychotherapists.

The social prediction table was first applied to materials from 57 delinquent cases treated at the Thom clinic between 1947 and 1953. Beginning in June 1953, a preliminary survey of clinical records revealed the daunting prospect of establishing the five needed factors from more extensive case materials. Rexford thus wrote to Eleanor on a recent discussion with Thompson:

I told him frankly that I did not know how usable for his purposes he would find our clinical records. For instance, he wondered if there would be any material on family relationships, and when I observed that he would find literally hundreds of pages in each one of our long-term records concerned largely with family relationships, he looked somewhat taken aback.¹⁰⁶

To assuage the worries of Thompson and the Thom Clinic's trustees, Eleanor soon agreed to personally direct Thompson in synthesising these extensive psychotherapy materials for scoring.¹⁰⁷ In fact, while the Clinic put forward extensive interview and observational material, Eleanor still found fault with the Thom Clinic's lack of home investigations, citing 'some difficulty here and there because of the incompleteness of the materials'. Overabundance or scarcity of information was joined by anxiety about the consistency of interpretation and scoring. Eleanor thus wrote to Rexford 'to make certain that in those cases which are

¹⁰³ Eveolyn Rexford, 'Some Problems of Juvenile Delinquency as the Child Psychiatrist Sees them', 26th May 1953, ETSGP, Box 62 Folder 9.

¹⁰⁴ 'Annual Report of the Director of the Thom Clinic for 1953', ETSGP, Box 62 Folder 8: 2.

¹⁰⁵ Eleanor Glueck to Rexford, 19th February 1954, ETSGP, Box 62 Folder 8.

¹⁰⁶ Rexford to Eleanor Glueck, 1st June 1953, ETSGP, Box 62 Folder 8.

¹⁰⁷ Memorandum, 16th June 1953, ETSGP, Box 62 Folder 8.

“scorable” there is essential agreement between your scorer and myself’.¹⁰⁸ Beyond existing material on long-term cases they hoped that staff would obtain the necessary factors from a child as a matter of course in initial application interviews. However, it was later reported that ‘all of the application interviews did not contain the requisite information and that briefing of even trained professional persons is important if initial contacts are to be used routinely for scoring of the Glueck tables’.¹⁰⁹ The purported convenience of the prediction table as a ‘useful instrumentality’ was thus tempered by the need to standardise judgement and bring existing records and interviewing practices in line with the Gluecks’ specific information requirements.

Rexford’s initial report in 1954 conversely counterbalanced statistical prediction with clinical judgement. The social prediction table retrospectively scored 47 of the 57 delinquent cases as high risk but this result was presented alongside psychiatric impressions of ‘improvement’ in behaviour, school progress, peer relationships, interests, health, and family structure. Faced with the relapse of two ‘improved’ cases into delinquent and gang activities Rexford acknowledged that there were as yet ‘no conclusive psychiatric criteria to determine which child is suffering from transitory delinquent symptoms and which is heading for a long criminal career’.¹¹⁰ Rather than turning to the prediction tables, however, she instead pointed to the need for ‘highly developed special skills’ among clinicians as well as ‘a personality makeup enabling the therapist to function as a support and a desirable model for identification’.¹¹¹ For Rexford, psychotherapy was necessarily personal rather than instrumental. The social prediction table was instead primarily studied in the Thom Clinic as an object of psychiatric analysis requiring dynamic explanation. In 1955 a Thom Clinic paper reported:

Our increasing preoccupation with the psychodynamic family inter-relationships which promote and perpetuate the antisocial pattern of behavior in the young child bears directly upon the questions implicit in the scheme of the social prediction tables, that is if these items regarding the attitudes of the two parents to this specific child have a high predictive value for potential

¹⁰⁸ Eleanor Glueck to Rexford, 17th June 1954, ETSGP, Box 62 Folder 8.

¹⁰⁹ Memorandum, June 1955, ETSGP, Box 62 Folder 7: 5-6

¹¹⁰ Rexford, ‘Report of Follow-Up Study April 1st to July 1st 1954 of Research Study in Delinquency Carried Out at Thom Clinic from November 1947 to July 1952, ETSGP, Box 62 Folder 8: 15

¹¹¹ *Ibid.* 17.

delinquency, why and how do these factors represent a nuclear constellation of great significance for the development of antisocial behavior?¹¹²

Presented with 'gross' factors, and probabilities of delinquency, the Thom Clinic hoped for a more dynamic formulation of the features 'picked out' by these tables.

In 1956 Rexford reported on 100 boys randomly selected at intake, comparing their initial social prediction table scores with later diagnoses by staff. Most notably, in comparing cases later diagnosed as 'antisocial' or 'neurotic' she pointed to roughly equal proportions of neuroticism below and above the cut-off score of 250 while all antisocial cases (31 in total) had scored above this threshold. These findings still raised diagnostic questions however, particularly in those cases scoring 250-299, with a 63.5% chance of delinquency. For Rexford and her clinicians this '63.5 group' was a 'peculiarly complex problem in correlation' with no clearcut diagnosis, instead pointing to a 'provocative' mixture of antisocial and neurotic symptoms.¹¹³ Dr. Virginia Clower, who had scored these cases based on their application interviews later concluded: 'our impression is that the scales almost invariably give high scores to the child with aggressive destructive behaviour problems, whether these problems are seen in an individual with an antisocial character formation, a neurosis, or a psychosis'. Scores however, could only summarise inter-familial situations which would be fully expounded through complex, long-term analysis. For now, Clower speculated that varying scores for paternal and maternal discipline or affection may reflect a case's identification with a more or less disturbed father or mother. Thus, while reporting agreement with the Gluecks' scores, clinicians further wondered how 'the scales may indicate in broad outline some very complicated relationships in the family'.¹¹⁴

Ultimately, the application of the social prediction table in the Thom Clinic appears to have stalled by the 1960s. In 1957, Eleanor had thanked Clower for her important work on the diagnostic and therapeutic significance of the table, but referred to her team as 'the only

¹¹² Memorandum, June 1955, ETSGP, Box 62 Folder 7.

¹¹³ Rexford to Eleanor Glueck, 11th June 1956, ETSGP, Box 62 Folder 7.

¹¹⁴ Virginia Clower to Eleanor Glueck, 16th May 1957, ETSGP, Box 62 Folder 7.

clinical group at work on this problem'.¹¹⁵ Responding to the Gluecks' requests for further study in subsequent years, Rexford was hopeful but non-committal, pointing to the limited time of staff and 'dire difficulties in relation to funds'.¹¹⁶ Writing to them in 1964, she did not know whether anything would ever be worked out but was still intrigued by the clinical and theoretical questions raised by the tables: 'my clinician's why always reverberates to reports of the use of the prediction tables'.¹¹⁷ Here and in prior Thom Clinic studies, the social prediction table had itself become an object of psychoanalytic explanation as therapists sought to recover the individual dynamics reflected in its statistical scores. By correlating delinquency with the discipline, affection and cohesion of parents and families, the table readily accommodated this analytic emphasis. Indeed, the Gluecks had deliberately selected these factors to reflect 'under-the-roof' culture and 'family drama'. Even so, predictive scores and probabilities were only a starting point in diagnosis and treatment which would depend on the personality and judgement of therapists. Prioritising their ongoing casework, these clinicians were evidently interested in making sense of prediction in their own terms but less able to devote time and resources to the new information requirements of scoring the 'seemingly gross items... which make up the social prediction scale'.¹¹⁸

The School

The applications and 'validations' examined thus far have been largely retrospective. Among the studies cited by the Gluecks to answer their critics almost all had scored children already judged delinquent, claiming that their tables *would have* successfully identified them as potential offenders. The 'proof of the pudding' they sought, however, required longitudinal studies, that applied the tables to a sample of young children and followed their behaviour in subsequent years. This test of prediction was undertaken in New York's public schools through the 1950s and early 1960s by the New York City Youth Board (NYCYB). The Board's executive director, Ralph W. Whelan, had worked as a social investigator on *Unraveling* and now pushed the value of testing and establishing the Gluecks' methods. Writing on the NYCYB's 'experiment' in 1954, he argued that 'prediction and control are the hallmarks of scientific method'. As well as serving these 'fundamental' purposes in a school population, scientific

¹¹⁵ Eleanor Glueck to Clower, 21st May 1957, ETSGP, Box 62 Folder 7.

¹¹⁶ Rexford to Eleanor Glueck, 21st March 1960, ETSGP, Box 62 Folder 7.

¹¹⁷ Rexford to Sheldon and Eleanor Glueck, 7th July 1964, ETSGP, Box 62 Folder 7.

¹¹⁸ Rexford to Eleanor Glueck, 8th June 1954, ETSGP, Box 62 Folder 8.

prediction would also justify the resources for improvement: 'direct evidence of need as produced in valid applications of such a scale would be mighty weapons in securing wider acceptance of preventative measures, and the necessary financial support'.¹¹⁹ Whelan hoped that prediction tables would highlight those in most need, working with local child guidance clinics. However, this would ultimately contribute to the further criminalisation of particular urban areas and groups. The aim was to 'select individual children within specified geographical areas who are in greatest need of special attention', areas chosen, as in *Unraveling*, on the basis of high delinquency rates along with the industrial, commercial and residential features of the 'delinquency area'.¹²⁰ In connection with chosen areas of study, the social prediction table was also now applied to racial minorities. As Whelan summarised, 'in choice of schools and neighborhood, the study group, by design, includes high proportions of Negro and Puerto Rican children'. He anticipated that 'the applicability of the prediction table to different ethnic groups will be one of the most significant results to emerge from the present study'.¹²¹

The study had applied the social prediction table to 223 New York school boys entering first grade between September 1952 and May 1953, 51 white, 41 Puerto Rican, and 131 'negro'. Here, their initial scores already connected risk to race, with 18% of the white group scored above the cut-off point of 250 as potential delinquents, compared to 29% and 38% of the Puerto Rican and 'negro' groups respectively. As in *Unraveling* and other validation studies, the assignment of criminal propensities also intersected with the evaluation of economic circumstances. 42% of those scored as potential delinquents were dependent on private agencies, compared to 11% of the potential non-delinquents. In turn, the social prediction table again picked out single parent families as criminogenic pointing to only 36% of 'high chance' delinquents living with both parents.¹²² In line with contemporary discourses surrounding the 'pathological' circumstances of black families and unmarried mothers, Whelan pointed in particular to the higher proportion of absent parents in the negro group,

¹¹⁹ Ralph W. Whelan, 'An Experiment in Predicting Delinquency', *The Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology and Police Science*, Vol. 45 (4) (1954): 441.

¹²⁰ Ibid. 440.

¹²¹ Ibid. 436.

¹²² Ibid. 438-439.

aligning race, illegitimacy, and criminal propensities through the scores and statistics of the social prediction table.¹²³ The sites of prediction, as revealed by an interim report of 1957, were also those identified by the NYPD as 'critical points' for crime with 203 of the now 256 boys of the study coming from 37 schools in the Bronx.¹²⁴

Along with the social and racial composition of the sample, this 1957 report also suggested an ongoing concern to standardise scores and 'iron out' questionable judgements. Each case had been scored by both project supervisor Maude M. Craig and by Selma Glick, consulting Eleanor on any cases of disagreement. By 1957 however, 40 cases had been submitted for rescoring since the rating criteria had 'evolved in their final form', citing insufficient data, disagreements and miscellaneous reasons for low confidence. 16 cases were rescored by Craig, Glick and a Mrs Schute who, 'coming from different disciplines provide a balance to one another'. Other concerns with prior scores were dismissed as suggestions made on a 'frankly clinical or impressionistic basis'.¹²⁵ On one hand the researchers of the NYCIB study, to validate initial predictions, sought standardisation and consistency across staff and cases while. On the other hand, they regularly adapted to available information and personal perspectives as the social prediction table 'evolved' in new settings. The eventual results of the study would, in fact, be given in terms of a new social prediction table which differed significantly from that used at the outset.

In the NYCIB study, the social prediction table, as in other examples, underwent a process of clarification and adaptation to new settings, information and personnel. For the Gluecks, the objectivity of their predictive factors was balanced against the varying skill of those assessing them. Writing to Rexford in 1956, Eleanor thus summarised the major problems of applying the tables in terms of 'the skills of the field investigators', concluding that 'it cannot be said that the scale itself does not do its object, it can only be said that the investigations which

¹²³ For contemporary discourses on 'pathological' black crime and illegitimacy see Muhammad, *The Condemnation of Blackness*: 226-268; Kunzel, 'White Neurosis, Black Pathology': 304-331

¹²⁴ 'Present Status of the Prediction-Validation Study, May 1957': 2, ETSGP, Box 62 Folder 7.

¹²⁵ Ibid. 3-4.

enter into the gathering of the needed data are not adequate'.¹²⁶ The Gluecks ascribed perceived failures of prediction to practitioners and available materials rather than the table itself. But the technique of assessing and scoring the five factors was not at all self-evident. Just as researchers in New York were adapting to the social prediction table's requirements, others hoping to apply the social prediction table to school children sought the Gluecks' guidance, such as Doris Appel working in the school system of Grosse Pointe, Michigan. Responding to Appel's queries on the classification of certain cases, Eleanor returned some quickly noted answers. A dead or absent father was rated as 'lax' while sporadic discipline by different adults was marked as 'erratic'. Meanwhile, in cases where family members were absent for reasons beyond their control, 'cohesiveness' could be rated based on the remaining family.¹²⁷ In 1958 another inquirer struggling with the table was reassured that 'even the group at the New York City Youth Board had to turn to us in the beginning of their inquiry for instructions in regard to scoring the cases', relying on Eleanor to clarify uncertainties in the collection of data and their 'proper' interpretation and scoring.¹²⁸

Eleanor forwarded other queries for Craig to answer based on the NYCIB's experience with the table. Responding to juvenile court judge William Ginos in 1954 Craig advised that 'we learned that scoring could not be done mechanically', but rather 'requires sensitivity to the problems and relationships within a family group'.¹²⁹ Having taken on the Gluecks' supposedly impersonal tool of prediction, she and her researchers instead found that its results relied on the personal qualities of an investigator, as well as Eleanor's direct involvement to ensure accuracy and consistency. For others, insistence on training and thorough investigation raised an unexpected workload in applying the tables. Avanelle Davis, hoping to write a thesis on the prediction of delinquency in the first grade thus anxiously inquired:

I believe I understand how scoring is done, but I am not sure just how I go about arriving at a decision concerning a child. For example, one of the factors is listed as discipline of the boy by father: overstrict or erratic; lax; firm but kindly. Do I answer this and the other factors with the opinion I have gathered from home

¹²⁶ Eleanor Glueck to Rexford, 12th June 1956, ETSGP, Box 62 Folder 7.

¹²⁷ Doris Appel to Eleanor Glueck, 1st September 1954; Sheila Murphrey to Appel, 8th September 1954, ETSGP, Box 52 Folder 2.

¹²⁸ Eleanor Glueck to Beverly Lipschitz, 20th March 1958, ETSGP, Box 58 Folder 2.

¹²⁹ Maude Craig to William Ginos, 1st July 1954, ETSGP, Box 58 Folder 1.

visits, interviews or what? Also is my opinion determined by the presence of certain conditions in the child's life? In other words will it be necessary for me to interview each child, make a home visit or just what method is used in collecting the data? I had planned to use the scale with approximately two hundred and twenty five first and second graders in the building where I teach.¹³⁰

Responding to these concerns, Eleanor assured Davis that 'a case worker with psychiatric skills is accustomed to doing this work and can arrive at judgements rather quickly'.¹³¹ The social prediction table appeared to the Gluecks' readers as a tool to streamline judgement however such questions surrounding the scoring of subjective inter-familial qualities pointed back to the assumed competencies of the psychiatric or social caseworker and often to Eleanor's own personal experience.

In 1963, after 10 years of longitudinal study, Craig and Glick reported on the results of the NYCYB study for 244 boys who had now reached 17 years of age with somewhat mixed results. Of 126 scoring below 200, given an 8.2% chance of delinquency, only 7 were reported as offenders while, at the other extreme, 14 of the 17 highest risk cases with scores over 300 were now reported as delinquents. However, at the middle of the scale predictions were uncertain. In particular, 30 of the 40 boys scoring between 250 and 299, with a 63.5% chance of delinquency, remained non-delinquent despite being placed above the Glueck's cut-off score, while most incorrect predictions had scored between 247 and 255. Applied at school entrance, the social prediction table had significantly overpredicted delinquency in this middle group.¹³² Other challenges reflected the above tensions between purported objectivity and underlying judgements in the Gluecks' predictive methods. Craig and Glick stressed the training of case workers in the terminology of *Unraveling* whereby 'all data to be used for case ratings had to be factual and observed rather than impressionistic or diagnostic'.¹³³ Nevertheless, William Angoff, working as a statistical consultant for the NYCYB studying the reliability of NYCYB raters, had pointed to frequent disagreement on factors of maternal and paternal affection. Here Craig and Glick, once again, suggested the influence of different

¹³⁰ Avanelle Davis to Murphrey, 8th January 1957, ETSGP, Box 58 Folder 2.

¹³¹ Eleanor Glueck to Davis, 11th January, 1957, ETSGP, Box 58 Folder 2.

¹³² Maude M. Craig and Selma J. Glick, 'Ten Years Experience with the Glueck Social Prediction Table', *Crime and Delinquency*, Vol. 9 (3) (1963): 256-257.

¹³³ Ibid. 253.

disciplinary backgrounds, claiming that while some social workers limited their assessment of parental affection to surface manifestations, others had employed psychoanalytic concepts with different results.¹³⁴

To solve these and other problems the original social prediction table had been significantly revised over the 10 years of study. Due to inconsistencies between raters, both factors of parental affection were dropped to produce a new three factor table covering paternal discipline, maternal supervision and family cohesion. Still unsatisfied with this table, The NYCIB study limited subsequent iterations almost entirely to judgements of the boy's mother. Along with the difficulty of evaluating absent fathers, Craig and Glick drew on experience wherein 'the mother's role during the first six years of life seemed to assume greater significance than we had thought and perhaps should be weighted more heavily'.¹³⁵ Consulting with the Gluecks a final three factor social prediction table was now based on discipline by mother, supervision by mother and cohesiveness of family, divided more conveniently into three score classes with 8.6%, 58.2% and 89% chances of delinquency. The original scores of the 244 boys were accordingly rearranged allowing Craig and Glick to report that 186 of 193 'low scorers' were non-delinquent, 23 of 27 high scorers were delinquent and 9 of 19 in the middle group, with an "almost even chance", were delinquent.

Ostensibly a successful 'validation' of the social prediction table, the NYCIB study in fact required the ongoing recalibration of scores and factors long after predictions were first made to correct the divergent impressions of raters, new familial conditions of the sample, and uncertainty in the 'middle group' with its resulting overprediction of delinquency. Nevertheless, these results were presented as the fulfilment of original predictive promises made by the Gluecks. The *New York Times* reported, 'way of predicting delinquency found accurate in 10-year test', hinting that prediction tables 'may be the cornerstone' of future preventative efforts and pointing to a new NYCIB manual of procedures for applying the

¹³⁴ Ibid. 257-258.

¹³⁵ Ibid. 258.

Glueck tables.¹³⁶ A letter concerning this manual in November 1964 reported hundreds of orders and telephone calls with requests from universities, schools, social agencies, doctors, lawyers, parents and parent-teacher associations ranging across 43 states and, beyond the US, England, Sweden, Denmark, Israel, Mexico, and Puerto Rico.¹³⁷ We cannot follow the prediction tables further into these new settings, however, by now they had encountered various desires for predictive efficiency, being modified in turn by the priorities and experience of practitioners and their target populations.

In particular, the NYCIB study had deliberately sought to prove that prediction was 'applicable to as heterogeneous a population as one might find in any metropolitan city'.¹³⁸ Statistically linking risk of crime with the integrity of the family, the social prediction table added to a growing discourse on the purported social dangers and inadequacy of black parents and homes. Wartime and post-war literature on 'the negro family' produced a picture of 'matriarchal' organisation and absent fathers traced back to the slavery period and would be followed in the 1960s by discourses on the racialised 'culture of poverty'.¹³⁹ Writing on changing notions of illegitimacy, Regina Kunzel has thus pointed to the post-war psychiatric treatment of white unmarried mothers and 'simultaneous re-conceptualization of black illegitimacy as a symptom of cultural pathology'.¹⁴⁰ For Craig and Glick, ten years' experience with the table similarly showed the 'need for eradicating the family pathology and enriching family life as a primary step in the prevention of juvenile delinquency'.¹⁴¹ With other studies, the social prediction table's application to 'problem families' became more racially specific. Samuel Kramer of the US children's bureau, applying the 'Glueck scale' alongside other questionnaires, concluded in 1964 that black male youth 'develop poorer socialization' while re-iterating the 'essentially matriarchal' organisation of black families.¹⁴² The same year,

¹³⁶ Foster Hailey, 'Way of Predicting Delinquency Found Accurate in 10-Year Test', *New York Times*, 10th November 1964: 1, 42; Craig and Glick, *A Manual of Procedures for Application of the Glueck Prediction Table*, (New York City Youth Board: New York, NY: 1964).

¹³⁷ Anon. to Craig and Glick, 24th November 1964, ETSGP, Box 62 Folder 2.

¹³⁸ Craig and Glick, 'Ten Years' Experience...': 252.

¹³⁹ See E. Franklin Frazier, *The Negro Family in the United States* (University of Chicago Press: Chicago, IL: 1939).

¹⁴⁰ Kunzel, 'White Neurosis, Black Pathology': 322.

¹⁴¹ Craig and Glick, 'Ten Years' Experience...': 261.

¹⁴² Samuel Kramer, 'Predicting Juvenile Delinquency Among Negroes', *Sociology and Social Research*, Vol. 48 (4) (1964): 478-489.

Virginia Montero Seplowin reported on the successful application of the Glueck prediction table to ‘a Puerto Rican subculture’, which pointed the way to ‘improved methods of handling Puerto Rico’s growing youth problem’, also citing broken homes and ‘the need for guidance in child-rearing practices’.¹⁴³ Later, in 1965 the Gluecks’ social prediction table and its implementation by the NYCIB were cited, alongside many other studies, by Daniel Patrick Moynihan (1927-2003) in his influential report on ‘The Negro Family’. Working as Assistant Secretary of Labor to President Johnson, Moynihan here reiterated the Gluecks’ ‘five critical factors in the home environment’ and laid particular stress on absent ‘negro’ and Puerto Rican fathers reported in the NYCIB sample.¹⁴⁴ With its emphasis on familial factors, the Gluecks’ social prediction table readily accommodated this increasing scrutiny and suspicion of non-white families, joining and feeding a wider discourse on racialised criminality and ‘cultural pathology’.

Conclusions

The social prediction table appealed to predominant contemporary concerns to correct delinquency and other social problems through the stable home and family. Moreover, it promised to organise these concerns and guide fallible judgements by using objective statistical probabilities. Faced with the uncertainties of youth and their criminal potential, practitioners thus sought out the Gluecks’ tables, methods, scales, questionnaires and so on as impersonal tools. The hope for more secure, more efficient evaluation of future propensities was, however, balanced by practical needs to modify existing practices or the table itself to available information, new target populations and the priorities of new settings. The Gluecks’ correspondence through the 1950s attests to the frequent difficulties encountered as unexpected shortcomings in records or training arose amongst those hoping for a convenient predictive tool. All of the studies discussed above ultimately turned to Eleanor’s direct supervision in scoring cases to ensure that factors were correctly and accurately assessed. While accommodating broad contemporary notions of risk and appealing

¹⁴³ Virginia Montero Seplowin, ‘Application of the Glueck Social Prediction Table to 50 Minors in the Puerto Rican Culture’, May 1964, ETSGP, Box 62 Folder 11.

¹⁴⁴ Daniel Patrick Moynihan, *The Negro Family: The Case For National Action* (Office of Policy, Planning and Research, United States Department of Labor, March 1965): 39.

to a varied readership many evidently decided that the new prediction table and its information requirements incurred too many costs.

Indeed, there is also a counterfactual question which must be raised, even if it cannot be adequately answered: would the above cases have been judged or regarded differently without the social prediction table? Predictive factors were purportedly a result of objective statistics but still required a personal judgement of home and family, often returning to the skill and experience of psychiatric social workers. In this process the table encountered pre-existing notions of risk amongst criminal justice, educational, clinical and law enforcement practitioners. The initial decision to apply a prediction table also remained closely linked to the perceived dangers of the 'delinquency area' seen in marginal sections and communities of the city. The social prediction table facilitated increased scrutiny towards economically dependent, minority, and otherwise 'broken' or 'inadequate' families who were, nevertheless already suspected and scrutinised by schools, welfare, and criminal justice. Even so, practitioners still requested the Gluecks' tables and guidance in applying them, to ensure efficiency, screen out undesirables, and justify resources or action; in the words of one reviewer, to finally 'do something' about potential delinquency. In practice the social prediction table provided only a part of any judgement on criminal propensities. Its primary role appears to have been not prediction but organisation and validation. Enumerated factors contained and synthesised the assorted theories, specialisms, hunches and prejudices which surrounded the child and thence provided a score which could validate and justify suspicion.

Conclusion

History and Dystopia


In 1956 the author Philip K. Dick (1928-1982) released a short story titled 'The Minority Report' (Fig 7.1). It presented a disquieting future in the aftermath of destructive global conflict in which mutants with the 'talent' of precognition are exploited by police departments to identify, arrest and permanently detain criminals before any crime is committed. In 1950 Sheldon and Eleanor Glueck published *Unraveling Juvenile Delinquency* which presented their latest prediction tables, now promising to score the future criminal propensities of six-year-old school entrants. It has become commonplace for both proponents and critics of modern crime prediction to invoke and examine 'The Minority Report' (more commonly the 2002 film adaptation) as a dystopian analogue to twenty-first-century crime prediction.¹ In this framing Dick's story of 'precrime' is taken as an astute prediction or warning now being realised through futuristic technologies and modern computing power. But Dick's story, viewed in light of the prior chapters, can barely be considered a prediction. Even as he wrote about precrime in a future New York City, the Gluecks were already planning the application of the social prediction table to New York school children. Viewing 'The Minority Report' in its proper mid-century context we can briefly examine Dick's engagement not with the far-off future of policing but with the drive to prediction in his own time.

The 'precog' mutants whose prophecies reveal 'precrime' may have seemed strange and science fictional to readers but the 'analytical machinery' surrounding them is more familiar. Prophetic utterances are 'scrupulously recorded by data collectors', analysed, reassembled, 'transcribed on conventional punch cards, and ejected into various coded slots'.² While no year is given for the events of the story, the precrime system apparently 'finds its genesis in the computers of the middle decades of this century'.³ Thus, when the protagonist is himself

¹ See Perry et al., *Predictive Policing*: 8, 82; Lemov, 'An Episode in the History of PreCrime': 637, 646-647; Scannell, 'This is Not Minority Report': 107-129.

² Philip K. Dick, 'The Minority Report', *Fantastic Universe*, Vol. 4 (6) (1956): 6.

³ Ibid. 18.



the minority report

by . . . Philip K. Dick

The precogs sat in darkness and explored chill hinterlands of future crime. How infallible was their frightening gift of prophecy?

THE FIRST thought Anderton had when he saw the young man was: *I'm getting bald. Bald and fat and old.* But he didn't say it aloud. Instead, he pushed back his chair, got to his feet, and came resolutely around the side of his desk, his right hand rigidly extended. Smiling with forced amiability, he shook hands with the young man.

"Witwer?" he asked, managing to make the query sound gracious.

"That's right," the young man said. "But the name's Ed to you, of course. That is, if you share my dislike for needless formality." The look on his blond, overly-confident face showed that he considered the matter settled. It would be Ed and John: everything would be agreeably cooperative right from the start.

"Did you have much trouble finding the building?" Anderton asked guardedly, ignoring the too-friendly overture. *Good God, he had to hold on to something.* Fear touched him and he began to sweat. Witwer was moving around the office as if he already owned it—

Some three or four years ago an exceptionally brilliant group of quite young writers brought a fresh approach and, despite their youth, an ever advancing maturity to science fiction. To its coming of age they contributed as substantially as did a good many of the old timers, with their somewhat wider background in the field. Conspicuous in that vanguard were Robert Sheckley, Evan Hunter and Philip Dick. In this, Mr. Dick's newest novelette, there's a chess game kind of suspense, and a glimpse of tomorrow astoundingly prophetic.

4

Figure 21: The original publication of 'The Minority Report' by Philip K. Dick in science fiction magazine *Fantastic Universe* (January 1956).

embroiled in the paranoia of crime prediction, his apparent fate is revealed to him through a format familiar to mid-twentieth-century readers; the punch card:

On the card was his name. Line one – an already accused future murderer! According to the coded punches, Precrime Commissioner John A. Anderton was going to kill a man – and within the next week. With absolute, overwhelming conviction, he didn't believe it.⁴

Through the subsequent narrative, Dick questions the supposed infallibility of precrime, the guilt or innocence of future criminals and the prediction of human behaviour more broadly. In this future, criminals-to-be are taken in daily 'round-ups' to detention camps where they

⁴ Ibid. 8.

‘eternally claim they’re innocent’.⁵ Yet the prophecies that condemn them remain in the hands of fallible or malicious humans. A subordinate is handed punch cards and told to ‘see which ones we want... use your own judgement’.⁶ The police themselves are under the scrutiny of others receiving duplicate cards. The precogs, meanwhile become sources of uncertainty as they begin to contradict and successively overwrite each other’s predictions. In Dick’s precrime system, two out of three precogs produce a ‘majority report’ of future crime while the possibility of future innocence remains hidden in the titular ‘minority report’ which the ‘guilty’ protagonist must seek out. Even science fiction prophecy might be a matter of probability.

The point here is not to draw a direct line of influence from the Gluecks’ prediction tables to Dick’s precrime. Such connections must remain speculative. The point is, rather, to view ‘The Minority Report’ not as an anticipation of twenty-first-century crime prediction but as a reflection on cold war American society, increasingly pervaded by suspicion and, conversely, the frightening certainty seemingly offered by prediction. Crime prediction was neither the invention of a criminologist team nor the conceit of a science fiction author. The prediction of dangerous, delinquent, and criminal behaviour was a practical problem which had concerned America’s social, educational and legal institutions since the start of the twentieth century at least. With regards to juveniles especially, judges, educators and other practitioners employed standardised tests, psychiatric experts, and predictive ‘instruments’ to meet the agreed dangers of developing youth. In 1960 the Gluecks responded to those wary of prediction tables by placing them alongside more familiar interventions from prior decades:

If the argument of those who oppose the use of identification techniques to disclose which children are vulnerable were sound, we should logically close all of our child guidance clinics, dismiss our school counsellors and visiting teachers and sit back complacently (as, unfortunately, we too often do today) until the child has developed into a true delinquent or gang member and then haul him into court with the usual far from satisfactory result.⁷

Their tables were the latest answer to a shared concern for crime prediction, drawing and iterating upon prior tools and attempts from across various disciplines and sites of contact

⁵ Ibid. 6.

⁶ Ibid. 7.

⁷ Sheldon Glueck, ‘Ten Years of Unraveling’, 307.

between children and the state. Reflecting on the period from 1900-1960, we can examine crime prediction not as a coming dystopia but as a history of shifting suspicion towards American youth and trust placed in experts and ‘instruments’ to manage risk.

Crime Prediction and American Society, 1900-1960

Throughout this history I have returned to the themes of eclecticism, pluralism and the imperatives of practical prediction. Attempts by American criminologists to predict criminal behaviour were eclectic, investigating wide-ranging factors and details of the delinquent’s body, personality, and social existence, all of which might reveal criminogenic significance. In turn this reflected the plurality of disciplines, professions, and practitioners interested in crime and its prediction. Academic researchers in medicine, psychology, anthropology, and the social sciences were joined by court, school, institutional, and social work professionals, all bringing distinctive perspectives, methods, and sources of information. The resulting knowledge of crime and delinquency was thus highly diverse. Information about offenders and their possible futures, however, ultimately had to be synthesised into clear recommendations and assessments. Viewed in this practical context, the methods of prediction examined in this thesis were attempts to bring myriad perspectives, suspicions and perceived risks into coherence for officials facing the imperatives of sentencing, supervision, treatment, release, and so on.

Beginning in the early-twentieth century, chapter 1 introduced these concerns with the spread of new sentencing and ‘treatment’ innovations, joined in 1909 by the creation of the American Institute for Criminal Law and Criminology as an interdisciplinary forum on crime and its prevention. Probation, parole, and indeterminate sentencing presented new professional opportunities for the investigation and assessment of offenders in prison boards, new court laboratories, and juvenile courts. Hopes in treatment and reintegration, however, were joined by fears of recidivism and further depredation. Diverse forms of criminal data assembled in the pages of the JAICLC had to serve this goal of differentiating between improvable cases and future dangers to society. Anthropometry and intelligence testing provided two such models for practical criminology in recognising congenital criminal ‘types’, doomed to future

wrongdoing. Here prediction rested on convenient, regular measures while ‘treatment’ reduced to sterilisation or permanent incarceration. However, as shown in this chapter, persistent doubts were raised through counter-examples, dynamic or environmental explanations of offending, and the seemingly irreducible complexity of individual cases. The eugenic segregation and sterilisation of the so-called ‘feeble-minded’ continued and remained one tool available to criminologists. Going forward, however, the problem of crime prediction could not be solved by a single measure or data point.

In Chapter 2 I turned to William Healy and Augusta Fox Bronner’s attempts to resolve the complexities of the individual delinquent and advise juvenile court officials. Working in the Juvenile Psychopathic Institute of Chicago from 1909 and then the Judge Baker Foundation in Boston from 1917, Healy and Bronner promoted the intensive, eclectic investigation and diagnosis of each case. The resulting facts of a child’s life were organised through the psychiatric interview and analysis of the offender’s ‘own story’. Complexity was thus managed by psychiatric judgement, presenting public officials and private clients with clear ‘common sense’ connections between past antecedents and present or future behaviour. Temporal arrangement of the facts into a narrative or biography formed the methodological and rhetorical basis for clinical diagnoses and prognoses of juvenile offending. Yet Healy and Bronner were just one link in a network of criminal justice, corrections, welfare, charities, and families with diverse perspectives and priorities. Predictions of future criminality were thus tied to apparent behavioural trajectories but also reflected these priorities and strategies in securing psychiatric support for suspicion or sympathy towards a case.

Healy and Bronner’s diagnoses and prognoses were just as easily ignored and, faced with an interwar ‘crime wave’ progressive projects of crime prevention and child guidance seemed under threat. Introducing criminologists Sheldon and Eleanor Glueck in Chapter 3, their follow-up study of JBF cases marked not so much a turning point as the beginnings of a shift from psychiatric authority to probabilistic prediction in guiding officials. The meeting of clinical and statistical methods was fraught, as reflected in the disputes between Healy, Bronner and the Gluecks over the relevance and meaning of case materials and the factors extracted from

them for tabulation. Statistics of cases and outcomes pointed to the failure of the JBF to 'cure' delinquency but were, as I argued, also used by the Gluecks to undermine psychiatry's capacity for 'commonsense' understanding, treatment and prediction of the child's behaviour. Specific causal connections or patterns were disrupted by the process of factorisation. Without any objective means of prioritising 'causal' factors, complex cases could, according to the Gluecks, only yield statistical correlations

Chapter 4 introduced the Gluecks' alternative to clinical expertise: the 'predictive instrument'. Numerical scores, they argued, conferred objectivity and efficiency in the recognition of risky individuals and likely recidivists. The Gluecks now called on embattled judges, clinicians and other practitioners to 'organise' their judgements in accordance with their actuarial tables. In turn, they began planning for the extension of prediction to all American youth so that normal school children could be differentiated from future wrongdoers. The study which would become *Unravelling Juvenile Delinquency* (1950) began with negotiations to access comparable samples of delinquent and non-delinquent youth. Most significantly, I pointed to the role of the 'delinquency area' in shaping the study and its targets. Using both statistical crime rates and qualitative judgements of morally 'blighted' neighbourhoods, The Gluecks mapped out Boston's poor youth for study. In turn, this brought the Gluecks and their investigators into contact with ready-made networks of information gathering and surveillance through schools, corrections, charities, welfare and other agencies. The data for crime prediction drew from prior sources of oversight within the highly-scrutinised 'delinquency area'.

Chapter 5 continued this exploration of the research behind *Unraveling*, tracing the extraction and organisation of social and psychiatric data from homes, interviews and Rorschach tests for use in prediction tables. Social investigators moved strategically to secure parental confidence while quietly judging the material and moral conditions of delinquent and non-delinquent homes and families. Psychiatric interviewers probed for personality traits and other pertinent information while Rorschach analysts looked for indications of defiance, sadism and other delinquent characteristics in the responses of the boys. In each of these

cases I noted the significance of codification and computation through standardised forms, punch cards and, finally, tables of correlation. These processes turned various, sometimes contradictory perspectives and observations into a coherent, 'objective' dataset. I argued that, in *Unraveling*, the Gluecks exploited this enumeration to 'reweave' disparate disciplinary approaches, expectations and factors into a single predictive outlook based on correlations, as exemplified in the resulting prediction tables.

Finally, with Chapter 6, I turned to the reception and application of the Gluecks' prediction tables through the 1950s. While reviews of their work remained mixed, they nevertheless received a large influx of requests to test and implement their methods. In particular the 'social prediction table' appealed to widespread contemporary concerns with the value of 'normal' family life. Here the Gluecks' desire to experimentally validate their tables dovetailed with post-war anxieties concerning the threat of wayward youth to American families, society and security. For many practitioners in criminal justice, corrections, education, and therapeutics the Gluecks' tables seemed to finally make predictions convenient, reliable, and justifiable to decision-makers. In practice, however, the social prediction table was readily modified as it was applied in new settings, with varying informational requirements across new target populations. Indeed, this reflected the continuing responsiveness of crime prediction to suspicions and priorities in a variety of practical settings which, by the mid-century, were expected to produce regular predictions of juvenile behaviour and risk.

Crime prediction through these decades did not suddenly emerge from criminological findings but was, rather, a shared practical concern in public and private agencies and institutions responsible for youth. In this thesis I have repeatedly contrasted the clinical, diagnostic approach of Healy and Bronner with the statistical, probabilistic approach of the Gluecks, but these can be regarded as different solutions to common problems of prediction: managing the complex facts of a case to produce useable recommendations on their future propensities. Both teams collaborated with a variety of disciplines and practitioners, drawing upon their perspectives and extant suspicions. Both then sought to synthesise these sources of information to provide authoritative assessments of future behaviour which could be useful

to those judging or supervising offenders. Healy and Bronner leveraged their clinical, psychiatric expertise, based on which they provided diagnoses and prognoses in relation to a perceived trajectory of behaviour. The Gluecks subsequently undermined this clinical 'common sense' in favour of assessments organised by statistical regularities. By reducing various cases into separately enumerated and correlated factors they could then make these factors work together in prediction tables which provided decision makers with a single score and associated chance of criminality.

While responding to a common practical context, these approaches differed in several important respects. clinicians like Healy and Bronner had placed their therapeutic hopes in a case-by-case understanding of the dynamic individual offender. While retaining the eclecticism of earlier approaches the Gluecks, in their promotion of prediction tables, reframed the individual delinquent in relation to a statistical population whose regularities now determined a case's potential. Combined factors invoked the weight of probability rather than any particular causal significance or sequence as part of a broader shift in criminological research from 'causes of crime' to later 'risk factors'. Most significantly, the Gluecks' prediction tables invoked the certainty and security of seemingly objective quantification. These were 'tools', 'instruments', 'scales' and so on which claimed to direct fallible human judgement and, in Theodore Porter's phrase, called on criminal justice to 'trust in numbers'.

The Gluecks were not alone in this statistical, actuarial turn. Indeed, those discussing their work have tended to downplay their contribution in light of subsequent developments or 'dead ends' in criminological theory and practice. Case and Haines frame the Gluecks as originators of a fundamentally flawed programme of risk factor research (RFR), reiterating many of the same criticisms articulated by reviewers in the 1950s. For Case and Haines the Gluecks thus 'set the ball rolling for a RFR movement which views young people as the passive recipients of the negative impact of childhood risk factors – helpless "crash test dummies" careering pre-determined and inevitable offending outcomes'.⁸ Laub and Sampson meanwhile point to the academic isolation of the Gluecks in their own day and the subsequent

⁸ Case and Haines, *Understanding Youth Offending*: 64.

denigration of their research programme by ascendant criminological sociology.⁹ Within the broader history of actuarial crime prediction, Harcourt primarily considers the tools of Chicago sociologists and their adoption by State and Federal prisons and parole boards from the 1970s onward, apparently overshadowing their one-time rivals the Gluecks.¹⁰ However, such perspectives are primarily concerned with ‘success’ or ‘influence’ from the perspective of more recent criminology. While criticising the assumption of ‘sociological positivism’ in histories of criminology, Laub and Sampson similarly revisit the Gluecks’ work primarily for insights into present research problems.¹¹

These assessments of the Gluecks have seriously underestimated their historical significance in the promotion and proliferation of crime prediction in wider American society. The question of crime prediction does not reduce to priority disputes between researchers, nor is it limited to prisons and parole prediction. Unlike others developing actuarial prediction tools the Gluecks were primarily interested in the onset of juvenile offending and the possibility of generalised prediction applied to American youth. In pursuing these aims they came into contact with practitioners who had their own interests in anticipating and controlling children’s behaviour. It is this integration with wider networks of care, surveillance, and control of youth which makes historical study of the Gluecks so valuable. In following first Healy and Bronner and then the Gluecks this thesis has traced not only criminological perspectives but also their interaction with extant suspicion in courts, institutions, schools, welfare networks and homes as well as the crucial role of these collective suspicions in shaping criminological crime prevention.

Organising Suspicion

Exploring the wider networks of surveillance and suspicion that informed crime prediction can raise problems for historical explanation. Stated briefly, did criminological science and its

⁹ Laub and Sampson, ‘The Sutherland-Glueck Debate’: 1402-1440.

¹⁰ Harcourt, *Against Prediction*: 47-76.

¹¹ Laub and Sampson, ‘The Sutherland-Glueck Debate’: 1429-1433.

methods of prediction generate expectations of future criminality or, conversely, did crime prediction merely reflect pre-existing prejudices in the networks we have outlined? To account for this reciprocal interaction between extant prejudice and new criminological practices this thesis has understood and described crime prediction as ‘organizing suspicion’. Criminologists negotiated diverse beliefs, priorities, and anxieties surrounding children’s future criminality to secure assistance, information, and professional status. These broader, pluralistic suspicions equally shaped the resulting prognoses and predictions. However, the case histories, datasets, and scoring systems of criminologists attempted to bring these suspicions into order, resolve their contradictions, and give them new scientific authority to determine a course of action. In turn these organised cases and statistical correlations became criminological knowledge which further reinforced suspicion and prejudice.

In developing this perspective I have drawn on Latourian notions of ‘inscription’ and ‘translation’ across ‘actor-networks’, while also following Benjamin’s emphasis on the coproduction of carceral technoscience and discrimination, along with several others who seek to historically situate modern crime prediction software.¹² crime prediction is thus shown interacting with and reinforcing historic notions of urban, racialised risk while, in Scannell’s words, ‘produc[ing] “instabilities” that justify state violence’.¹³ To this I would add that, as well the threat of ‘instabilities’, crime prediction also had to construct coherent recommendations to assure decision-makers. This is how this thesis has considered measures of criminality, psychiatric expertise, and ultimately prediction tables. As noted in Chapter 4, the Gluecks ‘predictive instruments’ reflected the same drives noted by Porter, to quantitative objectivity in situations of distrust. As well as the appeal of seeming objectivity in ‘a decision made by the numbers’ the promotion of prediction tables to score criminal potential by the mid-twentieth century also rested on their ability to coordinate varying perspectives on a given child’s future.¹⁴ Furthering these perspectives we can, therefore, understand how twentieth-

¹² See Latour, *Science in Action*; Benjamin, ‘Introduction’: 1-22; Miller, ‘Shadows of War, Traces of Policing’: 85-106; Scannell, ‘This is Not Minority Report’: 107-129; Edler-Duarte, ‘The Making of Crime Predictions’: 199-215.

¹³ Scannell, ‘This is Not Minority Report’: 123.

¹⁴ Porter, *Trust in Numbers*: 8.

century crime prediction accommodated but also distinctively ordered and reaffirmed prejudices.

The New York City Youth Board's (NYCYB) validation study of the social prediction table, discussed at the end of Chapter 6, can be revisited as an example of this 'organization of suspicion' and its long-lasting consequences. Working from the Gluecks' research in *Unraveling*, the NYCYB's implementation of the table corresponded to geographic and demographic preconceptions of criminality. School districts, primarily in the Bronx, were selected as promising targets for crime prediction, especially noting the potential value of the table for application to African American and Puerto Rican children. Subsequently investigators would provide scores based on a mixture of disciplinary perspectives on the purported inadequacies of homes and families under study. Contrary to hopes of convenience and efficiency, scoring in fact required particular attention to discrepancies, resolved by Eleanor's personal intervention or else the removal or modification of disputed factors. Yet, in the end, the NYCYB study claimed success, pointing to valid scores and predictions which were expected to justify further surveillance and preventative resources. In 1965 when Daniel Patrick Moynihan presented his report on *The Negro Family* to the US Department of Labor, he cited the Gluecks' prediction research and its application by the NYCYB alongside other studies used to establish the 'cultural pathology' of African Americans, subsequently a target for increasingly punitive intervention.¹⁵ Investigators applying the social prediction table began with pre-existing assumptions and suspicions which shaped its use. However, scores, by some effort, brought these preconceptions into statistical order conferring authority to justify local or even Federal action.

Here the Social Prediction Table joined older discourses on black criminality which, following historian Khalil Gibran Muhammad, must be understood via the longer interaction between racial prejudice and statistics. As Muhammad argues:

The post-Moynihan social scientific and public policy view of black pathology [...] began, statistically speaking, in the 1890s [...] Shaped by racial ideology and

¹⁵ Moynihan, *The Negro Family*: 39.

racism, the statistical ghetto emerged, study by study, in the Progressive era, as the northern Black Belt formed block by block.¹⁶

As with broader suspicions of future criminality, racial discrimination through crime prediction involves prior prejudices and the various measures which steadily consolidate them. The Social Prediction table, increasingly used to target non-white populations through the 1950s, formed one part of this process, pointing to the further racialisation of crime prediction through the latter-twentieth century.

This thesis has been necessarily been limited in scope to particular episodes in twentieth-century crime prediction, focusing on Healy and Bronner in the JBF and the Gluecks' seminal study to explore particular criminologists' interactions with wider networks and perspectives. Even these two pairs have not been exhaustively covered here. Healy and Bronner continued their work at the JBF until their joint retirement in 1947. After 1960 the Gluecks continued to conduct and collate studies following up cases and validating prediction tables until Eleanor's death in 1972, followed by Sheldon's in 1981. More research remains to be done, not only on these figures but on other criminological efforts in prediction, such as the Burgess Method and its successors in parole prediction or other past approaches to predictive sentencing, policing, and surveillance. Having followed the organisation of suspicion in particular cases of psychiatric prognosis and probabilistic scoring, this thesis can hopefully offer a framework for others in exploring and connecting scientific, institutional, social, and cultural histories of crime prediction. As well as widening perspectives on prediction in the period covered by this thesis, future research must also consider its subsequent implementation and modification in the later-twentieth century. The brief survey of predictive practice given in chapter 6 is only a starting point for further research into the proliferation of prediction. It also remains for scholars to follow the movement of crime prediction tools and techniques beyond US practitioners to examine their transnational influence and modification. As Harcourt briefly notes, individual risk assessment tools have, since the 1970s, proliferated and developed internationally, drawing on earlier methods and factors while also establishing various new standards of assessment.¹⁷ Meanwhile, modern US predictive policing software is increasingly

¹⁶ Muhammad, *The Condemnation of Blackness*: 7.

¹⁷ Harcourt, *Against Prediction*: 77-88.

spread through international markets for privately developed police technology and software, although the subsequent adoption of these tools, along with their intensive information requirements, is far from certain.¹⁸

While work on the international spread and uptake of crime prediction unfortunately remains limited, future research on their use in the later-twentieth-century United States must account for dramatically altered attitudes surrounding treatment, mass incarceration, and juvenile justice following the 1960s. When defending their prediction tables in 1960 the Gluecks deflected fears of error, injustice, and harm by referencing the ultimate beneficence of predictive crime prevention. ‘False positives’, they claimed had little to fear from predictions, which ‘can do little harm and might even do considerable good’ through increased therapeutic oversight.¹⁹ In fact, the therapeutic claims of criminologists had consistently lagged behind the development of predictive surveillance, while the Gluecks themselves were often ambivalent towards clinical intervention. Interest in the social prediction table from correctional institutions primarily referred to its potential use in screening out troublemakers while ‘treatment’ informed by prediction still reduced to a choice between probation or institutionalisation. Nevertheless, however genuine the Gluecks’ affirmation of treatment, their prediction tables had emerged through collaboration with the welfare, educational, clinical and charitable agencies of progressive era America, and were envisaged as part of an ever-improving, pre-emptive, corrective network.

Historians of the later-twentieth-century United States instead point to the increasing criminalisation rather than correction of juvenile delinquents. Historians of psychiatry thus describe the atrophying of community mental health programmes, social psychiatric reforms, and inpatient care for troubled youth as a result of both budgetary pressures and anti-psychiatric movements for deinstitutionalisation.²⁰ Conversely, other scholars have written prolifically on the rise of mass incarceration which, by 2008, had resulted in a peak US prison

¹⁸ For instance, see Leo Kelion, ‘Crime Prediction Software “Adopted by 14 UK Police Forces”’, BBC News, 4th February 2019, <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-47118229> [Accessed 30th April 2024]

¹⁹ Sheldon Glueck, ‘Ten Years of Unraveling’: 306.

²⁰ Smith, *The First Resort*: 237-269; Doroshov, *Emotionally Disturbed*: 183-232.

population of 2.3 million, mostly non-whites.²¹ Arguing for the wider social and political significance of this trend, Heather Ann Thompson points in particular to the selective incarceration of minority communities in America's major cities as part of a 'criminalization of urban space'.²² Elizabeth Hinton, in fact traces mass incarceration to the interventionist social policies of the 1960s which inaugurated the 'war on poverty' but also an intensifying 'war on crime'. Alongside the 'Great Society' social policies of President Johnson, the 1965 Law Enforcement Assistance Act facilitated Federal involvement and funding for local police, courts and prisons, resulting in grants worth almost \$10 billion by 1981. In what Hinton calls 'one of the essential ironies of American history', policies enacted by liberal reformers and social scientists of the civil rights era subsequently provided the resources to target black 'cultural pathology' and launch punitive campaigns in response to urban unrest in the 1960s and 70s.²³ Indeed, Julilly Kohler-Hausmann points to the surveillance of the poor and non-white through post-1960 welfare systems which 'often enlisted the penal system and its rituals to signal the suspect position of recipients'.²⁴

Further research will have to account for the role of crime prediction in later-twentieth-century mass incarceration. Harcourt's critique of the 'ratchet effect' of prediction already provides a valuable starting point, describing the vicious cycle whereby a profiled population forms an ever-greater proportion of the incarcerated population which, in turn, is used to justify further profiling and incarceration.²⁵ Changing conceptions of juvenile criminality (particularly non-white juvenile criminality) must also be accounted for in future histories of crime prediction. Between 1966 and 1970 the juvenile court system familiar to Healy, Bronner, and the Gluecks was fundamentally altered by three landmark cases: *Kent Vs. United States* (1966), *In re Gault* (1967), and *In re Winship* (1970). Rulings in these cases reasserted the rights of juveniles to formal trial and due process but would subsequently lead to increasing

²¹ Kelly Lytle Hernández, Khalil Gibran Muhammad and Heather Ann Thompson, 'Introduction: Constructing the Carceral State', *The Journal of American History*, Vol. 102 (1) (2015): 18-24.

²² Heather Ann Thompson, 'Why Mass Incarceration Matters: Rethinking Crisis, Decline, and Transformation in Postwar American History', *The Journal of American History*, Vol. 97 (3) (2010): 706-716.

²³ Hinton, *From the War on Poverty to the War on Crime*: 1-26.

²⁴ Julilly Kohler-Hausmann, 'Guns and Butter: The Welfare State, the Carceral State, and the Politics of Exclusion in the Postwar United States', *The Journal of American History*, Vol. 102 (1) (2015): 99.

²⁵ Harcourt, *Against Prediction*: 145-171.

criminalisation and incarceration of delinquents who would have previously been informally managed by court officials and corrective agencies.²⁶

Changes in court procedure have been compounded by the racialisation of juvenile crime control with corrective community programmes primarily reserved for white middle class youth at the expense of supposedly incorrigible non-white offenders.²⁷ This is also reflected in the different approaches of heightened drug enforcement since the 1960s to different communities, frequently presented as the protection of vulnerable white adolescents from non-white dealers whose communities, conversely, warrant violent policing.²⁸ The overall result of these racialising, criminalising trends in American juvenile justice has been heightened fear of the once sympathetic young offender to the extent that Americans in the 1990s were warned of a coming wave of so-called 'juvenile superpredators'.²⁹ As Sealander argues of these shifts, 'if early twentieth century Americans sentimentalized children's innocence, late twentieth century citizens exaggerated their brutality' as the imagined image of the improvable juvenile delinquent was superseded in public consciousness by that of the dangerous black gang member.³⁰ For subsequent histories of crime prediction, these trends are suggestive of important research to be done on the prediction's accommodation of and contribution to increased fear and suspicion of urban space and minority youth in an expanding carceral state.

Along with the need for further research, the above trends underscore the ongoing contingencies of crime prediction's unfolding history. Returning to the twenty-first century, proponents of predictive assessments and algorithms point to the impersonal objectivity of quantified factors and calculated risks. Prediction is, in this view, a choice of science over

²⁶ Sealander, *The Failed Century of the Child*: 36-43.

²⁷ For examples see Hinton, *From the War on Poverty to the War on Crime*: 218-249; Di Castri, 'The Settler Colonial Roots and Neoliberal Afterlife of Problem Behavior Theory': 107-128.

²⁸ Michael D. Lassiter, 'Impossible Criminals: The Suburban Imperatives of America's War on Drugs', *The Journal of American History*, Vol. 102 (1) (2015): 126-140; Donna Murch, 'Crack in Los Angeles: Crisis, Militarization, and Black Responses to the Late Twentieth-Century War on Drugs', *The Journal of American History*, Vol. 102 (1) (2015): 162-173.

²⁹ See James C. Howell, *Preventing and Reducing Juvenile Delinquency: A comprehensive Framework* (SAGE Publications: Thousand Oaks, CA: 2009): 3-16.

³⁰ Sealander, *The Failed Century of the Child*: 50.

sentiment, 'even though the reality may, at times be terrifying, especially for lawyers [...] and judges [...] who lack scientific training'.³¹ The intuitions of officials are inadequate to the problems of criminal risk: 'subjective experience alone cannot definitively answer them. But data can'.³² Even wariness of prediction is framed in relation to the 'unintended consequences' of 'aggregate data analysis' for fair and equal justice.³³ Sonja Starr rightly notes the capacity of risk factors and scores to deepen inequalities, using 'dry, technical language to obscure discrimination that we would otherwise never accept'.³⁴ However, it is, once again, misleading to approach discrimination as an unintended consequence of prediction. Predictive tools and expertise in the twentieth century encountered and fostered demand from practitioners for the technical means to justify discrimination between perceived low- and high-risk groups. To do this, predictions also had to adapt and accommodate a range of already-existing suspicions and prejudices amongst intended users. This is evident in the historical episodes I have discussed as well as in twenty-first-century crime prediction. For instance, Edler Duarte's discussion of crime mapping software notes the process of fixing crime report data to match 'common sense' expectations of safe and dangerous neighbourhoods.³⁵ Meanwhile, Kelly Hannah-Moffat, from over 100 interviews with Canadian legal, probation and parole workers, notes how these groups used risk assessments to meet their own desires for personal security and desired case outcomes: 'Practitioners routinely admitted that risk assessment tools were not "reliable" predictors but that they preferred them because using them *minimized their own risk* of being blamed for subsequent consequences'.³⁶ In turn she notes the significance of discretion wherein practitioners can inflate or deflate the scores of less quantifiable factors of behaviour and lifestyle to offset perceived inaccuracies of the overall assessment and secure harsher or more lenient decisions for those they feel are deserving.³⁷

³¹ Kopf, 'Federal Supervised Release and Actuarial Data': 207.

³² Milgram et al, 'Pretrial Risk Assessment': 219.

³³ Holder, 'Speech presented...': 254.

³⁴ Starr, 'The New Profiling': 229.

³⁵ Edler-Duarte, 'The Making of Crime Predictions': 199-215.

³⁶ Kelly Hannah-Moffat, 'The Uncertainties of Risk Assessment: Partiality, Transparency, and Just Decisions', *Federal Sentencing Reporter*, Vol. 27 (4) (2015): 244.

³⁷ *Ibid.* 244-247.

Such insights into past and present crime prediction remind us of what Theodore Porter has called the 'irrepressible human characteristics' of statistics.³⁸ Crime predictions are replete with these human traces: of those the data are supposed to represent but also of those who gather and utilise this data. By following these traces we can look back from the predictions and ask: which locations and groups are targeted? Which data are prioritised and utilised? How has information been gathered and organised? Which recommendations are followed, ignored, or modified? While it may be convenient to regard crime prediction as a dystopian imposition of new technology, the more difficult truth is that these methods and tools have historically responded to widespread desires for predictive certainty and validation in deciding who to trust and who to condemn. Prediction does not begin or end with the expert, evaluation, score, or algorithm, and behind any tool which claims to find future criminals there lies a murky history in which the true bases of suspicion will most likely be found.

³⁸ Porter, *Genetics in the Madhouse*: 7.

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