The notion of coadunacy and the problem of self/other relationality in theology with special reference to Kant, Fichte, Hegel, Barth and Pannenberg.

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Michael Alsford

The Notion of Coadunacy and the Problem of Self/Other Relationality in Theology
with special reference to Kant, Fichte, Hegel, Barth and Pannenberg.

PhD, 1990.

ABSTRACT

This work seeks to explore the problem of self/other relationality with reference to certain key thinkers in western philosophy and theology. To this end we have deployed the notion of coadunacy as a specifically theological model of human relationality.

In chapter one we present a substantive picture of the biblical tradition's understanding of human communality, suggesting that this presents Christian theology with its ideal of coadunacy expressed in the Old Testament's insistence that "it is not good that man should be alone" and the New Testament ideal that we should be "all one in Christ". We continue by examining the observable social phenomenon of radical individualism and isolation within our society and suggest that this ought to stand as a challenge to modern Christian theology.

In chapter two we outline the fields of inquiry which will guide us through the task of constructing a theological understanding of human coadunacy and in presenting a critique of those approaches to self/other relating which are in some way insufficient or unchristian.

Chapters three to six contain analyses of the approaches to the issue of self/other relationality argued for by Kant, Fichte and Hegel, Barth and Pannenberg. These thinkers are selected for their major contributions to both western thought and theology in particular.

It will be argued that in each of these thinkers a significant deficiency exists in their treatment of self/other relationality which ultimately does violence to the other by prioritizing the self. Furthermore it will be argued that the issue of situatedness, as an element within the discussion of human relationality is, by and large, ignored by the aforementioned thinkers.

The concluding chapters suggest that a truly Christian notion of coadunacy ought to prioritize the other by way of a Christ-like act of self-abandonment and take into account the human experience of situatedness and embodiment.
The Notion of Coadunacy

and the Problem of Self/Other Relationality in theology

with special reference to Kant, Fichte, Hegel, Barth and Pannenberg.

Michael Alsford

PhD

University of Durham, Department of Theology

1990

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for Sally

and with special thanks
to Professor D.W. Hardy

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ABBREVIATIONS

AC    The Apostles' Creed
ATP   Anthropology in Theological Perspective
BQ    Basic Questions
CD    Church Dogmatics
CL    The Christian Life
CPR   Critique of Pure Reason
CPrR  Critique of Practical Reason
GMM   Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals
HNEH  Human Nature, Election and History
JGM   Jesus, God and Man
L     Logic
PH    Philosophy of History
PK    Personal Knowledge
PM    Philosophy of Mind
PN    Philosophy of Nature
PP    Place and Placelessness
RH    Revelation as History
SK    The Science of Knowledge
TI    Totality and Infinity
TKG   Theology and the Kingdom of God
TPS   Theology and the Philosophy of Science
WM    What is Man?

Full bibliographical details will only be given in the footnotes where the work cited is not included in the bibliography.
Before we begin it is important to make perfectly clear that this work is intended to be a piece of Christian theology. That is to say our concerns, analyses and critiques are by no means disinterested ones but operate from within the Christian tradition in the hope of contributing to it. Any attempt to engage with this work in abstraction from said tradition will undoubtedly result in misunderstanding. We shall be reiterating this point again in subsequent chapters by way of reminder.

The motivation for this thesis is partly a phenomenological one and partly a theoretical one. That is to say it is prompted by the unavoidable observation that within contemporary western thought and life to say "human being" is taken to say, at the most fundamental level, individual and that this tendency towards radical individualism and isolation is ideologically rooted.

The roots of this totality of the individual self are many and varied, and their relationships to each other are tortuously complex. However, although it is only possible in a work of this kind, to point to a small number of notable examples of this mode of considering the human being, it is clearly the case that such a prioritizing of the individual subject does pertain within western culture.

Accepting the veracity of the above observation the following question must arise within Christian theology: is the view of the human being as essentially individual, and thus concomitantly as a constitutive element within larger corporate complexes, consistent with Christian theology as traditionally conceived? It is the contention of this work that this is not the case, and that a notion of human being as an essentially corporate reality is required if we are to take seriously both the protological dimension of human createdness in the image of the triune God, and the eschatological dimension of human redemption and reconciliation with both God and the rest of humanity. To this end we will be introducing the notion of coadunacy as a way of speaking about the capacity for relationality essential and thus necessary for human being.

The concept of coadunacy is introduced here for two basic reasons. Firstly we are concerned to deploy a concept of human relationality
which is expressive of the essentiality of human communality. In other words we wish to speak of human relationality as a necessary mode of human existence in the image of God. The Oxford Dictionary defines coadunate as to be "joined together, congenitally united" and coadunation as "The action of joining or state of being joined together in one." It goes on to refer to Cardinal Manning's use of the term in connection with the unity of body, soul and spirit in the one person. It is the notion of congenital unity, with all that this term suggests with regard to radical and familial reciprocity, that we are particularly concerned to emphasize here and it is for this reason that we chose to make use of the term "coadunacy".

The second reason for making use of the term coadunate has to do with our concern to colonise a potent relational term for theology. To this end we will be seeking to fill the notion of coadunacy with a specifically theological content through the course of this work.

Ultimately we will be concerned to articulate a theological understanding of human being as essentially a complex incorporating self, other and context. By the "self" we have in mind what is traditionally understood by that term; in other words discrete self-consciousness, the "I". By the "other" is meant self-consciousnesses that are not "I". The notion of "context" is potentially more ambiguous in so far as it inevitably includes the other within it, along with practically everything which is not-self. For our purposes we shall adopt the literary meaning of context which understands it in terms of those elements which encompass a particular point thereby informing its meaning. In other words we are talking about situation, the "when" and "where" of human being. Thus our discussion of context will involve consideration of situatedness - that is, the subjective experience of being located, and place - the actual empirical experience of human location.

It is hoped that once such a theological notion of coadunacy is spelt out it will form at least the basis of a heuristic by which various forms of the totalism of the individual subject might be criticised, while also providing the beginnings of a theological understanding of self/other relationality which might be developed in the future.
The social order at present emerging may contain within it potentialities of destruction and dehumanization of which any previous order was incapable. On the other hand, it must be recognized that the concepts of community, personality, freedom, responsibility and morality demanded as the content of salvation within it are in fact closer to the Christian definition of these things than those demanded either by pre-scientific or capitalist society. Moreover, if God gave to the Church so to interpret its gospel of salvation as to fulfil both the one-sided social ideals of incorporation and of individualism, then surely he may be trusted to empower his followers to present it now, when society demands it, in what can be the fully Christian terms of redemption to personal community.

In this chapter we intend to examine what might be referred to as the contours of coadunacy. By this we have in mind the presentation of a sequence of suggestions as to why coadunacy is of theological significance and furthermore what a notion of coadunacy ought to involve. The purpose of this exercise will be to provide a tool for the examination of various notions of relationality drawn from a range of thinkers. It is hoped that at the end of our investigations we might be in a position to articulate a more detailed theological notion of human coadunacy. Before we begin, however, some preliminary clarifications need to be made.

It cannot be stressed too strongly that in this chapter we will be attempting to put together a tool, a quite substantive one perhaps, with which to engage, dialectically, with certain key thinkers. In other words we will not, at this time, be attempting to construct a fully developed picture of the notion of coadunacy but rather a sketch suggestive of the major features necessary to such a picture. It is hoped that the utilization of such a tool as a means of entering into dialogue with the aforementioned thinkers will result in a fuller articulation of the notion of coadunacy in our concluding chapter.

A further point that we would like to make here is that the notion of coadunacy we are attempting to articulate here is a Christian, theological notion and thus both our critique of various understandings of relationality and our attempted construction of an
alternative perspective must be viewed in this light. It will be fundamental to our discussion, for example, that coadunate existence, in other words a form of inter-personal relationality, is normative for human being on the grounds of human creatureliness. Thus, whether it is made explicit in every case or not, wherever we speak of coadunacy we have in mind a thoroughly theological notion.

We shall turn now first to a brief discussion of the significance and problematic nature of the notion of coadunacy and secondly to our proposed outline of the possible shape that such a notion might take.

The significance and problem of coadunacy

Before embarking upon any theological enterprise it is important to identify what exactly is at stake in the prospective discussion. By this we have in mind such questions as: "why is the question of human relationality of importance to Christian theology?" and "why does the notion of human relationality need to be considered critically by theologians at all?" We shall consider the former of these two questions first.

1. The importance of relationality for Christian theology

Although the question of the status of the Judeo-Christian scriptures takes the form of a fundamental theological problematic, nevertheless to claim that these scriptures are in some sense primary for the Christian tradition is, to my mind, in no way to side-step the problems. Irrespective of the many and varied hermeneutical approaches, the biblical writings have always been understood as the primary texts of the Christian faith. Kelsey points out that

Virtually every contemporary Protestant theologian along the entire spectrum of opinion from the "neo-evangelicals" through Karl Barth, Emil Brunner, to Anders Nygren, Rudolf Bultmann, Paul Tillich and even Fritz Buri, has acknowledged that any Christian theology worthy of the name "Christian" must, in some sense of the phrase, be done "in accord with scripture".2

Clearly such a claim does not address the question of biblical authority and it is beyond the scope of this present work to take up the issue here. All we intend to do at this point is to affirm that Christian theology, to be Christian, must engage with the text of
scripture in some way. Thus any notion of human relationality which lays claim to being Christian and theological must also be related to the biblical witness "in some sense".  

In his work *Sanctorum Communio* Bonhoeffer makes the claim that "it is no accident that we read in Genesis 2:18: 'It is not good that man should be alone.'"  

The reason for this, he argues, is that man in the primal state must be thought of as being in immediate community of service with God... This community is a real connection of love between an I and an I. In the Christian conception of God, known to us from the revelation in Christ, but also from the church of Christ, the community of God and social community belong together.  

This is an important insight and one which we would certainly wish to affirm here, that human sociality is of protological significance, in that it has to do, in the first instance, with humanity's relationship with its creator. The very fact of our creatureliness establishes us as fundamentally relational. The Jewish scholar Moshe Greenberg draws attention to this point when he makes the claim that "The proper aim of the Torah is to establish harmony among men; being the word of the universal God who cares for all his creatures, the scope of the Torah is no less than all men." He continues by indicating that the unity of all people in Hebrew thought has both a protological and an eschatological dimension:

The kinship of all men as the descendants of one father and the creatures of one Creator impressed itself upon the Hebrew imagination...The myth of one mankind under one God in primeval times - from Adam to the Tower-builders - pressed for a complementary vision of a reunited mankind under God at the end of time.  

For this reason it can be affirmed that it is not good that we be alone. It is because this statement concerning the wrongness of human isolation derives its force from the logic of the creator/creature relationality that we can, along with Barth, regard the specific content of male/female relationality as secondary, in some sense, to I-Thou encounter in general.  

The reason for utilizing the notion of coadunacy to describe human relationality theologically is intimately tied up with what we have said above. The Oxford Dictionary defines "coadunate" as to be "joined together, congenitally united". In other words, in speaking of human coadunacy we are first and foremost speaking of that which is normative for human existence and not merely giving expression to
the results of social engineering. The Judeo-Christian tradition has relationality at its very heart in that it is expressive of humanity's relationship both with its creator God and with its fellow creatures. J. Muilenburg identifies the symbol of the family as being "the most elemental expression of community in ancient Israel". He goes on to argue that the unity of the family has as its locus the father who is regarded as its creator and source and also its representative and redeemer:

The relationship of the father to his family is not merely physical; it is psychical and "spiritual" as well. The physical relationship is the bearer of the psychical. All of this suggests that family terminology was suited for an expression of the relationship between God and his people, and especially for the nature of the relationship which united them."9

In his Theology of the Old Testament W. Eichrodt makes this point in the strongest of terms when he asserts that; "...Old Testament faith knows nothing, in any situation or at any time, of a religious individualism which grants a man a private relationship with God unconnected with the community either in its roots, its realization or its goal."10 It is for this reason that Jesus is able to sum up the whole of the law in the famous couplet demanding love of God and love of neighbour.

The need to assert that relationality has to do with humanity's "primal state" is a vital one for Christian theology and is integral to its traditional tripartite schema of creation, fall and redemption. In maintaining the protological significance of human relationality, the logic of the Christian tradition allows us to make sense of the clearly observable brokenness of human society, while still laying claim to a hoped-for redemption and restoration. Christian theology has always recognised human fallenness as having to do, ultimately, with the breaking down of humanity's relationship with God, and concomitantly of that with its fellows. The Genesis stories speak of human alienation from God in that Adam and Eve hid themselves from Yahweh, and also of human self-alienation. Adam and Eve are depicted as being ashamed to face one another in their nakedness. Finally, the tragedy of human relational brokenness is witnessed to in the first murder, where Cain utters the words which may be seen as paradigmatic for human relational brokenness, "am I my brother's keeper?"11
Already it ought to be clear that relationality and the human experience of its brokenness are at the very heart of the Christian story, and thus of fundamental significance. The Christian religion has to do, at its most foundational level, with human beings' relationships with their Lord and creator and with their fellow creatures. Indeed, the message of salvation preached by Jesus Christ may be characterized as a message of reconciliation, through which humanity is brought back into relationship with God and with itself. John Robinson makes this point eloquently when he writes:

...conversion must be, through and through, a community affair. For a man becomes a person when he discovers himself in the I-Thou relation of community, and in actual experience grasps with the total response of his being that he has been made for, and has his centre in, other persons.¹²

Wolfhart Pannenberg, whom we shall be considering in some detail in a subsequent chapter, also highlights this relationship between Jesus' message of salvation and what we have called humanity's "primal" relationality - that which is essential to human being

....the natural essence of man is revealed in Jesus' eschatological preaching. By promising salvation without preconditions but demanding unconditional trust for this premise, he brings man into his natural relationship with God, corresponding to man's creaturely destiny.¹³

Jesus' message of salvation and the proximity of the kingdom of God contains within it the promise both of *restoration* and *transformation*. A restoration of our relationship with God and our fellows but also an empowering to new life, what St. Paul refers to as the new creation in Christ.¹⁴ It is important that we remain aware of these twin poles of Christ's redemptive work, particularly in the light of criticisms we shall make of both Barth and Pannenberg who appear to reduce the significance of the protological dimension of human being, subsuming it within the doctrine of salvation as one single reality.¹⁵ The Christian tradition clearly recognizes the redemptive work of Christ as both *restoring* and *transforming*. There is a very real tension here between Christian protology and teleology which must not be reduced to similitude. While the New Testament witness certainly does speak of a new creation in Christ, being born to new life, being raised with Christ from death to life, it also makes use of the language of healing and restoration.
In the Gospels we find Jesus' message of forgiveness of sins inextricably linked with our forgiveness of others, in the Lord's prayer. The Gospels exhort us not only to love our neighbour as ourselves but also to love our enemies. The parable of the prodigal son may be regarded as a most striking précis of the whole Gospel story. In it we see illustrated the primal familial relationship with the Father, the fall into broken relationship, the presence of hope for restoration and the actuality of restored relationship. Indeed, if the parable of the prodigal son might be regarded as illustrative of the history of humanity's relationship with God, then the parable of the Good Samaritan might equally well be seen as the Gospel ideal for human relationality as indiscriminate love of the other.

In the Fourth Gospel, in the so-called high priestly prayer, Jesus is recorded as making this request of the Father:

My prayer is not for them alone (the disciples). I pray also for those who will believe in me through their message, that all of them may be one, Father, just as you are in me and I am in you. May they also be in us so that the world may believe that you have sent me. I have given them the glory that you gave me, that they may be one as we are one: I in them and you in me. May they be brought to complete unity to let the world know that you sent me and have loved them even as you have loved me.

Here we have expressed, in the plainest of terms, the Christian hope for human community with God and with the rest of humanity. This is the message of the Gospel of Christ, that all who acknowledge the Lordship of Christ are to be reunited with God and with each other. Indeed Jesus is said to have prayed here that his followers be empowered to an intimacy of relationship with both God and each other that is equivalent in some way to that which he shares with his Father. In this respect, and we shall see this developed in some detail in both Barth and Pannenberg, Jesus' relationship to the Father is regarded as the paradigmatic form of inter-personal relationality. Indeed the question of the nature of Jesus' relationship to his Father becomes a central theme in early Christian theology, giving rise to the classical trinitarian debates. In the light of this it will come as no surprise to find that in our subsequent analysis of Barth and Pannenberg's treatment of human relationality we shall be considering the significance of
their understandings of the triune nature of God as a possible source for human coadunacy in some detail.

The Gospel emphasis upon Christ's work as one of restoring and transforming human relationships with God and with others is taken up in the rest of the New Testament. In the letter to the Galatians we have summed up for us once again the essence of the Gospel in terms of restored relationality through Jesus Christ:

You are all sons of God through faith in Christ Jesus, for all of you who were baptised into Christ have been clothed with Christ. There is neither Jew nor Greek, slave nor free, male nor female, for you are all one in Christ Jesus.19

It is this intimacy of relationship with both God and others which is regarded as both normative for human being but also, in the light of the reality of human brokenness, as possible only in Christ Jesus.20

The New Testament epistles speak of an empowering to a new relationship with both God and others, a relationship of familial intimacy. Often it is "the Spirit" who is regarded as the agent of this new Community:

...those who are led by the Spirit of God are sons of God. For you did not receive a Spirit that makes you a slave again to fear, but you received the Spirit of adoption. And by this we cry, "Abba, Father". The Spirit himself testifies with our Spirit that we are God's children.21

Indeed, in this same chapter of the epistle to the Romans we find some remarkable verses linking the status of human interpersonal relationality with the created order in general.22 In the light of this we hope to give due consideration throughout this work to the question of the relationship that exists between humanity and its environment or place.

The empowering to unity via the activity of the Spirit is taken up again in the first epistle to the Corinthians. Here we are presented with the famous image of the Church as a single body made up of many parts; "we were all baptised by one Spirit into one body -whether Jews or Greeks, slave or free".23 Yet this picture of unity is regarded as merely a preliminary to the classical New Testament definition of love in 1 Corinthians 13. Love, we are told, is the highest of all virtues, never self-seeking, always trusting, protective and preserving. This is the self-abandoning
love of Christ, the love which Christ demands of his followers as a sign of the presence of the Kingdom of God.

A new commandment I give you: Love one another. As I have loved you, so you must love one another. All men will know that you are my disciples if you love one another. 

This imitation of Christ and his self-abandoning love is a theme which continues throughout the New Testament not only in an anthropological mode but also in an ecclesiastical one. It is the Church of Jesus Christ, as those for whom the Kingdom of God is a present reality, which is called and empowered to true communion with God and with others.

In the first letter of John we have the love of Christ juxtaposed starkly with the archetype of broken human relationality - the sin of Cain. Here also we find a reiteration of the definition of true Christ-like love, first found in the Fourth Gospel, as total self-sacrifice.

This is the message you heard from the beginning: we should love one another. Do not be like Cain who belonged to the evil one and murdered his brother... We know that we have passed from death to life, because we love our brothers. Anyone who does not love remains in death... This is how we know what love is: Jesus Christ laid down his life for us. And we ought to lay down our lives for our brothers.

Even from this rather cursory examination of the biblical tradition we can see that relationality is at the very heart of its protology, its anthropology, its Christology, its pneumatology, its ecclesiology and its eschatology. Having said this it is important that the place and significance of the individual is not marginalised. Talk of community within the biblical tradition always presupposes that said community - be it the nation of Israel or the Church of Christ - be made up of persons in relation. The body of Christ is always regard as being constituted by many distinct parts. We shall say more concerning the importance of this dynamic of the one and the many later. What is important for us to do now is to give some indication as to why the theme of self/other relationality is to be regarded as problematic for contemporary Christian theology, despite its observed centrality to the earliest recorded traditions of the faith.
ii. The Problematic

As we have noted, it ought now to be clear, even from the brief examination above, that the theme of relationality is absolutely central to the Christian tradition. Furthermore, any theology which seeks to engage with the biblical texts as primary in some way for the Christian faith must attempt to do justice to the ideal of human relationality found therein. This is not to say, and we have already pointed this out, that the biblical texts are not also concerned with the significance, responsibility and dignity of the individual person. Indeed relationality within the Christian tradition is always understood in terms of discrete persons in communion, a self and an other. There is no sense in which communality might be understood as absorption or the negation of the other. We are not swallowed up into the God with whom we relate; neither do we subsume the other with whom we relate into ourselves. The Judeo-Christian tradition appears to maintain a tensive relationship between the communal and the individual, the emphasis upon the latter presenting the former from collapsing into some form of undifferentiated collective.

The motivation for this present work is two-fold, and may be broadly categorised as phenomenological and ideological, although it is with the latter of these two that we will concern ourselves most.

By phenomenological we have in mind the clearly observable tendency towards radical individualism and privatism within contemporary Western society. There has been considerable sociological analysis conducted in this area, and it is not the task of the present work to rehearse such analysis here. Statistically, at least within the United Kingdom, human isolation is increasing at an alarming rate.

One of the most notable features of the period since the Second World War has been the increase in people living alone: in 1986 nearly a quarter of households in Great Britain contained only one person, compared with about one tenth in 1951. At the same time the proportion of households containing five or more people has halved, and is now less than one tenth.

This tendency towards increasing privatization supports the findings of J.H.Goldthorpe and D.Lockwood who, in the early 1960's, began their now famous study of the "affluent manual worker". The original point of the project was to test the validity of the "Embourgeoisement thesis" which held that with the advent of higher
wages and the accompanying improvement in the standard of living, the traditional working classes were being assimilated into a broad middle-class, with respect to their ideals and social activities. The results of the study demonstrated however that while this was not in fact the case, the working class maintaining its own distinct set of values, it was found that with an increase in material prosperity the working classes did exhibit a strong tendency towards increased privatisation.

It would be difficult to sustain the idea that the affluent workers we studied typically possessed dual social identity - still working class in their role as rank-and-file production employees but in their out-of-work roles indistinguishably part of the middle-class society... Rather than such an assimilation, our findings would indicate as the most probable concomitant of these workers' orientation to work and of their present type of employment what we have earlier referred to as privatisation - a process, that is, manifested in a pattern of social life which is centred on, and indeed largely restricted to, the home and the conjugal family.30

One of the most significant observations to issue out of this study was that given the choice of remaining within the context of the larger kinship network and moving to the socially isolating environment of a new town or city in search of financially more rewarding employment, the latter was generally chosen. Some of those couples interviewed expressed misgivings concerning the move.

To break away from their existing pattern of sociability had been, in other words, a prerequisite of their becoming affluent; and this, despite the possibility of isolation, was the course of action that they had chosen to follow.31

The occasions to socialise were also found to be affected drastically by the tendency for both couples to be gainfully employed and more often than not being involved in shift work and over-time. Of those interviewed a scant 16% of husbands reported activities that were both "extra-mural" and extra-familiar. The study concludes on this point that we have, then, a variety of evidence to show that for the majority of our affluent workers and their wives time outside work was time devoted overwhelmingly to home and family life rather than to sociability of any more widely based kind.
This observation we see as being fully in accord with the individual's "dominant orientation to work - their emphasis upon economic pay-off".\footnote{32}

Privacy is no longer the accepted right of a privileged few, every Englishman's home is now his castle. With the concept of privacy being pushed back within the border of individual self-consciousness partly as a result of the Cartesian \textit{cogito}, as we shall see in subsequent chapters, privacy and property are no longer so intimately linked. Arthur Britton points out that

\begin{quote}
The belief in the interiorisation of a world of meaning and uniqueness of experience is embodied in the language and literature of Western society ... Privacy is not only taken for granted, it is elevated to a moral category. The violation of an individual's privacy is viewed in the same way as the desecration of the sacred by the unfaithful.\footnote{33}
\end{quote}

Britten suggests that it is upon the women that privatisation has had its most debilitating effect. The picture painted by the social sciences of the horrors of inner city life and the boredom and monotony of the isolated suburban housewife are justification enough to condemn the privatised world. The process of privatisation has had the effect of placing the wife and the "domestic structure" under unnatural and harmful strain. The privatised husband expects to find all the support and resources necessary to cope with the stresses of everyday life within the obviously limited context of his wife and family. This relatively small community simply cannot maintain such a demanding drain on its emotional and physical energies and hence elements within it often break down.

\begin{quote}
The family was the place where you found a haven from the exacting world of work, from the 'rat-race' of the factory floor and the 'status differentials' of office. And there was your wife - 'the little woman' - waiting for you with your meal prepared, your socks washed and your children disciplined.\footnote{34}
\end{quote}

This is the curse of individualism and its attendant doctrines that places under so much stress the remaining coadunate units as to burst them at the seams. Stanley Hauerwas points out that in America the family is more often than not seen as primarily a contractual arrangement using the language of rights and exchange to define it.\footnote{35} This is because the coadunate unit of the family is becoming more and more difficult to sustain, without supporting legal structures, under the present pressures.
Martin Pawley in his book *The Private Future* examines this issue further, drawing out the concomitant effect of privatisation, that being the evacuation of the public realm.

There is now nothing but a vacant terrorized space between the government — which controls and maintains production — and the isolated consumer, who increases his consumption in proportion to his isolation.36

The advent of suburban man is, says Pawley, the direct result not of an eroding of so-called traditional values by the barbaric elements within society, but rather of the development of industry, consumerism and the media. The intensive utilization of what Pawley refers to as "energy slaves", that is, items such as cars, washing machines and vacuum cleaners, reduces the need for social interaction and dependence.37 Trapped on this path of isolation Western society must consume at an ever increasing rate to maintain the level of detachment necessary for social harmony. The breakdown of the extended family consisting not simply of husband, wife and children but also of grandparents and even aunts and uncles, coupled with a general trend towards a lower level of occupancy speaks of a terrible movement towards isolationism all but completed in the latter half of this century.

Today, one's home is seen, for all practical purposes, as one's total environment in which one's basic and recreational needs are amply provided for by the technological marvels of our age. It is now possible to live one's life in a manner considered successful and comfortable by Western standards without ever leaving the confines of one's home. Computer links are available via the existing telecommunications network, through which one may conduct one's business, collaborate on a book with a colleague hundreds of miles away, pay one's bills, do one's shopping and send letters and documents without even having to go to a post-box. Videos make it unnecessary to visit a cinema or the theatre, hi-fi can reproduce operatic, orchestral and rock music with pin-point clarity while one pops a pre-packed gourmet meal into the micro-wave oven ready for an evening of isolated entertainment.

What is missing from this individualistic utopia is the transcendent other. Indeed, personal stereo allows one to remain within one's cosseted solipsistic world even while indulging in the unsavoury business of entering the public sphere. Pawley points out that even such an innocuous invention as central heating, by heating every
part of the house, makes it unnecessary for members of a family to congregate in one place. Thus the elderly are shunted off to old folks' homes and children abandon their parent's home as soon as possible in search of their own autonomy, their own total environment. Despite the rabid individualism outlined above the notion of community is still a current one. However, it is now completely in the hands of the image makers, the media men;

Recognition of the fact that this community... has become an illusion, an image, a roll of tape, a spool of film, a splendid but empty palace, is too painful. Hence the retention of the language and pagentry of community and obligation to describe an increasingly gim-crack façade of public events for which self-interest is the only comprehensible motivation. This massive self-deception, the best-kept secret of our century, is only betrayed by behaviour, never by words - for 'we' intentionally lack the words to describe it. Behaviour in this sense has become increasingly divorced from the language that purports to explain it as part of the same self-protecting process. A triumph of security.

Thus, while we are assured through advertisements that by using a certain brand of washing powder our family life will be enhanced, the presupposition being that this is a state of affairs sought after by Western man, in actual fact we continue to seek complete irresponsibility. The most comforting phrase in our society is "without obligation". In this sense, the rejection of the transcendent other permits us to live our lives without the need for relating or indeed, more disturbingly, without the social and emotional apparatus to begin to relate to those beyond us.

The disintegration of humanity's coadunate nature, coupled with the atrophying of the correlative social structure, has created a poisonous no-man's-land of the traditional public realm. The public sphere is now a place of all-powerful and malevolent bureaucracy, escalating prices and mob violence. Comfort and security are available only within the environment that has been tailored to one's individual needs - in other words, the home - although to an equally significant degree, the car provides a similar cocoon-like environment. Pawley speaks of a "secondary reality" that is constructed by the individual to counter the undeniable horrors of a public realm left to run wild. It is this secondary reality that is fed by the media, consumerism and of course politicians, the latter
of whom has discovered that what wins elections is not issues but
tax-cuts and higher wages.

The privatized individual vacates the public realm which thus falls progressively into the hands of a bureaucracy laced with speculative corruption. Such administration in turn leads to more news of families evicted and old ladies living in their bathrooms and thus confirms the wisdom of the initial withdrawal itself. Because the public realm is less and less often experienced and more and more reported it becomes an image consisting of rapes, hijackings, riots, speeches, murderers and racketeers... Like unprofitable railways which can only be kept running with massive subsidies, collapsed communities are attended by increasing numbers of social workers who are paid to prop up a structure collapsing of its own weight... the old patterns of community care patched up repeatedly by infusions of public money and professional skill. 38

Those who have most successfully fortified themselves against the outside world are also protected from the horrors of its disintegration by the controlled and emotionless reporting of the news on television and radio, where the announcement of thousands of deaths through floods and starvation and war is given out in the measured tones of society's professional shock absorbers.

Clearly this tendency towards isolation presents a powerful challenge to Christian theology to restate the ideal of human communality, to assert that it is not good that we be alone and that in the light of the redemptive work of Christ, we can be empowered to a new communion with God and our fellows. However, simply to indicate that true human coadunacy is both demanded and made possible through the salvific work of Jesus Christ is, to an extent, to take refuge behind one of the primary symbols of the Christian faith. It will be necessary to unpack this theological assertion and explain what we might call the necessary conditions for human coadunacy and this we intend to do in our concluding chapter.

The second of our motivations in engaging with this issue of human communality is an ideological one. By this we have in mind concern over elements within the Western intellectual tradition that have contributed to the prioritizing of the subject over the object, the self over the other. Clearly it would not be possible here to assess the whole of Western intellectual history as it relates to this issue. What we propose to do however is to limit ourselves to the consideration of certain key figures, within the disciplines of both philosophy and theology, who have exerted a powerful influence
over contemporary thought. We need say very little here as regards the precise nature of our concern over the treatment of self/other relationality found in the work of our chosen thinkers. This will constitute the bulk of this thesis proper. However, it might be suitable at this point to indicate briefly the areas that we expect to prove problematic.

In our consideration of the idealistic philosophies of Kant, Fichte and Hegel we will be concerned to highlight what might be referred to as a totalism of the subject or the ego. While all three of these thinkers may rightly be seen as having a fundamental concern with the issue of relationality there is a clear tendency in them all to prioritize the subject. It is the "I" or the "self" or the "ego", the "subject or "mind" that always initiates relationship and has power over the act of relating. In such a view the place and significance of the other is subsumed under the overwhelming power of the "I". The dangers inherent in totalistic modes of thought have been more than apparent in this century and certainly do not require rehearsal here. Suffice it to say at this point that any notion of relationality which regards the other as merely a means to an end for the self, or in which the self alone is seen ultimately as the power behind self/other relating must be viewed with suspicion by Christian theology. As we have already noted above, the earliest recorded traditions of the Christian faith seem to indicate that communality has to do with discrete persons in a relational dynamic. Indeed if a prioritizing of one or other of the poles of this dynamic is to be witnessed at all in the biblical tradition, it might well be argued that it is the other who is empowered over the "I" in Christ-like self-abandonment. We shall be considering this further in a subsequent chapter.

Our examination of two leading twentieth century theologians will take the form of an assessment of the sufficiency of their treatment of self/other relationality from within the Christian tradition. As we have already mentioned in our introductory chapter, the choice of Karl Barth and Wolfhart Pannenberg for this purpose is dependent upon a number of reasons. Firstly, both Barth and Pannenberg are thinkers of undoubted stature who could not be accused in any way of operating at the margins of theology. Furthermore, both thinkers are concerned to engage with the theological agenda in its broadest terms, seeking to provide the most comprehensive and all-embracing picture possible. In the light of this the issue of relationality
is found in their thinking to be inextricably linked to the rest of the theological enterprise, and is not simply treated as an isolated doctrinal concern. For both of them human relationality has to do with the very essence of what it means to be human and in the divine image. Finally, it may be said that in selecting Barth and Pannenberg we have to do with two opposing theological methods, often characterised as theology "from above" and theology "from below". Another way of considering this may be to see Barth and Pannenberg as representative of the revelation/natural theology debate. It is clear that they do represent two distinct theological approaches and for this reason it seems valuable to focus our attention upon them.

Ultimately we are concerned to ascertain whether or not Barth and Pannenberg provide us with an understanding of human interpersonal relationality which is consistent with the ideal of communality witnessed to in the biblical tradition; in other words, whether or not they recognise the essential nature of human communality, whether they maintain the important distinction between the self and the other, and thus avoid totalisation of the subject, and whether they give due expression to Christ-like self-abandonment to the other as the fundamental condition for human coadunacy. One of the major problems which we will be attempting to highlight within these representative theologies is the tendency to produce a form of theological totalism in the shape of Christological determinism. In such an instance, the person of Christ becomes the all-powerful subject, determinative for all human being, while "actual" created humanity becomes the subordinate "other" subsumed under the Christological ideal.

In the light of all we have said above, we shall turn in the next chapter to a statement of three basic themes within the notion of coadunacy. It is intended that these themes will function, in some respect, as the categories of a theological hauristic which ought to provide the background to our analysis of the aforementioned thinkers.
NOTES


3. Cf. D. Kelsey, *op.cit.*, where he makes the important point that:

   When a community of Christians call a set of writings the "Christian canon," she affirms that it is her "Scripture." It is to say that this set of writings ought to be used in a certain way in the church's common life. But more than that: It is to say that just *these* writings are *sufficient* for the ends to which they ought to be used in the church...Thus for a community to call itself "church" is to say, *inter alia*, that it is a community whose continuing self-identity depends on the use, not just (vaguely) of some writings, but precisely use of just *these* writings. p.104f, passim.


   ...Old Testament thought of man's creatureliness leads also to the clear grasp of the concept of humanity, which is quite distinct from the view generally held among ancient peoples. As creatures of the one God the peoples are members of one great family...And as mankind appears at the beginning of Israel's records as a single entity, so too, in Israel's view of the future, mankind appears as the united community of nations receiving God's new world, and thus returning to their origin. p.36.

8. Cf. CD 3/1 Barth on male-female relationality as exemplary of the I-Thou relational structure.


17. J. Macmurray makes the point that the universalization of the Gospel in Jesus' message is based upon the recognition of the
true nature of human community as is seen in Jesus' response to the question "who is my neighbour?". Cf. Creative Society. A Study of the Relation of Christianity to Communism, p.65.

20. Macmurray argues that the universal community of mankind is more than a bare possibility for Jesus because it is an expression of the true nature of man himself and is thus grounded in the nature of reality. However, this community - the Kingdom of Heaven - is both the truth and the goal, because human beings behave in a way which denies the reality of their own nature - i.e. because of sin. op.cit., p.67.
Cf. also J.A.T.Robinson, who expounds the significance of the Eucharist as making present and bringing to us a unity within the Church which empirically does not exist, except in a gravely distorted reflection, because of sin. op.cit. Chapter 7.

22. Romans 8:19-22.
25. Ephesians 4:32-5:1,2; Philippians 2:1-5; Galatians 6:2,10.
27. 1 John 3:12-16.
29. Social Trends 18, 1988, p.36f.
30. Goldthorpe & Lockwood The Affluent Worker in the Class Structure, p96-97
31. ibid. p.97.
32. p.103.
33. A.Britten, The Privatized World p.49.
34. Britten, p.69.
35. S.Hauerwas, A Community of Character p.81.
37. Cf. Pawley, p.11.
Like the pretence that the Nazi regime in Germany was an inexplicable throwback to barbarism with no roots or consequences in Western Europe the idea that the emerging society of privatized uninvolved, anti-community individuals is somehow divorced from its parentage, offers a perverse comfort to those who cannot see the extent to which their own lives are made up of the same tendencies.
38. Pawley, p.46.
39. Pawley, p.100.

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In the previous chapter we have attempted to draw attention both to the importance of the notion of coadunacy for a Christian view of humanity and also to the problem of increasing isolationism and radical individualism within western culture. In this chapter we plan to outline our foci for analysing a selection of thinkers who have had a significant engagement with the issue of human relationality. In so doing we shall be concentrating our attention on three fundamental themes of coadunacy: the nature of human coadunacy, the loss of human coadunacy and the restoration of human coadunacy.

We will be concerned here to suggest questions that need to be asked concerning the status of human coadunacy; whether it is in any sense normative for human being; the nature and extent of self/other estrangement - that is whether the human capacity for relationship with the other is understood as damaged or impaired or perhaps completely destroyed; and the nature, extent and mode of any possible restoration of human coadunacy. It is important to note that while these themes and the questions they generate will not manifest themselves as a formal structure for our subsequent analysis, they do represent our overall concerns and are implicit both in our selection of material and in the way in which we use this material. They will of course be of particular significance when we turn from the analysis of each thinker's approach to the issue of relationality and to our critique of said approach. In this respect the questions that are to be expressed in this chapter will form the matrix out of which our subsequent analysis and critique of certain thinkers' approaches to the issue of human relationality will arise. Furthermore it will be in response to the emergent critique of these thinkers that our own substantive theological statement of the normativity of human coadunacy will develop.

Thus, the rest of this thesis will fall into three parts: Firstly we shall outline three basic, albeit implicit, fields of inquiry which will constitute the dialectical threshold for our subsequent analysis of certain thinkers, that is to say the limits of our dialogue with said thinkers. These fields or themes have already been identified above as the nature, loss and restoration of human coadunacy. In other words these groups of questions will serve both
to focus our attention and to limit the range of our examination. Secondly we shall be engaging with five major thinkers, from both philosophy and theology, who have, in one way or another, addressed the issue of human relationality. These thinkers will be considered in the light of our tripartite dialectical threshold — that is to say we shall be primarily concerned with their understandings of human relationality, the failure of human relationality and the restoration of human relationality. This engagement will take the form of analysis and critique. Finally we intend to present a positive theological statement of the normativity of human coadunacy once again drawing upon our three themes but this time in their Christian mode: the Christian ideal of coadunacy, the Christian understanding of sin and the Christian understanding of reconciliation. These last two themes, it must be made clear, will be treated with respect to the issue of relationality and not in any exhaustive way.

It should by now be clear how the three themes of inquiry that are to be outlined below will run through the rest of this work, how they will function both as a tool for critical engagement with other thinkers and also as a basis for substantive theological construction. We turn now to the presentation of these fields of inquiry.

The nature of human coadunacy

Clearly the primary question that needs to be directed towards any system of thought which purports to give an account of human relationality is that concerning the nature and foundation of this relationality. Any answer given to this question will undoubtedly depend upon whether one is operating with what we might broadly designate an essentialist or an existentialist perspective on human being. By this we mean whether human being is understood as having to do, primarily, with a pre-established ontology — pre-established by God for example — or whether human being is largely a function of the choices made within the environment and context in which it is located. Is human being an a priori given or is human being in some way self-creating? Does essence precede existence or vice versa? This issue arises most significantly for us in the context of the question concerning whether coadunacy is considered to be normative.
for human being or not. It will be this aspect of the essence/existence debate on which we will be focusing in this work.

In so far as the Christian tradition clearly maintains, at its most fundamental level, that the human being is a creature of God I do not believe it to be out of place here to indicate that our own substantive treatment of human coadunacy will seek to argue for its ontological, that is to say normative, significance for human being. In other words we shall be arguing that coadunacy is essential to human being as being intended by God. While we do not wish to cloud our present statement of the fields of enquiry by the incorporation of constructive theological material better suited to our concluding chapter, I think it nonetheless important that the theological character of this work be kept in mind. That is to say we are not disinterestedly engaged in this study of human relationality but are conducting our examination from within the Christian tradition and this participation in a given tradition will inevitably influence our mode of analysis. Wherever this influence is most pronounced we hope to make it apparent.

Thus, for our own purposes, we need to ask whether relationality is considered to be normative for human being by those thinkers with whom we shall engage, and if so in what sense is it normative? Are human beings understood to be in relation by virtue of their ontology? In other words, is coadunacy a necessary mode of human being? or is human communality simply regarded as the product of social engineering?

Questions of this kind are of vital importance with respect to the larger question concerning whether or not there is an ideal mode of human existence. If there is such an ideal state for human being, is this something that has been lost and thus requires restoration or has it more to do with a human destiny yet to be achieved? A question of equal significance is the one concerning the basis and status of any alleged ideal standard for human being. From whence do we derive this ideal standard? Is it some manner of Platonic universal, or perhaps, rather, has it to do with divine creative intent? On the other hand behavioural science tells us that "We have not yet seen what man can make of man." If human being is indeed self-creating by means of enviromental and social control then any answer given to the question concerning an ideal human state must surely be a relative one. With respect to the issue of human
coadunacy we must then ask whether communality is in fact a more ideal state for human being than some form of radical individualism and if so why? It might well be argued that human coadunacy is in some sense pragmatically ideal in that as a species we are stronger together than we are apart and thus human community ought to be encouraged as a strategy for human survival and progress. However such a utilitarian perspective upon human communality is substantially different to any view which argues that communality is the a priori proper mode of human existence. It will be found that, in one form or another, all five of our chosen thinkers fall more readily into the latter category than into the former in so far as they all wish to argue that human being is, in some sense, necessarily in relation with the other.

However, if human being is indeed understood as, to a greater or lesser extent, coadunate being, then we need to ask questions concerning the fundamental basis of this unity between self and other. That is to say we need to consider the mode of this relationality. For example, is this relationality a function of the unity of perception within human rationality, or is it understood in terms of the subsumption of all particularity under one unifying reality; or rather has it to do with creation in the image of the three personed God - that is to say in the image of a divine society? It will be important to consider to what extent human being can be said to be "naturally" in relation with others and to what extent human relationships have to be worked at. Clearly, and as we shall discuss in our concluding chapter, human beings do not tend to encounter the other in the first instance as "friend" but rather as "stranger". Even if this were not the case we would still need to inquire into the possible distinction between passive and active relationality. In other words even if the ontological status of coadunacy for human being is accepted we still need to inquire into the nature of coadunacy in particularity that is to say "my" relationship with "you". As we shall see during our subsequent analysis certain thinkers, due to their preoccupation with the universal categories of relationality, have a tendency to neglect the important dimension of particular persons in particular relationships.

Following on from this concern for the particularity of human coadunacy the character and quality of coadunacy also needs to be considered. For example, is coadunacy to be understood in primarily
personal terms, best expressed in the language of friendship, family and love or is the language of dignity, worth and value regarded as more appropriate? Has coadunacy more to do with a priori formal structures, rational or otherwise, or interpersonal dependency and human agency? In other words are Buber's I-Thou, I-It distinctions understood to be in any way substantial ones and is human coadunacy seen as belonging to the former or the latter category?

As we have already intimated above, to say that human being is being in relation need say nothing concerning the quality of that relationality. In a sense we are all in relationship with each other by virtue of sharing a common environment. It is common to talk of cultural groups, for example, as "societies"; however, while there are general factors which might help us to identify, let us say, British society, this tells us very little about my actual relationship with any particular member of that society. Furthermore while we might wish to argue that human relationality must be founded upon some understanding of human dignity and worth we need to ask whether this in itself constitutes a sufficient basis for full human coadunacy or indeed whether it can even account for human relationship as we ourselves experience it.

An issue that will be of central concern throughout this work is the one relating to the question of power in human relationality. Within self/other relationality where is the power over the relationship located? In other words, who has the initiative in human relationality? Is it the self who has priority over the other in such relating or is the other empowered over the self? Are we to understand human coadunacy as manifesting itself in some form of Hegelian life and death struggle where one is destined to be subsumed by the other - what E.Levinas refers to as totalism - or has it more to do with the disempowering of the self for the other?

This particular question concerning the mode of coadunacy, the location of relational power and the prioritizing of either the self or the other within human relationality, will emerge as absolutely fundamental to both our critique and to our substantive statements concerning a possible Christian understanding of coadunacy.

In general therefore it will be questions of the sort outlined above which will need to be kept in the forefront of our thinking as we examine the nature of human coadunacy as understood by our
selection of thinkers. We turn now to the field of inquiry concerning the apparent loss of human coadunacy.

Loss of coadunacy

One of the most fundamental questions which needs to be addressed to any system of thought which seeks to deal with the issue of human relationality is this: does it do adequate justice to the undeniable human experience of alienation from the other? Does it explain why the self encounters the other as stranger? and does it identify the nature of this strangeness? Any attempt to address this field of questions will naturally depend quite substantially upon the answers given to those questions which constituted our previous field.

If the normativity of coadunacy for human being is accepted, in the sense of an ontological or essential ideal, then the clearly discernible alienation of the self from the other needs to be accounted for. In other words we need to ask why there exists an apparent disparity between ideal and actual human nature and what constitutes the cause of this disparity. Clearly any talk of a deviation from an ideal must sooner or later give rise to the language of loss and damage. Thus for any system of thought which seeks to argue for coadunacy as an ideal for human being an understanding of the apparent loss of coadunacy is clearly necessary.

This concern over the loss of coadunacy gives rise to a whole range of subordinate questions. For example, is this loss of coadunacy symptomatic of a more fundamental human malaise or is it in fact to be understood as the root of all human deviation from whatever might be considered normative for human being? As we shall see in a subsequent chapter the theologian Wolfhart Pannenberg wishes to understand human brokenness or sin as ego-centricity, in other words a self-centered mode of human being which denies both the divine and human other. Furthermore we need to consider to what extent this loss of coadunacy is a tragic one and to what extent humanity might be considered culpable for it. That is to say, is the present human experience of alienation from the other the result of some event or process of cosmic significance such that we are powerless in the face of it or is it rather to be understood as a function of human agency such that the situation might be changed and the ideal be
restored via an act of human will? This will of course have obvious implications for anything that might be said with regard to the possible restoration of coadunacy. Clearly this line of inquiry leads us on to questions concerning the extent of the loss of human coadunacy.

Are we to suppose that in speaking of such a loss we are suggesting that human beings have lost the capacity for communality or is this capacity simply impaired? We also need to consider whether all human relationships are similarly damaged. We are all undoubtedly aware of our alienation from other human beings but what of alienation from God and from our surrounding environment? It will become clear from our analyses of Barth and Pannenberg that there exists a strong tradition within Christian theology that wishes to understand human brokenness in all its forms - in other words sin - as the direct result of the breakdown of relationship between human beings and God. However, we shall find cause to question the adequacy of the treatment of human relationship to an external context or environment provided by all five of our chosen thinkers and thus plan to develop this neglected theme in our concluding chapter.

Of course, if coadunacy is not understood as normative for human being qua human being then the question concerning why, if indeed at all, alienation from the other - divine, human or environmental - needs to be overcome, and in favour of what?, requires an answer. As we have already intimated above, without some notion of an ideal mode of human being any attempt to identify human deviancy from the norm becomes problematic. I think it would be true to say that all five of our chosen thinkers appear to operate with some notion of what is normative for human being, whether that norm by bound up in some future destiny or in the person of Christ for example. These thinkers seem to want to understand human being with reference to some transcendent ideal such as Hegel's Spirit or in the case of Barth and Pannenberg the person of Christ as the one true imago dei, or in the instance of Kant the transcendentalty of human rationality. The point we wish to make here is that in the absence of such an ideal notion of human being one is surely forced to adopt a more phenomenal approach to the question "why ought self/other alienation to be overcome?"

Throughout our analysis it will be important to consider how the notion of alienation or brokenness or sin is understood in the context of
human relationality. In other words how does the breakdown of human coadunacy actually manifest itself? Is it, for example, primarily a psychological problem having to do with emotional and mental states in principle open to resolution via clinical means or has it to do with human participation in an as yet unresolved metaphysical process? On the other hand it could be that the brokenness of human relationality has to do with social structures which promote radical individualism and human isolation. Clearly, as we shall attempt to argue in our concluding chapter, the Christian tradition wishes to maintain that human relational brokenness is a function of sin and as such is more than simply an apparent disjunction between the self and the other. Rather it has to do with the spoiling of human being, at an ontological level, as a result of our estrangement from the creator God who is the very source of human being. It is important that questions concerning the nature and extent of human brokenness be addressed to theologians particularly in the light of the doctrine of reconciliation via the person and work of Christ and it is thus to the theme of restoration that we turn now.

Restoration of coadunacy

Clearly one of the most significant questions that needs to be asked of a system of thought claiming to deal with human relationality, in the light of its afore-mentioned brokenness, is whether it actually makes any provision for the restoration of coadunacy? Assuming that coadunacy is considered normative for human being and further that this essential unity of self and other is in some way spoilt, giving rise to estrangement and alienation, is this damage understood as reparable and if so, in what way?

Questions concerning the possibility, mode and extent of a restoration of human coadunacy relate directly to our two previous themes. Clearly the way in which both the ideal of human relationality and our experience of its brokenness are understood will be determinative for any treatment of its restoration. Questions concerning the mode of restoration are of particular significance for it is here that we have to do with the issue relating to our own direct involvement in this process. Is the restoration of human coadunacy something which is initiated and proceeds without actual human involvement? Are we speaking here of an irresistible divine act of restoration on our behalf or perhaps
of a similarly irresistible metaphysical synthetic process where all things are, by the very nature of reality, being brought into unity? We shall find that for most of our chosen thinkers the movement from alienation and towards unity has something of an inevitable character about it in that it has to do with a cosmic process or an unavoidable destiny or divine lordship.

On the other hand, if human agency is understood as essential to the task of restoring coadunacy then questions concerning the strategy for such an involvement need to be asked. How do we go about relating to the other as friend rather that stranger? By what means do we disempower ourselves with regard to the other and overcome our fear of the other? Any treatment of human involvement in the task of restoring human coadunacy must attempt to answer such questions. Indeed we shall find cause to question the sufficiency of this important issue within the thinking of our respective thinkers. For this reason we shall attempt, in our concluding chapter, to outline a possible strategy for human involvement in the restoration of coadunacy.

Furthermore, questions must be asked concerning the extent of restored human coadunacy. That is to say, if the language of restoration is to be used with respect to human coadunacy we need to consider whether this restoration is to be understood as total or partial, as immediate or as part of an ongoing process to be consummated at some point in the future. As we have already mentioned above, while Christianity speaks of the overcoming of sin and estrangement through the person and work of Christ the present experience of the church is by no means one of sinless perfection. Any understanding of the restoration of human coadunacy must therefore still account for the continued human experience of estrangement from the other. Thus, to reiterate, we need to ask whether the restoration of human coadunacy is understood as total or partial, as ideal or actual, as an immediate change in the human constitution or as a process towards a coadunate destiny. Finally we need to ask whether a particular understanding of the restoration of human coadunacy accords with actual human experience, that is to say whether the claim that coadunacy is restored or is in the process of restoration is borne out in our actual experience of the other.

In the light of all that we have said, our overall analytic concerns ought now to be clear. Throughout the course of the next four
chapters of this work we intend to elicit answers, from each of our
five thinkers, to some of the fundamental questions raised above
concerning human relationality. We will attempt to uncover what each
respective thinker understands human relationality to entail,
particularly as regards its basis and priorities, how it is that
they attempt to describe and account for alienation or relational
brokenness and how they go about treating the theme of a possible
restoration of self/other communality and once again the emergent
priorities of such relating. Having done this we shall continue by
offering a critique of the thinkers based both upon the sufficiency
of each respective treatment of the notion of relationality, whether
they provide an adequate and satisfying account of the human
experience of relatedness and alienation, but also upon their
similarity and dissimilarity to a Christian theological
understanding of these issues. This last criterion clearly requires
further comment.

As we have already mentioned above this work is to be regarded as
operating from within the Christian tradition and as such any
attempt to understand it as a disinterested study will be
fundamentally mistaken. Our ultimate aim is to present at least the
beginnings of a Christian theological understanding of human
coadunacy founded on foundational doctrines of the faith but also
in response to and issuing out of dialogue with certain thinkers who
have made a significant contribution to our understanding of human
relationality. Clearly our treatments of Barth and Pannenberg will
have to table a more specific question concerning the adequacy of
their respective theologies as descriptions of the Christian
tradition and experience which would perhaps be less appropriate,
although by no means inappropriate, to ask of Kant and Hegel.
However, while both Kant and Hegel clearly understood themselves to
be engaging, to a greater or lesser extent, with the Christian
faith, this is by no means clear in the case of Fichte as we see in
a subsequent chapter. We hope that the insights gained and the
pitfalls identified through our examination of Kant, Fichte, Hegel,
Barth and Pannenberg will permit us to begin the task of
constructing a uniquely theological understanding of coadunacy.

Once again it needs to be stated quite clearly that throughout this
work we intend, as far as possible, to let our chosen thinkers speak
for themselves free from the constraints of an obtrusive analytic
agenda. For this reason the analytic questions outlined above will
not be found expressed as such during our analysis. These questions and concerns will form rather an implicit orientation to this study. They influence, for example, our selection of thinkers, the material focused on, the limits of our analysis and the nature of our emergent critique. Ultimately these three fields or themes of inquiry will reappear more explicitly in our concluding chapter where we will seek to provide a theological response to them. The explicit appearance of these three themes in our final chapter, deliberately avoided in the previous analytic chapters, will be justified as a self-imposed agenda in no way alien to our own thinking.

We turn now to a consideration of the philosopher Immanuel Kant and his particular contribution to the issue of human relating as treated by him in terms of subject/object relationality.
NOTES


2. Cf. Chapter 3, Kant

3. Cf. Chapter 4, Hegel

4. Cf. Chapter 5 on Barth and Chapter 6 on Pannenberg. Both of these theologians regard the triune nature of God as significant for human relationality. In Chapter 7 we shall also utilize the doctrine of the Trinity in this way.

5. This formalism will prove to be one of our major criticisms of Kant's understanding of human relationality. Cf. Chapter 3.


7. This will emerge as our own understanding of the active nature of human coadunacy and will require that we outline a strategy for the disempowering of the self for the other. Cf. Chapter 7.

The inclusion of a chapter on the critical philosophy of Immanuel Kant in a work concerned with the nature of human relationality might appear somewhat out of place. While it would certainly be true to say that Kant did not concern himself with this issue directly there is a very real sense in which his epistemological considerations have important implications for the problem of human sociality. What is of the first importance for Kant and is ultimately of significance for our present discussion is the epistemic question concerning the nature of the relationship which pertains between subject and object. This concern and indeed the perspective that Kant ultimately arrives at with respect to it is summed up quite clearly in the First Critique when he writes:

> The transcendental unity of apperception is that unity through which all the manifold given in an intuition is united in a concept of the object. It is therefore entitled objective, and must be distinguished from the subjective unity of consciousness, which is a determination of inner sense - through which the manifold of intuition for such [objective] combination is empirically given.²

We shall be returning to this important notion later on. It must be stressed here however, that Kant in no way regards himself as having to do with any ontological or traditionally metaphysical notions of subject and object; rather his concern is fundamentally epistemic. Kant is motivated by the desire to establish the necessary a priori or transcendental conditions for human knowledge in the face of what he saw as the potentially devastating scepticism of Hume and those of like opinion. It is as an out-working of this primary concern that he concentrated his attention upon the structure of human knowing, that is the object's appearance to the subject. From this we may identify certain loci within Kant's thought which have significance for our own concern with human relationality. Firstly, what is it that constitutes the determinative nature of the subject for the object in Kant? That is to say, in what sense, if indeed any, is the subject to be regarded as constitutive of the appearance of the object? Concomitantly we need to ask whether, for Kant, there exists a real disjunction between the object-for-subject and the object-in-itself. Certainly, as we shall see in the
following chapter the German Idealist tradition rejected the notion of the "thing-in-itself". It seems clear to us from the outset that Kant may be seen as engaging with the three fields of inquiry spoken of in chapter two. He is concerned with the normative nature of the subject's relationship to the object, he is clearly aware of the problematic of the subject/object disjunction and his critical philosophy represents an attempt at describing the way in which this disjunction is overcome in the transcendental unity of apperception.

In seeking to clarify the subject/object relation Kant found himself engaged both in a consideration of the limits of human understanding, summed up in his critique of metaphysics and his introduction of the notion of noumena and, concomitantly, in an analysis of the application of the categories of the understanding to the phenomenal world. We shall turn now to an exposition of both of these issues as they present themselves in Kant's thought primarily from the Prize Essay up until the first Critique.

Our reasons for electing to focus upon these particular writings within the Kant corpus are partially pragmatic in that we are not here attempting to address the complete work of Kant but simply to draw attention to certain tendencies exhibited within the tradition of which he is often considered to be the leading exponent. Our second reason involves our concern to indicate that these tendencies were integral to the development of Kant's thought and do not simply represent a minor aberration drawn from the First Critique and brought to an artificial prominence by the present writer.

It could of course be argued that we ought to concentrate our efforts on all three Critiques, representing, as they do, the end-product of Kant's mature thought. However we accept the observation of the translator and scholar of Kant, L.W. Beck, who writes:

Although the Critique of Pure Reason was written almost exclusively for the professional philosopher, it was nonetheless the foundation for most of Kant's other writings, nearly half of which were addressed to the general learned public.³

This observation is further amplified when Beck points out the analogical relationship that exists between principles in the first and second critiques.⁴ It is in the First Critique that Kant presents us with his definitive epistemology, which forms the undeniable foundation for all his subsequent writings irrespective of possible changes in emphasis. It is in the First Critique that
The phenomenal/noumenal dualism is established and, as we shall see, it is where the Cartesian *cogito* is developed and indeed transformed into Kant's notion of the transcendental unity of apperception.

We have chosen to begin our examination of Kant's critical thought with the Prize Essay for it is here that Kant begins his formal investigations concerning the nature and limitations of human knowledge. It may well be that traces of his mature critical philosophy might be discovered further back than this but for our purposes the question set by the Berlin Academy represents the formal presentation of a problem that would concern Kant for the rest of his life. All this having been said we will be engaging with Kant's *Second Critique* in the later part of this chapter for reasons which will become clear if they are not so already.

The Quest for Clarity and the Limits of Human Reason.

In many ways it would be true to say that the turn to the subject in Kant has its roots in his consideration of the nature and extent of metaphysical knowledge. It is undoubtedly the case that one of the central concerns of Kant's thinking was that of the place of metaphysics. During the mid-1750's and early 1760's Kant lectured in metaphysics and mathematics along with courses on physical geography, natural science, mechanics, geometry and theoretical physics. Despite the vast and varied range of subject matter that he was called upon to teach, Kant complained:

I sit daily at the anvil of my lectern and keep the heavy hammer of repetitious lectures going in some sort of rhythm. Now and then an impulse of a nobler sort, from out of nowhere, tempts me to break out of this cramping sphere...

Nevertheless he continued with the drudgery of academic life until 1762 when he began to concern himself with those issues upon which he was to have his most lasting effect. The Berlin Academy of Science had set as the problem topic for the year 1763 the following:

It is desired to know whether metaphysical truths in general and the first principles of *Theologia naturalis* and of morals in particular are susceptible of clear and evident proofs like those of geometrical truths, and if they are not susceptible of aforesaid proofs, what the particular nature of their certainty is, to what degree their
stated certainty can be brought, and whether this degree is sufficient for complete conviction.\textsuperscript{7}

Kant was deeply aware of the importance of this topic and began his response to the question by claiming that "The question proposed is of the kind where fitting solution results in higher philosophy necessarily receiving a definite shape."\textsuperscript{8} With the Prize Essay Kant initiated a major change in direction from that exhibited in his earlier work the Universal Natural History and Theory of the Heavens. In this latter work Kant had maintained that while it is true that metaphysics is founded upon experimental data, through the synthetic power of imagination it is permitted to go beyond experience, enhancing and making real additions. However in his Prize Essay, the Enquiry Concerning the Clarity of the Principles of Natural Theology and Ethics, Kant abandoned this view arguing that metaphysics contributes to human thought only by way of its clarificatory revelation of the structures of that thought. In no way does metaphysics make a substantial contribution to the body of our knowledge.

What I am trying to say is primarily this: in metaphysics one must proceed entirely by analysis. For the business of metaphysics is indeed the disentangling of confused knowledge.\textsuperscript{9} Kant argues that while the mathematical sciences proceed by way of synthesis, that is through an "arbitrary connection of concepts", the philosopher may only formulate concepts analytically, in other words "by separation from that knowledge which is clarified by analysis." Thus while the geometer takes four lines and constructs a square or a trapezium from them, the philosopher takes, for example, the already existent if muddied notion of time and seeks to clarify it by means of an examination of its constituent parts.\textsuperscript{10} It is Kant's opinion that despite the analytical nature of philosophy, philosophers still attempt to proceed synthetically in imitation of the mathematician. Consequently, says Kant, a true metaphysics has never been produced. In this connection it is important to note that Kant does make provision, for a synthetic approach towards metaphysical concepts that have received adequate clarification by means of analysis.\textsuperscript{11}

Although mathematical knowledge and metaphysical knowledge are approached in their own distinctive ways, both are capable of certainty, albeit of different sorts. One of the basic differences between mathematical and philosophical certainty arises from the
aforementioned synthetic and analytical natures of these two areas of human thought. As a mistaken view of a concept stems, according to Kant, from the failure to recognise a certain characteristic of a thing, philosophy and metaphysics are more open to uncertainty than their mathematical counterparts.\textsuperscript{12} This is necessarily the case as in mathematics we proceed synthetically and therefore we choose which particular characteristics we wish to bring together to form a concept. However, continues Kant, in philosophy where the concepts are already given, one's analysis may prove to be faulty; a vital characteristic might have been ignored and the resultant definition rendered inaccurate. It would thus not be unreasonable to maintain that for Kant, at least at this point in his development, while mathematics is regarded as a constructive discipline philosophy is essentially a deconstructive one.

Ultimately, whereas mathematical knowledge may be approached by concrete "signs" as Kant calls them, philosophy may only be engaged with in the abstract and via the imprecise medium of words. Despite this Kant is still prepared to allow that "Metaphysics is capable of a certainty which is sufficient for conviction". He goes on to say, in the section of the essay bearing the above title:

> Metaphysical certainty is the same as that of any other philosophical knowledge, for the latter can only possess certainty, if it accords with the general principles furnished by the former. It is known from experience that, even outside mathematics, we can in many cases be perfectly certain, to the extent of conviction, by means of rational argument, metaphysics is only philosophy applied to more general rational judgements.\textsuperscript{13}

Once again Kant ventures his opinion of "mistakes" which are not matters of ignorance but the results of judgements made in the absence of complete data. In the course of this discussion Kant clearly reveals his Cartesian roots when he tells us that "some predicates are known with certainty of a thing. Good! Make them the basis of your inferences and you will not go wrong." It is clarity and the disparaging of all vagaries which characterise the post-cartesian quest for epistemic certainty and Kant is clearly heavily influenced by this perspective on the nature of knowledge. Nevertheless, he continues, once you attempt to go beyond "inference" and establish "definition", despite the lack of the necessary data you will fall into error. "It is thus possible to
avoid errors, if one seeks out certain and clear knowledge, without however pretending so lightly to definitions."

It is not altogether clear what Kant means when he says here that, on the one hand, we can have a degree of certainty concerning certain predicates sufficient to build inferences upon them, and also that we should actively seek out "certain and clear knowledge", and on the other hand that such knowledge may not be resolved into a clear definition for fear of error. However it seems obvious that at least at this stage in his development Kant would wish to allow metaphysics some role in human thought, albeit only a clarificatory one, whilst also imposing limitations upon its ability to provide definitive knowledge comparable to that derived from empirical sources.

We can already see here the beginnings of a fundamental problem that will continue to plague Kant's treatment of the relationship between the self and the other. The quest for clear and certain knowledge, in the Cartesian sense of epistemic indubitability, implies both that the other be engaged with at the level of formal knowledge and further that that knowledge be complete. There is no room for mystery here; to be lacking in data as regards some object or concept is to court error. Further problems arise when we consider whether our engagement with the other is analytic or synthetic in nature? Is the other in some way "given" to me in its totality as are, according to Kant, time and space, such that I know that other through, for want of a better term, a process of exploration or do I construct the other for myself in the same way as the mathematician brings together three lines and calls them a triangle?

By the time Kant had developed his mature critical thought he had clearly allied himself with the latter of these two options and it is in this that we will subsequently find the essence of our dissatisfaction with his treatment of self/other relationality.

In the section of his Prize Essay immediately following that which we have just considered, Kant allows the truths of metaphysics a certainty "no different in kind from that of every other rational knowledge with the exception of mathematics". Ultimately Kant means by this that it is equally possible to come to certainty as the end result of metaphysical analysis as it is with mathematical synthesis, but it is simply that mathematic conviction is far easier to arrive at. It would seem that in this essay, while fearlessly
cutting back on the effective influence of metaphysical thought, Kant still finds himself duty-bound to find a place of relevance for this discipline in his epistemology.

In 1766 Kant had published, anonymously, his strange and uncharacteristic work, *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer, Illustrated by Dreams of Metaphysics*. A very idiosyncratic work, Cassirer refers to it as an exuberant and satirical work, "which in its literary form and in its stylistic dress alike upset all the traditions of the literature of scientific philosophy." Dreams of a Spirit-Seer charts a significant development in Kant's understanding of metaphysics and its subject matter. His concern over those things which go beyond the empirical and synthetic leads Kant to examine the claims of visionary and mystic Emanuel Swedenborg specifically in his major work the *Arcana Coelestia*. The final result of Kant's investigations is summed up in the preface to *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer*:

> The author confesses with a certain humility that he was so simpleminded as to track down the truth of some tales of the sort mentioned. He found - as usual, where one has nothing to look for - he found nothing.16

Then why did Kant, a man of proven philosophical seriousness, expend his energies upon what seemed to many to be highly dubious areas of study? Cassirer answers this question in a way that would place this rather strange work of Kant fully in line with his central concerns:

> All this... (that is, the reasons given by Kant in the preface for the production of the book) ... would hardly have influenced Kant, who was not easily led astray by any 'author's itch', to occupy himself so intensely with the 'arch-phantasist' Swedenborg, the 'worst visionary of them all', if it were not that what he discovered in Swedenborg had a queer, indirect link with the crucial questions to which his own inner development had led him.17

Cassirer continues by pointing out that for Kant "Swedenborg is ... the caricature of all supersensible metaphysics,...". As we have already seen in earlier works, Kant laments the lack of any true metaphysics and indeed rejects most of the existing systems as founded upon an erroneous methodology, but here he equates the substance of such systems, despite their pretense at philosophical respectability, with the empty imaginings of the visionary.

The result of Kant's enquiry into the spiritual realm expounded by Swedenborg and his like is far closer to the opinion held in the
First Critique than it is to the prize essay which preceded it by only a few years. Contemporary metaphysics, says Kant, exerts an almost unbearable fascination upon the human mind and yet for all that it cannot truly be understood nor can it constitute true knowledge. Only out of empirical human experience can knowledge, that is clear and certain knowledge and not the vagaries of the visionary, properly be fashioned; the so-called "spiritual realm" can no longer be thought of as a subject for rational thought claims Kant.

... Metaphysics is a science of the limits of human reason... I have not determined these limits with any precision here, but have indicated that the reader will find on further reflection that he can excuse himself from all vain inquiries with regard to a question the data for which are to be found in a world other than the one in which he perceives himself to be.  

Thus Kant expresses his characteristic "enlightened" rejection of a supersensible reality open to human thought, and sets about a redefinition of metaphysics to suit its new role. As Cassirer puts it, "...metaphysics is still a science for him; however it is no longer a science of things in a supersensible world, but of the limits of human reason."

It would be in the Inaugural Dissertation, written four years later, that Kant would begin to formulate his language of limitation in more detail, redefining metaphysics in terms of the faculty of human knowing. We shall be returning to this important work in the following section.

To be aware of the single-mindedness of Kant's developing thought from the time of the Inaugural Dissertation up until the completion of the First Critique one need only examine his letters to Marcus Herz. Although very sporadic, gaps of years separating some of them, there is no indication that Kant ever turned from the task to which he had set himself, despite considerable pressure being placed upon him to publish before he was ready. In his letter of June 1771 he tells Herz that he is working on a book entitled "The Limits of Sensibility and Reason". By February 1772 he has decided upon two subsections, one practical dealing with phenomenology, the other theoretical, having to do with metaphysics. He also makes reference to "transcendental philosophy" in connection with the categories of reason and speaks of his readiness to embark upon a "critique of pure reason". November 1776 sees Kant expressing, apparently as a
result of much labour, the same opinions as put forth in his
previous work, that:

... it must be possible to see the field of pure
reason independent of empirical principles in its
judgments, since it lies in us a priori and can
expect no revelations from experience. Now in order
to delineate, in accordance with sure principles,
the complete compass, divisions, limits and whole
content of pure reason, and in order to place the
boundary-stones so that one may know with certainty
in the future whether one is on the territory of
reason or that of sophistry, the following is
essential... 

Kant then goes on to outline his proposal for a critique of pure
reason.

In the preface to the first edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason*
Kant considers the paradox of human reason, that is the constant
pressure of questions whose answers are beyond the capability of
human rationality. Nevertheless, these questions persist and despite
centuries of philosophical thought all that has been achieved is a
cacophony of differing opinions and systems of thought none of
which, claims Kant, are valid, for all of them "overstep all
possible empirical employment". Indeed, rather than illuminating the
human condition,

by this procedure human reason precipitates itself
into darkness and contradictions... For since the
principles of which it is making use transcend the
limits of experience, they are no longer subject to
any empirical test. The battlefield of these endless
controversies is called metaphysics. 

It is to this battlefield that Kant proposes to bring the "peace" of
critical thought by the setting up of clearly defined boundaries for
human thought. In his *Reflection on the Critique* (No.128) Kant speaks
of it as bringing light to the darkness and gloom created by
metaphysics, however this is a light which "illuminates the dark
spaces of our own understanding, not the things unknown to us beyond
the sense world". It is the very nature of human thought which
should now concern metaphysics and the knowledge that such an
analysis would provide is the only true transcendental knowledge. It
is important to make clear that Kant does not refer to actual a
priori concepts and principles as in themselves transcendental.
Rather, it is the knowledge of such principles and their function,
as relating to phenomena, that is true transcendental knowledge;
what can alone be entitled transcendental is the
knowledge that these representations are not of
empirical origin, and the possibility that they can yet relate a priori to objects of experience.\textsuperscript{22}

In other words, transcendental knowledge has to do with the mode of human thought and its capacity to function rather than any specific operation of rationality in its encounter with phenomenal objects. In the light of this Kant concludes that the presumptuous title of "ontology" once assumed by metaphysics must now be replaced by "the modest title of a mere Analytic of pure understanding."\textsuperscript{23} The pure categories of thought have absolutely no application beyond the sensible realm; they constitute simply the form of the understanding.

To prevent sensible intuition from going beyond the bounds permitted of it, Kant introduces his notion of the noumenon. All things which are not within the sphere of appearance are noumena: "the concept of a noumenon is ... merely a limiting concept, the function of which is to curb the pretensions of sensibility". The understanding cannot approach those things pertaining to the noumenal realm and thus "must think of them only under the title of an unknown something."\textsuperscript{24} Coupled with the inaccessibility of any supersensible world Kant also debars us from knowledge of the "thing-in-itself". That is to say, according to his doctrine of transcendental idealism, those appearances which are vouchsafed to us via our senses are only representations. The significance of all this for our present concern will become apparent when we discuss the notion of the noumenal self latter in this chapter. Furthermore, and in full accord with the argument contained in the Inaugural Dissertation, the aforementioned representations are given order and form by the twin categories of space and time which themselves have no independent existence beyond us and are in no way related to the objects of our sense. It is precisely the error of transcendental realism, says Kant, to produce the illusion that in our experience of the phenomenal world we are actually dealing with things-in-themselves.\textsuperscript{25} H.E. Allison helpfully clarifies Kant's argument in this way:

Kant is here arguing that transcendental realism leads to empirical idealism, which is the doctrine that the mind can only have immediate access to its own ideas or representations (the 'ideal' in the empirical sense). The point is that because the transcendental realist misconstrues the reality of spatial objects ('objects of the senses') he is forced to deny that the mind has any immediate experience of such objects. Transcendental realism is thus presented as the source of the pseudo-problem of the external world and of the
typically Cartesian version of skepticism that is associated with it.2e

As we shall see later it is arguable that Kant himself does not escape a similar charge of scepticism due to the difficulty his system has in giving and account of the reality of both the self and other selves. Certainly Kant already seems to be suggesting that the other qua other is inaccessible to the self as anything other than a representation construed by that self and this we shall consider in more detail later in this chapter.

In the Preface to the Second Edition of the Critique of Pure Reason Kant outlines the failure of philosophy to establish any form of a priori knowledge on the basis of an assumed conformity of our knowledge to objects in the world. Utilizing such an epistemology, only a posteriori knowledge is available to us. Indeed in a subsequent work Kant goes as far as to claim that if objects of our knowledge are seen as things-in-themselves, then we can in actual fact have no knowledge at all. (26)

We shall turn our attention now to Kant's consideration of the subject, that is to say the mind with its categories of understanding, as determinative for the appearance of the object.

The Cognitive Determination of the Active Subject.

It is significant to note that even as early as the Prize Essay Kant was already concerning himself with those issues which were to become fundamental to the First Critique. In the opening introduction to the Prize Essay Kant makes it clear that he is concerned to formulate a philosophy of knowledge which would be the counterpart to the Newtonian approach to the physical sciences. Later in his essay he claims that:

The true method of metaphysics is basically the same as that introduced by Newton into natural science and which had such useful consequences in that field.2e

Kant is essentially concerned to discover the fundamental rules or principles or even laws of human thought just as Newton had done for the material world. As we shall see this was precisely his concern in the First Critique, the Introduction to which echoes the Introduction to this earlier work. Although the term "transcendent" is not used here one can already see Kant struggling towards his
understanding of the transcendental categories of human thought as he seeks to find an appropriate place for metaphysics. "Metaphysics" says Kant "is nothing other than a philosophy of the first principles of our knowledge."

A correlative to Kant's concern over the right approach to metaphysical enquiry is his dismay at the constant misuse to which it is subjected by thinkers who seek to support their own philosophies by means of metaphysical creations derived from a synthetic method inappropriate to the discipline. In subsequent works Kant takes issue with the respected Newton for precisely this reason. The essential argument of the Prize Essay is encapsulated in the Second Reflection which explains the nature of metaphysical certainty:

In metaphysics I have a concept given to me already, although it is a confused one. My duty is to search for the clear, detailed and determinate formulation of this confined concept.... In philosophy, and especially in metaphysics, one can often know a great deal about an object with clearness and certainty, and also derive certain conclusions therefrom, before possessing a definition of that same object.... I can be immediately certain about various different predicates of any particular thing, in spite of the fact that I do not know enough about that thing to give a detailed and determinate concept of the thing, that is a definition.:

Thus as we have already observed the Kant of the Prize Essay had not entirely abandoned metaphysics as an authentic epistemic concern although he had substantially cut back on its actual utility as a source of knowledge.

In the Summer of 1770, on his taking up of a Chair in Logic and Metaphysics, Kant delivered his Inaugural Dissertation On the Form and Principles of the Sensible and Intelligible World. The structure and style of the Dissertation are a return once more to the conventions of philosophical literature, after the radical departure exhibited in Dreams of a Spirit-Seer. Kant clearly outlines the various elements involved in the notion of a world beginning with "Matter", "Form" and "Entirety", and moving on to the more complex problems of space and time. However, these sections of the work constitute little more than rough working definitions whereas the sections dealing with "sensibility" and "metaphysics" are of considerable importance for our understanding of the point which
Kant had reached in his view of human cognition, and, as a result, his understanding of the relationship between subject and object.

In Section Two of the Dissertation Kant makes his first reference to the terms phenomenon and noumenon; the former he associates with sensuality, the latter with intelligence. It is important for our present purposes to note that by sensibility Kant means the "receptivity of a subject", that is to say, the possibility of a subject being affected by external object. By intelligence or rationality he has in mind the "faculty of a subject by which it has the power to represent things which cannot by their own quality come before the senses of that subject." From this Kant maintains that objects which are presented to us via sensation "are representations of things as they appear" whereas things which are thought of via the intellect only are "representations of things as they are". It is at this point in the discussion that Kant introduces his now famous notion of the transcendental categories of human thought, an understanding of human cognitive power which, as we shall see, has serious implications for the nature of the rational subject's engagement with the other. We can already see here in the Dissertation Kant's critical understanding of the subject as constructing a representation of the object with which it then engages and it will be with this notion of the subject as powerful over the other that we shall have cause to question in the concluding section of this chapter.

While not yet making use of the term transcendental, Kant points out that all sensual knowledge necessarily has to do with both matter and form, these being the substance and specificity of a given sensibility, but whereas the former is merely evidence of "the presence of something sensible", the latter points to an ordering process which Kant hinted at earlier when he spoke of "a certain natural law of the mind":

... it is not some adumbration or schema of the object, but only a certain law implanted in the mind by which it co-ordinates for itself the sensa which arise from the presence of the object. For objects do not strike the senses in virtue of their form or specificity. So, for the various things in an object which affect the sense to coalesce into some representational whole there is needed an internal principle in the mind by which those various things may be clothed with a certain specificity in accordance with stable and innate laws.
Although Kant speaks of the intellect as the faculty of non-sensitive representation he does make a distinction between the real and logical use of the intellect. The former does indeed have to do with given, pure ideas, which it orders into particular experiences. However, despite this exercise of the intellect upon empirical concepts they still remain within the category of sense data no matter how refined is the rational process through which they have come. They are the product of what Kant calls inner sense. He goes on to argue in the light of this that philosophy has done itself a great disservice (and he singles out Christian von Wolff particularly here) by the failure to maintain the distinction between the phenomenal and noumenal realms.

It is precisely this concern which is the only proper subject for metaphysics and Kant applies himself to it with all his energy.

Now the philosophy which contains the first principles of the use of the pure intellect is METAPHYSICS. But its propaedeutic science is that science which teaches the distinction of sensitive cognition from intellectual cognition, and it is of this science that I am offering a specimen in my present dissertation.33

Empirical principles, says Kant, cannot be found in metaphysics, likewise one will not discover metaphysical concepts within the sensual manifold, but only within pure reason or intellect. And by metaphysical principles Kant reminds us he does not mean those things pertaining to any supersensible realm but rather "concepts abstracted out of the laws planted in the mind". These concepts include the notions of "possibility, existence, necessity, substance, cause etc..." and their correlates.

Thus we see Kant, in contradistinction from Newton, speaking of the "contagion of sensitive cognition with intellectual"; there is no room, nor is there any need for any form of deus ex machina in the thought of Kant. Indeed, in a letter to his friend Marcus Herz as he approached the completion of the First Critique, Kant rejected the epistemic systems of Plato, Malebranche and Crusius on the grounds that they all opted for some form of pre-established harmony to explain the possibility of human thought:

... in determining the origin and validity of our knowledge, however, the deus ex machina is the most absurd argument one could choose.34

It is interesting to note that the concepts of space and time expounded in the Inaugural Dissertation would appear to be in all
but their final critical form as they remain unchanged, albeit greatly expanded, in the First Critique. In Section 3 of the Dissertation Kant informs us that the two most primary formal principles of the phenomenal universe are space and time. Further to this, these concepts, far from being in some way generated by the material world and its effect upon the senses, are in fact transcendental conditions of human knowing. Time is a "pure intuition", which precedes every sensation:

Time is not something objective and real, nor is it a substance or an accident or a relation, but it is the subjective condition necessary by the nature of the human mind for co-ordinating with each other by a fixed law whatsoever things are sensible, and it is a pure intuition.\textsuperscript{35}

The notion of time as an objective reality Kant dismisses as "a most absurd fabrication", the greatest offenders being the English. The status of time as the formal principle of the sensible world is arrived at by means of the contention that all things are thought of either simultaneously, that is, at the same time, or in related succession.

The notion of space receives a very similar treatment to that of time. As with the concept of time, "The concept of space is not abstracted from external sensations", it is a pure intuition which manifests itself in the presence of sensible objects which could not be thought of apart from its supposition. Kant uses exactly the same formula down to the last word to describe space as he does time: "Space is not something objective and real... Space is therefore the formal principle of the sensible world, absolutely first...\textsuperscript{36}" and so on, even down to the comment concerning those who erroneously see space as "real", for example the English and Leibniz. As categories which provide the grounds for empirical knowledge it goes almost without saying that neither time nor space have anything to do with any supersensible reality; they are strictly applicable only to the phenomenal realm.\textsuperscript{37}

For Kant, as we have seen, knowledge - rather than issuing out of a conformity of the mind to external objects - is the result of the mind's ability to provide conceptual structuring to the manifold of experience provided by the material world. In other words, knowledge is to be understood as the conformity of external objects to the a priori categories of the human mind, categories such as substance and causality. It is solely due to these categories that we
apprehend reality as anything other than a chaotic mass of uncoordinated sense-impressions. Kant outlines his hypothesis clearly in his Preface to the Second Edition of the Critique of Pure Reason:

The examples of mathematics and natural science, which by a single and sudden revolution have become what they now are, seem to me sufficiently remarkable to suggest our considering what may have been the essential features in the changed point of view by which they have so greatly benefited. Their success should incline us, at least by way of experiment, to imitate their procedure, so far as the analogy which, as species of rational knowledge, they bear to metaphysics may permit. Hitherto it has been assumed that all our knowledge must conform to objects. But all attempts to extend our knowledge of objects by establishing something in regard to them a priori, by means of concepts, have, on this assumption, ended in failure. We must therefore make trial whether we may not have more success in the tasks of metaphysics, if we suppose that objects must conform to our knowledge. This would agree better with what is desired, namely, that it should be possible to have knowledge of objects a priori, determining something in regard to them prior to their being given.

It is here that we come to the heart of the Kant's understanding of the priority of the subject in that the primary desire of critical thought appears to be to establish the a priori determination of the object by the subject. We shall consider this central issue in more detail subsequently.

To return to our exposition, another fundamental concern of the critical philosophy is its insistence on the realm of sensory experience as constituting the only material available to the a priori categories:

Our nature is so constituted that our intuition can never be other than sensible; that is, it contains only the mode in which we are affected by objects.

By this means Kant hoped to bring final reconciliation to rival metaphysical systems. He argued that such metaphysical disagreements were the inevitable result of a misguided attempt at forcing the categories of understanding beyond their operational limits. Thus, despite man's "natural disposition" towards metaphysical question and speculation, all attempts at a resolution of the problems raised in this area are destined to failure:

Human reason has this peculiar fate that in one species of its knowledge it is burdened by questions which, as prescribed by the very nature of reason
itself, it is not able to ignore, but which, as transcending all its powers, it is also not able to answer.\textsuperscript{40}

Thus, while the concept of "God" might still be thought without contradiction, as an \textit{ens realissimum} for example, it is not possible that such a God might be known, being "outside" the manifold of sense experience. The same would appear to be the case for the self and other selves. Essential to the whole structure of the Kantian epistemology is the dichotomy between phenomenal and noumenal realities, coupled with the attendant acknowledgement of the unknowability of the "thing-in-itself". J.J. Davis maintains that without this doctrine the Kantian analysis is difficult to sustain. He points out that Kant saw it as,

\begin{quote}
essential for the achievement of two of the major goals of his enterprise: ending the conflict of metaphysical systems through the limitation of the categories of the understanding to an empirical use, and preserving the autonomy of human moral experience and the possibility of freedom in the face of the necessity prevailing in the realm of phenomena.\textsuperscript{41}
\end{quote}

Let us consider further the determinative priority of the subject over the object in Kant's thinking, that is to say the constitutive role that the mind has for phenomena.

There is, to quote L.W. Beck, a "promethean revolution" operational within Kant's philosophy which goes a long way towards establishing the subject as pre-eminent in terms of epistemology and, some would argue, morality. It is the subject that establishes its own reality in Kantian thought not by virtue of creating a physical world, for Kant insists on maintaining the independent reality of the thing-in-itself, but by the application of the categories of the mind to establishing what we know as "nature" or the "natural order".

It was Prometheus who seized the prerogative of the gods and gave it to humankind. Through possession of fire, everything else could be created... Man is no god, but in his creativity he may be godlike, and many of the tasks previously assigned to god in the creation and governance of the world are reassigned by Kant to man.\textsuperscript{42}

It has been said that the ultimate question being addressed in all of Kant's work is "What is man?" Beck claims, quite rightly I believe, that his final answer, typified in the First Critique, is "man is creator". In the First Edition of the \textit{Critique of Pure Reason} Kant expounds an understanding of man as the creator of his
world by the operation of the categories of understanding upon the manifold of sense experience.

...the order and regularity in the appearances, which we entitle nature, we ourselves introduce. We could never find them in appearances, had not we ourselves, or the nature of our mind, originally set them there. For this unity of nature has to be a necessary one, that is, has to be an a priori certain unity of the connection of appearances; and such synthetic unity could not be established a priori if there were not subjective grounds of such unity contained a priori in the original cognitive powers of our mind, and if these subjective conditions, inasmuch as they are the grounds of the possibility of knowing any object whatsoever in experience, were not at the same time objectively valid.  

This faculty of rules is the very "lawgiver of nature". While sensibility provides us with a collection of chaotic forms only the human understanding can give the rules necessary for a unified view of reality. These rules, says Kant, are by no means external to us, being the a priori product of our understanding. "They are not borrowed from experience; on the contrary, they have to confer upon appearance their conformity to law, and so to make experience possible." There can be no synthetic unity of the manifold of appearances outside of this operation. Indeed this whole section of the Transcendental Deduction might well be seen as the Kantian equivalent to a creation narrative, where epistemological order is established out of the chaos of intuition.

That Kant was aware of the radical nature of his claim here seems obvious from the way in which he concludes this section by attempting to pre-empt the expected criticisms:

However exaggerated and absurd it may sound, to say that the understanding is itself the source of the laws of nature, and so of its formal unity, such an assertion is none the less correct, and is in keeping with the object to which it refers, namely, experience. Certainly, empirical laws, as such, can never derive their origin from pure understanding. That is as little possible as to understand completely the inexhaustible multiplicity of appearances merely by reference to the pure form of sensible intuition. But all empirical laws are only special determinations of the pure laws of understanding, under which, and according to the norm of which, they first become possible. Through them appearances take on an orderly character, just as these same appearances, despite the differences of their empirical form, must none the less always be in harmony with the pure form of sensibility.
In the Second Edition this line of thought is equally apparent. Here Kant expands on his use of the "abiding and unchanging 'I'", found in the first edition treatment of the Transcendental Deduction, showing his "Cartesian hand" by relating all the "manifold intuitions" to the Cogito, albeit in its distinctively Kantian non-substantive manifestation. It is the self-conscious subject which forms the basis for what Kant calls the "unity of apperception", or rather it is the unity of apperception which presupposes the transcendental self. As in the First Edition this unity of the manifold of sense experience,

...is an affair of the understanding alone, which itself is nothing but the faculty of combining a priori, and of bringing the manifold of given representations under the unity of apperception.

It is this aspect of Kant's thought which prompts Beck to observe that

The autonomy of the individual in creating out of chaos the world in which one is to live is a characteristic of Kant's teaching as it is of that of the modern existentialist thinker.

Both versions of the "Deduction" assume the universality of the categories of understanding; that is to say, the possibility of a separate and quite different "lawgiver of nature" for every individual self-consciousness is never entertained by Kant. In the light of this W.H.Walsh, who is normally particularly charitable towards Kant, suggests that both he and Hume "...confront the objection how in such circumstances different individuals can be said to inhabit a common world." Walsh continues, nevertheless, to attempt to draw an answer to this question from Kant's writings but is forced to conclude, as regards his reinterpretation, "I cannot point to a passage in which he states it explicitly, and may even be over-charitable in suggesting that he toyed with it." We must say of Kant therefore that, following the western philosophical tradition since Plato, he assumes both the universality of truth - all truth is one - and concomitantly the universality of human knowing. This assumption functions for Kant as a Transcendental presupposition.

The freedom of the subject.

Although we began this study by stating that we would limit our analysis to the material leading up to and including the First
Critique it is important that we consider Kant's distinction between what he understands as the "standpoint" of the sensible world, and the "standpoint" of the intelligible world as found in his ethical writings.

The first of these two standpoints has already been explored above. It represents the perspective of the First Critique where all that is accessible to human knowing, including the self-conscious subject, is accessible only as it appears and not as it is in itself. However, in subsequent works, such as the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals and the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant acknowledges the validity of a second standpoint founded upon the idea of freedom, which establishes the human person as not only part of the sensible manifold but also part of the intellectual or noumenal world:

Even as regards himself - so far as man is acquainted with himself by inner sensation - he cannot claim to know what he is in himself... since he acquires his concept of self not a priori but empirically, it is natural that even about himself he should get information through sense - that is, through inner sense - and consequently only through the mere appearance of his own nature and through the way in which his consciousness is affected.

So far this is in agreement with what we find in the "Paralogisms of Pure Reason" as presented in the First Critique. The "I" is not accessible, in itself, to human understanding, but only as the perceived unity of human thought. However, Kant continues:

Yet beyond this character of himself as a subject made up, as it is, of mere appearances, he must suppose there to be something else which is its ground - namely, his Ego as this may be constituted in itself; and thus as regards mere perception and the capacity for receiving sensations he must count himself as belonging to the sensible world, but as regards whatever there may be in him of pure activity (whatever comes into consciousness, not through affection of the senses, but immediately) he must count himself as belonging to the intellectual world, of which, however, he knows nothing further.

It is the unconditioned causality of the human will free from the determination of the sensible world to which Kant can now refer as a causa noumenon. Freedom, or the autonomy of the will, is to be regarded as a necessary postulate of practical reason, and represents the form of human morality.
The material content of human morality, by virtue of its necessarily empirical nature, is ultimately determined by consideration of consequences such as the greater good or self-satisfaction, or the betterment of the species. This, argues Kant, is an insufficient basis for universal moral law. To perform our duty, to act as we ought for the sake of the moral law, and not simply for some desired end as a consequence of moral activity, demands both that the moral law itself be unconditioned, and that we— as rational beings— be free from all determination as regards our compliance with it. "Ought", argues Kant, implies "can". What the moral law demands of us we must be free to perform. It is in the light of this freedom, manifesting itself in the autonomy of the will that we may regard ourselves as "independent of determination by causes in the sensible world..." as bound only by the laws of reason. Being conditioned by the empirical world or laws of nature Kant refers to heteronomy, while determination solely by the rational will be called autonomy.

Reason, Kant maintains, represents a power beyond even the understanding. The activity of the understanding, while sharing in reason's spontaneity, can produce of itself only those categories which are necessary for the unification of sense-data within the one consciousness. Reason, by comparison, is not dependent upon sense experience in order to engage thought. Reason, says Kant, exhibits the character of pure spontaneity in that it gives rise to "ideas"—in other words, unconditioned concepts the highest of which is the distinction between the sensible and intelligible realms.

We need not trouble ourselves here with the further intricacies of Kant's moral philosophy. What is important for our purposes is his rather surprising notion of the transcendental or noumenal self. Has Kant reneged upon his doctrine of the unknowability of the thing-in-itself as so forcibly argued in the First Critique? I think not.

There are two important points which need to be constantly borne in mind when considering Kant's treatment of the transcendental self. Firstly, Kant does not intend us to understand him as promulgating a form of metaphysical schizophrenia. There are not two distinct selves, one operating in the world of sense and bound by the laws of nature (such as cause and effect), the other existing in some noumenal reality characterized by the exercise of pure unconditioned reason. Both these aspects of the rational subject "...not merely
can get on perfectly well together but must be conceived as necessarily combined in the same subject"61. Human persons are said by Kant to conceive of themselves or perceive themselves to be, or to become aware of themselves in a "double way"62: that is, they become conscious of themselves as both contingent natural objects and also, "qua intelligence", as part of the intelligible world. The point is that Kant is speaking of differences in perspective. The human person "has therefore two points of view from which he can regard himself..."63

The second point that needs to be made - and Kant himself goes to great lengths to make it - is that individuals' awareness of themselves as free and thus as part of the intelligible world does not overturn the epistemic embargo established by the First Critique upon theoretical knowledge of that world.

By thinking itself into the intelligible world practical reason does not overstep its limits in the least: it would do so only if it sought to intuit or feel itself into that world... If practical reason were also to import an object of the will - that is, a motive of action - from the intelligible world, it would overstep its limits and pretend to an acquaintance with something of which it has no knowledge. The concept of the intelligible world is thus only a point of view which reason finds itself constrained to adopt outside appearances in order to conceive itself as practical.64

Practical reason is thus not a mode of reason by means of which we might apprehend the transcendental self as if it were some form of empirical intuition. It is a perspective not that we occupy in the manner of some epistemological vantage point, but which we must consider ourselves actually to be qua rational being. This point is of considerable importance if we are to avoid the misapprehension that Kant is providing us with a new set of moral categories which function in relation to inclinations in the same way that the categories of pure reason function in relation to sense-data. There is no synthesis between the a priori and empirical in Kant's view of human ethical activity. As we have already mentioned, absolute and universal moral law exists as pure form which requires no material context if it is to maintain its claim to universality.

It is the very formality of what Kant calls the "principle of volition" or "the principle of the will" which establishes the moral worth of rational, ethical behaviour. All a posteriori material
motives are to be abandoned in the quest for unconditioned moral worth:

Where then can this worth be found if we are not to find it in the will's relation to the effect hoped for from the action? It can be found nowhere but in the principle of the will, irrespective of the ends which can be brought about by such an action; for between its a priori principle, which is formal, and its a posteriori motive, which is material, the will stands, so to speak, at a parting of the ways; and since it must be determined by some principle, it will have to be determined by the formal principle of volition when an action is done from duty, where, as we have seen, every material principle is taken away from it.66

By virtue of the autonomy of the will every individual, as an unconditioned rational being, must consider him/herself to be the maker of universal law. This making of universal law in so far as it does not depend upon any cause other than the rational will as causa noumenon establishes all rational beings as ends in themselves.66 The notion of rational beings as ends in themselves is absolutely central for Kant's understanding of personhood.

All rational beings, claims Kant, must be regarded as ends in themselves and never as means. It is in the nature of things to be conditioned, dependent upon the laws of nature and thus to be ultimately of relative value. Rational beings, on the other hand, by virtue of their unconditioned nature as ends and not merely means, may lay claim to the status of persons. Only rational beings, possessing autonomy of will whereby they establish universal moral law, are to be regarded as ends in themselves and as beings of absolute worth. Thus only rational beings may be regarded as personal in Kant's view.

Now I say that man, and in general every rational being, exists as an end in himself, not merely as a means for arbitrary use by this or that will: ... Beings whose existence depends, not on our will, but on nature, have none the less, if they are non-rational beings, only a relative value as means and are consequently called things. Rational beings, on the other hand, are called persons because their nature already marks them out as ends in themselves. Persons, therefore, are not merely subjective ends whose existence as an object of our actions has a value for us: they are objective ends - that is, things whose existence is in itself an end...67

For Kant the attribution of intrinsic worth or dignity to persons as opposed to merely an arbitrary or relative price stems precisely
from this understanding of the rational being as autonomous law-maker, and thus as end in itself. That which has a mere price may be substituted for something of equivalent price. However, to have dignity is to be beyond all price and equivalence. Only humanity therefore in its unconditioned mode as law-maker and determiner of all value can have dignity:

that is, an unconditioned and incomparable worth - for the appreciation of which, as necessarily given by a rational being, the word 'reverence' is the only becoming expression.**

The notion of rational beings as ends rather than means further gives rise to Kant's understanding of the society of persons as a Kingdom of ends. By "Kingdom" Kant intends "a systematic union of different rational beings under common laws". A rational being is a member of this Kingdom when, as a maker of universal law, he also subjects himself to that law in its following expression:

Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end.**

Thus the rational being, as end in itself and consequently as Person, must regard all other rational beings similarly as ends, as autonomous law-makers. We must, argues Kant, "reverence" each individual and ascribe to them the "dignity" and "worth" which is intrinsically theirs by virtue of their personhood, this personhood being constituted by their consciousness of themselves as free moral law-makers - in other words, as transcendental selves.

For Kant relationality would appear to amount then to the formal recognition of human dignity; that is to say, of the other as being of intrinsic worth. We must hold in the highest esteem, we must "reverence" the other who, qua rational being, must be acknowledged as possessing the same autonomy of the will and therefore as being part of the same intelligible world as that which we are conscious ourselves of occupying. Cassirer expresses it this way:

...all rational beings stand under the law so that in constituting their personhood, they are in relation with the moral individuality of all others, and so that they also demand the fundamental worth which they thus grant themselves from every other subject and acknowledge it in all other subjects...**

Whether such a formal description of human sociality in terms of an acknowledgement of the intrinsic dignity of the individual person, is
at all adequate will be considered in the second part of the conclusion to this chapter. Suffice it to say here that the reduction of the basis and nature of human relationality to the level of mere principles would seem to be little more than that, a reduction. We turn now to our concluding remarks.

**Conclusion.**

It must be said at the very outset of our critical remarks that whatever the shortcomings of Kant's understanding of human relationality, his fundamental concern with this issue is undeniable. For Kant the fact of the subject's relationship to the object is clearly necessary. The external world, in all its variety and complexity, is intimately bound up with the thinking subject which gives it form and order. Thus whatever I, as subject, encounter in the world as object, or other, I am immediately and necessarily related to as the transcendental categories of thought working upon the sensible intuitions I receive make that object an appearance for me. Thus the importance of the normative status of relationality, which we spoke of in chapter two under the heading of the first field of inquiry into coadunacy, is clearly acknowledged by Kant. Nevertheless, and as we discovered from the First Critique, it is precisely this cognitive power of the subject to construct a representation of the other, with which it subsequently engages, rather than relating to the other as it actually is, which must give us cause for critical concern here. Furthermore, Kant's attempt, in his ethical writings, to develop his understanding of self/other relationality in terms of respect and dignity, while not being without value, will be seen to be severely limited and ultimately to be an inadequate or at least insufficient expression of human relationality in all its fulness.

Taking the substance of the Critique of Pure Reason first, there appear to be two fundamental problems arising out of the Kantian epistemology, as it bears upon the possibility of human relationality.

Firstly, despite Kant's clear belief in the existence of the "thing-in-itself" the transcendental unity of apperception demands that the object be always object in relation to subject. In connection with this J. Brown makes the very strong claim that in the Kantian epistemology the "Object, as the thing-known, as appearance to
Subject or mind, the unknowable noumenon has undergone modification by the nature and activity of the subject." It has to be said that while there is a useful point being made here this assessment of Kant's understanding of the relationship between subject and object is not altogether accurate and for that reason can be misleading. While we would certainly want to agree with Brown's contention that the object as appearance represents a modified experience of the other relative to what it is in-itself, we must stop short of making the wholly different claim that this very object-in-itself as unknowable noumenon is similarly modified.

In so far as Kant appears to make no distinction between the subject's apprehension of things and its apprehension of other subjects — to use Buber's terminology between I-It and I-Thou relations — other selves must, along with all other objects, submit to the synthesising structures of the mind in order to become apprehensible, qua knowledge, for the subject. This would appear to be the only way in which the reality of the other self might impinge upon the subject that is, at least in part, as constituted and modified by that subject. The possibility of engaging with the other self-in-itself is simply beyond the constitutive capacity of the categories of human thought. We must take care therefore not to fall into Brown's error which attempts to conflate the subject's construal of the other as an appearance for itself, which Kant clearly seems to teach, with the actual modification of the inaccessible noumenal other. Kant makes this exact point when he writes:

I am not...in a position to perceive external things, but can only infer their existence from my inner perception, taking the inner perception as the effect of which something external is the proximate cause.

Although Kant would certainly wish to affirm the existence of the thing-in-itself, and thus by implication the other self-in-itself, there is serious doubt as to whether he allows for a true knowledge of the other as distinctively other rather than with its determination by the subject as appearance. There is a very real question which needs to be asked concerning the relationship between the other for the subject and the other qua other. Clearly there is no ground in Kant for arguing for their equivalence.

John Macmurray regards the problem that Kantian epistemology has with the other qua other and the subject's apprehension of it as
characteristic of post-Cartesian thought. He observes of the critical philosophy that it fails to do justice to, and even to allow for the possibility of our knowledge of one another; and this failure arises because its formal conception of knowledge excludes this possibility by postulating the 'I think' as the primary presupposition of all experience.7e

Gordon Kaufman makes a similar point when he suggests that there is a fundamental difference between our knowledge of "things" and our knowledge of persons. Things, argues Kaufman, are indeed readily accessible to examination and determination by the subject while knowledge of persons, "is derived from their acts of revealing or unveiling themselves to us when they communicate with us."7e Although the body may well be regarded as an "object" for the subject this is not so for the other as communicating other: Our encounter with another self in the process of communication is thus an encounter with a reality that is in a certain sense beyond our direct reach and observation. We could not know this reality did he not choose to reveal himself to us from beyond. For this reason the other self is always mystery in some significant sense, always unknown ... always transcendent of our world.77

It is the critical tradition's insistence that only the realm of sense experience may be considered a legitimate source for human knowledge and its failure to distinguish between objects and other subjects which renders it incapable of dealing with the "mystery" of the other-self other than by, as Levinas observes, reducing the "other-self" simply to a manifestation of "my-self".7e

The second problem that ought to concern us here is closely connected to the first, albeit of a more immediate nature. It would appear that not only does Kant exhibit a difficulty in accounting for the subject's encounter with other selves, free from prior determination by that subject, but, as we shall see, there is also considerable ambiguity in his thinking as regards the exact nature of the subject itself.

In some instances there is evidence to suggest that Kant accepted the existence of a noumenal self, unknowable but nonetheless an actual thing-in-itself;

If then...we admit that we know objects only in so far as we are externally affected, we must also recognise, as regards inner sense, that by means of it we intuit ourselves only as we are inwardly affected by ourselves, in other words, that, so far
as inner intuition is concerned, we know our own subject only as appearance, not as it is in itself.79

However, there is clear indication that Kant rejected the notion of a substantial self in favour of an understanding of the self as a necessary postulate for the unity of apperception in other words for the self as active. The self, maintains Kant, is not merely unknowable but is in a very real sense the presupposition of unified experience:

Self-consciousness in general is therefore the representation of that which is the condition of all unity, and itself is unconditioned. We can thus say of the thinking 'I' (the soul) which regards itself as substance, as simple, as numerically identical at all times, as the correlate of all existence, from which all other existence must be inferred, that it does not know itself through the categories, but knows the categories, and through them all objects, in the absolute unity of apperception, and so through itself...there is nothing more natural and more misleading than the illusion which leads us to regard the unity in the synthesis of thought as a perceived unity in the subject of those thoughts.80

Whether or not we can come to any final conclusions concerning the actual existence of the Kantian noumenal self one thing is certain. Despite the necessity of positing such a self as a condition for the unity of human experience, there is no sense in which Kant might allow this self to be known and this unknowability of the self poses a number of important questions as regards the nature of human relationality.

If selves are ultimately unknowable in the sense of not being susceptible to the categories of rational thought, then in what way does Kant permit distinct selves to experience each other? The answer lies in our previous recognition of the Kantian self as active rather than substantive. The Kantian self, as we have already noted, is to be identified with the unity of thought, the activity in which all things are brought into synthetic unity for mind. Furthermore, Kant makes it perfectly clear in his ethical writings that the activity of the self is characterized by freedom in that it is in no way determined by externality. The subject encounters the objective world and acts upon it as autonomous individual rationality, constructing a representation of that world by which means it is related to it. Thus we find that subject/object relationality is characterized in Kant by the free
exercise of cognitive power exercised by the autonomous individual subject. Thus while Kant presents us with a picture of how the problematic of relationality is overcome, our second field of inquiry into coadunacy as expressed in chapter two, the empowering to unity, our third field of inquiry, appears as a function of the prioritization of the subject.

So, what is it that takes place during an encounter between two distinct subjects, two people? The noumenal 'selves' involved in such an encounter are beyond the apprehension of either party. Each subject must render the other an object, at least in part, of its own construction. It would appear impossible for the Kantian other, as an unknowable unifying activity, to commit itself to an act of self-revelation to the other in so far as such a self is never properly available in-it-self but only as a representative construct initiated by the apprehending power of the autonomous subject. As J.Brown points out, "The synthetic unity of apprehension involves being in a perspective for mind".91

We must conclude therefore that despite his concern to indicate the natural relatedness of subject and object, self and other, Kant tends to over emphasise the power of the autonomous subject who is always regarded as acting upon the other and construing the other for self. Consequently the other qua other, while clearly providing the necessary sensual data for the rational subject's activity of synthetic representation, is ultimately and in-it-self left beyond relationality. It is only as a construct of the self that the other relates to the self. It is clear to see how this notion of the self as constantly exercising power over the other so as to assimilate that other for mind might ultimately manifest itself in the form of Hegel's understanding of the Master/Slave struggle which we shall consider in more detail in the following chapter.

While Kant's treatment of the transcendental self in his ethical writings certainly establishes a distinction between persons and things and while it further establishes the basis and nature of the community of persons as a Kingdom of ends, it can hardly be regarded as providing a full and sufficient account of human relationality.

Kant's ethical writings are in full accord with his denial, in the First Critique, of any actual knowledge of the self - or of the other as self - except as an appearance constituted by the subject. Even though the transcendental self must be assumed as a postulate
of practical reason it certainly cannot be known. The essential self remains, for Kant, epistemically mysterious. There is no perspective that we may occupy which might render the intelligible self an object of intuition. To understand practical reason as providing such knowledge is a misapprehension that Kant is at pains to avoid.

As we have seen, what is ultimately constitutive of personhood is, for Kant, the nature of rational beings as ends in themselves. Concomitantly, the community of such persons is formed out of the individual person's respect or "reverence" for the other as an autonomous law-maker who ought never to be treated as a mere means, but always as an unconditioned end.

There are three things which need to be said here concerning Kant's treatment of persons and the basis for their forming a society.

Firstly, there would appear to be no existential referent to Kant's noumenal self. In other words the distinction which Kant establishes between the phenomenal and noumenal self has the effect of disengaging the self-in-itself from all inclinations, desires, passions and motivations which go to make up actual human existence. R.F.A. Hoernle makes this point when he observes that Kant ...had inherited the tradition of treating a priori propositions as devoid of existential reference... the absolute value of a will determined to action by no other motive than pure respect for the moral law, is an a priori proposition... It is one of a set of a priori propositions which together make up the "rational part", or the "metaphysic" of morals. To this set of propositions, considered on this abstract a priori plane, the question whether they apply to, or are true of, any actually existent beings is irrelevant.

This leads on to our second point. Is it really adequate to define personhood solely in terms of the rational being as unconditional end? Clearly we would want to affirm Kant's attribution of unique value and dignity to human persons as distinct from things. Nevertheless personhood cannot be reduced simply to the level of the formal principle of the autonomy of the will. As we have already noted above, the a priori principle of the freedom of the rational being lacks any existential referent. In other words, it does not allow us to engage with real people as they are experienced. Furthermore, the notion of personhood as constituted by its character as end rather than means does not permit the possibility...
of a person rendering him/herself a means through an act of self-
abandonment to the other. Self-sacrifice must surely involve, to
some extent at least, the self becoming a means and this, in Kant's
view, is to negate one's personhood.

Finally, if the notion of person as end is found to be too formal an
understanding of the individual self, then the notion of human
community as a Kingdom of ends must be open to a similar criticism.

To have "reverence" for or to acknowledge the "dignity" of a person
while clearly a necessary presupposition for human relationality
cannot be viewed as an adequate or sufficient account of the
complexities of interpersonal relationship. The language of dignity
and respect may well be of value in describing the preliminary and
formal stages of our engagement with the other as initially
strangers to us but its adequacy as a tool for describing the sort
of personal commitment which we experience towards a loved one, for
example, must be highly questionable. Recognition of worth is far
too formal a notion to account for human relationality in all its
fullness. Furthermore, there would appear to be at least grounds
for suspecting that for Kant it is the moral law that is the real
object of respect, while the actual person, with all their
existential "inclinations", is caught up in this attitude of
reverence only in a secondary manner. As the quotation from Hoernle
above has already implied, it is the a priori proposition as regards
the value of the unconditioned will which is the real object of
reverence, the actually existent being is "irrelevant". J.Baillie
makes this very point when he writes:

...where Kant erred, and where his eighteenth-
century education was too much for him, was in his
analysis of this experience [the experience of the
Unconditioned] into mere respect for a law...The
reduction of the spiritual life of mankind to the
mere respectful acceptance of a formula was, in
fact, the last absurdity of the eighteenth
century.

Clearly Kant's failure to do adequate justice to human beings as
experienced both self-consciously and as discrete others, while
concentrating his attention upon abstract rational principles, must
severely limit his contribution to the debate concerning the
relationship between the self and the other. Simply to regard the
existential reality of the human person, in terms of conditioned
inclination, as unimportant both to the constitution of that person
and to their potential for communion with others is to abstract so
far from our actual experience of self and other as to be of dubious value. Seeing this attitude in tandem with Kant's understanding of the immediate subject's cognative power to construe the other with whom it relates, a view which places interpersonal relationality firmly in the power of the autonomous rational subject, must give us cause to question the actual significance Kant allows to the other as an equal partner in the process of self/other relationality.

We shall turn now to the development of Kantian critical thought in the form of the German Idealism of Fichte and Hegel where the questionable significance of the other identified in the thinking of Kant is also to be found.
NOTES

1. cf. Beck p. 21, who argues that Kant had no sociology of knowledge, "He overlooked the variable social dimensions of thought and was little interested in the philosophy of language."

2. Critique of Pure Reason (CPR), B139


4. ibid. p. 23.


6. The announcement of the topic was made in June 1761, the closing date for entries being early 1763. Kant began his work on his essay late into 1762 and thus refers to it as a "hastily composed work".

7. Cited Cassirer, p. 66.


10. ibid. First Reflection, 1 p. 6.


12. ibid. Third Reflection, 2, p. 25.


14. ibid.

15. Cassirer, p. 78.

16. ibid. p. 80

17. ibid. p. 80.


19. Cassirer p. 83. Cf also p. 91. The implications of Kant's conclusion at this stage in his development were to colour the whole of his subsequent thinking: "The battle against metaphysics and its conception of God and a supersensible world means to him also the battle for a new positive foundation for autonomous morality."


21. CPR; A. viii.

22. CPR; A. 56; B. 81.

23. CPR; A. 247; B. 303.

24. CPR; A. 255-256; B. 310-312.

25. CPR; A. 369.


27. Prolegomena 14.


29. ibid. p. 15.

30. In a letter to Lambert in September 1770 Kant says with reference to his dissertation: "The first and fourth sections
can be scorned without careful consideration; but in the second, third and fifth, though my indisposition prevented me from working them out to my satisfaction, there seems to me to be material deserving more careful and extensive exposition."

Cited Cassirer, p. 113.

31. Inaugural Dissertation 3. (M.U.P. p. 54.)
32. ibid. 4, p. 55.
33. ibid. 8, p. 58. Cf. also Cassirer, p. 115: "For Kant philosophy is the science of the boundaries of human thought."
35. Inaugural Dissertation 14/5. (M.U.P. p. 65f.)
36. ibid p. 70f.
37. It is interesting to note here the significance of Kant's notion of space as a distinctly rational function, alongside his rejection of the Newtonian conception of space and the implications this is seen to have for the place of the subject in Kant's thought. Professor T.F. Torrance traces the development of the concept of space and time first to its identification with God himself, next to its Newtonian understanding as an "infinite receptacle" (infinitum capax finiti) and finally to Kant's notion of it as equivalent to a function of human cognition. (36) The first development had the effect of militating against God's immanence in the created order, especially with respect to the Incarnation, since it was not possible that He could be both container and content. In the case of the Kantian development, the receptacle notion of space, which defined the limits of comprehension, was transferred from God to man, thus rendering God unknowable and universalising the human subject. Torrance makes an important observation when he writes:

If space and time are a priori forms of man's sensory perception, then the point of absolute rest is transferred to a centre in man himself. His one fixed point is his self-understanding. Theologically this must mean that there can be no God for man outside of himself or independent of his consciousness, no divine constant invariant with human determinations and valuations. Then the only God man can or will have is that which he postulates in his need and morally appropriates for himself.

Space, Time and Incarnation. p 44
38. CPR; B. xvi.
39. CPR; B. 75.
40. CPR; A. vii.
41. Davis, p. 236ff.
42. Beck, p. 28.
43. CPR A 125-126.
44. CPR A 126.
45. CPR A 127-128.
46. CPR A 123.
47. CPR B 131-132.
48. CPR B 134-135.
49. Beck, p. 29.
50. Walsh, p. 90.
51. Walsh, p. 95 cf. p. 91ff.
53. GMM p. 112
54. cf. CPR B p. 407ff.
55. GMM p. 112
56. *Critique of Practical Reason* (CPrR) p. 57
58. GMM p. 113
59. ibid. p. 112
60. ibid.
61. ibid. p. 116
62. ibid. p. 117
63. ibid. p. 113
65. GMM p. 65.
67. GMM p. 91
68. ibid. p. 97
69. ibid. p. 95
70. ibid. p. 91 cf. p. 95f.
71. Cassirer, op. cit. p. 249.
72. J. Brown, *Subject and Object in Modern Theology*, p. 177.
73. CPR A368
74. cf. CPR A368ff.
75. Macmurray, *The Self as Agent*, p. 73.
77. ibid. p. 75.
78. cf. E. Levinas, *Totality and Infinity* p. 39ff
79. CPR B156.
82. Cf. GMM p. 91
We have considered in previous chapters, the possible shape of a Christian theological notion of coadunacy, something that we shall develop in greater detail in our final two chapters, and the incipient totalism of the Kantian critical tradition in its establishing of the rational self as empowered over the other in the act of construing the other as appearance. In this chapter we shall seek to trace these totalistic tendencies as they were subsequently developed by both Fichte and Hegel. This will be done in an attempt to demonstrate a certain degree of logical inevitability concerning the detrimental or at the very least limiting nature of this totalism with respect to self/other relations and thus its fundamental opposition to a Christian understanding of coadunacy. We shall proceed now with our examination of Fichte and Hegel and in particular with their notions of ego and spirit respectively. As has already been said, what we hope to show here is the way in which totalism and the tendency towards the absolutizing of the thinking subject, that are incipient in Kant, were developed by the aforementioned thinkers into actual philosophical doctrines. The point of this exercise is ultimately to reveal the necessarily damaging notion of totalism that issues out of the work of Fichte and Hegel. In so far as the German Idealist tradition has its roots in Kant this chapter must perforce be read in the light of our earlier chapter on Kant himself.

Clearly both Fichte and Hegel are fundamentally concerned with our three basic themes of coadunacy. Indeed the tripartite movement of the dialectic, present in both thinkers, may be regarded as an expression of their concern for the normality of unity, the problem of particularity and the ideal of unity. J.E. Grumley makes the point that much of Hegel's work focuses upon the problem of 'division' or the problem of 'diremption' (Trennung). In one of his earliest works Hegel has this to say concerning the nature of philosophy:

Division (Entzweiung) is the source of the need for philosophy, and as the culture (Bildung) of the age, the unfree given side of the structure. In our culture, that which is an appearance of the Absolute has isolated itself from the Absolute, and determined itself as independent. At the same time, however, the appearance can not deny its origin, and must therefore proceed to form the multiplicity of determinations into a whole.²
Here, and in his own way, Hegel is affirming as of utmost importance the themes of normality, problematicity and unity that we have identified as the basic fields of inquiry into the notion of coadunacy. However, before we consider the work of Hegel we shall turn now to the work of J.G. Fichte.

1. Fichte and the notion of Ego

It would not be too great an over-simplification to claim that post-Kantian idealism arose out of the ashes of the doctrine of the noumenon. Although Kant required the notion of the thing-in-itself to account for human sensations, he denied the possibility of direct knowledge of it, arguing that noumena were beyond the application of the categories of human understanding. It was quickly pointed out by followers of Kant, such as Fichte, that causality, being one of the categories the sole province of which was the phenomenal sphere, was inapplicable to things-in-themselves, and thus the one thing Kant claimed to know about the noumenal realm, that it caused sensations, was itself inadmissible according to the canons of the First Critique.

Although arguing strenuously that his system was continuous with that of Kant understood aright, Fichte rejected the notion of the thing-in-itself as a product of dogmatism, the obverse of idealism, and as such as deterministic, materialistic and a misunderstanding of Kant's true thought. It is "a pure invention and has no reality whatsoever. It does not occur in experience." Leaving aside the question of the legitimacy of Fichte's claim to be following Kant, which even on a charitable reading of his work must be viewed with the greatest of suspicion, it is undeniable that Fichte represents a logical development of the Kantian system, along one of its possible tracks, that is, the route of the "I-think".

Having abandoned the concept of the noumena Fichte was left only the cogito or, as he referred to it, the Ego with which to work. He opens his first Introduction to The Science of Knowledge, ignoring the first two pages of preface, with the following injunction:

Attend to yourself: turn your attention away from everything that surrounds you and towards your inner life; this is the first demand that philosophy makes of its disciples. Our concern is not with anything that lies outside you, but only with yourself."
While a full discussion of Fichte's system falls outside the scope of this present work it is of great importance that we come to understand his concept of the ego or the self. For it is precisely in this notion of the ego, das ich that Fichte transforms Kantian epistemology into a metaphysic with ontological significance.

Fichte's concern with the free moral subject prompts him to assert that while the choice between dogmatism and idealism is dependent upon the inclination and interest of the individual thinker, the mature philosopher who is aware of his freedom as an agent and moral subject will inevitably be drawn to the idealist system. The immature thinker will, on the other hand, tend towards determinism and materialism, concentrating on the not-self rather than the self. Thus, while for the idealist "the only positive thing is freedom..."7, "The majority of men" who are wedded to dogmatism, "could sooner be brought to believe themselves a piece of lava in the moon than to take themselves for a self".9 It is the difference between those whose concern is the thing-in-itself and those whose concern is with the self-in-itself.9

But if we are to dispense with the externality of the thing-in-itself, from whence do we derive our experience of the world, that which is not-self? For an answer to this question we must turn to consider Fichte's basic notion of self-consciousness or ego.

The first step towards an understanding of Fichte's fundamental philosophical principle takes us back to the quotation from the first introduction to The Science of Knowledge, where Fichte calls upon us to turn our attention towards our inner life.10 We must engage in a process which seeks to look beyond the objective self to the pure ego. While such an endeavour is doomed to failure, it is in the failure of our attempts to objectify the ego that we become aware of it as the very condition of objective thought.11 Whenever we attempt to think, the self, the pure ego is always beyond that objectification as the act of consciousness. The non-objectifiability of the pure ego does not mean that we can have no real awareness of it. Fichte speaks of "intellectual intuition" which gives rise to an awareness of the self:

> It is the immediate consciousness that I act, and what I enact: it is that whereby I know something because I do it.12

This intuicing of the self is a uniquely personal experience which cannot be reduced to proofs and concepts, but must be discovered by
each person for themselves. Nor is it in any way an exotic or esoteric procedure, for it arises out of the mundane activities of everyday life.

Everyone, to be sure, can be shown, in his own admitted experience, that this intellectual intuition occurs at every moment of his consciousness. I cannot take a step, move a hand or foot, without an intellectual intuition of my self-consciousness in these acts;...\(^{13}\)

It is this awareness of ourselves as agents that is important for Fichte. He is not concerned with the content of any given action but simply the awareness of ourselves as the performers of it. This for Fichte is the crux of the matter. Far from attempting to put forward a doctrine of the substantiality of the ego, which would show it to be objectified and thus reduced to the level of a dogmatic concept, Fichte speaks of the "self-active self".\(^{14}\) The self is not ossified within the constructing definition of a static thing, but is to be regarded as totally free, as activity constantly determining and never determined:

"Intellectual intuition is the only firm standpoint for all philosophy. From thence we can explain everything that occurs in consciousness; and moreover, only from thence. Without self-consciousness there is no consciousness whatever; but self-consciousness is possible only in the manner indicated: I am simply active... I ought in my thinking to set out from the pure self, and to think of the latter as absolutely self-active; not as determined by things but as determining them."\(^{15}\)

Thus pure or transcendental ego must not be mistaken for an entity, existing behind consciousness, which engages in activity. The ego is activity.

Having established the transcendental ego as the fundamental principle of his philosophy Fichte moves on to the next stage in the development of his idealist metaphysics. It is important to bear in mind at this point that it is with metaphysics that Fichte is concerned, and that not in the sense that Kant understood it. Fichte is not engaged in a mere analysis of the nature of consciousness, but seeks to derive the whole of objective reality, the not-I, including other selves, from the transcendental ego. The obverse of this procedure sees existence as fundamental and, despite attempts by the dogmatists to hide behind idealist language in speaking of existence for us, this is simply paying lip service to idealism proper.\(^{16}\) "We cannot abstract from the self", says Fichte.
We are that which thinks therein, and hence... nothing could ever come to exist independently of us for everything is necessarily related to our thinking.17

It is the active subject that is prior to all things; the natural world is concomitantly subordinate to it. Indeed, it would be true to say that for Fichte the natural world is nothing more than a manifestation, at an empirical level, of the activity which constitutes the transcendental ego.

It would suit our purposes very well to join some of Fichte's original audience in labelling him as an extreme solipsist. His concentration upon the ego and the muted nature of his metaphysical speculation in The Science of Knowledge would, and did, naturally lead his readers to the conclusion that Fichte was concerned with deriving all of reality from the individual self, perhaps even from Fichte himself. Fichte strongly rejected this interpretation of his work as a massive misrepresentation, and while it would be tempting to criticise him on the grounds of his alleged solipsism we must take seriously his claims that by the term ego he intended his readers to understand absolute consciousness rather than any specific individual human consciousness.

However, despite Fichte's insistence upon the supra-individual nature of the absolute ego, he is by no means immune from the accusation of solipsism, or at the very least, a form of totalism, in the form of the absolutising of the subject, which grounds reality ultimately within human consciousness. Let us now consider how it is that Fichte's idealism can be said to lead to the subordination of reality to the human consciousness. There appear to be three basic areas which need to be considered in this connection. Firstly, we need to understand how absolute consciousness, which neither exists nor is conscious for itself, achieves consciousness and existence through human intuition. Secondly we will consider how the feeling which constitutes human consciousness, by virtue of its harmony with the absolute ego, represents an infallible guide to our moral duty. Finally, and as a concomitant of the first two points, we shall assess Fichte's claim that the created order is nothing more than a stage for the activity of our moral life, an obstacle posited for the development of the absolute ego.
Consciousness and the Absolute Ego.

Fichte makes it quite clear in his treatment of the absolute ego that while it is the ground of consciousness, it is not itself conscious. The reason for this, says Fichte, is that for true consciousness to arise there must exist some manner of opposition. Without opposition the ego remains a pure activity. Consequently it is necessary for the ego to posit the non-ego, objective reality within itself in order to bring itself to consciousness. In other words, the unlimited absolute ego must posit that which is not itself in order to identify itself by differentiation. Thus the ego encounters the not-ego, "clashes" with it, as Fichte puts it, and is forced to recoil back upon itself initiating its own self consciousness.

It (the ego or self) is also, accordingly, no consciousness, not even a consciousness of self; and simply because no consciousness comes about through this mere act, we may indeed infer further to another act, whereby a not-self arises for us; only so can we make progress in our philosophical argument, and derive as required the system of experience.\(^{19}\)

While the ego and the not-ego represent the first and second principles of the science of knowledge, Fichte goes on to introduce an important third principle which has to do with the form of the opposition between the first and second principles.\(^{19}\) Fichte quite rightly points out that the positing of the not-self from within the self must logically result in total self-negation. The question thus arises, how can the self or ego come to consciousness through opposition to the not-ego without nullifying itself? Fichte resolves this problem by viewing the opposition between the two principles as one of limitation rather than "mutual elimination".\(^{20}\) The process of limiting, says Fichte, involves only partial negation and concomitantly implies that, "Both self and not-self are posited as divisible".\(^{21}\) The ego posits within itself a limited ego and a limited non-ego which "clash"\(^{22}\) with each other, driving the ego forwards towards a greater awareness of itself. It is this opposition of limited ego to limited not-ego which forms the human finite consciousness.\(^{23}\)

In other words, it is only in so far as the finite human consciousness is involved in continual opposition to the natural order, that is the not-ego, that the absolute ego comes to and...
continues to develop in consciousness. Patrick Gardiner accurately expresses this vital aspect of Fichte's system when he writes:

...the spiritual character of reality in no way implied that it should be regarded as a seamless or harmonious whole: its inner 'striving' essence entailed conflict and division, such division being, so to speak, self-generated and involving it in a continual struggle to overcome constraints and obstacles that had their source in its own primordial activity. Human beings were the vehicles of this process and, as such, could fulfill themselves only by pitting themselves against a resistant natural world where ultimate function was to offer them the opportunity for realizing their potentialities as free self-determining being.\(^{24}\)

It is at this point that Fichte's metaphysical idealism merges with his ethical idealism and we shall be considering this important aspect of his thought shortly.

It is important to note here that with the positing of the not-ego Fichte had no intention of reinstating the notion of the thing-in-itself. The not-ego is entirely conditional, it exists only for consciousness and, as Fichte tells us in the introduction to his treatment of the "second principle", in deriving it, "we proceed from a fact of empirical consciousness."\(^{25}\)

In this connection Fichte was required once again to reject an interpretation of his work which understood him to be attributing the creation of the not-ego or natural order to the individual finite self, claiming that it is with the absolute self that he is concerned. Despite Fichte's strenuous rejection of a subjectivist interpretation of his work, even granting that when he speaks of the self or ego he is referring to an absolute rather than an individual human self, he cannot ultimately avoid the allegation that for him the activity of the individual self is always prior. It is the self rather than any form of cooperation between self and other that is the operator.

As we have already noted, the absolute ego is not in itself conscious, consciousness only being possible as the result of opposition between the two principles and not as inherent to the one unconditioned absolute. Consciousness for the absolute is derived from, or at least through, finite human consciousness alone. As for the material world, the not-self which Fichte claims is intuited by the absolute self he also claims — and this is essential to his system if it is to remain truly idealist — that the material world
is only real for consciousness. In the light of his notion of the absolute as not conscious in itself, this must surely imply human consciousness.

We are thus left with two potentially alarming notions. Firstly that the absolute self is dependent for its conscious development upon the continual struggle between human beings and the natural world, and secondly that the material world is, in some sense, merely the product of human consciousness. The logical implication of these two notions is that there exists a metaphysical mandate for human domination and aggression towards the material world which is, after all, subordinate to the human consciousness. Fichte develops this line of reasoning further as he seeks to highlight the ethical significance of these principles and it is to these ethical considerations that we now turn.

The Natural Order as Moral Stage

As we have seen, for Fichte the absolute self strives towards self-consciousness via the activity of finite selves within the natural world and this activity, continues Fichte, is always moral activity. His rejection of deterministic dogmatism went hand in hand with his characteristically Kantian concern with the freedom of the subject. To say that we are self-conscious beings is to say, according to Fichte, that we are first and foremost centres of activity. It is as agents that we interpret the natural world, "we do not act because we know, but we know because we are called upon to act - the practical reason is the root of all reason."

For this reason Fichte is adamant that the natural world is "ours" in a unique sense. The world is the only available stage upon which we may exercise our moral vocation, there is no neutrality or external autonomy attached to the natural world, it is no more or less than the field of our agency. Indeed, as we saw previously, the positing of the world, or not-self, was vital for Fichte's system as it is the not-self which constitutes the abstract against which the active subject strives; without it the subject could not be said to act and would fail both to fulfil its moral duties and to continue as conscious.

Once again we must remind ourselves that the not-self or natural world is not the Kantian thing-in-itself, it is posited or assumed as the necessary condition of moral agency. Fichte is quite unambiguous at this point, that "we are compelled to believe that we
act, and that we ought to act in a certain manner, we are compelled to assume a certain sphere for this action. 29 In this Fichte is clearly remaining true to his Kantian ethical heritage.

Thus we find that just as Fichte's system provides a metaphysical mandate for opposition towards the natural world, so too does he establish ethical grounds for such an attitude. Not only that, but in his focusing upon the primary importance of human moral activity, he is open to the allegation that he reduces the entire natural world to a function of human consciousness, which is in turn a product of human agency:

...the essence of transcendental idealism is general, and of its presentation in the Science of Knowledge in particular, consists in the fact that the concept of existence is by no means regarded as a primary and original concept, but is viewed merely as derivative, as a concept derived, at that, through opposition to activity, and hence as a merely negative concept. To the idealist, the only positive thing is freedom; existence, for him, is a mere negation of the latter. 29

The external world is thus viewed as possessing no innate value. Indeed it can only be said to exist while we pit ourselves against it. There is no conception in Fichte's thought of human beings as part of the natural world, or as having any responsibility towards it. It is there simply to be conquered and overcome. Yet how are we to act in this world? In what way do we choose one action over another, and how are we to be sure that we are fulfilling our moral duty? It is to these questions that we shall now turn.

Consciousness and Moral Duty

Following Kant, Fichte wished to establish a foundation for our ethical awareness which is both absolute and available to all irrespective of intellect. He was also concerned that such a foundation should not be identified with any manner of external authority. Fichte finally focused upon the notion of conscience as the basis for moral law, the phrase "Act according to your conscience" being his fundamental moral imperative. He tells us in The Science of Knowledge that consciousness of the moral law... which itself is doubtless an immediate consciousness derived from no other, forms the basis for the intuition of self-activity and freedom. I am given to myself, by myself, as something that is to be active in a certain fashion, and am thereby given to myself as active in general... Only
through this medium of the moral law do I behold myself. As in all of Fichte's work, it is the practical dimension which takes precedence here. Conscience is described as a feeling (Gefuhl), an immediate experience of what our duty is. This feeling has its roots in the harmony which exists between us as finite empirical selves and the absolute self or ego.

Thus conscience is an infallible guide to our moral duty both metaphysically, through our harmony with the absolute, and also by definition, in so far as Fichte defines conscience as the immediate awareness of our moral duty. Our feeling of conscience can under no circumstances mislead us, we may be responsible for obscuring conscience so that its application to certain actions may no longer be apparent, but conscience itself is always infallible. Indeed Fichte will not even allow that an individual, whose awareness of his duty is not obscured, might choose to abandon said duty and refuse to implement the action it demands: "such a maxim would be diabolical; but the concept of the devil is self-contradictory".

In Fichte's ethical idealism we see the practical outworking of his notion of the absolute ego as free, unlimited activity. This reality-grounding activity is manifested finitely within similarly free human moral agency. Patrick Gardiner expresses the import of Fichte's position quite clearly when he writes:

In practice, this meant that the agent's motivation should be governed by laws which he, as a self-conscious subject, imposed upon himself and made the ground of his conduct. But conduct so activated was, for Fichte, nothing less than moral conduct; it was only when what was done was performed simply on the basis of 'an immediate consciousness of our determinate duty' that we fulfilled our true vocation as agents in the world. Thus the practical conclusion of Fichte's metaphysic was a form of ethical idealism, designed to confirm the reliance of the ordinary person upon the direct deliverances of his conscience.

There can be little doubting the radical subjectivism, in terms of the Kantian autonomous will, inherent in Fichte's ethical thinking, where the dictates of one's conscience are absolutized into moral imperatives. Indeed his only concession to the fact of the multiplicity of individual consciences is in his adoption of a Rousseauian social contract theory contained in his consideration of the concept of rights. The notion of rights, says Fichte, only
carries meaning in the context of a society, for it is only possible to speak of my right to do or have something in the face of others who may deny me that right. The concept of rights is a limiting concept, it limits the potentially limitless freedom possessed by each individual. In other words, the freedom of the individual is limited by the freedom of the rest of society. Ultimately, says Fichte, the totality of individual wills to freedom form one general will when the constituent wills are equalized. It is this general will, backed by an executive empowered to coerce conformity to the contract, which forms the state.

In the light of our examination of Fichte, we are now in a position to consider the essential anti-coadunate totalism inherent within his thought, and hopefully to point out the potentially dangerous excesses to which such a system of thought may lead.

As we shall see Fichte's totalism can be regarded as operating at two fundamental levels, the metaphysical and the empirical. In the first instance there is little doubting the fact that for Fichte human beings are the finite manifestation of the absolute self. Indeed the whole of human reality, both conscious and material, is posited purely and simply to bring the absolute to consciousness. The logical consequence of such a view is the absolutizing of the self. Further, the natural world is merely a tool, a condition of consciousness and obstacle or challenge to be overcome. Thus humanity, rather than being called upon to live responsibly and harmoniously within a created natural world which is its proper context, is encouraged to constantly place itself in opposition to that world, to fight against the natural order. It is only in this way that we remain truly conscious and concomitantly that the absolute is able to derive said consciousness from its finite expression in human beings. Ultimately the whole realm of human life and experience is reduced to an empirical means to a metaphysical end. We are thus ultimately functions of the absolute.

At the empirical level of human activity we have already noticed that for Fichte, the natural world is merely the necessary condition or context for moral action. Indeed our world is exactly that; that is to say, the natural order is a product of consciousness and as the absolute is not conscious in itself, it is the product of human
consciousness. We posit a world for ourselves, a world to be overcome via the execution of our ethical duty. For Fichte our ethical duty is vouchsafed to us by our infallible conscience, such that we are constantly made aware of our individual moral obligation. The suggestion that there might exist a moral imperative which is external to the free subject is, to Fichte, an expression of gross dogmatic determinism.

Thus, at a finite level, we witness the same totalism of the self as was evident at the level of the absolute self. External reality and the foundation for ethical activity both reside within the conscious self. There is no mistaking Fichte on this point, despite his attempts to defend himself against the charge of solipsism. He is quite unequivocally subjectivist in his derivation of both the world and moral law from human consciousness. The natural order cannot be derived from an absolute that is, in essence, not conscious but active, nor can moral duty be derived from any other source than the free individual self's feeling of conscience. Such a view must inevitably encourage an attitude of radical individualism, where all externality is subordinate to the self whose behaviour is controlled by laws derived from that very self as a manifestation of the ego's "absolute self-activity".

As we have mentioned, Fichte attempts to avoid the totalism of the individual self, via his social contract theory of rights. However this does little more than transfer such a totalism from the individual self or will to the general will or state. Further, it serves to confirm our assessment of Fichtean man as the radical individual, totally self-determining and unrestrained, who can only function alongside other similar individuals with the aid of a constraining social executive.

The totalism of the general will or state is the logical result of Fichte's idealism. The derivation of the first principle of the science of knowledge from our immediate awareness of self via intellectual intuition renders its validity, and thus the validity of the entire system, self-evident. It is thus not surprising to find that for Fichte, the only true rational state is the one founded upon his own philosophy. Indeed, he went further arguing that such a state, with its system of rights, would never be truly stable while in isolation and he thus looked forward to world-wide acceptance of his ethical idealism.
It is not within the scope of this thesis to consider the influence of Fichte's thinking upon the excesses of the Third Reich. However it is not difficult to see how such a Reich might utilize Fichte's work. By absolutizing the general will, the state, by virtue of its being a contractually limited finite manifestation of the absolute will, there exists a metaphysical mandate for both enforced conformity to the state and also totalitarian expansionism directed at those functioning outside of the authentic rational state. By investing the German nation with this mandate Fichte must be seen as contributing to the foundational ideology of Nazism.

Fichte, following in the footsteps of Kant, exhibits a similar attitude towards military expansionism as did the neo-Kantians. He maintains in his Grundzüge, that "It is the natural tendency of every civilized state to widen its borders on every side and to take up all available territory into its own civic unity." R.H. Murray has highlighted the way in which Fichte took the law-giver of Rousseau and turned him into Nietzsche's Übermensch.

Anticipating both Carlyle and Nietzsche, Fichte writes: 'To compel man to adopt the rightful form of government, to impose Right on them by force, is not only the right, but the sacred duty of every man who has both the insight and the power to do so. There may even be circumstances in which the single man has this right' - a Herr Hitler, for instance - 'against the whole of mankind; for, as against him and Right, there is no man who has either rights or liberty. He may compel them to Right that being an absolutely definite conception, valid for all men alike; a conception which they all ought to have and which they all will have as soon as they raise themselves to his level of intelligence, and which, in the meantime, thanks to the grace of God working in him, he holds in the name of all and as their representative. The truth of this conception he must take upon his own conscience. He, we may say, is the compulsive power, ordained of God.'

In his Address to the German Nation Fichte exhorts the German people to unify in the face of Napoleon, to become the custodians of the Right and to promulgate it via their patriotic zeal. Continuing along these lines we find him exhorting the virtues of the dictator. The Staatslehre claims that only such a Hero may save men from their own follies:

The only check assumed by the hero or dictator is the tender mercies of his own conscience... the dictator is the very man to coerce warring wills into one, and so hasten the progress of mankind. Force and right, according to Joubert, are the governors of this world; force till right is ready -
Yet Fichte's endowing of the German people with such a cultural mission is of secondary importance to us at this stage. The point we are attempting to make is that Fichte's philosophical idealism, by virtue of its inevitable totalism, is completely inimical to the notion of coadunacy which we see as essential to the Christian view of humanity and its relationship with God, the environment and itself. While coadunacy involves humanity in an intimate relationship with a God who remains other, Fichte's idealism, as we have seen, identifies us with the absolute in so far as the absolute comes to consciousness through finite human consciousness. Whereas coadunate existence involves us in a world which is an essential, albeit external, part of our own identity and for which we are responsible, Fichte would have us constantly at odds with nature in a never-ending striving towards domination. Finally, where the notion of coadunacy regards humanity as a corporate entity which nevertheless involves both the self and the other in reciprocal interrelationship, Fichte sees all selves as ultimately free and self-determining, forming a society only through artificial limitations and the threat of coercion manifesting itself in contractual form.

This damaging totalism, incipient in Kant and explicit in Fichte, achieves its greatest level of sophistication in the work of Hegel, to whom we shall now turn.

2. Hegelian Totalism

It is of course a commonplace to bemoan the seemingly impossible task of mastering the encyclopaedic breadth and complexity of Hegel's thought, coupled as it is with his all but impenetrable literary style. Thankfully it is not the purpose of this work to explore the depths of Hegelian thought. Rather it is our purpose to examine the place provided in that system of thought for the significance of the other.

As our concern within this thesis is with the notion of coadunacy, as defined previously, we shall concentrate our analysis on Hegel's understanding of the relation between the self and the other and the self and its world. However, having said this, any attempt to master an aspect of Hegel's thinking without first having gone
through his logic is a forlorn hope. Logic is not simply the formal structure of his thought but constitutes a metaphysic which is the very structure of reality. Indeed, it is only because it is the latter that it can be said to be the former. This is precisely what Hegel means when he claims that the real is rational and the rational real. Clearly the Hegelian logic is in fact a metaphysic.

Logic

The nature of Logic for Hegel is of crucial importance as regards our concern with self/other relationality for it is Logic in its dialectical movement which characterises the relationship between the one and the other which is ultimately determinative for what a thing truly is in itself. Logic is the inner dynamic of a thing whereby it comes to itself through a process of self negation which issues out of its confrontation with its other. But we are ahead of ourselves here. What is now called for is an examination of Hegel's understanding of the logically necessary relationship which exists between the one and its other such that we might come to an understanding of the status of the other in this engagement. To this end we must now turn to a detailed examination of the nature of Hegel's logic as developed particularly in the first part of his Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences.

Hegel's notion of dialectic is one of daunting complexity. Simply put it involves the three familiar moments of the thesis, antithesis and synthesis, which represent a movement towards the Absolute Idea. The thesis and antithesis represent, to an extent, a development of the Kantian antinomies, that is, apparently contradictory and yet equally valid states of affairs. Both sets of affairs have a legitimate claim to being absolute, says Hegel. A true understanding of the nature of reality as dialectically structured does not stop at such contradictions but looks beyond them to a synthesis of the two terms into one whole that is being-for-self.

All that we have just said in fact tells us very little as regards the actual nature of reality as a dialectical process. If we hope to get anywhere with our understanding of Hegel and the dialectic then we must grasp the logic of dialectic.

Logic, which for Hegel is the preliminary concern of the Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences, is nothing less than the science of the pure Idea, Idea being the abstract medium of Thought. It is to be distinguished from the classical logic of
Aristotle and the schoolmen whose concern was with the formal structures of thought as derived from experience and also from the attempts of Kant's critical philosophy to examine the nature of cognition as rooted also in sense experience. Logic, in other words, is concerned not with the mere form and content of thought but with thought as it is an end for itself; that is, as absolute Idea and not simply as objects of consciousness. Logic seeks to apprehend pure notions, in disassociation from mental images and familiar conceptual structures. The realm of pure thought, which the science of Logic attempts to navigate us through, is totally self-referential, "...the fact is that in a notion there is nothing further to be thought than the notion itself." Thought, says Hegel, far from being mere thought subordinated to the dictates of empirical phenomena, is the only way in which absolute truth may be approached. Indeed, contrary to popular belief, the rational - rather than producing nothing more than fanciful chimeras - expresses the fundamental reality of things. Philosophical reflection, properly construed, should not lead us in the direction of the critical philosophy which teaches the fundamental difference between the products of our own thought and things in themselves, but rather it ought to show up the nature of objects in their ultimate relativity, while all the time still maintaining their validity as isolated predicates.

It is this revelation of relativity inherent among particular phenomena which drives us towards what Hegel sees as the "natural belief of man" that thought is coincident with things. The world of things is merely an aggregate of isolates prior to the act of reflection which alters the way in which things are made present to us, causing us to abandon the outward manifestation in search of the inward universal. While outward forms are individual, isolated and ultimately transitory, the universal is the infinite and true essence of things. It is for this reason that, in contradistinction to Kant, Hegel claims that "...the theme of Logic is in general the supersensible world".

It is at this point that we encounter the very root of Hegel's idealism, for this universal which the science of Logic is committed to examining, is available only for the mind:

The universal does not exist externally to the outward eye as a universal. The kind as kind cannot be perceived: the laws of the celestial motions are not written on the sky. The universal is neither
In other words, when speaking of animals, for example, while we may point out particular animals such as dogs or cats, we cannot point towards a universal animality, animal qua animal, in the same way. "Animal qua animal", says Hegel, "does not exist". However, it is precisely this animality, this universal which is real only for the mind, that constitutes the "permanent inward nature" of particular animals. Without this universal a particular thing loses its essence and is no longer identifiable as animal. It is because of this that Hegel can make the claim that "'Reason is in the world'; which means that Reason is the soul of the world it inhabits".

Thus it is thought alone which constitutes the mode of apprehending the universal, the soul of the world. It is both the "constitutive substance of external things" and also the "universal substance of what is spiritual". It is the reconciliation of these two aspects of thought, "the self-conscious reason with the reason which is in the world" that forms the proper goal of philosophical science.

Thought, says Hegel, is the object of mind and the exertion of thought is an act of mind or, more accurately, an act of my mind. For Hegel it is of the very essence of our claim to freedom that we be understood as thinking for ourselves. It is the universality of thought, unconstrained by the external transitory phenomena, in its abstract state of self-reference, which constitutes our freedom.

Thus Hegel can make the claim that:

The real nature of objects is brought to light in reflection; but it is no less true that this exertion of thought is my act. If this be so, the real nature is a product of my mind, in its character of thinking subject - generated by me in my simple universality, self-collected and removed from extraneous influences - in one word, in my Freedom... To think is in fact ipso facto to be free, for thought as the action of the universal is an abstract relating of self to self...

Freedom demands abstraction from all that is other than ourselves. In the presence of that which is not-self we are no longer free. Man is free because he thinks and through his thinking he becomes aware of his universality. Animals, says Hegel, are in a manner of speaking universal, in their animality, but do not apprehend themselves as universal for they never proceed further than their
sensory experience of isolates. In other words it is not from the side of nature that the universal makes itself present for consciousness. If this were so then simple sensory experience would be sufficient to bring all with the appropriate sense organs, animals as well as humans, to conscious universality. Rather it is man as a king who thinks that rendering himself an "I", first in particularity and then in universality as "being-for-self". Such an "I" is "thought as a thinker" in which everything is taken up for me. Hegel defines it as a "vacuum" or "receptacle" for a "whole world of conceptions". In this receptacle, which is thought in the activity of thinking, all particularity is both put aside and yet remains a constant potential. In such a way the I is the universal which contains within itself the totality of everything.

Logic is thus the study of this pure thought, the "I" which is thought as thinker. Its concern is only with independent thought and its products, that which it brings into existence. It is for this reason, and here we return to our original point, that Hegel can say: "Logic therefore coincides with Metaphysics, the science of things set and held in thoughts - thoughts accredited able to express the essential reality of things." The synthesis of Absolute Being and its antithesis Absolute Not-Being is Absolute Becoming. Thus the Absolute is...

...the process of its own becoming, the circle which presupposes its end as its purpose and has its end as its beginning. It becomes concrete or actual only by its development and through its end.

It is this teleological process of the dialectic ultimately resulting in self-thinking thought, which constitutes the Absolute, the whole of reality. In the light of this it is essential that we do not conceive of the Absolute as some manner of transcendent reality which merely manifests or expresses itself within the universe, in so far as it is the universe; it is its own self-manifestation.

The Absolute is both subject and object, it is self-thinking thought that which unifies all things within itself. In other words, it is what Hegel calls Spirit.

In so far as the Absolute is the totality of reality, true philosophy must be regarded as the totality of truth, the Absolute actualized in conceptual form. In other words, for Hegel philosophy is the Absolute's knowledge of itself and not merely some external
representation of the Absolute. Only via speculative reason (Vernunft), as opposed to mere understanding, can the human mind accommodate the process of dialectic which unites apparently contradictory concepts within the synthesis of unity in difference.

1. Being

The Absolute, says Hegel, in its logically prior form is pure Being. Thus the first of Hegel's three subdivisions of logic is the Doctrine of Being. Pure being, rather than being the ultimate and final determinant, as traditional ontology would have us believe, is on the contrary totally indeterminate. It is "utter emptiness and instability besides," as the beginning of the dialectical movement towards the self-awareness of the absolute being is merely thought without determination, that is, without an other:

When thinking is to begin, we have nothing but thought in its merest indeterminateness: for we cannot determine unless there is both one and another; and in the beginning there is yet no other. The indeterminate, as we here have it, is the blank we begin with, not a featurelessness reached by abstractness, not the elimination of all character, but the original featurelessness which precedes all definite character and is the very first of all. And this we call Being.

Being, in other words, is an empty "is" and thus, argues Hegel, it passes apparently paradoxically, into its opposite, that is, Nothing. To say that being is empty and indeterminate, without form and content, is to say that it is also nothing. Thus the Absolute itself may be defined as both Being and Nothing or Not-being. It is the movement of the empty abstractions of Being into nothing, and Nothing into Being in an endless process of reciprocal cancellation which gives way to the unity of Becoming. Being and Nothing are, says Hegel, merely "Vanishing factors" whose process of changing into each other is the restlessness of Becoming.

Becoming is the first concrete thought, and therefore the first notion: whereas Being and Naught are empty abstractions. The notion of Being, therefore, of which we sometimes speak, must mean Becoming; not the mere point of Being, which is empty Nothing any more than Nothing, which is empty Being. In Being then we have Nothing and in Nothing Being; but this Being which does not lose itself in Nothing is Becoming... Becoming is only the explicit statement of what Being is in its truth.
In other words, to make use of a familiar phrase, the Absolute's Being is in Becoming.

This primary form of the dialectic is of considerable importance for our understanding of the status of the other for Hegel. Here pure universal Being, by positing its negative, Nothing, partakes of particularity via a relationship with its other. However, this process of self-othering is clearly just that, a process, and one which ultimately sublates the other in its movement towards individuality. This is the all important structure of the Hegelian logic, the movement of the Universal through the Particular to the Individual. These three movements correspond to the three sections of Hegel's Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences, The Logic, The Philosophy of Nature and The Philosophy of Mind.

The other, the moment of particularity, is always the middle term between empty universality and self-conscious Spirit, it is the process of return and sublation.67 It is here that we see the absorption of the other into the totality of the self, for the other is only ever the reflection of the self; the self posited as its own negative, but a negative that is in itself a fundamental process of return to the self. We need to keep this notion of the self-othering of the Idea particularly in mind when we consider the second subdivision of the logic — that is, the doctrine of Essence — and also when we consider Hegel's Philosophy of Nature, which represents the second part of his Encyclopaedia and thus the essential manifestation of the particularity of the other. It is in this second moment of the dialectic that we find the very particularity of the other qua other being negated as it collapses into the universal self, on its way towards self-consciousness as individual subject. The other for Hegel is nothing but a dead thing, a "corpse" as he refers to Nature 68 outside of its necessary character as a return to self, to the Idea consummated as Spirit. We shall return to this later on in this chapter.

The "utter restlessness"69 of Becoming is also destined to vanish just as its constituents, Being and Nothing, are ultimately consumed in Becoming. There must, says Hegel, be a result to Becoming, "Becoming implies that somewhat comes out of it"70 and that somewhat is Determinate Being, in other words becoming which has become. In the final section of the First Subdivision of Logic Hegel defines Determinate Being in terms of the triad of Quality, Quantity and
Measure. These three represent particular modes of Being, which is no longer empty. We shall not dwell long over these categories as they are only of passing interest to our overall concern.

The category of Quality is that which makes an "is" what it is. It has to do with the immediate mode of Being, unlike Quantity, which is a mode of Being, a differentiation, and external to itself.\(^7\)

Hegel speaks of elementary bodies in Nature, such as oxygen and nitrogen, as "existing qualities"\(^7\) and similarly, albeit in a subordinate way, character is regarded as a quality of mind. Quality then, as the determinateness of being or rather, as Hegel puts it, "determinateness which is"\(^7\) may rightfully be called Reality, insofar as it passes from its abstract indeterminacy, which is inner and subjective, into particularity or being-there-and-then.\(^7\)

As we have already mentioned Quantity is the external, indifferent mode of Being, such that when a thing is altered by becoming greater or less, it still remains the same thing. To use one of Hegel's examples, making a house bigger or smaller does nothing to the nature of the house qua house, it is still a house no matter how big or small it is. However, having said this, there comes a point where changes in quantity do begin to alter quality. The resolution of the categories of Quality and Quantity ultimately comes in the synthesis of Measure which is defined as "the qualitativ quantum"\(^7\), that is, a quantum determined by the quality or character of a thing. Thus quality and quantity are implicit in each other.

In measure quality and quantity originally confront each other, like some and other ... In the process of measure, therefore, these two pass into each other: each of them becomes what it is implicitly; and thus we get Being thrown into abeyance and absorbed, with its several characteristics negatived. Such Being is Essence.\(^7\)

It is as the immediacy of Being passes over into self-mediation via a process of self-negation, thus cancelling its immediacy that we encounter Essence. The transitory nature of the immediate, which ordinary consciousness studies as being, becomes clear in the light of the dialect to which Essence is the result. For while "in Being everything is immediate, in Essence everything is relative."\(^7\) That is while Being is always by or for itself Essence is always in relation, indeed it can be said to be Being in relation. It is this
doctrine of Essence which constitutes the second subdivision of Logic.

ii. Essence

The reality of Essence is revealed, says Hegel, to the "standpoint of 'Reflection'" that is to say that once the immediacy of Being is revealed as transitory, a "mere seeming" continued reflection penetrates behind this appearance to permanent Essence. Being, says Hegel, looks in upon itself and sees itself as reflected Essence. In this way Being and thus Essence may be defined as self-relatedness. It is this self-relatedness which constitutes the form of Identity and this will become particularly important when, in a subsequent section, we consider self-consciousness, for Hegel tells us that not only is it "identity as self-consciousness" which "distinguishes man from nature, particularly from the brutes..." but also that "The true knowledge of God ... begins when we know him as identity - as absolute identity."

The categories of Reflection, as Hegel calls them, are pairs of correlatives intrinsic to Essence. These categories always represent an inner and an outer, such as Essence and Existence, Force and its expression, substance and accidents, cause and effect, Necessity and Freedom. Thus under the reflective gaze Being breaks down into its constituent categories. However, to leave Being in this state of distinct inner essence and outward appearance would be to reintroduce the Kantian thing-in-itself, to divorce the appearance of a thing from its hidden actuality. Thus, as we might expect, Hegel resolves these two moments in a synthetic third moment, this third moment he calls Actuality. "Actuality is the unity, become immediate, of essence with existence, or of inward with outward." Thus Actuality is essence existing as itself. It is identity-in-difference.

iii. Notion

The third and final subdivision of logic is the doctrine of the Notion. The Notion is, of course, the synthetic third moment of the dialectic involving Being and Essence. In the Notion the immediacy of Being and the mediacy of Essence pass into self-mediation. In the process of self-mediation a thing passes into another, its opposite, while always remaining itself. For this reason, says Hegel, the movement of the Notion is neither a transition into another nor is it a reflection on another. It is Development.
Transition into something else is the dialectical process within the range of Being: reflection (bringing something else into light), in the range of Essence. The movement of the Notion is development: by which that only is explicit which is already implicitly present... The truth of the hypothesis ... lies in its perceiving that in the process of development the notion keeps to itself and only gives rise to alteration of form, without making any addition in point of content.86

The doctrine of the Notion possesses its own triadic structure, or rather movement, comprising of the subjective or formal notion, the Objectivity or Notion invested with immediacy and the synthetic resolution of these two terms in the Idea of absolute truth.87

While pointing out that the concept of Notion occupies a far higher place in speculative logic than does its counterpart in traditional formal logic, which sees notion as merely an empty form of thought, Hegel nonetheless recognises a fundamental similarity between the two understandings of notion. The similarity lies in our experience of deducing a specific content from a notion and tracing particular contents back to their notion. This, says Hegel, is the very nature of notion, to contain within itself all its specific contents and developments like a seed which contains, ideally, the whole plant, like the mind, as described by Plato, which contains innate ideas and indeed as God who includes within himself as Spirit his other, the Son.88

The subjective term in the dialectical progress of the Notion towards absolute Idea initiates a movement from categories such as causality or measure, encountered previously, whose concern was primarily with the objective sphere, towards the abstract categories of thought. We are no longer uniquely concerned with immediate and independent Being but with, to quote the first subheading of the triad that constitutes the subjective Notion, "The Notion as Notion," that is, with thought as conscious of itself. J.N.Findlay puts it in this way:

...the notions we deal with will be subjectively as well as objectively oriented: they will be notions of notions, explicitly relating what they deal with to the central, co-ordinating life of thought. Hitherto, we may say, we have been employing notions, but not thinking of them as notions... We have also, in the past, been more concerned with particular thought-determinations than with the universal that ran through them all: we have
operated with thoughts rather than considered what it was to be a thought.\textsuperscript{90}

In other words, the Notion, insofar as it is pure self-consciousness, may be identified with the I. We see this mirrored in the very nature of philosophical science where the aim is to "arrive at the notion of its notion"\textsuperscript{91} and this by way of the free act of thought by which "it occupies a point of view, in which it is for its own self, and this gives itself an object of its own production".\textsuperscript{92} Indeed we see the Notion as the self-referential I prefigured in the doctrine of Being where Hegel speaks of Being-for-self. Being-for-self partakes of the category of ideality\textsuperscript{93} while the Notion is absolute idealism.\textsuperscript{94} Being-for-self resides in the I\textsuperscript{95} but is immediate, while the Notion being perfect freedom mediates self to self and thus is the I which contains all previous terms in itself.\textsuperscript{96}

To say that the Notion is abstract and universal is by no means to deny its concreteness. The very fact of it being the unity of Being and Essence makes it "concrete out and out".\textsuperscript{97} The Notion is indeed abstract, if by that we mean it is not open to the senses, but this abstraction does not, contrary to traditional belief, imply the Notion is merely empty rational form, for the dialectic has overcome the false dichotomy of form and content, such that Notion is "an infinite creature form, which includes ... the fullness of all content".\textsuperscript{98}

Thus the universality of the Notion is not to be confused with some common denominator such that it is identifiable as the aggregate of a number of elements having certain features in common. If this were the case the Notion would constitute something distinctly other than these several elements which share it as a universal. In theological terms it would be equivalent to considering the trinity as distinct from Father, Son and Spirit, a tertium quid.

In the light of these observations it seems clear that while for traditional formal logic the Notion represents the first term in a syllogistic triad, that is the empty universal, for example "All men are mortal", for speculative logic the Notion contains all three terms or moments. Thus Hegel finds within the subjective Notion not merely universality but also particularity or judgment and individuality or the syllogism.\textsuperscript{99} Thus Notion not only contains universal categories such as man and mortality, for example, but
also the possibility of a particular genus and a definite individual partaking of such categories, for example, Caius. The bringing together of the first two terms in the synthetic unity of individuality is the notional equivalent to the unity of existence or appearance and essence in actuality. Indeed Hegel tells us that, "Individual and actual are the same thing" but whereas actuality is still rooted in immediacy the notion is self-mediating, involved in self-development rather than, as Hegel puts it, merely potential effectiveness, such as cause seeking to effect something other. Having made the point that the universal, in Hegel's view, is not merely an empty category or common factor but is concrete in its universality we must be wary lest we interpret this as implying that every specific individual may be deduced from its Notion. We are not, in other words, able to extract the distinct person, Caius, or even his particular species, from the universal Notion of "man". Rather what Hegel appears to hold is that the universal is made specific in particular instances and it is this specification which validates the Notion as universal:

It is a mistake to imagine that the objects which form the content of our mental ideas come first and that our subjective agency then supervenes, and by the aforesaid operation of abstraction, and by colligating the points possessed in common by the objects, frames notions of them. Rather the notion is the genuine first; and things are what they are through the action of the notion, immanent in them, and revealing itself in them.

Although Hegel introduces subjectivity into his concept of the notion this does not mean that objectivity has been passed by. The second part of the dialectic of Notion involves the Notion in its own self-objectification. It is in what Hegel calls the Distinctive syllogism, which equates with individuality, the third moment of the Notion, that the Notion realizes itself in its objectivity. The subjective Notion, as we have already found, is not some empty mental category waiting to be filled by external objective phenomena, but rather breaks through into objectivity as the universal is mediated to the individual via the particularisation of a species of genus.

Hegel himself admits that this fundamental transition from subjectivity to objectivity, which after all must be the ultimate test of idealism, does "appear strange" at first glance. Unfortunately Hegel does not see this strangeness as imposing any
"obligation to seek to make the transition plausible to the image-loving conception". Instead he directs us back to the transition to actuality in the dialectic of Essence as the imperfect precursor to the Notion's transition to objectivity. However, the Notion does not achieve true objectivity, that is, Notion in-and-for-itself except via a dialectical movement. This movement begins with objects as undifferentiated isolates possessing no affinity with each other, in other words, Mechanism and moves on to the tendency of objects towards differentiation such that they are "what they are only by their relation to each other", what Hegel calls chemism, which has to do with the quality of an object.

The final resolution is found in Teleology which, put crudely, is an object's appetite for its end. The satisfaction of this appetite, the conformity of the object with its design, is mediated through the middle term of Means; that is, "objectivity made directly subservient to purpose". This is what Hegel means by the somewhat anthropomorphic phrase the cunning of reason. For the End to maintain its distinctiveness from the object, it utilizes the mechanical and chemical processes, allowing objects to relate to one another as they will, oblivious to the ultimate Ends to which they are related;

Reason is as cunning as it is powerful. Cunning may be said to lie in the intermediate action which, while it permits the objects to follow their own bent and act upon one another till they waste away, and does not itself directly interfere in the process, is nevertheless only working out its own aims.

In theological terms, says Hegel, this cunning of reason corresponds to Divine Providence, in that while God allows humanity to act in whatever way pleases them most, yet the ultimate result of human behaviour is the accomplishment of the divine will and purpose. Indeed, Hegel goes as far as to say that the resulting divine plan "differs decidedly" from the ends envisaged by those involved in its resolution.

However, this is yet an external and finite teleology in that each End itself becomes the means of a higher End, "The End achieved consequently is only an object, which again becomes a Means or material for other Ends, and so on for ever".

It is at this point that we see Hegel making his final move towards the breaking down of the subject/object distinction. The
independence of the object in the face of its End must be dissolved, "the show of that independence", says Hegel, must be got rid of.\footnote{115} The Notion as End, says Hegel, is in fact the very inner nature of the object, such that "objectivity is ... as it were, only a covering under which the notion lies concealed."\footnote{117} Truly infinite End involves the removal of the appearance of otherness, such that the Notion becomes its own End, in other words it becomes truth. It is this unity of form and content, subject and object in the self-actualizing process of the Notion towards its becoming its own result which is what Hegel calls the Idea.

The Idea is the final destination of the Hegelian destination, the Idea and the Absolute are one and the same:

The Idea is truth in itself and for itself - the absolute unity of the notion of objectivity. Its 'ideal' content is nothing but the notion in its detailed terms: its 'real' content is only the exhibition which the notion gives itself in the form of external existence ... The definition, which declares the Absolute to be the Idea, is itself absolute.\footnote{116}

The Idea is truth in so far as it is the correspondence of things with their notion; it is mind in that in its "developed and genuine actuality" it is subject, and it is Absolute in that it is totality of all things;

In the Idea we have nothing to do with external things ... everything actual, in so far as it is true, is the Idea, ... Every individual being is some one aspect of the Idea.\footnote{119}

The process of the Idea can be traced, not surprisingly, through three stages: immediacy, knowledge and finally the Absolute Idea.

The immediate idea, says Hegel, is Life, that is, the notion as soul realizing itself in the externality of the body. It is Life which resolves first the disjunction between soul and body and then between living being and inorganic nature. However in death objectivity reclaims the organic body. Only through the universality of kind is the objectification of death defeated.\footnote{120} It is in this knowing of itself as kind that the idea abandons its immediacy and moves onward to free self-subsistence. Similarly in cognition, which is the idea in the medium of universality, the idea as subject comes to the external immediacy of the world and brings about an identification of the two poles within itself. It is this process of cognition which permits the thinking self to have
confidence in its knowledge of reality in distinction from the
critical philosophy which deprives us of any such confidence:

Consequently it is the certitude of the virtual
identity between itself and the objective world.
Reason comes to the world with an absolute faith in
its ability to make the identity actual, and to
raise its certitude to truth...

Hegel continues with a discussion of the nature of the Analytical
and Synthetic methods\textsuperscript{122}, the latter being the reverse of the
former. In the synthetic nexus of unanalysed individuality Hegel
identifies Construction, which is the source of the middle terms
which produce the unity of the synthesis, and Demonstration, which
is the necessity of the synthetic nexus. It is this necessity which
goes beyond the simple giveness of externality in its identity as
self-relating notion. In other words, the synthetic content of
cognition is no longer contingent but finds itself to be necessary,
self-determining. Another name for self-determining cognition, says
Hegel, is Will.\textsuperscript{123}

While intelligence merely proposes to take the world
as it is, Will takes steps to make the world what it
ought to be. Will looks upon the immediate and
given present not as solid being, but as mere
semblance without reality.\textsuperscript{124}

It is here that we have the resolution of the theoretical and
practical idea in the harmonious process constituted by the identity
of the "is" with the "ought to be" towards the Good, that is the
ultimate End of the world.\textsuperscript{125}

It is this final synthesis of "is" and "ought" which completes the
movement towards the Absolute Idea. It is important at this final
point to be aware that the Absolute Idea is not merely this end
point as if we might kick away the rest of the logical ladder. The
Absolute Idea is the whole process leading up to and including the
final resolution of theoretical and practical, subject and object.

It is all three terms of Being, Essence and Notion;

To speak of the absolute idea may suggest the
conception that we are at length reaching the right
thing and the sum of the whole matter. It is
certainly possible to indulge in a vast amount of
senseless declamation about the idea. But its true
content is only the whole system of which we have
been hitherto studying the development.\textsuperscript{126}
In other words Hegel's concern is ultimately with the journey from points A to B rather than with the starting and finishing points in themselves.

Thus we see that the dialectical process is not simply a logical procedure aimed at giving us a better understanding of reality, it is expressive of the very essence of reality. Reality is the dialectical process and the process in totality is the Absolute Spirit. Because Absolute Spirit comes to consciousness via finite human spirit, the whole of human history is seen by Hegel as being, in fact, the development of the consciousness of Absolute Spirit.

The Philosophy of Nature.

While we have already examined the broad categories of the movement from the universal through the particular into individuality, as contained in Hegel's Logic, an examination of the way in which this movement is seen to manifest itself in the realm of nature is of considerable illustrative value.

The Philosophy of Nature constitutes the second part of Hegel's Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences and as such represents, in the overall scheme of the dialectic, the movement of the Idea into particularity - that is, into otherness.

Nature has presented itself as the Idea in the form of otherness. Since therefore the Idea is the negative of itself, or is external to itself, Nature is not merely external in relation to this Idea (and to its subjective existence Spirit); the truth is rather that externality constitutes the specific character in which Nature, as Nature, exists.\textsuperscript{127}

Hegel expresses this self-othering of the Idea in theological terms when he identifies the incarnate son of God (as opposed to the eternal Son) with Nature's otherness, "Nature is the son of God, but not as the Son, but as abiding in otherness - the divine Idea as held fast for a moment outside the divine love."\textsuperscript{128}

The divine Idea, claims Hegel, only truly comes to itself in full self-consciousness through the sublating of its otherness. Nature is merely the corpse of the understanding until it is understood as being the Idea in the process of becoming Spirit. The son of God in his return to the Godhead brings about the completion of the divine procession towards absolute spirit and Hegel maintains that "The Philosophy of Nature itself belongs to this path of return...".\textsuperscript{129}
It is this characteristic of the other as essentially a process of return and sublation that is of concern to us here. Hegel's Philosophy of Nature charts the course of this return; the coming to awareness, to individual consciousness, of the Idea as it emerges from static universality via external particularity into its true being-for-self as absolute Spirit. J.N. Findlay makes the important point that, "In Hegel's theory of Nature ... one sees the philosopher's principles at work, casting their slant upon our talk and thought about the world around us." Conversely, and if Findlay is right in this claim as we believe him to be, an examination of some of Hegel's "thoughts about the world around us" ought to highlight and illustrate "the philosopher's principles at work".

While in the grand scheme of the dialectic the philosophy of nature occupies the mediating role of particularity standing between unconscious universality and conscious individuality, within this movement of the self-othering of the Idea in Nature can be seen, at various levels, the process of dialectic in microcosm, so to speak. Thus, the philosophy of nature is divided up into the triad of Mechanics, Physics and Organics, each of which is trisected as much as a further five times in the case of the Organics.

It is unnecessary for our purposes to conduct a detailed examination of Hegel's philosophy of nature from beginning to end, as much of its substance involves a highly specific and somewhat eccentric exposition of the physical and biological sciences. What is of value to us here are the examples of the sublation of particularity which characterises the very essence of Nature, and which Hegel sees as manifesting itself at every level of the Natural order. We shall turn now to a consideration of some of the key instances of Nature's sublation of itself in the hope that this might further illustrate our perception of Hegel's negation of the other qua other in the totality of the self.

Hegel understands Nature as the Notion "positing... what it is in itself". In this way the Notion externalizes itself "...as an utterance or expression, a coming forth, a setting forth, a coming-out-of-itself, in so far as the subjectivity of the Notion is lost in the mutual outsideness of its determinations". We are already familiar with this movement from our treatment of the Logic. The Idea remains universal and unconscious until confronting its other,
its negative, in an act of self-reflection and self-othering. This universal and "rigid being-for-self" is understood by Hegel as being "shut up within oneself, an opaque neutral existence on one's own." This rigidity is characterized as inert (ruhend) and hard, having the principle of separate individuality at its heart. This, says Hegel, "is the mechanical phenomenon of pure rigidity" as opposed to the true being-for-self which involves the self's relating to another and subsequently sublating that relationship such that it can become a process of self-relating: "... real being-for-self is self-relating negativity, the process of fire which, in consuming an other, consumes itself". Continuing with this analogy Hegel regards the purely mechanical, rigid being-for-self as possessing only the potential for combustibility.

Only through this process of combustion and consumption does the Idea come to consciousness, to true being-for-self. This is made particularly clear in the second division of the philosophy of Nature, the Physics, where light, for example, is described as the "universal self of matter." Light is "pure existent force of space filling", it is "absolute velocity", "pure materiality", "being-within-self". Being free from all resistance and all determination by an other it lacks not just self-consciousness but also its true identity as light:

Because... it lacks the infinitude of the return into self, light is not self-consciousness; it is only the manifestation of itself, not for itself, but for another.

Light thus lacks the concrete unity with itself possessed by self-consciousness as an infinite point of being-for-self, and is consequently only a manifestation of Nature, not of spirit... Light as such is invisible; in pure light nothing is seen... It is first in the limit that the moment of negation - and therefore of determination - is found; and it is in the limit that reality first begins... It is only after light has distinguished itself as light, as against darkness, that it manifests itself as light.

There are two important points to notice here. Firstly, light as a pure universal, free from determination by an other, does not truly possess even its own identity as light. It is in the act of "making manifest" that light becomes truly existant. As an affirmation of the importance of the other this movement in Hegel's logic is of considerable significance for our own understanding of coadunacy. The movement from the universal to the particular is a movement from...
empty subjectivity to determination by another and "being-for-another". Hegel clearly understands the existence of light in this way, for "To say that we have to consider the existence of light, is to say that we have to consider the being-for-another of light". However, despite the undeniable significance of the other in Hegel's treatment of light, we find him concluding that light ultimately lacks self-consciousness. The reason for this is plain. Self-consciousness, for Hegel, is only achieved during the transition from the second to the third moment of the dialectic; that is, in the movement from particularity to individuality. This movement constitutes the return of the self from the particularity of the other and into the totality of the conscious self. Light, however, is only being-for-another; it is the Ego that is "pure self manifestation" - in other words, being-for-self.

The Ego as pure "reflection-into-self" is for Hegel a true expression of spirit. For Ego the externality of the particularised other is sublated such that the Ego becomes both subject and object, both self and its other. In so much as light is only for-another and not for-itself, as the totality of self and other, then it has not undergone the process of return to self from externality, which characterizes Essence, and thus it lacks self-consciousness.

This understanding of consciousness and true being-for-self as issuing out of the unity of the self and the other receives its most powerful expression in the Organics where Hegel clearly states:

Life is the union of opposites generally, not merely of the opposition of Notion and reality. Wherever inner and outer, cause and effect, end and means, subjective and objective, etc., are one and the same, there is life.

This is the ultimate entelechy of the dialectical process, the subsuming of self/other relationality into a single totality. It is reality's determination by the Notion which guarantees the necessity of this movement at every level, such that it manifests itself in astral bodies and biochemistry alike. No area of reality escapes this determination, the process of dialectic is absolutely irresistible.

It is in the third part of the Philosophy of Nature, the Organics, that we find some of the clearest explication of Hegel's understanding of the consummation of the other by the self, the Idea or in this case "life", in its return-into-self. Predictably the
process by which life comes to itself as "individual subjectivity a
vitality in is completeness" falls into three parts. Firstly we
have Geological Nature, which is the basis of life, rigid being-for-

self. "It is like a skeleton, which can be regarded as dead
because its members seem still to subsist formally on their
own...".

The second stage, that of self-othering, is always characterized by
Reflection, the particularizing of the subject as other. This is
a process of estrangement where the subject and its object are
distinct. Hegel regards Plant Nature as the organic expression of
this moment of the dialectic. "The plant...does not advance beyond a
formal distinguishing of itself from itself, and it can remain only
in formal communion with itself." In Plant life, argues Hegel, we
observe the unfolding of subjective singularity into "an objective
organism in the shape of a body articulated into parts which are
separate and distinct". It is this separateness and distinctness
which characterize plant life as "feeble and infantile", a life
which involves only the multiplication of individuality rather than
a true sublation of the other. The self-differentiation of a
plant is a differentiation into identical individual parts which,
rather than being taken up into true being for-self, are only
superficially unified in the complete plant as a "basis" (Boden)
rather than "a subjective unity". Simply encountering the other
is not enough to give rise to true life and thus we move on to the
third stage of the dialectic as manifested in the organic world,
Animal organism.

If the second, plant stage of the dialectic is categorised by Hegel
as "the Water-Kingdom, the kingdom of neutrality" then it ought
to come as no surprise to find that the third kingdom, that of
animal organism, is referred to as the "Fire kingdom". The
subjective animal organism is the expression of the Notion as all
consuming, as that which takes up all particularities into the
totality of the Idea, of life as self-mediating. It is important to
note here that life as true veritable subjectivity is not simply
the end result of this dialectical process - it is this process in
its perpetual and dynamic totality. Life therefore is the very
process of self-othering and the consumption of that other into
unifying subjectivity:

Fire releases itself (entläßt sich) into members,
there is a perpetual passage into product; and this
is perpetually brought back to the unity of
subjectivity, for the self-subsistence [of the members] is immediately consumed.\textsuperscript{160}

Animality, maintains Hegel, “exhibits the developed determinations of the Notion as existent within it”\textsuperscript{151}, in the form of the inevitable three moments of universality, particularity and individuality. In this instance these moments express themselves as sensibility, which is universal being-within-self; Irritability, which is the capacity for and reaction to stimulation by another, and Reproduction which is the return to self from out of external relationality, the positing of self as singular.\textsuperscript{152}

Hegel regards the above-mentioned moments of the dialectic as corresponding to three basic animal systems, the nervous system, the circulatory system and - significantly, for our purposes - the digestive system. While we shall not dwell on the first two of these systems, corresponding as they do to the now familiar moments of universality and particularity, the third system does warrant our further consideration in the light of what it tells us about the assimilation of the other by the self in Hegel’s thinking.

Of the nervous and circulatory system, Hegel has this to say: “The blood is the endless, unbroken unrest of welling forth, whereas the nerve is at rest and remains where it is.”\textsuperscript{13} While sensibility, the first moment, is in its abstraction “the inert, dead side of the organism”, manifesting itself in bone production\textsuperscript{154}, the second moment expresses itself in the pulsation of the blood as it particularizes itself in its relationship with externality - the transformation of food into blood - and its internal relating “as the source from which everything takes its nutriment.”\textsuperscript{155}

The system of digestion stands as a graphic manifestation of the overcoming of the external other and its assimilation into the self. Hegel is quite unambiguous concerning the nature of this process of consumption which transforms the other into the self of the consuming individual.

...non-organic nature is seized and ingested as an individual thing. The individual organism seizes it, crunches and destroys it as a purely external structure and transforms it into itself, ... (1) It infects it with organic lymph, the saliva; (2) It works on it with the neutrality of the alkaline and acid principles, with the animal gastric and pancreatic juices; (3) Lastly, it attacks it with the bile, the onslaught of the fiery element on the ingested food.\textsuperscript{156}
The language used here is particularly significant as it typifies the relationship between the individual organism and its external other as one of coercive power, where the self seeks to overcome the other by seizing it, destroying it, transforming it, infecting it, attacking it and subjecting it to onslaught and ingestion. These are violent words, ones that contain more than an echo of the master and slave duality contained in the *Philosophy of Mind*.157

It is this violence towards the other and its ultimate sublation and transformation into the self which characterizes the movement from the second to the third moment of the dialectic, and which we find wholly unsatisfactory as a way of describing human relationality. Any notion of self-other relationality which necessarily involves violence being done to either the one or the other must be considered unacceptable to the Christian tradition. The other must be engaged with as other, and the resulting relationality must not involve either the reduction or subsumption of that other into the self such that the other loses its particularity and uniqueness. Indeed, we have suggested in our notion of coadunacy, which we will develop more fully in our concluding chapter, that if either of the relating parties is to be placed in peril through the act of relating then the Christian tradition would always have it be the immediate self. It is the language of sacrificial self-giving and abandonment that characterizes true Christ-like relationality and not the violent exercise of sublating power exercised by the self over the other, as Hegel would have us believe.

The chief moment in digestion is the immediate action of life as the power over its non-organic object which it presupposes as its stimulus only in so far as it is in itself identical with it, but is, at the same time, its ideality and being-for-self. This action is infection and immediate transformation.158

The animal organism, argues Hegel, is to be regarded as substance while non-organic externality is merely accident. Particularity, he continues, is simply a form which must be surrendered.159

Before we conclude our examination of Hegel's *Philosophy of Nature* there are two points that need to be made. Firstly, all that we have found in Hegel's explication of the processes of nature must be seen as holding true for the whole of reality. The determination of reality by the Notion is all-pervading, and the logic of the dialectical process follows the same necessary path whether we are
considering astronomy, chemistry, biology or psychology. Thus the violent sublation of the other by the self, as found in the Philosophy of Nature, is to be regarded as essential to the totalising process of Hegel's dialectic at every level of reality. "Not until one does violence to Proteus", to particularity, do we attain to the totality of truth beyond the "sensuous appearance of Nature"."

Secondly, and more specific to our treatment of the Philosophy of Nature, Hegel makes it quite clear that - our first point notwithstanding - the non-organic nature which he sees as being constantly overcome and subsumed by animal nature, is in fact to be understood as the totality of externality, organic and inorganic alike:

The animals and plants which the animal consumes, are, it is true, themselves organic structures, but for this animal they are relatively its non-organic nature. What is particular and external has no enduring existence of its own, but is a nullity as soon as it comes into contact with a living being..."

It would seem from this that whatever I, as an individual organic being, encounter - that which is external to myself - must become for me non-organic and transient. Non-organic being is "only a sublated moment in the organic self" and as such is to be identified with that self, never as a distinct other.

Hegel's closing remarks in the Philosophy of Nature sum up quite succinctly just exactly what it is that he hopes to achieve via his examination of the process of dialectic as it manifests itself in the natural world.

The aim of these lectures has been to give a picture of Nature in order to subdue this Proteus: to find in this externality only the mirror of ourselves, to see in Nature a free reflex of spirit: to know God, not in the contemplation of him as spirit, but in this his immediate existence."'

Having considered the structure of Hegel's thought via an examination of his Logic and having further illustrated it via reference to the Philosophy of Nature we shall now turn to consider the essential antipathy which exists between this form of idealism and the notion of coadunacy as outlined in Chapter 2.
Hegel and Coadunacy.

By way of general introductory comment, prior to taking up a position critical of Hegel, it is important for us to be aware of the valuable elements within Hegel's thought. Indeed, there are a number of points of coincidence between Hegelian Idealism and our notion of coadunacy. Firstly, Hegel's overriding concern to dissolve the dualisms established in critical thought in a form of a necessary relationality pertaining between the self and the other, the internal and external, subject and object, is wholly in keeping with our concerns with coadunacy. Further more Hegel recognises the notion of God as trinity as being the fundamental ideal, expressed in religious form as the unity of the self and the Other. He seems to express the nature of the divine coadunacy, God, as his own corporate context quite clearly when he writes concerning the dialectical movement of the notion,

...as it is expressed in the teaching of Christianity: not merely has God created a world which confronts him as an other; he has also from all eternity begotten a Son in whom he as Spirit, is at home with himself. 164

Likewise, just as God is at home with himself, we are truly at home with our world, for in breaking down the subject-object dualism Hegel, as Fichte attempted before him, unifies the disjunction between appearances and things-in-themselves, making this world truly our world and rendering the question of an underlying and inaccessible reality redundant. The world is uniquely personal and is there only for the subject. In the Philosophy of Mind Hegel makes this point quite plain when he maintains that

Subjective certainty must not find itself limited by the object but must acquire true objectivity; and conversely, the object, on its side, must become mine not merely in an abstract manner but with regard to every aspect of its concrete nature. 165

In a similar way the self without the "other" is merely an abstract "I", an empty universal. It is only through the other that we truly encounter ourselves as free, self-conscious and self-determining and it is only as self-determining that we can be said to possess and exercise will which, as we have seen, is a manifestation of the Absolute Idea. 166

Yet despite these strong similarities between the Hegelian concern with the dissolution of the abstract immediacy of isolates within
the synthetic process and that of coadunacy, there also exists a far more fundamental dissimilarity.

That Hegel attempts to make mind and thought account for far too much in its subsumption of all externality is a commonplace observation. Indeed a thorough-going idealism might be said to be necessarily disposed to such an attempt. However, it is not simply idealism as such which places Hegel in opposition to the tenets of coadunacy, but rather the inexorable inevitability of the dialectic, in particular the transition from the second to the third moments. It is the inevitable subsumption of the other in the subject's return to itself, as graphically illustrated in the Philosophy of Nature, which is the basis of the third moment of synthesis, and which constitutes a form of totalism inimicable to coadunacy.

While considering the Idealism of Fichte we focused our attention upon three basic questions concerning his system's opposition to coadunacy. First we asked whether it was true to say that Fichtean Idealism ultimately collapses into solipsism; next, whether it allowed for a created context in which human beings might be placed and towards which they are responsible; finally whether it adequately allows for the reality of distinct selves in relation. While we shall adopt this same line of questioning with Hegel, it should be clear by now that the all-pervasive structure of Hegel's logic will often force us to repeat our critique, particularly as regards the second and third question, inasmuch as the deficiencies being highlighted are founded upon the same dialectical moment.

**Hegelian Subjectivism**

We shall not expend much of our time on this particular question. As we noted with Fichte, it would suit our thesis very well if we could identify Hegelian subjectivism ultimately as solipsistic. However such an accusation simply cannot be sustained. The second moment of the dialectic allows a movement towards the other. Being takes on its true nature as Becoming only in relation to its other which is Nothingness. Similarly, Appearance comes to itself as Actuality only through the otherness of Essence. For Hegel it is mediation which brings about the true reality of a thing. In the sphere of self-consciousness Hegel maintains that the simple immediacy of the "I",

must be grasped as the individually determined Universal which, in its determinateness, in its difference, relates itself to itself alone. This
already implies that the 'I' is immediately negative self relation, consequently the unmediated opposite of its universality which is abstracted from every determinateness, an individuality which is, therefore, equally abstract and simple.\textsuperscript{67}

The "I", says Hegel, can be identified with pure Being which, as we have seen, is the beginning of the dialectical process and as such is "the poorest and most abstract".\textsuperscript{68} In itself the I is "Absolute Indifference", being defined as a blank, and featureless I+I.\textsuperscript{169}

This, if it were all that could be said of consciousness, would indeed constitute solipsism, but the dialectic is a process away from the isolated and immediate. True determination requires both one and another, claims Hegel. In our natural exclusive state we are merely isolated creatures of appetite motivated by need and driven by necessity. However in being-for-another the one and the other recognize each other as free through a mutual struggle which, at its extreme, places the life of the individual at risk.\textsuperscript{170}

I am only truly free when the other is also free and is recognized by me as free. This freedom of one in the other unites men in an inward manner... Therefore, men must will to find themselves again in one another. But this cannot happen so long as they are imprisoned in their immediacy.\textsuperscript{171}

Hegel is not here making sociological observations. Indeed he is not even outlining an ideal state, ideal in the sense of a counsel of perfection. This dialectical movement from individual immediacy to a mediacy involving the other is part of the very logic of reality. It is this movement of the dialectic, this \textit{Becoming} which takes the place of traditional static ontology for Hegel. Thus the movement to the other in the second moment of the dialectic is logically necessary, and thus ontologically necessary. It is not possible for man, for human consciousness, to by-pass this process, for in a very real sense man \textit{is} this process. In the light of the above, any interpretation of Hegelian thought which seeks to cast it in a solipsistic mode must be refuted.

As we have intimated above, Hegel's inclusion of the other into what we might call the self's ontology of Becoming, may be regarded as in keeping with our coadunate concerns. Similarly his unifying of the self and inorganic external otherness via the synthesis of inward essence with outward appearance, forming \textit{Actuality}, provides us with a reality from which we are no longer alienated. The world in which we live, in which we have experiences, is \textit{true} and \textit{actual} precisely
because we do live in it. This too is coincident with the notion of coadunacy which sees the created order as essential to the essence of human being.

However, the synthesis of phenomena with the thing-in-itself so as to produce a non-dualistic epistemology is one thing; to extend the application of the dialectic so that it becomes the inevitable process of reality towards its ultimate synthesis as totalizing mind is quite another. It is at this point of synthesis, where the "one", having come to itself via its opposition to the "other", returns to itself again, having subsumed the other within itself - such that the other is real only as the opposite pole of self relating - that we encounter Hegelian totalism and its antipathy towards a Christian notion of coadunacy.

As we have suggested in our first two chapters the notion of coadunacy - while involving the self with the other in an intimate and essential manner, perhaps analogous to that found in the trinitarian relations - maintains the integrity of the other as distinct from the self. In contradistinction to this view, the Hegelian dialectic is a movement towards a moment of synthesis which reduces the other to the self, such that the other is merely an illusory foil produced by the synthetic notion as Idea, as necessary to its self actualization. Hegel puts it like this:

In the course of its process the Idea creates that illusion (of the other), by setting an antithesis to confront it; and its action consists in getting rid of the illusion which it has created. Only out of this error does truth arise. In this fact lies the reconciliation with error and with finitude. Error or other-being, when superseded, is still a necessary dynamic element of truth: for truth can only be where it makes itself its own result.\textsuperscript{172}

When considering this final transition of the Notion to Idea J.N.Findlay, who is by no means unsympathetic towards Hegel, tells us that we are:

Facing the central message of Hegelianism: that 'otherness' in all its forms exists only to call forth the energies, and to intensify the self-awareness of Spirit. The Objective World, ... must be seen as no more than the row of ninepins that self-conscious Spirit must bowl over in order to be self-conscious Spirit.\textsuperscript{173}

We see this mediation of the other prefigured in Hegel's exposition of Essence for which he says "there is no real other"\textsuperscript{174}.
Hegel and the Natural Order.

For Hegel it is of the utmost philosophical centrality that thought and Being be seen as synonymous: “thought is the very thing itself”\(^{176}\). It is the totality of Mind and Spirit, which is all to Hegel. Thus insofar as Nature represents the contradiction to Absolute Spirit, it is the task of Spirit, as the totality of the dialectical movement, to achieve victory over this externality by assimilation, thus initiating a return to itself:

This triumph over externality which belongs to the Notion of mind, is what we have called the ideality of mind. Every activity of mind is nothing but a distinct mode of reducing what is external to the inwardness which mind itself is, and it is only by this reduction, by this idealization or assimilation, of what is external that it becomes and is mind.\(^{176}\)

It is only via this reduction to inwardness that the extended world of Nature becomes mind and thus true knowledge or idea. Nature, says Hegel, must sublate its otherness. As mere externality it is not Spirit and thus beyond understanding. It is “only the corpse of the Understanding ... a 'petrified' or 'frozen intelligence'”.\(^{177}\) Material reality, for Hegel, must undergo a transformation, it must become thought:

Thus intelligence is explicitly, and on its own part cognitive: virtually it is the universal - its product (the thought) is the thing: it is a plain identity of subjective and objective. It knows that what is thought, is, and that what is, only is in so far as it is a thought.\(^{178}\)

In the light of what has already been said concerning Hegel's view of Nature as a fundamental contradiction to spirit, there can be little doubt that for him, as we found for Fichte, the natural world has no independent and intrinsic value, it is merely a transient moment in the process of Spirit's coming to self-consciousness. Thus, such value as it does have lies in its opposition to Mind which posits it simply to reassimilate it in a return to itself as both universal and concrete. Thus, along with Fichte, we have found Hegel using the language of aggression and violence when speaking of Spirit's relationship to nature. Nature is to be striven against, assimilated, overcome and transformed by the triumphant Spirit.

...instead of leaving Nature as she is, and taking her as she is in truth, instead of simply perceiving her, we make her into something quite different. In
thinking things, we transform them into something universal. It is difficult to avoid the overwhelming impression that Nature, for Hegel, performs the same function as it does for Fichte, in that it is posited in order that Mind, or Spirit, may encounter it as other and thus further its own development. As F. G. Weiss puts it, 

For all its richness and splendor, Nature is, in Hegel's view, only abstract and inward (undeveloped), its materiality or externality being the very antithesis of the order and unity which mind introduces, the mere possibility of that unity. 

There is never any question about the ultimacy of Spirit. While Nature is "spirit estranged from itself... a Bacchic god unrestrained and unmindful of itself," the negative of the Idea... God's first born... Lucifer... "Spirit is by definition the very act of unity. In the triadic movement Spirit posits non-spirit or Nature to facilitate its own development. It is a necessary experience of self-abandonment for the Spirit, but it is by no means permanent and Spirit or Mind is always primary, always the agent. Spirit ultimately reasimilates Nature back into itself during the third moment of the dialectic. That third moment is taken up in the totality of Mind which is, at least in its finite form, human being for as we shall see, man qua man is always mind and, as Hegel points out, "Man in so far as he is Spirit is not the creature of nature." 

Thus humanity and Nature, indeed Absolute Spirit and nature, exist in an antithetical relationship with each other until the latter is transformed and absorbed back into the former. Nature is "divine" only when taken up into mind, into the absolute notion ...but as it is, the being of Nature does not accord with its Notion; rather is Nature the unresolved contradiction. Its character is positedness, the negative... Thus Nature has also been spoken of as the self-degradation of the idea... 

Thus, as we found in Fichte so we find in Hegel, Nature, the external world, is nothing more than a means to a metaphysical end, an obstacle course for the Spirit. Nature has no truth, no unity, no beauty, indeed no reality outside of Spirit. Humanity as Spirit is as remote from Nature as is Absolute Spirit.

It is difficult if not impossible to see any point of contact between Hegel's view of the natural order and the Christian view.
which regards humanity as part of a natural world created for their enjoyment, and for which they are ultimately responsible. For Hegel externality is not something to be involved in but something to be overcome and internalised. One cannot be said to be at home in the external order, according to Hegel's understanding, quite the reverse, the external order is only truly at home when internalised, when subsumed by the individual self. For this reason it will be important for us to consider the significance of place and situatedness in our understanding of coadunacy and this we plan to do in our concluding chapter.

Hegel's notion of Nature as ultimately alien and contradictory to humanity as Spirit can, surely, only encourage an attitude of radical exploitation of the created order, in accordance with the dialectical imperative which seeks to reduce it to the level of Mind. The natural realm exercises no claim upon us. In effect Hegel provides humanity with the same metaphysical license to manipulate and transform the natural order according to the dictates of the prevailing culture, free from the constraints of ecological responsibility and coadunate relationship with our place.

This assimilation of all things by Spirit into a total unity does not stop with Nature but continues into the personal dimension of other minds and it is to this issue that we now turn.

The Self and the Other

As we have noted Hegel's concern with the importance of the Other in drawing the one or the self away from its isolated immediacy protects his subjectivism from falling into solipsism. This at least preliminary concern with the Other is particularly in evidence during Hegel's account of the dependence of the self-conscious "I" upon self-conscious Other. In the opening remarks to the Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind Hegel makes it quite clear that the injunction to self-knowledge, "know thyself", is not a mandate for individual self-contemplation, by which he has in mind "the particular capacities, character, propensities and foibles of the single self".¹⁶⁶

Hegel continues by pointing out that the "I", rather than referring to a particular individual, is in fact a universal category insofar as everyone is an "I".¹⁶⁷

'I', therefore, is mere being-for-self, in which everything peculiar or marked is renounced and buried out of sight; it is as it were the ultimate
and unanalysable point of consciousness ... 'I' is the vacuum or receptacle for anything and everything ...

In the Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind we find two important statements which, when taken together, encapsulate the essence of Hegelian Idealism and constitute its fundamental antipathy to our notion of coadunacy. Hegel is quite clear that (a) man's genuine reality is as mind and (b) that "An out-and-out Other simply does not exist for mind". There is no Other for Mind precisely because it is universal. The "I", says Hegel, "is something perfectly simple, universal". Furthermore, and as we have already noted in the movement of Hegelian Logic, true ideality of mind is the overcoming of externality in the Notion. Thus Hegel can make the claim that,

Every activity of mind is nothing but a distinct mode of reducing what is external to the inwardness which mind itself is, and it is only by this reduction, by this idealization or assimilation, of what is external that it becomes and is mind.

As man's true reality is as Mind then it follows that it is in man's very nature to assimilate and overcome the other. So once again we encounter the logical inevitability of the dialectic in its unstoppable progression towards the totality of mind. In this particular instance Hegel seeks to illustrate his point via his famous discussion of the relationship between master and slave, which he sees as being expressive of the confrontation between individual self-consciousnesses.

In the Logic the Master/slave confrontations appears briefly within the Third Subdivision of Logic, under the section dealing with the universality of the Notion. Here, Hegel points out that for the slave the "I" is his master and not himself. He continues by relating this subsumption of slave into master to Rousseau's Social Contract where individuals are absorbed into the universal will which Hegel identifies as the notion of the will.

In the Philosophy of Mind we find the master/slave distinction within Hegel's discussion of self-consciousness as Recognitive. Recognitive self-consciousness is where my immediate or instinctive self-consciousness, which lacks reality due to its lack of distinction, comes into opposition with another independent ego. Once again Hegel utilizes the language of antagonism when giving an account of this process of recognition. "The process" he says "is a
It is "a life and death struggle" which results in one of the combatants merely retaining his individual self-consciousness while the other gains recognition from the former. It is here, says Hegel, that we encounter the master and slave status. The conflict must not be seen simply as an observation on how men have conducted themselves thus far. Such knowledge, if it can be called that, is merely knowledge of men which information is meaningless.\textsuperscript{196}

Hegel, when speaking of the fight for recognition, is referring to "a necessary moment in the development of human spirit".\textsuperscript{197} This expression of the logical necessity of subjugation receives further amplification when Hegel points out that although in the first instance the slave surrenders himself to his master, who has thus achieved realized identity through recognition, the slave ultimately outstrips his master who is enslaved to a selfish individuality. The slave thus progresses beyond immediate desire through his subjugation to the desire of another. This subjugation, says Hegel, "forms the beginning of true human freedom".\textsuperscript{198} For this reason Hegel can make the following assertion:

This quaking of the single, isolated will, the feeling of the worthlessness of egoism, the habit of obedience, is a necessary moment in the education of all men. Without having experienced the discipline which breaks self-will, no one becomes free, rational and capable of command. To become free, to acquire the capacity for self-control, all nations must therefore undergo the severe discipline of subjugation to a master.\textsuperscript{199}

Thus for Hegel world history is the development of the Spirit as it subjugates the natural will to universal law which alone is true freedom. As Bertrand Russell observes, Hegel's understanding of freedom is, to say the least, odd.\textsuperscript{200} Freedom, for Hegel, means freedom to obey the law and be conformed to it. As we have noted it is Rousseau's universal will that Hegel sees as expressing the freedom of law which gives rise to the State.\textsuperscript{201}

Freedom, which is the substance of mind and thus the very reality of man, is a process of self-relating whereby mind abstracts itself from all externality to be at home with itself.\textsuperscript{202} Freedom is "the absence of dependence on an Other"\textsuperscript{203} but it is also more than this;

...It attains actuality not by fleeing from the Other but by overcoming it. Mind can step out of its abstract, self-existent universality ... can posit within itself a determinate, actual difference, something other than the simple 'I', ...
and this relation to the Other is, for mind, not merely possible but necessary, because it is through the Other and by the triumph over it, that mind comes to authenticate itself and to be in fact what it ought to be according to its Notion, namely, the ideality of the external, the idea which returns to itself out of its otherness.²⁰⁴

This quotation sums up quite clearly the dialectical process resulting in the mind's return to itself in true authenticity. Here we see the nature of man as absolute mind which posits the other "within itself" and returns the other to itself. Just as we saw with regard to the natural order, the other self-consciousness is no more than an obstacle for Mind to overcome to facilitate its development so that it might relate to itself as other. Individual distinctiveness is swallowed up in the single universal self which is the self-conscious expression of the Notion as inclusive of its own telos.

The doctrine of the universal self, man as absolute undifferentiated mind, is, it must be said, fundamentally at odds with human experience. We relate to each other as distinct selves, individual centers of consciousness, albeit sharing a common humanity. We are certainly not aware of ourselves as regaining an awareness of being part of one absolute self during the course of our relating to other persons, in the manner of remembering some innate tacit knowledge.²⁰⁵ This having been said it is certainly possible to envisage an attempt to construct a society or ideology in accord with Hegelian principles. Such as society could not fail to give rise to a mode of human existence radically opposed to the principles of coadunacy.

Hegel's dismissal of the particularities of human life as "foibles of the single self" appears to be a rejection of the very basis of personal existence. Surely it is these very particularities which make up our lives as distinct, identifiable persons? Indeed Frances Berenson makes the not unreasonable suggestion that "In Hegel's philosophy man, or more precisely, 'person', disappears altogether".²⁰⁶

For Hegel the Other is equivalent to the category of Means as found in the discussion of Notion as End. As we noted, the Notion as End is "free existence"²⁰⁷. Ultimately Means is found to be intrinsic to the End and its apparent independence a mere illusion. As we have seen, to say humanity is Mind is to say humanity is free, and
freedom is for Hegel the logically necessary overcoming of the Other by the absolutely self-determined via a process of mediation.\textsuperscript{208} In that respect the Other is always negative.

Freedom as overcoming the Other is quite clearly antithetical to the Christian tradition and is certainly at odds with the notion of coadunacy. Indeed, the freedom of Christianity must always be the freedom of the cross, that is, a sacrificial freedom which does not seek to triumph over the other but which is prepared to give itself, to empty itself, as Christ did, in the service of the Other. In defining freedom as freedom to conform to an absolute law, Hegel makes an important point. However while for Hegel the law is the totalizing process of absolute reason, within the Christian tradition it is the law of God which is one of self-abandonment rather than absolute self-determination.

Thus where coadunacy seeks to express the truth of self/other relations in terms of a sacrificial mutual self-abandonment which not only gives rise to coinherence, but also maintains and affirms distinctive otherness, Hegel speaks of an aggressive act of self which ultimately establishes the totality of the self and the other as Spirit or Mind.

The Hegelian system is also at odds with Christianity and its reality as coadunate on the subject of God's triune identity. The Hegelian Trinity, while expressing quite helpfully at times the nature of the divine self-reference, has the unfortunate effect of divinizing human being. Hegel speaks of God as creating a world "which confronts him as an other" and which is finally overcome by him and taken up into the totality of the divine Spirit.\textsuperscript{209} This not only involves the divinization of the natural order and finite consciousness, but also dispenses with the distinct persons constituting the Trinity. This particular Hegelian doctrine undercuts the very basis of coadunacy which, as we have argued, is derived from the image of God as persons in community.

It should come as little surprise to us to find Hegel accused of giving rise - or at least contributing - to some of the worse excesses of totalitarianism within human history. Although we might wish to take a cooler line than some of his more vitriolic critics\textsuperscript{210} it is hard to see how a system which teaches the logical necessity of the domination of the one over the many could avoid such criticism. Indeed, it is not easy to see how, in the
practicalities of finite existence, Hegelian totalism prevents itself from collapsing into a radical particularism, manifesting itself either in some despot or tyrant, or in an élite group of some description. Such a despotism would find itself in possession of a metaphysical mandate, such as we noted in Fichte, for all its operations as an expression of the development of the absolute. Indeed Hegel, as we know, does invest the state with considerable authority, encouraging conflicts between states as a means of stimulating the development of the Freedom of Spirit as developing throughout history. Bertrand Russell makes this same point when he writes of Hegel:

In external relations... the State is an individual, each State is independent as against others... He goes on to argue against any sort of League of Nations by which the independence of separate States might be limited... Conflicts of States can only be decided by war... Their rights have their reality in their particular wills and the interest of each State is its highest law.211

Such a view, argues Russell, quite apart from justifying "every internal tyranny and every external aggression that can possibly be imagined", is simply inconsistent with Hegel's overall concern with the absolute totality of Spirit which surely ought to have encouraged a single world State rather than "an anarchic collection of States".212

By his definition of it as the "consummation of and realization of the Notion of objective mind,...in which mind develops its freedom into a world posited by mind itself,"213 Hegel does indeed appear to glorify the state. Not for him is the Lockeian state founded upon expedience. The state is not simply a mechanism for the protection of individual properties but rather a transcendent entity which demands and has the right to the life of any citizen. In this sense the state is seen as practically divine. Concomitantly Hegel regards war as a worthwhile necessity insofar as it strengthens the state, preventing stagnation and the development of private interest.214 Coupled with this view of the state comes Hegel's notion of history as the process by which the Spirit comes to its own self-consciousness. In this we might plot the "path" of the Spirit as it proceeds throughout history leaving in its wake the great civilizations of the world.

The progression of the Spirit takes the form of a linear development from east to west beginning with the civilisation of China and
India, moving steadily on through Greece and Rome and finally to the Germanic races. Never again will the Spirit retrace its steps claims Hegel, and thus the oriental peoples will never progress any further than the level of infancy at which they were left when the Spirit moved on. Each newly visited civilization was greater and more advanced than the one preceding it, for these historical phenomena were the manifestation of the Spirit growing in self-awareness and freedom. It will come as little surprise to find that for Hegel, as we saw in Fichte, the ultimate telos of the Spirit, the point at which it manifests itself as truly free is within the Germanic civilization. Germany, says Hegel, is the final expression of the Spirit and as such has a divine duty to advance this transcendent culture by whatever means seems appropriate. For this reason R. H. Murray lays this accusation at Hegel's door:

'Die Welt-Geschichte ist das Welt-Gericht', was the view of Schiller. The history of the world is the judgement of the world. Hegel adapted it to mean that the history of the world is the supreme court at whose bar each nation stands incessantly to plead for life or death. He himself stands at the bar of this court, and his supreme condemnation is that it is he, more than Kant or even Fichte, who bestowed upon the German that sense of a divine mission of the State which the modern world witnesses with dismay.

As we have hopefully made clear, it is ultimately in the doctrine of the Notion that we find the basic antipathy towards true coadunacy. It is in the Notion that the one and the many, the Self and the Other are resolved into the one absolute Idea and are thence found to have always been one and the same. The Hegelian Mind, or Spirit, or Idea at its very core is other to itself, a self-referential one. It is this very absolutism of the other in the self that Levinas critiques so thoroughly in his work Totality and Infinity and it is this fundamental act of violence to the integrity of the other that places Hegelian thought in opposition both to coadunacy and to the Christian gospel.

In the following chapter we shall consider the way in which two major twentieth century theological figures have attempted to address the issue of self/other relationality, these thinkers being Karl Barth and Wolfhart Pannenberg.
NOTES

1. J. E. Grumley, History and Totality, p. 12
3. Cf. Chapter Two of this present work.
4. The Science of Knowledge (S. K.) p. 54 (1, 482)
5. S. K. p. 10 (1, 428 cf. 1, 429; 1, 431)
6. S. K. p. 6 (1, 422)
8. S. K. p. 162
9. S. K. p. 10
10. S. K. p. 6 (1, 422)
11. In the preface to the English translation of Fichte's Popular Works there is an interesting and relevant account of his lecturing technique as recorded in the autobiography of Henry Steffens:

"Gentlemen," said he, "collect yourselves - go into yourselves - for we have here nothing to do with things without, but simply with the inner self." Thus summoned, the auditors appeared really to go into themselves..."Gentlemen," continued Fichte, "think the wall," - (Denken Sie die Wand)..."Have you thought the wall?" asked Fichte. "Well then gentlemen, think him who thought the wall."

12. S. K. p. 38
13. ibid.
15. ibid.
17. ibid. p. 71.
18. S. K. p. 35
21. ibid.
28. ibid.
31. cited Copleston, op. cit. p. 66.
33. S. K. p. 38.
34. Cf. p. 92 below, note 54.
35. Murray, Individual and State, p. 143
36. ibid, p. 144.
37. Logic (L) 76ff.
38. L. 9, 13.
39. L. 25
40. L. 32
41. L. 65ff.
42. L. 6-7
43. L. 9
44. L. 36
45. cf. L. 116
46. L. 33ff cf. p. 16
47. L. 28
48. L. 34
49. L. 37
50. cf. L. p. 37
51. L. 37
52. ibid.
53. cf. L. p. 8
54. L. 15
55. cf. L. p. 35-6
56. ibid.
57. L. 38
58. ibid.
59. ibid.
60. L. 36
62. L. 123ff.
63. L. 135
64. L. 125
65. L. 127ff.
66. L. 132
68. cf. ibid
69. L. 134
70. ibid.
71. L. 134, 145
72. L. 134
73. L. 135
74. ibid.
75. L. 157
76. L. 161
77. L. 161
78. L. 162
79. L. 163
80. ibid.
81. L. 162
82. L. 168
83. L. 196
84. L. 179, 192, 213, 215, 219f.
85. L. 200
86. L. 224
87. L. 225
88. L. 223-225
89. L. 226 my emphasis
90. J.N. Findlay, *Hegel A Re-examination*, p. 221
91. L. 23
92. ibid
93. L. 140
94. L. 223
95. L. 141
96. cf. L. 228
97. L. 228
98. L. 223
100. L. 253ff.
101. L. 226
102. L. 226f.
103. L. 228
104. L. 255ff.
105. L. 256
106. ibid cf. p. 6
107. L. 261ff.
108. L. 261
110. L. 269
111. L. 270
112. L. 272
113. L. 273
114. L. 273
115. ibid
116. L. 274
117. ibid
118. L. 275
119. ibid
120. L. 281-2
121. L. 283
122. L. 285ff.
123. L. 289f.
124. L. 291
125. ibid
126. L. 293
127. PN p. 13-14ff
129. ibid.
130. Cf. Findlay p. 267
131. PN p. 24
132. PN p. 100
133. ibid.
134. PN p. 87
135. PN p. 88-89
136. PN p. 89
137. PN p. 89 cf. p. 95-98
138. PN p. 88
139. PN p. 274f.
140. PN p. 277
141. PN p. 276
144. PN p. 303
145. Cf. PN p. 304
146. PN p. 303 cf. p. 276.
147. PN p. 276
188. L. 38
189. PM. 1, cf. p. 11
190. PM. 11
191. cf. L. 223ff.
192. PM. 11
193. L. 227-8
194. PM. 170
195. PM. 171
196. PM. 1
197. PM. 173
198. PM. 175 cf. L. 39
199. PM. 175 my emph.
200. B. Russell History of Western Philosophy, p. 707
201. cf. L. 264-265
202. cf. PM. 11
203. PM. 15
204. PM. 15 my emphasis
205. cf. L. 102, 225
206. PM. 87
207. L. 267
208. cf. L. 55
209. cf. L. 225, PM. 299ff; D. Schlitt, Hegel's Trinitarian Claim.
211. B. Russell, op. cit. p. 712
212. ibid
213. L. 22
217. E. Levinas, Totality and Infinity.
Having examined the factors both contributory and detrimental to coadunacy as they are to be found within the philosophies of Kant, Fichte and Hegel, we shall proceed now, in this and the following chapter, to consider two more recent thinkers, Karl Barth and Wolfhart Pannenberg.

We have suggested, and will later develop the idea, that coadunacy ought to be regarded as normative for human being. This normativity having as its originating locus the divine ontology as essentially and irreducibly persons-in-relation. In other words God's being is, to make use of J.D. Zizioulas' terminology, "being as communion". It has been further suggested, albeit in a preliminary manner, that human being, by virtue of its being created in the image of the divine Being-as-communion, shares this same relational ontology. That is to say, by saying human being we intend persons-in-relation-in-environment.

Given the above it should be clear where, in any particular theologian's thought, we might expect to find either support for or opposition to this understanding of coadunacy.

As we attempted to outline in our first two chapters, coadunacy may be considered in the light of three fields of inquiry and these fields express themselves in a Christian mode when dealt with by theology. The first relates to the ontological foundation of coadunacy, its normativity in other words, and will be found to engage both with the doctrines of the triune God and the imago dei. The second has to do with the loss of coadunacy, the being of humanity as derived from the being of God as persons-in-relation is seen as broken in our undeniable experience of estrangement and alienation from each other. Alongside this last theme goes the Christian hope for an empowering to new relationality restored by virtue of the redemptive activity of Christ made actual for us by the Holy Spirit. Thus, in an examination of our chosen theologians, for the purpose of ascertaining in what sense they might be considered allies or antagonists with respect to the notion of coadunacy, we must focus upon these three fields albeit in their Christian theological mode.
We shall consider first what is said concerning the phenomenon of human relationality, then move on to consider Barth's and Pannenberg's understandings of the *imago dei* and assess whether or not they have a conception of the divine Trinity which is adequate to the task of providing a theological foundation for human coadunacy. Finally we shall consider whether they do adequate justice to the human experience of relational brokenness and in what manner the restoration of coadunacy is understood to take place.

**Being in Encounter**

In Volume 3/2 of his *Church Dogmatics* Karl Barth identifies what he refers to as "the basic form of humanity" as "being in encounter". By addressing the question of humanity's basic form he sees himself as engaging with the preliminary part of the larger question concerning the nature of human creatureliness.

In previous sections of volume 3/2 Barth explains the derivation of human being as being from God, and that "basically and comprehensively,... to be a man is to be with God." This is the highest and final statement that can be made concerning man and it is a truth which can be derived only via the revealed word of God, and by no other means. That is to say, it is a truth of theological anthropology, and as such is completely inaccessible to the human sciences. As the man Jesus is elected to be both man and God from all eternity, we are men only in so far as we are with Jesus, via his redemptive activity for us, and thus in covenant relationship with God.

There is a relational dynamic in evidence here at the very core of our humanness, such that we are only human in the light of our relationship with God, and we are in relationship with God via the one who is both for God and man, the man Jesus. Thus Barth may make the claim: "The ontological determination of humanity is grounded in the fact that the one man among all others is the man Jesus." We shall return to this issue of the derivation of humanity from God through Jesus Christ when we consider the question of the mediation of the *imago* of God to human being. In this section we mean to consider whether or not Barth possesses a notion of the ontological nature of human relationality akin to our notion of coadunacy as spelt out in Chapter 2. Having said that, it is nonetheless important to anticipate our later exposition of Barth's
understanding of the origin and foundation of human being in terms of being with God in Christ, as this is determinative for his discussion of human relationality.

In the section of the Church Dogmatics entitled 'The Basic Forms of Humanity' Barth expounds his notion of humanity as fundamentally being-in-encounter. In the previous section Barth had identified Jesus as Man for Other Men and had pointed out the ontological significance of Jesus being "for others":

He is originally and properly the Word of God to men, and therefore His orientation to others and reciprocal relationship with them are not accidental, external or subsequent, but primary, internal and necessary. It is on the basis of this eternal order that he shows Himself to be Neighbour and Saviour of men in time.

That there is a disparity between Jesus' humanity and our humanity is, says Barth, inevitable. "Christology is not anthropology", and thus to define the man Jesus as the man for others is not to define all men in exactly the same way. Only Jesus is the Son of God, the Word of God to men, only he is fundamentally for others. "For no other man can we say that from the very outset and in virtue of his existence he is for others". We are "victims of idealistic illusions" if we seek to attribute to humanity in general features which are exclusive to the humanity of Jesus.

All this being said, there has to be some similarity between the man Jesus and other men, otherwise why use the term man to describe them both? If the disparity between the man Jesus and men in general were absolute then in what sense can they both be referred to as man? Similarly, says Barth, it would be difficult to see how the man Jesus could be for other men as their Saviour, deliverer and representative if he were totally different from those he came to represent. Thus a question is prompted concerning the co-ordination between Jesus and other men, which takes the form of an inquiry into the basic form of humanity:

We have also to ask in respect of others how far as men they are beings which can be represented by the man Jesus in His suffering and conquering. We have to ask what it is that makes them possible for the covenant which is revealed and opprative for them, which God has concluded with them, in this being of Jesus. We have to ask what it is that makes them capable of entering into covenant with God as the creatures of God.
In other words, Barth is looking for a mode of relating which might establish some manner of "correspondence and similarity" between men and the man Jesus. He ultimately identifies this similarity, which is not only between us and Jesus but also, and by virtue of this former relationship, between us and God, as being with others. Man in abstraction from his fellows is thus ipso facto non-human, and this definition of humanity is derived from the "primary text" that is, the humanity of the man Jesus.

Barth's understanding of human being here is clearly ontological in nature, and in that respect closely resembles our notion of coadunacy as essential to the very being of humanity. Man in abstraction, says Barth, is simply not man, and he criticises Nietzsche's Zarathustra for idolising the man of "azure isolation".

If we see man in and for himself, and therefore without his fellows, we do not see him at all. If we see him in opposition or even neutrality towards his fellows, we do not see him at all. If we think that his humanity is only subsequently and secondarily determined, as an incidental enrichment, by the fact that he is not alone, we do not see him at all. If we do not realize and take into account from the very outset, from the first glance and word, the fact that he has a neighbour, we do not see him at all.

To be isolated from one's fellows, or to regard the other as of little significance, is to be alienated from Jesus and therefore to be without God and neighbour. Indeed this isolated non-human, says Barth, cannot have Jesus as Deliverer and Saviour. However, and it is here that we shall subsequently identify one of the key weaknesses in Barth's treatment of the phenomenon of human relationality, it is precisely this sinful man, the man who is without his fellows, of whom Jesus is the Deliverer and Saviour. Thus even sinful man does not lose the humanity attributed to him by grace, for to admit to this would be to attribute to sin the power of creation and "man does not accomplish a new creation by sinning". Man's very being is determined by his relationship to Jesus and Jesus is always the man for others, the Saviour of sinners. Thus although man might "shame" his human nature, and "bring himself into supreme peril" - it is difficult to see just exactly what such shame and peril might actually involve here - the fact that he is always with Jesus, that is to say always under the
Lordship of Christ and thus constantly in his presence, means that he never ceases to be man.

Even the sinful man who denies his humanity and in a blatant or more refined way turns his back on his fellows stands in the light of the humanity of Jesus.\textsuperscript{21}

We shall consider the implications of this characteristically Barthian claim in our subsequent critique. Suffice it for now to note that for Barth the very essence and being of man, that is God's gift of humanity, is being in relationship and he will permit no definition of humanity that does not entail the other, the thou. "We have to rule out the possibility of a humanity without the fellow man".\textsuperscript{22} In this respect Barth provides much support for our notion of coadunacy which seeks to define human being as being in relation.

After a lengthy excursus in which he attacks the isolationism of Nietzsche\textsuperscript{23} Barth returns to his central theme of being in encounter by clarifying three central elements within his definition of humanity. Firstly, humanity is determinate. That is, man is "created by God and for God"; man is God's covenant-partner.\textsuperscript{24}

Secondly, humanity is properly "being of the one with the other", in similarity and distinction to Jesus, who is exhaustively being for others. Man, says Barth, is with others in a reciprocal relationship which is unlike Jesus' humanity, which is always and "irreversibly 'for'".\textsuperscript{25} Finally humanity is fundamentally a duality of the "one man with the other", such that even when one person encounters many others, true humanity resides in the basic form of humanity which is the one with the other one.\textsuperscript{25} This final point appears rather curious and we shall be considering in due course why Barth makes it, and its implications for human relationality.

Barth continues by making a preliminary examination of the statement "I am" in which he utilizes the work of Martin Buber to illustrate that even in this subjective confession we make a distinction between the "I", the "Thou" and the "it". Thus this declaration of "I", by which I posit myself, points us not towards "a pure absolute and self-sufficient I", which is an illusion, but towards the I in encounter with a distinct Thou.\textsuperscript{26} Thus to say "I" is never to refer to an empty subject but is first to acknowledge the distinction between the I and the Thou, and then to identify the Thou "as created by the same God", so as ultimately to confess the "basic
formula", as Barth calls it, "I am as Thou art". This formula, says Barth, affirms the dynamic encounter of the one and the other in historical distinction; it speaks of a necessary encounter proper to humanity, and of an ontologically significant encounter.

'I am as Thou art', we do not describe the relationship between two static complexes of being, but between two which are dynamic, which move out from themselves, which exist, and which meet or encounter each other in their existence.

The particularities of my existence, argues Barth, say nothing and are of no significance with respect to the basic question of my humanity. The criteria of humanity are visible only through the realisation of the encounter between the I and the Thou. Having said this Barth proceeds to expound what he sees as the four basic elements which characterise human being in encounter. These four factors are: i. seeing one another eye to eye; ii. speaking and hearing; iii. rendering mutual assistance; iv. Engaging in the above gladly.

i. Seeing "eye to eye"

Looking at one another eye to eye is for Barth the "root-formation of all humanity". This looking constitutes both our preliminary experience of distinction from and visibility to the other. By looking the other in the eye we automatically allow the other that same experience of us, we open ourselves to the other in this act of looking and being looked at, we maintain our particularity as a Thou in the vision of the Thou, but in the midst of this we recognise each other as similar:

I know thee as a man, as something like myself, and I make it possible for thee to know me in the same way. We give each other something in our duality, and this is that I and Thou are men. We give each other an insight into our being.

This looking at each other "eye to eye" bears a similarity to Emmanuel Levinas' notion of apprehending the "face" (visage) of the other, although for Levinas the emphasis is upon distinction rather than reciprocation: "Thought alert to the face of the other is the thought of an irreducible difference."

This notion of embodied availability, where a person is present to another and is thus, in a sense, available to that other is a vital one and will be taken up in a less formal manner in our concluding chapter. The actual looking into a person's eyes might be
regarded as a true signal of availability in that one is, as Barth so rightly explains, presenting oneself to the other. By entering the visual field of the other we are presenting ourselves to the consciousness of the other. We are engaging in openness and "not refusing to know others or being afraid to be known by them...".\textsuperscript{35} Once again Barth affirms the nature of this encounter as fundamentally a duality, claiming that "Where a man thinks he sees and knows a group, or a group a man, or one group another group, ambiguity always arises".\textsuperscript{36} He goes on to argue that often our encounter with groups are merely matters of social science and systematisation which are thus encounters with "blind existence".

Barth refers to such encounters where openness in duality is replaced by the simplicity of a general encounter with a group as bureaucracy. "Bureaucracy is the encounter of the blind with those whom they treat as blind".\textsuperscript{37} Such a mode of encounter, where people are categorised and grouped according to arbitrary classifications, renders human beings invisible to each other. The bureaucrat, says Barth, is thus "always inhuman". What Barth has to say here concerning bureaucracy mirrors Levinas' criticism of \textit{totalism}\textsuperscript{38} and Brunner's criticism of \textit{collectivism}\textsuperscript{39} in that he refuses to understand human relationality in terms of the subsuming of particularity into an undifferentiated whole. Our encounter with the other is from the very outset an encounter "as two histories".\textsuperscript{40} The I and the Thou are never synonymous.

However, despite our agreement with Barth at this point, it seems unnecessary as a device to avoid the dangers of totalism to suggest that humanity as being in encounter "can only take place in duality".\textsuperscript{41} We shall return to this point later. At present we may note that in Barth's first moment of human encounter we find a good deal of apparent support for an understanding of human beings as fundamentally available to each other by virtue of their physical accessibility.\textsuperscript{42} We hope to develop Barth's understanding of direct eye contact with the other into the broader notion of \textit{signals of availability}. Whether or not the simple fact of eye contact can be made to bear the weight of an activity which opens the self to the other and vica versa, to the degree that Barth seems to suggest, is open to question. However, Barth continues to develop his notion of being in encounter when he moves on to the next moment, which
constitutes an amplification and deepening of the eye to eye encounter.

ii. Mutual speaking and hearing.

In this section Barth seems to acknowledge that despite all the grandiose claims previously made for visual encounter with the other, there is far more to human being in encounter than simply seeing each other. Despite the importance and necessity of that openness which comes with mutual seeing there are, says Barth, no guarantees that in this openness I truly reach Thou, and vice versa.

By mere seeing we either do not know one another at all or only imperfectly, for on the plane of mere seeing the one has no opportunity of putting himself before the other, i.e., of interpreting himself, of declaring who and what he is, what his person and being are according to his own understanding of himself.43

Mere "seeing" has the tendency to locate the power and initiative to relationality squarely with the apprehending "I". The "I" can do nothing but rely upon his/her own resources, forming a picture of the other, the Thou, in his/her own image. Concomitantly the other is saddled with the burden of existing "for the one who sees him in the picture which he has formed of him. He is no more than what he seems to be in his eyes and according to his standards."44 This is an important observation by Barth and one that is of considerable significance in our culture where images and image-making are big business, and where what is seen of the other is seldom an authentic expression of that other, but rather a construct designed to shield the true self.45 The old adage "never judge a book by its cover" is as pertinent today as it ever was, and Barth, for all his claims concerning the significance of seeing the other, is well aware of this fact.

What is required, says Barth, to prevent our falling foul of images and totalistic interpretations of the Thou according to the lights of the I is "interpretation". To this end "humanity as encounter" says Barth "must become the event of speech", this speech event taking the form of reciprocal expression and reception and reciprocal address and reception.46 Expression is a speech-act in which I interpret myself for and to the other, augmenting and correcting the other's interpretation of me, based on the fact of my visibility. Such self-expression is by no means motivated by any fear on my part that I might be misunderstood by the other, rather
it issues out of a desire and indeed a duty to be of assistance to
the other in his apprehension of me. We fall short of genuine
self-expression when we present ourselves to the other out of our
own need for vindication or when we articulate a false image of
ourselves to the other:

Only when I speak with him with this purpose in view
- not for my own sake but for his - do I express
myself honestly and genuinely to him. Words are not
genuine self-expression when in some respect I keep
myself back... when I represent myself in another
guise than that in which I know myself...

Just as we can present a false visual image of ourselves to the
other, so too can we support that image with false self-expression.
Barth is well aware of the possible misuse of words, although to the
accusation that words are empty and false he replies "It is not the
words that are really empty. It is men themselves when they speak
and hear empty words". We have a fundamental responsibility to
de-mystify ourselves for the other so that in his "unavoidable task
of making something of me" he is not left merely to his own
devices. Similarly the other is also engaged in expressing himself
to me so that neither one of us is left with the potential ambiguity
of a visual representation. In response to the self-declaration of
the Thou I must listen and hear the word that is spoken to me and
for my sake. In this act of hearing I declare the incomplete nature
of my view of the Thou and stand before the Thou in need. To deny
this fundamental need is not to hear what the other has to say
concerning herself to me and to my assistance.

If I do not accept the fact that my view is
incomplete and needs to be supplemented and
corrected... there can be no place for the Word of
the Thou.

This need to have the other represented to me by the other himself
is not a matter of mere information-gathering or curiosity. It is
an ontological need and thus its fulfilment is absolutely necessary.
"I am not a true I and do not genuinely exist without him". We are
doomed to empty subjectivity if we shut our ears to the self-
representation of the other in encounter with whom lies our true
humanity. In the light of this we ought to be profoundly grateful
to the other for their word to us.

Yet self-representation is not the only speech-event by which we
encounter the Other. The I, says Barth, is and must be involved in
the wider verbal activity of address where we engage in conversation
with the other, in which we initiate "a kind of penetration from the sphere of the one into the sphere of another being". It is not altogether clear what Barth has in mind in the distinction, found in this section of his argument, between expression and address. Both modes of speech involve the declaration of the I to the Thou as a necessary supplement to the other's picture of that I, and both involve the process of de-mystification of the self for the other.

Such distinction as there is between these two ways of speaking to the other seems to lie in the function that Barth attributes to them. As we have seen self-expression is a mode of speech where we declare what we see as the truth about ourselves to the other; in effect it is a transfer of information. In the act of addressing the other Barth appears to have in mind a presentation of the self for inclusion into the life of the other, "Address is coming to another with one's being and kneeling and asking to be admitted." Address is thus not simply an exchange of information concerning discrete selves but an entering of each other's sphere of existence and as such it is a rejection of isolation in favour of a plea for mutuality. Once again Barth sees this addressing of the Thou as a duty fulfilling a fundamental need. Clearly the other may not be aware of his need, and may actually wish to be left alone. However Barth maintains that we ought not to be satisfied with making "a few tentative efforts" at seeking admittance into the life of the Thou. I must refuse to be silent by constantly addressing the other, not withholding our involvement in their sphere. Similarly I too must be open to the word of address from the other, for "Two monologues do not constitute a dialogue."

The other must not be encountered by me merely as an object of external consideration, nor must I hide behind a false humility which closes its ears to the other with the excuse that I can hardly do justice to the other's address to me. My very existence as an I is called into question if I choose to remain in isolation, not to hear the other. In the act of receiving the address of the other and reciprocating that address I and Thou exist as truly human:

A dialogue, and therefore the humanity of the encounter of I and Thou, begins only when the spoken word becomes a means to seek and help the other in the difficulty which each entails for the other. On this presupposition the two do not merely speak together, in a commonly produced sound of words, but

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they genuinely talk with and to one another in human words. In his discussion of speech-events as encounter, Barth seems to intend that we would want to refer to as the availability of the self which is a fundamental condition of being-for-others. In our concluding chapter we shall explore the notions of passive availability, constituted by the simple fact of our embodiment, of signals of availability - that is to say, those signs which we consciously and unconsciously give out which indicate that we might be approachable by the other - and actual availability where we begin to communicate ourselves to the other. Barth's first and second moments of encounter, seeing and speaking/hearing approximate to our passive and actual availability. However he appears to ignore the need for the intermediate signalling stage, or at best subsumes this stage within the moment of speaking and hearing. This lack of a signalling stage in the process of the self becoming available to the other characterises the idealistic and highly formalised nature of Barth's notion of encounter, a theme to which we shall be returning subsequently.

iii. Encounter as mutual assistance

The third moment of encounter consists in mutual assistance, that is to say in being at the disposal of the Thou. "If I and Thou really see each other and speak with one another and listen to one another, inevitably they mutually summon each other to action." In this reciprocal summoning to assistance both the I and the Thou acknowledge their need of each other and their willingness to support one another. This encounter as assistance must not be confused with mere altruism. Altruism, says Barth, can be as inhuman as pure egoism if it operates under the illusion that I do not need the other as much as he needs me, "for everything is reciprocal in this matter".

By assisting the other we stand by him, we support and help him, we "take part in the questions and anxiety and burden of him, accepting concern for his life." It is this aspect of self-availability which we refer to as being a resource for the other. God alone, says Barth, is self-sufficient, I and Thou must live in constant awareness of our need to grasp each other's hand and so to live with and not without each other in response to mutual need and reciprocal assistance.
However, despite this fundamentally human activity of offering and requesting help and support to and from the other, Barth is quite emphatic that there is a limit to our self-giving and concomitantly to our claim on the other. Barth has consistently made the important point that in all our encounters with the other, "I and Thou are not inter-changeable." He goes on to argue here that in so far as we are necessarily distinct we cannot ultimately replace or represent the other. Only Jesus can be for man in this absolute way. Human beings can correspond to Jesus' being for only in standing with or beside the other.

He can be so near to him that his being supports though it does not carry him; that he gives him comfort and encouragement though not victory and triumph; that he alleviates though he does not liberate.

It is only in this support that I and Thou avoid "empty subjectivity", "misery", "void" and "futile being". However all this is ultimately conditional upon the final moment of encounter which dictates that all our seeing and hearing and doing be performed "with gladness".

iv. Encounter in gladness

The performance of the first three moments of encounter with gladness constitutes for Barth "a great unseen lacuna", "the secret of humanity" and its "all-animating and motivating dynamic." It is the "substance" and "soul" of humanity and as such must accompany our seeing and hearing and assisting if they are to be truly constitutive of our humanity.

The category of gladness seems, at first sight, to be a rather strange one in this context. Of course we would hope that our encounter and relationship with the other might not be grudging, yet it is often the case that we relate to the other out of a sense of duty or even in the midst of animosity out of which we might hope for a more congenial relationship. However, on further examination we find that Barth's primary concern in deploying the notion of gladness relates to what might well be regarded as one of the most fundamental systematic constraints of his thinking: that of freedom and determinacy. It is at this point that Barth's understanding of humanity and its being in encounter generates many of its strengths, weaknesses and its ambiguities as we shall see in our subsequent critique.
The first point to be made concerning the word "gladly" is that its alternative is not, as one might suppose, "reluctantly" but rather "neutrally". In other words, to oppose gladness in my encounter with the other is to suggest that I am free to choose between a glad encounter or a reluctant merely external encounter. To this Barth poses the question:

Do I really have the choice of actualising being in the encounter between I and Thou either gladly or reluctantly? Am I in some sense free to do justice either gladly or reluctantly to the human significance of eyes and mouth and ear and action, and therefore of my whole relationship to the Thou of which we have been considering the positive content? Can I in some way have both possibilities at my disposal, reserving them both for myself?  

The answer to this question is, for Barth, quite clearly No. To believe ourselves to be capable of such a choice is to look "past real man, who is not capable of this reservation and control." If such a choice for reluctant or glad encounter were indeed possible we would find ourselves in an impossible position, says Barth. There would exist an irresolvable conflict between the fact of our "actual situation" as in encounter with the other as a result of an ontological ordering of the "I" in relation to the "Thou", and the motivation of our "innermost being". In other words there would pertain a radical disjunction between internal and the external, such that I might subject myself to encounter "as to an ineluctable law of nature" but simply as an "alien law" which has nothing to do with me as human, but being prescribed for me. For Barth such a state of affairs is not merely intolerable but impossible. The relationship between the one and the other is in no way merely "an accidental fact of human existence", but is to do with his very essence, and "In his essence... his heart, he is only what he is gladly." Any conception of human freedom which permits the possibility of a choice between glad, essential encounter between the I and the Thou and a reluctant, inhuman acquiescence to an external law of encounter with fellow-man speaks of a humanity "without root, without dynamic, without substance, without soul".  

The point here for Barth is that human being is not a matter of debate or choice. Just as man is not without but with God, so too is he "not without but with his fellow-man". In this sense man is confronted by a law, the law of his own creatureliness. Man as created by God is not alone, but is always in the presence of his
fellow-man. Human freedom consists in our freedom to obey this law of God both internally and externally, as an act of absolute spontaneity. Thus for Barth,

The situation between man and man is genuinely inescapable, and I do real justice to it, only if it is not subject to my caprice even in the sense that I am not free inwardly to accept or reject it, but can only accept it, knowing that it is only and exclusively in this situation that I am myself, and can act as such. Humanity is the realisation of this togetherness of man and man grounded in human freedom and necessary in this freedom.71

This freedom of man to be together with his fellow-man as a necessary determination of his humanity does not entail either the losing of oneself in the other, or the subjugating of the other to the self. Both these forms of totalism constitute a misunderstanding of humanity's intrinsic togetherness which interprets free companionship and association in terms of tyranny and slavery.72

The fundamental situation of humanity in encounter, in which man finds himself, is ultimately a mystery to him, says Barth. We may - and indeed have no choice but to - accept the gift of the other while in turn offering ourselves in the reciprocal acts of seeing and being seen, speaking and hearing, helping and being helped, and all in gladness, but the whys and wherefores leave us silent. "All words fail", says Barth "at this decisive point". We may however at least point towards the hiddenness of the conditio sine qua non of humanity, via our faith in God as Creator.73 It is God who determines human nature as being with the other, and thus it is impossible to say of God that he gives man the possibility not to be human. Indeed, to be other than in encounter with the Thou would be to have a nature alien to that of the man Jesus, such that he alone would possess true humanity as intended by God, and we would be beyond representation by him. The ultimate word that can be said of man however is this:

Real man as God created him is not in the waste of isolation. He does not have this choice. He does not need to emerge from this waste. It is not just subsequently, and therefore not with final seriousness, that he is with his fellow-men. His freedom consists from the very outset in his intending and seeking this other, not to be his tyrant or slave, but his companion, associate, comrade, fellow and helpmate, and that the other may be the same to him... Human nature is man himself.74
Having described what Barth means by humanity as being in encounter, it is important that we consider the mediation of that being. As we have noted above, ultimately the why of human being must remain a mystery to all save the creator God. However Barth does identify the *imago dei* as being the source, or more accurately the "definite and unequivocal form", of human being in encounter, and in this basic assertion we find an agreement with our own notion of human coadunacy as founded upon our imaging of the Triune God. We shall proceed now to consider this aspect of Barth's work in an attempt to understand both the grounding of his notion of being in encounter and the extent of its similarity to our own notion of human coadunacy as the divine image.

**Barth and the image of God**

In the first volume of the *Church Dogmatics* Barth argues strongly against the *analogia entis* of Roman Catholic theology and Emil Brunner's notion of a "point of contact" between man and God. These manifestations of a non-revelatory natural theology, argues Barth, take their force from an understanding of man, even sinful man, as in some sense the image of God. It is this imaging of God which is meant to provide the foundation for man's intrinsic capacity for God. To this Barth has this to say:

> This point of contact is what theological anthropology of the basis of Gen.1:27 calls the 'image of God' in man.... In this sense, as a possibility which is proper to man *qua* creature, the image of God is not just, as it is said, destroyed apart from a few relics; it is totally annihilated.

Nevertheless, despite this apparent rejection of the reality of the *imago dei* for and in man, Barth does not in fact dispense with the notion altogether. Even in the wake of his designation of the *imago* as "annihilated" he is prepared to admit that there is a proper sense in which the image of God in man might be spoken of:

> The image of God in man of which we must speak ... is the *rectitude* which through Christ is raised up from real death and thus restored or created anew, and which is real man's possibility for the Word of God.

From these two quotations two points must be born in mind as we examine Barth's understanding of the *imago dei*. Firstly, the image of God is never an innate "quality" or "attribute" possessed by man *qua* creature. We do not have the image of God. The second point
is that in so far as human being is in the image and likeness of God it is so only by virtue of its identification with and representation by the man Jesus Christ, who is prototypically true humanity. With these theological controls in mind we turn now to Barth's developed discussion of the imago in volume 3 of the Church Dogmatics.

The imago dei, says Barth, consists fundamentally in the confrontation and encounter between I and Thou. This encounter takes two forms, the confrontation between God and human being and that between man and woman.

In the act of creation God not only brings into being a world of things whose otherness resides in their simple distinction from God, he also creates the human who stands in relation with him as a true "counterpart". Only in humanity, says Barth, is there a real other to God, another with "independent life".

There are only two things that we are told about the creation of humanity says Barth. The first is, as we have noted, that humanity was created by God. The second is that it was created male and female. Leaving aside the suggestion that Barth focuses upon the man/woman distinction as an attack upon homosexuality which undoubtedly has some truth in it, Barth is primarily concerned here with establishing the man/woman encounter as the actual and definite form of being in encounter.

Man can and will always be man before God and among his fellows only as he is man in relationship to woman and woman in relationship to man. And as he is one or the other he is man... The fact that he was created man and woman will be the great paradigm of everything that is to take place between him and God, and also of everything that is to take place between him and his fellows.

It is in this basic form of encounter that human beings can be said to be in the image and likeness of God. Thus we have a form of dialectic being established, where we are the image of God only as being in encounter, and we exist in encounter by virtue of our inalienable relationship with Christ as the image and likeness of God. In Barth's own words, the imago consists "as man himself consists as the creature of God. He would not be man if he were not the image of God." What we have here is what we have previously seen Barth speak of as "the secret of humanity": that humanity is not without but with God, and that its sole determination is as
covenant-partner to God. There is a particular and characteristically Barthian logic in operation at this point, a logic which must be entered into if we are to fully comprehend what Barth really intends in his talk of human being and consequently his talk of human relationality.

Although Barth designates the why of human being and its form as a secret and a mystery he does provide us with one basic clue as to the dogmatic foundations of that form. God experiences, in his form as Trinity, "harmonious self-encounter and self-discovery". He exists in reciprocal and open confrontation with himself as I and Thou, Father and Son. Man, continues Barth, "is the repetition of this divine form of life, its copy and reflection". By this he means that there is an analogical correspondence between man and his creator; not an analogy of being but an analogy of relations, the analogia relationis. It is in this analogical sense that we might talk of man as in God's image, not as an innate possession but as a gift of divine grace. Having made the point concerning the analogical similarity between God and humanity which constitutes the imago dei, Barth initiates a movement to Christology which, in the light of our previous discussion of his treatment of human relationality as Christologically determined, can only be regarded as inevitable.

The human likeness to the divine, says Barth, is neither due to humanity nor maintained by humanity. It is not and "cannot be his own concern". In the light of the "episode of the fall" where man seeks the impossibility of inhumanity, that is, creaturely existence without God, it is only in "divine restoration and removal" that man in encounter is in the divine image. Thus the imago dei is properly a fact of salvation and hence of Christology:

... man has reason to look for the man who will be different from him, but who for this reason will be real man for him, in the image and likeness of God male and female in his place and on his behalf, namely, Jesus Christ and His community.

Jesus alone is truly the image of God, claims Barth, and consequently it is the man Jesus who is absolutely and truly human. As we have already noted, human being is a determinate being: determined by its divine dimensions of being for God and for man. This understanding of humanity is not simply a catalogue of fundamental accidents but rather a dogmatic statement concerning the essence of man. Yet having defined humanity according to this dual
encounter the logic of Barth's Christology becomes apparent. Jesus alone is the one elected by God to be perfectly and absolutely for God,

    Man is essentially for God because he is essentially from God and in God. When we say this we are speaking of the man Jesus. We cannot say quite the same thing of man generally and as such.  

Again, for man

    If the divinity of the man Jesus is to be described comprehensively in the statement that He is man for God, this humanity can and must be described no less succinctly in the proposition that He is man for man, for other men, His fellows.

We must emphasise here that these statements of Barth's are primarily Christological statements and are thus ultimately trinitarian, having to do with Jesus' relationship to the Father. This being of Jesus for God and man is not "accidental" or "external" or "subsequent" says Barth, but "primary, internal and necessary". It is ontological and total. Thus we find that for Barth it is the man Jesus who is truly man, humanity as intended by God. It is Jesus who is the imago dei who is both for God and for man. It is Jesus who is God's perfect covenant-partner and it is in the act of covenant-partnership with God that we find what Barth refers to as real humanity.

In the light of this ultimate revelation of humanity in the man Jesus, in what sense can it be said that we as particular men and women are truly human and thus in encounter with both God and man? Barth provides us with a simple answer to this question: we are human beings, that is we are for God and man as we are in Christ. That is to say, what Jesus is by virtue of His election by God we are by virtue of our inclusion in the man Jesus. Jesus is both the elected and rejected one of God as He is rejected on our behalf He is also elected on our behalf. There can be no doubt that for Barth we are only human in so far as Jesus is human. As we saw in our discussion of being as encounter, particularly in the third moment of encounter as assistance while we might aid our fellows, only Jesus can represent and indeed replace us. In this He alone can be truly for rather than simply with us. Thus Barth may say unequivocally:

    There is no abstract humanity and therefore no correspondingly abstract human self-understanding.
Man is no more, no less, no other than what he is through and with and for Jesus Christ. There can be no sense in which the Son of God took on a humanity that was alien and prior to Him. The humanity of the man Jesus is His in a completely non-derivative way as an ontological necessity, unlike ours which although it is ontological and necessary, is so only because of our being in Christ. There is no other humanity than that which is found in encounter with the man Jesus so that "without Christ" we "would not be man at all", and this is not just true of Christian man, the man who knows Christ, but "...each man as such - not just the man who knows him but also the man who scarcely knows him or knows Him not at all". This is at the very core of Barth's teaching on humanity for in so far as the man Jesus is elected by and for God and man from all eternity, the humanity of Christ constitutes both the first and the final form of humanity.

From all eternity God elected and determined that He Himself would become man for us men. From all eternity He determined that men would be those for whom He is God: His fellow-men. In willing this, in willing Jesus Christ, He wills to be our God and He wills that we should be His people. Ontologically, therefore, the covenant of grace is already included and grounded in Jesus Christ, in the human form and human content which God willed to give His Word from all eternity.

In other words God's act of creation and redemption are in fact metahistorically coterminous. God's being for man and determination of man for Himself and his fellows constitutes a single act of covenant fulfilled in Christ. While sin is simply an "episode" in the life of man the covenant is the life of man. Thus the atonement wrought in Christ in which the man Jesus is elected to be both for God and for man is no mere counter episode instigated in opposition to sin. It was God's will to become man from all eternity. Certainly the event of the incarnation in history is an event which saves us from sin and death, and forms the Church, however there is more and greater than this. As the first-born of all creation Christ is the first and eternal word of God.

As very God and very man He is the concrete reality and actuality of the divine command and the divine presence, the content of the will of God which exists prior to its fulfilment, the basis of the whole project and actualization of creation and the whole process of divine providence from which all created being and becoming derives.
We must grasp the logic of Barth's christology at this point if we are subsequently to identify its points of weakness. Man, that is particular man, you and I, exists as truly human only in Christ and under his Lordship as determined from all eternity in the one unbroken act of covenant, whereby we are for God and our fellows. In Christ alone do we "live and move and have our being". Outside of Christ there is no humanity, not even fallen sinful humanity. We shall return to this point later.

The point to be made here is that Barth identifies, as do we, the imago dei as the source of our being as relational, and thus properly human. Further, Barth sees the imago of God relating to the encounter between the Father and the Son within the divine Godhead, identifying the Trinity as the prototype of human relationality. In this we must agree with him, particularly in the basic form of the imago as man and woman. Thus, before we finally turn to our critique of Barth's understanding of human relationality, it would be valuable to consider the nature of those Trinitarian relations which serve as the source of the possibility for human encounter.

The triune relationality

To engage with Barth's notion of the Trinity is to do nothing else but to cut to the core of his theology. To pull at just one of the threads of his doctrine is to run the risk of unravelling the whole of Barth's theology and to become hopelessly entangled within its complexities. I do not propose to do that here. My purposes here are quite specific. What sort of relating takes place between Father, Son and Holy Spirit such that their relationality may serve as the source for ours, as Barth clearly would have it do? Thus if my explication of the nature of the divine Trinity, as conceived by Barth, appears to be incomplete, that is because it is not intended to be in any way exhaustive.

God's being as Trinity is a uniquely theological datum, communicated to us in God's own act of self-revelation. This act of self-communication from God to man has a "three-fold form": the initial speaking of the Word in the Christ-event; the recollection of this event in the text of Scripture; and the preaching of the Word by the Church. It is only the first of these three which is the true Word of God. The second and third forms become the Word by faith and the grace of God who chooses to make himself objective for
us. "The direct Word of God" says Barth "meets us only in its twofold mediacy." Thus there is ever and only one Word of God which becomes actual for us in Scripture and proclamation by God's grace. In these two forms God speaks the same Word from all eternity; in Scripture and proclamation we do not have to do with a word once spoken in past history, but with God's eternal Word to man.

It is this doctrine of the Word of God that stands as "the only analogy" to the doctrine of the Trinity of God, claims Barth. For revelation, Scripture and proclamation read Father, Son and Holy Spirit. To the question, Who is this God who reveals Himself in this three-fold way the answer must be that God reveals Himself through Himself. He reveals Himself through Himself. He reveals Himself. God, says Barth, is the Revealer who is identical both with this act in revelation and with its effect. It is because God is identical with his act of revelation that we can know him as Trinity. Thus the triune nature of God, far from being the product of mere theological speculation, is for Barth the very truth of God's act of revelation, and as such the one and only authentic starting point for theology. The very fact of God speaking to us declares him as Trinity, as the one who is his very Word to man.

The act of divine self-revelation makes known to us God's being as both veiled and unveiled, unknowable and yet made known to us. As the God who reveals himself, he is completely free and self-sufficient, quite beyond human ken. As the God who reveals himself to us he is free to be for us in self-differentiation. In this act of self-differentiation the God who is Lord over us and thus totally independent of us exercises his freedom to become free for us as well as free from us.

He can so indwell the other that, while He is its Creator and the Giver of its life, and while He does not take away this life, He does not withdraw His presence from this creaturely existence which is so different from His own divine life.

This is the ultimate mystery of the incarnation of the Son of God, that is, God's freedom to be free even from himself, "to be God a second time in a very different way, namely in manifestation, i.e., in the form of something He Himself is not." Thus God reveals himself to be both the hidden Lord and Father and also, in divine self-differentiation, the revealed Word, the Son of God. As the "effect" of his revelation to human beings God shows himself to be
the very capacity, for us, to receive his Word. In this way he distinguishes himself also as Spirit.\textsuperscript{112}

This becoming of His own alter-ego by God, in his becoming God a second time\textsuperscript{113}, is by no means a mere economic device on God's part, undertaken for the salvation of humanity. On the contrary it is the very truth concerning the divine being whose "unity is neither singularity nor isolation"\textsuperscript{114}. The Son of God, says Barth, while being the basis of divine immanence through the incarnation, is "as an eternal mode of the divine being".\textsuperscript{115} Thus the divine Trinity is nothing less than the repetitio aeternitatis in aeternitate.\textsuperscript{116}

For Barth it is of supreme importance that what God reveals himself to be in his act of self-disclosure is precisely what he is in Himself. That is to say there can be no distinction between an economic and immanent Trinity. God is Father not simply because he is our creator but because he is eternally the Father in his repetition of himself in the Son:

God's trinitarian name of Father, God's eternal fatherhood, denotes the mode of being of God in which He is the Author of His other modes of being.\textsuperscript{117}

Thus the Fatherhood, and therefore the being as Creator of God, cannot be understood in separation from the Son and the Spirit, for it is only as God repeats himself as Son and Spirit that he is Father. This unus et individuus of God in "His work and essence" is similarly true of all the divine activities, such that the Father, as the Father of the Son, is also the God who "acts in reconciliation and redemption".\textsuperscript{118} This unity in distinction is the truth behind the doctrine of the perichoresis of the Father, Son and Holy Spirit,

according to which all three, without forfeiture or mutual dissolution of independence, reciprocally interpenetrate each other and inexist in one another.\textsuperscript{119}

There can be no one-sided modalism in our notion of the Trinity, says Barth; the very unity of God in which he interpenetrates himself is a unity in eternal self-repetition and distinction.\textsuperscript{120}

This is the crux of the trinitarian relationality, this mutual interpenetration. To say that God exists in three modes of being is not to identify each of these modes as a separate and discrete center of consciousness, and thus three persons in the modern sense of the term person.\textsuperscript{121}
The statement that God is One in three ways of being ... means, therefore, that the one God, i.e. the one Lord the one personal God, is what He is ... in the mode of the Father, in the mode of the Son, and in the mode of the Holy Ghost.¹²²

There is only one divine subject says Barth, not three, and the unity of the three modes of being, Father Son and Holy Spirit, stems wholly from the fact that they are reiterations of this single subject. God's threefoldness, says Barth, consists in the fact that in the essence or act in which God is God there is first a pure origin and then two different issues...¹²³

Thus for Barth the unity of Father Son and Spirit cannot be regarded as a form of social community consisting of discrete persons involved in intersubjective relationship as there is only ever one divine subject. Indeed, despite his rejection of an understanding of the modes of God's being as personal, he does make the concession at the end of volume 1/1 of the Dogmatics that while it might be possible to regard Father and Son as persons, "the Holy Spirit could not possibly be regarded as the third 'person'".¹²⁴ It is the Spirit, says Barth, by virtue of His (he still uses the personal pronoun here!) being a "common element", constitutes the act of fellowship and communion between Father and Son.

Yet even given this designation of the Spirit as the "act of communion, the act of imputation, love, gift"¹²⁶, the relationship between Father and Son is one of a shared identity, an equality, a formal interpenetration which is summed up in the claim made by Eberhard Jüngel concerning Barth's understanding of the Trinity:

as his own interpreter God corresponds to his own being. Since, however, God as his own interpreter ... is he himself, since also in this happening as such it is a question of the being of God, then the highest and last statement which can be made about the being of God is: God corresponds to himself.¹²⁶

Jüngel continues by making it perfectly clear that in speaking of God's self-correspondence we are speaking "of a relationship".¹²⁷ In other words, God as Father, Son and Holy Spirit relates to himself because he is himself, in repeated distinction perhaps, but nonetheless the one divine subject.

In this understanding of the triune God we find very little by way of similarity and support for our notion of coadunacy as derived from the notion of God as persons-in-communion. Furthermore, as we
shall now see, Barth's own understanding of human being in encounter appears to suffer as a result of his conception of the triune being of God.

**Conclusion**

The first thing that needs to be said concerning Barth's explication of the phenomenon of human being in encounter is that it appears overly formal and unrealistic, largely on account of the powerful Christological determinism so central to Barth's view of humanness.

Barth's insistence on the basic form of human encounter as that of an I-Thou duality cannot be fully true to human experience. Certainly it is true that I relate to distinct others, individual selves, but it is also true that I encounter the other in plurality, parents rather than parent, friends rather than simply friend, family rather than simply piecemeal encounters with a brother, a sister, a child and so on. These encounters with others surely represent authentic relationality and not just what Barth refers to as encounter with faceless "Bureaucracy". The identification of a dualistic structure as the only true and authentic mode of human encounter is an inevitable out-working of Barth's systematic commitment to the divine encounter expressed as the duality of Father and Son with the Holy Spirit being identified as the bond of fellowship between these two. By denying the possibility of the Holy Spirit's being a third person within the Trinity Barth is left with no other recourse but to maintain that the basic form of encounter is that of a duality, that is if he wishes to continue regarding the divine Trinity as the ultimate source of human relationality. Indeed, as we see there is cause for doubting whether the Barthian Trinity ultimately consists of as much as a true encounter in duality.

For Barth, that humanity is in encounter is a fundamental fact of its existence. We are not without but with our fellow. Certainly, and as we have suggested in Chapter 2 and will argue fully elsewhere, there is a sense in which we are always in encounter with the other, always passively available simply by virtue of our being embodied, and thus open to external scrutiny. Barth explains this in his first moment of encounter as seeing and being seen. Furthermore we would affirm with Barth the ontological significance of being as being with the other. However, as we shall see, there
is a tension in Barth between his recognition of the broken and alienated state of human existence and his Christological determined understanding of human being. It is at this point that we must depart from Barth's understanding of human encounter. For Barth there appears to be no hiatus between encounter and reciprocation. I encounter Thou in the four moments of being in encounter, and the Thou reciprocates as a fact of humanity constituted by being in Christ. For Barth "the rent tearing human existence to its depths is healed and closed in virtue of a historical relation to genuine Transcendence" 31, that is, by virtue of human relationship with the man Jesus. Indeed, Barth goes further by claiming that "at bottom this rent does not exist". 132 Inhumanity, man without his fellow, is, says Barth, "a man who does not and cannot exist". 133

Despite all his claims that to be without the other is to be "non-human" Barth allows no room for the possibility of this inhuman mode of existence. Even the one who denies both God and his neighbour "showing himself to be supremely non-human" does not cease to be man, for he does not lose God's address to him "his creaturely nature stands in the light of the humanity of Jesus." 134 For Barth the determinative locus of humanity is God. It is God alone who creates humanity to be human; to be truly human is to be God's creature in covenant relationship with him and addressed by him. By sinning we do not initiate a new creation altering our nature:

The fact that man sins does not mean that God ceases to be God and therefore man man. In this context, too, we must say that man does not accomplish a new creation by sinning. He cannot achieve any essential alteration of the human nature which has been given. He can only share this nature and himself. He can only bring himself into supreme peril. But the fact that he has in the man Jesus his Saviour and Deliverer is the pledge that he has not ceased to be a man, a being ordered in relation to this Jesus. 135

For Barth Jesus Christ constitutes "the first and eternal Word of God" in which the sin of man, that is, the tendency to inhuman existence outside of the covenant relationship with God, "is already met, refuted and removed from all eternity". 136 This Word of God is his Word of creation, which is coterminous with redemption. In other words, and as we have already noted, for Barth creation is election. In the light of the impossibility of being estranged from oneself, from the other, Barth does not feel compelled to address
the issue of my undeniable experience of the other as stranger. Concomitantly the exchange of power which, as we shall explore in our concluding chapter, must be regarded as an essential part of self-availability is not to be found in Barth. There is no mention in Barth's discussion of the risk involved in self-giving, of the placing of one's self in the power of the other. We are in encounter with the other purely and simply as a fact of our humanity. We are human because we are in Christ, replaced and represented in the humanity of the man Jesus. We are never free not to be human; all are human because all are in Christ; all are in encounter because all are human. This is the basic logic of the Christological determination of humanity.

There is a very real tension in Barth's treatment of human estrangement, and, concomitantly, his understanding of self-giving abandonment to the other as stranger, so important for our own notion of coadunacy, is to say the least ambiguous. Clearly Barth recognises the brokenness and disorder which characterize human existence in rebellion against God. The human race, argues Barth, exists in a state of "disorder" and "deviation":

The order from which it deviates is the form of an obedient life of people in fellowship with God which includes as such the corresponding form... of a life of people in fellowship with one another.

This disorder is the result of humanity's fall into unrighteousness, a fall not only away from God but also away from each other and away from oneself. This is the essence of sin as experienced by humanity. It is human being in contradiction to itself. While the Christian may legitimately engage in rebellion against particular manifestations of human contradiction and alienation, such as "painful conditions of life" and particularly "tyrants, those by whom they find themselves browbeaten, defrauded and oppressed..." nevertheless as Christians, says Barth, the only authentic revolt is the one against disorder, that is, disobedience to God. Alienation from God of necessity involves alienation from the rest of humanity.

"In and with the sin of Adam, who wanted to be as God, there is already enclosed the sin of Cain, the murder of his brother." As we have already noted, the very being of humanity is never the possession of human beings. Humanness, the imago dei, is only ever
a gift, vouchesafed to us in Christ and under his Lordship. For this reason Barth can assert quite unequivocally that

Man's alienation from God at once carries with it his self-alienation: the denaturalizing of the humanity and fellow humanity of his own existence, the contradiction of the determination, inalienably given to him as God's creature, that he should belong to God and have in him his Lord... 

It is precisely here that we may identify the point of tension between Barth's understanding of human self-alienation and his above-mentioned tendency to understand I-Thou relationality as an inalienable fact of human existence in Christ. It is quite clear that for Barth human brokenness and alienation from self is a function of humanity's disobedience and alienation from God; "As people are estranged from God, so they are from themselves and their neighbours, alienated from God and themselves and their fellows." 

Barth goes on to point out that it is the Lordless powers, that is, "human abilities, exalting themselves as lordless forces, against man himself" originally loaned to human beings by God for our well-being, which are now in revolt and work to our harm. It is these Lordless powers, human abilities in disorder and disobedience, which tear apart human society.

The lordship of these powers, which are all of them no more than exponents of the rebellion that separates men from God, is synonymous with the destruction and ruin of both the individual and society.

All this being said, there is a serious problem here. Despite all that Barth has to say about the Lordless powers and human estrangement, these powers are ultimately nothing more than "fictions" and "illusions". They are, says Barth, "only a pseudo-objective reality", never truly lordless, never absolute and never ontologically godless. The reason for this is plain and we have already touched on it above. The Word of God, which is Christ, the one Word of creation and election, is the one inescapable determination for human being. Sin, on the other hand, is "overshadowed and crowded into the margins by Grace". This Christological determinism thus takes the form of an anthropological idealism where Christ alone is the true human being.

If this is indeed the case then we may find support for our criticism of Barth's treatment of the reality of human brokenness in Bonhoeffer's examination of communality when he writes; "The whole
of idealism is unaware of any cleft between the primal state and the Fall, or of the significance of this cleft for the person and the view of community."\textsuperscript{160}

True alienation from God is, according to Barth, ultimately impossible, and so concomitantly is human self-estrangement.

Naturally, man's being without a Lord, without God, cannot alter in the slightest the fact that God is his God and that in reality and truth he does have God as his Lord. He cannot escape from God: 'If I ascend to heaven, thou art there! If I make my bed in Sheol, thou art there also!' (Ps. 139:8) It would be unthinkably terrible if this were not so, if God allowed man to tread his evil way to the bitter end, if he ceased on his side to be man's God and Lord. It is bad enough for men, and fateful enough, that he can at least attempt this alienation from God, this flight from his Spirit and countenance into the wilderness of these heights or depths, that in a dreadful "as if" and in contradiction of his true determination, he can exist "absolutely". In no case does he achieve more than an imagined godlessness and lordlessness, a pseudo-absolute being and existence, a thought, speech and act "as if" he were without God and without a Lord.\textsuperscript{151}

It is in the light of the "more or less one-sided decree" of the covenant established in Christ as God and man\textsuperscript{162}, "the rent tearing human existence to its depths is healed and closed".\textsuperscript{153} It is this healing act of atonement that reconciles humanity to God and to itself, which is "the most basic history of every Man. It is the first and most inward presupposition of his existence." Jesus Christ as the history of God with man is the very act of atonement which "takes precedence of all other history".\textsuperscript{164}

The point being made here is this: if humanity's alienation from itself is a direct result of its alienation from God, and if this latter alienation is, according to Barth, overcome in Christ then surely humanity's self-estrangement is also overcome. Despite a very real concern to indicate the brokenness of human existence, Barth's Christological determinism appears to force him into an understanding of human estrangement as impossible rebellion. The rent tearing human existence is healed. We are in actuality neither estranged from our God or our fellows, for we are all under the Lordship of Christ who determines our true humanity as reconciled to the one and the other. It is this reconciling history, argues Barth, which overcomes all other human history and this time, unlike the pseudo-reality of sin.
There is no room for any fears that in the justification of man we are dealing only with a verbal action, with a kind of bracketed "as if", as though what is pronounced were not the whole truth about man. We have suggested, and will later develop the notion, that the dynamic of human coadunacy be understood in terms of self-abandonment to the other, whom we encounter as stranger and to whom we offer power over ourselves as an act of coadunacy. This act of self-abandonment, while being performed in hope that the other whom we encounter will not abuse his or her empowering over us is still an act which takes place within the context of human estrangement. The dynamic of coadunacy denies the other as stranger by self-abandonment in the face of the very real strangeness of the other. For Barth there is no strangeness in the Thou whose immediate response to encounter is to reciprocate and not abuse. To abuse this encounter would be to be inhuman, to be estranged, and this is ultimately not possible, all humanity existing in the light of Christ's humanity and atonement.

Barth's ambiguous attitude toward the notion of alienation and self-abandonment cuts to the very heart of his Christology. In the face of the irresistible and eternal determination of human beings for God, there is little sense of a fundamentally human response to God. Human freedom is freedom for God. It has been pointed out by others that in Barth, while there is a definite Hegelian chord struck in his notion of the triune God as existing in the distinction of in and for himself, there is no point at which Barth identifies an act of negation in the transition of God in himself as Father to God in Christ, as Hegel clearly does. R.D. Williams makes a similar point when he observes that there is little, particularly in the earlier volumes of the Dogmatics which speaks of "God's self-abnegation in the face of created freedom." Where God does encounter the fallen word it is in an "annihilating negation" and not one of abandonment to the other who has become stranger:

Even in IV/1, the emphasis is far less on the Son of Man given up into the hands of sinners, God at man's mercy, than on the judgment of God upon man. Barth will write eloquently of the suffering and dereliction of Jesus bearing the wrath of God; but not of Jesus as 'God bearing the wrath of man', Bonhoeffer's God 'pushed out of the world on to the cross.' We have already noted Barth's denial (CD 1:1 p.176) that God gives himself into our hands;
yet the incarnational paradox is that this is precisely what he does.169

Thus precisely at the point where Barth identifies the divine imago which is constitutive of all humanity as being in encounter, in other words the man Jesus Christ, we find an almost total absence of self-abandonment to an other who is empowered over us, and to our potential harm.

It is significant to note that in Church Dogmatics 4:1, in the section entitled "The Way of the Son of God into the Far Country", a section in which one might expect to find the language of divine self-abandonment to a broken world, we find instead that the way "into the far country" is characterized by obedience.160 This obedience is the Son's obedience to the Father, the Father who, as we have seen above, is still King even in the far country. At his baptism Jesus subjects himself to God161. When he suffers it is "under the hand of God"162. The divine incarnation, the condescension of God, his becoming flesh has to do not with abandonment to those who hate him and would do him harm, but with "(1) the obedience of the Son to the Father, shown (2) in his self-humiliation, His way into the far country, fulfilled in his death on the Cross".163 What we have here is not Bonhoeffer's Son of God, "pushed out of the world onto the Cross" by a broken humanity to whom he had abandoned himself, but rather "He stands under the wrath and judgment of God, He is broken and destroyed on God."164

This brings us finally to Barth's understanding of the I-Thou encounter as analogous to the confrontation of Father, Son and Spirit within the divine Trinity. The first thing to be said here as regards the intra-divine relationality is that properly speaking Barth presents us with, at best, a binity of Father and Son. In the final section of 1:1 where Barth addresses the doctrine of the Holy Spirit, he makes it perfectly clear that the Spirit is in no sense a third "person" alongside Father and Son.165 The Holy Spirit occupies the position of "common element" or "act of communion" which exists between Father and Son.166 As Moltmann points out, to refer to the Spirit as the bond of love between Father and Son is to render him ultimately redundant in the light of the already pertaining relationship of eternal generation and self-giving.167 As we have already noted, it is this reduction of the Spirit to the
level of a relationship that establishes the I-Thou duality as the ultimate form of encounter.

Having observed that Barth's understanding of the Trinity ultimately collapses into a binity as the Spirit becomes a mere duplication of the Father's love for the Son, there is good reason to suspect that even this duality finally falls in on itself, resolving itself into the one absolute subject. Both Moltmann and Williams argue convincingly that in opting for a self-interpretative model of the Trinity, as Barth does in his prioritizing of God's act of revelation, he is committed to the notion of a single subject who speaks and reveals himself as Lord. In speaking, God reiterates himself as subject in the act of self-interpretation. Indeed in the first half of 1/1 Barth affirms that in the Trinity there is only "one divine I". Moltmann accuses Barth of attempting to utilize the doctrine of the Trinity according to an Idealist reflexive tradition, in order to secure a notion of the divine essence as sovereignty. As Fichte spoke of "being" and the "existence of being" and the "reflection" that makes them one, so Barth speaks of God as the one who is absolute subject through distinction and self-recollection.

Thus God the Father, the one "personality", articulates himself in Christ through eternal repetition:

But in the reflection logic of the absolute subject, the Son is nothing other than the self of the divine "I", the counterpart, the other, in whom God contemplates himself, finds himself, becomes conscious of himself and manifests himself.

There is a very serious charge of modalism being made of Barth here, and one that despite his protestations he is hard put to refute.

Whether we agree with Moltmann's accusations of Barth and his Idealistic interpretation of Barth's reflexive trinity, there can be little doubt that Barth certainly places his emphasis upon the single divine personality in three modes. Any attempt to identify a single divine subject as the source for intersubjective human relationality must surely be fraught with difficulties. For the divine Trinity to serve as a the source and model for relationality between distinct persons it must itself be understood, surely, as persons in relation, and not as person in three-fold repetition. Such an observation must also throw a serious shadow over Barth's
attempt to account for the reality of human encounter on the basis of our imaging the divine nature as I-Thou encounter.

In concluding our discussion of Barth it would be unfair and insulting to a thinker of his stature and insight to suggest that in actual fact Barth was unaware of human brokenness and estrangement. It is important to reiterate here that our criticisms derive their force from the ubiquitous systematic determination of God's freedom and sovereignty in Barth's work, coupled with a form of Christological idealism. It is ultimately this dogmatic determination which forces Barth into an unrealistic and potentially unsupportable notion of human being, in Christ, as unavoidably and actually being in encounter. To be fair, there is much in Barth's writing, as we have sought to show above, to indicate that he was indeed acutely aware of the brokenness of human existence and its alienation not only from God but also from itself.

We turn now to a consideration of human relationality as understood by Wolfhart Pannenberg.
5. CD 3/2 p. 128. Barth would be prepared to acknowledge that the human sciences may well point to symptoms of the human condition (though they can only be recognised as such a posteriori), but they are unable to cut to the core of human existence.

8. It is worth bearing in mind at this point that Barth would not be happy with this inversion of his procedure, which is always a movement from God to man, not vice versa.

35. CD 3/2 p.251
36. CD 3/2 p.252
37. ibid.
38. Cf. Levinas, Totality and Infinity
40. CD 3/2 p.248
41. CD 3/2 p.252
42. Chapter 3
43. CD 3/2 p.253
44. ibid.
45. Chapter 7 p.xx
46. CD 3/2 p.253
47. CD 3/2 p.355
48. CD 3/2 p.254
49. CD 3/2 p.260
50. CD 3/2 p.254f.
51. CD 3/2 p.255
52. ibid.
53. CD 3/2 p.256
54. ibid.
55. CD 3/2 p.259
56. ibid.
57. Chapter 7.
58. CD 3/2 p.260-1
59. CD 3/2 p.261-2
60. Chapter 7
61. CD 3/2 p.264
62. CD 3/2 p.261
63. CD 3/2 p.262
64. CD 3/2 p.264-5
65. ibid.
66. CD 3/2 p.266
67. ibid.
68. CD 3/2 p.167
69. ibid.
70. CD 3/2 p.268
71. CD 3/2 p.269. My emphasis.
72. CD 3/2 p.271
73. CD 3/2 p.272
74. CD 3/2 p.273-4
75. Chapters I and II.
76. CD 1/1 p. 238
77. CD 1/1 p. 239
78. CD 3/1 p. 184
79. CD 3/1 p. 203
80. CD 3/1 p. 184
81. ibid.
83. CD 3/2 p. 274
84. CD 3/2 p. 186
85. CD 3/1 p. 184
86. CD 3/2 p. 271
87. CD 3/1 p. 185
88. CD 3/1 p. 189
89. CD 3/1 p. 190
90. ibid.
92. CD 3/2 p. 208 cf. 261f.
93. CD 3/2 p. 210
95. CD 3/2 p. 203
96. CD 2/2 p. 350ff. 353
97. CD 3/2 p. 260ff.
99. CL p. 19
100. CL o, 20ff, cf. CD 4/1 p. 35.
101. CD 4/1 p. 45f
102. CD 4/1 p. 47
103. CD 4/1 p. 48
104. CD 1/1 p. 88ff.
105. CD 1/1 p. 121
106. ibid.
107. CD 1/1 p. 305
108. CD 1/1 p. 296
109. CD 1/1 p. 299
110. CD 2/1 p. 313
111. CD 1/1 p. 316
112. CD 1/1 p. 332 cf. p. 451ff.
113. CD 1/1 p. 316
114. CD 1/1 p. 354f.
115. CD 2/1 p. 317
116. CD 1/1 p. 353f.
117. CD 1/1 p. 393
118. CD 1/1 p. 394-5
119. CD 1/1 p. 396
120. CD 1/1 p. 349-50
121. CD 1/1 p. 355-58
122. CD 1/1 p. 359. My emphasis.
123. CD 1/1 p. 364
124. CD 1/1 p. 469
125. CD 1/1 p. 470
127. op. cit. p. 25.
128. CD 3/2 p. 243-4
129. CD 3/2 p. 252
130. CD 1/1 p. 469
131. CD 3/2 p. 119
132. ibid.
133. CD 3/2 p. 264
134. CD 3/2 p. 226, 7
136. CD 4/1 p. 48
137. cf. Chapter 7
138. cf. CD 3/2 p. 64
139. The Christian Life (CL) p. 211
140. CL p. 207
142. CL p. 213-4
143. CL p. 233
144. CL p. 215
146. CL p. 233
147. ibid.
148. CL p. 215
149. CD 2/2 p. 390
150. D. Bonhoeffer, Sanctorum Communio, p. 40
151. CL p. 390
152. CD 4/1 p. 25 cf. 3/2 p. 94f.
153. CD 3/2 p. 119
154. CD 4/1 p. 157
155. CD 4/1 p. 95
158. R.D. Williams, p. 189.
159. Ibid. p. 176
160. CD 4/1 p. 192
161. CD 4/1 p. 164
162. CD 4/1 p. 175
163. CD 4/1 p. 177
164. CD 4/1 p. 175f
165. CD 1/1 p. 469
166. CD 1/1 p. 470
169. CD 1/1 p. 35
170. Moltmann, p. 139f, 142.
171. Ibid, p. 143.
In the previous chapter we considered the notion of human relationality as I-Thou encounter within the theology of Karl Barth. In this chapter we shall be addressing the same issue, but from within a very different theology. Nevertheless, in our treatment of human relationality in the theology of Wolfhart Pannenberg we shall utilize the same strategy as in our previous analysis of Barth. That is, we shall examine what is said concerning the actual phenomenon of human relationality and subsequently move on to consider the significance of Pannenberg's view of the imago dei and the Triune nature of God, sin and the person of Jesus Christ for this phenomenon.

Unlike Barth Pannenberg is concerned with what he refers to as fundamental-theological anthropology, as distinct from traditional dogmatic anthropology. The latter, says Pannenberg, is founded upon the presupposition of divine revelation; the fact of God is thus taken as the a priori of human existence:

since it supposes the reality of God as it sets about speaking of human beings, it surrenders the possibility of joining in the discussion at the level of anthropological findings.

In contrast to this approach, fundamental-theological anthropology seeks to engage with the phenomena of human existence by way of interaction with the human sciences such as biology and cultural anthropology. Pannenberg is insistent that the conflict between theology and the Enlightenment atheism of Feuerbach and subsequently of Marx, Nietzsche, Freud and Sartre must take place on the field of anthropology. It is in this arena that the atheists have chosen to attack religion with their claim that the notion of God is fundamentally an expression of human self-alienation, and it is here that theology must make its stand:

The basic question posed by modern atheism is this: Does man, in the exercise of his existence, assume a reality beyond himself and everything finite, sustaining him in the very act of his freedom, and alone making him free, a reality to which everything that is said about God refers? Or does the freedom of man exclude the existence of God...?
Thus, says Pannenberg, any choice between religion and atheism must ultimately be a choice between distinct anthropologies, that is between distinct understandings of the phenomena of human existence.

Pannenberg argues that the neo-orthodox theologies have failed to take up the challenge of Enlightenment atheism and as such are theologies in retreat. These are "positivist" theologies, says Pannenberg, in so far as they are founded ultimately upon a fideistic appeal to divine revelation. The relocation of a supernatural authority basis from the revelation principle of sola scriptura to the "Word of God" as either kerygma (Bultmann) or the Christ-event as witnessed to by the apostles (Barth) is entirely inadequate, as "in both cases the authoritarian character of the appeal to revelation remains untouched." Pannenberg continues by arguing that modern man regards such authoritarian claims with "...the suspicion that they clothe human thoughts and institutions with the splendour of divine majesty," thereby elevating them beyond critical examination.

Before we proceed to examine Pannenberg's understanding of human relationality, as he sees it witnessed to within the study of the phenomena of human existence, it is important that the following point be made. Pannenberg does not regard himself as engaged in "natural" theology as traditionally conceived. His concern is rather with humanity's self-understanding, which issues out of its experience of itself and the world. Pannenberg argues that it is impossible to return to a traditional natural theology in the face of its critics. Schleiermacher pointed out that all religion is fundamentally historical and that natural theology is simply an abstraction from the concrete experience of religion. Ritschl denied the possibility of an understanding of God founded upon the presently existing world, and Barth argued that natural theology empties revelation of its significance.

Pannenberg allies himself with the tendency to conceive of God as "the presupposition of human subjectivity", such that not the natural world as such but human experience of the world and of the individual's existence within it repeatedly supplies the point of departure for discussing the reality of God.

He traces this understanding as far back as the fifteenth century theologian Nicholas of Cusa. Subsequently this view was taken up by thinkers such as Descartes, Leibniz, Kant, Fichte, Schelling and
Indeed, says Pannenberg, with the discovery of the principle of inertia the notion of a "first maintaining cause became superfluous". Thus, for Pannenberg:

The material of a theology which reflects upon this complex of experience is not a religious subjectivity which is dependent upon an act of faith, nor a religious interpretation of the world laid down in advance by an authoritative revelation. It is the history of religion as the record of men's historical experience of themselves in the context of the totality of their world and thus of the reality of God and the gods. The truth of such an experience depends upon its power to illuminate the situation of men in their actual historical world.

The importance of the history of religions as the basic data for theology cannot be stressed strongly enough in Pannenberg's thought and we shall consider this central theme in some detail in a moment.

Anthropological argument, continues Pannenberg, occupies a position of apologetic prolegomena to theology in that it may highlight the constitutive nature of humanity's religious dimension, in opposition to atheistic critiques of religion, while stopping short of providing actual proof for the reality of God. In short, anthropological analysis may be said to demonstrate the finitude and thus the dependency of human existence, rather than the existence of an infinite and independent God.

A general theological anthropology cannot be expected to do more than demonstrate the religious dimension of man's being. It can show that what takes place in religious experience is as much a constitutive part of man's being as walking erect, or the ability to use fire and tools. But it cannot be expected to supply a proof of the reality of God.

We shall be engaging with Pannenberg's theological anthropology at some length in a subsequent section of this chapter.

Before we proceed to discuss Pannenberg's understanding of human relationality it is important that we clearly understand the nature of his concern with theology as having to do with the history of religion and, prolegomenal to this, his overall concern with the task of theology itself.

Theology and its Task

In his work Theology and the Philosophy of Science Pannenberg clearly identifies what he sees as the root of theology's inability to arrive at any final judgements by way of theological statements:
...such statements have to do with reality as a whole, and not just with its general structural features, but with the totality of its temporal process. Because of this a final judgement is impossible from someone who stands within this still open process, and not at its end... It is only the end of all history which can bring a final decision about all claims about reality as a whole and therefore in relation to the reality of God and the destiny of man.19

This is an important claim in that it indicates for us the areas of essential concern in Pannenberg's theological programme. Furthermore it highlights the fundamental relationship which exists, for Pannenberg, between reality as historical process and the task of theology: a relationship which, as we shall see, is at the very heart of Pannenberg's thought.

If one were to press Pannenberg for a concise definition of theology, at least as it has been perceived to function throughout history by those engaged with it, his answer would in all likelihood be that theology is the science of God. By this Pannenberg has in mind an understanding of theology as a discipline which "derives its unity from its object", that is, God, and furthermore that "its object is unitary".21 However, to say that God is the object of theology is not to endorse what Pannenberg refers to as the positivism of dialectical theology, in which the concept of God takes a dogmatic form.22 For Pannenberg God is a problem rather than a dogma of Christian theology. That is to say that the idea of God takes the form of an hypothesis which "is measured and verified on its own implications."23 This process of substantiation of the God-hypothesis depends upon what Pannenberg understands as the theme of theology: that is, the fundamental "assumption... that the word 'God' is to be understood as referring to an all-determining reality"24 and that, concomitantly, "substantiation of talk about God requires that everything which exists should be shown to be a trace of the divine reality."25

That God ought to be understood as the all-determining reality while being "a linguistic convention, a nominal definition and also incomplete"26 is absolutely crucial to Pannenberg's conception of the very possibility of theology. This notion of God as the power which determines and unifies the whole of reality is derived, as we shall see later, from the religious experience of humanity, in which
it encounters the divine reality as that which orders and unifies the totality of created reality.\textsuperscript{27}

Pannenberg argues that this understanding of God, at least within Western thought, is always a "pre-given" "nominal definition", resulting from the combination of Greek philosophical notions of divine unity as the foundation for the unity of the cosmos, and Jewish monotheism.\textsuperscript{26} It follows, argues Pannenberg, that if God is indeed the all-determining reality, then the totality of all that is is both determined by God and only intelligible with God. Thus to the question

\textit{In what objects of experience is God... indirectly co-given, and what objects of experience can therefore be considered traces of God?} The only possible answer is all objects.\textsuperscript{29}

When Pannenberg speaks of all existing objects as being \textit{traces of God} he has in mind not individual objects in isolation but rather the totality of all beings in their "unbroken continuity" with each other. In this light,

\textit{Theology as the science of God would then mean the study of the totality of the real from the point of view of the reality which ultimately determines it both as a whole and in its parts.}\textsuperscript{30}

Here we have both the \textit{problematic} and the \textit{thematic} elements inherent in Pannenberg's understanding of the idea of God. The problematic and hypothetical nature of the notion of God arising out of our ever-changing perspective on reality establishes theology as a finite search for knowledge,... constantly exposed to the possibility that its object, as a result of the process of being explained, may turn into a different one...\textsuperscript{31}

While the theological thematic is, by definition, always that power which determines all that is, Pannenberg argues that it is the question: "what unifies and determines the totality of reality?" which forms the interface between theology and philosophy. Philosophy is concerned not with isolated particularities but with "the being of beings... reality in general".\textsuperscript{32} In dealing with reality as a whole one cannot avoid the question concerning the nature of reality's unifying factor; in other words, "What is common to all existing things and what it is that makes all that exists a unity as a single reality".\textsuperscript{33} This question, says Pannenberg, is a question concerning God and it is one that cannot be avoided by philosophy without "contradicting itself".\textsuperscript{34}
In its treatment of reality in general philosophy is obliged to make assumptions concerning the whole of reality and such assumptions, argues Pannenberg, cannot be made in isolation from the question about "the possibility of such a totality, of the unity which unifies it" - in other words, God. The fundamental difference therefore between philosophy and theology is that while the former may postpone the question of God, the latter may only engage in a study of the totality of reality in relation to the divine reality which determines it. Once again we are returned to the twin poles of problematic and thematic within Pannenberg's conception of the theological enterprise. Our idea of God must "illuminate experience of the world" if it is to carry any conviction. "To this extent experience of the world" - the problematic - "and the search for the power that ultimately determines it" - the thematic - "is even today essential to any attempt to gain knowledge about the reality of God".

As we have already noted in our preliminary remarks Pannenberg sees not the natural world but human experience of it as the source for our knowledge of God.

Access to the idea of God... is no longer possible directly from the world, but only through man's self-understanding and his relation to the world.

Such an understanding of the knowledge of God prompts the question how and in what way do the totality of reality and the divine reality which determines it exist in human experience? Clearly reality in its totality is not accessible to us in view of its still on-going development. The future, argues Pannenberg, is still open. The temporal and historic nature of reality renders our experience of it necessarily provisional and incomplete. This gives rise to a serious problem. If, as Pannenberg has already claimed, experience of particularity is only possible in the light of the idea of totality yet the totality of reality is not available to us, in that we may only experience it incompletely, then from whence do we derive this concept of totality which makes experience possible at all? Pannenberg suggests that this problem might be overcome by means of hypothetical models of the totality of meaning:

The totality of reality does not exist anywhere complete. It is only anticipated as a totality of meaning. The totality which is an essential framework for any item of experience to have determinate meaning does not exist at any point as a totality; rather, it can only be imagined by transcending what exists at any point. This
anticipation, without which... no experience is possible at all, always involves an element of hypothesis, of subjective conjecture, which must be confirmed - or rejected - by subsequent experience." 

This understanding of an anticipated totality of meaning is of vital importance to Pannenberg for he maintains that it is only within such models that the reality of God is present. It is for this reason that Pannenberg can assert that while "God is not present to human experience as one object among others" he is nonetheless present, albeit indirectly, "only on the assumption that the reality of God is co-given to experience in other objects". Furthermore, in so far as models of the totality of meaning are always subjective, anticipatory hypotheses which are historical in nature, then the co-givenness of the divine reality, God's self-revelation, is also historical. This is the very basis for Pannenberg's characteristic understanding of revelation as history.

if the totality of reality itself is still incomplete and is at any time a totality only by anticipation in subjective models of meaning... it follows not only that the particular experience of reality as a whole must be subjective, but also that it must be historical, and it further follows that the reality of God can make itself known only in the same way that reality as a whole has always been experienced, that is, historically.

In the light of this understanding of God's presence being co-given with models of the totality of meaning, Pannenberg maintains that all talk of the totality of reality takes the form of religious language. Furthermore all expressions of the unity of human experience may rightly be perceived as religious phenomena, and in both these cases the presence or absence of God-language is seen as irrelevant.

Pannenberg goes on to qualify this last point by suggesting that while individual religious experience may be regarded as the building blocks of "the great historical religions", it is only within these socially organized religions that such experiences become "intersubjectively valid truth". In other words, it is the historical religions rather than individual religious experiences alone which must be regarded as the expressions of the experience of divine reality within the totality of meaning of experienced reality.
We shall be returning to Pannenberg's treatment of the importance of the history of religions in this chapter.

So, what then does Pannenberg understand the task of theology to be? Quite simply, the task of theology is the testing of religious traditions. Theological investigation takes the form of an inquiry into the claim of religious traditions to worship, or at least describe, the all-determining reality. In this respect theology may be regarded as the science of religion, although not of religion in general but of specific historic religions such as Christianity. Thus,

The method of a theology of religion and religions is to test religious traditions by the standard of their own understanding of the divine reality... it tackles the... important question of whether the particular tradition has fulfilled in one historical situation, or now fulfils, the claim implicit in its talk of a God with power over reality. Does it, in other words, provide an interpretative approach to reality which gives insight into the way it is experienced in practice? The superiority of the Christian religion for Pannenberg relies on its ability to demonstrate, under critical scrutiny, its capacity for providing the best unification of human experience into a total understanding of reality currently possible, and to demonstrate also that this "anticipatory grasp of reality as a totality" be understood as the self-communication of God. Pannenberg makes it perfectly clear that claims concerning divine reality are to be tested not against any form of supernaturally revealed dogma but in the light of their "implications" for the interpretation of experienced reality. Because experienced reality is historical, theology itself is therefore historical. Pannenberg thus maintains that

The presence of the all-determining reality in a historical phenomenon can be investigated only through an analysis of the totality of meaning implicit in the phenomenon.

Pannenberg is not unaware of the possibility that our hypothetical models of the totality of reality might take on the character of "unwarranted dogmatism." Although such hypotheses are necessarily presupposed in all experiences of reality this does not mean that they need remain critically unexamined, nor does it exempt them from revision.
Pannenberg is ultimately concerned to show how theological statements take the form of hypothetical utterances concerning the meaning of our experience of reality. Such speech takes place in the light of the theological thematic—that is, God as the all-determining reality—and the theological problematic, that being the indirect co-givenness of this divine reality within historical human experience. This historical form of human experience of the divine reality demands that theological statements submit to hermeneutical criteria. By this Pannenberg means that the process by which religious experience is transmitted and received in particular historical forms must be brought under constant examination. The reason for this has to do with the religious material's "implications on a changed horizon of experience". In other words theology has as its concern not a collection of static doctrines, but the study of the process whereby the religious hypotheses of a tradition are transformed in the light of an alteration in the historical perspective. Pannenberg suggests therefore that the Christian religion, for example, ought to be studied as "a process of transmission" rather than as a "system of doctrines and rites".

We shall turn now to a more detailed examination of the importance of the history of religions in Pannenberg's thinking particularly as this relates to his understanding of the superiority of the Christian tradition.

**Theology and the History of Religion**

It is this conception of the theological enterprise which places Pannenberg in opposition to dogmatic theologians such as Barth. By placing emphasis upon the historical manifestation of the divine reality within the process of human history, Pannenberg understands revelation and the religious cults which seek to interpret it as essentially provisional in nature. The provisionality of divine realization in history makes it necessary for all religions to remain open to their own transformation, to their future. Failure to maintain an attitude of such openness results in what Pannenberg calls the finitization of religion, where the infinite God who is always making himself known anew is reduced to a static archetype or tradition.

In the opening paragraphs of his essay "Toward a Theology of the History of Religion" Pannenberg allies himself with the concerns
of Paul Tillich, who challenged Christian theology to develop an attitude to the history of religions which was neither supranaturalistically exclusivist in the manner of Barth, nor abstractly naturalistic in the manner of the Enlightenment. In this Pannenberg recognises the influence of one of Tillich's teachers, Ernst Troeltsch:

Tillich's shift to the questions of Ernst Troeltsch takes on the significance of an impressive omen. The longer theology persists in a kerygmatic approach that permits no questioning of the truth of the kerygma itself, the longer the urgent questions concerning Christianity as a religion among the religions... are put off, the greater must be the devastation that will occur when it awakens from its kerygmatic dreaming. The recent discussions about a Christian atheism provide a foretaste of this.60

Pannenberg clearly takes up this challenge, expressing real concern that unless Christian theology engages seriously with the critical study of religions, then it will be in no position to distinguish itself from said religions. Such a lack of distinction would render Christianity susceptible to the general critiques of religion as voiced by such as Feuerbach and Freud.61

Despite all this however Pannenberg finds that he must take issue with Troeltsch in that the latter's theology does not allow for any claims to ultimacy by the Christian religion. This he attributes to a failure on Troeltsch's part "to take seriously the presence of the eschaton in Jesus and in primitive Christianity."62 It is here that we come to the crux of the particularity of the Christian religion for Pannenberg.

The ultimacy of the Christian revelation can be illuminating, not as a supranaturalistic presupposition, but only if it can result from an unprejudiced understanding of the total process of the universal history of religion.63

We shall return to this issue and its Christological significance for Pannenberg later.

Pannenberg is concerned to identify, through the study of religions, the fundamental mutualities which exist between religions and which might indicate a deeper underlying relationship between them. As a means of discovering such kinships Pannenberg regards the approach of the phenomenology of religion to be fundamentally flawed. His primary reason for this evaluation is that it "abstracts from the historical particularity of its material"64; in other words, it
fails to take into account the provisional and thus "historically alterable" nature of religion. The phenomenological method proceeds as if "'the' religious life has remained essentially the same throughout time". Such a view is clearly at odds both with Pannenberg's anthropology and also with his understanding of the reality of God.

As regards the former, Pannenberg makes it clear that, the general anthropological sciences notwithstanding, man is a fundamentally historical being and as such is essentially in transformation. Thus, "it is only through historical portrayal that one comes as close as possible to the actual course of the concrete life of man". With regard to the latter, the coming to appearance of the divine reality for man is always, argues Pannenberg, an experience of all-encompassing power, which takes place "within the horizon of current experience of existence". Pannenberg talks about the experience of divine reality - that is, acts of God - as "happenings" (Widerfahrunis) which occur within the concrete experience of historical humanity. Thus "happenings of divine reality are historical events". It is precisely for this reason that questions concerning the veracity of religious claims about the reality of God or gods have to do with the history of religions.

Thus we find that both human beings and the experience of divine power are historical in nature. Consequently only a history of religions can provide us with an adequate understanding of humanity's religious experiences. In pursuit of this endeavour, however, we are warned by Pannenberg against adopting the notion of a universal religion, in the manner of Hegel, of which the particular historical religions are merely types. It is important for Pannenberg that specific religions are regarded as both essentially open to their own transformation - which might take the form of a syncretistic union with other religions - and as related to other religions by more than mere historical succession.

Above all, it is no longer possible to coordinate, with Hegel, any particular religion with a single stage of the total process of the religious development of mankind, once one has become aware of the profound changes one and the same religion undergoes in the course of its history. ... As a rule, the growth of religions has taken place in the form of adjacent processes, sometimes in mutual interaction, less frequently as a succession in which one religion accomplishes the dissolution of another....
So where does the historian of religion look to find the fundamental unity of the religions? Pannenberg clearly recognizes that "The religions of mankind have as little unity at the outset as mankind itself". Yet it is this phrase "at the outset" which gives us the clue to Pannenberg's attempted resolution of this problem. Characteristically, the unity of the multifarious religious traditions is not to be found in common archetypes or shared origins, but rather in a future destiny. This destiny is achieved via the competitive conflict which arises when particular religions, with their own specific understandings of the unity of human experience and the meaning of human existence, collide with each other.

Pannenberg here begins to introduce the distinctiveness of the Christian religion as he writes: "One can begin to speak of a global process of integration for the first time in relation to the history of Christian missions and the Islamic conquests." The relevance, even the "saving power" and thus the "truth" of a religion is, argues Pannenberg, a function of its ability to "provide a basis for a universal unity in the experience of reality". When religions contend with each other a process of integration takes place, the result of which is a syncretistic religion which provides a more total view of reality, by virtue of the potency of its God or gods, than did the original competing religious perspectives. Indeed Pannenberg regards Christianity as affording "the greatest example of syncretistic assimilative power" in its absorption not only of Greek philosophical thought but also of the mediterranean religious traditions.

Thus by means of its thrust towards a universal mission, Christianity has become the ferment for the rise of a common religious situation of the whole of mankind. And only in relation to this it is possible to speak of a general religious history of mankind. The unity of the history of religions is therefore not to be found in their beginnings but rather in their end.

Thus for Pannenberg, as we have noted earlier, one of the fundamental task of theology in its study of the history of religions involves the examination of the basis and shape of the unity of religions, as the historical disclosure of that unity of the divine reality towards which human beings are orientated. To refer to our previous quotation, the task of theology is to explore the "ferment" out of which a unified religion will arise.
The key to Pannenberg's understanding of the progressive unification of the world's religions lies ultimately in his understanding of God, an understanding that he regards as common to all the major religious orientations. It is because mankind has always construed its gods as "powers determining the totality of reality" that conflict over the nature of reality takes place when religions collide. Indeed it is at this level of "reality-reference" (Wirklichkeitsbezug), as Pannenberg calls it, that the religious perspective per se enters into conflict with the atheism of Feuerbach. Feuerbach's understanding of religious experience as merely the expression of human psychological states is a critique which operates at the level of the debate concerning "the fundamental structures of human behaviour". As we shall see later, Pannenberg is concerned to engage with this anthropological debate in an attempt to indicate, contra Feuerbach, the structural orientation of human beings towards God.

However, while "the anthropological argument is decisive for the atheistic criticism of religion", the situation is not so straightforward for those seeking to affirm a religious perspective. The abstractness of structural language concerning human existence, particularly as in relation to divine reality, must be overcome by reference to the actual concrete experience of divine power within the history of human existence. That is what Pannenberg means when he speaks of an act of God, or a "happening" of divine power:

The gods of religion confront men as realities distinct from themselves because they are experienced as powers over the whole of men's existence including the world.

It is this experience of the totalising effect of divine power over human existence which is the subject matter for theology. Through religious language we seek to articulate both the nature of this unifying power and also our orientation towards it. Insofar as these experiences of divine power are historical in nature, their analysis necessitates a perspective on the history of religions as the history of those powerful events which unify the totality of human experience and which point towards a common destiny.

...granted that what is at stake for man in his being referred to that mystery is essentially the wholeness of his own being and therefore of the universal truth that unites all men, as well as the unity of the world and the correspondence of his existence with this, it follows that this mystery
will confront his particularity in events which illuminate a wider range of his experience of existence and in fact will encounter him as a power over at least one aspect of his existence and of his world as a whole.\textsuperscript{e7}

Once again we see that it is within history that God reveals himself in a definitive way. This coming to appearance of the divine takes the form of an historical succession, where each revelation of the divine reality is always provisional. It is this very provisionality which is at the heart of the divine infinite, argues Pannenberg. Indeed he goes as far as to suggest that in most instances the successive stages of the divine coming to appearance conflict and contradict each other.\textsuperscript{e6}

Nevertheless, despite this provisionality Pannenberg wishes to maintain that history, rather than being characterized by the elusiveness of some future divine destiny, is to be seen as the actual coming to appearance of this destiny. So, although mankind attempts to close off religion from the future, by living in unhistorical relation to primordial myths and archetypes and traditions, the historical nature of religious experience constantly brings about religious transformation:

...archaic people close themselves off from the historic future. But in actuality, and against their own will, all religions stand within a process of history that does not allow the allegedly archetypal contents of their myths to continue to exist as perfect exemplars, but alters them and in this way unmasks their provisionality... In the repetition of ever renewed critical revision of every one of its stages, the history of religions is the unending path along which the infinite destination of man for the infinite God moves toward its appropriate realization and, indeed, even comes to be manifested...\textsuperscript{e9}

Pannenberg makes clear in the strongest terms that it is the very reality of the divine being, or beings, which is thrown into question by the history of religions. In the history of religions we have to do with the rise and fall of divinities, as once supreme and totalizing gods give way to a new understanding of the divine that is better able to make sense of the totality of human existence.\textsuperscript{90}

It is here that we find expressed the uniqueness of the Judaeo-Christian tradition for Pannenberg. With the religion of Israel we encounter a distinct orientation to the future, encapsulated in the
hoped-for redemption by Yahweh from national exile. However, despite this apocalyptic perspective, there still persisted a residual tendency to look back, toward archetypical divine events such as the Exodus and the giving of the law at Sinai. It was only with Jesus' message of the eschatological kingdom, which had already come in power, that a complete turning toward the future was initiated. While non-Christian religions, due to their closedness to the future and thus to their own transformation, were only aware of the appearance of God in a limited and fragmentary manner, Christianity perceives the revelation of God in its "inexhaustibility". This definitive appearance of God's future reign within human history is identified by Pannenberg with the person of Jesus of Nazareth, and it is thus to Pannenberg's Christology that we now turn.

Jesus as the Anticipation of the Power of the Future

If we are to understand what it is that Pannenberg regards as essentially determinative for human existence, and thus for human sociality, we must consider two related themes which characterize his theological programme. The first we have already dealt with—that is, the essentially historical nature of human existence and its orientation towards the divine power of the future, whose coming to appearance in history is articulated within mankind's religious traditions. The aforementioned traditions must, as we have seen, be continually open to their own transformation in the light of more integrative disclosures of the divine mystery. It is mankind's orientation towards this common, unified destiny which, as we shall later see, forms the basis for Pannenberg's understanding of human sociality.

The second theme, prolegomenal to Panenberg's whole enterprise, is his understanding of Jesus of Nazareth as the historical person in whom God has come to appearance. Pannenberg makes it quite clear that Christianity has as its foundation not the abstracted teaching of Jesus, but Jesus the historical man.

The Christian faith is founded on the historical person—that is to say, not on his teaching or anything else which can be detached from him as a person, but on this particular man.

Pannenberg's Christology, while differing from that of Barth in its primarily historical—-as opposed to dogmatic—-shape, does share an
important similarity with the Barthian Christology. This similarity is summed up in one of the final sections of *Jesus, God and Man*, entitled "The summation of Humanity in Jesus Christ". Pannenberg himself acknowledges his indebtedness to Barth at this point, when he writes

Barth has... made theology conscious anew of the mediation of all other elections both of the community and of the individual, through the election of Jesus Christ. Further, building on the solid heritage of Reformed covenant theology, Barth has grasped the relation between Jesus and the whole of God's history with humanity more profoundly than most contemporary theologians. For him the unity of God with man in Jesus Christ is the fulfilment of the community with man which God had always planned in his covenant.

Where Pannenberg takes issue with Barth is over the latter's prototypical understanding of the person of Jesus Christ, and his relationship with humanity. While for Barth the divine act of the election of humanity in Christ takes the form of "a hidden decree of the eternal God without involving his historical revelation in Jesus Christ" for Pannenberg God's election of humanity in Jesus is coordinate with Jesus' historical mission.

....only in the function of his historical mission of service to humanity toward the coming Kingdom of the Father is he as a person God's elect, on whom is decided the election or rejection of all other men. He is not God's elect in his own right, but in his service to the people of God who are elected by the Father through him.

It is at the resurrection of the man Jesus that his divinity, in other words his identification with the futurity of God's reign, is confirmed. Furthermore, this confirmation of Jesus' divinity has, says Pannenberg, "retroactive power" over the whole of Jesus' pre-Easter activity. Having made this point, Pannenberg is concerned not to give the impression that he believes Jesus' divinity to be a "consequence of his resurrection... Jesus did not simply become something that he previously had not been". By raising Jesus from the dead God both confirms his divine authority and makes his "divine Sonship" manifest.

Clearly Pannenberg's ontology of eschatological determinacy must be kept in mind here. It is that mode of existence for which a person or thing is destined that is essential to its being. Thus Jesus' destiny to be raised from the dead by God, constituting the one
unique and wholly sufficient revelation of God, is ontologically determinative for his entire existence.99

Resurrection from the dead, argues Pannenberg, is not only integral to the Judaeo-Christian apocalyptic expectation, but also to the very structure of human existence. It is humanity's hope for the future which permits it to cope so well with the inevitability of death. Pannenberg draws on the thought of Ernst Bloch here when he writes:

Ernst Bloch has expressed the suspicion 'that death... can only be suppressed so well because new life was once hidden behind it, that is, it was dreamed about and believed to be there.'100

The fulfilment of human existence, maintains Pannenberg, would appear to be a "foolish" notion in the face of death. Only hope oriented to a future resurrection from death provides humanity with the strength to live in spite of the grave. Pannenberg identifies this hope with humanity's openness to the world (Weltoffenheit), as perceived by contemporary anthropology. We will consider this at greater length in due course. Furthermore this openness to the surrounding environment is indicative of a more fundamental openness to that which transcends the finite: in other words, an orientation towards the God whose future reign will bring about the fulfilment of human destiny.

The phenomenology of hope indicates that it belongs to the essence of conscious human existence to hope beyond death. This supposition is confirmed by consideration of that specific element in human existence summarily expressed in the language of modern anthropology by the concept of man's openness in relation to the world (Weltoffenheit) or his environmental freedom (Umweltfreiheit). More precisely, this concept involves an openness that goes beyond every finite situation.101

In the light of this anthropological datum Pannenberg maintains that although the Judeo-Christian apocalyptic may no longer be valid for modern man per se, "Its fundamental elements, the expectation of a resurrection of the dead in connection with the end of the world and the Final Judgment can still remain true even for us."102

Thus, with the resurrection of the man Jesus we have to do, says Pannenberg, with the proleptic experience of the end of the world. It is in the resurrection of Jesus that the future destiny of man to be raised from death to communion with God is made actual for us in
history. Indeed it is this unique historical event which constitutes the very act of God's self-revelation. For Pannenberg,

The Christ event is God's revelation... only to the extent that it brings the beginning of the end of all things. Therefore, Jesus' resurrection from the dead... is the actual event of revelation.¹⁰³

Indeed, following Barth's identification of the Revealer and what is revealed Pannenberg seeks to establish an identity of essence between Jesus and God, founded upon the historical event of the resurrection. It is here that we may find the basis of Pannenberg's unique understanding of the doctrine of the Trinity. Rather than being, as is characteristically the case, a piece of dogmatic speculation, the doctrine of the Trinity is for Pannenberg historical in nature. It issues out of the identification of Jesus with the divine essence at his resurrection and coupled with his perceived distinction from the Father during his ministry.¹⁰⁴

It should now be quite clear that the historical nature of the theological enterprise is absolutely central to Pannenberg's thought. Human being is for Pannenberg historical being and the God who makes sense of this historical existence reveals himself in that history and is the lord of that history. Consequently we shall find that in accordance with his primary anthropological concern with human self-understanding Pannenberg's analysis of relationality takes the form of an examination of the human experience and understanding of the historical reality of a shared world or "culture"¹⁰⁵ and ultimately of a common destiny to community with all humanity under God and empowered by Jesus and his message of salvation.¹⁰⁶ We shall turn now to an examination of these issues as they relate to Pannenberg's treatment of the phenomena of human relationality.

**Anthropology and human communality**

We shall be drawing most of the material for our discussion of human relationality in Pannenberg from his recent work on theological anthropology, *Anthropology in Theological Perspective*. This is for the very obvious reason that it represents his most comprehensive and mature treatment of the issues and questions. We shall of course be referring to the Pannenberg corpus in general wherever it is appropriate for clarification or for highlighting the remarkable single-mindedness and consistency exhibited in Pannenberg's work over the last two decades.
Although it is always a somewhat arbitrary exercise to attempt to identify a "centre" or "lynch-pin" to a person's theology, we shall do so here by way of providing a starting point for our analysis. In resorting to this approach we do not intend to reduce Pannenberg's thought to the level of one over-arching notion, but rather to use this notion as a way into a very complex theological programme which, in our view, defies any attempt at entering at random which forces the reader to engage with it only at certain key points. The concept that we have chosen as at least one entrance into Pannenberg's anthropological thought, is that of exocentricity or openness, and its obverse egocentricity or centredness. The reason for this choice ought to be clear to anyone who is familiar with Pannenberg's work in that the notion of exocentricity touches his theology at every point. It is with this concept that anthropology, metaphysics, Christology and dogmatic theology find their point of engagement for Pannenberg.

In modern anthropology Pannenberg identifies, particularly in the writings of Max Scheler and Helmuth Plessner, the concept of "openness to the world", by which is intended humanity's spiritual being which is "no longer subject to its drives and its environment" but is "free from the environment". This notion of openness, argues Pannenberg, witnesses to the religious and specifically Christian thematic in which "the essence of human being is seen as a destiny that will be achieved only in the future". It is this destiny which constitutes God's image in human beings, as we shall see later, and which represents the point at which fundamental-theological anthropology and dogmatic anthropology meet. Dogmatic anthropology, says Pannenberg, has as its central themes the image of God in human beings, and the notion of human sin. These two dogmatic themes, argues Pannenberg, are also central for any theological interpretation of non-theological anthropological analysis. However neither of these two themes must be seen as irrevocably wedded to what Pannenberg regards as the now outdated world-view which gave rise to the classical doctrines of the original state and the fall:

If we avoid this prejudice, we will see that the doctrines of the image of God and sin thematize the two basic aspects found in the most varied connections between anthropological phenomena and the reality of God. To speak of the image of God in human being is to speak of their closeness to the divine reality, a closeness that also determines their position in the world of nature. To speak of
sin, on the other hand, is to speak of the factual separation from God of human beings whose true destiny nonetheless is union with God; sin is therefore to be thematized as a contradiction of human beings with themselves, an interior conflict in the human person. 

The Christological thematic is introduced when Christianity asserts that it is only through Christ that human beings are freed from the bondage of sin, or closedness, and reconciled to God, which is their ultimate destiny. It is thus reconciliation in Christ which frees human beings for true humanity as the image of God. We shall consider Pannenberg's Christological understanding in more detail in a subsequent section of this chapter.

The notion of exocentricity or openness has its distinctive metaphysical manifestation in Pannenberg's understanding of the so-called ontological priority of the future. We shall not attempt a full explication of Pannenberg's metaphysics at this point, but as it is such an important element within his theology it is necessary that we outline it, albeit briefly, before we proceed any further.

In an article which analyses Pannenberg's philosophical foundations, R.D. Pasquariello identifies "four notions which function as postulates" for Pannenberg's understanding of truth:

1. Truth is historical in nature.
2. As truth is a whole, ultimate truth is accessible only from the perspective of the end of history.
3. Truth and reality "as-a-whole" are identical.
4. The truth of a being is determined by its future destiny.

The Hegelian ancestry of Pannenberg's thinking is obvious here. Truth, argues Pannenberg, is coextensive with the process of history. The corollary of this, as has already been noted at the beginning of this chapter, is that any comprehension of the truth at a point within the historical process is always merely provisional with respect to the ultimate truth which is resolved only at the eschaton. It also follows that the truth of any contingent individual, that is to say its essence, is a function of its future. In other words it is determined by its ultimate destiny which is established not at some primordial beginning, but rather at the end of history itself. It is this understanding of truth and reality which constitutes the basis for Pannenberg's contention that the
future is ontologically prior to all preceding historical reality. Thus for him human openness to the future is ultimately human openness to God, with whom it is our destiny to be in communion. How Pannenberg effects this transition from his understanding of the totality of the future and to God is a moot point and one that we shall subsequently return to.

In the light of the above comments it should be clear why we consider the notion of openness as central to Pannenberg's work, and why it is that we choose to begin our analysis of his understanding of human relationality from this point.

Unlike Barth's thought, there are no convenient dogmatic assertions concerning human relationality in Pannenberg's writings. As we saw in the previous chapter, Barth takes the I-Thou distinction and builds a thoroughly dogmatic and Christological understanding of human relationality as encounter. Indeed, we have made the accusation that for this very reason Barth's view of human sociability is less than fully authentic to human experience. Pannenberg criticises the personalist anthropology, particularly that of Buber, on the grounds that it depends upon separating personal I-Thou relationships from the practical concerns of the human experience of the world, in a way which is nowadays no longer possible.4

As we have already noted, Pannenberg rejects traditional natural theologies which he regards as being bound up with an outmoded preoccupation with the natural order and its presupposed first cause.16 His criticism of I-Thou personalism represents the other side of this same coin. Just as a preoccupation with the impersonal natural order is unhelpful, and indeed no longer viable as the starting point for apprehending the divine reality, so too says Pannenberg, is exclusive or excessive personalism. What is required is an approach which "argues from the existence and experience of human beings in order to show that God is inevitably presupposed in every act of human existence." In other words Pannenberg is suggesting a synthesis of the personalist and naturalist perspectives to form something akin to Hegel's understanding of reality as always being for mind.17 Modern philosophy, he argues... showed increasing determination in conceiving God as a presupposition of human subjectivity and to that extent it thought of him in terms of humanity
and no longer of the world. Not the actual world as such but human experience of the world and of the individual's existence in it repeatedly supplied the point of departure for discussing the reality of God. 116

As we have said, rather than following the Barthian dogmatic which sets out to derive the nature of human relationality from an absolute revelation, Pannenberg seeks to appropriate the theories of the anthropological sciences in an attempt to reinterpret them, according to what he refers to as the religious thematic. Thus, at least in the first instance, much of what Pannenberg has to say concerning the phenomenon of human relationality takes the form of description rather than prescription. For Pannenberg the human experience of relationality is part of the much larger context of human beings' total experience of the world. The corollary of this observation is that in attempting to identify the anthropological factors which Pannenberg considers relevant to the theme of human communality, we are engaging in a somewhat artificial and piecemeal analysis of his work. This having been said, it is nonetheless an important and necessary piece of analysis in that it highlights an entirely different way of addressing and normalizing the notion of human relationality than that found in theologies such as Barth's and Brunner's, which are dependent upon the pattern of the I-Thou encounter.

Pannenberg begins his anthropological discussion by maintaining the uniqueness of humanity's place in the natural world. Contrary to the views of behavioural science, Pannenberg argues that human beings are by no means limited in their behaviour to an environment and therefore to a sector out of the total reality of the world, a sector that is determined by the vital interests of the species and corresponds to an innate behavioural schema. 119

If such an innate behavioural schema does indeed exist within human beings, then it exists, says Pannenberg, "only in a singularly rudimentary and attenuated form". 120 It is this understanding of humanity's special place in the world which marks philosophical anthropology out from behaviourism, with which it otherwise has much in common. 121

Pannenberg draws on the work of Arnold Gehlen, who regarded the characteristic form of human instinctual behaviour as being one of "natural instability". Thus contrary to the behaviourist views of
men such as Konrad Lorenz and the biologist Jacob von Vexküll that human beings, like animals, have an instinctively limited focal awareness of their surrounding environment, Gehlen argued that human instinctual life is characterized by "plasticity", and a "readiness to deteriorate". Gehlen further argued that unlike animals who may undergo instinctual deterioration at a secondary level via the process of domestication, the readiness to determination in human instinctual life is "primary and not secondary in the case of man".

The reason why this particular piece of anthropological analysis is so important for Pannenberg becomes clear when we find that to describe humanity's special place in the natural order, Gehlen and others have utilized the notion of "openness to the world". Humanity's openness to the world stands in marked contrast to the animal world's limitation to and dependence upon particular environments which are in fact discrete sectors of the totality of the world. Pannenberg singles out Max Scheler, Helmuth Plessner and Arnold Gehlen as the originators of the discipline of philosophical anthropology with its understanding of human being as "open to the world", or as Plessner referred to it, as exocentric.

Scheler, drawing on the vitalist philosophy of Henri Bergson, and particularly his book Matter and Memory, developed a view of human beings as spiritual beings whose spirituality - while manifesting itself in a bodily correlate - is not dependent on or derivative of biological factors. Scheler identified this bodily correlate to humanity's spirituality as the human person's openness to the world. Human beings, rather than being limited by their instinctual drives to an environment determined by their perception of those features significant for personal survival and the survival of the species, are free to inhibit such instincts. It is this act of "voluntary inhibition", argues Scheler, which points to an origin that transcends human biology - in other words, the human spirit. Indeed Scheler goes on to argue that in this act of spiritual transcending of biological factors, human being reveals its unique character as one which transcends life itself, even its own life.

This voluntary inhibition of instincts - which at every point is presupposed in all freedom from inhibition and indeed makes the latter possible to begin with - points precisely, according to Scheler, to that 'which gives man his unique characteristics', that is, to a 'principle opposed to life as such, even to life in man'.
This human spirit which opposes life itself must have a source outside of the process of evolution, maintains Scheler. Such a course, he continues, "can only be located in the highest Ground of Being". In other words, for Scheler humanity's special place in the world is derived ultimately from God.

Helmuth Plessner, although thinking along parallel lines to Scheler, sought to establish a non-metaphysical origin for human exocentricity. In so doing he adopted the notion of exocentric position, by which he sought to describe the uniquely human experience of being centred both within the immediate self - subsequently defined in terms of a central nervous system, in the manner of the rest of the animal world, but also outside of the immediate self. It is the exocentric character of human existence which is witnessed to in our ability to distance ourselves both from the world in which we live and objectify it, and furthermore to stand back from ourselves in acts of self-reflection.

Pannenberg suggests that Plessner's notion of exocentricity is ultimately synonymous with self-consciousness and thus does not entirely disengage from Scheler's notion of spirit, although how Pannenberg identifies self-consciousness with spirit is not clear. Plessner's primary perspective is however non-metaphysical in that it seeks to establish human exocentricity not upon any transcendent grounds ultimately opposed to life, but rather from within a structurally modified life exhibited in humanity. According to Pannenberg, the weakness of Plessner's understanding lies in his lack of clarity as regards the exact nature of the "outside" in which human beings have their exocentric existence. It is for this reason that Arnold Gehlen chooses to adapt Scheler's notion of openness to the world, rather than Plessner's terminology.

Gehlen sought to develop an understanding of human openness and humanity's special place in the world without adapting either the metaphysics of Scheler or Plessner's view, which had humanity as merely different from other animals by degree. Gehlen maintained that humanity's unique capacity for instinctual inhibition, which Scheler traced back to spirit and thence to God, might be explained as a central structural feature of the human form of life... We are no longer dealing, then, with a special effect produced by some force, but rather
with the specific structure of the human mode of existence itself.\textsuperscript{129}

Gehlen continues to develop this idea by taking Scheler's notion of humanity's inhibition of evolution and refining it into his own conception of human beings as "deficient beings". By this term Gehlen had in mind the work of the anatomist Ludwig Bolk and the zoologist Adolf Portmann. Bolk's work showed the apparently underdeveloped state of human organs, which he described as "foetal states or conditions that have become permanent."\textsuperscript{130} This, argues Gehlen, is an observable physical manifestation of humanity's capacity for biological and evolutionary inhibition. He goes on to appeal to Portmann's description of human beings as "physiologically premature". Human beings, according to Portmann, unlike the other higher animals, appear to be born a year too soon and therefore in an unfinished state. As a result of this enforced prematurity, human beings spend their final year of properly interuterine development exposed to the influences of a social environment.

It is precisely this condition of human deficiency and helplessness with its corresponding need for social support which gives rise to what Gehlen refers to as a "hiatus" between perceptions and impulses. By this Gehlen means that while in animals perception and impulse form a closed system, where the senses only admit those impressions which will trigger the animal's innate instincts, in human beings this is not the case. Human perceptions, argues Gehlen, are not inflexibly wedded to instinctual reactions and thus the closed behavioural mechanism found in animals is not the dominant factor in human life. Our instincts, by virtue of their aforementioned deficiency, are far too indistinct and underdeveloped to be triggered invariably by distinct perceptual stimuli. For this reason human perceptions are given free rein, or, as Pannenberg puts it, "a life of their own",\textsuperscript{131} and we are permitted impressions of the world which are not limited by our instinctual impulses.

Gehlen maintains that humanity both makes up for its instinctual deficiency and copes with the attendant "inundation" of stimuli and perceptions by way of the characteristically human activity of language and culture-building.

Through their action they ease the burden of the complex multiplicity of stimuli that pour in on them by creating in language a symbolic universe that enables them to render manageable the profusion of impressions. In Gehlen's view, language is the fundamental instance of human creative cultural
activity. The concept of action includes, for Gehlen, all cognitive processes and cultural achievements... for Gehlen human beings are beings who create themselves by gaining control of their world. 132

While Pannenberg is in agreement with Gehlen's understanding of human being as cultural being he is critical of his tendency to regard human openness to the world as unqualified, a weakness found in many of the other thinkers concerned with exocentricity 133, and as representing a given state rather than a process of human self-realization.

Pannenberg finds support for his understanding of human exocentricity as a process in the writings of Herder. Indeed he points out that Gehlen regarded Herder as the forerunner of his own work. 134 Yet there are, observes Pannenberg, major differences between the view of Herder and those of Gehlen. Unlike Gehlen, Herder does not regard human action as the source of human self-realization. While humanity must indeed construct a world for itself in the light of its instinctual alienation from the animal world, nevertheless this process of self-development is by no means the unique result of human activity. In Herder's view humanity has a disposition towards self-improvement, this disposition taking the form of reason and freedom. Further, this innate "direction for human life" 135 is regarded by Herder - as in Scheler - as having its source in God: indeed it is identified by Herder with the image of God which replaces basic animal instinct in human beings.

We shall be considering the importance of the imago dei for Pannenberg in the following section of this chapter. However it is important that we touch on this matter briefly here, as it is relevant to Pannenberg's understanding of human self-realization as being a teleological process, dependent upon external factors.

Herder maintains that the image of God in humanity corresponds to instincts in animals, in that both provide direction to the respective lives of those beings. Furthermore the imago is a teleological concept in that it represents a standard or goal to be achieved. It is for this reason that Herder can write "we are not yet men, but are daily becoming so." 136 Thus the imago dei and the essence of human being are intrinsically related for Herder. But if the present human experience of the image of God is as a disposition towards teleological self-realization, the question arises how is it
that we achieve our ultimate entelechy? As we have noted, Herder does not regard human self-development as being the result of human activity. Pannenberg observes of Herder that "... he says explicitly that human beings are unable to 'hew art' or 'fashion' themselves." It is to education that Herder looks for human self-development, and by education he has in mind the twin elements of tradition and learning coupled with reason and experience. The former of these two elements involves human beings' interaction with each other, and is particularly germane to our present concern with human relationality. Pannenberg quotes Herder on this point:

no one of us became man of himself: the whole structure of his humanity is connected by a spiritual birth, education, with his parents, teachers, friends; with all the circumstances of his life, and consequently with his countrymen and their forefathers; and lastly with the whole chain of the human race.

Of course there is an element of individual participation in this process of self-becoming. I must cooperate with tradition and learning via the exercise of my reason and experience — in other words by the use of my "organic powers" which, in turn, are stimulated by the external influences of tradition. In this respect we are not simply passive receptors but actively engage with learning and tradition. Ultimately it is divine providence working through these two factors which provides Herder with the guarantee that humanity will achieve its destiny:

Learning and tradition, on the one hand, and reason and experience, on the other, contribute to the achievement of this destiny only because in the collaboration of these factors divine providence is also at work and, through the mediation of other human beings, forming individuals for the good to which they are destined, educating them, that is, to be the image of God.

Herder is significant for Pannenberg in two ways; firstly in his understanding of openness to the world as descriptive of a process which has "the human subject for its result" and secondly for his insistence that this process of human becoming cannot be understood as the product of the human subject. Where Pannenberg parts company with Herder is at the point at which Herder introduces the idea of divine providence.

If there is to be any justification for Herder's procedure, it must be shown that the religious and theological concepts are not extrinsic to the
It is for this reason that Pannenberg turns to Scheler and Plessner who, as we have seen, argue that the religious thematic, manifested in exocentricity, is essential to the very structure of human life.

For our present purposes two important points have emerged as regards the significance of human relationality in Pannenberg’s thought. Firstly, Pannenberg identifies true humanness, what he calls human essence, with human destiny. This destiny, while being characteristically "not yet", is still - as we found in Herder - determinative for present human existence. Thus for Pannenberg

The present life of human individuals even in the case of radical alienation is still human. The essence or essential nature of being human thus becomes a matter of the destiny of men to be human...\[141\]

Human destiny, argues Pannenberg, is to become the image of God. In this respect Jesus Christ represents the realization of human destiny when he is spoken of in the New Testament as the image of God. We shall consider the significance of Pannenberg’s Christology for our concern with human relationality in a subsequent section of this work. Suffice it to say here that Pannenberg’s anthropology takes as its norm the notion of humanity as being in God’s image.\[142\] In this regard we find ourselves very much in agreement with Pannenberg in that we have suggested that the essentiolity of coadunacy for human being be understood as having its basis in the imago as the point at which the divine communality, that is God in Trinity, is normalised for humanity.\[143\] However, as we shall see later, there is an important question to be asked concerning the extent to which human essence, as future destiny, is determinative for present human existence. Is it, in the manner of Herder, determinative merely in a dispositional sense, as a tendency or direction towards an ultimate good, or is it determinative in the same sense in which Christ as true man is determinative for humanity in Barth’s thinking?

The second of the points, relevant to our concern, which arise out of Pannenberg’s consideration of Herder and the others who have followed him is more immediately germane to the theme of human relationality.
In Herder we noted that human development towards a fully realized identity as in the image of God is not a matter of autonomous self-enhancement but rather involves participation in an exocentric process. Pannenberg concurs with this view refining Herder's exocentric categories of learning and tradition into the notions of human solidarity and human culture;

The way of human beings to the (divine) reality in which they can ultimately ground their exocentric existence and thereby attain to their own identity is thus always mediated through the experience of the external world. This is especially true of the relationship with the other human beings, that is, with beings whose lives are characterized by the same questions and experience.\(^{144}\)

Thus as human beings we are not engaged in what Pannenberg calls an exercise in "Promethean... self-enhancement" but rather in an involvement in the finite world of the other upon which our destiny depends. In this understanding of the finite as performing a mediating function with respect to human being and the infinite, Panennberg admits his indebtedness to Hegel as well as to Herder.\(^{145}\)

So we find that just as with our own notion of coadunacy, Pannenberg identifies openness to the other, both socially and environmentally\(^{146}\) as having to do with the very essence of human being. Indeed he defines human sin in terms of \textit{centredness}, the obverse of openness or exocentricity, by which he understands a radical individualism which serves to alienate the self from the other:

The image of the individual who takes himself or herself to be the centre of his or her life aptly describes the structure of sin... In the Christian tradition this radical individualism is considered as alienation from the authentic destiny of man. When the highest value is no longer universal reason, but individual decision, radical autonomy has been often considered the peak of existential freedom. In a Christian perspective, it can be the darkest alienation from authentic existence, from one's own destiny and identity.\(^{147}\)

However in spite of the value of this understanding of human relatedness in terms of openness and human sin as \textit{centredness} the question of the sufficiency of these conceptions must be raised. While openness to the other, exocentricity, is clearly a prerequisite for human relatedness it cannot be completely identified with the actual experience of human relating. Openness, availability to the other may well constitute the necessary
condition of coadunacy but must not be confused with coadunacy per se as Pannenberg appears to do. Similarly the notion of centeredness or egocentricity as a translation of the concept of sin is also susceptible to the charge of being an insufficient one. Centeredness is for Pannenberg essentially privative characterized by ignorance as regards the proper destiny of man. Following Augustine Pannenberg understands sin as a perversion of human desire which is in essence good; sub ratione boni. This perspective throws into question the nature of sin as wilful rebellion and conscious rejection of both God and the other:

Therefore, no one can leave God behind in the sense that one can deny other, finite possibilities of choice. As Augustine knew, a man does not come into the animosity of sin toward God directly through a naked decision against God. ... Rather, a man falls into sin and thereby into contradiction against God through his relation to things and men, through his refusal to transcend and thereby to affirm his particular finite situation... Men generally do not come to the decision against God as a result of an original free decision, but as a consequence of their behaviour. Here they live in fundamental error about themselves. ... 

In the light of his understanding of sin as having to do with egocentricity and autonomy Pannenberg maintains that although "the eternal value of the individual and of his life" represents one of the most important contributions of Christianity to human existence, nevertheless, human destiny and thus essential humanity "involves the idea of an eschatological community". This community is first and foremost a community with God, indeed it is the Church's role to symbolise this new humanity. However Pannenberg goes further by asserting that

One can stay in communion with God only by participating in his love for the world. Thus, God's love aims at a universal community of human beings in communion with him.

It is the responsibility of the Christian Church therefore to support and encourage other persons towards their destiny to be in the image of God.

The importance of human relationality, or what we have called coadunacy, for Pannenberg is clearly undeniable, and yet there is a tendency, as with all of Pannenberg's work, towards a rather generalized discussion of the issue. Certainly human communality is central for Pannenberg but thus far he has said little to indicate
how such human communality might function. In other words, what the
criteria for relationality might be. The *imago Dei*, which we have
suggested ought to be understood as the source of human coadunacy
in that it mediates the divine communality to us, functions in
Pannenberg's understanding, as we have already seen, as a
description of our ultimate destiny to be in communion with God and
our fellows. While we would wish to argue that human coadunacy
arises out of the same will to self-abandonment exhibited within the
divine community of Father, Son and Holy Spirit, so far Pannenberg
has done little more than indicate that our communality is an
eschatological reality which is determinative for our present
existence. It is this future destiny to which we are orientated that
establishes the structural openness of human existence perceived by
the anthropological sciences. We have already expressed our concern
over Pannenberg's tendency to identify the condition of openness
with the actuality of human relationship and so shall not repeat
ourselves here.

Pannenberg is as concerned to indicate the importance of human
sociality for human self-consciousness as he is to demonstrate its
significance for our procession towards an eschatological destiny.
Indeed both these themes are ultimately continuous for Pannenberg,
drawing on Hegel's *Philosophy of Spirit*, particularly the master and
slave analogy, along with the work of William James and G.H. Mead on
the notion of the *social self*.

Pannenberg asserts that

*...the social reference could not explain the
genesis of self-consciousness were it not that a
being 'present to the other as the other' were
presupposed as a universal basic structure of human
behaviour.*

Thus once again we find that for Pannenberg the social dimension of
human existence is fundamental to the very structure of human being;
in other words, it is essential. He goes on to maintain that

*The concrete explication of these relations that are
implicit in the structure of human behaviour takes
place, of course, in the context of social life.*

To understand this we must return to Pannenberg's previous
discussion of the philosophical anthropologists and zoologists.

As we have seen Pannenberg wishes to relate the development of
individual self-consciousness to the social context. However in
addressing the issue of self-consciousness, he sees no reason why he
should abandon the arena of behavioural analysis for that of psychology. Behavioural research of the kind conducted by Gehlen and Portmann has to do with "behaving" or "self-comporting" individuals and thus, argues Pannenberg, deals with the subject in its entirety. In other words, Pannenberg regards human bodily behaviour as corresponding fully with the "appearance of self-consciousness"; that is to say in the tensive relationship between centrality and exocentricity. Only in the treatment of self-consciousness as it relates to the totality of human life can behavioural science adequately fulfil its brief, which is the description of human external behaviour.

In that it is human self-consciousness which represents for Pannenberg "the place where the struggle for identity must be carried out", the question arises concerning the role of the social context for human identity-forming. Pannenberg has already maintained that the struggle for identity, that is the resolution of the tension between the centrality of the ego and our exocentric destiny, takes place within and is in some sense generative of self-consciousness. Having made this point he tables the following question, which he clearly wishes to answer in the affirmative:

Is human exocentricity perhaps to be defined as sociality? Do human beings perhaps live outside themselves, extra se to the extent that they live by participating in the enveloping context of their social and cultural world with its traditions?

Pannenberg regards human sociality as ultimately a cultural phenomenon, by which he means that it has both a biological and a symbolic referent. There is more to human sociality than a mere animal pack-instinct. This is not to deny the biological data which points towards humanity's distinctive social relations. We have already noted Arnold Gehlen's view that human beings, in the light of their alienation from the natural world of instinct, are fundamentally cultural beings in that they must create a cultural environment in order to survive. Adolf Portmann's understanding of human being as "physiologically premature" prompts him to recognize that the uniquely human functions such as speech and particular modes of behaviour, which develop during our first year of life, are from the outset phenomena that have a social imprint... from the very beginning they are influenced in their formation by the fact of social contact.
Here Pannenberg once again identifies the religious thematic. Following Herder's notion of the image of God, Pannenberg argues that it is the very incomplete and thus necessarily social nature of human being which militates against it being the creator of its own social environment. Action of this type, argues Pannenberg, presupposes a completed subject while human being is a being in becoming, a developing ego. This "chicken and egg" dilemma of whether humanity creates culture or vica versa can only be resolved with reference to the eschatological destiny of humanity, which is at least dispositionally determinative for present human existence.

As we have previously noted Pannenberg rejects the dialogical personalism of Buber as a way of understanding the significance of human social relations. The I-Thou encounter, argues Pannenberg, who is following Theunissen here, is never developed into a positive description of relationality but rather depends upon a via negativa that defines I-Thou encounter as the obverse of I-It relations. Furthermore the theological manifestations of this form of personalism tended to simply invert the I-Thou relation prioritizing the Thou, in this case God, and transforming it into the sovereign I. Pannenberg is similarly unhappy with both the implied denegation of the I-it relation, that is to say our involvement in a shared objective world, and what he regards as the danger of the possible justification of a withdrawal from the modern technicized world which is controlled by the I-It relation and from the anonymity of social mechanisms.

It is these perceived deficiencies in the I-Thou encounter model which prompts Pannenberg to look elsewhere for a proper understanding of human sociality.

Pannenberg recognises a more significant development of the theme of the ego's social relationship to the other in the work of G.H. Mead. Mead, following William James, drew the distinction between the spontaneous ego or I and the ego that is the object of self-reflection - that is, the me or the self. Mead was concerned to identify the way in which human beings externalise themselves in the process of self-objectification. Pannenberg comments upon this concern by observing that The object of this question is nothing less than the genesis of the human form of life which we have already seen, with Plessner, to be characterized by exocentricity.
Pannenberg is, understandably, favourably disposed towards Mead's insistence that human self-consciousness issues out of a process of becoming, rather than representing a "primordial datum of human subjectivity". Our ability to objectify ourselves in the process of self-reflection, argues Mead, arises out of our social engagement with other persons. This process demands of human beings that they exist extra se; that is to say that they put themselves in the place of the other. It is this exocentric or social self which is the me of reflection. Mead suggests that the way in which the social self realizes itself, that is places itself with the other, is via the medium of gestures and movements.

It is in having our gestures interpreted and returned to us by way of response by the other that we are able to reflect upon ourselves. Mead amplifies upon this by pointing out that vocal utterances are essentially vocal gestures and that the responses we receive from others as a result of these gestures permits us to apprehend the meaning and significance of these gestures. It is in this manner that we put ourselves in the place of the other.

The possibility of self-reflection in human beings is based, therefore, on the fact that they perceive their own vocal utterances and experience the reaction of others to these as a reaction to the sound they have produced. They thereby put themselves in the situation and role of the other and are able to see themselves from the vantage point of the other and thus from a distance, as it were.

While Pannenberg sees much of value in this view he also recognises its fundamental difficulties. It is not easy to identify the basis for the unity of the ego and the self in Mead's thinking. Pannenberg points out that in as much as it is the ego which composes the social self, via the act of reflection, then it is the ego that is ultimately constitutive for the self and not the social process as Mead would clearly have it be. Further, there is a problem with any notion of a unified self-image in that the social self must inevitably engage with a broad variety of others, each of whom will present us with a different image of the self that our egos reflect upon. In response to this line of criticism Mead argued that in fact we engage not with individual others but with social groups or generalized others. However this does not fully deal with the problem as there are clearly a multiplicity of such groups also. Ultimately, argues Pannenberg, we must have an
understanding of the social component to human self-realization which touches upon the very ego itself, and does not remain operative merely at the level of an extrinsic social self.

Pannenberg sees the psychoanalytical tradition of Freud as resolving some of the problems apparent in Mead's theory of the self. Freud, rather than looking to generalized social groups for the source of the ego's self-image, turns instead to our specific identification with our parents or more specifically to their idealized superego. 16 It is in the overcoming of the Oedipus complex that the narcissistic ego, Pannenberg's centered "I", gives way to real ego; that is, an exocentric mastery of reality. 17 Even in the more developed forms of Freudianism as expounded by Heinz Hartmann and Erik Erikson the problem of the unity of the ego and the self still pertains:

... are not ego and self identical? Am I not myself? And is not my self my self only because I am identical with it? But if I and my self are in fact identical, then a change in my self necessarily means a change in my ego as well. At this point, the question does of course arise: Who is it, then, that accomplishes the process of change? 171

Pannenberg seeks to resolve this problem by prioritizing the self as the foundation for the ego's stability. In this way he seeks to demonstrate that both the self and the ego are socially determined. 172 The ego, he argues, contrary to its treatment in the idealism of Fichte, is not to be regarded as a self-positing unchanging subject, which lies behind all alterations in the extrinsic self. Rather it is to be regarded as relating to the existential moment of identity with the self: only in this moment does the ego establish its identity and continuity. In this respect the individual person is socially determined at every level of its identity formation.

Only indirectly, insofar as the "I" of the isolated moment is known as identical with "myself", and therefore as the mentally present manifestation of that totality of states, qualities and actions that in the eyes of a 'generalized other' are to be ascribed to the individual which I am - only in this way does the 'I' as such acquire a continuity that lasts beyond the isolated moment. 173

Despite all of this, says Pannenberg, we are by no means passive in this process of identity formation. The individual may accept, reject or ultimately modify the roles and indeed the social self assigned to them. It is in this way that we can be said to define
our own identity and thus, concomitantly, our own cultural environment. Pannenberg continues this line of discussion by attempting to identify that which makes this self-identification possible.

In tackling this issue he turns to the science of developmental psychology and its understanding of the symbiotic nature of a child's relationship to its mother in the early stages of its life. Pannenberg suggests that it is here, where the child's life is not clearly distinguishable from that of its mother, that "we may probably see the ontogenetic point of departure of human exocentricity." By this he means that the symbiotic relationship between mother and child forms the basis for human beings' intense involvement in the external world.

Following Erik Erikson Pannenberg sees the experiences of basic trust as arising out of the mother/child symbiosis. This basic trust is, in the first instance, given to the mother who represents for the child the totality of its world. Subsequently trust broadens to include the father and the larger family. Ultimately the child must disengage from its unique bonding with its parents as the totality of its environment and redirect its basic trust towards the world. Pannenberg quickly points out that this trust in the world is by no means a naïve lack of awareness concerning the negative or antagonistic components within our environment. To ignore these is to retreat into a fantasy world. Such behaviour, he argues,

is not simply to be judged, with Freud, a regression to an infantile attitude towards reality. Such behaviour is also a perversion that is directly opposed to basic trust. For in basic trust, human beings preserve their openness to reality: the reality of other human beings and the world and, via these, the reality of their creator. For in basic trust, human beings preserve their openness to reality: the reality of other human beings and the world and, via these, the reality of their creator.

Basic trust must include what Tillich referred to as "the courage to be" in that it stands in opposition to anxiety and the desire for "limitless wish fulfilment". Trust directs us away from the ego as the foundation of human self-becoming and towards a symbiotic involvement in the totality of the world.

There is certainly some similarity here between Pannenberg's notion of trust and our understanding of coadunacy as arising out of the human capacity for self-abandonment. In that basic trust enables human beings to engage with the world and the other without fear and
in the face of the negative experiences of life, it corresponds with our understanding of the self's abandonment to the other in the full knowledge of the dangers involved in such an act. Pannenberg asserts that "The identifying of oneself with something always requires courage and trust in the soundness of that with which one involves oneself." With this latter qualification we find ourselves at odds with Pannenberg for, although self-abandonment certainly requires courage of us in the face of the risk involved, it is precisely because we cannot be sure of those to whom we abandon ourselves that such an act is courageous. For Pannenberg the act of self-abandonment takes place in the light of "the constancy and reliability of that in which they put their trust," while we would want to maintain that abandonment to the other takes place without any such guarantee. The point of disagreement between Pannenberg's view and our own notion of human coadunacy becomes apparent when we recognise that for Pannenberg basic trust is ultimately to do with selfhood and not with the other as other:

The connection between trust and self-identification makes it clear that in the child's basic trust and in the later actualizations of this the issue is selfhood... As a trust that concerns selfhood and not merely secondary issues, basic trust presupposes in those to whom it is given a commitment to the fostering of the selfhood of the trusting person.

Thus while we are indebted to Pannenberg for his analysis of the socio-biological origins of human relationality and his subsequent treatment of the ecstatic elements within human life which project us out towards the other, we remain suspicious as to the actual status he allows to the other. It would appear that in so far as Pannenberg focuses upon the individual's trust and openness the initiative for human relationality is always in the power of the self. While we would certainly want to affirm that in the context of human brokenness and the attendant alienation from and fear of the other the individual must engage in a deliberate act of abandonment to the other this must only ever be regarded as a necessary condition for coadunacy. Paradoxically although the capacity for self-abandonment is a strategy of dispossession it is not, as Pannenberg would appear to have it, relationality as such. True coadunacy, as we understand it, only takes place once the abandoned self in all its powerlessness is disposed of by the other. We shall return to this point again. Suffice it to say here that it would appear that Pannenberg may well be liable to the same criticism that we made of
Hegel, and indeed Fichte, that in the final analysis the other is merely a means to an end - in this case the end being the realization of the self.

The Significance of the image of God

We turn now to the important question of the place of the *imago dei* in Pannenberg's treatment of human sociality.

We have already noted how significant Herder's understanding of the image of God is for Pannenberg's consideration of human exocentricity. The *imago* for Herder stands both as the realization of human destiny and also as a dispositional determination towards that destiny. Pannenberg finds this view particularly congenial to his understanding of the ontological priority of the future and of God as the power of the future. Pannenberg rejects the notion of the image of God as "a perfection of the original state that was lost by the fall"\(^{192}\), which he sees as issuing out of the no longer viable mythical orientation towards a primordial and paradisal time. The *imago dei* must not be conceived of as the foundation for a process of Promethean human self-realization, rather it is to characterise humanity's openness to the world and to God:

> Herder's recourse to the idea of the divine image seems thus to be an expression of his opposition to the idea of a human self-fulfilment through active self-enhancement. In order to realize their human destiny, their humanity, human beings remain dependent on the most varied influences from outside and on the harmonious contribution of these to the advancement of their humanity. Their disposition to be like God is therefore fulfilled only by God himself, through the operation of his providence.\(^{183}\)

This understanding of the image of God as being the realization of human destiny for communion with God is fully in keeping with Pannenberg's conception of truth as an historical reality. In as much as truth is only fully realized in its completed historical form, at the *eschaton*, so too humanity will only achieve its full realization - that is, the coincidence of existence and essence - on arrival at its future destiny. Indeed for Pannenberg this is the definition of salvation which, he argues, "is obtained when the destiny of man becomes identical with his present existence, when man is united in his present with his past and his future."\(^{184}\) It would be fruitful, in the light of this close relationship between
Pannenberg's understanding of truth and human destiny, to consider the former in some more detail.

In the essay "What is Truth?", Pannenberg traces the western understanding of truth back to two sources, the Greek and the Hebrew traditions. The Hebrew emeth, unlike the Greek aletheuein, does not denote some eternal, static and complete entity or set of entities, such as Plato's "forms", which may be apprehended in total by human rationality, but rather represents a dynamic continual process of faithfulness and reliability. In this sense, says Pannenberg, while aletheuein simply "is", emeth "must occur again and again". In pointing out this distinction Pannenberg cites Hans von Soden who argued that for the Hebrew, truth is

\[\text{reality seen as history ... not something that in some way or another lies under or behind things, and is discovered by penetrating into their interior depths; rather, truth is that which will show itself in the future.}\]

Thus for the Greek, the notion of truth required conceptualisation in terms of unchangeableness. The Hebrew understanding however allowed for the integration of contingent events, that is the ongoing process of history, into its definition of truth. Emeth

\[\ldots\text{ has the meaning of standing firm, establishing, supporting, bearing. Emeth means reliability, the unshakeable dependability, of a thing or word and thus also the faithfulness of persons. The words of a man are emeth to the extent that they prove to be reliable.}\]

It is this aspect of "becoming" that is totally absent from the aletheia which is forever the same, timeless and absolutely simple. Indeed aletheia is constantly hidden behind the multiplicity of sense experiences which may be penetrated only by the "logos-informed" reason. Yet despite these differences there are, says Pannenberg, some elements held in common between emeth and aletheia. Both recognise truth as ultimately reliable, the one element of constancy and permanence in a world of flux, and similarly, it is held by both that truth could be experienced, albeit in rather different ways. As we have pointed out, experience of truth for the Greek involved its disclosure "to the logos of cognitive comprehension". Emeth however had to do with binding oneself in faith to the God of truth:

\[\text{Previous experience of the constancy of a man or even of God is always, for the Israelite, a}\]
Pannenberg is self-confessedly heavily indebted to the Hebraic conception of truth, as referred to above, which refuses to regard truth as a concealed "object", but instead, with its emphasis upon truth's historical character, views it in a more contingent manner. Indeed, says Pannenberg, in the West there has been an increasing shift towards the subjectivization of truth, coming to a focus within the Romantic movement and nineteenth century historicism. Thus, in the light of this understanding, a false distinction between truth and its diverse historical manifestations must be avoided. The unity of truth can now only be thought of as the history of truth, meaning in effect that truth has a history and that its essence is the process of this history.

Pannenberg believes that the philosophy of Hegel represents the first real understanding of truth as an historical process, and offers comment upon Hegel's claim in The Phenomenology of Mind that, "the truth is the whole":

That which makes this whole into a whole can become visible only at the end. All preliminary stages will be driven beyond themselves by their inner contradictions. They will first find their truth beyond themselves.

Pannenberg sees Hegel converging with the Biblical notion of truth in two ways. Firstly, in his understanding of truth as process and not as the "unchangeable", and secondly in his claim that the contradictory elements within this process are resolved and find their unity at the "end". So, "what a thing is, is first decided by its future, by what becomes of it." Nevertheless, Pannenberg is aware of a fundamental error in Hegel's thinking. Given the nature of his analysis of the unity of history and truth, Hegel was obliged to regard his own perspective as that of the end of history, the consequence of which militated against his having an openness to the future. It is this error which in turn gives rise to the undervaluing of contingent events and uniqueness in Hegel's system. It is at this point that Pannenberg's distinctive Christology provides a solution to the Hegelian error. For in Christ, as we noted earlier, we have a proleptic manifestation of the end of
history and thus an anticipatory understanding of the unity of truth. The apocalyptic nature of Jesus' ministry bears witness to the reign of God and the establishing of his kingdom at the end of history. Indeed, Pannenberg goes further. Through the event of the resurrection of Christ both the message and divinity of Jesus are confirmed beyond doubt:

Jesus of Nazareth is the final revelation of God because the end of history appeared in him. It did so within his eschatological message and in his resurrection from the dead.192

Due to the ontological priority of the future the divinity of Christ, realized at the resurrection, becomes retroactively applicable to the whole of his pre-resurrection ministry. Without the resurrection the person of Jesus lacked not simply vindication but actual divinity. Indeed Pannenberg goes even further when he asserts the interdependency of the persons of the Trinity in such a way as to be able to claim that

The resurrection of Jesus is just as constitutive for the divinity of the Father as for the divine sonship of Jesus. Without the resurrection of Jesus the Father proclaimed by Jesus would not be God.193

Christ, in other words, is the eschaton, the reign of God, in what Pannenberg calls Vorgriff. He is the full expression, in our history, of the end of history and all that that entails for the unity of truth, the completion of the kingdom, the fulfilment of human destiny and the revelation of God. R.D. Pasquariello explains the category of Vorgriff in the following way:

The Vorgriff is mere anticipation; it is not the whole. However, because it is anticipation, it is the presence of the whole constituted from the future, the end being already anticipatorily present. This Vorgriff, an anticipation which is conscious of itself as such, which realizes that the end is provisionally present, allows an understanding of meaning that remains open to the future. It recognizes that the ultimate meaning of a thing is given only in the context of the whole. It is an anticipatory grasp of the final future of the individual contingent event.194

It is through this very category of Vorgriff that Pannenberg is able to explain the age-old dilemma of the "Kingdom of God" being both "already and not yet".

It is thus the proleptic nature of the Christ event which is determinative for human destiny and which provides us with the

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guarantee of our future as the image of God. As we have previously noted salvation, for Pannenberg, is to be equated with the fulfilment of our destiny to openness for God, an openness which is of the very structure of human existence and "which is designated as openness to the world in contemporary anthropology."\(^{195}\) However, despite the so-called structural nature of human openness Pannenberg regards the man Jesus as ultimately determinative for human destiny as the image of God. 

Man's destiny to openness for God constitutes not only the object of Jesus' office, but it is at the same time fulfilled by Jesus' own conduct in his office and in his destiny.\(^{196}\)

In this respect Pannenberg is very close to Barth. The man Jesus, says Pannenberg, not only represents God to man but also man to God, such that "In his person, Jesus has become the fulfilment of the human destiny to communion with God."\(^{197}\) Pannenberg is quite clear in his claim that in Jesus Christ the essential nature of being human, that is, human destiny is realized. It is for this reason that Jesus can be referred to as the image of God\(^{198}\). As we have already noted Pannenberg appears to take a very Barthian perspective here when he speaks of Jesus as representative man, the man who is "well-pleasing in the eyes of God".\(^{199}\) It is precisely because of Jesus' status before God, in the light of the resurrection, that our communion with him is the guarantee of our communion with God. Jesus is in Pannenberg's theology ultimately what he is in Barth's, the true man, the "prototype of the new man"\(^{200}\) and Pannenberg is at pains to indicate the authenticity of this conception from within the totality of the Christian tradition. As we shall now see he focuses on nine fundamental "conceptual patterns", as he calls them, which serve to confirm the representative significance of the man Jesus.\(^{201}\)

To begin with, Jesus is the man who, via the incarnation, is in full possession of the Logos. In this respect Jesus is man in full communion with God, which is Pannenberg's definition of the imago dei, human destiny and human essence, which are coextensive in his theology. As a continuation of this, Jesus is also the man who, via his ethical perfection, brings about the realization of man's "striving towards the imitation of God (homoiois theoi)"\(^{202}\). Also through his act of obedience to the Father Jesus fulfills the
requirements of duty which a fallen humanity is bound to offer by way of satisfaction through his work of supererogation.

The fourth of Pannenberg's nine points brings us closer to the heart of Jesus' status as representative humanity. In his act of submission to the judgment of God, and here we have an echo of Barth's understanding of Christ as rejected as well as elected man, "Jesus is the prototype of God's dealings with humanity and thus also the prototype of justification by faith". Jesus is further considered prototypical of humanity in that in him man's consciousness of God is fully realized. We saw in the previous section of this chapter how Pannenberg's notion of human self-becoming is bound up with the exocentric structure of human existence. It is the social self which feeds the developing "I". We further noted how this exocentric orientation, witnessed to in contemporary anthropology, is nothing less than a manifestation of human beings' openness to God, which is ultimately determinative for the essence of human being. In the man Jesus, the exocentric orientation to God is dominant, thus establishing the essential humanity of Jesus Christ; that is, the unity of existence and essence. It is this unity of existence with human essence that constitutes the image of God in Pannenberg's theology, and which thus identifies Jesus as that image.

Pannenberg continues his discussion of Jesus' representative humanity as being a function of his relationship with God by invoking Barth's notion of Jesus as the man for us. As we noted in the previous chapter, Barth regards Jesus' determination for us as being ultimately dependent upon his prior determination for God. It is in his being for God that Jesus is true man and it is only as a subsequent outworking of this essential humanity that he is for his fellows. Pannenberg regards this Barthian conception as yet another indication of Jesus' prototypical humanness.

As the Son of God Jesus further represents the ought of human existence. He is the one who through his relationship with the Father is the inheritor of creation. In this way he represents the foundation of what Gogarten understands as "the sovereign lordship of modern man over the world", the realization of which, according to Pannenberg, calls us to greater care of the created order and to put an end to our exploitation of it.

The realization of the image of God in Jesus Christ calls for responsible stewardship of man in the
creation which, in the words of Paul, 'waits with eager longing' for 'the glorious liberty of the children of God' (Rom.8:19-21). 210

Jesus, continues Pannenberg, is furthermore the "essence of faith" or, as Ebeling put it, the "witness of faith" 209 in so much as his relationship with the Father generates for us the content of our own faith.

The final point to which Pannenberg wishes to draw our attention is the Catholic understanding of Jesus Christ as the perfection of human being. Karl Rahner makes the following point in the light of this view: "Christology is the beginning and end of anthropology, and this anthropology in its most radical realization, namely Christology, is in all eternity theology." Pannenberg relates this view to his understanding of Jesus being characterized by total openness which is constitutive of true humanity. 210

For Pannenberg Jesus is the proleptic experience of communion with God which is our destiny. It is in this respect that, just as we found in Barth, the *imago dei* may only truly be regarded as a designation of the man Jesus Christ. There appears to be an unresolved ambiguity in Pannenberg's thinking at this point however. By referring to Jesus as the image of God, the true man, does he intend this in the same sense that Barth does? In other words, is Jesus Christ in some way ontologically true man, such that all that he is is made real for us, or is he simply an exemplar, the guarantee and hope for the future? While there appears to be very real evidence for the latter view,

> When we say that ultimately through his resurrection from the dead the true man, the real human being that is the destiny of us all, has appeared in Jesus, then we can only mean that in him the hopes of men are fulfilled. 211

Pannenberg clearly wishes to say more than this. It is precisely because Jesus is the fulfilment of human hope that his "saving character" can have "universal relevance". 212 It is quite clear that in Pannenberg's view it is Jesus alone who is to be regarded as the Son of God in that unique way established by his resurrection. Our sonship is a derived one made real through communion with the man Jesus. In so far as Jesus is also true man by virtue of his sonship, that is his communion with God which is the essence of human being, so too do we derive our essential humanness from Jesus. 213
In his exposition of St. Paul Pannenberg sees the determinative nature of Jesus' humanity spelt out quite clearly. In Romans 8:29 Paul identifies Jesus as the one and only true image of God, such that

...the appearance of Christ meant that what had previously been regarded as humanity was now replaced by a radically new kind of humanity. The first Adam was confronted in Jesus - and definitively so in the resurrection of Jesus - by a new and final form of human being whose "image" we all bear, that is, to whom we are all to be conformed. (Rom. 8:29).

Indeed, Pannenberg expounds Paul in a particularly Barthian conclusion when he argues that Jesus Christ, the image of God and destiny of humanity (2 Cor. 4:4) is also the protological image of God spoken of in Genesis 1:27. This view, coupled with the more traditional perspective also found in Paul which has the *imago* as "at every point already a feature of the human being" is seen by Paul as being harmonised in the understanding of Christ as prototypical human being. It is thus in his image that the first human being was created.

In order to explain the connection between that first human being and the new human being who has been manifested in Christ, these (early Christian) theologians maintained that only the visible appearance of this prototype itself in the incarnation could bring the image of God in us to its completion.

Pannenberg is in full agreement with this understanding of the significance of Jesus' appearance for human being. Jesus is the one who brings into history, that is into human becoming, the realization of that becoming. In the light of this proleptic experience of our future destiny manifested in the life and ministry of the man Jesus the future becomes "powerful in the present"; indeed Pannenberg goes further in that it is seen as powerful over the present. "It is the power of contradiction to the present, and releases forces to overcome it." Thus the presence of Jesus as the power of the future is the confrontation of human existence and human essence, where the latter becomes dominant. It is for this reason that Pannenberg can assert that, "... it has become possible to live one's present existence in its current, concrete configuration in the way it appears in the light of God's future and thus in his ultimate truth." He makes the same point when expounding Ignatius of Antioch:
... the historical once-for-all of the saving event, in which the eschatological destiny of the human person becomes present and operative, caused the concept of human nature to be, as it were, liquefied and remolded into that of a salvation history (oeconomia) which leads 'to Jesus Christ, the new man'. In this way the theologians avoided the ... error of a dualistic separation between the first Adam and the second, the earthly man and the heavenly, and, ultimately, the God who creates and the God who redeems.220

From this we may conclude that Pannenberg, in much the same manner as Barth, treats creation and redemption as ultimately a single divine act.221 The image of God in which human beings are created is synonymous with Jesus Christ who is true man, essential humanity that is realized in communion with God and with the rest of humanity. Thus, as we found in Barth, the essential humanness of human beings is not founded upon a primordial act of creation in which the image of God was in some sense made our possession.222 Rather, according to both Barth and Pannenberg, we are in the image of God, that is in receipt of our essential humanity, only via our participation in Christ. Pannenberg goes on to maintain that as this participation in Christ is both the redemptive and creative activity of God, in that it is the proleptic realization of our destiny, the creative and ultimately dominant power of the future, it is universally determinative.223 To be human is to be orientated towards the future, that is open to God, and this is achieved for us in Jesus who is the realisation of human destiny.

It is from this perspective, namely, the explication of the Christ event as an event for all people, that it becomes clear that the father of Jesus Christ has always been one God from the very beginnings of Israel and, indeed, from the beginning of the world.224 From this it is difficult not to conclude that human relationality, openness to the world and the other, is for Pannenberg a fact of our inevitable determination by the future as realized by our inescapable participation in Christ. By blurring the traditional distinction between created and redeemed humanity, through his identification of creation with the eschatological destiny of humanity for community with God and others, Pannenberg appears, unintentionally to be sure, to evacuate his conception of sin as human centredness of much of its power.225 Thus the struggle between human egoism and human coadunacy which we have suggested demands of us an act of self-abandonment164 seem to be already resolved for
Pannenberg in Christ, who brings about the resolution of this struggle in the proleptic power of human essence over existence. 

We shall consider now the nature of Jesus' empowering to relationality as the bringing to actuality of human destiny for community with God and others.

Jesus and the empowering to relationality

Pannenberg clearly understands Jesus, his message and his relationship with the Father, as the true exemplar of human relationality. Jesus' message of the approaching Kingdom of God and the attendant salvation offered freely to all demands of those who receive his words that they sacrifice all to the fulfilment of the will of God. Pannenberg points out that
to do the will of God means to act as God acts, who lets his sun rise on the evil and the good and ... directs his salvation to the just and the unjust.

The very logic of divine forgiveness, argues Pannenberg, demands that those who are in receipt of forgiveness ought to forgive others also. Indeed, "Even the forgiveness that has already been received is forfeited when it is not passed on in one's own conduct towards others."

In this process of divine forgiveness being received and transmitted within human experience Pannenberg recognises the theme of futurity so characteristic of his theology; "The divine forgiveness that opens the future to the recipient places him in a position to open up the future for his fellowmen also."

The connection between forgiveness of sins and neighbour love is, argues Pannenberg, the very foundation of Jesus' radical interpretation of the law. When questioned concerning the right way to pray Jesus is said to have taught the Lord's Prayer in which divine forgiveness and our forgiveness of others are intimately related.

Yet forgiveness of others does not simply involve an uneasy truce between two hostile parties. It has a positive rather than a negative character. Forgiveness, suggests Pannenberg, includes the most radical form of love, love for the enemy (Matt.5:43ff). It is decisive for understanding forgiveness that one sees it in this kind of unity with love and does not conceive it only negatively as the renunciation of hostile sentiments. It is common to love and forgiveness that both open the future. Therefore, also, forgiveness always includes the active element of help for life, just as Jesus himself heals by
forgiving sins (Mark 2:1-12). The parable of the good Samaritan (Luke 10:25-37) shows love's creative relation to the situation and lack of preconditions, corresponding to the lack of preconditions in Jesus' proclamation of forgiveness and presence of salvation.230

This understanding of unconditional neighbour love is not merely an utopian ideal, inappropriate to "the raw reality of life"231, rather it is the love empowered by Jesus' message of eschatological salvation. It is this promise of future situation, as we have already noted in our treatment of the imago dei in Pannenberg's thought, which makes manifest human destiny. Human destiny is to be with God and with our fellows. That is to say, human destiny is a communal destiny. Jesus' message of salvation, by which Pannenberg understands both his words and his life lived vicariously for humanity,232 establishes in history the reality of human destiny for community. "In his person, Jesus has become the fulfilment of the human destiny to community with God."233

Pannenberg makes it quite clear that communality has always been the destiny, indeed the essence of human existence. However with the coming of Jesus this has become clear for the first time.234 It is in Jesus and his message of salvation that human community, indiscriminate neighbour love finds its fulfilment:

By creating community, love realizes the unity of human destiny. Thus Jesus' commandment of love also reveals the essence of men, his destiny to community... all human striving towards community finds its fulfilment in the love Jesus has made possible...235

The empowering to true communality which is simultaneously the essence of humanity and its destiny derives directly from the presence of the future Kingdom of God in the man Jesus. Indeed, says Pannenberg, the very language of Fatherhood used by Jesus of God is intended to indicate the closeness of the reign of God and thus the reality of its power to bring about the fulfillment of human destiny. "That the nearness of God's Kingdom includes salvation in itself establishes the confident nearness of God himself expressed in addressing God as 'Father'."236

There are a number of points in Pannenberg's discussion here that we would wish to affirm as being essential to a Christian understanding of human coadunacy.
Firstly and, as we shall see in a subsequent chapter, the radical nature of Jesus' call to neighbour love must be regarded as being at the very heart of the Christian experience of coadunacy. Love of the other must be modelled upon Christ-like self-abandonment where the other, no matter how alien or hostile, is related to unconditionally. Love of the stranger ought to be characterized not by fear but, as Pannenberg maintains, by trust.

The next point to be affirmed is Pannenberg's insistence that humanity is essentially communal - in his understanding, by virtue of its destiny - but also that the capacity for unconditional love of the other is a gift made actual for us in Jesus as the one who fulfils human destiny. These twin poles are essential to a balanced understanding of human communality for they bear witness both to humanity's essential nature as communal while also indicating its need for empowering to true community in the context of human brokenness or "centeredness". We shall expand on these points in more detail when we consider the notion of coadunacy at length in our concluding chapter. We shall turn now to consider what importance, if indeed any, Pannenberg gives to the doctrine of the Trinity as it bears upon our concern with human relationality.

The Significance of God as Trinity

Pannenberg makes it quite clear that in so far as he regards the doctrine of the Trinity as being grounded in the fact of revelation he is very much in the company of both Hegel and Barth. It is "In the fate of Jesus", says Pannenberg, that "the God of Israel is revealed as the triune God". Having said this it is important that we recognize the fundamental dissimilarity which exists between the Barthian - and for that matter the traditional Western - conception of divinity, and what Pannenberg has in mind. Pannenberg thoroughly rejects what he sees as Western theology's Platonic conceptualization of God as the incomprehensible "world-ground", in favour of a notion of divine otherness as rooted in free historical activity.

The notion of the one divine being as person in the sense of self-consciousness is to be seen as the heresy of Christian theism. This understanding of God leads either to the concept of a God who exists beyond (senseitig) the world or to the idea of a self-unfolding of God in which the world...
Divine sovereignty, argues Pannenberg, is not founded upon transcendent subjectivity but rather upon God's "immanence in the phenomena of the world". God is, to quote Bonhoeffer, "the beyond in the midst of our lives". It is for this reason that Pannenberg criticises Barth's doctrine of the Trinity. He points out that following Dorner Barth speaks of the one self-conscious and personal God who differentiates himself into three modes of being and thus opens himself up to the charge of subordinationism:

It is impossible to avoid - in spite of all the emphasis upon the equal divinity of the three modes of being - an understanding of the Father as the original form of the divine ego and as the author of his other modes of being.

Pannenberg suggests that this problem might be resolved if God's personhood were regarded as the result of, rather than the basis for the three modes of being. However, this would prove highly problematic for Barth, for whom the doctrine of the Trinity is "an expression of God's subjectivity, in his revelation, that is that the subjectivity of God is the root of the Trinity and not its result."

Pannenberg's own understanding of the Trinity is one in which "the plurality of the persons is not derived but original and only in this is the unity of God real". This claim requires careful unpacking in the light of Pannenberg's theology as a whole.

It is important that we understand that for Pannenberg, God is the power of the future, indeed the future is the very "mode of God's being", such that prior to this future God's being is always conditional being. Thus we find that

...the being of God and that of his kingdom are identical, since the being of God is his lordship. He is God only in the execution of his lordship, and thus full accomplishment of his lordship is determined as something future.

Pannenberg is here drawing upon the thought of Ernst Bloch and his understanding of "futurity as a quality of being". Thus history, in its totality, as the process by which God's reign is finally established, is nothing less than the realization of God himself. Pannenberg is at pains to point out that by this he does not mean to describe the movement of history as expressive of or a manifestation
of some abstract transcendent consciousness but as the actual process of divine becoming.

... the otherness of God is demonstrated in specific, contingent events with a concrete meaning for the men participating in it, so God assumes properties into his eternal essence through such deeds in that he chooses these and no other events as the form of his contingent operations.

Here we have Pannenberg's anthropological understanding of the social self's priority over the ego, which we considered earlier, having its ultimate expression in the way of being of God himself.

Having established the nature of divinity as the exercise of the reign of God, Pannenberg proceeds in his explication of the Trinity to consider both the unity and distinction between God the Father and God the Son. As we have already noted, it is in the man Jesus that the future reign of God, his lordship, is realized proleptically in history. It is in this way that God is for us here and now, in anticipation of our destiny for communion with him. In that Pannenberg has already identified God with his reign, the recognition of the man Jesus as the one in whom the Kingdom of God has become proleptically apparent establishes his essential divinity. In this we see not the revelation of an abstract and metaphysical relationship between the Father and the Logos but rather the actual eternal unity of the Father and the Son. Alan Galloway describes what Pannenberg has in mind here when he writes

...the second person of the Trinity is not some essence or metaphysical entity other than Jesus of Nazareth. The eternal communion within the Godhead between the Father and the Son is not some ghostly, metaphysical transaction. It is precisely what took place between them in the birth, life, death and resurrection of Jesus of Nazareth.

Furthermore, the differentiation between the Father and the Son is now the historically undeniable characteristic of the man Jesus' relationship to the Father.

Pannenberg, as we found also in Barth, is reluctant to designate the Holy Spirit as a third person within the Godhead, choosing rather to identify some attribution of personhood to the Spirit's activity within human subjects.

The Spirit shows himself to be a personal reality by not extinguishing the personal character of human action through his activity but by letting personal life come to consummation through willing dedication.
The personhood of the Holy Spirit speaks of our exocentricity, that is the human person's dependence upon that which is other than itself. In the specifically Christian sense the Holy Spirit is the "personal center of Christian action". The Spirit's unity with the divine essence stems from his activity in uniting us with Christ while his distinctness is one with our present experience of distinction from both the Father and the Son.

W.J.Hill refers to Pannenberg's view as Neo-economic Trinitarianism and there is certainly a degree of consensus with this opinion. H.Burhenn speaks of the trinitarian distinctions in Pannenberg's thought as "temporal distinctions" while R.Olsen refers to them as "connected with the different phases of the activity of God in history". This would certainly appear to be a justifiable description of Pannenberg's Trinitarian thinking, particularly in light of statements such as the following:

The trinitarian God is ... a single being and this one God is not impersonal, nevertheless, he is only a person in the form of one of the trinitarian persons at a time. This is because each of the persons not only derives its being and personhood mediatory through its relation with the other two but also its divinity.

Unlike Barth's understanding of human being as being in encounter and our own notion of coadunacy Pannenberg does not look to the inter-trinitarian relations to establish the foundation for human communality and this is just as well. Pannenberg's so-called neo-economic trinitarianism, understanding God in terms of a single person, certainly does not recommend itself as an adequate foundation for a model of human relationship. Indeed the emphasis upon the other as ego-forming, which we noted in Pannenberg's anthropological analysis, seems to be very much in evidence here where the divine person posits itself in history as a means towards self-realization. Hill notes this Hegelian perspective when he observes:

Such a God is engaged in a dialectic of self-differentiation, an emptying act of himself into the other that explains both his own life and the being of the world. In trinitarian language, this means the Father positing his Word and the Spirit arising out of the tension between them as a synthesis of love... This calls into question the unity of God until it is realised that the fulness of personhood is achieved precisely in the relinquishing of autonomy and isolation in surrender to the other,
out of which emerges a new and higher form of unity.\textsuperscript{262}

The actual status of the other in this process gives cause for some concern. Is the other simply the means to a higher synthetic end? If this is so then for all Pannenberg's talk of the self-dedication of the self to the other, the other is ultimately taken up into the one divine person. Furthermore, if only one of the three "persons" constituting the Trinity is truly personal at any one time, in what sense can they be said to be involved in acts of interpersonal relationality? Is not the ultimate fate of such a Trinity to collapse dialectically into a unity that either is abstract and impersonal in kind, or reduces to the moral unity of a divine koinônia?\textsuperscript{726*}

Conclusion

There is undoubtedly much of value in Pannenberg's treatment of human sociality, particularly in his analysis of the anthropological manifestations of human exocentricity. We certainly find support for our notion of human coadunacy in the explication of Portmann's understanding of the human "extrauterine springtime" which establishes human being as "deficient being" in need of immediate social support.\textsuperscript{264} Similarly the notion of basic trust and Mead's treatment of human gestures as the means to human ecstatic existence would all seem to provide anthropological evidence for our contention that human being is fundamentally communal being. However it is at this point that we must part company with Pannenberg.

As we have attempted to indicate throughout this chapter, our basic difficulty with Pannenberg's understanding of human sociality revolves around the status he accords to the other. It would seem that human openness to the other, while prioritizing the social self, has as its goal the development and realization of the ego. The point we wish to make concerning human being as coadunate is that the other is prioritized as other. The notion of coadunacy regards human being as irreducibly communal, as a complex consisting of the self and the other, in mutual abandonment to each other. We see the difference between Pannenberg's view of human sociality and our own particularly highlighted in his notion of basic trust. At first sight this conception might appear to echo our own understanding of the necessity for the will to abandonment as a condition for human coadunacy. However this is not the case. For
Pannenberg trust may well involve an act of abandonment, but it is by no means an abandonment of the self to a potentially hostile other.

Those who trust abandon themselves to the consistency and reliability of that in which they trust. Basic trust is not, however, directed immediately to the self but rather to that agency which is able to protect and promote the self and in fact promises to do so. This last point is important. As a trust that concerns selfhood and not merely secondary issues, basic trust presupposes in those to whom it is given a commitment to the fostering of the selfhood of the trusting persons.266

Two things need to be said concerning the conception of basic trust. Firstly, it appears to be either optimistically naive267 or highly selective. Either Pannenberg is of the opinion that all to whom we might abandon ourselves in trust will be reliable and beneficent, or that we ought only to commit ourselves in this way to those who we know will have our best interests at heart. Secondly we note once again that basic trust has as its goal not abandonment of the self to the other qua other but the promotion of the self through the agency of the other.

There would appear to be in Pannenberg's thought a form of historical determinism intimately bound up with his christology which might well be responsible for what we have spoken of as his optimistic naivety concerning the reliability of those in whom we put our trust. As we have already noted, this tendency towards the overcoming of present human fallenness - via the proleptic event of Christ which establishes creation and redemption, existence and essence as coextensive - drastically reduces the reality of human brokenness. Indeed, in the light of this theological structure, Pannenberg can even maintain that

the person is not at the disposition of others, even though others may very well dispose of the present-at-hand, bodily existence of individuals and even, in differing degrees according to the particular case, of their psychic reactions. This kind of disposition may be exercised through physical force but also through seduction and through forms of psychic influence which render the individual pliable and which run from brainwashing to the more subtle forms of persuasion. The personality of the person so abused is not put at the disposal of the other, but it is, as it were, disconnected.268
We need to be very suspicious of this rather gnostic sounding language. Surely if we are not at the disposition of the hostile other, in so far as our essential personhood is yet to be realized, then this holds true even for our disposition towards the other who, in Pannenberg's language, we can trust. Is not the logic of Pannenberg's view that in our present existence we are inevitably disconnected from the other? Furthermore, such a view would seem to drastically devalue human suffering by disengaging it from essential personhood.

In conclusion it would seem that while making a significant contribution to a view of human being as both structurally and essentially social, Pannenberg falls foul of the idealistic tradition upon which he draws and its tendency to reduce the other, that towards which we are structurally open, to the means towards self-realization. Similarly, by rooting the essence of human being in a future human destiny which is proleptically determinative for us, through communion with Christ via the Spirit, Pannenberg reduces the significance of present human existence and consequently evacuates sin and human brokenness of much of its power.

The realization of human coadunacy must take into account the brokenness of human being and its environment. It is for this reason that we have spoken of the will to self-abandonment in the face of this brokenness as the condition par excellence of human coadunacy. Furthermore, in speaking of human coadunacy, we do not intend a self-realizing process but rather a multipersonal complex which is, in its very nature as communal, the being of humanity.

I. Fairweather and J. McDonald express this thought very well, particularly as it effects the Church, when they write:

> Christians have the resources to be more aware of their own self-deception. In the revelation of the transcendent God who removes all restrictions on our concern for others, and in its place for confession and forgiveness, Christian faith can free people from their self-deception because it frees them from their anxiety... Accepted by God, and continually accepting that acceptance, he is free for existence for others, and has ceased to be careful about others' acceptance, and to be worried about his own sense of importance... this freedom is never a permanent possession, and has to be constantly renewed and realised in obedience to God's love.
NOTES

3. Cf. ATP p.12,
4. ATP p.15ff.
5. BQ3 p.106
6. BQ3 p.87ff cf. ATP p.16
8. Revelation as History (RH) p.226
9. ibid
10. BQ3 p.99f
11. BQ3 p.103ff.
12. ATP p.11
13. BQ3 p.80ff.
15. BQ3 p.97 cf. Theology and the Philosophy of Science (TPS) p.304
16. BQ2 p.101
17. op. cit. p.223 cf. TPS p.304
18. BQ3 p.94
19. Theology and the Philosophy of Science (TPS) p.343.
21. TPS p.297
22. TPS p.298f.
23. TPS p.300
24. TPS p.303
25. TPS p.303 cf. BQ1 p.156f.
26. TPS p.302
27. TPS p.303ff cf. BQ1 p.156.
28. TPS p.302f.
29. TPS p.303
30. TPS p.303
31. TPS p.300
32. TPS p.303
33. ibid.
34. TPS p.304
35. ibid
36. cf. TPS p.305
37. TPS p.309
38. cf. p. 2 above.
40. TPS p. 309f.
41. TPS p. 310
42. ibid.
43. TPS p. 301
44. TPS p. 310f cf. Revelation as History
45. TPS p. 311
46. TPS p. 311–313
47. TPS p. 313
48. ibid.
49. TPS p. 321
50. TPS p. 314
51. TPS p. 320
52. TPS p. 315–322
53. TPS p. 332
54. TPS p. 338
55. TPS p. 339
56. TPS p. 341
57. ibid.
58. BQ2 p. 109ff.
59. BQ2 p. 65ff.
60. BQ2 p. 66–67
61. BQ2 p. 184ff.
62. BQ2 p. 68
63. BQ2 p. 69
64. BQ2 p. 75
65. BQ2 p. 75f
66. BQ2 p. 78
67. BQ2 p. 104
68. BQ2 p. 105
69. BQ2 p. 78
70. BQ2 p. 79f
71. BQ2 p. 86
72. BQ2 p. 81f
73. BQ2 p. 92–3
74. BQ2 p. 93f.
75. BQ2 p. 82
76. BQ2 p. 88f.
77. BQ2 p. 87
78. BQ2 p. 94
79. BQ2 p. 95f.
80. BQ2 p. 96
81. BQ2 p. 99
82. BQ2 p. 101
83. The Apostles Creed in Light of Today's Questions (AC) p. 25f.
84. BQ2 p. 104 cf. p. 110f.
85. Cf. AC p. 22ff.
86. cf. AC p. 25
87. BQ2 p. 104
89. BQ2 p. 109
90. BQ2 p. 110f.
91. BQ2 p. 114f.
92. AC p. 45f. cf. JGM p. 385
93. JGM p. 378
94. JGM p. 383-4
95. JGM p. 384
96. JGM P. 385
97. JGM p. 135
98. ibid.
99. JGM p. 136
100. JGM p. 84
101. JGM p. 85
102. JGM p. 82
103. JGM p. 129
104. cf. JGM p. 158ff
105. ATP p. 315
107. Scheler cited, ATP p.35.
108. ATP p. 58
109. ATP p. 20 cf. HNEH p.13
110 ATP p. 20
112. BQ1 p.26f.
114. BQ3 p.89
115. Cf. ATP p.11f
116. ATP p.12
117. Cf. Chapter 4 p 87ff.
118. ATP p. 11f.
119. ATP p. 33
120. ATP p. 34
121. Cf. ATP p. 35
122. Cf. ATP p. 33-34
123. Cf. ATP p. 34
124. ibid.
125. 1911, cf. ATP p. 35.
126. ATP p. 36
127. ATP p. 36
128. ATP p. 37
129. ATP p. 38
130. ibid.
131. ATP p. 39
132. ATP p. 39-40
133. ibid.
134. ATP p. 43
135. ATP p. 45
136. ibid.
137. ibid.
138. ATP p. 46
139. ibid.
140. ATP p. 66
141. HNEH p. 23, 24.
144. ATP p. 70
145. ibid.
146. HNEH p. 25f.
147. HNEH p. 26 cf. ATP pp. 243, 266, 279, 283
148. ATP p. 116
149. JGM p. 353
151. HNEH p. 30.
152. ibid.
153. HNEH p. 35
154. ATP p. 74
155. The Principles of Psychology 1890, Mind, Self and Society 1934
156. ATP p. 159
157. ibid.
158. ATP p. 160
159. ATP p. 164
160. cited ATP p. 162
161. cf. pp. 5ff above
162. cf. ATP p. 181ff.
163. ATP p. 184
164. ATP p. 185
165. ibid.
166. cf ATP p. 71
167. ATP p. 187
168. cf. ATP p. 189
169. cf. ATP p. 191ff.
170. ATP p. 194
171. ATP p. 198-8
172. cf. p. 221ff.
174. ATP p. 226
175. ATP p. 228
176. Cf. ATP p. 228-289
177. Cf. Chapters 1 and 8.
178. ATP p. 229
179. ATP p. 230
180. ibid.
181. Cf. ATP p. 244ff, 260ff.
182. ATP p. 54
183. ATP p. 53
184. JGM p. 193
186. BQ1 p. 3
187. ibid.
188. ibid. p. 7
189. BQ1 p. 20-21
190. ibid. p. 21
191. ibid. p. 22
192. RH p. 125, JGM p. 64-69
193. Der Gott p. 87
194. Pasquariello, "Pannenberg's Philosophical Foundations" p. 341
195. JGM p. 193
196. JGM p. 194f.
197. JGM p. 195
233. JGM p. 195f.
234. cf. JGM p. 234
235. ibid.
236. JGM p. 229ff.
237. RH p. 143
239. Gründfragen Systematischer Theologie, p. 110-1
240. ibid.
241. GST p. 100 cf. JGM p. 164f.
242. GST p. 100
244. cf. BQ2 p. 242
245. BQ2 p. 240 cf. Theology and the Kingdom of God (TKG) p. 62-63
246. BQ2 p. 238ff.
247. BQ2 Chapter 5.
248. BQ2 p. 181
249. cf. p. 17ff above
250. cf. JGM p. 334-7
251. JGM p. 163ff.
252. Galloway, Wolfhart Pannenberg p. 102
253. JGM p. 159f.
254. JGM p. 178
255. JGM p. 177
256. ibid.
257. ibid. p. 179
259. Burhenn, "Pannenberg's Doctrine of God" SJT 28, p. 536
260. Olsen, SJT 36, p. 227
261. Gründfragen Systematischer Theologie, p. 110, cf. TKG p. 71
262. Hill, p. 165-6
263. ibid.
264. cf. ATP p. 38-9
265. cf. Chapters 1 and 8.
266. ATP p. 230
267. cf. TKG p. 95-6
268. ATP p. 241
In the previous four chapters we have attempted to describe and assess various ways in which self/other relationality has been understood. Furthermore we have sought to identify certain areas of weakness in these conceptions of relationality, particularly with regard to the prioritizing of the self over the other and the abstraction of said notions of relationality from concerns over context or environment.

As we stated in chapter two, and need to reiterate here, our critique has not been a disinterested one, that is to say we have engaged with our selection of thinkers from a perspective within the Christian tradition. We have sought to assess to what extent each of the aforementioned approaches to the issue of relationality might represent an inadequate and insufficient understanding of a Christian notion of coadunacy. To this end we previously outlined three fields of inquiry which functioned as an implicit agenda for our analysis, these being the nature of coadunacy, the loss of coadunacy and the restoration of coadunacy.

The purpose of this chapter is twofold. Firstly we shall consider what it is that we have learned from our study of Kant, Fichte, Hegel, Barth and Pannenberg as regards the notion of human coadunacy. We hope to be able, in the light of our previous analyses, to identify those elements which are of most value to the Christian tradition and those which might be regarded as unhelpful to it. Secondly, in so far as our aforementioned three fields of inquiry have operated at a tacit level throughout the previous four chapters, we intend here to make good our promise, in chapter two, to develop these general fields into three explicit Christian theological themes of coadunacy. These themes will represent a distinctively Christian theological approach to the questions raised within our initial three fields of inquiry albeit in a preliminary form.

Before we continue with the two basic tasks of this chapter it will be useful indicate here the theological shape of coadunacy as it has begun to emerge from the previous analytic chapters.

It should be clear from what has gone before that the primary commitment of this work is to an understanding of human being as in
essence a complex involving persons in relation inhabiting an environment. Having said this we are not concerned with the simple phenomenon of a multiplicity of selves relating in a minimalist way within indistinct or abstract space-time. In other words, we have a particular quality in mind when we talk of human relationality and inhabitation. By using the term essential in this context we intend to convey an understanding of human relationality involving the self and the other which is of ontological significance. It has been suggested that the basis of this claim to ontological significance for human communality is to be found within an understanding of human being as created in the imago trinitatis. Clearly such a claim will ultimately require some detailed consideration of both the doctrines of the Trinity and the imago dei. However, while we hope that our discussion and critique of both Barth and Pannenberg may provide some indication as to the direction that such a theological enterprise might take it is beyond the scope of this present work to take up the task proper. We have hinted throughout the preceding chapters that a social model of the Trinity which lays its emphasis upon the threeness of the persons rather than the oneness of the substance or subject would seem to be of most value in establishing the normality of coadunacy and there would appear to be no shortage of such models within Christian theology. For the moment however, we must limit ourselves to the perhaps less familiar task of outlining what might be called the dimensions of and conditions for coadunacy, that is to say for human being as fundamentally relational and environmental.

The term that we have chosen to deploy in this connection is coadunacy. As we have already pointed out the word coadunate speaks of congenital unity, of the many being unified in the one. Having suggested an ontological derivation of coadunacy from the divine Being as persons in relation, mediated to human being via the imago trinitatis through both creation and redemption, our concern in these final chapters will be to discuss the shape of a substantive theological understanding of human coadunacy. That is to say, what it is and how it is realised within the brokenness of human existence: the dimensions of and conditions for coadunacy.

In our previous discussion of the protological dimension of human coadunacy, in chapter one, we made it quite clear that there is a very real sense in which the "conditions" of coadunacy are met simply by virtue of our creaturiness and furthermore as being
created in the image of a coadunate, or more properly tri-adunate God. That is to say, the being of humanity is by creation coadunate, just as the Being of God is Trinitarian. Nevertheless in the light of the middle term of the Christian story, humanity's undeniable estrangement from both God and itself, we are prompted to consider what coadunacy ought to look like and what conditions must pertain in order to encourage and restore what is, after all, the proper being of humanity.

The Lessons of History

From our examination of a range of thinkers who have exerted a major influence upon western thought, and theology in particular, and who have also engaged with the issue of relationality certain lessons may be learned.

Without doubt the issue of subject/object or self/other relationality is found to be of fundamental significance for Kant, Fichte, Hegel, Barth and Pannenberg. With Kant there is a clear desire to maintain that the phenomenal world in all its complexity is intimately related to the thinking subject which provides its form and order. All that "I" encounter as object in the world is related to me via sensible intuition and the transcendental categories of thought. However, and as we noted in chapter three, it is this very cognitive power of the subject over the object in the former's constructive representation of the latter that has given us cause for concern. The object, for Kant, is always object in relation to subject. The reality of the other thus only impinges upon the self as an appearance construed by the self. Engagement with the other self-in-itself is clearly beyond the constitutive capacity of the categories of thought. The other qua other and the other-for-self are by no means equivalent for Kant. We must beware the Kantian tendency to over-emphasise the power and priority of the subject who is always regarded as acting upon the other and thereby construing that other for self.

We have further noted that while the Kantian understanding of human community as a kingdom of ends, as found in the Second Critique, certainly has value it is by no means sufficient as a description of human relationality. The language of "reverence", "dignity" and "respect" which is central to Kant's understanding of persons as ends can only have a preliminary and formal status as an expression
of self/other relationality. Nevertheless it is undoubtedly here that Kant is most helpful to our particular concern for it is here that he begins to consider the issue of self/other relationality as distinct from that of subject/object. The relationship between the self and the other who is always, in the first instance, encountered as stranger must surely begin with respect and an acknowledgement of worth and dignity.

However, Kant would appear to leave the issue at this stage. Indeed, we have suggested that there are grounds for suspecting that for Kant the object of reverence is the "moral law within" rather than the actual person, with all their existential inclinations. The question regarding who has the priority within self-other relationality is one which has persisted throughout our study.

With Fichte's ethical idealism we saw the development of Kant's notion of the autonomy of the will in terms of the absolute ego's free and unlimited activity. We have noted that for Fichte the absolute ego progresses towards self-consciousness through the activity of finite selves within the world. It is as individual agents struggling against the natural order that human beings are seen to be moral agents. The external world is regarded as possessing no innate value, and thus humanity is not in any way obligated to it, the natural world is posited merely to be overcome.

For Fichte all externality is understood as subordinate to the self whose behaviour is informed by laws derived from that self as an expression of the absolute self-activity of the ego. By means of a form of social contract theory, Fichte exports this totalism of the self into the general will, giving rise to a totalism of the state. The truly national state, argues Fichte, may only gain stability via world-wide expansion. Indeed, such a state has a cultural mission which it must pursue militarily.

In Hegel's thinking we have discovered much of value. Clearly there is a concern throughout his work to do away with the dualisms established by critical thought, by emphasising a necessary relationality as existing between the self and the other, the internal and external, subject and object. Furthermore, Hegel seems to regard the doctrine of God as Trinity as being the religiously expressed ideal of Self/other unity. In dispensing with the subject/object dualism Hegel seeks to unify the Kantian dichotomy

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between appearance and things-in-themselves, establishing the world as our world and rendering redundant the question of an underlying and inaccessible reality. The world, Hegel argues, is uniquely personal, as it is there only for the subject. Likewise, the self without the other is only ever an empty universal and abstract "I". It is our engagement with the other which establishes us as free. The other is, for Hegel, intimately involved in the self's ontology of becoming. Hegel's insistence that actuality is formed from the unity of the self and external otherness, by way of the synthesis between inward essence and outward appearance, does much to establish a reality from which we are not fundamentally alienated.

However, all this having been said, we found ourselves concluding that the Hegelian synthetic process—while certainly a unifying process—was ultimately aggressive towards the "other" in its particularity. For Hegel, the self as empty universal comes to itself via confrontation with the other, only to return to itself again having subsumed the other within itself. This totalism of the self is enshrined in the very process of dialectic where, in its movement towards the moment of synthesis, the other is reduced to a mere illusory foil which is necessary to the self-actualisation of the self. We noted that ultimately for Hegel "there is no real other".

With Karl Barth and Wolfhart Pannenberg we turned to the distinctively theological engagement with the issue of self/other relationality.

In Barth's theology the notion of self/other relationality is discussed by way of the concept of encounter. This encounter takes the form of an I-Thou duality which is absolutely central to the essence of human being. The basic form of humanity is described by Barth as "being-in-encounter". Barth's understanding of the ontological basis for human relationality closely resembles our concern that coadunacy be regarded as essential to the very constitution of human being. Indeed, Barth clearly wishes to see the imago dei as having to do with the essentiality of human relatedness. We noted further that Barth, in response to Nietzsche, denies the possibility of the individual human being in abstraction.
Barth devotes a substantial part of volume 3/2 of his *Church Dogmatics* to a detailed explication of the four elements which he regards as characteristic of human being in encounter: seeing, speaking/hearing, assisting and gladness, which is the attitude in which the other three ought to be rooted. This understanding of the nature of human relationality, which seems to see it as a process comprising of stages of deepening commitment - in addition to seeing it as in some way essential to human ontology - is a valuable one. Clearly if the Christian tradition wishes to maintain its commitment to the doctrine of sin and human brokenness then some understanding of human relationality as being in need of healing and restoration is in order. However it is at this point that we take issue with Barth.

We have argued that the powerful Christological determinism central to Barth's understanding of humanness gives rise to an overly formal notion of human relationality. That humanity is in encounter is, for Barth, a fundamental fact of human existence *in Christ*. Our present experience of alienation from the other is overcome, in Barth's theology, by the ultimate determination of Jesus' humanity. While we have noted that Barth is quite clearly aware of human brokenness and estrangement, we found ourselves having to conclude that the ubiquitous systematic determination of God's freedom and sovereignty, coupled with a form of Christological idealism, forces Barth into an unrealistic notion of human being - in Christ - as always and actually being-in-encounter. The power and initiative for human relationality are ultimately in God's hands, not ours. Thus there is some justification for suggesting that a totalism of the subject is operative in Barth's thinking, albeit a totalism of the divine subject.

With Pannenberg and his characteristically anthropological approach to theology we found a great deal of valuable support for our concern with the essentiality of human coadunacy. Pannenberg's notion of *exocentricity* and his drawing on the anthropological sciences in support of this concept of human openness presents us with a convincing picture of the phenomenon of fundamental human communality. Portmann's understanding of human being as "deficient being" requiring social support, coupled with Erikson's identification of *basic trust* as developing from child/mother relationships to a general orientation beyond the self are regarded
by Pannenberg as constituting anthropological evidences for the understanding of human being as essentially social.

Clearly we would wish to affirm with Pannenberg that human communality cannot simply take the form of a dogmatic assertion. If human being is fundamentally communal being, albeit fallen communal being, then this ought to be manifest, to some degree, within actual human experience. Nevertheless, despite this valuable contribution by Pannenberg, we are forced to take issue with him over the status his theology accords to the other.

It appears that while openness to the other certainly prioritizes the social self for Pannenberg, this exocentricity has as its goal the development of the ego. It is this understanding of openness to the other as essentially a means towards self-realization of which we are suspicious. As we have noted previously one of Kant's most significant and valuable contributions to the issue of self/other relationality is that human persons are never to be regarded as means, but rather always as ends. This assertion must surely be regarded as a necessary - albeit prolegomenal - condition for human communality.

We have further found ourselves taking issue with Pannenberg's theological determinism which is expressed in terms of human destiny. As with Barth, so too with Pannenberg it is the person of Christ who is true human being. It is only through our communion with Christ via the Spirit, and that proleptically, that we are orientated towards a future destiny which is ultimately determinative for human being. In the light of this inevitable orientation towards the future, present human existence in all its particularity, and the reality of human brokenness, appear to be diminished in their significance in Pannenberg's theology. We noted in this connection the insufficiency of Pannenberg's reinterpretation of the doctrine of sin in terms of centredness.

Clearly there is much to be learned from the thinkers with whom we have engaged. All five of them are unanimous in their belief that the very structure of reality, both ontologically and epistemologically, is fundamentally relational. We contribute structure to the world, says Kant; we are part of the over-all unity of reality argues Hegel; reality in its historical development is the very mode of human existence, suggests Pannenberg. The other
must be regarded as being of the highest worth, an end not a means. The other is absolutely necessary to the self and to be without the other is to be less than fully human. We must thus live life in an attitude of openness and trust, for only in this way can human destiny be fully achieved. All these insights are of immense value for our understanding of human coadunacy.

However, there are two major themes that need to be explored by Christian theology in its attempt to express an understanding of human relationality, and which appear to have been neglected in the thinking of the aforementioned thinkers.

The first of these, as has been suggested throughout this work, is the prioritisation of the other in human relationality as an expression of Christ-like self-abandonment. While relationality is clearly a major concern of the thinkers we have considered, the initiative or power for relationship appears always to come from the subject, be that subject divine or human. Furthermore, the reality of human relational brokenness must constitute the starting point for our consideration of a strategy for self-abandonment. We must take "centredness" seriously as an aspect of human sin. Thus any notion of self/other relationality which seeks to prioritize the other must first discuss a strategy for the disempowering of the self.

The second theme which we wish to take up in our concluding chapters is that of human situatedness. With the possible exception of Pannenberg, there is a sense in which all the thinkers with whom we have concerned ourselves have tended towards a somewhat abstract notion of relationality. Human relationality is treated universally, rather than particularly. The context that we inhabit is either marginalised or, as in the case of Fichte and Hegel treated as an object of animosity. In short relationships are regarded for the most part as "being made in heaven".

It seems to me that any thorough-going notion of human coadunacy must involve an understanding of human beings existing within a context or environment or place. Human being as embodied existence must be treated with due seriousness if we are to provide a theological understanding of relationality which is true to human experience, and which does not stop short at dogmatic and idealist assertions. How we relate to our surrounding and how this relatedness affects who we are and how we engage with the other is
an issue which has increased in significance proportionally with our ability to structure our own environment. While our treatment of the theme here will of necessity be preliminary in character, I hope that it will at least have the effect of tabling the issue for further theological consideration.

In chapter two we outlined three basic fields of inquiry which formed the basis of our exploration into the thought of Kant, Fichte, Hegel, Barth and Pannenberg: The nature of human coadunacy, the loss of human coadunacy and the restoration of human coadunacy. We pointed out that while this schema would not be found expressed as such during the course of our analysis we would be imposing it upon our own thinking in this concluding chapter. We intend to make good this promise now by outlining a Christian theological approach to these three themes which appear, in their Christian mode, in the following form: Human coadunacy as creaturely norm, The problematic of sin and The Christological restoration of coadunacy.

Three themes of coadunacy

1. Human coadunacy as creaturely norm

In speaking of that which is normative for human being we are engaging with issues concerning the very essence of humanity. Explorations into the norms of human existence are motivated by the fundamental question "what is a human being?" and for this reason questions concerning normality are ontological ones which seek to identify the necessary constitutive elements of human being. Such a task is clearly fundamental to Christian theology which maintains that humanity owes its existence to a creator God. Indeed the Christian tradition has at its very centre an understanding of human being as both intended by God and as in some way spoilt by deviation from the divine intention. These perspectives on the nature of human being are associated with the doctrines of creation and redemption, the latter being understood in terms of new creation, and the doctrine of sin. For the Christian tradition to speak of human normativity is for it to address the issue of what the creator God intended humanity to be. Thus, to suggest that coadunacy is normative for human being a Christian theology must
identify it as part of the divine creative intention for that being. To this end certain doctrines, fundamental to the Christian tradition, must be considered.

By saying that coadunacy is normative for human being, at its most basic level, we are reiterating the biblical observation that it is not good that we be alone and that the ideal mode of human existence is to be one in Christ. The theological foci of normative human coadunacy, it is suggested, may be usefully identified as having to do with human creatureliness, which we have already considered in chapter one, and the twin doctrines of the *imago dei* and the Triune nature of God. The choice of these particular doctrines for our exploration into coadunacy as normative for humanity is hardly a startling one. The doctrines of the *imago dei* and the Trinity are considered foundational for the Christian tradition or to use a term suggested by T.F. Torrance they are part of the "ground and grammar" of theology. It is to the Christian doctrine of creation that theology has always looked for an understanding of human being as a creature of God, as one whose very existence is derived from God and whose nature and mode of being issues from the divine intention to create a being of a certain kind. Furthermore, it is fundamental to Christian theological anthropology that the human creature is created in the divine image, that in some way human being is an echo of the divine being. The doctrine of the *imago dei* has always been seen as central to any theological explication of the essential nature of human being and consequently the Christian doctrines of God and Humanity are inextricably linked. For the purposes of our examination into the normativity of coadunacy for human being it is the distinctively Christian understanding of God as Trinity which is of significance here. Once again we must say that when dealing with the doctrine of the Trinity we are engaging with a fundamental doctrine of the Christian tradition which, while it has never ceased to be problematic for theology, has always been regarded as central to the understanding of God as Father, Son and Holy Spirit. The point that we wish to make here is that the doctrines which we are dealing with here as essential to our understanding of the norm of coadunacy are by no means marginal to the Christian theological enterprise but are ones which have always been recognised as being of foundational significance.

The claim that human beings are first and foremost creatures is already to establish them as in relation. That is to say that human
being is always one pole of the creator/creature relationality which, within the Christian tradition, is characterised as an interpersonal relationship of familial intimacy. Thus a Christian notion of coadunacy must involve, in its claim to normality, reference to human creatureliness and we have already explored the significance of human creatureliness in chapter one. In our quest to focus our theological understanding of coadunacy as a norm for human being we will concentrate our attention here on the doctrines of the image of God, and the Trinity.

a. The imago dei and the norm of coadunacy

The Christian doctrine of the imago dei is by no means an unproblematic one. Questions concerning the constitution of the imago and its status and condition in the light of human sin make it a difficult doctrine to build on. The biblical tradition says little concerning the specific nature of the imago. In Genesis 1, where the Judeo-Christian tradition finds the first reference to human being created in the image of God, we read

"Let us make man in our image, after our likeness; and let them have dominion over the fish of the seas and over the birds of the air, and over the cattle, and over all the earth..." So God created man in his own image, in the image of God he created him; male and female he created them. (Gen1:26)

We are further informed in Genesis 9 that while "every moving thing that lives" may be considered food for man (9:3), "whosoever sheds the blood of man by man shall his blood be shed; for God made man in his own image" (7:6). This clearly indicates the sanctity of human being as image bearer.

In the New Testament the imago dei is seen in a specifically Christological light. In Colossians 1:5ff it is said of Christ that

He is the image of the invisible God, the first-born over all creation. For by him all things were created... He is before all things, and in him all things hold together.

Similarly in 2 Corinthians 4:4f we hear of

the light of the gospel of the glory of Christ who is the image of God ... For God who said "Let light shine out of darkness" made his light shine in our hearts to give us the light of knowledge of the glory of God in the face of Christ."
It is significant that both these references to the imago are to be found in passages concerning creation. We will consider this further in a moment.

That the **imago dei** is in some way constitutive for human being is something that Christian theology has always wanted to maintain, although the content of the image has been interpreted differently. Augustine, referring to Genesis 1:26-27, writes: "... this text says that human nature itself, which is complete in both sexes, was made in this image of God."²

Thomas Aquinas, following Augustine, relates the **imago** to human beings' unique rationality: "God's likeness in the manner of an image is to be found in man as regards his mind; but as regards his other parts only in the manner of a trace".³ However he does go on to suggest that the human bodily form is "more after God's image and likeness than the bodies of other animals".⁴

In many ways Calvin is in agreement with Aquinas when he informs us that

> although the primary seat of the divine image was in the mind and heart, or in the soul and its powers, yet there was no part of man, not even the body itself, in which some spark did not glow.⁵

Indeed, in the light of this Calvin asserts at the very outset of his *Institutes* that "Without knowledge of self there is no knowledge of God" and "without knowledge of God there is no knowledge of self".⁶

With Luther we encounter a less precise and - as a result - a more dynamic understanding of the **imago dei**. For Luther, to be in the image of God would appear to mean living a life orientated towards God. In this respect the **imago** is relational for Luther rather than having to do with a specific human power.

> ... my understanding of the image of God is this: that Adam had it in his being and that he not only knew God and believed that He was God, but that he also lived in a life that was wholly godly; that is, he was without the fear of death or of any other danger, and was content with God's favour.⁷

Luther paraphrases this understanding of the **imago** : "living, just as God lives".⁸

As we have already seen this understanding of the **imago dei** as principally relational is taken up and developed by Karl Barth.⁹ For Barth, to be created in the divine image is to be created after
the image of the triune God who is always in relation. In this respect, Barth's notion of the *imago* bears similarity to that of Luther, in that it is our covenant relationship with God that is at the very heart of the matter. Indeed, it is Christ's perfect relationship with the Father which identifies him as truly the image of God.

In a similar view, we found that for Wolfhart Pannenberg the *imago* has to do with relationality, with our future destiny to be one with God and with our fellows.\(^e\)

It is with this relational understanding of the *imago dei* found, for example, in Luther, Barth, Brunner and Pannenberg that we wish to ally ourselves. It seems to us that four fundamental points arise out of the Genesis 1 passage concerning the *imago dei*. Firstly, as we have argued in chapter one, human beings are creatures of God and as such are, from the very outset of their existence, in a Creator/creature relationship.

Secondly - and it is understood that this is a contentious issue - the plural "let us make man..." (*Elohim*) is significant in that it introduces an interpersonal dimension into the divine decision to create human being. This divine plurality, which is subsequently understood as triunity, represents the God who creates humanity as personal and relational in his very essence, prior to any act of creativity. It is *because* God is relational that he creates human being, he does not create *so that he might be* relational. As we have learned from Hegel, it is only in the presence of otherness that the one becomes truly personal.\(^f\) This person-forming plurality in divinity is vital if we wish to understand human personhood as being derived from God. This perspective is one that is clearly taken up by Barth, as we have also seen.

Next - and again as we see in Barth - we are told that when God created human being in his image he created male and female. Apart from the clear implications this may be taken as having for sexual equality, for man/woman relationships and for the sacrament of marriage, this duality exemplifies the communal nature of the divine image. Thus we would wish to maintain that while the *imago dei* has to do with human covenant relationship with the divine Creator, it also has to do with a human self/other reciprocity which is necessary to human existence, in the light of the divine assertion that "it is not good for man to be alone". (Genesis 2:18)
The radical nature of this relationality is illustrated by the insufficiency of human relationship with any other creature (Genesis 2:20) and the subsequent description of woman as "bone of my bone and flesh of my flesh" (Genesis 2:23). This radical "flesh and bone" reciprocity is at the very heart of our notion of coadunacy as having to do with congenital unity,¹ that is with a unity of familial significance.

Finally we are told of humanity's "dominion" over the earth, which issues out of his being created in the divine image. In the light of this we would want to maintain that the *imago dei* has to do not only with human/divine and human/human relationality, but also with relationality between human beings and their environment. Genesis 2:15 speaks of men being put in the garden of Eden to care for it, and we are subsequently shown how human sin effected a radical breakdown of harmonious relations with God, with other beings and with the created order. (Genesis 3:17-19, cf. Romans 8:22). The significance of place and situation is vital to any consideration of human relationality and it is a concern to which we will be returning in some detail.

Although Christology properly constitutes our third theme, it is important to note here that, as Barth has argued so strenuously, the *imago dei* has a vital Christological dimension which must find a major place in any discussion concerning human relationality. Jesus' relationship with the Father must be regarded as the paradigmatic form of coadunacy. The fact that the New Testament references to Christ as the *image* of God are found within the context of concern with creation is surely indicative of the restoration of human relationality in a new act of creation in Christ. We will speak of this further when we consider our third theme. As we have already said the status of coadunacy as normative for human being depends upon our understanding of the nature of the God in whose image we are created. We turn our attention now to therefore to the Christian doctrine of God as Trinity.

b. The triune nature of God and the norm of coadunacy

The doctrine of the *imago dei* becomes particularly significant for the issue of human relationality with the development of a trinitarian understanding of God. While a full discussion of the development of the doctrine of the Trinity is beyond the scope of
this present work there are a number of important points which do need to be made, some of which have been adumbrated above.

To begin with, in speaking of the divine Trinity the Christian tradition claims to be saying something distinctive about the divine ontology. Furthermore, it is expressing a truth about the nature of God which is made apparent only by way of the divine self-witness. In other words, the Christian confession of God as Trinity is derived uniquely from his act of communing with humanity in history. It is in the specific event of the incarnation of the Logos that we witness the relationship of Father, Son and Spirit. In the person of Jesus Christ we are permitted to gaze upon the mutuality of God in the Son's address of the Father as a discrete person. We are led further into the divine mutuality with the coming of the Paraclete, the comforter, provided by Christ and described by him as the mediator of his continued presence and activity to and for the Church.

In its attempt to avoid both modalism and tritheism the doctrine of the Trinity seeks to express the mystery of the divine unity in particularity. As we saw when we considered the idealism of Hegel, the tendency to subsume particularity into a single totalizing subject has disastrous implications for coadunacy. The Trinitarian understanding of God as the unity of three persons speaks of radical reciprocity and not of absorption. In this respect Pannenberg's suggestion that our Trinitarian formulations ought to begin with a consideration of Jesus' relationship with the Father, as opposed to beginning with debates concerning the pre-incarnate relationship of the Logos with the Father, has considerable merit. Clearly the Gospel accounts of Jesus' relationship with the Father illustrate both particularity and intimate communion. Jesus prays to his Father and places himself in obedience to the will of the Father. As we shall discuss in our concluding chapter, it is Jesus' attitude of self-abandonment to the will of the Father which is paradigmatic for our relationship with others.

Alongside this particularity Jesus' unity with the Father is made quite apparent. "He who has seen me has seen the Father", says Jesus. He prays that we will be united with one another even as he is with the Father. Indeed the cry of dereliction from the cross is surely expressive of the pain experienced as a result of the intolerable rift which opened up between Father and Son. It is for
these reasons that the New Testament can assert: "No one who denies the Son has the Father; whoever acknowledges the Son has the Father also". (John 2:23).

The Christian confession that "God is love" (1 John 4:16) also speaks of divine relationality. To say that God is love is to say that it is part of his very essence to love and that this has always been the case even prior to human creation. The Triune God does not require a created other to provide an object for his love, for he is in eternal relationship with himself as Father, Son and Spirit. Richard of St. Victor expresses this point with both clarity and beauty when he writes:

Surely it ought to be noted in the divine persons that the perfection of one demands the addition of another and consequently in a pair of persons the perfection of each requires union with a third. ... For when two persons who mutually love embrace each other with supreme longing and take supreme delight in each other's love, then the supreme joy of the first is in intimate love of the second, and conversely the excellent joy of the second is in love of the first. As long as only the first is loved by the second, he alone seems to possess the delights of his excellent sweetness. Similarly, as long as the second does not have someone who shares in love for a third (condilectus), he lacks the sharing of excellent joy. In order that both may be able to share delights of that kind, it is necessary for them to have someone who shares in love for a third.21

It seems to us that an understanding of the triune nature of God as being expressive of persons in relation is of immense value in helping to establish communality as normative for human being. Clearly if the triune nature of God is to be seen as significant for human coadunacy, then a social model of the Trinity would appear to be necessary.22 Indeed, in our analyses of both Barth and Pannenberg we were particularly concerned to assess the place and significance of the doctrine of the Trinity for their respective theological anthropologies. The point at which a social understanding of the Trinity might become normative for human sociality is quite clearly in the imago dei. If human being is truly to be regarded as being in the divine image then that image must be communal in some manner. E. Schillebeeckx makes this very point when he argues that

Created and called to be the 'image of God', the image of the triune God, man is also orientated towards the human community. Being man means living in one great family of men, which comes from God and
goes back to the one God. The love of God and fellow-humanity are therefore two fundamental demands of life.\footnote{23}

We thus suggest that the \textit{imago dei} ought more properly to be expressed as the \textit{imago trinitatis} and that being after the likeness of God is always \textit{being as communion}.\footnote{24} As we shall see in subsequent chapters, any monarchical understanding of the divine being as, for example, a single subject, removes vital theological support for the normality of human communality.

What we have attempted to focus on here in the first of our three themes are the bases for a normative theological anthropology, specifically as regards the norm of coadunacy, founded upon uniquely Christian theological data. By \textit{normative} we mean having to do with the very ontology of human being. By \textit{Christian theological data} we have in mind doctrines that have been regarded as foundational to the faith by the Christian tradition.

As we have argued above, that human being is derivative and dependent is part of what the Christian tradition understands by human creatureliness. At the very center of theological anthropology, therefore, is the recognition that we are creatures of God. Concomitantly we must understand our creatureliness as an outworking of divine intent. That is, when God created human being this act was a function of his will to create a being of a particular type. For this reason it is appropriate for theology to speak of the \textit{norm} for human existence - in other words, the divine intention for human being.

For our purposes we have been concerned to articulate the basis for normative human coadunacy - that is to say, for human being as essentially relational by divine intent. We have argued for this normative coadunacy in the light of human \textit{creatureliness}, the \textit{imago dei} and the \textit{trinitarian} being of God. Human being is being in relation precisely because it is \textit{created being}, and thus always encounters an other in its Creator.\footnote{25} Furthermore, human being is created in the divine image that is, in the image of the God who is himself always in relation, Father, Son and Holy Spirit. The reciprocity encountered in Jesus' relationship with the Father speaks to us of a trinitarian communality which is radical, but which avoids the absorption of one into the other. Thus in our
understanding of human communality as an expression of the *imago trinitatis* the particularity of the other must be maintained as an essential aspect of that being in communality.

**II. The problematic of sin**

In the previous section we have suggested that any notion of communality that is to be considered normative for human being ought to entail as its essential foundations human creatureliness, the doctrine of the *imago dei* and the divine interpersonal triunity which informs the relational dimension of that image. It is precisely this doctrine of the image of God, with its reference to human origins in God's creativity and character, which gives Christian anthropology its normative perspective. That is to say it permits Christian theology to engage in discussions concerning what is proper and improper to an understanding of human being. The inquiry into the nature of human being, for Christian theology, must always take into account the divine, creative intention. Our anthropology is not purely phenomenological; for Christian theology human being is a function of divine agency.

Having said this it is vital that our present experience of the brokenness of human relationality be acknowledged as a – if not the – fundamental problematic of the Christian faith. In saying this we are engaging with the existential reality of human being. These two poles of the essential and the existential are always present in a theology which tries to do justice both to God's creative sovereignty, and to human actuality.26

As has been mentioned earlier, the biblical tradition clearly identifies sin as having to do with the brokenness of human relationships with God and with others. Indeed human sinfulness has always been regarded as central to Christian dogmatic theology, and this is inevitably so given that it constitutes the *raison d'être* of the Christian gospel of salvation. To characterise Jesus' message and mission as one of redemption, or reconciliation or salvation, is always to prompt the question - redemption from what?

The doctrine of sin is in itself a problem in that it appears to elude precise definition. R.R. Williams informs us that "there is no positively stated orthodox doctrine of sin comparable to the soteriological doctrines of Trinity and Christology".27 However, having recognised the relational aspect of the *imago*, it ought not to surprise us if we find that sin - which in some way signifies the
loss of or damage to the *imago* - also has a relational dimension. It has been suggested that the doctrine of sin is best understood as a "tensive symbol", expressive of a range of meanings and this seems to us to be a useful perspective. Thus, while we will most certainly be laying emphasis upon the relational dimension of sin, this is by no means to suggest that this exhausts the meaning of the doctrine.

In his book *Death: the Riddle and the Mystery*, Eberhard Jüngel speaks of sin and its ultimate end in death in terms of relationlessness. He writes:

... death is the consequence of man's pernicious drive toward this relationlessness. Man's disastrous urge towards the deadliness of relationlessness stands in direct proportion to death's aggressiveness as alienating man from God and as breaking up human relationships.

In a similar vein, as we have seen, Pannenberg wishes to interpret sin in terms of "centredness" or "ego-centricity", where the individual person's openness to God and to others is replaced by self-prioritizing. Karl Barth, writing in *The Christian Life*, is quite adamant that "the Fall" was a fall not only away from God, but away from one another: "In and with the sin of Adam, who wanted to be as God, there is already enclosed the sin of Cain.

The Judeo-Christian picture of the Fall has at its root man's desire for autonomy and self-sufficiency. As Barth points out from the Genesis narrative, Adam's sin was that he wanted to be as God. The consequence of this dislocation from God is that we no longer consider ourselves to be our brother's keeper. Our current experience of relational brokenness prompts us always to encounter the other as a stranger. Indeed, the opening chapter of the Gospel of John illustrates how even God is now considered a stranger by us: "He was in the world, and though the world was made through him, the world did not recognise him. He came to that which was his own, but his own did not receive him." (John 1:10f).

It seems to us that our experience of the other as stranger is born, in part, out of fear: fear of, or at the very least anxiety over, the sin of Cain, fear of the potential for violence and animosity inherent in the mysterious stranger. It is this which represents the tragedy and paradox of relational brokenness, for while it is the mysteriousness of the stranger which fuels our fear, it is our fear which helps to fuel our estrangement from the other. In the
light of this it is important that Christian theology articulate a strategy for breaking into this paradox, and clearly this must be a Christological strategy for it is Christ who frees us from fear. We shall be exploring such a strategy in a subsequent section of this chapter by means of the notions of signals of availability and self-abandonment to the other as ways in which the self may be disempowered for the other.

Clearly if we wish to talk about the normality of human coadunacy then we must attempt to account for our present experience of relational brokenness. Similarly, if we wish to speak of the reconciling work of Christ as an empowering to restored and transformed coadunacy, as we do, then we must understand such an empowering as taking place in the context of human sin. In other words, we must avoid any triumphalistic tendency which understands full human relationality to be restored immediately by divine fiat. Those who acknowledge Christ as Lord and who constitute his Church are quite clearly not experiencing full coadunacy. No matter how realized an eschatology one may have, there is no sense in which humanity, or any group of human beings, might be regarded as fulfilling the image of God in all its intended perfection, at the present time. Jürgen Moltmann sums up this point when he writes:

> It is the old experience so often shared by believers: 'Christianus semper est in fieri', says Luther. A Christian's being is in becoming. His becoming is a continual repentance, a continual new start in a new direction. It is a new start from sin to righteousness, from slavery to freedom, from doubt to faith, and from past to future. That is why the Christian's being is still hidden in the womb of the divine future. 'It does not yet appear what we shall be'. (1 Jn.3:2).

In the light of this it will be important to discuss the conditions for coadunacy. In other words, how is true Christ-like communion with the other brought about within the context of a fallen and thus alienated humanity?

Throughout this work it has been found that while certain influential thinkers are clearly aware of the normative status of self/other, subject/object relationality, and while they are similarly aware of disjunctions between the two poles of this relationality, the manner in which unity is seen to be restored tends to prioritize the subject over the object. We have suggested that this is true not only of philosophers such as Hegel, but also
of theologians such as Barth who appear to prioritize the agency of the divine Subject over human particularity. It seems to us that this prioritizing of the subject over the other is part of what the Christian tradition would wish to understand as sin. In this respect it is part of the sickness and not part of the cure.

In speaking of the human experience of broken relationality, we are thus dealing with nothing less than the Christian doctrine of sin. To say, as we have done above, that the *imago dei* has to do with relationality is also to say that the loss of that image, or any damage suffered by it, also has to do with relationality.

Human relational brokenness affects both our relationship with God and that with our fellows. Human sin seeks to prioritize the self over the other, and to establish an autonomous egocentricity. This condition of sin gives rise to the tragic fear-estrangement syndrome, where we fear the stranger because of his or her strangeness, and we perpetuate estrangement because of our fear. The reality of human sinfulness experienced in terms of relational brokenness takes the form of a tragic condition which unaided humanity is incapable of resolving. It is for this reason that the Christian tradition speaks of the need for grace and for divine empowering to a restored humanity - the divine image.

### iii. The Christological restoration of coadunacy

As we have already mentioned, hope for restored coadunate existence and the empowering necessary for its realization is always to be understood *Christologically*. The Christological reference of our anthropology is two-fold, and corresponds to the afore-mentioned poles of the essential and the existential; that is to say, it has to do with Christ both as the revelation of what human being should be - the essential - and as the one who responds to and overcomes the brokenness of our situation - the existential. In the light of this we can speak of Christ as the one who is our exemplar, the "true" human being, whom we must imitate, and as the one who empowers us to the restored image of God. Both these poles need to be maintained if we wish to avoid an understanding of Jesus Christ which regards him as either simply an example to be followed or as a totalising power who ultimately does violence to human freedom.
It is through the person and work of Jesus Christ that we are reconciled to God and our fellows. This relational aspect of salvation is consonant with the systematic pattern which we have already suggested whereby the imago is seen as essential relatedness, and sin as the breakdown of human relationality. The New Testament speaks of a "new creation in Christ" whereby those who follow Christ and who constitute his Church are to be restored to the ideal of human existence before God. As we have seen in a previous chapter, human destiny for communion with God and others is a major theme in Pannenberg's theology where it is expressed with great insight.

As we shall also see in the rest of this chapter, our concern with the empowering and the imitation of Christ raises important questions about the relationship between divine and human action.

To say that restored human coadunacy is fundamentally Christological could be to do nothing more than to take refuge behind one of the primary symbols of Christian theology. What we must do here, albeit in a suggestive manner, is to specify what we might mean by invoking Christology in this way, considering these two categories of the empowering of Christ and the imitation of Christ.

a. The Empowering of Christ

By "Christological empowering", what we ultimately have in mind is grace; that is, God's unconditional gift of salvation from sin and reconciliation with himself through the person and work of Christ. The Christian faith has always maintained, in some form or another, that sin has to do with an "enslavement" from which human beings are incapable of releasing themselves. It follows that human alienation, as an aspect of sin, is similarly invincible, and that grace is necessary to effect freedom from this condition. As we have already noted, the New Testament uses the language of creation and re-creation to describe both the person of Christ as the image of God, and also the redemptive work of Christ on our behalf. In other words, what we are saying is this: for Christian theology to talk about the restoration of human coadunacy is not for it to engage, primarily, in sociological but in soteriological discourse.

We thus suggest that human communality, in the context of human brokenness, is made truly possible only via the empowering work of Christ, by which human being is restored to the imago dei. Only through the restoration of human being to proper creaturely
relationship with God and to the image of that triune God—in other words, divine being as communion—is coadunacy re-established as normative for humanity. The "high-priestly prayer" in the Fourth Gospel has Jesus praying that those who believe might be unified. Similarly in the letter to the Galatians we are told that we are "all one in Christ Jesus" because of our "faith in Christ Jesus", because we were "baptised into Christ" and "clothed with Christ". It seems clear that according to the New Testament witness the normality of coadunacy lies solely in the reality of being the body of Christ. It is as Christ's body that human beings are, in the context of their sinfulness, restored to unity with each other and with God. E.Schillebeeckx sums up this point when he writes with reference to Vatican II:

...the christian basis of the community and of fellow-humanity is concisely stated—God calls us in Christ to a community of brothers. The gift of grace is a covenant between God and his people, his great family. Because of this, the church of Christ is a fraternal community.

b. The Imitation of Christ

Having considered the place of divine empowering to coadunacy through Christ, we also want to suggest here that a truly Christian notion of coadunacy ought to involve the imitation of Christ. That is to say that if Jesus Christ is to be understood as the exemplar of the Christian faith, and the revelation par excellence of what true (essential) human being ought to be, then relating to others as Jesus related to others must be a primary condition for human coadunacy.

The basic concept of incarnation as the presence of God with us, Emmanuel, should not be overlooked in this context. The very mode of God's salvific work is itself a relational act and communicates something of the nature of the God in whose image we are made. Jesus, as the God-man, is the one in whom we see radical reciprocity between human and divine; he is the revelation of the God who communicates himself, and of true humanity which is realised in response to God.

The imitation of Christ must take into account both the life and the teaching of Jesus. As we noted in our opening chapter, Jesus' personal message of forgiveness of sins is linked in the gospels with our forgiveness of one another. Indeed, throughout the gospels, Jesus' teaching is concerned with relational themes:
forgiveness, love, service of others - and all this, unilaterally.37 As we saw in chapter one, the parables of the good Samaritan and the prodigal son illustrate the unconditional nature of the demand that we love God and our neighbour as ourselves. In Matthew 23:8ff we hear Jesus speaking of the familial unity of humanity which exists on the basis of God's fatherhood and which should prompt our service of one another. Although we do not have time to explore this theme here, we would also see as significant Jesus' attitude towards his followers. They are described in familial terms; he prays that his disciples will be one, even as he and the Father are one; and the understanding of the Church as a coadunate entity, the body of Christ, is clearly extremely important in the rest of the New Testament.39

Jesus' teaching must not, of course, be seen in isolation from his own life and person. Again as we saw in chapter one, Jesus' relationship with the Father is the paradigmatic form of interpersonal relationality, and self-giving to the Father and to others is at the heart of Jesus' being. It seems to us that the mode of relationality most characteristic of Jesus' relationship with others is one of self-abandonment. We shall explore this way of relating to the other in some detail in the concluding chapter of this work. Suffice it to say here that the New Testament witness presents us with a picture of Jesus as the one who gave himself completely to others, without condition or reserve and even unto death; the one who declared that he had come not "to be served, but to serve, and to give my life as a ransom for many."(Mark 10:45). Jesus' relationship with others is never seen to be conditioned by fear or animosity, even in the face of hostility. Jesus is regarded by the New Testament as the one who is always available to the other, with all the risks that such unconditional availability might involve.

Of primary significance then is the experience of Jesus on the cross. It is at the cross that we are made aware of the depth of Jesus' relationship with the Father both in his abandonment to the Father's will, even to death, and in his cry of dereliction. Furthermore it is at the cross that we see Jesus' rejection of the category of stranger and enemy in his act of forgiveness toward those who have caused his suffering.

We would suggest here that any truly Christian notion of human coadunacy ought to entail the imitation of Christ whereby
relationship with the other is characterised by this self-abandonment and unconditional availability.

Given the validity of all we have said above concerning grace and the centrality of Christological empowering to coadunacy, it is important not to marginalise the place of human agency in this imitation of Christ if we are to preserve the integrity of human particularity and avoid christological totalism where all of humanity is subsumed into the person of Christ. Clearly belief in Christ has not brought about true human coadunacy even within the Church and, as often as not, the New Testament expresses the ideal of communality in the form of a demand. Love of God and of neighbour is found as a commandment on Jesus' lips. Similarly in Matthew's account of the Sermon on the Mount we are told not to "resist an evil person", to love our enemies and to thus be perfect as the Father is perfect. Insistence on easy social utopia is not part of the Christian tradition and thus true human coadunacy has to be achieved. There are conditions to be fulfilled before coadunacy is an actuality for human being.

The second reason to stress the imitation of Christ as a human response and decision is to avoid the tendency to so emphasize God's activity in redemption that the particularity of the human other is somehow subsumed in the divine subject. This is a theme which has been pursued, in one form or another, throughout this thesis.

In speaking of the Christological dimensions of human coadunacy we are, in a sense, returning to our preliminary concerns with normative coadunacy and divine creativity. It is Jesus Christ who is identified by the New Testament as the *imago dei* and thus true human being. It is thus through the person and work of Christ that human being is re-created and restored. This image is seen to be restored by Christ by virtue of the reconciliation he brings about between human being and its Creator, and human being and itself. It is this Christological empowering to reconciliation and restored coadunacy which breaks into our existential experience of the syndrome of fear and estrangement.

In Christ, who is the agent of creation, human being has restored to it, by grace, the conditions necessary for coadunacy: reconciliation with God, restoration of the *imago*, freedom from fear and, as Pannenberg puts it, hope for a communal destiny with God and others.
The presence of Christ among those who follow him and acknowledge him as Lord always results in an empowering to community. This has always been the experience of believers from the first disciples to the present day. In this respect the Church represents a witness to the potential for restored human coadunacy and also points forward to a destiny where we might be one in Christ.

Alongside this emphasis upon Christological empowering we have placed the notion of the imitation of Christ. This is necessary if we wish to avoid a form of determinism which in its emphasis upon grace, reduces the significance of human particularity and otherness, and in so doing partakes of the brokenness of coadunacy, rather than in its restoration.

In Christ we see the perfect example of coadunate divinity and humanity. He is the true image of God, the one who both abandons himself to the will of the Father, and also abandons himself to us in the face of our estrangement. Both in his person and in his teaching Jesus exemplifies the denial of estrangement which is proper to those who are in the image of the triune God. Thus, alongside human empowering to coadunacy in Christ, where God is actively engaged in an act of re-creation, there must also exist human response. This response must take the form of a strategy for the imitation of Christ. The letter to the Philippians is worth quoting here as it expresses exactly what we have in mind.

If you have any encouragement from being united with Christ, if any comfort from his love, if any fellowship with the Spirit, if any tenderness and compassion, then make my joy complete by being like-minded, having the same love, being one in spirit and purpose. Do nothing out of selfish ambition or vain conceit, but in humility consider others better than yourselves. Each of you should look not only to your own interests, but also the interests of others. Your attitude should be the same as that of Jesus Christ: Who, being in very nature God, did not consider equality with God something to be grasped, but made himself nothing, taking the very nature of a servant, being made in human likeness. And being found in appearance as a man, he humbled himself and became obedient to death— even death on a cross. (Philippians 2:1-8)

In the following chapter we shall speak at some length concerning a possible strategy for Christ-like self-abandonment and also the significance of context for human coadunacy.
NOTES:

2. We have already made reference to J.D. Zizioulas' notion of the social Trinity found in his book Being as Communion and this understanding of divine interrelationality may well be of value. For further information on this theme see W.J. Hill, The Three Personed God, Chapter 3 "The Trinity as Community".
4. Logic p.161
5. CD.3/2 p222
9. Summa Ia 93,6 p.69.
10. Summa Ia 93,6 p.71.
11. Inst. 1:15:3 p.188.
14. ibid.
15. Cf. Chapter 5 below.
17. Chapter 4.
20. Cf. Chapter 6 below
22. J.D. Zizioulas' understanding of the divine being as communion may be of use here but would doubtless require further development and some defending against its critics. Cf. Being as Communion, especially chapter 1 "Personhood and Being".
25. cf. Brunner talks about the self-limitation of God in the act of creation - a self-limitation which is necessary for the "over-againstness" of the creature who is therefore able to respond to God. Dogmatics Vol.II p.19f; also Moltmann, who argues for a similar view from the idea of creation ex nihilo, God in Creation p.86ff.

27. Christian Theology, ed. Hodgson and King, p. 168


32. Cf. 2 Cor 5: 17f

33. P. Ricoeur argues that the "riddle of the slave-will, of a free-will which is bound and always finds itself already bound" is the ultimate theme which is given to thought by the Christian, "anthropological" symbolism of evil. Fallible Man, 1967, p. xx; The Symbolism of Evil, 1967. p. 151ff. Cf. also Reinhold Niebuhr who also insists on the necessity of this paradox, The Nature and Destiny of Man, I p. 278.


35. Galatians 3: 26-29

36. Schillebeeckx, The Mission of the Church, p. 63


In this chapter we intend to treat two distinct areas of human relationality which have emerged as problematic throughout our previous analytic chapters. Firstly, it would seem that for all the thinkers with whom we have engaged it is the immediate self who is prioritized within self/other relationality. Indeed not only is the self prioritized but in some cases the other is actually understood as subsumed by the self. We have suggested throughout this work that this totalization of the self is at variance with a truly Christian understanding of coadunacy which has the self-abandoning Christ at its centre. It is the nature of this Christ-like self-abandonment and the suggestion of a possible strategy to this end which will occupy us during the first half of this chapter.

Our second area of concern here issues out of our observation that among the thinkers with whom we have had to do the significance of the context in which self/other relationality takes place appears to be marginalised. By the context of relationality we have in mind notions of situatedness and place. In the light of this apparent omission we will spend some time discussing the possible significance of situatedness and place for our understanding of human coadunacy.

We have suggested that the notion of coadunacy be understood at its most basic level in terms of persons in relation inhabiting an environment. In the light of this rather crude definition the following discussion will fall into two distinct parts. The first will address the issue of human relationality, that is community between the self and the Other, while the latter will deal with the question of human involvement in an environment specifically as this relates to situatedness and the notion of place.

1. The Self and the Other

   i. Structural Controls

Before proceeding with a full discussion of coadunate relationality it is important that we identify certain structural limits to the notion which will help to guide us in establishing its shape.
The overriding factor in our consideration of human coadunacy has already been spelled out: that it is founded upon the creator/creature duality and the divine trinitarian relationality as mediated to human being through the *imago dei*. The following controls, founded upon insights drawn from a previous analytical chapters, thus suggest themselves: firstly, coadunacy has to do, at its core, with inter-personal relating and therefore defies reduction beyond the complex of the self and the other. Concomitantly it is in opposition to isolationism and radical or autonomous individualism.

Secondly, coadunacy refers to a non-absorptive relationality; that is to say the self and the other, while unified and essential to each other, remain distinct selves. There is no absorption of the self and the other into a third category of coadunacy, just as the Father, Son and Spirit are not absorbed into one undifferentiated Godhead.

Thirdly, coadunate relationality is non-totalizing in that the self is not subsumed in the other, nor the other in the self.

Finally, coadunacy has to do with a particular quality of relating which takes the trinitarian character as its standard. Thus we will expect to find categories such as love, mercy and justice inherent within the notion of coadunacy.

Bearing these controls in mind we shall now proceed to discuss the shape of the dynamic of coadunacy.

ii. The Stranger and the Availability of the Self

There is a very real sense in which, no matter how isolated we may be, we are always found to be in relation with other persons. This relationship may be merely formal in that we are someone’s child or parent, or a relative of some kind, it may be simply functional, manifesting itself in our dealings with shop assistants and various forms of bureaucracy. Even antagonism and out-and-out isolationism require us to be in relation, otherwise to whom are we antagonistic, and from whom are we isolated? The point is that while we exist we are always, to a greater or lesser extent, available to others even if this availability is merely the prolegomena to a denial of the other. Furthermore, even this wilful denial of the other must be a denial in the face of the givenness of our relationship with the
other. The other who is alienated from me via an act of will on the part of either of us is still other for me. I still encounter him or her as a person, an embodied locus of particularity'.

Thus my enemy and even the stranger are never entirely free of the complex of relationality. Indeed, it is this unavoidability of relationality which refers us back to the protological basis of coadunacy that human being is in essence created as persons in relation and as such images the divine triune relationality. It is the very being of humanity to be in relation, for to say human being is to speak of the self/other complex, just as to speak of God is always to speak of Father, Son and Spirit. The whole gamut of human emotions and experiences are inextricably bound up with our relatedness. Love, hate, jealousy, gratitude, greed, pain and joy all find a place within the matrix of our relationality. When we are denied the normal avenues of relationship we often find surrogates in fictional characters, television personalities and pets.

However, in speaking of coadunacy in accordance with our aforementioned structural controls, we are concerned not merely with the bare bones of the fact of human relationality but with a particular quality of relating. If we are right 'in maintaining that self/other relationality is at the very heart of human being then our qualitative concerns with respect to human relationality are precisely identifiable with the quality of being human. That is to say that a view of human being as coadunate must seek to articulate a more complete and satisfying understanding of what it means to be human than do non-relational models.

In that coadunacy is a theological notion and more specifically a Christian theological notion it must ultimately leave us with a view of humanity which is consistent with the teachings of Jesus and the witness of the Christian tradition concerning the quality of human being. We have already considered the eschatological basis for human coadunacy with respect to the restoration and transformation of human being in the person and work of Christ, and thus will not recapitulate here. Suffice it to say here that for our notion of coadunacy to remain Christian it must be expressive of the dignity and value attributed to humanity by its Creator.

That a lower level of relationality is in operation during our interaction with, for example, an acquaintance whom we might nod to
on the train every morning than is the case with a life-long friend with whom we grew up is clearly obvious. The question is, however, what makes the relationship I have with a close friend qualitatively superior to that which I have with a nodding acquaintance? By way of an answer to this question we would like to suggest that the quality of relationality is related to the level of availability. By availability we mean the self's availability for and to the other. Let us consider this availability factor more closely.

As has already been mentioned there is a sense in which we are always available to the other, even if this availability is only passive. If we can be referred to in any way, by sight or sound for example, or even by second-hand description, then we are available to the other in such a way that we can be reacted to. I have never personally met with certain of the world's fascist dictators nor have they made any attempt to relate with me directly. Similarly I know little about Mother Theresa and cannot really say that I have a significant relationship with her. However both the dictators and Mother Theresa are available enough to me through second-hand sources for me to dislike dictator "X" and to like Mother Theresa. In that I can declare my liking for the one person and my dislike for the other, it might justifiably be said that I relate to them. However in that they are totally unaware of me there is a lack of reciprocity such that a true dynamic of relationship cannot be said to pertain. The other might well be available to me but I am not available to the other unless, of course, I take steps to facilitate my availability to them by visiting the aforementioned people in, let us say, South America and Calcutta. It is only really by meeting with these people that I might make myself available to them and they might truly make themselves available to me.

The generalities of public availability such as are commonplace among the famous and infamous, are really no basis for a relationship. The famous are in the public eye, not in my eye. By maintaining a rapid report rate it becomes possible for the media to simulate the dynamic process of personal activity in such a way that one might feel that one actually knows or has a relationship with certain public figures, the royal family for example. A daily report on what the Princess of Wales is wearing or doing can build up an image which might be related to. The effect is akin to a childrens' flick-book where an image in a slightly different pose is printed on every page so that when the pages are flicked through at
speed the illusion of a moving figure is created. The more pages and images, and the faster the flick rate, the smoother and more convincing the image. Similarly with a film, we have a vast number of complex images each being minutely different from its neighbours such that when they are presented to us at a particular rate we perceive the perfect illusion of activity. But the truth is that the images do not move.

In a similar manner successive images of particular persons are presented to us via reports and second-hand accounts in such a rapid fashion that the illusion of active personal dynamic is achieved. This illusion is so convincing that we do quite often feel ourselves to be in a real relationship with a real person, rather than with what is at best a crude analogue of that person. We indulge in many such one-sided pseudo-relationships where the other is either constructed by some anonymous third party or even by ourselves. There is a great trend within the childrens' toy industry to produce toys which are "your friend": dolls with unique faces and birth certificates, teddy bears with name tags and labels asking you to take care of them. It is even possible to purchase a doll which responds to your voice with its own random conversation, indeed it is quite amusing to place two such dolls in the same room and watch them converse with each other. In the computer industry the quest for true artificial intelligence, while being a questionable one, certainly has its advocates and even though such artificial intelligence is still a reality only for science fiction, computers are programmed to relate to us as if they were persons. In the parlance of the computer industry, we interface with the machines.

There are two points to be made concerning the sort of relating described above, that is, with public images, simulated companions such as talking dolls, and interactive machines. Firstly, and quite obviously, we are not dealing with real persons but with simulcra of persons, artificial constructs which are in no way synonymous with a dynamic subject. Such simulcra are mere static images presented to us by some anonymous agency. These are mythological persons constructed in our image and made available to us by the manufacturer or reporter or the media executive. They are made available to us for they are unable to make themselves available. A fascinating example of this image-making is to be found in the
phenomenon of the film star, particularly during the silent film era².

The second point to be made here is that while such simulcra of persons cannot make themselves available to and for me as they are not true selves, neither, by the same token, can I make myself available to them. In other words there is no capacity for acceptance within these artificial others. Thus we find that an image of a person is given to us, it does not give itself, and further we cannot give ourselves to such an image. Ultimately we are talking here of the dynamic of reciprocal availability between the self and the other where the authentic giving of oneself as an act of will is met with the authentic free acceptance of that gift by the other, similarly as an act of will. Let us consider, then, not the self confronted by the image of a person but by a true person, the subject who is other to me and to whom I myself am other.

We started by suggesting that the difference between my relationship with an acquaintance and my relationship with a close friend might be located in the level of availability of one to the other. Let us pursue this thought further.

In my first encounter with the other the dominant experience is one of alienation. The other conforms to the category of stranger. Once we have assimilated the passive availability of the other as embodied we are confronted by the threatening mysteriousness of the stranger. The stranger is not mine nor is he or she for me, there is no availability involved in the other who is stranger; nothing of the self of the other is freely and willingly offered by the stranger. The stranger remains a stranger because he knows that knowledge is power and that to give knowledge of one self to another is to give power over oneself to the other. Into the vacuum that is the stranger we empty our fears and mistrusts, casting the other in the image of the predator who is out to consume us if once given advantage over us. This is the point of Hegel's master/slave discussion, that we fear that our initial experience of the other will give rise to a confrontation in which the other will seek to dominate us. It is this fear which establishes estrangement as our primary experience of the other; as much as anything it is a defensive posture.
The experience of the non-availability of the stranger is universal. We need only to enter a so-called "public" place to be able to identify the ways in which we deny ourselves for the other. Of course the occupation of a public place is certainly a significant step towards availability in that it brings the self and the other together in proximity to each other. However, such benefits as this bestows in terms of facilitating availability can be almost completely obviated by our will towards estrangement. It is this will towards estrangement, fuelled by fear and mistrust, that will prevent two people sitting together in a doctor's waiting room from conversing with each other. We communicate nothing of ourselves in these encounters, our faces become impassive, our language monosyllabic. If we happen to be also in the company of a friend, our conversations with that person are carried out in hushed whispers.

When in a strange place I find myself loath to ask for directions for fear of placing myself in the hands of a stranger. We dread calling attention to ourselves, preferring rather the anonymity of a particular uniform, be it a pin-striped suit or denim jeans. Similarly we would rather concentrate our attentions upon anything rather than the other person: a newspaper or magazine, a personal hi-fi, the passing scenery or even our footwear. As strangers to the other we present only an image in much the same sense as the images of the famous which are presented to us in newspapers. Our existence as strangers to the other is expressive of the same type of unavailability as we found in the doll and the machine, more sophisticated perhaps and reinforced by the presence of our physical bodies in a place shared with the other, but a simulcra of a person, nonetheless. I sat beside someone for months in a university library, presenting an image of utter studious seriousness, before a chance occurrence opened up the way beyond this construct and to a relationship of infinitely greater significance. It is to a consideration of the nature of this "chance occurrence" that we shall now turn.

Bearing in mind all that we have said concerning our experience of the other as stranger and considering this in the light of the obvious tendency of persons towards relationships with other persons, we clearly find ourselves in the presence of a tension. The resolution of this tension is the very act of making friends. It is the transition from estrangement to communion, from the non-
availability of the self to an at least partial availability. The catalyst, or catalysts, which trigger off this dramatic transition are extremely complex and it is not the task of this work to make an examination of them in any detail. However, it is relatively straightforward to catalogue some of the major factors involved. Body language has been recognized of late to play a significant part in the preliminary stages of human interaction, as have other forms of non-verbal communication such as the wearing of certain clothes, and being regularly present in certain places. Spoken language, no matter how formal the style, may also provide clues pertaining to an appropriate way into a relationship with another. A term that is sometimes used to describe these agents which catalyse relationships is sign or signal, and we shall utilize this terminology here.

A signal of availability must itself be an act of availability. By making such a signal we are communicating something of ourself to the other, albeit in a guarded way. Thus, even from within the depths of our estrangement from the other, our essential being as relational, founded upon the imago trinitatis, manifests itself in our first tentative offering of ourselves to the other. Of course, such signals of availability are not always actively directed at the other. An aspect of my behaviour may be observed by the other and interpreted as a signal. For example, let us return to my image of studiousness in a university library. My estrangement from the person sitting next to me might well have persisted had that person not noticed my surreptitious reading of some science fiction literature. It was this chance observation which prompted him to express his appreciation of the genre, and thus initiate a conversation from which would ultimately develop a close personal friendship. So what is the nature of these signals such that they can stimulate the dramatic process from stranger to friend?

As we have already mentioned a signal of availability, whether it is active, such as wearing a badge expressing one's political persuasion, or passive, for example engaging in a piece of non-directive behaviour such as reading a book in a public place, is in itself an act of availability. Although we may fear making ourselves too available to the other and thus opening ourselves up to abuse, we cannot stop being ourselves no matter how adept we might be at rendering ourselves unavailable to the stranger. We will generally dress in a manner we find pleasing, we will read what we find interesting, we will often be found in places which we find
congenial indulging ourselves in favourite pursuits. All these factors, and many others, may serve as signals indicating a non-threatening common ground upon which I and the stranger might meet. This common ground appears to be constructed from a mutual exchange of information concerning ourselves.

The point of such an exchange is that while it inevitably speaks of a degree of mutual availability, it does not involve an imbalance of power. For example, in our experience of estrangement there is in operation not a dynamic of relationality but a static balance of power. I have no power over the stranger and they have no power over me. In some ways this situation may be seen as analogous to the keeping of state secrets at an international level. However once I discover, via a signal of some sort, that the stranger shares with me an appreciation of a certain type of literature I am free to make this aspect of myself available to that person with little fear that by doing so I might be placing myself in the power of the other. For example, the person sitting next to me in the library would be unlikely to approach me as a stranger and admit to a liking for science fiction literature for fear that I might ridicule him for his interests or simply reject this offering of personal information as a matter of complete indifference to me. However, this fear of my power to dismiss this aspect of the stranger is dissipated when the basis for the experience of this power is removed. In the light of the stranger's observation of the sign indicating my enjoyment of science fiction, he is free to offer me the same information concerning himself safe in the knowledge that sharing the same knowledge about each other gives us the same power over each other, and thus negates the potency of that power. To use a crude but nevertheless useful analogy, you might well find a man with a fine head of hair ridiculing a bald man, but you will never see two bald men ridiculing each other for being bald.

Of course our day-to-day experience of the stranger and our encounters with other persons are by no means as formal as the preceding comments tend to imply. However despite this formalism, which is sadly unavoidable in any attempt at describing interpersonal relations in a systematic way, I believe the above observations to be accurate to our preliminary experience of the other, particularly as we encounter that other as stranger. I would suggest that often our fears, the transmission of signals of availability and the balancing of powers between ourselves and the
stranger operate at an unconscious, instinctive level rather than at the level of cynical manipulation and out-and-out paranoia.

The process of developing friendship continues with an ever-increasing availability to and for the other. With each new act of availability, that is, with each new reciprocal communication of an aspect of self which takes place between the self and the other, there follows a reduction in the possibility of dominating power and an increase in the power to participate. Jürgen Moltmann makes the distinction between these two modes of empowering in his 1984-1988 Gifford lectures, *God in Creation*:

If science sets its sights on the acquisition of power, then scientific knowledge is dominating knowledge. We know to the extent in which we can dominate it. We understand something if we can 'grasp' it ... But belief in creation only arrives at the understanding of creation when it recollects the alternative forms of meditative knowledge. 'We know to the extent to which we love', said Augustine. Through this form of astonished, wondering and loving knowledge, we do not appropriate things. We recognize their independence and participate in their life. We do not wish to know so that we can dominate. We desire to know in order to participate. This kind of knowledge confers community, and can be termed communicative knowledge, as compared with dominating knowledge.

With this reduction of the power to dominate the attendant fear of domination is dissipated, and is ultimately replaced by trust. The feared stranger is no more and the other has become the friend with whom I can "feel at home". This "feeling at home" with another speaks of the inclusion of the other into our personal existence. Our home is often a place where we may go and shut out the stranger; to be at home with someone is to see them not as strangers to be shut out, but as part of our selves, and thus as participants in our lives at the most intimate of levels. To the friend we are vulnerable because when we enter our "home" so as to shut out the rest of the world the friend is shut in with us.

Ultimately the process of signals and mutual exchanges of aspects of ourselves gives way to free communion. At this point the careful attention to the balance of power which characterises our preliminary interaction with the other is transformed by trust into unilateral self-availability. In other words, we begin to give of ourselves without the assurance of a secure power-base from which we are unassailable. We communicate with the other freely and without
fear. It is for this reason that we do not have to establish a common ground, via an exchange of information, for every aspect of our lives before making it available to the other. Mature friendship does not continue as a never-ending process of mutual disarmament. There is a very real sense in which we are still potentially powerful, in a dominant way, over our friends and they over us. Friendship always involves risks precisely because as the friendship deepens, we no longer call upon our friends to divest themselves of their power over us by vouchsafing to us similar power, but rather we trust those friends not to exercise this power, which remains theirs. It is for this reason that betrayal by a friend is the cruellest betrayal of all.

We have spoken freely of the availability of the self, of self-giving, or self-communication and such like, as an expression of interpersonal relationality, but what exactly do we mean by such phrases? It must be said that questions concerning what it is exactly that we give to the other when we give ourselves or make ourselves available to them are as difficult to address as the more primitive questions concerning the actual nature and identity of that self. However, I should suggest that in practice we have little difficulty in recognizing who are our "good friends" and, at least to an extent, why we think of them in such a way. My friends are involved in rich communication with me, they tell me of themselves, what they are doing and feeling, just as I tell them. When I communicate with a friend in this way I am aware of myself engaging in the same kind of discourse as I am when I indulge in purely interior dialogue. In baring one's soul to a friend one is articulating those inner truths about oneself which are normally the subject-matter for our own internal conversations. We talk readily, almost hungrily, about who we are, our desires, fears, loves and hates. I have never known it to fail that when I or a friend begin to speak of our deepest and most personal feelings, thoughts and experiences then a veritable cascade of intimacies are brought forth from both parties, a cascade that is no respecter of the lateness of the hour.

Not only do we make ourselves available to our friends through communicating via words and signs, we also give of ourselves at an emotional level. We share joy and pain, we sympathize and sometimes even empathize with those whom we love. We are prepared to be a resource for the other who is our friend, such that our emotional
energies are theirs to draw upon, to lighten the burden of their pain and anguish without any apparent benefit to ourselves other than the well-being of our friend. To love the other is to forget oneself as a predominant concern, to make ourselves totally available to and for the other. It is in this way, in losing ourselves, that we gain ourselves. In this sense, in giving ourselves over to the other as a resource we establish the hope that such a resource will be available to us when we need it. This hope is however always just that - *hope*, never *claim* or *demand*. It is the hope that "love" will remember us. Kierkegaard clearly understood this hope of being remembered by love in the act of forgetting self when he wrote:

> ... the lover in his love thinks only about giving fearlessness and saving another from death. Yet the lover is not therefore forgotten. No, the one who lovingly forgets himself, forgets his own suffering to consider another's misery, forgets what he himself loves in order lovingly to consider another's loss, forgets his own advantage in order lovingly to look at another's: truly such a one is not forgotten. There is One who considers him: God in heaven; or love considers him... The self-lover is busy, he shrieks and shouts, and stands for his rights in order to make certain of not being forgotten - and yet he is forgotten; but the lover who forgets himself, he is remembered by love.

This forgetting of ourselves as an act of making a resource of ourselves for the other extends beyond the emotional to the material. Thus our time, skills and financial resources are also put at our friend's disposal. If a friend comes to us in distress and in need of companionship we will forsake the pleasures of our favourite television programme or the early night we have been promising ourselves and spend time with that person. As a friend, it is my business to be aware of any financial and material inequalities which exist between myself and my friends and to act to redress the imbalance. Thus within the community of friendship there ought to be nothing that I can do by virtue of my financial status that would be impossible for the rest of my friends.

In this brief discussion we have come a long way from the self/stranger dichotomy characterized by mistrust, competition and delicate balances of power to arrive at the self/friend relationship of self-availability. The fact that the process described above is observed to take place at all, at the very least in my experience, speaks of a tendency towards relationality which has the potential
to transcend the inherent alienation found within our world and which Christian theology understands in terms of sin.

However, although we might identify this tendency towards relationality with the - albeit "ruined" - nature of human being as created in the image of the triune God, that is, with the protological dimension of human creatureliness, there is considerably more to be said before we can engage with the radical aspect of human coadunacy as restored and transformed via the reconciling and empowering work of Christ. We shall proceed now to consider what a true dynamic coadunacy must involve if it is to stand as expressive of the depth of human relationality as the image of the divine relationality.

iii Coadunacy and the Dynamic of self-abandonment

In speaking of the dynamic of coadunacy we are speaking of human being as restored to its true mode as radically relational. Coadunacy is that aspect of human being which in the beginning defines us as essentially persons-in-relation and which, in the end, through the reconciling and transforming work of Christ, is expressive of human being created anew as communal being, to be one just as the Father, Son and Holy Spirit are one.

Although, as we have repeatedly mentioned, our experience of the movement from the other as stranger to the other as friend, may be understood as an expression of our essential coadunacy as bearers of the imago dei, the fact of estrangement still persists. It is this middle term of the Christian story, the fall of humanity into sin, into alienation and estrangement from its creator and itself, which calls for a restored but also transformed coadunacy. By restoration we have in mind the work of Christ by which he restores to us all that was intended by God for human being in this primal act of creation. In transformation it is the re-creative activity of Christ that we have to do with; that is, with the creation of a humanity empowered to deny the alienating power of sin, to confront it and negate it. It is this new possibility of confronting and denying estrangement that is of the essence of a dynamic coadunacy founded upon the new creation in Christ. We shall turn now to consider this possibility for the denial of estrangement for it is at this point that we encounter the true operation of coadunacy.
In the preceding discussion we began by identifying our primal experience of the other in terms of stranger. The other is thus always considered stranger, to be feared until proven a friend to be trusted. Even given a desire that everyone we meet might want to become our friend, it is that "become" which identifies the other as primarily stranger to us. It is simply not true to experience that people regard each other as friends and hope that they will not become strangers. This order is always reversed. However, in speaking of coadunacy we are attempting to articulate an understanding of humanity as freed from fear and thus freed from the other as stranger. It is at the very root of coadunacy's radicalness that it denies the reality of the stranger. The dynamic of coadunacy is our ontological birthright as relationality given potency over estrangement via the reconciling work of Christ, who frees us from fear and gives us the hope of eternal life. It is important to stress again, at this point, that the basis for humanity's capacity for the generation of social relationships is a protological capacity; that is to say it is human being as creature which is being-in-relation. The redemptive activity of Christ empowers human being to overcome its alienation from itself as communal being, restoring a true dynamic of coadunacy. Thus the Christian Church, rather than absenting itself from the rest of human society by identifying the foundation of human relationality solely upon the present work of Christ, and thus establishing itself as stranger to the world, must stand as an example of the potential for coadunacy which is our birthright by virtue of our created humanity. Stanley Hauerwas calls such a community a "contrast model":

The hallmark of such a community, unlike the power of the nation-states, is its refusal to resort to violence to secure its own existence or to insure internal obedience. For as a community convinced of the truth, we refuse to trust any other power to compel thus the truth itself... The final task of the Church is to exhibit in our common life the kind of community possible when trust, and not fear, rules over lives.

The overcoming of estrangement and the denial of the other as stranger calls for a movement towards the other which goes beyond the piecemeal availability of the self involved in the movement from strange to friend, as described above. The dynamic of coadunacy
entails nothing less than self-abandonment as the primal mode of human relationality.

At its most basic level the self-abandonment which we see as giving rise to true human coadunacy involves the negation of the category of stranger in our dealings with the other. Thus the other is encountered primarily as friend and neighbour, and elicits from us an unconditional availability which is prior to any such signalling conventions as described previously. To re-use our legal analogy, the other is first and always innocent until proven guilty.

To say self-abandonment must not be taken to have said self-negation, for it is an affirmation of our true selfhood which is only possible in the fullness of coadunate human existence, that is, human being as a corporate being. In this self-abandonment we follow the example of Christ who abandons himself to be incarnate, who abandons himself to the abuse of humanity, who abandons himself to the will of the Father and ultimately to death, without ever turning that abandonment to the other into self-negation. In Christ we see total availability to and for the other without reduction of the self. In self-abandonment we are not talking of a weak-willed acquiescence to the domination of others, but a will to total self-availability to the other, empowered by the reconciling work of Christ. In the gospel of Matthew we see this juxtaposition of power and self-abandonment when it is recorded that as Jesus is being seized by the chief priest's men one of his disciples attempts to defend him, only to be told by Jesus "Put your sword back into its place; for all who take the sword will perish by the sword. Do you think that I cannot appeal to my Father and he will at once send me more than twelve legions of angels?" (Matt.26:52-53) Similarly in John's Gospel Jesus informs Pilate that he would have no power over him unless it had been given to him (Jn.19:10-11).

It is this self-abandonment in the presence of the power to be purely for self, that is, in the presence of the power to deny the other, which constitutes the basis for the dynamic of coadunacy. It is to this reality that the Church is called; we are called to love one another as Christ loves us and gave himself for us. This community of self-abandonment in love and trust is what Stanley Hauerwas means when he talks of the Church as a "community of character", a "contrast model" to the world which is constituted by strangers. And yet true coadunate existence is, as we have
maintained, the birthright of human being *qua* human being. The Church is but the custodian of the dynamic empowering to overcome human estrangement from others and from God by virtue of the work of Christ. Thus the encountering of the other primarily as friend must not be confined within the community of faith, for, as Christ taught, the loving of those who love you must be coupled with a love for those who do not, if we are to engage in truly rewarding relationality. (Matt.5:46f).

This brings us to an important aspect of the dynamic of self-abandonment as the reality of empowered coadunacy. True self-abandonment, by its very nature and the nature of the estranged world in which it is called to confront that estrangement, inevitably involves personal risk. To give oneself over into the hands of the other is, to misquote the Old Testament, a fearful thing. For even when we are empowered to encounter all persons as friends and neighbours, these are still mysterious and unknown neighbours, and we would be fools to consider ourselves as necessarily safe in their power. Nevertheless it is the act of self-abandonment in the face of the other's power over us and our attendant powerlessness which initiates the dynamic of coadunacy, albeit in a potentially one-sided and thus incomplete way.

The dynamic of coadunacy as self-abandonment speaks of two potential movements. In our encountering the other from the perspective of our empowering to self-abandonment, we experience the twin poles of anxiety and hope. We are anxious in the light of the potential for rejection and domination by the other, but we hope that our self-abandonment might meet with a reciprocal abandoning of the other towards us. It is the possibility of either of these two poles being realized which characterizes this dynamic of coadunacy, at least initially, as involving extreme personal risk.

The realization of our hopes for true reciprocal self-abandonment, founded upon our understanding of human being as essentially communal, is brought about when we abandon ourselves to the other, putting ourselves in their hands to find that simultaneously they have placed themselves into our hands. In this way true fellowship and love are engendered without the need for covert exercises of power with the inherent potential for domination that such exercises of power necessarily involve. The other is met with open hands and ultimate concern for their well-being. In like wise, by abandoning
ourselves for the sake of the other, we hope that the responsibility for our care and well-being might be taken up by the other. It is in this way that we may truly "love our neighbour as ourselves", for in loving our neighbour we hope that our neighbour will love us. Thus the true dynamic of coadunacy involves a love of the other which is ultimately reflexive, such that as Kierkegaard points out, the lover who forgets himself is not ultimately forgotten by love."

Although it must be confessed that most if not all of my friendships and loves have developed via the process of gradual self-availability as described previously, which transforms strangers into friends, I think it true to say that these relationships do exhibit the signs of a coadunate dynamic. Certainly I find myself neglecting my own concern for my well-being in the light of my concern for my wife and close friends, and this neglect of self has grown out of a trust that my neglect of self will be met by similar self-neglect from them, in the light of overriding care for me. Such self-abortion places us at the disposal of the other in that we become a resource for them. In this way all that we are and all that we have at our disposal is made available to the other. Such a commitment to self-abortion involves a radical attitude to life and property. To be truly abandoned to the other is to identify any disparity in material prosperity between myself and the other as unacceptable and to understand all my personal skills and abilities as being at the service of the other. Ultimately coadunacy as abandonment of the self to the other is a dynamic which has martyrdom as its entelechy, for this abandonment to the other must be total, extending even to the laying down of one's life for the other. It is this preparedness to give up our lives which Jesus identified as the greatest expression of love and is witnessed to both in his own death, and in the deaths of the world's martyrs throughout the ages.

Speaking of martyrdom brings us back to the aspect of self-abortion which is characterised by anxiety in the face of the risk involved in abandoning ourselves to the other. Although we abandon ourselves in hope, it is hope in the presence of risk. We found our hope upon an understanding of human being as in the image of the triune God, and thus as essentially coadunate, while our anxiety is born out of our experience of the estrangement which characterizes human existence. In denying the power of estrangement we may abandon ourselves to the other, whom we refuse to identify as
stranger, thereby initiating the dynamic of coadunacy, but we have no guarantee that this self-abandonment will be reciprocated. It is at the point of abandonment to the other in an environment characterised by estrangement, rather than within the Christian community empowered to coadunacy, that the greatest risk is to be encountered, but it is also the place where our experience of abandonment becomes most authentic.

We have chosen to utilize the term abandonment rather than, for example, sacrifice, because of the sense of powerlessness within a hostile environment which the former term conveys. With a term such as sacrifice we are often concerned with specific acts of self-giving motivated by particular situations. Further, in the notion of self-sacrifice we take up the dual role of sacrificer and sacrifice which provides us with the opportunity to retreat into the former role as an aspect of ourselves which is retained for ourselves. The language of self-abandonment leaves us no such retreat in its implications of a one-way journey into a hostile environment in which we are powerless, by the normal definition of that term, and from which we are unable to return to a place of safety. Once we choose to abandon ourselves to the other we are irrevocably committed to a process which might end in true coadunate relationality characterised by mutual love and care, or in martyrdom.

Our abandonment in an estranged world is thus truly taking leave of ourselves. The common associations with the word abandonment call to mind babies left on door-steps or in parks and other public places or the ancient oriental practice of exposing unwanted children to hostile environments. Our abandonment to the other in the face of an environment which is characterized by estrangement is nonetheless drastic. At the very least our self-offering might be rejected, and although this experience is far from fatal we must all have experienced the pain and emotional hurt associated with such rejection. An example of the kind of pain that we feel in these instances might be found in our experience of "first love". In the midst of our adolescent confusion we are often very vulnerable and the rejection of our first overtures of mature love can cause deep hurt. We become melancholy and distant, we lose our appetite, we find it impossible to concentrate. On the other hand, rejection by the other might cause little more than embarrassment, which we often attempt to hide with outbursts of indignation and anger. However,
the point is that rejection always hurts us and the more we offer the greater the potential for hurt. Nobody likes to have a gift flung back at them.

Yet true self-abandonment presents a very great temptation to the other, for to be truly abandoned to the other is to place power over oneself unilaterally into the hands of the other and, as we have been told, power has a tendency to corrupt.

The logic of the dynamic of coadunacy as self-abandonment in the midst of estrangement, while denying the other as stranger simultaneously affirms the possibility of the self as victim. In this possibility we see the dynamic of coadunacy as truly the *imitatio Christi*. In the Sermon on the Mount Jesus associates divine perfection with the ability to love one's enemies and encourages his hearers to aspire to this perfection (Mat.5:43-48). During the same discourse Jesus speaks of self-abandonment in the face of victimization in these well known words:

> You have heard that it was said, 'Eye for eye and tooth for tooth'. But I tell you, Do not resist an evil person. If someone strikes you on the right cheek, turn to him the other also. And if someone wants to sue you and take your tunic, let him have your cloak as well. If someone forces you to go one mile, go with him two miles. Give to the one who asks you, and do not turn away from the one who wants to borrow from you.

In this passage we see Christ's rejection of what we have called the "balance of power" which is maintained between the self and the stranger, typified in the *lex talionis*, and his affirmation of abandonment to the other despite victimization. To be a victim of the other whom we regard as neighbour, but who regards us as a stranger, is as inevitable to the movement of self-abandonment in an estranged world as was the movement of Christ to the cross. In a world dominated by fear and acquisitiveness abuse of the abandoned self is an all-too real possibility, indeed it is most likely a probability. Once the fear of the peculiarity of self-abandonment is overcome by the other, the tendency towards self-serving and domination begin to assert themselves. Thus we cannot be surprised to find that if we make of ourselves a resource for the other then we are likely to be exploited in the same way in which all the world's resources are exploited. We need only imagine for a moment the scenario which would develop around a person who left their home unlocked, their money and possessions accessible to all and
publicised their willingness to undertake any task or labour for the sake of and in the service of others. There can be little doubt that such a person would very soon lose all they had and be swamped by demands to take on all the wearisome labours imaginable. In short, self-abandonment might easily be transformed, in an estranged world, into slavery or self-negation.

We have said previously that coadunacy as self-abandonment does not involve self-negation. Indeed it is impossible to abandon oneself to the other as the ultimate expression of self-availability if there is no self to make available. Similarly abandonment to the other is to the good of the other, not to their detriment, which a continuation in alienation and self-centeredness most assuredly is. Kierkegaard focuses clearly upon the necessary limitations on self-abandonment when he points out that we are commanded to love our neighbour as ourself and not better than oneself:

...God you must love in unconditional obedience even if that which He demands of you may seem injurious to you ... A man, on the contrary, you must only - yet, no, this is the highest - you must love a man as yourself; if you can better perceive his best than he can, then you will not be able to excuse yourself by the fact that the harmful thing was his own wish, was what he himself asked for. If this were not the case, then there might quite rightly be something said about loving another man better than yourself; for this love would consist in: despite your own conviction that it would be harmful to him, obediently doing it because he asked it, or adoringly, because he wished it. But this you simply have no right to do; you are responsible if you do it, just as the other is responsible if he should misuse his relationship to you in this way.

The dynamic of coadunacy must not be identified with any sentimental naivety or irresponsible acquiescence to abuse. As we stated earlier in our outlining of the controls that limit the dynamic of coadunate relationality, coadunacy is non-absorptive and non-totalising. That is to say, the self and the other remain distinct selves in a relational dynamic we call coadunacy. They are neither reduced to a single synthetic moment nor is the one absorbed into the other.

The point at which self-abandonment encounters the above controlling principles is one of obvious tension. It would certainly be possible to deploy these controls in such a way as to attempt to defuse the inherent risk involved in self-abandonment to the other. Indeed it would be impossible to militate against such an
illegitimate utilization of these limiting factors. Ultimately the onus is always upon each one of us as to whether we will choose to engage in truly coadunate relationships with the other, be that other known or unknown. It is this will to coadunacy manifested in the will to self-abandonment which properly guards against coadunacy lapsing into self-negation. Although we understand the Christian gospel as proclaiming the possibility of empowering to coadunacy as the recreation of human being, nevertheless this empowering engages with already existent, albeit estranged, human creatureliness. Recreation is not creation ex nihilo and thus encounters concrete human will. This will might respond to the offer of empowering to coadunacy, it might reject it in favour of a radical individualism or, more likely, it might fail to respond at all, lapsing into apathy and from thence to estrangement by default.

We have considered at some length the nature of coadunacy as a movement of the self to the other. However our preliminary definition of coadunacy involved not only the other self, but also the environment in which we are situated or placed. As you recall, we spelled out our concern to articulate an understanding of human being as essentially a complex involving self, other and environment. In the following section of this chapter we shall attempt to examine the significance of the human experience of situation and place, particularly as they relate to our notion of coadunacy.

2. The self and its environment

i. Situatedness

Humanity does not exist within an experimental vacuum, we are influenced by the world we live in and in turn we affect it. Changes in temperature, in seasons, in the atmosphere we breathe and the food we eat link us intimately with our environment. Indeed, in our utilization of tools and our being located in a particular place we often extend our perception of the immediate self beyond our bodies to incorporate the object or location in question. It is in this that humanity exercises its relation to a total context which is the triune God's by virtue of his existing as a context. Humanity follows the divine structure of oneness with a context.
which it is (by virtue of its Trinity) by constantly establishing an intimate unity with the context in which it (i.e. humanity) is.

This notion of situatedness or contextual unity has received some very valuable consideration of late from within the post-critical and phenomenological schools of thought. In Levinas' writings we find this understanding under the heading of habitation\textsuperscript{12}; in Polanyi we have the notion of indwelling\textsuperscript{13}. However it is in the writings of Maurice Merleau-Ponty that we find the clearest articulation of this theme of indwelling or embodying.

For Merleau-Ponty the atomistic character of critical thought is regarded as simply inadequate to the task of describing and understanding human knowing and experience. One is not made aware of individual stimuli to ears and eyes and nose and skin in a piecemeal fashion, but rather as a composite whole. The terminus for our experience of the world is, of course, the body. Our bodies, argues Merleau-Ponty, are not simply objects in a world alongside other similar atomistic objects, but are rather that which gives form and orientation to our world. Merleau-Ponty speaks of the body as,

\begin{quote}
...the darkness needed in the theatre to show up the performance.\textsuperscript{14}
\end{quote}

It is because our bodies are the point of intersection between two planes, these being our immediate selves and our world, that we may experience the world at all. Merleau-Ponty is quite adamant that we exist as persons in a world, within a context and not within some neutral objective realm of pure criticism from which we might make objective judgments founded upon indubitable data. It is his view that philosophy should become, and must become the only adequate interpreter of meaning by virtue of its recognition of man's essential place within his context. Here we would substitute theology for philosophy, but the sentiment expressed is the same:

\begin{quote}
...it (philosophy) alone goes all the way in the effort to know what Nature and History and the World and Being are, when our contact with them is not only the partial and abstract contact of the physical experiment and calculation, or of the historical analysis, but the total contact of someone who, living in the world and in Being, means to see his life fully, particularly his life of knowledge and who, an inhabitant of the world, tries to think himself in the world, to think the world in himself, to unravel their humbled essences and to form finally the significant 'Being'.\textsuperscript{15}
\end{quote}
Merleau-Ponty calls us to vacate the illusory domain of essences, as does Levinas, from whence we attempt to grasp the "pure object which the minds soars over". To inhabit such a realm is so to distance ourselves from experience that we must ask the question - is it still really our experience? Merleau-Ponty would answer no. Just as Mary Midgley points out that man is bound to his context and becomes nothing more than a "shrivelled petal" when removed from it, so too does Merleau-Ponty stress the absolute human necessity of situatedness.

The point is that as human beings we belong in and are part of a created world and this to such an extent that our abstraction from our world via individualism, epistemic solipsism or Levinas' totalism represents a real reduction in our essential humanity.

This environment of brute existence and essence is not mysterious: we never quit it, we have no other environment. The facts and essences are abstractions: what there is are worlds and a world and a Being not a sum of facts or a system of ideas, but the impassibility of meaninglessness or ontological void... it is, whatever we may say, this world, this Being that our life, our science, and our philosophy inhabit.

In short we exist within a context with which we are actively engaged and not simply observing. For, ultimately, "...there is no essence, no idea, that does not adhere to a domain of history and of geography". In a way which is similar to Polanyi, when he speaks of tools as extensions of our bodies, "we pour ourselves out into them and assimilate them as part of our own existence. We accept them existentially by dwelling in them", so Merleau-Ponty speaks of a re-configuration of our body image in the light of its indwelling a particular environment or object:

To get used to a hat, a car, or a stick is to be transplanted into them, or conversely, to incorporate them into the bulk of our own body.

Merleau-Ponty's discussion of human situatedness is a vital step forward in the understanding of humanity as residing not within the autonomous individual but within the contextual complex comprising of the Other and the environment. On its own it stands as an attractive common-sense approach to the question of human knowledge and existence in the world. However, when coupled with the transcendent dimension as expressed in the notion of the triune God who is the model and image for contextual identity and true humanity, the insights of Maurice Merleau-Ponty become even more compelling.
and are recognisably coadunate in their approach to the problems of our existence.

ii. Place.

Alongside the primarily subjective and internalized conception of situatedness, as discussed above, there stands the more concrete and external notion of place as it is often spoken of by geographers and architects.

To feel a sense of belonging when inhabiting a certain geographical place is an experience common to all of us. The place we refer to as "home" exerts a very unique influence over us, which is not easily transferable to any other object or location. It is part of our very humanity to be placed and to respond to such places in a variety of different ways. Some places, such as the town we grew up in or the church we got married in, hold a special significance for us while other places are simply background locations for our everyday activities. Yet despite the vast range of our possible responses to particular places, one thing is certain: we are never divorced from the phenomenon of place. Humanity is always located, always is in some place, regardless of the intensity of our involvement with that place.

E. Relph writes, quoting Heidegger:

To be human is to live in a world that is filled with significant places: to be human is to have your place. The philosopher Martin Heidegger declared that a 'place' places man in such a way that it reveals the external bonds of his existence and at the same time the depths of his freedom and reality.21

Both our identity and our security are intrinsically bound up with our sense of place. We identify ourselves by referring to the house, street, town in which we live and the country to which we belong.

The expression of place-related identity has many different levels of emphasis depending upon the sort of self-identification we are seeking to convey. Within the context of immediate locality within a particular street, for example, we might be identified by the name or number of our house. A different identification comes into play when supporting a local football team, or expressing regional differences or when one's country goes to war. Indeed, were extra-
terrestrial contact to become a commonplace, a sense of planetary identity would no doubt become relevant.

But what exactly is a place? and what constitutes the identity of a place such that we, as human beings, can and indeed must participate in it?

Relph begins his analysis of place by distinguishing between various aspects of the related notion of space.22 Primitive space is the un-selfconsciously experienced space of basic human behaviour, experienced at an instinctive level as our sense of dimension. Primitive space, as such, relates directly to our bodies and senses. It has been suggested by others that there exists a certain number of archetypal settings that are necessary for fundamental human behaviour to continue without interruption. These settings are related to a particular human activity such as eating, sleeping and sheltering. There are those who would further maintain, from their study of animals, that there is a fundamental biological attachment to a particular place of security which is precognitive and which powerfully expresses all those attachments normally attributed to the notion of home.24

The value of such an analysis of primitive space, particularly for our purposes, is that it would seem to indicate what Relph refers to as "a deep and presymbolic differentiation of and attachment to space".25 In other words it indicates that the basic human desire to belong in a place is more than the result of sociological conditioning, but evidences an essential and constitutive aspect of humanity's biological make-up.

The next level of spatial awareness is far more immediate and egocentric being referred to as perceptual space.26 This is the space in which we act, it is in and through this space that we have direct contact with the places around us, and in and through which, to make use of a biblical allusion, "we live and move and have our being". Perceptual space provides us with the framework within which we define things and settings as close to us or far away from us, crowded or empty, man-made or natural. Certain perceptual spaces constitute places of great personal significance to us. These are the places to which we commit part of ourselves and which, in turn, give themselves up to us in a reciprocal act of identity enhancement. Such perceptual spaces, where personal, are not
uniquely private. We may share a public landscape or place as well as experience the intrinsic continuity between your place and mine.

G. Matorz expresses the depth of our involvement in perceptual space in this way:

We do not grasp space only by our senses... we live in it, we project our personality into it, we are tied to it by emotional bonds, space is not just perceived... it is lived.27

Thus as we move beyond the unconscious experience of primitive space towards the more immediate and personally involved level of perceptual space we find humanity's essential unity with its context asserted once again. Just as the triune God is not outside of himself so humanity is not outside of its place. To say "human life" is already to have said human place for, as Matorz has pointed out, space is lived and not perceived from some point outside.

Existential space is that space which receives its definition and structure from the particular culture to which we belong.28 The meaning of such space is in a constant state of flux as it undergoes a never-ending process of restructuring as a result of human activities. In short, existential space is that space which is defined by society and experienced by the individual. Such space may be defined as sacred, in the case of a church, or authoritative, for example a police station or No.10 Downing Street. Indeed even places with a particular aesthetic value may only hold such meaning by consensus.29

What is significant here is that wherever human beings gather together in a society they imbue their surroundings with special meaning. Once again space is not simply a receptacle in which to exist, but it is a context which is intrinsically bonded to human life. Certain public settings serve as extensions of the corporate life of a community. Our personal sense of the sacred is heightened while in a church building, while our appreciation of nature might be accentuated during a walk in the local park. Particular public meeting places, such as parish halls, village greens or the local pub, often heighten our sense of unity with the community. Indeed, the example of the public house is particularly interesting as it does not necessarily have to be "our local" for it to generate a feeling of comradeship and unity. I have found it to be the case when, for example, walking round Yorkshire and the Lake District that stopping off at a previously unknown inn would generate a
certain sense of human community, albeit at a somewhat nebulous level.

War graves and places symbolising human suffering also produce emotional responses within us even when the events being referred to took place before we were born. It is through our essential relationship with space and place that we maintain our continuity with past generations and with humanity in its widest sense. Many primitive cultures, such as the Australian aborigines, maintain a far more profound relationship with their landscape than do we in the West, each element of the land possessing an importance significance for them. A. Rapoport writes:

Every feature of the landscape is known and has meaning - they then perceive differences which the European cannot see ... As one example, every individual feature of Ayer's rock is linked to a significant myth and the mythological beings who created it. Every tree, every stain, hole and fissure has meaning. Thus what to an European is an empty land may be full of noticable differences to the aborigines...3°

We do not simply internalise our feelings and experiences, nor do our actions evaporate the moment after we have performed them, but rather they become part of a total context of internal and external reciprocity. The place where I proposed to my wife is as integral to that experience as are my own personal memories of it. Indeed the weather, the noises, the trees, the buildings and the very time of day were woven together with our words and feelings to form a living and lived in experience. To abstract us from the place, or to pretend that the incident took place elsewhere would beggar the whole experience.

Our whole lives are full of such experiences, not all of them as profound as a proposal of marriage, but nevertheless experiences which took place. Indeed it is a cause for much concern that, within developed industrialised countries in particular, a high degree of uniformity of place is being evidenced. Big department stores, airports, fast-food chains, shopping malls, offices and new towns are the same the world over. It is thus becoming increasingly difficult to attach symbolic significance to a particular place when that place fails to express any actual particularity.31

In connection with this problem of spatial uniformity, it has become quite common within developed countries to hear of architectural space. By this is meant that space which is "created" by city and
town planners as they seek to utilize society's living space along functional and economic lines. There are two points that must be made concerning this planned or architectural space. Firstly, it involves a conception of space as a neutral and plastic commodity to be manipulated according to purely pragmatic criteria. Secondly, planned space is non-experienced space, it is an abstract and detached space, or what Relph refers to as "two-dimensional map space", inasmuch as those who have to do with such planning relate to the space involved primarily via maps and blue-prints.

The consequences of such a view of space are too involved to discuss here, however we have already made reference to one of them. The tendency towards a uniformity of space and place must result, at least in part, from a prefabricated modular mentality which seeks to create human living space by shifting and manipulating a number of conventional architectural forms within the confines of a map of a given area. Whether that area be in Brazil or Japan, the results are the same: high-rise office blocks, suburban housing developments and factories all selected off the architectural peg.

a. What is place?

Whereas the term space properly refers to a broad general context and setting, the notion of place involves a focusing of our attentions and intentions upon a specific location which is at once part of the larger spatial context and yet also stands at a distance from it. The phenomenon of place is not an easy one to define as it manifests itself upon many different and yet interrelated levels, ranging from the broad geographical identification of a land-mass to a particular corner of a particular room. Place is, to use Relph's terminology, a multifaceted phenomenon of experience.

We shall now look at some of the different facets of place, in an attempt to assess the nature of the identity of places. Having done this we shall move on to the most important issue, as regards this present work, that of our relationship to and experience of place.

b. The identity of place

There would appear to be four basic elements which need to be included into any discussion concerning the identity of place. These are physical appearance, activities, meanings and what has been referred to as the spirit of place.
The first of these elements has to do with the distinctive landscape of a place, its topography, overall setting and climate. It is these things to which we immediately respond when encountering a new place. We ask questions such as, where does this path lead? where can I park my car? how far away is the sea? We respond to the climate, thinking it either too hot or too cold, we notice striking features of the landscape such as a cathedral, forest or monument of some sort. All these things play on our senses and allow us to build up a physical picture of the place we are in which contributes to its overall identity.36

In a similar way we continue our identification of a place by asking what happens in it. Is it a holiday resort or a financial centre? is work scarce or plentiful? what takes place in this or that building? Often the physical appearance of a structure will provide us with a clue as to the activities which take place within it. K.Lynch points out that certain environmental settings act upon us, like custom and tradition, triggering off patterns of behaviour at an unconscious level; for example, being reverent in church and relaxed on the beach.37

However, the identity of a place is more than just the sum of its physical appearance and the activities performed within it. The attribution of meaning and significance to a place by a person or group of persons is a vital component of the identity of that place. The experience of a place as my place or as a beautiful place or an awful place may well be founded in its appearance or activities, but that is not to say that they belong to or are inherent in that place. It is we, as human beings, who bestow meaning upon places. We "name them", we arrange objects in them and we fill them with significance as we live out our lives in them.

There is no one static meaning which can be said to encapsulate the identity of a place for all people and all time. The meanings of a place are as numerous as the people who know it. Consider for example the site of Auschwitz or Buchenwald - are they sites of victory for a "master race" or places of sorrow or shame? Is a public house a place of communal refreshment or a den of iniquity? and are this country's cathedrals beautiful pieces of architecture to be preserved, tourist attractions to be marketed, places of worship or scandalous wasters of money and resources?
It is the result of the complex interplay which takes place between these facets of place which make up the very identity of a particular place. As Relph puts it:

What is significant here is the way in which physical setting, activities and meanings are always interrelated. Like the physical, vital and mental components of behaviour that Merleau-Ponty (1967) identifies, it is probable that they constitute a series of dialectics that form one common structure. Physical context and activities combine to give the human equivalent of locations within the 'functional circle' of animals (see Cassirer 1970, p.26); setting and meaning combine in the direct and emphatic experience of landscapes or townscapes; activities and meaning combine in many social acts and shared histories that have little reference to physical setting. All of these dialectics are interrelated in a place, and it is their fusion that constitutes the identity of that place.

We have separated out from the rest of the elements which make up a place's identity the aforementioned notion of the "spirit of place". This is due to the difficulty in addressing this factor in any cognitive manner. A place's "spirit" or "atmosphere" may be contributed to by the three factors already discussed above, and yet it remains unchanged despite physical alterations, changes in activity and the attribution of a different meaning to a given place. The spirit of a place is its soul, it is what makes this place this place as opposed to any other place in the cosmos. It has to do with the ghosts which haunt a place, long-forgotten people and events which, although historically insignificant in accordance with the prevailing canons of historiography, are nonetheless "recorded" by their setting, captured and held by their place. Indeed, just as we speak of events "taking place", so too should we think of "places taking events".

Lawrence Durrell sums up this notion of a place's spirit when he writes, somewhat whimsically, of landscapes bestowing their own distinctive character upon those living in them:

I believe you could exterminate the French at one blow and resettle the country with Tartars, and within two generations discover to your astonishment that the national characteristics were back at norm - the restless metaphysical curiosity, the tenderness for good living and the passionate individualism: even though their noses were flat. This is the invisible constant in a place.

If human beings are indeed coadunate entities, whose existence and identities are intrinsically bound up with "the other" and with
their external contexts, then it should in no way surprise us to find, as we appear to have done, evidence of a reciprocal relationship pertaining between humanity and its "place". We name places, act in places, fill places with meaning. They, in turn, augment our identities by reflecting them back at us; they help to define our activities and behaviour, they capture the spirits of bygone generations and mediate them to us in the present, thus enriching our lives and enhancing our solidarity with the whole of humankind. Indeed our looking to various old or ancient places and our concern to preserve them speaks both of our need to be related to the part but also our desire that the present be mediated to the future.\textsuperscript{40}

Now that we have some small notion of the structure of a place's identity, let us go on to consider how we, as human beings, relate to and experience places.

c. The human experience of place

The human desire to belong to and within a community and setting is best referred to as a need for "roots". This botanical image brings to mind the organic relationship that exists between a living entity and its environment. Simone Weil writes, concerning human rootedness,

To be rooted is perhaps the most important and least recognised need of the human soul. It is one of the hardest to define. A human being has roots by virtue of his real, active and natural participation in the life of the community, which preserves in living shape certain particular expectations for the future. This participation is a natural one in the sense that it is automatically brought about by place, conditions of birth, profession and social surroundings. Every human being needs to have multiple roots. It is necessary for him to draw well-nigh the whole of his moral, intellectual and spiritual life by way of the environment of which he forms a part.\textsuperscript{41}

There are two important points which arise out of Simone Weil's observations. Firstly, human rootedness is a natural phenomenon, that is, it is of the essence for humanity. Secondly it is absolutely necessary for truly satisfying human existence. The second of these factors derives, obviously, from the first.

To be rooted is to belong within a place, as well as to a people. "My place" provides me with a perspective on the rest of the world and allows me to identify myself within that world. As we have
mentioned previously, our immediate consciousness of self is extended to incorporate the environment in which we are situated. It is little wonder, therefore, that many people who have had to endure the crisis of having their homes burgled liken the experience to a form of rape.

K. Lynch, quoting Harvey Cox, refers to a woman from the Czech town of Lidice which was totally effaced by the Nazis. She tells us that, notwithstanding the loss of her family, her most profound shock came when she returned to Lidice to find it no longer existed, not even to the extent of scattered remains and ruined buildings. The woman from Lidice was thus totally displaced, as the setting which formed the matrix of her experience of the past and sense of progression into the future, of her apprehension of human community and activity and of her sense of belonging within a distinctive identifiable place ceased to be.

In a similar instance Isak Dinesen tells us of the Masai tribe of East Africa and the way in which they sought to short-circuit the crisis of displacement, despite the reality of physical relocation:

> The Masai when they were moved from their old country, north of the railway line, to the present reserve, took with them the names of their hills, plains and rivers, and gave them to the hills, plains and rivers in the new country.42

In the case of the woman from Lidice, her place had "died" before she was given the chance to effect even a partial transfer of significance from it to a new setting.

In our modern transient society we are constantly forced to relocate for economic and social reasons. We have therefore developed various methods for transferring the significance of "home" from one locale to another. Thus it is that we seldom, if ever, sell everything we own when we move to a new place, but rather carry with us a vast array of objects which we arrange about us in an attempt to duplicate our previous environment. We take great pleasure in unpacking a favourite picture or a much-loved piece of furniture. And yet, despite our efforts to carry our homes about with us, we are still confronted by the strange streets and unknown buildings which make up our "new place" and roots, once dug up, are exceedingly difficult to re-establish. Indeed, the place that we refer to as "home" tends to remain home no matter how long we have been absent from it.
Vincent Vycinas writes of home as:

an overwhelming, inexchangeable something to which we were subordinated and from which our way of life was orientated and directed, even if we had left home many years before.43

Relph refers to home as "an irreplaceable centre of significance". One's home is not simply a house or the place where one happens to live, nor is it a place to which we have a certain degree of attachment. Home is the place where we feel we belong, it is the place that we truly care for and with which we share an almost symbiotic relationship. It is the place that we know "like the back of our hand".

This sense of possessing a deep and organic bond with a particular place can be found expressed in a variety of sources: in the Old Testament writings concerning the Hebrews' relationship with the land which God had given them44, in the fictional work of Stephen Donaldson46, and in the poems of William Blake46. It is similarly to be found in the pre-literate experiences of African tribes people, Australian aborigines and American Appalachian farmers47.

This unity of human experience as regards the importance and indeed the necessity of our belonging to a place prompts Relph to conclude that:

A deep relationship with places is as necessary, and perhaps as unavoidable, as close relationships with people; without such relationships human existence, while possible, is bereft of much of its significance.48

It should be clear, in the light of our brief discussion of the phenomenon of place, how important this notion is to the concept of coadunacy. Human beings do not simply "feel" that they ought to be situated but actually are situated within real space and real places.

Coadunacy involves both the inner psychological desire to belong within a context and also the actual concrete involvement within such a context. Just as the divine trinity both desires to exist and actually causes itself to exist within an environment defined by its own self-designated dimensions49, so too does coadunate humanity exist within a place created by God, but defined by humanity's symbiotic relationship with that place. To utilize an image from the Old Testament, while God created a garden man and woman were appointed as gardeners to tend and live in it.
The dynamic of coadunacy initiates in human beings a return to their roots, roots which run through a community of people and also deep into the bricks and mortar, the earth and sky and water of the places in which they belong. The significance of such places increases as we absorb their characters and pass on to them aspects of our own identities through our activities, our arranging of objects and the attribution of meaning to and within them. In a like way, the triune God may be regarded as acting within himself, in constant dynamic relationship with himself via the process of perichoresis, which pertains between the elements of the Godhead and, further, attributing a variety of meanings to himself as his own environment.

Gabriel Marcel has said: "An individual is not distinct from his place; he is that place." While this can only be said to be partially true of humanity, it is wholly true of God.

It is because God freely constitutes an environment which is his own identity and consequently acts within it, that we, as created in his image, are free to form our places as extensions of our identities, to create out of existing space settings which enrich and are enriched by our being there. It is this fundamental belonging to a place and its belonging to us which we claim is part of humanity's essential coadunacy as founded upon the imago dei.

If the above claim is to be taken with any seriousness at all then, concomitantly, we must express serious concern with regard to the contemporary maleise often referred to as placelessness. By placelessness is meant the sense of transience, of belonging nowhere and to no-one, which appears to pervade the more industrially developed societies. Placelessness is encouraged by many factors: the never-ending quest for promotion or the better-paid job which makes us sit loose to our present context and prevents us from putting down firm roots; the uniformity of modern architecture with its modular mentality, which produces whole blocks of identical suburban houses and offices such that we find it increasingly difficult to differentiate one place from another; mass-produced consumer goods which threaten to do for the interiors of our buildings what architects and town planners are doing to the exteriors, and the intensive large-scale programmes of change and alteration to our towns and cities, organized and executed by anonymous planners at any alarming rate. It is these things,
coupled with numerous other factors, which threaten to render human being placeless and efface yet another aspect of the divine image from human life and that as such represent an on going challenge to Christian theology.

What we have sought to do in this work is to highlight the challenge that privatism, isolationism and the totalization of the subject presents to theology. Our own attempts at formulating a notion of coadunacy are clearly limited but it is hoped that by reintroducing this notion and filling it with a specifically theological content we may have provided the blueprints for a uniquely Christian theological tool for engaging with the aformentioned problems of radical individualism.
NOTES


2. In Woody Allen's film "The Purple Rose of Cairo" the unreality of the film persona is dramatically portrayed when a character from a film crosses into the real world and finds it impossible to operate within it as a true person.

3. In Ursula Le Guin's Earthsea trilogy the basis of a sorceror's power lay in his knowledge of the names of people and things. This idea of power through knowledge of a person's name is common throughout the world's mythologies and legends.


6. S. Hauerwas, A Community of Character, p. 103.

7. cf. p. 267 above and note 5.


13. Polanyi, Personal Knowledge (PK) p. 55ff. Cf. also the notion of "life-worlds" as found in the writings of phenomenologists such as P. Berger.


17. M. Merleau-Ponty, Visible and Invisible, p. 117.

18. Ibid. p. 115.


22. Ibid. p. 8.


27. ibid.
28. ibid p.12.
29. Forests and mountains, for example, may be regarded both as places of dark foreboding, or magnificent grandeur, places of peace and tranquility or fear and danger. Similarly the slag heaps of industrial areas, while in the first instance constituting an eye-sore upon the land, may, having become covered in grass, provide an aesthetically pleasing adjustment to the topography of a previously flat and uninteresting landscape. Cf. Lynch, *What Time is this Place?* Ch.1.
31. Cf. Relph p.20
32. Relph, PP, p.27.
33. ibid. p.24-5. Relph continues his discussion of space with the categories of *cognitive* and *abstract* space. These notions properly have to do with the more abstract and mathematical understandings of space and are therefore of little relevance to our present discussion.
34. ibid. p.29.
36. In R.Zelazny's "Amber" chronicles, we are given an interesting insight into the nature of place. It describes how members of the royal family of Amber could transport themselves to any conceivable time and place simply by calling to mind the appearance of that place and, while actually moving, imagining its features appearing one by one, as they continued on their way. By this process they would eventually construct, feature by featured, the required place from their mental picture of it. Cf. particularly *Nine Princes in Amber* 1972 and *The Guns of Avalon* 1985.
41. cited Relph, p.40.
43. cited Relph, p.39.
44. Cf. H.Snyder, *Liberating the Church*, p.46, who refers to W.Bruelgemann's argument that

The Bible is not,... the story of God and his people only, but of God, his people and the land. Land, both as "actual earthly turf" and as symbol of rootedness or "historical belonging," ... is "a
central, if not the central theme of biblical faith." Keeping the biblical focus on the land before us "will protect us from excessive spiritualization, so that we recognize that the yearning for land is always a serious historical enterprise concerned with historical power and belonging."

W. Brueggemann, *The Land.*


47. Relph, PP, p. 39.

48. Relph, p. 41.

49. cf. Chapter 7, p. 241ff above.

50. ibid. p. 43.

51. Cf. Lynch, op. cit.,

Our new suburbs and new towns... seem all begun yesterday and completely finished then. There is no crevice through which one can venture back or forward. p60
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