

**بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ**

**وَمِنْ آيَاتِهِ خَلْقَ السَّمَوَاتِ وَالْأَرْضِ**

**وَإِخْتِلَافِ أَلْسِنَتِكُمْ**

**وَأَلْوَانِكُمْ إِنَّ فِي ذَلِكَ**

**لَآيَاتٍ لِلْعَالَمِينَ.**

صدق الله العظيم.

(القرآن الكريم: سورة الروم، آية 22)

**And among His Signs is the  
creation of the heavens and  
the earth and *the variations*  
*in your languages* and your  
colours; verily in that are  
Signs for those who know.**

(The Holy Qur'an: 21, 30: 22)

والحرب إذا نشبت،  
فلا بد أن يكسبها في النهاية طرف مهما كانت خسائره.  
أما الخاسر الحقيقي فيها فسنكون نحن العرب،  
المؤمنين بحق أمتنا في الحياة سواء كنا في العراق  
أو في أي بقعة من وطننا العربي الكبير.  
(جلالة الملك الحسين بن طلال)

The war, if it should start,  
will inevitably in the end be won by one  
side, no matter how greatly that side suffers.  
But the real loser in this war will be ourselves,  
the Arabs, who believe in our nation's right to live,  
whether in Iraq or in any part of our great Arab nation.  
(His Majesty King Hussein Bin Talal)

# Abstract

The question of theme-rheme structure, complicated as it is, becomes even more complicated when viewed from a comparative perspective. For this and other reasons, I decided to embark on this study.

Any linguistic study, theoretical, applied, comparative or otherwise, should be based upon a well-defined linguistics school of thought. With this in mind, I adopted the systemic functional approach (originally established by Firth of the London School and developed by Halliday) as a model for both the study of language and the analysis of thematic structure of the clause complexes which realise the whole body of the text. The analysis in this thesis is carried out to investigate the following hypotheses: (1) The universality of this systemic model, (2) the universality of this model's thematic structure, be it simple or multiple, (3) the use of translation as a tool to enrich the understanding of the thematic structure of the source and target languages, (4) the emotiveness of Arabic political discourse compared with the English, and (5) the critical linguists' structural features of political discourse and their manifestations in Arabic and English.

For this purpose, a comparative analysis of English and Arabic source and target language texts (SLTs & TLTs) were carried out, using a Hallidayan model of thematic structure, which, while based on Halliday's notion of multiple theme, divided the thematic sphere of the clause complex into major, minor and initial thematic slots.

The results of this analysis show that Halliday's systemic and thematic models do have cross-language validity, that the use of translation as a tool in comprehending the thematic structure of language ranges from weak to strong cases, depending on mood type of the clause in question, and that Arabic, as a target language, preserves and presents Halliday's multiple themes more frequently than English. It also shows that Arabic political discourse is more emotive than English and that the structural features of political discourse are realised in different degrees in the two languages, depending on the nature of the topic, the ideological orientation and personality of the writer, and the linguistic resources available to a language to realise such features.

Since the translator's task is exclusively and continuously concerned with meaning, it is not surprising that Halliday's systemic model of language (and consequently his thematic model), which sees language as 'meaning potential', should offer a serviceable tool for determining the constituent parts of the source language text and its network of relations with its translation. Finally, if the translator's first task is to contribute to understanding between individuals and nations, and his second to transmit knowledge, then his third is to mediate cultural features, not so much in terms of the foreign language's cultural features ('cultural equivalents') which are pragmatically vivid (but usually inaccurate), but in terms of Halliday's universal experience (ideational component) and ultimately common humanity.

**THE PRESENTATION OF THEMATIC  
STRUCTURE IN THE TRANSLATION OF  
ENGLISH AND ARABIC POLITICAL DISCOURSE**

**TWO VOLUMES:**

**VOLUME ONE**

**BY:**

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**A THESIS SUBMITTED FOR THE  
FULFILMENT OF THE DEGREE OF  
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY**

**THE GRADUATE SOCIETY  
FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES  
UNIVERSITY OF DURHAM**

**1994**



**27 JUL 1994**



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## **Declaration:**

**I, the author of this thesis, declare that none of the material in this thesis has been previously submitted by me or any other candidate for a degree in this or any other university.**

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**TO THE MEMORY OF MY MOTHER AND  
FATHER WHO TAUGHT ME THE VALUE OF  
SELF-DEPENDENCE**

## **ACKNOWLEDGMENTS**

I would like to express my great respect, regards and thanks to those who have made this study possible, particularly:

1. My most loving wife, Fairouz, for her patience over my continuous inquiries on matters that pertain to Arabic syntax, morphology and rhetoric. I also thank her for helping me in segmenting the Arabic source and target language texts, for proof reading and editing my English-into-Arabic translation and for helping me in determining the word order of these texts, and finally for counting the number of words per text. Without her help and my supervisor's assistance and guidance, this study would never be possible.
2. The same words of thanks go to my supervisor, Dr. James Dickins, for his cooperation, patience, constructive criticism and valid comments throughout the various phases of this study. I especially thank James for his academic and friendly attitude as well as his high spirit and his encouragement to proceed with the topic of this research. Last but not least, I am greatly indebted to James for editing, proof reading, and re-editing my Arabic-into-English translation and for verifying all my research material.
3. I also thank Dr. Kafīha from Algeria and Dr. ʿali ʿimran from the United Arab Emirates for proof reading my Arabic translation of the English SLTs from a political perspective, and for their valid remarks and suggestions. In this respect, a very special thanks goes to Dr. Salāma Nʿaymāt (Jordan University) for mailing all the Arabic political data analyzed in this study. Finally, I would like to pass my gratitude and appreciation to all those who provided me with the moral support needed for this study.

**. . . translation is just like chewing food that is to be fed to others. If one cannot chew the food oneself, one has to be given food that has been already chewed. Such food however is bound to be poorer in taste and flavour than the original.**

Kumarajiva (trans. of Buddhist texts  
into Chinese, cited in Fung Yi-Lan, 1948)

## Table of Arabic Transliteration

Arabic Letters	Transliteration (Normal) (Names)		Arabic Letters	Transliteration (Normal) (Names)		Case Markers
ء	·		ض	ḍ		fathā= a
ب	b		ط	ṭ		ḍamma= u
ت	t		ظ	ẓ		kasra= i
ث	ṭ	th	ع	ʿ		
ج	j		غ	ġ	gh	Vowels
ح	ḥ		ف	f		ā = ā
خ	x	kh	ق	q		ū = ū
د	d		ك	k		ī = ī
ذ	ḏ		ل	l		
ر	r		م	m		
ز	z		ن	n		
س	s		هـ	h		
ش	š	sh	و	w		
ص	ṣ		ي	y	ʾ	

## **CHAPTER ONE**

### **INTRODUCTION**

#### **1.0 Layout of the Chapter**

This chapter will consist of five main sections. Section 1 will discuss the reasons that persuaded me to embark on such an endless and far-flung topic. This will be followed by section 2 which will briefly discuss the major problem of this study, guided by the various views of those linguists who, at one period of their linguistic career, have said something about it, but could not find a way out, to the extent that some of them started (very recently) casting many doubts on this linguistic phenomenon (cf. 1.2). Section 3 will show the limitations and the reservations of this research. Section 4 will inform the reader of those who would benefit from the research. This will be followed by section 5 which will list the main hypotheses to be tested in this research; these can be considered as the real motivations for this study, and have formed the basis of my research efforts (the theoretical as well as the applied). The final section will layout the overall plan of the study and will outline its main parts and chapters, with the purpose of trying to find answers to the proposed hypotheses by either proving, modifying, or even negating all or some of them. With all this in mind, I decided to go ahead with this research.

#### **1.1 Purpose of the Study**

The purpose of this study is two-fold. These two motivations came into being and started bothering me, as a professional interpreter/translator for the past 15 years, when I first came to Edinburgh and attended an MSc taught-course in translation and interpreting at Heriot-Watt university. This course, I value very highly because it placed me on the first step of academic research in the field of translation. It was at that time I came to hear of phrases like 'marked and unmarked themes', 'text-type focus' (narrative, expository, argumentative, legal text types), although I had previously been exposed to all this, and had actually translated numerous numbers of these text types, without realizing their theoretical importance. This demonstrates the existence

of "a gap, as Yallop (1987, p. 347) puts it, between theory and practice, . . . . The [latter] is practical, relatively unself-conscious, based upon everyday experience; the former is analytical or scientific, relatively deliberate and self-conscious<sup>1</sup>."

As the MSc course advanced and more texts from both languages were translated, the course principal tutor, a native speaker of Arabic, handed the participants of the course a select bibliography that should be consulted in order to enhance their knowledge of the material presented in the class sessions, which a number of students wasted no time in consulting. These texts included books and articles (the latter mostly his) that deal mainly with translation theories, text linguistics, theme-rheme structure as a cohesive device in texts, and Arabic rhetoric (though not Arabic grammar), to name just a few, which I later came to realise, as very important in both translators' training and translation research.

While going through some of these articles (particularly Hatim 1987a, 1987b, & 1989) I was struck by the fact that the generalizations and conclusions were mainly based upon the same three English source language text extracts (SLTs; the same texts in all three mentioned articles) not exceeding 6-7 clauses at the maximum with no Arabic target language texts (TLTs) to support these claims. Claims like "in short, we have demonstrated that the [Arabic] nominal clause is essentially evaluative while the verbal is essentially non-evaluative" (Hatim, 1987a, p. 61), others like "the [Arabic] verbal structure tends to be predominant in non-evaluative, expository texts, while nominal clauses are typical of evaluative, argumentative texts" (Hatim, 1989, p. 144), and finally others where he draws a comparison between the theme and the rheme of two clauses picked out from extracts of two different types of texts, by saying "the difference can be adequately explained only in terms of the relevance of the theme or rheme in questions of the development of the subsequent discourse" (Hatim 1989, p. 144<sup>2</sup>). All I can say at this moment is that, of course, the theme and rheme functions are different even within the same clause, with regard to their function in the development of the same text. They will therefore inevitably be different if they are picked from two different extracts of two text types, namely, expository (news report) and argumentative (editorial), as was done by the author of the article.

I was moved then to respond to such dramatic generalizations; however the limited time and the nature of the dissertation required for the fulfilment of an MSc



prevented me from doing so. But now since I have all the time in the world to respond to such generalizations, I decided to do so for two reasons. The first is egoistic and has to do with my profession as an interpreter/translator. Had I been translating wrong throughout those 15 years, and thus fooling my customers, and people who placed their trust in my capabilities as an interpreter/translator? The second is purely academic: if what I had been taught during that course, regarding English into Arabic translation, turned out through an extensive research of the thematic structure of the Arabic clause (be it verbal or nominal or both) to be false, then all pertinent aspects of translation, i.e. grammar, information structure, semantics, pragmatics, sociolinguistics, the question of the various types of equivalence, text linguistics, etc. (including translation from Arabic into English) would follow suit. Therefore, instead of letting someone else find out how misinformed on those two issues I was, I decided to do it myself.

## **1.2 Analysis of the Major Problem**

As I see it, the major problem in this type of research does not lie in the nature of the research *per se*, as much as in the complexity of the many linguistic concepts, and different terminologies given to these concepts as alternatives to the term and concept of 'thematisation' throughout the literature. This is not only my view, but it reflects the views of virtually all linguists who have got involved in research of this type. As Bolinger comments on the many terms given in literature to linguistic concepts like theme and rheme:

One sign of immaturity [in science] is the endless flow of terminology. The critical reader begins to wonder if some strange naming taboo attaches to the term that a linguist uses, whereby they must be buried with him (Bolinger, 1968 [1975, p. 554<sup>3</sup>]).

In this respect, Schlobinski and Shutze-Coburn (1992) point out that theme/topic is a commonly used term for a variety of approaches to a range of functional concepts<sup>4</sup>. In their view, there are few terms in linguistics that are so widely used without proper justification, however. They also viewed the principal points of the early concepts of topic (known in the 19<sup>th</sup> century as the psychological subject (theme) representing the idea which is present in the consciousness of the speaker/writer/thinker, and to which a second, the psychological predicate is connected; cf. chapter 2); these concepts were

further elaborated by the Prague School (in which came to be known as the functional sentence perspective [FSP]), and were outlined as follows:

1. There is a special point of departure for the utterance;
2. this point of departure is dependent on the context, and
3. the normal ordering of sentence constituents is based on psychological factors.

These three aspects of the definition of theme/topic -- the syntactical, the contextual, the cognitive, all of which have played an important role from the start-- have been the subject of continuous controversy as they have gone through repeated stages of clarification and reinterpretation, or as Danes (1974b, p. 222) puts it: "[clarification] assumes that one can agree on the basic concepts **WHICH SHOULD BE KEPT TERMINOLOGICALLY 'CONSTANT'**"[my emphasis]<sup>5</sup>.

Contrary to Danes' expectations and clarification, one glance at the literature shows that this long-awaited 'consensus' is not close at hand. As a result, the variety of approaches to the study of theme/topic is indeed overwhelming. In general, there exist four basic categorizations of theme, depending on the way it has been defined. I say 'basic' because the exact boundaries are hard to draw and, further, some approaches include aspects of more than one group. In these four groups, the term theme/topic refers to the clause in comparison to what is also known in literature as discourse topic; these four categories include:

1. theme/topic as given/known information
2. theme/topic as the point of departure of the clause as a message
3. theme/topic as the constituent expressing what the clause is about
4. theme/topic as the basis of communication dynamism.

De Beaugrande (1992) points out that, in linguistics, theme/topic was not central to theory and research, probably for lack of "a clearly defined place in the prevailing descriptive or generative schemes" (de Beaugrande, op. cit., p 243<sup>6</sup>). He further points out that the term is encountered frequently nowadays, though still without a general consensus on its status. In this respect, de Beaugrande (1992, pp. 243-245) lists three major reasons for this emerging frequency and the use of such term; these are:

1. Theme/topic is "A MULTIPLEX" phenomenon of language, relating to virtually all of the established "LEVELS" or "COMPONENTS" [original emphasis]. These components include: (a) phonology where a theme/topic can be indicated in the

intonation patterns of a tone group, as by a lower or a falling tone, (b) morphology where a language may have inflection or particles for demarcating the thematic/topical element(s), such as definite articles and (c) syntax where many languages indicate the thematic/topical element(s) through the clause organization, for example, by placing it/them before the non-thematic/rhematic element(s). It also includes: (d) lexicon where the organization of and access to entries in a lexicon is influenced by topical relations, such as Halliday's (1976) lexical cohesion, among entities with related meanings and (e) semantics where a theme/topic is a content or proposition, for example, one on the global level of discourse meaning. It further includes (f) pragmatics where thematicity/topicality depends on what speaker/writer and hearer/reader can be presumed to know already in a given discourse situation, and (g) stylistics where strategies for foregrounding and backgrounding themes/topics can be identified with particular styles, such as a technical style designed for experts in a domain of discourse. For this reason, de Beaugrande (1992, p. 244), points out, "an investigation of topic may involve considerable complexity and coordination among levels of description."

2. In support of this, de Beaugrande (loc. cit.) argues that "theme/topic is not merely a linguistic, but also a **SOCIAL** and **PSYCHOLOGICAL** concern" [original emphasis]. In this respect, he emphasizes that each society or social group has its own repertory of topics that are considered appropriate for discourse among certain participants, and which are considered as part of the cultural heritage of that group/community/society. Furthermore, themes/topics must be psychologically organized in cognition and memory, in terms of "frames", or "schemes" that promote discourse processing by indicating what typically belongs to a certain topic<sup>7</sup>.

3. The prominence of thematicity/topicality varies from language to language, being much less obtrusive, I believe, in English than in Slavic languages, for example. In this respect, de Beaugrande (loc. cit.) points out that "in English, topicality is less influential and tends to be conflated with the subject-predicate organization of sentences", and, I presume, to a greater extent than in Arabic which, being a relatively free word order language, can thematise other elements (particularly dependent clauses; cf. 7.5.2 & 7.6.2) more readily than English.

De Beaugrande (1992, p. 246) concludes his discussion by the following discouraging remark:

For reasons like the three just expounded, topic is a significant **BUT UNRULY NOTION** that spills across familiar divisions in the study of language and culture, and that it appears more **URGENT** for some investigations and **LESS** for others [my emphasis].

Another type of discouragement from embarking on a research of this type comes from Givon (1983), who points out that most of the 1970s practioners in investigating the subject of thematic/topical structure, whether those following the Praguean tradition or the Hallidayan one, tended to divide the sentence into two distinct components, one of which is theme/topic/old information and the other rheme/ comment /focus/new information, and that all of them tended to link the topic to "discourse structure, communicative intent, communication dynamism, functional sentence perspective, etc., in ways that tended to be often both vague and mysterious" (Givon, 1983, p. 5<sup>8</sup>).

It is not only the problem of terminology that Givon says faces any new researcher who wishes to work in this area, but, rather, another four: three of these are discussed by Givon in his 1983 article and one in his 1988 article. These can be summarized as follows:

1. Theme/topic does not always precede the rheme/focus/comment, as linguists, according to him, rather passively accept. He supports this by four types of construction; namely, left- and right- dislocations, and subject and object contrastive topics. In such cases, he points out each sentence has two topics, one of which is 'grammaticalized as subject'.
2. In a transitive clause with two proper nouns and one definite noun, where one of the proper nouns is a direct object, we end up with three possible themes/topics of the clause, namely the subject, the direct object and the indirect object. In examples of this type, he introduces what he calls the "degree-of-topical-scalarity". Even here, he questions his own invention, regarding the nature of degree: is it of importance or topicality?
3. The third problem, which, according to him, neither the Pragueans nor any of their adherents were able to solve, pertains to the relation between 'topic', definite NP', 'pronoun', 'agreement', and 'zero anaphora'. For Givon (op. cit., p.6 ), these are not "overly damaging to the concept of topic/theme as a functional prime, but eventually their import starts to sink in." These include examples like:

- 1-1 a. . . . (he came in) and (0= *he*) sat down. (zero anaphora)  
b. . . . (he came in;) *he* then sat down. (unstressed pronoun)  
c. . . . (she came in;) then *HE* sat down. (stressed pronoun)  
d. . . . (the woman came in;) then *the man* sat down. (definite NP)  
e. . . . (*now the man, he* never joined . . . . (left-dislocated NP)

Here, according to Givon, the italicized NP is 'subject', 'topic, and 'definite'. He (loc. cit.) believes that each seems to perform a different discourse function, but "how defined, and how related to topic, or topicality?"

4. However, the most vexing discouragement comes from his 1988 article, in which the problem regarding thematicity/topicality is associated with the relation between the atomic notion of topic/theme and that of focus/rheme. In this respect, he sarcastically says:

To this day, gallons of print-ink are expended in trying to **TORTURE** their exact relation in discrete, nonscalar, platonic mould. But even a cursory look at grammar, data already suggests **SCARALITY OF FOCUS**, much like scalarity of **TOPIC** . . . (Givon, 1988, p. 246) [my ellipsis and emphasis]<sup>9</sup>.

To illustrate this point, one can consider the following examples:

- 1-2 a. It was to **JOHN** that I gave the book (CLEFT-FOCUS)  
b. **To JOHN** I gave this book, . . . (CONTRASTIVE FOCUS)  
c. I gave the book to John. (NEUTRAL)

In these examples, Givon also points out, that there is a clear 'gradation' in the degree of 'focus-ness' ('emphaticness', 'contrastiveness') assigned to '*to John*'.

Despite all the alternatives to the term 'thematisation' and the lack of consensus over a constant term, despite the multiplicity of this linguistic phenomenon, its social and psychological implications and its degree of obtrusiveness in various languages, and despite all other minor problems, whether mentioned among the above or not, I decided to embark on this study, with the aim of trying to probe new ways of understanding the thematic structure of the clause by carrying out a comparative study between two languages, namely English and Arabic. Armed with a Hallidayan grammatical and systemic functional model of thematic structure and with the process of translation, I intend to conduct an extended analysis of data from both languages prior to and after translation, hoping that the process of translation will act as a helpful tool in understanding the thematic structure, on the basis of whether the translation process preserves and presents the original thematic structure of the original language or ignores

it and replaces it with a new one. I would also like to assure Bolinger, that I will entrust a member of my family, when I pass away, to bury with me any newly coined terminology that might be created as a result of this research and any further research on this or any other topic. I also would ask Givon to spare me only a quarter of a gallon of print-ink for this topic, which, I believe, would not add too much to the number of gallons which were spent until 1988 in trying to 'torture' the exact relation between theme and rheme.

### **1.3 Scope of the Study**

This research will be limited to a comparative analysis and study of the linguistic presentation of the thematic structure of the various moods of the clauses that, following Halliday's (cf. 3.6) systemic functional model, comprise the chosen examples of Arabic and English written political discourse prior to and after their translation (cf. 3.6). In this respect, no ideological ideas are imposed upon the reader, nor are they, if there are any at all, meant to insult, offend or defame the reputation of anybody. Illustrative examples that are accompanied by some political comments by the author are intended only to enhance certain linguistic aspects of the thematic structure of the clause in question which lie beyond the mere structural level of that clause, e.g. the pragmatic level (the intention of the writer) which cannot be explained without the author's political comments. Thus, this study is purely linguistic<sup>10</sup>.

Although the phonological level will be used quite extensively, especially when it comes to segmenting both texts into what I will call 'rhematic clause', it will not be a central concern, since, as I indicated above, this study is meant to deal with written texts. However, I expect that, following Halliday (1985), in certain construction such as cleft-sentences, pseudo-cleft sentences, (which lie at the border line between written and spoken discourse), and marked and glossed thematic structures, the phonological level of language will be a great help in demarcating thematic and rhematic fields of such constructions. Finally, all conclusions drawn from this study will be applicable to the genre of discourse, whose sample texts are used as data for this research, i.e. written political discourse. They could also be applicable to other genres of discourse, through additional research using a similar methodology to the one adopted here.

#### **1.4 Practical Benefits of the Study**

Three types of academic researchers and research practioners would benefit from this study: namely, text linguists, discourse analysts and interpreters/translators. For text linguists and discourse analysts, the thematic structure of the independent clause 'penetrates through' all the current and the agreed upon levels of language, the semantic, the syntactic and the phonological (cf. 1.2). Above all, de Beaugande (1992; cf. 1.2), points out that the thematic structure/topic is also a social and a psychological concern; this amounts in Halliday's socio-semiotic model of language (cf. 3.5) to the cultural level which lies beyond the linguistic level. Thus for discourse analysts and text linguists alike, thematic structure exceptionally contributes to two major aspects of the textuality of any text: its cohesion and coherence<sup>11</sup>.

For translators, like myself, the benefit of this study is indisputable; it comes as a result of the penetrative capability of thematic structure through all levels of language, including its non-linguistic, semiotic/cultural level which is realized by the three traditional linguistic levels. The thematic structure of the clause (typically realizing certain types of speech act, which, I believe, lie in the heart of any culture, given that language is one of the many tools in realising the semiotic values of its speaking community) can, if rendered and presented correctly, assist the translator in overcoming most, if not all, of the translation problems he encounters during the process of translation. These problems, outlined by Hatim (1990, pp. 21-22), include the comprehension of the source language text (SLT), the transfer of meaning and the assessment of the target language text (TLT)<sup>12</sup>.

#### **1.5 Hypotheses to be Investigated**

The following hypotheses will be tested with regard to the present research. The comparative approach, both in the theoretical portion of this study and in the applied, will be utilized to either corroborate, modify or negate these proposed hypotheses:

1. I assume that Halliday's systemic and functional grammatical model of thematic structure is also applicable to languages, like Arabic, which are non-Subject-Verb-Object (SVO) in word order (WO), and in which the major theme, in the Hallidayan

sense of what the clause is about (cf. chapter 3), does not precede the verb but rather follows it (cf. chapters 5 & 7).

2. As a consequence of the first hypothesis, Halliday's functional model of systemic linguistics has a cross-language validity, and can be used for languages other than English, taking into consideration its non-linguistic socio-semiotic dimension (level), which is usually realized by the traditional levels of all adult languages and which, in turn, divides up social reality on the basis of the needs of the various speaking communities (cf. chapter 5).

3. Translation can be used as a tool in understanding the thematic structure of some independent clauses of the SLT, by investigating and analysing their counterparts in the TLT.

4. Arabic, as a TL, can preserve and thus present Halliday's multiple thematic structure (cf. chapter 3) more fully than English.

5. Arabic political discourse is more emotive than English.

6. Arabic, as SL and as TL, realizes the salient features of political discourse more fully than English.

To test these hypotheses, a corpus of ten political texts (5 English & 5 Arabic) were selected; they all deal with aspects of the same topic: the Gulf crisis. All texts were translated by a professional native Arab translator, the author of this study. The Arabic translation of the English texts were also edited, proof read and re-edited by professional native Arab translators and specialists, and by Arab political scientists to see if the translation complies with the overall norms/schemes of Arabic political writing. The same procedure was followed with English target language texts (TLTs), except that the editing, the proof reading and the re-editing was carried out by Arabists who are native speakers of English. This long process of editing and proof reading is deemed necessary in order to carry out such a comparative study; without this, the results of the analysis would not be satisfactory, and hence would undermine the overall purpose of the study. I believe that, although they are set out for other purposes, table 9, in comparison with table 10, of appendix-G, can be looked at as an evaluative scheme of the quality of the Arabic translation. In this respect, I conclude by insisting that a comparative study of this type **MUST HAVE A HIGH QUALITY OF TRANSLATED TEXTS.**



## 1.6 Organization of the Study

The linguistic phenomenon of thematisation, to use Halliday's term, has been dealt with in the literature under various rubrics, a fact which constitutes the major problem of this research (cf. 1.2). In addition to Halliday's division the former into theme and rheme or "non-theme", as he sometimes calls it, other linguists, from various other schools, bring in other names: the Transformational Generative Grammarians, notably Chomsky (1969 [1970])<sup>13</sup>, use other terms like "presupposition and focus", and "topic and comment". Similarly, the Prague School linguists, notably Mathesius, Firbas, Danes, among others, have established their own terminology (cf. chapter 2).

In approaching this vast, complicated and somehow controversial discussion of what are essentially one and the same notion, I decided to divide this study into two major parts: a theoretical study which outlines the major models of thematic structure in the literature (part A: volume I), and an applied study (part B: volume II). By carrying out a comparative study of the various models adopted in analysing thematic structure of both Arabic and English, I hope I may be able to test some of the above hypotheses, which are theoretical in nature like the second one above, for instance (cf. chapter 5). On the other hand, most of the hypotheses which pertain to the presentation of thematic structure in translating between the two languages and to the aspects of written political discourse expressed, will be tested on the basis of the applied study which will involve a detailed analysis of data from each language both as SL and TL, in order to reach sound judgements regarding the accuracy, falsehood or whatever will emerge as a result of these analyses. This corpus study was carried out, following Halliday's (1991, p. 31) advice that "it had always seemed to me that the linguistic system was inherently probabilistic, and that frequency in text was the instantiation of probability in grammar"<sup>14</sup>.

Looking at the survey of models of thematic structure from this vantage point, it would be an overwhelming task to review the theoretical context that underlies the work that has been done in this area. I therefore have not attempted to do so, nor have I tried to be exhaustive in citing the relevant literature. Rather, in each chapter of the survey of models, I have chosen, at most, three or four linguists, or a specific work from which I bring highlights which have bearing on the key issue and which relates

mainly to thematization and, to a lesser extent, to information structure. I only treat the latter, from the point of view of how often it has bearing on the former, the main subject of this study. To avoid any confusion between the various points of view on the question of theme-rheme structure, I have separated the presentation of the relevant views in separate sections and consequently separated my own comments and critique thereof, which in each case is added afterwards (cf. chapter 4).

For the reader who wishes to have a quick overview of the contents of each chapter of each part of this study (part A contains 4 chapters of theoretical study in addition to the introduction, and part B contains 2 chapters of applied study, in addition to the conclusion), the following outlines are provided:

1. Chapter 2 briefly covers the Praguean thematic model as outlined by the main linguistic figures of the Prague school, namely Mathesius, Travenicesk, Danes and Firbas; it also includes Firbas' accounts of the means of functional sentence perspective (FSP), and Danes' thematic progression schemes for text development as well as his latest views regarding thematisation and information structure, which come close to those of the Hallidayan model.
2. Chapter three will be devoted to the Hallidayan systemic thematic model. It incorporates Halliday's linguistic insights, and his socio-semantic and socio-semiotic models of language. It also includes the author's critique of Halliday's ideas regarding his thematic model, and outlines a modified Hallidayan thematic model which will be adopted by the author to analyze the data in chapter 7.
3. Chapter four will be devoted to a discussion of post-Hallidayan thematic models proposed by a number of linguists who have contributed to the explication of some aspects of Halliday's model. These linguists will be evaluated on the grounds of two main perspectives: whether they adopt a pro-Hallidayan approach, in separating the notion of thematisation from that of information structure, or whether they are pro-Praguean, by having these two notions conflated and mapped onto each other, and thus treating them as if they were one.
4. Chapter five will be devoted to a comparison between the traditional approach to thematic structure in standard Arabic (SA) which has been carried out by traditional Arab grammarians (TAGs) and modern models, e.g. Halliday's. It will also include the Arab Rhetoricians' contributions to the various areas of thematic structure, and some

native Arab linguists who discussed the thematic structure of the independent clause in Arabic, using either the Praguean model or other functional models. The last section of this chapter discusses the model (outlined initially in the last section of chapter 3) proposed by the author in analysing the data.

5. Chapter 6 explains the overall methodology adopted in the analysis of data and the criteria used in segmenting the corpus (Arabic & English) into rhematic clauses, and the technique applied in the analysis. This will be followed by a brief discussion of text-types on the basis of what text linguists call 'text type focus' (cf. Werlich, 1983). The two final sections will discuss in some detail a Hallidayan approach to the study and analysis of political discourse, clarified and adopted by a group of linguists who are known throughout the literature as 'the critical linguists' (cf. Fowler et. al. 1979)<sup>15</sup>.

6. Chapter 7 presents the procedure of analysis and exemplification of theme (sections 1 & 2) plus 12 consecutive sections of detailed corpus analysis of thematic structure for the Arabic and the English texts, and their corresponding TLTs. The results of this analysis is tabulated in 16 tables, and divided on the basis of the modified Hallidayan thematic model (cf. appendix E & F). Four further tables will be constructed to show the word order types of the Arabic SL and TL texts (tables 9 & 10 of appendix-G) and the distribution of first and second personal pronouns between the rhematic clauses (RCs) of the English and Arabic SLTs. Section 15 will discuss the issue of thematisation and translation, regarding the significance of the latter to the former. This will be followed by the final section which will round up and conclude the various findings of the analysis, including those that provide some answers regarding the relevance of the hypotheses set out above; some of these findings may well be applicable to written political discourse only, since this is the genre used in this analysis.

7. The final chapter will review the relevance of the proposed hypotheses in the light of both the theoretical and the applied portion of this study. This will be followed by three other brief sections which will, respectively, outline the modified Hallidayan model for the comparative analysis of thematic structure, any additional findings of the research, and further areas of study for future research.

Before closing this introductory chapter, it must be pointed out that the analysis that will be carried out will be based on the English and the Arabic texts (both the SLTs and the TLTs). In this respect I will be looking at the TLTs to see how they reflect my interpretation of the SLTs, especially the thematic structure, assuming that translation might help in the understanding of that structure. It must also be borne in mind that TLTs in either language are not natural texts, no matter how well-versed in the linguistic features of both languages and how well-experienced in translation the translator(s) is/(are). Therefore, decisions regarding the thematic structure of some TL clauses, will, at times, be determined by the syntactic structures that are enlisted in the realization of the SL clause.

## **CHAPTER TWO**

### **THE PRAGUEAN MODEL**

#### **2.0 Layout of the Chapter**

This chapter will consist of six main sections. Section one will outline the general principles and assumptions of the Prague School (PS) regarding the theory of thematic structure of the sentence. Section two will discuss in some detail the contributions of its main founders: Mathesius, Travnicek, Firbas and Danes, among others, followed by a short critique of each one's contribution. Section three will discuss Firbas' means of functional sentence perspective (FSP), namely linearity, semantic structure and context, and their contribution and interplay in determining the theme-transition-rheme structure of the sentence. Section four will discuss Danes' application of theme-rheme structure on the discourse/text level: his (1970 & 1974)<sup>1</sup> thematic progression (TP) scheme. Section five will discuss how these thematic issues contribute to the development, coherence, and connexity of discourse form Danes' latest contribution and outlook to such issues and towards the development of text linguistics (Danes, 1983 & 1989)<sup>2</sup>. The final section will include a summary of the Praguean model in the light of the recent changes of opinions of some of its main figures, especially Danes, whose recent formulation of thematic and information structure comes close to that of systemic linguists, e.g. Halliday.

#### **2.1 The Prague School**

##### **2.1.0 Introduction**

What differentiates the PS approach regarding the synchronic study of language from their American contemporaries (the descriptivists), and what differentiates the PS so sharply from Chomskyan School of thought which has succeeded the 'descriptivists', is that the PS linguists, as well as their adherents, saw language in terms of function, although, of course, the PS linguists can be described as descriptivists as well. For a linguist working in the American tradition, at the time of the evolution of the PS,

grammar is a set of elements\_\_ "emes" of various kinds in Bloomfield's work, and "rules" of various sorts for a Chomskyan; furthermore, the analyst seems to take much the same attitude to "the linguistic structure as one might take to a work of art, in that it does not usually occur to him to point to a particular element and ask: 'what's that for?'\_\_ he is rather content to describe and contemplate" (Sampson, 1980, p. 104)<sup>3</sup>. The PS linguist, on the other hand, looked at languages, to use this metaphor, as one might look at a car motor, seeking to understand what jobs the various parts or components were doing and, how the nature of one component determines the nature of others. When they described language, the PS linguists' practice was almost identical to that of their contemporaries\_\_ they used the notions 'phonemes' and 'morphemes', for instance, but they tried to go beyond description to explanation, saying not just 'what' languages were like, but 'why' they were the way they were. By contrast, Chomsky also proposes explanation for language, but his has to do with the mind/brain, rather than language functioning in a social context.

### **2.1.1 General Principles and Assumptions**

Since their first meeting in Prague on the 6<sup>th</sup> of October 1926, what gives the Prague linguists their coherence is their unquestionable commitment to the functionalist conception of language (Vachek, 1966, p.8)<sup>4</sup>. For them, the function of language in communication is paramount. According to Vachek (1966, p.4), Mathesius, the founder of the PS, called for a synchronic study of language in 1911; this, thus, antedates the appearance of Saussure's *Cours de Linguistic Generale* by four years. Trnka comments on Saussure's contribution to linguistic study by saying that it lies in his having:

placed linguistics on a new, logically structuralist basis by replacing the atomizing realism and naive empiricism of the older school [descriptive and historical] with the concept of function and system of hierarchically ordered signs (Trnka, 1948 [Vachek, 1966, p. 159])<sup>5</sup>.

The Pragueans also claimed that language can be organized to show the respective function of each of its structural components. As a result, they saw language as a structure in which all the levels are, to some degree, mutually interdependent\_\_ i.e., "it is a system of systems" (Vachek, 1966, p. 28). The term functionalism meant to them that "no element of language can be duly evaluated if considered in isolation from

other elements of that same language" (Vachek, op. cit., p. 6). The Pragueans did not also consider structuralism as incompatible with historical linguistics; "it acknowledges the importance of diachronic research, which is deepened and made more precise 'by the contributions of the structuralist approach'" (Trnka, 1948 [Vachek, 1966, p. 160]). Moreover, he also adds that

language is a system at any moment of its development. . . . The sharp line between synchrony, treating language as a system, and the non-structuralist diachrony, which only violates that system, is clearly fictitious (loc. cit.).

To the PS linguists, functionalism meant that "any item of language exists solely because it serves some purpose, because it has some function (mostly that of communication) to fulfil" (Vachek, 1966, p. 7)<sup>6</sup>. Thus, as Vachek points out, function to them [PS] equates with meaning (Vachek, op. cit., p.30). One of the school members, Karcevskij (1929 [Vachek, 1966, p. 31]) points out that the same sign has several functions, while at the same time the functions that it expresses can also be expressed by several signs. In other words, every sign in a language is both "homonymous" and "synonymous", i.e., it is constituted by mutual crossing of those two series of the considered facts, or as he puts it:

The relation between the phonic sign (*significant*) and the content (*signifie*) is always found to be of a somewhat gliding nature, in fact, there is always a kind of tension between the two. The sign tends to have other functions beside the one involved in a particular context; the content (*signifie*) is capable of being expressed by other means other than the primary sign. Thus the two are found to be asymmetrical . . . it is exactly this asymmetrical dualism of the structure of the sign that makes it possible for the language to develop at all: the 'adequate' position of the sign always becomes shifted as consequence of its adjustment to the needs of the concrete situation (Vachek, 1966, p. 31) [my ellipsis].

Hence the sign is constantly changing, creating an "inner tension" with the systems as adjustments are made in order to keep the systems in balance and compensate for the changes.

Mathesius, the originator of this functional approach, sees the roots of the PS linguistics as emerging from the work of the 19<sup>th</sup> century linguistics, in that, as indicated above, it shared an interest in the synchronic study of languages emphasizing that the synchronic study is as essential as the diachronic or historical one. However,

it differs from the 19<sup>th</sup> century linguistics in that it, in principle, emphasizes the functional aspect of language, e.g. it views language as a system. In this regard, Mathesius says:

language can be used as a means of communication only because it forms a system of signs which are interrelated and balanced in a certain manner. If this system is disturbed, a new equilibrium is achieved through the working of language itself (Mathesius, 1975, p.12).

In fact, it is this emphasis on the functional aspect of language that distinguishes the PS. In the words of Sampson (1980),

the hallmark of the PS linguists was that it saw language in the terms of function. I mean by this not merely that members of the PS thought of language as a whole as serving a purpose, which is truism that would hardly differentiate them from others, but they analyzed a given language with a view to showing the perspective functions played by the various structural components in the use of the entire language (Sampson, 1980, p. 104).

The PS linguists' approach to function is characterized by three features:

1. They generally favoured three functions of utterances of speech.
2. They tended to agree on the definition of these functions.
3. They tended to see these functions operating in conceptual clusters in a certain order.

Describing these functions, listed in Bühler's *Sprachtheorie*, (cf. 3.3.1), Vachek (1966, pp. 34-35) translates: (1) the word "Darstellungsfunktion" as "reference function", which means informing of factual, objective content of extra-lingual reality, (2) the word "Kundgabefunktion" as "expressive functions, which covers, in addition to (1), the individual peculiarities of speech that distinguishes the speaker from other members of the community, and (3) the word "Appellfunktion" as the "appeal function", which refers to the effect of an utterance on the listener and which aims to influence him in some way, often even to urge some positive action on his part or, conversely, to prevent him from undertaking such an action.

The very basic assumption that underlies the Pragueans functional approach is the belief that the structures of language (grammar, phonology, and semantics) are determined by the function that they perform. Any unit of language [at any level] exists only because it has a function to perform. These units form 'language', which as a whole, exists only to fulfil a function\_\_ communication. In general terms, the



Pragueans are concerned with the functions of linguistic units in particular, and the functions of language in general, rather than language as a system composed of units. In other words, they are primarily interested in the ways these linguistic units are used as communication signs in a language.

The Pragueans view language as an instrument of communication; they emphasize the instrumental character of language to a degree which leads them to look beyond the internal structural organization of language as a system. They go further to find why languages are structured the way they are. In attempting to do this, they try to deal with 'external' forces that contribute to the organization of language. These external forces include psychological, physical, social, cultural and environmental purpose-related properties of language, hence their adoption of Bühler's conception of language functions from a psychological point of view.

The Pragueans' commitment to the belief that the internal structure of linguistic structure is determined almost entirely by the external or "extra-linguistic factors" puts their approach within the realm of pragmatics. The Pragueans try to achieve "pragmatic adequacy" in their analysis of language (cf. 4.5).

In the course of their analysis of language, the Pragueans systematically try to explain the interaction of linguistics and extralinguistic factors including the whole communication situation, the speaker's intention and attitude, cultural and social background, and the different presuppositions present in the act of communication. Language is not to be analyzed in isolation; rather, it is to be analyzed in its communication form with regard to the context of situation.

By adopting this approach in analysing language, the functionalist approach of the Pragueans as well as that of Halliday (see chapter 3), stands in opposition to the formal approach. Formal theories tend to view language as a mental process, while functional theories view it as a social process, (although it is possible to adopt a formal approach to the study and analysis of language, which is not mentalist) (cf. chapter 5: 5.1 & 2). Functionalists reject the formal assumption that language is an autonomous system and believe that language is to be studied with regard to its social functions.

Functionalists recognize and account for the information structure of linguistic utterances. In doing so, they analyze the message content of an utterance, its manner of communication, to whom it is communicated, the situation of communication and the

pragmatic presuppositions of the utterance. They propose that in order to analyze fully the linguistic structure of an utterance, one needs first of all to understand its message or content, the function of each element to the overall structure of the immediate context or context of situation. Functionalists analyze an utterance in accordance with the communication functions performed by those elements composing it.

Functionalists emphasize the relationship between the 'form' of the linguistic unit and its 'functions'. As mentioned above, this assumption is that the surface form of linguistic units is partially determined by their communication functions. It is these assumptions that give the PS the label "functional".

The major syntactic assumption of the Pragueans is that syntactic analysis of language is functional, hence the term functional syntax. They always stress the centrality of functional notions of syntactic analysis, and always emphasize their functional orientation. This fact is made clear from the following excerpt:

By stressing the attribute of 'functionalist', The Prague linguists have intended to underline their conviction that the study of the system of language can only do justice to the facts to be expressed if these facts are analyzed with regard to their functions, especially, of course, to their communicative functions. . . . The Prague Linguists are convinced that it is only this approach that can enable the analyst to cover all facts of language as one systemic whole, in all their aspects and all language levels, the lowest and the highest (including the evasive facts of the stylistic level). (Danes & Vachek, 1964a, p. 24)<sup>7</sup>.

The traditional Pragueans view an utterance as consisting of two basic parts, one labelled the **theme**, that part of the utterance which indicates information already 'given' or 'known' from the preceding context, and another labelled the **rheme**, that part which represents 'new' information to be conveyed by the speaker and or a writer. Subsequently some of the Praguean linguists (Danes, 1989; cf. 2.5) began reevaluating their original position regarding the association of new information with rheme and old/given information with theme (cf. also 2.6). Moreover, the Pragueans propose that the syntactic structure of an utterances is to be analyzed in terms of these two functionally based notions. Other functionalists in America, as seen in the previous sections, use the terms topic and comment to refer to theme and rheme respectively.

The initial and final positions in an utterance are of special importance to the Pragueans' approach to syntactic analysis. This point, however, is not innovative since it has been the tradition in rhetorical description to attach such specific significance to

the initial and final positions of an utterance. The Pragueans' assumption is that the initial position of an utterance is usually associated with 'what the utterance is about', and the final positions is associated with 'emphasis'.

The Pragueans also propose that within an utterance, the 'normal' or 'neutral' sequence of the two parts is such that the theme precedes the rheme. This observation agrees with the findings of psychology which suggests that 'new' pieces of information tend to follow 'old' or 'known' information in the process of communication. Mathesius (1975)<sup>8</sup> calls this the neutral sequence of theme-rheme "the objective sequence" in contradistinction of rheme-theme, which he calls "subjective sequence" (see next section). From a linguistic point of view, the Pragueans indicate that the sequence of these two functional elements is attributed to factors determined by the communication functions of the two elements\_\_ the communicative intentions of speakers and/or writers.

## **2.2 The Main Founders of the Praguean Model**


### **2.2.1 V. Mathesius**

In his functional approach to the study as well as to the analysis of language, Mathesius seems to be working within the framework of Bühler's three functions of language referred to in the previous section. But Mathesius does not define them with reference to one another, perhaps because he sees the 'expressive' and the 'appeal' functions as applying to utterance, while reference function refers to an earlier stage of linguistic encoding: the selection of elements or units of experience to talk about from the context of situation. The following quotation, from Mathesius (1975), explains his view of the expressive and appeal functions, the latter of which is called by certain other linguists the 'conative' function (see section 3.4.1 below); Mathesius prefers to call it the 'communicative function':

speech has two functions, i.e., it can operate as a means of expression and of communication. Expression is spontaneous manifestation of one's emotions; it does not reckon, or is not meant to reckon with the hearer. It is an expression for the sake of expression, of a purely subjective kind. On the other hand, communication has a social character; it applies to another speaker as the hearer, being intended to evoke certain thoughts,

decisions, etc. (Mathesius, 1975, p. 13).

Mathesius (1975) also believes that speech originally functions only as a means of expression, which gradually changes to communication, until expression becomes a secondary signal accompanying communication. Thus, when Mathesius (1975) refers to a particular utterance as the basis of linguistic analysis, he primarily means a communicative utterance. The difference between stages in the realization of a communicative utterance are clarified by the following diagram:



Based on Mathesius (1975, p. 14)

What can be deduced from above quotation and diagram is that, for Mathesius, the starting point of a functional analysis of languages should be "the communicative needs of the hearer", and a functional syntax, as mentioned above, will incorporate both functional and structural principles, i.e. 'outer' functions and 'inner' ones, proceeding "from the functional necessities to the formal means by which they are satisfied" (Mathesius, op. cit, 15).

Mathesius' major contribution to linguistic theorizing was his notion of functional sentence perspective (FSP). He believes that the most important aspect of the sentence is the reaction of the speaker to some reality. This part of the speaker might be said to be manifested in a certain assertiveness. And thus, from examining the sentence from the point of assertiveness, Mathesius believes that the functional perspective of the sentence consists of two basic elements: a statement and an element about which the statement is made. The latter he calls the 'basis' (theme), and the former, he calls the nucleus (rheme). So what is stated about the basis is the nucleus

of the utterance or rheme<sup>9</sup>. In other words, the theme is the part of the utterance (sentence) which refers to a fact or facts already known from the preceding context, or to facts that may be taken for granted or presupposed to be known by the hearer or the reader, and thus does not contribute, or only minimally contributes, to the information provided by the given utterance (or sentence). The other part, the rheme, contains the actual new information to be conveyed by the sentence (utterance) and consequently enriches the knowledge of the listener or reader substantially.

Before proceeding any further, it is most appropriate to give the reader Mathesius' definition of the sentence and why he uses the sentence interchangeably with utterance, and why he sometimes, does not use the term utterance at all. The following definition is quoted by Vachek (1966):

the sentence is an elementary speech-utterance, through which the speaker (or writer) reacts to some reality, concrete or abstract, and which in its formal characteristics appears to realize grammatical possibilities of the respective language and to be subjectively, that is from the point of view of the speaker (Vachek, 1966, p. 88)<sup>10</sup>.

According to this definition, the sentence is defined as an 'elementary' element in order to be distinguished from a more extensive utterance which, according to Mathesius (1975, p. 79) "may include two or more sentences".

Mathesius points out that all languages exhibit the distribution of information into these two elements, theme and rheme, but that languages may differ in the way FSP is expressed. In fact, the basis of Mathesius investigation was that a comparative or a contrastive analysis of languages from the functional point of view ( he did some contrastive studies between Czech, English and German) would help in defining the nature of FSP more precisely and in distinguishing the syntactic principles peculiar to the individual languages.

Since Mathesius felt that word order (WO) was primarily determined by FSP, at least for Slavic languages, he concentrated a good deal of attention on the general principle of WO. In this respect, he, as well as most of the Prague linguists including Vachek, Danes and Firbas, draws his inspirations from Henri Weil's treatise (1844), *De L' Ordre des Mots Dans Les Langues Anciennes Comparees aux Modernes*, (*The Order of Words in the Ancient Languages Compared with That of Modern Languages*). In this book, Weil considers the order of ideas-- that is the linear development of thought from

an initial notion to a goal-- is a universal principle reflecting the movement of the mind. Thus a sentence will contain "a point of departure, an initial notion . . . the ground, which is the information to be stated to the hearer" (Weil, 1844, [1978, pp. 29-30])<sup>11</sup>. This order of ideas is, in principle, distinct from the syntactic order, which itself follows "the form of the a sensible action"\_\_ a kind of drama containing an entity that acts, an action, an entity that receives the impulse of the action, and finally whatever else is affected indirectly by the action (time and place, etc.) (Weil, 1844, [1978, p. 24]). According to Weil, a sentence effectively combines both of these orderings.

There are in the proposition two different movements: an objective movement, which is expressed by the syntactic relations, and a subjective movement, which expressed by the order of words. It may be said that syntax is the principal thing because it inheres in the objects themselves, and because it does not vary with the point of view from movement to movement. (Weil, op. cit., p. 30).

Weil also believes that there is a striking difference in the movement of ideas as far as different languages are concerned. On the one hand, in ancient languages (especially Greek and Latin), "the movement of ideas is shown by the order of words, [and] the syntactic movement is expressed by terminations" (Weil, 1844 [1978], p. 36). On the other, in modern languages, the order of words expresses both the order of ideas and the syntactic relations. Thus, for Weil, modern languages tend to make "syntax conform to the required order of words", so that the grammatical subject is an entity that acts as a point of departure for the thought (Weil, 1978, p. 37). In addition, he notes that the order of ideas can be reversed thus placing the "goal", for example, before the initial notion. Weil calls this inversion "pathetic order", for it operates as a vehicle of emotion, "when the imagination is vividly impressed, or when the sensibilities of the soul are deeply stirred, the speaker enters into the matter of the discourse at the goal" (Weil, op. cit., p. 45).

In examining the WO of Czech, Mathesius found that Weil's observation about ideas in the ordinary sentence and in the reversed, pathetic order, together constitute the primary ordering principle. This is why he proposes two types of ordering of the elements of theme and rheme in the sentence (Mathesius, 1975, pp 83-84). He calls the first ordering the "objective order", in which, the speaker takes account of the hearer and the context of situation, and conforms with the usual or "neutral" mental

procedures. Mathesius exemplifies this by:

- 2-1 Byl (theme) jedou jiden kral (rheme).  
[there] was once one king  
Once upon a time there was a king.

As for the second type, which Mathesius calls the "subjective ordering", the type of arrangement that is used in excitement. In this type of ordering, the speaker impartially states the new element of the intended statement and only afterwards adds the known element from which he actually starts. Mathesius exemplifies this type by:

- 2-2 Dva syna mel ten kral. A do sveta se chtel, podivat ti synove.  
Two sons the king had. and the world the sons wanted to see.  
The king has two sons. They wanted to see the world.

Mathesius (1975) adds a third case, which he considers as sub-part of the objective ordering, but it differs from objective ordering by a personal pronoun, as if it referred to something known, although in fact it does not, as the person meant is expressly stated afterwards. Mathesius exemplifies this type by:

- 2-3 On mel dva syny, ten kral. A oni se chteli podivat do sveta, ti synove.  
He had two sons, that king. And they wanted to see the world, the two sons  
The king had two sons, and they wanted to see the world.

This latter case is referred to by Halliday (1967 & 1968) as "substitution" (cf. 3.6.4.2), and by others as right dislocation (cf. 4. 5). In additions to the above, Mathesius (1975, p.84) proposes a third type of objective order, where the explanation is added immediately after the pronominal theme as its apposition, as in:

- 2-4 . . . a oni, ti synove, se chteli podivot do sveta.  
. . . and they, the sons, wanted to see the world. (or)  
. . . and they wanted to see the world, the sons.

FSP, however, is only one of the principles determining word order in the sentence of a language. The other principles are those of grammatical structure (the association of syntactic functions like subject and object with specific positions in the sentence), and the sentence rhythm (the association of positions with elements that are rhythmically heavy or light) (Vachek, 1961, p. 237). The system of WO in a language is characterized by a kind of hierarchy of these principles — a ranking of relative importance of each of the principles. In Czech (and in general in all Slavic languages or inflectional languages) the principle of FSP is the strongest determiner of WO, and the grammatical and rhythmical principles are of secondary importance. Danes (1970) sums up the situation of WO of inflectional languages, where FSP is the leading

principle, and that of non-inflectional ones, where the grammatical principle is the leading principle of their WO, as follows:

Generally speaking, English, in essence, is no less sensitive to the need of functional perspective than the languages with so-called free word order (such as Slavic languages, especially Czech), but the difference lies in the different means employed by them for this purpose. . . . In English, it is rather the suprasegmental phonological structure that signals the functional perspective (i.e. the points of the highest amount of communicative value). . . . In Czech, this is done by the position of the elements (words) in the utterance (Danes, 1970, p. 136).

Thus, in the following Czech examples, taken as non-emotive sentences, the initial element, the theme, is understood as information which is already known or given, and the final element, the rheme, is new information (underlining here indicates the bearer of greatest stress)<sup>12</sup>.

- 2-5 Curl rozabilo Vazu. ( Charles broke a/the vase').
- 2-6 Vazu rozabilo Curl. ( The vase was broken by Charles).
- 2-7 Curl vazu rozabilo. ( What Charles did to vase was break it).
- 2-8 Vazu Curl rozabilo. ( What happened to the vase was that Charles broke it)
- 2-9 Rozabilo Curl vasu. (What was broken by Charles was a/the vase.)
- 2-10 Rozabilo vazu Curl. (The one who broke the vase was Charles

The medial element in these sentences cannot be clearly assigned to either theme or rheme: nominal expressions may either be thematic or rhematic depending on whether they are given a kind of transition, an intermediate level between theme and rheme. This matter, however, is more clearly examined in writings of Mathesius' successors, mainly Firbas, and so I shall take it up again below.

In contrast to Czech, English WO is primarily determined by the grammatical principle, and FSP and the rhythmical principles play a secondary role. Thus the relatively rigid WO of English Subject-Verb-Object (SVO) can override the neutral FSP progression of the theme-rheme. However, as Mathesius (1928 [Vachek, 1964, p. 61<sup>13</sup>]) notes, there is a strong tendency in English to preserve the theme-rheme sequence by associating the theme with the grammatical subject. This can account in part for the relatively high frequency of passive constructions, particularly, when the "agent" is not expressed. In Czech, the passive construction is rare, and particularly so when the 'actor' is mentioned in the equivalent of a 'by-phrase'. In English, however, the passive has a second function: "it enables us to reconcile the occasional wish not to be explicit about the identity of the actor [for the sake of politeness, sometimes] with



the grammatical requirement that each finite verb have a subject" (Sampson, 1980, p. 105). In his later examination of English, Mathesius was less sanguine about the importance of FSP as a principle in governing WO in English. In fact, he went so far as to say and assert that "English differs from Czech in being so little susceptible to the requirements of FSP as to frequently disregard them altogether" (Firbas, 1964a, p. 113)<sup>14</sup>. Mathesius dissatisfaction arose from the analysis of non-emotive sentences like:

2-11 A boy came into the room.

For Mathesius, this sentence illustrates rheme-theme order: the subject 'a boy', expresses new information (or information that is not derived from the context) and is thus rhematic (in contradistinction to the generalization that the theme and the subject coincide in English); the directional adverbial phrase "into the room" designates the setting or a location that is already known and is thus the theme. Similarly, the positioning of objects and adverbials does not necessarily adhere to the FSP principle that the rheme appears at the end; Compare, for example 2-12, where 'a new book' is rheme, with its Czech and German counterparts in (2-12a & 2-12b) respectively:

2-12 He bought a new book yesterday.

2-12a Koupla Vcera novou knihu.

2-12b Er kaufte gestern ein neues buch.

It should be noted that in postulating FSP as the main principle determining WO in Czech, Mathesius sometimes, had to expand the notion of "given" in order to account for themes in discourse initial sentences; he even allows for sentences without themes. Thus, in 2-13, the initial adverbial phrase, although conveying new information, selects locational information from the situation which has not yet been presented and makes it function as setting or background:

2-13 V jejdne Zemi panoval Karl.

in one country reigned a [one] king

In a (certain) country reigned a king.

Mathesius (1939 [1947]) believes that while it is usual in a simple narrative for the theme to be drawn from the facts that are known or can be gathered from the preceding sentences, in what is termed "objective order", he also believes that not all themes convey known information<sup>15</sup>. According to him, some sentences go "counter"

to the perspective in that the initial element is not already known as the previous example shows. To study this problem, which has been the source of criticism by Travincsek, as well as by Firbas and Danes to some extent (cf. next section), Mathesius looks at sentences that occur at the beginning of stories, since in discourse initial position, there is no reason to expect them to convey known information.

In following this problem through, which is the main thrust of Mathesius (1939 [1947]) article, he discusses four type of introductory sentences:

1. Existential sentences: which include a general indication of time:

2-14 Byl jednou jeden Kral  
[there] was once one king  
There was once upon a time a king.

In this example the theme has two functions: (1) to express existence with respect to a specific person or a thing, whose identity is disclosed in the rheme, and (2) to suggest the setting— here, for example, the temporal setting.

2. The second type of introductory sentence also primarily stresses the existence of a person or a thing, see (2-13) above. In such an example, Mathesius believes that the local or temporal setting becomes the theme even though is not known information. It seems as a sort of "anticipatory" reference to something that has not yet been described.

3. In the third type, the narrator dispenses altogether with the existential sentence, and begins talking directly bout the protagonist 'Chuda selka', in the case of example 2-15 below, as if it were already known to the reader or the listener:

2-15 Chuda selka sla do lesa na stlani.  
poor peasant-woman to the forest for litter  
A poor woman went to the forest to look for litter.

According to Mathesius (1939 [1947]), the agent in these types of sentences is of less communicative value than the action itself; more important is the goal, but the most important of all is the purpose of the communication. In this type of introductory sentences, however, there is a suggestion of uncertainty: the listener or the reader is not given definite information, and because of this lack of definite information, he concludes that he is meeting the protagonist for the first time. Mathesius (1939) calls this a "contracted opening", because he considers that it is expanded form would be two full sentences, the first of which would be existential, for example:

2-16 There was a poor peasant woman. She went to the forest to look for litter.

4. The last type of sentences has a theme that is known to both the speaker and the listener as in:

2-17 U jiru        budou mit        svatbu.  
At the-Jirsas they will have wedding  
At the Jirsas, there will be a wedding.

Mathesius believes that sentences of this kind are more apt to occur in conversation, as they draw on a stock of common knowledge shared by the interlocutors.

Using these and a number of other examples, Mathesius concludes that (1) the theme need not contain known information, and (2) that it can occur in varying positions, such that if the sentence contains several expression, where the theme and the rheme are actually 'intertwined' (Mathesius, 1939 [1947, p. 240]). His other contributions in this article include the idea that known information is extended to encompass knowledge shared by interlocutors from an accumulated stock of discourse referents, or knowledge of the real world, in the pragmatic sense of the term.

#### 2.2.1.1 Critique

Firbas (1964b, p. 277, [foot note 5])<sup>16</sup> has translated Mathesius' interchangeable use of the Czech terms "vychodiste" as "the theme of utterance", or call it theme1, and the term "thema" (vypovedi), or theme2. In his note, Firbas asserts that the two terms are synonymous, and he considers them to be so along with the term "zaklad" (rheme), throughout the Prague linguistic literature in both English and Czech.

Although Mathesius (1939 [1947]) has used both terms as hinted, the synonymy which Firbas mentioned in his note was never complete. In fact, Mathesius himself admits this fact when he says in the same article:

In the first place, the theme1 of the utterance is not the theme2 [in the sense of known information], as it would seem from the term psychological subject (Mathesius, 1939 [1947], p. 235).

Thus, as Mathesius points out, theme1 is not always the same as theme2 in the sense of known information. This can be seen clearly in simple connected narratives where the theme1 is usually the theme2 that carries over from the preceding sentence, for example:

2-18 Byl jednou jeden karle ten mel tri sysny. Ne jestarisho z nich napaldlo, ze si pujde do sverta hledat nevestu.

[there] was once-upon-a-time king, and this/he had three sons; eldest of them occurred (0=he) for himself go into the world look-for bride.

There was once upon a time a king. And he had three sons. The eldest of them had the idea that he wanted to go out into the world to look for a bride.

Here, theme1 in the second sentence is the same as theme2 that was stated explicitly in the first, and theme1 in the third is the implicit theme2 of the second. (Mathesius, 1939 [1947], p. 235).

It is clear that at the time of writing, Mathesius was already concerned about some type of distinction. Firbas recognizes this problem in the article but states that "in his subsequent papers, he [Mathesius] no longer makes this difference". This latter statement of Firbas proves that the attempt, by Mathesius to distinguish between given and new information on the one hand and the notions of theme and rheme, is ignored, not only by him but by Firbas as well. It is only Travnicek who brings it up again 23 years later (1962), and Danes (1983 & 1989), as will be shown below.

Firbas (1974, pp.23-24)<sup>17</sup>, points out that Mathesius offers two conceptions of theme: that which expresses "something that is spoken about", and according to the other, it [theme] expresses something that is known or at least obvious in the given situation". According to Firbas (1974, p. 23), Mathesius has not elaborated these two conceptions, and the two conceptions of theme "need not to coincide". Thus, in a sentence like:

2-19 An unknown man has asked him the way to the railway station,  
'an unknown man' expresses a person talked about , but conveys neither known nor obvious information. Therefore, Danes, as well as Firbas, believe that Travnicek is right to regard the criterion of known and unknown information as accommodating the most general feature of theme.

Although Firbas (1974) believes that Mathesius's conclusion that the grammatical principle is the leading one as regards the English system of WO is "undoubtedly correct", he points out that Mathesius "is . . . not right in making the FSP principle responsible for emotive (marked) WO." (Firbas, 1974, p.24). For him, the common feature of such WO in English is not due to its deviation from the basic distribution of communication dynamism (CD) but rather due to its 'rigid' grammatical

sequence: subject-verb-object.

The second point worth mentioning here is the fact that Mathesius rejects any treatment of linguistic issues on a psychological basis. This is why he objects to the earlier terms of the last quarter of the 19<sup>th</sup> century linguistics to associate theme with psychological subject and rheme with psychological predicate because they connote psychological orientation which he feels tends to place the issue outside the scope of linguistics, where he believes it belongs. Thus he antedates Halliday by almost five decades in the latter's insistence of not treating the concepts of theme-rheme on a psychological basis (cf. 3.3.2).

Other linguists, e.g. Chafe (1974), have however paid a lot of attention to the study of the relationship between language and consciousness. Chafe considers that the primary purpose of language is "to increase the amount of knowledge that is shared by separate minds" (Chafe, 1974, p. 111)<sup>18</sup>. He also points out that, in order for linguistics communication to take place, the speaker must make certain assumptions about what it is in the consciousness of his addressee, and the premise that underlies his linguistic expression is that what he is transmitting will enter the consciousness of his addressee. For Chafe, communication begins with material entering the speaker's consciousness, from which he selects certain parts to be transmitted to some hearer; it proceeds with the transmission process itself, which for some would be the object of "linguistics proper", and it ends with the hearer integrating the material into his own consciousness. The delivery of new and old information affects the structure of language in a multiplicity of ways; this fact constitutes the specific evidence for Chafe that an understanding of consciousness cannot be separated from the study of language.

Following Mathesius' contrastive analysis of Czech, English and German on an FSP basis, that is the patterning of sentences into theme and rheme, a number of Prague linguists follow suit. Some of them have undertaken the task of elaborating on the notion of FSP by expanding it and by incorporating it into a coherent theory of language. Firbas carries over the discussion with FSP by his concept of communication dynamism (Firbas, 1964 & elsewhere). Danes and Svoboda carry out some attempts to integrate the concepts of FSP, at the discourse (text) level. Travnicek is the only Prague linguist, (with the possible exception of Danes 1989; cf. also 5.8 below), who echoes Mathesius' doubts about the separation between the concepts of 'given and new'

on the one hand, and 'theme and rheme' on the other.

### 2.2.2 Travnicek<sup>19</sup>

In his article, which carries the same title as Mathesius' (1939 [1947]) "On the so-called Functional Sentence Perspective", Travnicek does not consider that 'theme' necessarily carries known information, and consequently, he objects to the necessity of associating theme and 'known'. He is convinced that there is a broad concept of the theme which applies to all sentences\_\_ that the essential nature of theme is something which is universally applicable and invariant. Accordingly, he calls for the identification of a concept which transcends consideration of whether the element in question refers to information that is known or given, be it an external referent from the preceding discourse or a referent from the situational context:

The essential feature of the sentence theme is something other than givenness with respect to the preceding sentence\_\_ Some larger principle than givenness. The latter is only one type of theme but not the only type (Travnicek, 1962, p.165).

Travnicek shows, through the analysis of Mathesius' examples of introductory sentences as well as fragments from everyday conversation, that all these examples have a theme in the initial position, since the principle that is common to all themes is derived from the relationship of the sentence to the object of thought outside it from which the message expressed by the sentence arises. In his words,

every thought has an object, a section of reality, taken in by the senses or mediatorially given, which the speaker (writer) has in mind and to which the thought refers. . . . The theme is the sentence element that links up directly with the object of thought, proceeds from it, and opens the sentence thereby (Travnicek, 1962, p. 166).

He points out that associating the theme with given information, as Mathesius has done, narrows the concept of theme and makes it difficult to apply in the case of sentences that cannot possibly convey any known information. Travnicek claims that this error committed by Mathesius has forced the latter to speak about "anticipatory themes", themes that come later in the sentence, and about "themeless sentences".

For Travnicek, all sentences have themes (a reminder of Halliday; cf. 3.6.1.3), and themes share a common essential feature: they are always in initial position. The

theme that coincides with given information is of the type which Travnicek calls "**objective**" theme. In a one element sentence, he believes that the theme and rheme become "merged" (Travnicek, 1962, p. 166).

Travnicek objects to Mathesius dichotomy between formal and functional sentences. Instead, Travnicek (loc. cit.) believes that there is no such a thing as purely formal perspective, "language is not pure form but rather a form filled with information content". For him, grammar expresses information about the relations that obtain in thought content which refers to the object and phenomena of the speaker's world.

With this broad view, Travnicek is also able to account for several different relations of the theme, such as the 'objective theme', which coincides with the given information, as was mentioned above. He also proposes a **simple theme** (a single element) as contrasted with a **developed theme** (more than one element each with a thematic function), and a **conceptual theme** as contrasted with **emotive theme**. The latter co-occurs with the conceptual theme and forms an outer bracket around it, so to speak, with the result that the conceptual theme is relegated to second position but still remains a theme and will have a different thematic function. From the examples analyzed by Travnicek, which are those of Mathesius above, it is evident that the thematic element can be realized in a variety of grammatical rules.

1. The theme can be a noun as in:

2-20 Jeden Karl mel tri syny.

One king had three sons.

A king had three sons.

In this example, the object of thought is the situation in which the speaker begins the narrative. He is asked to tell a story, he agrees and begins: 'A king . . .' \_ as if he were saying 'I will tell you about a king.' 'The king', here, remains in his mind the topic of the story; 'Jeden karl', 'a king' is the theme of the sentence and 'mel tri syny', 'had three sons' is the rheme. (Travnicek, 1962, p. 166).

2. The theme can be an adverbial setting as in:

2-21 Na prozelenalem pastivisku sedely dve zeny

in greenish pasture sat two old women.

In a greenish pasture sat two old women.

Here, the author introduces his story by establishing the place of the event\_\_ the setting (loc. cit.).

3. Theme can be a conjunction as in:

2-22 No tak tedy, byl jednou jeden kral.

Very well then [there] was once-upon-a-time one king.

Very well then there was once upon a time a king.

The conjunction 'No tak tedy', 'very well then' is an emotive expression, it expresses:

a certain feeling on the part of the speaker, a certain emotive mood\_\_embarrassment, indecision, and finally the intention to tell a story. The three words of the sentence form an indivisible unit of meaning, which makes sense only in relation to the sentence 'byl jednou jeden kral'. This is the case of the independent emotive theme adjoined to the conceptual theme 'byl jednou', 'there was once upon a time'. From the point of view of syntax, the conjunction 'No tak tedy', 'very well then' is an independent sentence theme, whereas the conceptual theme is elemental; it forms an element in the sentence to which it belongs. (Travnick, 1962, pp. 167-168).

4. The theme can be a verb as in:

2-23 Trefila kosa na kamen.

Struck scythe against stone.

Struck scythe against a stone (= The scythe has hit against a stone).

Here the verb 'trefila' (struck)

sets up a sharp conflict of opinion or will between two persons. This is the objective reality to which the speaker connects via the verb 'trefila', 'struck'. With 'trefila', the conflict is established in broad symbolic terms, and by means of the connection 'kosa na kamen' '[the] scythe against [a] stone', it is concretized . . . From the point of view of information, the theme is contained in the object of thought; it not expressed outside the sentence. (Travnick, 1962, p. 166).

Travnick would also consider grammatical forms in initial position to have thematic function by virtue of the grammatical relations that they establish for the rest of the sentence. Thus the copula has no lexical meaning but it still has a conceptual value in that it expresses past tense in the given situation, "which is quite enough" (loc. cit.). Moreover, he feels that Mathesius (1939 [1947]) fundamental error is that he has failed to take full account of the connection between linguistic utterances and thought, "and through them, objective reality\_\_ the situation out of which thought and linguistic action arises and take their course" (op. loc).

### 2.2.2.1 Critique



Firbas (1964b) critiques both Mathesius' article (1939 [1947]) and Travnicek's (1962). Although he criticizes both, he favours the insights of his colleague, Mathesius, at the expense of Travnicek. To be fair to both, Firbas also concurs with some of the concepts that Travnicek raises in his article.

To start with, Firbas points out that Travnicek does not cover all aspects of Mathesius' theory of FSP, nor does he account for other papers written by Mathesius on the subject. According to Firbas, all that Travnicek concentrates on is the problem of theme. However, Firbas agrees with Travnicek in the latter's conclusions that from the point of view of FSP, all four sentences that Mathesius discusses in his article "have themes" (Firbas, 1964b, p. 273); he also believes that Travnicek is right in maintaining that these introductory sentences can be interpreted from a uniform view point. Firbas also concurs with Travnicek's conclusions that "the conveyance of known information is not an essential feature of the theme, and that it is necessary to look for a more general principle" (loc. cit.). For Firbas, this principle, criterion or phenomenon is the degree of communicative dynamism (CD) carried by the sentence element (cf. 2.2.4); whereas for Travnicek, that criterion is included in his definition of theme as the element(s) "that link(s) up directly with the subject of thought, proceeds from it and opens the sentence accordingly" (Travnicek, 1962 [Firbas, 1964b, p. 269]). By identifying the theme with the first element(s) of the sentence, Firbas, believes that Travnicek disregards both his criterion of CD and Mathesius' criterion of known and unknown information. Thus Travnicek, according to him, "fails to appropriate what can be described by the distribution of CD within the sentence, i.e. its FSP, or in other words, the perspective in which the grammatical and semantic structures of the sentence function at a certain degree of contextual dependence" (Firbas, op. cit., p.273). Because the difference of CD can assume various shapes, he says, "the theme may occur elsewhere other than in the first position" (loc. cit.).

Firbas' second point of criticism arises from Travnicek's definition of theme, and results in his accusing Travnicek of adopting a different interpretation of the notion of psychological subject, as an alternative to the term theme, from Mathesius who disapproves of the psychological, non-linguistic attitude implied by the term. Thus Firbas believes that Travnicek's definition of the theme is too psychological. To support this claim, Firbas, states that the concept of thought, which Travnicek talks

about in his definition, is not "clear enough to admit the object being introduced into the definition of theme", nor is there "sufficient and reliable knowledge of the way the sentence links up directly with its corresponding thought" (Firbas, 1964b, p. 274). He also points out that the relation between the theme in terms of FSP, and its correlates in thought "is certainly not so straightforward as suggested by Travnicek's definition" (loc. cit.). He also indicates that means of sentence opening differ from language to language. In this context, he quotes from an article by E. Benes entitled "The beginning of German Sentences from the Point of View of FSP", where the latter differentiates between 'basis', the original translation of Mathesius term 'theme', and theme in Firbas's sense. Firbas believes that Benes definition of theme matches his own definition: "as the element carrying the lowest degree of CD within the sentence (Firbas, 1964b, p. 276 & 1974, p. 24). On the other hand, he points out that Benes' definition of 'basis' is heavily influenced by that of Travnicek's<sup>20</sup>. In concluding his criticism, Firbas also points out that Halliday's conception of theme comes near to Benes' basis, but differs from it in one important point. "Halliday totally abstracts from the preceding context" (Firbas, 1974, p. 25).

In spite of the fact that Travnicek's article is an appraisal and an alternative approach to FSP, it shows a great deal of resemblance between Travnicek's position with regard to theme and rheme concept and that of Halliday (1967, 1968 & elsewhere). First of all, Travnicek characterizes the function of the theme in much the same way as Halliday has done (cf. 3.6.2). The most striking parallel is the attempt by both linguists to separate theme and rheme concepts from the notions of given and new. Halliday admits that he is using theme in the same sense as Travnicek. In fact, Halliday states that "I myself take theme in Travnicek's sense: it is the FSP element that is realized by the first position, and has nothing to do with previous mention" (Halliday, 1974, p. 53). In the second place both of them, however, do not deny the fact the theme can be associated with given information: Halliday calls this 'unmarked theme', which, I believe, is adapted from Travnicek's notion of 'objective theme'.

Halliday also agrees with Travnicek's formulation in identifying different types of themes. Halliday's 'ideational' element of the theme, the structural elements of subject, predicate, complement and adjunct (SPCA), which he, sometimes, calls 'topical themes' and, at others, cognitive themes (cf. 3.6.2.4 below) are no more than Travnicek's

conceptual themes which were contrasted by the latter with emotive themes, called by Halliday 'interpersonal' elements of the theme. Travnicek's distinction between conceptual and emotive theme parallels Halliday's distinction between cognitive and non-cognitive themes. Both linguists also agree that the themes that constitute an outer bracket to those inside are more marked. What seems to be lacking in Travnicek formulation is Halliday's elements of textual themes: resources within the language that help in creating the text or discourse (cf. also 3.6.2.4 for types of theme proposed by Halliday).

### 2.2.3 Danes<sup>21</sup>

Unlike other linguists working on FSP, Danes advocates an approach to syntax involving three distinct but interrelated levels: (1) the level of grammatical structure, (2) the level of semantic structure and (3) the level of organization of utterance (or of text). Here, I shall present Danes' explanation of each of these levels. For the semantic level, he says:

From an analytic point of view, the sentence is based on the kind of relations that are sometimes called "logical"; these relations are derived from nature and society and appear to be essential for the social activities of man, e.g., actor and action; the bearer of a quality or of a state and the state; the action and the object resulting from the action or touched by it, etc., different circumstantial determination (determination of place and time, . . .); causal and final relations, relations of consequence, etc . . . Semantic relations like these are linguistically rendered [realized] in different languages differently, with different depth and width (and must not be confused with grammatical categories of subject, object, etc, . . . (Danes, 1964b, p. 226) [my ellipsis].

To put it in simple everyday wording, these are the universal extralinguistic categories which express abstract features like, for example "living beings", "individuals", "qualities", "actions" and "relational" notions (for example, "actor", "result", "cause"). In other words, this is what Halliday (1970 and elsewhere) calls the "ideational component" (cf. 3.3.2).

As for the grammatical level, Danes maintains that it can be categorized by the fact that it is autonomous, and not consistently dependent on the semantic level; however, the elements of the grammatical level have varying degrees of affinity with

the respective semantic categories, thus integrating the various parts of speech and grammatical categories, i.e., subject and object, into sentence patterns. In this respect, grammatical categories such as subject, etc., are based on the semantic content and not on the syntactic form only (as would be the case in a formal approach, such as the Chomskyan); they are bearers of a linguistic function in the given system. The autonomy of the grammatical form reveals itself in the diversity of languages (while the semantic categories, being the direct realization of the extralinguistic reality, seem to be universal, or nearly so) (Danes, 1964b, p. 227).

Later in his argument Danes discusses the level of the organization of utterance, by providing the following:

The third level is that of the organization of utterance, to put it briefly, it makes it possible to understand how the semantic and the grammatical structures function in the very act of communication, i.e., at the moment they are called upon to convey some extra-linguistic reality reflected by thought, and are to appear, in an adequate type of perspective. The conditions of the act of communication are determined by the general character and regularities on the one hand, and on the other by the attitude of the speaker towards the message.

Thus the domain of the organization of utterance pertains to all that is connected with the procedural aspect of the utterance (in contrast with the abstract and static character of the other two levels), that is to say, the dynamism of the progressive accumulation, as well as the dynamism of all other elements of utterance (semantic and grammatical too), arising out of the semantic and the formal tension and of the expectation in the linear progression of the making up of the utterance.

Further, all extra-grammatical means of organizing utterance as a minimal communicative unit are contained in this level as well. Such means as intonation (as a complex of melody and stress)<sup>22</sup>, the order of words and of clauses, some lexical devices, etc., (some of which may be operative on the grammatical level, too).

The framework for the dynamism of the utterance represents 'the functional perspective' in the strict sense, i.e., the principle to which elements of an utterance follow each other according to the amount (degree) of communicative dynamism they convey, starting with the lowest and gradually passing to the highest. In this way, an utterance may usually be divided into two portions: the theme (or topic), conveying the known (given) elements of the utterance, and the rheme (or comment), conveying the unknown (not given) elements of an utterance. (Danes, 1964b, pp. 227-228).

As can be noticed from the above, Danes assumes three levels of idealization of the

sentence<sup>23</sup>:

1. the sentence as a singular and individual speech act.
2. sentence as one of all possible different communicative units of the given language.
3. sentence as an abstract structure, i.e., as a pattern of distinctive features; the set of which represent a sub-system of the overall grammatical system of language.

According to Danes, a great majority of utterances represent manifestations of a small set of sentence-patterns and he calls such utterances 'sentences'. In this respect he says:

it is clear that the above represents three steps in the process of generalization. What belongs to speech (*la parole*) and represents material immediately accessible for our observation, is the utterance event. If we deprive such an event (by way of abstraction) of all accidental, singular and individual elements, connected with its phonic or (graphic) '*ego, hic et nunc*', we arrive at an utterance which no longer belongs to speech, which, however, contains many more features than only these belonging to the most abstract and general syntactic pattern of the grammatical system: the utterance remains part of the context and situation, it contains concrete lexical items, some elements of modality (which often expressed by non-grammatical means, e.g., by means of lexical items or of intonation), etc.

Thus at a second step of generalization, we arrive at the utterance. By analysing it, we discover : (1) non-grammatical, but systemic means of its organization such as mostly word order in Slavic Languages (as far as it serves as a means of organizing the utterance and context), intonation as a device of integration, delimitation and segmentation of utterance, of emphasis, etc . . . (2) on this step of generalization, we ascertain even some grammatical features, which, however, do not belong to the constitutive features of a sentence pattern (e.g., mostly, the use of morphological categories, such as moods, tenses, or even the grammatical agreement in an utterance that is not based on an underlying sentence pattern.

And finally only the third, the highest step of generalization is obtained by the specific grammatical device of the utterance, viz, the sentence pattern.

. . . under the term 'sentence pattern', we understand then, generally speaking, a syntactic structure of the kind that converts a sequence of words into a minimal communicative unit (an utterance) even outside the framework of connected discourse, i.e., even when it has been taken out of its settings (the situation and the context). It is such a structure as is sufficient by itself to signal a given sequence of words as an utterance-pattern is a specifically communicative structure (Danes, 1964b, pp. 229-230).

It appears from the above that the three levels approach to syntax proposed by Danes operate at different levels of abstraction. The semantic level would seem to operate at a more abstract level of organization of utterance. This is similar to Mathesius' (1975) approach, who sees semantic encoding as operating prior to syntactic encoding (cf. 2.2.1).

### 2.2.3.1 Critique

In discussing Danes' article, two authors are worth mentioning: Halliday (1974), and Firbas (1974). Halliday's critique is discussed later; he equates his semantic functional components (ideational, interpersonal and textual) respectively with Danes' three levels of syntax (the semantic, the grammatical and the level of utterance; cf. 3.3.2). As for the second author, Firbas (1974) distinguishes between three types of sentence patterns based on Danes' three levels. He calls them the "semantic sentence perspective" (SSP), the grammatical sentence pattern (GSP), and the communicative sentence pattern (CSP). He points out that " . . . it would be certainly possible to imagine a context in which the semantic and grammatical structure [in a sentence like] 'John wrote a poem' would function as an utterance event following the agent-action-goal (SSP), the subject-verb-object (GSP) and theme-transition-rheme (CSP)" (Firbas, 1974, p. 16).

These three patterns recognized by Firbas are distinct, though interdependent levels of syntactic structure in accordance with Danes' three levels. It is obvious in Danes' three levels and Firbas' patterns that it is the third level or pattern that determines the first two. As Halliday (1974, p. 46) points out, these levels are "not just accidentally co-existent systems or levels of structure; they are functional components of grammar", even though the separation of these levels is criticized by him (cf. 3.3.2).

These levels or patterns are said to represent the three components of language. The semantic level includes notions like 'agent, patient and action'. The grammatical level includes notions like 'subject, object, predicate, etc.', and is seen as the domain of the formal relations between categorical elements in an utterance. The third level deals with the ways messages in an utterance are structured (with both thematic structure -- theme and rheme-- and information structure-- given and new information).

The third level represents the domain of what Pragueans call FSP. FSP is usually referred to by the Pragueans as the text organizing principle (Danes, 1970 & 1974). The significance given to the FSP level by the Pragueans can be justified in the light of their basic assumption that language is dynamic\_\_ changes according to situations in daily life. In relation to the other two, the FSP level is concerned with the way(s) the grammatical and the semantic structures function in the act of communication. Implied in Danes' discussion of the three levels is the point that the thematic structure of the third level is 'dynamic', while the semantic and grammatical structures, as mentioned earlier, are "static".

#### **2.2.4 J. Firbas**

Firbas's approach contains some of the most widely accepted ideas about FSP. He believes that an adequate theory of FSP must take into account the way "the semantic and the grammatical structures function in the very act of communication, i.e., at the moment they are called upon to convey some extra-linguistic reality reflected by thought and are to appear in an adequate kind of perspective" (Firbas, 1971, p.137)<sup>24</sup>. For Firbas, one of the basic concepts of FSP theory is "communication dynamism" (CD), "the concept of CD is based upon the fact that linguistic communication is not static, but a dynamic phenomenon. By CD [Firbas] understands a property of communication to be conveyed and consisting in advancing this development" (Firbas, op. cit., p. 136). It is the dynamic nature of communication that is the focus of interest in this system, and Firbas believes this to be reflected in the different degrees of CD carried by each meaningful linguistic element. The degree of CD borne by an element is determined by "the extent to which the element contributes to the development of communication, to which, as it were, it "pushes the communication forward" (Firbas, 1972, p. 78)<sup>25</sup>.

According to Firbas (1964a, b, 1971, 1972 & elsewhere), the relationship between the theme of sentence and CD is as follows:

The thematic elements are those elements which form the foundation of the utterance, from which the speaker proceeds. They are elements that contribute least to the CD of the utterance, where CD means "the extent to which the sentence elements contribute to the development of

communication (Firbas, 1964b, p. 272).

He thus rejects Travnicek's (1962) account of the theme, and supports his colleague's, Mathesius', original position of associating theme with given information, in spite of the fact that Mathesius, as shown above, had some doubts on the matter regarding initial sentences in the discourse, and in associating rheme with unknown information. Firbas qualifies this position, however, by emphasizing that the status of known or unknown information must be considered from the point of view of the hearer or the reader, and from "the more general view point of contextual dependence" (Firbas, op. cit., p.269).

In applying the hearer's point of view to Mathesius' four types of introductory sentences (cf. 2.2.1), Firbas sees that he must deviate from Mathesius' interpretation of the second and the third types and consider them to be "homogeneous" (contextually independent) rather than "heterogeneous" (contextually dependent). Thus for Firbas, the first three types are all contextually independent. He only considers the fourth type as contextually dependent; this is so because known information is drawn from a stock of knowledge shared by the speaker and hearer (Firbas, 1964b, p. 269).

Noting that Mathesius regards the first type as homogeneous because it comprises "only the rheme of the utterance with its accompanying words" (Firbas, 1964a, p. 270), he wonders whether there might be some other criterion other than known or unknown information that would make it possible to categorize the first type as heterogeneous. Answering his own inquiry, he points out that there is such a criterion, and that of the degree of CD, which he defines above.

According to Firbas (1964b), there is an interplay of two factors in FSP: one is the basic distribution of CD and the other is the semantic structure of the sentence; he later Firbas, (1975a & 1979) calls them means of FSP and adds a third means/factor: context (cf. 2.3.3. below). As for the semantic factor, he believes that it works mainly in the part of the sentence which conveys only new information. It is "capable of indicating the degrees of CD through the various items of semantic content conveyed by sentence elements" (Firbas, 1964b, p.270).

For Firbas, the semantic content represents the external referents and the relationships between them. According to him, the semantic content can act "counter" to the basic distribution of CD: "the sentence is capable of acting counter to its own linear character" (Firbas, op. cit. p. 275). Thus, for example, in the sentence,



2-24 Byl Jednou jeden Kral.

[there] was once one king

There was once upon a time a king.

Firbas points out that the copula 'Byl', ([there] was), expresses existence and is communicatively "semantically" less important than the simple temporal setting 'jednou', (once upon a time); whereas the expression of the existing person or thing 'jeden kral', (a/one king), is the most important, or most dynamic element, on the other. Again in a sentence like,

2-25 V jedné zemi panoval jeden kral.

In one country, he reigned one king.

In a country there ruled a king.

Although the element 'panoval, (reigned), primarily expresses existence, causing the element 'kral' to recede into the background, nevertheless "it expresses action and therefore carries a higher degree of CD" (Firbas, 1964b, p. 271)<sup>26</sup>.

When the semantic structure and the basic distribution of CD are parallel, or operating in the same direction, the order is considered by Firbas to be "non-emotive" (loc. cit.), whereas when they operate in the opposite directions, the order is considered by Firbas to have "an emotive colouring". (loc. cit.). Because of these two factors, in addition to context, CD can only be a question of "degree". On this basis, Firbas (1964b, p. 272) has defined FSP as "the distribution of (various degrees of) CD over the elements of the sentence in regard to various degrees of CD carried by its elements". He also believes that it is through CD that it is possible now to define theme in a manner that would uniformly cover both sentences which are contextually independent (as a rule occurring at the beginning of the discourse (text), or perhaps opening new sections, i.e. paragraphs, of it and always conveying only 'new' information), and those that are contextually dependent. Accordingly, he defines the theme as the element(s) of the sentence "carrying the lowest degree(s) of CD within the sentence" (Firbas, 1964b, p. 272); and another deviation from Mathesius, he emphasizes is that "the theme is the lowest degree of CD not the conveyance of known information" (loc. cit.).

In spite of what is said, Firbas, however, does not disregard the criterion of "known-unknown" information. Even if it does not cover the essential feature of the theme, it still renders much valuable service:

1. It determines sentence elements that convey known information: information to be gathered from the verbal or situational context, i.e. "sentence elements through which a sentence becomes contextually dependent (and which are always thematic)" (Firbas, 1964a, p. 272).
2. It simultaneously determines sentence elements that convey new or unknown information and contributes the contextually independent section of the sentence (usually the rheme).

Although Firbas rejects Travnicek's identification of theme with the first element(s) of the sentence and states that it cannot be regarded as its essential characteristic (cf. 2.2.2.1), he believes that Travnicek's treatment of the phenomenon has contributed to his knowledge of the sentence beginning. In this regard, Firbas says:

From the point of view of the linear character of the sentence, the sentence beginning can be regarded as a starting point (opening) in many respects. It opens the grammatical line, the line of semantic structure, the intonation line, and of course the FSP line, i.e. the one along which the degrees of CD are being distributed. All these, and possibly other lines, have their share in building up the field of relations within the sentence (Firbas, 1964b, p. 275).

Thus, for Firbas, a sentence is a field of relations, mainly grammatical and semantic, functioning in a certain type of perspective (FSP).

In a subsequent article (Firbas, 1965), Firbas elaborates more on the notion of CD by postulating a range of transition between the lowest and the highest degrees of CD :

The element carrying the lowest degree of CD constitutes the theme, these carrying the highest degree, the rheme, the element carrying the very lowest degree of CD functioning as the theme proper, the one carrying the very highest degree is the rheme proper; in regard to the amount of CD carried, transition ranks above the theme on the one hand and below the rheme on the other (Firbas, 1965, p. 171)<sup>27</sup>.

This is not, however, the first time Firbas talks about a tripartite division of FSP; he has already talked about it in his early articles (Firbas, 1964a, 1964b & elsewhere). For Firbas, the question of FSP goes beyond the mere division of the sentence into two parts of theme and rheme: "it has recourse to a gamut of degrees respectively carried by elements extending from the theme proper to the rheme proper (Firbas, 1965, p. 171). He does not delimit the exact range of the transition, for he considers that it is determined largely by the mutual relations of the sentence elements. He further points

out that the elements with the lowest degree of CD (themes) occur first in an utterance and are said to be "less dynamic". Obvious in Firbas' approach is the suggestion that elements carry an increasing load of CD as the utterance progresses. This holds true, at least, of the utterances in their 'unmarked' order of elements: theme-transition-rheme.

#### 2.2.4.1 Critique

Adjemian (1978, p. 226)<sup>28</sup>, a linguistic historian, questions the validity of Firbas' "notions of different degrees of 'themeness' and 'rhemeness', and regards that CD as an unfortunate attempt to measure the communicative capabilities of the sentence elements". He also believes that the concept of CD is "extremely vague and almost impossible to utilize in a rigorous linguistic description". He goes on to say that Firbas' claims are based upon mere "speculations". Another more critical observation comes from Francis (1966, p. 149)<sup>29</sup>, who calls Firbas' studies in CD "an impressionistic ventures into stylistics and marked by good deal of arbitrary statements". Similarly, Chafe (1974, pp. 119-120) questions Firbas' transitional degree of CD and asks whether a speaker could actually "assume certain material to be in the addressee's consciousness to some intermediate degree" or not.

The main criticism, however, which Firbas receives in his attempt to enhance and modify Mathesius' concept of FSP, and its criterion of known\unknown information, comes from his student Svoboda (1974)<sup>30</sup> who criticizes Firbas' criterion of CD, although he himself uses the concept of CD, with modifications, in analysing old English texts in his (1981) book *Diatheme*.

Svoboda begins by reviewing Firbas' definitions of CD, since the latter began talking about this concept (Firbas, 1946a, 1964b, 1965, & elsewhere). Svoboda (1974, p. 38) points out that if the statements of these definitions are taken in isolation, they "may seem insufficient and may lead to confusion". Like the linguists just mentioned, he questions the rules of ascertaining the degree of the contribution to the "development of discourse" by the sentence elements and questions the validity of these rules if there are any. He regards the entire work of Firbas until that point in time as "an extensive definition of CD, presenting an open system of rules and at the same time giving reasons for their survival".

In Svoboda's opinion, Firbas' concept of CD is closely connected with two things: (1) with the general means of conveying information by language and the "objective" information amount carried by certain language elements, and (2) with the personal approach of a language user to communication, which consists of increasing or decreasing the information amount of certain language elements according to the intention of the language user; this may be termed "subjective information". Svoboda also points out that in order to provide for the validity of the theory of FSP, the ideal case would be to measure either the relative or the absolute amounts of objective and subjective information carried by the elements; however, he believes that "to the present stage of the development of the information theory, **the probability of proving the theory of FSP is very low**" (Svoboda, 1974, p. 39) [my emphasis]. As an alternative approach to Firbas' way of measuring the amount of information carried by the sentence elements as predicted by Svoboda, he proposes another method of defining CD by means of "contextual dependence", which, according to him, "seems to be less resistant to measuring or testing than the information amount is" (loc. cit.).

According to Svoboda, contextual dependence is of two types: (1) horizontal (or linear) dependence, constituted by the sequence of elements and (2) vertical dependence (or cross-reference), constituted by the occupancy of identical and or closely related elements. Using Danes' (1964b) three-levels approach to syntax, he emphasizes that these two kinds of contextual dependence should operate on all three levels.

On the grammatical level, contextual dependence is constituted by (1) the sequence of formal elements and (2) the occupancy of identical formal elements and their substitutes; this is measured in terms of "formal distance existing between the elements within a certain formal textual segment" (Svoboda, 1974, p. 40). On the semantic level, contextual dependence is constituted by (1) the sequence of semantic elements and (2) the occupancy of closely related semantic elements; this is measured in terms of "degrees of semantic affinity . . . of the elements within a certain semantic textual segment" (loc. cit.).

On utterance level, FSP level, or what Svoboda (1968) has termed the functional level, contextual dependence is constituted by (1) the sequence of communicative elements, each of them reflecting a definite part of the extra-lingual reality in the very act of communication, and (2) the occupancy of a communicative element(s) closely

related to the part of the extra-lingual context to which a language user is taking a standpoint. This follows Mathesius' definition of the sentence as "an elementary expression of the standpoint, implemented by lingual means of the speaker or writer to some extra-lingual reality" (Mathesius, 1975, p. 185; cf. also note 10). On this level, contextual dependence, according to Svoboda, will be measured in terms of "the degree of correspondence between the parts of the extra-lingual reality expressed by communicative elements and that which is being taken as a standpoint to a certain communicative textual segment reflecting the situation in the extra-lingual reality at a given moment of communication" (Svoboda, 1974, p. 40).

Svoboda admits that his definition of CD is a working one, "its aim being to make CD verifiable not only in languages with the distribution of CD representing the leading WO principle, but also for those where other WO principles play the dominant role" (loc. cit.). He offers the following 'working definition': **"CD is an abstraction from and generalization of the reciprocal of contextual dependence"** (loc. cit.) [original emphasis].

It is evident from his definition that CD and contextual dependence are regarded as complementary phenomena, but at the same time, CD is regarded as a broader idea than that of contextual dependence, because the former is an *abstraction* from and *generalization* to the reciprocal of the latter<sup>31</sup>. From the way he defines CD, Svoboda believes that it is more suitable than that of contextual dependence since it may be employed in all possible kinds of utterances. He concludes his argument by pointing out that since he is not mainly interested in the absolute, but in the relative amount of CD in a given pattern of utterance organization, he believes that he is, to a certain extent, free to choose the criteria for measuring contextual dependence and the result, according to him, will be approximately the same.

### 2.3 The Means of FSP

Firbas states that FSP "is the outcome of a tension, or rather an interplay of, the tendency towards the basic distribution of CD on the one hand, and the context and the semantic structure on the other" (Firbas, 1974, pp. 21-22). For Firbas, as mentioned earlier, the basic and the main idea of the theory of FSP is that the separate elements

of the sentence (clause) do not contribute to the development of discourse in the same way; some are communicatively more important than others\_\_ "they -as it were- push the communication forward with greater force and may be regarded communicatively more dynamic" (op. loc). This is why he defines theme of a sentence or a clause in terms of CD as the element(s) that "carries the lowest degree of CD within a sentence/ a clause" (Firbas, 1975, p. 317)<sup>32</sup>. Firbas bases his concept of CD on the fact that communication is not static: it is a dynamic process or phenomenon, and that this phenomenon is manifested primarily in the operation of three other phenomena: context, linear modification and semantic structure. According to him, the degree of CD of an element (always relative to the degree of CD of other elements of the same sentence) is determined by the result of the three factors or three means of FSP, as they are frequently called. Firbas (1979)<sup>33</sup> has arranged these three factors in a sort of a hierarchy of their effect on FSP starting with context at the top end with linearity at the bottom. In what follows, a detailed discussion of each will be presented with examples from English and sometimes from Czech.

### **2.3.1 Linearity ( Basic Distribution of CD)**

Bolinger (1965) has developed the concept of 'linear modification', in which "the gradation of position [in the direction towards the end of the sentence in Firbas' terms] creates gradation of meaning when there are no interfering factors [i.e. those of context or semantic structure]" (Bolinger, 1965, p. 288)<sup>34</sup>. The gradation of meaning, in turn, contributes to the further development of communication. Thus the FSP sequence of Mathesius' 'theme-rheme' and of Firbas' 'theme-transition-rheme' is the unmarked type of this development, since it shows, according to Firbas (1964a, b & elsewhere), a consistent rise in CD from the lowest level to the highest. Sometimes, however, it is considered as the scale of communication importance, and is determined by "the semantic structure of the sentence" (Sgall et. al., 1973, p. 19)<sup>35</sup>. Thus in a simple sentence like:

2-26 A boy [theme] hit [transition] a girl [rheme],

Firbas asserts that this functional sequence can also account for a change in the degree carried by a particular element according to its position in the sentence. For example,

"a contextually independent infinitive of purpose carries a lower degree of CD when occurring initially than when occurring finally" (Firbas, 1971, p.137):

2-27a In order to see him, she went to Prague.

2-27b She went to Prague in order to see him.

Similarly, in the case of a verb with both dependent and independent objects, the one coming later within the linear arrangement of the sentence also carries a higher degree of CD as in:

2-28a He gave a boy an apple.

2-28b He gave an apple to a boy.

Moreover, in sentences stating the existence or appearance into the scene", the verb is usually considered to come first in the scale (bearing a lower degree of CD) than the noun phrase referring to the appearing object(s). In English marked intonation is often present in such cases (the centre of intonation usually falls on the noun phrase functioning as rheme):

2-29 A STRANGER [rheme] came [theme].

Firbas (1971, p. 271) also adds the adverbial functioning as "local or temporal setting" as bearing a lower degree of CD when occurring first in the sentence as in:

2-30 Last week, my uncle wrote some LETTERS.

2-31 In France, SPRING had begun by that time.

From the example recited, the study of linearity can be practically identified with the study of word order (WO). In Indo-European Languages, there is a tendency to put the most dynamic elements (the element with the maximum CD) at the end of the sentence; in some languages (Czech), the tendency is so strong, as hinted above, that it becomes the leading WO principle (cf. 2.2.1). In Czech, for example, the WO with the most dynamic element at the end is considered to be 'normal, neutral, or objective'; while the WO with the most dynamic element at the beginning is regarded as 'special, coloured or marked'. In comparison with Czech, the above tendency in English is much less pronounced and the WO with the most dynamic element at the beginning cannot be regarded as marked. Firbas (1964a) emphasizes that the emphasis of a front-positioned word is not due to a high degree of CD carried by such a word, but rather "the English emotive WO principle is to be interpreted first and foremost in regard to (on the background of) the grammatical principle" (Firbas, 1964a, p. 120 & 1979, p. 49). In support of this point, Firbas also lists the following examples, which, according

to him, do not deviate from the objective WO.

2-32 These lessons time will teach all alike.

2-33 These great men, we trust that we know how to recognize.

Here, the noun phrases 'these lessons' and 'these great men' are thematic; and the elements following these "show an increase in CD ending up with rheme proper" [the highest degree of CD of the rhematic field] (Firbas, 1964a, p. 120).

Thus the basic distribution of CD is implemented by a series of elements opening with the element carrying the lowest degree of CD (theme) and gradually passing on to the element carrying the very highest degree of CD. Context and semantic structure operate, according to Firbas (1964a & b), either counter or parallel to the same direction of the basic distribution of CD. Firbas (1974, p. 122) has likened the latter to what Weil (1844, [1978, p. 43]) has called "the movement of the mind".

Firbas (1974) also points out that it is evident that it is sentence linearity, particularly with nouns, that signals the mentioned orders of functions, but what is of particular interest, according to him, is the question why, in the absence of semantic and grammatical signals and of any dependence on preceding context, "sentence linearity signals just the mentioned order"? [the objective type] (Firbas, op. cit., p.35). He believes that answering such a question is 'simple', and that is, "being 'very primitive' (though efficient) means, sentence linearity cannot\_ under the circumstances\_ but reflect the normal and natural order of phenomena occurring in the extra-lingual reality" (op. loc). Thus to initiate an action, the actor, or the doer of the deed, to use Halliday's terms, must necessarily exist before it. Only after it has started, can action, or the process of action, reach or effect its goal or produce some altogether new object as in:

2-34 A potter made a vessel.

By the same token, communication develops, and the degree of CD arises accordingly, and the intonation centre falls on the object, expressing the goal of the action. The sequence displays the basic distribution of CD. The way the grammatical core of modern English WO has become established is certainly not at variance with the nature and requirement of FSP. The conclusion suggests that it could not be otherwise, for FSP serves the communication purpose of the sentence. On the basic instance level, i.e. the level of complete context independence of the sentence, "the grammatical order S(ubject)- V(erb)- O(bject) is in full harmony with the basic distribution of CD (Firbas,



1974, p. 36). In the presence of semantic and/or grammatical signals, however, linearity may become inoperative and deviation from the basic distribution of CD may take place. Moreover, context may intervene and some items, like the object, for instance, may become contextually dependent. In consequence, the extra-lingual reality would be viewed and presented from a different angle, and thus the degree of CD would change accordingly.

The above notes substantiate the view that the basic distribution of CD is a factor actually observed by the language. In actual utterances, or utterance types, the basic distribution of CD tends to be either fully observed by the language or to have the deviation duly signalled. The way the interplay of the means by which FSP is implemented will naturally vary from language to language and lead to different hierarchies of WO principles. The ultimate point of departure, however, will remain the basic distribution of CD.

### **2.3.2 The Semantic Structure**

The operation of semantic structure is within the context-independent sections of the sentence. The meaning of the individual elements as well as the relation between them may affect the distribution of CD. Thus Svoboda (1981), following in the steps of Firbas (1979), points out that the degree of CD conveyed by a sentence element may depend on its semantic content taken alone or in relation to the semantic content of other sentence elements. Looking at it from this perspective, the semantic structure may account to a great extent for the sentences that Mathesius (1939 [1947]) has considered as "themeless" or "insusceptible" to FSP. In a sentence with a contextually independent verb and object, the object will carry a higher degree of CD because it expresses, as mentioned earlier, the goal of the action, and "as unknown goal [outcome] of an action appears to be more important than the action itself" (Firbas, 1971, p. 137). For example in a sentence like:

2-35 John [theme] wrote [transition] a poem [rheme]

the object is an essential amplification of the verb, but if either or both of the object and the verb convey already 'known' information, the problem of susceptibility to FSP does not in fact arise, for elements conveying things already known pass into the theme

(become thematic)\_\_\_ regardless of the position they occupy in the sentence. Having become thematic, the sentence elements no longer co-operate in constituting FSP through their semantic content or semantic relations into which they enter. (Firbas, 1964a, p. 114). The subject of sentences like the above, whether dependent or independent, will each bear a lower degree of CD than the verb or the adverbial element of place "for a known or unknown agent expressed by the subject appears to be communicatively less important than an unknown action expressed by a finite verb and/ or an unknown goal (expressed by the object or the adverbial element of place) at or towards which the action is directed" (Firbas, 1971, p. 137). This is also exemplified in the following:

2-36 A little girl [theme] was reading [transition] a wall poster [rheme].

2-37 An old man [theme] rode [transition] into a deserted farmyard [rheme].

The above principles apply regardless of the position such elements occupy within the sentence. However, if the verb of the sentence expresses the notion of "existence (or appearing on the scene), the verb is usually considered to come first in the scale (bearing a lower degree of CD and to be followed by the noun phrase referring to the existing (entering) object(s) as in 2-29 above. Thus, if the verb of the sentence expresses the notion of existence or appearance onto the scene, a contextually independent subject will carry the highest degree of CD, "for an unknown person or thing appearing on the scene is communicatively more important than the act of appearing on the scene itself" (Firbas, 1972, p. 80) as in:

2-38 A girl (rheme) came (transition) into the room (theme).

For Mathesius, the non-emotive structure of this sentence would have to be looked upon as insusceptible to FSP, because in its most natural use, it does not display the theme-rheme sequence. Its semantic structure has been explained by Firbas (1974, pp. 81-19) as follows: "the verb 'came' expresses the notion of appearance on the scene, the adverbial 'into the room' expresses the scene and the subject 'a girl' a newcomer appearing on it". Under the circumstance, i.e. in the case of the most natural use of the utterance, the adverbial element carries known information, or information derivable or recoverable from the preceding verbal or non-verbal situation in Halliday's terms, and is in consequence contextually dependent. As for the remaining elements, the contextually independent subject announcing the person appearing on the scene is

communicatively more important than the contextually independent verb which expresses the notion of appearance. The contextual independence of the subject is sufficiently signalled by the non-generic indefinite article. In terms of degrees of CD, the subject carries the highest, the adverbial element the lowest, and the verb ranks between the two.

Danes (1974), quoting from a paper submitted to the International congress of Linguistics held in 1967 in Bucharest, says: "I suggested that the different semantic relations between theme and rheme might supply a criterion for linguistically relevant classification" (Danes, 1974, p. 123). He also supports this view by quoting, from Benes (1968, p.271)<sup>36</sup>, who says: "this relationship of the rheme to the theme can be regarded as the constituent act of the utterance, just as the relationship of subject to object as the constituent act of the sentence" (Danes, 1974, p. 124). Benes exemplifies his thoughts by the following examples:

2-39 Prague is the capital of CSSR.

2-40 The capital of CSSR is Prague.

In the first sentence, the actual communicative aim, according to Benes, is to assign a quality to its bearer [the quality 'the capital of CSSR is assigned to the bearer, here the theme, 'Prague']. In the second, however, it is the assignment of a bearer to a quality, although both have the same grammatical as well as semantic structure and identical lexical filling.

Following this line of argument, Danes proposes a further generalization: "any theme-rheme nexus actualizes a particular semantic relation contained in the semantic (propositional) structure of the underlying sentence, so that the communicative sense of an utterance (CSU) may be defined in terms of the semantic function of the rheme portion to the theme portion of the underlying sentence" (1974, p. 124).

Firbas (1975, p. 320 & 1979, p.50) has proposed two scales, known as "the Firbasian scales" (Svoboda, 1981, p. 2), to reflect the gradual rise in CD. The two scales were eventually fused by Firbas (loc. cit.) into one. Within the context-independent sections of communication, he, as hinted above, discusses the concept of "appearance/ existence into the scene (Ex) and "phenomenon appearing/ existing on the scene" (Ph) as well as the concept of "quality" (Q), specification (Sp) and "setting" (Set) (Firbas, 1975a, p. 319). Firbas also defines quality in terms of being either

"permanent" or "transient" aspect or (trait) of a phenomenon that has been introduced on the scene (a permanent aspect is mostly expressed by an adjective and transient aspect is mostly expressed by a verb). On defining quality, especially the permanent type, I believe Firbas follows Mathesius who says: "an adjective usually denotes either a permanent quality or a quality whose duration is not determined" (Mathesius, 1975, p. 57).

Firbas also believes that the quality can be modified, provided that modification is context-independent, and can be regarded\_\_ in view of the dynamics of discourse\_\_ as an **Sp**. Moreover, he also points out that further context-independent information conveying important limiting circumstances may serve as further specification (**FSp**). Firbas provides the following examples as an illustration of the quality scale:

2-41 He [**Q** bearer] offended [**Q**] an old man [**Sp**] in a most dangerous way [**FSp**].

In this respect, Firbas points out that it is important to note that **Sp** is linked with a suitable semantic content. Thus, "context-independence, together with semantic content, is considered prerequisite to **Sp**" (Firbas, 1975, p. 319).

These two scales can be drawn and exemplified to show the way they can be fused together to make one scale. The two separate scales are illustrated by these two examples:

2-42 There [**Scene**] was [**Ex**] a little girl [**Ph**].


2-43 She [**Q. bearer**] had [**Ex**] little curl [**Sp**].

The scale in 2-42 is called by Svoboda (1981), after Firbas (1979), the "appearance scale" (**A-** scale), whereas the one in 2-43 below is called the "quality scale (**Q-** scale).

These two scales can be exemplified together by the following sentence:

2-44 A girl [**Ph/ Q. Bearer**] came into [**Ex**] the room [**Scene**] and sat down [**Q**].

Svoboda (1981, p. 3) has fused the two scales as follows (see next page):



(Figure 2-1 , Adapted from Svoboda 1981, p. 3)

Under this contextual conditioning indicated by the brackets, the adverbial element of purpose 'in order to buy a car' would serve as a **Set.** in the first of the following two sentences, but as a **Sp.** in the second; at the same time, the locational adverbial phrase 'to town' (expressing the goal of the motion) and the temporal adverb 'yesterday' would respectively serve as a **Sp.** and a **Set.** in both examples:

2-45 In order to buy a car [**Set**], he went to town [**Sp**] yesterday [**Set**].

2-46 He went to town [**Sp**] yesterday [**Set**] in order to buy a car [**Sp**].

These two scales can be described in terms of functional semantics: the scene describes the possible world to which the proposition pertains, "phenomenon appearing or existing", the entity that is introduced into this world, appearance or existence", the process by which the object is introduced into this world as a bearer of a permanent (attributed) or transient quality, that about which something is said. Quality, the process attributed to the quality bearer and the specification, is what specifies the range of operation the process specifies.

As for the relation between semantic structure and the grammatical structure, Firbas (1975, p. 320) believes that "the latter is rooted in the former". To justify his claim, Firbas points out that the grammatical structure does not merely combine forms as such but, with the aid of formal relations, effects a **semantic connexion**, i.e., a connexion of **meanings**. According to Danes (1966, p. 56)<sup>37</sup>, "these meanings might be called '**syntactic meanings**' and characterized as the generalization of lexical meanings contained in the sentence, accompanied by the relational structure of the. . .

grammatical sentence pattern" [my emphasis and ellipsis]. It seems, here, that Halliday (1974), in questioning the validity of the grammatical level of Danes' (1964b) in his "three-levels approach to Syntax", neither read Danes' (1966) nor Firbas (1974), or simply ignored them, when he says " this [the level of grammatical structure] seems rather circular. Why should language have a level of structure whose only purpose is a level of structure?" (Halliday, 1974, p. 46), although he himself talks in these terms as well (cf. 3.3.2).

Firbas (1975) points out that it must be borne in mind that apart from its role in syntax, an item of meaning continues to refer to an item of the extra-lingual reality and, in this way, continues to convey a piece of information. Thus the semantic structure is constituted by all the items of meaning (information) and the relations into which they enter within the formal framework of grammatical structure. In the act of communication this latter structure provides fields and units within which and over which CD is distributed<sup>38</sup>, and which are in consequence made to function in a definite perspective.

According to Firbas (1975), the most common way of expressing a phenomenon existing on the scene is the existential 'there' shown in the examples 2-42 & 2-44. However, there are other verbs or verbal phrases mentioned in Firbas (1966<sup>39</sup>) which introduce a phenomenon into the scene. These verbs and verbal phrases include "occur", "come", "come into view", "come into the scene", "come in" "come up" , to take place", "to arise" and a number of others. In the same article, Firbas argues that these verbs and verbal phrases "undoubtedly imply or even explicitly express appearance\_\_ a kind of coming into existence\_\_ on the scene" (Firbas, 1966, p. 243).

Firbas, (1966) also draws attention to a group of other types of verbs that do not explicitly express appearance and existence on the scene like the ones mentioned above, but they clearly enough "do play the same role on the level of FSP" (Firbas, op. cit. p.243). Such verbs function in the same way as Firbas' 'well-known' example: 'a girl came into the room'. These verbs include the ones exemplified in the following sentences:

2-47 A haze (rheme) hovered (transition) over his face (theme).

2-48 A fly (rheme) settled (transition) on his face (theme).

In order to show how the semantic structure of sentences with verbs expressing

appearance or existence into the scene operate counter to the direction of the basic distribution of CD, Firbas (1966) presents sentences with action-type verbs that have a goal of the action, an object, and which operate in the same direction of the basic distribution of CD at the level of FSP, as in:

2-49 A boy (theme) broke (transition) a vase (rheme).

Here, the attention is drawn to the effect, the result or the goal of the action rather than to the 'subject' or 'doer of the deed', to use Halliday's terms, although, according to Firbas, the subject conveys new information and is accompanied by a "non-generic indefinite article". As a result, the object is the rheme, whereas the subject is the theme.

Firbas (1966) also points out that the various means of FSP should not be studied in isolation but in relation to one another. He emphasizes this claim by examining examples in English and Czech, where there is more than one FSP means contributing to the signalling of the CD distribution within the sentence elements. Among the examples that Firbas has examined, the following two are selected: the first is accompanied by its Czech origin and its literal translation, and the other is merely the English version of Matt. 12.22.

2-50a Nekdy se ozve z ordinance strasny krik [rheme], [hdyz doktor taha zub nejakmu klaoucetie].

Sometimes itself it-makes-heard from surgery terrible cry [ when doctor pulls tooth to-some to-boy].

2-50b Sometimes, a terrible cry [rheme] was heard [when the doctor was pulling out the teeth of some little boy].

According to Firbas (1966, pp.244-245), both in the Czech sentence and its English literal translation, the subjects (the underlined words) constitute the rheme, and the verbs expressing appearance or existence on the scene. In the English version, although the verbs are in the passive, yet the rheme does not occupy end position as in its Czech counterpart. It follows, then, that in the English version, "the passive, is not used as a means of facilitating the shift of the rheme into end-position", but it "co-operates with other means in signalling as rhematic subjects that occur at the beginning of the sentence or very near to it" (Firbas, 1966, p. 245). In spite of all this, Firbas still insists that, by saying this, he does not mean to "invalidate" Mathesius' observation that

the passive voice is frequently used in English as a means of arranging the sentence elements into theme-rheme sequence. What Firbas means with what he says, according to him, is that Mathesius observation is feasible only if "the cooperation means permits it" (loc. cit.).

Before closing this argument, it is appropriate to mention a group of words, which owing to their semantic bond to context, function as thematizing elements. These include:

the personal, possessive, demonstrative and reflexive pronouns and the definite article. Under favourite conditions, they effectively signal contextual dependence . . . in this way, they in fact serve as a media through which the semantic structure may operate even within that section of the sentence which has become contextually dependent (Firbas, 1966, p. 241).

Similarly, there are a group of words which Firbas calls as "rhematizers"; words like 'even' and 'only' in English, 'i' in Czech and some others. These elements according to him, "render the element they accompany as rhematic" (Firbas, 1974, p. 20).

### **2.3.3 The Contextual Factor**

The operation of context (including the context established by co-text) makes some information given, and that information is normally thematized. Firbas ( 1975, p, 318 & 1979, p. 31) distinguishes three kinds of context:

1. experiential context (the context of common experience [knowledge] shared by the speaker and the listener).
2. situational context (the ad-hoc context of the immediate situation in which the utterance is produced).
3. verbal context (= co-text; the ad-hoc verbal context preceding the sentence).

In terms of their relevance in determining the degrees of CD of the sentence elements, the third factor is the most important, followed by the second then the first. In addition to these factors, the purpose of the speaker or writer either "confirms" or "changes" the contextual conditioning at the very moment of utterance; in fact, it is considered by Firbas (1975) as the last "court of appeal" in deciding whether an element is context-dependent or not. Thus, in a sentence like:



2-51 Bob rushed into the window

the information conveyed by 'the window' may be known depending on whether it has been mentioned in the previous verbal context or not. Hence it could either be "thematic or rhematic"; but as a goal of 'Bob's motion' derivable neither from the context of the immediate situation nor from the preceding verbal context, 'the window' will be unknown and thus contextually independent. In other words, although 'the window' may be contextually given or situationally perceived, what remains unknown is the purpose of communication, and that is the "expression of the direction of the movement" (Firbas, 1971, p.136).

For Firbas, the concept of context, whether dependent or independent, with its contextual conditioning, is closely related to that of the concept of scene. He believes, as does Svoboda (1981), that by referring to context, he is referring to scene in operation, or what Svoboda (op. cit., p.93) refers to as the "scene dynamics". This is why Firbas points out that contextual dependence is not simply based on previous mention, but is rather restricted by the "narrow scene". To him, the narrow scene is

a complex phenomenon of linguistic, and to a certain extent even non-linguistic, phenomena that operate at the moment a sentence is produced or perceived and which selects the foundation laying-elements. i.e. such as within a sentence constitute the foundation upon which the core of the information is to be developed and completed. The complex of the narrow scene is made up of the following three constituents: (i) elements derivable from immediately relevant preceding verbal and situational context, (ii) underivable elements that join the derivables in their foundation-laying function, (iii) the immediately relevant orientation of discourse. (Firbas, 1983, p. 101)<sup>40</sup>

From the speaker's or writer's point of view, the foundation-laying process operates "at the moment a sentence has been produced and a new one is to be implemented", (Firbas, 1981, p. 38)<sup>41</sup>; whereas from the point of view of the reader or listener it operates "at the moment a sentence has been digested and a new one is to be taken in". Also one has always to bear in mind that there exists no preceding sentence at the beginning of a monologue or dialogue in discourse (or text).

As indicated above, Firbas (1983) proposes three constituents of the narrow scene. In the first, the derivable elements, the phrase "immediately relevant" is of special importance in this context, because Firbas does not believe that the entire preceding verbal context or the entire situational context are relevant. In regard to the

former, for example, there is, according to him a "limited range" of derivability. In delimiting this range, he follows in the steps of his student, Svoboda (1981), in assuming that the semantic content or feature remains derivable for a span of about 6-7 clauses (an essentially psychological fact to Svoboda), even if it is not re-mentioned<sup>42</sup>. In addition to the condition of the 6-7 clauses span that these non-thematic elements should be introduced in the narrow scene within, Firbas (1983) adds another condition, and that is, their semantic content or features should not express some "evidently new aspects; for instance, contrast, the result of a selection, recapitulation" (Firbas, 1983, p. 102), because in this case, they would be re-introduced into the broad scene of the discourse as non-thematic elements again. As for the latter, the situational context, Firbas points out that such phenomenon can be considered as a derivable referent only if it appears strikingly obvious at the moment of communication and if it attracts the sender's and the receiver's attention and becomes an object of their immediate concern. Thus, the immediate relevant context, whether verbal or situational, is an extremely limited and restricted section of the entire verbal and situational context, which, in its turn, forms part of the wide context of experience shared by the sender and receiver of the message.

As for the second constituent of the narrow scene, the underivable elements, Firbas believes that these elements do not contribute to the development of communication the same way either in manner or extent. He exemplifies these underivable elements by the following two sentences:

2-52 In Bambourgh castle [scene: setting] once [scene: setting] lived  
[existence] a powerful king [phenomenon].

2-53 Many, many years ago [scene: setting] a young king [bearer of quality]  
waged [quality] an expensive war [specification] in a most ruthless way  
[further specification].

Firbas believes that, provided that the above two examples are entirely underivable, they respectively reflect his two semantic scales (See previous section). In the first sentence, however, the two settings can be particularized as local and temporal. In the second, the setting can be particularized as temporal, the quality as action, the specification as goal and the further specification as the manner in which the goal is achieved. Although, linearity does play an important role in their implementation, Firbas (1983) emphasizes that these scales are not WO concepts, and points out that derivability can

lead to a neutralization of functions. He also believes that,

irrespective of its semantic content, a derivable element will perform a function that may be broadly labeled as scenic, virtually ranking as setting. Even if performed by derivable elements, the function of setting and quality bearer remain distinct as long as the other functions, performed by underivable elements remain distinct as well (Firbas, 1983, p. 102).

Thus, under the heading of underivable elements that contribute least to communication, and hence join the derivable elements (the first constituent of the narrow scene) performing the foundation-laying function are "first and foremost the settings and the quality bearers" (loc. cit.). In addition to these two elements in both scales, Firbas also adds the verb of the first scale as part of the foundation-laying provided that there is no other element in the sentence serving as setting as in:

2-54 Rain was falling.

As for the third component of the narrow scene, the immediate orientation of discourse, this covers both the immediate communicative purpose of the sender and its interpretation by the receiver of the message. Here, it may be argued that these phenomena defy objective investigation. But Firbas, thinks otherwise: he believes that "both the sender and the receiver are bound by the objectively existing context of immediate relevance and by the laws of the interplay of context, linear modification and semantics" (Firbas, 1983, p. 103). Without the law of interplay of the mentioned factors and that of boundness to the existing context, the sender and the receiver cannot exchange roles. Added to these 'laws', it should be pointed out, that, in spoken language, the immediate concern of communication can be signalled out by "the disambiguating force of intonation" (loc. cit.); whereas in written language, "it is the following verbal context that must be taken into account" (loc. cit.). Firbas, however, admits that the sender of the message can subjectively manipulate the immediately relevant objective context, but he can only do that within certain limits; otherwise, the manipulation becomes manifest against the background of the objective context, and hence multifunctionality may arise. This multifunctionality will result in multiple interpretation of one and the same utterance, or to use Grice's (1975) cooperative principles, will flout the principle and maxim of relevance<sup>43</sup>.

In Firbas' approach, these foundation-laying elements, as indicated above,

constitute the foundation, i.e., the section of the sentence which becomes to be known 'theme', and the rest of sentence is made up of the core-constituting elements which become to be known as 'non-thematic' or the rhematic elements.

In his analysis of old English texts, Svoboda, adopting Firbas, "appearance and quality scales, has divided the clause into two parts: the one representing the scene and the other representing the appearance of a new quality (and specification) on this scene. The former is the "narrow scene" which consists of the thematic elements of the clause or, as Firbas names in the above quotation, "the foundation laying-process". After the introduction of the "core of the information [the rheme]" in the process of communication, which is mainly the appearing phenomenon or the new quality and/or its specification; then, as a whole, the broad scene comes into existence constituted by all the thematic and non-thematic elements of the sentence. Svoboda (1981) terms the broad scene "the communicated scene", whereas Firbas (1979) terms it "the personal communication". Later on, however, Firbas (1983, p. 103) describes the communicated scene of Svoboda (1981) as "the referent of the communicated scene", which is merely a change in terminology rather than a change in Firbas' position.

The formation of both types of scenes is a dynamic process or phenomenon, because the evaluation of whether elements are thematic or non-thematic is based on the ever-changing syntactic, semantic and contextual conditions. Therefore, in order to describe the character of these changes, a "freeze" of their continual flow has to be produced if discourse has to be analyzed, and it seems that the clause is the most suitable point to freeze the flow at, since it contains both types of scenes, or to use Hallidays' concept, to analyze text or discourse as a product while keeping in mind that it is a continual process.

It must be kept in mind, however, that neither the narrow nor the broad scene remain the same throughout the text. According to Svoboda (1981), they display two kinds of change: (1) quantitative change of their number of elements takes place in the subsequent scenes, and (2) qualitative change which is reflected in the fact that certain elements within the scene are new arrivals, while some of the other elements were taken over from preceding scenes (of the same kind), and hence the thematic progression of discourse (see next section). The qualitative change also includes the characteristics of the scene members from the view point of both their present and their preceding

functions as thematic and non-thematic elements.

The concept of "instance level" is also based on the concept of context and its effect in the distribution of CD on the various elements of the sentence. Svoboda defines the concept of instance levels as: "the proportion of context-dependent to context-independent elements of the clause" (Svoboda, 1981, p. 100). These levels are three and are, in fact, based on the three types of contexts that Firbas has identified: the experiential, the situational and the verbal. These levels are: (1) the basic level, (2) the ordinary level and (3) the second instance level (Firbas, 1979, p. 45).

At the basic instance level, all elements of the clause are context independent. This type of sentence, as mentioned earlier, occurs at the beginning of discourse, and therefore, the degree of CD is determined by the semantic structure and linearity. But Svoboda does not accept the idea of an element being fully context-independent, because, according to him, "language is not used in vacuum and even the very opening clause of a text is more-or-less closely connected with the situation in which it is, or is expected to be, used" (Svoboda, 1981, p. 100). He also claims that since it is not specified linguistically, the presupposed situation or "broad scene is rather *FUZZY* and the question of contextual-independence becomes a matter of degree" (loc. cit.) [my emphasis]. However, if looked at from the point of view of narrow scene, any opening clause in the discourse (or text) may be regarded as context-independent, because there is no narrow scene preceding it, and the clause creates, in fact, the first narrow scene of the possible sequence.

At the ordinary instance level, the sentence or the clause contains context-dependent as well as context-independent elements as a result of being part of an overall text or discourse, and, except for the opening sentence of the text or, to some extent, for those of the opening paragraphs of constituting the text, all non-opening sentences display the property of cohesion. In this type of sentence, all three means of FSP operate in determining the distribution of CD over its elements, and all such sentences contain thematic elements which in some way or other are semantically related, and all of them are regarded as ordinary level clauses that constitute the majority of the sentences in any text type.

As for the last type, the second instance level, the operation of both the semantic structure and linearity is kept to the minimum because this type of sentences consists

of one non-thematic element in sharp 'ad hoc contrast', while all other elements represent an extensive theme. Thus, in the following example, 'David' in the reply to the question is rheme, whereas the rest of the answer is an extended theme:

2-55a Did John give you the book?

2-55b No, **DAVID** [rheme] gave me the book [theme].

In this type of sentence, the speaker picks up a single element which is to attract the attention of the listener or hearer, and at the same time is to be contrasted with a preceding context without referring to a new extralinguistic event. This is in line with Sgall's claim that "the sentence repeats what has already been said (or thought) and it is, as a whole, contextually bound, except for a single element that stands in contrast and that as the only one belongs to the rheme" (Sgall et. al., 1973, p. 32).

In Halliday's terminology, the second instance sentences are examples of contrastive focus, a notion which can be compared with what the Pragueans, Mathesius Firbas and others, have termed as "subjective" (cf. 2.3.2). But as far as Halliday's use of the term 'theme' is concerned, I would agree with the Pragueans that it does not always seem useful to associate the theme with the sentence or the clause beginning, since every linguist including Halliday himself believes the discourse or text is an on-going process, and in some relatively free word order languages, especially inflectional (using the same root for different grammatical categories; cf. chapter 5) ones like Arabic, it is, to some extent, possible to thematise any of its sentence elements.

From the point of view of narrow scene, the second instance sentences represent the case in which the oscillation reaches its utmost point in the direction of broadening the narrow scene and suddenly stops<sup>44</sup>. Svoboda (1981) likens this state of affairs to a situation where the narrow scene may be conceived of as being extended and frozen suddenly, and any further movement by any element becomes a phenomenon appearing or existing on the scene and hence becomes "rheme proper". This is also compared with the situation in which acting is stopped on the stage for some reason or another and a "propman" comes into the scene to repair it, or there is a "hitch" in the play, and all actors (here the thematic elements) are out, and the only moving phenomenon is the spot of light of the spotlight. Moreover, Svoboda believes that second instance sentences are rare, and in speech, they are caused by "technical defects, misunderstanding [and] correction of mistakes" (Svoboda, 1981, p.101).

## **2.4 Danes' Thematic Progression Scheme**

Danes (1970 & 1974) argues that the means of FSP, which also can be interpreted as the "thematic organization", are not confined to a single utterance only. They "permeate" the structure of the whole discourse or text; "they work in utterance sections . . . as well as in utterance groups, i.e. in portions of a text comprising a number of utterances (such paragraphs, sections, chapters, etc.) or the text (discourse as a whole)" (Danes, 1970, p. 137). According to him, this type of study comprises problems such as types of, and segmentation of, discourse, the hierarchy of its thematic structure and the different possible ways of the progression of the subject matter presentation or the thematic progression (TP). By the latter problem, the topic of this section, Danes means:

the choice and ordering of utterance themes, their mutual concatenation and hierarchy, as well as their relationship to the hyperthemes of the superior text unit (such as the paragraph, chapter, . . .), to the whole text, and to the situation. TP might be viewed as the skeleton of the plot (Danes, 1974, p. 114).

At the same time, he points out that, before determining sentence elements that convey known information (theme), and those that carry new information (rheme), the principles according to which this and not another portion of the mass of information has been selected must be known. In other words, Danes wants to know the principles underlying thematic choice or TP. In order to do this, he seeks the help of Hausenblas (1969), who defines theme, as quoted by Danes (1974, pp. 113), as "what has been posited to the fore, into the focus of the field of vision, and at the same time, what presents a foundation to be developed (elaborated) in the subsequent discourse". (see Firbas' 1983 definition of narrow scene in the previous section). From the statement of this definition, one would agree with Danes that it expresses two functions of the theme: (1) the perspective function, which consists of the hierarchical gradation of thematic text components (and involving a static point of view, regarding the text as a completed whole), and (2) the prospective function, in which the theme serves as a point of departure for the further development of the semantic progression and, at the same time, as a prospect or a plan of this development (in which case, the dynamic aspect of the progressive realization of the text is accounted for).

The dynamic aspect of text construction, which has been adduced from Hausenblas' definition of the theme above, is, according to Danes, "a new thing", and he points out that he is not able to draw "a clear-cut picture" of what this aspect really consists in and where to draw the line between the two aspects. According to him, these difficulties probably arise from

the lack of an exact model of dynamic structure of objects, realized in time (real or fictitious); such a model, taking into account their progressive growth, would involve a progressive nexus (relative to the 'future' functions of components in the subsequent portion of the text and in the resulting whole), a regressive nexus (relative to possible modifications and transformations of components arising from the backward effect of subsequent components), and a continuous process of cumulation. It might be interesting to interpret our [Danes'] notion of 'TP' in terms of the two aspects (Danes, 1974, p.113).

Thus, for Danes, it is the theme that plays the more important role in the construction and organization of text. Although the rheme is "the core of the utterance", the theme, being informatively insignificant, is employed in the relevant means of construction.

The inquiry into the thematic organization of text is closely associated with the investigation of "text coherence", or to use Danes' (1974) term, "text connexity". A number of linguists, including him and Hausenblas, call for the employment of "coherence" in texts in the "neutral (unmarked) sense when analyzing text coherence". In fact Hausenblas (1964, [Danes, 1974, p. 114])<sup>45</sup> has gone as far as to say: "coherence (connexity, continuity) is not a necessary property of texts: they not only display this property to a very uneven degree, but some of them may be characterized exactly as 'discontinuous'". But Danes maintains his basic assumption that text connexity is represented by TP. In this context, the latter can be described in terms of FSP, i.e. each utterance will be presented as a nexus of theme-rheme elements and, as assumed by the Pragueans, each theme (as an already known, old piece of information) has to be chosen (derived) from either the subject matter (hypertheme) that is already been mentioned in the given discourse (text), or from the common stock of knowledge of the participants in the given discourse (potential readers of the text).

In this context, the task of the text analyst is to find out the contextual and/or the situational connection of each theme. In order to do this, Danes (1974) proposes what he calls the "*wh*-questions" procedure. He points out that this procedure can be



employed, motivated by the given context and situation, for eliciting the rheme of a given utterance. Thus, in one way or another, these wh-questions are no more than rheme questions. Moreover, Danes suggests that it is possible to assign to any sentence a set of *wh*-questions, representing all possible types of context in which the given sentence is applicable, and consequently revealing all possible FSP-structures which it can acquire, including its thematic element(s). For Danes, this procedure "seems workable, since it is objective, purely linguistic, and involves both the contextual and the thematic aspect of FSP (Danes, 1974, p. 115).

One more point that Danes takes in consideration before outlining his TP scheme, is the type of utterances that may be involved in his scheme. He divides utterances into two main types: "simple utterances" (involve sentences containing only one theme-rheme nexus, with simple theme and rheme), and "complicated utterances" (involving sentences that, from an FSP point of view, reveal a more complicated 'composed' or 'condensed' theme-rheme structure, while they still represent a single grammatical unit<sup>46</sup>. Danes (1974, p.117) classifies and exemplifies these complicated utterances as follows:

**1. Composed Utterances:**

**a. Multiple Utterance as in:**

2-56 Goethe wrote the second part of *Faust* after eighty, and V. Hugo astounded the world with *Toruemada* at eighty.

**b. Utterance with a multiple theme as in:**

2-57 The melting of solid ice and the formation from ice of liquid water [**multiple theme**] exemplify physical changes [**rheme**].

**c. Utterance with a multiple Rheme as in:**

2-58 It is further postulated [**theme**] that the activated amino acids are joined together . . . and that the long chains are molded in a specific manner [ **multiple rheme**].

**2. Condensed Utterances:**

**a. Utterance with a complex theme as in:**

2-59 This dark-coloured liquid, known as crude petroleum or oil, [ **complex theme**] is obtained from wells of different depths [**rheme**].

**b. Utterance with a complex rheme as in:**

2-60 The amino acids [**theme**] are required for making proteins, consisting of long chains of these units [**complex rheme**].


As for the main types of the TP concatenation scheme of theme-rheme, Danes (1970 & 1974) proposes five main (or typical) ones. The contextual or situational connection will be indicated with a vertical arrow, whereas the horizontal arrow indicates the theme-rheme nexus in an utterance. Thus the TP might be defined as "the concatenation of particular themes and their connection with the text, its subparts and the situation" (Danes, 1970, p. 137). These five types are:

**1. SIMPLE LINEAR PROGRESSION (or TP with linear thematization of rhemes).**

According to Danes, this represents the most elementary, basic TP, in which the rheme (Rh) of the first utterance becomes the theme (Th) of the next one and so on. In other words, each Rh becomes the Th of the following utterance as in:

2-61 The first of the antibiotics [Th] was discovered [Transition (Tr)] by Sir Alexander Fleming in 1928 [Rh]. He [Th2=Rh1] was busy [Tr] at the time investigating a certain species of germ which is responsible for boils and other troubles [Rh2].

Thus the diagram representing this type of TP can be shown as follows (see next page):




**2. TP WITH A CONTINUOUS THEME.**

This scheme is characterized by the occurrence of the same theme as the theme of every following utterance. The following themes do not, however, have to be fully identical in wording and consequently, to some extent, in meaning. Thus they might be "near synonyms" of the same word as well as different "naming", or "signs", of the same concept. This is reminiscent of Svoboda (1981, p. 179) who calls these types of themes "long-lived themes", in which non-thematic elements are introduced and "after creating one or more hypertheme strings\_\_ they start appearing as thematic elements without (rhematic) predecessors. Svoboda (loc. cit.) also believes that no matter which of them is established first in the broad scene, the other "synonymic" elements automatically acquire the same status and appear as themes. He also points out that the clues to recognizing certain items as synonymous are often given not by the verbal and

the situational context, but of the most general context of all\_\_ the context of experience. (see previous section for the types of contexts as outlined by Firbas, 1979).

In his analysis of Old English (Svoboda, 1981) considers the different names of Christ, not initially introduced as rhemes, to be all themes of this type. This is probably why Danes (1970) shows this TP scheme (as drawn below) starting with the theme-rheme (Th-Rh) nexus and then the Rh of the first utterance as the one becoming the Th of the subsequent utterances. However, this is not reflected in Danes' (1974, p. 119) neither in the example nor in the diagram representing this TP. Below is the diagram adapted from Danes (1970, p. 138) followed by the one taken from (Danes, 1974, p. 118):



Danes (1974) also exemplifies this TP in the following example:

2-62 The Rousseauist [Th1] especially feels [Tr] an inner kinship with Prometheus and other Titans [Rh2]. He [Th1] is fascinated by any form of insurgency [Rh3]. . . . He [Th1] must show [Tr] an elementary energy in his explosion against the established order and the same time a boundless sympathy for the victims of it [Rh4]. . . . Further the Rosseauist [Th1] is [Tr] ever ready to discover beauty of soul in anyone who is under the reprobation of society [Rh5].


### 3. TP WITH DERIVED THEMES.

This type of TP is characterized by the fact that the Th of one or more utterances is not derived from the Rh of the preceding utterance, but directly from the overall theme or "hypertheme" (of a paragraph or other text section). This seems to be

a further shift from the basic definition of theme of the utterance (realized by the clause or sentence) towards the notion of 'topic under discussion', which takes the theme from the sentence or clause level (grammatical level) to a higher level (may be a discourse or a text level, which for Halliday, 1970 and elsewhere, is the semantic level, since, for him, text is a semantic unit. cf. Chapter 3). The choice and sequence of the derived utterance themes will be controlled by various special (mostly extralinguistic, such as time sequence) usages of the presentation of subject matter. Danes (1974, p. 120) illustrates this type of TP by the following example:

2-63 New Jersey [Th= Hypertheme] is [Tr] flat along the coast and southern portions [Rh], the northern-western region [Th1] is [Tr] mountainous [Rh1]. The coastal climate is mild, but there [Th2] is [Tr] a considerable cold in the mountain areas during the winter months [Rh2]. Summers [Th3] are [Tr] fairly hot [Rh3]. The leading industrial production [Th4] includes [Tr] chemicals, processed food, coal, petroleum, metals, and electrical equipment [Rh4]. The most important cities [Th5] are [Tr] Newark, Jersey City, Paterson, Trenton, Camden [Rh5]. Vacation districts [Th6] include [Tr] Asbury Park, Lakewood, Cape May and others [Rh6].

Danes shows the diagram of this TP type as a main theme, where the TP of all other themes are derived from it. I would liken it to a tree that consists of a number of branches:



Adapted from Danes, 1974, p.119).


#### 4. THE EXPOSITION OF A SPLIT THEME:

This type of theme is characterized by the fact that a certain Rh is explicitly or implicitly doubled (Rh' + Rh'') or multiple (Rh' + Rh'' + R''' + . . .), so that it gives rise to a pair (triple, . . .) of TPs: the first Rh' is expounded and after this progression has been finished, Rh'' becomes the Th of the second TP and so on. These partial progressions may be of one type only, or they may present a combination of different types, without having necessarily a parallel structure. Danes (1974, p. 121) illustrates this type of TP by the following example:

2-64 All substances [Th1] can be divided [Tr] into two classes: elementary substances [Rh'] and compounds [Rh'']. An elementary [Th2= Rh'] is [Tr] a substance that consists of only one kind [Rh'2]. . . . A compound [Th3= Rh''] is [Tr] a

substance which consists of atoms of two or more different kinds [Rh''3].

Danes (1974, p. 120) shows the diagrams of this TP as follows:



#### 5. TP WITH AN OMITTED LINK (OR WITH THEMATIC JUMP):

The concatenation of this theme is a modification of the first type, in that, it consists of the omission of one or more potential utterances in the TP, especially when the thematic content of such utterances is quite simple, plainly implied by the context and therefore redundant and unnecessary.

Danes points out that these TP's have to be considered as abstract principles, models or constructs. He clarifies this by saying that implementation and realization of these models in a particular language depends on the properties of the given language, especially on the different means available for rendering FSP. In this respect, he points out that in some languages, English for one, such expression as 'both . . . and', on the hand . . . on the other, and many others, are used to signal TP of type 3 above. The same thing is also available in Arabic in expressions like: *hāda min nāḥiya . . . wa min nāḥiyatin 'uxrā . . . , wa min jānibin 'āxar . . .*, and some others. He also believes that such expressions are text oriented: every text type has a certain number of these expressions which Danes terms the "network of orientation" (1970, p. 130), and which are known, nowadays, in text linguistics under the rubric of 'genre identification'.

#### 2.5 FSP and Text Connectedness

In one of his late articles, Danes (1989) renews his claim, which he has already

made in 1974 & 1983, that the "FSP is a complex of at least three different though related and partly overlapping phenomena: [1] communicative articulation of the utterance (theme-rheme), [2] bipartition of the utterance into known and unknown information and [3] degrees of communicative dynamism (CD) of the utterance constituents" (Danes, 1989, p. 23)<sup>47</sup>. As indicated earlier, Danes (1964b) has pointed out that the distinction between 1 & 2 goes back to Mathesius (1939 [1947]), where he defines "the starting point of the utterance (vychodesko)" as "that which is known or at least obvious in the given situation and from which the speaker proceeds"; whereas "the core of the utterance (Jadro)" is "what the speaker states about, or in regard to the starting point of the utterance" Danes (1974, p. 106). Mathesius, as quoted by Danes (loc. cit.), defines "the foundation (or the theme) of the utterance (Zaklad, tema)" as something "that is being spoken about in the sentence", and the "core (Jadro)" as what the speaker says about the theme. Distinction 3 has been introduced by Firbas. By CD, Firbas means, as already mentioned before, "the extent to which the sentence contributes to the development of the communication (Firbas, 1964b. p. 270), and he also states that the theme is constituted "by the sentence element(s) carrying the lowest degree(s) of CD within the sentence" (Firbas, op. cit., p. 272). Moreover, he also asserts that theme "need not necessarily convey known information or such as can be gathered from the verbal and situational context" (loc. cit.). Danes (1974, p. 107) points out that this third aspect of FSP may be viewed as a refined analysis of the second aspect.

In his second claim in the 1989 article, Danes asserts that none of these components has a direct bearing on text connectedness although, according to him, "their contribution to it [text] is no doubt considerable, but conditioned by the underlying network of isotopic relations (NIR) in text" (Danes, op. cit., p. 23)<sup>48</sup>. Similar notions to NIR have also been given by other linguists like 'anaphoric relations' (Halliday & Hasan, 1976). In addition to the definition he presented in his 1983 article, (see previous endnote), Danes redefines NIR, as "a qualified class of relations obtaining among the members of the set of particular 'discourse subjects' of a given text" (Danes, 1989, p. 24). The term discourse subject is not to be understood, here, in the sense of grammar. As a discourse subject, Danes treats anything: whether it is an object, a group or class of them, a quality, state, process, action, circumstance,

event, episode or the like that the speaker has just in mind when applying a nominating (or deictic) unit in the process of text production in order to introduce, mention, re-introduce or recall something. Thus, this semantic relation can either be identical, partially identical to the discourse subject, or there must be an objectively statable semantic affinity obtaining between discourse subjects. Undoubtedly, any coherent text reveals a complicated network of the isotopic relations; a thing which prompts Danes to maintain that "the term or the notion of 'known piece' of information of contextual boundness is in fact interpretable on the level of isotopy only" (Danes, 1989, p. 25).

To the great surprise of many of the Prague school adherents, Danes (1989, p. 25) finally comes to the point, which he has repeatedly signalled in his earlier writings (Danes, 1974) or quotes from others, where he says that he agrees "with Halliday (1967 & elsewhere) and with some other linguists that 'thematization' is independent of what has gone before, and that the theme-rheme bipartition is, in principle, contextually independent". He asserts this point by reference to Mathesius (as indicated in the beginning of this section). In this context, he again says that "the presentation of the theme need not be a known piece of information was maintained by Mathesius from the beginning of his studies of FSP" (Danes, 1989, p. 25), which, again, echoes what Firbas (1964b & elsewhere) always says. He even quotes Halliday, when the latter says: "the speaker is free to select whatever theme he likes" (Halliday, 1970, p. 357)<sup>49</sup>. Nevertheless, the speaker often chooses as the theme of the subsequent utterance a discourse subject known from the previous context, i.e. an "isotopic" or an anaphoric one. The anaphoric motivation of the speaker's thematic choice is typical of certain text types. This choice may also depend on other motives, some of which are of a subconscious character, while others appear unmotivated to the interpreter.

The operation of thematic choice on NIR, taking place in those cases when the speaker selects for thematisation 'known' discourse subject, may be described and presented as a kind of TP, which represents a component of the whole development of the thematic relation in a text or, to use Danes' terminology, "thematic route" (See TP in the previous section). According to Danes, however, TP belongs to a different type and may be classified according to the following three kinds of criteria (see next page):

1. Thematisation concerns preceding:
    - Theme
    - Rheme
    - Whole theme-rheme nexus (i.e. An utterance)
    - Sequence of utterance (a text interval)
  2. The thematised content component:
    - is taken over (iterated) from preceding context
    - is semantically derived from a preceding text component.
  3. The thematised content component:
    - precedes immediately (a contact thematisation)
    - precedes at a distance (a non-contact thematisation)
- (Danes, 1989, pp. 25-26) .

From a textual point of view, the most relevant point here is the distinction between the types with thematisation of a rhematic component and those types with the thematization of a thematic component (cf. previous section). As a result, one would agree with Danes when he says: "we may state in general that the phenomenon of thematic connection in the form of TP undoubtedly represents a substantial contribution of FSP to text connectedness" (Danes, 1989, p.26).

Following in the steps of Sgall et. al. (1973), Danes (1989) challenges his own earlier 'objective' method of *wh*-question as a testing procedure or criterion to divide the utterance context in such a way that one portion corresponds to the *wh*-element of the question (the 'new') and the other to the rest of the question (the 'known'). He believes that, in some utterance, for example, the information structure corresponding to a yes/no question, reveals no bipartition ("all-new utterance"). Furthermore, the further investigations of the phenomenon has led Danes to the conclusion that "in fact we do not in principle ascertain the 'knowness' (contextual boundness) and the 'newness' (contextual non-boundness) of the two portions of the utterance content, but **SOMETHING ELSE**" (Danes, 1989, p. 27) [my emphasis].

In support of the above argument, Danes, draws counter examples to contextual-boundness from (Sgall et. al., 1973):

- 2-65 At Christmas, we were expecting our relatives.  
2-65a Uncle John [theme] came first, (or):  
2-65b First [theme] came uncle John.

Here, both responses (a & b) appear to be contextually bound, nevertheless, each of them may be chosen as 'known' or 'new', and both utterances represent a naturally



coherent continuation of 2-65, so that the information bipartition cannot be explained in terms of contextual boundness. It may be also sensible to say that, in general, context determines the kinds of things which it is reasonable to say (rather than determining text in a precise manner). Here, context determines both possibilities as reasonable.

Therefore, Danes suggests for the information bipartition, "an underlying principle other than the contextual boundness should be sought for" (Danes, 1989, p. 27). In order to solve this problem, Danes approaches it from the view point of the "aim of communication". He believes that in an utterance, without the question of appeal, the speaker intends to convey to the hearer something that will, presumably, as indicated earlier, be of interest to him. By this bit of information, the speaker wants or attempts to cause the hearer to become better informed, i.e., to change or modify, in a certain way, and measure his world knowledge. In order to accomplish this, the speaker adopts the strategy of starting from an assumed, "presupposed", state of knowledge on the side of the hearer and he then tries to enrich it with something "new" which he assumes to be very probably interesting to the hearer. Thus in:

2-66 Do you know the news of Dick & Vicky?

2-66a Dick and Vicky got divorced yesterday.

[This example is adapted from Danes, 1989; the correct question would be: Have you heard . . . ?]

new information rests in the speaker's instructing the hearer to substitute, in his stock of knowledge, the relation 'to be married', between 'Dick and Vicky', by the information 'they are no longer married: they are divorced'.

In this respect, Danes lists two conditions for what he calls "happy performance of informing by means of an utterance" (Danes, 1989, p.28). These are:

1. I (the speaker) assume that you have believed (up to this moment) that . . . , or . . . that you (still do not know that . . . .")

2. I (the speaker) assume that (at the moment) you are interested to know that . . . .")

Here, presumably of course, one (the speaker in particular) could flout these pragmatic purposes, but according to Firbas (1983), one is liable to lose contact altogether with the listener and communication may come to a halt if they (especially the speaker) start flouting the cooperative principles of communication (see reference to Grice's cooperative principles and underlying maxims in note 43) This final interpretation

appears to be confirmed by the hearer's reaction (responses) in cases when one of the assumptions (or both of them) has not been fulfilled as in:

2-67 Why are you telling me this?

2-67a I know all about it already.

or by possible introductive locutions of the speaker in cases when he himself is not quite sure of the fulfillment of the assumptions:

2-68 Maybe you have already learned that . . . .

Thus it seems that it is the agreement between the actual state of the hearer's knowledge, on the one hand, and the speaker's assumption on the other, that represents the necessary foundation of any happy communication. I believe that this may be the "something else" that Danes refers to in an earlier quotation as what is ascertained of "the two portions of utterance content", namely the "known" and the "new".

Similar to this line of thinking is that of Sgall et. al. (1973 & 1980), and also found problems with what they called "contextually bound elements". They suggested resolving this problem by introducing the psychological notion of "activated or foregrounded elements of the stock of shared knowledge" (Sgall. et. al., 1980, p. 155)<sup>50</sup> (cf. 4.3 & chapter 5). Danes, however, criticizes this solution, because, according to him, it is rather 'problematic', and he lists two major problems in it. First, there are serious doubts about whether it will be possible to test objectively the degrees of activation. Second, the authors themselves, he says, claim that activated elements may function not only as 'contextually-bound', but also as 'non-bound', thus leaving the notion of 'contextual boundness' as undetermined as before. One has to keep in mind that Danes' rejection of Sgall et. al's psychological approach towards context-bound elements, however, tallies with the initial rejection of Mathesius, the father of the Prague School, in associating linguistic matters with psychology. The adoption of a more psychological oriented approach comes as a result of a group of Prague School linguists being influenced by the line of thought of the generative grammarians. This group includes Sgall and some others.

As for the relationship between the degree of CD of an utterance and the connectedness of discourse (or text), Danes (1989) concentrates on Firbas' (1979 & elsewhere) definition of CD (quoted earlier in this section). Danes finds that the one possible way of interpreting the crucial notion of Firbas' "further development of

communication" is to relate it to a different (relative) degrees and kinds of contextual "newness". Thus, when speaking of a different kind of newness, Danes has in mind the distinction between newness in the sense of introducing into the text "a new heterotopic discourse subject, and the newness implied in such an instance where one and the same discourse subject will be re-introduced by means of such expression that "some properties of it be revealed due to the semantic content of that expression (cf. e.g., following textual sequence of the names referring to an identical discourse subject: a man, my husband's friend, Peter Brook, this well known artist)" (Danes, 1989, p. 30). Finally, Danes, believes that the study of different degrees of newness \_\_ or of knownness when looking at the same phenomenon from the opposite pole\_\_ and of various factors conditioning them, opens an interesting and promising field for further investigations of text connectedness.

## **2.6 Summary and Conclusion**

Ever since Mathesius introduced the notions of theme and rheme into structural linguistics and presented a detailed analysis of the two notions in their relationship to syntax in the narrow sense, and to the main means of expression as well as to style and discourse (Mathesius, 1975; cf. 3.2.1), Czech linguists have held differing views of what might be called, following Sgall (1987, p. 48), "topic-focus articulation."<sup>51</sup> For instance, while Firbas (1966, 1975 & elsewhere; cf. also 2.2.4) works not only with the dichotomy of theme-rheme structure, but distinguishes the hierarchy of communication dynamism (CD), covering perhaps all sentence parts, Danes (1974 & 1989) analyzes the relationship of theme-rheme to their means of expression. In this respect, Danes and some others assign the articulation of theme-rheme structure to individual utterance tokens, rather than to sentences (as units of the grammatical system of the language). On the other hand, arguments have been provided to consider theme-rheme articulation as belonging directly to one of the levels of the language system and not only to the domain of communication. (Danes, 1964; Benes, 1968; cf. also 2.2.3, 2.4 & 2.5). And while Firbas, understands semantics as one of the major sources of means of FSP (cf. 2.3.2), Danes, who considers theme-rheme structure to belong to another level of language (i.e. the utterance/pragmatic level) other than those of the grammatical and the

semantic structures, underlines the semantic impact of theme-rheme structure.

In his efforts to clarify the concept of FSP, Firbas (1987) proposes two starting points of communication (the title of his 1987 article): the one opening the linear arrangement of words or rather constituents making up a sentence and the other carrying the lowest degree of CD within the sentence. The second starting point also begins the gradual development of the message of the communication towards the carrier of the highest degree of CD (e.g. the rheme), which completes this development and moves towards the element "towards which the sentence is perspectivised [e.g. the theme] (Firbas 1992a)<sup>52</sup>". In this respect he also says:

These two points may coincide, but not necessarily so. The starting point of linear arrangement is invariably the beginning of the sentence. But the starting point of the development of communication seen in the light of the distribution of CD is not position bound: though tending towards a front position, it may occur anywhere in the distributional field (Firbas, 1987, p. 24)<sup>53</sup>.

Thus, in examples like 'last night, I was reading a book while I was waiting for you', the starting point of linear arrangement, following Firbas' formulation, is 'last night'; whereas the starting point of the development of communication in terms of CD is the personal pronoun 'I' following the temporal adverb.

In relating both the starting point of linear arrangement and of the 'terminal' point of the communication within a written sentence to his three means of FSP (cf. 2.3), Firbas (1987) points out that Danes (1974, pp. 106-114; cf. also 2.3.3, 2.4 & 2.5) comes to the conclusion that inquiries into FSP reflect three aspects:

1. The first aspect is described as the theme-rheme structure (the theme expressing what the sentence is being spoken about and the rheme what is said about the theme so characterised) and referred to as "communicative articulation".
2. The second aspect is described as the distinction between known (context-dependent, given, or old) information and new (context-independent) information; this distinction constitutes the information structure (its components being the point of departure, provided by known information, and the core provided by new information).
3. The third aspect is that of the various degrees of CD.

Although Danes links the concept of CD with the distinction between known and new information, according to Firbas (1987), he does not link the concept of CD with

the elements that convey exclusively new information. According to Danes (1989) such elements may show different degrees of communicative importance, but in his view the concept of communicative importance should be kept separate from that of CD and not identified with it (cf. 2.5).

While not linking context dependence/independence, point of departure, core and CD with particular sentence positions, Danes, as suggested in the previous section, treats theme and rheme as position-bound phenomena. In this sense, theme is invariably linked with the beginning of the sentence and rheme with the rest of the sentence. In this respect, Firbas (1987, pp. 42-43) points out that "Danes' uses the terms theme and rheme in the same way as Halliday." Thus, by treating theme and rheme as position-bound concepts, Firbas emphasizes, "the theme-rheme structure aspect does not choose as its criterion the point towards which the communication is oriented," because the interplay of FSP factors (cf. 2.3) tend to place this point (rheme) towards or at the end of the sentence, but not necessarily so. This point, according to Firbas (loc. cit.), may in fact occur in the section of the sentence referred to by the theme-rheme structure aspect as thematic. Nor is position-boundness a permanent characteristic of the element that in terms of the interplay of FSP factors starts the development of communication and has come to be labelled theme, because such factors tend to place this element at or towards the beginning of the sentence, but it may occur in the section referred to by the theme-rheme aspect as rhematic.

Another important difference between Firbas' and Danes' approach concerns the so-called 'aboutness' feature. In Firbas' formulation, the 'foundation-laying' (thematic) elements start the development of the communication and announce what the core-constituting elements (transitional and rhematic) will be about. Seen in this light, the starting point of the development of the communication need not coincide with the starting point of the linear arrangement. Thus, from a Firbasian point of view, it is the elements of the sentence that open the development of communication that tells the recipient what the sentence is to be about; or as Firbas (1992a, p. 347) plainly puts it: "I do not sever aboutness from thematicity". On the other hand, in terms of Danes' (1974 & 1989) theme-rheme structure aspect, it is the beginning of the sentence that announces what the sentence will be about (cf. 3.6.6).

## **Chapter Three**

### **The Hallidayan Model**

#### **3.0 Layout of the Chapter.**

This chapter will consist of six main sections. Section 1 will summarize the background of Halliday's systemic functional approach to the linguistic structure of English as presented, developed and applied by M. A. K. Halliday himself. The second section will discuss the emergence of Halliday's systemic approach to the study of language. Section 3 will present his functional theory, and will contain a discussion and analysis of his functional components and how they are realized in the surface grammatical structure. Sections 4 and 5 will respectively discuss Halliday's socio-semantic and socio-semiotic models of language. All these parts will be presented solely from Halliday's own point of view. This will eventually lead into a discussion of the main topic of this chapter: Halliday's model of thematic structure, outlined also from his point of view. This will include a summary and a critique of his thematic model, and a proposed thematic model for the analysis of English and Arabic data which will be carried out in Chapter 7.

#### **3.1 The Background to Halliday's Linguistic Approach**

M. A. K. Halliday is the product of the London School\_\_ more specifically, the University of London School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS)\_\_ and of the teaching of its long-term leader Firth (1890-1960). However, Halliday's work is the most important modern development of the ideas originated by his teacher, whom he departed from in order to build his own model and to broaden his Firthian background with insights from other schools and trends in linguistics including the PS functionalism. It is Firth, therefore, that we must turn to for an initial explanation of Halliday's orientation. This is the reason why the term neo-Firthian has been applied to him (Monaghan, 1979)<sup>1</sup>.

Firth inherited from Henry Sweet (1845-1912) and Daniel Jones (1845-1912) \_\_ two English phoneticians\_\_ and their contemporaries a concern with "the description

of language for practical purposes" ( Butler, 1985, p.1)<sup>2</sup>. At the same time, Firth was insistent that linguistics should be an autonomous discipline with its own terminology and methodology rather than borrowing from other empirical sciences. During the 1930s, Firth was influenced by his colleague Malinowski, who was a professor of Anthropology at the London School of Economics. Firth was also influenced by the predominant linguistic movement in Europe at that time, the Structuralist movement, which was initiated by the French linguist de Saussure. Across the Atlantic ocean, in the USA, linguists like Bloomfield were feeling their way in their new approach of behaviourism<sup>3</sup> after the shift they made from mentalism<sup>4</sup>. These and other linguistic figures such as Whorf played a major role in shaping the Firthian linguistic approach which presented itself to Halliday to evaluate, and either enhance, update, contradict, or take for granted in building up his own views and insights about language and linguistic study. In what follows, therefore, there will be a brief review of these major linguistic figures and movements and their impact on each other in general and finally their impact on the development of Firth's and eventually Halliday's Linguistics. In addition there will be a discussion and appraisal of some of these figures and their relevance to the development of systemic functional grammar as presented by Halliday.

### 3.1.1 de Saussure

As mentioned earlier, the Saussurian approach was the predominant linguistic approach during the 1920s and 1930s, the time in which the London School linguists, and notably Firth, were shaping their linguistic insights. Saussure's term "*etat de langue*"<sup>5</sup> was widely taken up by linguists and the task of linguistics seem to lie in the twofold purpose of describing this *etat*, and in developing the methods necessary for doing this in the manner of the natural sciences. For Saussure, *etat* was a self-contained and rigid entity, certainly so far as the individual speaker is concerned. The individual receives his *langue* from the community in which he grows up. The *langue* is property of the community, beyond the influence of the individual. Therefore, the individual is quite unable to influence and change the *langue*. Looking at language from this perspective, two important points have to be taken in consideration: one is that the entity to be described is static, and the other is that the entity to be described is not

*langue* as manifested in the language use of the individual (for which Saussure used, another term, *parole*), but the abstract entity *langue* which exists quite apart from the individual's uses of it. Thus linguists, following Saussure, are strictly bound to concentrate on the description of a self-contained abstract entity, rather than on the contextually determined linguistic uses of language by the individual.

Halliday, (1985b) points out that the systemic theory accepts the Saussurian concept of how system is represented by the observed *actes de parole*. But, according to him, he has to interpret it as Hjelmeslev did:

first in the framework of system and process where process (text) 'instantiates' the system, and secondly, with a distinction between instantiation and realization. The latter refers to the stratal organization of the system (and therefore also of the process) whereby the expression is said to 'realize' the content" (Halliday, 1985b, p. 9)<sup>6</sup>.

Moreover, Halliday also stresses that whereas Saussure, separates *langue* from *parole*, systemic theory follows Hjelmeslev in encompassing both. Thus for a linguist like Halliday,

to describe language without accounting for text is **STERILE**: to describe text without relating it to language is **VACUOUS**. The major problem perhaps is that of interpreting the text as process and the system as evolution. . . . In other words, of representing both the system and its instantiation in dynamic as well as in synoptic terms ( Halliday, op. cit., p.10) [my emphasis].

In addition, Halliday, in the same article emphasises that dynamic models of semiotic systems are not very well developed, and this is one of the problems that theorists of languages now have to solve.

Saussure's structuralism makes use of two crucial and related categories: *syntagm* and *paradigm*. For Saussure as well as Halliday, relations between an item and another present in the structure are *syntagmatic*, and relations between an item and another items not present in the structure are *paradigmatic*.

In spite of Firth's overt rejection of Saussure's dichotomies because of its separation between language and functions it carries out in the life of the individual and consequently his influence on its development, he was, as we shall see below, working within the general Saussurian framework.

### 3.1.2 Malinowski



As a result of his field work in the Trobriand Islands, Malinowski claimed that language in its 'primitive' use "functions as a link in concerted human activity. . . . It is a mode of action and not an instrument of thought" (Malinowski, 1923, p. 312). In this view, he considered words as 'tools'\_\_ just like those tools used by prehistoric man\_\_ and the meaning of a tool generally lies in its use. This is similar to the view of Wittengstein, as expressed by his well-known dictum "the meaning of words lies in their use" (Wittengstein, 1935, p. 80)<sup>7</sup>. For Malinowski, then, meaning was seen in terms of the function of utterances, or even of whole text, in their context of utterance, or, more generally, in their typical context of situation. In this respect he says:

A statement in real life is never detached from the situation in which it has been uttered. . . . Utterance and situation are bound up inextricably with each other and context of situation is indispensable for the understanding of the words. Exactly as in reality of spoken or written languages, a word without linguistic context is a mere figment and stands for nothing by itself, so in the reality of a spoken living tongue. The utterance has no meaning except in a context of situation (Malinowski 1923, p. 307)<sup>8</sup> [my ellipsis].

Malinowski also wrote that the "meaning of a single utterance can be defined as the change produced by this sound in the behaviour of people" (Malinowski, 1935, P.59)<sup>9</sup>, which sounds behaviouristic, or as restated by J. Lyons: "the meaning of the utterance is the totality of its contribution to the maintenance of . . . the patterns of the society in which the speaker lives and to the affirmation of the speaker's role and personality within the society" (Lyons, 1977, p. 607<sup>10</sup>) [my ellipsis]. Thus, it is from Malinowski that the idea comes that it is the use of language which gives it its meaning. Therefore, language is to be understood in terms of its function in the given culture. Moreover, language in general serves more than one purpose: it is multifunctional.

Language was identified by Malinowski as having initially three major functions: the "pragmatic", the function of "acting or affecting action," the "narrative", the function of "preserving information about the culture through its stories being retold"; and the "magical", the function of "exercising control over the environment" (Malinowski, 1935, pp .231-250). These functions were inspired by his observations of the Trobriand Islanders in Polynesia. In addition to these three main functions, Malinowski also identified a fourth one: the "phatic" function which he defined as "a type of speech in

which the ties of a union are created by mere exchange of words. . . . they fulfil a social function, and that is their principal aim" (Malinowski, 1923, p. 315)

According to Kress (1976, p. viii)<sup>11</sup>, Malinowski's fieldwork in Polynesia had demonstrated to him the 'impossibility' of translating terms and texts from a language of one culture to that of another. In this respect, one ventures to say that if language were a self-contained system and could be described only in terms of itself, and its meaning could be made explicit only entirely of itself, then translation would be impossible; whereas if the language system is self-contained, but all languages relate to one extra-linguistic reality (physical, social, psychological, etc.), then perfect translation should be possible. By the same token, if language system plus the culture to which it relates are taken together to be self-contained, then perfect translation, following Kress (1976), should be impossible. Thus, the term 'self-contained' could be understood in these two senses. Malinowski's response, however, is that language is far from being self-contained in either of these two senses; it is entirely dependent on the society on which it is used: (1) it has evolved in response to the specific needs of that society, and (2) its use in the that society is context-dependent. Sampson (1980) has the following to say about this point:

He [Malinowski] makes the point that a European, suddenly plunged into a Trobriand community and given word-by-word translation of the Trobriander's utterances, would be no nearer understanding them than if the utterances remained untranslated\_ the utterances become comprehensible only in the context of the whole way of life of which they form a part (Sampson, 1980, p. 225)<sup>12</sup>.

In addition, Malinowski found that in order to understand what was said, it was necessary to possess some knowledge of the cultural characteristics of the Trobriand society as reflected in the context of situation in which particular types of utterances were produced and which were themselves regarded as embedded in the context of culture.

As for Malinowski's contributions to Halliday's linguistic insights, Kress (1976, p. viii) has mentioned the following:

1. Halliday takes over Malinowski's definition of meaning as function in context. This was of course taken over by Halliday via Firth as we shall see below.
2. Halliday accepts Malinowski's characterization of language as multi-functional, and

while Halliday does not take over any one of the major speech functions defined by Malinowski, he makes use of them in several ways: Halliday's interpersonal, ideational and textual functions incorporate some of the facets pointed to in Malinowski's functions. In particular, there is quite a strong affinity between Malinowski's pragmatic and Halliday's interpersonal function.

3. Through the comparison that Malinowski drew between the "phylogenetic" aspect of language development in general and the "ontogenetic" aspect of language development in the child, Halliday saw the two as being similar, although he agrees with Saussure's notion of the arbitrary relation between content and expression and stresses the fact that "every linguist should agree that there is arbitrariness at this point" (Halliday, 1978, p. 45)<sup>13</sup>. Nevertheless, the child has certain needs, and expresses them by certain sounds. "The meaning of the sound is its function in the context" (Kress, 1976, p.viii). The difference, however, is that the child expresses his needs in the conventionalized functions of the language which is spoken around him, and the conventional structures which are available for their expression because the child is growing into a society which already has an established and conventional ways for expressing certain needs; whereas 'the primitive man' (who for Halliday, the linguist, would be pre-historic, but for Malinowski, the anthropologist, might be a Polynesian) has no such restrictive context because there is no language around him which would dictate the development of the expressions of his needs. Therefore 'the primitive man' shapes for himself the form of expression of his needs. In other words, he shapes language to reflect the uses he wants to make of it.

Due to his wealthy background, as a descendent of an aristocratic Polish family, Malinowski expressed his views about the social life of the Trobriand Islands, including their language, in the most arrogant and unfortunate way. This is why he spoke of their language as "a mode of action rather than a countersign of thought" (Malinowski, 1923, p. 297), and "not an instrument of reflection" (ibid. p. 312). Could it be that the people of the Trobriand Islands whom he studied did not think and did not have minds of their own! I think the phrase quoted by Kress (1976, p. ix) which says "Language, in its developed . . . scientific function is an instrument of thought . . ." would suggest such an answer. The other thing that would corroborate this assumption of the above lies in the titles of his two main works, about which Sampson (1980) says:

his reputation would be secure if for no other reason than [his] unusual felicity in naming his books; there can be few other scholars whose dry academic volumes are graced with titles as alluring in their different ways as *Coral Gardens and their Magic* and *The Sexual life of Savages* (Sampson, 1980, p. 223).

These are probably some of the reasons that "several of Malinowski's early contentious remarks (e.g. those of a primitive language) are ignored by Halliday" (Kress 1976, p. viii). Halliday (1980a), points out that when Malinowski first developed the notions of context of situation and that of culture, he had the idea that

if you needed the concept of context of situation only if you were studying a 'primitive' language, the language of unwritten culture, but that you would not need such concepts for the description of language of a great civilization (Halliday, 1980a, [1989, p. 7])<sup>14</sup>.

Ten years later, however, he has come to the conclusion that what he has said earlier about primitive languages was completely irrelevant and that he was wrong. He was an honest enough scholar to say so. Referring to his earlier work, he writes:

I opposed civilized and scientific to primitive speech and argued as if the theoretical and scientific writing were completely detached from their pragmatic sources. This was an error, and a serious error at that. Between the savage use of words and the most abstract and theoretical one there is only a difference of degree. Ultimately all the meaning of all words is derived from bodily experience ( Malinowski, 1935, vol.2., p.58).

In spite of this apology, Sampson points out that "being led by the behaviourist fallacy . . . [he tries to] deny the existence of unobservable thought-processes, although his comments about the use of language in civilized societies shows that in 1923, he was not wholly consistent in his 'bad behavioursim'" (Sampson, 1980, p.225). In fact, Malinowski, in his earlier writing, supports the idea that modern scientific language does consist of 'telling' rather than 'doing'. But when he realized that he was inconsistent in his views he tried to deny this, and argued again that "even Western scientific discourse was a matter of 'doing' rather than a matter of 'telling', but his attempt was unsuccessful" (Sampson, 1980, p. 225).

In his appraisal of Malinowski, Firth recognizes that Malinowski was not primarily interested in elaborating a linguistic theory, and concluded that his "technical linguistic contribution consists of sporadic comments, immersed and perhaps lost in what is properly called his ethnographic analysis" (Firth, 1957b [Palmer, 1968, p.

161))<sup>15</sup>.

To be contrasted with Malinowski is the American grammarian Whorf. The link between the two can be made most easily through the Malinowskian notion that language in its structure mirrors the real categories derived from the practical uses both of the child and 'primitive man'. That does not mean that Whorf worked with a category of people and with a culture that are not, in Malinowski's sense of the word, 'primitive', as were the Trobriands which the latter studied. Rather, the main difference between the two, however, aside from their different aims, is that Whorf was highly sensitive "to the richness and subtlety of the aboriginal American Indian cultures and languages which he studied" (Kress, 1976, p. xi). In what follows, a brief summary of the aspects in which Whorf can be said to have contributed to Halliday's linguistic theory.

### **3.1.3 Whorf**

Like Malinowski, Whorf insisted on the link between cultural organization and the reflection of this in the structure of language. But, unlike Malinowski, as mentioned earlier, he was a linguist, and this influenced what he was doing in two ways. First, he used language as a starting point for his work; that is he viewed the relation between language and culture from the point of view of language. Therefore it was not surprising that he stressed the importance of language in ordering society, "rather than deriving the nature of language from social structure" (Kress, 1976, p. xi). Secondly, he actually looked for and attempted to describe the grammatical categories which he felt shaped the "philosophy, world view, or conceptual organization" of the culture he was studying. These categories, Whorf realized, were unlikely to be expressed directly, in the surface organization of the language, i.e., in the lexicogrammatical level, to use Halliday's terminology. His interest therefore focused on a distinction between what he called "overt" and "covert" categories. For Whorf, an overt category is one which has an explicit formal representation on the surface structure (e.g. the category plural in English) or at the lexicogrammatical level. The covert category is one which does not (e.g. the category animate in English). The impact of all this on Halliday as mentioned by Kress (1976, p. x) was "the clear acceptance of the relation of language

and culture, a view of language as the embodiment of a conceptual system and an explicit attempt to describe the relevant linguistic categories needed in any account of the deep grammar of a language."

Before moving into the third and most important figure of all, Firth, who contributed most to the development of Halliday's linguistic insights and to his linguistic model for the study and analysis of language, it is worth mentioning, that, like Malinowski, Whorf did not attempt to establish a linguistic theory. He is merely a language thinker. His descriptive work is intended to be 'neutral' with respect to any particular framework. Halliday (1985b) commends Whorf's insight and contributions to the study of language and its relation to culture when he says:

Whorf . . . showed how it is that human beings do not all mean alike, and how their conscious ways of meaning are among the most significant manifestation of culture. Whorf's notions of cryptotype and his conception of how grammar models reality, have hardly yet begun to be taken seriously; in my opinion they will eventually turn out to be among the major contributions of twentieth century linguistics (Halliday, 1985b, p. 3) [my ellipsis].

It was left to Firth, then, to try and build such a theory from the insights of all predecessors and contemporaries and his own thoughts about language. This will be the subject of the next section.

#### **3.1.4 Firth**

Whereas Malinowski viewed context of situation in concrete terms, Firth considered it in terms of "abstract schematic construct" (Butler, 1985, p. 4). For Firth, it is "a group of related categories at different levels from the grammatical categories but rather of the same abstract nature" (Firth, 1950 [1957, p. 182])<sup>16</sup>, which was intended "for application especially to typical repetitive events in the social process" (Firth, 1957a, p. 176)<sup>17</sup>.

Firth accepted Malinowski's views of the relation between language and society, particularly, Malinowski's definition of meaning as function in context. Firth's aim was to build Malinowski's concept of context of situation into a linguistic theory. Therefore, Firth gave extensive consideration to the nature of meaning and to the elements of a linguistic theory, with the aim to develop a comprehensive theory of

linguistics that would account for the full range of meaningful use of language. Thus, "he [Firth] was anxious to get away from the narrow view of semantics as an autonomous level", and, instead, "he conceived that any adequate theory of language "has to be apt to what people are doing when they are talking" (Mitchell, 1975, p.2)<sup>18</sup>. In order to build such a theory that would incorporate Malinowski's context of situation and his definition of meaning as function in context, Firth had to develop a methodology that would allow him to provide a description of language in these terms. According to Kress (1976), this uncovered some problems and raised questions which were never raised before by either linguists or sociologists. These problems, were:

1. If the meaning of a linguistic item depends on cultural concepts, one needs to establish sets of categories which link linguistic material with the cultural context.
2. The notion '*meaning is function in context*' will have to find formal definition, so that it can be used as a principle working throughout the theory; that is, the smallest linguistic item must be describable in these terms just as much as the largest. [original emphasis]
3. The theory has to provide for a continuity of description ; it has to allow the linguist to relate the statement of function in context of the smallest to that of the largest linguistic unit (Kress, 1976, p. xi).

To solve these problems, Firth attempted to formalize the notion of paradigm, and to retain the notion of structure of syntagm; both are reminiscent of de Saussure. As a result, the theory became to be known as "System Structure Theory." As for the first problem raised in Kress's quotation, linguists generally agree on a broad outline about the units to be used in the description of language which commonly could be used in describing its surface structure; units such as those of lexicogrammar, in Halliday's terminology, including those of the sentence, the clause, the group, the word and the morpheme. Unfortunately, no such agreement exists when it comes to the description of socio-cultural units. Although Firth had addressed himself to this problem as early as 1935 in his important paper "*The Techniques of Semantics*"<sup>19</sup>, the questions were not even being asked until very recently. In other words, neither linguists nor sociologists, were attempting to connect the two disciplines in a sufficiently serious fashion to lead to the establishment of the necessary categories. I believe one of the problems has to do with size: the micro-level of linguistics versus

the macro-level of sociology. Kress believed that "while linguistic behaviour rests on the shared knowledge by speakers of a finite set of abstract rules, which could be enumerated and described, the same was not true of social behaviour, which was seen as infinitely variable and not rule governed" (Kress, 1976, p, xii). Neither linguists nor sociologists, had asked the question: what are the appropriate categories for the statement of the context of the largest linguistic units?

In his attempt to solve the first problem and answer the above question, Firth sets out the following categories in order to describe the context of situation:

- A. The relevant features of participants: persons, personalities
  - (i) The verbal action of the participants
  - (ii) The non-verbal action of the participants
- B. The relevant objects
- C. The effect of the verbal action (Firth, 1957d,[Palmer, 1968, p. 182])<sup>20</sup>.

Such "schematic constructs" provided a specification of the contexts within which whole utterances or even texts functioned and thereby had meaning. But, Firth, the linguist, went much further than Malinowski, the anthropologist had been able to do in terms of his ethnographic interests. Context of situation, though of central importance, "was just one kind of context in which linguistic units could function. Other contexts were provided by the 'levels' postulated to account for various types of linguistic patterning. Thus grammatical items could be functioning in grammatical context . . . etc". (Butler, 1985, p, 5). Moreover, Firth's view of meaning as function in context led him to regard all these various types of function, at all levels, as aspects of meaning. In his own words, "meaning . . . is to be regarded as a complex of textual relations, and phonetics, grammar, lexicography, and semantics each handles its own components of the complex in its appropriate context" (Firth, 1935, p, 19). Meaning is thus dispersed into a number of 'modes'. Firth likened this situation to "a splitting of a white light into its spectral components on passing through a prism" (1951a [1957, p.192])<sup>21</sup>; this is a very wide-ranging view of meaning and Firth has been criticized for its idiosyncrasy. Firth even maintained that "it is part of the meaning of an American to sound like one" (loc. cit.), which at first sight, says Lyons (1977, p.608) looks "rather more puzzling", but then he partially defends Firth's view on this issue by saying that, "statements like this might



seem to depend upon a perverse and wilful extension of the term meaning" and there is little doubt that

Firth [is] delighted in the shock-effect of such formulations of what he meant by 'meaning'. But they are consistent with his general view that being meaningful, or having meaning, is a matter of functioning appropriately (i.e. significantly) in context (Lyons, 1977, p.608).

In spite of all the criticism of his treatment of meaning, which according to Lyons (loc. cit.), "constitutes a healthy reaction against the excessive and essentially empty conceptualism of traditional approaches to meaning", his view of meaning as function in context has remained, though with some important refinements by Halliday as we shall see in the sections below.

The categories listed above by Firth to describe the context of situation have raised some sort of discontinuity of units from different levels. Kress (1976) believes that there is discontinuity within the phonological structure of the phonemes, for example; they are abstract linguistic entities operating as basic units in a syntactic context. "There is a very minor discontinuity there, that between syntax and phonology" (Kress, op. cit., p. xii). But when it comes to the border area between language and the social context in which it operates, we will be dealing, in this case, with two different sets of entities: a social level set, and a linguistic one. In this respect, Kress (loc. cit.) argues that "it is impossible to link the units of the one kind [the social level set] with the units of the other [the linguistic]. . . . unless the theory regards linguistic behaviour as one form of social behaviour", (cf. 3.4 below). This, however, brings us back to the question of whether language is a self-contained system, psychological in its orientation (an 'internal' theory), or a context-dependent entity, sociological in its orientation (an 'external' theory). Kress, as well as Halliday, as we shall see in sections to come, stress the fact that it would be totally wrong to assume an "either/or" matter; an internal theory, Kress says, "can attempt to make the link with the larger context just as an external theory of language will have to provide a full description of the internal structure of the utterance" (Kress op. cit., p. xiii). Nevertheless, systemic linguists adopted the second view simply because "the former theory . . . will have precisely the difficulty pointed to; while the latter will not. And that the "external theory is more suited to providing a description with no discontinuity from the socio-cultural to the purely linguistic units". (loc. cit.).

As for solving the second problem which has to do with his attempt to develop a linguistic theory based on the notion of function in context, Firth did this by means of the concept of *system*. For Firth, a system is an enumerated sets of choices in a specific context. This gives rise to two sets of contexts for an item: the context of other possible choices in a system, and the context in which the system itself occurs. These two contexts are again a reminder of the structuralist's influence upon Firth and later upon Halliday. Firth saw language as organized along the two axes, syntagmatic and paradigmatic, although as mentioned earlier, Firth never considered himself a Saussurian. According to him, elements in the syntagmatic relation formed *structures* at the level concerned, while events in a commutative relation at a particular place in a structure were said to constitute a *system* in a restricted sense of the term. It is the system used in this sense which gives rise to the label 'systemic', a term given to Hallidayan linguistics after 1966.

Due to its significance in Halliday's later work, and the fact that it is one of the most important contributions of Firth to Hallidayan Linguistics, it is worth while, giving some of the precise statements of the system's development in Firth's latest papers of the 1950s:

... 'linguistic forms' are considered to have meaning at the grammatical and lexical levels, such 'meanings' being determined by interrelations of the forms in the grammatical systems set up for the language. A nominative 'meaning' in a four-case would in this sense necessarily have a different 'meaning' from a nominative in a two-case or in a fourteen-case system. (Firth, 1951b, P.227)<sup>22</sup>.

Palmer (1968, P.7<sup>23</sup>) observes that this view shows a very strong Sausurrian orientation: Firth's 'meanings' appear to be identical to Saussure's 'values'<sup>24</sup>. This is because, to Saussure, all identity is oppositional; a linguistic entity only has an identity by not being another linguistic entity with which it is contrasted. Moreover, according to Culler (1976, p. 26)<sup>25</sup>, Saussure believes that each language produces a different system of "signified: units whose value depends on their relation with one another". Generalizing the point, it may be said:

in all cases, we discover not *ideas* given in advance, but *values* emanating from the system. When we say that these values correspond to concepts, it is understood that these concepts are purely differential, not provisionally defined by their content but negatively defined by their relation with other terms of the system. Their most precise

characteristics is that *they are what those are not* [original emphasis] (Culler, 1975, p. 117).

Firth adds a criteria of exhaustiveness and finiteness to that of the mutual determination of values:

Systems of units or terms, set up by the linguist provide sets of interior relations by means of which their values are mutually determined. In order to have validity, such systems must be exhaustive and closed, so far as the particular state of the language, suitably restricted, is under description (Firth, 1957c, [Palmer, 1968, p.150]).

Here again, this notion of systems being 'exhaustive and closed' sounds very Saussurian. Indeed, exhaustive and closed might also be taken to mean the same as language being a self-contained system mentioned earlier. However, this description and characteristics of system tallies with what Berry (1975) says about the three major properties of systems in general: being mutually exclusive, finite and dependent in their meanings on the rest of the terms or options in the system:

By naming a meaning and by assigning it to a system, where it is mutually exclusive with other named meanings, we are able to show both *something of what it does include and also what it does not include*. The fact that a system is finite means that a boundary is given to the area of meaning that the terms have in common. It is because the system refers to an area of meaning with a fixed boundary that the meaning of each term in the system depends on the meaning of all the other terms (Berry, 1975, p. 146)<sup>26</sup>.

In contrast with system, the term structure was used consistently throughout Firth's work. Firth defines it in one of his 1950s' articles, collected by F. Palmer, as "an inter-relationship of elements within the text or parts of the text" (Palmer, 1968, p. 186). Firth makes the relationship between system and structure explicit in his following statement:

. . . system, systems, terms and units are restricted to a set of relations between commutable units or terms which provide values for the elements of structure (Firth, 1957d. [Palmer, 1968, p.186]).

One final point that deserves to be mentioned with regard to Firth's linguistics which distinguishes it from that of Saussure, and that is Firth's preference for a "polysystemic" approach to language. According to Firth, Linguistic analysis must be polysystemic, because for any given language, "there is no coherent system (*ou tout setient*) which can handle and state all the facts" (Palmer, 1968, p. 24).

As for the contribution and importance, in general, of Firth's linguistic work to that of Halliday's, one can give this brief summary:

1. **Context of Situation**, that is, a view of language as closely dependent on stateable conditions. From here, Firth developed his theory of multiplicity of language within the total language. In his later development, Firth insisted that the techniques of linguistic description, based on dispersion of modes, should be applied not to language as a whole but to "a restrictive language", which "serves a circumscribed field of experience and said to have its own grammar and dictionary" (Palmer, 1968, P. 87). Firth gave some examples of restrictive languages like, scientific, sports, propaganda . . . etc. Palmer (1968, p. 7) believes that Firth was "a realist and held the view that it was impossible to do everything at once. "From this development, Halliday was able to take this over and build his work in register (cf. 3.5.3).

2. **The Renewal of Connection.** Firth insisted that the "abstract constructs or categories" which he proposed for the description of the context of situation must always be related back to textual data to be rechecked again for applicability. (Firth, 1957d, [Palmer 1968, p.199]). It has become common practice in systemic theory and in Halliday's work in particular to relate everything done in theory to the analysis of discourse or text. It can also be said that the applicability of the theory to real data is one of the checks of its scientificity.

3. **System.** In its redefined form, this became a major component in Halliday's theoretical insights in the early versions of his theory (cf. 3.3: Halliday's socio-cultural shift which characterizes nearly all his post-1966 writing.

4. **Collocation.** To Firth, collocation refers to the concept of structure or relations on the syntagmatic axis into which lexical items habitually enter; it is thus considered a part of the meaning of the lexical items concerned. Firth (1951a [1957a, p.196]) claims that "one of the meanings of **night** is its collocability with **dark**, and of 'dark', of course, collocation with 'night'." Halliday has extended the concept of collocation to include not only the habitual co-occurrences, as Firth was interested in, but also to cover co-occurrences of any degree of 'strength' (Butler, 1985, p. 7).

Kress believes that the most significant shortcoming in Firth's work is:

that he did not provide a set of terms or categories which could systematically relate all the descriptive statements on all levels to each

other. To express this in terms of function in context, he did not show what the contexts of all linguistic units were and how they were to be related (Kress, 1976, p. xv).

This may be one of the reasons that Firth has been subject to criticism by linguists like Lyons (1966 & 1977), Sampson (1980), among others<sup>27</sup>. Their criticism is mainly concentrated on "Firth's wide-ranging and idiosyncratic interpretation of 'meaning' in linguistics and his reliance on contextual variation" (Butler, 1985, p.9), ignoring the fact that, for Firth as well as for Halliday, contextual variation is a primary notion in the theory which attempts to account for the relationships between language and situation. In fact, Kress (1976) claims that Firth never regarded semantics as a separate area of linguistics. Kress supports his argument as follows:

the answer to that apparently curious omission lies in precisely this: the principle underlying all linguistic description was the statement of the function of linguistic items in their context, and that for Firth was meaning. Thus all the linguist's activity was about the statement of meaning, about semantics. *There could, for him, be absolutely no reason for talking about a separate level of semantics* (Kress, 1976, p. xiv), [my emphasis].

This point is similar to one made by Lyons (1977) about Firth's position with regard to meaning as 'function in context' or semantics in general. Lyons says:

Semantics, in the Firthian use of the term, relates utterances to their context-of-situation; but all branches of linguistics necessarily deal with meaning. There is nothing tautological, therefore, about the Firthian phrase 'semantic meaning', and there is nothing contradictory, or otherwise anomalous, about such phrases as 'phonetic meaning' or 'grammatical meaning' (Lyons, 1977, p. 608).

This final point made about Firth's view of meaning and semantics, including the one made by Mitchell (1975) above, are probably, as we shall see when discussing Halliday's linguistics insights, the main reasons for the hazy [my term] boundary that Halliday draws between the various levels of language. It was left to Halliday to take up the task of using Firth's ideas and contributions on context of situation, on restricted languages and on system and structure, and to build a linguistic theory in which language categories and their relations are made explicit.

### **3.2 The Emergence of Halliday's Systemic Model:**

Since the mid 1960s, and to be more specific, since his article "Some Notes on Deep Grammar" (Halliday, 1966<sup>28</sup>), Halliday's linguistic emphasis has shifted from the surface patterning of grammar. This shift of emphasis has resulted in the emergence of a model of grammar, known ever since as "Systemic Grammar". This change of linguistic attitude comes as a reaction to the dissatisfaction with the examination of such patterning, which was thought of as insufficient to provide a satisfactory account of many aspects of language phenomena. Chomsky (1964)<sup>29</sup>, for example, probes a "deep structure" for sentences, which provides semantic interpretation, and is related to "surface structure" by a series of "transformations". He defines surface structure of a sentence as "a proper bracketing of the linear temporally given sequence of elements, which the paired brackets labelled by category names", while deep structure, which is "in general not identical with surface structure", is "a much more abstract representation of grammatical relations and syntactic organization" (Chomsky, 1964, p. 32)<sup>30</sup>p.

On the other hand, although Halliday (1966, [Kress, 1976, p. 88]) recognizes that Chomsky's distinction between 'surface structure' and 'deep structure' is "extremely valuable and widely accepted", he takes a different approach when shifting his views from an account of surface structure to the need for a more abstract or deeper approach to grammar. Halliday's approach, however, is based upon the concept of system as representing deep paradigmatic relations, and a more abstract interpretation of syntagmatic (structural) relations than those adopted in his earlier works on the "Scale and Category" model.

As previously mentioned, the category of system has developed since Halliday's 1956 model, where it was subsidiary to class, to become one of the major categories of his 1961 model, where it appeared to be regarded as a set of choices available at particular places in the structure. In his 1966 article, however, Halliday reinterprets the distinction between deep and surface aspects of linguistic patterning. He does this by picking up the points he made in his 1961 article, that the relation of *order* between elements of structure of a given unit is different from, and more abstract or "deeper" than, the *sequence* relations between surface exponents in the syntagmatic combination. Indeed, as has been said by Halliday (1961), sequence is only one possible way in which structural relations may be expounded. Thus exponents of particular grammatical classes, in sequence relation, may be said to represent the surface structure, while

structural relations between abstract elements such as 'Subject, Predicate, Complement, and Adjunct' (SPCA) in the clause (now seen as structural *functions*) represent the deeper aspects of syntagmatic patterning. The two are connected by 'realization' (a term borrowed by Halliday from Lamb (1966) to replace the term 'exponent').

The concept of system has been developed further since the 1966b article, yielding a description of the paradigmatic patterning of language in terms of sets of systems or system "networks" operating within the rank scale as their "point of origin". Certain systems networks are selected from the clause rank, others at the nominal class of the unit group and so on.

The organization of systems into networks becomes possible once the concept of delicacy is extended from structural relations to systemic relations.

The scale of delicacy . . . has proved of value in textual analysis [ the primary orientation of Halliday's work] because it provides a variable cut-off point for the description: the analyst can go as far as he wishes for his own purpose in depth of detail and then stop. *Delicacy can be illustrated with reference either to structure or to system.* [my emphasis]. (Halliday, 1964, [Halliday and Martin, 1981, p.22])<sup>31</sup>.

Halliday (1964) also proposes two types of delicacy ordering of systems: hierarchical and simultaneous, these may be used to represent simple relations of dependence and independence. Dependence occurs "when terms or options in different systems are hierarchically ordered, such that a selection from one can only be made only if a particular term or terms has been chosen from an earlier, less delicate, systems" (Butler, 1985, p. 40). On the other hand, a system is simultaneous with another if "it is independent of the other system, but has the same 'entry condition' of the other system. When two systems are simultaneous, their terms combine freely, any term from one system can combine with any term from another" (Berry, 1975, p. 182).

To illustrate the above type of ordering in delicacy, Halliday considers his earlier accounts of part of the theme system in the clause. For this example the point of origin is specified as the major independent clause, that is a clause which contains a predicator. The following two sets of sentences and the two figures below are taken from his 1964a article (Halliday and Martin 1981, pp. 23-24).

- 3-1 a. The Smiths are having a party this evening.  
b. It's the Smiths that are having a party this evening.  
c. A party the Smiths are having this evening.

d. It is a party the Smiths are having this evening.

3-2 a. The Smiths are having a party this evening.

e. They are having a party this evening the Smiths.

Below are the figures which represent the type of networks of theme systems in which each set will be included:




FIGURE 3-1




FIGURE 3-2

To start with, both figures show two simultaneous systems at the least delicate end of the network: independent choices are made between (i) predicated and unpredicated theme, the former being realized by the "highlighting" of the element concerned, the theme, by means of "it + be + relative clause construction", as in examples ( b & d in 3-1); and (ii) the subject or complement as the initial "thematic" element (Halliday also included adjunct theme, but he did not cater for it in those above networks).

As Halliday points out "with the cut-off at this point clauses of the set 3-1 have the same grammatical description" (as shown from figure 3-1). "In order to discriminate between them, the further distinction (as shown in figure 3-2) may be introduced; the members of example 3-2 will then have a different grammatical description" (Halliday, 1964, [Halliday and Martin, 1981, p. 23]). This differentiation between sentences (a) and (e) results from proposing a further system of "theme substitution" entry, which is dependent on the selection of both [unpredicated theme] and [subject theme] from the initial simultaneous systems. Thus, where one system



shown as derived by delicacy from a term in another\_\_ that is, as hierarchically ordered in respect of another\_\_; this , according to Halliday, "represents a point at which the analysis may either proceed or stop short" (Halliday, 1964, [Halliday and Martin, 1981, p. 25]).

The most crucial step in the development of Halliday's model, according to Butler (1985, p.46) is when Halliday suggested that paradigmatic relations are primary, in that they constitute the basic, underlying relations of language:

Systemic description may be thought as complementary to structural description, the one concerned with paradigmatic and the other with syntagmatic relations. On the other hand, it might be useful to consider some possible consequences of regarding systemic description as the underlying form of representation, *if it turned out that the structural description could be shown to be derivable from it.* (Halliday, 1966, [Kress, 1976, pp. 93-94]).

Moreover, Halliday, (loc. cit.) admits that the concept of "explicit grammar" implied in the above formulation derives mainly from the work of Chomsky, and that "steps taken in this direction on the basis of *any grammatical notions are made possible by his* [Chomsky's] contributions". Thus, not only is the system now the most fundamental category of the theory, Halliday also makes it clear that terms in systems are viewed as being closely related to their underlying semantic properties:

. . . underlying grammar is 'semantically significant' grammar, whether the semantics is regarded, with Lamb, as 'input' , or, with Chomsky, as interpretation. What is being considered, therefore, is that part of the grammar which is as it were 'closest to' the semantics may be represented in terms of systemic features (Halliday, 1966 [Kress, 1976, p. 94]).

According to Butler again, this is an important statement. Halliday's work had, from the beginning, always insisted on the meaningfulness of linguistic elements, building as it did on the work of Firth, but here, there is an explicit claim "that grammar can be written so as to reflect, at least in part, the specifically semantic meaning (to use Firthian distinction) of formal choices, and that such a grammar can and should take

the system as its most fundamental category" (Butler, 1985, p. 46).

### **3.3 Halliday's Functional Theory**

The concept of deep paradigmatic relations and syntagmatic structure which were discussed by Halliday in his (1966) article became linked with what became identified later, from around 1967 onward, as "a key feature of Halliday's theory, namely, the postulation of functional components of grammar" (Butler, 1985, p. 46). Halliday (1968) observes that language has "a multiple function", and that function is well-established in the literature and has been referred to in the work of Malinowski (1923) and in that of Buhler (1934), and in the classification of the linguistics of the Prague School.

By a Functional theory of language, Halliday means "one which attempts to explain linguistic structure, and linguistic phenomenon, by reference to the notion that language plays a certain part in our lives; that it is required to serve certain universal demands" (Halliday, 1971b, [1973, p.104])<sup>32</sup>. What is needed according to him, is a functional theory which, rather than being directed towards sociological and psychological investigations (Malinowski and Buhler respectively), is intended to "shed light on certain features of the internal organization of language" (Halliday, 1973a, [1973, p. 26])<sup>33</sup>, to explain "why language is as it is and why language is organized in one way rather than in another" (Halliday, 1970, p. 141)<sup>34</sup>. It is in this sense, primarily that Halliday uses the term functional in formulating the theory of language. In fact the notion of function is so important to him that he equates the functional theory of language with the theory of language itself when he says: "in my opinion a functional theory is a theory of language, and is an essential aspect of any theory that attempts to explain the nature of language" (Halliday, 1974, pp. 45-46)<sup>35</sup>.

Halliday's claim is that the grammar of language, as shown in the previous section, is regarded as "semantically significant grammar"; it is also often referred to by Halliday as the "meaning potential" of the language. Moreover this grammar is itself organized along functional lines, and this is where the name "functional grammar" originates. Halliday claims that

when we examine the meaning potential of the language itself, we find

that the vast number of options embodied in it combine into a few relatively independent networks, and these networks correspond to certain basic functions of language. This enables us to give an account of the different functions of language that is relevant to the general understanding of linguistic structure (Halliday, 1970, p. 142).

On the same lines as Halliday's (1968) "multiple functions" view of language is his claim that "it is a universal that all languages are called upon to fulfil a small set of distinct though related demands" (Halliday, 1968, p.207)<sup>36</sup>. This "plurality" of language function is reflected in the system, and different parts of the system realize different functions, not in the sense that a given sentence or part of a sentence has one function and is therefore specified exclusively by one component of the system, but in the sense that, while every sentence expresses a combination of functions and thus all parts of the system have contributed to its specification, it is possible to formulate the contributions made by each part. Halliday says:

If we represent the sets of options available to the speaker in the grammar of the English clause, these options group themselves into a small number of subsets, distinct from one another in that while within each group of options there is a very high degree of interdependence, between any two groups the amount of interdependence, though by no means negligible, is very much less. This provides a syntactic basis for the concept of language functions, and suggests how the diversity of function recognizable at the semantic levels may be organized in the course of realization (Halliday, 1968, p. 207).

Although, according to Halliday, the functions themselves are semantic in origin, they are said to be reflected in grammar as "blocks of options" with few connection between them. The grammatical system, Halliday says, "has as it were functional input and structural output" (Halliday, 1973a [ 1973, p. 36]).

Halliday sets up four components to embody these functions in the grammar of English. For Halliday, these components represent four functions that language as a communication system is required to carry out. These components are "the experiential, the logical, the discoursal and the speech-functional or the interpersonal" (Halliday, 1968, p.208). In the early 1970s, however, (Halliday, 1970 & 1973), there was a certain amount of renaming of these components: the experiential and the logical were subsumed under the label "ideational", the discoursal component was renamed as "textual", while the "interpersonal" remained the same. No explicit reasons were given by Halliday for this renaming, but I believe that it comes as a natural result of



Halliday's change of position towards his concept of meaning potential, which in the early 1970s onwards, becomes associated with the semantic stratum rather than the lexicogrammar.

While still working within the broad perspective originally established by Malinowski, Halliday considers the meaning which is associated with the speaker's choice within a given situational context as derived from the function which that choice performs in communication. The exercise of options from different interrelated systems serves to "link the different functions which language is required to fulfil" (Halliday, 1968, p.207). This is why he (Halliday, 1974, p. 45) says that "language is as it is because of the function it has evolved to serve", and consequently, this is why the human semiotic should have taken precisely this form and no other.

The term function is not used by Malinowski, Firth and Halliday in its strict "logico-mathematical sense" (Hjelmslev 1947, pp. 33-34)<sup>37</sup>. The latter examines the various acceptations of the term, and points out that the linguist's needs to use function both to express the fact that an entity has dependencies with other entities, such that certain entities premise others, and also the fact that "the entity functions in a definite way, fulfils and assumes a definite position in the chain" (Hjelmslev, op. cit. p.34). The latter meaning is relational, the function necessarily involves some contact with reality. Hjelmslev calls this the "etymological" meaning of the term<sup>38</sup>. Even though he does not use the etymological meaning of function in his definitional system, he (loc. cit.) considers that it is in fact "the real definition of function."

It is in the etymological sense that the term function has been used by Halliday and, as mentioned earlier, Firth and Malinowski. For them all, it is a relational term, and the function necessarily involves a contact with reality, i.e., the context of situation. In this same sense, also, function has been the basis of the theory of language developed by the Prague School starting in the early 1930s:

By function we do not mean a sort of mathematical relation, but simply the fact that the implementation of language supplies the members of the given language community with the means of inter-individual communication in the broadest sense of the word. This inter-individual communication is not confined to the actual content that is literally expressed by concrete speech utterances but includes all sorts of social contact in so far as this is made by language means (Vacheck, 1966, p.33)<sup>39</sup>.

Before discussing Halliday's functional components, it is appropriate to look into other categorizations of language functions proposed by other authors; later on, it will be shown how Halliday himself compares these components with his own.

### **3.3.1 Proposed Components of Language Function**

Malinowski (1923 & 1935) proposed two broad categories of the functions of language, namely, the "pragmatic" and the "magical" uses of language. He further subdivides the pragmatic into "active" or "phatic" and "narrative", while the magical uses of language remain associated with ceremonial or religious activities in the culture (cf. 3.1.1.2).

Another quite different classification is associated with the Austrian psychologist K. Buhler (1934), who was concerned with language from the standpoint not so much of the culture but of the individual. Buhler made the distinction into "'expressive', 'conative' and 'representational' language: the expressive oriented towards the 'self', the speaker, the conative towards the rest of the reality\_\_ that is, anything other than the speaker or the addressee, the representational being a language of informing of factual objective content of extralinguistic reality" (Vachek, 1966, p. 34). According to Halliday (1980b, [1989, p. 15])<sup>40</sup>, Buhler was "applying a conceptual framework inherited from Plato: the distinction of first, second and third persons; and on this basis Buhler recognized three functions of language according to their orientation to one or other of the three persons." Halliday, however, believes that the demands that the speakers, listeners, writers and readers make on language are indefinitely many and varied. They can be, ultimately, derived from a small number of general headings, but these headings will depend on "what type of questions we are asking" (Halliday, 1971b [1973a, p. 105]). Therefore, from a psychological point of view, the functions of Buhler were functions of language in the life of the individual; whereas the functions adopted by Malinowski, looked at from a sociological point of view, were those of language which serve in the life of the community.

The Pragueans adopted Buhler's basic functions of language (cf. Chapter 2). Buhler's three functions discussed above should *not* be regarded

as naturally exclusive within *ONE* context or within some of its

*segments. . . . In most instances two even all of the three functions are found to coexist in the same utterance, but one of them is found to be prominent* (Vacheck, 1966, p. 35) [my emphasis & ellipsis].

What is said by Vacheck above echoes, though from a distance, the claim of almost all text-typologists that text-typological functions are not exclusive, but that one such function will 'predominate' in any particular text, as Beaugrande and Dressler (1981) have said:

Some traditionally established text types could be defined along functional lines, i.e. according to the distribution of texts to human interaction. *We would be able to identify some **DOMINANCES**, though without obtaining a strict categorization for every conceivable example. . . . In any text, we would find a mixture of descriptive, narrative, and argumentative functions* (Beaugrande & Dressler, 1981, p. 184) [my emphasis & ellipsis]<sup>41</sup>.

Jackobson (1960) expands on Buhler's three functions by including another three: the poetic function, oriented towards the message; the transactional function, oriented towards the channel and metalinguistic function oriented towards the code. He sees a speech event as being influenced by six factors, each of which determines a different function that language can have when it is usually used by the speaker in society. "There is [1] the addresser, who sends [2] a message to [3] the addressee, which must be within [4] a context that is 'seizable' by the addressee, and delivered in [5] a shared code that is common to the addresser and the addressee, and finally, there must be [6] a contact, understood as being both a physical channel and a psychological connection between the addresser and the addressee which enables both of them to be in communication (Jakobson, 1960, p. 353)<sup>42</sup>. Each of these factors determines a different function which may be more or less prominent in a given utterance. Jakobson considers that "context corresponds to Buhler's [1] referential or representational function". Buhler's expressive function, which Jakobson prefers to call [2] "emotive", refers to language that is focused on the addressee; while orientation "towards the addressee coincides with [3] the conative function, [and when] language emphasizes the message for its own sake, [4] the poetic function is paramount" (Jakobson, 1960, p.353). The contact corresponds to that function of language which serves to "prolong or to discontinue communication, and to check whether the channel works (Jakobson, op. cit., p. 355), which Jakobson likens to Malinowski's notion [5] of phatic function. Finally,

"language that deal primarily with the code itself has [6] a metalinguistic function" (Jakobson, op. cit., p. 356)

Desmond Morris (1967)<sup>43</sup> comes up with yet another classification of the functions of language which he called "information talking", "mood talking", "exploratory talking" and "groom talking". The first cooperative exchange of information, Morris seems to imply, comes first, although in the life history of a human child "it arises last of all" (Halliday, 1980b, [1989, p. 16]). The second is likened to Buhler's and Britton's (see below) "expressive function". The third is defined as "talking for talking sake, aesthetic or play function"\_\_ what Malinowski referred to earlier (1935) as "phatic communion", meaning communion through talking, "when people use expressions like 'nice day, isn't?', as a way of 'oiling' the social process and avoiding friction" (Halliday, op. cit., p.16)

James Britton (1970)<sup>44</sup> adapted and developed in a different direction Buhler's scheme of language functions. He proposed a framework of "transactional", "expressive" and "poetic" functions. As an English educator, he was concerned with the development of writing abilities by small children in school, where, he believed, writing developed first in an expressive context, and the ability was then evolved to "outward" to transactional writing on the other hand and to poetic on the other. Transactional writing was that which emphasized the participant role, whereas in poetic language, the writer's role was more that of a spectator" (Halliday, 1980b [1989 ,p. 17]).

Halliday (1980b, [1989], p.17) believes that although these schemes look very different, and use different terms, and although apart from Britton (1970), none of the proponents had read any of the others, there is a considerable similarity among them (see next page):

Malinowski (1923)	pragmatic		shaded area <sup>11</sup>	magical	
	narrative	active			
Buhler (1934)	representational (3rd person)	conative (2nd person)	expressive (1st person)	shaded area	
Britton (1970)	transactional		expressive	shaded area	poetic
	informative	conative			
Morris (1967)	information talking	shaded area	grooming talking	mood talking	shaded area
	information uses: (orientation to control)	interactive uses (orientation to effect)		imaginative uses	
		control other	mutual support	express self	ritual poetic

Figure 3-3: Functional theories of language where function equal 'use'.

Halliday represents them in this table and sets them out in rows, in such a way that there is a vertical correspondence:

Each entry corresponds more or less to those above and below it. When we do this, we can see that all recognize that language is used for talking about things (informative\_ narrative\_ representational\_) and they all recognize that language is used for 'me and you' purposes, expressing the self and influencing others ( mood\_ expressive\_ conative\_ active). More patchily, there is a third motif of language in a more imaginative or aesthetic function (Halliday, 1980b, [1989, p. 16]).

What scholars were producing, according to Halliday (1980b, [1989, pp. 16-17]) was essentially a kind of conceptual framework in "non-linguistic terms", looking at language from the outside, and using this as a "grid" for interpreting the different ways in which people "use" language. In all these interpretations with the exception of Danes' (cf. 2.2.3), one can say that language function is interpreted as equal to use.

In his investigation of the theory of the function of language, Halliday takes the above schemes one step further: a step that interprets functional variation not just as variation in the use of language, but rather as something that is built in to the organization of language itself, particularly to the semantic system.

In other words function will be interpreted not just as the use of language but as a fundamental property of language itself, something that is basic to the evolution of the semantic system. This amounts to saying that the organization of every natural language is to be explained in terms of a functional theory (Halliday, 1980b, [1989, p.17]).



The next section gives an explanation of Halliday's Functional approach as represented by his functional components. This will be presented as a comparison to and an extension of the above table, with one major difference, namely that I take into account Halliday's claim that, in his components of language function, function no longer equals the use of language.

### **3.3.2 Halliday's Functional Components**

Halliday, like Malinowski, Bühler, Jakobson, and all others, proposes a multifunctional mode of language. For him, the three essential functions of language are, as mentioned earlier, the ideational, the interpersonal and the textual. He differs from Malinowski in that he does not equate functions of language with use of language, and he differs from Bühler and Jakobson in that the three functions are "simultaneous and compatible" (Halliday, 1974, p. 49).

As also mentioned earlier, there are many demands or uses that language is called upon to serve, which no linguistic theory has attempted to systemize, but the fact that language can serve such a variety of purposes is precisely because the language system is organized into this small set of "highly generalized functional components". Whatever we are using language for, "we need to make some reference to the categorization of our experience [ideational function]; we need to take some role in the interpersonal situation [interpersonal component]; and we need to embody these in the form of text [textual component]" (Halliday, 1974, p. 49-50). In other words, "an utterance must be about something; it must express the speaker's stake in the matter, and it must be operational in its own context" (Halliday, op. cit., p.51).

Each of these general functions of language corresponds in the Hallidayan model, to one of his "dimensions of grammatical structures" (Halliday, op. cit., p.49), which he later characterizes as "semantic components". Each dimension consists of a subset of "highly interdependent systems" (Halliday, 1968, p.207) - paradigmatic sets - whose terms express semantic correlates of the various subfunctions within the particular dimension of the grammar.

In Halliday's 1977 model, the ideational dimension embraces both the experiential and the logical functions, and "the two sets of the systems are tightly

interdependent" (Halliday, 1977, p. 178)<sup>46</sup>. The logical system expresses logical meaning – e.g. "parataxis and hypotaxis, the subject, predicate relations and the universal relation of 'and', 'or', 'if', and negative implication" (Halliday, 1968, p.209). He also believes that

There is in every natural language a relatively small network of fundamental logical relations which are not the relationships of formal logic, but those from which the relationships of formal logic are ultimately derived (Halliday, 1980b, [1989, p. 21]).

The experiential systems are those that express "patterns of experience" or "the expression of content". Their function corresponds to Bühler's representational or referential function, or the level of semantic structure proposed by Danes (1966, pp. 226-227)<sup>47</sup> (cf. 2.2.3). In Halliday's model for English, the experiential function is expressed by transitivity, or as he calls it "the grammar of processes\_\_of action, mental processes, relational and of the participants in these processes and of the attendant circumstances" (Halliday, 1974, p. 50).

The interpersonal dimension might be expected to correspond to Danes' level of grammatical structure (Danes 1966, p. 227), although Halliday emphasizes not the formal aspect of syntax, but rather the functional meaning of the respective systems in terms of the speakers participation in the speech event: "his choice of speech role (mood) and his assessment of the validity of what he is saying (modality)" (Halliday, 1974, p. 47). This is why Halliday questions, in this same article, the validity of Danes' grammatical structure. If, he says, "it is purely formal and deprived of all semantic content, why should a language have a level of structure whose only function is to be a level of structure?" (loc. cit.; cf. also 2.2.3 & 2.2.3.1). Halliday suggests, therefore, that "this level is equivalent, in Bühler's scheme, to a combination of the conative and the expressive functions" (Halliday, op. cit., p. 47). The interpersonal dimension comprises the systems of mood, or as Halliday calls it "the grammar of speech functions\_\_ the roles adopted (and those imposed on the listener) by the speaker, and his associated attitudes" (Halliday, op. cit., p. 50). Furthermore, Halliday believes that Danes' *grammatical structure* "is not very well named; it is a functional component like the first one ['the semantic structure']"; he also adds that "*it is equally 'semantic'*" (Halliday, op. cit., p. 47) [my emphasis]. Halliday also points out that it is the 'level'

whose elements are subject, predicate and the like. The subject in English, Halliday (loc. cit.) stresses, "is essential to the expression of mood"; in fact, the organization of clauses into some form of predicative structures has in many languages, English for one, a modal function of expressing the speaker's participation in, or intrusion into, the speech event: his choice of speech role (mood), and his evaluation of the validity of what he is saying (modality). As a result of the above argument, Halliday postulates:

an "experiential component" (= Buhler's "representational", Danes' "semantic" and an "interpersonal" component (Buhler's "conative" and "expressive", Danes' "grammatical"), and [he] insists that both are represented on equal terms in the description of language. In other words, each has both semantic and lexicogrammatical connotations (Halliday, 1974, p. 47).

Finally, in addition to the functions identified by Buhler, and the levels of structure proposed by Danes, Halliday goes on to establish a dimension corresponding to the "enabling" or textual function, which he considers "intrinsic to all languages" (Halliday, 1974, p. 47). This is the function by means of which language is "enabled to serve the variety of ends in the contexts of which it has evolved" (Halliday, op. cit., p. 53). When speakers assume that what they hear and read is text, i.e., that communication is taking place, for Halliday, this assumption is a functional one, since "it rests . . . on recognizing the role that language is playing in the situation" (Halliday, op. cit., p. 48). This dimension corresponds to the "grammar of the message" (Halliday, op. cit., p. 50): the grammar which specifies choices which the speaker makes in "introducing structure into discourse" (Halliday, 1967c. p.179)\_\_\_ and which results in the establishment of "the point of departure" for the organization of the clause as a "message", in the regulation of the delivery of "information" and in the "grounding" or the assignment of relative "salience" to a specific element or portion of an utterance. These choices represent the ultimate and the essential means by which the pieces of language are organized into the text. The systems to which these choices correspond are the tools for the formation of the message. Its stems represent

the principal options whereby the speaker introduces structure into discourse (in the ideal sense) ensures 'comprehension'\_\_\_ the recognition of the text as a text and its interpretation along predicated lines, (Halliday, 1968, p. 179).

The textual dimension includes the systems that constitute resources not only for

attaching the clause to what has gone before in the preceding text or discourse, but also for "organizing the sentence in such a way that it is appropriate as information in context" (Halliday, op. cit., p.210).

Halliday considers that the expression of the textual systems is unquestionably represented "as part of the meaning potential" (Halliday, 1974, p. 48). According to him, the systems respective functions, as mentioned earlier, have semantic correlates. Utterances are necessarily "multifunctional", but their structure must bring all the functions together so that they are integrated. The systems within each broad dimension of the grammar "are elaborately interrelated and there is also interdependence between the three major dimensions" (Halliday, op. cit., pp. 50-51). Every clause includes realization of systems representing a multiplicity of functions, and "all parts of the grammar have contributed to its specification" (Halliday, 1968, p. 207). In this context, Halliday also believes that "there is no suggestion of one component being 'deeper' or 'more surface' than others" ( Halliday, 1974, p. 51).

### **3.3.3 Realization of Functional Components in Surface Structure**

As early as the late 1960s, Halliday proposes that the functional components "enter into, and collectively exhaust, the determination of English clause structure" (Halliday, 1969a, [Halliday & Martin 1981, p. 139])<sup>48</sup>. In other words, the structural functions in the clause are fully derivable from the systems of option in transitivity, mood, and theme, but no one of these sets of options by itself fully specifies the clause structure; each one determines a different set of structural functions. To support this argument, Halliday provides the following example (taken from Halliday 1969a) :

3-3 // well then surely // he must have made a fair amount of money//

Halliday's analysis of this sentence runs as follows:

- A. Ideational (Transitivity) : Actor: (he) + process: (must have made) +  
Range: (a fair amount of money.)
- B. Interpersonal (Modal) : Subject (he) + Predicate (must have made . . .).
- C. Textual (Theme) : Theme: (well then surely he) + Rheme: (must have made . . .).

Thus, the structural description of the clause will be a string of elements each of which is a complex of structural functions (3-4a & b):

3-4a. well then/ surely/ he: ( Theme/ Conjunction + Modality/ Theme/ New/ + Actor/ Subject/ Theme/Anaphoric).

3-4b. must have made/ a fair/ amount of money. (Process/Predicator/modality + Range/ New ).

In the above analysis, Halliday assumes that this sentence was taken from a spontaneous speech situation, and consisted of two phonologically unmarked tone groups, with the tonic nucleus falling on 'surely' and 'money'. He also omitted the "complement", "rheme", and "given" as not needing to be specified.

Halliday sometimes uses the analogy of polyphonic music, in which several "strands" or lines are "interwoven to form the complete musical fabric [surface structure]" (e.g. Halliday, 1973a [1973, p. 42]). Each strand in the language structure is contributed by one of the functional components, and consists of a complex of functions, functional roles or microfunctions.

Until now, the term function has been used in three related, but distinct senses: (1) the non-technical meaning which can be glossed as corresponding to the overall uses of language, (2) a component of grammar (ideational, interpersonal and textual) and (3) a role forming a structural element in a strand contributed by one of the functional components.

Halliday (1961) has pointed out that the elements of structure proposed by "the scale and category model" (e.g. subject, predicate, complement and adjunct of the clause; SPCA) be more accurately regarded as "relations" or "functions". From 1966 onward, however, Halliday's orientation towards a semantic orientation of grammar became clearer. Therefore, it is not surprising that, according to Butler,

other functional relations of a semantically oriented kind, become incorporated into the grammar. Such relations are proposed for each of the key areas of transitivity, mood, and theme, which constitute the functional component networks of the clause rank. These functional roles are elements making up the strands of structure contributed by each functional components (Butler, 1985, pp. 48-49).

Transitivity is concerned, as mentioned earlier, with the relations between processes and their participants. There is a functional relationship between types of

process (for example, action, process, etc.) and types of participants involved in the process (i.e. actor performing the action and the goal towards which the action is directed). The ideational function, thus, provides a strand of structure consisting of functional elements such as actor, process and goal. Halliday (1985, p.34)<sup>49</sup>, provides the traditional notion of the nineteenth century definition of actor as

the logical subject, which meant 'the doer of the action'. It was called 'logical' in the sense this term had from the seventeenth century, that of 'having to do with relations between things', as opposed to 'grammatical' relations which were relations between symbols.

Halliday's own definition of the concept of actor does not differ a great deal from the above definition except the name. Moreover, he maintains the idea that his ideational component consists of two sub-components: an experiential and a logical. The above definition is quoted by Halliday as one used by the 19<sup>th</sup> century linguists for the logical subject. His own definition of actor is that:

the actor is a function of the **CLAUSE AS A REPRESENTATION** (of a process). It is the active participant in the process: the 'one that does the deed (Halliday, 1985, p. 35) [original emphasis].

Halliday's rejection of the 19<sup>th</sup> century definition of the notions of logical subject, grammatical subject and psychological subject (see the definition of these two below) comes as a reaction to his rejection of the idea that these three types are "varieties of a superordinate concept covering all the three". He believes that this is not true when it comes to talking about "natural living languages", where these three notions are "three separate and distinct functions". (loc. cit.).

The mood system distinguishes initially between the clause types indicative and imperative, and then between declarative and interrogative types of indicative clauses. The functional role "modality", contributed by the interpersonal component, has the function of carrying these distinctions, that part of the clause which is not concerned with showing mood distinction being "residual" or "propositional" (cf. Halliday, 1968, 1973b & 1976). Within the modal element, the mood distinction is shown by the "presence" or "ordering" of the subject and the finite verb. Halliday exemplifies this by the following example (taken from Halliday, 1973, p.43) (see next page):

3-5	This Gazebo was built by Sir Christopher Wren.			
	S	P		A
	Modal		Propositional	

The fact that the clause is indicative in mood is signalled by the presence of the subject. Furthermore, the subject precedes the finite verb which shows that the clause is in the declarative mood rather than the interrogative. To show this last point clearly, Halliday gives the following example:

3-6	Was	(this Gazebo)	built	by Sir Christopher Wren?
	P	S	P	A
	Modal		Propositional	

Halliday (1967c, p.213) gives a definition of the subject as "that nominal which, together with the finite element, fulfils a modal role in the realization of speech function; the two together form a constituent specified by the mood system"<sup>50</sup>. Thus, there is an intimate relationship between the functional roles of modal or proposition and the S,P,C and A functional structure of the clause. It is also made clear by Halliday (loc. cit.) that "the function subject is specified in the mood systems, not in the transitivity systems; the term therefore, corresponds to the 'surface subject' of transformational grammar and not to the 'deep subject' (which is the transitivity function)". Halliday (1985) provides the following as the 19<sup>th</sup> century definition of the grammatical subject:

'that of which something is predicated'. It was called 'grammatical' because at the time the construction of the subject and predicate was thought of as a purely grammatical relation. It was seen to determine various grammatical features, such as the case of the noun or pronoun that was functioning as subject and its concord of person and number with the verb, but was not thought to express any particular meaning (Halliday, 1985, pp.33-34).

Following his comment of the 19<sup>th</sup> century labelling and definition of grammatical subject, Halliday also redefines grammatical subject:

The subject is a function of the **CLAUSE AS AN EXCHANGE**, It is the element that is held responsible : in which is vested the success of the clause in whatever is its particular speech function (Halliday, 1985, p.37) [original emphasis].

The textual component contributes to the functional roles of theme and rheme: the theme is "what is being talked about, the point of departure of the clause as a message" ( Halliday, 1967c, p. 212), and the rheme constituting the rest of the clause. Also derived from the textual component, are the functional roles of "Given" and "New", representing a distribution of information into that which "the speaker assumes to be available to the hearer and that which is represented as new". The latter roles, however, strictly operate in the structure of the phonological unit "tone group" rather than that of the clause. The theme, in the sense of the traditional grammar of the second half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, is renamed thus after the "psychological subject", which Halliday defines as:

‘that which is the concern of the message.’ It was called psychological because it was what the speaker had in his mind to start with, when embarking in the production of the clause (Halliday, 1985, p. 33).

Again, Halliday provides his own definition of theme in a number of his articles since 1967; these all turn out to be the same. One of the latest definitions of the concept of theme is

a function of **THE CLAUSE AS A MESSAGE**. It is what the message is concerned with: the point of departure of what the speaker is going to say (Halliday, 1985, p.36.) [original emphasis].

In order to consider the functional strands of which the overall clause structure is composed, a fuller analysis, adopted mainly from Halliday (1973,[1973a, p.43]), is given in the example below: it is assumed also, as in example 3-4 above, that the clause is extracted from a spoken discourse, and has one tone group with the tonic nucleus falling on the last syllable, for the purpose of allocating the ‘given and new’ elements of the functional structure:

3-7.		This Gazebo was built by Sir Chirstopher Wren		
A. Ideational	:	Goal	Process	Actor
B. Interpersonal:		Modal	Propositional	
C. Interpersonal:		S	P	A
D. Textual	:	Theme	Rheme	
E. Textual	:	Given		New

(Halliday, 1973, [1973a, p.43])

This analysis shows clearly that each part of the clause serves a number of functions, derived from the different functional components. The group ‘this Gazebo’, for example, has a complex function of roles: goal, (part of) modal, theme, and (part



of) given. "The functional roles are themselves reflexes of the systemic choices made by the clause network of transitivity, mood, and theme, and by the tone group in the information distribution network" (Butler, 1985, p. 50). The realization of these systemic choices as a single integrated structure involves the "hooking up together the selections in meaning which are derived from the various functions of the language, and realizing them in a unified structural form" (Halliday, 1973; [1973a, p. 42]).

### **3.4 Halliday's Socio-Semantic Model of Language**

One of the most salient features of Hallidayan linguistics in the late 1960s was its functional orientation. In addition, Halliday asserts that the very design of the grammar itself reflects the basic needs which language is called upon to serve, namely the expression of experience (ideational function), and the expression of social roles and attitudes (interpersonal function) together with the language's internal function of organizing messages into coherent texts (textual component). In the early 1970s, Halliday continues to emphasize the functional basis of language, but, by this time, he has attempted to integrate his functional approach into a wider perspective of the language system.

Being of a Firthian nature, this perspective is sociological. In this perspective, the main preoccupation is social man, and the study of social man presupposes the study of language in conjunction with him. This issue has been a major concern of modern linguistics. Firth (1935), who first introduced the term "sociological linguistics", discusses the study of language in a social perspective and outlines a program for "describing and classifying the typical context of situation within the context of culture . . . [and] types of linguistic functions in such a context of situation" (Firth, 1935, [1957, p. 27])<sup>51</sup>. As mentioned earlier, Firth's notions of context of situation and that of culture, were derived from those of Malinowski's (1923), whose ideas about what might be called situation, culture and semantics respectively provide an interesting starting point for the study of language and social man. These ideas have encouraged linguists like Halliday, (1971a [1973, p.49])<sup>52</sup>, to "look at language as a form of '**behavioural potential**'". From this point of view, language is considered as a range of possibilities, an "open-ended" set of options in behaviour that are available

to the individual in his existence as a social man. Malinowski's context of culture is the environment for the total set of these options, his context of situation is the environment of any particular selection that is made from within them.

Thus Malinowski's two types of context embody the distinction between the potential and the actual: the context of culture defines the potential and the context of situation defines that of the actual. According to Halliday (1971a), Firth merely developed the notion of context of situation and did not concern himself with the context of culture., "since he preferred to study generalized patterns of actual behaviour, rather than attempting to characterize the potential as such" ( Halliday, op. cit., p. 50). As a result, Firth built his linguistic theory around the original and fundamental concept of "system", as used by him in a technical sense; and "this is precisely a means of describing the potential and of relating the actual to it" ( Halliday, 1971a, p.51), although in the previous page (50), he claims that Firth did not attempt to characterize or describe the potential. Palmer (1968) believes that Firth did not concern himself with the context of culture because of his insistence on the need for accurate observation, and in no way implied that the study of language could be reduced to the study of instances, which Firth explicitly denies. With this, Palmer seems to be defending Firth in particular, and the systemic linguists in general, against the accusations of Chomsky and the Generative Grammarians, who accused the former of being corpus-oriented.

Halliday, (1971a, [1973, p.51]), also interprets the notion of system as a "set of options that is specified for a given environment [i.e. a given context of situation]. The meaning of it [system] is that under the conditions stated, there are the following possibilities." By making use of this notion, Halliday describes language as a form of behavioural potential, and in this way, language analysis comes within the range of social theory, provided that the underlying concepts of such a theory are such that they can be shown to be realized in social contexts and patterns of behaviour.

This is the reason why Halliday (1974a, [1978, pp. 12-16])<sup>53</sup> sees language from an "inter-organism" perspective, which is concerned with behaviour in social interaction and not from the "intra-organism" perspective, which was dominant at that time due to the influence of Chomskyan linguistic insights, and in some respect still remains the dominant perspective. Therefore, when Halliday, (1974a), talks of social

man, the contrast he makes is not of the social versus the individual, but rather that of the social versus the psychological. Looking at the individual from an inter-organism perspective (looking at him from the outside), Halliday regards the individual as an integral whole; whereas looking at him from an intra-organism perspective (looking on the inside of the individual, into his works); Halliday focuses on the first. But at the same time, Halliday does not seem to deny the existence of both perspectives; in fact he says:

language can be considered from either of these points of view, the first is what we called . . . 'language as behaviour', the second 'language as knowledge'. Language and the social man means a function of the whole man; hence language man to man, or as human behaviour. (Halliday, 1974a, [1978, p. 13]) [my ellipsis].


In spite of the fact that he considers the two perspectives to be "complementary", he adopts the first, the "the sociolinguistic" one, which he refers to as the inter-organism perspective. For him (), therefore, language is considered as:

the encoding of 'behavioural potential' into a 'meaning potential', that is a means of expressing what the human organism 'can do' in interaction with other human organisms, by turning it into what he 'can mean' ( the semantic system) is, in turn, embedded into what he 'can say' (the lexicogrammatical system, or grammar and vocabulary).

The last step in the process of realization is that of lexicogrammer being realized as a combination of phonological and ultimately phonetic elements. Halliday, as early as 1971, says almost the same thing about the potentiality of language:

the potential of language is a meaning potential. This meaning potential is the linguistic realization of the behavioural potential, 'can mean' is 'can do' when translated into language. The meaning potential is in turn realized in the language system as lexicogrammatical potential which the speaker 'can say' ( Halliday, 1971a, [1973, p. 51]).

Butler (1985) believes that there is an implicit shift in the quotation above: the term meaning potential was originally used for the functionally based networks of lexicogrammar, those of transitivity, mood, and theme; but now it is being used for the potential available at a new socio-semantic level. In this new model, the socio-semantic is related both "upwards" to behavioural options which are themselves outside language, "downwards" to the syntax and lexis of the language, the relation involved, as we said earlier, is that of realization (see next page);



In order to ensure a sound basis for his sociosemantic model, Halliday insists that the meaning choices should relate to behaviour options which are interpretable, and are predicted to be important on the basis of some social theory. The theory which Halliday bases his discussion on is that of Bernstein (1971), in which language is held to play a critical role in the socialization of the child through what the latter proposes as "critical social contexts" in the socialization process. Halliday investigates these contexts and settings that are socially significant in the transmission of cultural values. In addition, he believes that language has evolved in the service of these social functions. Therefore, it is to be expected that Halliday will take account of the social factors in explaining the nature of language; this is why he claims that there is a clear "linguistic motivation" for the studies of a socio-linguistic kind.

Butler (1985, p. 60) believes that what Halliday is aiming to do, "is to provide an account of the meaning potential available in behavioural environments defined in terms of the categories of a social theory". These categories may relate to generalized social contexts of importance to the culture as, for example, the context of the mother and the child interacting which is central to Bernstein's theory of socialization. These categories may also relate to types of settings in which structural units of social interaction can be identified such as that of shop interaction<sup>54</sup>.

The behaviour potential patterns derived from social contexts and settings are thus intrinsic to the social theory; they are arrived at in a search for explanations of social phenomena, and are independent of whatever linguistic patterns may be used to express or realize them. The function of the semantic network, however, is to show how these "social meanings" are arranged into linguistic meanings, which are then

realized through the different strata of the language system. But whereas the social meanings or behaviour patterns are specific to their social contexts and settings, their linguistic reflexes are very general categories such as those of transitivity, mood, modality, information structure and the like. Thus, Halliday, (1972, [1973 , p. 99])<sup>55</sup>, concludes that "the input to the semantic network is sociological and specific, and the output is linguistic and general"<sup>56</sup>. Halliday clarifies his position, in this regard, by implying that the social contexts and settings themselves are highly specific when he says:

the range of alternatives that each one offers, the meaning potential available for the speaker in a given situation type, tends to be specific to the situation type in question; whereas the grammatical options through which the meaning selection are realized are general to the language as a whole (Halliday, 1972, [1973, p. 100]).

What the above suggests is that the 'move' from the general social categories to the general linguistic ones must involve an intermediate specific categorization, in this case it is the semantic networks of the semantic system or stratum, where the one is related to the other; "an interface of more specific feature is needed to bridge the gap from generalization of sociology to those of linguistics" (Halliday, 1972, [1973, pp.100-101]).

Therefore, the task, as seen by Halliday (1972), is to specify both meaning options available in a given context or setting, and the possible combinations of lexicogrammatical options which can realize the semantic choices. He also asserts that options in natural language exist at all levels: phonological, lexicogrammatical and semantics. The semantic options, as mentioned earlier, are, in turn, coded in options in grammar, but there are no grammatical categories corresponding exactly to such concepts such as threat, for example. Halliday, (1971a & 1972 and elsewhere) does not expect to find a simple one-to-one relationship between the grammatical options and the semantic ones. Instead, there may be a prediction, deriving from a social theory, that this will be among the significant behavioural categories represented in the meaning potential. In this case, it should be possible to identify certain options in the grammar as being systematic realization of these categories, since presumably they are to be found somewhere in the language system.

Halliday (1971a) asserts that there is nothing new in the notion of associating

If one looks at the examples 18a-e, one finds different word order (WO) in each sentence, even the one which has no case markings has a VSO WO, which suggests that this word order is the unmarked case of SA because it resembles 18b and c which have the case-markers (cf.5.2 below). Sentences 18c & d and 18e represent, respectively, a VOS verbal sentence, an equational sentence and an imperative or requisitive sentence.

Quṭrub, a Basran and a student of Sibawayhi, is the only TAG who voices his rejection of the notion that 'parsing case-markers' (al-'i'rāb) signals meaning of NPs. He points out that these markers are invented by the grammarians to speed up the utterance of discourse segments and to avoid spelling out two consecutive utterances where one ends with a jussive case and the other begins with one, a thing that may delay the articulation of the rest of the utterance of discourse. Thus, "when they [Arabs] link a noun with the subsequent utterance, they use other cases other than the jussive" (quoted in az-Zajājī, 1959, p. 70); az-Zajājī rejects this claim when he (loc. cit) says:

if what he (Quṭrub) says is true, then it would be possible to make the subject in the genitive case, in the nominative case or in the accusative case . . . , so long as the sole purpose is to avoid the jussive case following the pause, in order to straighten the discourse. This will eventually lead to 'a deterioration of discourse', and it will contradict the methods by which Arabs are using their language to communicate [messages] and will contradict the wisdom of their WO. [my ellipsis and translation].

This claim by Quṭrub is also rejected by Mustafa (1959, p.52)<sup>18</sup>, who believes that "Quṭrub was not faithful to his view", but Mustafa does not go any further in his comment.

Although Mustafa criticizes the TAGs with regard to their categorization of the various types of 'operators' ('awāmil), he follows suit their notion of the case-markers as signals of meanings and functions of the NPs<sup>19</sup>. He points out that TAGs would not have adhered to such a notion had they not been convinced that these case marking are used as means of delineating the meanings of discourse constituents. Therefore, according to him, the 'the nominative case marker' (damma) signals predication ('isnād) ; this is made clear from the fact that the NP, in a sentence, is meant to have another constituent "to be attributed to it, and to say something about it" (Mustafa, op. cit., p. 50), which, in Halliday's (1967c) sense, is the theme followed by the rheme, or

### 3.4.1 Halliday's Meaning Potential Versus Chomsky's Competence

These two notions are somewhat different: a meaning potential is defined not in terms of the mind but in terms of the culture; not in what the speaker "knows", but as what he "can do" \_\_ in the special sense of what he can do "linguistically". Halliday, (1971a, [1973, pp. 52-53]) emphasizes that the distinction is important because "can do" is of the same order of abstraction of "does"; the two are related simply as potential to actualized potential, and can be used to illuminate one another<sup>57</sup>. "But 'knows' is distinct and clearly insulated from 'does'; the relation between them is a complex and oblique, and leads to the quest for a 'theory of performance' to explain the 'does'" (Halliday, 1971a, [1978, p. 54]). This is what lies behind Hymes (1971) notion of '*communicative competence*', or competence in use<sup>58</sup>. Halliday () links this with Chomsky, when he says that the great thing Chomsky has achieved is that he was the first to show that natural language could be brought within the scope of formalization. In other words, one can study language as a formal system. The cost of this, according to Halliday, is a very high degree of idealization, which will result in leaving out a great many of those variations and those distinctions that are precisely of interest to those who are concerned with the sociological study of language. Halliday believes that by looking at language from this point of view, Chomskyan linguistics becomes so highly idealized that it becomes a form of "reductionism"<sup>59</sup>; whereas if

you are interested in linguistic *interaction*, you don't want the high level of idealization that is involved in the notion of competence; you can't use it, because most of the distinctions that are important to you [ as a socio-linguist] are idealized out of the picture (Halliday, 1974; in 1978, p. 38). [or 'ironed out' to borrow the term from Geach (1969)<sup>60</sup>, the philosopher].

This may be the reason why Halliday rejects any dichotomy of competence and performance, opposing what the speaker 'knows' to what he 'does' in his inter-organism perspective, which in turn rules out consideration of what the speaker knows. This may be also the reason why he describes Hymes' (1971) "psycho-sociolinguistic" model as an "unnecessary complication", since Hymes' position, as described by Halliday, looks as if "he is taking the intra-organism ticket to what is actually an inter-organism destination" (Halliday, 1978, p. 38).

For Halliday, (1971a, 1972, 1978 & elsewhere), a linguistic theory that accepts a low degree of idealization is the one that satisfies the needs of a social theory, and this is, according to him, what the meaning potential attempts to make possible. What follows is an example of how to enter the language system via semantic networks that realize the higher behaviour potential.

### 3.4.2 The Relationship between Behavioural Potential and Social Context: An Example

Halliday (1971a & 1972) admits that the examples he is using to show how the networks of semantic options can serve as a bridge between the sociological and the purely linguistic conceptual framework, are both "hypothetical" and "invented". But he asserts, however, that they are "based on actual investigations of social learning . . . carried out in London under the direction of Professor B. Bernstein ( Halliday, 1972, [1973, p.73]). He also draws on the work of Turner (1973)<sup>61</sup>, from whom most of his examples are taken.

One of the examples Halliday uses to illustrate the relationship between meaning potential and social context is that of a mother trying to control the behaviour of a child. For the purpose of brevity, only one portion of this example in this social context is discussed<sup>62</sup>. Out of the socio-semantic network, (shown in Halliday, 1972, [1973, p. 89]), which consists of the options of threat and warning with or without an explicit condition, the threat option is selected for the purpose of exemplification here:




Figure 3-4: The Threat Semantic Network

In controlling the behaviour of her child, the mother has a range of alternatives open to her. Some of these are non-linguistic: she can, for instance, smack the little one. However, if, instead, she decides to adopt linguistic means, the following are some of the options open to her, taken from (Halliday, 1972, [1973, p. 89]):

3-8 I'll smack you. [ if you do that again] (1,2,5,7).



- 3-9 Daddy'll smack you. (1,2,5,8).  
 3-10 You'll get smacked. (1,2,6).  
 3-11 I shall be cross with you. (1,3,7).  
 3-12 Dady'll be cross with you. (1,3,8).  
 3-13 You'll have to stay home (1,4)<sup>63</sup>.

If we take the first of these examples, we shall find that the mother's behaviour could be described linguistically as well as behaviourally. From the latter view point, the option can be categorized as a threat of punishment linked, for example, to the repetition of behaviour. From the former view point, however, the option can be described in terms of mood: a hypotactic complex clause in which the main clause is a transitive clause of action in simple future with 'smack' as process, 'I' as actor and 'you' as goal. The dependent clause, being conditional, is likewise of the action type, with situationally-referring process 'do that' & actor 'you'.

Halliday, (1972, [1973, pp. 90-91]), has also provided a set of preselection statements giving realization of that meaning in terms of choices in the lexicogrammatical areas of transitivity, mood, theme, voice, aspect and person, also lexical categories, specified as selections from particular sections of Roget's Thesaurus<sup>64</sup>. Below is a table of the lists of those that pertain to the examples given above:

Terms in Socio-Semantics	Lexico-grammatical Realization
physical punishment (2)	clause: action: vocabulary ('do' type), effective, ( 2 participants): goal= 'you'; future tense; positive; verb from Roget (972, 276).
agency specified (5)	voice (active) = 'you'.
agency unspecified (6)	voice (passive).
by the speaker (7)	actor/ attribuend= 'I'.
by others (8)	actor/ attribuend.
mental punishment (3)	clause: relational: attributive = adjective.
restraint on behaviour (4)	clause: action: modulation: necessity; actor, = 'you'.

Table 3-1: Options of the social context of threat and their realization in lexicogrammar.

Halliday (1972) has made it clear that the examples chosen were favourable ones. He also admits that he is "not able to construct a socio-semantic network for highly intellectual abstract discourse" (Halliday, op. cit., p.92), which could be taken as a hint by Halliday that it might be inherently impossible to construct such a network. He asserts however that these examples, beside being favourable, are also significant

in themselves, because they play a great part in the child's early learning of language; and even if with some adults the types of social contexts that are most favourable for sociolinguistic investigation become, as it were, "minority time" usages, he says, "this does not mean that they are not unimportant to the understanding of language" ().

Therefore, the meaning potential, or what the speaker can mean, is regarded as one of the realizational tools of a higher behavioural potential, specifying what a particular culture or sub-culture can do. In the work of Halliday from the mid of the 1970s onwards, (especially, 1975 & 1975a, 1977, 1978, 1979, 1980a , b & c), the notion of a higher behaviour system further is explored. In this respect, he (1978, p. 39) says:

it would be better at this point to talk in terms of a general semiotic level: the semantic system, which is the meaning potential embodied in language, is itself a realization of a higher level semiotic which may define as a behavioural system or more generally as a social semiotic. So when I [Halliday] say 'can do' I am specifically referring to the behaviour potential as a semiotic which can be encoded in language, or, of course, in other things too.

In what follows, I shall briefly review Halliday's views of language from a wider perspective: the semiotic one.

### 3.5 Language as Social Semiotic

For Halliday (1980a), The term "social semiotic" can be thought of as indicating a general ideology or intellectual stance<sup>65</sup>. This represents the approach that Halliday has been using in his recent work, and it has been a feature of his own thinking since "[he] became interested in the study of linguistics" (Halliday, 1980a, [1989, p. 3]).

The concept of **semiotics** derives initially from the concept of the sign, and this modern term refers back to the term *semaninon, semainomenon* (Signifier, signified) used in ancient linguistics by Stoic philosophers. The Stoics were the first to evolve a theory of the sign between the third and the second century B. C. Two thousand years later, the concept was developed further by the French linguist de Saussure<sup>66</sup>.

Culler (1976, p. 90) points out that Saussure has defined semiology (= semiotics) as "the science that would study the life of signs within society". For Halliday (1980a), however, such a definition tends to leave the sign as "an atomistic" and an isolated

concept, although he admits that the work of Saussure has a very strong conception of language as a set of relationships, and although Saussure's sign stands very much at the midpoint of sound and meaning — i.e it is rather closer to Halliday's lexicogrammar, than to the level of pure meaning, where Halliday sees semiotics as having its focus. This may be the reason which motivates Halliday (1980a, [1989, p.4]) to modify Saussure's definition of semiotics as "the study of the sign system" — in other words, as the study of **meaning**, in the most general sense of the word.

On the basis of his modification of the Saussurean definition of the term, Halliday considers linguistics as a kind of semiotics. It is one aspect of the study of meaning, and it may be, in some rather vague undefined sense, the most important, the most comprehensive, and the most "all-embracing". There are other modes of meaning in culture such as painting, sculpture, music, dance and so on. Other modes of meaning also include social behaviour like ways of dressing, family structure and the like. All these are bearers of meaning in the culture, something which prompts Halliday () to define culture as "a set of semiotic systems, a set of meaning, all of which interrelate."

In order to explain the general notion of semiotics, Halliday () claims that he cannot operate with the concept of sign as an entity; instead, he would have to think rather of systems of meaning, "systems that may be considered as operating through some form of external output that we call a sign, but that are in themselves not sets of individual things, but rather networks of relationships" (). It seems from this that Halliday is identifying the external output as the sign here and it seems also as if he is saying the system is made up of signs. Consequently, it is in this sense that he is using the term "semiotics" in order to define the perspective from which he looks at language, and in terms of which he considers language as one among many systems of meanings, which, if taken together, constitute human culture.

As for the term "social", Halliday uses it to suggest two things simultaneously. The first is general: used in the sense of social system, which he takes to be synonymous with culture. Thus, when he uses the term "social semiotics", he is simply referring to the social system, or culture. The second is specific, this is the use of the term in the sense of the relationships between language and the social structure, considering the social structure as one aspect of the social system, other aspects being the family role system, status and role relationships, hierarchy: caste social class and

so on (cf. figure 3-6 below).

As a result of considering the realities that lie above and beyond language, and which language serves to express, Halliday suggests that there are many directions in which one can move outside language in order to explain what language means. One of these directions, the psychological, adopted by Chomsky (1957) and Lamb (1966), explains language in terms of the processes of the human mind or the human brain. While not excluding any direction of interpretation, Halliday adopts the social one. He attempts to relate language primarily to one particular aspect of human experience, namely that of social structure. Thus Halliday takes the view of the social system as a semiotic system, a system of meaning, that is realized through the linguistic system.

The two systems, the social and the semantic, operate side by side, as two aspects of "a single unitary process". One has to bear in mind the fact that 'product' and 'process' are both important to Halliday although he is possibly more interested in process. In building up his social semiotic, the networks of meanings that constitute the culture, the child becomes "a member of the species of social man". The social man is, effectively, "a sociosemiotic man", a man as a repository of social meanings" ( Halliday, 1975a, p. 122<sup>67</sup>). In principle therefore, the child is learning one semiotic system, the culture, and the same time, he is learning the means of learning it, a second semiotic system, the language , and in particular the semantic system of the language, which is "an intermediary in which the first is encoded [realized]" (Halliday, op. cit, 122).

Thus what Halliday has called "language as a behaviour potential" in his early articles in the 1970s becomes known as "language as social semiotic" in articles which he has written since the mid 1970s. The total picture of language as social semiotic can be sorted out by identifying and integrating its various components into some sort of composite pattern including a socio-linguistic model. These components, as summarized by Halliday, (cf. Halliday, 1975a, p. 122 & 1975b, [1978, p. 109]), are the text, the situation, the text variety (register), the code (in Bernstein's sense), the linguistic system itself and the social system. Below is a brief discussion of each.

### **3.5.1 Text**

Halliday provides some definitions of text in most of his work since the early 1970s. Here, I shall list just a few. Halliday (1975a, p. 123), defines text as "any instance of language that is operational, as distinct from citational (like sentences in a grammar book, or words listed in a dictionary). Another definition by Halliday (1978, p. 122) is that "text is language that is functional: doing some job in some context, as opposed to isolated words or sentences that might be put on a blackboard". A third one is that, "text is any passage, spoken or written that does form a unified whole." (1976, p. 1)<sup>68</sup>. The combining factor of these and many other definitions of the term text is the fact that, for Halliday, text is "sociological event, a semiotic encounter through which the meanings that constitute the social system are exchanged" (Halliday, 1977, p. 197). The individual member of a society, is, by virtue of his membership, a "meaner", one who means. By his acts of meaning, and those of other individual meaners, the social reality is created, maintained in good order, and continually shaped and modified. In this context, Halliday (1975a, p. 123) says of text: " it is meaning and it is choice". Text is meaning that is, as mentioned earlier, encoded in (i.e. realized by) words and sentences, rather than consisting of them. Thus, Halliday locates text at the semantic level of language, and considers it a "semantic unit". The second main property is that of choice: text is "a selection within numerous sets of options; everything that is said presupposes a background of what **might** have been said but was not" ( Halliday, op. cit. p. 123). In linguistic terms, each decision by the speaker presupposes a paradigmatic environment, a set of options that have the potentiality of being selected under the given conditions. But since Halliday has defined the text as a semantic unit, and thus a constituent of the semantic system, he has proposed subsequently to change the word "said" with the word "meant"; and definition of the

text has become as "text is what is meant".

By text, then, we understand a continuous process of choice. Text is meaning, and meaning is choice, an ongoing current of selection each in its paradigmatic environment of what might have been meant (but was not) (Halliday, 1977, p. 195).

Hence, text is a "semantic structure" that is formed out of a continuous process of choice among innumerable (probably in the sense of involving recursivity in semantics), and interrelated sets of semantic options. Therefore, text, according to Halliday (1975a, p. 124), "is the actualization of meaning potential", since these sets of options\_\_ what can be meant, are the meaning potential of the semantic system.

Halliday (1975a) also suggests two ways of looking at meaning potential: either to look at it as the whole range of the semantic system of the language, or to view it as the form of sub-systems each of which is associated with a particular situation. The former is produced within the context of culture, the latter within the context of situation. Thus, text represents choice; it is 'what is meant', selected from the total set of options that constitute what can be meant. For this reason, Halliday (1975b, [1978], p. 109) defines it as "an actualized potential". The meaning potential, which is the paradigmatic range of semantic choices that is present in the system and to which the members of a culture have access in their language, can be characterized in two ways corresponding to Malinowski's distinction between the context of situation and the context of culture (Malinowski, 1923 & 1935). If meaning potential is interpreted in the context of culture, Halliday believes that "it involves the whole semantic system of the language" (Halliday, 1975a, p.124). This is why, in his later writings, Halliday (1975b, [1978, p. 109]) says that "this [context of culture] is a fiction, something we cannot hope to describe", and this is possibly why Halliday (1989) does not offer a separate model of the context of culture because according to him, "no such a thing yet exists, although there are useful ideas around" (Halliday, op. cit., p. 47). But if meaning potential is interpreted in the context of situation, it is a particular semantic system or a set of sub-systems, which is associated with a particular situation type, and this is why Halliday says that "it [context of situation] may be a more accessible one" (Halliday, 1975a, p.124.). Looking at text from the second vantage point, it may be possible to represent aspects of the meaning potential of a language as a set of options

that are specific to a given situation type. A text, produced in a particular context of situation, is a product of the actualization of the various choices made from the meaning potential available in that type of context. It is a product in the sense that it is "an output, something that can be represented in a systematic term" (Halliday, 1980a, [1989, p. 10]). But the text is not only a product of various choices made, it is also "an interactive process", the means of exchange between the members whether they are speakers engaging in a dialogue or writers and readers. It is a process in the sense of continuous process of semantic choice, a movement through the network of meaning potential, with each of the choices constituting the environment for a further choice. Hasan (1978, p. 229<sup>69</sup>), expresses the notion of text as "a social event whose primary unfolding [realization] is linguistic". Hasan (loc. cit.) also believes that if text can be seen as a bridge between the verbal symbolic system and the culture, "this is because of the relationship between text and the social context: text is in language as well as in culture". In other words, text is

both an object of its own right . . . and an instance of the social meaning in a particular context. It is a product of the environment, a product of a continuous process of choices in meaning that can be represented as a multiple paths or passes through the networks that constitute the linguistic system. (Halliday, 1980a, [1989, p.11]).

### **3.5.2 Situation**

Halliday has defined situation as "the medium in which the text lives and breathes" ( Halliday, 1975a, p.125); and as "the environment in which text comes to life" (Halliday, 1975b, [1978, p. 109]). Both definitions reflect one and the same idea: this is that the situation is the determining environment of the text; or as Halliday also puts it "it [situation] is the ecology of the text" (Halliday, 1975a, p. 125).

The above concept of situation is still within a general Malinowskian framework. As Firth (1957, p. 182), notes, however, situation "should not be interpreted in concrete terms as 'a sort of audio-visual record' of the surrounding backdrops of sight and sound, but as an abstract representation of the environment in terms of certain general categories having relevance to a text". (cf. 3.1.4 for a summary of Firth's characterization of context). Halliday (1975a, [1978, p. 109]), in turn, points

out that if situation is to have a place in the socio-linguistic universe, it has to be characterized in more abstract terms. It has to be conceived of not merely as situation, but in terms of situation *types*, in the sense of what Bernstein (1971) refers to as a 'social context'. This is essentially a semiotic structure: "a constellation of meanings deriving from the semiotic system that constitutes the culture" ( Halliday, 1975a, [1978, p. 109).

Halliday ( 1975b, [1978, pp. 109-110]), also believes that if it is true that a hearer, given the right information, can make sensible guesses about what the speaker is going to mean, and so is able to negotiate verbal interactions, and even, for example, adjust to a conversation which they have entered half way through, then this 'right information' is what Halliday refers to as social context. This information is the properties of a particular situation type, which collectively functions as the determinant of the text by specifying the semantic configuration that the speaker will typically fashion in the context of a given type. In other words, it is through the analysis of situation types as complexes of values for variables in the semiotic structure that Halliday is able to make the link between texts and situations produced in those texts.

### **3.5.2.1 The Semiotic Structure of the Situation**

Halliday (1975a), has pointed out that there are numbers of different approaches to characterizing the structure of the situation or the social context. For him, the most notable is Hymes' (1967), who characterizes the situation in terms of eight categories: form and content of the message, setting, participants, ends (intent and effect), key, medium, genre and the interactional norms.

According to Halliday, the problem with Hymes' categories is the kind of status and validity that can be accorded to a conceptual framework of this type: "are these to be thought of as descriptive categories providing a framework for the interpretation of the text in particular situation type instances, as conceived of by Malinowski? or are they predictive concepts providing a means of the determination of text in a generalized situation type?" ( Halliday, 1975a, p. 129). Halliday believes that either would be of interest, and I believe that they are saying the same thing, because interpretation and predictivity are one and the same aspect of the semiotic structure of a situation: two



sides of the same coin. But he adopts the second one, simply, as mentioned earlier, because he does not think of this or that situation, but of a situation type, "a generalized social context in which the text is created; and of the situational factors not merely as descriptive but as constitutive of the text" (Halliday, op. cit., p. 130). Logically, one can say that the text is created in a particular situation, but this situation is only understandable as a token of a situation type. For Halliday (1975a & b), such a conceptual framework for the representation of situation type, or properties of the social context as he calls it above, has to accomplish two things at the same time. The first thing is to predict features of the text, considered by Halliday as a semantic concept, where semantics, to him, is the highest stratum of the linguistic system and the one which realizes meaning potential (the latter being actualized/realised by texts). The second thing is that these categories (the semiotic aspects of the situation) should be two-faced: they should be related "downward" to the text and "upwards" to some higher order of abstraction\_\_ "in this case, it is two higher orders: the social and the linguistic systems" (Halliday, 1975a, p. 129). The odd part of this last quotation is the notion that these situational categories look "upwards" at the linguistic system, when the linguistic system, with semantics as its highest level and represented by text as its main unit, is beneath them (in terms of the general metaphorical orientation adopted by Halliday), and the situational categories are already looking down at the semantic level when looking at the text. In fact, the semiotic structure of the situation, in terms of field, tenor and mode, does "activate", according to Halliday (see below), the components of the semantic systems: the ideational, the interpersonal and the textual. These components, as will be discussed below, realise the semiotic structure of the situation.

Halliday's framework for the characterization of situation type is one he himself, Mackintosh, and Strevens have developed (Halliday, et. al. 1964)<sup>70</sup>. It is a three-fold analysis of the situation in terms of **field**, **tenor** and **mode**. He admits that it was not clear at that time 'why' he adopted such a scheme beside the fact that "intuitively it seemed simpler", but he gives a more complete answer when he says: "it can now be seen to offer a means of making an essential link between the linguistic system and the text" (Halliday, 1975a, p. 130). In hierarchial terms, Halliday seems to be proposing something along these following lines (see next page):




Figure 3-5: Halliday's proposed integration of the social & linguistic systems as depicted in Halliday, 1975a & b (>= higher rank)

The situation type, then, as Halliday understands it, is characterized by a particular semiotic structure, a complex of features which sets it up apart from other situation types. This semiotic structure can be interpreted in three dimensions: the ongoing activity (field), the relationships involved (tenor) and the symbolic or rhetorical channel (mode).

The field corresponds roughly to Hymes' setting and ends; it is the field of action, including symbolic action, in which the text has its meaning. It therefore includes what we usually call subject-matter, which is not an independent feature, but is a function of the type of activity.

The tenor, which corresponds in general terms to Hymes' participants and key, refers to the role relationships that are embodied in the situation, which determine levels of formality and speech styles but also very much else besides.

The mode, roughly Hymes' 'instrumentalities' and 'genre'; refers to the symbolic channel or wavelength, which is really the semantic function or functions assigned to language in the situation. Hence, this includes the distinction between speech and writing as a special case (Halliday, 1975a, p. 131).

In proposing the analysis of situation types in terms of the values of field, tenor and mode variables, Halliday is attempting to show in what way context of situation influences the selection of meanings for the construction of a text. His hypothesis is that each of the three functional components of the semantic system, the ideational, the interpersonal and the textual, is "activated" by one of these semiotic features of context of situation.

Each of the components of the situation tends to determine the selection of options in a corresponding component of the semantics. ... the field determines the experiential meanings, the tenor determines the selection of interpersonal meanings, and the mode determines the selection of the textual meanings. (Halliday, 1977, p.201).

Here, two major points emerge. The first point is explicated by Butler (1985, pp. 66-67), and the second is explained by Halliday himself (cf. 1975a, pp. 130-131 & 1975b, [1978, pp.109-110]). As for the first, Butler believes that if two texts differing in field are compared, the most likely differences in meaning choices "will be noticed with types of process, participants, circumstances, and the like, including the lexical characterization of relevant objects, persons and so on. "And if two texts differing in tenor are compared, the most likely differences "will be in the area of speech roles, styles of address, lexical and intonational expressions of attitude and other such interpersonal features. "While if two texts differing in mode are compared, the most likely differences "will be located in the areas of theme, information structure and cohesion."

The second point is that if the hearer or reader is given the "right information", he will be able to make "sensible guesses or predictions about what the speaker or writer is going "to mean" and about the linguistic properties of the text that is associated with it. According to Halliday, this prediction is going to be two-fold: about the register, which is the semantic options that typically feature in the environment or social context, and also about the grammar and vocabulary, which are the realization of the semantic options. Halliday also believes that in order to make these "sensible predictions", an "intermediary level" or some concept of text variety is required; and this is what he means by register.

### **3.5.3 Register**

Halliday (1975b, [1978 p. 110] & 1980c, [1989, p. 36]), defines register in terms of a "semantic concept"; whereas, as early as 1964, it was defined in terms of a "lexicogrammatical concept". This change came as a natural result of Halliday's overall linguistic shift from a lexicogrammatical based theory in the 1960s to a semantic based theory since the mid 1970s onwards. Lexicogrammatical register has been defined as "what the person is speaking is determined by what is he doing", in contrast with the "dialect", which is defined as "what the person is speaking is determined by who he is" (Halliday, 1975b, .110). In other words, register is language variety according to "use"; whereas dialect is language variety according to "user". As for the semantic definition of register, Halliday says:

A register can be defined as the configuration of semantic resources that the member of a culture typically associates with a situation type. It is the meaning potential that is accessible in a given social context. (Halliday, 1975b, [1978, p. 111]).

Following Halliday's line of linguistic thought, the register must also include the expressions, the lexicogrammar and the phonological features, that typically realize those meanings. This explains why some register types have "indexical features" in the form of participant words that have the function of indicating to the participants that this is the register in question. Halliday has given examples like " 'once upon a time', which is an indexical feature that serves to signal the fact that we are now embarking a traditional tale" (Halliday, 1980c, [1989, p. 39])<sup>71</sup>.

Halliday (1980c) also divided registers into two main categories: closed and open-ended types. This division is not clear-cut, but it is a scaler-type, which moves gradually, like a pendulum, from one end to the other: from an extremely closed system to a largely open-ended system with some indeterminate cases in between. For example, there are certain registers in which the total possible meanings, meaning potential, is fixed and limited, and may be quite small; whereas, in some others, the range of meanings is much less constrained. Closed registers were referred to by Firth as "restricted languages" (cf. 3.1.4), in the sense that there is no scope for either "individuality" or "creativity" because the range of possible meaning is fixed. Halliday (1980c) gives the language of civil aviation (the exchange of messages between the ground air traffic controller and the air crew in the cockpit), as an example of restricted languages. Here, the messages exchanged have one and only one meaning and are

internationally recognized (a claim supported by the author of this thesis who is a former air force pilot). At the other end of the scale come the most open-ended types of registers. These, according to Halliday (1980c), include all the various kinds of conversational strategies, the forms of discourse which speakers in everyday interaction use with other people when they try to persuade them, entertain or teach them, or whatever. Yet, Halliday (1980c, [1989, p.40]), believes that

even these are never totally open-ended. There is no situation in which the meanings are not to a certain extent prescribed for us. There is always some feature of which we can say, 'this is typically associated with this or that use of language'.

Halliday also believes that even the most spontaneous conversation has its strategies and styles of meaning. As a result, there is no absolute freedom of selection from all the resources of the linguistic system. If such freedom were given to speakers or writers, there would be no communication between interlocutors in any speech situation because they would lose the sense of coherence, continuity of the discourse topic realised in the text (in this case, spoken) at hand. Halliday, () insists that "we understand each other because we are able to make predictions, sub-conscious guesses, about what the other person is going to say."

The last point to be discussed in register and which has some bearing on language as social semiotic system is that of the relationship between register and dialect<sup>72</sup>. According to Halliday (1980c), dialects, in principle, are saying the same thing, the same meaning, in different ways; whereas registers are saying, that is to say, actualizing or realizing different meaning potentials. Thus dialects differ mainly in lexicogrammar, phonology and phonetics; whereas registers differ at almost all levels of language, but mainly the semantics and lexicogrammar as its realization, and to a lesser extent phonology, although Halliday believes that "certain registers do require distinctive voice qualities" (Halliday, 1980c, [1989, p.41]).

Although, as seen from the above paragraph the two concepts are both "mutually defining and distinct", there is also a close interconnection between registers and dialects. In any society, for example, one always finds some sort of division of labour among the member of that society: different activities are carried out by different classes or groups, who speak, as a result of their class structure, their social status and their type of activity, different dialects. To confirm this hypothesis, Halliday provides

an example of Western Bureaucrats whose register is always associated with the standard dialect of the language used by the society in question. So there are various lines of interconnection between dialect and register in spite of the fact that they are distinct. Consequently, different social groups or classes of one society tend to have different conceptions of the meanings that are appropriate to a given context of situation. They have, what Bernstein (1971) refers to as a different "coding orientation".

#### 3.5.4 Code

Halliday (1975c, [1978, p. 67]) has defined code as "the principle of semiotic organization governing the choice of meanings by the speaker and their interpretation by the hearer."<sup>73</sup> In this sense, code controls the meanings the speaker-hearer attends to. In Halliday's overall socio-linguistic picture of language as social semiotic, codes act as determiners of registers, operating on the selection of meanings within situation types:

when the semiotics of language \_\_ the ordered sets of options that constitute the linguistic system\_\_ are activated by the situational determinants of text (the field, the tenor, and the mode), this process is regulated by codes (Halliday, op. loc).

Besides, Halliday, (1975a , b & c), has emphasized that codes are not varieties of language in the sense that registers and social dialects are. Moreover, Hasan (1973) points out that codes are located 'above' the linguistic system; they are types of social semiotics or symbolic orders of meanings generated by the social system:

while social dialect is defined by reference to its distinctive formal properties, the code is defined by reference to its semantic properties ... the semantic properties can be predicted from the elements of social structure, which, in fact, gives rise to them. This raises the concept of code to a more general level than that of language variety; indeed, there are advantages in regarding the restricted and elaborated codes of behaviour, where the word behaviour covers both verbal and non-verbal behaviour (Hasan, 1973, p. 258)<sup>74</sup>.

Halliday (1975b & c) has also pointed out that the code is actualized in language

through register, the clustering of semantic features according to situation type. In this respect, Bernstein (1971) used the term "variant", e.g. "elaborated variant", to refer to the characteristics of a register which derive from the choice of codes<sup>75</sup>. But, as mentioned above, codes are types of social semiotic, symbolic orders of meaning generated by the social system. "Hence, for a child, they [codes] transmit and control the transmission of, the underlying pattern of a culture or sub-culture, acting as the primary socializing agencies of family, peer groups and school" (cf. Halliday, 1975b & c, [1978, p. 68 & p. 111 respectively]).

### **3.5.5 The Linguistic System**

In a socio-linguistic approach to language, it is the semantic system that concerns the linguist the most. Halliday, however, did not maintain the same position with regard to those functional component networks of transitivity (ideational), mood (interpersonal) and theme (textual). In his early writings, he regards them as part of the lexicogrammatical level of language, but subsequently redefines them as being the main components of the semantic stratum. This fluctuating position of Halliday has been subject to severe criticism by a number of linguists (cf. Berry 1982). The placing of these functional components on the semantic level was initially suggested by Halliday from the mid of 1970s onwards. In 1975c, for example, he says: "these have to be interpreted not as functions in the sense of 'uses of language', but as the functional components of the semantic system" (Halliday, 1975c, [1978, p. 112]). He also indicates in the same article that these components are modes of meanings that are present in every use of language in every context. For Halliday, text is a product of all the three; it is a "polyphonic composition" in which different semantic melodies are interwoven, to be realized as an integrated lexicogrammatical structure, each component contributing a band of structure to the whole.

The ideational function represents the speaker's meaning potential as an observer. It is the content function of language, language as 'about something'. This is the component through which the language encodes the cultural experience, and the speaker encodes his own individual experience as a member of a culture.

The interpersonal component represents the speaker's meaning potential

as an intruder. It is the participatory function of language, language as doing something. This is the component through which the speaker intrudes himself into the context of situation, both, expressing his own attitudes and judgements and seeking to influence the attitudes and behaviour of others.

The textual component represents the speaker's text-forming potential; it is that which makes language relevant. This is the component which provides the texture; that which makes the difference between language that is suspended *in vacuo* and language that is operational in the context of situation. . . . It is only in combination with the textual meanings that the ideational and interpersonal meanings are actualized (Halliday, 1975c, [1978, pp. 112-113]) [my ellipsis].

Even though Halliday considers these components constituents of the semantic system, he insists that they are reflected in lexicogrammar in the form of discrete networks of options of transitivity, mood and theme. These networks of options have little influence on each other as far as one selection from one of them is concerned, but at the same time, such a selection will affect further selections from the same component; or as Halliday puts it: "each of these three sets of options is characterized by strong internal but weak external constraints" (Halliday, ).

### 3.5.6 Social Structure

In general, social structure is that specific form of the organization of a given society. From a socio-linguistic point of view, it is the main source of several of the socio-linguistic components described so far. Halliday (1975c) concentrates mainly on three of the many ways in which social structure is "implicated" in a social theory. He also outlines the role of social structure in building up a socio-linguistic theory by listing three of its main contributions.

In the first place, social structure defines and gives significance to the various types of social context in which meanings are exchanged. This would include the types of social contexts that are of central importance:

the different social groups and communication networks that what is



known as tenor\_\_ the status and role relationships in the situation\_\_ are obviously products of the social structure, the types of activity (field) and even the available media and the types of rhetorical channels with its associated strategies (Halliday, 1975c, [1978, p. 112]).

In the second place, the social structure determines the various familial patterns of communication through its embodiment in the types of role relationships within the family. It regulates the meanings and meanings' styles that are critical in the process of cultural transmission.

In the third place, the social structure enters in through the effect of social hierarchy, in the form of "caste and class". This is obviously the background to social dialects, which are both a direct manifestation of social hierarchy and also a symbolic expression of it, maintaining and reinforcing it in a variety of ways: for example, the association of dialogue with register\_\_ the fact that certain registers conventionally call for certain dialectical modes\_\_ expresses the relation between social classes and the division of labour, as mentioned earlier. In a more pervasive fashion,

the social structure is present in the forms of semiotic interaction, and becomes apparent through incongruities and disturbances in the semantic system. . . . The social structure is not just an ornamental background to linguistic interaction, as it has tended to become in sociolinguistic discussions. It is an essential element in the evolution of semantic systems and semantic processes (Halliday, 1975b [1978, p. 114]) [my ellipsis].

### **3.5.7 A Diagrammatic Representation of Language as Social Semiotic**

Halliday (1975c) has represented the whole picture of language as social semiotic. The arrows in the diagram should be interpreted as "determines" as Halliday has intended them to be except where otherwise labelled. The diagram below is adapted from Halliday (1975c, [1978, p. 69]; see next page):




Figure 3-6: Schematic representation of language as social semiotic.

Halliday (1975b, [1978, p. 125]), gives a summary of the above figure of the semiotic representation of language which he has outlined as follows:

Social interaction typically takes a linguistic form, which I [Halliday] call *text*. A text is the product of infinitely many simultaneous and successive choices in meaning, and is realized as lexicogrammatical structure, or 'wording'. The environment of the text is the context of situation, which is an instance of a social context or *situation type*. The situation type is a semiotic construct which is structured in terms of *field, tenor and mode*: the text-generating activity, the role relationship of the participants, and the rhetorical modes they are adopting.

These situational variables are related respectively to the *ideational, interpersonal, and textual* components of the *semantic system*: meaning as content (the observer function of language), meaning as participation (the intruder function) and meaning as texture (the relevance function). They are related in the sense that each of the situational features typically calls forth a network of options from the corresponding semantic component; in this way the semiotic properties of a particular situation type, its structure in terms of field, tenor and mode, determine the semantic configuration of *register*— the meaning potential that is characteristic of the situation type in question, and is realized as what is known as a 'speech variant'.

This process is regulated by *code*, the semiotic grid or principles of the organization of social system. The subcultural variation is in its turn a product of the *social structure*, typically the social hierarchy acting through the distribution of family types having different familial role systems.

### 3.6 Halliday's Model for Thematic Structure

In the present study, I have chosen to work within a functionalist framework, as indicated in the introduction to this thesis, and within that framework, with Halliday's systemic model for "a grammar of the message" advanced originally by Halliday (1967 & 1968). In this model, Halliday identifies two systems, within an overall systemic framework, by means of which discourse is organized: the system of information and the system of thematisation. Each exist for a specific purpose. Each has its own function. Each is independently variable.

Halliday's account differs from that of the other functionalists, particularly those of the Prague School (Mathesius, Firbas, Danes & ...etc), who, except Travnicek (joined later by Danes and Firbas: cf. 2.2.3 & 2.2.4 respectively), would treat the whole message formulation, as was argued in Chapter two, as a single phenomenon\_\_ i.e., as the realization of pragmatic word order or functional sentence perspective (FSP). The theme, as has been defined by Mathesius (1939 [1947], p.234) and as discussed in the previous chapter, is "that which is known or at least obvious in the given situation, and from which the speaker can proceed in his discourse" (translated by Firbas, 1966, p. 268). The Pragueans have defended this view for more than half a century: the theme is regarded as synonymous with given and with psychological subject, while the enunciation or rheme is synonymous with new information and with psychological predicate.

Most part of the literature that has been developed around the notion of theme and rheme and the distribution of information has followed the Pragueans and even some of the post-Hallidayan linguists have followed the Pragueans in equating the notion of theme with that of given (or old) and new information with rheme. For some linguists, particularly in the United States, topic and comment have been a third set of 'near synonyms'. Topic has also been differently defined as a nominal that is specially

marked (syntactically, morphologically and/or phonologically) and which governs a larger stretch of discourse.

The popularity of the Pragueans' position has always been accompanied since the beginning, by the recognition of the following main complicating factors: (1) new information can precede given information, (2) the theme, or at least the perspective, from which the speaker proceeds, needs not be in initial position, and (3) the theme can consist of new as well as given information. These difficulties were recognized by Mathesius himself in his 1939 article, and there is an extensive Prague literature on the subject (cf. chapter 2).


The root of the problem, reflected in these complicating factors, is the conflation of the two systems which, according to Halliday (1967c), have independent functions. One of the Pragueans, Travnicek (1962), also saw advantages of separating theme from given information, but the voices of his colleagues, principally Mathesius and Firbas, were stronger. The existence of two distinct functions has been noted by a few non-systemic linguists as well. Grimes (1975) and Givon (1979) and many others have cited discourse studies of non-European Languages, which have distinguished between theme and information systems. Givon, using a different approach to linguistic description, recently concluded that "the linguistic notion of grading . . . is really a composite of two separate psycho-communicative processes" (Givon, 1979, p. 99)<sup>76</sup>.

However, with a few exceptions, such as these, the studies that have been conducted have used the conflated Praguean view in which theme and rheme are equated with given and new. The studies that I am aware of include Mathesius (1939 [1947]), Firbas (1964b & 1966) on Czech and English, Deyes (1978) on English, Aziz (1988) and Obiedat (1990) on Arabic.


The tendency for linguists to perceive only one phenomenon, one function, may derive from the fact that, according to Halliday (1968, pp. 210-211), a number of systems that have the clause as their starting point will coincide in their neutral, unmarked form, like a series of nearly identical superimposed templates: the distribution of given-new information is roughly parallel to that of theme and rheme, which, in SVO languages, coincides with the structures of actor-process-goal (for example), and which in turn coincides with the logical relation of subject-predicate. Figure 3-7 below is adapted from Halliday (1968, p. 211), and modified by the author to match the change

in Halliday's position with regard to the functional components:


1. Transitivity System (experiential component 1967-1968)  
(ideational component 1977 onward)



2. Predication system (logical component 1967-1968)  
(included in ideational component 1977 onward)



3. Theme system (discourse component 1967-1968)  
(textual component 1970s onward)



4. Information system (discourse component 1967-1968)  
(textual component 1970s onward)




Figure: 3-7

When all systems occur in the unmarked form, as shown above, the systems are indistinguishable, although the constituent structure is not the same in all four systems. A polysystemic approach model, like that of Halliday's, makes it possible, nevertheless, to examine the part that is played by each function.

Many linguists have approached the issues conditioned by other approaches to grammar. Linguistic understanding of the language systems of thematic structure may be clouded by an attempt to see them in terms of predictable roles of syntax or in terms of propositional case roles. Whereas roles are seen in terms of the relationships of nouns to a central verb (Fillmore 1968), the theme and information systems are considered by Halliday to belong to another dimension of grammar in which their terms

commute with other terms within their own paradigms. Although in a particular language, the theme and the information focus of new information may tend to be expected preferentially by certain syntactic structures or case roles, I am convinced that any effort to account for these systems via syntax and propositional content will fail to consider their essential import\_\_ i.e., their function at the level of discourse in the creation of text. Their relation to discourse which is expressed through thematisation and information systems is of particular importance in the process of translation, where it is essential to capture the organisation of a text, and all the meanings this entails to recreate the same message in another language. It is my concern with the need to specify these relations as part of the translation process that has led to the present study.

Therefore, this section brings together the main points about theme and information systems that are contained in Halliday (1967a, b, &c; 1968, 1970, 1974, 1976, 1977 and 1985). The basis for all of his work on thematic structure is his 1967 and 1968 articles. The rest of Halliday's work on thematic structure comes as a result of changing his view about the place and status of functional components. But his view of what the textual component consists of remains virtually the same. This model will be presented solely from a Hallidayan point of view in order to maintain the coherence of the study. A critique of Halliday's model will also be discussed (cf. 3.6.6).

As discussed earlier (cf. 3.4 & 5), Halliday's linguistic model has three main areas of selection or "dimensions of the grammar", which contribute to the realization of the clause in English: the ideational, the interpersonal and the textual. Each of these, as has been said, consists of a series of paradigmatic systems which specify different syntactic functions "combinations of which make the structure of the clause" (Halliday, 1967c, p. 199). The ideational dimension, composed of the system of transitivity, includes the sets of options relating to cognitive content: the linguistic representation of extra-linguistic reality, whether the phenomena of the external world or the feelings, thoughts and experience" (loc. cit.). Thus the ideational function of the clause is that of representing what is in the broadest sense called "processes"\_\_ i.e. actions, and events. The interpersonal, with the systems of mood, involves those options which specify the status of the speaker in the speech situation whether he is informing, commenting, questioning, persuading, confirming and ... etc. The textual dimension encompasses the choices that the speaker makes which assigns to the elements of the

clause, not as participants in the extra-linguistic processes but as components of a message; with the relation of what is being said to what has gone before in the discourse and its internal organisation into acts of communication" (Halliday, 1967c, p. 199).

The three dimensions of the grammar are simultaneous and compatible in the clause. Halliday, summarizes them as follows:

given the clause as a domain, transitivity is the grammar of experience, mood is the grammar of speech function, and theme is the grammar of discourse. (Halliday, 1967c, p. 199).

Following Halliday's renaming of some of these linguistic terms in the 1970s, the theme was redefined to read "the grammar of the message" (Halliday, 1974, p.50). In addition, Halliday (1967c and elsewhere), specifies three separate dimensions and emphasizes that their systems, although they look independent, are in fact interrelated.

The present study is mainly concerned with one aspect of the third dimension of the model, which Halliday refers to by different names. Sometimes it is "the theme system"; at others, it is the "theme system complex" or the "thematic organisation of discourse" (Halliday, 1967c, p.200). It must be kept in mind, however, that Halliday himself admits that he uses the term "theme" in two main senses: the general name and the name of a particular role in the distribution of information and in the organisation of the clause as a message. Therefore to avoid any confusion in my use of the term, I shall use, throughout this study, the term "thematic structure" or "thematisation" in the narrow sense or "micro-sense"; the term "thematic organisation of discourse" or "discourse organisation" I shall use in the more general sense or "macro-sense". By the same token, Halliday (1967c, p.200) avoids using terms like "topic and comment" because they tended to be used in a way "which conflates what are here regarded as a distinct function, with topic meaning both given and theme".

Halliday emphasizes that the roles specified by the thematic organisation of discourse are of a different kind; he identifies six main systems; three of which concern individual elements in the clause; these are predicated, substituted and reference themes. The other three which relate to the clause as a whole are information structure, thematisation and identification. Of the last three, the former two are essential to the presentation of the clause as a message; their function is to ensure that the clause is

"sewn" [my term] into the discourse. In English, options in the information structure are realized by phonological features of the intonation contour, and by the distribution of information in the clause in terms of given and new information. Thematisation is realized by the sequence of elements in the clause structure in terms of theme and rheme, and identification and predication, which are optionally used and realized by "certain specific patterns of clause structure". The last two systems, which the speaker or writer also invokes optionally, substitute and reference themes, are realized lexically.

### **3.6.1 Information Structure**

According to Halliday (1967a, [Kress, 1976]), information structure is a type of discourse organisation. It refers to the organisation of the act of communication into a structure by which discourse is carried forward. Therefore, for any stretch of language to function as discourse or text, it has to be organized into "quanta of information, or message blocks called the information units" (Halliday, 1977, p.183). Each information unit, and its phonological realisation, which Halliday (1967, 1968 & elsewhere) calls tone group, is encoded as one unit of intonation. The information unit is not "coextensive with any constituent type derived from other sources, it must rather be accounted for in its own right with its own internal structure" (Halliday, 1967a, [Kress 1976, p.175])<sup>77</sup>. In its unmarked option, the information unit is "one clause; more specifically, it is one non-embedded clause together with all clauses that are embedded in it" (Halliday 1967c, p. 201). It can be regarded as the "default" condition, to use a term from computing which is also used in much the same sense in generative grammar, because Halliday's "good principle of 'other things being equal'" does not always hold. He admits (Halliday, 1985, p. 274), that "information unit's relation to the grammatical constituents is by no means random". In fact it is the speaker who decides where each information unit begins and where it ends. In principle, the speaker's choice is completely independent of the clause structure; this is why in many cases the information unit's boundaries do not necessarily coincide; instead, they often overlap, except in the unmarked case as indicated above. In the marked case, the information unit "may be less than or more than a clause or any combination of these" (Halliday, 1967c, p.201).



Halliday (1967c) also points out that the distribution of information into information units represents the speaker's blocking out of the message into quanta of information or message blocks. The first option available to the speaker is the rate of delivering of these information units for a given stretch of discourse. This, according to Halliday, can be carried out in either one of the two ways: information delivered slowly indicates that the discourse has been segmented to a large number of information units; whereas information delivered rapidly indicates otherwise. The speaker's decision in this context is a "meaningful one" (Halliday, op. cit., p.202), because it has to do with what he decides to encode as a unit. Although Halliday admits that the division of discourse into information units is related to other systems in the textual component, e.g., thematisation and identification, the important thing is that "it represents a distinct dimension of structural organisation that is not derivable from other syntactic options" (Halliday, 1967c, p.203).

#### **3.6.1.1 Information Focus**

The structure of the information unit is made up of the two elements given and new. The new element is marked out by the use of "tonic prominence as the culminative feature\_\_ the syllable on which the tonic prominence falls is the last accented syllable of the new" (Halliday, 1967c, p. 203). Halliday emphasizes the fact that the information focus depends upon the information structure; "It involves a selection, within each information unit, of a certain element or elements, as points of prominence with each message" (loc. cit.). In other words, each information unit has a focus which corresponds to one primary point of focus or to the "newest" information being conveyed, and which, in turn, corresponds to the assignment of "tonic nucleus in the tone group" (loc. cit.). The tone group, to use Halliday's (1967c) definition, is a phonological unit that functions as realization of the information structure. The speaker's choice as what information is the newest in the tone group constitutes the two major options of the overall information system. The decision is linked with the segmentation of the speech into units. In the most frequent, neutral or unmarked case, the cutoff of the information unit comes immediately following the delivery of the newest information. It is only in the marked case that the newest information occurs

elsewhere in the tone group. Thus the speaker's selection of the newest information realized in the structure is the focus; "information focus reflects the speaker's decision as to where the main burden of the message lies" (Halliday, 1967c, p. 204). To native speakers of English, this phenomenon is known as "emphasis"; it refers to marking out part of the message block which the speaker wishes to be interpreted as informative. For Halliday, however,

what is focal is 'new' information; not in the sense that cannot have been previously mentioned, although it is often the case that it has not been, but in the sense that the speaker presents it as not being recoverable from the preceding discourse (loc. cit.).

As mentioned above, the focus in English can be realized phonologically as the tone nucleus or as the primary stress of the tone group. Thus in an example like:

3-14 There is a **SHED** at the back of the house<sup>78</sup>,

the speaker may choose to call attention to a single element or 'narrow focus', as he has done in the example above, or to a longer stretch within the information unit, or the unit as a whole (broad focus). Semantically speaking if the speaker chooses the 'narrow focus', it means that the information structure is environmentally specified; there is no indeterminacy: every element of the structure is given except the one carrying the tonic prominence. However if the speaker selects the 'broad focus', semantically this means that the information structure is not environmentally specific, and indeterminacy results. In this case, the whole information unit may be either given or new, or new may begin at any structural boundary. According to Halliday (1977, pp. 184-5), the only restriction is that "new cannot be discontinuous: G+N, N+G, and G+N+G are all possible structures, but not N+G+N\_\_ the last can be achieved by encoding as a sequence of two information units". In order to come up with some sort of solution to this, Halliday (op.loc) proposes that the focal element is the highest ranking sub-constituent for which the prominence is culminative. That is to say, if the information unit is one clause (this being as a matter of fact, the unmarked form of the mapping), the focal constituent will be a group, the group next ranking unit below the clause, provided the tonic prominence falls on the last accented syllable of the entire group. Halliday (loc. cit.) gives the following example:

3-15 //I would as/ soon/ live with a/ pair of/ unoiled/ garden/ **SHEARS**//

where the tonic prominence on 'shears' marks the entire noun group 'a pair of unoiled

garden shears' as being the focal constituent (since information unit is a clause). If the tonic prominence had been assigned to 'unoiled', says Halliday, "the focal constituent would only be the word 'unoiled' itself, since the prominence would not be culminative for the whole noun group, but only for the word" (Halliday, 1977, p.185).

Halliday (1967c, p.204) also points out that the focal information may be a feature of mood not of cognitive content, as when, for example the "do support" is used in the confirmation of an asserted position:

3-16 He **DID** paint the shed.

In this case, it is the choice of a more marked mood which in itself is the option, since the assignment of focus on **DO** is not optional, once the mood has been selected.

Although for every information unit the speaker must make a decision that results in the assignment of focus (for without a centre of focus, the unit's structure is incomplete), there is considerable freedom about how he can exercise this option. What constrains his decision is the pattern of information that has been established in discourse up to that point.

When focus is unmarked it falls at the end of the information unit; and rather than highlighting a single element in the structure, the focus is culminative "referring to the general sense of the message" (Halliday, 1967a, [Kress, 1976, p. 179]). When the focus is marked, a single element is brought to the foreground, and marked focus can occur at any point in the information unit. The function of marking implies a meaning contrary to what the speaker thinks the listener is apt to expect, and "he [treats] the non-focal component as presupposed" (loc. cit.). Below are some examples from Halliday (1977) to show some instances of marked focus in non-final position including one, the last, where the focus is final and marked:

3-17 **JOHN** painted the shed.

3-18 John **PAINTED** the shed.

3-19 John painted the **SHED**.

In each of these examples, the marking suggests that a normal expectation is not fulfilled.

Halliday (1967a, [Kress, 1976, p. 179]) believes that, perhaps, in the majority of instances in English, the tonic falls on the last accented syllable of the tone group. This, according to Halliday (1967c, p. 204), can be interpreted in the light of the

phonological structure of the tone group itself, which consists of an obligatory tonic segment optionally preceded by a pretonic segment. This also suggests the generalization that the information unit consists of an obligatory new element, realized as a tonic, optionally preceded by an element realized as pretonic, but "this general picture of (given following new) is only partially valid" (Halliday, op. cit., p. 205), because as mentioned earlier, the focus of information may fall anywhere in the information unit. However, the information focus affords the speaker a choice: choice within which a term, the unmarked, "represents the minimum of organisation [ effort] and will thus be expected to have the highest text frequency" (Halliday, 1967a, [Kress, 1976, p. 178]). In contrast with given and new, according to Halliday, (1967c and elsewhere), theme-rheme structure is realized by the sequence of the elements in the clause, such that theme always precedes rheme; information structure sequence of given - new is merely the unmarked case: "this realization is far from being obligatory". Halliday cites some example in support of the last quotation, among which is:

3-20 //ALL the/ GCE/ papers have to be/ marked out of/two/hundred//  
where new precedes given.

### **3.6.1.2 Given and New Information**

Information is usually new in terms of the external or textual content of the preceding discourse; it can also be new in terms of the shared speech situation. Whether textual or situational, newness is with respect to the pattern of the discourse that has preceded the clause. Hence the speaker's assignment of new is constrained by what has been said before.

New contrasts in this sense with given information, although Halliday himself does not feel comfortable with the dichotomy. This is probably because he believes the focal information may be a feature of mood, not of cognitive content, as when the speaker confirms an asserted proposition. However, the confirmation is still 'new' in the sense intended. Therefore, according to Halliday, "if we use the-- admittedly rather inappropriate"-- term 'given' to label what is not 'new' we can say that the system of information focus assigns to the information unit a structure in terms of the two functions 'given' and 'new'" (Halliday, 1967c, p.204). Thus, it can be said that it is

the terms that Halliday finds inappropriate and not the notions themselves. For him, given has no communication function in and of itself; it is merely that which serves to define the existence of new:

the information focus assigns the function new to what is within its domain. What lies outside that domain have the function given and here lies the distinction that arises between marked and unmarked focus" (loc. cit.).

Therefore the system of information focus can be thought of as introducing a binary pattern of given and new into the organisation of information, although it does not impose a binary structure on every information unit, "since the element given is optional" (Halliday, op. cit., p.209). For example in answer to a question like,

3-21 What happened in the storehouse?

the respondent answer can be one word, representing the new information only:

3-22 Fire!

With the information structure, what is important is that the choice is up to the speaker. Focus is assigned by the speaker to whatever he chooses to present as new, and in marking this choice, he is not under constraints arising from the current clause; the structural cues are derived from the distribution of information in the preceding discourse.

The meaning of given is treated by the speaker as recoverable by the hearer from the environment. Conversely, new means "treated as non recoverable", which does not imply that the item in question can not have occurred before, but that if it has, the meaning that is associated with it is "non recoverable" in the context. Halliday (1985, p. 277) summarizes the above as follows:

What is treated as recoverable may be so because it has been mentioned before; but that is not the only possibility. It may be something that is in the situation, like I and you; or in the air, so to speak; or something that is not around at all but that the speaker wants to present as given for rhetorical purposes. The meaning is: this is **NOT NEWS**.

Likewise, what is treated as non-recoverable may be something that has not been mentioned before; but it may be something unexpected, whether previously mentioned or not. The meaning is attend to this: this is **NEWS** [my emphasis].

Below is an example taken from Halliday (1977, p. 184) in support of the above argument:

3-23 D'you want to speak to John or to Mary Smith?

I want to speak to **JOHN**.

3-23a Have you met John and Mary Smith?

**JOHN** I know.

In both answers, **JOHN** is shown as the new in the response, not because it has not occurred before, but because it is carrying other information (John is the one I want to speak to: John and NOT Mary) that the speaker assumes to be non-recoverable to the hearer\_\_ since otherwise, presumably, he would not have asked the question in the first place.

There are however a certain number of elements in language that are intrinsically 'given' in the sense that they are not interpretable except by reference to some previous mention in the discourse or by reference to some feature of the situation. These include the anaphoric elements (those referring to things mentioned in the previous discourse or text) and deictic elements (those that are interpreted by reference to "here and now" of the discourse). According to Halliday (1985, p. 277), these two types of elements "do not carry information focus; if they do they are contrastive". Therefore, when the unmarked focus of an information unit is mentioned, where the focus falls on the final lexical item, it excludes any item that is inherently given. So, for example,

3-24 // how'd you/ do at that/ **INTERVIEW** /today//

the unmarked form does not fall on 'today' because it is a deictic element, occurring as a post-tonic item.

### 3.6.1.3 The Semantic Relationship Between Given and New & Theme and Rheme

As we have seen above, Halliday stresses that the systems of information and theme are not to be conflated: the two are independently variable (Halliday, 1967c, p.205). One of the main differences between them is that the status of new, as mentioned above, is relative to the discourse that precedes the current clause, whereas the status of theme is "independent of what has gone before" (Halliday, 1967a, [Kress 1976, p. 180] & Halliday 1967c, p. 212). In other words, in Halliday's sense, theme has its status with regard to the current clause. Nevertheless he recognizes the frequent congruence between the two patterns, as he does between the information unit and the clause. Just as in the case of the information unit, the clause corresponds to its

unmarked realization, so, in given and new order of presentation, the unmarked sequence parallels theme and rheme. Moreover, there is a close relationship between information structure and thematic structure. "Other things being equal", Halliday (1985, p. 278 & elsewhere) says, "a speaker will choose the theme from within what is given and locate the focus, the climax of new, somewhere within the rheme". But although, as mentioned above, they are semantically related, the two notions are distinct (theme and rheme versus given and new), The theme is "what, I, the speaker choose to take as my point of departure, the given is what you, the listener, already know about or have access to" (Halliday, 1985, p. 278). This is why Halliday (loc. cit.) says that "theme-rheme is speaker-oriented"; while "given-new is listener oriented". However, both concepts are "speaker-selected": "it is the speaker who assigns both the thematic and the information structures, mapping one on to the other to give a composite texture to discourse and thereby relate it to its environment."<sup>79</sup>

Halliday believes that at any point of discourse process, there will have been built up a rich verbal and non-verbal environment (context) for whatever is to follow; the speaker's choices are made against the background of what has been said and what has happened before. This explains why one always takes the first clause or sentence in any text to consist mainly of new information, since no verbal or non-verbal environment has built up yet. The environment will often create local conditions which override the globally unmarked patterns of theme and given and new and rheme.

Halliday (1985, p. 280) gives more examples of marked and unmarked information structure, and shows how what is marked in one environment may be unmarked in another, as in the systems of nominalization, for example, (cf. 3.6.3.1 & 3.6.3.2), whose function is to distribute the elements of the English clause into alternative patterns of theme-rheme. As will be shown below, these are of two types: theme identification and theme predication.

As mentioned above, in its unmarked case, the locus of information focus falls at the end of the last lexical non-anaphoric and non-deictic items; but this is not the case in the systems of nominalization, as Halliday (1985, p. 280) shows in the following examples, where the unmarked information focus is located on the theme (see next page):

3-25

	UNMARKED FOCUS		MARKED FOCUS	
	You	were to BLAME	YOU	were to blame
NON-NOMINALIZED NON-PREDICATED THEME	theme given	rheme new (focus)	theme new	rheme given
NOMINALIZED (PREDICATED THEME)	It's YOU	who were to blame	It's you	who were to BLAME
	theme new	rheme given	theme given	rheme new (focus)

Halliday also believes that the function of nominalization is to align theme-rheme with given and new in such a way that the focus falls on the theme; this makes the theme new and the rheme given. But this again is the unmarked case in predicated themes, so that once again there will be "a marked variant in contrast with it" as shown in the example above.

What follows is a detailed discussion of the thematic organisation of the clause, in the narrow sense, which, with that of the information unit, contributes to the grammar of the message of discourse as a whole, in Halliday's model. This part of the model is the main concern of the study, and thus it will be introduced at this stage, also, from a Hallidayan point of view only.

### 3.6.2 Thematisation

The function of thematisation, the second main system in the textual dimension, gives the clause its character as a message, or as a perspective from which the development of the clause proceeds. This is done by assigning to it a structure in terms of theme and rheme or "non-theme", as Halliday, (1967a, in Kress 1976, p.179) calls it. Thematic structure, or thematisation, as Halliday sometimes calls it, introduces the structure of the upcoming message; it is "what the message is about" (Halliday, 1967c, p.213). Unlike the information system, as we have said earlier, thematisation is directly associated with the structure of the current clause in that it has a deciding effect on the options that are available to the speaker in constructing the rest of it.

Halliday (1985, p. 38) assumes that in all languages the clause has the character of a message: it has some form of organisation giving it the status of a communicative



event. But this can be achieved in different ways. In English, as in many other languages, the clause is organized as a message by having a special status assigned to one part of it. One element in the clause is enunciated as theme; this then combines with the "remainder" (another name used by Halliday for the rheme), so the two parts together constitute a message.

In comparison with the information structure, which specifies a structural unit and structures it in such a way as to relate it to previous discourse, thematic structure "takes a unit of sentence structure, the clause, and structures it in such a way that is independent of what has gone before" (Halliday, 1967c, p.212). This structuring is realized simply by the sequence of elements: theme followed by rheme. Thus, every clause has a theme: "the element selected by the speaker as theme is assigned first position in the sequence" (Halliday, 1967a, in Kress, 1976, p. 179); "it is what is being talked about: the point of departure for the clause as a message" (Halliday, 1967c, p. 212). Everything else in the clause is rheme, which, according to Halliday, only exists in relation to the theme: "as an explanatory comment about this demand [theme]" (Halliday, op.cit., p. 213).

As mentioned earlier, some grammarians, especially from the United States, have used the term "topic and comment" instead of theme and rheme. According to Halliday (1985, and elsewhere), the topic-comment terminology carries a rather different connotation: the label topic usually refer to only one kind of the theme, which Halliday labels "multiple theme" (cf. 3.6.2.4 below). Moreover, this also tends to be used for two concepts, theme-rheme and given-new, that are functionally distinct. This view, however, partially contradicts that of Halliday (1967c) where he does not associate any kind of thematic structure within the term topic-comment (cf. 3.6.). Nevertheless, Halliday always insists on using the terms theme & rheme, when discussing the thematic structure of the clause. Although Halliday stresses that the theme can be identified as what comes first in the clause, he insists that this is not how the category theme is defined. The definition is functional, as it is with all elements in this interpretation of a grammatical structure.

The theme is one element in a particular structural organisation, which taken as a **whole**, organizes the clause as a message. This is the configuration theme-rheme. A message consists of a theme combined with rheme (Halliday, 1985, p.39) [my emphasis].

Within this organisation of the message, parts of its meaning lies in which element is chosen as its theme. There is a difference in meaning, for example, between

3-26 A halfpenny is the smallest English coin

and,

3-27 The smallest English coin is a halfpenny.

According to Halliday (loc. cit.), the latter can be glossed as 'I'll tell you about the smallest English coin', where 'the smallest English coin' is the theme; whereas the former can be glossed as 'I'll tell you about a halfpenny', where 'a halfpenny' is the theme. The difference lies in the choice of the thematic element in both clauses. By glossing them in this way, as 'I'll tell you about . . .'; we can feel that they are two different messages.

Halliday also believes that it is not the first position that defines the theme; it is "the means whereby the function should be realized in this way" (Halliday, 1985, p.39); there are languages which have a category of theme realisationally similar to that of English: in Arabic, for example, the typical theme of the nominal sentence comes initially. Indeed, generally speaking in any language, the message is organized in terms of theme and rheme structure, and if this structure is expressed by the sequence in which the elements occur in the clause, then it seems natural that "the position for the theme should be at the beginning, rather than at the end or at some other specific point" (loc. cit.). This, however, does not accord with the positioning of the theme of the verbal sentence in Arabic, which follows its verb (cf. 5. 2).

Halliday's claim, in the previous section, that theme and given belong to two different systems, is supported by the fact that their referents may be glossed differently; given means 'what you were talking about', or 'what I was talking about before', while theme means 'what I am talking about', or 'what I am talking about now' (Halliday, 1967c, p. 211), and as has already been made clear the two do not necessarily coincide. Thus theme and given are independently variable and derive from different sources; "given-new is a discourse feature, while theme-rheme is not" (Halliday, 1967a, [Kress, 1976, p. 179]).

In English, sometimes, the theme is announced explicitly, by means of some expressions like 'as for . . .', 'with regard to . . .', 'about . . . etc. Halliday points out that this is only possible in nominal themes that are introduced by a locution of this

kind. In this case, the theme is set apart as a separate information unit, and sometimes, in writing, it is separated from the rest of the clause by a comma. It is then normally picked up later in the clause by an appropriate pronoun. The following example is borrowed from Halliday (1985, p.39).

3-28	As for my aunt,	the duke has given her that teapot
	Theme	Rheme

This is an example of a 'marked theme', but 'unmarked' themes can also be treated the same way: glossed with the same locution. Another example from Halliday (1985, p. 40) in support of this is:

3-29	The queen of hearts,	<b>she</b> made some tarts
	Theme	Rheme

In speech, the theme of a clause is frequently marked off by a separate intonation contour, or a tone group as it is called; this is especially likely when the theme is either (1) an adverbial group or prepositional phrase, (2) a nominal group not functioning as subject; that is to say, it is any thematic element other than the common or 'unmarked' pattern. This in turn supports Halliday's claim that "if a clause is organized into two information units, the boundary between the two is overwhelmingly likely to coincide with junction between theme and rheme" (loc. cit.).

As hinted above, one of the theme options is unmarked, and its identification provides a useful insight into the meaning of the theme-rheme structure as a whole. The question raised here is: which element in the clause would be the unmarked theme? Halliday's answer is this: 'look into the mood system and find out'.

### 3.6.2.1 Theme and Mood

Halliday (1985 , 1967c & elsewhere) points out that the element chosen as an unmarked theme depends upon the mood of the clause. Every independent clause selects for mood, with the exception of some minor ones like 'John!', 'Good night' (which only realize the rheme). To start with, it seems necessary to show aspects of the mood network options that are open to the speaker or writer. The following

network of mood is taken from Butler (1985, p. 43):




figure 3-8: The Mood Network of English

In order to see the unmarked option in each of the above choices, it is appropriate to follow the main network options of the clause.

#### 3.6.2.1.1 Theme in Declarative Clauses

The unmarked theme of a declarative clause, according to Halliday (1985 & elsewhere), is conflated with the subject. "it is chosen as the theme unless there is a good reason for choosing something else" (Halliday, 1985, p. 45). The function 'subject', as understood here, says Halliday (1967c, p.213), is specified in the mood systems, not in the transitivity systems. "The term, therefore, corresponds to the surface subject of a transformational grammar, not the deep subject (which is a transitivity function)". He also defines subject as "that nominal, which together with a finite verbal element, fulfils a 'modal role' in the realization of speech function" (loc. cit.). Thus, the two elements together form a constituent specified by the mood systems: one [role] which is obligatory in independent clauses, and optional in dependent ones. Therefore, since mood and theme interact, it is natural, according to Halliday, that the subject is definable as the unmarked theme of the declarative clause.

Although Halliday (1977, pp. 182-183), maintains this view, he asserts that it is important "to stress in this connection that the function subject in the clause is **NO LESS A SEMANTIC FUNCTION** than other clause functions as agent or theme" (Halliday, op. cit., 182). For him, it is a function "deriving from the interpersonal component, [considered by Halliday (1977) as constituent of the semantic system], via the system of mood; the subject is the mood-carrying (modal) nominal, meaning in declarative clauses 'I state that X . . . ' (Halliday, op. cit., p. 183).

The mapping of the function theme on the subject, whether the latter is understood in the sense of Halliday (1977 or 1967c), adds a further explanation for the use of thematic equative (see section 3.6.3.1 & 3.6.3.2 below). For example, in clauses such as,

3-30 You are the one I blame,

the subject 'you' is the unmarked theme; whereas in non-identifying clauses, such as

3-31 You I blame for it,

the pronoun 'you' is the marked theme (simply because it is not subject), and so it adds a sense of contrast.

Halliday (1985) establishes a priority table or scale of the occurrence of unmarked theme in the declarative clause in everyday conversation with personal pronouns, like 'I', being at the near end of the scale and with nominalisation at the far end. He also does the same with marked themes, placing adjuncts at the near end and complement at the far end. Below is this table of priority as depicted by Halliday (1985, p.46; see next page):

	FUNCTION	CLASS	THEME EXAMPLE	CLAUSE EXAMPLE
UNMARKED THEME	SUBJECT	NOMINAL GROUP/ PRONOUN AS HEAD	I, YOU, WE, SHE, IT, THERE	I # HAD A LITTLE NUT TREE.  THERE # WERE THREE NICE MEN.
	SUBJECT	NOMINAL GROUP COMMON/PROPER NOUNS AS HEAD	MARY  LONDON BRIDGE.	MARY # HAD A LITTLE LAMB.  LONDON BRIDGE # IS FALLING DOWN.
	SUBJECT	NOMINALIZATION	WHAT I WANT	WHAT I WANT # IS A PROPER CUP OF TEA.
MARKED THEME	ADJUNCT	ADVERBIAL GROUP/ PREPOSITIONAL PHRASE	MERRILY, ON SATURDAY NIGHT	MERRILY # WE ROLE A LONG.  ON SATURDAY NIGHT # I LOST MY WIFE.
	COMPLEMENT	NOMINAL GROUP  NOMINALIZATION	A BAD PUDDING  WHAT THEY COULD NOT EAT THAT NIGHT	A BAD PUDDING # THE KING DID MAKE.  WHAT THEY COULD NOT EAT THAT NIGHT # THE QUEEN NEXT MORNING FRIED.

Table 3-2: Types of themes in declarative clauses. Theme-Rheme boundary is shown by #.

Halliday (1967c, p.213) also emphasizes that the selection of theme is a meaningful option within the clause, and the speaker may select a marked theme, as in:

3-32 The play John saw yesterday,

which means: 'but I don't think that he's seen the film'. As one can see from 3-32, in declarative clauses, unlike interrogative ones, as will be shown below, "the thematic pressure on the subject is much less strong and marked themes are frequent in all registers" (Halliday, 1967c, p. 214). Halliday also points out that the marked theme represents the foregrounding of the point of departure, and its meaning appears from its tendency of association with a particular information structure. Moreover, he claims that there is "NO TENDENCY" [my emphasis] for the unmarked theme to appear in a separate information unit, but "such a tendency is very noticeable with marked themes" (loc. cit.). He gives the following as example of the latter:

3-33 //These **HOUSES** // my grandfather **SOLD**/

3-34 // **THAT** // I don't **KNOW**//

In these examples, the first unit consist of the theme and nothing else.

Halliday (1985, pp. 45-47) emphasizes that the most marked type of theme in declarative clauses is the complement as in:

3-35 Nature I like.

Here, the marked theme 'nature' is a nominal complement, which being a nominal "has the potentiality of being subject, which has not been selected as subject, and which nevertheless has been made thematic" (Halliday, op. cit., p. 45). Sometimes even a complement from within a prepositional phrase functions as theme, particularly in idiomatic combination of preposition and the verb, such as:

3-36 Two things we need to comment on.

Among the types of complement, I believe, the most marked would be the personal pronoun 'me', which is at the far end side of the scale in contrast with unmarked subject 'I'.

In declarative clauses, there is a sub-category, as shown in the network above called the exclamation clauses. These typically have exclamatory wh-element as their theme as in:

3-37 How cheerfully he seems to grin.

Although the marked theme is a lesser option and more infrequent than the unmarked, Halliday cautions that the marked theme

is not to be equated with rare; it simply contrasts with unmarked, unmarked being one which in some respect LESS MOTIVATED than others in the same system, and is therefore selected unless there is specification to the contrary (Halliday, 1967c, p. 219).

### **3.6.2.1.2 Theme in Interrogative Clauses**

The basic meaning of a question is a request for an answer. Therefore, according to Halliday (1967a, c & 1985), the natural theme of a question is "what I want to know" (Halliday, 1985, p.47), and whatever marks out "what I want to know" in the interrogative clause is the theme of that clause. Normally, the type of information the questioner is seeking is one of two things: either the polarity (yes or no answer) to what he says, or the identity of some element in the content of what he hears. In the former, the element of the clause that is put in the first position is the finite verb; whereas in the latter, it is the wh-element of whatever function in the clause it has: whether subject, complement of either the verbal group or the prepositional phrase, or an adjunct. The meaning of polarity is "I want to know 'whether or not . . .'" ; whereas the meaning of the wh-interrogative is "I want you to tell me the person,

the thing, time, place, manner, etc.", (Halliday, 1985, p.47).

Thus, interrogative clauses embody the thematic principle in their structural make up, and it is a characteristic of the interrogative clause in English that one particular element comes first in the unmarked case. The reason is that that element, owing to the very nature of the question, has the status of a theme. This is why Halliday (loc. cit.) points out that "the speaker does not choose each time to put this element [ wh-, or the finite verb] first; its occurrence in the first position is the **REGULAR** pattern by which interrogative is expressed" [my emphasis]. Therefore, no matter what function the wh-element has in the clause, it is put forward to represent the unmarked theme of the clause as in:

3-38 What shall I mend it with?

where 'what', an 'object' of a preposition, means 'that something is needed to mend X with . . .'.

On the other hand, in the yes/no interrogative clause, the theme, according to Halliday (1967a, c & 1977), is the finite verb. But this is not the case in Halliday (1985, p. 48), where he says, "it [theme] **EXTENDS OVER THE SUBJECT AS WELL**" [my emphasis]; he points out that the finite verb and the subject form a two-part theme. He gives some example in support of this new claim, among which this is selected:

3-39

Is	anybody	at home
theme1	theme2	rheme
theme		rheme

As indicated above, this latter view contradicts what Halliday originally said back in 1967 and even in 1977 about the theme of the polar interrogative clause, although the finite verb 'is' in the above example can be ellipted informally. From Halliday, 1967a (in Kress, 1976, p. 180), the following is quoted:

In yes/no interrogative, what is in question is the polarity: is the answer positive or negative? Since it is the finite element of the verbal group that carries the realization of polarity, **THIS ELEMENT, AND THIS ELEMENT ALONE, IS MARKED OUT AS THE THEME OF THE CLAUSE**, and therefore precedes the subject [my emphasis].

Moreover, in both kinds of interrogative clause, the choice of a typical



(unmarked) thematic pattern is "clearly motivated" (Halliday, 1985, p. 48), since this pattern has evolved as a means of conveying the basic message of the clause. Hence, there is a strong tendency for the speaker to choose the unmarked form and not to override it by introducing a marked theme in the front. Although, as Halliday (1967c, p. 213) points out, "marked theme in the interrogative is infrequent, since interrogative have a 'built in' unmarked theme in the form of a question or rather a request for information, the speaker **MAY** override this by introducing another element as his point of departure, such as a prepositional phrase, an adjunct or even a complement, respectively", as in:

3-40 After tea will you tell me a story?

3-41 In your home who does the cooking?

3-42 The play where did you see?

Nevertheless, Halliday stresses the fact that, in spite of some marked instance as the above examples, "it is much rarer to introduce a marked theme (complement of adjunct) in an interrogative clause (Halliday, 1967a, [Kress, 1976, p. 180]), simply because the question itself, whether polar or of a wh-type, is the point of departure of the clause as a message; whereas, in the declarative clause, for example, the subject (the unmarked theme) is no more than "getting off the ground" (loc. cit.). Therefore, it might not be unreasonable to suggest that the preference for an "inverted interrogative structure" in English, by contrast with other languages that have the same resources, is due to the relative importance assigned to the thematic organisation in the syntax of English.

### 3.6.2.1.3 Theme in Imperative Clauses

Halliday (1985, p. 49) emphasizes that the message in the imperative clause is "I want you to do something" or "I want us (you and me) to do something". Hence the unmarked theme is (you or let's) as in:

3-43 You keep quiet.

3-44 Let's go home.

Halliday (loc. cit.) adds another form of imperative with the finite verb do, which is function, is to mark the clause explicitly as positive or negative:

3-45 Do keep quite.

3-46 Do let's go home.

Here, the theme is the form of 'do'. In the negative, where the meaning is "I want you (or us) not to . . .", the theme is typically 'don't' as in:

3-47 Don't you argue.

3-48 Don't let's go home.

The latter, however, has an alternative theme which is 'let's' as in:

3-49 Let's not go home.

There are, however, some imperative clauses, which, according to Halliday (1985, p.49), either have no thematic structure, and exist only as rhemes only, or can only be thematised by analogy with the above examples. In fact, this contradicts Halliday's claim that the theme is always the first element(s) of the sentence/clause (although Halliday also points out that theme is 'an optional' element). These imperative clauses include examples like 'You', which has no finite verb or 'sing me a song' which has no subject. In both types, the element of request (or order) is left implicit. Halliday (loc. cit.), however, emphasizes that, since they have a strong association of first position with thematic value in the clause, "this has the effect of giving the verb the status of the theme"; Therefore, he has analyzed such clauses in either one of the following two ways:

3-50	I want you to	sing me a song.
	theme	rheme

or,

3-51	Sing	me a song.
	theme	rheme

I believe that these two examples can also be combined in one imperative sentence like:

3-52 I want you to [theme1] sing [theme2] me a song[rheme1] [rheme2].

The imperative clause, according to Halliday (1967c, p.219), represents one of two types of clauses in which the predicator regularly occurs in the initial position, the other being the non-finite dependent clause, "but in neither of them, the theme is marked". In other words, the theme is conflated with the predicator instead of the subject, adjunct or complement, but as we have seen above, Halliday (1985) has interpreted them differently.

### 3.6.2.2 Theme and Passive

Halliday (1967a & c) regards the option 'passive' in the transitivity system as a means of dissociating the roles of the subject and actor while leaving the theme unmarked. For Halliday (1967c, p. 215), the subject is the role which, with that of the finite verb, specifies the speech functions in the various options of the mood systems discussed in the previous section; in transitivity terms, however, subject may be actor, goal, beneficiary or range. In information focus, the subject may be included with the given or new, but in the unmarked focus, it is included with the given. In thematisation, the subject may be included with the theme or rheme. What is unmarked here, depends, as mentioned earlier, on the mood, but if the case of discussion is restricted to the declarative clause, the unmarked option has the subject as theme. Thus in a clause such as:

3-53 //John's/ seen the/ play//,

has four simultaneous constituent structures:

- (1) Transitivity: Actor (John) + Process(seen)+ Goal(the play).
- (2) Mood: Subject (John) + Predicate ('s seen the play).
- (3) Information unit: Given (John's seen) + New (the play).
- (4) Thematization: Theme (John) + rheme (has seen the play)  
(Halliday, 1967c, p.215).

The above roles are mapped on to one another to form a complex structure: "the elements of structure is then a complex of structural roles" (Halliday, op. cit., pp.215-216). In transitivity, for example, the presence of the feature 'effective' specifies the 'potential' presence of the roles actor and goal. Other options in the transitivity, like for example, 'voice', have a mapping function, and these in turn include either the feature 'operative, or active in the traditional grammar's terms, and the feature 'receptive', or passive. According to Halliday (1967c), the 'operative' feature specifies the mapping of actor on to subject and of goal into complement. Therefore, in the example above, which is "a declarative, operative, unmarked in focus and unmarked in theme, "actor= subject= given= theme" (Halliday, op. cit, p. 216)<sup>80</sup>.

Halliday (1967c, p. 216) believes that this would be generally considered the "favourite clause type", at least in effective clauses. On the basis of this argument,

Halliday (loc. cit.) draws the following conclusion: "it is not unreasonable to represent declarative as 'unmarked in mood' and operative, in the environment of effective, [and] 'as unmarked in voice'".

In other words, if the unmarked option, discussed above, is selected in each set of options, the nominal to which the role of actor is assigned will also be the variable that enters into the determination of speech function and the point of departure, but not the point of information focus, in the message.

Halliday (1967c) also points out that any variation from the unmarked will have various combinations in the roles of the element that functions as actor, subject, theme and given. In what follows, I shall discuss two different combinations of options that pertain to passive.

(1) When the transitivity option is receptive (passive) and marked in voice, the theme and actor do not coincide, as in the following example:

3-54 //these houses were built by my **GRANDFATHER**//

Here, the actor is focal, non-thematic and optional; the goal is thematic. In considering the actor optional in this option, Halliday (1967c, p.217) follows on the steps of Svartvik (1966, p.141), who says that "the great majority of receptive clauses in contemporary English have no agents"<sup>81</sup>. The effect here is to emphasize the actor as the point of new information (carrying information focus), and the goal as the point of departure for the clause as message. In this context, Halliday also (1967c, p. 216) says:

It seems appropriate to interpret the feature 'receptive' in the grammar as that option which maps goal on to the subject because this is the reason for selecting the option: since the subject is the unmarked theme, the receptive allows the goal to be thematic while remaining, qua theme, unmarked\_\_ and the actor either to be absent or, if present, to carry the unmarked focus.

(2) When the transitivity option is operative with marked theme, the clause may still be active (actor as subject) as in:

3-55 //these **HOUSES**// my grandfather **SOLD**//

In this case, however, the speaker has foregrounded, marked and placed the theme in a separate information unit. Moreover, he lets the focus on the second information unit falls on the process rather than the actor without introducing contrastive meaning of information focus.

In explaining the meaning of passive, Halliday (1967c, p.217) also follows on the steps of Mathesius, (1928 [Vachek, 1966, p. 91]), who attributes the high frequency of passive in English to the thematic organisation of the clause and its interaction "with other dimensions of the structure"\_\_ in particular what Halliday calls transitivity and its various options. The meaning of passive, as Halliday sees it, is summarized as follows:

the speaker selects the option 'receptive' in the transitivity system in order to take as unmarked theme a nominal having a role other than that of actor (one of goal, beneficiary or range), the actor either being unspecified or having unmarked focus within rheme. (Halliday, 1967c, p. 217).

Besides, Halliday (loc. cit.) emphasizes the fact that the option receptive "may or may not be passive in the sense of having a passive verbal group", because he believes that the passivity of the verb is entirely unnecessary as a realization of the receptive as we have noticed above. This is why, according to Halliday, the verbal distinction of active and passive serves a different purpose, namely the distinction between orientation to the process or to the agency as in:

3-56 The door opened.

3-57 The door was opened.

In a word, the same factors, (those of the thematic organisation of the clause as a message), that favour 'inversion' for mood, are also the same ones that favour inversion in transitivity; this is evident in the relatively high frequency of the passive construction.

### **3.6.2.3 Modal Adjuncts, Conjunctions & Relatives as Themes**

To start with, an adjunct, as a theme, establishes a cognitive setting of time, place, manner, or cause. It is quite frequent in English. In fact, it is "the most frequent marked theme" in the English clause (Halliday 1967c, p. 219) as in:

3-58 Yesterday John saw the play.

Halliday recognizes that more than one adjunct can appear in thematic position: "the function theme, restricted elsewhere to a single clause element, can in the case of adjuncts extend over two or more" (1967c, p. 219). Halliday suggests that there may

be an implicit relationship between these elements of either hypotaxis or embedding. Adjuncts, either individual or in a series, are often set apart from the rest of the clause by segmentation into separate information units as in:

3-59 The other day in Sheffield I watched an interesting new process.

Where we can have the adjunct as one information unit ending with the 'Sheffield' or two: one ending with 'day' and the other with 'Sheffield'.

Halliday (1967c, p.220) raises the question of whether in some instances the adjuncts are actually constituents of the clause, and therefore whether in fact they are themes, since necessarily they must occur in initial position. He indicates that some of them are "best regarded on other grounds as not being constituents of the clause."

Whether he decides to consider adjuncts as components of the clause or not, Halliday (1967c & 1985), however, divides them into two categories: conjunctive adjuncts, those which relate the clause to the preceding text (best known as discourse adjuncts), and modal adjuncts, those which express the speaker's judgment regarding the relevance of the message. Halliday does not find it difficult to justify the occurrence of either of them in an initial position in the clause, and hence as themes. For the latter, his justification is:

if the speaker includes within the message some element that expresses his own angle of judgement on the matter, it is natural for him to make this his point of departure (Halliday, 1985, p. 50).

His justification for the former (discourse adjunct) is:

if the speaker includes some element expressing the relationship to what has gone before: the theme of the message, then becomes an indication of its significance at that point in the discourse (Halliday, op. cit., p.51).

Therefore, in modal and discourse adjuncts, the theme is specified in terms of speech function and discourse structure respectively, and, according to Halliday (1967c, p.221), "does not preclude the enunciation of a further theme in the area of cognitive meaning that may follow them in the clause, such as a subject, complement or an adjunct of time and place". Moreover, these adjuncts favour an initial position, and thus become thematic, but are not restricted to it: "they can come elsewhere in the clause, and they may be added as an afterthought" (loc. cit.).

The same argument and reasoning hold true for conjunctions, which by their initial position, serve as unmarked themes<sup>82</sup>. Halliday suggests that some of these

which obligatorily occur in the initial position, still "permit at least some thematic variation in the clause", but this variation is restricted; so these items are felt to be clause constituents and there is "a slight thematic flavour to their occurrence in initial position" (Halliday, 1967c, p. 220).

Halliday (1985, pp. 51) stresses that these items (conjunctions) are inherently thematic; it seems that in the evolution of language, they have "floated to the front of the clause and stayed there". Therefore, the speaker does not have to choose each time to make *if* or *and* as his theme. He merely chooses the meaning of *if* & *and*, as part of the package; the words that express the meanings are assigned thematic status. Halliday also believes that when one of these items is present, it does not exhaust all the thematic potential of the clause, and in this case the speaker has to select which element to place next to the conjunction. Typically, or in the unmarked cases, it is usually the subject that follows, but it may be other elements other than the subject: it could be an adjunct or even a complement as in the following examples:

3-60 *if* at first you don't succeed

3-61 *but* the cask of pearls no one has found.

In both examples, the only reason to put the adjunct '*at first*' and the complement '*the cask of pearls*', in front of the conjunctions *if* and *but* respectively is to mark them as thematic, which shows that the function of theme is still present following the two conjunctions.

Moreover, this does not mean, as mentioned above, that there is a slight "thematic flavour" with the conjunction itself, because, according to Halliday (1985, p. 52), "the theme has to be interpreted as a meaning, rather than as this or that particular item that realizes the meaning". Therefore, the theme of a clause beginning with *but*, as the one exemplified above, is not so much the word in itself, but as the meaning 'contrary to the expectation just set up'. In order to support his view about these conjunctions having "thematic flavour", Halliday points out that the occurrence of marked themes after conjunctions is considerably "rarer than in non-conjoined clauses", which, according to him, means that

some part of the total thematic potential in the message is as it were 'USED UP' when we assign a clause a particular status as co-ordinate or subordinate to one another (Halliday, 1985, p. 52) [my emphasis].

Relatives, unlike conjunctions, do not form a separate word class; they either

function as subject, adjuncts or complement, either by themselves or within a structure of a group, nominal, adverbial, or phrasal, like *whose house, with whom, for whichever reason, however badly. . . etc*<sup>83</sup>. Halliday (1985,p. 52) stresses that "a relative group or phrase of this kind functions, as a whole, as the theme of the clause in which it occurs".

#### **3.6.2.4 Multiple Themes**

As hinted in the previous section, conjunctives and modal adjuncts do not exhaust all the thematic potential of the clause; they can be followed by subject, complement or circumstantial adjuncts as themes of the clause. Halliday summarizes this principle as follows:

If the initial element in the clause does not function as Subject or Complement or CIRCUMSTANTIAL Adjunct (. . . it embraces all adjuncts **other than** conjunctive and modal ones), the Subject, Complement or Adjunct next following is still part of the theme. (Halliday, 1985, p. 53) [original emphasis].

With this in mind, Halliday explicitly introduces the notion of a multiple theme\_\_ where part of the clause functioning as theme has a further, internal structure of its own. This internal structure of the theme is based upon the principle that the clause, as explained in the previous sections, is the product of three simultaneous semantic processes. For Halliday (loc. cit.), the clause is "at one and the same time a representation of experience [ideational component], an interactive exchange [interpersonal component] and a message [textual component]".

Although the theme-rheme structure is the basic form of organizing the clause as a message, in the total make-up of theme all functional components may contribute. According to Halliday, "there is always an ideational element in the theme" (Halliday, 1985, p.53) [original emphasis]. There may be, but not necessarily, interpersonal and/or textual elements as well. The typical or unmarked sequence in the clause is textual followed by interpersonal followed by ideational. The sequence of interpersonal followed by textual may be modified, which has the effect of being "marked"; but the ideational element is always the final one\_\_ "whatever follows the first ideational element of the clause is automatically part of the rheme" (loc. cit.).



In principle, Halliday (loc. cit.) believes that the "ideational element is anything that represents "a process, a participant on that process . . . or a circumstance attendant on that process"; these same elements also function in the mood system as "Predicator, Subject, Complement or Adjunct". Thus, the ideational elements within the theme is "some entity functioning as Subject, Complement and Adjunct". Halliday refers to these elements as "TOPICAL THEME, since they correspond 'fairly well' to the elements identified as 'topic-comment' analysis". According to Halliday (loc. cit.), "there is no further thematic structure within topical theme", although he admits, four lines earlier, that "a **predicator is rarely thematic**". This would make one wonders whether, "**rarely**" of (1985), does not mean the same as "**rare**" of (1967c), [my emphasis], where Halliday cautions that the "infrequent" occurrence of marked themes is not to be equated with "rare", although, as we have discussed earlier (cf. 3.6.2.1.3), Halliday gives the verb in imperative clauses the status of theme (e.g. sing me a song), and he even says "this also happens, although **VERY INFREQUENTLY**, in declarative clauses" [original emphasis]; he gives the following example in support of this:

3-62 Forget I shall not,

where **forget**, is put in first position to give it thematic status.

Halliday (1985) divides the textual elements that contribute to the internal structure of the theme into three categories<sup>84</sup>. The first includes continuative items such as *yes, no, well, oh, now*, "which signal that a new move is beginning: a response, in dialogue, or a move to the next point if the same speaker is continuing" (Halliday op. cit., p.54). The second includes structural conjunctions items such as (*and, when, even if*) and relatives such as (*who, whoever*) (cf. 3.6.2.3); these are what Halliday always refers to as "the obligatory thematic elements". The third set of items is that of conjunctive adjuncts, which, as mentioned earlier, Halliday prefers to call "discourse adjuncts"; the main function of these is to relate the clause to the preceding discourse.

Halliday also summarizes the interpersonal elements, that take part in the internal construction of the theme, as modal themes<sup>85</sup>, the finite verb in a 'yes/no' interrogative clause and the vocative element. According to Halliday (1985, p. 54),

the vocative is a floating element which may occur anywhere; if it is thematic, it typically marks the beginning of the interpersonal theme, though it may follow the modal adjunct if there is one.

Halliday (1985, p. 55) provides a number of examples to illustrate the various constituents of the multiple theme, among which the following example is selected to demonstrate what has been discussed above, and about which Halliday (op. cit., p.56) says that one might have "to wait a long time before hearing one as complex as that":

3-63	well	but	then	Ann	surely	wouldn't	the best idea	be to join the group
	continuative	structural	conjunctive	vocative	modal	finite	topical	
	textual			interpersonal				
	Theme							

At this stage of discussion of Halliday's theme, one can explain now why is it that Halliday (1985) considers that the finite verb, being an interpersonal element, to form only part of the overall thematic elements of the interrogative clause. The subject, which constitutes the other part of the theme of the interrogative clause, is an ideational element and not an interpersonal element. Therefore, the theme structure in interrogative can be best explained in terms of a multiple themes. (see the interpersonal theme box in 3-63 above).

As can be seen from the example above, the theme of any clause in English extends up to and includes the topical theme. The latter is any element of the clause that has some function in the ideational component: a process (which according to Halliday is 'rare'), a participant in it whether subject (as actor/ agent) or complement (as or goal/ patient) and a circumstance of time, place, cause and manner attendant on that process. Halliday (1967c, p. 222) summarizes the ordering of the thematic structure of the complex clause (sentence) in the following table (see next page):

	THEME						RHEME		
	Non-Cognitive			Cognitive					
	Sentence structure	Discourse	Speech Function						
	Marked Theme			Unmarked Theme					
	Conjunction	Discourse Adjunct	Modal Adjunct	Comp. (or) Adjunct	WH-	Finite Verb		Subject	
	although							John	saw the play yesterday . . . .
		however						John	saw the play yesterday.
(and)		perhaps				John	saw the play yesterday.		
(and)				what			did John see yesterday?		
(and)					did		John see the play yesterday?		
(and)						John	saw the play yesterday.		
	although			yesterday			John saw the play . . . .		
		however		yesterday			John saw the play.		
(and)		perhaps		yesterday			John saw the play.		
(and)				yesterday			what did John see?		
(and)				yesterday			did John see the play?		
(and)				yesterday			John saw the play.		

Table 3-3: The Order of Thematic Elements in the Structure of the Complex Clause

### 3.6.2.5 Clauses as Themes

Basically, Halliday considers theme-rheme structure a 'purely' clause structure, "whose elements are . . . constituents of the clause" (Halliday, 1985, p. 56). But he does not deny that there are other features of thematic organisation in different "guises" throughout the system of language, that have manifestations below and above the clause.

Below the clause, Halliday (1985) indicates that the very sequence of the nominal and the verbal groups as well as the prepositional phrase incorporate the thematic principle into their own structure. The finite verb in interrogative clauses has already been discussed in thematic terms in addition to the verbal group of the imperative clauses. (cf. 3.6.2.1.2 & 3.6.2.1.3).

Above the clause, Halliday (1985) indicates that the thematic principle also holds true. It lies behind the organisation of the written text into paragraphs; in fact, "the topic sentence of a paragraph is nothing other than its theme", but Halliday does not go any further in his discussion on this direction except to point out that he has analyzed

a text using the topic sentence as the theme of each paragraph in the text<sup>86</sup>.

In discussing clauses as themes, Halliday remains within the lexico-grammatical level of the English language; he only raises the argument from the simple clause consisting of one simple clause to a "complex clause", or a sentence, consisting of one main clause, "the Head", plus one or more modifying or dependent clauses as in:

3-64 Give that teapot away if you don't like it,

or its reverse order, where the main clause is preceded by the dependent one. Where this order is used, according to Halliday, (1985, p. 57), "the motive is thematic" as in:

3-65 If winter comes, can spring be far behind?

Halliday also points out that examples like 3-65 pose no problem in analysis as long as the analyst keeps in mind that each of these constituent clauses still have the thematic structure of its own. But the problem arises when additional thematic elements are added at the beginning of such clauses as in:

3-66 But honestly Mary, if winter comes can spring be far behind.

Here, Halliday, suggests that it depends upon the intonation: "if it is spoken as a separate tone group" (Halliday, 1985, p. 58), it is part of the overall theme of the clause complex; if not, it is part of the theme of the first clause, whether the first clause is dependent or independent. At the same time he says, "but it does not matter, so long as it is shown to be thematic" (Halliday, 1985, p. 58); he never explains how to treat such additional thematic structures if they are part of a sentence of a written text and not a spoken one. For Halliday (op. cit, p.193), the clause complex is "the only grammatical unit above the clause"; at the same time, he says that "a sentence will be defined as a clause complex". He also points out that "there is no need to bring the sentence as a distinct grammatical category. We can use it simply to refer to an orthographic unit that is contained between two full stops" (Halliday, 1985, p. 193). Any reader, at least one like myself, reading these statements on the same page of a book will surely be in doubt as to the status of the term "sentence" for Halliday: is it part of the grammatical level of the language? Or is it part of the orthography, the phonetic level, and acts as the realization of the of the clause complex at that level? If it is the latter, an orthographic unit delimited by two full stops, I would accept Halliday's first suggestion that '*but honestly Mary*' is part of the overall theme of the clause complex. If it is a grammatical unit, which Halliday denies, the thematic status

of 'but honestly Mary' is indeterminate, because, if it part of a spoken text, the reader has the choice to say it either way: as a separate tone group or part of a tone group. The only constraint that would force him to say it in one way rather than the other is the "verbal and non-verbal" contextual background that is already built up in the discourse until that point. Nevertheless, Halliday, has analyzed only the 3-65 above without the additional thematic elements as follows:

3-65a	If	winter	comes	can	spring	be far behind?
	theme1			rheme1		
	structural	topical		finite	topical	
	theme2		rheme2	theme3		rheme3

Halliday (1985) also points out that there is a special class of clauses that function as theme in the complex clause; this is the grammatical metaphor<sup>87</sup>. Halliday (op. cit, p. 58) believes that the function of the grammatical metaphor is "get the theme-rheme structure the way the speaker wants it due to the fact that grammatically metaphorical forms are never synonymous with their non-metaphorical [or congruent] counterparts" (Halliday, 1985, p. 58).

According to Halliday, grammatical metaphors are two-fold: ideational and interpersonal; the former is always associated with the function of theme; whereas the latter is "sometimes associated with the choice of theme" (Halliday, 1985, p. 58). Below is an example taken from Halliday (1985) to illustrate the interpersonal metaphor and its association with thematic choice:

3-67	I	don't believe	that pudding	ever will be cooked
(a)	theme1	rheme1	theme2	rheme2
(b)	interpersonal (modal)		topical	
	theme3		rheme3	

In this example, the independent clause ' *I don't believe*' is expressing modality in the form of '*in my opinion . . . not likely*', and the rest of the clause complex is merely a dependent modifying clause. Halliday proposes that, the test to find out whether a certain clause is metaphorical or not is the question tag procedure. In the above example the tag would be "*will it?*", (referring to the pudding as a ideational element) and not "*do I?*" referring to the speaker, who is only expressing his point of view,

assuming that the clause is interpreted non-metaphorically. In the analysis above, the literal, or congruent (non-metaphorical), interpretation is shown in version (a); whereas the metaphorical (interpersonal type) is given in (b).

### **3.6.2.6 Theme in Dependent, Minor and Elliptical Clauses**

In addition to discussing the theme in independent major clauses, Halliday (1985) also discusses thematic structure of other types of clauses. In fact, 'the congruent analysis, type (a), of 3-67 above is no more than an analysis of theme in dependent clauses. Halliday (1985, p.61) points out that "there is thematic structure . . . in all major clause types: that is all clauses expressing mood and transitivity whether independent or not". The only difference is the scale of options open to the speaker in each of the clause types. The scale ranges from an almost open-ended set of options to almost no options at all in minor clauses such as "look!", "good morning", "well done!", which, according to Halliday (1985, p.63), "have no thematic structures at all": they are merely rhemes. As the speaker starts moving a way from the open-ended freedom of choice, e.g. the unmarked independent declarative clause, structural pressures from the various parts of the grammar start acting. Halliday, exemplifies the latter case with the interrogative, imperative or even dependent types of clauses, where the "thematic principle has determined what it is the theme of the clause, leaving only highly marked alternative options . . . or else no options at all (Halliday, op. cit., p. 61).

To give the speaker more freedom of choice, there is what Halliday calls "the compensatory principle" whereby, "if what comes first is fixed . . . then what comes next may retain some 'thematic flavour,'" (loc. cit.). What this means is that if the initial position is not the realization of thematic choice, as in the case of discursal or modal adjuncts, but of some other choice in the grammar, then what follows it is part of the theme. As indicated earlier, Halliday has defined the boundaries of the theme up to the first element in the ideational element (or as he calls 'topical theme'). Hence in 3-65a above, one part of the theme is the *if*, expressing the relation of the present clause with what has preceded it in the text or the discourse, whereas the other part of theme is *winter* which has a function in the transitivity (as actor) and in mood (as

subject).

Halliday emphasizes that the various patterns of theme selection are very significant in the overall development of the text. This echoes what Danes (1974) says about the process of thematic progression of the text (cf. 2.4). The choice of theme, clause by clause, may look a fairly haphazard matter; but it is not:

The choice of clause themes plays a fundamental part in the way discourse is organized; it is this, in fact which constitutes what is often known as the 'method of development' of the text. In this process, **THE MAIN CONTRIBUTION COMES FROM THE THEMATIC STRUCTURE OF THE INDEPENDENT CLAUSES.** But other clauses also come into the picture, and need to be taken into account on the theme-rheme analysis (Halliday, 1985, p.62) [my emphasis].

Halliday (1985) provides a summary of the various thematic organisation of clauses other than those that are independent. He divides them into four classes or categories: dependent, embedded, minor and elliptical clauses.

(1) **Dependent Clauses.** These are of two type: finite and non-finite. If finite, they typically have a conjunction as structural theme followed by a topical one as in:

3-68 [he felt]	that	his work	was done
	structural	topical	rheme
	theme		

If the clause begins with a Wh-element, this element becomes the topical theme, since, according to Halliday, it has a function in the transitivity structure of the clause as in:

3-69 [I asked] Why no-one was around.

If the clause is non-finite, Halliday gives three various options of the theme structure. The first is that there may be a preposition as a structural theme followed by a subject as a topical theme. The second is that there may be a preposition as a structural theme and no topical one. The third is that there may be neither: the clause is merely rhematic. Below are three following examples that show each case:

3-70	with	every door	being locked	[we had no choice].
3-71	By	0= [none]	counting sheep	[she finally fell a sleep]
3-72	0= [none]	0= [none]	to draw lots	[first collect some pebbles].
structural		topical	rheme	
theme				

(2) **Embedded Clauses.** These are clauses which function inside the structure of a

nominal group, as 'defining relative' clauses as in

3-73 Those who came to dinner were not all her friends.

Here, the clause '*who came to dinner*', acts as a defining relative clause of '*those*'. Halliday (1985) considers that the thematic structure of this type of clauses is the same as that of dependent ones; however, he points out that, since these clauses are "down ranked" or rank-shifted, they do not function as a constituent of the sentence, and therefore "their thematic contribution to the discourse is minimal, and for practical purposes can be ignored" (Halliday, 1985, p.63).

(3) **Minor clauses.** These have already been exemplified above as expressions or 'clauses' that have no thematic organisation at all; they consist mainly of rhemes. Examples include calls, greetings and exclamations. They resemble a class of items such as titles, and labels\_\_ not regarded as clauses because they have no independent speech function.

(4) **Elliptical Clauses.** Halliday (1976 and elsewhere) divides these elliptical clauses into two types: anaphoric, where some part of the clause is presupposed from what has gone before, and exophoric, where the clause is not presupposing anything from what has gone before, but simply "taking advantage of the rhetorical structure of the situation, specifically the roles of speaker and listener" (Halliday, 1985, p.63). The first type (anaphoric ellipsis) is very common in dialogue in English as well as Arabic, especially in response to questions of various types: whether yes/no or wh- type. the presupposition ranges from partial to almost complete type where there is no thematic structure at all as in answers like *yes, no, all right*, where every thing is presupposed except the rheme or the 'new' bit of information. As for partial presupposition, the following example is borrowed from Halliday (1985, p.63):

3-74	'I	will see it,'	said Goody fleet;
	theme	rheme	

3-75	'so	will	I' (0) .	said Goody Fry. (0) = 'go see it'
	conjunctive	finite		
	theme			

As for exophoric ellipsis, the subject and the finite verb are 'understood' from the context. Examples of this type of ellipsis includes clause like *Thirsty?* (*are you*



*thirsty?*) , *No idea. (I have no idea)*, Such clauses, according to Halliday (1985, p.64), "have, in fact, a thematic structure; but it consists of rheme only. The theme is (part of) what is omitted in the ellipsis".

### 3.6.3 Identification

Halliday has defined identification as "an option whereby any clause may be organized into a 'cleft-sentence' with equative form, and in a number of possible arrangements" (Halliday, 1967c, p.223). It is an optional sub-system within the textual component, which assigns an "identified-identifier" structure to the clause; thus, any clause can be organized into an equative form 'x equals y' through the nominalization of one of its elements<sup>88</sup>, as in:

3-76 What John saw was the play,

which usually involves a definite identified element and contrasts with a non-identifying clause like:

3-77 John saw the play.

The basic identifying clause is an asymmetrical equative clause with the meaning "X is to be equated with Y" (loc. cit.). The identification clause like 3-76 is made into an identifying clause by the speaker assigning the functions 'things to be identified' and 'identifier' to its structure. For Halliday (1967a & c), the identified is 'known' and the identifier is 'unknown'. In English, the identified is a nominalization introduced either as a wh-word or a substitute noun form ('one' or 'the thing'). Below are more examples taken from Halliday (1967c):

3-78 The one who painted the shed was John.

3-79 The thing that John painted was the shed.

As we shall see in chapter four, this construction is referred to by other linguists as 'pseudo-cleft' or the 'wh-cleft'. As far as the theme of such construction is concerned, it is always the whole of what is on the left side of the equation, the verb "2 *be*", as Halliday (1967c) calls it, regardless of whether it is the identified or the identifier, i.e., regardless of whether or not it is the nominalization. Hence, the nominalization structure with the 'wh-element' can be the rheme as in:

3-80 John is the one who painted the shed.

3-81 Watney's is what we want.

By the use of equative structure, identification gives uniqueness by definiteness to the identified. Thus when it is in the theme position, it is highlighted in a special way. For example:

3-82 We want Watney's,

is to be interpreted that we might want other things as well, where 'Watney's belong to the universe of things 'we want'; whereas,

3-83 What we need is Watney's,

exclusively narrows the universe of what we need to the Watney's and nothing else. Halliday also points out that there is a further aspect of difference between the two versions of this 'beer slogan' and that is, in 3-82, the theme is merely '*we*', whereas in 3-83, it is '*what we want*'.

In an anaphoric identifying clause, (Halliday, 1967c, pp. 231-233), the demonstratives (especially '*this & that*') occur with greatest frequency as the identifier in an identifying clause. These demonstratives tend to occur in thematic slots and, at the same time, do not carry an information focus, which thus falls on the identified as in:

3-84 // that is what I WANT// (meaning: what you have just mentioned).

In this example, the identifier 'that' is anaphoric and "therefore can not be NEW unless contrastive" (Halliday, 1967c, p. 231); so when the identifier is anaphoric, i.e. demonstrative, the given-new structure may be incongruent with that of identified-identifier. But, among all closed systems, Halliday (1967c, p. 223) stresses that "demonstratives are not always anaphoric, they are reference items whose reference may be either situational . . . or textual, and if textual it may be backward (anaphoric) or forward (cataphoric). When anaphoric, as has been noticed from 3-84, they are non-focal, since what is referred to anaphorically is 'given' unless contrastive, but when situational or cataphoric, demonstratives are focal and thus new. Therefore, the contrast between 3-84 and:

3-85 //THAT's what I want// (meaning: the thing over there or what I'll say next)

is obvious from the fact that the identifier will carry information focus, as shown above, provided it is referential to the situation or cataphoric.

Halliday (1967a, [Kress, 1976, pp. 186-187]) believes that the very high

frequency of demonstrative identification is not perhaps unexpected especially in scientific and conversational discourses, since they constitute two features both of which contribute significantly to the role played by the message as part of the discourse.

The speaker encodes one part of his message as the known [identified] and then he identifies it by an unknown [identifier] that is at the same time shown to be recoverable from the preceding discourse, either that of his interlocutor or \_\_ sometimes to forestall interruption\_\_ his own (Halliday, op. cit., p. 186).

If, however, the referent of the anaphoric demonstrative is in the speaker's own previous utterance, the demonstrative often constitutes a separate information unit and thus carry information focus ( which, since the item is anaphoric, is contrastive) as in:

3-86 //THAT's what //PUZZles me//

This, according to Halliday (1967a &c), relates to a general tendency of identification clauses, "namely their greater tendency . . . to constitute two separate information units, the known and the unknown, each constituting one" (Halliday, 1967a, [Kress, 1976, p. 187]). In this respect, however, the identifying clause follows the usual pattern, whereby the first information unit is "coextensive with the theme" (loc. cit.), and if it has the usual sequence of known followed by unknown, the whole of the nominalization functioning is known as thematic. Therefore, in a clause like:

3-87 //the one who broke the WINDOW // was JOHN//,  
the theme is the 'the one who broke the window'.

Halliday (loc. cit.) thus concludes that "the association of information with anaphoric demonstrative . . . is thus predictable in identifying clauses from the fact that here the demonstrative is at the same time both the unknown and theme". He also sums up his argument on the identification clause as he starts it by saying that, unlike information structure and thematisation which are essential in the creation of text, identification is optional from the standpoint of its communicative purpose. Halliday argues that its '*raison d'être*' is to highlight the theme.

### 3.6.4 Other Thematic Structures

Under this sub-section, three additional 'optional' thematic choices, which have some bearing on the thematic structure of the clause and hence on discourse in general,

will be discussed. These are: the predicated, the substitutive and reference themes.

### **3.6.4.1 Predicated Themes**

Like identification, predicated themes are realized by equative structure of identified- identifier through their structural formulae or internal predication which consists of "it + be + who + . . . " as in:

3-88 It was John who painted the wall,

where 'it . . . painted the wall' is identified (definite/'given' information) and 'John' identifier ('new'/contrastive information) and the relator being the class of verbs '2 be' (cf. 7.4.2 & 7.10.2). It is close to the meaning of the identifying clause with the sequence identifier-identified such as:

3-89 John is the one who broke the window.

Both examples are related to 'John broke the window', but identification and predication differ in some aspects from one another. While the former, for example, can map the function 'theme' on either the identifier or the identified, the latter can only map the theme on the identifier. Although both give "explicit prominence to the theme by exclusion" (Halliday, 1967c, p. 236), the highlighting involved, is different. In identification, "the prominence is cognitive: 'John, and nobody but John, broke the window'; whereas in predication it is thematic: 'John and nobody else is the topic of the clause'" (loc. cit.).

Although in most instances the two look similar, Halliday emphasizes the difference between them when it comes to highlighting some thematic elements like 'in spite of the cold' in a sentence like:

3-90 It was in spite of the cold that he went swimming,

that does not have any identification equivalent. Moreover, Halliday notes the frequency of predicated themes in wh-clauses and equatives as in:

3-91 What was it that John wanted?

3-92 It is John that is the leader.

which if they occur in identification clauses at all their "coding presents difficulties of interpretation" (Halliday, op. cit., 237)

Halliday (1967c & 1985) points out that any element in the clause having a

representational function can be marked off by predication; moreover, "any cognitive theme, marked or unmarked can be predicated, the least likely being the anaphoric unmarked themes, the most likely being marked themes of any kind" (Halliday, 1967c, p. 237). Thus in a clause such as:

3-93 His earlier novels I've read

the meaning is that of a contrast: 'but his later ones, I do not know anything about'; whereas in the predicated form of this clause, as in:

3-94 It is his earlier novels I've read

the meaning here, according to Halliday (loc. cit.) is not cognitively contrastive but simply that 'these are the ones I'm talking about'.

Two additional options arise in association with predication, (1) between the predicated formulae: '*it + be + X + who . . .*', and '*there + be + X . . .*' and (2) between '*it + be + X + who . . .*' and the formulae '*X + it + be + wh-element . . .*'.

In the first option with "*it . . .*", the theme is defined (uniquely specified), hence the contrast with identification; whereas with "*there . . .*", the theme is undefined (non-uniquely specified): '*X and no others*' as opposed to '*x, possibly among others*', based on the fact that "'it' and 'there' being the cataphoric forms corresponding, respectively, to the definite and indefinite article" (Halliday, 1967c, p. 238). As for the second option, Halliday (loc. cit.) asserts that it adds "little more than rhythmic variation" as in:

3-95 The dog it was that died,

where the form '*the dog it was that . . .*' "explicitly asserts the thematic status of the noun 'dog'. Halliday (loc. cit.) also asserts the fact that although the structural mechanism of the predication makes 'it', which contrasts with 'there', appears thematic, "this 'it' is non-anaphoric and never can be thematic."

According to Halliday (1967c & 1985), the only two restrictions on elements in the clause that can't be thematically predicted have to do with the verb and the equative clause. As for the first restriction, Halliday (1967c, p. 238) points out that, with the exception of some Celtic dialects in English, which "regularly accept verbal theme" as a result of the initial position of the clause being occupied by a verb, verbal predicated themes are "genuinely rare" and are restricted to examples such as:

3-96 [He said he would resign]. And resign he did!

Other than examples of this type, verbal predicated themes are highly restricted. The second type of restriction, that of thematic equative, Halliday believes that the identified element, which is in one sense the 'value' of the equative clause, "can never be predicated" because, according to Halliday (1967c, p. 239), this is "predictable from the fact that what is predicated has the role of identifier within the predication", so that in clauses like:

3-97 It's the leader that's John

can only be interpreted as 'this is how John can be recognized'.

What is of interest about the predicated theme in this study is two-fold. The first one has to do with the relationship between information structure and thematisation. In this respect, and since accentuation is not marked in writing, the predication has the "additional function in written English of directing the reader to interpret the information structure in the intended way" (Halliday, 1985, p. 60), as in:

3-98 John's father wanted him to give up violin. It was his teacher who persuaded him to continue.

Halliday (loc. cit.) has analyzed the second sentence of 3-98 as follows:

	It	was his <b>TEACHER</b>	who	persuaded him to continue
(a)	theme	rheme	theme	rheme
(b)	theme		rheme	

According to Halliday (1985, p.60), the tonic accent falls on '*teacher*', where it contrasts with '*John's father*' in the first sentence: it is a contrast of attitudes between the two themes of the clauses. Halliday also indicates that in the example above, the (a) analysis is that of a local congruent type while (b) is of the predication type.

The second point of interest is that the predicated themes in English provide an example of contrast with the Arabic Language in the question of ' *ʾatawkīd bi ʾistiʿmāl damīr š-šaʾan*' (emphasis by using the pronoun of status; cf. 5.1.1). To anticipate some of the characteristics of this optional thematic construction, we may consider the explicit formulation of contrast in both languages such as:

3-99 It was **JOHN** who painted the window

which contrasts with its Arabic counterpart as in:

3-100 *ʾinna*-(hu) (pronoun of *status*) **Jūn** al-ladī dahana ššubbāka.

where the English and the Arabic 'John' are the highlighted elements in the two clauses and constitute the theme of the local congruent thematic structure as well as part of the thematic structure of the two predicated clauses.

#### 3.6.4.2 Substitution

Halliday (1967c, p. 239) has defined substitutive theme as "an option whereby the speaker can assign to clause-final position an element which would otherwise appear as unmarked theme"; thus, it will be presented as if it were a "delayed theme" as in

3-101 They drive on the **LEFT** in the **UNITED KINGDOM**

3-102 They don't seem to **MATCH, THESE COLOURS**.

According to Halliday, the above examples consist of one clause and one information unit; however, there are two points of focus in each. The first point carries primary focus; the second that occurs within the "delayed theme", or as it is called by some linguists 'tail' (cf. 4.5.1.4), carries a secondary information focus, being added to the clause as "an afterthought" (Halliday, 1967c, p. 241).

In terms of thematisation, the adjunct in 3-101, as mentioned earlier (cf. 3.6.2.3), is an unmarked theme when in a delayed position; whereas the reverse is true of the delayed subject in 3-102: it is marked when in delayed position. In this respect Halliday says:

Substitution thus reverses the normal sequence of theme-rheme and introduces a delayed theme after the remainder of the message. The theme in this case is the subject, which is substituted in the modal constituent by a concord pronoun; this refers cataphorically, although since the typical context for a substitute clause is one in which the subject is partially recoverable, from the discourse or the situation, while still requiring to be specified as secondary information, it appears that the function of the pronoun as general reference items is not irrelevant to the interpretation. (Halliday, 1967c, p.240).

Halliday (loc. cit.) explains the meaning of the delayed theme as "'first, I'll say what I have to say and then I'll remind you what I'm talking about'".

Halliday (loc. cit.) believes that it might be the length of the nominalization that plays some part in determining the preference of a substitutive form, but the major part is mainly played by the structural role of nominalization. If nominalization is of the class "thing", functioning as a participant in the transitivity structure, the substitute form

is still the marked one as in:

3-103 It excited him what he saw;

beside the unmarked as in:

3-104 What he saw excited him.

Halliday (1967c, p. 240) points out that "clauses in which nominalization is derived from the feature 'identifying' are of this type". Whereas if the nominalization is of the class "fact", having the structural role of information, the substitute form is the unmarked one, as in:

3-105 It worries me to see him so overworked.

Halliday draws the attention to the fact that the two types are different: in the former, where nominalization is of a 'thing' type, "substitution is obligatory"; whereas in the second type, where nominalization of the 'fact' type, such an element is likely either "to be referred to by an anaphoric demonstrative", if fully recoverable, or "to be delayed , as partially recoverable . . . until after the cognitive content of the message" ( loc. cit.). Since, as mentioned at the beginning of this sub-section, the substitute form is in fact "rarely more than one information unit"; therefore, substitution, according to Halliday (1967c, p.241), is not a device for segmenting information but rather a **MEANS OF DISTRIBUTING IT INTO A PARTICULAR THEMATIC PATTERN**" [my emphasis].

#### 3.6.4.3 Reference

Halliday (1967c, p. 241) has defined reference as a "form of pronominal anaphora within the clause", and it is restricted to nominal theme of declarative clauses; it is the case in which the marked nominal theme, fronted from its normal position in the clause, has an anaphoric pronominal referent in the original slot as in:

3-106 *These houses*, my grandfather sold *them*.

It is rarely used for the purpose of thematisation in English except in cases related to long themes, especially when "it is not subject" as in:

3-107 *The sound that came floating out in the air* I didn't know I had *it* in me. Moreover, it is a rare construction in English, and it is more likely to be used when the theme governs an intervening relative clause as in:



3-108 This man, that I recently has a quarrel with, his son has established a company.

Halliday (1967c, p.241) considers that both reference and marked substitution are "fully integrated into the information structure", and thus deserve treatment among the options for dealing with thematisation and information structure, since they "are in no way distinguishable by pause and rhythmic irregularity". (loc. cit.).

### 3.6.5 Summary of the Model

Throughout his discussion of thematic structure, in the widest sense, Halliday (1967a , c & 1985) emphasizes the fact that the grammar of the English clause includes a set of options whereby the speaker organizes his act of communication as a component of a discourse. In order to accomplish this, the speaker assigns the clause a two-part theme-rheme structure, the theme taking an initial position in the sequence. The element that can be thematic may either be non-cognitive or cognitive. The latter can either be unmarked or marked and, if marked, it involves the foregrounding of an element from its neutral slot and making it the point of departure for the message. Moreover, the theme "may be an item recoverable from the preceding discourse, but it is not necessarily so; **THE SELECTION IS INDEPENDENT OF THE CONTEXT**" (Halliday, 1967c, p. 242) [my emphasis].

The cognitive theme, whether marked or unmarked, may be given further prominence in one of the three options. Firstly, the theme may be given prominence by a positive or negative predication. Secondly, it can also be given prominence by being 'picked up' by an anaphoric pronoun later in the clause, which serves two purposes: isolating it as a separate point of departure and specifying its transitivity role in the clause. Thirdly, it may be shown to be partially recoverable from preceding discourse by being substituted by a cataphoric pronoun and delayed to the end of the clause as a secondary information focus.

The clause may also be organized into a "two-part 'identifying' structure with equative from, in terms of the paired functions identified-identifier, and, perhaps, 'value-variable'" (1967c, p.242). The identified is usually represented by nominalization, "which regularly, though not obligatorily, includes all elements in the clause except one; and one whole term in the equation takes on the function of theme,

appearing in the first position" (loc. cit.). This structure (identification) is frequently associated with an identifier which functions anaphorically, particularly a demonstrative. Halliday (loc. cit.) believes that this acts as "integrating the clause into the discourse through the identification of the defined participant with one that has been mentioned before". This however, seems to contradict the claim that Halliday advocates at the end of the first paragraph of this sub-section.

Summing up, then, the thematic system complex (again in the broad sense) in English has, as its primary features two main independently variable systems, namely the information and thematisation systems, which are essential to the presentation of any message. They are defined in terms of their function in communication: the former to regulate the delivery of information, and the latter to set the perspective of the current clause. These two systems are indispensable to the structuring of discourse; it is how they are exercised in language that is optional and dependent on the language in question.

What remains of this summary is a contrast between the various aspects of these two systems listed below as follows:

1. The information system is expressed through units that are independent of the clause. This process is directed by the speaker's choices with regard to the pacing and segmentation of information to be delivered. Thus what one looks for as a subject of study in the information systems is the information unit and its 'centre', the information focus. The information unit coincides with the clause structure when the former is unmarked; when marked, the information unit may be longer or shorter than a clause. In the case of thematisation, on the other hand, the object of study is the theme, which is associated with the structure of the clause.
2. Constraints on the information system are imposed only by the information structure of discourse up to that point; whereas thematisation is constrained by the syntactic and lexical choices that are available to the language in question. This is probably why Halliday, as quoted earlier, claims that the selection of theme is independent of what has gone before, and this is why one can say that the basis of reference for the information is the overall discourse, mainly the preceding one; whereas it is the current clause in thematisation.
3. With information systems, the role of the listener is more active, at least in spoken

discourse; the speaker's pacing is directly based on the feedback; whereas, in thematisation, the listener's involvement is less because thematisation systems offer choices that are already available and established in the language.

4. As far as instantiation is concerned, it largely involves a phonological type the information systems, via the intonation contours; the peak corresponds to the focus, or information centre; whereas, in thematisation, it involves the speaker's choice as to what to put first in the initial slot in the structure.

5. When the information unit, the tone group, is unmarked, the focus is 'broad' and falls at the last lexical item of the unit; when marked, however, it becomes 'narrow' and can fall anywhere in the unit. The theme, by definition, is usually clause initial, except in the case of substitution and predicated themes. Marked theme corresponds to the fronting of an element from a more neutral position in the clause.

Finally, information and thematisation systems are realized concurrently, and in its unmarked form the information unit coincides with the clause. The clause is the place of interest in this context because

it provides, perhaps in all languages, a point of intersection of three sets of options . . . associated with experiential meaning, speech function and discourse organisation. These three are inter-related in complex ways, and each of them may be found to shed light on the other (Halliday, 1967c, p.243).

### **3.6.6 A Critique of Halliday's Thematic Model**

In principle, Halliday's systemic-functional grammar is a grammar based on the clause, but, as Halliday (1967, 1985 & elsewhere) points out, it has a strong projection towards text. It aims at providing the hearer/reader with the necessary syntactic, semantic and textual information to enable him to analyze not merely isolated sentences, but also any naturally occurring text into several different types of structure. One of these structures is that of theme and rheme; together, these two elements contribute to the functional configuration of the clause as a message. As indicated earlier, they represent part of the textual component of language (the other being the information structure: given and new), in contrast with the ideational component, which is concerned with the experiential content, and the interpersonal component, which is concerned with

the speaker's role in the speech situation, his personal commitment and his interaction with others. The textual component is, in fact, instrumental to the other two; "it is only because we can select the desired form of the message that we can use language effectively, both to represent an experience and to interact with those around us" (Halliday, 1970a, p. 326)<sup>89</sup>.

As indicated above, Halliday always distinguishes, within the textual component, the theme-rheme structure as independent of the distribution of information into given and new. This is the main feature that distinguishes his approach from those of the traditional Pragueans and their followers. In this respect, he says:

while given-new is a structure not of the clause but of the information unit, and is realized not by sequence but by intonation, theme-rheme, on the other hand, is a structure of the clause, and is realized by the sequence of the elements: the theme comes first (Halliday, 1970a, p. 356).

Therefore, and agreeing with Halliday, theme is not the same as given, although the two functions are often, as mentioned above, realized by the same element(s) (especially when both are unmarked or typical). This is because, while both contribute to the organisation of the message, the meaning of each is different:

. . . . 'given' means 'here is a point of contact with what you know ' (and thus does not tied to elements in the clause structure), whereas 'theme' means 'here is the heading to what I am saying' (Halliday, 1970a, p.361).

More revealing still are Halliday's statements about the function of theme when he (op. cit., pp, 356-357) says that, in principle, the theme is the point of departure, "THE TAKE OFF POINT OF THE CLAUSE, and the significant fact about it is that the speaker is free to select whatever theme he likes" [my emphasis].

In this same article as well as in many others, Halliday draws a parallel between initial clause elements and the initial elements in other structures lower than the clause, namely the verbal and the nominal groups. According to him, in both types of group, the first position realizes a structural function which relates to 'speaker-now'. In the verbal group, the orientation of speaker-now is achieved by means of the finite element which carries the deictic meaning of the tense, and in the nominal group, it is achieved by the central determiner such as 'the' 'this', and 'my'. With this insight, Halliday suggests that initial position may in itself be the meaningful in English. Within the

clause, the function of theme is precisely that of constituting its deictic elements, in that it defines the speaker's angle on the ensuing content. It also insures, in the ideal case, "the recognition of the text as a text, and its interpretation along predicated lines" (Halliday, 1968, p. 179).

These insights are very revealing and one would willingly go along with Halliday's view of theme, except for the fact that he, sometimes, introduces a 'double-sided' or even a contradictory definition of the concept: "theme is the starting point [point of departure] of the message; it is what the clause is going to be a bout" (Halliday, 1985, p. 39). In this definition, theme consists of two strands, which at first glance may appear to be the same thing under different guises, but when it comes to examining the realization of theme in natural texts (cf. chapter 7), it is found that this is far from being the case. The point of departure of the message is not necessarily what the message is about, although the two may coincide in one wording. Even Halliday's identification of a 'topical theme' as the first ideational element does not solve the problem, as can be seen from the examples illustrated in the previous sections of this chapter and by examining the various realization of thematic element(s) in the coming analysis of data (cf. also chapter 7).

Halliday (1967 & elsewhere) indicates that theme is a meaningful choice, and, as in other areas of grammar, the speaker/writer has at his disposal unmarked and marked thematic options (cf. 3.6.2). According to Halliday, unmarked themes coincide with the first constituent of each mood structure (cf. 3.6.2.1). Therefore, whether the clause is declarative, interrogative (wh- or yes/no- questions) or imperative, its starting point is the expected (the subject, [the wh-element or finite plus the subject], or the predicator, respectively), the one which announces the mood type of the clause. On the other hand, theme is said to be marked when any of other element of structure, but the expected one, is brought to initial position, as in 3-109, where the underlined elements are unmarked compared with 3-109a, where the underlined are marked:

3-109 The Gauls Sacked Rome in 390 B. C.

3-109a In 390 B. C. the Gauls sacked Rome.

Looking at these examples and many of the same nature and of the various types of mood, it can be seen that the initial constituent 'DOES NOT ALWAYS' fulfils both the halves of the Hallidayan definition of theme. Thus, I suggest that a case can be made

for considering each of the thematic elements, like the ones underlined above, as constituting, in some way, the point of departure of the ensuing clausal message. They don't, however, always represent 'what the clause is about'. Although I agree with Huddelston (1988) that the topic is 'elusive' and always need to be identified in context, I would not wish to say, for instance, that in 3-109a, the clause is about 'in 390 B. C.', since the message is clearly about either 'the Gauls', 'Rome' or even the 'sacking of Rome'<sup>90</sup>. The subject, 'the Gauls' in 3-109, seems to coincide with the possible topic, since there is no fronted adjunct. Halliday, however, makes provision for this, calling it 'topical theme' (cf. 3.6.2.4), where the subject in the declarative clause constitutes the topical theme as long as it is not preceded by an adjunct, which, when present acts as the topical theme of the clause instead.

The notion of topical theme has to do with the fact that Halliday allows for the possibility of multiple themes. Thus, in an example like 3-66 (illustrated above, but repeated for convenience):

3-66

But	honestly	Mary	if	winter	comes	can	spring	be far behind?	
THEME						RHEME			
structural	modal	vocative	structural	topical		finite	topical		
textual	interpersonal		textual	ideational		inter-personal	idea-tional		
THEME1						RHEME1	THEME2		RHEME2

it is possible to talk of multiple themes. This notion is not, in principle, incompatible with the function of initial elements as providing a starting point for the development of the following clause as a message. However, most of the thematic elements in 3-66 (but honestly Mary if) are not even remotely concerned with the what the clause is a about. By postulating multiple themes, Halliday is able to suggest that the three functional components may be present in the thematic structure of the clause (cf. example 3-66). But it is only the ideational theme -the topical theme- which is essential, according to Halliday, and all that follows it is rheme.

I believe that the problem lies in identifying as necessarily topical themes the first ideational clause constituent, which may be an adjunct. This requirement leads the reader into the counter-intuitive position of saying that in examples like:

3-110 Towards the end of his life [theme], Freud concluded [theme1] *that* he [theme2] was not a great man [rheme2] [rheme1] [rheme].

'towards the end his life' is topical theme in the first clause complex, while 'he' is the

topical theme in the embedded clause. Thus, it would surely seem more satisfying to have 'Freud' as the topical theme, or rather the topic, in the clause complex, and the same can go for 'the Gauls' in 3-109a above.

Similar, though more sarcastic, is the critique given by Hudson (1986) regarding Halliday's notion of multiple and topical themes. Hudson points out that Halliday might have found the definition outlined above adequate because he was able to pick out the themes in any clause and work out general rules which governs their use, e.g., "the theme of any clause extends up to (and includes) the topical theme", and "the topical theme is the first element in the clause that has some function in the ideational component" (Halliday, 1985, p. 56). In rejecting Halliday's notion of multiple themes, (which was proposed by the latter to justify his 'double-sided' definition of theme) Hudson says:

Perhaps he [Halliday] is tuned into language in a way that the rest of us are INCAPABLE OF, but those of us who can't easily PICK OUT the parts of the clause which define 'WHAT IT IS GOING TO BE ABOUT' or 'ITS POINT OF DEPARTURE' are simply unable to decide whether any of his claims about themes are right or wrong (Hudson, 1986, p. 798)<sup>91</sup> [my emphasis].

Somewhat confusingly, Halliday himself seems to deny some elements (like 'that' of the previous example) the status of theme when he explicitly says: "if what comes first is fixed, . . . then what comes next may retain thematic flavour" (Halliday, 1985, p. 61) [my ellipsis]. But, nevertheless, Halliday has taken two steps in this direction. Firstly, in his 1985 work, though not in his 1967 work, he includes, as theme, the subject as well as the finite part of the predicator in polar (yes/no) interrogatives (cf. 'Is anybody home?': see section 3.6.2.1.2). The justification given by Halliday is that the finite, being part of the interpersonal component, cannot realize ideational theme. Secondly, in a note at the end of a textual analysis (Halliday, 1985, p. 67), he proposes the category of "displaced themes", which he defines as "a topical element which would be unmarked theme (in the ensuing clause) if the existing topical theme was reworded as a dependent clause." Thus, 'Robert' is "displaced theme" in: 3-111 Apart from a need to create his own identity, Robert felt . . . , since the topical theme 'Apart from a need to create his own identity' can be rephrased as:

3-111a Besides needing to create his own identity, Robert felt . . . ,  
and consequently, 'Robert' becomes the unmarked topical theme in the ensuing clause. This, to me, seems quite unnecessary; it is simpler and more realistic to discount adjuncts, however realized, as having the status of topical themes.

In support of this argument, Downing (1991, pp. 126-127<sup>92</sup>) presents three reasons for discounting adjuncts the status of topical themes:

1. Adjuncts do not represent participant roles in the semantic (ideational process in Halliday's terms) structure of the clause, and are, therefore, not inherent, either in the semantics or the syntax. They can never, in 'congruent representation', be topics in the sense of the narrative category ('what the narrative is about?') as in 3-112 (below), where the 'topical theme' ('12 August'), apart from being part of a 'grammatical metaphor', cannot be identifiable with 'what the clause is about':

3-112 12 August [theme] found the travellers in Rome [rheme].

2. Fronted adjuncts do not disturb the mood structure of the clause, and so the fact that they are fronted does not affect the predictability of which the clause is going (a analogous to Khatib's et. al. [1985] insistence that the verbal sentence in standard Arabic remains verbal, no matter how many circumstantial adjuncts (zurūf) precede its verb; cf. 5.2.1). The obvious exception, however, is fronted directional adjuncts which provoke Subject-Predicator inversion, such as 'away' in:

3-113 Away [theme] ran the terrified horse [rheme].

The purpose of this fronting is two-fold: (1) to provide an emphatic point of departure for the clause, and (2) to push the subject towards final position, where it will receive the main 'unmarked focus', a participant element which would not, otherwise, occupy this position. We may want to consider 'away' an ideational theme, but it seems counter-intuitive to call it 'topical theme, (in the sense of what the clause is about).

3. Following in the steps of Chafe (1976, p. 50), Downing's third justification for discounting fronted adjuncts as having the status of topical themes is that their functions consists not in announcing what the topic is about, but in providing a spatial, temporal or other circumstantial framework within which the ensuing message can develop. (cf. 4.3).

This argument is also supported by two other arguments presented by Grimes (1975; cf. 4.2), and Muir (1972). Both linguists, like Hudson (1986), go so far in their



counter-arguments to including all types of adjuncts as parts of the theme of the clause (theme in the sense of Halliday's topical theme: 'that what the clause is about'). Muir (1972, p. 97), for instance, points out that the exceptions that are not taken into accounts when locating theme occurrence, as the first unit of the clause, exclude (a) initial 'linkers' such as 'and', 'or', etc., (b) 'binders' such as 'because' and 'if' (Halliday's coordinating and subordinating conjunctions), (c) evaluative disjuncts such as 'frankly', 'fortunately', etc. (Halliday's modal adjuncts), and (d) conjuncts such as 'yet', 'then', etc. (Halliday's textual/structural or conjunctive adjuncts)<sup>93</sup>.

However, it is not only fronted circumstantial adjuncts that I wish to exclude from topical theme status in analysing the original and the translated Arabic texts, but also fronted attributes, in Halliday's relational processes, or, to be more specific, I propose that they be 'renamed' (since there are a lot of terms available for different types of theme). An example is an attributes like 'furious' in:

3-114 Furious they were,

where 'they', counted as ideational, can hardly be considered the 'topic'. In this respect, I join forces with Downing and consequently with Givon (1983), when the latter says that topics must be entities, and therefore, participants in the semantic structure:

topic is the participant most closely associated with the higher-level 'theme' of the paragraph; and finally it is the participant most likely to be coded as the primary topic- or grammatical subject- of the vast majority of sequentially-ordered clauses or sentences (Givon, 1983, p. 8)<sup>94</sup>.

And as Halliday himself says: "in attributive clauses there is only one participant, since the attribute IS NOT A PARTICIPANT" (Halliday, 1985, p. 114) [my emphasis].

A further problem, however, arises with fronted attributes, namely that they may provoke the inversion of subject and predicator, especially when the verb (like the verb 'to be') is lacking in communicative dynamism (in Firbas' terms; cf. 2.2.4 & 2.3) and would inappropriately receive nuclear focus if left in final position; hence the inversion, as in:

3-115 Chief among those young men [theme] was Plato [rheme].

Therefore, and on the basis of the above arguments, I would suggest, in line with Downing (1991), a dissociation of theme in the sense of 'initial position' from

topic in the sense of ‘what the clause is going to be about’, just as Halliday has always proposed, as indicated throughout (cf. 3.6), a dissociation of structure theme-rheme and that of given-new. Theme may coincide with topic in the same wording, just as it may coincide with given, but theme and topic are not the same category. Topic will identify what a particular part of the text is about, while theme (or initial element) represents the point of departure of the message. In this respect, Halliday’s notion of multiple themes is still valid and advantageous, with the difference that the first ideational element need not represent a cut-off point between theme and rheme, especially if such element is of ‘non-participant’ ideational type (metaphorical and directional adjuncts and some attributes are exceptions). In this respect, I propose the following typology of themes:

1. Major cognitive themes to include (in Halliday’s sense of topical themes) only the participants in the process of Halliday’s ideational component.
2. Minor cognitive themes, to include (in Halliday’s sense of the term) circumstantial adjuncts,
3. Initial noncognitive themes, to include (1) discoursal adjuncts (textual elements like: *besides, all in all, any way, etc.*), (2) modal adjuncts (*interpersonal elements like: perhaps, probably, certainly, etc.*), (3) vocatives (i.e. *Doctor!*), (4) continuatives (items like: *Oh!, Yes, No, Well, etc.*) and (5) conjunctions (pure coordinators like: *and, but, etc.* & portmanteau/combined coordinators like: *but, then, so, yet, etc., ;* and subordinators, like: *if, although, etc.*).

This implies additional parameters that must be taken into consideration when it comes to the stage of this study, where data (real texts) are analyzed. These new parameters will include (1) whether clause complexes, which the texts are segmented into, contain one or more theme types, (2) whether the various categories of themes are preserved in translation or not, (3) under what condition a particular type of theme, for instance, is maintained or discarded, and (4) whether it is maintained merely as a point of departure (initial element) for the clause as a message, a notion which applies to all three proposed types of theme, or it is maintained as that ‘what the clause is about’, a notion which only applies to the first type.

## **Chapter Four**

### **Post-Hallidayan Models**

#### **4.0 Layout of the Chapter**

This chapter will consist of five main sections. Section one will be an introduction to the two main approaches to the definition of theme, the combining approach and the separating one in Fries' (1983) terms, which were adopted by various linguists and schools of linguistics, following Mathesius' (1939, [1947]) initial definition of the concept. The main differences and characteristics of both approaches will be briefly outlined. Section two will discuss Grimes' (1975) contribution to the thematic structure of the clause, mainly his concept of cohesion and staging. Section three will investigate Chafe's (1976) concepts of 'givenness', 'contrastiveness', 'frameworks', among other topics that pertain to thematic structure of the clause. Section four will discuss the contribution of Prince with regard to the cleft constructions (Prince 1978) and her concept of givenness and newness, as outlined in her 1981 article. Finally, section five will include a general discussion of Dik's 'functional grammatical approach' to the study of theme which will include his concepts of theme, topic, discourse topic tail and what he calls 'language independent order of constituents' (LIPOC). With sections 2, 3, 4, and 5, there will also be incorporated a critique, a discussion and an appraisal of these linguists' contributions. Evaluation of the various contributions of these linguists will be made in terms of whether they agree with the Prague School formulation (the combiners; cf. chapter 2) or that of the Hallidayan approach (the separators; cf. chapter 3)<sup>1</sup>.

#### **4.1 Introduction**

Over the last thirty years or so, linguists from all over the world and with different linguistic views have become more and more interested in discourse as an object of study. As part of their interest, they have begun discussing the concepts of theme-rheme, or topic-comment, a concept which, as indicated earlier, has been used by the Czechoslovak linguists since the early thirties. As we also have noticed, several

approaches to the definition of theme have been proposed, but most of them are derived from Mathesius' (1939 [1947]) original definition, which was translated by Firbas as:

[the theme] is that which is **known, or at least obvious in the situation** and from **which the speaker proceeds** (Firbas, 1964b, p. 268)<sup>2</sup> [my emphasis].

From this quotation, one can elicit two aspects (or parts) of the definition of the theme in Mathesius' sense: thematic information as (1) information which is known or obvious in the situation, and (2) information from which the speaker proceeds. According to Fries (1983), a number of linguists, almost all the Prague School linguists, as well as Van Dijk, Gundel, Kuno and some others, have followed Mathesius in believing that these two factors define one and the same concept. Although each has some important contributions and refinements to add, including members of the Prague School, the basic point remains, in their view, that

the thematic content or topic of a sentence is determined to a great degree by how the formulation expressed by the sentence relates to the information already available in the linguistic and non-verbal context (Fries, 1983, p. 116)<sup>3</sup>.

This means that the theme of the sentence must always be known information and one can only tell what is or what is not known information in a particular sentence by looking at how the information in the sentence relates to the information available in the context. Fries calls this approach to the definition of theme the "combining approach" (Fries, 1983, p.117). Although Van Dijk (1977), Danes (1974)\_\_\_ initially, Chafe (1976), Dahl (1976) and others stick to this approach, they have pointed out that this approach suffers from the problem that "the concept of known or given information and new information are quite complex" (Fries, 1983, p. 117). Dahl (1976), for example, identifies seven concepts which are different but closely related and which have been confused with one another in discussions of given and new information.

The separating approach treats the two portions of Mathesius definition as two separate concepts. In fact the strongest advocates of this approach, as already seen in chapter 3, are the systemic linguists led by Halliday. Halliday and his adherents believe that Mathesius' definition of the concept of theme, as mentioned above, consists of two different aspects. This is why they refer to them by two different names; they call elements of information, 'that were given or at least obvious in the given situation',

given information; this is one part of in the opposition 'given- new'; on the other hand, they call the other types of information, which Mathesius defines as element of information 'from which the speaker proceeds', theme. Themes enter into the structural relation 'theme-rheme'. Separators, particularly Halliday, believe that a better description of the meaning of the theme, as already mentioned in chapter 3, would be "the point of departure of the clause as a message" (Halliday, 1967c. p. 212). They further claim that in English, the theme of the clause is realized by the initial clause level constituent of that clause; however it should be emphasized that this claim regarding word order, as Halliday (1967, 1985, and elsewhere) acknowledges, is not advanced as a language universal, but is rather a claim about English.

It should also be pointed out that since advocates of the combining approach base their definition of theme on what is known information, and that known information may occur anywhere within the clause, or may be totally absent from the clause, they find clauses without themes (cf. 2.2.1). On the other hand, advocates of the separating approach view initial position in the clause as significant in English, and they believe that it realizes the meaning 'point of departure of the information in the clause'. As a result, to separators, clause level themes occur initially in their clauses, and with few specifiable exceptions involving ellipsis, all clauses have themes. (cf. 3.6.2). Furthermore, the separators believe that word order signals the point of departure independently and that distinction such as given versus new information contribute to other meaning distinctions. Combiners, on the other hand, believe that word order combines with given information to jointly determine the theme of the clause<sup>4</sup>.

With regard to the definition and the study of theme, Fries (1983) lists five major aspects of the separating approach in contrast with the combining one. These five aspects can be summarized as follows:

1. The combiners either ignore the contribution of word order (Van Dijk 1977), or treat it as contributing to the same concept as the given-new distinction (as in the concept of communicative dynamism proposed by Firbas; cf. 2.2.4). Separators, on the other hand, tease out and separate the contribution of word order and the distinction between given and new information, and they use the term theme to indicate the meaning of the initial position in the clause in English.

2. Although the separating approach defines a concept that is quite different from that defined by the combining approach, the two concepts correlate with one another to some extent. In particular, given information, no matter how one defines it, says Fries, "tends to occur at the beginning of the clause" (Fries, 1983, p. 118).

3. Although most separating definitions of theme are expressed as relevant to and derivable from clause structure, Halliday makes it clear in a number of his works that the theme-rheme distinction is primarily relevant to a number of grammatical levels including at least the levels of group, clause and sentence. Theme, therefore, is a grammatical structure which arises out of choices made at each of these grammatical ranks. These choices, however, are essentially semantic choices, that is, they are choices of meanings: 'what notion will I use as point of departure of the information in this unit?' The answer to the question is textually determined, that is to say, the answer depends on the role of that particular unit in the total text. But the choices are realized in physical order, and the result of making a choice is to impose a structure on the unit involved.

4. This point pertains to the group and the clause in Halliday's formulation. Fries believes that "there are good and sufficient reasons to say that the beginning is special for some reasons" (Fries, 1983, p. 118). In groups, for example, constituents which have to do with orienting the information of the group typically occur at the beginning of the group (for example, Halliday's deictic function within the nominal group). Similarly, at the clause level, many ordering rules, to use a transformationalist notion, involve the beginning of the clause, including the rules as varied as the passive, the obligatory rules of conjunctions, of question words, and of relative pronouns, and the result for fronting the adverbs, objects and other constituents. In other words, the internal significance of the beginnings of these units is well-established.

5. Fries' final point turns out to be a direct criticism of Halliday's formulation of theme. Fries points out that Halliday has never brought forward any argument to justify his statement that the theme or the beginning of the group, the clause, or the sentence means "the point of departure of the message expressed by the unit" (Fries, 1983, p. 119). To present such an argument, Fries believes, would require looking at sentences, clauses and groups in context. Since Halliday, according to Fries, "was not focusing on the meaning of the theme, the expressions he cites in his articles are often made up

ones and are rarely provided with context" (Fries, 1983, p. 119).

## 4.2 Grimes

In his attempt to produce a model of discourse production and analysis, Grimes (1975) identifies three types of distinct relationships or dimensions that underlie discourse; these are 'content', 'cohesion' and 'staging'<sup>5</sup>. Content, which Grimes sometimes refers to as cognitive, referential structure, 'semantic organisation' or 'semantic structure', "embraces **LEXICAL** and **RHETORICAL** relationships; that is, both the way in which things that are perceived are said to relate to each other in the ordinary sense of dictionary meaning . . . and the way in which these propositions about relations group together into larger complexes" (Grimes, 1975, pp. 112-113) [original emphasis]<sup>6</sup>. Thus, looked at from this perspective, the content system of languages has a hierarchical grouping, i.e., sentences, paragraphs, incidents, episodes, etc. In addition, Grimes also suggests that content might include what Fillmore (1968) and (Halliday, 1967, 1968 & elsewhere) call 'modality', but he immediately skips the idea because he prefers to treat 'modality', following Halliday, as a system by itself, e.g. within Halliday's interpersonal component.

Grimes (1975) considers cohesion, the second set of relationships to be fundamentally independent of the cognitive type of relationship. Cohesion is "cumulative" and "linear" rather than hierarchical, simply because cohesion has to do with the means of introducing 'new' information, and keeping track of the 'old' information, rather than analyzing what the content of the new or the old information actually is. Moreover, it is also related to the rate at which the hearer can process new information.

As for staging, the third type of relationships that operates in discourse, Grimes believes that such relations "are concerned with expressing the speakers' perspective on what is being said. Normally they make one part of the stretch of discourse the **THEME** or **TOPIC** and relate everything else to it" (Grimes, 1975, p. 113). These thematic structures 'set the stage' for entire discourses, for intermediate levels of discourse, i.e., paragraphs, sections, and for the clauses. Therefore, in the simplest instance, staging, cohesion and content support each other, or, to use Halliday's (1967,

1968 & elsewhere) term, they are interrelated. This is obvious from the fact that theme, for example, is normally (typically) selected from information that has already been introduced, and this, in turn, is related to the rest cognitively as well as thematically. However, as Grimes (1975, p. 113) puts it, "frequently enough, at least, one of the three ways of organizing information parts company with the rest", and this is why they have to be distinguished.

When it comes to discourse analysis and constituents of discourse, Grimes follows on the steps of other linguists, especially Longacre (1968, 1970, 1971 & 1972). He believes, and in line with Halliday, that larger units of language (discourse) or text "are made up of [**consist of**] smaller units in a particular arrangement" (Grimes, 1975, p. 101) [my emphasis]. Therefore, larger units can be partitioned into smaller ones according to a particular principle. In this respect he suggests that constituent analysis makes use of a universal property of surface grammars, partitionability, which could be thought of equally well as a property of the transformational systems that produce surface structures from deep structures. This type of analysis, thus, proceeds by partitioning in order to catalogue the kind of elements and kinds of relationships among elements that a language makes use of in its discourse system. For Grimes (op. loc.), however, "constituent analysis is not the end of linguistics, but rather a systematic way of doing the spade work".

In this respect, Grimes points out that text can be divided into sections in a number of ways. Among the main principles involved in partitioning discourse or text are (1) temporal setting (always changing), (2) spatial setting (very much like stage scenery) (3) trajectory which is "a moving sequence of spatial settings through which a participant travels", (Grimes, op. cit., p. 103) and (4) theme. The latter principle is of special interest to Grimes. He believes, quoting other linguists, that it is enough to say that as long as the speaker continues talking about the same thing, he remains within a single segment of the text at some level of partitioning. But when the speaker changes the subject, he passes from one element of the organisation of the text to the next element, hence paragraphing is tied tightly to thematic organisation. This is why, following Christensen (1967), he believes that the topic sentence in English paragraphs suggests that change of theme may be the basis of at least some partitioning into paragraphs in English.



As regards his position on the levels of organisation of discourse, he sums it up as follows:

there seems to be three general kinds of semantic units: first there are role or case relationships, which in a predicate grammar . . . are a class of predicates that are characteristically dominated by and selected by the lexical predicates (for example, *go* selects an agent-subject, the one who goes, in its use of a verb of motion). Second, are lexical predicates that correspond more or less to the meaning of words. Third come rhetorical predicates that express the relationships that unite propositions built from lexical predicates and roles to form rhetorical complexes, and that recursively unite rhetorical complexes. The minimal expression of roles and lexical predicates is in the clause, while the minimal expression of rhetorical predicates is more extensive than the clause, usually involving the sentence. Larger units are required for expressing more complex production made within rudimentary grammar that is implied here. Sentences, paragraphs, and the like are most conveniently thought of as packages of information that are wrapped up for the hearer's benefit, to help him keep track of where he is (Grimes, 1975, pp. 107-108).

Therefore, he believes that whether or not Longacre's (1970, 1971 & 1972) organisation of discourse (clause, sentence, paragraph, incident, episode, . . . etc.) have a universal basis or not, "they do form a useful grid for analysis of discourse" (op. loc.).

In what follows, I shall briefly present Grimes' (1975) concepts of cohesion and staging which are of interest to the subject of this study, especially the latter, and consider whether Grimes' ideas lean towards Halliday's concept of thematic structure or those of the Pragueans.

#### **4.2.1 Cohesion**

Before starting the discussion of his ideas with regard to both cohesion and staging, Grimes admits that he owes all of his thinking on the subject to Halliday's well-known articles on 'transitivity and theme in English, parts 1, 2 and 3' (Halliday, 1967 & 1968). Thus it may not seem unreasonable to say that he belongs to Halliday's camp, but this judgment has to wait until his line of thought on the subject at hand is investigated.

As already mentioned, cohesion, for Grimes, has to do with the way information mentioned in speech is related to information that has already been available. In this respect, Grimes (1975) departs from Halliday's terminology, and to a limited extent

from some of Halliday's ideas, although, in some respects, as will be explained below, he has given more explication of certain areas which Halliday does not exemplify very well and does not illustrate fully even in his most recent writings. Grimes gives two main reason for departing from Halliday's terminology in this respect. The first reason is that some of the terms that Halliday uses are "chosen from the grey area of nomenclature in which each linguist does that which is right in his own eyes, and few do the same as anyone else" (Grimes, 1975, p. 273). He also points out that Halliday's use of "information unit" and "focus" fits very well in this context, but the different uses of them in the current scene is bound to be misunderstood no matter how carefully he defines them; whereas, according to Grimes, the terms he is using as a replacement, namely "information block" and "centre" respectively, are "a little easier" to associate with phenomena they describe, and a little less likely to be used in a different sense (op. loc.) by other linguists." The second reason Grimes gives for his diversion from Halliday's terminology has to do with his belief that the terms used by the Halliday "tend to be put into morphological paradigms that are not transparent" like his distinction "between 'mode & modality', and between 'encoding and decoding', which is tightly defined but I . . . have to keep turning the pages back to keep track of which means what" (Grimes, 1975, p. 273). In spite of this deviation, Grimes still draws on Halliday's ideas rather than on those of Chafe (1970 & elsewhere) with regard to the subject at hand (cf. 4.3.1).

Like Halliday, Grimes observes that, as far as structure of language is concerned, it is the speaker who decides, in addition to having to decide on the content of what his hearer can take in at one time, how much of the information content he thinks his hearer can take in at one time. This decision is, of course, made based on the speaker's decision in the light of what he thinks his hearer already knows. This is why, according to Halliday and Grimes, the package of information that results, or Grimes' information block (Halliday's information unit) may or may not correspond to some easily recognized substring of the content. The extent of the information block is signalled by a single intonation contour (cf. 3.6.1).

Grimes (1975) points out, following Halliday (1967 & 1968), that there are two factors which determine the speaker's decision in blocking information. The first factor is textual: this refers to the information that the speaker feels is clear to the extent that

it need not be blocked separately. The second factor is situational: this refers to expressions that refer to the immediate situation of speech. Examples of situational elements include 'performative elements' like 'I' [speaker], 'You' [hearer], or 'this' and 'that' for visible entities in the surrounding environment. These elements are not to be blocked separately, especially if attention has not been called to them linguistically for the first time.

In addition to these two factors which he adopts from Halliday, Grimes clarifies in simple terms Halliday's concept of splitting up of information units for rhetorical effects, e.g. in speeches, by introducing what he calls "the rate of information interjection" (Grimes, 1975, pp. 274-275) that the speaker wishes to establish as far as his addressee rate of consumption [of information] is concerned. In this respect, Grimes indicates that the shorter the information blocks are the higher the rate of information injection will be and vice versa. He points out, however, that there are two important exceptions to this rule, which are used in contemporary American English. The first is the practise of some radio and TV newscasters who use rather large, well-organized information blocks, even when they are communicating new information. By lengthening their information blocks, Grimes believes that they may be suggesting the fiction: "you are well posted on the world situation. Nothing I have to say will surprise you. There are, however, a few details I can add to what you already know, and these may interest you" (Grimes, 1975, pp-275-276). The second exception is in the opposite direction: politicians, especially in their election campaigns, tend to speak in very short information blocks, in situations where, according to Grimes (op. loc.), "any hearer who could not predict the rest of the speech himself is simply a 'novice' in politics", because the content is mostly or highly redundant and the rate of information injection is very low. Thus both the newscasters and the politicians manipulate this blocking principle: the former to play down the quantity of new information, and the latter to give the appearance of new information even when there is barely anything new about it.

Although, like Halliday, Grimes believes that information blocking is independent of content, he points out that the two lock together at certain points. To explain this point, he draws on the idea of 'markedness'. Again, also drawing in Halliday's ideas, he shows that a marked construction in language is selected under certain condition; whereas the unmarked construction is the 'default' state of affairs.

Therefore, for him, as well as for Halliday, an information block that correspond to a single clause is unmarked in its relationship to content organisation, whereas a marked information block is one that does not correspond to an independent clause.

In the course of his investigation of the marked information block, Grimes points out some of its usages in discourse. Among these are:

1. The marked information block implies a judgment on the part of the speaker about the hearer's capacity to assimilate what he is saying. This is related to the fact that each information block has a 'centre' (i.e., Halliday's 'focus'), which, according to Grimes (1975, p. 278), "represents the least predictable part of the block".
2. The marked information block may also be used when the speaker wishes to prevent misunderstanding of content structures that are otherwise ambiguous. Grimes exemplifies this by the following two examples:

4-1 //The MAN who is over there// is WATCHING us//

4-2 //The MAN// who is over there// is WATCHING us//

In the first example, the postnominal qualifier 'who is over there' and the noun 'the man', which it modifies are blocked together; this tells the hearer which man he has to attach 'watching' to. In contrast, in the second example, the postnominal qualifier is blocked separately because the speaker believes that the hearer already knows what the noun phrase refers to; thus all the postnominal qualifier functions is adding incidental information, and so appropriately blocked by themselves.

3. Information blocking can also be used to clarify just how far certain adjuncts carry: they tend to apply only to one information block. If the adjunct is marked off in a block of its own, then it applies to the block next to it, and if it is included within a larger block, then it applies within the block. For example, in

4-3 //On WEDNESDAY//uncle GEORGE arrived//and we had a PICNIC//,

the sentence initial adjunct is blocked by itself, and so applies to 'uncle George arrival'. As for 'the date of picnic' it could have been any day of the week. The same effect would be achieved, as indicated above, if 'on Wednesday' is uttered as part of 'uncle George arrived'. But if both clauses, in the above example, are put together as one block, the adjunct will apply to both. The same thing would happen if the whole thing consists of only one information block. On the other hand, an adjunct placed in the final position of the clause or two coordinated clauses will apply the same way but in

the opposite direction.

Grimes also points out that each information block contains at least one information centre, which he redefines as "that part of the block in which new information is concentrated" (Grimes, 1975, p. 280), and consequently, the rest of the block contains predictable material. As with the case in Halliday (1967, 1968 & elsewhere), the information centre, as mentioned earlier, is identified by intonation. As with the quantity of information, the speaker also decides where to place the centre of the information block. In Halliday's words, the speaker has to designate the "part of the message block as that which he wishes to be interpreted as informative" (Halliday, 1967c, p. 204). In addition, the speaker can direct the hearer's evaluation of what is to be taken as new and what is given.

Grimes believes that the decision with regard to what is to be considered relatively new is independent of the constituent structure of the block. It is also independent of the underlying content structure which the constituency reflects. Below are four examples in which the underlying content is the same. The speaker's decision about 'informativeness' of the parts is different, although they are all natural in the right context:

4-4 **MY** puppy is black.

4-5 My **PUPPY** is black.

4-6 My puppy **IS** black.

4-7 My puppy is **BLACK**.

New information, Grimes indicates, corresponds to the information that could be given as an answer to some questions, but the search for questions is complicated by a further characteristic of given information: answers often leave out part or all of the presupposing statement that is behind the question, as in the following question proposed for example 4-4:

4-8 Whose puppy is black?

where the familiar principle of ellipsis leads most often to 'mine' as an answer. Thus intonation centres that answer a question illustrate centre assignment on a cumulative or contextual basis: "the information is new with reference to the text that has gone before and the situation" (Grimes, 1975, p.281).

Grimes identifies other types of intonation centre; some of which he considers secondary to the primary one, and have some equivalence in Halliday's formulation.

Most noticeable among these is what Grimes calls "forestalling centre placement" (Grimes, op. cit., p. 282) [ Halliday's marked focus]. According to him, this placement of 'focus' can fall anywhere in the sentence or the clause and can apply to anything at all in comparison to what he calls "contextual centre placement" (op. loc.) [ Halliday's unmarked focus], which is restricted almost completely to content words, or falls on lexical items, to use Halliday's term. For illustration of forestalling centre placements, Grimes provides examples like,

4-9 I saw **HIM**.

where the 'centre' falls on an anaphoric word that would never be a centre in the contextual sense. Grimes (op. loc.) interprets example (4-9) as "be careful\_\_ the reference you would understand by ordinary bracketing is the wrong one for this use of *him*; so look for the next most likely referent".

In addition to the primary stress, Grimes also, following Halliday, points out that the information block may have a secondary information centre. He identifies three types of this type based upon the type of information they communicate:

1. The first type communicates information that is relatively unpredictable, yet is dependent in some way on primary stress, as in:

4-10 We'll **BE** there if we **CAN**.

where the secondary centre 'can' involves a contingency. Here, the speaker has the option of separating them, but he chooses to combine them and makes the second one subordinate to the first.

2. The second type could be thought of as 'halfway between being new by forestalling and being contextually new'. Halliday (1967c) characterizes this type as given information that is to be noted. Grimes (1975) emphasizes the fact that this type appears in what he calls "thematic tags" in which the tag consists of given information, as in:

4-11 He fixed it **FAST** did **GEORGE**.

3. The third kind of secondary information centre is the one where the pitch is not only lower than the primary one, but distinctly 'lower' than the general pitch of the rest of the block. In examples like the ones given below, this type of centre is represented by a falling arrow before the word, as in:

4-12 **GEORGE** does not  **THINK** so.

Here, the deviation of the pitch line to the low side of normal seems to be capable of being used for adding a negative evaluation by the speaker. Other uses of this type of secondary centres include, casting a bad light on something innocuous as in 'BAD' in utterances like:

4-13 He **REALLY** had a **BAD** night,

where the statement of 'GOOD' instead of 'BAD' sounds ironical.

Grimes (1975) poses the question with regard to the source of the 'information centre', when the information block is contextually bound. His answer to his inquiry draws completely on Halliday's (1967 & 1968) formulation that the unmarked centre (focus) falls on the last word, content word, (lexical item) of the block, even if it is not final. One consequence of this, which is also similar to that of Halliday, is that Grimes assumes that given information precedes new information: the former lays the ground for the latter. As a result of experiments, Grimes reaches the conclusion that given-new sequence has a built-in point of ambiguity: the longer the block, the more possible division points there are between where the given information leaves off and the new information part begins. In other words, it is not exactly determined or known how far the centre (focus) extends; all that the hearer knows is where it ends. This is the same problem Halliday faces in his analysis of information structure, but, in the examples he has provides in exemplification of the unmarked focus (cf. 3.6.1), he draws the boundaries between given and new. Furthermore, both authors have indicated that discourse initials do not include given information, an opinion which is shared by the Pragueans as well.

Grimes differs with Halliday (1967, 1968 & elsewhere), who believes that there is no problem in identifying the boundary between given and new information in the case of marked focus, where the focus falls anywhere other than the last lexical item. Whereas Halliday considers that the marked focused-element is new and anything else is given, Grimes believes that ambiguity still exists here, and he gives examples like the following to prove his point:

4-14 The six kids on the **CORNER** might have seen them.

According to Grimes, the first reading takes the entire noun phrase 'the six kids on the corner' as the 'new' part, which is similar to Halliday's formulation. But it could also imply a contrast with 'the six adults [or even the six kids] down the block'. Thus, the

second reading takes only the prepositional qualifier 'on the corner' as the new information, which contrasts with 'down the block' or 'on the balcony', for example. Therefore, the marked intonation centre can cover rather large constituents or single words, even parts of a single words, as in:

4-15 The effect you expect should be **IM**plosion or **EX**plosion.

At the end of his discussion of cohesion, Grimes identifies a group of items that are inherently incapable of carrying information focus or centre. These include anaphoric elements, reference items in Halliday's term, demonstratives, proforms, modals, prepositions and conjunctions. He also identifies some words that carry new information more often than not. Whenever a situational reference is being defined, the **DEICTIC** word referring to that situation is new and is a prime candidate for the information centre, as in:

4-16 **THAT** is the one I want. [pointing to it]

In addition to situational deictics, cataphorically defined demonstratives have reference to something the hearer has not been told yet, they are new in the sense of "promising that the information will be given later, that is to be treated as unity, as in:

4-17 **THIS** is the one we demand: an **IMMEDIATE CESSATION** . . .

Moreover, Grimes also indicates that the interrogative elements of repetitive questions which refer to something that has been asked or answered carry the information centre. He also includes forestalling information centres as indicating new information anywhere in the block. Their meaning is contradictory to what the hearer presupposes: "the interpretation of the this element is not what I think you expect it to be (Grimes, 1975, p. 291).

#### 4.2.2 Staging

According to Grimes (1975, p. 323), "every clause, sentence, paragraph, episode or discourse, is organized around a particular element that it is taken as its point of departure". This seems as though the speaker presents what he wants to say, as hinted earlier, from a particular perspective. Therefore, Grimes finds it convenient to think in terms of how various units "**ARE STAGED**" [original emphasis] for the hearer's benefit, e.g., to enrich his state of knowledge. He also believes that "staging is at least



partially independent of both content structure and cohesive structure, [and] it operates at many levels of text organisation simultaneously" (op. loc.).

As with the case of cohesion, Grimes' selection of the term 'staging' is an attempt to break away from the terminological bind. Terms like 'topic', 'focus', 'theme' and 'emphasis' and many others appearing in the linguistic literature, according to him, "have created a wide range of overlap and confusion to the extent that they become **NEARLY USELESS**" (Grimes, 1975, p. 323) [my emphasis]. As in cohesion, he also identifies two patterns of staging: the unmarked and the marked; the former depends on the 'mode', (Halliday's mood) of the clause.

In English, Grimes points out that 'mode' is expressed by the way the subject is related to the modal elements (cf. 3.6.2.1). The subject is the unmarked topic or theme in the declarative clause, and this is why a subject must be present in an independent clause; something which makes Grimes (1975, p. 325) believe that such a requirement is so strong "that English uses dummy subjects, where none is supplied", as in:

4-18 *It* is raining

4-19 *There* is a possibility that we will leave a week early.

As for the rest of theme status in the rest of 'mode' types, i.e., polar and non-polar interrogative, the imperative and the rest, Grimes (1975) treats them the same way as Halliday has done (cf. also 3.6.2.1). '

With respect to marked theme, Grimes (1975) indicates that whatever is placed initially in the clause other than the element which normally signals the 'mode' (the subject and modal), constitutes a marked topic in English. This kind of thematic marking is most common in declarative mode. In other mode types, the unmarked topic is less frequently preceded by anything. If it is, especially in polar in non-polar interrogative, the subject is the element that is usually fronted. In order to prevent the loss of modal information that depends on the order of subject and finite verb form, a pronoun is left behind in its regular position, as in:

4-20 **Max** did *he* eat the apples?

4-21 **The carpenters** what did *they* finish today?

In Halliday's terminology this is 'reference', while in other approaches, it is called 'left-dislocation'. Grimes' name for this construction is "REPRISE" pattern.

Grimes likens the marking of thematisation, which he sees as related to a semantic factor of 'prominence', as though

stage directions were given to the spot-light handler in the theatre to single out a particular individual or an action, or as though one actor were placed close to the audience and another off to the side. In fact, staging metaphors appear to be highly appropriate for the marked varieties of a whole range of linguistic phenomena that have a long history of being hard to handle (Grimes, 1975, p. 327).

This quotation is a reminder of Svoboda (1981) who uses almost the same idea in his discussion of second instance sentences, in which each sentence contains one non-thematic element (the rheme proper), while the rest of the sentence is an extended theme (cf. 2.3.3). Grimes believes that if the speaker is given a collection of propositions that are interconnected by shared references, his decision about what to 'front' and what to 'centre' on the stage, what to present in a secondary way, and what is unimportant enough that it need not be mentioned, is a thematic decision. Thus looked at from this vantage point, staging concerns much more than grammatical topicalization, it is, following Halliday's formulation, a meaningful choice.

As for adjuncts occupying initial positions in the clause, Grimes points out that quite a few languages use initial adjuncts as part of their staging. He calls such introductory sentence adjuncts, following others, "linkages", in which a clause that describes an event is repeated to provide the point of departure for the next event. He believes that, in one sense, a linkage is the topic of the sentence it introduces; yet the main clause of the sentence has its own internal topic (cf. 3.6.2.4). This makes the linkage be parallel to dependent clause introducers in English, where the relator is the unmarked topic but the secondary thematic options are also available within the clause. On the other hand, the sentence topic expressed by linkage and the internal clause topic may be independent. In spite of this, Grimes (1975, pp. 328-329) indicates that "non-anaphoric connectives like '*and*', '*but*' etc., **appear to be athematic even though they are initial**" [my emphasis]. They are, according to him, followed by the full range of thematic options (possibilities) for the clause (cf. 3.6.2.4). Thus this independence "establishes them outside the system; whereas, as he emphasizes that "some discourse level connectives like first, . . . second, . . . may go with junks of speech larger than clauses, but they also appear to be **athematic** for the same reason" (Grimes, op. cit., p.

329) [my emphasis]; a claim which, from an intonational point of view, seems to be odd. Between thematic and athematic elements, Grimes also identifies a range of what he calls "semi-thematic introducers" (op. loc.) [my emphasis] that restrict some of the possibilities of what can be topicalized after them. This class of linkages includes subordinating conjunctions, like 'although & because' in this sense. Added to this type, are what he calls "modally oriented introducers like 'perhaps', [which] have a similar effect" (op. loc.).

In order to show the independence of theme from cohesion, Grimes (1975, pp. 329-331) presents a series of paradigms<sup>7</sup>. He also points out that before the reader or the hearer reacts to such examples of these paradigms, he must observe his own thematising behaviour day by day. He believes, though, that "our grammatical tradition is heavily biased towards regarding unmarked thematisation as well-behaved and proper and marked thematisation as aberrant" (Grimes, 1975, p. 331). For him, marked options are likely to be blocked separately, rather than be included in the same information block with the rest of their clause. The subject and the object are most likely to be blocked separately; adjuncts moved to the front are less likely to be in separate information block, and if they are, as hinted above, blocking is a means of making their scope explicit.

Grimes (1975) also discusses the role the voice system plays in showing the relationship between content and staging. In this respect, Grimes discusses the mapping rules that relate content structure to surface grammar by assigning one role as subject and other roles as other clause functions. Unmarked mapping relates the agent role when it is present, and otherwise some other role, to the subject, and the subject in turn to topic via the modal system, in the active voice. Thus, in the active sentence:

4-22 George brought these pickles,

'George' is in the agent relationship to 'bring' in the content structure; it is at the same time the subject in relation to the 'mode' (mood), and the surface form, and is the unmarked topic or theme. On the other hand, marked mapping, for Grimes and before him for Halliday, dissociate the agent from the subject position and thus from the unmarked theme and 'mode'. At the same time, they leave the theme unmarked. In this passive mapping, the agent is treated in one of two ways that are not easy to handle in the active voice. In the first instance, the agent can be treated as new information

by making it the unmarked centre or 'focus' of the information block or unit, as in:

4-23 These pickles were brought by **GEORGE**.

In the second instance, the agent is left out, either because it is vague, as in:

4-24 The city was bombarded,

or because it is irrelevant, as in:

4-25 I was just told that my uncle died.

Other nominal elements can also be made topics in the passive voice; thematic status is restricted to whatever role maps to the grammatical object; thus sentences like:

4-26 These strawberries were given to me, &

4-27 I was given these strawberries,

are equivalent in content but different in staging. Furthermore, Grimes (1975, pp. 332-333) distinguishes non-agentive derivation from passive in English<sup>8</sup>. According to him, while passive retains its agentive meaning even when the agent is omitted, the non-agentive leaves out the agent explicitly, as respectively in:

4-28 The homes were sold. [by someone]

4-29 The homes sold.

For Grimes, thematisation or topicalization in English, as well as in some other languages, is a means by which partitioning or dividing the content of a sentence into two parts is carried out. Those parts of the sentence are usually joined by an equative construction (Halliday's verb '*to be*'), or what is called 'pseudo-cleft' construction. Grimes (1975, pp. 338-342) points out that the two parts are related to each other in the same way that a question and its answer are related, and they are, in fact, generally expressed by the grammatical pattern similar to those used for question on the one hand and relative clauses on the other. Therefore Grimes (1975) speaks of two of these two parts as "the question part" and the "answer part", as in:

4-30 What he thinks [question part] is that money cure all ills [answer part].

In such constructions, either the question part or the answer part can come initially and hence become the theme of the equative clause, to use Halliday's terminology. As Halliday (1967c) points out, the answer part of the partitioned (equative) construction may be nearly anything:

1. It may consist of a major clause such as:

4-31 He is the one who brought the pickles

where the subject acts as an answer to the question 'Who brought the pickles?'

2. It may consist of the object, as in:

4-32 What this country needs is a good five-cent cigar.

3. It may consist of the verb itself, as in:

4-33 What I would like you to do with that pet snake is give it away.

4. It may consist of an adjunct that is not a major clause constituent, as in:

4-34 How he did it was with mirrors.

5. It may consist of an adjunct that is not a direct constituent of the clause, but a constituent of a constituent, as in:

4-35 He is the one whose arm was injured.

As noticed from the above examples, the question part of the pseudo-cleft sentence is always a nominalized clause. It may have a head noun introduced to give it the nominalized form, as in:

4-36 The one who saw the play was John

which answers an underlying question 'who saw the play?' On the other hand, the question word itself may act as the head of the nominalized construction, as in:

4-37 What I told him was that he should resign.

The nominalized question, as Grimes (1975, p. 340) points out, "is always definite rather than indefinite". This is why when the head noun is added to the question to give it a nominalized form, the determiner '*the*' is usually required, as in:

4-38 The thing that Susie wanted was a drink of water.

4-39 The car I was driving was a Plymouth.

Dummy head nouns like '*person, thing, time, place, fact, reason, way* and *one* are always generic, while nouns like '*car*' are, although more specialized, still generic in relation to answers like 'Plymouth'.

When the question word 'what' acts as the head of the nominalized construction, its definition may be specified either by a demonstrative in the answer or by the fact that it is in the question part of a thematically partitioned construction. This specification of definiteness can be illustrated respectively by these two examples:

4-40 What we ought to do is this.

4-41 What we ought to do is pack the courtroom.

Following Halliday (1967 & 1968), Grimes identifies three main features distinguishing

a simple clause and a partitioned one. The first one is reflected in the following:

Thematically partitioned constructions [equative clauses] differ systematically from the corresponding simple clauses. One might say . . . that a simple construction involves a process and the participants in the process, whereas a partitioned construction defines one of the participants, the one in the answer part, by the fact that he participates in the process (Grimes, 1975, p. 341) [my ellipsis].

The second difference is that of the exclusiveness: the partitioned construction are exclusive while the simple clauses are not; it is reflected in Halliday's well known example of the British beer advertisement: 'what we want is Watney's (cf. 3.6.4.1). As for the third feature, which is Grimes' own contribution, it lies in the fact that the partitioned construction gives a clear ending for the topic of the clause. He illustrates this feature by the following examples:

4-42 He puts on his coat.

4-43 What he puts on is his coat.

According to Grimes, it is easy, in the first example, to say that '*he*' is the thematic starting point but it is not as easy to say that the next word, '*put*', is not the topic; whereas in the pseudo-cleft sentence, the topic includes every thing up to the form of '*be*' that forms the equative framework. This is probably what lies behind Grimes' naming of this phenomenon in its relation to the discourse studies as thematic partitioning.

Grimes attributes a large number of cleft and pseudo-cleft sentences to the thematically partitioned sentences of 'question-be-answer' form. The difference, according to him, between cleft and pseudo-cleft sentences is that in the former the question in the relative clause form is moved to the end of the construction after the answer part, and a dummy '*it*' or '*there*' is left in its place in the initial positions to preserve the modal function, as in:

4-44 It was me who said it.

which has an extraposed question part 'who said it?', and the answer part, 'me', that is actually the topic. According to Grimes as well as Halliday (1967 & 1968), 'me' is the topic in a different sense, however, to a topic in a pure cleft construction. "Whereas the pseudo-cleft topic is exclusive in terms of the definition given [to] it, the topic of the extraposed form [it cleft] is exclusive as the theme" (Grimes, 1975, p. 341). Thus, in a pseudo-cleft construction like,

4-45 I was the one who said it,

the implication is that 'I and nobody else is involved in saying it', while in a pure cleft construction, like 4-44, the implication is 'I and nobody else am being talked about as theme'. Besides, extraposition relates to more than topicalization alone, it applies to other things than the question of a cleft sentence. "It is, for example, obligatory for some verbs such as 'seem', where a subject complement clause is extraposed, and where there is no form of 'be' is involved, as in:

4-46 It seemed that he left us to pay the bill,

which appears to supply the answer to the question : 'what seems (to be the case?)', in which the assertion about the event is fronted, and thus given topic status, while the event may be divided into topic and comment.

### 4.2.3 Critique

Clements (1979)<sup>9</sup> points out that, in his discussion of discourse, Grimes has posed two basic questions. The first is of a psychological type: how best can one characterize the basic meaning of a prose message? The second is of a linguistic type: how does surface structure of prose guide a reader to the organisation of the message?

To answer these questions, Grimes (1975) suggests that prose may be characterized in terms of three basic dimensions: content, cohesion and staging. With regard to content, he uses 'case grammar' (Fillmore, 1968)<sup>10</sup> as the basic semantic component. In addition, he posits "rhetorical predicates" which serve to link "case segments" together. For example, for him, two sentences may be linked by a simple conjunction, or by a cause-effect relationship, etc. The units which he has termed case segments are in fact 'propositions' — simple or complex. Thus the rhetorical predicates serve as a higher order organisational system linking propositions together.

At the sentence level, Grimes uses, in his analysis, case segments; beyond the sentence level, he seeks to characterize the ways in which propositions may be connected. At this level, his analysis reflects both semantic distinctions and surface organisational properties of text, but, according to Clements (1979, p. 287), "more recently, however, Grimes has come to regard surface organisational features as belonging to the staging dimension", which is a generativist orientation.

As for the second dimension of prose, which Grimes calls cohesion, this has to do with the speaker's or the writer's attempts to relate what he is saying to the knowledge he presupposes in his audience and to the connection he wishes his audience to make. Among the linguistic phenomena which Grimes sees as part of this dimension are linking devices such as "anaphora" and "cataphora". Other linguistic phenomena which affect the cohesive structure of prose are "placement of intonation, and lexical choices related to focus and presupposition" (Clements, 1979, p. 289). Thus for Grimes (1975), the basic notion of cohesion is that the speaker or writer can vary the manner in which he uses linguistic devices to bind segments of discourse together.

The notion of staging, according to Clements (1979) depends primarily on three linguistic intuitions, two of which have been around for some time in the work of the Prague School linguists (chapter 2) and systemic linguists, notably Halliday (chapter 3). For Grimes, the distinctions between theme and rheme and given and new are important determinants of prose structure. As for the third intuition which, according to Clements (1979, p. 289), is Grimes' idea; this has to do with combining these two distinctions "to yield a hierarchical structure", where "the height in this structure would indicate the degree of prominence given to particular parts of the message".

Throughout discourse, each topic may be identified as 'new' (if it is being introduced for the first time), and 'old' (if it has been mentioned in an earlier topic-comment construction). The basic principle by which Grimes orders topics hierarchically for English is that an old topic retains the level of its previous mention, while a new topic is placed one level below the preceding one unless it is coordinated with an earlier topic. In general, each comment is considered to have the same level in the hierarchy as the topic to which it is attached. Thus all the information in the text is ordered hierarchically on the basis of the topic pattern.

Overall, staging may be seen as a set of rules which operate as the semantic base of a message in discourse production and which exert a high level of control over the reception process (control over what is remembered from reading a piece of prose). Staging rules, according to Clements (1979, p. 291), "provide part of the story about how deep structure is mapped on surface structure and vice versa". Grimes, therefore, identifies an important component of prose structure which has not been dealt with by the more psychologically oriented studies. In fact, Clements (op. loc.) believes that "his



[Grimes'] analysis of staging provides one component of the required mapping between the base [deep structure] and surface structure".

Commenting on Grimes' claim that his goal is "to restate Halliday's work on theme in a more comprehensive form" (Grimes, 1975, p. 24), Hendricks (1977), in a review of Grimes' *Thread of discourse* (1975), says that

Grimes does not do much more than modifying Halliday's terminology (e.g. use of staging instead of thematisation). He [Grimes] would have been better advised to have placed Halliday's work in a broader context by indicating the divergent senses which such terms as 'given-new' and 'theme-rheme' have been used in the literature (Hendricks, 1977, p. 957)<sup>11</sup>.

With regard to Hendricks' negative comment, one can say that Hendricks is partially right in what he says, but he is not completely correct. This is because, although most of Grimes' ideas are a repetition of those of Halliday, and all he does is to change their names, he has also modified, clarified and enhanced some of them, and provided the reader with more appropriate examples (Halliday is repeatedly accused of poor exemplification). Grimes explains things more clearly as, as noticed above, in his classification of the types of secondary stress and their various uses by the speaker and in pointing out in the case of wh-clefts (pseudo-clefts) that they are analogous to the question part and the answer part of the statement. He also clarifies the fact that the answer part of the wh-cleft could be either a whole clause (subject), an object, a verb, an adjunct or even an adjunct within an adjunct (see section 4.2.2), a thing which is not clarified fully by Halliday. Moreover, Grimes also points out that the question part is always definite rather than indefinite, and hence almost always thematic if it occurs to the left of the verb 'to be'; this is why 'head nouns' like 'one' and 'thing' are always preceded by the definite article 'the' when used to give a nominalized form. Grimes opposes Halliday in two main areas:

1. With regard to the source of new information of marked focus, Halliday suggests that whatever item the stress falls on, except the last lexical item, in marked focus, is 'new', and any other item in the clause is given; whereas Grimes, as explained above, believes that the boundary between given and new is still undetermined (see section 4.2.2).
2. With regard to adjuncts occupying initial position, Halliday initially proposes that

they better not be considered part of the clause (cf. 3.6.2.3 & 3.6.2.4), but later on, he comes to the conclusion that items like 'and', 'but' and 'if' are thematic in the sense of the overall meaning of the clause and what they introduce, and do not prevent the clause of having its own internal (cognitive) theme (cf. 3.6.2.4). Grimes, on the other hand, believes that such items, which he calls 'linkages' could be the topic of the sentence in one sense, but the main clause of the sentence, as in the case of Halliday's, could have its own topic, and that the linkage and the topic of the main clause could be independent, i.e. the overall meaning of the sentence fails to point out the thematic status of these connectives. For this reason Grimes proposes that non-anaphoric connectives like 'and' and 'but' appear to be 'athematic', and thus these items are better considered outside the system. In addition to these connectives, Grimes denies that items like 'first . . .' 'second . . .' etc. are thematic although he admits that they could be accompanied by large chunk of discourse. He even talks of 'semi-themes': items like 'because, although' and the 'modally oriented introducers' like 'perhaps'. In other words, Grimes is shedding doubt on the whole of Halliday's textual and interpersonal thematic part of the clause and only recognizes, as it appears from his argument, cognitive themes. This view also has been adopted by one systemically-oriented linguist (Hudson, 1986) in his review of Halliday's (1985) *An Introduction to Functional Grammar* (cf. 3.6.6 for the latter's comments). The last point to be said in this respect is that the new terminology which Grimes introduces as alternatives to Halliday's will surely make things more difficult to absorb because there already exists a large number of terms, and there is no need, as Hendrich (1979) points out, for any additional terms that point to almost the same concepts with very minor differences and findings, in as much as there is a need to place these concepts in a broader context to test their validity as universal features of all languages.

#### 4.3 Chafe

In his 1970 book, *Meaning and the Structure of Language*, Chafe presents a model, which can be considered an advanced step in the development of thought about information and givenness. This model's reference to given and new information is important in that it represents an American link with the Prague School linguists'

insights and their contributions to what is known in the literature by functional sentence perspective (FSP). In this respect he introduces linguists like Mathesius, Firbas and others like Halliday, who work in this aspect of discourse development.

Chafe (1970 & elsewhere) sees information structure as a form of discourse organisation, such that any piece of discourse consists of a sequence of linearly organized elements whose purpose is to convey the content component of the language, a thing that prompts the speakers or writers to arrange the units of information, given and new, in ways that enables them to convey their 'intended meaning' to their hearer or reader. With respect to given and new information, he writes:

Typically it is the case that the speaker assumes that some of the information he is communicating is new; it is information he is introducing into the hearer's mind for the first time. But typically it is the case that information in the sentence is not new. Some of it is information which the speaker already shares at the time the sentence is spoken. This shared information constitutes a kind of a starting point based on concepts already '*in the air*', to which the new information can be related (Chafe, 1970, pp. 221-212)<sup>12</sup> [my emphasis].

According to Chafe, old (given) information can be shared from the common environment, Halliday's speech situation, in which the interactants are interacting or can be shared on the basis of sentences already uttered\_\_ in the latter case ( Halliday's context of situation) is linguistically created.

As for the source of new information, Chafe admits that the above quotation might be misleading as far as new information is concerned, simply because he believes that it might be taken that new information is not necessarily something brand new to the addressee's mind\_\_ "something that the addressee's mind does not at this point contain at all, either in consciousness or in memory (Chafe, 1974, p. 122)<sup>13</sup>. In addition to Halliday's (1967c, p. 204)<sup>14</sup> definition of new information as "not necessarily new in the sense it cannot have been previously mentioned", Chafe (op. loc.) says "it [new information] is not necessarily new in the sense that it is not present in the addressee's memory". All that counts, according to him, is that new information is assumed not to be present, at this very moment, in the addressee's consciousness. By the same token, given information should not also be regarded as included everything already known, but only what is present in consciousness.

For Chafe, the distinction between given (old) and new information is the

principal phenomenon which underlies discussions of what have been called throughout the literature 'topic and comment' or 'theme and rheme' beside the many other terms proposed by many linguists and schools of linguistics. He even points out that, in a certain limited way, the distinction between 'old' and 'new' is reflected in the terms '*subject*' and '*predicate*', but he admits that these two terms have to do more properly with particular parts of the surface structure, and not the semantic structure. Nevertheless, there is a strong correlation between old information in the semantic structure and subject in the surface one, at least, as Chafe (1976) claims, in languages like English. Therefore, in his search for a term to designate the semantic entity whose meaning is describable as 'new information', Chafe points out that "terms like comment and rheme are both **AWKWARD**" (Chafe, 1970, p. 212) [my emphasis]; this is why he prefers to stick to the term '**NEW**', which, in turn, reflects a direct influence by the Prague School linguist's formulations, where rheme or comment is conflated with new information, which can be added, "not to a whole verb or noun but to a particular semantic unit within either" (Chafe, 1970, p. 212). This last point was subject of criticism by Grimes (1975; cf. 4.3.1).

Chafe also indicates that the 'least marked sentences' are those which represent normal word order in English, and new information in such sentences is reflected by elements with primary stress and high pitch, whereas old or given information is pronounced with "low pitch and a weaker stress, unless it is contrastive" (Chafe, 1976, p. 31). In contrastive sentences, new information means that the choice of the unit to which it is attached is selected, rather than some other possible choices is being presented by the speaker as new information<sup>15</sup>. But at the same time, he lists various examples of contrastive sentences, which, he indicates, contain more than one item of new information, as in:

4-47 **DAVID** [not George] **EMPTIED** [not filled] the box.

4-48 **DAVID** [not George] emptied the **BOX** [not the suitcase].

4-49 David **EMPTIED** [not filled] the **BOX** [not the suitcase].

Chafe (1974) points out that the status given and new may have something to do with the order in which items are ordered within the sentence, as for example in English and some other languages, where the material assumed to be in the addressee's consciousness tend to be transmitted first. But he focuses his attention on how pitch

and pronominalization as surface structure indices of 'givenness'. Thus in sentences like:

4-50 I just found some books that belong to **PETER**,  
'I', 'books', and 'Peter' are most likely convey 'given' information, unless contrastive, but 'Peter' is most likely to convey new information due to the effect of word order.

For Chafe, intonation and pronominalization are basically reflected in given and new, but they mainly hold true for nouns and not verbs. A verb bearing new information shows a high pitch so long as it is not accompanied by any noun that carries new information as in:

4-51 It is **RAINING**.

4-52 He **BROKE** it.

But if the verb and the noun following it convey new information, only the noun has a high pitch, as in:

4-53 He broke the **GLASS**.

Chafe (1974) also points out that the high pitch on items of new information is different from that on contrastive items: the former is sustained when followed by another high pitch, but the latter always falls. According to him, "every item that carries a contrastive pitch is distinguished by its own pitch drop, no matter what comes after (Chafe, 1970, p. 226-227), as in:

4-54 I bought Matthew a **BOOK**,

in which 'Matthew' is pronounced with partial drop in pitch and will not be raised again until 'book', whereas in:

4-55 I bought **MATTHEW A BOOK**,

the high pitch remains sustained throughout the new information.

Moreover, Chafe goes as far as to say, of course opposite to what Halliday and Grimes (1975) have affirmed, that "in many cases a contrastive item is evidently 'given' rather than new information" (Chafe, 1974, p. 119).

Chafe (1974) also draws the attention to the status of consciousness in linguistics and psychology. In linguistics, the distinction between given and new information has received a certain amount of attention, but it has never been explicitly related to the psychological notion of consciousness. The most extensive and prolonged tradition in distinguishing between given and new information, as has already been discussed, is

that of the Prague School linguists on the one hand and the systemic linguists on the other.

As has already been explained in chapter 2, the Prague linguists subsume the notion of 'given-new' under the label of FSP, which involves, according to Firbas (1965, p. 170 & elsewhere) "the distribution of communication dynamism (CD) within the sentence". According to the Prague School linguists, especially Firbas, and to Chafe as well, the distribution of CD is determined by 'contextual dependence', which, in turn, is constituted by the amount of the already given (known information), and of the newly conveyed (unknown information) as well as the manner in which this kind of information is conveyed. In this respect, Chafe says:

if we interpret the word 'given or known', as meaning 'assumed by the speaker to be present in the addressee's consciousness' and newly conveyed or unknown as meaning the opposite [not present], the general picture presented by the Prague Czech work can easily be related to the idea about consciousness (Chafe, 1974, p. 119).

Thus, while the Prague school linguists, mainly Firbas (1964 & elsewhere), speak of the lowest degree of CD as the theme of the sentence, Chafe identifies it with information assumed to be in the addressee's consciousness. Similarly, while the Prague School linguists associate the highest degree of CD with rheme, while Chafe identifies it with material being newly introduced into the addressee's consciousness. However, there is one aspect of the degree of CD that Chafe denies altogether, and that is the transitional status or the intermediate degree of CD that has been given to the finite verb. For Chafe (1974, p. 119), "this three-way distinction raises doubts, since it is not obvious that the specification assumption regarding the addressee's consciousness can be based on anything BUT a binary choice". In this case, Chafe has one of three choices: either expand his earlier assumption, admit such a possibility or question the Czech postulation of multiple CD. In fact, he takes the last position: he criticizes the concept of CD (cf. 2.3.4.1), and attributes this three-way distinction of CD to a confusion of various factors, but especially the failure to distinguish clearly between elements of semantic structure and elements of surface structure, e.g. one of the oldest notions seems to be that the finite verbs are often (though not always) transitional elements with respect to CD. This may be the reason why Chafe (1970 & elsewhere) insists on attributing the status 'new' to a single item rather than a group or

a phrase where the primary stress falls.

Other work associated with or relative to Chafe's has been done by Halliday (1967 & 1968). Halliday uses the term 'theme' as a general term for those phenomena that are concerned with

the information structure of the clause; with the status of the elements not as participants in the extralinguistic processes but as components of a message; with the relation of what is being said to what has gone before in the discourse and its internal organisation into an act of communication (Halliday, 1967c, p. 199).

In one sense, Halliday, as mentioned and quoted earlier, characterizes new information as not being new "in the sense that it cannot have been previously mentioned, although it is often the case that it has not been, but in the sense that the speaker presents as not being recoverable from the preceding discourse" (Halliday, op. cit., p. 204). Later on, however, he says:

The constituent specified as new is that which the speaker marks out for interpretation as non-derivable information, either cumulative to or contrastive with what has preceded; the given is offered as recoverable anaphorically or situationally (Halliday, op. cit., p. 211).

In this respect, Chafe's main objection is Halliday's use of 'recoverability' for given information. Chafe believes that if his explanation of the concept of consciousness is correct, the addressee does not "need to perform some operation of recovery for given information" (Chafe, 1974, p. 120). In other words, the point he tries to make in his argument is that "such information [given or old] is already in the stage, the addressee's consciousness [back to the stage metaphor], while new information is that which the speaker brings on the stage by uttering something other than what is present on the stage. Therefore, recoverability is not an appropriate characterization of what is happening psychologically.

Chafe (1976) still assigns the status 'new information' to a single semantic unit within the noun group or verb or the verb phrase. In his 1976 article, he identifies six statuses or "packaging phenomena" of the noun, which are associated primarily with how the message is sent and secondarily with the content of the message itself. These include the following:

(a) the noun may be either given or new; (b) it may be a focus of contrast; (c) it may be definite or indefinite; (d) it may be a subject of its sentence; (e) it may be the topic of the sentence; and (f) it may

represent the individual whose point of view the speaker is taking or the speaker empathizes (Chafe, 1976, p. 28).

The first three statuses seem primarily to be related to the function of information, while the last three seem to be related to the function of theme. In this respect, Chafe admits that he excludes other statuses like generic and non-generic because they have more to do with content than packaging, although they interact with definiteness in certain ways. He also excludes other statuses of the noun like 'theme' and 'emphasis' because he believes that "they are unnecessary; that is, they are alternative labels for the phenomena" (Chafe, op. cit. p. 28). In addition, he also admits that the restriction of the phenomena (the packaging) to nouns is merely an arbitrary one because some of these statuses apply equally to the verb, especially those of givenness and contrastiveness, and that the emphasis on nouns is "purely expository" (op. loc.). Chafe also reminds the reader that these statuses are not statuses of the noun as a lexical item, but of a noun as a referent. Thus if the noun is given, for example, "the idea which the noun expresses has this status" (Chafe, op. cit., p. 29).

In identifying the statuses of the noun, Chafe takes into account two major considerations: the syntactic and the cognitive. Syntactic considerations include also two main points: (1) the status of the grammatical subject which can be established through surface case inflection and/or (2) the fact that this is the noun with which the verb agrees (e.g., in person, number, and/or gender). As for the cognitive functions or considerations, they include statuses where the subject is a "'condition stimulus' . . . , the figure of a figure-ground relation or an 'interest-object', . . . the 'conceptual focus' . . . , the most prominent element in the sentence . . . the 'focus of attention' . . . and so on" (Chafe, 1976, p. 29). Chafe, contrary to this quotation which has been built up from the proposals of other linguists, believes that perhaps some of these characterizations are more appropriate to the psychological subject of the late 19<sup>th</sup> century linguistics rather than the grammatical subject, and that perhaps the latter "is only a syntactic phenomenon lacking any cognitive significance altogether" (op. loc.).

For his part, Chafe (1976) concentrates on the cognitive considerations, although he points out that they lead into "a morass of uncertainty" (op. loc.); he, however, suggests that a prerequisite for an eventual solution to these puzzles of uncertainty is approach which unifies linguistic and psychological evidence into a total picture of how



language functions. Thus the approach which he follows in discussing these phenomena starts with the cognitive function of each status, followed by the way it is expressed in English, how it is established in the addressee's consciousness, how long it lasts there, and ending with a consideration of the cases in linguistic and psychological literature in which a particular status has been confused with. Some of these statuses, namely givenness and contrastiveness, have already been briefly discussed above. As for definiteness, Chafe identifies four possible methods of its combination or interaction with givenness. These include:

1. Definiteness and givenness can go together as in those typical sentences, where, after the speaker has said:

4-56 I saw a carpenter yesterday.

he may go on and call 'a carpenter', 'he' or 'the carpenter', and treating him in either case as being already 'given'.

2. Definiteness and newness, as in:

4-57 I talked with the carpenter yesterday,  
where 'the carpenter' is both definite and new.

3. Indefiniteness and newness can go together, as in:

4-58 I just saw a funny looking bird.

Here, the addressee is assumed to be able to identify the referent. In this case it is hardly likely that the referent will be in the addressee's consciousness at the moment this sentence is uttered.

4. Indefiniteness and givenness can go together, as in:

4-59 I saw an eagle yesterday.

4-59a Sally saw one too.

Here, the referent expressed as 'one' is at issue. According to Chafe (1976, p. 42), "it [one] is clearly given, being both low pitched and pronominalized". The referent of 'one' is different from that of 'an eagle', and 'one' is given because it is a particular which is categorized in the same way as the other. Thus, Chafe (op. loc.) believes that it may be valid to say that "indefiniteness entails newness except in those cases where the indefinite referent is different from the referent which established the givenness".

Subject, which I believe is Chafe's first status related to thematic function, is widely looked at as a status strictly syntactic with only indirect cognitive relevance at

best. Chafe, however, suggests that it is 'a priori' unlikely that a status which is given such prominence in English and many other languages "would not do some work for language, and would be only arbitrary and superficial in its function" (Chafe, 1976, p. 43). This is why he points out that it would hardly seem advisable to ignore the possibility that 'subjecthood' has an important cognitive role. In the course of history, however, the subject role has been integrated with other roles and functions. It could then be the case that surface subject status is not associated consistently with a single cognitive status, but Chafe suspects that the association of subject is more consistent than is believed.

On the basis of the this argument, Chafe (1976) suggest that the best way to characterize the subject is to follow on the steps of late 19<sup>th</sup> century linguists in claiming that the subject is "what we are talking about" ( Chafe, op. cit., p. 43), which is adduced from the fact that human knowledge appear to consist, among other things, of a large number of cognitive units which represents our knowledge of particular individuals and events, and about which, we know certain things. Among the many ways in which new knowledge is communicated is by identifying some particular as a starting point and adding to the addressee's knowledge about it, as in:

4-60 John broke his arm yesterday.

In this case 'John' is the particular expressed as 'the point of departure', which new knowledge or 'information' is provided about. Although sentences of this type provide other information about other things rather than the subject, (e.g. about John's arm) the main package of information is unfolded, the knowledge about the subject is the most accessible. Following the experimental research of Perfetti and Goldman (1974)<sup>16</sup>, Chafe (1976, p. 44) calls this the "adding knowledge about" hypothesis regarding the functioning of subjects, and it would seem to have testable consequences as Perfetti and Goldman have done.

As for the interaction between subject and the status of "givenness", Chafe opposes (Hornby, 1971) who defines 'topic' as "the part of the sentence which constitutes what the speaker is talking about . . . The rest of the sentence, the comment, provides new information about the topic" (Hornby, 1971 [Chafe, 1976, p. 47]). Chafe's argument is that if it is assumed that 'topic', here, is equivalent to what he calls 'subject', then would it be appropriate to say that the rest of the sentence provides new

information? According to him, this is at least as much a problem of the terminology 'given' and 'new' as it is of the nature of 'subjecthood' and 'topichood'. He concludes his argument by saying: "there is no necessary correlation of subject status with givenness, or for the matter of nonsubject status with newness" (Chafe, 1976, p. 48). To prove his point in the first part of the quotation, Chafe has the following example:  
4-61 The **DOG** knocked over the **LAMP**.

This sentence could be an answer to a question 'what happened?', where both 'the dog' and the information about (knocked over the lamp) are introduced as new information into the "addressee's consciousness" (op. loc.). As for the second portion of the quotation, there are countless examples in which non-subjects are introduced as 'given', as in:

4-62 The **DOG** knocked it over.

Here, this sentence could be an answer to questions such as 'what happened to the lamp?'. Thus, according to Chafe (op. loc.). "although there is some tendency for subjects to be given, that may be about all can be said about interaction between subject status and the 'given-new' distinction".

Chafe (1976) also assumes that the term 'topic' is simply "a focus of contrast" that has been, for some reason, placed in an unusual position at the beginning of the sentence. This appears to be true for sentences like:

4-63 The **PLAY**, John saw **YESTERDAY**.

4-64 As for the **PLAY**, John saw it **YESTERDAY**.

Both sentences have a double focus, but the difference between the two is that (4-64) is more explicit in relation to the fact that 'the play' is one item out of a list of things that are being paired, and that the reason for placing it at the beginning of such contrastive sentences is because "it is evidently a 'given' item from a list which is being run through (implicitly or explicitly), whereas 'yesterday' is being brought in as new-information to be paired with it" (Chafe, 1976, p. 49).

In this respect, Chafe questions the possibility of identifying the contrastive focus placed at the beginning of a sentence in English (out of its word order) with topics in Chinese, or what Chafe calls "topic-prominent languages", since in those languages, there is no requirement for the topic to be contrastive" (Chafe, 1976, p. 50), and since the role of topic of what he calls "real topics" is quite a different one.

Consequently, Chafe suggests that it would be a step forward to stop using the term topic for those contrastive sentences. For this same reason, he draws a distinction between "what the sentence is about" in "subject- prominent languages", like English, and the "frame within which the sentence holds" (Chafe, op. cit., pp. 50-51) in topic-prominent languages like Chinese. Thus, for languages that have real topics, such as Chinese-- i.e. those that have become conventionalized part of the grammar-- Chafe feels that information is expressed "in a way that does not coincide with anything available in English" (op. loc.). By way of illustrating this, he lists some examples, among which the following is selected from Chinese:

4-65    nei-xie shumu shu-shen    da.

4-65a   those    trees   tree-trunks   big. (or) 'As for those trees, their trunks are big.'

In examples of this type, Chafe objects to the use of standard English translation 'As for those trees, their trunks are big', simply because there is no contrast involved in the original sentence (source sentence), which means that there is no packaging device in English that corresponds to the Chinese topic device, and hence there is no fully adequate translation.

Among other linguists, Chafe have looked at thematic properties taking semantics as their starting point. For him, what a topic, as a cognitive notion, appears to do is to limit the applicability of the main prediction to a certain restricted domain, as 'the bigness of the trunks' applies to within the domain of 'those trees'. Thus, the topic, for Chafe, "sets a spatial, temporal or the individual framework within which the prediction holds" (Chafe, 1976, p. 50). In addition, he also shows that 'real topics' (in topic-prominent languages) are not so much 'what the sentence is about' as the 'framework within which the sentence holds'. Therefore, to produce a correct translation of 4-65a above, English can accomplish this either by adverbial phrase or by 'substantial reorganisation' of the whole clause, as in the following two examples respectively:

4-66    The trunks of these trees are big/

4-67    Those trees have big trunks.

In addition to the distinction mentioned above, Chafe also draws another type of distinction in which he distinguishes between real topics and what he calls "premature subjects" (Chafe, op. cit., pp. 51-52). He sees the premature subject as a

kind of aberration in the timing of the processes of the sentence construction. In short, a topic would be-- or might have originated as-- a subject which is chosen too soon and not as smoothly integrated into the following sentence (Chafe, 1976, pp. 52-53).

In reorganizing a separate status for empathy, Chafe (1976) points out empathy interacts with other statuses that referents can have. He also emphasizes the fact that the hierarchy of empathy tends to be as follows: the speaker is at the top of the hierarchy followed by the addressee, then the third person. In addition to this human-type scale, Chafe suggests that human referents are most likely to coincide with subject status and perhaps with definiteness, as well as become the focus of empathy. From a cognitive point of view, empathy appears to lie in the fact that people are able to imagine themselves "seeing the world through the eyes of others as well as form their own point of view, and that this ability has an effect on the use of language" (Chafe, 1976, p. 54).

#### 4.3.1 Critique

As hinted earlier, Grimes (1975) follows Halliday's (1967 & 1968) formulation in discussing cohesion rather than Chafe's (cf. 4.2.2). According to Grimes (1975, p. 273), Chafe "blurs the distinction between it [cohesion] and thematisation or staging". This lack of distinction, however, says Grimes (op. loc.), "does not hurt, because his remarks on the distribution of new and old information apply mainly to unmarked thematisation in Halliday's sense", where unmarked theme is usually selected from given (= old) information. Chafe does not, for example, worry about cases like:

4-68 My hat I had to leave at the cleaner's,

under the circumstances that the theme 'hat' and the most predictable information 'I' are different. This is why Grimes (1975, p. 273) doubts that Chafe would maintain the same position he held with regard to assigning 'new' information to a single semantic unit rather than adopting Halliday's view as well as his in pointing out that information is not hierarchically built but rather 'linear and culminative', especially if Chafe wants to extend his ideas so as to embrace discourse or text.

Although Chafe (1974 & 1976) covers more packaging phenomena than in (Chafe 1970), his position is largely unchanged: he still assigns a referential value to

the semantic element that corresponds to the peak of salience, and, at the same time, still assigns new information to a single semantic element. He also does not attempt to establish any systemic relationship between the 'packaging phenomena' that are usually included under the single heading of information\_\_ givenness, contrastiveness, . . . etc. Nevertheless, he broadens his interpretation of given information that it must be in some way be recovered from discourse.

The packaging phenomena of Chafe (1976) can be logically considered as a possible alternative to Halliday's formulation with regard to the meaning of theme as it applies in English, where the latter defines it as "the point of departure of the clause as a message" (Halliday, 1967c, p. 212), and where theme is realized as the initial element(s) of the clause. On the other hand, as indicated above, Chafe suggests that theme is not needed as a sperate phenomenon of the noun, for it is "at best an alternative label" (Chafe, 1976, p. 28) for such concepts as 'givenness', 'contrastiveness', 'definiteness', 'subject', or 'topic'. From his discussion on topic, Chafe (1976, p. 50) indicates that topic is only meant to apply to certain structures on "Chinese and other topic-prominent languages". Thus, he doubts that the term ought to be applied to phenomena such as placement at the beginning of the clause, as in:

4-69 Yesterday John left.

4-70 John left yesterday.     "

4-71 **THAT** I know.

By doing this, Chafe eliminates from consideration the one concept (topic) which has been used for so long as a paraphrase or an alternative to the term 'theme'. Moreover, the status 'subject' would also be eliminated immediately as an alternative label for 'theme', since it does not either explain or account for the early mention of items which are not 'subjects' as in examples (4-69 & 71) above. At the same time, definiteness can also be dropped out as an alternative label, simply because it cannot be used to explain why phrases containing indefinites or those that do not belong in the definite-indefinite system altogether might occur at the beginning of the sentence, as in:

4-72 Under a loose plank by the lamp, he hid a knife.

On the basis this argument, the two remaining candidates that are left as alternative labels for theme are givenness and contrastiveness. Chafe, as mentioned earlier (cf. 4.3), points out that there is a regular correlation between initial position in

the clause and given information, but his reference to such assumption comes in an oblique manner: "although there is some tendency for 'subjects' to be given, that may be all that can be said about interactions between subjects and given-new distinction" (Chafe, 1976, p. 48). Subjects, of course, tend to occur initially in their clauses. In fact, Chafe's argument depends upon the existence of such a correlation. Fries (1983, p. 145) believes that Chafe's statement in discussing example 4-61 above "makes no sense except by reference to the existence of the correlation of initial position with given information". Chafe (1976) does not explain either why such a correlation should exist, nor does he explain the significance of the clause initial position of the clause.

In discussing the cognitive nature of contrastiveness, Chafe also sheds no light on the significance of the initial position in the clause. Although he presents some very interesting experiments which appear to demonstrate a correlation between the background of a contrast and "what the sentence is about" (Chafe, 1976, p.52), it seems from the description of the experiment that 'what the sentence is about' can be better paraphrased as (1) assumed background information, than (2) point of departure of the information. Point (2) is Halliday's description of the meaning of theme, while (1) describes a totally different concept.

Fries (1983, p. 146) suggests that another difficulty which arises in Chafe's discussion of contrastiveness as a source of adverbials and objects in initial positions lies in the fact that Chafe appears to claim that time objects, adverbials etc., may occur initially in the clause only when these elements are contrastive. As can be noticed from the examples about contrastiveness like (4-64 above), most of Chafe's examples in this respect involve contrastive structure and intonation. One of the reasons he cites for saying that topic in Chinese and other topic-prominent languages differs from theme (=topic) in English is that in these languages, as indicated above, "there is no requirement that topic be contrastive" (Chafe, 1976, p. 50). If that lack of requirement in Chinese is to be taken as differentiating Chinese from English, says Fries, "then it would seem to imply that in English the placement of adverbial elements, objects, etc. in the initial position in the clause can occur only under contrastive focus. **THIS CAN EASILY BE SHOWN TO BE FALSE** (Fries, 1983, p.146)<sup>17</sup> [my emphasis].

One last point needs to be brought up with regard to the contrast between Chafe's and Halliday's treatment of contrastive focus in the clause. While Halliday

(1967, 1968 & elsewhere) emphasizes that contrastive information is always new information and any thing else in the clause is given, Chafe raises doubts about whether this is so or not. He believes "it is not-- or need not be--" (Chafe, 1976, p. 35). He gives two main reasons for contrastive information to be otherwise. The first point has to do with his characterization of new information, which he explains earlier and which he even likens to Halliday's own definition of new information (cf. 4.3). For him in a sentence like:

4-73 **RONALD** made the hamburger,

the speaker may very well assume that the addressee is already thinking about 'Ronald', either as one of the candidates for the role or in connection with other things. This is why, according to Chafe, pronouns can be the focus of contrast, as in:

4-74 **HE** did it.

On the basis of this, Chafe comes to the conclusion that the principal condition under which given items receive the intonation peak of a sentence is just when they are the focus of contrast. In addition to this he believes that

what is communicated by a contrastive sentence is that a certain focus item rather than other possible ones is correct, but that cannot be regarded as new information in the sense of a referent newly introduced into the addressee's consciousness (Chafe, 1976, p. 35).

The second point which Chafe brings in support of this assumption is that a sentence might have in more than one contrastive focus: it might have a double or a triple foci as in, respectively:

4-75 **RONALD** made the **HAMBURGERS**. [but **SALLY** made the **SALAD**]

4-76 **RONALD BOUGHT** the **MEET**. [but **SALLY PICKED** the **LETTUCE**]

In these instances, the assertion that 'some one did something', or the background information, in Chafe's terms, could either be 'given' or 'quasi-given', and the candidates of these roles or the patients of the action (process) could be given or new.

In his later writings, Chafe becomes increasingly interested in the typological aspects of information processing. In this respect, he suggests what he calls the notion of "idea unit" (Chafe, 1982, p. 38)<sup>18</sup>, which is similar to Halliday's 'information unit', though Chafe's investigations lead him to propose that spontaneous spoken language is produced in "thought groups" or "spurts" that average between 6-10 words in length, and which have a minimum duration of two seconds, and typically are bounded by



pauses. From the psychologist William James, he borrows the idea of "perching" of consciousness:

As we take, in fact, a general view of the wonderful stream of our consciousness, what strikes us most is the different pace of its parts. Like a bird's life, it seems to be made of an alternation of 'flights' and 'perching' The rhythm of language expresses this. . . . The restings of flight are filled with thoughts of relations, static or dynamic, that for the most part obtain between the matters contemplated in the periods of comparative rest ( James, 1890, p. 243).

Chafe believes that "the phenomena [of given-new information and topic and comment] are inseparable from the psychological phenomena" (Chafe, 1987, p.21)<sup>19</sup>. According to him, the reason for alternation between given and new (or topic and comment) is that the human 'short-term memory' cannot hold very much. Only a small amount of information can be 'lit up' in our minds at one time.

In one of his recent articles, in which he discusses grammatical subjects in spoken and written English, Chafe (1991) views the use of grammatical subject from a functional point of view<sup>20</sup>. In this article, he points out, as already hinted earlier (Chafe, 1976), that a formal role that is so 'well-defined' and 'pervasive' in the English language would also have a pervasive functional role. To envisage the type of such role, he adopts the concept of *referent* (already alluded to in Chafe, 1976), which represents an idea of a person an object or abstraction. For him, a particular referent may be 'verbalized' with any number of different words or phrases, and many aspects of language suggest that people verbalize experiences as composed of states and events in which referents function as participants. Furthermore, the function which Chafe has characterized as 'a starting point', is, of course, expressed by the grammatical subject of the clause. "Subjects are the grammatical expressions of the starting points" (Chafe, 1991, p. 49). Moreover, the relation between subject (a formal status) and starting point (a functional one) is pervasive, according to him, in conversational English.

Chafe also emphasizes the fact that English is a language that is 'so fond of subjects' that it, sometimes, forces a subject to be used though the state or event being communicated has no participants at all like the well-known weather expression:

4-77 *It's* raining.

These types of subjects Chafe calls 'non-functional subjects' in contrast with other linguists who call them 'dummy subjects'. Under non-functional subjects, Chafe also

includes what (Shiffrin, 1987) calls 'discourse markers'<sup>21</sup>.

With regard to the properties of referents that are verbalized as subjects and which may distinguish spoken and written language, Chafe (1991) identifies two main properties that are of importance in this respect. The first is associated with the expression of 'given', 'accessible' and new information conveyed by the referent, while the second is associated with the relative importance of the referent to the topic of the discourse. With regard to the first, Chafe (1991) points out that the terms given, accessible and new information are associated with the differences of what he calls the "*activation state of referents*" (Chafe, 1991, p. 51). Chafe suggests that a referent will be in one of the three possible states of activation in the mind of the producer and receiver at any particular moment of discourse processing. He calls three states: *active*, *semiactive* and *inactive*. Chafe defines each of these states as follows:

An *active* referent is one that is in the focus of a person's consciousness at a particular moment. Traditionally it might be said to be stored in short-term memory. Most other referents are *inactive*, they traditionally be said to be stored in long-term memory. In addition, some referents that are not fully active will be more accessible than those in the inactive state. Reference in this intermediate state can be called *semiactive*. A referent will usually be in this semiactive state because it is inferrable from another referent that was fully active (Chafe, 1991, p. 51) [original emphasis].

This state of activation will, of course, change as discourse proceeds. Typically, a referent will be at first inactive, and at some point will become active, then will recede in the semiactive state and will, perhaps, become inactive again.

The state of a referent in the speaker's or hearer's consciousness, whether it is given, accessible or new, has a direct effect in the way it is verbalized (or realized, to use Halliday's terminology). If it is given, it is most likely to be verbalized as an unaccentuated pronoun. If, on the other hand, the referent is new it tends to be verbalized as an accented full noun phrase. An accessible referent will also be verbalized as an accented noun phrase, "but its accessibility relaxes some of the constraints that apply to new information, in that accessible referents are more likely to be used in the subject role than are new ones" (Chafe, 1991, p.52).

As for the second property in terms of which a referent may differ within the discourse, a referent may, for example, be the topic of the discourse itself. This type

of referent Chafe calls a "*primary*" referent; he exemplifies this by the protagonist in a narrative. In addition to the primary referent, he also identifies "*secondary*" referent (ones that play a supporting roles) and "*tertiary*" referents (ones that play only an incidental role). Of special interest to Chafe (1991) is the last type, because he believes that this is the one referent that is verbalized as a subject which conveys new information. But Chafe (1991) has emphasized that the proportion of subjects that express new information is extremely small, especially in conversational English, and consequently does not play a prominent role in the development of discourse, since, according to him, very little attention need to be paid to those referents<sup>22</sup>. The emphasis on subjects as not verbalized as bearers of new information has also been expressed in Chafe's earlier articles (see Chafe 1976 above). However, he explicitly expresses this when he says:

only rarely the subject of a clause expresses brand new or previously inactive information. The only circumstance under which such a subject is likely to be found is that in which the clause **BEGINS A NEW PARAGRAPH-LIKE SECTION OF THE DISCOURSE** (Chafe, 1986, pp. 21-22)<sup>23</sup> [my emphasis].

This last quotation from Chafe tallies with Halliday's 1967c & elsewhere and with Grimes' (1975) assertions that initial discourse clauses do not contain any given information, and that what is expressed in them is merely new information. This view of Chafe's, however, is modified later in his article of 1991, when he points out that in an example like:

4-78 . . . Jack didn't come and help you I guess?

The referent verbalized by 'Jack' must have been known to the addressee as well as to the speaker. In this case, then, it can be called a '*shared*' referent like 'given' and 'accessible' information, since the latter two will have been activated in the preceding discourse. But later on, he, again, modifies this generalization with regard to 'new' referents by saying:

new referents . . . may be either shared or unshared. Often a speaker will activate a referent assumed to be already present in the addressee's knowledge base, but simply not activated up to that point. At other times a speaker will activate a referent not shared by the addressee, adding it to the addressee's knowledge for the first time (Chafe, 1991, p. 53).

This last quotation strikes a bell of what Clark and Haviland (1977) call the speaker's-

reader's 'given-new' contract and Prince's (1981) taxonomy of 'shared knowledge' (cf. 4.4 below).

To sum up the discussion of Chafe's contributions on thematic structure, one is still liable to maintain the comments raised above and agree with Fries (1983) with regard to the importance given to the initial position in the clause. All we have seen in Chafe's late articles is a more psychological involvement in the role of the subject, as a referent operating in the mind of the speaker and hearer with no mention of its thematic status as a clause initial element, although he hints at its role in discourse development. Furthermore, one also notices (Chafe, 1986 & 1991) that Chafe adds a new distinction to the noun (subject or referent): the status of 'accessibility' to be differentiated from 'given' and 'new', in addition to the status of givenness which he first established in his article of 1976. Could it be, as indicated earlier, that Chafe has come to the conclusion that he would accept Firbas' (1964b & elsewhere) transitional status of communication dynamism for some referents in the discourse and that he has given up the binary distinction of information into given and new? If this is not the case, what status would be given to the 'accessible' information in terms of theme and rheme: is it the theme (or topic) of the clause or is it the rheme (or comment) of the clause, bearing in mind that he prefers to use 'new' instead of rheme or comment? From his discussion of the concept of 'accessible' information, I am, and hopefully I am right from a Hallidayan point of view, assuming that this information is thematic, since, according to him, items of "accessible information are more likely to be used in the subject role than are new ones" (Chafe, 1991, p. 52) [quoted above].

#### **4.4 Prince**

In studying cleft-sentences in discourse, Prince (1978) claims that the meaning of two types of cleft-sentences, the it-cleft and the wh-cleft, are different<sup>24</sup>. To prove her point, she examines their presupposition and focus from the standpoint of discourse. In doing this, she disagrees with Akmajian (1970, p. 149), who claims that "they are synonymous, share the same presupposition, answer the same questions, and, in general, they can be used interchangeably"<sup>25</sup>. Prince, however, agrees with Bolinger (1972), who claims that 'it' is referential, and for him, the reference is a proposition that has

already been mentioned or introduced in previous discourse. Bolinger is concerned to establish the differences between the two types of clefts, since he is convinced that "there are no situations in the system where "it makes no difference 'which way you go'" (Bolinger, 1972, p.71)<sup>26</sup>. Bearing this last quotation in mind, Prince proposes that the presupposition (the *wh*-clause) of the *wh*-cleft (sometimes called pseudo-clefts) is 'given', while that of the *it*-cleft is 'known'.

Before comparing their discourse functions and domain, Prince draws attention to their syntactic domains in order to be able to recognize those differences in distribution that simply reflect arbitrary grammatical differences. In this respect, Prince (1978) agrees with Akmajian (1970) that the two types of cleft sentences differ in what categories of constituents may be focused. Both constructions readily accept a noun phrase, but an adverb or a prepositional phrase commonly occur mainly (though not only) in *it*-clefts, while verb phrases or sentences commonly occur in *wh*-clefts. Thus, according to Prince, the only significant overlap concerns focused noun phrases. Even in this overlap the two constructions differ: *it*-cleft may focus an animate as well as an inanimate noun phrase with equal facility, whereas the *wh*-cleft, unless a lexical head noun is added, like 'the one', 'the thing' etc., may focus only on an animate noun phrase, as in the following two examples which illustrate the *it*-cleft:

4-79 It was **MAGRUDER** who leaked it.

4-80 Who leaked it was **MAGRUDER**<sup>27</sup>.

To support the two main claims she makes above, Prince (1978) points to her data which consist mainly of actual cleft sentences in discourse. The experimental research she carries out shows a major difference between the two types of cleft sentences with regard to the average length of their focused and presupposed constituents. In *wh*-clefts, the presupposed string is one third the average length of the focused string or "the presupposed string constituted approximately of 25% of the corresponding whole non-clefted sentences" (Prince, 1978, p. 886). On the other hand, the presupposed string of the *it*-clefts is nearly twice as long as the focused string, or "66% of the corresponding non-clefted sentences" (op. loc.). For Prince, 'focus' refers to the number of words in the constituent following the copula in both the *wh*-cleft and the *it*-cleft (for the *it*-cleft it is an initial assumption which Prince herself, as will be shown later, does not take to mean a clear-cut focus and that elements following the 'it' are always focused (new); sometimes they are non-focused or given). On the other hand,

she takes presupposition to refer to the number of words following the wh-word in the wh-clefts, and the number of words following 'that', or the 'ellipted wh-word'(=0) in it-clefts.

Analysing the figures of her experiment, Prince points out that the results seem intuitively correct for wh-clefts if the "logico-semantic notion of presupposition is equated with 'old/given/known information' and focus with new information (Prince, 1978, p. 886). Citing Grice's (1975, p. 46<sup>28</sup>) maxim of manner "be brief (avoid prolixity )", she notes that it seems natural to use as few words as possible to invoke a shared referent or to refer to something 'known', which leads her to apply the term given to the presupposed part of the wh-cleft (i.e., the wh-phrase). By the same token, it also seems natural to present new information in greater detail. But the results of the it-clefts figures initially surprised her, but as we alluded to above, she was not after all was so surprised when she recites examples like:

4-81 . . . from a tissue of lies . . . the notorious medieval piece known as the *Fetha Negest* was woven, thereby consecrating the theocratic and feudal character of the ruling classes. It is *this same myth* which is perhaps perpetuated in the two so-called modern constitutions (that of 1931 and 1955), wherein it is stated that a multi-religious, multi-ethnic Ethiopia is a christian fief in the image of the ruling minority's own religious products and class interests. (original ellipsis)

Prince's (1978) reaction to it-cleft sentences like this is that 'it is obviously absurd' to consider the presupposed clause 'which is perhaps . . .' in the above example, as given or known information in this piece of discourse, and/or the focused constituent 'this same myth' as a new piece information, hence contradicting her own assumptions above. But she comes to the conclusion that even if limiting ourselves to focused noun phrases, discourse-related differences exist between the two types of clefts, since she believes that (4-81) may not be replaced by wh-clefts in the above discourse, and preserve coherence.

As already mentioned, Prince (1978) has almost committed herself to the belief, that in the case of wh-clefts, the logical presupposition and given information seem to "match quite closely" (Prince, op. cit., p. 887). To prove her point, she cites various examples in which the information is repeated explicitly in the previous situation, hence there is a direct access to the referent, or reference to information which is known or knowable from implication or implicature, as in:

4-82 Nikke Cain, 19, does not want to be a movie star. What she hopes to do is be

a star in a horse-show circuit.

Here, Prince suggests the notion of the bridge, in order to get from the new information back to what is known. The notion of the bridge in pieces of discourse is particularly useful because if the hearer or reader hears or reads the first non-clefted sentence of 4-82 above, he will immediately think that the subject, 'Nikke' does not want to be any thing at all, and, consequently, one is liable to start such a sentence with 'in fact'. But when the reader/hearer reads/hears the next clefted sentence, he immediately constructs an inferential bridge\_\_ Nikke, after all, wants to be something: a star on the horse show circuit.

Prince, as will be discussed later, takes given to mean a referent in Chafe's (1974 & 1976) sense of the term: anything the speaker may assume to be in the addressee's consciousness on the basis of either of "extralinguistic or linguistic context" (Chafe, 1976, p. 31). The referent, she points out, may be explicitly mentioned, physically present or 'saliently inferable' from context. Prince's notion of a bridge implies that the hearer may sometimes have to construct this in order to identify the antecedent which need not actually be in his consciousness. Nevertheless, she puts down a discourse condition with regard to wh-clefts when she says:

a wh-cleft will not occur coherently in a discourse if the material inside the (subject) wh-cleft does not represent material which the cooperative speaker can assume to be appropriately in the hearer's consciousness at the time of hearing the utterance. (Prince, 1978, p. 888)

Prince identifies six types of antecedents or information units which may coherently serve as antecedents to wh-clefts. These can be summarized as follows:

1. Explicit information, more or less. This involves information given explicitly (or nearly so), as in the repetition of the antecedent, in the previous context, or in the accompanying non-linguistic context, as in Prince's two examples respectively (cf. underlined items):

4-83a '... in Haviland and Clark (in press) they say that . . . . Certainly what they are talking about is . . . .'

4-83b 'You see, what I am doing, John, is putting you in the same situation as President Eisenhower put me with Adams.

2. Implicit information. In this type of antecedent, the hearer has a bit more work to do since the actual phrases are rarely repeated, and the line between explicit and implicit information is often fuzzy, as in:

4-84 At first contact he developed a furious hatred for the party of social democracy. 'What most repelled me', he said, 'was his hostile attitude towards the struggle for . . . .'

3. Contrast. In this type of discourse, the antecedents are related to the preceding linguistic context, but here the relation is one of contrast, which may be of one positive or negative, anatology, comparative, superlative, time, etc., as in:

4-85 Our position is a DYNAMIC one. It will be more and more refined as conditions change in the course of the struggle. What is CONSTANT is our commitment to a revolutionary emancipation of Ethiopia.

Prince (1978) points out that the antecedent in these three types of information is more or less (re)constructible on semantic grounds, but pragmatics is far more important in the remaining three types:

4. Metalinguistic antecedents. Although the antecedents of this type can be (re)constructed from the preceding context, the hearer is assumed to be entertaining certain metalinguistic notions. In this respect, Prince suggests that "if A [a speaker] is or has been speaking or is reported to have spoken, then any one involved in the speech situation, including A, means or meant something" (Prince, 1978, p. 890). She illustrates this type of antecedent from real discourse in:

4-86 A: . . . There is something to be said for not may be this [this may not be a] complete answer to this fellow, but may be a statement to me. My version is bing, bing, bing. This is a possibility. [author's proposed correction to the underlined]

B: Uh huh!

A: What I mean is we need something to answer somebody.

As seen from 4-86, there is no complementizer 'that' in the focused clause of such sentences. In addition to this feature, she also shows that the focused clause often displays certain other features that are usually associated with main clauses, e.g. the imperative as in the above example. Since such wh-clefts are often used not simply for changing previous assertions, but also for remarking them; the presence of such main clause phenomena lends support to a functional explanation of their existence.

The four types of wh-clefts constructions all have their antecedents contained in or at least partly (re)constructible from their preceding contexts. In the last two, however, the antecedent lies in the norms of the speech situation; in other words, they represent the speaker's relevant thought rather than what is in the text itself.

5. The 'think-construction'. In this type, which is most common in conversational



discourse genres, it seems that the speaker's relevant thoughts, observations, opinions, reactions, etc., (often negative) are taken to be the constant appropriate concern of the hearer, and may therefore nearly always be assumed to be in the hearer's consciousness as in:

4-87 What troubles me is: one, will this thing not break someday and the whole thing - domino situation- everything starts crumbling, fingers will be pointing . . . '

6. The 'happen-construction'. In this type, the antecedent is not retrievable from anything in the preceding context, and yet the discourse is coherent. In this respect, there seems to be a pragmatic principle that says: "events keep occurring\_\_ and that in our culture [the American one], at least, they [events] are our proper and constant concern" (Prince, 1978, p.893). The happen clauses are extremely common in oral data, and not at all infrequent in the written. Their distribution in different types of discourse is wider than the 'think clauses', indicating that it is more generally appropriate for a speaker to assume that his co-participants are consciously concerned with past, present and future events than with his thoughts, as in:

4-88 A: Hellow, operator. I'm trying to dial BU7-1151. Could you please check it for me.

B: [checks] What happened is that the whole exchange got overloaded. Wait a few hours and try again.

Moreover, like think-clauses, happen cleft clauses frequently introduce main assertions, and thus often occur without the 'that-complementizer', as in:

4-89 '. . . I think what happened is he ran that string out and finally just gave up because that would not work . . . '.

The above six types of antecedents can be diagrammed below as discussed by Prince (1978, pp. 889-893):




Figure 4-1: Antecedents of Wh-Clefts.

Prince (1978) also draws a comparison between Chafe's and Halliday's positions with regard to the question of givenness. She points out that Chafe (1976 & elsewhere) distinguishes 'given', what is in the speaker's consciousness (active, inactive or

semiactive; see previous section), from 'new' and its complement, by giving a low pitch to pronominalization as examples of markers of givenness. On the other hand, Halliday (1967, 1968 & elsewhere) approaches the notion of given versus new from the opposite direction, starting with the notion of information focus: "that which is represented by the speaker as being new, textually (and situationally) non-derivable information" (Halliday, 1967c, p. 205). For Halliday, information focus may be marked (e.g. by special stress) or unmarked (e.g. by 'normal' stress), and given information is the complement of the marked focus only:

A distinction . . . must be made between unmarked focus, realized as the location of the tonic on the final accented lexical item, which assigns the function 'new' to the constituent in question, but does not specify the remainder, and the marked focus, realized as any other location of the tonic, which assigns the function new to the focal constituent and that 'given' to the rest of the of the information unit (Halliday. 1967c, p. 208).

Thus, as can be seen from the above, Chafe and Halliday define given entities in different ways; while Chafe takes the speaker's assumptions as "primitive and directly relates givenness to certain of those assumptions, Halliday . . . takes intonation as primitive and inherently relates givenness to certain intonation contours" (Prince , 1978, p. 895)<sup>29</sup>.

Prince's own position with regard to the status of given and new information in wh-cleft sentences, is that she follows in the steps of Chafe. Thus, for her, given is what the speaker assumes to be in the hearer's consciousness. Prince, however, modifies the verb "assume" and makes read as "may cooperatively assume" (Prince, 1978, p. 894), because she believes that the speaker need not actually think that the information is in the hearer's mind\_\_ only that it would be appropriate if it were. It is only to such information that the cooperative utterer of the wh-cleft may require "bridge-building" on the part of the hearer.

In contrast with the information contained in the Wh-cleft, the presupposed information represented by the it-cleft '*that*-clause' does not have to be in the hearer's mind, although it may be. Prince illustrates this type of cleft sentence by examples from actual discourse like:

4-90 A: Mmm . . . [eating a piece of fudge]

B: Aren't these good? It was only sheer will power that kept me from eating 12 each night.

This example also illustrates the difference between given (i.e. assumed to be) in the hearer's consciousness and 'known' (i.e. may not be assumed to be in the hearer's consciousness). For example, if A is asked why B does not eat all the 'fudge', he would have given a correct answer: that there is 'something' that stops B from eating the 'fudge', simply because it (the fudge) is still there, but this does not mean that A will know exactly what that particular 'something' is, and certainly it is not in his mind. Prince, however, does not claim that it-clefts present information in this traditional sense.

To illustrate her point more with regard to the fact that the utterer of it-clefts makes no assumptions to what is in the hearer's consciousness, Prince examines the it-clefts of some idioms, as in:

4-91 It's a sort of an arbitrary line that you are drawing.

According to Prince, the type of discourse this idiom has been extracted from has nothing to do with line drawing, and thus the activity could not have been thought of by the speaker to be in the hearer's consciousness, but Prince believes that this information is known.

As for the functions of it-clefts in actual discourse, Prince identifies two types of it-cleft, each of which functions differently in discourse: the stressed focus it-clefts and the informative presupposition it-clefts. The first type occurs when the focused constituent of the it-cleft has a strong stress, and hence represents new information - often contrastive, as in the case of wh-clefts. The difference between the two lies in the communicative value of their presupposition. In wh-clefts, as discussed above, the wh-clause represents information that the speaker 'cooperatively assumes' the hearer is or can be thinking about. In this sense, Prince (1978) equates such information with Halliday's theme of a particular stretch of discourse; whereas the 'that-clause of stressed focus it-clefts represents known or old information, which, according to Prince, "is not marked as assumed in the hearer's consciousness and which is not theme" (Prince, 1978, p. 888). Prince likens this contrast between the wh-clefts and the stressed-focused it-cleft with what Halliday has made between given, which Prince calls known or old, and theme in his well-known quotation:

The difference can perhaps be best summarized by the observation that, while 'given' means 'what you were talking about' (or 'what I was talking about before'), theme means 'what I am talking about' (or 'what

I am talking about now'); and, as any student of rhetoric the two do not necessarily coincide (Halliday, 1967c, p. 212).

Although Prince does not object to Halliday's distinction between given information and theme, she points out that Halliday is speaking of theme in general. What applies to wh-clefts, as far as theme is concerned, is not only what the speaker is 'talking about now', but also what he expects the hearer to be thinking about.

Prince (1978) illustrates the difference between the stressed-focus it-clefts and the wh-clefts in the following pair of sentences:

4-92a. So I learned to sew books. They're really good books. It's just the covers that are rotten.

4-92b. So I learned to sew books. They're really good books. What is rotten is just the covers.

In 4-92a, 'it' is known or knowable, from the fact that the speaker sews books, that there is something 'rotten' or amiss with them. However, the theme of this discourse, what it is about, is 'books', not 'what is rotten'; thus the it-cleft is ideally suited to the task.

On the other hand, Prince also points out that the stressed-focus it-cleft is also ideally suited for the Prague School concept of communication dynamism (CD) (cf. 2.2.4). In this respect, Prince claims that it-cleft *that*-clauses can be seen as carrying a very low degree of CD<sup>30</sup>— so low that they are frequently deleted or are simply missing, yielding a structure that is not obviously formally identifiable with an it-cleft, but Prince (1978, p. 897) insists that "it can be nothing else", as in:

4-93 Who made this mold? Was it the teacher? Was it the medicine man?

Prince, however, admits that stressed-focus it-clefts are odd in one respect: whereas the wh-clefts comply with the typical notion that old or given information, in English at least, precedes the unknown or new information, in the stressed-focus it-cleft, it is the new information that precedes the given information, as in:

4-94 A: So who is Barbara?

B1: Let me put it this way. When you last saw me with any one, it was Barbara I was with.

B2: . . . I was with Barbara.

B3: . . . The one I was with was Barbara.

In B1 it-cleft construction, B extracts the new information from A's question, 'Barbara', from the last position and placed it before the old information, '*I was with*'. Although the non-clefted sentence, B2, is in the right order (new information preceded

by given), Prince believes that it is "less natural". For her, such a sentence, in this type of context, would have the following problem:

one tends to interpret the new information as being 'with Barbara' or 'was with Barbara', yielding a rather bizarre reading in which 'Barbara' does not identify the 'anyone' of the preceding clause. Thus, though the it-cleft presents information (old vs. new) in an **ABERRANT ORDER**, it clearly marks which is which (Prince, 1978, p. 897) [my emphasis].

By the same token, the comparison between B1 and B3 is even more complex because it has to do with the question of theme: what is the theme in each construction. Prince (op. loc.) points out that the theme of this piece of discourse is 'Barbara'; B3, as already discussed above, gives the impression that the speaker is changing the theme to 'the one I was with', who, at the moment, could easily assumed to be 'non-Barbara'.

Thus, of such situations, Prince maintains that

the focus of a wh-cleft must be distinctly less active in the hearer's (assumed) consciousness than the information in the wh-clause: possibly that which is most prominent in the consciousness is (usually?) the theme; and in the wh-cleft, **THE WH-CLAUSE IS A MARKED THEME**. (Prince, 1978, pp. 897-898) [my emphasis].

As for the second type of it-cleft construction, which Prince calls 'the informative-presupposition', the hearer is presented with information in the it-cleft that-clause that he is not thinking about (or even does not know). This situation will present the speaker with a strong rhetorical temptation to map new information onto the that-clause; an action that would be in the typical or traditional line of putting new information last. In this case, the overall purpose of the speaker is to enrich the knowledge of the hearer with the information contained in the it-cleft's that-clause, because the hearer is not expected to know it, as in:

4-95 ##It was just about 50 years ago that Henry Ford gave us the weekend. On September 25, 1926, in some what shocking move for that time, he decided to establish a 40-hour work week, giving his employees two days off instead of one. [## means discourse initial sentence].

In this type of discourse, which is a newspaper filler, if the first sentence not clefted, it would seem as though the newspaper had just discovered (or pretending to have discovered) the information in the that-clause; the it-cleft, in contrast, serves to mark the information as a known fact, unknown only to the readership. In comparison with wh-cleft constructions like:

4-96 ## What we have set as our goal is the grammatical capacity of children\_\_ a part of their linguistic competence.

The difference between 4-95 and 4-96 is obvious. According to Prince,

in the wh-cleft, what is presupposed on the logico-semantic level **IS** truly presumed in the discourse (pragmatic?) level; but what is presupposed logico-semantically in the informative-presupposition it-cleft is **NEW** information on the discourse level\_\_ and therefore, in contrast to both the wh-clefts and the stressed-focus it-cleft, [the that-clause in the informative-presupposition it-cleft] has a high degree of CD (Prince, 1978, p. 898) [original emphasis].

Furthermore, compared with the stressed-focused it-clefts, the informative presupposition it-clefts are formally and unambiguously identifiable in three main respects:

1. The informative-presupposition it-clefts have normally (vs. weakly) stressed that-clauses.
2. The informative-presupposition it-clefts have a short and anaphoric focus, which is either a (subject) noun phrase or an adverbial, generally of time, place and reason.
3. The informative-presupposition it-clefts' that/wh-clauses are not deletable, but the complementizer 'that' can be deleted after a focused adverbial so long as the construction is of the stressed-focus type, as in:

4-97 [cupping his cheeks] It's **HERE** [0=that] I look like Mina Davis.

In discussing the function of informative-presupposition it-clefts in discourse, Prince (1978) inquires whether the new information contained in the 'that-clause' of this type of construction is a performance error in the part of the speaker or whether it is purposeful or functional. Prince emphasizes that it is not a performance error for two main reasons: (1) these constructions have predicative stress patterns and (2) they tend to occur in formal, often written, discourse\_\_ the type least likely to contain errors. According to her, they are well-formed and functional. Their function, or at least one of their functions is that "they **MARK A PIECE OF INFORMATION AS FACT**, known to some people although not yet to the intended hearer" (Prince, 1978, pp. 989-900). From Prince's functional approach to discussing these constructions, one can extract the following general functions of this type of it-cleft in discourse:

1. They are frequent in historical narratives, where the speaker wishes to indicate that he/she does not wish to take personal responsibility for the truth or originality of the

statement being made. In this respect, Prince draws an analogy between them and the hedge clause (in fact she considers hedges as a sub-type of this type of it-cleft construction). The difference between them is that the hedge clauses, like 'it seems that . . .', reduce the speaker's responsibility towards his statement, by weakening the statement itself: by making it into a guess, whereas in the information presupposition it-cleft, it is the other way round: by strengthening the statement and presenting it as an already known fact. This is why Prince suggests that such an "it-cleft is particularly well-suited in persuasive discourse", as in:

4-98 It is chiefly for the sake of this super-sense, for the sake of complete consistency, that it is necessary for totalitarianism to destroy every trace of what we commonly call human dignity.

Thus one can say, following Prince, that one man's opinion or evaluation is another man's fact, and the users of this construction may well be in good faith. This leads Prince to believe that "it is . . . very difficult to draw a line between a propagandistic use of it-clefts and a factual use" (Prince, 1978, p. 900); moreover, it-clefts of this type function like footnotes in that they seem to say: 'don't argue with me. I did not invent this'.

2. As indicated above, although all informative-presupposition it-clefts have the general function of presenting statement as facts, they also have some other more specific sub-functions, which can be classified as follows:

2.1 In news reporting, they serve in bringing the hearer or reader up-to-date so he can appreciate the actual news, as in:

4-99 ##It was just a year ago that the city's major banks launched . . . the Philadelphia mortgage plan (PMP) . . . to foster investigation in older neighbourhoods. Today, PMP is still in business in force for a total of \$10.7 million . . . (## = discourse initial sentence).

2.2 They are used in a subtle way for ironical purposes, as in:

4-100 ##'It is through the writings of Basil Bernstein that many social scientists have become aware of the scientific potential of sociolinguistics. . . Yet their very popularity has often deformed Bernstein's views which are much more complex than that. First . . .'

2.3 They suggest that one state of affairs is related to another, often implicating a sort of a cause-and-effect relationship, as in:

4-101 But why is the topic so important? Apparently, it is the topic that enables the listener to compute the intended antecedents of each sentence in the paragraph.

2.4 They indicate deference or politeness\_\_ a surprise, perhaps, to those who think they are the exclusive property of pompous rhetoricians. Prince, however, believes that "actually, it is not surprising" (Prince, 1978, p. 902), when she illustrates this sub-function with examples like:

4-102 It is with great honour and pleasure that I announce Hilary Putnam. . . .

Here, the speaker plays down his role in the event, subordinating it and himself in the situation as in the syntactic structure. It also has to be noticed that the *that*-clause contains a performative sentence<sup>31</sup>. The latter point is taken by Prince as support and justification of the very existence of this type of *it*-cleft (the informative-presupposition construction), although she left open the question of to the notion that *it*-cleft *that*-clauses are logically presupposed in a theory in which performative sentences are considered neither true nor false, but felicitous or infelicitous (cf. note 31). She takes this to mean that *wh*-clefts and *it*-clefts are not equivalent and that *that*-clauses in *it*-clefts do not always represent old information in discourse.

On the basis of these findings, Prince proposes the following two definitions of given and known information:

- (a) GIVEN INFORMATION: Information which the cooperative speaker may assume is appropriately in the hearers consciousness.
- (b) KNOWN INFORMATION: Information which the speaker represents as being factual and as already known to certain persons (often not including the hearer) (Prince, 1978, p. 903) [original capitalization].

As can be noticed from the two definitions, the two notions of given and known are very different. To the notion of given, Prince attributes the phenomena of *wh*-clefting, and all types of 'deletions under identity'. She also considers 'right dislocation' (Halliday's, 1967c, substitution) as a correction of the speaker's assumption of the hearer's state of mind and consequently, of what can be taken by him as given. Prince also points out that if the speaker is "uncooperative" with regard to given information, the result will be that the resulting utterance ranges from clumsy to incomprehensible, and the speaker himself will be seen as out of touch with the reality of the speech situation.

On the other hand, for Prince, known information "is less related to what one thinks of as 'grammar', and less immediately relevant to speaker-hearer's interaction" (Prince, 1978, p. 903). Instead, it is rather related to what she calls (op. loc.) "the choice on the part of the speaker of particular word choices (*the fact that*, *factive*



predicates)<sup>32</sup>. Prince also points out that "looseness in designating information as known (i.e. overdesignating) tends to yield an effect of pomposity or manipulativeness rather than incomprehensibility" (op. loc.).

To further emphasize her point with regard to the distinction between wh-clefts and it-clefts, Prince (1978) draws on a piece of experimental research carried out by Hornby (1974)<sup>33</sup>. She believes that the findings of Hornby's research have to do with such a distinction. In this experiment, Prince noticed that the mistakes of misrepresentation that were committed by the subjects with regard to it-cleft (these were all of the stressed-focus type) were due to the fact that an it-cleft marks the that-clause information as 'known', which tempted the subjects to be less careful about verifying them; in fact, discrepancies were missed twice as often. In the wh-cleft, the information in the wh-clause is marked as 'given', (i.e. assumed to be in the hearer's consciousness); and the cooperative subjects, acting as though it was the case, did not bother to verify nearly half of them. Prince main objection to the test, although she accepts its results, is that the sentences were used in isolation (out of context), which seems to be inappropriate and an ineffective means of discovering how speakers verify statements in natural discourse.

Prince (1981)<sup>34</sup> taxonomizes given information into three different types: (1) givenness in terms of predictability or recoverability (associated with Halliday (1967& 1968), & Kuno (1980 & elsewhere), (2) givenness in terms of saliency in the speaker's and/hearer's consciousness (associated with Chafe 1970 & elsewhere), and (3) givenness in terms of shared knowledge. Although Prince has pointed out that no two linguists associated with each type of givenness the same thing, nevertheless, these three types of givenness are not mutually independent. In this respect she says:

If the speaker can predict that some particular item or items will occur in some particular position within the sentence, then the speaker must assume that it is appropriate that the hearer have some particular thing in his/her consciousness [saliency]. And if the speaker must assume that the hearer has some particular thing in his/her consciousness, then the speaker must assume that the hearer has some assumptions or can draw some inferences (Prince, 1981, p. 231).

Furthermore, all three levels of givenness sometimes involve cases where some items are given for extralinguistic reasons, showing that all three levels must ultimately relate to extralinguistic phenomena, and in particular be in the hearer's mind.

In dividing shared knowledge, the third type of givenness in the above quotation, Prince rejects, like many other linguists working in this 'thorny' field, the term 'shared knowledge' as being the cause of a lot of confusion, and rejects the term 'givenness' as being inconvenient. She prefers her own term 'assumed familiarity', which lacks, according to her, the unhelpful connotation of symmetry and fact and does not sound like anything else.

For Prince, the problem of assumed familiarity is not tied up with any kind of assumption the reader/hearer makes about the writer/speaker's assumptions in as much as the bearing of these assumptions on the form of the text or discourse being produced. In this respect the form is not uniquely determined by the objective information the speaker/writer is attempting to convey either. Thus, Prince (1981) is not concerned with what one individual may know or hypothesize about another individual's belief-state except in so far as that knowledge and those hypotheses affect the forms and the understanding of linguistic productions. The problem is, therefore, a linguistic one. ". . . the goal of linguistics", Prince says, "is to produce a theory of discourse that distinguishes between a random sequence of sentences and something we would intuitively call a 'text'" (Prince, 1981, p. 233) [my ellipsis].

To solve the problem of taxonomy of assumed familiarity, Prince lays down a three-part solution. First, the taxonomy of linguistic form; it is already taken care of, according to her, by the structural and generative schools of grammar and linguistics. Second, the taxonomy of assumed familiarity, and third, the relation between them, which Prince tries to establish in her 1981 article. With regard to the second and third solutions, Prince produces a discourse model, whose elements spring from the taxonomy she has worked out for 'shared knowledge' or her 'assumed familiarity'.

Prince's (1981) taxonomy of given-new information is based on assumed familiarity. Her taxonomy is basically tripartite: in addition to given information, which she calls 'evoked', linguistic items may convey information that the text receiver is assumed to be able to infer, and thirdly they may contain new information. Within the three main components, there are finer distinctions, which makes the taxonomy especially appropriate for her purpose. Prince has given the following examples, which are assumed to appear in discourse-initial sentences:

4-103 Pardon, would you have a change of a quarter?

4-104 A guy I was with says he knows your sister.

4-105 I got on a bus yesterday and the driver was drunk.

4-106 Hey, one of these eggs is broken!

4-107 Noam Chomsky went to Penn.

As for the first type of given information, the evoked type, information may be given as a result of being 'textually evoked' as 'he' in 4-104, or 'situationally evoked' as 'you' in 4-103. Inferreds (the second type) are discourse entities that the text-receiver may infer from other entities. Hence, 'the driver' in 4-105 is inferable from the fact that buses have drivers, which Prince has called 'inferable non-containing', and which the hearer can infer via logical reasoning as just shown. Inferreds may also have the form of 'containing inferreds', i.e., "what is inferred off of", as Prince (1981, p. 236) puts it, "it is properly contained within the inferable" entity itself. Thus, 'one of these eggs' in 4-106 may be inferred from the situationally evoked element 'these eggs' that is contained within the noun phrase itself. The third type, new information, may, says Prince, basically be of two kinds: 'brand new' or 'unused'. Brand new information may, in turn, be 'anchored' to some other discourse entity (e.g., A guy I was with, in 4-104, anchored to the situationally evoked entity 'I'), or 'unanchored' (e.g., a bus, in 4-103). Noam chomsky in 4-107 refers to an unused entity. Though not inferable, this entity is assumed to be available to the text-receiver. It contains new information, but it is, at the same time, expected to be identifiable and hence, more familiar to the hearer or reader than a brand new entity.

Thus, unlike evoked or inferable information, unused information is not assumed to be present in the specific 'text world' (in the sense of Enkvist 1989), the text world that the text receiver is, ideally, constructing with the help of the text-producer's instructions, i.e. the text. Instead, unused information is assumed (by the text-producer) to be available in the text-receiver's 'universe of discourse', (again in the sense of Enkvist 1989, p. 166) when he say: "the universe at large within which the text can be placed"<sup>35</sup>. Obviously, this is where things can go wrong: the assumptions that the text-producer is making about the text-receiver's consciousness, and the knowledge they shares may not actually tally with the state of things in the receiver's actual text world and the universe of discourse. The text-producer's choices of strategies also reflects the degree of receiver-orientation he/she wishes to opt for.

In this model of discourse, Prince likens a text to a recipe: "a set of instructions from a speaker to a hearer on how to construct a particular discourse model" ( Prince,

**Textually Evoked** > Unused > Inferred (non-containing) > Inferred (containing) > New (Anchored) > New (Unanchored)  
**Situationally Evoked** (Figure 4-2: Prince, 1981, p. 245; [ $\geq$  greater than]).

On the basis of this scale, one may say that a noun phrase representing a certain point on the scale implicates that the speaker could not have felicitously referred to the same entity by another noun phrase higher on the scale. The recognition of such a scale permits this sort of implicature to be subsumed under the Gricean maxim of quantity. Nevertheless, Prince also points out that the use of the scale "must be relative to the speaker's hypothesis about the hearer's belief-set and cannot be constructed as a statement about relative probability of a particular type of noun phrase occurring" (Prince, 1981, p.245). Prince supports this claim by the fact that the 'unused' is higher than the 'inferrable' in spite of the fact that most texts contain more inferrable entities than unused ones. The reason is that most entities discussed are simply not previously assumed to be known to the hearer. For example in 4-105, if the speaker who utters it happens to know the driver by name (e.g. Jake), but he assumes that the hearer does not know this, he cannot substitute 'Jake' for 'the driver', and still be cooperative and the sentence coherent. If, on the other hand, the speaker thinks that the hearer already has an entity for this individual with the attribute 'Jake', and the speaker simply says 'the driver', the hearer, by following the 'familiarity scale', will infer 'not-Jake' and will, if he/she ever finds out, feel that the speaker has withheld information, or in Grice's (1975) terms, has breached the maxims of quantity and probably of manner.

Thus, the familiarity scale may fall under a more general convention that says, "hearers do not like to make new entities when old ones will do and that speakers, if they are cooperative, form their utterances so as to enable the hearer to make maximal use of the old entities" (Prince, 1981, pp. 245-246).

#### 4.4.1 Critique

Halliday's (1967c & elsewhere) systems of identification (Prince's wh-clefts) and predicated theme (Prince's it-clefts) are associated with the study of thematic construction rather than that of information structure. In this regard, there is again a difference in the literature, which results from conflating the systems of thematisation and information structure. Almost all literature that deals with the discoursal aspect of the cleft sentences would associate them with the system of information rather than of theme; this is why cleft sentences have been dealt with by Prince (1978) under information structure.

For his part, Halliday distinguishes between the type of prominence that the theme has in the two types of cleft sentences (Halliday, 1976c, p. 236). The identified theme (in wh-clefts) has a cognitive prominence; what is identified is made salient because it is claimed to be the only one that fulfils the conditions established by the identifier, as for example, in Halliday's well-known brewery illustration:

4-108 What we want is Watney's.

With identification, Halliday, as discussed above (cf. 3.6.3), has pointed out that a simple sentence like:

4-109 John saw the play.

is turned into an equative clause consisting, on the one hand, of a wh-form that nominalizes the side of the equation that is the identifier, and, on the other hand, of the element that is identified, as in:

4-110 What John saw was the play.

'What John saw' becomes the entire theme constituent which is nominalized by the wh-form. Thus, it is the equative structure, according to Halliday (1967c & elsewhere; cf. also 3.6.3), which specifies that one of the constituents has a thematic function. Either the identified or the identifier can occur in theme position, as in:

4-111 **THE PLAY** was what John saw. [not the movie]

In this respect, Halliday points out that "whichever of the two [identified or identifier] occurs in the first position, the whole of that element is thematic" (Halliday, 1967c, p. 226).

With Predicated theme (it-clefts), on the other hand, the prominence is thematic; the theme, and nothing else, is what the clause is about:

4-112 It is Watney's that we want.

The predicated theme (it-clefts; cf. 3.6.4.1), according to Halliday, "maps the function identifier onto that of theme, giving explicit prominence to the theme by exclusion" (Halliday, 1967c, p. 236). Thus, in the following example, Halliday claims that the thematic meaning is 'John and nobody else is the theme':

4-113a. John broke the window.

4-113b. It is John who broke the window.

Beside the type of prominence that differentiates wh-clefts from it-clefts, Halliday also identifies another aspect which is treated in thematic terms: wh-clefts can map the theme on either the identifier or the identified, the wh-clause and the focus in Prince's terms. These two main differences were also supported by Grimes (1975), who says that the difference between the it-clefts and the wh-clefts (pseudo-clefts in his terms) is that, in the former, the question part (Prince's that/who clause and Halliday's identified) is moved to the end of the construction after the answer part, and a dummy 'it/there' is left in its place to preserve the modal function (cf. 4.2).

However, this represents a basic inconsistency, since the theme is no longer in the initial position. Thus, I feel that it is more faithful to Halliday's overall theoretical approach to the study of theme to consider, along with Travnicsek (1962), that the theme is the non-cognitive copula 'it was John' (the copula plus the dummy 'it'), and that its function is to assert the existential, presentational relationship, as in 4-113b above. This, of course, is in keeping with Travnicsek's thematic explanation of the copula 'byl' (=it) or, 'there was or were', which, he emphasizes, "has only grammatical and no lexical meaning" (Travnicsek, 1962, p. 166; cf. 2.2.2). On the other hand, 'it' could be taken as theme by itself, since as already, indicated above, that Prince (1978) joins forces with Bolinger in assuming that 'it' is co-referential or 'cataphoric'. This position also receives some support from Halliday (1967c, p.238) when he says: "'it' and 'there' being the cataphoric forms coresponding to the definite and indefinite article."

Following Halliday, Prince would give thematic status to the predicated theme, but when it comes to the identified theme (wh-cleft), she is unwilling to spell it out explicitly, contrary to Halliday, when she says "possibly that which is most prominent in the consciousness is (usually?) the theme" (Prince, 1978, p. 898). She even calls the wh-clause a marked theme (cf. 4.4).

Hoyle (1983), like Halliday, sees the significance of the theme in wh-clefts as well, but, whereas Prince (1978) considers that the primary function of the wh-clause, as discussed above, is to present material in the wh-cleft as 'given', Hoyle, on the basis of transcription from civil trials, has observed that the speakers often use wh-expressions, such as 'what I said', 'what you are saying', 'what he is saying', etc., "to introduce something entirely new, to inject an opinion, or to disagree" (Hoyle, 1983, p. 11)<sup>36</sup>. 'What I think', on the other hand, can be used on a conciliatory form, to "introduce something put forward tentatively" (Hoyle, op. cit., p. 12); whereas 'what I am assuming', "tends to weaken the force of the statement" (Hoyle, 1983, pp. 12-13). In this respect, she concludes:

As an introducing element, the wh-phrase serves as the theme of the sentence. But the new information is not only new, it is somehow tentative. It may be . . . presented as if already unexceptionable, or it may be contradictory to what has come before or potentially controversial. A speaker, then, may use a wh-cleft to avoid doing something, making a new statement, making a direct accusation or making his own assessment of a situation (Hoyle, 1983, p. 13).

Gundel (1988) considers the it-cleft construction (cf. 3.6.4.1) as one of two major constructions in which the topic-comment construction is reversed, the other being the right-dislocated construction (cf. 3.6.4.2). The latter is defined by Gundel in almost the same terms as Halliday defines his substitutive theme. For Gundel, a right-dislocated construction occurs when "a constituent that refers to the topic [usually a full noun phrase] is adjoined [appears] to the right of a full sentence comment containing a co-referring expression [usually a pronoun]" (Gundel, 1988, p. 225)<sup>37</sup>, as in:

4-114 It is a great place, San Francisco.

4-115 I like him a lot, your uncle.

In it-clefts, however, with the construction that consists of 'it + Be + noun phrase (NP) + NP, "the first NP is focused [Prince's 1978 'stressed-focused type'], and the second noun phrase is 'a headless' relative clause that describes the topic, [thus] comment precedes topic" (Gundel, 1988, p. 226).

In an earlier article written in 1977, Gundel gives detailed information regarding three major issues: the it-cleft, the right dislocated construction, where the former is derived from the latter (pseudo-cleft, or wh-cleft, right dislocated constructions), and the source of the pronoun '*it*', which she argues is not, after all, 'a dummy pronoun' as most linguists believe, (except, of course, Bolinger, 1972), but rather a semantically referential pronoun like any other pronoun. As discussed above, Prince (1978), however, rejects Gundel's discussion of 1977 with regard to 'it' being a topic, although she agrees with Bolinger (1972) that 'it' is co-referential.

As for the last point, Gundel (1977 & 1988) believes that "whatever rule (of course, a generative one) produces sentences like 4-114 & 4-115 (if they are indeed derived by a rule at all) will produce sentences like 4-116 & 4-117 (below), where the subject of the pseudo-cleft (Prince's wh-cleft) sentences has been dislocated" (Gundel, 1977, p. 552)<sup>38</sup>:

4-116 It was an explosion, (what Bill heard.)

4-117 It was San Francisco, (the place) we spent our holiday.

Such constructions, I believe, provide a natural source for cleft constructions. Moreover, sentences like 4-116 & 4-117, without the elements in the parentheses, are hardly distinguishable from the cleft sentences.

It might be objected that it-cleft sentences have a different function than the right-dislocated pseudo-clefts (wh-clefts). I, believe, however, that the difference is merely a stylistic matter: right dislocated constructions are, in general, clearly more colloquial. Gundel (1977, pp. 552-553) in this regards reaches the following two main conclusions: firstly, the topic-comment order is identical for clefts (it-clefts) and right-dislocated constructions. In both cases the comment or new (a Praguean-held view) precedes the topic or old (presupposed information)<sup>39</sup>. Old information, in both constructions, is typically omitted if it is easily predictable from the context, as in:

4-118 A: I guess you are leaving for New York soon.

b: Yes, It's on Sunday (0). [0= ellipsis = that I'm leaving]

4-119 A: I guess Bill's sister will be here.

b: Yes, She is coming on Saturday, (0). [0= Bill's sister]

Secondly, Gundel points out that the question is not whether it-clefts have the same function as the right-dislocated sentences in general (an answer to the objection raised earlier), but whether it-clefts are interchangeable with corresponding right dislocated pseudo-clefts. Her answer to this inquiry is clearly positive, and I believe is the right



one.

Deriving it-cleft from right-dislocated sentences also provides a principled source for the subject 'it' of the it-clefts sentences. In particular, she claims that this 'it' is a pronominal reference to the topic at the end of the sentence. The assumption that the 'it' in the cleft sentences in languages is an ordinary pronoun, and not just a dummy subject is supported, as Gundel (1977 & 1988) indicates, by evidence from cleft sentences in languages like Russian, which, unlike English, does not have dummy subjects, indeed "probably it doesn't require the sentence to have subject at all" (Gundel, 1977, p. 553), as in:

4-120 Eto Ivana ja videl. [It was Evan I saw]

4-120a Pronoun + Ivan + Accusative I saw. [in Russian, cleft-sentences typically begin with a pronoun]

Gundel (1977) emphasizes the fact that not all languages are supposed to start their cleft sentences with a pronoun reference to the postposed topic, since the pronoun is easily recoverable, and in fact has a copy elsewhere in the sentence, and thus can be deleted. She does not, however, provide an example of these languages. Therefore, and based upon her analysis of Russian, she suggests strongly that 'it', in cleft sentences is not a dummy subject, but an ordinary co-referential pronoun, and that deriving clefts from right dislocated pseudo-clefts (wh-clefts) provides a natural explanation for the source of this pronoun.

What remains to be said is that Prince (1978) work on the distinction between the two types of cleft constructions bridges the gap between syntax and discourse. This work picks up where syntactic work leaves off, bringing a discoursal considerations to distinguish between the wh-cleft and the it-cleft.

#### 4.5 Dik

Dik's approach to functional grammar (FG) first appears in 1978 with the publication of his book *Functional Grammar*. His interest in functionalism, as far as language is concerned, is already seen in his earlier work (Dik 1968), and his FG is currently considered a serious attempt to provide an alternative to Chomsky's Transformational Grammar (TG)<sup>40</sup>. These two models are different, according to Dik, in many respects, although they are similar with respect of their 'descriptive

adequacy'<sup>41</sup>. They are also different in terms of their 'explanatory adequacy', that is, "with respect to the criteria which would allow one to determine which of the two descriptively adequate functional grammars is the better one" (Dik, 1978, [1981, p. 6]). For his part, Dik proposes three standards of explanatory adequacy in order to evaluate the validity of a functional grammatical approach; these are the pragmatic, the psychological and the typological.

As for typological adequacy, Dik believes that language universals are to be explained in terms of the constraints inherent to that particular language. Moreover, this requirement, according to him, must be capable of providing grammars for typologically different languages, and consequently account for the similarities and differences between languages. This requirement also entails the necessity of using data from a wide variety of languages both in the setting up and the testing of general linguistic hypotheses. In this respect, however, Dik has warned of two main dangers: (1) one cannot go deeply into the systems of widely divergent languages, as one can do when restricted oneself to one's native language, and, in this case, one has to rely on descriptions written from different points of view, and which are produced for different purposes. The second warning is that by restricting oneself to just one language (the native one), one is easily lead to "a biased view of the possibilities of languages, as the history of linguistics amply illustrates" (Dik, 1978, [1981, p.9]).

Psychological adequacy must account for the fact that rules underlying the language system, i.e. underlying the construction of linguistic expressions (the way speakers construct and form their expressions: the productions rules) are different from rules underlying the description of psychological structures, principles and strategies which determine the way in which linguistic expressions are perceived, interpreted, processed, stored, retrieved and produced (i.e. the addressee's comprehension models). According to Dik, grammar should be psychologically adequate, that is, it should not be incompatible with strongly validated psychological hypotheses about language processing. Thus, the difference between the linguistic and psychological complexities cannot be ascribed to some specified interfering factor\_\_ "then one should reconsider the grammar and see if it can be reformulated so as to correlate with the psychological findings, since, after all, "languages are instruments used by human beings with given psychological properties" (Dik, 1978, [1981, pp. 7-8]). Nevertheless, he points out that

one should be very careful when applying this principle, and that it must be subject to retention or rejection of hypotheses and theories. On accounting to the findings of psycholinguistic research, Dik (op. loc.) feels that "FG stands a fair chance of more closely approximating psychological adequacy than other theories of language do".

For Dik, pragmatic adequacy is the most salient feature of FG. It is generally achieved by analysing language as an instrument of verbal interaction. FG analyzes utterances, not as isolated sentences; rather it takes the whole communicative setting (Halliday's context of situation) in which these utterances are used. This is why Dik prefers an FG approach "which is compatible with what we know about verbal interaction to one which is not" (Dik, 1978, [1981], p. 6). In other words, FG is a grammar which reveals those properties of the linguistic expressions which are relevant to the manner in which they are used, and does this in such a way that they can be related to a description of the rules governing verbal interaction. Thus take a simple interaction, like:

- 4-121 A: Who is coming for dinner tonight?  
B: Peter.

Here, there is a lot involved in the pragmatics of this seemingly simple exchange. There are certain pragmatic rules that are specific to this type of exchange, and one should be able to connect these rules in a natural way with the functional description of the expressions as such. Thus, FG of English should describe questions like 4-121 in such a way that it is possible to account for the following facts in terms of description. The first fact has to do with the question part: it should be connected with specific presupposition like:

- 4-122 Someone is coming for dinner to night.

Secondly, The fact that this question is a request from the speaker to his addressee to supply him with a specification of the unknown entity represented by some one in the presupposition. Thirdly, the answer part can be interpreted, in such context, as an assertion to the effect that 'Peter is coming for dinner'.

In his model of FG, Dik specifies functional relations at three different and interrelated levels: (1) semantic (i.e. agent, goal, recipient, etc.), (2) syntactic (i.e. subject, object, etc.) and (3) pragmatic (i.e. theme, tail, topic and focus). Moreover, he identifies the differences between these three levels of function as follows:

Semantic functions specify the roles which the referents of the term

involved play within the 'state of affairs' designated by the predication in which they occur.

Syntactic functions specify the perspective from which that state of affairs is presented in the linguistic expression.

Pragmatic functions specify the information status of the constituents within the wider communicative setting (Dik, 1978, [1981, p. 13]).

On the basis of this definition, Dik (op. loc.) develops the view that the final meaningful content of any linguistic expression is "co-determined by functions from each of the three functional levels", and like Halliday, he believes that the linguistic expression will **EQUALLY** be co-determined by these three levels of function" (Dik, 1978, [1981, p. 14]) [my emphasis].

Throughout his model, Dik takes pragmatics as "the all-encompassing framework within which semantic and syntax must be studied"(Dik, 1980, p. 2)<sup>42</sup>. By the same token, he considers semantics 'subservient' to pragmatics and syntax subservient to semantics. This model also assigns functions at each of these three levels. At the semantic level, as already hinted, the starting point is that, there is a set of rules for 'predicate construction'; at the next level, there are rules that 'linearize' the semantic relations into functionally-oriented syntax. In the final 'pass', the output of the syntactic rules is 'reread' in terms of pragmatic functions, which "specify the information status of the constituents in question, within a particular setting in which they are used" (Dik, 1978, [1981, p. 19]). Each level of Dik's FG has rules that can affect the output of the other layers, but in general, the movement of the output is from the semantics to the pragmatics via the syntax.

In his FG model, Dik identifies four pragmatic functions; two of which, theme and tail, he calls 'external', and the other two, topic and focus, he calls 'internal'. For him external means that they are 'outside' the main clause predication structure, whereas internal means that they lie within that structure. In this respect he defines these four pragmatic functions as follows:

. . . theme specifies the universe of discourse with respect to which the subsequent predication is presented as relevant.

. . . tail presents, as an 'afterthought' to the predication, information meant to clarify or modify it.

. . . topic presents the entity 'about' which the predication predicates

something in the given setting [context of situation].

... focus presents what is the most important salient information in the given setting (Dik, 1978, [1981, p. 19]) [my ellipsis].

At the pragmatic level, Dik considers these functions as universally connected with special positions before, after, and inside the clause; they are characterized by means of special patterns of stress and intonation. These constituents' ordering patterns are also subject to the tendency for information to build up in complexity as it moves towards the end of the clause. These patterns are summarized in what he calls "Language-Independent Preferred Order of Constituent" (LIPOC) which, Dik proposes, looks like,

4-123 P2, P1 (V) S (V) O ,P3

where P2 stands for the theme, P1 for the topic and P3 for the tail.

In this scheme, Dik points out that the S & O stand for the neutral or the unmarked position of subject and object. The V position indicate the possible position of (finite and non-finite) verb and the commas stand for breaks in the intonation. For Dik, P1 position is particularly important; it is either taken by elements from 'special positions' used for special categories of constituents (e.g. question words), or used for constituents with topic or focus functions. P2, the theme position, is the 'left-dislocation position' and P3 is the 'right-dislocation position'.

Dik also suggests that languages may have different functional patterns for main and for subordinate clauses. With regard to the latter, he suggests, for example, that the P1 position could be occupied by many types of constituents (e.g. subordinates, relative pronouns, question words, etc.), to the degree that there is "little room left for other types of constituents to be fronted to that position" (Dik, 1978, [1981, p. 21]). On the other hand, P1 position in main clauses, is, in general, 'open' for the positioning of constituents with special pragmatic functions of topic and focus.

In what follows, there will be a brief discussion of each of Dik's four major pragmatic functions and how these functions determine his proposed LIPOC. Before going into this, I find it appropriate to discuss, from Dik's point of view, the nature of pragmatic functions in his FG model.

#### **4.5.1 The Nature of the Pragmatic Functions**

By pragmatic functions, Dik understands as "functions which specify the information status of the constituents involved within the wider communicative setting [context of situation] in which they occur" (Dik, 1978, [1981, p. 128]). He also believes that the communicative setting is not 'objectively' given to the participants in a process of verbal interaction, but consists, in fact, of what the speaker and the addressee know, believe or assume to be true when producing or interpreting some linguistic expression. He categorizes the full body of knowledge and assumptions available to a speaker or addressee into three major components:

1. Long-term information concerning the world and other possible worlds. (general information).
2. Information derived from what interactions the participants perceive take place (situational information).
3. Information derived from the linguistic expressions which have been exchanged before or after any given moment (contextual information).

Dik (1978, [1981, p. 128]), in turn, divides this information in terms of assumptions the speaker and the addressee have into information that is common (shared information), information only available to the speaker and information only available to the addressee. Moreover, he also stresses the fact that the primary functions of communication is two-fold: firstly, to effect changes in the pragmatic information of the other participant, either by adding new information to his body of beliefs or by substituting some portions of this body; secondly, to make the addressee aware of a piece of information, which he did possess, but was not thinking about at that given moment. In order to avoid a break down in the communication process between two participants, it is essential that each one of them has a reasonable idea about which part of information is shared between them and which part is not. Dik believes that this is not a 'drawback' within a functional approach; on the contrary, it is "an advantage, since it will help us achieve pragmatic adequacy . . . in our description of linguistic expressions" (Dik, 1978, [1981, p. 129]).

#### **4.5.1.1 Theme**

As mentioned earlier, Dik points out that the pragmatic status of the function

theme is to be interpreted as a constituent which "represents a domain for the universe of discourse with respect to which it is relevant to pronounce the following predication" (Dik, 1978, [1981, p. 130]). Besides, he interprets it as a left-dislocated constituent and not as integral part of the 'predication proper', and is merely connected with it by relations of a pragmatic character. Thus in sentences as:

4-124 That guy, is he a friend of yours?

4-125 That trunk, put it in the car!

4-126 As for the students, they won't be invited,

each of the underlined items or constituents is theme, in Dik's formulation, and represents an entity or a set of entities that the subsequent predication is going to 'bear upon'. In each, one can understand that the structure of linguistic expressions within a theme is expressible in terms of the following strategy: 'here is something with respect to which I am going to produce a predication (e.g. the students in 4-126), and here is the predication (e.g. they won't be invited)'. This is similar to the explanation which Halliday (1967c) provides for the strategy the speaker adopts in introducing the reference theme (cf. 3.6.4.3).

The most important property of theme in Dik's formulation is, as already mentioned, that, in certain crucial cases, it cannot be regarded as being part of predication. Thus sentences like,

4-127 Is that guy a friend of yours?

4-128 Put that trunk in the car!

4-129 The students won't be invited.

can be considered as alternative realization of an underlying predication. But this is impossible, however, with constructions such as:

4-130 As for the students, adolescents almost never have any sense.

4-131 As for Paris, the Eiffel Tower is really spectacular.

For such sentences there is no natural 'source' of the theme within the predication that follows it, although that predication, according to Dik (1978, [1981, p. 133]), "bears on the theme on one way or another".

Dik's descriptive problem lies in the fact that certain sentences beginning with the theme could be thought of as being 'extracted' from the predication following it. He calls this method, by which theme is extracted, the "extraction analysis". This method assigns the theme to one of the predication's constituents, and places it in the left-dislocated position. This approach, however, is rejected by Dik because it does

not account for those sentences in which themes cannot be thought of as originating in any antecedently given predication. In order to account for sentences of two kinds of theme (the one originating from the predication and the one that does not), Dik prefers to use a uniform treatment of all sentence types. In this uniform treatment, he takes the theme as always placed 'outside' the performative modality of the subsequent predication. This means that the predication following the theme can have the full range of performative modalities (such as declarative, imperative, interrogative) as in the examples 4-126, 127, 128 above.

Dik (1978, [1981, pp. 134-135]) presents a four-points argument in support of this claim. First, if there is an explicit predicative verb in the predication, the theme is not usually dominated by the performative verb. Thus one can have sentences of the following form:

4-132 As for the students, I promise you that they won't be invited.

Second, a fact that would indicate the independence of the theme is that it can itself have interrogative modality, as in:

4-133 My brother? I haven't seen him for years.

Here, assuming that it is correct to assign the function theme to 'my brother' (which I doubt to be correct, on the ground that these are better regarded as two [utterances] sentences, the first of which is verbless), one would have great difficulty in accounting for the interrogative modality in terms of the extraction analysis; sentences like 4-133 would be less troublesome in an approach along the lines of Dik's, that is being justified here, where the theme is outside the modality of the predication. Third, if theme were extracted from the predication, one would expect to have the semantic and the syntactic functions, and consequently the corresponding marking of its source constituent within the predication. But for a theme produced in 'partial' independence of the subsequent predication, this will not be necessarily be the case. Moreover, Dik (1978, [1981, p. 135]) points out that there are several languages in which "a left-dislocated theme constituent may not have the marking which it would have if it occurred within a predication. Rather, it will necessarily have a sort of 'absolute' form" characterized by the most unmarked case (typically the nominative), as in:

4-134 That man, we gave the book to him yesterday.

4-135 To that man, we gave the book to him yesterday.

Fourth, in terms of the speaker's behaviour, it seems, as Dik (op. loc.) notes, "that a



speaker will often produce a theme before he has a clear idea of what sort of predication he is going to produce about it". Thus it is quite natural to find a hesitation phenomenon between the theme and the predication, as in:

4-136 As for the students, let me see . . .

4-137 As for the students, mmm, I don't know really . . .

4-138 As for the students, ehm, let me think . . .

These hesitation phenomena would be difficult to explain under the assumption that theme is extracted from antecedently completely developed predications.

To solve this descriptive problem, Dik suggests that the relationship between theme and predication cannot in all cases be expressed in simple semantic or syntactic terms. This is only possible in cases in which the theme re-appears in the form of a pronominal element within the predication, since, in these cases, one can say that the term functioning as theme must be such that it could also appear in the place of the pronominal element, that is, "it must conform to the selection restrictions imposed on the argument position marked by a pronominal element within the predication (Dik, 1978, [1981, p. 137]), in which, sentences like the one below can be accounted for in this way:

4-139 As for my friend John, he is crazy about bronze statues.

This method, however, is not feasible for cases in which theme is structurally independent of the predication. Nevertheless, even in the cases mentioned above, there is a restriction on the possible theme-predication combinations. To illustrate this point, Dik quotes examples and comments made on them from Ross (1970, p. 231, note 20)<sup>43</sup>, who made some pertinent remarks on examples like 4-131 (repeated here) above:

4-131 As for Paris, the Eiffel Tower is really spectacular.

4-140 As for Albuquerque, the Eiffel Tower is really spectacular.

Ross (1970) has noted that there must be some connection between the theme and the predication, and thus he has pointed out that it is doubtful whether this connection can be established in purely linguistic (i.e. semantic and syntactic terms) because, as example 4-131 shows, the connection appears to be based on such 'real-world knowledge' in the fact that the Eiffel tower is in 'Paris', and not in 'Albuquerque'<sup>44</sup>. Ross tallies with that of Dik regarding theme as a pragmatic rather than a semantic function, and, as a pragmatic function, theme is "co-dependent upon the

pragmatic information available to the speaker and the addressee" (Dik, 1978, [1981, p.137]). Thus the connection between theme and predication can be established in pragmatic terms, and a possible candidate might be the pragmatic function of Grice's (1975) 'maxim of relevance' (be relevant). To specify this maxim in terms of theme and predication, Dik suggests the following condition of the theme-predication combination:

For any pair of theme (T) and predication (P) to make sense, it must be **RELEVANT** to pronounce P with respect to T. (Dik, 1978, [1981, p. 138]) (my emphasis).

Although, Dik believes that Grice's relation of relevance is not 'well-defined', it will give, in combination with the Dik's condition, an intuitively first approximation of the possible relationships between theme and predication. But he also points out that, as far as pragmatic rules are concerned, the condition in the above quotation is a matter of "more-or-less rather than all-or-none" (op. loc.), simply because judgment of relevance will vary with the 'full array' of speaker's and addressee's pragmatic information. Thus, for example, if some one believes that Albuquerque has its own Eiffel Tower, it will be fully acceptable. Furthermore, since relevance concerns a basic communicative requirement of communication, one may expect this relation to have quite general cross-linguistic applicability.

Dik wraps up his discussion of theme by making the following three notes:

1. He notes that what he calls theme is very often referred to by other linguists as 'topic'. In this respect, he does not follow such usages. His justification for not doing so is that he wants to distinguish the pragmatic function of theme, which for him operates outside the main predication of the clause or the sentence, in contrast with that of topic which operates inside the predication. He also indicates that he does not believe that his interpretation of the theme differs from what others understand by topic. In this respect, he quotes the definition of topic as spelled out by Barry (1975)<sup>45</sup>:

. . . topic has the function of specifying the relevant universe of discourse (frame of reference, domain of referentiability) of its comment; the range of things with respect to which it makes sense to assert that comment (quoted by Dik, 1978, [1981, p. 140]).

2. Dik also believes that all languages have some sort of theme construction, but that some differ from others in the extent to which they make use of this construction as the 'normal' way of producing linguistic expressions. In this regard, Dik maintains that

languages can be divided into two main categories as far as the use of the theme (in this sense) is concerned. In the first category, the theme may be evaluated as a "substandard or sloppy way of expressing oneself"; whereas, in the second category, "it might have been 'gramaticalized' to the extent it becomes the unmarked way of producing sentences" (Dik, 1978, [1981, p. 140]).

3. Dik also notes that languages may differ in their treatment of the variables marking open-term positions: some tend to always express these by means of pronominal elements, while others leave them unexpressed in different conditions. He illustrates this from English by the following:

- 4-141 That man, I hate him. [pronominal expression]
- 4-142 That man, I hate (0). [ 0= unexpressed pronoun]
- 4-143 That man I hate.

4-143, although quite close to the construction of 4-142, is not treated by Dik as consisting of theme and an open predication. Contrary to Halliday's formulation of 4-143 as a 'marked theme'(cf. 3.6.2), Dik emphasizes that 4-143 is merely "a construction in which the **OBJECT** of the predication has been brought to an initial position (Dik, 1978, [1981, p. 141]) [my emphasis].

#### 4.5.1.2 Topic

Unlike other approaches to pragmatic functions, Dik's distinguishes between theme and topic. In order to justify this distinction, he draws attention to the fact that one linguistic expression may have both a theme and a topic, but these need not to be identical to each other, as in example 4-133 above (repeated here):

- 4-133 As for Paris, the Eiffel Tower is really spectacular.

Here, the theme 'Paris' sets the scene (a reminder of Svoboda 1981, and Grimes 1975), and specifies the domain of the universe of discourse with respect to which the predication following it is going to represent some 'relevant' information. On the other hand, the predication itself is not about 'Paris', but about the 'Eiffel Tower', that is to say, the constituent 'the Eiffel tower' has the topic function within the predication. In other word, in the predication, one says something about the topic (the Eiffel Tower), and at the same time, saying something about the topic is relevant with respect to the theme 'Paris'.

Thus, Dik believes that in 4-133, the theme and the topic do not coincide, and therefore, they must be functionally differentiated. But this differentiation, according to him, is less evident in cases in which there is more direct, pronominally marked relationship between the theme and the topic in sentences like 4-141 (repeated below):

4-141 That man, I hate him.

Here, Dik stipulates that the theme 'that man' and the topic 'him' may be co-referential (which they are, but only in terms of the way he looks at theme and topic). He also suggests that information-wise, this seems quite reasonable: "the theme sets the stage for the predication to make sense" (Dik, 1978, [1981, p. 142]); the predication is about the topic. Thus, for the predication to make sense with respect to the theme, there must be some sort of specific relation between the two.

Dik's argument for the distinction between topic and theme and the former being part of the predication is based upon the following facts listed by Dik (1978, [1981, p. 142]):

1. If theme (in his formulation, of course) is deleted from any construction, the remaining predication is still complete; whereas if topic is deleted from a construction, the remainder does not form a complete predication.
2. Topic must conform to the selection restriction imposed on its position within the predication; whereas theme will only conform to these restrictions when it is coreferential with the topic.
3. Theme is usually presented in an 'absolute form' without any marking of semantic and syntactic functions; whereas topic often carries the markings appropriate to its semantic and syntactic functions within the predication unless there are some topic markers, like 'ga' and 'wa' in Japanese, which neutralize the syntactic and semantic functions respectively.

In this respect, Dik also points out that although subject and topic usually coincide, the sort of priority defined by topic function (priority with respect to how the 'state of affairs' is presented, and from whose point of view) is not identical with the sort of priority defined by the theme function (priority with respect to 'what the predication is about' given the pragmatic information of the speaker and addressee). According to Dik, "any item of a predication, regardless of its semantic and syntactic function, may qualify for topic function, given the appropriate pragmatic conditions.

Thus, in a context defined by a question like 4-144, each of the underlined constituents in the answers will be assigned topic functions:

- 4-144 What about the Eiffel Tower?
- 4-145a The Eiffel Tower is really spectacular.
- 4-145b I rather like the Eiffel Tower.
- 4-145c On the Eiffel Tower, I once had lunch.
- 4-145d We were going to the Eiffel Tower.

As for the possibility that some clauses have two topics, Dik seems not to be inclined to commit himself to such a belief saying that this needs further investigation and study. In principle, however, he is in favour of assigning one topic per predication, especially for those languages which pay special attention to the treatment of topic constituent in terms of marking or constituent order (word order).

#### 4.5.1.2.1 Discourse Topic

Dik (1989, p. 226)<sup>46</sup> defines the nature of discourse topic in the following terms: "a discourse topic [D-topic], taken in a wide sense of coherent text (a story, a monologue, a dialogue, a lecture, etc.) is 'about' certain entities". In this sense, one may think of discourse as containing 'a topic store' which is empty at the beginning of the discourse (unless the topic has been fixed in advance, as in a meeting or a lecture), and which is gradually being filled with discourse topics (D-topics) as these are introduced into the discourse. The latter case fits in perfectly the Arabic proverb: "al-ḥadīṭu du šujūn" (discourse is versatile). Some D-topics will be 'short-lived', and disappear quickly, while others will be more pervasive and kept a live all through the discourse.

In discussing D-topics, Dik (1989, p. 268) poses four main questions, which he answers during his discussion of the issue. These questions, pertaining mainly to the question of 'topicality strategies' available to a language, are:

1. How is a new topic first introduced into the discourse?
2. How is a D-topic maintained, kept alive as a given topic?
3. What kind of sub-topics may be associated with a given topic?
4. What kind of strategies exist for re-introducing a given topic as a resumed topic in discourse?

In answering the first question, Dik proposes different types of constructions for

introducing a new topic into the discourse. He believes that these different types show a high degree of uniformity across languages. The first type of construction he proposes is the use of an explicit meta-linguistic statement about what is going to be the topic of the following piece of discourse, as in:

4-146 I am going to tell you a story about an elephant called Jumbo.

where, the object position (Danes' 1974 rhematic position; cf. 2.4) is often used for the introduction of new topics. When the subject position is used (The unmarked thematic position of Halliday 1967c & elsewhere), however, Dik points out to the frequent use of existential or locative-existential constructions, as in:

4-147 Once upon a time, there was an elephant called Jumbo.

Another common strategy, proposed by Dik, for introducing new topics is through predicates which, in some way or other, designate a form of "appearing on the scene" (a reminder of Firbas's rhematic status of elements appearing into the scene: see section 2.3.2), as in:

4-148 Suddenly, right before our very eyes, there appeared a huge elephant.

In the above terms, the topic that is first introduced into discourse (the scene or the stage), takes an indefinite term (a rhematic status in the Prague linguist's formulation). This is, of course appropriate, in terms of the analyses of Prince (1981) and Chafe (1976), in situations where the speaker has no reason to assume that the addressee is aware of its identity. For Dik, however, it is not a necessary property of new topics; even when the speaker has no reason to assume that the identity of the new topic is known to the addressee, he may well use a definite term to introduce it, as in:

4-149 Yesterday in the bus, I met your sister Mary.

4-150 Mind you, there is the money issue. We have to reckon with that.

4-151 Do you know who was there as well? Our very own prime minister!

In this respect, Dik suggests that new topics combine properties from the 'dimensions of both topicality and focality': "they are topical in that they introduce a **TOPICAL ENTITY** into the discourse, and they are focal in that they **INTRODUCE** the entity into the discourse" (Dik, 1989, p. 269) [original emphasis]. Moreover, Dik believes that these properties are displayed across languages, in that there is relatively a strong preference for these new topics to be introduced in relatively a later position in the clause. In languages which normally place a subject in initial positions, new topics subjects take a later position, and sometimes occurs at the very end of the clause.

Many languages, for example, have a characteristic opposition between:

4-152 The man [given topic] was in the house.

versus:

4-152a In the house was a man [new topic].

4-152a is a reminder of the well-known Egyptian film entitled:

4-153 fi bayti- nā rajul-un  
in house (gen.)-our a man-(nom.)  
(There is) a man in our house.

where the rest of the film (D-topic) is about the heroic actions 'that man' has carried out during the 'tripartite aggression' on the Suez Canal in 1956.

As for the third strategy for introducing new topics into discourse, Dik proposes what he calls "presentative" constructions, in which an adverb or a dummy pronoun occupies the subject position in the clause, as in:

4-154 On the horizon, there appeared a car.

In answering the second question which pertains to maintaining D-topic, once it is introduced into discourse, Dik suggests that, in order to keep the D-topic 'alive' as long as it is needed in the discourse, references to that topic must repeatedly be made in subsequent predications. These references will create a sort of 'topic chain' through the relevant parts of discourse. If that chain is broken, as a result of introducing some other topics, or because the last reference to the topic in question is too far removed<sup>47</sup>, the D-topic may have to be re-established, or 'revived' as it were, in the form of a 'resumed topic'.

Strategies for topic maintenance have been described by other linguists in terms of "identification spans" (Grimes, 1975) and topic continuity. Grimes establishes a scale of strength for the identification of the referential elements in his identification span. This rank scale of the strength of reference material, from top to bottom, starts with the proper names as the most explicit reference followed by explicit description of the referent, to common nouns, to nouns used generically, to pronouns and on the bottom of the scale, the implicit reference or the reference without identification (Givon's as well as Dik's 0 [zero] anaphora)<sup>48</sup>. In this respect, Dik points out that "the intuitions behind these notions are basically the same: speakers apply strategies aimed at maintaining a given topic as long as it is relevant to communication" (Dik, 1989, p. 271). Languages, in general, provide various grammatical means for signalling

that one is still talking about the same topic. These means include the following:

1. **Anaphoric Reference.** According to Dik, a given topic may be maintained through repeated anaphoric reference in subsequent predications. Anaphoric reference may take different forms (see note 29 above) as exemplified by Dik's 'invented example':

4-155 Yesterday I got a phone call from the tax inspector [new topic]. He [pronoun] /the man [generic noun]/the joker [descriptive epithet] told me to come to his [possessive pronoun] office, and he [pronoun]/0 [0=anaphora] gave me the impression that I was in for some trouble.

By using the anaphoric devices underlined in the above piece of discourse, the D-topic is kept alive for further references. In this respect, Grimes has suggested that these types of anaphoric references may be ordered on a scale from stronger (more explicit) to the weaker (less explicit or rather implicit: see note 30 above) anaphora, and uses his scale in defining his notion of identification span: ". . . a series of identifications of the same participant . . . in which no identification is stronger than the one before it" (Grimes, 1975, p. 92) [my ellipsis]. According to this view, when 4-155 is continued with a stronger anaphoric reference like:

4-156 Now, this inspector happens to be a good friend of my sister.

this would by definition, according to Grimes (1975), constitute the beginning of a new identification span.

By the same token, Dik (1989) also believes that the stronger the anaphoric expression, may also be a way of returning to a given topic after another 'given topic' as has been mentioned.

2. **Syntactic Parallelism.** In certain languages, the maintenance of given topic through discourse requires that it reappears in similar syntactic positions in the subsequent predications. In such languages, the topic may be formed by explicitly introducing a new topic, and then maintaining it by anaphoric reference through a whole series of clauses, all commenting on the same topic (a reminder of Danes's 1974 thematic progression scheme of a continuous theme; cf. 2.4).

In answering the third question, which pertains to the type of sub-topics that may be associated with the main D-topic, Dik follows in the steps of Prince (1981) who subsumes what Dik calls sub-topic under her notion of inferrable antecedents or referents. This is said because Dik treats these types of sub-topics as 'entities' which may be inferrable from the newly introduced topic, and which are based on one's



knowledge of what is normally the case in the outside world. Even the examples Dik provides to illustrate and support his argument are similar to those given by Prince (1981) (cf. 4.4). Compare the following:

4-157 John gave a party, but the music was awful. (Dik 1989)

4-158 I got on a bus; the driver was drunk. (Prince, 1981)

In both examples, it is inferrable, from the knowledge of the world, each 'bus' has 'a driver' and every 'party' will have some 'music'. Thus a sub-topic, to Dik, may be defined as what may be legitimately inferred from a given topic on the basis of one's knowledge of what is normally the case in the world. To further support his view point in this regard, Dik also quotes what Hannay, who formulates the given topic relation with that of the sub-topics, in this regard says:

If an entity X has been activated in the given setting [context of situation], then the speaker may present an entity Y as a sub-topic entity, if  $X \text{ R } Y$ , where R is a relationship of inference (Hannay, 1985, p. 53)<sup>49</sup> [original emphasis].

As for the R relation, Hannay (op. loc.) says: "R= part of, member of, subset of, instance of, copy of, aspect of, opposite of, projection of, associated with, . . . " [original ellipsis].

Moreover, Dik (1989) also points out that the given topic and sub-topic relation works both ways: if an entity is connected to a given topic through any of the R relations, it may be treated a sub-topic in further discourse; on the other hand, if some entity is treated as a sub-topic, the interpreter will assume that there is some R relation involved, even where this is not immediately apparent, as in the following example:

4-159 Patience walked into a room. The chandeliers burned brightly.

Clearly, when a 'room' is introduced in the discourse, the speaker can hardly be assumed to be able to infer 'chandeliers' as a potential sub-topic. Rather, he speculates on the addressee's ability to reconstruct the link between the chandeliers and the room after the latter has been mentioned. In this respect, it seems that Dik also draws heavily on Clark and Haviland (1974<sup>50</sup>), especially when they argue that languages users are able to building 'bridging assumption' in order to connect one entity to another. Indeed Clark and Haviland's (1974) two well-known and much-quoted examples with regard to the issue at hand are also quoted by Dik (1989), to demonstrate by psycholinguistic means, that the construction of such bridging assumption takes time:

4-160 Mary got some beer from the car. The beer was warm.

4-161 Mary got some picnic supplies from the car. The beer was warm.

Here, Clark and Haviland has pointed out that it took their subjects a longer time to interpret 4-161 than to interpret 4-160; the reason is attributed to the fact that it took them longer time because they have to build a 'bridge' in order to connect 'the beer' with 'the picnic supplies'.

In answering the fourth question, which pertains to re-introducing a given topic to discourse, which has not been mentioned for sometime, Dik suggests that a shift will be required in order to go back to that D-topic. This shift, however, will require a strategy by which the D-topic is brought back onto the 'stage of discourse'. Such a strategy will typically consist of the following steps:

- (i) some indication that a shift is made from one given topic to another,
- (ii) a strong form of anaphoric reference ('strong' in the sense of Grimes 1975 and (iii) an explicit or implicit indication of the fact that the entity has been mentioned before (Dik, 1989, p. 277).

To illustrate the 3-point strategy, Dik provides the following example:

4-162 John had a brother Peter and a sister Mary. Peter . . . [considerable discussion of Peter]. **NOW, MARY, JOHN'S SISTER MARY**, who I mentioned before  
. . . .

In 4-162, 'now' signals a change in topic (point i), 'John's sister Mary', is a strong anaphoric reference (point ii) and 'who I mentioned before' is the explicit reference to the fact that the entity was introduced before (point iii).

#### 4.5.1.3 Focus

Dik (1978 [1981] & 1989) has defined focal information in a linguistic expression as "that information which is relatively the most important or salient in the given communicative setting, and considered by S [the speaker] to be the most essential for A [the addressee] to integrate into his pragmatic information" (Dik, 1989, p. 277). Furthermore, as already indicated above, the focal information will thus concern the changes that the speaker wishes to bring about in the pragmatic information of the addressee, either by 'adding' a new piece of information or by replacing an existing one. In either case, there must be a difference between the pragmatic information of the speaker and his picture of the addressee's pragmatic information. Typically, therefore, the focal information in a linguistic expression pertains to the

difference between the speaker's pragmatic information and what he assumes of the pragmatic information of the addressee. Thus, the focal information is presented as being 'new' to the addressee. It may also include information already assumed to be available to the addressee, but focused on by virtue of some implicit or explicit contrast, as in:

4-163 John and Bill came to see me. **JOHN** was **NICE**, but **BILL** was rather **BORing**. Here, the constituents 'Bill and John' are emphasized, although they have already been introduced and may thus be assumed to be given topics to the addressee. The focusing, here, is due the contrast between the two 'parallel' statements about 'John' and 'Bill'. In this respect, Dik was not against the inclination to identify focal information with 'new' when he says: "we should . . . not all too easily identify focus with information new to the addressee" (Dik, 1989, p. 278) [my ellipsis].

The best, and probably, the easiest way to illustrate the operation of focus assignment is with the wh-questions and their answers, as in:

4-164 X: **WHERE** is John going?  
Y(a): John is going **TO THE MARKET**.  
Y(b): **TO THE MARKET**.

In the question part of this example, X signals that he presumes that 'John' is going somewhere, and he doesn't know where, but at the same time, he presumes that Y knows, and that is why X asks Y and wishes that Y should tell him where 'John is going'. For his part, Dik likens the question to an 'open form' of the following type:

4-165 John is going to -----.  
Please fill in the space!

In other words, the wh-question is a means of signalling that X (the speaker) has some 'gap' in his information; therefore, requesting Y (the addressee) to fill in this gap. Thus the wh-element (where) is the element which signals and identifies the gap in X's information, and thus 'where' pertains to the presumed difference between X and Y pragmatic information. Therefore, the Wh-element is the focal element in the question.

As for the answer part in 4-164, Y, in turn, knows through X's question that there is a gap in X's pragmatic information, and that gap needs to be filled with the required information. If Y possesses the required information, and is prepared to share it with X, he may answer either by (a) or (b) of 4-164. In either case, it is the constituent 'to the market' which contains 'the focal information' and may assigned the

focal function. In this respect, Dik comes to the conclusion that:

a question word is an open predication in X, presented with interrogative illocution, and signalling a request for S [the speaker] to A [the addressee] to fill in the gap in the open position, marked by the question, with appropriate information (Dik, 1989, p. 281).

Dik (op. loc.) categorizes the focus function in accordance with two main parameters: (1) the scope of the focus functions, i.e., the question of what part of the underlying clause structure is placed in focus, and (2) 'the communicative point' of focusing, i.e., the question of what pragmatic reasons underlie the assignment of focus to the relevant part of the underlying clause structure.

As for the first parameter, focus may be assigned to any part of the underlying clause structure, as shown in the following diagram:




Figure 4-3 (Adapted from Dik, 1989, p. 281)

When focus, however, is distinguished on the basis of communicative point, the following diagram is suggested:




Figure 4-4 (Adapted from Dik, 1989, p. 282)

What remains to be illustrated is the four sub-types of the counter-presupposed focus which, in conjunctions with the others that have been exemplified, can be shown in the following table:

Type of Focus	Addressee's Pragmatic Information	Type of New Information	Expression Type
(i) Completive	-----	X	X!
(ii) Replacing	X	Y	Not X, but Y!
(iii) Expanding	X	X + Y	Also Y!
(iv) Restricting	X + Y	X	Only X!
(v) Selecting	X (or) Y	X	X!

(Table 4-1: Adapted from Dik, 1989, p. 283)

Although this table illustrates only cases of focus with term scope of figure 4-3, Dik (1989, p. 284) points out that other parts of the predication can have the same sub-types, i.e., the focus on the predicate, for which he provides more illustrative examples<sup>51</sup>.

#### 4.5.1.4 Tail

According to Dik (1978, [1981, p.153]), the pragmatic functions of the tail characterizes the constituent as an "after-thought" to the main predication, and presents information that is meant to "clarify" or "modify" the predication. As is the case of theme, Dik believes that tail is not part of the main predication, and is assigned to material which is produced 'outside' of the 'predication-proper'. Although both operate outside the clause's main predication, theme and tail operate in quite different ways. Apart from the difference of functionality, it has been noticed above that their positions in relation to the clause are different: the theme occupies the left-most side of the clause, and the tail the right-most side; for this reason the former is sometimes called left-dislocated and the latter the right-dislocated position. Moreover, like the theme, the tail is usually separated from the clause main predication by what Dik calls the "comma-intonation", as in the following examples (tail is underlined):

4-166 He is a nice chap, your brother.

4-167 I didn't like it very much, that book of yours.

4-168 I like John very much, your brother I mean.

4-169 John gave the book to a girl, in the library.

As in the case of theme, Dik raises the question of whether the constituents that form the tail construction can be regraded as being 'extracted' from the predication or whether they are partially independent. In the above examples, there is a convincing argument in both directions. On the one hand, in 4-166, it would be absolutely odd for the speaker to first produce 'he is a nice chap' without knowing who he is. In terms of the speaker's behaviour, one would assume, as Halliday (1967c) has already done with regard to substitution (cf. 3.6.4.2), that something like the following is the case here: 'let me tell you something about him (assuming that the speaker presumes that the hearer knows whom he is talking about when he says: 'he is a nice chap'; the speaker, then, realizes that he must give more specification other than 'he', and he does that as

a tail to the predication). In this respect, the speaker assumes that the predication which he expresses may be more fully specified than is recoverable from the expression he uses, hence he adds the tail 'your brother'. On the other, in 4-168 it does not seem to be necessary to assume that at the moment the speaker produces the word 'John', the underlying term must be fully specified as 'your brother John': it could be any other 'John'. Thus the tail in this case (4-168) may add information which was not contained in the original predication. The same thing also applies to 4-169, where the prepositional phrase 'in the library' could be 'anywhere else' (e.g., in the classroom, in my office, etc.). This also means that new information is added to the predication as a form of a 'second thought' to the preceding predication. In this respect, Dik (1978, [1981, p. 154]) comes to the conclusion that "tail constituents can be produced outside, and in part independently of, the preceding predication". Even in the former case, where the general condition on possible tails is that they should be interpreted as a further specification or modification of (part of) the predication, modification may even include 'correction', as in:

4-170 John won't even be invited, eh . . . Bill I mean.

Here again, it shows that the tail need not be a further 'spelling out' of information already contained in the predication.

Unlike theme, which can be chosen independently of the following predication and where the predication is adjusted to the theme rather than the other way round, tail, is exactly the opposite, since its constituent must in one way or another 'specify' or 'modify' the preceding predication. Thus, the question of dependency of these two pragmatic functions runs from left to right: from theme, to predication to tail. This explains the fact that the partial independence of the tail, as in examples like 4-168, 169 & 170 above, does not lie in the possibility of choosing it in complete independence of the predication, "but, [rather], in the fact that it does not necessarily contain a further 'spelling out' of material already contained in the predication" (Dik, 1978, [1981, 155]). Dik (op. loc.) also notes another difference between the relation between theme and predication on the one hand and that of tail and predication on the other. Whereas, as already hinted above, the theme can be produced in an 'absolute form'<sup>52</sup>, the relation between the predication and tail is signalled by the fact that in some languages the tail cannot be so produced, as in the following to examples:

4-171 We gave the book to him yesterday, to your brother.

4-172 We gave the book to him yesterday, your brother [absolute form: not accepted by Dik. I believe, however, that it could be accepted if the main stress is placed on 'yesterday'].

Again, here, Dik (op. loc.) comes to another conclusion: "tails which give further specifications of the constituent in the predication must have a corresponding marking". This means that tails must have the same semantic and (possibly) syntactic functions as the term marked by the pronoun in the preceding predication. This probably explains why Dik rejects 4-172, because the tail, being absolute, does not function syntactically as an object of a preposition, since its pronominal form in the main clause is functioning in this way.

With regard to its universal aspect among languages, Dik points out that, like theme, tail could either be highly marked, and evaluated as 'ungrammatical' in some languages, or it could be a quite normal way of producing linguistic expressions. Dik illustrates this by examples from English and French:

4-173 John, he gave it to Peter, your book.

4-174 Jean, il le donne a Pierre, ton livre.

Here, according to him, although 4-173 is highly marked in English, 4-174 is a quite normal way of expressing oneself in French. With regard to Arabic, on the other hand, 4-173 can be translated in two ways: the standard way and the colloquial one, and only in the latter can one maintain the left and right dislocations of Dik (theme and tail), as in:

4-173a jun, ʾaʿṭayt-u-hu l-abītar, kitāba-k. [Jordanian colloquial Arabic]  
John, gave-I-the book to-Peter, book-your.

(or)

4-173b ʾaʿṭayt-u-hu la-bītar, kitāba-k yā Jūn! [Jordanian colloquial Arabic]  
gave-I-it to-Peter book-your oh John.

4-173c ʾaʿṭaytu kitāba junin li-bītar. [Standard Arabic translation]  
gave-I book of John to-Peter.

Correspondingly, one may expect that the pragmatic functionality of the theme in French is less outspoken in English or even in Arabic, where, in the latter, as will be shown in chapter 5, Dik's theme (kitābu Jūn, 'John's book') as can be seen in 4-173a & b, corresponds, in Jordanian colloquial Arabic, to the grammatical notion of 'badal ʾištīmāl' ('inclusive permutative'), or Halliday's substitutive theme (cf. 3.6.4.2).

In this respect, Givon (1976)<sup>53</sup> has advanced the hypothesis that verbal

agreement in general originates through the process described above, and he gives a great many arguments based on data from different languages, to substantiate his claim. Dik notes that although he and Givón differs in terminology, he agrees with Givón's view that "the gradual 'demarking' of marked constructions with either a 'topic-shifted' constituent (= [Dik's] theme) or an 'afterthought-topic' constituent (= [his] tail) (Dik, 1978, [1981, p. 156]).

#### **4.5.2 Language-Independent Preferred Order of Constituents (LIPOC)**

As already hinted above, the predication underlying linguistic expressions are regarded as constructions in which no linear order has been defined over the constituents. Dik (1980, pp.19-20) suggests that, in order to arrive at the actual linear order of linguistic expressions, then, "we need rules and principles which **GIVE** a relative order to previously unordered sets of constituents". In this respect, Dik rejects the TG approach on this matter (that the different types of constituent orderings of a language are based merely on one underlying order in the deep structure). Dik's FG approach is based upon his assumption that a language has more than one basic order of constituents. In his view, FG tries to account for constituent ordering in terms of a restricted number of general principles, which, according to Dik, "have a cross-linguistic validity" (Dik, 1978, [1981, p. 172]). These principles, which he (op. loc.) also calls "preferential tendencies" are the following:

- a. The preference for having constituents with the same functional specification in the same structural positions.
- b. The preference of assigning certain positions to certain designated categories of constituents and to constituents characterized by pragmatic functions.
- c. the preference of having constituents ordered from left to right in order of increasing categorical complexity.

The first preference is accounted for in Dik's FG by setting up one or more 'functional patterns' which define the positions which constituents of given functional status can take under certain conditions. As for the second preference, it is accounted for by adding certain 'special positions' to these functional patterns, and by giving rules which specify which type of constituent can be brought to those special positions, and



under what conditions. The third preference is captured in the 'Language-independent preferred order of constituents (LIPOC).

Before going on to discuss Dik's general schema of the functional patterns, it is deemed necessary to show how these three principles 'counteract' each other, and the factors that influence the selection of such a schema. On the last point, Dik lists six major factors that influence such a selection<sup>54</sup>:

1. The difference between main clauses and subordinate clauses.
2. The difference between the various types of sentences.
3. The difference between unmarked and marked verb forms.
4. The difference between finite and infinite verb forms,
5. The categorical differences between the constituents functioning as subjects and objects.
6. The relevance of constituents other than subject, verb and object.

To illustrate the counteraction in the operation of principles (a) through (c), Dik considers the following artificial example from a language with a subject in immediately postverbal position, i.e., with a neutral pattern like

4-174 X (any constituent) V(erb) S(ubject) Y (any constituent).

In most cases, especially in declarative sentences, where subject typically assumes a topic function (in line with preference (b) above), it strongly tends to occupy an initial position, resulting in:

4-174a S (topic) X V Y.

But when the subject is a pronoun, it will, according to Dik's (c) preference, prefer a position before rather than after the V, resulting in:

4-174b X S (pronoun) V Y.

And when the subject is a subordinate clause, preference (c) will tend to bring it to final position, resulting in:

4-174c X V Y S(subordinate clause).

The result of all this is that the subject constituent may occasionally occupy four various positions with respect to the other major constituents of the sentence. This, according to Dik (1978, [1981, p. 175]) is "in contradiction with principle (a), which would prefer a single position for all subject constituents". Thus, the resulting tension might lead to a restructuring by which preference (a) is done 'justice', but then the

other preferences (b & c) will be violated. Thus, Dik's illustrating example emphasizes the dynamic view of constituents' order not only with respect to what he calls 'the historical drift', but also with regard to the synchronic situation in any one stage of language development.

As already shown above, Dik's proposed functional patterns are hypothesized to conform with the following language-independent pattern schema:

4-175 P2 [theme], P1[topic] (V) S (V) O, P3[tail].

It is also has been argued (cf. 4.5.1.1 & 4.5.1.4) that theme and tail are operating 'outside' the clause predication; thus it is what is between them is thought to present the essential skeleton of the functional patterns of the clause proper. Moreover, Dik believes that 'S & O' stand for the 'neutral' or 'unmarked' subject and object constituents.

In accordance with this schema, Dik (1978 [1981], 1980 & 1989) proposes that English major pattern will look like this:

4-176 Theme, P1 S V O, Tail

Moreover, he also suggests another 'minor' schema to account for certain type of questions (mainly interrogative type) and some minor clauses; this pattern takes the following schema:

4-177 Theme, P1 Vf S Vi O, Tail

where 'Vf' indicates the position of the finite verb and 'Vi' indicates that of the infinite one. The positions S, V & O are called by Dik the "pattern positions" for subject verb and object respectively. These are the positions where the constituents of this type end up in, if they have not been brought into P1 by the rules for determining the use of this 'special position'. Dik (1978 [1981] & elsewhere) enumerates four rules (R<sub>n</sub>) that account for preference (b) above. These rules are:

- 4-178 (R1) P1-constituent ——— P1.  
(R2) Topic, focus ——— P1.  
(R3) X ————— P1.  
(R4) Subj — S, Obj — O, Verb — V. (Dik, 1980, p. 21).

As for their application, Dik says:

(R1) applies to certain designated categories of constituents, here called "P1-constituents", which have the property of going to P1 obligatorily. In English, questions and relativized constituents and subordinating conjunctions belong to the category of P1-constituents. (R2) says that a constituent with either topic or focus function is placed in P1.

Languages may differ in whether they treat (R2) as optional or obligatory. (R3) says that if P1 is still available after the application of (R1) and (R2), some other constituent, here indicated by X, can or must go to P1. This rule, which is not necessarily present in all languages, is meant to account for two facts: (i) sometimes a language brings constituents into P1 which cannot be explained in terms of (R1) or (R2); (ii) some languages appear to have a constraint to the effect that P1 must be filled by some constituent. If it is not filled through the application of (R1) or (R2), it is filled by some language-specific application of (R3). Thus languages differ with respect to whether or not they have (R3) at all, and further with respect to which values X can take. (R4), finally, simply says that constituents go to their respective pattern positions when they have not been brought into P1 by the application of the earlier rules. (Dik, 1980, p. 21).

LIPOC, or Dik's preference (c), is tentatively set up by Dik in the following form (<='less complex than'):

- 4-179 (I) CL<PRO<NP<NPP<V<NP<PNP<SUB  
 (II) (a) for any category X, X<PX  
 (b) for any category X, X<X & X  
 (c) for any category X and Y, X<X(Y). (Dik, 1980, p. 23).

According to Dik, (I) gives the preferred order in which categories of the given types tend to be linearized in the structure of the clause. He also notes that NPs have no preference for appearing before or after the verb; whereas, postpositional phrases (NPP), prefer preverbal position, and prepositional phrases (PNP) prefer postverbal position. On the other hand, (II), (i-iii) indicate the effect with respect to LIPOC of adding certain elements to a constituent of category X. (II-a) indicates the effect of adding a preposition, (II-b) the effect of conjunction and (II-c) the effect of a constituent being embedded in another one.

Dik also points out that the special positions of theme, P1 (topic) and tail are "judged to be insensitive to the operation of LIPOC: they can harbour constituents of any complexity, regardless of their position in the LIPOC." (Dik, 1980, p. 23). This seems to tally with Dik's operations of the rules quoted above. Thus, LIPOC's influence, as suggested by Dik, remains in the following area circumscribed by the brackets:

4-180 Theme, P1 { (V)S(V)O(V) }, Tail  
 [LIPOC]

According to LIPOC, then, the preferred position of clitic elements (CL)<sup>55</sup> is the second position in the clause proper, and the preferred position of subordinate clauses

is at the very end of the clause, being the most complex constituent.

Dik points out that there is a sort of competition between LIPOC and the functional patterns of a language. In this rivalry, as Dik calls it, whichever wins will arrange the clause constituents accordingly: "if LIPOC wins out, the language will develop alternative functional patterns which are more in accordance with LIPOC". (Dik, 1980, p. 23). At the end of his argument, Dik comes to the conclusion that LIPOC is a universal concept that could possibly apply to all languages. In this respect, he says:

LIPOC belongs to linguistic theory rather than to individual grammars, and can be interpreted, synchronically, as defining range of possible variations in constituent ordering patterns, and historically, as specifying a family of possible changes in constituent ordering (Dik, 1980, pp. 23-24).

#### 4.5.3 Critique

The work of Dik is both syntactic and discoursal just as it is also a mixture of functionalism and formalism. His grammar begins with rules for term formation and predicate construction of the semantic level; the output then is subjected, via a syntactic level, to the assignment of pragmatic functions. At the pragmatic level, topic and focus are assigned to constituents of the predication itself, whereas theme and tail are entirely discourse-based and occur optimally before and after the predicate respectively. For Dik, the last set of functions represent the upper limit of grammar, but grammar works essentially from 'bottom-up' and the pragmatic level does not affect the configuration of units at the lower level; hence Dik (1978 [1981], 1980 & 1989) claims that the special positions in the clause for theme, topic and tail are 'judged to be insensitive to the operations of LIPOC', (quoted above). Although Dik considers theme and tail as having functions at the pragmatic level, the approach is not entirely discoursal. And in spite the fact that Dik's recent publications (Dik, 1989), owes a lot, with regard to his ideas on discourse topic, to Chafe (1976), Prince (1981), and Clark and Haviland (1974), this influence seems to add only a psycholinguistic flavour to his amalgamic model of formalism and functionalism. He even admits from the start (Dik 1978, [1981, p. 15]) that his model is meant to cover any type of linguistic expression, to the extent that the internal structure of that expression is governed by grammatical rules.

It is, thus, not restricted to the internal structure of sentences inasmuch as there are combinations of sentences related by syntactic and semantic rules. Moreover, the sets of structures covered by FG will be called the set of 'independent linguistic expressions', where he (op.loc.) defines an independent linguistic expression as "one which is in no way dependent on its preceding or following context".

Dik uses the terms theme and topic differently from other authors. In some instances, his theme corresponds to Halliday's thematic structure of substitution; in others, it resembles Halliday's marked theme, although he rejects the fronting of the object 'that man' in sentences like 4-143 (repeated here) as a marked theme:

4-143 That man I hate.

By the same token, although he defines topic in a way similar to that of Halliday's theme, it turns out, in fact, to be based on the informational status. Thus his model, in this area, adopts the same theoretical position as the others: the conflation of the theme system with the information system: an obvious influence of the Prague School Linguistics. Dik also defends the functionalist approach very strongly, although, his FG model represents, in my view, an attempt to produce generative rules purportedly derived from the speech situations. I believe, however, that there is a theoretical problem in mixing generative rules, independently, if not autonomously at the level of predicate formation, with cues from the speech situation, especially when Dik talks of himself as following in the steps of Hymes (1972<sup>56</sup>) where the latter talks about 'communicative competence', something which Halliday (1978, p. 38) describes as "an unnecessary complication"<sup>57</sup>. Moreover, Dik's FG model does not make it clear whether the largest or the smallest units are the ones that are defined first\_\_ i.e. whether it is essentially 'top-down' or bottom-up'. Provision for interrelation of the various levels in the model is somewhat scanty.

In substance, however, Dik's FG is similar to the functional approach of the Prague School and that of Halliday. This similarity is evident in terminology as well as methodology and convention; his three levels of language function methodologically corresponds to the Prague School three-level approach to syntax (Danes, 1964). According to Dik, functional relations operate on three different levels: (1) semantic functions, i.e., agent, goal and recipient ( a reminder of Danes's semantic levels and Halliday's ideational component), (2) grammatical level, i.e., subject and object (Danes'

grammatical level and Halliday's interpersonal component) and (3) pragmatic level, i.e., theme, topic, focus and tail (Danes' level of utterance and Halliday's textual component). In this respect also, Dik, like Danes and Halliday, regards these three levels of functional relations as interrelated, that is, all three equally 'co-determine' the form of the linguistic utterance or expression.

To sum up this critique of Dik, one can tentatively assume that his approach is labelled functional for three main reasons: (1) his model's adherence to the basic assumption of functional linguistics\_\_ the 'form' of an utterance is at least partially determined by its 'function', (2) the functional paradigm mentioned earlier, and (3) the use of function as the main 'primitive' in linguistic analysis.

## **Chapter Five**

### **A Comparison Between the Arab Traditional Approaches to Thematic Structure of Standard Arabic (SA) and Modern Approaches<sup>1</sup>**

#### **5.0 Layout of the Chapter**

The present chapter will consist of eight main topics, which will briefly cover the main aspects of thematic structure in SA. Section 1 will include the traditional Arab grammarians' (TAGs<sup>2</sup>) definition of the equivalent terms of theme-rheme in SA, those of the rhetoricians, and those of the logicians who follow in the steps of Aristotle. In addition, there will also be a discussion of two interrelated phenomena that have a direct impact on determining the theme of the sentence in SA. These are 'case marking' (case-ending) and 'parsing' (al-*'i'rāb wa ḥarakātuḥu*). Section 2 will include a discussion of the two main types of sentence structure of SA\_\_ the nominal and the verbal, and some indications of functionalism in the TAGs' approach to analysis of SA. Section 3 will include the thematic structure of the various moods of sentence construction in SA. This section will be presented from a systemic linguistic point of view, following Halliday's thematic model as outlined in chapter 3. This, of course, does not assume a complete resemblance between the two systems of thematic organization in the two languages; on the contrary, it is meant to draw a comparison between the two: English as a so-called 'rigid' SVO language and Arabic as a relatively 'flexible' VSO language with its verbal sentence type (starting with a verbal phrase), and with its nominal sentence type (starting with a noun phrase) consisting of a subject and a predicate (S+P). This section will include the discussion of theme in declarative, interrogative, imperative, jussive, embedded (subordinate) sentences. In section 4, there will be a discussion of the copulative structures in SA. This will include the types of copulative verbs, other devices of copulative constructions and the theme in equational sentences. Section 5 will discuss the concept of given and new information in SA, and how it relates to the concept of theme, including a discussion of theme and focus in SA. In Section 6, thematic structure of ellipted SA sentences with special emphasis on theme and rheme will be presented. Section 7 will present some attempts carried out by two Arab linguists, al-Moutawakil (1985) and Aziz (1988), to analyze Arabic texts

using Western linguistics approaches. The last section will include a proposed model by the author which will be used in the analysis of thematic structure English and SA RCs of the political writing selected as the data for this study (cf. chapters 6 & 7).

### 5.0.1 Introduction

In discussing the thematic structure of Arabic sentences, whether verbal or nominal and of Arabic discourse (text), two lines of thought have to be taken into consideration. The first has to do with the TAGs, who adopted a rather formal approach to the study of SA, and the second has to do with Arab rhetoricians, who adopted a rather functional (pragmatic) approach to the study of SA, i.e. relating languages to the context in which it is used.

In a language like Arabic, which is relatively flexible as far as word order (WO) is concerned, thematic study should orient itself more to rhetorics\_\_ ‘a half-way house’ between syntactic typology and text semantics; without doing this, one may end up pretending that the sentence theme is a language independent notion like discourse topic, which of course it is not. ‘abbās (1989, p. 87), following in the steps of al-Jurjānī (1988), says: ‘the order of constituents when uttered results from their arrangement in the mind’ (tartūbu ll-alfāzi fi n-nuṭqi . . . nāshi ‘an tartībi l-ma‘āni fi n-nafs”<sup>3</sup>), and that this order when uttered is designed completely ‘to accommodate the meanings that the speaker wants to express’ (‘an-nuṣumu ‘īdan tartūbu l-kalāmi wa ‘anta taṭṭiqu bihi qad ṣumima taṣmīman tāmmān liyuwāfiqa l-ma‘āni l-laṭi turidu ‘an tu‘abira ‘anhā)<sup>4</sup>. In other words, thematic study must have something to do with *staging* (cf. 4.2.2), or linear presentation of topic entities rather than purely with aspects of the content of discourse. There are usually more topic entities in the universe of discourse than there can be sentential themes. What one must find out is to what extent the thematic choices made by the speaker or the writer of SA will influence the hearer’s/reader’s intuitive notion of ‘gist’, or the important points in the discourse content. If one manages to come up with a reliable notion of sentence theme in SA, one might be able, in the long run, to show how, in different types of languages, syntactic presentation is made to serve the organization of information flow, helping the receiver to interpret the message, and memorize the main points in it.



## 5.1 Definition of Terms

### 5.1.1 Terms Used in SA for Theme-Rheme/ Topic-Comment

Unlike English, SA Arabic has 'few' equivalent terms to stand for the concepts of theme-rheme or topic-comment. These Arabic terms can be looked at from three points of view: that of the TAGs who use their own terms 'al-mubtada`' and 'al-xabar', and introduce the terms 'al-musnad and 'al-musnad `ilayhi', which are used by the rhetoricians as well. The third type is introduced by the logicians who follow in the steps of Aristotle, like Ibn l-Muqaffa<sup>6</sup>(1978)<sup>5</sup>.

According to Anīs (1978, p. 275)<sup>6</sup>, for the logicians, the sentence in Arabic consists of what he calls "mawdū` wa mahmūl", 'a subject (topic) and a comment'. In other words, the sentence is 'about a person or a thing which something is related to'. Anīs provides the following example to illustrate the logicians' view:

5-1   `aš-šams-u    šāṭi`at-un  
          the-sun-nom. shining- nom (tanwīn) 'nutation'  
          The sun is shining.

Here the 'sun' is presented in front of one's mind to 'judge and evaluate', and 'is shining' is the verbal phrase that complement one's judgment, and which represents the specific property that the speaker wants to present to the hearer, and which explains the term of 'maḥmūl'. Thus, for the logician, the terms 'maḥkūm `alayhi and ḥukm' are the terms that are used to stand for theme-rheme or topic-comment in SA, and he does not care, according to Anīs, about the rest of the sentence as long as he finds out the result of the evaluation (comment) which results in joining (rabṭ) the two parts of the sentence together.

Anīs (1978) likens these terms used by logicians to those of the rhetoricians, who divide the sentence into two main parts: 'predicand' (al-musnad `ilayhi) and 'predicate' (al-musnad). al-Hāshimī (1978, p. 93) regards al-musnad `ilayhi as that part of the sentence which is either a "mubtada` [theme or topic] that has a xabar [rheme or comment], a 'agent/ subject' (fa`il), or a 'pro-agent/surrogate subject' (na`ib l-fa`il) [active or passive accusative]"<sup>7</sup>. He also defines "al-musnad" as either a "xabar [rheme or comment] or a 'complete verb' (fi`l tāmm) (al-Hāshimī, op. cit. p. 119). `abbās

(1989, p. 88), following al-Jurjānī, gives a somewhat different definition of 'the predicate' (al-musnad) by saying, what translates as, "a mubtada' /predicand, which has either an agent or a pro-agent that can replace the xabar, the xabar in the nominal sentence or the verb in the verbal sentence"<sup>8</sup>. According to him, TAGs have divided 'al-mubtada'' into two types:

1. A type that requires a xabar, as in:

5-2 'aš-šams-u                      šāṭi'at-un  
theme/musnad 'ilayhi rheme/musnad  
the-sun-nominative      shining- tanwin [nutation]  
The sun [theme] is shining [rheme].

2. A type that requires a subject/agent (fā'il) that compensates for the unavailability of the predicate (xabar) when the mubtada is either an active or a passive participle ('ism fā'il aw 'ism maf'ul) as in the following three examples (the first two of which are nominal sentences and the third is a verbal one):

5-3 'aZayd- un                      qā'im -un?  
musnad                              musnad 'ilayhi  
is-zayd- nutation                  awake- nunnation  
Is Zeid [theme] awake [rheme]? [Halliday's formulation]

5-4 'a-mansiyyat-un      fīlasṭīn-u?  
musnad                      musnad 'ilayhi  
is-Palestine                  forgotten-nom.?  
Is Palestine [theme] forgotten [rheme]? [Halliday's formulation]

5-5 jama'a Abu-Bakr-in                      al-Qur'ān-a.  
musnad      musnad 'ilayhi                  qayd (direct object)  
collected abu-bakr-genitive-nutation) the-Qur'an- accusative  
Abu-Bakr [theme] collected the Holy Qur'an [rheme]. [Halliday's formulation]

For the rhetoricians, the musnad ilayhi and the musnad are the two main constituents of the sentence in SA, but unlike the logicians, they also study the rest of the constituents of the sentence, which they call 'al-quyūd', 'the complements' such as the direct object 'the Holy Qur'ān' in example 5-5<sup>9</sup>. Thus, any part that does not constitute part of the musand 'ilayhi or the musnad is called 'qayd'. These, according to al-Jurjānī (1988), 'abbās (1989) and al-Hāshimī (1978), among many others, include, in SA, the object in the verbal sentence, whether it is one or more, 'the cognate accusative' (al-maf'ul l-muṭlaq), 'the accusative of cause' (l-maf'ul li 'ajlihi), and 'the accusative of accompaniment' (l-maf'ul ma'ahu). They also include all the, 'the follow

ups'/(dependents)' (ʿat-tawābiʿ): the adjective (ʿan-naʿt), the explicative conjunction (ʿaṭf al-bayān), the coordinating conjunction (ʿaṭf an-nasaq), 'the premutative' (l-badal), the circumstantial accusative (al-ḥāl), the accusative of specification (at-tamyīz), negation (an-naḫī), the conditional particles (ʿadawāt aš-šart) and the canceling verbs (al-ʿaḫāl ʿan-nāsixa).

As for the terms used by the TAGs which correspond to theme-rheme or topic-comment, 'al-mubtadaʿ' is used for theme/topic and 'al-xabar' for rheme/comment. In his *Kitab*, Part. 2, Sibawayhi, the father of the Basra School, states that al-mubtadaʿ is "any noun which [one] starts a sentence with, and which has to be followed by speech, 'kalām' [xabar]" (Sibawayhi, 1968, p. 126)<sup>10</sup>. Moreover, he points out that both the mubtada and what is built on it (the xabar) are in the nominative case, and the mubtada usually, or typically, comes first followed by the xabar, and argues that the relation between them is that of predication/leaning on one another (al-ʿisnād) because they are, respectively, no more than a predicand and a predicate (musnad ʿilayhi and a musnad). In this respect, he indicates that neither of these functions can dispense with the other<sup>11</sup>. Like logicians and rhetoricians, Sibawayhi illustrates the predication (al-isnād) relation as follows:

5-6 ʿabdu-llahi     axū-ka.  
mubtadaʿ         xabar  
Abdullah     brother-your  
Abdullah [theme] is your brother [rheme].

Sibawayhi also points out that this relationship resembles the one that exists between the verb (al-fiʿl) and the subject (in the verbal sentences, where the verb must have a noun as subject in the same way as the 'predicate' (xabar) must have a 'predicand' (mubtadaʿ), as in:

5-7 yaḏhab-u             Zayd-un  
musnad (xabar)     musnad ʿilayhi (mubtadaʿ)  
goes- nom.         Zayd-nunation  
Zeid goes away.

Ibn Yaʿīsh, a Kufan grammarian, defines the mubtada and the xabar in almost the same way as Sibawayhi: the mubtada is the musnad ilayhi, and the xabar is the musnad, and the latter follows the former in the sentence<sup>12</sup>. The two schools, however, differ in their account of the way the mubtada acquires its nominative case. Whereas the Basrans believe that the mubtada acquires its nominative case as a result

of "āmīl l-ʿibtidāʿ", 'thematisation operator', which, to them, means a sort of a covert operator (ʿāmīl muqaddar), or an abstract, 'semantic', one (ʿāmīl maʿnawiy), the Kufans believe that the muḩtada and the xabar provide the nominative case for one another, and there is no other operator involved. As for the verbal sentence, the Kufans believe that the subject (al-fāʿil) establishes the meaning of the verb because the latter 'leans upon the former' in the same way the xabar leans upon the muḩtada. There is one difference, however, and that is, the muḩtada has its xabar following it in the nominal sentence, and the xabar (usually the verb 'al-fīʿil') precedes the muḩtada (usually the subject 'al-fāʿil). Other than this difference, according to the Kufans, the subject (al-fāʿil in the verbal sentence) and the predicand ('al-muḩtada' in the nominal sentence) are functionally (pragmatically) one and the same.

### 5.1.2 Case Marking in SA

SA is a highly inflected language and both verbs and nouns are inflected. When inflections are assigned to nouns, they are called 'case markers', and when they are assigned to verbs, they are called 'mood markers'. Verbal mood markers can be summarized as follows:

5-8	<u>Mood</u>	<u>Inflection</u>	<u>Example</u>	<u>Gloss</u>
	indicative	u	yarkuḩ-u	He runs.
	subjunctive	a	yarkuḩ-a	he runs
	jussive	0 <sup>13</sup>	yarkuḩ-0	Let him Run!
	imperative	0	urkuḩ-0	(0= you) Run!

Case markers in SA can be illustrated as follows:

5-9	<u>Case</u>	<u>singular</u>	<u>Dual</u>	<u>Masculine Plural</u>	<u>Feminine Plural</u>
	nominative	u	a	u	u
	accusative	a	ay	i	i
	genitive	i	ay	i	i

TAGs have studied 'case markers' primarily from the point of view of their relation to 'form and function'. Grammatical functions such as subject, object, or object of preposition are morphologically marked lexical forms. Case markers in SA indicate the syntactic functions; almost all noun phrases (NPs) in SA are morphologically marked with a case ending which indicates the grammatical relation of the NP. In other words, there is a correspondence between grammatical relations and surface cases in SA. Nominal case markers, for example are assigned to NPs which function as subjects as in:

5-10 nāma Zayd-un.

slept zayd-nom.  
Zeid slept.

- 5-11 al-faṭūr-u                      šahiyy-un.  
The breakfast-nom. delicious-nunation  
The breakfast is delicious.

Subjects and predicates in SA are assigned the nominative case (5-11), whereas accusative cases are assigned to all types of objects and other grammatical functions like the ones mentioned in the previous section, and which were named by the rhetoricians as ‘quyūd’ (complements) (cf. example 5-5). The genitive case markers are assigned to NPs functioning as objects of prepositions and/or as the second element in the possessive phrase, as in 5-12a & b respectively:

- 5-12a dahab-tu    ʾila    s-sūq-i.  
went- I        to        the market-genitive  
I went to the market.

- 5-12b sūq-u                      d-dahab-i        baʿīd-un.  
market-nom. the-gold-gen. far-nom. (nunation)  
The gold-market is [too] far.

Case markers in SA need not always have morphological realization; their presence, however, is always assumed even if they are not marked on the surface structure, as in:

- 5-13 jāʾa    l-fatā.  
came the-boy  
The boy came.

Here, the common noun ‘l-fatā’ is the subject (theme) although the nominative case marking is not explicit. This means that these cases can either be overt or covert. Furthermore, TAGs also point out that, in SA, sentence constituents can be permuted (cf. 5.1.2) from their normal position provided that they maintain their overt case markings. This indicates that case markers still maintain the grammatical relations, although the constituents bearing them are out of their typical (unmarked) positions to a marked ones, as in:

- 5-14 al-kitāb-a                      ʾištārā-hu Zayd-un.  
the-book-accus. bought-it zayd-nunation  
The **BOOK**, Zeid bought it.

### 5.1.3 Parsing (al-ʾiʿrāb) in SA

According to Anīs (1978), TAGs have devoted much of their work to the study of ‘parsing’ (‘iṣrāb), to the extent that the most eloquent scholars of SA at that time felt embarrassed to say anything in front of a grammarian. The study of ‘iṣrāb is traditionally associated with the study of ‘awāmil al-‘iṣrāb’ (case-operators). The study of these two major grammatical issues reached its highest degree of abstraction in Sibawayhi’s *Kitāb*. The basic assumption underlying the study of ‘iṣrāb and the ‘operators’ (‘awāmil) is the belief that ‘the expression/utterance’ ‘lafz’ of a constituent is influenced by its function (waḏīfa). The variation in function is traditionally attributed to the variation in ‘grammatical operators’ (‘awāmil). These grammatical operators cause a change in the form and consequently in the function of constituents. According to the traditional theory, function is governed by these operators which work on constituents and cause them to be ‘governed’ or ‘operated on’ (ma‘mūlun fīhi).

For all TAGs, ‘parsing’ (‘iṣrāb) is the most essential characteristic of SA. Entomologically, ‘iṣrāb means ‘to make explicit’. Traditionally, it is defined as the variation in the status of word-endings due to variations of operators (‘awāmil). Ibn Hishām, quoted by Abdul-Ḥamīd (1963, p. 45), defines ‘iṣrāb as "the effect ‘the operators’ (al-‘awāmil) have on words"<sup>14</sup>. This effect can be either ‘overt’ (zāhir) or ‘covert’ (muqaddar) as in the examples 5-13 and 5-14 respectively. TAGs also point out that the covert realization of case markers on examples like 5-13 is purely due to phonetic reasons that have to do with the articulation of the vowel sound and the nominative case marker on ‘l-fata’, a thing that prevents the realization of the marker on the surface structure.

The opposite of ‘parsing’ (‘iṣrāb) is traditionally called ‘inflexibility or invariability’ (al-binā’). Words are said to be either ‘inflectional or invariable’ (mu‘raba or mabniyya) depending on their structure, as in:

5-15a ja‘a ‘īsā-0.

came Eisa-0 (nom.)

Eisa came.

5-15a ra‘ay-tu ‘īsā-0.

saw-I Eisa- (accus.)

I saw Eisa.

5-15c marar-tu bi-‘īsā-0.

passed-I by-Eisa-0 (gen.)

I passed by Eisa.

In all the three examples above, the ending of the NP does not change in spite of the fact that it has three different grammatical functions\_\_ subject, direct object and object of preposition. This invariability in word-endings is called ‘al-binā’’. In SA, TAGs have divided speech into three parts: verbs, nouns and particles. For them, particles are ‘mabniyya’, nouns are mostly ‘mu‘raba’, and verbs, except the present (imperfect) tense form, are mostly mabniyya (invariable).

As can be seen from the title of this section, parsing (‘i‘rab) in SA is equated with parsing in English, the reason being the closeness of their definition and implications. *The Oxford English Dictionary* defines the verb ‘to parse’ as “to resolve the sentence, etc. into its components of speech and divide them grammatically”. Thus, there are two operations involved in parsing:

1. The analysis of sentences into their relevant parts.
2. The grammatical description of these parts.

TAGs have defined grammatical operators (al-‘awāmil) as those factors which cause the realization of the function necessitating the inflection (Qabbish, 1979, pp. 5-9). They have divided these operators into two types “‘awāmil lafziyya’ (formal operators) and “‘awāmil ma‘nawiyya’ (abstract [semantic] operators). An example of the first is:

5-16 lan      yaḏhab-a      Zayd-un      ‘ila      s-suq-i.  
will not go-subjunctive Zayd-nunation to      the-market-genitive  
Zeid will not go to the market.

Here, ‘lan’ ‘will not’, a verbal article of negation, requires the verb following it to be in the subjunctive mood, and the preposition ‘‘ila’ (to) requires its object to be in the genitive case. Both of these particles are traditionally analyzed as formal operators. As for the abstract type of operators, which are relevant to the subject of study, these can be exemplified as follows:

5-17 al-kitāb-u      muḥīd-un.  
the-book-nom. beneficial-nunation.  
The book is beneficial.

Here, the initial nominal is traditionally analyzed as ‘theme/topic’ (mubtada’); nominals occurring initially in the sentence are assigned the function ‘mubtada’’, and should always be in the nominative case. TAGs (the Basrans) claim that what causes the

mubtada to be in the nominative case is 'the initial position' operators (ʿāmil l-ʾibtidāʾ); this consequently causes 'l-kitābu' in 5-17 to be in the nominative case.

The most important aspect TAGs emphasize with regard to case markers in 'parsing' (al-ʾiʿrāb) is that they signal the meanings of the NPs, whether these cases are nominative, accusative or genitive. In support of this general view, az-Zajājī, a Baghdadi grammarian, believes that these case-endings are made to signal the meanings of the various types of NPs. In this respect he says:

Since NPs bear meanings like agents (subjects), patients (objects) and genitives, and since there is no indication in their construction to signal these meanings, the case markers of parsing (ʾiʿrāb) are made to predict and signal these meanings, in order to provide the speakers with ample choices in the language with regard to what can be preposed or postposed whenever required to do so [my translation] (az-Zajājī, 1959, p. 69)<sup>15</sup>.

Ibn Fāris goes even further when he suggests that these case-markings can also distinguish between the various types of meanings that the users (speakers and hearers) intend to convey to each other, which, in a modern linguistic sense, can be taken to mean the pragmatic intention of the interlocutors (Ibn Fāris, 1964, p. 190)<sup>16</sup>. This view of Ibn Fāris was made clearer and exemplified by ʿabd at-Tawwāb (1983)<sup>17</sup>, who agrees with Ibn Fāris by illustrating his claim as follows:

5-18a akrama n-nās Muḥammad.  
honoured the-people Muhammad  
The people honoured Muhammad.

This sentence can be interpreted in many different ways:

5-18b akrama n-nās-u Muḥammad-an.  
honoured the-people-nom. Muhammad-accus.  
The people honoured Muhammad.

5-18c akrama n-nās-a Muḥammad-un.  
honoured the-people-accus. Muhammad-nom  
He honoured the people, Muhammad.

5-18d akrum-u n-nās-i Muḥammad-un.  
the most honoured-nom. (amongst) the-people-genitive Muhammad-nom.  
The most honoured amongst the people is Muhammad.

5-18e ʾakrim n-nās-a Muḥammad-un  
be hospitable (to) the-people-accus. Muhammad-nom.-Vocative.  
Oh Muhammad! Be hospitable to the people.



If one looks at the examples 18a-e, one finds different word order (WO) in each sentence, even the one which has no case markings has a VSO WO, which suggests that this word order is the unmarked case of SA because it resembles 18b and c which have the case-markers (cf. 5.2 below). Sentences 18c & d and 18e represent, respectively, a VOS verbal sentence, an equational sentence and an imperative or requisitive sentence. Qutrub, a Bastran and a student of Sibawayhi, is the only TAG who voices his rejection of the notion that 'parsing case-markers' (al-'itrāb) signals meaning of NPs. He points out that these markers are invented by the grammarians to speed up the utterance of discourse segments and to avoid spelling out two consecutive utterances where one ends with a jussive case and the other begins with one, a thing that may delay the articulation of the rest of the utterance of discourse. Thus, "when they [Arabs] link a noun with the subsequent utterance, they use other cases other than the jussive" (quoted in az-Zajā'ī, 1959, p. 70); az-Zajā'ī rejects this claim when he (loc. cit) says:

if what he (Qutrub) says is true, then it would be possible to make the subject in the genitive case, in the nominative case or in the accusative case . . . , so long as the sole purpose is to avoid the jussive case following the pause, in order to straighten the discourse. This will eventually lead to 'a deterioration of discourse', and it will contradict the methods by which Arabs are using their language to communicate [messages] and will contradict the wisdom of their WO. [my ellipsis and translation].

This claim by Qutrub is also rejected by Mustafa (1959, p.52)<sup>18</sup>, who believes that "Qutrub was not faithful to his view", but Mustafa does not go any further in his comment.

Although Mustafa criticizes the TAGs with regard to their categorization of the various types of 'operators' ('awāmil), he follows suit their notion of the case-markers as signals of meanings and functions of the NPs<sup>19</sup>. He points out that TAGs would not have adhered to such a notion had they not been convinced that these case marking are used as means of delineating the meanings of discourse constituents. Therefore, according to him, the 'the nominative case marker' (damma) signals predication ('isnād) ; this is made clear from the fact that the NP, in a sentence, is meant to have another constituent "to be attributed to it, and to say something about it" (Mustafa, op. cit., p. 50), which, in Halliday's (1967c) sense, is the theme followed by the rheme, or

the topic followed by the comment. As for the genitive case marker (the kasra) it indicates a relation of connectivity between a word and what precedes it, with or without a preposition particle, as in:

5-19a kitāb-u Muḥammad-in mumazzaq-un.  
book-nom. Muhammad-gen. torn-nom. (nunnation)  
Muhammad's book is torn.

5-19b kitāb-un li-Muḥammad-in mumazzaq-un.  
book-nom. for-Muhammad-gen. torn-nom. (nunnation)  
A book of Muhammad is torn.

Mustafa differs, however, from the TAGs when he claims that the accusative case (al-fatha) does not indicate any meaning; it is merely a 'light marker' in SA. He summarizes his position with regard to case-markers of 'i'rāb as follows:

only the damma [nom. case] and the kasra [gen. case] are markers of 'i'rāb. They are not what remains of complete syllables [as Arabists like W. Wright has assumed<sup>20</sup>], nor are they the result of 'overt operators' ('awāmil ḡāhira), but they are the **WORK OF THE SPEAKER TO SIGNAL A MEANING IN PROCESS OF COMPOSITION AND OF WO.** (Mustafā, 1959, p. 52.) [my translation and emphasis].

Among the relatively new generation of linguists in the Arab World, who join forces with Quṭrub in his view of rejecting the meaning case markers may indicate, is Anīs (1978). He believes that these case-makers of 'parsing' ('i'rāb) do not constitute part of the building up of sentence structure, and do not indicate or signal any meaning of its NPs. In support of Quṭrub's point of view he says:

the connectivity in any word is its final zero-marking, be it 'mabniyya' (invariable) or 'mu'raba' (inflectional), since it is possible to pause on either one by using a jussive case-marker. In spite of this pause, the word [as well as the sentence containing it] remains well-formed, and would not lose any part of its meaning (Anīs, 1978, p. 242) [my translation].

Anīs, following in the steps of western linguists, identifies two factors that determine the meanings of NPs whether subjects/agents or objects/patients in sentences of SA. The first factor is WO, which can be divided into special slots for each linguistic constituent; the second factor is context (verbal or situational) in which the sentence is uttered. This is why he rejects Mustafa's (1959) position, which is pro-TAGs, with regard to case-markers; this is also why researchers in languages, like SA,

are mostly interested in studying three main topics:

1. The structure of SA sentences
2. The connectivity (cohesion and coherence) between these sentences
3. WO, which indicates the position of the slots of the sentence constituents: the verb phrase (VP), the noun phrase (NP), whether subject or object (agent or patient) and the complements which TAGs call 'faḍalāt' (complements).

Anīs (1978) illustrates WO, the first factor determining the meanings and functions of sentence constituents, by the positions of the subject in relation to that of the direct object in the sentence. He points out that their positions are determined by the various types of linguistic styles (ʿasālīb l-luġa) or, to use the modern linguistic terms, the various discourse types or genres and not by the case-markings of, nominative and accusative cases (ḍamma and fatha) respectively. Thus, if any sentence constituent changes its typical or unmarked position, one can easily trace it in its new position without any fear of ambiguity, because the sentence in SA will, in most cases, leave a co-referential pronoun (either overt or covert) to mark the unmarked position from which the constituent in question has moved, in order to draw the attention of the reader/hearer to its unmarked case. Contextual conditions will also play a decisive role in guiding the reader/hearer to the new position of the constituents, as in the following three cases where the subject is placed after the object.

1. In an exclusive construction (al-qasr), as in:

5-20 wa ma yaʿlamu taʿwīla-hu illa llāh-u.  
and only knows interpretation-its only allah-nom.  
It is only **ALLAH** who knows its interpretation.

2. In a long sentence, where the subject and its complement (i.e subordinate clauses) may result in delaying the object, and thus placing it further away from the verb, which acts as its 'acted upon constituent', as in:

5-21 lan yanāl-a ʿallāh-a luḥūmu-hā wa dimāʿu-ha.  
will not reach allah-accus. meat-their and blood-their  
It is not their **MEAT** nor their **BLOOD** that reaches Allah.

3. When the subject contains pronoun which is coreferential with the object, as in:

5-22 hādā yawm-un yanfaʿu ṣ-ṣādiqīna ṣidgu-hum.  
this day-nom benefit the-honest-acuss. honesty-their-nom.  
This is a day in which the honest will benefit from their honesty.

On the basis of this argument, Anīs does not accept the idea of Sibawayhi who, in his

*Kitāb*, claims that speakers/writers change the positions of the subject and the object for the purpose of emphasis, nor does he accept al-jurjānī who, in his *Dalā 'ilu l- 'Ijāz*, claims the same thing .

The second factor that determines the meaning and function of sentence constituents is the contextual conditions (verbal or situational) that circumscribe the speech event. Anīs (1978) believes that both the speaker/writer and the hearer/reader know the nature and the type of linguistic expressions required in a particular context. Furthermore, he asserts that languages are not lists of lexical items listed in a dictionary, neither are they isolated sentences in a book, or uttered in isolation. Languages are types of discourse that are associated with the conditions of the speakers and hearers, who know the speech situation, and, thus, will not find it difficult to identify the subject from the object on the basis of these contextual circumstances.

Of immediate interest to this study, beside Anīs' (1978) two factors determining constituents' functions and meanings, is Mustafa's (1959) point regarding the status of 'the nominative' case-marker (the damma) as being the signal for 'predication' (isnad), and that and not only having its unmarked position at the of the 'theme-topic' (musnad 'ilayhi) NP , but also being placeable at the end of the 'rheme-comment' (musnad constituent(s). In this respect, Mustafa mentions three functions in which the nominative case-marker (the damma) is used by grammarians: the mubtada, the subject and the 'pro-agent' (nā'ib al-fā'il). As indicated earlier, all three can be used as 'topic or theme' (musnad 'ilayhi), and this is why the scholars of eloquence (al-bayān) and those of rhetorics (al-balāga) treat them under one rubric (al-musnad 'ilayhi). If one follows the rules governing these three types of nominatives, one will find that they are similar to some extent; a thing that prompts Arab linguists and rhetoricians (Sibawayhi himself in his *Kitāb*, 1968, vol.2, page, 26) to discuss them under one section in books written about grammar and rhetorics.

As for 'the pro-agent' (nā'ib al-fā'il) (cf. 5.3.1.1), TAGs did not, from a formal perspective, differentiate it from the subject\agent (al-fā'il). In fact both are treated under one section; they justify such a unified treatment by examples like:

5-23 kusir z-zujūju.

broken the-glass

The glass [theme] was broken [rheme].

5-24 *ʾinkasar z-zujūju.*  
broken the-glass  
The glass[theme] broke [rheme].

Here, one can hardly note any difference between the two examples either in Arabic or in the English translation, except the morphological change in the Arabic VP structure. Other than this difference; they look the same; 'the glass' (*az-zujaju*) remains, from a pragmatic perspective, the 'theme/topic' (*musnad ʾilayhi*) in both sentences.

TAGs, in fact, differentiate between 'subject/agent' (the *fāʿil*) and 'theme/ topic' (the *mubtada*), but when one examines these differences in depth, one comes to the conclusion that these differences are no more than of an artificial type, because I believe that, from a pragmatic point of view, both the *fāʿil* and the *mubtada* serve the same function: they are there [in the universe of discourse or the world at large] for the speaker/writer to say something about. Thus these invented difference by the TAGs are no more than 'a play of wit' and do not serve in understanding SA discourse. These differences, however, can be categorized under four major types.

1. TAGs insist that the typical position of the *fāʿil* (subject/ agent) is following the verb, whereas that of the *mubtada* is typically initial, but it could be postposed: a free movement that is not permissible for the *fāʿil* in the same degree. This, of course, a grammarians' judgment, but, there would be no difference in meaning (apart from the thematic markedness) between sentences like:

5-25a *ṣahara l-ḥaqq-u.*  
appeared the-truth-nom.  
The truth [theme] appeared [rheme].

5-25b *al-ḥaqq-u ṣaraha.*  
the-truth-nom. appeared  
The truth appeared.

TAGs, especially the Basrans, did not allow 'al-ḥaqqu' to be preposed in 5-25a because it is 'subject' (*fāʿil*), and did not allow it to be postposed in 5-25b because it is 'theme' (*al-mubtadaʾ*). This judgment, however, is artificial and has no effect on discourse. In this respect, SA does not prevent the NP that is being talked about (theme, topic or *musnad ʾilayhi*) from being postposed, or what is said about it (rheme, comment or *musnad*) from being preposed. In fact, this is what makes Arabic a relatively free, or to be more precise, a flexible word-order language.

2. The second difference that TAGs have drawn between the two constituents is that the mubtada can be ellipted and ‘the agent/subject’ (al-fā<sup>c</sup>il) cannot. This is also another artificial difference drawn by TAGs, because, when the mubtada is not mentioned in the sentence, they claim that it is ellipted, while if the subject/agent (al-fā<sup>c</sup>il) is not mentioned they claim that it is covert (mustatir), as in:

5-26 Context: kayfa Zayd-un?

how Zayd?

How is Zeid?

A: 0 danif. (0= ellipsis= Zaydun)  
0 sick.

B: danifa 0 (0= mustatir/ellipted= Zaydun)  
(0= Zeid) has-become-sick  
0 sick.

3. TAGs’ third difference between the mubtada and the fā<sup>c</sup>il is that while there must be an agreement in number between the mubtada and the xabar, this is not required between the verb (fi<sup>c</sup>l) and the subject (fā<sup>c</sup>il), as:

5-27a fāza l-baṭalu.

won the-champion

The champion [theme] won [rheme].

5-27b fāza l-ʾabṭālu.

won the-champions

The champions [theme] won [rheme].

Here, the verb ‘won’ (fāza) does not morphologically change to fit in the plural number in 5-27b, and it remains rheme in both cases. 5-27a & b can be compared with similar examples where the same verbal sentence is nominalized, as in:

5-28a al-baṭal-u fāza.

the-champion-nom won

The champion [theme] won [rheme].

5-28b al-ʾabṭāl-u fāzū.

the-champions won.

The champions[theme] won [rheme].

From a pragmatic point of view, no change happens as far as theme-rheme arrangement is concerned except for the fact that in 5-28a & b, rheme follows its theme, and in 5-27a & b the arrangement is reversed, except, of course, for the preposing of a constituent, that is typically postposed, for the purpose of emphasis. This is why this agreement

in number between the subject (al-fā'il), the theme, and the 'verb' (fi'l) in 5-28 does not come as a result of the 'predicate' (musnad) being a NP or VP or because 'the predicand' (musnad 'ilayhi) is a 'verb' (fi'l) or a subject (mubtada'), but it comes in accordance with anastrophe, as shown in this table, which illustrates 5-27 & 5-28:

	al-musnad 'ilayhi preposed	al-musnad postposed
al-musnad fi'l (VP)	al- 'abṭālu fāzū	fāza al-abṭālu
al-musnad 'ism (NP)	al- 'abṭālu fā 'izūna	fā 'iz-ūna l- 'abṭālu

Thus if the 'theme/topic' (musnad 'ilayhi) is preposed, the 'rheme/comment' (musnad) must agree with it in number, whereas, if it is postposed, the musnad is already singular.

4. The agreement in gender between the mubtada and the xabar is more required in comparison with that between the verb and the subject (al-fi'l and al-fā'il). In fact, TAGs point out that if the fi'l (the verb: al-musnad) is 'leaned upon' a metaphorical feminine musnad 'ilayhi, it is permissible to have two cases of the verb: one feminine (5-29a) and one 'neutral' (5-29b), as in:

5-29a 'amṭara-ti s-samā' u.  
rained-fem. the-sky  
It (the sky) [theme] rained (rheme).

5-29b 'amṭara s-samā' u.  
rained the-sky-nom.  
It (the sky) [theme] rained [rheme].

In this respect, TAGs also indicate that the Arabs generally prefer agreement in gender, and this agreement is deemed more necessary when the 'theme/topic' (musnad 'ilayhi) is preposed, that is, when it is in its typical unmarked position in a nominal sentence and in a preposed (marked) position in the verbal one.

## 5.2 The Basic Sentence Structure of SA

Many linguists, especially those who are influenced by Chomsky's transformational grammar (TG), have treated Arabic as an SVO language like

Lewkowicz (1967 & 1971), for example<sup>21</sup>. I believe that this is a misleading assumption, since Chomsky (1965 & elsewhere)<sup>22</sup> does not specify in his work whether the 'base' he proposes is for English only or for all languages. In this short introduction to sentence type in SA, I would like to argue that this assumption of Chomsky's adherents, with regard to SA, is not accurate, taking Lehmann's (1973 & 1976<sup>23</sup>), Greenberg's (1961<sup>24</sup>) typological studies, and the TAGs treatment of what they call 'al-*'ištigāl*' (government) to consideration.

Lehmann (1976, p. 447) points out that the essential constituent of the sentence is the verb, and that the constituent referred to as subject is secondary. He also gives primacy to the object-verb relationship over subject-verb one. In this respect, he points out that consistent with VO languages are consistently inflectional rather than agglutinative ones<sup>25</sup>. The inflectional nature of Arabic can be illustrated from SA, by comparing its simple verb with the causative and the reciprocal, or any derived form, as in:

5-30a *kataba Zayd-un risālat-an.*  
wrote Zeid-nom a letter-accus.  
Zeid [theme] wrote a letter [rheme].

5-30b *kattaba-hu risālat-an.*  
dictated-him a letter-accus.  
He dictated him a letter.

5-30c *kātaba-hu.*  
corresponded (with)- him  
He corresponded with him.

As can be seen from the 5-30b & c, entities marking the morphological categories may merge with the root, and either affects the elements of the root or be affected by them in contrast with the agglutinative languages like English (see previous note). Examples illustrating the effect on the root of lengthening the vowel phoneme /a/ (5-30c) and the gemination of the phoneme /t/ (5-30b) are shown above.

Lehmann (1973) also proposes a fundamental principle of placement of categorical entities which represent modifiers. According to this principle, modifiers are placed on the opposite side of a basic syntactic element from its primary concomitant. The verb, as already indicated, is the primary concomitant of the object, which is typically a noun in SA or a verbal sentence (clause) acting as a noun.



Therefore, modifiers that modify the object occupy the position opposite to the verb, i.e., right of the verb. This means that the nominal modifiers must follow the noun in VO languages, and the WO should take an arrangement of constituents that can look like this: verb, noun, followed by the noun modifiers. This placement of modifiers is typical of SA, which is a consistent VO language, where noun modifiers like relative constructions, adjectives and genitive expressions follow the nouns, as in, respectively:

5-31a qābala Aḥmadūn r-rajula l-ladi fāza fi l-musābaqa.  
met Ahmad-nom. the-man who won in the-contest  
Ahmad [theme] met the man who won the contest [rheme].

5-31b qābala Aḥmadūn rajul-an ṭawīl-an.  
met Ahmad-nom. a man-accus. tall-accus.  
Ahmad [theme] met a tall man [rheme].

5-31c qābala Aḥmad-un sadīqa jāri-hi.  
met Ahmad-nom. friend neighbour-his  
Ahmad [theme] met his neighbours' friend [rheme].

From a thematic point of view, the subject noun phrase in these sentences is the unmarked theme. By the same token, however, verbal modifiers such as negation, interrogation, causation, reciprocity, reflexivization, etc., must be on the opposite side of the object. Thus, in VO languages, the order looks something like this: verb-modifiers, verbs followed by the object. This also can be illustrated, from SA, in examples like:

5-32a kasara Zayd-un az-zujāj-a.  
broke Zeid-nom. the-glass-accus.  
Zeid [theme] broke the glass [rheme].

5-32b mā kasara Zayd-un az-zujāj-a. [negation]  
not broke Zeid-nom. the-glass-accus.  
Zeid [theme] did not break the glass [rheme].

Examples like 5-32b and many others illustrating the fronted position of verb modifiers give ample proof and support to Lehmann's formulation and shows that SA is a VO or VSO language and not an SVO one<sup>26</sup>.

Similarly, Greenberg (1961; see note 24 above) has identified a series of formal universals of grammar, most of which has to do with WO, and which permit the establishment of a basic order of typology.

To start with, Greenberg's ninth universal principle has to do with interrogatives.

He points out that if interrogative particles are placed initially in the sentence, languages are prepositional, and if final, they are found in postpositional ones. In SA, they are typically placed initially, as in:

- 5-33 hal jā`a Zayd-un?•  
Did come Zeid-nom.  
Did Zeid come?

In his formal universal principle 12, Greenberg points out that if a language has a dominant VSO order in declarative sentences, it always places interrogative words or phrases first in interrogative word questions (wh-questions), as in 5-33b & 5-34b:

- 5-33a jā`a Zayd-un. [declarative: verbal]  
came Zeid-nom.  
Zeid [theme] came [rheme].

- 5-33b man jā`a?  
who came?

- 5-34a hādā Zayd-un. [declarative:nominal]  
This is Zeid.

- 5-34b man hādā?  
Who is this man?

Universal principle 18 states that in languages with dominant VSO, an inflected auxiliary always precedes the verb. In SA, auxiliaries always precede, as in:

- 5-35 yajibu `an `a-dhab-a `ila s-sūq-i.  
have (to) I-go-accus. to the-market-gen.  
I [theme] have to go to the market [rheme].

Greenberg also points out in his 17<sup>th</sup> universal principle that languages with a dominant VSO order have their adjectives following their nouns. SA gives a perfect example of complying with this principle, as in:

- 5-36a Zayd-un rajul-un šujā<sup>c</sup>-un. [nominal sentence]  
Zeid-nom man-nom. courageous-nom.  
Zeid [theme] is a courageous man [rheme].

- 5-36b šāhad-tu rajul-an šujā<sup>c</sup>-an. [verbal sentence]  
saw-I man-accus. courageous-nom.  
I saw a brave man.

Greenberg also asserts in his 6<sup>th</sup> universal principle that all languages with a dominant VSO order have a SVO order as an alternative, and, in some of these languages (not in Arabic) as the only alternative basic order. This can be illustrated

from SA by the following examples:

- 5-37a *ḡaraba Zayd-un ‘amr-an.* VSO [Zeid hit Amr.]  
5-37b *Zayd-un ḡaraba ‘amr-an.* SVO [It was ZEID who hit Amr./Zeid hit Amr.]  
5-37c *ḡaraba ‘amr-an Zayd-un.* VOS [He hit Amr, ZEID./Amr was hit by Zeid]  
5-37d *‘amr-an ḡaraba-hu Zayd-un.* OVS [Amr was hit by Zeid/Amr, Zeid hit him]

Although these examples seem to support Greenberg’s universal principle 6, there are, however, counter-examples to this principle. If the object is indefinite in Arabic as in example 38b below, then the SVO WO is not appropriate, unless the sentence comes at the beginning of a discourse. Such examples would be like:

- 5-38a *ḡaraba Zaydun rajul-an.* VSO [Zeid hit a man.]  
5-38b *rajul-an Zayd-un ḡaraba-hu.* SVO [A man was hit by Zeid.]  
5-38c *ḡaraba ‘amr-an rajul-un.* VOS [Amr was hit by a man.]  
5-38d *‘amr-an ḡaraba-hu rajul-un.* OVS [Amr was hit by a man./ Amr, a man hit him]

Sentences 5-37d and 5-38b & d suggest a distinction between subject and topic/theme. The head NP is the topic of the sentences; however, it need not be the subject. As a matter of fact, the subject and the topic are only the same in 37(a, b & c) & 38a, where WO is SVO, whereas in 5-37d and 5-38d, the object is the initial element in both.

Chomsky (1965, pp. 71-74) defines the subject of the sentence in terms of a sequence of the following rules:

- 5-39a Sentence  $\longrightarrow$  NP + VP  
5-39b VP  $\longrightarrow$  V + NP

This supposedly basic configuration identifies the subject, which is the NP in 5-37b; moreover, in accordance with 5-39a, every sentence contains a VP. Influenced by Chomsky’s analysis, Lewkowicz (1967), among others, has analyzed Arabic as an SVO language. SA unambiguously distinguishes between subject and topic, as will be explained in the third argument below with regard to the TAGs’ treatment of what they call ‘al- ‘iṣṭigāl’ (government). According to the Basrans, every topic is, to some extent, the head NP of the sentence in which it occurs (in an SVO WO). Thus one can safely say that SA can topicalize (in a sense of Halliday’s 1967c sense marked theme) a subject or a non-subject, as in:

- 5-40 *ḡaḡara r-rajul-u.*  
came the-man-nom.  
The man [theme] came [rheme].

- 5-41 šāḥad-tu l-bint-a.  
saw-I the-girl-accus.  
I [theme] saw the girl[rheme].
- 5-42 fataḥ-tu l-bāb-a bi-l-miftāḥ-i.  
opened-I the-door-accus. with-the-key-gen.  
I [theme] opened the door with the key [rheme].
- 5-43 qābal-tu mudīr-a l-madrasat-i.  
met-I principal-accus. (of) the-school-gen.  
I [theme] met the principal of the school [rheme].

I believe that the underlined NP in 5-40 already has the status of unmarked theme in Arabic as well as its English counterpart, whereas the underlined elements of examples 5-41 & 5-43 are part of the rheme, because they constitute what the TAGs call earlier ‘complements/surplaces’ (faḍalāt), that are associated with the verb, which according to TAGs, especially the Kufans, constitute the predicate (rheme/comment) of the verbal sentence. The above two arguments, which are influenced by TG, consider only as topic the NP that is initial, which in Halliday’s model constitutes only the marked theme (cf. 3.6.2). This comes as a result of combining the thematic structure and the information structure under one rubric: topic. This is why ‘the man’ (ar-rajulu) in 5-40 is only considered topic when it is preposed, and this is why generative linguists have treated Arabic as an SVO language.

To continue with the above argument, TG linguists point out that NPs like the underlined in 5-41 through 5-43 can be placed to the front and be treated as topics, which, in Halliday’s model (e.g. reference theme: cf. 3.6.4.3), become marked themes by the process of substitution, as in:

- 5-41a al-bint-u                      šāḥad-tu-ha.  
the-girl-nom.                      saw-I-her  
The girl [theme] I saw her [rheme].

In certain cases, ‘topicalization’ does not have to be accompanied by assignment of nominative case, but the ‘topic’ stays in the accusative case, as in:

- 5-44 ‘amr-an                      ḍaraba-hu Zayd-un.  
Amr-accus. hit-him                      Zeid-nom.  
Amr [theme] , Zeid hit him [rheme]. (or) Amr [theme] was hit by Zeid [rheme].

According to linguists following the TG model, the underlined NP in 5-41a is topic and not subject, which is similar to TAGs’ treatment of such cases (as will be shown in the

third argument below). According to case-grammarians, (Saad 1982<sup>27</sup>), the topicalization that derives 5-41a from 5-41 involves three transformation processes: copying, transformation and pronominalization, as in:

5-45 šāhad-tu l-bint-a.

5-45a al-bint-a šāhad-tu al-bint-a. [copying]

5-45b al-bint-a šāhad-tu-ha. [transformation/ The Kufans' view]

5-45c al-bint-u šāhad-tu-ha. [pronominalization/ The Basran's view]

In comparison with 5-41a(=45c), 5-44 involves only a movement transformation which moves the object to the beginning of the sentence. Case grammarians call this type of movement "secondary topicalization" (Saad, 1982, p. 11)., a term which seems to be borrowed from Fillmore (1968)<sup>28</sup>.

The above analysis and arguments are consistent, as will be shown below, the terminology of TAGs, who call what has been called subject (actor), and what has been topic in primary topicalization (marked theme in Halliday's term), 'al-mubtada' u bihi', 'that which is begun with'. In secondary topicalization, no movement transformation is involved. Thus, like TAGs, the TG linguists take the nominative NP in SA as the topic or 'mubtada'. The important point here is that while 5-45 has a VSO order, 5-41a (=45c) does not, it has rather an S[topic]VSO. A VP in a transitive sentence consists of a verb followed by an object in accordance with Chomsky's phrase structure rules stated above. Therefore, SA has no VP in this sense of the term. On the other hand, subject as identified by the phrase structure rule 5-39 must be followed by a VP and as such does not exist in SA. Therefore, there is valid evidence, that in its unmarked WO, Arabic is a VSO language.

Similar, though having a different purpose than the above two TG-oriented arguments, is the argument given by TAGs with regard to whether the preposed object/patient should be in the nominative or remain in the accusative case. Like TG linguists, TAGs had endless disputes regarding this matter; these finally resulted in a 'half-way solution'. This final solution rested on the fact that the preposed object can stay either way, depending on the purpose, 'mainly the rhetorical/pragmatic one', of the speaker/writer in preposing the object, which seems to be the 'scape-goat' for the TAGs when they are faced with such problems. TAGs have dealt with this problem, as indicated earlier, under the rubric of 'al-'ištigāl' which translates to similar term in TG (government), as in:

5-46a Zayd-un [theme & new] laqī-tu-(hu) [rheme & given].

Zeid-nom. met-I-(him).

Zeid [theme], I met him [rheme] (or) It was **ZAID** [theme & new] that I met.  
[Rheme & given.]

5-46b Zayd-an laqī-tu-hu.

Zeid-accus. met-I-him.

I met him [rheme & given] , **ZAID** [theme & new]. (cf. 3.6.4.2)

The problem that faces the TAGs in this respect is two-fold. Firstly, the verb (the operator here) has operated upon the 'suffixed/ connected pronoun' (damīr muttaṣil) (hu: 'him') and the verb is kept 'occupied/ engaged with', hence the name 'al-ʾiṣṭigāl (keeping busy), and thus it does not 'bother' the preposed object any more. This is what prompts TAGs and TG linguists to go for the accusative case in 5-46b, and hence 'topicalization'. Secondly, If this preposed object is to maintain its accusative case, as some of the TAGs suggest, as will be shown, they have to 'presuppose' an ellipted operator prior to it, which, of course, is a verb similar to the overt one, as in:

5-47 (0=laqīt-u) Zayd-an laqī-tu-hu.

(0=met-I) Zeid-accus. met-I-him.

It was Zeid, that I met. (or) **ZEID** is the one I met.

This is similar to the TG process of copying except that TAGs call it 'al-ʿāmil l-muqaddar' (the covert operator).

TAGs identify three grammatical situations, which they explain in pragmatic terms, in which the preposed object remains in the accusative case:

1. If the verb is of the performative type (ṭalabī aw ʾinšāʾī), which, typically, does not convey a xabar<sup>29</sup>. In this case, TAGs believe that the preposed object must stay in the accusative case. Their 'pragmatic justification' of this case is that, since the object is not the one that is being 'talked about' in the sentence, i.e. theme or topic, and there is no more 'new information' to be rendered after it in the same sentence, it can be preposed while maintaining its accusative case: preposed as if a 'new' piece of information for the purpose of 'emphasis'. This evidence seems to support that translation of the Arabic examples into it-cleft construction in English, and supports earlier claims about it-clefts (cf. 4.4). An example from SA to illustrate this would be:

5-48 Zayd-an ʾidrib-0-hu.

Zeid-accus. hit-(0=you)-him

**Zeid**, you hit him! [imperative]. or

It is **Zeid** [theme& new] that you should hit [rheme/given].

TAGs' only exception to this rule is that when the 'ṭalab' (demand) is of a general type and not specific. This exception can be exemplified from the Holy Qur'ān or any type of legal writings, e.g., constitutions, that applies to everybody, a thing that prompts TAGs to say that it has a sort of a 'ixbār' (informativity), as in:

5-49 wa s-sāriq-u                      wa s-sāriqat-u                      faqṭa<sup>c</sup>-ū aydihimā.  
and the-man-thief-nom. and the-woman-thief-nom. cut-plural hands-their  
As for the man-thief and the woman-thief [theme], cut of their hands [rheme]!

2. If an interrogative particle ( 'a = hamza) and negative particles, like 'mā', 'lā' precede the preposed NP (object). Here, TAGs point out that although it is preferable to have the NP in the accusative case on the basis of the justification given above, they do not object to changing its case to nominative. They, however, do not give any justification for changing the case (except that they may had a covert operator in mind). In my opinion, since it is the speaker/writer who decides what to use on the basis of the contextual circumstances that surround the speech situation, it is he who decides what to talk about, whether the preposed object or the subject. Thus if the speaker wants talk about that preposed object, i.e. make it the topic/theme, he must put it the nominative case, but if he wants to 'inform' about the subject, i.e. make the latter the topic/theme, by using the verb and this preposed object or any 'fadla', he must leave the preposed object in the accusative case, as in, respectively:

5-50a 'a Zayd-an      qarab-ta-hu      am 'amr-un  
was Zeid-accus. hit-you-him      or Amr-nom.  
Was it Zeid or Amr [theme/new] that you hit [rheme]?

5-50b 'a Zaydun      qarab-ta-hu      am habas-ta-hu?  
was (it) Zeid hit-you-him or jailed-you-him?  
Was it the case [theme] that you **HIT** Zaid or **JAILED** him [rheme].

3. If the preposed NP acts as either an answer to an interrogative accusative, or if it comes as the head NP in a second coordinated sentence, and the two sentences are not separated by particles like 'as for' ('ammā)<sup>30</sup>, as in 5-51a & b and 52a, respectively:

5-51a man                      laqī-ta? [wh-question]  
whom/who met-you?  
Whom/who did you meet?

5-51b Zayd-an      (0= laqī-ta). [answer]  
Zeid-accus. (0= met-I)  
Zeid (rheme).

5-52a   ʾadnay-tu   Zayd-an   wa ʿamr-an   ʾaqṣay-tu-hu.  
          stay close-I   Zeid-accus. and Amr-accus. stay a part-him.  
          I [theme] let Zeid stay close to me [rheme] and (0=I theme)  
          let Amr stay a part [rheme].

But if the second coordinated clause in 5-52a is preceded by ‘ʾammā’, TAGs, especially Sibawayhi, propose the nominative case for the second clause’s preposed object, as in:

5-52b   ʾadnay-tu   Zayd-an   wa ʾammā ʿamr-un   fa- ʾaqṣaytu-hu.  
          stay close-I Zeid-accus. and as for Amr-nom. stay a part-I-him.  
          I [theme] let Zeid stay close to me [rheme] but as for Amr [theme/new],  
          I let him stay a part [rheme].

In this situation, it seems that the TAGs seem to have made use of the asymmetry of the way coordinated sentences are expressed: if the previous discourse is expressed by a verbal sentence, then the next piece of discourse is usually expressed by a verbal sentence too. This harmony tallies with SA WO, and adds evidence to Ḍayf’s (1982, p. 235) claim that “Arabic has originated as a poetic language”<sup>31</sup>, and probably still is so.

### 5.2.1 Verbal Sentences.

As indicated earlier, TAGs have analyzed verbal sentences into two basic constituents: al-fiʿl (musnad/comment/rheme) and al-fāʿil (musnad ʾ ilayhi/topic/ theme). The former expresses the temporal, action (process), or condition, and the latter the person, the thing which the process is attributed to. TAGs also point out that subjects in verbal sentences are represented as acting with transitive verbs or with intransitive verbs, such that they have a temporary status or condition as far as the process itself is concerned. In this respect, the verbs are the ‘ʿawāmil’ (operators), which could be identified with ‘head’ in modern linguistics, and which operate either on a subject or an object, depending on the type of the verb, hence the VSO or VS WO in the verbal sentence is its typical unmarked sense.

Thus subjects must follow their verbs, but in cases, where they do not (when preposed/postposed), they usually leave a representative behind (a connected or a covert pronoun) to indicate their typical/unmarked positions, as in:

5-53a   ʾaṭ-ṭullāb-u           ḥaḍar-ū.  
          the-students-acc. attended-3pl



**the-students-nom.    came-plural    connected    pronoun.**

The students [theme] came [rheme].

In this example, the connected pronoun /ū/, being ‘cā'id' (co-referential) with the subject, functions as the agent of the sentence. The pronoun /ū/ follows the verb immediately, which gives strong evidence of the ‘topicality’ of ‘aṭ-ṭullābu’ of TG, and marked theme in Halliday’s term.

This also suggests the ungrammaticality of some verbal sentences, as in:

5-53b hadar-ū 'at-tullāb-u.

came- plural nom. connected pronoun the-students-nom.

**They came [rheme], the students [theme].**

From the TAGs point of view, this sentence is grammatically not correct because it contains two subjects/agents, but from a Hallidayan point view as well as Western linguists', it might be regarded correct because the so-called second subject is no more than an 'after-thought', where the speaker feels that he gives less information than is required to express what he pragmatically has in mind.

One point that is worthy of mention in this discussion of the typical WO of verbal sentences is what grammarians have said with regard to its beginning. Khatīb et. al. (1985, p. 85) point out that the verbal sentences has to be considered as always starting with the verb (al-musnad), unless of course its fā'il/subject or maf'ūl bihi/object is preposed for any reason<sup>32</sup>. Thus if it starts with any of its fadalāt (complements) other than subject or object, what will be considered as its beginning is the verb, as in:

5-54a baynamā kun-nā nastamiʿu ʿila l-mūsīqā, samiʿnā šurāx-an ʿafzaʿa-nā.

while were-we listening to the-music, heard-we screaming-accus.

**frightened-us**

While we were listening to the music [theme], we heard screaming that

frightened us [rheme].

This is a verbal sentence although the adverbial phrase is preposed in the verbal sentence for emphasis (marked theme, in Halliday's terms), because this sentence can be re-written in its unmarked thematic sense as:

5-54b sami<sup>c</sup>-nā šurāx-an      ʾafza<sup>c</sup>a-nā. baynama kunnā nastami<sup>c</sup>u ila l-mūsīqā.

heard-we screaming-accus. frightened-us while were-we listening to the-music

We [theme] heard screaming that frightened us while we were listening to the music [rheme].

This is why TAGs have divided embedded sentences (cf. 5.3.4), whether nominal or

verbal, into two major categories: those that replace a single word in the compound sentence (cf. chapter 6), and those that do not. They regard the former type as sentences that can be parsed, and the latter as not subject to parsing. The TAGs as well as ‘neo-grammarians’ are still disputing to the number and type of each.

### 5.2.2 Nominal Sentences

Traditionally, a nominal sentence usually starts with a NP as its ‘initial element’, a *mubtada* ‘topic, followed by *xabar*/comment. The initial element(s) may consist of other constituents and constructions like the verbal noun sentence ‘*jumla maṣḍariyya*’, as in:

- 5-55 *‘in taṣūm-ū xayrun lak-um.*  
 if fast-you good for-you  
 If you fast [theme], it will be good for you [rheme].

In this sentence, the *mubtada* (theme/topic) ‘*‘in taṣūm-ū*’ can be replaced by one word ‘*ṣiyāmukum*’ (your fasting), and the verbal clause is analyzed as a *mubtada*’, constituting the first constituent of an equational sentence in SA (cf. 5.4.5).

By the same token, in nominal sentences like:

- 5-56 *al-muwāṭin l-muxliṣu yudāfi‘u ‘an bilādihi.*  
 the-citizen the-faithful defends country-his  
 The faithful citizen [theme] defends his country [rheme].

Here, the verbal-predicate ‘*yudāfi‘u ‘an bilādihi*’ is an embedded (dependent) verbal sentence that acts as ‘*xabar*’ (rheme/comment). In this respect, TAGs claim that if the agent is preposed, as indicated above, the verb does not have an overt subject, but rather a covert one. This sentence can be parsed (a) and thematically analyzed (b) as follows:

5-56b	al-muwāṭin	l-muxliṣu	yudāfi‘u	0=huwa	‘an bilādihi
(a)	mubtada’	adjective	fi‘l	fā‘il	ḵār wa majrūr
(b)	mubtada’/theme		xabar/rheme		

Although the pronominal subject ‘*huwa*’ is usually ellipped on the surface structure, its presence is implied or ‘*mustatir*’ (covert). It could however, be present on the surface structure for the purpose of emphasis, as in (see next page):

5-57	Zayd-un	kitābu-hu	jadīd-un.
(a)	mubtadaʿ	mubtadaʿ	xabar
(b)	theme ʿ	rheme	

Zeid            book-his        (is) new.  
Zeid's book[theme] is new [rheme].

TAGs analyzed 5-57 in two ways: one group analyzed it as (a) and the other as (a & b). The one group who analyzed it as (b) only analyze the main clause or as they call it 'al-jumla l-kubrā', while the other group who analyzed as a & b analyze the main clause and the subordinate or embedded one (cf. 5.3.4), which they call 'al-jumla ṣ-ṣuġrā' (cf. also chapter 6). In the case of the (a) analysis, the 'resumptive/coreferential pronoun' (ḍamīr ʿistiʿnāf) is obligatory because its presence links the main clause with the subordinate one and without it the nominal sentence would be ungrammatical. In order for this noun to be a real linking one, it must agree with its co-referent in number and gender. Unlike the type of pronoun discussed above under 'al-ʿiṣṭigāl' (government), the pronoun in examples like 5-57 cannot be dispensed with. Thus one can safely state here that for the resumptive pronoun to be there, a relation of possession between the mubtada (theme/topic) of the main clause and that of the subordinated one must exist; this basically occurs when the both sentences consist of mubtadaʿ and a xabar that are NPs.

Anīs (1978), following in the steps of the TAGs, divides nominal sentences into three major types: (1) a nominal sentence, where the musnad ilayhi/mubtada (theme/topic), is a definite NP, 'maʿrifa' (known) and the musnad/xabar (rheme/comment) is an indefinite NP, 'nakira' (unknown), (2) a nominal sentence, where the musnad ilayhi and the musnad are indefinite NPs, and (3) a nominal sentence, where both the predicand (musnad ʿilayhi) and the predicate (musnad) are both definite NPs.

As for the first type, Anīs subdivides it into two sub-types depending on the type grammatical function of the musand in the sentence. The first sub-type, where the musnad is either an indefinite adjective or noun, can be illustrated, respectively, by:

5-58 Zayd-un ṭālib-un nājiḥ-un.  
Zeid-nom. student-nom. successful-nom.

Zeid [theme] is a successful student [rheme].

- 5-59 al-ʿilm-u            nūr-un  
The-science.nom light-nom.  
Science is enlightening.

As shown in this type of examples, typical WO in SA requires that the musnad ilayhi precedes the musnad (start with the known and proceed to the unknown information for the benefit of the receiver), unless the sentence is preceded by an interrogative or a negation particle. Interrogative can be illustrated by examples like:

- 5-60 ʾarāḡib-un    ʾanta ʿan širāʾi s-sayyārati?  
willing-nom. you not to buy the-car.  
Are you [theme] willing not to buy the car [rheme]?

The musnad 'rāḡibun' is an indefinite descriptive adjective that preposed for emphasis, and the question asked in 5-60 is to challenge it as a proposition. The question in 5-60 can, however, be asked in another way, as:

- 5-60a ʾa ʾanta rāḡib-un    ʿan    širāʾi    s-sayyārati?  
Are-you willing-nom. not to buy-gen. the-car?  
Are you willing not to buy the car?

Here, the question is asked to challenge the status of the speaker (al-musnad ʾilayhi) rather than al-musnad. This can also apply to the indefinite noun, as in:

- 5-61 ʾa-samak-un    al-ḥūt-u?  
is-fish-nom. the-whale-nom.  
Is it fish [rheme], the whale [theme]. [substitution in Halliday's formulation]  
(cf. 3.6.4.2).

Here, the interest is directed towards a certain type of fish, which is taken as the point of interest of the speaker to 'speak about' (theme), hence the 'whale' is postposed (right-dislocated in the English translation). If, however, the interest is directed towards the 'whale' itself, the nusnad ilayhi will be preposed, as in:

- 5-61a ʾa-al-ḥūt-u            samak-un?  
is-the-whale-nom. fish-nom.?  
Is the whale [theme] a fish [rheme].

The second sub-type of the first type of nominal sentences, where the musnad is either a prepositional or an adverbial phrase, anastrophe is optional; in 5-62a and 5-62b, the meaning does not change; the change is merely a matter of style:

- 5-62a al-ḥamd-u            ll-lāh-i.  
the-thanks-nom. for-Allah-gen.  
Thanks [theme] God [rheme].

- 5-62b *ll-lāhi*                      *l-ḥamd-u*  
for-Allah-gen. the-thanks-nom.  
For Allah [theme/new] (goes) all the thanks [rheme].

The second major type of nominal sentence, where both the musnad *ilayhi* and the musnad are indefinite, is also divided by TAGs into many sub-types. There are, however, two sub-types that are of interest to this study. The first sub-type is the one where musnad *‘ilayhi* (predicand) is modified by an adjective which causes it to be more specific, as in:

- 5-63a *ṭālib-un*                      *mujtahid-un*                      *xayr-un*                      *min ‘āxara kasūl-in*  
a-student-nom. hard-working-nom. better-nom. than another lazy-gen.  
A hard-working student [theme] is better than a lazy one [rheme].

The second type is when the musnad is either a prepositional or an adverbial phrase, as in:

- 5-63b *fī-hā*                              *fākihat-un wa naxl-un wa rummān-un.*  
in-it (co-referential) fruits-nom. and dates-nom and pomegranate-nom.  
In it [rheme], there are fruits, dates and pomegranate [theme].

With regard to the third major of nominal sentences, where both the musnad *ilayhi* and the musnad are definite NPs, rhetoricians (al-Jurjānī, 1988) and (‘abbās, 1989), among many others, use WO to explain the notions of definiteness (knownness) and indefiniteness (unknownness), although both constituents are definite. In this respect, ‘abbās (1989, p. 210) discusses this matter by illustrating it in examples like:

- 5-64a *Zayd-un*                      *‘ax-ū-ka*  
Zeid-nom. brother-nom.-your  
Zeid [theme] is your brother [rheme].

- 5-64b *‘ax-ū-ka*                      *Zayd-un.*  
brother-nom.-your Zeid-nom.  
Your brother [theme] is Zeid [rheme].

In 5-64a, ‘abbās points out that the speaker knows that X has a brother but he does not know that his name is ‘Zeid’, while in 5-64b, the speaker knows ‘Zeid’, but he does not know that he is X’s brother. This distinction, however, is also stylistic, since the denotational meaning does not change in either sentence (cf. 2.3.2 & 3.6.3).

With regard to the third type nominal sentences, one final point is worthy of mention. Most TAGs point out that, in addition to the fact that the typical position of *xabar* is after the *mubtada* (predicand), it is also typical for the *mubtada* to be definite, thus known information, and the *xabar* to be indefinite and thus unknown information.

At the same time, however, TAGs also suggest that there are cases where the *mubtada* and the *xabar* are definite: both have the definite article 'al' (the). From a grammatical as well as a functional point of view, if two nominals, a common noun and an active or passive participle, follow one another as in:

5-65 *at-ṭullābu n-nājiḥūna*

the hearer/reader will expect that there must be a *xabar* to follow in order to benefit from, because, for him, this is no more than a *mubtada*\*/theme followed by a *naʿt*/adjective. To avoid this ambiguity, TAGs point out that Arabic makes use of what they call 'pronoun of separation' ('*ḍamīr al-faṣl*') to separate the one element from the other. In modern linguistic terms, this pronoun, as will be shown below (cf. 5.4), is no more than a copula in SA, since Arabic does not contain copulative verbs like English, for example.

### 5.2.3 Functional Aspects in TAGs' Analysis of SA

Two main aspects of functionalism will be briefly outlined with regard to the TAGs' formal analysis of SA. The first has to do with the relationship between a linguistic form and other parts of the linguistic patterns or systems in which it is used, i.e., a NP in grammar can function as a subject, an object or a complement, etc. These syntactic functions or relations are the major feature of the several models of linguistic analysis, including the approaches adopted by the Prague School and systemic linguistics; terms such as FSP (cf. chapter 2) and functional grammar (cf. chapter 3) have been used to characterize theories that treat the notion of function as central.

The second aspect of functionalism that will be discussed in this section is the TAGs' position with regard to context whether verbal or situational, and how the TAGs make use of it in their formal analysis of SA. In a modern linguistic sense, it is the role language plays in the context of society as well as the individual, or what is come to be known the social functions of language, the ways in which language is used to communicate ideas, to express attitudes, and so on.

As for the first aspect, TAGs usually distinguish between two aspects (systems) of the languages: its '*lafẓ*' (expression) and its '*maʿnā*' (meaning). For them, the former refers to the form of the linguistic expression, while the latter to the meaning of the

expression as intended by the speaker/writer. This is, somewhat, similar to the traditional TG notion of surface structure (lafz: 'expression/utterance') and deep structure (ma'nā: 'meaning'), although deep structure is not felt to be semantic structure as such; the relation between the two is expressed by Sibawayhi's (1881, p. 7) traditional view that "the meaning of an element influences its expression".

TAGs assume that language should be informative in the sense that it denotes 'ma'nā' (meaning) which 'al-mutakallim' (the speaker) intends to convey to the hearer, as in:

5-66 Zayd-un ḥakīm-un.  
Zeid-nom. wise-nom.  
Zeid [theme] is wise [rheme].


This sentence is informative, since it conveys information that is believed to be unknown to the hearer. In this respect, 'Zeid' is said to be known, while 'is wise' is not. In his *Kitāb*, Sibawayhi discusses 'old' and 'new' information in terms of whether the hearer knows what the speaker intends to convey. Sibawayhi also establishes different degrees of 'knownness' with regard to information status. His claim is that, within an utterance, some elements are more informative than others, i.e. here 'ḥakīm-un' is more informative than 'Zayd-un'. According to him, much of what one says is governed by what one thinks of how much the hearer knows, expects or wants to know. In this respect, Sibawayhi (1881, p. 182) says that "the speaker's speech goes in accordance with the hearer's expectations". He, thus views 'meaningful utterances' as those which convey new information to the hearer in order to achieve the social obligation to communicate.

In this respect, TAGs classified language into three main categories: nouns which qualify meaning as to substance or provide substances and information in the language, verbs which qualify meaning as to time or provide representation for actions/events which affect the substance, and particles which function as a linkage between the two, or as az-Zajājī (1959, p. 44) put it: "etymologically, 'al-ḥurūf' ('edges') are called thus, because they fall between the edges of the nouns and verbs" [my translation].

In dealing with these categories, TAGs outlined a model of syntactic hierarchy: this can be regarded as either a constituency model of syntax or a dependency one. The former is similar to that of immediate constituents (IC) analysis (again a striking

similarity with IC in TG & elsewhere), where a unit is related to a neighbouring unit by their placement within a larger unit, as in:

5-67 al-walad-u rakiba d-darrājat-a.  
the-boy-nom. rode the-bicycle-accus.  
the boy [theme] rode the bicycle [rheme]:



TAGs have used a number of terms to refer to the notion of function in their analysis. They have made frequent references to function whenever they dealt with 'mawāḍiʿ', 'maḥal', 'manzila', 'mawāqīʿ', and 'waḍīfa', all of which mean either, places, positions, or statuses. In this respect, I believe that TAGs use these terms to discuss the notion of function. Their basic assumption is that the 'surface structure' was governed by the functions of units in the language. These units include the verbs, nouns, particles, verb phrases (VP), clauses and sentences. Functional relations between these units are the key factors linking these units together. They view language as a 'system' made up of slots, with certain units occurring in these positions. For them, for example, a sentence is traditionally analyzed as having three major slots: subject, predicate and 'complement' (fadla), with nouns occurring in the subject and object slots and verbs in the predicate slot.

Furthermore, TAGs have pointed out, as indicated earlier, that the 'maʿnā' (meaning) of the element is influenced by its 'function' (waḍīfa), which, in turn, influence its 'utterance' (lafz). Thus in examples like 'he went' (dahaba) and 'he hit' (ḍaraba), the difference between them is both in meaning and form. The former requires no object, while the latter does. In this context, TAGs are referring to the notion of transitivity in verbs. Another example which TAGs use to refer to this point, is the difference between 'al-fāʿil' (agent/subject) and 'al-mafʿūl bihi' (patient/object). They argue that the function of an element would influence its form, as in:

5-68 ḍaraba Zayd-un ʿamr-an  
hit Zeid-nom. Amr-accus.  
Zeid [theme] hit Amr [rheme].



TAGs contend that the function of the agent 'Zeid' causes its (utterance/ expression) to be in the nominative case. In fact, TAGs, including Sibawayhi, az-Zajājī, az-Zamakhsharī, Mālik Bin Anas and Ibn Hishām, have used the term 'mawḍiʿ' to refer to 'function' (in the sense of function in the language system). Thus in 5-68, 'Zaydun' is in the nominative case because it is in the 'agentive place/slot' and its function is to fill in that slot, and the same argument holds true for 'amr-an'.

Carter (1973, p. 148) points out that Sibawayhi uses the term 'mawḍiʿ' in his *kitāb* to mean function in the current sense<sup>33</sup>. This use by Sibawayhi can be understood more clearly if one recalls what Bloomfield (1957, p. 185) states about the relationship between function and position when he says: "the positions in which a form can appear are its function, or collectively, its functions"<sup>34</sup>. Prior to this, Sibawayhi uses 'mawḍiʿ' to indicate the linguistic function of an element. If one considers, what he, in his *Kitāb*, vol.2 (Sibawayhi,1968, p. 156), says with regard to the mawḍiʿ of 'kam' (how much):

'kam' has two positions: one for 'ʾistifhām' (interrogative) , [which places it] in the status of 'kayfa' and 'ʾayna' (how and where) [inquiring about the number of times], and the other is xabar [informing of a large number of times].

Sibawayhi's use of 'mawḍiʿ' (position) suggests that the position a word occupies in the sentence is not 'aimless': it reflects both the speaker's intentions (intended messages) and influences the hearer's ability to interpret the message.

TAGs study of WO in SA primarily resulted from their interest in the positions words occupy in a sentence. They used the following terms to refer to WO: 'mawāḍiʿu l-kalimāt' (position of words), 'tartīb u l-kalimāt' (order of words), and 'at-tartīb l-waḍʿī' (the positional order). Thus, in dealing with WO in SA, TAGs assumed that the position of words is determined by their communicative function. This functional assumption has been traditionally used to account for a considerable number of linguistic phenomena in Arabic such as inversion, focus, topicalization, relativization, among others. Speakers and/or writers determine the order of words in accordance with the communicative functions intended to be conveyed by these words. They have considerable freedom in choosing positions of words in a sentence due to grammatical functions and relations. A subject or an object, for example, may occur before the verb. This displacement of subjects and objects from their normal positions in a sentence has

been traditionally seen as a device of emphasis, contrast or focus (i.e., locutionary force). Implicit in the traditional approach of the study of WO in Arabic, however, is the functional assumption that native speakers and writers of Arabic manipulate the order of words to achieve intended communicative (rhetorical) purposes (i.e., illocutionary or perlocutionary force).

The second aspect of functionalism in the TAGs' formal analysis of SA is their use of the notion 'ʿas-siyāq' (context). For TAGs, language is treated as a social behaviour. Sibawayhi, for example, uses many terms in his description of language behaviour that are used till now for the description of human behaviour. Terms, which he refers to by 'ways' of speaking, include words like 'sunna', 'wajh', 'naḥw', 'šarf', 'ṭarīqa', 'madḥab' and 'majrā', among others, which are used in Islamic law to describe certain ways of human behaviour.

Among others, Sibawayhi believes that since language is a human behaviour, it should be subject to some behavioural criteria. In this respect, he adopts some sort of 'ethical criteria' to judge and evaluate discourse; he explains these criteria in his *Kitāb*, vol. 2, (Sibawayhi, 1968, p. 25) under the section : 'al-ʿistiḳāmatu fi l-kalām' (straightness of discourse), where he divides discourse into four major parts with regard to his ethical criteria:

1. mustaqīmun ḥasan ( straight and right), as in:

5-69a ʿatay-tu-ka ʿams-in  
came-I-you yesterday-gen.  
I came to [visit] you yesterday.

2. mustaqīmun wa kāḍib (straight and false), as in:

5-69b ʿatay-tu-ka ḡad-an. (unacceptable in SA)  
came-I-you tomorrow-accus.  
I came to [visit] you tomorrow.

3. mustaqīmun qabīḥ, (straight and bad), as in:

5.69c qad Zaydun raʿay-tu-ka. (unacceptable in SA)  
[it is] Zeid saw-I-you.  
It is Zeid that I saw you.

4. muḥālun kāḍib (impossible and false), as in:

5-69d sawfa ʿašrabu maʿa l-bahri

will drink-I water the-sea-gen.  
I will drink the water of the sea.

By using these four criteria, Sibawayhi is able to evaluate the 'well-formedness' of an utterance by using 'ḥasan wa kādib', and he uses the criteria 'mustaqīmun wa qabīḥ' to evaluate the utterance from the point of view of its appropriateness to logic and social conventions of the speech community.

TAGs have made use of two types of context: 'dalīlun lafẓī' (literally: formal pointer) and 'dalīlun ḥālī' (literally: situational pointer), which can be translated, respectively, in the modern linguistic terms into verbal context and situational context. By the use of these two notions of context, TAGs are able to investigate a number of linguistic phenomena in Arabic like ellipsis, focus, and emphasis, among others.

For Sibawayhi, speech/discourse does not exist in isolation; it occurs between a speaker/writer and a hearer/reader. Sibawayhi develops in his *Kitāb*, an elaborate system of speech communication; his assumption is that speakers have some new knowledge they wish to convey to the hearer, and that they structure their messages in ways which allow the hearer to interpret them. The hearer's expectations and needs are usually met by the speaker's conveyed messages. I believe that Sibawayhi, though formal in his approach to language analysis, has succeeded in outlining a theory of information structure in Arabic. Most of the current functional notions dealing with the study of information structure of languages can be easily equated with Sibawayhi's notions. For example, his notion of 'less' and 'more' informative elements in an utterance (a sentence or a clause) can be equated to some extent with Firbas' notion of CD (cf. 2.2.4), but what seems to be missing in the TAGs' formal approach is the criterion by which to decide which elements are more or less informative; a thing that Firbas himself, hundreds of years later than Sibawayhi, could not sort out, and which subjected him to severe criticism (cf. 2.2.4.1).

With regard to Sibawayhi's four ethical criteria of appropriate (to context) and well-formed utterances, Carter (1973, p. 147) points out that by 'mustaqīmun', the hearer understands the conveyed message(s), whereas the term 'muḥāl' indicates that an utterance is not intelligible\_\_ lacking communicative value. I believe that Sibawayhi's proposal of these two criteria do account for non-structural, extra-linguistic factors that determine the intelligibility of communicative of messages.

With regard to 'ḥasan' and 'qabīḥ', Carter (1973, p. 147) indicates that they can be equated, in a modern linguistic sense, with 'well-formed' and 'ill-formed' respectively. Furthermore, it is the hearer who determines the degree of comprehensibility and well-formedness of the utterance; it also seems that Sibawayhi, among other TAGs, is concerned with how communicative messages are effectively conveyed to the hearer. Thus, the criteria of 'qabīḥ' and 'muḥāl' can also be used to refer to the speaker's failure to communicate effectively intended message(s). This is why TAGs in general, and Sibawayhi in particular, are very keen on placing great significance on the interaction between speakers and hearers.

Among the practical examples that show Sibawayhi's interest in analyzing and consequently interpreting an utterance by reference to its context (especially situational) are the following (taken from his *Kitāb*, vol.1 1881, p. 257):

5-70 makkata wa rabbi l-kaʿbati! / turīdu makkata.  
Makkah [by] God [of] the-Holy Shrine. / want-you Mecca

I swear that [theme] you are going to Mecca [rheme]. / You [theme] want to go to Mecca [rheme].

This sentence, he suggests, can be addressed to some one if the speaker sees that one dressed in white for pilgrimage during the pilgrimage season. Another example, which Sibawayhi explains in terms of situational context is that people cheer 'Allāhu ʿakbar' (Allah is Great) when they see the moon of the month of Ramadan.

At the end of this discussion, one can say that there is a functional aspect to TAGs' analysis although their analysis of Arabic was fundamentally formal. TAGs did not ignore the functional side of the language, that is the role language plays in the social life of the individual, in either their discussion of the function of sentence constituents, their use of WO, or of context. The nature of their overall approach to the study of language was synchronic, because they were primarily concerned with the description of the Holy Qur'ān. This is the main reason for not considering them as functionalists in the modern linguistic terms, because functionalists are interested in both the synchronic as well as the diachronic analysis of language, in that the latter can help establishing and explaining the former. But this does not mean that the primary goal of the functionalists is to study language from a diachronic view point; on the contrary, functional linguistics, established primarily by Mathesius, is an alternative

method to the neo-grammarians diachronic approach towards the analysis of language.

On the basis of the above argument, one can suggest that, within a functional theory of language, grammar functions to provide an intelligible communicative discourse; and rhetoric is mainly concerned with the effectiveness of the communicative units of that discourse. The primary function of communicative units is to convey the intended information. Thus, a functionalist is primarily concerned with the study of the 'communicative' aspects of linguistic units, and secondarily with their 'expressive', 'evaluative' or emotional aspects, a statement which could be applicable to the Prague School linguists, but not to Halliday. Expressive aspects of linguistic units deal with the way(s) messages are expressed; evaluative aspects with appropriateness of the message(s) to the given context, and emotional with the additional rhetorical purposes of the conveyed message(s) such as emphasis or contrast.

Functionalists are usually interested in both the grammatical and rhetorical aspects of language. The function of grammatical structure is to make meaning available to convey information, and speakers/writers utilize functional devices (WO, certain prosodic elements) for practical reasons. The function of the rhetorical structure is to affect the hearer/reader by conveying extra information for additional purposes such as emphasis, persuasion, request and command (speech acts). The interaction between speakers and hearers is of central significance in both rhetorical and functional elements. According to Aristotle *Rhetoric*, speech consists of three major elements: the speaker, the hearer and the speech itself; this corresponds roughly to those contextual elements proposed by Malinowski and Firth (cf. 3.1.2 & 3.1.4 ). Thus, analysis of rhetorical structure requires the analysis of the following aspects: the speaker's expression in terms of intelligibility, correctness, syntactic elaborateness, appropriateness to the context of situation, aesthetic aspects of language used and the hearer's response, which indicates whether the speaker effectively communicated the intended message(s), thus producing a particular effect in the hearer's mind.

Functionalists would use the communicative method to investigate genetically related and non-related languages. In this respect, TAGs were not interested in comparing Arabic with any other language except Ibn Janāh, a Hebrew native speaker, who tried to conduct a contrastive study between Arabic and Hebrew, two Semitic languages. TAGs were not also concerned to come up with language universals. With

regard to formal or functional analysis, TAGs never tried to analyze varieties or genres of language other than the Qur'ānic, poetic, and other limited genres like orations. Even in these limited number of genres, TAGs did not go beyond the sentence level to discourse level (text) in their analysis. This, of course, does not include the Arab rhetoricians' attempts to go beyond the sentence level in analyzing the discourse that was used in the Califas' courts (al-majālis) although, as discussed earlier, TAGs were very interested in the preceding and following sentence or context (verbal or situational) in determining the meaning of the current sentence.

### **5.3 Theme and Mood in SA**

In his discussion of mood in his late 1960s and early 1970s' articles, Halliday points out that a clause or, rather more accurately, an independent clause (a sentence) in English, is either indicative (having an expressed subject) or imperative (having no expressed subject). Furthermore, he also indicates that clauses which are indicative go on to select either an interrogative or declarative mood, and that the interrogative mood could be either polar interrogative (yes/no question clauses) or non-polar (wh-question clauses). Declarative clauses select either assertion or exclamation. On the other hand, imperative clauses can select either jussive or optative, the latter type having non-permissive 'let' and a non-second person nominal. Jussive imperatives are either exclusive or inclusive, the former being realized by the imperative verb and the an implicit second personal pronoun (you); whereas the latter being realized by 'let + a second person (that is 'let us' or let's). The disjunctive entry condition to the [without or with tag] system expresses the generalization that declarative clauses (whether assertions or exclamations) or jussive clauses (whether exclusive or inclusive), can, but need not have a tag (cf. 3.6.2.1 for Halliday's network for mood).

From a systemic linguistics' point of view, the above options in the mood of the clause mainly involve insertion and concatenation realization rules (cf. 3.3.3) of the elements of the clause structure: for instance, indicative clauses contain a subject, while imperative do not; declarative clauses have the word order of subject followed by the

predicate, while interrogative clauses have P<S>, the subject either follows or is followed inside the predicate, as in:

- 5-71a John hit the ball. [declarative]
- 5-71b Did John hit the ball? [polar question]
- 5-71c Who hit the ball? [Wh-question]
- 5-71d Hit the ball! [imperative/jussive]
- 5-71e Let him hit the ball! [imperative/jussive]

As for the difference of the three types of indicative clauses, Halliday attributes it to the type of element occupying the initial position in each: subject in declarative, finite element in the yes/no question and a wh-element in the wh-interrogative. As mentioned earlier, Halliday regards this position as having a unique communication function in the clause, being 'the starting point' for the message (cf 3.6.2).

Mood and its associated options are associated with the interpersonal function as manifested in the clause structure, and this function is concerned with the interaction between the speaker and the addressee, which is made clear in the following:

Mood represents the organization of participants in speech situations, providing options in the form of speaker roles: the speaker may inform, question, or command; he may confirm, request confirmation, contradict or display any one of a wide range of postures defined by the potentialities of linguistic interaction (Halliday, 1967c, p. 199)<sup>35</sup>.

Thus, for Halliday, mood is equated with the selection of communication roles by the speaker (stating, questioning, requesting, and the like), and the allocation of the role choices to the hearer. Communication roles, however, are related by Halliday to mood in a rather implicit and indirect way; they are not to be equated with it; rather the relationship between different levels of patterning in Halliday's work is left blurred and implicit.

By comparison with the system of mood in English, there is nothing in the TAGs' description of Arabic which corresponds closely to Halliday's account of the mood system in English, and thus the general structure of Arabic makes an account of this nature much less obvious for Arabic than is for English. The moods (şiyag) that TAGs normally mention in their work are the indicative (sometimes called the declarative), the subjunctive, the jussive (or opocopatus) and the energetic. These moods, i.e. what are traditionally identified as moods in Arabic by Western grammarians, are restricted to the imperfect tense and are, in fact, modal variations of

the tense form represented by the indicative<sup>36</sup>. The fact that SA has never possessed a distinction of moods for the perfect shows that their diversity in the imperfect is not originally based upon a need for different ways to express a verbal action.

According to Dayf (1982, p. 59), among many others, TAGs refer to the perfect tense as an action which is deemed complete, while the imperfect, on the other hand, refers to action not completed, or still enduring for a certain given time. In SA, however, there is a tendency to project the original functions of the perfect and imperfect into an actual temporal classification of past versus present, although both tenses can express the verbal idea in any of the three temporal states: present, past and future.

as-Sāmarā'ī (1983, p. 52) points out that in Arabic syntax, the temporal span is not well 'under control' as in Indo-European languages<sup>37</sup>. This applies not only to the past tense, but to both the present and the future. In this respect, Ibn Ya'īsh points out that the duration of the tense of the verb itself can be delimited by the verbal and situational context (*bīdalāl l-hāl wa l-'istiqbāl*); thus it is left for the receiver to find out from the contextual circumstances of the discourse or text.

For these reasons, one is encouraged to look for an alternative approach to the system of mood in Arabic other than the purely formal mood of TAGs which is based on morphological rather than functional criteria as well as on the inaccurate notion of tense of the verb. The pragmatic approach adopted by Arab rhetoricians, which is based upon the speech situation and speech role given to the participants as well as context, seems closer to modern linguistic theories applied by functionally-oriented western linguists to languages like English.

In this respect, there is, however, a confusing literature with regard to the distinction between 'sentence' (*jumla*), the TAGs' unit of formal analysis of SA, and utterance (*kalām*), the rhetoricians's unit of pragmatic analysis. This confusion is finally resolved by al-Astrabādi (1975) who points out a neat distinction which is made by TAGs between 'kalām' which is intended as a semantically independent utterance, and 'jumla' which can be used for any sentence, whether it is independent or not. In this respect he says "any kalām is a jumla, but not the reverse" (al-Astrabādi, op. cit, p. 8)<sup>38</sup>. Thus it seems that the distinction between the two terms does not depend so much on the kind of linguistic sequence to which they can refer as on the way in which



this sequence is considered: what characterizes ‘kalām’ is the fact that it bears a single load of information for the benefit of the hearer (fā’ida), and to the realization of such benefit, all the constitutive elements of the sequence contribute, while ‘jumla’ suggests a more formalistic approach, taking into account the nature of these elements and their structural (syntagmatic) relationships. This is probably why it is possible to speak of ‘jumla ismiyya or fi’liyya (nominal and verbal sentence), while no TAG or neo-grammarians, to my knowledge, ever uses ‘kalam fi’li or ‘ismī’. Moreover, a sentence, whether independent or not, is the maximal domain in which operate the basic syntactic analytical devices evolved by TAGs: namely, those based on the theory of ‘‘ifrab’ (government) (cf. 5.1.3).

Although the rhetoricians’ point of view on utterance and texts was not basically different from that of the TAGs in as far as ‘predication’ and ‘complements’ are concerned, the rhetoricians set up a new approach to reflection on language such that even the terms which are originally borrowed from grammar take another content in this new context. To support this proposal, one has to remember, first of all, that rhetoricians have consistently defined the very object of ‘‘ilmu l-ma‘āni’ in reference to such pragmatic terms as ‘the requirement of the situation’ (muqtaḍā l-ḥāl) or ‘the situation of communication’ (maqāmāt l-kalām), which are notions basically alien to the way TAGs, at least the later generation (those who come after the two traditional schools of grammar, the Basrans and the Kufans: see note 1 above), conceived of their object of study. In this respect, it is very significant, as already mentioned, that the sentence (jumla) was not their basic unit of investigation, but rather the concept of utterance (kalām), where the latter cannot be reduced to a mere sequence of words analyzed in terms of well-formedness, but on the contrary, requires that its conditions of production be taken into consideration.

Close to systemic linguists and functionalists in general, Arab rhetoricians have systematically interpreted formal and semantic properties of utterances as related to the communicative functions they fulfil in the interaction between speaker (mutakallim) and addressee (muxāṭab). As a result of this attitude, which has its roots in Greek rhetoric, Arab rhetoricians, as said earlier, have established in ‘‘ilm al-ma‘āni’ the dichotomy of informative versus performative utterance (‘kalām xabari wa kalām ‘inšā’i’). In this respect, al-Qazwīnī says:

an utterance is either informative or performative because either it has an external reference to which it is or is not adequate, or it does not: in the first case it is informative, in the second it is not. Moreover every informative utterance requires a predicative relationship (isnād), a predicand (musnad ʿilayhi) and a predicate (musnad) (al-Qazwīnī, 1980, p. 85)<sup>39</sup> [my translation].

This dichotomy is manifestly a pragmatic one, because it rests on the distinction between two basic types of usage of language: one only aiming at transmitting information to the addressee; the other, at actually acting on him or her through language. In addition to this dichotomy, Arab rhetoricians also divided informative utterances into three basic categories depending on the state of mind of the speaker towards the information being transmitted. If he feels that the addressee has no preconceived opinion at all regarding the information he or she wants to convey (xālī ad-dīhn), he or she will present it in a simple, plain way, and consequently choose an ‘initial’ (kalām ʿibtidāʾī) and an unemphasized type of utterance, usually a verbal sentence with no emphatic means or particles, as in:

- 5-72 ḥuriqat maktabatu l-ʿIskandariyahti qabla ʿahdi ʿumarin Ibn l-Khaṭṭāb.  
burned library (of) the-alexandria before era Omar bin al-Khattab.

The Alexandria library [theme] was burned before Omar bin al-Khattab's era [rheme].

- 5-73 al-balāḡatu l-ʿarabiyyatu ʿarabiyyatun fi ʿuṣūlihā.  
rhetoric the-Arabic Arabic in origin-its

Arabic rhetoric [theme] is of an Arabic origin [rheme].

If, on the other hand, the speaker feels that the addressee is to some degree ‘dubious’ (mutaṣakik) about the information, he/she SHOULD present it in a more forcible and emphasized manner by using corroborative markers (muʿakkidāt), and, in this case, the utterance will be of the ‘rogative’ type (kalām ṭalabi), as if the speaker were acting upon the addressee to believe him by adding an emphatic particle like ‘inna’ to examples 5-72 and 5-73 above. Finally, if the speaker thinks that the addressee is frankly hostile in his denial (munkir), the speaker/writer MUST face the addressee with a highly strengthened and emphasized enunciation, by swearing with an oath like ‘I swear to God’ (wallāhi) preceding the emphatic particle in 5-72 and 5-73. This classification is further refined by envisaging cases when the speaker anticipates and

attributes to the addressee states of mind which the latter has not actually manifested<sup>40</sup>. Obviously such a fine typology presupposes that the conditions of production of speech are taken into account while analyzing an utterance.

Linguistic and non-linguistic contexts also play a crucial part in the way the rhetoricians approach the relationship between form and meaning: verbal and situational context in a modern linguistic sense, or co-text and context (*muqtaḍa ṣ-ṣāhir wa muqtaḍa l-ḥāl*). This brings about what they call 'proper or primary meanings' (*maʿānī ʿawwaliyya*) and 'figurative or secondary meanings' (*maʿānī ṭānawīyya*), which reflect the intentions and objectives of the enunciator and which are sometimes quite far from the linguistic meaning, as in the case of proverbs, for example. To understand secondary meanings, the hearer/reader needs more than the knowledge of the rules of grammar: he needs to know a great deal about the conditions in which the speech was produced, and the strategies used by the speaker/writer to convey what he/she really had in mind.

As mentioned above, the basic unit of investigation in rhetoric is the utterance (*kalām*), which, according to rhetoricians as well as TAGs consist of four main parts. These are the predicand (*musnad ʿilayhi*), which is the term spoken of, the predicate (*musnad*), which is the term with which something is said about the predicand, the predication (*ʿisnād*), which is the relationship or judgment (*ḥukum*) established between the first two, and finally the constraints (*al-quyūd*), which serve to determine (*tuʿakkid*) the extension and/or conformity with what the speaker has in mind. The first two are exhaustively discussed by TAGs, but when it comes to the third they look at it as a sort of 'conjuring trick' operation; that is to say, it is there as long as the two pillars of predication (*al-musnad wa l-musnad ʿilayhi*) are there. By doing this, they skip or forget an important aspect of discourse which is the process of its production. Instead, and here they come close to Halliday, they treat speech acts as products only: they look only at their impact rather than the speech acts themselves. But, unlike Halliday, this is coupled also with their forgetfulness of the participants' role in the speech situation.

The rhetoricians' attitude is quite the opposite. It is explicitly laid down by al-Jurjānī, who argues for the need to recognize the operation of the predication, beside that of the predicand and predicate:

Now, if you have recognized that no information can be imagined except

between two things, that which is spoken and that which is spoken about, you also need to recognize that there is a third term after these two; and this is because, just as you cannot conceive of there being information if there isn't both [something] informing and [something] informed about, in the same way, there can be no information until there is an **INFORMANT** (muxbir) from whom it stems and from whom it occurs, so that it is attributed to him and he is responsible for it in such a manner that he be considered right if it is true and wrong if it is false. Don't you see that it is well known that there is no information and no negation until there is **SOMEONE** who affirms or denies so that he be their source and so that he be their asserter and the one who imposes or refuses in that matter, and so that he be, through that, agreeing or disagreeing, right or wrong, just or unjust (al-Jurjānī, 1988, p. 406)[my translation and emphasis]<sup>41</sup>.

In this quotation, al-Jurjānī points out that although the predicand and the predicate are the main two pillars of an utterance, the speaker (referred to as the 'informant') and the addressee (referred to as 'someone') are considered the source of the predicative relationship, since they assume the responsibility for the truth value of the assertion produced. This way of considering predication as resting on the activity of the speaker and the reaction of the addressee tallies with what has been previously discussed about the classification of utterances by the strength of their assertion. The predication is affirmative or negative, strong or neutral according to the speaker's beliefs and to what he or she anticipates of the addressee's attitudes to what he or she wants to tell the addressee.

On the basis of the above argument, Arab rhetoricians also felt the need for a typology of utterances. Theirs is not merely formal (as with the TAGs in their analysis of the imperfect tense of the verb), but they try to establish a systematic relationship between the formal and the semantic/pragmatic (meaningful) properties of the utterance types. In their study of the modes of the predicate, rhetoricians distinguish between two types of predication (proposition): verbal and nominal. If the speaker 'chooses' a verbal predicate (realized by a verbal utterance [sentence]), they say it is to stress that the predicative relationship has a dynamic, progressive and/or evolutionary aspect. This is basically because verbs entail a meaning of 'renewal' (tajaddud). On the other hand, verbs being time-bound, their use in an utterance means that the state of affairs predicated is anchored in a temporal series. In contrast, the speaker's use of a nominal predicate (realized by a nominal utterance [sentence]) means that he or she disregards

in the predication all dynamic or temporal aspects, since nouns are essentially characterized by permanency (*tubūt*).

Nominal predications are further differentiated by Arab rhetoricians on the basis of the determination of the predicate (*ta'kīd l-xabar*). In some cases, it is not determined by the speaker as in:

5-74 Zayd-un            ḡaniyyun.  
Zeid-nom. (is) rich-nom.  
Zeid [theme] is rich [rheme].

The predication here only realizes an attribution of the predicand of the property designated by the predicate. But on other occasions the predicate is determined (*mu'akkad*), as in:

5-74a Zayd-un    l-'amīr-u. . . . (or)    Zaydun huwa l-'amīru.  
Zeid-nom. the-amir-nom            Zeid (is) the prince.  
Zeid, the prince, . . . .

Here, the predication aims at indicating to the addressee that an entity which is 'known' to him or her is 'identical' with another entity also known. The new information in this case is neither the predicate nor the predicand, but the fact that the former is to be identified with the latter<sup>42</sup>.

As for the verbal predication, it is appropriate to say that the objects of transitive verbs are analyzed as specifying constraints (*quyūd*) on the predicate. This is quite natural when one considers a transitive verb with two different objects. This approach led rhetoricians to examine the case of transitive verbs without any mention of objects. al-Jurgānī (1988, pp. 118-124) explains that this situation might arise out of two quite different intentions. The first is when an object is in fact intended and when its nature is quite clear from the speech situation or the context (*bihi dalīl al-ḥāl wa mā sabaqa min al-kalām*). The second is when no specific object is intended at all, because it is the absolute realization of the predicate which is pertinent. al-Jurjānī illustrates the second point mainly from the Holy Qura'n by verses like:

5-75 wa 'allāh-u ya'lamu wa 'antum lā ta'lamūna. (the Holy Qur'an. 24:19)  
and God-nom. knows-He and you don't know  
And God [theme] knows [rheme], and you [theme] you do not know [rheme].

Like TAGs, the Arab rhetoricians recognize a circumstantial type of predication characterized by the fact that the predicate is either a prepositional group (*jārrun wa majrūr*) or circumstantial (*ẓarf*). Rhetoricians consider the function of such predication

in the nominal sentence, as a condensed type of verbal utterance (ixtiṣār al-fiʿliyyah), in the sense that the subject/mubtada ‘operates’ on its object/xabar in the same way as the verb operates on its subject and object. As for the conditional utterances, rhetoricians treat them as a type of complex utterances, where the protasis (ʿaṣ-ṣarṭ) is a constraint (a pre-condition) of the apodosis (al-jawāb).

This typology of informative predication produced by rhetoricians allows them to reach a very high degree of sophistication in their analysis of texts, but one has to bear in mind that these informative predication are basically uttered to inform the addressee of the existence of a state of affairs which he or she does not know. Therefore, the typical (unmarked) use is the transmission of ‘the content of information’ (fāʾ idat l-xabar). But it may be used in a ‘marked’ sense, where it is addressed to an addressee who knows all about the proposition. In this case, the latter’s reaction might be ‘why are you telling me this; I know all about it’, however, the speaker’s intention is not to tell him something the addressee already knows, but to let him know that the speaker knows it as well. The rhetoricians call this ‘the implication of information’ (lāzim l-fāʾ ida). Beside these basic and intrinsic types of informative predication, rhetoricians also identify what one can call ‘secondary’ types or informative predication, which they call the aims (ʿagrād l-xabar)<sup>43</sup>.

As mentioned in section 5.2, performative utterances are defined as those which are not liable to be challenged with regard to their being true or false. They are called performative (inṣāʿ) because their very realization aims at performing an act such as asking a question, giving an order or instituting a new state of affairs, particularly in legal proceedings.

Performative predication, as mentioned earlier, are divided by rhetoricians into two basic types: the first type, which they call ‘rogative performative’ (inṣāʿ ṭalabī), basically serves to express (realize) requests; the second type, called ‘non-rogative’ (inṣāʿ ḡayr ṭalabī). Under the first type, rhetoricians list the following sub-types: order (al-ʿamr), prohibition (an-nahy), inquiry (al-ʿistifhām), wish (at-tamannī), and calling (an-nidāʿ); and the second, they list contractual formulae (ṣiyaḡ l-ʿuqūd) such as ‘I agree’ (qabiltu), used to express acceptance of a bargain, expression of astonishment as conveyed by ‘exclamatory forms’ (at-taʿajjub), oaths (al-qasam), and expression of praise and blame (al-madhū wa ḏ-damm).

The above discussion and argument of the notion of predication from the pragmatic point of view of Arab rhetoricians can now be illustrated in a type of a systemic network of mood based upon the speech role of the participants in the speech situation in addition to the TAGs 'more-or-less' formal approach to the imperfect tense of the verb, which serves as a support for the above argument of the rhetoricians:




Figure 5-1

### 5.3.1 Theme in Declarative Clauses in SA

As is the case in English and presumably in all languages, declarative sentences in SA are mainly used by the speaker/writer to convey a piece of information which the hearer/reader may or may not be aware of (see section above). These can be realized by either a declarative verbal sentence in its marked or unmarked status, or by a nominal sentence, which whether marked or unmarked is more assertive than the verbal sentence in its unmarked status.

As discussed earlier, a declarative predication realized by a verbal sentence in its unmarked status starts with the verb, which with its complements or 'surpluses' (mutaʿalliqāt aw faḍalāt) constitutes the predicate (rheme/comment) of the sentence, and the subject (al-fāʿil) constitutes the theme/topic of the sentence. In its marked status, the verbal sentence may have either a preposed subject or object preceding the verb. When the subject precedes the verb, there are two conflicting points of view: the Kufans treat it as a preposed subject, and hence in Halliday's terms, a marked theme, which has either a separate information unit or constitutes the focus of a one-information unit's sentence. The second view is that of the Basrans: the preposed subject is not a subject anymore but a 'mubtada'. From a thematic point of view, both cases can be treated the

same: as a marked theme conveying the focus of the message (new information), and the rest of the verbal sentence as the rheme, as in:

5-76a zāra jalālat-u l-Ḥusayni l-qiyādat-a l-ʿāmma.  
visited his majesty-nom. the-Hussain the-headquarters-accus. the-general.  
His majesty (king) Hussain [theme] visited the general headquarters  
[rheme].

5-76b jalālat-u l-Ḥusayn-i zāra l-qiyādat-a l-ʿāmma.  
majesty-nom. the-Hussain-gen. visited the-headquarters-accus. the-general.  
His majesty (king) Hussain [theme] visited the general headquarters [rheme].

When the object is preposed, however, TAGs left the option open as far as considering it as a 'mubtada' or a preposed object (in the nominative or accusative case respectively), although the Basrans (especially Sibawayhi) prefer the nominative case, i.e. they treat it as a mubtada<sup>44</sup>. Here, the situation differs from the case of preposing the subject: TAGs insist that if the speaker prefers the accusative case, then the preposed object is part of the predication, since it is a surplus/complement element (fadla), which is the view of the Kufans (Mustafa, 1959, p 154). But, for the Basrans, who prefer the nominative, it is a marked theme (mubtada), and the rest of the sentence is its rheme (xabar), as in:

5-77 al-qiyādat-u l-ʿāmmat-u zāra-(hā) jalālat-u l-Ḥusayn-i.  
the-headquarters-nom. the-general visited-it majesty-nom. the-Hussain-gen.  
The general headquarters [theme], his Majesty king Hussain visited (it) [rheme].  
(or)  
The general headquarters was visited by his Majesty, King Hussein.

In its unmarked status, the nominal sentence starts with a defined noun phrase (NP), hence known information, followed by a non-defined NP (unknown information). From a formal (as well as a pragmatic) point of view, the first NP acts as a 'mubtada' (theme/topic) and the second as a 'xabar' (rheme/comment).

According to the TAGs as well as rhetoricians (see previous section) a predicand in the nominal sentence may also consist, in its unmarked status, of a NP (usually defined) followed by a prepositional or an adverbial phrase that conveys the new information and acts as the rheme or comment of the sentence (xabar). In the marked status, where the prepositional or adverbial clause precedes a non-defined NP, TAGs and rhetoricians point out that the purpose of preposing is to define the undefined NP, which conveys the new information in this case, as in:



- 5-78 ‘ala š-šajarati (xabar & given) ‘uṣfūr-un (mubtada’ & new).  
on the-tree a bird-nom.  
There is a bird [theme & new] on the tree (rheme & given).

This example runs in line with Halliday’s (1967c) formulation as far as the distribution of information structure is concerned: the theme may consist of either given or new information, but it parts company with his formulation with regard to his insistence theme constitutes the initial element(s) of the clause, even if the clause starts with a non-cognitive elements like modal adjuncts, relatives and conjunctions (cf. 3.6.2.3 & 4). Halliday, however, is supported in his formulation from Arabic by Beeston (1970<sup>45</sup>), whose argument with regards to examples like the above runs counter to both TAGs and rhetoricians, although Halliday (1985, p.38) has stated explicitly that his model of thematic structure is a model made mainly for English<sup>46</sup>. Consider an example like:

- 5-79 fi hādā l-mawḍī‘i(xabar & given) qaṣr-un (mubtada & new).  
in this the-place a castle.  
In this place, there is a castle (or)  
There is a castle [theme & new] in this place (rheme & given).

Here, Beeston believes that the prepositional phrase ‘in this place’ a defined entity term functioning as theme (mubtada), followed by an undefined substantive functioning as predicate\rheme (xabar). In this respect he says:

‘castle’ in such a statement is clearly a classificatory predicate whose communicative value resides in stating what sort of a thing ‘this place’ contains, and **ENGLISH SHOWS AN INTRINSIC APPRECIATION OF THE PREDICATIVE FUNCTION OF ‘CASTLE’** by the alternative structure ‘there is a castle in this place’, which sets ‘castle’ in the nominal predicative position after ‘is’ (Beeston, 1970, p. 68) [my emphasis].

Beeston reasserts this position in a later article (Beeston, 1974, p. 475)<sup>47</sup> when he explicitly says that "the accepted notion of the ‘**INVERTED NON-VERBAL**’ sentences, consisting of prepositional followed by an undefined substantival subject is a **MYTH**" [my emphasis].

As can be seen from Beeston’s first quotation, the only justification he provides for his counter analysis is that "English shows an intrinsic appreciation of the predicative function of ‘castle’", which sounds as if Arabic is a mere variety of English, and thus Arabic can be analyzed only by reference to English. In this respect, one is

prompted to make the following points:

- (1) Of the many volumes written by TAGs and Arab rhetoricians, (none of which are listed in Beeston's 1970 book) none of them seems, even to hint at what Beeston has voiced.
- (2) If TAGs and Arab rhetoricians part company with Halliday with regard to the status of theme as an initial element, Beeston parts company with him regarding information structure and joins forces the traditional Pragueans' view, which, until very recently, admits that theme can convey new as well as old information (cf. 2.3.3 & 2.5)<sup>48</sup>.
- (3) Beeston's analysis of Arabic is mainly formal, and the notion of 'context' is rarely mentioned in his 1970 book. Thus if he has come to those two conclusions on the basis of contextual factors, then these will have to be taken into consideration.

By the same token, the verbal sentence can start with a prepositional or an adverbial phrase, as in:

5-80 fi l-masā' -ī (Theme1) dahaba Zayd-un (Theme2) 'ila s-sīnamā (Rheme).  
In the-evening-gen. went Zeid-nom. to the-cinema-gen.  
In the evening [Theme1], Zeid [Theme2] went to the cinema [rheme].

5-81 wa(theme1) 'inda l-maḡībi(Theme2) ḥaḍara Zayd-un(Theme3) mina l-ḥaql-i.  
and on the-sun set, came Zeid-nom from the-field-gen.  
and(theme1) on sun-set [theme2], Zeid(Theme3) came back from the field [rheme].

In principle, the analysis of 5-81 in terms of theme and rheme, follows Halliday's formulation. When the clause starts with a cognitive element (SPCA) whether marked or unmarked, what follows it is rheme. TAGs' formal analysis of Arabic, however, accepts a preposed cognitive element and yet re-analyzes the rest of the sentence rheme in terms of theme and rheme.

At the end of this sub-section, it is appropriate to bring one final piece of evidence for the fact that the verbal element in the sentence whether transitive or intransitive constitutes with its complements or surpluses (*muta'alliqāt al-fī'l aw al-faḍalāt*) the core of the predication. Ibn Ya'īsh's explains the relationship between the predicand (*al-mubtada'*) and the subject (*al-fā'il*) by saying: *al-mubtada* [in the nominal sentence] is the counterpart of the *fā'il* [in the verbal sentence] in having, both of them, something predicated of them [i.e., in both of them being the subject]" (*al-mubtada nazīr l-fā'il fi l- 'ixbārī 'anhumā* [the nominal and the verbal sentence] *wa l-xabar fīhimā*

hwua l-juzu 'u l-mustafād) (Ibn Ya'īsh, *Šarḥu l-Mufaṣṣal*, Vol. 1, p. 88).

### 5.3.1.1 Theme and Passive

In the classical theory of syntax of SA, all functions of the complements or surpluses (muta'lliqātu l-fi'l aw l-faḍalāt) are 'signified' in a generic way by the verb, and can be specified by an element in the sentence because they further specify or define the potential range of reference. But for most TAGs, the idea seems to be used only in order to explain the relationship between the verb and its complements. For Ibn 'as-Sarrāj, for instance, the verb does not assign the accusative case to an element unless it (the verb) contains an indication of it. Such a formulation seems to exclude implicitly the element to which the verb assigns the nominative case, that is the subject. There is, however, a place within the theory where this distinction, founded on purely formal criteria (subject nominative and complement accusative) does not hold: the analysis of passive verbal sentence, or in TAGs' terms, 'the doing [process] whose doer is not named' (fi'lun mā lā yusammā fā'iluh). According to TAGs as well as rhetoricians, the doer of the action, the actor in Halliday's terminology, is not mentioned either because it is unknown, or well-known to the extent that it will not benefit the receiver. In this case, the place of the subject in the active sentence both as a predicand (musnad ilayhi) and as the element bearing the nominative marking is occupied by a 'surrogate subject' (nā'ib fā'il), which can be one of the following surpluses (faḍalāt) elements:

1. The first (external) object of the verb whether it takes one or more object, as in:

5-82 ḍuriba Zayd-un.

hit Zeid-nom.

Zeid [theme] was hit [rheme].

2. The internal (cognate) object (al-maf'ūl l-muṭlaq) provided it is specified and inflectional (muxaṣṣaṣ wa mutaṣarrif) either qualitatively or quantitatively, as in, respectively:

5-83 ḍuriba ḍarbat-un ṣadīdat-un.

hit (a) hitting-nom. violent-nom.

A violent hitting was hit./He was hit violently.

5-83a *ḍariba ḍarbatānī*

hit two-hits

He was hit twice./ Two hits were hit.

3. The prepositional phrase, as in:

5-84 *julisa ʿala l-kursyyī.*

was sat on the-chair

The chair [theme] was sat on [rheme].

4. The local circumstance (*ẓarf makān*) as in:

5-85 *sīra farsaxānī.*

walked two leagues

Two leagues [theme] were walked [rheme].

5. The temporal circumstance (*ẓarf ẓamān*), as in:

5-86 *ṣīma ramadān-u*

fasted ramadan-nom.

Ramadan [theme] was fasted<sup>49</sup>.

According to al-Astrabāḍī (1975), all the sentence constituents that can be used as a predicand (*musnad ʿilayhi*) of the verbal sentence whether active or passive have in common the property of specifying an intrinsic ‘necessary’ dimension of the verbal notion (*ḍaruriyyāt l-ficil*). Thus, if the verb denotes a ‘doing’ (process), it must be necessarily involve a doer (actor), something ‘done’ (the internal or cognate object), somebody or something ‘done to’ (the external object), a time and a place when and where the process is carried out (the circumstances: *ʿaẓ-ẓurūf*). Consequently, the verb can accept any one of these as a predicand, even if there is at least a partial hierarchy between these elements (notably, whenever the ‘doer’ is expressed, it must be the predicand, and in default of the doer, the direct object). On the other hand, the rest of the terms which specify ‘less’ intrinsic or necessary dimensions of the verbal notion, such as ‘cause’ or ‘motivation’ (*al-mafʿūl li ʿajlihi*), cannot be used as predicand of the passive verbs, since, according to al-Astrabāḍī, many actions or processes are done without cause at all.

For TAGs, passivization is a morpho-syntactic process that involves three main steps:

1. The deletion of the subject if available
2. The movement of the first object, if available, or any of the other elements mentioned above to the subject position.

3. A change in the morphological status of the verb whether it is in the past or the present tense, like 'kataba' (wrote) which becomes 'kutiba' and 'yaktubu' (write) which becomes 'yuktabu'<sup>50</sup>. In this respect, Fillmore says something similar to this point when he states the morphological requirement of the verb 'give' in English:

The normal choice of subject for sentences containing an A(gent) . . . is the agent. The verb 'give' also allows either object or D(ative) [indirect object or object of preposition] to appear as subject as long as this 'NON-NORMAL' choice is registered in the verb. This 'registering' of a non-normal subject takes place via the association of the feature (+ passive) with the verb (Fillmore, 1968, p. 37) [my emphasis].

The resemblance between Fillmore's notion and az-Zajāji's (1959, p.88) is striking, especially when the latter, in support of TAGs, points out that the prepositional phrase becomes the subject, since it replaces it as a 'surrogate subject'. Thus, sentences like 'sira 'ila Miṣra' ('It was walked to Egypt'; cf. also 5-84) are permissible, but such a passive verb will be unacceptable without the prepositional phrase.

From a systemic point of view, Halliday (1967c) considers the passive option in the transitivity network (his ideational component) a 'receptive' option, where the roles of the grammatical subject and that of the actor are separated, while leaving the theme unmarked and mapped onto the grammatical subject (cf. 3.6.2.2). For him, this unmarked theme is a nominal other than the actor (usually the goal, the beneficiary or the range), while the actor itself is either unspecified or having an unmarked focus and thus is placed at the end of the clause. Furthermore, Halliday, following in the steps of Mathesius (1928, [Vachek, 1966, p. 91]), attributes the high frequency of passive in English to the requirement of thematic organization and its interaction with the other dimensions of structure, e.g., the transitivity network and its various options<sup>51</sup>.

Thus the passive construction can be related to problems of theme (keeping in mind, as mentioned in the previous paragraph, that voice is not fully determined by the theme system. Bubenik (1979, p. 295) points out that there are essentially two different strategies in the organization of discourse with regard to passive constructions: either "a great predilection in languages such as English for the true passive construction (i.e. the construction including the agentive phrase 'Zeid was struck by Amr')"<sup>52</sup>. On the other hands, he (loc. cit.) says that "in Arabic, there is an obvious disinclination to its use" because the requirement of a normal sequence of theme-rheme in Arabic is more

easy because word-order (WO) is more free than in English. Thus if the first object becomes a theme (i.e., if the role of actor and theme are separated) the strategy in SA is to keep the active voice and resume the thematised object by a pronoun in the contrastive context such as:

- 5-87 Muḥammad-un fataḥa l-bāba wa š-šabābīk-u fata-ḥā Zeid.  
Muhammad-nom. opened (he) the-door and the-windows-nom. opened-them  
Zeid  
Muhammad [theme] opened the door [rheme] and the windows [theme] Zeid  
opened them [rheme].

On the other hand English reconciles the antinomy between the requirement of WO and theme-rheme structure, by the use of the passive voice, as in:

- 5-88 Muhammad [theme] opened the door [rheme], but the windows [theme] were  
opened by Zeid [rheme].

On the basis of this example, it seems that English favours the passive construction because it allows the actor- if it is to be specified- to occur at the end of the passive clause (sentence), and thus carries, in Halliday's formulation, the unmarked information focus. On the other hand, SA may place the actor at the end of the active clause, since the unambiguous semantic interpretation is guaranteed by the resumptive pronoun (ad-ḍamīr l-ʿāʾid aw ḍamīr l-ʾistiʾnāf) which is annexed to the verb. The same thing can be achieved when using passive in English, as in second coordinate clause in 5-88 above.

The true passive construction in SA, as hinted above, does not include an agentive phrase, simply because SA does not have an equivalent to the agentive particle 'by'. If this is present in an English passive construction, such a construction can be termed as a 'full passive', if not, it is 'agentless' as in the case of SA. SA, however, can, to some extent, name the agent in one of two ways: either by repeating the same passive construction as an active one, which is rare, or by using particles like 'min', 'bi' or 'li' (Cantarino, 1974), which are not equivalent to 'by', since they have a rather different range of reference. These two cases can be exemplified from SA by:

- 5-89 qad muddat l-māʾidatu maddat-hā kubrā ʾaxwāti š-šabyyi.  
(had been) set the-table set-the table oldest sisters the-boy.  
The table [theme] had been set by the boy's oldest sister [rheme].

- 5-90 ʾinna mā yuḥā ila šāhibihi ʾinnamā yuḥā ʾilay-hi mina l-lāhi dātihi.

that what revealed to friend-his was revealed to-him from God Himself  
That what had been revealed to him [theme] was revealed to him by God Himself  
[rheme].

However, interactions with the process of thematisation introduces further options; the speaker of SA, for example, may wish to thematise the old information. In this case, SA will keep the active voice of the predicate and will resume the preposed subject by the resumptive pronoun, as in:

5-91a context: man fataḥa š-šabābīka?  
Who opened the-windows?

5-91b answer: aš-šabābīk-u Zaydun-un fatah-ā.  
the-windows-nom. Zeid-nom. opened-them  
The windows [theme] Zeid opened them [rheme].

On the other hand, Bubenik (1979, p.307) points out that "in English, the direct object can be thematised only if it becomes an independent information unit (especially when the speaker echoes the question in his answer", as in:

5-92 Who opened the windows? The windows? Zeid opened them.

However, in this context, English may do what SA may not, namely, it may passivize in order to thematise the given information without making it an independent information unit. It does this by using a passive construction: 'the windows were opened by Zeid'.

### 5.3.2 Theme in Interrogative Sentences

TAGs as well as Arab rhetoricians like al-Jurjānī (1988), al-Hāshimī (1978), and ʿabbas (1989, p. 190) among many others, define the interrogative (al-ʿistifhām) as a request for information which the speaker does not know before (ṭalabu l-ʿilmi, wa huwa ʿistixbaruka ʿan š-say ʿī alladi lam yataqaddamu laka ʿilmun bihi). This definition is similar to that given by Halliday (1967c & 1985; cf. 3.6.2.1.2). Similar also to Halliday's formulation is the fact that Arab rhetoricians identify two main types of interrogative:

1. The acknowledgment type (at-taṣdīq): the purpose of this type, which corresponds to Halliday's polar interrogative (yes/no questions: see figure 5-1 above) is to inquire about polarity of what the speaker says, whether positive or negative (a yes/ a no

answer) (‘itbāt šay‘in lišay‘in aw nafyuhu ‘anh). This type of interrogative is usually expressed in SA by two particles ‘al-hamza’ (‘a) and ‘hal’. These correspond to the English finite verb in Halliday’s formulation; the former, however, can be used for the second type as well.

2. The wh-question type (at-tašwwur): the purpose of this interrogative is also similar to that of Halliday’s (1985, p. 47) formulation; that is, to tell the speaker "about the person, the thing, time, place, manner, etc." All interrogative particles in SA, except ‘hal’, can express this type of interrogative; these particles are: (man) who, (mā) what, (matā) when, (‘ayna), where, (kam) how much, (kayfa) how, (‘annā) (how/where/when), ‘ayyāna (when: future) and ‘ayy (which/whose), which in modern linguistic terminology, are the interrogative pronouns.

From a formal point of view, TAGs point out that the easiest way to find the grammatical function of these particles is to change the interrogative particle into a declarative word (kalima taqrīriya), whether that particle is used for polar or non-polar purposes. What this means, according to al-Anṣākī (1975, p.389), is to change the question, classified by rhetoricians as a performative proposition (cf. figure 5-1), into an informative proposition. i.e. realized by a verbal or a nominal sentence. This can be done by replacing the interrogative particle with the missing (unknown/ new) information. He, however, points out that the word order of the question must not be altered in order for this procedure to work correctly, as in:

5-93a (‘a) banayta hādā l-manzil? / (hal) banayta hādā l-manzil?  
(question word) built-you this the-house? / did built-you this the-house?  
Did you [theme] build this house [rheme]? [Halliday’s formulation]

5-93b (na‘am) (0= banaytu hādā l-manzil). (0= ellipsis)  
(yes) (0= built-I this the-house).  
Yes [rheme].

5-94a (mata) ‘āda Zaydun mina l-Bašra?  
when returned Zeid from the-Basra?  
When [theme] did Zeid return from Basra [rheme]? [Halliday’s formulation]

5-94b (‘ams) (0= ‘āda Zaydun mina al-Bašra).  
yesterday (0= returned Zeid from the-Basra).  
Yesterday [theme1] Zeid [theme2] return from Basra [rheme].

With regard to questions like 5-93a, al-Jurjānī (1988, p.87) points out that doubt, or



challenge in the modern linguistic sense, is directed against the verb, whether it really exists/happens or not. Since the verb with its complements (*muta'alliqāt*) constitutes the predication in the verbal sentence, then inquiring or even challenging its truthfulness or falsity by the interrogative would place the particle in a position that indicates 'unknownness'. Moreover, by replacing this interrogative with yes or no, what follows it can be ellipted because it is already known from the previous context as in 5-93b. This also applies to 5-94a and its answer 5-94b except that the questioner (the speaker) may inquire about various missing elements in the sentence such as the object, the predicand (*al-musnad ilayhi*), the predicate (*al-musnad*) and the complements (*al-faḍalāt*).

If, as al-Anṣārī (1975) points out, the normal word order of the question is disturbed in the answer, the resultant sentence would look like this:

5-95a (man) jā'a min Baḡdād?  
Who came from Baghdad?

5-95b jā'a (ZAYD-UN) min Baḡdād.  
came Zeid-nom. from Baghdad.

5-95c (Zayd-un) jā'a min Baḡdād.  
Zeid-nom. came from Baghdad.  
Zeid [theme/ new] came from Bagdad [rheme & given]. [Halliday's formulation]

From a pragmatic point of view, 5-95b is not an appropriate answer to 5-95a simply because it puts Zeid, the new information, in an unmarked position making it act as an unmarked theme of the verbal sentence, and places the verb and its complement, which are already known from the previous context, in positions that are markedly or unmarkedly liable to be focussed by the speaker in Halliday's terms. In thematic terms, 'Zeid', in 5-95b, can be considered as contrastive, and thus endowed with new information, which presents the identity of the one who comes from Baghdad ('Zeid and one else . . .') and the one who the message is all about. From the traditional Pragueans' perspective, 'Zeid' is rheme, since it carries the new information; However, from their more recent perspective (Danes, 1989; cf. 2.4), which tallies with Halliday's formulation, 'Zeid' is thematic, since it can convey given or new information. On the other hand, 'Zeid' is a marked theme in 5-95c, which again agrees

with TAGs', especially the Basrans', formal view that 'Zeid' is a predicand (mubtada').

There is, however, a counter argument to this view that springs up from the fact of 'the relatively free word order of Arabic', (cf. previous sections). This view would say that Arabic can thematise any part of its sentence, and does not have the same relatively tight restrictions as English has with regard to grammatical word order. In this respect, the condition dictated by 'al-Anṭākī (1975), who follows in the steps of the TAGs, does not really apply to a language like Arabic when treating it from a pragmatic point of view. To illustrate this using al-Anṭākī's procedure, the following example is selected:

- 5-96a (kayfa) [rheme] ḥālu aṭ-ṭifli l-ʿarabiyy? [theme]. [traditional Pragueans]  
how is status (of) the-child the-Arab?  
How [theme] is the status of the Arab child [rheme]. [Halliday's formulation]
- 5-96b (miskīn-un) [rheme] aṭ-ṭifl-u l-ʿarabyy-u [theme]. [Traditional Pragueans]  
miserable-nom. the-child-nom. the-Arab-nom.  
The Arab child [theme] is miserable [rheme]. [Halliday's formulation] (OR)  
How miserable [theme/new] is the Arab child! [rheme\given]. [more emphatic Hallidyan formulation]

These examples serves as a counter argument to Halliday's formulation from Arabic. Moreover, at the discourse level, I believe that 5-96b contributes to the discourse theme of a text talking about the 'the Arab child', where 'misery' is probably one aspect of it and not the other way round. Supported by the TAGs and rhetoricians, the above example illustrates the fact that the predicate (musnad), in a nominal sentence, is preposed for the purpose of emphasis.

One point worthy of mention with regard to non-polar interrogative in Arabic pertains to what rhetoricians call the 'equal' structure with regard to the coordinating article 'or' (al-muʿāḍil bi ḥarf l-ʿāṭf 'am'), which could be spelled out in the interrogative or left out to be picked up by the addressee from the context, as in:

- 5-97 ʾa-musāfir-un Zaydun am muqīm-un?  
(question word) -going (away)-nom. Zeid or staying?  
Is Zeid [theme] going away or staying? [rheme].

Here, 'musāfirun' is the counterpart of 'muqīmun', and, according to Arab rhetoricians, 'Zeid' 'cannot' follow the interrogative particle because it is not the correct counterpart (synonym) of 'muqīmun', given that 'Zeid' is known to the speaker and the addressee as the one being inquired about. In this respect, one may pose a question with regard

to the way the addressee recognizes the type of question with 'al-hamza' (ʾa), whether it is polar or non-polar, since the speaker has the choice of uttering the equal structure or leaving it out. The answer comes from the rhetoricians: "the question of whether an interrogative is of a polar or non-polar type is dependent upon the speaker, his intentions, his rhetorical purpose and the degree of comprehension of the addressee"; and thus the speaker may ask either type. (fa-qaḍiyyat at-taṣwwuri wa t-taṣdīqi ʾinnamā tarjiʿu ʾila ʾitibāri l-mutakallimi wa qaṣḍihi wa ḡaradihi mina l-kalāmi, wa fahmi l-muxāṭabi lah) (ʿabbās, 1989, p. 174).

Finally, Arab rhetoricians, mention some cases in which the interrogative serves other rhetorical purposes than the two main types discussed above. These 'secondary' ones include cases like the use of the interrogative for declarative interrogative (ʾistifhām taqrīri), and rhetorical interrogative (ʾistifhām ʾistinkāri; cf. also 7.3.4. & 7.9.4). These two plus others do not differ in their treatment with regard to thematic structure from the polar and non-polar types<sup>53</sup>.

### 5.3.3 Theme in Imperative and Jussive Sentences.

Like Halliday (section 3.6.2.1.3), Arab rhetoricians define the imperative option (al-ʾamr) as "a demand, by the speaker, from the addressee, to carry out an order from a higher position of authority" (ṭalabu ḥuṣwūli l-fiʿli mina l-muxāṭabi ʿan ṭarīqi l-ʾistiʿlāʾ). This imperative action could be either of a positive or a negative/jussive (prohibition) type (nahī), as 5-98a and b respectively:

5-98a ʾidhab ʾila l-sūqi wa ʾaḥḍir l-fākihata!  
go (you) to the-market and bring (you) the-fruit  
(0=you) [theme] go to the market [rheme], and (0=you) [theme] bring the fruit [rheme].

5-98b lā taḍhab ʾila l-sūq!  
don't go (you) to the-market  
Don't [theme] go to the market [rheme]!

In this respect, Arab rhetoricians identify four main positive imperative constructions and only one negative (the one illustrated by example 5-98b); these four are:

1. The imperative verb construction (example 5-98a): this order can be addressed to one

addressee (example 5-98b), to a group of addressees including the speaker himself, or to one or more non-present at the scene (ga 'ib) by imperative verbs that are equivalent to English (let's or let him/them) (cf. 3.6.2.1.2) like 'da'nā' or 'da'hu/da'hum', as in:

5-99 da'nā nadhabu 'ila l-sūq!  
let (us) go-(we) to the-market.  
Let's [theme] go to the market [rheme].

2. The present tense of the verb that is preceded by the order particle (al-lām), which corresponds to English (let him) (cf. also 3.6.2.1.2), as in:

5-100 li-yadhab/li-ndhab 'ila l-sūq!  
(let him/us) go to the-market  
Let him/us [theme] go to the market [rheme]!

3. The 'order verbal noun' ('ism fi'il l-'amr): this, to some extent, corresponds to what Halliday (1985, p. 49) calls the elliptical form "'you' imperative, which has no subject or finite verb" such as 'keep quiet 'ših' or 'mih', which are somewhat like 'hush' and 'shshsh' of colloquial spoken English, and which, according to Halliday, "have no explicit theme" (cf. 3.6.2.1.3). In such constructions, the theme is the addressee's covert pronoun (ad-damīr al-mustatir). Halliday, on the other hand, points out that the theme could be the ellipted pronoun as in SA or simply have no theme at all but are mainly rhematic construction, or the imperative 'verb' itself is theme (cf. 3.6.2.1.3). However, these ellipted forms of imperatives in both English and SA are linguistically marginal.

4. The 'cognate noun' (al-maf'ūl l-muṭlaq): This construction becomes imperative only when the verb and its subject are ellipted, as in:

5-101 ṣabran 'alā d-dirāsati wa l-baḥṭi!  
patience with regard to the-study and the-research  
(You) Be patient [theme] with regard to study and research! [rheme].

Although Halliday does not present an equivalent construction to this one in English, it seems that it can, by analogy, be treated as having the covert subject (sometimes the subject is overt) as theme.

What seems to be the difference between the Arab rhetoricians and Halliday with regard to the thematic structure of this type of sentences is that Halliday (1985, p.49) believes that, in imperative, theme is "conflated with the predicator instead of the subject, adjunct and complement" (although, at the same time and in the very same page, he analyzes structure like:

5-102 Keep quite!

as having the implicit (ellipted) 'you' or 'let's' as themes of the clause). On the other hand, Arab rhetoricians, being influenced by formal analysis, still believe that the verb is the centre of predication, and thus it is the subject (agent/actor) which is theme of the clause. Thus, in the above examples, the theme of the clause is mainly the subject whether overt or covert.

### 5.3.4 Theme in Embedded (Subordinated) Clauses

As hinted in section 5.3, TAGs differ with regard to sentence boundaries. One group, according to al-Anṣārī (1975, vol. 3, pp. 305-306), believe that the sentence, whether nominal or verbal, consists of two main parts (pillars): the subject (musnad 'ilayhi), whether a predicand or subject of a verbal sentence (mubtada' or fā'il), and a predicate, which can be a predicate of a nominal sentence or a verb (xabar or fi'il plus one of the latter's complements). This group's definition of sentence boundaries is purely formal because it disregards the question of whether the addressee benefits/ or receives complete information from the sentence being uttered or not. On the other hand, the second group point out that the sentence boundaries can only be delimited by reference to the benefit of the addressee. Thus they define the sentence as "an expression or an utterance (kalām) which is fully beneficial/informative and can be followed by a full stop" (al-Anṣārī, 1975, p. 305), (al-'ibāratu l-mufīdatu fāidatan tāmmatan yaḥsunu l-wūqfu 'alayhā).

As mentioned in the same section above, rhetoricians follow the second group's view of the 'utterance' boundary, and consequently adopt the utterance as their basic unit of analysis. But this position does not prevent Arab linguists and Arabists from going below the utterance level in their analysis of subject (theme/topic) and predicate (rheme/comment), or to use Beeston's (1971 & 1974) terms 'theme and predicate'. Thus, structurally, TAGs divide sentences in SA into two main types: the 'large sentence' (al-jumlatu l-kubrā) and the 'small/embedded sentence' (al-jumlatu ṣ-ṣuḡrā) (cf. chapter 6) to account for sentences like:

5-103 Zaydun 'in jā'a fa-krim-hu.  
Zeid if came-he treat-(you)-him

If Zeid comes [theme], you should honour him [rheme]. [Halliday's formulation]

This sentence can be thematically analyzed as having a primary theme 'Zeid' and a main predication constituting of the rest of the sentence. But the predication, as a conditional sentence in SA, can also be analyzed in terms of two parts: 'the condition' (ʿism š-šart) and its 'answer' (wa jawābuhu), where the condition can be treated as a second theme while the answer as the second rheme.

When he discusses the relationship between the various sub-types of the two types of sentences (š-šagrā wa l-kubrā), Ḍayf (1982, p. 256), in turn, divides these sub-types into two major types: independent and dependent sentences (jumal mustaqilla wa gayr mustaqilla). He gives a definition of each on the basis of structure (a syntagmatic rather than a paradigmatic definition, in the systemic sense of the term). Ḍayf defines the independent sentence as complete in itself and says that it does not require any word preceding or following it. He points out, however, that this type of sentences is 'rare' and consists of only six main types: the resumptive (al-ʿistiʿnāfiyya), which is usually discourse initial, the dialogue type, (al-ḥuwāriyya), which answers a question in continuous discourse, the appositive (al-ʿitirāḍiyya), the interpretive (al-mufasssira) and any sentence that is coordinated with any of these types.

On the other hand, Ḍayf (1982) defines dependent or embedded sentences as those complementizers of a previous word or a sentence. As to the exact number and types, as mentioned earlier, grammarians are still disputing: one group says seven another says ten (cf. Khaṭīb et. al. 1985). In this respect, the discussion with regard to their thematic structure, will be limited to the most common types, because what applies to one type, applies, in principle, to all. The ones that will be exemplified in this context will be the relative sentence (jumlatu š-šila), the answer of the oath (jawābu l-qasam), the jussive, the non-jussive and the non-adverbial conditionals, (jawābu š-šart l-jāzim wa gayr l-jāzim wa gayr aḏ-ḏarfiyy).

Thus subordination or embedding is a syntactic device in SA, whereby speakers and writers combine propositions which, otherwise, have to be expressed in separate sentences. Therefore, when two finite verbs occur in a verbal sentence, for example, there is either a coordination of predicates or a subordination. This is why, as mentioned earlier, TAGs distinguish between the two types (the large and the small

sentence). To illustrate from the relative sentence, the following examples can be analyzed (see next page):

5-104	ʿalladīna	kānū maʿana bilʿamsi	jāʿ	u	l-yawma
	theme1	rheme1	rhe-	theme2	em2
	Theme		rheme		

those were with-us yesterday came-they the-day.  
The ones who were with us yesterday [theme] came to day [rheme].

5-105	tatamannāt	l-ʿummu	ʿan yašfā	Zaydun
	rheme1	theme1	rheme2	theme2
	rhe-	theme	me	

hopes the mother that be cured Zeid  
The mother [theme] hopes that Zeid be cured [rheme].

5-106	zanna	l-ʿabu	ʿanna Zayd-an	māta
	rheme1	theme1	theme2	rheme2
	theme		rheme	

thought the father that Zeid died  
Zeid's father [theme] thought that he is dead [rheme]

The above examples are analyzed in terms of a primary theme in the larger sentence and a secondary theme in the predicate (rheme) of the embedded sentence, which seems to be in line with Halliday's thematic model (cf. 3.6.2.5 & 6).

The most common complementizer particles are 'ʿan'. This introduces an embedded verbal sentence, and the verb following it must normally be in the imperfect subjunctive. On the other hand, 'ʿanna', introduces a nominal embedded sentence and requires a nominal declarative complement as illustrated in the example above.

By the same token, the examples below illustrating, respectively, the answer (jawāb) to oaths, jussive, non-jussive and non-adverbial conditionals can be analyzed in the same way in terms of primary theme (theme1) and secondary theme(s):

5-107 laʿin jāʿa Zaydun (theme1) la-ʿakrimann-hu (rheme1).  
if came Zeid should-honour-I-him  
If Zeid came [theme], I should honour him [rheme].

5-108 ʿanna ʿit-tajaht-a fi l-bilādi (theme1) lāqayt-a taqadduman (rheme1). . .




wherever went-you in the-country found-you progress . . .  
Wherever you go in the country [theme] you would find progress [rheme].

5-109 'idā dāfa't-a 'an l-ḥaḡi (theme1) fahādā wājib (rheme1).  
if defended-you for the-right this duty-nom.  
If you defend righteousness [theme], it would be a duty [rheme]

5-110 'in tas 'alu-nā (theme1) nu'ṭik (rheme1).  
if ask-us we-give-you  
If you ask us for charity[theme] we will offer you [theme]

In his discussion of the sentential predicate of nominal sentences, Beeston (1974, p.474) points out that the TAGs do not state how far the process of embedding can go in specifying the predication, and therefore, he proposes that two embeddings are only possible under certain limiting restrictions, and "a third is not at all". He exemplifies this from nominal sentences, where he 'authorizes' two embeddings on the basis of the fact that the nominal examples like 5-111:



which Beeston provides, are no more than what TAGs as well as neo-grammarians call 'an inclusive permutative' (badal 'ištīmāl). Here the 'substitute' 'his students' (talāmīduhu) is included or related to the 'substitutee' 'the professor' (al-'ustādu). From a pragmatic point of view, however, Khatīb et. al. (1985, p12) point out that the speaker can go in embedding as long as it takes, in order for the addressee to understand exactly the speaker's intention are with regard to the predication. Looking at the problem from this vantage point, Beeston's limitation does not serve the pragmatic function of 'enriching' the addressee with the 'exact' type of knowledge the speaker is trying to communicate; this is probably why TAGs left the number of substitutions allowed in a nominal sentence open-ended. Therefore, I find it quite odd that Beeston rejects sentences like the following as being inappropriate:

5-112 hādā š-šahru l-'ustādu talāmīdu-hu fi 'ijāza.  
this month the-professor student-his in vacation  
This month [theme1], the professor's students[theme2] are in vacation [rheme].

According to Beeston, this sentence is unacceptable because it contains more than one secondary theme, which to an educated native speaker of SA, such as myself, looks perfectly acceptable. These types of specifying constructions within the predicate of the nominative clause involve a recursive structure in modern linguistics terms, and recursivity seems to be accepted by all modern schools of linguistics.

Beeston, however, authorizes one structure that can involve a 'tertiary' theme, and that is when that third theme is the 'pronoun of separation' (ḍamīr l-faṣl), as in:

5-113 al-`ustādu (theme1) talāmīdu-hu (theme2) humu (theme3) l-mas`ulūna `an l-fawḍā  
the-professor students-his are the-responsible for the-outrage.  
The professor [theme], his students are responsible for the outrage [rheme].

The status of the pronoun of separation is still debatable: the Basran TAGs claim that it has no grammatical functions other than the fact that it is used to strengthen/emphasize the predication, and the Kufans, who do not disagree with Basrans with regard to emphasis, believe that it functions as a 'mubtada`' (theme in Beeston's terms). Arab rhetoricians, as will be shown in the following section support the Basrans' view point.

## 5.4 The Copula in SA

### 5.4.1 Copulative-Equivalent Structures in SA

Halliday (1967c, p. 223) defines a copulative or an equational structure in English as "an option, whereby any clause may be organized into a 'cleft-sentence' with an equative form, and in a number of arrangements". (cf. 3.6.3). This option, according to Halliday (loc. cit.) assigns an 'identified-identifier' structure to the clause. i.e. an equative form 'X = Y'. Comparing it with English, the copulative structure in SA allows the nominal sentence, which originally does not contain the temporal notion, and the 'verbal sentence', where the verb has been devoided from its lexical meaning, and only serves as a conveyer of the temporal notion, to be treated in the same way

Ibn Yaʿīsh points out in his *Šarḥ l-Mufaṣṣal* (vol.3, pp. 109-114), among many others, including rhetoricians as well, that there are two main syntactic devices in SA, by which 'copulative-equivalent' structures are created: the pronoun of separation

(ḍamīr al-faṣl), and one grammatical category called by TAGs the ‘cancelers’ (ʿan-nawāsix<sup>54</sup>). Among the second type, only ‘the incomplete verbal group’ (al-ʿafʿālu n-nāqisa) which includes the verb ‘to be’ (kāna wa ʿaxawātuhā) is to be mentioned with regard to the equative structure in SA, and particularly the imperfect verb ‘to be’ (kāna), which is the most widely used.

As for the pronoun of separation (ḍamīr al-faṣl), Ibn Yaʿīsh (loc. cit.) lays down three main conditions with regard to its occurrence in a nominal sentence, and consequently for it creating a copulative (equational) structure. These are:

1. It must be in the nominative case, and be the first element in the speaker’s mind as far as its coreferentiality with the predicand (al-mubtadaʿ).
2. It must be placed between the predicand and the predicate (al-xabar).
3. The mubtada and the xabar must be defined: being either proper nouns, defined by the definite article ‘the’ (al t-taʿrīf), annexed to a definite noun (muḍāf ila maʿrifa) or coreferential with a definite noun by a ‘referring pronoun’ (ḍamīr ʿāʿid).

From a pragmatic point of view, al-Hāshimī (1978), among many rhetoricians identifies three main functions that a the pronoun of separation serves in a sentence; these are:

1. Exclusiveness or specification of the ‘predicate’ (musnad) to the predicand (musnad ʿilayhi) (qaṣr aw taxṣīṣ l-musnad ila l-musnad ʿilayhi)<sup>55</sup>, as in:  
5-114 ʿalam yaʿlam-ū ʿanna llāha (huwa) yaqbalu t-tawbata ʿan ʿibādi-h.  
don’t know-they that Allah (copula) accepts-he the-penitence of worshippers-his  
Don’t they [theme] know that ALLAH [theme1] is the ONE who accepts the  
penitence of his worshippers [rheme].
2. Emphasis of Exclusiveness, especially if the structure contains another specification, as in:  
5-115 ʿinna llāha (huwa) t-tawwābu r-raḥīm.  
(empathic) Allah (copula) the-forgiving (and) the-compassionate  
Allah (no body else) [theme] is the forgiving and the compassionate ONE  
[rheme].
3. Distinction between the predicate (xabar) and the ‘epithet’ (n-naʿt) on the one hand and between the predicate and ‘permutative’ (l-badal) on the other. Examples to illustrate this include:

5-116 Zaydun (huwa) n-nājiḥ-u.  
Zeid (copula) the-successful-nom.  
Zeid [theme] is the one who is successful [rheme].

5-117 hāḍa (huwa) l-kitāb-u.  
this (copula) the-book-nom.  
This [theme] is the book [rheme].

Without the pronoun of separation, 'n-nājiḥu' in 5-116, can be considered, according to al-Anṣākī (1975, vol. I, p. 203), as an 'epithet/adjective' (naʿt/ṣifa) for Zeid. By the same token, he also (op. cit.) points out that, without that pronoun, 'al-kitābu' (the book) in 5-117, can be considered a 'permutative' (badal) for the demonstrative pronoun.

The verb 'to be' (kāna), as second device, is originally a fully-fledged or a complete verb (fiʿil tām) (meaning to exist: 'yūjadu), but, according to al-Antaki (1975, vol.2, p.5), who follows in the steps of Ibn ʿaql in the latter's interpretation of Ibn Mālik's *Alfiyya*, "language has devoided the verb 'to be' (kāna) of its lexical meaning [exist] because it does not need it [i.e. when it is placed as an initial element in the nominal sentence]; it [language] only needs its 'inflectional dummy form', that carries the temporal notion" ('atat l-luḡatu ʿala l-fiʿli kāna l-laḍi maʿnāhu (wajada) wa farragathu min maʿnāhu hāḍa li ʿannahā laysat biḥājatin ila lafẓihi l-qābili li-t-taṣarufi wa l-laḍi yaḥmilu fikrata z-zaman)<sup>56</sup>. As a result of its loss of its lexical meaning, the verb to be (kāna) becomes no more than a means of linking the predicand with the predicate in an equational-equivalent sentence. This is why TAGs as well as rhetoricians call it an incomplete verb. But one has to remember that this verb was a complete one; its complete counterpart 5-118 as well as its incomplete form 5-119 can be illustrated respectively, in:

5-118 kāna mutarjimun wa kāna yaʿmalu fi s-saʿūdiyya.  
there (was) a translator (and he was) working in Saudi Arabia.  
There was a translator who was working in Saudi Arabia.

5-119a kāna Zayd-un nāʾim-an.  
was Zeid-nom. sleep.accus.  
Zeid [theme/given] was a sleep [rheme/new]. (or)

5-119b ʾZayd-un kāna nāʾim-an.  
Zeid-nom. was a sleep-accus.  
It was Zeid (and nobody else) [theme/new] who was a sleep [rheme/given]. (or)

5-119c nā'im-an      kāna Zayd-un.  
asleep-accus.    was    Zeid-nom.  
Zeid [theme] was the one who was a sleep [rheme]. (or) Zeid was asleep.

In examples 5-119a, b & c, the verb 'to be' (kāna) occupies two different positions: initial and medial. In this respect, al-Anṭākī (1975, vol. 2, p. 5) points out that 'kāna' can be placed before the predicand (mubtada) (5-119a) and after it (5-119b & c). This, however, does not prevent the predicate, operated upon by 'kāna' and thus in the accusative case, to be preposed as in 5-119c, and this kind of preposed accusative has tempted some Arabists like Fleisch (1966) to suggest that an accusative predicate is no more than a 'circumstance' (ḥāl) for the predicand (mubtada')<sup>57</sup>. This can easily be refuted by the fact that because the verb 'to be' (kāna), as emphasized above by Antāki (1975), has already lost its lexical meaning when it precedes a nominal sentence, and that 'circumstance' (al-ḥāl) is an adverbial complement (faḍla) that can be dispensed with with a complete verb; a word like 'a sleep' (nā'im-an) in 5-119c is not a complement (faḍla) but a 'pillar' (ʿimād), and in this respect a preposed predicate.

#### 5.4.2 Theme in Equational (Copulative-Equivalent) structures in SA

With regard to the thematic structure of English equational clauses, Halliday (1967c) states that whatever comes to the left of the verb 'to be' is theme and whatever follows it is rheme, regardless of whether it is the identifier or the identified. He illustrates this in his well-known 'beer advertisement':

5-120a Watney's [theme] is what we need [rheme]. (versus)

5-120b What we need [theme] is Watney's [rheme].

As in SA, this construction gives the meaning of exclusiveness (this and this only) as highlighted by the speaker.

SA treats thematic structure in a generally similar way to English, with some differences, however. In the case of the verb 'to be', when the predicand-predicate are inverted as in example 5-119c above what precedes the verb 'to be' is actually the predicate (xabar/rheme), since it says 'something' about the predicand (mubtada/theme) that is not supposed to be presupposed by the addressee, otherwise he would not ask a question like 'where Zeid has been' (ʿayna kāna Zaydun?); whereas examples 5-119a & b can be treated on the basis of Halliday's formulation.

On the other hand, the copulative-equivalent structures in SA created by the pronoun of separation (ḍamīr l-faṣl) has also two possible thematic constructions, sentence. The first structure can be illustrated by examples like:

5-121a al-mu'minūna humu l-fā'izūn.  
the-believers (copula) the-winners.

The believers [theme] are the ones who shall win [rheme].

This case tallies with Halliday's formulation, that is, whatever precedes the pronoun of separation is a theme and whatever follows it is a rheme, and the pronouns is there for separating them and emphasizing the fact that predicate (xabar) belongs exclusively to this predicand (the Basrans' point of view).

The second case, however is the same as the first case in as far as word order is concerned, but different with regard to the status of the pronoun of separation itself. The dispute alluded to above between the two traditional schools of grammar (the Basrans and the Kufans) with regard to this pronoun is clarified by Ibn Ya'īsh in his *Šharh al-Mufaṣṣal* (vol.3, p. 109) when he says "the Basrans call it 'pronoun of separation' (ḍamīr faṣl) and the Kufans call it "imad' (a pillar)" , thus it is natural for the Kufans to treat it as a secondary theme in Beeston's and Halliday's terms, and what follows it is its rheme, and it constitutes with its rheme a primary rheme for the primary theme of the nominal clause as in 5-121b, re-analyzed as:

5-121b	al-mu'minūna	humu	al-fā'izūn.
	theme1		rheme1
		theme2	rheme2

the-believers (are) the-winners.

The believers [theme] are the ones who shall win [rheme].

From a pragmatic point view, however, Arab rhetoricians join forces with the Basrans.

This can be seen from the function of the 'pronoun of separation' outlined in the previous section, and since this study is 'pragmatically-oriented', the rhetorician's view is taken as the final word<sup>58</sup>.

## 5.5 Theme and Focus in SA

For Halliday the information structure of the clause (a sentence with one independent clause and one or more dependent ones) is a type of discourse organization, where the latter consists of a sequence of information blocks (tone groups) which represent the phonological realization of the information unit (cf. 3.6.1) . These units are linearly organized to convey the message contents of language (i.e. its ideational and interpersonal components in Halliday's formulation). Speakers or writers organize these units in a way that reflects their choices in the organization of discourse on the basis of their intentions of what to convey. Thus, such arrangements increase or decrease the informative aspects of these information units because speakers or writers differ in the way information units are linearized. They, however, structure these units in a way that enables the hearer or reader to decode the communicated information in the way intended by the speakers or writers.

Chafe (cf. 4.3) also points out that the analysis of information structure of sentences is based on the speaker's or writers assumption as to what portion of the message is to be presented as 'given' and what is to be presented as 'new'. This interaction between the two (the speaker and the hearer) is only made possible through the availability of a given verbal and/or a situational context. Thus, given information is that which denotes the extent to which the item is assumed to be known by the hearer/reader ('already present in his consciousness), and thus referred to anaphorically.

By comparison with English, TAGs as well as rhetoricians point out that, in SA, given information tends to precede new information, unless, like English, the speakers/writers are aiming at achieving certain 'emotive' purposes such as focus/emphasis and/or contrast. In this respect, 'abbās (1989, pp. 321-322) says that

typically the predicand (mubtada) must be defined [cf. given]. Being thus [given] rests on the fact that it is what you [the speaker] are informing about. Therefore it must be 'known' [given] to the addressee; otherwise, how could you [the speaker] start with something which the addressee does not know. As for the predicate (xabar), it is what you are informing about the mubtada, and thus, there is no harm in having it 'unknown' [new] to the addressee [my translation].

As can be gathered from this quotation, SA like English has the given-new order of the information unit as its unmarked case. Any deviation from this unmarked order would serve, as hinted above, some special communicative purpose. To illustrate this from

SA, the following examples with some ‘context questions’ are selected:

5-122a <sup>ʾ</sup>akala Zayd-un at-tuffāḥat-a.  
ate Zeid-nom. the-apple-accus.  
Zeid [theme] ate the apple [rheme].

5-122b Zayd-un <sup>ʾ</sup>akala at-tuffāḥat-a.  
Zeid-nom. ate the-apple-accus.  
It is ZEID [theme & new] who ate the apple [rheme]/ ZEID[theme & new] ate the apple [rheme].

5-122c at-tuffāḥat-u <sup>ʾ</sup>akala-hā Zayd-un.  
the-apple-accus/nom. ate-it Zeid-nom.  
The APPLE [theme], Zeid ate it [rheme]. (or) the Apple was eaten by Zeid.

5-122d <sup>ʾ</sup>alladī <sup>ʾ</sup>akala t-tuffāḥata (huwa) Zaydun.  
the (one) ate-he the-apple (copula) Zeid  
The one who ate the apple [theme] is Zeid [rheme].

5-122e Zayd-un (huwa) <sup>ʾ</sup>alladī <sup>ʾ</sup>akala t-tuffāḥat-a.  
Zeid-nom. (copula) who ate-he the-apple-accus.  
Zeid [theme] is the one who ate the apple [rheme].

5-122f <sup>ʾ</sup>aš-šay<sup>ʾ</sup>u alladī fa<sup>ʿ</sup>ala-hu Zayd-un bi-t-tuffāḥati <sup>ʾ</sup>annahu <sup>ʾ</sup>akala-hā.  
the-thing which did-he Zeid-nom. with-the apple that ate-he-it  
The thing which Zeid did with the apple [theme] is he ate it.

5-123a māḍā ḥadaṭa? 5-123b māḍā fa<sup>ʿ</sup>al Zaydun?  
What happened? What did Zeid Do?

5-123c man <sup>ʾ</sup>akala t-tuffāḥata? 5-123d māḍā fa<sup>ʿ</sup>ala Zayd-un bi-t-tuffāḥat-i?  
who ate-he the-apple what did Zeid-nom. with-the-apple-gen.  
Who ate the apple? What did Zeid do with the apple?

5-123e māḍa <sup>ʾ</sup>akala Zaydun? 5-123f mal-ladī akala-hu Zayd-un?  
What ate Zeid What ate-he Zeid-nom.  
What did Zeid eat? What did Zeid ate?

5-122a, for example, can be an answer to 5-123a & b, but it is inappropriate as an answer to 5-123c & f. The point here is that a speaker/a writer structures his question in a way that reveals his intention, which can be called ‘information soliciting’. The hearer/reader, in turn, structures his response in a way that fulfils this intention, by providing the missing piece of information. Moreover, the hearer has the choice of providing new information first or last. If the hearer starts with new information, this reflects his intention to achieve information focus/emphasis and/or contrast. Information



focus relates each information unit in a message to the preceding discourse. In this respect, I suggest that users of SA achieve information focus by providing new information first (i.e mapped onto the initial constituent(s) of the sentence), be it the theme or rheme, unlike Halliday who always (cf. 3.6.2) ties the initial position(s) of the clause with theme in English. Thus, 5-122a & b can be appropriate answers to 5-123a, although they differ in the way in which the speaker conveys his message; this difference, however, is realized by the fact that in 5-122a, he intends to convey his message in a 'neutral' (unmarked) way, while in 5-122b, he conveys it in a marked/contrastive construction. In Halliday's formulation, 5-122a can be interpreted as a neutral proposition: 'Zeid ate the apple, among many 'Zeids' in the universe of discourse'; whereas, in 5-122b, the proposition can be interpreted as: 'Zeid and nobody else ate the apple', or 'Zeid and no body else is the theme of the sentence', using Halliday's formulation (cf. 3.6.4.1). The information focus in 5-122b (Zaydun) reflects the complementary part of the presupposition which represents the focal point of the message: the most prominent piece of information, which is represented by Halliday as a 'marked theme'.

In the above examples also, context questions 5-122c & f establish the focal point of their answers 5-123b & c, which are expressed in English by means of it-cleft and pseudo-cleft respectively. The same focus can be expressed in response to the same questions by the use of contrastive stress in English. However, since SA is predominantly written, stress is considered to have a secondary role, such as assigning a compound foci (cf 4.3) in answers to context questions like:

5-124 Q: hal 'akal-ta l-xubza?  
          did ate-you the-bread  
          Did you eat the bread?

5-125 A: LA! ZAYDUN 'akal 'A-TUFFĀḤATA.  
          no! Zeid ate the-apple  
          NO! it was Zeid [theme/new] who ate the APPLE [rheme/given].

Here, 5-125 illustrates a compound focus in SA, where 'Zeid', subject, and 'the apple', object, are focussed by a contrastive focus.

There are a number of syntactic devices in SA that increase or decrease the degree of 'givenness' of one or more elements, while increasing the focus/emphasis of other constituents of the sentence. Among these, in SA, are the it-equivalent and the

pseudo-equivalent constructions, and some special emphatic particles, which either emphasize certain constituent in the sentence or emphasize the sentence as a whole. These particles are called by TAGs 'emphatic particles' ('adawāt t-tawkīd). In what follows, there will be a brief discussion and exemplification of each one on the basis of their impact on the thematic structure of the sentence whether nominal or verbal.

### **5.5.1 Pseudo-Cleft & It-Cleft Equivalents Constructions in SA**

It has been pointed out by Halliday (see section 3.6.4.1) that there are two important points with regard to predicated theme (theme in cleft constructions): (1) the relationship between information structure and thematisation and (2) the relationship between the latter and focus, which TAGs call emphasis (at-tawkīd) in Arabic grammar. These two assumptions will be taken a step further in SA by examining how and when speakers/writers of SA use sentences equivalent to those of it- and pseudo- cleft in English; the choice of selecting one over the other will be investigated.

By comparison with their English translations, examples 5-122b & (c and d) above represent it-cleft and wh-cleft equivalent constructions in SA. Looking at these examples, one comes to the conclusion that the grammatical mechanics of creating them cannot be considered the same as those of their English counterparts, although both are meant to function in the same way: achieve focus for the various parts of the proposition. In SA, cleft constructions merely take a constituent from its unmarked position and place it in an 'unusual' one, hence the marked WO of SVO, OVS and VOS are produced, which is, in some way, similar to Halliday's notion of a marked theme (cf. 3.6.2). In this respect, one can propose that the preposed subject or object represents a focus on these two constituents. In other words, the constituent is made more prominent than the rest of sentence, hence it is referred to as cleft-equivalent in SA. On the other hand pseudo-cleft-equivalent constructions in SA are closer to their English counterparts in being related to the relative and the equative structures (see previous section).

As mentioned earlier, VSO and SP are the neutral WO in verbal and nominal sentences respectively. Thematically speaking then, SVO and OVS are the marked ones. These ones express the way in which it-cleft equivalent and pseudo-cleft-

equivalent sentences are considered in SA, as in examples 5-122b and e respectively. In 5-122b, for example, the focussed subject 'Zeid', can be a focussed theme with regard to context-question 5-123e and rheme with regard to 5-123c. The same thing can be applied to the object 'apple' in 5-123e, where it can be considered as theme with regard to 5-123e and rheme with regard to 5-123c.

It is quite possible, therefore, to change WO in SA and still maintain grammaticality of sentences, since Arabic as mentioned before has a relatively free WO, and since it marks the sentence constituent with case-endings, wherever they are placed within the sentence (cf. 5.1.2). In its unmarked case, I believe that SA, like English, has its unmarked focus with the rhematic part of the sentence, whether the latter is nominal or verbal (the final lexical item in both, in Halliday's formulation; cf. 3.6.3). To test this assumption from SA, the following example is selected, where the subject is placed final in a verbal sentence:

- 5-126 \*akala t-tuffaḥat-a      ZAYD-UN.  
ate the-apple-accus. Zeid-nom.  
The apple [theme] was eaten by Zeid [rheme]. (or)  
ZEID [theme & new] is the one who ate the apple [rheme]. (cf. 3.6.3.)

Here, 'Zaydun' would be focussed. It also should be noticed that 5-122e and 5-126 can properly answer the questions 5-123c, although 'Zaydun', as mentioned above, is theme in 5-126 with regard to 5-123c, and it is syntactically focussed. Thus, one can generalize that by certain syntactic manipulations like those of WO, users of SA can focus different constituents in the sentence by placing them in positions other than their normal (unmarked) ones and still maintain grammaticality, proper decoding and comprehension by the addressee, whether hearer/reader, of the intended meaning of the speaker/writer.

Closely related to it-cleft construction in English and it-cleft-equivalent constructions in SA is what TAGs call 'the pronoun of status' (ḡamīr aš-šaʿn aw l-ḥikāya aw l-qīṣa), which, according to Ibn Yaʿīsh's *Sharḥ al-Mufaṣṣal* (vol. 3., pp. 114-117) precedes the verbal or nominal clause; the clause following it acting as its predicate, as in:

- 5-127a (huwa) (mubtada1/theme1)      Zayd-un (Mubtada2/theme1) qādim-un  
(xabar2/rheme).  
(pronoun of status)      Zeid-nom. coming-nom.  
It is ZEID [theme] who is coming [Halliday's formulation]

The Kufans, including Ibn Yaʿīsh himself, call this pronoun as an ‘unknown pronoun’ (aḍ-ḍamīr l-majhūl) (equivalent to ‘it’ in English cleft construction) because it is not usually preceded by any referent, hence its equivalence to the dummy ‘it’ in English. As far as the it-cleft equivalent construction in SA is concerned, this pronoun is usually suffixed to ‘the cancellers’ (ʿan-nawāsix) grammatical operators, especially the emphatic particles ‘inna’, as in:

5-127b inna-hu (mubtada/theme1) Zayd-un(theme1) qādim-un (xabar/rheme).  
(emphatic particle-‘concern’ pronoun) Zeid coming.  
It is **ZEID** [theme] who is coming [rheme]. [Halliday’s formulation]

From a thematic point of view, however, the difference between 5-127a and 5-127b is that more emphasis is placed on the theme (in this case the second mubtada) in 127b due to the fact that the proposition is being preceded by the emphatic particle ‘inna’; the English translation, on the other hand, does not distinguish between the two sentences<sup>59</sup>.

To sum up this sub-section, the marked WO of SVO and OVS are used by users of SA to achieve focus. These constructions involving marked WO are found to represent it-cleft and pseudo-cleft equivalent constructions in SA. Most importantly, it has also been demonstrated that discourse governs the use of these types of construction in SA, such that speakers and writers use the marked order of SVO and OVS as cleft constructions to answer specific questions, which ask for specific information. On the other hand, the VSO constructions are meant to answer general questions relating to the overall state of affairs: ‘what happened’ (māḍā ḥadaṭ?).

### 5.5.2 Additional Methods of Focus in SA

Among the emphatic particles (ʿadawāt t-tawkīd), the following are well known, for their use by speakers and writers in SA to achieve focus: (1) lām l-ʿibtidāʿ, (2) inna, (3) the oath (l-qasam), (4) ‘qad lit-t-ṭahqīq’ (acknowledgment), (5) ‘the emphatic letter’: nūn at-tawkīd, (6) the cognate verb (l-mafʿūl l-muṭlaq), (7) innamā of exclusiveness (l-qasr) and (8) the glossed particle ‘ammā in combination with ‘fa’. The first and the second particles give emphasis to the predicand (mubtada) in the nominal sentence. The third gives emphasis to the verbal sentence as a whole, whereas

the fourth, fifth and sixth give emphasis to the verb in the verbal sentence, and the last two give emphasis for constituents in both the nominal and verbal sentence<sup>60</sup>. To illustrate each one, the following examples are respectively selected:

- 5-128a LAZAYD-UN ḍāhib-un ila l-Baṣrat-i.  
Zeid-nom. going-nom to the-Basra-gen.  
it is Zeid [theme/new] who is going to Basra [rheme/given].
- 5-128b ʿinna ZAYD-AN ḍāhib-un ila l-Baṣrat-i.  
Zeid-accus going-nom. to the-Basra-gen.  
Zeid [theme] is going to Basra [rheme].
- 5-128c wa ʿallāhi **laYADHABA-NNA ZAYD-UN ILA L-BAṢRAT-I.**  
(I swear that) will go Zeid-nom to the-Basra-gen.  
I swear that [theme1] Zeid [theme2] will go to Basra [rheme2] [rheme1].
- 5-128d qad **DAHABA** zayd-un ila l-Baṣrat-i.  
did go Zeid-nom. to the-Basra-gen.  
Zeid [theme] **DID GO** to Basra [rheme].
- 5-128e li**DATHABA-NNA** ila l-Baṣrat-i.  
go-you-must to the-Basra-gen.  
You [theme] must go to Basra [rheme].
- 5-128f **DAMMARAT** ṭ-ṭāʾirāt-u l-Baṣrat-a tadmīr-an.  
destroyed the-aircrafts-nom. the-Basrat-nom. destruction  
The aircrafts [theme] destroyed Basra completely [rheme].

With regard to achieving focus by using the particle ʿinnamā, Schub (1977), p. 208) points out that the focus is usually placed at the end of the sentence, whether verbal or nominal, as in:

a. (the nominal sentence):

- 5-129a ʿinnamā al-walad-u huwa **L-KABĪR-U.**  
the-boy-nom. (copula) the-big one.nom.  
The boy [theme] is **THE BIG ONE.**
- 5-129b ʿinnamā al-kabīr-u hwua **L-WALAD-U.**  
the-big one-nom. (copula) the-boy-nom.  
The big one [theme] is the **BOY** [rheme]. [unmarked focus in Halliday's terms]  
(OR):  
It is the **BOY** [theme] who is the big one [rheme].

b. (the verbal sentence):

- 5-129c ʿinnamā ʾakala zayd-un **T-TUFFĀḤAT-A.**

ate Zeid-nom. the-apple-accus.  
It was the **APPLE** [theme] that the boy ate [rheme].

As for the use of 'as for' (ʿammā) in combination with (fa), they are mainly used, according to Schub (1977, p.208), to topicalize the various constituents of the sentence, whether verbal and nominal (one aspect of Halliday's treatment of theme: 'the marked type' only), as in:

a. (the nominal sentence):

5-130 ʿammā al-walad-u fa-(huwa) l-(kabīr-u).  
(as for) the-boy-nom. fa-(copula) the-big one-nom.  
As for the boy [marked theme], he is the big one [rheme].

b. (the verbal sentence):

5-131 ʿammā zaydun fa-ʿakala t-tuffāḥat-a.  
(as for) Zeid ate-he the-apple-accus.  
As for Zeid [marked theme], he ate the apple [rheme]

The conclusion, which Schub comes to at the end of his short article tallies with the one arrived in the previous sub-section, and that is:

"it is *word order* which is the main factor in determining which part of a verbal sentence is focussed upon; other factors, such as pronoun reduplication, the use of presentatives, [ʿaḥruf at-tanbīh in Sibawayhi's terms like ʿinna, ʿinnamā, and ʿammā, among many others] are relatively minor determinants in focusing" (Schub, 1977, p. 210<sup>61</sup>) [original emphasis].

## 5.6 Theme and Ellipsis in SA

### 5.6.1 Halliday's Notion of Ellipsis

For Halliday (1976, p.142)<sup>62</sup>, the starting point for the discussion of elliptical clauses in English is that "something is unsaid"; and that "what is unsaid is undoubtedly 'understood', or as he puts it: "it goes without saying". According to him also, there are two sources from which this 'unsaid' element can be supplied: the verbal and the situational contexts. With regard to the study of ellipsis as a cohesive device in text, it is the former that counts. Thus, an item is elliptical when its structure does not express all the features that have gone into its make up\_\_ all the meanings. In this

respect, Halliday lays down a general guide for the notion of ellipsis in English:

ellipsis occurs when something that is structurally necessary is left unsaid; there is a sense of incompleteness associated with it . . . the essential characteristic of ellipsis is that something which is present in the selection of underlying ('systemic') options is omitted in the structure\_\_ whether or not the resultant structure is in itself incomplete (Halliday, 1976, p. 144) [my ellipsis].

Halliday also points out that, like substitution, ellipsis is a relation within a text, and that in the majority of instances, the presupposed item is present in the preceding text; in other words, it is normally an anaphoric relation. Unlike substitution, ellipsis leaves the slot of the missing item empty and does not fill it with a representative of the missing class item; this is why Halliday calls ellipsis as a special case of substitution when he says: "ellipsis is substitution by zero" (Halliday, op. cit, p. 145).

Halliday considers the notion of ellipsis and all other cohesive devices as additional relations that the speaker/writer establishes in order to construct discourse (text). These additional relations within the text are not subject to the inbuilt limitations of the complex clause, from the point of view of its contribution to the texture of discourse. These limitations, according to Halliday (1985, p. 287)<sup>63</sup>, are: (1) the fact that the complex clause consists of a number of clauses next to one another in the text, and thus (2) remain inherent in the nature of grammatical structure. What is needed, Halliday asserts, is a type of relation that may involve elements of any extent, both smaller and larger than clauses: "from single words to passages of texts". This, Halliday points out, "cannot be achieved by grammatical structure; it depends on a resource of a rather different kind". These 'non-structural' resources, among which ellipsis is one, are what Halliday (1976, 1985 & elsewhere) calls cohesion. These resources include, reference, lexical cohesion, which Halliday considers as a semantic relation, substitution and ellipsis, which he considers a lexicogrammatical relation and conjunction, which he considers to be "on the border line between the two" (Halliday, 1976, p. 6).

### **5.6.2 Ellipsis in English**

Halliday (1976 & 1985) identifies three major types of ellipsis within the clause

structure that can be 'presupposed' owing to the fact that the missing items can be picked up from the previous clause. These are nominal, verbal and clausal ellipsis. These three types, according to Halliday, cut across sentence boundaries, and thus are cohesive and contribute to constructing discourse. Halliday also mentions a fourth type: "when two clauses are structurally related, the second is BRANCHED" (Halliday, 1976, p. 143). At one point, as will be discussed later, Halliday points out it is cohesive, but most of the time, he considers it cohesion within the clause (sentence) structure, and thus it is not 'cohesion proper'. In what follows, a brief discussion and exemplification from English of the three types of ellipsis will be presented.

1. **Nominal Ellipsis.** In this type, ellipsis occurs within the nominal group (NG) that acts either as a subject (subject in Halliday's unmarked sense of thematisation or complement in the marked sense) of the clause, its complement (object), or its 'rhematic' actor in the case of a passive construction. Among the noun phrases that can act as heads (H) of NGs, and, thus, are subject to ellipsis are the common nouns (Halliday (1976, p. 147), which can be further specified (a reminder of the types of the 'surpluses' (al-faḍalāt), which specify the subject (al-fāʿil) in the verbal sentence or the predicand (al-mubtada) in the nominal sentence in Arabic: see section 5.1.1). These specifiers include, according to Halliday (loc. cit.), deictic (D), numerative (N), epithet (E) and classifier (C)., (see section 5.4.3) as in:

5-132 Those [D] two [N] fast [E] electric [C] trains [H] passed the station in a very high speed.

According to Halliday, under certain contextual circumstances, the function (H) may be ellipited and its function can be assumed by other elements. This is what Halliday means by nominal ellipsis. The range of presupposition that results from ellipsis in the NG depends in the very structure of the NG itself; in this respect Halliday says:

It [presupposition] extends only over the part of the presupposed group which could follow the element acting as a 'head' in the elliptical group. Those parts which would precede or be concurrent with the head are excluded from presupposition, . . . what can be presupposed, therefore, is anything having a function in the series D, N, E, C that is **LATER** than that occupied by the head of the elliptical group (Halliday, 1976, p. 151) [original emphasis; my ellipsis].

This quotation can be illustrated, following in the steps of Halliday (loc. cit.), by taking the NG of 5-132 above:



<u>If the elliptical group is:</u>	<u>these are repudiated (&amp;)</u>	<u>these are NOT repudiated</u>
those (which) (D)	D (those)	N, E, C, H= (two . . . trains)
two (N)	D, N, (those two)	E, C, H= (fast . . . trains)
two fast (N,E)	D,N,E (those two fast)	C, X, H= (electric trains)
some electric ones (D, C)	D,N,E,C, (those . . . electric)	H= (trains)

In this respect, Halliday (loc. cit.) points out that the further to the right the final element of the presupposing group, the more usual it is to presuppose by substitution rather than by ellipsis, as in the previous illustration, where 'some electric one' is more common than 'some electric (0= trains)'. This is why Halliday comes to the conclusion that the cline of presupposition in nominal ellipsis can look like this: (D) and (N) are more common than (E) and (C). This, of course, does not deny the fact that (E) and (C) can be anaphoric and cohesive, but they tend, as Halliday indicates, to achieve this status by substitution rather than by ellipsis.

**2. Verbal Ellipsis.** By verbal ellipsis, Halliday (1976, 1985) means ellipsis that happens within the verbal group (VG) of the clause. He illustrates this type by examples like:

5-133 A: Have you been swimming? B: Yes, I have (0= been swimming).

5-134 A: What have you been doing? B: (0= I have been) swimming.

On the basis of these examples, verbal ellipsis can be defined with regard of what is missing of the VG of the second clause (the response), which can be 'replaced' from the one preceding (the question). In this respect Halliday says:

technically, it [verbal ellipsis] is defined as a verbal group whose structure does not express all its systemic features\_\_ all [systemic] choices that are being made within the verbal group system. [i.e. features as positive as opposed to negative, finite as opposed to non-finite, and active as opposed to passive, as well as those of a particular tense. present, past or future; but none of these selections is shown in its structure]. . . They have been recovered by presupposition. (Halliday, 1976, p. 167) [my ellipsis].

Halliday (1976, p. 170) divides verbal ellipsis into two major types: lexical and operator ellipsis. The former, as the name implies, presupposes (omits) the lexical verb as exemplified by 5-133; while the latter "involves the omission of operators: the lexical verb remains intact" (Halliday, 1976, p. 174), as in 5-134. In addition to the deletion of the operators in 5-134, the subject also is ellipted from the clause. Thus, lexical ellipsis is, as Halliday (loc. cit.) points out, "is ellipsis from the right". In addition to the deletion of the lexical verb, as can be seen from Halliday's example 5-133, the preceding elements, except the initial operator (the one realizing polarity, in systemic

terms) are also deleted, as well as what follows the lexical verb like complement and adjunct. On the other hand, operator ellipsis is "ellipsis from the left": the initial element (the mood constituents) in the VG is omitted and the following elements (except the item realizing polarity) may be omitted, all except the lexical verb. To illustrate this, Halliday (1976, p. 192) draws the following table showing the systemic features of the clause that can be ellipped and thus presupposed from the previous one:

<u>Clause systemic features</u>	<u>Lexical Ellipsis</u>	<u>Operator Ellipsis</u>
1. Polarity	Inapplicable (always expressed)	Not presupposed
2. Finiteness & Modality	Inapplicable (always expressed)	Presupposed
3. Voice	Presupposed	Presupposed (could be repudiated under certain conditions)
4. Tense	Not presupposed (except last order selection in compound tense)	Presupposed unless repudiated
5. Lexical verb	Presupposed	Inapplicable (always expressed)

As can be seen from the this table, operator ellipsis involves the deletion of what Halliday calls 'the modal block' (the finite verb and the subject), which realizes the mood system of the clause, which, in turn, is responsible for determining the thematic structure of the various types of moods a clause may select (cf. 3.6.2). In this respect, the ellipped mood of the subsequent clause will have to be recovered from the previous clause, and whatever thematic structure the previous clause has will be the thematic structure of the ellipped one, following Halliday's formulation that the mood system of the clause determines its thematic structure (cf. 3.6.2). For this reason, Halliday (1976) limits the domain of verbal ellipsis to question-answer contexts, because, according to him, any deletion of the elements representing the mood system of the clause without being presupposed in the previous one does not contribute to the total picture of cohesion, his main concern. This is why most of the examples he uses to support his argument with regard to verbal ellipsis are of the question-answer type. On the other hand, lexical ellipsis does not omit any element from the modal block, and thus mood of the clause is fully explicit.

**3. Clausal Ellipsis.** From a structural point of view, Halliday (cf. 3.2) points out that a clause in English consists of four main structural units: subject (S), predicate (P), complement (C) and adjunct (A), with the mood element consisting, as mentioned earlier, of the (S) and the finite part of the (P), an the rest of the (P), the lexical verb with the optional elements of (C) and (A) constituting what Halliday (1976, p. 194) calls the 'residue' (not to be confused with 'surpluses' in Arabic), which makes up the

'propositional part of the sentence. To illustrate this, the following examples is selected from Halliday (loc. cit.):

5-135 The duke | was | going to plant | a row of poplars | in the park.

Modal		Proposition (residue)		
S	P		C	A
NG	VG		NG	Preps. group (PG)
Theme	Rheme			

Thus, what can be ellipted (presupposed) as a result of verbal ellipsis, whether operator or lexical, depends on the following principle, which is laid down by Halliday, and which, according to him, can be applicable to all forms of ellipsis:

although the structural elements themselves are not present in the elliptical item, the features that are realized by these elements **ARE** present. So a clause in which there is operator ellipsis of the verbal group has no subject; but if the clause presupposed by it is indicative (indicative being the feature realized by the presence of a subject), then it also is indicative even though it has no subject. Similarly a clause in which there is lexical ellipsis of the verbal group has no complement or adjunct, but it takes over any of the features realized by these elements (types of transitivity; time, place, manner, etc.) that are present in the presupposed clause. Therefore, if the elliptical clause is making a **DIFFERENT** selection within these features - referring to a different time, different goal, different location, etc. - this **MUST** be expressed overtly, in order to repudiate the previous selections; and on the other hand, if it is making the same selection - i.e., if there is no contrast between the two clauses with respect to a given selection- this **CANNOT** be expressed overtly (Halliday, 1976, pp. 195-196) [original emphasis].

Looking at the clause structure from another vantage point, Halliday (1976 & elsewhere) asserts that the clause in English is considered as the expression of various speech functions, such as statements, questions, responses, and so on. It also consists of a two-part structure, modal and proposition, as illustrated in 5-135 above, which according to Halliday (1976, p. 197) represents the 'favourite clause type', in which the modal element precedes the propositional one, though need not to, as it is the case with Halliday's 'marked thematic structure' (cf. 3.6.2). The following two examples represent two 'marked' cases, where part of the proposition (marked theme and new information) precedes the modal elements (see next page):

5-135a	In the park	the duke	was	going to plant	a row of poplars.
	Proposi-	Modal		-tional	
	A	S		P	C
	PG	NG		VG	NG
	Theme [new]	Rheme			

5-135b	A row of poplars	the duke	was	going to plant	in the park.
	Proposi	Modal		-tioanl	
	C	S		V	A
	NG	NG		VG	PG
	Theme [new]	Rheme			

The two types of verbal ellipsis are derivable from these two major division of the clause; there can be ellipsis in the modal element, as in:

5-136a A: what was the duke going to do?

B: (0= The duke was going to) Plant a row of poplars in the park.

Here, the modal element as well as the subject are deleted. There is also ellipsis in the propositional element as in:

5-136b A: Who was going to plant a row of poplars in the park?

B: The duke was (0= going to plant a row of poplars in the park).

On the basis of examples like these, Halliday, 1976, p, 199) comes to the conclusion that,

in a finite clause, with either of these two types of ellipsis, the verbal group is elliptical:

<u>Clause</u>	<u>Verbal Group</u>
(1) modal ellipsis	operator ellipsis
(2) propositional ellipsis	lexical ellipsis.

At the same time, Halliday, (loc. cit.) points out that there are certain circumstances under which this does not hold, i.e clausal ellipsis does not match verbal ellipsis<sup>64</sup>.

A fourth type of ellipsis, which Halliday (1976, p. 146) mentions, but does not elaborate, since it takes place, according to him, within the boundaries of a single structure, and hence does not contribute to the cohesion of the text as a whole is what he (1976) calls "branching ellipsis". He illustrates this type by examples like:

5-137 John brought some carnations and Catherine (0= brought) some sweet peas<sup>65</sup>.

Such examples, according to Halliday, have, what he calls: 'a branching structure'

which does not occur when presupposition is between sentences (ellipsis proper). Thus, this type is rejected by Halliday, because it is 'structural'. Additional examples of this type include some type of operator ellipsis within the sentence in the context of coordination, as in:

5-138 Some were laughing and others (0= were) crying.

Here, there are two different subjects (themes in Halliday's formulation) in contrast with one another, and the verbal form is branched: *were (laughing and . . . crying)*. The operator (were) is structurally related to both halves of the coordination, as indicated in the bracketing. This type of ellipsis also happens in lexical ellipsis, with one lexical verb being related to two or more coordinate operators, as in 5-137 above. These two types of 'branched ellipsis' are similar to the notion of 'dispute' (at-tanāzu<sup>66</sup>) in Arabic traditional grammar, where two operators, usually two verbs, dispute over one subject or object, as in, respectively:

5-139 qama wa qa'ada r-rijāl-u.  
stood and sat the-men-nom.  
The men stood up and (0=the men) sat down.

5-140 ra'aytu wa ḥayyaytu Zayd-an.  
saw-I and greeted-I Zeid-accus.  
I saw Zeid and (0= I) greeted him.

While Halliday (1976, p. 204) insists that there is not such a type of clausal ellipsis which consists of omitting one element of the clause structure, he admits that his rejection is for the purpose of stating a generalization: "one which explains why certain theoretically possible types cannot occur independently\_\_ though they may occur in branching structures":

5-141 We went to the river yesterday. (0= yesterday) We had dinner too.

Here, 'yesterday' in the 'branching' sentence is not considered elliptical by Halliday (loc. cit.). Instead, he believes that it merely implies, in this context, the particular time referred to in the preceding sentence. Thus, 'yesterday' in the second sentence does not, according to him, embody a temporal feature, nor, this feature is, in any sense, omitted from the sentence. For Halliday, examples like 5-141, in which the omission of one element from the clause, where that element is otherwise obligatory\_\_ such as subject or complement following a verb which requires one, led him to formulate a general principle about cohesion in the clause:

Other than in question-answer environment . . . the basis of both ellipsis and substitution . . . is the 'two-part structure, modal and proposition'. One or the other these element may be presupposed, as a whole; but the smaller elements which make them up\_\_ **S, C, P, or A MAY NOT BE PRESUPPOSED IN ISOLATION** (Halliday, 1976, pp. 205-206) [my ellipsis and emphasis].

Halliday, however, admits that the facts on which he bases this principle on are often indeterminate, as the facts, for him, of any language are. He also clarifies the fact that he does not 'force' them into a 'mould', but in certain instances, he chooses that interpretation which brings more of them within the scope of a single generalization\_\_ provided "it is one which makes good sense" (Halliday, op. cit., p. 206). I believe this is what one should do.

### 5.6.3 Ellipsis in SA

‘abbās (1989) defines the notion of ellipsis as:

the omission of part of the utterance (al-kalām) that is used to express [realize] the intentional meaning. The deleted portion may be a word or a sentence; the utterance should be understood without it. This deleted portion must also have a preceding contextual evidence (in this case a presupposed item in the previous sentence) that interprets it (‘abbās, op. cit., p. 459<sup>67</sup>) [my translation].

Unlike English, Arab grammarians and rhetoricians divided ellipsis in Arabic into two major parts: word ellipsis and sentence ellipsis; the latter type is not, however, equivalent to Halliday's clausal ellipsis. As for contextual evidence, that interprets the missing item(s), ‘abbās (loc. cit.) points out there are three different contextual means: situational (exophoric in Halliday's terms), verbal and logical. By logical context, ‘abbās (1989) means that this context is 'rational' because he believes that the hearer is not going to interpret it verbatim, if he has the smallest amount of sense. Consider an example like:

5-142 Ya Zaydan! ‘awqif l-qāfila!  
Oh Zeid! Stop the convoy!

Here, the speaker does not mean that he is calling Zeid to stop the column of 'cars' or 'camels', but calling him to tell the drivers or riders (ellipted in this context) to stop the convoy. In contrast with Arab rhetoricians, Halliday, only takes verbal context into

account and, to a very limited extent the situational factors , since as mentioned earlier (see previous section), ellipsis, to him, is a lexicogrammatical relation. Thus he does not accept the idea of interpreting the presupposed items on exophoric grounds, "since it is the preceding texts that provides the relevant environment in which the presupposed item is located" (Halliday, 1976, p. 308).

Under word ellipsis, Arab rhetoricians and grammarians mainly discuss the omission of the verb, the subject, the object and some other constituents of the verbal sentence, and the predicand (al-mubtada'), the predicate (al-xabar), and the epithet (al-naʿt) from the nominal sentence, in addition to the annexation, the noun classifier (al-mudāf) from both the noun groups of both types of sentences. Under sentential ellipsis, rhetoricians discuss and exemplify this type from the Holy Qurʾān<sup>68</sup>. The main concern in this study is the first type. Thus, what follows is an attempt to 're-classify word ellipsis' in SA on the basis of Arab grammarians' and rhetoricians' discussions and following in the steps of Halliday's classification. The purpose of this re-classification is to establish a common ground for comparing the thematic structure of elliptical clauses in both languages. 'Word' ellipsis in Arabic can be sub-categorized into three major parts: nominal, clausal ellipsis and word ellipsis:

#### **1. Nominal Ellipsis.**

In comparison with nominal ellipsis as a cohesive device in English, SA shares some of the elliptical features and devices of English. One of the features that signals nominal ellipsis in SA and which is similar to that of English, is what Arab grammarians call 'nutation' (nun.) (ʿat-tanwīn), case-ending (Hasan, 1975, Vol. 1, p. 44). This feature is most commonly used with the 'emphatic particles' (ʿadawāt at-tawkīd) in SA, such as 'each and all' (kul wa jamīʿ), among others (called by Halliday 1976, 'pre-deictics'), as in the following example borrowed from Hasan (1975), followed by an example taken from Halliday (1976):

5-143 qassamt-u t-tarikat-a bayna mustaḥiqqī-hā, wa ʿaʿtayt-u kull-an  
divided-I the-inheritance between eligible-its and gave-I each-nun.

(0= mustaḥiqq-in) hiṣṣata-hu<sup>69</sup>.

(0= eligible-nun.) share-his.

I [theme] divided the inheritance between those eligible for it, and I [theme] gave each (0= eligible person) his share [rheme].

5-144 The men got back at midnight. Both (0= men) [theme] were tired out [rheme].

In both examples, the ellipted item (the head) in the second clause can be recovered from the preceding one. Sometimes, however, the presupposition of the 'head' is carried out by a 'reference pronoun' (ḍamīr 'ā'id) rather than ellipsis. As for Halliday's (1976) 'post-deictics', it is possible to illustrate this type of nominal ellipsis in the NG from SA in:

5-145 wa fuj<sup>\*</sup>at-an zahara talāt-u šubbān-in 'ala l-masrah.  
Suddenly-nun. appeared three-nom. youths-nun. on the-stage

'inḥanā l-'awwal-u taḥiyyat-an li-jumhūri, wa 'ammā (0= 'aš-šabb-āni)  
bent the-first great-nun to-audience, and as for (0= the-youth-two)

al-'axar-āni faqad waqaf-ā wājim-ayni.  
the-other-two did stood-they silent-they.

5-145a And suddenly there appeared three youths on the stage. The first bent down to greet the audience. As for the others (0=two youths), they stood silent.

This example matches those examples that Halliday (1976) uses to illustrate post-deictics as heads:

5-146 I've used the two yellow folders you gave me. Can I use the others (0= three).

With regard to the use of numeratives as 'heads' in English, Halliday (1976) subcategorizes them into three main types: numerals (ordinals), cardinals and indefinite particles. In comparison with the Arabic, the following two examples are selected respectively from English and Arabic:

5-147a Smith was the first person to arrive. I was the second (0= person).

5-147b ḍahab talāt-tu 'ašdiqā'-in 'ila l-Baṣrati wa 'āda t-talātu sālimīn.  
went three-nom friends-gen. to the-Basra and returned the-three safely  
Three friends went to Basra, and the three (0=friends) returned safely.

The third type of numeratives, the indefinite quantifier is not elliptical in SA; there must be a 'reference pronoun' that refers back to the presupposed nominal group as in the translation of the following example borrowed from Halliday (1976):

5-148a Can cats climb trees?  
Most (0= cats) can do.

5-148b 'a-tastaḥḥu l-qīṭaṭu tasalluqa l-'ašjāri?  
mu'zamu-hā (= al-qīṭaṭi) yastaḥḥu ḍālik.

The function of epithet as head of a nominal group is fulfilled by an adjective. Halliday (1976, p. 163) indicates that adjectives as heads can be sub-categorized into



comparative and superlative ones, although, according to him, adjectives as heads are "not common" in ellipsis except the "colour adjectives". With regard to the superlative and comparative forms, he says:

. . . comparative and superlative adjectives are really functioning in a way that is more like a Numeratives, possibly instead of the function Numerative in the nominal group, we should recognize a more general function 'Ordinative', which would include superlative and perhaps comparative adjectives as well as . . . 'Numerative proper' (numerals and indefinite quantifiers). (Halliday, 1976, p. 163) [my ellipsis].

If what Halliday proposes as the general function 'ordinative' with its numerative-oriented function does not include the indefinite quantifier, this function will match what Arab grammarians call 'the preference nouns' (ʿasmāʾ u t-tafḍīl)<sup>70</sup>. Thus, like ordinal numerals, superlatives are usually accompanied with the definite article 'the', as in:

5-149 Apples are the cheapest (0=fruits) in Autumn.

On the other hand, comparative adjectives, according to Halliday (1976, p. 164), are inherently presupposed by reference, where a standard comparison must exist: anything must be, for example 'bigger than' something else. He, however, indicates that comparative adjectives can be sub-categorized into two types: the attributive type which really constitutes 'comparative proper', and which does not take 'the', and thus is not subject to ellipsis, as in:

5-150 Mary is cleverer than Huda.

The second type referred to by Halliday is what he (1976, p. 164) calls "semantically superlative", and thus can be elliptical, as in:

5-151 I saw many actors. Smith is the better (0= actor).

In comparison with SA, ʿabbās (1989, p. 465) claims that the omission of the epithet/adjective (ʿaṣ-ṣifa aw naʿt) is less common than that of noun (head in Halliday's formulation) which it specifies or describes, due to the fact that an adjective can replace a noun, and thus can act as it were one. ʿabbās (loc. cit.) provides examples like the following extracted from the Holy Qurāʾn to illustrate his claim:

5-152a al-lladi ʿaḥamahu min jūʿin (0= ṣadīd) wa ʿāmanahum  
min xuf (0=ṣadīd) (30: 106-4).  
who feed-them against hunger and safeguard-them  
from fear

5-152b (He is the one) Who provides you against (0= severe) hunger and safegaurds you from (0= great) fear.

As for noun classifiers as head, Halliday points out earlier that (see previous section) that, instead of ellipsis, it is better to use substitution with them; this is why he does not discuss them in detail. In SA, however, the classifier in Halliday's formulation corresponds to what rhetoricians and grammarians call 'annexation' (al-<sup>ʿ</sup>iqāfa), and in this case, the classifier is what specifies or classifies an indefinite noun (al-muḍāf). This classifier can, in certain contexts, replace the 'annexed to' (al-muḍāf ilayhi), as in:

5-153 s<sup>ʿ</sup>ala l-<sup>ʿ</sup>ustādu l-faṣla (0= ṭullāba al-faṣli) <sup>ʿ</sup>an Zayd-in<sup>71</sup>.  
asked the-teacher the-class (0= students of the class) about Zeid-nun.  
The teacher as the class (0=students of the class) about Zeid.

## 2. Clausal Ellipsis

As indicated in the previous section, clausal ellipsis in English involves either the presupposition of the mood elements (operator/ modal ellipsis) or the of the lexical verb with the optional deletion of the subject and the complement and adjunct. The other point which Halliday (1976) emphasizes is that these two types of ellipsis occur mainly in question-answer contexts. In comparison with SA, both types of ellipsis take place; an example of modal ellipsis in SA will include examples like:

5-154 A: māḍā kunt-a taf<sup>ʿ</sup>alu fi l-maktaba? B: (0= kuntu) <sup>ʿ</sup>adrusu (0= fi al- maktaba)  
A: what were you doing in the library? B: (0= I was) studying (0= in the library).

This example of operator/modal ellipsis deletes the mood of the clause 'I was' (kuntu) as well as the adjunct 'in the library' (fi l-maktaba), where the Arabic sentence and its English translation match.

With regard to lexical ellipsis, <sup>ʿ</sup>abbas (1989, pp. 263 & 265) and Dayf (1982, p. 235) mention one rhetorical purpose, by which the predicand (al-mubtada) in the nominal sentence and the predicate (whether nominal or verbal) are deleted. This is where "there is no benefit gained by the hearer in uttering either of them". This looks acceptable as far as deleting the predicand in either the nominal or the verbal sentence, since it will be presupposed and consequently recovered from the question being asked. It looks rather 'odd', however, how can one dispense with the 'predicate' from the response part, since the main aim of the question, as indicated earlier (see section 5.3.2) is to 'enrich' the hearer with the new information that is mapped onto the predicate (al-

xabar), be it a verb and its surpluses (specifiers) or a noun group in the nominal sentence. The examples with which Dayf (1982) and ‘abbās (1989) illustrate lexical ellipsis include ones like:

5-155 A: man zārak-a \* [Dayf, 1982]  
who visited you?

B: Zaydun (0= zāran-i).  
Zeid (0=visited me)

5-156 A: man ḥarrara fīlasṭīna mina ṣ-Ṣalībiyyīna [‘abbās, 1989]  
who liberated Palestine from the crusaders.

B: Ṣalah d-dīn (0= ḥarrara fīlastina mina ṣ-ṣalībiyyīna).  
Saladdin (0= liberated Palestine from the crusaders.

In this example, the lexical verb, the complement and the adjunct are ellipped and thus recovered from the question. From a personal point of view, however, this presupposition will look more appropriate if achieved by substitution rather than ellipsis because speakers or even writers of SA tend to use the proform ‘do’ in combination with ‘so’ (fa‘ala dālik). This is done for the purpose of making the intended meaning more explicit to the hearer/reader at the expense of brevity when using ellipsis, and not, as some may think, because SA is a formal language and ellipsis tends to be avoided in formal contexts. As for the controversy raised earlier with regard to deleting the predicate in these construction, this will be discussed in the next section.

### 3. Word Ellipsis.

Under word ellipsis within the sentence boundary, Arab rhetoricians and grammarians discuss the omission of single items like the verb, the subject, and the object, among others, from the verbal sentence, and the omission of either the predicand (al-mubtada) and the predicate (al-xabar) from the nominal sentence. ‘abbās (1989, pp. 462-466) attributes this omission to three main purposes: brevity, stylistic variety and a device to draw the attention of the hearer/reader to what is being heard or read. As with Halliday’s branching ellipsis, both cases are marginal with regard to cohesion within the text. But as far as their thematic structure is concerned, (what mainly concerns this study) they contribute to ‘the structural cohesion of the text, since each is thematically and informationally structured. In what follows, are examples of the main types of word ellipsis in SA that touch upon the thematic structure of the sentence, and which, to some extent, have to do with TAGs’ formal analysis (cf. 5.2):

1. The ellipsis of the verb (l-fi'l), as in:

- 5-157 (0= qara'at-u) l-kitāb-u(a) qara'at-u-hu.  
(0= read-I) the-book-nom./(accus.) read-I-it.  
I read it [rheme], the book [theme]. [nominative case-ending] (or)  
The book [theme], I read it [rheme]. [accusative case-ending] (or)  
The book [theme] was read by me [rheme]. [ " " " ]

2. The ellipsis of the subject (al-fā'il), as in:

- 5-158 talabbadat s-samā'u bi-l-guyūmi wa 'arsala-t (0= s-samā'u) l-maṣar.  
overclouded the-sky with-the-clouds and started-it (0= the-sky) the-rain  
The sky [theme] became overclouded [rheme] and (0= the sky) [theme] started  
raining [rheme].

3. The ellipsis of the object (al-maff'ul bihi), as in:

- 5-159 'aqraḍ-tu Zaydan (0= māl-an). [second object]  
lent-I Zeid (0= some money-nun.).  
I [theme] lent Zeid (0= some money) [rheme].

4. The ellipsis of the predicand (al-mubtada), as in:

- 5-160 wa qal-ū 'itaxaḍa r-raḥmān-u walad-an . . . bal (0= hum) 'ibād-un  
mukramūna. (Holy Qur'ān, 21: 26) [my ellipsis]  
and said-they begotten-he Allah-nom. offspring-nun . . . (0=they) servants-nun.  
honoured.  
And they say: (Allah) has begotten offspring . . . (0=they) are but servants raised  
to honour.

5. The ellipsis of the predicate (al-xabar), as in:

- 5-161 'ukulu-hā dā'im-un wa zilluhā (0= dā'im-un).  
(The Holy Qur'ān, 13: 13-35)  
enjoyment-its perpetual-nun. and shade-its (0= perpetual).  
Perpetual is the enjoyment thereof and (0= perpetual) the shade therein.

Other constituents that can be individually ellipted are either specifiers of the verb, the subject, the predicand or the predicate. Thematically, therefore, they can be treated depending on what part of the sentence they specify.

#### 5.6.4 Theme in Elliptical Sentences of SA

In his discussion of theme in elliptical clauses, Halliday (1985, pp. 63-64) concentrates only on clausal ellipsis (question-answer contexts), and on those very minor and rare examples of some exophoric expressions like 'thirsty?' and 'no idea' (see section 3.6.2.6). Looking at ellipsis from a wider perspective in both English and

SA, one finds that in nominal ellipsis (which Halliday does not discuss in terms of ellipsis in English), an elliptical nominal group, in which the head (the thing) is replaced by a deixis, a numerative, or an epithet, can act as either a theme or rheme depending on which part of the clause structure this elliptical nominal group occupies: a subject, a complement, an object of preposition, or an actor in a passive construction. In the Arabic 5-143 above, for instance, the pre-deictic 'each' (kullan) acts as part of the rheme of the sentence; whereas, in 5-145, the numerative 'heads' 'the first & the two' ('al-awal & 'al-ittnān) constitute the theme of the two consecutive clauses. On the other hand, in an elliptical nominal group, where the epithet is acting as head whether of a superlative type or of a comparative type that is 'semantically superlative' (cf. previous section), the resultant structure is an equational clause, in which, according to Halliday (1967c & 1985), whatever comes to the left side of verb 'to be' is theme and anything else to the right hand side of it is rheme, as illustrated by 5-149 and 5-151 above.

With regard to clausal ellipsis, what is uttered is the new information that is missing in the question being asked. For Halliday (1967c & elsewhere) the theme in an interrogative context is an optional element, yet it constitutes the first element(s) of the clause in English (e.g. 'Did you do it?' - 'yes'). How could it be so if it is presupposed in an answer to a question! Thus, what is uttered in the answer is not the rheme proper, but theme conveying the new information, since, according to Halliday, the theme of the interrogative clause is the wh-element. This same problem also faces Arab grammarians and rhetoricians (see 5.6.3), although they look at it from a different perspective. 'abbās (1989), for instance, points out that the predicate could be deleted from the sentence in a question-answer context because, as mentioned earlier, it does not 'benefit' the hearer/ reader. The examples which he uses to illustrate this point include example 5-156 (repeated here) and 5-162 below:

- 5-156 A: man ḥarrara fīlasṭīna mina ṣ-Ṣalībiyyīna?  
who liberated-he Palestine from the-crusaders.  
Who liberated Palestine from the crusaders?  
B: Ṣala d-dīni (0= ḥarrara filastina mina ṣ-ṣalībiyyīna).  
Saladdin (did) [or] (0= liberated Palestine from the crusaders).

- 5-162 A: man kātib- u l-ʿarabiyyati l-ʿawwal?  
who writer-nom. the-Arabic the-first

Who is the best Arabic writer.

- B: Mustafā Ṣādiq r-Rāfi'ī (0= kātibu l-'arabiyyati l-'awwal).  
Mustapha Ṣādiq al-Rafeī (0= writer the-Arabic the-first)  
Mustapha Sadiq al-Rafei (0= is the best Arabic writer).

In both these examples and their English translation, what is presupposed or ellipted in the response is not the predicate ( in 'abbās's terms) and is not the rheme (in Halliday's terms), but rather given information, looking at the two terms from a pragmatic point of view. Thus, what is presupposed in the answer is given information that is mapped onto the rhematic part of the clause, looking at the latter from a purely syntactic point of view. Therefore, when Halliday says: "it [theme] is the FSP element that is realized by the first position, and has nothing to do with previous mention" (1974, p.53), he is not looking at theme from a pragmatic point of view, but from a purely syntactic one<sup>72</sup>. Finally, It can be proposed that in the interrogative clause and its answer, what is being requested is the missing information (usually new), which when being realized in the answer is mapped onto the theme, the entity, which the interlocutors may proceed to 'say more things about'.

## **5.7 Discourse Analysis of SA Using Western Linguistic Approaches .**

Under this section, I shall discuss two attempts to analyze thematic structure of SA; the first is carried out by al-Moutawakil (1985)<sup>73</sup>, using Dik's functional grammar approach (cf. 4.5); the second by Aziz (1988)<sup>74</sup>, using the Prague School (PS) approach (cf. chapter 2).

### **5.7.1 al-Moutawakil**

al-Moutawakil, following in the steps of Dik (1978 [1981] & elsewhere)<sup>75</sup>, draws a distinction between the pragmatic functions of theme and tail on the one hand, where theme is taken to be equivalent to reference theme in Halliday's terminology or left-dislocation, and tail is equivalent to substitution theme in Halliday's terms or right-dislocation, and the function of topic and focus on the other, where topic is taken to be equivalent to Halliday's marked theme and focus to be equivalent to rheme in its 'unmarked sense' or even theme when it conveys 'new information' when its

contrastive). He defines topic and theme in exactly the same terms as Dik (1978 [1981]) has done.

In his 1985 article, al-Moutawakil discusses the procedures by which topic is assigned in SA from Dik's point of view of functional grammar (FG), the constraints on such assignment procedure, the case-marking and the properties of the constituent to which the function 'topic' is assigned. In his discussion of these various aspects of topic assignment, he concentrates on one type of sentence structure: the sentence with a verbal predicate.

With regard to topic assignment, al-Moutawakil (1985, p. 78), points out that, in functional grammar, "syntactic functions (subject object, . . .) and pragmatic functions (topic focus, . . .) are assigned, under specific conditions, to terms of a predication each of which already bears semantic functions (agent, goal, . . . etc.)". According to him also, pragmatic function assignment is ordered after syntactic functions (cf. 4.5), as in 5-163B, where 'Zeid' realizes the semantic function agent and the syntactic function subject and finally the pragmatic function 'topic':

5-163 A: matā raja<sup>a</sup> Zayd-un?  
when returned Zeid-nom.?  
When [theme] did Zeid return [rheme].

B: raja<sup>a</sup> Zayd-un l-bāriḥata.  
returned Zeid-nom. the-yesterday.  
Zeid [theme] returned yesterday [rheme].

In nominal sentences, al-Moutawakil illustrates topic assignment with examples like 5-164B, where 'Zeid' realizes no semantic function (zero), a syntactic function subject and finally a pragmatic function topic:

5-164 A: kayfa ḥālu Zayd-in?  
How condition Zeid-gen.  
How [theme] is Zeid's condition [rheme]?

B: Zayd-un marīd-un.  
Zeid-nom. sick-nom.  
Zeid [theme] is sick [rheme].

With regard to the constraints on topic assignment in Dik's FG, al-Moutawakil (1985) quotes what is originally called by Dik (1978 [1981]) the 'bi-uniqueness constraint', which al-Moutawakil has formulated as follows:

The terms in a predication are labelled for semantic, syntactic and

pragmatic functions in such a way that: (1) no term may have more than one function at each of the three functions [and] (2) no function may be assigned to more than one term (al-Moutawakil, 1985, p. 79).

The assignment of semantic and syntactic functions do comply to Dik's FG, but the assignment of pragmatic functions is only partially subject to it. In this respect, al-Moutawakil believes that only one pragmatic function may be assigned to any term in the predication, but the same pragmatic function may be assigned to more than one term; hence topic may be assigned, under suitable pragmatic considerations, to "more than one term in a predication" (al-Moutawakil, 1985, p. 79). He illustrates this in examples from SA such as:

5-165 A: liman ʿaḡā Zayd-un l-kitāb-a?  
who gave Zeid-nom. the-book?  
Who [theme] gave Zeid the book to [rheme]?

B: ʿaḡā Zayd-un l-kitāb-a ʿamr-an.  
gave Zeid-nom. the-book-accus. Amr-accus.  
Zaid [theme] gave Amr the book [rheme].

In the answer part of this example, al-Moutawakil points out that 'Zeid & the book' are assigned the pragmatic function 'topic'. He also emphasizes the fact that, in SA, sentences which are formed from a predicate (verbal, adjectival or nominal) and only a single argument (one participant in Halliday's systemic terms), topic function is automatically assigned to that argument/participant irrespective of its semantic and syntactic function, as in the answer part of 5-164 above, and in:

5-166 zayd-un yarkuḍ-u  
Zeid-nom. runs-he.  
Zeid [theme] is running [rheme].

On the other hand, in sentences with 'n-place predicate', al-Moutawakil (loc. cit.) raises the question of whether topic is assigned to any of the arguments or whether there is a hierarchy including a preference for particular arguments. In answer to this question, he points out that, in principle, any argument of a predication can receive topic function provided, of course, that it does not bear a pragmatic function (e.g. focus). Semantic functions, according to him, seem to play no part in topic assignment, a proposal he defends by citing the following two examples as a justification:

5-167 rajaʿa Zayd-un l-bāriḡata.  
returned Zeid-nom. the-yesterday.  
Zeid [theme] returned yesterday [rheme].



5-168 qābala Zayd-an ʿamr-un.  
met Zeid-accus. Amr-nom.  
Amr [theme/new] met Zeid [rheme/given]. (or)  
It was AMR [theme/new] who met Zeid [rheme/given].

5-169 rajaʿa l-bāriḥata Zayd-un.  
returned the-yesterday Zeid-nom.  
Yesterday [theme/new] Zeid returned [rheme/given].

Here, the underlined terms/constituents are assigned, according to al-Moutawakil, topic functions, although, from a semantic point of view, 'Zeid' in 5-167 acts as agent, and a goal in 5-168, whereas 'yesterday' is a 'time' factor in 5-169.

As for syntactic functions, al-Moutawakil points out that in SA (as in several natural languages) the constituent with the subject function is most likely to be the topic. This links up, to some extent, with the formal analysis of TAGs (cf. 5-2), where the relation of 'predication' (al-ʿisnād) holds, in verbal sentences, between the predicates, the verb and the complement (xabar or musnad) of the sentence and the predicand (subject: 'al-fāʿil'). This analysis, although too extreme (since topic function is assigned neither exclusively nor obligatorily to the subject), expresses a well-formed intuition about the subject constituent's 'special right' to receive topic function. In this respect, al-Moutawakil (1985, p. 80) proposes what he calls "topic-worthiness hierarchy", with the decreasing inclination to occur as topic:

5-170 subject > object > recipient > beneficiary > . . . > etc. [ $\geq$  more than]

With regard to case-marking, al-Moutawakil points out that the formal expression of constituents in Dik's FG is determined by the functions they fulfil: cases are attributed on the basis of the semantic, syntactic and pragmatic functions borne out by the various elements of the sentence<sup>76</sup>. The case-form of a constituent that is part of the predication is determined by its semantic functions and, if it has one, by its syntactic function. The case-form of an external constituent (the pragmatic functions theme and tail in Dik's formulation) is determined by its pragmatic functions alone. The 'internal' pragmatic functions (topic and focus) are neutral, according to al-Moutawakil (1985, p. 81) with regard to cases borne by the constituents to which they are assigned. Thus, a constituent receiving an 'internal' pragmatic function displays the case conferred upon it by its semantic (or probably syntactic) function. In the examples 5-167 through 5-169, illustrated above, the underlined constituents take the case-form

bestowed upon them by functioning as a subject, an object and as an adverb of time respectively.

In Dik's functional grammar, followed in this context by al-Moutawakil, the positioning of topic is "co-determined by syntactic functions, pragmatic functions, the structural complexity of constituents and, to a certain, and as yet not clearly determined extent, semantic functions" (al-Moutawakil, 1985, p. 82). According to al-Moutawakil also, the placement rules for a constituent to which topic is assigned and the constraints upon these rules differ appreciably according to whether the constituent occurs in a sentence with a verbal predicate or in a sentence with a non-verbal predicate. In order to meet the criteria set out by Dik's (1978 [1981]) 'functional' model, al-Moutawakil (1985) limits his discussion of the placement of topic in verbal sentences. Thus, he argues for the hypothesis that the constituent order of the Arabic verbal sentence follows the following pattern:

5-171 P2 P1 P0 V S (O) (X) P3.

In this word order (WO) scheme, P2 and P3 represent the 'external' pragmatic function of theme and tail respectively; the 'internal' positions are occupied by elements that constitute the 'predication proper'. Position P1, according to al-Moutawakil, is occupied by complementizers (e.g., wh-words), while P0 is reserved for constituents with the pragmatic function of focus (e.g., interrogative pronouns, contrastive focus) or of topic. Positions V, S, (O) and (X) are occupied respectively by verbs, subjects, objects and any other constituent such that X is the position for constituents that lack syntactic or pragmatic functions (in functional grammar terms).

On the basis of the fact that syntactic function is one of the factors that co-determine the placement rule 5-171, a constituent with the function topic may occupy the positions corresponding to its syntactic function as in examples 5-166 & 167 above; in sentence like 5-167, 'yesterday' (al-bāriḥata) is placed in position X by virtue of its semantic function (time). However, in accordance with a general tendency ( a tendency which is not specific to Arabic), the preferred position of the topic is early in the sentence as in:

5-172 *fi l-laylati* l-māḍiyati (topic) [p0] qara<sup>ˆ</sup> t-u kitāb-an.  
in the-night the-past read-I book-accus.  
Last night [theme] I read a book [rheme].

5-173 *Zayd-an (topic)* [p0] qābal-tu-hu  
Zeid-accus. met-I-him.  
Zeid [theme] I met him [rheme].

The question that may be posed here is this: what is the exact position of topic, since Dik's functional grammar identifies three clause-initial positions as shown in 5-171 above? Does topic (theme in Halliday's terms) occupy position P2, P1 or P0 when placed at the beginning of the sentence? To solve this problem, al-Moutawakil (1985, pp. 83-84) suggests the following:

1. The topic in examples like 5-172 & 5-173, although placed at the beginning of the sentence, can only occupy a position inside the predication, since it is one of its terms (i.e. an element that receives a given semantic function and to which a syntactic function may be assigned). Thus, it follows that the topic cannot be placed in P2, which is one of the positions characterized by being outside the predication proper. al-Moutawakil's main justification for the proposal that topic position is inside the predication is that if it is placed in front of the complementizer (e.g. the interrogative particle 'a') which always occupy absolute initial position in the predication (position P1), the resulting sentences will be ungrammatical, as in:

5-173a *Zayd-an (topic)* [P1] 'a [P0] qābal-ta-hu?  
Zeid-accus. question-word met-you-him.  
Zeid, did you meet him?

2. After he argues that topic cannot be placed in P2, al-Moutawakil argues that it cannot occupy P1 position either, simply because a complementizer might occupy that very position, as in:

5-173b 'a [P1] *Zayd-an (topic)* [P0] qābal-ta-hu?  
question-word Zeid-accus. met-you-him.  
Is it Zeid [theme/new] you met [rheme]?

On the basis of these two points above, al-Moutawakil comes to the conclusion that the only remaining position for topic is P0.

As can be seen from 5-173s, the topic placed in P0 is necessarily a 'referring expression', i.e., an expression conveying information likely to allow the hearer to identify, in a given context, the entity it refers to. Thus, in sentences in which the topic does not have this property (i.e., it is not a referring expression), placement in P0 is blocked and the resulting sentence is ungrammatical, as in:

5-174 *Kitāb-an* [P0] qara'-tu-hu.

book-accus. read-I-it  
A book, I read it.

Here, the definite article 'the' ( 'at-ta'rif), as a coreferential element, is missing from the noun phrase 'book' (kitāban), hence the ungrammaticality of the sentence. Thus, al-Moutawakil formulates a referentiality constraint with regard to topic placement in P0 that reads: "A topic placed in P0 must be a referring expression (i.e., an expression conveying information permitting the hearer to identify its referent" (al-Moutawakil, 1985, p. 85).

Nevertheless, there are, according to al-Moutawakil, certain constituents in Arabic that cannot be placed in P0, even if they have the function of the topic or contrastive focus. These include:

1. The constituent with the syntactic function subject is normally placed after the verb in accordance with 5-171 placement scheme, because if it is placed before the verb, it can occupy position P2, thus becoming a theme, as in:

5-175 Zayd-un (theme) raja'a (0= he = topic) l-bāriḥat-a.  
Zeid-nom returned (he) the-yesterday-accus.  
Zeid [theme] returned yesterday [rheme].

Instead of assigning the topic 'Zeid' which turns out be the theme of the sentence, al-Moutawakil assigns the function topic to the 'covert pronoun' (aḍ-ḍamīr l-mustatir) 'he' (huwa), which is 'coreferential with' 'Zeid', the theme. Thus, al-Moutawakil (1985, p. 86) concludes here that "the term [constituent] to which topic is assigned, if it is also a subject, necessarily occupies the position conferred upon it by its syntactic function".

2. The constituent with the semantic function 'object of accompaniment' (al-ma'fūl ma'ahu). If this constituent is assigned a topic function, it necessarily occupies the position it has by virtue of its semantic function. Thus it cannot be placed in P0 because of a syntactic rule of Arabic preventing the 'object of accompaniment' constituent from being positioned before the verb, as in:

5-176 A: man sāfara wa Zayd-an?  
who travelled and Zeid-accus.  
Who [theme] travelled with Zeid [rheme]?

B: sāfara 'amr-un wa Zayd-an (topic)  
travelled Amr-nom. wa Zeid-accus.  
Amr [theme/new] travelled with Zeid [rheme/given].

But not:

B: wa Zayd-an sāfara ʿamr-un. [not acceptable]  
and Zeid-accus. travelled Amr-nom.  
Amr [theme/new] travelled with Zeid [rheme/given].

3. Sentences in which an object-topic is placed in P0 are, to say the least, marked. Thus, 5-177c, in which 'Zeid' (Zaydan) is positioned before the verb, is marked if not ungrammatical as compared with 5-177b, in which the constituent occupies the position conferred to it by its syntactic function:

5-177a A: man raʿā Zayd-an (topic)?.  
who saw Zeid-accus.  
Who [theme] saw Zeid [rheme].

5-177b B: raʿā ʿamr-un Zayd-an (topic).  
saw Amr-nom. Zeid-accus.  
Amr [theme] saw Zeid [rheme].

5-177c B: Zayd-an (topic) raʿā ʿamr-un [not grammatical]  
Zeid-accus. saw Amr-nom.  
Zeid [theme] has been seen by Amr [rheme].

al-Moutawakil, however, points out that sentences like 5-177c, if grammatically acceptable, will lose their marked character when the topic placed in P0 is picked up again by a suffixed anaphoric pronoun (ḡamīr ʿāʾid muttaṣil) in the verb as in:

5-178a A: hal qaraʾa-ta l-kitaba (topic)?  
Q-word read-you the-book  
Did you [theme] read the book [rheme]?

5-178b B: l-kitaba (topic) qaraʾ-tu-hu.  
the-book read-I-it (=the book)  
It is the BOOK [theme/new] I read [rheme].

Sentences similar to 5-177c would not be problematic if the context shows that the object positioned in the sentence initial position is meant to have not a topic function but a contrastive focus function, as in 5-179b which is meant as a contrastive response to 5-179a:

5-179a A: ʾa qābal-ta ʿamr-an?  
met-you Amr-accus.  
You [theme] met Amr [rheme].

5-179b B: Zayd-an (contrastive focus) qābal-tu (lā ʿamr-an)

Zeid-accus.                      met-I    (not Amr-accus.)  
It was ZAID [theme/new] I met [rheme/given].

Thus, position P0 is one position for a constituent to which, according to al-Moutawakil, the pragmatic function topic and focus has been assigned. This position can only be occupied by one constituent, i.e., one topic or one focus. Therefore sentences like 5-180 will be ungrammatical because position P0 is occupied by a topic and a focus at the same time:

5-180    man (focus) l-bāriḥata (topic) ra'ay-ta?  
          who            the-yesterday    saw-you  
          Who [theme] did you see yesterday [rheme].

Moreover, if the topic functions, according to al-Moutawakil, is assigned to more than one constituent or term in the predication, only one of them may occupy P0, hence the ungrammaticality of 5-181c compared with 5-181b:

5-181a A: māḍā (focus) fa'al-ta l-bāriḥata (topic) fi l-bayti (topic)?  
          what            did-you the-yesterday    in the-house.  
          What [theme] did you do in the house yesterday [rheme]?

5-181b B: l-bāriḥata (topic) qara'-tu kitāb-an    fi l-bayti (topic).  
          the-yesterday    read-I    book-accus. in the-house.  
          Yesterday [theme] I read a book in the house [rheme].

5-181c B: l-bāriḥata (topic) fi l-bayti (topic) qara'-tu kitāb-an.  
          the-yesterday    in the-house    read-I    book-accus.  
          Yesterday [theme] I read a book in the house [rheme].

#### 5.7.1.1 Critique

Because he follows Dik's functional grammar (FG) and not Halliday's in his analysis of SA, al-Moutawakil's (1985) approach is both syntactic and discoursal; in other words, his analysis, is a mixture of formalism and functionalism, with one eye on Dik's FG and the other on TAGs' formal analysis (cf. 5.2). Thus, he presents a model of analysis that ranges between the two. With regard to his analysis, the following points are worthy of mention.

Firstly, in comparison with Halliday's functional grammatical approach, what al-Moutawakil (1985) treats as 'theme and tail' are, as mentioned earlier, no more than reference and substitutive themes in Halliday's terminology respectively (cf. 3.6.4.2 &

3.6.4.3). Furthermore, what al-Moutawakil (1985) proposes as 'topic and focus' in the verbal sentence in SA, and the fact that topic can be assigned to more than constituent provided that constituent is not focused (new information or comment/rheme) are a reminder of the traditional Prague School formulation that theme/topic is always selected from known information and rheme/comment from new/focused information.

Secondly, his rule of constituent placement of the verbal sentence in SA (cf. 5-171 (repeated here for convenience):

5-171 P2 P1 P0 V S (O) (X) P3

is, in principle, similar to TAGs' formal sentence structure of the verbal sentence in its unmarked form (VSO). He, however, extends this formal structure, to meet, as alluded above, Dik's functional model (cf. 4.5), by adding P2 (the theme placement), P1 (the interrogative particle) and P0 (the topic), the bracketed-X (for any constituent with no 'syntactic or pragmatic function'), and P3 for tail. What al-Moutawakil misses in this layout is the placement of all these 'optional extras' to the VSO word order (WO) inside brackets like X. From a pure functional point of view, position X does not exist because there is not any sentence constituent that lacks a grammatical function in the verbal sentence of SA. Moreover, there is not any constituent in the sentence that is not associated with 'a pragmatic function', be it textual (thematic/rhematic) or informational, because, for text linguists and functional grammarians, de Beaugrande and Dressler (1981) and Halliday (1967c & elsewhere) among many others including Arab rhetoricians, a sentence, as a whole, within a text functions as a realization of a message, which in turn, contributes to the cohesion and coherence of the text.

Thirdly, regarding the placement of topic within the verbal sentence, al-al-Moutawakil (1985), as shown above, assigns this to the position P0 because positions P2 and P1 can be occupied by theme and interrogative particles respectively. However, if one assumes that these two positions (P2 and P1) are not occupied by any of these constituents (the verbal sentence exhibits a simple VSO order), what will happen to these two positions? Are they going to be deserted? Or occupied by the topic? al-Moutawakil points out that if the subject is preposed from its unmarked position in the verbal sentence, it does not act as a topic any more but becomes 'theme' (marked theme in Halliday's formulation). The same thing applies to complements and adjuncts in Halliday's terms. al-Moutawakil (1985) also repeats TAGs' insistence that

a preposed subject or object should always be picked up by a referring pronoun in the main predication of the sentence, and asserts that a preposed subject or object cannot 'compete' with an interrogative particle in occupying position P1, otherwise they would render an ungrammatical sentence (cf. 5-173a). In this respect, al-Moutawakil (1985) could have followed Halliday's assertion that the placement of theme/topic in SA follows the mood system of the clause, be it declarative, interrogative, imperative, etc., although, as indicated earlier, TAGs did not fully develop anything like a mood system for Arabic on the lines of the one developed for English. The rhetoricians, however, have succeeded in developing something similar to the English mood system based on the pragmatic needs of interlocutors (cf. 5.3).

Finally, it can be said that the distinction between theme and topic drawn by al-Moutawakil (as well as Dik) in their present conditions and justification and as outlined above (cf. 4.6) is superficial and not discrete.

### 5.7.2 Aziz

In his discussion of theme-rheme organization in Arabic, Aziz (1988) follows the traditional PS approach rather than Halliday's because the PS approach, according to him, is not confined to the positional identification of the theme. Unlike English, which is governed by strict grammatical rules, Arabic can thematise any section of the sentence. In this respect, Aziz (1988, p. 118) points out that "the advantage of this approach (PS) is obvious for a language which has a relatively free word order".

Arabic sentences, as indicated in previous sections, are of two basic kinds: verbal and nominal. The former contains a verbal element (V) in its predication and has the pattern Verb (V) + Subject (S) + Object (O) in its unmarked case, as in:

5-182 kataba      ṣadīq-ī      risālat-an.  
Transition - Theme - Rheme [ PS formulation]  
wrote      friend-my letter-accus.  
My friend [theme] wrote a letter [rheme]. [Halliday's formulation].

The nominal sentence consists of an adjective, a noun or a predication phrase complement (C) predicated of another nominal element acting as subject, with no verbal copula in the unmarked terms, as in:

5-183 Zayd-un      kasūl-un.



Theme - Rheme  
Zeid-nom. lazy-nom.  
Zeid [theme] is lazy [rheme].

For Aziz, in verbal sentences comprising three or more elements, the verbal element is usually transitional (cf. 2.2.4), the grammatical subject theme and the rest of the sentence (object (O), adverbial (A) and complement (C)) is rheme. This is applicable to the unmarked word order in a verbal sentence:

5-184 *ʾiṣṭarā*    *zayd-un*    *sayyārat-an.*  
transition - theme    - rheme  
bought    Zeid-nom. car-accus.  
Zeid [theme] bought a car [rheme].

5-185 *ḍahaba*    - *zayd-un*    - *ila s-sūq-i.*  
transition - theme    - rheme  
went    Zeid-nom.- to the market-gen.  
Zeid [theme] went to the market [rheme].

In nominal sentences, Aziz asserts that theme is associated with the subject of the sentence, and rheme with the predicate, since, in the unmarked word order, these sentences are about the first nominal element of which the second is predicated. Furthermore nominal sentences have no transitions when they indicate no particular time, unless, as in indicated above (section, 5.5.1); they are preceded with one of the imperfect verbs (*kāna wa ʾaxawātihā*). In these sentences, the verb 'to be' (*kana*), according to Aziz, usually functions as transition:

5-186 *kāna*    *Zayd-un*    *kasūl-an.*  
transition - theme    - rheme  
was    Zeid-nom. lazy-accus.  
Zeid [theme] was lazy [rheme].

In all the above examples, it appears that the theme is associated with the grammatical subject, transition with verb and the rheme with the object, the adverb or the complement. There is, however, no one-to-one correspondence between the grammatical categories and the thematic ones because the former belong to the grammatical component of the language and the latter belongs to the utterance/textual components in Danes' and Halliday's terminology respectively. Furthermore, Aziz points out that a neutral context is assumed with a minimal degree of presupposition in all these examples: they all seem to answer the question "what happened?". Following in the steps of Firbas (1972)<sup>77</sup>, contexts, to Aziz, range from those with minimal

(unmarked) presupposition to the marked ones where all the elements except one are presupposed. Context-dependent elements, in the PS' formulation, will normally be associated with theme, whereas context-independent elements are rhematic as in:

5-187 A: māḍā kataba Zayd-un?  
rheme -transition- theme  
what wrote Zeid-nom.  
What [theme] did Zeid write [rheme]?"

B: kataba - Zayd-un - risālat-an.  
transition - theme - rheme  
wrote Zeid-nom. letter-accus.  
Zeid [theme] wrote a letter [rheme].

In 5-187, all sentence elements, except the object, are presupposed. Therefore, they are context-dependent or given information, whereas in contexts like:

5-188 A: man kataba r-risālat-a?  
rheme- transition - theme  
who wrote-he the-letter-accus.  
Who [theme] wrote the letter [rheme]?"

B: Zayd-un - kataba r-risālata.  
rheme - transition - theme [PS' formulation]  
Zeid-nom. wrote he the-letter  
Zeid ( theme/new] is the one who wrote the letter [rheme/given]. (or)  
Zeid [theme/new] he wrote the letter [rheme/given]. [Halliday's formulation]

From the PS point of view, as shown in 5-188, the grammatical subject, Zeid, is context-independent and therefore, rheme, the verb is transition, and the object is theme. In this context, Arabic grammatical rules allow a second word order where the object is placed in the initial position without changing the active voice into passive (cf. 5.3.1.1). This is what Halliday (1967c, 1985 & elsewhere) calls 'marked theme' (cf. 3.6.3) and what Firbas (1964) calls 'the emotive word-order principle' (cf. 2.2.4) as in:

5-189 \*ar-risālat-u kataba-hā - Zayd-un.  
theme - transition - rheme [PS' formulation]  
the-letter-nom wrote-it Zeid-nom.  
The letter [theme] was written by Zeid [rheme]. (or)  
The letter [theme/new] Zeid wrote it [rheme/given]. [Halliday's formulation]

A sentence, according to Aziz, conveys a message; the purpose of this message is determined by the speaker. Thus, in 5-185 above, the purpose of the message is to indicate the direction of the motion; this direction is considered new information (and thus rheme) in spite of the prefixed definite article, which is an indication of a second

mention of the term. Similarly, example 5-190 below, given an unmarked interpretation, has the grammatical object or the complementation of the verb as the purpose of communication. Here, too, this part is new:

5-190 fataḥa l-walad-u l-bāb-a.  
transition - theme - rheme  
opened the-boy-nom. the-door-accus.  
The boy [theme] opened the door [rheme].

As far as the principle of linearity is concerned, thematic elements tend to occur earlier in the sentence, while rhematic elements occupy the end position. This is what has already been called the unmarked word order. The reverse of this is the marked word order. I agree with Aziz when he says that "in languages like Arabic, where word order is relatively free, it is not possible to tie thematisation arrangement to any one fixed word order". (Aziz, 1988, p.121).

As for the thematic structure of interrogative sentences in Arabic, Aziz, following in the steps of TAGs and Arab rhetoricians, points out that questions are of two kinds: those asked to provide new information (wh-questions), and those asked to confirm or negate a state of affairs or a process (yes/no questions). The former type asks for information about time, manner, agent, etc., and begins with a wh-question, which points out the purpose of the message. For Aziz, the question word functions as rheme, followed by transition, if there is any, and then theme, as in:

5-191a māḍā ʾištārā Zayd-un.  
rheme - transition - theme  
what bought Zeid-nom.  
What [theme] did Zeid buy? [rheme].

5-191b man raḥal-a?  
rheme - theme  
who left-he  
Who [theme] left [rheme]?

As for yes/no questions, the particles 'hal' and 'ʾa', are used to express polarity in interrogatives (cf. 5.3.2). Here, the polarity is the purpose of the message. Thus, these two particles, according to Aziz, are also rhematic, as in:

5-191c hal raḥala Zayd-un?  
rheme - transition - theme  
did left Zeid-nom.  
Did Zeid [theme] leave? [rheme] (Hallidayan formulation)

5-192 hal iṣṭarā Zayd-un as-sayyārat-a?  
rheme - transition - theme  
did bought Zeid-nom. the-car-accus.  
Did Zeid [theme] buy the car? [rheme]

In commands, Aziz points out, the process functions as the rheme in the unmarked case, which has the primary prominence (stress) as in:

5-193a ʿiftaḥ l-bāba!  
rheme - theme [the PS' formulation]  
(O= you) [theme] open the door! [rheme] [Halliday's formulation]

In this respect, Aziz also points out that the new information may be carried by the object, in which case it is the rheme and the verb is the theme; in this case, the sentence is marked and has contrastive stress on the grammatical object, as in:

5-193b ʿiftaḥ l-bāba!  
theme - rheme (not the window) [the PS' formulation].  
(O=you) [theme] open the door [rheme] (not the window) [Halliday's formulation].

A critique of Aziz's approach to Arabic texts in terms of thematic structure will be incorporated with the next section which will outline a proposed model by the author for the analysis of Arabic and English texts whether original or translated.

## **5.8. A Proposed Model for Thematic Analysis of English and SA Texts**

After discussing various models of thematic structures, and the methods by which these models are used to analyze English and SA, I shall propose, for the purpose of this study, a model that will suit English and which tallies, to a large extent, with what TAGs and Arab rhetoricians say about Arabic. This model will hopefully establish new grounds for text analysis of SA, and encourage others to try to find, through its discrepancies, new models that are more useful in analysing SA.

The model proposed here is not strange to those who have studied the approach of the Prague School (cf. chapter 2) and that of systemic linguistics as represented by Halliday's functional grammar (cf. chapter 3). The model does not adopt either of the two models in total, but rather takes from both approaches what would be suitable for SA (as a relatively free and inflectional language) and does not contradict either with TAGs' formal (grammatical) approach or the rhetoricians' pragmatic one. It will be

analogous to Halliday's thematic approach (cf. 3.6.2), based mainly on his system of mood, but on the mood network for SA outlined in section 5.3 above.

To start with, I shall consider the subject, in SA, the theme of declarative sentences, following in the steps of Halliday (1967c, 1985 & elsewhere). This means that in a verbal sentence with a VSO word order (WO), and in a nominal sentence with SP WO (here, the predicate in the nominal sentence is anything other than a verbal phrase), S will be treated as the unmarked theme in both constructions, and as a bearer of known or given information. Furthermore, I will consider rest of the sentence as the rheme of the sentence, unlike Aziz (1988) (cf. 5.7.1 above), who considers the verb as a transitional element between theme and rheme, following in the steps of Firbas (cf. 2.2.4), since Arab TAGs and rhetoricians (cf. 5.3.1) equate the subject (al-fā'il) in a verbal sentence with subject (al-mubtada') in the nominal sentence, and both Aziz himself as well as al-Moutawakil (1985) consider the verb in a one-participant verbal sentence as rheme/comment (cf. 5.7.1 & 5.7.2 respectively).

As for the marked theme in SA (theme that conveys new information), I shall consider any sentence constituent (whether in a verbal or a nominal sentence) as a marked theme if it is preposed from its unmarked positions within a VSO or SP WO. Thus marked WO's of verbal sentences like SVO, OVS VOS, and SOV will be regarded as representatives of marked theme, be it the subject or the object. In addition to this, any circumstantial adjuncts (ẓurūf az-zamān wa l-makān) or prepositional phrases (al-jārr wa l-majrūr) will be considered as marked themes in verbal sentences (not in the sense of what the clause is about [except metaphorical usage; cf. 3.6.6]) while, contrary to Halliday (1985), discoursal adjuncts and conjunctions will not be considered as part of the theme of the clause (again not what the clause is about, but initial themes; cf. 3.6.6). In other words, only cognitive elements of SPCA will be considered as candidates for theme in the verbal sentence, where the last one (A) establishes the cognitive setting of the time, place, manner, cause, etc. (cf. 3.6.2.3). Marked theme in nominal sentences will involve the inversion of subject and predicate, where the latter expresses known information signalled by the situational context. This has already been exemplified above by examples that are rejected by Beeston (1970 & 1974) who describes it as a 'myth', and even denies the concept of inversion altogether (cf. 5.3.1).

Closely related to declarative sentences in English and SA, according to Halliday (1985, p. 47), as well as al-Anṭākī (1975, vol.2, p. 361), where the interrogative particle is used in both languages, and acts as theme and a conveyor of new information as in 5-194a and its Arabic translation:

5-194a	What tremendously easy questions	you ask.
	Theme [new]	rheme

5-194b	Ma	‘ashala l-‘asilata l-lati tas‘al.
	Theme [new]	Rheme

As in the case of interrogative, exclamation articles (corresponding to English wh-words) exclaim about something already known to the interlocutors, but what is unknown is the degree of its ‘unusualness’. TAGs as well as rhetoricians dispute a lot over the nature and the grammatical function of the exclamation article ‘What’ (mā); they finally settle for considering it as an interrogative and from a grammatical point of view regard it as predicand (mubtada‘) and the rest of the sentence is its predicate (xabar)<sup>78</sup>. From a pragmatic point of view, however, I believe, following Halliday (1985), that it is a theme (but a bearer of new information), and the rest of the sentence is a rheme but conveying given information (being mentioned previously). Some TAGs interpret examples like 5-194b as follows: ‘something made the questions being asked very easy’, but unlike in the case of interrogative, the speaker is not interested in knowing this information as much as expressing the fact that the questions are easy.

With regard to interrogative sentences in SA (cf. 5.3.2), I shall consider the wh-word, whether in wh-questions or yes/no questions as the theme of the sentence (the grammatical subject, following Halliday’s formulation, will be considered part of the thematic sphere). This approach tallies, to some extent, with Halliday’s model with regard to theme of interrogative clauses in English in that the theme is ‘the initial element(s) of the clause’, and about which the rest of the clause is ‘saying something’, and without which the question, I would add, would not have been asked (cf. 3.6.2.1.2). This approach is also close to the one adopted recently by Firbas (1992)<sup>79</sup> with regard to the relation between thematic structure and communication dynamism (CD)

(equivalent to Halliday's concept of information structure) (cf. 3.6.1).

For Halliday, (1967c, 1985 & elsewhere) the wh-element, and the finite verb with the grammatical subject, on the one hand, constitute the 'unmarked theme' (hence known or given information) of the wh- and the yes/no questions respectively. On the other, the traditional view of the Pragueans, which was adopted by Aziz (1988) (cf. 5.7.1), considers the wh-word and the yes/no question particles ('a or hal) which correspond to 'do(es) . . .' as the rheme of the interrogative sentence in SA, on the basis of the fact that these interrogative particles represent the information 'foci' of the question, hence the most important piece of information.

Firbas (1992, pp. 98-99) criticizes both approaches, as will be shown below, for almost the same reason. The traditional Praguean approach that generally associates given information with theme and new information with rheme, which he himself contributes to creating through his interpretation and enhancing of Mathesius (cf. 2.2.1), has also been rejected by Danes (1989; cf. 2.5) who finally joins forces with Halliday in distinguishing between thematisation (theme-transition-rheme) and information as two types of structures operating on the sentence/clause as part of continuous discourse. Firbas (1992, pp.98-99) now comes to believe that associating theme with given information and new with rheme in all types of sentence structures "does not take the addressee into account, who must be told what information he or she is expected to complete, confirm or deny". Thus, such information or part of it usually remain irretrievable from the immediately relevant context. For instance, the forms 'Who?' (man) and 'Do'? ('a or hal) cannot be used if the addressee is incapable of completing them by information retrievable from context. In this respect, Firbas says:

If the speaker/writer and not the immediately relevant context were the criterion of known information, then every declarative sentence would have to be interpreted as conveying known information, and as being entirely thematic (Firbas, 1992, p. 99).

This is the main reason why Firbas (op.loc.) also criticizes Halliday (1967c), when the latter asserts that the question of 'recoverability and non-recoverability' of the information is decided by the speaker, who does this by means of a 'nuclear stress' placed on 'new' information. For Firbas, this question is a result of interplay of more than factor and not only the position of the word in the sentence (word order), but also semantic content of the item(s) involved and context. As a result, the FSP of the

question, is determined by the distribution of CD over its constituents as a result of the interplay of all the aforementioned factors, where context is the last court of appeal of retrievability or irretrievability, because it is binding for both the speaker and for the addressee. Consequently, Firbas structures the FSP of the question as follows:

First the relationship of the question to the immediately relevant context is examined and the context-dependent elements are established. Then the operation of linear modification and semantics within the context-independent section of the question is analyzed and the relationship between the context-independent elements assessed (Firbas, 1992, p. 100).

Thus in examples like the following (borrowed from Firbas, 1992, p. 98):

5-195 (1) When (2) will (3) Father (4) go (5) with Peter (6) to London?

5-196 (1) Will (2) your Father (3) go (4) with Peter (5) to London?<sup>80</sup>

The interrogative *when* in 5-195 cannot be looked upon as "a successful competitor of the verb"<sup>81</sup>, assuming that 'father' is a context independent element in both examples because of its vicarious character, which Firbas explains as follows:

It [when] substitutes for an adverbial element that is to be expressed in the reply. On account of its weak semantic character it does not serve as a temporal specification, but acts as a context-independent temporal setting. **HENCE IT IS THEMATIC, BUT CARRIES A HIGHER DEGREE OF CD THAN THE CONTEXT DEPENDENT 'FATHER'** (Firbas, loc. cit.) [my emphasis].

Firbas (1992) also points out that the mood exponents in a yes/no question in English (realized by the finite verb and the subject in Halliday's systemic formulation) indicate unsolved yes/no polarity. In this way, the mood exponent points forward to the solution to be given in the reply. Within the question itself it points to the element towards which the question is prespectivized, i.e. to the question focus. Although it does not convey the missing information (thus it is thematic since Firbas, among the Prague School linguists, associates missing information in the interrogative with rheme), yet it vicariously points to it via the question focus, and it acts as "the question focus anticipator (QfocA)" (Firbas, 1992, p. 101). The term 'anticipator' seems to be used by Firbas as another term for CD with regard to communication development.

By the same token, in a *wh*-question, interrogativity is co-expressed by the *wh*-word, which, like the mood exponent in the yes/no question, points forward to the reply. It does so via the question focus and therefore acts as a QfocA. For reasons given in



the previous quotation, Firbas (loc. cit.) points out that it performs "a thematic function".

As for the thematic structure of imperative, embedded, equational, cleft-equivalent and elliptical sentences in SA, the approaches discussed in 5.3.3, 5.3.4, 5.4.2, 5.5.1 and 5.6.2 respectively. In comparison with Halliday's model for the analysis of thematic structure of English, this model, together with the modification carried out to Halliday's (cf. 3.6.6), will be used to analyze the thematic structure of both the English and the SA texts selected for this study as well as their translation (cf. chapter 7). There will be taken in consideration, of course, the inherent differences of thematic structure when comparing the role of translation in preserving the thematic structure in translation from Arabic to English and vice versa.

*(To Be Followed by Volume II: Applied Study)*

