Post-transition management of transboundary resources: the case of Cyprus.

Hocknell, Peter Richard

How to cite:

Use policy
The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes provided that:

• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
• a link is made to the metadata record in Durham E-Theses
• the full-text is not changed in any way

The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.

Please consult the full Durham E-Theses policy for further details.
Post-partition Management of Transboundary Resources: The Case of Cyprus

Peter Richard Hocknell

Thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. No quotation from it should be published without the written consent of the author and information derived from it should be acknowledged.

Department of Geography
University of Durham

December 1998

22 JUN, 1999
**Declaration**

This thesis is the result of my own work and contains nothing which is the outcome of work done in collaboration. None of the material has previously been submitted for a degree at this or any other university.

It does not exceed 100,000 words in length.

Peter Hocknell
Durham
December 1998

**Statement of Copyright**

The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. No quotation from it should be published without their prior written consent and information derived from it should be acknowledged.
Abstract

Peter Richard Hocknell
Post-partition Management of Transboundary Resources: The Case of Cyprus

As a developing international norm, the process of managing transboundary resources represents a significant opportunity for the development of peaceful cooperation through equitable and sustainable means. Paradoxically, however, this management process has the power also to create new tensions and reinforce pre-existing divisions amongst interested parties. This thesis explores the manifestations of this contradiction through a detailed case study of transboundary resource management in the de facto partitioned state of Cyprus. How has transboundary resource management operated across Cyprus’s de facto partition boundary? Why have problem-solving mechanisms formed to deal with some transboundary resources, but failed to achieve success in connection with others? Is it possible to de-link resource conflict issues from the protracted political conflict, so that the former could be resolved without reference to the latter?

The thesis is structured into three parts, and is presented—although not correspondingly—with broadly three audiences in mind. Within Part I (Chapters 2 and 3), at one level, by examining partitioned states this study specifically addresses those, most notably within the discipline of political geography, currently debating the role of ‘international boundaries’—both territorial and socio-spatial—and reassessing the normative assumptions upon which they are (re)constructed. At another level, the theoretical discussion addresses the debate amongst ‘political realist’ and ‘liberalist’ accounts of the circumstances under which parties cooperate or, indeed, fail to cooperate in the management of transboundary resources. In so doing, the international relations community is addressed. The argument of Part I, taken as a whole, constitutes both a critique and reconsideration of theoretical and methodological debates within and, increasingly, across these two disciplinary communities.

Following this, Parts II and III should then inform and raise the awareness of policy-makers, academic observers, and other interested parties to the importance of transboundary resources in Cyprus. The implications of cooperative and/or conflicting transboundary resource management for the resolution of the Cyprus conflict hardly need highlighting, yet this remains a subject which has barely been touched upon in
contemporary literature. Part II (Chapter 4) examines the rapid reconfiguration of the territorial character of intercommunal relations on the island, from the late-1950s until complete *de facto* partition in 1974. A knowledge of these events not only provides a necessary backdrop to transboundary relations post-partition, but is also imperative for a sufficiently contextualised analysis of subsequent decision-making strategies in Cyprus.

Part III (Chapter 5 onwards) is devoted to a detailed analysis of transboundary resource management in post-partition Cyprus. While the chronology of events is important, these three chapters are structured more thematically to open up further consideration of the theoretical concerns. Methodologically, in order to address the ‘level of analysis problem’ common to most ‘transboundary’ research, a dualistic research strategy was employed—whereby multi-method and multi-source analysis concentrated, at one geographical scale, on the ‘borderland’ of Cyprus, and, at a second geographical scale, on the island-wide perspective. The sub-division of the borderland interface into two further studies—of the largely rural United Nations buffer zone, and of the transboundary urban space of Nicosia and Famagusta—was also practical. Both studies examine the processes and outcomes of transboundary resource management, yet in relatively distinct politico-geographical contexts. Chapter 8 ties together the main descriptive and analytical themes of the overall thesis by way of conclusion.

This thesis demonstrates that post-partition Cyprus has exhibited a number of islands of cooperation over transboundary resource management and that, under certain politico-geographical conditions, the Cyprus conflict has not been unchanging and intractable. Even so, an increasingly diverse and complex form of ‘transboundary relations’ has co-existed with, and has been directly related to, a central overarching cleavage over the political economy of recognition. ‘Cooperation’ has become, for both the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities, a matter of judging its importance in terms of potential gains/losses; in turn, transboundary resources are seen not only in absolute but also in relative terms. Transboundary resource conflicts are patently concerned with boundaries, ‘national’ sovereignty and contested ‘state’ development. In this light, transboundary resource management in Cyprus appears increasingly prevalent in the island’s affairs and represents a potentially critical focus both for future cooperation and conflict. While this thesis does not blindly offer a prescription for the resolution of this dilemma, it seeks to enhance what has been a surprisingly limited understanding of its complexity.
## Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contents</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abstract</td>
<td>ii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contents</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List of Illustrations</td>
<td>ix</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List of Plates</td>
<td>xi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List of Tables</td>
<td>xii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronyms</td>
<td>xiii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Units and Conversion Factors</td>
<td>xiv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acknowledgements</td>
<td>xv</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Chapter 1**

**Introduction**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.1 Introduction</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2 Partition</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3 A Spatial Typology of Transboundary Resources</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.4 Transboundary Resource Management</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.5 The Case of Cyprus</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.6 Research Framework</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.6.1 A note on geographical research in Cyprus</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.6.2 Methodological approach</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Part I Transboundary Resource Management**

**Chapter 2**

**Cooperation and Transboundary Relations**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2.1 Introduction</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2 Approaching the Problem of Transboundary Cooperation</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2.1 Political realism and neorealism</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2.2 Functionalism, neofunctionalism and neoliberal institutionalism</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter 3
Theory into Practice, Practice into Theory:
Transboundary Resource Management in Partitioned States

3.1 Introduction 74
3.2 Perspectives on Transboundary Resource Management in Partitioned States 75
3.3 Configurations of Power 77
   3.3.1 Towards the management and resolution of transboundary resource conflict 79
   3.3.2 Partition and the balance of power 80
3.4 Transboundary Resource Needs 84
   3.4.1 Developing transboundary resource law 85
   3.4.2 The political dimension of partitioned resources 89
   3.4.3 The role of ‘other(s)’ needs 91
   3.4.4 Separating transboundary resource ‘needs’ 92
3.5 The Role of Interests and Ideas 95
3.6 The Functions of the Partition Boundary 99
   3.6.1 Borderland ‘models’ within the European Union and North America 99
   3.6.2 Partition, borderlands and state reintegration 102
3.7 Conclusions 108
Part II  Partitioning Cyprus

Chapter 4
Partitioning Cyprus and the Creation of Transboundary Resources

4.1  Introduction 122
4.2  Partitionism and Partitionists 123
  4.2.1  Pre-1960: colonialism and self-determination 123
  4.2.2  The 1960 constitutional 'settlement' 127
  4.2.3  1960-1974: from independence to de facto partition 128
4.3  Territorial Partition 137
  4.3.1  The United Kingdom Sovereign Base Areas 137
  4.3.2  The 'green line' of Nicosia 140
  4.3.3  The Turkish Cypriot 'enclaves' 142
  4.3.4  The United Nations buffer zone 146
4.4  Conclusion: The Creation of Transboundary Resources 153

Part III  The Management of Transboundary Resources in Post-partition Cyprus

Chapter 5
Island-wide Perspective: Contesting Transboundary Resources, Development and an 'Island' State

5.1  Introduction 165
5.2  In the Aftermath: Interpreting a Geographical Redistribution of Resources 166
  5.2.1  Representing absolute and relative losses 166
  5.2.2  Reassessing the resource base 169
5.3  The Meaning of Transboundary Resource Management 172
  5.3.1  Water resource management (I): a common, transboundary
Chapter 5

Problem	 172
5.3.2 Power lines	 185
5.3.3 'Humanitarianism' and the *quid pro quo*	 190
5.4 'Other(s)’ Transboundary Resource Needs	 194
5.5 Development of an ‘Island State’
   5.5.1 An 'island economy'	 197
   5.5.2 An 'island environment': security discourse and bicomunalism	 204
   5.5.3 The UNDP ‘Environmental Programming for Action in Cyprus’
       study	 209
5.6 Conclusions	 217

Chapter 6

Borderland Perspective (I):
Managing Transboundary Relations in the United Nations Buffer Zone

6.1 Introduction	 234
6.2 UNFICYP and the Buffer Zone	 235
   6.2.1 Managing the territorial and military *status quo*	 236
   6.2.2 In search of ‘normal conditions’	 238
6.3 Economic Activities at the Borderland Scale	 240
   6.3.1 Access and utilisation	 240
   6.3.2 Managing migratory resources	 250
   6.3.3 A ‘liminal’ state	 252
6.4 Water Resource Management (II): Hydrological Interdependencies In
   and Along the UNBZ	 255
6.5 Buffer Zone, *Nekri Zoni*, or *Sinir*?
   6.5.1 Contrasting approaches to boundary management	 261
   6.5.2 Reading between the lines: discursive representations of space
       and place	 267
   6.5.3 Delimitations of the borderland	 273
6.6 Conclusions	 279
Chapter 7
Borderland Perspective (II):
Nicosia, Famagusta and Transboundary Urban Space

7.1 Introduction 293
7.2 Water Resource Management (III): Nicosia and Famagusta 294
  7.2.1 The supply of the capital(s) 294
  7.2.2 The destabilisation of the quid pro quo 297
  7.2.3 Famagusta’s dual dependency 301
7.3 Underground Cooperation: The Nicosia Sanitary Sewerage System 303
  7.3.1 The bi-polar development of Greater Nicosia 303
  7.3.2 The Nicosia sanitary sewerage system 305
7.4 The Nicosia Master Plan 309
  7.4.1 A second agreement 312
  7.4.2 Common or superordinate goals? 316
  7.4.3 Functional spill-over and the limits to cooperation 320
7.5 Famagusta: The Other Divided City 323
  7.5.1 Post-partition development of Famagusta 324
  7.5.2 Exorcising the ghost 326
  7.5.3 Rebuilding as ‘confidence-building’: Boutros-Ghali’s ‘CBMs’, 1993-1994 327
7.6 The Saliency of a Dualistic Borderland 332
  7.6.1 Land uses along the ‘green line’ 333
  7.6.2 Representations of the border 336
7.7 Conclusions 340

Chapter 8
Conclusions: Cyprus, Partition and Transboundary Resource Management

8.1 An Overview 352
8.2 Explaining Transboundary Resource Management in Cyprus 353
  8.2.1 The rise and fall of ‘low politics’ 353
  8.2.2 The political economy of recognition 357
8.2.3 The institutionalisation of territoriality 362

8.3 Prospects for Cyprus 365

8.3.1 Implications for a resolution to the Cyprus conflict 366

8.3.2 Contested territory: state, inter-state or trans-state management? 367

8.4 Partition and Transboundary Resources 371

Appendices

Appendix 1 Major Third Party Interventions in the Cyprus Conflict since 1974 377

Appendix 2 High-Level Agreements of 1977 and 1979 378

Appendix 3 Mapping the Territorial Boundary Proposals 380

Appendix 4 In-depth Semi-structured Interviewing 382

Appendix 5 UNFICYP’s Mandate of 1964 385

Appendix 6 *De Facto* and *De Jure* Territorial and Maritime Boundaries of Cyprus 387

Appendix 7 UNFICYP’s Deployment 394

Bibliography

Primary sources 399

Newspapers and media 399

United Nations documents 400

Cyprus official documents 402

Other documents 405

Maps 406

Secondary sources 407
List of Illustrations

Figures

Figure 1.1 A spatial typology of transboundary resources 7
Figure 1.2 The de facto partitioned island of Cyprus 16
Figure 2.1 Spatial elements of House's operational model of transactional flow across boundaries 59
Figure 3.1 Overlapping perspectives: schematic representation of core intervening variables in transboundary resource management in partitioned states 78
Figure 3.2 Stages of transboundary relations between partitioned states 103
Figure 4.1 British proposal (1956) and Turkish proposal of 35° parallel (1957) 126
Figure 4.2 The 'green line' of Nicosia within-the-walls 141
Figure 4.3 Turkish Cypriot proposal to Galo Plaza, 1965 145
Figure 4.4 Turkish Cypriot 'enclaves', 1970 147
Figure 4.5 Turkish Cypriot 'enclaves', 1973 148
Figure 4.6 Denktash and Günes plans, August 1974 152
Figure 4.7 Positions of the Turkish military intervention forces, July-August 1974 152
Figure 5.1 Major water supply projects and distribution networks in Cyprus 176
Figure 5.2 Electricity generation and transmission networks in Cyprus 187
Figure 6.1 Diagrammatic representation of the management of the UN buffer zone 241
Figure 6.2 Land uses within and along the UNBZ, 1975 242
Figure 6.3 Avlona, Astromeritis and the UN buffer zone 243
Figure 6.4 Transboundary resources in the Lefka-Skouriotissa region 248
Figure 6.5 Schematic representation of water transfers across the UN buffer zone 257
Figure 6.6 Geographical imagination along the United Nations
Figure 6.7  Partition of the *de jure* administrative boundaries of Athienou, Lysi and Dherinia  276
Figure 7.1  Nicosia’s transboundary water supply: supply from Morphou and to north Nicosia, 1974-1994  298
Figure 7.2  Greater Nicosia and the UN buffer zone  304
Figure 7.3  Priority ‘revitalisation areas’ for Greek Cypriot government funding in central Nicosia, 1991-1996  318
Figure 7.4  Urban morphology and development of Famagusta  325
Figure 7.5  Land uses along western half of Nicosia’s ‘green line’  334
Figure 7.6  Land uses along eastern half of Nicosia’s ‘green line’  335
Plates

Plate 6.1 Redrawing ‘Cyprus’ through the ‘logo-map’: KTP station signs, pre- and post-1974 268
Plate 7.1 The Nicosia sanitary sewerage system 306
Plate 7.2 Greek Cypriot caricature of Akinci (left) and Demetriades (right) cooperating over the sewerage system 310
Plate 7.3 Turkish Cypriot caricature of Nicosia’s unified sewerage system 311
Plate 7.4 NMP’s Physical Development Plan ‘with’ and ‘without’ buffer zone 314
Plate 7.5 Urban regeneration in Chrysaliniotissa: Minoos St., Nicosia (south) 315
Plate 7.6 Urban regeneration in Arab Ahmet: Kamil Pasha St., Nicosia (north) 315
Plate 7.7 Ledras Street viewing point and memorial, Nicosia (south) 337
Plate 7.8 ‘Border’ shop, Kyrenia 337
Plate 7.9 The border as ‘spectacle’: advertising hoardings in Dherinia 338
Plate 7.10 Varosha through the looking-glass 338
List of Tables

Table 1.1  Major cases of state partition since 1900  5
Table 2.1  'Borderlands' and 'border regions': a comparison of conceptual frameworks based on an integration continuum  56
Table 5.1  Estimates of island's resources under 'occupation' post-partition  168
Table 5.2  Estimated island-wide water balance in Cyprus  174
Table 5.3  Principal aquifers in Cyprus  174
Table 5.4  Estimated water consumption in Cyprus (\textit{de facto}) by sector in 1994  180
Table 5.5  Comparative electricity generating capacities of \textit{AHK} and \textit{KIB-TEK} in 1994  189
Table 5.6  The geographical scale of 'action areas' proposed by UNDP environmental programming study  213
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronyms</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AHK</td>
<td>Electricity Authority of Cyprus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFL</td>
<td>Cease-fire Line</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>European Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECJ</td>
<td>European Court of Justice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDL</td>
<td>Forward Defended Locality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FSL</td>
<td>Farming Security Line</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ILA</td>
<td>International Law Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ILC</td>
<td>International Law Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KIB-TEK</td>
<td><em>Kibris Türk Elektrik Kurumu</em> (Turkish Cypriot Electricity Authority)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NMP</td>
<td>Nicosia Master Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OP</td>
<td>Observation Post</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PTCA</td>
<td>Provisional Turkish Cypriot Administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROC</td>
<td>Republic of Cyprus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SBA</td>
<td>(UK) Sovereign Base Area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCP</td>
<td>Southern Conveyor Project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEM</td>
<td>Single European Market</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TFSC</td>
<td>Turkish Federated State of Cyprus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRNC</td>
<td>Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDI</td>
<td>Unilateral Declaration of Independence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNBZ</td>
<td>United Nations Buffer Zone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNCHS</td>
<td>United Nations Centre for Human Settlements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNFICYP</td>
<td>United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNGA</td>
<td>United Nations General Assembly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commission for Refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WDD</td>
<td>Water Development Department (ROC)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Units and Conversion Factors

#### Units of length

1 nm

= 1.852 km

#### Units of area

1 donum

= 0.10 hectares (ha) = 0.22 acres

1 square kilometre (km$^2$)

= 100 ha = 1,000,000 square metres

1 square mile (m$^2$)

= 2.59 km$^2$

#### Units of flow

1 cubic metre (cu.m.)

= 1,000 litres
Acknowledgements

This thesis has been made possible by the support I have received from many sources. I wish to acknowledge gratefully the studentship from the Department of Geography, University of Durham. Those who have freely offered their advice and time are such in number that it would be impractical to name them all individually. While thanks are collectively theirs, there are those who warrant additional credit.

I must firstly acknowledge the inspiration and guidance of my two supervisors, Professor Gerald Blake and Michael Drury, whose own work sowed many of the seeds for this thesis. My previous working experience with Gerald Blake at the International Boundaries Research Unit (IBRU) was to open numerous and varied avenues for me to explore, for which Clive Schofield, Martin Pratt and Carl Grundy-Warr often helped me along the way. Also at Durham, the presence of Paul Sant Cassia, Rodney Wilson, John Norton and Kaiyan Kaikobad provided opportunities for a necessary multidisciplinary perspective on my work. On occasions where I presented preliminary findings from this work, the technical assistance of Arthur Corner and David Hume in the Department’s Drawing Office proved crucial, and was to be later supplemented by my introduction to cartographic software courtesy of Owen Kimber and Helen Dunsford.

Both Nancy et al. at the Cyprus American Archaeological Research Institute (CAARI), and Niyazi at the Hydarpasha Tişaret Lisesi (in south and north Nicosia respectively), made me feel a welcome researcher while living in Cyprus. At the same time, I was most fortunate to befriend, in particular, Eleni, Joseph, Michael, Myria, Oliver, Peter (times two!), Ruth, Stavros, Tamer, Yiannis, and Yusuf. I could not overestimate my gratitude for their generous support and critical advice.

It remains for me to offer my warmest thanks to both my family, whose constant encouragement they may have at times regretted, and Françoise, who was always there to boost me up or to bring me down to earth, whichever was needed at the time! While this thesis is dedicated to all four of you it was written in memory of my late grandfather ‘Pop’, without whom this work would literally not have been possible.
Chapter 1
Introduction

1.1 Introduction

In normative terms, the process of managing resources in environments partitioned by political boundaries represents a significant opportunity for both the development of peaceful cooperation and the effective and equitable management of resources, not only at the level of the partitioned ‘state’, but across local, regional, and global scales. Paradoxically, however, this process also has the power to create new tensions and reinforce pre-existing divisions among interested parties, potentially to the detriment of international peace and both short- and long-term resource management, in that an emerging duty to cooperate for the joint management of transboundary resources challenges the very core of the international legal order, grounded as it is on the sovereign right of control over activities within ‘state’ borders.

This paradox represents the central focus of this thesis, for two main reasons. First, disputes over transboundary resources are being increasingly recognised; it has even been posited that conflicts involving the management of natural resources are the most numerous source of international conflict.1 On examining the spatial extent of natural resources, it would not be unrealistic to suggest that such resource management, representing both an internal and external threat to environmental security, will be a contributory factor to future disputes. International drainage basins, for example, constitute 47% of the earth’s land area, while there are an indeterminate number of groundwater aquifers of similar status.2 Moreover, of the 221 ‘high-priority natural habitats’ identified worldwide, 35% straddle international boundaries.3 Any significant interference by one state on the management of such transboundary resources may have effects—beneficial or detrimental—on another state, be it contiguous or distant.

In parallel, politico-territorial ‘realignment’—either through partition or secession—has arguably become the ‘order of the day’.4 The November 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement for Bosnia and Hercegovina reignited the debate over partition as a solution to conflict; unlike the ‘velvet divorce’ of Czechoslovakia, it evoked strong
memories of the previous attempt to 'ratify' partition—in Cyprus.\(^5\) Partition is a manifestation of the dialectical relationship between the Wilsonian doctrine of 'self-determination for peoples' and the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of 'states'. Some 127 new states have emerged since 1945, and the number of recognised international land boundaries has increased from approximately 280 in the late 1980s to about 315 today.\(^6\) New land is not being created; instead, states have fragmented into smaller states and other political structures.\(^7\) Ever since 1648 international law, the basis of the Westphalian state system, has abhorred undefined territory and portrayed international boundaries as inviolable; indeed, this is embodied in the constitution of the United Nations, the Organisation of African Unity, and the Duma agreement on the Commonwealth of Independent States.\(^8\)

In essence, as both processes—transboundary resource management and the creation of international boundaries (\textit{de jure} and \textit{de facto})—become ever more salient, it is argued that they have become inherently though not necessarily contradictory. This study explores the manifestations of this contradiction through a detailed case study of transboundary resource management in the \textit{de facto} partitioned state of Cyprus. By considering the debates surrounding 'partition', 'resource management', and 'transboundary resources' in this opening chapter, the basis for the theoretical framework will be provided. The case study is introduced, along with the means by which research was carried out and the methodological challenges set by the research environment.

\subsection*{1.2 Partition}

It is clearly beyond the scope of this study to evaluate fully the short- and long-term conditions of partition's effectiveness as a peaceful means of political and territorial management. Having been the subject of surprisingly little comparative investigation over the last half century, the legitimisation of politico-territorial separation has received varied critical commentary in recent years, of which several common approaches can be identified.\(^9\) One notably underdeveloped line of analysis concentrates on what Waterman has described as the 'petty consequences' of partition: the direct consequences of an imposed partition boundary on peoples and socio-economic
networks which were previously geographically part of a single political unit. While dismissing the pejorative undertones of this description, this thesis—concerned as it is with partition’s implications for resource management at various geographical scales—brings this tranche of analysis to the fore.

In the disciplines of political geography and international relations, the concept of ‘partition’ is generally understood to describe a situation in which an existing political-geographical entity is territorially divided into two or more separate parts. It is therefore both an attribute and a process—by the divisions that it creates in political and economic terms (territorial or socio-spatial, de jure or de facto), and by virtue of its discontinuities taking place over a temporal scale. Partition accordingly has a strong functional character. Be it a case of nationalistic, political or ideological conflict amongst groups, the role of partition is often seen as a means of conflict management, if not of its resolution. It has generally been presented as “a traditional and accepted method for terminating disputes outstanding amongst nations without recourse to war”, “a useful technique for resolving conflicts on the basis of equity and reciprocity”, and “a very practical geographically highly relevant way to end war and to make peace”. It has been the ‘best worst solution’, a ‘small price to pay’, preferable to potential or actual war.

This immediately begs the question: ‘for whom does partition function?’. McGarry and O’Leary argued that partition is compatible with liberal democratic institutions. When effective, partition resolves conflict by allowing the divorce of antagonistic communities within multi-ethnic states. However, by reducing intercommunal contact in volatile situations the physical separation of warring communities may help to create, in Galtung’s terminology, a ‘negative peace’, or peace through dissociation. Legitimising separateness may lead to both genuine and imaginary conflicts of interest. Partition is also rarely negotiated between equal partners but is more often imposed, multilaterally, involving one or more ‘foreign’ power as broker and/or perpetrator. Partition, as Hitchens rightly observed, requires partitionism and partitionists.

How do partition boundaries differ from any other international boundary? How can partition be analytically distinguished from other politico-territorial realignments? These are not just problems of semantics but of important subjectivities; geographical separation might be seen as something cede by force by one party, whereas as a
secession by another. Secession infers an indigenous process of realignment through the unilateral rejection of the state’s sovereignty—the new state is ‘liberated’, in other words, with the issue of boundaries being comparatively muted. Consequently, apparent cases of partition are often cases of secession, such as Norway from Sweden (in 1905) or, more recently, Croatia and Slovenia from Yugoslavia (in 1992) and Eritrea from Ethiopia (in 1993). By contrast, relatively clear instances of partition include British India and Palestine, although the case of the Republic of Cyprus remains more problematic for some observers.

Whilst acknowledging latent problems in distinguishing partition from secession, Table 1.1 offers an overview of the major partitioned states created this century. Partitions which accompanied the collapse of empires are not included, although the recent case of the USSR, the dissolution of which two influential authors have argued generated ‘new partitions’, illustrated the problem of assessing the largest realignment this century. Given the scale of this case, however, and the fact that the new states were territorially well-defined pre-1989, it does not enter this analysis. Other omissions include instances of simple boundary line changes, transfers of relatively small parcels of territory from one state to another, partitions not involving a common land border (for example, East and West Pakistan), or internal state (re)partitions (e.g., Nigeria).

Examining the characteristics of these thirteen cases, there are some commonalities worthy of immediate note. Nearly half of the states were partitioned with violent, intercommunal unrest; three were directly linked to the tail-end of colonial empires; while there is just a single case of partition by mutual consent. In theory, only two contained more than two new politico-territorial entities (although the original ‘Palestine’ never was, the proposed one has yet to be, and East/West Pakistan were nominally as one). Perhaps most notably, only two partitioned states have ever reunified. Although conclusions were drawn from the analysis of a limited number of cases of partition, Stultz was able to recognise several other features common to the generation of state partition including, inter alia: the most eager parties for partition were the minority population; there were religious differences between the majority and minority population; partition plans involved the creation of just two political entities;
Table 1.1  *Major cases of state partition since 1900*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Territory partitioned</th>
<th>Duration of partition</th>
<th>Territories produced</th>
<th>Length of common land boundary (km)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>French Syria</td>
<td>1920/21-</td>
<td>Syria, Greater Lebanon</td>
<td>375</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British Palestine</td>
<td>1921-47</td>
<td>Palestine, Transjordan</td>
<td>&gt;300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>1920/21-</td>
<td>Irish Free State, Northern Ireland</td>
<td>360</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>1945/47-90</td>
<td>Federal Republic of Germany, German Democratic Republic</td>
<td>1,381</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>1947-</td>
<td>Israel, Transjordan, (Palestine)</td>
<td>238</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British India</td>
<td>1947-</td>
<td>East and West Pakistan, India</td>
<td>2,912 (India-West Pakistan), 2,519 (India-East Pakistan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French Indochina</td>
<td>1949/54-</td>
<td>Cambodia, Laos</td>
<td>541</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>1953-</td>
<td>North Korea, South Korea</td>
<td>238</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>1954-76</td>
<td>North Vietnam, South Vietnam</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ruanda-Urundi</td>
<td>1962-</td>
<td>Rwanda, Burundi</td>
<td>290</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republic of Cyprus</td>
<td>1963/74-</td>
<td>Republic of Cyprus, Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus</td>
<td>181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czechoslovakia</td>
<td>1993-</td>
<td>Czech Republic, Republic of Slovakia</td>
<td>197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>1995-</td>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina Federation, Serb Republic</td>
<td>1,053</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

External third parties played critical roles in the drawing and implementation of partition; time constraints promoted partition (as opposed to other, assimilative strategies); and the relocation of 'misplaced' persons was necessary following the boundary creation.\(^{25}\) There remains outstanding, however, a lack of work on the role of strategically perceived transboundary resources in the development of partitioned states *after* partition. In Chapter 3, by way of overview and to place the Cyprus conflict in the wider context, contemporary partitioned states are surveyed so as to facilitate further evaluation of their post-partition commonalities (and dissimilarities) and, in turn, to complement previous attempts to establish general characteristics of partitioned states which have generally disregarded the creation of transboundary resources.\(^{26}\)
1.3 A Spatial Typology of Transboundary Resources

While transboundary resources represent the main units of analysis in this thesis, identifying what constitutes a ‘resource’ is problematic. Zimmerman now famously professed that;

"resources are not, they ‘become’; they [...] expand and contract in response to human wants and actions".28

Their interpretation in association with political boundaries has drawn often confusing categorisations, ranging from the legalistically-specific to the conceptually-vague.29 Perhaps not coincidentally, these resources have been interchangeably classified as ‘shared’, ‘international’ and ‘transboundary’. Yet Székely has cogently argued that the ‘sharing’ of resources implies the perpetuation of (inherently conflicting) dual sovereignties—a suspect notion of ‘inter-state’ resource management.30 At a more extreme level, P.J. Taylor pointed out that, by adding a transboundary dimension;

"our ‘inter’ concepts are set against our ‘trans’ concepts as polar opposites: the former defines processes reproducing states, nations and territories, the latter processes that undermine them".31

Contrary to belief that the words ‘shared’, ‘international’, and ‘transboundary’ are synonymous, it is assumed that these concepts must be ‘unpacked’.32

In this light, to assist this analysis, particularly in order to accommodate its inherent spatiality, four general and often overlapping types of transboundary resources are identified (Figure 1.1). ‘Intra-boundary resources’ lie ‘within’ a boundary (e.g., a buffer zone, demilitarised zone (DMZ)), while ‘straddling resources’ are located ‘across’ a boundary line separating political entities ‘A’ and ‘B’. As Figure 1.1 illustrates, ‘migratory resources’ have a more dynamic and fluid character; at any time, they may also become ‘straddling’ or ‘intra-boundary resources’. They are often associated with ‘transboundary externalities’, which occur when management activities located wholly within one distinct territory produce results that affect another, usually contiguous, territory. In theory externalities can be either negative or positive, but in the context of transcending jurisdictional boundaries, they are more often the former.33
Finally, 'common property resources' refer to those transboundary resources that are technically beyond national jurisdiction (i.e., territorial spaces such as the deep seabed, the troposphere, stratosphere and, arguably, Antarctica). They may also be known as the 'global commons' or the 'common heritage of mankind', after Arvid Pardo. Once again, this terminology suggests 'political realist' undertones in that it implies a sovereign right to territory, and is synonymous with the idea that the 'tragedy of the commons' is simply a problem of inappropriate property right allocation. Yet elements of the principle of the 'common heritage of humankind' do have a bearing within areas of state jurisdiction, and there is much work on a broadened concept of 'global commons'. According to the United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the 'commons' are outside either 'national' jurisdiction or the ability of national authorities to deal with them; subsequent definitions have included, for example, 'social' space occupied by those who fall outside 'national' jurisdiction (especially refugees and the internationally displaced).

All four types illustrated may involve non-renewable resources (e.g., hydrocarbons), renewable resources (e.g., fresh water resources) or, significantly, take the form of complex ecosystems. In this last case there may be a multiple number of riparians involved as the externalities of the management process may be geographically far-removed from the point of origin, and the number and type of actors concerned with such resources will expand or contract as the jurisdictional boundaries shift. This typology can of course be extended by adding new perspectives on what a 'resource' is (e.g., refugees) and on which 'boundaries' to consider (e.g., regional administrative, geopolitical 'blocs'). Nonetheless, that the nature of the process of transboundary resource management differs considerably from one type to another is highly significant in trying to assimilate the differing interpretations of transboundary resource management demonstrated in a rapidly growing literature.

One must also note within this literature the prevalence of traditional examinations of transboundary resource management which focus solely on a single natural or infrastructural resource. Utton rightly argued that because transboundary resources have been the object of isolated, resource-by-resource study at academic, government, and private levels, certain transboundary resources have received considerable attention (e.g., international river basins) to the detriment of more comparative analysis. Sympathetic to this, attempts to produce a more integrated,
Introduction

holistic and ultimately multidisciplinary study of an affected ‘environment’, recognising the variety of scarce resources embedded within it, are complemented in this thesis.\textsuperscript{41} This involves integrating a longitudinal survey of disputes—both ongoing and resolved—with what Kaufman termed ‘lateral learning’ from similar transboundary conflicts, to inform a more interdisciplinary model of conflict resolution.\textsuperscript{42} The focus therefore rests on the transboundary resource(s) perceived to be key to relevant parties, be this perception politically, economically, culturally and/or environmentally determined.

1.4 Transboundary Resource Management

An understanding of the process of transboundary resource management logically necessitates an initial appreciation of ‘resource management’. In a much-cited work, O’Riordan considered it to be;

“a process of decision making whereby resources are allocated over space and time according to the needs, aspirations, and desires of man [sic] within the framework of his technological inventiveness, his political and social institutions, and his legal and administrative arrangements”\textsuperscript{43}

As previously argued, however, the politico-geographical character of the ‘framework’ within which the decision making takes place cannot be assumed. The sovereign state remains the foundational systemic premise for international relations, both in theory and (arguably, to an ever-lessening degree) in practice. It remains a basic tenet of state sovereignty that a state has the right to exercise ‘full’ and ‘permanent’ sovereignty over its resources.\textsuperscript{44} ‘Internal’ (or ‘territorial’) sovereignty suggests exclusive competence and a monopoly of power, ‘equal’ to all other states. ‘External’ sovereignty suggests that the state is not subject to a higher authority, although this is not ‘absolute’ in that various international institutions are in evidence.

The characterisation of resource management in terms of this modernist concept of sovereignty suggests that the complexity of the ‘arrangements’ that O’Riordan highlighted is accentuated further; indeed, to understand this, an appreciation of the normative concerns behind this management process proves necessary and instructive. As Marsh, Malthus and Ricardo gradually destroyed the idea of the ‘superabundance’ of
Introduction

resources and a 'divide-and-conquer' approach to resource management, concerns over physical scarcity have been translated into concerns over the economic and geopolitical scarcity of 'developmental resources'. This became most famously institutionalised in the Club of Rome’s *Limits to Growth*, followed by the 'blueprints' of Pearce, which ultimately advocated a market-based approach to environmental problems. In this light, mainstream 'utilitarian' models of international resource management have assumed that whenever a distinct area of (political or economic) consensus exists, actors will reach agreement over mutually beneficial institutional and organisational arrangements. Rational utility maximisers will find ways to optimise: to realise feasible joint gains, while simultaneously minimising transaction costs.

Subsequent considerations, reflecting widespread indications of a progressive shift of public opinion toward more ecologically-informed policies, critically reassessed "[the underlying values behind the abstraction labelled resource management]", and exposed a techno-centric and utilitarian ideology. A traditional (Western) approach, assuming that nature and natural resources were available to be exploited for human benefit, was to instead emphasise 'rationality over emotionalism', 'ethics over economics', and 'ecology over engineering'. Associated with this philosophy is the eco-centric idea that ties of interdependence often prescribe the unitary development of certain environments, and crucially inseparable from this is a recognition that resource management at the international and global scale might be the most crucial as it exposes the dichotomy of state and environmental values. After all, the concept of ecosystemic management dictates the need to manage many species sharing a common habitat rather than one species in isolation. Reflecting this, the 1987 'Brundtland Report', with the substantive agenda of UNEP in tandem, came to emphasise both intergenerational equity and 'holistic' approaches to environmental protection. UNCED's Rio Declaration in 1992 formally recognised the need to integrate economic development with environmental protection into what has been perhaps most widely conceptualised as 'sustainable development'.

As previously suggested, transboundary resource management has generally been understood to address natural, organic ecosystems, but there are arguments for also applying these principles to other spatial (e.g., urban, economic) systems. Clearly, the existence of a distinct 'urban system' is highly problematic in that a city as an 'ecological unit' suggests that some equilibrium can be reached. Nonetheless, the
particular political practices of a given locality (especially the ‘local’, municipal state) and the wider structural and systemic processes present must also be examined.\textsuperscript{54} Transboundary governance suggests a need for the development of broader ‘transnational structures’, structures which appear most prevalent in Western Europe and North America.\textsuperscript{55} Nijkamp has argued that, in the former, the provision of accessible transnational network infrastructure (physical and non-physical) is a \textit{sine qua non} for economic restructuring processes in border regions which will, otherwise, continue to reflect their weak ‘frontier position’.\textsuperscript{56} The densely populated ‘transfrontier metropoli’ of Western Europe (e.g., Geneva, Lille, Maastricht) and the US-Mexico border (e.g., San-Diego-Tijuana, El Paso-Ciudad Juárez) illustrate how the economic base, transport structure and social composition of once separate border cities become intertwined.\textsuperscript{57} In some of the 14 ‘twin’ border cities of North America, Herzog illustrated the significance of the spatial context, going so far as to argue that, when located in highly urbanised areas, international boundaries ‘fade’. The urban areas join to create a transnational living space.\textsuperscript{58}

The consideration of spatial delimitation has clearly been key to this process of conceptually understanding transboundary resource management in opposition to a homogenising modern state, and various propositions can be cited. Young sought to develop the idea of an ‘international resource region’ as an appropriate managerial unit for resource management and environmental quality: “a[n international] geographical area demarcated in terms of the functional issues associated with the management of natural resources and the maintenance of environmental quality”.\textsuperscript{59} Westing thought in terms of ‘ecogeographical regions’, defined as “a unit made up of living and non-living components of the environment that interact to form a life-support system”.\textsuperscript{60} Hayton and Utton referred to a ‘critical transboundary resource management area’, to be managed as a unified system in terms of both natural and infrastructural resources.\textsuperscript{61} In addition, Scott recognised more recent work on the concept of ‘bioregional planning’ as a basis for reformulating border area policy.\textsuperscript{62}

Do these spatial unitisations sufficiently acknowledge, however, that transboundary resources are most efficiently and equitably managed in the context of \textit{cooperative arrangements} involving all relevant parties?\textsuperscript{63} Fundamentally, as will be considered in Chapter 2, any territorial ‘division’ of the management of natural resources raises serious and complex questions concerning an emerging duty to
cooperate for the management of transboundary resources, and definitions of resource management and environmental ‘security’. As further considered in Chapter 3, the implications of functional (re)unification has been most vividly illustrated in urban areas comprehensively disrupted by intercommunal conflict. Transfrontier externalities take many forms including sewage contamination, air and water pollution. The substantial duplication or parallelism in the provision of public services on both sides create ‘contiguity diseconomies’ which impede ‘synergistic’ collaboration. Yet, while state leaders are increasingly aware that cooperation, coordinated policy-making, and more integrated domestic policy is necessary to manage and relate multiple interdependent forces involved in environmental protection operating at various scales, Jerusalem, Beirut, Berlin, and Mostar, along with Cyprus' capital, Nicosia, exemplify the need not only for an understanding of ‘rational’ responses to technical problems, but also for an understanding of the political and economic differences between bordering groups that can and do impede the coordination of common planning solutions.

In many cases protracted political conflict severely constrains the practice of creating collaborative regimes, although in certain instances effective cooperation can be augmented, and even eventually aid the long-term goal of seeking a peaceful resolution to the wider conflict. Like transboundary resource management, therefore, the process of ‘transboundary cooperation’ in general must also be examined, if only because of its normative significance. In turn, the first half of Chapter 2 suggests that cooperation can be seen by conflicting parties to be both legitimate and illegitimate. These observations are informed by the debate within the discipline of international relations amongst ‘political realist’ and ‘liberalist’ accounts of the circumstances under which parties cooperate or, indeed, fail to cooperate in the management of transboundary resources. Utilitarian concepts, based on arguments of administrative efficiency, environmental protection and the promotion of citizen’s welfare, may be rightfully employed to legitimise attempts to institutionalise transboundary cooperation. Contested issues of equability and externalities, nevertheless, arise repeatedly in conjunction, in that by constructing frameworks to manage the growing complexity of interdependence it is assumed that the proposed frameworks are most appropriate, and that there are sincere grounds for agreement amongst the disputing parties. Universalistic claims, in short, can be often appropriated by one state or hegemony to justify its (rational/idealist/devious) agenda in international politics.

12
The further implication of this is that, in adopting a prescriptively internationalist (or 'top-down') approach to transboundary resource management, traditional mechanisms and diplomatic responses provide merely a palliative—succeeding only in 'managing' the resource conflict, as a consequence of by-passing the fundamental 'resolution' of what is also a group identity conflict. The problem can therefore be turned on its head, to suggest that it is the institutional procedures themselves which are perpetuating this political realist scenario. Picking up the gauntlet, theorists and practitioners are increasingly focusing on a more pluralised peacebuilding and peacemaking process in the hope of contributing to a long-term management or even permanent resolution of international conflict, and moving from a 'negative' to a 'positive peace'. In the meantime, a comprehensive definition of 'transboundary resource management' remains elusive, and inherently so it would seem. A recent reconceptualisation of 'resource management' is pertinent to this dilemma. Westcoat defined the process as;

"a conscious, intentional, formal rationalization of everything which can serve as a means towards some end. It is entirely instrumental. It is oriented towards 'success', which might be construed as sustainability, survival, social justice, utility or capital accumulation, depending upon the context in which it occurs".73

It is apparent that while two normative concerns have combined to create a broad principle applicable to resource management in the 'international' context—the peaceful management of transboundary resources in an equitable and sustainable manner74—this multi-dimensional principle is inherently, though not necessarily, undermined by various contradictions between its elements.

1.5 The Case of Cyprus

Geographical 'scale' is critical to the analysis of what is the third largest island in the Mediterranean. Indeed, it has been customary for observers to employ other area comparisons: Cyprus' 9,251 km² of land is roughly equal in size to Connecticut (US), to the Lebanon, to Puerto Rico, or to the UK counties of Norfolk and Suffolk combined. Similarly, considering that approximately 815 km constitutes the average length of a contemporary international land boundary (de jure), the 181 km-long United Nations
buffer zone (UNBZ) appears to be a minor boundary (de facto). Indications of Cyprus’ small scale of significance are also to be found in demographic studies of the island. With a population of little over 235,000 in 1900, by independence in 1960 it had grown to stand at 650,000. There were still important ethno-demographic distinctions to be made—the Greek Cypriots made up 77.1% of the population, Turkish Cypriots 18.2%, with the remainder made up of British (3.1%) and Armenians, Maronites and Latins. Moreover, the overall population island-wide steadily grew throughout and beyond the intercommunal violence of the 1963-1974 period, if with significant intercommunal variations, such that the estimated population was 850,000 by the second half of the 1990s. Nonetheless, the populace on the island has not yet crossed the one million threshold.

Spatial determinism, however, belittles the intrinsic value of the island’s character. In an environment which hosts diverse and highly sensitive ecological systems, where water is a scarce and vital resource, and where economic development has depended on unevenly distributed land and coastal resources, that the island should be managed as a unified system is intuitively appealing. It is one, however, which conflicts with the political realities of violent conflict and territorial control. Drury suggested, that “not only is no man an island; neither, within the spectrum of political geography, can any island be so regarded”. To examine legitimate resource concerns in Cyprus it is necessary to temporarily move away from their geo-, meteoro- or hydro-logical setting to view them in a much less territorially-defined context. In so doing, the choice of which geographical scale is to be employed in analysing the Cyprus case becomes paramount because, throughout history, Cyprus has held a position in the annals of international conflict ‘out of all proportion to its size’.

Firstly, in line with the 1960 independence treaties, Britain kept a foothold on the colony in the form of two Sovereign Base Area’s (SBAs). Then, after a protracted process of partition—when the principally Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities grew further apart, the latter establishing territorially-distinct ‘enclaves’—the island was effectively divided in 1974 by the creation of a United Nations buffer zone (UNBZ) between cease-fire lines (Figure 1.2). On Cyprus, the actions of both Greece (400 km to its west) and Turkey (75 km to its north) were complicit in this process.

Immediately, Cyprus became a more challenging environment for research, both theoretically and methodologically. It is widely accepted that the general character of
intercommunal relations which subsequently developed was largely determined by the predominantly unproductive process of intercommunal and 'high level' negotiations undertaken intermittently, and largely through the channels of the UN, from 1974. The various and multifaceted peacemaking efforts employed by third parties to address the wider Cyprus conflict post-partition have been widely discussed and speculated upon elsewhere (Appendix 1).78 It is sufficient here to briefly highlight two critical dimensions of such negotiations—the constitutional and the territorial character of any settlement—as a precursor to distinguishing their implications for transboundary resource management.

Only by early 1977 did summit meetings begin to again seriously consider a solution to the protracted Cyprus conflict. Rauf Denktash, President of the self-declared Turkish Federated State of Cyprus (TFSC) and Archbishop Makarios, President of the internationally-recognised Republic of Cyprus (ROC), agreed on a basis for future negotiations—the so-called 'Four Guidelines' (Appendix 2)—which envisioned the future state as bicommunal, bizonal, and with each territory to be determined according to economic viability, productivity and existing property rights. Subsequent meetings saw little progress, until May 1979 when a ‘Ten-Point Agreement’ was reached which saw Denktash and Spyros Kyprianou (succeeding the ROC presidency after Makarios’ death) reaffirm the 1977 principles (Appendix 2); nonetheless, it constituted an agreement on a form of words but not on what they were intended to convey.79 In particular, the territorial character had become a sticking point (Appendix 3). Apart from these two substantive high-level agreements in the immediate post-partition period, while subsequent negotiations claimed adherence to their success, the UN-sponsored search for a solution was to be plagued by failure. While Greek Cypriot demands had technically evolved from complete reunification to a bicomunal federation, they included strong central powers (overseeing, inter alia, natural resource and public utilities management), certain territorial concessions from the north and the removal of Turkish troops from the island. In essence they came to revolve around what were seen as three essential ‘freedoms’ reliant upon no internal borders: freedom of movement over the whole island; freedom of settlement and the right of refugees to return to their pre-1974 property; and, the freedom to own property in the north.
In contrast, the Turkish Cypriot negotiators had sought a ‘bi-regional’, decentralised federation (with resource management devolved to the federal states), with political equality in its main institutions, although even that position was to become increasingly unacceptable as the Turkish Cypriots’ territorial base acquired in 1974 metamorphosed into the ‘Turkish Federated State of Cyprus’ (TFSC, in 1976), and then to the unilateral declaration (UDI) of an independent ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’ (TRNC, in 1983) which remained, it is crucial to note, internationally unrecognised. Since then, the failure of direct talks between successive ROC presidents (Kyprianou, Vassiliou (from 1988) and Clerides (from 1993)) and Denktash (the ongoing TRNC president) have cast doubt on the whole negotiations process (Appendix 1). Two relatively intensive peacemaking initiatives were undertaken by Perez de Cuellar (‘Set of Ideas’, 1992) and Boutros Boutros-Ghali (‘Confidence-building Measures’, 1993-94), but these were similarly unsuccessful.

The UNBZ continues to function as a largely closed border today, from the island-wide perspective and from the borderland perspective, and significant questions remain over the future role of the de facto boundary in the region as a whole: will it function as a Greece-Turkey (and therefore intra-NATO) boundary? will it function as an ‘internal’ or ‘external’ border of the EU (could the EU cope with an ‘internal’ border conflict?)? As the Mediterranean becomes what King described as Europe’s ‘Rio Grande’—a ‘water boundary’ separating two economic systems, demographic regimes, and ways of life—how will Cyprus’s internal (and external) border function within this divide?

While, after 1974, the academic study of the high-level negotiations consolidated a well-established tradition in Cyprus, the study of geography, not least ‘political’ or at times ‘politicised’ geography has proven less attractive. In particular, politico-geographical studies of transboundary resource management and transboundary cooperation in post-partition Cyprus thus far are embryonic and fragmented. Analyses of transboundary relations have been overwhelmingly dominated by studies of the so-called ‘high politics’ and often violent nationalist-integrationist dialectic as manifested in intercommunal negotiations, political party debate, and politicised social movement struggles. Admittedly, it is axiomatic that transboundary relations at the island-wide scale have been extremely limited since 1974; while the UNBZ remained so impermeable, both physically and psychologically, non-cooperation has consistently
been the ‘easier option’ to cooperation. But at least as far back as the 1950s there has been an almost constant debate over the possibility of cooperation and coexistence between the two communities of the island, and since 1974 this debate became even more intense and significant for the very reason that it was believed to prove indicative to both the international community and, most importantly, to the local population, of the extent to which the two communities could live again within the same boundaries, under the same government. However, with few exceptions, research has perpetuated the relative neglect of numerous ‘low politics’ transboundary relations, despite the fact that many of them raise issues of identity and territory. Given the variety of de facto resource transaction flows and linkages between the ROC and the TRNC, added to the mix of de jure and de facto interdependencies between the ROC/TRNC and the UK SBAs, this neglect is surprising.

Yet, while this approach does not suggest that transboundary resource management at the island-wide scale has been the product solely of the tensions and the progress of ‘high level’ initiatives towards a settlement, nor that it has been in any way an inevitable outcome of the widespread conflict, it does establish that contested resource management policies should be firmly located in the context of a political struggle. To this end, an understanding of the conflict over the management of transboundary resources, their relationship to the larger political conflict, and the potential for cooperation and collaboration, must be provided by reconstructing the process of partitioning Cyprus—from its inception in the late 1950s, to its territorially fragmented form in the 1960s, until its most concretised (although not legalised) manifestation in 1974. In line with Minghi’s suggested sub-division of studies of partition (a ‘pre-partition’ stage, an ‘active partitioning’ stage, and a ‘post-partition’ stage), the aim of this reconstruction in Chapter 4 will be to underscore those aspects of the politico-territorial, socio-economic, and environmental partitions of Cyprus that explicate the subsequent (‘post-partition’) significance of particular transboundary resources to the respective Cypriot communities, as examined from Chapters 5 to 7.
1.6 Research Framework

The research and methodological framework generated for this study is detailed in this final section, while Appendix 4 presents more particular methodologies employed.

1.6.1 A note on geographical research in Cyprus

As previously suggested, transboundary processes are something rarely considered in relation to the Cyprus conflict. This has been especially so since the events of 1974 when the two main communities of the island became most effectively partitioned. Two possible factors observed during my own research stand out when looking to explain this shortfall.

First, as is common with psychological dynamics during conflict, there is a general paucity of information (both printed and verbal) which transcends the divisions. This ‘silence’ is of course historical; Patrick’s research of the political geography of the 1963-1971 period has received an unprecedented level of academic recognition largely for its empirical insights into otherwise highly confused and contested times. Since then, while the number and variety of research sources has grown, this cannot be said of the degree of ‘information-openness’ displayed by concerned parties. During research for this study, where information was evident it often remained either classified or, when available, required detailed verification. It must be cautioned that, for both political and technical reasons, until mutual agreement is reached between the two communities various data will remain in dispute. In certain cases, indication will be given for the consideration of figures as orders of magnitude, not technical data.

Second, any reference to ‘boundaries’ and ‘borders’ and, by extension, ‘transboundary’ issues in Cyprus is on the one hand de rigueur (according to the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot official line) and, on the other hand, anathema (according to the policy of the Greek Cypriots, the UN and the remainder of the international community). Once again, this is highly instructive in itself, explaining to a large degree the unwillingness of previous studies to move the analytical perspective to the border region. It also calls for me to state that such loaded terms are used in their conceptual and abstract, not legal or ‘official’ meanings. Am I ‘pro-Greek’ because I discuss intercommunal cooperation, ‘pro-Turk’ because I emphasise the role of boundaries and
the saliency of territoriality, or 'pro-Anglo-American' because I consider both? It is hoped that the reader understands that because a certain name/term is used, a conscious stand in the dispute should not necessarily be inferred.⁸⁸

As a researcher, it would be just as ethically wrong to fail to highlight the contrasting localised events—largely negative, but also positive in character—which took place just before, and then during the bulk of my fieldwork in Cyprus between September 1996 and May 1997. ‘Negative’ events continued to receive the majority of academic attention. In August 1996, the status quo on the island reached something of a watershed with the worst period of intercommunal killings for 22 years, concentrated in the increasingly under-resourced UNBZ. Protesting over the impermeability of Cyprus’ border relative to those of Europe, a motorcycle rally made various incursions into the UNBZ, over 40 demonstrators and 19 UNFICYP soldiers were wounded in clashes, and at Dherinia a Greek Cypriot was beaten to death by Turkish Cypriot police and counter-protesters. Three days later, immediately following his funeral, the Greek Cypriot’s cousin was fatally shot (again at Dherinia) while trying to lower a Turkish flag in the UNBZ. Then, in September, an attack launched on a Turkish Cypriot observation post along the UNBZ resulted in the death of one Turkish Cypriot soldier and the wounding of another. The killing, which has remained unsolved, exacerbated a situation only to be further worsened the following month by the shooting of another Greek Cypriot by Turkish soldiers manning the northern cease-fire line. Thereafter, events took on an increasingly military and geostrategic character, involving not only annual exercises conducted by the Greek and Greek Cypriot forces (in October) and Turkish Forces (in November), but also, in January 1997, the Greek Cypriot House of Representatives’ vote to purchase Russian S-300 surface-to-air-missiles.⁹⁰

By way of contrast, a more positive development in October 1996 saw the UN peacekeeping force repeat an ‘open house’ at Ledra Palace Hotel (within the UNBZ) to celebrate ‘United Nations Day’. Both communities were invited, and the previous year this had attracted 5,000 Greek and Turkish Cypriots, making it the largest bicommunal gathering since 1974; in September 1996 3,000 attended and I was fortunate enough to participate in this, the first of a number of bicommunal meetings I would eventually attend.⁹⁰ Such public gatherings, however, failed to completely dispel the prevailing tension. From October, Greek Cypriot campaigners began to blockade intermittently the southern side of the Ledra Palace border checkpoint; on one occasion during the
following January tear gas was used by Greek Cypriot police to disperse the demonstrators. And although in April over 400 Turkish Cypriots crossed the border to make a pilgrimage to Hala Sultan Tekke mosque (arguably the third most important Muslim landmark in the world, yet based in the southern city of Larnaca) and, a week later, over 100 Greek Cypriots crossed north to visit Apostolos Andreas monastery for the first time since 1974, the day after I left the TRNC a bicomunal ‘peace concert’ in the UNBZ served only to mix any messages further. As one of the biggest intercommunal gatherings since 1974, it was violently opposed from the start by right-wing elements: in the south, the ‘Pan-Cyprian Anti-Occupation movement’ clashed with police, while in the north the Turkish nationalist ‘Grey Wolves’ attacked the concert bus.

In addition to these contextual observations, other ethical considerations directly affected the methodological approach employed in researching this study. An appreciation of postcolonialist and postmodern writings demands recognition of the ‘other’ and the role of ‘Orientalist’ discourse. Moreover, it heightens awareness of the role of the observer/outsider as researcher and representer, and of changes to the nature of the object of research through the research process itself—what is technically termed the ‘double hermeneutic’. These ethical considerations are an imperative in research environments such as Cyprus, where traditionally the politicisation of issues has even determined which baker to visit, or what beer to order. Perhaps to an even greater extent, however, my research approach has been informed by what the critical theorist Robert Cox identified as the differences between the (narrow, abstract) ‘problem-solving’ and the (open, reflective) ‘critical theory’ perspective on international conflict, generated by the dialectical interaction of theory and practice. Given the normative value of the process of ‘transboundary resource management’ already noted, questions of ontology and epistemology can easily be marginalised by the congenial, empiricist-positivism of social and intellectual ‘givens’. The analysis of transboundary resource management, both in general and with particular reference to partitioned states, will illustrate how accommodatory rather than revisionary both traditional legislative and diplomatic approaches to ‘problem-solving’ remain. The status quo—both in terms of operational and discursive practices—has remained implicitly uncontested. More ‘cognitivist’ approaches suggest, instead, a growing recognition of the narration of
‘norms’, ‘knowledge’, and ‘progress’ on which these traditional approaches have been founded.

It is intended, nevertheless, that while my mode of representation will be illuminated by such ‘anti-foundational’ epistemology, it recognises that the analytic views of ‘outsiders’ remain important for understanding.96 Although cultural difference is accentuated through the particularism of ethnographic studies, and the inherent subjectivity of truths and facts must be recognised, it remains necessary to generate empirical (though not empiricist) information. Adopting a reflexive approach does however position myself as a (British, educated, white, male) subject in relation to the ‘other’—suggesting power relations that influenced what I did, how I interpreted and how I related to the subjects of this study. Where relevant, such relations are indicated.

1.6.2 Methodological approach

In order to identify and explain complex processes of transboundary resource management in a partitioned environment, it is necessary to adopt the method of identifying causal mechanisms situated in localised contexts.97 To provide a geographical expression to much of the contemporary ‘transnational discourse’, empirical research is necessary to supplement and ground theoretical understandings. To this end, by using a single-case study approach the practice of managing Cyprus’ transboundary resources is assessed, and explanations for its operational character sought. While the case study framework has at times been criticised for being idiographic and externally invalid, J.C. Mitchell’s and Hamel et al.’s emphasis on relating the particularities of the locality back to theoretical propositions mirrors this thesis’ purpose.98 The theoretical debates, in other words, must become geographically ‘embedded’. If the causes and forms of transboundary resource management in Cyprus are sufficiently different from the expectations of the various theoretical approaches, one may question their theoretical capabilities in explaining transboundary cooperation in this context. The single-case study framework is also being embraced for its proficiency in framing closed, singular objects of study—in the case of Cyprus, where the relatively ‘closed’ island system and the ties of geography often prescribe unitary development, this approach becomes particularly relevant.99
During preliminary field research in Cyprus (December 1995) it was noted that, in terms of transboundary relations, it was imperative to analyse not only the individual agents in their causal contexts, but also how the causal mechanisms geographically manifested themselves in the local partitioned environment. For reasons elaborated in Chapter 2, a ‘borderlands’ perspective provides a suitable analytical tool, if with important clarifications. As previously observed, for ‘transboundary’ analysis a number of geographical scales must be considered. Researching the ‘borderland’ similarly invites debate on the so-called ‘level of analysis’ problem, whereby the ‘borderland’ (read: ‘region’) can be understood to be all that is, on the one hand, ‘sub-national’ and, on the other, ‘supra-local’. Events invariably have more than one cause, and causes can be found in more than one type of location. As Yeung lucidly noted, attributing causal power to territorially-defined yet analytically-constructed ‘borderlands’ and ‘regions’ may suffer from the same logical flaw of ‘containerisation’ as ‘states’ do according to the ‘borderless world’ discourse. This study of Cyprus, instead, advocates a borderlands perspective (i.e., researching at the ‘scale’ rather than necessarily at the ‘level’ of the border).

Overall, a dualistic research strategy was therefore chosen—of detailed ‘borderland’ work complemented by research undertaken at the island-wide scale. As Paasi argued, “[t]hese perspectives are not mutually exclusive but are necessarily complementary. [...] [N]ational and local perspectives should be both constituted and constitutive for each other.” Basing both research strategies on a more thematic focus of transboundary resource management largely circumvented the problem of separating ‘local/regional/(inter)national’ levels from ‘local/regional/(inter)national’ scales, and allowed for their subsequent resynthesis. Moreover, although there remain inherent difficulties in comparing one borderland with another, when such research is approached thematically—and is informed by recent ‘transnational’ developments—(dis)similarities should become more identifiable. It was necessary to capture and research spatial interactions, from the level of the individual to international influences, in the borderland. Using the ‘trans-border prism’ of the borderland makes it possible to view complex dynamics of policy-making, both ‘international’ and ‘national’, ‘foreign’ and ‘domestic’. The sub-division of the ‘borderland’ interface into two further studies—the largely rural UNBZ, and the transboundary urban space of Nicosia and secondarily, Famagusta—was also practical. Both studies examined the processes and
outcomes of transboundary resource management, but in quite distinct environmental contexts.

When evaluating theoretical explanations about causal relations, it is recognised that ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions are useful in guiding intensive case study analysis. In the light of the above, the research questions to be answered in the case of Cyprus are:

- How does the process of transboundary resource management operate in this partitioned state? To what extent have institutionalised principles and practices of transboundary resource management been able to develop since partition?

- Why are mechanisms formed to deal with some transboundary resource management issue areas, but fail to achieve success in connection with others? Is it possible to de-link resource conflict issues from the protracted political conflict, so that the former could be resolved without reference to the latter?

- How has the general ‘milieu’ of Cyprus affected the progress of both transboundary resource management and intercommunal peace?

- How useful is it to use a ‘borderland’ perspective to address problems of resource management affecting two or more (de jure or de facto) states? In Cyprus, to what extent is the ‘borderland’ an appropriate managerial unit in the context of transboundary resource problems?

- What recommendations may be made for the future management of transboundary resources in Cyprus, whether in a political climate of reunification, or in one of perpetual de facto or eventual de jure partition?

- What lessons, if any, can be learned from Cyprus to develop understanding of managing transboundary resources in other partitioned states and other boundary-related contexts?

These questions are directly addressed in Chapter 8, which brings together the main descriptive and analytical elements of the study in order to draw conclusions.
Multi-methodological approaches, both in terms of means of data collection and analysis, were employed within the single-case study framework to address these questions, as it is argued that evidence based on a variety of cross-checking methods—the process of ‘triangulation’—aids internal validity. Baxter and Eyles have noted, however, that simply using two or more methods does not necessarily guarantee more rigorous results; rather, triangulation of both methods and sources strengthens credibility. This has become a strong tenet of interpretative research design and, in reaction to the traditional discourse of international relations centred on state ‘governance’ and ‘sovereignty’, the application of critical theory to international relations studies increasingly recognises the need to acknowledge the power relations present in both ‘reality’ and ‘observation’. Analysis of the ‘intellectuals of statecraft’—leaders, bureaucrats, experts and advisers—by examining the ‘texts of international politics’, including rhetoric, metaphors, and forms of reasoning, allows for the appreciation of the ‘politicalness’ of the historical production of geographical knowledge. Examining the conceptual and practical reasoning used to legitimise policy, moreover, must be adopted universally, be it either the analysis of traditional ‘security’ or, for example, the analysis of more ‘ecopolitical’ discourse.

Supplementary to the referencing of secondary sources previously suggested, therefore, primary data collection was undertaken—largely as an amalgam of archive searches and interviews. Documents were sourced in the UK, notably at the UN Information Centre Library (London) and library and database resources at the International Boundaries Research Unit and the Middle East Documentation Unit (Durham). Given the inconsistent policy within UNFICYP regarding access to detailed information, both contemporary and historical, the UN Secretary-General’s six-monthly reports on peacekeeping operations prove educational. Patrick’s previous insight into UNFICYP’s operations illustrated previously the explanatory power of such empirical data, and also UNFICYP’s role as ‘gatekeepers’ to extensive primary research.

In addition, three fieldwork sessions were conducted in Cyprus for a combined duration of nearly six months—in the south (September-December 1996), in the north (March-May 1997), and then both in the south and north (September 1997). Government and private libraries, and newspaper archives were referenced. Verification of both primary documents and secondary sources of information was possible through interviews and observations with key actors/informants (and vice-
versa). At one level, in-depth and semi-structured interviews were conducted on both sides of the _de facto_ partition lines. Interviews evolved around a semi-structured questionnaire; Appendix 4 outlines this research methodology in more detail. In accordance with the geographical perspectives previously introduced, numerous interviews with a broad range of actors and informants were conducted to analyse decision and policy matters with potential causal groups, and to elucidate pertinent processes of transboundary resource management. In addition, in-depth 'oral histories' were extracted from users and managers of the resource-significant UNBZ in order to aid trend analysis of, for example, historical events and changes in land use.\(^{115}\) The relating of this 'local knowledge' (based on an ethnographic approach) to the identification of island-wide patterns (based on a more expansive approach) proved an important analytical process.

Parallel to interviewing, field observations were made within the UNBZ and in areas adjacent to it by adapting 'rapid appraisal' methods which have resulted from the growing interest in "simple, systematic and innovative techniques designed to acquire, analyse, and effectively utilise information", especially on issues such as natural resource management in developing rural areas.\(^ {116}\) Methods of participatory 'transect walks' were adopted in the urban environment with key local informants, and adapted to the UNBZ in the light of practical constraints.\(^ {117}\) Complementary, therefore, to qualitative time-series analysis of historical maps and aerial photographs from the state level (where available), rapid appraisal mapping studies and observations facilitated an assessment of the outcomes of resource management processes at the local level.\(^ {118}\) In a similar vein, that evidence be obtained from persons in border regions participating in both 'formal' and 'informal' transboundary activities was a crucial determinant on the research process (i.e., including public and private representatives).\(^ {119}\)

The data thus collected was linked with the broader analytical methods to provide the central arguments of the thesis. Asking the same questions of different sources of evidence—allowing one method to inform the other, the discovery of paradox and contradiction, and extension of the breadth of enquiry—and, subsequently, sequencing them together through analysis, leads to an advanced and more accurate understanding of the post-partition management of Cyprus' transboundary resources. Yet, while grounding the theoretical discussion in empirical analysis, this thesis seeks to make a contribution towards developing concepts and theories. It examines several
research questions in depth through a theoretical case study of a single, well-defined partitioned state. Inherently, therefore, there are spatial, temporal and personal biases. Nevertheless, the conceptual framework developed and the general conclusions in Chapter 8 may prove applicable to other cases of partition and other international (i.e., non-partition) boundaries.

This study does not blindly offer a prescription for the resolution of the many transboundary resource management problems that have developed in Cyprus from the 1950s. Rather it seeks to enhance the understanding of the complexities of these interrelated problems in the hope that, in the long-term, this understanding might contribute to their resolution, and to a resolution of the intercommunal conflict. Transboundary resource management appears increasingly prevalent in Cypriot affairs and, as suggested at the start of this chapter, represents a potentially critical focus both for future cooperation and conflict. This study has only started to address this dynamic and much neglected issue.

Endnotes:


3 Bibby et al. (1992).

4 Waterman (1996: 346). Mirroring this language, McGarry and O'Leary (1993: 11) argued that since 1991 secession has become 'a growth industry', an 'in-vogue method of ethnic conflict resolution'.


6 Moreover, Blake (1998: 250) noted predictions of between 25 to 100 new states by 2050.

7 Griggs and Hocknell (1995: 49).

8 See Boutros-Ghali (1992). United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) Resn. 1514 (14/12/60) recognised the right of all peoples to self-determination; exercise of this right however, did not inevitably lead to secession. UNGA Resn. 1541 (10/12/60) identified three options for 'self-determination': sovereign independence, free association with a sovereign state, or integration with an independent state (Wilmer, 1993: 169).

9 Waterman (1984, 1987, 1996); Smooha and Hanf (1996); Holland et al. (1997); Kumar (1997a, b). The following viewpoints have been identified: historical, legal and ethical, political, cultural and humanitarian, and structural (Waterman, 1987: 155).


Allport (1954).


Stultz (1979: 2). In this sense, partition differs from federalism in that the latter involves a relatively benign ‘vertical’ split in sovereignty, while the former is a ‘horizontal’, politico-geographical split (P.J. Taylor, 1993: 169).

Waterman’s own argument developed inconsistencies. In 1987 he clearly saw Cyprus as a case of partition, while the TRNC was later referred to as a secessionary state, if admittedly a failed one (Waterman, 1987; 1989: 120; 1996: 348).

P.J. Taylor (1993: 173); Waterman (1996). For an understanding of the geographical history of these forms of partition, see Pounds (1964: 66-67) and Fraser (1984: 2-7). Both Pounds (1964) and Waterman (1984; 1987) saw the use of the term partition in these contexts as not entirely relevant to an understanding of partition as “a modern twentieth century political-geographical process” (Waterman, 1984: 100). The terms ‘break-up’ or ‘collapse’ are seen as more appropriate for such cases as the Russian, Austro-Hungarian or Ottoman Empires.

Included in various studies of ‘partition’ are Kashmir, Kurdistan, Papua New Guinea, Somaliland and South Africa. The ‘partitions’ of Egypt-Syria, and Gambia-Senegal offer further ambiguities in the term.

These are, respectively: Ireland, Korea, East and West Pakistan, Republic of Cyprus, and Bosnia-Hercegovina; French Syria, British Palestine, and British India; and, finally, Czechoslovakia.

Stultz (1979: 7-9). Stultz (1979: 2) identified only four cases of partition: Irish Free State, British India, Palestine, and the de facto partition of Cyprus.


O’Riordan (1971); B. Mitchell (1989).

Zimmerman (1951: 15).

See, for example, Dupuy (1983: 54); Székely (1986); CIRT (1989: 2); Lauterpacht (1995).

Székely (1986).


Caponera (1995: 121) illustrated such a belief. Moreover, in this study the term trans- ‘boundary’ rather than trans-‘border’ is preferred—as will be discussed in Chapter 2, the latter post-fix represents
a 'place' of intrinsic interest, whereas the former refers to an abstract line of no width. Similarly, the term 'cross-border' fails to move analysis beyond the use of 'containers'.


34 See Malta's declaration to the UNGA (1967), which suggested that it was dangerous to treat the deep seabed as res nullius ('the property of no one'); instead, it should come under communal international management.


38 Young (1994: 21).

39 Young (1994: 22). Examples of such instances include fish stock migrations, ozone depletion, and acid rain.

40 Utton (1987a: vii). See, for example, Lowi and Rothman's (1993: 173) broad theoretical conclusions drawn from a study on transboundary water resources alone.

41 Székely (1986); Utton (1987: viii); Kaufman et al. (1997).


43 O'Riordan (1971: 19).

44 Schrijver (1993: 21-22) noted how the notion of permanent sovereignty over natural resources was in fact only recently reaffirmed by the UN, from the 1950s, in their recognition of so-called 'under-developed' countries and self-determining peoples, and this was encapsulated in UNGA Resn. 1803 (14/12/62).


46 Meadows et al. (1972); Pearce (1991); Postel (1992).

47 Young (1994: 85).

48 O'Riordan (1976); Simmons (1981: 340).

49 O'Riordan (1971: 19).


52 See Principle 4 of UNCED (1992). UNEP have attempted to clarify UNWCED's original use of this term (UNWCED, 1987), suggesting it implied "progress towards national and international equity, as well as the maintenance, rational use and enhancement of the natural resource base that underpins ecological resilience and economic growth" (UNEP, 1989). It is generally accepted that this term requires yet further elaboration. To a large extent, 'Principle I' of UNCED reproduced Brundtland's 'managerial attitude' and anthropocentric concern for 'development' (Escobar, 1995: 192). A competing 'eco-' or 'bio-centric' approach, valuing 'nature' for its own sake, remains largely absent from international environmental law.

53 Dupuy (1983: 54); Herzog (1986); CIRT (1989).

55 Herzog (1991a).


57 Herzog (1996: 178) defined a 'transfrontier metropolis' as a "zone of transnational settlement space [...] functionally unified by common daily 'activity systems' (work, shopping, school, and social trips), shared natural resources and environmental features (air, water, flora, fauna, etc.), and product and labor markets that overlap the political boundary".

58 Herzog (1996: 177, 186); Ingram and Varady (1996). For examples of twin-cities in different politico-economic contexts, see work on Bratislava (Slovakia)-Vienna (Austria) (Mladek, 1994), Kuhmo (Finland)-Kostamuksha (Russia) (Tikkanen and Käkönen, 1996). In Africa, Asiwaju (1994: 73, fn.5) provided examples of medium-sized interlocking border settlements around Nigeria.

59 Young (1977: 7). Whilst recognising the problems in demarcating such units territorially, Young argued that "it is ordinarily unnecessary to achieve absolute precision [...] Widespread agreement on a core area is sufficient to serve as a basis for the implementation of managerial arrangements" (Young, 1977: 25-26). Indeed, Young (1994) later developed this into his 'ecosystems perspective'. As will become more evident, such a view contradicts the practice of the majority of transboundary resource regimes for which territorial delimitation remains a highly contested process.

60 Westing (1989a: 2).

61 Hayton and Utton (1989).


64 Suarez-Villa et al. (1992); Clement (1996).

65 P. Haas (1990: 62-3).


67 Keohane's (1984: 51-52) definition of 'cooperation' is commonly accepted: "when actors adjust their behaviour to the actual or anticipated preference of others, through a process of policy coordination".


69 Young (1977: 12).

70 Dalby (1990: 179).

71 From another point of view, "diplomacy [...] is the tool of governments to see to it that those international relations [i.e., transboundary environmental problems] are kept under control so as to avoid the use of always more expensive and less effective methods of problem solving, such as reverting to military force" (Björkborn, 1988: 123).


73 Westcoat (1991: 88, original emphasis). He added that, in this light, it should be judged by its consequences—anticipated and unanticipated.
These assumptions are made explicit in the seminal summaries provided by Utton (1987b) and Blake (1995).

EIU (1997-98: 20). Of this estimate, it was suggested that 23.3% fell in the north. According to a de facto census in the north (i.e. of the total population present ‘on the day’ (including tourists, etc.)) undertaken in December 1996, the population of the north was 198,215 (Kyle, 1997: 47). However, another, more ‘standard’ census was undertaken in February 1998 and recorded 162,950 (The Cyprus Mail, 12/2/98). Neither census allegedly included personnel of the Turkish Forces.


Nonetheless, a number of invaluable contributions sampled from a broad spectrum of work can be identified: Cranshaw (1978); Ertektin (1984); Koumoulides (1986); Keashly and Fisher (1990); Mandell (1992); Richmond (1998a). Explicit ‘international relations’ readings of the general Cyprus conflict, considering the realist-idealist/pluralist spectrum of approaches, are provided by Richmond and Kerri Lindsay (1995) and Theophylactou (1995a).


It is imperative to note that the buffer zone is neither a legal nor officially recognised ‘international boundary’, in that the territory to its north is not recognised as an independent state separate from the ROC (save by Turkey). According to Oppenheim (1955: 53), an international boundary must mark “the legal termination of the territory of one state or political unit which has an international status and role, and the commencement of the territory of another state or political unit”. In practice, however, the buffer zone partitions Cyprus into two separately functioning territorial entities. Both claim sovereign statehood: the ROC for the whole of the island, and the self-declared TRNC for the northern territory (3,354 km² in size). The terms borders, ROC and TRNC are used without any parenthesis in order to ‘demystify’ them (c.f. Sant Cassia, 1998: 96).

King (1998).

These important distinctions have been championed by Painter (1995) and Paasi (1996).

Previously, these relations have been briefly touched upon, most notably, by Grundy-Warr (1984; 1987; 1994a, b) and, most recently, by Kliot and Mansfield (1997).


Patrick was a Commissioned Officer in the Canadian armed forces, serving with UNFICYP for a short period during the late 1960s (see Patrick, 1976).

See Gruen’s (1994: 265) observation, mirrored in Cyprus, that certain water data are treated on a par with military intelligence.

Just as Wilson noted that “acres of print” had been produced analysing ‘the Troubles’ yet little had been said about the Irish borderlands in relation (Wilson, 1994), I would argue that the ‘Cyprus Problem’ remains subject to analyses that overlook the significance of the post-1974 border.

One consequence of this problem with terminology is toponomy (King and Ladbury, 1982; Wellenreuther, 1993). Placenames are used in accordance with contemporary UN reports (i.e., colonial originals), although their usage and contestation becomes of particular interest in Chapter 6. This may not yet satisfy either Greek Cypriot or Turkish Cypriot readers.

More detailed examinations of these and similar developments in Cyprus have been made in Schofield and Hocknell (1998), and in IBRU’s Boundary and Security Bulletin (BSB) (Vol. 3-).
The ‘UN Day’ which I attended in 1997 attracted over 4,000 persons from both communities.

*Cyprus Today* (3/5/97).


Loizos (1981: 133) argued that, from 1974, “[p]olitics saturated Cypriot [sic] life, with everyone having been affected by the events”.

Cox (1981). These differences have been further acknowledged in the disciplines of political geography (Painter, 1995: 144-45) and international relations (Linklater, 1995: 256; George, 1994: 177; 1996: 56).


Eckstein (1975: 94-123), J.C. Mitchell (1983: 190-197); Hamel *et al.* (1993: 48-49), and Yin (1993; 3-27) have all contributed significantly in pioneering a more sophisticated definition and classification of the ‘case study’ approach.

J.C. Mitchell (1983: 191). This is, of course, not to assume that the case is a truly ‘closed system’.


Paasi (1996: 75). In a number of ways, my conceptual/methodological approach overlaps with Paasi’s recent study on nation- and territory-construction in Finland (at both the national-scale and border-scale).

Scott *et al.* (1996a: 20).


Sayer (1992); Yin (1994).

The work of Young (1977; 1994), Hansen (1983), Waterman (1987), and Lowi (1995) proved invaluable in formulating these and other questions during this research.

Sprout and Sprout (1957); Jervis (1976); van der Wusten (1997: 325). The concept of the ‘operational environment’ describes the structures and processes that delimit a ‘milieu’ of relations (e.g., interstate or intercommunal relations), while the ‘psychological environment’ encompasses an actor’s own ideas or images of that milieu (Sprout and Sprout, 1957: 311-2). While these two environments are distinct, they are totally interdependent (North, 1977: 572) (see Appendix 4).

See, for example, Burgess (1984); B. Mitchell (1989); Stoecker (1991); Newman (1991).


It is important to note that this research has been largely confined only to English language works, although the translation of a number of sources proved both necessary and enlightening.


In the context of rapid appraisal, a ‘transect walk’ is defined as the process of “systematically walking with informants through an area, observing, asking, listening, discussing, identifying different zones, seeking problems, solutions and opportunities, and mapping and diagramming resources and findings” (Chambers, 1992: 16). Due to the constraints of access (both to land and to personnel), participation was largely limited to what might be termed ‘transect drives’, accompanying UNFICYP vehicle patrols in all three ‘Sectors’ of the UNBZ (Appendix 7 (c)). On a number of occasions, access to the UNBZ, on foot and by vehicle (entering mainly from the south), was also obtained with ‘local’ informants.

Adeniyi (1989).

Hansen (1983); M. Anderson (1996a). The subsequent ‘distillation’ of these actors’ lessons allows the determination of what processes promote or deter transboundary cooperation (Scott et al., 1996b: 21).
Part I

Transboundary Resource Management
Chapter 2
Cooperation and Transboundary Relations

2.1 Introduction

It has been argued in the opening chapter that the problem of the achievement of effective cooperation between relevant parties represents one of the greatest obstacles to ensuring the equitable and sustainable management of transboundary resources. This chapter will look in detail at the idea of cooperation, and critically examine the theoretical debate spanning a number of disciplines concerning the conditions under which cooperation amongst international actors may or may not arise. Section 2.2 examines the debate broadly contested amongst 'political realists' and 'liberalists' over the origins of, and potential for, cooperative behaviour, drawing on theoretical work which has particular relevance to transboundary resource management. It is appropriate to examine the interrelations between cooperation and conflict: exploring 'conflict' that is both resource-specific and more generic in nature, and the means of managing both conflicts as a step towards more cooperative behaviour.

In Section 2.3, means of analysing the transboundary context will be revisited and an argument will be made for a reassessment and a repositioning of the focal point of analysis. A territorial dimension informed by a greater understanding of the significance of socio-spatial boundaries—a 'borderland' perspective, that precipitates a fuller comprehension of the process of managing transboundary resources—will be (re)emphasised. In conjunction with this section, preliminary conclusions will then be drawn on the theoretical approaches to transboundary cooperation within dynamic and complex transboundary contexts such as Cyprus before moving on, in Chapter 3, to examine and illustrate the developing practice of transboundary resource management with particular reference to partitioned states.
2.2 Approaching the Problem of Transboundary Cooperation

It can be argued that there has been little theoretical work on cooperation across boundaries, or what is referred to here as ‘transboundary’ cooperation. Analysts often choose to consider what is commonly known as ‘international’ cooperation, and the majority of theoretical and conceptual work under consideration below concerns itself with cooperation as part of traditional ‘international’ relations—the policies, in other words, adopted by individual states in relation to other states. Writers with differing perspectives of international relations, however, offer contrasting interpretations of the conditions under which ‘international’ cooperation is likely to occur, and an examination of the ensuing debate holds implications for traditionalist approaches to the analysis of what can be understood instead as ‘transboundary’ cooperation.

Initially, it must be stressed that the analysis of cooperation should not be confused with its celebration, nor necessarily identified with optimisation or ‘positive-sum games’. Milner, after problematising the concept of international cooperation, recognised three general forms: ‘tacit’ cooperation which may occur without communication or formal agreement, but when actors’ expectations converge; ‘negotiated’ cooperation which follows an explicit bargaining process; and ‘imposed’ cooperation which implies more coercive approaches that have not surprisingly been the focus of studies on so-called hegemonic powers. Cooperation is an inherently subjective term, and Jervis went so far as to argue that distinguishing behaviour as cooperative or not is an artificial process. This study chooses, like Groom and Taylor, to look at cooperative relations that are not solely inter-state or inter-governmental. Unlike Groom and Taylor’s work, however, which argued for the analysis of ‘legitimised’ relationships alone (i.e., those which are ‘not overtly or structurally coercive’), this study prefers to take a less restrictive and less prescriptive approach, in the belief (like Jervis) that what is perceived as ‘cooperative’ must be contextualised. It is argued moreover that this analytical process can be in itself highly instructive.

There are a number of theoretically-informed explanations of transboundary political and economic cooperation originating from the discipline of international relations, and a growing body of work is applying such theoretical approaches to transboundary resource problems. Although for pedagogic reasons they are divided up, it will become obvious that approaches intersect at numerous points and, through
necessity, many observers draw on more than one in their analysis of international cooperation.

2.2.1 Political realism and neorealism

The traditional 'realist' school sees cooperation in terms of intergovernmental relations between independent states, where concern rests with the relation between state power and order. States are the major actors in international affairs and, in the absence of an effective and legitimate international authority, they are seen to competitively interact in the context of anarchy with notions of 'national security' permeating all their actions. In turn, cooperation, in whatever form, is likely to be *ad hoc* and determined largely by the interests of the most powerful state actor or hegemon. Cooperation, in other words, is both a function of and conducted within the parameters of power politics.

In this light, states will at best respond to the developing knowledge of scarce transboundary resources and important systemic linkages through the traditionally competitive and conflicting pursuit of state power, and in this pursuit of power states prefer to avoid or minimise dependency on other states if this necessitates a reduction in their relative power position. 'Dependency', in this sense, connotes some form of vulnerability to the choices of whichever party is dominant in the relationship. The realist approach to international relations is thus ambiguous in suggesting how states will manage transboundary resource management problems or, rather, how self-interested actors can cooperate in the face of anarchy and overriding conflicting interests. Realists assume a hierarchy of issues in world politics determined by this 'security dilemma', with the 'high politics' of military security dominating the 'low politics' of economic, social or environmental affairs. Leadership provided by hegemonic states is understood by some as facilitating achievement of positive collaboration among states, but more generally, issues of 'low politics' are relegated to the back burner.

Some realists have, however, refocused the much-contested concept of 'power' in material terms, concentrating instead on control over the production process, including raw materials, sources of capital, and markets. These neo-, or 'structural' realists recognised growing economic interdependencies in the 1970s in the search for material resources. In terms of environmental 'power resources', for example, state
power translated as being the primary controller of the resource so as to determine any collective decisions affecting it, or having enough capacity to affect unilaterally the quality of a transboundary resource.\(^\text{12}\)

As part of the neorealist school, there are divisions between those who suggest that cooperation is most likely to occur in a condition of hegemonic stability, and those that claim limited cooperation is possible in the absence of hegemony.\(^\text{13}\) Some neorealists therefore advocate that cooperation may occur where the costs of unreciprocated concessions are less, as state survival is perceived to be less at stake.\(^\text{14}\) The work of Keohane and Nye presented the characteristic of 'complex interdependence', suggesting an increasing number of 'transgovernmental relations' involving significantly both a diversity of issues and of actors.\(^\text{15}\) Even these more 'liberal' neorealists, however, continue to focus on political power suggesting that without changing the underlying principle of Darwinian anarchy, effective and extensive cooperation is virtually impossible. Competitive behaviour remains intrinsic to all forms of collective action, and selfish interests are instead pursued within multilateral institutions. International principles, rules and decision-making procedures are non-mandatory and volatile; as a consequence, side payments and issue-linking (or 'package deals') become important steps in generating a 'balanced' agreement, as relative gains becoming more important than absolute gains.\(^\text{16}\)

Both classical and 'neo' realist interpretations of international cooperation rightly acknowledge the structure of the international, decentralised political (and with structural realists 'economic') system, from the perspective of inter-state relations. As the work of Keohane and Nye went some way in recognising, however, there is room for a more 'pluralist' approach to issues affecting global affairs. The realist approach has received much critical attention for which groups of actors it emphasises and which issues preoccupy it; it is beneficial to consider three commonly-voiced criticisms in more detail.

First, with an emphasis on the so-called 'billiard ball' system it is assumed that the state is a rational actor whose identity and interests do not change. Yet, the idea of rational foreign policy decision-making by a reified state has been undermined by emphasising how cognitive dynamics distort the decision-making process. Jervis' seminal work illustrates the problems decision-makers are faced with in a world of uncertainties.\(^\text{17}\) Rather than reducing perception and misperception to exogenous
variables, it is necessary to recognise the vital role they play in decision-making processes, which often lead to 'sub-optimal' courses of action. In addition, and perhaps more fundamentally, the coherent pursuit of a 'single' national purpose is often thwarted by sub-systemic interests. The complexity of internal decision-making has led many to reconsider the role of 'domestic' politics. With increasing political decentralisation, institutionalised power in foreign-policy making, and effective organisational influence (i.e., access to decision-making), domestic factors significantly intrude into systemic theories of cooperation. Milner suggested three reasons for this: a deconstruction of intrastate politics is necessary to understand how cooperation has been legitimised, while an understanding of internal policy helps explain the strategies states use to realise their part of the cooperation. Finally, domestic ratification of formal cooperative agreements is a fundamental requirement.

This shortfall in political realism has been somewhat superseded by a second, that of its ahistorical approach. An entrenched state-centric perspective which leaves the concept of territorial sovereignty untouched ignores the unprecedented elimination of economic barriers (e.g., EU, NAFTA, ASEAN) and the creation of a so-called 'global geopolitical' economy through 'transnational liberalism', which has led many to talk of the 'death of the state' and 'a borderless world'. In terms of transboundary interactions, international boundaries appear increasingly less problematical: research on economic and spatial restructuring, and on the shifting ground under established political institutions, practices and concepts, stresses the 'unbundling' of territorial sovereignty. Harvey interpreted a growth in 'placeless' transboundary interdependencies (conceptualised as 'space-time compression') as contradicting notions of exclusive territoriality. The growth of common markets and of various trans-state functional regimes affecting both global and local space has led to a 'pincer movement' or 'geopolitical squeeze' on the traditional concept of the territorially-integral state. Consequently, in some world regions it has become increasingly difficult to distinguish 'foreign' from 'domestic', 'outside' from 'inside', 'us' from 'them'.

While economic forces have played a large part in undermining state autonomy, recent political developments have further fuelled the 'demise of the state' debate. The 'resurgence' of nationalist and ethnic groups, dominating armed conflicts over recent decades, illustrated the political weight of non-state group identities. A shift from
primordial conceptions of ethnicity to revisionary theories emphasises a growing geopolitical 'disorder', exemplified by the dissolution of the USSR, the break-up of the state Socialist economies of Eastern Europe, and the disintegration of Yugoslavia in the post-Cold War environment. Samuel Huntington's contentious thesis inspired work on the growing significance of contesting 'cultural civilisations', advocating cultural-economic primacy over the political in defining borders. New actors and interests have (re)emerged, exposing a realist approach that fails to accommodate non-'inter-state' conflict. The emergence of political movements outside the framework of territorial states inspired Agnew's criticism of conventional assumptions that have dehistoricised and decontextualised state formation and integration, of states seen as fixed units of sovereign space, and of the 'snapshot' representation of the everyday world political map. Political identity, in other words, is no longer anchored in the singular, normatively appealing 'nation-state', with a Westphalian notion of identity being ever more undermined by diasporas, social movements, social classes, interest and ecological groups. It is easy to demonstrate that the idea of, firstly, a (unitary) 'nation state' speaking and acting in the (uniform) 'national interest' and, secondly, a dominant language of 'international' (sic) relations exclusionary in its treatment of 'non-languages' employed by the 'other', are both highly problematic.

Yet, such perceptions of politico-territorial dissolution appear far from universally applicable. It has been rightly pointed out that many of these observations have taken place in advanced industrial states, predominantly in North America and Western Europe (which make up less than 10% of the total length of international land boundaries), and J. Anderson noted that even the processes identified here were;

"partial and selective, with globalisation affecting different state activities unevenly. Contemporary configurations of political space are a complex mixture of new and old forms, the latter continuing to exist rather than being tidily removed to clear the ground for new polities".

More generally, P.J. Taylor argued that the 'efficacy of territoriality' is too apparent; politically the state remains the major power container. The resurgence in national and regional territorialities suggests that the stability of many borders between 1945 and 1989 owed more to Cold-War subordination than a new, emergent international order—ethnic and national pluralism, in other words, need not be state-destroying. Indeed,
dividing up existing states along cultural lines may actually strengthen the interstate system as its new members move nearer to the 'national ideal', suggesting a predisposition to take on the characteristics and discourse of 'international relations'. Moreover, like Cyprus, there remain conflicts that have survived beyond the Cold War-period and remain "in a twilight world between deadlocked war and permanent negotiation".36

Thus, while a postmodern or postnationalist critique seriously undermines the dominant schools of international relations, it should not be extended beyond visible realities as in many cases states remain the most consequential actors.37 Rather this critical thinking has forced the recognition of 'others': would-be or 'pseudo' states, intergovernmental organisations, international NGOs, multinational corporations, and various associations and networks—all independent actors exercising functional control in a more pluralised space.

This leads onto another major criticism of traditional realist approaches. Recognition of the gradual 'globalisation' of economics and culture noted above necessitated, in addition, a reconceptualisation of the political assumptions upon which state's preoccupation—that of 'security'—is based. One issue central to this study is that of ecological, transboundary interdependencies which traditionally have been paid scant attention within international politics. Global environmental issues directly contest state sovereignty and security, particularly transboundary resource and environmental management problems that enrich the growing 'geoecological world view' of potential for environmental catastrophe ignorant of state boundaries.38 The overriding concern with state security deserves revision as so-called 'low politics' increasingly overlap the traditional concerns of 'high politics'.39 Effectively addressing these transboundary problems will require ever-greater levels of cooperation among states that all too frequently assert their prerogatives of sovereignty.

The marriage of ecopolitics and security was championed by the sociological liberalism of Karl Deutsch, developing his work on non-state groups and social communication to identify transboundary 'security communities' which marked a shift from state-orientated power politics.40 More recently, Pirages reconfirmed that increasing economic and ecological interdependencies necessitated an understanding of different actors involved in more numerous transactions.41 As observers note, however, the merits of integrating environment and resource management concerns with the
notion of 'security' are frequently contested. A body of work has developed which cautions against casually adopting terms such as 'environmental security' and 'resource diplomacy', largely because of their state-centric connotations. The politicisation or even militarisation of environmental and resource management problems, and their treatment as existential threats, may restrict the range of means available for resolving such conflicts. Grundy-Warr and Rajah, for example, have documented the specific links between state building and the 'security' problematic in the developing world whereby state legitimacy and coerced social cohesion become the key determinants of 'whom' security is for (often a particular political identity), and 'where' it is contested (often at the margins of its spatial ecumene). Indeed, Graeber argued that the 'desecuritisation' of the environment would actually accommodate two alternative levels of action to the state: the global and the local. Often the most salient political factors are not state-confined, but are 'localised' citizens groups, social movements, international environmental organisations, or global corporations.

There appear, nevertheless, legitimate concerns that a more extensive understanding of 'security'—be it state or non-state oriented—must recognise environmental and resource management interdependencies. As noted in Chapter 1, the concept of sustainable development has forced actors more fully to acknowledge the links between economic and environmental issues. In turn, this further undermines the realist conception of territorially-integral states with absolute sovereignty; Homer-Dixon suggested, for example, that increasingly there are environmental components to inter-group conflict. Although not envisaging alarming, often historically-deterministic scenarios of 'resource wars' which have been most often debated in studies of 'hydropolitics', he argued that environmental conflict would be a persistent feature of sub-national politics, necessitating appropriate and effective conflict resolution mechanisms. In turn, there were clear benefits from comprehending further the reverse relationship, that of the effect of military security on the environment, in that environmental change can be both cause and consequence of conflict. Arthur Westing's work examined the full extent to which major war might disrupt the environment, particularly in the extreme form of environmental warfare. While cautiously optimistic about the nurturing of non-belligerent and pro-environmental cultural norms, he stated that true human security could only flow from a combination of social and environmental 'security'. 
In whatever form, a more holistic conception of security has significant implications for the analysis of transboundary resource management in its exposure of the contradictions between traditional accounts of international relations and the emerging environmental agenda. Resource exhaustion and environmental destruction have provided states an element of mutual self-interest, and an imperative for avoiding the ‘territorial trap’. In so doing, the dysfunctionality of explaining collective action through an understanding of power structures alone is accentuated. In the light of these commentaries, it is no coincidence that alternative schools of thought have developed in parallel. To address these theoretical realignments an examination of developments within the liberal institutional school of thought is called for.

### 2.2.2 Functionalism, neofunctionalism and neoliberal institutionalism

A functionalist approach to international cooperation originates with David Mitrany’s vision of expanding a ‘working peace system’, whereby transboundary organisations replace the state as the mechanism for satisfying common needs rather than ‘high politics’. Mitrany’s work, along with that of Rosenau and Burton, argued for encouraging ‘webs’ of human interaction to the extent that “boundaries of states would be hidden from view”. It was believed possible to extend cooperative transactions in common issue areas excluded from the elements of ideology and dogma to more politicised relationships, meaning that, in terms of institutional structures, ‘form would follow function’ as trans-‘national’ community-building generated sets of relations and new demands for international institutions satisfying felt needs. Mitrany argued that;

> “the functional approach [...] would help the expansion of [...] positive and constructive common work [...] making frontier lines meaningless by overlaying them with a natural growth of common activities and common administrative goals”.

This perspective has clear implications for international conflict in that mutual contacts over common tasks may engender greater amity at the individual level, while the gradual enmeshment of governments through ever-growing interdependencies will make the cost of severance through conflict prohibitively high. The creation of integrated institutions would gradually foster transboundary cooperation via a ‘spill over’ effect.
Such an approach clearly overlaps with integration theory in its recognition of the significance of interdependency, but here Pentland has argued the similarities end. Of the four major traditions of thought concerning international political integration, functionalism is seen as the most threatening to the political state system. ‘Federalism’, by contrast, is essentially a state-led approach while ‘pluralism’, although a community model, remains more politicised. Contrary to this view, however, P. Taylor convincingly argued that Mitrany’s prescription was not the abolition of governments but rather issues of ‘sovereignty’ becoming irrelevant. Mitrany himself argued that;

“[o]ur social activities are cut off arbitrarily at the limit of the state and, if at all, are allowed to be linked to the same activities across the border only by means of uncertain and cramping political ligatures. What is here proposed is simply that these political amputations should cease. Whenever useful or necessary [...] activities would be released to function as one unit throughout the length of their natural course”.

Pentland’s fourth integrationist tradition of thought distinguished is that of neofunctionalism, whose concerns lie less with recognising consensus than interest-groups’ demands, particularly economic groups which are seen to heavily impose on decision-making processes and stimulate further integration. In contrast to functionalist beliefs in a ‘spill over’ process which involved the transformation of the relative importance of particular issues, neofunctionalism argues that a hierarchy of issues persists and thus ‘spill over’ occurs only as a consequence of decision-making procedure. A process of ramification develops as successful collaboration by states in one particular technical area encourages expansion into other issue areas; this process became idealised as the ‘necessary logic of functionalism’ or the ‘functional imperative’. This would be particularly prevalent in issue areas that concerned matters of ‘low politics’ (i.e., economic, social, scientific, environmental issues). Neofunctionalists therefore suggest that certain supra-national, task-related organisations are possible, but only once the resistance of other organisations and individuals has been overcome.

Ernst Haas’ refinement of functionalism’s integrationist elements became synonymous with the embryonic process of European integration, the-then-EEC representing the ‘neofunctionalist showpiece’. Here, E. Haas recognised that the ‘European Coal and Steel Community’ was established because it accommodated a number of compatible rather than coincidental interests for different groups. Along
Cooperation and Transboundary Relations

with Sewell, E. Haas attempted to be more realistic about the possibility of de-politicising the process of international cooperation (i.e., by-passing state institutions), suggesting that there was more potential for cooperation in some affairs than in others. Even here, however, neofunctionalists are uncomfortable with the distinction between political and welfare relations. At the procedural level, functionalists must logically envisage 'spill over' leading groups into increasingly political sectors, where particularist values generate unintended consequences. In addition, functionalism explains neither a breakdown of international coordination nor a fundamental change in the content of regional integration. E. Haas instead argued that cooperation results not from the unsolicited surrender to a common good, but from the convergence from the separate perceptions of interest. His work therefore reintroduced various factors into the integration process: politics, power, free will, individual leadership, learning processes and, significantly, institutional failure and breakdown.

Parallels can be made with Muzafer Sherif's belief in 'superordinate goals'. These 'goals' are "compelling and highly appealing to members of two or more groups in conflict but which cannot be attained by the resources and energies of the groups separately". A superordinate goal, therefore, differs from a common goal in that the latter can be achieved unilaterally. In the former, any discussions, plans, or action are collated, and a cumulative effect of reducing prevailing friction transpires! Sherif warned, in turn, that 'contact' between hostile groups without superordinate goals could simply serve as a medium for perpetuating attitudes and stereotypes. His work did therefore infer homogeneous 'attitudes, sentiments, aspirations, and goals' in the groups' values and norms. As Ryan rightly tried to explain, however, in applying these reconciliatory features of group dynamics to protracted social conflict it is necessary to learn from neofunctionalists, who do not recognise a pre-existing moral community but, instead, seek to motivate interdependency through self-interest.

When examined together, the broad conceptualisation of 'institutions' within functionalism and neofunctionalism has drawn their greatest criticism and has prompted further analysis of institutional structures, powers, rules and procedures. This has been best exemplified by 'neoliberal institutionalists' who in general have ascribed greater importance to the role of institutions in the mitigation of conflict and the development of cooperation in the political and economic order, claiming that formal and informal rules play a much larger role than in realist approaches. They have not employed
Cooperation and Transboundary Relations

simplistic liberal institutional (or ‘mercantilist’) beliefs that cooperation is an implicit expectation but rather assumed that, if the two conditions of mutual interest and institutional variation exist, cooperation and collaboration are possible. Neither have they assumed that international agreements are easy to keep, but they take a less deterministic view than realists of ‘anarchy’ in international relations. In cases where states receive assistance from institutions that reach beyond the state system, and reduce the uncertainties they may have about the intention of others, international institutions make it possible for actors to take otherwise inconceivable actions. As arguably the principal agents of transboundary cooperation, institutional frameworks appear in many forms of which Keohane emphasised three: formal international (non-)governmental organisations; international regimes; and societal conventions. Young recognised feedbacks nonetheless; international organisations may be initially instrumental in regime formation, but then may also become the objects for administrating such regimes (e.g., UNEP).

In the advocation of the need for ‘world government’, notably through the writings of federalists, (neo)functionalists, and pluralists, international organisations have traditionally been seen to provide the necessary management given the growing complexity of interdependence within and between issue areas, although recent analyses have taken a less benign view, presenting their systemic (and systematic) failure both within and across issues and institutions. A much more decentralised approach to the possibilities for cooperation in international relations focuses on the functional role of international ‘regimes’ in facilitating cooperation. International regimes are generally presented as a form of collective action by states to govern specific ‘issue areas’, where their behaviour is constrained by common principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures. In this sense they are not necessarily a new phenomenon, but are increasingly recognised as undermining traditionalist views of state sovereignty. The management of interdependencies requires instruments and structures which go beyond conventional diplomacy and formal international organisation. While neorealists have rightly criticised regime theorists for missing the true origin of cooperation, in that the very existence of a regime implies a previous agreement to cooperate (determined by the particular distribution of power), regimes have proven potential for generating further cooperation through issue-linkage and side-payments. On the issue of international resource and environmental management, Oran Young noted that institutional and
organisational regimes can generate a strategy of spontaneous, negotiated or imposed ‘order’. Functionally, therefore, regimes may stabilise mutual expectations about normative behaviour, reduce transaction costs, provide scarce information, and generate a ‘shadow of the future’ in situations in which (as ‘game theorists’ would describe) instrumentally rational actors have an incentive not to cooperate.

Recent neorealist interpretations of regime development suggest a move to ‘issue’-based analysis, examining the organisations and institutions (and, significantly, their differently distributed ‘power resources’) within specific, more clearly defined issue systems that allow for greater complexity. This device was pioneered by a ‘Tübingen school’ (examining East-West relations) in response to ‘the American preoccupation’ with the theory of hegemonic stability, which was seen as failing to explain that among the same state actors cooperation occurred in one issue area, whereas in other issue areas, ‘unregulated conflict management’ persisted. The ‘issue area’ in this sense is determined by the degree to which the sub-issues (or ‘objects of contention’) are linked functionally (i.e., for technical reasons) or perceptually (i.e., through the perceptions and behaviour of the participating actors). In so doing, this school of thought develops from Rosenau’s early work on the importance of ‘linkage politics’ (whereby certain issue areas will be dealt with in certain ways); from the work of Mansbach and Vasquez who offered an issue-based paradigm for explaining inter-group relations; and from Keohane and Nye’s analysis of two specific issue areas in international relations. A ‘problem-structural approach’ is adopted which implies that inherent characteristics of issues or conflicts predetermine the way in which they are dealt, and therefore mirrors the neorealist distinction between ‘high’ and ‘low’ politics; they hypothesise, accordingly, that if the conflicts in the issue area are conflicts of interest about goods assessed relative to other parties, regime formation is a difficult process or in fact does not occur at all.

Yet, as can be seen from the foregoing, along with other studies of interdependence, regime analysis still largely ignores transnational, non-state agents to the aggrandisement of powerful states. One attempt to correct this imbalance is Peter Haas’s work on the influence of ‘expert knowledge’ (or ‘epistemic communities’) on the reformation of national objectives. He preferred to look at policy making in terms of such non-systemic variables as ideas, knowledge, beliefs, experts and scientists, arguing that emphasis on cognitive frameworks addresses the issue of variable state perceptions.
and interests which, he argued, (neo)realist and historical materialist approaches lack. In a state of ecosystemic complexity, for example, government officials rely on knowledge and expert opinions of others. Young’s work on the role of ‘political leaders’ in regime formation similarly ‘brings the individual back in’. He argued that the establishment of effective international institutions ordinarily requires the interplay of at least two of three common forms of political ‘leadership’, just as P. Haas’s work illustrated the integral role Stjepan Keckes played in orchestrating the Mediterranean pollution control regime. Both these approaches indicate how states and leaders may realise that new attitudes and political decision-making procedures are necessary to cope with economic and environmental pressures. In their most provocative form, they also suggest how ‘hegemony’ in either the cognitive or Gramscian sense can dominate policy making in different national settings.

Neoliberal institutionalist thinking also develops on more traditional, state-orientated concerns with international organisations and international law. Young noted that both the contractarian approach of those who advocated ‘world peace through world law’ and the functionalist beliefs in incrementalism via ‘spill over’, succeeded in highlighting the significant role of international organisations and institutions in global affairs. Where they fell short, however, was not only in their failure to evaluate the effectiveness, efficiency, and equitability of such organisations and, in turn, the institutions within which they were situated, but also to determine the conditions under which ‘governance without government’ could practically solve collective-action problems. Young’s understanding of a ‘governance system’ hinged on the process of ‘institutional bargaining’ on matters of common concern to a distinct social group based on a consensus rule—as opposed to ‘legislative bargaining’ which aims to meet the requirements of majoritarian rule. Moreover, he argued that the latter simply distributes provisions among the parties while the former provides incentives to settle, on provisions seen as equitable to all, in an integrative fashion.

Overall, these theoretical developments have led to a reduction in the limitations of traditional political discourse, providing space for new voices in the decision-making process, and creating opportunities for institutional and ‘conventional’ changes. More nuanced, pluralist approaches have gone some way in suggesting how ‘transboundary relations’ can be explained when the boundary in question is not de jure, and how theoretical approaches that take a ‘top-down’ perspective on international cooperation
and transboundary resource management are in danger of being blind to non-state actors and issues. With this increasingly complex 'milieu', a number of theoretical and methodological challenges arise in understanding the politico-geographical space and boundaries being 'transcended'. Rittberger advocated a 'microscopic perspective' in order to understand why regimes emerge in some issue areas but not in others, while Tooze argued for an empirically-grounded approach. If there is any consensus it is to be found in a recognition of the need more firmly to ground these on-going theoretical discussions in historical empirical analysis. It is to these challenges which this analysis will be turned to next.

2.3 Rethinking Transboundary Relations

As indicated throughout the previous discussion, across many disciplines there has been an 'epistemological celebration' of spaces and positions astride boundaries, and in-between nations and identities. This has precipitated a welcome critique of a variety of discursive practices, including political geography and international relations, in its recognition of difference and multivocality in both 'core' and 'periphery'. Furthermore it has led to a reassessment of what 'boundaries'—in both the general and specific meaning of the word—represent, their origins and their functions. In the light of fresh observations, this section aims to reintroduce and reinterpret theoretical and conceptual approaches to boundaries as a means of further 'rethinking' transboundary relations. This study draws inspiration from both recent examinations of the construction of socio-spatial identities and the associated narrative power of boundaries, and from studies of a seemingly paradoxical reaffirmation of territorial saliency. These examinations call for further consideration of transboundary relations from a variety of perspectives to critically examine political, economic, social, and psychological processes, and how they are manifested in transboundary contexts. Implicit to this approach, however, is a recognition that the spatial manifestation of these processes is central to any geographical investigation of transboundary resource management. Boundaries, in particular, continue to play a key role, not only as a political weapon, but also as a distinct location for transboundary cooperation/conflict.
2.3.1 Deconstructing boundaries

Political geographers have traditionally understood boundaries as expressions of the 'territoriality of states', whereby 'political space' is invariably portrayed as synonymous with 'physical territory'. As previously indicated, this has proven a similar point of departure for studies of international relations. Recent work, however, has noted how geographers increasingly seek to place the traditionally state-orientated notions of boundaries within other social theoretical constructs, with studies moving away from focusing on a restrictive, purely territorial construction of state boundaries to a social and symbolic construction, one where state-society relations do not necessarily operate within the same, non-problematic division of space. In parallel, other social scientists have attempted to understand the role of space and territory in their understanding of personal, group, and national boundaries and identities, and to argue that boundaries should be understood as the spatial outcomes of various societal processes.

State boundaries are equally social, political, and discursive constructs, with deep symbolic, cultural and historical origins. They are manifestations of the social and historical construction of both spatial and social demarcations—what Paasi has termed 'socio-spatial consciousness'. The notion of a boundary is, in other words, now more explicitly connected with such problematic categories as nation, race, ethnicity or state. Identities and boundaries are increasingly interpreted as synonymous in that boundaries both create identities and are created through identity. Discussion regarding the construction of socio-spatial boundaries has developed in tandem with an increasing evaluation of the role of language and discourse in the process of constructing spatial demarcations, and the way in which territory itself is employed as an ethnic 'marker'. Geographers participating in 'critical geopolitics', in particular, have increasingly challenged the geographical assumptions of international relations theory by arguing that more attention should be paid to boundary-producing practices and representations of identity—the epistemic processes by which 'us/them', 'inside/outside' and 'self/other' are objectified and delimited. Invariably, the outcome of such territorial inscription is that "boundaries are constructed, spaces demarcated, standards of legitimacy incorporated, interpretations of history privileged and alternatives marginalized".
With these ‘postrealist epistemologies’ in mind, it seems pertinent to this discussion briefly to differentiate between what is understood by ‘partition’ and ‘division’ or, rather, how these two terms are represented in both lay and academic discourse. In an oft-cited work, Henderson and Lebow sought to distinguish between two forms of partition—a ‘partitioned state’ and a ‘divided nation’. Territorially, the former is “one that has disintegrated from internal strife among heterogenous ethnic, linguistic, or religious groups that formerly coexisted as a single polity”, while cases of the latter “possess high ethnic homogeneity, common historical traditions, and a previous record of successful political unity”. Clearly this distinction needs to be reconsidered on one fundamental assumption, that being the notion of a homogenous, demarcated ‘nation’. The legitimisation of self-identifying groups remains a fundamental challenge to the world’s state system, and contentious notions of nation-building and nation-destroying litter the history of territorial management. As noted in the opening chapter, the normative idea behind partition is the principle of ‘self-determination’ yet, by definition, the degree to which a group identity is perceived to be ‘unified’ or, in contrast, ‘separate’ represents the very crux of the identity conflict itself. Classification, in other words, becomes necessarily more troublesome when considering the case of the ROC, where many Greek Cypriots have argued that the de facto partition of 1974 halted what was slow but steady progress towards a nation-state norm. By contrast, many Turkish Cypriots and Turks saw taksim (‘partition’) as the inevitable resolution of inter-communal conflict begun (at the very latest) in 1963. In other words, on one hand Cyprus is represented as an ‘unjustly’ divided nation, while on the other it is a ‘naturally’ partitioned state.

It seems useful to adapt Henderson and Lebow’s conceptualisation further for, while not unique to boundaries of partition, it is the process of separating what were notionally unitary and integrated systems—be they river basins or urban plans—that makes ‘division’ through partition so meaningful. As long as there is no obvious moral hierarchy enabling liberalists or socialists to claim that integration is better than partition, such actions will remain inherently contested. In turn, the narrative power of boundaries needs to be taken far more seriously as distinguishing ‘internal’ from ‘external’ is in itself a social and political action.

Yet, in the light of these critical developments, what role, if any, do physical, territorial boundaries have now in constructing socio-spatial and national boundaries
and identities? Contemporary discourse on territory raises many questions concerning the normative modes of political and territorial compartmentalisation, which are themselves represented as a 'territorial trap'. The apparent transformation of socio-spatial organisation into a so-called 'postmodern hyperspace' is inherently interlinked with the debate over the extent to which international boundaries are threatened in both their physical and functional form.

Given the tenor of much of the recent work of critical geopolitics it might seem strange to witness something of a 'return' to the study of boundaries. As has been argued in Section 2.2, perceptions of politico-territorial dissolution are spatially and temporally distinct. Since the end of the Cold War, territorial issues—land and maritime—have become particularly salient problems in European politics (both eastern and western), while remaining critical issues elsewhere. Recent history is witness to the resurfacing of 'territorial ideologies' fuelling violent conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and Iraq, and prolonging presently unarmed conflict over the 'last frontiers' of territorial gain (such as maritime areas, Antarctica and outer space). Between the late 1980s and late 1990s the number of international land boundaries grew from around 280 to 315. Deterritorialisation, in other words, is accompanied by reterritorialisation because ‘territoriality’ persists as the geographical expression of social and political power, and territory continues to function as a spatial means of defence and control, and as an economic asset in itself. Transboundary relations and the management of transboundary resources cannot be understood without recognising the tendency for political and economic power to be organised territorially.

Yet, in spite of the continuing presence and, arguably, dominance of sovereign states in these relations, the value of territory is not constant and an ahistorical approach to such value ignores contextual developments. If, as has been argued, the relationship of security and the economy to territory is socially constructed, subjectively perceived ‘justice’ rather than ‘rational’ state interests might provide an alternative basis for explaining the emergence of territorial disputes. Boundaries, as such, remain manifestations of the nation-building process and the more general principle of territoriality. As institutions they inherently embody contested norms and values. Newman and Paasi pointed out that boundaries become one part of the discursive landscape of social power, control, and governance, with their Janus-faced character in mind, the degree to which boundaries are ‘open’ or ‘closed’, ‘soft’ or ‘hard’,

52
Cooperation and Transboundary Relations

'barriers' or 'bridges' becomes highly revealing. These considerations lead the discussion on to critically examine the strategic, functional character of boundaries further, with the possibility of reconstructing their role in decision-making.

2.3.2 Recognition of boundary functions and 'borderlands'

Although boundary function classifications invariably interlink in practice, it is possible to broadly distinguish political from socio-economic functions. Since the Treaty of Westphalia of 1648, international boundaries have primarily performed a role of security and this has commonly led to the reduction of boundaries to the function of containerisation, with border-related problems centred on territorial disputes and violations of 'sovereign space'. Conceptions of regions contiguous to a boundary correspondingly remained rooted in a tradition preoccupied with peripherality and under-development. Boggs' work on international boundaries illustrated a view that boundaries could not 'promote' trade or human intercourse, so much so that they simply functioned as 'institutionalised buffer zones'. From a socio-economic point of view, the work of Christaller and Lösch theorised the effects of similarly 'closed' borders. Lösch emphasised the artificial distorting element of the boundary, whereby the perceived conflict between a state's priorities of performance, control, culture, and progress, contradicted regional priorities for economic rationality. Likewise, Christaller hypothesised that border regions lacked the necessary conditions for economic development and were socio-politically disadvantaged.

Contemporary research on border regions and border landscapes, however, offers fresh insights and exposes, firstly, a static perception of boundary functions employed within traditional international relations and localisation theory. Secondly, it has highlighted the intrinsic value of the 'border' as a source of sub-national political power. Most vividly, the combination of a 'Europe of regions' with a 'Europe without borders' has demonstrated the increasing importance of 'networks', 'connectivity and interoperability' in transboundary European relations. Even in cases where political divisions retain their primacy in dictating inter-state relations, common cultural landscapes at the local level have begun to create 'transborder regions'. Cappellin suggested, moreover, that transboundary cooperation may reduce core-periphery disparities by encouraging the integration of peripheral regions into the wider political
system, and, in a similar vein, in North America Duchavek has illustrated how ‘subnational units’—their elected officials, experts, or administrative staff—project themselves on to the international scene spatially, through what is termed ‘transborder regionalism’ and ‘global micro-/para-diplomacy’. The former refers to a subnational unit’s geographical response to complications of contiguity, similar to what Ratti identified as ‘transbordering economies’ and Ohmae as naturalised economic regions. ‘Global micro-/para-diplomacy’, in turn, illustrates subnational units’ awareness of global interdependencies and their increasing propensity to deal with the functional sectors of a ‘foreign’ central government and/or private enterprises.

Particularly with the legacy of artificial boundary-creation and partitioning, across Africa space has opened for transboundary linkages to (re)develop. Given the policy of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), the status quo in terms of boundary demarcation has been maintained, associated structural obstacles have similarly persisted, and political concerns, particularly those relating to state security, are still generally viewed as more important than economic or welfare issues. Yet a number of observers have been at pains to highlight a sub-division of Duchavek’s subnational level, distinguishing ‘formal’ from ‘informal’ relations—the latter involving neither national governments nor local authorities, and characterising many transboundary linkages in Africa. Asiwaju’s work, in particular, sought to emphasise ‘humanistic’ dimensions of transboundary relations emanating from the partitioning of cultural areas.

Awareness of a more dynamic functional role of ‘border regions’ has steadily grown. Indeed, Duchavek was prompted to translate the conceptualisation of an ‘international regime’ from Krasner’s state-centric context to the context of “geographically delineated regions that cooperate across an intersovereign boundary”. This reformulation of the ‘regime’ concept is worth highlighting if only in that Duchavek’s ‘transborder regime’ constituted a necessary attempt to address the geographical realities of contiguous regions, and to recognise the functional significance of ‘sub-state’ areas in international affairs. Indeed, certain geographical categories can be rethought in connection with processes which are ‘trans’-boundary, including the so-called ‘first law of geography’ in that transboundary resource management has an inherent spatial dimension by nature of its frequent involvement of parties contiguous to each other. While Keohane and Nye explained ‘complex interdependence’ in terms of
inter- or trans-state (i.e., societal) relations, they failed to pursue the relationship between issue structure and particular patterns of intra-state politics, and so undervalued the importance of domestic-policy making processes involving subnational units. Far from obliterating local cultural differences, international influences in fact shape ‘the particularities of place’ by stimulating and encouraging distinctive local and regional spaces.

The idea that border areas are now developing as a dynamic interface suggests a conceptualisation more akin to the classical notion of a ‘frontier’. To better understand this, various attempts have been made at classifying or modelling the development of border regions in terms of transboundary political, economic, and social relations. Stoddard, for example, presented a relatively static model of a ‘border buffer zone’, functionally linked through a symbiotic ‘doctrine of mutual necessity’. More recent work, however, has incorporated both a spatial and temporal dimension to the development of border regions—or ‘borderlands’, based implicitly on the notion of an integration continuum. Table 2.1 illustrates four well-documented and relatively distinct studies for comparison.

The common assumption for each framework is that inhabitants of border regions may play an exponentially-greater, and perhaps even determining role in the transition from conflict to cooperation, despite the obstacles frequently raised by central governments. Each framework is unique, however, in conceptualising the development of ‘border regions’ and ‘borderlands’ in different issue areas. The most celebrated has been Martínez’s people-focused approach which suggested the gradual generation of a ‘borderlands milieu’ through socio-economic interaction, arguing, if less deterministically than Hansen, that economic development is a principal stimulus for transboundary cooperation. By contrast, Momoh’s ‘borderlands’ correlated more with group-identity, while Suarez-Villa et al.’s typology, in line with the work of Ratti and Reichman, concerned itself with the border as a barrier and its associated transboundary economic and administrative disparities. Goonerate and Mosselman’s work in Eastern and Southern Africa differed, yet again, in that it suggested that a necessary factor in the development of certain ‘border regions’ was cooperation over transboundary resources (Table 2.1).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Integration Continuum</th>
<th>'Borderlands' - Martinez\textsuperscript{148}</th>
<th>'Borderlands' - Momoh\textsuperscript{149}</th>
<th>'Barrier networks' in 'border regions' - Suarez-Villa \textit{et al.}\textsuperscript{150}</th>
<th>'Border regions' - Goonare and Mosselman\textsuperscript{151}</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>\textit{NON-INTEGRATION}</td>
<td>\textit{alienated}</td>
<td>Tension; border functionally closed; interaction totally or nearly totally absent. Stability 'on/off'; border slightly open, limited bilateral interaction; borderlanders develop relationships. Stability prevails; socio-economic complementarity prompts increased cross-border interaction; borderlanders carry on cooperative relationships. Stability; functionally merged economies; unrestricted movement of people and goods; common social system perceived.</td>
<td>zero borderland</td>
<td>isolated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>\textit{co-existent}</td>
<td>borderland counter-minus with boundary, but sides' ideologically or religiously opposed. no cultural or ethnic affinity, and borderland space is minimal.</td>
<td>minimum borderland</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>\textit{inter-dependent}</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>\textit{COMPLETE INTEGRATION}</td>
<td>\textit{Integrated}</td>
<td>citizens on both sides have ancestral ethnic and linguistic affinities and links spanning millennia.</td>
<td>maximum borderland</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Despite its conflict resolution implications, nonetheless, this and other work further illustrated how 'borders', 'barriers', and 'bottlenecks' impact negatively on the synergy and symbiosis of network configurations. The effects of border discontinuities and the spatial diffusion of activities persist, and substantial duplication or parallelism in the centralised provision of public services, infrastructure, or law enforcement on either side of a boundary reproduce 'contiguity diseconomies'. The particular modus operandi of potential transboundary 'nodes', for example, may prevent suitable compatibility in practice and, perhaps most important of all, if 'dissimilar belief sets' exist (even after the elimination of the physical boundary) then either side's interests may become subordinate to nationalist nodal centres. Church and Reid, and Krätke shared similar concerns over the loss of geographical proximity (or the 'closeness effect') when positive developments of transboundary cooperation 'leapfrog' the border region itself, in favour of a nodal centre elsewhere. As indicated in Chapter 1, cooperation is not necessarily 'positive'. Interdependency does not always equate with mutual benefit as transboundary exchanges can be both licit and illicit, equitable and inequitable. Trade does not necessarily facilitate peace, as Barbieri's historical study of interstate economic linkages suggested—extensive interdependence may actually increase the likelihood of conflict. There may not be, in other words, an automatic move toward the dynamic, developing border regions analysed by modern theories of regional development.

It is clear that the key to understanding border regions is related to the function of the border and the nature of the integration shown across it. Conceptual work on 'borderlands' has begun to reflect such dynamics yet, perhaps most importantly, such work suggests the need to move away from a monolithic, aspatial, and atemporal approach to international boundaries. The proposal is for an approach which recognises the functional character of such boundaries—traditionally understood as delimiting State 'A' from State 'B'—as variable in practice. Morehouse's recent work, for example, highlighted the on-going need to delve further into the functional character of transboundary regions, and to examine the implications of boundaries as social constructions. Her typology of seven boundary functions differentiated between the legitimising reasons given for particular boundary management in disputes over natural resource and environmental issues. Permeability of the border, in this sense, was invariably issue-specific. As such, borderlands must be theorised as highly contested
and dynamic areas of ideological, cultural and physical turmoil, but realising this analysis, in turn, necessarily becomes more complex and problematic.\textsuperscript{161}

2.3.3 Geographical space and scale in transboundary interactions and flows

The conceptualisations of borderlands and state reintegration illustrated above fail to compensate fully for the seemingly contradictory processes of cooperation and conflict present in the same border zones, and are generally weak in explaining why interaction occurs when it does, and identifying what structural relationships are involved. By extension, they collectively demonstrate the analytical problem of comprehensively representing a multitude of issue areas within a border context. Given the 'differentiation' within boundaries, it becomes necessary to break down the analysis further as each activity and each interest group has its own 'border' and 'border zone'.\textsuperscript{162}

A more empirical understanding of border-related processes would seem to necessitate an analytic framework dealing with transboundary cooperation as a process. One frequently referred operational model, based on the core-periphery concept and on transaction flow analysis, was proposed by John House who was conscious of the contribution political geography could make in a field very much exclusive to political science and international relations.\textsuperscript{163} A structural model introduced in parallel recognised the distinctive regional and national levels of policy-making on borders, and identified in particular their 'adaptive' and 'maladaptive' tendencies. The overall method advanced was empirically-based, specifically examining actual transactions and linkages in what House recognised as developing 'transnational frontier regions'.\textsuperscript{164} By aggregating 'cross-frontier transaction flows' amongst several issue areas (goods, people, capital and services) it sought to integrate the complexity of social, economic, cultural, and political data as a coherent basis for understanding transboundary interaction (Figure 2.1). House argued that as neighbours evolved from a state of crisis to a more stable and harmonious relationship, 'A-B' transactions developed and 'Az-Bz' transactions followed thereafter.

There have been numerous analyses of transboundary linkages that have mirrored House's operational approach, and Minghi suggested that the borderlands of Western Europe provided ample evidence to support the notion that under 'normal' peaceful conditions, House's 'Az-Bz' transactions take on a major role.\textsuperscript{165} Despite
Figure 2.1 Spatial elements of House's operational model of transactional flow across boundaries

Cooperation and Transboundary Relations

implicitly neorealist) reservations that borderland transactions are virtually non-existent along hostile or ‘closed’ borders, it has been illustrated that connections such as those identified by House can occur even when one side does not recognise its neighbour’s existence. 166 Both House’s models have certain limitations, however, many of them inherited from transactions analysis in the 1960s. 167 The lack of general theoretical focus has lessened their explanatory power, and Hansen argued that they were too descriptive and empiricist, containing only highly qualitative statements. 168 Structural elements demand access to complex and detailed information on transboundary flows and linkages, and there has yet to be any explicit analysis of the models in singular or comparative border contexts. 169 Moreover, Hansen questioned the degree to which they could analyse the complex interdependencies of border regions and suggested instead distinguishing between economically-orientated ‘efficiency values’ and politically-orientated ‘sovereignty values’, as it was argued groups motivated by the former play a more prominent and less constricted role in transboundary cooperation. 170 Duchavek again questioned whether transboundary regional interaction would necessarily increase should state-centre to state-centre interaction increase. 171

House’s model nonetheless highlighted the on-going need to better identify and understand a variety of transboundary processes. Conscious of the outstanding need to recognise the specific contexts for transboundary cooperation, therefore, a number of studies have sought to emphasise these processes at various geographical scales. To better understand the contrasting evidence highlighted above it must be recognised explicitly that international boundaries have a differential impact at different scales of analysis. As Newman and Paasi argued, they exist simultaneously at the global scale (in the geopolitical and economic landscape), the state scale (in the nation-building process), and at the local scale. 172 The need to assess changes in the character and function—the ‘meaning’—of state boundaries in itself necessitates an appraisal of the significance of such boundaries at different spatial scales.

Overall, by moving away from the ‘boundary’ as abstract, normative space to real ‘place’, the study of processes within areas contiguous to the boundary is thus opened up. Focus is placed on the territorial interface—the physical boundary and its associated ‘borderland’—where issues of traditionally ‘domestic’ politics increasingly confront or conform with those of neighbouring states, and/or those of their own state. This approach increasingly highlights peoples and problems that have too often been
Cooperation and Transboundary Relations

placed on the 'periphery', both theoretically and methodologically. Local contexts therefore present several theoretical and methodological challenges. The 'naturalised' categorisations of 'local', 'regional', 'national' and 'global' become analytically more ambiguous. Concluding from this, there is apparent encouragement to shift focus to the realities of the landscape being manifested in and around the politico-territorial divide in that the borderland is seen to provide "a unique opportunity for a local-scale regional focus but within an international context", a place where the interaction between integration and national sovereignty is especially 'transparent'.

International boundary studies have long-focused upon the delimitation and function of boundaries and their impact upon borderlands and borderlanders. As such they have played a major role in identifying and empirically investigating the intricacies of the border. Perhaps more importantly, however, they suggest that the key to understanding and defining border regions is related to the nature of the border rather than a polarised approach on an 'open-closed' axis. Areas of geographic contiguity, most notably with a 'transborder economic space', can play an ever-growing role in inter-state relations and eventually gain substantial autonomy. A border area need not necessarily suffer permanent disadvantage and its development is not only determined by its geographical situation in the framework of the state economy, but even more so by its own regional economic, functional, and developmental context in transboundary space.

2.4 Conclusions

In several ways there exists great scope for integrating a more nuanced 'borderlands' perspective with developing theoretical approaches employed in analysing transboundary resource management. It is worth reiterating those benefits on offer to the two disciplines of political geography and international relations. By reassessing the assumptions within their own disciplines and, in parallel, opening them up to complementary debates within other disciplines, a more multilayered and multidisciplinary approach appears not only possible but desirable.

On one hand, for international relations theorists there are two interlinked developments which in this analysis have been presented as an integral part of
rethinking international relations as ‘transboundary’ relations. The driving force behind this reconceptualisation is contemporary, often multidisciplinary research which highlights an ever more pluralised political environment involving new actors, issues, and spaces— ‘new’ in that previously they were either unrecognised, undeveloped, or under-represented. Firstly, a dualist, inter-statist approach to ‘new’ inter-group relations simply reproduces traditional conceptualisations; a consensus has developed arguing that approaches to international relations must account for the growing complexity of ‘transboundary’ relations in terms of economic restructuring, cultural diversity, and a more pluralised space inclusive of ‘non-state’ actors. The management of interdependencies requires instruments and structures which go beyond conventional diplomacy and formal international organisation, which clearly originate from a variety of sources, depending on what assumptions and foci are employed in explaining transboundary cooperation.178

By extension, there is similar discontent with approaches which systematically distinguish ‘high’ from ‘low politics’.179 Duchavek suggested;

"the line between security concerns, on the one hand, and nonsecurity issues is obviously quite fluid and certainly not as clear as the authors of old or new constitutions and traditional diplomats seem to believe".180

A preoccupation with military, ‘national’ (read: state) security excludes the recognition of other political movements operating not only at this level, but potentially at the local or the global level. However it is configured, it is evident that the surge in transboundary regionalisms and nationalism are part of the complex of the dynamic relationship between state and society, and analyses need to be more appreciative of cultural and social, as well as political and economic, theory. A Gramscian-inspired perspective on transboundary relations—more contextual, and linguistically conscious of ‘facts’—allows us to think of state boundaries more as strategies in social struggles than simply ‘preordained’ social facts.181 Focus must also fall on the territorial embeddedness of uneven political and economic systems within their own geographical and historical contexts, for it is the contextual location that “infects the system” with particular cultural meanings.182 At the very least this prescribes a more sociological approach that does not predefine cultural conditions, but rather teases out the human dimensions of ‘daily life’; an interpretative perspective demanding an awareness of both institutional, structural and social processes, and their localised manifestations.183
On the other hand, for borderland scholars there are two fundamental points for reconsideration. The first is that traditional political geography has implicitly adopted many realist assumptions previously discussed, but such geopolitik as realpolitik has become ever more contested. Territory simplifies issues of political control and gives relationships of power a greater tangibility and appearance of permanence; by providing symbolic markers, a ‘sense of place’ distinguishing ‘us’ from ‘them’ is (re)created. Underlying this therefore, and secondly, use of a more theoretically nuanced understanding of cooperation over transboundary resource management (learning particularly from neoliberal institutionalist and neofunctionalist explanations of cooperation) seeks to overcome a “lack of concern with explanation and a consideration of process” in traditional regional geography. These analytical developments strongly suggest, as Newman and Paasi argued, more of a multidimensional and multidisciplinary framework for the study of boundary-related phenomena like transboundary resource management.

At most, this critical debate has suggested distinguishing instead ‘trans-state’ from ambiguous, so-called ‘transnational’ or interstate’ relations highlighted from the late 1970s;

“a focus on trans-stateness [...] should imply more than simply ‘across’: we need to use the strong sense of the prefix ‘trans’ to mean ‘beyond’ [...] interstateness accommodates adaptation of states [...] trans-stateness implies demise of states in a transition from that system”.

New forms of governance appear to be developing in parallel with the ‘de-realisation of borders’ in the post-Hobbesian state. Nonetheless, and to a large degreecountering the growing discourse of ‘transnationalisation’ in economic and political relations—which has moved away from analysis of ‘fixed’ geographical conditions (including international boundaries) and retreated from a ‘strong’ spatial determinism—there must be a commitment to the use spatial concepts as a means of analysing politics at a variety of spatial scales. Boundaries, after all, are ‘functionally determined’ and not necessarily state determined; as such, these functions are differentially ‘spatialised’. Alger declared that;

“[t]his is not to say, of course, that states are necessarily unimportant, nor that state borders may not have special significance. But these are questions to be answered by empirical investigation, not a priori assumptions”.

63
While they are necessarily problematised, boundaries are not erased neither socio-spatially nor territorially, highlighting an imperative to evaluate closely the emerging 'boundary-opening' rhetoric.  

The systemic determinism of a political realist approach has failed to sufficiently accommodate these variables, well-established within the discipline of political geography. While there is a conscious move away from atheoretical case studies of boundary conflicts, demarcation processes, and empirical presentations of transboundary relations, the empirical core of these studies continues to have a legitimate role in the construction of knowledge about boundaries which remain a very practical and often technical question in both 'international' and 'transboundary' relations. As will be seen in the next chapter, borders transform from a locus of division to one of cooperation and integration under certain favourable conditions, yet there remain many cases of both land and maritime boundaries largely closed to such integrationist processes.

Endnotes:

1 Hansen (1983) and M. Anderson (1998) took a similar view.
2 Keohane (1995: 281). This is the language of economists and game theorists.
5 Groom and Taylor (1990: 3). Blake (1993: 36) similarly highlighted 'malignant' varieties of transboundary cooperation involving non-state actors.
6 Particularly informative examples include studies on transboundary resource regions (Young, 1977), transboundary marine resources (Keohane and Nye, 1989), transboundary sea pollution (P. Haas, 1990; Rittberger, 1990), transboundary urban ecosystems (Herzog, 1991a, b, c), and transboundary river catchment areas (Lowi, 1995).
7 Early protagonists of such Hobbesian beliefs included Morgenthau (1948) and Waltz (1959).
8 Groom (1990: 9).
10 'Hegemonic stability theory' suggests that the presence of a dominant actor possessing a preponderance of material resources is necessary for cooperation both to form and function. For an extended account, see Keohane (1984).
Cooperation and Transboundary Relations


12 P. Haas (1993: 177). This recognises but fails to fully overcome the problem of pinpointing the main controller of that power, of weighting each element of power or, more fundamentally, defining ‘power’ which realists generally see as the ability to control or influence the actions of others.


14 P. Haas (1990: 38).

15 Keohane and Nye (1989). Keohane noted, however, that this work (originally published in 1977) “persuaded me that these actors continue to be subordinate to states” (Keohane, 1989: 8).


17 Jervis (1976).

18 Putnam (1988), for example, argued for a ‘two-level game’ approach—foreign policy versus domestic policy—to understand international policy-making.


24 Harvey (1989).


28 Galtung (1993); Huntington (1996).


31 P.J. Taylor (1995: 1) rightly commented: “[i]t is commonplace to note that the word international does not refer to what it describes [...] But this is not a mere linguistic lapse; it reflects the victory of a particular politics [...] state-centred politics legitimating itself as national politics”.


34 Conversi (1995); A.D. Smith (1995); Fuller (1997).

Cooperation and Transboundary Relations


38 It can be argued that, in environmental matters, ‘zero-sum games’ do not exist because it is always possible for all sides to lose.


48 Kaufman et al. (1997: 38). The much-criticized work of Bulloch and Darwish (1993), and to a lesser extent Naff and Matson (1984) and Gleick (1994), which ‘predicts’ future wars over fresh water resources has tainted an otherwise pioneering debate over the role of environmental concerns as catalysts for both diplomatic and armed conflict. The starting point of this debate is often over the extent to which the 1967 Arab-Israeli war was rooted in Arab diversion plans in the Jordan River catchment, but has developed into more substantive arguments over the implications of inequitable fresh water distribution amongst Middle East states (see Beaumont, 1994a).

49 Thomas (1992: 143-150).

50 Westing (1986; 1990a).


52 Dyer (1994); Princen and Efinger (1994).


54 This is an umbrella term that encompasses approaches common to a number of post-World War II liberal international theories, including (neo)liberal institutionalists, (neo)functionalists, and regime theorists, all of which “stress the impact that institutions may have on political behaviour and outcomes in world affairs” (Lowi, 1995: 220, fn. 13).

55 Burton (1972: 43); Mitrany (1966; 1975); Rosenau (1969).

56 P. Taylor (1990b: 126). This functionalist view was further conceptualised as ‘technical self-determination’.

As will become clearer in Chapter 3, John Burton (1975) was keen to evaluate the implications for conflict resolution in functionalism.

Pentland (1975).

P. Taylor (1990a; 1990b); Groom (1997: 27). P. Taylor (1990a: 25, fn.21) highlighted in Mitrany’s quote above the assumption of the persistence of ‘frontier lines’ which, although ‘meaningless’, are being overlaid, suggesting the continuation of the state in some form. This argument appears, intentionally or not, to be repeated in Burton’s above quote too.

Mitrany (1966), an abridged form of which was reprinted in Nelsen and Stubb (1994: 95).


Pentland (1975: 20). Indeed, E. Haas’s work, along with that of Mitrany and K.W. Deutsch, must be viewed in the context of the devastation of two World Wars, and the subsequent exploration for political and economic integration.

Harrison (1990: 141).


E. Haas (1964); Groom (1975); Samhat (1997: 354-5).


Sherif (1958: 355); Pruitt and Rubin (1986). Surprisingly, the parallels between this work and Stein’s (1983) distinction between ‘coordination’ and ‘collaboration’ regimes has not yet been identified. Stein argued that participants only recognise common rules in the former to solve a dilemma of ‘common aversion’, but go so far as to establish some formal authority of enforcement in the latter because ‘common interests’ are at stake.


Ryan (1995: 139) argued confusedly that functionalists worked on self-interest rather than intrinsic reconciliatory interests; in so doing, he overlooked the early work of Mitrany, Burton and K.W. Deutsch which implicitly recognised the basis of a moral, social community in the present world system. Ryan’s commentary also failed to credit on-going idealist work that suggests the presence of norms of inter-group peace. Fearon and Laitin (1996), for example, noted that ethnic conflicts were invariably cauterised short of war because ethnic groups were conscious of the implications of indiscriminate threats and inter-ethnic transgressions, and sought out an equilibrium through in-group ‘policing’.

Harrison (1990). Heathcote (1975) and Groom (1997) suggested that functionalism is analogous with Gemeinschaft in the Ferdinand Tönnies sense (where consensus is the essence), while neofunctionalism was based on Gesellschaft (which is achievement-oriented).

Higgott (1994); Keohane (1989). Keohane (1995: 285, original emphasis) defined an ‘institution’ as “a general pattern or categorization of activity or [...] a particular human-constructed arrangement, formally or informally organized”. International law, for example, can be seen as a general pattern...
Cooperation and Transboundary Relations

including a variety of particular arrangements codified in legal form (e.g., the regimes of the United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea).

76 Keohane (1989:4). 'Conventions' are referred to in the sense not of international law but of social theory (i.e., implicit rules and understandings).

77 Young (1994: 164). Unlike the 'conventional' make-up of institutions (see above), organisations are material entities (Young, 1994: 26).


79 There remains much debate over the definition of a 'regime', although Krasner's is most widely used: "sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actor's expectations converge in a given area of international relations" (Krasner, 1983: 2). Stein argued more generally that "a regime exists when the interaction between parties is not unconstrained or is not based on independent decision making" (Stein, 1983: 117). 'International regimes' consequently differ from 'international organisations' in that regimes are 'only' sets of norms and rules (although issue-specific), while organisations are purposive entities which can be issue-specific (e.g., International Whaling Commission), related to several issue areas (e.g., UNEP), or constitutional (e.g., UN) (Mayer et al., 1993: 403).

80 Keohane (1984: 61) offers a (state-centric) definition of 'issue areas': "sets of issues that are [...] dealt with in common negotiations and by the same, or closely coordinated, bureaucracies, as opposed to issues that are dealt with separately". See Krasner's 'regime' definition specifically referring to an 'issue area' (Krasner, 1983: 1).


82 Young (1983).

83 Elliott cautioned that these 'norms' do not always incline actors to maximise welfare through collaboration ('interdependence norms'), but can also be defined by short-term security interests ('sovereignty norms') (Elliott, 1994: 10).

84 Axelrod (1984) argued that when parties commit themselves to meeting over the indefinite future, the 'shadow' cast may provide an incentive to cooperate, thereby overcoming the problem of cooperating under the security dilemma (Jervis, 1978: 167).

85 Keohane (1986).

86 Rittberger (1990; 1993: 13). 'Unregulated conflict management' describes adversarial behaviour, which can be 'regulated' by the joint observance of mutually accepted norms and rules for dealing with an object of contention (Rittberger and Zürn, 1990: 15-16). One means of regulating the conflict management is through a regime.

87 Rosenau (1969). 'Linked issues' are most evident when efforts to deal with one issue have unintended consequences affecting other regimes, and vice-versa; in turn, the more decentralised the political system (and therefore higher level of interdependence), the more problematic such linkages become (Young, 1994: 24-25).

88 Mansbach and Vasquez (1981). Whereby an 'issue' consisted of "contention among actors over a set of related questions, concerning the allocation of economic resources or support for non-material values" (Willetts, 1990: 269).

Cooperation and Transboundary Relations

Rittberger (1993: 13-16); Efinger et al. (1993: 264). Rittberger et al. chose to expand on Krasner’s regime definition, stipulating that its injunctions also have to be ‘effective’ and ‘durable’ (Rittberger, 1990: 8).

Haggard and Simmons (1987), Hafler (1993), and May (1996) are among those who have cited the work of Strange (1983) and Putnam (1988) in this respect. This criticism also covered Keohane’s work, even though he later attempted to move away from a “too narrow and confining” structuralist approach (Keohane, 1989: 8). For a critical commentary on this ‘move’, see George (1996: 48-52), while Tooze’s (1990) review of regime analysis provided an instructive critique of the American, ethnocentric articulation of regime and international relations theory in general.

P. Haas (1990).

93 P. Haas (1990: 65).


95 ‘Structural leaders’ are expert in translating material resources into appropriate bargaining leverages; ‘entrepreneurial leaders’ rely on exceptional negotiating skills to frame issues appropriately; while ‘intellectual leaders’ produce the necessary intellectual capital that shapes the perspectives of those participating in regime formation (Young, 1991: 288-98).


97 Cox (1983); E. Haas (1990); Young (1994: 124-5, 157-8). See also Strange’s definition of ‘structural power’ which included “control over knowledge, belief and ideas” (Strange, 1988: 26).

98 Young (1994: 15-16). For an introduction to the more recent debate on the means of making such assessments, see Rittberger (1990), P. Haas et al. (1993), and Young (1994).

99 Young (1989a). A ‘governance system’ thus differs from an international ‘regime’ in that the latter only covers a limited number of issues, or a single issue-area. Following Young’s logic through, all regimes are governance systems and all governance systems are ‘social’ institutions, but not vice-versa (Young, 1994: 26).

100 Young (1994: 27).


103 While it is not possible to generalise, works of particular note in ‘deterritorialising’ space and emphasising emergent ‘translocalities’ (Appadurai, 1996) include Der Derains and Shapiro’s (1989), Peterson’s (1992) and MacMillan and Linklater’s (1995) ‘post-positivist’ reevaluations of discursive boundaries in international relations, Gupta and Ferguson’s (1992) contention that ‘borderlands’ represent the ‘normal’ locale of the postmodern subject, and Bhabha’s (1994) focus on the privileged location of spaces of the margins—a cultural position between designations of identity.


105 Increasingly political geographers (see, for example, Prescott, 1987; Rumley and Minghi, 1991; Eva, 1994; Paasi, 1995; Forsberg, 1995a; Newman and Paasi, 1998) are critically conscious of traditional, atheoretical studies of boundaries, and the representation of boundaries as simple, empirical manifestations of state power.

Cooperation and Transboundary Relations


109 Paasi (1995); J. Anderson and Shuttleworth (1998: 198). See also Said (1995: 54), and Barth's (1969: 9) seminal work on the constitution of ethnic groups and the 'nature' of the boundaries between them. The geographical designation of exclusionary territories, as Said (1995: 331) argued in his deconstruction of the 'Orient', is "an odd combination of the empirical and the imaginative", an 'idea' which "derives to a great extent from the impulse not simply to describe, but also to dominate and somehow defend against it".

110 Dalby (1991); Ó Tuathail and Agnew (1992); Ó Tuathail (1995). While a large portion of discourse analysis concentrates on 'deictic' expressions originating from written/spoken geographical text (see, for example, Johnson (1994)), Hakli (1998a: 336) noted how 'space-transcending practices' such as maps, surveys, and statistics have also proven a popular focus of critical attention.


118 Agnew (1994).


120 Foucher (1994); Forsberg (1995a). See, for example, in Africa (Griggs, 1995) and the Middle East (Schofield and Schofield, 1994); Asia-Pacific (Grundy-Warr, 1994c); and the Americas (Girot, 1994).

121 Glassner (1991); M. Anderson (1996a).

122 Blake (1998: 1, 3), who also noted the irony that with improving technologies (e.g., Global Positioning System) many boundaries were being re-surveyed and accurately demarcated only for the first time.


129 Boggs (1940: 11), as cited in Herzog (1991c: 588). Even more recently, Prescott (1965: 76) conceded that "the only function of a boundary is to mark the limits of authority or ownership".
Cooperation and Transboundary Relations

130 Christaller (1966); Lösch (1954).
131 Ratti and Reichman (1993).
132 Bufon (1994).

133 Cappelin (1992); Duchavek (1986a; 1986b). This work is synonymous with other studies on 'globalisation', previously highlighted, which emphasises the reconfiguring of what is understood to be 'domestic' and 'foreign' policy both between contiguous border regions, and with distant centres of economic and political power.

135 See, for example, Asiwaju (1984).
139 Goertz and Diehl (1992: 6-7); Forsberg (1996: 360).

144 The use of this continuum was suggested by C. Brown (1997). Debate continues over differentiating a 'borderland' from 'frontier' and 'periphery'. Adejuyigbe (1989: 28) employed the traditional argument of Kristof (1959) and De Blij (1967) that 'frontiers' are "features of the period before boundaries are delimited"; and 'borderlands' are therefore a post-boundary phenomena. At the level of application too there remain problems in delimiting a border-impacted area; see, for example, suggestions for its unitisation based on a local authority (Adejuyigbe, 1989), an economic zone (EC, 1994), or a catchment area (Goonerante and Mosselman, 1996). With this in mind, Hansen's broader definition of 'border regions' is most commonly used: "sub-national areas whose economic and social life are directly and significantly affected by proximity to an international boundary" (Hansen, 1981: 19).

147 Ratti and Reichman (1993).
Cooperation and Transboundary Relations

Kamann (1993: 75-81).


Steiner and Stum (1993: 352-54).


As Eva (1994) noted, by linking boundaries with borderlands it is dysfunctional to think in terms of boundary lines alone.


Minghi (1991); Martinez (1994). This conclusion was formulated following the application of House's model to Israel's borders. It was recommended, however, that it "should be checked if this also is or was the case between [...] both sides of Cyprus and other tension-filled areas" (Soffer, 1994: 190).

For a review, see Willetts (1990: 257-59).


Inevitably, more limited application of these elements of the model is enforced in hostile, information-sensitive borderlands. While House championed its inductive contribution, he later recognised the problem of incommensurable databases from either side of the boundary, and the embryonic state of the work understanding perceptions and attitudes in transboundary work (House, 1982: 265). Hansen (1983) similarly noted its shortfall in handling behavioural variables. Furthermore, however, it is not possible to recreate the spatial differences that House modelled as it is harder to distinguish between the local, regional and national levels in Cyprus. Transboundary urban space often contradicts House's traditional model of centre distanced from periphery. In Cyprus, the economic, political and social 'centre' of the island is on what would be 'traditionally' the periphery.


Duchavek (1986a: 24-26).


Cooperation and Transboundary Relations

176 Prescott (1965; 1987); Strassoldo (1989).
180 Duchavek (1986a: 13).
185 Sack (1986); J. Anderson and Shuttleworth (1998: 198). Forsberg (1996: 380, fn. 7) explained that "place is a space that is known and territory is a controlled place". 'Place' in this sense is understood as a site of social contest, constantly reproduced over space and time (Massey, 1992).
191 Groom (1975: 94).
Chapter 3
Theory into Practice, Practice into Theory:
Transboundary Resource Management and Partitioned States

3.1 Introduction

The preceding chapter concentrated on the theoretical study of transboundary relations with regards to cooperation and resource management in general. This chapter will examine in more detail the application and manifestations of these disciplinary approaches to transboundary resource management in practice. At the same time, this analysis necessarily acknowledges that there is a recursive process of learning and adaptation between theory, policy and outcome—that the dominant dichotomy of theory and practice (between 'abstract' and 'concrete') is in reality inseparable, although invariably there are significant discrepancies between the two.¹

The focus of this chapter rests on the implications of dividing the management of resources through partition. To frame this analysis, Section 3.2 suggests an overview of the intervening variables involved in transboundary resource management in partitioned states. As previously noted, problems over transboundary resource management are not particular to states that have been territorially separated, in that all inter-state boundaries have the capacity to generate similar if not the same problems, yet it can be argued that a disproportionate number of the most seemingly intractable conflicts over transboundary resources have been manifested in partitioned states. In substantiating this qualitative argument, this chapter will examine cases of partition other than Cyprus, offering a broad outline of the character of transboundary relations pertaining to transboundary resources. The framework forwarded evaluates the extent to which both (neo)realist and (neo)liberal institutionalist perspectives have manifest themselves in, and are reflections of, the decision-making and management practices of partitioned states.

Waterman has rightly noted the lack of comparative work on the political geography of partition,² and an understanding of transboundary resource management in partitioned states 'beyond' the single-case study is no exception to this shortfall. While
it is neither practical nor desirable to generate such generalisations here, the framework proposed can only benefit further comprehension of the many implications of state partition, although the level of generality remains high due to the inadequacies of existing theoretical discussion on the topic. As such, the following discussion raises a multitude of immediate questions concerning transboundary relations in partitioned states which may be analysed further elsewhere.

3.2 Perspectives on Transboundary Resource Management in Partitioned States

The variance in thinking about questions of international or 'transboundary' cooperation in general is attributable to the disciplinary perspectives and larger world-views which analysts may bring to the study of this subject, echoes of which were heard throughout Chapter 2. What they all have in common, however, is their call for a change (of varying degrees) to decision-making procedures, and international organisations and institutions which are presently seen as unconducive to the successful management of global affairs as they perceive it. (Neo)realism seeks to explain international behaviour in terms of the system in which actors operate, rather than in terms of factors internal to the parties. Countering a Grotian view of rules or norms, the realists' maxim is that new institutions and governance systems are epiphenomenal, merely reflecting the underlying balance of power. Moreover, at the 'subnational' level, the dynamic development of 'border regions' (which points to their practicality as areas of cooperation rather than conflict) is in fact an extension of political and economic power seeking to overcome the barriers to international finance.

Regime analysis has, in response, sought to examine the institutionalised cooperation of states for managing conflicts and interdependence problems, instead of relying on self-help strategies (even when self-help action may seem to produce greater individual benefits or less individual costs). In addition, the neoliberal challenge to the realist approach has proven revealing. Clearly, both regimes and epistemic communities have the power to reduce uncertainty by providing information and facilitating negotiation. Moreover, they counter the anarchistic beliefs of a Hobbesian worldview;
"[t]he fact that there is no central government in international society should not blind us to the roles of a wide variety of international organizations in the administration of issue-specific governance systems".\(^6\)

Mitrany’s functionalism, it should be noted, has been more prescriptive in its analysis of international cooperation; indeed, a number of observers have argued that ‘functionalism’ is not so much a theory as a strategic approach—a ‘way of building piecemeal’—and, in this sense, it suggests an open-ended process.\(^7\) Even the less normative logic of integration that neofunctionalists emphasise, while falling short of the functionalist’s technocratic determinism, implicitly preserves a positivist ideal of cumulative encroachment, and fails—particularly in their analysis of European integration—to question where the locus of power lies.\(^8\) Neoliberalism, in contrast, has argued that states look primarily to their own prosperity and capability, but with little concern about their position (and possible ‘gains’) relative to an increasingly complex mix of political entities. The potential for facilitating other, novel forms of governance aside from the territorially-based ‘nation-state’ is highlighted. Moreover, it bases its analyses on the constellation of interests and the decision-making level of analysis that (neo)realism has generally ignored.

The creation of state interests and preferences would appear to necessitate greater comprehension of cognitive theory that does not assume rationalistic approaches are irrelevant, but rather chooses to explore the limits of human rationality, emphasising instead knowledge dynamics, communication, and identities.\(^9\) Indeed, cultural theorists (and later even E. Haas himself) noted neofunctionalism’s organisational determinism and its inadequacy in accounting for significant changes in belief-systems.\(^10\) Keohane, nevertheless, has argued that a more ‘reflectivist’ approach fails to generate a feasible alternative to the established research programs of neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism. In the analysis of international regimes, a majority of observers share the view that ‘the most persuasive interpretations’ are likely to draw from a number of theoretical traditions.\(^11\) The study of environmental regimes in particular has so far demonstrated that it is impossible to explain regime dynamics in terms of any single variable.\(^12\)

With these preliminary observations in mind, a number of broad variables must be recognised in order to formulate explanations of transboundary resource management in Cyprus. From an analysis of developments in partitioned states, and in the light of
the foregoing discussion, it is possible to draw up a more precise list from the numerous variables suggested to determine the character and development of transboundary resource management in partitioned states. Four core intervening factors, which depending upon the contextualities of the individual case will not always be of equal importance nor concurrent, are identified in a framework (Figure 3.1). These are examined in more detail in the following four sections, although not necessarily in any order of significance. It will become clear that the first three sections draw on both 'traditional' and more recent concerns of the international relations community, while the fourth variable has been a common concern for political geographers.

3.3 Configurations of Power

It is axiomatic that elements of conflict prevention, control, de-escalation, settlement and resolution are an integral part of optimising transboundary cooperation and, in turn, transboundary resource management. The debate between realists and liberals hinges on the degree to which conflict resolution in transboundary resource management can facilitate cooperative behaviour on other issues, particularly those of concern to 'high politics'. Whilst realist interpretations suggest that a transboundary resource issue cannot be divorced from a larger, protracted social conflict, and therefore cannot be truly resolved until that wider conflict has itself been settled, functional integration has the potential to spill over into political peace according to liberal institutionalists—at the global scale for Mitrany, at the regional scale for E. Haas. Clearly, in the context of partitioned states like Cyprus, the potential to resolve transboundary resource conflicts as even a limited precursor to resolving the overall political conflict deserves serious consideration. It is argued, nonetheless, that state partition may hold significant implications for the subsequent configuration of power amongst those party to a transboundary resource conflict.
Figure 3.1 Overlapping perspectives: schematic representation of core intervening variables in transboundary resource management in partitioned states

(i) 'configurations of power' (a)symmetry of political, economic, and military relations, both inter- and sub-state.

(ii) 'transboundary resource needs' absolute and relative resource needs, depending on linkages, spatial typology, and issue area.

(iii) 'role of interests and ideas' access to and perceptions of conflict resolution and third parties, and motivations of interest-based groups (e.g., institutions, epistemic communities, elites, individual leaders).

(iv) 'functions of the boundary' boundary management, characterisation of the border and perceptions of the adversary, and borderland integration.
3.3.1 Towards the management and resolution of transboundary resource conflict

Conventional methods of addressing transboundary resource conflict are usually defined in terms of security threats with all the methods available to settle disputes operative only upon the consent of the particular states, although the role of third parties as intermediaries in international conflicts is now well established with, typically, international organisations and agencies, and states (local or distant) participating. The principal formal mechanism for conflict prevention, management and resolution remains, however, the United Nations, while the main procedures for addressing resource conflict through peaceful means are diplomacy and adjudication. Of the former, negotiation, mediation, conciliation and peacekeeping are key. Negotiation and consultations are the most utilised, frequently taking place at the bilateral level on issues such as access to, use of, and cooperation on transboundary resources. They are often used as a precursor to other procedures—in particular mediation (or ‘good offices’), which can be subdivided into ‘pure’ mediation and mediation ‘with muscle’, the latter involving significant leverage tactics by a third party, although neither having any binding character. Conciliation involves a largely reactive yet ‘independent’ third party providing an informal link between antagonists, and a settlement which must be accepted by the parties. Peacekeeping involves the deployment of military personnel to monitor cease-fires, although Galtung’s work has inspired numerous studies on the deficiency of short-term conflict management (‘peacekeeping’, which typified the UN’s 1964-74 role in Cyprus) when unsupported by mechanisms for long-term conflict resolution—‘peacebuilding’ (from the ‘bottom-up’) and ‘peacemaking’ (from the ‘top-down’).

International adjudication by a legitimate, authoritative third party—either through arbitration or judicial settlement—is held to be the most effective and equitable method of resource dispute settlement where diplomacy appears to have failed. The principle of peaceful settlement has been echoed in various legal instruments dealing with transboundary resources, although judicial settlement—for example, before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and more ad hoc tribunals—is only slowly becoming accepted by the international community. Moreover, while international legal regimes usually involve forms of compliance, there may be significant limitations.
of international law given that disputes are rarely (if ever) about interpretations of agreed values but rather about what those values should be.\textsuperscript{21} From negotiations through to judicial settlement, therefore, there is an increasing loss of control between the disputant states.\textsuperscript{22} Moreover, both diplomatic and legislative mechanisms briefly discussed above generally operate with an implicit appreciation of the realist belief that there can be no ‘resolution’ to, only temporary ‘settlement’ of, interstate conflict. International diplomatic or legal institutions, from this perspective, provide merely a ‘palliative’.\textsuperscript{23}

3.3.2 Partition and the balance of power

In the light of this conflict resolution framework, it must be recognised that a crucial dimension to understanding transboundary resource management in partitioned states is an appreciation that ‘partition’ represents a parting of the ways, at which one state becomes two or more (\textit{de jure} or \textit{de facto}) states, each one of which may see itself as the ‘legitimate heir’ to the \textit{raison d’être} of the unit which previously existed.\textsuperscript{24} This is because, for partition to come about, “either coercion or its polar opposites, cooperation and consent, must be present”.\textsuperscript{25} In cases of the latter, there may be little animosity as the new political entities consider the process as legitimate and complete, as the ‘velvet divorce’ of Czechoslovakia most recently exemplified. Although the separation necessitated the renegotiation of some 2,800 documents, which redetermined ‘foreign’ relations and divided transport, telecommunications and public services, these negotiations proceeded relatively smoothly.\textsuperscript{26} In cases of coercive partition, however, both the newly-created states may be inward-looking and mutually hostile, suggesting limited development of ‘interstate’ relations.\textsuperscript{27} But how does this larger political conflict shape the various efforts to find a resolution to transboundary resource disputes?

Given the choice, states generally have three options: to retain the \textit{status quo}, to seek a transboundary agreement, or states may prefer independent action over transboundary resource management because of the loss of control over domestic resources resulting from collective action.\textsuperscript{28} The security of economic, political and military capabilities, as Grieco argued, are “the ultimate basis for state security and independence in the self-help context of international anarchy”.\textsuperscript{29} The potential for
redistributing such power to other states, especially whereby they gain relative to others, would act as a barrier to transboundary cooperation. Any transboundary regimes that did develop might be mere reflections of the new underlying configuration of power, or a hegemonic state.

Furthermore, this realist view implies that partitioned states may prefer unilateral action because of the potential loss of sovereignty and independence. States are, after all, collective entities. To reiterate: territory is the platform for engaging in international relations and sovereignty provides the legitimisation, yet not all territories are sovereign states. Within its boundaries, the state possesses ultimate authority—it is sovereign, both ‘internally’ in that it is ‘constitutionally insular’, and ‘externally’, in that it is seen as independent in relation to other states. Its definitive powers, therefore, are that a sovereign state “consists of being constitutionally apart, of not being contained, however loosely, within a wider constitutional scheme”. This constitutional independence is seen as the essential qualification for a state’s membership of the so-called international community, and consequently a territory which is constitutionally contained is not sovereign and hence is not eligible to participate on a regular basis in ‘international relations’. While the partition of British India into India and East and West Pakistan in 1947 was recognised by the UN, when East Pakistan—resenting political and military dominance exerted by West Pakistan—took this one step further, Bangladesh initially failed to receive recognition other than from India. As in the Cyprus case, therefore, the origin of ‘recognition’ in this sense cannot be found with legitimising a sovereign, but with recognising that sovereignty is an existential issue, a means of self-determination.

These dilemmas are aptly illustrated by transboundary resource management in ethnic and intra-state conflicts that characterise state partition—conflicts often between the nebulously distinguishable de facto (but not de jure) ‘state’ entities. Much of the literature has failed to monitor relations between these ‘anomalous’ states, a direct result of the political realism informing traditional ‘security’ studies which see states as homogenous units in perpetual competition, while overlooking internal challenges to political authority which reflect a lack of domestic legitimacy. Yet MacMillan and Linklater have suggested that by the early 1990s nearly one-eighth of states were not in full control of their respective territories—for example, the Lebanon, Jordan, and the Republic of Cyprus. In a number of cases these contested territories had become
‘institutionalised pseudo-states’, such as the Serb Republic of Bosnia and the TRNC, developing many attributes of a ‘normal’ state, declaring sovereignty (if largely unrecognised), and in full control of their territory. If there is therefore, as suggested above, a continuum of procedures for handling transboundary resource and environmental disputes (ranging from use of good offices at one end to formal court proceedings at the other), then cases of non-recognition will significantly complicate this diplomatic-legal axis. Indeed, it has been noted how conflicts may evolve from a state-communal conflict to one that includes important ‘interstate’ interactions (e.g., balance of power mechanisms, arms races), such that appreciation of the pattern of spatial expansion of a conflict becomes paramount directly because it implies that a combination of ‘international’ and ‘intercommunal’ third party intervention strategies will be required. The UN, in turn, with diplomatic (peacekeeping and peacemaking) tools designed to reduce inter-state conflict, risk being overwhelmed by a high number of ‘interminable’ conflicts.

Such complex politico-territorial circumstances may be represented internationally as cases of ‘occupation’, as has been the case given the presence of Turkish Forces on Cyprus, in that international law abhors lack of title to territory, and regards belligerent occupation as an inherently temporary state. In turn, the basis for the international protection of ‘occupied’ resources may be derived from the confluence of the law of military occupation—the so-called Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, and the principle of permanent sovereignty of people over natural resources reflected in previously mentioned UN resolutions. Specific obligations also arise from the UNGA’s International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966), which respects, inter alia, the right of self-determination and for peoples to dispose freely of their natural wealth and resources. The very fact that any principled utilisation of the Jordan river and its tributaries, for example, has been superseded by de facto usage raises the question of distinguishing between de jure and de facto uti possidetis (i.e., the doctrine of ‘what one possesses, one shall possess’) when taking into account ‘prolonged usage’. Accordingly, Israeli proposals for the Med-Dead Canal and more recent settlement construction in the West Bank clearly illustrate the balance of power associated with such arguments. While the occupying power must not exercise its authority in order to further its own interests (e.g., to exploit the resources or other assets of the territory under its control for the benefit of its own territory or economy),
the prolongation of such occupation nonetheless raises serious questions over the rights of populations in 'legal and political limbo'. During a long occupation, many practical problems (e.g., road construction, higher education, water use, electricity generation) may arise that do not admit of mere temporary solutions based on the idea of preserving the status quo ante.\textsuperscript{42} States concerned wishing to maximise individual benefits have a powerful incentive to exploit resources unilaterally.\textsuperscript{43} Given the sacred cow of national security, the primary concern of the parties, in other words, becomes the issue of relative, and sometimes even absolute, 'gains'.\textsuperscript{44}

As in Cyprus from the 1950s, cooperation and conflict may become a function of the minority's/autonomous groups' demands for self-government and contacts with the 'mother'-country on the other side of the/another border.\textsuperscript{45} These systemic and regional power balances were ideologically-based in the case of Vietnam, where military supplies from North Vietnam and China in the South post-1954 led to the military involvement of the US within ten years of partition. Further illustrating the importance of both exogenous and endogenous power sources post-partition, the Republika Srpska in Bosnia and Hercegovina, respectful of its ethnic and ideological ties with the militarily powerful Serbia (and Montenegro), may yet prefer unification with Serbia rather than restoration of the multi-ethnic Bosnian state nominally declared in 1992. Rather than permit the return of Muslims and Croats 'ethnically cleansed' during the war, radical leaderships have continued to block efforts to enforce the 1995 Dayton agreement's goal of recreating centralised management institutions for a 'united Bosnia'.

In the light of these observations, symmetrical politico-legal structures are generally considered favourable preconditions for transboundary resource conflict management. The constraints on one party, due to lack of power, may be greater than others, and the outcome of a cooperative arrangement will then depend on this asymmetry. Crucially, the basis for 'symmetry' may differ. As previously noted, in certain cases partition has suggested an exogenous move towards realignment. The 'skewed' partition of Palestine came about when the British referred the debate to the UN, whilst the partition of British India and Ireland was part of consecutive post-World War imperatives which led the British to 'divide and quit'.\textsuperscript{46} The most powerful state(s), benefiting from economic inequalities in the international system, subsequently have obvious incentives to support a management arrangement that operates to maintain
Transboundary Resource Management and Partitioned States

and secure their skewed advantages. With time, however, this power configuration may alter such that cooperation then becomes more likely, as occurred in Germany in the late 1960s when, as West Germany came to recognise the political regime in the East, cooperation in the form of the Quadripartite and the Helsinki Agreements became possible. In these contexts in particular, parties are frequently loath to make concessions regarding specific issues more out of a concern for the future negotiating positions on other issue areas (i.e., the problem of issue linkage) than out of any policy on the particular issue at hand. It remains, therefore, to recognise the importance of an international political system with no superordinate central authority for managing transboundary conflict, and to consider the suspicion and distrust that this may breed in managing transboundary resources. In essence this perspective, generally adopted by political realists, suggests that power and capabilities define transboundary relations concerning resource management. However, as the next three sections will suggest, in addition to these structural factors, the unique character of the ‘state’ and the resources themselves may also influence the conduct of transboundary affairs.

3.4 Transboundary Resource Needs

Waterman raised, but did not fully consider, the following questions: does an uneven distribution and sharing of resources hinder the separate development of partitioned states? Does it encourage their eventual reunification? Or does it prompt the state which is better endowed to consolidate its separate development? In essence, he addressed one of a number of dimensions of transboundary resource ‘needs’ which may affect transboundary resource management in partitioned states. It is necessary to state that absolute and relative resource needs are in themselves determined by a number of factors intervening—political, economic, social, and psychological, but ultimately ‘entropic’ (i.e., the physical limits of the resource). As North noted, ‘resource scarcity’;

“will depend to a considerable extent upon the demand for it and the pattern of distribution, as well as the ‘absolute amount’ of it in existence, the amount of conflict over it, and the various costs associated with obtaining it”.
The geographical context of the transboundary resource itself is, in other words, of primary concern. In terms of 'absolute' fresh water resources, for example, a secured water supply is a cornerstone of national planning and development, particularly in water-scarce regions. The intertwining of natural resource ownership, control and exploitation as part of state building (as 'national property') is argued to be a prominent feature of Third World societies, as is a perception of any contestation of such resources as a 'security' threat. Mandel has suggested, moreover, that resource scarcity increases transboundary confrontation rather than cooperation, especially when scarcity is perceived as the product of intentional human manipulation.

3.4.1 Developing transboundary resource law

Once again, it is beneficial to examine both traditional and developing 'norms' and 'rules' for managing transboundary resources, and resolving conflicts over resource needs. It remains difficult to discuss transboundary resource needs without some understanding of the central role played by international law, which shapes the underlying framework of the international system for allocating such resources. As Vogler noted, "just as apolitical discussions of legal frameworks will tend towards unreality, so the significance of legal questions for the study of regimes should not be underestimated"; their rules and principles continue to shape how states see transboundary resource problems and the solutions they consider. The various sources of international law have traditionally been considered—international conventional law (i.e. treaties), international customary law (i.e. state practice), general principles of law recognised by 'civilised nations', and international case law and judicial decisions. It is not possible to study critically one single body of doctrine constituting 'transboundary resource management', as clearly no such body exists. Nonetheless, it is necessary to shed light on, in preliminary fashion, the following questions: What attempts have been made by the international community to codify and realise a comprehensive series of legal principles covering transboundary resource management? In turn, to what extent does state practice reflect an emerging duty on states to coordinate and cooperate in the management of competing transboundary resources needs?

Up until the early 1970s, the institutionalisation of conflict management and resolution was generally state-orientated such that traditionally 'realist' legislative and
diplomatic frameworks largely remained the sole instruments of conflict management and resolution. As part of this 'classic' paradigm, bilateral approaches historically predominated over multilateral forms of cooperative engagement across boundaries. For obvious reasons states were inclined to formulate rights expanding their sovereignty rather than recall their duties, such that Carrol had to mark the origin of the exercise of transboundary 'environmental diplomacy' with the advent of the recognition of acid rain in the late 1970s.\textsuperscript{56} Many observers, however, date the dawn of a transboundary resource management 'doctrine' to 1972 and the UN Conference on the Human Environment, which adopted the Stockholm Declaration and proclaimed in 'Principle 21' that;

"States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own environmental policies and the responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction".\textsuperscript{57}

UNEP was established, and UNGA resolutions were soon to reflect this principle, in particular Article 3 of the 1974 UN Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States which provided that;

"in the exploitation of natural resources shared by two or more countries, each State must co-operate on the basis of a system of information and prior consultations in order to achieve optimum use of such resources without causing damage to the legitimate interests of others".\textsuperscript{58}

UNGA Resolution No. 3281 was commonly recognised as a first step to articulating a set of principles governing the management of transboundary natural resources.\textsuperscript{59} By 1978 UNEP had issued a series of fifteen Draft Principles which, whilst in the light of notable state objections fell short of specifying state obligations, reiterated the main concepts of cooperation, joint management, avoidance of negative externalities, and exchange of information.\textsuperscript{60} Since then, however, the process of reconciling the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources with the duty to cooperate for the joint management of transboundary resources has encountered inherent difficulties.\textsuperscript{61}

In general, possibly the most difficult transboundary resources to manage have been those which move 'across' international boundaries. Such migratory (and, at times, straddling) transboundary resources raise unusual challenges to their use and
development and they appear to be the most prevalent. Perhaps the most extensive and significant developments thus far have been concerned with transboundary fresh water resources, including rivers, drainage basins and lakes, and groundwater resources. Indeed, through this case it is possible to illustrate the availability of certain institutional frameworks that may offer the most optimism in addressing transboundary resource needs. Fresh water is essential to life and a basic human need, yet it is a finite resource and various factors are recognised as likely to diminish its availability in the future: economic development, population growth, climatic change, and political control.

Supplementary to this, 214 river basins—accounting for over half the land area of the Earth, and encompassing nearly 40% of the world’s population—are listed as crossing international boundaries, with 26% of these shared by three or more riparians. Indeed, of the 15 largest river watersheds worldwide (covering 26% of the land area) all but 3 are international in character. In spatial terms, integrated, holistic, drainage basin-wide water management is prescribed by most observers, but the unitary approach conflicts with the jurisdictional realities, exacerbated in that rivers (so often naturally dynamic) have often been used for delimiting boundaries and cease-fire lines.

Any obligation of management can only be based on either general principles and (largely UN-initiated) recommendations within international law, or on customary principles adopted by the riparian parties within each transboundary water system. Up until the 1950s the main concern for those managing transboundary rivers and lakes was that of freedom of navigation. With the growing demand for an ever more diverse range of uses for water, however, the international community increasingly looked to international law for assistance in codifying water sharing agreements over consumptive (i.e., non-navigational) use of international waters, to the extent that over 2,400 bilateral agreements developed which deal with water management allocations of international basins—two-thirds of which have been signed in Europe and North America.

Up until the first half of the twentieth-century, the basis for shared waters was the ‘Harmon doctrine’ which provides that a state has an absolute right to manage water lying within its territory as it sees fit; states have no right of continuous water supply from other states even if they are located within the same river system. By definition, this emphasis on sovereign territory benefits upstream users. Linked with this approach is the doctrine of ‘prior appropriation’, whereby water rights are prescribed to the first user in time. Alternatively, the doctrine of absolute integrity of a river basin is often
favoured by downstream states in that it advocates the corollary, whereby each state renounces exclusive rights to water quantity and quality. Over time, both of these extreme doctrines have been rejected and other principles have begun to take their place. While recognising that there remain no binding treaties, it has been argued that international customary law now provides a set of four basic guidelines: the principle of equitable utilisation; the prohibition of management practices likely to cause appreciable and lasting injury to other states; the duty of prior consultation; and the duty to co-operate and to negotiate in good faith with a genuine intention of reaching an agreement.

The principle of equitable utilisation of shared water resources evolved with the belief that a riparian’s ‘share’ be determined by the overall water balance and their contribution to it. To make use of this highly subjective principle, the International Law Association’s (ILA, an NGO of legal experts) Helsinki Rules on the Uses of International Rivers in 1966 formulated the ‘drainage basin’ concept, a term which in addition to rivers, lakes, and channels included groundwater, seasonal streams, estuaries, canals, flora and fauna. Since then, the Helsinki Rules’ ambiguous terminology has generated inherent problems in effectively quantifying ‘equitable’ and ‘reasonable’ utilisation. While few international treaties subsequently made direct reference to this duty, the 1997 Convention on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses, drafted by the International Law Commission (ILC, an organ of the UN), succeeded in citing the principles of ‘reasonableness’ and ‘equity’ as the basis for a legal obligation and thus further cemented limitations on the sovereignty principle. The prohibition of management practices likely to cause appreciable and lasting injury to other states drew largely from ‘Principle 21’, although this was to be later clarified in the specific context of transboundary waters with the adoption of the World Charter of Nature by the UNGA in 1982 and the Helsinki Convention on the Use of Transboundary Watercourses of 1992, the latter which re-emphasised the need for upstream users to avoid any negative externalities on downstream users.

In addition to these two principles, the duty of prior consultation calls for the exchange of necessary and accurate data and information, as illustrated in UNEP’s 1978 Working Group report which further called for joint scientific research. ‘Agenda 21’ of UNCED’s 1992 Rio Declaration implicitly recognised the need for ‘harmonisation’ of transboundary water resource strategies, just as ILC draft articles made exchange of
data and information mandatory.79 Lastly, the duty to co-operate and to negotiate in good faith with a genuine intention of reaching an agreement was based on the recognition that it was in the long-term interest of states to demonstrate honestly a commitment to improved relations. 'Agenda 21' specifically called for states to "[c]ooperate in the assessment of transboundary water resources, subject to the prior agreement of each riparian State concerned", while the 1992 Helsinki Convention called for riparian parties to cooperate "on the basis of reciprocity, good faith and good-neighbourliness". 80

None of these principles can be wholly considered a legal obligation but remain instead dependent upon circumstances. 81 Moreover, and significantly, the duty to cooperate largely underpins the others which in themselves suffer from ambiguous terminology (inherently so, it could be argued, given their role as guidelines). Nonetheless, the significance of these four embryonic principles in the development of transboundary resource management in general should not be underestimated. They clearly place limitations on the absolutist doctrines concerning territorial sovereignty and integrity, and prescribe new parameters on which to draw up water sharing agreements. Over the last thirty years, in spite of its overarching consensual character, a number of prevailing principles emanating from international customary law can be identified. Not only do states have a duty to notify and consult on the use of transboundary resources, recognising the imperative to move from passive information to active 'internationalisation' of such knowledge as part of conflict reduction, management and resolution. 82 They also have to share equitably in the management and use of transboundary resources, and to prevent serious damage to the environment of other states. 83 Finally, states are increasingly obliged to preserve res communes omnium ('things owned by everyone'), up until now referring to specific geographical areas but potentially gaining relevance to biodiversity. 84

3.4.2 The political dimension to partitioned resources

As Björkbom observed, whilst 'Principle 21' is subscribed to in 'theory', the basic principle of transboundary resources law in 'practice' remains state sovereignty over natural resources. 85 Partitioned states are certainly no exception to this generalisation. Along the western flank of the Middle East, home to the most geographically
concentrated number of partitioned states (French Syria, British Palestine, Palestine, and the ROC), the implication of a regional scarcity in fresh water has attracted considerable academic attention, notably concerning the waters of the Jordan, Litani, Orontes and Yarmouk which took on even greater importance in the partitioned environment of Israel-Palestine. Given the ‘international’ hydrology of this area, a regional water sharing and development plan would be desirable yet remains unattainable whilst unilateral developments remain the norm. With the creation of the Palestine-Lebanon partition boundary in 1923, the important Litani headwaters fell 4 km into southern Lebanon. The Zionist-Israeli belief in ‘legitimate rights’ to the river further strengthened in the 1940s as southern Lebanon’s abundant water resources became an anomaly in the semi-arid environment. A plan was devised in 1943 whereby the Litani would be diverted via a tunnel into the Jordan basin, flowing south into Palestine; as a measure of reciprocation, the Lebanese would be compensated with hydroelectric power generated from the water transfer. After a series of Israeli-initiated plans proposed throughout the 1940s, the so-called ‘Cotton Plan’ was recommended in 1954 by the US presidential envoy, Eric Johnston. Even though it excluded the Litani, the Israelis eventually accepted its recommendations, only for the plan to be halted by use of a veto in the Arab League Political Committee. Syria believed such a plan would indirectly constitute recognition of Israel.

Since then, without any comprehensive legal focal point, neither Arab nor Israeli planners could justify nor receive complaints that were not in themselves contestable, and development of the region’s water resources occurred unilaterally. Ironically, the Johnston plan developed a ‘sacrosanct value’ by all parties concerned and whenever disputes arose both the US and the Johnston plan’s principles were often referred to. Yet by the late 1990s up to three-quarters of the West Bank’s water resources was still being diverted into Israel, Mekorot (Israel’s national water company) having integrated the West Bank and Gaza supplies since 1982. As this example suggests, absolute needs are often based on perception enforced by the contradictory character and lack of data transboundary data.

In this sense, the level of understanding about a particular (or, especially, systemic) transboundary resource problem will determine to a large degree the consensus between parties. Henderson and Lebow placed particular emphasis on the post-partition existence of two increasingly independent sets of political institutions,
and the corresponding divergence of administrative structures which would encourage bureaucratic resistance to transboundary mergers.\textsuperscript{92} Just as a unified technical perception of a transboundary problem may favour successful international agreements, so may a dissimilar belief set discourage this.\textsuperscript{93}

\textbf{3.4.3 The role of 'other(s)’ needs}

The chequered success in traditional third party involvement in transboundary resource management can be reinterpreted as the failure of third parties to comprehend sufficiently the nature of the essential ‘needs’ of the disputants. Both Azar’s work on ‘protracted social conflict’ and Burton’s examination of ‘deep rooted conflict’ consider disputes over basic human needs highly resistant to de-escalation in general. These conflicts are characterised by intense mutual distrust resulting from an interconnected array of structural factors (political, economic, ethnic, religious), where power-based and coercive forms of conflict management and resolution may further frustrate needs for recognition and participation.\textsuperscript{94}

In response, another peace-building method with a more explicit third party involvement has developed. ‘Problem-solving workshops’ have gained increasing currency from their application in the Irish, Arab-Israeli and Cypriot conflicts, whereby ‘impartial’ facilitators or consultants assist politically-involved members of each community in analysing the underlying issues while searching for creative solutions.\textsuperscript{95} Applicable to both international and intercommunal conflict resolution, Fisher called it ‘third party consultation’ which, it was argued, should be seen as complementary to traditional mediation at the international level, particularly at the pre-mediation or pre-negotiation phase (as both Rothman, and Fisher and Keashley have argued).\textsuperscript{96} This informal, low-risk, non-coercive methodology clearly employs a social-psychological approach to conflict and cooperation. Yet, as Fisher and Keashley noted, it does not necessarily negate a more realist notion of ‘objective’ differences in interests causing intergroup conflict, but it does emphasise how perceptions, attitudes and interactions can then determine the subsequent (de)escalation of the conflict.\textsuperscript{97} This work is also clear in its recognition of a mix of ‘real’ and ‘perceived’ dimensions to conflict, although it remains rightly inconclusive in prescribing which type of intervention for which (‘objective’ or ‘subjective’) dimension of the conflict. Rather, a contingency
Transboundary Resource Management and Partitioned States

approach is suggested whereby issues of common concern constitute an agenda and are discussed first, building trust and interdependencies in preparation for discussions over the most divisive issues.⁹⁸

Burton has argued moreover that, by removing the ground for conflict and eliminating or transforming the conflict situation, a permanent ‘resolution’ may be achievable.⁹⁹ Conventional conflict management is based on the premise that a given conflict is the result of competition over tangible resources (i.e., territory, economic resources, power, authority) which can be distributed, thus creating a ‘settlement’. However, since these distributive methods are resisted in protracted social conflicts, integrative conflict management—problem-solving, integration, consensus-building and superordination (i.e., ‘positive-sum’ games)—offers a supplementary form of diplomacy.¹⁰⁰ Examining needs-based disputes outside the state-versus-state framework this acknowledges part of the political reality which has to be dealt with.¹⁰¹ Such workshops are increasingly recognised as one part of a so-called ‘unofficial’ or ‘track two’ diplomatic process, which advocates bringing together conflicting groups, influencing public opinion and developing economic cooperation.¹⁰² While distinguishing ‘common’ from ‘divisive’ disputes remains inherently problematic, ‘a central task of diplomacy’ will be sorting out these issues in order to coordinate, via a ‘multi-track’ approach, complementary distributive and integrative strategies.¹⁰³

3.4.4 Separating transboundary resource ‘needs’

These observations return this analysis to the debate over the so-called ‘separability thesis’.¹⁰⁴ To what extent is it realistic to separate ‘welfare’ needs from ‘politics’ needs, ‘low politics’ from ‘high politics’? Claude asked;

“[i]s it in fact possible to segregate a group of problems and subject them to treatment in an international workshop where the nations shed their conflicts at the door and busy themselves only with the co-operative use of the tools of mutual interest?”¹⁰⁵

Neoliberals (and to the greatest extent, functionalists), as previously noted, suggest that there is more potential for cooperation in economic and welfare matters than in ‘national security’ issues. Blatter hypothesised that ‘productive tasks’ (e.g., common transport facilities) with the expectation of positive results for all concerned parties are easier to
manage than transboundary problems with a redistributational character; in cases of the latter (e.g., transboundary water resources), supposedly constituting 'low politics', any regulation represents a 'zero-sum game'. From a functionalist perspective, less contentious issues could be 'neutralised', and as states became ever more interdependent in economic, technical and welfare issues, the continuous process of interaction would 'spill over' into regional peace. In economic terms, Smooha and Hanf noted the argument that since the duplication of state apparatus is costly, further multiplication of an already divisive and inefficient world system would be counterproductive. Such conclusions were drawn in their observation of West Germany in that certain humanitarian principles had to be recognised to make the inner-German border more permeable, even if that led to de facto acceptance of the status quo. Partition will often hamper the development of post-partition economies and, given the inertia within West Germany to maintain transboundary linkages and flows and seek a more normal footing to ensure the security and viability of Berlin, even after a twenty year period of partition there was a sense of inevitability in the emergence of Brandt's new Ostpolitik.

However, the case of the Republic of Ireland more fully illustrates the limits of this argument. Like the German case, the partition line largely followed the historical provincial boundaries, and historically the island location lent urgency to a perceived need for more regional cooperation and integration. The Government of Ireland Act in 1920 envisaged a 'Council of Ireland', composed of representatives from both south and north, yet it never met. Something of a watershed was predicted, however, with the coming of the Single European Market (SEM) in 1992, which confirmed the fears which it had generated in the peripheralised north for the prospect of a 'one-island economy'. On one side of the argument were those who believed that cross-border cooperation could and would undermine political and cultural roots of partition, leading ultimately to political reintegration and unity. What Lyne termed 'technocratic anti-partitionism' developed from the belief that the border was merely a temporary division, and that naturally-forming economic and cultural ties legitimised eventual reunification. In contrast, the pro-partition lobby (including those in the south displaying a sense of 26-county nationalism) accepted, implicitly or explicitly, that demands for territorial autonomy and nationhood on both sides of the boundary needed to be satisfied. At the most, Unionist agreement on economic cooperation was
conditional on the separation of economic developments from political means and effects.113

Clearly, in this case the existence of a ‘semi-militarised frontier’ ensures that it is not easy for technocratic anti-partitionism to supplant the more limited rationalisation of partition embodied in present forms of transboundary cooperation. Instead, it has been suggested that transboundary cooperation can only take place in connection with ‘non-contentious issues’. The Foyle Fisheries Commission, controlling fishing on Lough Foyle, illustrated the development of ‘rational’ transboundary resource management, although its establishment was not part of any trend, nor was its remit extensive.114 Douglas more recently highlighted the benefits of cross-community interaction within Northern Ireland, where ‘non-political and non-constitutional issues set in a variety of non-sectarian contexts’ have been prioritised (e.g., local government administration, education, employment and the voluntary sector).115 The ratification of the April 1998 agreement reiterated an apparent ‘cross-border’ imperative documented in both the 1973 ‘Sunningdale’ and 1985 Anglo-Irish Agreements, raising new socio-economic as well as ‘political-national’ reasons for cross-border institution building.116 It nevertheless retained what Anderson and Hamilton termed the ‘bogus separation’ of the ‘political’ and ‘economic’, promulgated by ‘functionalist’ unionists.117

This would appear to concur with the view that comparative advantage—or ‘relative gain’—is attainable in all transactional forms, be they military, economic, or ecological interdependencies. Rees similarly argued that:

“[s]ince the value of resources is determined by the culture that uses them, it follows that the value of particular resources varies not only over time but also over space.”118

In this sense it can be argued that transboundary resource needs may also depend upon the spatial typology of the resource in question. With regards to the importance of upstream access to transboundary water systems, as previously suggested, strategic position may offset structural power weaknesses.119 Adopting a traditional approach to transboundary relations, there appear contradictory approaches to ‘foreign’ relations, with both cooperative and conflicting transboundary policies being employed over time. It is not necessarily the case, in other words, that cooperation and conflict are respectively limited to ‘low’ and ‘high’ politics. This suggests that the higher the level
of transboundary resource interdependence, the more complex and pervasive collective-action problem-solving becomes.\textsuperscript{120}

### 3.5 The Role of Interests and Ideas

The willingness to participate in cooperative, peace-building initiatives concerning transboundary resource management problems (indeed, by extension the willingness to seek actively a resolution within such ventures) will be greatly determined by specific interests with respect to the transboundary 'problem', and the very perception of the 'problem'.\textsuperscript{121} 'Objective' indicators determining participation, as previously noted, may include resource dynamics, socio-economic conditions, and technical infrastructure. However, as argued in Chapter 2, culturally normative and cognitive factors may also influence the perception of problems and the definition of preferences and self-interests, and may vary according to levels of analysis, be it state, 'international', 'supranational', or 'subnational'.

Scott et al. noted generally that the intensity of transboundary cooperation in general will often depend on the existence of an elite—invariably political, but also business, NGO or community, willing to invest time, effort, and money in promoting the development of transboundary networks.\textsuperscript{122} At the state level, Jo and Walker similarly recognised that pre-partition collaboration resulted in a predilection for encouraging transactions which, in turn, increased interstate collaboration.\textsuperscript{123} The (a)symmetry of inter-state political and economic relations, however, has already been noted as a crucial intervening variable, supplemented by the internal, 'vertical' boundaries between levels of government and among agencies, and the 'horizontal' boundaries between 'pseudo-states' and other intra-state 'rebel' elements.\textsuperscript{124} Where this explanation may falter, in other words, is when the dominant form of power is not 'legitimate' power, whereby a non-zero-sum game becomes unattainable.\textsuperscript{125} To reiterate, 'states' which have referred to themselves as 'sovereign' have been seen as the legitimate actors in the international system since European colonialism, and 'non-state' organisations have been recognised with some reluctance as subsidiary actors.\textsuperscript{126}

To circumvent these barriers, transboundary resource management has become increasingly characterised by a multifaceted network of participants, in which public
and private interests from different political 'levels' are involved. States may collaborate with the assistance of institutions, organisations, and regimes, particularly in non-zero-sum contexts. Indeed, in her study of riparian relations in the Jordan, and the Tigris-Euphrates and Nile basins, Lowi concluded that;

"states which are antagonists in the 'high politics' of war and diplomacy tend not to agree willingly to extensive collaboration in the sphere of 'low politics', centred around economic and welfare issues. They have to be induced to do so".  

Whilst the involvement of international third parties may have a particular role, as noted throughout Part I of this thesis, even then transformation to a cooperative setting is not guaranteed as formal compliance in transboundary arrangements remains the principal barrier. In the context of international relations, parties may be directed to act in particular ways when confronted with complex transboundary interactions because of attributional biases, whereby helpful acts are perceived as inconsistent with the nature of 'others' and it is accordingly believed that the 'other' would not have taken such action had it not been forced to do so. Eric Johnson discovered this problem of 'stereotype'-reproduction in trying to formulate agreement amongst the riparians of the partitioned Jordan River in the 1950/60s, which was only indirectly successful. More recently, while the Oslo Declaration of Principles set the timetable for a permanent settlement, including the status of Jerusalem, little progress has been recorded since 1993. Similarly, in Bosnia, the Dayton Accord proposed a common economic space and arms control, and created structures for the return of refugees rebuilding civil society, in the hope that these spaces would make the partition lines irrelevant. Annex 9 of the Dayton Accord saw the establishment of public corporations within Bosnia and Hercegovina covering infrastructural issues such as transportation, energy, postal and communication facilities, with two members from the Muslim-Croat Federation and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) each and one from the Republika Srpska examining issues of 'mutual benefit'. The accord was in reality a partition agreement, and the lack of progress since has instead raised legitimate concerns of its development into three-way (Hercegovinian Croats from Bosnian Muslims) or even four-way (western from eastern Republika Srpska) partition.

Yet, despite the absence of a comprehensive international legal framework, parties to partition have at times been influenced by a 'new willingness' to negotiate in different forms. As partition drew the border between India and Pakistan across the
Indus River system so it highlighted the need for irrigation water on both sides; during 1947-48 India invoked the ‘Harman doctrine’ and cut off transboundary canalled water supplies. In 1960, through the World Bank and, in particular, the leadership of Eugene Black (the-then-President of the World Bank), a bilateral agreement was drawn up whereby India effectively relinquished its upper stream sovereignty and the Permanent Indus Commission prepared specific cooperative arrangements, initiated studies and coordinated policies (although it did not commit riparians beyond this consent so that integrated development of the resources remained implausible). The corollary of the threat of water scarcity was witnessed, however, on India’s eastern borders where agreement was more recently reached with Bangladesh over the sharing of the Ganges. A Joint Rivers Commission oversaw the management of more than 140 tributaries common to both states since 1972, by which time East Pakistan had seceded, and was temporarily supported by a 1977 to 1989 agreement committing the riparians to equitable apportionment and prior consultation after the Farakka dam-building dispute. Even further east—encompassing the partitioned states of Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam (and Thailand)—the UN’s Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE) initiated the Lower Mekong River Committee in 1957. In close collaboration with ECAFE, the committee promoted and controlled the planning of the lower basin from the mid-1950s through the many violent conflicts that characterised the region, generating a so-called ‘Spirit of the Mekong’ which appeared to permeate an April 1995 treaty on cooperation for sustainable development in the basin.

Leading on from this, the role of regimes and epistemic communities in reducing uncertainty by providing information must also be recognised. ‘Networks’, characterised by loose, informal couplings between actors, organised less as territorial units and more on the basis of la géométrie variable, may form an integral part of the cooperation process. Informal network relations can often react more flexibly to prevailing problems, recruiting members without having to take sectoral or horizontal (i.e. ‘international’) interests into account, and the network can be (re)formed at little expense or effort. Interpersonal contacts and mutual trust appear to be preconditions to such networks; problems of legitimacy may be exacerbated in this way, however, as informal networks may lack transparency and democratic participation. Indeed, this presupposes that the participants involved have the necessary authority to make decisions. While ‘epistemic communities’, therefore, need to lobby both ‘upwards’ (to
top policy makers) and ‘downwards’ (to actual resource users) in non-participatory regimes, when consensus by a public consultation process may not be normal, then the extent to which these communities must lobby ‘upwards’ is magnified. In addition, it must be noted that epistemic communities who become influential actors in their own right are not necessarily consensual or impartial, such that intracommunal conflicts may develop, bringing into question Haas’ argument that epistemic communities are truly ‘transnational’ groups. Cooperation, to reiterate, can come about through both trust and coercion. Even if a state-led interest group (which will usually have the necessary decision-making authority) offers less coercive involvement in generating transboundary resource management, by definition a politically powerful promoter will politicise the initiative. The distinction between ‘neutral’ and ‘partisan’ representation, in short, remains subjective; it threatens to reproduce traditional commitment to an ‘epistemic realism’ of actors independent of ideas or beliefs about them. These dynamics have been clearly illustrated in on-going efforts to formulate a transboundary ‘peace bioreserves system’ within and beyond the Korean demilitarised zone (DMZ). The subject was separately broached with UNEP by both North and South Korea in 1991, but subsequent interest originated solely with the southern government which greatly encouraged international environmentalists’ concerned about the ‘safe haven’ for fauna and flora within the DMZ itself. Ultimately, the scheme—which would involve the establishment of bicommunal villages and an overall erosion of the military landscape—was interpreted by the south as a substantial confidence-building measure to ‘smooth the way’ for ending the ‘unnatural’ partition of the peninsula. This teleological argument, previously noted in the case of Ireland, threatened to become a derivation of geographical determinism however; assuming this, as Pounds noted, the division of the former Spanish island of Hispaniola into Haiti and the Dominican Republic, of Timor into its Portuguese and Indonesian sectors, and even of the Malay Peninsula, could be diagnosed as morally wrong.

As noted in Chapter 2, if international organisations as entities exist as passive servicing bodies whose function is to facilitate inter-state deals, as realists would argue, then this explains more why transboundary resource problems cannot be resolved than why they are. Few states are able to participate as individual actors even though international organisations may not necessarily ‘transcend’ the state as the building
block of international order(s). Instead, a coalition of interests develops. This might still be explained, as by international ‘regime theorists’, considering the state as the underlying principle of regimes such as UNCLOS. According to the ‘new institutionalist’ revival of Grotian international law, by contrast, it is supranational, societal ideas, principles and norms that govern state, market and individual behaviour about a transboundary issue. One such example is the supranational role of the EU in the Irish conflict, which was further emphasised after the 1992 watershed, most notably through the 1995 Special Support Programme for Peace and Reconciliation. In tandem with an EU-funded INTERREG programme from 1990, this not only concentrated on promoting N. Ireland and the Irish border counties, but placed special emphasis on promoting reconciliation through integration. Essentially functionalist beliefs of ‘technocratic anti-partitionists’ in the integrating powers of the SEM have been largely misplaced, given the failure of the EU to develop closer economic links.

3.6 Functions of the Partition Boundary

The preceding sections have highlighted the plurality and complexity of power, resources, interests and ideas involved in transboundary resource management in partitioned states. Finally, it is necessary to look at the role of the partition boundary itself as an intervening variable, given the recognition that ‘national’ borders can usefully be considered as units of analysis in their own right. It is beneficial to reconsider initially a number of boundary-related institutional developments referred to in the previous two chapters, namely the changing functions of border regions in certain ‘Western’ contexts.

3.6.1 Borderland ‘models’ within the European Union and North America

It was suggested in Chapter 2 that Western Europe and North America were witness to significant developments in transboundary cooperative regimes. A vast body of literature has developed around this and has led some observers to refer to the EU’s formulation of a new ‘paradigm’ of transboundary cooperation, and to both the US-Mexico and EU border regions as a ‘generic model of transfrontier cooperation’.
applying Keohane’s logic for means of analysis (who was analysing transboundary cooperation in general), academic focus has invariably been placed on areas where a doctrine of transboundary resource management appears to have developed most and where, arguably, the benefits of transboundary cooperation have appeared easiest to realise.151

In Western Europe, for example, from the 1970s the Council of Europe developed the ‘European Outline Convention on Transfrontier Cooperation between Territorial Communities or Authorities’, which significantly provided a possible ‘international law basis’ for agreements between territorially-based public authorities below the ‘national’ level.152 Its significance led Asiwaju to hail it as a ‘triumph of micro-diplomacy’.153 Yet, the ‘Outline Convention’ had itself been preceded by predominantly localised initiatives concerned with development and planning agencies, and transboundary river commissions; notable examples included the Regio Basiliensi,154 the EUREGIO,155 the Rhine and Danube River Commissions,156 and various initiatives on the Upper Rhine Valley.157 The Regio Basiliensi, a tri-national planning and promotional agency overseeing the French-Swiss-German border, formed in 1963 notably through the common interests of both the business and civic elites in Basel, although the origins of the Regio are widely recognised as the result of the Swiss government’s needs to offset the disadvantages of non-membership of the EEC.158

Indeed, although the Regio has been described as the ‘leading world model for transfrontier planning’,159 most West European regions were by the 1990s still dependent upon additional, traditionally bilateral agreements,160 and the Outline Convention was limited in impact.161 In North America, similarly, the institutional core of transboundary resource management had until recently centred on two bilateral, environment-related agencies—the International Joint Commission (IJC) and the International Boundary and Water Commission (IBWC). Although they were able to lay a legitimate claim to autonomy from the executive branch of their member governments (Canada-US, and US-Mexico respectively), the IJC’s efforts have been seen to be exclusive, technocratic, and often by-passed by ad hoc diplomatic initiatives determined by state interests,162 while the IBWC—although being described as “[perhaps] the finest example of functional cooperation in transboundary resources management between highly dissimilar countries anywhere on the globe”163—was established on an inflexible and soon-outmoded mandate164 given the dynamic
developments of the US-Mexico border region.\textsuperscript{165} Transitional arrangements brought in from 1983 (with the ‘La Paz Agreement’), and more comprehensively as side agreements to the trinational NAFTA in 1993, offered more hope in overcoming the IBWC’s shortfalls.\textsuperscript{166}

Overall, these developments in North America and the EU nonetheless contrast starkly with statist and narrowly-defined, ‘political’ security-obsessed attitudes which mark so much of the realist rhetoric. Neofunctionalists have argued that the development of European integration—from the European Coal and Steel Community to the Maastricht Treaty, and particularly the renewed political activity from the late 1980s—has personified the search for problem-solving instruments, and Ryan has argued that the European Community exemplifies the pursuit of superordinate goals at the macro-level.\textsuperscript{167} Yet, this argument contradicts on-going work that has disputed an idealised ‘spill over’ explanation (the main thesis of neofunctionalism) of European cooperation and integration.\textsuperscript{168} In many respects, it is suggested that the EU’s approach has not escaped the conceptual and pragmatic mould of the sovereign state system. While the embryo of a federal Europe exists in supranational institutions and developing EU border regions, the EU is dominated by its member states and its transboundary policy is likely to be tolerated or promoted in order to further ‘national’ politico-economic interests for the foreseeable future. The limited practical effect of the 1981 Outline Convention personified the confusing links between economic integration and national sovereignty.\textsuperscript{169} The ‘peace by pieces’ approach within the EC, should it be forgotten, is not only a functional process but also a process of territorial alliance;\textsuperscript{170} a revived neofunctionalism threatens to ignore the renewed salience of historical borders and identities Europe-wide, and their growing contestation in political and economic forums.

In this light, M. Anderson has argued that, while objectives are impressive and ambitious, the forms and the legal bases for transboundary cooperation at the borderland scale are hardly new, being largely based on intergovernmental agreements or conventions, treaties, private law agreements, and other informal arrangements.\textsuperscript{171} Transboundary associations, even issue-specific river authorities, have little judicial or executive power, such that borderlands continue to escape any real democratic accountability.\textsuperscript{172} Hansen’s comparative study of cooperation in Western European and North America noted how issues involving adjacent border regions generally had to be
Transboundary Resource Management and Partitioned States

dealt within the respective national capitals because the only institutionalised means of communication across borders was 'international' law and diplomacy. Integrationist initiatives across state borders have become salient features of European Union and NAFTA affairs, yet all the while they leave outstanding questions over the degree to which these constitute autonomous 'regions' or more 'pseudo-territorial' units—in other words, whether they truly represent a move away from modern geographical scales of political space (i.e., the territorial logic of 'local', 'national', 'international') to more deterritorialised, heterogeneised forms of governance.

Hansen has suggested that the US-Mexico border in particular may prove instructive for other, less understood border regions. It is perhaps surprising to note, therefore, that instead there have since been tentative calls for the translation of the European 'models' beyond their context—to the Middle East, and to Africa's OAU where, in spite of the imposition and reproduction of colonial boundaries, states with poorly administered borders have indirectly allowed the continuation of substantial transboundary movements of people, goods and resources. The application of such models to Southeast Asia proves just as complicating; it has been suggested that economic 'growth triangles' within ASEAN and its embryonic Free Trade Area, built upon minimal institutionalisation (and therefore maximum political control), potentially throw up distinctly 'Asian' forms of 'transboundary' cooperation. Peachy et al.'s analysis of the Singapore-Indonesia border region, by way of example, suggested that, while joint projects significantly transformed the socio-economic landscape of the area, with the dominance of 'high politics', genuine transboundary institutions have failed to prosper.

3.6.2 Partition, borderlands and state reintegration

In terms of the development of functional relations particular to states which have undergone partition, similar models can be identified. Minghi recognised three stages in partition: 'pre-partition'; 'active partitioning', and 'post-partition', and this final stage was the focus for most of Henderson and Lebow's earlier work which recognised five more distinct stages in the development of functional relations within states that have undergone either partition or division. According to their model (Figure 3.2), after the 'pre-partition' stage of unity the initial stage of partition was characterised by intense
Figure 3.2  Stages of transboundary relations between partitioned states

mutual antipathy. A third stage accounted for *de facto* acceptance of one another, which was followed by *rapprochement* that eventually led back to unification.

The underlying assumption of staggered development post-partition in this work is self-evident, as indeed are its similarities with Martinez *et al.*'s modelling of borderland integration. The final two stages of Henderson and Lebow's model suggested progression from *rapprochement* to reunification, particularly in cases of 'divided nations'. Henderson and Lebow recognised that 'normalised' functional relations between newly-partitioned states were slow to develop, and that a hazily-defined 'in-between' status of partial reunification (Stage IV) would prove common. Even so, partial or even total reintegation of the partitioned states was predicted, making strong parallels both with Martínez's model and, historically, with prescriptively integrationist characteristics of neofunctionalism as noted in R.E. Johnston's work.

In the light of the above observations, it can be argued that the nature of the partition boundary and border region is clearly important, and provides further evidence of the role of external forces in the post-partition environment. First, it is vital to appreciate that in a large number of cases of partition, the character of the post-partition boundary was (or was to become) not a simple, single demarcation line synonymous with modern international land boundaries, but alternatively a DMZ, 'buffer zone' or 'zone of separation' with a territorial character of its own. DMZs are usually established as a necessary post-conflict measure, such as the 1949 Armistice Agreements which established DMZs between Israel and Syria. Although they were most common immediately post-World War I, they remain a salient means of border management today (e.g., between Iraq and Kuwait from April 1991), while one of the most celebrated DMZ's—what is in essence a 14 km wide boundary established between North and South Korea in 1953—continues to act as a container for over 3,300 km² of territory. Vietnam's DMZ, agreed upon at Geneva in the summer of 1954, varied in width from 5.6 to 10km. As Prescott noted, while the lines containerising such DMZ's function exactly as 'international' boundaries; indeed, they are also much more difficult to cross and more apparent in the landscape than most other boundaries.

Other 'alternative' territorial arrangements have been considered for partition. In post-Dayton Bosnia and Hercegovina, an ambiguously termed 'zone of separation' was eventually set up around what was the agreed cease-fire line but which now largely
Transboundary Resource Management and Partitioned States

constitutes the 'Inter-Entity Boundary Line'. The zone, which is all but demilitarised, extends for up to 2 km either side of this line in open terrain, yet (as in Nicosia) was narrower than 1 km in parts of Sarajevo.\(^{187}\) The federation lines in Bosnia were set up as a transitional line of division, and were nominally supported by freedom in both human movement and trade.\(^{188}\) The 51:49 per cent partition included the right for refugees to return to their properties or receive fair compensation for being misplaced; in practice, the boundary has become an indelible feature of the post-partition landscape.\(^{189}\)

Clearly, in a large proportion of partitioned states (Table 1.1, Chapter 1) it is not acceptable to take the boundary for granted. In cases where, although general inter-state recognition may have been achieved, there remain outstanding territorial claims, then states may not cooperate in transboundary resource management because the very 'boundary' to be transcended is contested. As in the case of UNCLOS, international law has only entailed an obligation to consult and negotiate where states have broadly agreed on the delimitation of their maritime boundaries, and not in cases where no boundary is delimited in a disputed area.\(^{190}\) While joint development arrangements provide a ready solution to mutual problems in intractably disputed maritime areas, such legal mechanisms do not represent the solution to more fundamental jurisdictional problems.\(^{191}\) While it is true that boundary management is in general a reflection of centralised state policy, which in itself may be determined by the perceptions of the adversary and the historical characterisation of a 'border' in 'official' discourse, the intrinsic value of the border region must not be subverted. The problem of delineating two or more hermetic parts illustrates the difference between what Klieman distinguished as the 'conceptual' and 'planning' stages of partition, "where the issue becomes not whether to make an incision but exactly where to draw the lines of division".\(^{192}\) For instance, the very positioning of the partition boundary also brings with it the problems of ethnic minorities trapped or 'enclaved' with the new majority group.\(^{193}\) This is still witnessed in the initial partition of Palestine, which failed to satisfy either Arab or Jewish land-owners. Another notable example is the conflict embroiling India and Pakistan over the 'unfinished business of partition', in Kashmir.\(^{194}\) Indeed, it is useful here to reconsider the concept of 'antecedent' and 'subsequent' boundaries: in the former, where there is little development before boundary-creation, any future population settlement would generally accord with the boundary; but where development occurred subsequent to boundary-creation, then once homogenous ethno-
territories become separate socio-spatial political entities. Studies of India, Palestine and Ireland noted that, while some transboundary political institutions were retained post-partition (most often to deal with economic linkages), the overwhelming rhetoric of partition meant that such residual cross-border elements remained ‘still-born’.

These observations bring the analysis back to Henderson and Lebow’s distinction between partition types, introduced in Chapter 2—the difference in essence between the permanence and ephemerality of the partition boundary. In what ways does Korea’s partition boundary differ from Cyprus’, or Ireland’s from India’s? In the cases of Israel-Palestine/Jordan, and North-South Korea, ‘normalisation’ has barely begun. As can be seen, in certain cases, a nation will remain divided (e.g., Korea), while in others, various destabilising forces—such as the undermining of a particular ideological/economic regime, or less conspicuous practices of transboundary socio-economic reintegration and nationalism—instigate the process of reunification (e.g. Germany). Although this was never an explicit assumption of Henderson and Lebow’s modelling, which identified an ‘in-between’ status of partial unification (Stage IV), the use of ‘stages’ produces strong inferences of successive development. It would appear that critical observations of the ‘developing borderlands’ school of thought made previously (see section 2.3.2) appear to be mirrored in the development of partition boundary functions. There is no necessary inevitably about staggered progression or ‘development’; ultimately, the model suggests little scope for permanent partition. While Kumar optimistically suggested that the ‘no-man’s land’ of India’s partition has, unlike in Cyprus and Bosnia, gradually become a border rather than a buffer zone, he was rightly forced to recognise the constant recreation of ‘no-man’s land’ in Kashmir.

Moreover, a study of the two cases of Cold War partitioned states which have reunified—Vietnam and Germany—suggested that even once a common group identity has been territorially reestablished, the notion of peaceful coexistence remained elusive. While in Vietnam the southern elites were politically dominated by their northern counterparts following 1976, in Germany traditional and oppositional elites of the late-GDR became subordinate to the west Germans. Additionally, cultural and social dissimilarities persisted for some time after reunification; indeed, to such an extent in Vietnam that the strength of the southern capitalist region virtually negated the political power of the ‘winning’ northern elite. Thus, while the ‘borderlands-to-centrality’ thesis is supported in post-1990 Germany, if only where east-west linkages...
Transboundary Resource Management and Partitioned States

have rejuvenated Berlin’s central role, in largely non-industrialised Vietnam the national economy has failed to marry north with south. Overall, these developments suggest greater acknowledgement of Minghi’s more open-ended subdivision of the process of partition.

Lastly, transboundary cooperation between local or regional actors, other than that initiated at the central state level, usually takes place within the context of legal and institutional restrictions. The problem in developing a legal status, as previously suggested, is because a legal personality can only derive from one body of law; in addition, the principle of territorial jurisdiction implies the rejection of the use of judicial and legislative powers on ‘foreign’ soil. Local authorities may in turn lack administrative or financial autonomy as one of the main risks involved in subnational diplomacy is the fear on the part of the state, of erosion of authority through policy fragmentation. As such, problems of compatibility and flexibility may be confronted directly by the border regions. Yet on the basis of developments in Western Europe, just as the nation-state would be eroded ‘from above’, so regional forms of government would erode the nation ‘from below’. A further implication of this, of course, is that a ‘Europe of Regions’, in superseding the ‘Europe of nation-states’, would dissolve any national conflicts. In the Irish conflict, however, neither government north or south was willing to devolve control over resources to the border region which had no regional body to represent it; correspondingly, European integration in this context exemplified, as Anderson and Goodman noted, the contradictions of substate regional development and the logic of ‘national’ sovereignty.

This would strongly suggest that, no different from states, border regions are not unitary actors. In terms of the ‘environmental security’ debate, Thomas reiterated the point that competition over scarce resources also takes place within the domestic sphere; both Mumme and Ingram have similarly highlighted the determining power of domestic policy on transboundary relations, in the context of the US-Mexico border. Transboundary resource management, from this perspective, becomes less a problem of international than intranational relations when, within border regions, different interest groups compete for their demands. ‘Political will’, in turn, may in fact be necessary most at the level of implementation; in the case of border regions, this may be determined by the organisational resources, the level of autonomy, sufficient knowledge about the problem, and the existence of common interests (or ‘regional
Burton similarly added that resource management must be functionally effective at the 'domestic' level before it can be argued that it could be arranged on an international scale. From the borderland perspective, this would seem to be especially pertinent given the legal, administrative, or linguistic barriers to be overcome in partitioned states.

In the light of the many contradictions, in a number of ways these popular models of transition are undermined because they are based on the rationale of Eurocentric/Western notions of transition and development. Regional participation may be strongly dependent upon the degree of decentralisation of the respective 'national' authority, and given that 'national' agents can still be identified as the dominating participants for transboundary resource management in the EU and North America, because they still have the necessary authority and resources to address problems concretely, it is of little surprise that the extent of state decentralisation and regionalisation has been a large determinant of transboundary integration initiatives in partitioned states. Although they must be recognised as simplified models, given the shortfall in attempts to theorise and conceptualise the process of transboundary cooperation in partitioned states, their explanatory significance should not increase unchecked. It can be seen that a 'gradualist' assumption clearly evident in European integration was reflected in Henderson and Lebow's model.

What this 'borderlands' approach does provide, however, is a more appropriate framework of spatial analysis. Cooperation over transboundary resource management is often limited to the spatial confines of the border region. This is the result of the interplay of factors, most notably the actors involved, the spatial distribution of resource problems which are recognised as being 'transboundary', and the dynamics of a restrictive border management in partitioned states. By focusing on the borderland, these processes are more easily located.

3.7 Conclusions

Over the last thirty years a limited but important range of principles, norms and models have developed in relation to transboundary resource management. Reflecting a more general 'squeeze' on the practices of sovereign states, these developments manifest
geographically, on one hand, at the global or transnational scale and, on the other hand, at the borderland/regional or subnational scale. In turn, these practices are inherently both reflections of and reflected by various theoretical perspectives on the process of transboundary resource management. 'Transboundary resource management' can be seen in this light as both an active process and a normative goal, but these two characteristics may not always coincide.

With the population sample of partitioned states, however, it has been argued that it is necessary to begin reexamining these theoretical perspectives, reweighting in particular certain determining factors in the light of various characteristics which, although not individually unique to partitioned states, collectively substantiate the need for a revised explanatory perspective. In certain aspects, in other words, the 'theory' needs to be remoulded in the light of the general 'practice'. None of the recognised theoretical propositions alone can explain transboundary resource management. This may be a consequence of the failure of transboundary cooperation to develop enough autonomy as a 'political phenomenon' thus far, but also a result of the relative paucity of data on 'practice' on which to base 'theoretical' interpretations. The framework proposed therefore synthesises various theories and seeks to give each of them some weight. As part of the recursive process, analysis concurs with already established factors and supports their explanatory power in examining the general developments at the global and borderland scale. The debate between neoliberalism and neorealism has rightly highlighted the weakness of most international institutions and the absence of sanctioning power, although the basic tenets of functionalism are clearly still of influence in the study of regional integration; it is possible to create effective regimes for shared natural resources and environments in areas of great strategic sensitivity.

Political factors—in particular questions of legitimising authority, fears over national security, and historic conflicts—have plagued even the 'models' of European transboundary resource management. Within this heartland of transboundary cooperation, the conclusions of O'Dowd are supported;

"[f]or all the political arguments over the future of European integration and the theoretical analyses offered by the functionalists, realists and post-modernists, the actual outcome of EU integration for national sovereignty remains obscure. It is here that empirical studies of national boundaries and border regions can help illuminate the rather complex and fluid order emerging".214
Much of the postmodern discourse has its roots in a Western European territorial narrative, propagated by scholars within the Western European and North American tradition—while, “for the rest, territorial partitioning remains the order of the day”. Planning and policy-making at the physical edges of states must be understood within its local context where, as many observers still find, national sovereignty remains a dominant force. Functionalist approaches underestimate the ‘inertia’ of existing structural conflicts with a self-sustaining dynamic of their own. In short, there is not yet a single case where a boundary is so well defined that there will be no extra technical and juridical consequences for the management of transboundary resources.

Beyond this, generalisations become less valid, if not self-defeating. While the cases of partition share certain basic similarities there are significant differences in conditions and variables that account for the variation in outcomes. The analysis in this chapter has inevitably begged the question: are there models of transboundary cooperation and resource management to follow in Cyprus? European transboundary cooperation is still in its infancy, and a majority of observers now argue that the Western European ‘model’ is inappropriate for understanding the asymmetries of the US-Mexico border region, and beyond. Conversely, in fact, perhaps there is more to be learnt from examining the US-Mexico case as a means of better understanding problems at the EU’s external borders, where economic disparities are currently being exacerbated.

Perhaps, more realistically, there is a need to look beyond (or behind) both contexts after recognising the difficulties in constructing policy models of transboundary resource management which presuppose the existence of harmonious bilateral relations, and a convergence of interests at the local, regional and global scales. An alternative to a priori models is the distillation of lessons from a range of contexts where institutional developments can be examined as they are nested at all levels—regionally, nationally, and internationally—with authority residing at each level according to political will, resources, and knowledge. The complexities span institutional, structural, spatial, temporal and cognitive dimensions, and the particular idiosyncrasies of partition generate too many case-specific causal factors. There is clearly much more thought required to consider the transfer of any ‘model’ arrangements to partitioned states. In the rest of this analysis, using the theoretical
framework provided in Part I, these and other problems are addressed in a detailed case study of the management of transboundary resources in Cyprus.

Endnotes:

5. Milner (1992: 479). Ritterger (1993: 19) provided an important qualification, noting that the role of international regimes in conflict resolution lay also in the effect of 'insulating' certain issue areas against a negative 'spill over' from tensions among the same actors arising elsewhere.
13. This determination of variables is, of course, arbitrary and dependent upon its limitations. Nonetheless, the framework may help isolate and define issues, and help point out incentives in favour or obstacles in the way of an interested party pursuing a particular option or alternative in transboundary resource management.
20. Alheritiere (1987: 147-149). Article 34 (1) of the UN Charter declares, moreover, that "only States may be parties in cases before the Court" (UN, 1989).
21 Groom (1993); Young (1994); Forsberg (1995b).


26 M. Anderson (1996a: 74). This is not to suggest that all transboundary relations in this case proved amicable; in the light of problems with transmigration to Germany, the border is tightly controlled.


28 LeMarquand (1977: 19); Rogers (1993: 123).


32 Thomas (1992: 118-121).


34 Kolossov and O'Loughlin (1998a).


36 Hampson (1996: 18).


38 Playfair (1992: 1).


40 Beschorner (1992: 63). This is, however, only in relation to former colonial territory (Ratner, 1996).


46 Kumar (1997a: 26).


Transboundary Resource Management and Partitioned States

49 North (1977: 574). At times, however, and as the Iraq-Kuwait conflict illustrated, even in the absence of debilitating scarcities, transboundary disputes may arise due to the belligerent, resource-expansionist ambitions of one or more of the parties.

50 Falkenmark (1986: 85);


54 According to Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice.

55 Utton and Teclaff (1987) illustrated exploratory work on what they termed 'transboundary resources law'. More comprehensive and technical diplomatic-legal analyses of international 'environmental' law are provided by Carrol (1988a), and Birnie and Boyle (1992).


57 UNCHE (1972, emphasis added), since reiterated in Principle 2 of UNCED (1992) which was adopted by 176 states and the EC. Schrijver (1993: 24) argued that the paragraph on shared resources was included in response to the serious differences of opinion between Argentina and Brazil on the Brazilian use of the Plata River watershed for an HEP project.

58 UNGA Resn. 3281 (12/12/74), emphasis added. Article 30 further provided that "[a]ll States have the responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other States" (emphasis added). See also UNGA Resn. 3129 (13/12/73).

59 A majority of Western states voted against or abstained on UNGA Resn. 3281 (12/12/74), although not the Republic of Cyprus, Greece or Turkey.

60 UNEP (1978). Note that a definition of 'transboundary resources' could not be agreed upon (Schrijver, 1993: 24).


63 This is no doubt largely because, as Prescott (1987: 125) noted, the commonest source of resource development disputes are water bodies.

64 Thomas (1992: 135-37);

65 This figure of the 1978 UN Register of International Rivers has been updated on various occasions (see Biswas,1993; Caponera,1995).

66 Blake (1993: 42). Seven of these have 5 or more riparian states.


69 Rogers (1993: 117); Blake (1994: 362). See Caponera (1987) for an introduction to the problems in defining an appropriate managerial unit to be used for 'international' or 'transboundary' water law.

70 Introduced in 1895 by the US Attorney-General in a dispute with Mexico concerning irrigation rights along the Rio Grande River.
Rogers (1993: 119). Rogers noted that this doctrine remained implicit within the belief that 'equitable use' (see below) be conditioned by 'past utilisation of the waters'.


ILA (1966).

Caponera (1987: 4-5); Draper (1997: 348). The many factors related to these measures are defined in Article 5.


Draper (1997: 346). This principle derives from the Latin maxim *sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas* ('so use your own property as not to injure your neighbour'). The associated international responsibility for water quality, especially protection from transboundary water pollution, has received only belated attention.

Principles 5, 6, and 8 (UNEP, 1978).


Goldie (1987). UNEP (1978) recommended environmental assessment before engaging in any activity with respect to shared natural resources, and Environmental Impact Assessments (EIA's) have become increasingly important in the transboundary context.


Examples from an exhaustive analysis of hydropolitics in this region include Starr and Stoll (1988); Gruen (1992); Kliot (1994); Lowi (1995).


Kliot (1994).


Murakami (1995: 392). E. Anderson (1991: 32) noted that Israel was already using the aquifers to the north and west, almost to their maximum, even before 1967.

Kliot (1994).


Le Marquand (1977).

Fisher (1972).
Rothman (1989: 3).

The term 'track two' diplomacy was devised by Montville and Davidson (1982). Advocates such as Montville have gone so far as to introduce the European Community as "one of the greatest successes of track two diplomacy in human history" (Montville, 1995: 20).
Rothman (1989); Keashly and Fisher (1990); Diamond and McDonald (1996).
Stultz (1979: 9).
Lyne (1990); Kumar (1997: 33). Given that a European antidote was being prescribed to the Irish conflict, this technocratic anti-partitionism was labelled by Lyne as Ireland’s ‘homegrown specimen of neo-functionalism’ (Lyne, 1990: 418).
J. Anderson and Hamilton (1998). An Annex to ‘Strand Two’ of the Belfast Agreement declared 12 issues (including agriculture, environment, health) which ‘North-South cooperation and implementation may include’ (emphasis added).
Hardin (1982).
Transboundary Resource Management and Partitioned States


Székely (1992: 573); Scott et al. (1996b: 21).

Jo and Walker (1972).

B. Mitchell (1990: 6).


Lowi (1995: 9), although this study is undermined by its preoccupation with Israeli and Jordanian relations, thus largely failing to incorporate (and so pluralise) relations with the other riparians of Syria, the Lebanon and a potential Palestinian state. See also Libiszewski (1997).


The problematic development of this transboundary city is especially well covered in Reichman (1993); Newman (1995); Albin (1997).


The Transportation Corporation was to become a 'model' for the establishment of other joint bodies (Dayton Agreement, Annex 9, Article III) (US State Department, 1995).


Rogers (1993: 129). Whether a dispute is 'ripe for resolution' is generally understood as being determined by a 'hurting stalemate', a looming catastrophe, legitimate representation and a way out of conflict, but also the introduction of new 'norms' or new constituency pressures (Hampson, 1996: 14).

Kliot (1994).

Joint Indian-Bangladeshi monitoring of the Ganges' discharge began after the 12 December treaty (BSB, Vol. 3, No. 1, p.41).


Scherer et al. (1994a).


Kim (1997); Westing (1998b). For similar observations made on the Berlin Wall, see The Cyprus Mail (12/11/96).
Moreover, history has taught that 'cultural regions' have almost never conformed with a physical, geographical unit—be it an island or a river basin (Pounds, 1964: 170).


Not one 'major' transfrontier project had been undertaken since its endorsement, and seven of the twenty-one national members had failed to ratify it (Italy, Spain and France only doing so with reservations) (Herzog, 1991c: 595; M. Anderson, 1998: 84).

Such conclusions have generally advocated the 'rehabilitation' of neofunctionalism (Tranholm-Mikkelsen, 1991).
Transboundary Resource Management and Partitioned States

168 For a critique, see Groom (1994); O'Neill (1996), and for an explicitly realist account see Dedman (1996). De Gaulle's vigorous reaffirmation of the French state in the 1960s is invariably used as a starting point.


175 Forsberg (1996: 367); Delaney and Leitner (1997: 95); Hakli (1998b); Murphy (1998). Fundamentally, it must be recognised that a ‘Europe without borders’ is inherently synonymous with ‘Fortress Europe’, by the EU’s reproduction of ‘external’ borders and ‘buffer zones’ (notably to its east and south) (O'Dowd and Wilson, 1996: 14).


178 Asiwaju and Barkindo (1993); Asiwaju (1994: 71).


180 Peachy et al. (1998: 50-54).


185 Prescott (1975: 486).


187 Indeed, mirroring UNFICYP’s mandate, the Bosnian, Croatian and Serbian parties to the Dayton Agreement were generally obliged “to recreate as quickly as possible normal conditions of life [sic] in Bosnia and Hercegovina” (Dayton Agreement, Annex 1A, Article 1, para. 1, emphasis added) (US State Department, 1995).

188 Illustrating this optimism, even as late as May 1996 the former US Assistant Secretary of State, Richard Holbrooke, was warning about the collapse of the Dayton structure and the possibility (not, note, the actuality) of the ‘partition’ of Bosnia and Hercegovina (OMRI, No. 92, Part II, 13/5/96).

189 SIPRI-UNESCO (1998: 35). As part of this landscape, it is also worth considering the problematic boundaries which buffer two separately partitioned states, probably best exemplified by Israel’s borders. The 1973 Syrian-Israeli armistice agreement provided for symmetrical ‘zones of forces
limitations', monitored by UN observers and US overflights, while between the two sides a narrow DMZ was manned by a UN disengagement force. Even so, along the Israel-Lebanon border, characterised by the 'security zone' originally established in 1976, transboundary connections centred around population, trade, and infrastructural interchange have been identified (Soffer, 1994).

190 Fox (1990).


195 Fraser (1984: 194-5); J. Anderson and Hamilton (1998). In Ireland, the EU and Anglo-American relations, by internationalising the issue and creating new intergovernmental frameworks, have however gone some way in influencing the discourse of territorial sovereignty maintained in Northern Ireland (O'Dowd and Corrigan, 1996: 130).

196 Henderson and Lebow (1974), which was soon adapted by Minghi (1976) and later by Waterman (1987).


198 Waterman (1987) subsequently broke these stages down yet further, offering a more 'finely tuned' version, but this again incorporated Henderson and Lebow's distinction between partition resulting from 'internal' forces (a 'partitioned state'), and partition resulting from 'external' forces (a 'divided nation'). Considering the reservations on this contested distinction already made (Chapter 2, Section 2.3.1), the position advocated in this thesis is more in line with the approach of Paddison and Waterman's later work, which preferred to conceptualise partition as one section on a continuum from unitary state to completed partition (Paddison, 1983: 27-33; Waterman, 1989: 122).


201 Corson and Minghi (1994).


203 In the case of Berlin, the former 'no-man's land' became prime real estate, with rents increased by 600%, while once-peripheral agricultural land surrounding the city but formerly in the GDR now constituted an extension of the city's suburbs (Corson and Minghi, 1994: 130).


Indeed, the functionalist argument "cannot be applicable and effective in reducing the political content of decision-making at any one level unless applicable at all levels that have a bearing on that level" (Burton, 1975: 238-9).

Questions remain, moreover, over the breakdown of 'integration' or 'separation' by issue area.


See in particular P. Haas (1990) and Young (1993). P. Haas discredited the hegemonic stability theory concerning the formation of international environmental regimes. The pollution-control regime for the Mediterranean Basin encompassed important states that span the Greek-Turkish and the Arab-Israeli conflicts.


Pers. Comm., Prof A. Székely, 14/7/98, Durham.

See, for example, Friedmann and Morales (1984); Herzog (1991b; 1991c); and Scott (1996).

Ossenbrügge (1994).

Scott et al. (1996b: 22).

Ingram et al. (1994: 34).
Part II

Partitioning Cyprus
Chapter 4
Partitioning Cyprus and the Creation of Transboundary Resources

4.1 Introduction

Like all boundaries, partition boundaries are social, economic and psychological, as well as political constructions of a historical origin. In the two preceding chapters it was argued that in order to understand how and why cooperative transboundary interaction develops, a partitioned state must be situated not only within the larger structures and processes of the political economy, but also within its specific historical, cultural and locational milieu. A starting point for this case study, therefore, must be the analysis of state formation and change in Cyprus, with its territorial and socio-spatial dimension as a central theme.

In order to comprehend the complex policy and practice of transboundary resource management in Cyprus, it is necessary to consider a number of historical, structural and contingent factors: the chronology of partition; the legacy of asymmetrical economic development between the two main communities of the island; and, contingent factors of political interests and ideas—what Hitchens termed ‘partitionists’ and ‘partitionism’—which led both to the establishment and subsequent undermining of the ROC’s constitution and, ultimately, to its partition.1 To this end, Section 4.2 mirrors Minghi’s sub-division of the partitioning process by examining the ‘pre-partition’ and ‘active partitioning’ stages.2 Consideration of the ‘post-partition’ stage will become an important focus of Chapters 5-7; instead, the objective here is to provide a background to the politico-territorial problems of resource management in Cyprus. To explain this more fully, Section 4.3 deconstructs the boundary-creation process whereby, first, the capital city of Nicosia was effectively partitioned and the Turkish Cypriot community withdrew into territorially-distinct enclaves, and, second, the island as a whole was separated territorially by the UNBZ. It is argued that the particular development of territorialities in Cyprus (by the two communities’, their ‘motherlands’, and other international parties)—a process which has received
surprisingly little academic attention—was to have major implications for policies subsequently adopted towards managing transboundary resources 'post-partition'.

4.2 Partitionism and Partitionists

Using a standard narrative approach this section recounts the causes and consequences of the partitioning process in Cyprus up until 1974, developing in particular a focus on the impact of the process on what were to become transboundary resources after 1974. As a prelude to partition, political, economic and social developments in Cyprus from the mid-1950s were to generate a number of violently divergent ethnonationalist forces, such that between 1960 and 1974 the majority of international diplomatic attention was devoted to attempts to contrive an acceptable method of power-sharing within a unitary state. In practice, however, by 1974 a policy of state partition had proven the most powerful political and military force.

4.2.1 Pre-1960: colonialism and self-determination

From pre-classical times, several foreign powers—Egyptians, Assyrians, Romans, Franks, and Venetians included—successively conquered, acquired and then ruled the island of Cyprus. In spite of the turbulence of this period, the development of its political, socio-economic and cultural character had served to introduce three foreign powers of particular note to Cyprus—Greeks, Ottoman Turks and the British Empire. Principally of Greek cultural origin, Cyprus was without Turkish inhabitants until the Ottoman conquest of Venetian Cyprus in 1571, when the nucleus of the Turkish Cypriot community was established alongside relatively indigenous Greek-speaking Christians, although by the eighteenth century Greek numerical ascendancy had been reasserted. It was not until 1878, after the Congress of Berlin, that the administration fell under British control, in return for a guarantee to defend the Ottoman Empire against Russian aggression and for the island to remain technically under Ottoman sovereignty. At the onset of World War I, during which the Ottoman Empire was to ally with the Central Powers, Britain unilaterally annexed Cyprus, and the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923 (which relinquished Turkey's rights to the island) confirmed the new colonial power's status.
Within two years Cyprus was a Crown colony; geopolitically, to the British not only had it come to represent a Russian-Turkish frontier but also a staging post for residual interests in the Far and Near East.\(^4\)

Generally, during Ottoman times the Turkish Cypriot population had dispersed widely over the island, although it avoided the densely forested (and largely Greek-populated) Troodos Massif.\(^5\) Throughout the British colonial period the population ratio of the two main communities remained roughly four (Greek) to one (Turkish), although the total population rose threefold. Nevertheless, the population distribution pattern pre-independence was such that in none of the six administrative towns (nor their districts) did the ratio of Greek to Turk exceed 7.4:1 or fall below 2.2:1.\(^6\) The number of ‘mixed’, intercommunal villages oscillated, however; in 1891 they constituted 346 of 702 population centres, yet by 1960 out of 623 settlements only 114 contained both communities.\(^7\) While this was also a consequence of growing urbanisation, by 1960 ethnic ‘quarters’ even in villages appeared, separating the ‘majority’ from ‘minority’. Only 37 villages had no single group at least twice as numerous as the other.\(^8\)

Against this demographic backdrop, colonial rule served further to differentiate rather than assimilate. The education system was segregated from the early 1920s, intercommunal marriages occurred but were frowned on, and socio-economic life had proven manageable though not completely integrated.\(^9\) On to this the British colonial principle of administrative divisions along ethnic lines formed the first roots of partition.\(^10\) An ineffective multicommunal Legislative Council had been formed in 1882;\(^11\) from 1925 it was reconstituted, yet once again fostered more mistrust than alliance. This was to be further exacerbated by the involvement of the two Cypriot communities on opposite sides during the 1912-13 Balkan Wars, World War I, and the 1919-23 Greco-Turkish War, after which ethnic division came to be based more on ‘postjudices’ rather than simple misconceptions.\(^12\) Ironically, the Greek Orthodox Church had become a significant political, social, and educational force due to the Ottoman millet administrative system, and now served to whip up civil unrest. In particular, Greek Cypriot nationalist sentiment—in the form of enosis (‘union’), as part of the wider Megali Idhea in Greece of liberating and unifying the Hellenic world—developed to the extent that by October 1931 major anti-colonial riots were witnessed in Nicosia, and the Legislative Council was dissolved as Greek Cypriot members for the
second time walked out. Political parties were subsequently banned by the colonial power until 1941.\textsuperscript{13}

In 1954, the resurfacing of \textit{EOKA}\textsuperscript{14}, the Greek Cypriot anti-colonial, pro-Hellenic organisation and the confirmation of Cypriot self-determination as part of Greek foreign policy signalled the growth of Turkish fears for Greek Cypriot hegemony. \textit{EOKA} sought to bring about the cultural idea of \textit{enosis} militarily, and as a counterforce, the idea of \textit{taksim} ('partition') was advanced by Turkish Cypriot nationalists. Anti-colonial riots from April 1955, politically led by the ethnarch Archbishop Makarios III, signalled the almost total dependence of the colonial forces on the Turkish Cypriot minority for policing.\textsuperscript{15} While they had more to gain from British patronage, Turkish Cypriots were increasingly ‘nationalised’ as they were drawn alongside the British in fighting \textit{enosis}.\textsuperscript{16} Turkey had also reacted; the nationalist position, buoyant since the 1920s with the creation of Atatürk’s ‘new’ Turkey, was, up until the 1950s, for the reversion of Cyprus to Turkey following the departure of Britain, but it now proposed the partition of the two communities (Figure 4.1)—in 1957 the Turkish premier, Menderes, was to suggest the adoption of the 35\degree parallel of latitude for the purpose of partition; territory to the north would become Turkish, and to the south Greek. The right of self-determination dictated, instead, that the ‘natural’ result would be the partitioning of the island as Cyprus was, by ‘natural necessity’, tied up with the Anatolian mainland.\textsuperscript{17} In 1955 Turkish Cypriot organisations had formed in opposition (\textit{Volkan}, later \textit{TMT}),\textsuperscript{18} acting as a counterfoil to \textit{EOKA} yet intensifying intercommunal clashes. Ethnic minorities evacuated villages with the onset of large-scale rioting. By the time the shooting ended in March 1959, 509 people had been killed of which 156 were British.\textsuperscript{19}

This so-called ‘Emergency Period’ (1954-59) had effectively sowed the seeds for intercommunal partition. Britain, deeply involved with the events in Suez in 1956, was to dispatch a force 30,000 strong, yet let it be known that any solution appeasing Greek and Turkish interests would be acceptable.\textsuperscript{20} Segregation was to a large extent reflected in British proposals too; Radcliffe suggested in 1956 the self-determination of both communities. A north-south line (Figure 4.1) west of Nicosia had been proposed, with Greek Cypriot territory to its east.\textsuperscript{21} As in Palestine, by most conceivable standards the situation was that of two distinct ethnic groups coexisting most uncomfortably within a single, small geographic area. However, again like Palestine in 1946, and in
India a year later, partition as part of 'divide and rule' was rejected on the grounds of unfeasibility and the risk of conflict.\textsuperscript{22} The colonial power's competency in the 'art and science' of partition was greatly complicated by the Cold War dimension, with the US—as the post-Suez regional superpower—seeking to balance Greek-Turk (and consequently NATO) interests.\textsuperscript{23} In parallel, Cypriot decolonisation was gathering strength as a movement, and having been discussed at the UNGA from 1954 to 1958, the British were slowly resigning themselves to the idea of self-determination—or, rather, the familiar device of devolving responsible government to Cyprus within the Commonwealth.\textsuperscript{24} Dual nationality and a Greek and Turkish sharing of administration on the island constituted the salient points of the 'Macmillan Plan' of 1958—a plan which the Colonial Office classified as 'pre-partition', and the British Prime Minister himself described as 'metaphysical partition'. This framework was to shape profoundly the subsequent constitutional settlement in 1960.\textsuperscript{25}
4.2.2 The 1960 constitutional ‘settlement’

In early 1959 talks were held in Zürich between Greece, Turkey and Britain. In keeping with the island’s history, the two Cypriot communities were not party to the negotiations which led to final agreements at the London Conference on Cyprus in February, when action was taken to prepare for a transfer of sovereignty. The so-called Zürich-London Agreements were made up of three international treaties through which the ROC’s ‘alliance’ was to be determined by a Greek and Turk military presence on the island, its ‘establishment’ was to safeguard a British military presence also, while its constitution was to be ‘guaranteed’ by Greece, Turkey and Britain. Article 1 of the Draft Treaty of Guarantee declared that:

“[t]he Republic of Cyprus undertakes to ensure the maintenance of its independence, territorial integrity and security, as well as respect for its Constitution. It undertakes not to participate, in whole or in part, in any political or economic union with any State whatsoever. It accordingly declares prohibited any activity likely to promote, directly or indirectly, either union with any other State or partition of the Island”.

Without any referendum on the island, the communities were presented with a *fait accompli*; both *enosis* and *taksim* were to be abandoned.

In providing for a ‘bicomunal’ state, however, the constitution recognised the two communities by their ethnic origin, language, culture and religion; indeed, this communal dualism was most effectively institutionalised in government offices. Recruitment to positions of power was to be made explicitly on the criterion of the ethnic identity of the applicants. Executive power was divided between a Greek Cypriot President and a Turkish Cypriot Vice-President; while there was an inherent provision for *bona fide* cooperation between the two leaders, both had the power of final veto over legislation and decisions of the House of Representatives and of the cabinet on foreign affairs, defence and internal security. The public service was to be separated between Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot on a 70:30 ratio respectively; this was even reflected in the Council of Ministers where one of three key posts (defence, finance, or foreign affairs) was also to be allocated to a Turkish Cypriot. Representatives of the House were to be elected separately by the two ethnic groups and divided into two communal chambers, while, once again, the House president was Greek Cypriot and the vice-president Turkish Cypriot. Finally, composition of the lower courts in the judicial
system was to be determined by communal membership. Whilst in addition to a Greek Cypriot and a Turkish Cypriot representative, the Supreme Court was composed of a ‘neutral’ judge—neither a citizen of Greece, Turkey or Britain. In essence, therefore, the two communities were seen as “the two sharers of the power, resources and wealth of the State”,30 within this framework, ‘other’ citizens—the Maronites, Armenians, Lebanese which made up nearly 2% of the island’s population at the time—were given three months to choose the community to which they were to ‘belong’ (all opted to be ‘Greeks’). Not only was the identity problem left unaddressed, its symptoms had been accentuated.

4.2.3 1960-1974: from independence to de facto partition

With independence on 16 August 1960, ‘Cypriot’ society was now more territorially-defined than ever before; it was de jure synonymous with the island and not, specifically, with an ‘anomalously’ aterritorial Hellenic notion of identity, nor with any ideal of a ‘Greater’ Turkish nation. The ROC formally fell under a new leadership of what was nominally a Cypriot ‘nation-state’. Following elections the previous December, Makarios became President and Dr Fazil Kâtçik took up the post of Vice-President.

The constitution, which had been imposed by third parties, was now ironically left to the two communities with minimal third-party involvement in implementation.31 It was not long before the 199-article constitution focused itself as two major issues. Of primary debate was the Turkish Cypriot insistence on implementation of their constitutional right to fill 30% of the public service posts, a prerequisite for a shared division of resources.32 The Greek Cypriots argued, with some justification that there was a shortage of qualified Turkish Cypriots, conscious also of the discrepancy between the specified ratio and the general population ratio on the island (80:20). Greek Cypriot civil servants threatened collective resignation, and numerous appointments were disputed in the Supreme Court (now with a German ‘neutral’ judge).33 Turkish Cypriots feared being by-passed and dominated in political affairs.34 Operational deadlock similarly developed in legislative bodies, to the extent that taxes were eventually used to finance separate communal institutions.
Perhaps more significant was what became known as ‘the battle of the five towns’: Nicosia, Limassol, Famagusta, Larnaca, and Paphos were to be divided under separate Greek and Turkish councils according to the constitution, which stated that a ‘co-ordinating body’ made up both communities would ‘concern itself with matters which required a degree of cooperation’. Accordingly, five separated municipalities in the five district towns, which had existed de facto from the EOKA uprisings in 1955, were to receive de jure recognition on the basis of territorial separation. Their continuation was to be reviewed after four years. This ‘municipal partition’ was never effected by the Greeks Cypriots; the Turkish Cypriots stopped paying rates, vetoed Government financial policies, and eventually ‘legalised’ councils of their own in early 1963.

A constitutional deadlock had come about. Post-independence, with the formalisation of ethnic and political cleavages, the nationalist sentiments of both communities were rapidly evolving and immobilising the state apparatus. In essence, the Turkish Cypriots feared a majority, Greek Cypriot leadership seeking to erode their newly-won rights, while Greek Cypriots saw Turkish Cypriot obstructionism as a prelude to a Turkish-initiated partition. Each side sought to ethnicise the state in its favour, and as certain elements of each community become more frustrated, and looked to Greece and Turkey for support, so the problem was further internationalised (by right of birth the republic had sought to establish itself with the UN, the Council of Europe, the British Commonwealth, and the Movement of Non-Aligned Nations).

On 30 November 1963 Makarios, who had always claimed the constitution was imposed by force majeure, moved unilaterally to alter it. Among the thirteen changes proposed would be unified town councils and the abolition of the 70:30 ratio of Greek and Turkish Cypriots in the public services. Certain areas would fall under ‘Improvement Boards’ to be designated by the government, as a unitary state with majority rule was implicitly sought in favour of the Greek Cypriot community. Cyprus had indeed become geopolitically a terra nullius, a political instead of an administrative ‘orphan’. Makarios’ non-aligned, anti-NATO stance had the tacit support of the island’s largest and by now Communist-dominated labour movement AKEL, and these strategic manoeuvrings did not go unnoticed. In reply to the proposed amendments, Küçük warned of the spectre of enosis and called for the rejuvenation of the bicommmunal state, or acceptance of partition; at the local level, the government was
pressed to demarcate pre-existing if blurred ethnic municipal boundaries. Significantly, on 16 December Turkey also officially rejected the amendments if only for the precedent they were setting.\textsuperscript{42} Within five days the much-predicted intercommunal violence began, and 700 Turkish Cypriot hostages were seized in north Nicosia.\textsuperscript{43} The development of 'private armies' on the island, which had been stockpiling since independence, was further encouraged. The constitution had stated that 40% of the 'national' army was to be made up of Turkish Cypriots, yet Küçük and Makarios insisted on ethnically dividing and integrating units respectively. The compromise of independence instead of \textit{enosis} had appalled the military leader of \textit{EOKA}, General Grivas (a Cyprus-born Greek army officer), and a conscript Greek Cypriot National Guard came to be staffed by Greek officers and controlled from Athens. In early 1963 their expansionist 'Akritas Plan' went so far as to rejuvenate the idea of \textit{enosis}, through force if necessary.

Under the Treaty of Alliance, Greece and Turkey had been able to maintain on the island 950 and 650 troops respectively; in December, they both left their camps near Nicosia to join the fighting. In the capital, Turkish Cypriot representatives in the government, House of Representatives, Civil Service, Police and Army moved from their positions and into the Turkish quarter, thus creating \textit{de facto} Greek Cypriot government bodies. By 25 December, the threat of Turkish military intervention pressured Makarios into a cease-fire while he appealed unilaterally to the UN Security Council. A tripartite force, involving the three Guarantors' forces stationed on the island, was formed in principle (although at no time did this truce force act in unison to maintain order; in practice, the British contingent led the way as 'postcolonial' peacekeepers).\textsuperscript{44} A London conference in the new year broke down as Greek Cypriot demands for the abrogation of the London-Zürich agreements and a unitary state clashed with Turkish Cypriot calls for geographical partition.\textsuperscript{45}

The Security Council was to eventually debate the issue in February, with Makarios seeking to abrogate the Treaty of Guarantee and to have recognition of what was, \textit{de facto}, a monocommunal ROC reaffirmed. He rejected a US-proposal of NATO peacekeepers and the US, conscious of a Soviet-Greek Cypriot alliance on the island, warned Makarios that UN precedent suggested that, were Turkey to intervene, partition would be the favoured solution.\textsuperscript{46}
By March 1964 Makarios was to learn from Turkey that unless there was an immediate cease-fire, an end to ‘the killing of Turks’, and a return of all hostages, Turkey would ‘use the right of unilateral action conferred on her by the Treaty of Guarantee’. Turkish forces on the island positioned themselves around northern Nicosia, and there were reports of military concentrations along Turkey’s southern coast. Following an emergency meeting of the Security Council the tension subsided, and emphasis was placed on quickly introducing what was then only the third mission by a world peacekeeping force. Security Council Resolution 186 of 4 March, set against the backdrop of escalating tension in the Eastern Mediterranean which in Anglo-American eyes had generated a peace imperative, fell in Makarios’ favour and called for a UN mediator and for the setting up a peacekeeping force to take over from the British. Even if the status of the treaties remained an open question, most importantly the legitimacy of what had now become a Greek Cypriot government had been secured at the highest level. The resolution recommended, *inter alia;*

> “that the function of the Force should be in the interest of preserving international peace and security, to use its best efforts to prevent a recurrence of fighting and, as necessary, to contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order and a return to normal conditions”.

The mandate was only timetabled for a 3 month period. Given its ambiguous use of language (Appendix 5), it was interpreted differently. For the Greek Cypriot community, while UNFICYP was to operate as a neutral this did not equate with equality in treatment; rather, UNFICYP’s role was to assist (the Greek Cypriots) in the elimination of the ‘rebels’ and ‘separatist movement’ and, in so doing, return Turkish Cypriot territorial enclaves to ‘government’ control. Mistakenly, it was also believed that the 1960 treaties would be revised and that an internationalisation of the conflict through the UN would negate Turkey’s threat of invasion. By contrast, UNFICYP was greeted by the Turkish Cypriot side as protectors and, more importantly, a ‘return to normal conditions’ was read as UNFICYP restoring the equal status of the two Cypriot communities as under the 1960 constitution, if not on the same geographical basis. In turn, the UN mediator’s role was to bequeath it equal recognition, a vital piece of diplomatic armour which had been temporarily lost under Resolution 186.

As for the UN, both of these interpretations were rejected. The mandate, while recognising one side as the legitimate government, was to be informally interpreted such
Partitioning Cyprus

that UNFICYP could maintain an ‘uneasy equilibrium’. As for the ‘return to normal conditions’, this was seen to necessitate providing assistance in ameliorating administrative, economic, social and judicial problems arising from the communal divisions. For both communities and for the UN, therefore, if for completely different reasons, a ‘return to normal conditions’ was seen spatially to redress the island-wide political circumstances. This was to prove significant when, after the creation of the buffer zone ten years later, this part of the mandate was to be recentred onto activities in the de facto border region.

In spite of its contested meaning, this mandate was to remain intact throughout the rest of the 1960s. The communal divide had widened as Greek Cypriots moved towards majority political control and the Turkish Cypriots stood by power-sharing. As violent clashes continued and chaos reigned, the Greek Cypriot government charged TMT with coordinating the mass movement, and UNFICYP—in particular the preliminary British contingent—of tacitly partitioning parts of the island. These charges of partitionist and non-cooperation tactics grew as the Turkish Cypriot leadership more frequently pointed out that coexistence in a unitary state as proposed by the Greek Cypriots was unacceptable. A year after the Nicosia incident 25,000 Turkish Cypriots had become refugees, nearly 5% of the community’s population, 4,000 of whom were in temporary refugee camps awaiting their return. Turkish Cypriots had evacuated 72 mixed villages and abandoned another 24 solely-Turkish Cypriot villages in their quest to move to the security of Turkish Cypriot ‘enclaves’.

By June, Turkey was reaffirming its intentions to attack, while Greece reiterated its promise to follow Turkey into any war. Much to Turkey’s frustration, an eleventh-hour letter from US President Johnson to Prime Minister İnönü temporarily silenced them, while also ostracising them within NATO. Nonetheless, by August, in response to Greek and Greek Cypriot forces’ attacks on the strategically vital Turkish Cypriot enclaves in Tylliria (especially aimed at neutralising the Kokkina beach-head), there were Turkish air force bombardments. By now Cyprus had become entangled in Cold War politics. Ever more conscious of a potential Graeco-Turkish war and the strategic significance of Cyprus on the south-eastern flank of NATO, US peacemaker Acheson forwarded a revised yet just as ill-judged ‘double enosis’ plan (negotiated between Greece and Turkey) at a conference in Geneva which called for, inter alia, the unification of Cyprus with Greece, the provision of a military base on the island for
Turkey, and the territorial division of Cyprus into eight cantons (two of which were to be administered by Turkish Cypriots).\textsuperscript{57} Turkey provisionally accepted it, while Makarios rejected its attack on Cyprus' 'full and unrestricted independence'. Now fully cognitive of Turkey's military commitment to the conflict, a guarantee of military protection was sought by Makarios from the USSR, which duly publicised its commitment in response to what they perceived as a threat near to its 'southern borders'.\textsuperscript{58} Tensions subsided, but further diplomatic battles were won by Makarios. The Galo Plaza report of March 1965, the first major perspective on the conflict presented by a UN mediator suggested the abandonment of talks on the basis of the 1960 accords and by rejecting any notion of federation. This implicitly backed Makarios' long-term objectives to the extent that Turkey rejected the UN mediator's role outright. In the General Assembly, Makarios' predicament struck a chord with newly-independent decolonised states.

In the absence of intercommunal and international diplomatic interventions, General Grivas—the Greek Commander of the Cyprus National Guard—led armed clashes in November 1967 with Turkish Cypriots into the enclaves of Kokkina and Ayios Theodhorus. Once again Turkey talked of a major attack but was dissuaded by intensive US, NATO and UN shuttle diplomacy, spearheaded by Cyrus Vance. Greek troops were forced to withdraw, although geopolitical variables were proving unstable as Makarios (now perceived in the US as the 'Castro of the Mediterranean') refused to dismantle the National Guard and received Soviet support in his argument that the Greek \textit{junta}—which had ruled since the \textit{coup} in April—had received US backing.\textsuperscript{59} Makarios was now more consciously distancing himself from the \textit{junta}, viewing independence as more 'feasible' than \textit{enosis}; at these polar opposites, however, the National Guard was becoming increasingly split.

Throughout the 1964-67 period the political landscape had rapidly changed as more Turkish Cypriots withdrew and concentrated into territorially-distinct enclaves. Given the fragmented control of its dispersed territories, the Turkish Cypriot leadership was initially disrupted; a civil-military synthesis of administration was to develop whereby a 'General Committee' had formed in the urban enclave of Nicosia by May 1964, while the Turkish Cypriot quarters of the district towns were operating as municipalities.\textsuperscript{60} From December 1967, this fragmented administration was to transform into the 'Provisional Turkish Cypriot Administration' (PTCA) as the Turkish
Cypriot leadership sought recognition of their apparatus for a 'state within a state'. Once geographically separated, economic development remained—in Sherif's terminology—a common goal of both communities, but was conducted unilaterally and asynchronously. Separation was most prominent in the large towns, where services and administrative structures were duplicated. UNFICYP became key negotiators in managing any intercommunal trade. With Greek Cypriots controlling over 90% of the island, the local balance of power was overwhelmingly in favour of the majority population. At the time of independence the average per capita income of a Turkish Cypriot was around 20% below that of a Greek Cypriot, while between 1961 and 1971 the Turkish Cypriot's mean per capita income dropped to half that of their counterparts. In the mid-1960s, the economic embargoes were virtually comprehensive as the ROC's government argued that materials and merchandise could easily be used for armed efforts.

Frequent charges of discrimination were made by Turkish Cypriots of the island's now wholly-Greek Cypriot administration. By the time the UN arrived in late March 1964, approximately 55,000 Turkish Cypriots were relying on food and medical supplies from Turkey. The ROC built new roads, electricity supply lines and water distribution networks which circumvented the enclaves, arguing that facilities were not provided in villages which owed money to the 'government' and that District Officers also collecting taxes were prevented access to the enclaves. By September 1964, 4,000 Turkish Cypriots were without their income from government posts. Guaranteed water supplies ended, and with restrictions on the sinking of boreholes, water rationing being commonplace during the frequent dry periods. With the breakdown of functional unity, agriculture became the hardest hit sector of the Turkish Cypriot economy, although UNFICYP—in addition to their more general humanitarian assistance—effectively escorted farmers to their fields. Even so, conflicts arose over harvesting rights, and UNFICYP estimated in 1966 that half of Turkish Cypriot abandoned lands were being leased to the other community while the ROC government tried to impose up to 50% taxes on Turkish Cypriots grains being produced in the northern enclave of Nicosia. In the light of these constraints there was little private investment by the Turkish Cypriot business community; for them new, transboundary relations were evolving with the Turkish mainland and with UNFICYP.
Both parts of Cyprus survived in their separate ways, pursuing their different goals, and the boundaries between them took on a new solidity and endurance, physically and psychologically. It was the Greek Cypriot government, and their claims to the whole island, that brought the greatest reaction from the Turkish Cypriot leadership. Greek Cypriot observers noted the 'symmetry' and 'symbiosis' of the communities' cultures, which had become threatened only upon foreign intervention. In the economic sector, if any, there was more or less complete unity and mutual dependence of the two communities pre-1960. Yet the degree of cohesion, of commonality, of nationhood, was now clearly contested; paradoxically, the economic blockade of enclaves was itself part of a cycle of reprisals which made Turkish Cypriots more insistent on a separatist solution, coupled with often-self-imposed isolation of the Turkish Cypriot community.

At the 'grassroots' level, however, limited cooperation over community issues survived as patterns of coexistence were never totally disrupted, and this received a boost when intercommunal talks between Clerides and Denktash (having returned from exile in Turkey) began in 1968, now based notably on the equal status of the representatives of the two communities. Although the restrictions of Turkish Cypriot freedom of movement was lifted in March 1968, and intercommunal relations visibly improved, the spatial segregation remained as the Turkish Cypriots rejected the Secretary-General’s suggestion of allowing the free movement of Greek Cypriots through their enclaves. By now, there were even fewer political and associational organisations that transcended ethnic divisions, and those that remained were exposed to viscous attacks from right-wing elements within both communities who sought to negate a 'Cypriot' nation in preference for a Turk or Hellenic ideal. Two subcommittees, established during intercommunal negotiations in 1969, met until January 1970 to study, inter alia, Turkish Cypriot participation in the public utilities (i.e., water, electricity, telecommunications), only to remain 'in limbo' due to a lack of substantive agreement. Overall, the territories remained ethnically homogenous. As Patrick noted prophetically in 1971, given the fragmented character and size of the Turkish Cypriot territories, compulsory migrations and land swaps would be needed if a viable geographic base was to be established.

From November 1972, with Grivas back on the island, the resurrection of an increasingly anti-Makarios form of EOKA came to light. One year after the
establishment of EOKA-B, which was vehemently opposed to ‘partition disguised as enosis’, Makarios also learnt of a change of head of the Greek military junta, and tension between Makarios (having survived various assassination attempts) and the Greek government heightened. By mid-1974, it was Greek military action that was looking a possibility. Intercommunal talks on the island had been suspended since 2 April and, in May, the Secretary-General understatedly reported ‘little progress’ towards a return to ‘normal conditions’. On 6 July 1974 Makarios publicly claimed that the 650 Greek officers with the Cyprus National Guard were collaborating with EOKA-B. As he called for their withdrawal, Greek and Greek Cypriot National Guard troops on 15 July moved in to depose him and to open the way for Nikos Sampson, notorious for his killings of the British with EOKA and his anti-Turkish and pro-enosis sentiments, as de facto leader of the state.

Turkey’s reactions to the coup d’état against the island’s government, orchestrated by the National Guard and under the direction of Greek officers, had been seriously underestimated. Disregarding pressure to reach a non-military solution from both an ambivalent Britain and a US preoccupied with ‘Watergate’, Turkey chose to intervene sending sea and airborne forces to northern Cyprus on 20 July. Unilaterally invoking the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee, it began an extensive military operation in the north which eventually culminated in the control of around 37% of the island. To counter what was eventually internationally rebuked, Turkish Cypriots (backed by Turkey) pointed out that a return to the status quo ante was impossible given the subordinate role their minority had come to play in that state; the Turkish ‘Peace Operation’ had been prompted by the coup d’état while noting that the other guarantor—Greece—was the perpetrator.

The Greek mainland military junta was to collapse on 22 July, Sampson resigned a day later, and Clerides became Acting-President in Makarios’ absence (the latter having escaped, ironically, to London thus confounding reports of his assassination). UNSC Resolution 353 called for tripartite talks, and Britain, Greece and Turkey met in Geneva from 25 July. Further talks began on 10 August, only for both Günes and Denktash to propose geographical separation, whereby Turkish Cypriots would control 34% of the island in total (see below). The Geneva conference broke down on 13 August and a second phase of the military activity began, to be concluded three days later with another but this time final cease-fire arrangement. Ecevit, the
Turkish Prime Minister, was to declare that the foundations for a federal state were now laid, although there were still some 40,000 Turkish Cypriots left in the south. While Turkey had won a military victory and the Turkish Cypriot community had been saved from what was arguably developing into some form of enosis, the second phase of the military intervention brought widespread condemnation for rejecting a non-violent path to a solution. Precise figures may never emerge, but the events of July-August 1974 reportedly claimed the lives of 900 Turkish Cypriots with 600-900 missing (from a Turkish Cypriot population of some 116,000), the lives of 2,000 Turkish troops, and from the Greek Cypriot community (which at the time totalled approximately 500,200) 2,000 deaths and over 1,600 missing. More than a third of the island’s total population became refugees, 180,000 of them Greek Cypriot.

4.3 Territorial Partition

In the light of these political, economic and social developments on the island, a more detailed examination of the spatial manifestations of the process of partition holds several benefits. The four main stages of the ROC’s territorial partition are therefore considered below.

4.3.1 The United Kingdom Sovereign Base Areas

With the turmoil of the intercommunal conflict, it is often forgotten that the first modern-day international boundaries of Cyprus—de jure or de facto—were those delimiting the ROC from British Sovereign Base Areas (SBAs). They were to impact on the ‘island state’ to the extent that even before the events of 1974 the ROC’s sovereign control was never to be fully independent, nor fully synonymous with the island of Cyprus. Moreover, it was to perpetuate the temptation for ‘outsiders’ to treat Cyprus as a tactical pawn rather than as a fully independent country.

Upon Cyprus’s independence, two bases—Dhekelia SBA and Akrotiri SBA—were retained by Britain as sovereign territory (Appendix 6 (a)). The British government, conscious of the ‘security of tenure’ on the island as a base for the Middle East, had been unwilling to concede in negotiations, and their involvement in the future
Partitioning Cyprus

of Cyprus was further legitimised in their role as a guarantor of the new republic’s independence, territorial integrity and security. Yet they faced an Archbishop who sought to mitigate the resentment of exclusion from the Zürich-London agreements by extracting as many concessions as possible. Negotiations in February 1960 focused on the size of bases, and on the location of ancillary facilities. While in May 1959 the British Foreign Office had talked of bases covering 160 square miles (m²) including seven villages, the first Cypriot delegation suggested 36 m², excluding all villages. An unsuccessful British counter-proposal provided for an area of 120 m² with the exclusion of all villages except Akrotiri. Following a series of talks, Makarios dropped out of the negotiations; they were contributing to the postponement of the republic’s declaration of independence, at a time when the economy was stagnating and unemployment was exacerbating intercommunal tensions. It was left for Küçük on 2 April to propose an area of 100 m², and on 1 July an agreement was eventually reached; a total of 99 m² of non-ceded lands was eventually demarcated as British sovereign territory, roughly 3% of the island land area.

Demarcation was undertaken by a Boundary Commission composed of representatives appointed by the former colonial power and the ROC. Provision was made for the settlement by an ‘independent expert’ of any question regarding correct interpretation, and minor amendments to the boundaries taking into account local administrative conditions were allowed, if agreed by both sides. The limits of the land boundary and the territorial sea boundary were delimited as international boundaries within the 1960 Treaty of Establishment. Delimitation of the former attempted to minimise military use of what was highly productive territory. Akrotiri’s boundary excluded much of an intensively cultivated horticultural region west of Limassol; even so, irrigated land in the northeast of the peninsula was incorporated as a land connection between an air base and camps, the island’s largest salt lake became a military sensitive sight, and the Greek Cypriot village of Akrotiri was incorporated. Dhekelia SBA, by contrast, included at the time mainly unirrigated cropland. It nevertheless extended for 24 km along the coast, and enforced the ‘enclavemence’ of two villages and much of their irrigated lands and two areas (separated by a British road) encompassing Dhekelia power station.

While the territorial land boundary was clearly delimited and demarcated, the territorial sea boundary was, characteristic of maritime jurisdiction in the Eastern
Partitioning Cyprus

Mediterranean as a whole, less well defined (see Appendix 6 (b)). The SBAs were governed, along with the UK's other dependencies, by the Territorial Waters Jurisdiction Act of 1878. Four specific lines were established running from the low-water mark off the international boundary terminals. They were not lines of equidistance, however, but instead appeared to have been drawn perpendicular to the shoreline. As they proceeded away from the coast the orientation of the line changed, presumably because a greater length of coast was considered in determining its general direction. It is important to note that the agreed maritime boundaries did not have any seaward terminus, and could theoretically be continued indefinitely or until the adjacent lines connected—as they would do 32 nautical miles (nm) offshore in the case of Dhekelia SBA. As such, they could accommodate both the UK claim of 3 nm and the Greek Cypriot claim of 12 nm, as well as any extension of either claim (Appendix 6 (c)).

The functional character of the SBAs' boundaries were also clarified. Annex F to the Treaty of Establishment detailed that both governments recognised that—in order not to "impair the economic, commercial or industrial unity and life of the Island"—customs barriers ought to be avoided with duty and tax of any sort, once having been charged, exempted on goods crossing the border. Subject to the 'military requirements and security needs of the British government', the Cypriots were granted freedom of movement across the boundaries, and extensive rights regarding administration, cultivation and employment inside the bases. Similarly, Cypriots had freedom of navigation and fishing in the SBAs territorial waters. An annual rent of UK£12 million (mn) was to be paid to the ROC until 1965, and then subject to review; this was withheld from 1964, however, as payment to 'Cypriots' proved too legally complicating for the British authorities. As for Britain's more general presence on the island, it retained the right to use, without restriction or interference, forty specified smaller sites including buildings, water sources, parts of ports, and Nicosia airport. A further ten training areas (including land, sea and air space) were available to British forces for restricted use; these were in fact larger than the SBAs.
4.3.2 The ‘green line’ of Nicosia

Before the establishment of the SBAs, during the inter-communal troubles between 1955-59, a proto-boundary had developed in Nicosia within-the-walls with the ironically-named ‘Mason-Dixon line’, a wire fence following Paphos and Hermes Streets for most of its length. This physically separated the Greek and Turkish quarters of the Old City, and the ‘green line’ was later to mirror it.\textsuperscript{104} The killing of two Turkish Cypriots on 21 December, as Greek Cypriot policemen patrolled the Old City’s ‘red-light’ area (which was situated, for ‘mutual convenience’, on the borderline between the two communities), was to encourage the formation of barricades.\textsuperscript{105} Following more, localised fighting and the likelihood of a Turkish military intervention, a nominal ceasefire was agreed on Christmas Day. The next day British representatives suggested to Makarios the deployment of SBA troops in positions where they could separate the two communities.

The events surrounding the delimitation process were to prove revealing of how the UNBZ would eventually evolve. Major-General Peter Young, the commander of the British units, met the British High Commissioner and senior representatives from both communities, while Greek and Turkish diplomats and commanders were also consulted.\textsuperscript{106} Primarily, the commander was aware of a fragile peace; in response, a ‘neutral zone’ was sought within which troops could observe fighters’ movements. Ground-level observations of fighters’ positions were made but agreement was not forthcoming, as the Turkish Cypriot leadership continued to reject British patrols, whilst offering their own interpretation of any boundary—notably along the lines of Menderes’ representation (Figure 4.1).\textsuperscript{107} It was not until the night of 28 December that an agreement of sorts was possible, during a meeting at the British High Commission: Clerides and Georghadjis represented the Greek Cypriot community, Denktash and Orek represented the Turkish Cypriots, whilst Greek, Turkish and British officials were also present. At 4 am the following morning general agreement had been achieved; a ‘Joint Political Committee’ was to oversee the formation of a peace force, and the establishment of a ‘neutral zone’ had been eventually accepted;

“[t]ime and time again [the commander’s] green chinagraph pencil retraced the line across the talc of his field map, only to be rubbed out and changed in direction to suit the requirements of one side or the other. At last the pencil
Figure 4.2  The 'green line' of Nicosia within-the-walls

Source: 'Green line' delimitation based on UNFICYP Master Map, D/008/96, Scale 1:7,500
Partitioning Cyprus

wavered no more—and the Green Line [sic] was finally and irrevocably drawn.\textsuperscript{108}

The line (Figure 4.2) was soon demarcated using oil drums distinctively painted green.\textsuperscript{109} Outside Nicosia’s walls, the line snaked along the forward positions of opposing fighters, rarely more than the width of a street across and inviting the fighters to infiltrate buildings which marked the boundary.

A tripartite ‘Truce Force’, to include contingents from the three guarantor states, was immediately created to disengage forces and to bring Nicosia back “to a state of normality”.\textsuperscript{110} In practice, however, a force of only 2,700 British soldiers remained to keep the peace. The ‘green line’ legitimised the separation of the two main communities, providing a ‘chinagraph frontier’ which was to soon outlive its original purpose of ensuring a workable but temporary cease-fire.\textsuperscript{111} Yet, while the Greek Cypriots rejected it for its restrictions on their ‘unfettered independence’, and Turkish Cypriots noted its symbol of partition, it was largely the fear of attack and abduction which had halted movement within the capital; elsewhere on the island, in places where no cease-fire lines existed, it was significant that each community remained in its own sector.\textsuperscript{112}

4.3.3 The Turkish Cypriot ‘enclaves’

In December 1963, as Turkish troops left their barracks to take up strategic positions in Nicosia’s suburbs of Orta Keuy and Geunyeli, and Turkish fighter planes were flying over the island, petty violations of the ‘green line’ were quickly to take on greater proportions. With the cease-fire, enclaves had developed in areas with a relatively high local density of Turkish Cypriots or mixed villages.\textsuperscript{113} Although only a few areas were to become recognised formally by UNFICYP as ‘enclaves’, eventually forty-four pockets of Turkish Cypriot territory developed, including the urban quarters of Nicosia, Famagusta, Larnaca and Paphos. Even in Paphos District, which at the time had the highest ratio of Turk to Greek (1:3), the desire to settle in population clusters rather than risk geographical divorce became paramount for Turkish Cypriots.\textsuperscript{114}

The largest and strategically most important enclave extended from north Nicosia northwards, high into the Kyrenia range, merging with the Turkish Cypriot village of Temblos on the coast. This enclave was 130 km\textsuperscript{2} in area with 35,000
inhabitants, of whom approximately one fifth were refugees. The Geunyeli-Aghirda enclave, as it became known, developed not only because of its proximity to the origin of intercommunal violence in Nicosia, but also as a result of a large catchment area in Nicosia’s surrounding mixed and Turkish Cypriot villages. It had entrapped both the Nicosia-Kyrenia road (a route for the anticipated Turkish military intervention) and the stronghold of St Hilarion castle, necessitating the drawing of new cease-fire lines (CFLs) by UNFICYP. It was centred in central Nicosia, where both communities had improved and extended their defensive positions along the ‘green line’, which was subsequently redelimited and redemarcated—a cordon sanitaire had been established between the opposing forces’ fighting positions. From March 1964, UNFICYP began to monitor this ‘no-man’s land’ with which they were ‘saddled’, based as it was on an agreement to which they had not been party to.115

In this sense, a part of Nicosia, along with other less distinct enclaves in the major towns, was in fact territorially separated; it is clear nonetheless that territorial partition was incomplete and Nicosia was able to continue operating functionally. Representations of ‘enclaving’ elsewhere were similarly deceptive in that certain areas remained contested in the eyes of UNFICYP. Invariably, ‘local agreements’ had been drawn up to overcome the interlocking mosaic of social and economic movements. The intercommunal boundaries, as Patrick noted, resembled more of ‘frontier zones’;

"such zones are ill-defined, and their irregular shapes depend on local patterns of ethnic settlement, land ownership, communication, transportation, and intercommunal hostility".116

Enclaves were often surrounded by two concentric rings of fortified posts, between which UNFICYP patrolled a ‘contested zone’.117 There were geographical idiosyncrasies in certain urban areas, however: around the Turkish quarter of Famagusta a demilitarised zone was established; in Paphos a derelict ‘no-man’s land’ ran through the town; while, in Larnaca, a confrontation line similar to that in Nicosia came under UNFICYP’s surveillance and (also like Nicosia) continued to restrict the freedom of movement after January 1964.118 The disengagement of forces in Limassol in February 1964, which was overseen by a ‘Political Liaison Committee’, did not necessitate CFLs.119 The most innocuous enclave could be found at Ktima (Paphos), where British troops established a cease-fire in March 1964 only to then demarcate and patrol a CFL
as in Nicosia and Larnaca, yet encompassing a Turkish Cypriot area only a few hundred yards square in size.\textsuperscript{120}

In the light of Makarios’ municipal amendments, and his belief in integrating Cyprus with Greece so that the ‘borders of Greece’ would extend to North Africa, territorially the control of the main Turkish areas became an imperative. Reflecting an increasingly ethnocentric view of Cypriot territory in the eyes of the Turkish Cypriot community, without such clear demarcation these areas would remain perpetually an ‘archipelago’ of neighbourhoods, townships and villages within a ‘Greek sea’.\textsuperscript{121} Legal recognition of separate communal status within the five main municipalities was inadequate unless a spatial dimension was added.\textsuperscript{122} The Turkish Cypriot community had created new functional regimes, adding a vital spatial dimension to their call for recognition.\textsuperscript{123} These ‘holes’ now riddled the nominally unitary Republic, and by 1964 only 48 mixed villages remained.\textsuperscript{124}

Given UNFICYP’s formal recognition of the ‘enclaves’ generated only by ceasefires which they oversaw (Nicosia, Kokkina, Limnitis and, at times, Ktima), these territories officially constituted only between 0.5-1.6% of the island’s land area yet, in reality, some 10% of the island’s territory was now ‘enclaved’.\textsuperscript{125} By extension, approximately 90% of all Turkish Cypriots lived in areas outside the military control of the recognised government.\textsuperscript{126} In November 1964, UNFICYP had reached an agreement with the ROC such that, while the ‘whole’ island was open to UNFICYP movements, access was largely restricted to the enclaves.\textsuperscript{127} Lightly armed community forces on both sides successfully controlled movement on certain roads. Yet, this new spatial regime was to reproduce many pre-existing barriers; concrete walls represented ‘psychological walls’ and, in the sense that the UN aided it, it was becoming a ‘partition by default’.\textsuperscript{128}

Acheson’s proposal had envisaged a sovereign Turkish base on the eastern panhandle of Karpas, but Turkish Cypriots would have only two or three areas of ‘local self-administration’.\textsuperscript{129} As for Galo Plaza’s report a year later, the Turkish Cypriot case for federation had been firmly rejected; moreover, the island was to be demilitarised thus exacerbating Turkish Cypriot fears for security. On 22 February 1965, Küçük had forwarded a memorandum calling for the creation of a boundary to separate the two communities (Figure 4.3). Running from Yalia on the north-west coast, through Nicosia’s ‘green line’ before reaching Famagusta on the east, the boundary would create
Partitioning Cyprus

Figure 4.3  *Turkish Cypriot proposal to Galo Plaza, 1965*


a new territory of over 1,000 m², 38% of the Republic’s area. While they had left room for compromise, not surprisingly the proposal was poorly received by both the Greek Cypriot administration and the UN (and was dubbed the ‘Attila line’). Then Between late 1970 and mid-1971, during intercommunal negotiations, Clerides was reported to be providing for the redrawing of district boundaries whereby the Turkish Cypriot populace, lands and administrative centres would be more coincident. But by 1970 there remained only 35 ‘mixed’ villages, with 105 now exclusively Turkish Cypriot, and the PTCA sought the redrawing of autonomous boundaries primarily according to ‘communal’ considerations.

Any formal recognition of the enclaves’ territory would have proven impossible in practice. Their delimitation remained contested, CFLs were inexact and their ambiguities led to many micro-territorial clashes. Inevitably, given the fluidity of territorial control at the local scale over an eleven-year period, and their general contestation, a variety of cartographic representations were to be provided. While
Patrick’s mapping of the enclaves in 1970 (Figure 4.4) remained the most widely-cited, several other interpretations (such as the Kolodny map of 1971, which resembled markedly an American version) effectively demonstrated both the contested and fluid nature of the intercommunal boundaries. Patrick’s work differed (and sometimes significantly) from previously unpublished observations made by Blake and Drury in 1973 which, given the partial ‘normalisation’ of relations five years previously, sought to distinguish between Turkish Cypriot settlements which controlled Greek movement from those which did not (Figure 4.5). Nonetheless, in principle, the enclaves had become ‘ghettos with an extraterritorial status’. Cumulatively, they had become the ‘geographical stepping stones’ to Turkish Cypriot autonomy and, ultimately, de facto statehood.  

4.3.4 The United Nations buffer zone

In view of the time that had passed since its establishment, it is noteworthy how much remains undisclosed about the initial creation of the buffer zone. What were the reasons for the introduction of such a territorial regime? How was the final decision on its delimitation reached? To what extent was there agreement between and within the Greek, Turk, British and UNFICYP representatives, and how did this relate to the aspirations of the two Cypriot leaderships? The significance of these issues is fully demonstrated in Chapters 6 and 7.

The coup d’etat on 15 July 1974 had set in motion the most territorially disruptive chain of events in the island’s modern history. Five days later Turkish Forces had swamped the Cyprus theatre of conflict, with landings by parachute and helicopter-borne troops into the main Nicosia-Kyrenia enclave, and seaborne troops west of Kyrenia. Despite virtually guaranteed naval and air superiority, Turkish Forces made slower progress than the three days anticipated. Faced with strong Greek and Greek Cypriot resistance, a shortage of ammunition, both the seaborne assault and paratroopers succeeded only in reaching Geunyeli as other Turkish Cypriot enclaves fell to the National Guard. Eventually, a wedge was driven from the Kyrenia bridgehead to forces in Nicosia, establishing an overcrowded corridor of some 8% of the island. A ceasefire was brought about on 22 July but, for the Turkish government, while the area secured would “remain permanently as a Turkish Cypriot region” and would “form the
Figure 4.4  *Turkish Cypriot 'enclaves', 1970*

Figure 4.5  *Turkish Cypriot 'enclaves', 1973*

Source: Adapted from previously unpublished work of Blake and Drury.
basis for the final settlement of the Cyprus problem”, the boundaries established proved insufficient for Turkish purposes, with some 50-60,000 Turkish Cypriots (approximately half the community) still lying outside the now enlarged Kyrenia-Nicosia enclave. UNFICYP assisted in delimiting opposing forces’ positions as at 1600 hrs, but its Commander, Prem Chand, had failed to get universally ratified any document listing conditions to be observed.

In spite of the collapse of the Greek junta, fighting and intercommunal atrocities resumed the next day and Turkish Forces edged outwards from their stronghold. The commercially and politically significant Nicosia International Airport—at the time under Greek Cypriot National Guard and Greek army control, but constituting a new objective for Turkish Forces—received particular attention. British SBA Forces, who still held the right to exercise control over the airport in emergency under the 1960 constitution, augmented the UN troops. The UK found itself (as the main troop contributor) ‘within an hour’ of war with Turkey, but the airport was not taken and, once fully occupied by UNFICYP troops, it was declared a UN ‘protected area’. The US were finally able to initiate the conference which they had sought since the start of Turkey’s operations; while Turkish units were still advancing, Greek and Turkish delegations met under British chairmanship (Foreign Secretary Callaghan) at Geneva on 25 July.

Tense and abnormal conditions surrounding what became the first of two Geneva conferences appeared to preclude any chance of success, as international attention was concentrated on avoiding an inter-NATO war. While the Greek, Turkish and British Foreign Ministers formally noted the ‘existence in practice’ of two autonomous administrations, in producing a map Mavros, the Greek Foreign Minister, declared on 26 July that Turkish units had advanced a further 100 km since the ceasefire; the US representative sought to know of Turkey’s ‘terminal boundaries’. Given the fragility of their hold of territory, the settlement of security issues had become an imperative for the Turkish government at the conference. Ecevit called for the extension of Kyrenia-Nicosia enclave both west and especially eastward as far as Famagusta, in spite of the major territorial gains possible to its north. It would appear that the Turkish Forces had agreed to a cease-fire and insisted on the creation of a broad ‘security zone’ in order to generate enough room for their forces to reassemble and be reinforced; yet at ‘expert’ meetings, while Bitsios (as the Greek delegate) proposed a
600 metre-wide zone controlled by UNFICYP, the Turkish side sought a wider zone free of UN personnel.\textsuperscript{148}

As a compromise, another military standstill was agreed on 30 July, and the Geneva Declaration called for the immediate effecting of a ‘security zone’ at the limit of the areas occupied by Turkish Armed Forces—a zone the size and character of which was to be finalised by the Greek, Turkish, British, and UNFICYP representatives at another conference a week later. Pending such a determination, no forces were to enter the existing area, but the overall withdrawal of all foreign troops was notably put off.\textsuperscript{149} As for the already established Turkish Cypriot enclaves under siege, Greek and Greek Cypriot forces were to be evacuated and those enclaves outside the present area of Turkish control would continue to be protected by the ‘security zone’.

From 2 August, the military representatives of Greece, Turkey, and the UK met with UNFICYP to determine the size of the new zone, but with no success. UNFICYP were instructed by UN Secretary General Waldheim to demarcate the CFLs using helicopter flights.\textsuperscript{150} For five days the military representatives alone contested the location and determination of forces’ positions ‘as of 10 pm on 30 July’, while a British helicopter flew them along the CFLs and repeatedly over Kyrenia. A partial agreement was struck on the Nicosia section, and demarcation was then verified by car, but fighting elsewhere, especially in Kyrenia and Famagusta, had restricted the overall delimitation process.\textsuperscript{151} Finally, on 10 August a CFL document was produced, “most of” the CFLs having been finally agreed,\textsuperscript{152} and it was promptly sent off to Geneva for the tripartite conference delegates much to Waldheim’s relief.

Yet, during the seven days since the cease-fire not one aspect of the Geneva Declaration had been successfully addressed; while the Turks insisted on the evacuation of Turkish Cypriot enclaves, the Greek side sought an immediate cease-fire. Significantly, on reconvening at the second conference, Mavros suggested to Günes (the Turkish Foreign Minister) that Turkish Forces had gained over 35 km\(^2\) since 30 July.\textsuperscript{153} But Turkish insistence on ‘regional autonomy’ had become more explicit; on 9 August Günes informed Callaghan that;

\begin{quote}
“the area under our control is only one twenty-fifth of what the property rights and the size of the Turkish Cypriot community would \textit{entitle} us to. Naturally, that is not enough”.\textsuperscript{154}
\end{quote}
Cease-fire maps had been prepared, on which Günes was '95% agreed', but by now Clerides (as Acting-President) and Denktash had joined the meetings and, for the first time, incorporated their diametrically opposed views into the debate: Clerides insisted on the reaffirmation of the principles of the 1960 Constitution, while Denktash sought a new order based on 'geographical separation'.\textsuperscript{155} Suspecting imminent expansion of the 348 km\textsuperscript{2} of territory now held by Turkish Forces, on 11 August Greece withdrew its request for a withdrawal to the 30 July CFL, only to receive three proposals in response the following day.\textsuperscript{156} Callaghan initially presented a contentious draft document which referred to 'two autonomous administrations within boundaries';\textsuperscript{157} then, in a meeting with Clerides and Callaghan, Denktash submitted a proposal for a partitioned, bi-regional federation (Figure 4.6), calling for 34\% of the island to remain under Turkish Cypriot control, although conceding that the 'frontiers' could be discussed.\textsuperscript{158} Clerides and Mavros rejected it, only for Günes to propose an 'alternative': the creation of six autonomous Turkish Cypriot cantons (Figure 4.6) whereby the Nicosia enclave was enlarged, the Karpas remained Greek Cypriot yet isolated, but population displacement was to be kept to a minimum. While five cantonal boundaries could be agreed upon later, Günes insisted that the Nicosia region (making up 17\% of the island) be delimited within 48 hours, at least by a demilitarised 'buffer zone'.\textsuperscript{159} Turkish Forces were visibly caught in a narrow land corridor, and compelling considerations of security remained.\textsuperscript{160} The central issue to the conference had now become the geographical federation of Cyprus; while their exact demarcation could remain outstanding, a 'rough fixing' of boundaries was non-negotiable. Mavros and Clerides, the latter fully conscious of Makarios' likely rejection of the plan, asked for a 36- to 48-hour consultation period.\textsuperscript{161} This was refused by Günes, who now insisted that Clerides declared beforehand acceptance of the principal of a single geographical zone for the Turkish Cypriots, and that the zone be established within the next three to four days.\textsuperscript{162}

As the conference collapsed and the 'second round' began, the Turkish, who had augmented their forces during the cease-fire, advanced west, east and north-east (Figure 4.7). Having initiated a series of consecutive cease-fires in Nicosia on the night of 14/15 and 15/16 August, UNFICYP sought to negotiate one at the island-wide level.\textsuperscript{163} By 1800 hours on 16 August, when the next Turkish Forces cease-fire was called, a boundary reminiscent of the 'Attila Line' existed.\textsuperscript{164} The Greek Cypriots were keen to note, however, that even this line had been extended (incorporating the villages of
Figure 4.6  *Denktash and Günes plans, August 1974*


Figure 4.7  *Positions of the Turkish military intervention forces, July-August 1974*

Vatilli and Lysi, for example) and that the Turkish Cypriots now had a common boundary of approximately 45 km with the British ESBA. Technically, a permanent cease-fire line remained.

4.4 Conclusion: The Creation of Transboundary Resources

As Minghi argued more generally, the length of time a territory is under pre-existing sovereignty is a critical factor in assessing the development of a state towards partition. Cyprus' partition was effectively institutionalised in Zürich and London in 1959, and the division of Cyprus' developmental resources along communal lines was to begin in December 1963 and had been effected in practice by August 1974. Partition had developed from concept, to plan, to policy. Patrick conceptualised the spatial and organic character of this process which began in central Nicosia, spread to become a zone encircling the Turkish Cypriot enclave, jumped to other towns with similar effect, while also spreading out into the rural areas as less well-defined but more localised patterns developed in parallel. Yet, while the British may have sought to replicate the characteristics of other 'neutral territories', the SBAs constituted the initial and an important chink in the fragile china of Cyprus' independence.

The 1960 constitution treated the ethnic groups as homogenous, self-contained political entities whilst also 'rationing' out their responsibilities; in turn, this was to conflict both with the majority-minority view held by the Greek Cypriot leadership and, if to a lesser degree, with the Turkish Cypriot belief in their 'politically equal' status. In the Legislative Council and later in the House of Representatives, empowerment was granted on the basis of communal, not 'Cypriot' status. As such, the constitution was less a consociational or functional federation designed to accommodate for the partnership of two communities, but rather a legacy of intercommunal strife. While there is merit in the argument that had the two communities shown more 'willingness to cooperate' the original constitution could have worked, in the light of the prevailing circumstances its long-term success was always suspect.

It was posited in Chapter 1 that 'partition' had a wide range of meanings as an ideology and as an institutional arrangement, but that the reality was often far removed from the ideal. For the British, partition often served to resolve the dilemmas of
decolonisation or when other means of stabilisation had failed, yet Cyprus was to fall significantly short of this. Indeed, territorial surgery—what Eden had himself termed "the last refuge of baffled statesmanship"—had been 'foreshadowed' in the very making of colonial policy.\textsuperscript{176} While the devising of a complex constitution for the 'vexed island' was in actual fact achievable, the cooperation of the Cypriots had not been secured as the coming of independence failed to obliterate pre-existing ethnic particularities.\textsuperscript{177} For the Turkish Cypriots and Turkey, or notably the partitionists amongst them, this was the consequence of an expansionist Hellenism which for the former dictated an explicit form of political equality, preferably with a territorial character. For the Greek Cypriots and Greece, partitionism had been unsuccessfully fought through political manoeuvring, economic coercion, and a non-collective nationalist aggression split amongst those seeking independence and those in search of immediate \textit{enosis}. Inadvertently, however, through their exclusionary policies, they had conducted their own form of partitionism.

Although by 1964 \textit{de facto} partition already existed, as Cranshaw suggested, its roots were only beginning to grow deep.\textsuperscript{178} Intercommunal divisions, initially based in religious and cultural terms only to be quickly refashioned along lines of nationalism, had become more clearly defined also in geographical location. It was not until 1974, however, that an almost total political, economic and social polarisation had been achieved along the modernist lines of 'statehood', with the foundations for an impenetrable boundary delimiting distinct territories. This was greatly due to the gradual internationalisation of the conflict but not, as Joseph has argued, because the problem had ceased to be a 'domestic' affair.\textsuperscript{179} In a similar vein, Drury has argued that;

"the conventional physical resources of Cyprus have been as innocent as have been its inhabitants in influencing its fate; what has been crucial has been its location".\textsuperscript{180}

It is no coincidence that external powers completely dominated the crucial days of July-August 1974, both in the instigation, continuation, and eventual amelioration of the intercommunal conflict. Yet from the analysis in this chapter it is clear that, while Drury's argument might prove strong from a geopolitical perspective, by 1974 Cyprus' inhabitants were generating their own nationalist, material and cultural interests. Thus, as well as the 'structural' factors encouraging the creation of weak intercommunal linkages and the 'de-legitimisation' of cooperation, there were historical and
geographical characteristics of significance. Nor, for that matter, were Cyprus' resources, many of which had become 'transboundary' in character, to play such an innocent role—as this chapter has suggested, and as the next three chapters will more fully demonstrate.

Endnotes:

1 Hitchens (1997).


4 McDonald (1989: 8); Hunt (1990: 261).

5 King and Ladbury (1982: 2).


7 Patrick (1976: 8); Rizvi (1993: 61).

8 Of these, Greek Cypriots formed a majority in 23 and Turkish Cypriots in the other 14 (Drury, 1972: 164; Loizos, 1976: 28).

9 For contrasting views on the contested idea of 'peaceful coexistence' and intercommunal relations in the colonial period, see Kyrris (1976; 1977) and Loizos (1976) with Salih (1978) and Denktash (1988). A brief 'historiography' of the discourse of integrationism-separatism is provided in Papadakis (1993).

10 Hill (1972: 419); Coufoudakis (1976a: 34).

11 Stavrinides (1976: 24). Hill (1972: 547) dubbed it a 'toy parliament'. Chaired by the British Governor, it was composed of 9 British officials, in addition to 12 Greek Cypriot and 3 Turkish Cypriot representatives (McDonald, 1989: 87, fn.1).

12 Purcell (1968: 245). Britain was to unsuccessfully offer the island to Greece during World War I, as an incentive for her to become an ally.

13 Kyle (1984: 5). Michaelides (1993) has argued that such nationalism was to be cultivated later as Turkish resistance groups forced Turkish Cypriot members to leave transethnic unions (e.g., PEO), although this could be said of EOKA also (see below) (Sant Cassia, 1996).

14 EOKA stands for Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agoniston ('National Organisation of Cypriot Freedom Fighters').


16 Frendo (1993: 24). Rizvi (1993: 65) has criticised this argument by suggesting that British-Greek Cypriot relations had reached a nadir several years beforehand, although Rizvi's argument fails to discount the possibility that the colonial authorities may have chosen to employ Turkish Cypriot resources at a later stage of this struggle. More importantly, perhaps, Sant Cassia (1996) sought to destroy the Orientalist myth that Turkish Cypriots were 'willing pawns' in British colonial tactics, which depicts their nationalism as somehow less 'genuine' than the Greek Cypriot.
Kuçük (1957: 18); Ramady (1976: 2). Küçük suggested moreover that partition would not create economic difficulties because '85%' of the Turkish population were landowners, compared to only '30%' of Greek Cypriots.

18 TMT stands for Turk Mudafa Teshkilat, ('Turkish Resistance Organisation'). Denktash has since argued that its military leadership was based in mainland Turkey (McDonald, 1989: 81, fn. 14).

19 Patrick (1976: 7); The Independent, 31/3/95.

20 McDonald (1989: 9).

21 Melamid (1960: 118). Melamid’s highly ironic ‘class exercise’ in partitioning superbly illustrated the academic exercise of delimiting boundaries to accommodate settlement catchment areas, irrigation water supplies, and mining infrastructure.

22 Kumar (1997c).


26 CMND (1960: 3); Cranshaw (1978: 340).

27 CMND (1960: 86).

28 Stavrinides (1976: 13).

29 Kyriakides (1968: 60).

30 Stavrinides (1976: 13).

31 Hampson (1996: 28).

32 Bitsios (1975: 118), the Greek representative to the UN in 1964, quoted Denktash’s opinion in 1959 on the constitutional provisions: “I am not satisfied at all [...] I shall be satisfied only when everything will be divided at the percentage provided for our participation in the administration [i.e. 30%]. And I mean commerce, industry, everything”.

33 Joseph (1990: 21).

34 Kyriakides (1968: 111).


37 Foley (1964: 165).

38 Joseph (1990: 20); Rizvi (1993).

39 In order to placate right-wing opposition Makarios appointed EOKA people to key positions (Kyle, 1984: 9; Joseph, 1990: 23).

40 Durrell (1957: 204).
Partitioning Cyprus

AKEL, which stands for Anorthotikon Komma Ergazomenou Laou ('The Progressive Party of the Working People'), sought an independent socialist republic.


Pounds highlighted the spiritualistic discourse of 'geographical predestination' employed by Greek Cypriots, including the Minister of Interior who protested against any proposal to partitioning "the holy soil of Cyprus" (The New York Times, 2/3/64, cited in Pounds, 1964: 163).


Foley (1964: 180).

Foley (1964: 184). The two previous were in Gaza (UNTSO) and the Congo (UNOC).

UNSC Resn. 186 (4/3/64), para.5 (emphasis added).


UN S/5950, para. 220.

UN S/6102, para. 24.

Kyriakides (1968: 120); Ramady (1976: 2-3).

UN S/6102, para. 45. Patrick (1976: 78-79) concluded that, contrary to Greek Cypriot propaganda, the majority of Turkish Cypriots became refugees only after kinsmen had been killed within their vicinity, and not as part of a design for partition. However, even after 1967 and the introduction of pro-rapprochement 'normalisation measures' by Makarios (see below), Turkish Cypriot political and military leaders were to control the return of refugees.

Patrick (1976: 75).

Stearns (1992) has argued that the US saw Cyprus less as a 'country' but more as a 'problem'.


Patrick (1976: 82).


Harbottle (1970: 55). While disruptive in general, it was possible to overcome the embargo under certain circumstances; for example, Greek Cypriot businessmen had Turkish representatives in the enclaves (Ramady, 1976: 5), and local officials from both sides often sought informal 'understandings' (Patrick, 1976: 86-87).
Partitioning Cyprus

Joseph (1985: 201). Turkey was itself unable to impose sanctions on the Greek Cypriots, who controlled the majority of ports and industries on which the Turkish Cypriots were also dependent (Patrick, 1976: 209).


Attalides (1979: 96); Drury (1981: 300). Drury (1977) provided an instructive regional study of Turkish Cypriot underdevelopment in southwestern Cyprus.

UN S/5950, para. 190).


UN S/11294, para. 47; Patrick (1976: 110-111); Cranshaw (1978: 372).


Ramady (1976: 5).

Cranshaw (1978: 373).


The reason for ‘intercommunal’ rather than ‘international’ talks appears to have been the UN’s desire not to dangerously entangle Greek-Turk interests further (Hampson, 1996: 36). In so doing, this process presented the Turkish Cypriot negotiators with a greater sense of ‘political equality’.

Patrick (1976: 166-167) observed that the ‘normalisation’ move by the Greek Cypriot government was not itself entirely altruistic, given the labour shortages its economy was facing at the time. This further brought into question what was understood by each leadership as ‘normal’ conditions (Grundy-Warr, 1984: 112).

Drury (1981: 300) observed a vicious cycle which encouraged an ethnically homogenous environment: while Greek Cypriots were decreasingly inconvenienced by the enclaves (having produced their own, new spheres of influence), the Turkish Cypriot’s were able to move relatively freely (although many chose not to) such that their “awareness of the improving Greek lot was as great as the latter’s ignorance of, and indifference towards, the Turk’s mounting frustrations and sense of divorce”.

Sant Cassia (1996).


Patrick (1976: 337). See also Panagides’ (1968) pessimistic economic analysis.

UN S/11294, para. 44.

Cranshaw (1978: 393).

Coufoudakis (1976b) and Oberling (1982) provide contrasting views of the long-running debate over the legitimacy of Turkey’s second phase in the light of the collapse of the coup.

The number of refugees created both south and north of the UNBZ remains contested (Planning Bureau; 1975a: 1; PIO (south), 1996; Morvaridi, 1993).

These are also known respectively as the Western Sovereign Base Area (WSBA) and the Eastern Sovereign Base Area (ESBA).

Eden (1960: 396); CMND (1960).


Cranshaw (1978: 357).

Recent SBA reports actually calculate the area as 98 m², made up of WSBA (47.5) and ESBA (50.5) (SBA, 1996: 1).


Melamid (1961: 307-308). Reflecting their unusual status, its inhabitants were offered either dual citizenship (British and Cypriot) or compensation for ‘emigration’ into the ROC.

92 Melamid (1961: 308).

There are at least 46 potential maritime boundaries in the Mediterranean, of which only 10 have been formally agreed (Blake, 1997: 77).

Unless other agreements superseded the 1878 Act, which is not the case for the SBAs.

Prescott (1987: 299-300). Nor did they apparently allow for any territorial waters attributable to the enclaved Dhekelia power station (Interview, Area Officer of Dhekelia SBA, Dhekelia, 6/12/96).

US State Department (1972: 2). An alternative explanation offered by one commentator is that the alignment of the delimitation lines was the result of British military requirements at the time the agreement was concluded (Ahnish, 1993: 258).

Although there exist no published records of the negotiations which led to this agreement, the US State Department argued that this deliberate non-termination is due to the concern that either party might extend its territorial sea such that it would envelope or enclose the other’s sea, or anticipating the need for the limits to serve as a continental shelf or seabed boundary beyond the territorial sea (US State Department, 1972: 2). The UK government more recently argued that these boundaries were open-ended simply to ensure that access from either SBA does not require transit through the ROC’s territorial sea (Pers. Comm., Territorial Waters Officer, UK Ministry of Defence Hydrographic Office, 2/5/96).

Prescott (1987: 300). Langford (1993: 415) clarified this comment by noting that waters lying beyond the 3 nm UK territorial sea claim but within 12 nm of the ROC coast are in fact ‘high seas’. On 6 August 1964, the ROC unilaterally claimed territorial waters 12 nm measured from the low-water line (Ahnish, 1993: 162).

CMND (1960: 82, 201).


With regards to the airport, however, the British government had declared that it be taken over once ‘Cypriots’ sufficiently qualified became available (Cranshaw, 1978: 357).


The Cyprus Mail (27/12/63); Harbottle (1970: 64). Clerides and Denktash became involved only once the agreement had been struck (The Cyprus Mail, 30/12/63).


Fursdon (1990: 12).

As declared by Sandys, the British Commonwealth Relations Secretary, who allegedly proposed the 'neutral zone' idea (The Cyprus Mail, 31/12/63).


Cranshaw (1978: 368).


Patrick (1976: 54, 297).

Patrick (1976: 131). In addition, as at Pyla, the proximity of the ESBA discouraged activities that would threaten its local patronage (Patrick, 1976: 307).


Drury (1977)


The former estimates can be found in UN S/6102, para. 143 and Stegenga (1968: 155) respectively, while the latter is attributed to Drury (1981: 298).


Volkan (1979: 80); Kumar (1997a: 31).


UN S/5950, para.109.


Partitioning Cyprus

133 Patrick (1976); Kolodny (1971). An optimistic Turkish Cypriot map was reproduced in TCHRC (1983: 159).


135 King (1980a).

136 In addition to newspaper archives, this analysis draws heavily on Polyviou (1976) and Birand (1985) who provide invaluable accounts, if only of the high-level proceedings.

137 IISS (1975: 77-78); Henn (1994: 81). In all, six days had been planned to reach what was termed the Sahin line, the ultimate objective of the mission (Birand, 1985: 45).


139 Turkish Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit, as quoted in Birand (1985: 48).

140 IISS (1975: 78).


144 The US and UN were also in attendance (Birand, 1985). White (1997: 262) rightly noted the absence of either Cypriot community in these initial Geneva negotiations.


146 Birand (1985: 60).

147 Ecevit (1984: 15); UN S/11568, para. 6.


150 The Cyprus Mail (3/8/74).

151 The Cyprus Mail (4-8/8/74).

152 These were the words of the British representative, Colonel Hunter (The Cyprus Mail, 10-11/8/74).

153 The Cyprus Mail (8/8/74); Birand (1985: 84).

154 As quoted in Birand (1985: 87, emphasis added). Callaghan (1987: 349) has since questioned Günes' real authority at the conference, as it was apparent that the Turkish Generals were calling most of the shots. In turn, the introduction of Denktash to the proceedings later on was to have limited impact because, according to Callaghan (1987: 354), Denktash had confided in him that he was obliged to obey his 'masters' on the Turkish mainland.

155 The Cyprus Mail (13/8/74); Birand (1985: 92).


On 13 August Clerides, after Callaghan’s prompting, also provided his own draft proposal, which referred to the ‘grouping’ together of villages by respective communal authorities, but for administrative purposes alone. By now, both Callaghan and Kissinger saw this as not ‘enough’ to appease Clerides’ counterparts, and they instead sought to initiate negotiations on reducing the Turkish demand from 34% to 20%, and to greatly reduce the refugee implications (Polyviou, 1976: 355).


UN S/11568, para. 15.

King (1979: 122) noted rightly the geographical and logistical ‘logic’ behind the annexation of the north of the island. The Turkish Cypriot/Turkish alliance had often highlighted the ‘natural’ links (either geological or historical) of the northern section with Turkey (Kuçük, 1957; Ismail, 1989: 10).

Péchoux (1976: 20) also depicted CFLs encircling the Louroujina and Pergamos enclaves on 17 August. As noted in Chapter 6, there were to be several key Turkish advances after 16 August (UN S/11568, para. 26).

UN S/12946, para. 23; Tornaritis (1975: 80). Given the Turkish Forces’ preference for siege and consolidation within enclaves, rather than outright territorial assault in the first phase, the demarcation of Nicosia’s ‘green line’ was to alter little during these events (as it had done since 1964) (The Guardian, 22/7/74). In the less built-up or less inhabited areas outside the city walls (e.g., the abandoned area of Omorphita and a golf course to the city’s west), however, the demarcation line was to change (Péchoux, 1976: 18).


Klieman (1980) employed these conceptual divisions in his study of Palestine.


Melamid (1961: 308).

Stavrinides (1976: 114).

Necatigil (1994: 51) argued that, like Bosnia-Hercegovina’s 1994 agreement, such constitutions require a territorial basis before ‘true’ federation can be obtained.


In support of this Turkish Cypriot argument, see Camp (1980).

Eden (1960: 415); Holland et al. (1997: 258).

Rizvi (1993: 60). This scenario was in direct contrast to Eden’s purported intentions (Eden, 1960: 397, 415).


Part III

The Management of Transboundary Resources in Post-partition Cyprus
Chapter 5
Island-wide Perspective: Contesting Transboundary Resources, Development and an ‘Island’ State

5.1 Introduction

The previous chapter explained the partitioning process in Cyprus, and observed that while political, socio-economic, and cultural boundaries were unquestionably discernible between the two communities prior to 1974, the events surrounding the Turkish military intervention were to draw most effectively a single boundary between Greek Cypriot, Turkish Cypriot and, at the same time, across the island’s resource base. This chapter seeks to illustrate, from the island-wide perspective, to what extent and in what form transboundary resources were subsequently recognised, examining a broad spectrum of political debate after 1974. In this, as in the two chapters which follow, events are not necessarily analysed in chronological order; while their sequence remains important, and historical relations—especially concerning intercommunal and ‘high level’ negotiations (Appendix 1)—are implicit throughout, and highlighted where relevant, these three chapters are structured more thematically to open up the main theoretical considerations which concern this thesis.

Section 5.2 considers ‘official’ representations of the immediate consequences of partition in 1974 on what were perceived to be key resources for either community from the island-wide perspective. As noted in the opening chapter, while the general character of post-partition intercommunal relations was to be largely determined by the unproductive process of intercommunal and ‘high level’ negotiations from 1974, it is argued that, in particular, ‘official’ representations of the (re)distribution of resources in the aftermath of summer 1974 were to subsequently determine their ‘transboundary’ character. From 1974 to 1975, a transboundary resource management agenda was formulated by the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities. Central to this were two specific forms of implicit cooperation over transboundary resource management—concerning water resource and electricity power supplies, which are analysed in Section 5.3 as a means determining the ‘meaning’ of transboundary resource management in
Cyprus. The two subsequent sections go on to examine a crucial debate within and between both ‘official’ and ‘unofficial’ spheres of society in Cyprus, over whether the economy and the environment of Cyprus should be addressed at the geographical scale of the ‘island’. From this, conclusions are then drawn as to the extent and form of transboundary resource management from the island-wide perspective.

5.2 In the Aftermath: Interpreting a Geographical Redistribution of Resources

In searching for the ‘intellectual wellsprings’ of partition, Klieman noted an English cultural and historical predisposition to compromise which was, in the “sweet language or reasonableness”, expressed proverbially as ‘half a loaf of bread is better than none’.

In exploring contrasting ‘official’ interpretations of political and economic developments in the immediate aftermath of the summer of 1974, it becomes apparent that the particular bifurcation process in Cyprus meant that, for a number of reasons, not all parties consented to receiving only ‘half a loaf’ (or at times less). Neither for that matter, however, did receiving ‘less’ necessarily translate into producing ‘less’ economically. Even within a year of de facto partition, the foundations for the socio-economic future of each community had been laid, and the political character of transboundary resource management had begun to take shape.

5.2.1 Representing absolute and relative losses

Given their political and economic status before the Turkish military intervention, it was of little surprise that the Greek Cypriot, internationally-recognised government was outraged by all the material and cultural loss that such an ‘unnatural’ separation entailed. By December 1974, in a letter to the Secretary-General, Zenon Rossides (the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the UN) had documented the consequences; as a result of the second phase of ‘aggression and invasion’ the area now under Turkish ‘military occupation’ had expanded ‘tenfold’, to ‘40%’ of the island’s territory. Seventy-per cent of its total gross output had now been ‘cut off’. Indeed, a fuller
picture of the post-partition resource landscape began to develop from various sources, predominantly originating with the Greek Cypriot authorities (Table 5.1).

Of the economically-active Greek Cypriot population, 35% had been made 'idle'. As a consequence of this 'biblical catastrophe', substantial agricultural investment had been seized and tourism, 61% of whose assets were north of the UNBZ, was 'totally destroyed'. The agricultural sector (the largest employer, and producing foodstuffs which were the traditional export) was the worst hit through the loss of land, exports and, in addition, a heavy loss of individual life savings. With the two most important tourist resorts (Famagusta and Kyrenia) and their associated hotel capacity now in the north, tourist receipts were also lost. Factories in the north collectively producing 26% of manufacturing output were affected. The ROC's dependence on foreign sources of raw materials, semi-finished and final products had inevitably rocketed. Of Greek Cypriot property, over an estimated CY£250 mn worth of houses had been evacuated, over CY£150 mn of movable household property was left behind, in addition to CY£7.5 mn of agricultural equipment and CY£8.5 mn worth of cattle stock.

There was a general international consensus that what was left behind by the 180,000 Greek Cypriot refugees collectively constituted a greater material and socio-psychological loss than those resources which fell beyond the reach of the 40,000 Turkish Cypriot refugees after 1974. While accepting these broad 'realities', however, to a great extent no matter what sources were used for estimating the economic impact in 1974, it was impossible to provide an objective evaluation—because of events just prior to the military intervention, in particular the 1972-73 drought, the oil crisis, and the UK's accession to the EC which had not yet affected economic indicators fully. The military intervention had "struck an island that was already threatened". The construction of such precise 'balance sheets', it could therefore be supposed, served additional purposes. Primarily, the scale of change relative to that affecting the Turkish Cypriots clearly mattered. The Greek Cypriot authorities invariably presented such figures as ratios or percentages, thus emphasising the reconfiguration of resources vis-à-vis the island's skewed population ratio. There seemed to be an imperative to stress this even more, given that the population density in the north had fallen from over 180 to less than 95 persons/m², while in the south it had risen from 173 to over
Table 5.1  *Estimates of the island's resources under 'occupation' post-partition*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Resources falling under 'occupation'</th>
<th>% island's total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Area</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>territory</td>
<td>37-40&lt;sup&gt;13&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>coastline</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>continental shelf</td>
<td>40 +</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Land resources</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tobacco</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>carrots</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>citrus</td>
<td>79 +</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cereals</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>green fodders</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mining and quarrying outputs</td>
<td>50-56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>agricultural exports</td>
<td>48-60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>livestock production</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>crop production</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>olives</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>carobs</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>potatoes</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Infrastructural resources</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tourist accommodation under construction</td>
<td>87-96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fishing shelters</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>existing tourist accommodation capacity</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>industrial output</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hospital bed capacity in rural areas</td>
<td>45.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>housing stock</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>school buildings</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>district hospitals</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources:<sup>14</sup>.

220 persons/m<sup>2</sup>.<sup>15</sup> In addition, however, with regards to the ambiguous status of Turkey's role in the north,<sup>16</sup> strategically important land was presented as inaccessible and this reaffirmed suspicions that Turkish Forces, during the second phase of their military intervention, had sought to create an economically viable Turkish Cypriot sector.<sup>17</sup> By extension, emphasis was placed on the likely 'lack of maintenance', 'crops not harvested', and 'agricultural potential systematically destroyed' in the north.
5.2.2 Reassessing the resource base

Within the space of a year, however, it became clear that the absolute loss of certain resources for Greek Cypriots would not necessarily translate directly into an economic downturn for the long-term. A series of ‘Emergency Action Plans’, superseding the ROC’s 1972-1976 Third Five-Year Development Plan, aimed at improving the severed infrastructure, creating employment, and maintaining social benefits. Fortunately, most agricultural produce was exported early in the year (and thus pre-coup and military intervention), so that although Greek Cypriot citrus exports plummeted as the Morphou area fell to the Turkish Forces, volume of potatoes exported (which were mainly grown in the Kokkinokhoria region) was able to double in the next three years. Thus, by the end of 1976, the volume of Greek Cypriot exports was at record levels, with clothing, footwear and cement leading the way. In spite of their catastrophic resource base losses, the Greek Cypriot government had established structural adjustments underpinning an economic regeneration programme which was to pave the way for further economic progress.

For the Turkish Cypriot community, the events of 1974 were largely interpreted favourably in socio-political terms, in direct contrast to Greek Cypriots. A process of resettlement had begun, most notably with the Turkish government and Denktash demanding that the 9,390 Turkish Cypriot temporary inhabitants of Akrotiri SBA to proceed via Turkey to northern Cyprus. The SBAs had, during the military intervention, become crowded with refugees, both Greek Cypriot (in Dhekelia) and Turkish Cypriot (in Akrotiri). In spite of Greek, Greek Cypriot and British protestations, a general agreement of an exchange of population was achieved on 20 September 1974. Between July 1974 and December 1975 some 180,000 Greek Cypriots and 40,000 Turkish Cypriots moved southwards and northwards respectively.

While the Turkish Cypriot community were by implication excluded from nearly two-thirds of the island, they now had 37% of the land area, disproportionate to their population ratio. It was ironic, therefore, that it was they who were to suffer most in economic terms in the aftermath of 1974. Specifically, two formal developments were to form the basis of their economic and social policy, complemented by one notably ‘unofficial’ development. Infrastructural resources gained priority for financial assistance; the most urgent problem being the reestablishing of an east-west road link.
Island-wide Perspective

(between the citrus growing region of Morphou and the town of Famagusta). Tymbou airport was formally upgraded to international standards (and renamed as ‘Erçan’), and a national airline was established. About 90% of the financial investment on these and other projects between 1975 and 1977 was provided by Turkey. Primarily, however, there was a concerted programme for resettling Turkish Cypriots and reallocating available resources—in essence, expropriating extensive Greek Cypriot property. Turkish troops and Turkish Cypriots had looted Greek property, resentful of their economic deprivation during the past eleven years. On 1 November 1974 the UNGA had called for renewed talks under the ‘good offices’ of the UN Secretary-General. Five days later Clerides, whilst still Acting-President of the ROC, publicly voiced his belief for the first time that a federal solution now had to be sought, and by the following January discussion had begun to address the powers and functions of a central government in a federal Cypriot state, the idea of a multi-regional settlement now having been destroyed. This was demonstrated when, on 13 February 1975 the ‘Turkish Federated State of Cyprus’ (TFSC) was established, which—so the constitution read—was ready to form the Turkish Cypriot half of a federal republic, the economic policy of which was directed into making the best use of ‘idle factors of production’, and to begin ‘planning’ the economy.

Without any baseline information on the pre-1974 economic activities of Turkish Cypriots, however, the TFSC’s planning proved problematic. By using a general classificatory system, the aim was to try to resettle every refugee village (i.e., the collective inhabitants) in a ‘place’ with similar characteristics in the north. A ‘Housing and Rehabilitation Office’ advised villagers over the allocation of kahva, farms, and boreholes. As for the transfer of title deeds, from November 1974 Turkish Cypriot refugees owning land in the south were to receive compensatory land, together with an ‘equal value land document’. This necessitated the re-surveying of agricultural land uses before correlations were eventually found (e.g., 1 donum of citrus orchards now equated with 10.2 donums of cereal land), and the redrawing of rural administrative boundaries to accommodate new agricultural ownership. Cooperative farming organisations were quickly (re)established in order to manage perishing and unharvested agricultural resources over the short term, especially the citrus orchards in Morphou, while financial aid and food was more generally provided through the authorities and through the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR).
A majority of Turkish Cypriots were farmers and, up to 1974, their community’s share of the island’s international trade was below 10%. At the industrial level, consequently, while a proportion of the sector was rented on a long-term basis to private parties, a lack of previous experience in the industrial sector encouraged the TFSC to take over the management of 60% of industrial factories, as a public company in collaboration with corporate interests in Turkey. ‘Cyprufruvex’ was therefore established in 1975 to manage and market agricultural produce, while ‘Cyprus Turkish Tourism Enterprises Ltd.’ were to own or rent the majority of the 2,600 hotel beds remaining in the north. Nonetheless, by mid-1976 only 19% of the manufacturing industries acquired were in production, and at a reduced capacity. Agriculture remained the dominant industry, accounting for 36% of GDP.

Leading on from this was an unofficial development. The shortage of Turkish Cypriot technical manpower to manage resources was considered resolvable through the import of manpower from mainland Turkey. In parallel, in-migration had been encouraged to prevent the abandonment of whole areas; the governments of both (north) Nicosia and Ankara were concerned about an anti-mainland backlash with economic stagnation. Just as Turkey was to prop up the ailing economy immediately following the military intervention, so Turkish settlers—introduced as either ‘seasonal workers’ or soldiers’ relatives visiting ‘temporarily’—were to exploit latent economic potential. These developments, not surprisingly, brought strong diplomatic reactions from the Greek Cypriot side; immigration was seen only as furthering the usurpation of hotels, restaurants, factories and other industries now lying north of the CFLs. Turkish and Turkish Cypriots were accused of reallocating heavy machinery, yachts, trucks, and cars belonging to Greek Cypriots, or exporting them to Turkey.

Just as the fragmentary territorial partition of the two main communities on the island from 1963 to 1974 had affected their respective negotiating stances, so the 1974-1975 population transfers, which completed the partition of the island into two distinct ethnic zones, were to hold major implications for the subsequent negotiations. And just as the negotiating positions were to develop and contest the meaning of a proposed federal, bicommmunal ‘state’, so the reconfiguration of the resource base between the two communities was to become a significant source of diplomatic (and almost military) conflict. Fundamentally, and as Waldheim was to later observe while ‘evaluating’ the overall conflict in 1981, “qualitative and quantitative divergences of views have [...]

171
Island-wide Perspective

emerged with regards to the search for objective criteria. The two sides’ estimates of natural resources, land ownership, infrastructure, percentage of land under each side’s control, number of displaced persons, differ”. By extension, it can be argued that there was to be no basis for ‘objective’, transboundary resource management proposals for the foreseeable future.

5.3 The Meaning of Transboundary Resource Management

Contrasting interpretations of Cyprus’ resources in terms of their redistribution post-1974 were subsequently to further impact on ‘official’ interpretations of their transboundary character. Given the presence of a de facto partition boundary, the extent to which resources—and any cooperation over their management—remained ‘intercommunal’, or became ‘international’, inter-‘state’, or ‘transboundary’ in nature, proved highly instructive. By examining the two major issue areas—water (Section 5.3.1) and electricity supplies (Section 5.3.2)—where transboundary interdependencies were, uniquely, accommodated after 1974, it is necessary to be equally as interested in the history of transboundary cooperation produced in Cyprus, as the history of cooperation produced about Cyprus, as Section 5.3.3 will consider in detail.

5.3.1 Water resource management (I): a common, transboundary problem

The scarcity of fresh water resources on the island has often been described as the second ‘Cyprus Problem’ although, it in laying out the ROC’s first programme of economic development in 1961, President Makarios stated that “[t]he lack of sufficient water constitutes the most serious problem of Cyprus”. Thus, in his otherwise triumphal opening speech to the House of Representatives, Makarios observed that the island, despite its explosive economic potential. The growth of a burgeoning agriculture and tourism economy rested precariously upon an attenuated water resource base. In the past, Cyprus’ water shortages had been blamed on a vicious circle of natural and structural constraints: the lack of rainfall, and the absence of a planning body to overcome complex private water rights. With a view to an ‘equitable distribution of water’, the ‘nationalisation’ of the island’s water resources would now be considered
and annual government investment was to increase sevenfold; dams, in particular, were to replenish groundwater resources and improve domestic supplies. Over the next generation, Makarios’ bullishness was to be dramatically vindicated. Notably, developments occurred on the supply side of the water equation as the Archbishop famously declared “not a drop of water to the sea”; the water-impoverished island came to possess the largest concentration of dams anywhere in the world. In February 1960, the recently-inaugurated ROC government, as the new member of the United Nations Organisation, had made its first request for technical assistance to what was then the United Nations Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance (UNPTA). This was to constitute the basis for the state’s first development programme. As a result of what came to be known as the ‘Thorpe Report’, an Economic Planning Commission was established which, in close cooperation with other UN organisations and agencies, identified ‘priority areas’ for technical assistance and interaction. The most substantive UNDP programmes, island-wide, were to address the management of the scarce water resources, recognised in the original report as a critical sector for development. Two extensive UNDP-assisted water surveys were undertaken between 1962 and 1973, although, in the light of the intercommunal troubles they were largely devoid of Turkish Cypriots participation. Nonetheless, upon these the ROC were to draw their future water management plans.

Water supply problems were an island-wide phenomena. Representing a semi-arid island exposed to the whims of low, unevenly distributed and unreliable rainfall pattern, Cyprus’ water balance had been historically precarious. While the average yearly rainfall island-wide is limited to 470-500 mm, half of it falling between December and January, in four out of ten years less than half of this amount is received. This rainfall was also spatially differentiated, ranging from 300 mm in the central plain and the southeastern part of the island, to 1,100 mm and 550 mm at the top of the Troodos and Kyrenia ranges respectively. There are no perennial rivers and of the rainfall, with average maximum temperatures in July and August reaching 36°C on the central plain leading to 80% losses by evapotranspiration, only about 900 mn.cu.m. of water in Cyprus is left as surface run-off and for underground recharge (Table 5.2). On this balance, of the mean annual water crop island-wide, the outflows create a small but significant deficit of 5%.
### Island-wide Perspective

#### Table 5.2  
*Estimated island-wide water balance in Cyprus*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Island-wide (mn. cu. m./yr.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mean annual precipitation</td>
<td>4600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evapotranspiration</td>
<td>900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I) Surface water</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irrigation</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>diverted for usage or storage</td>
<td>190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>runoff to sea</td>
<td>260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II) Replenishment of aquifers</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(over)pumped</td>
<td>270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lost to sea</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


#### Table 5.3  
*Principal aquifers in Cyprus*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aquifer</th>
<th>Pumpage (mn. cu. m./yr.)</th>
<th>Replenishment (mn. cu. m./yr.)</th>
<th>Losses to sea</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Morphou</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Akrotiri</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kokkinokhoria</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyrenia Mtns</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>na</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicosia</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polis</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Famagusta</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maroni</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paphos</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The island’s principal aquifers (see Table 5.3 and Figure 5.1) were to be found along the coast and in coastal valleys. Since 1950 the water table of Morphou’s aquifer had been dropping up to several feet per year, not only due to increasing water demands (especially from citrus) but also due to a lack of natural replenishment. Great importance had been given to development of groundwater, at the time proving cheaper than dam construction, such that between 1927 and 1959 the drilling of wells was subsidised by the colonial government. Between 1960 and 1974, in turn, further surveys were undertaken to try and assess the potential of these critical resources, and a series of dams, including those at Lefkara and Yermasoyia, were constructed in parallel as an integral part of formulating a long-term water ‘master plan’ of action.

With independence, part of the island’s critical water resource base had fallen within the SBAs territory. However, the first precedent for transboundary water management had been set during the SBA’s establishment when it became evident that, subject to ‘military requirements and security needs being met’, policy regarding the control of water in the SBAs would be considered by a joint, ‘international’ committee. Annex B of the 1960 Treaty of Establishment provided that representatives from the ROC and UK would continually review the question of such water supplies as they affected their respective needs, and “to ensure that those needs are met and that the water available is fairly distributed”. It was to survive the 1974 de facto partition and prove an important regime for both riparians, especially in Dhekelia SBA which was to rely on groundwater and an ageing desalination plant for subsequent years.

In terms of relations between Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot water users, in contrast, the partitioning of Cyprus had quickly exacerbated the ethnic and political nature of water control. Post-partition, in both policy and practice, there was to be increasing divergence on an institutionalised basis. The impact of the creation of the UNBZ on the geographical distribution of water resources had been direct. Each side was left with sufficient water to sustain immediate community needs, but the limited water distribution infrastructure meant that the Greek Cypriot community had lost direct access to the largest underground aquifer in Morphou—meaning, at the time, that over 40% of the island’s aquifer reserves were within the north. Precious water springs at Kythrea and Lapithos (estimated at 60% of the total water available for irrigation),
Figure 5.1  **Major water supply projects and distribution networks in Cyprus**

Sources: Compiled by author from MANR (north) (1980); Iacovides (1993); B. Smith (1997: 239).
were inaccessible, as were 20% of domestic water supplies.\textsuperscript{52} It was claimed, overall, that one third of water resources now fell under ‘Turkish occupation’.\textsuperscript{53}

For their part, the Turkish Cypriot community was excluded from the greatest discharging rivers, running off the Troodos mountains to the south. In strategic terms it was clear that supplies relative to those of the Turkish Cypriots were as important as their absolute amount. Of 40 streams island-wide, only a quarter fell in the north, while the Turkish Cypriots’ 8 active dams (with 8 mn.cu.m. capacity) compared unfavourably with 45 dams on the Greek Cypriot side (with sixfold capacity).\textsuperscript{54} During the sixth Vienna talks in late March 1977, Önan, the Turkish Cypriot interlocutor, in formally rejecting ‘grossly exaggerated’ Greek Cypriot claims of ‘75.8%’ of the island’s economic resources falling in the north, estimated that only 17.3% of the (unspecified) ‘water resources’ were now in the TFSC, and that if Morphou and Kythrea were lost in accordance with Greek Cypriot territorial proposals (see Appendix 2), then Turkish Cypriots would have access to only 4.46% of the ‘annual safe yield of aquifers’, and 0.2% of ‘running streams’.\textsuperscript{55}

By 1981, when their own territorial proposals were forwarded for the first time, it became clear that the underground aquifers were of greatest importance to the Turkish Cypriots: those on the Greek Cypriot side were seen to offer excellent prospects for utilisation and development, while the Famagusta and Morphou aquifers in the north were threatened with destruction by overextraction and seawater intrusion.\textsuperscript{56} In turn, the Turkish Cypriot authorities noted that the Mesaoria plain received less irrigation than land in the south. By now, Denktash was making less quantitatively but more qualitatively precise statements;

“\textit{[w]e are the guards of our borders. Let us all together shout at the Greek side, which says that if Morphou is not given there could be no peace. Then there will be no peace. Because Morphou will never be given back}”.\textsuperscript{57}

Indeed, Atakol, the TFSC’s Minister of Energy and Natural Resources, had declared on 2 March 1975 that “\textit{[i]f we proclaim our independence it is because we have been pushed by the difficulties of our water supplies}”—if without, as Pechoux rightly observed, specifying how this institutional change would allow them to manage what remained largely a hydrological and technical problem.\textsuperscript{58} A lack of water data to verify such estimations held further implications. The Greek Cypriot authorities noted that the ROC's Water Development Department building housing the hydrological records and
the library had been burnt down during the 1974 events. The problem of objectively
guaging available water reserves island-wide was to prove significant over the longer-
term.

These ‘officially’ constructed representations of a divided and distinctively
separate hydrological character to Cyprus after 1974 nonetheless failed to give
sufficient recognition to the presence of a number of inherited hydrological
interdependencies which persisted. Indeed, it was apparent that there was an informal
agreement between the two communities’ de facto authorities to maintain certain
transboundary sections of the embryonic water supply system, as it was set up before
1974. Although generally presented as an island-wide (read: ‘national’) issue, as will be
considered in Chapters 6 and 7 the location of this cooperation was largely a product of
and limited to the borderland but nevertheless enforced a certain degree and type of
transboundary cooperation, further considered in Section 5.3.3.60. Transfers
concentrated at the border region, where a large number of rural villages and towns
drew their domestic water supplies from the ‘other’ side (as further discussed in Chapter
6), where the Pendayia-Morphou boreholes made a significant contribution to the total
water requirements of Nicosia, and where the Lefkara-Skarinou region in the south
provided supplies for Famagusta (see Chapter 7).

From the late 1970s, in the south, given both the hydrological conditions and
also the realities of territorial control, which for the ROC ran counter to a rapidly
growing economy, the water development projects initiated pre-1974 were to grow both
in number and scale, involving major interbasin transfers aiming at a more complete
utilisation of all ground and surface water resources. The events of 1963-1974 had
temporarily ‘postponed’ but ultimately terminated the completion of those projects
which had included areas now under Turkish Cypriot control, most notably plans for the
Morphou-Tylliria project assisted by the UNDP and FAO (see Chapter 6).61 They
failed, however, to prevent the eventual completion of the other irrigation, dam-building
and water transfer projects located in the south. While water treatment plants were
constructed at Kirokitia, Kornos and Limassol, large water development projects were
undertaken at Paphos (for irrigation, completed in 1982), Khrysokhou (for irrigation,
planned completion 1998), and in the Pitsilia and Vasilikos-Pendaskinos regions (both
localised infrastructural developments, completed in 1984 and 1987 respectively)
(Figure 5.1). The largest and most significant construction undertaken by the ROC,
Island-wide Perspective

however, was the Southern Conveyor Project (SCP) initiated in 1984, for which the UNDP continued to provide consultancy services and the World Bank invested US$300 mn. Exhausted underground water supplies in the rich potato-growing region of Kokkinokhoria area, located in the east of the area under de facto ROC control, had spurred on the Greek Cypriots with plans to store water from the Troodos mountains. During the 1982-86 period, 60% of the ROC's agricultural development budget was allocated for developing water supplies, in itself making up 26% of the ROC's total development budget. The SCP's waters were subsequently used to irrigate 14,000 ha along the coastal area between Akrotiri and Famagusta, and were intended to recharge aquifers in Limassol and Larnaca districts. It was to remain the most ambitious water development activity on the island.

Speedily-implemented and extensive water development works in the south post-partition, were to contrast sharply with progress north of the UNBZ. The TFSC's water authorities had immediately recognised a need to further develop the historically plentiful supplies of underground water in the Morphou area while, at the same time, the resource management considerations already made pre-1974 on the aquifer's overextraction could not be ignored. In 1977, it was estimated that while irrigated citrus in the area—which as a whole was generating 80% of the TFSC's foreign exchange earnings—required some 55 mn.cu.m./yr., the safe yield of the aquifer was 35 mn.cu.m./yr. To supplement these resources, therefore, a project would divert 20 mn.cu.m./yr. from the nearby Xeros, Marathasa and Karyotis rivers that historically had flowed to the sea to provide vital irrigation waters for Morphou and to recharge the aquifer. Funding of the project was unsuccessfully sought through the EC, the FAO/UNDP's feasibility study for the Morphou-Tylliria was unilaterally adapted by the TFSC, with assistance symbolically from Turkey's Water Supply and Irrigation Department. Contracts for the Morphou Derivation Project (Figure 5.1) were not established until October 1981; a regulator and canal system was initially established in the Lefka region, while the second stage, linking Karavostassí and Nikitas, began in May 1983. Further inland, and eastwards, the areas surrounding north Nicosia and Famagusta were characterised by very little groundwater potential, and through a Nicosia-Famagusta 'Drinking and General Water Project', established in 1991, Famagusta was finally linked with Morphou's aquifer (Figure 5.1)—although, in turn, this placed additional demands on Morphou's reserves (see Chapter 7).
In spite of these unilateral, supply-sided infrastructural developments in the 1980s both north and, particularly, south of the UNBZ, a common water problem persisted. By the early 1990s there remained two general but major constraints for both communities: high variance in local rainfed water supplies and mining of aquifers, and a universal and disproportionate allocation of water for agricultural purposes. Demonstrating a bias towards agriculture largely in line with southern Mediterranean countries as a whole, and in line with most Middle Eastern countries in particular, up to 80% of water use was for irrigation purposes (Table 5.4).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 5.4</th>
<th>Estimated water consumption in Cyprus (de facto) by sector in 1994</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Island-wide (mn.cu.m./yr.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>318</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tourism</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>403</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Estimates from MAF (1992: 9); TAHAL (1995: 4); EIU (1997: 2nd qtr., 19). Note: In the absence of previous analysis, ‘Island-wide’ is estimated simply by combining the consumption levels for the two de facto territories.

The lion’s share of available water for the agricultural sector was generally rationalised in terms of food security and unemployment in rural areas. And as with most centralised water authorities, the main constraint over improved planning and management, over the medium to long-term, was the capability to develop a sophisticated and far-sighted water management strategy, along with the legislation and administration to support it. The creation of a ‘domestic’ never mind a ‘transboundary’ framework for this had clearly been stalled since the 1960s onwards.

By 1994 the Turkish Cypriot water authorities, with an estimated potential water supply of only 110 mn.cu.m./yr. (Table 5.4), were notably grappling with a marginal but
Island-wide Perspective

increasing deficit. Irrigated agriculture, 65% of which was made up of tree crops, was also becoming characterised by low water quality supplies. Sea water intrusion at Morphou, due to overpumping by the 650 irrigation and 15 municipal boreholes since the 1950s, had now extended for up to 4 km inland. A basic lack of adequate data continued to constrain the planning effort in the north, while in the south the government had been able to approach the World Bank to provide an environmental review and action plan and subsequent reports; these, however, subsequently suggested that rather than concentrating on new dams and desalination plants (with their respective problems of redundant capacity, and expensive and polluting fossil fuels), Greek Cypriot policy should concentrate on the demands of the agricultural industry. Making such a policy-shift unattractive, however, was an ever-strong farming lobby unmoved by the argument that the tourist and manufacturing sectors now supported the economy.

A distinguishable crisis point was to be reached by both communities by the mid-1990s. In November 1996 the Greek Cypriot Water Development Department (WDD) noted that irrigation demands had increased 20% since 1990, while rainfall since the previous October had been 75% normal levels. Dam levels in the south were falling: 66.5% of capacity in February 1995; 34% in August 1996, and they were to be only 10% two years later. Transboundary cooperation had seemingly become a sine qua non both to address the question of current inequalities in the distribution of existing water resources on the island, and also to find additional water supplies and constrain demands to provide for current and short-term supply gaps. Prescriptions had been made previously by US observers, who advocated drafting protocols for an island-wide ‘Water Compact’: a comprehensive, integrated water management programme would better manage the complex groundwater resources, where cooperation might have benefited from economies of scale. Yet, in spite of growing third party interest, both state authorities continued to look away from the ‘other’ alternative. Following its Middle Eastern neighbours, in the search for alternatives, with surface and groundwater under stress, both parties looked to desalination and water imports. The first major desalination plant on the island, in Dhekelia became operational in April 1997, although with an initial capacity of only 20,000 cu.m./day, its impact was generally recognised as limited. As the need for water supplies was recognised increasingly from the early 1990s, the two communities had become ‘outward-looking’ in their search for
external, transboundary assistance. But they were to remain, in essence, ‘inward-looking’ in that the political boundaries being traversed were those of a common ‘national’ identification: the Turkish Cypriot authorities looked to Turkey, while the Greek Cypriots looked to Greece.

This continuing divergence was most vividly illustrated in their reconsideration of importing fresh water to the island. Transfers from Turkey were not a new idea, having been first considered in the late 1950s by British and Turkish diplomats while Cypriot independence was under discussion, and the 1961 ‘Thorpe Report’ had recommended to the ROC that a water pipeline link with Turkey be seriously considered. In February 1974, after a series of extremely dry seasons, Makarios had requested a government study considering imports from both Syria and Turkey, but it was only months later, just before the second wave of the 1974 Turkish military intervention, that there were reports of Turkish investments in water (and oil) pipelines linking the north with the mainland. Within the year the TFSC Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources had expressed the belief that the Mesaoria plain was capable of supporting over a million people through water imports, although a ‘30 mn.cu.m./yr.’ annual deficit in Morphou remained a major concern. In parallel, there were reports of both British and French companies undertaking pre-feasibility studies for both pipeline (to either the north-east or north-west of the TFSC) and tanker imports from Turkey. While the economic downturn in Turkey temporarily undermined the scheme, the results of a French study were publicised with much speculation in early 1978: the laying of a pipeline had been considered most effective, but its costs suggested that tanker imports would be preferable in the short term. With this mind, in April 1978, at the time when Denktash was generally eager to discuss ‘other practical steps to heal the wounds of the past’, he proposed the construction of a pipeline to bring water from Turkey to Cyprus for use by both communities; indeed, it was proposed as a ‘joint project’ offered to ‘the whole island’.

Although this particular proposal was in vain, throughout the 1980s the Turkish Ministry of Agriculture refused to drop the idea of the grandiose water project. It began to resurface from May 1991, coinciding with the worst drought on the island for 20 years. Facing local political pressures but also aware of its appeal to international funding agencies, Denktash invited the US, World Bank and UN to prepare a project to import water from Turkey to the TRNC, and offered again to share the water with south
Cyprus. The Greek Cypriots were called on not to make a political issue out of what was a 'humanitarian problem'. Rather than looking across the de facto border for assistance, however, there were signs that the Greek Cypriot community—just like their counterpart—was looking to its 'mainland' ally for assistance. In 1991, and now dictated by 'necessity', the ROC gave serious consideration to its own proposal of importing—from Crete, with some 50,000 cu.m. of drinking water transported by tanker to Limassol each week.85

The proposals of both communities failed to evolve before immediate water shortages were temporarily alleviated with the rainfall of winter 1991, but the drought had also focused the minds of third parties. On approval of the overall, high level framework agreement based on the UN Secretary-General's 'Set of Ideas' in 1992, the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities, in order to promote goodwill and closer relations, were to implement an action programme that called for, inter alia, the establishment of a 'bicommunal committee' to survey the water situation in Cyprus and to make recommendations on ways of meeting the island-wide water needs, 'including from external sources'.86 Not only did this appear to address growing Turkish Cypriot concerns over the deteriorating state of Morphou's aquifer, but kept alive the idea of 'common' water imports. The technical impracticalities that such a project would entail clearly remained second to a basic need, and Yılmaz, Turkish Minister of State, began to seriously concern himself with a US$200 mn water project from 1994,87 if now as part of a more extensive Turkish 'Peace Pipeline' proposed by Turkish Prime Minister Özal in 1987.88 Turkey arguably faced neither immediate water shortages, nor did it have extraneous limitations on its national water resources.89 A proposed diversion from the Seyhan and Ceyhan rivers would be distributed to Syria, Israel, Jordan, the West Bank and Gaza, theoretically to formulate a positive regional interdependency to enhance cooperation.90 Additional projects using Medusa bags would carry 1,880 mn.cu.m/yr. of Manavgat water to terminals in northern Cyprus, various ports along the Mediterranean and Red Sea and, symbolically, to Greek islands.91

By March 1997, the 'Water for Cyprus' project had been finalised: to cost US$250 mn, an 80 km supply line would bring up to 70 mn tons/yr of water to Syrianochori ('Kümköy' in Turkish) on the west coast (Figure 5.1). Gurel, the new Turkish State Minister, declared that it would meet the water demands not only of the TRNC but 'all of Cyprus', and Denktash reaffirmed that "[i]f the Greek Cypriot
administration wishes, it can benefit from it". Finally, in October, Turkey and the TRNC signed a landmark protocol for 3 mn cu.m/yr of drinking water to be tankered from the Turkish mainland, in water bags, to the north-west coast of Cyprus. In logistical terms it was a ‘world first’; moreover, in the eyes of Gürel it meant “water of life for the TRNC”, and was generally presented as solving the drinking water shortage for Nicosia and Famagusta while helping to replenish Morphou’s groundwater.

The Greek Cypriot authorities, however, having repeatedly rejected previous proposals, responded to the water-for-peace scheme as “an emergency response to the drought on the northern side and a further attempt to integrate the north with Turkey”. For the Greek Cypriots, transboundary water transfers of this nature could be considered only after the Cyprus conflict was resolved. And meanwhile, the Greek Cypriot government continued to blame the difficulties in the ‘rational’ development of water resources on the ‘occupation’. This adversarial approach encouraged a defensive, mistrustful, and ultimately disinterested response from the north, who made little more of the offer but for political ammunition: common water imports could yet lay the foundations for long-term cooperation, but their rejection would only further separate the ways of the two ‘states’. By early 1998 the Turkish Cypriot press reported the TRNC’s water balance equated with a 20% annual deficit each year, while the dams in the south, their main source of supply, had been as low as 90% empty for prolonged periods since the mid-1990s. These statistics were greatly affected by what had now become the third worst (and on-going) drought this century, and the worst for 60 years. New supplies seemed imperative and, in July, the infrastructure was inaugurated and first water balloon arrived. Denktash clearly recognised his new power position: while Turkish President Demirel observed that, once the whole water scheme had been completed, “water can irrigate the whole of Cyprus three times over”, Denktash declared that the Greek Cypriots were “welcome to share [...] the water from Anatolia”, because whether or not they considered themselves equal, “they still need water”. Although the Greek Cypriot authorities had informally shown an interest, unilateral courses of action were preferable.

Only by studying the transboundary water resource dispute in its wider context could a fuller appreciation of not only its complex nature, but also its gravity, be appreciated. Even with water shortages from the mid-1990s, a distributive, ‘us’ versus
'them' approach to the water dispute was being reproduced. For Clerides, the link from water supplies to 'high politics' was clear;

"we will never give up our land and water. This is not permitted by our security nor our national dignity. It is not permitted by our principles, our values, or the dreams in which we believe. It is not permitted by our history".102

For the Turkish Cypriots, Morphou remained the key strategic resource. Commenting on reports of its transfer to the Greek Cypriots, according to Ghali's 1992 proposals (see Appendix 2), Denktash observed again;

"[w]ho says we will give it? Morphou and its surroundings are our source of water. We left a fertile area with vineyards and gardens in the south that was five times as large".103

Atakol, now as Minister for Foreign Affairs and Defence, similarly argued that under Ghali's maps and without Morphou, the TRNC would be left without drinking water.104

At the island-wide scale, water had been drawn exponentially into political, socio-economic and ideological arenas. From the island-wide perspective, the 'second Cyprus problem' failed to become the primary concern of either government.

5.3.2 Power lines

In addition to pre-existing water interdependencies, another major transboundary resource created with the establishment of the UNBZ was that of electricity power supply. A year after the nationalisation of various small electricity companies in 1952, Cyprus' first thermal power station was commissioned at Dhekelia. By 1966 a second power station had been built at Moni (near Limassol) so that, by 1974, Dhekelia and Moni were producing a total generating capacity of 204 Megawatts (MW) to cater for a maximum consumption of 174 MW island-wide. Frequent complaints from Turkish Cypriots after 1963 had necessitated UNFICYP's involvement in negotiating continued supplies, although in general the government-controlled Electricity Authority of Cyprus (AHK) continued to supply the enclaves.105

After 1974, however, the geographical divorce of 1974 was to see a considerable amount of disruption to electric power lines in areas of confrontation, despite UNFICYP's negotiations for technicians from both communities to carry out repairs.106
More significantly, the only two generating power stations were based in the south, under the control of AHK. Dhekelia power station soon became uneconomic and a new station, initially with two units with a combined capacity of 120MW, was subsequently built alongside in 1982, although the final units were not added until 1993 at which time the old Dhekelia power station was decommissioned. In the north, there had been remarkably public declarations in the period between the two phases of the Turkish military interventions in August 1974 of Turkey’s immediate plans to establish a 50MW power plant in Kyrenia. Yet, the first major power station was not commissioned until 1981 at Dikmen (‘Dikomo’ in Greek) and operated until 1991 when it ceased production, by which time—conscious of its fragile power supplies—the Turkish Cypriot’s own electricity authority (KIB-TEK) began to build the new power station at Tekniçik (Trapeza) in 1990, the product of a Turkey-TRNC ‘technical cooperation’ agreement valued at US$120 mn. Even so, illustrating its configuration in 1996 (which had altered little for 15 years), Figure 5.2 shows an electricity distribution network which connected the whole island, crossing the UNBZ from Dhekelia SBA, Athalassa, Orounda and Karvounas. Indeed, from 1974 to 1981, the north received all of its electricity from the south, and from 1981 some 70 to 80% of its supply came from this source.

These transboundary supplies continued with only minor hiccups, however, until they met something of a watershed in 1994, with considerable repercussions. Although power cuts in the north had occurred up to, during, and beyond 1974, they were to grow gradually more frequent by the late 1980s. During cuts in the summer of 1987, while the Greek Cypriot government defended itself, stating that they were the result of unusually high demand and mechanical failures, north of the UNBZ there were strong suspicions of political motivation. Prevention of the ‘further development and strengthening’ of the northern state, as Eroglu (the leader of the right-wing UBP party) interpreted the power cuts, was the Greek Cypriots motive—in essence, it was a move to incorporate the electricity supply into the economic embargo. Yet in line with Greek Cypriot calculations, an UNFICYP report suggested that peak consumption could only be met island-wide if all the generating facilities of both sides were fully operational. Eventually, between 1994-95 the situation regarding the supply of electricity shot to the top of the agenda in northern Cyprus, was discussed by the
Figure 5.2  *Electricity generation and transmission networks in Cyprus*
Source: Updated from *AHK (1994a)* and UN sources.
Council of Ministers daily, and received unprecedented media attention. Commercial life and industry almost ground to a halt, the fragile tourist sector suffered badly, irrigation water pumps were rendered redundant, and domestic users were often without power for twelve hours a day or more. Local observers alarmingly predicted the total collapse of the TRNC economy.\textsuperscript{114}

A number of imbalances had arisen. Primarily, as the new Tekniçik power station was nearing completion in August 1994 (one year behind schedule) when an explosion occurred on one of its two turbines, killing one employee and delaying the project for another year. In addition, the Greek Cypriots were themselves having supply problems: with the old Dhekelia station having just been retired, and one of the units at new Dhekelia (Figure 5.2) suffering technical problems, the \textit{AHK} was finding it difficult to meet its own community’s needs, never mind those of the north. At the start of 1994 the generating capacity on the island was such that the north, with only 40 MW of generating capacity, had clearly weaker infrastructural resources than the south which had a total generating capacity of 605 MW (Table 5.5). However, given that the peak demand island-wide in 1994 was 550 MW the true picture was only appreciated on realisation that, towards the winter of 1994, Greek Cypriot capacity had fallen to 440 MW and Turkish Cypriot capacity was down to 20 MW: an island-wide shortfall of 90 MW remained unaddressed. The Turkish Cypriot government were forced to introduce extraordinary practical measures to manage electricity supply including the prioritising of certain businesses, the encouragement of inter-company power transfers, and the reactivation of old generators. Even a proposal of floating power stations to the island was under consideration.\textsuperscript{115} While contacts were made to renew talks over the problem with Greek Cypriot officials, little assistance was forthcoming.

It was clear that, since 1974, the TRNC as a whole had become heavily dependent on \textit{AHK} for its supply of electricity. When demand exceeded supply, however, ‘load-shedding’ (i.e., rotating regionalised power cuts) as necessary; indeed, according to UN sources, the \textit{AHK} were traditionally under instructions to cut power in the north first, and only to cut it in the south as a last resort. While power cuts had been a common feature for the majority of the post-partition period, Turkish Cypriot patience ran out in 1994 when they faced power cuts on a scale not witnessed before. Turkish Cypriot public opinion was critical of previous governments for allowing dependency on the south for electricity to continue for some twenty years, but a large proportion of
Table 5.5  Comparative electricity generating capacities of AHK and KIB-TEK in 1994

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Generating Station</th>
<th>Greek Cypriot</th>
<th>Turkish Cypriot</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dhekelia ‘B’</td>
<td>300 (5 x 60 MW)</td>
<td>20 (1 x 20 MW)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dhekelia ‘A’</td>
<td>50 (1 x 50 MW)</td>
<td>20 (1 x 20 MW)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moni</td>
<td>180 (6 x 30 MW)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dikmen</td>
<td></td>
<td>20 (1 x 20 MW)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tekniçik</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total base load generation</td>
<td>530</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergency back up only</td>
<td>75 (2 x 37.5 MW at Moni)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL CAPACITY</td>
<td>605</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: AHK (1994a), KIB-TEK (1996), and UN sources.

the blame was placed on the Greek Cypriot authorities. There was real concern within UNFICYP that nationalist elements in the north would retaliate in some way. This general perception was further fuelled when on both ‘Atatürk Day’ and on the 11th anniversary of the TRNC’s UDI the power cuts were particularly severe. A similar interpretation was made by Denktash who suggested the original explosion at Tekniçik was sabotage.\(^{116}\) It became apparent that he had brought up the dependency issue on a number of previous occasions, where Denktash had allegedly suggested joint management;\(^{117}\) this time, however, Denktash’s response was largely directed at the Greek Cypriot government. In September 1994 he called for his populace to keep a record of any losses incurred, for which the Greek Cypriots would be forced to compensate for at a later time.\(^{118}\) Furthermore, by that December Denktash had dramatically concluded that, left with no alternative by the ‘enemy’, the only way to resolve the problem was to ‘blow up’ Dhekelia and/or Moni power station. He observed that;

"[c]reating darkness on the Greek Cypriot side is not difficult at all. We have refrained from such an action because we maintain a conscientious approach."\(^{119}\)

Indeed, Denktash claimed that (undefined) persons had already been deterred from doing so.
Island-wide Perspective

The threat was never carried out. It had nonetheless exposed the fragility of the apparent transboundary understanding. The Turkish Cypriot authorities argued that they received their electricity for two main reasons: because the south as the recognised government received all incoming international aid to the island and that, in line with the principles of the 1960 constitution, all of the island’s existing state infrastructure was the resource of both communities jointly. The electricity supply, therefore, was an entitlement. It was claimed, in addition, that the costs of maintaining the system in the north was equivalent to the cost of the power gained. In response to this crisis, there was little visible sympathy from the AHK who identified the cause of the north’s dependency on their power as a product of the northern ‘illegal government’s’ failure to invest in its generating capacity.

5.3.3 ‘Humanitarianism’ and the quid pro quo

As with their supply of water (see Chapters 6 and 7), the Greek Cypriot-run AHK were also keen to announce that ‘as a result’ of the 1974 events they had ‘lost control’ of property estimated, at prices prevailing at the time, at CY£8 mn. Moreover, the 1974 events had signalled the beginning of a ‘great economic drain’ due to their inability to collect electricity bills from the areas ‘under the control of the Turkish army’. They subsequently kept a rolling estimate of this ‘drain’ which by 1995 was calculated at CY£146 mn unpaid since 1974. From the mid-1980s the AHK had been warning that the increasing use by the north could jeopardise the authority’s long-term financial position. Early on in 1994 the AHK was to declare that, without a proposed new plant (at Vassiliko), the whole island would suffer major blackouts by 1997.

The AHK’s budgetary calculations nonetheless required clarification on two accounts. Firstly, there were always charges for the electricity in the north, levied by KIB-TEK, but the revenue was never transferred to the Greek Cypriot authorities (there had been talk in the 1960s of the existence of a ‘frozen account’ pending a solution) largely due to their refusal to recognise the authority of the Greek Cypriots. Up until the 1994 shortages the Turkish Cypriots had, however, received electricity well below cost price—according to UN sources, roughly 25% of that charged in the south. As a consequence, domestic usage in the north became almost double that in the south, creating an even greater resource dependency. Moreover, the unbilled consumption had
been subsidised by the consumers in the south with bills being raised between 10-35%; such subsidies appeared all the more galling to Greek Cypriots given their apparent funding of the Turkish Forces. Secondly, it could not be determined whether the Greek Cypriot authorities would in fact have accepted any payment from the north—they did not do so in any other economic arena, largely for fear that doing so might be viewed as indirect recognition of the northern ‘state’. Such developments in transboundary resource management nevertheless begged the question of why the north refused to pay, and the south continued to supply. Assuming that the ‘giving’ party was continually testing the other party, and that, as the probability of default was perceived to increase then the amount ‘given’ would fall, why was this not the case in this transboundary regime?

The rationale for this seemed to involve a quid pro quo relationship between the two communal authorities, tacitly established immediately after 1963, involving an informal ‘water-for-electricity’ exchange. This reciprocal regime operated for three main reasons. Principally, electrical power was needed to operate the Morphou water pumps and so maintain water supplies to the south (especially Nicosia, see Chapter 7). Both electricity and water supplies had generally not been sanctioned since December 1963 primarily because of the fragmented population segregation; it was not possible to cut off such services in Turkish quarters and enclaves without disrupting substantial numbers of Greek Cypriots. Indeed, the development of a quid pro quo could be traced back to mechanisms developed in Larnaca from 1964, where the water system had been owned by the Turkish Cypriot community prior to December 1963. As it fell into Greek Cypriot hands, so the government chose not to bill the Turkish Cypriot quarter for electricity supplies.

Another key determinant of this policy, however, was that successive Greek Cypriot governments maintained the policy that the supply of power was a ‘humanitarian gesture’;

"in our plans we always considered that Cyprus is an integrated, is a unified area. We take care of their needs too". Not to do so would unreasonably affect their ‘Cypriot’ compatriots. There appeared to be another level to this moral, altruistic approach, however, where—as with the vital if minimal supply of water to the north—Greek Cypriots had the chance significantly to
Island-wide Perspective

lose face to the international community by controlling adversely the supply of what was commonly understood to be a basic need. As LeMarquand noted generally on this ‘image’ dilemma;

“[t]he desire to pursue a good neighbourly policy, to be a model of cooperative international [sic] behaviour, or to be candidly egocentric are examples of national attitudes which may positively or negatively influence a country’s willingness to cooperate with its riparian neighbours”.32

Clearly, the former consideration was uppermost when, with the Turkish Cypriot’s UDI looming in 1983 and speculation that the Kyprianou government would cut off both water and electricity supplies, the Greek Cypriot authorities preferred to maintain the link.133 There was throughout considerable, heated inter-party debate over the provision of electricity for free—in 1993 DIKO (the Democratic Party) insisted that as soon as Tekniçik came on line, the supply should be withdrawn and repayment immediately sought.134 Nonetheless, in real terms this arrangement was considered a form of aid to the north, paid for by the consumers in the south. As such, an issue linkage was being sought by the Greek Cypriots: an agreement to supply not only weakened Denktash’s claim that his community lived under a complete economic blockade, but it also built up a ‘reservoir of good will’ to draw on for future concessions.135

Another added impetus to this ‘humanitarianism’, however, originated from the Greek Cypriots politico-military power relations with the north. On one hand, the military threat could never be underestimated; with a twist of semantics, Denktash’s ‘conscientious approach’ had dissuaded Turkish Cypriots from striking the power stations ‘only’ because they were “humanitarian and fair”.136 Thus restraining the exercise of their power was the extent of reciprocal interdependence between them and the Greek Cypriots, with the underlying assumption for the latter being that the less evident such altruistic interdependence, the higher the chances of resource conflict. On the other hand, the AHK refused to meet or maintain close contact with KIB-TEK for fear of granting them tacit recognition. In so doing, they safeguarded their own power position, that of being the only recognised government-affiliated electricity authority on the island.

Consequently, the eventual creation of a nominally sustainable generating station in the north (Tekniçik) by mid-1996 was quickly greeted by Greek Cypriots, on one hand, as a financial saving, but on the other hand their response was mixed with
Island-wide Perspective

concern that this absolute gain in generating capacity was undermined by their loss of political clout to a 'breakaway' state. With the island-wide demand for electricity expected to increase at a rate of approximately 10% per annum, the need for careful management and forward planning remained—its mismanagement already having constituted a *casus belli*. By March 1995 the electricity shortfall had been considerably alleviated, due to both an increase in generating capacity island-wide, and due to Tekniçik's completion. Subsequently, except for remaining transboundary transfers from the south to the north along the UNBZ (especially Nicosia), the TRNC proudly announced their self-sufficiency and 'independence'. From then on, however, the system control of \( \text{AIHK} \) and that of \( \text{KIB-TEK} \) were in direct telephone contact as the Turkish Cypriot side continued to require some supplies from the south throughout 1996, and remained dependent upon unguaranteed supplies of power plant fuel from Turkey.

The existence of water and electricity interdependencies after 1974 had necessitated different policies from the two communities. Within a year of summer 1974, the Greek Cypriots were making plans to build their own water storage systems to reduce dependency on the Turkish Cypriot Morphou supply, who were themselves planning their own power station. By the mid-1980s the Greek Cypriots had succeeded in their quest for nominal self-sustainability in water (and thus exploding what they perceived as the 'myth' of water dependency on Morphou), while at the same time ensuring that the north remained dependent upon them for largely political and strategic reasons. In the north, the process of extracting themselves from this dependency was not to peak until the mid-1990s, by which time the Turkish and TRNC governments had made water and electricity infrastructure the top two development priorities for the unrecognised state. Denktash was to conclude, in the light of electricity supply problems in 1994, that "we must create a situation in which there is no need to ask if the Greek Cypriots will be cutting our water supply or not".
5.4 ‘Other(s’)’ Transboundary Resource Needs

From the mid-1980s, alongside the considerable rhetoric of cooperation over strategically-vital transboundary resources at the ‘official’ level, emerged an increasing proliferation of initiatives and organisations with different criteria and procedures, involving other issue areas and other actors. With this came a growing recognition that apart from strategic, military, and diplomatic factors, it was also assumed that socio-structural, psychological, economic and cultural variables were significant in influencing intercommunal and inter-societal relations. The abject failure of traditional third-party interventions in the protracted social conflict—“incapable of dealing with interstate, state-communal and intercommunal interactions”—reflected a belief that the small-state interactions of Cyprus were merely the unfortunate ‘by-product’ of superpower-dominated regional interactions and were, in turn, of little significance.

Rejecting this thesis, and aware that no change to the status quo had been affected since 1974, ‘unofficial’ discourses of transboundary relations came to mix with high-level debate as individual citizens on both sides of the UNBZ became collectively involved in transboundary relations. What could be termed ‘semi-official’ bicommunal meetings were to take place between political parties during the 1980s. Political parties had first met in Libya in 1980, then later in various European cities as part of an ongoing Czechoslovakia-sponsored venture. However, less overtly politicised, ‘unofficial’ sources of influence—particularly problem-solving workshops—became more widely encouraged by the late 1980s, largely due to the growing interest of international third parties in the Cyprus conflict (Appendix 1). In 1989, the German ‘Education Institute for Democracy and the Preservation of the Environment’ initiated meetings involving both communities which, within a year, had institutionalised into the island’s first post-1974 bicommunal social movement—‘The Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot Citizens’ Movement for Democracy and Federation in Cyprus’. ‘Independent of’ and ‘beyond’ any formal or official procedures, it was to last only a year but set a number of precedents. With a flourish of meetings at the former Ledra Palace Hotel, by November 1992 a ‘Bicommunal Steering Committee’ was established. This came to represent a core group of up to 300 Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots coordinating a growing number of bicommunal activities; it ultimately led to an intensification of
meetings and workshops from 1993, with the US Agency for International Development (USAID) funding the training of conflict resolution skills, while UNFICYP and the ‘Cyprus Fulbright Commission’ provided logistical support. In 1994 these developments were complemented by a US-based ‘Cyprus Consortium’, and from 1996 a ‘Conflict Resolution Trainers Group’ overtook the Steering Committee, reflecting the third parties’ desire to allow for more loose coalitions built upon local, citizen-based participation and coordination.

By the mid-1990s, as Hadjipavlou-Trigeorgis observed, at no other time since 1974 had so many genuine efforts to reestablish contacts and cooperation been made by so many diverse social groups in each community. As suggested above, hopes that ‘unofficial elites’ could promote an alternative vision where politicians and officials had failed were not restricted to ‘grassroots’ interest groups, nor was this their intention. ‘Track II’ was increasingly overlapping with ‘Track I’: in addition to EU, UK, German, French and Slovak sponsored programmes, the UN, through UNHCR in particular, was soon to recognise the value of this ‘conflict resolution movement’ from the island-wide perspective. UNHCR had entered the Cyprus arena in August 1974 in its capacity as Co-ordinator of United Nations ‘humanitarian assistance’ for Cyprus’ displaced populace, but it was to gradually develop a strictly ‘bicomunal humanitarian’ programme of activities in 1986 when the US became its sole donor (via USAID). Moreover, from 1992 until April 1997 it was to fund only projects to be carried out by bicomunal teams (increasingly, therefore, overlapping in mandate with UNDP), such that by late 1996 it had channelled over US$273 mn to the two communities. At the island-wide scale, a variety of issue areas were covered: forestry; pest control, education, air pollution assessment; also, from 1991 architects were to meet every two months, studying building restoration plans in the south and north and raising the awareness of the island’s architectural heritage. In addition, cardiologists considered a CY£8 mn bicomunal cardiology centre, furthering historical cooperation over health with Turkish Cypriots crossing south for certain treatments.

However, progress on these comparatively ‘new’ and ‘non-strategic’ issue areas faced an uphill battle. After an independent review of its programme in early 1997, UNHCR terminated its administration of the humanitarian programme. Moreover, this was to unfortunately coincide with a marked deterioration in the Turkish Cypriot leadership’s view of ‘Track II’ activities. The self-evident belief in such programmes
that, once progress was achieved in confidence building over specific ‘humanitarian objectives’, any outside interference would be neutralised and conditions for a viable settlement could be created through a multiplier effect, was being seriously questioned. Even with, and at times because of, third party assistance, ‘unofficial’ transboundary relations generated their own problems and, seemingly inevitably, led to political tasks. The backlash to bicommunalism was based on the premise that the two tracks were, at best, complementary but, more likely, threatening;

“[w]e cannot allow them [Turkish Cypriot participants] to be hostage to the interests of third parties, and there are signs that it’s being done in the Cyprus context”.

Bicommunal meetings were merely a “talk-show”, with people coming together but failing to cooperate within the (de facto) “realities” of the island. In the south too, if for different reasons, the bicommunal movement had become an important if not unique process of ‘empowerment’ for citizens, bringing with it an unfair degree of expectancy. Post-1974, only the Greek Cypriot Left was to show particular interest in bicommunal cooperation—consistent with the international orientation of the Left and its tendency to de-emphasise local differences through the promotion of class ideologies cutting across allegiances to ethnicity and religion—and, subsequently, disappointment with the little progress emanating from the ‘alternative’ form of dispute resolution was ultimately focused on to those very individuals trying to fill the ‘mediation gap’.

In addition, with bicommunal events which necessitated crossing at Ledra Palace checkpoint, the Turkish Cypriot authorities played a key role as gatekeepers. The participation of Turkish Cypriots was often determined on a case-by-case basis, with little reason or warning given. Despite vocal support from the Security Council for its efforts, and pleas to remove obstacles to such contacts, the Turkish Cypriot authorities continued to exercise tight control on attendance. From late January 1997, authorisation was usually granted for events in the UNBZ, but not always for events in the south. At the start of October, Denktash then made it clear his government’s wish for all bicommunal contacts to cease, given that, as Denktash perceived it, the EU was trying to create the impression “it was talking to the Turkish side” when these were contacts with NGOs and not the TRNC government. By late December this position had hardened and, ignoring protests from opposition parties, Taner Etkin (TRNC
Foreign Minister) announced that all transboundary contacts at Ledra Palace organised by embassies, trade unions, students and other groups were suspended. This appeared to support a general perception amongst Greek Cypriot and international observers that the Turkish Cypriot leadership banned, by rule, contact between institutions that would lead to genuine rapprochement while allowing selectively only those contacts that constituted an indirect recognition of the TRNC.

In examining the roots of ‘other(s)’ transboundary resource needs, the remainder of this chapter considers the problematic and ultimately limited progress of ‘unofficial’ (i.e., non-state) transboundary resource management initiatives. Two issue areas—the economy and the environment—which received attention increasingly at the island-wide scale from the mid-1980s, predominantly through third party-led, transboundary resource management initiatives, are examined in more detail.

5.5 Development of an ‘Island State’

From the 1950s, the logic of regional development in Cyprus precipitated a widely-held belief amongst local and international observers that there was ‘no economic logic to partition’, stressing the inevitability of unity rendered by economic forces. The historical preconditions of the Greek Cypriot policy in particular dictated that the ‘Island’ remained the primary unit for cooperation, integration, and ultimately reunification, reflecting a belief that interregional transboundary links were of secondary importance and simply reflected the wider case for ‘all-Island’ economic cooperation. Although historical, this belief was to acquire a more cohesive form after 1974 when the promotion of the idea of natural or logical division of Cyprus’ territorial space exemplified a state-centred, nationalistic discourse based, on what Hakli has elsewhere termed, the savoir of regions as spontaneous organic entities.

In this sense, projection of an ‘island economy’ and an ‘island environment’ in Cyprus served two particular purposes. Firstly, it provided a spatial framework for apparent mutual benefits—party political and other interest groups largely interpreted economic cooperation to meet their own political ends, thus supporting Jervis’ belief that cooperation is more likely to occur in economic relations than in security relations, given that the strategic structure of the former is positive-sum while that of the latter is
more zero-sum.\textsuperscript{173} The ‘island’ also provided, however, a suitable metaphorical device for a politico-geographical imagination, based on objectivist rhetoric, which sought to evoke images of unity to give consistency and legitimacy to political order.\textsuperscript{174} This rhetoric was to be employed by both anti-partitionists in the south (and north), but also extensively by third parties concerned with transboundary resource management and conflict resolution while addressing ‘island-wide’ problems.

5.5.1 An ‘island economy’

Analyses of the consequences of partition and the further fragmentation of the resource base on the small island economy of Cyprus have generally highlighted three distinguishing features: a rapid, so-called ‘economic miracle’ in the south, the relative economic ‘underdevelopment’ of the Turkish Cypriot north and its integration into its Turkish motherland, and the absence of any economic interests transcending the UNBZ.\textsuperscript{175} Firstly, and as previously noted, for the Greek Cypriot community the force of the changes of 1974 had signalled the need to avert a social and economic collapse, but the powers of economic recuperation were equally as great.\textsuperscript{176} Economic growth became export-led, Arab markets were exploited for a growing clothing and footwear industry such that domestic exports increased fivefold between 1973 and 1985 and, in addition to concentrating on manufactured goods, tourism from Northern Europe became the most important source of foreign exchange. Exposure to the international economy found the ROC looking to shipping and offshore banking as determinants of economic activity, and an emphasis on the tertiary sector was to by-pass to a great extent the problem of scale.\textsuperscript{177} In spite of the political uncertainties deterring inward investment and a limited resource base, the Greek Cypriots came to enjoy one of the highest standards of living in the Mediterranean (and above that of Greece).

In the north, in direct contrast, economic development was to remain stunted and non-self-supporting.\textsuperscript{178} The Turkish Cypriot side repeatedly complained to the UN over the all-encompassing embargo, imposed by the Greek Cypriot authorities since 1963. It was argued that as long as they were isolated from international relations, travel, trade and tourism, distrust and a crisis of confidence between the two communities would only deepen.\textsuperscript{179} While lagging behind the south, the northern economy was to witness more market-orientated farming, and the manufacturing of foodstuffs and textiles.\textsuperscript{180}
Without any major structural transformation, however, around one-third of the working population remained in agriculture (accounting for only one-fifth of the GNP), and the only sector to grow in competition was an unproductive public administration. The northern economy was to become closely linked and over-dependent on the volatile Turkish economy.

Relative to these observations, the third general conclusion of economic analyses has received little further consideration. Intercommunal economic contacts were largely insignificant, as the Cyprus conflict touched all potential levels of economic collaboration. Yet, it was apparent that after 1974 certain economic ventures were to continue and others developed—a transboundary process which clearly requires more serious consideration. The main bicommmunal contacts post-1974 were trade union-led, reflecting their general belief that the working class of the island would be guaranteed better prospects of welfare, economic and cultural growth under a settlement. After meeting in March 1977, for the first time since the Turkish military intervention, in July 1979 two federations—the Greek Cypriot PEO (the Pan-Cyprian Worker's Federation) and the Turkish Cypriot Dev-Is—formulated a joint communique which called for the reopening of factories along the UNBZ (see Chapter 6) and encouraged the employment of Turkish Cypriots in the south. Although, in procedural terms, they had become something of a 'model' bicommmunal movement, a second forum was to again prove difficult in organising, undermined as bicommmunal contacts were by the high level political developments.

At the commercial level, there were also transboundary networks. The only petroleum refinery, as the Turkish Cypriot side were keen to point out, was situated in the south. Since then, however, the refinery had sought to supply the entire petrol market and a substantial proportion of the LPG and gas oil of the island, including the north. Once again, LPG was subsidised (through higher rates on petrol in the south) and over 3,000 tons was being supplied to the north each year because it was understood to be directed to their most 'needy' rural areas. These working relationships, in other words, involved relatively continuous cooperation which was being sanctioned not only through the threat of loss of future savings/earnings but, again, for 'humanitarian' purposes. By the mid-1990s, however, this trade had all but dried up as Turkish Cypriot authorities established Turkish sources.
Cyprus’ prolonged process of accession with the EU, by way of contrast, demonstrated at the most ‘supra’-national level the political economy of cooperation in Cyprus. Given the basic tenets of neofunctionalism, the EU’s growing involvement in the Cyprus conflict would/should have a significant effect by ‘upgrading the common interests’ of both communities to a higher authority. Indeed, in terms of ‘the economic imperative’ for the north, the ever-growing role of the EU as a facilitator of economic cooperation in Cyprus presented a number of theoretical possibilities. At the very least, the European Parliament’s Council of Ministers was encouraged to consider the extension of economic exchanges between Europe and Cyprus to the north because, in terms of territorial unity, the economy of the island was hampered by its being partitioned.

On the contrary, political hostilities and a lack of appropriate institutions were to remain major impediments to ‘purely’ economic integration between north and south. In practice, the ‘chicken and egg’ question remained a difficult one to answer: accession to the EU, or an overall settlement—which should come first for (which) Cyprus? This problem was first raised by the Association Agreement between Cyprus and the EEC in December 1972, which envisaged the establishment of a Custom Union within ten years. Until 1964, a Cypriot delegation to the Parliamentary Assembly (comprising representatives and substitutes from both communities at a ratio of 2:1 in favour of the majority community) had sat since the ROC joined the Council of Europe in 1961. With the events of 1963-1974 soon altering the playing field, the EEC chose formally to conduct affairs with the internationally-recognised Greek Cypriot government, funding projects of benefit to the ‘whole island’—specifically, dealing with domestic water supply via the SCP, Nicosia’s sewerage system (see Chapter 7), and the construction of two power units at Dhekelia power station. Inevitably the second stage of the agreement, scheduled for completion by 1977, was put on hold, but only until the mid-1980s when Papandreou’s government picked up the gauntlet—Greece having become a full EC member in 1981. By 1995, it was well understood that negotiations on Cyprus’ accession would begin six months after the end of the next Inter-Governmental Conference, with or without a settlement of the Cyprus conflict. The Secretary-General and Security Council welcomed the development which, they recognised, would instil a new sense of urgency and facilitate an overall settlement.
In the light of a steady if drawn-out process it was therefore somewhat of a surprise when in July 1997, reacting to an EU reaffirmation (in Agenda 2000) of its decision to open accession talks with Cyprus, both the Turkish Cypriot and Turkish governments set in motion a sequence of events that caused the rapid postponement of UN-led negotiations. Several factors prompted this behaviour. By the time an agreement to proceed with a Cyprus-EU Customs Union (by 2002) had been struck in May 1987, Turkey had formally applied to become a full member itself. Throughout the EU accession debate Turkish Cypriots objected strongly to the role of the Greek Cypriot government as the sole interlocutor, just as they had objected to the process of applying for EU aid via the government in the south. Legally, they added, under the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee the ROC could not unite with any state, and by inference, nor become a member of any international association of which Greece and Turkey were not members themselves. While the EU was no ‘state’, the Turkish Cypriots claimed one state in particular was an integral part of the EU: Greece, thus making indirect enosis a possibility. This defence was further founded on fears that the Greek Cypriots’ call for the ‘three freedoms’ would be automatically upheld as human rights on Cyprus’ accession, and that Turkish troops would be forced to leave.

July’s formal announcement appeared just as galling for Turkey, given their absence from the EU’s invitation list. Although an associate member of the EEC since 1963, Turkey’s only real success with the EU was its customs union in 1995. Since then, while enlargement had been a key feature of EU affairs, Turkey continued to receive a cool response on its prospects for membership. The EU question was not purely political, however. In Cyprus, the economic asymmetry either side of the UNBZ heralded a problematic integration of the north with both the south and the EU in general, and although the EU and US were most often quoted, it was not possible to predict who would fund the necessary restructuring. Though small, the economy in northern Cyprus remained fragile and largely Turkish-funded, and in July 1994 the European Court of Justice (ECJ) effectively banned TRNC-produced exports of citrus fruit and potatoes to the EU, as they had to be certified by the ROC. The TRNC government reacted by halting UN negotiations and reassessing federation as the ‘only’ solution on the table, reflecting a more general perception amongst Turkish Cypriots that EU-funding of ‘bicomunal’ projects was skewed; Turkish Cypriot proposals submitted (e.g., for the Morphou derivation project) were understood to have been
rejected owing to Greek Cypriot objections that they were not ‘bicommunal’, which naturally brought into question the funding of the Vasilikos-Pendaskinos irrigation system, or even the SCP system in total.\textsuperscript{197}

From then on, Denktash’s opinion of the EU rapidly worsened and there were a growing number of occasions where further integration with Turkey, both economic and political, rather than the EU proved more attractive. In January 1997 a Turkey-TRNC economic cooperation protocol was signed worth US$250mn for the TRNC, while six months later a nine-point bilateral integration agreement set up an Association Council to oversee the ‘gradual economic and financial integration and partial integration on security, defence and foreign policy matters’. The Greek Cypriots and Greece naturally viewed EU accession as a significant tool for levering apart the increasingly united defence of Turkey and the TRNC. In addition, the veto of Greece—and potentially, it must be remembered, of Cyprus—threatened to complicate the situation yet further. Greece repeatedly sought to link the Cyprus issue with the establishment of the EU Customs Union with Turkey, with the argument that an occupying state could not be part of Europe, and accordingly blocked an ECU 600 mn financial protocol with Turkey from 1994. The conflicting EU policies therefore were to persist: Turkey would try to hold-up the accession of Cyprus while Greece was similarly unlikely to accept Turkish membership before a settlement in Cyprus.

The unitary development of the ‘island’ was clearly problematic. The Greek Cypriot government’s emphasis immediately after 1974 had been on the complementarity of investment, labour input and resources in various regions of the island.\textsuperscript{198} Non-integration would affect the viability of many sectors of industry and of the population; looked at in isolation, each area of Cyprus was ‘incomplete and inadequate’, but as part of a whole it represented ‘a meaningful economic supplement’.\textsuperscript{199} Reduction (even through federalism) in the size and scale of industrial activities, and of the ‘domestic’ market, would turn the manufacturing sector into the cottage industry of the past and wipe out the advantages of technological progress.\textsuperscript{200} Put in its simplest form;

“the country is too small for the misallocation of resources [...] Economically, Cyprus is a single unit. [...] it is utterly impossible for an administrative line to be drawn in any manner without disregarding the problem of viability”\textsuperscript{201}
Island-wide Perspective

"[a]ny form of separation would inevitably cause the artificial creation of areas rich in certain resources on the one hand and areas characterized by a complete absence of economic resources on the other." 202

Even by the time the much-heralded ‘economic stagnation’ and ‘eternal underdevelopment’ had been avoided courtesy of dramatic economic growth throughout the 1980s, however, the Greek Cypriot authorities maintained this ‘organic’ discourse. With time, however, it was increasingly employed to address the benefits for an underdeveloped Turkish Cypriot community: a reunited economy could bridge the economic gap whereby market forces could establish an ‘equilibrium’ between the two communities.203 A common, Cypriot currency, the safeguarding of the ‘three freedoms’, harmonisation with the EU, and the favourable conditions of political security would overcome the shrinkage and waste of resources.204

Yet, while this discourse (similar to Lyne’s ‘technocentric anti-partitionism’) persisted amongst Greek Cypriot policy-makers, there was to be a crucial condition: there could be little development of macro or micro economic issues until an overall settlement to the Cyprus conflict was found.205 Economic cooperation was not encouraged, except in ‘humanitarian’ areas, because the TRNC was not recognisable.206 In turn, to legitimise any cooperative economic approach the Greek Cypriot authorities had to overcome the fear that cooperation with the Turkish Cypriots might indirectly entail subsidising the Turkish Forces.207 The economic status quo was to prove more desirable than what could be achieved through diplomatic channels, wherein political always risks had to be considered. In any case, the uncooperative tactics of the Turkish Cypriot leadership had, it was generally perceived, nipped the majority of any bicommmunal economic initiatives in the bud. The ROC authorities were conscious of “an iron curtain”—the Churchilian phrase applying to Cyprus now, not Russia.208

As Theophylactou also noted, this suggested that lessons could be drawn from the German case (as noted in Chapter 3), when the FRG refused to recognise the GDR (as Greek Cypriots failed to recognise the Turkish Cypriots) until Willy Brandt’s ostpolitik—which was to succeed ultimately where the non-recognition regime had failed in bringing down the GDR. Its translation to the Cyprus context (as nordpolitik), whereby the Greek Cypriots could allow the opening of the border and the acceptance of the de facto political reality in the hope of undermining the Turkish Cypriot authorities, had obvious advantages; moreover, the business elites in each community appeared

203
Island-wide Perspective

receptive to economic rapprochement based on the pragmatic laws of interdependency. Indeed, somewhat mirroring the resurgence in economic neofunctionalism within Europe as a whole, a growing number of proposals were being presented by academic observers; a similar scenario, for example, was proposed by Mehmet: “an evolutionary process of confidence-building” concentrating on economic cooperation first (e.g., a limited free trade agreement) and closer political cooperation later, “on the presumption that economics appeals to man’s [sic] rationality”.

Such ‘all-island’, economic triumphalism, however, inevitably fuelled the insecurity of the Turkish Cypriot leadership and nationalist electorate. How could economic contacts (like EU membership) in practice entail free movement of persons, services and capital on an island divided into two separate parts? The only sign of acceptance was in Denktash’s belief that, by leaving the border intact, economic cooperation would further institutionalise and stabilise the political status quo, not subvert it. For the Turkish Cypriot authorities the ‘dual economy’ which had developed before 1974 was satisfactory, but ‘inter-state’ relations could be based on genuine cooperation for ‘mutual benefit’.

5.5.2 An ‘island environment’: security discourse and bicomunalism

The island’s environmental management generated a similarly broad sphere of debate, touching as it did both on activities considered at the island-wide scale and also those embedded at the local (and especially borderland) scale. Before assessing the progress of arguably the most significant transboundary, bicomunal environmental study to date, initiated by UNDP in the early 1990s, it is imperative to consider the wider ramifications of environmental affairs in Cyprus, and their manifestation in the bicomunal context.

Intracommmunal differences in approaching the environment, based on class and strategies of ‘modernity/Europeanisation’, have been rightly highlighted by Argyrou. The two largest community-based environmental groups in the south—Ikologhiki Kinisi (‘Ecological Movement’) and Fili tou Akamas (‘Friends of Akamas’)—were founded in Nicosia, which arguably set most of the sociocultural standards other towns sought to emulate (or resist). Of comparable interest was the purported ‘Occident/Orient’ and ‘North/South’ clash. A large proportion of the environmental NGOs island-wide were
either established by British 'expats'/retirees (especially so in the TRNC), or were heavy in their numbers, generating perceptions of the 'rich North' wishing to constrain the development aspirations of the local community.\textsuperscript{214} Such perceptions were to be enriched over time through separate, long-standing proposals to create National Parks both in the Akamas and Karpas peninsulas (in the south and the north respectively), the two least developed and consequently most potentially lucrative tourist regions.\textsuperscript{215} The situation in Akamas was further exacerbated given the presence of 125 km\textsuperscript{2} of British military 'range area' in its heartland, in accordance with the 1960 Treaty of Establishment.\textsuperscript{216}

It can be argued, however, that this discursive relationship between the environment and identity, such that "physical space, constructed or otherwise" lends itself to 'ideological purposes', appeared to have been just as, if not more, pronounced in the nationalist realm.\textsuperscript{217} The 1960 constitution of the ROC contained no provision for environmental protection, but following the work from 1967 of a Country Planning Committee, the 1972 Town and Country Planning Law (based on British planning law) provided for the adoption of an 'Island Plan' complemented by 'Local Plans'. In the south this law remained the primary legislative regulator of land development and physical planning yet, after significant pressure from prospective developers, it only came into force in its entirety in December 1990. The institutionalisation of environmental matters remained fragmentary; a 'Environmental Protection Law' (for water and air pollution) was only enacted in 1991. Partly in response to this shortfall, from the mid-1980s nearly thirty environmental NGOs were to develop in the south. Although displaying diverse concerns about the environment, a majority operated under the umbrella of 'The Federation of Environmental and Ecological Organisations' (established in 1988) although, as suggested by Argyrou, this failed to iron out various intracommunal inconsistencies in understanding and approaching environmental concerns, as will be noted later.

In the north, at the international level the unrecognised Turkish Cypriot authorities were unable to attend international conferences on the environment from 1974. Representatives in the north, for example, which since 1974 held 58% of the island's coastline, were not to participate in the Mediterranean Action Plan.\textsuperscript{218} While an 'Environment Law' was similarly enacted in 1990, the necessary regulations to facilitate its legal implementation were not established until 1997. In tandem with the south, by
the mid-1990s there were over ten environmental NGOs, most of which had developed in the late-1980s/early 1990s,\textsuperscript{219} and for a short period there was also an Environmental Co-ordinating Committee to prevent duplication of efforts and to ensure major environmental concerns were being addressed.

Given the suggested political dimension to state-led, island-wide policies, it was no surprise that concerns over the environment were not free from ideological and dogmatic discourse. Most notable were Greek Cypriot concerns with integration and a uniform policy encompassing the island as a single environmental unit. Geography, geology, weather, flora and fauna had conspired over time to make it a single country, and the events of 1974 had challenged the intuitively appealing notion of island-wide management.\textsuperscript{220} For the Greek Cypriot government, the link was both direct and conscious (it is worth quoting at some length);

"[t]he Turkish invasion and occupation of 40% of the island is considered to be the most serious threat on the Cyprus ecosystem in recent centuries by bringing about an almost complete division of all the ecological and environmental parameters and dimensions".\textsuperscript{221}

It was fully aware of how ‘aggression and occupation’ had brought about ‘irreparable damage’ to the environment.\textsuperscript{222} Moreover,

"[t]he destruction, the barbarity and plundering […] are reminiscent of the dark days of the Middle Ages. […] The demographic and cultural alteration of Cyprus threaten[s], in the long term, the whole of the island’s ecosystem. […] The importation of foreign elements to the island’s ecosystem […] constitute[s] an ecological gangrene".\textsuperscript{223}

The discursive marriage of environmental problems and ‘ecological sores’ with the ‘national’ problem was vividly portrayed, even if its Orientalist rhetoric was put to one side.\textsuperscript{224} Directly because of the ‘division of the island’ and the ‘uncertainty’ generated for public and private decision-makers, the economy had been revitalised ‘without the time to consider the environment’; in turn, there was no way to plan and implement a uniform and integrated development and conservation programme.\textsuperscript{225} It was, consequently, not until the mid-1980s that planning in the south began to move slowly from the short-term in response to the 1974 events, to more of a long-term perspective.\textsuperscript{226}
Island-wide Perspective

In addition, the “illegal ‘state’ of the occupied part of Cyprus” had no obligations regarding the Berne Convention or CITES. This was rightly based upon the observation that the TRNC had never been bound by any inter-state environmental treaties even though, although unrecognised, it remained subject to any obligations concerning environmental protection, and the rules of customary law applied as it asserted ‘statehood’. Following the Greek Cypriots’ logic through, therefore;

“the turning point will be, of course, [...] the unification of the island which will terminate the current artificial division of its ecosystem and will allow for a unified environmental policy for the whole country to be implemented”.

Ambiguities concerning the environmental policy in the north, which suggested that authorities in the north and Turkey combined had allowed unpalatable land use changes, were also an implicit cause for concern within the UN—the Secretary-General himself reported in 1996 that some 20% of the northern territory was now ‘reserved for military purposes’; it was, after all, one of the most densely militarised areas in the world.

In this light, the history of bicommmunalism involving NGOs from both south and north was a short one. Many environmental concerns raised affected one community more than the other. Rapid coastal zone development in the south after 1974, due to the focusing of political attention on settlement issues as part of the ‘economic miracle’, was generally understood to have created gravely negative social and environmental effects by the late 1980s. This development had yet to fully emerge on a comparable scale in the north. Of much greater significance, however, were to be the political positions of the individual NGOs. Approaches to the wider Cyprus conflict were evidently polarised along a crudely-definable Left (rapprochement) and Right (‘rejectionist’) axis. Contrasting intracommunal perspectives threw up apparently contradictory environmental rhetoric from the north and from the south. Yet while such oppositional voices rightly served to complicate any generalisations, it was plausible to suggest that NGO constitutions sang broadly the same tune as ‘official’ government policy, thus seriously underscoring the strangulation of environmental bicommmunalism. An example of the considerable complexities of the political nature of cooperation between Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot is a relatively minor episode in the short history of environmentalism in Cyprus, an initiative undertaken by the Friends of the Earth (FOE, based in the south) in 1990. The specific point of contention was the proposal of a face-to-face meeting with a Turkish
Cypriot environmental NGO. Encouraged by Charles Gaulkin, then UNFICYP Spokesman, to mark ‘World Environment Day’ in June with a meeting at Ledra Palace, the FOE coordinator had sought amongst the Greek Cypriot NGOs to draft a ‘joint declaration’ to mark the day.235 Divisions both within the general ‘green’ movement and within FOE itself over the politics of procedure were to take centre stage, however; the most widely-proposed pre-condition set was that the Turkish Cypriot NGO should declare in advance that “the single greatest ecological problem facing Cyprus today is the occupation of the north of the island”.236 As a reflection of the state level’s perceived need to legitimise their control over a territorially weak ‘nation’, and at the same time negate the necessity and relevance of the TRNC, ‘environmental security’ was interpreted as responding to the ‘unnatural occupation’ of the island’s ecosystem.

While a small entourage was eventually organised to attend, on the morning of the event they were informed that, at the last minute, the Turkish Cypriot delegation had been refused permission to cross into the UNBZ by their authorities.

The incident successfully highlighted two contradictory processes. A ‘rejectionist’ lobby amongst Greek Cypriot environmentalists was unable to consider bicommunal environmental contacts free from politics, both specifically through distrust of the ‘other’s’ intentions and, more generally, through fear of recognition.237 The inclusion of various political elites within NGOs in the north, while improving NGO access to decision-making parties, also led to the politicisation of such NGOs and further complicated their perceived ‘neutrality’.238 Ironically, however, in addition a ‘rejectionist’ Turkish Cypriot leadership had refused to accept the legitimacy of such bicommunal contacts, not only strongly indicating that the Turkish Cypriot NGO was not in search of entrapment, but more generally illustrating the breadth of issue areas forced to pass screening procedures set by the leadership in the north. In this case, it reflected a belief among planners and NGOs in the north that rather than prescribing an ‘island-wide’ scale of management as a matter of course, the geographical scale of intended legislation had to be appropriately determined.239 Turkish Cypriot environmentalists felt that while cooperation in the field of environmental conservation carried a major potential for confidence-building, Greek Cypriot attempts to ‘block’ international finance for such areas as water development in the north were fundamentally counter-productive.240 Yet, the specific position of the ROC’s and
TRNC’s policy on (bicomunal) environmentalism can be deduced from the most comprehensive third party intervention on the matter since 1974.

5.5.3 The UNDP ‘Environmental Programming for Action in Cyprus’ study

Fundamentally, as a distinct issue area, the environment appeared to be the most politically ‘neutral’ area in which to identify mutually acceptable joint initiatives.\textsuperscript{241} It was, after all, “a subject which has no borders, no boundaries, it concerns everybody”.\textsuperscript{242} An ‘Environmental Profile’ was seen to be an imperative, given that a World Bank report on the Mediterranean in 1990 noted a high level of conflict over resource use on the island, and another report three years later for the Greek Cypriot government recognised coastal zone degradation and an unsustainable water balance as the two problems of major concern.\textsuperscript{243} To address these urgent environmental issues, additional assistance was sought by the ROC from the UNDP through their Programme Support Project, the progress of which this analysis will now focus on.

By the early 1970s, the ROC had come to represent the most concentrated field of UNDP aid in the world. Since the onset of intercommunal troubles in 1963, however, a variety of reasons had meant that the Turkish Cypriot community had received little of it.\textsuperscript{244} For the Turkish Cypriots, ‘unilaterally’ and ‘illegally’ accredited as the UNDP was to the Greek Cypriot government, it was only by 1969—when all hope of receiving aid direct had evaporated—that the Turkish Cypriot leadership supported the Turkish Cypriot submission of offers for assistance.\textsuperscript{245} From then on, however, the UNDP became more individual programme-orientated, most notably when, after 1974;

“[the] UNDP, in agreement with the Government, [...] continued its position that for technical assistance in the area of long-term resource management and environment, as well as in the area of human health, issues should, if possible, be addressed for the island as a whole”.\textsuperscript{246}

Special emphasis was now given to development efforts which would ‘promote intercommunal cooperation’ and serve both communities ‘in an equitable manner’—in short, reaffirming the UN’s desire to achieve ‘a return to normalcy’, and for more bicomunal development projects.\textsuperscript{247}
Given the developing principle of commitment to both communities, it was therefore with some surprise when, in early April 1997, it was announced suddenly that the UNDP’s Cyprus office (as with UNHCR’s) would be closing ‘within the week’. Over thirty-seven years of involvement in Cyprus had seen the UNDP partner numerous government bodies, if largely in the south (wholly so after 1974). The country programme, as with all such UNDP missions, was funded by UN member states’ voluntary contributions, and for each five-year country programme the UNDP allocated certain moneys to certain projects. The UNDP responded to government requests, was able to reject them, and was even able non-coercively to recommend ideas for projects. Yet, they were never able to receive and consider requests direct from any ‘government’ authority in the north. Instead, a practice had developed whereby any request for assistance from the Turkish Cypriot community came through the UNDP, but was then channelled to the internationally recognised government, thus avoiding any inter-‘government’ contact and tacit recognition of the ‘authorities’ in the other side. Paradoxically, however, the UNDP was also trying to channel technical assistance to the “whole of the nation [sic] of the country”. This operational approach was clearly problematic. In practice, any request for assistance would be scrutinised by the Greek Cypriot government, particularly if there were any political or security implications. A further implication of this (notably exploited from 1963 to 1974) was that, by calling for a greater proportion of UNDP money to impact on his beleaguered community (whilst fully conscious that such requests would fail), the Turkish Cypriot leadership was able to legitimise his policy of non-recognition and non-cooperation with the Greek Cypriot ‘usurpers’ until a political settlement was negotiated.

In spite of this historical background, global developments during the previous two decades had suggested to the UNDP that the environment was a ‘common cause’ requiring ‘common action’. By the 1990s the UNDP was giving high-priority to improving public sector efficiency, and economic restructuring with the growing prospect of full EU membership. Aware of the rapid and largely uncontrolled economic growth over the previous two decades, long-term resource management of the island’s renewable and non-renewable resources was highlighted as a new sectoral theme, notably with special emphasis placed on ‘island-wide activities and environmental issues’. Indeed, Cyprus was seen as a special case;
Island-wide Perspective

"the continuing rapid growth of the island’s economy during the past few years has given further impetus to the need for special environmental action in order to sustain the present pace of economic and social development without endangering the quality of the island’s natural environment". 233

Consequently, the environment was portrayed as "another logical priority area for island wide cooperation". 254 Conversely, the UNDP Resident Representative went so far as to suggest that in line with government policies (presumably those of the ROC) the environment "could even be considered a priority area for bicommunal cooperation as for several environmental issues an island wide approach may, in fact, be the only avenue to long term solutions. 255

With these assumptions, third party involvement was recommended to assist the ‘concerned authorities’—de facto representatives and interest-groups on both sides of the UNBZ, 256 one notable observation of the 1987 UNDP report had been the government bodies’ failure to recognise fully the benefits of bringing private and non-governmental agency efforts into the environmental planning process. 257 A study was initiated in the autumn of 1989 by the UNDP Resident Representative who made contacts with interested parties on either side of the UNBZ. In line with developing UNDP policy in general, local rather than international consultants were approached; 258 however, although two non- ‘governmental’ environmental planning consultants were then contracted, there was concern that they should be able to prepare the political environment within their own communities to make realisation of projects possible. 259 The two consultants, with the Representative as moderator, met at Ledra Palace and were able to synchronise their general approach to the project before returning to their respective communities and formulating their own team of experts. 260 Discussions then ensued with relevant people, notably including government personnel, on identifying priority issues and assessing the feasibility of each idea.

The study’s objectives had been to provide an update of the state of the island environment as a whole, a systematic assessment of the need for additional action for environmental policy and management programmes, and a formulation of specific proposals for technical assistance to meet various priority needs. 261 In this sense, the study was to simply present specific environmental problems to be addressed over the next 5-10 year period. Only after completion of the reports would funding be sought, with the UNDP and other potential international donor agencies (e.g., UNHCR, WHO, UNESCO, UNEP) to provide the catalyst for technical assistance. This approach thus
differed markedly from the UNDP’s previous environmental reports in that it took a broader view of Cyprus’s environment (both structurally and spatially), and in turn acknowledged what was assumed to be a genuine interest on both sides of the UNBZ to cooperate on various environmental matters. The final study was eventually presented in four parts: two volumes individually covering the two main communities, one volume detailing approximately 40 suggestions for areas of possible technical assistance, and an executive summary (Table 5.6). Collectively, the 40 proposals covered specific areas that would deliver “a major positive impact on [...] sustainable environmental developments in Cyprus”, and which required external assistance.

In terms of geographical scale, within the final proposals it was possible to distinguish those addressing borderland-specific problems from those concerned with island-wide policy. Only three addressed borderland problems, all related to the geographically partitioned capital of Nicosia (see Chapter 7). Of the island-wide ‘actions’ one fifth referred specifically to the Turkish Cypriot north (Table 5.6). A number of action areas generally addressing island-wide issues were also, in reality, problems located in the north; for example, the feasibility study on underground barriers was largely proposed to examine their potential along the Morphou and Famagusta aquifers. By contrast, only two ‘actions’ were particular to the south—dealing specifically with tourism and wetlands management (Table 5.6).

There were structural problems in undertaking the report, given that there was not only a general paucity in baseline information of key environmental indicators, but that environmental data was spread between various government departments, never mind between two de facto governments. This predetermined the degree to which the study was able to provide an integral, literally island-wide analysis of Cyprus’ environmental management and to develop certain island-wide norms. More fundamentally, by separating ‘north’ from ‘south’, the two most detailed reports reproduced this analytical division. This approach was surprising, given that the UNDP Resident Representative recognised that Cyprus’ relatively small size could make it ‘the ideal country’ to use as a model for comprehensive environmental programming by “transcending the existing political divide” between the island’s two communities.
Table 5.6 *The geographical scale of ‘action’ areas proposed by UNDP environmental programming study*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Priority areas</th>
<th>Action</th>
<th>Scale</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General</td>
<td>- develop an Environmental Education and Awareness Programme</td>
<td>Ø</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- feasibility study for creation of natural history museum, parks, etc.</td>
<td>Ø</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- establish EIA procedures*</td>
<td>Ø</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atmosphere</td>
<td>- formulate guidelines on ‘polluter-pays’ principle*</td>
<td>Ø</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- revise the Nicosia Master Plan Transportation Study*</td>
<td>=</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- comprehensive study of atmospheric fluxes of particulate matter</td>
<td>Ø</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- study on high-tech application of wind and solar energy*</td>
<td>Ø</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fresh water resources</td>
<td>- study on renewing domestic water distribution networks</td>
<td>Ø</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- study on clearing silt from reservoirs</td>
<td>Ø</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- control of agricultural chemical residues in all water sources*</td>
<td>Ø</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- study on recycling used waters</td>
<td>Ø</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- study on methods to reduce evaporation*</td>
<td>Ø</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- study on solar-powered desalination plants*</td>
<td>Ø</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- study on introduction of central sewage systems*</td>
<td>Ø</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- comprehensive study on water resource management*</td>
<td>Ø</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- feasibility study on underground barriers</td>
<td>Ø</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- study on maintaining wetland ecosystems*</td>
<td>Ø</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- study on bio-data of man-made and natural wetlands</td>
<td>Ø</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrestrial resources</td>
<td>- comprehensive land improvement scheme*</td>
<td>Ø</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrestrial ecosystems</td>
<td>- pilot project to combat soil erosion on foothills of Kyrenia Range</td>
<td>Ø</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- afforestation project on Kyrenia range</td>
<td>Ø</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- forest fire-fighting system</td>
<td>Ø</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- project on identification of native fauna and flora*</td>
<td>Ø</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine resources and regional marine environment</td>
<td>- coastal zone and pelagic resource management*</td>
<td>Ø</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- study for institutionalising marine resource management</td>
<td>Ø</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithosphere</td>
<td>- comprehensive policy and legislation regarding mines and quarries*</td>
<td>Ø</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- preparation of geotechnical and isoseismic data for development*</td>
<td>Ø</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- elaboration of regulations for aseismic structures*</td>
<td>Ø</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- workshop for pre-disaster planning*</td>
<td>Ø</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human settlements</td>
<td>- linear park along Pedhieos River</td>
<td>Ø at</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- prepare master plan for old town Famagusta</td>
<td>Ø</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- preparation of environmental zone map*</td>
<td>Ø</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
- upgrading of local experts and their resources in planning
- expert assistance in town planning implementation techniques
- comprehensive development plan for Paralimni and Ayia Napa
- comprehensive development plan for Karpas Peninsula

Human health and welfare
- review of capabilities in monitoring toxic and harmful substances
- study of Nicosia Sewerage Treatment Plant (esp. effluent reuse)
- study on industrial waste treatment
- feasibility study on establishing bicommunal waste/biogas plant

Ø - island-wide scale
∪ - specific to Greek Cypriot area of control
∩ - specific to Turkish Cypriot area of control
= - borderland scale
* - both Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots to be trained/involved in its preparation/implementation.

Source: Adapted by author from UNDP (1991c; 1991d).

In the light of these observations, the determining factors behind the original proposals are worth highlighting. To identify priority areas, the findings of previous technical studies were considered, as was any possible involvement of NGOs in initiatives. Perhaps most significantly, however, activities which would benefit the island 'as a whole' and which would require the cooperation of both communities were to receive particular attention (Appendix 8). This was clearly based on the UNDP's belief that previous UN involvement in 'technical cooperation'—be it through the UNDP, UNHCR or other UN agencies—had greatly supported the on-going efforts for a solution to the Cyprus conflict under the aegis of the UN Secretary-General;

"[t]hrough technical contacts and exchanges of views, mutual understanding and cooperation between the two communities is fostered."

There were also economic incentives to present the report as a bicommunal undertaking given that an increasing number of funding agencies employed an explicit 'bicommunal-only' policy. After initiating the study the UNDP Resident Representative was to become increasingly involved in its diplomatic marketing; one track was to argue that it was possible to expand the Nicosia Master Plan 'model'
(Chapter 7) into environmental arenas, given their potential for generating other regimes of ‘practical cooperation’.267

For a number of reasons, however, this was not to be the case as the overall project failed to progress any further. The Turkish Cypriot consultant, accompanied by the UNDP’s representative, presented the final publication to Denktash in 1991, who received and seemingly accepted its formulation. The train of events in the south was even more unclear, however; the report was submitted to the UNDP who were then to present it to the Greek Cypriot authorities when the whole initiative appeared to dramatically falter. The perception in the north was that the Greek Cypriot consultant had been unable to ‘sell’ the projects to the Planning Bureau of the ROC, and that these authorities had then demanded that the publication be stopped and its circulation terminated.268 By contrast, the perception in the south was that the UNDP representative had failed to generate sufficient interest from funding agencies before he ended his representation role in Cyprus. Similarly, however, the Greek Cypriot consultant suspected that the study’s failure came down to what was simply termed as ‘politics’.269

To understand more fully what such ‘politics’ might have entailed it is necessary to set the UNDP study in its wider context. It would be possible to assume that, for three main reasons, the Greek Cypriot authorities chose not to act on the UNDP report as presented—to expand, in other words, on their UNDP-orchestrated ‘cooperation’ in other environmental issue areas (e.g., animal and agricultural disease control). Primarily, the ROC refused, as they had done throughout the prolonged conflict, to recognise any other ‘government’ authority on the island. This interpretation was vividly reflected in the Turkish Cypriot consultant’s representation of the Greek Cypriot point of view;

“[i]t was them [the Greek Cypriots] who should decide on what projects and what to do on the island, and it wasn’t up to [...] him [the UNDP Resident Representative] to present projects and to seek, to engage the Turkish Cypriot community in the decision-making and choice of projects”.270

The fact that the team of experts in the north included officials from the unrecognised government simply exacerbated any Greek Cypriot concerns; there was a strong possibility that the two consultants—while nominally operating at the ‘civil society’ or ‘Track II’ level— would be coming together during more formal negotiations to discuss
joint policies, while at the same time consulting with the \textit{de facto} authorities of the two sides.\textsuperscript{271}

Without being able to identify precisely the initiator of the project, this evolutionary ‘grey area’ led on directly to a second Greek Cypriot concern, that of how the projects might subsequently be managed. It was perhaps not coincidental that another Turkish Cypriot report, published in parallel and similarly funded by the UNDP, called not only for the enlisting of a ‘Turkish Cypriot Community Liaison Officer’ to coordinate the proposed initiatives but also for the establishment of another permanent UNDP office, in the north.\textsuperscript{272} This format was presented (once again) as being one similar to the implementation of the Nicosia Master Plan, involving representatives from two separate communities in a bicomunal relationship (see Chapter 7).\textsuperscript{273} Yet, notably in the eyes of the Greek Cypriot authorities, it clearly was not—precisely because of the relatively greater geographical scope, structural depth, and multilateral character of the many projects suggested. Supplementing this was the increasingly questionable role of the Resident Representative himself; a one-off appearance in an environmental debate on Turkish Cypriot national TV rapidly contributed to his \textit{persona non grata} status with the Greek Cypriot government.\textsuperscript{274}

Finally, there may well have been funding problems, not simply in terms of guaranteeing support but also in distributing the funds between the two communities given that a larger proportion of action areas fell within the north.\textsuperscript{275} The Turkish Cypriot community had been traditionally dissatisfied with the amount of benefits received from UNDP-sponsored assistance, reflecting their more commonly-held view that the UN system penalised non-state interest groups;\textsuperscript{276}

\begin{quote}
"outside agencies are precluded from working with or supporting the other communities. In turn this leads to a lack of international support for environmental protection, sustainable development and architectural heritage conservation in the areas administered by the unrepresented ethnic groups".\textsuperscript{277}
\end{quote}

This, in addition to the more obvious recognition dilemma for the Greek Cypriots, had greatly diluted the perceived potential for utilising environmental conservation as an intercommunal confidence-building measure.\textsuperscript{278}
5.6 Conclusions

From the island-wide perspective, although both ‘official’ and ‘popular’ representations of the impact of the events of 1974 on resource management were to be made up of a plurality of orientations and positions, certain themes could be traced within them, and differences identified between them. Examination of political processes and social relations in the aftermath of 1974 has revealed three areas of contestation: transboundary resources, the meaning of transboundary resource management, and the ‘state’ mechanisms for facilitating this process of cooperation.

The very meaning of island-wide transboundary resource management was contested. The ROC’s consistent policy not to cooperate further with the Turkish Cypriot authorities over water supplies, beyond specific interdependencies at the borderland (as considered in the next two chapters), served two purposes: it avoided direct or indirect recognition of the northern government, and it proved their ability to survive as a state in the meantime. Given that the latter motive was in essence contradictory, in that it conflated their more general argument for the reformation of ‘island-wide’ resource management structures, it would seem plausible to suggest that the former motive—non-recognition of the TRNC—was primary. Ultimately, the UNDP project also faltered because the parties found it impossible to compromise on a specific issue before being assured that there would be compensations on other issues. After partition, intercommunal relations became even more limited than between 1964 and 1974, and even the gradual pluralisation of the mediation process—involving alternatives from ‘above’ (UNHCR, EU, UNDP) and from ‘below’ (citizen-based social movements, elite groups) the state level—were seemingly unable to override ‘state’-led political agendas. Alternative mechanisms of transboundary cooperation were fundamentally contested. Following two significant high-level agreements in the immediate post-partition period, the UN-sponsored search for an overall solution was plagued by failure and talks were eventually hijacked by the development of the ROC’s application for membership with the EU.

While the character of protracted social conflict suggested that it was impossible to isolate issue areas, in that each one was linked to others at a number of different levels, a range of issue-specific initiatives were to develop nevertheless. Internationally-sponsored bicommunal projects proved a valuable means of facilitating
transboundary cooperation, particularly for the Turkish Cypriot community who were barred from directly approaching international organisations. The extent to which these informal, citizen-based networks were impacting on either the high-level negotiations or the general consensus within each community, and whether such networks could be considered a sufficiently cohesive ‘epistemic community’, remained indiscernible. Nationalist elements in both communities saw intercommunal contacts as an insufficient challenge to the status quo—constituting a threat to the Greek Cypriots position that the two communities could not live together whilst the Turkish Forces remained, while representing a threat to the Turkish Cypriot position that the two communities simply could not live together. Moreover, in the latter case, it was felt critical by the Turkish Cypriot authorities that the process should not openly challenge ‘Track I’ officials and negotiators, nor allow itself to be exploited or ‘degraded’ by opposition parties.

Opportunities for transboundary economic cooperation were not to be taken formally whilst, for the UNDP, the political developments in Cyprus complicated its position, inherently subject as it was to the birth of a new yet only short-lived unitary state. The ‘development’ of the ‘island’ state was soon to be contested primarily between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities to the extent that the UNDP’s own position became integral to the conflict. In turn, the UNDP’s so-called ‘technical’ or ‘functional’ initiatives were to become increasingly politicised, and the UNDP’s goals in Cyprus—those being the ‘creation of national self-reliance’ and ‘the achievement of sustainable development for the island as a whole’—grew ever more problematic. Reflecting on its goals, the UNDP was simply unable to facilitate ‘self-reliance’ at the island-wide scale, least of all at the ‘national’ scale, and eventually left Cyprus at a time when development on the island—rather than being comprehensive or ‘sustainable’—was as deeply contested as ever.

In its purest form, at the island-wide perspective from 1974 the view appeared to hold that political questions of ‘national sovereignty’ were quite distinct from, and superseded, questions of economic development, interdependence, or cooperation. The two community authorities were willing to sacrifice their own potential advantages if that meant denying the other side the chance to relieve the pressures it faced. The Cyprus conflict had become both intercommunal and ‘international’—‘international’ in the sense that the relevant parties could be found beyond the borders of the de jure Republic of Cyprus (i.e. Greece, Turkey, UK, US, EU), and also, as has been previously
argued, the conflict involved 'would-be' international actors in the form of the de facto TRNC government. 'Intergovernmentalism' in Cyprus now involved de facto collaboration between highly centralised 'states' with unequal power and resources. It will be seen in the next two chapters how conducive this was in allowing this growing plurality of actors to operate at the borderland scale, and in so doing to develop or maintain transboundary links on a smaller scale than the politicised, nationalised space of the 'island of Cyprus'.

Endnotes:


2 UN S/11569. This figure was calculated and publicised within six days of the cease fire (The Cyprus Mail, 22/8/74), although, as with the majority of statistics used in this process, it was allegedly based on 1972 estimates (Planning Bureau, 1976a: 2).

3 PIO (south) (1976e: 1).


6 Although, the upgrading of Larnaca airport to international status was to encourage soon both incoming tourists and outgoing exports (Wilson, 1992: 35).

7 Planning Bureau (1975a: 5).


9 Planning Bureau (1975a: 3).


11 Loizos (1981: 128-31, 196-8) noted the Greek Cypriot refugees' ‘preoccupation with loss’ in the aftermath of 1974, and their propensity to generate “obsessive citations of things lost” so as to handle their grief, although they were led to be believe that this ‘loss’ was temporary.

12 Karouzis’ (1977) calculations, moreover, suggested that several of these estimates were based on donums of land held by Turkish Cypriots in 1960 rather than just prior to the military intervention. A similar representation is recorded in The Cyprus Weekly (28/9-4/10/79) which stated that while the ratio of refugee land ownership in terms of donums lost was 3.2:1 (Greek Cypriot: Turkish Cypriot), the ratio in terms of commercial value lost was 19.3:1.

13 Due to outstanding delimitation problems (see Chapter 6), it has not been possible nor practical to calculate the post-1974 territorial ratio exactly. The UN Secretary-General reported the area 'north of the buffer zone' to be 'over 36%' (UN S/24472, para.17), while Karouzis (1977: 115) calculated '37.1%' and Pechoux (1976: 22) suggested '38.5%'. The Greek Cypriot government often refers to a conveniently-rounded up '40%', while their Turkish Cypriot counterparts often prefer to use absolute measurements (i.e., '3,354 km²').
In addition to other sources cited throughout this thesis, the following represented key texts: PIO (south) (1976; 1995: 85); Planning Bureau (1975a, b); Karouzis (1977: 123); Kourvetaris (1977); ROC (1996a: 17).

Planning Bureau (1975a: 16).

Roberts (1992: 29, fn. 13) noted that the presence of Turkish forces immediately after 1974 was viewed in some UNGA resolutions as an ‘occupation’, but in subsequent years the question was deferred (see UNGA Resn. 37/253 (13/5/83)). While Turkey consistently denied military occupation on the grounds that a new government had been established in the northern portion, and that Turkey did not exercise control there (Interview, Legal Adviser and Former Attorney-General of TRNC Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Defence, Nicosia (north), 24/4/97), numerous cases of international law continued to question this argument.

Ramady (1976: 7); Drury (1981: 301). Questioning these suspicions, Pechoux (1976: 23-24) noted the poor military value and ‘geographical coherence’ of the dividing line chosen. However, this argument failed to consider the fact that, by definition, there is no dividing line which would not be in some way artificially disruptive. In late August 1974, nonetheless, Denktash reportedly responded to further Greek Cypriot activities by noting “Cyprus is a small island. It could mean extending our boundaries”, and in July 1975 Greek Cypriot newspapers reported Turkish plans to further annex the Larnaca oil refinery and Kokkinokhoria region (The Cyprus Mail, 27/8/74; 6/7/75).


See Christodoulou (1992) for extensive analysis of Greek Cypriot economic development from the second-half of the 1970s onwards.

IISS (1975: 80).

UN S/11717, paras. 23 and 35; UN S/11900, para. 35. Thousands could still be found on the ‘wrong side’ by June 1975, however, when nearly 11,000 Turkish Cypriots remained in the south, while 10,500 Greek Cypriots resided in the north.


Atun (1980: 104); Interview, Speaker of the TRNC House of Representatives, Former Prime Minister, Nicosia (south), 30/4/97.


UN S/12463, para. 29; Morvaridi (1993a: 223). In December 1982, ‘final possession’ certificates (i.e., title deeds) were eventually issued for formerly-Greek Cypriot properties and land (The Cyprus Weekly, 26/11-2/12/82).

Atun (1980; 105). A minimum of 153 donums of cereal land (or equivalent) was calculated for ‘the long-term rehabilitation of a family unit of five persons’.

Island-wide Perspective


36 UN S/11724. A Turkish settler-Turkish Cypriot conflict of interests must also be noted, however, given that, while settlers were not formally given title deeds, they were often perceived to have received better land/property relative to Turkish Cypriots (Morvaridi, 1993a: 230).

37 Hampson (1996: 40).

38 The Cyprus Weekly (6-12/11/81).

39 ROC (1961: 7, emphasis added). This was, to some extent, not surprising given that he did not recognise the ‘other’ problem.


41 With a mere 6 mn.cu.m. in 1960, the dam storage capacity had risen to 298.7 mn.cu.m. by the late 1990s, with a ratio of 50 large dams for every 10,000 km² (WDD, 1997).

42 Thorpe (1961: 1).


44 King (1980b: 323). The examination of rainfall in other, even smaller Mediterranean islands (e.g., Malta, Stromboli) suggests that Cyprus’ precipitation is especially critical for an island with finite resources (Aubriet, 1993: 31). In Cyprus, moreover, studies suggested a 14% reduction in rainfall between the 1900s and 1990s (Kypris, 1995: 11).

45 The World Bank rightly noted the impracticality of constructing a de facto water balance separating south from north (World Bank, 1995: i).


47 GOC (1946: 21); WDD (1989: 6).

48 CMND (1960: 202).

49 Part II (Section 8, Para. 3: 26) of Annex B (CMND, 1960).

50 The Committee met three times a year. Notably, however, relations across the new, de facto border with the Turkish Cypriot authorities were never to be formalised (Interview, Area Officer of Dhekelia SBA, Dhekelia, 6/12/96).

51 Again, this figure can probably never be confirmed. Moreover, Greek Cypriot water officials more recently suggested that, in 1996, the Morphou aquifer constituted only 15% of these reserves.

52 Hitchens (1984: 104). Ironically, folklore had it that the Kythrea spring originated in the Turkish mainland mountains, and had flowed from under the sea red with blood spilt during Turkish battles (Thirgood, 1987: 346, fn. 12). These springs had dried up by the late 1980s however.

53 The Cyprus Mail (12/7/75); PIO (south) (1976e: 96).

54 Atakol (1974: 8). These statistics were to form the basis of the Turkish Cypriots’ negotiation proposals in 1978.
55 Ertekün (1977: 26). While the Greek Cypriot authorities established the ‘Turkish Cypriot-owned Wells Committee’ to manage the wells left behind by the Turkish Cypriots, in preparation for their anticipated return, by 1989 over 441 such wells were being used by Greek Cypriot refugee farmers (WDD, 1990: II-20).

56 In this proposal it was also argued that the average rainfall in the south was three times that of the north (UN S/12723, Annex).

57 UN S/14539. Note this is not the author’s translation.

58 This quote is cited in Pechoux (1976: 44, author’s translation).

59 The Cyprus Mail (12/7/75).

60 Kliot and Mansfield (1997: 508) failed to recognise these less publicised transboundary transfers.

61 Lytras (1993: 131). Part of the Vasilikos-Pendaskinos and Southern Conveyor projects, noted below, also fell within the north.

62 André and Robert (1985: 3); EIU (1985: 53). The final phase of the SCP is expected to be completed in 1999.

63 WD (1977: 1). With these estimates it should be cautioned, however, that no groundwater level measurements were taken in the area between 1974 and 1979. Indeed, the basis of this project was republished in 1980, and while the recharge deficit had increased to 25 mn.cu.m./yr., the project’s proposed supply coincidentally had also increased by the exact same amount (MANR, 1980: 1). Various estimates for net reductions in groundwater storage are provided in Gökçekus and Doyuran (1993: 828).

64 EES (1974); Gökçekus (1990: 52). As further discussed below, the EC rejected the funding request as part of their First Financial Protocol in 1979 because it was not considered ‘bicomunal’ (Alemdar, 1992: 19). Given the transboundary nature of the Morphou aquifer, recognised also by international observers (Storrie, 1976: 35; Pechoux, 1984: 18), this decision was badly received by many Turkish Cypriot environmentalists.


66 Richez (1991: 69). Water uses in this region are split 79% agriculture, 13% domestic, and 8% industry (Hamdy et al. 1995: 179). A projected estimate for consumption by 2010 in the ROC is 415 mn.cu.m./yr. (of which 320 mn.cu.m. is for irrigation), and for the TRNC is approximately 180 mn.cu.m. (of which agriculture is 158 mn.cu.m.) (Biçak, 1996: 6; WDD, 1997).


69 Biçak et al. (1996) noted remarkably optimistic water potential estimates of up to 153 mn.cu.m./yr.


71 Cyprus Times (19/7/91); Cyprus Today (11/4/92). Resulting from the lack of indigenous technical resources, by the late 1990s there were instead reports of Turkish state geological engineers conducting the first hydrogeological review of the north since 1974.


222
Gunnerson (1986; 1992). Similar observations were widely publicised in an October 1996 speech by Thomas Lovejoy, Chair of the US Government Committee on Environment and Natural Resources. While there were reports of a US and EU (and even a 'rival' Russian') effort to discuss the issue with both communities over the following year, no progress was recorded (The Cyprus Weekly, 20-26/9/96; 28/12/97; 14/3/98).


One small plant belonging to Dhekelia SBA had operated historically, but failed to make sufficient use of its 1,000 cu.m./day capacity (B. Smith, 1997: 240). Demonstrating the apparent flexibility of the ROC-SBA Joint Water Commission, however, on the completion of the new Dhekelia plant the SBA authorities successfully sought access to its output on a commercial basis (Interview, Principle Water Engineer, ROC Water Development Department, Nicosia (south), 10/12/96). Similar commercial arrangements were made over the Kouris Dam waters for Akrotiri SBA (Interview, Area Officer of Akrotiri SBA, Phesouri, 6/12/96).

Thorpe (1961: 8).

The different deficit to levels previously noted is instructive of the lack of comprehensive water data in the north.

EIU (1975, 3rd qtr: 16; 1976: 1st qtr, 15; 1976: 4th qtr, 24). Up to 70 mn.cu.m./yr was expected to be pumped by the pipeline.


UN S/12715, Annex.

UN S/12723, Annex.


Detailed in an appendix to the 'Set of Ideas' (UN S/24472, Annex).


For opposing views see Beschorner (1992: 65) and Tashan (1994: 261).

Wachtel (1994).


This was to rise to 7 mn.cu.m./yr by 1999, although parties to the contract reportedly envisaged deliveries of three to four times this volume.

NCM (March-April, 1997); GWR (9/10/97). Of the 30 mn.cu.m. to be imported annually, 5 mn would be sent for domestic use while the remainder would recharge the aquifer.
This was the alleged response from Kassoulides, the ROC’s Spokesman, when in conversation with the TRNC Foreign Affairs and Defence Minister, Taner Etkin (Bayrak TV, Nicosia (north), 23/1/97, (FBIS-WEU-97-017)).


The TRNC’s general stance had been presented in Alemdar (1992).

The TRNC required approximately 112mn.cu.m./yr, but had only 87.5mn.cu.m./yr of secure resources. They too had problems with their dams; of the 18, 2 were dry and the remaining 16 contained only approximately 3mn. tons of water, even though the combined dam capacity was 17.5mn tons. More recent reports suggested that Morphou aquifer was being tapped at twice the rate of recharge.

NCM (31/5/98; 31/7/98). Allan (1983) provided a revealing analysis on the use of natural resources as ‘national fantasies’, whereby resource development projects are attributed unreal qualities (replete with ‘warlike jargon’) by central governments.

NCM (31/5/98). Accordingly, by late 1998 tenders were being called for emergency desalination plants or water imports, with Crete again highlighted as a probable source. Whereas the sponsor of the Cretan water had been kept secret in 1991, this time it was made public that Greece would be providing 15 mn.cu.m of drinking water for free as ‘aid’ (The Cyprus Weekly, 17-23/5/98; 28/10/98; 3/11/98).

Addressing the populace on the 22nd anniversary of the Turkish military intervention (CyBC radio, Nicosia (south), 20/7/96, (FBIS-WEU-96-141). A senior ROC water official argued that the only way a transboundary water agreement similar to that between the ROC and SBA could be formulated would be on a ‘very informal’, probably ‘humanitarian’ basis (Interview, Principle Water Engineer, ROC Water Development Department, Nicosia (south), 10/12/96).

The Cyprus Mail (15/2/92).

Cyprus Today (15/1/94). Illustrating the power of knowledge on transboundary resources, these comments had been supported by the general release of a satellite image of the island produced by Shell International which, for the Turkish Cypriot government and media, ‘proved’ that apart from Morphou most of the underground resources fell in the south (ironically, however, this was presented mistakenly, in that specifically the ‘red’ areas identified were reflecting green cultivation).

Monopolising the electricity supply market, the AHK is a semi-autonomous government organisation, whose Board of Directors is appointed—for their political rather than technical background—by the President of the ROC.

UN S/11568, para. 55.

The Cyprus Mail (4/8/74; 11/8/74).

EIU (1990: 3rd qtr., 21).


There were reports, for example, of major power cuts to the Turkish quarter of Larnaca during the Turkish military intervention (The Cyprus Mail, 24/8/74).

UN S/19304, para. 29.
Island-wide Perspective

112 EIU (1987, 4th qtr.: 25). Denktash allegedly approached Turkey to consider the laying of underwater power cables from the mainland (Sabah, Istanbul, 25/12/94 (FBIS-WEU-94-250)).

113 UNS/19304, para.29.

114 As reported in Cyprus Today (12/11/94).


116 Such action was substantiated by neither the German-Hungarian-Austrian consortium which supplied the equipment, nor UN technical experts who laid the blame at faulty welding (Jansen, 1995: 15; UN sources).

117 This was in exchange for Turkish Cypriot consumers paying their bills (see below), and arose during the 1968-1972 intercommunal talks (Sabah, Istanbul, 25/12/94 (FBIS-WEU-94-250)).

118 Bayrak radio, Nicosia (north) 18/9/94 (FBIS-WEU-94-182); Kibris, Nicosia (north), 20/9/94 (FBIS-WEU-94-184).

119 Sabah, Istanbul, 25/12/94 (FBIS-WEU-94-250), emphasis added.

120 Although, his repeated warnings precipitated security alerts at both Dhekelia and Moni power stations and provoked strong demarche’s to the UN from the Greek Cypriot government (CyBC radio, Nicosia (south), 23/11/94 (FBIS-WEU-94-227)).

121 Interview, Planning Branch Manager, KIB-TEK, Nicosia (north), 18/4/97. A Turkish Cypriot economist calculated in 1993 that the Greek Cypriot authorities ‘owed’ US$616.6 mn to the Turkish Cypriots from unpaid dues and international aid between 1964 and 1991 (Cyprus Today, 24/7/93).


124 AHK (1982: 45; 1994a: 29). In fact, given the restrictions of freedom of access to AHK employees and the payment of bills, unpaid consumption had begun before 1974 such that, by the time of the Turkish military intervention, unpaid bills by Turkish Cypriot consumers already amounted to CY£3.5 mn (UN S/11294, para. 49). The Turkish Cypriot side argued, nonetheless, that pre-1974 only consumers in Nicosia and Larnaca were not paying, in the latter because the supply system had been seized from the Evcaf administration by Greek Cypriot authorities (CTIC, 1970: 17).

125 EIU (1986-87: 59).


127 O Agon, Nicosia (south), 9/12/94 (FBIS-WEU-94-237). This newspaper was keen to highlight that Greek Cypriot refugees were similarly levied.

128 The UN Secretary-General termed the water transfers ‘bicommunal understandings’(UN S/25912, para. 25).

129 Patrick (1976: 111). This was to change after 1974, when it became possible to cut the majority of supply to the north “within minutes” (Interview, Senior Generations Projects Engineer, AHK, Nicosia (south), 24/10/96, original emphasis).

130 Patrick (1976: 112).
Island-wide Perspective

131 Interview, Senior Generations Projects Engineer, AHK, Nicosia (south), 24/10/96, emphasis added. Consequently, it was argued, the AHK historically supplied approximately ‘20%’ of its own generating output to the north (i.e., equivalent to the population ratio).

132 LeMarquand (1977: 12).


137 EIU (1990: 1st qtr., 27).


139 UN S/488, para. 24.

140 The Cyprus Today (15/6/96); Interview, Planning Branch Manager, KIB-TEK, Nicosia (north), 18/4/97. In addition, KIB-TEK introduced a most unpopular 130% rate increase in January 1995, due to the growing costs of Tekçiçek, and a further 56.5% mean increase was incorporated from April 1998.

141 UN S/411, para. 28. Fuel supplies for the north from Turkish fuel distributors have proven a long-term problem, given the TRNC’s economic weakness. In July 1995, at a time when 350 tons of diesel fuel needed on a daily basis was costing KIB-TEK US$55,000, there were reports that they requested from the south, via UNHCR, for mazout supply from the southern-based Mobil Oil Company (CyBC radio, Nicosia (south), 21/7/95, FBIS-WEU-95-142; UN sources). Indeed, by the end of 1995, while in absolute terms the AHK’s power supply to the north had fallen from 395 KW (in 1994) to 54 KW, in relative terms over 11% of the north’s overall supply still came from the south (KIB-TEK, 1996: 11, 15).

142 Loizos (1976: 15).

143 Interview, Permanent Secretary of the ROC Ministry of Commerce, Trade and Industry, Nicosia (south), 10/12/96.

144 This was probably most notably demonstrated, in February 1994, when Denktash visited Ankara and discussed a TL1,500 bn package of assistance to provide for public works investment (EIU, 1994: 2nd qtr., 30).


148 This became a Slovak-sponsored venture after its partition.

149 See Talbot (1977) and Hadjipavlou-Trigeorgis (1998: 259) for details of its remarkably ‘Track I’-like origins, of other workshops up to then.

150 Its demise has since been pinpointed to the retention of permissions for Turkish Cypriots to attend during local elections (Hadjipavlou-Trigeorgis, 1993; 1998).
Island-wide Perspective

151 CC (1995). The consortium consisted of three private US bodies: the Conflict Management Group, the Institute of Multi-Track Diplomacy and the National Training Laboratory. Its approach was largely in line with Kelman’s problem-solving workshop methodology (Kelman, 1972).

152 Hadjipavlou-Trigeorgis (1993: 82).


154 CRTG/CFC (1996). Regarding this UN-overlap, in 1997 UNHCR’s Chief of Mission considered the Cyprus mission as a unique ‘aberration’ of UNHCR’s role in that they were still overseeing projects which had evolved from ‘emergency’ to ‘developmental’ phases, and thus beyond UNHCR’s mandate (CNA, Nicosia (south), 9/5/97(FBIS-WEU-97-129)).

155 These funds were channelled to both communities through the Red Cross and Red Crescent respectively, which eventually amounted to US$15 mn worth of essentially US Congress funds (Pers. Comm., former UNDP Resident Representative in Cyprus, New York 26/7/98).

156 The Cyprus Weekly (25-31/10/94). The latter was, however, largely restricted to monitoring transboundary pollution in Nicosia. Even so, at the end of 1995, Lasan (1995: 105) estimated over 910 Greek Cypriots and 450 Turkish Cypriots regularly involved in UNHCR’s programme.

157 UNHCR (1995). At various staged these contacts overlapped with the Nicosia Master Plan, discussed in Chapter 7 (Interview, Founding member of Architects Association, Nicosia (south), 18/11/96).

158 The (Greek) Cyprus Medical Association rejected UNHCR’s proposal. It was argued, by ROC government spokesman Kassoulides, that additional, bicommmunal services were not necessary: “[t]here are political reasons [...] Building a heart centre on the ‘green line’ means we assume the partition line is permanent” (The Cyprus Weekly, 14-27/4/95; 26/4-2/5/96). Also, in 1990 through UNHCR funds an Institute of Neurology and Genetics was established, and in 1995 it was moved to just south-west of Nicosia’s UNBZ, nominally to serve both communities but in practice still limited to the southern access (Interview, Chairman, The Cyprus Institute of Neurology and Genetics, Nicosia (south), 3/12/96).

159 UN S/437, para. 23. Although UNHCR was to retain its mandate for the protection of refugees and asylum-seekers in Cyprus, in March 1998 the UNDP (see section 5.6.2) and USAID reached an agreement for the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) to take over UNHCR’s bicommmunal activities. Emphasis was explicitly placed on funding ‘civil society organisations’ and NGOs (UN S/488, para. 26) while, in a preemptive letter sent from UNHCR to interested parties in late summer 1997, it was made clear that priority consideration would be given to issue areas traditionally considered to be ‘low politics’ (e.g., environment, water, forestry).


161 Interview, Special Political Adviser to the President of the TRNC, former UNDP consultant, Nicosia (north), 28/4/97. During interviews with political elites in the north it was noticeable how acquainted many were with the rhetoric of cooperation and Track II diplomacy, an observation similarly made by one concerned Turkish Cypriot opposition leader: “[s]econd track trying to influence the first track? On the contrary, I saw the man from the first track coming to the workshops!” (Interview, President of the New Cyprus Party, Nicosia (north), 8/4/97).

162 Kizilyu’rek (1993: 4); Interview, Fulbright Senior Scholar, Nicosia (south), 30/9/97.

163 Democratic Rally (DIKO) (moderates of the nationalist centre) and AKEL traditionally stressed the common aspects shared by the two peoples, although the former for reasons of economic development rather than class struggle.

See, for example, UN S/16, para. 20.

166 UNSC Resn.1032 (19/12/95); UN S/411, para. 15.


169 This virtual border closure was in contrast to an event only weeks earlier; the largest transboundary crossing of people since the 1974-75 population exchanges took place when around 1,000 Greek Cypriots crossed to visit Apostolos Andreas monastery (over 10,000 had applied).

170 Sophocleous (1976: 93); Storrie (1976: 34). Hitchens' (1987: 13; 1997: 149) argument was based on the 'fact' that most of the water resources were in the north, and most of the citrus was in the south.

171 Planning Bureau (1975a: 19). These observations are inspired by O'Dowd and Corrigan's (1994-95) study of Irish relations.


178 This section does not seek to present a simplistic picture of economic asymmetry, and in so doing ignore the legitimate concerns raised over the ROC's economy—e.g., vulnerability with concentration (in economic terms), and environmental externalities (in development terms)—nor prospective economic 'successes' in the TRNC (e.g., the so-called 'university education' industry (Olgun, 1993)); rather, it presents the general economic character of the two communities so as to shed further light on their approach to transboundary economic relations.


182 Wilson (1992: 116);


186 UN S/12723, Annex. Cyprus Petroleum Refinery Limited was a joint venture between the ROC (65% share) and private interests (Mobil with 20%, and local firm Petrolina with 15%) (EIU, 1995-96: 26).

187 Interview, Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Commerce, Trade and Industry, Nicosia (south), 10/12/96. This constituted about 6% of BP and Mobil's on-site production (The Cyprus Weekly, 2-8/11/90.)
Island-wide Perspective


193 BEC (1993: 15). The EU's first two financial protocols (1979-83, and 1984-89) focused on these projects, but by the third protocol ECUs were recentred on EU harmonisation.

194 Although, after 1964, Cyprus was not represented at all at the Parliamentary Assembly until 1984, when Greek Cypriot delegates retook their seats (Necatigil, 1995: 20).

195 UN S/467, para. 19; UNSC Resn. 477 (27/6/96).

196 Theophanous (1996); Interview, Ambassador Delegation of EC Commission, Nicosia (south), 3/10/97.


198 Planning Bureau (1975a: 21); Ramady (1976: 7).

199 Planning Bureau (1975a: 24-27).

200 Symeonides (1977: 264).

201 Planning Bureau (1975a: 28).


204 Planning Bureau (1996: 10-11).


206 Interview, Director of the ROC Department of Industry, Nicosia (south), 10/12/96.


208 Interview, Permanent Secretary of the ROC Ministry of Commerce, Trade and Industry, Nicosia (south), 10/12/96.


210 Mehmet (1992: 170-171). See also proposals for economic cooperation, including a joint economic commission, in Lafrenière and Mitchell (1990). A Richard Holbrooke-initiated proposal, whereby the respective Chambers of Commerce were to further economic and trading links, prompted businessmen's [sic] meetings from November 1997, but with little progress recorded.

211 For such a view, see Necatigil (1995: 20).

212 Tatar (1977: 5-7).
Island-wide Perspective


[216] The area could be used for 70 days/year, and fires often broke out (UNDP/WB, 1995). According to Papastavros (1989), Greek Cypriot demonstrations in the late 1980s (and mid-1990s) over the 'national' symbol of Akamas echoed the 1956 anti-colonial struggles.


[218] Cant and Olgun (1995: 51). Blake (1987a) rightly noted that, in fact, of the 776 km coastline, 296 km fell to the ROC, while 413 km fell north of the UNBZ and 67 km within the SBAs (although Panayiotou (1992) offered different ratios). Furthermore, Blake calculated that 22 km of Cyprus' 55.2 km of sandy beaches fell in the TRNC, and 3 km fell within Akrotiri SBA.


[220] The Cyprus Mail (15/10/91). Of the 123 endemic species (of approximately 1,800 species and subspecies of natural flora), 53 are in fact restricted to the Troodos range (in the south) and 17 to the Pendactylos range (in the north) (ROC/METAP, 1991: B3).

[221] Papastavros (1994: 1), repeated in ROC (1996a: iii). A post-partition study by the (Greek) Cyprus Geographical Association similarly concluded that 16 out of 29 physiographic regions had been wholly or partially 'occupied' (The Cyprus Mail, 22/11/74).

[222] Statement by the Minister of Agriculture, Natural Resources and Environment, Head of the Delegation of the Republic of Cyprus to the 'Nineteenth Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly for the review and appraisal of Agenda 21', New York, 25/6/97. One notable environmental obscenity to the ROC was the memorialisation of landscape in the north—a TRNC and Turkish flag, painted (literally) onto the Kyrenia range and thus dominating Nicosia's skyline, supposedly covered 165,000 m² in area (The Cyprus Weekly, 10-16/12/93; Interview, Environment Officer, ROC Environment Service, Nicosia (south), 21/11/96).


[230] UN S/411, para. 10(a). Of course, this raised the debate (mirrored in the Akamas and the UN's very own buffer zone) over whether in fact military areas effectively preserve an environment that might otherwise be commercially developed.

[231] It is suggested that the low level of institutionalisation made these interest groups more akin to 'green movements' than NGOs. Thomas (1992: 29) made this qualitative distinction.
This development, and the associated lack of effective environmental law enforcement, are considered in Andronikou (1987: 3); Blake (1987a); ROC (1992: 57); Godfrey (1996: 111); Delft Hydraulics (1996).


For example, a presentation by the Leader of the ‘North Cyprus Green Action Group’ at Ledra Palace in 1995 declared that “[a]lthough Cypriots share the same skies and the same seas, the division of the island is an obstacle to the solution of environmental problems”.


Interview, Former Coordinator of Friends of Earth (Cyprus), Larnaca, 30/11/97. Within a month, fourteen ‘rejectionist’ members of the Paphos Group of the FOE had resigned. Successive if limited bicommunal meetings between the FOE and the Turkish Cypriot Green Peace Movement were eventually arranged in May 1991 (The Cyprus Weekly, 8-23/4/91).

The logical argument for the Greek Cypriot environmental NGOs was that while they wanted to cooperate, they could not cooperate ‘concretely’ on anything of a political nature and given that for many NGOs the key environmental problem was fundamentally political, issues for collective action were thus few (Interview, Chairman of Cyprus Environmental Movement, Nicosia (south), 18/10/96).

I am indebted to the General Secretary of the ‘Lefkosa Chapter of the Society for International Development (SID)’ for this observation.


Pers. Comm., former UNDP Resident Representative in Cyprus, Nicosia (south), 26/7/98.

Interview, Greek Cypriot planning consultant, former UNDP consultant, Nicosia (south), 25/9/97.

World Bank (1990; 1993). The conclusions from 1990 were based on the greatest coincidence of economic activities, urbanisation and valuable natural resources, and were therefore drawn even without reference to the political conflict over resources.


UNDP (1991a: 12, emphasis added).

UNDP (1991a: 5).

Interview, Resident Representative of the UNDP Mission in Cyprus, Nicosia (south), 30/9/96 (original emphasis. It is necessary to note that at the time the representative was in fact Greek Cypriot). The Planning Bureau, which constituted the main nodal point for relations with the UNDP (and EC), was originally set up with UNDP assistance and had responsibility for the preparation of ‘island-wide’, regional and sectoral plans for the ROC’s development.

Interview, Resident Representative of the UNDP Mission in Cyprus, Nicosia (south), 30/9/96.


UNDP (1991d: 1). The ROC was to be further encouraged through other diplomatic fora, with the Non-Aligned Movement and the Commonwealth stressing transboundary and global
interdependencies and the importance of coordinated multilateral effort by the late 1980s (Thomas (1992: 58-9).

252 UNDP (1991a: 5).


254 UNDP (1991d: 3); emphasis added. An island-wide ‘environmental profile’ had actually constituted one of US-envoy Nelson Ledsky’s ten ‘confidence building’ proposals forwarded in December 1989, as reported in the Turkish Cypriot press.

255 During the 1980s the mandate of what was now the UNDP’s Resident Representative had extended to ‘United Nations Resident Coordinator for Operational Activities for Development’, such that s/he was to orchestrate the full intellectual and technical resources of the UN system in support of ‘national development’.


258 Between 1987 and 1993 the ratio of ‘international’ to ‘national’ experts employed in UNDP-assisted programmes reversed from just less than 2:1, to well over 1:2 (Boutros-Ghali, 1994: 70, para. 195).

259 Indeed, the Greek Cypriot consultant had previously been a senior member of the Town Planning Department and the Leader of the Greek Cypriot Nicosia Master Plan Team (see Chapter 7), and the Turkish Cypriot consultant later became a special political adviser to Denktash. T. Mitchell (1994: 134) considered the debate over whether third parties should be ‘impartial’ outsiders or ‘partial’ insiders.

260 This was in spite of the fact that, as the Turkish Cypriot consultant recalled, “[i]n the first meetings there were episodes of spontaneous journey’s through history and mild references to victimization by the other community” (Olgun, 1992).


264 UNDP (1991d: 5, 12). This is not to suggest that the UNDP did not realise that “more structured consultative arrangements between the two communities to deal specifically with environmental issues of mutual interest” might later be required (UNDP, 1991d: 11-12, emphasis added). At the very least, however, it was indicative of their belief that environmental affairs sufficiently constituted ‘low politics’.


266 UNDP (1991d: 3).

267 Interview, Special Political Adviser to the President of the TRNC, former UNDP consultant, Nicosia (north), 28/4/97.

268 Interview, Special Political Adviser to the President of the TRNC, former UNDP consultant, Nicosia (north), 28/4/97.

269 Interview, Greek Cypriot planning consultant, former UNDP consultant, Nicosia (south), 25/9/97. He concluded that the report was subsequently placed in a ‘gilded draw’ by both sides.
Interview, Special Political Adviser to the President of the TRNC, former UNDP consultant, Nicosia (north), 28/4/97 (original emphasis).

Pers. Comm., former UNDP Resident Representative in Cyprus, Nicosia (south), 26/7/98.

UNDP (1991e). A similar proposal was made in Örek (1973: 24). The 1991 report sought to address the many information gaps on the Turkish Cypriot community alone. A comparable report in the south was not requested by the UNDP.

Interview, Special Political Adviser to the President of the TRNC, former UNDP consultant, Nicosia (north), 28/4/97.

The role of the Resident Representative was crucial and, significantly, complicating at times. See Childers and Urquhart (1994: 91-94) for a critical analysis of eclectic responsibilities undertaken by UNDP Resident Representatives since 1980 (whom they describe as a ‘UN resident thespian’). This also reflected, however, a citizen-based suspicion of the intentions of third parties. Even amongst the pro-bicommunal environmentalist lobby in the south, yet another division marked those who sought self-determining (i.e. ‘Cypriot’) initiatives from those seeking third-party (generally US) involvement (Interview, Fulbright Senior Scholar, Nicosia (south), 30/9/97).

The then-UNDP Resident Representative was to remain convinced that substantial funding could have been secured (Pers. Comm., former UNDP Resident Representative in Cyprus, Nicosia (south), 26/7/98).

Indeed, this was evident in the run up to the events of 1974, with low Turkish Cypriot participation in the UNDP’s industrial development projects (UN S/11294, para. 45-46).


Haas (1989). Again, however, these is also a consequence of their progress having been poorly documented (Fisher, 1992c: 253).


Olgun (1992: 2). On the Greek Cypriot side too, it was suggested that there was a structurally-defined reluctance to fund bicommunal NGOs with monies otherwise gratefully channelled through the ROC Planning Bureau (Interview, UNHCR Chief of Mission, UNPA, 24/9/97).

While UNHCR saw itself as “a toy to be played with” by the two communities, UNDP similarly argued that it had become a “target” and was taken for granted, particularly by the Greek Cypriot side (Interview, UNHCR Chief of Mission, UNPA, 24/9/97; Interview, UNDP Resident Representative in Cyprus, Nicosia (south), 12/12/95).

Chapter 6
Borderland Perspective (I): Managing Transboundary Relations in the United Nations Buffer Zone

6.1 Introduction

In Chapter 5 the development of transboundary resource management from the island-wide perspective was examined. This chapter seeks to build on this insight through refocus of the perspective of analysis on to the ‘borderland’, specifically the non-urban spaces of the UNBZ. Narrowing the geographical focus from all-island to the border scale allows for the examination of issues from a more ‘local’ perspective taking into account how ‘borderlanders’—along with a myriad of state, international and supranational agents most traditionally associated with ‘international’ relations—were party to, and affected by, transboundary resource management.

As previously suggested in Chapter 4, the establishment of the UNBZ in August 1974 had a profound effect on UNFICYP’s relations with the two main communities. Section 6.2 reconsiders UNFICYP’s broad mandate for managing these relations. The much-speculated, formal, and high level negotiations on the territorial character of a settlement to the Cyprus conflict have suggested the likely presence of an inter-entity ‘boundary’ in Cyprus for some time to come (see Appendix 2). Indeed, it is now customary for commentators to criticise UNFICYP’s consolidation of an ‘abnormal’ status quo, inhibiting the long-term need for a new and viable ‘political order’. While to some extent complementing this line of argument, its focus in Section 6.3 to 6.4 will be recentred by moving it away from the traditional, ‘national’ scale of analysis and repositioning it on the ‘borderland’ scale, as a means of provoking what appears to be a general ambivalence over the role of the spatial entity of the UNBZ. More significant questions evidently remain over the continued use of the UNBZ to manage contested space in terms of resource management concerns. Furthermore, Section 6.5 then deconstructs the meaning and the functional role of the ‘buffer zone’ by examining its contested representation at the state and local level, for both Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot—a process further considered in the urban context in Chapter 7.
6.2 UNFICYP and the Buffer Zone

As geopolitics has taught, what are termed ‘buffer states’ have a history of being constructed where there was a desire to reduce the possibility of contact between two powerful states. ‘Buffer zones’ have a similar history. They have invariably demilitarised, although they appear to have generally differed from what have been formally identified as demilitarised zones (DMZs) in their function. Blake, for one, argued that “[b]uffer zones are [...] generally temporary phenomena, with less permanence than neutral zones or demilitarised zones”, as exemplified by the creation of a buffer zone to facilitate disengagement of Israeli and Egyptian forces after the Second Sinai Agreement of September 1975. Nonetheless, as the UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) in the Golan Heights illustrated—whose operations, coincidentally in parallel with UNFICYP, have also been largely undertaken within a ‘buffer zone’ since the summer of 1974—it would appear critical to recognise that the international community must be prepared to administer such zones for an extended period of time.

Since its establishment, the ‘buffer zone’ in Cyprus has continued to provide both a timely and topical case for reconsidering the effectiveness of ‘alternative’ approaches to territorial management in contested border areas. It is ‘timely’ in that, given the continued six-monthly renewal of UNFICYP’s mandate for over thirty-four years, it would appear that the role of both UNFICYP and the buffer zone they administered was accepted by all parties concerned. On the contrary, the ‘disputants’ contested view of UNFICYP’s mandate and the UN’s more general peacemaking role has been, if anything, a growing feature of studies on the conflict. Cyprus’ UNBZ also remains ‘topical’ given that UN and other multinational military personnel increasingly have the basic core function of a ‘buffer force’, supervising an established cease-fire between the parties. As observers have been keen to highlight in the post-Cold War period, therefore, many lessons are still to be learnt by critically examining this, the longest-standing force-level UN peacekeeping mission and, in turn, one of the most durable examples of an alternative to traditional territorial management.
6.2.1 Managing the territorial and military status quo

In spite of the events of summer 1974—which were, once again, radically to alter the political geography of the island—given the lack of vocal consensus within the Security Council at the time, it was seen as preferable not to provide a new mandate for UNFICYP (Appendix 5). Instead, the geography of the mandate was reconfigured such that it should administer nearly 300 km² of 'buffer zone', delimited by the CFLs of the Turkish Forces and the Greek Cypriot National Guard. Indeed, in the light of their spatial redeployment, UNFICYP personnel became almost entirely confined to the UNBZ as this territory became their central focus after the population transfers in 1975. From this point on, UNFICYP became more of a 'buffer force', which held implications for their overall mandate. In managing the military and territorial status quo, two sub-divisions must be made: maintenance of the spatial delineation of the CFLs and, by extension, their prevention of a recurrence of fighting by maintaining and restoring law and order (as carried over from the 1964-74 peacekeeping period).

Chapter 4 previously illustrated how the scale of the Turkish military intervention in 1974 dictated that UNFICYP were downgraded to a wholly ineffective role of by-stander, yet they were soon to return to the forefront as facilitators of an informal cease-fire agreement. An intensive patrolling programme was undertaken by UNFICYP to establish and record the forward limits of opposing forces. UNFICYP observation posts (OPs) were gradually erected in between, and patrols began to monitor activity along the confrontation lines. Crucially, however, no formal agreement on the spatial delimitation of the CFLs was ever negotiated in 1974, nor since. In Nicosia, by December 1974, UNFICYP were considering the establishment of a 'neutral area' between the two parties. Elsewhere, islands of enclaves remained vulnerable, particularly in the north where special UN detachments were restricted by Turkish Forces. Despite the cease-fire, Turkish Forces had made notable advances in late August in the areas of Pyroi, Galini, Dherinia, Yerolakkos, and north of Dhekelia SBA. Yet, with strengthened fortifications elsewhere, the UN Secretary-General observed the line of direct confrontation beginning to 'crystallise', making territorial withdrawals evermore difficult to negotiate. Only in December was the UN able to illustrate for the first time the new 'limit of area of Turkish control' (Appendix 7 (a)), although reference to the CFLs invariably used the euphemistically-termed 'forward
The United Nations Buffer Zone

defended localities’ (FDLs). The peninsula of Louroujina (‘Akinçilar’ in Turkish) was not depicted as falling north of the Turkish Forces’ FDL until a year later, by which time the FDLs of the National Guard had also been included (Appendix 7 (b)). The ‘areas’ in between remained unnamed for some time; indeed, it was only at the end of 1976 that the Secretary-General’s report referred to a ‘buffer area between the two lines’. There were now over 120 such observation posts, of which 85 were permanently manned, and UNFICYP’s patrol routes had been extended to enable the monitoring of the whole CFL system.

By 1978, the CFLs had begun to stabilise, but UNFICYP could only provide either side with a trace of their respective lines. Even then, Turkish Forces initially declined to review their CFL, while negotiations with the Greek Cypriot National Guard were on-going. Both parties continued to establish their own version of the lines and accordingly, by late 1980, UNFICYP still found itself with the unenviable task of operating without any agreement with either protagonist as to their delineation. In practice, UNFICYP (as one UN Secretary-General put it) supervised “by loose mutual consent, two unmarked, constantly disputed cease-fire lines”, on a self-confessedly ad hoc basis.

By extension, troop deployments or training exercises within 1 km of either side of the UNBZ without prior notification were considered cease-fire violations, as were breaches of the seaward extensions of the CFLs on the coast (see below), and overflights by military or civilian aircraft. Just as they had been from 1964, regular cease-fire line movements were less conscious efforts by the opposing forces to expand ‘territory’, but more an attempt by one side to ‘gain face’ at the other’s expense. Even so, local scale ‘violations’ of the UNBZ escalated to dangerous proportions when not properly handled. Accordingly, the disincentive for UNFICYP’s alteration of the CFLs was clear. Ironically;

“[b]oundaries and positions have become so fixed that it has become impossible to change anything […] The movement of an observation post even a few feet necessitates endless negotiations and reams of paperwork”. Hundreds of such movements occurred each year, however, and in areas where the CFLs were in close proximity face-to-face confrontations were literally a persistent concern —the UNBZ ran from east to west for approximately 181 km, but varied in width from 7 km near Athienou to only 3 metres in Nicosia’s old walled city (Appendix 6 (a), and Figure 4.2, Chapter 4).
Supplementary to their maintenance of the military aspect of the territorial *status quo*, UNFICYP were also mandated to preserve the ‘integrity’ of the UNBZ from unauthorised entry by civilians. Traffic accidents, fires, thefts, and rubbish and sewage disposal were only secondary concerns to that of ‘crowd control’, a role which was to prove vital if often unrealised. Over the years there was a visible increase in civilian demonstrations along and invariably within the UNBZ, originating largely from the Greek Cypriot south. Not coincidentally, this developed in parallel with the reduction of UNFICYP’s troop strength—and dramatically so in 1993, following Boutros-Ghali’s financial reassessment, when UNFICYP was reduced in size by 44% such that its strength temporarily dipped below 1,000. The belief in a strong military presence along the UNBZ survived in the light of the zone’s acquired character, when infantry units were still preferred over military observers to maintain effective control. UNFICYP themselves, however, were the first to recognise their limited resource power and mandate, which was most vividly illustrated at Dherinia in August 1996.

6.2.2 In search of ‘normal conditions’

In the light of the UNBZ’s militarised character, UNFICYP were at pains to keep the *status quo*, preserving what was commonly referred to (in notably state-centric terms) as “the integrity of the buffer zone”. In effect, it could be argued that UNFICYP came to “control” a fourth, *de facto* ‘state’ in Cyprus—the UNBZ constituting 3% of the island’s territory (in addition to the *de jure* ROC and UK SBAs, and the *de facto* TRNC ‘states’). Yet, UNFICYP’s function was clearly not aimed solely to provide a ‘barrier’ between the two communities or to mount border patrols. After 1974, it had to continue encouraging a return to what was ambiguously described as ‘normal conditions’, the force’s promotion of which was now focused on to a new ‘borderland’. Just as there was no agreement between UNFICYP and the opposing forces on the delimitation of the UNBZ, however, nor was there any formal agreement on the use and control of this zone. While the other two functions of UNFICYP as declared in their original mandate—maintaining the cease-fire, and restoring law and order—were relatively self-explanatory, it was in the ‘return to normal conditions’ that UNFICYP’s mandate was most broadly interpreted after 1974.
In spite of the radical changes and the visible need for a greater peacebuilding dimension, in late 1974 the Security Council adopted a number of resolutions which required UNFICYP to perform only certain additional functions.  The renewed mandate in 1974 included cease-fire observation, the facilitation of prisoner exchange by the International Committee of the Red Cross, and a humanitarian element to encourage the resumption of normal civilian activity. Very much in line with the tripartite Geneva Declaration of 30 July 1974, therefore, UNFICYP became responsible for the buffer zone, indeed, this territory became their central focus. ‘Good offices’ were still made available for negotiating over public services, particularly water and electricity crossing the UNBZ, and a humanitarian element to encourage the resumption of ‘normal’ civilian activity was institutionalised with the establishment of a special Humanitarian and Economics Branch at UNFICYP HQ, on 22 July 1974. In other words, peacebuilding was in principle to become more developed at the local scale, as UNFICYP quickly realised that it was not in the interest of either side to turn the UNBZ into a ‘waste land’, a ‘barren, depopulated zone’. In the restoration of economic activity, UNFICYP therefore encouraged ‘ad hoc measures designed to save lives, minimize suffering and, to the extent possible, restore civilian activities’.

The ‘extent possible’ was largely determined, however, by the degree to which the ‘return to normal conditions’ (one sub-mandate) was dependent on maintaining the cease-fire and restoring law and order (the other sub-mandate). Soon after UNFICYP’s establishment in 1964, UN Secretary-General U Thant had viewed this relationship as sequential, the latter preceding the former. This view left outstanding, however, questions as to whether this approach largely predetermined the primacy of the military/security function of the UNBZ over and above its integrationist function; moreover, which time period were ‘normal conditions’ referring to—the 1960-1963 ‘Cyprus’, which was itself unstable and grew increasingly ‘abnormal’? Or the 1963-1974 ‘Cyprus’?
6.3 Economic Activities at the Borderland Scale

The idea of transforming what had become characteristically a 'security' or 'boundary landscape' back to some derivation of a 'normal' landscape became a complicated and paradoxical aspect of UNFICYP's operational mandate after 1974. Primarily, there were questions over access to and utilisation of the resources within the zone itself, but in spite of the institutionalisation of UNFICYP's management of these problems, the economic development of the UNBZ was to remain piecemeal and, in socio-psychological terms, transitory.

6.3.1 Access and utilisation

UNFICYP were positioned between the opposing forces with the intention of pursuing 'normal civilian activities' in the area, and from 1986 an all-weather patrol track ran along the whole length of the zone, allowing UNFICYP surveillance opportunities, the resupply of OPs, and rapid reaction to any incidents (Figure 6.1). Nevertheless, access to and development of the UNBZ was extremely convoluted, and this was most vividly illustrated in agricultural practices which had been previously the dominant economic activity along the 181 km length of the UNBZ.

From 1974, UNFICYP were keen to point out that the UNBZ contained some of the most valuable agricultural land of Cyprus. Indeed, at the time of its establishment the UNBZ, while only taking up 3% of the land area, accounted for an estimated 10% of cultivated agricultural land on the whole island, cutting as it did through the southern section of the irrigated area of Morphou, the cereal-growing region of the Eastern Mesaoria, and the potato-growing area of Kokkinokhoria (Figure 6.2). This was set against the backdrop of an economy, both north and south of the UNBZ, traditionally dominated by agriculture; of the GDP in 1960, the agricultural sector contributed 21%, and an estimated 39% of the population were farming full-time. As far as the territorial partition subsequently affected the resource base, Greek Cypriot estimates noted in particular that the loss of Morphou basin—with the largest concentration of citrus plantations—and Famagusta and Kyrenia, had dealt a heavy blow to citrus production in both the rural and overall economy of the ROC. The majority of the Greek Cypriots displaced were agriculturalists, faced with cultivating different crops or
Figure 6.1  *Diagrammatic representation of the management of the UN buffer zone*

Source: Adapted from Grundy-Warr (1994b: 181).44

seeking out new professions.45 These relative changes were complemented with the need to use formerly-agricultural lands for redeveloping the economy, resulting in a further absolute loss of available land. For their part, by 1977 the Turkish Cypriot negotiators were arguing (initially with less concern) that their land comprised 28.66% of the agricultural productivity island-wide.46

Recognising the self-evident value of intra-boundary resources falling within the UNBZ, UNFICYP chose to allow farming and other economic activities, if with two crucial provisos: primarily, cultivation should not be a threat to the legitimate
Figure 6.2  Land uses within and along the UNBZ, 1975

Sources: Adapted by author from WDD (1975), MANR (south) (1976), and ROC (1983).
The United Nations Buffer Zone

security interests of either side, and, secondarily, proof of ownership or rightful employment was needed before access was permitted. From 1974 farming permits were issued *ad hoc* at various locations along the UNBZ. By mid-1975, however, Turkish Forces were reported to be placing unilaterally new restrictions on the farming, grazing and harvesting activities of Greek Cypriots in areas where such activities had previously been permitted.47 Indeed, many Greek Cypriots were being arrested in the zone.48 UNFICYP accordingly developed an innovative system of escorting farmers, shepherds, and others working in areas of confrontation: a ‘Farming Security Line’ (FSL) (Figure 6.1) was established to administer the largely agricultural economic activities, its delimitation—to reiterate—dependent upon the two principal guidelines of security and ownership.49

The first major test case for these new regulations occurred at Avlona, an abandoned Greek Cypriot village 21 km west of Nicosia (Figure 6.3), which after 1974 had become bounded by Turkish Forces not only to its south, but also to its west where the citrus plantations fed by Cyprus’ most important groundwater aquifer and dam lay.50 The Morphou area was also noted for its excessive fragmentation of land holdings, mainly because of the existence of perennially irrigated land.51 Since the autumn of 1974, Greek Cypriot farmers were able, under UNFICYP escort, to farm their land in this area within 500 metres (m) of the Turkish Forces’ CFL; indeed, this practice had been formalised within a year by an agreement with the local Turkish command.52 By the spring of 1976, however, there were moves to repopulate Avlona by Turkish Cypriots, whose authorities had sought UNFICYP’s agreement to a 200 m wide strip of land forward of their CFLs to be made available to the new village inhabitants. The implications of this issue were eventually discussed amongst officials of the UN, Turkey and the two Cypriot communities. UNFICYP expressed their understanding that while new farming activity arrangements could be made subject to consent, existing local agreements would remain in effect until so modified.53 It became clear that the Turkish Cypriot side objected to what they perceived as an inequitable division of the intra-boundary resources, proposing instead the use of ‘grid line 90° Northing’ as the ‘approximate boundary’ for farming (Figure 6.3).54 This line, however, would have necessitated the transfer to Turkish Cypriots of land previously cultivated by Greek Cypriots, and behind the lines originally agreed upon in 1975. Furthermore, the Turkish
The United Nations Buffer Zone

Cypriot side proposed the formation of an *ad hoc* committee to review all existing practices between the CFLs.\(^5\)

The implications of this proposal, not only for the local communities' economy, but also for the precedent being set for future transboundary issues, spilt over into localised violence in September 1976 as Turkish Cypriots attempted to work the contested land.\(^6\) Even the UN Secretary-General himself became involved in high-level discussions as the issue escalated. While compromise proposals were eventually drawn up, the Greek Cypriot authorities continued to reject on principal any transfer of Greek Cypriot-owned land to Turkish Cypriot farmers, which they saw to be disturbing the *status quo* within the UNBZ.\(^7\) Elsewhere along the length of the UNBZ, by mid-1977 there were over 100 different locations where informal, 'local agreements' had been made with the Turkish Forces to allow limited Greek Cypriot farming.\(^8\) From thence, however, expansion was slow, such that there were only 160 such locations recorded by May 1979.\(^9\) General activity steadily increased during subsequent years, and agricultural practices reemerged to the extent that, by 1993, the UN Secretary-General reported that over 1500 land owners now farmed in the UNBZ—indeed farming had been extended 'almost to the limit of land available'.\(^6\)

Clearly, however, the limit of land 'available' was determined by several factors, many of which were to all intents and purposes not 'normal' but 'abnormal'. There was an outstanding problem with mines. During the construction of defensive positions in August 1974, neither side complied with international procedures for marking minefields.\(^6\) Although UNFICYP undertook to record those known, the problem failed to be resolved with neither side assisting in confirming its scale; accordingly, an estimated 38 minefields and booby-trapped areas remained inside the UNBZ, and a further 73 were located within 500 m of it.\(^2\) An estimated 16,000 mines were contained in these areas. In addition, like the CFLs, delimitation of the FSLs was proving difficult in the light of the intense distrust between respective military personnel, to the extent that UNFICYP were forced to begin demarcating these during 1982.\(^3\) By 1988, however, concern was expressed by the Turkish Forces over the close proximity to their CFL of some of the Greek Cypriot farming activities.\(^4\) On 18 October, following negotiations, UNFICYP was able to formulate an agreement with the Commander of Turkish Forces such that, while the 'current farming situation' would be 'frozen';
"[n]o new farming up to 200 metres from TF [Turkish Forces] CFL would be authorised by HQ UNFICYP [...] [but a]ny new farming in the 200-400 metres bracket from TF CFL would be discussed at HQ UNFICYP/HQ TF Kyrenia level to assess security implications before UNFICYP would authorise it".65

Farming was being determined by militarily-precise boundaries. Unfortunately, while the Turkish command had agreed to accept and not be consulted over any farming further than 400 m from their CFL, the ratification of the 'current' farming situation remained a sticking point. A large portion of the FSL was soon demarcated, yet many so-called 'problem areas' were never ironed out. Moreover, while UNFICYP stated explicitly that this intra-boundary 'no-go' area was established purely for 'security reasons', and in no way constituted any extension of Turkish Cypriot sovereignty, it had constituted another de facto appropriation of ROC territory.66

Yet, probably the greatest problem of utilisation of the UNBZ which remained largely unspoken was that of land tenure. As previously noted, UNFICYP chose to allow farming and other economic activities with two provisos: proof of ownership, and provided that activities presented no security threat to either side or to UNFICYP. Farming permits were issued, nonetheless, with little recognition of ambiguous territorial sovereignty. As Christodoulou noted, the land and water tenure system at the time of independence became intelligible only in so far as its antecedents were known.67 A complex pattern of land ownership, notably with scattered Turkish Cypriot plots, and with many villages claiming common grazing lands, meant that while 18% of the cultivated lands were in Turkish Cypriot possession, this was made up of widely scattered, small fragmented plots.68 This only began to be addressed with land consolidation in the 1970s, but the population exchanges of 1975 curtailed consolidation and led again to an increasing number and decreasing size of holdings in the south.69

Although illegal after 1964, the selling of land to members of the 'other' community was commonplace, but such sales were never registered; of those deeds established prior to then, the ethnicity of the landowner was never recorded.70 Since 1963, neither community was willing to open its land registration books to an impartial audit,71 and after 1974 land tenure was to be further complicated as title deeds for the land of displaced persons had to be reconsidered island-wide, an almost impossible endeavour given that the ROC Land Registry's records for Famagusta and Kyrenia fell to the north.72 The (Greek Cypriot) Land and Survey Department remained the only
source used by UNFICYP, making it impractical for Turkish Cypriots to contest ownership.

With time, even the issuing of farming or work permits also proved administratively problematic. In Sector 4, for example, in line with UNFICYP practice as a whole, permits had been issued on an ‘until recall’ basis since the early 1980s. By December 1996, however, changes of ownership had proven this unlimited regulation obsolete and new permits were (re)issued on a yearly basis. In spite of the threat of UN restrictions and warnings from the relevant municipal authorities, illegal Greek Cypriot farming continued, to the extent that one-tenth of those farming in the sector enjoyed ‘past tolerance’ practice. In essence, UNFICYP faced the problem of identifying and administering an industry increasingly characterised by a mobile (and thus less ‘locally’ identifiable) workforce. The percentage of urban resident land holders in the south had risen from less than 11% in 1977 to over 20% in 1985; indeed, many farmers using the UNBZ would rent neighbouring land the owners of which were unwilling to cultivate themselves, and so undertook their own de facto land consolidation. Further complicating UNFICYP’s administration, however, was that in the UNBZ itself five villages remained populated—Troulli, Athienou, Pyla, Mammari, and Dhenia (Appendix 6 (a)). These were designated ‘civilian use areas’ and manned by local civilian police. By 1996 their combined population totalled 8,000, almost entirely Greek Cypriot, except for Pyla—a mixed village including over 350 Turkish Cypriots.

One direct implication of these ‘indigenous’ settlements was that, by 1977, at the same time as the farming activities were being resurrected, there were moves to rejuvenate industrial ventures in the UNBZ. In March, a proposal by the Greek Cypriot trade union SEK to reopen 7 factories, recreating 1500 jobs, was rejected by Turkish Cypriot union leaders—because of ‘security reasons’, reactivation was a ‘political issue’. This response from the north was in apparent contradiction of their authorities’ efforts to reactivate latent, and environmentally contaminating infrastructural resources elsewhere—at Lefka, where the de facto territorial partition in 1974 had separated economic interdependencies. The dislocation of the Cyprus Mines Corporation’s (CMC) installations at Xeros and Lefka had forced the Skouriotissa mines to close, and the loss of the Hellenic Mining Company’s loading installations at Karovostassi (Figure 6.4). The internationalisation of the transboundary resource had complicated matters for the Turkish Cypriots, however, and resulted in considerable environmental concerns.
Figure 6.4  Transboundary resources in the Lefka-Skouriotissa region
The US-owned, CMC-operated copper mine and associated purification, storage and transportation facilities located between Lefka and Karavostassi had remained untouched since 1974, and local Turkish Cypriot interest groups became aware that 30,000 tons of tailing deposits left in the earth reservoirs posed a serious environmental threat. Groundwater samples taken locally suggested that arsenic was three times and selenium was six times their respective legal limits, and storm water runoff was directly discharging into the Mediterranean discolouring a 2 km stretch of the shoreline. Even so, the US-based, transnational company refused to accept any responsibility when approached by Lefka municipality in March 1996. CMC conveniently argued that until 1974 the environmental standards had been acceptable; only in the light of the disruptive events of 1974, and the exceptional political situation of 'Turkish occupation', had environmental problems arisen. No 'compensation', it was added, had been offered by the Turkish government.

Elsewhere along the border, there were those more successful at turning the divisions presented by the border to their economic advantage. The asymmetry between the Greek Cypriot and the Turkish Cypriot economy had created the theoretical possibility of Greek Cypriot borderlands becoming growth poles, exploiting cheap labour from the north. While this was never fully realised, since independence the British SBAs had traditionally employed some 2% of the Cypriot workforce (in 1973 up to 1700 Turkish Cypriots were employed), and from 1974 Dhekelia SBA formed the largest example of an intercommunal employer on the island. Dhekelia had a new neighbour along 45 km of its northern boundary, where UNFICYP held no immediate responsibilities or independent means of communication for the Ayios Nicolaos-SBA link road (Appendix 6 (a)). By mid-1996, up to 6,000 Turkish Cypriots were crossing the border to work each day in the south, usually in construction but also in the SBAs themselves where the majority of the 300 Turkish Cypriots employed by the SBAs worked. Advantage was taken of salaries fivefold the average in the north. Following the violent period of August 1996 in Dherinia, however, these economic interdependencies were put to the test. All Turkish Cypriots working in the south—commuting from the north, from Pyla, or from the south—found themselves adversely affected economically, and—except for the SBAs—most were suspended temporarily from their employment. Although Turkish Cypriot employment within Larnaca and Potamia was largely unaffected, UNFICYP as a whole were able to negotiate only
unemployment entitlements for others. IRCIVPOL, the UN’s civilian police, specifically sought to reestablish local employment opportunities for Pyla.\textsuperscript{88}

Other ‘borderlanders’ nearby had a much longer history of negotiating such boundaries, however, given the presence of Dhekelia SBA (and, for that matter, Akrotiri SBA) since 1960. The colonial administration, as noted in Chapter 4, had sought to demarcate ‘out’ the Greek Cypriot villages around Dhekelia SBA so as to include them in the new independent state. This inclusionary process was, by definition, also exclusionary in that capital investments and titled property consequently fell on the ‘other’ side. Some 60\% of the SBAs were privately owned, and taking up their ‘freedom of employment and cultivation’ under the Treaty of Establishment, were intensively farmed by the Cypriot populace.\textsuperscript{89} But as a result of the refugee influx between 1974 and 1975, the enclaved villages spread across the international borders and into the SBAs such that of some 6,500 Greek Cypriots that came to live in the villages, over 5,000 were refugees.\textsuperscript{90} Transboundary resource utilisation appeared in its most contested form in the ‘enclaved’ Greek Cypriot villages of Xylotymbou, Ormidhia, and Xylofagou (see Figure 6.7 below), and to a lesser extent Dhekelia power station, with notable riots by local Greek Cypriot farmers in March 1986 (over water supplies in Akrotiri), and in July 1993 and October 1994 (over land rights in Dhekelia).\textsuperscript{91} While the SBA authorities forwarded military and security concerns for the prevention of economic development, symbolically, in respective cases the farmers saw themselves as “just like the Greek Cypriot enclaved in the north”, “enclaved by the British since 1960”.\textsuperscript{92} The SBA boundary had indeed become an entrenched ‘frontier’ between the former British Empire and its former subjects.\textsuperscript{93} For some Greek Cypriots, the Turkish military intervention was not the first time they had had their land ‘taken’.\textsuperscript{94}

6.3.2 Managing migratory resources

At its eastern and western extremities, where the UNBZ borders the Mediterranean Sea, the maritime dimension to the geographical separation had a similar if less pervasive effect on the normalisation of the two main communities’ exploitation of resources. Seaward extensions of the two CFLs, and what UNFICYP termed the ‘Maritime Security Line’ (MSL), were established by UNFICYP “as a practical measure for security and safety purposes in the vicinity of Kokkina and Famagusta” (Figure 6.1, and
The United Nations Buffer Zone

Appendix 6 (a)). The first such delimitation came in 1985 following a tense period in Famagusta area, during which persistent violations of the seaward extension of the Turkish Forces’ CFL by Greek Cypriot fishing boats and pleasure craft led Turkish Forces to use light weapon fire as warning shots. UNFICYP eventually negotiated an MSL—a median line in the area between the two CFL extensions. Indeed, the Turkish Forces subsequently marked the seaward extension of their cease-fire line with four buoys (Figure 6.1).

Optimal management of renewable resources which were of substantial interest to several states in the region, and which had been treated as common property in recent history, was to prove virtually impossible. Although the contribution of the fishing industry to the economy of both Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot was small, the 1974 de facto maritime partition had socio-economic ramifications. Greek Cypriots estimated that 41% of their boats and trawlers had been left behind or destroyed by the events, while 8 out of 12 fishing shelters had fallen north of the UNBZ. Out of 1,100 m² of fishing grounds, nearly half was accessible only from the north; 60% of the annual fishing income was lost. Although stocks in the resource-rich Famagusta Bay were largely overexploited by 1974, and trawling dangerously intensified in subsequent years, measures implemented in 1982 by the Greek Cypriot authorities, whereby the fishing season was shortened, were to reactivate markedly a flagging industry.

Consequently the small fishing community on both sides of the UNBZ, with fishing in Cyprus being carried out mainly on the island’s continental shelf, were increasingly to frequent the MSL environs, predominantly derived from the south but also from the north despite the presence of military no-go areas offshore. This particularly focused on access to fish within the area of the UNBZ maritime extension, an issue which became a water-based version of the contested agricultural activities on land. At times, MSL violations were based on the perception that richer fishing grounds lay in or beyond the delimited zone; as one British Lieutenant dryly observed, “the fish are not stupid, they know it is safer here with UNFICYP”.

Predominantly, however, such activities constituted a more politically-conscious response to the need to use the island’s waters for economic purposes, particularly for Greek Cypriot fishermen. In Kato Pyrgos, while also reflecting a perception amongst the Greek Cypriot fishermen that the MSL area was resource-rich, the fishing activities illustrated that they “[did not] want to recognise the so-called dead zone in the sea”.
Always, however, this had to be balanced with a legitimate fear of the Turkish Forces sea patrols “waiting to shoot them” or, at the very least, confiscating their boats. Similar problems were experienced with enclaved Greek Cypriots in the Karpas peninsula, where four fishing vessels were worked by Greek Cypriot families subject to permission from Famagusta’s authorities.

6.3.3 A ‘liminal’ state

From the above analysis, it is clear that access and utilisation of the UNBZ was problematic, and the development of the territorial zone as a region of ‘transborder collaboration’ (as advocates of the ‘Europe of Regions’ might phrase it) became even more stunted over time. One insightful way of illustrating this point when considering the views of those living within and along the UNBZ is by drawing upon a metaphor employed in Wilson’s 1993 anthropological examination of ‘liminality’ in the Irish border region. ‘Liminality’ is, as Wilson suggested, a metaphor for both the situation in which people at the border live, and for the conditions which travellers who cross the border experience. This liminal state is;

“temporary, necessary, and polluting [...] a paradoxical condition of permanent transition [...] At the risk of taking this metaphor too far, [...] international borders and border zones are liminal states (i.e., transitional conditions of culture and community) between the ordered, structured, and unpolluted ‘conditions’ of nation and state. Frontiers are expected to be different and uncomfortable”.

This metaphor aptly captured the abnormal ‘conditions’ of the UNBZ where, in principle, UNFICYP sought to recreate normal ‘conditions’. This would appear to have been the case for the three main interested parties.

In Cyprus, in 1976, the UN Secretary-General had observed that “in the area between the lines, the status quo [...] is maintained, without prejudice to an eventual political settlement concerning the disposition of the area”. The present, in other words, was represented as being transitory and with an (as yet undefined) time-limit. While this approach was understandable in terms of maintaining diplomatic neutrality, it of course had repercussions for those who lived, worked or indeed crossed the UNBZ. For UNFICYP, gatekeepers to the ‘fourth state’, their time in the zone was a brief one as dictated by what was commonly a six-month ‘tour of duty’. In turn, their decision-
making powers were similarly limited. UNBZ incidents were dealt with by UNFICYP through a liaison system which started with the ground-troops, and then moved to the sectoral headquarters, with UNFICYP HQ as the last stop. As a consequence of this low-level liaison with opposing forces and borderlanders, great responsibility was placed with the ground-troops, particularly considering the cumulative number of ‘small’ incidents that were resolved at the first port of call each and every day. In military terms, as Fursdon observed;

“[T]hrough briefing and experience on the job, the UN soldier soon gets to know the pattern of normal activity authorised in his [sic] area. He learns, for instance, the type and level of farming work authorised in his part of the buffer zone, and its associated movement; the normal military routine of the soldiers of the two sides manning positions in his area [...] He will memorise the look of their dug-in defensive positions”.

Yet UNFICYP’s inevitable ‘shuttle diplomacy’-style of mediation, rather than face-to-face contact, suggested a lack of increased dialogue or understanding. UNFICYP, in their military peacekeeping function, exercised indeterminate territorial rights as rationae personae, although not sovereign rights per se. On one hand, given the overall duration of their operation on the island, they developed more of a detailed understanding of a particular local and human space relative to any other interested party on the island, and relative to many other UN missions worldwide. Through this, it was possible for them to maintain a critical degree of communication on key resource issues between the two sides. However, given the condition of ‘permanent transition’ of each peacekeeper, the subsequent lack of continuity translated into sub-optimal decision-making. As Cranshaw noted pre-1974;

“the UN functioned by persuasion. The turnover of troops was rapid and performance varied from unit to unit. The personality of a single officer in handling a delicate problem could make the difference between success and failure”.

Moreover, the ‘normalities’ to which Fursdon referred to were of a predominantly military nature and—contrary to what UNFICYP’s mandate implicitly implied—failed to offer sufficient evidence of a return to any sense of non-military, non-bounded ‘normality’.
The other interested parties were naturally those who wished to make use of the UNBZ—the two main communities. This was predominantly Greek Cypriot landowners who, in periods of relative peace, were encouraged to apply for permits. Conversely, incidents in certain areas brought about a sudden drop in applications to cultivate land. The violent clashes at Dherinia in August 1996, for example, had widespread repercussions: the disrupted lives of one Greek Cypriot couple illustrated quite graphically the transitory nature of borderlanders in the UNBZ. Farming just 1 km outside Dherinia, about half of their land fell within the UNBZ which they sought to continue using because of the soil quality and access to a highly productive private water borehole. They had to visit a one-roomed house each day to water their greenhouse, and a relationship built up with UNFICYP's patrol whereby the couple, because of the regularity of their visits, were informally excused from bringing and showing their permits each day. At times, therefore, working in the UNBZ was virtually synonymous with farming elsewhere. However, since the reduction in UNFICYP's patrols after the 1993 financial review, followed by the violence of August 1996, they increasingly operated in what they perceived as an environment of 'fear' and 'insecurity'. Neither of them now stayed overnight in their house as they once had the option of doing, especially after rumours that Turkish Forces were reconnoitring their area under dark. A certain uneasiness pertained to farming with 'alien' soldiers looking on, as one UNFICYP peacekeeper noted.

These perceptions were common amongst those who lived, worked or indeed crossed the UNBZ, who often found themselves in an uncomfortable position, yet 'neutral'. This awkward sense of transition or postponed 'becoming' (Loizos termed it 'the waiting') was significant in that it interlinked with the Greek Cypriot farmers own notion of transition and activism (see below). In another context, Paasi recognised metaphorically similar 'prisoners of space', who even though:

"in general have accepted the rather normative rules that have been established in the zone and have accepted them as being caused by the curiosity and blundering of [others], [...] have been rather frustrated by them".

Thus, the imposition of a buffer zone nominally along modern, 'Western' notions of territorial delimitation was for many at odds with local perceptions of spatial mobility.

The converse was largely true with Turkish Cypriot borderlanders. Although UNFICYP reported a slight upturn in the area farmed by Turkish Cypriots north of the
The United Nations Buffer Zone

FSLs as from 1982, such land was to be largely utilised as scrub or for rough-grazing land for goats alone. Two main factors contributed to this apparent Turkish Cypriot disinterest in utilising this space, one being the presence of 3 km-deep Turkish Forces' 'military zones' north of the UNBZ which discouraged (both physically and psychologically) Turkish Cypriots utilising UNBZ land. In a number of locations, even UNFICYP were unable to negotiate directly with the few Turkish Cypriots with permits, being channelled instead through a Turkish military 'Liaison Officer'. In addition, and perhaps most significantly, while the Turkish Cypriots had access to more cultivable land relative to their counterparts as a whole, they had owned little of the land which now fell within the UNBZ. This was clearly evident in the two most 'rural' sectors of the UNBZ. By early 1997 in Sector 1 (Appendix 7 (c)), west of Nicosia where over 5,000 plots of land were allowed to be worked, out of 1,118 work permits only 5 were held by Turkish Cypriots. The area to the east of Nicosia (Sector 4) was solely Greek Cypriot-farmed, save for ten Turkish Cypriots farming 'Haliland' on the Pyla-Pergamos plateau. The 'fourth' state was therefore also a 'liminal' state only for those who most frequently entered it—UNFICYP and Greek Cypriots.

6.4 Water Resource Management (II): Hydrological Interdependencies In and Across the UNBZ

One further implication of the existence on an important agricultural and economic resource base in the UNBZ and its environs was the directly associated presence of scarce, transboundary water supplies. Until 1974, with less direct precipitation than the mountain ranges both due north and to its south-east, the central plains were generally supplied by localised, underground water reserves, supplemented by an embryonic colonial, ROC, and then de facto Greek Cypriot state-controlled water distribution system. The UNBZ and its associated borderland which was subsequently imposed onto this hydrological landscape, in addition to being exposed to the same erratic precipitation levels as elsewhere on the island, was also witness to the demise of the very aquifers upon which the region's economic development had been historically built. As previously suggested in Chapter 5, despite the shortage of extensive distributional infrastructure at the island-wide scale pre-1974, there were a number of
strategically important hydrological interdependencies post-1974 and, under the historical *quid pro quo* agreement, a series of transboundary water exchanges existed at the borderland scale (Figure 6.5). While these were small in scale compared to the main Morphou-Nicosia transfer, their importance was to grow, if only symbolically, as the water supply regime established for the capital became unstable (as considered in detail in Chapter 7). The analysis considers the interdependencies from east to west (Figure 6.5).

It is possible to observe that in Athienou, to the west of the city of Famagusta (considered in detail in Chapter 7), prior to the finalisation of the SCP in 1994 the town’s only permanent drinking water sources were two pipelines originating in a complex and increasingly unreliable trans- and intra-boundary borehole system around Potamia (Figure 6.5). From there water was pumped to a 270 cu.m. storage tank at Skasmata in the so-called Louroujina ‘pocket’, then to flow by gravity to the former Turkish Cypriot village of Petrophani, where it was used to irrigate land north-west of the now deserted settlement by farmers from Athienou. By the mid-1990s, up to 350 cu.m./day passed from Potamia to Petrophani, and UNFICYP regularly checked water meters at either end. This pipe connection received no maintenance from 1974, and with air pressure outlets often jammed, the old pipes burst for which UNFICYP were forced to organise bicomunal meetings to organise repair teams. From 1974, Athienou’s second pipe source supplied drinking water again from the Potamia region, where six boreholes fed an underground pipe lying north of Skasmata through the UNBZ, directly to Athienou. The so-called ‘airstrip’ water meter, south-west of Athienou, was checked by UNFICYP to ensure that between 700-900 cu.m./day was received. Overall, however, it was inevitable that Athienou’s complex supply system generated fragile transboundary relations. Indeed, in September 1992 the ROC Ministry of Commerce, Trade and Industry noted how the town’s inconsistent water and electricity supplies, which crossed into the north in various locations, had affected the local farming and industrial economy.

With ‘Phase I’ of the SCP completed in 1994, which included a conveyor system to Kokkinokhoria, Athienou and Troulli, an extra 450 ha of Athienou’s cultivated land could be irrigated, and the town became independent from the convoluted Potamia-Skasmata-Petrophani supply route. Even so, other infrastructural developments were to impact negatively north of Athienou. According to a local-level, bicomunal
**Figure 6.5**  *Schematic representation of water transfers across the UN buffer zone*
agreement orchestrated by UNFICYP in January 1992, the northern, Turkish Cypriot village of Ayia was disconnected from its 200 cu.m./day historical link with the Potamia-Petrophani supply in the light of worsening pipeline capabilities. The northern authorities in turn rejected a Greek Cypriot offer to deliver some 70 cu.m./day via a pipe through the village of Melousha, also north of the Turkish Forces CFL, which made similar use of a pre-existing pipeline connection. Melousha’s own supplies came from the Athienou ‘airstrip’ pipeline and were much-needed for a region largely cut off from the Turkish Cypriot water projects developed after 1974 (see Chapter 5)—although, once again, broken pipes and formal protests forced UNFICYP to seek local-level solutions involving the installation of UN-monitored water meters at key points. It could be assumed, nonetheless, that the water supply for the northern villages of Melousha, Ayia and Louroujina were, exceptionally, deployed free of charge through pipelines from the south, with UNFICYP assistance. The Turkish Cypriot authorities continued to charge Turkish Cypriots, Turkish settlers and UNFICYP for the consumption of water provided free of charge from the south.

As for Louroujina itself (Figure 6.5), after 1974 the primary source was, as before, the Kochati well, fed by a shallow aquifer. Once again, a UNFICYP-monitored agreement saw 70 cu.m./day transferred across the CFLs, and at times up to 150 cu.m./day was being supplied to the Turkish Cypriot peninsula. As elsewhere, nonetheless, the agreement was brought increasingly into question with the drier years of the 1990s; although bicommunal meetings were initiated (notably with representatives of the Greek Cypriot WDD from 1994-95), Louroujina’s water problem gradually deteriorated such that only 4 cu.m./day was leaving the well at the start of 1997, leaving Louroujina to truck in potable water and irrigate its land with what little remained.

In addition to piped sources, groundwater in the border region continued to be utilised privately. Drilling permits for new wells in the UNBZ were generally established by the mid-1980s, under the same provisos as for land, although many older wells were never formally registered by UNFICYP or its related agencies. Under the ROC’s legislation, all groundwater, surface water and wastewater resources were invested to the state, but the acquisition of drilling permits lay with the authority. While the District Officer held the ultimate authority to grant permits, many boreholes were unlicensed, farmers purchased neighbour’s water, and overpumping was common.
antiquo water rights existed on most streams, moreover, and an estimated 10-15% of the island’s water supplies came from sources tied up by private water rights. Like land and trees, water rights in Cyprus were historically complex, forming part of citizens’ property titles which were divided upon the death of the owner among his/her dependants.138

Historical water rights also became a complicating issue to the west of Nicosia (Figure 6.5). In 1977, Greek Cypriot authorities were accused of turning off private Turkish water supplies from Kato Koutraphas, south of the UNBZ, to Angolemi and Elea.139 In addition to the previously examined disputes in Avlona, therefore, the problem of sharing not only multi-communal but also multi-ownership waters persisted and, with that, tentative diplomacy. Considerable effort was expended by UNFICYP to ensure the water distribution system was being ‘fairly and efficiently operated’, even during periods of high-level political unrest.140 After the dry summer of 1991, UNFICYP unsuccessfully offered to sponsor intercommunal meetings between respective water boards and departments and, specifically, from 1992 the peacekeepers made repeated representations for bicommmunal cooperation to prevent the further deterioration of the Morphou aquifer.141 The agricultural economy of the border villages, and now even Morphou itself, was beginning to be affected by a band of underground seawater intrusion moving southeastwards, towards the UNBZ.142 In April 1992, a US$15 mn project proposal was also unsuccessfully submitted by the TRNC’s Ministry of Interior, Rural Affairs and Environment to the UN, which proposed the construction of a 15 km clay barrier along the coastline.143 As part of the parallel debates over the ‘Set of Ideas’, Denktash noted that Morphou supplied 160 of the 700 mn tons of Cyprus’ water, and all of it was located within the Turkish Cypriot zone.144

In the light of these failures to further extend the limited cooperation from the ‘local level’ at the citrus-growing border region to the ‘high level’ at Nicosia, over time UNFICYP’s on-going observation and negotiation role was to prove crucial. In mid-1986, they assisted on a maintenance programme carried out on the Marathasa Dam, it being under the control of the Greek Cypriot government yet providing water for irrigation to Turkish Cypriots in Lefka (Figure 6.4 and 6.5).145 Prior to 1974, local Turkish Cypriots had feared the transfer of water from the Tylliria area (where there was a large Turkish Cypriot population with an estimated 38,000 donums of land requiring irrigation) to Greek Cypriot Morphou.146 Cooperative intercommunal relations had been
therefore sanctioned such that, by the early 1970s, 1300 donums to the north and south of Lefka was being supplied by Marathasa Dam, while due west of the town another 770 donums was commanded by Kafizes Dam. After 1974, the roles had truly reversed, with the Greek Cypriots as the upstream users but, as an extension of the *quid pro quo*, their water authorities had chosen to maintain the release of overflows to the north. Once again, in 1989, UNFICYP were able to facilitate two bicomunal water projects in the repair of the conduit providing water from Kafizes dam to Lefka following flood damage and, by November, in the desilting of the dam at Marathasa.

This pipeline diplomacy was increasingly called into question as proposals for rival ‘upstream’ and ‘downstream’ projects on the Xeros river became apparent in the early 1990s. Turkish Cypriot authorities were preparing to build a dam to trap water flowing from the south and so improve their Morphou Derivation Project, at the same time as the Greek Cypriots completed a feasibility study on the construction of another dam, upstream on the same river but south of the UNBZ. In fact, consultants had been called upon to study a project for the combined utilisation of all Tylliria’s seasonal rivers—Marathasa, Xeros, Kambos, Limnitis and Pyrgos (Figure 6.4). The proposed Northern Conveyor Project, to augment both the urban water supply in Nicosia as well as to provide for irrigation in the Solea Valley, received serious consideration from the mid-1990s. It seemed that the ROC water department had been forced finally to focus on the remaining existing surface water resources, which had previously proven too political to consider. Only kilometres future east, studies were also being carried out on freshly damming the Peristerona river and further damming the Akaki river, both flowing north, for local irrigation needs.

From 1974, in summary, while the UNBZ physically separated the two communities, at the same time, and seemingly paradoxically, it was also to bring them together to cooperate through necessity. These localised, small scale interdependencies demonstrated not only the role of informal, local-level agreements invariably initiated and managed by UNFICYP, but just as significantly the persistent of water shortages and mutual necessities at the borderland scale. While the political reasons detailed in Chapter 5 for why the *quid pro quo* was established remained just as salient, other functional reasons for the continuation of such interdependencies, based on geographical proximity and spatial interaction, had to be added.
6.5 **Buffer Zone, Nekri Zoni, or Sinir?**

Before drawing conclusions on the management of transboundary resources in and along the UNBZ, and moving on to consider the manifestation of these relations in the urban context in Chapter 7, it is necessary to begin tying together a number of characteristics suggested throughout this chapter regarding the functions of the UNBZ itself in relation to transboundary relations. Strategists have often prescribed approaching the Cyprus conflict through concentrating on regional- and geo-politics, especially on the so-called Cyprus ‘triangle’ of Nicosia-Ankara-Athens.154 In turn, the *de facto* boundary has been reduced to representations of “the never-ending juxtaposition of the heirs of two empires”, “a frontier between the West and the Middle East as well as between Christianity and Islam” or, even more concisely, “civilisation’s faultline”.155 Such ‘formulaic dyadisms’ have served many agendas, acting as neat yet ‘totalising binary clichés’.156 Moreover, while recognising these legitimate boundary narratives, the aggrandisement of their geopolitical significance threatens to overshadow localised facets of the ‘green line’-UNBZ character.

There appears much explanatory power to be gained for understanding transboundary resource management by examining in more detail the cognitive processes involved in determining relations in and around the UNBZ. This section examines not only how, firstly, the UNBZ—despite its self-evident contested management—was used to supplement particular policies by the ‘state’, but also how the functional realities of the borderland previously noted led to the generation of a different, and at times contradictory, boundary discourse at the ‘local’ level. Both approaches to the UNBZ, it is argued, held major implications for the development of the UNBZ as a ‘borderland’.

### 6.5.1 Contrasting approaches to boundary management

It was previously suggested in Section 6.2.1 that, as far as UNFICYP were concerned;

“[w]hile the buffer zone is not maintained by UNFICYP to divide the communities in Cyprus, it is an element in the cease-fire arrangements accepted by both sides”.157
Clearly, this ‘acceptance’ was not necessarily universal as both communities developed their own policy of approach to its management. In terms of controlling border crossings, for example, three locations developed following the creation of the UNBZ in 1974 where one or both communities and other nationals could legally cross, either northwards or southwards. Only one checkpoint—at the Ledra Palace Hotel in central Nicosia—provided anything resembling a formalised border-crossing point however. Here, diplomats and tourists had to pass through three separate halts—Greek Cypriot, UN, and Turkish Cypriot—to cross from one side to the other. There was little encouragement to travel south-to-north and, given that the Greek Cypriot government declared all seaports and airports in the northern territory ‘prohibited ports of entry and exit’, non-Cypriots were not allowed to enter the south from the north, although, by agreement with UNFICYP, Greek Cypriot police allowed Turkish Cypriots (but not Turkish ‘settlers’) to cross south for ‘humanitarian’ purposes. As for the northern authorities, Greeks or Armenians were specifically rejected from crossing to the north.

In territorial terms, these border management policies reflected wider interests. For successive Greek Cypriot governments, the UNBZ was to represent a temporary phenomena—what Richarte termed a ‘black-spot’—which, during its existence, served only to highlight the ‘national struggle’ and to illustrate the military threat of Turkey; accordingly, only in exceptional circumstances, such as with the Turkish Cypriot UDI in November 1983, did the Greek Cypriot authorities close the border. And for legal precedent if nothing else, the Greek Cypriot government continued to protest all violations of their territorial waters, and of their airspace both south and north of the UNBZ when Turkish military aircraft were involved in exercises.

This relatively consistent anti- ‘border’ policy of the Greek Cypriots, however, met something of a challenge in October 1996, revealing a more problematic approach to transboundary relations. Prompted by the shooting of Greek Cypriots along the UNBZ over the preceding three months (see Chapter 1, Section 1.6.1), DIKO MP Marios Matsakis set up a blockade on the southern side of Ledra Palace checkpoint. Accompanied by refugees, the close family of those killed in Dherinia, and often schoolchildren, his action halted virtually all crossings of people northwards. Emphasis was placed on ‘persuading’ tourists not to cross north, each one intending to spend at least CY£20 on a day trip, and he claimed that up to 1,000 had been dissuaded in the first three weeks of the campaign. Matsakis highlighted the border crossing procedure
of paying CY£1 at the northern checkpoint, and of signing an official form of the ‘so-called TRNC’;

“[i]f this is not recognition of Denktash’s state, then what is? We are talking about hundreds of thousands of pounds which we [the Greek Cypriots] have given to the Turkish military forces”\(^{163}\)

What became known as the ‘anti-occupation’ or ‘enlightenment’ campaign also became a headache for the Greek Cypriot government, however, as Denktash, in direct response to what he represented as “border closures”, made veiled threats to deport the enclaved Greek Cypriots and Maronites in the north, or at least prevent them from coming south.\(^{164}\) Ergolu, the Turkish Cypriot Prime Minister, warned that his community was losing some CY£10,000 each day.\(^{165}\) As Denktash carried out his threat of border closure on 6 November, Matsakis announced plans to make the blockade a daily event (initially it was only enforced at weekends), despite calls from the Greek Cypriot Foreign Minister to end the campaign which was seen as hurting Turkish Cypriots (economically) more than Turkey, and providing a confused message internationally. At times, the free movement of UN and diplomatic personnel had been impeded. The blockade extension never transpired, but the protests gathered steam over the new year and, in one incident on 19 January, tear gas was used by Greek Cypriot police to disperse 40-50 demonstrators blocking the crossing point.\(^{166}\) By the time UNFICYP had negotiated the reopening of the border, the Turkish Cypriot authorities had further reacted by preventing virtually all bicommunal events, a prohibition not lifted until the Tekke mosque crossing the following January.

There were other inconsistencies in the Greek Cypriot border policy. Indeed, much less formally, transboundary smuggling was to develop soon after the August cease-fire, gaining a reputation for profitable transfers involving various merchandise travelling south-to-north, but also, from north-to-south (citrus, olive oil and whisky). Smugglers initially used the common channel of Dhekelia SBA (especially the Pergamos-Pyla link) rather then the Ledra Palace checkpoint, but later exploited weak spots at Lympia, Athienou, Potamia and Astromeritis (Appendix 6 (a)).\(^{167}\) A localised smuggling economy transcending the border was based on extensive informal contacts; although minimal, it became at times highly symbolic—in April 1979, a Turkish Cypriot district court ruled that smuggling across the UNBZ was not a crime, a view
which Denktash immediately and categorically rejected because “[t]here cannot be a state without boundaries”.168

By the mid-1980s, the issue had become an economic concern even for the south. In early 1987, it was estimated that visitors to the mixed, UNBZ-village of Pyla were spending over CY£250,000 on smuggled fish and whisky per month.169 As Martínez generalised elsewhere, it appeared morally and culturally ‘acceptable’ to breach border regulations that interfered with economic gains.170 In the border area south of Pyla and towards Larnaca, the development of expensive houses illustrated not only the safety of the SBA and a burgeoning tourist infrastructure market, but also the lucrative trade of smuggling. Fish and fashion goods travelled south, and the smuggling of livestock from the north was to become a daily occurrence; indeed, in 1995 and again in April 1997 the Greek Cypriot authorities were forced to consider an animal identification ‘tagging’ system.171 Under threat of breaking their own embargo, however, one local newspaper suggested that US$1 mn of goods (especially livestock and other agricultural produce) was sold to the south from the ‘other’ community and US$300,000 worth of goods (especially vehicle spare parts) was sold by the Greek Cypriots to the north in the first half of 1995 alone.172

In this sense, whilst UNFICYP’s ‘buffer’ duties were frowned upon by the Greek Cypriot administration, it was axiomatic that the Greek Cypriot authorities suffered from the same paradox as UNFICYP. As Karivas, the ROC Defence Minister, had reaffirmed after border incidents in December 1995;

“[Greek Cypriot] guardsmen [...] must realise that although our goal always remains Cyprus’ unification, the mission at the buffer zone is to guard the gates and that we cannot trust those on the other side or develop relations with them”.173

The practical maintenance of their CFLs sat uncomfortably with ‘national’ policy. This was apparently also a similar case for the Turkish Cypriot authorities—reflecting their policy of official non-recognition of the CFLs, they instead ‘observed’ them from the ‘military zone’ demarcated north of the disputed CFLs (up to 3 km deep in rural areas, but as little as 5 m in Nicosia).174 Yet, while they disputed the CFLs which UNFICYP maintained, from 1974 there was, nonetheless, tacit and vocal recognition of a sinir (‘border’). Both the Turkish Forces and the Turkish Cypriot leadership used the growing institutionalisation of the UNBZ as means of proof.175
This was most effectively illustrated in practical terms in April 1988, when Turkish Cypriot authorities suddenly required that certain categories of Greek Cypriots and foreign nationals entering from the south present their passports for stamping. Both the Greek Cypriot government and the UN Secretary-General immediately recognised this as a move to establish crossing-point procedures synonymous with an international border, and called on Denktash to restore the status quo. In their formal territorial proposals (Appendix 2), Greek Cypriot authorities had generally sought to avoid separate customs either to the north or to the south of any potential federal boundary. By the second half of the year the status quo was restored, but another incident arose—symbolically, a year after the fall of the Berlin Wall. In November 1990, Denktash allowed Greek Cypriot journalists to cross north without regular ‘border’ formalities, and proposed that Greek Cypriots with legitimate business in the north be allowed to cross at a day’s notice. This relaxation was short lived; the number of journalists was restricted and, as other Greek Cypriot pilgrimages and demonstrations were barred, the border quickly reclosed—“the wall must stay”, Denktash had concluded, until the Greek Cypriots stopped ‘violating the borders’ and gave up their demands for sovereignty over the north. The ‘routinisation’ of the TRNC’s response to border ‘violations’, complemented by UNFICYP’s mandate, led inevitably to a de facto acceptance of the territorial sovereignties.

Notably, two years later, passport controls for Turkish Cypriots and Turks travelling between Turkey and northern Cyprus were abolished, suggesting both the relaxation of border controls only with certain neighbours, and further integration with Turkey. Again, in 1994, after the effective ECJ ban on their exports, 1,000 Turkish Cypriot workers blocked the checkpoint and, offering further proof of their management of a sinir shared with the Greek Cypriot ‘administration’, the Turkish Cypriot authorities imposed new regulations and fees for entry and exit from the north in April 1998—for the first time, a £15 sterling ‘visa’ fee for Greek Cypriots and Maronites crossing north, and a £4 sterling tax for all people crossing the checkpoint southwards. While tourists were still encouraged to cross north, therefore, ‘other’ visitors were effectively controlled.

From almost as soon as it was established, the UNBZ had become a political tool for the two communities as much as for UNFICYP, but it was to be especially
effective for the Turkish Cypriot leadership's argument. Whilst discussing the TRNC's 'border of 189 [sic] kilometres' in 1990, Denktash proclaimed that;

"a state may have a dispute with its neighbours about its boundaries; indeed, the boundaries may not have been decided upon [...] and yet, if the territory exists and its people call it their homeland, if people and territory combined form the fatherland, the foundation for statehood exists". 183

It was, nevertheless, possible to demonstrate also the coincidence of the Turkish Cypriot 'people' and their sinir, and to suggest the accumulation of a more 'territorialised' identity since 1974, through less explicit means. The project of mapping the 'state' provided a visualising device, and the 'map' became an increasingly popular tool for representing and celebrating these spaces, and the resources they encompassed. Cartographical discourse adopted an inclusionary/exclusionary role; even annotations on tourist maps served a particular purpose—for instance, to counter the ROC's 'official' cartographical depictions of the 'island state', whereby the northern territory was presented as an 'Area Inaccessible Because of The Turkish Occupation', Turkish and Turkish Cypriot 'official' cartography ambiguously but effectively referred to the Rum Bolgesi ('Greek sector') on their own maps. 184

As Krishna noted in post-partition India, such a preoccupation with borders and operation of the inside/outside antinomy "serves not so much to prevent 'foreign infiltration' as it does to discipline and produce the 'domestic(ated) self"185 The territorial proposals for a solution to the Cyprus conflict (Appendix 3) traditionally represented the most formal mode of ethnic delimitation. Gottmann more generally illustrated how the 'state' may create iconography to cement national solidarity, 186 a process which can be further institutionalised by forming what Paasi termed a 'symbolic shape', similar to what B. Anderson referred to as the 'logo-map'—a recognisable, pervasive emblem reinforcing the 'imagined community'. 187 The post-1974 amendment to the insignia of the Turkish Cypriot's, state-owned KTP petrol company illustrated (Plate 6.1), by way of example, how 'official geographies' supplemented the more pervasive political representation of the territory of the TRNC. 188 Sant Cassia has argued, moreover, that this 'fetishism' of sovereignty increasingly led to the emphasis of its symbols rather than its substance, as the TRNC was to remain practically and politically isolated. 189
6.5.2 Reading between the lines: discursive representations of space and place

Just as it was possible to examine how boundaries were contested yet, at the same time, used to support the various interests of the parties involved in the high-level negotiations for a settlement, so it became possible to consider, in association with the UNBZ, relations between these dominant and other, more popular 'imaginative geographies'—which could be seen as;

"descriptions and discursive constructions around place which are made and remade within a particular cultural setting".190

'Place' in this sense, and as previously argued in Chapter 1, can be considered as not only bound up with connections to specific territories at specific times. In addition, "different localities and their structures of expectations are [...] bound with the constitution of personal spatial practice and experience".191 In short, it is necessary to distinguish between the physical identity of a border region and the identity of the people living there seeking to access and utilise its resources (i.e., their interpretations of the 'border'). While the United Nations read the area geopolitically as a 'buffer zone', there were other processes of discursive construction that need to be isolated to understand fully the impact of the 1974 boundary delimitation and demarcation process on transboundary resource management.

An examination of how those experiencing the everyday life of the UNBZ themselves portrayed the zone provides valuable insights.192 Both Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots created respectively their own 'buffer zone' discourse. For Greek Cypriots living or working in the UNBZ, the area had two common and interrelated features, both underlined by the representation of the area as the nekri zoni ('dead zone'). This term served as a metaphor for the UNBZ both as an everyday 'place', and as an ideological approach. Firstly, the zone was 'dead' through its personification of what had been 'killed' by Turkish actions in 1974: an economically viable and valuable area. In this sense, it could be argued that it was a common psychological reaction after the creation of a boundary after violent conflict: fear, particularly on the 'losing' side.193 The territory was 'dead' because of the militaristic character it soon acquired; it was a 'security landscape', akin to a 'no-man's land' (a term which often replaced nekri zoni).194
Plate 6.1  Redrawing ‘Cyprus’ through the ‘logo-map’: KTP station signs, pre- and post-1974
Secondly, and more significantly in psychological terms, the area between the CFLs was 'dead' because it was there to be rejuvenated, perhaps even 'resurrected'. Sant Cassia wrote on the nekri zoni;

"it is a place of death, a place where transgressions are staged and managed for the purposes of representation". This was notably reflected by one elderly farmer in Dherinia who stated that;

"[b]etween 1974 and '83 this land was dead, and no one was using it. At '83, [I] thought 'well, something is going to give', so I went through the police and the UN authorities and got permission to utilise a piece of it and slowly got permission to utilise more, to the extent that I'm using it today—and freed the dead zone from being dead".

Through these narratives, the reuse of the UNBZ by Greek Cypriots was an integral part of 'living' in the nekri zoni.

In contrast, the authorities north of the line preferred to keep their side as uncultivated, open ground, a defensive strip ahead of their fixed military positions. Accordingly, farmers were discouraged from crossing into it and thus the Turkish Cypriot area reaffirmed its symbolism to the Greek Cypriots—'brown and dead'. For Turkish Cypriots, the 'green line' had, since 1963, represented a more 'natural demarcation' which ensured their security of life and property, and the UNBZ subsequently inherited this sinir characteristic as the Turkish Cypriot leadership and Turkish military personnel concerned themselves with defining the 'state' limits. Sant Cassia rightly concluded, therefore, that for the Turkish Cypriot state the border "had to be 'protected' from transgressions, physical, symbolic and somatic", while for the Greek Cypriots the evident lack of order along the UNBZ (to be later demonstrated par excellence at Dherinia in 1996) "delegitimized the TRNC whilst legitimating the Republic".

However, as the actions of Greek Cypriot farmers suggested, while access to and transgressions of the CFLs were political in character, the UNBZ did not fail to become an integral part of the (non-political) 'everyday' life of people on both sides of the CFLs. In spite of the idiosyncrasies manifested throughout the UNBZ, economic life emerged. For people living in this border environment, boundaries were an essential part of the activities and discourses of daily life. Access was, at times, informal
(especially with an increasingly under-resourced UNFICYP), as one Athienou farmer noted;

"[i]n Potamia, if I go to the buffer zone for 3 days, I don’t have to go every day to get the [UN] paper. They sign the dates, let’s say from 11th up to 16th, and I can use the same paper every day". 201

Autonomy in daily routine was evident in other forms, with, in a number of cases, the larger land-holders in an area of the UNBZ often becoming informal interlocutors with UNFICYP concerning general developments in their environs on behalf of their neighbours. 202 This micro-scale institutionalisation of local politics reflected a need to ‘get on with life’ such that, with structures established, the UNBZ (re)developed a ‘sense of place’ for those willing to regularly accommodate its more generally anomalous and liminal character. Greek Cypriots were not using access to the UNBZ as an opportunity to retaliate and instigate inter-ethnic conflict, their own well-being overriding any such desires. 203 This was most evident during transect walks/drives with those utilising the UNBZ, where the landscape prompted stories of confrontations, near-arrests or near-shootings along the FSLs, while being interspersed with general, routine comments about daily, ‘mundane’ agricultural practices.

This ‘normalisation’ was also reflected in a general lack of cognisance of the precise delimitation of CFLs. Paasi has argued elsewhere, it must be noted, how personal territorial identification may be more “lived out in daily practice rather than being thought of reflectively”. Consequently, questions to people regarding such identification can be “at worst a [...] violent intervention in their socio-spatial representations and [...] an expression of scientific colonialism”. 204 There was certainly, at times, a lack of explicit ‘terриториal’ consciousness amongst people in the villages adjacent to and even in the UNBZ, to the extent of not being aware of the general location of the CFLs and how much of their property fell ‘in’ or ‘out’. 205 In this sense, those acquainted with the UNBZ for most of its existence had become increasingly socialised to the existence of the boundary. By being able to use the UNBZ courtesy of UNFICYP from a relatively early stage after the zone’s creation, Greek Cypriots in particular had learnt to operate in the zone as part of ‘everyday’ life. Such remarkably personalised spaces, reflecting the need to understand and manage life in the UNBZ, were even created by UNFICYP themselves. As Fetherston noted, a key preventive
The United Nations Buffer Zone

method to deter changes to the CFLs was to label them as ‘UN’ material items—barbed wire, buildings, and OPs.206 One extension of this labelling process was the generation of successive layers of place-naming over time, most intensively illustrated along Nicosia’s ‘green line’ (Figure 6.6). Along its route were “notable landmarks”: ‘Yellow Car’ (the rear bumper of which marked the CFL, although the Turkish Forces’ disputed this), ‘Annie’s House’ (where a Greek Cypriot woman lived until 1991), ‘Magic Mansion’ (formerly Nicosia’s largest department store), and ‘Buffer Zone Café’ (run by Greek Cypriots, and opening into the UNBZ, and frequented by UNFICYP until the early 1990s). There was, in short, “a tale to be told at every twist and turn on the line”.207

From the above observations, it is plausible to suggest that, in the border area, identity, space and political power were to become contested within the discursivity of ‘everyday’ affairs.208 Highlighting the inter- ‘state’ and dyadic nature of border relations, in other words, threatens to overshadow more locally and personally constructed transgressions, notably by the Greek Cypriot community. It should not be surprising, in addition, that the separate and distinct representations of the UNBZ by each community naturally brought into question perceptions of UNFICYP at the local scale. In seeking explicitly to preserve the ‘integrity’ of the UNBZ from unauthorised entry or activity, at the same time UNFICYP sought to maintain the peacekeeper’s character of impartiality and noncoercion.209 The social interaction of military and civilian was to demonstrate the importance of the views of disputants on not only the nature of the conflict, but the actors involved.210 The presence of UNFICYP immediately added an extra line of authority to ‘everyday’ life. As Papadakis observed from his study of Pyla, Greek Cypriots within the UNBZ had to contend with gaining formal UN permission to build when they would more usually go ahead with such activities before approaching their own authorities.211

The extension of the UN’s authority such that it further restricted and frustrated what Greek Cypriot’s perceived to be ‘normal’ conditions was a source of conflict. But a further implication of this friction was the questioning of UNFICYP’s impartiality. UNFICYP’s liaison and decision-making was to be carried out through ‘persuasion and negotiation exclusively’.212 To reiterate, UNFICYP’s legal framework of relations with the ‘host’ government had been provided by the end of March 1964, such that
Figure 6.6  Geographical imagination along the United Nations 'green line'

Source: Compiled by author from transect walks.
arrangements for close and continuous liaison with the ROC and the Turkish Cypriot leadership were made. These arrangements, however, suggested 'equality' between the parties, and this lacked appeal to one Greek Cypriot farmer in Potamia, who questioned the establishment of certain farming practices near his barley fields. He generally saw UN double-standards;

"the Turks shouldn’t be allowed to farm on our side of the dead zone, south of the UN street [patrol line] [...] It is illegal that the Turks are on this side".

UNFICYP were perceived to have taken the side of the "powerful Turks" over the “poor and powerless” Greek Cypriots. On the issue of impartiality, however, this view of UNFICYP was to be uncommonly shared with their Turkish Cypriot counterparts, as previously noted at Avlona.

From the foregoing, it can be argued that local scale territorial divisions in the UNBZ were generally 'microcosms' manifest and reproduced by the state 'macrocosm' of two, de facto exclusive territorial sovereignties. As J. Anderson and Shuttleworth have noted in Northern Ireland, the 'macrocosm' of exclusive territoriality at the state level produced and was reproduced by the 'microcosms' of activity at the local level. Yet 'place' was also a composite of more than one geographical scale, being international, national and in certain cases local. Territoriality provided a link between the 'local' with the 'national' spatial scales—it became part of the general, active discourse of Turkish Cypriot partitionism and, conversely, Greek Cypriot antipartitionism.

6.5.3 Delimitations of the borderland

It remains to be considered to what extent and in what forms the two communities recognised a 'border region' or a 'borderland' extending beyond the inherently border-dominated spaces within the UNBZ. Reference throughout this chapter has been made to a 'borderland', yet it is clear from the above analysis that, in terms of the contemporary conceptualisations of 'borderlands' and 'border regions' forwarded in Chapter 2 (Table 2.1), delimitations (either politico-territorial or socio-spatial) of this phenomenon in Cyprus have reflected consistently 'non-integration' across rural sections of the UNBZ.
South of the UNBZ, it could be argued that, post-1974, there was little evidence of any distinguishable 'border region' separate from other areas under de facto Greek Cypriot control, especially given the relatively small scale of the island. This was to a large extent a reflection of the more general, historical lack of regional autonomy and identity on the island, as noted in Chapter 4. Like many post-colonial states, both the unitary and partitioned ROC tended towards political and economic centralisation and, in turn, little social sense of 'regionalist cohesion' within communities only further exacerbated by the population movements of 1974-75. This observation, however, does not negate the existence of a 'border region' at other scales. Indeed, Hitchens observed a more all-encompassing 'invisible but still palpable line of division';

"[t]here is no village or town, however far from the that line, which does not pay an indemnity to it with impoverished refugees housing, and with memories".

In terms of how the Greek Cypriot community considered the partition lines, therefore, this view suggested that no regional borderland had developed but that rather, at the extreme, the whole island was a borderland.

It is worth reiterating, however, Hansen's definition of a 'border region': "sub-national areas whose economic and social life are directly and significantly affected by proximity to an international [sic] boundary". With this in mind, and therefore supplementary to Hitchens' observations, it is necessary to note the existence of 'border regions' which were delimited from 1974. Admittedly, in the rural areas of the south, population movements did not alter such that the whole of the border area became significantly depopulated. Urbanisation was to continue as the key factor influencing population distribution and settlement pattern, and the peri-urban areas of Nicosia (and to its south-west), Larnaca, and the Kokkinokhoria region to the east were to benefit most from population influxes resulting from a combination of refugee settlement, urbanisation and a burgeoning coastal tourism industry. Yet, immediately after 1974, the Greek Cypriot government were aware of the negative implications of proximity to the CFLs, which meant that 22 schools could not operate, various industries in the south "bordering the dangerous zones" were closed, some 5,500 houses were abandoned, and the 24,000 people displaced from the 'area' were left jobless. In planning terms, for successive Greek Cypriot governments, the ideological nature of the border region
rested upon people moving towards or living in the *nekri zoni*, and this was manifested concretely into various pro-settlement policy decisions.

Probably the first ROC pledge to 'border regions' was witnessed in June 1977, when the Minister of Commerce and Industry, speaking at Paralimni, observed that "hundreds are working at the risk of their life in lands adjacent to the occupation forces". A month later it was announced that CY£250,000 worth of infrastructure would be invested in the industrial and tourist development in the Kokkinokhoria region, 'cut off' from the remainder of the island. The revival of the development of a recognised 'border region' had become, in principle, a new policy. Subsequent pleas for government recognition were to be heard at both the western and eastern extremities of the UNBZ by the mid-1990s, particularly in terms of infrastructural investments such as road access. The settlement structure of these areas were particularly disadvantageous, lacking large urban centres, and in Kato Pyrgos to the west (Appendix 6 (a)), cut off from the ROC's *de facto* centre by the UNBZ to its west and east, and to its south by the Troodos range, a road link through to the Tylliria region had been postponed since 1974. Similarly, to the far east of the island, a proposed Dhekelia-Famagusta highway presented an awkward planning problem. The middle section would follow parallel to the Dhekelia-Famagusta SBA road (Figure 6.7) but, while to 'nimby' SBA residents this route would avoid affecting cultivable lands to the south, to one local MP it would create "an additional buffer zone south of the present one".

Dherinia, Athienou and neighbouring settlements were generally regarded by the ROC planning authorities as *akritikes* ('fringe/border') places (Figure 6.7). Dherinia, which pre-1974 was developing as a suburb of Famagusta, had its growth northwards halted by the UNBZ, and it subsequently became a secondary service centre for the region's tourist centres to the south. Soon after 1974, however, a government-led scheme provided low-interest housing loans up to CY£15,000 to young families, encouraging them to build in the UNBZ-affected villages—specifically, Dherinia, Athienou, Troulli, Lymbia, Mammari and Dhenia (Figure 6.7 and Appendix 6 (a)). Athienou was the largest settlement located wholly within the UNBZ since 1974, and was populated by 4,500 Greek Cypriots by 1996.
Figure 6.7  *Partition of the de jure administrative boundaries of Athienou, Lysi and Dherinia*
This pro-settlement policy would suggest, therefore, that Hitchens' perception of an all Greek Cypriot-encompassing borderland was a reflection more of an ‘official’ Greek Cypriot belief in the non-recognition of the ‘border’, and the recognition instead of a ‘frontier’. As previously noted, in political geography ‘frontiers’ have been commonly distinguished from ‘boundaries’ and ‘borders’, whereby;

“[a] frontier is [...] outward-orientated and boundary inward-orientated. Whereas a boundary is a definite line of separation, a frontier is a zone of contact”. 233

A ‘frontier’ suggested a dynamic, progressive and ultimately temporary character to the ‘border region’.

North of the UNBZ, a similar if symbolically different regional character was to develop. In the aftermath of 1974, settlements along the UNBZ (along with other economically or geographically ‘remote’ areas) were to be predominantly inhabited by Anatolian Turkish immigrants, engaged in livestock production.234 As Heinritz and Wellenreuther have observed, the Turkish Cypriot settlement policy aimed to dispersing the new state’s population to all quarters, particularly to prevent whole areas being left abandoned.235 A large proportion of the villages to be left abandoned were along the UNBZ, and inhabited by Greek Cypriots pre-1974. This move suggested a pro-border settlement policy similar to that in the south, but Wellenreuther’s work suggested that by the early 1990s, along the length of the UNBZ (excluding Nicosia and Famagusta’s western suburbs) these areas remained either ‘stagnant’ or ‘emptied’ areas relative to the TRNC as a whole.236 Turkish Cypriots living along the UNBZ did not necessarily feel more established or able to think in the long-term. While perceptions in and along the UNBZ suggested that Turkish Cypriots (as Greek Cypriots) had successfully “internalised the border into their everyday lives”, 237 the process of translating this level of self-awareness into political or economic benefits was incomplete, largely due to the liminality of the area which stunted the establishment of any regional structures to plan for the ‘borderland’ over the longer-term.

This was demonstrated most by people from borderland villages—both those using the UNBZ for their livelihood and local officials—who were aware of their village’s status in the high-level negotiations on a territorial settlement (see Appendix 3), and the possibility of, often once again, becoming refugees. This was especially the case in Lysi (‘Akdogan’ in Turkish), for example, where although the region remained
agriculturally important, inward investment was limited (Figure 6.7). In Lefka, the local economy had historically depended upon its strategic location on the western mountain pass and the rich copper deposits (see above), but after 1974 it found itself 10km from the UNBZ and Skouriotissa. The debate between local interest groups, the municipality and the central government illustrated a conflict of priorities. Not only was the local population to manage the economic and environmental problems associated with the mines, but its geographical location at the extreme western end of the TRNC meant that it received only minimal direct investment—in the form of a new University and new housing, and only after lengthy prompting from the municipal authorities and realisation that, under Boutros-Ghali’s 1992 territorial proposals (Appendix 3), the town would remain ‘Turkish Cypriot’. North of the UNBZ, therefore, the borderland villages generally received even less government recognition beyond the initial incentives for the settler population to inhabit abandoned villages. There was little reason for distinguishing these economic disadvantages from any other region, given the fragile condition of the TRNC economy overall.

While these locally-based discursive representations outlined here do not contribute directly to the Cyprus conflict, they arguably framed and contextualised the situation within which transboundary disputes occurred, by reiterating on a daily basis the imaginative geographies through which both the state and the people apprehended and understood their place on the island. Although there were to develop distinguishable border regions on either side of the rural areas of the UNBZ, fundamentally these two regions were not to merge to form a transboundary spatial unit. As such, the Cyprus case reflected both Martínez’s ‘alienated’ and Momoh’s ‘zero’ borderland (Table 2.1). The de facto existence of two centralised states operating back-to-back brought with it the problem of differential access to resources on each side. Even if more transboundary cooperative ventures had been attempted and allowed (House’s ‘Az-Bz’ transactions), different remits and contrasts in legislative and executive powers underlay the organisational problems endemic in any attempt to defend the local transboundary environment in an integrated, effective manner. ‘Direct rule’ and local unaccountability channelled all negotiations through the central ‘state’. It can be posited that the lack of a regional consciousness and civil society gave the predisposition for all politics to be ‘nationalist’, lacking any fully legitimate, comprehensive overview or coordinating body in the transboundary context, the
regional development problems continued to be fought on each side unilaterally, and with a large measure of self-interest.

6.6 Conclusions

To summarise, there have developed various constructions of the UNBZ since 1974. The most dominant one has represented a territorial boundary—both the temporariness and the integrity of which UNFICYP problematically sought to preserve. In traditional security terms, UNFICYP’s buffer zone proved something of a palliative. While Alan James noted the ‘prophylactic’ effect of having a buffer zone which by definition, was a threat to neither side, it must be recognised that UNFICYP further institutionalised the conflict through their institutionalisation of de facto territorial partition. This argument has been rightly tempered by those who have noted that local level cease-fire maintenance remained an essential prerequisite to any meaningful high level negotiations. The belief in maintaining a buffer zone to manage ‘space’ in the territorial sense was vindicated by the low number of killings and general maintenance of the military status quo. It remains to highlight, however, the highly contested nature of UNFICYP’s ‘buffer zone’, and its reinterpretation and representation at both the ‘state’ and ‘local’ level which held direct implications for transboundary resource management at the borderland scale, and beyond.

The UNBZ’s development as an ‘alienated’ borderland, both in terms of intercommunal contact and sufficient recognition from the central ‘state’, led to generally ‘alienated’ resource management. From 1974, any formalised cooperation at the scale of the non-urban border region was to subsumed by an array of tacit, informal arrangements, invariably negotiated via UNFICYP as third party. Apart from the limited developments in water supplies and transboundary workers’ movements, and the overall understanding concerning access and utilisation of the zone itself, little or no officially-coordinated transboundary political or economic activity occurred in the region. In parallel, the populace of the non-urban region of the UNBZ, either Turkish Cypriot or Greek Cypriot, were unwilling or unable to sufficiently contest this dominant discourse of non-cooperation.
They were, nonetheless, able to reinterpret and remould this discourse as it affected their everyday lives within the borderland. By moving away from mapping the abstract territorial space of the UNBZ to begin understanding the real ‘place’, the vignettes (as Krishna declared elsewhere) “serve to acquaint us with a part of the world we have pulverized in our minds into a space dominated by ‘the border’”.245 By including the voices of these actors within the context, an ethnographic imagination and method has allowed for increased comprehension of lives and perspectives involved in a struggle for recognition and control of transboundary resources.

Endnotes:

1 Stegenga (1968: 186).

2 Prescott (1965: 46).


5 See, for example, Grundy-Warr (1994a: 76-78); Richmond (1998a) and Ker-Lindsay and Richmond (1998).

6 White (1997: 263).

7 Fetherston (1994: 47); Grundy-Warr (1994a); Evriviades and Bourantonis (1994). With the total cost of supporting UNFICYP now over US$50 mn per year, and voluntary contributions to the Special Account for UNFICYP leaving a deficit currently in excess of US$200 mn, UNFICYP lives on as an expensive lesson in peacekeeping and peacemaking. McDonald (1993: 182) estimated that UNFICYP had operated as a cost of over US$3 bn since 1964.

8 Fetherston (1994: 56).


10 A major exception was UNFICYP’s protection of Nicosia International Airport (see Henn, 1994).

11 Assurances from the UN that a detailed map had been drawn up in 1993, and was awaiting an overall agreement, cannot be given any weight given the number of areas still visibly under dispute (Interview, UNFICYP Chief Spokesman, UNPA, 5/12/96).

12 UN S/11568, para. 22.

13 UN S/11568, para. 23.

14 UN S/11568, para. 26.

15 UN S/11568, para. 27.

16 UN S/11568, Map No. 1528 Rev. 25.

280
The United Nations Buffer Zone

17 UN S/11900, Map No. 1528 Rev. 27. Compare with Appendix 7 (a).

18 UN S/12253, para. 19.


20 UN S/12723, para. 21.

21 UN S/12946, para. 25.

22 UN S/14275, Annex, para. 4.


26 *The Blue Beret* (October 1996: 5). At its peak in June 1964 the total strength of UNFICYP was 6,411, although this number had halved by 1970, having been scaled down in mid-1968 as the community leaders began intercommunal talks.

27 Kostakos (1994: 65). The Greek Cypriot and Greek governments subsequently chose to contribute to one third of UNFICYP’s costs, fuelling Denktash’s argument that UNFICYP was effectively the ‘mercenary’ of the Greek camp (McDonald, 1993: 184). Indeed, since their UDI in 1983, the TRNC, backed by Turkey, indicated that they were in no position to accept resolutions extending UNFICYP’s mandate (UN, 1996: 164). In practice they cooperated, if inconsistently.

28 UN S/26777, para. 16.

29 UN S/24050, para. 50. This powerful conceptualisation was coined by Godfrey Jensen of *The Economist* in 1987 (*The Cyprus Weekly*, 20-26/11/87).


32 See UNSC Resns. 353, 354, 355, 359 and 361 (1974). Harbottle (1991b; 1994: 47) has recounted with regret the previous opportunity to alter this dimension of UNFICYP’s mandate, in 1968 when intercommunal relations had improved. He unsuccessfully asked for a proposal to be considered at the Security Council of substituting a civilian operation for the increasingly ‘routinised’ military one, along the lines of UNOC in the Congo and with the object of “rebuilding the bridges of communication, understanding and intercommunal cooperation”.


34 Fetherston (1994: 57).


36 UN S/12253, para. 71; UN S/12723, para. 68.


Soffer and Minghi (1986). Rumley and Minghi (1991) provided one of the first reviews of what can be understood by a 'boundary landscape'.


Grundy-Warr (1987: 75). In turn, this map—the only land use map at an island-wide scale to be made publicly available since 1974—was based on the 1968 Land Use Series of the UK-based Hunting Technical Services, and updated for the citrus orchards in the Morphou-Tylliria region with 1972 aerial photographs.

In the south, however, within just less than thirty years, these figures had plummeted to 7% and 13% respectively (UNDP, 1991a: 8).

PIO (south) (1976d: 3).

From the transect drives and transect walks conducted in all three deployment sectors of the UNBZ (Appendix 7 (c)), it was clear that these characteristics were not uniform.

This would have allegedly fallen to 14.3% had they accepted the Greek Cypriot territorial proposals of 1977 (Appendix 3 (a)) (Ertekin, 1977: 26). Although nearly 65% of the island land area was classified as agricultural land, it was the case that only half of the island was actually cultivated due to marginal conditions (ROC/METAP, 1991: B7). By 1995, while the agricultural sector was contributing to only 14.2% of the TRNC's GDP, the share of agricultural products in exports was over 58%. In 1990, the industry still used over 25% of the labour force and 85% of the freshwater resources in the north (Warner, 1992: 58; MANR (north), 1996: 1).

UN S/11717, para. 18.

UN S/11717, para. 21.

A small number of Turkish Cypriot inhabitants had evacuated Avlona in 1958 (Patrick, 1976: 97).


UN S/12253, para. 21.

UN S/12253, para. 22.

This, according to the Military Survey maps used by UNFICYP, was approximately 35°09' latitude.

UN S/12253, para. 27.

UN S/12253, para. 24.

By 1977, UNFICYP were forced to propose a modus vivendi for the tending of two large, poorly irrigated citrus orchards, and four Greek Cypriot-owned boreholes were eventually to provide drinking and irrigation water to local Turkish Cypriot farmers (UN S/12342, para. 19.; Interview, UNFICYP First Humanitarian Office Assistant, UNBZ Sector 1 (ARGCON), 5/12/96).

UN S/12253, para. 20; UN S/12342, para. 19.

UN S/13369, para. 25.

UN S/26777, para. 18.
61 UN S/11568, para. 29-30.

62 UN S/488, para. 12. In 1998, the Turkish Forces indicated their readiness to negotiate the minefield issue only following an extension of the 1989 unmanning agreement (see Chapter 7).

63 UN S/15812, para. 33.

64 UN S/20310, para. 21.

65 Unpublished UNFICYP report from Meeting Between FC UNFICYP and COMD TF at 50 TKA, Nicosia on Tuesday 18 October 1988 at 1100 hrs.

66 Interview, UNFICYP Senior Humanitarian Branch Officer, UNPA, 26/11/96.


69 Grivas (1988: 7). Ironically, many of the larger farms had been lost to the north with the creation of the UNBZ (Burton and King, 1982: 186). By 1994, only 39 consolidation schemes in the south had been completed, covering 9,200 ha (Enotiades, 1995), while there remained little effort at consolidation in the north (Interview, Under-Secretary of TRNC Ministry of Agriculture, Natural Resources and Energy, Nicosia (north), 25/3/97).


71 Patrick (1976: 15). The Greek Cypriots clearly valued their ability to substantiate their claims “by facts and figures which cannot be denied or questioned” (The Cyprus Mail, 14/8/75).

72 Contrary to the Turkish Cypriot title deed policy previously noted in Chapter 5, the Greek Cypriot authorities were more hesitant about reallocating the other community’s land and property. From January 1976, the ROC worked towards allocating the 104,300 donums of Turkish Cypriot farmland to refugee farmers (The Cyprus Mail, 23/1/76). In essence, Turkish Cypriot properties were held ‘in trust’ by the Interior Ministry, and income from their utilisation went to a special fund. Moreover, on 7 March 1992, after the TRNC Minister of Housing declared his intention to hand over the title deeds of Greek Cypriot property to the effect that “not an inch of unregistered land will remain within the borders of the [TRNC]”, the Greek Cypriots set about the problematic process of reconstructing the records of Greek Cypriots’ deeds in the north to symbolically retrieve their right of freedom of ownership (The Cyprus Mail, 7/3/92). A week later they further announced that ‘needy’ non-refugees would be allowed to take over Turkish Cypriot property and to use deeds for collateral; moreover, non-refugees along the UNBZ would be given priority (The Cyprus Weekly, 13-19/3/92).


74 One associated problem was that, given the obvious implications, UNFICYP forbid in the UNBZ the national pastime of hunting. Nonetheless, Greek Cypriot hunters continued to enter the restricted areas, firing shots. A ban was eventually declared by the Greek Cypriot government in 1992, although with limited results (UN S/26777, para. 66); during the next hunting season (November-December), 384 violations were recorded (UN S/680, para. 18).

75 ROC/METAP (1991: B8); Interview, Greek Cypriot farmer, Dherinia, 15/10/96.

76 In addition, the village of Strovilia which fell within the British ESBA was adjacent to the UNBZ, whilst within Vrysoules a tiny Greek Cypriot population—bizarrely manned by one UNFICYP and one Turkish Forces soldier—continued to live as pre-1974. There were officially two other ‘civilian use areas’—at Paphos Gate, on Nicosia’s venetian wall (see Chapter 7), and the Dhali-Lymbia road.
Throughout the pre-1974 intercommunal troubles, left-wing PEO had also striven for a non-sectarian policy (Hitchens (1984: 53), and they envisaged UNBZ factory units employing from both communities (The Cyprus Mail, 8/11/78). This proposal was resurrected in November 1997 as part of Holbrooke's initiative with the communities' businessmen. Of 20 rapprochement proposals, one called for the repair, reactivation and bringing back to the productive process the industrial units, shops and farms lying in and along the UNBZ, but with little effect (FCR, No. 41, p.16).

Spearheading the protests was Lefke Cevre ve Tanitma Dernegi, a Lefka-based NGO which had sought more generally to highlight the lack of political and financial recognition this peripheral border-region had received since 1974. In focusing on its border context, this NGO was unique island-wide and, in lobbying international private agencies, conducted a limited form of 'paradiplomacy.' (Duchevek, 1986a).

In Pyla, UNHCR commissioned and funded the drawing up of a Physical Development Plan in April 1997 to improve its physical amenities, and thus create work opportunities for the many Turkish Cypriot unemployed there (UN S/437, para. 20; The Blue Beret, August 1997, p.15). Initial work from July 1997 concentrated on the Turkish Cypriot kahva ('coffee shop') and Greek Orthodox church (UN S/962, para. 26).

These were by no means the first anti-SBA demonstrations post-partition. Towards the end of the 1970s, in the light of the dismantling of US installations in Iran and the subsequent increase in value of the Cyprus bases, AKEL and EDEK (allegedly with Moscow's support) led an intensive campaign (Kirsch Leighton, 1979: 4-5). Furthermore, in the light of the UK authorities' non-payment since 1964 (see Chapter 5), by 1979 the ROC was claiming CY£400 mn in rent arrears.

These observations rightly highlighted other 'enclaves' on the island, with their own de facto boundaries, most notably the Greek Cypriot enclaves of Karpass, and the militarised Turkish Cypriot enclave of Kokkina. Regarding the former, ever since 1974 the UN maintained a concern over the restriction of Greek Cypriot farming only to fields in the vicinity of their villages (UN S/12463, para. 29), while efforts to enable Greek Cypriots to bequeath their next-of-kin with fixed property appeared in vain as local authorities handed it on to settlers or left it empty (Interview, UNFICYP Humanitarian Assistant, UNBZ Sector 4 (AUSCON), 5/6/97).
The United Nations Buffer Zone

93 Hitchens (1990: 123).

94 *Interview*, Greek Cypriot farmer, Dherinia, 15/10/96. In this interview, I was made particularly aware by the farmers of my role (as a ‘Brit’) in correctly ‘reporting back’ their plight.

95 *UN S/680*, para. 17.

96 *UN S/17657*, para. 19.

97 *UN S/17657*, para. 19. It appears that, following a number of incidents where the MSL was crossed by vessels from the south, these buoys were renewed in June 1989 (*UN S/21010*, para. 16). The seaward extension of the CFLs was, however, then violated even more frequently over the 1991-92 period—at both Famagusta and Kokkina (*UN S/23263*, para. 17; *UN S/24050*, para. 17).

98 Blake (1997b).


100 *The Cyprus Mail* (26/5/76).

101 Demetropoulos (1985: 70); Garcia and Demetropoulos (1986: 11); BEC (1993: 19). While offering good fishing grounds for red mullet, in general Famagusta Bay was simply more accessible due to the prevailing westerly winds, and was to remain popular with artisan skills and fishing activities (*Pers. Comm.*, Director of ROC Department of Fisheries, Nicosia (south), 2/4/96).

102 By the 1990s, *de facto* maritime jurisdiction in Cyprus increasingly became disputed. On 3 May 1993, the ROC deposited geographical coordinates for straight baselines (*Appendix 6 (d)*). The baseline system encompassed the entire coastline (including the TRNC and SBAs). In April 1993, following the firing of a Turkish vessel off the coast from Larnaca, Denktash rejected the ROC’s unilateral declaration, and declared his intention to extend the TRNC’s jurisdiction to 12 nm (*CyBC radio*, Nicosia (south) 30/4/93 (*BBC SWB ME/1677*)). Coordinates were unsuccessfully submitted to the UN in 1996 (*Appendix 6 (e)*). The coordinates submitted, however, only took into account the maritime extension of the UNBZ.

103 Matthews (1987: 116); *Interview*, Director of ROC Department of Fisheries, Nicosia (south), 21/10/96.

104 By 1995, there were only around 200 families in the north engaged in fishing (there were no trawlers up until 1990), compared to 800 full/part-time persons employed in this primary sector in the south in 1989 (in addition to approximately 500 ‘occasional’ fishermen) (MNR (south), 1989: 27; MNR (north), 1996: 1; *Interview*, Head of Fisheries, TRNC Department of Animal Husbandry and Fisheries, Nicosia (north), 26/3/97).

105 *The Cyprus Weekly* (15-21/7/94); *Interview*, Paphos District Fishing Officer, Kato Pyrgos, 6/11/96; *Interview*, Greek Cypriot fisherman, Kato Pyrgos, 6/11/96. Nor were Larnaca-based pleasure-boat tour operators content with the restrictions during the summer. They were to develop a sight-seeing route to ‘see Varosha’, which invariably resulted in UNFICYP’s intervention as they approached the MSL on the eastern coast (see also Chapter 7) (*The Cyprus Mail*, 27/8/98).

106 One local fisherman detailed frankly that the Turkish Forces had relayed, via UNFICYP, that he would be shot if he was caught violating the area again (*Interview*, Greek Cypriot fisherman, Kato Pyrgos, 6/11/96).

107 *Interview*, UNFICYP Humanitarian Assistant, UNBZ Sector 4 (AUSCON), 5/6/97.

The author is grateful to Kaiyan Kaikobad (University of Durham) for this observation.


This was an uncommon choice of farming in the UNBZ. Low-intensity crops were usually preferred (e.g., barley), and they also required little infrastructural investment (The Cyprus Mail, 12/4/98).

Interview, Greek Cypriot farmers, UNBZ Sector 4, 15/10/96.

Pers. Comm., UNFICYP Humanitarian Assistant, UNBZ Sector 4 (AUSCON), 15/2/97. One mixed-crop farmer in Potamia found it increasingly difficult to water his clover at night; although UNFICYP turned a blind eye to the security risk, he was more "scared" of the Turkish Forces nearby (Interview, Greek Cypriot farmer, Potamia, 26/10/96).


UNS/15149, para. 31.

Pers. Comm., UNFICYP First Humanitarian Office Assistant, UNBZ Sector 1 (ARGCON), 18/1/97.

‘Haliland’ remained officially the property of the ROC. UNFICYP handled it on the premise that no additional buildings were allowed, only farming and flock-grazing activities (Interview, UNFICYP Humanitarian Assistant, UNBZ Sector 4 (AUSCON), 5/6/97).

Drury (1972) observed that the original choice of Turkish settlement location on the island was largely determined by proximity to water since Venetian times.

Only at times of extreme water shortages did these interdependencies receive attention beyond the local level, and UNFICYP were to remain a crucial third party in issues of compliance, as they had done since 1963.

Interview, UNFICYP Humanitarian Assistant, UNBZ Sector 4 (AUSCON), 5/6/97.

The Turkish Cypriot Security Forces were also reported to be diverting 25 cu.m./week to supply their local OPs. Greek Cypriot water authorities frequently highlighted to UNFICYP their desire to repair faults in these intra-boundary water systems. Characteristically, the AHK similarly considered the UNBZ as their "own area" (Interview, Senior Generations Projects Engineer, AHK, Nicosia (south), 24/10/96).

Interview, UNFICYP Humanitarian Assistant, UNBZ Sector 4 (AUSCON), 5/6/97.
The United Nations Buffer Zone

The Cyprus Weekly (4-10/92).

WDD (1997).

UNFICYP remained in the dark about the reasons for and repercussions of the Turkish Cypriots' decision (Interview, UNFICYP Humanitarian Assistant, UNBZ Sector 4 (AUSCON), 5/6/97).

Interview, UNFICYP Humanitarian Assistant, UNBZ Sector 4 (AUSCON), 5/6/97. Although free of charge from the south, by early 1997 Melousha was receiving 100 cu.m. instead of the traditional 200 cu.m./day (Pers. Comm., UNFICYP Humanitarian Assistant, UNBZ Sector 4 (AUSCON), 15/2/97).


Interview, Senior Water Engineer, ROC Water Development Department, 15/11/96.

MANR (south) (1984: 24) recognised the economic and legal power these rights held in delaying state-led water management. As Durrell (1957: 61) commented, "the most elementary litigation assumes gigantic proportions". While the Greek Cypriot authorities had established the 'Turkish Cypriot-owned Wells Committee' to manage the wells left behind by the Turkish Cypriots, in preparation for their anticipated return, by 1989 over 441 such wells were being used by Greek Cypriot refugee farmers (WDD, 1990: 11-20).

The Cyprus Mail (7/4/77).

For instance, general bicommunal talks on water broke down in 1984 following the Turkish Cypriot's UDI the previous November (UN S/16596, para.37).

UN S/23263, para. 23; UN S/24050, para. 22; UN S/25912, para. 25.

By 1997 the conductivity of waters in these areas was between 750 and 2,250 ppm Cl\(^{-}\) (Interview, TRNC Water and Geology Department Officer, Morphou, 15/5/97; Morvaridi, 1995).

Cyprus Today (25/4/92).

Bayrak radio, Nicosia (north) (FBIS/WE, 13/5/92), cited in Bolukbasi (1995: 472). This perception that 'all' of the aquifer fell under the TRNC conflicted with that of Alemdar (1992), previously noted in Chapter 5.

UN S/18102, para. 31.

Örek (1973: 19).

Kontetatis (1974: 70). Nonetheless, even by independence it was recognised that these dams had failed to address the large irrigation requirements in the region (Thorpe, 1961: 101).

UN S/20663, para. 18; UN S/21010, para. 19; UN S/21340, para. 19; The Cyprus Weekly (30/6-6/7/89).

The Cyprus Weekly (14-20/12/90); Interview, UNFICYP Second Humanitarian Branch Officer, UNPA, 9/10/97.

The study was completed in early 1997 but, conscious of its political character, public statements from the Greek Cypriot authorities on the proposal have been rare until only recently (The Cyprus Weekly (4-10/92)).
The United Nations Buffer Zone

Weekly, 4-10/97; WDD, 1997). The Pyrgos, Limnitis and Karyotis remained the only rivers in this area undammed.

151 Enotiades (1995); The Cyprus Weekly (7-13/2/98); Interview, Head of Division of Water Resources, ROC Water Development Department, Nicosia (south), 30/9/97. In addition, by then Lefka was being supplied with only 0-20 tons/hr (Interview, Senior Water Planning Officer, Water Department Office, Morphou, 8/4/97).

152 ROC (1994: 17); Interview, Senior Water Engineer, ROC Water Development Department, Nicosia (south) 15/11/96.

153 WDD (1997).


157 UN S/19304, para. 19.

158 In an addition to Ledra Palace, Turkish Cypriots working in the south could cross from Pergamos to Pyla with UN permission, or with SBA permission through the so-called ‘two-and-a-half mile crossing’ point at the Famagusta end of the SBA’s Ayios Nicolaos extension (also known as ‘Black Knight’ crossing by British Forces, or ‘Golden Horn’ by Turkish Cypriots).

159 The Cyprus Mail (17/4/92).


161 Civisilli (1996: 62). Further illustrating the growing territoriality of the two communities, the Greek Cypriot House of Representatives declared the UDI as a “violation of its [Cyprus’] borders” (The Cyprus Weekly, 18-24/11/83).

162 See, for example, UN S/17650, Annex. In defence, the Turkish Cypriot government stated that such ‘overflights’ took place within the ‘sovereign borders and airspace of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’. The TFSC had established its own ‘Flight Information Region’ in March 1977.

163 The Cyprus Weekly (13/9-12/12/96); CyBC radio, Nicosia (south), 8/11/96 (BBC SWB EE/8/11/96).

164 UN S/16, para. 20.

165 The Cyprus Mail (6/11/96). Reflecting on the economic incentives of selective border management, in June 1986, as Turkish Prime Minister Özal visited the north prompting EDEK socialist party supporters to blockade the checkpoint (thus stopping foreign journalists heading north), Denktash barred all movement north. This resulted in the stranding of approximately 600 Danish and Austrian UNFICYP personnel in the north for days (EIU, 1986, 3rd qtr.: 17). It was noted, nonetheless, that the subsidised LPG supplies had been allowed to cross north (see Chapter 5) (The Cyprus Weekly, 11-17/6/86).

166 CNA, Nicosia (south) 19/1/97 (BBC SWB EE/2830).

167 Péchoux (1976: 40); EIU (1977, 4th quarter: 26); The Cyprus Weekly (5-11/980; 9-15/6/95).


169 The Cyprus Weekly (9-15/1/87).
The United Nations Buffer Zone

170 Martínez (1994: 10).


175 It was argued that, in the light of various agreements the Greek Cypriot military had signed concerning the UNBZ, such as the 1989 unmanning agreement (see Chapter 7), “if there is no such thing as the buffer zone, why did they make this agreement?” (Interview, Legal Adviser and Former Attorney-General of Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Defence, Nicosia (north), 24/4/97).

176 UN S/19927, para.26. It was also then that it became compulsory for other Greek Cypriots wishing to cross to the north to complete formal entry forms.

177 Interview, Permanent Secretary of the ROC Ministry of Commerce, Trade and Industry, Nicosia (south), 10/12/96.

178 UN S/20310, para. 17.

179 EIU (1990: 1st qtr., 21).

180 Sant Cassia (1998: 104). One Turkish Cypriot official recited to me a UN report on this incident to support his argument: “[a]s the action planned by the demonstrators would breach [the cease-fire] arrangements, UNFICYP sought the co-operation of the [Greek Cypriot] Government of Cyprus in ensuring that the integrity of the buffer zone was respected” (UN S/19304, para. 19) (Interview, Legal Adviser and Former Attorney-General to TRNC Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Defence, Nicosia (north), 24/4/97).

181 Bayrak radio, Nicosia (north), 11/7/94 (BBC SWB EE/2047).

182 Notably, while Greek Cypriots were allowed a £10 sterling payment per month for multiple visits, Maronites were granted a reduction of £30 per year for multiple visits for the whole family (UN S/1998/488, para. 21). Turkish Cypriots working in the SBAs or at UN headquarters were exempt from fees (NCM, 28/2/98).

183 PRD (1996: 26). At the same time, however, they were just as aware of overuse of this tool, which threatened to undermine their arguments as extremist. Indeed, there were at times conscious efforts to dilute the significance of this boundary rhetoric. Ecevit, for example, had argued, if from a more federalist perspective, that “the demarcation lines between the different zones of a federal state are not the same as international boundaries. Even international boundaries, in some parts of the contemporary world, are losing their rigidity” (Ecevit, 1984: 33).

184 CTO (1986); Martin (1993: 363-66).


186 Gottmann (1952; 1973); Hakli (1998a).


188 Radcliffe (1996: 26). While stating this, it is necessary to note the general lack of detailed but unclassified ‘official’ TRNC maps. It can be presumed that this is largely a consequence both of the
highly militarised land uses in the north, and also an historical lack of technical expertise in cartographical representation.

192 These conclusions are drawn from analysis of interviews, texts, speeches, and practices adopted by ‘locals’ in relation to the UNBZ.
194 The north has similarly been represented as a ‘desert’ after 1974 (UMC, n.d.).
195 Hadjipavlou-Trigeorgis (1989: 80) noted elsewhere the tendency for Greek Cypriots to refer to the ‘holy soil of occupied Cyprus’. One Greek Cypriot farmer in Kaimakli (Nicosia) proudly described his section of buffer zone land as “the heart of Cyprus” (Interview, Greek Cypriot farmer, Kaimakli, 4/10/96).
197 Interview, Greek Cypriot farmer, Dherinia, 15/10/96, original emphasis. The farmer had lost some 100 acres of land north of the UNBZ.
199 NCM (24/7/65).
201 Interview, Greek Cypriot farmer, Athienou, 10/12/96. This farmer had been forced to farm further afield after Athienou lost 51,000 of its 60,000 administrative land to the north (see Figure 6.7 below). Turkish Cypriot in Lysi farming in the SBAs officially had to cross at Pergamos, but benefited from ‘weak points’ along the UNBZ (Interview, Turkish Cypriot farmers, Lysi, 17/9/97).
202 Pers. comm., former BRITCON member of UNFICYP, Durham, 9/10/96.
204 Paasi (1996: 354). This problem of the ‘double hermeneutic’ has been previously considered in Chapter 1.
205 On being asked to identify the location of their lands, for example, (Greek Cypriot) farmers invariably found it impossible either to point out the ‘start’ and ‘end’ of the UNBZ and their lands in relation to it on foot, or to mark these on maps provided. This was not only a reflection of the ‘fuzzy’ nature of the CFLs in general, but also an apparent lack of need in knowing exactly where the UNBZ was.
209 Harbottle (1970: 45).
There has been growing interest in the significant interaction between 'grassroot' processes and UN missions which have highlighted this 'bottom-up' perspective. Studies on both UNFICYP peacekeeping (Moskos, 1976; Grundy-Warr, 1994b) and UN peacemaking (Richmond, 1998) illustrate this development in Cyprus.


UN S/5634, annexes I and II.

Interview, Greek Cypriot farmer, Potamia, 26/10/96; Melakopides (1996: 67). Two more general points can be drawn from this quotation. Firstly, how competition for transboundary resources in the UNBZ was invariably focused on 'Turks' rather than 'Turkish Cypriots'. This was obviously a reflection of the greater presence of Turkish Forces rather than Turkish Cypriot farmers in the zone, but also reflected a more general Greek Cypriot predisposition to lay the 'blame' for the creation of the UNBZ on the Turkish military intervention and, in so doing, avoid criticism of Turkish Cypriots. Secondly, it reflected how in spite of their rejection of the UNBZ and its 'border' persona, Greek Cypriots still recognised the 'illegality' of its violation.


The poverty of data immediately reveals that the sub-national economy (and demography) is an issue of little immediate importance to the either political entity. The majority of data is aggregated state-level analysis, poorly equipped to be broken down spatially. Any continuity in statistics was further disrupted by the separation of statistics and research departments from 1974.


Hitchens (1984: 10). This highlights the problem of 'containerising' the borderland, previously noted in Chapter 1. Adejuyigbe (1989: 30-31) argued that "all units which abut directly on the external boundary will be designated as borderland units", but that 'borderland' characteristics may also be found further afield.

Switzerland is invariably presented as the typical 'state-as-borderland' (Hansen, 1981), while claims have been made elsewhere—for example, Hungary (Hajdu, 1994) and all the member-states of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) (Asiwaju, 1994).


UN S/11568, para. 43; Planning Bureau (1975a: 3-12); Drevet (1991: 249). By November 1974, most of the 24,000 Greek Cypriots were to return to their houses in Nicosia or along the UNBZ.

The Cyprus Mail (11/6/77; 30/7/77).

In late 1994 Greek Cypriot citrus growers, for example, farming the village lands of Avlona, Kato Kopia and Zodhia (Figure 6.4), voiced their need for additional government aid because of their 'struggle' to harvest the UNBZ—an area which the Agriculture Minister, Costas Petrides, recognised as an important contribution to the economy (The Cyprus Mail, 26/11/94)


The Cyprus Weekly (13-19/8/96).
The United Nations Buffer Zone


229 *Interview*, Planning Officer, ROC Town Planning and Housing Department, Nicosia (south), 2/10 97. Papadakis (1998c) noted that *akrites* "used to be the heroic guardians of Byzantium against 'barbaric infidel' attacks, celebrated by Greek historians".

230 Reflecting the paradox for Greek Cypriot planners, such as those in Nicosia (see Chapter 7), Dherinia's provisionary 'Local Plan' assumed free access to and links with Famagusta, even though no surveys of the area to the north could be made, nor removal of the border guaranteed.

231 *Interview*, Nicosia District Inspector, ROC Department of Town Planning and Housing, Nicosia (south), 19/11/96.


235 Heinritz (1987: 75); Wellenreuther (1993: 182). The latter rightly commented on the paucity and lack of continuity in demographic data by regions in the TRNC, such that only general statements can be made.


238 *Interview*, Mayor of Lysi Municipality, Lysi, 17/9/97). Non-Greek Cypriot land/property was more expensive due to the possible implications of a settlement (Morvaridi, 1993a: 227)

239 *Interview*, Former Mayor of Lefka Municipality, Lefka, 15/5/97).

240 *Interview*, Mayor of Lefka Municipality, Lefka, 14/5/97; *Interview*, Director of Planning and Project Department, TRNC Ministry of Interior, Nicosia (north), 24/4/97.

241 *Interview*, Nicosia District Officer, Nicosia (north), 14/4/97.

242 Sant Cassia (1996).

243 James (1990: 235). Maynard (1994: 109) went so far as to suggest that the absence of a clear geographic dividing line pre-1974 prevented UNFICYP from fulfilling its peacekeeping mandate.

244 Grundy-Warr (1994a: 72).

Chapter 7
Borderland Perspective (II):
Nicosia, Famagusta and Transboundary Urban Space

7.1 Introduction

In this chapter the management of transboundary resources will be examined within the urban context: primarily, in the transboundary urban spaces of Nicosia and, secondarily, of Famagusta. In Chapter 1 it was argued that an ‘organic logic’ of transboundary resource management can be extended to ‘urban ecosystems’; in recognition, this chapter examines transboundary resource interdependencies at the urban scale of these two partitioned settlements. Focus is placed largely on the transboundary management of public utilities and urban planning. Chapters 5 and 6 have already referred to a political decision by both communities to continue with transboundary water supplies in the urban context, and Section 7.2 examines this in detail. This section is then followed by analysis which concentrates more on the overall planning of the urban system, and is split for analytical reasons by examining, firstly, Nicosia and, secondly, Famagusta.

P.J. Taylor has argued that boundaries and capitals are the two most explicit products of the inter-state system. In practice, the urban area of Nicosia, therefore, provides something of an apogee in ‘inter-statism’: it is two capitals, it is two primate cities, and it is separated by the oldest section of the de facto boundary in Cyprus. Nicosia therefore provides a rich testing ground to lay substantive foundations for the analysis of complex ‘intermunicipal’, ‘intercommunal’ and (de facto) ‘international’ relations in the urban context. Given the dualistic development of post-partition Nicosia, briefly considered in Section 7.3.1, a number of central government and, most significantly, municipal government actors became gravely concerned over the growth of what had arguably, up until 1963, operated as an ‘urban ecosystem’. In an attempt further to ameliorate this bifurcation in planning post-1974, two major transboundary projects were instigated with UNDP assistance: a city-wide sanitary sewerage system (Section 7.3.2) and the Nicosia Master Plan (NMP) (Section 7.4), the latter of which the UNDP recognised as being the most celebrated bicommunal activity they had ever
supported on the island. The NMP became the activity by which the UNDP and many others seeking cooperatively to manage transboundary resources were most encouraged: 'a singular example' of 'pursuing a developmental strategy of unification goals'. The origins of this cooperation are critically examined in Section 7.4.2, and cautionary observations are made on the NMP in Section 7.4.3. The problematic development of Famagusta is then considered in Section 7.5, from which it is argued that, despite the interest of third parties, the 'spill over' effect of various precedents set in Nicosia failed to undermine the saliency of the border in both partitioned cities. Conclusions are then drawn in Section 7.7.

7.2 Water Resource Management (III): Nicosia and Famagusta

In Nicosia, the hydrological realities of *de facto* partition, examined in different contexts in Chapters 5 and 6, were at their most stark. While the longest (seasonal) river on the island—the Pedheios-Yialias, which had once divided the Old City on a west-east axis—had been rerouted to the city's northwestern flank in 1567, it was to be replaced almost precisely in orientation in December 1963 by another separating body, the 'green line'. It was ironic therefore that this fledgling boundary was subsequently to contribute to the separation of the administration of water supplies in partitioned Nicosia. Neither the 'green line' nor its later manifestation, the UNBZ, were able, however, to separate completely the water supply for the city. Indeed, it can be argued that the engine for the *quid pro quo* cooperation over water supplies, observed in Chapter 5 from the island-wide perspective, is historically located within the urban borderland context of Nicosia. By extension, the on-going 'success' of the *quid pro quo* agreement was largely determined by a change in the water balance in Nicosia. It will become clear that these developments were largely mirrored in Famagusta.

7.2.1 The supply of the capital(s)

Figure 6.5, in Chapter 6, illustrated the hydrological interdependencies traversing the UNBZ, and the link that Nicosia's water supply held with the water reserves of Morphou's aquifer. It is necessary to reiterate that the history of water transfers to the
south across the UNBZ generally, and across the ‘green line’ in particular, was perpetually to be contested. Examining figures available, however, it would appear that southern Nicosia after 1974 received over 3 mn.cu.m./yr. of water from the northern source of Morphou, crossing the UNBZ to the west of Nicosia. On a yearly average, similarly, it was generally understood that this roughly corresponded to an equivalent amount then transferred back—across the city’s ‘green line’—to north Nicosia. This to-and-froing of water resources represented an integral part of the ‘water-for-electricity’ arrangement.

These transboundary transfers at the urban scale could also be explained to a great extent, however, by examining the administrative set-up of the water supply for the whole of Nicosia from 1960. While the central government’s Water Development Department (WDD) was responsible for the operation and maintenance of all sources of water supply for Nicosia, including the conveyance of water to service reservoirs on the urban fringe, from there water was sold in bulk to the Nicosia Water Board who undertook the distribution of water within their area of supply. A Nicosia Water Commission held the responsibility for the distribution of water to the whole of Nicosia within-the-walls, and it operated its own well and borehole sources. As with all town water boards in Cyprus, the ROC government historically charged the Nicosia authorities for water delivered to its storage reservoirs, although the WDD oversaw the initial conveyance costs. After 1974, the Nicosia system was always treated as a special case even though, in north Nicosia, a separate central government water department developed post-1974 and, moreover, from 1993 the northern municipality also had its own water works department. To operate the urban water supply geographically as one, a common water distribution system serving both Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot sectors of Nicosia was maintained post-partition, whereby water was transferred from the Morphou aquifer region, crossed the UNBZ southwards via pipelines, and was then stored in the suburbs of southern Nicosia, to be treated and mixed with other waters coming from the foothills of the Troodos mountains (and eventually via the Kornos treatment plant). Water was then transferred into the urban agglomeration, and—due to the historical unity of the distribution system in central Nicosia—supplied the whole of Nicosia, south and north.

In 1974, and for a number of years afterwards, the Morphou aquifer was the main supply for the whole of Nicosia; this dependency was an integral part of the more
general *quid pro quo*. Greek Cypriot estimates suggested that, in 1974, between one-half and three-quarters of all of Nicosia's water supply still came from the Morphou aquifer; by September 1974, for example, the minimum daily requirement for Nicosia was 24,000 cu.m., of which 12,000 cu.m. came from Morphou. There were, nonetheless, immediate threats to this regime. The influx of refugees into Greater Nicosia, had put massive pressures onto the Nicosia Water Board, despite a wet year and city-wide water rationing from early April 1974, and the abandonment of the Morphou-Tylliria project (which was to address the already expanding domestic needs of the capital) further exposed Nicosia's dilemma. In addition, in the months leading on from the violent summer events, Morphou’s pump station proved unreliable. While the average daily supply in summer months was over 28,000 tons, of which half was from the Morphou-Pandayia area, only 16,000 tons in total were being supplied for weeks after the August cease-fire. Moreover, from June 1975 until February 1976, there was to be a series of interruptions of water supply from Dikomo, and from a broken pump at Syrianokhori (north-west of Morphou), which forced water rationing in Nicosia. While Greek Cypriot offers of assistance in repairing Morphou’s infrastructure were allegedly rejected, it was clear that the Turkish Cypriot authorities were just as anxious to renew supplies in the light of the implications for north Nicosia.

In practice, UNFICYP generally escorted any repair work on the water network (as they did for electricity), and chaired meetings concerning the supply of what were seen as ‘essential services’. Reaffirming the degree to which the existence of networks of transboundary, inter-agency contacts favoured successful agreement on shared waters. In consecutive dry summers of 1981-82, for instance, UNFICYP were able to initiate a meeting at Ledra Palace to arrange a contingency water distribution and rationing programme for Nicosia as a whole over the coming winter. They also served as couriers for damaged or unserviceable parts being sent to the south for repair or replacement.

In the light of these observations, it would appear that the water transfer regime in Nicosia was developed because, in terms of supplies, the Greek Cypriot authorities initially recognised that several important sources and conveyance systems serving the city were located within the north. The Morphou boreholes historically made a significant contribution to the total water requirements of the city. The technical realities of *de facto* partition in terms of managing a unified urban water system also
made, for the Greek Cypriot authorities, the cooperation of both sides ‘necessary’ to achieve the desired results. The hydrogeological environment in which these relations were conducted could not be ignored. The Greek Cypriots maintained this tacit regime knowing that they would have to lay a whole new system of water pipes, to replace those installed to serve a unified island network during the colonial period.

7.2.2 The destabilisation of the quid pro quo

It is necessary to note, however, a gradual but significant change in the balance of what was purportedly ‘supplied’ to the south and ‘returned’ to the north. The Greek Cypriot Nicosia Water Board have since claimed that originally, after the military intervention in 1974, for every 4 cu.m. of water heading south from Morphou, only 1 cu.m. was returned to the north. A balance was met, with electricity being supplied to the north. By the 1990s, in contrast, for every 1 cu.m. of water supplied from Morphou, the Greek Cypriot authorities claimed that between 3 cu.m. were being returned, although the Turkish Cypriot water authorities continued to claim that they received the equivalent to their supply from Morphou, if not slightly less. Figure 7.1, based on UN statistics up to 1994, would appear to confirm this but illustrates, more significantly, the fall in the Turkish Cypriots supply from Morphou to the south.

This apparent change was, therefore, not just in relative but also in absolute terms: in 1974, at times up to 10,000 cu.m./day came to the south from Morphou, whereas by 1996 only 2,500 to 3,000 cu.m./day headed south. In turn, by 1993 the supplies from Morphou were making up only 15% of the (Greek Cypriot) Nicosia Water Board’s available resources, and by 1996 this had halved. By the mid-1990s, the quid pro quo agreement had been transformed such that while the Greek Cypriots supplied between 2.6 and 3 mn.cu.m/yr to north Nicosia, this was after having received only 1 mn.cu.m/yr from Morphou originally.

Changing water supply levels were largely the result of two hydropolitical developments. At one level, by the early 1980s the ROC government was coming under increasing pressure over Nicosia’s dependency on Morphou’s resources. Lyssarides, the president of the (centre left) socialist party EDEK, perceived a link with the ‘national struggle’, and DISY members argued that “securing adequate supplies of water to the capital should be part of the general defences of the country”. As part of the ROC’s
more general water development works programme, examined in Chapter 5, Nicosia's supply accordingly became a priority. The Vasilikos-Pendaskinos project sought to augment the capital's domestic water supply, along with Larnaca's and Famagusta's, and the construction of the Kornos treatment plant was to provide 32,000 cu.m./day from 1985. Moreover, in the light of the abandonment of the Morphou-Tylliria project, the Southern Conveyor Project (SCP) was accordingly expanded after 1974 to include Nicosia's domestic water supply. With these investments, what was received from Morphou took up a smaller share of southern Nicosia's overall supplies.

Furthermore, although these exchanges clearly involved small amounts of water, they represented a valuable resource for the Turkish Cypriot authorities. Indeed, the reason for the fall in Morphou's supply to the south was largely the increasing needs of north Nicosia, for which the supply from the south continued to represent approximately 40% of all water supply. In practice, over 90% of north Nicosia's total water supply was to come eventually from Morphou in that, by 1997, north Nicosia received 2-3,000
Transboundary Urban Space
cu.m./day from the south, and 7,000 cu.m./day from Morphou direct. Yet, of that direct supply, 2,000 cu.m./day had then to be transferred on to Famagusta (see below). North Nicosia’s only other supplies were from wells at Dikomo and other, private boreholes. Moreover, north Nicosia used to be able to supply its consumers 3 times a week, but since winter 1996-97 this dropped to once a week. In the summer, for example, while the city’s water demand peaked at 15,000 cu.m./day, the supply lay between 7 and 9,000 cu.m./day at best. The destabilisation of the quid pro quo could therefore be better understood on examination of the relative transboundary resource needs of the two communities.

While the ‘balance’ in the general quid pro quo relationship did not exist from the 1980s—as the south became less dependent on the Morphou supply, while it was still supplying power to the north—in the mid-1990s, there arose the possibility of this ‘understanding’ returning to some sense of equilibrium, with the north becoming virtually self-sufficient in electricity generating power. Yet, the quid pro quo remained unstable as the Greek Cypriots maintained the policy of supplying water to the north; only on occasions, when the hydrogeological environment in which these relations were being conducted could not be ignored—such as the island-wide drought from 1990, did they consider lessening these supplies. From the observations made in Chapter 5, it can be assumed that this was a consequence of the primacy of their overall ‘humanitarian’ policy. While the Greek Cypriot water authorities (both centrally, and locally) often presented the integrated, interregional character of water conveyance on the island as a function of the necessity of a ‘rational water programme’; on reflection, the ‘meaning’ of this particular type of integration was quite different. For one senior Greek Cypriot representative, this set-up was;

“not my definition of cooperation. Cooperation in my view is [...] a joint effort to develop a resource. [...] Cooperation is not to supply something for free, simply because that was the set-up before [1974].”

Nevertheless, the Greek Cypriot side repeatedly highlighted the process whereby water was ‘supplied’ to the north, yet no ‘payment’ was received in return.

By 1993, the Nicosia Water Board calculated that Turkish Cypriot consumers ‘owed’ CY£3 mn in unpaid bills. While acknowledging the role of UNFICYP as third party, they frequently highlighted their own provision of spare parts or the replacement of pumping units in the north. Even though the water from Morphou became much less
significant to their supplies over time, this relationship was maintained because of the ‘humanitarian aspect’ of the water problem.28 Indeed, mirroring Denktash’s use of the term ‘humanitarianism’ during the electricity dispute in 1994, the Turkish Cypriot authorities, for their part, similarly stressed that they had continued to supply water from Morphou post-1974 because of both communities’ basic water ‘needs’.29 More obviously, however, they maintained the regime knowing that Morphou’s water was increasingly too saline, as indeed it was for domestic consumption, becoming up to ten times the salinity of the Troodos waters.30 The process of mixing these waters with the south’s treated waters from Kornos subsequently solved this problem. In addition, any political decision to cut the transfer of Morphou’s water to the south would provide the Greek Cypriots with a reason to cut their supplies to the north elsewhere along the UNBZ (see Chapter 6), and to Famagusta (see below).

Not surprisingly, this highly informal policy adopted by the Greek Cypriot government was widely misunderstood, and left it open to internal criticism. The fact that Greek Cypriots were perceived to be supplying the north with electricity and water in Nicosia for free, in addition to the smaller transfers along the length of the UNBZ already examined in Chapter 6, became a legitimate cause for concern amongst the Greek Cypriot community as water rationing in their own sector grew more common.31 Nicosia’s southern consumers were particularly displeased with being charged nearly threefold the amount domestic consumers in Limassol were paying, and blame for this was often placed on the subsidisation of water supply to the north.32 This appeared even more baffling to them given the likelihood of north Nicosia becoming integrated into an international distribution system through the Turkish water balloon imports (if, at the same time, becoming even more ‘dependent’ upon external water supplies). Nevertheless, these arguments failed to appreciate that Nicosia’s water supply had developed as an integral part of the ROC government’s policy, with much wider implications than simply for the capital city.33 The ‘humanitarianism’ of successive Greek Cypriot governments had become a primary rhetorical device, and a potential negotiating tool.
7.2.3 Famagusta’s dual dependency

These conclusions can be further substantiated on examination of water supplies to the eastern, coastal urban area of Famagusta. In 1960, at independence, problems with the quality and quantity of water supply in the district of Famagusta were recognised as being the most acute island-wide, chiefly as a result of an artificial-recharge scheme begun under colonial administration in 1954 which had clogged the main aquifer with suspended silt and clay. Exacerbating this, overpumping from 1955 to 1965 had resulted in the southeastern Mesaoria water table falling by 7.6 metres; indeed, from 1965 to 1980 this major aquifer was to be overextracted by 20 mn.cu.m./yr. Seawater intrusion at Famagusta had destroyed the agricultural potential of the coastal area up to 1.5 km inland by the mid-1960s, and while the city was to receive water within the original SCP proposal, de facto partition had resulted in this end section of the project being shelved by the Greek Cypriot authorities.

Famagusta, and most other settlements along the Nicosia-Famagusta road, temporarily improved their independence on water following the construction of a main pipeline from the Morphou aquifer to Famagusta in 1991, water from which was centrally stored in two 3,500 cu.m. reservoirs. Even so, Famagusta continued to rely upon historic supplies from the south, via Phrenaros reservoir. Since 1974, water had been supplied free of charge from Phrenaros to a watertower in Varosha; for over a decade and a half after 1974, this continued to operate on an informal basis although UNFICYP had become increasingly aware of problems with compliance. Therefore, according to agreements reached at a bicomunal water authorities’ meeting in early 1991, a set volume of 1900 cu.m./day was to be transported south to north. This was then recorded daily by UNFICYP, which allowed for the detection of any illegal connections to the pipe. More often than not, however, the daily average amounted to 1,000 cu.m., helped little by the loss of 120 cu.m. through leakages.

Reacting to regular protests from Famagusta’s Turkish Cypriot mayor over the short supply, Greek Cypriot authorities reasoned that the cause of the breakdown in this transboundary water regime was scarce supplies in the south, despite the SCP surface water inputs since 1987. Locally, the 170 km² Kokkinokhoria aquifer, located largely in the south, had been overpumped since the 1950s such that only 18% of the original reserves were still available. Not only had a government-sponsored scheme, whereby
boreholes were dug for private irrigation, run since 1927 but in practice some 47% of the 8,000 boreholes in this region were being mined without permit.\textsuperscript{41} UNFICYP similarly interpreted the problem as structural, if originating more at the island-wide scale; the south observed water restrictions of which the north had been reluctant to introduce.\textsuperscript{42}

An alternative interpretation was that the \textit{quid pro quo} had been further destabilised. For the Turkish Cypriot local authorities there was an implicit understanding behind the agreement that their water supply from the south was a form of ‘compensation’ from the Greek Cypriots for what they were being supplied from Morphou. As noted previously, however, Greek Cypriots were fully aware that south Nicosia was by now only receiving some 4,000 cu.m./day from Morphou; accordingly, for ‘humanitarian reasons’ they were still delivering 1,700 cu.m./day to Famagusta (but no more).\textsuperscript{43} Additional to this, moreover, after a series of protests in the summer of 1994, UNFICYP learnt that the Turkish Cypriot Security Forces had secretly installed a link to the main pipe near Dherinia, siphoning off up to 40 cu.m./day for army installations in Varosha (see below).\textsuperscript{44}

As the supply of water supplied to the north was dependent upon the gravity flow generated at Phrenaros reservoir, water shortages were regular during summer months, when Phrenaros had to supply in addition the south’s tourist resorts of Ayia Napa and Protaras. Water would then be supplied to the north during night hours, creating dangerous high pressure on a pipe which had not been maintained since 1974. However, after crossing the UNBZ the pipe entered the fenced area of Varosha where UNFICYP were traditionally refused free access, and UNFICYP argued that, without such access, they were unable to verify the claims of Famagusta’s mayor that the south was failing to supply the agreed water quantity.\textsuperscript{45} Once again, in September 1994, and in tandem with power cuts (see Chapter 5), the Greek Cypriot supply of water to Famagusta reportedly fell to 1,100 tons from the ‘agreed 2,000 +’ tons.\textsuperscript{46} The Turkish Cypriot local authority’s problems were being dictated not only by their dependency on the Greek Cypriot supply, but also by ‘internal’ dilemmas. Famagusta’s input from Morphou in 1995 was approximately 1500 cu.m/day yet, given the salinity of the Morphou water, the top-up waters from the south proved vital to establish a mixing process. By extension, and further demonstrating the asymmetrical dependency, both Famagusta’s water quantity and quality had become contingent on the south.\textsuperscript{47}
7.3 Underground Cooperation: The Nicosia Sanitary Sewerage System

Whilst partitioned Nicosia was linked underground through water supplies, another and arguably more substantive form of cooperation between Nicosia's two communities was, somewhat innocuously, over their sewerage. While it was to be 'underground' in physical character, the cooperation was also 'underground' in its political formation—a feature that held implications for longer-term urban planning in Nicosia and the island in general. Initially, however, it is necessary to consider this transboundary initiative in the context of Nicosia's post-partition development.

7.3.1 The bi-polar development of Greater Nicosia

Urbanisation had developed rapidly in Cyprus. In 1946 less than 26% of the population of the island were urban-based, and by independence—despite witnessing a change from a rural-based to a more commercial and industrial economy—this had grown only a further 10%. By 1973, however, just less than 270,000 (42%) of the 632,000 island inhabitants were officially urban. Of more importance to this analysis, however, was the tendency for the growing suburbanisation to be ethnically-segregated, and Nicosia was no exception. Some 40% of the Turkish Cypriot population inhabited towns compared to 26% of Greek Cypriots. Even by 1960, the suburbs of Kaimakli and Orta Keuy held over 82% of Nicosia's Turkish population, yet only 3% of the Greek Cypriot inhabitants (Figure 7.2). In fact, over one-half of the urban Turkish Cypriots were to be found in Nicosia, and it was no coincidence that the city came to represent the 'mutual incompatibility of the two main communities'.

Nicosia had been the island's capital for several centuries previously. Its urban population of 34,463 in 1946 had risen to 45,629 by 1960, at which time it had become the administrative centre for the newly-independent state, but from 1963 it was to develop into two de facto capitals. The culmination of partition in 1974, as previously indicated, led to a concentration of resources such that refugees were temporarily housed in and around urban centres. With approximately 200,000 refugees post-1974, the process of urbanisation in the south became more rapid so that by 1982 urban residents accounted for 63.5% of the total population of the ROC. By 1992, this had risen to 68%, with 30% (over 47,000) of the overall population falling within Nicosia's
Figure 7.2  Greater Nicosia and the UN buffer zone

southern urban complex, as it sprawled out to the south and west (Figure 7.2). In the north as a whole, the population remained dispersed after 1974, except for Nicosia which by 1978 hosted over 23,180 inhabitants. Like its southern half, north Nicosia witnessed suburban growth, if in more consolidated form, and by 1996, according to a *de facto* census, north Nicosia’s population stood at some 40,000.

### 7.3.2 The Nicosia sanitary sewerage system

At the time of independence the sewerage system of Nicosia, as with the majority of Cyprus, consisted of individual septic tanks and absorption pits within each property. Yet, the clay content of a large area of the city was such that such pits were inadequate. In addition, storm water collection was relatively undeveloped city-wide. In 1965, less than two years after Nicosia had become geographically partitioned, the ROC government approached the World Health Organisation to prepare a pre-feasibility study on the sewerage and drainage system for the whole of Nicosia. In the light of this report a full study was then undertaken in 1968 by a Canadian consultancy firm who prepared a fifty-year master plan for Nicosia’s sewerage and storm collection system. In spite of the presence of the ‘green line’, they analysed the urban area as a whole, and were formally given the task of deciding whether to proceed with a separate or combined (i.e., bicomunal) sewerage system.

The 1968 Report proposed three development stages and, for the treatment plant, a site in the north east of the city at Mia Milia, at the time controlled by Greek Cypriots, was chosen after consideration of the geology, relief and prevailing-wind direction (Plate 7.1). Three-quarters financed by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the balance being met by the ROC government, work began in 1972 and was scheduled for completion by August 1974.

The events of summer 1974 clearly had a direct impact on the progress of the system’s construction, particularly now the Mia Milia sewage treatment was located 2.4 km north of the Turkish Forces’ CFL. Most of ‘Stage 1’ had been completed, in particular most of the treatment plant (Plate 7.1). Yet, a crucial part of the main outlet now in the UNBZ remained unfinished, large sections of the route of the main trunk sewer fell in the north, and the treatment plant itself needed substantial repair work in the light of the violent conflict. In addition, Nicosia’s population—with an influx of
refugees—had poured into areas which had not been anticipated, meaning that sewerage system expansions planned for the future were now needed urgently. However, in terms of this project’s administration there were substantial problems. Nicosia had become a city with two distinctive heads (three, if UNFICYP as ‘gatekeepers’ to the UNBZ was included). In order to supervise its implementation and administer the system, the Nicosia Sewerage Board, a semi-independent government body, had been set up in January 1971. Even so, the officially recognised, Greek Cypriot Municipality of Nicosia had not controlled the administration of its northern enclave since 1964, and was now physically exempt from all affairs north of the National Guard’s CFL. Unofficially, Nicosia now had two municipal offices and two mayors.\(^5^8\)

Although funded by the IBRD, the project was originally, and remained after 1974, a UNDP technical assistance project. Reacting with relative speed, the UNDP used this role to oversee negotiations between what were termed (to avoid the political minefield) Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot ‘representatives’ at the municipal level, Lellos Demetriades and Mustafa Akinci respectively, with the participation of representatives of the World Bank and UNFICYP.

It would appear, however, that cooperation developed incrementally; as will become clearer in subsequent analysis, it is necessary to examine this process in some detail. In the afterglow of the Makarios-Denktash breakthrough at high-level negotiations in 1977 (Appendix 1), there were rumblings of an agreement struck by the UNDP with Denktash’s approval, and this was presented by the Turkish Cypriot press as enabling the Greek Cypriot sector to complete its part of the project.\(^5^9\) Negotiations were to stall, however, and it was not until Demetriades, mayor of (southern) Nicosia and also Chairman of the Sewerage Board, took up the gauntlet and obtained permission to proceed with a transboundary project from both Clerides and Denktash,\(^6^0\) and later from Makarios. Demetriades has since recounted Makarios’ response to his proposal; the Archbishop privately declared “yes, you can do it, but be careful. If you succeed you shall get the credit, if you don’t we shall dismiss you as an irresponsible mayor”\(^6^1\). Demetriades recognised a coalition of views, nonetheless, which had generated a moment ‘ripe for resolution’; both he, Clerides and Denktash were lawyers by training and, despite the obviously opposing political views, shared some common ground, while Akinci was a trained architect and one, according to Demetriades, “not ready to
divide a city”.\textsuperscript{62} Akinci had his own hurdles to overcome, given his standing as a political opposition figure.\textsuperscript{63}

Eventually, after a formal round-table meeting between Demetriades and Akinci on 25 September 1978, chaired by the UNDP, an agreement was reached, although the apportionment of costs between the two sides had been postponed until a later date.\textsuperscript{64} Work was expected to commence within three months to provide improved sanitary facilities and domestic water connections both sides of the UNBZ. Notably, the UN Secretary-General hoped the joint project would soon be followed by others, and welcomed it as a ‘gratifying development’.\textsuperscript{65} UNFICYP provided escorts for inspection of the construction site, and facilitated the transfer of equipment,\textsuperscript{66} but while a series of talks went ahead in February it was significant that work did not begin again until August. Akinci raised concerns over the agreement text which he felt left out the Turkish Cypriot areas in ‘Stage 1’, which indeed had been left untouched since early 1970.\textsuperscript{67} But by May 1980, ‘Stage 1’—including the new work on the Turkish Cypriot side—had been completed with the aid of construction firms from both communities. As hoped for, in December 1982 the EEC and the European Investment Bank agreed to fund ‘Stage 2’, as part of their financial protocols, which got under way in May 1984 (Plate 7.1).\textsuperscript{68} It was further extended until late 1986,\textsuperscript{69} a complicated process involving the laying of pipes across the UNBZ for which UNFICYP provided liaison and military escort, especially given that the Mia Milia site was now located within a Turkish Forces ‘high security military area’.

While the reasoning behind this cooperation appeared, at the functional level, relatively self-explanatory, it is necessary to question further why and how this apparent cooperation came about. To this end, the relationship between Demetriades and Akinci at the municipal level of Nicosia must be reconsidered. While the third party role played by the UNDP was crucial, the two representatives moulded its procedural character, demonstrating their more grounded understanding of the island’s politics.\textsuperscript{70} As Demetriades noted;

“[w]e went away from the central UN organisation and got under the umbrella of UNDP which was more concerned with down to earth things like funding and technical stuff, rather than with political issues. Equally important was that we decided that we do not keep minutes [...] after the first two or three meetings”.\textsuperscript{71}
The representatives' handling of their own constituencies appeared to be similarly effective. Plate 7.2 represented the congenial view from Satiriki, a Greek Cypriot newspaper; Demetriades was clearly able to legitimise his cooperative relationship with Akinci: "we both had in mind the interests of all the people of the Nicosia area. Politics became secondary to the importance of humanitarian and public health considerations". For Yeniduzen, a Turkish Cypriot (opposition party) newspaper, however, such an interpretation was not so well illustrated (Plate 7.3). Rather, the 'wall' remained and the relationship was somewhat dehumanised. It is these small but distinct differences in interpretation and discursive representation of intermunicipal (yet intercommunal) relations that will be carried across into an examination of this project's successor, the bicomunal Nicosia Master Plan.

7.4 The Nicosia Master Plan

Prior to 1974, urban planning in Nicosia, in terms of centralised control, was largely unaddressed and uncoordinated. During the colonial period the city had extended outside the historic walls and economic development saw the urban area expand south-west (Figure 7.2). Planning law was a direct inheritance from the colonial legislation which was, in turn, overlaid on Ottoman legislation. A planning study of Nicosia undertaken by Nottingham University (UK) in 1968 was all but nullified by the subsequent geographical separation, although, even at its time of completion, Nicosia was ethnically segregated. In addition, a 'Town and Country Planning Law' had been enacted by the (Greek Cypriot) ROC government in 1972—an 'Island Plan' was approved by the Council of Ministers in 1973, and was nearing publication in 1974. At the same time, 'Local Plans' for the island’s six major towns were being prepared. The events of 1974 meant that, although sections relating to preparation of the above plans were implemented, the laws' provisions were never enacted. Building control both in the south and the north, therefore, was for the next fifteen years to be exercised effectively under the colonial provisions of the Streets and Buildings Regulations Law and the Buildings Regulation of 1946.
Plate 7.2  Greek Cypriot caricature of Akincl (left) and Demetriades (right) cooperating over the sewerage system
Source: Satiriki (30/9/78), reproduced in UNHCR (1996: 9).
Plate 7.3  *Turkish Cypriot caricature of Nicosia's unified sewerage system*

7.4.1 A second agreement

Nicosia was no exception to these weaknesses in planning control, the shortfalls of which were most vividly illustrated after 1974 when Nicosia's urban structure was separated most effectively. Notably, it was the city's two 'representatives' who once again began transboundary dialogue to address this issue. In October 1979, Demetriades and Akinci met, under the chairmanship of the UNDP once more (and with their own technical experts) and, as with the sewerage links, in a capacity as 'representatives' of their respective communities. This time, an agreement stated that;

"[t]here should be close co-operation between the two sides for the purpose of examining and finally reaching conclusions for a Master Plan of Nicosia. To achieve the above, meetings between the two sides and their experts at Ledra Palace should be continued".74

Following this agreement, technical assistance was requested from the United Nations Centre for Human Settlements (UNCHS (Habitat)) and funding from the UNDP. An NMP 'team' was composed of international experts, and professionals—urban planners, architects, sociologists and economists—from both communities.

UNCHS (Habitat) conducted a preparatory mission at the end of 1979, producing a project document that was signed by all parties concerned in March 1980, and from early 1980 the NMP team met regularly under UNDP auspices at Ledra Palace, the UN headquarters in Nicosia's 'green line'. Work began with UNFICYP's assistance on socio-economic surveys, and assessments of physical structures, land use patterns, and existing legislation. The results of these surveys were revealing, particularly for Nicosia-within-the-walls: the urban land uses were changing rapidly, with warehouses, workshops or vacant plots replacing residential areas, particularly areas contiguous to the 'green line', and young families were giving way to the elderly and the unemployed. By 1976 nearly 50% of the residents of Nicosia within-the-walls were refugees. The diagnosis was, in the words of the UNDP, that the "heart of Nicosia would soon become a derelict no-man's land". After all, the UNBZ, while taking up one-tenth of the Old City, also took up one-sixth of the Greater Nicosia area (according to the NMP boundaries).79

A plan was finally completed in July 1984 and, at the official handing-over ceremony at Ledra Palace in January 1985, Demetriades hailed the occasion as "a..."
landmark in the tormented life of our capital city". The NMP plan itself was divided into two phases. 'Phase 1' (from 1981-84) would involve drafting a long-term physical plan for Greater Nicosia to the year 2000, while the second (1984-85) would focus on a more detailed operational plan for Nicosia's central area. The overall objective was to establish a general planning policy, and the general strategy remained one of urban consolidation, the containment of urban sprawl, and the optimal use of available resources. While the 'official' reasons for the NMP were multitudinous, they all addressed the fundamental problem of planning what was seen as a unified urban system. In essence, 'Phase 1' developed two scenarios so as to be flexible enough to accommodate the various territorial proposals for a political settlement to the Cyprus conflict. Consequently, plans were duplicated, yet made compatible: a contemporary Nicosia 'with buffer zone', and another possibility for Nicosia 'without buffer zone' (Plate 7.4).

'Phase 2' of the NMP (from 1984 onwards) dealt specifically with the preparation of an Area Scheme for the Old City, and the Central Business District (CBD), both north and south. At the time, with no Town and Country Planning Law enacted, the NMP team decided to concentrate on only those measures deemed 'essential' for the immediate implementation of the Area Schemes. The two main 'special projects' focused on Chrysaliniotissa in the south (Plate 7.5), and Arab Ahmet in the north (Plate 7.6), which were designed to act as 'pilot' schemes and demonstrate how both public and private investment could combine the old with the new. In Chrysaliniotissa, restoration focused on 27 dwellings, a public garden and other open spaces, with housing grants for 108 inhabited houses; while, in Arab Ahmet, 30 houses were to be restored (with repair grants for 8 units) and various community facilities (e.g., a museum) were provided for. Planning activities were carried out by the local team members, although the UNDP through UNCHS (Habitat) continued to finance short-term consultants. From 1987, when the third phase started, funding was forthcoming from UNHCR (essentially USAID funds) while the UNDP continued to seek out other funding agencies.
Plate 7.4  NMP's Physical Development Plan 'with' and 'without' buffer zone

Plate 7.5  
Urban regeneration in Chrysaliniotissa: Minoos St., Nicosia (south)

Plate 7.6  
Urban regeneration in Arab Ahmet: Kamil Pasha St., Nicosia (north)
7.4.2 Common or superordinate goals?

The ‘unofficial’ reasons for the establishment of both the NMP and its predecessor, the sanitary sewerage system, during a five year period after partition—a period which, but for the 1979 Agreement, was characterised by deadlock within the high-level negotiation process (Appendix 1)—clearly deserves further consideration. With regards to the NMP, as the UNDP Resident Representative in Cyprus noted in 1985, “[t]hat such a plan could be drawn up in the middle of political turmoil and dissent is due to the wisdom and courage of these Cypriots [Demetriades and Akinci] of both communities who found the strength to cast aside any misgivings and mistrust they may have felt towards each other”.85 In evaluating the NMP, however, which stood out as the most significant and celebrated transboundary resource management venture to develop on the island since 1974, an appreciation of the perceptions of the decision-makers is imperative. As one former NMP team member cautioned, “the [NMP] at times means different things to different people”.

To consider this observation, it is necessary to return to the initial cooperation on the sewerage system. Akinci himself sought to clarify on a number of occasions that the origins of cooperating over sewage were more functional: “the kidneys were on our side after 1974 and [...] it was not economical, nor feasible, to build another treatment plant. They [the Greek Cypriots] had to come to an agreement”.87 The acceptance of the NMP by the Greek Cypriot authorities was also encouraged by strategic factors. By the mid-1980s there was heightened concern over the economic ‘blight’ of what was once the capital’s Central Business District (CBD); south of the UNBZ, between 1976 and 1992 while the population of Greater Nicosia grew by over 64%, that of Nicosia-within-the-walls fell by 62%.88 This translated into a growing political concern over the demise of the areas along the ‘green line’ and UNBZ—in particular the decline of businesses and population numbers which might lead to the de facto extension of UN territory and further de facto contraction of the ROC.89

At the municipal level, in particular, soon after the creation of the UNBZ Demetriades was having to balance pressures from the small shopkeepers association (Povek) along the ‘green line’ who, initially, called for financial assistance to encourage them to stay in the ‘1,000’ shops within the ‘depressed areas’.90 As a result of the political and economic instability post-partition, the land market had suffered a slump
which was felt differentially across the urban space. Reversing the classic ‘distance-decay factor’, land prices fell along the ‘green line’ and in the suburbs which touched on the UNBZ as it ran out from the city—as a result not only of the psychological effect of the demarcation line, but also of the low rentability of old housing and superannuated infrastructure. Nicosia’s Greek Cypriot population had ‘turned its back’ on the CBD.

Hermes Street, already affected by the ‘green line’ from 1963, was all but subsumed by the UNBZ, and the CBD subsequently shifted southwards to fall outside the old city walls.

The Greek Cypriot government’s initial fear over the consolidation of a ‘border area’ in its capital was further evidenced in June 1991, when ROC President Vassiliou announced plans to invest CY£10 mn through infrastructural developments and through a package of financial incentives for rejuvenating areas in proximity to the ‘green line’, and to Nicosia’s UNBZ in general (Figure 7.3). Serving as a catalyst for private investment separate from the NMP, more importantly, it sought to stem the depopulation of Nicosia’s ‘border areas’ and to reverse the trend in the development of workshops in the Old City which were perceived to be ‘dangerous’. Looking towards a ‘reunited Nicosia’, a pedestrianisation programme was proposed (eventually funded by the EC), centrally-located car parks were planned (funded by the ROC), and housing loans made available to support the local population and boost rebuilding in the “depressed areas”. Indeed, there was a desire to attract ‘anyone at all’ to the area to prevent its depopulation.

For Greek Cypriots, the NMP thus complemented the ‘national struggle’, encouraging the breaking down of the nekri zoni, and institutionalising the possibility of reunification (if not of Cyprus, then at least of Nicosia). The Town and Country Planning Law of 1972 was only ever partially implemented and, in the south, blame for this was specifically placed on the ‘Turkish invasion’. As far as Greek Cypriot sentiments were concerned, the prolonged division of the island’s territory had;

“had a destructive impact on the settlement system on the Island [sic]. Population distribution, the functioning relations and interconnections which have been established through centuries have literally been disconnected by artificial boundaries dividing cities (i.e. Nicosia), severing communication networks (national and regional road systems), enforcing the duplication of major infrastructure (airports, ports, power plants, etc.), and bre[al]king up social and cultural ties”. 

317
Figure 7.3 *Priority 'revitalisation areas' for Greek Cypriot government funding in central Nicosia, 1991-1996*

Source: Compiled by author from unpublished ROC Town Planning and Housing Department maps.

Nicosia’s ‘Local Plan’, along with the ‘Island Plan’ as a whole, had been outdated by the influx of refugees and territorial partition across Greater Nicosia as a whole. 101 Within the NMP itself, therefore, the ‘green line’ within the Old City was recognised as “the most important ‘gluing’ area in the functional integration of the city”. 102 Such integrationist rhetoric was also common in Demetriades’ public statements. Nicosia, invariably but also incorrectly presented as ‘the last divided capital city in the world’ (note the definite articles), was “a divided city brutally separated by a dead zone [...] This is what the Turkish Attila has left us with”. 103 Symbolically, in the aftermath of the collapse of the Berlin Wall, Demetriades observed that “[w]hile tyrants fall and walls of
shame are torn apart elsewhere, the walls of Attila still stab our lands, the walls of shame are still here”. However, through cooperation over the sewerage and the NMP, it was now possible to prove that “Nicosia is a divided city on the surface, but underneath it’s fully united”.

As Theophylactou has noted, neorealists would argue that leaders are unable to conform through fear of failing to maximise their own long-term gains, regardless of their attitudes towards a common good. Yet, clearly Demetriades’ belief in the common good of Nicosia reflected more personal instincts, and the exploitation of such populist slogans was perhaps more in order to placate the ‘rejectionist’ lobby. It is therefore necessary to return to the role played by the two municipal leaders, highlighted previously by the UNDP representative. The evident ‘bargaining skill’ of Nicosia’s mayoral ‘representatives’ provided strong evidence of the dangers of placing too much weight on the role of structural power in processes of regime formation at the transboundary level. The origins of the NMP’s establishment and momentum was largely due to the regime’s introduction of new actors who influenced, crucially, both municipal and national behaviour and contributed to the development of coordinated and convergent planning. Common principles and norms gave way to a common set of planning rules. In turn, the NMP provided many functional goods—information about the environment and other actor’s choice, and a stable forum for interactions that reduced the transaction costs of planning an historically integrated urban area.

The operating level of the NMP was, although horizontal, between municipalities whose ‘national’ basis remained moot. Pragmatically, in the light of the problematic constitutional legitimacy, as long as specific ‘official’ labels were not used there was perceived to be no ‘absolute need to agree’ in order to cooperate. Politics was, temporarily, by-passed. Distinct, therefore, from the ‘balanced reciprocity’ evident in the original ‘water-for-electricity’ arrangement, where benefits were largely calculated by the state authorities, in the case of the NMP, reciprocity was more ‘generalised’. Maintenance of the relationship was perceived to be more important than short-term gain, and the norm of the relationship appeared more altruistic. Demetriades, with Akinci in tandem, became an ‘entrepreneurial leader’ by using certain negotiating skills to cast Nicosia’s issues in a way that facilitated cooperative bargaining, and to broker interests around the choice of a preferred regime arrangement. The role of these two political leaders, who found relatively (but not
Transboundary Urban Space

absolutely) ‘neutral’ political space at the municipal level to cooperate, was significant. In addition, the ‘mayors’ proved ‘structural leaders’ in that they successfully politicised their space to achieve their objectives. The municipal level had to be both political and yet apolitical: it was political in the way that Nicosia’s problem were presented as an issue requiring immediate attention; it was apolitical in that it was rarely if ever considered in high-level negotiations.

Briefly put, the role of Demetriades and Akinci was foundational to cooperation, whether or not they sought political rewards. Indeed, it has been argued that it is more reassuring if leaders are motivated to engage in entrepreneurial activities out of a durable sense of self-interest rather than an ephemeral consideration of altruism. In terms of assessing the effectiveness of both these transboundary regimes, it is necessary to consider, inter alia, their original goals. As Young noted;

"[m]ore often than not, those engaged in regime formation are motivated by goals they do not feel comfortable articulating in public as well as by goals they deem appropriate for inclusion in public statements. Typically, these unstated goals deal with distributive concerns in contrast to the pursuit of some common good."

As with the majority of transboundary initiatives, nonetheless, secrecy was paramount and so was silence. Cooperation, as depicted in the Turkish Cypriot newspaper, was kept secret and, quite literally, underground. The instigators lost out because of this secrecy, however, with little if any recognition, although this was no doubt their wish.

7.4.3 ‘Functional spill over’ and the limits to cooperation

In considering the ‘spill over’ of these developments in Nicosia, it is useful here to distinguish further between three strands of what neofunctionalists have understood ‘spill over’ to be: ‘functional spill over’ may arise from overriding forces of technical interdependence; ‘political spill over’ suggests the refocusing of a society’s activities and expectations to a new supranational centre; while ‘cultivated spill over’ places emphasis on the possibility of the ‘upgrading’ of common interests to a central institution. The result of the cumulative ‘spill over’ would probably lead to the integration of other tasks.
Transboundary resource management in Nicosia, it can be argued, benefited from 'functional spill over' as determined by its centrality, both in terms of its geography and the available conflict resolution structures. In geographical terms, the strains and distortions resulting from one integrative step (the sewerage system) resulted in pressures from related fields of urban management for coordination (as opposed to Stein's 'collaboration'). The NMP, in turn, set a redevelopment precedent for central Nicosia as whole, which was even to include the rejuvenation of those derelict buildings within the 'green line'. It became apparent, in September 1996 that 40 collapsing buildings in Hermes Street were to be pulled down by UNFICYP for safety reasons. The impending prospect of buildings written in to the NMP being demolished dictated that these intra-boundary resources received much consideration, and Demetriades successfully sought ROC Cabinet funds for their repair. In terms of available conflict resolution structures, the location of Ledra Palace Hotel under UN administration, in the UNBZ just outside Nicosia's walls was vital. Parallel to their provision of arrangements for developing the Master Plan in 1979, UNFICYP assisted other meetings between the communities' union leaders and journalists and, in early 1980, between officials from the Water and Health Departments. By mid-1993 UNFICYP had managed to establish a Humanitarian Exchange Point at Ledra Palace, for family reunions, welfare payments and where visa requests could be administered. A journalists' meeting room was also provided in early 1995.

A precedent had been set by the NMP. Nonetheless, these benefits of centrality alone failed to generate a high level of interdependency, or so-called 'issue density', whereby expectations stabilised and the NMP regime was able to institutionalise the likelihood of both sides becoming involved in long-term cooperation. While the NMP provided many lessons, they largely remained with that project, as the NMP failed to generate a truly interdependent, transboundary planning body; the regime's political set-up proved too inflexible to encompass any development of the NMP teams' powers. In turn, this encouraged a negative perception of the 'meaning' of the NMP amongst 'rejectionist' elements of the two communities. For many Greek Cypriots there was a perception that the northern municipality was a 'free-rider', a view which grew from 1990 when the popular intermunicipal pairing of Demetriades and Akinci ended, the latter losing his seat after 14 years in office. In this sense it is necessary to recognise that their independence, which gave them
significant power, was forever being contained by the political leadership on either side.\textsuperscript{127}

For the Turkish Cypriots, as Akinci has commented, they may well have preferred positive ‘spill over’ from the sewerage system into joint water system projects rather than urban planning.\textsuperscript{128} Indeed, certain Turkish Cypriot officials refused to treat the NMP as pure ‘cooperation’, but rather as an extension of the sewerage plan—a functional imperative, unproductive for them in economic terms, which constituted the ‘core’ of subsequent transboundary relations in Nicosia, relations not of ‘cooperation’ but of separate coexistence.\textsuperscript{129} It was less surprising, therefore, that no comparable central state-led ‘border rejuvenation’ scheme developed in the north. Even when supporting the NMP, however, Turkish Cypriot ‘official’ policy remained concerned over viewing ‘cooperation’ in the urban context as a de-politicised planning initiative—as anything more than Sherif’s ‘superordinate goal’—precisely because Greek Cypriot authorities saw the recreation of a unified Nicosia as an attractive confidence-building measure, which might eventually lead to the reintegration of the two Cypriot communities on the island.\textsuperscript{130}

It would be short of the mark to blame the limited progress of the NMP in purely political terms, however, given additional structural constraints. While the zoning was there, the legislative sanctions were not. In the north, although a zoning map and physical plan was drawn up in 1975, it remained non-implemented such that, from the completion of the NMP plans in 1984 little was then possible until 1989 by which time the original plans needed substantial (re-)revision. Of particular note, however, were the economic constraints on the NMP. The magnitude of funds required for its schemes were unprecedented for urban development in Cyprus. While in the south the financial injection of private funds was to dwindle (along with relatively static municipal and government funding), in the north the financing of the projects within the overall plan was severely debilitated. Arab Ahmet, in particular, was restored much more slowly than Chrysaliniotissa due to lack of funds and poor planning control.\textsuperscript{131}

It was necessary to set the funding of the NMP in the context of the TRNC economy as a whole. There were major practical problems concerning recognition with UNHCR (and later the EU), in particular the fact that all UNHCR funds were prescribed according to the population ratios at the time of the 1974 military intervention.\textsuperscript{132} This was approximately 80% Greek Cypriot and 18% Turkish Cypriot and, ever since, the
Turkish Cypriot community—in line with their call for complete political equality—sought a 50:50 share of incoming funds. In terms of public funds, the annual per capita Gross National Product (GNP) in the north, it should be remembered, was less than a quarter of that in the south, and this had been even worse at the municipal level of Nicosia. A survey conducted in 1985 concluded that municipal revenues in the south were estimated to be 7 times those in the north, and expenditure almost 9 times as much. Yet, even in the south the possibility of significant revenue for the municipality further strengthened the impetus to cooperate. The political economy of cooperation (or the so-called ‘neofunctionalist logic’) it would seem, played a vital role given that, on viewing the project as a whole, both sides expected there to be an economic ‘lollipop’ at the end of it.

Nor was there unconditional success with the original cooperation over the sewerage system. ‘Stage 3’ remained outstanding, and given that not all of Nicosia had been connected and that capacity at Mia Milia was nearing overload by the mid-1990s, the stability of transboundary relations remained an integral part of the on-going project. In the UNDP’s environmental study of 1990 (see Chapter 5), concerns were raised—particularly by the Greek Cypriots—of ‘malodorous effluents’ being discharged into the Pedhieos River bed at the Nicosia sewage treatment plant. Turkish Cypriots were themselves concerned that north Nicosia’s new industrial zone, nearly four times the size of the old site near Mia Milia, had no sewerage pretreatment facilities at all (Plate 7.1). In response, and reaffirming their general optimism, the 1991 UNDP report noted that the successful completion of the proposed reuse of treated effluent “could well serve as a model for the development of other bicommunal projects”. Yet the UNDP continued to provide logistic support for its operation and maintenance only until its 1997 departure (see Chapter 5).

7.5 Famagusta: The Other Divided City

Not only was presenting Nicosia as, variously, ‘the last divided capital city in the world’, ‘the last divided city in Europe’, or even just ‘the last divided city’, largely mistaken, it also surprisingly ignored one other example of urban physical separation on the island post-1974. Like Nicosia, Famagusta’s Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot
communities were ethnically segregated from 1963, but the establishment of the UNBZ—and in particular, the anomalous character of territorial control in Famagusta’s southern suburb—was to affect most dramatically the political geography of the settlement’s future development.

7.5.1 Post-partition development of Famagusta

Since the early days of colonial rule, Famagusta was the location of the chief port, linked to the rest of the island along its east-west axis by the sole railway line. Its population had grown sixfold between 1881 and the mid-1950s, but of that population, the Turkish community comprised only 17%. The central walled city—the Kaleiçi—remained predominantly Turkish Cypriot, but by independence a new suburb Varosha, to the city’s south, was to be made largely of Greek Cypriot residents. Varosha represented the first substantial tourist development along Cyprus’ coastline. From a figure of 34,774 in 1960, Famagusta’s population stood at just 17,180 in 1978, in line with the spatial shrinkage of its ‘urban area’ as a whole as a result of the peculiar cease-fire arrangements of 1974. Advances by the Turkish Forces in late October 1974 (subsequent to, in other words, the 16 August cease-fire) were recorded in the Dherinia area, south of Famagusta (Appendix 6 (a)), but were designated as unacceptable by the UN. An arrangement was eventually reached whereby the central part of Varosha was fenced off, and fell under the control of the Turkish Forces (i.e., the Turkish Government) who could not allow change the status quo in the area pending a solution. As such, derelict Varosha was bounded on three sides by territory under Turkish Cypriot control, to the east by the sea, and to the south by the UNBZ (Figure 7.4)—in total, an area covering some 4 km by 1.5 km of coastal and once-agricultural land.

This dislocation from central Famagusta (‘Gazimagosa’ in Turkish) of what had become the settlement’s new growth pole (with 116 hotels) had a significant impact on the morphology of Famagusta’s subsequent development. Whereas from the mid-1950s to 1974 new developments were beginning to cluster south of the Kaleiçi, from 1974 the direction of Turkish Cypriot development turned 180° (Figure 7.4). Ribbon development was encouraged by the locating of industry on the new Famagusta-north Nicosia road, and in particular the establishment of the largest university in the north in
Figure 7.4 Urban morphology and development of Famagusta

Transboundary Urban Space

Source: Compiled by author from plans of Famagusta Town Planning Department.
1986 which, by the mid-1990s, housed over one third (approximately 10,000 students) of the municipality's population.\textsuperscript{142} Areas contiguous to Varosha's fence failed to attract investment, particularly given the unpredictable future of the military-controlled area,\textsuperscript{143} and, as will be considered below, after 1974 political interest was to be focused on the southern suburb which was widely perceived to have become a 'ghost town'.

### 7.5.2 Exorcising the ghost

As from August 1974, the issue of reopening Varosha (‘Marash’ in Turkish) was generally used as a political tool by both communities, but in particular the Turkish Cypriot leadership who, given that Turkish Forces controlled the area \textit{de facto}, was effectively able to control its future. In fact, ‘unofficially’, at the ground-level the \textit{status quo} had been altered soon after 1974, when the steady removal of commercial items and other movable objects from the area into the north became a common occurrence—the Turkish Cypriot authorities explaining to UNFICYP that records were being kept and that compensatory measures in certain cases would be taken in the event of a political settlement.\textsuperscript{144} By the end of 1977, however, a hotel management school and a casino had been opened, and the renaming of streets had begun.\textsuperscript{145}

For the purposes of political negotiations, however, the Turkish Cypriot government were to use the ‘official’ \textit{status quo} as a bargaining tool. In May 1978, as high-level negotiations progressed, Denktash announced that between 30-35,000 Greek Cypriots could return to Varosha but, at the same time, the threat of a number of hotels being reopened by the Turkish Cypriot community was used.\textsuperscript{146} While the 1979 high-level agreement prioritised the resettlement of fenced-off Varosha, whereby Greek Cypriot refugees would return immediately upon a settlement, the Turkish Cypriot side held that an overall settlement had to be considered first, given that Point 6 of the agreement (Appendix 2) called for a ‘return to normal conditions’, interpreted by Denktash as an end to the Greek Cypriot economic blockade.\textsuperscript{147} Maps subsequently forwarded by the Turkish Cypriot side would, however, have left the Greek Cypriots only a narrow enclave on the coast, permitted limited refugee-return, and subjected them to a Turkish border control.\textsuperscript{148} By contrast, the Greek Cypriots insisted on Varosha falling under UN control as part of any likely settlement to the dispute.\textsuperscript{149} It was of little surprise therefore when Denktash chose to argue in 1981 that, with its submission as
part of comprehensive Turkish Cypriot proposals, the Varosha issue had come to be treated as an integral part of an overall settlement.\textsuperscript{150}

In January 1984, the Turkish Cypriot authorities reopened access to 10-20 houses inside Varosha’s northwestern perimeter fence as a ‘temporary relief measure’.\textsuperscript{151} By then, the Security Council had reserved it exclusively for resettlement by its pre-1974 inhabitants, preponderantly Greek Cypriots.\textsuperscript{152} Moreover, on 16 March the Secretary-General reiterated his belief that Varosha, as delimited by the Turkish Cypriot proposals in 1981, should be transferred to the UNBZ by Turkey.\textsuperscript{153} The issue remained unresolved however, and by November 1986 UNFICYP reported the accommodation of students from Famagusta’s university in two hotels inside the fenced area. Denktash responded to the Secretary-General’s protests over the change to the status quo by stating this was a temporary set-up;\textsuperscript{154} additionally, in response to the Secretary-General’s reaffirmation of the perimeter of the fenced area (by supplying a map) and of their consideration that the Turkish government was responsible for the area, Denktash claimed that there was no such common understanding. Varosha was a ‘municipal matter’ within the TRNC.\textsuperscript{155} Speculation continued when, on 19 July 1990, security forces from the Turkish mainland were replaced in Varosha by TRNC military personnel, in a coordinated demonstration of anger over the Greek Cypriots’ EC membership application a fortnight previously (see Chapter 5), and on the 16th anniversary of the Turkish military intervention.\textsuperscript{156}

7.5.3 Rebuilding as ‘confidence building’: Boutros-Ghali’s ‘CBMs’, 1993-1994

By the early 1990s, consequently, Varosha had remained largely untouched and undeveloped for fifteen years. It was in this light that the UN-Secretary-General proposed the inclusion of Varosha within a package of ‘confidence-building measures’ (CBMs). In his 1992 \textit{Agenda for Peace}, Boutros-Ghali attempted to develop the UN’s overall post-conflict peacebuilding capacity which;

\begin{quote}
“may take the form of concrete cooperative projects which link two or more countries in a mutually beneficial undertaking that can only contribute to economic and social development but also enhance the confidence that is so fundamental to peace”.\textsuperscript{157}
\end{quote}
Little academic attention had previously been given to CBMs involving 'intra-' or 'pseudo-state' identity groups, when compared with inter-state conflicts, although this was hardly surprising given CBMs' working definition.\textsuperscript{158} In this context, CBMs (which may be uni-, bi- or multi-lateral) were firmly based on the principles of international law as documented by the UN.\textsuperscript{159} Goldblat has advocated their translation to the regional level, where confidence building could promote better communication, impose military constraints, and strengthen cooperation among parties. In this last domain, CBMs might include the reinforcement of existing political cooperation and economic integration, the undertaking of joint economic development in border areas, the pooling of resources for mutual assistance, or the institutionalisation of environmental protection.\textsuperscript{160} Ben-Dor and Dewitt proposed a functionally broader interpretation of confidence-building processes and instruments to include less traditional avenues such as humanitarian gestures, cultural exchanges, the media, and 'functional steps' such as resource management.\textsuperscript{161}

A variety of tentative CBMs had been employed in Cyprus, under various guises, from 1974. With the 'Ten-Point Agreement' in 1979, the UN Secretary-General had expressed his wish to concentrate on Varosha, the constitution, territorial aspects, and 'initial practical measures'.\textsuperscript{162} When talks resumed in June 1979, however, the parties were unable to address any of the substantive aspects, and talks were to falter as procedural issues and security concerns came to light.\textsuperscript{163} The most concerted effort to incorporate CBMs into the formal negotiating sphere, however, came a decade later.\textsuperscript{164} In mid-1990, the UN Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar declared that if no progress was to come from the reconvening of intercommunal talks in the coming October, then the Security Council would have to "give serious consideration to alternative courses of action".\textsuperscript{165} No progress came, and by November 1992 the new Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, had concluded that there was "a deep crisis of confidence between the two sides".\textsuperscript{166} In an attempt temporarily to 'leap-frog' the difficulties which had arisen with the 'Set of Ideas' throughout June, and reflecting a tangible optimism within the UN, he forwarded a series of CBMs in a resolution.\textsuperscript{167} Both the Security Council members and the UN's Cyprus representatives invested heavily in the belief that, while neither an end in themselves nor a substitute for the wider political process, the CBMs would be mutually beneficial and facilitate the political process towards an overall settlement.\textsuperscript{168}
The process of placing Varosha under UN administration had been again supported in the 1992 ‘Set of Ideas’. Within the UN Secretary-General’s CBMs in 1993, however, came the opportunity to address this long-standing problem. Specifically, the proposal was to place the fenced area under UN administration for bicomunal contact and commerce, in particular making any economic opportunities available to Turkish Cypriots. As a “special area for bicomunal contact and commerce, a kind of free trade zone”, Varosha would be opened in two stages—two months after falling under UN control, the fenced area south of Dhimokratis Avenue would be rejuvenated for the largely Greek Cypriot owners, while the area north of the Avenue would be addressed at a later stage (Figure 7.4). Intercommunal and tax-free trade in the zone would be promoted.

It was necessary, however, to place the proposals for Varosha within the context of the CBM package as a whole. The Secretary-General’s Deputy Special Representative, Gustave Feissel, held 34 meetings in New York with the two leaders during April and May 1993, during which it was possible to reach agreement on a list of CBMs that both sides would be prepared to implement. While constituting an ‘old idea resurrected’, evidently on this occasion more pressure was being applied for progress on the CBMs when representatives of the five permanent members of the UNSC attended the first meeting. The CBMs themselves also threw a new light on issues the UN considered suitable for consideration in ‘high level’ talks. The draft proposals identified 14 CBMs, 12 of which were taken to be already ‘acceptable’ to both sides. Although 14 in number, they were actually presented as three separate issues: the first two (in order of reading) were the placing of Varosha under UN administration, and the reopening of Nicosia International Airport (NIA) located in the UN Protected Area to civilian traffic under the control of the UN. The third was in itself an eclectic mix of 12 issues on which there was already informal agreement (including party leaders’ and Chambers of Commerce meetings, joint projects in Nicosia, electricity), and issues on which the UN had been seeking agreement in recent low-level talks (UNBZ unmanning, bicomunal journalists’ centre, etc.). Thrown in amongst these were relatively novel proposals, but their meaning was more open-ended and ambiguous (including ‘expert’-led cooperation in water, environment, and an ‘equitable’ distribution of international funds). For the next 18 months the leaders’ were to focus on the CBM package.
On Varosha, while the Greek Cypriots accepted the draft proposals, micro-territorial amendments were sought by the Turkish Cypriot side, who argued that the fenced area lying north of Dhimokratis Avenue had to be excluded from UN administration, to generate a ‘security buffer’ between it and Famagusta’s port (Figure 7.4). In essence, an area comprising 20% of Varosha’s territory, would separate Greek Cypriots from an exclusive Turkish Cypriot settlement. While he retreated from this position, Denktash did so with the understanding that the Turkish Cypriots would control the access road from the south even though it would pass through Greek Cypriot areas (Figure 7.4). Denktash also reiterated his position of 1981, whereby such an area would be settled by Turkish Cypriots. As the joint meetings proceeded through May 1993 it had become clear that both the Greek Cypriots and Greece were in agreement with the proposals, on condition that, as Vassiliou put it, they “must not put the cart before the horse”. Recognition—direct or indirect—of the TRNC was not a proviso. The Turkish Cypriot side, however, suggested that, in addition to small scale amendments of the territorial scenario for Varosha, any opening of this area deserved the removal of all restrictions on their seaports and airports, including Erçan (‘Tymbou’) airport. Moreover, Denktash eventually stated that any response would be delayed for over a fortnight as he considered technical issues with the administrations both in Nicosia and Ankara, and back in Nicosia he faced a hostile reaction to the package.

Notably the Secretary-General, through his Special Representative, widened his contact base in the autumn, suspecting that the ‘practical’ way the CBMs could work on the ground had not been yet fully appreciated. Two ‘technical missions’ to Cyprus were organised, and on both sides of the UNBZ the Chambers of Commerce and Industry, trade unionists, politicians and technicians were approached throughout October and November. The findings were positive, if again largely restricted to the two main issue areas; significant economic gains would benefit both communities—the Greek Cypriots with a 15% increase in tourism capacity through rejuvenation of Varosha, but particularly the Turkish Cypriots who would take up half of an estimated 9,000 new jobs, would allegedly lessen their economic embargo by 80-85%, and would boost their GDP by 20%.

In this light, the Security Council continued to believe unanimously in an agreement intended to facilitate the political process towards an overall settlement. The package was to facilitate speedy progress, but not to substitute an overall settlement of
the Cyprus conflict; even so, the Secretary-General could not fail to note that the CBMs would represent the most important development on the island in two decades, manifesting good will towards the ‘other’ and transforming the atmosphere on the island. The first two CBMs, the ‘experts’ report proclaimed;

“would at long last provide avenues of contact between the two communities and would give them the opportunity, in a limited setting devoid of risk to their respective communities, to become reacquainted and to reveal to each other their goodwill and respect, and their desire to get together and to cooperate”.

Proximity talks were initiated in February 1994, by which time Denktash had returned and was now backed by a coalition of views.

On 9 March, Clerides and Denktash received a paper detailing the draft ideas for the implementation of the CBMs. Feissel proposed that, in Varosha, the Dherinia road should fall under UN protection and that the southern perimeter of the fenced area and the UNBZ be unmanned by Turkish Cypriot forces but, after a series of six different maps in the fenced area were considered, it was clear its southern edge, passing through the suburb of Ayios Memnon, was contested (Figure 7.4). Discussions followed between each leader and the Secretary-General’s special representatives, who took on board new ideas and finally presented an ‘adjusted’ draft paper on 21 March. While Clerides accepted what became known as the ‘21 March paper’ on condition that Denktash did likewise, the latter community leader objected to what he saw as wording concerning Varosha and NIA that had changed from the 1 July 1993 package. The unmanning of the area south of Varosha, the placing of the passage through this area under UN control, and micro-territorial disparities between UN maps and those of the Turkish Cypriots were, for Denktash, unacceptable changes.

Come the end of April, Denktash announced that the talks had collapsed, and in June Clerides said “the package of the CBMs and the process is dead”. Informal direct talks took place in October, but by December the Secretary-General was to announce that while Denktash sought agreement on Varosha and the NIA, Clerides now required acceptance of the basic principle of an overall settlement based on single sovereignty and international personality. This reflected sincere Greek Cypriot concerns over the consolidation of the status quo through such ‘partial’ solutions; there was a perceived need to ensure that sufficient common ground existed, otherwise ‘meaningless’ discussions on the CBMs could not be considered until after an overall settlement.
Clerides was also now using the EU membership process as a negotiating lever, and the export-ban decision of the ECJ in July 1994 had, for the Turkish Cypriots, negatively impacted any likely benefits from the CBMs. In November, direct talks on the CBMs failed to reemerge.

The Secretary-General himself had stated in February 1994 that the modalities for implementing the CBMs needed to be worked out within two months. By mid-1995 that moment had long passed, and the prospects for movement in the near future were weak. In line with observations made in the previous chapter, the specifics of boundary management—what the ‘border’ would separate, where the ‘boundary’ would fall, and who could cross the ‘border’—greatly contributed to the stalling of the negotiations’ progress on the reopening of Varosha (and the NIA). More significantly, it is argued, unlike Nicosia, Famagusta’s development had been tied up integrally with the ‘high politics’ of the two de facto states. Although focused on the borderland scale, neither Varosha (nor the NIA) were limited to the borderland either in terms of actors involved or politico-economic ramifications. An opportunity to cooperate on what Boutros-Ghali had perceived to be ‘practical’ issues had failed, and Varosha retained its role as a political rather than socio-economic resource. In May 1995, Turkish Cypriot authorities reopened a church in Varosha as an icon museum for the public; later, in the light of the Greek Cypriots’ S-300 missile deal in January 1997, Denktash announced that he would not only shelve his ‘implicit’ agreement to the CBMs if the missile deployment went ahead, but that Varosha would be socially and economically integrated with the main city.

7.6 The Saliency of a Dualistic Borderland

The preceding analysis has demonstrated that the urban development of both Nicosia and Famagusta remained politically and geographically divided, despite various practical third party and local level interventions. Finally, it remains to briefly consider the saliency of the partition boundary in this light, reflecting both the ‘ground-level’ reality and the on-going contested representation of the border by the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities in the urban context.
7.6.1 Land uses along the 'green line'

Despite the limited nature of their study of central Nicosia in 1994, Kliot and Mansfield drew two notable conclusions. First, it was argued that Nicosia's urban division was relatively 'open', failing to constitute a real 'obstacle' for those wishing to cross. It has been previously noted in Chapter 6 that this can be largely refuted given that, while Ledra Palace constituted the main crossing point on the island, crossing procedures were specific and highly restrictive, even for the 'foreign tourist'. However, Kliot and Mansfield's second conclusion, that Nicosia's land-use development on either side of the 'green line' pointed towards the entrenchment of 'separateness', appears more valid and deserves further consideration. In Nicosia, the dualistic character of its urban core established in 1963 was to remain. As Figures 7.5 and 7.6 illustrate, while the rejuvenation measures—municipal/NMP- and central government-led in the south, but only municipal/NMP-led in the north—halted both the complete degradation of the Old City of Nicosia, and the complete loss of CBD functions within-the-walls, land uses along the 'green line' remained fundamentally unconventional for a city 'centre'.

This detailed survey of the contemporary land use along the 'green line', both to its north and to its south, revealed an array of characteristics, of which three generalisations appear to be key. Firstly, extensive evidence of military security features in the urban landscape remained on both sides, but most notably the existence of the Turkish Forces 'military zone' which represented a de facto extension of the 'green line' northwards (Figures 7.5 and 7.6). While the 'military areas' were less conspicuous along the 'green line' in the north, the border line was more distinguishable. This contrasted with land uses in the south which more generally abutted or spilled over into the 'green line', especially in areas affected by military unmanning agreements (disused public buildings within the UNBZ are bracketed).

Secondly, on examination of the land use itself, it was generally discernible that there remained a high density of vacant/derelict plots, workshops, while the zoning of trade and residential plots was more haphazard, especially when compared with the 'planned' land uses under the NMP (see Plate 7.4). In Chrysaliniotissa (Figure 7.6) and Arab Ahmet (Figure 7.5), for example, locations of the two 'Area Schemes' of the NMP, traditional residential land uses had been consolidated, and in both Ledras Street and Arasta Street (Figure 7.5) there were signs of a resurgence in shops, restaurants and
Figure 7.5  Land uses along the western half of Nicosia's 'green line'

Figure 7.6  *Land uses along the eastern half of Nicosia's 'green line'*

open meeting places. It was also, as Kliot and Mansfield suggested, 'business as usual' at the communities' respective municipal markets.

Overall, nonetheless, the 'green line' was, as Kliot and Mansfield hypothesised and in line with the NMP's conclusions some twelve years earlier, non-conducive to residential and 'desirable' commercial uses, while at the same time attracting 'obnoxious' land-uses. And even in areas which had (re)gained a residential character on both sides, land-uses considered 'undesirable' by the respective municipal authorities were very much evident (e.g., Kurdish 'settlers' housed in the east of north Nicosia, and 'red light' areas in certain locations along the 'green line' in the south). This contributed to the overall disjointed and 'unplanned' nature of the urban centre as a whole.

7.6.2 Representations of the border

Within that urban landscape, even so, it was necessary also to consider not only the 'real' but also the 'symbolic' messages transmitted by the 'green line'. The city is a powerful medium for the communication of messages—political, economic, socio-cultural—both consciously and subconsciously, through the very design of space and the way in which it is used. It is argued that the messages, often explicit but sometimes hidden, within the urban landscape of Nicosia (and Famagusta) reproduced opposing boundary discourses of a nekri zoni (for the Greek Cypriot community) and of a sinir (for Turkish Cypriots).

On the Greek Cypriot side, at the northern tip of Ledras Street (Figure 7.5), the main retail and commercial axis for the city until its demise from 1963, a memorial allowed visitors to peer into the 'green line', and (uniquely) to take photographs (Plate 7.7). The memorial sought both to consolidate the representation of pain and suffering from the 1974 'invasion', while at the same time silencing the visitor who might have concluded that the border was permanent. In a number of instances, the presence of the boundary was also used for economic advantage, in addition to political commentary; at 'Berlin No.2' cafe, with 'Check Point Charly' written across its signboard, the visiting tourist could sit and 'relax' only five metres from the 'green line' (Figure 7.6). Indeed, other seemingly 'perverse' interests in the border were arguably
Plate 7.7  Ledras Street viewing point and memorial, Nicosia (south)

Plate 7.8  'Border' shop, Kyrenia
Plate 7.9  The border as ‘spectacle’: advertising hoardings in Dherinia

Plate 7.10  Varosha through the looking-glass
exploited by UNFICYP themselves. A weekly ‘Green Line Tour’, led by UNFICYP between the CFLs, had become something of an event for which diplomats, UN personnel, relatives and other accepted guests were encouraged to enjoy the ‘pleasure’ of a walking tour through the ‘landmarks’ along the ‘green line’ (see Chapter 6).198

The Greek Cypriot government increasingly voiced its opinion that the use of the UNBZ as a ‘tourist site’ was a ‘disgrace’. 199 This seemed somewhat hypocritical, nonetheless, given a similar venture of their own making at Dherinia, south of Famagusta. Here, cafe rooftops and binoculars were to be hired out so the visitor could look out and northwards, across the UNBZ (Plate 7.9). On view was the ‘ghost town’ of Varosha, a potent symbol of death and the visible failure of time to heal wounds and dispel memories (Plate 7.10). While this might have come across as ‘negative sightseeing’, it specifically provided an opportunity to visually tour the northern landscape, presenting an ‘idealised’ image of what Turkish Forces had created while, at the same time, insulated the voyeur from the real dangers of gazing on the ‘other’. 200 Sant Cassia observed;

‘[t]hrough this looking-glass border, mimesis and exchange conspire to create and service images of the self and the other. [...] Indeed, all the Green Line [sic] is intended to be seen and seen as not intended to be seen’.201

Whilst photography was prohibited in all other locations along the UNBZ, its acceptance at Dherinia (as on Ledra Street) served to allow for an appreciation of the ‘death’ of the dead zone in a controlled environment. It has been previously illustrated how the Greek Cypriot community’s policy of dhen xehno (‘I don’t forget’) reflected an unrelenting desire to return to their previous homes, and their rejection of the present as a ‘solution’; in the border context, Gumpert and Drucker similarly observed that ‘‘[l]ife on the other side’ becomes an obsessive mystery, curiosity made compulsive because access is blocked. In a strange way, the ‘Green Line’ [sic] invites, but bars individuals from crossing”.202 In Nicosia, in particular, the marriage of tourism and the boundary appeared most striking.203

Characteristically, no such sites to gaze from were presented north of the ‘green line’, nor anywhere else along the UNBZ’s northern CFLs. In contrast, one of only very few obvious references to the presence of the UNBZ was the succinctly titled ‘Border’ shop north of Ledra Palace checkpoint (Plate 7.8), along with more general graffiti on
the walls which, in contrast to the south, lined sections of the 'green line'. When considered together, messages in both Nicosia and Famagusta sought to reproduce the discursive representation of the UNBZ as, on one hand, a *nekri zoni* and, on the other, a *sinir*. These were supplementary to the 'ground-level' realities of a distinct border region negatively affected in terms of socio-economic land-uses.

### 7.7 Conclusions

In spite of the various endogenous and exogenous efforts to dilute the significance of the *de facto* partition boundary between the two communities, it remained a salient feature of the urban landscape on both of its sides. It has been demonstrated that cooperation over Nicosia's sewerage system and its Master Plan failed to 'spill over' largely because, in themselves, the two regimes were the result of a specific time (to a large extent exploiting the confidence generated through the 1977 and 1979 'high level' agreements respectively) and, also, of a specific place and space (both political and functional, at the level of the municipality). This concluding statement will be considered in more detail.

Firstly, it must be acknowledged that technical and functional issues—even 'superordinate goals' like the sewerage system—were inherently dealt with within cultural contexts, in which they were embedded. Efforts at resolving transboundary issues in Nicosia demonstrated that these disputes, set as they were in a protracted conflict setting, were not simply about water, electricity, sewage or urban planning; they took on many of the attributes of the larger conflict. The parties involved viewed the transboundary resource dispute as a manifestation, or microcosm, of the political rivalry. Only when transboundary initiatives were accepted by the high-level political actors—a process successfully undertaken in Nicosia with the sewerage system and the NMP, but wholly unsuccessful with plans for the rejuvenation of Varosha and NIA—was any degree of effective cooperation possible.

However, and secondly, as a direct result of this political system being played out in local 'places', the system was also 'infected' by localised factors. The most important factor in Nicosia, it would appear, was the role of human agency in the form of local political leaders—Lellos Demetriades and Mustafa Akinci—who found the
political 'space' at the municipal level to cooperate. To better understand the contrasting evidence highlighted above—complex, contradictory processes of both cooperation, coexistence, and conflict in Nicosia—it must be recognised explicitly that boundaries (de jure or de facto) have a differential impact at different scales of analysis. This largely explains why the NMP, in the words of Lellos Demetriades, acquired some sort of 'diplomatic immunity', operating at a scale where the effect of physical space and of geographical proximity in producing functional interdependencies was always relatively clear and unproblematic for the respective political leaderships.

However prosaic a common sewerage system may seem, it constituted an important and possibly epochal punctuation mark in Nicosia's post-partition history: the moment when geographical separation had to take the functional factor into account. Technocratically, if not socially, this suggests that there developed something of a 'borderland' (if not 'epistemic') community in urban Nicosia, a border region functionally linked by a small number of resource management issue areas. As such, this case reflected Gooneratne and Mosselman's conceptualisation of a 'resource based' border region (see Chapter 2, Table 2.1). While it is not possible to state that the relatively high level of cooperation in Nicosia was the consequence of the urban context, it is conversely not possible to say that the UNBZ was homogenous and uniform along its length. The 'urban' context evidently witnessed more substantive and interactive transboundary cooperation than the 'rural', as considered in Chapter 6.

This brief analysis has revealed a much more nuanced understanding of the geography and history of cooperation in the contemporary city of Nicosia. Cooperation in post-partition Nicosia has never been simply about solutions to practical, functional issues; its current form may be read as a 'rationalisation' of partition rather than an attempt to transcend it. Cooperation was largely limited to the practical problems of the UNBZ and its associated spatial discontinuities because it had been, and remained, inextricably enmeshed in relations of political power. A city is not separate from the problems of society at large, and neither Nicosia nor Famagusta were an exception.

Endnotes:

It received the World Habitat Award in 1989.

UNDP (1991a: 2).


Indeed, in 1973 the Nicosia Water Commission had been working on the installation of a pressurised water supply system for Nicosia-within-the-walls when the events of 1974 halted work with only 40% of the system complete (WDD, 1977: 89). It was later finished along with the laying of sewerage pipelines in the late 1970s/early 1980s (see below)

The Cyprus Mail (7/9/74); Interview, Technical Manager, Nicosia Water Board, Nicosia (south), 27/11/96.

The Cyprus Mail (3/4/75).

The Cyprus Mail (22/8-15/9/74).

The Cyprus Mail (17/6/75; 19/10/76). Specialists from the UK pump manufacturers were eventually enlisted to visit the station.

UN S/11717, para. 44.

Le Marquand (1977).

The Cyprus Weekly (19-25/6/80); UN S/15149, para.32.; UN S/15502, para. 33.


Jansen (1995: 15). This was particularly important in Nicosia within-the-walls, where feasibly it was impossible to manage the distribution to the two sectors separately (Kesishian, 1990; Interview, Manager of Water Works, Turkish Municipality of Nicosia, Nicosia (north), 2/4/97).

Interview, Manager of Water Works, Turkish Municipality of Nicosia, Nicosia (north), 2/4/97.

In 1984, for example, south Nicosia received a total of 10.1 mn.cu.m/yr. supply, 3.5 mn.cu.m of which came from Morphou. In 1989, north Nicosia received 3.8 mn.cu.m/yr. from the south (WDD, 1989: ix-10).

The Cyprus Weekly (26/11-2/12/93); Interview, Technical Manager, Nicosia Water Board, Nicosia (south), 27/11/96.

Interview, Senior Water Engineer, ROC Water Development Department, Nicosia (south), 21/11/96.

Manolis Christofides, cited in The Cyprus Weekly (26/6-2/7/81).


Cyprus Today (28/3/92).

Interview, Manager of Water Works, Turkish Municipality of Nicosia, Nicosia (north), 2/4/97.

Planning Bureau (1975a: 20).

Interview, Technical Manager, Nicosia Water Board, Nicosia (south), 27/11/96.

27 The Cyprus Weekly (26/11-2/12/93). Moreover, the Water Board argued that 50% of the water supply in northern Nicosia was lost in pipe leakages. Their northern counterpart put this figure at 20%, optimistically given that leakages in the south were themselves alleged to be 14% of Nicosia's supply (Interview, Technical Manager, Nicosia Water Board, Nicosia (south), 27/11/96; Interview, Manager of Water Works, Turkish Municipality of Nicosia, Nicosia (north), 2/4/97; The Cyprus Weekly, 22-28/3/96).

28 Interview, Technical Manager, Nicosia Water Board, Nicosia (south), 27/11/96.

29 Interview, Manager of Water Works, Turkish Municipality of Nicosia, Nicosia (north), 2/4/97.

30 By 1997, it was estimated that Morphou waters were over 860 ppm Cl\(^-\), while Kornos treatment plant waters were 80 ppm Cl\(^-\) (Interview, Planning Official, ROC Water Development Department, Nicosia (south), 18/9/97).

31 The Cyprus Weekly (17-23/1/97).

32 The Cyprus Weekly (26/1-1/2/96); GWR (23/10/98).

33 Southern Nicosia, it should be noted, was not totally freed from dependency on the Morphou supplies as they awaited the completion of other water development works (Interview, Principle Water Engineer, ROC Water Development Department, Nicosia (south), 10/12/96). A long-awaited dam on the Pedhieos was finally being considered by the late 1990s, for the recharge of the valley aquifer up to Nicosia, while plans for the serving of Nicosia by a second desalination plant at Larnaca remained some way off. The Dhekelia desalination plant, opened in 1997, did not yet have the capacity to supply the capital (The Cyprus Mail, 9/12/94; WDD, 1997).

34 Thorpe (1961: 12, 102).


36 Konteatis (1967: 15).


38 Interview, UNFICYP Humanitarian Assistant, UNBZ Sector 4 (AUSCON), 5/6/97. Famagusta's authorities argued that, before they were linked with the Morphou supply (via north Nicosia), the Greek Cypriots had been supplying 2,400 cu.m./day (Interview, Municipality Water Officer, Famagusta, 9/5/97).


41 GOC (1946: 21); Iacovides (1993: 19).


43 Interview, Former Chief Engineer of Famagusta Water Board, Phrenaros, 2/12/96; Interview, UNFICYP Humanitarian Assistant, UNBZ Sector 4 (AUSCON), 5/6/97.

44 Interview, UNFICYP Humanitarian Assistant, UNBZ Sector 4 (AUSCON), 5/6/97. The reactivated Orduvevi Hotel and the student houses were also linked, via another pipe, to the Varosha water tower (see below).

45 Interview, UNFICYP Humanitarian Assistant, UNBZ Sector 4 (AUSCON), 5/6/97.
Transboundary Urban Space

46 The Cyprus Today (3/9/94).

47 Interview, Municipality Water Officer, Famagusta, 9/5/97.

48 ROC (1996a: 21).

49 ROC (1984: 5).

50 Drury (1972: 177).

51 Drury (1972: 178).

52 ROC (1984: 5).


54 MacLaren (1968).

55 MacLaren (1968: 6).

56 The Cyprus Weekly (16-22/5/80).

57 Of Nicosia within-the-walls, 87% had been completed, while outside the Old City only 62% was done (The Cyprus Mail, 13/9/75). This included 52 miles of sanitary sewers and approximately 16 miles of domestic connections (SBN, 1994: 3).

58 This deserves a qualification, however; separate Turkish Cypriot municipalities had been established since 1958, and received recognition through the ROC constitution (see Chapter 4).

59 This Kibris report was cited in The Cyprus Mail (21/9/77). In fact, outstanding problems with the sewage from Orta Keuy, the Municipal market, and the Saray Hotel areas in the north were no doubt a prime motivator for the Turkish Cypriots.

60 It is perhaps no coincidence that, at the same time, Denktash was to again forward his proposal of the setting up of a 'Ministry of Cooperation', singling out areas for joint action (water, energy, environment, tourism), and providing a stage-by-stage approach to an overall settlement. It had been forwarded at Vienna the previous April, and was once again rejected by the Greek Cypriots for stressing division (into federal bodies) instead of unity (The Cyprus Mail, 16-17/2/78).

61 Interview, Lellos Demetriades, Mayor of Nicosia (south), Nicosia (south), 1/11/96. At the time, mayors were appointed (by the Archbishops) and not elected. The Greek Ambassador, according to Demetriades, was strongly opposed to the proposal.

62 Interview, Lellos Demetriades, Mayor of Nicosia (south), Nicosia (south), 1/11/96.

63 Souter (1987: 87) recognised this as a particular sticking point with Denktash.

64 EIU (1978, 4th qtr: 14).

65 UNS/12946, para. 82.

66 UNS/13369, para. 36.

67 The Cyprus Weekly (16-22/5/80); Interview, President of Communal Liberation Party and former Mayor of Nicosia (north), Nicosia (north), 10/4/97.

68 The Cyprus Weekly (16-22/5/80); UNS/16858, para. 46.
69 UN S/18102, para. 41.
72 The Cyprus Weekly (16-22/5/80). This is not to suggest Greek Cypriots were wholly satisfied with the dependency arrangement. In October 1990 Demetriades had to calm fears of the northern authorities blocking sewage flow to the Mia Milia in the event of a war (The Cyprus Weekly, 12-18/10/90).
73 The Cyprus Weekly (26/10-1/11/79).
74 UNDP/UNCHS (1984: 1).
75 UNCHS appointed an International Consultative Panel.
76 UNCHS (Habitat) (1988: 4).
77 By 1981, southern Greater Nicosia was 147,000 in population, and north Nicosia was 41,000 (Heinritz, 1987: 78).
82 UNDP/UNCHS (Habitat) (1985b: 2). As part of the second phase, international consultants held seminars at Ledra Palace Hotel (UN S/17227, para. 41).
83 Chrysaliniotissa had 31% of its housing stock vacant by 1987 (Gillet, 1988: 14).
84 Irwin (1989: 22); UNHCR (1993: n.p.).
85 The Cyprus Weekly (25-31/1/85).
86 Interview, Greek Cypriot planning consultant, former Greek Cypriot Team Leader of NMP, Nicosia (south), 25/9/97.
87 The Cyprus Weekly Magazine (No. 1, November 1989, p. 13, emphasis added). Although, this contradicted the Sewerage Board’s threat in 1975 to carry out a completely new study ‘in the light of present facts’, with a new plant at Kaimakli, if the Turkish Cypriots refused to cooperate (The Cyprus Mail, 13/9/75; 27/6/76). Nonetheless, Robertson, MacLaren’s consultant, later confirmed that the slope of the ground had meant that it was prohibitively expensive and difficult to construct two separate systems (Lafreniere and Mitchell, 1990: 75), and the ROC Ministry of Interior was clearly concerned over temporary sewage disposal measures (The Cyprus Mail, 28/9/74; 13/3/76).
88 The Cyprus Weekly (13-19/2/87); Rossides (1995: 116).
89 This local perception was further illustrated by the owner of Fylakiou, a restaurant adjacent to the ‘green line’ in Axiothea Street, who proclaimed that “[i]f we go the buffer zone will be extended into Chrysaliniotissa” (The Cyprus Weekly, 14-20/11/86).
90 Twenty years later Povek was still protesting, this time against the subsequent pedestrianisation of the Old City’s CBD, whilst describing the NMP as little more than ‘window dressing’ (The Cyprus Mail, 6/11/74; 8/11/75; 6/11/96).
Sophocleous (1984: 20, 23); Heinritz (1987: 80). For the Greek Cypriots, the Peak Value Intersection (PVI) had, of course, been shifting southwards since 1963 (ROC, 19766: 27).

92 Interview, Member of the Greek Cypriot NMP Team, Nicosia (south), 16/10/96.

93 The author was able to obtain from the Greek Cypriot authorities classified aerial photo images of central Nicosia in October 1963 and in September 1993. Through a stereoscope, the 'scar' of derelict land-use along the 'green line' is clearly visible.

94 The Cyprus Weekly (28/6-4/7/91); The Cyprus Mail (7/7/92); Ashiotis (1995). The ROC House of Representatives had allegedly enacted legislation as early as October 1974 for the reduction of rents on dwellings where the tenant could prove their living had been affected by proximity to the UNBZ (The Cyprus Mail, 13/10/74).

95 Illustrating the gradual institutionalisation of the border area, by now an 'ad hoc' committee of the ROC House of Representative for the Nicosia Green Line' had been established (The Cyprus Weekly, 20-26/9/91).

96 By June 1993, however, with a change of government, Povek declared that Clerides had put the scheme on ice, and in December it emerged that a wider fiscal deficit had encouraged the ROC government to revise Vassiliou's commitments (The Cyprus Weekly, 25/6-1/7/93; 17-23/93). Of 600 housing improvement applications, only 19 had been passed. Although in response to growing local protests, the Ministry of Interior announced in May 1994 that 186 applications had been approved (The Cyprus Weekly, 17-23/12/93; 20-26/5/94), the scheme was eventually abandoned by the end of 1996 (Interview, Senior Planning Officer, ROC Town Planning and Housing Department, Nicosia (south) 20/11/96).

97 Papadakis (1993: 11).

98 Hadjipavlou-Trigeorgis and Trigeorgis (1993: 353-4) have argued that, in applying an 'evolutionary approach' to conflict resolution in Cyprus, it is necessary to consider as part of any territorial settlement the creation of a third, 'joint area', which would include a reunited Nicosia, and Varosha. Kumar has similarly suggested that cities—as multi-ethnic enclaves—could play a priority role in breaking through to an overall settlement (Kumar, 1997b: 139). There appear to be three possible scenarios for Nicosia: reunification (reestablishing spatial integrity), permanent sharing of autonomy (based on historically interlocking but separate sovereignty), or international status (i.e., to 'depoliticise' the city, akin to the corpus separatum of Jerusalem proposed by the UN in 1947) (Emmett, 1997: 16).

99 There were, for example, subsequent calls from AKEL to extend this particular scheme to Dherinia after the August 1996 killings—AKEL MP Christos Mavrokordatos declared that "[p]eople must be made to feel secure so that vitality along the confrontation line is maintained" (The Cyprus Weekly, 27/9-3/10/96; 8-14/11/96)—and to the whole of Ayios Dhometios, once again after shootings incidents in early 1998 (The Cyprus Weekly, 14-20/98).

100 ROC (1996a: 31).

101 In the south, the Island Plan was 'temporarily substituted' for the rural areas by a largely ineffective regulatory instrument, the 'Policy Declaration for the Regulation of Development and the Protection of the Environment' (ROC, 1996).


103 Cyprus Today (Vol. 15, May-August, Nos. 3-4, p.1). Other 'divided cities' include Jerusalem, Belfast, and, arguably, Berlin, Beirut and Sarajevo remain essentially divided (Abbott, 1998).
EIU (1990: 1st qtr., 20). Simitis was to proclaim eight years later, on the first ever visit of a Greek President to the island, that Nicosia’s ‘wall of shame’ would fall as other walls had fallen (CyBC radio, Nicosia (south), 25/6/98 (BBC SWB EE/3264)). By contrast, Denktash always refused to employ the ‘Berlin Wall’ analogy, largely because the economic inferiority of the Turkish Cypriots made such an idea impermissible (Drevet, 1991: 324).

Interview, Head of Hydrology Division, ROC Water Development Department, Nicosia (south), 15/11/96.


Lafrenière and Mitchell (1990: 78).


P.J. Taylor (1993: 318) argued that the ‘local state’ could appear a ‘double-edged sword’, promoting its own policies in opposition to the central state.

Young (1994: 115).

Young (1994: 144-5).

Demetriades (1998). The NMP bicommunal teams never quite meet ‘weekly’ as they intended, yet despite interruptions where joint activities were frozen, such as between November 1983 and February 1984 after the Turkish Cypriot UDI (UN S/16596, para. 47), intercommunal dialogue was relatively regular.


Stein (1983).

The Cyprus Weekly (27/9-3/10/96).

The Cyprus Weekly (25-31/10/96).

UN S/13672, para. 32; UN S/13972, para. 28.


UN S/488, para. 22.


Scott et al. (1996b: 16), studying the intergovernmental regime of NAFTA, coined the term ‘limited cooperation logic’, whereby logic recognises functional interdependence of Mexican and US border cities but fails to envisage actual integration.

Interview, Resident Representative of UNDP Mission in Cyprus, Nicosia (south), 30/9/96.

Interview, Greek Cypriot planning consultant and former Greek Cypriot Team Leader of NMP, Nicosia (south), 25/11/96. For UNHCR, as third party, a practical reason for this stunted growth was that “because of the control of the border we have limited checkpoints”, so that there was limited access for contractors doing the ‘brickwork’ to pass freely (Interview, UNHCR Chief of Mission, UNPA, 24/9/97).
Interview, Member of the Greek Cypriot NMP Team, Nicosia (south), 16/10/96; Interview, Greek Cypriot planning consultant, former Greek Cypriot Team Leader of the Nicosia Master Plan, Nicosia (south), 25/9/97.

Interview, Resident Representative of UNDP Mission in Cyprus, Nicosia (south), 30/9/96.

Lafrenière and Mitchell (1990: 77). Indeed, Akinci has argued that the real issue behind cooperating over the sewerage was, for the Turkish Cypriot community, the historical discharging of effluents into the Kalindira (‘Pedheios’) river (Interview, President of Communal Liberation Party and former Mayor of Nicosia (north), Nicosia (north), 10/4/97).

Alemdar (1992: 19); Interview, Special Political Adviser to the President of the TRNC, former UNDP consultant, Nicosia (north), 28/4/97. Even the most pro-rapprochement Turkish Cypriot opposition party leader argued, if reluctantly, that “we don’t have anything that we are cooperating [on] in the true sense”, although the blame for this was placed on the Turkish military who, it was argued, ultimately sanctioned any bicomunal contacts (Interview, President of the New Cyprus Party, Nicosia (north), 8/4/97);

As Kabaalioglu (1997: 264) exasperated frankly, “money is spent in order to treat the Greek shit which now comes into the Turkish territory here, and this is something which they proudly talk about whereas it is something which should be neglected”.

Kocher (1995: 14); Interview, Senior Planning Officer, TRNC Department of Town Planning, Nicosia (north), 29/4/97.


Interview, Greek Cypriot planning consultant, former Greek Cypriot Team Leader of the Nicosia Master Plan, Nicosia (south), 25/9/97.

UNDP (1990; 1991c). At the time, effluent load at the plant came from an equivalent of 45,000 persons from south Nicosia, and 12,000 persons from north Nicosia, in addition to untreated factory liquids from both sides.


UNDP (1991c: n.p, emphasis added). Lafrenière and Mitchell (1990: 76) also talked of its role as a “precedent for cooperation”.

UNOPS were to take up the funding of this modernisation stage, reportedly worth US$3-4 mn.

Drury (1972: 178). Except for at Lefka (see Chapter 6), the railroad was dismantled in 1952, although recent reports suggest its rebuilding (The Cyprus Mail, 25/11/98).

Melamid (1956: 360).

UN S/11568, para. 26. Later, in 1990, the Commander of the Turkish division gave reasons for this post-cease-fire advance; ironically, he argued that he did not think it wise to take only half the city and so create “a second Nicosia” (The Cyprus Mail, 22/7/90).

Interview, Planning Officer, Famagusta Municipality, Famagusta, 12/5/97; Interview, Senior Planning Officer, TRNC Town Planning Department, Nicosia (north), 29/9/97. According to the de facto population census in 1996, it was estimated that Famagusta held 27,637 people.

Interview, Mayor of Famagusta Municipality, Famagusta, 12/5/97.
Transboundary Urban Space

144 UN S/12463, para. 36.

145 UN S/12463, para. 35.

146 UN S/12715, Annex. No reference was made to concrete percentages, nor to substantial border adjustments around Varosha during these talks. It is worth noting that, in contrast to parallel developments in Nicosia, the construction of Famagusta’s sewerage system (which lay largely in Varosha) was never rejuvenated.


149 Indeed, by now the Chairman of the (Greek Cypriot) Famagusta Refugee Movement, Constatinos Lordos, saw an agreement on Varosha as “the first bridge—to be followed by many others—in order to close the abyss separating the two communities” (The Cyprus Weekly, 31/10-6/11/80).

150 UN S/19228, Annex.


154 UN S/18880, para. 25-26. The buildings continued to be used for students.

155 UN S/19228, Annex.


157 Boutros-Ghali (1992: 32, para. 56). Cooperative projects on agriculture and the sharing of water or electricity resources were highlighted as suggestions.

158 “To translate the general principles of international law regulating interstate [sic] relations into positive action [...] [and to] provide credibility for affirmations of peaceful intentions and for the declared determination of states to comply with their contracted international obligations” (Goldblat, 1993: 17). For other state-centric examinations of CBMs, see Byers et al. (1987), Efinger (1990), Ben-Dor and Dewitt (1994a) and Feldman (1994).

159 UNGA Resn 2625 (24/10/70); UN (1989).


161 Ben-Dor and Dewitt (1994b: 24-27); (1994c: 334).

162 UN S/13672, para.49.

163 It was not until February 1980 that Greek Cypriot Foreign Minister Rolandis outlined his interpretation of such ‘measures’: seeking financial assistance for the Turkish Cypriot community, reactivating Nicosia International Airport (NIA), and seeking UNDP assistance with public utility works island-wide (UN S/13972, para. 43).


165 UN S/24472, paras. 38-39.
UN S/24830, para. 63.


See, for example, UNSC Resn. 939 (29/7/94).

UN S/24472, Annex.

UN S/26026, para. 37.


UN S/26026.


UN Yearbook (1994: 386). For an illustrative map of the original UN proposal for Varosha, see UN S/629, Annex II.

EIU (1993: 3rd qtr., 10).

The Cyprus Weekly (29/10-4/11/93).

UN Yearbook (1994: 387). While the main Turkish Cypriot opposition parties (Akinci’s Communal Liberation Party (TKP) and the Republican Turkish Party (CTP)) both endorsed the CBMs as a major step towards an overall solution, the ruling National Unity Party (UBP) was hostile to the idea of a step-by-step approach if the two sides were not on an equal footing from the start.


Cumhurriyet (29/5/93), cited in Civisilli (1996: 114); Cyprus Today (29/1/94).

UN S/262, para. 36. Although with similar reservations, the Security Council’s resolution of 29 July reaffirmed that the CBMs would “facilitate the political process towards an overall settlement” (UNSC Resn. 939 (29/7/93). A similar, neofunctionalist optimism was evident in the Council of Europe’s interpretation of the CBMs (CE, 1994: 19, para. 55).

The 40-page report was cited in Cyprus Today (29/1/94, emphasis added).

The Cyprus Weekly (18-24/2/94); Dodd (1995: 11).

UN S/380, para. 3.


UN S/467, para. 4, as endorsed in UNSC Resn. 939 (29/7/94).

On 28 August, the TRNC National Assembly declared as such (Dodd, 1995: 15). The collapse of the Turkish lira in April 1994 exacerbated this perception of an economic imperative (Richmond, 1998a: 206).

UN S/262, para. 9; UN S/467, para. 7.

UN S/488, para. 17.

Bayrak radio, Nicosia (north) (10/1/97) (BBC SWB EE/2814). Notably, within Denktash’s threat to reopen Varosha was a rejection of the Greek Cypriot belief that the area was 80% theirs pre-1974; instead, the Turkish Cypriot leader argued, 70% of the land ‘around’ Varosha had been vakf before it was ‘seized’ by the Greek Cypriot ‘rebels’ of the 1950s (EIU (1997: 2nd qtr., 27). The ownership of vakf land (belonging to the Turkish religious foundation), which was estimated to be over 23,500 donums, dates back to Ottoman times.

Kliot and Mansfield (1994b).

This systematic survey substantially updated Kliot and Mansfield’s (1994b: 159) earlier, limited attempt to plot the land use along the ‘green line’. It is based on the identification and categorisation of land use at the ground-level (i.e., the ground floor to buildings, although, often for security reasons, there are few buildings along the ‘green line’ which have substantial functions above the first floor). Locations were often revisited at weekends and in evenings to record different functions for buildings. Each symbol categorises land use of approximately 5 metres in length.

In May 1989, following the shooting of a Turkish Cypriot soldier, UNFICYP’s long-standing proposal for military deconfrontation along ‘sensitive areas in Nicosia’ was implemented, specifically at Paphos Gate, Ayios Kassianos, and the derelict school at ‘C77 Jeep’. An extension to this agreement failed to transpire (see Figure 6.6, Chapter 6).


For similar conclusions on Nicosia’s two ‘National Museums, see Papadakis (1995: 62).

For security reasons, it was not possible to photograph the other branch of the ‘Border Shop’, which was located only metres north of the Turkish Cypriot checkpoint at Ledra Palace, north Nicosia.

See, for example, The Blue Beret, May 1996, p.6. It is noticeable how the ‘green line’ was often quoted interchangeably with the UNBZ, on both sides of the island and internationally. This is not strictly correct (see Chapter 4). It was first formally referred to by the UN in May 1964 (UN S/5679).

In early November 1996, negative TV coverage in the south forced UNFICYP’s spokesman to reject their alleged role as a ‘travel agency’ (The Cyprus Mail, 13/11/96).

Arreola and Curtis (1996). In interview, the Mayoress of Dherinia was obviously uncomfortable with this development, but she recognised it as being ‘therapeutic’ for the local population (Interview, Mayoress of Dherinia, Dherinia, 2/12/96).

Sant Cassia (1998: 95, original emphasis).


Timothy (1995) rightly noted the strong links between the two.

This intermediate political space was, to some extent, recognised in Harbottle’s (1970: 120-122) illustration of the productive local-level meetings of mukhtars and village elders during the mid-1960s.


Lyne (1990: 43).
Chapter 8
Conclusions: Cyprus, Partition and Transboundary Resource Management

8.1 An Overview

This thesis has demonstrated the significant relationship between partition boundaries—both territorial and socio-spatial—and the complex process of transboundary resource management. This has been achieved through an examination of the debate amongst political realist and liberalist accounts of the origins and forms of ‘international’ cooperation, as manifested in the context of the de facto partitioned island of Cyprus. This final chapter reconsiders the research questions forwarded in Chapter 1, and brings together the main descriptive and analytical elements of the study so as to highlight its original contribution in three concluding arguments. The first reflects on an understanding of the interplay between ‘high’ and ‘low politics’, and seeks to explain their relative importance to transboundary relations in Cyprus. The second conclusion highlights the political economy of recognition, and its predominance in the context of this de facto partitioned state. The third reaffirms the utility of adopting a spatially differentiated perspective in understanding the ‘hows’ and ‘whys’ of transboundary resource management, and stresses the importance of geographical scale and territoriality in contextualising such analysis. The final two sections of this chapter then suggest broader conclusions emerging from this study.
8.2 Explaining Transboundary Resource Management in Cyprus

How does the process of transboundary resource management operate in this partitioned state? To what extent have institutionalised principles and practices of transboundary resource management been able to develop since partition?

This thesis has contributed to embryonic discussion on the multifaceted concept of cooperation and its ability to provide a richer explanation of processes of transboundary resource management. Using case study analysis, a solid empirical base has been built for the principal contentions of this study, which are detailed below.

8.2.1 The rise and fall of ‘low politics’

Why are mechanisms formed to deal with some transboundary resource management issue areas, but fail to achieve success in connection with others? Is it possible to de-link resource conflict issues from the protracted political conflict, so that the former could be resolved without reference to the latter?

It has been demonstrated that post-partition Cyprus exhibited a number of islands of cooperation over transboundary resource management, and a strong case has been put forward that the conflict has not been unchanging and intractable, and that accommodatory relations were evident in the midst of conflict. In so doing, a number of crude stereotypes and over-simplifications have been challenged. Both observers of, and parties to, the Cyprus conflict have often argued that because so many elements of the conflict are identity-based and existential, the conflict is zero-sum by definition and joint problem-solving is impossible. Assumptions of non-cooperation in Cyprus are not merely reductive; in addition, they suggest that those who fail to cooperate are hopelessly incorrigible, those who do cooperate inherently enlightened, and the relationship between these appropriate and legitimate.

First, in terms of identifying the origins of transboundary resource management in Cyprus, it is possible to conclude that the 'state' alone was not successful in generating these transboundary, arguably 'cooperative' initiatives. By the late 1970s, it became clear that a new intercommunal framework was emerging, stimulated by the
Conclusions

'internationalisation' of the local political environment. The high-level agreements, the growth in international funding for bicommunal transboundary cooperation, and the development of leaders at the municipal borderland level, all marked a significant break with the preceding period as they introduced 'new' actors into the political arena.

In this case, general theories of transboundary cooperation—particularly 'classical realist'—can be rejected because of their treatment of interest formation and norms as extraneous variables. Admittedly, at this 'borderland' scale, however, transboundary resource management was largely to benefit the Greek Cypriots. It is suggested that this was due to the presence of a more active 'borderland' community (both in the rural and the urban context) to the south of the UNBZ, and the provision of third parties. In Nicosia, the 'entrepreneurial leadership' of Lellos Demetriades, benefiting from the pro-rapprochement support of Mustafa Akinci and an essentially 'neofunctionalist' UNDP policy, was able legitimately to negotiate a unified sewerage system. While assisting both sides over the long-term, it primarily alleviated an immediate problem for the Greek Cypriot municipality, and once transboundary contacts were successfully established at the municipal level, Demetriades was able to exploit the 'shadow of the future' and initiate a common planning initiative in the form of the NMP. These developments appeared to concur with the differences between what Martínez distinguished as 'national' and 'transnational' borderlanders. The former are unwilling or unable to develop more than low-level contact with the 'other side', while the latter are immersed (Martínez assumed that this was voluntarily) in a binational system.

In addition to local actors, clearly third parties allowed the communities to establish cooperative contracts with the 'other'. Intermediaries—UNFICYP, UNDP, UNHCR, or the EU—acted as links, supplying information and monitoring compliance. Regarding the cooperation over sewerage, for example, Demetriades made it clear that were it not for the UN, in addition to the "considerable diplomatic as well as engineering skills" of the Canadian consultant, there would not have been any progress.2 Benefiting from the presence of UNFICYP, an informal third party framework developed which provided for access and utilisation of transboundary resources without the threat of recognising the northern or the Turkish military authorities. At times, they operated not only as guarantors but also as gatekeepers. Through this arrangement, Greek Cypriot farmers, fishermen, industrialists and hunters sought to break the border
Conclusions

As such, these transboundary arrangements demonstrated the extent to which the ideas of issue area ‘hierarchy’ and the boundaries between ‘low’ and ‘high politics’ were dissolved. The politics of agenda formation (high/low issues) and more subtle and differentiated than ‘realists’ would have us believe. The raising—or politicisation—of a transboundary issue also came ‘from below’; in so doing, this rightly illustrated another dimension in the means and ways ‘international relations’ are being conducted. Contrary to the simplicities of orthodox ‘realism’, a plurality of interests, ideas and actors were engaged in political processes transcending the UNBZ. Notably, borderlanders themselves were not merely passive victims of structures and decisions imposed from above. Some responded to marginalisation by turning the border into an economic resource through smuggling and, more recently in the south, the accessing of grant-economies, although such strategies were insufficient antidotes to overall socio-economic disadvantage in the UNBZ, and in areas of close proximity.

Indeed, spatial proximity could not be ignored when looking to explain the significant cooperative developments detailed above. The effect of physical space—of geographical ‘closeness’—in producing these functional imperatives was clear. The most durable and long-lasting transboundary resource management initiatives were limited to the borderland scale. Such cooperation was largely determined by the practical, functional problems of the UNBZ and its associated spatial discontinuities. Indeed, many collaborative ventures were a response to geographical interdependencies in existence prior to 1974; a distinction can be made between transboundary interdependencies established pre-partition (water and electricity supplies), those established in the ‘active’ period of partitioning (Nicosia’s sanitary sewerage system), and those established post-partition (the Nicosia Master Plan)—for analytical as well as chronological reasons. The simplest form of transboundary resource management was clearly based on existing networks—be they infrastructural in focus (as with water and electricity), or social (as with the trade unions and ‘other’ transboundary resource needs). Existing and preconditioned networks or institutions were reused to reduce transaction costs, but were not formed necessarily for that purpose.
Conclusions

Moreover, what the scale of analysis division demonstrated is how an ‘issue area’ was not internally consistent—transboundary ‘water’ was managed differently between the two communities at the border scale compared to how it was managed at the island-wide scale. In turn, this study has highlighted an important ‘horizontal’, spatial consideration to the traditional, ‘vertical’ distinction of ‘low’ from ‘high’ politics.

For instance, while the UN were often at pains to stress the island-wide nature of their many and diverse activities in Cyprus, this was never close to being the case. The 1991 UNDP environmental project and 1993-94 CBMs largely faltered, it could be argued, because although certain issues may have been concentrated in the border region (where they might have appeared more ‘functional’ or ‘superordinate’), they were in essence interrelated with issues of the macro-political economy of the Cyprus conflict. The Nicosia sewerage project and NMP dealt with relatively functional and technical matters geographically limited to the *de facto* border area, and exemplified the role of local actors operating within a less-overtly politicised space of the municipality. The NMP remained something of a flagship for those seeking reintegration. Yet, fundamentally, spatial proximity and interdependency proved determining forces for this utilitarian integration. The political reality instead suggested that isolated efforts at transboundary cooperation were incapable of generating any quantifiable momentum—neither for a reunion of the two sides to Nicosia, nor certainly for a resolution to the Cyprus conflict. While neofunctionalists were right to recognise common interests, these did not necessarily ‘spill over’ and alter the hierarchy of ‘low’ and ‘high politics’ over the long-term.

It remains to recognise, however, that this diversity and complexity co-existed with, and was directly related to, a central over-arching political cleavage over recognition and sovereignty. Resource management conflicts were patently concerned with territory, borders and ‘national’ sovereignty. The ‘normal’ politics of interest-groups, classes and localities were invariably distorted by the *de facto* partition, and subordinated to the ‘Cyprus problem’. Transboundary resource management failed to develop this further, instead confirming the primacy of politics over economic and ‘other’ issues in the border region, and the limited involvement of sub-state actors in new structures. This persistent centralisation of political power was to prove a limiting factor.
Conclusions

This would appear to reflect what has been identified elsewhere as the 'dual paradox' of 'spill over'. Firstly, for the process to begin, a non-controversial, separable issue had to be found; but if the issue was that unobtrusive, then it was highly unlikely that there was reason for further expansion. Consequently, the two communities (and their associated problems) were simply reinforced. Secondly, if the issue generating cooperation was more likely to facilitate 'spill over', then neofunctionalism would become 'self-disconfirming'; the (predominantly state) actors would realise, in addition to short-term gains, a long-term threat to their sovereign power. Excepting instances where there exists a functional imperative (determined by spatial proximity or pre-existing interdependencies), due to this paradox 'low politics' may rise but may then fall again, pushed down by the high politics issues of 'national security' and the political economy of recognition.

8.2.2 The political economy of recognition

How has the general 'milieu' of Cyprus affected the progress of both transboundary resource management and intercommunal peace?

In a number of ways, therefore, the political economy of recognition has represented the crux and kernel of the struggle over transboundary resources. With fear of stating the obvious, the creation of a partitioned Cyprus was not the product of contractual agreement. In turn, the raisons d'être of both new 'states' were undermined (in the case of the ROC) and poorly defined (in the case of the TFSC). Accordingly, they became inward-looking and mutually antagonistic. Post-partition, the Cyprus conflict was to become primarily a political one, with self-identity inseparably married with a sincere concern for political and economic recognition.

In turn, transboundary resource management in Cyprus was never simply about utilitarianism or rational planning. It was inextricably enmeshed in relations of power, dependency, and identity. What was perhaps more remarkable about island-wide transboundary problems—in light of the considerable amount of positive rhetoric that they generated at the borderland scale—was how the central state remained, as a symbol, a key if not the key determinant of policy-making in transboundary affairs within Nicosia, Famagusta and along the rural sections of the UNBZ. The 'recognition
Conclusions

The "recognition game" came to dominate transboundary relations leading to a distributive, zero-sum or 'us' versus 'them' approach to transboundary resource disputes. Socio-psychological dynamics (in particular ethnocentric and exclusionary perceptions) played a key role; historical factors weighed heavily among the determinants of the decisions affecting transboundary relations.

Consequently, it is plausible to suggest that this 'recognition game' was in effect part of James' broader 'game' of international relations, whereby political elites sought to (re)gain power relative to their enemies through whatever means possible. This was illustrated after the events surrounding the 1990/91 environmental study, when, as far as the Turkish Cypriot side was concerned, the UNDP country programme as a whole became 'inactive' - the UNDP's 'member states only' approach was considered to be a fundamental impediment to its operational effectiveness. A similar reading was made of the more recent 'bicommunal' approach;

"instead of helping to improve intercommunal relations this concept has now become a political obstacle to co-operation [...] [M]any projects which would be beneficial to one or other community do not lend themselves to a bicommunal approach, for geographic, social, cultural, or economic reasons".

Without a logical pattern of administering funds to assist directly in locality-specific problems in the north, the country programme's success had been severely limited spatially. While the south became officially 'developed', the north—with little financial resources per se—remained unofficially 'under-developed'. This only served to reproduce the Turkish Cypriot belief that the UN, in continuing to recognise the monocommunal ROC since 1964, was violating its equal political status. The further implication of this 'internationalisation' of arguably 'intercommunal' affairs was that, in operating 'behind their back', the UN afforded the Turkish Cypriots no consideration of legitimate rights and interests. The UN's often technocentric and ecocentric discourse essentially advocated anti-partitionism which, in turn, reflected and articulated rationality tied to 'state' institutions and practices. At the inviolable core of the discourse lay ideas concerning the nature of transboundary resource management which ultimately provided the techno-/eco-centricism's raison d'etre. These ideas—the natural, organic-like whole of the 'Island' of Cyprus, its 'small' territorial size, and its common, unified past and/or future—existed in the form a particular set of discursive limits which actively influenced the management of political space in Cyprus.
Conclusions

By extension, in Cyprus the UNDP, unlike UNFICYP and UNHCR post-1974, failed to sufficiently remould its operational approach to the changing political realities on the island. This appeared even more anomalous given that much of the necessary groundwork was laid by the controversial introduction of a UN peacekeeping force from 1964. The key difference was, however, that the UNDP formed an integral part of the optimism and nominal ‘unity’ that came with the establishment of the new republic in 1960. Other UN bodies only entered the theatre once the intercommunal troubles resurfaced, and recognition of the de facto existence of a separate Turkish Cypriot voice had evolved. To paraphrase Escobar, the UNDP in line with United Nations resolutions, chose the internationally recognised ROC as its ‘client’.

Key to this was the ‘objectification’ of ‘Cyprus’ through the UN’s discourse, a ‘Cyprus’ within which it failed to recognise (or, rather, failed to recognise by way of self-criticism) its own internal role. An organisation devoting itself to the cause of developing across borders was itself an element of the most powerful system of state (i.e., border) legitimisation in the world.

This state-centric, essentially asymmetric approach meant that the rhetoric of managerialist interdependency in the case of Cyprus, whereby international organisations such as the UNDP oversaw state (‘national’) development, was subverted by the reality of intradependencies on the island. In this sense, and as Gallarotti has argued more generally, third parties can in fact prove destabilising forces rather than simple palliatives—their solutions discourage states from pursuing more substantive or long-term solutions to international (or in this case, ‘transboundary’) problems when they are a source of destabilising linkages and, ultimately, when it ‘takes sides’ in conflicts.

Within this systemic framework the UNDP, just as UNFICYP had done in fossilising the pre-1974 political map, became an important instrument of statecraft; throughout its 37-year mission, it found itself hostage as each side sought to justify recognition.

This thesis has therefore demonstrated how a lack of regard for developing principles of transboundary resource management—the exchange of information, equitable utilisation, and avoidance of harm to other resource users—was fundamentally undermined by a general disinterest in a duty to cooperate, supporting a ‘realist’ belief that the two communities’ interests in Cyprus remained unchanged for a longer period of time than anticipated by third parties, even in the light of new institutions.
observation requires one notable clarification, however; there was in fact extensive ‘interest’ in cooperation, in that its appearance in whatever form, in whatever context, was to be scrutinised by the respective community authorities to a remarkable extent. Managing ‘cooperation’ became a matter of judging how important it was in terms of potential political gains/losses. Transboundary resources were seen in absolute but also (and especially) in relative terms.

In the light of these conclusions, it should not have been surprising that there were literally no formal agreements to cooperate over transboundary resources at the high level, even in the case of continuing to supply water and electricity. For successive Greek Cypriot governments such a move would have been tantamount to accepting the present state of affairs for the indefinite future. Instead, to overcome this ‘temporary’ set up—although one which found them supplying more water than they were receiving, and nursing an unpaid multi-million pound electricity bill—cooperation was presented as a ‘humanitarian gesture’. Cooperative transboundary resource management was essentially ‘repackaged’ to make a political gain out of an economic loss. This form of cooperation was still based on some form of calculation as the communal authorities were able to weigh up the costs of defaulting. In this sense, the sanctions were in the form of moral pressures from the other party or other, third parties.

For the Turkish Cypriot and Turkish authorities, by contrast, the hope was that a ‘step-by-step’ approach on the ‘smallest issues’, such as common municipal problems, would lead to minimal friction (i.e., maintenance of a satisfactory status quo) and for the ‘grand’ issues to be considered only later. Thus, while the Turkish Cypriots argued that Greek Cypriots blocked joint economic and environmental projects because of questions of recognition, the Greek Cypriots replied that Turkish Cypriots often used the ‘bait’ of joint projects to achieve extra recognition, and that the Greek Cypriots would then be accused of ‘backing off’ when they refused to agree on ‘official’ labelling. Island-wide cooperation over so-called ‘low politics’ issues was therefore to exist only in the management of transboundary water and electricity supplies, for two specific reasons: the fact that there were interdependencies pre-dating the events of 1974 and, secondly, because they were considered to be ‘humanitarian’ in nature. In sum, there was a self-evident basic need for these resources for both communities, even though that need was as much governed by improving their negotiating position as by physical resource scarcity. The collaborative regime overseeing water transfers at the borderland
scale exemplified the dilemma of common interests or, to take it one step further, the 'tragedy of the commons' in that both sides sought to resist individually rational behaviour (that would lead to a collectively suboptimal outcome in game-theoretic terms) and, instead, exercised mutual restraint by collaboratively managing the resource. Much of UNFICYP's diplomatic work, although fitful, was the manifestation of this dilemma of common interests.

In both absolute and relative terms, through the electricity linkage the north made all the material 'gains' well into the mid-1990s. And again, cooperation over water supplies benefited the Turkish Cypriot side throughout, particularly when after the mid-1980s its own contributions to Nicosia's supply diminished, inspite of the continued perception of a quid pro quo relationship. When these two mechanisms are considered together, however, and set within the context of strategic interests, it is evident that benefits through the 'water-for-electricity' arrangement were shared more equally. The Greek Cypriot side realised that by participating in this transboundary regime, even when it became unbalanced, they avoided both diplomatic and military losses—the former to the international community for failing to supply 'basic needs' to the Turkish Cypriots, and the latter to Turkey who remained throughout a potential military threat. To further illustrate this point, there would have been, for example, no incentive for cooperation over transboundary water supplies in the border region (where the Greek Cypriots, as the 'upstream' user, held the trump card) if the Turkish Cypriots themselves had no reciprocal power over the south. In practice, however, the north did: in the form of supplies to Nicosia but more significantly humanitarian principles and military threats. Indirectly, there was reciprocal interdependence.

It is important for political geographers and international relations analysts to accept, therefore, that cooperation (as with conflict) is not uniformly interpreted as homogenous. The concept is diverse in origin; additionally, its development is perpetually contested and reformed. In order to move the debate forward, a most important step lies in distinguishing between different kinds and bases of cooperation. In general, given the inevitable coincidence of strategies, interactive decision-making involves an element of cooperation and conflict.
8.2.3 The institutionalisation of territoriality

How useful is it to use a ‘borderland’ perspective to address problems of resource management affecting two or more (de jure or de facto) states? In Cyprus, to what extent is the ‘borderland’ an appropriate managerial unit in the context of transboundary resource problems?

In presenting a spatial (island-wide/borderland) perspective on the Cyprus conflict, it has already been noted how it was possible to better comprehend the often ‘hidden’ geographical origins of transboundary resource management. Two additional observations are possible, and concern the parallel processes of deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation in Cyprus which have significantly contributed to a non-uniform character of the ‘borderland’.

First, the plurality of actors operating within the borderland, coupled with the establishment of a number of transboundary regimes, led to a breaking down of the ‘barrier’ function of Cyprus’ de facto partition boundary from 1974. It is useful to return briefly once again to the original functions of the UNBZ. Groom threw favourable light on its formation in that it provided a new starting point, of a bicomunal and bizonal character;

“the process of coming together must be slow and incremental, at least initially, through practical co-operation at the grass roots level in a variety of functional dimensions. Indeed, the situation has a seemingly paradoxical element in that the precondition for coming together is a period of separation”.

Through the UNBZ, the overall level of violence and number of territorial ‘violations’ were subsequently contained and, ultimately, an inter-NATO war has thus far been prevented. This is an imperative given that, as the events of August 1996 fully illustrated, there were occasional dramatic failures in containing violence. The UNBZ technically remained a cease-fire regime and, in principle, the separation of Greek Cypriot from Turkish Cypriot provided a necessary degree of security from which members of the two communities could move toward functional relationships not impinging on ethnic issues. If, as Burton and Väyrynen have suggested, this de facto territorial position had been accepted at an early stage, the two separate autonomies could have been helped more efficiently to arrange positive functional arrangements in
areas of common interest. In Nicosia and in rural parts of the UNBZ, there was limited acceptance of the territorial ‘realities’ in the first few years of partition.

It is necessary, however, to examine a second observation drawn from analysis of the borderland. The juxtaposition of the growth of local transboundary activities with on-going territorial controversies, such as those over CFL fortifications along the UNBZ, illustrated how the border could be diluted and yet consolidated at the same time and in the same place. Indeed, of much greater significance to this study was how the Cyprus conflict became increasingly (re)territorialised. While it may appear ironic that boundary discourse is so pervasive in a political environment where only one international boundary officially exists (between the ROC and the UK SBAs, albeit in two sections), there is clearly much more of significance to this. Chapter 4 fully illustrated how ‘partitionism’ and ‘partitionists’ laid strong foundations in the 1955-74 period of hostilities. From 1960, the colonial buffer between the two communities was largely removed, inviting direct confrontation; territorially, the Cyprus conflict subsequently evolved from being amongst other things a contest over freedom of movement within a fragmented state (during 1963 to 1974), to a much more dyadic if less violent debate essentially concerned with sovereign rights (from 1974). In turn, the Cyprus conflict became not only a de jure intranational (Greek Cypriot-Turkish Cypriot) and international (Greek-Turk) conflict, but also a de facto ‘international’ (read: transboundary) dispute, which could only add to the complexity of its resolution. Both Kumar and Stultz recognised that partition plans often involved the creation of just two political entities, which would suggest the promotion of this dyadic approach to conflict.

The nebulous concept of ‘local autonomy’ was, from 1964, to complicate virtually all high-level negotiations, although the TRNC did not require ‘international recognition’ in order to influence political relations; in fact, for the Turkish Cypriot side ‘recognition’ remained a ‘political’ rather than legal matter throughout. A position of transition was adopted—a ‘statelet in limbo’, somewhere between de facto and de jure recognition—from which they were to bargain for more ‘judicial realism’. It became increasingly practical for foreign governments and international organisations to note the existence of two autonomous administrations on the island, and to operate within that framework. Within this framework, territoriality and Paasi’s ‘socio-spatial consciousness’ were visibly contested in Cyprus. Territorial identities and narrative
accounts of ‘us’ and ‘them’ were produced and reproduced, not just at the state level but also beyond the ‘official narratives’ at the local level, where spaces of exclusion and inclusion were similarly pronounced. The ‘ROC-TRNC’ clash, nonetheless, remained the most widely recognised discourse. The ROC emphasised the development of ‘divided sovereignty’, while the TRNC developed a discourse of ‘partitioned sovereignty’.

The UN, boundary-managers par excellence, greatly facilitated this process. From 1974, while the island hosted the internationally recognised ROC and two UK Sovereign Base Areas, and an unrecognised TFSC/TRNC, in addition it was divided into a United Nations-administered buffer zone, and a Turkish Forces-administered Varosha. The associated boundaries, as noted in Chapter 2, reified the power ‘within’, whereby territoriality was further institutionalised. The prime exemplar was the political construction of the TRNC, arguably along ‘Western’ lines, which facilitated the use of such rhetorical devices as ‘state security’ and ‘territorial integrity’ by the central authorities. In this sense, the Turkish Cypriot leadership (willingly) fell into the ‘territorial trap’ of reifying the northern de facto state as a fixed unit of sovereign space. The management of the UNBZ by UNFICYP, however, also fell into this ‘trap’. UNFICYP’s role in ‘micro-diplomacy’ that became part of ‘everyday’ life in and along the UNBZ should not be underestimated. In handling resource management issues, while respecting innocent civilian activity and the exercise of property rights, UNFICYP successfully adopted a damage limitation approach. Yet in this sense resources within the buffer zone were ‘quarantined’; the benefits to be gained from this action were confined to only certain spaces in the border region and, in turn, to certain issue areas as dictated by security concerns. By definition, this boundary management was always sub-optimal because UNFICYP (if unwillingly) were, in essence, generating their own powers of ‘inclusion’ and ‘exclusion’. As has been argued more generally, the ‘good fences make good neighbours’ approach in fact prevented intercommunal association. UNFICYP’s mandate reaffirmed the primacy of military and security over both socio-economic and psychological concerns.

What these two additional observations also imply, therefore, is the need for the realisation that the UNBZ was not a monolith. There is a tendency to approach a ‘border’, ‘boundary’ or ‘borderland’ as a single, homogenous entity. Clearly, in the case of Cyprus, the ‘boundary’ must be understood as an amalgamation of different, and
often conflicting, patterns and processes. The UNBZ (as ‘borderland’) had indeed become, to employ Gupta and Ferguson’s description, a place of ‘incommensurable contradictions’, where cooperation developed in parallel with conflict, deterritorialisation with reterritorialisation, the ‘official’ with the ‘unofficial’. Immediately following the population exchanges in September 1975, generally the UNBZ became for the two communities, on one hand, the prospective boundary of two separate political entities, while on the other a point of severe contest. In this sense, the local communities’ discourse reflected ‘official’ policy yet, ironically, both state’s ‘official’ representations of the UNBZ were to be also undermined by processes operating at the local scale. Firstly, for the Turkish Cypriot authorities and the Turkish Forces, the dynamic rejuvenation and ‘pushing back’ of many parts of the UNBZ by local Greek Cypriots was to remain a constant threat to their maintenance of a single, definable and uncontested border. Secondly, Greek Cypriot representations of a single, territorially integral, island state, legitimised and rationalised by UN resolutions, became increasingly contested by de facto territorial realities which, over a thirty-four year period, saw multiple boundaries develop and become institutionalised into a more single boundary overall.

8.3 Prospects for Cyprus

What recommendations may be made for the future management of transboundary resources in Cyprus, whether in a political climate of reunification, or in one of perpetual de facto or eventual de jure partition?

The preceding analysis does not license any unqualified predictions regarding the prospects for transboundary resource management in Cyprus. Clearly, de facto cooperation and its associated ‘hidden’ political geographies must be examined within the context of systemic and historical processes of change affecting the de facto partitioned state. From this, a number of implications are discernible.
8.3.1 Implications for a resolution of the Cyprus conflict

Questions remain over the potential for furthering cooperation beyond its current confines. Overall, it has been implicitly suggested in the analysis of a number of issue areas that the operational character of 'cooperative' transboundary resource management is at times unsustainable over the long-term. This observation requires clarification on two accounts.

First, transboundary cooperation in post-partition Cyprus was near impossible and where it was possible, it was often unpopular and consequently furtive. The inability to identify the net direction of transboundary interactions between the south and the north provided evidence of institutional insensitivities to transboundary issues in Cyprus. In this light, it should not have been surprising that cooperation did not just remain tacit, but fundamentally contested. The 'secret diplomatic', quid pro quo agreement of 'swapping' water for electricity, for instance, became asymmetrical largely because of its inherent informality and lack of compliance checks. In terms of absolute versus relative gains, the 'water-for-electricity' arrangement clearly transformed from the late 1980s and, while the cooperative relationship should not be undervalued in itself, it evolved such that it gave little more than a confused and inherently contestable message to both communities: to the south, Turkish Cypriots were increasingly considered to be 'free riders' while, to the north, Greek Cypriots were criticised for cutting off what were understood in the north to be 'compensatory' electricity and water supplies.

Similar cautionary observations can be made of the NMP, which was to stand out as the ground-breaking transboundary linkage developed in Cyprus after 1974. As noted in Chapter 7, the inertia the NMP generated was insufficient to 'spill over' into more substantive transboundary structures, a shortfall which may be only just beginning to dishearten those (particularly Greek) Cypriots and interested third parties who placed so much hope in its potential. Bicommunal activities sponsored by international agencies were also undermined by the absence of any perceivable 'spill over'. It has been noted with regard to the 'two tracks' of conflict resolution, of which 'Track II' Denktash generally characterised as interference in 'internal affairs', that they were in danger of failing to converge but instead continuing into the distance unconnected. In relation to this, concerns over the 'routinisation' of transboundary activities have been
raised by Strassoldo, who suggested that while 'charisma' gets less expressive and events become 'bureaucratised', "cross-border relations may come to be seen as any other social relation, with various mixes of cooperative and conflictual elements".42

Secondly, it would be plausible to conclude from this observation that, as with most protracted social conflicts, the sense of inertia in Cyprus' political and territorial status quo remained dominant. The repeated UN initiatives, the ebb and flow of US and UK interest in the search for a solution, and the battle to avoid the blame for breaking up any talks and/or other transboundary relations gained some sense of inevitability. This view fails to do justice to the considerable efforts of the UN in particular, yet the search for a resolution was not only supported but perhaps even complicated by a mix of ad hoc and loosely-coordinated inter/supranational-led initiatives across the broad range of transboundary resources. The diplomatic attention given by the two communities to the US, UK and EU demonstrated how tightly the UN's hands have been tied in facilitating a solution alone. This study would appear to substantiate observations that the existing status quo has a dynamic of its own, and this inertia has been underestimated.43 Furthermore, and as sections of this study have clearly demonstrated, the introduction of a 'third party' to assist the conflict resolution process may not guarantee any progress at all. Rather, what that party represents to both internal and external interest groups is crucial. The experiences of the EU and the UNDP have fully illustrated the complex position an international organisation may play in Cyprus.

8.3.2 Contested territory: state, inter-state or trans-state management?

As the spectre of the 1960 settlement remains in evidence, those on and off the island continue to ask how a (con)federated Cyprus would function? Groom proposed that thinking in terms of psycho-social communities and networks, and of complex interdependence and regimes, provides a range of instruments of governance which may be appropriate for many trans- and extra-Mediterranean ties.44 In considering this, it is useful to return to P.J. Taylor's interest in encouraging trans-state, trans-territory, and trans-nationality processes.45 In analysing the conflict, taking for granted the boundary—be it portrayed as de facto or de jure—obscures precisely what is at issue: the question of boundaries, sovereignty and identity. Therefore, and mirroring O'Dowd's conclusions on the Northern Ireland conflict, what needs to be negotiated and
agreed is the 'meaning' and 'management' of boundaries and state sovereignty. Krishna has suggested that the process of 'decolonisation' necessitates the denationalisation of the narratives that embody space and time. Following this logic through, as long as boundaries, borders, territory and sovereignty remain contested, Cyprus will fall short of any semblance of a postcolonial condition.

Nonetheless, settlement of the sovereignty issue should not be considered the **sine qua non** for an improvement in 'transboundary' resource management island-wide. 'National' solutions to a 'national' problem, which emphasise intercommunal borders and relations within given state frontiers, invariably succeed in 'managing' rather than 'resolving' because of their failure to generate transnational strategies involving transborder institutions and non-territorial forms of political participation. It has been argued elsewhere that, in order to address UNFICYP's poor peacemaking record, detailed agreements could in principle be reached regarding the delineation and demarcation of the CFLs, and of the status and use of the buffer zone. Political boundaries would clearly be less important the greater the powers of a federal government, but only in certain functions; as long as economic disparities of the two communities are divorced from negotiations, the stability of any settlement is likely to remain questionable. And should a prospective central federal authority have exclusive jurisdiction on physical borders, or on the management of water resources? The repudiation of exclusive territoriality would, thus, be a prerequisite to ending the 'recognition game', in parallel with the advancement of non-ethnic modes of mobilisation around issues of resource management, the environment and planning. Only then is it likely that the *de facto* border could be straddled, never mind transcended. As Martínez noted generally:

"conditions on the border may change, but the innateness of the boundary as an agent of abrasion will not disappear unless itself completely disappears".

Cyprus' boundaries will have to be rewritten or unwritten, to expurgate the imagination, before they are erased in reality.

Therefore, while certain neoliberal institutionalist initiatives which profess to depoliticise particular areas of conflict may appear naive in the wider context, it is unnecessary to 'throw the baby out with the bath water'. Briefly put, a neofunctionalist emphasis on 'low politics' issues as an incentive for transboundary cooperation is not
necessarily invalidated because, arguably, the duty to cooperate over transboundary resource management has become not only a recognised principle to encourage the peaceful resolution of transboundary conflicts per se, but also to facilitate more equitable management and sustainable development of (non)renewable resources. The state and its people, ecocentrics may note, are not the only ‘victims’ of partition in this region; it is plausible to argue that any transboundary resource management initiative deserves recognition in its own right, whether it contributes to the resolution of the wider conflict or not. This would appear to be particularly paramount given the normative questions relating to environmental policy and a broadening of the ‘security’ concept in the Mediterranean as a whole.  

Although transboundary resource mechanisms, regimes, and institutions may be limited in scope and power, they may begin to redefine political identities by developing transboundary (political) communities which undercut the fixation with national territoriality. It would be necessary to swallow two bitter pills, however: for (either ‘official’ or ‘unofficial’) Greek Cypriots seeking cooperation over transboundary resources, cooperation would have to be conducted between two politically equal parties, while for Turkish Cypriots this would necessitate dropping their call for international, de jure state recognition. Particularly in the light of the precedents being set within the EU, just as transboundary resource management continues to develop so its value as an international norm increases. Thus, it is plausible to suggest that the negotiating rhetoric of the Greek Cypriot ROC may transform from its preoccupation with sovereignty and territorial integrity towards a determination to recognise and even prioritise transboundary issues within an enlarged Europe.

What is currently holding back such an entente is the Turkish Cypriot belief in self-determination, a similar yet apparently contradictory international principle which is, in turn, perceived to threaten the raison d’être of the ROC. Yet, in time such a scenario could be accommodated within a variety of ‘solutions’ to the conflict, be it federation, confederation, or even the annexation of the TRNC to Turkey (assuming Turkey were to fall further under the EU umbrella in the coming decades). Far from being mutually contradictory, in principle autonomy and regionalism is encouraged within a union of states. Accordingly, transboundary resource management appears inherently but not necessarily at odds with the broad principle of self-determination.
because self-determination, while loaded in ideals, may be achieved through non-state-threatening means.

It remains to be stated, nevertheless, that in spite of the apparently legitimate need for creating more devolved transboundary authorities given the democratic and economic benefits, the potential repercussions for both governments have retained their saliency and primacy. In Cyprus, it is apparent that the speed with which usage of the island’s resources is likely to increase has quickly outpaced developments in the realm of effective managerial arrangements. It is self-evident that both communities, living under insecurity and anticipating final political solutions, could not manage to the optimal degree the natural and infrastructural resources of their community. Echoing Azar’s thesis, the notion of ‘sharing’ territory in Bosnia, Palestine and Cyprus “may be based on universal concepts of human rights and equality, of multiculturalism and shared identities, but it is not based on the reality of protracted conflict, animosity, hatred and mistrust”. A belief that new institutional frameworks would lead to the domination of localised cultural identities and practices relies largely on a fetishised understanding of liberal institutionalism. It has been left to Adelman to suggest that engendering confidence is much more difficult than the position adopted by traditional CBM theorists in cases of intercommunal conflict where;

“issues of mutual recognition of the other are in question and when there are also disputes over territory, [...] in situations where existential questions and turf wars are central”.

Ben-Dor and Dewitt themselves concluded that CBMs were out of their depth when dealing with the ‘substantive issues’ which require most attention. Groom similarly suggested, for the Cyprus case, that it was more fruitful to start with behaviour, building local ties of a practical, infrastructural nature rather than substantive issues of constitutional principle.

Again, however, it has been clearly illustrated that in the Cyprus case this raised the feasibility problem of identifying ‘issues’ unrelated to the political economy of the antagonists. It remained to facilitate an international regime for the management of the natural resources of Cyprus which was simultaneously acceptable to the principal actors involved and desirable in terms of well-defined normative criteria. Transboundary resource management became surrogate for deeper-rooted political and economic struggles relating to resource distribution and medium-term ‘state’ development. Any
hopes in formally separating the 'humanitarian' from the 'high-level' politics, a process which remained surprisingly salient for many parties, would have to somehow overcome these dilemmas. From this, in terms of the complex associations between security and transboundary resource issues, it can be suggested that substantive transboundary management frameworks look only feasible in the context of a durable resolution to the broader Cyprus conflict (if not, the Greek-Turk conflict). Yet, the point should not be ignored that the 'management' of transboundary resource conflicts, rather than their resolution, is likely to further entrench the protracted social conflict. This 'managerialist' approach is premised, and one could say flawed, on a pragmatic acceptance of communal separation within Cyprus and, as it cannot supersede it, it uncritically accepts its primacy and permanency. The discourse on 'partition' and 'geographical separation' exacerbates this.

8.4 Partition and Transboundary Resources

*What lessons, if any, can be learned from Cyprus to develop understanding of managing transboundary resources in other partitioned states, and other boundary-related contexts?*

In answer to the questions posed by Waterman, in general in the case of Cyprus an uneven distribution of resources hindered the separate development of the *de facto* partitioned state, failed to encourage its eventual reunification, and prompted the party better endowed with a particular resource to consolidate its separate development. Throughout this study reference has been made to transboundary resource conflicts in other, contemporary and historical cases of partitioned states. As Chapter 3 illustrated, the Cyprus case is not unique in all its characteristics; problematic interrelations between partition and transboundary resources are similarly as important in other cases of state partition. Further, comparative work is required to better distinguish commonalties, and the framework forwarded in Chapter 3 should inform such work.

By examining the Cyprus conflict as a case of partition, however, this thesis has highlighted two politico-geographical processes which it has been demonstrated may significantly affect the development of transboundary resource management: the
dialectic of state sovereignty and the self-determination of peoples and, secondly, the functions of territorial and socio-spatial boundaries. Far from ending conflict between self-identifying groups—be they so-called peoples, nations, or states—territorial separation through partition is often a causal factor in the (re)emergence of disputes, such as the creation of transboundary resources, and the seemingly inevitable conflict of interests over their subsequent management. Partition in this sense can be regarded as a temporary expedient until either a more suitable or a more permanent solution can be found. These are familiar objections in this context, though they do not carry less weight for being so.

There are clearly a number of features which combine to make this case ‘unique’: its island status, its spatial proximity to motherland actors, the relative absence of divided cities in all but a few other states, and the particular mix of colonial, regional and superpower actors in the ‘milieu’. More generally, however, Cyprus arguably represents a prototypical case of the need to blend legitimate identity group interests with the advantages of collective cooperation; directions towards resolution of this hold significant implications to the global political system as a whole. Kumar recently argued that Bosnia constituted a turning point in the international community’s approach to partition as it transpired that ‘divide and quit’ might turn into ‘divide and be forced to stay’. In the twenty years leading up to Bosnia, developments in Cyprus necessitated a protracted commitment to a protracted conflict in an unstable region. As this thesis has shown, events in Cyprus already provide ample evidence of the need to invest in transboundary institutions, as an easier route to ‘withdrawal’. And, unfortunately, with the persistence of the dysfunctional nation state ideal, and the efficacy of territoriality, the canons appear to be established for further partition.

Endnotes:


2 The Cyprus Weekly (16-22/5/80).

3 In this light, there may well be scope for further spatially sub-dividing the ‘straddling’ type of transboundary resource (see Chapter 1), so as to distinguish those resources located only within the environs of the borderland from those which extend beyond the border area into ‘non-border’ affected areas.

4 Schmitter (1996).
Conclusions


7 *Interview*, Special Political Adviser to the President of the TRNC, former UNDP consultant, Nicosia (north), 28/4/97.


9 *Interview*, UNDP Resident Representative in Cyprus, Nicosia (south), 12/12/95.

10 Consequently, while the settlers provided economic security, the Turkish Forces provided military security (Wilson, 1992: 136).


12 Necatigil (1995: 10). Employing the argument that the south had 'vested interests' in maintaining the economic *status quo*, Denktash consistently called for a new *modus operandi* (TCHRC, 1983: 59).

13 Escobar (1995: 107) argued, in the context of developing states, that institutions like the UN discursively and institutionally construct 'client categories'.

14 T. Mitchell (1995: 151) has made observations elsewhere on the role of USAID.


16 *Interview*, UNDP Resident Representative in Cyprus, Nicosia (south), 30/9/96.


18 *Interview*, UNDP Resident Representative in Cyprus, Nicosia (south), 30/9/96.


20 Further examples of this debate are cited in Lafrenière and Mitchell (1990: 83).


27 Illustrating the more general saliency of 'international' boundaries at the *fin de millénaire*, Cyprus, like the Irish case, exemplified in heightened form some of the contradictions at the heart of the European integration process (J. Anderson and Goodman, 1994: 50).

28 Stultz (1979); Kumar (1997c). Groom (1997: 17) noted how 'geographical propinquity' may invite conflict as much as it does cooperation.

29 Hampson (1996: 38).
Conclusions

30 Camp (1998: 150). See Necatigil (1981) for such an approach. Turkey, it must be recognised, may not wish for partition, given the potential for a Greek military build-up in the south (Bahcheli, 1992: 68).

31 Statements of Italian, French, German, Dutch and US officials during 1997-8 concerning the problematic EU enlargement process. In late August 1997, for example, the Italian Foreign Minister controversially noted the “basic fact” that “[t]here are two republics in Cyprus, two entities, two governments” (The Guardian, 28/8/97).


33 These terms originated with Waterman (1996: 351).

34 Harbottle (1991b) went so far as to favourably compare UNFICYP’s post-1964 peacekeeping operations with the British forces’ attempts during the 1950s (UNFICYP was only a third the strength). For reasons previously addressed, however, this interpretation threatens to overshadow the role of the rapid geographical separation post-1964, which progressively saw less intercommunal contacts.


36 Agnew (1994). Krishna (1996: 209) has more specifically highlighted a ‘postcolonial condition’ of preoccupation with national space and borders.

37 See Grundy-Warr (1994a, b) for an introduction of this informal ‘micro’ and ‘macro’ peacekeeping division.


52 Lafrenière and Mitchell (1990: 80).


E. Anderson and Fenech (1994); Richmond (1998b).


Stavrinides (1996: 35) has commented on practical cooperation in general.


Argyrou (1996: 58) described the Turkish Cypriot policy as one advocating 'neo-coexistence'—while they respond to cooperation in principle, such cooperation has a territorial basis wholly unacceptable to the Greek Cypriot position (see, for example, Müftüzade, 1987: 38; Sonyel, 1997: 45).


Ben-Dor and Dewitt (1994b: 340).


Interview, Special Political Adviser to the President of the TRNC, former UNDP consultant, Nicosia (north), 28/4/97; Interview, Fulbright Senior Scholar, Nicosia (south), 30/9/97. This optimism was seemingly fuelled by the decision at the 1997 Glion talks to address the 'humanitarian' problem of the missing persons (Interview, UNHCR Chief of Mission, UNPA, 24/9/97).


Klieman (1964: viii).


Kumar (1997a: 34).
Appendices
Appendix 1: Major Third Party Interventions in the Cyprus Conflict since 1974

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Mediation 'with Muscle'</th>
<th>Mediation</th>
<th>Consultation ('Track II')</th>
<th>Peacekeeping</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>New York meeting (Feb-Mar 1990)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Nicosia 'humanitarian' meetings (July-Aug 1997)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from Keashly and Fisher (1990: 442-43); Mandell (1992: 210-18).
Appendix 2: High-Level Agreements of 1977 and 1979

(a) High-Level Agreement of 12 February, 1977

1. We are seeking an independent, non-aligned, bicommmunal Federal Republic.
2. The territory under the administration of each community should be discussed in the light of economic viability or productivity and land-ownership.
3. Questions of principles like freedom of movement, freedom of settlement, the right of property and other specific matters, are open for discussion, taking into consideration the fundamental basis of a bi-communal federal system and certain practical difficulties which may arise for the Turkish Cypriot community.
4. The powers and functions of the central government will be such as to safeguard the unity of the country having regard to the bi-communal character of the state.

(b) High-Level, 10-Point Agreement of 19 May, 1979

1. It was agreed to resume the intercommunal talks on 15 June 1979.
2. The basis for the talks will be the Makarios-Denktash guidelines of 12 February 1977 and the UN resolutions relevant to the Cyprus question.
3. There should be respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms of all citizens of the Republic.
4. The talks should deal with all territorial and constitutional aspects.
5. Priority will be given to reaching agreement of the resettlement of Varosha under UN auspices simultaneously with the beginning of the consideration by the interlocutors of the constitutional and territorial aspects of a comprehensive settlement. After agreement on Varosha has been reached it will be implemented without awaiting the outcome of the discussion on other aspects of the Cyprus problem.
6. It was agreed to abstain from any action which might jeopardise the outcome of the talks, and special importance will be given the initial practical measures by both sides to promote goodwill, mutual confidence and the return to normal conditions.
7. The demilitarisation of the Republic of Cyprus is envisaged, and matters relating thereto will be discussed.

8. The independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-alignment of the Republic should be adequately guaranteed against union in whole or in part with any other country and against any form of partition or secession.

9. The intercommunal talks will be carried out in a continuing and sustained manner, avoiding any delay.

10. The intercommunal talks will take place in Nicosia.
Appendix 3: Mapping the Territorial Boundary Proposals

(a) Greek Cypriot proposal, March 1977


(b) Turkish Cypriot proposal, April 1978

Sources: PIO (north) (1978); unpublished Turkish Cypriot maps supplied to author by PIO (south).
(c) The Ghali ‘non-map’, August 1992

Source: UN S/24472.

(d) The ‘revised’ Ghali map, October 1992

Source: Fileleftheros (25/10/92).
Appendix 4: In-depth Semi-structured Interviewing

As with most interpretative research, the main goal for this study was the investigation of causal processes in context to elicit a holistic (rather than reductionist) range of explanatory factors; the purpose of this methodological approach was primarily to obtain more in-depth knowledge about the multiple ways interested parties have managed transboundary resources. It is for this reason that, complementary to systematic documentary analysis, a mainly qualitative method of data collection was chosen. Interviews were conducted in a semi-structured fashion, with predominantly open-ended questions to elicit the interviewee’s personal specification of key issues, and their positions on them. In so doing, this approach considered both what has been differentiated as the ‘operational’ and the ‘psychological environment’ of decision-making in policy, to formulate explanations for the progress of, and suggest the potential for, transboundary resource management within the combined ‘milieu’.

So-called ‘snowball’ or ‘purposeful’ sampling was employed as the respondent selection procedure, whereby ‘information rich’ cases were recruited, until ‘redundancy’ or ‘saturation’ when no new themes emerged. These groups were of course not entirely homogeneous, nor were they necessarily mutually exclusive but they constituted a reasonable cross-section of the different parties to the resource management process. It was also evident that, because of the selection criteria employed, the research population and low sample size was not necessarily representative. Rather than applying a generative viewpoint, an attempt was made to explore the different processes involved in generating and maintaining the characteristics of transboundary resource management.

The principal research tools used were two semi-structured questionnaires or ‘checklists’ (see below), with the assumption that an informed, interactive and collaborative dialogue would allow a joint construction of meanings, yielding a fuller and more nuanced response than a structured questionnaire. ‘Checklist A’ was generally used for in-depth interviews (e.g., farmers, fishermen, residents, and other ‘borderlanders’), in particular for narrative reconstruction (‘oral histories’), although themes were amended slightly when interviewing mayors, mukhtars and other local administrative personnel to accommodate more structural and institutional issues.
‘Checklist B’ was generally used with ‘key informants’ and ‘key actors’ (e.g., government elites, UNFICYP, non-government interest groups). Both ‘checklists’ were piloted during preliminary fieldwork in December 1995, and divided into three sections. The first on ‘Checklist A’ comprised of basic socio-economic questions (information for which was not always gathered directly), while the next two used more open-ended questions on resource access and utilisation and perceptions of the border region. ‘Checklist B’ was more formally structured to elicit often specific information, yet this was supplemented by open-ended questions on resource management and any future plans and prospects.

Even though the interview represented a ‘snapshot’, a temporal dimension to responses was always sought for. If respondents led on to a topic that formed a later question, this was followed, and the original point was then returned to. On each section (and notably after the interview), while the checklist acted as guide, space was left to record additional comments and conversations. During the ethnographic interviews, a photocopy of a large-scale map of the relevant area was always available; its appearance sometimes proved an interruption to the conversation, invariably because of its alien representation of what were often personal ‘mental maps’ (as discussed in Chapter 6). It was nevertheless invaluable for locating the details of often geographically-specific issues.

Although English was widely spoken, in less ‘urban’ areas translators were employed although not always required. With agreement, interviews with both ‘key actors’ and sometimes ‘key informants’ were recorded and catalogued, and then later transcribed to facilitate their more accurate representation. Where interviewees are quoted, direct verbatims are presented in order to recognise ‘emic’ terminology (i.e., concepts introduced by the respondent alone). In a number of instances, this necessitated the re-translation of specific sections of the tape record. For ethical reasons, in certain contexts it was anticipated that a recording of the interview was inappropriate, but the respondent’s permission was sought prior to the interview on all other occasions (although recording was refused only once). In a number of cases, respondents were revisited or recontacted to clarify interpretations and meanings.

It is contextually significant to document the location of interviews. While informal interviews were conducted in a variety of localities, the ethnographic research concentrated on eight borderland settlements—three in the south (Dherinia, Potamia,
and Astromeritis), three in the north (Famagusta (‘Gazimagosa’ in Turkish), Lysi (‘Akdogan’), Lefka (‘Lefke’), and two of which were wholly or partly within the buffer zone (Nicosia and Athienou) (Appendix 6 (a)). The general characteristics of these settlements are discussed in the main text, and Nicosia and Famagusta receive detailed treatment in Chapter 7. As anticipated, away from the formal office the interviewing environment was less ‘controllable’. In spite of the patriarchal system which employs the kafenion or kahve (‘coffee shop’, in Greek and Turkish respectively) which made them a problematic meeting place and with a propensity to generate ‘group discussions’, it was often viewed in preference due to available time and to circumvent the social/political complications of respondents inviting a researcher into their home. In turn, although some women were involved, ‘Checklist A’ interviews were biased towards the traditionally (if not wholly realistically) ‘male’ domains of farming and fishing.

**General Layout of Semi-Structured Interview ‘Checklists’**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Checklist A</th>
<th>Checklist B</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Socio-economic status</strong></td>
<td><strong>Contextual background</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>place(s) of residence; primary (and secondary) occupation; type, extent, and location of units of ownership (e.g., land, boat, borehole); other contextual characteristics (often recorded cumulatively as ‘oral history’).</td>
<td>history of agency being represented; chronology of development of (perspectives on) resource management.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Resource access and utilisation</strong></td>
<td><strong>Resource management</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>access to resource units (inc. any procedural issues); utilisation of resource units; socio-economic sphere of influence; history of territorial changes on the above; responses (personal and collective); outstanding problems.</td>
<td>general resource management (i.e., from island-wide, regional and local perspectives); impact of intercommunal conflict on above; collective (i.e., agency) responses; outstanding problems.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Perceptions of the buffer zone</strong></td>
<td><strong>Future plans and prospects</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>personal attitudes (inc. security; degree of personal involvement); collective attitudes (at various administrative and social levels); future plans and prospects.</td>
<td>collective (‘official’) beliefs on development of resource management; personal beliefs on development of resource management; personal beliefs on development of wider conflict.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix 5: UNFICYP's Mandate of 1964

UN Security Council Resolution (186), 4 March 1964

The Security Council

Noting that the present situation with regards to Cyprus is likely to threaten international peace and security and may further deteriorate unless additional measures are promptly taken to maintain peace and security and so to seek a durable solution.

Considering the positions taken by the parties in relation to the Treaties signed in Nicosia on 16 August 1960;

Having in mind the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and its article 2 par.4. which reads: “All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations”;

1. Calls upon all member-states, in conformity with their obligations under the Charter of the United Nations, to refrain from any action or threat of action likely to worsen the situation in the sovereign Republic of Cyprus, or to endanger international peace;

2. Asks the Government of Cyprus, which has the responsibility for the maintenance and restoration of law and order, to take all additional measures necessary to stop violence and bloodshed in Cyprus;

3. Calls upon the communities in Cyprus and their leaders to act with the utmost restraint;
4. **Recommends** the creation, with the consent of the Government of Cyprus, of a United Nations Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus. The composition and size of the Force shall be established by the Secretary-General, in consultation with the Governments of Cyprus, Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom. The Commander of the Force shall be appointed by the Secretary-General and report to him. The Secretary-General, who shall keep the Governments providing the Force fully informed, shall report periodically to the Security Council on its operation;

5. **Recommends** that the function of the Force should be, in the interest of preserving peace and security, to use its best efforts to prevent a recurrence of fighting and, as necessary, to contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order and a return to normal conditions;

6. **Recommends** that the stationing of the Force shall be for a period of three months, all costs pertaining to it being met, in a manner to be agreed upon by them, by the Governments providing the contingents and by the Government of Cyprus. The Secretary-General may also accept voluntary contributions for that purpose;

7. **Recommends** further that the Secretary-General designate, in agreement with the Government of Cyprus and the Governments of Greece, Turkey, and the UK, a mediator, who shall use his best endeavours with the representatives of the communities and also with the aforesaid four Governments, for the purpose of promoting a peaceful solution and an agreed settlement of the problem confronting Cyprus, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, having in mind the well-being of the people of Cyprus as a whole and the preservation of international peace and security. The mediator shall report periodically to the Secretary-General on his efforts;

8. **Requests** the Secretary-General to provide, from funds of the United Nations, as appropriate, for the remuneration of the mediator and his staff.
Appendix 6: *De Facto* and *De Jure* Territorial and Maritime Boundaries in Cyprus

(a) The United Nations buffer zone and the UK Sovereign Base Areas

Source: Adapted by author from UNFICYP Master Map, 0/008/96, 1:50,000 Scale.
b) Maritime boundaries in the Eastern Mediterranean

Section 3

1. The Republic of Cyprus shall not claim, as part of its territorial sea, waters lying between Line I and Line II as described in paragraph 2 of this Section, or between Line III and Line IV as described therein.

2. The lines for the purposes of paragraph 1 of this Section shall be as follows: —

   Line I: From the position on the low-water line lying in a 163° direction from Point No. 57D11, as defined in Schedule A to this Annex, in a 163° direction for 6.85 miles; then in a 207° direction for 3 miles; and then in a 204° direction.

   Line II: From the position on the low-water line lying in a 108½° direction from Point No. 59A/5, as defined in Schedule A to this Annex, in a 108½° direction for 7.8 miles; and then in a 136° direction.

   Line III: From the position on the low-water line lying in a 170° direction from Point No. 41B/10, as defined in Schedule B to this Annex, in a 170° direction for 3.8 miles; then in a 136° direction for 3.1 miles; and then in a 156° direction.

   Line IV: From the position on the low-water line lying in a 103° direction from Point No. 42B/3, as defined in Schedule B to this Annex, in a 103° direction for 0.9 miles; then in a 150° direction for 6.3 miles; and then in a 176° direction.

3. In paragraph 2 of this Section, the distances quoted are in sea miles reckoned at 1,852 international metres to one sea mile, and the bearings are referred to the True North and are given in degrees reckoned clockwise from 000° (North) to 359°.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sequence</th>
<th>Latitude</th>
<th>Longitude</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1.       | 35° 06' 49" | 32° 16' 52"
| 2.       | 35° 05' 40" | 32° 16' 12"
| 3.       | 35° 04' 15" | 32° 16' 15"
| 4.       | 35° 02' 21" | 32° 16' 15"
| 5.       | 35° 01' 30" | 32° 16' 29"
| 6.       | 34° 57' 05" | 32° 18' 15"
| 7.       | 34° 53' 59" | 32° 18' 32"
| 8.       | 34° 51' 30" | 32° 21' 03"
| 9.       | 34° 45' 19" | 32° 24' 15"
| 10.      | 34° 42' 13" | 32° 29' 42"
| 11.      | 34° 39' 17" | 32° 39' 29"
| 12.      | 34° 38' 30" | 32° 42' 19"
| 13.      | 34° 38' 42" | 32° 54' 07"
| 14.      | 34° 34' 01" | 32° 56' 06"
| 15.      | 34° 33' 47" | 33° 01' 45"
| 16.      | 34° 34' 06" | 33° 02' 12"
| 17.      | 34° 40' 14" | 33° 02' 30"
| 18.      | 34° 42' 19" | 33° 15' 42"
| 19.      | 34° 43' 12" | 33° 19' 37"
| 20.      | 34° 43' 52" | 33° 22' 06"
| 21.      | 34° 46' 45" | 33° 29' 47"
| 22.      | 34° 49' 08" | 33° 36' 18"
| 23.      | 34° 51' 48" | 33° 38' 18"
| 24.      | 34° 55' 41" | 33° 38' 57"
| 25.      | 34° 58' 44" | 33° 43' 52"
| 26.      | 34° 56' 32" | 33° 51' 46"
| 27.      | 34° 58' 52" | 34° 07' 23"
| 28.      | 34° 57' 20" | 34° 05' 05"
| 29.      | 34° 57' 38" | 34° 05' 13"
| 30.      | 34° 59' 21" | 34° 04' 38"
| 31.      | 35° 00' 40" | 34° 03' 55"
| 32.      | 35° 13' 10" | 33° 54' 15"
| 33.      | 35° 16' 50" | 33° 55' 36"
| 34.      | 35° 19' 45" | 34° 04' 00"
| 35.      | 35° 22' 25" | 34° 05' 22"
| 36.      | 35° 29' 40" | 34° 18' 40"
| 37.      | 35° 33' 21" | 34° 24' 30"
| 38.      | 35° 38' 31" | 34° 33' 40"
| 39.      | 35° 39' 04" | 34° 34' 15"
| 40.      | 35° 42' 36" | 34° 36' 22"
| 41.      | 35° 39' 10" | 34° 25' 52"
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sequence</th>
<th>Latitude</th>
<th>Longitude</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>42.</td>
<td>35° 33' 41&quot;</td>
<td>34° 10' 38&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43.</td>
<td>35° 28' 57&quot;</td>
<td>34° 03' 11&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44.</td>
<td>35° 24' 33&quot;</td>
<td>33° 45' 11&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45.</td>
<td>35° 21' 37&quot;</td>
<td>33° 36' 25&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46.</td>
<td>35° 21' 00&quot;</td>
<td>33° 17' 27&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47.</td>
<td>35° 22' 08&quot;</td>
<td>33° 06' 52&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48.</td>
<td>35° 24' 08&quot;</td>
<td>32° 55' 10&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49.</td>
<td>35° 13' 42&quot;</td>
<td>32° 55' 15&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50.</td>
<td>35° 08' 38&quot;</td>
<td>32° 50' 15&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51.</td>
<td>35° 10' 58&quot;</td>
<td>32° 44' 25&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52.</td>
<td>35° 11' 45&quot;</td>
<td>32° 40' 11&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53.</td>
<td>35° 11' 45&quot;</td>
<td>32° 38' 37&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54.</td>
<td>35° 10' 35&quot;</td>
<td>32° 33' 15&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55.</td>
<td>35° 08' 37&quot;</td>
<td>32° 31' 27&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>56.</td>
<td>35° 03' 20&quot;</td>
<td>32° 27' 05&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>57.</td>
<td>35° 02' 30&quot;</td>
<td>32° 23' 52&quot;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendices

(e) Letter to H.E. Mr Boutros Boutros Ghali, Secretary-General of the United Nations Organisation, from Mr. Taner Etkin, TRNC Minister of Foreign Affairs and Defence, 23 October, 1996

Your Excellency,

I wish to refer to the geographical coordinates transmitted by the Greek Cypriot administration to the United Nations on 3 May 1993, showing baselines for measuring the breadth of the territorial sea of “Cyprus”. In this connection, I would like to bring to your kind attention the following:

In spite of the current political realities, the said geographical coordinates transmitted by the Greek Cypriot administration of Southern Cyprus encompass the territorial waters of the whole island. As such, the Greek Cypriot administration, once again, purports to demonstrate that a unified “Cyprus” exists and that it had jurisdiction and sovereignty over the entire island.

I wish to reiterate that there is no unified Republic of Cyprus as established under the international Cyprus treaties of 1960. The partnership Republic established in 1960 by virtue of the 1960 Agreements was destroyed by the Greek Cypriot partner’s onslaught on the Turkish Cypriot partner. In December 1963, Turkish Cypriot elements in all the state organs were forcefully ejected. During the 1963-74 period, the Turkish Cypriot people were subjected to a systematic campaign of ethnic cleansing by the Greek Cypriots. Since 1963, each side has ruled itself while the Greek Cypriot side has continued with the false pretence that it is the “legitimate Government of Cyprus”. Within the course of a gradual process of political and administrative evolution, two autonomous administrations, the existence of which was recognised by the three guarantor powers with the Geneva Declaration of 30 July, 1974, have emerged. In their present form, these are the Greek Cypriot administration in the South and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) in the North.
I wish, therefore, to set the record straight by pointing out that it is erroneous and an act of misinformation for the Greek Cypriot administration to have transmitted the said data, purporting to represent the island as a whole. The geographical coordinates of the starting points of the Lateral Border of the Territorial waters of the TRNC are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Latitude</th>
<th>Longitude</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>West of Erenköy (Kokkina)</td>
<td>35° 10'43.36&quot;</td>
<td>32° 35'53.07&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East of Erenköy (Kokkina)</td>
<td>35° 11'21.26&quot;</td>
<td>32° 37'41.68&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East of Derinya (Dherinia)</td>
<td>35° 04'12.05&quot;</td>
<td>33° 59'56.46&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West of Yesilirmak</td>
<td>35° 10'59.89&quot;</td>
<td>32° 42'32.91&quot;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ellipsoid and Datum: WGS 84  
Zone number: 36  
Zone width: 6°
Endnotes

1 See J. Anderson and Goodman’s (1994: 59-60) instructive methodological approach to interviewing in the Irish context.


3 Burgess (1992: 209) classified this as ‘theoretical’ sampling. While noting this, respondents were drawn from different status levels within organisations (e.g., UNFICYP) to accommodate any contradictions (Burgess, 1984: 75).


7 This previously unpublished letter was kindly deposited with the author by the TRNC Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Defence.
Bibliography
1. Primary Sources

1.1 Newspapers and media

1.1.1 English language

- BBC Summary of World Broadcasts:
  - Middle East and Africa (BBC SWB/ME) (1974-September 1993)
  - Eastern Europe (BBC SWB/EE) (September 1993-)
- Boundary and Security Bulletin (BSB)
- The Cyprus Mail
- Cyprus Times
- Cyprus Today
- Cyprus View
- The Cyprus Weekly
- The Economist
- The Economist Intelligence Unit Quarterly Economic Review and Annual Supplement (EIU)
- Financial Times
- Financial Times Global Water Report (GWR)
- Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS)
- The Independent
- The Guardian
- Open Media Research Institute (OMRI)
- Special News Bulletin/Northern Cyprus Monthly—Kibris (NCM)
- The Times

1.1.2 Greek and Turkish language

- O Agon (Greek)
- Alithia
- CyBC radio/TV
- Cyprus News Agency (CNA)
- Fileleftheros
- Satiriki
- Simerini
- Ankara radio (Turkish)
- Bayrak radio/TV
- Cumhurriyet
- Halkin Sesi
- Kibris (Potasi)
- Sabah
- Yeniduzen
1.2 United Nations documents

*The Blue Beret*, UNFICYP: Nicosia (south).


UN Chronicle (1974-), UN Department of Public Information: New York.


(1991e) Socio-Economic Profile of the Turkish Cypriot Community and the Main Issues to be Addressed in Preparing for a Political Solution to the Cyprus Problem, prepared by Olgun Consultancy Services for the UNDP: Nicosia (north).


UNGA [United Nations General Assembly] (1967) Examination of the question of the reservation exclusively for peaceful purposes of the sea-bed and the ocean floor, and the sub-soil thereof, underlying the high seas beyond the limits of present national jurisdiction, and the use of their resources in the interests of mankind, by Arvid Pardo, UN General Assembly Doc. No. A/C.1/PV/1515, 1 November.


### 1.3 Cyprus official documents


**CMND** (1960) *Cyprus: Presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State for the Colonies, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and the Minister of Defence by Command of Her Majesty, July 1960, Cmnd. 1093*.

**CTIC** [Cyprus Turkish Information Centre] (1970) *Double Measure of Facilities in Cyprus*, CTIC: Nicosia.


MANR (south) [Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources] (1976) *Land Use in Cyprus*, MANR: Nicosia (south).


PCTA [Provisional Cyprus Turkish Administration] (1970) *UN Aid to Cyprus: An Analysis of the technical and Financial Assistance Given to Cyprus by the UN and its Agencies, and the Extent of Benefits Derived by the Turkish Cypriots from this Aid*, Planning Bureau of the PCTA: Nicosia.


(1976e) *The Turkish Invasion of Cyprus and its Effects in the Economic and Social Sectors with Particular Reference to the Labour Field*, PIO: Nicosia (south).


Planning Bureau (1975a) *The Economic Consequences of the Turkish Invasion and the Future Prospects of the Cyprus Economy*, PIO (south): Nicosia.


(1976b) *Cyprus National Report*, prepared for UNCHS (Habitat) (Vancouver), ROC Department of Town Planning and Housing: Nicosia (south).


TCHRC [Turkish Cypriot Human Rights Committee] (1983) *Greek Cypriot Economic Blockade and Embargo Against the Turkish Cypriot Community*, TCHRC: n.p..

UMC [Union of the Municipalities of Cyprus] (n.d.) *They Make a Desert and They Call it Peace*, UMC: Nicosia (south).


Bibliography


1.4 Other documents


CE [Council of Europe] (1994) ‘Draft revised report on the situation in Cyprus (recent political developments)’, Parliamentary Assembly Political Affairs Committee, AAP4111.94 (s:pol), 10 November.


JC [Joint Communique] (1982) Joint Communique by the Cyprus Civil Engineers and Architects Association and the Union of Chambers of Cyprus Turkish Engineers and Architects, Annex 1, 22 May 1982.


US State Department (1972) 'Territorial sea boundary: Cyprus-Sovereign Base Area (UK)', Limits in the Seas, No. 49, Bureau of Intelligence and Research: Washington, D.C.


1.5 Maps


Planning Bureau (1975b) Cyprus and the Turkish Invasion, map prepared by Department of Lands and Surveys, April, ROC: Nicosia (south).
2. Secondary Sources


Bibliography


Bibliography


Ertekün, (1977) Inter-Communal Talks and the Cyprus Problem, Turkish Federated State of Cyprus: Nicosia (north).


Bibliography


(1973) The Significance of Territory, The University Press of Virginia: Charlottesville, VA.


(1993) ‘Epistemic communities and the dynamics of international environmental co-
operation’, in Rittberger, V. (ed.) Regime Theory and International Relations, Clarendon

Haas, P.M. et al. (1993) ‘The effectiveness of international environmental institutions’, in
Haas, P.M. et al. (eds.) Institutions for the Earth: Sources of Effective International


(1990) ‘Cyprus and Lebanon: a historical comparative study in ethnic conflict and outside

(1993) ‘Unofficial inter-communal contacts and their contribution to peace-building in

(1998) ‘Different relationships to the land: personal narratives, political implications and
future possibilities in Cyprus’, in Calotychos, V. (ed.) Cyprus and its People: Nation,
Identity, and Experience in the Unimaginable Community, Westview Press: Boulder,
Co., pp.251-276.

Hajdu, Z. (1994) ‘Cities in the frontier regions of the Hungarian state: changing borders,
changing political systems, new evaluated contacts’, in Gallusser, W.A. (ed.) Political


Häkli, J. (1998a) ‘Discourse in the production of political space: decolonizing the symbolism

(1998b) ‘Cross-border Identities in the New Europe: Ghost of the Past or Sign-post to the
Next Millenium?’, unpublished paper presented at IGU World Political Map Conference
on ‘Nationalisms and Identities in a Globalized World’, Dublin and Belfast.


Hamel, J. et al. (1993) Case Study Methods, Qualitative Research Methods Series, Vol. 32,
Sage Publications: London.

Hamilton, L.S. et al. (eds.) Transborder Protected Area Cooperation, AALC and IUCN:
Canberra.

Hampson, F.O. (1996) Nurturing Peace: Why Peace Settlements Succeed or Fail, United States

of Texas Press: Austin, Texas.


Bibliography


Bibliography


(1980a) ‘Cyprus since 1974: Economic and Demographic Change’, unpublished paper presented at the Fifth Mediterranean Conference, Bar-Ilan University, Tel Aviv.


Bibliography


Bibliography


Bibliography


Bibliography


(1994) 'Environmental Impacts of the Turkish Invasion on the Cyprus Ecosystem', unpublished paper presented at the Sixth International Conference 'Environmental Contamination', Delphi, Greece.


Bibliography


Bibliography


Bibliography


Sidaway, J.D. (1992) 'In other worlds: on the politics of research by 'first world' geographers in the 'third world'’, Area, Vol. 24, No. 4, pp.405-408.


Bibliography


Bibliography


Tornaritis, C.G. (1975) The Turkish Invasion of Cyprus and Legal Problems Arising Therefrom, PIO: Nicosia (south).


Bibliography


(1987b) 'The emerging need to focus on transboundary resources', Transboundary Resources Report, Vol. 1, No. 1, pp.1-2.


(1979) *Theory of International Politics*, Addison-Wesley: Reading, Mass..


Bibliography


