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It's the ideology stupid! The securitisation of extremism by Prime Ministers in the United Kingdom from 1997 to 2016.

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It's the ideology stupid! The securitisation of extremism by Prime Ministers in the United Kingdom from 1997 to 2016.

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Abstract

This thesis identifies and examines the securitisation process of extremism, applying Securitisation Theory and Speech Act Theory to analyse parliamentary discourses (and where appropriate relevant other public speeches) by Prime Ministers in the United Kingdom from 1997 to 2016. It shows that extremism has been securitised in several ways, first as 'Islamic extremism', and then as 'violent and non-violent extremism'. Although not always openly linked to Islam, an analysis of securitising speech acts shows a major emphasis on presenting 'Islamic ideology' as the root cause of 'violent extremism'. Hereby it is the non-violent extremism which is framed as leading to acts of violence, thereby achieving a securitisation of extremism overall. The reason for this research was to investigate if and how extremism had been securitised in the United Kingdom and how Securitisation Theory by the Copenhagen School could be applied as a research framework for its analysis. In order to make the framework applicable to the case chosen, it was expanded with John R Searle's Speech Act Theory, which formed the basis for a 'Securitising Speech Act Classification'. This classification allowed for an explicit investigation of how extremism was presented as a security threat and which extraordinary measures were suggested to curb the threat. The research shows that securitisation of extremism took place discursively, with all Prime Ministers employing securitising speech acts to present extremism as an existential threat to various Referent Objects, such as the state, national security, and society. On a theoretical level, this means that the proposed framework adapted from the Copenhagen School with amendments from Speech Act Theory allows the study of discursive securitisation by elite actors, making it an applicable method for securitisation research on a practical level. The key benefit for the reader of this thesis is that it offers an understanding of how a concept that is objectively not dangerous in itself, such as extremism, has entered the security agenda and become securitised via language. It offers an insight into securitisation and how it happens, and it discusses Securitisation Theory's limitations before offering solutions for overcoming them (expanding the focus of speech acts). Although the thesis comments on how extremism was securitised, it does not answer the question why it entered the security agenda as it did not focus on the Prime Ministers' reasonings for securitisation. Instead, it aimed to apply the 'Principle of Expressibility' brought forward by John R Searle, working under the assumption that everything which is said is also meant the way it is presented.

Table of Contents

List of Figures

List of Tables

Dedication

To those who said I could

and

To those who made sure I would

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This has been what feels like the longest journey and definitely not an easy one. I would like to start by thanking my first supervisory team, Dr Christopher Davidson and Dr Christian Schweiger who took me on as a PhD student without any background in Political Science or International Relations. When Prof Ilan Zvi Baron took on my research project, he opened my world to the philosophy of language and political theory, which I am forever grateful for.

The late Prof David Held further fostered my thirst for knowledge and an understanding of political concepts. For having taken me on as a supervisee to being a wonderful mentor and person, there is an inherent debt which I can never pay back. In his last email to me before his passing, he encouraged me to stick with it and finish this PhD thesis and I hope that by doing so, I am able to somehow return the kindness and trust he invested in me. I cannot leave the other co-supervisors I have 'amassed' over the years aside and my gratitude and thanks go out to Prof Helen Fenwick and Dr May Darwish who, without hesitation, decided to take me under their wings. My final supervisor, Prof Roger Mac Ginty, is another person whom I will be forever thankful to. I know that neither us chose one another, but his optimism and encouragement kept me afloat in times when I thought I could no longer push forward. His mentorship allowed me to settle on a topic for this thesis and follow it through. Dr Cameron Harrington, my secondary supervisor also deserves a special mention for his valuable insights and recommendations regarding not only the thesis' structure, but the thesis itself.

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Declaration

The material contained within this thesis has not previously been submitted for a degree at Durham University or any other institution. All information or contributions have been clearly referenced.

Statement of Copyright

The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. No quotation from it should be published without the author's prior written consent and information derived from it should be acknowledged.

Acronyms

ACPO	Association of Chief Police Officers
ARE	Animal Rights Extremism
ARO	Animal Research Organisations
ARNI	Animal Rights National Index
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
BLM	Black Lives Matter
CAQDAS	Computer Assisted Qualitative Data Analysis Software
CJPOA 1994	Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994
CONTEST	Counter-terrorism Strategy
COPRI	Conflict and Peace Research Institute
CoS	Copenhagen School
CTSA 2015	Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015
CPS	Crown Prosecution Service
CPSIA 2016	Charities (Protection and Social Investment) Act 2016
CVE	Countering Violent Extremism
DCLG	Department for Communities and Local Government
DOPC	Cabinet Defence and Overseas Policy Committee
EU	European Union
GCHQ	Government Communications Headquarters
GFC	Global Financial Crisis
GM	genetically modified
FCO	Foreign and Commonwealth Office
FOI	Freedom of Information
FTF	Foreign Terrorist Fighters
HC	House of Commons
HM Government	Her Majesty's Government
HMIC	Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary

HMICFRS	Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire and Rescue Services
IPPR	Institute for Public Policy Research
IR	International Relations
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
ISC	Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament
ISIS	Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
ISIL	Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
LASIT	Left, Anarchist and Single-Issue Terrorism
MAPPA	Multi-agency public protection arrangements
MCU	Muslim Contact Unit
MI5	Military Intelligence, Section 5 Security Services
MISC 13	Cabinet Committee on Animal Right Activists / Ministerial Committee on Animal Rights Extremism
MOD	Ministry of Defence
MOPAC	Mayor's Office for Policing and Crime (London)
MP	Member of Parliament
MPS	Metropolitan Police Service
MPSB	Metropolitan Police Special Branch (MPSB/SO12)
MSC	Munich Security Conference
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCDE	National Coordinator for Domestic Extremism
NCTPOC	National Counter Terrorism Policing Operations Centre
NDET	National Domestic Extremism Team
NDEU	National Domestic Extremism Unit
NDEDIU	National Domestic & Disorder Intelligence Unit
NETCU	National Extremism Tactical Coordination Unit
NPOIU	National Public Order Intelligence Unit
NSBIS	National Special Branch Intelligence System

NSC	National Security Council
NSID	National Security, International Relations and Development Committee
NSS	National Security Strategy
NUS	National Union of Students of the United Kingdom
OEF	Operation Enduring Freedom
PET	Preventing Extremism Together
PM	Prime Minister
PMQs	Prime Minister's Questions
PVE	Preventing Violent Extremism
RICU	Research, Information, Communications Unit
RIPA 2000	Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000
RSC	Regional Security Complex
RUSI	Royal United Services Institute
RWT	Right Wing Terrorism
SAT	Speech Act Theory
SDS	Special Demonstration Squad / Special Duties Section
SOCPA 2005	Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005
SOS	Special Operations Squad of the MPS
ST	Securitisation Theory
TA 2000	Terrorism Act 2000
TA 2006	Terrorism Act 2006
UCO	Undercover police officers
UCPI	Undercover Policing Inquiry
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction
XR	Extinction Rebellion

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Introduction

"We must pull this up by its roots. Within Britain, we must join up with our Muslims community to take on the extremists. Worldwide, we should confront it everywhere it exists"
(Blair, 2005b).

"(…) it is an illusion to believe that if we leave today's extremists alone, they will leave us alone"
(Brown, 2006a).

"The battle against Islamist extremism is the battle of our generation"
(Cameron, 2015a).

Overview

Extremism is a word that is hard to define. It is particularly difficult to define because, to a large extent, it lies in the eye of its beholder. To rephrase Ganor (2002: 287), the question of who is an extremist depends entirely on the subjective outlook of the interpreter. From the outset, extremism does not, in itself, appear to be dangerous – the term itself is defined by the Oxford English Dictionary (2018) as "[a] [t]endency to be extreme; [or a] disposition to go to extremes". The Penguin English Dictionary (2007) explains it as "advocacy of extreme political measures; radicalism". However, the Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary (2020) takes a less nuanced, more judgemental view, stating extremism to be "political, religious, etc. ideas or actions that are extreme and not normal, reasonable or acceptable to most people". Looking at the United Kingdom, it appears that extremism, or counter-extremism to be more precise, had been heavily emphasised through policies like the Prevent Strategy, indicating that the issue has been part of the security agenda for years.

Securitisation Theory (ST) by Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde – the so-called Copenhagen School (CoS) – seems to offer a way of studying the process of this 'securitisation', meaning the moving of a topic from the non-political sphere to the political and eventually the security sphere. The difference between a politicised and securitised issue lies in the former being dealt with inside of what can be thought of as 'normal' politics, whilst the latter is 'confronted' with 'extraordinary' measures (that is to say measures that fall outside of the normal political framework). A securitising actor is able to break free of the usual standard

political rules by way of a speech act; without such an actor, no such situation of securitisation is possible (see Buzan et al, 1998).

According to the Copenhagen School, security is socially constructed through discourse. More precisely, when a Referent Object is presented as existentially threatened, extraordinary measures become possible. Buzan et al (1998: 36) define Referent Objects as "things that are seen to be existentially threatened and that have a legitimate claim to survival". Anything can be constructed as a Referent Object by a securitising actor; however, some Referent Objects may be more likely to be presented as threatened than others. For example, positioning 'national security' as essential for survival might be easier than presenting the 'environment' as being threatened.

One of the strengths of securitisation analysis is that it allows analysts "to address the question of how support for extraordinary measures, such as war, comes to pass" (Gaufman, 2017: 3). However, the original interpretation of ST is more as a theory than a method. One that explains the process of securitisation instead of analysing it. Considering that it can be seen as both a grand theory and a framework, developing a sound methodology for this research proved difficult.

The author noticed distinctive features in the literature: Often academics claim that an issue has been securitised, but they do not offer a detailed account of how they came to their conclusion. Instead, it is asserted in passing that a topic has been securitised. This is particularly troublesome, as not even the Copenhagen School (CoS), the 'founding fathers' of the theory, have been able to establish definite criteria for the definition of 'successful' securitisation – an issue that has become one of the most contested aspects of Securitisation Theory. Hansen (2000: 295) goes as far as to say that the "framework abstains from an objective—or quantifiable— definition as to when securitization is successful".

Therefore, to address the question of whether and how extremism was being securitised in the United Kingdom, the author took a critical look at Securitisation Theory and when 'successful' securitisation happens. She concluded that the point of 'successful' securitisation should not be defined but that securitisation occurs when an issue is presented as an existential security threat and when extraordinary measures are suggested via securitising speech acts by a securitising actor in a

position of authority. To get to this outcome, the author approached Securitisation Theory and its initial understanding by the Copenhagen School, trying to understand and develop a way of making the theory applicable as a method for studying the securitisation of extremism in the United Kingdom. In order to do so, she complemented ST with philosopher John R Searle's Speech Act Theory, developing a 'Securitising Speech Act Classification'. The bottom line of Speech Act Theory is that one must engage with how language is performed rather than just seeing it as a mechanism of description. For Searle, his Speech Act theory is both a theory of language and a theory of action (Searle, 1969:17), which allows for it to act as a basis for the study of discursive securitisation.

The author analysed the securitisation of extremism by studying the discourse of several Prime Ministers via this new theoretical framework, taking a Securitisation Speech Act lens to show how the issue of extremism was rhetorically presented over time. The reasons for doing so were (1) to investigate how a speech act focus facilitates the study of securitisation and (2) to explore the securitisation of a term previously not considered securitised. However, the conducted research showed that extremism had been institutionally securitised and hence had already been placed in the security sphere even before official securitising discourse took place. For one, 'animal rights extremism' had been long established as a security threat prior to 'Islamic extremism' creeping onto the security agenda. The author also realised that the securitisation that took place was not clear-cut, in the sense that the term (Islamic extremism) did not start to become securitised overnight. For example, she had originally assumed that Tony Blair had not attempted to associate extremism with danger before the 7/7 London attacks, when in fact, he had indeed employed securitising moves before then. Also, she had at first thought that Gordon Brown would be more of a desecuritising actor regarding extremism. This assumption was also proved wrong, as evidence bore out that Brown had actually maintained the issue of extremism on the security agenda. Similarly, her research showed that David Cameron's securitising discourse was much more prevalent than initially assumed. Not only did he securitise 'all forms of extremism', but he also attempted to justify military engagement in the Middle East as an extraordinary measure to curb the threat of 'Islamic extremism' to British security (as Tony Blair had previously done).

By analysing the security discourse over several premierships, it can be shown how the presentation of the threat changed over time. Whilst Blair linked extremism discursively[1] with Islam, Brown attempted to move away from the connotation, focussing on 'violent extremism' instead. Cameron brought both concepts together, securitising not only violent and non-violent extremism, but also 'Islamist extremism' (which he also often calls 'Islamic extremism'). It must be pointed out that both Tony Blair and David Cameron often use the terms 'Islamic extremism' and 'Islamist extremism' interchangeably, without differentiating that the former indicates 'relating to Islam' whilst the latter is originally considered to be synonymous with 'political Islam'[2]. Islamic extremism should therefore be seen as a 'catch-all' category under which movements relating to Islam are grouped (see Hammond, 2008: 220).

In practice, her findings are relevant for several reasons. For one, they show that it is possible to keep an issue such as extremism, which in itself does not pose a direct danger (unlike terrorism), securitised over several decades. Secondly, the research demonstrates that through institutionalised securitisation of extremism, it was easier to frame it as a threat following the grammar of security (see Buzan et al, 1998). This research also has several ramifications on a theoretical level as it shows how the securitisation of an issue can change over time. Therefore, securitisation can be seen as a process which can alternate gradually, meaning that once an issue has entered the security agenda it is not easily moved back to the political sphere – in particular, given a securitising actor's inclinations and justification for securitisation. That is not to say that this is done consciously but rather that it is a result of the continued threat framing which becomes institutionalised and internalised by securitising actors. Consequently, this thesis contributes to the critical security literature, highlighting the importance of discourse. By emphasising a securitising speech act framework, the study of securitisation becomes easier, in particular when researching the securitisation of a subject

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[1] The securitisation of domestic extremism aka 'animal rights extremism' was institutionalised.

[2] For example, it has been argued that Islamists see Islam as a guide to politics or a political system that must be implemented (see Bolliger & Steinvorth, 2018) whilst the term Islamic means "belonging to Islam" (McGraw-Hill, 2015: 203). Badran (2001: 47) points out that it is not uncommon for scholars to "confuse Islam and Islamism" because the difference between the two can be certainly indistinct.

previously not deemed securitised. This is particularly important as securitisation studies tend to focus on researching topics which have already shown strong signs of securitisation even prior to any formal investigation. Via the application of the herein developed 'Securitising Speech Act Classification', the identification of non-traditional threats can be aided and can enable a broadening of securitised subjects outside of the traditional security sphere.

Research Rationale

In 2015, the UK government introduced the Prevent Duty, indicating that extremism was no longer to be handled within the scope of political means. The statutory duty made it a legal requirement to stop people from becoming terrorists, but it also introduced what can be considered human rights restrictions with respect to what was coined 'extremism'. Therefore, the question arose as to how it had become possible, that 'extremism', a concept which the author had, until this point, not considered negative, was all of a sudden being considered outright dangerous. Schools were now required to teach the Suffragettes movement as extremist under the Prevent Agenda (see Wolton, 2017), and one might ask how a women's-rights movement was suddenly grouped together with ideas of terrorism, violence, and presented as dangerous. Keeping in mind that academics such as Gregory (2010: 86) believed that the UK government had long since started to use the labels of 'extremism' or 'violent extremist' to refer to home-grown terrorism, exploring how this happened – how extremism became a threat considered dangerous enough to warrant extraordinary measures – seemed a worthy topic of research.

Something does not become a security issue overnight; securitisation happens over time and sometimes it creeps up on us. Extremism is one of these things which seems to suddenly have become an existential threat – something which needed to be confronted with urgency. When David Cameron addressed the Jewish NGO Community Security Trust in March 2015, he did not mince words: "The battle against Islamist extremism is the battle of our generation" (Cameron, 2015a). He was not the first Prime Minister to have framed extremism as a security issue, Tony Blair having previously done so, followed by Gordon Brown. However, each took a different stance and securitised different forms of extremism, be it domestic extremism, non-violent and violent extremism, or Islamic extremism. According to Kundnani (2015:26), when it comes to British counter-terrorism policy-making,

"the concept of extremism has become central" in recent years. This can be seen in several UK government undertakings such as Prevent (2008, 2009, 2011, 2015a, 2015b), the introduction of the Prime Minister's Extremism Taskforce (2013), the Prevent Duty (2015), and the proposal of a Counter-Extremism Bill (2015).

In a nutshell, the official Government discourse went from terrorism prevention to preventing 'violent extremism' to 'non-violent extremism' to 'just' extremism. But why focus on extremism when it comes to counter-terrorism? The reasoning is several-fold. For one, the underpinning belief that extremism leads to terrorism and the two are unenviably linked. The overarching idea seems to be that terrorists undergo a radicalisation process, leading someone with 'extremist' views to eventually act out. By countering what are perceived as extreme ideologies, the government aims to intervene in this process and to "stop individuals from becoming terrorists or supporting those who do" (Allen, 2017: 65). The Prevent Strategy, part of the Counterterrorism Strategy (CONTEST), which the Prevent Duty was based on, had established the UK government's anti-radicalisation approach which took centre-stage in its counter-terrorism efforts.

Originally the Prevent Strategy was titled 'Preventing Violent Extremism Strategy' and had been officially introduced by the Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG) in 2008. However, the idea behind it, the governing of a "pre-criminal space" and emphasis on counter-radicalisation, had been its focus since 2006 (Dresser, 2018: 7). One must emphasise here that, although not illegal, holding an extremist worldview was deemed dangerous enough to necessitate pre-criminal intervention by the state, indicating that extremism had become a security issue and was no longer considered a mere political dissent. This approach eventually peaked with the Prevent Duty's introduction in the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015, Part 5, Chapter 1, Section 26 (1). Whilst the statutory duty was placed on specified authorities to have "due regard to the need to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism" (HM Government, 2015: 5), the Government also indicated that this duty was expanding to extremism as it was framed as the root cause of terrorism.

According to the UK government, extremism and radicalisation are both seen as leading to terrorist acts. In the 'Tackling extremism in the UK' report by the Extremism Taskforce, it is clearly stated: "We will not tolerate extremist activity of

any sort, which creates an environment for radicalising individuals and could lead them on a pathway towards terrorism." (Home Office, 2013: 1). The rationale for this is to stop vulnerable individuals at a pre-criminal stage (Lowe, 2017: 918) and before legal measures are able to take effect. Due to the focus on the process of radicalisation, there were important shifts made by governments away from just countering terrorism through retaliation. Instead, they focused on responding to the "threat of violent extremism" via prevention took centre stage (Altermark & Nilsson, 2018: 56). As Pauwels et al (2014: 18) point out

> "Terrorism and violent extremism are often interchangeably used and governments have the tendency to quickly condemn every form of political protest or violence as terrorism"

The policy for dealing with these "threats" was to put a much heavier emphasis on the prevention and countering of 'violent extremism' in the way of the state, through its institutions and actors who would aim to "intervene in order to try and stop individuals from becoming terrorists or supporting those who do" (Allen, 2017: 66-67).

Looking at the definitions of extremism, it appears that by linking it to threats to society, there is always a certain kind of judgement by demonising the term (for example presenting it as something negative). After all, as Pressman, (2009: 5) puts it: "The label of "extremist" is a value judgment". As this thesis takes a constructivist approach to securitisation regarding the concept of extremism and its usage, it does not aim to define the term but wants to focus on how it is presented by securitising actors. By looking at discourses, it is possible to draw conclusions about how the concept is used by the speaker, what threats are associated with it, and at whom these threats are directed. This research therefore intends to contribute to the understanding of the UK governments' handling of extremism, offering an insight into how extremism has become securitised. This is important because understanding how extremism was securitised can help us form a better-informed appreciation of how we come to regard something as dangerous. Especially in cases where the issue presented as 'security threat' does not actually entail a real physical threat as such. In this way, this thesis allows for a broader questioning as to the necessity of 'extraordinary measures' and, consequently, whether such measures should be seen as acceptable. This research is also important because it can offer a viewpoint from which to orient oneself when investigating how the securitisation

of extremism might unfold in the future. Indeed, it seems predictable (based on past developments) that current events (such as the recently proposed Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill 2021) will keep the issue of extremism on the security agenda – i.e., there is no desecuritisation in sight.

A matter of language and authority

When we talk about security in its traditional sense, we assume that there are 'real' threats that are dangerous to our survival and that these threats need to be controlled. However, according to Securitisation Theory and one of its founders, Ole Wæver, it is the other way around. There are no natural things out there that are security threats unless they have been articulated as such. It is people deciding to deal with certain things in a particular way – naming something a security problem – that thereby makes it a security threat. In engaging in such speech acts, the way we interact and deal with the problem changes. By framing something as existentially vital to our survival, it becomes securitised. Once something becomes securitised, it must be dealt with outside of political norms and therefore, under such circumstances, extraordinary measures can be implemented. To summarise philosopher John L Austin (1962), saying *is* doing. What we say has an impact on the world and words shape reality. Securitisation Theory argues that any issue can be moved from non-political to political and can eventually be turned into a security issue through speech acts. According to the Copenhagen School, anything can become a security issue through speech acts, standing in stark contrast to the more traditional view on security. For the CoS, security is constructed through language via speech acts (Wæver, 2000: 251). A speech act is an utterance with meaning as opposed to "*just* uttering sounds" (Searle, 1965: 227). It is "the utterance in itself that is the act: by saying it, something is done" (Wæver, 1989: 5). Some issues are easier to securitise than others, especially when they are already preconceived as threatening (Wæver, 2003: 15).

Based on the works of Austin and Searle, Ole Wæver (1989, 1995), and Buzan et al (1998) developed Securitisation Theory in order to understand how threats emerge. Securitisation Theory allows us to understand, what it is exactly that we do when we label something a security issue. More specifically, it allows for insight into what is happening when a securitising actor presents something as an existential threat and legitimises extraordinary measures. According to the

Copenhagen School, security is socially constructed through discourse. More precisely, when a Referent Object (for example society) is presented as being existential threatened, it justifies exceptional measures. Whilst "a discourse that takes the form of presenting something as an existential threat to a referent object" is considered a 'securitising move', an issue is only securitised 'successfully' when the audience accepts something as an existential threat (Buzan et al, 1998: 25). For the CoS this means that presenting something as an existential threat does not result in securitisation unless the Referent Object is seen as threatened by the audience. This is the distinction between a securitising move and 'successful' securitisation (Buzan et al, 1998: 25). However, taking audience acceptance as a criteria for successful securitisation raises three questions: (1) which audience needs to be convinced of the legitimacy of a securitising move? (McDonald, 2008); (2) what does 'acceptance by the audience' mean and entail exactly? (McGuire, 2013); and (3) how ought we to measure audience acceptance? (Salter, 2008).

However, Buzan et al (1998: 26) also explain that "a successful securitization has (…) three components (or steps): existential threats, emergency action and effects on interunit relations by breaking free of rules" (Buzan et al, 1998: 26), notably leaving the criteria of audience acceptance out. Basing securitisation success on these elements, a threat needs to be presented as having been moved outside of 'normal' politics, resulting in the implementation of extraordinary measures. However, by reducing securitisation to the acts of the speaker (an illocutionary speech act) there is no role for the audience of securitisation (Vuori, 2008). The argument can be made here that, as soon as a securitising actor has initiated their securitising moves and has been able to suggest extraordinary measures to curb a threat via a security argument, audience acceptance is no longer needed to establish whether a securitisation attempt has been successful or not. Still, the CoS would later emphasise that the audience plays a central role in ST (Wæver, 2011a: 468) and that the audience is not just consuming the securitsing move but should be seen as "the co-producing actor that is necessary in order to bring about a transformation of a social situation (*in casu* a securitization)" (Wæver 2011; Wæver 2015, in Wæver, 2017: 127). This can be understood as the CoS seeing security as "taking place among subjects, refer[ing] primarily to the process of acceptance of a securitizing move" (Broecker & Westermeier, 2019: 109).

Therefore, one interpretation of the CoS' understanding of the securitisation process can be seen in Figure 1, where the main components of Securitisation Theory are presented figuratively, highlighting the original theory's speech act emphasis.

Figure 1 - Securitisation process by the Copenhagen School [author presentation]

Balzacq (2005: 171) argues "that a speech act view of security does not provide adequate grounding upon which to examine security practices in 'real situations'. For instance, many security utterances counter the 'rule of sincerity' and, the intrinsic power attributed to 'security' overlooks the objective context in which security agents are situated". Similarly, the Copenhagen School's focus on speech acts and, therefore, their disregard for context leads to limitations on accounting for the total securitisation process (Wilkinson, 2011: 94). Another criticism of Securitisation Theory and its focus on the securitising actor is raised by Hübschle (2010: 11), who does not believe that a securitising move is the consequence of a securitising actors' sole decision. She refers to Carrapiço (2008: 28) and her argument that the decision to securitise an issue is made as a result of dialogue and does not solely rest on the securitising actor alone but on other agents as well. By not emphasising this, the Copenhagen School fails to get down to the root of uncovering the threat decision making process. Others such as Booth (2007), Bigo (2000) and Hansen (2000) are also concerned with the CoS' focus on securitising actors having to be in a position of power. This emphasis marginalises groups or

individuals not in a position of authority, dismissing the idea that they might also 'speak security'.

Due to some limitations of Securitisation Theory (for example 'success criteria' and speech act focus which are going to be discussed in detail in Chapter 1), adaptions have been made and different slants have been taken. Examples include taking a sociological approach to the theory as seen in Balzacq's work (2005) as well as Bigo (2008) and Roe (2008), Croft's post-Copenhagen securitisation theory (Croft, 2012), Côté' Social Securitization Theory (2015), Floyd's theory of 'Just Securitization' (2019), and visual securitisation approaches (Hansen, 2011; Heck & Schlag, 2013). Securitisation Theory has also been advanced with different discursive takes. For example, Donnelly (2013) augmented the theory by incorporating philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein's concept of a language game, Eroukhmanoff (2018) studied 'indirect securitisation', relying on John R Searle's theory of indirect speech acts and Stritzel (2014) based his model of study of securitisation on a critical discourse analysis approach. This list could be easily expanded and it seems curious that even its founding fathers Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver appear to have taken different stances on how the theory should be developed in their later work (see for example Albert & Buzan, 2011; Greenwood & Wæver, 2013).

Research questions and objectives

This thesis aims to identify and examine the securitisation process of extremism, applying Securitisation Theory and Speech Act Theory to analyse parliamentary discourses (and where appropriate relevant other public speeches) by Prime Ministers in the United Kingdom from 1997 to 2016. Based on John R Searle's SAT, the author developed a 'Securitising Speech Act Classification' acting as a structure for the analysis of speeches by securitising actors. The classification, alongside an analytical guide of questions to ask when identifying the threat construction to different Referent Objects, as well as acting as an aid for pinpointing extraordinary measures, are all valuable contributions made by the overall framework presented here. Ultimately, this research presents a new way for studying securitising moves and the securitisation of issues. Whilst securitisation is often studied around the analysis of both what is threatening (Security Issues) and what is threatened (Referent Objects), Wæver & Buzan (2020a: 64) have pointed

out that a "concrete research project" can also be "organised around a study of one or the other". It is therefore possible to focus this thesis on how the concept of extremism was securitised via a speech act-centred approach to securitisation, rather than as different security issues which have arisen in the United Kingdom over a certain time period.

The thesis also explores how language brings the threat of extremism into existence and manifests urgency which in turn warrants (extraordinary) measures, indicating securitisation. It similarly aims to investigate whether or not securitisation has taken place and to what extent, doing so via a proposed securitisation framework that aids in the identification and analysis of securitising speech acts. Accordingly, there is one main question that underlies this research:

- How was extremism securitised by the discourse of UK Prime Ministers from 1997 to 2016?

Subsequently, this thesis not only offers an analysis of UK Prime Ministers' discourses in (and outside) Parliament from 1997 to 2016, it also critically reviews institutionalised securitisation. That is to say it looks at how the issue of extremism was dealt with before it became part of the security agenda. Several sub-questions emerge from the main research question:

- How have UK Prime Ministers securitised extremism in official speeches?

  o How is extremism presented?
  o Who or what is framed as the Referent Object of extremism?
  o What extraordinary measures are suggested for curbing the threat of extremism?

The thesis additionally aims to answer subsequently arising questions, such as when securitisation happens and how. Further, it investigates the different Referent Subjects[3] relating to the threat of extremism, how they are made to appear dangerous discursively and what extraordinary measures are suggested and implemented in response. It proposes that overall, the danger of extremism is

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[3] In the case of this thesis, the core securitisation concepts are expanded to the Referent Subject, which is the source of the threat; more precisely what or who threatens the survival of the Referent Object. The Referent Subject is the threat to the Referent Object or in Balzacq' s words "what threatens" (2011: 36), so to speak the "threat issue" and refers to the 'existential threat'.

located in extremist ideology which is presented as the main threat behind terrorism. Buzan et al (1998: 83) believe that the causes and effects of an issue (for example climate change) can also be securitised and made to be a threat in the securitisation process. This can be particularly well observed because 'ideology' is framed as a cause for 'extremism'; and 'terrorism' is framed as the effect, which then in turn causes other threats such as 'terrorist attacks' and violence to be associated with the issue of extremism. This is why the thesis' title refers to *'It's the ideology stupid!'*[4], highlighting that 'extremist ideology' was presented as the main underlying threat of extremism by all Prime Ministers evaluated.

Research Contribution
The securitisation of extremism has not been explored in the United Kingdom

As pointed out by Bourbeau (2015), securitisation studies is one of the most dynamically researched topics in security studies, which can be seen in an expansive number of academic works written in the field. Securitisation Theory has been applied in many areas, it proves to be a popular topic, in particular for undergraduate and taught postgraduate research, where it appears to have been more or less successfully applied on a variety of subjects. The theory is continuously evolving, engaging with different perceived 'security threats' over time which "each present peculiar challenges that trigger more general rethinking of core concepts – roughly: identity, nationalism and migration in the 1990s, terror and religion in the 00s, climate change in the 2010s" (Wæver & Buzan, 2020a: 60). Securitisation research appears to suffer from 'selection bias', where only those cases are studied where clear indicators for a successful (or 'failed') securitisation are already evident (Austin & Beaulieu-Brossard, 2018: 308). This might explain why the securitisation of threats like terrorism, have been studied more prominently than extremism, which is less commonly associated with danger. However, by studying an issue not clearly securitised from the onset, the research will be more fruitful in terms of unexpected outcomes. There appears to be a tendency to study topics already located in the security sphere. However, while closely linked topics such as terrorism have been studied, the securitisation of the topic of extremism has

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[4] Leaning on the famous phrasing of Bill Clinton's 1992 presidential campaign "It's the economy, stupid!" (Christiansen, 2017).

never been the subject of research in the context of the United Kingdom[5]. Despite the topic not having been studied from a securitisation theory angle, in recent years there has been an interest in exploring how the concept of extremism has become synonymous with terrorism. For example, Onursal & Kirkpatrick (2019:1) analysed British Parliamentary discourse, showing that there was a move towards "targeting non-violent extremism as if it were terrorism". Also, Ben Harbisher (2015) explored how activists were framed as terrorists and extremists by British authorities and states that terms such as "'extremism' have been popularised to condemn the activities of groups such as al Qaeda and ISIS (Islamic State), but at the same time have been liberally applied to campaigners" (Harbisher, 2015: 474).

Additionally, British counterterrorism policies have been the topic of research by Kathryn Fisher (2012: 4) who through "a relational-securitization approach" explored "official British discourse, identity, securitization, and counterterrorism from 1968 to 2011". James Malcolm (2011) researched "*The securitisation of the United Kingdom's maritime infrastructure during the 'war on terror*'" from a sociological viewpoint for his doctoral thesis, in which he concluded that securitisation took place as the UK maritime infrastructure was presented as the Referent Object needing protection from international terrorism. Similarly, Gareth Mott (2018:v) analysed "the official British construction of the threat of cyberterrorism", using a securitisation lens. Leonie Jackson (2018: 77) mentions in her book on *Islamophobia in Britain* that framing Muslims as a threat "can be understood as part of a broader contemporary trend towards the securitisation of identities". This is something which Arshad Isakjee (2012) explored when he researched how the identities of young Muslim men in Birmingham were securitised.

Jackson (2007: 395), although not applying securitisation theory, looked at the "discourse of 'Islamic terrorism'" and how it constructs Muslims as the enemy. Furthermore, several authors researched the impact of counter-extremism measures such as Prevent (see for example Choudhury & Fenwick, 2011; Dresser, 2019; Thomas, 2015, 2019 - just to name a few). One also should mention Will Jackson's research, which explored "the ways in which counter-extremism work serves to

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[5] Smith et al (2019) looked at the way the US media framed 'violent extremists' as a threat.

depoliticise those deemed 'extreme' and in turn serves to delegitimise, and in certain cases criminalise, any truly alternative politics to those that define the current regime" (Jackson, 2012: 137). Without using securitisation analysis, he effectively showed the securitisation of extremism given that he argues that the issue has been pushed outside legitimate politics. Considering this gap in research, this thesis aims to advance existing knowledge by exploring securitisation processes regarding extremism by elite actors in the United Kingdom – something which had yet to be studied.

Adaptive Securitisation Theory approach with an emphasis on Speech Act Theory

This thesis makes three main amendments to the 'classical' securitisation framework of the Copenhagen School. (1) It focuses on John R Searle's Speech Act Theory, (2) it leaves audience acceptance out based on the position of the securitising actor, and (3) it presents a 'Securitising Speech Act Classification' that acts as tool for analysis. The author of this research argues that given the theory's constructivist approach, the point of 'successful' securitisation cannot and should not be defined and that taking audience acceptance as a 'given' via the legitimate authority position of the securitising actor through collective intentionality allows us to disregard it as a unit of measure. Securitisation Theory is able to act as the basis of understanding of how securitisation happens and should not be seen as being about the success of a securitising move but rather the analysis of it.

This thesis circumvents the audience's acceptance that extremism is a threat by focussing on the speech acts (securitising moves) of elite actors. This is possible because it bases its understanding of language on Searle's 'Principle of Expressibility', which holds that "(w)hatever can be meant can be said" (Searle, 1968: 415). Additionally, the author of this thesis worked out two major points regarding why Searle's Speech Act Theory approach is suitable for the study of securitisation. Namely: (1) it includes a Speech Act Classification (also known as a taxonomy of illocutions) and (2) it acknowledges the creation of institutional facts through collective intentionality. The latter is important as it ties in with the ideas of legitimacy and the power to 'speak security'.

To simplify, using Searle's *X counts as Y in C* formula, one can say: "Extremism (X) counts as a threat (Y) in the United Kingdom (C)". Extremism gains its status

as a threat through 'collective agreement' but for such a status change (from non-threat to threat) to happen, "society as a whole has to approve" (see Fotion, 2000: 202). This approval is given indirectly, as seen in the *(S has power (S does A))*[6] formula, which is centres on collective acceptance, what Searle calls the basic structure of imposed power (Searle, 1995: 111). Searle (2006: 23) states the relationship of both formulas by explaining that "we do not just accept that somebody has power, but we accept that they have power in virtue of their institutional status". Applied to the UK case, one can argue that *(Prime Minister has power (Prime Minister securitises))*. That this understanding of the power structure at play and its legitimacy is not one that is necessarily supported by the CoS will be shown in Chapter 1. However, there have been academics such as Behnke (2006) who believe that this state-centric approach allows for the study of securitisation.

Therefore, for this thesis, securitisation taking place in the discursive realm shall be defined as:

1) When a securitising actor uses speech acts to frame something or someone as a threat (Assertive), tries to get people to do something to curb the threat (Directive) and/or commits her/himself to doing something against the threat (Commissive), securitisation is happening.

2) When institutionalised securitisation shows itself in security practices and policies.

3) And when measures to curb the 'threat' (suggested by securitising actors) have been suggested.

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[6] S stands for Speaker, A for act/activity.

Figure 2 - Three pillar framework to study the securitisation of extremism in the UK [author presentation]

Centred around this, the author of this study developed a framework which can act more as a tool than a theory. Based on the three interlinked pillars – Speech Acts, Institutionalisation, and Extraordinary Measures (see Figure 2) – the analysis of securitisation in the United Kingdom was undertaken. The category of 'institutionalised securitisation' as a unit of analysis allows for the contextualisation of the historical conditions of the threat issue. Albeit, Buzan et al (1998: 25) argue that securitisation does not need indicators to be analysed. Nevertheless, the author of this thesis believes that taking on board considerations of institutionalisation lends context to how the issue of extremism became securitised. Furthermore, it offers the background needed in order to evaluate why a topic is more likely to become securitised. For example, an issue traditionally linked to security is more inclined to be successfully presented as a security threat, given its historical context and association with 'threateningness' (see for example Wæver, 2003: 15).

This leads to the next pillar of the proposed framework, the suggestion and introduction of extraordinary measures. For the CoS, the securitisation of any issue can be attempted (via a securitising move), but not any issue will be 'successfully' securitised. The difference between a politicised and a securitised issue lies in the former being dealt with inside of 'normal' politics, whilst the latter is 'confronted'

with 'extraordinary' measures (that is to say, measures outside the normal political framework). Only through a speech act is the securitising actor able to break free of the usual standard political rules. Without it, the CoS believes, no such securitising move would be possible (see Buzan et al, 1998). Therefore, the existence (or proposal) of extraordinary measures is essential for both securitisation and its study. Looking at the context of a suggested measure allows the researcher to draw a distinction between extraordinary and ordinary measures. For example, the suggestion of teaching British values in order to counter extremism in schools might at first sight not seem outside of the political norm. However, the government intervening in school curriculums in order to 'fight extremism' is.

The author took the Speech Act Theory approach put forward by philosopher John R Searle as the basis for the study of securitising speech acts and developed a 'Securitising Speech Act Classification' (see Table 1). Using this tool offers an in-depth understanding of the way elite actors securitised extremism, acting as the primary pillar of her analytical framework.

	Speech Act	Securitising speech act indicator	Guiding note
Assertive	State, describe, classify, explain	Something or someone is a threat	Speaker tells 'how things are'
Directive	Order, command, request	Extraordinary measure to curb the threat	Speaker tries to get people to do something
Commissive	Promise, vow, pledge, contract, guarantee, threaten	Extraordinary measure to curb the threat	Speaker commits her/himself to doing something
Expressive	Apologise, thank, congratulate, welcome, condolence, accept	*[most likely irrelevant and not an indicator]*	*Speaker expresses feelings/attitudes*
Declaration	Pronounce, declare, christen	Speaker has to have 'authority' (create state of affairs just by representing it as created)	Speaker changes 'reality' by stating, no audience acceptance needed

Table 1 - 'Securitising Speech Act Classification'

Looking at the securitisation of a topic it is not about a process which has a start and an end but about the subjective interpretation of the securitising actors. Had

they not themselves decided that an issue was an existential threat, they would not have framed it as such, keeping in mind that 'speaking is doing', and Searle's 'Principle of Expressibility'.

The author believes that Speech Act Theory gives Securitisation Theory the lens with which to explore the formation of security through discourse. In order to combine the two as a framework, she wants to demonstrate how to apply it as a method; displaying how it helps, amongst extraordinary measures and institutionalisation, to study how the securitisation of extremism has taken place. The 'Securitising Speech Act Classification' (see Table 1) acts as a structure for the analysis of speeches by securitising actors which is based on Searle's SAT. Combined with an analytical guide of questions (see Element	ST Question(s)
Existential Threat	What does the threat entail?
Referent Subject	What or whom threatens?
Referent Object	What is being threatened? Whose survival is at stake?
Extraordinary Measures	Which measures are suggested to curb the threat? Are they (extra)ordinary? Are they outside of 'normal' politics?

Table 2) to ask when identifying the threat construction to different Referent Objects, and with its aiding in the pinpointing of extraordinary measures, the overall

framework offers a new way to study securitising moves and the securitisation of issues.

Element	ST Question(s)
Existential Threat	What does the threat entail?
Referent Subject	What or whom threatens?
Referent Object	What is being threatened? Whose survival is at stake?
Extraordinary Measures	Which measures are suggested to curb the threat? Are they (extra)ordinary? Are they outside of 'normal' politics?

Table 2 - Analytical framework question guide

Based on this analytical framework guide, types of speech acts will be determined before the 'threat', 'Referent Object', and 'Referent Subject' are identified (as guided by several main questions seen in Element	ST Question(s)
Existential Threat	What does the threat entail?
Referent Subject	What or whom threatens?
Referent Object	What is being threatened? Whose survival is at stake?
Extraordinary Measures	Which measures are suggested to curb the threat? Are they (extra)ordinary? Are they outside of 'normal' politics?

Table 2*). This is important for uncovering mechanisms and descriptions of (security) speech acts which create the 'institutional fact' of extremism being an existential threat to different Referent Objects.

Thesis structure
The thesis comprises eight chapters overall[7] and is divided into two parts. ***Part I*** offers the theoretical underpinning of this study with **Chapter 1** serving as an

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[7] Including the Introduction.

introduction to Securitisation Theory and the understanding of security as an analytical framework by the Copenhagen School. It also includes a lesser emphasis on other schools of adaptions (such as the Paris School which takes a 'sociological' stance to securitisation as opposed to the Copenhagen School's 'philosophical' one). Chapter 1 aims to trace the initial conceptualisation of ST and explores its key elements. The Copenhagen School's understanding of securitisation, the securitisation spectrum, the importance of the speech act as a securitising move, as well as the facilitating conditions of security are each investigated respectively. Furthermore, this chapter highlights criticisms and limitations of Securitisation Theory and attempts to locate its theoretical roots. It also seeks to present the theoretical framework needed to analyse and identify securitisation processes through a Speech Act Theory lens. It shows how the securitisation of extremism can be studied via John R Searle's 'Speech Act Theory' and how it fits into his wider social theory. It discusses Searle's taxonomy of speech acts to show how Searle's SAT can aid in the analysis of securitisation. The chapter also addresses the link between Speech Act Theory and Securitisation Theory and how it can help in the study of the securitisation of extremism.

In order combine the two into a single framework, **Chapter 2** will demonstrate how to apply it as a method; displaying how it helps, amongst extraordinary measures and institutionalisation, to study how the securitisation of extremism has taken place. Therefore, this chapter develops the 'Securitising Speech Act Classification', acting as a framework for the analysis of speeches by securitising actors based on Searle's SAT. Combined with an analytical guide of questions to ask when identifying the threat construction to different Referent Objects, as well as aiding in the pinpointing of extraordinary measures, the overall framework offers a new way to study securitising moves and the securitisation of issues. The chapter also includes questions of methods, including how materials were chosen for analysis, offering insights into the research design and the data collection and selection methods used. Furthermore, it explores the tools and methods employed for data analysis, which was conducted with the computer assisted qualitative data analysis software (CAQDAS) programme, NVivo.

Part II of the thesis covers the analytical exploration of the securitisation of extremism, beginning with **Chapter 3** and its inquiry of dealings with the concept

of extremism by UK Governments over the past thirty years via careful review of government documents, policies, and strategies. It critically reviews institutionalised securitisation, meaning how the issue of extremism was dealt with before it became part of the 'official' security agenda and openly securitised via discourse by Prime Ministers. The chapter demonstrates that, having established initiatives such as the 'Domestic Extremism Database' and 'Undercover Policing Units' targeting 'domestic extremists', the danger of extremism had been quietly moved onto the government's security agenda via a "security argument". The chapter shows that State and Police have presented not 'one' concept of general extremism, but rather two concepts of extremism as a security threat. The former, being of the political kind and termed 'domestic extremism' has been dealt with since the 1960s; the latter centres on a religious dimension from the early 2000s onwards. The chapter therefore addresses the dichotomy of framings regarding 'extremism' up to a point in the mid-2000s.

Chapter 4 chronologically as well as thematically analyses the securitising speech acts in Tony Blair's discourse on extremism from 1997 to 2006, highlighting his securitisation of Islamic extremism. It shows how his overarching ideal of anti-isolationism, the attitude of wanting moralists and realists to be partners in a global world spreads to much of his policy making, with the underlying stance of the national affecting the international and vice versa. Whilst it can be observed that Tony Blair's overall security discourse focused on terrorism, by extension he would frame extremism as the threat to several Referent Objects (British safety, British Muslims etc). An analysis of his speeches shows that he never really framed other forms of extremism as a threat, focusing almost exclusively on Islamic extremism, which he emphasised as a driver of violence. The chapter illustrates how the main idea Tony Blair portrays in his discourses is that extreme religious ideology leads to extremism, and extremism leads to terrorism. Another heavily featured theme is that "distorted Islam" is dangerous, but not "true Islam". Instead, he frames moderate or 'mainstream' Islam as an antidote to extremism. Gordon Brown's securitisation speech acts during his time as Chancellor of the Exchequer to Prime Minister from 2006 until 2010 are investigated in **Chapter 5**, analysing both parliamentary debate speeches as well as speeches deemed of importance given outside parliament in order to explore his securitising speech acts regarding

extremism. This chronologically structured chapter carves out the main themes of Gordon Brown's securitising of extremism and compares them to those of his predecessor Tony Blair. The analysis concludes by identifying the three themes that are most prominent in Gordon Brown's discourses: "British Values", "violent extremism", and the notion of "isolation of extremists/extremism". The themes previously raised by Tony Blair continued in Gordon Brown's discourse: terrorism represents a global challenge that will be defeated by international collaboration. It can be concluded that Gordon Brown kept extremism on the security agenda, albeit focussing on 'violent extremism' (though still associating it with Islam).

Chapter 6 offers an analysis of David Cameron's securitising speech acts, starting with his first term of office in 2010 to the end of his premiership in 2016. It shows him to be a main securitising driver with a heavy emphasis on Islamist Extremist Ideology which he frames as the root of violence and terror. The chapter traces the shift from Gordon Brown's usage of extremism, showing how the notion of non-violent extremism being an existential threat to the security of the United Kingdom gained prominence. It illustrates how David Cameron's reference to 'all types of extremism' does not mean different forms of ideological extremism. Instead, his emphasis lies on Islamist extremism but also includes violent and non-violent extremism. **Chapter 7** compares the three Prime Ministers' discourses and the securitisations of extremism, bringing together theory and empirical analysis to offer an understanding of how and when securitisation happens via securitising speech acts. It also demonstrates how specific types of extremism (Islamic, violent, non-violent, etc.) were securitised via speech acts. Finally, it further explains the relevance and consequences of the securitisation of extremism, whilst offering recommendations for future research.

1. Securitisation Theory of the Copenhagen School and using Speech Act Theory to study the securitisation of extremism

"Security issues are made security issues by acts of securitization"

(Buzan et al, 1998: 204)

1.1. Introduction

This chapter functions as the basis for the theoretical foundations of the thesis, elaborating the Securitisation Theory (ST) of the Copenhagen School (CoS) and John R Searle's Speech Act Theory (SAT) in order to gather an understanding of how to study the securitisation of extremism by Prime Ministers. Despite some weaknesses, the author believes that the original ST offers a good foundation for analysing how securitisation happens when combined with Searle's SAT approach. Given the aim of the thesis to explore how extremism became something 'dangerous' via discourse, it seemed fitting to make use of Securitisation Theory.

According to the Copenhagen School's Securitisation Theory, anything can become a security issue through speech acts, that is to say, for the CoS, security is constructed through language (Wæver, 2000: 251), a perspective that stands in stark contrast to the more traditional view on security. Among the myriad theories dealing with the implications of security discourse, the CoS' securitisation approach is the most prominent (Balzacq, 2005: 171). Securitisation Theory's focus on speech acts leads to the idea that security should not only be conceptualised in a traditional sense (for example militarily), but that it is also about social perceptions and negotiations. In other words, the concept of security needs to be broadened to encompass more than just traditional security-related sectors.

As reported by Wæver & Buzan (2020b: 390), the roots of Securitisation Theory go back to earlier works by Wæver (1989), Buzan et al (1990)[8] and Wæver et al (1993)[9], before eventually being officially conceptualised in the book chapter 'Securitization and desecuritization' by Ole Wæver (1995) and the book '*Security. A New Framework for Analysis*' in 1998 by Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de

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[8] Barry Buzan, Morten Kelstrup, Pierre Lemaitre, Elzbieta Tromer and Ole Waever.

[9] Pierre Lemaitre, Morten Kelstrup, Barry Buzan and Ole Waever.

Wilde. The aforementioned are generally considered the main contributors to the Copenhagen School (Stritzel, 2007), a term "coined" by Bill McSweeney in 1996[10] (Wæver 2003: 7). The CoS takes a radically constructivist approach to security, seeing the 'realness' of a threat as a question of the speech act that makes a threat rather than as any objective measure of said threat (Buzan et al, 1998: 204). They believe that securitisation "is constituted by the intersubjective establishment of an existential threat with a saliency sufficient to have substantial political effects" (Buzan et al, 1998: 25). Hence, by speaking, the securitising actor creates the threat and brings it into existence for the addressees of his or her speech via the creation of a mutual understanding. Security through this lens is seen as intersubjective and political, which addresses the question of "who can securitize what and with what effects?" (Laustsen & Wæver, 2000: 708). Essentially, Securitisation Theory provides a framework "to define security and determine how a specific matter becomes securitized or desecuritized" (Emmers, 2003: 132) which makes the theory suitable for the study of how extremism has come to be a security threat.

Even though it is considered the dominant theory for explaining security (Shipoli, 2018: xi), when speaking about Securitisation Theory, one has to keep in mind that there is not *one* singular theory. Instead, the original theory has evolved, been adapted and modified since its introduction[11]. ST must not be thought of only as a political or empirical theory of security but also as both a concept and an analytical framework (Guzzini, 2011: 332). When it comes to the application of ST, Ole Wæver (2003: 21) himself points out that "(t)he theory rather operates as a conceptual apparatus" resulting in different forms of studies and various research questions. He also highlights that

> "(i)t is an 'idea theory' that unfolds potentially far into other areas. It is built from one core idea, that security should be conceived as a speech act, and works out from here towards meta-theory, empirical studies, etc. (…)"
>
> (Wæver, 2003: 35).

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[10] Huysman (1998: 479) states that the Copenhagen school is associated with the 'Centre for Peace and Conflict Research' which was established in 1985 and was later renamed the 'Conflict and Peace Research Institute' (COPRI).

[11] Broadly speaking, the Paris School (also sometimes referred to as the 'French School') encompasses Didier Bigo, Philippe Bourbeau and Thierry Balzacq. There is also what is known as second generation securitisation scholars, most prominently Holger Stritzel (his work on seeing security as translation) and Rita Floyd (her work on 'just securitisation' where she was inspired by the just war tradition (Floyd, 2014: 122), Stefano Guzzini (2011) studying causal mechanisms in securitisation, and Stéphane Baele (experimental securitisation approach), all of whom have brought the concept of ST forward but taken a step back from the original CoS approach.

Balzacq (2015: 103), however, stresses that there are different forms of "various theories of securitization, each of which is committed to distinctive ontologies and epistemologies", highlighting that these different orientations have their own methodologies. In other words, ST can be interpreted differently and therefore the methods and relevant issues change due to the research interest and emphasis (philosophical vs sociological approach) in question. Despite several shortcomings, which will be elaborated upon later, the following chapter will stress the philosophical approach taken by the CoS and how it can act as more applicable method than conventional ST approaches by incorporating Searle's Speech Act Theory. In order to do so, this chapter first addresses Securitisation Theory as understood by the Copenhagen School, emphasising the securitisation spectrum and when securitisation happens. It then discusses the importance of the Referent Object (what is threatened) and the Referent Subject (what is threatening) before discussing the role of securitising actors in relation to their audiences and highlighting the main criticisms of the CoS ST approach. The chapter then outlines the applicability of Speech Act Theory for the study of securitisation, as well as its criticisms, before showing how John R Searle's Speech Act Theory can be applied to the study of securitisation.

1.2. The Copenhagen School and Securitisation Theory

As pointed out by Wæver (2003: 7) the Copenhagen School (CoS) "is built around three main ideas: 1) securitisation, 2) sectors and 3) regional security complexes". The concept of securitisation comes from Ole Wæver whilst the latter two – sectors and regional security complex theory – have been developed by Barry Buzan (Wæver, 2004: 8)[12]. In traditional international relations theory, sectors had, up to this point been more implicitly treated before the CoS introduced the concept of treating sectors explicitly, referring to them as 'analytical devices' which help to explore securitisation processes (Albert & Buzan, 2011: 415). Buzan et al (1998: vii) proposed to examine the nature and characteristics of security by separating it

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[12] According to Huysmans (1998: 485), the CoS "has straddled the boundary between peace research and security studies".

into five sectors[13]: military, political, economic, environmental, and societal[14]. By doing so, they are rejecting "the traditionalists' case for restricting security to one sector, arguing that security is a particular type of politics only applicable to a wide range of issues" (Buzan et al, 1998: vii). Sectors are defined as having different characteristics to securitised issues depending on the context but they are also considered vital to speech acts (Hansen, 2016: 5). Buzan et al (1998:17) insist that one cannot look at the sectors independently, as by doing so "linkages between sectors [are] lost or obscured". However, Wæver (1999: 335) later specified that "the set-up with five sectors is an analytical net to trawl through existing security discourses to register what is going on". Taking this into consideration, this research paper will not restrict its focus to different sectors, but will instead concentrate on a particular actor at play. The paper will aim to discover how Prime Ministers securitised extremism.

The third idea of the CoS, the regional security complex (RSC) theory was first introduced by Barry Buzan in 1983[15]. All three ideas, ST, sectoral security, and RSC theory are inter-related and brought together in the 1998 book '*Security. A New Framework for Analysis*'. Buzan et al (1998: vii) declared that their new framework offers a "constructivist operational method for distinguishing the process of securitization from that of politicization – for understanding who can securitize what and under what conditions". Williams (2003: 514) highlights the importance of the Copenhagen School in regards to the development and advancement of constructivism, asserting the school's emphasis on examining security practices "as specific forms of social construction, and securitization as a particular kind of social accomplishment". Similarly, Trombetta (2008: 588)

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[13] The sectors have an analytical status, not an ontological one, according to Albert & Buzan (2011: 415). They serve as analytical devices and "were identified simply from the existing usages in the discourses of security". They are not exhaustive and can be expanded.

[14] Later on, the Copenhagen School revised its sectors and added identity and religion (see Laustsen & Wæver, 2000) to widen its framework.

[15] He originally defined a regional security complex as: "a group of states whose primary security concerns link together sufficiently closely that their national securities cannot realistically be considered apart from one another" (Buzan, 1983: 106). Taking securitisation theory on board, a regional security complex is defined as "a set of units whose major processes of securitization, desecuritization, or both are so interlinked that their security problems cannot reasonably be analyzed or resolved apart from one another" (Buzan et al, 1998: 201). RSC theory helps to put more emphasis on the "regional level in security analysis and suggests an analytical scheme for structuring analysis of how security concerns tie together in a regional formation" (Wæver, 2003: 8). However, the research aim of this thesis does not lie in interregional security, allowing for a disregard of RSC.

emphasised that the CoS view on "(s)ecurity in this perspective is not a value or a condition but a form of social practice". However, their combined research outputs were not without critics, most importantly Bill McSweeney's (1996) criticism of the early theoretical inconsistencies between the works of Wæver and Buzan[16]; and Ken Booth's (2007: 167) critique of the school's "curious theoretical mixture of liberal, poststructural, and neorealist assumptions"[17].

1.2.1. The Securitisation Spectrum and when securitisation happens

According to the CoS, any issue in the public realm can be located on a spectrum that ranges from non-politicised, through politicised, to securitised and the placing on the spectrum is open (Buzan, et al, 1998: 24)[18]. For the CoS, non-politicised means that the issue is neither publicly debated nor dealt with by the state, whereas a politicised issue "is part of public policy, requiring government decision and resource allocations, or, more rarely, some other form of communal governance" (Buzan et al, 1998: 23). It is still managed within the standard political system through political institutions and public debate while security issues require exceptional measures breaking free from established rules (Martel, 2014). More precisely, a securitised issue is presented in such a way that it is "requiring emergency measures and justifying actions outside the normal bounds of the political procedure" (Buzan, et al, 1998: 23-24). By portraying an issue as an existential threat, the securitising actor "has claimed a right to handle the issue through extraordinary means, to break the normal political rules of the game" (Buzan et al, 1998: 24). Albert & Buzan (2011: 423) point out that "securitization is an operation that takes place *within* the political system", which can be understood as meaning that for something to undergo securitisation, it has to be

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[16] To which they replied in their (1997) article 'Slippery? Contradictory? Sociologically Untenable? The Copenhagen School Replies'.

[17] See Chapter 4 of Booth's 2007 book 'Theory of World Security' for a more detailed discussion on the shortcomings of the CoS.

[18] Coen (2014: 9) also introduced the normalised category "as conceptual counterpart to the "securitized" category" and an extension of desecuritisation. However, she argues that desecuritisation has to already have happened for normalisation to take place. Additionally, Neumann (1998) introduces a new category, 'violisation' which comes after securitisation in the securitisation scheme and could be, for example, the outbreak of war. See also Perera (2015) on militarisation versus securitisation. He claims that securitisation is a concept akin to militarisation but the latter is "a process involving or giving importance to the military in civil and political life" while the former is broader (Perera, 2015: 52). See also Lupovici (2013: 204) and his concept of 'pacifisation' which "occurs when issues are framed and constructed as related to peace in order to justify policies".

located within the political sphere in the first place, voiding the notion that something non-political can become securitised straight away.

However, it is essential for the issue to become securitised, having been framed as an existential threat against which emergency measures outside the 'normal' political spectrum have been taken. This process will be the main focus of this thesis. According to Wæver (2017: 127), there needs to be a contrast to 'normal politics', as securitisation reduces "the possibility of politics, because questions of survival can easily be insulated from contestation through rhetorics of urgency, loyalty and cohesion". Still, whilst this might sound like a clear indicator that an issue has been moved from the political to the security agenda, Buzan et al (1998: 86) point out that "emergency measures are still designed in the realm of ordinary policy debates" and are therefore not necessarily on their own a tell sign for securitisation. McDonald (2008: 70) highlights the dilemma of determining the exact point at which securitisation takes place, which he states is still a topic of controversy amongst securitisation scholars[19]. Taking 'extraordinary measures' as the primary indicator that an issue has moved onto the security agenda (and thereby become securitised), means that the concept needs to be clearly defined. For the CoS 'extraordinary measures' refers to measures that go beyond 'normal' politics. This can happen, for example, "in the form of secrecy, levying taxes or conscription, placing limitations on inviolable rights, or focusing society's energy and resources on a specific task" (Buzan et al, 1998: 24). As reported by Collins (2005: 571), an "extraordinary or emergency measure, is an action beyond the usual remit of the actor and as this action is targeted at an enemy it could be quite draconian". He cites implementations of laws or legislations by governments as examples of extraordinary measures, stating that this shows that an issue has left the "politicized part of the spectrum"[20].

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[19] Bourbeau (2008: 69) also criticises the CoS for not differentiating "the intensity within the securitization process: either an issue is securitized or it is not".

[20] When emphasising that the call for "extraordinary" or "emergency" measures has to be done by the securitising actor, one can consult Lucke & Dück (2016) who analysed the case of the November 2015 Paris Attacks through the lens of securitisation where French president François Hollande declared a state of emergency ("*L' état d'urgence*") not even a day after the attacks had occurred, calling them "*un acte de guerre*" (Hollande, 2015 in Lucke & Dück, 2016: 2). Also note that Aradau & Van Munster (2009: 689) point out that, for example, 'counter-terrorist policies' can be seen as form of exceptionalism.

Zedner (2007) argues that one can define something as an extraordinary measure as soon as it infringes on Human Rights and is therefore not any longer to be considered a 'normal political measure'. Extraordinary measures might not be applied in spheres not traditionally associated with security as such areas lack the 'logic of war' (Roe, 2004: 284)[21]. However, Vultee (2007: 41) supports the idea that successful securitisation has been achieved when "members of the public are more ready to widen the range of things done in their name: to be less insistent on their (and others') procedural rights; (…) without much if any public input or debate; to hand over power, in short, until the crisis is over"[22]. Hence, the giving up of rights can also be considered an extraordinary measure outside of normal politics indicative of securitisation. Recognising this will help in analysing and exploring extraordinary measures suggested by Prime Ministers in the UK.

According to the Copenhagen School, Securitisation Theory enables us to differentiate between the process of politicization and the process of securitisation (Scott Nicholas Romaniuk & Webb, 2015). However, the question of how clearly this distinction can be drawn remains. For example, Wæver (2003: 12) argues that although it may easily be mistaken for the 'intensification of politicisation', securitisation is actually "opposed to politicisation". As explained by McDonald (2008:71), the CoS believes that something which has entered the security agenda is immediately dealt with "in urgency and secrecy", having moved out of public discussions, and thereby reduced the number of actors involved in deliberation and decision making. The distinction lies in the fact that the politicisation of an issue allows it to be openly debated by many, entailing a participative decision-making process, whereas the securitisation of an issue, by its very nature, curtails these dealings:

> "(s)ecuritisation means to present an issue as urgent and existential, as so important that it should not be exposed to the normal haggling of politics but should be dealt with decisively by top leaders prior to other issues"   (Wæver, 2003: 12).

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[21] Buzan et al (1998: 83) give an example of securitising actors failing to move an issue from politicised to securitized in the environmental sector, stating that NGOs such as Greenpeace try to frame environmental issues as existential threats but fail to locate them outside of politicisation on the securitisation spectrum. Buzan et al (1998: 83) report the reason for their failure to securitise environmental issues as being tied to the fact that such issues point "to an unspecified, relatively remote future", making it difficult to invoke a state of urgency. The CoS also has two terms: "Paranoia (the securitization of non-existent threats) and complacency (the nonsecuritization of apparent threats)" (Buzan et al, 1998: 57) which have apparently never caught on in ST research (or at least the author did not come across them).

[22] This would also entail 'audience acceptance'.

One must also remember that whilst many see securitisation as a process whose starting point is a Speech Act, the theory's chronological structure is not always observable (Kapur, 2018: 64). Additionally, securitisation can be described as a "process that unfolds as agents start and stop speaking security" (Donnelly, 2013: 45). Evidently, there is a danger of seeing securitisation as a linear process (Hirschauer, 2014: 414), which is not the case as both securitisation and desecuritisation can happen at the same time and are not "mutually exclusive" (Austin & Beaulieu-Brossard, 2018: 301). Desecuritisation, on the other end of the securitisation spectrum, is defined as "the shifting of issues out of emergency mode and into the normal bargaining processes of the political sphere" (Buzan et al, 1998: 4). This does not mean that desecuritisation equates to the re-politicization of an issue. Indeed, desecuritisation simply describes a situation in which an issue is no longer dealt with as a security urgency (Wæver, 2017: 127). Given that the CoS sees 'security' as something negative and securitisation as something to be avoided (Williams, 2003: 523), desecuritisation is considered "the optimal long-range option" (Buzan et al, 1998: 29) in which issues are moved out of a "threat-defence sequence and into the ordinary public sphere" (Wæver, 2004: 10)[23]. This preference for 'de-security' is considered "the central normative claim" of the securitisation framework (McDonald, 2011: 283) where security is seen as negative in that it results in a process of securitisation which can be empirically observed (Bust-Bartels, 2021: 14). However, there are two things which one has to keep in mind here.

Firstly, ST does not "provide logical or moral reasons for procedural or substantive norms" (Thompson, 2021: 227). Secondly, Stefano Guzzini's (2015: 9) argument raises a considerable point by noting that "(s)ecuritisation is related to a unit of analysis which is neither objective, nor subjective, nor indeed the aggregation of different subjective understandings". This view is supported by Wæver & Buzan (2020a: 65) who have pointed out that ST should be applied objectively but can help "to structure debate on the pros and cons of handling a specific threat in a

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[23] Wæver & Buzan (2020a: 64) refresh our memory that "the theory is only a reminder about seeing the dark side of any securitization, not a postulate that securitization is always wrong".

security mode".[24] Wæver & Buzan (2020b: 391) explicitly clarify this by highlighting that ST "does not aim to guide when something 'should be securitized'. It is a framework for analysing what happens when something is securitized and the politics of struggles over this act".

1.2.2. What is threatened and what is threatening

Referent Objects are traditionally states or nations, particularly in the more traditional sectors of the military (Lucke & Duck, 2016). Buzan et al (1998: 36) define Referent Objects as "things that are seen to be existentially threatened and that have a legitimate claim to survival". Wæver (2008: 583) defines Referent Objects as something "which is deemed threatened and holds a general claim on 'having to survive', e.g. the state, the environment or liberal values". For him, the Referent Object "is that which you can point to and say, "it has to survive, therefore it is necessary to...."" (Wæver, 2009: 22). In theory, anything can be constructed as a Referent Object by a securitising actor, but some Referent Objects are more likely to become successfully securitised than others[25]. Hansen (2000), for example, shows that although they represent a Referent Object, 'women' have not been presented as such throughout discourse and therefore "do not exist [as a Referent Object] independently of discursive articulation (Hansen, 2000: 288)[26].

Depending on the sector, threats and Referent Objects can differ but might also overlap. They can include "national sovereignty, national economies, collective identities, and environmental habitats" (Emmers, 2007: 422), "individuals, groups, communities" (Abrahamsen, 2005: 57), large banks (Floyd, 2016: 48), and even nationality, religion, and race (Hansen, 2000: 297). Banks, for instance, are probably more likely to succeed as Referent Objects in the economic sector than the environmental sector, demonstrating how Referent Objects are often sector specific. For example, Buzan et al (1998: 123) list "tribes, clans, nations (and nation-like ethnic units which others call minorities), civilizations, religions and

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[24] The author also wants to draw attention to an argument made by Matthias Schulze (2012: 30) who explicates that differentiating between subjective and objective security only makes sense if it aids the understanding of security being seen as objective.

[25] Note that the CoS recognises that although theoretically objective, in practice security often cannot be subjective. They state that in practice, "there are socially defined limits to what can and cannot be securitized" (Buzan et al, 1998: 39).

[26] See her article 'The Little Mermaid's silent security dilemma and the absence of gender in the Copenhagen School' (Hansen, 2000).

race" as Referent Objects in the societal sector. In the military sector, where everything is very state-centric in nature, the state is most often the Referent Object, though, Buzan et al (1998: 53) note that 'religion' can also be used as a Referent Object in this sector. In the political sector, sovereignty would be considered a Referent Object for a state "because sovereignty is what defines a state" and threats involving it would be existential (Buzan et al, 1998: 150). In the religious sector, "faith" is a likely Referent Object (Laustsen & Wæver, 2000).

For the purposes of this thesis and the non-sector specific analysis it wishes to carry out however, the Referent Object will be left open, allowing for a broad perspective on how the threat of extremism is framed towards different things/people.[27] Also, Wæver & Buzan (2020a: 62) now admit that there is not "always only one referent object at play in a given case, actually often several different threats and referent objects are combined in the same discourse", which can be further seen as a nullification of the sector referent specific analytical approach.

Buzan et al (1998: 21) believe that an "existential threat can only be understood in relation to the particular character of the referent object in question". They also note what they call a seemingly 'fairly demanding criterion', namely that "the issue has to be presented as an *existential threat*" (Buzan et al 1998: 24) [emphasis added]. Furthermore, it is worth mentioning that Buzan et al (1998: 83) also believe that the causes and effects of an issue (for example climate change) can also be securitised and conceptualised as a threat in the securitisation process.

In the case of this thesis, the core securitisation concepts are expanded to the Referent Subject, which is the source of the threat; more precisely what or whom threatens the survival of the Referent Object. The Referent Subject is the threat to the Referent Object or in Balzacq's words "what threatens" (Balzacq, 2011b: 26). It is the "threat issue" and refers to the 'existential threat' in question. The term "Referent Subject" was not introduced by the Copenhagen School but was rather coined by Balzacq (2011a: 3)[28].

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[27] Her analysis (see Chapter 6) showed that the Referent Object and Referent Subject were interchangeable in the case of Muslim youth which was presented as both threatened by extremism but also threatening because of extremist tendencies.

[28] For example, in a study undertaken by Susanne Keesman (2013: 222), on the Dutch government's securitisation of Communism in the late 1940s to early 1950s, she identified the Referent Subject as

To sum up, a securitising move is the attempt of an actor (securitising actor) to move an issue from the realm of politics into the realm of security, portraying an issue as a threat that needs to be taken care of by way of extraordinary measures. This framework will be key in the analysis to come of how Prime Ministers securitise extremism as it makes clear that, without moving an issue outside 'normal' politics by evoking a threat situation for the survival of a Referent Object, extraordinary measures cannot be suggested nor implemented. Given the main aims of this thesis, identifying Referent Objects and Referent Subjects relating to extremism will be an essential aspect of the research framework so as to clearly illustrate the contemporary securitising moves of elite actors. This, in turn, allows us to uncover mechanisms and descriptions of (security) speech acts that 'manifest' extremism as an existential threat to different Referent Objects.

1.2.3. Securitising actors and audiences

Buzan et al (1998: 36) define securitising actors as "actors who securitize issues by declaring something – a referent object – existentially threatened". The securitiser is the one who decides that something ought to be dealt with as an existential threat, but he or she must still convince an audience of this for the securitisation to be successful. For Wæver (1995 [1998: 8]), a security actor[29] is a state or non-state actor usually considered to be an institutional voice (an 'elite' who has authority)[30]. He argues that the securitisation act performed by a state allows it to fend off an existential threat which could cause it harm. They believe that both individuals and groups can act as securitising actors, citing possible securitisers as "political leaders, bureaucracies, governments, lobbyists, and pressure groups" (Buzan et al,

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"the totalitarian threat of a communist subversion" to the Referent Object "the state of the Dutch democratic order".

[29] Sometimes also referred to as the 'securitising agent', 'securitisation actor', 'securitising actor' or 'securitiser'. Floyd (2018: 50) points out that there is inconsistent use of terminology when it comes to the field of securitisation. Hence it is important to keep in mind that not every academic defines the terms the same way.

[30] In the past, securitising actors were firmly considered to be states or NGOs, however, recent studies have also identified civil society as a securitising actor. For example, Peer Ilner (2015: 480) studied how the Black Panther movement "declared American everyday life a vital threat in order to safeguard a consistent racial identity", leading to securitisation by a non-state actor. Also, Monika Barthwal-Datta (2009) who explored civil society groups and the media as securitising actors on the topic of misgovernance in Bangladesh, a topic which produces several threats to different Referent Objects. Greaves (2016: 1) looked at the Inuit in Canada and Sámi in Norway as 'securitizing actors' within their own countries whilst Mireanu (2010) explored Italian vigilantes as securitising actors in one paper and far-right groups in Hungary in another (Mireanu, 2013). Similarly, Nina Bust-Bartels (2021) researched vigilante groups in Germany as securitising actors.

1998: 40). Wæver (1995: 57 in McDonald, 2008: 69) suggests that successful securitisation tends to involve the articulation of a threat "only from a specific place, in an institutional voice, by elites" [31]. This position is reinforced by Buzan et al (1998: 31) who state that the success of a securitising move is influenced by the status of the securitising actor, for example the extent to which he, she, or it possesses "the power"[32] to define security. Hence, the securitising actor is essential in the ST framework as they are "the one who makes the claim - speech act - of pointing to an existential threat to this referent object and thereby legitimizing extraordinary measures" (Wæver, 2008: 582).

Bourbeau (2015a: 90) believes that it is not up to the securitising actor to "navigate freely toward successful securitisation", stating that the grammar of security has to be observed in the initial speech act in question. He also echoes Buzan et al (1998: 31) when he notes that a securitiser needs to be in a position of power and/or needs to possess social capital before a securitising move can succeed. Furthermore, he states that the "audience of a security speech act must accept proposed securitising moves as legitimate" (Bourbeau, 2015a: 90) for securitisation to be successful. Whilst the notion of 'legitimacy' is often present in securitisation studies, Olesker (2018: 312) states that there is "surprisingly little clarification on the meaning of legitimacy and how it informs the securitisation process". However, Balzacq (2014: 4) offers an adaptable definition by Robert Dahl (1984: 54) who states that legitimacy "is not any more reliable and durable than naked coercion but it also enables rulers to govern with a minimum of political resources". Without this legitimacy, securitising moves would not be able to result in the implementation of extraordinary measures. With this in mind, the actors chosen for analysis in this thesis (Tony Blair, Gordon Brown, and David Cameron) were chosen on the basis

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[31] Recently, the concept of collective securitisation has also gathered prominence, for example, by Fijałkowski (2013) who looked into ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) as a regional organisation being a collective securitising actor. More recently, Sperling & Webber (2019) developed a six-stage model of 'collective securitisation' which was applied by Kaunert & Léonard (2019: 261) to explore "the recent and significant growth of European Union cooperation on counter-terrorism".

[32] However, as pointed out by Baele (2020) in his observations on the securitisation of Covid19, the 'social capital' of the securitising actor might not always be needed. He argues that 'divisive leaders' were still able to 'securitise' Covid19 (as in 'audience' acceptance of 'extraordinary measures') despite sometimes 'low social capital' which might suggest that (actor) "legitimacy can also be an output of securitization" (Baele, 2020: 4).

that, given their political status as Prime Minister and therefore acting head of the UK government, they had the legitimacy to implement extraordinary measures.

When it comes to 'audience acceptance', the Copenhagen School states that acceptance "does not mean in civilized, dominance-free discussion; it only means that an order always rests on coercion as well as consent (…)". Furthermore, they declare that it "is always a political choice to securitize or to accept a securitization" (Buzan et al, 1998: 29) emphasising what audience acceptance requires and how to measure it. Moreover, Wæver (2008: 582) believes that the 'audience' are "those who have to be convinced in order for the speech act to be successful in the sense of opening the door to extraordinary measures, otherwise not available".

However, reading the work of the CoS more closely, they state that

> "Successful securitization is not decided by the securitizer but by the audience of the security speech act: Does the audience accept that something is an existential threat to a shared value? Thus, security (as with all politics) ultimately rests neither with the objects nor with the subjects but among the subjects (cf. Arendt 1958, 1959; Wæver 1990; Huysmans 1996)"
>
> (Buzan et al, 1998: 31).

This provides us with an understanding of a relationship between speaker and audience, which is later laid out by Wæver (2015: 124). He highlights that the interaction between audience and securitising actor is an important point as it "studies securitization as a relationship", demonstrating how both "jointly reconfigure their relationship".[33] Wæver has also explained that Arendtian political thought underpins his own perspective and underlines securitisation. Wæver (2011: 468) believes that Securitisation Theory permits its users to "reduce away politics by deriving it from objective threats or causal explanations at the particular point of securitization".

1.3. Criticism of the Copenhagen School's Securitisation Theory

Buzan et al (1998: 25) argue that a securitising move results in successful securitisation only if accepted by the audience. However, when talking about audience acceptance, two questions arise, (1) which audience needs to be convinced of the legitimacy of a securitising move (McDonald, 2008); and (2) what does acceptance by an audience mean and what does it entail exactly (McGuire, 2013).

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[33] This is where John R Searle's concept of collective intentionality proves helpful for adapting his SAT approach to ST.

Discussing the role of the audience is therefore important for this thesis which makes the claim that audience acceptance is not a necessity for the study of securitisation when taking an elite-actor speech act approach.

Whilst it might be argued that the impact of the speech act on audiences is not necessarily easy to assess, the CoS does indeed emphasise the role of the audience. According to Sjöstedt (2019: 31), in ST it is often assumed that the "conception of audience is related to the securitizing actor". Nevertheless, Côté (2016: 543) lays out that despite the centrality of the audience in the securitisation framework "the ability of audiences to engage actively in the process is nearly nonexistent within securitization theory". Whilst the CoS does not explain in detail how this relationship can be measured, if one takes a Schmittian approach[34] then it can be assumed that the legitimacy of the securitising actor (derived from their position of authority and respectively of 'power') demands that they be 'accepted' by the audience. This entails a "decisionist imposition of a will" where the "sovereign voice self-Referentially declares a state of exception" (Gad & Petersen, 2011: 318)[35]. For Carl Schmitt the "essence of sovereignty was the ability to decide on the exception" (Peoples & Vaughan-Williams, 2010: 71) and this exceptional situation enables the state to suspend the law based on its right to self-preservation (Schmitt, [1922] 2015: 18-19)[36].

This take on securitisation would mean that "securitization is an act that is received by an audience outside of the speech act, an audience that is not part of the production of meaning" (Gad & Petersen, 2011: 318). However, Wæver (Wæver 2011; Wæver 2015, in 2017: 127) repeatedly emphasises that securitisation is not about "communication and perceptions" and that scholars are mistaken when they reduce it to "a securitizing actor making a threat argument to convince an audience". Instead, he argues that "the audience is not those listening to a speech –it is the co-

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[34] Referring to German jurist and political theorist Carl Schmitt (see Williams, 2003: 515).

[35] However, Schmitt (1985a cited in Aradau & Van Munster, 2009: 689) believes that "exceptionalism does not simply refer to the creation of moral panics by means of which state elites can further their interests, often by undermining civil liberties. Rather, it is a 'general concept in the theory of the state'".

[36] Interestingly, Schmitt refers to Jean Bodin, the French legal and political scholar who lived in the 1500s when working out a definition of sovereignty. For Bodin, one sign of sovereignty is that it entitles the sovereign to break free of the law and, deducing from this, gives them authority for other actions (such as declarations of peace and war, pardon right and being the court of last resort) (Bodin in Schmitt, [1922] 2015: 16). Still, Bodin has never been cited as the inspiration for Securitisation Theory nor has his concept been mentioned.

producing actor that is necessary in order to bring about a transformation of a social situation (*in casu* a securitization)" (Wæver, 2017: 127). As Wæver's emphasises when outlining the Arendtian political thought[37] that underlines this understanding of securitisation:

> "the [securitisation] theory places power in-between humans – not least through the central role of the audience – and insists on securityness being a quality not of threats but of their handling, that is, the theory places power not with 'things' external to a community but internal to it"
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> (Wæver, 2011a: 468).

This reinforces the notion put forward by the CoS that security is socially constructed through discourse. Nevertheless, Wæver (2011a: 478, Note 2) himself has stated that although the CoS understanding of security "in terms of exception, emergency and a decision (although not by a singular will, but among people in a political situation)" might be Schmittian[38], he does not consider this political thought to be extensive as "the place of security in the theory is as an anti-politics or the politically constituted limit to politics" (Wæver, 2011a: 478, Note 2). One can therefore state that both the logic of exception (Schmitt)[39] and politics taking place among people (Arendt) are present in the ST.[40]

Another criticism of the importance of the securitising actor in Securitisation Theory is raised by Hübschle (2010: 11) who disagrees with the notion of the securitising move being a consequence of the securitising actors' decision. She consults Carrapiço (2008: 28), whose argument states that the decision to securitise an issue is made as a result of dialogue, and that it does not solely rest on the

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[37] See also Motta (2015) and Motta & Pimentel (2016) on Hannah Arendt's contributions to Securitisation Theory.

[38] See also Behnke (2006: 65), Huysmans (1998: 244) and Williams (2003: 512) who point out Carl Schmitt's influence on ST. The latter also acknowledges that the CoS approach is not fully Schmittian but highlights that their notion of security as a 'speech act' is "underpinned by an understanding of the politics of enmity, decision, and emergency which has deep roots in Schmitt's understanding of political order" (Williams, 2003: 515).

[39] The question remains how conscious these theoretical underpinnings were when the theory was developed, given that Wæver himself was not aware of the theory being read from a Schmittian angle and had not read his works until after having formulated his ideas of securitisation (Wæver, 2004 in Ejdus, 2009: 10). It was only later that he elaborated that ST's understanding of the concept of security is Schmittian (see Wæver, 2011a).

[40] "However, this exaggerates the scope of securitization theory as it was originally developed purely as an analytical framework to study securitization(s), rather than as a broader theoretical framework with which to analyse international security" (Nyman, 2013: 61).

securitiser alone but other agents as well. By not emphasising on this, the CoS fails to get down to the root of uncovering the threat decision making process. Stritzel (2011: 344) confirms that a proven weakness of ST lies in the "problems of defining reliable criteria of success, stemming from the claim that something is successfully securitized once a securitizing move has been accepted by a 'relevant audience'". For him, the limitation is mostly down to defining the relevant audience. Côté (2016: 549) argues that "the audience is omitted as a unit of analysis" in the CoS framework, highlighting that it is therefore "difficult to adequately analyze the relationship between the speaker and the audience". Balzacq (2011a: 1) maintains that the Copenhagen School conceives of the audience as "a formal - given - category, which is often poised in a receptive mode". This view is supported by Buzan et al (1998: 26)'s explanation that "successful securitization has (…) three components (or steps): existential threats, emergency action and effects on interunit relations by breaking free of rules" (Buzan et al, 1998: 26), which omits the criteria of audience acceptance. This reading would reduce securitisation to the speech acts of the speaker, leaving no role for the audience (see Vuori, 2008). However, as already discussed above, the CoS has repeatedly emphasised that ST does give the audience a central role (Wæver, 2011a, 2017).

Probably the most contested aspect of Securitisation Theory is the definition of when the securitisation of a topic has been achieved, that is to say, been successful. Hansen (2000: 295) goes as far as to state that the ST "framework abstains from an objective—or quantifiable— definition as to when securitization is successful". Buzan et al (1998: 24-25) state that "(...) when a securitizing actor uses a rhetoric of existential threat and thereby takes an issue out of what under those conditions is "normal politics" we have a case of securitization." However, this explanation indicates that securitisation takes place as soon as the speech act of security has been made, which would render the success of securitisation solely a question of the securitising actor, and not the audience. Keeping in mind that the Copenhagen School also states:

> "A discourse that takes the form of presenting something as an existential threat to a referent object does not by itself create securitization - this is a securitizing move, but the issue is securitized only if and when the audience accepts it as such"

> (Buzan et al, 1998: 25).

This quote shows a contradiction to their earlier definition of securitisation success. McDonald (2008: 576 in Fabricius, 2013: 16) takes note of this this dilemma and points out that there "is an inherent paradox in that a successful securitisation does not require extraordinary measures to be implemented, only accepted by an audience, owing to difficulties in defining when such an audience acceptance occurs". Furthermore, the CoS states that "securitization is not fulfilled by only breaking rules (which can take many forms) nor solely by existential threats (which can lead to nothing) but by cases of existential threats that legitimise the breaking of rules" (Buzan et al, 1998: 25) which again, makes the point of successful securitisation difficult to define. This view is also interesting as it indicates a less than objective evaluation of threats and their validity, something that the CoS claims to want to generally avoid[41]. Floyd (2017: 677ff) has laid out the difficulties of this approach and how they encompass a "constructivist deficit" of the Copenhagen School's approach. In her opinion, the question of when securitisation has been successful should be answered not by academics but by security practitioners themselves[42].

The difficulties in the empirical application of ST due to "various problems and tensions at the theoretical level" is something which makes the analysis of 'securitisations; unclear according to Stritzel (2014: 34). However, one can also consult Broecker & Westermeier (2019: 107) here, who believe that a complete and universally accepted securitisation[43] can never happen, which highlights that there is no need for the analysis of 'successful' securitisation in terms of a general 'audience acceptance' as securitisation can never be universally successful. There will always be contestation. Instead, this thesis will take the position that a well-thought through methodology is one which allows for the study of the securitisation process and whether or not it has occurred as opposed to linking it to difficult to quantify criteria such as audience acceptance. For this reason, the rest of this thesis will proceed under the assumption that audience acceptance is not a necessary criterion to study securitisation with an elite actors securitising speech act approach.

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[41] See Buzan et al (1998: 31).

[42] Roe (2004: 281) also makes an interesting point in claiming that 'successful securitisation' can only be found out retrospectively, establishing that "security logic is *ex post facto* apparent".

[43] As in a securitisation is accepted by everyone.

Two further criticisms of the Copenhagen School are worth noting. The first points out that Securitisation Theory takes an Eurocentric approach (see Wilkinson, 2007), focusing solely on European security issues (Emmers, 2016). The second argues that the focus on normative democracy prevents the CoS' ST approach from being applied to non-democratic states, since in these states the 'exception' is already the norm (Aradau, 2004)[44]. McDonald (2008: 69-70) points out that, given the CoS' definition of security as being "in opposition to a conception of 'politicization' or 'normal politics'" which in turn is characterised "by the rule of law [and] open political deliberation", it can be argued that there is indeed a focus in ST on "Western liberal democratic state[s]". Similar views are echoed by Wilkinson (2007: 8) who picks up the term "Westphalian straitjacket"[45] introduced by Buzan and Little to highlight that the CoS "has yet to actively escape from the Westphalian straitjacket owing to this institutionalized Eurocentrism". She highlights the shortcomings of the CoS' Western centric assumptions "about concepts such as society, identity and the state" which can leave out security dynamics in non-Western applications (Wilkinson, 2007: 22) but also acknowledges that this can be remedied – something which she later shows in her works on securitisation in Kyrgyzstan (Wilkinson, 2009)[46].

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[44] See also Roe (2012) for a more acute theoretical debate on the limits of exceptionalism in Securitisation Theory.

[45] Defined by Buzan & Little (2001: 25 in Wilkinson, 2007: 7) as "the strong tendency to assume that the model established in seventeenth century Europe should define what the international system is for all times and places".

[46] In late 2019, Alison Howell & Melanie Richter-Montpetit (2020) first published an article online calling Securitisation Theory racist, which resulted in wide discussions. They claim that ST by the CoS is "structured not only by Eurocentrism, but also by civilizationism, methodological whiteness, and antiblack racism" (Howell & Richter-Montpetit, 2020: 16). According to Howell & Richter-Montpetit (2020), by emphasising 'normal' Western politics as the ideal, ST not only legitimises colonialism but also racism. Its focus on elite actors, seen as upholding the status quo of racist thought as it is rooted in a 'methodological whiteness' (Howell & Richter-Montpetit, 2020: 11). They also claim "that racist political thought is integral" to Securitisation Theory (Howell & Richter-Montpetit, 2020: 4) and by focussing on "Arendtian 'normal politics', it implicitly undertakes to defend the status quo of a violent international racial order" (Howell & Richter-Montpetit, 2020: 11). Their arguments were seen by many as problematic and their article was openly defused by not only Lene Hansen (2020) but also Wæver & Buzan (2020a, 2020b). The latter not only responded in detail to the shortcomings of the article, including its academic weakness (e.g. wrong references and plagiarism) but also addressed the accusations of racism whilst acknowledging that the ST approach could do more to be applicable in non-Western settings. Whilst Securitisation Theory in its original form is difficult to adapt to non-Western settings (Jackson, 2006), more and more academic studies have applied ST in non-Western cases. For example, Bilgin (2011) adapted Securitisation Theory to Turkey, Vuori (2003, 2008, 2014b) applied it in a Chinese context, Neo (2021) in Malaysia, and Hirschauer (2014) in Africa. Pratt & Rezk (2019) also showed that, with adaptions, ST can be applied to non-democratic contexts when they researched the securitisation of

The author of this thesis believes that although there are inconsistencies in defining securitisation success and audience acceptance, the theory is able to offer the basis for an understanding of how securitisation happens. In a nutshell, what is important is the analysis of a securitising move, rather than its success, and this is something that ST can indeed help with.

1.4. Speech Act Theory for the study of securitisation

Given the thesis' focus on speech acts, the following section will briefly explore its significance in the study of securitisation as initially envisaged by the CoS. Baele & Sterck (2015: 1124) state that "(u)nder this perspective, a securitising move is an attempt made by a political actor to convince the public rhetorically that a social issue belongs to the realm of security problems and thereby calls for exception politics". Essentially, the construction of a threat through a speech act is considered the securitising move. For the CoS, a securitising move results in securitisation, once it has been accepted by the audience, results in extraordinary measures and follows the grammar rules of security. However, the extraordinary measure does not itself have to be implemented as even Buzan et al (1998: 25) point out when they express

> "We do *not* push the demand so high as to say that an emergency measure has to be adopted, only that the existential threat has to be argued and just gain enough resonance for a platform to be made from which it is *possible to legitimize emergency measures* or other steps that would not have been possible had the discourse not taken the form of existential threats, point of no return, and necessity. If no signs of such acceptance exist, we can talk only of a securitizing move, not of an object actually being securitized"

> (Buzan et al, 1998: 25) [emphasis added]

Consequently, the implementation of emergency measures is not mandatory for a securitisation move to take place, but it should at least be possible to legitimise them via discourse. More precisely, a speech act has to follow "a specific rhetorical structure (survival, priority of action "because if the problem is not handled now it will be too late, and we will not exist to remedy our failure")" (Buzan, et al. 1998:

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the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt after the Arab Spring in 2011. Similarly, Staar (2021) researched how the United States were securitised as an existential threat in North Korea.

26). For discoursive securitisation to happen Buzan et al (1998: 33) end up dividing the speech acts' facilitating conditions as following:

(1) the demand internal to the speech act of following the grammar of security,

(2) the social conditions regarding the position of authority for the securitizing actor—that is, the relationship between speaker and audience and thereby the likelihood of the audience accepting the claims made in a securitizing attempt, and

(3) features of the alleged threats that either facilitate or impede securitisation

(Buzan et al, 1998: 33).

Nevertheless, Wæver (2003: 14-15) later expands on these 'felicity conditions'[47] of "a successful[48] security speech act", defining them as follows:

1) the demand internal to the speech act of following the grammar of security and constructing a plot with existential threat, point of no return and a possible way out;

2) the social capital of the enunciator, the securitising actor, who has to be in a position of authority, although this should neither be defined as official authority nor taken to guarantee success with the speech act; and

3) conditions historically associated with a threat: it is the more likely that one can conjure a security threat if there are certain objects to refer to which are generally held to be threatening-be they tanks, hostile sentiments, or polluted waters.

(Wæver, 2003: 14-15).

However, he also states that they do not need to be present for securitisation to take place, but that they should be seen as "facilitating conditions" (Wæver, 2003: 15). It is important to keep in mind here that Balzacq (2005: 172-173) argues that security speech acts should not be seen as something which follows rules but rather as "discursive techniques" which enable a securitizing actor to frame an issue as dangerous. Similarly, Guzzini (2011: 331) states that "'securitization' refers not to a single act or ritual (like marriage) but to a process that can lead to the anticipated effects, but does not do so necessarily". This view moves away from the speech-act centric approach of the CoS but sees speech acts as part of the securitisation process. One has to remember here that the speech act focussed approach can only work if

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[47] A term borrowed from Philosophy of Language.

[48] Successful as in the sense that it has been performed according to criteria.

one assumes that "fully conventionalized patterns and authorized speaker positions do exist" (Broecker & Westermeier, 2019: 104-105).

According to Wibisono (2015: 83) a securitising move can also be seen as performance of "a break between the politicised and securitised statuses of the issue". In light of the securitisation spectrum, it appears that making such a distinction is not possible because the move itself is not an indicator for successful securitisation but only a criterion for a securitisation attempt through a speech act. Furthermore, Qadri (2020: 55) points out that "(t)he performative speech act can also constitute a *securitizing move*, the attempt to push an issue out of the domain of everyday *politics* and into the domain of *security*". Another interpretation of a 'securitisation move' and its speech-act aspect states that the framing of a threat underlies "the linguistic components of the speech act" which are implemented by the speaker (Hansen, 2016: 5). On the other hand, Roxanna Sjöstedt (2013: 146) believes that the notion of a securitising move can also act as an indicator for securitisation, in empirical terms[49]. She puts forward that for doing so a securitising move is defined as:

> "the public framing of an issue as a national threat, accompanied by a strategy for action. If a decision-maker has publicly declared that an issue is a threat to national security, and presents an action plan to handle this threat, a securitizing move has been initiated. If the issue is presented in more general terms or lacks a concrete strategy, there is no move".
>
> (Sjöstedt, 2013: 146).

Her definition raises some interesting points, in particular when it comes to securitisation success criteria. It is also worth considering that this definition might ease some of the methodological issues of Securitisation Theory and help to clarify when securitisation happens since securitising moves are not always effective, and can therefore only be considered to have been a securitising attempt.[50] The distinction would be that the securitising move needs to fulfil certain criteria for securitisation to happen where the securitising attempt would fall short (for example

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[49] Keeping in mind that she follows the sociological approach to Securitisation Theory.

[50] Even the study of failed securitisation is useful as seen in Biba (2016: 1) who explored 'unsuccessful securitizing moves', stating that doing so "can be helpful in raising sufficient awareness of an issue to gain the attention of the relevant audience(s)" who need to accept a securitising move for it to be successful. It is important to point out that just because the securitisation of an issue failed once, it does not mean that it will fail again in a different context.

through the lack of authority of the securitising actor or when the logic of security is not evoked).

Even though the Copenhagen School is considered to deny a meaningful role for the audience (due to its emphasis on speech acts creating security by illocution) (Balzacq, 2005, Floyd & Croft, 2011, Stritzel, 2007), the author of this thesis thinks that this is not the case on a theoretical level. Instead, she sees it as a way of allowing for securitisation to be studied. She believes that Staar (2021: 95) sums this up well when he states that on a practical, applicable level, speech act centred frameworks of securitisation can "prove useful because they consist of an abstract, theory-based approach, clearly defined source material and a comprehensible way of analysing said material".

1.4.1. Criticism of the speech act approach of the Copenhagen School
Usually, the securitisation process has focused on discourse alone without taking context into consideration, which leads to limitations. By reducing security to the 'grammar of security', the "conditions that surround the practice are dropped out of the framework (Balzacq, 2014: 2). This is one of the criticisms most prominently voiced by Thierry Balzacq (2005, 2010, 2011, 2015) and Holger Stritzel (2011, 2012, 2014) who have tried to adapt securitisation theory accordingly, taking context more into account. Bourbeau (2015b: 396-397) expresses this in strong words:

> "the Copenhagen model, as currently organized and applied, cannot explain variation in levels of securitization and […] it presents a thin understanding of the concept of power, particularly the power of contextual factors – which should be understood as the power to enable and/or constrain securitizing agents".

Balzacq (2005: 171) argues "that a speech act view of security does not provide adequate grounding upon which to examine security practices in 'real situations. For instance, many security utterances counter the 'rule of sincerity' and, the intrinsic power attributed to 'security' overlooks the objective context in which security agents are situated". Wilkinson (2011: 94) likewise considers that the Copenhagen School's focus on speech acts and therefore their disregard for context leads to limitations. They are not the only ones taking offence to Buzan et al's use of Speech Act Theory. Mutengesa (2014: 131), for example, sees "Securitisation

Theory as [the] mutilation of the Austinian Speech Act"[51], arguing that Speech Act Theory's roots in linguistics make it incompatible with the constructivist premises of the CoS and that it misunderstands Austin's original theory. However, according to Ceyhan (1998 in Trombetta, 2007: 12), Ole Wæver' understanding of Austin "is influenced by Derrida's interpretation" which might explain why the CoS' interpretation of Speech Act Theory takes a post-structuralist notion[52]. Still, Wæver (2011, 2015b, 2017) often cites Marina Sbisà's re-reading of JL Austin and his Speech Act Theory approach, because he believes that the 'mainstream version' of Speech Act Theory waters down the "social effects of an illocutionary character", preferring instead "Sbisà's 'neo-Austinian' version" (Wæver, 2015: 127). According to Sbisà's reading "the illocutionary effect ('done in saying') is co-produced by the audience in a more extensive sense than pure uptake" (Wæver, 2015: 122), something which is disputed by many including Balzacq (2005); Floyd (2010); Stritzel (2007) and Vuori[53] (2008) who believe that reducing securitisation to the acts of the speaker (illocution) leaves no role for the audience[54]. Here one must keep in mind that, as Floyd (2016: 688) point out, in "philosophy of language there is no uncertainty at all over either who or what the audience of speech acts is: it is simply the addressee of the speech act"[55]. Consequently, Côté (2016: 549) believes that the Speech Act approach taken by the CoS framework is "largely incompatible with the highly intersubjective view of security construction".

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[51] He emphasizes that the CoS fails "to recognise that Austin's theory is not merely premised on speech as an act of making an utterance but rather, it is constructed around the use of verbs whose action function lies in their utterance" (Mutengesa, 2014: 34).

[52] According to Pouliot (2004: 319), both post-structuralism and constructivism can be seen as postpositivist approaches in International Relations.

[53] One needs to highlight that Juha Vuori (2003, 2008, 2011) is one of the few scholars studying securitisation who takes John R Searle's speech act approach as the basis for an analytical framework, even though Vuori emphasises on the perlocutionary effect often (which is something disregarded by Searle).

[54] It is interesting to note that Jaap de Wilde (2008: 596) has stated that "Security discourse begins with a securitizing actor. Other participants in the discourse *are irrelevant* for detecting the discourse even though they are crucial for understanding its proceedings and political consequences" [emphasis added].

[55] However, the author of this thesis disagrees as she believes that it is possible to leave room for the audience as non-passive, with emphasis on Searle's Speech Act Taxonomy and direction of fit of illocutions (see next chapter), because the illocutionary point gets "the words (more strictly - their propositional content) to match the world" and/or "to get the world to match the words" (Searle, 1976: 3). By adapting Searle's framework, it was possible to develop a 'Securitizing Speech Act classification' which does go beyond the intention of the speaker, in particular when taking on board Searle's Speech Act rules & collective intentionality.

This criticism, that "securitisation is not merely a self-referential process based on rhetoric of the actor alone, but rather an inter-subjective exchange between a securitizing actor and an audience" (Gad and Petersen 2011:3; Balzacq and Guzzini, 2015:3–4, in Olesker, 2018: 314) is one of the most prominent challenges raised against the CoS securitisation approach. Balzacq (2005: 177), for example, argues that, on the one hand, taking on a 'security is a speech act' approach with a focus on the illocution and leaving out the perlocutionary effect, will not account for the audience. On the other hand, incorporating the perlocution would mean that the 'self-referentiality' of the speech is left out. Floyd (2016: 679) highlights this "constructivist deficit" which she believes results in the difficulty to analyse "how security plays out empirically".

Bigo (2000: 194) criticises the CoS' focus on speech acts by arguing that "it is possible to securitise certain problems without speech or discourse", citing policing as an example. Furthermore, Wilkinson (2011) takes issue with the fact that traditionally, Securitisation Theory does not take non-verbal expressions of security into account, for example, demonstrations or protests. Hansen (2011), McDonald (2008), Williams (2003), Vuori (2010) highlight that by solely focusing on speech acts, images and visualisations are not seen as constituent parts of a securitising move. Lene Hansen (2000: 287) in particular believes that the emphasis on speech acts leads to a danger of leaving out "non-verbal communication" which leads to the 'Silent Security Dilemma' where "insecurity cannot be voiced, when raising something as a security problem is impossible or might even aggravate the threat being faced". Sarah Bertrand (2018b: 298) explicates this when she writes that by "locking the very existence of security into a specific type of speech acts, 'security speech' becomes unattainable for the subaltern"[56].

Here, the elite-focus of the speech act centric securitisation approach can be criticised once again, as pointed out by Booth (2007: 166) who is concerned with the element of elitism present in the CoS, stating that "What matters above all for the school is 'top leaders', 'states', 'threatened elites' and 'audiences' with agenda-

[56] She later elaborated that the "central argument I put forward in 'Can the subaltern securitize?' is that securitisation theory creates a situation where – akin to Rudyard Kipling's white man's burden – one feels compelled to speak 'security' for the subaltern who cannot securitize. This is what I called the colonial moment in securitization theory: a situation where the subaltern is first silenced and can then only be spoken for" (Bertrand, 2018a: 307).

making power. Those without discourse-making power are disenfranchised, unable to join the securitisation game". This is similarly seen in Bigo's (2000: 194), argument that "not everyone has the ability (social or political) to enunciate a security statement even though they may have it linguistically". Broecker & Westermeier (2019: 104-105) likewise take objection to the speech act (and thereby securitising actor) approach as they believe it "displays a fixation on pre-existing, usually state- and elite-centric, institutionalized positions of power stemming from the realist tradition of thought". They also point out another criticism of the CoS speech act approach. Namely, that it does not account for an explanation of "the overall success or failure of instances of constructing securitization", believing it to result in "largely descriptive" findings which do not "explain the socio-political and ultimately discursive dynamics that lead to the (in)effectiveness of speech acts" (Broecker & Westermeier, 2019: 92).

Although parts of this criticism may be valid, the author of this thesis argues that, given her focus on elite securitising actors, she will not claim to uncover the underlying mechanisms of the securitisation process apart from securitising speech acts. Contextualising the speeches and having explored the previous institutionalised securitisation of extremism, the author is able to show the process itself via speech acts, rather than practices alone. Additionally, by adapting and incorporating some of John R Searle's work, she is able to overcome some of the previously discussed criticisms.

1.5. Speech Act Theory by John R Searle

In a nutshell Speech Act Theory is about how language performs. How do we understand language and how is language performed instead of just being a mechanism of description? Or, as Eniy (2016: 41) put it, the "emphasis lies on the quest to understand and explain how speakers and hearers use language". Based on the works of Austin and (and less so Searle), Ole Wæver (1989, 1995) and Buzan et al (1998) developed Securitisation Theory in order to understand how threats emerge. Keeping in mind that Wæver's reading of Austin is influenced by French philosopher Jacques Derrida's interpretation (Trombetta, 2007: 12) and said philosopher's work on "how text matters for what it does rather than for what it says" (Adamides, 2012: 16), one cannot help but wonder how deep he engaged with

JL Austin's work and why it led him to disregard John R Searle's approach[57]. The following section is going to explore the main components of Searle's Speech Act approach (and by extension ontology) that make it a fitting alternative for the study of securitisation.

Searle's taxonomy of speech acts is based on his former teacher Austin's work[58] which defines the "five basic kinds of illocutionary acts" (Searle, 1976: 1): representatives (or assertives), directives, commissives, expressives, and declarations" (Searle, 1976: 1). According to Searle (1999), speech acts come in different types: they can be about asking a question, making a request, giving an order, or explaining something. This is what is known as an illocutionary act, which Searle believes to be the "minimal complete unit of human linguistic communication" (Searle, 1999: 137). He believes that the essential characteristics of a speech act are the illocutionary point, direction of fit, and expressed psychological state (Searle, 1976). Now, the first dimension of different illocutionary acts is "the point or purpose of a type of illocution" – the *illocutionary point* (Searle, 1976: 3). The illocutionary point will vary according to the illocution in question, for example requesting has the illocutionary point of getting the hearer to do something, while declaring would have the illocutionary point of changing the world through presenting it as changed ('*I hereby pronounce you husband and wife'*). Searle (1999: 147) believes that "the illocutionary point determines both direction of fit and which intentional state is expressed in the performance of the speech act".

In order to analyse illocutionary acts, one needs to distinguish them through the effect or consequences on the hearer of the act. For example, through telling a story, the speaker might amuse the hearer, or by ordering the hearer to do something, the speaker might get the hearer to do something. Looking at such examples, the first verb is the illocution and the second one (perlocutionary effect) is the effect the illocutionary act has on the hearer. Searle focuses on the illocutionary act, stating

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[57] Aside from Vuori (2008, 2010) who focuses on the perlocutionary effect of securitising speech acts via Searle, the main authors in the field of securitisation studies either focus on Austin's Speech Act Theory (Wæver, 2015) or do not take a speech act theoretical understanding as the basis of their research, focusing instead on what is referred to as a 'sociological' or 'pragmatic' approach to Securitisation Theory.

[58] For an excellent analysis of how Searle adapted Austin see Dörge (2004).

that they have to be performed intentionally. This is where he draws the line of the perlocutionary and illocutionary act, as Searle (1999: 137) believes that perlocutionary acts are not intentionally performed. This leads him to focus on the illocutionary act itself, stating that the illocutionary act is "the unit of *meaning* in communication" [emphasis in original] and that "Illocutionary acts, meaning, and intention are all tied together" (Searle, 1999: 137). For example, A can deter B from going on a hike by pointing out the danger of hiking. Whilst the speech act would be warning, the effect can either fail or succeed depending on the conditions surrounding the speech act. However, it's not in A's control how B is affected by his warning.

As discussed above, Wæver (2011) is also wary of emphasising perlocutions when studying securitisation. It is important to keep in mind that perlocutionary acts are *not* performatives, they can achieve an effect but do not 'act' themselves (see Searle & Vanderveken, 1985: 12). Therefore, they are incompatible with the securitisation approach of 'saying is doing' and the idea that securitising moves are performed (see Buzan et al, 1998: 40). The author of this thesis agrees and she consequently takes on board Searle's 'Principle of Expressibility' in an attempt to analyse what a speech act means when conducted by a securitising actor. Searle's principle of universal expressivity (AKA the 'Principle of Expressibility') holds that everything which can be meant can also be said (Searle, 1968: 415).

1.5.1. The use of Searle's work to study securitisation
Despite Wæver's criticism that SAT approaches like that of John R Searle "allows for 'securitization' to occur without political co-production between securitizing actor and audience" (Wæver, 2015: 124), the author of this thesis believes that it is nonetheless possible to use it as the basis for a framework for analysis. She also acknowledges that the interaction between audience and securitising actors is an important point as through it can "stud[y] securitization as a relationship" and allows for an exploration of how both "jointly reconfigure their relationship" (Wæver, 2015: 124). However, she believes that Searles' wider Speech Act Theory (including his work on Social Reality) allows for an observation of how language shapes reality and institutional facts which in turn are seen as 'real' given 'collective

intentionality' by the addressees of the securitising speech acts.[59]   This is one common theme of Searle's work, as he states that, "*we* create private property: money, property, government, marriage, and a thousand other such phenomena by representing these phenomena as existing" (Searle, 2007: 41) [emphasis added]. Constitutive rules enable us to create institutional facts via the performance of a speech act (Searle, 1975a: 38). According to Zaibert (2003: 58), the concept of speech acts plays such an important role in Searle's work because it links his ideas together: "it is through speech acts that we create social institutions". This ties in with the idea that for an extraordinary measure to be implemented, it needs the securitising actors' authority which is based on that actor's being 'legitimate' in the sense of being an institution 'created' by the 'we-intend and which aids the "intersubjective establishment of an existential threat" (Buzan et al, 1998: 25).

One has to remember here that social facts, including institutional facts, are based on social behaviour which in turn requires collective intentionality, meaning a shared understanding. Consequently, language is required to create such an intersubjectivity, despite social behaviour being possible without language (see Searle, 1991a: 342). A feature of collective intentionality is therefore its co-operational form of behaviour, which is described through language, for example, "by saying it is not just the case that *I* am doing something and *you* are doing something but that *we* are doing something together" (Searle, 1991a: 341-342). However, how can there be such a thing as collective intentionality "if all the intentionality I have, is in my head, and all the intentionality you have is in your head"? (Searle, 1998: 149). As a solution for this 'problem of methodological individualism' Searle (1998: 150) believes that

> "the irreducible form of the intentionality in my head, when we are doing something collectively is, 'we intend'. And I don't have to reduce that to an 'I intend' and a set of mutual beliefs. On the contrary, I have the 'I-intends' that I do have, *precisely because* I have an irreducible we-intend" [emphasis added].

This stands in stark contrast to his earlier works, where Searle (1975: 38) believed that language's purpose is to communicate and "the unit of human communication in language is the speech act, of the type called *illocutionary act*". This belief in itself would make his Speech Act Theory potentially incompatible with Wæver's

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[59] This is in fact very close to the concept of 'intersubjectivity' understood as something that leads different people to the same conclusion when looking at things in the same way.

attitude to ST as the latter believes that securitisation is *not* about "communication and perceptions" (Wæver 2011; Wæver 2015, in Wæver, 2017: 127). However, when looking at Searle's ontology[60], it becomes clear that he aims to present a unified theory of mind, language, and society (Smith, 2003: 2) and his later approach is about more than just communication. For Searle (2001: 174) his "accounts of speech acts, of the mind, and of social reality are intended as, in varying degrees, general theories". Unlike his former teacher JL Austin, who was suspicious of general theories, Searle believed general theories to be possible.

Calling it the 'Principle of Expressibility', Searle (1968: 415) states that "(w)hatever can be meant can be said". This notion underlines most of his work as it allows speech acts to be analysed "restating what is said so that it now coincides with what is meant" resulting in the unification of the meaning of the sentence and the meaning of the speaker (Fotion, 2000: 25). One can also adapt this to ST and argue that whoever positions themselves in a certain way very much *means* what they say, when they say it, on the assumption that speaking is doing. Vuori (2013: 134) has a similar line of argument when he points out that as analysts, we have no capacity of actually knowing what someone's motives were in conducting a speech act. Instead, "we can infer what an utterance does conventionally and thereby what it means conventionally" which aids the analysis of securitizing speech acts as "a security rationale or a security modality is dependent on a fairly stable constellation of meanings" (Vuori, 2013: 134).

In general, Speech Act Theory emphasises "the psychological state of the speaker while downplaying the social consequences of speech" (Woolard & Schieffelin, 1994: 59). However, Searle's approach is not so much about the psychological state of the speaker as it is about the creation of a mutual social reality. One should keep in mind that "language is a tool by which the politicians can command, request, persuade and declare…etc" (Jabber & Jinquan, 2013: 1). Language also enables humans to create status functions in order to create power relations, as status functions are seen as sources of power according to Searle (2014: 39). Through language, we create a mutual understanding of the world around us. Searle (1994:

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[60] Searle does not like epistemological approaches. He stated: "I have never taken epistemology, in general, or skepticism, in particular, very seriously" and "the interesting questions for me have always been ontological and not epistemic" (Searle, 2001: 173).

39) explains that these powers created by status function declarations have names "such as (in English) "rights," "duties," "responsibilities," "obligations," "authorizations," and "permission", which he coins "deontic powers"[61]. It comes down to determining when people accept institutional facts about the conditions of institutional facts. The creation of institutional facts always has a double direction of fit – that is the creation of a state of affairs just by representing it as created (word-to-word and therefore world-to-word).

Even the use of certain words can aid in altering the system of existing status functions. Searle (2008b: 454) gives the example of Communists in Russia, introducing the use of the word 'Comrade' to address each other "as a way of creating new status functions and destroying old ones". Searle (2008b: 455) argues that it by way of "the Status Function Declaration whereby we create an institutional reality by representing it as existing". Hence, illocutionary speech acts can be used to analyse securitisation as they are about "You mak[ing] something the case by representing it as being the case" (Searle, 2008b: 458). Searle believes that "Status Function Declarations create Status Functions, which in turn create deontic powers, and these provide desire-independent reasons for acting" (Searle, 2014: 39). One can therefore argue that looking at the creation of deontic power through speech acts is one way of looking out for securitisation. In fact, it is Balzacq (2015: 109) who, following Searle's approach regarding the deontic powers in SAT, questions if it might not be more applicable than Austin's understanding. He wonders if it is possible to deduce that a speech act is superseded by the deontic powers of the securitizing actor taken from audience acceptance, which would go beyond the speech act itself (Balzacq, 2015: 109)[62]. The author of this thesis takes a similar position. She believes that through 'collective intentionality', status positions of securitising actors are cemented, and that this in turn enables them to create an intersubjective recognition of a securitising speech act and subsequent securitising move[63].

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[61] From the Greek word for "duty".

[62] Despite considering Searle's SAT approach, Balzacq (2005: 171) had previously argued "that a speech act view of security does not provide adequate grounding upon which to examine security practices in 'real situations.'" He believed that the 'rule of sincerity' would be void and securitising actors could not be objectively analysed with this approach (Balzacq, 2005: 171).

[63] Even though for her analysis a securitising move is nothing more than a particular kind of speech act suggesting extraordinary measures.

One could argue that by electing someone to a position of power, one already collectively accepts that person. Hence if that person declares something a threat, they have the authority to do so. Now, if one can argue that securitisation is not a matter of the internal intention *but* of the speech act itself (which is in this case a declaration), then the speaker already changes the world, no matter what the internal intention is. Delving further into the speaker's intention, if one says that by making a declaration, the intention is already there (even if the speech act is a lie, the manner in which it is delivered is is still intentional), then the sincerity condition is not necessary and one does not need to take the psychological state of the speaker into account, just his or her *expressed* psychological state. Taking sincerity into account would also be difficult for the reasons pointed out by Balzacq (2005: 175), who states that most political elites' discourse is not necessarily sincerity. One can also make the argument that a speaker can perform an illocutionary act without (specifically) intending to do so. It seems therefore possible to assert that the speech act itself counts as changing reality, independent of the speaker's internal intention as long as the external intention is communicated as such. In particular, when it comes to the assertive illocutionary point, it is in itself already "a commitment on the part of the speaker to the truth of the expressed proposition", and "a speaker can make an assertion quite satisfactorily without giving a damn whether the hearer assumes what he says is true" (Searle, 2001b: 288).

With all of this in mind, it is important to turn, once more, to some criticisms levied against the Searlean SAT framework of analysis, as it has just been laid out. This framework forms the basis of the analysis in the forthcoming chapters and so it is important to understand, acknowledge, and where possible defend against its shortcomings. For example, Sbisa (2002: 422) has criticised Searle for not recognising external social circumstances as essential to illocutionary acts. She fails, though, to account for the fact that he does do so, at least in his wider social theory. She further states that by leaving out the perlocutionary act in his research, he does not take into account the effect of speech acts on their hearers (Sbisa, 2002). Yet, according to Searle (1976: 3) for "most important illocutionary acts, there is no essential perlocutionary intent" because perlocutionary acts are not intentionally performed (see also Searle, 1999). After all, both Austin and Searle believe that it is only the speaker who is the driving force of the speech act and therefore

responsible for creating both illocutionary and perlocutionary effects (Reich, 2011: 4). The role of the hearer for the successful realisation of these effects is consequently only a predictable and static condition. Furthermore, according to Reich (2011: 4), it is irrelevant "whether the hearer's contribution is of a voluntary nature".

Nevertheless, for Vuori[64] (2008: 74), "the perlocutionary act is in fact the criterion for the success or failure of securitization and a relevant aspect in the explication of the strands of securitization speech acts". Vuori believes that the perlocutionary effect of securitisation comes down to political legitimacy and that "securitization legitimates action otherwise deemed non-legitimate" (Vuori 2003: 107). He agrees that perlocutionary effects are unpredictable by stating that "the illocutionary act of a securitizing speech act can have the intended perlocutionary effect of persuading an audience to provide someone with legitimacy for action against a perceived threat but the actual perlocutionary effect of resistance against this move" (Vuori, 2008; 2010 in Stritzel, 2011: 350). Considering this, one might assume that by focussing on the impact of the perlocutionary act, one can also establish the effect of the speech act on its audience. Nevertheless, this poses a challenge for analysts aiming to evaluate the perlocutionary effect of a speech act which is hard if not impossible to do, even though studying securitisation through the perlocutionary effect would allow more emphasis on the 'audience' (see also Stritzel, 2011: 349). One could assume that the perlocutionary act is the one which 'makes' securitisation, given that it has an effect on the hearer. However, as stated by Cohen & Perrault (1979: 186-187) it is the *perlocutionary effect* produced by the *perlocutionary act* which has an impact on the audience. Hence, the act itself is not the securitising move and one cannot know if the act will have a consequence on the audience and if so to what extent. The effect can therefore not be intended by the speaker as they have no control over it. This is also where Wæver (2015: 122-123) disregards the perlocutionary act for the study of securitisation, having claimed earlier that his interest lies in the act of speech ('doing *in* saying') as

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[64] Juha Vuori has also taken on Searle's Speech Act Theory approach to study securitisation, however, he emphasises on the perlocutionary effect (see Vuori, 2008, 2011). Despite his later focus on the perlocutionary effect, his earlier works adapted Searle's work to act as a framework "to analyse securitization arguments and to evaluate their parts against the social function of security for example" (Vuori, 2003: 6).

opposed to the "effects brought about by speech act" ('doing *by* saying') (Wæver, 2011: 123).

1.6. Conclusion

As discussed, there are different ways to study securitisation depending on which approach one is taking (e.g., the philosophical or sociological approach). This thesis aims to look at the securitisation processes carried out by elite actors (specifically Prime Ministers), and does not allocate a specific role to the audience. The reasons for this are numerous. For one, the author believes that in order to apply ST as a method in the philosophical sense, the analysis of the effect of the speech act on the audience is impossible to measure. Of course, it can be argued that the audience takes an active role in either agreeing, accepting, disapproving, or contesting securitisation moves. However, focussing on the result of the securitisation move, namely the suggestion or implementation of extraordinary measures, is a sufficient condition for securitisation to take place. The author of this research also argues that given ST's constructivist approach, the point of 'successful' securitisation cannot and should not be defined. Furthermore, taking audience acceptance as a 'given' via the legitimation of the securitising actors through collective intentionality allows us to disregard it as a unit of measure. Despite its flaws, the author believes that ST offers a good basis of understanding of how securitisation happens and that it is not concerned with ascertaining the success of a securitising move, but rather with the analysis of the move itself.

As shown in this chapter, the Speech Act Theory approach inspired by Searle can be applied to Securitisation Theory, and, by extension, to the analysis of securitisation. The author of this thesis disagrees with Wæver's (2015: 123) assessment of Searle's approach in which he claims that it reduces speech acts to "communication of intention" and that Searle "re-creates a divide within speech act theory between language and action". Searle's whole social theory has developed over time and seeing speech acts as 'just' a form of communication is reductive. It is also something Searle has obsoleted since he first wrote that "the purpose of language is communication" (Searle, 1975: 38), stating that "the representational aspect of the speech act has to be distinguished from the communicative aspects" (Searle, 2001b: 176). Furthermore, for Searle (1995; 2006), language is what makes

society possible in the first place, it helps us construct social reality and is therefore not 'just' a means of communication.

Additionally, his idea of collective intentions creating social reality can explain how society is made possible through language. Looking back, his idea of 'institutional facts' can be applied in order to identify a potential securitizing move. For example, applying his *X counts as Y in C* formula, one can say: "Extremism (X) is a threat (Y) in the United Kingdom (C)". Extremism gains its status as a threat through 'collective agreement' – for such a status change (from non-threat to threat) to happen, "society as a whole has to approve" (see Fotion, 2000: 202). This approval is given indirectly, as seen in the *(S has power (S does A))*[65] formula, which represents the collective acceptance of what Searle calls the basic structure of imposed power (Searle, 1995: 111). Searle (2006: 23) states the relationship of both formulas by explaining that "we do not just accept that somebody has power, but we accept that they have power in virtue of their institutional status". To conclude, in relation to the research interest of this thesis, the author considers Prime Ministers as legitimised securitising actors. The audience in this case is considered formally and accepting of securitising moves, given the securitising actor's status and collective intentionality.

In order to combine the two as a framework, the next chapter will demonstrate how to apply it as a method; displaying how it helps, amongst extraordinary measures and institutionalisation to study how the securitisation of extremism has taken place. It explains how the 'Securitising speech act classification' (based on Searle's SAT) acts as a framework for the analysis of speeches by securitising actors. In addition to providing an analytical guide of questions to ask when identifying the threat construction to different Referent Objects and to aid in pinpointing extraordinary measures, the overall framework offers a new tool for studying securitising moves and the securitisation of issues. Subsequent chapters will also address further methodological questions, including how materials were chosen to be analysed.

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[65] S stands for Speaker, A for act/activity.

2. Methods and Methodology

*" (...) interpretive researchers see theory as statements concerned with
understanding the properties of those object that we study"*
(Lamont, 2015: 57)

2.1. Introduction

Having established the different approaches to Securitisation Theory (ST) and that John R Searle's approach to Speech Act Theory (SAT) can be used to look at securitisation, the following chapter delves into the framework that will be used as a *method* of analysis. Keeping in mind that this chapter aims to describe the methodological approach of this research, it also details the thesis' research design, aimed at exploring the securitisation of extremism in the UK between 1997 and 2016. Further, it seeks to explain the reasoning not only of the case study itself but also behind the empirical data collection. It will additionally outline how Searle's Speech Act classification was adapted to form the basis of a 'Securitising Speech Act Classification', aiding the study and analysis of securitising speech acts by Prime Ministers.

Again, it is important to highlight that Securitisation Theory is a theory which can explain how (and that) securitisation happens; the theory itself can act as a framework for analysis but is *not* itself a method. The primary definition of securitisation that this thesis takes, given its speech act focus, is the one given by Buzan et al (1998: 24-25), which describes it as "(...) when a securitizing actor uses a rhetoric of existential threat and thereby takes an issue out of what under those conditions is "normal politics,"". The author of the present study will call this the 'securitisation process'. As pointed out by Wilkinson (2007: 21) there is a danger that Securitisation Theory enables "a tidied-up, simplified view of things by concentrating on the outcome rather than the process". Hence by drawing together from both outcomes *and* securitising moves (in the form of speech acts), the securitisation process (see Figure 3) will also be explored. Usually, ST research starts at the macro level and is situated in the field of international relations (Bust-Bartels, 2021: 14). However, a more micro-level analysis seemed more suitable as this study also disregards the Regional Security Complex (RSC) theory aspect of the original formulation of ST by the Copenhagen School (CoS).

In order to explore the securitisation process, a framework was developed which encompasses three factors in the securitisation of the issue of extremism in the United Kingdom:

1) The Speech Act ('Securitising Speech Act Classification')
2) Institutionalisation
3) Extraordinary Measures

This is not to say that securitisation cannot be studied in other ways, however, by using the three aforementioned as signs[66] and analytical units (in case of the securitising speech act), a relatively holistic picture can be drawn. Other analytical units, such as the 'Functional Actor'[67] (see Floyd, 2020) could have complemented the research, however, this would have gone beyond the scope of this thesis. Similarly, elite interviews[68] could have rounded off this research by allowing for the evaluation of 'Institutionalisation'. However, the depth and amount of data analysed is already efficient enough to draw conclusions and gain insight into the topic, in particular given the thesis' focus on Speech Act Theory. Additionally, Buzan et al (1998: 177) point out that, although sources other than documents and speeches "could reveal intentions and tactics" of securitisation, it is not the purpose of the study of securitisation in the discursive sense to find the 'real motives' for securitisation.

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[66] Buzan et al (1998: 25) state that "Securitization can be studied directly; it does not need indicators". However, they continue by saying that "The way to study securitization is to study discourse and political constellations" (Buzan et al, 1998: 25) with the former taking place directly and the latter indirectly (for example by focussing on political elite discourse).

[67] Wæver (2003: 11) defines 'functional actors' as "central actors in a sector who are not involved in securitisation but greatly influence the dynamics of the sector, e.g. an polluting company in the environmental sector".

[68] However, interviewees can also often not divulge what has really happened, as counter-terrorism and by extension counter-extremism is something that is not very transparent.

Figure 3 - Securitisation Process[69]

Despite using SAT as the basis for its framework, this thesis does not mean to be a pragmatic-linguistic tool of analysis. Instead, the researcher simplifies some of the theory's aspects in order to make the study of securitisation possible without the analyst needing a background in linguistics or semantics. The aim was to construct an alternative methodological tool, focussing on elite discourses and enabling the analyst to draw conclusions from speeches. When applied, it is possible to identify not only what the threat entails but also who/what the threat threatens (the Referent Subject) and what extraordinary measures are being suggested in order to curb said threat.

To achieve this, a speech corpus had to be created encompassing speeches delivered by Prime Ministers both within and outside of Parliament (where and when they were delivered in a relevant security context or considered otherwise important). This was possible as one has to keep in mind that speeches given are often prepared for specific audiences and purposes (see Hermann, 2008: 53). Hence, a speech given, for example, by David Cameron announcing new counter-extremism measures at the Ninestiles School in Birmingham on the 20th of July 2015 was not primarily addressing the school as an audience but rather the wider public. By extension, one can safely say that it was given in a security context due to its focus

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[69] Designed by the author of this thesis based on Buzan et al (1998) and her own interpretation.

on extremism as a security threat and it being aimed at the more general public. One must also consider that formal speeches by politicians are usually *disseminated* as well as *delivered*. For example, there are "multiple repeating and amplifying actors such as friendly newspaper columnists" which echo speeches and their messages (Mac Ginty, 2021).

This chapter will provide detail regarding how the research was designed and its rationale. It explores how the case of study was chosen and why, whilst also addressing the choice of analysis. Further, it offers insight into the data collection and selection process as well as the framework application. This is particularly important in order to offer the reader "the opportunity to judge the transferability of the study to another setting" (Saunders et al, 2016: 206), but also in order to offer the reader the insight to judge the research process and validity. The author also wants to remind the reader that she does not claim to have completed this research in the sense of representing the whole securitisation process of extremism in the UK. Rather, she sees this thesis as one way of understanding it, aiming to complete a puzzle of how issues become security concerns through speech acts by elite actors. Based on an arrangement by Buzan et al (1998: 176), the structure of this chapter will proceed as follows: first the Choice of Case will be explained, followed by the Choice of Material and Sources, and then the Choice of Analysis.

2.2. Choice of Case

According to Ruffa (2020: 1135), a 'case' "is usually defined as an instance of a broader phenomenon under study". For the research at hand, the broader phenomenon in question is the securitisation of extremism in the United Kingdom ranging from 1997 to 2016. Although a single case study, it analyses securitisation by three different securitising actors (Tony Blair, Gordon Brown and David Cameron). The reasons for having chosen a single case approach are several. The UK case showed itself to be unique with the governments emphasis on extremism in political discourse but also the political structure where the 'power' of the Prime Minister, as head of government derives "from leadership of the largest party in the legislature, [and] more exceptionally from enjoyment of the confidence of a cross-party parliamentary majority" (Leach et al, 2006: 182-183). A comparative approach to another country for example, would not have been able to deliver comparative results and overcomplicated the study.

Analysing elite actor discourse in the form of Prime Ministers' securitising speech acts was also recognised as an opportunity to see how the adapted ST speech act focused framework could be applied, and whether it would be possible to study securitisation based on Searle's speech act approach. Whilst it is not unusual to select single case studies according to convenience, this can lead to a selection bias which, in turn, can hinder the generalisability of findings (Ruffa, 2020: 1139). This is often a criticism of securitisation studies where most scholars focus on the 'successful' cases of securitisation (for example cases where there is a high likelihood of an issue having become securitised as it is traditionally already associated with danger), avoiding cases of failed securitisation or the study of cases deemed to deal with an issue not already linked to security. In the case of this thesis, there are two reasons why this is avoided, 1) the issue of extremism, although already linked to terrorism, has not been regarded a 'low hanging fruit' for securitisation and 2) despite being a selected case, it was not entirely clear from the beginning whether the issue had been moved onto the security agenda and how.

Additionally, looking at different discourses over time enabled the author to observe that the issue of extremism was repeatedly securitised and (sometimes) desecuritised by different actors. Taking a single case for analysis also allows for a more detailed look at the processes of discursive securitisation. As reported by Klotz (2008: 51), the study of a single case study makes sense if the object of study "does not fit our expectations based on prevailing theories or conventional wisdom". The securitisation of extremism, a concept at first sight not associated with danger, does not seem to fit this description. Given past research's focus on more conventionally dangerous 'threats', the securitisation of extremism in the UK seemed curious. Also, it is interesting to see how the concept of extremism was dealt with by different actors over almost two decades. The case chosen for investigation is therefore that of three different Prime Ministers (Tony Blair, Gordon Brown and David Cameron) over five terms of office, ranging from the year 1997 to 2016. Examining securitisation moves initiated by these different securitising actors over almost 20 years allows to make useful conclusions. As stated by Vuori (2013: 136), cases over longer periods of time "also enable the examination of institutionalized securitization and the specific watchwords of security that are prevalent in the particular socio-political order".

The analysis of a small case allows for the author to see how the application of ST plays out and as pointed out by Ruffa (2020: 1139), a small unit of analysis allows the researcher to observe a specific interest in more detail. Although not always generalisable, case studies can pinpoint "theoretical propositions" (Yin, 2003: 10-11) and given that they are explanatory, can allow for explanations of "how or why some condition came to be" (Yin, 2018: 351). By permitting the researcher to concentrate more on context when focussing on fewer cases, more complexity and broader underlying dynamics can be accounted for (Ruffa, 2020: 1133ff).

2.3. Choice of Material and Sources

The main materials analysed were parliamentary speeches as well as other public speeches given by UK prime ministers in which extremism had been addressed. Additionally, government publications were collected to round the picture of the institutionalised securitisation of extremism. Because all data that was collected came from sources open to the public, there were no noteworthy ethical concerns associated with the research process. As pointed out by Lamont (2015: 21), "(r)esearch is about making choices", and in this case, choices had to be made about what data to look at and why. Given that the state-centric focus of this research project, the UK government was chosen to be analysed as a securitising actor in the form of three Prime Ministers. There were several reasons why Prime Ministers were chosen to be analysed. For one, they can be thought of as main actor being able to securitise, given their 'position' as Premier and the effective head of the British government who "derive[s] much of their authority and democratic legitimacy from their position as elected leader of the majority party in the House of Commons" (Leach et al, 2006: 183). Secondly, they are in a position to take "the lead in any unexpected crisis that affects the government or majority party" (Budge et al, 1998: 201) and by extension the main decision maker of British government policies, being able to "deprive ordinary MPs of any real political influence at all" (Budge et al, 1998: 418). It is also the Prime Minister who holds "special responsibilities in the sphere of national security" (Leech et al, 2006: 183) allowing them to 'speak security'.

Of course, as previously discussed, other securitising actors will have taken part in the securitisation of extremism (for example, Secretaries of State) and 'functional agents' will also have contributed to the securitisation process. However, as "the

most powerful politician in Britain" (Budge et al, 1998: 200), the Prime Minister holds the most authoritative and widely heard position in the government. It is she or he who makes decisions, sometimes even without approval of parliament and constituents. One has to remember that when it comes to contemporary politics of security, political actors such as heads of state have been considered to be competent and empowered to make decisions in security matters (Bust-Bartels, 2021: 76).

This thesis' focus on parliamentary discourse evaluation also has several reasons. As reported by Umney (2016: 16) "parliamentary debates can be considered as meetings where particular problems, often of national importance, are presented and where solutions to those problems are proposed and discussed with a view to reaching some kind of negotiated conclusion". Hence, speeches in Parliament are of national importance and shape the security agenda. Parliaments are also the place where politics 'happen'. Other speeches were additionally collected to compliment those which were delivered in parliament, given that it is in speeches that "leaders are presenting their public persona – how they would like to be perceived by the public" (Hermann, 2008: 53). These speeches delivered outside Parliament were also collected because they were full of securitising moves (see for example David Cameron's Munich Security Conference Speech in 2011).

It should also be noted that, as pointed out by Hermann (2008: 52-53), speeches may not always reflect the opinion of the speaker, given that they may well be written by a speech writer or other members of staff. Another issue associated with working with speeches can be that the transcription has been edited and is not always a 'literal recording'. This can even be the case with 'verbatim' transcripts as reported by Yin (2003: 87) citing the deliberate editing of U.S. Congress hearings by both staff and testifiers. Similarly, Cribb & Rochford (2018: 8) have argued that the Hansard method of transcription of parliamentary debates does not always accurately reflect the parliamentary discourse, for example by leaving out interruptions from the chambers. Nevertheless, the underlying assumption of this thesis is that what is said is also meant, given the 'Principle of Expressibility' and therefore it is believed that speech writer and speech giver will have the same opinion once the speaker gives the speech as the speaker would not say something they do not mean to convey. It is therefore irrelevant if a speech writer has a

different opinion than the speaker as long as the speaker still choses to give the speech. Additionally, whenever possible, emphasis was put on 'transcripts as given' while shortened speeches were disregarded to ensure the evaluation of securitising speech acts.

According to Bryman & Bell (2019: 277) the state can provide "a great deal of textual material of potential interest, such as official reports". This proved to be the case with the UK government. In particular the Internet allowed the author access to digitised data from government institutions, but also speeches and reports. Using archival records, including organisational records, the researcher was able to provide a more holistic picture of the chosen case study (Yin, 2003: 88-89) than if she had focussed on speeches by Prime Ministers alone, allowing her in particular to explore the institutionalised securitisation of extremism in Chapter 3.

In order to retrieve the main speech corpus, several databases were used, amongst them The Hansard[70] as well as GOV.UK[71], ProQuest U.K. Parliamentary Papers[72], the Political Speech Archive[73] and the British Political Speech Archive[74] (see Data Sources Appendix A). In a manner typical of qualitative research, which is itself an interpretative approach to research, the author of this study used multiple sources for the collection of data (see Creswell & Creswell, 2018: 257-260) and included media outlets as sources of speech transcripts in order to triangulate the data. The fact that the case study undertaken in this thesis relies on multiple sources of evidence means that it aided triangulation of data sources (see Yin, 2003: 13-14) which involves "using more than one source of data and method of collection to confirm the validity/credibility/authenticity of research data, analysis and interpretation" (Saunders et al, 2016: 206). In the case of this study, data triangulation was undertaken through the comparison of different sources for data, for example speeches accounted for on more than one database. This triangulation of data collection can also help to "cross-reference (…) findings" (Lamont, 2015:

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[70] https://hansard.parliament.uk

[71] https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches

[72] https://parlipapers.proquest.com

[73] https://www.ukpol.co.uk

[74] http://www.britishpoliticalspeech.org

96), for example by comparing discourse with official documents and media reports.

In order to decide which documents to look out for, it was important to think about which documents are central to the research question of how extremism is securitised in the United Kingdom. Finding the secondary data needed to answer the research question can become "a matter of detective work" (Saunders et al, 2016: 344) and "it can be difficult to get full access to an organization's official records (Lamont, 2015: 98). However, as pointed out by Wæver, (2005: 35): "Discourse analysis works on public texts. It does not try to get to the thoughts or motives of the actors, their hidden intentions or secret plans".

Therefore, there was no need to delve into the hidden depths of archives in order to uncover secret documents. Additionally, in order to show the institutionalised securitisation of extremism, older government websites were searched via the UK Central Government Web Archive[75] as well as the Internet Archive[76] and its Wayback Machine[77]. However, a complete picture cannot be guaranteed as sources like the Public Record Office's Digital Preservation unit (2003) have stated that their archives are a 'selective collection'. Official documents have the benefit of representing government discourse as the government wanted it to be presented, but they also have the downside of not always being easily accessible. Searching the Freedom of Information Request Archive 'WhatDoTheyKnow'[78] and publications of evidence of the Undercover Policing Inquiry (UCPI)[79] allowed the author to gain a more comprehensive overview of the institutionalised dealings with extremism by Government and its intuitions. However, these documents found are sometimes incomplete and only show a fraction of what went on behind the scenes (see Creswell & Creswell, 2018: 264).

By using the asterisk symbol (as a so-called wildcard symbol) at the end of the root of the term extremism, it is possible to broaden the search to words containing related terms (for example searching extremis* will turn up extremists, extremist,

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[75]https://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20031203000220/http://www.pro.gov.uk:80/about/preservation/digital/webarchive.htm

[76] https://archive.org

[77] https://archive.org/web

[78] https://www.whatdotheyknow.com/

[79] https://www.ucpi.org.uk/search-results/

extremism, extremisms). As for the UK Parliament Hansard website, a few advanced search functions were available. For example, 'spokenby:member name', will show all contributions that a particular member has made in the Hansard records. Furthermore, a date range can be specified, aiding data collection for the required time frame. Overall, 220 speeches containing the concept of extremism were collected. To contextualise this, a range of Government strategies relating to extremism were also gathered, including the National Security Strategy (2008, 2009, 2010, 2015), CONTEST (2006, 2009, 2011), PREVENT (2008, 2009, 2011, 2015a, 2015b) and the Counter Extremism Strategy (2015). The author of this research believes that she was able to gather a representative sample of official policies during the time period under study.

For Tony Blair, 61 speeches were collected, 48 having been given outside parliament, 13 inside the House of Commons (see Figure 4 below).

Figure 4 - Tony Blair Discourse on extremism 1997-2007

For Gordon Brown, 37 speeches were collected, 19 given inside and 18 outside Parliament (see Figure 5 below). In order to investigate previous securitising attempts by Gordon Brown's his discourses on extremism as Chancellor were also collected, seeking out if his presentation of extremism changed when taking over the office of Prime Minister.

Gordon Brown Discourse on extremism 2005-2010

	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Parliament		1	7	3	5	3
Public		4	3	7	4	

Figure 5 - Gordon Brown Discourse on extremism 2005-2010

In the case of David Cameron, overall, 128 speeches containing extremism were collected, 52 of which were given to the public, and 76 of which were delivered inside the House of Commons (see Figure 6 below). In case of David Cameron, speeches were also collected from his time as leader of the opposition to investigate possible discursive changes from when he became Prime Minister in 2010.

David Cameron Discourse on extremism 2005-2016

	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Parliament		1	4	2	4	4	7	3	9	14	19	9
Public	2	2	4	4	1	1	8	2	3	13	8	4

Figure 6 - David Cameron Discourse on extremism 2005-2016

The fact that the topic of extremism is gaining in importance is evident from the increased frequency with which extremism is mentioned over time by all three actors and is itself an indicator that securitisation is afoot.

In order to evaluate the political discourse associated with the securitisation of extremism, several steps were undertaken (see Figure 7). 1) Relevant documents were selected from across several semantic domains, for example strategies, parliamentary debates, and political speeches (see also Halperin & Heath, 2017: 347).

Figure 7 - Overview of the speech act analysis collection process

2) Texts were then chosen according to "a securitization discourse materialized in them" (Vuori, 2013: 135) which narrowed down the amount of data. This was sometimes difficult given the vast number of speeches all given in a security context. However, whilst all collected speeches were analysed, for the analytical chapters (Chapter 4, 5 and 6), not all securitising speech acts were highlighted in the write-up. Instead, these chapters focus on the most representative ones. The texts were also subjected to several examinations on the basis of data source credibility and whether they included information necessary for the main research question and its aims.[80] This parsing of the data was particularly necessary because, as pointed out by Bryman & Bell (2019: 300), "analysis can only be as good as the documents it explores". Most importantly, the researcher asked herself whether there was a relevant security context to the data.

She then started to preliminarily code the data in step 3) in order to familiarise herself with the data. Finally, in step 4) the texts were contextualised as this allows "to generate a rich or 'thick' description of key events, the context within which these events occurred, the roles of the actors involved, the influence of external

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[80] See also 'Evaluating your secondary data sources' (Saunders et al., 2016: 343).

influences such as economic or commercial pressures, as well as outcomes"
(Saunders et al, 2016: 184). To provide some of this context, biographies and
memoirs of the three main securitising actors were consulted with care[81].
Additionally, the author drew up a timeline of terrorist and extremist related events
as well as other noteworthy political events (such as elections, scandals etc) to be
able to evaluate the background of the securitising moves, which provided the
author with further knowledge relevant to deciding which documents warranted
detailed analysis.

2.4. Choice of Analysis

According to Buzan et al (1998: 35-36) taking a speech-act approach to the analysis
of securitisation requires clear differentiation between three types of units –
Referent Objects, securitising actors, and functional actors[82]. Furthermore, for
something or someone to become securitised, it must be framed as an existential
threat warranting emergency/extraordinary measures taken outside the 'normal'
political spectrum. The author of this thesis has taken a strict textual speech act
analytical approach, which means that she did not take non-verbal aspects nor the
tone of a speech into account, focussing instead on the wording alone.

Element	ST Question(s)
Existential Threat	What does the threat entail?
Referent Subject	What or whom threatens?
Referent Object	What is being threatened? Whose survival is at stake?
Extraordinary Measures	Which measures are suggested to curb the threat? Are they (extra)ordinary? Are they outside of 'normal' politics?

Table 3 - ST based analytical framework guide questions

Based on the analytical framework guide[83] seen in Table 3, the type of speech act
was determined before the 'existential threat', 'Referent Object', and 'Referent
Subject' in question were identified. This is important for uncovering mechanisms
and descriptions of (security) speech acts that manifest the 'institutional facts' that

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[81] As a memoir might not recount events accurately.

[82] They define it as "actors who affect the dynamics of a sector on behalf of the referent object or the actor calling for security on behalf of the referent object, this is an actor who significantly influences decisions in the field of security. A polluting company, for example, can be a central actor in the environmental sector – it is not a referent object and is not trying to securitize environmental issues (quite the contrary)" (Buzan et al, 1998: 36).

[83] Adapted and modified from Fabricius (2013: 25).

in turn render extremism an existential threat to different Referent Objects. Referred to by Buzan et al (1998) as the 'existential threat', the term 'Referent Subject' will be used from here onwards for analytical reasons (see previous Chapter).

The Referent Subject is the threat that is posed to the Referent Object, or in Balzacq's words, "what threatens" (Balzacq, 2011b: 36) – the "threat issue". For example, in a study undertaken by Susanne Keesman (2013: 222) on the Dutch government's securitisation of Communism in the late 1940s to early 1950s, she identified the Referent Subject as "the totalitarian threat of a communist subversion" and the Referent Object as "the state of the Dutch democratic order". The wording "Referent Subject" is not a term introduced by the Copenhagen School but one termed by (Balzacq, 2011a). However, for analytical purposes of studying the securitisation of extremism, this term seems rather fitting. For the CoS, the Referent object is usually treated as specific to a certain sector (Buzan & Hansen, 2009: 30). However, the author of this research finds this approach too restrictive as it would lead to the potential danger of leaving out certain relevant 'Referent Objects'. For this reason, her Securitisation Speech Act analysis framework allows for different Referent Objects to be identified in a more objective way. For example, her analysis of Gordon Brown's discourses brought to light that 'charities' were sometimes framed as the Referent Object (see chapter 5).

One should also consider the argument made by Ciută (2009 in Staar, 2021: 83), who states that "it is not sensible to define *a priori* that securitisation speech acts must refer only to an existential threat and at the same time claim that the formulation of the meaning of security can be observed this way". One can therefore assume that, in order to analyse discursive securitisation, the threat framing must be noted before concluding whether it is presented as existential. The author of this thesis wants to call attention to the fact that 'security' is seen as a self-referential practice which allows something to become a threat "not necessarily because a real existential threat exists but because the issue is presented as such a threat" (Buzan, et al, 1998: 23-24). Whilst 'existential threats' can legitimize the breaking of 'normal politics (see Buzan et al, 1998: 25), the author argues that they do not need to necessarily be presented as existential nor accepted for securitisation to take place. Rather, by presenting them as danger to a Referent Object, the securitising actor puts an issue on the security agenda. Moreover, the suggestion of

extraordinary measures by the securitising actor also enables the analyst to identify the securitising move[84].

Furthermore, the 'Securitising Speech Act Classification[85] was developed[86] (see Table 4) based on Searle's taxonomy of speech acts (Searle, 1999) which helps to explore different securitising speech acts.

	Speech Act[87]	Securitising speech act indicator	Guiding Note
Assertive securitising speech act	state, describe, classify, explain, claim, suggest, diagnose, suspect, believe, suspect, assume, insist, conclude	Something or someone is a threat	Speaker tells 'how things are'
Directive securitising speech act	order, command, request, plead, advise, dare, ask, beg	Extraordinary measure suggested to curb the threat	Speaker tries to get people to do something
Commissive securitising speech act	promise, vow, pledge, contract, guarantee, plan, threaten	Extraordinary measure suggested to curb the threat	Speaker commits her/himself to doing something
Declarative securitising speech act	pronounce, declare, christen	Extraordinary measure implemented regarding threat	Speaker creates new state of affairs by representing it as created because of the existence of extralinguistic institutions

Table 4 - Securitising Speech Act Classification

Whereas Stritzel & Chang (2015: 550) focus on the "ideal-type of a securitizing speech act" in their securitising speech act framework, for this study, Searle's speech act classification acted as a foundation which was adapted for a simplified analysis[88].

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[84] The author also wants to draw attention to an argument brought forward by Rita Floyd (2016b: 691) who points out that "(b)y insisting that threats need to be cast in existential terms, the CS [Copenhagen School] yet again stipulates what security means, in this case by imposing that the condition of being secure deals with survival and not welfare or specific interests".

[85] Very loosely based on Stritzel (2014).

[86] Leongkamchorn (2010) claims that Searle's speech act taxonomy has always been flexible in adaption. Therefore, the author took the liberty of adapting it in order to make analysis of securitising speech acts easier.

[87] Based on Searle (1969) but with verb additions by Qadir & Riloff (2011).

[88] How the analytical approach was developed is further expanded in Section 2.5.1.

The author analysed her corpus (data selection discussed above) with the computer assisted qualitative data analysis software (CAQDAS) programme NVivo. The above scheme (Table 4) is an example of how speech act theory guided the discourse analysis of the primary documents in regard to the securitisation framework. It aided the exploration of the various security speech acts used in order to securitise extremism and how it was presented as a 'security threat' or in the terminology used in this thesis – the 'Referent Subject'. Coding 'existential threats' and 'Referent Objects' and 'Referent Subjects' enabled the author to uncover the mechanism and description of (security) speech acts that create the 'institutional facts' of political extremism being an existential threat to different Referent Objects (see Figure 8 - Example of NVivo Coding Surface). Not only did the analysis involve the highlighting of security discourse, but it also aimed at identifying the mechanisms by which a threat is created. Furthermore, by highlighting the speech acts present in the discourse one can look at their function as a "securitising move". Additionally, the author contextualised the speeches given in her analysis which is important for several reasons. For one, a Prime Minister might have put more emphasis on counter-extremism shortly after a terrorist attack. Secondly, looking at the background enabled the author to draw new conclusions. For example, she was able to show that the framing of extremism as an international threat was used as a way to justify intervention in Afghanistan (see Chapter 5 and 6).

Figure 8 - Example of NVivo Coding Surface

2.5. Speech Act Framework for Analysis

The next sections will explore how a Speech Act analysis can be applied to studying linguistic securitisation by Prime Ministers in the UK. It will also elaborate on the concept of 'Institutionalisation' and 'extraordinary measures' as subjects of analysis. In order to study the securitisation of extremism in the UK, a framework (see Figure 9) was developed which encompasses three factors relevant to studying the securitisation of a topic:

1) The Speech Act
2) Institutionalisation
3) Extraordinary Measures

Wilkinson (2011: 94), for example, takes issue with the Copenhagen School's "outcome- dependent retrospective view of security" while Conze (2012) questions whether securitisation can be seen as an analytical tool to assess the present or if it is more of a historical method. However, the author of this research argues that, given the theory's constructivist approach, the point of 'successful' securitisation cannot and should not be defined. Looking at the securitisation of a topic is not about a process which has a start and end but about the subjective interpretation of the securitising actors. Had they not themselves decided that an issue was an existential threat, they would not have framed it as such, keeping in mind that 'speaking is doing'[89]. Therefore, for this thesis securitisation taking place in the discursive area shall be defined as:

4) When a securitising actor uses speech acts to frame something or someone as a threat (Assertive), tries to get people to do something to curb the threat (Directive) and/or commits her/himself to doing something against the threat (Commissive), securitisation is happening

5) Institutionalised securitisation shows itself in security practices and policies

6) Measures to curb the 'threat' previously framed by securitising actors

Basing securitisation around these components, for an issue to be securitised it needs to be presented as a threat via securitising speech acts and this must result in

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[89] Of course, there might have been ulterior motives at play which would be hard to analyse. The author instead relies on Searle's Principle of Expressibility.

the issue being put outside normal politics via the suggestion and/or implementation of extraordinary measures. The institutionalisation of the threat refers to the historical conditions of the threat, hence the context can also be seen as pre-dating the official public discourse aiding future securitising moves. Here one should consider Huysmans (2006: 25), who believes that "(t)he speech act of security draws upon a historically constituted and socially institutionalized set of meanings". Whilst institutionalisation can precede securitisation (and aid it), it can also be a part of securitisation. However, the author of this thesis argues that, for her research, institutionalisation should be seen as the fertile ground that aids the securitisation of a topic. In the specific case of her research, having the 'issue of extremism' institutionalised 'silently' (as in no prominent speech acts observable) through policies acted as a fire accelerator[90] that pushed extremism as a threat onto the security agenda. Hence, she believes that institutionalisation happens when the "security argument [is] so well established that it is taken for granted" (Buzan et al, 1998: 28).

Figure 9 - A model for securitisation analysis

Regarding the focus on speech acts, the argument can be made that as soon as a securitising actor has initiated her or his securitising moves and has become able to implement extraordinary measures to curb the threat, audience acceptance is no

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[90] Or 'put fuel onto the flames'.

longer needed to establish whether a securitisation attempt has been successful or not. Taking this as the basis for further analysis enables the researcher to include more than 'extraordinary' measures into her account and can also help to locate measures which might not appear to act outside the 'political' or 'security' norms. By emphasising on the speech act and the authority of the securitising actor, audience acceptance is excluded and assumed to be a 'given'. These three factors are overlapping and not completely separate, they cannot be seen as a process but should be taken as indicators as well as analytical aides for the exploration of the securitisation of a topic.

2.5.1. The Speech Act

Given this thesis' speech act-centred approach to securitisation, this research is leaving the criteria of audience acceptance out. Instead, its focus lies on the analysis of the securitising speech acts brought forward by Prime Ministers. It is therefore assumed that when a securitising actor uses speech acts to frame something or someone as a threat (Assertive), tries to get people to do something to curb the threat (Directive) and/or commits her/himself to doing something against the threat (Commissive), securitisation is happening. In order to analyse securitising speech acts, a 'Securitising Speech Act Classification' (see Table 4) was developed, based on Searle' taxonomy of speech acts.

2.5.1.1.Speech Act Classification based on Searle's taxonomy of speech acts

According to Searle's taxonomy of illocutions, there are five categories of illocutionary acts: Assertives, Directives, Commissives, Expressives, and Declarations (Searle, 1976) which shall be regarded as the five main illocutionary speech acts. However, Searle (2001a: 174) prefers to call them "five basic types of illocutionary point", which can be confusing, in particular when looking at his earlier writings.

Searle (1976) stated several problems with the development of his classification. For one, it is difficult to differentiate between illocutionary verbs and varying kinds of illocutionary acts. He therefore believes that it is important to keep in mind that although differences can be helpful for analysis, they can never be a sure form of distinguishing different illocutionary acts. Eventually, he took the "illocutionary point, and its corollaries, direction of fit and expressed sincerity conditions, as the basis for constructing a classification" (Searle, 1976: 10).

In order to summarise his taxonomy, which the author of this thesis later adapted and applied, she created a table (see Table 5), highlighting different key elements of the five basic types of illocutionary points. Searle's taxonomy is based "on illocutionary point, and illocutionary point is best explained in terms of the essential conditions of speech act" (Searle, 1991: 81). There are several essential conditions, but the table below focuses on the conditions of satisfaction as these were the most relevant for the development of a 'Securitisation Speech Act Classification'.

	Illocutionary Point	Examples	Direction of Fit	Conditions of Satisfaction
Assertive	Commit the hearer to the truth of the proposition	Statements, descriptions, classifications, explanations	Word-to-World	Is the utterance literally true or false?
Directive	Get the hearer to behave in such a way as to make his behaviour match the propositional content of the directive	Orders, commands, requests	World-to-Word	Cannot be true or false but they can be obeyed, disobeyed, complied with, granted, denied
Commissive	Commitment by the speaker to undertake the course of action represented in the propositional content	Promises, vows, pledges, contracts, guarantees, threats (unlike above, it is against the interest of the hearer and not for the benefit of the hearer)	World-to-Word	Cannot be true or false but they can be carried out, kept, or broken
Expressive	Express the sincerity condition of the speech act	Apologies, thanks, congratulations, welcomes, condolences	Null direction of fit (match between propositional content and reality)	The truth of the propositional content is simply taken for granted
Declaration	Bring about change in the world by representing it as having been changed	"I pronounce you man and wife," "War is hereby declared," "You are fired," "I resign".	Double direction – world-to-word (by representing it as having been changed) and therefore achievement of word-to-world	• create state of affairs just by representing it as created. • generally possible only because of the existence of *extralinguistic institutions*.

Table 5 - Speech act classification based on Searle's taxonomy of speech acts (1999: 148-150) [author representation]

The first type is the *Assertive* illocutionary point (or Assertive speech act). It is a speech act aiming to commit the hearer to the truth of the proposition by presenting "the proposition as representing a state of affairs in the world" (Searle, 1999:148). Examples of assertive illocutions are statements, descriptions, classifications, and explanations. As every assertive is an expression of a belief, its sincerity condition is always belief. That means that the speech act must be performed sincerely, hence the speaker believes what he or she says (Searle, 1969). Because Assertives have the word-to-world direction of fit, they can be either true or false, which leads to the condition of satisfaction by predicting whether the assertive can be considered true of false (Searle, 1999: 148). Searle (2001b: 290) emphasises this by saying that "the point of the Assertives is to represent how things are in the world by committing the speaker to the truth of the expressed proposition". A statement like "It's snowing" according to Searle (2008: 448) "does not just express an intentional state; though it does, by the way, also express an intentional state, because every statement is an expression of a belief. But the point of expressing the belief is *not* to tell you about the speaker's inner mental states of belief but to tell you about *how things are* in the world" [emphasis added]. Applying this to securitisation theory, this means that the speaker tells 'how things are' and therefore frames something or someone as a threat. For example, when Tony Blair employs the Assertive speech act to frame extremism as a threat (see Table 6), he tells the audience 'how things are' but also presents extremism as a threat to the Referent Object's (the UK's) 'stability', therefore employing a securitising speech act. Based on the 'word-to-world' notion, he 'changes' the world via words.

The second type is the *Directive* illocutionary point (also Directive speech act). Here the speech act aims to get the "hearer to behave in such a way as to make his behaviour match the propositional content of the directive" (Searle, 1999: 148). Orders, commands and requests are examples of directive illocutions which have a world-to-word direction of fit. Because a Directive is an expression of desire, its sincerity condition is always desire. When it comes to its satisfactory conditions, a Directive cannot be true or false but can either be obeyed, disobeyed, complied with, granted, or denied (Searle, 1999: 148-149). In the case of the securitisation speech act framework, this means that the securitising actor tries to get people to do something. As an indicator for this, she or he puts forward extraordinary

measures to curb the threat[91]. For example, Gordon Brown (2008) is attempting to get people to do something about the threat, in the case of the example given in Table 6, he requests everyone "to fight extremism wherever it exists" alongside him through the Directive speech act.

The third type is the *Commissive* illocutionary point (or Commissive speech act). According to Searle (1999: 149), "every commissive is a commitment by the speaker to undertake the course of action represented in the propositional content". The Commissive illocutionary point can therefore be adapted to be a securitising speech act of a speaker who commits her/himself to doing something against a threat by committing to the implementation of extraordinary measures. Promises, vows, pledges, contracts, and guarantees fall in this category. Threats also fall into this category, but they are a case for themselves as they are against the interest of the hearer and not for the benefit of the hearer. When it comes to their satisfactory condition, Commissives cannot be true or false but they can be carried out, kept or broken. Their direction of fit is world-to-word and their sincerity condition is always intention (Searle, 1999: 149). As for the Commissive speech act, the speaker him or herself commits to doing something about the threat thereby employing a securitising speech act. As seen in the example in Table 6, David Cameron (2013) pledges to implement the extraordinary measure of extended policing powers to defeat 'violent extremism'. The speech act classification therefore also allows for extraordinary measures to be found as the Commissive speech act is when the speaker commits themselves to doing something.

The fourth type is the *Expressive* illocutionary point (or Expressive speech act). Searle (1999: 149) states that "the illocutionary point of the expressive is simply to express the sincerity condition of the speech act". Examples of Expressives are apologies, thanks, congratulations, welcomes, and condolences whose propositional content (truth) has to be taken for granted as there is a null direction of fit (match between propositional content and reality). When it comes to the sincerity condition, it varies based on the type of expressive (e.g., an apology is sincere if the speaker genuinely feels sorry about what he is apologising for, or congratulations are sincere if the speaker genuinely feels glad about what he is

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[91] See Table 6 for further examples.

congratulation the hearer for) (Searle, 1999: 149). For the securitisation speech act framework, this expressive illocutionary point was disregarded as it would not follow the grammar of security to evoke a state of emergency and urgency.

The fifth type is the *Declarative* illocutionary point (Declarative speech act). The illocutionary point of Declarations is about changing the world through representing it as changed. A state of affairs is presented in a speech act as a given by presenting it as such. Searle (1999: 150) gives the examples of "I pronounce you man and wife," "War is hereby declared," "You are fired," "I resign" and argues that all have a double direction of fit. That is world-to-word (by representing it as having been changed) and therefore achievement of word-to-world. Searle (1999: 150) locates Declarations as a unique type of speech act as "they actually make changes in the world solely in virtue of the successful performance of the speech act". For example, if someone like a priest successfully pronounces a couple man and wife, then a state of affairs exists in the world that did not exist before. Such declarations are generally possible only because of the existence of extralinguistic institutions. Searle (1989: 549-550) makes a distinction between linguistic and extralinguistic declarations. For example, by saying "I resign", the speaker creates the new fact of having resigned by saying so. Now, a priest marrying a couple and thereby declaring them husband and wife can only do so because he is in a position of authority. Searle (1989: 550) believes that being in a position of power is an extralinguistic fact required to perform certain Declarations successfully. They can also be considered 'institutional speech acts', as they require a "special position by the speaker and the hearer within that institution" (Searle, 1979: 7). Hence, declaring war and baptising someone, for example, need to be backed up by an extralinguistic institution or fact. For the analysis of securitisation that means that a securitising actor who uses a Declaration will only be able to change a state of affairs if she or he has the 'authority' to do so. Declarative speech acts are the rarest of the five types of illocutionary point as the circumstances have to be 'right' for them to be felicitous. However, Tony Blair successfully employed such a speech act when he changed the name of the 'Ministerial Committee on Animal Rights Activists' to 'Ministerial Committee on Animal Rights Extremism' on the 29th of June 2006 in a written statement. He changed the 'state of affairs' via the authority bestowed upon him.

	Speech Act	Securitising speech act example	Securitising speech act indicator	Guiding Note
Assertive securitising speech act	State, describe, classify, explain	"(…) unless we articulate a common global policy based on common values, we risk chaos threatening our stability, economic and political, through letting extremism, conflict or injustice go unchecked" (Blair, 2006b)	Something or someone is a threat	Speaker tells 'how things are'
Directive securitising speech act	Order, command, request	"But let us agree that the first thing we should do is that we do everything to fight extremism wherever it exists" (Brown, 2008).	Extraordinary measure suggested to curb the threat	Speaker tries to get people to do something
Commissive securitising speech act	Promise, vow, pledge, contract, guarantee, threaten	"We will defeat violent extremism by standing together… …by backing our police and security services… …and above all by challenging the poisonous narrative of extremism on which this violence feeds" (Cameron, 2013).	Extraordinary measure suggested to curb the threat	Speaker commits her/himself to doing something
Declarative securitising speech act	Pronounce, declare, christen	"I have decided that it would be more appropriate for MISC 13 to be called the *Ministerial Committee on Animal Rights Extremism*, and not, as listed previously, the Ministerial Committee on Animal Rights Activists. This is to reflect more closely the Committee's terms of reference" (Blair in HC Deb Volume 448 Written Statement, 29 June 2006, emphasis added)	Extraordinary measure implemented regarding threat	Speaker creates new state of affairs by representing it as created because of the existence of extralinguistic institutions

Table 6 - Examples of securitising speech acts by Prime Ministers

The earlier shown Table 4 shows this framework of analysis which was applied to all speeches examined in order to show the securitising moves by elite actors, how they framed 'extremism' as a threat to different Referent Objects, and which extraordinary measures they suggested to curb the threats. By searching out the different securitising speech acts, the author is able to identify the securitising mechanism more easily. For example, the Assertive speech act shows the framing of the threat and how it is presented. The Directive speech act on the other hand, indicated by Directive speech act verbs such as "order, command, request" almost always reveals the extraordinary measure suggested against the threat. This is similar to the Commissive speech act where the speaker commits her/himself to taking on the threat.

2.5.2. Institutionalisation

The speech act might not always initiate the securitisation but most often it is at least an indicator (see Bourbeau, 2014). One can therefore not assume that securitisation starts until the 'official' speech act has been uttered (for the purposes of the analysis these might have been uttered behind closed doors, and therefore cannot be researched). Nor is it possible to pinpoint the exact start of a securitisation process in most cases. Instead, the dimension institutionalised securitisation offers, acts as a marker of securitisation taking place. For Buzan et al (1998: 27), some cases of securitisation can become institutionalised which means that there is no longer a need for the threat to be presented within the context of urgency as it is already a given. For example, through the presentation of a threat as recurrent or persistent, "the response and sense of urgency become institutionalized" (Buzan et al, 1998: 27). Urgency has often been already established through previous securitising moves and there "is no further need to spell out that this issue has to take precedence, that it is a security issue" (Buzan et al, 1998: 28).

These institutionalised securitisations show themselves in non-public security practice, for example, because the logic of security forbids a public debate. Buzan et al (1998: 28) cite 'black programs'[92] not showing up in the United States' budget due to their nature of security and above that the accompanying need for secrecy.

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[92] According to Linnemann & Medley (2019: 342), the UK government added the word "black" "to mundane terms such as budgets, operations, and sites to denote that which is outside the realm of understanding and privilege of everyday citizens—knowledge redacted in the interest of national security".

The so called 'black budget' allows the US government to have a secret budget which does not need approval by Congress (Sanders & Austin Fitt, 2004: 18ff). In the case of the United Kingdom, Roe (2008: 619) cites 'Operation Desert Fox'[93] as "a case of institutionalized securitization". Here, then Prime Minister Tony Blair had involved the British military alongside the American military in the bombing of Iraq in 1998 to stop Iraq from using its alleged chemical and biological weapons (Daddow & Gaskarth, 2011: 6). However, he had only retrospectively sought the approval of both Parliament and the public and 'The Iraq Inquiry 2016' found that Blair had "actively misled the public as to the case for war" (McCormack, 2019: 3). As for Roe (2008: 619), he argues that the emergency measure of military intervention had been possible due to the threat having "already been established in 1990, immediately prior to the first Gulf War", demonstrating an instance of institutionalised securitisation. According to Lupovici (2016: 415), Buzan et al (1998: 28) and Roe (2008: 618) believe that "the role of the audience is marginalized or excluded in cases of institutionalized securitization". Hence, in order to explore the securitisation of extremism, it was also decided to look at institutionalised securitisation, where neither speech acts nor the analytical factor of audience acceptance is necessary. Instead, it is treated as a given. Furthermore, exploring institutionalised securitisation as an indicator for securitisation enables the exploration of *when* the issue moved onto the security agenda.

This is possible if one adopts a viewpoint offered by Bourbeau (2014: 195) and assumes that the security practice is where securitisation is 'locked in' and "pre-existing security practices may through security discourse be legitimised and institutionalised". The other viewpoint brought forward by him is that "security practices are implemented *before* security discourses occur; in this case, the role of security discourses is to legitimise and institutionalise a pre-existing situation" (Bourbeau, 2014: 195) [emphasis added]. So to speak, one is confronted with a chicken/egg dilemma. What came first? An issue became securitised through institutionalisation or institutionalisation made securitisation possible? For this thesis, the working assumption of institutionalised securitisation is that it shows

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[93] Desert Fox was also the nickname of German Field Marshal Erwin Rommel (Mamdani, 2005: 169).

itself in security practices and policies[94]. Therefore, it is an indicator for the occurrence of securitisation in terms of policy practice, but it does not need to pre-date the speech act. For example, the policing of domestic extremists (discussed in the next chapter) is a policy practice which was not initiated through official speech acts, but it also does not indicate securitisation of extremism on its own. Christina Boswell gives the rationale for this, indicating that although discourse might "legitimize the use of certain security practices", these practices do not need to have been given public legitimation; instead "administrative agencies may have substantial scope for action without being held accountable to public or judicial scrutiny" (Boswell, 2007: 593).

Hansen (2012: 532) elaborates on this idea, stating that the uptick of such security practices might indicate that either 1) no previous political discourse is necessary for legitimisation and/or 2) political approval was already given behind the scenes. The author of this study believes both to be the case but also wants to highlight that institutionalised securitisation can both be seen as pre-dating the official public discourse but also as aiding future securitising moves. Institutionalisation should also be seen as the historical conditions of the issue to become a security threat; hence it is referring to context and not just security practice alone. It should also be kept in mind that the concept of institutionalisation is geared towards the understanding of the CoS, hence what Bourbeau (2011, 2014) has called the 'logic of exception' as opposed to the 'logic of routine'. The two should not necessarily be seen as incompatible, the former referring to the CoS' emphasis on securitisation being observable through extraordinary measures and the latter seeing "the securitization process as routinized and patterned practices, particularly bureaucracies' and security professionals' practices" (Bourbeau, 2011: 398).

Regarding the cooperation of these two views in the research implementation, the institutionalisation section should be seen as the historical contextualising of how extremism could be framed as a security threat through elite actors' speech acts because of its prior institutionalisation. It is therefore a piece of the puzzle which, in combination with extraordinary measures suggested in speech acts, allows the author to create a more holistic picture of the securitisation process. This is in

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[94] See also Reiners (2015: 40) who regards "institutionalisation as a potential effect of securitisation".

particular important as the institutionalisation of extraordinary measures (such as the establishment of 'Domestic Extremist Database' in the 1980s) further highlights the interplay of the institutionalised securitisation of extremism through measures outside of 'normal' politics.

2.5.3. Extraordinary Measures

For the CoS, any issue can be securitised but not any issue will be securitised. The difference between a politicised and securitised issue lies in the former being dealt with inside of 'normal' politics, whilst the latter is 'confronted' with 'extraordinary' (that is to say outside the normal political framework) measures. Only through the speech act is the securitising actor able to break free of the usual standard political rules. Without such a speech act, the CoS believes, no such thing would be possible. If there was not such a distinction, there would be the danger of 'watering down' security – any issue could be considered to be a security concern solely based on the speech act alone. Therefore, extraordinary measures are essential to securitisation. However, how should exceptional, extraordinary, emergency measures be defined? Buzan et al (1998: 24) cite several examples of the breaking of 'normal' political rules, "(e.g. in the form of secrecy, levying taxes or conscription, placing limitations on inviolable rights, or focusing society's energy and resources on a specific task)" (Buzan et al, 1998: 24). Here one can again consult the case of Tony Blair and military intervention. As cited by Emmers (2016: 171-172) "deployment of military force in Iraq during the 'Iraqi Freedom' campaign of 2003 illustrates the use of extraordinary measures without first convincing the relevant audience" as the coalition partners Tony Blair and George Bush's decision was met with protest on the grounds of having acted 'without legitimacy'. Whilst Emmers sees this as failed attempt at securitisation (the discourse having failed to convince the public of the need for military intervention based on the urgency of the threat), the author of this research argues that given the actual implementation (even though suggestion would have sufficed) of the extraordinary measure (in this case military force), the securitising moves did not fail but also that the securitising happened and was not just attempted. Rather they might have been retrospectively questioned (even at the time), but acting in the position of authority and consequently having the power to act, both securitising actors were able to conduct the securitisation of Saddam Hussein. Also, failed securitisation would entail that the issue had not been moved onto the security agenda which was clearly not the

case. For instance, Buzan et al (1998: 83) give an example of securitising actors failing to move an issue from politicised to securitised in the environmental sector, stating that NGOs such as Greenpeace try to frame environmental issues as existential threats but fail to locate them outside of politicisation on the securitisation spectrum.

Applying this to the United Kingdom, Lister (2019: 424) argues that "UK counter terrorism politics sometimes looks akin to "normal" politics, with open, public contestation as well as deliberation and debate". Therefore, he does not consider them extraordinary measures. For him, despite being often cited as examples of securitisation (see for example Aradau & Van Munster, 2009), counter-terrorism politics still operate within the 'normal' political sphere. He believes that the parliamentary system allowed an open debate on counterterrorism legislation and states that indicators such as 'fast-tracking' of legislation (where parliamentary debate is restricted) have not taken place for the "major pieces of counterterrorism legislation that introduced controversial measures such as stop-and-search without suspicion (Terrorism Act 2000), the extension of pre-charge detention to 28 days (Terrorism Act 2006), and the Control Orders of 2005 (Counter Terrorism Act 2005)" (Lister, 2019: 424). Indeed, one could argue that committee hearings (such as Human Rights Inquiries) *prevent* reviews, and that reports of Independent Terrorism Reviewers can be seen as control mechanism that take away the 'acceptance' of a securitising move, indirectly acting as contestations. However, given that some advice on reviewing legislation has been discarded by the UK government, the sole responsibility and decision-making responsibility remains with the core executive. The author of this research also argues that securitisation is not about the successful implementation of extraordinary measures, but rather the mere suggestion of doing so.

Gad (2017: 108-109) suggests that for the analyst the line between 'ordinary' and 'extra-ordinary' is often difficult to establish as different measures might be considered ordinary to one Referent Object and extraordinary to another. For example, allowing only a specific ethnic group to vote might be seen as undemocratic to the Referent Object of individuals in a democracy (hence outside of 'normal politics') but ordinary for the Referent Object of 'Ethnic Identity' given a different outlook on the concept of democracy (Gad, 2017: 108). Following this

line of inquiry, one can argue that in the case of the United Kingdom, when David Cameron framed "Charities" as the Referent Object[95] to the threat of infiltration of extremism and instigated the 'Charities (Protection and Social Investment) Act 2016' (CPSIA 2016) [96], it might not have been an extraordinary measure in the eyes of some. However, CPSIA 2016 mandated that the Charity Commission would hold "the power to prohibit individuals with "extremist" views from holding controlling positions within charities" (Lynch, 2015) which is a clear extraordinary move given the danger of abuse of power. One can also conclude that, for a measure to be considered extraordinary, it needs to be shown as something helping to curb an existential threat. The author does not believe that the measure has to be extraordinary as such, but its extraordinary-ness shows itself in its being suggested as a measure necessary to stop a threat from harming the Referent Object.

Additionally, looking at the context of a suggested measure also enables us to draw a distinction between extraordinary and ordinary measures. For example, the suggestion of teaching British values to counter extremism in school might at first sight not seem outside of the political norm. However, the government intervening in school curriculums in order to 'fight extremism' is. The implementation of prison counter-extremism programs on the other hand appears, given its different context, more inside the political norm but should also be considered out of the ordinary as it has been presented as a way to curb an existential threat. One has to remember though, that extraordinary measures only need to be suggested by a securitising actor for securitisation to take place, the implementation is not necessary because the focus of the thesis lies on the speech act bringing about the securitisation[97].

2.6. Limitation and considerations

The thesis has several limitations such as not being able to account for the security practices of the securitisation of extremism due to its speech act focus. Furthermore, by focussing on Prime Minister discourses alone, it leaves out the securitising moves by other actors (such as the Home Secretary for example) who would have had an impact on the overall securitisation of extremism. Furthermore, the analysis

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[95] For more on the framing of charities as a threat see Bolleyer & Gauja (2016).

[96] see Charity Commission for England and Wales (2018).

[97] Because securitisation is "the discursive process through which an intersubjective understanding is constructed within a political community to treat something as an existential threat to a valued referent object, and *to enable a call* for urgent and exceptional measures to deal with the threat" (Buzan & Wæver, 2003: 491) [emphasis added].

of the selected speeches does not claim to fully represent a conducted debate or a security strategy, in particular as it only analysed Prime Minister discourses. However, the speeches were examined for securitising speech acts characteristics for a securitisation of extremism.

Whilst this study demonstrates that extremism had been securitised in the United Kingdom, it raises further questions about why the securitisation happened and to what ends. The framework does not allow to explore the motivation of securitising actors but rather focuses on the outcome of their securitisation decisions. Hence, in order to understand why the securitisation of extremism happened, further research would be required, albeit with a different framework for analysis. One has to keep in mind though that this research never aimed to uncover the reasoning behind the securitisation of extremism.

From the results of this research, it can be concluded that all three Prime Ministers securitised extremism, which raises the question of their motive for securitisation. The author of this thesis can assume that there are different motives for securitising extremism depending on the actor (for example Tony Blair using it to justify military intervention). What is certain is that security issues are prioritised and dealt with at the highest political level, and the perception of a security threat triggers intense political activity.

It is important to remember that the CoS securitisation framework "is limited in its ability to address questions such as why a certain audience accepts the articulation of a phenomenon as a threat or what the mechanisms are that trigger the acceptance of a narrative as an existential threat" (Gaufman, 2017: 3). Keeping this in mind, this research does not aim to understand the underlying reasoning behind an instance of securitisation of extremism, nor how and if an audience accepts or rejects securitisation attempts. Instead, it justifies this approach based on Searle's 'Collective Intentionality' and 'Principle of Expressibility' (see previous Chapter).

Traditionally, the securitisation framework studies securitisation in different sectors. However, Buzan et al (1998: 168) state that they "see sectors as a purely analytical device, as different lenses through/ which to see different views of the same issues" and that 'cutting the world into sectors' is not where a security analysis should start. When differentiating different sectors there is also a risk of missing

"intense security dilemmas in cases where the threat of A against B lies in one sector and the threat to which A is reacting (and thereby possibly reinforcing) from B is found in another sector" (Buzan et al, 1998: 169). Other limitations on employing the sector approach are that it can lead the analysis to "confuse the partial reality of the sector, with the total reality of the whole" (Buzan & Little, 2000: 75) and to compartmentalise security dynamics in different sectors (Wæver, 2017: 126). Hence, the five-sector model will not be applied, and securitisation is looked at beyond sectors. That means that although securitisation is studied as taking place in the political sector, it expands to other sectors. For this reason, instances in which a securitising move extended to another sector were highlighted where applicable, for example in the case of David Cameron securitising in the social or religious sectors (see Chapter 6).

Austin & Beaulieu-Brossard (2018: 308) draw attention to the emphasis that Securitisation Theory places on a "deductive method" which then evolved to "a minimalistic framework to be 'tested' over multiple cases". Leaving out inductive methods to study securitisation might hinder the evolution of the theory and limit new findings and approaches. That is why it is important to note that this thesis takes both a deductive but also somewhat inductive approach. Generally, ST is seen as a model which is applied deductively, hence one of theory testing. However, an inductive approach, on the other hand, operates the other way around, with the theory coming after the analysis. Whilst the author of this research originally intended to adjust the theory and then apply it, through application it became clear where the 'weaknesses' of this approach laid, enabling her to modify the framework. As pointed out by Austin & Beaulieu-Brossard (2018: 308) the deductive method of application brings the danger of forgetting "that ST's original articulation was strictly 'ideal' in its formulation, and certainly not intended to reflect the 'reality' of security speak in every instance". Keeping this in mind, the justification for modifying the theory can further be extended. Additionally, the idea of securitisation being a linear process is disregarded. In the opinion of this author, there will be overlaps of different occurrences of securitisation at the same time (for example, Tony Blair's renaming of 'Ministerial Committee on Animal Rights Activists' to 'Ministerial Committee on Animal Rights Extremism', see

Table 6 and his securitising speech acts regarding Islamic Extremism at the same time).

2.7. Conclusion

This chapter explained how speech act analysis can be applied in combination with 'institutionalisation' and 'extraordinary measures' to study the securitisation of extremism by Prime Ministers in the UK. This thesis takes a constructivist approach, given Securitisation Theory's theoretical foundations in constructivism. Williams (2003: 514) further highlights that it is "the understanding of speech-acts developed by Austin and Searle which has been so influential in the development of constructivism in International Relations[98]" whilst also stating that "it examines security practices as specific forms of social construction, and securitization as a particular kind of social accomplishment". In regards to the Speech Act Theory approach, one needs to take into account that Searle himself sees it as both a theory of language and a theory of action (Searle, 1969: 17) with Špehar & Jerbić (2015: 36) positioning Speech Act Theory "at the intersection of social constructivism and discursive/poststructuralist approach", placing the theory firmly in the discipline of social sciences. Nevertheless, it is important to consider the views by both Ringmar (1997:282) and Jørgensen (2001) cited in Stripple (2007:7) who believe that there needs to be a differentiation "between constructivism in IR as a substantial theory and as a philosophical concern". This thesis sees it as both, however, given the application of philosophical Securitisation Theory with a Speech Act Theory approach. This chapter also expanded on the methods employed to collect the data, exploring the reasoning behind data selection and offering insight into the organisation of the data. Furthermore, it showed the tools and methods employed for data analysis. The next chapter is going to analyse the institutionalised securitisation of extremism by UK Governments via careful review of government documents, policies and strategies which would aid the securitisation of extremism by Prime Ministers through speech acts.

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[98] In connection, see the treatment of Speech-Act Theory in Wendt (1999).

Part II

3. The institutionalised securitisation of extremism through Police and State

"Domestic Extremism does not include faith-based groups"
(HM Government, 2007: 74)

3.1. Introduction

The objective of this chapter is to investigate the institutionalised securitisation of extremism in the United Kingdom over the past decades, and to show that the issue of extremism was handled as a security threat foregoing[99] securitisating speech acts by elite actors. For Buzan et al (1998: 27), the institutionalised securitisation of an issue means that there is no longer a need for the threat to be presented within the context of urgency, as such a state of urgency is already a given. In the case of this thesis, it is believed that institutionalised securitisation consequently shows itself in security practices and policies which can operate without the need for public debate, given that the threat is so well established that its dealings no longer need to be openly legitimised. The institutionalisation of the extremism here therefore also refers to the historical conditions of the threat, pre-dating the official public discourse which aided future securitising moves. In this particular case, institutionalisation was foregoing discursive securitisation – the 'issue of extremism' was institutionalised 'silently' (there were no prominent speech acts observable) with policies and practices acting as facilitators for future securitisation.

The author argues that having established initiatives such as the 'Domestic Extremism Database' and 'Undercover Policing Units' targeting 'domestic extremists', the danger of extremism had been quietly moved onto the security agenda via a "security argument". The level of secrecy preventing open debate is a sign of institutionalised securitisation and can be observed in the handling of extremism by the government and its security services (including the police). This in turn resulted in fertile background for future securitising moves regarding 'Islamic extremism', which were initiated via securitising speech acts by Prime

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[99] The chapter will address the period up to 2005.

Ministers (see chapter 4, 5 and 6). The historical association of extremism with terrorism and the institutionalised dealings with 'domestic extremism' make it possible for the securitising actor to invoke securitising speech acts given that a threat is already "generally held to be threatening" (see Wæver, 2003: 14-15).

When looking at how extremism has been dealt with by the UK government over the past decades, it is critical to distinguish how extremism is defined and more specifically how the concept was approached. It appears that ahead of the 9/11 attacks, extremism was mostly dealt with in the policing sphere, in particular being defined as 'domestic extremism'. However, as of now, there is no official legal definition of the term 'domestic extremism', nor the term 'extremism'. Nevertheless, observations show that the term has been loosely applied by police to many groups who have dissented against the existing political system over the years. The policing of 'extremists' goes back as early as the late 1960s[100], with a renewed focus on the threat of 'domestic extremists' in the late 1990s and early 2000s. As evidence by careful review of government documents, policies, and strategies; the concept of policing extremism had been on the security spectrum as early as the 1960's. This is particularly true of the idea of 'domestic extremism', which back then had a different connotation as it was initially differentiated from terrorism but applied to what can are now seen as dissidents of government policies. Once a group was labelled 'extremist', the police were able to justify extraordinary measures such as undercover infiltration of such perceived extremist groups – measures that would not have been possible without prior criminalisation.

From 2001 onwards[101], a distinction was made between two kinds of extremism – the so called 'domestic extremism', and extremism linked to religious terrorism and

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[100] Although it is reported that MI5 had been combating the "continued threat of extremist Zionist terrorism" as early as the late 1940s (Andrew, 2009: 263). For more on MI5 and 'Jewish political extremism' regarding Palestine/Israel see West (2005: 406ff).

[101] According to Bartolucci & Skoczylis (2017: 339) although there had not been any 'jihadist attacks' in the United Kingdom in the period from 1995 to 2001, the threat had been gaining attendance. The 9/11 US attacks had moved the issue of religiously inspired terrorism onto the security agenda of the Western world, including the United Kingdom. However, at this point, the concept of 'radicalisation' had not yet taken hold; hence extremist Islam had not been framed as an existential threat. That is not to say that Muslims had at this point not been seen as a threat to British security. This is pointed out by Hewitt (2008:69 in Thomas, 2012: 79), who alluded that UK security services by 2003 "had become convinced that British Muslims represented the top terrorist threat" and that until 2005, MI5 had heavily increased its investigations into British Muslims. Special Branch also extended its efforts and set up the Muslim Contact Unit (MCU) which was dedicated to undertaking Muslim community outreach (Lambert, 2008: 31).

by extension religious ideology. The concept of 'Islamic extremism' emerged in the early 2000s, gaining momentum over the last two decades. Whilst 'domestic extremism' has mostly been linked to animal rights activism, extremism related to terrorism has been heavily associated with Islam in particular[102]. The Government has stated that "faith-based groups" are not included in the term 'domestic extremism'" (HM Government, 2007: 74). Instead, it frames these groups as 'single issue' protests. Whilst it does sometimes relate them to acts of terrorism, it also clearly distinguishes them from the concept of religiously motivated extremism, which it almost always links to terrorism. That the concept of 'extremism' then became clearly linked to Islam can be seen as early as 2004, as evidenced by the leaked draft report on 'Young Muslims and Extremism' by the Home Office and Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO). However, although politicised, it did not gain prominence until after the 7/7 London bombings in 2005[103] (see also Lowe, 2017), which "were executed by an 'enemy within' ", meaning that counter-terrorism measures could no longer be directed 'abroad' and had to "target the domestic population" (Choudhury & Fenwick, 2011: 55).

This chapter shows that despite the assumption that dealing with extremism is a 'new phenomenon', there is a long history within the UK government of attempts to manage 'domestic extremists' in particular. When looking at extremism and how it has been securitised, one needs to understand the associated terminological context and how it has been understood and used. Due to the sheer size of available data, it would be impossible to cover all policing activities related to counter-extremism. Instead, this chapter is going to briefly explore some key indicators of institutionalisation, such as the operations of the Special Demonstrations Squad (SDS) and the National Public Order Intelligence Unit (NPOIU). It will also show that 'undercover policing' proves that extremism has been securitised and institutionalised, with a particular emphasis on it operating outside 'normal politics'. To this end, it will highlight that the threat of extremism had established itself to a point that no 'public debate' was necessary to justify the covert

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[102] There might be an explanation when looking at the domestic/international angle. For example, Thomas (2012: 16) argues that "Islamist violent extremism is viewed as 'International'" whilst "right-wing violent extremism, or similar activity by animal liberationists or anti-globalisation and anti-capitalism" are seen as domestic.

[103] However, it was 'internal' Islamic motivated extremism as the perpetrators had been British-born and had been influenced from abroad.

surveillance of those which were considered a potential threat to national security. Additionally, it will examine UK counter-terrorism measures and initiatives and show that 'animal rights extremists' were institutionally securitised despite not having been officially defined as terrorists. The chapter ends with an overview of counter-terrorism measures directed at the threat of extremism, showing that 'Islamic Extremism' superseded 'domestic extremism' after the 7/7 attacks.

3.2. The struggle for a definition of domestic extremism

In order to understand and contextualise the institutionalised securitisation of extremism, one needs to begin by looking at the relevant definitions. Whereas a legal definition of terrorism exists, it does not exist in the case of 'domestic extremism' nor of 'extremism' (Monaghan, 2013: 943). Whilst the threat of extremism was originally situated in questions of domestic security stemming from 'radical protest groups', it has since become an 'umbrella term' which is "inherently difficult to define operationally" (O'Donnell, 2015: 114).

In his report on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly in the United Kingdom, UN Special Rapporteur Maina Kiai (2013: 7-8) pointed out that the broad definition of 'domestic extremism' is an area of concern as it leads to the conflation of peaceful protesters with "real extremists". Previously, the case of John Catt, a pensioner who found out that he was classified as a 'domestic extremist' by the police, despite not having a criminal record nor having shown any indications of being anything other than a peaceful protester, had gathered public attention (BBC News, 2013). Catt went on to bring his case to the European Court of Human Rights, which criticised the "the loosely defined notion of 'domestic extremism'" in its ruling (The Times, 2019: 51).

Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) pointed out the uniqueness of 'domestic extremism', which, although not legally defined, can be seen alongside "many colloquial terms in policing (such as domestic abuse and organised crime) which assist with identifying the nature of the work, but have no legal definitions"

(HMIC, 2012: 29)[104]. It further recommended that the "ACPO[105] and the Home Office should agree on a definition of domestic extremism that reflects the severity of crimes that might warrant this title" (HMIC, 2012: 12). In 2013, it went on to raise the critisism that there had not been any progress made regarding a new definition (HMIC, 2013: 12).

According to former Chief Constable of the Thames Valley Police, Mr Peter Neyroud (2014 in O'Donnell, 2015: 109), the term 'domestic extremism' has stuck since its adoption and "has subsequently been used to embrace a much wider group of potential harms". There are several things that come to mind when looking at the 2006 definition of 'domestic extremism' by the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO):

> Domestic extremism and extremists are the terms used for activity, individuals or campaign groups that carry out criminal acts of direct action in furtherance of what is typically a single issue campaign. They usually seek to prevent something from happening or to change legislation or domestic policy, but attempt to do so *outside of the normal democratic process*.
>
> (ACPO, 2006 in HMIC, 2012: 11) [emphasis added].

For one, it does not appear to be a strict definition as such, given its grouping of object and subject ('domestic extremism' and 'extremists'). It also seems fuzzy and indecisive. For example, how is the activity of 'domestic extremism' distinct from 'criminal activity' as such, and is anything that is not lawful automatically 'extremist' when it is associated with a single cause? Whilst many see this definition as too broad (see Kiai, 2013, 2017), it can also be considered one-sided or emotive (Mills, 2013: 33). For example, Woodman (2018b: 6) highlights that the ambiguous 'normal democratic process' stands for 'parliamentary democracy' which then "inhibits the self-organisation of those outside the ruling class, at least when it has any political direction". He points out that with this definition, strike action and protests by unions would be considered 'domestic extremism', because strike actions are limited to 'action over pay and conditions' by legislation and

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[104] They also claim that the "(T)he term „domestic extremism" was coined at some point shortly after 2001" (HMIC, 2012: 29). Although this was technically the case, the issue of (political) extremism had been policed long before under the banner of counter subversion, which, according to Woodman (2018a: 3) has been "rebranded in the twenty-first century as 'domestic extremism' policing".

[105] Association of Chief Police Officers.

exclude "trade unionists who embrace wider political strikes" (Woodman, 2018b: 6).

Similarly, Joyce (2016: 37) argues that this loose definition led to the application of 'domestic extremism' to "a wide range of peaceful and lawful activities". This view is echoed by Kiai (2013:8) who states that this police definition "encompasses everybody who protests". He therefore recommends that British authorities aim for "a tighter definition of "domestic extremism" and instruct police officers that peaceful protestors should not be categorized as domestic extremists" (Kiai, 2013: 21). However, despite being criticised, the definition was still used by the National Domestic Extremism Unit (NDEU) as its 'working definition' in 2013[106] (HMIC, 2013: 25) and it is not too dissimilar to the 2019 definition employed by the Metropolitan Police Service[107].

Internal concerns about the difficulties associated with defining extremism, and the danger of the label being applied to peaceful protest can be seen in '*A review of national police units which provide intelligence on criminality associated with protest*' by the Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC, 2012: 11). In this document, it was concluded that "the term „domestic extremism" should be limited to threats of harm from serious crime and serious disruption to the life of the community arising from criminal activity". Another suggestion of the review was "to adopt the definition of extremism in the Government's PREVENT strategy for counter terrorism" (HMIC, 2012: 11). Nevertheless, the Prevent II definition was aimed at Islamic motivated acts or terrorism and by extension 'Islamic Extremism' (see also next chapter 4 and 5) and it should be noted that the term 'domestic extremism' is not mentioned in the Prevent Strategy I, II, and II. This becomes apparent when reading Prevent II which defines extremism as:

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[106] The "expansive definition" had also been used by the undercover policing units under the ACPO from 2006 to 2011 (O'Donnell, 2015: 109).

[107] Which reads: "Domestic extremism mainly refers to individuals or groups that carry out criminal acts of direct action in pursuit of a campaign. They usually aim to prevent something from happening or to change legislation or domestic policy, but try to do so outside of the normal democratic process" (MPS, 2019: 1).

> "…vocal or active opposition to fundamental British values, including democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs. We also include in our definition of extremism calls for the death of members of our armed forces, whether in this country or overseas"

(Home Office, 2011b: 107).

Its definition clearly aims at Islamic extremism, given its indirect linking of the concept of extremism to terrorism by evoking the danger to troops. Lowe (2017a: 919) highlights that despite not being a legal definition, the definition of extremism in Prevent II has been used by UK courts to determine "if a person's behaviour is extremist". The definition seems vague, and the report fails to give any concrete examples of what British values entail. This issue of lack of definition "clearly contravenes the principle of maximum certainty, which requires laws to be sufficiently precise to permit the public to make decisions and to conduct themselves in accordance with the law" (Zedner, 2021: 3-4). It also makes it almost legally impossible to determine if someone or something is extremist[108]. The notion of not being able to define extremism legally extends to policing, as Lubbers (2019: 233-234) points out: "(t)he use of the label with or without definition has led to forms of political policing and a way to treat protest as a form of cri me".

In a '*Question and Answer Session with the Deputy Mayor for Policing and Crime, the Commissioner for the Metropolitan Police and the Assistant Commissioner for the Metropolitan Police*' on the 27th of June 2013, Sir Bernard Hogan-Howe, then Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police Service admitted, upon being confronted about the fuzzy definition of 'domestic extremism' by Jenny Jones that:

> "There has been a problem of definition I do not think by the Metropolitan Police Service but I think by the Home Office. It is really difficult to be absolutely clear about it. The HMIC identified there was a problem but did not identify a solution and it a real difficulty. You are right. It should be clearer"

(Police and Crime Committee, 2013: 38).

Greany (2013: 1) points out that in October 2013, the decision to change the definition of domestic extremism was made by the then Head of National Counter Terrorism Functions" and implemented in November 2013. However, the Commissioner at the London Mayor's Office for Policing and Crime (MOPAC)

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[108] See for example Burinov et al (2018) about the difficulties of incorporating counter-extremism into a legal framework.

offered another working definition in the same year (again not a legal definition), stating that:

> "Domestic Extremism relates to the activity of groups or individuals who commit or plan serious criminal activity motivated by a political or ideological viewpoint"
>
> (MPS, 2013).

The same definition was later also adopted by the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS, 2014). As of March 2021, Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire and Rescue Services (HMICFRS[109]) seems to have dropped the use of the term 'domestic extremism', replacing it with 'aggravated activism'(Siddique, 2021).

This might be a result of tensions regarding the difficulty of defining the term, but it is likely also the result of tensions related to distinguishing the concept further from the government's treatment of other forms of extremism. For example, Prevent II first mentioned the threat of 'right-wing extremism' in 2011 (Home Office, 2011: 4). Making MI5 responsible for "Right Wing Terrorism (RWT) and Left, Anarchist and Single-Issue Terrorism (LASIT) in April 2020" (MI5 Security Service, 2020), the issue was moving away from domestic policing. However, even though the Security Services are responsible for 'Domestic Extremism', the police still holds a strong stance in the policing of extremism and the MPS is "currently reviewing its terminology", whilst also trying to move away from using the term (Sadiq Khan, 2019)[110].

It should also be noted that the Government defined 'domestic extremism' differently in other cases, as seen in the Multi-agency public protection arrangements (MAPPA), which is a statutory guidance for police, prison service and probation trusts "for managing sexual and violent offenders" (HM Government, 2007: 8). In the guidance, it stated that

> "The term "Domestic Extremism" applies to unlawful action that is part of a protest or campaign. It is often associated with "single issue" protests, such as Animal Rights, Far Right and Far Left political extremism, anti-war, anti-globalisation and anti-GM (genetically modified) crops"
>
> (HM Government, 2007: 73).

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[109] Previously HMIC up until 2017.

[110] It should also be remembered that there is a long history of "Security Service/police cooperation in uncovering, disrupting and then arresting suspects" in counter-terrorism (Omand, 2010: 100), which would extend to counter-extremism work.

It can be observed that this definition is very different from the definition presented in Prevent II, in particular with regards to not mentioning religious extremism and focusing instead on more political grounds (left- and right-wing groups for example). It is possible that this was done in order to position the issue within the realm of policing. Schlembach (2018: 500), who extensively researched the police surveillance of 'domestic extremists' in Britain, highlights how the missing legal definition in official guidelines (none in police nor other government institutions) led protesters, be it animal or environmental activists, to be labelled domestic extremists and subsequently made subject to the associated treatment.

One has to keep in mind that the convolution of 'domestic extremism' with 'potential terrorism' raises an "ethical question about the state's view of the scope of legitimate political activism" (McKim, 2013: 261). One can therefore argue that the application of the label 'domestic extremist' by police is "a means of shaping the public's perception of social movements, and of controlling demonstrations" (Harbisher, 2019: 60). Instead, it becomes a 'catch-all term' and without "legal basis or agreed definition, the phrase could be applied to anyone police wanted to keep an eye on" (Evans & Lewis, 2013: 179). This notion is echoed by Woodman (2018b: 7) who calls this open-ended application "a way of delegitimising any substantial dissent, parcelling off those who desire change from the non- subversive population, rendering the subversives fair game for state repression". For example, peaceful anti-fracking protesters have been grouped under the term 'domestic extremists' rather than 'activists' and have been policed accordingly (Jackson et al, 2019: 29). The debate of how 'domestic extremism' is defined and dealt with is an ongoing one. Extinction Rebellion (XR) and Black Lives Matter (BLM) protests have prompted a review of policing protests as recently as 2021 (Siddique, 2021).

3.3. The policing of 'domestic extremism'

As shown above, the concept of 'domestic extremism' "has been expanded in practice and incorporated in police debates, even though it lacks a clear definition" (Dencik et al, 2015: 8). Harbisher (2015: 478) believes that domestic extremists have been on the government's counterterrorism agenda since 2004. However, this is not the case as they were internally addressed long before. In fact, "surveillance, infiltration, and criminalisation" had long been established when it came to domestic extremist groups (Kundnani & Hayes, 2018: 6), with many being

"targeted by undercover policing units" (Lubbers, 2019: 233-234). Schlembach (2018: 491) sums this up well when he writes that "[t]he spectre of environmental 'domestic extremism' has long been postulated by police leaders and security analysts in Britain".

It is not just environmental or animal rights activism which was being managed within the security sphere but 'extremists', which have been securitised to some extent or another since the 1960's[111], having been treated the same way as 'terrorists' in many cases. For example, the Undercover Policing Inquiry (UCPI) published the 1968 paper by Special Branch Chief Inspector Conrad Dixon titled *'Penetration of Extremist Groups',* which outlines the basic principles for the infiltration of "extremist organisations", in this case from the left-wing spectrum (Dixon, 1969: 1). Similarly, then Chief Constable of Derbyshire Police Mick Creedon, who had been tasked with leading Operation Herne[112], found that the Special Demonstrations Squad (SDS) "did attempt to obtain intelligence in relation to 'black racial disorder' and 'black extremist politics' as early as 1969" (Creedon, 2014b: 73). It appears that the UK government, when referring to 'extremism' prior to the 7/7 attacks, almost always used the term to "refer to a range of extra-parliamentary political groups and movements[113]" (Kundnani & Hayes, 2018: 6). It can be seen as a form of extension of the UK governments' dealings with subversives[114], which had been a key concern during the Cold War but has since been readopted as 'counter-extremism', in particular in association with the countering of Islamic terrorism (McKay & Walker, 2017: 1861).

In a way, the policing of domestic extremism can be considered a rebranding of 'counter-subversion' work (Woodman, 2018a: 3). This policing of dissent was

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[111] Arguably even earlier then that as reported by Brinson & Dove (2014: 11) who state that MI5 had started to "compile numerous 'personal files' on known and suspected Communists, as well as other 'political extremists'" during the 1920s.

[112] Operation Herne had been initiated by the MPS after The Guardian had revealed that undercover police officers of the SDS had used the identities of deceased children to infiltrate various protest movements such as animal rights groups (Kelly & Slapper, 2020).

[113] Such as "animal rights activism, radical environmentalism, the peace movement, anti-fascism, Black nationalism, Irish nationalism, anarchism, communism, Trotskyism, neo-Nazism, and Islamic political movements" (Kundnani & Hayes, 2018: 6).

[114] The Home Office defined subversion as "[s]ubversive activities are those which threaten the safety or well being of the State, and which are intended to undermine or violent mean" (Home Office, 1984: 4). It has been claimed that counter-subversion work had ceased to be one of the MI5's main priorities with the end of the Miner's Strikes in 1985 (see Andrew, 2021), but it appears that this work has since been redelegated to the Police through Special Branch Units (Milne, 2014: 18).

often undertaken via 'undercover units' and should be regarded as 'political policing' (Woodman, 2018a: 2). The threat of 'domestic extremists' was further institutionalised by the establishment of the National Coordinator for Domestic Extremism (NCDE) in 2004, which was in charge of overseeing "the work of key public order policing units" under the ACPO (Gilmore, 2010: 23). Whilst employing over 100 police personnel and having an annual budget amassing approximately £9 Million, the ACPO refused to give details about the workings of the NCDE, including details of its staff "or the location of the subsidiary units" citing the need for 'secrecy' (Gilmore, 2010: 23). This shows a similarity to the Black Programs referred to by Buzan et al (1998: 27), as the NCDE can operate in secrecy without having to justify their spending or operations on the grounds of keeping the nation safe. Hence, in the name of security, the policing of 'domestic extremism' outside political norms is further testament to the institutionalised securitisation of extremism.

The following sections are going to explore the notion of infiltrating extremists groups via police operations in order to show the institutionalised securitisation of extremism in more detail based on the cases of the Special Demonstrations Squad (SDS) and the National Public Order Intelligence Unit (NPOIU).

3.3.1. Special Demonstrations Squad/Special Duties Squad (SDS)
The Metropolitan Police Special Branch (MPSB)[115] had "first applied in 1887 to a section with national responsibility for covering extremists, Irish and others" (Blakely, 2003: 9) and has since been covering the "intelligence side of policing" (Weeks, 2013: 193). Whilst Security Services had the lead in the overall intelligence efforts of threat assessment regarding UK national security[116] (Omand, 2010: 100), they became "less interested in domestic political threats" by the beginning of the 1990s (Evans & Lewis, 2013: 130). This was seen as an opportunity by many in command of the SDS, who saw it as a chance to "occupy the ground the security services were vacating" (Evans & Lewis, 2013: 131).

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[115] It then developed a "key relationship with MI5" around World War One when it "focused on foreign anarchists and German espionage" (Blakely, 2003: 9).

[116] Special Branches historically closely work together with the Security Services, assisting "by collecting information that could support national security intelligence work" (Rimington, 1994 in Bonino, 2018: 55).

The "Special Operations Squad (SOS)[117] had been formed in 1968 by the MPS Special Branch in response to mass Anti-Vietnam War demonstrations in Grosvenor Square, London" and "was renamed Special Demonstration Squad (SDS) between November 1972 and January 1973" (Creedon, 2014a: 8). According to an internal memorandum, the "SDS was set up initially to produce intelligence by way of penetration by undercover Special Branch officers at a time when ultra-extremist left-wing activity on the streets of London was at a peak" (MPS, 1976: 1). By 1974, the SDS had penetrated Pro-Irish Organisations, Trotskyists, Anarchist/Alternative Society Groups (such as the Claimants Union), Maoists, 'Stop all Racialist Tours' but also, "to a lesser degree" Squatters and 'Big Flame'[118] (Kneale, 1974: 1).[119] The gathering of "(i)ntelligence on individuals and organisations in the extremist groupings is the valuable by-product" of the SDS work regarding its public order surveillance, according to internal memos by the MPS (MPS, 1975: 6) which encouraged the SDS' undercover policing.

The Special Demonstrations Squad was later renamed the Special Duties Section "to reflect the unit's widening remit to include domestic extremism" in 1997 (Creedon, 2014b: 17) and was disbanded in 2008 after having "infiltrated supposedly subversive protest groups" for over 40 years (Hamilton, 2014: 7). From 1969 to 1989, there was a significant growth in funding by the Home Office to the SDS (Taylor, 2015: 21), showing that its operation and running was given a significant importance. Paul Lewis (in Home Affairs Committee, 2013: Ev 17) stated that:

> "The Special Demonstration Squad, kind of existed like a unit within a unit. It was hidden away in Special Branch. Even some senior officers were unaware of its existence. I think when that happens and you do not have the level of accountability that you do for other areas of policing, then it is more likely for things to go awry".
>
> (Lewis, in Home Affairs Committee, 2013: Ev 17).

This highlights several things which show an institutionalised securitisation of the issue of extremism. For one, there is a level of secrecy which keeps the undertakings of extremism policing hidden from not only the public but also other governmental

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[117] Originally, the SOS "was to gather intelligence on demonstrations by left-wing extremists and identify the organisers and participants promoting disorder or violence" (Creedon, 2014b: 17).

[118] A revolutionary socialist feminist organisation (see Cornell & Tudor, 2020).

[119] Other groups were also penetrated but have been 'censored' in the official documentation.

institutions. Given there is less accountability, there is more room to act outside the usual boundaries of policing. The lack of accountability and oversight can be explained with the establishment of an internal state of urgency. In general, there is always less accountability in undercover policing due to its secretive and less formal nature (Mac Giollabhuí et al, 2016: 631). However, in the SDS, this seems to have been more severe given its flexible chain of command and its separation from other police units.

Creedon (2013: 5) highlights that on "the insistence of the Home Office, the squad[120] was to be maintained with the strictest secrecy, so as not to compromise the Government or its sensitive operations". The sphere of secrecy was dominant and "very few people outside of the MPS Special Branch knew of it" until its later years (Creedon, 2013: 5). Even at the Home Office itself, there seems to have been little awareness of activities by the SDS (Taylor, 2015: 19). It enabled the SDS officers to operate "with reduced formality" because there was an emphasis on "the importance of low visibility, informality and secrecy" (Innes & Thiel, 2008: 559). Without having to justify their undertakings (which were aided by the institutionalisation of threat prevention) the threat of extremism allowed the policing unit to go beyond 'normal policing'.

Whilst the Unit's initial purpose was to gather intelligence "on individuals who were seen to be attempting to subvert the state" (Creedon, 2015: 5), its later focus shifted towards the policing of what were considered extremists. This move can be observed since the late 1960s when the Unit "expanded its remit beyond reporting upon left wing extremism to include the far right, Irish terrorist groups and any groups that were intent on committing serious pubic disorder" (Creedon, 2013: 4). Whilst the "C" Squad of the Metropolitan Police Special Branch (MPSB) was responsible for the policing of "domestic extremism" the responsibility of the "S" Squad (the SDS) lay in covert operations, including the surveillance of extremists (Bonino, 2018: 56-57). In its 'Statement of Purpose', the SDS stated that:

> "The primary object is to provide information in relation to public order problems: the secondary by-product is that our knowledge of *extremist organisations* and individuals active in them is considerably enhanced" [emphasis added]

> (SDS, 1968 in Creedon, 2014a: 8).

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[120] SDS.

The above quote highlights how 'extremist organisations', and by association 'extremist individuals', were framed as threats to public order. It also highlights that the SDS was responsible for policing what was considered to be extremist elements. This stance towards extremism did not shift much in the 1990s. This is evidenced by the SDS' statement of purpose in its 1996/7 Annual Report, in which it mentions that one of its objectives is "to supply information about the intentions of *militant political extremists* in relation to public order events" (Creedon, 2015: 7) [emphasis added] as well as "to provide intelligence on the criminal activities of individuals or groups involved in support of terrorism and animal rights extremism" (Creedon, 2015: 8). The 'issue' of domestic extremism gained importance with regards to the Special Branch's not having to focus as much on countering IRA operations anymore in the late 1990s. It was particularly refocused onto the then recent intensification of aggressive stances among animal rights groups (e.g. via bomb attacks and intimidation) (Dencik et al, 2018: 1437). It was also around this time that the SDS shifted its focus from public disorder and protest to "include long-term activities of gathering intelligence on individuals" (Bonino, 2018: 57). This move manifested in its renaming to the "Special Duties Section to reflect the unit's widening remit to include domestic extremism" in 1997 (Creedon, 2014b: 17).

Additionally, according to Operation Herne reporting, the SDS deployed officers "into extreme activist groups either involved in serious violence or assessed by the MPS Special Branch as having the potential to become involved in such activity"(Creedon, 2014a: 25). This shows a clear pre-crime intervention stage, something which was later to be adapted in the UK government's strategy to combat 'Islamic extremism' as the source of terrorism in the 2000s.

3.3.2. National Public Order Intelligence Unit (NPOIU)

According to Evans & Lewis (2013: 177), there "was an unprecedented increase in the undercover infiltration of political activists" at the beginning of the century under the New Labour government which had come into power under Tony Blair in 1997. The National Public Order Intelligence Unit (NPOIU) was created in 1999 and aimed "to reduce criminality and disorder from domestic extremism and to support forces managing strategic public order issues" (HMIC, 2012: 5). In its founding years, it maintained strong connections with the SDS, with staff members

moving "between the SDS and the NPOIU" (Dawson & Brown, 2020: 14). According to the Undercover Policing Inquiry (2018: 17), its "role was to manage all intelligence considered to relate to domestic extremism, and included carrying out undercover policing operations". It was subsumed with other units under the National Domestic Extremism Unit (NDEU) within the Metropolitan Police Service (HMIC, 2012: 5), which was incorporated into the National Domestic Extremism and Disorder Intelligence Unit in 2013 (Joyce, 2016: 37-28).

Schlembach (2016: 62) claims that the NPOIU "was centrally involved in gathering intelligence for the purposes of informing public order policing in Scotland, as well as internationally in countries such as Germany, Iceland, Italy, France and Spain". Hence, it did not focus on domestic extremism in the London Metropolitan area alone. Up until 2006, the NPOIU was part of the MPS, at which point it was moved "to be under the control of the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO- the predecessor body to the National Police Chiefs Council)" (Dawson & Brown, 2020: 14). In 2010, the "NPOIU was merged with National Extremism Tactical Coordination Unit (NETCU) and National Domestic Extremism Team (NDET)[121] to form the National Domestic Extremism Unit (NDEU)" (Creedon, 2013: 6) under the MPS. This move away from the ACPO had been prompted by "concerns from HM Inspectorate of Constabulary and ACPO itself about weak governance and oversight" (Home Affairs Committee, 2013: 3).

Before that, the NPOIU was the contact point for when "there is a substantial threat to public order, which arise from political extremism or protest activity" (APCO, 2001: 49 in Pike, 2005: 53). The phrasing highlights that 'political extremism or protest activity' are grouped together with criminality and framed as 'substantial threats' to the Referent Object of 'public order'. However, how APCO defined 'political extremism' is unclear and its application of 'domestic extremism' has been problematic (as discussed previously). When the NPOIU was "located within the MPS, it was funded by the Home Office to reduce criminality and disorder from domestic extremism and to support forces managing strategic public order issues" (Creedon, 2015: 8). Even before this, it had been partially funded by the Home Office, going back to its formation in 1999 (Evans & Lewis, 2013: 180).

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[121] Which had been "formed in 2005 to co-ordinate investigations conducted by forces across the country"(Evans & Lewis, 2013: 180).

As an undercover unit, the NPOIU worked in "total secrecy" in its early stages (MPS, 2016: 8) and remained a "secret and isolated unit" when it took over the work of ARNI (MPS, 2016: 10). It was then co-located with the Animal Rights National Index (ARNI) (ACPO, 1999a:2) which was subsequently expanded to "include all forms of domestic extremism, criminality and public disorder associated with cause-led groups" (Evans et al, 2009: 6). ARNI had been formed in 1986 with "the intention of managing information and intelligence associated to animal rights activism" (MPS, 2016: 7) and was also run under the MPSB (Swallow, 1998: 123). The absorption of ANRI by NPIOU can therefore be seen as another sign of the securitised institutionalisation of extremism which had now internally been expanded under the police. According to Woodman (2018a: 24) this unit can be considered "a manifestation of this ACPO-led attempt to develop national and regional cross-force intelligence sharing to combat demonstrations, strikes and mass public disorder, a system which was integrated into the wider political policing apparatus".

As pointed out in a review on the activity of the NPOIU by Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC), it was concluded that there was "insufficient detail to provide assurance that the intelligence requirement could not have been fulfilled through less intrusive means (i.e. that the use of an undercover officer was necessary)" (HMIC, 2012: 7). The fact that the NPOIU undertook covert policing of what they considered to be a threat to national security in so many cases shows how institutionally securitised the threat of 'domestic extremists' really was. Furthermore, suspects later became known not having actually been criminals. One can assume that the use of the 'watch word' extremism reveals itself in what Buzan & Wæver (2009: 267) call the "elaborate arguments about the securityness of the specific case", indicating institutionalised securitisation.

3.3.3. The threat of 'animal rights extremism'
When exploring the institutionalised securitisation of extremism, the way in which 'animal rights extremism' has been dealt with stands out. Animal rights activism has for a long time been grouped under 'domestic extremism', despite it being ill defined and despite the fact that the "use of the word 'extremism' [has become] too

synonymous with that of terrorism[122]" (Mills, 2013: 31-32). The institutionalised securitisation of animal rights extremism can be seen in the formation of the Animal Rights National Index (ARNI) in 1986, which had "the intention of managing information and intelligence associated to animal rights activism" (MPS, 2016b: 7). This is also shown in the SDS' undertaking of undercover missions aimed at the "extremist wing of the animal rights movement" and consisting in the infiltration of the Animal Liberation Front from 1984 onwards (MPS, 1994: 5). ARNI was run under the MPSB (Swallow, 1998: 123) and was "responsible for the collection, evaluation and dissemination of intelligence related to animal rights terrorism" (Williams, 2005: 34). Before being merged with the NPOIU in 1998, it was "running over 100 informers on an annual budget of £140,000" (Woodman, 2018a: 22). The fact that "animal rights surveillance took the lion's share of resources" (Evans & Lewis, 2013: 179) in the NPOIU shows how institutionally securitised the threat of 'animal rights extremists' really was, given the emphasis of it over other forms of 'domestic extremism'.

The Government had aimed at legislating against 'animal rights extremists' before, for example when the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act of 1994 (CJPOA 1994) introduced the offence of 'aggravated trespass'. This offence made it illegal to "trespass on land where there is an intention to intimidate, obstruct or disrupt persons engaging in a 'lawful activity'" and was "aimed specifically at animal rights protesters" [123] (Gilmore, 2019: 618). The 1994 Public Order Guidelines for Special Branch cited in Blakey (2003: 71) is therefore not surprising:

> "Animal Rights – Special Branches are expected to 'gather intelligence on animal rights extremist activity and seek to prevent attacks on persons and property targeted by such extremists'"

As part of a nation-wide reaction to fight the threat of animal rights extremism under the Labour Government, efforts to surveil animal rights activists were increased in the 1990s and early 2000s with at least eight known undercover police officers[124]

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[122] Martini & Njoku (2017: 77) highlight that by the 1980s, "the term terrorism started being used to describe all kinds of illegitimate political violence, and arrived to include left-wing political extremist groups".

[123] Gilmore (2019: 618) also points out that "the aggravated trespass powers have since been used in response to a wide range of 'direct action' protests, including environmentalist, anti-war, and anti-austerity protests".

[124] Given the undertakings of the Undercover Policing Inquiry (UCPI), the known numbers will probably be increasing.

having been tasked to undertake covert work (Woodman, 2018a: 22). One has to keep in mind here, that animal rights activists were considered 'domestic extremists' and it is therefore no wonder that when the National Public Order Intelligence Unit (NPOIU) started out, it was co-located with ANRI (ACPO 1999a:2) and the database[125] was expanded to "include all forms of domestic extremism, criminality and public disorder associated with cause-led groups" in 1999 (Evans et al, 2009: 6). This central database was run by the NPOIU and contained "details of persons identified as domestic extremists" (Joyce, 2016: 336). These accounts contained anything from "names, pseudonyms, photographs and dates of birth (…) as well as information about telephone calls and email activity" (Evans & Lewis, 2013: 181). Further, the database paid attention "to any political activity: attendance at demonstrations and meetings, political pamphlets, comments on blogposts" (Evans & Lewis, 2013: 181). It is also troubling from a human rights perspective "when people do not know whether their names are on these databases, what information is contained on them, for how long and in what way the information is used, tension and mistrust are likely to be exacerbated" (Kiai, 2013: 7).

For example, Green Party peer Baroness Jenny Jones found out that she had been under observation and in the Domestic Extremist Database for more than ten years in 2014 (BBC News, 2014). She had never been previously arrested and had been assured by the National Coordinator for Domestic Extremism (NCDE) in 2009 that "political parties, politicians, journalists or trade unions" would not be monitored by the NDEDIU[126] (Jones, 2015: 8). However, other Green Party politicians such as MP Caroline Lucas or Mayor of London candidate Sian Berry found themselves subject to surveillance and the collection of personal data (Mead, 2018: 260). One has to remember here that one feature of institutionalised securitisation is that it

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[125] It was later to be managed by the National Domestic & Disorder Intelligence Unit (NDEDIU) (Apple, 2019: 198) and the National Counter Terrorism Policing Operations Centre (NCTPOC) (MPS, 2016a). The now renamed 'Domestic Extremist Database' (also internally known as 'Fairway') is split into two teams: "one for protest and disorder and the other for domestic extremism" (Mattson, 2014: 28). There is a lot of secrecy going on when it comes to counter extremism units which are not transparent at all, nor do they explain criteria for people being put on their database.

[126] According to Mayor of London Sadiq Khan there were "2690 nominals on the National Special Branch Intelligence System (NSBIS) database used by National Counter Terrorism Policing Operations Centre (NCTPOC), formerly the National Domestic Extremism and Disorder Intelligence Unit (NDEDIU)" (Khan, 2017).

excludes the general public "from the securitizing process" (Roe, 2008: 632). The level of secrecy preventing open debate therefore shows how institutionally securitised the issue of animal rights extremism was and how ingrained the policing of dissent was internally in the police services.

The extraordinariness of the database is evidenced in its storage of data regarding people who have never been criminals and who have shown no sign of criminality. As pointed out by Woodman (2018b: 6) "a large proportion of those on the domestic extremism database have no criminal record", which is a further indicator for the police applying the label of 'domestic extremist' loosely and not as they previously claimed to refer to "criminal minority or groups intent on carrying out 'criminal acts of direct action". Whilst one can argue that the police has "a legitimate duty to ensure that anarchy and violence are not part of protests", this should not include peaceful protesters (Kiai, 2013: 7).

The policing of animal rights extremism did not stop there. According to Dencik et al (2018: 1437), the 'National Crime Squad' set up a new unit to deal with 'Animal Rights Extremism' in 2001 which was to incorporate other forms of 'domestic extremism' from 2004 when the National Extremism Tactical Co-Coordination Unit was funded (Evans et al, 2004: 1). Located in Cambridgeshire, it "was tasked with giving security advice to hundreds of companies in aviation, energy, research and retail who were the targets of protest" (Evans & Lewis, 2013: 180). The NETCU had been set up by the Home Office due to lobbying pressure by the pharmaceutical industry who were worried about the "extreme criminal behaviour of some people within the animal rights movement" (Pearl, n.d. in Evans & Lewis, 2013: 180). Whilst the Unit originally aimed to focus on the threat of animal rights extremism, it did end up advising companies targeted by other forms of protest (Evans & Lewis, 2013: 180). Here one can argue that the Home Office was acting as an extension of industry interests, further 'criminalising' what can often be considered legitimate protest.

The Terrorism Act of 2000 also provided a legal footing for dealing with 'animal rights extremists', placing animal rights activists "firmly within the framework of anti-terrorism law" (Williams, 2005: 35). Under the 2000 Act, the restrictions of differentiating international and domestic terrorism had been lifted, so that counter-terrorism measures were made to be applicable to all forms of terrorism: "Irish,

International, and domestic" (Alexander & Brenner, 2003: 88). The definition of terrorism was broadened and now included 'serious damage to property' (which could also be seen as extending to the activities of animal rights activists). Its general interpretation of terrorism was also open to apply to many political or ideological groups[127]. As pointed out by Ian Cuthbertson (2007: 53) with this definition, the "British government abrogated for itself the sole prerogative to decide how political groups could, or could not, advance their political views". Hence, any form of dissent, including what had been framed as animal rights extremism could now be easily considered terrorism. Whilst the TA 2000 did not attempt to proscribe any other forms of domestic terrorist groups (excluding Irish ones), "animal rights and environmental militants" were still considered to possess "the sophistication, threat to persons, or overall strength to warrant suppression" (Walker, 2011: 344).

According to Demirsu (2017: 137), this "broad definition is tailored for securitizing acts, allowing the criminalization of legitimate demonstrations and unlawful protests which pertain to issues of public order, but not terrorism per se". Hence there are concerns that political protests might be persecuted if they do not conform with government norms (Syrett, 2015: 169). According to Ryan (2019: 18), the TA 2000 definition of 'terrorism' would later have ramifications for the government's counter-extremism measures. The government seems to have been aware of this, adding that "some of the activities of animal rights extremists are often considered to be acts of terrorism" and pointing out that the Terrorism Act covers "all forms of terrorism, including serious violent acts carried out by animal rights extremists, by widening the definition of terrorism" (Home Office, 2004a: 10)[128].

In 2004, it was claimed that the issue of 'animal rights extremism' "posed one of the most serious threats to Britain's economy at that time because of the increasing

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[127] The full definition reads: 1.- (1) In this Act "terrorism" means the use or threat of action where- (a) the action falls within subsection (2), (b) the use or threat is designed to influence the government or to intimidate the public or a section of the public, and (c) the use or threat is made for the purpose of advancing a political, religious or ideological cause. (2) Action falls within this subsection if it- (a) involves serious violence against a person, (b) involves serious damage to property, (c) endangers a person's life, other than that of the person committing the action, (d) creates a serious risk to the health or safety of the public or a section of the public, or of the public, or (e) is designed seriously to interfere with or seriously to disrupt an electronic system (Section 1 Terrorism Act 2000).

[128] However, Mills (2013: 41) has argued that there "has been a clear steer from government and senior police leaders that in reducing animal rights extremism, the Terrorism Act 2000 should be avoided and instead normal statute law be adopted to impact upon the problem".

intimidation of companies linked to animal experiments" (Evans, 2004 in Ellefsen, 2021: 90). As a result of a "campaign of harassment and intimidation towards [the] employees and associated service providers" of pharmaceutical companies, lobby groups had demanded that the government step up its reaction against such forms of activism. By threatening the withdrawal of business from the United Kingdom, they were able to amount pressure on the government, which ended up adopting "a 'robust' response by directing the police to impact upon the problem" (Mills, 2013: 31). Even before that, the Home Office had already addressed 'animal rights extremists' as another area of police work in *'The National Policing Plan 2004 – 2007'*, highlighting its institutionalisation[129]. The policing of 'animal rights extremists' was also addressed in the *'Policing Performance Assessment Framework'* (Home Office, 2003: 21ff). Here it is striking to observe the concessions made to the police in terms of their management of "animal rights activists[130]" in the statement: "It is important that the police make full use of the powers and offences at their disposal to protect those individuals, families and businesses who are targeted in this way" (Home Office, 2003: 13).

This is in stark contrast to the '*National Policing Plan 2005-08: Safer, Stronger Communities'*, published in 2004, which states that "domestic extremism, including animal rights extremism" are a criminal threat to the United Kingdom (Home Office, 2004b: 3). Further, it called for a "consistent approach across the UK to respond to incidents committed by extremists (both international and domestic) under the section of Counter-terrorism" (Home Office, 2004b: 3). It appears here that 'animal rights extremists' were singled out and dealt with differently than the extremists later linked to religion and terrorism. In the 2004 paper '*Animal Welfare – Human Rights: protecting people from animal rights extremists'*[131], the Government's strategy for countering animal rights extremism continued to frame

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[129] It is interesting to note that '*The National Policing Plan 2003-2006*' published in 2002 does not mention animal rights extremists nor any other form of extremism. It also does not prioritise counter-terrorism measures, grouping them under 'other policing responsibilities' (Home Office, 2002a: 17) which indicates that the issue gathered importance from 2003 onwards.

[130] "(…) to attempt to stop individuals and companies going about their legitimate business through harassment and intimidation" (Home Office, 2003: 13).

[131] The strategy most likely came after pharmaceutical companies had threatened to withdraw investments to the United Kingdom if the Government would not take a stricter stance on 'animal rights extremists' (see Evans et al, 2004). It also followed prolific cases, such as the taking of a grandmother's body from her grave in 2004 by animal rights activists who campaigned against a farmer who bred guinea pigs for research (BBC News, 2006a).

animal rights extremists as a threat (Home Office, 2004a: 3) and positioned them within the purview of policing.

The UK Government's strategy[132] also stated that "Extremist behaviour is despicable and will not be tolerated" (Home Office, 2004a: 3). It went on to say in 2004 that:

> "a tiny group of extremists are using illegal and violent methods to try to stop animal experiments. They are not trying to change the law but to frighten individuals, their families and friends, institutions and companies. Their campaigns of intimidation, harassment and violence against individuals and law-abiding businesses are totally unacceptable"

<div align="right">(Home Office, 2004a: 3).</div>

However, in the *Counter-terrorism Policy and Human Rights: Terrorism Bill and Related Matters Report by the Joint Committee on Human Rights* (2005), there seem to be considerable concerns about the grouping of 'animal welfare supporters' into the same category as extremists (see for example, page 12 and page 102,). Still, the Ministerial Committee on Animal Rights Activists was renamed the Ministerial Committee on Animal Rights Extremism by Tony Blair in June 2006 (Blair in HC Deb Vol 448 Written Statement, 29 June 2006), a securitising move based on the institutionalisation of the threat of 'animal rights extremism'.

Here Monaghan (2013: 944) points out that the "government has introduced a number of specific measures in relation to countering the threat posed by animal rights extremism without resorting to terrorism legislation per se". However, some of the earlier counter-terrorism legislations had indeed indirectly refered to the countering of the threat of animal rights extremism (see TA 2000). Moreover, other legislation in the policing area also indirectly addressed animal rights extremism. For example, Mills (2013: 37) highlights "Section 145 of the Serious Organised

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[132] Consulting the Civil Service Yearbooks, in the Home Office, in 2004, 'animal extremism' was officially listed when Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State Paul Goggins was recorded as being responsible for "Animal extremism" (Cabinet Office, 2005: 42). The following year, the same applied for Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State (Policing, Security and Community Safety) Vernon Coaker (Cabinet Office, 2006a: 43). However, this changed the following year when Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State Parmjit Dhjanda became responsible for "Preventing violent extremism" (Cabinet Office, 2006b: 37). From then onwards, the Department for Communities and Local Government (CLG) also initiated "The Race, Faiths and Cohesion Directorate", in which it stated the aim of ensuring "racism and extremism are effectively tackled and that support is given to those areas experiencing challenges to cohesion" (Cabinet Office, 2006b: 85).

Crime and Police Act 2005 [which] created the offence of 'interference with contractual relationships so as to harm animal research organisations' (ARO)".

3.3.4. Undercover policing of extremists

Simon (2015: 341) points out that the "the policing of counter-terrorism is characterised by secretive, covert practices". The author of this thesis argues that the same applies to the policing of counter-extremism, where a lack of accountability has been shown in the unveiling of what came to be known as the 'Undercover Policing Scandal' or 'Spy Cops Scandal'. Mark Kennedy was revealed as a former NPOIU officer who had "infiltrated numerous social and environmental justice groups" and at the same time deceived "women into long-term sexual relationships" (Loftus, 2019: 2087)[133]. It was revealed that another SDS officer, Bob Lambert, had even fathered a child with one of the activists that he was surveying undercover (Apple, 2019: 186). It also became known that SDS officers had stolen identities of dead children "to create cover identities" aiding the infiltration of what they considered extremists groups (Creedon, 2013: 19). This, amongst other allegations of misconduct by undercover policing operations, has made public "the political dimension of covert policing, and the various ethical and legal challenges associated with such investigations" (Loftus, 2019: 2072). Undercover policing, and by extension the criminalisation of what is deemed to be 'domestic extremism', seems hypocritical given the illegitimate practices undertaken by the SDS and NPIOU.

These scandals also prompted several inquiries and public investigations, most prominently the Undercover Policing Inquiry (UCPI), which had been set up by then Home Secretary Theresa May in 2013 (Robins, 2017: 673) and has been regarded as "one of the most complicated, expensive and delayed public inquiries in British legal history" (Casciani, 2020). As pointed out by Schlembach (2016: 58), the unveilings of the UCPI are "highly politically charged due its focus on the infiltration of left-wing social movements by the Special Demonstration Squad and the National Public Order Intelligence Unit". The more than 1000 infiltrated groups (Robins, 2017: 672) range from Anti-apartheid groups to the British National Party

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[133] He was infiltrating several "anti-war, environmental and anti-capitalist protest groups, both in the UK and the Republic of Ireland" for seven years (Bloom, 2012: 45-46). Moreover, it emerged that he had also "acted as agent provocateur on several occasion" leading to a collapse of a trial against "environmental campaigners, accused of conspiracy to commit aggravated trespass at Ratcliffe-on-Soar Power Station" in 2010 (Mead, 2018: 259).

and London Greenpeace (Evans, 2019). These revelation show that the "vague term 'domestic extremism' has been engaged to justify the monitoring of a wide range of groups from anti-austerity protestors [to] animal rights activists" (Wilson, 2017: 110ff). This further shows the institutionalisation of the threat of extremism given that it seemed to give these undertakings a legitimacy which they would not have had otherwise.

In general, undercover policing can be seen as a law enforcement technique which is "designed to produce evidence for use in a criminal prosecution; but it may also produce intelligence about political and religious groupings and threats to national security" (Ross, 2008: 240). Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) (2012: 6) justifies undercover policing by stating that the gathered "intelligence helps those responsible for protecting communities from serious crime and disruption to make better decisions (and therefore to prevent crime) by improving their knowledge about the level and type of threat the public might face". However, the question arises: Given that "prior reasonable suspicion that serious criminal acts may be in preparation" is needed (HMIC, 2012: 6), at what point does it become *necessary* to infiltrate groups that have not previously been linked with any criminal undertakings.

One has to remember though that the infiltration and disruption of extremist groups is "not a novelty in the policing landscape" (Bonino, 2018: 64). According to Fijnaut & Marx (1995: 9), undercover policing had a long tradition at the London Metropolitan Police Service with covert policing taking place "to control the Fenians, to arrest Irish terrorists, to stop violent anarchism and to surveil political refugees from Russia, France and Germany" since the late 19th century. One should emphasise that there "was no specific legislation defining the rules of undercover policing, only case law and police guidance" before 2000 (HMIC, 2012: 38). The lack of regulation might have been substantiated by a general threat situation justifying such extraordinary measure and therefore not attempting to have them controlled. It can also be explained by the institutionalised securitisation of the policing of dissent, and, by extension, of what is considered 'extremist' by security services.

However, with the introduction of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA 2000), public bodies carrying out "surveillance and covert investigations"

were now required "to obtain a written authorization for most forms of covert activity" in order to limit abuse by those policing (Loftus, 2019: 2073-5). Whilst the tapping of phone lines must be approved by the Home Secretary and the "planting of listening devices[134]" requires permission by the Chief Constable, "with the pre-authority of the OSC[135]", in the case of undercover policing operations, the authorisation of a Chief Officer is enough (HMIC, 2012: 9-10). Undercover policing also does not require "a judge's authorisation" (Bloom, 2012: 45), which leaves the sole responsibility of authorisation on the police. The HMIC (2012: 10) itself points out that there is "no formal training provision for authorising officers". Whilst RIPA 2000 can be regarded as a step towards more human rights protection, due to its bureaucratic application, it "obscures from investigators the significance of their moral obligations" (Harfield, 2014: 158), especially if they are not trained in how to give these authorisations.

That these bureaucratic safety measures did not always work is evidenced by the undertakings of the NPOIU, in which, although given by senior officers, the authorisation was based on incomplete information. For example, in the case of Mark Kennedy, authorising officers were not provided with "potentially relevant information on the overall background to his deployment, or on some of his activities while deployed" (HMIC, 2012: 9). Arising from this lack of information, the authorising officers were not able to assess the situation accordingly and consider whether covert surveillance was necessary or if there were alternate means of intelligence gathering available which would have be less intrusive (HMIC, 2012: 9). However, the author of this thesis would like to point out that this, in itself, appears to be a result of the lack of understanding and training that authorising police officers possess. It also shows the difference of accountability in these undercover policing units, which seem to have thought themselves above the law. Again, one can argue that a blind eye was turned to the lack of regulation and the 'rogue' policing, as it was considered necessary to keep the nation safe. This itself further demonstrates how the institutionalisation of the threat of extremism had taken hold, entirely in the sense of the end justifying the means.

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[134] "on residential premises or in a private vehicle".

[135] Office of Surveillance Commissioners, working alongside the Home Office.

Given that secrecy is "a necessary prerequisite" of undercover policing, it cannot be forgotten that this "secrecy afforded to the police must be rendered accountable" (Hadjimatheou, 2017: 293). Once there is no accountability, we have a case of exceptionalism and have therefore moved the issue outside of normal politics, indicating institutionalised securitisation. This is evidenced in particular by the fact that policing usually needs to be perceived as legitimate by the public in order to be effective (see Harfield, 2014: 133). Once policing acts outside these legal and legitimate frameworks of democracy, it is questionable how to justify it unless a state of existential urgency has been established beforehand. As pointed out by Bok (1989: 274 in Bonino, 2018: 62), "the "limited secrecy and deception [that] can be legitimate to police work [and the] crucial moral questions […] of possible harm, unfairness, and [the] undermining of trust" create a tension in terms of what undercover policing should and should not do. Here one needs to question how the police is justifying the undercover policing of groups they deem to be extremist. In particular, given the lack of a precise legal definition of the terminology, they are effectively 'criminalising' any group or person that they infiltrate, since their justification lies in the prevention of a crime[136]. Usually, undercover policing "has been used to obtain evidence against a person who is suspected of having committed – or is in the course of committing – a crime" (Loftus, 2019: 2072). Therefore, 'domestic extremism' becomes an issue "of crime, even if politically-motivated" (Woodman, 2018b: 2) and institutionally securitised.

Similar doubts are raised by Spalek & O'Rawe (2014: 157), who question: "Why should the stability and "smooth functioning" of the nation state be deemed to have more value than facilitating challenge to its basic injustices?". They further highlight the dubious nature of justifications for undercover policing in light of what they argue it represents and says "about the real values underpinning our society, and indeed our policing and security apparatus" (Spalek & O'Rawe, 2014: 157). Here one should consider the argument made by Joyce (2016: 335-336), who believes that by applying the term 'domestic extremism' to state dissidents, government institutions such as the police purposefully criminalise them "in order to legitimise a coercive response against them". Likewise, Woodman (2018b: 2)

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[136] Keeping in mind that it was the ACPO 2006 definition of 'domestic extremism' which was used for undercover policing units such as the NPOIU from 2006 to 2011 (O'Donnell, 2015: 109).

highlights that undercover policing is justified by the government and its institutions on the grounds of protecting the state "from dangerous subversive and extremist elements".

3.4. UK counter-terrorism measures regarding extremism up to 2005

It is important to review some of the UK government's counter-terrorism measures and initiatives as they directly and indirectly affected its dealings with extremism. As pointed out by Innes & Thiel (2008: 558), the distinction between 'domestic extremism' and terrorism is often hard to sustain if both are criminalised in the same framework. In the Home Office's 1998 consultation paper on *'Legislation Against Terrorism'*[137], it is stated that:

> "[in the] last 25 years the main domestic terrorist threat in the UK has come from militant animal rights activists and to a lesser extent from Scottish and Welsh nationalist extremists"

(Home Office, 1998: 11).

One can observe here that the discourse does not seem to differentiate between extremists and terrorists but rather bundles them into the same bracket. Rather, the construction of the threat seems to involve a move away from precision. It appears that extremism is, at this point, associated either with a worldview (in this case animal rights) or a nationalist stance. It also shows that domestic terrorism was not equated with Irish Terrorism, which was given its own category.

When the Terrorism Act 2000 was given Royal Assent in July 2000 it became the backbone of later counter-terrorism measures by the UK government (Bartolucci & Skoczylis, 2017: 336)[138]. Under the 2000 Act, the restrictions of differentiating international and domestic terrorism had been lifted. However, it also allowed for an "unusually wide discretion" for law enforcement agencies and other legal institutions (Hamilton, 2019: 18). The TA 2000 introduced the "controversial stop

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[137] Following the August 1998 Omagh bombing, Prime Minister Tony Blair announced that Parliament was going to consider a new anti-terrorism legislation (Baber & Wood, 1998: 8-7) despite the signing of the Belfast Peace Agreement in April 1998 (Taylor, 2011: 212) which had hoped to bring more peaceful times.

[138] According to Scheppele (2004: 126), the Government "attempted to codify Britain's myriad of crisscrossing and conflicting anti-terrorism statutes into one code that would meet human rights standards" but would also soften legislation regarding Northern Ireland. The TA 2000 then replaced the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1989, the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1996, and parts of the Criminal Justice (Terrorism and Conspiracy) Act 1998 which were originally temporarily passed in the 1970s to deal with terrorism in Northern Ireland (The Guardian, 2009).

and search provision known as 'section 44'", which allowed police "forces to stop and search individuals and vehicles in the *absence of a 'reasonable suspicion'* that a crime has taken place" (Demirsu, 2017: 75) [emphasis added]. Although this statute was considered to prevent terrorism, it had been used by police "to thwart, curtail or end peaceful protests" – something that is indicative of the securitisation of protests (Pickard, 2019: 8) and which can therefore also be seen as a securitisation of what the state and police forces considered 'domestic extremism'. For Wood (2017: 63), the introduction of section 44 (s.44) is an indication of a 'state of exception' (extraordinary measure), given the argumentation by the government that the risk of terrorism "requires 'emergency powers' to tackle the threat". Consequently, the application of stop and search orders in the domain of 'domestic extremism' policing can be seen as another sign of the institutionalised securitisation of the perceived threat via extraordinary means. Here an exceptional measure is utilised against something that is considered by the police service to be a threat to national security to such an extent that extraordinary measures are justified[139].

3.4.1. Terrorism and the threat of violent extremism/'Islamic Extremism'

The 9/11 attacks in the United States made counter-terrorism a top priority of the security agenda for both the US and the UK governments (Gearson & Rosemont, 2015: 1040). In order to respond to the now more prominently seen threat of terrorism, the UK government initiated several strategies, starting with the 2003 Counter-Terrorism Strategy (CONTEST), which included provisions for dealing with the threat of 'violent extremism' (see Thomas, 2012: 74). CONTEST was initially created within the Cabinet Office, showing that the then Prime Minister Tony Blair, saw the issue as being of the utmost importance, in particular in light of his public statements (see Chapter 5). CONTEST[140] is the UK's main policy

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[139] Given its extensive criticism (see for example Mythen & Khan, 2006; Pantazis & Pemberton, 2009) s.44 was eventually scrapped in 2011 (Schwell, 2014: 33), after the European Court for Human Rights had "declared that section 44 was in violation of the right to privacy, right to liberty, as well as the principle of non-discrimination considering the ethnic profiling incurred by the practice" (Demirsu, 2017: 76).

[140] CONTEST II was relaunched in 2009 under Prime Minister Gordon Brown's Labour government. The Coalition Government of the Tories and Liberal Democrats reviewed previous strategies and launched CONTEST III in 2011. According to the Guardian (2009), it expanded the definition of terrorism, which was formerly defined as "violence for political ends". It now includes action, used or threatened, for the purpose of advancing any "political, religious or ideological" cause. In 2008 this was extended to include a "racial" cause.

instrument for dealing with terrorism (Fischbacher-Smith, 2016: 401) and it was designed to respond to "what was perceived as a new threat, stemming from both within and outside the United Kingdom's national borders" (Altermark & Nilsson, 2018: 56). It was meant to become a "new 'core strategy' for countering international terrorism" (Parker, 2010: 20) but would later broaden its focus to include the threat of domestic terrorism, in particular with its Prevent programme.

When the UK government presented its 'Prevention of Terrorism Bill' in the House of Commons on February 22nd 2005, the accompanying materials provided by the Home Office aimed to highlight the need for the new legislation. In Paper Three, titled *'International Terrorism: Reconciling Liberty and Security – The Government's Strategy to Reduce the Threat'*, the stance on extremism prevention was laid out. Under the section 'Prevention: preventing extremism and terrorist recruitment', what was later to become the Prevent strategy, is discussed. It is stated that "Violent extremists of all types should be marginalised, while those with genuine, peaceful aspirations should be welcomed into the political mainstream" (Home Office, 2005: 2). While no definition of violent extremism is provided and what exactly the marginalisation entails is left open, the strategy shows that the focus was laid more heavily on the prevention of terrorism. In other words, the emphasis was on how to stop terrorist from becoming terrorists, hence on attempting "to identify individuals who are not terrorists now but might be at some later date" (Kundnani, 2014: 16). This also extended to the issue of extremists which were seen as would be terrorists.

After the London bombings in July 2005, "the UK government began to focus more concertedly on the ideological aspects of counter terrorism and 'soft' measures" (Howell & Lind, 2009:63). This meant that its attention shifted towards the prevention of the ideological causes of terrorism, which it saw in Islamic extremism. There was now a stronger emphasis on the Prevent[141] strand of CONTEST. What came to be known as the 'British model' aimed "to employ community-based counter-terrorism approaches to impact Muslim communities and improve communications, marginalize extremists and favour social

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[141] Whilst Prevent I (2009), II (2009) and III (2011) do not mention 'domestic extremism', there have been reports that "Prevent materials produced by police forces across the country have referred to anti-fracking activism as a form of 'domestic extremism'" (Gilmore et al., 2020: 361).

integration" (Klausen 2009 in Bonino, 2012: 14). The rationale for these pre-emptive measures is similar to the one previously applied to 'domestic extremists': to stop them before they become violent and endanger the nation's security. However, through the exceptional threat of this new home-grown terrorism, it became possible to justify "a precautionary approach that involves coercively pre-empting anticipated crimes at an earlier stage than the traditional criminal law permitted" (McCulloch & Wilson, 2016: 71). The author of this thesis argues that this has not been a new tactic, given that 'domestic extremism' had been managed similarly in the past. She therefore argues that, through the institutionalised securitisation of 'domestic extremists' and their policing, it became easier to implement new extraordinary measures in the pre-crime sphere targeting Islamic extremism. As pointed out by McCulloch & Wilson (2016: 57) "[p]re-crime counterterrorism laws, by merging national security with crime, marry the politics of identity with criminal justice to an unprecedented extent". This has already happened before with 'domestic extremism', for example in the case of what was perceived as 'animal rights extremism'. The surveillance of animal rights activists without a criminal record in the 'domestic extremism database', for instance, shows that they have been dealt with in a pre-crime context by police. Countering extremism therefore fulfils the criteria of pre-emptive policing, which is similar to UK counter-terrorism approaches evidenced in its preventive emphasis (see Prevent strategy). Given that the term 'extremism' is now often almost synonymously used with the word 'terrorism', it is not surprising that 'Islamic extremism' became seen as one of the main threats facing the United Kingdom. From July 2005 onwards though, the climate changed to one in which 'Islamic extremism' gained more importance and also became framed as more of a threat. The attacks were "the trigger for a new programme, 'Preventing Extremism Together'" (Walker, 2011: 383).

The Home Office's 2005 call for consultation publication '*Preventing Extremism Together: Places of Worship*' highlights the Government's new focus on 'Islamic extremism'. It is stated here that:

> "The Government is keen to explore ways in which communities can be supported to address the problems of radicalisation and extremism in their midst. The Muslim community in the UK is a responsible and respected part of our multi-cultural and multi-faith society and, in particular, has insisted on taking action against

extremism, lest the activities of extremists in recent months taint the good reputation of the mainstream Muslim community"

(Home Office, 2005:1).

Whilst not calling it 'Islamic extremism', it becomes clear that the government is framing extremism here as something that is linked to religion, in particular Islam.

3.5. Conclusion

A good indicator that something has become institutionalised and securitised is a relative lack of "constant drama" due to the implicit assumption that the topic is already "in the area of urgency" (Buzan et al, 1998: 27). In the case of extremism, when policy papers or internal police documents mention 'extremism', just by using the term, they have already evoked a sense of priority and the notion that the matter can and should be handled outside of normal politics. Given the connotation of the term and the urgency that has been established over decades of practice and association with the term (for example the policing of dissent), it might explain why there is no longer a need to define it officially. Saying the word 'extremist' is enough to establish a collective intentionality of the threat.

These examples of institutionalised securitisation show themselves in non-public security practice, for example because the logic of security forbids a public debate (see Buzan et al, 1998: 28). Here it can be argued that the support shown to the SDS and NPOIU by the Home Office is a sign of institutionalised securitisation, as it deemed itself justified in endorsing something which could only be legitimised on the basis of a logic of security. This implies that extraordinary measures such as the undercover policing units and the domestic extremism database could be legitimised by the State and Police due to the perceived security threat that extremism posed. Because the logic of security forbade public debate, institutions such as the police were able to deal with the perceived threat of extremism in whatever way they saw fit.

Looking at the usage of the term 'extremist', it appears that the UK Government security sector has a long history of applying it to people and groups which they deem dangerous to the state. In the 2000s the term 'domestic extremism' started to crop up and become officially used internally to describe a range of different groups which were considered to have the potential to become criminal, disrupt public peace and be a safety risk to the state. As pointed out by O'Donnell (2015: 122) the

"term Domestic Extremism and its contemporary meaning needs to be understood in light of (1) the underlying terrorist threat and concurrent extreme violence and criminality by animal rights activists that existed at the time of its emergence, (2) its later expansion in scope, and (3) the contemporary unresolved tensions over its reach and application".

The government and its institutions have struggled to define extremism (see Zedner, 2021), but without proper defining, they were able to apply the term to an array of issues which could have otherwise not been dealt with in a security sphere. When looking at the police response to 'domestic extremism', it becomes clear that the government and its institutions justified extraordinary measures such as undercover policing on the basis of the severity of the perceived 'threat' to the state. The policing of what is considered extremist by the government and the police can therefore be seen as the state aiming to keep itself safe, something that is indicative of a securitisation process. The logic of security therefore "lends legitimacy to police in their attempts to criminalise resistance to fascism (as just another form of extremism), and to intelligence services to spy on anti-racists and anti-fascists (as potential subversives and extremists" (Fekete, 2014: 36).

The institutionalisation of counter-extremism can be seen in the expansion of undercover policing in the 2000s, where not only "funding for policing domestic extremists doubled", but where there was also an increase in undercover policing activity (Evans & Lewis, 2013: 179). The policing and criminalising of domestic extremism shows an eradication of 'usual' policies and practices as evidenced by the covert nature, secrecy, and limited regulation involved. In particular, the undercover policing work of the SDS and NPOIU stands out as being outside of the framework of accountability.

Parallel to this securitisation of 'domestic extremism', the notion of 'Islamic extremism' gained prominence from 2001 onwards, becoming firmly established as a security threat after the 2005 London terror attacks. If one previously assumed that the concept had not been dealt with before this point, then one would be mistaken, as evidenced, for example, by the *Draft Report on 'Young Muslims and Extremism'* dating back to 2004. As this form of extremism had not been dealt with under the concept of 'domestic extremism' due to its international dimension, it is not surprising to see it linked to CONTEST, which up to 2011 did not focus on any

other form of extremism than the Islamic variety. The notion of the extremism being 'foreign' (as opposed to domestic) exacerbates the 'othering' of Muslims in discourse, a demographic which is clearly singled out more than any other religion in terms of its links to this 'non-domestic extremism'. According to Kundnani & Hayes (2018: 7), the "concept of extremism became institutionalized in policy" since 2006 with the introduction of the prevention of extremism strand of CONTEST.

Before having traced the emergence of the concept of extremism, the author of this thesis had assumed that the discourse of extremism had always included religion, however, this does not appear to be the case. Instead, it appears that the distinction of domestic and non-domestic extremism in the case of the United Kingdom has been not only one of a domestic versus foreign nature but also one of a political versus religious nature. Rather than 'one' general concept of extremism, two concepts of extremism have entered the security agenda – the former, being of the political kind since the 1960s; the latter being of the religious dimension from the early 2000s onwards. As securitisation is a process, there cannot be an exact pinpointing of when each issue moved from the political to security sphere. However, the transitions are fluid and both terms are overlapping not just in time but also in usage. It appears that even the Government itself, at points, could not help but conflate the two concepts, often grouping the political and religious aspects of extremism together. See, for example, *The Home Office Strategic Plan 2004-2008* where the usage of the term is as inconsistent as ever.

It also needs to be emphasised that this chapter only offers an overview of the institutionalisation of extremism and does not focus on the actual security practices implemented during the policing of 'domestic extremism'. Indeed, it would not be feasible to give an insight into the behind the scenes of the institutionalisation due to the secretive nature of counter-extremism work. Therefore, this chapter does not claim to give a complete picture but presents a glimpse of indicators of institutionalised securitisation. It should be seen as a prelude to what enabled Prime Ministers to securitise the issue of extremism over the years to come.

By exploring the institutionalised securitisation of extremism, the researcher discovered that the issue of extremism had already been moved onto the security agenda prior to any Prime Ministers' securitising speech acts. It can be

demonstrated that, in this case, policies and practices regarding extremism go further back and had become institutionalised early on. Arguably, this aided the establishment of the threat of extremism, given its historical association. One has to remember that "(s)ecuritisation is therefore the product of a historical process which is always emergent" (Schwell, 2014: 90). When extremism is not defined legally but institutionally securitised, then it becomes easier to employ extraordinary means because the term itself evokes the logic of security (a threat needing to be curbed in order to ensure survival). The government can reframe the threat however it sees fit (for example criminalising ARE[142] and then Islamic extremism) without employing further speech acts. The acceptance of the threat is already internally given, as the end justifies the means and urgency has been established.

Husband & Alam (2011: 62) believe that, because the United Kingdom had such a long history of operating 'state security' due to its dealings with Irish terrorism, there was "a fruitful foundation for the post-9/11 evolution of the current protective state". The author of this thesis argues that the government and the police's dealings with the threat of 'domestic extremism', in particular its institutionalisation via special policing units and wide-ranging definitions to account for anything which could be perceived to be against the state, also provided a basis for the securitisation of 'Islamic extremism' in the years to come. On the other hand, Woodman (2018a: 23) points out that the 'war on terror' discourse propelled the 'domestic extremism' police apparatus. Indeed, one should see this as an interplay of securitisation. Both, the threat of 'domestic extremism' and the threat of 'Islamic extremism' were building up on each other, magnifying each other and becoming interlinked. For example, a lot of counter-terrorism measures previously aimed indirectly at what the state deemed extremist, but with the introduction of Prevent and its focus on the prevention of 'Islamic Extremism' it ended up being extended to 'all forms of extremism' in later years (see Chapter 6). Prevent, originally aimed to prevent people from being drawn into Islamic extremism and is now being used by police forces to police what they consider 'domestic extremists' (see Gilmore et al, 2020: 361).

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[142] Animal Rights Extremism.

The way Prime Ministers have been securitising the concept of extremism through speech acts, in particular 'Islamic extremism' will be explored in the following chapters. These chapters will also address the suggested extraordinary measures in the context of extremism, emphasising the respective Prime Ministers' security discourses. The next chapter traces Tony Blair's securitising speech acts, showing that he located the threat of extremism in Foreign Affairs and Domestic Security. It chronological as well as thematical analyses the securitising speech acts in Tony Blair's discourse on extremism from 1997 to 2006, highlighting his securitisation of Islamic extremism.

4. Tony Blair's securitisation of Islamic extremism as a danger from abroad and within

4.1. Introduction

Tony Blair became the UK Prime Minister in 1997 without much government experience (Garnett & Dorey, 2016: 608) and was to hold his position for 10 years before resigning in 2007. Originally a barrister he had not practiced long before entering politics (Beloff, 2007: 291). Tony Blair's time in office divides opinions. At the beginning of his premiership, he was seen as a 'fresh face' and initiator of reforms but he was later considered to have tainted his legacy via his involvement in the 'War on Terror' (see for example, Bower, 2016, Strong, 2017).

There are two main areas where Tony Blair can be seen to have securitised the concept of extremism: 1) in Foreign Affairs, and 2) in Domestic Security. The former is evidenced by his justification for military action based on the idea of fighting extremism abroad. The latter gained prominence with the idea that the 'threat of extremism' also posed a danger domestically. This thesis therefore argues that both, the 9/11 and 7/7 attacks, were the main prompts for discursive changes and that Tony Blair acted as a securitising actor, positioning extremism as a security issue.

While at first glance, Blair's main securitising moves relate to terrorism (see for example Blair 2005d), careful speech act analysis shows that he was able to securitise the 'issue' of extremism at the same time, as he tends to conflate the two concepts often (see for example Blair 2005a). One should also look at the extraordinary measures against terrorism that he suggested and introduced. For example, the Terrorism Act of 2006 had a large impact on counterextremism measures and criminalised the encouragement of terrorism (also definable as 'non-violent extremism'). It was also under Blair's government that the United Kingdom took a stronger legislative stance against terrorism in general (see previous chapter), implementing several new permanent pieces of legislation regarding terrorism (Parker, 2010: 17) which were, by extension, also measures against extremism.

When Blair first came into office, he "was in an extraordinary strong position to see through reforms" given the Labour party's majority in Parliament and was considered to have 'unprecedented levels' of authority (Hellmuth, 2015: 140).

Initially, Tony Blair wanted to undertake "wide-ranging constitutional reforms" but his focus on domestic reforms changed to an increased interest in foreign affairs following the 9/11 attacks (Russell, 2011: 8). Mumford & Selck (2010: 297) believe that Blair always wanted "to make his unique mark and to embody the continuity of foreign policy" when he was elected, hence prioritising Foreign Affairs from the beginning. This showed itself, for example, in Blair's Chicago Speech in 1999, which he gave in support of military intervention in Kosovo (see Freedman, 2017). Overall, he and his government's foreign policy had "an ethical dimension" based on Blair's 'Doctrine of the International Community' (Cook 1997a; Blair 1999 in Gilmore, 2014: 23) which can be seen as an explanation for his presentation of extremism as a global security issue.

When looking at Tony Blair's discourse on extremism in the House of Commons in the context of securitising speech act analysis, one cannot look at it in isolation. Whilst the focus of analysis lies on speech acts given in Parliament, securitising moves made outside of Parliament have to be considered as well in order to understand and properly analyse Blair's securitisation of extremism. This is particularly the case when speech acts are made in a security context. At first glance, it appears that Blair did not mention extremism extensively in a security context until 2005. However, if speeches given outside Parliament are taken into account, as they should be, then a different picture arises, one that is vital for understanding the approach Tony Blair has taken on extremism[143].

The following chapter aims to explore chronologically, as well as thematically, the securitising speech acts undertaken by Tony Blair. His overarching ideal of anti-isolationism, the attitude of wanting moralists and realists to be partners in a global world (Blair, 2001a), spreads to much of his policy making, with the underlying stance of seeing the national as affecting the international and vice versa. This anti-isolationist stance also shows that, whilst it was originally assumed that the discourse of extremism only entered the political agenda after the London 7/7 attacks, it had actually already been present much earlier. It had crept across the securitisation spectrum from a politicised state to a securitised state and had already

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[143] As pointed out by Kettell (2013: 266), having a "compelling public discourse was central to the political strategy adopted by New Labour" and it is therefore not surprising that there were a large amount of speeches given outside Parliament.

been institutionally securitised (see Chapter 3). It can be summed up that Tony Blair's discourse focuses on religious extremism, specifically Islamic extremism, rather than incorporating other forms of extremism[144] and presenting them as an existential threat (see Table 7 below).

	Speech Act	Speech Act Example	Securitising speech act indicator	Guiding note
Assertive securitising speech act	State, describe, classify, explain	"(…) unless we articulate a common global policy based on common values, we risk chaos threatening our stability, economic and political, through letting extremism, conflict or injustice go unchecked" (Blair, 2006g)	Something or someone is a threat	Speaker tells 'how things are'
Directive securitising speech act	Order, command, request	"We must pull this up by its roots. Within Britain, we must join up with our Muslims community to take on the extremists. Worldwide, we should confront it everywhere it exists" (Blair, 2005b)	Extraordinary measure suggested to curb the threat	Speaker tries to get people to do something
		"That is what this battle is about, within Islam and outside of it; it is a battle of values and progress; and therefore it is one we must win" (Blair, 2006g)		

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[144] Despite aiming some securitising moves at domestic animal rights activist extremism, which never took centre stage. For example, when Tony Blair stated "I have decided that it would be more appropriate for MISC 13 to be called the *Ministerial Committee on Animal Rights Extremism*, and not, as listed previously, the *Ministerial Committee on Animal Rights Activists*. This is to reflect more closely the Committee's terms of reference" (Blain in HC Deb Vol 448 Written Statement, 29 June 2006, emphasis added).

Commissive securitising speech act	Promise, vow, pledge, contract, guarantee, threaten	"We will consult on a new power to order closure of a place of worship which is used as a centre for fomenting extremism and will consult with Muslim leaders in respect of those clerics who are not British citizens, to draw up a list of those not suitable to preach who will be excluded from Britain" (Blair, 2005a)	Extraordinary measure suggested to curb the threat	Speaker commits her/himself to doing something
Declarative securitising speech act	Pronounce, declare, christen	"I have decided that it would be more appropriate for MISC 13 to be called the Ministerial Committee on Animal Rights Extremism, and not, as listed previously, the Ministerial Committee on Animal Rights Activists. This is to reflect more closely the Committee's terms of reference" (Blair in HC Deb Vol 448 Written Statement, 29 June 2006, emphasis added)	Extraordinary measure implemented regarding threat	Speaker creates new state of affairs by representing it as created because of the existence of extralinguistic institutions

Table 7 - Examples of securitising speech acts by Tony Blair (1997-2007)

The notion of drawing a distinction between violent and non-violent extremism has only subtly entered his discourse and he never includes right-wing extremism in his speeches in in the data collected. The main idea he portrays is that extreme religious ideology leads to extremism, and extremism leads to terrorism. Another heavily featured theme is that "distorted Islam" is dangerous, but not "true Islam". Furthermore, extremism in the Middle East is often presented as the Referent Subject to British Security – the Referent Object.

4.2. The War on Terror

In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks in the US, Tony Blair emphasised the dangers of terrorism profoundly[145]. However, regarding extremism, while he talked about the issue alongside terrorism, he did not seem to make any securitising speech acts. In a BBC interview with journalist Alex Brodie on the 19th of September 2001, Tony Blair made several statements concerning extremism when asked if a resolution of the Palestine/Israel conflict would have prevented the attacks, Tony Blair said:

> "I believe that these attacks were a long time in the planning, I have to say. And I also believe that the *extremists*, the fanatics that carried out these attacks, frankly they're *the enemies of the peace process*"

> (Blair, 2001d) [emphasis added]

However, while he engaged in an Assertive securitising speech act to frame extremists (alongside fanatics) as the Referent Subject who are threatening the Referent Object of the Middle East's peace process, he did not suggest any measures to curb this threat apart from unspecified 'action' against terrorism in general. This is not surprising given the recent nature of the events at the time. According to Cook (2013: 44), Blair viewed the peace agreement between Israel and Palestine as "a vital element in reducing frustration and extremism in the Middle East that, in his view, threatened the West". Hence, it does fit within his narrative of framing "extremism" as the Referent Subject and security problem.

A few months later, he had changed his tune slightly, during the joint Press Conference with Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon. Following their meeting in Jerusalem on the 1st of November, 2001, he often used the wording 'political extremism' (Blair, 2001b). He mingled his term with religion, talking about the need for moderate Muslims "to take back their religion from the extremists that are trying to hijack it for political purposes" (Blair, 2001b). In this instance he engaged in a Directive securitising speech act but also allocated extremism as a political issue. This stance shifted somewhat in his speech at the Lord Mayor's Banquet in London on Monday the 12th of November 2001. Talking about the events of 9/11 and their perpetrators, he used an Assertive securitising speech act to state that one

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[145] For an analysis of the "changing nature of New Labour's discursive strategy on Britain's role in the war on terror, especially as it was articulated by the then-Prime Minister, Tony Blair" see Kettell (2013: 264ff).

of their drivers[146] was "an extremist and perverted version of Islam which seeks to shoulder aside or overthrow moderate counsels" (Blair, 2001c). On this occasion, he was also talking about the common interest of several countries in the Middle East "in fighting religious extremism", no longer using the terminology of 'political extremism'. In the speech, he also explained that

> "The time has come for the voices of mainstream Islam to take on the extremists. This is not a battle we in the West can fight. We cannot impose our own models on very different societies. But we can help and we can offer support for the vast majority of decent Muslims in that battle. It needs to be made clear again and again that our quarrel is not with Islam but with extremism and fanaticism, whether it be Christian, Jewish, Hindu or Islam"

(Blair, 2001c).

Through this Directive speech act, he suggested the extraordinary measure of 'mainstream Islam' having to 'fight' extremism. His use of language (battle/quarrel/fight) also indicates his threat framing of extremism (and fanaticism). The notion of moderate (or mainstream) Islam having to stand up and fight extremism was to gain in importance in Blair's speeches again in 2006 (see for example Blair, 2006a, 2006g), clearly indicating that he saw it as a measure against the threat of extremism.

According to Bulley (2008: 391), Blair argued in this speech that "terrorist attacks on New York had 'shattered the myth' that the west can ignore the rest of the world". To offer some context, 9/11 had cost more British citizens their lives than "any other terrorist attack in British history". This led the British Government to react forcefully, implementing several extraordinary measures including "new legislation, expanding police powers, strengthening cooperation between different security agencies, and formulating a coherent strategy for dealing with the al Qaeda threat" (Parker, 2010: 19).

With regards to the government's legislative response, there were "five significant new pieces of legislation concerned with terrorism enacted between 2000 and 2008". These included a stronger Terrorism Act in 2001, the proscription of several "Islamist organisations", and new deportation orders as part of the "Prevention of Terrorism Act" in 2005 (Thomas, 2012: 77). Additionally, CONTEST (Counter Terrorism Strategy) was introduced in 2003, as the UK's "long-term strategy for

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[146] Amongst the 'failed state' in Afghanistan, poverty and instability in the Middle East.

countering international terrorism" and became officially known as CONTEST in July 2006[147]. CONTEST is the UK's main policy instrument for dealing with terrorism (Fischbacher-Smith, 2016: 401) and was designed to respond to "what was perceived as a new threat, stemming from both within and outside the United Kingdom's national borders" (Altermark & Nilsson, 2018: 56)[148]. At this point in the 'War on Terror', however, government focus "was overwhelmingly on foreign nationals who were residing in the UK rather than on British citizens per se" (Sabir, 2014: 109). Nevertheless, according to some commentators, government officials were at that time already aware of the possibility of British-born terrorist incidents[149] and recognised the likelihood that attacks would take place in the UK (Blick et al, 2006: 35).

4.3. Securitisation taking place before and during military intervention

In response to the 9/11 attacks, the UK took part in the "initial invasion of Afghanistan" and the UN legitimised US-led 'Operation Enduring Freedom' (OEF) in October 2001 (McCormack, 2019: 32), being one of the first nations to join (Jensen, 2015: 301). Dyson (2011: 72), believes that 9/11 had been a turning point for Blair who afterwards themed his policies "around the perception of an apocalyptic security threat, namely the potential axis of rogue states with terrorist groups". It is therefore not surprising that he was supportive of military intervention in both Afghanistan and later in Iraq. The latter, according to Freedman (2007: 627), was the "most important and fateful consequence of 9/11". Blair's conception of 'enlightened self-interest' combined with his 1999 'doctrine of the international community' allowed him to legitimise the idea of military intervention under the war on terror (Ritchie, 2014: 93). Hence, in 2002, Blair was able to justify involvement in Afghanistan to "depose the ruling Taliban regime" (under the pretence that it was hiding al-Qaeda members) (Kettell, 2013: 268). This allowed him to commit "British troops to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), a UN operation in Afghanistan" despite criticism by members of his staff and the House of Lords (Bower, 2016: 288). It is important to point out that Parliament had not voted to participate in these operations in 2001 or in subsequent

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[147] Before being revised in March 2009, July 2011 and June 2018.

[148] It was later revised to emphasise more on the Prevent Strand, in order to "prevent violent extremism" following the 7/7 London attacks (Allen, 2017: 67).

[149] See for example Curtis (2012: 283ff).

years, debating it only twice and treating it as a "relatively uncontroversial" issue (Mirow 2009 in Britz, 2016: 162-163).

During a speech given at the George Bush Senior Presidential Library in Crawford, on the 7th of April 2002, Tony Blair employed several securitising speech acts, framing Afghanistan as both the Referent Subject (threatening) and the Referent Object (being threatened), calling its population the victim of the Taliban but also perpetrators for having "nurtured the Al-Qaida terrorist network" (Blair, 2002b). He continued to use the Assertive securitising speech act of securitising Afghanistan as "a failed state purveying religious and political extremism, with its people ground under the heel of the fanatic" in order to justify military intervention (Blair, 2002b). This speech also highlights his stance of bad versus good Islam when he stated that the philosophy of Osama Bin Laden "represents extremism, cruelty, intolerance of different cultures and lifestyles. It can't be fought just with guns. It must be fought by moderate Islam against extreme Islam, by the virtues of religious and political tolerance triumphing over bigotry" (Blair, 2002b). It is the moderate Islam which is juxtaposed against 'Islamic Extremism', thereby foreshadowing Blair's idea about employing 'mainstream' Muslims as counterparts to 'extreme Islam'. It also shows securitisation in the form of Assertive- (extremism is an existential threat) and Directive- (extraordinary measures against the threat) securitising speech acts, highlighting that 'Islamic extremism' has become a security problem via discourse.

The same Spring focus of military action shifted towards a regime change in Iraq, again in the name of security with the framing of the urgent "need to tackle the threat posed by Iraq's possession of WMD in light of the changed 'calculus of risk' wrought by the 9/11 attacks" (Kettell, 2013: 268)[150]. Whilst Tony Blair insisted that the invasion of Iraq was justified due to the continued threat of terrorism, his strategy was seen by many as invoking the very thing it was trying to prevent, leading to increased terrorist threats (Bower, 2016: 555). The latter concern was echoed by security advisers who had warned that "an attack on Iraq would increase the likelihood of a terrorist attack in the UK" (Sabir, 2014: 2). The fact that this

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[150] For more on Blair's discourse to legitimise the Iraq invasion see van Klink & Lembcke (2012), Strong (2017) and Kettell (2013).

issue was important to Blair is evidenced by the rare parliament recall during recess for the 'Iraq and Weapons of Mass Destruction' debate on the 24th of September 2002 (see Besly et al, 2018: 56). One should remember that it was suggested that for Blair, "Iraq was about upholding values and the will of the international community" unlike US president George Bush for whom it was about achieving national interest (Clarke, 2007: 606).

Therefore, in this context, his speech at the Prime Minister's address to the Lord Mayor's Banquet on the 11th of November 2002, gains a different meaning when examined carefully. For example, framing WMDs as "one aspect of the new dangers we face" he continued to use the Assertive securitising speech act to state:

> "What preoccupies decision-makers now is a different danger. It is extremism driven by fanaticism, personified either in terrorist groups or rogue states"

> (Blair, 2002a).

He thereby defined extremism as including either 'terrorist groups' or 'rogue states', clearly framing it as a threat to the Referent Object of 'Global Security'. In the same speech, he continued to ponder the idea of military intervention as being necessary to confront these threats, thereby suggesting it as an extraordinary measure.

Despite heavy opposition and worries about "insufficient and inadequate intelligence", Blair continued to insist on backing and joining US president George Bush's decision to invade Iraq" (Keenan, 2017: 206) in 2003, notwithstanding warnings that involvement might lead to an increased risk of terror attacks for the United Kingdom (Blick et al, 2006: 35). This can be seen in several of his speeches throughout 2003. For instance, when he addressed the Foreign Office conference on the 7th of January 2003 stating that "religious extremism through the misinterpretation of Islam is a danger all over the world" he engaged in another Assertive securitising speech act (religious extremism is a security problem), framing 'global and local security' as the Referent Object (Blair, 2003a). At the Labour party's 'Local government, women's and youth conference' in Glasgow on the 15th of February 2003, he explained that now (after the Cold War)

> "(…) the old threat has been replaced by a new one. The threat of chaos; disorder; instability. A threat which arises from a perversion of the true faith of Islam, in extremist terrorist groups like Al Qaida"

The threats he frames are numerous but it stands out that he again conditions them around the notion of 'Islamic extremism' – a 'false' form of Islam – before continuing to assert the risk of WMDs in the hands of "repressive dictatorships" such as that of Iraqi Saddam Hussein (Blair, 2003b). Invoking the urgency of the threats of both terrorism and extremism, he used the Directive securitising speech act to get people to act when he said:

> "If the international community does not take note of the Iraqi people's plight but continues to address it casually this will breed terrorism and extremism within the Iraqi people. This cannot be allowed to happen"

Here we see that he fulfils some of the facilitating conditions of securitisation as he is "constructing a plot with [an] existential threat, point of no return and a possible way out" (Wæver, 2003: 14). Additionally, via other securitising speech acts he was able to continuously present extremism (alongside terrorism) as an existential threat.

A vote in the House of Commons on the 18th of March 2003 to deploy troops to Iraq was won by 412 to 149 votes by Tony Blair but was seen as a "mere passing gesture by government" rather than a genuine instance of parliamentary scrutiny (Jensen, 2015: 314). On the other hand, as opposed to the relatively swift decision making that took place in the case of Afghanistan, the question of intervening in Iraq was the subject of parliamentary debate 13 times between September of 2002 and March of 2003 (Britz, 2016: 164). One has to remember that at this point, there was no legal obligation to have a parliamentary "vote on the deployment of troops" (Wagner et al, 2017: 31).

Nevertheless, there was strong opposition to military action, even from within Blair's own party: the Leader of the House of Commons, Robin Cook, and the Secretary of State for International Development, Clare Short, resigned because "they disagreed with the Blair government's position on war in Iraq" (Garnett & Dorey, 2016b: 131). According to Besly et al (2018: 93), military action against Iraq was the cause of the "biggest rebellions during the Labour administration". Given the timeframe of the final Iraq vote ("the *night before* the invasion, with about 46,000 British troops already in the Gulf region"), and the "severe pressure

on dissenters to either abstain or vote in favour of the government" (Mello, 2017: 84) one can argue that it was Tony Blair's sole authoritative position that legitimised the final move. It should also be noted at this point that the invasion of Iraq was later declared illegal (see Finlan, 2008: 133ff).

Tony Blair acknowledged this in his "Speech on the threat of global terrorism" at Sedgefield on the 4th of March 2004[151] in which he said: "No decision *I* have ever made in politics has been as divisive as the decision to go to war to in Iraq. It remains deeply divisive today" (Blair, 2004) [emphasis added]. During the speech, he mentioned extremis* 5 times (as opposed to terrori* 20 times) but it becomes clear that he engaged in Assertive securitising speech acts, considering "nations liberated from oppression" (referring to Iraq and Afghanistan) as "a profound antidote to the poison of religious extremism" and thereby by extension terrorism (Blair, 2004).

As pointed out by Gearty (2005: 26) the "apocalyptic language" used by Tony Blair was a way for him to try to increase the legitimacy of previous military actions. Not even a week later, on the 11th of March 2004 the Madrid bombings took place, killing 191 people and wounding 1800 (Aldrich & Field, 2011: 281). This brought the 'danger of terrorism' closer to home and raised "questions about the blow-back effects of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq" as well as highlighting the possibility of domestic attacks (Kettell, 2011: 76). Rather than trying to incorporate the British Muslim community and listen to their concerns regarding the escalating wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Blair government now "intensified its efforts to promote "moderate" versions of Islam within Britain" (Bail, 2011: 116). His premiership had become difficult as he had let it be known that the upcoming elections in May 2005 would be his last run for office. This led some to consider him a 'lame duck', so to speak (Allen, 2011: 3). Despite this, the Labour Party won the general election for a third time, though with a reduced majority (Gamble, 2011: 306).

4.4. The London Attacks

Not even two months later, on the 7th of July 2005, the London attacks took place, killing 57 people and injuring more than 700 (Thomas, 2009: 51). Although in the immediate aftermath, it was thought to be an attack by "foreign-born extremists, it

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[151] Also known as the "Sedgefield Speech".

gradually emerged that the attacks were carried out by four British citizens"
(Ahmad, 2018: 113). The bombings "forced the issue of Iraq back to the top of the
political agenda, leading to renewed claims about a link to terrorism" (see, e.g.
Chatham House 2005; Sciolino and Van Natta Jr, 2005 in Kettell, 2013: 272).
Gamble (2011: 307) argues that the attacks were as much "an issue of internal
security" as they were "associated with foreign policy" due to the Blair
Government's involvement in the 'War on Terror'. Rather than acknowledging the
foreign policy impact and angle, the Government instead centred its "focus on
'perceptions' about Western foreign policy, rather than foreign policy itself"
(Kettell, 2011: 77) and "sought to make the terror of that day foreign, even though
it appeared largely domestic" (Bulley, 2008: 379).

However, taking into consideration that the attacks were indeed of a "'home-grown'
nature", the need to address the issue of terrorism (and by extension extremism)
became more domestic (Jackson, 2018: 42). Events that are as impactful as 7/7
always lead to change (Awan et al, 2019: 47) – the bombings were a turning point
when it came to British counter-terrorism policies and by extension also counter-
extremism measures (see Sabir, 2014: 3).

In the week after the bombings, a delegation of "senior Muslim community leaders"
was invited by Tony Blair to 10 Downing Street where he "was seeking
confirmation of the position that these bombings were neither a consequence of
British foreign policy, nor an expression of Islam, but rather the product of an
extremist ideology that all present were invested in defeating" (Ghadiali, 2016: 53).
This stance had already been seen in previous speeches (see for example Blair,
2002b) and would be repeated often from then on (see for example Blair, 2005a,
Blair, 2006e, Blair, 2006f). The group was appointed to the 'Preventing Violent
Extremism Taskforce' and was to produce reports concerning "the underlying
causes of extremism" (Ghadiali, 2016: 53). As part of the PET (Preventing
Extremism Together) workshops established by the Home Office (Brighton, 2007:
1), a report was produced including "sixty-four recommendations about how
government could act to prevent home-grown terrorism" (Bail, 2011: 123).
According to Briggs (2010: 971), the establishment of the Preventing Extremism
Together Taskforce was the first sign of a community-based approach to counter-
terrorism gaining prominence again. However, one can also see it as another

extraordinary measure and threat framing by the Blair government. For one, the naming suggests that extremism, rather than terrorism has become a focal point.

In his first Commons statement 4 days after the bomb attacks in London on the 7th of July 2005, Tony Blair stated:

> "It seems probable that the attack was carried out by *Islamist extremist terrorists*, of the kind who over recent years have been responsible for so many innocent deaths in Madrid, Bali, Saudi Arabia, Russia, Kenya, Tanzania, Pakistan, Yemen, Turkey, Egypt and Morocco, of course in New York on September 11, but in many other countries too"

(Blair, 2005d) [emphasis added].

Whilst he has not used the term Islamist extremist terrorist in the past, he heavily alluded to it in a speech at the Foreign Office Conference on the 6th of January 2003, where claimed that "religious extremism through the misinterpretation of Islam is a danger all over the world" (Blair, 2003a)[152]. In these examples, he appears to convolute not only Islam and extremism, but also terrorism, engaging in Assertive securitising speech acts to evoke the image of all three as a threat to several countries (Referent Object).

At the Labour Party Conference in Brighton on the 16th of July 2005, Blair's securitising of extremism becomes more clear when he used Assertive securitising speech acts, stating that the roots of extreme ideologies are deep and can be seen "in the extremist minority that now in every European city preach hatred of the West and our way of life" (Blair, 2005b). By framing "our way of life" as the Referent Object being threatened by hate preachers (the Referent Subject), he introduced the notion of extremism as having both violent and non-violent forms and levels of danger. He continued by saying that:

> "This is what we are up against. It cannot be beaten except by confronting it, symptoms and causes, head-on. Without compromise and without delusion. The extremist propaganda is cleverly aimed at their target audience. It plays on our tolerance and good nature. (…) Their cause is not founded on an injustice[153]. It is founded on a belief, one whose fanaticism is such it can't be moderated. It can't be

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[152] See also his speech to his Sedgefield constituency at the 5th of March 2004. Whilst the focus of the speech clearly rests with the securitisation of terrorism, the securitising moves in regard to extremism cannot be underestimated. The speech itself mentions variations of extremism 5 times, including three of 'Islamic Extremism' and one of 'religious extremism' as opposed to 20 mentions of variations of terrorism (terrorist, terrorist groups, global terrorism etc.).

[153] Referring to the idea that extremism is fuelled by 'unjust' military intervention in the Middle East.

remedied. It has to be stood up to. And, of course, they will use any issue that is a matter of dissent within our democracy. But we should lay bare the almost-devilish logic behind such manipulation"

<div align="right">(Blair, 2005b).</div>

Evoking a case of urgency, "Extremist propaganda" is now presented as the Referent Subject that poses a danger due to "our society", because it is too tolerant and is failing to confront the threat. Further, fanaticism that cannot be moderated is presented as another threat through Assertive securitising speech acts. The Directive securitising speech act that it "has to be stood up to" is vague however, as Blair does not offer what the "standing up" entails. Nonetheless, he clearly positioned extremism as a security issue that needed to be fought outside of 'normal politics'. It becomes clear that, although Tony Blair wanted to confront the threat of extremism, he had no other suggestion for stopping it than to confront its ideology. One has to keep in mind that this speech was given less than two weeks after the London Bombings, when emotions where still running high. This becomes even more obvious when he closed his speech with Directive securitising speech acts, saying: "We must pull this up by its roots. Within Britain, we must join up with our Muslims community to take on the extremists. Worldwide, we should confront it everywhere it exists" (Blair, 2005b).

Here, he introduced the idea that the Muslim community bears the brunt of the responsibility for "taking on extremists", though he qualifies this by adding that this responsibility is shared with "us". This distinction between the Muslim community and "us" is in itself a concept which was later heavily criticised as leading to Islamophobia and the singling out of a group. According to Miah (2017:89), he was "one of the early political figures to conflate the idea of integration, community cohesion and radicalisation" and this speech showed that he "viewed the idea of Muslim problematic as one of the key factors contributing towards the terrorist attacks in London".

A few weeks later, during a press conference with the Spanish Prime Minister José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero in London on the 27th of July 2005, Tony Blair revealed that a part of their talks consisted in discussions about "the issue of the common struggle against terrorism and how we combat this extremism that relies and depends on a quite twisted and perverted doctrine of the religion of Islam" (Blair,

2005c). Again, terrorism and extremism are thrown together and presented as a security issue entailing 'Islamist extremism'.

On Friday the 5th of August 2005, Tony Blair gave a press briefing outside Downing Street which has been cited by many as landmark speech (see for example Bright, 2006: 21) in which he uttered the since then frequently quoted words "Let no-one be in any doubt, the rules of the game are changing" (Blair, 2005a) (see for example by Demirsu, 2017: 83, McGhee, 2012: 121, Walker, 2013: 547, Norton, 2007: 118, and Beloff, 2007: 292[154]). Speaking domestically about extremism, the main theme in this speech is that of Islamist extremism being framed as the threat to the Referent Objects of British Society. He introduced extraordinary measures to stop the threat of not only extremism but terrorism. Whilst it is important to keep in mind that at this point, the discourse merges the two concepts often, the following securitising speech acts refer to extremism alone, indicating that it is being presented as a threat in its own right.

Tony Blair started off with an Assertive securitising speech act, stating, "I have been asked to deal firmly with those prepared to engage in such extremism; and most particularly those who incite it or proselytise it" (Blair, 2005a). Here, he indicates that it is not just him who wants these new measures implemented and he frames extremists who incite terror (or preach it) as the Referent Subject. He went on to point out that these measures were also being called for by the Muslim community themselves when he stated that:

> "Much of the insistence on strong action to weed out extremism is coming most vigorously from Muslims themselves, deeply concerned lest the activities of the fanatical fringe should contaminate the good reputation of the mainstream Muslim community in our country"

> (Blair, 2005a).

In this way he frames the mainstream Muslim community as another Referent Object that is threatened by the Referent Subject of extremism while at the same time evoking the picture of good vs bad Islam again.

As for specific measures, citing "the changed conditions in Britain" he uses the Commissive securitising speech at to commit that "we will legislate further, including, if necessary amending the Human Rights Act" to modify the regulations

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[154] Who states that this was Blair voicing 'populist philosophy'.

on deportations. This is a clear indicator that the issue of terrorism (and extremism by extension) has been moved outside the political agenda and firmly placed in the security sphere. By evoking a 'state of emergency', Tony Blair now legitimises the violation of Human Rights in order to curb the threat at hand, clearly moving outside 'normal' politics by putting "limitations on inviable rights" (see Buzan et al 1998: 24).

By stating that once "the new grounds take effect, there will be a list drawn up of specific extremist websites, bookshops, centres, networks and particular organisations of concern", he evoked the image of extremism as a Referent Subject and continued by saying that "active engagement with any of these will be a trigger for the home secretary to consider the deportation of any foreign national" (Blair, 2005a). The following quote further highlights the extraordinary measures already implemented as well as those suggested via Directive and Commissive securitising speech acts:

> "We have already powers to strip citizenship from those individuals with British or dual nationality who act in a way that is contrary to the interests of this country. We will now consult on extending these powers, applying them to naturalised citizens engaged in extremism and making the procedures simpler and more effective"

> (Blair, 2005a).

It becomes clear that the stripping of British citizenship from "citizens engaged in extremism" is an indicator of the securitisation of extremism, not just terrorism[155]. This is further solidified when Tony Blair said:

> "We will consult on a new power to order closure of a place of worship which is used as a centre for fomenting extremism and will consult with Muslim leaders in respect of those clerics who are not British citizens, to draw up a list of those not suitable to preach who will be excluded from Britain"

> (Blair, 2005a).

Not only did he suggest that religious (in this case Islamic) places of worship are "centres for fomenting extremism", he further presented the measure of banning

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[155] By presenting an issue as an existential threat, the securitising actor "has claimed a right to handle the issue through extraordinary means, to break the normal political rules of the game (e.g. in the form of secrecy, levying taxes or conscription, placing limitations on inviolable rights, or focusing society's energy and resources on a specific task)" (Buzan et al, 1998: 24). It is also important to look at the lack of debate surrounding the implementation of the new legislation as observed by Mills (2016: 11), who stated that "[t]he changes to deprivation powers were voted through with complete silence from the press".

and or excluding non-British citizens who are considered "not suitable to preach" without stating what a suitability to preach entails. Again, a breaking of norms indicating that securitisation is afoot. He seems to be aware of the danger of vilifying Islam as a whole when he said "I want to make it clear, yet again, that this is not in any way whatever aimed at the decent, law-abiding Muslim community of Britain" (Blair, 2005a). However, he further evoked the image of the good versus the bad Muslim. His discourse of conjuring the impression of the 'other' is further solidified when he claimed:

> "(…) coming to Britain is not a right. And even when people have come here, staying here carries with it a duty. That duty is to share and support the values that sustain the British way of life. Those that break that duty and try to incite hatred or engage in violence against our country and its people, have no place here"

> (Blair, 2005a).

Dividing "the category 'Muslim' into 'good Muslims', whose faith they respected, and 'bad Muslims', who were traitors, blasphemers, and hijackers of Islam" is a rhetorical strategy frequently employed by Blair (and US president Bush) according to Jackson (2018: 44). Especially in this speech, "Muslims became more explicitly targeted in political discourse" (Latour, 2014: 44) than before the 7/7 attacks.

4.4.1. Extraordinary measures against the threat

As for extraordinary measures, the August speech evoked many. For example Tony Blair's announcement of "new powers to combat terrorism" and his statement the he would be willing to amend the Human Rights act to make these new powers possible (see Norton, 2007: 118) show that he had created a state of urgency. These new policies, "drawing on counterinsurgency theory and practice" (Miller & Sabir, 2012: 20), would have been harder to suggest had he previously not evoked a state of emergency. Derek McGhee (2012: 121ff) also analysed the speech for securitisation and argues that "Blair satisfied many of Buzan et al.'s criteria (in the form of internal and external conditions) for a successful securitizing speech act, including 'internal conditions' associated with the construction of a plot replete with 'existential threat, a point of no return, and a possible way out'[156]".

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[156] Buzan, Weaver and de Wilde, Security, p.33.

For McGhee (2012: 123), taking a sociological[157] stance to securitisation, Tony Blair's intention was to generate "a consensus, in the form of a dominant discourse that would marginalize opposing and alternative discourses" in order to "to grant himself and his government the permission to fight terrorism as they saw fit". Whilst this interpretation seems fitting, it is not one the author of this thesis ascribes to, based on her different ontological stance whereby she does not address the intention of the speaker so much as what it is that the speaker is conveying (in the sense of meaning what they say). Therefore, she will now briefly explore Tony Blair's suggested measures in more detail.

According to Walker (2013: 548), the "implementation of these proposals signalled a considerable retreat from human rights principles and became a serious source of friction within the Blair government and the two Houses of Parliament". After the announcement for legislative change in August 2005, the Terrorism Act 2006 (TA 2006) was not passed until March 2006 even though "the Act's debate history stressed the need for haste in passing the Act" (Parker, 2007: 713-714). Having realised that the likelihood of British born terrorists being influenced domestically rather than just internationally was considerable, as demonstrated by the 7/7 attacks, the TA 2006 was supported by the belief that "the British government has been so far 'soft' on extremism going on in their own territory (Demirsu, 2017: 84).

When Tony Blair "proposed the criminalisation of the vaguer 'condoning or glorifying of terrorism[158]' in September 2005, he was not able to do so. Though he was successful in ensuring that "the 'encouragement of terrorism'" was included in the TA 2006 as an offence (Saul 2005:870-871 in Heath-Kelly, 2012: 74). That this is an extraordinary measure regarding extremism can be argued due to its focus on terrorism inciting speech (ergo extremism) as opposed to acts of terrorism. Also, this can be considered an "infringement on freedom of speech" (Landman, 2007: 85). According to Heath-Kelly (2012: 74-75) such

> "measures display sovereign power, in that they remove liberty from those 'encouraging terrorism', but this deployment of rule is intermixed with biopolitical logics of managing population and the prevention of extremist ideology 'infecting' other persons"

> (Heath-Kelly, 2012: 74-75).

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[157] He is also a sociologist.

[158] Referring to the concept of extremism.

Similar views are echoed by Kundnani (2014: 84) who believes that the TA 2006 was therefore "not preventing incitement to violence" (already covered by other laws) but "about criminalizing a wider set of Islamist ideological messages". However, the TA 2006 was just part of a wide-ranging legislative response to terrorism[159] (and by extension extremism) in response to the 7/7 attack, for example the Immigration, Nationality, and Asylum Act 2006[160].

Addressing the United Nations on the 15th of September 2005, Tony Blair insisted on the 'foreignness' of the attack based on its ideology (Bulley, 2008: 381). Whilst not explicitly framing extremism as a threat, he uses the Assertive speech act stating that: "[people] will never willingly accept the suppression of human rights and governance by extremism" (Blair, 2005f). This can be seen in his wider agenda of wanting to enable 'common values' to act as the antidote against extremism and by extension terrorism. Had previously 'foreign extremism' been "the cause of Islamist terrorist attacks, a value-driven British Islam was stressed as its solution" (Jackson, 2018: 32) as evidenced in the speech by Blair (2005a) previously.

According to Roach (2011: 298-299), it took the Blair government longer than expected to implement "his domestic extremism agenda" despite its majority in Parliament. He argues that this "demonstrated the ability of Parliament to resist the most extreme of the government's proposals" (Roach, 2011: 299). At this point in time the government also started to try to focus again on its Prevent strand of CONTEST, "which sought to prevent violent extremism" (Allen, 2017: 67). At the time, Prevent was representing "the government's attempt to support and promote a British Islam that would counter extremism and radicalism in Muslim communities, yet it was predicated on the articulation of Britishness as a remedy for terrorism and the notion that Muslims were dangerous, suspicious, and particularly susceptible to violent extremism" (Jackson, 2018: 46). However, it became the "central policy consequence of the July 2005 attacks" according to Jackson (2018: 47).

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[159] For more see Landman (2007).

[160] In the *Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006 (c. 13) 54 (1) (b)* it is added that "acts of encouraging or inducing others to commit, prepare or instigate terrorism (whether or not the acts amount to an actual or inchoate offence)".

4.5. The 'foreign' becomes a domestic threat

The danger of extremism abroad affecting the United Kingdom is a theme which is often observable in Tony Blair's speeches. During an interview at the London Conference on Afghanistan on the 31st of January 2006, he stated:

> "But the reason we should want to be in Afghanistan is *for our own security*, not just that of the Afghan people. If we allow Afghanistan to be taken back over by these deeply repressive appalling people who want to use Afghanistan as a source of the drugs trade, oppression and then export terrorism and this extremism around the world, if we are going to let that happen then we will feel the effect of that in London, in Europe, in the Arab and Muslim world, in the region of Asia"

> (Blair, 2006b) [emphasis added].

The Referent Subject (the non-democratic Afghanistan) is presented as a "breeding ground for terrorism and extremism" affecting the Referent Objects (the world, Europe, the Arab and Muslim world, etc.) but most importantly 'our own security' whereby military intervention is the suggested extraordinary measure to stop the threat. By following the grammar of security ('something is an existential threat, here is what we need to do to stop it'), Tony Blair succeeds in his securitising speech acts.

Tony Blair was the patron of *The Foreign Policy Centre* in 2006[161], self-described as "The European Thinktank with a Global Outlook". His speech to the Foreign Policy centre on the 21st of March 2006, published in "The Guardian", is very important with regards to his securitisation of extremism. The speech is also known as the ''Clash about civilisations' speech (see Bulley, 2008: 394). In it Blair made "his position clear, as never before" regarding what he perceived as the threats facing the world and Britain (Bright, 2006: 21). He articulated his ideas of empowering 'moderate' Muslims against 'extreme Islam' (Curtis, 2012: 312). The whole speech heavily focuses on extremism, but also introduces more of the framing of it being a domestic, "home-grown" threat as opposed to the previous discourse of locating it as an external, international issue affecting the Referent Object of Great Britain's safety on a national level. Nevertheless, although acknowledging that extremism is prevalent in the United Kingdom, he insisted that it has been brought about by external influences when he says the following about Mohammed Sadiq Khan, one of the 7/7 bombers:

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[161] See https://fpc.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2006/09/240-1.pdf for letter paper.

> "He may have been born here. *But his ideology wasn't.* And that is why it has to be taken on, everywhere. This terrorism will not be defeated until its ideas, the poison that warps the minds of its adherents, are confronted, head-on, in their essence, at their core"

> (Blair, 2006f) [emphasis added].

As previously stated, the notion of the extremism leading to violence as not having originated in the United Kingdom, but in the Middle East, is a theme which Tony Blair expands on in many of his speeches (see for example Blair, 2006a, 2006c, 2006d).

While preceding speeches by Blair mentioned extremism less, here it is mentioned 16 times in various phrasings (extremis*). However, the 25 mentions of terrori* in the same speech also show that it is still a security issue which is overshadowed by terrorism, despite its being presented as heavily interlinked.

> "The roots of global terrorism and extremism are indeed deep. They reach right down through decades of alienation, victimhood and political oppression in the Arab and Muslim world"

> (Blair, 2006g).

The following, in the form of Assertive and Directive securitising speech acts, illustrates how Tony Blair securitised not only extremism but also bundled it together with "conflict or injustice".

> "(…) unless we articulate a common global policy based on common values, we risk chaos threatening our stability, economic and political, through letting extremism, conflict or injustice go unchecked"

> (Blair, 2006g).

He continues with the theme of extremism being a threat to British society, and the next quote shows that he himself is aware of the offence being taken to his use of the term "Islamic extremism". However, it also illustrates the contestation of the securitisation of extremism inside the government, showing that, despite Blair's authority, his audience did not immediately agree with his securitising acts.

> "There is an interesting debate going on inside government today about how to counter extremism in British communities. Ministers have been advised never to use the term "Islamist extremist". It will give offence. It is true. It will"

> (Blair, 2006g).

However, he continued to defend the use of the term with the following illustration:

> "There are those - perfectly decent-minded people - who say the extremists who commit these acts of terrorism are not true Muslims. And, of course, they are right. They are no more proper Muslims than the Protestant bigot who murders a Catholic in Northern Ireland is a proper Christian.

> But, unfortunately, he is still a "Protestant" bigot. To say his religion is irrelevant is both completely to misunderstand his motive and to refuse to face up to the strain of extremism within his religion that has given rise to it"

(Blair, 2006g).

Thereby, he firmly lumps together extremism and religion, indicating that misunderstood forms of religion lead to extremism. Again, he evokes the imagery of the good, decent Muslim standing up to the extremists, which is also mirrored in statements such as "The extremism is not the true voice of Islam" (Blair, 2006g).

Speaking about extremist Islam, he frames its ideology as the threat to the Referent Subject of "We" which he highlights is not just the West but " "We" are those who believe in religious tolerance, openness to others, to democracy, liberty and human rights administered by secular courts" (Blair, 2006g). This shows that in his speech acts, what is threatened is not just society but "democracy, liberty and human rights administered by secular courts" (Blair, 2006g). He continued to call it a "clash about civilisation", stating that "It is the age-old battle between progress and reaction, between those who embrace and see opportunity in the modern world and those who reject its existence; between optimism and hope on the one hand; and pessimism and fear on the other" (Blair, 2006g). He went on: "where our security is held in common or not at all, the outcome of this clash between extremism and progress is utterly determinative of our future here in Britain" (Blair, 2006g).

As an 'antidote' to fight 'Islamic extremism' he suggested via Directive securitising speech acts, 'moderate' Islam, which in itself can be seen as an extraordinary measure for several reasons. For one, a secular state such as the UK should not usually intervene in the religious affairs of its citizens. Furthermore, it indicates a strong move towards an us versus them mentality, potentially alienating British Muslims. Also, given the sensitivity of religious matters, interference and deciding what is a moderate and what is an 'extreme' belief proves outside the state's purview.

According to Gilmore (2014: 27) in this speech, Blair "implicitly characterised those who reject liberal values as barbaric or uncivilised, rather than as adhering to

a different worldview". Bulley (2008: 382) believes that Tony Blair was framing the ideology behind terrorism as 'foreign' but also tied it together "with a range of other international issues: regional unrest, environmental issues and mass migration". It does indeed appear as though Blair used many Assertive and Directive securitising speech acts to present extremism as a security issue but also to frame the 'battle' against it as one between 'The West' and 'Foreign Islam'. Wood (2017: 78) argues that this narrative "may inflame attitudes by dismissing Islamic ideologies and the opinions some may have of the West and Britain". However, when Tony Blair appeared at an evidence session with the Prime Minister by the Liaison Committee on the 4th of July 2006, talking about his stance on fighting extremism[162], he is quoted as having said (with regards to Islamic extremism and Muslim Communities in the UK):

> "If we want to defeat the extremism, we have got to defeat its ideas and we have got to address the completely false sense of grievance against the West"

(Blair in BBC News, 2006).

Again, it can be observed that Blair frames the defeating of ideas as the extraordinary measure meant to curb the threat of extremism. But he also insists on Middle Eastern grievances against the West being unjustified. He also acknowledges that a community approach is needed and that "In the end, government itself cannot go and root out the extremism in these communities" (Blair in BBC News, 2006).

The next day in Parliament, on the 5th of July 2006, opposition leader David Cameron, referring to the aforementioned statements, agreed with Tony Blair stating that he "was right to emphasise the role that the Muslim community itself should play in helping to root out extremism". However, he added that "we all have a role to play in helping to foster a greater sense of common citizenship" (Cameron in HC Deb Vol 448 Col 809, 05 July 2006), almost foreshadowing his later policies which centred on a community surveillance approach. This can be seen as an acceptance of Tony Blair's securitisation of Islamic extremism by David Cameron. He proceeded to question the Prime Minister about the need for an "ambitious

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[162] However, although the author could find the minutes to the meeting (https://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons-committees/liaison/Formal-Minutes-2005-06.pdf), she could not find a transcript and can only go by secondary quotes from a BBC News article.

nationwide programme, including youth volunteering and school exchanges" (Cameron in HC Deb Vol 448 Col 809, 05 July 2006). Tony Blair's response was a foreshadowing of the "British Values to defeat extremism" approach later implemented with the Prevent Strategies (2008, 2009, 2011, 2015a, 2015b): he highlighted the importance of "fostering good community relations" and the sharing of "the British values of tolerance, respect for other people, democracy and liberty" (Blair in HC Deb Vol 448 Col 809, 05 July 2006). Whilst Blair had previously suggested the idea that values could defeat extremism, he had not been as specific as to call them "British values" but had talked about "values that sustain the British way of life" (Blair, 2005e) and "common values" (Blair, 2006g). In the same debate he continued to employ Directive securitising speech acts by saying:

> "The fact is that we are all going to have work very hard at rooting out extremism. We face a global movement with a global ideology, and we will defeat it only when we defeat its ideas as well as its methods"
> (Blair in HC Deb Vol 448 Col 809, 05 July 2006).

In order to stop the threat of extremism, a community approach is suggested which further securitises extremism (in this case 'Islamic extremism') as an ideological security threat.

Tony Blair's Speech at Georgetown University on the 26th of May 2006 employs several securitising speech acts with regards to Iraq, which he framed as the Referent Subject whose threat entails "religious fanaticism". He further stated that (referring to religious extremists) "They have come to Iraq because they see it as the battleground. The battle they are fighting is nothing to do with the liberation of Iraq, but its subjugation to their extremism" (Blair, 2006h). He tries to justify previous military intervention by stating that it was not the cause for more radicalisation but that religious fanatics "would still have found provocation in our very existence" in any way and that they "disagree with our way of life, our values and in particular in our tolerance. They hate us but probably they hate those Muslims who believe in tolerance, even more, as apostates betraying the true faith" (Blair, 2006h). Not only does he differentiate between moderate Muslims which he does not consider a threat, but he also frames "us" as the Referent Object.

Along the lines of the previous indications of terrorism being the result of extremism, he states (talking about the Iraqi people) that "The terrorism that afflicts them is the same that afflicts us. Its roots are out there in the Middle East, in the

brutal combination of secular dictatorship and religious extremism" (Blair, 2006h). There are several things to unpack from this particular quote. For one, he uses Assertive securitising speech acts to describe the threat, but he also indicates where the threat is located. He then frames both "us" and the Middle East as the Referent Object.

On the 18th of July 2006, Tony Blair gave a statement about the G8 Summit in the House of Commons, which took place between the 15th and 17th of July in St. Petersburg Russia. Although his securitisation of extremism operates on an international level, the framing here is one seen in previous speech acts. He stated that tensions at the time between Israel and Lebanon

> "began with acts of extremism by militant groups that were, as the G8 said unanimously, without any justification and were, of course, designed to provoke the very response that followed. In the communiqué issued by the G8, we refer to and condemn the activities of the extremist groups and, more elliptically, as we say, "those that support them"."   (Blair in HC Deb Vol 449 Col 151-152, 18 July 2006).

This stance is very important as he seems to distinguish between extremists and their supporters but fails to expand on a justification for this discourse. However, it appears that this is a step towards the securitisation of non-violent extremism, whereby extremism in previous securitising speech acts had almost always been associated with violent acts.

His statement continued with the image of the dangerous Muslim extremist, even though he does not explicitly use the term when he suggested:

> "All over the middle east [sic], there are those who want to modernise their nations and who believe, as we do, in democracy and liberty and tolerance, but ranged against them are extremists who believe the opposite—who believe in fundamentalist states and are at war not against Israel's actions, but against its existence"
>
> (Blair in HC Deb Vol 449 Col 153, 18 July 2006).

This further highlights the othering and 'us versus them' theme he frequently uses by contrasting extremists to the Referent Object of democracy, liberty, and tolerance in the Middle East, but also indirectly the United Kingdom.

4.5.1. The 'Arc of Extremism'

In his speech to the Los Angeles World Affairs Council on the 1st of August 2006[163], Tony Blair further contests the idea that terrorism is a product of poverty, arguing instead that "it will use the cause of poverty" (Blair, 2006f). He uses the Assertive securitising speech act to state "It is based on religious extremism. That is the fact. And not any religious extremism; but a specifically Muslim version" (Blair, 2006f). This further shows his securitisation of 'Islamic extremism', in particular the threat being caused by the 'bad' kind of Islam, not the mainstream moderate one. It is during this speech where he first introduces the concept of the "arc of extremism" which is later picked up on by David Cameron during parliamentary questioning on Iran and Iraq (see HC Deb Vol 457 Col 267, 21 February 2007).

For Tony Blair, the arc of extremism is "now stretching across the Middle East and touching, with increasing definition, countries far outside that region" (Blair, 2006f). He thereby frames "the arc of extremism" as the Referent Subject which poses a threat to the Referent Object of global and national security. With a Directive securitising speech act, he suggested extraordinary measures to combat the threat by saying: "we will not win the battle against this global extremism unless we win it at the level of values *as much as force*, unless we show we are even-handed, fair and just in our application of those values to the world" (Blair, 2006f) [emphasis added]. The use of force, in this case alluding to military action, clearly breaks free from 'normal' politics. His approach becomes more apparent when he went on to say:

> "we need a whole strategy for the Middle East. If we are faced with an arc of extremism, we need a corresponding arc of moderation and reconciliation. (…) I said at the outset that the result of this struggle had effects wider than the region itself. Plainly that applies to our own security"

> (Blair, 2006f). [164]

For Curtis (2012: 263-264) the speech shows signs of the 'divide and rule' strategy when Blair proposes "an 'alliance of moderation (pro-Western states) against the

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[163] One hast to keep in mind here that the speech was given during the height of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon (Sidaway, 2008: 3) and many Labour MPs were unsatisfied with "Blair's refusal to condemn Israel's disproportionate attacks and his failure to call for a ceasefire" (Bower, 2016: 622).

[164] During the Debate on the Address on the 15th of November, regarding the government's policy in the Middle East, Tony Blair makes further remarks of extremism in the region being "not just a tragedy for those two countries but a tragedy for the security of the world, including this country" (Blair in HC Deb Volume 453 Col 23, 15 November 2006).

'arc of extremism' (official enemies) in the Middle East". One has to keep in mind here that according to Allen (2011: 4-5), Tony Blair was suffering from a loss of political authority by the summer 2006 and was confronted by inner party revolts which lead him to announce in September 2006 that he was to step down in late 2007 to make room for Gordon Brown. Proceeding this announcement he had addressed the 138th annual Trades Union Congress in Brighton on the 12th of September 2006 where he employed the tactic of dog whistling[165] to the audience when he stated: "In respect of terrorism, there is a large part of the Western world inclined to believe the true threat is George Bush not Islamist extremism" (Blair, 2006e). The author of this thesis suggests that the phrasing of this sentence is deliberate as it can be construed to mean that Tony Blair agreed that George Bush was the "true threat" in order to appeal to his audience, which mostly consisted of people who opposed military intervention in the Middle East (left leaning trade unionists). Therefore, it can be argued that he employed this "dog whistling" in order to appeal more to his audience. His speech continues along the theme of the good versus the bad Muslim when he says:

> "Some days ago, I met some of the younger mainstream activists within the British community. I was excited by their intelligence and determination. They don't want to pander to this extremism but confront it. We should support them"

> (Blair, 2006e).

Again, one can see his use of Directive and Assertive securitising speech acts to frame the threat of (Islamic) extremism towards the Referent Object of "Mainstream Islam" whilst at the same time calling out the audience to help protect the Referent Object. He continues along the same lines during his leader's speech at the Labour Party Conference in Manchester on the 26th of September 2006 where he said (with regards to terrorism):

> "And its victims are mainly Muslim.
>
> This is not our war against Islam.
>
> This is a war fought by extremists who pervert the true faith of Islam. And all of us, Western and Arab, Christian or Muslim, who put the value of tolerance, respect and peaceful co-existence above those of sectarian hatred, should join together to defeat them.

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[165] According to Khoo (2017: 33), dog whistles are code words that "involve sending a message that can only be heard by audience members with suitably sensitive ears" He quotes political campaign manager Richard Morin for introducing the term in 1988.

> It is not British soldiers who are sending car bombs into Baghdad or Kabul to slaughter the innocent"

> (Blair, 2006c).

By highlighting "Mainstream Islam" as the Referent Object against Islamic extremists, he simultaneously achieves his speech act of Directives and Assertives to securitise extremism. It is also important to observe his framing of British soldiers as being non-violent towards the innocent, as it leaves room for interpretation as to whether the violence against the non-innocent by British soldiers was therefore justifiable. Kettell (2011: 82-83) calls this a strawman argument against commentors blaming the UK's military Middle East involvement as the cause of terrorism. Instead, he argues that Blair rhetorically aimed to frame the "causes of terrorism [as] distinctly void of any culpability on the part of the West", instead placing blame on 'extremism' and subsequently Islam (Kettell, 2011: 83). This is an interesting argument as it might explain Tony Blair's continued emphasis on the danger of ideology, allowing him to stir away from potentially having caused or increased the threat though recent military intervention, but also going back further in history. For example, the instability in the region had been linked to colonialism but also explicitly to British involvement in the past (see Curtis, 2012).

The notion that stability in the region affects the security of the United Kingdom can be also seen during the questioning at the House of Commons on the 18th of October 2006. Tony Blair was asked by David Cameron to explain his government policies with regards to Iraq and, in doing so, he employed Assertive and Directive securitising speech acts, saying:

> "I believe that the maintenance of democracy is absolutely essential for us, in Iraq and in Afghanistan. I know it is difficult, but our task is to stand with the moderates in those countries against the extremists"

> (Blair in HC Deb Vol 450 Col 867, 18 October 2006).

The Assertive securitising speech act alludes to the notion of extremists being a security threat whilst the Directive securitising speech act requests a curbing of the threat by standing up to it.

4.5.2. Confronting the internal threat

When the Prevent programme was officially announced in October 2006, it was presumed to be in direct response to the 7/7 bombings, however, according to Thomas (2010: 443), previous events such as 9/11 had helped "to convince the

government that it had a significant Muslim problem in relation to attractions to violent extremism" long before. This was also evidenced in the previous chapter (Chapter 3), (see for example Home Office, 2002: 9). Here the government officially introduced the Preventing Violent Extremism (PVE) path-finder fund "with a £6 million budget for priority local authorities (those with Muslim populations greater than 5%)" (Jackson, 2018: 48). This can be seen as the successful implementation of an extraordinary measure previously suggested in Tony Blair's securitising speech acts.

In his "The Duty to integrate: shared British Values" speech, given at Downing Street, Tony Blair spoke to an invited audience of school children at an event which was organised by the Runnymede Trust on the 8th of December 2006. The speech continued the 'common values' discourse previously shown in the Preventing Violent Extremism polices under CONTEST I (Miah, 2017: 75). Talking about integration and stating that it is about values ("It is about integrating at the point of shared, common unifying British values"), he comments:

> "Others warned me against putting the issue in the context of 7/7, of terrorism, of our Muslim community. After all, extremism is not confined to Muslims, as we know from Northern Ireland and fringe elements in many ethnic groups. But actually what should give us optimism in dealing with this issue, is precisely that point. It is true there are extremists in other communities. But the reason we are having this debate is not generalised extremism"

> (Blair, 2006c: 2).

Mirroring some statements from the Lord Mayor's Banquet speech on the 12th of November 2001 (see Blair, 2001c), Tony Blair alluded that the problem of extremism "is not a problem with Britons of Hindu, Afro-Caribbean, Chinese or Polish origin. Nor is it a problem with the majority of the Muslim community. Most Muslims are proud to be British and Muslim and are thoroughly decent law-abiding citizens. But it is a problem with a minority of that community, particularly originating from certain countries" (Blair, 2006c: 2).

Whilst it initially appears that Blair aims to stir away from associating extremism with Islam, closer reading shows that he still frames this 'non-generalised extremism' as a threat to the Referent Object of Britain's Security. According to Arènes (2014: 58), Blair "framed the question of radicalisation as a question of integration, to be understood within the wider framework of community relations

in Britain", indicating that "the 7/7 bombers seemed to have become terrorists due to a lack of integration in the British social fabric". In this case, it is British Muslims who become the Referent Object of the threat (Referent Subject) of radicalisation and extremism. Or as put by Brown (2008: 478) Tony Blair gives the "perception that British Muslims are not fully engaged with 'the British way of life'". At this point one can argue that the British Muslims had become "a source of violence, (but) this time as potential terrorists" (Çilingir, 2020: 171). Jackson (2018: 162) believes that in this speech, "Blair problematised Muslims" when he related them to perceived threats of "extremism, terrorism and lack of integration". The speech highlights that it was the 'lack of integration' which lead to the 7/7 bombers violence, rather than British military action in the Middle East (Brighton, 2007: 2).

4.6. Conclusion

It was on the 27th of June 2007 that Tony Blair finally gave up his position, having announced his resignation date officially a month earlier (Allen, 2011: 6). He ended up being "the only Labour leader to win three successive general elections" but his performance as Prime Minister has not been rated highly (Garnett & Dorey, 2016: 606). In the end, he struggled with the aftermath of his decision to have Britain involved in the Iraq invasion (Cook, 2013: 43). Some argue that it was the War on Terror with its "negative political implications" that led to his downfall (Duffy, 2008: 38). For instance, some point to "the UK's willingness under the Blair administration to countenance the fabrication of evidence relating to weapons of mass destruction, and then to commit British troops to the invasion of a sovereign state without proper sanction from the UN" as an example of this (Porter, 2014: 125). Looking at his political behaviour after 9/11 however demonstrates that he ended up shifting "from a traditional foreign policy agenda to a more ethics-oriented one" even earlier (see Kosovo), something which Blair also emphasised rhetorically (Mumford & Selck, 2010: 308).

It is not surprising that Tony Blair employed securitising speech acts regarding the international threat of extremism as it had been observed before that "fragile states" were securitised in order to legitimise military interventions (see Lambach, 2015: 439). Whilst this thesis does not claim to analyse the reasoning behind securitisation, it can still be assumed that Tony Blair, given his emphasis on the

dangers of extremism abroad, used the mechanism of securitisation to justify but also to explain military action in Afghanistan and Iraq. This is also in line with his denial that any form of terrorist threat had anything to do with Britain's military involvement abroad – something he did not present as a catalyst for Muslim grievances in Britain. Instead, he locates 'Islamic extremism' as the source of terrorism and violence. It therefore can be observed that Blair believes that terrorism "derives from a modern ''Islamic extremism'' that has contaminated the Muslim and Arab mind" (Cook, 2013: 55) which he continuously securitises as 'foreign' and non-British.

Regarding Tony Blair's suggestion of extraordinary measures against the threat of extremism, one of his main legacies regarding the topic is the TA 2006 which will continue to impact counterextremism measures for years to come. Also, the Prevent strategy which he and his government introduced in the aftermath of the 7/7 London attacks. As a proactive approach to countering radicalisation and extremist influences on the local level (Heath-Kelly, 2017: 300), the Prevent strategy can be considered an extraordinary measure, given its focus on the pre-crime stage. Tony Blair's focus on community engagement with Muslim groups, however, was seen as hypocritical given his association with the Iraq war and his continued framing of Muslims as a threat (see Briggs, 2010: 974). Especially, as pointed out by Bail (2011: 124), by aiming to empower "moderate Islam" he was running the danger of creating "artificial divisions within the British Muslim community".

It appears that Tony Blair's overall security discourse focused very much on terrorism. However, by extension, he would frame extremism as a threat (Referent Subject) to several Referent Objects (British safety, British Muslims etc). When Tony Blair talked about extremism, it was most often, especially towards the end of his premiership, in the context of religious extremism, in particular Islamic extremism. An analysis of his speeches shows that he never really framed other forms of extremism as a threat. Rather, he securitised Islamic extremism as a driver of violence. One can also observe that the notion of drawing a distinction between violent and non-violent extremism subtly entered his discourse over time. Whilst he was often intermingling extremism and terrorism in speeches following the 9/11 attacks (see for example Blair, 2002a), he started singling out extremism as the source of terrorism after the 7/7 bombings. The main idea he portrayed was that

extreme religious ideology leads to extremism, and extremism leads to terrorism. Another heavily featured theme is that "distorted Islam" is dangerous, but not "true Islam". Instead, moderate or 'mainstream' Islam is seen as an antidote to extremism.

Using Assertive securitising speech acts he was able to frame extremism as the source of terrorism and was able to evoke a state of urgency. Also, his use of Directive securitising speech acts often suggested ways of curbing the threats in question, using his position of authority to get people to do something. He also committed himself to countering the threat via Commissive securitising speech acts, introducing extraordinary measures (see Table 7). It appears, that overall, the most often used securitising speech acts by Tony Blair are Directives and Commissives, followed by Assertives. There is only one occasion in which he used a Declarative securitising speech act (see also Table 7) with regards to extremism, though it was in relation to animal rights extremism and not religiously motivated extremism.

One can takeaway from this analysis that Tony Blair did employ securitising speech acts most often in regards to 'Islamic Extremism', which he repeatedly presented as security threat not only on an international level (especially pre 7/7) but also domestically (after 7/7). He was often criticised for his terminology and one has to point out that the "accusations of 'Islamophobic policing'" (Klausen, 2009: 417) seem to be grounded in his discourse but also in the implementation of his suggested measures against the security issue of 'Islamic Extremism'. This was seen in the Prevent Strategy and its exclusive emphasis on Islam-related extremism. One should also remember that Tony Blair was able to claim interpretive sovereignty due to his position as acting head of state, allowing him to dictate the political discourse. Upon his resignation, the "notion of a 'war on terror' has [also] been rejected" (Syrett, 2015: 194) and Gordon Brown stopped using it (Bleich, 2014:144-145). He would also go on to stop using the term 'Islamic extremism'. This will be discussed in the next chapter, which will explore and analyse the securitisation of extremism by Gordon Brown and how he presented extremism differently than Blair in his securitising speech acts.

5. Gordon Brown and shared values to counter the threat of violent extremism

"It is by seeking to build on shared interests and shared values that we will isolate extremists and foster understanding across faiths"

(Brown in HC Deb Vol 467 Col 672, 14 November 2007)

5.1. Introduction

This chapter investigates the securitising speech acts regarding extremism by Gordon Brown as Prime Minister of the United Kingdom and primarily covers the time from June 2007 until May 2010. The analysis encompasses Gordon Brown's (parliamentary) speeches, statements, and press releases covering securitising discourses concerning extremism. By applying the 'Securitising Speech Act Classification' in order to study securitisation, the author explores how Brown framed the issue of extremism as a threat to survival to various Referent Objects via securitising speech acts. Further, she examines which extraordinary measures he suggested to curb the threat and whether he was able to keep extremism on the security agenda. Gordon Brown was elected to Parliament in 1983 and took the seat for the Scottish constituency Dunfermline East (Keegan, 2004); his position in the Labour Party was an important one as he was considered the co-author of New Labour, alongside Blair (S. Richards, 2020). He was the Chancellor of the Exchequer from 1997, when Labour came into power, until 2007 when he first took over Labour party leadership upon the resignation of Tony Blair, becoming Prime Minister on the 27th of June 2007 (Allport, 2009). Gordon Brown and Tony Blair, although both the faces of 'New Labour' had very different communication styles. Theakston (2011: 83-84) argues that "whilst Blair was deemed persuasive and able to connect to his audiences, Brown's style of speech was seen as too intellectual".

It was not just different verbal styles but also the aftermath of the 'war on terror' which set the two apart. The 9/11 terror attacks had led to a 'crusade against terror' by US president George Bush, a project which was supported by then Prime Minister Tony Blair who had involved the United Kingdom in the war against the Taliban in Afghanistan and subsequently the Iraq invasion in 2003. This proved to be controversial, the British public was not supportive and showed their disapproval with protests. Blair's own government was also not accommodating, spurring the

resignation of four ministers (Allen, 2011: 20). According to Whitman, (2010: 840), removing British troops from Iraq and the increased UK involvement in Afghanistan were the UK government's two main foreign policy issues from 2005 to 2010. Whilst Tony Blair was on good terms with George Bush, Gordon Brown had signalled "something of a break with the Blair approach to the 'special relationship'[166] in calling for a greater multilateralism and emphasising the EU's potential as a military actor" when he took over the role of Prime Minister (Betts & Phythian, 2020: 215).

Concerning Brown's overall approach to dealing with terrorism, he did not stir away much from previous Blair policies. For example, in June 2008, he resumed the debate over the detention of terrorist suspects without charge and pressed for an extension of the existing twenty-eight-day limit to 42 days. Brown, like Blair before, faced opposition, eventually having his proposal rejected by the House of Lords. Nevertheless, the British public seemed to be more tolerant towards increased security measures in the name of terrorism prevention (Allen, 2011: 19), which shows an institutionalisation of the threat. One has to remember that the UK's counter-extremism policy is rooted in its counter-terrorism policies (Rivers, 2018: 269). Hence, many extraordinary measures relating to extremism are visible, for example, in terrorism legislation (see Chapter 3).

McGhee (2012: 118) sees Gordon Brown as a desecuritising actor regarding "'terrorism' and counter-terrorism" (as opposed to Tony Blair who was previously in office). Whilst this might be somewhat the case regarding terrorism, the hypothesis does not equally hold when it comes to the securitisation of extremism. Gordon Brown does indeed show signs of moving extremism back to the political agenda (as opposed to the realm or urgency and security) (see for example Brown, 2008c). However, there are more occasions where he does the opposite, further emphasising extremism as an existential danger to overall security (see for instance Brown, 2007, Brown in HM Government, 2009: 6). It can also be observed that most securitising speech acts happened outside Parliament during his early premiership, where he attempted to keep the issue of extremism in the security sphere. However, upon introduction of the National Security Strategy (NSS),

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[166] US/UK relationship.

Gordon Brown also securitised extremism inside parliament, employing a language of survival to create a matter of urgency (see Brown in HC Deb Vol 467). It is also worth noting that during the later stages of his being in office he reverted back to the association of extremism with Islam more openly, locating its threat more internationally in order to justify the continued British military presence in Afghanistan. Also, upon having proven himself as more of a financial authority, he established the idea of financing education in order to counter extremism in his speeches more prominently (see Brown, 2008a). It can also be observed that Gordon Brown, although introducing measures against extremism (for example formalising the Prevent Strategy in 2008), did not often refer to them discursively. However, as argued by Thomas (2009 in Thomas, 2012: 158), despite the Brown government's avoidance of the use of the terminology of 'Islamic terrorism', "Islamist violent extremism was the clear focus of strategies". It can also be noted that, in comparison to Tony Blair's discourses, Gordon Brown did not differentiate extremism into foreign and domestic affairs as much. This is also evidenced by his replacing the "Cabinet Defence and Overseas Policy Committee" (DOPC) with the "National Security, International Relations and Development Committee" (NSID) (Richards, 2012: 102), indicating the combination of external and internal security. Whilst for Tony Blair, 'Islamic Extremism' and military intervention took centre stage, the three themes prominent in Gordon Brown's discourses are 'British Values', 'Isolation of extremists/extremism', and the notion of 'violent extremism'.

The subsequent chapter is structured as follows: an overview of Gordon Brown as Prime Minister will be given before both parliamentary debate speeches and speeches deemed of security importance given outside of Parliament are analysed[167]. The analysis is chronologically structured, starting in 2006 and then continuing to investigate the following years up until 2010. Although the thesis' focus is on Prime Minister discourse, it briefly touches upon some of Gordon Brown's securitisation attempts as Chancellor whilst running for office, given that they can be seen as efforts to establish himself as future leader. In conclusion, the main themes of Gordon Brown's securitising of extremism will be summarised and compared to those of his predecessor, Tony Blair.

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[167] For an in-depth explanation on data selection see Chapter 2.

As a short reminder on the framework for analysis, securitisation happens when a securitising actor uses speech acts to frame something or someone as a threat (Assertive), tries to get people to do something to curb the threat (Directive), and/or commits her/himself to doing something against the threat (Commissive). Table 8 (below) summarises examples of different securitising speech acts by Gordon Brown from 2006 to 2010, it also highlights the framework used, showing the reader how the analysis was conducted.

	Speech Act	Speech Act Example by Gordon Brown	Securitising speech act indicator	Guiding note
Assertive securitising speech act	State, describe, classify, explain	"(…) to tackle not just terrorism but the roots of terrorism - the extremism which seeks to justify it and the grievances that fuel it, fund it and give it cause" (Brown, 2006b)	Something or someone [extremism as root of terrorism] is a threat	Speaker tells 'how things are'
Directive securitising speech act	Order, command, request	"Our job is to make sure that we can help the legitimate Government in Yemen to deal with extremism within its borders, to expose extremist and radical preachers who have a perverted view of Islam (…)" (Brown in HC Deb Vol 504 Col 309, 20 January 2010)	Extraordinary measure[168] suggested to curb the threat	Speaker tries to get people to do something
Commissive securitising speech act	Promise, vow, pledge, contract, guarantee, threaten	"We in Britain will continue to step up our campaign, working with other countries, to separate decent minded young people from the pressures of divisive and extremist advocates of terrorism" (Brown, 2008a)	Extraordinary measure suggested to curb the threat	Speaker commits her/himself to doing something

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[168] It is important to point out that according to Emmers (2016: 172) "what constitutes an extraordinary measure is not always clearly defined" and in this case, it can be argued that 'inter-faith councils' should be considered to be outside the realm of 'normal' political activity.

Declarative securitising speech act	Pronounce, declare, christen	"I can also inform the House that we will be increasing yet again, this time by 10 per cent., the resources for the joint terrorism analysis centre, which brings together 16 departments including the police and intelligence agencies, and giving it a new focus on the longer-term challenge of investigating the path to violent extremism" (Brown in HC Deb Vol 473 Col 926, 19 March 2008)	Extraordinary measure implemented regarding threat	Speaker creates new state of affairs by representing it as created because of the existence of extralinguistic institutions

Table 8 - Examples of securitising speech acts by Gordon Brown (2006-2010)

5.2. Discourse as would-be Prime Minister

Seldon & Meaking (2016) suggest that Gordon Brown wanted to start a new era when he took over premiership from Tony Blair in June 2007 after having waited to take over the position for more than ten years. Brown had been waiting to become Prime Minister since as early as 1994 when he was outmanoeuvred by Tony Blair in the Labour Leadership elections. One has to keep in mind that their approaches will also differ given that Tony Blair had a parliamentary majority whilst Gordon Brown did not (McGhee, 2012: 115). According to Strachan (2013: 49), the newly formed committee's responsibilities were to include the updating of the National Security Strategy (NSS)[169], which later can be seen as a foundation for the extraordinary measures to be implemented in order to curb the threat of extremism, demonstrating its securitisation. Edwards (2007: 36), believes that Brown's February 2006 speech to the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) had already made clear that for Gordon Brown, "National and international security are connected and no longer the preserve of one or two departments but the responsibility of all of them". It is important to explore other changes implemented by the new Brown government regarding national and international security. For

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[169] Whose first version was published in March 2008.

example, Whitman (2010: 836) points out that initially, Brown's new administration in 2007 shifted the emphasis from the 'war on terror' to "a more careful and nuanced choice of language".

This difference to Blair's rhetoric could have already been observed in Brown's speeches ramping up to his premiership. For instance, a first attempt to securitise[170] extremism by Gordon Brown took place in his 'The Future of Britishness' speech to the Fabian New Year Conference in London on the 14th of January 2006. He talked about British values and what citizenship entails before stating that "July 7th has rightly led to calls for all of us, including moderates in the Islamic community, to stand up to extremism" (Brown, 2006b). Foremost, he did not clearly mention the word terrorism in his speech (in fact, although he mentions extremis* three times[171], he only mentions terrorism once in his speech[172]) in relation to a terror attack but alludes to it by using the date rather than for example "The 7/7 London attacks", a phrasing more commonly used[173]. He continued his speech by saying:

> "At one level when suicide bombers have connections with other countries and can, in theory, use the internet or be instructed through mobile phones, we know that defeating *violent extremists* will not be achieved through action in one country alone or one continent, but only globally, through all means: military and security means, but also debate, discussion and dialogue in newspapers, journals, culture, the arts, and literature. And not just through governments, but also through foundations, trusts, civil society and civic culture, as globally *we seek to distance extremists from moderates*"

> (Brown, 2006b) [emphasis added].

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[170] Given his political status, he did not have the authority to fulfil the facilitating conditions for securitisation (see Chapter 2).

[171] By using the asterisk symbol (as a so-called wildcard symbol) at the end of the root of the term extremism or terrorism, it is possible to broaden the search to words containing related terms (for example searching extremis* will turn up extremists, extremist, extremism, extremisms, while terror* will show words such as terror, terrorism, terrorist, terrorists. For more information on query modifying, see Kromer (2014) and Mishra et al (2009).

[172] In sharp contrast, in his 'Securing our future' - speech at RUSI in London on the 13th of February 2006, the focus lies heavily on terrorism with terrori* being mentioned 88 times as opposed to the mention of extremis* which occurs 12 times. The main aim of the speech, given its audience, appears to be one of securitising terrorism in the security sphere. It becomes clear that whilst Gordon Brown is still employing securitising speech acts, he also seems to be more subtle than Tony Blair by emphasising less on the danger but rather at the solution to the threat of extremism. By stating his aim to isolate extremism "wherever its source", he aims to move away from the connotation of extremism being solely linked to Islam (Brown, 2006b) . Furthermore, he attempts to evoke imagery of 'shared values' defeating the threat.

[173] However, even the use of the term "July 7th" is enough for the audience to understand what he is referring to.

This seems to be the first time Gordon Brown used the phrase "violent extremists", which marks a change from the previously used "extremists" as a term. It implies that there is a difference between extremism and violent extremism, whilst potentially hinting at extremism itself not being solely linked to violence and acts of terror. However, he continued the themes previously presented by Tony Blair: extremism posing a global threat which shall be defeated through international cooperation. He also hinted at the religious aspect of extremism by evoking preceding ideas of it being linked to Islam and there being a battle of moderate believers versus extremists. He suggests that extremists are influenced by international sources, locating the threat outside the UK, as Tony Blair had previously done.

5.3. Taking over premiership

One has to remember that Gordon Brown, when becoming Prime Minister, was being installed mid-term in a government that had been in office for some time. As Grube (2013: 82) puts it, Gordon Brown (alongside Paul Keating in 1991) are "both examples of prime ministers who assumed the role at a time when their parties had already been in office for several terms of government". It can therefore be assumed that in order for Brown to make a mark, he would have to distinguish himself from previous (Blairite) policies, especially with elections coming up, to substantiate his premiership. However, despite speculations of Brown wanting to establish himself as legitimate – elected – prime minister by calling a snap general election in 2007, he decided against it (Heppell, 2013: 151).

Upon becoming Prime Minister on the 27th of June 2007, Gordon Brown's first mention of extremism in Parliament took place during the Prime Minister Questions on the 11th of July 2007. The previous month had uncovered an Al-Qaeda inspired plot to behead a British Muslim soldier (see Nesser, 2008, 2014) and the Glasgow airport and London nightclub Islamic terrorist attempts which led to the UK threat level being increased from *severe* to *critical* from 30 June 2007 until 4 July 2007 (MI5, 2020). In the House of Commons, Dr. Nick Palmer (Broxtowe) (Lab) wanted to know, regarding Brown's response to the terrorist attacks: "does he see this as a struggle not between different civilisations, but between ordinary people of all religions and none, and the people who seek to kill us?" (Palmer in HC Deb Vol 462 Col 1445, 11 July 2007). Gordon Brown responded with Commissive and

Assertive securitising speech acts, framing extremists as a threat to the Referent Object of 'our civilisation' (evoking Blair, 2006) by saying:

> "(…) I hope that we can set up inter-faith councils in every constituency and community of our country so that we can bring together the faiths and all moderate opinion against those extremists who are trying to disrupt our civilisation and who, at the same time, of course offend every decent value of human dignity"

(Brown in HC Deb Vol 462 Col 1445, 11 July 2007).

He commits himself to lessening the threat by suggesting the measure of involving moderate voices against 'those extremists' whilst also appearing to evoke 'us vs them' imagery. It is arguable if this is to be considered an extraordinary measure, rather than one moving the issue back to the political realm. However, keeping his concept of British values in mind, this can be seen as an extraordinary measure in the wider context. Whilst 'extremists' are still framed as a threat; Brown's discourse does not indicate any urgency regarding the curbing of the threat.

During the National Security debate on the 25th of July 2007 Gordon Brown laid out the new National Security Strategy (NSS) for the United Kingdom, which was to eventually be developed between June 2007 and February 2008 (Stolberg, 2012: 58). Neil Ellis, Head of Resilience at RUSI argued that Gordon Brown's unveiling of the introduction of a NSS meant that "the government has now delivered the single-most important national security innovation since the fall of the Berlin Wall" (Ellis, 2007:na). Indeed, the implications of introducing a coherent National Security Strategy were substantial and showed another breakaway from previous Tony Blair policies. However, Stolberg (2012: 55) maintains that all sides of the UK political spectrum were supportive of the introduction of a NSS, going back to discussions that started in 2006[174]. The timing of the announcement of the NSS is also important, given that it came shortly after the failed Glasgow Airport and London nightclub car bomb attacks, whilst also taking place two years after the 7/7 attacks (Coaffee & O'Hare, 2008: 177). Again, the events also showed another breakaway from Blair when Gordon Brown "did not use the word "Muslim" in the days after the attempted car bombings" (Parker, 2007: 732).

In his statement, Gordon Brown said:

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[174] Nevertheless, he also argues that Gordon Brown, by introducing a more formal strategy and government process, wanted to emphasise that he was different from Tony Blair and his administration (Stolberg, 2012: 58).

> "Since the attacks of 7 July 2005, communities in Britain and across the world have come together in a common front against terrorism and against the propaganda that fuels it. This requires not just the security measures we are outlining today, but that we work with all communities—and, indeed, all countries—through debate, discussion, dialogue and education as we tackle at root the evils that risk driving people, particularly vulnerable young people, into the hands of *violent extremists*. Here, schools, colleges, universities, civil society, faith groups—indeed, every institution in our country—have a part to play"
>
> (Brown in HC Deb Vol 463 Col 845, 25 July 2007) [emphasis added].

It can be observed that this Directive speech act securitises the threat of extremism (violent extremists to be precise) as it entails terrorism or acts of terror. Young, vulnerable people are presented as the Referent Object at risk whilst institutions are requested to counter the risk by working together through "debate, discussion, dialogue and education". However, he fails to evoke a state of urgency, which is essential for securitisation in order to move issues outside the political realm and onto the security agenda.

Nonetheless, later in his speech, he introduced another measure to curb the threat when announcing an increase in spending for local authorities and community groups by £70 million over the next three years in order "to improve the capacity of local communities in our country to resist violent extremism" (Brown in HC Deb Vol 463 Col 845, 25 July 2007), demonstrating his commitment to 'resist violent extremism'. This can be considered extraordinary given the amount of money to be spent and considering its output ('resisting violent extremism'). He additionally used Commissive speech acts to commit himself to "developing leadership programmes for young people, strengthening the capacity of women's groups, and local projects to build citizenship" (Brown in HC Deb Vol 463 Col 845, 25 July 2007), which although suggested as a measure against violent extremism, cannot be considered extraordinary given its different focus.

MP John Reid[175] (Airdrie and Shotts) (Lab) commended Gordon Brown for his statement but inquired more about further "strategic issues" (Reid in HC Deb Volume 463 Col 853, 25 July 2007). Gordon Brown responded that he valued Mr Reid's arguments and stated:

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[175] Former Home Secretary under Tony Blair and considered his close ally (Richards, 2020: 262), MP John Reid did not hold an office in the Brown Government and had been opposing Brown taking over from Blair (Bower, 2007: 536).

> "The first is the importance of winning what I call the *hearts and minds argument*—some people may put it differently—integrating people into our community while making sure that the arguments against violence and extremism, which will isolate terrorists and potential terrorists, are held right across the country"

> (Brown in HC Deb Vol 463 Col 854, 25 July 2007) [emphasis added].

Hereby he undertakes Directive securitising speech acts by stating that ideological counterterrorism initiatives based on the hearts and minds idea are going to act as a deterrent to violence and extremism. However, despite subsequently convoluting extremism and violence again, Brown does not frame extremism explicitly as a threat of survival to a specific Referent Object. Still, he seems to evoke Blair's previous ideas about integration being pivotal as an 'antidote' to the issue (Blair, 2006a), which seems to reflect his worry that "certain 'communities' in the UK [were] self-segregating and living 'parallel lives' (a term made famous by Ted Cantle 2008)" (McGhee & Zhang, 2017: 939).

It is also one of the first incidences of Brown clearly citing the 'Hearts and Minds' strategy, which was later to become ingrained in the official Prevent Strategy. The notion of the 'Hearts and Minds' strategy was to be repeated during Gordon Brown's first speech to the Labour conference as party leader in Bournemouth on the 24th of September 2007. This time, regarding Foreign Policy, he insisted:

> "Let me say: there should be no safe haven, no hiding place anywhere in the world for Al Qaeda and terrorism. To prevail in this struggle will require more than military force and we will work with our allies to isolate extremism and win the battle of hearts and minds"

> (Brown, 2007).

There are solid securitising speech acts: the framing of the threat and the extraordinary (military as well as ideological intervention). Further, given the context, it is not surprising that Gordon Brown employed strong language to rally the party behind him, establishing himself as its new leader. Warsi (2018: 42-43) believes that this speech, especially regarding 'British Values' was where Gordon Brown "took up the Britishness rallying call" and that the conference "provided the backdrop for Brown's version of Britishness". However, the idea of Britishness and British Values acting as deterrence to extremism have been used by Gordon Brown before, as evidenced by his 'The Future of Britishness' speech to the Fabian New Year Conference in London on the 14th of January 2006 (see Brown, 2006b). At

this point, it appears that Gordon Brown's security discourse differed outside Parliament.

However, he also employed several securitising speech acts during the Debate on the Address on the 6th of November 2007, whilst talking about the proposed anti-terrorism bill:

> "The first duty of the Government is stability, security and the defence of the country, so the anti-terrorism Bill contained within this programme will address *the continuing threat of extremists* in a way that continues the measured response that we have taken to the terrorist events of June last year. We will publish a national security strategy and, reflecting the statement of the director general of MI5 yesterday and the broad consensus that *a security response alone is not sufficient to meet those threats*, we will publish new proposals for winning the battle of hearts and minds"
>
> (Brown in HC Deb Vol 467 Col 28, 06 November 2007) [emphasis added].

It is a good example of his convolution of terrorism with extremism, of the extraordinary measures suggested, and it shows how Gordon Brown uses Commissive speech acts to further securitise the threat of extremism. The quote also illustrates how extremism is now safely located in the security sphere whilst also recognising that more than 'hard' security approaches are needed to curb the threats, therefore further broadening the range of extraordinary measures to "the battle of hearts and minds". It also positions the threat as a continuing one, hence framing its decline as even more important for the survival of the Referent Object of the United Kingdom, its security and its stability; clearly evoking a state of urgency.

5.3.1. Further extraordinary measures to curb the threat of (non) violent extremism

At the National Security debate taking place on the 14th of November 2007, Gordon Brown clarified his vision of a National Security Strategy, highlighting a variety of (extraordinary) measures his government was planning to implement. One should keep in mind that not having a majority government meant that he had to be more forceful to get his policies approved. This might also be an explanation for his suggesting stricter security regulations than his predecessor, Tony Blair. Kettell (2011: 120) also argues that the precariousness of British military involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan had led to declining public support, which in turn made Brown focus on "anti-terror legislation" by emphasising on "the issue of national security

as a means of bolstering his leadership credentials". His speech functions as an update to the developments suggested in his July statement:

> "I want to update the House, as I promised in July, on *the measures we are taking at home* to root out terrorism and strengthen the resilience of communities *to resist extremist influences* following the incidents of 29 June and 30 June[176]. As everyone in this House knows, to succeed, those measures will require *not just* military and security resources but more policing and intelligence, and an enhanced effort to win hearts and minds"

> (Brown in HC Deb Vol 467 Col 667, 14 November 2007) [emphasis added].

The quote highlights several things, for one, the threat of extremism is located domestically[177] and is presented as the reason for terrorist acts through Assertive securitising speech acts. Furthermore, using Commissive securitising speech acts, resisting "extremist influences" is shown as a solution to the aforementioned threat whilst including a hard and soft power approach (military and security as well as ideological). It becomes clear that Gordon Brown has now stopped use the term "terrorist extremist/s", only mentioning it once in his statement. However, he still heavily links the two together when repeatedly referring to "violent extremism", mentioning the term six times whilst mentioning extremis* 16 times overall.

With reference to the international dimension of fighting extremism, Gordon Brown, through Declarative securitising speech acts, announced that £400 million were to be invested "through the Foreign Office, the Department for International Development and the British Council to tackle radicalisation and promote understanding overseas" (Brown in HC Deb Vol 467 Col 668, 14 November 2007), indirectly securitising extremism as a result through the Referent Subject of radicalisation. As far as direct measures introduced to curb the threat of extremism are concerned, Gordon Brown employed a Commissive securitising speech act by committing that "there will also be a single senior lead prosecutor in the Crown

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[176] 2007 London car bombs and Glasgow Airport attack.

[177] Whilst most of Gordon Brown's discourse revolving extremism has included a domestic focus, in the written statement of Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (Uganda) of the 26th of November 2007, he emphasises that the Commonwealth has "a critical role to play" in meeting several challenges, including "no room for complacency in the fight against extremism" (Brown in HC Deb Vol 468 Col 2WS-3WS, 26 November 2007). Similarly, in his last mention of extremism in 2007 in Parliament, during the Afghanistan debate on the 12 December 2007, Gordon Brown talks about British and NATO forces "driving the insurgents and extremists out of their hiding places, preventing them from regrouping and attacking the areas around the provincial capitals where stability is taking hold" (Brown in HC Deb Vol 469 Col 303-304, 12 December 2007). Again, he conflates terrorism with extremism but does not employ securitising speech acts.

Prosecution Service responsible for cases relating to inciting violent extremism" (Brown in HC Deb Vol 467 Col 669, 14 November 2007). One has to pay attention to the wording here, it is not the person engaging in violent extremism that will be prosecuted but the one inciting it. Hence, non-violent extremism specifically has been moved on to the security spectrum by Gordon Brown, though the concept had been institutionalised previously by Tony Blair (see for example Blair, 2005). In other words, the securitisation of non-violent extremism is more fruitful as the threat had already been established in security policies and practices (for example through the Terrorism Act of 2006 which criminalised the encouragement of terrorism, see also Chapter 3).

In order to "deal with the challenge posed by the terrorist threat" (Brown in HC Deb Vol 467 Col 669, 14 November 2007), Gordon Brown acknowledged that "we" need to do more. He suggested four things:

- "to challenge extremist propaganda and support alternative voices" (Brown in HC Deb Vol 467 Col 669, 14 November 2007).

- "to disrupt the promoters of violent extremism by strengthening our institutions and supporting individuals who may be being targeted" (Brown in HC Deb Vol 467 Col 669-670, 14 November 2007).

- "to increase the capacity of communities to resist and reject violent extremism (Brown in HC Deb Vol 467 Col 670, 14 November 2007)

- "to address issues of concern exploited by ideologues, where by emphasising our shared values across communities we can both celebrate and act upon what unites us" (Brown in HC Deb Vol 467 Col 670, 14 November 2007)

It appears that these measures are all of an ideological nature. Rather than 'attacking' the extremists, their ideology is supposed to be fought, isolated, and countered through an emphasis on shared values. The imagery evoked (celebration of unitedness) also aims to be one of hope, rather than intimidation. Gordon Brown acknowledged this when he pointed out that "This will be achieved not by one single programme or initiative and it will not be achieved overnight" (Brown in HC Deb Vol 467 Col 670, 14 November 2007), highlighting that his aims are achievable, albeit asking for caution as they involve long-term planning. The financial backing, for example "an additional £240 million to the Home Office between now and 2011 towards counter-terrorism policing (…) and £70 million towards community projects dedicated to tackling violent extremism" shows his

commitment to the 'Prevent Agenda' according to Briggs & Birdwell (2009: 134). Also, the introduction of "more than 2,000 police and support staff to be responsible for overseeing investigations into those who 'recruit terrorists and promote hate'" (Hellyer, 2008: 8) is clearly another extraordinary measure to counter the threat of non-violent extremism.

Brown (in HC Deb Vol 467 Col 670, 14 November 2007) also located the extraordinary measures to be taken in the fight of radicalisation and the curbing of the threat of extremism in the sphere of young people's institutions, framing prisons, universities, and places of worship as well as the internet as being threatened. Further, Gordon Brown employed Commissive securitising speech acts to announce extraordinary measures when stating:

> "As part of our intensifying measures to isolate extremists, a new unit bringing together police and security intelligence and research will identify, analyse and assess not just the inner circle of extremist groups, but *those at risk of falling under their influence*, and share their advice and insights."
>
> (Brown in HC Deb Vol 467 Col 670, 14 November 2007) [emphasis added].

This seems to be the first time he mentions people being "at risk" of being a threat by becoming extremists although the idea had been indirectly raised before. As extraordinary measures he suggests a police and security intelligence and research unit, "counter-propaganda" roadshows, online "propaganda" (national and international), and research on international and national radicalisation (hand in hand with extremism). The idea of "counter-propaganda" being a way of curbing the threat of extremism is highlighted when he says, "One central issue is how to balance extremist views supporting terrorism that appear on the internet and in the media" (Brown in HC Deb Vol 467 Col 670, 14 November 2007). By stating that this is a central issue, he locates the threat of extremists' views as the Referent Subject to the Referent Object of the internet and the media. Additionally, he announced that the Referent Object of charities is at risk of being exploited by extremist when employing Commissive speech acts announcing the creation of a new unit in the Charity Commission to "strengthen governance and accountability of charities" (Brown in HC Deb Vol 467 Col 670, 14 November 2007). This seems, in part, to be a solution based on previous scandals surrounding charities having been supported by government funding whilst having been seen as "sources of radicalisation".

172

By stating that "A specialist unit in the Prison Service will be tasked with stopping extremists using prison networks to plot future activities" (Brown in HC Deb Vol 467 Col 670, 14 November 2007), Gordon Brown presented extremists as threats to the Referent Object of "young people in the criminal justice system [who] are especially vulnerable to extremist influence" (Brown in HC Deb Vol 467 Col 670, 14 November 2007). In order to curb the threat, he suggested making funding available for "the Youth Justice Board, the National Offender Management Service and the many voluntary agencies that work with young people to support young people who may be targeted for recruitment by extremist groups" (Brown in HC Deb Volume 467 Col 670, 14 November 2007). Again, these are Commissive securitising speech acts with the existential threat (extremists using prisons to plot future activities – implying a security risk), the Referent Subject of extremists, the Referent Object of young offenders, and extraordinary measures (extra funding) to be implemented in response. Further, Gordon Brown highlighted that there is evidence that "some of those involved in promoting violent extremism" have used "outdoor activity centres and sports facilities" and that the government was now working on providing guidance to the Sports Sector "to ensure that, where possible, these facilities are not abused" (Brown in HC Deb Vol 467 Col 670, 14 November 2007). It is notable to see that he is talking about the promotion of violent extremism here, further indicating the securitisation of extremism not related to violent actions but it being the potential cause for violent behaviour.

Talking about the importance of mosques in the UK, he said that "We have had mosques in the UK for more than 100 years, serving local communities well" (Brown in HC Deb Vol 467 Col 671, 14 November 2007). Hereby he highlights that Islam has been a part of the United Kingdom for the past century, steering away from the notion that the religion itself is an external matter. By asserting that (referring to the British Muslim community) "the majority already work very hard to reject violent extremism" (Gordon Brown in HC Deb Vol 467 Col 671, 14 November 2007), he again evokes the picture of the good Muslim (like Blair previously), i.e., those who reject "violent extremism" (Brown in HC Deb Vol 467 Col 671, 14 November 2007). Yet, his discourse is more appeasing than that of Tony Blair previously aimed at the British Muslim community.

Statements such as "We know that young people of school age can be exposed to extremist messages" (Brown in HC Deb Vol 467 Col 671, 14 November 2007) show again the framing of young people as Referent Objects who are threatened by extremists' ideologies. Rather than locating the threat of extremism broadly, Gordon Brown put it into the religious sphere, more precisely one of Islam when stating that:

> "we will work in partnership with religious education teachers to promote the national framework for teaching religious education in schools[178], including making sure that children learn about all faiths" before using the Commissive speech act to announce the setting up of an advisory group which "will work with local communities to support the citizenship education classes run by mosque schools in Bradford[179] and elsewhere"

> (Brown in HC Deb Vol 467 Col 671, 14 November 2007).

Gordon Brown then announced via Commissive speech acts the extraordinary measure of funding a £2 million school linking programme which would twin schools of different faiths (Brown in HC Deb Vol 467 Col 671, 14 November 2007). One can argue that this highlights the us vs them ideology of his discourse, the 'good faith' being paired with the 'bad faith', but one can also give him the benefit of the doubt and assume that it is another push to incorporate the 'shared values' approach he previously alluded to. This is evidenced when he used Directive securitising speech acts to request: "It is by seeking to build on shared interests and shared values that we will isolate extremists and foster understanding across faiths" (Brown in HC Deb Vol 467 Col 672, 14 November 2007). He ended his statement by saying:

> "There is no greater priority than the safety and security of our people, and building the strongest possible relationships across all faiths and communities. I believe that it is possible, through the actions that we are proposing, to build a stronger consensus in Britain that will both *root out terrorist extremism* and build more vibrant and cohesive communities"

> (Brown in HC Deb Vol 467 Col 672, 14 November 2007) [emphasis added].

It is here where he mentions "terrorist extremism" for the first time in his speech, firmly linking terrorism with extremism. The quote highlights the urgency with

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[178] According to Meer (2007: 57) in the aftermath of the 7/7 bombings "a series of generic objections emerged (…) concerning the compatibility of Muslim Schools with life in Britain".

[179] Schools in Bradford were part of a pilot to launch a national school linking programme in England to support the implementation of the duty on schools to promote community cohesion (Department for Education, 2011).

which he securitises extremism via his emphasis on "safety and security", the measures suggested to curb the threat being summed up as necessary for Britain to strive. Overall, in his statement about the National Security Strategy, Gordon Brown uses many Commissive securitising speech acts, introducing extraordinary measures to curb the threat of extremism, thereby clearly securitising the issue of not only violent but also non-violent extremism.

5.4. Dealing with crisis after crisis and launching the National Security Strategy

Ahead of the fifth anniversary of the Iraq invasion in March 2008, Gordon Brown decided to set up an official inquiry with the support of many Labour MPs who wanted their party to move on from Blair's war policies (Betts & Phythian, 2020: 161). However, it took time to implement and the so called Chilcot inquiry was not established until June 2009 under chairman Sir John Chilcot. The timing was tactical according to Allen (2011: 21) because there would not have been a general election ahead whose outcome the inquiry's publication could have damaged for Labour. However, Whitman (2010: 841) believes that the inquiry "offered an opportunity to remove the Iraq war from Parliamentary politics in the run-up to the General Election", a subject the Labour party wanted to wash themselves clean of.

Eventually, when the UK government launched its first National Security Strategy (NSS) in 2008, there was according to McCormack (2015: 500) "no longer a division of domestic and international security". Whitman (2010: 838) believes that this was also Brown's attempt "to map the full spectrum of threats to UK security and the appropriate policy responses". Others, such as Gregory (2008: 2) argue that it had to do with Brown trying "to foster a greater political and public consensus" on counter-terrorism by placing it "within a wider framework of security concerns". On Wednesday the 19th of March 2008, Gordon Brown gave a statement on the National Security Strategy where he made several vital securitising speech acts by presenting extremism as an existential threat and announced extraordinary measures to curb said threat. For example, he repeatedly "informs" the House of extraordinary measures in a way reminiscent of a declaration. The author argues that the word "inform" in this case can be seen as a Declarative speech verb and

enables the speaker to change reality without audience acceptance[180]. When Gordon Brown states that funds are increased, departments merged and given more resources and that he was "giving (it) a new focus on the longer-term challenge of investigating the path to violent extremism" (Brown in HC Deb Vol 473 Col 926, 19 March 2008), he firmly presents these as extraordinary measures which are to be employed to counter (violent extremist) radicalisation.

On the 17th of June 2008, Gordon Brown delivered a speech on Security and Liberty to the Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR) in London. This speech has been seen by commentators such as Sparrow (2008) as directly addressing David Davis, who used to be Shadow Secretary of State for the Conservatives until the 12th of June 2008 when he resigned because he did not want to support what he deemed excessive new security measures. Davis cited the passing of the new Counter-terrorism Bill[181] which extended terrorist suspects' pre-charge detention from 28 to 42 days[182] as perhaps "the most salient example of the insidious, surreptitious and relentless erosion of fundamental British freedoms" (Davis, 2008). Nick Robinson, the BBC's Political Editor said that his "resignation is quite extraordinary and without precedent that I can think of in British politics and means that politics is now utterly unpredictable" (Robinson, 2008 in BBC News, 2008). It was also a resignation fuelled by Davis' unhappiness with his party leader David Cameron's support for more security measures (Sparrow, 2008).

Whilst Gordon Brown addressed mostly the threat of terrorism, he also pointed out the need for a "new approach to the long term challenge of isolating and confronting extremism – the long term struggle to win the battle of ideas" (Brown, 2008c). In his speech convolutes terrorism with extremism again, a theme which has been often used (as seen for example during the Debate on the Address on the 6th of November 2007). He also positioned extremism as a threat which needs to be confronted, framing it as an existential threat by evoking war analogies, thereby

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[180] See for example Kiklewicz (2010: 75) who states that "in constating utterances the subject of informing is the objective state of affairs, and in declarative utterances – the intentional state of the speaker".

[181] The Counter-Terrorism Bill 2008 was eventually not passed by the House of Lords (see Choudhury & Fenwick, 2011: 156).

[182] However, in 2008 the House of Lords would decide to stop plans "to extend the length of the detention period during which the police can hold suspects before filing charges to 42 days" (Klausen, 2009: 404).

securitising it. As for the extraordinary measure, he suggested the isolation and confrontation of the threat when stating:

> "We must recognise that winning the battle of ideas means championing liberty. To say we should ignore the longstanding claims of liberty when faced with the urgent needs of security is tempting to some, but never to me – it would be to embark down an illiberal path that is as unacceptable to the British people as it is to me"

(Brown, 2008c).

It becomes clear that Gordon Brown positions the security of the nation as *not* more important than liberty whilst failing to prove otherwise, given the severity of the proposed measures. One can therefore argue that at this point, he attempted to move the issue out of the security realm and back to 'normal politics', hence attempting to desecuritise. Comparing David Davis' resignation statement with Brown's speech it becomes obvious that Brown takes up Davis' issues, trying to mitigate them by emphasising the balance of "both protecting the security of all and safeguarding the individual's right to be free" (Brown, 2008c)[183].

5.4.1. The financial crisis and putting securitising of extremism on the backburner

September 2008 did not bode well for Gordon Brown and his premiership. The UK's financial economy was down, the polls for the Labour Party were not positive and the 2010 election was looming which would potentially enable the Labour Party to move in a new direction, with a new leadership. It was seen as an open secret that Foreign Secretary David Miliband had an eye on Gordon Brown's office (Süddeutsche Zeitung, 2008). Given these circumstances it is important to analyse Gordon Brown's interview with the BBC World News accordingly. The Prime Minister was at the time undertaking a two-day visit to New York to discuss the "US plan to bail out stricken financial institutions" (Porter, 2008). In October 2008, the global financial system was on the verge of economic collapse with many British banks being affected and about to go bankrupt (Rawnsley, 2010). Due to Gordon Brown's prudent acting and "taking a controlling interest in three major UK banks", the worst was avoided (Ritchie, 2014: 89).

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[183] One could therefore argue that Sparrow (2008) is right to say that Brown defended government policy in all security related areas and was most likely aiming to lessen the chance of other Conservative Party members to side with Davis. This seems especially important to Brown as he had at this point a minority government and needed to rely on other parties' support for his policies to get voted through.

The interview itself seemed to be Gordon Brown's attempt to make himself relatable and likeable. However, when asked about how he would aim to persuade countries to increase development aid, he also said:

> "You see when I am talking to an American I say look I was in Nigeria, I went to Abuja, visited a school in Abuja that was completely overcrowded, dilapidated, run down, great children there but no facilities. And then up the road there was a madrassa that was offering from an *extremist Islamic group* free education in good surroundings. And we have got to make the choice: do we want to help the children of Africa get educated in a way that is consistent with them *rejecting violent extremists*, or do we by our inaction make what is happening in Africa *a security problem for us in the future*?"

> (Brown, 2008d) [emphasis added]

The quote highlights his strategy on whipping up (financial) support by linking international threats and framing them as existentially relevant to the Referent Object of (in this case) Americans (but also children). However, the Referent Object can also be "us" as in everyone, presenting the fight against "violent extremism" as urgent in order to secure everyone in the long term. Additionally, it is the first ever mention of "Islamic extremism" by Gordon Brown, a phrasing he had vehemently rejected ever since becoming Prime Minister. This could be explained by him trying to present himself as more relatable to the general public, as the phrase had previously been well established.

Finance seems to be the central theme of his US-visit and subsequent speeches. Relying on years of experience as a Chancellor of the Exchequer, Gordon Brown was able to position himself even further as a financial expert, a strength which he played to on Thursday the 13th of November 2008 when he gave a speech at a New York Interfaith Conference. He establishes ties of financing education to counter extremism, using an Assertive securitising speech act to highlight that religious schools (madrasas) in Nigeria are "funded by an extremist group, poisoning the children's minds and attracting them to a life of terrorism" (Brown, 2008a). As a solution to the threat, he suggests better educational funding, stating "I believe we can do this, coming together, by spending $10 billion a year - $100 for each child" (Brown, 2008a). The funding of education to curb the threat, would later be repeated by Brown, also as a form of justification for the UK's continued involvement abroad (see Brown in HC Deb Vol 502 Col 643, 14 December 2009).

Further, he employed Directive securitising speech act mechanisms when saying, "But let us agree that the first thing we should do is that we do everything to fight

extremism wherever it exists" (Brown, 2008a), evoking a state of danger and reminiscing Tony Blair ("Worldwide, we should confront it everywhere it exists" Blair, 2005). He additionally aroused the importance of international cooperation to counter extremism when stating "We in Britain will continue to step up our campaign, working with other countries, to separate decent minded young people from the pressures of divisive and extremist advocates of terrorism" (G. Brown, 2008a). Hereby he pledges, through a Commissive speech act, to curb the threat whilst also asserting the aforementioned as security issue (for example extremist advocates of terrorism). He would later repeat similar arguments in his "Speech marking the 60th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights" on the 10th of December 2008 which is also one of the few occasions of him using the term 'religious extremism' (Brown, 2008b).

5.5. Positioning the importance of the international on the domestic

It was in June 2009 that local elections in thirty-four English local authorities, alongside elections to the European Parliament were to take place. According to Rallings & Thrasher (2009: 1), these elections were the first time since 1993 that local elections did not coincide with a general election. Brown had been encouraged to call for elections upon taking Premiership in 2007 but stalled, citing the need for more time to come up with a 'vision for Britain' (Hughes, 2010: 134 in Theakston, 2011: 91). Therefore, these upcoming elections would put Brown and his party to the test, making it more important for him to justify previous policies regarding, for example, military involvement. Ahead of the G20 meeting in London[184], Gordon Brown gave his 'Global Rules, Global Values' speech at St. Paul's Cathedral on the 31st of March 2009. Theakston (2011: 90) notes that "Brown performed impressively and was in his element in the negotiations and meetings of world leaders". Indeed, his handling of the financial crisis has been described as one of the few successes of his premiership (Dyson, 2018: 121). In his speech, he pointed out:

> "There are four great global challenges our generation must address urgently financial instability in a world of global capital flows, environmental degradation in a world of changing energy need, *violent extremism in a world of mass*

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[184] The G20 meeting was to be focussing on mitigating the impact of the financial crisis with Gordon Brown having taken a leading role in negotiations with the United States.

communications and increased mobility, and extreme poverty in a world of growing inequalities"

(Brown, 2009a) [emphasis added].

In order to address these threats, he suggests global cooperation and "agreed global rules informed by shared global values" (Brown, 2009a). Again, he emphasises international co-operation as essential to tackle the threat of violent extremism, something which he had positioned as the Referent Subject unsettling global stability. He also securitises violent-extremism as he is able to create a state of urgency by evoking the threat to survival.

When British troops officially ended combat operations in Iraq at the end of April 2009, 179 UK servicemen and women had been killed, costing the UK taxpayers about £8 billion, a number exposed by Brown himself during the Chilcot inquiry in 2010 (Allen, 2011: 21). However, British Armed Forces had increased over the last years in Afghanistan without showing substantial political and economic progress in the region, boosting the unpopularity of the United Kingdom's military involvement especially in the course of 2009, according to Whitman (2010: 841-842). Betts & Phythian (2020: 215) also state that Gordon Brown was continuously losing not only public support for Britain's involvement in Afghanistan but also support inside his own party, especially backbench support.

In this context, it seems telling that Gordon Brown aimed to justify the presence of British troop in the Middle East during the debate on Afghanistan and Pakistan on the 29th of April 2009, where he stated that "(…) not least through support for education and development, we want to prevent young people from falling under the sway of violent and extremist ideologies" (Brown in HC Deb Vol 491 Col 870, 29 April 2009). Here, the focus of the Referent Object is not a national but a global one. However, he later mentions in his speech that in his meetings with political leaders in Pakistan, they "discussed stronger action against terrorism and violent extremism." He goes on to say, "We are agreeing clear shared principles for our bilateral relationship: that terrorism and violent extremists present the most significant threat to both Britain and Pakistan; (…)" (Brown in HC Deb Vol 491 Col 872, 29 April 2009). By framing 'violent extremism' alongside terrorism as

"the most significant threat" not only to Britain but also to Pakistan[185], he securitises both concepts through Assertive securitising speech acts, as well as via the creation of a state of urgency and survival.

In June 2009, the updated National Security Strategy was published, including a "greater emphasis on the need to counter the domestic terrorist threat with its origins in Afghanistan and the border areas of Pakistan" (Whitman, 2010: 838). Allen (2011: 21) cites a July 2009 YouGov poll where three-fifths of British voters agreed that Gordon Brown 'is deliberately trying to fight the war "on the cheap"', alluding to the increasing death toll of British soldiers in Afghanistan. Whilst Tony Blair had encountered low numbers of fallen soldiers, under Gordon Brown, numbers increased – "thirty-nine in 2006, forty-two in 2007, fifty-one in 2008 and then 108 in 2009". (MoD, 2010 in Allen, 2011: 21). It is therefore not surprising that Gordon Brown needed to further justify the United Kingdom's military involvement abroad. During the Afghanistan and Pakistan debate on the 14th of October 2009, Gordon Brown stated that:

> "(...) Our objective is clear and focused—to prevent al-Qaeda launching attacks on our streets and threatening legitimate government in Afghanistan and Pakistan. But if we limit ourselves simply to targeting al-Qaeda, without building the capacity of Afghanistan and Pakistan to deal with terrorism and violent extremism, the security gains will not endure"

> (Brown in HC Deb Vol 497 Col 300, 14 October 2009).

This speech represents both a securitising and desecuritising move. For one, he convolutes violent extremism with terrorism, but also suggests that in order to curb the threat a not so ordinary measure, that of capacity building, must be taken.

A similar line of argument can be observed in the statements he gave at the 'Afghanistan and Pakistan' Debate on the 30th of November 2009 later that year. Whilst he first heavily focusses on the securitising of terrorism, reading between the lines, this extends to extremism, more specifically extremist ideologies. He also aims to include Muslims as the Referent Object. For example, he mentioned that around the world "thousands of men and women of all religions, including thousands of the Muslim faith, have been murdered in al-Qaeda outrages",

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[185] One also has to keep in mind that in April 2009, British security was able to prevent a terrorist attack by arresting 12 suspects who had planned suicide attacks in Manchester. Eleven of the suspects were Pakistani with ten had entered the United Kingdom on student visas (Nesser, 2014: 442), an issue which was later raised by proponents of tighter border controls and deportations.

highlighting that the threat also affects Muslims. He went on to list the number of casualties and injuries incurred at the 7/7 bombings and stated that more "recently in Britain, we have seen the 2006 Heathrow liquid bombs plot, the 2007 London and Glasgow bombings, and then this year an al-Qaeda-inspired conspiracy to target shopping centres[186]" (Brown in HC Deb Vol 501 Col 832, 30 November 2009). By evoking these recent (would be) attacks on British soil, he is framing the country as the Referent Object. By emphasising previous dangers linked to extremism and referring to already established threats, he is able to present the security risk of extremism more easily. He went on to stress that there "are now over 120 convicted terrorists serving sentences in British prisons, and the security services report to me weekly on the hundreds of would-be terrorists who seek to operate within and target our country" (Brown in HC Deb Vol 501 Col 832, 30 November 2009), thereby presenting and justifying extraordinary measures as somewhat successful .

Gordon Brown also employed several themes from past speeches when he said:

> "(…) because this is a fight for hearts and minds against violent extremism and those ideologies that would pervert the true Islamic faith, we have stepped up our work with our allies both to expose the damage that *murderous and extremist ideologies* do and to support those working across all faiths to uphold the common ground of dignity tolerance and respect for all"
>
> (Brown in HC Deb Vol 501 Col 832, 30 November 2009). [emphasis added]

Through an Assertive securitising speech act, he evokes pictures of a war (again highlighting the us vs them theme), common values, and the importance of working together to curb the threat of violent extremism and associated ideologies. The speech is also reminiscent of Tony Blair's framing of 'true Islam' vs 'perverted Islam' (see for example Blair, 2001 and Blair, 2005b).

Gordon Brown's speech on foreign policy at the Lord Mayor's Banquet on the 16th of November 2009, mentioning extremi* just twice, was telling. Both occasions show that 2009 revealed a shift in Gordon Brown's overall discourse on extremism, in which he started to locate the threat more globally as opposed to previous discourses. He laid out several points of discussion, one of them being better international cooperation regarding "a stronger counter-insurgency strategy to deny

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[186] Manchester bomb plot, previously mentioned.

the terrorists and extremists the space and freedom to threaten the safety and security of the innocents they target in our streets and thousands of miles away" (Brown, 2009b). Further, he mentioned that security services are tracking "a large number of suspicious individuals and potential plots" before employing the Assertive speech act of warning of al Qaeda's "extensive recruitment network across Africa the Middle East, western Europe and in the UK" (Brown, 2009b). In doing so, he positioned the threat internationally as well as domestically. He continued to talk about the danger of foreign fighters in Pakistan, attending learning camps there and returning to the United Kingdom, stating that:

> "It is because of the nature of the threat, and because around three quarters of the most serious plots the security services are now tracking in Britain have links to Pakistan, that it does not make sense to confine our defence against terrorism solely to actions inside the UK"

> (Brown, 2009b).

Hereby he continues to frame the danger to the Referent Object of the United Kingdom's security. Furthermore, he repeatedly justified British military presence abroad when stating, "So that is why I say the Afghan campaign is being prosecuted not from choice, but out of necessity" (Brown, 2009b) before highlighting that "this coalition does not intend to become an occupying army: it is building the capacity of Afghanistan to deal themselves with terrorism and violent extremism, what we mean by 'Afghanisation'" (Brown, 2009b). According to Whitman (2010: 838), Gordon Brown's speech was well regarded by the public and had been noted for both its heavy focus on the value of transatlanticism and its warning of nuclear proliferation in Iran.

5.6. Emphasising the Prevent Strategy as an extraordinary measure

The year 2010 was to prove itself to be another difficult year for Gordon Brown. On the 5th of March he was to appear in front of the Chilcot inquiry, where he would admit regret for not having defended the Iraq invasion more vigorously. However, he continued to do so and asserted that it was "the right decision, and it was [done] for the right reasons" (Brown in Allen, 2011: 21). According to Whitman, (2010: 841), there was controversy when it came to his evidence on the financing of the war and if spending had been enough to provide the troops with the necessary equipment. In the meantime, Gordon Brown also had to prepare for the upcoming General Election in May 2010.

During the Prime Minister's question time on the 13th of January 2010, Gordon Brown was asked by Mr. Gordon Marsden (Blackpool, South) (Lab), regarding the people of Blackpool's support of the Remembrance Day and Armed Forces Day ceremonies and their welcoming of troops returning from Afghanistan: "Will the Prime Minister confirm that the Government will continue their resolute action against any extremist group, wherever it comes from, that seeks to disrupt and dishonour that support?" (Marsden in HC Deb Vol 503 Col 684, 13 January 2010). Gordon Brown responded by acknowledging Blackpool's support, stating:

> "I share his views on extremists who use freedom of speech in our country to foster division and incite hatred and, in some cases, to incite people to kill. We have already strengthened our powers to allow us to prosecute them, and an organisation was proscribed yesterday[187] as a result of our determination to do what is absolutely necessary through the legal process. This is also about standing up for our shared values and showing young people in Muslim communities in particular that we stand for values of justice, dignity and fairness. I believe that our Prevent strategy, which involves talking to people in their schools, churches, faith groups and mosques, is an important way of building inter-religious consensus and a belief that we can solve all our problems together"

(Brown in HC Deb Vol 503 Col 684, 13 January 2010).

The above quote highlights several things. It shows that Gordon Brown's discourse centred on extremism as leading to violence, it shows a focus on the abuse of "free speech", and it represents a set of extraordinary measures to curb the threat in question. For one, through an Assertive securitising speech act, he emphasises the shared values approach to counter extremism while simultaneously linking extremism with Islam by locating the threat in the Muslim community. He further stresses the importance of the Prevent Strategy for countering extremism. Additionally, he employs Assertive speech acts to underline the danger of the threat to the Referent Object, the United Kingdom ("incite people to kill").

CONTEST II had been relaunched in March 2009, and in its Foreword Gordon Brown repeated that "(t)he first priority of any Government is to ensure the security and safety of the nation and all members of the public[188]". In so doing, he creates a sense of survival urgency before using the Assertive securitising speech act of stating that terrorism is "motivated by a violent extremist ideology" (Brown in HM

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[187] The home secretary Alan Johnson proscribed "al-Muhajiroun, Islam4UK, and a number of the other names the organisation goes by" the previous day (Davis, 2010).

[188] See also Brown (in HC Deb Vol 467 Col 672, 14 November 2007).

Government, 2009: 6). He went on to assert that "the most significant security threat to the people of the United Kingdom today comes from international terrorism", before employing the Directive securitising speech act of needing to understand the reasons for people's radicalisation in order to "stop them becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism or violent extremism in the first place" (Brown in HM Government, 2009: 6). He hereby locates 'non-violent extremism' as the source of both terrorism and 'violent extremism'. The strategy's Prevent strand is stated as "to stop people becoming terrorists or supporting violent extremism" (HM Government, 2009: 13), highlighting previous securitising moves by Gordon Brown. In comparison to CONTEST I, the revised strategy "was a significantly larger document" but was "deliberately conceived as a different kind of document from its predecessor" (McCann, 2019: 33). According to Norris (2015: 118), it built on the narrative of CONTEST I but emphasised on "the framing of terrorism as a problem that comes from abroad, the securitization of the Muslim Community and the inclusion of the language of shared values". Others like Neumann (2008: 2) however, believe that its goal was rather the preservation of the quality of life in the United Kingdom, not the elimination of the threat of terrorism by underscoring the preventative measures designed to stop the growth of extremism. The Prevent strand emerged from the 'Preventing Violent Extremism' initiative under Blair, had been criticised on grounds of its focus on Muslims, and now aimed to broaden its scope "around community cohesion" (McGlynn & McDaid, 2019: 562). This can be explained by the Labour government's underlying belief that terrorist attacks on British soil were "the result of something broken within British society, whereby certain sections of the community were turning violently against those amongst whom they had been born and raised" (Richards, 2017: 9-10). However, it still "sought to address the problem of violent extremism through funding programs of community cohesion and supporting "mainstream voices" within Muslim communities" (Rivers, 2018: 269-270).

During the Security and Counter-terrorism debate on the 20th of January 2010, Gordon Brown again spent most of the speech framing the threat of terrorism. Brown was questioned by the leader of the Liberal Democrats, Mr. Nick Clegg (Sheffield, Hallam) (LD), who welcomed the Prime Minister's statement and then wanted to know how to deal with al-Qaeda supporters in Yemen (Clegg in HC Deb

Vol 504 Col 309, 20 January 2010). In response, he agreed with Mr. Clegg and maintained the importance of backing "those elements who are standing firm against al-Qaeda and against a perverted view of Islam on the basis of which jihad is preached against the rest of the world" (Brown in HC Deb Vol 504 Col 309, 20 January 2010). He hereby positions the non-Islamic world as the Referent Object to the threat of a "perverted view of Islam", a line of argument previously avoided by him and which had been used continuously by his predecessor Tony Blair (see for example Blair, 2001, 2005b). He continues to convolute extremism with Islam, positioning the "bad" perverted al-Qaeda Islam against moderates and reformers in the same debate through Assertive securitising speech acts, stating, "I keep saying that we must expose extremism and back the reformers and moderates who want to show that the view of Islam as perverted by al-Qaeda is completely false" (Brown in HC Deb Vol 504 Col 314, 20 January 2010). By evoking the danger of the threat and establishing urgency, he securitises extremism further. It is also noteworthy that now, with his premiership coming to an end, he reverts to the framing previously pushed by Blair, which he had sought to avoid over the past years.

5.7. Conclusion

A wide variety of judgments have been made about Brown's premiership. Landale (2014) comments that his supporters saw him as an inspiring and brilliant leader who defended the interests of the United Kingdom and helped stabilise the global economy in the banking and financial crisis from 2007 onwards. On the other hand, Theakston & Gill (2011: 67) call his premiership "the third-worst since the Second World War", quoting a survey which rated Gordon Brown's time in office as "less successful than that of John Major". Critics also described him as inaccessible, suspicious, and authoritarian (Landale, 2014) and according to Mandelson (2010: 13 in Theakston, 2011: 79), Gordon Brown had admitted privately that he was not 'a good Prime Minister'. One has to keep in mind that his premiership was exemplified by his taking over from Blair and his having to deal with several crises in a short time span, some of which were completely out of his hands. As Grube (2013: 129) put it, "From foot and mouth disease outbreaks, to floods, to a GFC[189]

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[189] Global Financial Crisis.

to the debt crisis that followed, Brown never reached the political free air he no doubt craved to give voice to a wider agenda".

When analysing Gordon Brown's discourse on extremism, one can observe several shifts. Whilst for Tony Blair, 'Islamic Extremism' and military intervention took centre stage, the three themes most prominent in Gordon Brown's discourses are 'British Values', 'violent extremism', and the notion of the 'isolation of extremists/extremism'. Throughout his career, Gordon Brown seems to emphasise the concept Britishness, with commentators like Lee (2010: 89) claiming that is has always been a cornerstone of Brown's politics and his answer to saving the Union[190]. Bechhofer & McCrone (2007) believe that Gordon Brown addressed the topic of Britishness as early as 2005 whereas Lee (2010: 88) states that Brown associated himself "with Britain and Britishness, and policies and initiatives that would reinforce the British Union" going back to 1997. Nairn (2006: 6) suggests that Gordon Brown started his campaign of Britishness in early 2006, partially down to his leadership campaign in order to position himself as "heir-apparent to Leader Tony Blair" who had at this point pronounced that he was to stand down as Labour Party Leader and Prime Minister in 2007.

Looking at Gordon Brown's speeches, it appears that he did indeed emphasise on Britishness but also took a different approach to the discourse of extremism than Tony Blair previously. As extraordinary measure or antidote to extremism (as well as terrorism), Brown often repeats the concept of 'shared values', 'common values', 'global values' or British values (see for example Brown in HC Deb Vol 467 Col 670, 14 November 2007, Brown, 2009a and Brown in HC Deb Vol 503 Col 684, 13 January 2010). This notion is also supported by Uberoi & Modood (2013: 34) who argue that for Labour "Britishness is described as a source of self-understanding and belonging which reduces the appeal of extremist identities while encouraging mutual loyalty among citizens, all of which could seemingly be lost".

In comparison to Tony Blair's discourses, Gordon Brown differentiates less between foreign and domestic extremism. Although as chancellor in early 2006 he still presented extremism as an international threat that affected the domestic sphere, most of his mentions of extremism were in 2007. The concept of using

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[190] See also Hames (2015), Hassan (2007) and Leydier (2008).

British Values to fight extremism appears to be his hobbyhorse – one which he emphasised frequently going back to his time as Chancellor of the Exchequer. It is indeed Brown who, upon becoming Prime Minister in 2007, evolves the heart and minds strategy and starts to formally introduce measures to isolate extremism via shared values. It is then that he starts to emancipate himself from Blair's previous policies by implementing a cohesive NSS, including extraordinary measures to curb the threat of extremism, further formalising a consistent approach to what he manages to present as a threat. He thereby appears to be much more solution focused than his predecessor, starting to put policies and guidelines in place. Upon taking over leadership from Blair, he also moves away from the discourse of openly and directly associating Islam with extremism. However, even though he stops using the phrase 'Islamic extremism', he still heavily alludes to it being a threat by linking extremism to religion, as seen in particular during his National Security statements in June and November 2007. The themes previously raised by Tony Blair have continued; terrorism represents a global challenge that will be defeated by international collaboration. Brown also hinted at the theological component of terrorism by evoking past theories about its relation to Islam and the alleged war between mainstream believers and extremists. He suggests that the extremists are motivated by outside sources, identifying the danger beyond the United Kingdom, as Tony Blair had done before him. According to Kettell (2011: 95), his administration also refused "to accept any causal role for foreign policy in the threat from international terrorism, placing a premium on the role of values and ideas".

Isolating extremism from society is a topic that Gordon Brown continuously addresses. He commits himself to lessening the threat of extremism by involving moderate voices while still appearing to invoke the rhetoric of 'us vs. them'. In 2008 it can be observed that British Military involvement in Afghanistan was justified by linking the threat of extremism to the Referent Object of British security. In 2009, the main themes of Gordon Brown's discourse on extremism are firstly its tendency to lead to violence and the abuse of "free speech", and secondly the extraordinary measures he proposes to curb this threat. He continuously emphasises the shared values approach to counter extremism but simultaneously links extremism with Islam by locating the threat in the Muslim community. Looking at Gordon Brown's securitisation over the years, it can be observed that at

the beginning of his premiership, it was an important topic for him, especially in order to distinguish himself from his predecessors. However, the more he securitised, and the more his securitisation was accepted, the less he needed to continue to frame extremism as a threat. This can be seen by the decrease in mentions from 2009 onwards. At this point he locates the threat globally, most often linking it to Islam, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, thereby justifying British Military involvement. Towards the end of his time in office, he convolutes previous discourses (for example extremism equalling terrorism) in view of the upcoming election. Furthermore, it can be assumed that as his premiership drew to a close, he wanted to leave more of a legacy and therefore took up a more policy orientated approach (as seen in the introduction of the NSS and Prevent Strategy).

According to Allen (2011: 11), because Brown had co-governed with Blair for more than ten years, he would not have been able to offer many new policies. One can therefore assume that being more policy orientated regarding counter-extremism was a way to distinguish himself from previous Blair policies and discourses. Additionally, McGhee (2012: 115) highlights that Gordon Brown attempted (in a very different manner than Tony Blair) "to create a consensus (both in terms of cross-party and a wider 'national' consensus) on 'security', especially with regard to counter-terrorism policy. Rieff (2007 in Hammond, 2008: 236) had claimed that Brown decided to formally stop using the terminology of the 'war on terror', as well as the words 'Muslim' and 'Islamic' when speaking about security threats because he considered them to be "divisive and counterproductive". Bleich (2014: 144-145) also argued that Brown's avoidance of 'war on terror' related wording was an attempt to "shy away from terms that imply a connection to Islam, at least in events for public consumption". However, he also points out that, for Brown, acts of terror were "a criminal undertaking, and not one necessarily associated with any particular faith community". However, whilst this might have been his initial intention, it cannot always be observed in his discourse (see for example Brown, 2008d) as he does indeed associate Islam with extremism. It can be concluded that Gordon Brown kept extremism on the security agenda, though he focused on 'violent extremism' as opposed to his predecessor Tony Blair (who focused on Islamic extremism).

The following chapter will explore the securitisation of extremism carried out by David Cameron, who took over the premiership from Brown in May 2010. This governance change led to a speeding up of "counter-terrorism policies from collaborating with non-violent extremists to seeing them as part of the problem rather than as part of the solution" (Schmid, 2014: 5).

6. David Cameron and the ideology of extremism as a security threat

"The point is this: the ideology of extremism is the problem; Islam emphatically is not"
(Cameron, 2011a).

6.1. Introduction

David Cameron first became a Member of Parliament for Witney in 2001 prior to taking the Conservative Party's leadership in 2005[191]. From May 2010 to July 2016 he was the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom. As Prime Minister he held a position of authority, enabling him to make securitising moves as securitising actor. Given the main research question of how UK Prime Ministers have securitised extremism in Parliament, this chapter analyses how extremism is presented by David Cameron, who or what is presented to be at risk of the threat, and which extraordinary measures he suggested in order to curb said threat. When Tony Blair moved the issue of extremism onto the security agenda, he was securitising mainly 'Islamic extremism'. Gordon Brown, on the other hand, focussed his securitising discourses on the threat of 'violent extremism', although indirectly associating it with Islam. David Cameron, following Tony Blair's footsteps, kept the issue of extremism securitised but started to heavily include 'non-violent extremism', in particular stressing the danger of the 'extremist ideology'. Furthermore, he attempted to openly distance the government's agenda regarding extremism from Islam but ended up still emphasising on extremism as the root of a religiously motivated danger.

It can also be argued that David Cameron and his government were the main drivers behind the implementation of the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 (CTSA 2015) which can be seen as a main extraordinary measure in the securitisation process of extremism, given its focus on Prevent and its subsequent introduction of the Prevent Duty. There are many layers proving this hypothesis of the securitisation of extremism, evidenced by the following analysis of David Cameron's parliamentary speeches from 2010 to 2016 in context. Moreover, when appropriate, speeches regarding security matters given outside Parliament were also

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[191] He generally voted against Labour's anti-terrorism laws (3 votes for, 44 votes against, 23 absences), between 2001–2010.

analysed. It can be concluded that David Cameron continuously justified military action abroad by framing it as essential to curbing the threat of extremism and subsequently terrorism. In his discourse, extremism, specifically Islamist Extremist Ideology, is presented as the root of violence and is securitised (see Table 9). He securitises the ideology, which he locates as the reason for violent action, not the behaviour itself.

	Speech Act	Speech Act Example by David Cameron	Securitising speech act indicator	Guiding note
Assertive securitising speech act	State, describe, classify, explain	"The threat picture facing Britain in terms of Islamist extremist violence is more acute today than ever before" (Cameron in HC Deb Vol 599 Col 25, 07 September 2015).	Something or someone is a threat	Speaker tells 'how things are'
Directive securitising speech act	Order, command, request	"Whether they are violent in their means or not, we must make it impossible for the extremists to succeed" (Cameron, 2011a).	Extraordinary measure suggested to curb the threat	Speaker tries to get people to do something
Commissive securitising speech act	Promise, vow, pledge, contract, guarantee, threaten	"We will defeat violent extremism by standing together… …by backing our police and security services… …and above all by challenging the poisonous narrative of extremism on which this violence feeds" (Cameron, 2013).	Extraordinary measure suggested to curb the threat	Speaker commits her/himself to doing something

Table 9 - Examples of securitising speech acts by David Cameron (2010-2015)

The following chapter chronologically explores David Cameron's securitising of extremism, starting with his first term of office in 2010. Here it elaborates his discourses contextually, for example arguing that his securitising moves were a form of justification for military intervention in 2011 to 2013. It also explores how he implemented extraordinary measures from 2013 onwards to curb the threat of 'violent extremism' as well as the 'poisonous narrative of extremism' (see Cameron, 2013). The analysis shows that from 2013 onwards, David Cameron also employed securitising moves regarding extremism in order to get his audience to approve military intervention in Syria. The chapter then turns to the intensification of security discourse due to the rise of ISIS which led to the framing of the threat of extremism as even more urgent, resulting in the implementation of legal counter-extremism measures (see Prevent Duty). The chapter then moves on to David Cameron's securitising of extremism during his second term of office (2015-2016) which solidified his previous securitisation moves; before ending the analysis of his overall securitising speech acts regarding extremism in a conclusion.

6.2. Securitising as Prime Minister 2010-2015 (1ˢᵗ term)

The first time David Cameron mentioned extremism in parliament as Prime Minister[192] was during the 'Treatment of Detainees' debate on the 6th of July 2010. Responding to allegations of mistreatment of detainees by British security services, he states that "[...] terrorists and extremists are able to exploit those allegations for their own propaganda" (Cameron in HC Deb Vol 513 Col 176, 06 July 2010). Whilst this might not appear as securitisation as such, it still does frame both terrorists and extremists as a threat, more specifically their propaganda[193]. David Cameron continued to frame 'extremist Islamist arguments' as the Referent Subject to the Referent Object of 'our country' and 'the world', locating the threat both nationally as well as internationally during the debate. Similar securitising moves can be seen on the 5th of February 2011, when David Cameron gave a speech at the

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[192] When David Cameron became Prime Minister in May 2010, he was at 43 even younger than Tony Blair had been when he had taken the leading government position in 1997 and was the youngest prime minister since Robert Banks Jenkinson in 1812 (Wheeler, 2016). Despite being the largest party, the Conservatives were still 20 seats short of an overall majority after the May 2010 election and were only able to secure an overall majority with the aid of the Liberal Democrats (Besly et al, 2018: 45) which made it "Britain's first peacetime coalition government since the 1930s" according to (Quinn et al, 2011: 295).

[193] He also announced an independent inquiry which was welcomed by Human Rights groups (BBC News, 2010).

Munich Security Conference[194] (MSC) which was to gain notoriety for its strong stance on terrorism. Abbas & Siddique (2012: 131) state that "the speech on anti-terrorism, security and multiculturalism (…) caused considerable outcry among certain left-of-centre academics and commentators". They also argue that this speech was "his first public statement on the question of radical Islamism and its dangers for secular liberal nations such as Britain" (Abbas & Siddique, 2012: 131). However, this is not the case as he had already done so previously as MP (Cameron, 2005), as opposition leader (see for example Cameron, 2006), and as Prime Minister (see for example NATO Summit debate on the 22nd of November 2010)[195].

During the speech, David Cameron mentioned extremi*[196] 21 times (extremists – 6 times, extremist – 7 times, extremism – 8 times) and clearly emphasised the dangers of extremism as ideology leading to terrorism. Talking about "the origins of where these terrorist attacks lie", he claims that it is "the existence of an ideology, Islamist extremism" (Cameron, 2011a) that is at fault, thereby securitising 'Islamist extremism' as an existential threat through an Assertive securitising speech act[197]. He continued to differentiate Islamist extremism from Islam as a religion, stating that "Islam is a religion observed peacefully and devoutly by over a billion people. Islamist extremism is a political ideology supported by a minority" (Cameron, 2011a). The use of the phrase 'Islamist extremism' sticks out, being mentioned 4 times altogether and clearly indicating a policy shift from Gordon Brown's usage. It is also noteworthy to point out that he locates 'Islamist extremism' as a political, rather than a religious ideology (as Blair (2001b) had

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[194] The MSC is "the world's leading forum for debating international security policy [and] aims at debating the world's most relevant security challenges" (Stiftung Münchner Sicherheitskonferenz, 2020).

[195] Cameron himself stated later in his memoirs that this speech was where he was "setting out my stall on the Subject [of Islamist extremism]" and how to deal with the ideology (Cameron, 2019: 451). Smith (2016: 305) pointed out that the speech was given "the same day of a large anti-Muslim March by the English defence league in Leeds", however, this seems coincidental and not done on purpose. The speech also has to be seen in the context of the Conservatives just having been elected (although not as a majority) and as Allard-Tremblay (2017: 120) highlights, there was a shift in the policy on multiculturalism (as opposed to the previous Labour government).

[196] By using the asterisk symbol (as a so-called wildcard symbol) at the end of the root of the term extremism or terrorism, it is possible to broaden the search to words containing related terms (for example searching extremis* will turn up extremists, extremist, extremism, extremisms while terror* will show words such as terror, terrorism, terrorist, terrorists. For more information on query modifying, see Kromer (2014) and (Mishra et al, 2009).

[197] David Cameron used the term 'Islamic extremism' and 'Islamist extremism' interchangeably without differentiating.

previously in earlier speeches). He emphasised the difference using an Assertive speech act to state that "Islamist extremism and Islam are not the same thing" (Cameron, 2011a). The distinction becomes clearer when he went on to explain later in his speech that "The point is this: the ideology of extremism is the problem; Islam emphatically is not" (Cameron, 2011a), making certain that he does not want Islam to be convoluted with extremism. However, by using the phrasing of "Islamist extremism", he made a point by itself rather than calling it 'religious' or 'political extremism'. As indicated by Abbas & Awan (2015: 20), the speech did not address the "wider threat" of extremism in regard to "far right groups and lone wolf extremists". Instead, the focus of the threat framing still lies heavily with 'Islamist extremism'.

Repetitively talking about terrorism, he suggested that he believes that "the root lies in the existence of this extremist ideology" (Cameron, 2011a) and he positions its alure in the vulnerability of young Muslims' identity struggles. He further stated that it is "a process of radicalisation" which leads them to "this extremist ideology" and that "they don't turn into terrorists overnight, but what we see – and what we see in so many European countries – is a process of radicalisation" (Cameron, 2011a). This is an important point as it appears that Cameron does not conclude that extremist views automatically lead to violent acts. However, through Assertive securitising speech acts, he still positioned "young rootless Muslims" as Referent Subjects (which are threatening). He continuously uses Assertive securitising speech acts to claim that "it is clear that many of them were initially influenced by what some have called 'non-violent extremists', and they then took those radical beliefs to the next level by embracing violence" (Cameron, 2011a). He hereby overtly securitises non-violent extremism for the first time, positioning it as the Referent Subject whose threat entails terrorism (violence). He suggested extraordinary measures to curb the threat by confronting the ideology as well as encouraging a "shared national identity" (as had Gordon Brown previously, see Chapter 5). David Cameron further evokes the danger of both violent and non-violent extremists, creating a state of urgency when he orders, "Whether they are violent in their means or not, we must make it impossible for the extremists to succeed" and listing a variety of measures through Directive securitising speech acts when, for example, commanding the proscription of "preachers of hate"

(Cameron, 2011a). Here it becomes apparent that he sees both violent and non-violent extremism as on par and equal in terms of their imminent dangers.

Talking about the risk of allocating money to organisations that do "little to combat extremism" and subsequently comparing such practices to "turning to a right-wing fascist party to fight a violent white supremacist movement", he took a strong stance of convoluting Islam with extremism but also of fostering a worse public perception of Muslims (Cameron, 2011a). He also used the Directive securitising speech act of aiming to convince his audience to accept the threat of "non-violent extremism" when stating:

> "And to those who say these non-violent extremists are actually helping to keep young, vulnerable men away from violence, I say nonsense"
>
> (Cameron, 2011a).

Along the theme of Islamic extremism being separate to 'good Islam' (a theme previously often used by Tony Blair and to a lesser extent, Gordon Brown), he used Assertive securitising speech acts when stating that "The extremism we face is a distortion of Islam" and when he emphasised that Muslims themselves must do their part to counter it (Cameron, 2011a). Although the speech emphasises terrorism as a security issue, it also heavily identifies it as stemming from "extremist ideology" and claims it not to be interrelated with other "global problems, such as poverty and political grievance" (Adams & Edy, 2021: 11).

During the Counter-terrorism Debate of the 3rd of May 2011, David Cameron surprisingly used less forceful wording regarding extremism compared to his speeches earlier in the year. However, his statement to the House of Commons was also published separately by the Foreign & Commonwealth Office as a news item titled "*Prime Minister: "While Bin Laden is gone, the threat of Al Qaeda remains"*"(Cameron, 2011b), indicating that the speech was considered important from a Foreign Affairs' viewpoint[198]. David Cameron responded to a question by Mr. Pat McFadden (Wolverhampton South East) (Lab) with another instance of the securitisation of non-violent extremism, stating that it "(…) is not enough to say

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[198] Osama Bin Laden, figure head of terrorist organisation al-Qaeda, had been killed by US forces on the second of May 2011 which was considered by many to be a big strike against global terrorism (Burleigh, 2011). Whilst David Cameron was considered to have shown renewed confidence in Pakistan's government upon Bin Laden's demise, it also made clear that it was an "important restatement of Britain's new diplomatic approach to the country, which aims to rebuild trust with its leaders after years of mistrust" according to Whitehall officials cited by Barker (2011).

that we will prevent violent extremism, because we need to prevent extremism as well" (Cameron in HC Deb Vol 527 Col 463, 03 May 2011). It becomes clear that he is referring to extremism as both an action (violent) and an ideology (non-violent), mirroring previous securitising moves which see violent and non-violent extremism as equally dangerous.

The Afghanistan debate on the 6th of July 2011, pointedly held a day after the sixth anniversary of the July 2005 London terror attacks, proved to be an opportunity for David Cameron to justify Britain's military presence in Afghanistan[199], a strategy previously also having been used by Tony Blair (see Chapter 4) and Gordon Brown (see Chapter 5). David Cameron reflects in his memoirs that his intelligence services insisted that in 2010, having troops in Afghanistan was still warranted and claims that "[t]he most significant security threat to the United Kingdom remained al-Qaeda. If we left Afghanistan precipitately, it – and its training camps – could return" (Cameron, 2019: 183-184). Whilst in his 2010 discourse he did not link Afghanistan to extremism, he now referred to the London bombings as "an attack that was inspired by al-Qaeda and executed by extremists following the same perverted ideology that underpinned the 11 September attack in 2001" (Cameron in HC Deb Vol 532 Col 1511, 06 July 2011). He therefore indirectly located the threat in Afghanistan. It is poignant that he did not use the term "terrorists" but "extremists", underpinning that he sees extremist ideology on equal terms. He also used Assertive securitising speech acts framing Britain's and the British people's security as the Referent Object (Cameron in HC Deb Vol 532 Col 1511, 06 July 2011).

6.2.1. Securitising extremism to justify military intervention

Ashcroft & Oakeshott (2015: 297) argue that David Cameron was looking to prove himself in terms of war waging, pointing out that previously, Margaret Thatcher had used the Falkland wars and Tony Blair the Kosovo war to profile themselves as capable leaders. They state that the happenings during the Arab Spring earlier in the year had presented themselves as an opportunity for David Cameron to position himself as a humanitarian, liberal interventionist (Ashcroft & Oakeshott, 2015:

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[199] Although he had announced in the lead-up to the election that "his foreign policy priority would be withdrawal from Afghanistan" (Ashcroft & Oakeshott, 2015: 296).

297). Cameron now needed support for his decision to have Britain join the NATO-led military intervention to 'liberate' Libya from its leader Muammar Gaddafi (Wintour & Watt, 2011). To justify Britain taking part in the military intervention in Libya during the Libya debate on the 5th of September 2011, he framed 'democracy' as a measure[200] to curb the threat of 'Islamic extremism' before stating that it is wrong to believe that "supporting such dictators helped us to deal with Islamic extremism" (Cameron in HC Deb Vol 532 Col 32, 05 September 2011). He continued to employ Assertive securitising speech acts to frame the threat (Islamic extremists) as a global one located in Libya and Syria (Cameron in HC Deb Vol 532 Col 32, 05 September 2011), again trying to validate UK involvement in Libya (and Syria foreshadowing). David Cameron justifying intervention in the Middle East on the basis of combating the threat of extremism can also be seen again in his address to the United Nations General Assembly on the 26th of September 2012, where he pleaded to have the UN intervene in Syria (see Watt, 2012). He went on to again claim that the argument that dictators such as Gadhafi and Assad bring stability to the region should not count because repressed people lacking freedom and economic stability have "no alternative but a dead end choice between dictatorship or extremism" (Cameron, 2012)[201].

In January 2013, the terrorist group Katiba al-Mulathamin, which had reported links to Al Qaida, had taken more than 100 mostly international hostages at a gas facility in Algeria. Their reasoning was reported to be a retaliation to France's military intervention in Mali. What began on the 16th of January did not end until the 19th of January, resulting in the loss of life of more than 39 hostages, including six British citizens (Der Spiegel, 2013)[202]. While the situation was still ongoing during the Algeria Debate in the House of Commons on the 18th of January 2013, David Cameron made a statement regarding the "hostage crisis" stating that it is the terrorists who were responsible for the attack; he points out that "The action of these

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[200] One has to note here that 'democracy' cannot clearly be defined as an 'extraordinary measure', even though there could be arguments that exporting democracy (or exporting 'liberal values') and thereby imposing a political system are measures that go beyond the ordinary political sphere.

[201] He continues to *literally* repeat what he said in April 2012 when he goes on to state: "Islam is a great religion observed peacefully and devoutly by over a billion people. Islamist extremism is a warped political ideology supported by a minority that seeks to hijack a great religion to gain respectability for its violent Objectives" (Cameron, 2012).

[202] The attack proved to be significant in shaping future British foreign policy strategy (see Dennison, 2013 and Gilmore, 2013).

extremists can never be justified" (Cameron in HC Deb Vol 556 Col 1163, 18 January 2013).

When Henry Smith (Crawley) (Con), pointing out the proximity of Algeria to Libya, asked about there being any evidence "of the wider involvement of factions in other states?" (Smith in HC Deb Vol 556 Col 1175, 18 January 2013), David Cameron seized the chance to answer by positioning the security threat of 'Islamist extremist militants' in more than one country, potentially retrospectively justifying intervention in Libya as well as France's involvement in Mali (Cameron in HC Deb Vol 556 Col 1175, 18 January 2013). After delivering updates on the situation in Algeria at 10 Downing Street on the 20th of January 2013, David Cameron was asked by a reporter if he believed that "the threat to the UK from al-Qaeda in North Africa is as great as it was in Afghanistan a decade ago?". He responded by creating a state of urgency and suggested measures against the threat via Directive securitising speech acts stating that:

> "(…) What we face is an extremist, Islamist, violent, al-Qaeda linked terrorist group. Just as *we had to… have to deal* with that in Pakistan and in Afghanistan, so *the world needs to come together to deal with this threat* in North Africa"

> (Cameron, 2013a) [emphasis added].

It is important that he used the battling of "extremist Islamists" as a reason for previous military involvement in both Pakistan and Afghanistan[203]. The phrasing suggests that the UK had no other choice but to get involved, further indicating the urgency of the threat (still) faced.

This discourse is repeated a day later by David Cameron in Parliament during the Algeria Debate on the 21st of January 2013 when he located the threat of Islamist extremism abroad, adding Yemen, Somalia, and North Africa to the list of Referent Subjects. Additionally, he framed the UK as the Referent Object being threatened (Cameron in HC Deb Vol 556 Col 26, 21 January 2013). At this point, it appears that David Cameron's discourse has avoided locating the threat of extremism inside the United Kingdom, something he had previously done when framing young

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[203] Leading up to the 2010 election, David Cameron had emphasised that he would prioritise the withdrawal of British troops from Afghanistan (Ashcroft & Oakeshott, 2015: 296).

British Muslims at being at risk of becoming radicalised through an Islamist extremist ideology (see for example Cameron, 2011a).

6.2.2. The extremism taskforce and legal measures to curb the threat

According to Castle (2015), the murder of Lee Rigby[204] has been seen as the ignition point for David Cameron's drawing up of further legal counter-terrorism measures[205]. As a direct response to the attack, David Cameron announced the extraordinary measure of the formation of a taskforce on tackling extremism and radicalisation (HM Government, 2013). Giving a statement on the Woolwich incident at 10 Downing Street on the 23rd of May 2013, David Cameron stated that "this country will be absolutely resolute in its stand against violent extremism and terror" (Cameron, 2013). He went on to employ several securitising speech acts when saying:

> "We will defeat violent extremism by standing together…
> …by backing our police and security services…
> …and above all by challenging the poisonous narrative of extremism on which this violence feeds"

> (Cameron, 2013).

Through Directive and Commissive speech acts, he announced extraordinary measures to curb the threat of 'violent extremism', in this case entailing the 'poisonous narrative of extremism' which he positions as a factor leading to acts of (violent) terror. That he wanted everyone to stand together to curb the threat is demonstrated when he uses the Directive securitising speech act of saying: "Confronting extremism is a job for us all" (Cameron, 2013).

During the EU Council and Woolwich Debate at the House of Commons on the 3rd of June 2013[206], David Cameron updated Parliament on the investigation of the Lee

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[204] On the 22nd of May 2013, British fusilier Lee Rigby who was not on duty at the time of the attack and had been wearing civilian clothing was killed by Michael Adebolajo and Michael Adebowale in the London borough of Woolwich. The murderers claimed that they had killed Rigby due to him being a soldier and "to avenge the killing of Muslims by the British armed forces" (Abbas & Awan, 2015: 21). Both attackers had been British but had a Nigerian background. Reportedly, Adebolajo had attempted to go to Somalia to be trained by al-Shabaab (Nesser, 2014: 49).

[205] This might be the case as he extensively talks about it in his memoirs (see Cameron, 2019: 451ff) and Walker (2018: 2) determinates it as having reinforced counter-terrorism and counter-extremism measures.

[206] In the same debate, David Cameron also tried to gain support in the EU council intervention in Syria. Talking about human rights violations in Syria he uses the Directive speech acts to get approval for lifting "the EU arms embargo on the Syrian opposition", arguing that "We must be

Rigby murder and the "efforts to fight extremism in all its forms" (Cameron in HC Deb Vol 563 Col 1234, 03 June 2013), making it his first mention of "extremism in all its forms" (though he does not clarify what he means by this). Cameron used Directive securitising speech acts when saying of "extremist ideology" that "We must confront that ideology in all its forms" (Cameron in HC Deb Vol 563 Col 1234, 03 June 2013), which in this case most likely means non-violent and violent extremism. This interpretation can be supported by him recalling that since he became Prime Minister "we have ensured that the Prevent strategy focuses on all forms of extremism, and not just on violent extremism" (Cameron in HC Deb Vol 563 Col 1235, 03 June 2013). He further indicated that he positions extremism as an ideology as the threat, not the violent outcomes; whilst also highlighting that he sees 'all forms of extremism' as a threat. It can be observed that he used Commissive securitising speech acts, committing himself to taking on the threat of not just Islamic extremism but also right-wing extremism. Whilst he does not use the term, he suggests that Islamophobia could be considered a part of such extremism.

Mr. Julian Brazier (Canterbury) (Con) reminded the Prime Minister to consider "the deportation of preachers of hate" (Brazier in HC Deb Vol 563 Col 1243, 03 June 2013). David Cameron responded by saying that Mr. Brazier makes "an excellent point" before addressing the domestic angle of extremism of 'home-grown extremists'. Again, this shows how he positioned the threat both globally and domestically, especially when he admits that whilst "preachers of hate" need to be deported, the UK also has "our own domestic, home-grown problem to deal with as well" (Cameron in HC Deb Vol 563 Col 1243-1244, 03 June 2013). He further repeatedly fleshed out that he sees extremism as the 'poisonous ideology' which ultimately leads to acts of violence. His claim that debates in the House of Commons "set the context for confrontation of not just the violent extremism, but the extremism and poisonous ideology on which these people thrive (Cameron in HC Deb Vol 563 Col 1243-1244, 03 June 2013) is indicative of this. This also

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clear: unless we do more to support the official opposition, the humanitarian crisis will continue, the political transition that we want to see will not happen, and the extremists will continue to flourish" (Cameron in HC Deb Vol 563 Col 1234, 03 June 2013). He employs the Directive securitising speech act to get the House of Commons to agree with him by emphasising on the humanitarian crisis which can only be stopped through support of the Syrian opposition.

shows that he himself sees speech as something powerful which can lead to actual change. During the speech, David Cameron continued with both Assertive (to frame the threat) and Directive securitising speech acts to outline further extraordinary measures yet to be taken, foreshadowing the Prevent Duty. Additionally, he brought in Higher Education institutions and Prisons as Referent Objects in which he located the threat of "this poisonous narrative (…) this perversion of Islam and (…) this extremist narrative" stating that "All of us in the House" condemn it (Cameron in HC Deb Vol 563 Col 1244, 03 June 2013). By speaking for the whole parliament, he assumed authority but also suggests approval of his securitising discourses regarding extremism's danger as an ideology.

During the debate it becomes clear that David Cameron was pushing for the criminalisation of the pre-criminal stage of extremism, given the use of Directive securitising speech acts (Cameron in HC Deb Vol 563 Col 1245, 03 June 2013). Additionally, he located the threat in university campuses, Islamic centres, and mosques as well as online ("via people on the internet" Cameron in HC Deb Vol 563 Col 1247, 03 June 2013). The statement also highlights future policies of ensuring that the Prevent strategy becomes more enforced and that it helps hinder radicalisation. He located radicalisation as the threat both globally and locally but also used the Assertive securitising speech act to insist that "Pakistan, Somalia or elsewhere" are places where "extremists, jihadis and violent extremists" are trained (Cameron in HC Deb Vol 563 Col 1247, 03 June 2013). The distinction stands out here, he blends extremists with jihadis but also seems to draw the line to violent (active) extremism. By highlighting through a Directive securitising speech act that the threat needs to be fought internationally ("we cannot just pretend it is something we have to deal with domestically" Cameron in HC Deb Vol 563 Col 1247, 03 June 2013), he further justified intervention abroad.

This theme continues on the 19th of June 2013, where the debate on the G8 summit took place in the House of Commons[207]. It became a rallying call for David Cameron to have Parliament approve military intervention in Syria. He used

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[207] The G8 meeting had taken place a few days earlier, from the 17th to the 18th of June 2013 in Northern Ireland, most importantly discussing recent developments in Syria, where Civil War was raging (Aldrich & Cormack, 2016: 662).

Assertive securitising speech acts to position extremists (alongside the radicalisation of terrorists) as the Referent Subject that threatens global and regional (Middle East) security when stating that:

> "There is a radicalisation of *terrorists and extremists who will pose a direct threat to the security of the region and also the world*"
>
> (Cameron in HC Deb Vol 564 Col 896, 19 June 2013) [emphasis added].

By evoking the image of a 'humanitarian disaster' ("We are faced with a dramatically escalating humanitarian disaster with more than 90,000 dead and almost 6 million people having had to flee their homes", Cameron in HC Deb Vol 564 Col 896, 19 June 2013), he further pleaded for the House of Commons to agree with his proposal of intervention. He used both Directive and Assertive securitising speech acts to highlight the urgency of the situation, following the grammar of security, there is no point of return if the threat is not stopped (see Wæver, 2003: 14):

> "(…) we cannot simply ignore this continuing slaughter. Of course, it is right to point out that there are *extremists* among the Opposition. There are, and *I am clear: they pose a threat not just to Syria but to all of us*"
>
> (Cameron in HC Deb Vol 564 Col 896-897, 19 June 2013) [emphasis added].

David Cameron is indeed very clear in his securitisation of extremists, evidently framing them as a threat to 'all of us' but also not shy to point out that extremists are the threat even when they fight Assad. The determination of his speech acts can be explained by his pointing out that he will not take any actions without parliamentary approval, which means that he wants to convince his audience of the existential threat that they face.

David Cameron is able to further securitise the threat outcome of extremism by stating that radicalisation is both a danger domestically and internationally ("Afghanistan, Mali and elsewhere") through an Assertive securitising speech act:

> "(…) *we need to do more* to throw extremists out of mosques and confront the radicalisers and hate preachers, and *we must do more* to throw those who are not British nationals out of the country"
>
> (Cameron in HC Deb Vol 564 Col 905, 19 June 2013) [emphasis added].

By implying a 'huge programme' across Government to counter extremism and radicalisation, he was most likely referring to CONTEST (and its offshoot the

Prevent strategy). Through the framing of 'Young British People' as the Referent Object of radicalisation, he also suggested extraordinary measures to "crack down on centres of radicalisation" through securitising speech acts. He further, through Directive securitising speech acts, demanded the expulsion of extremists from mosques, convoluting extremism with Islam and requesting changes to immigration.

6.2.3. The threat of extremism to rationalise intervention in Syria

During the Afghanistan and EU Council Debate on the 2nd of July 2013, Jeremy Corbyn[208] (Islington North) (Lab) made sure to show his disapproval of the Afghanistan mission, including the potential for future British military involvement abroad. David Cameron disagreed with Corbyn, referring to what could happen if there had been no intervention, namely that Afghanistan would become:

> "a haven for al-Qaeda extremists who carried out plots, killing people on our soil, in America, and in other parts of the world. That is what happens when we do not engage"
>
> (Cameron in HC Deb Vol 565 Col 765, 02 July 2013).

It is noteworthy that he talked about al-Qaeda extremists as opposed to al-Qaeda terrorists being the threat to "people on our soil" (Referent Object) alongside the United States and the "world". The quote also highlights how he frames the fight against extremism as a matter of urgency which, if neglected, poses an existential threat to everyone. He continued to claim that Afghanistan is now "a country where there are *not* active plots against Britain being hatched", citing it (amongst other reasons) as being a result of military intervention (Cameron in HC Deb Vol 565 Col 765, 02 July 2013) [emphasis added]. Here again, he used Assertive securitising speech acts to describe that, although no longer a direct threat, Afghanistan was a security risk and ceased to do so because 'democracy' had been implemented. Potentially, it was also another attempt to get attention for his plight to intervene in

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[208] He was not yet leader of the opposition but a staunch supporter of peace, for example receiving the 'The Gandhi Foundation International Peace Award for 2013' in "recognition of his consistent efforts over a 30-year Parliamentary career to uphold the Gandhian values of social justice and non-violence" (The Gandhi Foundation, 2014).

Syria, hoping that through juxtaposition, the approval of Parliament could be sought.

On the 21st of August 2013 news emerged of Syrian president Bashar al-Assad having used chemical weapons on Syrian civilians. David Cameron was appalled by the human rights violation but also by the risk that these weapons would "[fall] into the hands of al-Qaeda and other extremist groups" (Aldrich & Cormack, 2016: 662-664). It was therefore decided that a government motion to have British troops involved would be filed. However, according to Vickers (2015: 233-234), the proposed motion "was vaguely worded and rather difficult to understand". Parliament was recalled to debate the 'Syria and the Use of Chemical Weapons Motion' on the 29th of August 2013. The government putting forward motions usually falls into the realm of Foreign Policy, sometimes the government also wants "to initiate a debate on a matter of public concern or potential concern to the House" (Besly et al, 2018: 286). Due to Parliament having been in recess, it proved difficult to get MPs committed to supporting the motion. As put by Deputy Prime Minister Nick Clegg (in Seldon & Snowdon, 2015: 463-464), "People weren't there, they couldn't talk to each other. We just didn't have the time, wherewithal and the venue to make the case".

Nevertheless, Besly et al (2018: 285) state that "a significant number of MPs said that they finally made up their minds which way to vote on military intervention in Syria *only* during the debate" [emphasis added]. The public was not in favour of Britain getting involved in Syria and "there was no appetite for military operations" (Vickers, 2015: 234)[209]. According to Kaarbo (2018: 39), David Cameron was surprised by the results as he did not seem to understand why his arguments did not take hold with Parliament. However, it has to be remembered that due to previous military intervention which did not have a good legal standing[210], many were wary of repeating previous mistakes regarding "the legality of British action" (Seldon & Snowdon, 2015: 454). Given the precaution of the debate's topic, it is not surprising that many questions were directed at David Cameron. First, he draws a parallel to the 2003 Iraq intervention – the argument that the employment of military forces

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[209] The debate lasted more than seven hours (Seldon & Snowdon, 2015: 465) and the motion by government was eventually lost by 285 votes to 272 (Beech & Munce, 2019: 121) with 30 Tory MPs and 9 Liberal Democrat MPs having voted against it (Besly et al, 2018: 94).

[210] Like the Iraq War engagement by British troops initiated by Tony Blair.

was another driver for radicalisation had been made before. However, he assured his audience that mistakes would not be repeated and used Assertive securitising speech acts to state that military intervention would not be another driver for extremism, whereas not intervening might be. It is the only mention of extremis* by David Cameron in this debate, which can be explained by his having to resort to other arguments for gaining approval by Parliament. Nevertheless, the debate is important. As Kaarbo (2018: 45) specifies, it made him "the first UK PM since 1782 to have his preference on a security matter over-ruled by parliament"

6.2.4. The rise of ISIS fuelling the securitisation of extremism at home and abroad

By mid-2014, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)/ Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) had become the "dominant opposition force in Syria" and also aimed to take over in Iraq (Cockburn, 2015 in Seldon & Snowdon, 2015: 626). These developments worried Cameron and he recalls in his memoirs that he knew that 'boots on the ground' from Western forces would feed the Western occupier narrative, however, he also thought that military intervention was needed (Cameron, 2019: 573). On the 15th of August 2014, the UN Security Council passed a resolution condemning "the gross abuse of human rights by Islamic State" which included "travel restrictions, asset freezes and other measures targeted at Al-Qa'ida affiliates" (Blackbourn & Walker, 2016: 840-841). The HM Government (2014) had released a press release ahead of the meeting, stating that they were going "to press for a United Nations Security Council resolution to make clear the shared determination of the international community to tackle the threat posed by ISIL". The next day, on the 16th of August 2014, an article written by David Cameron for the Telegraph titled *'Isil poses a direct and deadly threat to Britain'*[211] was published[212]. The article features 8 mentions of extremi* and 9 mentions of terror*. David Cameron uses Directive securitising speech acts when stating: "no tolerance should allow the room for this sort of poisonous extremism in our country" (Cameron, 2014c), referring to the ideology behind ISIS[213]. This is not surprising

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[211] See Cameron (2014a).

[212] The article was also circulated on the government website, indicating that David Cameron wanted to get his message out to as many people as possible.

[213] He would later state similar concerns in his biography (Cameron, 2019).

as he was already working on proposing another motion for military intervention in Syria, this time hoping for the majority support of Parliament[214].

Not even a week after publication, a video of the beheading of the American journalist James Foley, who had been taken hostage by ISIS, was released on the 19th of August 2014 (BBC News, 2014). It featured a masked ISIS member who spoke with a British accent. According to Vickers (2015: 235-236), this along with ethnic cleansing by ISIS troops resulted in a further shift in public opinion towards getting involved. On the 29th of August, David Cameron gave a speech "about the threat level in the United Kingdom increasing from 'substantial' to 'severe'" (Cameron, 2014d). Apparently, this was mostly down to growing alarm "about the danger posed by returning jihadists[215]" who had engaged with IS and related groups abroad (Seldon & Snowdon, 2015: 626-627). Talking about the terrorist threat posed he frames "a poisonous ideology of Islamist extremism" as the root cause (Cameron, 2014d) through an Assertive securitising speech act. The framing of extremism being a 'poisonous ideology' continues throughout his speech when he used the Assertive securitising speech act to state that "Islamist extremism is a poisonous political ideology supported by a minority" (Cameron, 2014d). He persisted in locating the threat of extremism both globally as well as domestically, hence to the Referent Object of global and national security. He also repeated the idea of a struggle between the 'good Islam' and the 'bad Islam'. However, he now draws the distinction along the lines of the 'bad Islam' being linked to politics rather than religion (Cameron, 2014d).

He recognised that legal measures are not the only way to deal with the threat in his speech and we can observe that he again made clear that he sees extremism as the root of violence and consequently terrorism. Through Assertive securitising speech acts, he is able to frame it as a threat to the "security of all us". Furthermore, the threat is one of not yet violent extremism, hence, he suggested a preventative

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[214] Also, the Royal Air Force had already began 'humanitarian' intervention when they started air dropping aid packages in Northern Iraq in August 2014 (HM Government, 2014). Indeed, Seldon & Snowdon (2015: 626-627) quote YouGov statistics which highlight that 36% of British people were now opposed to air strike involvement in early August 2014, a number which was to go down to 24% by late September. In August 2013, the situation had looked different with a large number (46%) opposing any kind involvement by Britain in Syria (YouGov, 2013). Whilst the Telegraph article mostly talked about the threat to ISIL abroad, it also made a link to security at home.

[215] See also Cameron (2014c) "We now believe that at least 500 people have travelled from Britain to fight in Syria, and potentially Iraq".

approach. Additionally, the quote highlights how he framed "British Values" as the antidote to extremism. He further clarified his agenda when he suggested that "as Prime Minister I have driven a new approach to tackling radicalisation and counter extremism in Britain, focusing on all types of extremism, not just violent extremism" (Cameron, 2014d). One could assume that he could be referring to other forms of extremism, such as, for example, left or right-wing extremism, but through context, it becomes clear that his main focus lies on "Islamic Extremism" at this point and 'all forms of extremism' refers to both violent and non-violent extremism. The large number of measures taken can be seen as another indicator for the successful securitisation of extremism at this point.

During the 'EU Council, Security and Middle East' debate on the 1ˢᵗ of September 2014, where David Cameron mentions extremis* 14 times, it becomes clear that the issue has taken priority in his discourse. Cameron started out by stating that he wanted to talk about "the measures we are taking to defeat extremism and keep our country safe" (Cameron in HC Deb Vol 585 Col 23, 1 September 2014). His securitising moves indicate that it is obvious that the threat of extremism needs to be curbed in order to keep the Referent Object of "our country" safe. Talking about the conflict in Gaza he stated his concerns about "growing reports of anti-Semitism on our streets in Britain" and made certain through Directive speech acts that anti-Semitism as a form of extremism cannot be allowed (HC Deb Vol 585 Col 24, 1 September 2014). Further, through his framing he also ensured that he does not believe extremism in any form to ever be justified, evidently putting it firmly into threat category. He mentioned the ongoings in Iraq, specifically referring to the "beheading of American journalist James Foley" (Cameron in HC Deb Vol 585 Col 24, 1 September 2014) before citing the European Council's stance which states that "*The European Council believes that the creation of an Islamic Caliphate in Iraq and Syria and the Islamist-extremist export of terrorism on which it is based, is a direct threat to'* every European country" and highlighting the numbers of European nationals having joined fighting in the Middle East (Cameron in HC Deb Vol 585 Col 24, 1 September 2014). Summarising the European Council's measures to stop people from travelling abroad to do so, David Cameron then continued to use Assertive securitising speech acts to claim that:

> "We should be clear about *the root cause of this threat: a poisonous ideology of Islamist extremism* that believes in using the most brutal forms of terrorism to force people to accept a warped world view and to live in a mediaeval state"

> (Cameron in HC Deb Vol 585 Col 24, 1 September 2014).

Again, his use of the phrase "poisonous ideology of Islamist extremism" as the cause of the existential threat to security can be observed. He continued to differentiate it from the peaceful religion of Islam, a trope he has continuously used in the past. Through juxtapositioning of what he previously called a political ideology, he makes clear that it is not to be located in the religious sphere. He employed both Directive and Commissive securitising speech acts when suggesting measures against the threat when saying "To confront the threat of Islamist extremism, we need a tough, intelligent, patient and comprehensive approach to defeat the terrorist threat at source" (Cameron in HC Deb Vol 585 Col 24, 1 September 2014). Here it becomes clear again that, although he sees extremism as the source of terrorism, he does still conflate the two concepts, using both terms interchangeably. Furthermore, his suggested measures now fall under more than just measures but can clearly be considered extraordinary measures, given his emphasis on military intervention[216]. He has moved the threat firmly onto the security agenda, both internationally and domestically, as demonstrated by his wanting to confront it both at home and abroad.

Turning to measures carried out to take on "the terrorist threat at home", he talks about "bringing forward emergency legislation, for instance to safeguard our use of communications data" (Cameron in HC Deb Vol 585 Col 25, 1 September 2014). That this includes extremism becomes clear when he insists that "(…) we need stronger powers to manage the risk posed by suspected extremists who are already in the United Kingdom." (Cameron in HC Deb Vol 585 Col 26, 1 September 2014). It is evident that, in his use of Directive securitising speech acts to request extraordinary measures to curb the threat of extremists, and in this case 'suspected extremists', David Cameron is fulfilling the conditions of securitisation. There is a point of no return, a state of urgency and measures suggested which are outside of

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[216] "(…) we need a firm security response, whether that means military action to go after the terrorists, international co-operation on intelligence or uncompromising action against terrorists at home" (Cameron in HC Deb Vol 585 Col 24, 1 September 2014).

the political sphere. Again, it is misleading to assume that David Cameron referring to 'all types of extremism' means different forms of ideological extremism. Instead, his emphasis is still very much on Islamist extremism, be it violent or non-violent. However, by calling out the non-violent extremism, he includes the ideology more so than extremism as an active form of violence (or extending to acts of terrorism). This can also be seen when he suggested dealing with the "terrorist threat" by "tackling radicalisation, focusing on all types of extremism, not just violent extremism" (Cameron in HC Deb Vol 585 Col 26, 1 September 2014) and suggesting similar measures as in his press statement at 10 Downing Street on the 29th of August 2014 (for example banning hate preachers). David Cameron finished his statement by highlighting the need for British Values and further securitisation of extremism by framing "our way of life" as the Referent Object (Cameron in HC Deb Vol 585 Col 26-27, 1 September 2014). By calling attention to the extremist narrative as a non-violent threat that can eventually lead to violence, Cameron distinguishes it further from terrorism, in particular through the phrasing of "men and women of violence" rather than using the word "terrorists" (Cameron in HC Deb Vol 585 Col 30, 1 September 2014). This also seems to be the first occurrence where he framed 'women' as the Referent Subject (as opposed to "young Muslim men" in the past[217]). One can see the importance of the debate as it foreshadowed the vote on military intervention in Syria which would take place on the 26th of September 2014.

Seldon & Snowdon (2015: 626-627) report that in late September, public opinion had further shifted "decisively in favour of air strikes against ISIS". On the 25th of September 2014, the UN adopted a resolution that "requires states to prevent suspected FTFs[218] from entering or transiting their territories and to enact legislation to prosecute FTFs" (Blackbourn & Walker, 2016: 840-841). In the debate on 'Iraq: Coalition Against ISIL' on the 26th of September 2014[219], David Cameron heavily referred to extremism and the dangers it poses as an ideology. He did not only use his speech to gain approval for airstrikes but also used Directive

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[217] See for example (Cameron, 2011a).

[218] Foreign Terrorist Fighters.

[219] David Cameron was very confident that he had Parliament behind him (Seldon & Snowdon, 2015: 627).

and Assertive securitising speech acts to frame it as a threat, as well as to introduce measures when he stated:

> "we are being clear about the cause of the terrorist threat we face. As I have said before, that means *defeating the poisonous ideology of Islamist extremism, by tackling all forms of extremism, not just the violent extremists*"

(Cameron in HC Deb Vol 585 Col 1256, 26 September 2014) [emphasis added].

Indeed, it would be easy to dismiss this debate as just dealing with ISIS abroad. But David Cameron made it very clear that 'the poisonous ideology of Islamist extremism' is to be taken on domestically as well, hereby firmly locating it as both an external and internal threat to the Referent Object of Britain's safety (Cameron in HC Deb Vol 585 Col 1256, 26 September 2014). Again, by framing extremism as the ideology behind terrorism, he firmly keeps it in the security sphere.

Going back to the attempt to persuade the House of Commons to side with him and his motion, David Cameron evoked a state of urgency when saying:

> "(…) But I want to be frank with the House. Even after ISIL has been dealt with, we should be in no doubt that future British Prime Ministers and future British Governments will, I suspect, be standing at the Dispatch Box dealing with the issue of Islamist extremism in different forms and in different parts of the world for many years to come"
>
> (Cameron in HC Deb Vol 585 Col 1266, 26 September 2014).

This underlines once more that he is using the debate to continue securitising Islamist extremism, framing it as an infinite threat to Britain's security and not just a threat through ISIS. Through both Commissive and Directive securitising speech acts, David Cameron ended his statement by drawing parallels to Tony Blair's previous, and by then highly controversial, Iraq military intervention, recognising that this might lead to a reluctance to get involved again. However, through careful phrasing ('Support our Muslim friends') he was able to convey the message that this intervention would not be interventionist as such but that it would be undertaken together with allies. He further established that this extraordinary measure is necessary in order to keep "our people and our country safe" (Cameron in HC Deb Vol 585 Col 1268, 26 September 2014). The government's motion was passed easily with 524 MPs in support, 43 against and 59 abstentions (Vickers, 2015: 236), potentially highlighting the success of David Cameron's securitising moves.

6.2.5. Putting counterextremism on legal footing

During the G20 debate on the 14th of November 2014, Michael Ellis[220] (Northampton North) (Con) pointed out that there might be a risk of charities supporting terrorist causes (Ellis in HC Deb Vol 588 Col 51, 17 November 2014). He wanted to know if the Charity Commission would be given the "powers and resources that it needs to deal with that problem" (Ellis in HC Deb Vol 588 Col 51, 17 November 2014). The question seems to be a rhetorical one as David Cameron had already announced "new funding for the Charity Commission to tackle abuse, including extremist activity, in the charity sector" and had published a draft Protection of Charities Bill (Cameron, 2014b) on the 22nd of October 2014. However, the question gave him another chance to securitise extremism, more precisely by framing Charities as the Referent Subject (who threaten) when saying "There is a problem with some organisations using their charitable status to support extremism or the extremist narrative" (Cameron in HC Deb Vol 588 Col 51, 17 November 2014). In fact, the introduction of the Draft Bill had been accompanied with another securitising move, claiming that: "I want to build a country which everyone is proud to call home. That's why I want us to confront the menace of extremism and those who want to tear us apart" (Cameron, 2014b). Again, this can be seen as an extraordinary measure where he introduces legal means to curb the threat of extremism. This is especially interesting as this happens in a sector not traditionally regarded to be one of security importance.

The murder of Lee Rigby was debated again on Tuesday the 25th of November 2014 upon the publication of an investigative report[221] by the House of Commons Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC). David Cameron began the debate by securitising both home-grown terrorists as well as extremists whilst still trying to differentiate between Islam the peaceful religion and what he previously called a perversion (Cameron in HC Deb Vol 588 Col 747, 25 November 2014). He continued to use Directive securitising speech acts when announcing another measure to curb the threat of 'extremist material' when stating that "MI5 is improving guidance and training for investigators for its online teams, and looking

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[220] He was, at the time (from 2010 to 2015), both member of the Statutory Instruments (Joint Committee) and the Statutory Instruments (Select Committee) as well as the Home Affairs Committee (from 2011 to 2015) (UK Parliament, 2020b).

[221] Which investigated whether Intelligence agencies know about Rigby's attackers and if the attack could have been prevented (Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament, 2014).

at new automated processes to act on extremist material online" (Cameron in HC Deb Vol 588 Col 748, 25 November 2014). The extraordinary measure of internet censorship had already been addressed by Cameron previously, on the 29th of August 2014 (Cameron, 2014d) and the 1st of September 2014 (Cameron in HC Deb Vol 585 Col 26, 1 September 2014). Further introduction of extraordinary measures can be seen when he insisted that the ISC is right to ask, "whether we need to give our agencies stronger powers to tackle extremists" (Cameron in HC Deb Vol 588 Col 750, 25 November 2014). Additionally, he continued to securitise extremism when alluding to the 'Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill', which was to be introduced the next day and which would "include essential new powers to seize passports to prevent travel, to stop suspects returning unless they do so on our terms, and to relocate suspected terrorists to other parts of the country and away from their extremist networks" (Cameron in HC Deb Vol 588 Col 750, 25 November 2014).

Through Directive and Commissive securitising speech acts he wanted to gather approval of the Bill when stating "I very much hope we can take this Bill forward on a cross-party basis, so our agencies are able to start using these vital powers as soon as possible" (Cameron in HC Deb Vol 588 Col 750, 25 November 2014). The urgency of the issue is further promoted by him through the following Directive securitising speech act, in which he tries to get his audience to accept the threats:

> "*We have to* equip our security services with the powers and the information they need to track down these terrorists and stop them attacking our people. *We have to confront the extremist ideology that drives this terrorism by defeating the ideas that warp so many young minds*. (…) We will need stamina, patience and endurance, but we will in the end defeat this extremism and protect our people and our way of life for generations to come"
> (Cameron in HC Deb Vol 588 Col 751, 25 November 2014) [emphasis added].

He hereby also used the Commissive securitising speech act of committing himself to curbing the threat of extremist ideology which he located as the source of terrorism. During the debate it also becomes apparent that he framed the task of 'combating extremism' not just as one for traditional security services but expands it to the education sector. By employing Directive securitising speech acts ("they have a duty to act"), he continued to suggest the extraordinary measure of community surveillance (Cameron in HC Deb Vol 588 Col 766, 25 November 2014).

Henry Smith (Crawley) (Con) elaborated on the case of one of his constituents having been the "first British-born suicide bomber in the Syrian civil war[222]" before asking how online radicalisation can be stopped (Smith in HC Deb Vol 588 Col 767, 25 November 2014). It seems to be almost like a planted question as it enables David Cameron to orate on the need for extraordinary measures, highlighting the issue of British citizens becoming 'radicalised' when he suggests:

> "(…) it is absolutely dreadful that there are people from our own country—many of whom were born, brought up and schooled here—who have had *their minds poisoned by this extremist ideology* and *gone to fight* or, in some cases, *tried to commit atrocities on our own soil against their fellow countrymen*"
>
> (Cameron in HC Deb Vol 588 Col 767, 25 November 2014) [emphasis added]

It is important to note that Cameron's phrasing allows for the interpretation of extremism as something which 'happens' to people, not something that they actively seek. Additionally, it appears that he positioned extremists again as an international but also domestic threat, the latter being aimed at the Referent Object of 'British people'. He concluded with the Directive securitising speech act of stating "We must use social media to communicate that message rather than just leaving it open to the radicals and the extremists" (Cameron in HC Deb Vol 588 Col 767, 25 November 2014), thereby emphasising the importance of a counter-extremism narrative.

On the 26th of November 2014, the Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill was presented to the House of Commons (HC Deb Vol 588 Col 922, 26 November 2014). The second reading took place on the 2nd of December 2014 (HC Deb Vol 589 Col 207-274, 2 December 2014) presented by then Home Secretary Theresa May. The committee of the whole house met later on the 9th, 15th and 16th of December to discuss the Bill[223] before it went to the third stage in January 2015. At none of the previous sessions did Cameron speak. On the 16th of December, more than half of the members of Parliament "voted against giving specified public

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[222] Abdul Waheed Majid had joined Jabhat al Nusra and killed himself (and others) in a suicide bombing in Aleppo in February 2014, he was a British national born to Pakistani parents and left Britain for Syria alleging to undertake 'humanitarian work' (Longman, 2015).

[223] See Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill - HC Deb Vol 589 Col 784-838, 9 December 2014, Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill - HC Deb Vol 589 Col 1173-1234, 15 December 2014, Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill - HC Deb Vol 589 Col 1305-1373, 16 December 2014.

bodies a duty to combat and reject messages of extremism in addition to a duty already in the Bill to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism" with 258 Conservative MPs against and 201 Labour MPs in favour (Public Whip, 2018). This seems somewhat confusing as this appears to be something in line with David Cameron's previous policies and approaches to extremism. However, the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 (CTSA 2015) was to be given Royal Assent on the 12th of February 2015 (see HL Vol 759 Col 1353 and HC Vol 592 Col 1000-1001). One must emphasise here that, although not being illegal, holding an extremist worldview was deemed dangerous enough to necessitate state intervention, indicating that extremism had become a security issue. This security approach had now eventually peaked with the Prevent Duty being introduced in the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015, Part 5, Chapter 1, Section 26 (1). Whilst the statutory duty was placed on specified authorities to have "due regard to the need to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism" (HM Government, 2015: 5), the Government also indicated that this duty was expanding to extremism, as it was framed as the root cause of terrorism, clearly highlighting the securitisation of extremism through this extraordinary measure.

6.3. Securitising as Prime Minister 2015-2016 (2nd term)

In May 2015, David Cameron was re-elected and was this time able to form a majority Conservative government. Upon having been reappointed Prime Minister, he continued to pay close attention to security matters (Aldrich & Cormack, 2016: 671) and announced plans for a new Counter-Extremism Bill after the first meeting of the new National Security Council (NSC) (Home Office, 2015). During the G7 debate on the 10th of June 2015, David Cameron located the threat of extremist ideology both globally and locally again when he used Directive securitising speech acts to say "we need to do more to tackle the causes—not just the consequences—of this terrorist threat", framing the cause as a "poisonous ideology of extremism" both globally and domestically (Cameron in HC Deb Vol 596 Col 1190, 10 June 2015). He continued to point out that ISIL was discussed at the G7 meeting and then uses the Assertive speech act to securitise when stating: "(…) in my view Islamist extremists, violence and terrorism are the greatest threat that we face on the national security front" (Cameron in HC Deb Vol 596 Col 1198, 10 June 2015). By mixing 'Islamist extremists' with violence and terrorism, he appears to signal that the threat is existential but also linked to Islam alone.

On the 26th of June 2015, the Tunisian tourist resort at Port El Kantaoui, Sousse had been the location of an ISIS affiliated terror attack, killing more than 39, among them 30 British citizens (Lanouar & Goaied, 2019: 404)[224]. On the 29th of June 2015 when Parliament debated the Tunisia attacks alongside the European Council meeting, David Cameron introduced a variety of extraordinary measures through Directive securitising speech acts to defeat "this terrorist threat", stating that "we must give our police and security services the tools they need to root out this poison" (Cameron in HC Deb Vol 597 Col 1174, 29 June 2015). He used Directives to demand more investigative powers to security services, better international co-operation, but also military action when he states that "we must deal with the security threat at source, whether ISIL in Iraq and Syria or other extremist groups around the world" (Cameron in HC Deb Vol 597 Col 1174-1175, 29 June 2015). Again, one has to keep in mind that the UK continued to participate in airstrikes in Syria, hence the need for Cameron to continue to locate the threat abroad. He repeated the securitisation of extremist narratives when he used Directive speech acts to demand:

> "(…) We must be stronger at standing up for our values, and we must be more intolerant of intolerance, taking on anyone whose views condone the extremist narrative or create the conditions for it to flourish"
>
> (Cameron in HC Deb Vol 597 Col 1175, 29 June 2015).

It becomes apparent that again, he framed non-violent extremism as an existential threat and firmly puts it on the security agenda through criminalisation of a pre-criminal stage. It is also noteworthy that he reverts to a previously employed framing of 'our values' as measures against the 'extremist narrative' (as had his predecessor Gordon Brown).

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[224] In his memoirs, David Cameron states that the Tunisia attacks in June 2015 had "brought me back to my view that we needed to confront non-violent extremism as well as violent extremism" (Cameron, 2019: 629). He continues to insist that: "I always tried to speak about 'Islamist extremism' and 'Islamic extremist violence', rather than just use the label 'Islamist'. Donald Trump doesn't bother with that distinction. Indeed, he goes in the other direction, frequently referring to 'Islamic terrorism', which in my view is extremely unhelpful" (Cameron, 2019: 630), a claim which does not hold as seen in the following debate.

Mr David Hanson[225] (Delyn) (Lab) referred to a case in his Welsh constituency (Hanson in HC Deb Vol 597 Col 1199-1200, 29 June 2015) where right wing neo-Nazi Zack Davies had attempted to murder Dr. Sarandev Bhambra "in revenge for the death of the soldier Lee Rigby" earlier that year and had just been found guilty by courts (Morris, 2015). Hanson claimed online radicalisation to be the source of the attack and wanted to know how it could be controlled (Hanson in HC Deb Vol 597 Col 1199-1200, 29 June 2015). Not only did he agree with the danger of extremism but he goes a step further by asking for additional measures to curb the threat. David Cameron responded positively, stating:

> "*The arguments about violent and non-violent extremism also apply to the extreme right.* This House would never condone the idea that we should tolerate the National Front but go after Combat 18[226]. We would never do that when it comes to fascism, so we should not do it when it comes to Islamist fascism either"

> (Cameron in HC Deb Vol 597 Col 1200, 29 June 2015) [emphasis added].

The framing of 'Islamist fascism' appears curious as it implies to out both nationalist socialist fascism and Islam on the same level. More importantly the highlighting of the danger of the extreme right does not compare to the way the dangers of Islamic extremism have previously been framed by David Cameron. Although it seems that he sees them as equally dangerous, reading between the lines makes it clear that right wing extremism is not at the centre of his counter-extremism agenda nor is it securitised by Cameron.

Upon being asked by Mrs Anne-Marie Trevelyan[227] (Berwick-upon-Tweed) (Con) about "how the new measures in the extremism Bill will tackle extremists and stand up for our values of democracy, equality, free speech and respect for minorities" (Trevelyan in HC Deb Vol 597 Col 1475, 01 July 2015), David Cameron took up his chance to elaborate the Bill. According to him, through Commissive and Assertive securitising speech acts the Bill would:

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[225] He was the current Shadow Minister (Home Affairs) and was later to become a member of the Draft Investigatory Powers Bill (Joint Committee) and Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament (UK Parliament, 2020a).

[226] The 'National Front' was a British fascist organisation founded in 1967 who was known to have used music as a recruitment tool (Shaffer, 2014: 114) and Combat 18 (C18) is a violent National Socialist group (Shaffer, 2014: 120) who was just recently banned in Germany (Fuchs, 2020).

[227] She was new to Parliament (since May 2015) and was later to become Minister of State (Ministry of Defence) (Minister for the Armed Forces) in 2019 (UK Parliament, 2021b).

"reinforce the work we have already done to increase funding for counter-terrorism and counter-terrorism policing; make sure there is a duty on public authorities to combat radicalisation; and *go after the fact that there are groups and individuals who are very clever at endorsing extremism but then stopping one step short of actually condoning terrorism*. That is what the new banning orders we are looking at aim to achieve, because we are clear *that people who support the extremist narrative have no place in our public debate*"

(Cameron in HC Deb Vol 597 Col 1475, 01 July 2015) [emphasis added].

Cameron has clearly identified the issue of extremism not being illegal (as opposed to terrorism). However, by convoluting the two (extremism and terrorism) he plans, through extraordinary measures, to combat the former as well. Additionally, he continued with the 'us vs them' theme, this time making clear that supporters of extremist narratives (the Referent Subject) are to be shunned.

6.3.1. Counter-Extremism Strategy and the Prevent Duty

David Cameron's speech at the Ninestiles School in Birmingham on the 20th of July 2015[228] was used to "set out his policy plans to address extremism and Islamic extremism" (Passman & Fellman, 2018: 3) and has been analysed by several academics, such as Richards (2017), Charalambous et al. (2015) and Reekes, (2015). According to Azad (2017: 2), the speech continues on what was set out by Cameron in his Munich Security Conference Speech in 2011. Kirka (2015) points out that the speech was a vehicle for announcing, "new powers" against extremism and that it was almost certainly deliberate for Cameron to have chosen the location as "a centre of the Muslim community in Britain". One can also argue that he might have chosen the Birmingham school forgoing the Trojan Horse scandal[229] for

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[228] For an identity driven discourse analysis of the speech, Richards (2017: 149) offers an in-depth analysis highlighting that "the essence of the speech was that "British values" were described as being under threat from a very specific problem in the contemporary era: a problem explicitly identified as an "ideology" of "Islamist extremism". However, the author of this thesis disagrees that "British values" are the Referent Object of the speech. Instead, it can be argued that it is the "British way of life" and "British values" which are suggested as measures to curb the threat.

[229] The 'Trojan Horse affair' was to be subject of many public debates when "Muslim educationalists stood accused of 'infiltrating' Birmingham schools" (Dobbernack, 2018: 379). Ofsted inspected several schools on the allegations "after concerns were raised that some governors were having inappropriate influence over the ethos and curriculum of their schools, leaving children 'at risk' of extremism" (Healy, 2019: 424). The government used the 'Trojan Horse affair' to highlight "the need for its new counter-extremism strategy" (Holmwood & O'Toole, 2018: 14) but the initial 'infiltration' by Islamic extremists was later debunked (Shackle, 2017). For an in-depth analysis see *Muslims, Schooling and Security: Trojan Horse, Prevent and racial politics* by Miah (2017).

symbolic reasons[230]. Khan & McMahon (2016: 90) state that the speech can also be seen as a response to the "defiant stance of many in academia towards Prevent" and in particular to the open criticism by the National Union of Students of the United Kingdom (NUS)[231].

David Cameron's speech is riddled with the use of extremis* over 60 times, he mentions extremism 15 times, extremists 17 times, while non-violent extremists and non-violent extremism are respectively mentioned twice. Extremist groups and extremist cause are mentioned once each, extremist ideology three times, extremist worldview twice as well as extremist narrative and extremist content once. Islamist extremism is mentioned 6 times, Islamist extremist ideology once and Islamic extremists twice. Additionally, he mentions the new Counter-Extremism Strategy 6 times. He continuously tries to emphasise that the "focus of my remarks today is on tackling Islamist extremism – not Islam the religion" (Cameron, 2015b). However, it is heavily implied that he frames it as the main threat when he insisted: "What we are fighting, in Islamist extremism, is an ideology. It is an extreme doctrine" (Cameron, 2015b). Although he referred to the ideology as the threat through his continuous use of the wording "Islamist extremism", he emphasised on the religion rather than the ideology. He addressed the audience when he claimed: "I know too how much you hate the extremists (…) and how you loathe that damage they do" (Cameron, 2015b). Hereby he implied a common understanding of what the threat entails. He continued to use Directive securitising speech acts by framing extremist ideology as "the root cause of the threat we face" before highlighting the reasons for "young people" to be drawn to it. Here we can see how he frames "young people" as the Referent Object at risk. David Cameron continued to securitise non-violent extremism when he located it as the cause for terrorism when stating through Assertive speech acts that "non-violent extremists" are the first

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[230] Coincidentally or not, the school was also attended by Moazzam Begg's son at the time (Khan & McMahon, 2016: 91). He is a CAGE activist "advocating for the rights of those held unjustly in the War of Terror" (The Independent, 2021).

[231] He addresses the NUS directly in his speech: "And while I am it, I want to say something to the National Union of Students. When you choose to ally yourselves with an organisation like CAGE, which called Jihadi John a "beautiful young man" and told people to "support the jihad" in Iraq and Afghanistan, it really does, in my opinion, shame your organisation and your noble history of campaigning for justice" (Cameron, 2015b).

influence of what might result in terrorism (Cameron, 2015b). In what can be seen as rebuking criticism, he used Directive securitising speech acts to claim that:

> "our new Prevent duty for schools is not about criminalising or spying on Muslim children. This is paranoia in the extreme. In fact that duty will empower parents and teachers to protect children from all forms of extremism – whether Islamist or neo-Nazi"
>
> (Cameron, 2015b).

This is one of the few occasions in his speech where he referred to right-wing extremism[232]. Still, through Commissive securitising speech acts, he aroused the image of the Prevent Duty being a protective tool against all forms of extremism, in particular against the Referent Object of "children" who are presented as being vulnerable. After laying out how to curb the threat of extremism through the Counter-Extremism Strategy, David Cameron summarised that he believes this "struggle of our generation" can be won through the promotion of British Values and the fighting of both violent and non-violent extremism.

The Prevent Duty was to officially come into force on the 21st of September 2015 (Home Office, 2015). It is therefore not surprising that it would be discussed during the 'Syria: Refugees and Counter-terrorism' debate on the 7th of September 2015. Referring to the Tunisia attacks earlier that year, David Cameron used the Assertive securitising speech act to state that: "The threat picture facing Britain in terms of Islamist extremist violence is more acute today than ever before" (Cameron in HC Deb Vol 599 Col 25, 07 September 2015). "Islamist extremist violence" is hereby framed as the existential threat for the Referent Object of Britain by evoking a state of urgency. Additionally the new powers (such as travel restrictions) available to the government for curbing the threat can be seen as extraordinary measures outside 'normal' politics which, given the fact that legislation had already passed, shows the continuous justification of measures. Again, by framing "poisonous ideology of Islamist extremism" as the root cause of the threat of extremism, David Cameron continued to keep it on the security agenda (Cameron in HC Deb Vol 599 Col 25, 07 September 2015).

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[232] Richards (2017: 152), argues this in the speech: "The Far Right is clearly identified as a nefarious security threat and an ideology very removed from mainstream ideas, although it is introduced rather sporadically into a discussion dominated by the threat from Islamist extremists, which could lend weight to critics who see it as a somewhat tokenist element of official discourse".

Yasmin Qureshi[233] (Bolton South East) (Lab) raised the issue of an increase in Islamophobic attacks in Britain and Europe before asking if David Cameron would "resist the temptation to use the term "Islamic terrorism"? It is not Islamic. It is just pure terrorism" (Qureshi in HC Deb Vol 599 Col 48, 07 September 2015). David Cameron responded by stating that "I describe it as "extremist Islamist terrorism" because I think simply to say that what we are facing from ISIL and others is terrorism is not a proper description of what we are facing" (Cameron in HC Deb Vol 599 Col 48, 07 September 2015). He then continued to highlight that he does not equate the religion of Islam with terrorism. However, despite such claims, the phrasing still suggests a link between the two concepts. Further probed by David Rutley[234] (Macclesfield) (Con) about the impact of "expansion of Islamic terrorism" in the Middle East being "bad news" for the region as well as "for the UK and for Russia" (Rutley in HC Deb Vol 599 Col 58, 07 September 2015), David Cameron positioned "Islamist extremist violence" as the Referent Subject to the Referent Objects of both Russia and the United Kingdom (Cameron in HC Deb Vol 599 Col 58, 07 September 2015).

On the 13th of November 2015, Paris was shaken by a co-ordinated terror attack where three suicide bombers denotated themselves outside the Stade de France whilst several shootings took place in other parts of the city. Further attackers undertook an assault at the Bataclan concert hall resulting altogether in 137 deaths and 413 injured. Responsibility for the attacks was claimed by ISIS, which said it had acted in retaliation to French airstrikes on the organisation (Hardcastle et al., 2019: 80)[235]. David Cameron mentioned the Bataclan attacks in his memoirs, stating that the attacks had been partially planned in Syria and that it therefore no longer made sense to fight ISIS in Iraq alone (Cameron, 2019: 635). Hence, the event would directly influence his policy approaches to terrorism but also extremism. This can already be seen on the 17th of November 2015, when the debate

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[233] She used to be a member of the Justice Committee and the Home Affairs Committee up until March 2015 and was part of the Foreign Affairs Committee from July 2015 to October 2016 (UK Parliament, 2021c).

[234] Rutley did not hold any government or committee positions at the time (UK Parliament, 2021a).

[235] According to Nesser (2018: xv), this was, at that time, Europe's "deadliest attack" since the Al Qaeda Madrid bombings in March 2004. However, in Madrid, 191 people lost their lives (see Burridge, 2014), making the attack more deadly.

on the G20 and the Paris Attacks took place at the House of Commons. In his opening statement, David Cameron expressed his condolences with regards to the terrorist attacks, stating that:

> "When we are dealing with radicalised European Muslims, linked to ISIL in Syria and inspired by a poisonous narrative of extremism, we need an approach that covers the full range: *military power, counter-terrorism expertise, and defeating the poisonous narrative that is the root cause of this evil*"
>
> (Cameron in HC Deb Vol 602 Col 522, 17 November 2015) [emphasis added].

Here it becomes apparent that he suggested more than one extraordinary measure to curb the threat of the 'poisonous narrative of extremism' and the Referent Subject of ISIS in Syria. Now, framing the Referent Subject as located in Syria enabled him to suggest military intervention on the basis of tackling the threat posed abroad to both domestic and international security. He also positioned 'violent Islamist extremism' as the Referent Object to 'British citizens', whilst also justifying further military involvement in the Middle East by rejecting the notion that it was military involvement in the first place that gave rise to the 'threat' (Cameron in HC Deb Vol 602 Col 528, 17 November 2015), something which Blair had previously also denied (see Chapter 4).

In the Syria debate on the 26th of November 2015, it is ISIS which is framed as the existential threat. Here, the existence of the so-called state is framed as something that "will be a rallying call for Islamist extremists all around the world, and that makes us less safe" (Cameron in HC Deb Vol 602 Col 1490, 26 November 2015). To curb this threat, Cameron announced extraordinary measures as part of a four pillar approach that included the UK counter-extremism strategy, diplomacy, military action, and humanitarian support[236] (HC Deb Vol 602 Col 1491-92, 26 November 2015). David Cameron's securitising becomes clear when he located the threat of a "poisonous narrative of Islamist extremism" both abroad and domestically through Assertive securitising speech acts (Cameron in HC Deb Vol 602 Col 1497, 26 November 2015). It was reinforced as he continued to frame it as an existential threat when he insisted, "we are at greater risk in terms of the dangerous recruitment of Islamist extremists in our own country for as long as this

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[236] He repeats the same measures during the ISIL in Syria debate on the 2nd of December 2015 (Cameron in HC Deb Vol 603 Col 336, 02 December 2015).

so-called caliphate exists" (Cameron in HC Deb Vol 602 Col 1510, 26 November 2015). By evoking a state of urgency and through the suggestion of extraordinary measures he keeps 'Islamist extremists' firmly on the security agenda.

Again, through an Assertive speech act, he engages in securitisation when saying that: "(…) this Islamist extremist violence, most notably through ISIL" is not only "a threat to us (…) but also a massive threat to the stability and security of the region (Cameron in HC Deb Vol 602 Col 1513, 26 November 2015), thereby framing the Referent Object as both the UK but also the stability and security of the Middle East. During the ISIL in Syria debate on the 2nd of December 2015, he also introduced another measure via a Commissive securitising speech act when stating that "we will establish a comprehensive review to root out any remaining funding of extremism within the UK" (Cameron in HC Deb Vol 603 Col 336, 02 December 2015).

In 2016, David Cameron was concerning himself with the upcoming Brexit Referendum, not mentioning extremism as often in Parliament and in public as in previous years. During the EU Council debate on the 5th of January 2016, David Cameron talked about the fact that the "challenges facing the west today are genuinely threatening: Putin's aggression in the east; Islamist extremism to the south" (Cameron in HC Deb Volume 606 Col 25, 22 February 2016). Here it becomes apparent that he still framed Islamist extremism as a threat to Western security. In 2016, it is also noteworthy to mention that David Cameron used the narrative of extremism to defame the Labour party. For example, during the Prime Minister questions on the 20th of April 2016, he stated his concerns about the fact that the Labour candidate for the Mayor of London had appeared on platforms of extremists[237]. Cameron was called out for this by the Labour opposition leader Jeremy Corbyn (HC Deb Volume 608 Col 916, 20 April 2016). Similar framings can be observed during PMQs on the 4th of May 2016, when he raised concerns about Sadiq Khan having shared "a platform with an extremist who called for Jews

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[237] Labour's candidate for Mayor of London Sadiq Khan had been revealed to have attended the "Palestine — the suffering still goes on" conference as speaker in September 2004 at Tooting Islamic Centre whilst he was running for Parliament, sharing a platform with which were considered 'Islamic extremists' (Murphy, 2016).

to be drowned in the ocean" (Cameron in HC Deb Volume 609 Col 163, 04 May 2016).

The Debate on the Address, also known as the Queen's Speech debate, took place on the 18th of May 2016[238]. The government had proposed a counter-extremism and safeguarding Bill[239] and David Cameron justified it by stating that he hoped "there will be all-party support to tackle the poisonous ideology that is at the heart of the extremist threat" (Cameron, 2016 in HC Deb Vol 611 Col 30, 18 May 2016). Whilst now not being present in discourse in Parliament, David Cameron seems to have established the securitisation of extremism via previous securitising speech acts.

6.4. Conclusion

Whilst opposition leader, in 2005, David Cameron had referred to 'extremist Islamist terrorism' (see Cameron, 2005), 'Islamist terrorism' and 'Islamist extremism' (Cameron, 2006), clearly linking extremism, terrorism, and Islam. Conservative Party politician and Cameron ally Sayeeda Warsi (2017: 92) voiced concerns about the use of the term Islamism, calling it a "politically objectionable term" as it confounds Islam with extremism. She claims that these "concerns on the use of language and descriptions were initially taken on board by David Cameron", stating that in 2007, "he argued that 'by using the word ''Islamist'' to describe the threat, we actually help the terrorist ideologues' work for them" (Cameron 2007, in Warsi, 2017: 92). However, Islamist extremism continued to be the main Referent Subject in David Cameron's discourses as opposition leader. Upon becoming Prime Minister himself in 2010, David Cameron started referring to 'Islamist extremism' as an ideology that causes terrorism (Cameron, 2011a). This clearly indicates not just a policy shift from Gordon Brown's usage of extremism but also a discursive one. From 2011 onwards, the notion of non-violent extremism being an existential threat to the security of the United Kingdom gained prominence. It is misleading to assume that David Cameron referring to 'all types of extremism' means different forms of ideological extremism. Instead his emphasis is still very much on Islamist

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[238] Given at the start of a new parliamentary session, it is the government's way of introducing its new legislative programme (Hansard Society, 2019). The debate takes place over several days and leads to a vote by the House of Commons (BBC News, 2016).

[239] In 2017, the Bill ended up "permanently shelved [...] after attempts to define extremism proved legally insurmountable" (Hamilton, 2019: 24).

extremism, while admittedly also including violent and non-violent extremism. It is important to note that he does not use the term 'terrorists' but 'extremists' instead, underpinning that he sees extremist ideology on equal terms to terrorism.

It can be observed that in 2012, David Cameron did not use Parliament to securitise extremism but shifted his focus on Foreign Policy, more specifically justifying military intervention in the Middle East. Radicalisation and extremism on campus became very prominent from 2013 and beyond in David Cameron's discourse. It was also the year when he was pushing for military intervention in Syria, which he occasionally tried to justify by securitising extremism. From 2013 onwards, there is also a bigger emphasis on home-grown extremism, locating the threat not just abroad but domestically. Whilst up to 2011, the good Islam vs bad Islam framing had been common, with the emergence of ISIS in 2014, the discourse slightly shifted. It can now be observed that he drew the distinction along the lines of the 'bad Islam' being linked to being political rather than religious (see Cameron, 2014d). He continues to differentiate it from the peaceful religion of Islam, a trope he has continuously used in the past. Through juxtapositioning of what he previously called a political ideology, he makes clear that it is not to be located in the religious sphere. One could assume that he could be referring to other forms of extremism, such as, for example, left or right-wing extremism. Nevertheless, through context, it becomes clear that his main focus lies on 'Islamic Extremism'. However, by calling out non-violent extremism he includes the concept of ideology more so than extremism purely as an active form of violence (or extending to acts of terrorism). Furthermore, it can be observed that when talking about 'all forms of extremism', David Cameron is referring to extremism as both an ideology (non-violent) and an action (violent) and associates it with Islam (Cameron, 2011a). His continuous use of the phrase "poisonous ideology of Islamist extremism" as the cause of the existential threat to security reinforces this observation. Based on his discourse, he is able to securitise extremism as an external and internal threat to the Referent Object of Britain's safety. Through speech acts, he ensures that he frames extremism as the root of violence and consequently terrorism.

Cameron equates the danger of violent and non-violent extremism. It is interesting that he is able to do so, given that non-violent extremism should be harder to securitise. However, he succeeds in creating a state of urgency, based on the history of the term (as it had previously been securitised by his predecessors Blair and Brown). It can be observed that regarding the framework for securitisation, several conditions aided the securitisation of extremism. For one, the authority position held by David Cameron. Secondly, he employed the grammar of security and through securitising speech acts (see Table 9), was able to frame the threat of both violent and non-violent Islamic extremism as existential to various Referent Objects (such as British Security). Additionally, (violent) extremism having been previously framed as an existential threat, and having been institutionalised, made it easier for David Cameron to now securitise non-violent extremism. The next chapter will present a conclusion and will draw together the findings of this and the previous chapters.

7. Conclusion

"It works like this: first we imagine a spectrum of all possible ideas, then we say that anything near one end or the other constitutes 'extremism'"

(Poole, 2007: 220)

7.1. Introduction

The starting point for this research was the observation that the term extremism had been increasingly used in political discourse for several years in a negative way, but that its meanings and consequences were not clearly defined. The umbrella term 'extremism' holds considerable potential for analysis in relation to domestic policy changes and securitisation over the past decade. The author wanted to find out how this securitisation happened and in what ways 'extremism' had been presented as an existential threat via securitising speech acts by elite actors. This thesis has provided an overview of the phenomenon of extremism in the discourse of UK Prime Ministers, using the concept of securitisation to explain how the perception of extremism as a threat was constructed through securitising speech acts. A threat becomes perceived as such as the result of a securitising speech act that constructs an intersubjectively shared understanding within a community, which leads it to perceive a particular issue as an existential threat and to treat it as such. The discursive representation of extremism as an (existential) threat and the resulting suggestion of extraordinary measures, such as military action or the Prevent Duty go hand in hand. Such a detachment from conventional political rules – breaking outside of 'normal politics' and the handling of matters at the highest political level – hence acts as evidence of securitisation.

The analytical framework of securitisation in this study is based on the Speech Act Theory (SAT) by John R Searle which understands speech acts as actions. In other words, by saying something, one is doing something. It also assumes that "(w)hatever can be meant can be said" (Searle, 1968: 415), basing its understanding of language on Searle's 'Principle of Expressibility'. While discourse analysis approaches often just assume that discourses constitute reality, SAT additionally focuses on the "speaker" as an actor. By identifying Prime Ministers as securitising actors who have both social capital (consisting of specific powers due to their office, such as decision-making power) and authority, the research question clarified

whether the discourse of Prime Ministers employed securitising speech acts in order to represent the securitisation of extremism. It was shown that extremism became a security threat when it was managed by a securitising actor, in this case Prime Ministers, who framed it within the logic of security as an existential threat which needs to be curbed. In this case it does not matter whether there is an objectively existing or a subjectively perceived potential threat of extremism. Instead, what is important is the way that language is used to create an understanding of threat and appropriate defensive measures.

7.1.1. Key findings

The analysis of three consecutive Prime Ministers' discourse on extremism illustrates how different forms of extremism are presented as a security threat via different securitising speech acts. All of the analysed securitising actors identified extremism as an existential threat, albeit to varying degrees and with different connotations. The analysis of the securitising speech acts also revealed an identical line of discursive reasoning among the securitising actors, from which argumentation strategies and structures could be derived and which served to underpin the claim of the threat. Together, these strategies and structures show the extent to which extremism is perceived as a threat by Prime Ministers and the extent to which it was presented as such, resulting in the securitisation of extremism.

The author identified three main presentations of extremism in securitising speech acts by elite actors in the United Kingdom: 'Islamic Extremism', violent, and non-violent extremism. She argues that the term became a buzzword to characterise dissent and perceived rejection of 'British Values', emphasising the perceived incompatibility of what is made to appear extreme via securitising speech acts. Prime Ministers, acting as securitising actors, legitimise a variety of extraordinary measures against the threat as part of what can be seen as a large-scale discourse on security policy. The securitisation of extremism has been increasingly focussed on locating the threat not just in violence but in ideas, namely in 'ideology'. This research found that it was the 'extremist ideology' above all which was framed as threatening and as needing to be fought, stirring away from a more subjective feeling of danger (extremism in relation to terrorist acts) to an intersubjective understanding of extreme ideas as being dangerous in and of themselves (see Table 10).

	Tony Blair	**Gordon Brown**	**David Cameron**
Existential threats	Islamic Extremism	Violent extremism	Violent and non-violent extremism
	(Islamic) Extremist Ideology *leads to* Acts of Terrorism		

Table 10 - Summary of securitisation of extremism by Prime Ministers

This research did not ask about the political effects and normative implications of the usage of what can be perceived as an ambiguous concept of extremism. Instead, it showed that despite its vague definition, despite the concept by itself not being 'dangerous', it became securitised by Prime Ministers for several reasons. For one, the institutionalised securitisation of extremism in the form of 'domestic extremism' provided the background for a common understanding of the threat scenario. It allowed for the securitising speaker to invoke danger without having to go into detail about what the danger exactly entailed. Secondly, employing securitising mechanisms in the form of Assertive, Commissive, and Directive securitising speech acts, securitising actors succeeded in both framing the threat and placing it outside of 'normal politics' via the creation of a state of urgency and the suggestion of extraordinary measures to curb the security issue.

7.2. Chapter by chapter summary

The first chapter offered insight into the Securitisation Theory (ST) of the Copenhagen School (CoS) and how John R Searle's SAT can be combined with it to study securitisation. These theoretical considerations were extended in the second chapter by a discussion of the methodological starting points that formed the basis for the research. The analysis of the data was based on procedures from the SAT analysis by Searle, which will be discussed in the following section with regard to its operationalisation in the present work. The author of this thesis found that combining ST and SAT to build a framework for analysis allowed elite securitising actors' securitising acts to be researched in an efficient way. This was possible because, due to the position of power and authority held by the actors in question, the author did not need to take audience acceptance into account. By

looking at the content of the speeches given by the respective Prime Ministers on extremism and the threat to national security in Chapters 4, 5 and 6, she was able to discover securitising speech acts and elucidate the ways in which extremism had been framed as a threat. Additionally, the newly adapted framework allowed her to analyse the different securitising speech act mechanisms, enabling her to pinpoint the suggestions of extraordinary measures – a necessary condition for securitisation. In this context, the background of the discourse regarding extremism and its securitisation mechanisms were discussed.

The addition of the institutionalised securitisation of extremism in Chapter 3 further provided the necessary background for understanding how extremism became securitised in the United Kingdom. Through the introduction of certain bureaucratic and administrative practices, securitisation processes became institutionalised and eventually became a method of governance. It appears that there is a long tradition of dealing with extremism, however, the context is framed by the historical background and challenges of the time (for example Irish nationalist movement, animal rights activism, Islamic extremism). When looking at the institutionalised securitisation of extremism, it is mostly 'domestic extremism' which was presented as a threat to the democratic system, involving the activities to undermine the state. Here it is not necessarily the Referent Objects of the nations' security but rather the state's survival which is at risk. Although not legally defined, there are several indications that extremism is dealt with by the law (for example in the TA 2000 and SOCPA 2005) and that it has been criminalised through pre-emptive policing. Examining the different definitions of extremism by government and its institutions, it is evident that there is no general agreement on how to define the term, but that it is a matter of consensus nonetheless that extremism poses a threat which has to be dealt with. One could say that the definition depends on the institution in question and its jurisdiction.

This concluding chapter aims at bringing together theory and empirical analysis in order to offer an understanding of how and when securitisation happens. It also demonstrates how specific types of extremism (Islamic, violent, non-violent, etc.) became securitised via securitising speech acts. The chapter addresses the research questions as well as the limitations and challenges of this study before discussing

the relevance and consequences of the securitisation of extremism. Finally, it offers recommendations for future research.

7.3. The presentation of extremism via securitising speech acts

Over the past decades, the concept of extremism has gathered more and more importance in not only the security field but also the political domain. What it exactly entails and how it is defined is unclear and has changed over time. It appears that the threat of 'domestic extremism' has been on the security agenda since at least the 1960s whilst 'Islamic extremism' became the more popular threat since the 9/11 attacks in 2001. The security interpretation is underpinned by a specific security rhetoric, the reference to external events, and the establishment of security continua between extremism and phenomena such as terrorism. Since then, 'Islamic extremism' has been described as the root cause for acts of terror and violence, and the securitising discourse surrounding it by Prime Ministers became even more pronounced upon the 7/7 London attacks in 2005.

On the linguistic-rhetorical level, securitisation takes place through the use of certain securitising speech acts, the most prominent of which take the form of the Assertive ('someone or something is a threat') speech act, the Directive ('speaker commands measures against the perceived threat') speech act, and the Commissive ('speaker commits her/himself to doing something against the threat via extraordinary measures') speech act. The analysis showed that extremism was presented as a threat in different ways. Sometimes the threat was portrayed as stemming from 'extremists' themselves, whereas at other times, it was 'extremist ideology' which was identified as the security issue.

When comparing the different Prime Ministers' discourses and how they present extremism, it becomes clear that they have several things in common:

1) Extremism is a security threat
2) Extremism is based on ideology
3) Extremism poses a danger to the state and to national security
4) Extremism is vaguely defined

Looking at the discourse of UK Prime Ministers on the matter of extremism, there also appear to be several distinctions: for one, there is 'Islamic extremism', secondly there is violent extremism, and thirdly, there is non-violent extremism.

There are several shifts in usage when it comes to these distinctions. For example, Tony Blair specifically refers to 'Islamic extremism' in his parliamentary discourse as well as in speeches given outside Parliament. Gordon Brown, on the other hand, tries to specifically distance himself from the wording previously used by by Blair, starting to refer to 'violent extremism' instead of 'Islamic extremism'. However, his discourse still shows that he conflates extremism with Islam as the source of terrorist acts. Additionally, we can observe shifts in the usage and securitisation of 'non-violent extremism' under David Cameron. It appears that he strongly insinuates that extremism is always linked to Islam and there are very few occasions when he uses securitising speech acts to refer to other forms of extremism.

As outlined, there are different forms of extremism, which differ in their presentation and in the ways they are securitised. 'Domestic Extremism' has been institutionally securitised and has barely been mentioned discursively by any of the researched securitising actors. The main focus of securitising speech acts by the selected Prime Ministers laid on 'Islamic Extremism' along with violent and non-violent extremism. When David Cameron starts to address "all forms of extremism", for example, he does not mean right-wing, left-wing, or other kinds of extremism. Instead, he tries to 'repaint' his previously criticised usage of 'Islamic extremism'. It can be seen that Cameron is committed to the idea of combating not only violent extremism but also non-violent extremism, which he claims also leads to violence and terrorism.

Extremists are presented through speech acts as being willing to promote their beliefs through not just legal, but illegal and often even violent means. This is evidence of the concept's securitisation through Assertive and Commissive securitising speech acts. They exacerbate a lack of integration and social tensions to the point of posing a risk to the state and to the very survival of the nation. They are presented as exploiting British hospitality by rejecting British values in order to implement their own objectives – the destruction of the 'West' and what it stands for. Here we can observe a retelling of Samuel Huntington's Clash of Civilisations, in particular by Tony Blair (see Blair, 2006f) and David Cameron (see Cameron, 2011a), who increasingly purport dichotomies between extremism and so-called moderate interpretations of Islam. In comparison, Gordon Brown did not differentiate extremism into foreign and domestic affairs as much, though he still

presented extremists as being motivated by outside sources, identifying the danger as stemming from beyond the United Kingdom. The thematisation and construction of extremism in the context of discourses around terrorism and security is intertwined with transnational discourses around Islam and its role in non-Muslim societies.

Whilst it was initially assumed that Tony Blair's overall security discourse focused heavily on terrorism, it turned out that he actually, more often than not, securitised *extremism* as the threat to several Referent Objects (British safety, British Muslims, etc.) and used securitising speech acts in the domain of foreign affairs as well as domestic security. This research also shows that, whilst it was originally assumed that the discourse of extremism only entered the political agenda after the London 7/7 attacks, it had already been present earlier and had crept onto the security spectrum. This was aided by the institutionalised securitisation of 'domestic extremism', which acted as a fertile ground for further securitisation (see Chapter 3). An analysis of Tony Blair's securitising speech acts shows that he focused almost exclusively on 'Islamic Extremism' as a threat – something which he presented as a driver of violence. However, one can observe that the notion of a distinction between violent and non-violent extremism subtly entered his discourse over time. Whilst he often intermingled the concepts of extremism and terrorism in his speeches following the 9/11 attacks (see for example Blair, 2002b), he began singling out extremism as the source of terrorism after the 7/7 bombings. The main idea that he portrays is that extreme religious ideology leads to extremism, and extremism, in turn, leads to terrorism. Another heavily featured theme is that "distorted Islam" is dangerous, but that "true Islam" is not. Indeed, Blair's speech acts, by and large, present moderate or 'mainstream' Islam as the antidote to extremism.

Whereas for Tony Blair, 'Islamic Extremism' and military intervention took centre stage, the three themes most prominent in Gordon Brown's discourses are "British Values", "violent extremism", and the notion of the "isolation of extremists/extremism". Throughout his career, Gordon Brown seems to have emphasised the concept of Britishness. It therefore seems rather fitting that he would present 'British Values' as an extraordinary measure to curb the threat of extremism. This notion was picked up again under David Cameron, who continued

to use Commissive and Directive securitising speech acts to position 'British Values' as a measure with which to combat extremism. The author of this thesis argues that this can be considered extraordinary because, by evoking the concept of 'British Values' or Britishness, Prime Ministers are suggesting a threat within society. Without saying it, they put foreign values in opposition to local (British) values, and frame foreign beliefs as dangerous to British values and therefore to British society itself. The extraordinary aspect here is the idea that individual citizens who live up to 'British Values' do not pose a threat, whereas those who do not are treated as suspicious. Hence, this creates a scenario of distrust within society, resulting in the making of a 'suspect community' – something which had been observed in the past in the UK governments' dealing with the Irish case[240].

As already mentioned, the focus on the securitisation of 'Islamic extremism' can be seen as a direct result of the emerging challenge posed by international terrorism and other contemporary events. The terminology suggests that from 2005 onwards, most securitising speech acts were aimed at religiously motivated extremism, in particular Islam. However, by branding Islam as extremist, there is a danger of making Muslims and Islamists indistinguishable. It can be observed that what lies at the core of the security continuum is the presentation of 'Islamist extremism' as a multiplier for a host of other problems. This leads to a transfer of illegitimacy in which, in the name of the fight against terror, measures are suggested that primarily affect the management of dissent.

The killing of soldier Lee Rigby and the deepening crisis in Syria seemed to increase David Cameron's efforts to securitise 'Islamic extremism', not just via speech acts but also through securitising moves regarding the government's Prevent strategy, which was overhauled again in 2015. By making the fight against extremism a fight against an ideology, Cameron downplays other factors that many experts believe play an important role in people becoming terrorists. Additionally, he puts Muslims under general suspicion, which can result in divisions within civil

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[240] The policing of the IRA during the 'Irish Troubles' had created what Paddy Hillyard (1993) coined a 'suspect community' in his book *'Suspect community: People's experience of the Prevention of Terrorism Acts in Britain'.* It meant that the British government had enforced a 'dual system of justice' whereby laws were established and enforced specifically for the Irish, separate to the rest of the United Kingdom. Rather than easing the situation, such legislation led to further radicalisation of "the Irish community, prolonging a political solution to the conflict" (Abbas & Awan, 2015: 17-18).

society. It becomes evident that David Cameron presents extremism as an ideologically motivated form of dissent against British Values, democratic principles, and the wider social order. For him, extremism is understood as a phenomenon which manifests itself in the intolerance and denial of what he calls 'British Values'. What is interesting here is that he frames extremism such that, even where no crime has been committed, the potential to commit a crime exists and there seems to be little distinction between extremist beliefs and extremist behaviour.

What all framings of extremism (be it violent, non-violent, domestic or Islamic) have in common is that they are so ambiguously defined that they can be applied to a wide range of forms of dissent or of what is not considered the social or political 'norm'. The securitisation of extremism, i.e., framing it as a danger to the survival of a wide range of Referent Objects (state, security, academia, health services, charities), allows securitising actors to suggest and implement a wide range of extraordinary measures. Securitising speech acts seem to be full of enemy image constructions, in particular in post-9/11 discourse. The threat of extremism is concretised and incorporated from then onwards and the choice of words becomes more drastic. The extremist threat becomes even more dominant in the discourse of David Cameron and is also mentioned in connection with other threats (such as terrorism). The Referent Objects described as endangered are located on the level of individuals (Muslim Youth), but above all on the level of National Security, and are to be found in the military, political, economic, and social sectors.

The analysis portion of this thesis (see chapters 4, 5 and 6) showed that the Referent Object and Referent Subject were interchangeable in the case of Muslim youth, which was presented as both threatened by extremism and as threatening because of extremist tendencies. Generally, extremism is presented as a danger to several Referent Objects such as national security and the state, but also (young) Muslims and 'British values'. By presenting 'Islamic extremism' primarily as a security problem for British national security, Muslims are stigmatised as sources of insecurity and therefore indirectly seen as threats. The idea that the religion itself is not part of 'British Values' makes the threat complete. An important aspect of the development of the securitisation of extremism is the expansion of Referent Objects over time. In 2015, for example, children were included alongside young people as

a potential risk group for anti-terrorism and counter-extremism measures. On the other hand, in 2005 it was the broader 'British society' which was presented as threatened.

7.4. The 'extraordinary measures' against 'extremism'

Keeping in mind the definition of securitisation for this thesis, any issue can become a security problem if it is made an existential threat via speech acts and emergency measures are suggested as a response by securitising actors. Securitisation therefore occurs when the securitising actor demands extraordinary measures in order to stop a threat via Directive and Commissive securitising speech acts. The spectrum of suggested measures against the 'threat' of extremism is wide ranging: from the suggestion of military action in Libya and Syria to the Prevent Strategy and 'British Values'.

Since David Cameron's Munich Speech in 2011 at the latest, the 'common values' or 'British values' approach against the danger of 'extremism' had taken centre stage. From this perspective, the turn to Islamist terrorism is not solely attributed to the difficult trajectory of "disturbed" individuals but is also generally associated with attitudes and sentiments within Muslim communities. Via his discourse, David Cameron suggests that these communities, although technically law-abiding, are ideologically supportive of separation from mainstream society and hold "anti-Western" values which play a crucial role in these 'extremists' becoming terrorists. It is clear that David Cameron's discourse was no longer exclusively about violent extremism (as previously seen by Gordon Brown) but about the ideas behind violent extremism, similar to Tony Blair's presentation of extremism. David Cameron wanted to oblige all sections of British society to adhere to liberal British values, suggesting that he was only concerned with "the ideology of Islamist extremism" (Cameron, 2014d) as the root cause of terrorism with the antidote of the British way of life in the form of "British Values".

Here one needs to keep in mind that seeing securitisation as a discursive construction allows for (speech act induced) suggestions of extraordinary measures, not just the implementation of such measures, to be considered securitisation. This is due to how an issue is classified and presented as a security threat, not necessarily how it ends up being dealt with. The fact that an issue is being dealt with at the highest political level by Prime Ministers themselves shows that the issue is a

priority, and their position enables them to call for further extraordinary measures. In general, the overarching goal of the suggested extraordinary measures seems to be to ensure a secure society by preventing extremism and, by extension, violence.

Cooperation with Muslim communities had gained importance in the context of anti-terror strategies after the turn of the millennium. Initially, cooperation with religious communities was part of the policy measures designed in response to the violent riots of the summer of 2001. An overriding goal of these measures was to fight and prevent crime. Muslim religious communities, in particular, were to contribute to conflict management and play a conflict-settling role. This idea was to be extended in the fight against extremism, where both Tony Blair and David Cameron repeatedly suggested the antidote of moderate Muslims standing up against 'extremist Islam'.

By 2005, the government began exploring legislative ways to make religious communities and their places of worship more accountable in the context of preventing and combating terrorism and, by extension, extremism. For example, Tony Blair also discussed changing the law to allow for more restrictive action against certain religious sites, such as expanding the powers of the security authorities in cases of suspected terrorism (see Blair, 2005a). Gordon Brown also suggested (and implemented) extraordinary measures when he increased spending for local authorities and community groups by £70 million in order "to improve the capacity of local communities in our country to resist violent extremism" (Brown in HC Deb Volume 463 Col 845, 25 July 2007), clearly aiming at the British Muslim community.

Regarding Tony Blair's suggestion of extraordinary measures against the threat of extremism, one of his main legacies on the topic is the TA 2000 and TA 2006, which would go on to impact counterextremism measures for years to come. The introduction of the Prevent strategy, which he and his government launched in the aftermath of the 7/7 London attacks, is another prime example of such extraordinary measures.

As an extraordinary measure or antidote to extremism (as well as terrorism), Brown often repeats the concept of 'shared values', 'common values', 'global values' or British values (see for example Brown in HC Deb Vol 467 Col 670, 14 November

2007, Brown, 2009a and Brown in HC Deb Vol 503 Col 684, 13 January 2010), something that was mirrored by David Cameron (see for example Cameron, 2014d, Cameron in HC Deb Vol 597 Col 1175, 29 June 2015). Similarly, isolating extremism from society is a topic that Gordon Brown continuously addresses. He commits himself to lessening the threat of extremism by involving moderate voices while still appearing to invoke the rhetoric of 'us vs. them' through Commissive securitising speech acts. David Cameron would equally continue along these lines of needing to 'embolden moderate Muslims' against the security threat of extremist ideology (see for example Cameron, 2015b).

It can also be observed that British Military involvement in Afghanistan was justified by linking the threat of extremism to the Referent Object of British Security – something that was done not only by Tony Blair (see for example Blair, 2004) but also by Gordon Brown (see for example Brown in HC Deb Vol 497 Col 300, 14 October 2009). Similarly, David Cameron suggested military involvement in Libya and Syria as an extraordinary measure against the threat of extremism abroad affecting national security (see for example Cameron in HC Deb Vol 532 Col 32, 05 September 2011).

A major extraordinary measure was first the establishment of Prevent and then the introduction of the Prevent Duty, the legal obligation for all schools, universities and other public institutions (for example the NHS) to "have due regard to the need to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism" (HM Government, 2015a) p. 18 in the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 (c. 6), Part 5 — Risk of being drawn into terrorism, Chapter 1, Section 26. In the accompanying guidance, it was laid out that "[b]eing drawn into terrorism includes not just violent extremism but also non-violent extremism, which can create an atmosphere conducive to terrorism and can popularise views which terrorists exploit" (HM Government, 2015b) p. 11. The Prevent Duty can also be seen as a call for institutions to spy and report on individuals, running the risk of undermining trust in such institutions. Moreover, how should extremist individuals be identified without a proper definition of what extremism actually entails? The resulting legitimisation of the powers of security actors, such as the establishment of mandatory Prevent Workshops should be interpreted as indications of an increasing institutionalisation of security in the area of extremism.

7.5. Implications/Contributions for Securitisation Studies

This thesis has several implications. It shows that securitisation can be analysed through speech acts, as originally suggested by Wæver, (1995: 55) and that once a securitising actor with the necessary social and political capital presents someone or something as a security threat he or she can thereby legitimise extraordinary measures. Whilst others such as Jackson (2006: 313) have argued that policy implementation is necessary for securitisation to be 'successful', this thesis argues that it is the securitising speech act which is the securitising move itself. Therefore, it maintains that, although security practices (as seen in institutionalised securitisation) can be securitising acts, it is possible to analyse securitisation based on securitising speech acts alone. This does not mean that securitisation does not manifest in other ways, for example in visual securitisation and the policing of a perceived security threat, but it allows for small case studies to be effectively studied without taking such alternatives into account.

Speech acts – the construction of threats via language – are what makes securitisation possible, and it can therefore be concluded that securitisation can be studied via the analysis of such speech acts on their own (so long as they are evaluated using a specific securitising speech act framework). Securitisation happens when a threat is accepted as an unquestionable reality and when extraordinary measures are suggested as a response. Securitising speech acts therefore construct a social reality without the need for audience acceptance as long as the actor holds a certain level of power or legitimacy. This does not mean that the audience does not play a role in securitisation. However, it does mean that, for this research, it was explicitly left out as a unit of analysis.

In order to investigate how the securitisation of extremism took place, a securitising speech act framework was developed to guide the analysis, as the CoS does not provide explicit methods on how to study securitisation. In order to apply the theory as a method and to overcome the issue of the audience, John R Searle's SAT approach was taken on in order to develop the 'Securitising Speech Acts Classification'. This thesis therefore makes several amendments to the 'classical' securitisation framework of the Copenhagen school. (1) it focuses on John R Searle's speech act theory, (2) it leaves audience acceptance out based on the position of the securitising actor, and (3) it uses the 'Securitising Speech Act

Classification' as a tool for analysis. Another unique feature is the study of the securitisation of extremism in the United Kingdom, which up to this point, has not been studied. This research is also important as it can offer a viewpoint on how the securitisation of extremism will unfold in the future, predicting (based on past developments) that current happenings (such as the new policing act etc.) will keep the issue on the agenda with no desecuritisation in sight.

By applying the Speech Act Framework for analysis, researchers can identify securitising moves by securitising actors, how they framed something or someone as a threat to different Referent Objects, and which extraordinary measures they suggested to curb the threats. By emphasising different securitising speech acts, securitising mechanisms can be found more easily. For example, the Assertive speech act shows the framing of the threat and how it is presented. The Directive speech act on the other hand, almost always reveals the extraordinary measure suggested against the threat. Similarly, the Commissive speech act (in which the speaker commits her/himself to taking on the threat) crystalises additional extraordinary measures. Given that extraordinary measures are always needed (not necessarily implemented) for a securitising move to take place, the herein developed Speech Act Framework allows for a focus on discourse alone.

In practice, the findings of this thesis are relevant for several reasons. For one, they demonstrate that it is possible to keep an issue such as extremism, which in itself does not pose direct danger (unlike terrorism), securitised over several decades. Secondly, the research indicates that, through the institutionalised securitisation of extremism, it was easier to frame it as a threat following the grammar of security (see Buzan et al, 1998). Additionally, by analysing the security discourse over several premierships, it was shown that the threat framing changed over time. Whilst Blair linked extremism discursively[241] with Islam, Brown attempted to move away from the connotation, focussing on 'violent extremism' instead. It can also be argued that the criminalisation of the encouragement of terrorism can be seen as a securitisation of 'non-violent extremism' under Tony Blair. On the other hand, Gordon Brown used a Commissive securitising speech act to announce, "a single senior lead prosecutor in the Crown Prosecution Service responsible for cases

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[241] The securitisation of domestic extremism aka 'animal rights extremism' was institutionalised.

relating to inciting violent extremism" (Brown in HC Deb Volume 467 Col 669, 14 November 2007), framing violent extremism as a security issue. Cameron brought both concepts together, securitising not only violent and non-violent but also 'Islamist extremism'.

This has several ramifications on a theoretical level too as it shows how the securitisation of an issue can change over time. Therefore, securitisation can be seen as a progress which can alternate over time, even though once an issue has entered the security agenda it is not easily moved back to the political sphere. This is particularly true given the securitising actors' inclinations and justification for securitisation. That is not to say that such securitisation is necessarily carried out consciously, but rather that it is a result of the continued threat framing which becomes institutionalised and internalised by said actors. As a consequence, this thesis contributes to the critical security literature, highlighting the importance of discourse. By emphasising a Securitising Speech Act Framework, the study of securitisation becomes easier, in particular when researching the securitisation of a subject previously not deemed securitised. This is especially important as securitisation studies tend to focus on researching topics which have already shown strong signs of securitisation prior to any formal investigation. Through the application of the adapted Securitising Speech Act Framework, the identification of non-traditional threats can be aided and a broadening of securitised subjects outside of the traditional security sphere is enabled. The study of securitising speech acts therefore allows for an evaluation of how something becomes a security issue through speech. It therefore can be applied to a range of issues previously not deemed to be on the security agenda.

The analysis of securitising speech acts by Prime Ministers demonstrated that the 'Speech Act Securitisation Framework' in combination with the 'Securitising Speech Act Classification' developed in Chapter 2 provides insight into the securitisation process of the topic of extremism. By extension, it can also be applied to a variety of other topics. Whilst traditionally, the study of securitisation is not restricted to discourse, this simplified framework allows the evaluation of securitising moves by focussing on elite discourse alone. This has several implications. For one, it allows the researcher to 'dive' into the securitisation of a topic with relative ease, enabling her or him to paint a 'picture' of the securitisation

of a topic. Secondly, by leaving aside the discourses of functional actors, it enables the researcher to focus on what is 'there'.

The Securitisation Speech Act Framework is a promising tool for future research on the securitisation of issues not yet deemed to be on the security agenda. ST in conjunction with Searle's SAT can help to find explanatory approaches for certain political and social developments, which, especially in the present day, could shed light on why language is so important in politics and the extent to which politicians make use of these strategic linguistic means in order to achieve certain results and attract the attention of the public, the media, and citizens.

7.6. Recommendations for future research of the securitisation of extremism

The research design could be applied to other European countries such as Germany in order to explore how and if securitisation of extremism took place via discourses by Chancellors. Investigating the institutionalised securitisation of the term would be interesting, given the country's different historical background of dealing with extremism. For example, in Germany, left-wing extremism has notoriously been considered a security issue dating back to the early 20th century, whilst it has been argued that right-wing extremism has been downplayed (see Schultz, 2021). Comparing the securitisation of extremism in the United Kingdom and Germany would then offer more insights into the conditions of securitisation.

To comprehend the impact of the securitisation of extremism, further studies could aim to find out the effect of the securitisation not just via extraordinary measures but the implications of such measures. Therefore, the relationship between securitisation and securitisation effects could be studied. Critical security studies should continue to deal with the construction of security and threats in the future but should also be able to question them. Although the CoS does not aim to judge whether somethings should or should not become securitised; or whether the securitisation of an issue should be deemed positive or negative; analysing securitisation processes allows us to evaluate the pros and cons of the securitisation of a topic. For example, having established that extremism has become securitised over time, the question arises as to whether this is in fact a good thing. Pinpointing and highlighting securitised issues can allow researchers, and more importantly

security professionals, to question said securitisation and may allow them to find ways to move issues back into a state of desecuritisation.

The 'Securitising Speech Act Classification' could also be applied to other cases in order to explore how other subjects, apart from extremism have been discursively securitised by elite actors. For instance, by using it to analyse speeches given in a security context, it would be possible to identify what or who is presented as an existential threat. This could also be extended to other forms of discourse to account for 'real-time' securitisation by evaluating, for example, the Twitter accounts of elite actors. Given the framework's focus on institutional securitising actors, it would be hard to analyse non-elite securitising discourse. However, it could be adapted to account for securitising attempts by other actors if a research agenda were aiming to identify securitising moves.

The author of this study would change a few things about this research if she were to repeat it. The analysis of the institutionalised securitisation of extremism could have been expanded through archival work, for example through an exploration of the records of the Metropolitan Police held at the National Archives (which are not digitally available). Furthermore, rather than focusing on the term 'extremism', she would have attempted to analyse how the concept of extremism (and by extension dissent) has been presented. For example, she could have included related terms such as fanaticism, radicalism, or radicalisation, which might have been used synonymously by securitising actors to group together what they saw as dissent.

The introduction of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill 2021 is also a giveaway of the continued securitisation of extremism as it builds up on the institutionalised securitisation of 'domestic extremism'. The Bill would "give the police unprecedented powers to prevent, control and punish protestors, [and] risk[s] neutralizing the use of protest as a vital tool to hold people and institutions to account" (Uthayakumar-Cumarasamy et al, 2021: 89). The fact that the issue of extremism has been kept outside of 'normal' politics can be seen in the Bill's side-lining of scrutiny in Parliament (see Mead, 2021). Therefore, the period of analysis could be extended to Prime Ministers Theresa May and Boris Johnson in order to capture the securitisation of extremism up to 2021. Similarly, the time frame could have been dated back to explore if securitisation of extremism took place discursively by Prime Ministers prior to Tony Blair.

7.7. Final Thoughts

This research challenged the traditional Securitisation Framework by the Copenhagen School and adapted it by incorporating Searle's Speech Act Theory to develop a Speech Act Framework for the analysis of securitising speech acts. By including institutionalisation and focussing on extraordinary measures, the author was able to show how the 'issue' of extremism entered the security agenda and remained there firmly throughout the analysed period. Further, she showed that, by examining how extremism is presented as a threat by Prime Ministers to create the impression of a state of emergency, the securitisation of the topic can be analysed without taking other actors into account.

It is also important to point out that uttering the word extremism allows for an automatic association with danger, since the term is ingrained in the public consciousness as a concept which acts outside of what is socially and politically 'normal'. By saying 'extremist' or 'extremism' the securitising actor has already moved something into the security sphere. Through further securitising speech acts, in particular Assertives and Commissives, they are able to further frame the threat.

Due to the terrorist attacks that occurred between 2005 and 2015, the securitisation of extremism as a security danger to the United Kingdom felt to be justified if extremism is framed as the source of terrorism. However, even though there might be a justification, there is also a danger associated with minimising the actual dangers of terrorism. The framing of 'Islamic extremism' is in particular noteworthy as it stands in contrast to the non-religious 'domestic extremism' previously moved onto the security agenda via institutionalised securitisation. It often appears that the latter is considered political whilst the former is rooted in religion. However, this might convey the impression that religiously motivated extremism is apolitical, which almost infantilises Islam, disregarding the political components of the religion.

However, what is important for the process of securitisation is not the real existence of security problems or issues, but rather the performative character of a speech act and its dramatisation. By saying that something is a threat, it becomes a threat. By saying 'extremist' or 'extremism', the securitising actor moves something into the security sphere and keeps it there when she or he continues to suggest extraordinary measures to curb the threat. This also has consequences for the normative

assessment of the idea of security and the assumption of an inherent undermining of democracy by extremism. Detaching security from the logics of depoliticised and undemocratic security, which are evaluated as damaging per se, opens up the possibility of shaping the concept of extremism as negative.

That the UK Government still has to define what (non-violent) extremism is and how to act against it without infringing on fundamental rights shows that there is no clear distinction between radicalisation, extremist thoughts, and active extremism. There also does not seem to be any substantive urge to define the term. It seems there is a smooth transition from extremism to terrorism against the background of national security. Extremism is seen as a preliminary stage of terrorism. While the latter has a clear legal framework, this does not apply to the term extremism. One could argue that the lack of definition serves a certain purpose. One can therefore see the securitisation of extremism, not as a rational reaction to a changed threat situation, but as a discursive strategy to legitimise extraordinary measures such as increased budgets for extremism prevention or the changing of national school curricula to include the teaching of 'British Values'.

Whether extremism, extremists and extremist ideology are a security threat or not is ultimately a fruitless discussion. Answering this question depends on whose security is at stake and what is meant by security in the first place. Therefore, this thesis focuses on securitising speech acts, not on asking about the possible motivations on the part of the securitising actors. However, this research also illustrated how the concept of security is visibly expanding and how the 'who and what' of security is becoming increasingly unclear. It proves that anything can become a security problem, provided that it is declared to be one by a securitising actor with social capital (see Wæver, 1995). Due to the prevalence of the security discourse described above and the dominance of security policy practices in dealing with extremism, it can be said that the intention of keeping it on the security agenda also leads to the marginalisation of alternative approaches to the phenomenon of extremism, even though they could make an important contribution to its desecuritisation.

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Appendices
Appendix A: Data Sources

NAME	URL
GOV.UK	https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches
Special Branch Files Project	http://specialbranchfiles.uk
The British Political Speech Archive	http://www.britishpoliticalspeech.org
The Hansard	https://hansard.parliament.uk
The Internet Archive	https://archive.org
The Political Speech Archive	https://www.ukpol.co.uk
ProQuest U.K. Parliamentary Papers	https://parlipapers.proquest.com
UK Central Government Web Archive	https://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20031203000220/http://www.pro.gov.uk:80/about/preservation/digital/webarchive.htm
Undercover Policing Inquiry (UCPI)	https://www.ucpi.org.uk/search-results/
Wayback Machine	https://archive.org/web
WhatDoTheyKnow (Freedom of Information Request Archive)	https://www.whatdotheyknow.com

Appendix B: Hansard Sources

- HC Vol 448
- HC Vol 449
- HC Vol 450
- HC Vol 457
- HC Vol 462
- HC Vol 463
- HC Vol 467
- HC Vol 468
- HC Vol 469
- HC Vol 473
- HC Vol 491
- HC Vol 497
- HC Vol 501
- HC Vol 502
- HC Vol 503
- HC Vol 504
- HC Vol 513
- HC Vol 527
- HC Vol 532
- HC Vol 556
- HC Vol 563
- HC Vol 564
- HC Vol 565
- HC Vol 585
- HC Vol 588
- HC Vol 589
- HC Vol 592
- HC Vol 596
- HC Vol 597
- HC Vol 599
- HC Vol 602
- HC Vol 603
- HC Vol 606
- HC Vol 608
- HC Vol 609
- HC Vol 611
- HL Vol 759