'One Thing': A Structural Comparison of Pauline Ethical Reasoning on Jewish Practices with Stoic Ethical Reasoning on Intermediates

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Abstract

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This thesis offers a structural comparison of Stoic reasoning on the intermediates (the προηγμένα ἀδιάφορα and the καθήκοντα) and Paul's reasoning on Jewish practices. This is done with the heuristic aim of understanding Paul's reasoning better, in particular his putative inconsistency on the topic of Torah observance. Accounting for the inconsistency created by Paul's positive and negative discourse on Jewish practices has presented a persistent scholarly problem for which this thesis offers a new solution. The analysis offered here suggests that there are two discernible patterns of discourse in both Stoic discourse on the intermediates and in Paul's discourse on Jewish practices. The argument of this thesis is that the similarities between Stoic and Pauline ethical reasoning demonstrate Paul's concern to establish the orientation to Christ as the singular first-order good in contrast to all other ethical selections and activities, including Jewish practices. His negative discourse on Jewish practices, though, portrays them not as vices but as neutral ethical selections, such that Paul could endorse their selection when compared to other practices of intermediate status. This argument is made by way of a concentrated analysis of Stoic ethics and an exegetical analysis of three Pauline texts regarding Jewish practices (Gal 2, Phil 3, and 1 Cor 8–10). This thesis contributes to Pauline studies by offering the first in-depth comparison of the Stoic intermediate categories with a particular topic in Paul's reasoning—Torah observance—which has far-reaching significance.

‘One Thing’: A Structural Comparison of Pauline Ethical Reasoning on Jewish Practices with Stoic Ethical Reasoning on Intermediates

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Contents

Abbreviations

Abbreviations of ancient literature, academic journals, and series related to the discipline of biblical studies are those used by the Society of Biblical Literature, as found in *The SBL Handbook of Style: For Biblical Studies and Related Disciplines* (2nd ed.; Peabody: Hendrickson, 2014).

Abbreviations of ancient literature and academic journals related to the discipline of ancient philosophy are those used in *The Oxford Classical Dictionary* (4th ed.; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).

The following are abbreviations also apply to this thesis:

DL	Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of Eminent Philosophers*
LS1	A. A. Long and D. N. Sedley. *The Hellenistic Philosophers: Volume 1: Translations of the Principal Sources, with Philosophical Commentary.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987.
LS2	A. A. Long and D. N. Sedley. *The Hellenistic Philosophers: Volume 2: Greek and Latin Texts with Notes and Bibliography.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987.
SVF	H. F. von Arnim. *Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta*. 4 vols. Leipzig: Teubner: 1903–24 (repr. Stuttgart: Teubner, 1964).

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Declaration

This work has been submitted to Durham University in accordance with the regulations for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. It is my own work, and none of it has been previously submitted to Durham University or to any other university for a degree.

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CHAPTER 1

One of the worst accusations a public figure can receive is that of inconsistency; the flip-flops waved at US presidential candidate John Kerry and Margaret Thatcher's denunciations of U-turns are still fresh in the memory of most. The more vehemence and passion that accompanies one's position, the harsher the reprisal if it is reversed and the louder the charges of hypocrisy will ring. It is not surprising, then, that we have questions for Paul on his view of the law—he is nothing if not impassioned. Pauline studies have long wrestled with inconsistencies in his ethical teachings. In 19th-century debates on the transatlantic slave trade, Paul's writings were used both by those defending the slave trade and by abolitionists.[1] In more recent memory, both feminist interpretations and patriarchal (or 'complementarian') ones have found an ally in Paul in their debates over gender roles and female ordination. Paul's view of the law is one especially acute example of his inconsistency. Paul can argue vociferously against circumcision but also speak of it as a benefit.[2] He accuses Peter of mandating Jewish practices of gentiles and then later advises gentile Jesus-believers to adopt Jewish practices.[3] He can, with palpable pride, describe the Torah and Jewish practices as advantages at some points, and discuss the same law and practices in terms of slavery, curses and rubbish at others.[4] Paul seems to blame Torah for introducing him to sin with one breath, and then call it 'holy, righteous and good' with the next.[5] Is the Torah and its requirements good or bad? While modern readers might imagine a cornered Paul squirming and equivocating, it is worth asking whether such inconsistency is incoherence or evidence of another pattern of reasoning.

1.1 *Euthydemus*: Socrates and the Stoics

The ancient Stoics often faced charges of incoherence regarding the intermediates, a category within their ethical structure which contained things and activities judged to be

[1] Cf. W. M. Swartley, *Slavery, Sabbath, War & Women: Case Issues in Biblical Interpretation* (Scottdale, PA: Herald, 1983), 35–6, 43–5; J. A. Harrill, 'The Use of the New Testament in the American Slave Controversy: A Case History in the Hermeneutical Tension between Biblical Criticism and Christian Moral Debate', *Religion and American Culture* 10 (2000), 149–86; L. M. Bowens, *African American Readings of Paul: Reception, Resistance & Transformation* (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2020), 15–183.
[2] Gal 5.2, 11; Rom 2.25; 3.1; Phil 3.3; 1 Co 7.18.
[3] Gal 2.11–21; Rom 14.15, 21; 1 Co 10.32. Cf. 4.3 below.
[4] Rom 3.1–2; 9.3–5; Phil 3.4–6; Rom 7.4–6; Gal 3.10–14; Gal 4.3–5; 4.21–31; Phil 3.7–9.
[5] Rom 7.7–12.

morally neutral, yet valuable.[6] These categories and the discourse about them were their response to the primary problems of Hellenistic ethics: formulating the τέλος, determining what contributed towards it, and identifying what was genuinely 'good'. Each school had its solutions to these problems and the Stoics developed a response which they argued established virtue as the first-order good, while assigning a different kind of worth for the conventional 'goods'. The intermediate categories of the 'preferreds' (προγημένα ἀδιάφορα) and 'appropriate activities' (καθήκοντα) could not be distinguished as virtue or vice, and yet were the normative selections and practices of the wise man. Because these categories were morally neutral, though, they could be described negatively when discussed in relation to virtue, and positively when discussed in relation to other intermediates.[7] These two patterns of discourse were criticized as contradictory by other schools, but the Stoics argued that the selections and activities conventionally regarded as 'good' did not have the unconditional property of benefitting which a 'good' must have. The conventional 'goods' could be used poorly or well, and could even be destructive. A similar argument is made by Socrates in Plato's *Euthydemus* and is considered by some to be the forerunner of the later Stoic categories.[8] A summary of the pertinent section of this dialogue is a helpful entry into these debates.

Socrates is portrayed as beginning his argument with two eudaemonist premises: that all human beings wish to prosper, and that they will prosper if they have good things (279a). Cleinias, his dialogue partner, agrees and they proceed to name the things that can be considered good in a fashion typical of ancient Greeks: wealth, health, etc. Socrates then asks whether such goods benefit merely by being possessed or by being used—it is agreed that they benefit by being used. Further, Socrates and Cleinias admit that they only benefit by *right* use. Socrates proposes that 'right use', the knowledge of correct use of these goods is wisdom. He then asks,

> Can we get any benefit from all the other possessions without understanding and wisdom? Shall we say that a man will profit more by possessing much and doing much when he has no sense, than he will if he does and possesses little? Consider it this way: would he not err less if he did less; and so, erring, do less ill? And hence,

[6] Cf. Sextus Empiricus, *Mat.* XI.64; Plutarch, *Stoic. rep.* 1042; *Comm. not.* 1060.
[7] E.g. Epictetus fends off charges that he 'despises' the ἀδιάφορα, *Diatr.* IV.7.33; whilst Chrysippus, on the other hand, even allowed calling the ἀδιάφορα 'good' in everyday language despite the formal categories, per Plutarch, *Stoic. rep.* 1048.
[8] J. Annas, 'Is Plato a Stoic', *Méthexis* 10 (1997), 23–38 (25); 'Virtue as the Use of Other Goods', in *Virtue, Love and Form* (eds. T. Irwin and M. Nussbaum; Edmonton: Academic Printing and Publishing, 1994), 53–66 (54); A. A. Long 'Socrates in Hellenistic Philosophy', in *Stoic Studies* (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1996), 1–34 (24–32).

> doing less ill, be less miserable? ... in which of the two cases, when one is poor or when one is rich, will one be more likely to do less? ... To sum up then … as regards the whole lot of things which at first we termed goods, the discussion they demand is not on the question of how they are in themselves and by nature goods, but rather, I conceive, as follows: *if they are guided by ignorance, they are greater evils than their opposites, according as they are more capable of ministering to their evil guide; whereas if understanding and wisdom guide them, they are greater goods; but in themselves neither sort is of any worth.*[9]

Santas summarises the Socratic argument here as beginning with two assumed premises (all wish to attain happiness, and will be happy if they possess good things), but this hypothesis is modified by two criteria for the goods in discussion, namely, use and, then, correct use. In other words, it is agreed that 'goods' only lead to happiness if they are *used* (not merely possessed), and if they are *rightly* used (not wrongly used). At this point it is agreed that incorrect use of these 'goods' can result in more error and more unhappiness than no use at all. Since a foolish person will use health and wealth to destructive ends, it is actually preferable for them not to use such 'goods'. So the final version of the original hypothesis is: 'happiness depends on the possession and *wise* use of good things'.[10] Socrates concludes that the conventional 'goods' are not genuinely good or bad, and that only two things can be considered so—wisdom and ignorance. The further conclusion, Socrates says, is that one must prepare oneself in every way to be wise, even to the point of enslaving oneself to another with the goal of wisdom.

There are many interpretations of Socrates' argument here,[11] and it is perhaps impossible to tease out a precise system from the Platonic texts. It is clear, though, that defining good was a significant Socratic task.[12] Since all the Hellenistic schools agreed that the τέλος of every rational being was εὐδαιμονία, it then became necessary to decide what contributed towards that end—or did not, but might mistakenly be thought to do so. Socrates' wake may be generally mapped out thus: Plato and Aristotle decided that virtue was a good, and sufficient for constituting the τέλος, but the conventional goods also contributed to it. Epicurus decided that virtue was good as a means to happiness, but since he identified happiness as pleasure, many of the conventional goods were also able to contribute to this

[9] Plato, *Euthyd.* 281a–e, trans. Lamb, LCL, 411–15 (italics mine).
[10] G. Santos, 'Socratic Goods and Socratic Happiness', in *Virtue, Love and Form: Essays in Memory of Gregory Vlastos* (eds. T. Irwin and M. C. Nussbaum; Edmonton: Academic Printing and Publishing, 1994), 37–52 (42).
[11] Per J. Annas, 'Plato', 25; G. Vlastos, 'Happiness and Virtue in Socrates' Moral Theory', *PCPS* 30 (1984) 181-213 (183–6); M. T. Ferejohn, 'Socratic Thought-Experiments and the Unity of Virtue Paradox', *Phronesis* 29 (1984) 105–22; Long 'Socrates', 30–35.
[12] Cf. Plato, *Meno* 88; *Gorg.* 467e–468c.

and also 'good'. The Cynics critiqued the conventions about the 'goods', but only the Stoics argued that virtue alone was to be identified as 'good'.

The connection between Stoic ethics and Socrates has long been alleged[13] and confirmed in recent decades.[14] According to Diogenes Laertius, Socrates was known for teaching that the only good is knowledge and the only evil ignorance, and that wealth and noble birth could actually bring their owners evil.[15] It is easy to imagine that such a flouting of convention would incite debate, and might lead to the Stoic conception of good. Long has argued specifically that this text provides the background for the Stoic choice to isolate virtue as the only good, and their choice to create subcategories of second-order value for the conventional 'goods'. As Sedley says, 'the key to Zeno's mature philosophy was his attempt to rescue an ethical role for conventional values'.[16] The Stoics held that virtue was the only good, vice the only evil, and all else was neither good nor bad, but neutral (the ἀδιάφορα). However, within this neutral category were subcategories which had a value of a different kind: the προηγμένα (preferred ἀδιάφορα) and the καθηκόντα (appropriate activities). Long theorises that the subcategory of the preferred ἀδιάφορα developed in an attempt to resolve the inconsistencies of Socrates' statements in *Euthydemus*. While Socrates clearly decides that wisdom is the only good, he also makes the statement that health is somehow a *greater* good (than illness), if guided by wisdom.[17]

> Only a value properly predicable of health as such could account for Socrates' immediately preceding judgment that the wise use of something like health is a *greater* good than the wise use of its opposite. Treat health as such as naturally 'preferable' to or more 'valuable' than sickness, but not 'better' or 'more constitutive of happiness', and Socrates' confusing remarks could be satisfactorily interpreted… Thus the Stoic doctrine of 'preferred indifferents' would allow Socrates to keep his stated conclusion that wisdom is the only good, while also making sense of this claim that the wise user of health has more of what is good (Stoically reinterpreted as 'valuable') than does his sick counterpart.[18]

To put it another way, some of the early readers of Plato's Socrates believed that he was predicating two different types of value: the value of the genuinely good (virtue) and the

[13] DL VII.2, 25; Cicero, *Acad.* I.43.
[14] Long, 'Socrates', 1–22; D. Sedley, 'The School, from Zeno to Arius Didymus', in *The Cambridge Companion to the Stoics* (ed. B. Inwood; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003) 7–32; E. Brown, 'Socrates in the Stoa', in *A Companion to Socrates* (ed. S. Ahbel-Rappe and R. Kamtekar; Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009) 275–84.
[15] DL II.31.
[16] Sedley, 'School', 9.
[17] Plato, *Euthyd.* 281e.
[18] Long, 'Socrates', 29–30.

value of more variable things. The value of these προηγμένα (health, wealth, etc.) and the καθήκοντα ('appropriate activities') associated with them (honouring family, country, etc.), was not unconditional in the way which the value of virtue was. That said, all things being equal, one would normally select them. However, if these selections were in conflict with virtue, or used viciously, they could be destructive. They retained a usefulness, but because they were not genuinely and unconditionally good, that value was volatile. The conventional 'goods' had an objective value and were indirectly more useful than their opposites, and thus were 'preferred' and 'appropriate'. However, virtue, as the only good, was to be pursued at any cost. As Long explains, for Zeno (the founder of Stoicism), '"value" is the genus of which "good" and "preferred" are two distinct species'.[19]

In the tradition of Socrates, the Stoics argued that virtue was the only genuine good, on the basis of the potential misuse of the conventional 'goods', and their dependence on virtue for benefit. At the same time, some of these conventional 'goods' retained a second-order value which was useful. Because the intermediates could be portrayed negatively in relation to virtue, or positively in relation to other ἀδιάφορα, there were two patterns of discourse for these selections and activities. Within Stoic reasoning, the possibility of portraying an ethical selection or practice as useful and valuable, *and* unstable and enslaving, provided evidence for its neutrality and the incommensurable good of something else.

1.2 Pauline Inconsistency

Socrates' dialogue in Plato's *Euthydemus* models an expected debate within ancient ethics: the need to delineate and defend what contributed towards the τέλος. Given the Stoic arguments, which at points could disparage the intermediates for their inability to contribute to the τέλος, and at other points ascribe them value, this dialogue is also instructive regarding Paul's inconsistency on Jewish practices. If two very different patterns of discourse on the same ethical practice, one positive and one negative, can be found within Pauline texts, perhaps what has been read as inconsistency is neutrality. The Stoic arguments demonstrate the possibility within ancient ethical reasoning of critiquing conventional values whilst affording them a role and value. The two patterns of discourse which their categories made available to them may provide an analogy to the patterns of discourse within Paul's ethics, which could endorse *and* critique convention to establish its system of value.

[19] Long, 'Socrates', 28; cf. LS1, 383.

1.2.1 Past solutions

The inconsistency in Paul's writings on the Torah and Jewish practices has generated numerous interpretive difficulties, and many proposed solutions. His inconsistency on this particular topic has been a focus of study in its own right—Heikki Räisänen insisted that even Paul's individual letters did not have internal consistency and that 'contradictions and tensions have to be *accepted* as *constant* features of Paul's theology of the law'.[20] More widespread have been interpretations which resolve the inconsistency by reading Paul's negative discourse on the Torah as descriptions of a righteousness achieved by law-keeping, and attempts at this righteousness by law observance as the epitome of human sin. The law represented prideful efforts to earn merit with God towards salvation in contrast to the justification provided in Christ by faith and grace. In this construction, the law is abolished for believers and relegated to a specific function of persuading people of their sin. This interpretation is referenced as the 'Lutheran' reading of Paul, which, though an unfair stereotype at points, nevertheless points to a constellation of interpretive choices in Protestant tradition which prioritises the antithetical framework of Galatians as an interpretive key for Paul's texts.[21]

E. P. Sanders is largely credited with problematising such antithetical readings of the law and gospel. Having argued for the positive ancient Jewish perspective on law-keeping in 'covenantal nomism', he famously explained that Paul's thought did not progress from plight to solution, but from solution to plight, and quipped that 'this is what Paul finds wrong in Judaism: it is not Christianity'.[22] His alternate readings of Paul were not as well-received however, and it fell to the 'New Perspective' to attempt an explanation of Paul's negative discourse. Most prominently, the works of Dunn and Wright have proposed that Paul's concerns about the 'works of the law' are that they have been used to privilege Jewish ethnic identity.[23] This interpretation correctly notes Paul's concern for gentile inclusion in his

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[20] H. Räisänen, *Paul and the Law* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1986), 8, 11, emphasis original.
[21] Cf. S. Westerholm, *Perspectives Old and New on Paul: The 'Lutheran' Paul and His Critics* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2004), for a recent and strong representation of this view. Influential recent representatives which the 'new perspective' responded to were R. Bultmann, *Theology of the New Testament*, vol 1, trans. K. Grobel (New York: Scribners, 1951), 108-9, 115-120, 259-69, 340-44; E. Käsemann, *Paulinische Perspektiven*, rev. ed. (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1972), 108–39.
[22] E. P. Sanders, *Paul and Palestinian Judaism: A Comparison of Patterns of Religion* (London: SCM Press, 1977), 1–12, 552. Others anticipated Sanders, such as W. D. Davies, and K. Stendahl; cf. the summary by P. J. Tomson, *Paul and the Jewish Law: Halakha in the Letters of the Apostle to the Gentiles* (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1990), 1–19.
[23] J. D. G. Dunn, *The New Perspective on Paul: Collected Essays* (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2005), 1–37, *et passim*; N. T. Wright, *Paul and the Faithfulness of God*, Christian Origins and the Faithfulness of God, vol. 4

communities, and the esteem with which Torah was held by ancient Jews. However, these readings often anachronistically import modern notions of ethnic identity and diversity into Paul's texts: Paul prides himself on *not* being a 'gentile sinner' (Gal 2.15). As will be seen, this identification of Paul's concerns over Jewish practices as primarily focused on ethnic superiority strains or limits the interpretation of his writings at points.

These reconstructions of Paul's statements on the law are unsatisfactory in various ways. Räisänen begins *Paul and the Law* by repeating descriptions of Paul's thinking as 'cogent and clear'.[24] Although he does so only to dismiss them, Paul's enduring legacy as an author and his general consistency of thought strain such an easy dismissal – is Paul really beset with a weak and crippled mind, as the philosopher Porphyry thought?[25] While it is now recognised that both the antithetical 'Lutheran' readings and the 'New Perspective' are problematic, a more recent interpretation of Paul's reasoning on the law is largely untested.

1.2.2 The current 'Paul within Judaism' solutions

In recent decades, some scholars have discarded antithetical readings and attempted to read Paul 'within Judaism', adopting a reading strategy which takes Paul's (and other ancient Jews') positive discourse on Torah as its starting point. Since Paul declares himself to be the 'apostle to the gentiles', his letters are determined by such scholars to be addressed only to gentiles, and Paul's negative discourse on Torah is read as exclusively referring to observance of the law by such gentiles. The scholars operating on this methodological basis explain Paul's rationale for opposing gentile Judaizing in a variety of ways.[26]

One of the most recent works in this interpretive project is Fredriksen's *Paul: the Pagans' Apostle*, which will serve as a well-regarded, if not entirely representative,

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(Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2013), 625 *et passim*; *Climax of the Covenant: Christ and The Law in Pauline Theology* (London: T & T Clark, 1991), 214, *et passim.*

[24] Räisänen, *Law*, 2.

[25] Cited by Räisänen, *Law,* 2–3, *apud* Macarius Magnes, *Apocriticus*, III.30.

[26] Representatives include L. Gaston, *Paul and the Torah* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1987); S. K. Stowers, *A Rereading of Romans: Justice, Jews and Gentiles* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994); J. G. Gager, *Reinventing Paul* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002); C. Johnson Hodge, *If Sons, Then Heirs: A Study of Kinship and Ethnicity in the Letters of Paul* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007); P. Eisenbaum, *Paul was not a Christian: The Original Message of a Misunderstood Apostle* (New York: HarperCollins, 2009); M. D. Nanos and M. Zetterholm, *Paul Within Judaism: Restoring the First-Century Context to the Apostle* (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2015); M. Thiessen, *Paul and the Gentile Problem* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016); M. D. Nanos, *Reading Paul Within Judaism*, vols. 1–4 (Eugene, OR: Cascade, 2017); P. Fredriksen, *Paul the Pagans' Apostle* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2017); K. Ehrensperger, *Searching Paul: Conversations with the Jewish Apostle to the Nations: Collected Essays* (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2019).

example.[27] Fredriksen accounts for Paul's two patterns of discourse on the law by positing a place for both within pre-existing strains of ancient Judaism. Her reading operates from the axiomatic position that Paul's negative discourse on Torah observance only refers to or is addressed to gentiles. Paul does state he is called to the gentiles,[28] but to then conclude that his auditors were a homogenous audience, and that 'the intended addressees of the letter are or can be the only subject matter in them' is unjustified.[29] Her reading comments on Phil 3.3–6 as though vv7–11 did not follow: Paul's statement in 3.3–6 demonstrates to Fredriksen that '*Jewish* circumcision … mattered very much to Paul'.[30] Despite referring to his own circumcision in Phil 3, she states that 'Paul nowhere in his letters says anything about (much less against) Jews circumcising their own sons … Paul expressed no view on Jewish circumcision, most likely because he assumed one: Jews who honored their ancestral customs circumcised their sons into the covenant on the eight day (cf. Phil 3.5)'.[31] Fredriksen thus brackets out any possibility that Paul references himself or his fellow Jews regarding the Torah, a reading which seriously misrepresents the full nature of his writings. Paul's positive discourse on the law does, Fredriksen argues, require 'Judaizing' of gentiles, but this is described as a 'moral conversion' of gentiles (in contrast to a 'halakhic conversion').[32] Varying levels of Judaizing were acceptable within ancient Jewish communities, which were open to gentiles.[33] Paul's resistance to some elements of gentile Judaizing, such as circumcision, is explained by an apocalyptic expectation of gentiles joining Jews in worship *as gentiles*.[34] However, there are no extant examples of this reading of eschatological texts, let alone that it was 'prominent (indeed predominant)'.[35] Fredriksen's reading also doesn't acknowledge that gentiles in the texts she cites do come under the covenant and law in

[27] The positions within the group often significantly differ, cf. M. V. Novenson, 'Whither the Paul within Judaism *Schule*?' *JJMJS* 5 (2018), 79–88.
[28] Rom 11.3; Gal 2.9.
[29] As critiqued by M. M. Mitchell, 'Paul and Judaism now: Quo vadimus?', *JJMJS* 5 (2018), 55–78 (64).
[30] Fredriksen, *Apostle*, 107.
[31] Fredriksen, *Apostle*, 113; cf. her comment on 1 Cor 7.18-20 (107): 'In this passage in 1 Corinthians, then, Paul *cannot* be talking about God's commandments to Israel. Circumcision or foreskin does not matter, he must mean, specifically and only for *not*-Israel, that is, for gentiles'.
[32] P. Fredriksen, 'Judaism, the Circumcision of Gentiles, and Apocalyptic Hope: Another Look at Galatians 1 and 2', *JTS* 42 (1991), 532–64 (547).
[33] Fredriksen, 'Apocalyptic', 547, 559.
[34] Fredriksen, 'Apocalyptic', 544–5; citing Is 2.2-4; 25.6; 56.3-7; Mic 4.1ff; Zech 8.23; Ps Sol 7.31-41; 1 Enoch 91.14. She says it is crucial to note that these texts speak of gentiles *as* gentiles—if they were proselytes, they would be identified as Jews. In *Apostle*, 129, Fredriksen considers the proposal of Thiessen, *Gentile*, that Paul's concern may be the invalidity of anything but eighth-day circumcision. It is Paul's opponents who have introduced a 'startling novelty' of gentile circumcision due to delayed apocalyptic expectations.
[35] Fredriksen, 'Apocalyptic', 553.

various ways, even though circumcision is not mentioned specifically.[36] Fredriksen is correct to note the presence of the 'God-fearers' within synagogue communities as well as the prosaic level of interaction with pagans required of Jews in the diaspora, but there is also evidence that some Jews would not have considered them full members of the community without proselytisation, thus providing a precedent within Judaism for Paul's opponents.[37] While haphazard levels of observance may have been tolerated, this should be distinguished from an authoritative figure's adamant insistence that gentiles *should not* be fully Torah observant or proselytise, as seen with Paul.[38] In short, while gentiles were welcome in many Jewish communities, there were ancient Jews who thought they should proselytise, and the inclusive strains of Judaism cannot explain Paul's intransigent *refusal* to proselytise gentiles. That his refusal to do so can be explained by an eschatological reading, for which there is no evidence, is tenuous, but, most importantly, is never used in Paul's arguments against Judaizing.[39] One cannot dismiss the entire epistle addressing this topic as 'difficult to follow' and 'more heat than light'.[40]

Fredriksen's reconstruction responds to Paul's inconsistency on Torah observance by answering that all of his discourse can be explained by pre-existing strains of Judaism—this is, in fact, a goal of the larger 'Paul within Judaism' project. The post-Holocaust impulse to read Christian texts in nuanced correlation with ancient Judaism rather than in supersessionist antithesis is a moral imperative, and the 'Paul within Judaism' project is asking important questions. Fredriksen is correct to emphasize the value Paul placed on his ancestral customs and to describe his work as a form of gentile 'Judaizing' despite his opposition to other forms—this is, indeed, an intra-Jewish debate rather than an anti-Jewish one.[41] Any constructions, however, must take all the relevant data into account. The historical notion of

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[36] Cf. Is 2.3; 56.5–8; Zech 14.16, which lie within or nearby the Fredriksen references, and which mention sabbath-keeping, sacrifices, festivals, and the covenant and law generally, without specifically excluding circumcision.

[37] Josephus, *A. J.* XX.2.4; *B. J.* II.17.10. Cf. S. J. D. Cohen, *The Beginnings of Jewishness: Boundaries, Varieties, Uncertainties*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), 158, summarises, 'as far as is known no Jewish community in antiquity (including Philo's) accepted as members male proselytes who were not circumcised'. Fredriksen is correct to note the liminal categories some gentiles could operate within during this period. However, the existence of some liminal participation does not eliminate the possibility of pressure to fully proselytize in some places and from some parties (cf. Cohen, *Beginnings,* 167–70, 217–9). This liminality also makes her argument for clear proselyte identification doubtful.

[38] The possible exception is the positions of Ezra, Nehemiah and *Jubilees*, which oppose intermarriage to any gentiles, even proselytes. This strand of exclusivistic tradition might assume that proselytisation is invalid, and only eighth-day circumcision, which ties the rite to Jewish birth, was valid. Cf. Thiessen, *Gentile*, 23–5. The texts evidencing this tradition, though, do not then make claims that such gentiles could be righteous and be considered the sons of Abraham through faith as Paul did.

[39] A point made more striking by Paul's practice of Scripture allusion, especially to Isaiah.

[40] Fredriksen, *Apostle*, 107, of Galatians.

[41] Fredriksen, *Apostle,* 109–27.

'Paul as a Jew' cannot be used to deny Paul his own voice. As Felski complains of historical hermeneutics, 'One of the main obstacles lies in the prevailing picture of context as a kind of box or container in which individual texts are encased and held fast'.[42] While the project has sought creative solutions to Paul's inconsistency, the problem remains.

Given the need for a reconstruction of Paul's view of the law that can account for all the data, whether from his texts or his context, the model drawn from ancient philosophical reasoning is worthy of consideration. Paul's apparent inconsistency in defending the value of the Torah at some points, and critiquing Torah observance at others could perhaps be likened to Socrates' argument that the conventional 'goods' are not unconditionally beneficial and are problematic when used incorrectly. Concurrent positive and negative statements regarding the same activity or selection were expected in Stoic reasoning regarding the intermediates because such realities were morally neutral yet 'preferred' or 'appropriate'. A comparison of this pattern of Stoic ethical reasoning and Paul's reasoning may perhaps shed light on this persistent scholarly problem.

1.3 Approaching Methodology

This thesis will analyse Paul's inconsistency regarding Jewish practices by a structural comparison with Stoic reasoning regarding the intermediates. This will firstly entail a study of the Stoic categories of the intermediates, the προηγμένα (preferred ἀδιάφορα) and the καθηκόντα (appropriate activities), and their role within the Stoic system. Secondly, selected Pauline texts will be interpreted exegetically in light of and in comparison with Stoic reasoning on the intermediates. It is not suggested here that Paul was a Stoic himself or was dependent upon any particular Stoic sources, but rather that Stoicism's ethical reasoning provides an illuminating analogy for Paul's.

Despite its popularity, comparative analysis has not had an unsullied history in biblical scholarship. J. Z. Smith pointed to the problems of such analyses in previous decades and a recent challenge—specifically regarding Christianity and Stoicism—has been

[42] R. Felski, 'Context Stinks!', *New Literary History* 42 (2011), 573–91 (577). Felski's concern is that historical readings not preclude texts' transtemporal resonances. This tendency by the 'Paul within Judaism' project is noted by B. R. Gaventa, 'The Legacy of J. Louis Martyn: the Interpreter and His Legacy', *JSPL* 7 (2017), 94–100 (97): 'Does Paul's Jewishness, for example, necessitate that he can only hold views of the law, of Abraham, of Israel, that other Jews also held?'.

levelled.[43] Based on MacIntyre's category of 'tradition' as a form of inquiry, C. K. Rowe argues that Stoicism and Christianity are 'incommensurable and noncompossible forms of life'.[44] Citing the work of MacIntyre and Wittgenstein, Rowe argues that much comparative analysis in biblical studies is invalid because it is based on faulty epistemology. In Rowe's opinion, the 'hopelessly out of date and voguishly cosmopolitan' encyclopaedic style of inquiry still dominates biblical studies. Both Smith and Rowe argue against the modernist assumptions of a rationality which can uncover a unified ontological whole by such comparisons, a clearer picture of 'what actually happened'.[45] Smith reminds the analyst that a comparison is an intellectual operation that is analogical not genealogical—it is a 'disciplined exaggeration' by which '*we* 're-vision' as *our* data in order to solve *our* theoretical problems'.[46] While he acknowledges that 'neither phenomenologically whole entities nor their local meanings are preserved in comparison'—since comparison can only deal with 'aspectual characteristics' of it—Smith still acknowledges the usefulness of such theoretical re-visioning.[47] Smith concludes one article by sitting in the tension which analogy creates and quotes Wittgenstein:

> 'But isn't *the same* at least the same? ... how am I to apply what the one thing shows me to the case of two things?' Wittgenstein's last question remains haunting. It reminds us that comparison is, at base, never identity. Comparison requires the postulation of difference as the grounds of its being interesting (rather than tautological) and a methodical manipulation of difference, a playing across the 'gap' in the service of some useful end….[48]

Rowe, though, asserts that the difference is too wide between traditions or 'forms of life' to play across. For him, the loss of 'local meaning' is so drastic that it renders comparative work only conceivable as juxtaposition. Since 'there is no rationality to which we can appeal that exists above or lies beyond what rationality is in the traditions', there is no

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[43] J. Z. Smith, *Drudgery Divine: On the Comparisons of Early Christianities and the Religions of Late Antiquity* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990; C. K. Rowe, *One True Life: The Stoics and Early Christians as Rival Traditions* (London: Yale University Press, 2016).
[44] C. K. Rowe, 'Making Friends and Comparing Lives', in *The New Testament in Comparison: Validity, Method and Purpose in Comparing Traditions* (eds. J. M. G. Barclay and B. G. White; London: T & T Clark, 2020), 23–40 (24, 29–32); cf. Rowe, *Life*, 182–4, 224–58.
[45] Rowe, *Life*, 176–8, 194–8; Smith, *Drudgery*, 48–52. The phrase 'what actually happened' as a description of historical positivism is taken from N. T. Wright, *The New Testament and the People of God*, Christian Origins and the Faithfulness of God, vol. 1 (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1997), 82.
[46] Smith, *Drudgery,* 52
[47] Smith, *Drudgery,* 53.
[48] J. Z. Smith, 'In Comparison A Magic Dwells', in *Imagining Religion: from Babylon to Jonestown* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), 19–35 (35). Citing L. Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1953), par. 65.

shared epistemological space from which comparative reasoning can take place.[49] Arguing from Wittgenstein's presentation of meaning in language as its use, and the description of such use as 'language games' and 'forms of life' alongside MacIntyre's 'tradition' model, Rowe hardens the traditions of Stoicism and Christianity into language games which function in a particular way. They make claims about 'certain kinds of truth', indeed, the 'most important things' so that comparison between them is 'less of a question about specific method than it is about being human in a world with competing accounts of what that is'.[50] However, such a hardening of language games is unfounded in Wittgenstein's own work. 'Forms of life' are a variety of activities, but Wittgenstein also categorized language itself as a 'form of life' and pointed to 'shared human behaviour' as the key to translation, thus indicating an (admittedly bare) level of universality in his conception.[51] This follows from his assertion that no language can be private if it is meaningful—meaning *is* use, but without any *shared* use there can be no meaning.[52] Because the rules are not fixed, but always changing, there is never complete commensurability, but there can be *some* shared meaning. The rules are also always changing *within* a tradition, a fact which Rowe does not integrate into his crystallisation of Stoicism and Christianity. The full contents of one cannot be carried into the other, but that is not what modern comparative methods are attempting to do. 'Inexact' is only a damning criticism when it does not meet the demands of the game, and 'untranslatable' is only a problem if one is concerned to preserve whole meanings intact.[53] As Smith reminds us, 'It is axiomatic that comparison is never a matter of identity'.[54] To conclude, Rowe's judgement that Stoicism and Christianity are not fully translatable is unproblematic—if they were, they would be identical rather than comparable. I do not agree that this distance makes them utterly untranslatable; there is no 'neutral' space from which to analyse, but the scholar's imagination deconstructs and reconstructs the shared, if blurry, space between two subjects for her purposes.

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[49] C. K. Rowe, 'A Response to Friends-Critics', *Comparison*, 125–42 (128).
[50] Rowe, 'Response', 140.
[51] Wittgenstein, *Investigations*, pars. 23, 206; cf. H. Sluga, 'Ludwig Wittgenstein: Life and Work, An Introduction', in *The Cambridge Companion to Wittgenstein* (eds. H. Sluga and D. G. Stern; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 1–33 (22).
[52] Wittgenstein, *Investigations*, pars. 243, 261. The correspondence and difference are famously described as 'family resemblances', par. 67. It is worth noting that the few direct statements Wittgenstein made about religious thought indicate that he considered it a way of knowing that existed separately or beyond language. Metaphysical belief was, for him, *not* a language game. In some sense, this might correspond to the Kierkegaardian leap that Rowe eventually espouses, but if so, this undermines his argument about traditions as forms of life (a premise Wittgenstein seems to deny).
[53] Wittgenstein, *Investigations*, pars. 71, 77, 88.
[54] Smith, *Drudgery,* 47.

1.4 A Working Methodology

If comparative inquiry is possible, albeit perilous, the work of Smith and others is a guide to due caution. Problems of comparative analysis in Pauline studies have been (in more distant past) the 'parallelomania' rebuked by Sandmel, as the 'extravagance among scholars' which exaggerates the 'supposed similarity' between ancient texts, especially concerning source and derivation.[55] Proposed 'parallels', even where tenuous, are piled up only to then argue for the superiority of one—usually Paul's. The normativity of Paul is a broader ongoing problem. Often the Pauline text controls the comparison to the detriment of the other subject and results in an oversimplification of both subjects (a treatment Smith dubs 'inhumane').[56] The history of Pauline interpretation is littered with claims of dependence, on the one hand, and notions of 'uniqueness', on the other, which buttress theological claims.[57] To be clear, this thesis does not argue for, or propose, any direct genealogical relationship between a particular Stoic form of moral reasoning and Pauline moral reasoning. Neither, though, is it the intention here to claim 'uniqueness' for either comparandum, but, instead, for a shared setting which is exegetically significant for a historical-critical interpretation of the relevant texts. It is this thesis' aim to view Paul and the Stoics as actors in a shared context (rather than one as the 'background' to the other), and in enough detail that each subject retains its own autonomous voice (since they are not identical).

To avoid oversimplification, Smith pleads with interpreters to recognize the nature of comparisons as 'disciplined exaggerations' that cannot deal with 'phenomena *in toto* or in the round, but only with aspectual characteristics of them'.[58] He also notes that although comparative work appears to work with *two* subjects, it is triadic rather than dyadic, since comparative projects arise out of the theoretical problems *we* are interested in solving. Even when not directly stated, the comparison is arguing that '*x* resembles *y* more than *z* with respect to…'. In the case of this thesis, the comparison works in the interest of the scholarly problem of Pauline inconsistency on the topic of Jewish practices. The explicit argument is that Paul's view of Jewish practices (*x*) resembles Stoic reasoning on the intermediates (*y*) more than the 'Lutheran' or 'Paul within Judaism' reconstructions (*z*). In hope of avoiding

[55] S. Sandmel, 'Parallelomania', *JBL* 81 (1962), 1–13 (1).
[56] Smith, *Drudgery,* 106; cf. Sanders, *Palestinian,* 13.
[57] Smith, *Drudgery,* 52, 78; cf. T. Engberg-Pedersen, 'On Comparison: The Stoic Theory of Value in Paul's Theology and Ethics in Philippians' in *Der Philipperbrief des Paulus in der hellenistisch-römischen Welt* (eds. J. Frey and B. Schliesser; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2015), 289-308 (290–1).
[58] Smith, *Drudgery,* 52-3. Citing F.J.P. Poole, 'Metaphors and Maps: Towards Comparison in the Anthropology of Religion', *JAAR* 54 (1986), 411–57 (14).

'inhumane' treatment, a thorough treatment of the Stoic intermediate categories with attention to their role within their ethical system will be undertaken. Ultimately, the purpose of comparison to serve 'our theoretical purposes' means that the work is heuristic: the proof of the pudding is in the eating. The question that matters for this thesis is: Does this help us understand Paul better?[59]

1.5 Review of Literature on Paul and Stoicism

Making a comparison, or imagining a relationship between Stoicism and Christianity, and Paul in particular, is nothing new. Tertullian described Seneca as 'one of ours', Justin and Origen recommended Musonius Rufus and Epictetus' teaching, and in the fourth century an apocryphal correspondence between Paul and Seneca emerged.[60] Over a century ago, new editions of Hellenistic philosophical texts generated fresh interest amongst biblical scholars—the most thorough was Bonhöffer's study of Epictetus.[61] He addressed questions of dependence and did word studies comparing Epictetus and the New Testament. Although he concluded that the 'spiritual meaning' of Stoicism was 'close' in some ways to Christianity, he especially drew attention to the 'irreconcilable' difference in meaning between Stoic and Pauline usages of particular words.[62] The work does suffer from outdated scholarship on Stoicism and a superiority bias in favour of Christianity.[63] Sevenster's comparison of Paul with Seneca, and Pohlenz's brief monograph *Paulus und die Stoa*, both of the same period, displays similar pitfalls in their heavily theological readings of Paul.[64] In the same period, an

[59] Engberg-Pedersen, 'On Comparison', 294.
[60] Tertullian, *An.* 20; Justin, *2 Apol.* 8; Origen, *Cels.* III.66, VI.2; Jerome, *Vir. ill.* 12; cf. C. W. Barlow, *Epistolae Senecae ad Paulum et Pauli ad Senecam quae vocantur* (American Academy in Rome, 1938) NB: this source could not be accessed for publication data under Covid-19 conditions; A. Fürst, et al, eds., *Der apokryphe Briefwechsel zwischen Seneca und Paulus* (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2006); A. Malherbe, 'Hellenistic Moralists and the New Testament', *ANRW* II.26.1 (1992): 267–333 (267–70); H. M. Hine, 'Seneca and Paul: The First Two Thousand Years', in *Paul and Seneca in Dialogue* (eds. J. R. Dodson and D. E. Briones; Leiden: Brill, 2017), 22–48.
[61] A. Bonhöffer, *Epiktet und das Neue Testament*, Religiongeschichtliche Versuche und Vorarbeiten (orig. pub.1911; repr. ed.; Gießen: Töpelmann, 1964). Cf. A. J. Malherbe, *Paul and the Popular Philosophers* (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1989), 1–5, 67–8. The publication of the *Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta* by H. von Arnim beginning in 1903 was the impetus to renewed interest in Stoicism.
[62] On similarities, cf. Bonhöffer, *Epiktet* cf. 382–88; on differences, e.g. regarding φύσις, 148; on the role of women, 166–7.
[63] E.g. discussion of Stoicism's failure to have the 'renewing' effect on the world which Christianity did, and the appraisal of the relationship between Stoicism and Aristotle in the conclusion, 383–5.
[64] J. N. Sevenster, *Paul and Seneca* (Leiden: Brill, 1961); M. Pohlenz, *Paulus und die Stoa* (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1964). The dissertation of R. Bultmann, published as *Der Stil der paulinischen Predigt und die kynisch-stoische Diatribe* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1910) is earlier but influential during this era, especially as a topic reintroduced into biblical studies by the work of S. K. Stowers, *The Diatribe and Paul's Letter to the Romans* (SBLDS; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1981). Also of this era

article by Braun compared Epictetus' and Paul's indifference towards the world, especially to marriage; again, similarities are noted, but Braun is persuaded that the purposes towards which the motifs are employed indicate profound differences.[65]

In recent decades there has been a 'third wave' of comparative work between Stoicism and the New Testament, and especially Paul. Malherbe wrote on Paul's interaction with Hellenistic philosophy generally and contributed a comprehensive article and sourcebook for New Testament scholars interested in its philosophical 'background'.[66] Engberg-Pedersen in particular has doggedly pushed for a thorough and wide-ranging reconsideration of Paul's writings in light of Stoicism. With his background in ancient philosophy, Engberg-Pedersen's work has been regarded as particularly qualified, and has

is H. D. Betz, *Der Apostel Paulus und die sokratische Tradition: Eine exegetische Untersuchungen zu seiner 'Apologie' 2 Korinther 10–13* (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1972).

[65] H. Braun, 'Die Indifferenz gegenüber der Welt bei Paulus und bei Epiktet', in *Gesammelte Studien zum Neuen Testament und seiner Umwelt* (Tübingen: Siebeck, 1962), 159–67.

[66] A. J. Malherbe, 'The Beasts at Ephesus', *JBL* 87 (1968), 71–80; *Moral Exhortation: A Greco-Roman Sourcebook* (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1989); *Popular*; 'Hellenistic Moralists'; cf. the Festschrift for Malherbe, *Early Christianity and Classical Culture: Comparative Studies in Honor of Abraham J. Malherbe,* NovTSup (eds. J. Fitzgerald, T. H. Olbricht, and L. M. White; Leiden: Brill, 2003).

been joined by the work of others.[67] Comparison of Paul's writings and the Stoic categories of the intermediates, however, is confined to several articles and one monograph.[68]

The one extensive work looking at Stoic intermediates in Paul is a monograph by Jaquette.[69] He explores the influence of the *topos* on Paul, identifies a range of 'indifferent matters' in Paul's texts by means of a set of criteria, and then analyses the purpose the *topos* served in Paul's communities.[70] By noting the verbal, conceptual, and formal features of this *topos* in Pauline texts, he helpfully confirms and develops the brief, but programmatic essay

[67] T. Engberg-Pedersen, ed., *Paul in His Hellenistic Context* (Edinburgh: Clark, 1994); *Paul and the Stoics* (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2000); ed., *Paul Beyond the Judaism/Hellenism Divide* (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2001); 'Stoicism in the Apostle Paul: A Philosophical Reading' in *Stoicism: Traditions and Transformations* (eds. S. K. Strange and J. Zupko; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 52–75; 'The Relationship with Others: Similarities and Differences Between Paul and Stoicism', *ZNW* 96 (2005), 35–60; 'Paul's Stoicizing Politics in Romans 12-13: The Role of 13.1-10 in the Argument', *JSNT* 29 (2006), 163–72; 'Gift-Giving and Friendship: Seneca and Paul in Romans 1-8 on the Logic of God's Χάρις and Its Human Response', *HTR* 101 (2008), 15–44; 'Self-Sufficiency and Power: Divine and Human Agency in Epictetus and Paul', in *Divine and Human Agency in Paul and His Cultural Environment* (eds. J. M. G. Barclay and S. J. Gathercole; London: T & T Clark, 2008), 117–39; ' 'Everything is Clean' and 'Everything that is Not of Faith is Sin': The Logic of Pauline Casuistry in Romans 14.1–15.13', in *Paul, Grace and Freedom: Essays in Honour of John K. Riches* (eds., P. Middleton, A. Paddison, and K. J. Wenell; London: T & T Clark, 2009), 22–38; *Cosmology and the Self in the Apostle Paul: the Material Spirit* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010); ed., *Stoicism in Early Christianity* (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 2010); 'The Logic of Action in Paul: How Does He Differ from the Moral Philosophers on Spiritual and Moral Progression and Regression?' in *Passions and Moral Progress in Greco-Roman Thought* (ed. J. T. Fitzgerald; Abingdon: Routledge, 2010), 238–66; 'A Stoic Concept of the Person in Paul? From Galatians 5:17 to Romans 7:14-25', in *Christian Body, Christian Self: Concepts of Early Christian Personhood,* WUNT (eds. C. K. Rothschild and T. W. Thompson; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2011), 85–112; 'On Comparison'; 'Stoicism in Early Christianity: The Apostle Paul and the Evangelist John as Stoics', in *The Routledge Handbook of the Stoic Tradition* (ed. J. Sellars; New York: Routledge, Taylor & Francis, 2016), 29–43; 'Paul, Virtues and Vices' in *Paul in the Greco-Roman World: A Handbook*, vol. 2 (ed. J. P. Sampley; London: Bloomsbury T & T Clark, 2016), 608–33. For others, M. L. Colish, 'Stoicism and the New Testament: An essay in Historiography,' *ANRW* 26.1: 334–79; R. M. Thorsteinsson, *Roman Christianity and Roman Stoicism: A Comparative Study of Ancient Morality* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010); N. Huttunen, *Paul and Epictetus on Law: A Comparison* (London: T & T Clark, 2009); G. H. van Kooten, 'Philosophical Criticism of Genealogical Claims and Stoic Depoliticization of Politics: Greco-Roman Strategies in Paul's Allegorical Interpretation of Hagar and Sarah (Gal 4: 21–31)', in *Abraham, the Nations, and the Hagarites: Jewish, Christian, and Islamic Perspectives on Kinship with Abraham* (eds. M. Goodman, G. H. van Kooten, J. T. A. G. M. van Ruiten; Themes in Biblical Narrative; Leiden: Brill, 2010), 361–85; J. R. Dodson and D. E. Briones, eds., *Paul and Seneca in Dialogue* (Ancient Philosophy & Religion 2; Leiden: Brill, 2017); G. Holtz, 'Paul, the Law and Judaism: Stoification of the Jewish Approach to the law in Paul's Letter to the Romans', *ZNW* 109:2 (2018), 185–211.

[68] Articles and chapters are J. P. Sampley, 'The Focus on Doing What Matters' in *Walking Between the Times: Paul's Moral Reasoning* (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1991), 77–83; J. L. Jaquette, 'Life and Death, 'Adiaphora,' and Paul's Rhetorical Strategies', *NovT* 38 (1996), 30–54; W. Deming, 'Paul and Indifferent Things', in *Paul in the Greco-Roman World: A Handbook*, vol. 2, 2 ed. (ed. J. P. Sampley; London: Bloomsbury T & T Clark, 2016), 48–67; T. Engberg-Pedersen, 'On Comparison', 297, 305; G. van Kooten, 'Paul's Stoic Onto-Theology and Ethics of Good, Evil and "Indifferents": A Response to Anti-Metaphysical and Nihilistic Readings of Paul in Modern Philosophy', 133–64 in *Saint Paul and Philosophy: The Consonance of Ancient and Modern Thought* (eds. G.-J. van der Heiden, G. van Kooten, and A. Cimino; Berlin: De Gruyter, 2017). Cf. the extended comments of P. A. Holloway, *Philippians: A Commentary* (Hermeneia; Minneapolis: Augsburg, 2017), 34, 70, 78–82.

[69] The monograph is J. L. Jaquette, *Discerning What Counts: The Function of the Adiaphora* Topos *in Paul's Letters* (Atlanta, GA: Scholars Press, 1995). Cf. the review of W. Deming, *JBL* 115 (1996), 758–60.

[70] Jaquette, *Adiaphora*, xiii, 19, 98–99.

of Sampley. Jaquette identifies a list of 'indifferent matters', such as life and death, poverty and plenty, and then treats a handful of texts where they appear. Some of Jaquette's insights will be referenced in the thesis, and the book helpfully confirms the presence of the *topos* in detail, while taking care to point out that Paul's use is 'adapted for use in a non-Stoic symbolic universe'.[71] One of its best qualities is the emphasis on the sociological purposes the category served for Paul, shoring up community boundaries from outside society and enhancing the cohesion of the community, for example.[72] He notes that the *topos* was able to 'legitimate normative conduct, [and] sanction innovation against norms and structures from which Pauline Christianity emerged'.[73]

Unfortunately, the quality of the monograph is generally uneven.[74] The treatment of the intermediates is confused at points, and the quality and detail of the exegetical work on the Pauline texts is inconsistent.[75] For example, Jaquette correctly states of Paul's Galatian opponents, 'By evaluating an *adiaphoron* (circumcision) as something essential, the opponents are guilty of mistaking what really matters and thus misrepresenting the gospel'.[76] However, his comments lack the level of exegetical detail needed to make his argument convincing. Jaquette's survey encounters Jewish practices at points, but either fails to address them as such, or simply as 'ethnic markers' which are 'indifferent'.[77]

After a review critical of Jaquette on the latter point, Deming himself briefly attempted to compare Paul's treatment of Jewish practices to ἀδιάφορα.[78] Deming surveys, as Jaquette also did, a handful of Pauline texts where the category might appear, and then explores the possibility that 'Paul may have envisioned circumcision, too, along the lines of a Stoic indifferent' based on its inclusion in 1 Cor 7.18–23 (he also references Phil 3 and Rom 3).[79] Deming concludes that, in light of this, 'several exciting possibilities come into view',

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[71] Jaquette, *Adiaphora*, 119.
[72] Jaquette, *Adiaphora,* xiv
[73] Jaquette, *Adiaphora,* xiii-xiv, 20.
[74] Deming, 'Review', notes a dependence upon Lesses for the organisation of one chapter and some particular phrasing.
[75] On the intermediates, for example, it is not clear whether they have intrinsic value or not (cf. Jaquette, *Adiaphora,* 39, 43, 45, 47, 50, 198). Other confusions are noted by Deming, review. The most-detailed exegetical treatments are that of Phil 1.21–26 (110–20) and that of Gal 2.6 (185–96).
[76] Jaquette, *Adiaphora*, 161.
[77] E.g. on the possibility of Rom 14 addressing Jewish practices, he simply states that 'Jews were not vegetarians or teetotalers' (132). On 'ethnic markers', cf. 154–65. He states that Paul's 'assertion that ethnic distinctives are *adiaphora* is not a denial of the ethnic role Jews and gentiles each play in the salvation of the other… the markers are indifferent' (163). How the markers are separate from such 'roles' however, or why the markers are 'indifferent' is not explained. In fact, the failure to treat Torah as such is noted as odd in Deming's review, 759.
[78] Deming, 'Indifferent'.
[79] Deming, 'Indifferent', 60.

and that scholars 'must consider the implications for this integration of Stoic and Christian ethics for mapping out a theoretical basis for Paul's ethics'.[80] These comments are from 2004, and in a postscript for the 2nd edition (2016), Deming states that he thinks any further comparative work on the *topos* would be 'precarious' and that he was 'uncertain' that anything 'meaningful' could be produced from such comparisons.[81] The explanation offered for these remarks is that he does not believe such 'discrete categories' exist in Pauline thought, and that the 'good' in Stoic ethics has 'little direct relevance for practical ethics'. The material on Stoicism below will demonstrate that neither of these objections is well-founded, and that a comparison can indeed provide 'exciting possibilities'. As we have seen in the survey above, there has not been a sustained comparison of the Stoic intermediates with any *particular* selection or practice in Paul's writings. This thesis hopes to address the shortcomings of the only lengthy work on the topic and supply the first sustained comparison of a practice in Paul's texts, one which is of enduring significance for scholars. Despite passing comments, and a few works on the *topos* of the ἀδιάφορα in comparison with Paul, no scholar has taken Paul's view of Jewish practices and Torah as a subject of sustained comparison with the Stoic intermediates—it is a hypothesis often speculated upon but one not fully explored.[82]

At this point, it will be helpful to make a comment on the key term, ἀδιάφορα. In the literature on some of the Pauline texts selected for this thesis, scholars often remark on a perceived correspondence between Paul's instructions and the ἀδιάφορα.[83] These references are cursory, however, and often use the translation of 'indifferents'. This translation is not incorrect, and it is the choice of most classicists, but those fields of scholarship are not often interpreting texts discussed every week in modern communities. This translation choice for

[80] Deming, 'Indifferent', 62.
[81] Deming, 'Indifferent', 63.
[82] Engberg-Pedersen, 'On Comparison', 297, 305; Engberg-Pedersen, *Paul,* 280; most extensively by Deming, 'Indifferent', 60-63.
[83] H.D. Betz, *Galatians: A Commentary on Paul's Letter to the Churches in Galatia* (Hermeneia; Philadephia: Fortress, 1979), 94; V. L. Wimbush, *Paul, the Worldly Ascetic: Response to the World and Self-Understanding According to 1 Corinthians 7* (Macon GA: Mercer University Press, 1987), 80; Tomson, *Law,* 197 fn. 56, 267, 275; D. Boyarin, *A Radical Jew: Paul and the Politics of Identity* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), 9, 42, 111–12; A. T. Cheung, *Idol Food in Corinth: Jewish Background and Pauline Legacy* (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic, 1999), 86, 95, 108; R. B. Hays, *The Faith of Jesus Christ: The Narrative Substructure of Galatians 3:1-4:11*, 2 ed. (Cambridge: Eerdmans, 2002), xli; G. D. Fee, *The First Epistle to the Corinthians* (NICNT; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2008), 475, 477, 478, 480, 483, 491; J. M. G. Barclay, 'Faith and Self-Detachment from Cultural Norms: A Study in Romans 14–15', *ZNW* 104 (2013), 192–208 (199, 206); Wright, *Faithfulness,* 358–64, 1038, 1120, 1136, 1495; E. P. Sanders, *The Apostle's Life, Letters and Thought* (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2015), 448. For a more extensive list of references in Pauline literature, cf. Jaquette, *Adiaphora,* 22–34.

discussion of texts which are used in modern communities can exacerbate the surrounding interpretive debates. This translation is especially problematic in reference to Paul's Jewish practices, as he clearly cared deeply about his ancestral law and customs, and it seems to determine prematurely a question at the heart of the problem: did Paul value these practices?[84] In English, 'indifferent' has connotations of apathy and disinterest, and is usually defined in opposition to that which is significant. However, a more nuanced study of the Stoic category will problematise such a conception. Because of such connotations, the translation is avoided throughout this thesis. The Stoics specifically rule out such connotations, and the connotations of the English term fail to account for the positive value of intermediates in Stoic theory.[85] Due to these concerns, the ἀδιάφορα are here described with the adjectives 'neutral' or 'indistinguishable', and the preferred ἀδιάφορα as the 'intermediate selections/activities', or simply 'intermediates'.

1.6 A Guide to This Thesis

This thesis offers a structural comparison of Stoic ethical reasoning on intermediates, the προηγμένα (preferred ἀδιάφορα) and the καθηκόντα (appropriate activities), with Paul's ethical reasoning on Jewish practices. The second chapter of the thesis is a summary of Stoic ethics with a concentration on the intermediate *topoi* and the two Stoic patterns of discourse on them. This is followed by an interlude to introduce terms of comparison to Paul's texts (the third chapter). The next two chapters will analyse Paul's reasoning in selected texts in comparison with Stoic reasoning. In order to answer the opening questions on inconsistency, two texts were chosen which demonstrated both Paul's negative and his positive discourse on the same topic: gentile adoption of Jewish dietary practices. Gal 2 and 1 Cor 8–10 illustrate the apparently inconsistent statements Paul could make on the same practice: at one point opposing gentile Judaizing and at another advocating it. Since some solutions to Paul's inconsistency on Jewish practices argue that his negative discourse is only addressed to or refers to gentiles, a third text (Phil 3) where Paul discusses his own practices as a Jew was added as a control, to evidence that Paul's patterns of discourse are not contingent upon the Jewish or gentile identity of his subjects. These three Pauline texts will be analysed as two

[84] For example, see the comments of J. Rudolph, *A Jew to the Jews: Jewish Contours of Pauline Flexibility in 1 Corinthians 9:19–23* (WUNT; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2011), who rightly objects to the sense of disinterest or insignificance which the descriptor of 'indifferent' carries in relation to the Torah (9, 10, 41, 46, 211, *et passim*).
[85] DL VII.104–5; cf. 2.4.1 below.

separate patterns of discourse regarding Jewish practices which are comparable to Stoic patterns of discourse on the intermediates.

The argument of this thesis is that the similarities between Stoic ethical reasoning and Paul's reasoning regarding Jewish practices demonstrate that he was deeply concerned to establish the singular first-order good of the orientation to Christ in contrast to all other ethical selections and activities, including Jewish practice. In both Stoic reasoning and Paul's letters, two patterns of discourse on intermediates emerge. The first pattern of discourse on intermediates was employed when there was a perceived categorical error which threatened the establishment of a first-order good. This pattern of discourse disparaged the intermediates in contrast to the first-order good, used arguments to demonstrate that the intermediates could be used well *or* poorly, and demonstrated that the intermediates were dependent upon the first-order good for genuine benefit. The intermediates were categorised as neutral in relation to the τέλος, and indistinguishable as virtue or vice. The second pattern of discourse on these same neutral intermediates was employed, by both Paul and the Stoics, when an intermediate selection or activity was being compared to another neutral one. This discourse ascribes second-order value to intermediates (over other neutral selections), which was objective yet conditional, and defends their use when it did not conflict with the first-order good. The possibility of two patterns of discourse on the same practice was evidence not of unintelligible inconsistency, but of neutrality and a reasoning process designed to isolate and defend one thing of incommensurable moral worth. The significance of this comparison for Paul's texts is that it offers an interpretation of his negative discourse on Jewish practices which demonstrates that the function of his rhetoric was designed not to deny any worth for Torah or Jewish practices but to establish the gospel message he preached. This interpretation is preferable since, firstly, it is sourced in the rationale offered in Paul's own texts rather than any extrinsic source, secondly, it is evidenced for the variety of subjects and auditors which this discourse addressed in his texts, and, finally, it can account for both the negative and positive patterns of discourse he has on this topic. In addition to offering an interpretation of the function of Paul's negative discourse on Jewish practices, the analysis of his positive discourse demonstrates that Paul could, in certain circumstances, ask gentiles to adopt some Jewish practices (i.e. to Judaize). This analysis further suggests a model, comparable to Stoic reasoning, for selecting and evaluating an intermediate which can shed light on Paul's ethical reasoning more broadly.

CHAPTER 2

A Compendium of Stoic Ethics with Particular Reference to the Intermediates

2.1 The Stoa

Stoicism was a Hellenistic philosophical school founded by Zeno of Citium, who began teaching around 300 BCE from a columned portico, a Στοά.[1] Ancient Stoicism is typically divided into three phases: early, middle and late/Roman. The early Stoa (c. 300–150 BCE) includes the scholarchs Zeno, Cleanthes, and Chrysippus. This period is also known for prominent dissenting pupils, most notably Aristo(n), a Cynic-leaning student who continues to be referenced in later periods as a representative of early controversies. In 155 BCE the scholarch Diogenes of Babylon was sent on a diplomatic mission to Rome, which resulted in celebrated debates and lectures, and new stature for the school in Rome.[2] The middle period (c.150–50 BCE) is dominated by debates with Academic Sceptics, and includes the scholarchs Antipater of Tarsus, Panaetius, and Posidonius. While markedly less organised without the geographical centre of Athens, the Roman period (c. 50 BCE–200 CE) includes many eminent figures, such as Athenodorus and Arius Didymus (advisors to Augustus), Seneca (adviser to Nero), and the sixteenth emperor Marcus Aurelius. Cicero, although himself an Academic Sceptic, admired Stoic ethics and is an important source on Stoicism. Other notable Stoics during the Roman period were Musonius Rufus and his student Epictetus. Stoicism of this period has long been associated with the aristocracy of the empire, and it was popular enough to surface in the literature and drama of the time.[3]

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[1] The 'Hellenistic' philosophies are those active in the centuries following the fall of the Greek city-states to Alexander and the death of Aristotle (usually dated 322 BCE). Cf. LS1, xi. The term 'school' here describes a loosely-organised philosophical movement which was not monolithic, but recognizably following or developing the philosophy of its founder (in this case, Zeno). In the earliest period, the schools did have traditional geographical associations (i.e., the Epicurean garden, Stoa, etc. in Athens) and more centrally-organised leadership, but upon the conquest of Athens in 86 BCE, the schools were decentralized, although still identifiable by the philosophical positions adopted. Cf. Sedley, 'School', 7–32; Long, *Hellenistic*, 107–17; B. Inwood, 'Stoicism', in *From Aristotle to Augustine*, Routledge History of Philosophy, vol. 2 (ed. D. J. Furley; London: Routledge, 1999), 222–52; Diogenes Laertius gives the ancient biographies of Zeno (VII.1–38), and his students (VII.161–202).

[2] Cf. M. Schofield, 'Stoic Ethics', in *The Cambridge Companion to the Stoics* (ed. B. Inwood; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003) 233–56 (250–53); Long, *Hellenistic,* 114–15; Cf. Cicero, *Off.* III.51–93, which describes some of the debates.

[3] C. Gill, 'The School in the Roman Imperial Period', in *The Cambridge Companion to the Stoics* (ed. B. Inwood; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003) 33–58 (56). Although Stoicism has long been thought dominant in the Imperial era, recent assessments have demonstrated that Epicureanism was just as, if not more, popular. Sedley, 'School', 30–31; Gill, 'Imperial', 34.

Long and Sedley characterize the study of Hellenistic philosophy as a jigsaw, and this characterisation rings most true when considering sources. There are no extant MSS from the early Stoa, only fragments, and the only complete and confidently-attributed Stoic texts are from the Roman period. Most of what is known about Stoicism, especially in its early and middle phases, is cobbled together from citations. The study of Stoicism begins by piecing together such fragments—such work has made great strides in recent decades.[4] The most extensive and systematic ancient accounts of Stoic ethics are found in three texts: Book III of Cicero's *de Finibus,* Book II of the doxographical work, Stobeaus' *Anthology* (often attributed to Arius Didymus), and Book VII in another doxography, Diogenes Laertius' *Lives of Eminent Philosophers*.[5] Other extensive, if less systematic, accounts include Epictetus' *Discourses,* Seneca's *Epistles*, and the *Meditations* of Marcus Aurelius.[6]

The Stoics divided their philosophical curriculum into three parts—logic, physics, and ethics—and conceived of their philosophy as a tightly-woven, interdependent system with each part connected to and relying upon the other.[7] Physics was the theory of everything that existed, which for the Stoics was all strictly material. The world was ordered by Zeus, who permeated the cosmos, and would guide it towards a fiery end in conflagration (the beginning of a new cosmos). Nature, as the physical reality of the cosmos, and the divine will manifested in all, was the linchpin which held the entire system together and with which rational humanity must exist in harmony to flourish. Long explains:

> The Stoics … prided themselves on the coherence of their philosophy. They were convinced that the universe is amenable to rational explanation, and is itself a rationally organized structure. The faculty in man which enables him to think, to plan and to speak—which the Stoics called *logos*—is literally embodied in the universe at large. The individual human being at the essence of his nature shares a property which belongs to Nature in the cosmic sense… Cosmic events and human actions are therefore … both alike consequences of one thing—*logos.* To put it another way, cosmic Nature or God (the terms refer to the same thing in Stoicism) and man are related to each other at the heart of their being as rational agents. If a man fully recognizes the implications of this relationship, he will act in a manner which wholly

[4] Compilations of particular authors or periods have been done—of note is the critical edition of Stobaeus' *Anthology* by C. Wachsmuth and O. Hense, *Ioannis Stobaei Anthologium*, vols. 1–3 (Berlin: Weidmann, 1884–1912), and the collection of H. von Arnim, *Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta*, vols. 1–3 (Leipzig: Teubner, 1903–5), which collected and organised fragments of earlier Stoics. A. A. Long and D. Sedley's two-volume *Hellenistic Philosophers* (1987) is a more recent collection, with the benefit of commentary and textual notes.
[5] Cf. Schofield, 'Ethics', 236; J. M. Cooper, *Pursuits of Wisdom: Six Ways of Life in Ancient Philosophy from Socrates to Plotinus* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012), 185; J. Annas, *The Morality of Happiness* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 21; Long, *Hellenistic*, 184.
[6] Another important, if biased, source, are the citations of Stoics by their critics, such as Galen and Plutarch.
[7] DL VII.40.

> accords with human rationality at its best, the excellence of which is guaranteed by its willing agreement with Nature. This is what it is to be wise….[8]

The Hellenistic philosophers could safely assume that all of humanity had a goal or Chief End (τέλος)—the one thing for 'the sake of which everything is done, but which is not itself done for the sake of anything'.[9] Conventionally this was conceived as happiness (εὐδαιμονία), for which each school offered their own definition. Determining what contributed towards or constituted εὐδαιμονία was not a matter of agreement. For Aristotle, it was a combination of virtue and good fortune, and Epicurus is well-known for thinking it to be pleasure. The Stoics, following the Cynics, insisted that virtue alone constituted εὐδαιμονία.

Long and Sedley call this Stoic tenant—that virtue is the sole constituent of happiness—'the bastion of Stoic ethics'.[10] This position is likely owed to their affiliation with Cynics, their interpretation of Plato's depiction of Socrates' death and, in particular, Socrates' views of the definition of the 'good'. Conventional conceptions identified 'good' with prosperity and 'virtue' with civic duties, but these notions were reconceived by Plato's Socrates along moral lines.[11] Plato argued that a tyrant could not be considered prosperous (no matter how many external 'goods' he had amassed) and thus turned the tables—rather than justice being a means to the end of an externally-defined prosperity, prosperity was seen (at least partially) as the means to the end of justice, now constituting (at least in part) a redefined prosperity. It is also first in Plato that we see the connection between good and benefit (ὠφέλεια) established, which was another point of agreement amongst the Hellenistic philosophers.[12]

In light of the standard definition of 'good' as that which benefitted, the Stoics' limitation of beneficial to virtue was unusual. Their rivals scoffed at this position as untenable—how could anyone say health and wealth were not beneficial? In reply, the Stoics offered further paradoxes: images such as a man happy on the rack, a slave who was king over all, and a father cheerily reminding himself of his children's mortality while kissing them. This, however, was only one side of their discourse—Stoic theory also appreciated the value of the conventional goods. As Sedley says, 'the key to Zeno's mature philosophy, was

[8] Long, *Hellenistic,* 108.
[9] LS1, 398.
[10] LS1, 357.
[11] A. W. H. Adkins, *Merit and Responsibility: A Study in Greek Values* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1960), 150–68.
[12] Adkins, *Merit*, 250.

his attempt to rescue an ethical role for conventional values.'[13] The Stoics insisted, however, that the value of the conventional 'goods' and the value of virtue were of two different orders. This categorisation then resulted in two different patterns of discourse about the conventional 'goods'. In a thoroughly Socratic vein of challenging convention, they often chose impulse as their starting-blocks, arguing that, contrary to common-sense, the object of impulse was not pleasure.

2.2 Impulse and Οἰκείωσις

2.2.1 Stoic epistemology

A basic grasp of Stoic epistemology will facilitate understanding of their ethical reasoning. Stoic epistemology was, broadly speaking, empiricist, in company with Aristotle and Epicurus, and took as its starting point 'impressions'(φαντασίαι), which were described by Zeno as being imprinted (τυπόω) upon the soul by objects.[14] Unlike the Sceptics, the Stoics held that most impressions (but not all) were useful for determining truth and forming scientific knowledge (ἐπιστήμη). The most common impression, the type which was the primary criterion of truth and viable as the basis of cognitions, was the 'kataleptic' (literally, 'graspable') impression (καταληπτική φαντασία).[15] Later Stoics modified their position to include the proviso that such impressions were the criterion of truth, 'provided there was no obstacle' (ἔνστημα).[16] When an impression was imprinted and judged 'kataleptic', the rational mind then gave assent (συγκατάθεσις) to it. Long and Sedley describe the distinction between receiving an impression and assenting to it: 'To have an impression is simply to entertain an idea, without any implication or commitment to it…. Belief consists in the

[13] D. Sedley, 'School', 9.
[14] DL VII.46, 50–1, Sextus Empiricus, *Math*. VII.228–2; Cf. LS2, 238–43. Since they were strict materialists, the Stoics could conceive of impressions arising from the movements of things moderns would not think of as objects, such as the soul. The sight of an object and the perception of a thought are both 'impressions'.
[15] Examples of non-'kataleptic' impressions were those experienced by madmen, or drunks. For an impression to be 'kataleptic', it had to be derived from an actual existing object, accurately represent that object in all its particular features, and then be effectively imprinted onto the senses, cf. DL VII.46.
[16] For example, previous assent to a non-'kataleptic' impression could prevent a current 'kataleptic' impression from being grasped. Cf. Sextus Empiricus, *Math.* VII.253–60; J. Annas, 'Stoic Epistemology', in *Companions to Ancient Thought, Vol. 1: Epistemology* (ed. S. Everson; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 184–203 (192–202). An example of an obstacle was when Menalaus refused to believe that Helen was in Egypt because he thought Helen was the phantom created by the gods and whom he had brought from Troy (although that was, indeed, the case and a 'kataleptic' impression which he therefore was unable to grasp). These modifications arose from debates with Academic Sceptics.

mind's positive reaction to an impression, its 'assent' to it'.[17] Zeno illustrated the stages to knowledge by holding out a hand: the palm lay open, receiving a 'kataleptic' impression, the fingers curled slightly in assent, then made a fist (κατάληψις, the grasping itself, cognition), then squeezed this fist tightly with his other hand – this, he declared was knowledge (ἐπιστήμη).[18]

Assent to an impression was a necessary precursor or component of impulse (ὁρμή) in Stoic theory. Brennan defines an impulse as a 'mental event that synthesizes a description of a particular, determinate state of affairs with an evaluative attitude toward that state of affairs and leads to immediate action'.[19] In Stoic theory, an impulse always (in rational animals) includes assent, and is a necessary condition for action. The significance of assent and impulse explains why evaluation (i.e. assent to the impression of something being valuable or advantageous, etc.) and impulse can be described by Seneca and Epictetus as the first two topics in their programs of ethical guidance.[20] In his explanation of selecting these topics, Epictetus states that the most common errors to avoid in assent are those known as the πάθη.[21]

2.2.2 The πάθη

For the Stoics, the passions were 'excessive impulses'.[22] Unlike Aristotle's position that a 'mean' should be sought between passions (such as courage between rashness and fear),[23] the Stoics held that all passions were to be avoided—the wise man would be ἀπαθής. The passions were 'irrational and unnatural movements of the soul',[24] and Chrysippus identified them specifically *as* judgements, false opinions.[25] These irrational judgements were

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[17] LS1, 239–40. 'A Stoic impression is not an impression *that* something is the case—which, in modern English, does imply some degree of belief—but an impression *of* something's being the case. In a cinema we get the impression of John Wayne's being on the screen in front of us, but not of course the impression *that* John Wayne is on the screen'.
[18] Cicero, *Acad. post.* II.145. Cf. LS1, 256–7.
[19] T. Brennan, 'Stoic Moral Psychology', in *The Cambridge Companion to the Stoics* (ed. B. Inwood; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003) 257–94 (276).
[20] Seneca, *Ep.* LXXXIX.14; Epictetus, *Diatr.* III.2.1–5. Cf. LS1, 344–5 for analysis of the different orders of ethical topics.
[21] Epictetus, *Diatr.* III.2.3.
[22] DL VII.110; Stobaeus, *Ecl.* II.7.10: ὁρμὴ πλεονάζουσα. The referencing format for book II of Stobaeus' *Anthology* follows A. J. Pomeroy, *Arius Didymus: Epitome of Stoic Ethics* (ed. A. J. Pomeroy; Atlanta, GA: Society of Biblical Literature, 1999).
[23] Aristotle, *Eth. nic.* II.5–6.
[24] DL VII.110; Stobaeus, *Ecl*. II.7.10.
[25] Variously identified as δόξα or κρίσις. Cf. M. Nussbaum, 'The Stoics on the Extirpation of the Passions', *Apeiron* 20 (1987), 129–77 (137).

the four primary passions: fear, desire, pain, and pleasure.[26] For example, grief (λύπη) is the irrational judgement that a present thing is evil.[27] Arius says that passion is an opinion which is disobedient toward reason: ἀπειθὲς τῷ λόγῳ.[28] In other words, it is an opinion, a type of reasoning, which is not functioning correctly (rather than the merely misinformed seeking reason)—reason run amuck.[29]

The πάθη were false judgements about value: as the definition of grief stated, they were judgements that something was good or evil, beneficial or harmful. Since the passions were impulses, they had a close relationship in Stoic theory with the intermediates, the conventional 'goods' which were 'impulsive', but not strictly 'good'.[30] The passions are a failure in assessment which assents that something is a good when it is not.[31] The objects of the passions' false judgements which were mistakenly judged 'good' were usually the conventional 'goods' such as health and wealth. Nussbaum explains that the πάθη rest on 'some kind of high evaluation of externals'.[32] She states:

> We should insist here that the propositions express not simply the agent's desires and preferences, but his or her values: the scheme of ends believed choiceworthy, by which she chooses to live … Second, the propositions ascribe to the item in question not only some value, but a serious or very high value (or disvalue).[33]

Since the conventional 'goods' were the objects and activities likely to elicit such miscalculations, the Stoics insisted, in provocative Socratic fashion, that only virtue be called 'good'. Assent that the conventional 'goods' *were* good led to dangerous impulses which had to be eradicated, not merely controlled. However, in defining the passions as judgements, the Stoics pitched ethical reasoning not as a battle *between* reason and impulse in a divided self, but as a battle won by the whole self for the whole self, a reasoning process in which impulse

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[26] DL VII.111-14; Stobaeus, *Ecl.* II.7.10; Cicero, *Tusc.* III.35; IV.14. (φόβος, ἐπιθυμία, λύπη, ἡδονή) Categorised under each were secondary passions, e.g., included with fear were nervousness, shame, etc.
[27] Likewise, fear is the irrational opinion that an expected thing is 'evil', pleasure the irrational opinion that a present thing is 'good', desire the irrational opinion that an expected thing is 'good'. Cf. M. Graver, *Stoicism and Emotion* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), 39.
[28] Stobaeus, *Ecl*. II.7.10a**.** Arius explains that many say 'I have knowledge, but nature forced me' which implies a more dualistic understanding than most Stoics would allow. Cf. B. Inwood, *Ethics and Human Action in Early Stoicism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985), 141–3.
[29] The Stoic doctrine here is formed in part against the structure of the person as conflicting 'parts' argued by Plato. Cf. C. Gill, *The Structured Self in Hellenistic and Roman Thought* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 3–14.
[30] Epictetus, *Diatr.* III.23; Stobaeus, *Ecl.* II.7.9.
[31] Cicero, *Tusc.* IV.24; e.g. DL VII.111 of wealth; Stobaeus, *Ecl.* II.7.10–10a of women.
[32] Nussbaum, 'Extirpation', 158.
[33] Nussbaum, 'Extirpation', 149–50. Citing Galen, *de Plac. H. et Pl.* IV.5; Cf. Cicero, *Tusc.* IV.26; Seneca, *Ep*. LXXV.11.

had a role to play. As Inwood states: '*apatheia* is *eupatheia*… *eupatheia* is simply the impulse of a fully rational man'.[34]

2.2.3 Οἰκείωσις

'The Stoics say that the first impulse of a living being is to preserve itself, since nature from the beginning has appropriated it to itself'.[35] This statement opens Diogenes Laertius' account of Stoic ethics, and it describes the notion of οἰκείωσις, or appropriation.[36] In debate with the Epicureans, the Stoics insisted that the object of a person's primary impulse was not pleasure, but self-preservation.[37] Οἰκειώσις refers to the fitting or appropriate relationship a being has with something else, including itself. Philologically, the word stands in contrast to ἀλλότριος (as a substantive, ἀλλοτρίωσις), as it was originally a term for the affiliation of a family member to one another and the household, and entails connotations of ownership, familiarity, affection, and belonging.[38] The animal's appropriation of itself was based on a rudimentary self-awareness (συναίσθησις or συνείδησις), and this appropriating of the being to itself then extended to discriminating from its environment what was οἰκεῖον to it.[39] As a creature receives impressions of things around and within it (e.g. feelings of pleasure or pain), these are accompanied by its impression of self: a dog sees a bone *as* a dog which is aware that it is a dog and therefore appropriates the bone to itself.[40] The animal's impression of its existence (a rudimentary self-perception) was the basis for a relationship of

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[34] Inwood, *Action,* 145.
[35] DL VII.85. Οἰκείωσις begins Cato's presentation, Cicero, *Fin.* III.16. Arius Didymus is an exception as he begins with the topic of good and evil (typically the second topic according to Diogenes). Since the Peripatetics adopted much of the Stoic doctrine on οἰκείωσις, he may have felt it was adequately addressed in his other sections. Cf. A. A. Long, 'Arius Didymus and the Exposition of Stoic Ethics', in *On Stoic and Peripatetic Ethics: The Work of Arius Didymus* (ed. W. W. Fortenbaugh; New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1983), 41–65 (49–56).
[36] It is infamously difficult to translate, cf. LS1, 250–1.
[37] Seneca, *Ep.* CXXI.7. For example, infants learning to walk clearly eschew pleasure and accept pain since walking is fitting for them.
[38] W. M. Martin, 'Stoic Self-Consciousness: Self-Comprehension and Orientation in the Stoic Theory of Oikeiosis', cited 17 Jan 2017. Online: http://privatewww.essex.ac.uk/~wmartin/SSC.pdf , (5); S. G. Pembroke, 'Oikeiosis', in *Problems in Stoicism* (ed. A. A. Long; London: Athlone Press, 1971), 114–41 (115); A. A. Long, 'Hierocles on *Oikeiosis* and self-perception', in *Stoic Studies* (ed. A. A. Long; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 250–63 (253).
[39] Cf. Seneca, *Ep.* CXXI.9, on non-rational animals' self-awareness. This is not, it must be stated, a Cartesian self-consciousness of mental states, or the subjective, private sense of self as the basis of epistemic certainty. Seneca states that he does not speak of an animal having awareness of a *definition* of their constitution, but only of their constitution itself. However, this is further clarified as the non- or pre-rational understanding of animals and children; presumably this could develop into a perception capable of a basic linguistic expression as rationality developed. Long, 'Hierocles', 256, 260; LS2, 310–1.
[40] Long, 'Hierocles', 260.

endearment to itself. This self-endearing relationship of οἰκείωσις resulted in self-preserving impulses, impulses which evolved with the development and constitution of the being.

Long has recommended the physiological concept of 'proprioception' to describe the concept of οἰκείωσις,[41] which gives a helpful sense of internal perception and orientation (i.e., a being's impulse towards something being determined by the thing's position towards it as well as its awareness of its own position and needs). Slightly differently, Martin states that impulses arising out of οἰκείωσις answer to the creature's question 'what *kind* of being am I?' and serve utterly practical purposes by leading towards appropriate action in line with that comprehension.[42] Animals display these impulses towards self-preservation, naturally appropriating what is best-suited to their various constitutions, including anything contributing to their wellbeing such as supporting their offspring, and others close to them. Hierocles describes οἰκείωσις as a set of concentric circles: the bullseye was one's own mind and body, the next ring encompassed children, parents, siblings and spouse, then the next ring extended family, then other relatives, then local residents, fellow tribesman and so on. Eventually, the rings expanded outward to include the entire human race.[43] Thus while the impulses of οἰκείωσις were centred around the animal's wellbeing and needs, this did not preclude seeking the wellbeing of others since it was assumed that it contributed to one's own wellbeing. In fact, it was said that the Stoics claimed οἰκείωσις as the basis for justice.[44] Since nature had bestowed reason upon humans, their rationality dictated what was fitting and appropriate for them.

2.3 The Τέλος

The Stoic accounts of οἰκείωσις appeal to Nature—the divine reason in all that exists—to ground their descriptions.[45] Nature has determined that each creature knows what has an affinity with its constitution, and that each creature will impulsively appropriate such things. Long argues that the Stoic theory uses the empirical evidence of appropriation in animal and human experience primarily to 'get off the ground'. However, as will be seen, Stoicism incorporates such experience insofar as it is grounded in its teleological

[41] Long, 'Hierocles', 258.
[42] Martin, 'Self-Consciousness', 17–18.
[43] Stobaeus, *Ecl.* IV.671.7–673.1.
[44] LS1, 353; Cicero, *Fin.* III.62-8.
[45] DL VII.88.

framework.[46] 'Nature, then, even in its more rudimentary products, provides a programme of "impulsive activity" which is both immediately self-sustaining, and also other-related'.[47] Hierocles' description of appropriation appears in a section entitled 'how to treat one's relatives', which demonstrates the way in which οἰκείωσις endorsed 'the normal customs and institutions of human society as natural'.[48] On the other hand, it was not an endorsement of them as truly 'good', since such an assessment would give way to the passions. Despite endorsing many impulses and ascribing them an objective value with the label 'natural', οἰκείωσις was by no means an error-free mechanism or a self-sufficient experiential basis for ethics. Hierocles' account states the wise man would attempt to contract the circles and draw the outer rings in towards the center. Hierocles' circles are designed and implanted by Nature upon the basis of self-awareness, but this contraction of the circles (i.e. the virtue of justice) requires rational development. After opening his account of Stoic ethics with the notion of appropriation, Diogenes Laertius closes the next paragraph saying, 'for reason supervenes (ἐπιγίνομαι) impulse as a craftsman'.[49] As Long argues, the accounts of οἰκείωσις invoke Nature to evaluate and ground the impulses:

> Nature in Stoicism is first and foremost a normative, evaluative, or if you will, a moral principle …. My claim is that when the Stoics prefaced such an assertion with the term, Nature, they intended to include an evaluation of the fact described. Mention of Nature makes a presumption of the purposefulness, the rightness, displayed by the fact that all creatures have instincts of a certain kind.[50]

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[46] A. A. Long, 'The Logical Basis of Stoic Ethics', *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 71 (1970–1), 85–104, (90).
[47] LS1, 352.
[48] LS1, 352.
[49] DL VII.86. Cf. Hicks, LCL, 195.
[50] Long, 'Logical Basis', 88–9. T. Engberg-Pedersen, *The Stoic Theory of Oikeiosis: Moral Development and Social Interaction in Early Stoic Philosophy* (Aarhus: Aarhus University Press, 1990), 38–43, disagrees. He is perhaps correct that there were alternate models of construction within Stoicism which grounded ethics in subjective and individual views, but his argument puts considerable weight on a single source (Cicero, *Fin*. III.16-21), one which *also* references nature in discussing the subjective impulses (at III.17). Cf. T. Tieleman, review of Engberg-Pedersen, *Mnemosyne* 48 (1995), 226–35; A. Erskine, review of Engberg-Pedersen, *CR* 42 (1992), 77–9. As G. Lesses, 'Virtue and the Goods of Fortune in Stoic Moral Theory', in *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy*, Vol. VII, ed. by J. Annas (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), 95-127 (95) states regarding Greek eudaimonism: 'This thesis is *both* a descriptive, psychological claim since human beings do want their own happiness… and a normative claim since persons ought to want happiness as the final good…' (emphasis mine). In the same way, the Stoics' teleological grounding of impulses in nature need not preclude the subjective experience of those impulses *per se.* As Long, *Stoic Studies,* 172–78, explains the subjective (or internal 'voice of reason') and the objective (or 'external') criterion are not conceived by the Stoics in opposition. The view here is that Stoic theory grounded its views of human nature in cosmic nature, so that their structure did not preclude human nature as experienced 'subjectively', and intended to include its ethical role in the discussion of impulses and intermediates. However, the teleological grounding in cosmic nature provided a control to define and limit what could be argued as fitting with human nature. As Schofield, 'Ethics', 244, explains, we are programmed, as animals, to have impulses, and, as rational animals, to live virtuously, a reference to human nature. 'But it is not *just* human nature… the negative and narrower point is that to articulate adequately the idea of the appropriate behaviour characteristic of virtue, it will not do simply to refer to human

As a uniquely rational animal, a human life lived in agreement with its (and thus all of) nature, must speak to its λόγος—this way of living, the excellent rational life, was called virtue. Cicero's account of Stoic ethics, which begins with appropriation, first describes an infant desiring what leads to its preservation, then a child naturally delighting in simple tasks of reasoning, then a period of practising and maturing this process of choosing the natural and rejecting the unnatural until it progressed into a pattern. Through this pattern the rational being perceives and attains the goal of moral excellence—virtue is the 'outgrowth' and 'later development' of the initial impulses felt by the infant.[51] He finishes the discussion by describing impulse as an old friend who introduces you to a new friend (virtue), who surpasses the old one in affection and value.[52] Virtue thus was not conceived in opposition to nature or impulse, but as their most highly-developed form. This construction led to charges of inconsistency, however, since the Stoics would later prioritise virtue over the conventional goods which were *also* natural, thus (in their opponents' mind) undermining the foundation of 'naturalness' (κατὰ φύσιν) upon which they had built virtue.[53] The Stoic responses sought to demonstrate the unique qualities of virtue that demanded this prioritisation.

As Diogenes Laertius explains, 'When reason has been given to rational beings according to a more perfect superintendence, life according to reason rightly becomes the life according to nature'.[54] Once rationality was identified as the unique feature of humanity in Nature's design, the Chief End (τέλος) of man could be reworked in Stoic terms. Zeno reportedly defined the τέλος as 'living harmoniously'.[55] Diogenes Laertius alternately reports Zeno's definition of the τέλος to be 'life in agreement with nature' which he then clarifies to mean the same thing as the virtuous life.[56] Arius similarly states that happiness consists in

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nature, or at any rate to human nature understood in too limited a fashion'. The subjective experience of human nature is understood as valid to the extent that it can be harmonised with cosmic nature. In this way, impulses, as an aspect of human nature, are warranted retrospectively from a rational view (i.e. Stoic doctrine) as the design of cosmic nature.

[51] Cicero, *Fin.* III.16–22. Trans. H. Rackham, LCL, 233–39.

[52] Cicero, *Fin.* III.23.

[53] E.g. Cicero's pointed question to Cato, *Fin.* III.27: '...how comes it that so many things that Nature strongly recommends have been suddenly abandoned by Wisdom?'. Cf. A. A. Long, *Epictetus: A Stoic and Socratic Guide to Life* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002), 183–4.

[54] DL VII.86.

[55] Stobaeus, *Ecl.* II.7.6a: ὁμολογουμένως ζῆν.

[56] DL VII.87. Cf. Stobaeus, *Ecl.* II.76a; Cicero, *Fin.* IV.14; Philo, *Prob.* 22; This is likely a gloss of the definition by Zeno, who was fond of mythical etymologies for explanation—since φύσις was divine λόγος, the quality of the harmony or consistency which the terser definition endorsed was one *with* nature (which ὁμολογέω could be construed to imply). Cf. A. A. Long, 'Carneades and the Stoic Telos', *Phronesis* 12 (1967), 59–90 (60–3); LS1, 399.

living according to virtue which is the same thing as living according to nature.[57] Virtue, then, was a pursuit to be chosen for its own sake[58] and since this was man's end as a rational being, only virtue was genuinely beneficial and, thus, good.[59]

2.4 Virtue

Virtue is simply the excellence or perfection of any given thing.[60] The perfection of the λόγος (the rational faculties) was traditionally identified as the four primary dispositions (with multiple subordinate virtues): wisdom (φρόνησις), courage (ἀνδρεία), justice (δικαιοσύνη), and temperance (σωφροσύνη).[61] These were consistent, steady dispositions (διαθέσεις) which co-inhered in the wise, and were described as the 'perfection according to nature of the rational being *as* rational being'.[62] There were also actions and people that were virtuous insofar as they participated (μετέχω) in virtue. Diogenes and Arius Didymus both go on to provide multiple divisions of the virtues into categories: primary and subordinate, of the mind, body and external, of the end themselves or productive of the end, and so forth. Likewise, vice is defined and organized in simple opposition to virtue: the four cardinal vices are folly (ἀφροσύνη), cowardice (δειλία), injustice (ἀδικία), unrestraint (ἀκολασία). Most of this was agreed-upon by other schools, including the superiority of virtue over the conventional 'goods'. Cicero's dialogue partners of various schools often wax eloquent on the worthiness of virtue over the conventional goods (while still designating these as genuine goods and contributing to happiness).[63]

The Stoics insisted, however, that virtue's value eclipsed the value of conventional 'goods', not by degree but by kind, which had the effect of making them incommensurable.[64] They argued that the value of virtue was distinct from the value of the conventional 'goods',

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[57] Stobaeus, *Ecl.* II.7.6e.
[58] DL VII.89, Cicero, *Fin.* III.36.
[59] Cf. Long, 'Logical Basis', 85–88. '"The goodness of living according to reason" is derived from, and not the grounds of, "living according to Nature". The following two statements are therefore mutually consistent: "Only what accords with or is a consequence of reason is good" and "only what accords with human nature and Nature is good"…. In confining "good" to what accords with reason, or what accords with human nature *and* Nature, the Stoics are arguing that nothing else is the goal of man *qua* man' (94). Cf. LS1, 374: 'Their best line of defence was the thesis that only the morally good is beneficial to man in his specific nature as a rational being'.
[60] DL VII.90–1. Cf. J. Annas, 'Ancient Ethics and Modern Morality', *Philosophical Perspectives,* 6 (1992), 119–36 (124).
[61] DL VII.92, 102; Cicero, *Fin.* V.36; *Off.* I.15; Stobaeus, *Ecl.* II.7.5a. These four were 'canonised' since Plato, cf. LS1, 383–5.
[62] DL VII.94
[63] Cicero, *Fin.* III.2, 30-1; IV.29, 37; V.59, 70, 77, 87, 90.
[64] Cicero, *Fin.* III.33–4.

and offered analogies to illustrate this distinction. The worth of wealth or health is like a drop of honey in the sea, like the light of a lamp eclipsed by the sun, like a coin amongst vast wealth, or like a single step on a journey to India. Stoics argue that, like a perfectly-fitting shoe, virtue's worth is not subject to quantity or degrees; its suitability is not increased by the existence of multiples.[65]

However, Annas points out that these analogies do not suggest utter discontinuity or dissimilarity in kind—both the lamp and sun give light—but rather they recognise the vastly different weight they have in ethical reasoning. To compare a coin to great wealth or to consider one step significant progress on a long journey amounts to a fundamental misunderstanding of those realities.[66] It was not that virtue was utterly dissimilar to things of lesser value—both could be discussed in terms of naturalness. In practical terms, though, they constituted a fundamentally different type of reality that demanded a distinct assessment and treatment. A step requires no preparation, but a journey is a massive undertaking; a lamp is a tool designed to light a task while the entire human society is structured around the light of the sun. No one responds to a coin as they respond to wealth. While each lesser entity shares an element of similarity with the greater entity, in practical terms they function so differently as to be incommensurable. Just as one might discuss both a prized possession and one's family with the language of 'treasuring' or 'cherishing', most would agree that someone who attempted to put a price on their family would be fundamentally, even tragically, misunderstanding what type of thing a family is. Cicero records a conversation where Cato is asked to weigh the value of various aspects of farming such as raising cattle and crops. Cato obliges with his opinion on various matters until asked about money-lending to which he replies: 'How about murder'?[67] When virtue or vice enters the picture, he immediately jumps categories—profit or usefulness is no longer a possible measurement, and he withholds judgement along those lines.

The logic was pressed even further—the Stoics argued not just that virtue and the conventional 'goods' should not be compared, but also that to do so would destroy virtue. The Stoics argued that virtue must be established as the only good, entirely sufficient to constitute εὐδαιμονία. Any other view of virtue risks its annihilation.[68] Virtue is imagined as

[65] Cicero, *Fin.* III.45-48.
[66] Annas, 'Ancient Ethics', 122.
[67] Cicero, *Off.* II.88–9. Cato is asked to judge the advantage of aspects of estate-management, since advantage is a criterion for appropriate actions in *De Officiis*.
[68] Cicero, *Fin.* III.11, 45; IV.40, 53; V.81; *Tusc.* V.52.

looking down and despising the vagaries of chance in life,[69] for if any of the fickle conventional 'goods' were granted the value of good or evil, then the wise man would be subject to fear and cowardice. If pleasure, for example, was regarded as good and pain regarded as evil, then no one could ever find happiness since all are under threat of pain and death at all times.[70] Even more specifically, Cicero argued that the virtues themselves operated *by* devaluing the conventional goods—for courage to be courage, it *required* one to despise pain (rather than fear it as an evil).[71]

The different weight or function possessed by virtue, in distinction from the conventional 'goods', is discussed in the secondary literature. The *Euthydemus* dialogue reminds G. Vlastos of the *Apology* where Socrates states that one should not give 'countervailing weight (ὑπολογίζομαι) to danger of life or death' but only to virtue or vice. 'Countervailing', Vlastos says, is to meet something from the opposite direction, or like 'an affidavit to stop proceedings'.[72] Annas, discussing the analogies above, describes virtue as a consideration which 'knocks' other considerations 'out of the running', 'stops the others in their tracks and sends us back to square one'.[73] Inwood says virtue is 'overriding'[74] and Engberg-Pedersen characterises the construction as 'onesided' and 'radical'.[75]

A Stoic penchant for hair-splitting terminology and vocabulary is commented upon in the literature, and seems to have been engineered, in part, to support this radical differential between the values of virtue and the conventional 'goods'.[76] Cicero metaphorically refers to boundary stones marking property lines, and declares that if the Stoics have rightly laid down the limits—the boundary lines—of the good, then it is possible to be always happy.[77] This line-drawing took place, in part, in the realm of vocabulary, with their refusal to label health, wealth, etc., 'good'. The complaint is made that the Stoics introduce a legion of terms with no substantive difference, and the Stoic rebuttal is that one who *regards* these things as evils will inevitably succumb to fear—in other words, the terminological line-drawing served to

[69] Cicero, *Tusc.* V.4.
[70] Cicero, *Fin.* III.29, 52-3; V.81; *Tusc.* V.28, 52.
[71] Cicero, *Fin.* III.29; *Off.* I.66.
[72] G. Vlastos, 'Happiness', 186. On ὑπολογίζομαι, he cites J. Riddell, *The Apology of Plato* (Oxford: Clarendon Press,1867), 66, 167.
[73] Annas, 'Ancient Ethics', 122–3.
[74] Inwood, *Action,* 210–11.
[75] Engberg-Pedersen, 'On Comparison', 306.
[76] Cicero, *Fin.* III.5, Zeno is an 'inventor of terms'; cf. Cicero, *Tusc.* II.30, 42; *Fin.* IV.56–60; V.89; Plutarch, *Stoic. rep.* 1048a.
[77] Cicero, *Tusc.* V.83.

guide the correct evaluation of impulses, without which knowledge and virtue were impossible.[78]

One linguistic buttress the Stoics relied upon to maintain their uncompromising position on the distinct value of virtue was a particular definition of good (ἀγαθός). With the good firmly identified with benefit since Plato, the Stoics argued that nothing could be called good which did not unconditionally and reliably have the property of benefitting—this was the boundary line.[79] In a vivid echo of *Euthydemus*, they pointed to the vulnerability of wealth and health to vice: nothing was good (beneficial) if good *or* bad use could be made of it.[80] Not only were the conventional goods weak in this sense, but their misuse often led to more misery than their opposites (e.g., in the hands of a tyrant, wealth was worse than poverty). In contrast, virtue was able to wring benefit even out of poverty or pain.[81] Diogenes offers this analogy to the unconditionally beneficial quality of virtue: as heat's property is to heating[82] (ὡς γὰρ ἴδιον θερμοῦ τὸ θερμαίνειν), so good's property is to benefitting; as heat could never have the effect of cooling something down, so a genuine good could never harm. Cicero gives the image of a heap labelled, for example, 'wheat'—so labelled, it must only contain wheat and not a blend of things 'unlike' (*dissimilia*) wheat.[83] Likewise, in the category labelled 'good', there cannot be anything that might not benefit a rational being, a view which precluded the conventional 'goods' in Stoic thought. As Long explains of the

[78] Cicero, *Tusc.* V.16-–17; *Fin.*III.29, 42.
[79] Cf. LS2, 350. 'Unconditional', 'reliable' describe the qualities the Stoics ascribed to virtue in contrast not to vice, but to the conventional goods. This is derived from the 'warming' analogy referenced below and the following explanation that since health and wealth can be used for evil as well as good, they do not meet the criteria. Inwood, 'Stoicism', 224, explains that to call something natural in Hellenistic philosophy was to 'claim that it is reliable in a way that nothing can be which is dependent on changeable personal decisions or social norms… nature is viewed with approval because it is in principle stable and consistently explicable…' In labeling the virtuous life the natural life for humanity, this is (in part) what the early Stoics meant. The 'reliability' of virtue also derives from the Socratic argument that virtue is sufficient for happiness (although this did not necessarily lead to the Stoic conclusion that conventional goods were not good). Cf. J. Annas, 'Plato', 26–27; cf. Annas, *Happiness*, 166; Gill, *Self*, 74; LS1, 383. Lesses, 'Goods', 99–100, explains: '…the virtues entirely comprise happiness because the virtues non-contingently suffice for obtaining whatever components of happiness there are'. Of the analogy to warmth, he says, 103: 'In this strictest sense of 'good', anything which contingently benefits a person would fail to be good'. B. Inwood, 'Rules and Reasoning in Stoic Ethics', *Topics in Stoic Philosophy* (ed. K. Ierodiakonou; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 95–127 (101), concurs: 'Preferred things, such as health and wealth, may be natural to us as humans; but they cannot be guaranteed to be the appropriate things to pursue in all circumstances… In contrast, virtue is always and in every case beneficial'. Cf. Long, 'Socrates', 31. Virtue is sufficient to comprise happiness, and thus 'reliable' since it can be depended upon to benefit and *not* harm, and it is 'unconditionally' beneficial and not contingent upon any other factors to do so.
[80] DL VII.103; Cicero, *Tusc.* V.45; Plato, *Euthyd.* 281c; Cf. LS2, 357; Plato, *Gorg.* 467e; *Meno* 87e-88a.
[81] Cicero, *Tusc.* V.28-31; Epictetus, *Diatr*. III.20.
[82] DL VII.103. I have translated the infinite form 'to heat' as the participial 'heating' to make the verbal form clear. Cf. LS1, 357.
[83] Cicero, *Tusc.* V.45.

Socratic dialogues which prefigure Stoic discussions: 'the import of his discussion… was that only virtue or wisdom bears the necessary relation to benefitting that anything good, properly speaking, must have: i.e., always benefitting and never harming'.[84] Lesses explains that, 'in this strictest sense of "good"', anything which contingently benefits a person would fail to be good' and says that the arguments 'also derive a related criterion for the predicate "good" to apply: if *x* is good then *x* can only be used well. The preferred indifferents are often wrongly confused with intrinsic goods—not with what is bad. Hence, these criteria are employed to show that health, wealth and the other preferred indifferents are not good for their own sake'.[85] In other words, the purpose of these arguments is to establish the distinct value of the good; since the conventional 'goods' were most prone to be confused with the good, virtue was established by disparaging these pseudo-goods in comparison to it.

For some Stoics, a helpful distinguishing factor was the vulnerability of the conventional goods to external forces beyond one's control, in contrast to the aspects of autonomy granted by reason.[86] The language of 'up to one' (ἐφ'αὐτῷ) or 'not up to one' is ubiquitous in Epictetus, for example.[87] Epictetus' lack of attention to the subcategories within the ἀδιάφορα reflects his Cynic leanings and the ongoing (or later revival of) Cynic influence on Stoicism.[88] As Antisthenes, a Cynic who also considered virtue sufficient for happiness, stated: 'Virtue is a weapon that cannot be taken away'.[89] In similar fashion to such Stoic accounts, one fragment, possibly from Arius Didymus, commences its account of the ἀδιάφορα by dividing up all existing things into those 'up to us' (ἐφ' ἡμῶν) and those which are not.[90] The tendency of Stoics to contrast the conventional goods and virtue along these lines reflect a wider theme of the availability of virtue to all and in all circumstances, a dictum arising out of the *exemplum* of Socrates. Sedley explains that the Stoics viewed the

[84] Long, 'Socrates', 31.
[85] Lesses, 'Goods', 104.
[86] As Socrates argues, what we think is 'good fortune' is wisdom, Plato, *Euthyd.* 279de.
[87] Epictetus, *Diatr.* I.4.19; *Ench.* 1.1–3, *et passim.* He also uses simple possession to express this, cf. IV.1.68; IV.7.14 *et passim.* Cf. Long, *Guide*, 208–12 on the connection of this language with autonomy and the προαίρεσις in Epictetus' thought.
[88] Gill, 'Imperial', 47–9. Aristo, who refused subcategories within the ἀδιάφορα is described by Long as 'the most Cynic of the Stoics', *Hellenistic*, 193. J. Sellars, *Stoicism* (Durham: Acumen, 2010), 113–14 discusses how Epictetus' use of the categories 'up to us' and 'not up to us' undermines the category of preferred ἀδιάφορα. Although he acknowledges the category, his construction (where none of the ἀδιάφορα are 'up to us') undermines its use with its focus on virtue, the only thing 'up to us'.
[89] DL VI.11-12.
[90] A scholion which Hahm argues originated in Arius Didymus' section in Stobaeus' *Anthology.* Cf. D. E. Hahm, 'The Ethical Doxography of Arius Didymus', *ANRW* 36.4: 2935-3055..

Aristotelian reliance on goods of fortune as making 'happiness unstable'.[91] Virtue held a distinct weight in ethical reasoning as the only properly-entitled 'good', and its unique ability to contribute directly to the τέλος. These tenets were based on the belief that reason was humanity's unique function and excellence, and it was then also available to all rational beings at all times.

For all of its reliability and sufficiency, virtue was also surprisingly fragile—hence its need to be established. As Klein explains,

> The Stoic identification of virtue and happiness seems to rest, at least in part, on the assumption that if objectives other than virtue are counted as ends of action in their own right, an immoralist can always construct plausible cases in which these objectives are to be pursued *contrary* to virtue. One basic motivation for the indifferents doctrine, therefore, is the supposition that virtue is always the most rational course of action, together with the assumption that this result cannot be secured if promoted indifferents are constituents of the human *telos*.[92]

For virtue to 'work', to constitute happiness, the Stoics were convinced that nothing else could be awarded the same value: as Cicero said, to be courageous, one must disdain pain. Left to the onslaught of impressions and (especially Epicurean) wayward assessments, most people were worthless, a sentiment a few pages of Epictetus' *Diatribes* will confirm. Although Epicurus' teachings were more nuanced than the hedonist stereotype (he taught that virtue was instrumental to pleasure, and pleasure itself necessitated restraint, for example), the Stoics considered his philosophy the primary threat to their 'bastion', indeed to virtue itself. How would men be emboldened to fight tyranny, or resist becoming tyrants themselves if they were taught that pleasure was their primary pursuit? The newly moral-coloured flourishing of εὐδαιμονία demanded more of humanity. Chrysippus summarised the debates on the τέλος and the good as a 'rivalry between pleasure and virtue'.[93] The Stoics championed virtue as the only genuinely-beneficial good, the only teleologically-sufficient natural life for a rational being, and in an incommensurable category of value that demanded a distinct weight in reasoning. Using precise terminology and Socratic arguments, the Stoics established virtue as the first order of value, the only good.

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[91] D. N. Sedley, *The Philosophy of Antiochus* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 155. Cf. Cicero, *Fin.* V.12, 68.
[92] J. Klein, 'Making Sense of the Indifferents', in *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy: Volume XLIX* (ed. B. Inwood; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 227–81 (251–2).
[93] Cicero, *Fin.* II.44.

2.5 The Intermediates: The *Topoi* of the Preferred Ἀδιάφορα and the Καθήκοντα

The distinct value and role of virtue in ethical reasoning, however, did not preclude a value or role for anything else. Such a view was the mistake of Aristo, who declared all except virtue and vice to be utterly indifferent.[94] Cato, as Cicero's spokesman for Stoicism, explains that this position threatens to destroy virtue: 'for it is the essence of virtue to exercise choice among the things in accordance with nature; so that philosophers who make all things absolutely equal, rendering them indistinguishable either as better or worse, and leaving no room for selection among them, have abolished virtue itself'.[95] If the debate about what constituted man's chief end was, at its heart, a 'rivalry between pleasure and virtue', then the Stoic subcategories attempted to maintain a role for pleasure (amongst other conventional 'goods') while still asserting the incommensurability of virtue. Grounding οἰκείωσις in Nature as its 'programme of impulsive activity' and grounding virtue in Nature as the uniquely natural function of rational beings made it possible to afford value to both virtue and the conventional 'goods': both were natural. Although they did not allow the terminology of 'good' and 'benefit' to be used in their strictest sense of health and wealth, the Stoics did consider it natural to appropriate such things under the proviso of reason. Virtue was always most appropriate, whether the conventional 'goods' stood alongside it or not. Even in the absence of health and wealth virtue stood available for all to procure happiness—this had been demonstrated conclusively by Socrates. Even death could not thwart the wise man's pursuit of virtue (and thus happiness)—'I would much rather die, having defended myself as I did, than to live thus', Socrates declared.[96]

Most men, though, not being forced into Socrates' position, would look to make a profit, keep healthy, and participate in society and politics. While the Stoics did not call such things 'good' or afford them first-order value, they afforded them an objective yet conditional value and the actual day-to-day selections of a Stoic would recognise this second-order value of the conventional 'goods'. Furthermore, these selections could result in benefit (i.e., good) when used virtuously. In one memorable analogy, Cleanthes describes natural impulses as 'half-lines' of iambic metre: worthless on their own but good once completed (τελέω) by the wise man's virtue.[97] As Diogenes' metaphor of reason as the craftsman suggests, the

[94] DL VII.160–64.
[95] Cicero, *Fin.* III.12, trans. Rackham, LCL, 229.
[96] Plato, *Apol.* 38e.
[97] Stobaeus, *Ecl.* II.7.5b8.

conventional ‘goods’ were conceived as the raw material which could be fashioned by the virtuous.[98]

2.5.1 The ἀδιάφορα

As mentioned above, two of the three most systematic sources for Stoics ethics begin with οἰκείωσις.[99] The account in Stobaeus’ *Anthology*, often attributed to Arius Didymus, begins as follows: ‘Those things exist, according to Zeno, which participate in substance. Of the things which exist, some are good, some are bad, and some are indifferent’.[100] After his accounts of appropriation, the τέλος, and virtue, Diogenes Laertius joins Arius: ‘of things that exist, some are good, some are evil, and some are neither’.[101] After discussing appropriation, the τέλος, and virtue as the only good, Cicero finally arrives at the *topos* of the ἀδιάφορα when he denounces Aristo for arguing that all things were utterly indifferent.[102] Having extensively outlined the first-order value of good, he clarifies that the preferreds (προηγμένα ἀδιάφορα) are neither good nor evil, and only have a moderate value (*aestimatio mediocris*).[103] In general, the *topos* of the ἀδιάφορα is introduced as the categorisation of all else that is indistinguishable as virtue or vice, good or evil: all else, including the conventional ‘goods’, are simply ‘neither’, categorically neutral.

Just as virtue and vice had their mirrored lists, the *topos* of ἀδιάφορα listed things such as life, health, freedom from pain, beauty, wealth, power, and noble birth. Also typically listed are the opposites of these: death, infirmity, pain, ugliness, poverty, loss of property, and slavery.[104] The term ἀδιάφορα itself must be handled carefully. Given its introduction after the delineation of good and evil, and its description as strictly ‘neither’, it must be understood apart from the connotations of the English ‘indifferent’—it means strictly neutral or indistinguishable *as* virtue or vice. This neutrality is reinforced by the language of οὐδέτερος and οὐδέν which is found not only in the introduction of the *topos*, but in other contexts, such as therapeutic discourse.[105] The Stoic accounts we have are quick to point out that their use of

[98] At one point they are straightforwardly called the ‘material’ (ὕλη) of virtue. Plutarch, *Comm. not.* 1069e.
[99] DL VII.85; Cicero, *Fin.* III.20.
[100] Stobaeus, *Ecl.* II.7.5a, trans. Pomeroy, *Epitome,* 11.
[101] DL VII.101. Cf. VII.62.
[102] Cicero, *Fin.* III.50.
[103] Cicero, *Fin.* III.53.
[104] DL VII.102; Cicero, *Fin.* III.51; *Tusc.* V.15, 28-30; *Off.* II.1, 9, 37, 88; Stobaeus, *Ecl.* II.7.5a.
[105] Cicero, *Fin.* II.68, III.36, V.79; *Tusc.* V.30, 73; DL VII.101; Epictetus, *Diatr.* I.25.2; I.29.7–8; I.30.2-4; II.1.6; II.1.7; III.3.5, 15; III.10.19; III.16.16; III.22.21, 34; IV.1.83; IV.7.26; Stobaeus, *Ecl.* II.7.5b, 11e.

the term ἀδιάφορα is not to be misunderstood as indicating things which have no power to stir impulse.[106] It is acknowledged that, of course, many things within the ἀδιάφορα have the power to incite appetency or antipathy. They were not, however, able to be distinguished as those things which benefitted or harmed, or detracted from or contributed directly to the τέλος.

The only thing constitutive of happiness was virtue. To admit anything else into that category would muddy the conceptual waters. As Cicero expressed it, although there was a difference to be discerned among these *indifferenta*, they were labelled as such *in the sense that* they were of no help when it came to happiness or misery.[107] Arius clarifies that these things are spoken of as 'indifferent' (and the 'differing') *in relation to something* (Τὸ γὰρ διαφέρον καὶ τὸ ἀδιάφορον τῶν πρός τι λεγομένων εἶναι). He goes on: 'They (the Stoics) say, "If we speak of bodily things and the externals as indifferent, (it is) to the proper life (in which lies εὐδαιμονία) that we say it is indifferent, not, by Zeus, to having accordance with nature and neither to impulse and aversion'.[108] Throughout this section, Pomeroy translates the preposition πρός with the phrase 'in relation to', which reflects Arius' explanation of the indifference being in reference 'to something'.[109] Distinction was immediately made within this neutral category by their introduction as binary sets of opposites, but within the larger structure of Stoic ethics, their introduction immediately following virtue and vice made the point that they believed that all the ἀδιάφορα share in common their neutrality in relation to the τέλος.[110]

While the Stoics are clear that the ἀδιάφορα are not to be misunderstood as unable to elicit impulse, such terminology—as with their restriction of ἀγαθός—was designed to upend conventional notions and prevent destructive category errors. Accepting such unsettling labels was meant to realign the criteria by which one evaluated impressions and gave assent, and thus construct knowledge: in simple terms, it cultivated detachment from what was unstable and conditional, and reserved unrestrained assent for what was unconditionally good. The Stoic wise man could famously cry from the rack that he counted the pain 'as

[106] DL VII.104–5.
[107] Cicero, *Fin.* III.50.
[108] Stobaeus, *Ecl.* II.7.7a.
[109] Pomeroy, *Epitome,* 44–45. Cf. Long, 'Arius Didymus', 50.
[110] DL VII.102: 'Neutral (neither good nor evil, that is) and all those things which neither benefit nor harm a man: such as life, health… *and their opposites*, death, disease…' (emphasis mine), trans. Hicks, LCL, 209; Stobaeus, *Ecl.* II.7. 5a, builds the opposites directly into the form of his list: 'These are examples of indifferent things: life, death, glory, lack of glory…'. Cicero, *Fin.* IV.20, 72; *Off.* I.115; *Tusc.* V.30.

nothing!' (*Quam pro nihilo puto*).[111] By this it was not meant that he did not have an impression of pain or have the knowledge that such pain was unnatural, but that he could nonetheless claim happiness (so long as he maintained his harmonious disposition) since pain was nothing *in relation* to happiness. One important aspect of the detachment which such categories inscribed was the way in which it facilitated comparison amongst the ἀδιάφορα, but discouraged it between ἀδιάφορα and virtue or vice as a category error (as Cato illustrated by refusing to compare money-lending with other practices). The re-describing of the conventional 'goods' as neutral ἀδιάφορα and 'nothing' created a pattern of discourse, another supporting buttress, to establish virtue and its 'countervailing' weight in reasoning. The critics of the Stoics claimed that their terminology was only a façade, and that they fundamentally agreed with the Peripatetics and Academics on the conventional 'goods'. Cicero's spokesman responds:

> The Peripatetics hold that the sum of happiness includes bodily advantages, but we deny this altogether… We deem health to be deserving of a certain value, but we do not reckon it a good; at the same time we rate no value so highly as to place it above virtue. This is not the view of the Peripatetics, who are bound to say that an action which is both morally good and not attended by pain is more desirable than the same action if accompanied by pain. We think otherwise… how could there be a wider or more real difference of opinion?[112]

2.5.1.1 Value

Value has been repeatedly referenced in this account without definition thus far. Axiology is not a major *topos* in Stoic ethics, but it permeates its structure. The passage just quoted from Cicero demonstrates this, as it explains the Stoic refusal to attribute 'goodness' to all advantages in mathematical terms—they are simply 'added up' differently.[113] The conventional goods are incapable of contributing directly to the 'sum' of happiness, and in accordance with Stoic doctrine on the unity of the virtues, it is impossible to multiply good to be happi*er*. At the same time, they state that the conventional 'goods' do have a certain type of value (*aestimatio aliqua digna*). As Long explains, in Zeno's ethics '"value" is the genus of which "good" (*agathon*) and "preferred" (*proegmenon*) are two distinct species'.[114]

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[111] Cicero, *Tusc.* V.73. Here placed in the mouth of Epicurus as a foil to the Stoics (who, in other words, could call this out more rightfully). Cf. Epictetus, *Diatr.* I.30.2-4; II.1.6; III.3.5, 15; III.10.19; III.16.16; III.22.21, 34. It is worth nothing that οὐδέν, οὐδέ and their cognates mean both 'nothing' and 'neither' in the sense of simply *not* falling into one or more categories.
[112] Cicero, *Fin.* III.43–4. Trans. Rackham, LCL, 263.
[113] Cf. A. A. Long, *Greek Models of Mind and Self* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2015), 132, on the connections between mathematics and reasoning in Plato.
[114] Long, 'Socrates', 28.

Diogenes Laertius and Arius Didymus both give three definitions of value (ἀξία) which, while not identical, seem to be largely similar.[115] The first type of value is that which in itself is a contribution to the harmonious life (i.e. the value of virtue). Second (or third for Arius) is the type of value connected to some of the ἀδιάφορα. Diogenes defines this as the value of some ability or use which, as an intermediary (μέσος), contributes to a life in accordance with nature. For example, he says, wealth or health 'might bring something' to such a life.[116] Arius, citing Antipater, labels this a 'selective' type of value through which a person chooses one option over another (i.e., to choose wealth over poverty): a more valuable option amongst an available range. This value, Arius clarifies, is ascribed not because these things contribute towards εὐδαιμονία but because of the necessity (ἀνάγκη) of making a selection.[117] The third definition of value which both sources offer is the exchange price given by an appraiser—a definition which they emphasise depends on his knowledge of the market situation and not a fixed price. Engberg-Pedersen notes that, while it is common today to speak of 'value' metaphorically, the Stoic use seems dependent on literal financial language.[118] The second type of value is of a different kind than the value of virtue, which cannot be accumulated or compounded with other types. This is not to deny the objective value of some of the ἀδιάφορα, but to understand that, as an appraiser knows of the value of goods, their value depends upon the market which, for the unstable ἀδιάφορα, is conditional. In the same way that the appraiser knows which values can be compared and exchanged (as the appraiser who says 'wheat exchanges for this amount of barley with a mule included'),[119] the wise man grasps both what is normally comparable and the market conditions which determine whether values are valid or not. Such appraisers recognize the fluctuating (rather than fixed) values of their goods. Cato is willing to assess the profits of livestock versus crops but not livestock versus money-lending—the former is comparing ἀδιάφορον with ἀδιάφορον, while the latter makes the category error of comparing ἀδιάφορον with vice, categories with values which are fixed in relation to each other. Long explains the value motif within the larger ethical structure:

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[115] DL VII.105; Stobaeus, *Ecl.* II.7.7f.
[116] DL VII.105: *τὴν δὲ εἶναι μέσην τινὰ δύναμιν ἢ χρείαν συμβαλλομένην πρὸς τὸν κατὰ φύσιν βίον, ὅμοιον εἰπεῖν ἥντινα προσφέρεται πρὸς τὸν κατὰ φύσιν βίον πλοῦτος ἢ ὑγίεια.*
[117] Stobaeus, *Ecl.* II.7.7g; cf. II.7.6d.
[118] Engberg-Pedersen, 'On Comparison', 298. This is illustrated by the fact that Lesses debates whether the third type of value is metaphorical or not, cf. Lesses, 'Goods', 106–7. However, cf. Stobaeus, *Ecl.* II.7.7f, which uses the 'appraiser' in a moral sense.
[119] DL VII.105.

> Both virtue and wealth accord with Nature, but they accord with it in different ways. Virtue accords with Nature in the sense that it is the special function or goal of a rational being to be virtuous … This statement is not relative to circumstances…. Wealth is a state which is objectively preferable to poverty, but wealth is not something which is the special function of a rational being to possess. The value of wealth is relative to poverty, but wealth has no value relative to virtue. Morally speaking, wealth and poverty are indifferent….[120]

2.5.1.2 The προηγμένα

Within the category of the neutral ἀδιάφορα, there was a primary division into two categories: those which were preferred (προηγμένα) and those which were dispreferred (ἀποπροηγμένα).[121] The preferreds did not constitute or contribute directly to the τέλος as virtue did, but could indirectly contribute to the τέλος in an intermediary fashion.[122] The preferreds had the second-order value defined above: worth selecting since it might bring an ability or use which indirectly contributes towards the harmonious life. The preferreds are the same as the conventional 'goods' of health, wealth, etc. Likewise, the dispreferreds are their opposites: poor health, poverty, etc.[123] Thus the preferreds map onto the conventional 'goods' discussed in *Euthydemus*. There Socrates affirms that these are actually beneficial only when correctly used, and such use is wisdom, which is genuinely good. The preferreds, despite their volatile instability, are still 'greater goods' (μείζω ἀγαθά) for the wise, however, than their opposites. Wealth's 'great*er*ness' in comparison to poverty to bring flourishing with correct use is likely the basis for the category of the preferreds within the ἀδιάφορα.[124] Although they must neither be compared to virtue nor given the same weight in reasoning, the preferreds have objective value as 'features of the world' designed by Nature.[125] This second-order value is conditional, but it affords them 'reason-giving' force, all things being equal.[126]

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[120] Long, *Hellenistic,* 192–3.
[121] Stobaeus, *Ecl.* II.7.7a; DL VII.106. There are also, thirdly, things 'utterly indifferent'.
[122] DL VII.105; Stobaeus, *Ecl.* II.7.7g.
[123] DL VII.106; Stobaeus, *Ecl.* II.7.7a; Cicero, *Fin.* III.51.
[124] Long, 'Socrates', 28–30.
[125] LS1, 358.
[126] 'Reason-giving' from K. M. Vogt, 'Taking the Same Things Seriously and Not Seriously: A Stoic Proposal on Value and the Good', in *Epictetus: His Continuing Influence and Contemporary Relevance* (eds. D. R. Gordon, D. B. Suits; Rochester: RIT Press, 2014), 16, 30; NB: this article was accessed online at and the printed volume could not be accessed under Covid-19 conditions to verify pagination. Thus all pagination for this item reflects the online version at: http://katjavogt.com/selected-papers/. The thesis adopts the position that the preferreds are conceived of as having an intrinsic value, which is nevertheless of a different order than the value of virtue. Cf. LS1, 358; Annas, *Happiness*, 166–68; Cooper, *Wisdom*, 189–90; this seems to be assumed at Schofield, 'Ethics', 241. Although he is in disagreement, Klein notes this as the majority view, 'Indifferents', 232. An alternative view, of Lesses, 'Goods', is that the intermediates had a distinct 'instrumental' role in the

Identifying and evaluating this objective second-order value was the work of wisdom.[127] This cannot be taken to mean that any ἀδιάφορα were constitutive of the τέλος; all these were neutral in relation to the chief end, and equally impotent to constitute it. It would be a mistake to think of virtue needing ἀδιάφορα—rather, virtue was needed because of the potentially-destructive nature of the ἀδιάφορα. The existence of politics, family, health, property, etc. and their objective, if conditional, value is normative and unquestioned. Instead, it is the need to live within these realities *well* that demands virtue.[128] There is no way to exercise virtue in a vacuum—a just decision or a courageous action would involve people or property. The ἀδιάφορα were not secondary matters in the sense of something to consider after virtue, but secondary in the sense of being the realm or medium of virtue.[129] The portrayal of wisdom as a craft was a metaphorical structure underlying the reasoning on the intermediates. The range of the craftsman's task is illustrated by the fact that the lists of preferreds and dispreferreds are comprised of only stock generic types. They were 'explicitly

agent's development, but this view attributes causality to the intermediates (109, 112, 124) which is at odds with the Stoics' objections to the ability of the intermediates to contribute to the τέλος. It is clear that virtue is able to exist independently of the intermediates, which Lesses' reading contradicts. Lesses, 124–6, also cannot account for the role the intermediates have in the wise man's preferences, if they have a distinct developmental role. The view here is that the preferreds and appropriate activities possess intrinsic value, preferability, and appropriateness as 'features of the world', aspects of the design of cosmic nature which reason recognises and which thus affords a reason for their selection. This value is of a different order than virtue, since it is unable to directly contribute to the τέλος. Due to their intrinsic 'accordance with nature', they are, generally, best-suited to indirectly contribute to the harmonious life, but this relationship cannot be construed along the lines of any causality towards the τέλος or commensurability with virtue. Their role and value is best conceived in light of the characterization of the sage as a craftsman—the carpenter's skill functions differently than his materials. While there are objective reasons for selecting one material over the other, their value is conditioned by circumstances, and their selection is conditioned by availability. When available and consonant with the 'logic' of his craft, the craftsman will select these. However, these materials would never, on their own, produce the final product. Even the best materials are dependent upon his skill, while, even with lesser-quality material, a skilled craftsman can have his way. This view fits with the metaphors of king/court and *talus* positions discussed below (i.e., nearer or 'promoting towards' the goal while never accomplishing it alone) as well as the language of reason 'fulfilling' impulse as a craftsman (DL VII.86), and completing the worthless 'half-lines' of iambic metre (*SVF* 1.566), and the conventional 'goods' 'serving' their guide (Plato, *Euthyd.* 281d–e) as the material of virtue (Plutarch, *Comm. not.,* 1069e). The carpenter has reasons for selecting oak over pine, but this does not suggest a goal of 'finding good wood' (i.e. a second τέλος); his selection is part of his comprehensive skill which recognises the objective value of oak subject to his end of 'making a table'. If the preferred wood is unavailable, he will improvise and still accomplish his goal—it is not a second end, nor is the end dependent upon 'finding good wood'. Recognising such objective value *is* part of the craft, although only in the context of expertise: a child who selects oak without expertise does not have valid reasons. In this way, the teleological grounding simultaneously endorsed and conditioned the impulses associated with the intrinsic value of the intermediates.

[127] Cicero, *Fin.* III.12, 50.

[128] I am grateful to G. Boys-Stones for emphasizing this to me in conversation.

[129] There is debate concerning what the wise man's deliberative model was meant to be, cf. Brennan, 'Psychology', 281–2; Vogt, 'Value', 9–16.

flagged as incomplete': 'it is in the spirit of the Stoic proposal to add to the list of values whatever is in general conducive to human life'.[130]

The association of the preferreds with virtue is explained by way of two more metaphors. The first, given by Cicero, is that of a position of a *talus* (a knucklebone used in the game of *tali*, similar to dice). If the player's aim is that the *talus* stands upright on its narrow side, the position of the *talus* on the narrow side as it fell would be more likely to lead to that end, and thus is preferred over another falling position. That intermediate position of the *talus* does not constitute the end, and that falling position could fail to contribute indirectly to the end, while another position could possibly do so, but it is easy to see how such a position, as a rule, is more useful towards the player's end.[131] The second metaphor, given by Arius and Cicero, and attributed to Zeno, is that of virtue as a king and the preferreds as its court.[132] In naming the primary categories of the ἀδιάφορα 'preferred' and 'dispreferred', Zeno explained such terminology applied to the second-rank, not first: a king is never 'promoted' (an alternate translation of προηγμένα) or 'preferred'. The king himself promotes or prefers other individuals towards himself and, being in the pre-eminent rank, cannot be 'promoted'. The metaphor reiterates the category error of confusing the first and second 'ranks' of value,[133] but also imagines an organic relationship, grounded in reason, between the two orders of value: as reason is the craftsman, it is the king who gathers and holds his court. Further subcategories could be drawn up within the preferreds and dispreferreds categories, a form of diaeresis Arius is especially fond of, with his 'baroque proliferation of forms … and further divisions'.[134] Although his subcategories may have been idiosyncratic, Arius' dominant description of the preferreds is that they are 'according to nature', an emphasis he shares with other sources as will now be seen.

2.5.1.3 According to nature

The objective value of the preferreds was described by their quality of being κατὰ φύσιν, 'according to nature'. The dispreferreds were opposingly παρὰ φύσιν, 'contrary to

[130] DL VII.103. The lists of things that are 'neither' ends with καὶ τὰ τούτοις παραπλήσια. Cf. Vogt, 'Value', 7; Inwood, 'Rules', 100, 111, 126.
[131] Cicero, *Fin.* III.54. Cf. B. S. Hook and S. O. Williams, 'The Simile of the Talus in Cicero, *De Finibus* 3.54', *CPhil* 91 (1996), 59–61. I disagree, however, that the illustration stresses the permanence of the good versus the impermanence of the intermediates—no attention is drawn to its temporal qualities.
[132] Cicero, *Fin.* III.52; Stobaeus, *Ecl.* II.7.7g.
[133] Stobaeus, *Ecl.* II.7.7g: 'no good thing is preferred because it has the greatest value'.
[134] Schofield, 'Ethics', 239; cf. Stobaeus, *Ecl.* II.7.7b–e. Cf. DL VII.107; Stobaeus, *Ecl.* II.7.7b; Cicero, *Fin.* III.56, IV.43.

nature'.[135] As Cato comments on the necessity of selecting amongst the ἀδιάφορα: 'It is the essence of virtue to exercise choice among the things in accordance with nature'.[136] Arius uses the κατὰ φύσιν description almost immediately after introducing the *topos* of the ἀδιάφορα and, in fact, only introduces the terminology of 'preferred' and 'dispreferred' later.[137] Like the references to Nature did for οἰκείωσις, this description functions to ground the use of some ἀδιάφορα in view of the Stoic τέλος.

The excellence of humans, as rational beings, is virtue, but other things could also be natural for them, even if such things are unable directly to constitute the τέλος. The quality of the preferreds as 'according to nature' posits some continuity between them and virtue in ethical reasoning. The analogies of a coin and wealth, step and journey, lamp and sun illustrated distinct weight in ethical reasoning for virtue, but they do not portray the preferreds and virtue as utterly discontinuous. Both are explained as an aspect of Nature's design, and the objective value of the preferreds is a 'feature of the world' in that sense.[138] Both virtue and the preferreds are natural for humans, but only virtue directly contributes to the τέλος. The choice to ground the impulses of οἰκείωσις and the second-order value of the preferreds in Nature 'rescued' a role for conventional 'goods'.[139] The structure also established virtue as the first-order value, as that which Nature had dictated was the unique feature of man, and unconditionally able to ensure εὐδαιμονία.

2.5.1.4 Selected

Inwood draws attention to another feature of the language on the preferreds, namely, that they are those things which are to be 'selected' (ἐκλέγομαι) or 'rejected' (ἀπεκλέγομαι).[140] This is in contrast to virtue, which is to be 'chosen' (αἱρέω) and vice, which is to be 'avoided', or fled from (φεύγω).[141] This distinction is clear in Arius' account, which uses cognates of αἱρέω multiple times to describe contrasting subcategories and divisions

[135] DL VII.107.
[136] Cicero, *Fin.* III.12, cf. III.53, IV.20, V.77-8.
[137] Stobaeus, *Ecl.* II.7.7a.
[138] LS1, 358.
[139] Sedley, 'School', 9.
[140] Inwood, *Action*, 198.
[141] This language is especially prominent in the middle Stoics' reformulations of the τέλος in response to attacks from Academic Sceptics. Cf. DL VII.87–8; Cicero, *Fin.*IV.14–15; LS1, 407–10; LS2, 394–403.

within virtue, but overtly avoids it when speaking of the ἀδιάφορα.[142] Arriving at the *topos* of the ἀδιάφορα, he begins thus:

> Having given an adequate account of the good and the bad, and what is worth choosing and what is to be avoided, and about the goal and happiness, we have thought it necessary also to give an account of what they say about indifferents… as the neither good nor bad, and as what is neither worth choosing nor to be avoided… It is [in this] sense that the things in between virtue and vice are called indifferent by the adherents of this sect, not in view of selection and rejection. Hence as well some things have a selective value, but others have a rejective lack of value, as contributing nothing to the happy life.[143]

Arius identifies the ἀδιάφορα as those things which are *not* chosen or avoided, but instead selected or rejected. The language of selecting (ἐκλέγομαι) and rejecting (ἀπεκλέγομαι) also only appears in Diogenes Laertius' treatment of the ἀδιάφορα, although choosing (αἱρέω) and avoiding (φεύγω) also appear there, so that his use is not as distinct as Arius'.[144] Cicero's account also hints at a distinction between 'selecting' and 'choosing', although it is less clear (the transmission into Latin providing no help in this regard). He does not discuss his translation choices regarding these terms, but there is a pattern whereby some are used of virtue, and others of the preferreds, which is perhaps a distinction derived from his sources.[145] An offhand comment by Piso, who mocks the Stoic penchant for hairsplitting terminology, is telling. He exasperatedly declares that, in his opinion, 'selecting' is a more forceful word than 'desiring' anyway![146]

The practical upshot of this distinction can be interpreted as a more passive reasoning posture towards the preferreds than virtue. One selects a preferred because it is an option presented, not because it merits active choice or desire in the way that virtue does. Health and wealth were the 'default options' of life which one naturally selected, assuming their availability. Their place as 'defaults' represented the conditionally normative value they had, but also the detached assessment they merited. Within the analogy of a coin and wealth, one might consider a person who 'selects' a coin found on the ground wise for doing so (in

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[142] Stobaeus, *Ecl.* II.7.5b, 6h, 5i, 5o, 6f, 7.
[143] Stobaeus, *Ecl.* II.7.7, trans. Pomeroy, *Epitome*, 43. The distinction is also carried out in his ληπτός terminology.
[144] Virtue is 'chosen' (αἱρετός) or 'to-be-chosen' (αἱρετέος), DL VII.89, 92, 99, 101, 115, 118, 124, 126, 130; selecting and rejecting only appear in reference to the intermediates at VII.105. However, here he also uses choosing and avoiding in a way that seems synonymous with selecting and rejecting, but it seems he has confused this distinction, cf. Clement of Alexandria *Strom.* II.21; Epictetus, *Diatr.* IV.7.40.
[145] *Expeto* is used of virtue as that which is 'desired', and a wider variety of terms is used of the preferreds: *selectio, sumo, eligo*, and (conversely, of the dispreferreds) *reicio*. Cicero, *Fin.* III.20; III.59; IV.20; IV.46; IV.71; V.90. Klein, 'Indifferents', 244, fn31, also finds this distinction, citing *Fin.* V.90.
[146] Cicero, *Fin.* V.90.

comparison to *not* picking up the coin), but one may also consider the same person a fool who missed a crucial (wealth-building) business meeting to go out of his way to pick up the same coin. Again, the terminological line-drawing reinforced the Stoic structure: the language of selection for the preferreds and choice for virtue reminded that 'such unreservedly positive attitudes are appropriate only in relation to the good'.[147] The preferreds were also cast as the options *not* 'up to us', and this passive language recognised the limited selections offered in life.[148] As Inwood describes it, 'In pursuing the indifferents a man can be frustrated by events beyond his control, but in the pursuit of good he cannot … Reservation is therefore to be used with selection, while choice need never be reserved …. The good, which is virtue, is certain and reliable and immune to reversal or frustration'.[149] It was wise to select judiciously from what was available, but destructive to actively desire such unstable things. The wise should surely set their hopes on that which could be argued to directly constitute happiness, and on what Nature definitively offered to all people.

Virtue was the only good, vice was the only evil, and everything in between, including the conventional 'goods', was indistinguishable as good or evil and neutral in relation to the τέλος. This categorisation of the conventional 'goods' as 'nothing', was designed to unsettle the conventional values in order to support the first-order value of virtue. However, the subcategory of the 'preferreds' within the ἀδιάφορα, such as health and wealth, was afforded second-order value. These intermediates were closely associated with virtue due to their ability to contribute indirectly to the τέλος. This, along with their value relative to the dispreferreds, provided reason for their selection. As those things 'according to nature', they had objective value as 'features of the world' designed by Nature, but that value was conditional in a way in which the value of virtue was not. The wise would unreservedly choose the good, while evaluating and selecting amongst the intermediates of the ἀδιάφορα with reserve towards the same end.

[147] LS1, 358.
[148] Long, *Hellenistic,* 191–3. The language of 'selection' may be similar to Epictetus' language of 'not up to us', in that it describes things that we may possess (by our selection), but that we must maintain a reserved stance towards since they lie ultimately outside our control.
[149] Inwood, *Action,* 212.

2.5.2 The καθήκοντα

The *topos* of the καθήκοντα (variously translated as 'duties', 'befitting acts', 'appropriate actions', or 'functions')[150] is presented following the topic of the ἀδιάφορα in each of our systematic sources.[151] Arius introduces the new *topos* by simply saying 'consistent with the topic of the preferreds is the topic of the appropriate actions'.[152] As Cicero explains more fully,

> But although we pronounce Moral Worth to be the sole good, it is nevertheless consistent to perform an appropriate act, in spite of the fact that we count appropriate action neither a good nor an evil … since those things which are neither to be counted among virtues nor vices nevertheless contain a factor which can be useful, their element of utility is worth preserving. Again, this neutral class also includes action of a certain kind, viz. such that reason calls upon us to do or to produce some of these neutral things; but an action reasonably performed we call an appropriate act; appropriate action therefore is included in the class which is reckoned neither as good nor the opposite….[153]

The 'appropriate actions' were another category of intermediates found in the neutral category, and determined to be indistinguishable as virtue or vice. Examples of appropriate actions were things such as honouring one's family and nation, marrying, caring for one's health.[154] These καθήκοντα were said to be the activities 'reaching down to' or 'extending to' living beings, and were described as 'following' (ἀκολουθία), actions which were a consequence of life in living beings, even plants.[155] The intermediates included the things preferred, and, related to these, there were also 'appropriate actions' which the Stoics judged to be useful for the rational creature to perform.[156]

2.5.2.1 Rationally-defensible actions

Cicero conspicuously uses the term *ratio* ('reasoning') no less than four times in the above paragraph: the καθήκοντα are defined as those actions for which it is possible to offer a defensible reasoning. Cicero discusses the καθήκοντα at length in *De Officiis* (a treatise based

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[150] While 'duties' is often used, Long, *Hellenistic,* 188, comments that this has a connotation of moral obligation which does not fit the Stoic usage.
[151] DL VII.107-109; Stobaeus, *Ecl.* II.7.8; Cicero, *Fin.* III.58.
[152] Stobaeus, *Ecl.* II.7.8.
[153] Cicero, *Fin.* III.58–9, trans., Rackham, LCL.
[154] Occasionally, the existence of inappropriate actions is also mentioned, cf. DL VII.108–10; Stobaeus, *Ecl.* II.7.8–8a; cf. Cicero, *Off.* I.9.
[155] They were also given a mythical etymology of καθήκω as derived from the phrase κατά τινας ἥκειν, DL VII.108.
[156] On the relationship between the two 'intermediate' categories, cf. Stobaeus, *Ecl.* II.7.8–8a; Cicero, *Fin.* III.60; Cf. Plutarch, *Comm. not.* 1069e.

on the work of the Stoic Panaetius), and he repeats the same definition there.[157] The καθήκοντα are defined in similar fashion by Arius and Diogenes, who says that the καθήκοντα are those actions 'for which a reasonable defence can be made'.[158] Diogenes underscores the association between the καθήκοντα and reason, when he says shortly thereafter that they are those which reason persuades to be done.[159] In short, the possibility of and need for a rational defence supporting the appropriate actions was commented upon repeatedly.

Diogenes connects the καθήκοντα to οἰκείωσις by saying that they are the activities arising out of impulses which are 'according to the appropriate arrangements of nature'.[160] Arius' account confirms this connection by treating the *topos* of impulse (ὁρμή) immediately following the καθήκοντα,[161] stating that 'what moves impulse is nothing other than an impulsive impression of what is fitting'.[162] In other words, the language of καθῆκον and οἰκεῖον was used to describe the assent to an impression which judged that something was 'fitting' or 'appropriate'. This assent, formed with one's self-perception, would coalesce into an impulse. Such impulses, when right (i.e. able to be defended by reason), were the kind that resulted in the appropriate actions. As the καθήκοντα were, along with the categories of the preferreds and dispreferreds, part of the guidance offered to those progressing towards virtue, this construction tied the development of virtue to the earliest impulses of οἰκείωσις. As Long describes it, the doctrine of οἰκειώσις imagines human nature as a 'voice of reason', providing an internal teleological principle which, because of Stoic pantheism, could be conceived as working in perfect harmony with cosmic Nature.[163] The intermediates were imagined as developing out of the earliest impulses, yet could also be described in 'top-down' fashion in line with each of the virtues, as Cicero's (or Panaetius') account does.[164] Like the doctrine of οἰκείωσις, the category of appropriate actions endorsed the conventional views and subjective experiences as conditionally normative. As Long and Sedley explain:

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[157] Cicero, *Off.* I.8.
[158] DL VII.107; Stobaeus, *Ecl.* II.7.8.
[159] DL VII. 108–9.
[160] DL VII.108: εἶναι ταῖς κατὰ φὐσιν κατασκευαῖς οἰκεῖον.
[161] Stobaus, *Ecl.* II.7.9–10e; cf. Cicero, *Fin.* III.21–22.
[162] Stobaus, *Ecl.* II.7.9. Epictetus often expresses something similar with an even wider range of vocabulary, including οἰκεῖον, as pointed out by Brennan, 'Psychology', 268. Citing Epictetus, *Diatr.* I.2.5–6; I.19.8–15; I.28.1–7; III.22.43.
[163] Long, *Stoic Studies,* 176. As Gill, *Self*, 37–8, describes it, the claim is that 'nature "appropriates" or "owns" each animal by appropriating it to itself'. Nature, the largest, most complex holistic system appropriates the smaller, holistic system (the living being) by that system's own appropriation of itself.
[164] Cicero, *Off.* I.15–16.

> On these foundations the Stoic will seek to erect a moral theory which takes account of the fact that human reason must be the ultimate arbiter of what is appropriate to human nature… 'Appropriation' as something innate and animal-like is only a foundation, a beginning. But our 'appropriate' attitudes of self-love, affection toward kindred, choice towards external property, are not forgotten in the fully developed doctrine of the virtues.[165]

2.5.2.2 The καθήκοντα as κατορθώματα

There is an additional subcategory within the καθήκοντα, a perfection of the appropriate actions called the κατορθώματα, often translated as 'right acts' or 'complete acts'.[166] Although overlooked by Diogenes, Cicero and Arius discuss this topic, and it is attested by other fragments.[167] Arius states that the κατορθώματα are complete (τέλειος) actions performed virtuously, such as acting justly. The καθήκοντα, he clarifies, are not done virtuously and thus are classified as intermediates (μέσα).[168] He later places κατορθώματα in contrast to ἁμαρτήματα, which he defines as actions performed contrary to right reason (παρὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον), or as neglect of a rational creature to perform καθήκοντα (ἢ ἐν ᾧ παραλέλειπταί τι καθῆκον ὑπὸ λογικοῦ ζώου).[169] Thus the καθήκοντα can either be done in an 'intermediate' sense, as appropriate but not virtuous, or they can be neglected (when neglected by a rational creature, then ἁμαρτήματα), or be completed by virtue and then κατορθώματα.[170] Cicero's account also discusses this perfection (*perfectum*) of the καθήκοντα, and states that without it, they are incomplete (*inchoatum*) actions.[171] This is reminiscent of Cleanthes' description of the impulses according to nature as 'half-lines' of iambic metre completed (τελειωθέντας) by the wise man's virtue.[172] Cicero explains the distinction with an

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[165] LS1, 352–3.
[166] This category is a distinction between the προήγμενα and καθήκοντα. The preferreds are not given the possibility of 'perfection' into virtue as the appropriate actions are. This is likely due to the fact that the latter are explicitly actions. The Stoics treat rationality as the unique or excellent function of the human animal, as Aristotle did (*NE* I.7.9–17=1098a), and also described reason as an active divine principle. Thus, an appropriate *action* necessarily includes the possibility of virtue (or error) and was able to be perfected into virtuous actions. As the actions of rational beings, they also cannot be utterly neutral since, in Stoic theory, all are either wise or non-wise. The appropriate actions of the non-wise are instead described as 'intermediate' (μέσος), Stobaeus, *Ecl.* II.7.8–8a.
[167] *SVF* III.500–23. Usually as perfected (τελέω), but this could also be described with the language of πληρόω, since virtue could complete such intermediates into the τέλος by its ability to constitute it, cf. Epictetus, *Diatr.* II.9.1–12; II.10.4, 7.
[168] Stobaeus, *Ecl.* II.7.8, 8a.
[169] Stobaeus, *Ecl.* II.7.11a. Cf. II.7.8a.
[170] Stobaeus, *Ecl.* II.7.11a.
[171] Cicero, *Fin.* III.59; cf. Seneca, *Ep.* 118.17.
[172] *SVF* 1.566

example: repaying a trust is an appropriate action; one repaid 'justly' is a right act.[173] In *De Officiis*, Cicero divides the appropriate acts into 'mean' duties (*medium officium*) and complete, right duties (*perfectum officium rectum*) and specifies that he refers to the καθήκοντα and κατορθώματα.[174] Although Diogenes does not discuss the κατορθώματα, he gives two divisions for the καθήκοντα, which perhaps evidence that he is wrestling with a similar distinction. He divides the καθήκοντα into those that are appropriate only in particular circumstances and those that are not dependent upon circumstances to be appropriate: the latter is illustrated by maintaining health and the former by maiming oneself. In other words, circumstances can alter an action that would normally be deemed inappropriate into the appropriate action.[175] Next, Diogenes divides the καθήκοντα into actions which are always (ἀεί) appropriate or those which are not always appropriate; it is always appropriate to live virtuously while other activities, such as walking, may not always be appropriate.[176] This second category sounds to attempt to delineate between the intermediate καθήκοντα and the perfect ones associated with virtue (but which are *also* appropriate). The appropriate actions, then, are intermediate actions advised to those progressing, but those same actions are able to be perfected into right actions when done virtuously, so that the wise man's κατορθώματα would include, or simultaneously exist as, the καθήκοντα.[177] In this way, the Stoic structure is shot through with the notions of appropriateness and naturalness from their portrayal of the earliest impulses to the fully rational actions of the virtuous, which were evaluated by reason in harmony with Nature.

2.5.2.3 Extensional activities

The wise man's complete 'right actions' are also 'appropriate actions', but the distinction between the two types of action is worth examining. As Cicero's comment on repaying a trust indicated, it is the addition of virtue (there, justice) that makes an appropriate action a fully right action.[178] The example draws attention to the way in which an appropriate action is identical to a right action from the external vantage point of the action performed, and yet distinct from it in regards to the disposition of the acting agent. The appropriate and

[173] Cicero, *Fin.* III.59.
[174] Cicero, *Off.* I.8.
[175] DL VII.109; Epictetus, *Diatr.* II.5.24.
[176] DL VII.105. Cf. Stobaeus, *Ecl.* II.7.8.
[177] LS1, 365–6.
[178] LS1, 366. Cf. Annas, *Happiness*, 97–8.

right actions were not different actions in every way: both are the action of returning a deposit. Seneca describes this feature of his behaviour regarding selection of intermediates:

> I shall seek them, but not because they are goods—I shall seek them because they are according to nature and because they will be acquired through the exercise of good judgment on my part. What, then, will be good in them? This alone—that it is a good thing to choose them. For when I don suitable attire, or walk as I should, or dine as I ought to dine, it is not my dinner, or my walk, or my dress that are goods, but the deliberate choice which I show in regard to them… if I have the choice, I shall choose health and strength, but the good involved will be my judgment regarding these things, and not the things themselves.[179]

Vander Waerdt explains that Stoic discussion of actions can be characterised from the aspects of the extensional and intensional. When the sources describe a right action as 'prudent walking', the extensional referent is 'walking': 'an objective description of the content of the action performed… *what* the action is'. 'Prudently' is the intensional aspect of the same function: 'an adverbial specification of the motivation with which the action in question is performed… *how* a virtuous action is performed, i.e., the agent's disposition'.[180] While the appropriateness of the extensional aspect could be dependent upon circumstances, the intensional aspect of all the wise man's actions guarantees 'moral infallibility', the actions' 'rightness'.

The identical extensional content of the καθήκοντα of the non-wise, and the κατορθώματα of the wise means that the same action, whilst being categorised as appropriate can, in actual fact, occur as an error, as an appropriate but not virtuous action, or as the fully virtuous (and appropriate) action of the wise man. Cicero states that an honourable action done for selfish reasons would no longer be courageous, and an action not done for the common good is 'contrary to nature' rather than appropriate.[181] Seneca gives the example of hosting a banquet: if it is done for the purpose of gluttony it is shameful, but if for the purpose of diplomacy, admirable. Virtue lies in the *way* something is done (*quemadmodum*).[182] The categorisation of some actions as 'appropriate', however, was useful for those progressing, as advised actions deemed to be generally 'rationally defensible'. Performed by those progressing (i.e. not by fools performing them 'contrary to reason' as the

[179] Seneca, *Ep.* XCII.11–3, trans. Gummere, LCL, 453–5.
[180] P. A. Vander Waerdt, 'The Original Theory of Natural Law', *SPhiloA* 15 (2003) 17–34 (29). Cf. LS1, 367 for the same language. 'Extensional' and 'intensional' describe, respectively, the referent and sense of a statement, or denotation and meaning. The 'intensional' aspect of a statement or definition is the epistemological perspective which the agent has to the properties of the referent.
[181] Cicero, *Off.* I.62; III.29-30.
[182] Seneca, *Ep.* XCV.36–56. At XCV.57 it is a 'state of mind' (*habitus animi*).

gluttonous host), such activities were done 'according to reason', but not fully 'right reason'. In other words, the one who hosts for the purpose of diplomacy may not have full harmony with Nature and perform the action with virtue, but he could be honing his craft, training in virtue.[183] The same extensional activity, performed according to 'right reason', with a consistent and correct intensional disposition, would be the wise man's virtuous action. In fact, *everything* the wise man does is right action, even if the extensional activity would not normally be categorised as appropriate, and even if, under normal circumstances, the activity could be judged *in*appropriate.[184] The wise man has no need of set lists or the injunctions for those progressing since he is directed by a natural 'law', his reason in harmony with Nature; this 'law', Chrysippus reportedly said, unfailingly commands right action (κατόρθωμα) and prohibits error (ἁμάρτημα).[185] The possibility of the wise man's right actions including something normally judged *in*appropriate can be accounted for by the subcategory of the καθήκοντα mentioned by Diogenes, actions only appropriate in particular circumstances. Such normally-inappropriate, but right actions of the wise, would not be included in the standard 'types' since they would be unusual and dependent upon conditional factors which the wise would be capable of taking into account.

Since the same extensional activity could be performed virtuously, appropriately, or even viciously, the set lists of the activities of the καθήκοντα could only function as 'rules of thumb' or 'at the level of general types'.[186] Such lists could not, by any means, guarantee the correctness of any particular action and they only described them as right actions by 'vacuous descriptions which contain a built-in reference to virtue or vice: "prudent walking"'.[187] As all the Stoic doctrines established, assenting to anything but virtue as 'good' was a disastrous categorical error, and describing the καθήκοντα as appropriate and natural was not intended to prescribe what *must* be done (as demonstrated by the identification by Arius and Diogenes of actions which were *always* to be done and *must* be done as virtuous actions). As Kidd explains, the lists of intermediates were only hypothetical imperatives implying 'may', but

[183] Cf. LS1, 365.
[184] Cf. LS1, 365–6; cf. Philo, *Cher.* 14–15, where an inappropriate action, such as lying, can be done 'rightly'.
[185] Plutarch, *Stoic. rep*. 1037d. The Stoics held that the wise never erred, and that all the non-wise were utterly fools; DL VII.123, 126–9.
[186] The language of Inwood, 'Rules', 100, 111, 126. Cf. LS1, 429. Vander Waerdt, 'Law', 21, argues that the problem of exceptions to conventional codes led (in part) to the redefinition of 'law' as the sage's reason: 'Zeno argues that all moral rules are subject to exception in ways that render any rule-based model of moral reasoning continually exposed to moral error'. The recognition of the categories' limitations also reflects the focus of ancient ethics on the 'executive virtues', cf. T. Morgan, *Popular Morality in the Early Roman Empire* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 179–81; Annas, *Happiness*, 7–13.
[187] Inwood, 'Rules', 103. Cf. 111, 126; LS2, 365.

not 'must'. The Stoics repeatedly stated that there were times when it was rational to abandon the set categories.[188] To drive this point home, the early scholarchs claimed that at times incest and cannibalism might be the most rational action (later Stoics used less-shocking examples such as amputation, when it is normally preferable to seek health).[189] Regarding lawcodes, Inwood notes that this results in the 'paradox of justified law-breaking',[190] a possibility Cicero and Philo wrestle with in Stoic terms.[191] Cicero offers an example: while the injunctions and laws to return borrowed property is a useful 'rule of thumb' based on an impulse to justice, if one has borrowed a knife from one who subsequently goes mad (and to return it would result in harm), the wise realise that this law must be broken for justice to be done.[192] Such examples recur in the literature to underscore the impossibility of identifying virtue with any list of activities. As with the lists of the preferreds, the lists of appropriate actions are not exhaustive; as Long and Sedley explain, '"Consequentiality in life", or what admits of "reasonable justification" … should be interpreted generously enough to accommodate anything a wise man would choose to do as well as conventional morality'.[193]

2.5.2.4 De Officiis *and its 'four* personae*'*

The indeterminate nature of the lists of intermediates, and the ability of such categories to adapt malleably to particular circumstances and agents is nicely demonstrated by Cicero's treatise on the καθήκοντα, *De Officiis.* This treatise is an important source of information on this *topos*, since Cicero states that it is based, at least in the case of the first two books, on a work by the Stoic Panaetius.[194] Cicero, relying on Panaetius, explains that the procedure by which to consider properly one's appropriate actions is threefold.[195] Firstly, one must consider whether an action is virtue or vice.[196] Secondly (assuming it does not clearly conflict with virtue or participate in vice), one considers whether the action will bring some advantage (*utilitas*), such as wealth, power, or something else otherwise helpful to oneself or others. Thirdly, one must make careful judgements when what seems (*videor*) to

[188] Kidd, 'Rules', 252–3.
[189] DL VII.121; *SVF* III.743–53; Epictetus, *Diatr.* II.5.20; III.24.60; III.26.24; IV.1.159; Kidd, 'Rules', 252.
[190] Inwood, 'Striker', 101. Cf. DL VII.122; Vander Waerdt, 'Law', 32.
[191] Cicero, *Off.* III.95; Philo, *Cher.* 14–5.
[192] A well-known example from Socrates, Plato, *Resp.* I.331c. Cf. LS1, 436.
[193] LS1, 366.
[194] Cicero, *Off.* I.6–7. The extent to which Cicero reproduces Panaetius' work is a matter of debate.
[195] Cicero, *Off.* I.9.
[196] This is *honestum*, probably chosen to reflect Cicero's political interests which will be further reflected in the motif of *gloria* in the treatise. While at times the term references Stoic virtue, *honestum* also includes other notions, such as honour.

be advantageous seems (*videor* again) to conflict (*pugno*) with what is virtuous. Cicero will go one to argue that this final consideration is a spurious deliberation, since, in Stoic doctrine, nothing could be judged advantageous if it was in conflict with virtue.[197]

In his presentation of Stoic ethics in *De Finibus*, Cicero begins with the impulses of οἰκείωσις, then ascends through rational selection of natural things into the development of virtue. In *De Officiis*, perhaps due to his reliance on Panaetius, Cicero's presentation is different, beginning by describing the cardinal virtues and then detailing the appropriate actions associated with each. As Dyck explains, this 'top-down' approach possibly reflects earlier Stoic treatises, since Chrysippus is said to have written one on the κατορθώματα, which could have framed the appropriate actions within the *topos* of the virtues.[198] After addressing each of the cardinal virtues, Cicero elaborates on the activities described as *decorum*.[199] One fascinating mode of analysis, which he elaborates upon in I.107–121, is that known as the 'four *personae*'. Here Cicero explains that consideration of appropriate actions should take into account the *personae* each person has: firstly, the universal character every person has (rationality), secondly, the character given specifically to each person (*quae proprie singulis est tributa*), thirdly, the character imposed by chance and circumstances, and, finally, the character applied by one's choices. He spends significant time describing the various possible characteristics of the second *persona*, that given in particular to each person: physical speed, strength, and attractiveness, wit, geniality, graciousness in conversation, etc. Examples include fellow senators, Socrates, Hannibal, and Odysseus amongst others.[200] This second *persona* can be so distinct and determinative that it made suicide an appropriate choice for Cato when it might have been a crime for others.[201]

Gill argues that, although this account is striking in antiquity for its 'interest in actual, differentiated, human beings', a close reading also demonstrates that the possibilities and characteristics are still socially determined.[202] *Persona* alludes to the metaphor of an actor's

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[197] Cicero, *Off.* III.11–13. Cf. II.9; III.20, 27, 34. Cf. Seneca, *Ep.* CXX.1–3.
[198] A. R. Dyck, *A Commentary on Cicero, De Officiis* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996), 58; cf. Plutarch, *Stoic. rep.* 1041a. LS1, 368, describe this feature as a 'grounding of "proper functions" in the sphere of activity peculiar to each of the cardinal virtues'. It illustrates the possibility of analysing appropriate actions 'both ascendingly, by reference to the individual's evolving rationality… and descending, by reference to the virtues which are their ultimate fulfilment and justification'.
[199] Per Cicero, *Off.* I.93, this noun is meant to refer to the qualities described verbally by πρέπω, πρεπόντως, although it is infused with aristocratic Roman conventions in Cicero's use, cf. I.125–51.
[200] Cicero, *Off.* I.107–14. Dyck, *Commentary,* 285, notes that the Greek *exempla* used here support the argument that this material is from Panaetius (Cicero prefers Roman *exempla*).
[201] Cicero, *Off.* I.112.
[202] C. Gill, 'Personhood and Personality: The Four-Personae Theory of Cicero', in *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* VI (Oxford: Clarendon, 1988), 169–99 (170–1).

role, which had a long history in Stoic thought. Epictetus also alludes to the metaphor in discussing particular social roles,[203] but his use is less focused than Cicero's (or Panaetius') on selection amongst the possibilities and, instead, more concerned to accept what is 'up to us': for him, one's role is cast by the playwright (Nature).[204] The interest of both in properly fulfilling roles and responsibilities within the conventional social structures again demonstrates the Stoic concern (unlike the Cynics) to uphold such structures. The available parts were a rather limited selection for most actors, and many would play the same parts. On the other hand, the motif recognised that what was appropriate for one might not be for another, and that in determining one's appropriate actions, 'one must use one's own nature as a yardstick in making choices.'[205] Such particular *personae* are not to be despised, but to be persisted in as long as they are not vicious—the second (or third or fourth) character (such as that given by circumstances) must not conflict with the first (rationality). The wise man is an actor who cannot choose which play he is cast in, or even the assortment of roles available to him, but he can assess his own characteristics and circumstances, and select the role and interpretation best-suited for himself. In so doing, he exercises his rational abilities and performs the work of wisdom by his intensional disposition as he selects extensional activities. Given that the καθήκοντα were dependent upon circumstances, and that the lists are only general types, the wise man was like the appraiser at the market, taking many factors into account. The range of appropriate actions was wide, stretching to incorporate particularities and changes over time, but the commanding faculty of the rational animal provided stability. Epictetus speaks of the roles a wise man might adopt as needed and asks, if we take the mask and props from the actor, is he still there? 'If he has a voice, he remains'.[206] The discussion of *personae* and roles recognised conventional social structures and the interplay of the wise man's reason with the wide variety of roles and circumstances he could face.

[203] Epictetus, *Diatr.* I.29.41–49; II.10.1–5.
[204] Epictetus, *Diatr.* I.29.41–49; *Ench.* 17; *Gnom.* 11; DL VII.160. Gill, 'Theory', 182, 192, notes that this reflects the socially-competitive and elite stratum of society within which Cicero writes.
[205] Dyck, *Commentary,* 279. Gill, 'Theory', argues that the account is less focused on what distinguishes individuals *from* each other than the characteristics that make one *distinguished.* As such, 'Its function is rather to identify certain key normative reference-points in rational, moral choice...' (176). Gill is correct to emphasise the overlapping social and conventional constraints operative in the account. However, Cicero's statements indicate that the *personae* do individuate selections. Gill admits, 178, that 'the stress on using oneself as a normative reference-point is especially strong in Cicero's discussion'.
[206] Epictetus, *Diatr.* I.29.41–7.

2.5.2.5 Advantage

As stated above, in *De Officiis,* Cicero first defines καθήκοντα as rationally-defensible actions, then explains the procedure outlined by Panaetius for considering such determinations. To determine an action to be rationally defensible, it seems, one must consider whether it clearly involved virtue or vice, and then whether the activity in question could bring something useful to oneself or others. This second consideration occupies the second book of *De Officiis* and is, Cicero states, entirely a deliberation about *utilitas.* This term is Cicero's translation choice for the Greek συμφέρον, 'advantage', a term which is often associated with virtue in Stoic literature.[207] Given the strict identification of ἀγαθόν and ὠφέλεια with virtue, the Stoics were unlikely to make the tactical error of admitting 'advantage' to be reliably secured by anything but virtue. Although it is not a prominent term, it does appear, as would therefore be expected, in the descriptions of virtue.[208] As Dyck describes it, 'the Stoics' policy on the expedient, then, was to accept it as desirable but to annex it to the good'.[209] However, the term was perhaps less contentious in so far as it did not feature in the debates over virtue in the way that ἀγαθόν did. It did however appear in descriptions of the intermediates and things besides virtue.[210] The term is not prominent in other discussions of the καθήκοντα, though, in the way that it is in Cicero's account, and some have argued that it was Panaetius' innovation to feature it in the assessment of intermediates.[211]

The procedure Panaetius advises, as well as specific statements from Cicero, make clear that this criterion should not be used to introduce competition between the intermediates and virtue. The first consideration to be made is whether an activity is virtuous or vicious, and if neither is an operative factor, *then* advantage is to be considered. Furthermore, Cicero explains, if something is judged advantageous but is in conflict with virtue, then it only *seems* advantageous: there cannot be genuine conflict between virtue and advantage.[212] According to Stoic doctrine, anything which is virtuous is advantageous, and if an activity is in conflict

[207] Dyck, *Commentary*, 17, 353; P. G. Walsh, *Cicero: On Obligations: A New Translation by P. G. Walsh* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), xxix.
[208] DL VII.99; Cicero, *Off.* III.11 11; Stobaeus, *Ecl.* II.7.5d, 11h, 5b2; Epictetus, *Diatr.* I.22.1–14; II.17.10; II.24.15; IV.7.9-10.
[209] Dyck, *Commentary,* 353.
[210] Epictetus, *Diatr.* I.2.5; I.28.5; II.22.15–20, 26; III.14.6; Stobaeus, *Ecl.* II.7.11d; 11m.
[211] Dyck, *Commentary,* 354; A. A. Long, 'Cicero's Politics in *De Officiis*' in *Justice and Generosity: Studies in Hellenistic Social and Political Philosophy* (eds. A. Laks and M. Schofield; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 213–40 (239). Cf. Plutarch, *Stoic. rep.* 1038a.
[212] Cicero, *Off.* I.9–10.

with virtue, it is impossible for it to be advantageous.[213] While Panaetius may have used συμφέρον as a separate evaluative factor to be used of the intermediates, he (and Cicero) are alert to its need to be used in line with the good and virtue rather than as an equally-weighted, competing criterion.[214] The common perception that *honestum* and *utilitas* can be separated, so that something could be determined advantageous while not moral, is, Cicero says, like a plague upon humanity.[215] Epictetus does not feature advantage as a separate criterion for καθήκοντα, but he uses it to make the same argument. He warns that if one puts his συμφέρον in one scale and virtue and appropriate actions in the other, the latter will all be destroyed, outweighed by συμφέρον.[216] For this reason, συμφέρον and καλόν must be kept together.[217] Cicero discusses the problematic nature of *gloria*, which he realises is often in conflict with justice. He argues that it should not be pursued for its own sake, but could be advantageous if selected on the basis of virtue.[218] Anything which seemed advantageous, but came into conflict with the good was *not* advantageous; this is what the refusal to separate advantage from virtue was meant to make clear. Epictetus explains that this is what the passions are: a judgement of advantageousness will lead to impulse, and when divided from virtue it was, of course, a dangerous impulse. It is impossible to judge something fitting or advantageous (here, he uses συμφέρον and καθῆκον synonymously) and still desire something else.[219]

It seems likely, then, that συμφέρον was used, at least by Panaetius, to evaluate the καθήκοντα when considering them. Some Stoic usages of the term referenced the evaluation of intermediates, but it was a term still primarily associated with virtue. As such, the criterion could not be used to contradict the uniquely beneficial nature of virtue—if something was judged advantageous but conflicted with virtue, then it only *seemed* advantageous. Misjudgements resulting in the passions were usually derived from this kind of confusion, which judged something advantageous but led one into conflict with virtue. On the other hand, it was perhaps acknowledged that the καθήκοντα, when used on the basis of virtue, could be evaluated in terms of advantage.

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[213] Cicero, *Off.* III.11; cf. III.20, 34; Epictetus, *Diatr.* II.7.1–10.
[214] Epictetus, *Diatr.* I.2.5; II.17.10 may indicate shorthand for the two orders of value: 'good and evil', 'useful and useless'.
[215] Cicero, *Off.* II.9.
[216] Epictetus, *Diatr.* II.22.18. Cf. II.22.27–28; I.28.5.
[217] Epictetus, *Diatr.* II.22.21.
[218] Long, '*De Officiis'*, 227, 231.
[219] Epictetus, *Diatr.* I.18.1–3.

2.5.3 Conclusion to the intermediates

The intermediates are the selections and activities ascribed second-order value, deemed appropriate and in accordance with nature in Stoic ethical theory. These preferreds and appropriate actions were strictly distinguished from the good of virtue and the evil of vice, and thus they were neutral in relation to the τέλος. Because of this categorisation, they were to be selected with reserve in contrast to the unreserved choice of virtue. The lists given of the intermediates were not exhaustive, but general types meant to endorse the objective value in the conventional 'goods', social structures, and practices. This objective value, though, was conditional in two interrelated ways.

First, the value of the intermediates was conditional in relation to virtue and vice, as the structure of Stoic ethics illustrates generally, and Panaetius' procedure for deliberating on the appropriate actions illustrates specifically.[220] The Stoic arguments for the unconditional ability of virtue to benefit, as well as the the inability of the conventional 'goods' to contribute directly to the τέλος, made the intermediates dependent upon virtue for benefit. The consequence of this state of affairs was, as Socrates concludes his dialogue saying, that one must be prepared to do anything in the pursuit of virtue. If a particular selection of a preferred, or the performance of an appropriate action, stood in conflict with virtue or participated in vice under the circumstances, it was not to be selected. This possibility does not nullify the objective value of the intermediates, but its value is irrelevant in that particular scenario since virtue or vice is in play—to select it in such circumstances is like losing wealth for a coin. Likewise, the vicious use of an intermediate does not negate the objective preferability of, say, wealth over poverty, but it does demonstrate the higher-order neutrality of the intermediates. The wise man takes the objective value of the intermediates into account, but knows that their value is conditional upon any conflict with virtue. Since the first-order value of virtue is incommensurable with the second-order value of the intermediates, if the selection of an intermediate conflicts with virtue, its objective value is no longer the 'paramount consideration' to be made in the circumstances.[221] Inwood summarises the intermediates' conditionality in the case of conflict with virtue:

> I suggest that we should think of the relation between preferred things and the good in this way. An adult continues to pursue those things which are preferred, but always in such a way that in case of a conflict with his pursuit of the good the impulse to the good will override his selection of the preferred thing… This seems to be the practical significance of the often repeated statements that virtue alone is to be chosen for its

[220] LS1, 358; Annas, *Happiness,* 121, 171; Inwood, *Action*, 210.
[221] LS1, 358.

> own sake and that the good has a kind of value different in kind from that of natural things… Seneca describes the relation of lower virtues to wisdom in terms which make it clear that *in cases of conflict* one must let morality be the overriding determinant in action… Gellius puts the points clearly: 'if there be some external obstacle… which is a thing to be rejected (*incommodum*), it is disdained.' When the Stoics say that we select the natural things but choose the good, this seems to be what they mean. In cases of conflict the good always comes first.[222]

Second, the value of the intermediates was conditional upon other factors. This is a feature that the subcategories wrestle with, as well as Cicero's section on the four *personae*. Some intermediates were preferred in all circumstances, others only in particular circumstances (e.g. health and amputation). Ascribing value to a particular selection or action depended not only upon its lack of conflict with virtue, but also upon numerous other factors. The philosopher might marry, if he finds someone likeminded and society is able to produce such a partner for him.[223] Seneca's selection of his menu and attire are conditioned by his social status.[224] Suicide was appropriate for some, but not for others. Opportunity introduced different selections to some and limited them for others. What was 'useful' to contribute indirectly to the harmonious life was different for Marcus Aurelius than for Zeno. There was a wide range of stock intermediates which, given typical 'market conditions', would have value for most—life, health, marriage, family—but the unfixed nature of the lists indicated that the intermediates could vary widely. The fact that the intermediates' value depends upon these circumstantial factors also intersects with the fact that an intermediate's value depends upon its lack of conflict with virtue. Because of Stoicism's pantheistic cosmology, there was theoretically no conflict between the intermediates and virtue, since both were 'according to nature'. Any conflict between virtue and intermediates was thus attributed to 'circumstances' which could temporarily alter the value of the intermediates (such as the appropriateness of returning property, altered by madness into inappropriate). However, circumstances were also responsible for the variety of intermediates, which didn't necessarily create a conflict with

[222] Inwood, *Action,* 210, citing *SVF* III.181. Cf. Cicero, *Fin.* III.23–25. Per Cicero, natural impulses are like an old friend who introduces you to a new friend (wisdom), who soon eclipses the old friend in value. One would hope to maintain friendship with both, but if the two were at odds, one would be loyal to the more valued friendship.
[223] Epictetus, *Diatr.* III.22.69.
[224] Seneca, *Ep.* XCII.11–13.

virtue, but simply multivalence and fluidity.[225] As Cicero says, in order to factor all this into evaluations, wise men must be 'calculators of duty' (*ratiocinatores officiorum*).[226]

2.6 The Relationship between Virtue and the Intermediates

The Stoics' critics were quick to sniff out a contradiction in their system. How could they exclude the intermediates from contributing to the τέλος, defined as 'living in agreement with nature', and simultaneously describe those same intermediates as 'preferred', and even 'according to nature'? The way in which Stoics conceived of the impulses and appropriate actions as the starting points of virtue, the 'training ground' of the skill of selection which led to consistent reason, heightened this sense of contradiction.[227] While the Stoics were well-prepared to defend their exclusion of the conventional 'goods' from 'good', their description of the same conventional 'goods' as 'preferred', 'appropriate', and 'natural' was less defensible. It is perhaps the case that the value of the conventional 'goods' could be so safely assumed that Zeno did not need to develop these arguments in his debates. The strange result, noted by Klein, is that 'surviving characterizations of indifferents are for the most part negative, so that it is easier to show what the role of indifferents in Stoic theory is not than to provide a detailed positive account of the doctrine'.[228] The categories of the intermediates, and their quality as 'according to nature', were a fixture throughout the literature, though, and were clearly important features for them rather than an ill-conceived misstep.

Although the relationship between the intermediates and virtue is not discussed (or perhaps did not survive) in as much detail as scholars would like, there are a few explanations in the literature, and some credible suggestions in line with the structure of their theory. As mentioned, Cicero gives an account of how impulses develop into rationality, and, finally,

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[225] The conditionality did not negate the objective second-order value. To argue that intermediates were so conditional as to afford no preferences is the argument attributed to Aristo(n), Sextus Empiricus, *Math.* XI.64–7. LS1, 358: 'Aristo's objection does not show that there are no *natural* preferences, but only that circumstances can alter preferences'.

[226] Cicero, *Off.* I.59.

[227] 'Starting point' is based on Cleanthes' use of ἀφορμή of impulse, Stobaeus, *Ecl.* II.7.5b8; Cf. Chrysippus' statement that there is nowhere to begin (ἄρχομαι) towards virtue except by the intermediates, Plutarch, *Comm. not.* 1069e. Cf. Cicero, *Leg.* I.27, 30, specifically in relation to justice.

[228] Klein, 'Indifferents', 235. I. G. Kidd, 'Stoic Intermediates and the End for Man', in *Problems in Stoicism* (ed. A. A. Long; London: Athlone Press, 1971), 150–72 (151), concurs: '… the difficulty is focused on *ta kata physin* and their relationship to the *summum bonum*'. Cf. Long, 'Carneades', 89. Inwood, *Action,* 210: '[T]hese critics are driving at a point worth making. Because of the radical transformation of human nature when reason supervenes, there is a serious question to be asked about how the two kinds of value are related to each other… This is a crucial question for the old Stoics, and unfortunately we do not have an explicitly formulated answer among the fragments which survive'.

virtue. He explains that the mind arrives at the notion of good by way of analogy to other things, although the goodness of virtue is still different in kind, and not degree. This is like acquiring the sense of 'sweetness' by eating foods, but also recognizing that none of them can compare with the sweetness of honey.[229] As Long explains, 'According with Nature takes the place of sweetness in the illustration'.[230] Although the intermediates and virtue are incommensurable, they both can be discussed, and their differing values explained, in reference to nature. The Stoic system which identifies Nature with divine reason, and with the actual events of the cosmos, creates considerable confusion at some points, but it enables 'nature' to refer to Nature in the cosmic sense and to the 'nature' of things within that cosmos. While they are connected logically and materially, they remain distinct. The Stoics postulate that Nature programmes the nature of specific living things with impulses (plants, animals, and humans) for self-preservation: they are 'natural' both in the sense that they accord with that being's nature, and in the sense that they are part of Nature's design. Because humans are the 'rational animal', these impulses are designed by Nature as starting points for virtue, and should develop into virtue. Humans are thereby capable of grasping their own nature accordingly, and discriminating appropriately from their environment, as animals do. However, humans, as rational, are capable of more complex appropriation (other people, for example), and, quite importantly, are capable of grasping not just their own nature, but Nature. Because they possess rationality, they can deduce divine reason and assent to it, and they can perfect the function of rationality into perfect harmony with Nature, both as it is perceived to be organised and as it actually happens. The Stoics arduously insist that this final possibility, a person's consistent, perfect harmony with divine reason, is of an entirely different order than an infant rooting for a nipple, or even the instinctive care most have for family and friends. Long argues that much of what the wise man's rationality entails is his ability not only to perceive his own nature as 'part' of the whole, but to perceive the 'whole' within which he fits.[231] The intermediates and virtue can both be described as being in 'accordance with nature', since Nature programmes human nature for both, and both consequently accord with human nature. In practical terms, however, they are incommensurable. Virtue is the unique function of humans, the perfection of their nature, and it alone is capable of constituting the τέλος of perfect harmony with Nature. The intermediates are unable to do this, and thus can only stand in indirect relation to the τέλος.

[229] Cicero, *Fin.* III.33–34.
[230] Long, *Hellenistic*, 201.
[231] Long, *Hellenistic*, 179–83.

The intermediates are understood to be able to contribute indirectly to the τέλος in two crucial ways: as Cicero's text asserts, firstly, they provide the analogy by which the quality of 'according to nature' is recognised, and, secondly, they are the materials employed by reason, the 'work of wisdom'.[232]

These two indirect contributions of the intermediates are referenced by several Stoic comments. The impulses can be 'guides', and they are, as Cicero puts it, like a friend who introduces you to another friend who grows even more dear.[233] Some texts portray distinct phases of development from infanthood, adulthood, to sagehood.[234] This process is portrayed in chronological sequence because of the time required for human maturation to develop rationality, the 'end point' of the impulses. Virtue, however, is conceived not just as the next step in a smooth progression, but as an 'all-or-nothing' transformation: a person under the water is always underneath the surface no matter how close or far he or she is to it.[235] It is also not the case that the intermediate practices are only a transitional phase, something left behind in the mature phase. Instead, the intermediates, having 'introduced' the rational being to 'accordance with nature', play an ongoing role as his conditionally normative selections and actions, but performed as fully right actions. The development of his virtuous disposition, however, alters his relation to these actions, and their quality.[236] This last point is discussed by Seneca, who explains that we think something is merely 'difficult to divide' right up until the moment we determine it 'indivisible', at which it becomes something quite different.[237] There are many things which agree with nature, but are nevertheless not 'good', he explains, because they are too 'light' (*leve*) and one should think little of them (*contemno*). The good not only agrees with nature, but completely follows nature (*si perfecte secundum naturam est*), which gives it *magnitudo*. The development into virtue, he explains, is not just an increase, but a change in quality (presumably in the same selections and actions). One illustration he provides is that of the capstone of an arch: this addition stamps upon the

[232] Long, *Hellenistic,* 193–4; Inwood, *Action*, 205–6. 'Work of wisdom' is from Cicero, *Fin.* III.50; cf. III.12.
[233] Cicero, *Fin.* III.23.
[234] Cicero, *Fin.* III.16–25; Philo, *Leg.* I.93–4; Seneca, *Ep.* CXXI.14–17.
[235] Cicero, *Fin.* III.48. Gill, *Self*, 32–3, says the addition of the rational capacity is a 'layering' whereby 'the higher state both presupposes and builds on the lower state and also modifies or transforms its operations'. Reason is an 'additional structuring agency and one which transforms impulse…'.
[236] Long, *Hellenistic*, 192; Gill, *Self*, 77. Cf. Gill, *Self,* 146–60, for a summary of the debate over what precisely engineers the shift in motivation from, at one moment, selecting intermediates as 'according to nature' to then realising the unique goodness of virtue (and the consequent devaluation of the same intermediates). Cicero references 'nature' to support and ground his claims, as Long, 'Logical Basis', correctly notes, but this is presented in the form of ethical doctrine, not as a correspondence between cosmic nature and human nature *simpliciter*. Gill's notion of 'rich naturalism' (77, 128, 160) is helpful; cosmic nature informs the wise man's development, but through the teaching of Stoic doctrine which is not mere physics, but also logic and ethics.
[237] Seneca, *Ep.* CXVIII.8–17.

previously-laid stones an entirely new situation (*condicio*). This is not because the capstone increases, but because it perfects or completes (*impleo*). Some things, through a process (i.e. one more stone added to others), leave behind their previous form and cross over into something new (*transeo*). The development of perfect reason does not leave behind the human nature as conceived at the earlier stages but incorporates it into something of a different nature than it was previously. Although he does not explicitly invoke the metaphor of the craftsman in this text, the language of *impleo* perhaps echoes it.[238] There is a correspondence between all that was in 'accordance with nature', as recognisably part of the design of Nature, whether perceived in 'light' things or 'great' things: all the stones are both stone and part of the arch.[239] It is the capstone, however, that transforms the stones into an archway, and thus has an entirely different function in its ability to alter and perfect the rest. The intermediates and the good correspond to one another to the extent that both are part of Nature's scheme for humans, like the quality of 'stone' that both the sides and capstone of an arch share. The latter, though, is the special function of rational beings and enables harmony with divine reason, and its existence transforms the intermediates into components of that perfect harmony, the materials of reason's craft.

2.7 Stoic Social and Political Theory: The Intermediates in Context

2.7.1 Prescriptives for those progressing

Given the conditional nature of the intermediates' value, Stoic advice could only be 'rules of thumb' or 'general types'. Nevertheless, many Stoics maintained that such prescriptives were useful, although it was a topic apparently debated from the earliest days of the Stoa.[240] Seneca, an important source on the topic, outlines three positions. The two which he opposes regard, firstly, injunctions as useless (and only philosophy necessary) and,

[238] E.g. the imagery of impulses being 'perfected' in Cleanthes' description of the virtuous perfecting the unfinished lines of metre, Stobaeus, *Eclog.* II.7.5b8; and shaped by reason as a craftsman, DL VII.86; cf. *Fin.* III.59.
[239] Inwood, *Action*, 209: 'But there is also a continuity between the good and merely natural things. And this continuity is what is needed to explain why the Stoics said that the goal, a virtuous life, is derived from our basic orientation to ourselves which is shared with all animals. A result of this is that the good can also be referred to as *oikeion*, just as merely natural things can also be called *oikeia* because they promote the well-being of what is primarily *oikeion,* our own constitution… Because man's nature is special, what is natural to him in the strict sense of the word must also be special. As all of our reliable sources tell us, the good is special in the sense that it is different in kind and not merely in degree'.
[240] Seneca, *Ep.* XCIV.2–4; XCV.45; Cf. Cicero, *Leg.* I.62; *Off.* I.7, on the association of *praecepta* with laws.

secondly, injunctions sufficient for moral goodness (and philosophy unnecessary).[241] He presents his own view as one derived from Cleanthes and there is good reason to consider it a mainstream Stoic position.[242] In Seneca's view, injunctions are useful for those progressing, but he agrees with Cleanthes' view that they are insufficient on their own and are only as good as the philosophical doctrines in which they are grounded. [243] Accordingly, some Stoic presentations include a catch-all paraenetic section giving 'persuasions and dissuasions' with descriptions of fine people (σπουδαῖοι) and common (φαῦλοι).[244] Frequently repeated material includes the equality of all sins,[245] the possibility of friendship amongst the wise (but not amongst the common),[246] the participation of the fine in politics and family,[247] but also the occasional adoption of Cynic habits,[248] the ability of the fine and inability of the common to participate in rational discourse.[249] The σπουδαῖος is the only one truly free, truly rich, and truly a king.[250] Cicero's 'persuasions and dissuasions' follow the *topos* of the καθήκοντα, and he transitions by stating that there are some appropriate actions which are shared by the wise and the unwise. This demonstrates, he continues, that they are intermediate (*medium*) and that this intermediate realm encompasses our practical deliberations (*omnes nostras cogitationes*).[251] It is clear that this *topos* reinforces the teaching on the intermediates as the normative and natural choices for selection. Conventional piety, social structure, and political activity are all given their place in these instructions, which guide the aspiring Stoic in moral progress towards eventual sagehood.

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[241] Seneca, *Ep.* XCIV.1–4; XCV.4–5. Josephus, *C. Ap.* II.16–17 perhaps evidences awareness of this debate with his comments that the philosophers did not try to communicate τὴν ἀλήθειαν τοῦ δόγματος to the masses. All schemes of education, he says, either teach principles (i.e. doctrines), or through customs and practice (i.e. injunctions or practical training). In contrast, his divine lawgiver combined both schemes, putting actions in unity or harmony with reason (ἅτε δὴ τὰ ἔργα παρέχων σύμφωνα τοῖς λόγοις).

[242] I. G. Kidd, 'Moral Action and Rules in Stoic Ethics', in *The Stoics* (ed. J. M. Rist; Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), 247–58 (247, 253–5). Aristo's position, as described in XCIV.2–3, though, sounds like Epictetus at points and may represent a more Cynic 'wing' of the Stoicism than Seneca (although Epictetus—a teacher—clearly affords a role to instruction, cf. *Diatr.* II.17.34–40). Cf. P. Mitsis, 'Seneca on Reason, Rules and Moral Development', in *Passions and Perceptions: Studies in Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind* (eds. J. Brunschwig and M. C. Nussbaum; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993) 285–312 (293–6), for the debate on the referents for Seneca's *praecepta* and *decreta.*

[243] Seneca, *Ep.* XCIV.4, .49–51; XCV.61–4. Cf. Epictetus, *Diatr.* II.2.21–6; II.13.16–26. Cf. Kidd, 'Rules', 252, 254.

[244] DL VII.118–31; Stobaeus, *Ecl.* II.7.11b–m; Cicero, *Fin.* III.60–77. Cf. *Off.* I.7, which connects this *topos* and the appropriate actions.

[245] DL VII.120, Stobaeus, *Ecl.* II.7.11l; Cicero, *Fin.* IV.77.

[246] DL VII.124; Stobaeus, *Ecl.* II.7.11b, c, i; Cicero, *Fin.* III.63–5, 70; Epictetus, *Diatr.* II.22.25.

[247] DL VII.1120, 121; Stobaeus, *Ecl.* II.7.11b; Cicero, *Fin.* III.68.

[248] DL VII.121; Cicero, *Fin.* III.68.

[249] Stobaeus, *Ecl.* II.7.11k; Cicero, *Fin.* III.72–3; Epictetus, *Diatr.* I.7.3, 29.

[250] DL VII.121–2; Stobaeus, *Ecl.* II.7.11i; Cicero, *Fin.* III.75, IV.74.

[251] Cicero, *Fin.* III.59-60.

Considering the Stoics' insistence on dividing humanity into only two disparate groups, the existence of paraenetic material is somewhat surprising.[252] Given the unity and coherence of the virtues, virtue was an all-or-nothing situation. Common people did not participate in virtue at all while the fine lacked nothing.[253] Those without virtue are still common no matter how far they have progressed towards it. Aristo's refusal to acknowledge a role for paraenetic material makes some sense in light of such a hardline view coupled with the rarity of sages. The wise, complete in virtue, had no need of such guidance and the foolish would remain so even with it. However, the Stoics argued that virtue was proven possible by men like Socrates, who displayed progress, and their tradition duly offered support for those in progress (προκοπή).[254] Cicero's defence of a 'second-grade' morality and a popular conception of 'goodness' is probably based on Panaetius.[255] Epictetus' handbook was for beginners to have at hand.[256] Seneca, contra Aristo, also defends the use of *praecepta* for those not wise, and Sellars argues[257] that this fits with the conception of philosophy as τέχνη (art or craft) in Stoicism[258]—wisdom was cultivated not only by grasping the logical principles but by exercising them skilfully in behaviour.

Stoic ethics, like other ancient philosophies, sought not merely to present a beautifully cohesive system of thought (although that was a point of pride), but to produce sages skilled in the τέχνη of virtue: it offered a way of life.[259] The intermediates were the craftsman's medium, the 'material' (ὕλη) of virtue.[260] There were objective features and qualities which the craftsman recognised that might result in 'rules of thumb', such as 'plain flour is generally more useful than strong flour'. Such generalisations, though, arise out of the higher-order logic of baking in pursuit of excellent craft, and are therefore also subject to it. As such, to select plain flour when making bread, while following the general injunction,

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[252] Stobaeus, *Ecl.* II.7.11g.
[253] Stobaeus, *Ecl.* II.7.11g, i; Cicero, *Fin.* IV.74; f. III.48.
[254] DL VII.91.
[255] Cicero, *Off.* III.14–15. Cf. LS1, 427; Inwood, 'Rules', 99–100, clarifies that this must not be misunderstood as two separate ethics, but that the wise have a different relationship to injunctions: 'Whatever the role of rules or other prescriptions in the moral life of ordinary men, it is clear that ideally wise moral agents... are reported to have a different relation to them. The wise man is said to have a special kind of authority with regard to normally binding moral rules'.
[256] As the title of Ἐγχειρίδιον ('dagger') vividly suggests.
[257] J. Sellars, 'Stoic Practical Philosophy in the Imperial Period', *BICS Supplement* 94 (2007), 115–40 (115–27).
[258] Annas, *Happiness*, 55, 67–9; 'Goods', 54–66; B. Inwood, 'Why do Fools Fall in Love', *BICS Supplement* 69 (1997), 55–69 (60).
[259] LS1, 345; A. D. Nock, *Conversion: The Old and New in Religion from Alexander the Great to Augustine of Hippo* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1933; repr. London: Johns Hopkins, 1998), 164–86; M. C. Nussbaum, *The Therapy of Desire: Theory and Practice in Hellenistic Ethics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 3–5 *et passim.*
[260] Plutarch, *Comm. not.* 1069e.

would conflict with the baker's skill and produce an inferior result. Furthermore, the preference for plain flour is subject to other conditions which lie outside the baker's control, such as damp, or product supply. Moreover, the mastery of the craftsman enables him not only to select what is available, and what is most appropriate for his project based on its objective qualities, but also to make selections which violate the general 'rules' but use the intermediates' qualities in unexpected ways to produce a desired result. Although strong flour is best for bread and plain flour is preferable for most other applications, including cookies, the skilled baker might select strong flour, with its higher protein content, to produce chewier cookies. The craftsman does not follow the injunctions woodenly, but such injunctions flow from the development and practice of his craft and they are therein proven useful for apprentices.

With any craft, skill comes by training. Wisdom is not gained by simply being told what to do—a teacher could demonstrate how to write one word, but the next time a different word might be required and the student will be stumped unless he learns how to write.[261] Epictetus longs for students who are like athletes, ready to exercise their wisdom.[262] Wisdom takes constant and extreme training—throw yourself into the very situations likely to incite incorrect desires and work your way up to more challenging situations.[263] Seneca prefers the metaphor of soldiering through an incessant battle.[264] He defines freedom as the ability to avoid slavery to any particular circumstances,[265] and the best soldiers against the enticements of Fortune and circumstance are those who are prepared by training[266]. Thus Seneca denies himself luxury at times,[267] and at others attempts to soldier on in a noisy living situation for 'practice' in doing philosophy amidst distractions.[268] Seneca also advises Lucilius to train himself, like a soldier practicing manoeuvres in peace-time, to go without luxurious food and dress by living roughly a few days a month.[269] He comments, though, that it is not particularly commendable since some live this way everyday (the extensional activities have no value in themselves)—any achievement lies in the fact that he has undergone such circumstances of his own volition (the proper intensional disposition).[270] In contrast to the

[261] Epictetus, *Diatr.* II.2.21–6.
[262] Epictetus, *Diatr.* II.17.29–38.
[263] Epictetus, *Diatr.* III.12.7–12.
[264] Seneca, *Ep.* XLVII.9–10; XLIX.6–7; LI.4–12, LVI.9–15; LIX.6–13; Cf. Epictetus, *Diatr.* III.24.31.
[265] Seneca, *Ep.* LI.9.
[266] Seneca, *Ep.* LI.4–12.
[267] Seneca, *Ep.* LI.2–6.
[268] Seneca, *Ep.* LVI.15.
[269] Seneca, *Ep.* XVIII.5–13.
[270] Seneca, *Ep.* XVIII.8. Cf. Epictetus, *Diatr.* III.13.20–21.

behaviour of the philosophical tricksters in *Euthydemus*, Epictetus' students only interested in impressive syllogisms, and the common people daily dragged away by excessive impulses,[271] the Stoic displays his mastery as he navigates through impressions and circumstances with a soul muscled and unwavering in its pursuit of the good.[272] Socrates, the archetype of self-mastery, was asked whether he had prepared for his trial and replied: 'Don't you think I have been preparing for this my entire life'?[273] The wise man was calm, but the inner stability he possessed was actually a constant preparation.[274] As Nussbaum explains, 'Virtue, then, is not an *inert* inner condition: it is imagined as a striving or straining: indeed, as Diogenes Laertius tells us, "the good man is always using his soul, which is perfect"'.[275]

Envisioning wisdom as a craft reflects the tension between the rules of a craft and the comprehensive skill which the craftsman must possess. Injunctions are like the music teacher who instructs to 'play the lyre' and does not include 'in tune and at the right time' even though he also means this.[276] There is a 'complex web of interlocking generalizations', aspects of which can be pointed out, discussed, and analysed, but the whole is only effectively grasped and managed by wisdom.[277] To divorce the injunctions from the high-order logic of the doctrines, or to recite the doctrines as a performance apart from the exercise of skill was to misunderstand the entire ethical project. To return to our entry point, the sophists who were interested in plying their protreptic arguments only for sport rather than virtue are the butt of *Euthydemus'* joke.[278] In the single example of proper argument given in the dialogue, Socrates discusses virtue as a craft—like an unskilled carpenter with all the tools and wood but no product, those without wisdom cannot use the conventional 'goods' rightly.[279] Even the most valuable tools or wood cannot produce a final product: without the carpenter, the τέλος cannot be attained. The intermediates were unable to directly constitute the τέλος and were neutral in relation to it. However, they had objective, if conditional value, which must be used in a way which did not conflict with virtue and recognised the highly-circumstantial nature of their value. There were recognised as general rules and prescriptives

[271] Epictetus, *Diatr.* III.3.11–13 *et passim.*
[272] Cf. Gill, *Self*, 77–80 on the 'sinewy' tenor of virtue.
[273] Epictetus, *Diatr.* II.2.8–9.
[274] E.g. Seneca, *Ep.* LIX.16, as well as the descriptions of consistency and harmony throughout Stoic accounts.
[275] Nussbaum, 'Extirpation', 135, citing DL VII.128.
[276] Plutarch, *Stoic. rep.* 1037d–e.
[277] Quoted phrase from E. Brown, 'The Emergence of Natural Law and Cosmopolis', in *The Cambridge Companion to Ancient Greek Political Thought* (ed. S. Salkever; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 331–63 (355).
[278] Plato, *Euthyd.* 277d–e; 278b–c.
[279] Plato, *Euthyd.* 280c, 280e.

for those progressing, but this was never meant to be a substitute for what it supported: the craft of virtue, available to all, adept at wringing benefit out of all, and thus the rightful pursuit of all.

2.7.2 Stoic politics

The 'persuasions and dissuasions' reinforced the conventional social and political structures, and their descriptions of the σπουδαῖοι and φαῦλοι, along with directly therapeutic sources, construct a picture of Stoic theory on society and politics. Zeno reportedly wrote a political work, *The Republic*, which later authors portray as embarrassingly Cynic.[280] It is difficult to trace the debate, but it seems likely that Chrysippus extensively developed this *topos*, as he did with much of Zeno's theory. Later Stoics wielded their influence, of course, and the texts of middle and Roman Stoics often display a conventional turn, exploiting Zeno's intermediate categories for much less radical results.[281] In the discussion above on the intermediates, the activities and selections involving the political and social spheres have been referenced at points, since they were included in the intermediate categories. Hierocles' set of concentric circles, previously mentioned, illustrates the provisions to accommodate the self-oriented impulses and the cosmic scheme of Nature. At the heart of the circles sat the rational aspect of self, mastering not only the body, but one's environment to achieve εὐδαιμονία, and utilising and incorporating the social and political structures designed by divine Nature to do so.[282] The admonition to draw even the outermost ring (all humanity) as near as possible towards oneself as possible attempted a broad, but not flat, recognition of common human ends. The immediate objection is that one cannot possibly have the same duties towards strangers as family, but, as Martin points out, this does not do justice to the variability in degrees which the model permits.[283] While one would *first* appropriate one's immediate family, city, etc., one should *also* appropriate all of humanity. The Stoic elevation of reason as the unique excellence of all humans, the rational animal, and their insistence on its fully-developed form (virtue) as the only good paved the way for their two most important political ideas: cosmopolitanism and natural 'law'.[284]

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[280] M. Schofield, *The Stoic Idea of the City* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999), 3–22. Cf. Long, *Hellenistic,* 205.
[281] J. Sellars, 'Stoic Cosmopolitanism and Zeno's 'Republic'', *History of Political Thought* 28 (2007), 1–29 (3), argues that the notion of cosmopolitanism in particular, though, remained relatively stable.
[282] Stobaeus, *Flor.* IV.671.7-673.1, text 57 G in LS1, 349.
[283] Martin, 'Self-Consciousness', 9–10.
[284] Nussbaum, forward to Schofield, *City,* 2d ed., xii.

2.7.3 Cosmopolitanism

Socrates was said to have declared himself a 'citizen of the world'[285] and again the Stoics followed suit. As far back as Zeno's *Republic*, the emphasis on virtue purportedly led to the idea of cosmopolitanism: world citizenship.[286] The Cynic influence is felt as late as Epictetus' scant patience for his students' homesickness—the Cynic is held up as a model of one free from the need for a country or family, and whose homeland is the entire earth.[287] In Stoic thought, the view of self as part of a larger, divinely-managed whole should regulate one's experience of life in order to maintain willing harmony with the divine will. This is seen vividly in Epictetus' images of the foot being appropriately dirty or even maimed for the sake of the body (i.e. one must accept adverse circumstances as part of the whole), but also in his conception of Zeus as general who assigns each where needed.[288] The 'whole' of which one was a part, though, was morally-freighted: it was a *polis* ruled by the divine will.[289] One coped with homesickness since virtue was sufficient: as constructed, the Cynic and Stoic doctrines created a 'positive allegiance to the cosmos'.[290] Elevating virtue over conventional political and social realities created, as Schofield states, 'not a wider community, but a wholly different sort of "community"'.[291] The virtuous were true family and friends—at points the wise and foolish are described in terms of a new ethnicity or nationality.[292]

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[285] Cicero, *Tusc.* V.108. Cf. Epictetus, *Diatr.* I.9.1.This also gets attributed to the Cynic Diogenes, cf. DL VI.63.
[286] M. Schofield, 'Epicurean and Stoic Political Thought', in *The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Political Thought* (eds. C. J. Rowe and M. Schofield; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 435–56, surveys the development of Stoic political thought. The notion of cosmopolitanism was predicated not on the mere presence or possibility of rationality, but on its development into virtue, and virtue also recognized the role assigned by cosmic Nature. Normally, this *was* with one's city and family of origin—most men were not Diogenes. Slightly differently, Philo, *Opif.* 1, identifies the Jewish lawcode given by Moses directly with Nature: the man who keeps *this* law is a κοσμοπολίτης.
[287] Epictetus, *Diatr.* III.22.45–52, 83–5; III.24.1–118.
[288] On the foot, Epictetus, *Diatr.* II.5.24-29; II.6.10. On Zeus as general, III.24.24–37, 95–118; cf. III.24.93, where nature is an οἰκονομία. For Stoic use of body metaphors to discuss one's part in the whole of nature, cf. M. Aur. *Med.* 2.1, 4.40, 7.13; Seneca, *Ep.* XCV.52; Epictetus, *Diatr.* II.5.24–9, II.6.10, II.10.1–6; Cicero, *Fin.* III.63; *Off.* III.32. Cf. Schofield, 'Ethics', 245; LS1, 345, 385, 399.
[289] Sellars, 'Cosmopolitanism', 2.
[290] Sellars, 'Cosmopolitanism', 5.
[291] Schofield, 'Political Thought', 453. Cf. Seneca, *De otio* IV.1, where the 'great' *res publica* is not the one 'appointed by the terms of birth'.
[292] Stobaeus, *Ecl.* II.7.11g: 'Ἀρέσκει γὰρ τῷ τε Ζήνωνι καὶ τοῖς ἀπ αὐτοῦ Στωικοῖς φιλοσόφοις δύο γένη τῶν ἀνθρώπων εἶναι...'; Gill, *Self*, links cosmopolitanism to the Socratic ideal of 'invulnerability': all people are predisposed by Nature to develop recognition of good 'regardless of other differences in innate character, upbringing, social context, or even intellectual gifts' (87). 'Humans are seen as having the… resources to acquire an understanding of goodness even if they are brought up in societies whose belief-structures are largely misguided' (377). Epictetus, *Diatr.* III.24.41 compares claims of Roman citizenship to claims of Stoic identity. Josephus, *C. Ap.* II.28, strikingly argues that the affinity of customs can be determined not only by birth but by choice of life (οὐ τῷ γένει μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῇ προαιρέσει τοῦ βίου νομίζων εἶναι τὴν οἰκειότητα). J. M. G. Barclay, *Flavius Josephus, Translation and Commentary, Vol. 10: Against Apion* (Leiden: Brill, 2007), 291, fn. 847,

Schofield argues that eventually Zeno's vision of a virtue-based cosmopolitanism threatened to undermine the existing *polis*,[293] and Epictetus' dismissal of the need to defend Greece from the Trojans probably did indeed sound a little too fanatical to most.[294]

2.7.4 Natural 'law'

Cosmopolitanism worked hand in hand with the notion of reason as a natural 'law', 'transcending all accidents of birth and local identity'.[295] As Watson points out, in particular of middle Stoicism, this metaphorical 'law' tends to surface in 'international settings' and scenarios where conventional laws conflict, when the need for a shared standard of behaviour is felt.[296] The Stoic metaphor of natural 'law' arose out of an established dichotomy between nature and law in Hellenistic discourse.[297] In response to the perceived limitations of lawcodes, the Stoics proposed a metaphorical 'law', identified as reason, which provided a standard of behaviour functioning independently of lawcodes.[298] Nature, as instantiated in divine and human reason, governs behaviour by prescribing and prohibiting and, in this way, it is *like* a law. Their system's identification of reason as natural and Nature as Zeus made it possible to equate reason with a natural *and* divine law over all. The mind of the sage was law, virtue the only ground of authority and freedom, and this was also an expression of divine reason in the cosmic sense.[299] As Brown explains, the use of the metaphor of natural 'law' 'wrests the traditional source of normativity (*nomos*) away from convention … and ties it exclusively to nature'.[300] This 'law' provided a higher-order standard by which

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notes the similar discussion of proselytes in Philo, *Spec.* I.52, 316–17; II.73; IV.159; *Virt*. 179, 218–9; *Praem.* 152. For an especially harsh relativisation of kinship ties, cf. Epictetus, *Diatr.* III.3.5; III.22.67–82; III.24.84–8.

[293] Schofield, 'Political Thought', 453. Van Kooten, 'Greco-Roman Strategies', notes that Stoic discourse on cosmopolitanism could, at times, entail 'strong criticism of the earthly city' (375), citing Dio Chrysostom *Borysth.* 29–38.

[294] Epictetus, *Diatr.* III.22.31–7.

[295] LS1, 435. Cf. Sellars, 'Cosmopolitanism', 2.

[296] G. Watson, 'The Natural Law and Stoicism', in *Problems in Stoicism* (ed. A. A. Long; London: Athlone, 1971) 216–38 (224–5). G. J. Pendrick, *Antiphon the Sophist: the Fragments* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 66, comments that even the 5th-century antithesis between φύσις and νόμος was an 'attempt to demonstrate the natural kinship of individuals whom law and convention wrongly divide'.

[297] On this dichotomy, and early Jewish negotiations with it, cf. C. Hayes, *What's Divine About Divine Law: Early Perspectives* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015), 54–89.

[298] Plutarch, *Alex. fort.* I.6; *SVF* III.314 *apud* Marcian, *Inst*. I; Plutarch, *Stoic rep*. 1037D. An early text, the *Hymn to Zeus* by Cleanthes, cites the κοίνος νόμος of Zeus twice in its 39 lines, Stobaeus, *Ecl.* I.25.3–27.4 (lines 24, 39; cf. 13). Cf. the well-known definition of 'true law' at Cicero, *Resp.* III.33 (*SVF* III.325); Vander Waerdt, 'Law', 27–9; Schofield, 'Political Thought', 451. That conventional laws were unnecessary for the wise is expressed by the statements that such laws were wrong or 'not laws', *SVF* III.324 *apud* Eusebius, *Praep. ev.* VI; Cicero, *Acad.* II.136. Cf. Philo, *Leg*. I.94.

[299] A. A. Long, 'The Stoic Concept of Evil', *PhilosQ* 18 (Oct 1968), 329–43 (334).

[300] Brown, 'Emergence', 353.

conventional law could be challenged, and even disregarded.[301] However, the metaphor also grounded the use of conventional lawcodes in the same higher-order standard, so that political activity, including lawkeeping and lawmaking were intermediates, appropriate activities.[302]

The notions of natural 'law' and cosmopolitanism grounded the conventional intermediates, such as political activity and responsibilities to kin, while simultaneously endorsing their use under the proviso of reason. The recognition of objective value in such structures and responsibilities allowed for the prioritisation of, for example, one's own city. Hierocles' circles do not utterly dissolve, and Cicero's recognition of quite particular features in selection resists using reason to engineer a flat universalism. At the same time, the categorical distinction between intermediates and good indicated the conditionality of such value, and the need to shift or realign such value at times. A striking example of this is Marcus Aurelius' attempts to remind himself of his duties to the 'common city' of all while fighting for Rome on the battlefield.[303] In one statement reminiscent of Cicero's *personae*, he says,

> It is for me to consider what is expedient. And what is expedient for each is that which is according to his own condition and nature; and my nature is rational and civil. On the one hand, as Antoninus, my city and homeland is Rome, and as a human, the world. Those things which turn up benefit for these (Rome and the world) are the only good for me.[304]

2.7.5 Conventional Piety

Traditional piety and cultic practice was of a piece with one's political and social ties and was also treated as an intermediate.[305] The Stoics argued similarly to other schools that most that was said about deities was mythical, but that such myths represented something divine, which was then associated with rationality.[306] Lucian, an Epicurean, illustrates well

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[301] B. Inwood, 'Commentary on Striker', *Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy* 2:1 (Jan 1986) 95–101. The re-imagining of law as wisdom allows the sage to 'craft' the conventional law by reason, including 'the authority to break general provisions…' when necessary, which is actually 'following nature in a higher, but more flexible sense' (101).
[302] A. A. Long, 'Stoic Communitarianism and Normative Citizenship', in *Freedom, Reason, and the Polis: Essays in Ancient Greek Political Philosophy* (eds. D. Keyt and F. D. Miller, Jr.; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 241–61 (255); G. Striker, 'Origins of the Concept of Natural Law', *Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy* 2:1 (Jan 1986), 79–94 (81–2, 93–4). Cf. the response by Inwood, 'Striker', 95–101.
[303] M. Aur. *Med.* III.4, IV.4.
[304] M. Aur., *Med.* VI.44.
[305] B. Nongbri, *Before Religion: A History of a Modern Concept* (London: Yale University Press, 2013), 25–45; Fredriksen, *Apostle*, 32–41.
[306] D. Sedley, 'The Atheistic Underground', in *Politeia in Greek and Roman Philosophy* (eds. V. Harte and M. Lane; Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013), 329–48 (339–40). Citing Aristotle, *Metaph.* 1074b1–14.

this ‘enlightened’ philosopher’s view of the traditional cult when he says that the goddesses are only ‘masterpieces of good craftsmen’, poor imitations of the true nature of the deity.[307] The Stoic satirist Persius mocks the man enslaved to cultic practices, who scurries about to satisfy every requirement, giving offerings during Roman festivals, praying on the Jewish Sabbath, and eating the garlic dictated by the priestess of Isis.[308] The identification of Zeus as Nature, divine reason,[309] resulted in something close if not identical to pantheism, and a well-known determinism.[310] This divine being, though, was also said to be ‘called by many names’,[311] a teaching which endorsed the traditional piety towards Athena, Aphrodite, Apollo, et al. The interpretation of each particular deity as only various representations of one all-encompassing deity, however, undermined such traditional practices relative to the philosophical pursuit of virtue. In practice, this led to a ‘partial and qualified acceptance of traditional polytheism’.[312] Neglect of piety was a vice, but only because it was ignorance.[313] Algra summarises:

> [The Stoics]… could re-interpret the meaning of certain elements of traditional cult (e.g., divination, prayer). Although this means that strictly speaking they could only accept a philosophically ‘enlightened’ version of traditional Greco-Roman religion, they did not in practice adopt a radical attitude toward the religious tradition. Plutarch reproaches them for sacrificing at altars and temples which they professedly believe should not exist at all (*St. rep.* 1034 C). Indeed, Epictetus admits that a Stoic should in practice respect the religious conventions of his country (*Ench.* 31, 5).[314]

2.7.6 Paradoxical politics

The satirist Persius also mocks the ‘freedom’ gained by manumission and alludes to the traditional Roman ceremony: as if one twirl round makes a Roman citizen![315] It should be noted that some of the most strident teaching in this vein comes from Epictetus, who first learned philosophy while a slave. Long says that Epictetus uses slavery not just as ‘one of his themes’, but as an encapsulation of his overarching message throughout his teaching.[316] To

[307] Lucian, *Imag.* 23; cf. *Gall.* 24.
[308] Persius, *Sat.* V.165–86. On Persius as a Stoic, cf. M. L. Colish, *The Stoic tradition from Antiquity to the Early Middle Ages*, *Vol. 1: Stoicism in Classical Latin Literature* (Leiden: Brill, 1985), 194–203.
[309] DL VII.135–6.
[310] Long, *Guide,* 21–3.
[311] DL VII.147.
[312] K. Algra, ‘Stoic Theology’, in *The Cambridge Companion to the Stoics* (ed. B. Inwood; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 153–78 (169).
[313] Stobaeus, *Ecl.* II.7.5b.
[314] Algra, ‘Theology’, 177–8.
[315] Persius, *Sat.* V.73–103.
[316] Long, *Guide,* 10.

denigrate a student's lack of detachment Epictetus often simply addressed him as 'Slave!',[317] a tactic which surely gained force by the irony of being levelled by a former slave. The Stoics were well-known for defining true freedom as the 'authority of independent action' and true slavery as the deprivation of that independent action.[318] Cynics made regular business of challenging convention, and many of the well-known Stoic paradoxes, such as the statements that only the wise are kings, free, or rich—or the idea of a 'law' that was 'natural'—trade on their Cynic roots and play with inversions of power and authority.[319] Such subversive moves were a feature of the Socratic project, which destabilized convention and transferred authority and power to ethical categories. Long argues that today's readers too quickly identify the Socratic and Stoic paradoxes as puzzles, forgetting their original functions as (literal) alternate opinions. A paradox throws accepted wisdom out the window and imagines the 'world up for grabs', a potential for redefinition which the Stoics exploited.[320]

Whether the radical society ascribed to Zeno's *Republic* was intended as utopian or not is debated, but its indisputable impact was wide-ranging redefinitions of the political along ethical lines. As Schofield states, 'Most fundamental and far-reaching from the point of view of later Stoicism was Zeno's identification of the wise or morally good man as the only true citizen, friend and free person, and the bad man as alien, enemy and slave. Its effect within Stoicism was pervasive'.[321] The much-later Seneca can say, 'We are born into a kingdom; freedom is to obey God'.[322] Inwood explains, 'This is, to be sure, a paradoxical idea of freedom; but it is far from unreasonable from the point of view of a determinist … It is the inevitable result of a complete consistency with himself and with the will of Zeus'.[323] The transfer of the political to the ethical is clear. On the other hand, while the paradoxes were more than metaphor, they were not meant to be revolutionary: slavery and freedom were still active political categories with material meaning for Seneca. Long argues that the real interest of Zeno's *Republic* 'lies in the criticisms of contemporary society which it implies. Stoic political theory is not a blue-print for reform but a paradigm of the world as it might be if men could be united not by artificial ties but by the recognition in each other of

[317] Epictetus, *Diatr.* I.4.14; I.9.20; I.24.17; I.29.16; II.7.13; II.13.18; II.20.3; II.22.31, *et passim.*
[318] DL VII.122: εἶναι γὰρ τὴν ἐλευθερίαν ἐξουσίαν αὐτοπραγίας, τὴν δὲ δουλείαν στέρησιν αὐτοπραγίας.
[319] DL VII.121–2; Stobaeus, *Ecl.* II.7.11i; Cicero, *Fin*, III.75; IV.74.
[320] A. A. Long, *From Epicurus to Epictetus: Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 14.
[321] Schofield, *City*, 95.
[322] Seneca, *Vit. beat.* XV.7.
[323] Inwood, *Action,* 110–1.

common values and common purposes'.[324] There is argument to be made that it was read more literally by Cynic-leaning Stoics, but either reading called for unsparing scrutiny of values and institutions as they stood. This may well, as Gill explains, lead to

> modification of conventional ideals … [but] tends not to issue in programmes of social or political reform. The characteristic Stoic move is, rather, to advocate the realization of Stoic ideas… within conventional social and political structures. This tendency is reinforced by Stoic thinking about social and political roles as a medium through which a deepening ethical understanding (developed through *oikeiosis*) can be expressed.[325]

In fact, paradoxes rely parasitically upon the continuing existence of the very structures and categories they upend: their shock-value depends upon conventional assumptions. Zeno's ascription of second-order value to such political and social structures as intermediates endorsed their use, while his restriction of first-order value to ethical 'good' conditioned it: the paradoxes crystallize these two aspects of his ethics.

2.7.7 Self-mastery

The wise man was able to select and perform the intermediates with reserve, resisting ascribing improper value to them, and thus preserve his well-being. The Stoic paradoxes undermined convention by transferring authority ascribed to social and political status and structures to the ethical realm: as Long says, 'applying politics to the soul'.[326] The authority of the free or king was not, however, transferred to just anyone—it was the *wise* who resisted slavery. Stoic politics made arguments about the power of reason to structure the self, to master the self. Epictetus asks how Diogenes could declare himself free while still a slave and imagines him responding:

> Antisthenes… taught me what is my own and what isn't my own. Property isn't my own; relations, family, friends, reputation… none of these are my own… He showed me that I possess that power free from all hindrance and constraint; no one can obstruct me… Who still holds any power over me, then?... that person who doesn't allow himself to be overpowered by pleasure, or by suffering, or by glory, or by wealth, and who is capable, whenever he thinks fit, of spitting his entire miserable body into some tyrant's face and taking his leave—to what can such a man still be a slave?[327]

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[324] Long, *Hellenistic,* 205.
[325] Gill, 'Imperial', 614–5.
[326] Of Plato, Long, *Models*, 129. Gill, *Self*, 386, states that even the final stage of ethical development is portrayed as in Stoic theory as a 'dialogue' between 'conventional beliefs and the emerging belief-set that reflects one's own progress in personal ethical development', a 'critical engagement' with communal values.
[327] Epictetus, *Diatr.* III.24.67–71; Cf. IV.1.113–22, trans. Oldfather LCL, 205.

The sage's wisdom made him unconquerable, the only true king, 'free' while, in reality, a slave. This concept of internal authority and rule over one's self, governing the impulses and passions while directing the whole self in pursuit of virtue, is referred to as 'self-mastery', a heritage bequeathed by Socrates to Hellenistic philosophy.[328] It was, importantly, a heritage forged in the heat of political debate.

In *Republic*, Plato critiques democracy as an inadequate improvement upon tyranny, since it elevates the notion of freedom at the expense of the good. If the structure of society is analogous to the structure of a person, then the unregulated, ill-defined freedom of democracy is akin to the disordered soul of the tyrant following every desire as legitimate, but to its ruin. Such 'freedom', the Socratic argument explains, is actually slavery.[329] Freedom, then, must not be unrestrained choice in general or of anything whatsoever, but unrestrained choice *towards* the flourishing life.[330] Freedom is, then, unrestrained *self*-restraint.[331] The enslaved were susceptible to weak opinion and easily swayed by rhetoric, while the rational were, in Plato's theory, those fit to rule, and trustworthy to use rhetoric for the good of the *polis*.[332] Since 'external political order is to be mirrored by internal psychological order', the soul likewise had capacity, in Hellenistic philosophy, both for slavish vulnerability and for εὐδαιμονία.[333]

The Socratic project memorialised by Plato and taken up by the Hellenistic schools established dualism between the ψυχή and σῶμα, and the weakness of the latter and superiority of the former. Although the Stoics' strict corporeality critiqued the Platonic dualism in metaphysical terms, it often echoed its dualism in ethical rhetoric, specifically to echo the 'hard' Socratic positions on reason.[334] Stoics also argued for the agency of the soul,

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[328] Long, *Epicurus to Epictetus,* 7–9, specifies that by this he means not just self-restraint or endurance but a 'pre-Freudian notion of a self that is completely transparent to reflection, and over which their owners claim such complete authority that they find themselves in total charge of where their life is going and indulge their emotions and appetites only to the extent that they themselves determine.' He later (9–10) describes it in political terms: 'The concepts of authority, power, ruler and subject, stable government and insurrection have become ways of analysing the self… an internal power over oneself'. For an example, cf. Epictetus, *Diatr.* III.24.67–71.

[329] For key points of these arguments, cf. Plato, *Resp*. IX.577c–579e; *Gorgias* 491a–494a.

[330] As Inwood, *Action*, 159, explains: 'Freedom from passions of desire, fear, and pain is here connected with not being pushed beyond certain limits, and also with *restricting* one's *orexis* to those things which are truly in a man's own power, the *prohairetika'* (italics for emphasis mine).

[331] *Gorgia*s 491e; cf. Long, *Models*, 112. The innovativeness of this development is vividly illustrated by Plato's dependence upon reflexive pronouns in his use of ἐγκράτεια, cf. *Resp.* 390b; 430e.

[332] G. Vlastos, 'Slavery in Plato's Thought', *The Philosophical Review* 50 (1941), 289–304 (289–90).

[333] Long, *Models*, 127. Thus the dualism of soul and body could be conceived as the relationship between master and slave, cf. Plato, *Leg.* 726; Vlastos, 'Slavery', 294–5.

[334] Gill, *Self*, 74–100. Gill argues for the 'psychophysical' holism of Stoicism, and thus reads these as only 'apparently', or 'quasi-dualistic'. He is correct that they are not intended to make metaphysical claims, but his language underestimates the design of such rhetoric to elevate reason.

in particular the ἡγεμονικόν, to rule over the self to its wellbeing.[335] Reason enables a soul to 'resist beguiling rhetoric and achieve … autonomy … to negotiate their human condition as embodied souls', deciding 'what to make' of its embodied experience.[336] Stoic theory, with its strict materialism, pantheism and identification of Zeus as divine reason, was particularly capable of assigning a measure of autonomy to human rationality.[337] The sage's effective, organising mastery was harmony with Zeus, the craftsman of the cosmos.[338] While they rejected the metaphysical dualism of Plato, the Stoics took up the 'evaluative contrast', which rendered a functional hierarchy between reason and all other capacities of the self.[339] The political birth-pangs of reason's superiority were never fully forgotten: the Stoics called the mind the ἡγεμονικόν, that which is 'capable of command' or 'authoritative'. Their definition

[335] *Resp*. I.352d-e; cf. Long, *Models*, 91–6, 106–7, 132–34. Long argues that the Homeric view is thoroughly psychosomatic, and the Platonic positions are constructed in debate with Gorgias, who portrays rhetoric like a drug before which others are powerless. In *Gorgias,* it is reason which can judge opinion, and withstand the effects of rhetoric.

[336] Long, *Models,* 116, 183. The claims that Hellenistic theories anticipate elements of modern notions of autonomy or subjective self-consciousness are rejected by Gill, *Self*, 325–407. Gill argues that any such innovations in Stoic theory can be understood as features emphasising psychophysical holism in combination with an 'objective-participation' framework. Gill's reconstruction is convincing regarding the 'cohesion' emphasised by the Socratic ideals, and he correctly asserts the predominance of the communal framework (and participation in it) for ethical development. To any extent which Stoics are understood to have asserted subjectivity, this must not neglect the objective criteria they asserted were universal to all rational animals. Further, any extent to which they are understood to have elevated individualist reflection, this was likely conceived of as an internalisation of (Stoic) communal dialogue. However, their particular combination of 'hard' Socratic ideals regarding virtue, in combination with the cohesion of the person, and the rule over the entirety of that person by reason, as instantiated in specific psychological processes which centred on assent *did* create an innovative level of transparency over the self by the self. While this was not intended to create criteria for personhood as such, their claims that this was the distinct feature of humans, and that it was (in Socratic fashion) universally available to all created a *de facto* criterion of rationality. Rationality was conceived in their specific psychological processes of (subjective) impressions, only fully 'rational' (and therefore human) when correctly evaluated, judged, and assented to as coordinated by the ἡγεμονικόν over the whole person. This psychological process was developed in participation with the (Stoic) community, and subject to objective criteria established by the communally-determined 'rich naturalism'. However, it was only capable of 'critical engagement' (384) with any communal values, or 'invulnerable' (88–9) to circumstances and pressures by the possibility of the measure of individualistic autonomy claimed by Socrates and epistemologically defined by Stoics' theory. As even Gill must admit (374), the focus of this process is centred on '*particular* psychosocial wholes'.

[337] Long, *Models*, 168–9, 175–6, 178, 188, 192, 194. Long argues (183–4, 189) this is most clearly illustrated by the Stoic emphasis on assent, the rational development which accompanied the self-perception of οἰκείωσις. A person always has the ability to withhold or give assent (190–1), a capacity which negotiated and manipulated the sensory experiences in harmony with divine will. 'What we experience through our senses depends on the state of the external world and how we position ourselves. We have only limited control over whatever else comes into our heads moment by moment. Such experience, much of it inevitably tinged with likes and dislikes, colours our consciousness, making us recipients rather than agents. This passivity, however, is what the faculty of assent limits, modifies, and transforms' (191). Volition was key to the disposition of the sage because it signalled the cooperation with divine reason in his action, which was, in their epistemology, the activity of assent. Cf. Epictetus, *Diatr.* I.17.21–3.

[338] Epictetus, *Diatr.* I.14.1–5, cited by Long, *Models*, 179–80. Cf. I.25.1–6; II.17.22–6; III.24.18 *et passim.*

[339] Long, *Models*, 118, 123.

of freedom also evoked political power with its use of ἐξουσία.[340] Freedom was not the authority to do anything, but the authority to do what was rational.[341] Such freedom was all that was possible, given the vagaries of chance and weakness of the body, but defined as such, the Stoic could claim that 'no one has authority over me'.[342] Socrates laughs at the guarantee Crito has made to the city, that Socrates will remain and Crito will bury him. When you bury me, he says, do not say that it is 'Socrates'—you might bury my *body*, but good luck catching *me*.[343] Epictetus summons this tradition when he claims:

> When a tyrant threatens and summons me, I answer, 'Whom are you threatening'? If he says, 'I will put you in chains', I reply, 'He is threatening my hands and feet'. If he ways, 'I will behead you', I answer, 'He is threatening my neck'. If he says, 'I will throw you into prison', I say, 'He is threatening my whole paltry body' … Does he, then threaten *you* not at all?—If I feel that all this is nothing to me,--not at all …. Who is there left, then, for me to fear? The man who is master of what? The things that are under my control? But there is no such man.[344]

In the Stoics' ethical iterations of these political motifs, the ability of virtue to directly constitute εὐδαιμονία, in contrast to the vulnerable conventional 'goods', was the basis of the wise man's authority and freedom over all, including himself, to live without constraint (ἀνάγκη) or compulsion towards anything but the τέλος.[345] Freedom was the self-restraint epitomised by reason's volitional harmony with the divine will: freedom is to 'obey God'.[346] In the final flourish of the *Encheiridion*, Epictetus cobbles together lines from Cleanthes' hymn and statements attributed to Socrates at his trial:

> Lead thou me on, O Zeus, and Destiny,
> To that goal long ago to me assigned.
> I'll follow and not falter; if my will
> Prove weak and craven, still I'll follow on.

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[340] DL VII.122.
[341] Epictetus, *Diatr.* IV.1.119, 146.
[342] Epictetus, *Diatr.* I.25.22.
[343] Plato, *Phaedo* 115ce. Cited by Long, *Models*, 153.
[344] Epictetus, *Diatr.* I.29.5–7. Trans. Oldfather, LCL, 185. Cf. I.1.10–13; I.9.12–17; I.29.16–19; III.6.5–7; III.18.3–5; IV.6.35; IV.11.26–9.
[345] On the connection between ἀνάγκη and slavery (and the lack of it in freedom), cf. Vlastos, 'Slavery', 297–301. Since freedom was construed as 'service' to divine reason, the only correctly-necessary thing was virtue, per Stobaeus, *Ecl.* II.7.6d (cf. II.7.7g). Freedom, though, was normally described as lacking compulsion or necessity since virtuous choices were willing; cf. Epictetus, *Diatr.* II.15.1-2; III.3.10; IV.1.1, 56–60, 76–9, 128–131. For ἀναγκάζω and cognates in Epictetus, cf. *Discourses*, II.5.8, IV.7.10-11, II.2.4, II.6.21, II.17.22, III.2.16, III.3.13, III.5.7, III.13.11, III.19.1, III.22.42, IV.1.110, IV.9.11-12, IV.13.21-24, *Ench.* I.3.
[346] Seneca, *Vit. beat.* XV.7. Volition, or 'willing' compliance with the divine will is significant in Stoic sources. This fits with the pantheistic determinism and construal of virtue as harmony with the divine will, Nature and reason, and the distinction of intensional dispositions to any activities. Cf. Seneca, *Ep.* XXXVII.2-3; LIV.7; LXI.3; XCII.11-13; XCV.57; *Ben*. I.6.1; Epictetus, *Diatr.*, III.5.7-11; I.12.24. Long, *Guide*, 208–20, translates Epictetus' προαίρεσις as 'volition', one's autonomy and volition unimpeded by externals, since, for Epictetus, 'the essence of the self is our decision-making, purposive, and evaluative disposition' (220). Cf. Inwood, *Action*, 210–12.

‘Whoso has rightly with necessity complied,
We count him wise, and skilled in things divine’.
‘Well, O Crito, if so it is pleasing to the gods, so let it be’.
‘Anytus and Meletus can kill me, but they cannot hurt me’.[347]

2.7.8 Regulative and normative strands

As these topics have illustrated, Stoicism did not shed its Cynic roots so easily, a result facilitated by the strict identification of ‘good’ with virtue. The Stoic was a ‘dual citizen’: due to the unconditional value of virtue, a cosmopolitan, and due to the conditional value of his political and social ties, a citizen of a city.[348] Ascribing value to both created, Gill argues, two strands of political thought from Chrysippus and possibly even Zeno onwards. It is worth quoting his explanation at length:

> We can identify two main strands in the writings of these thinkers … in one strand, the dominant thought is that the guiding ideals of personal and political life should be those whose truth is established by philosophy, whether or not these ideals correspond with the ones current in any given conventional society at any one time … In the other strand, the emphasis falls rather on the thought that the Stoic goal of ‘the life according to virtue’ is one that is properly pursued by engagement with the practices, roles, and (to some extent) the rules of one’s own, specific community … On the one hand, we find the seemingly radical Cynic rejection of conventional ethics … in Zeno’s and possibly Chrysippus’ *Republic*. On the other hand, we also find, as early as Chrysippus, and perhaps Zeno, the idea of a natural process of ethical development (*oikeiosis*) from instinctive self-preservation to (in principle) sagehood, a process which is conceived as underlying and occurring within, conventional social forms such as family and city-state …. Alternatively, we can see the two lines of thought as coordinate aspects of what is conceived from the beginning as a two-level theory. Zeno’s ‘city of the wise’, ‘the city of gods and humans’, ‘natural law’, function, on this view, as objective norms or regulative ideals. The realization of these ideals belongs, in principle, within the social structures (e.g. family, city-state) which are the normal vehicles for personal and social *oikeiosis*, that is, the natural impulse to identify with oneself and also with other humans. But life within these structures must be informed not only by their localized rules but also by regulative ideals; and this can give rise to interpersonal and political conflict or to ‘Cynic’ detachment from conventional structures.[349]

When Epictetus says that a father is ‘nothing’ in comparison to the good, he holds up this regulative ideal before his students: kinship ties are morally neutral. The Cynic Diogenes’ eschewing of a homeland epitomises that virtue is sufficient for happiness. On the other end of the spectrum, we have the socially-embedded figure of Cicero, the statesman, leveraging Stoic ethics to argue for the volatile value of *gloria* in the late Roman republic.

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[347] Epictetus, *Ench*. 53.1–4. Trans. Oldfather, LCL, 537. The final two lines are Plato, *Crito*, 43d and *Apol.* 30cd respectively.
[348] ‘Dual citizen’ used of Marcus Aurelius by Gill, ‘Writers’, 611. Cf. Seneca, *De Otio* 4.1.
[349] Gill, ‘Writers’, 598–9. Cf. Gill, *Self*, 84–5.

This two-level political theory mirrored the ethical theory's two orders of value: the regulative ideal of the detached sage served to establish virtue as the only good, while the participation of most in the conventional social structures recognized their objective yet conditional value.

2.7.9 Two patterns of discourse in context

The 'two-level' theory which Gill detects reflects the origins of the Stoa, in the heat of political debates and challenges to a conventional society. Zeno's unique contribution was to adopt the strident Cynic stance on virtue as the only good whilst acknowledging the indirect contributions of the conventional 'goods': a 'preferred indifferent' is itself a paradox. Stoic discourse on this category could reflect both sides of the paradox: on the one hand, that such things contributed 'nothing' to happiness, on the other, that there were objective reasons for their selection. To argue for the neutrality of the conventional 'goods', the Stoics discussed their inability to contribute directly to the τέλος, their dependence upon virtue for genuine benefit, their unreliability and possible misuse, and their lack of value in comparison to virtue. The defence of reason as the higher-order norm was regularly invoked by the denigration of the intermediates along these lines, which warned of the categorical error of assessing an intermediate as a good. Such challenges to convention could be misunderstood. Epictetus' tendencies are weighted towards the 'regulative ideal', with his focus on virtue rather than intermediates and his approval of the Cynic lifestyle. He claims that his lectures drew the reprimand that 'such words make people despise laws'.[350] Even so, he still assumes the conventional social structures and activities—his use of the metaphorical 'law' is not intended to create antithesis with any particular law code, but to draw attention to Stoic doctrines on the 'good' and warn of misplaced value judgements. The same Stoic who refused to compare virtue or vice with an intermediate was presumably capable of defending his selection of one intermediate over another.[351] So long as such a selection or activity did not conflict with virtue, and so long as it was appropriate or preferred in the circumstances, the wise man would use the intermediates to his advantage, guaranteed by his virtue. The intermediates were extensional activities dependent upon the intensional dispositions of the agent involved for any *moral* worth. The wise would be adept at recognising the objective value of some intermediates in comparison to others, yet they would also vigilantly assess the

[350] Epictetus, *Diatr.* IV.7.33.
[351] E.g. Cato on farming, Cicero, *Off.* II.88–9.

circumstances for their use. As Epictetus states, materials are indifferent, their use is not.[352] Stoic discourse on the intermediates in the abstract (as 'rules of thumb'), or in comparison to each other, could recommend set lists of selections and activities. However, such recommendations were also subject to a host of conditions which the wise man's comprehensive expertise would negotiate. These two patterns of discourse, the ability to disparage the intermediates at times and endorse them at others, was a result of their paradoxical categorization within Stoic ethics as 'preferred' and 'appropriate' while most fundamentally neutral.

2.8 Conclusion to Stoic Ethics

Stoicism was one of the most prominent Hellenistic philosophical schools, and it shared numerous features with the others. However, its ethical theory was distinctive for its claim that only virtue was rightly called 'good' due to its ability to contribute directly to the τέλος. This position continued the Cynic and Socratic tradition of challenging convention and elevating virtue. Zeno's ethical theory, though, also recognised a role for the conventional 'goods'. Impulses, such as those of οἰκείωσις, were grounded in Nature, which determined what was appropriate for all animals. Humans, as the rational animals, would necessarily find that virtue constituted the 'life in agreement with Nature'. Since virtue had the singular ability to contribute directly to the τέλος, its value was different in kind, not degree, and therefore incommensurable with anything else. The first-order value of virtue, and its status as the only 'good', was established in contrast to the conventional goods. While the conventional 'goods' did not directly contribute to the τέλος, and could be used well or poorly, virtue contributed directly to the τέλος, and its unconditional property was to benefit and not to harm. Thus Stoic rhetoric had an established pattern of discourse on the intermediates when discussed in contrast to virtue. Despite the disparaging rhetoric, these intermediates were categorised as neutral, since virtue was the only good, and vice the only evil, and all else was indistinguishable as either. However, within these ἀδιάφορα, Zeno created subcategories which ascribed second-order value to some as natural and appropriate intermediates. These intermediates were still fundamentally neutral in relation to the τέλος, and would thus be disparaged if compared to virtue, but they were defended as 'preferred' or 'appropriate' for their objective value in comparison to other ἀδιάφορα. The defence and

[352] Epictetus, *Diatr.* II.5.1.

explanation of this second-order value formed a second pattern of discourse on the intermediates evident in the Stoic doctrines. The second-order value of the intermediates was conditional, and meant to be assessed and selected with reserve due to the 'countervailing' weight of virtue in ethical reasoning.[353] Any indirect usefulness or advantage which such intermediates offered only pertained so long as it did not conflict with virtue—if it did conflict, its second-order value was no longer relevant. The comprehensive skill of the wise man, though, would recognise this objective and conditional value, and select and perform the intermediates which he could rationally defend, so long as they did not conflict with virtue. The structure of Stoic ethical theory, with its second-order value for the conventional 'goods', endorsed the conventional social and political structures and easily lent itself to domestication and conservativism. However, the theory's severe restriction of 'good' to virtue and the Stoics' unsettling paradoxes continually warned of over-estimating the value afforded to things such as 'law', 'citizen', or even 'preferred' in relation to the higher-order norm of virtue. Stoic ethics never entirely lost the radical edge of its Cynic roots, and its ability to be used by those looking for an ideal to regulate and critique the customs as they saw fit. Stoic doctrine established the only genuine good, the discriminating craft which could use everything else. In this unreserved pursuit of virtue, they thought they reflected the posture of Socrates, who concluded, 'it seems that every man must prepare himself by all available means so that he may be as wise as possible'.[354]

[353] Vlastos, 'Happiness', 186. Cf. 2.4 above.
[354] Plato, *Euthyd.* 281d-282a, trans. Lamb, LCL, 415.

CHAPTER 3

Interlude: Mapping Paul's Structure onto a Stoic Framework

The purpose of this brief chapter is to offer a broad definition of terms and to sketch some points of comparison before embarking upon the analysis of Pauline texts in comparison with the Stoic material just summarised. These will necessarily be defended in the exposition that follows, but it will be helpful to provide them as a frame of reference here. It must be reiterated that it is not the view here that Paul is a philosopher, nor that he is intent upon developing any philosophical doctrines as such. It will not be claimed that Paul is dependent upon any particular texts or material, nor that he was trained in any particular school, but merely that he uses elements of Stoic reasoning and their ethical structure to defend and explicate his own apostolic work. These elements are integrated into the text of his own arguments, of course, but his arguments are not conceived primarily as contributing to the structure or discourse that is Stoic philosophy. Paul uses shared elements to address what he perceives as a confused categorical error within the early Jesus-believing communities, and Stoic ethical structure provided amenable categories to delineate this confusion as he saw it.

Although Cicero *did* present himself as an amateur philosopher, on this particular point he and Paul are perhaps not that different. In *De Officiis*, for example, Cicero introduces terms and topics which are of particular concern to him as an elite Roman.[1] One of these, analysed by Long, is that of *gloria*, with which he has 'deep involvement', but which he also recognised as unstable.[2] As Long puts it, Cicero 'puts Greek philosophy to work' to address this concern, turning to Stoic theory for 'revisionary purposes' despite knowing himself deeply involved.[3] In Book I, one of Cicero's aims is to display the instability of *gloria* in comparison to *honestum*, in typical Stoic fashion, but he still slips, at one point, into bragging of his own quest for glory. 'Cicero's boasting at this point does his case against the honour code no good'.[4] The Stoic ethical structure, with its isolation of moral worth to one thing and recognition of other kinds of worth, proved to be useful for this manner of reform, which sought to challenge conventional values but still retained some use of the structures it

[1] Cf. 2.5.2.4.
[2] Long, '*De Officiis'*, 234.
[3] Long, '*De Officiis*', 215, 226,
[4] Long, '*De Officiis*', 227. Cf. Phil 3, where Paul boasts in the value system he is nonetheless concerned to address.

critiqued. It is an argument for reform, not eradication; against misuse, not all use. This pattern of reasoning, as explained of Stoic discourse, is exercised to disparage the worth of things which might be confused with good, rather than to establish their worth, since it could largely be assumed in the debate. Cicero's society took the place of glory for granted, just as many in Paul's community took the necessity of Jewish practice for granted.

There are too many differences between Paul and philosophers, and the Stoics in particular, to name them all, but several are especially significant to note. Most obviously, Paul is not a pantheist. The distinction between creator and creation, and the transcendence of the creator, was clear for him, and he could hardly have stomached describing all that happened, let alone most human impulses, as divine reason itself.[5] His view of the cosmos is much more conflicted than that, with angelic and demonic beings, and personified actors such as sin and flesh providing metaphysical complexity. Sin, in particular, is much more deep-seated than the Stoic notion, and certainly not remedied by correct judgements, training, and the anticipated development of rationality. This interacts with his view of the intermediates extensively, which are not only unstable *per se* (because of their secondary functions), or unstable because of the limits of human understanding, but *also* actively problematised by human sin at points. Paul's pessimism here makes Epictetus look positively jolly. The dire state of humanity is addressed, to Paul's mind, not by any natural development, but by the divine intervention of the Christ-event.[6]

The 'perfection' of human nature is not attained by any on their own, except by Christ, and it is the 'mind of Christ', as instantiated by the Spirit in believers, that imparts the all-important development which transforms everything else. Although Paul does not think that the human condition will be addressed solely by any pre-existing or 'natural' progression of events (such as epistemological development into rationality), the Stoic construction probably did offer a further useful feature for him. Stoic doctrine taught that the attainment of virtue, perfectly-consistent rationality, was an 'all or nothing' state.[7] Although people progressed from foolishness towards wisdom, one was always strictly one or the other.[8] This

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[5] Gill, *Self*, 160, warns against interpreting Stoicism too strenuously as 'the kind of naturalism in which, for instance, ethics is reduced to physics or is presented as conceptually dependent on foundations supplied by physics'. While cosmic nature grounded ethical claims, ethical doctrine was not identified strictly with physics.
[6] E.g. Gal 4.1–7, where Paul realises his metaphor might be interpreted to imply natural progression and introduces the notion of adoption where it is unexpected on the terms of the metaphor thus far.
[7] DL VII.123, 126–129.
[8] The Stoics may have thought this 'hard' ethical claim also reflected Socratic tradition. C. Rowe, 'Philosophy, Love, and Madness', in *The Person and the Human Mind: Issues in Ancient and Modern Philosophy* (ed. C. Gill; Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), 227–46 (241–44) analyses the metaphor of the charioteer and horses in *Phaedrus*, where the development of rational harmony is pictured as a 'sprouting of wings'. '[T]he combination

feature suits Paul's teachings on the Christ-event as a punctiliar event, also instantiated in punctiliar style in the ensuing events of Spirit-inhabitation.[9] One gets the sense, in reading Paul, of a one-time 'all or nothing' infusion of the Spirit (alternatively, 'mind of Christ', 'Spirit of Christ', 'law of Christ', etc.), with far-reaching possibilities for transformation.[10] Those who remain without that infusion are described in dire terms, hopeless of such transformation. On the other hand, Paul's athletic metaphors, anticipation of future eschatological events, and utterly realistic appraisal of his communities' failings indicate that he does not consider this transformative state to have arrived in a fully complete sense yet—this is not yet the utterly consistent and perfect harmony of the wise. However, if Paul is convinced that this 'rationality' imparted by the Christ-event is of divine initiative, and that it does not depend upon the normal order of events or human effort (although it it fully integrated with them), he can still assert the reality of this transformation. Continuing progression *and* perfection, which could not coexist in Stoic thought, strangely combine in Paul's regular *exhortatio* and unrelenting optimism.

Finally, there is one final point of distinction between Paul and the Stoics which creates complications for him. While the Stoics can separate the quality of reason's *perfect* harmony with nature from the *accordance* with nature which the intermediates had, Paul

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of tenses... points to a once-for-all victory on the part of the charioteer and his white horse… with the victory of philosophy, the black horse has had its day…' (244).

[9] Engberg-Pedersen, *Cosmology*, has argued that Paul's conception of πνεῦμα has similarities with the Stoic conception, such as its dimension of materiality. Particular aspects of the πνεῦμα in Stoic theory, such as its association with divine reason, its ability to 'totally blend' with matter, to animate living beings, yet remain recognisably distinct, do resemble Paul's usage. The analysis of C. A. Newsom, 'In Search of Cultural Models for Divine Spirit and Human Bodies', *VT* 70 (2020): 104–23, of the cultural cognitive models used for רוח in Israelite texts also reveal striking similarities between ancient Jewish conceptions of spirit/breath and the Stoic conception. Some similarities correspond to broadly Hellenistic tropes, such as the association with wisdom. Some features of the Jewish models, however, may have fitted particularly well with the Stoic conception, such as the animating, 'life-constituting' ability of divine spirit for all in the Hebrew Bible, alongside models which highlighted its transformative and 'pervasive… presence' on some, and concentrated charismatic animation in particular communities and individuals (compared to the Stoic πνεῦμα which lent cohesion to all living beings, yet was stronger in the virtuous). Newsom notes the ability of the Jewish texts to convey the 'qualitative dimensions of the spirit which differ' between general 'life-animating' presence and that which lends exceptional skill and wisdom (116), in similar fashion to the features of Stoic πνεῦμα as a widespread active principle in all living beings, and having strong tension in the wise. Paul is interested in the possibility of a 'concentrated' and charismatic spirit, and perhaps found amenable the Stoic conceptions of πνεῦμα which allowed not only for ecstatic experiences, but ordered ethical behaviour arising out of 'total blending' of divine and human reason (cf. Newsom's description, 111, of divine spirit operating on human thoughts as 'a model of temporarily inhabiting spirit that operates like a parallel sentience to the person's own mind…'). However, the activity of any divine spirit is restricted by Paul and linked to, even fused with, the historical person of Christ and the events generated by his life. This Christ-event has resulted in a divine presence qualitatively distinct from previous instantiations of any life-animating divine spirit: Paul's πνεῦμα is not what is breathed into the first Adam and animates all living beings, but the πνεῦμα from the second Adam.

[10] A similar transformation occurs with the development of rationality in Stoicism. As Gill, *Self*, 77, says of Cicero's account of developing rationality, the recognition of virtue as the only good 'leads to a revaluation of the natural advantages pursued first instinctively…'.

cannot so easily categorise all intermediates. This is due to the fact that the Jewish scriptures, including the Torah as basis for Jewish practice, have for Paul a divine origin. While Paul can neutralise all practices in relation to the divine action in Christ, this divine action is inexplicable apart from the Jewish scriptures, which means that it has a crucial role, even for gentile believers.[11] Other points of distinction will be seen in the exposition, such as Paul's elevation of the salvation of others as part of the good, and the qualities imprinted by the personal and narrative shape of his first-order value. The scaffolding Paul uses to build his structure is shared, but the structure he uses it to build is his own.

The interpretation of Paul offered in the subsequent chapters will be argued to align with the Stoic structure in the following terms. For the τέλος, the chief end, Paul posits salvation. This is a multivalent concept for him, and it can be referenced in numerous ways; in the texts here, it is referenced by the awarding of the status required for salvation, its eschatological climax, and the action of 'saving' (δικαιόω, ἐξανάστασις, and σώζω respectively). The good which contributes directly to salvation, and is accordingly afforded first-order value, is the believers' orientation to Christ. This good is divinely initiated by the apocalyptic Christ-event. If there is anything that corresponds in Paul's mind to the place of cosmic Nature in Stoic theory, it would be the Christ-event: a higher-order logic by which one knows divine reason and which provides limits upon any subjectively-perceived human nature. The good, the Christ-orientation, is also a multivalent notion, for which he has an array of terminology, but in the texts that follow it appears as faith in Christ and knowing Christ. In the final text to be discussed (1 Cor 8–10), the status of believers as those who exist 'through' Christ concurs with their love for God, their status as those known by God, and as those who subsequently do things 'to' God. The so-called 'goods' which Paul believes are being confused with this good (the Christ-orientation), and which do not directly contribute to salvation are then argued to have an 'intermediate' role. In Paul's communities, the conventional 'goods' most often proposed are Jewish practices, and this is what he is exercised to neutralise. However, he argues, at some points, for a second-order value for these Jewish practices, and, at other points, he posits the same second-order value for some

[11] This is comparable to other ancient Jewish methods of grounding or authorising interpretations of Torah, whether in the divine will (cf. Hayes, *Law*, 246–85; Tomson, *Law*, 248–54) or as 'Mosaic Discourse' per H. Najman, *Seconding Sinai: The Development of Mosaic Discourse in Second Temple Judaism*; Leiden: Brill, 2003, 9–19. Such interpretations, as Najman particularly points out, did not intend to replace Torah, but to 'interpret and develop the content of that text in a way that one claims to be an authentic expression of the law…' (13).

gentile practices. Like the Stoic arguments on the intermediates, it is often easier to understand what Paul thinks these practices do *not* do, than what they do in a positive sense.

Like Zeno and Cicero before him, Paul could safely assume the positive value of some things. He spends most of his time arguing against the over-estimation of this value, a categorical error which he believed threatened the establishment of the first-order value of the Christ-orientation. Paul's arguments against Torah observance for gentiles arise out of his conviction that the divine action in Christ and the orientation to him was sufficient to constitute salvation. Stoic reasoning provided the possibility of isolating one thing as having *sui generis* value, while retaining a different kind of value for others, and even arguing that the two categories, while necessarily distinct, were not *un*related. It was a model for arguing for the incommensurable value, and countervailing weight of one thing in ethical reasoning, one which suited Paul's purposes. Paul defends the first-order value of the Christ-orientation in contrast to other ethical elements, often Jewish practices, by arguing for their ability to be used well or poorly, and their dependence upon the Christ-orientation for salvation. This has the effect of neutralising all practices and selections *in relation to salvation*, despite whatever other intrinsic value they may have.[12]

Paul's experience with Christ-orientated gentiles, and his calling as the apostle to the gentiles, convinced him that God's action in Christ endorses and authorises gentile practice *qua* gentile. By the Spirit, these gentiles have exhibited behaviour which Paul can only describe as Torah-*like*, while insisting that it happens *apart* from Torah.[13] As this suggests, Paul has no recourse to describe these events, and even his own work, apart from reference to the Jewish scriptures. Paul argues for the legitimacy of gentile practice *qua* gentile, *and* that gentile Jesus-believers are demonstrably righteous. Between these two poles he devises an *ad hoc* method of ethical reasoning. This *ad hoc* method seeks to avoid, on the one hand, asserting explicitly that gentiles need to live like Jews (i.e. Judaize), and, on the other, endorsing any gentile behaviour which he considered *un*righteous.[14] So while Paul happily gives instructions for behaviour at numerous points, he carefully avoids prescribing specific extensional activities explicitly connected to Torah, or obligation to Jewish law, since this would be perceived as asking gentiles to Judaize, which he regards as an enslaving

[12] Cf. Rom 3.1, 9, where Paul states that there is a benefit to circumcision, but one which does not translate into superiority. A Stoic probably would avoid suggesting any association of an intermediate with ὠφέλεια; Paul is less precise, but the characteristics of an objective, yet conditional, value fit the category.
[13] Rom 2.14–15.
[14] Paul may be impressed by the behaviour he sees of some gentiles, but he is far from endorsing all the behaviour with which 'gentile sinners' are comfortable. It is important to remember, as Jaquette, *Adiaphora*, 36, states, 'paradoxically, discussion of non-essentials also serves to promote and maintain social conservativism'.

categorical error.[15] Stoic ethical reasoning is again perhaps useful for Paul since, while endorsing token selections and activities, it avoids assigning them moral worth and relies upon virtuous dispositions to 'perfect' them. Written lawcodes were perceived as dealing with behaviour at the level of extensional activities,[16] but Paul can discuss dispositions which he perceives as 'mapping onto' the Jewish scriptures in a variety of ways while avoiding specific Torah commands for gentiles.[17] As mentioned, these lists and set types were also intentionally unfixed and open-ended, which allowed for a wide variety of factors to be taken into account when judging what was 'appropriate' or 'preferred'. Paul can thus permit the wide variety of practices, customs, and statuses which he argues the Christ-event has endorsed, while still expecting them to be 'perfected' by the believers' Christ-orientation.[18] For Jews, Paul presumably considered Torah observance obligatory as national law, although insufficient for salvation apart from the Christ-orientation, and under its proviso for Jewish believers.[19] For gentiles, Torah is not law, but the Jewish scriptures still provide points of reference and analogy for their ethical reasoning. They are now oriented to Christ, and incorporated into the divine action of the Christ-event, which cannot be fully understood apart from education in the scriptures. The Christ-event functions like the course of actual events identified as cosmic Nature in Stoic theory, which provides control and limits to any subjective deductions made on the basis of human nature. The gentiles have authority to reason in the Spirit, based on their own self-perception as God's gentiles appropriated to him through Christ, whom they learn about in the Jewish Scriptures, and all of these elements create a messy, purpose-built 'web of interlocking generalizations'.[20] When he does prescribe behaviour that could be construed as specifically Jewish practice, Paul assiduously does so on the basis of their Christ-orientation, through which they are to understand the scriptures. This is similar to the 'top-down' approach seen in *De Officiis*, which grounded particular appropriate actions in the virtues, rather than the impulses.[21] In other words, as those oriented

[15] Hence the insight of H. D. Betz, *Galatians: A Commentary on Paul's Letter to the Churches in Galatia* (Hermeneia; Philadephia: Fortress Press, 1979), 275, that Paul never asked a gentile to 'do' the law. Gentiles, on the other hand, are to be law-abiding according to *their* nature (Rom 13.1–7).
[16] Engberg-Pedersen, *Paul*, 162, 172. See above, in section 2.7.4; cf. Kidd, 'Intermediates', 156–7; Vander Waerdt, 'Law', 18–19, 26; Hayes, *Law*, 56–66. Natural 'law' also commanded and prohibited actions, but those in harmony with divine will and accompanied by virtuous dispositions, for which no code can be created.
[17] Gal 5.18–23.
[18] Cf. Rom 14, where whatever one eats is 'to the Lord'. The inattention to systematising the intermediate categories is typical of 'Cynicised' Stoics, such as Epictetus, who did not reject such categories but focused on elevating virtue.
[19] Cf. the first-person plurals of Gal 2.15–17; Phil 3.1–14.
[20] Brown, 'Emergence', 355, of Stoic reasoning.
[21] Cf. 2.5.2.4.

to Christ, who is the one Lord in the *Shema*, they are to deduce that they cannot participate in idolatry from the theology they learn in the scriptures—but not strictly because Torah commands them not to worship idols. Paul also, in 1 Cor 9.1–14, demonstrates a model of 'bottom-up' reasoning from human nature, but which is then controlled by the higher-order logic of the Christ event (vv15–18). Paul labours to create communities of gentiles, with Torah-like, but not Torah-observant, righteousness, engendered through their orientation to Christ.

Paul can be understood as sharing Stoic-like structures in order to establish the first-order good of the orientation to Christ, which he presents as directly contributing to salvation. His conventional 'goods', with assumed value, are the Jewish laws and customs, and he uses Stoic-like structures to reform or critique perceived problematic uses of these. Albeit with a substantially different metaphysical and theological framework and content, these Stoic-like structures and patterns of discourse neutralise Jewish practices in relation to salvation, but also devise an *ad hoc* reasoning method which insists that some practices (including Jewish ones at points) are advantageous for the believers.

Chapter 4

Paul's First Pattern of Discourse: Establishing the First-Order Value of the Christ-Orientation

4.1 Introduction

To return to question raised at the outset of this thesis, how can Paul speak of the Torah and his Jewish heritage in such glowing terms at some points and so negatively at others? As the Stoics could endorse selection of the intermediates but also disparage them in comparison to virtue, perhaps Paul could regard his Jewish heritage as valuable, and yet insist on the incommensurable value of the believers' orientation to Christ. The Stoics argued that for virtue to be established, the intermediates must be selected with reserve and considered 'nothing' (οὐδέν) in relation to the τέλος. It is this structure of reasoning, which recognises *one* thing as contributing directly to the τέλος while simultaneously acknowledging a conditional value for other things, that is a distinctively Stoic pattern.[1] These discourse patterns are also evident in Paul's writings. Paul's inconsistency on Torah observance can be understood as a Stoic-like strategy designed to establish the first-order value of orientation to Christ (as that which directly contributed to salvation), while still identifying a second-order value for some selections and activities, including Jewish practices.

At numerous points in Paul's writings, there is evidence of the first pattern of discourse, which disparaged the intermediates in order to establish the first-order good. Two passages which demonstrate this first pattern regarding Jewish practices will be analysed in this chapter: Phil 3.1–4.1 and Gal 2.1–21. In Phil 3, Paul's discourse established the first-order value of knowing Christ by contrasting it with intermediates—Jewish credentials—which he felt were erroneously being judged as equally valuable. The reliance of his opponents on such intermediates was a categorical error—something was being regarded as genuinely 'good' which was not. In Gal 2, Paul opposes requiring an intermediate (a Jewish practice) because to do so would deny the first-order value of believing in Christ, which he argues to establish here. The latter text addresses the requiring of Jewish practice for gentiles and the former text references the reliance on Jewish practice by a Jew, so that Paul's

[1] Gill, *Self*, 131: 'It is this combination of ideas, seeing qualified value in the primary natural things but seeing virtue as the only good, that was absolutely characteristic of Stoicism and which aroused fierce criticism from ancient opponents such as Antiochus'.

warnings of categorical error apply to both gentiles and Jews. The argument of this chapter is that Paul's critical statements regarding Torah observance in Phil 3 and Gal 2 are not meant to disparage Jewish practice or repudiate Torah in general, but to emphasise rhetorically their inability to contribute directly to salvation in contrast to the Christ-orientation. To rely upon or to require these practices indicated they were mistakenly evaluated as having the same worth as the Christ-orientation. Although there is evidence even in these texts that Paul ascribed value to these practices, and retained use of them, his concern is that a failure to recognise their neutrality in relation to salvation would threaten the believers' Christ-orientation. Regarding Torah observance as a neutral intermediate explains Paul's adamant opposition to its pursuit in these texts and his appeals to Torah in his ethical reasoning elsewhere.

4.2 Phil 3.1–4.1

Philippians is one of Paul's most irenic letters, as scholars' suggested themes for it indicate: joy, friendship, consolation.[2] The exception to this harmonious tone is 3.1–4.1 which is notable enough to indicate to some the insertion of another letter.[3] Paul shifts unexpectedly from talk of a mutual friend to name-calling, a shift made more puzzling by the mystery of these opponents' identity—where are these 'dogs' in the rest of the letter? However, despite the shift in tone, the content of 3.1–4.1 continues themes of the epistle. Paul has been concerned to calibrate the community's values around Christ. In reference to the prayer in 1.10 that the Philippians be able to δοκιμάζειν ὑμᾶς τὰ διαφέροντα, and Paul's indifference towards death later in the epistle, Jaquette states that 'an important part of

[2] For consolation, cf. Holloway, *Philippians*, 1–11, 39–49; NB: this resource was originally accessed as a pre-publication manuscript, and the printed volume could not be accessed under Covid-19 conditions. Thus some of the pagination for this item reflects the pre-publication version and will be noted as such. For joy, cf. M. Bockmuehl, *A Commentary on the Epistle to the Philippians* (BNTC; London: A & C Black, 1997), 177; friendship, cf. G. D. Fee, *Paul's Letter to the Philippians* (NICNT; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1995), 12–14.

[3] W. Schenk, *Die Philipperbriefe des Paulus: Kommentar* (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1984), 5–11, views 3.2–4.3 as a 'warning letter' inserted into a main letter and alongside a smaller 'thank you' letter. For a chronology of the debate on the unity of the letter (which is based particularly on a suspected break at 3.1–2), see D. E. Garland, 'The Composition and Unity of Philippians: Some Neglected Literary Factors', *NovT* 27 (1985): 141–73, and P. Sellew, '"Laodiceans" and the Philippians Fragments Hypothesis', *HTR* 87 (1994): 17–28, which discusses the external evidence against the unity of the letter. Holloway, *Philippians*, 11–12, states that the majority of scholarship is currently in favour of the unity of the epistle, but he is concerned that this consensus be based on evidence rather than theological priorities. He gives an impressive list (20–1) of parallels between 3.1–4.1 and the rest of the letter that argue for congruent content and simultaneous timing. Engberg-Pedersen, *Paul,* 83–90, surveys the repeated motifs between this section and the rest of the letter, a 'tightly woven web of meaning'. Bockmuehl, *Philippians*, 24, and Fee, *Philippians*, 22–3, both question that a redactor would leave the troublesome phrases of 3.1, since scribal practice tends to 'erase' seams.

discovering what counts is distinguishing things that do not matter'.[4] Holloway also emphasises this statement as key to the epistle. Like many scholars, he regards the opening prayer in Paul's greeting as programmatic for the epistle, introducing significant themes. For him, 'Paul's prayer in Phil 1:10 that the Philippians learn to identify "the things that really matter"[5] evokes [the] theory' of consolation like that found in Seneca's letters.[6] Paul is unconcerned about his own imprisonment and death (1.12–26) and physical wellbeing (4.10–3) because these are not his 'goods'.[7] By asserting joy despite difficult circumstances Paul reinforces the first-order value of Christ (by attesting to the neutrality of circumstances and the ability of the Christ-orientation to constitute the end), and his refusal in ch3 to rely on his credentials does the same. Both are designed to promote the singular value of the Christ-orientation. Jaquette describes Paul's use of the ἀδιάφορα categories as a 'hedge against mistaken placement of values'.[8]

The reason that Paul 'comes out swinging' at 3.1 in an otherwise warm and congenial letter, I argue, is that his severe rhetoric and stark metaphors are part of a strategy to establish the first-order value of Christ. This pattern of discourse in Stoicism rhetorically disparaged the intermediates to elevate virtue by comparison, and Paul's negative language in this text similarly persuades the readers to 'rejoice in the Lord' (3.1). As Holloway underscores, 'It should be clear at this point … that Paul's command in 3:1a is anything but a moral cliché'.[9] The injunctions to 'rejoice in the Lord' and 'stand firm in the Lord' can be understood as variant expressions of the same concern which governs the section of 3.1–4.1: that the Philippians remain secure in their orientation to Christ and properly rejoice in him *by* resisting the false values of these opponents he warns against.[10] The inverse implication is

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[4] Jaquette, *Adiaphora*, 213.

[5] Holloway, *Philippians*, p. 21 of section 2 in pre-publication manuscript: 'On this reading Paul is employing the familiar cognitive distinction, made popular by the Stoics, between the things that do not matter (τὰ ἀδιάφορα) and the things that do (τὰ διαφέροντα)… This interpretation of τὰ διαφέροντα makes excellent sense of the consolation that follows in 1:12–26, where Paul... argues that "the things that really matter" in the present situation are neither his imprisonment nor the outcome of his trial... but the "progress of the gospel" and his own final "salvation"'.

[6] Holloway, *Philippians*, p. 6, section 1 in pre-publication manuscript.

[7] As Jaquette, *Adiaphora,* 114, says of 1.20–26: 'Neither death nor life has special value in itself; both pale in importance before the issue of whether Christ is honored in Paul's body'. Jaquette sees this, 119, as 'an example of Stoic-deliberations on life and death as adapted for use in a non-Stoic symbolic universe'.

[8] Jaquette, *Adiaphora*, xiv.

[9] Holloway, *Philippians*, p.17 in pre-publication manuscript. Holloway views 3.1–4.1 as a consolatory argument due to his view of the letter as a whole as one of consolation. I would instead see elements of consolation appearing *ad hoc*, as Holloway's own discussion of the genre, 4, 7–8, indicates is possible. His recognition, though, that Paul models the appropriate joyful response like a 'philosopher whose happiness rests solely on "the things that really matter"' and of the similarities to Seneca, 'who has learned "that one must not rejoice in empty things"' is helpful.

[10] Holloway, *Philippians*, p. 3 of section 3 in pre-publication manuscript.

that succumbing to the opponents' mindset would be a failure to rejoice in Christ. To persuade the Philippians of their need to avoid this categorical error and estimate the value of 'knowing Christ' differently than other practices, Paul employs Stoic criteria and analogies: he argues for the ability of 'knowing Christ' to contribute directly to salvation, and the inability of his Jewish credentials to do the same, and he uses a metaphorical motif of value and athletic imagery to illustrate the appropriate weight the two categories should have in one's reasoning.

4.2.1 3:1–6: Warning against a false value system which places confidence in intermediates

With 3.1, Holloway says that Paul 'uses "joy" to confront the Philippians with a philosophical ideal and to urge them to behave in a manner "worthy of the gospel" (1:27)'.[11] This appeal is immediately followed by a warning—they are to watch out for a group to which he gives three descriptors: 'dogs', 'evil workers', and 'the mutilation'. While the identity of these people is unknown,[12] these labels indicate several things—they are likely both fellow Jews (or proselytes to Judaism) and possibly workers within the Jesus-believing communities like Paul.[13] Κατατομή is an ironic wordplay on circumcision, a practice which they are perhaps enjoining for these Jesus-believers. That circumcision is perhaps the contested practice is evidenced by Paul's eagerness to claim the label for his community only a few words later: 'their so-called "circumcision" is just a mangled cutting; *we* are the circumcision' (v3). Following περιτομή, Paul labels himself and his community with three

[11] Holloway, *Philippians*, pp. 16-17 in pre-publication manuscript

[12] The variety of views: J. D. G. Dunn, *The Theology of Paul the Apostle* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1998), 464, says the consensus view is these opponents are Christian Jews who felt they needed to 'complete' Paul's mission by proselytizing his converts. Fee, *Philippians*, 287, identifies the opponents as 'Judaizers' ('those who might… urge Gentile believers to submit to circumcision', 289, 'Jewish Christians who promote circumcision among Gentile believers', 293–4). (His use of 'Judaizer' is a misnomer.) Holloway, *Philippians*, p. 4 of section 3 in pre-publication manuscript, sees this as an area of 'considerable debate', but finds (5) the characteristics 'consistent' with Paul's opponents in Galatians and 2 Corinthians.

[13] The word-play of κατατομή on περιτομή is almost universally understood to be a negative re-casting of circumcision. It is often pointed out that κύνας was a term used by Jews to refer to gentiles; cf. Mt 7.6, 15.26–7. Garland, 'Composition',167, cites *m. Ned.* 4.3, *m. Bek*. 5.6, texts which class dogs with gentiles. M. D. Nanos, 'Paul's Reversal of Jews Calling Gentiles "Dogs" (Philippians 3:2): 1600 Years of an Ideological Tale Wagging an Exegetical Dog?', on www.marknanos.com, correctly points out that all of these citations post-date Paul, and that it is a common disparagement in antiquity. This descriptor alone could not identify Paul's opponents as fellow Jews, but their identification as fellow Jews is based on his Jewish qualifications in vv5-6, paired with 'confidence in the flesh', the descriptor of his opponents' mindset. Ἐργάτης and its cognates are used elsewhere by Paul of his own work and that of other Christ-believers, whether he finds himself aligned with them or not (1 Th 5.13; 1 Cor 4.12; 9.1, 6, 13; 16.10; 2 Cor 11.13; Phil 1.22) so that most think these are workers within the Christ-believing community, e.g. Holloway, *Philippians*, p. 5 of section3 in pre-publication manuscript. It is not necessarily a technical word, though (cf. cognates in Gal 6.10; 1 Cor 9.13). Some (Dunn, *Theology*, 465; Garland, 'Composition', 168; Bockmuehl, *Philippians*, 188-9) connect this to Paul's well-known use of ἔργα with νόμος, but the extensive debate on the phrase precludes much help for interpretation.

further descriptors: they are those serving in the spirit of God, boasting in Christ Jesus, and not relying on the flesh. Thus within two sentences Paul disputes the claims of his fellow Jewish workers and qualifies a well-known Jewish practice in terms that only apply to Jesus-believers.[14] Given the polemical situation, even the positive labels Paul wants his followers to use are shaped by the opponents whom he has in mind here so that the labels are probably in opposition to qualities which Paul perceives his opponents as possessing (i.e. *not* serving in the spirit, *not* boasting in Christ, relying *on* the flesh). This is borne out by his next move which conflates ἐν σαρκί with elements of Jewish practice.

Taking up the last element of his description of these opponents—πείθομαι ἐν σαρκί—Paul continues his warning against his opponents by expressing concern over reliance or confidence in the flesh. He claims that although he does *not* identify with such confidence as a Jesus-believer in v3, he has even more capacity for such misplaced confidence.[15] Paul simultaneously describes himself as one who eschews confidence in the flesh (as part of the ἡμεῖς of v3a) and one who had confidence in the flesh (as the singular ἐγώ of v4a, c), effectively claiming a unique position to enable him to warn his followers of these opponents and their unqualified confidence.[16]

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[14] That Paul aims to reconceive this identity somehow is indicated by the governance of the main verb clause (ἡμεῖς γάρ ἐσμεν ἡ περιτομή), followed by three participial clauses, which did not necessarily correlate with Jewish identity. Dunn, *Theology,* 466, sees a link here to Paul's thought in Rom 2.28–9 and to the re-imagining of circumcision as an 'inward circumcision' in Deuteronomy and Jeremiah. Paul enters into a debate over the theological nature and purpose of circumcision. His customary use of περιτομή as metonymy, though, to refer to Jews in antithesis to gentiles, combined with his use here of a mixed Jew-gentile group, indicates that he can use it as both as a reference for Jews, and, paradoxically, of gentiles who are not circumcised (and elsewhere metonymically referred to as ἀκροβυστία, Rom 3.30; 4.9; Gal 2.7). In the latter case, it is redefined for ethical purposes by the descriptors of the participial phrases. Paul is not concerned to say that there is no such thing as standard circumcision, or that it does not represent Jewishness, but that it can also be reconceived in paradoxical fashion to refer to an ethical reality. Paul reconceives circumcision similarly to the Stoic reconception of the legal status of freedom to refer to an ethical reality and thus subvert the value of such statuses,. Paul slides into the shifting debate regarding what constituted 'Jewishness' at numerous points (such as offering his own list of credentials in vv5-6), but it is subsidiary to his goal. Ethnic labeling, even in antiquity, uses a shifting variety of cultural and historical factors as necessary to build an ethnic or cultural identity, cf. E. Gruen, 'Did Ancient Identity Depend on Ethnicity? A Preliminary Probe', *Phoenix* 67 (2013), 1–22. If Paul is read as an ethnic essentialist, he can safely assume the identification of Jews at numerous points, a fact which enables him to use such descriptors paradoxically when he wants. Such paradoxical reconception is not attempting to abolish the categories with which it plays—in fact, it depends on them parasitically—but to challenge conventional notions, and, in the case of the Stoic use, specifically to relocate them in the ethical realm. Here, Paul both acknowledges the conventional use of circumcision as a Jewish identification and challenges the value it holds by describing it with other factors which may, or may not, align with Jewish identity. The transfer of a term to the ethical realm which paradox facilitated did not eliminate its conventional use, but neither did it leave it unchanged. Paradoxical reconceptions challenge convention—while left functioning, the institutions and notions themselves were inevitably transformed by such challenges.

[15] The conditionality of Paul's statement is mildly expressed in his choice of conjunctions (καίπερ, εἴ) but most clearly by the past tense of the transition in v7.

[16] In sociological terms, Paul portrays himself as an 'outsider within', cf. P. H. Collins, 'Learning From the Outsider Within: The Sociological Significance of Black Feminist Thought', *Social Problems* 33 (1986): 14–32;

Paul proves his capacity for such misplaced confidence with seven credentials in vv5-6, six of which are unmistakably Jewish.[17] One of these credentials (ζῆλος), though, has proven potentially contrary to his identity as one who 'boasts in Christ'.[18] Thus Paul deliberately lists the specifically Jewish practices which he and his opponents were inclined to rely upon. Put precisely, Paul claims to be or have the same ἐν σαρκί credentials as his opponents and the capacity for the same reliance, but the point of distinction he wants to make between himself and them is the reliance upon such credentials.[19]

Paul's opening warning specifies what he perceives as a threat to the Philippians' ability to 'rejoice in the Lord' in a way 'worthy of the gospel'—a confidence in Jewish credentials. Such credentials are potentially, although not necessarily, contrary to the identity of those who 'boast in Christ Jesus', and should not be relied upon. A natural question would be 'for what?' or 'to what end?' do Paul's opponents rely on these credentials, a question to which the following verses provide an answer. He first, however, explains his shift away from reliance on such credentials with a metaphorical motif of value.

4.2.2 3.7–11: Paul's shift to a new value system

In another somewhat abrupt move, Paul describes the manner of rejoicing which he wants his readers to emulate with economic terms. Having identified himself as one laying claim to credentials at the heart of his dispute, he then adopts a metaphorical motif of value to explain his cognitive shift to one identified amongst οἱ ... οὐκ ἐν σαρκὶ πεποιθότες. Paul is unwilling to rely upon such practices because he now considers their value to have shifted

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G. Bracey, '"Race Tests": Racial Boundary Maintenance in White Evangelical Churches', *Sociological Inquiry* 87 (2017), 282–302. Paul's statement ἡμεῖς γάρ ἐσμεν ἡ περιτομή in contradistinction to those having confidence ἐν σαρκί which he illustrates *with* circumcision itself sets up a complex scenario where Paul sides with both his opponents and his readers at points. M. D. Nanos, 'The Question of Conceptualization: Qualifying Paul's Position on Circumcision in Dialogue with Josephus's Advisors to King Izates', in *Paul within Judaism: Restoring the First-Century Context to the Apostle* (eds. M. D. Nanos and M. Zetterholm; Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2015), 105–52, argues that Paul here takes a position against the validity of circumcision for proselytes in an intra-Jewish debate. Paul also references his own circumcision in this text, though, and, if Nanos is correct, his description of himself *and* his gentile auditors as 'the circumcision' is about the most confusing thing he could have possibly said.

[17] The one possible exception being κατὰ ζῆλος διώκων τὴν ἐκκλησίαν. Bockmuehl, *Philippians*, 199; Holloway, *Philippians,* p. 15, section 3 in pre-publication manuscript, amongst others consider ζῆλος to be nearly a technical term denoting a particular set of political and apocalyptic connotations within Judaism, although here it is further specified as persecution of the Jesus-believing community.

[18] Cf. Gal 1.13–14; my thanks to J. M. G. Barclay for pointing this out to me in conversation.

[19] Paul uses both the verb (πείθω, vv3, 4) and the related noun (πεποίθησις, v4) to describe the attitude he rejects towards Torah observance. Perfect forms of the verm in particular meant to depend upon, trust in or to put confidence in, LSJ s.v. 'πείθω'. This meaning was common in the LXX, cf. R. Bultmann, 'πείθω', *TDNT* 6:1–11. Given that Paul interchanges it with the noun and uses καυχάομαι in a parallel clause, this is the meaning here. Cf. Rom 2.17, 19, 23; 2 Cor 1.9.

relative to knowing Christ. In some contexts, such things were a 'gain' (κέρδος), but they are now 'loss' (ζημία) in relation to the surpassing (ὑπερέχω) value of 'knowing Christ'. He states three times some variation of the following statement: these credentials which he previously held to be a 'gain' he now holds to be a 'loss' on account of Christ (vv7, 8a, 8b-c).[20] After the initial statement in v7 (ἀλλὰ ἅτινα ἦν μοι κέρδη, ταῦτα ἥγημαι διὰ τὸν Χριστὸν ζημίαν), he launches into a long, complex sentence. V8a amplifies the statement of v7 with emphatic language and an increase in the scope of what is regarded as loss (ἀλλὰ μενοῦνγε καὶ ἡγοῦμαι πάντα ζημίαν), and specifies the purpose of such a shift in v7 (εἶναι διὰ τὸ ὑπερέχον τῆς γνώσεως Χριστοῦ Ἰησοῦ τοῦ κυρίου μου).[21] V8c reiterates the expanded scope of πᾶς and specifies the type of loss he now regards these credentials to be (σκύβαλον).

Paul then elaborates upon the nature of what he now considers to be 'gain'. Having previously specified his new gain of exceeding value as 'knowing Christ' in v8a, Paul circuitously repeats in v10a that 'to know him' (τοῦ γνῶναι αὐτὸν) is the result of the gaining and being found which he has elaborated upon in vv8c-9d (καὶ εὑρεθῶ ἐν αὐτῷ, μὴ ἔχων ἐμὴν δικαιοσύνην τὴν ἐκ νόμου ἀλλὰ τὴν διὰ πίστεως Χριστοῦ).[22] The delineation is not precise, but the repetition of γνῶσις/γινώσκω seems to indicate that knowledge of Christ is the primary commodity for which Paul is willing to lose all else, with gaining Christ and being found in him being either synonymous or precursors to the end of that knowledge.

'Gaining' and 'being found' are followed by a participial phrase which further elaborates that these states are concomitant with having a righteousness through faith and

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[20] Cf. the metaphor of value in 1.21. Fee, *Philippians*, 313, helpfully boils down the sentence of v8 to two themes: 'the "gain-loss" metaphor and its reason, "because of Christ"'. As Dunn, *Theology*, 474, says, 'The sharpness of the contrast is not so much to denigrate what he had previously counted as gain, as to enhance to the highest degree the value he now attributes to Christ, to the knowledge of Christ, and to the prospect of gaining Christ'. Holloway, *Philippians,* 116, highlights the similar logical move of 2 Cor 3.10: 'what was X is now not-X in light of what is surpassingly-X' all of which is due to the personal encounter with Christ. Contra Nanos, 'Conceptualization', 106, 140, this statement refers not to gentiles, but to his own circumcision which he regards as loss. While Paul endorses circumcision for Jewish males (1 Cor 7.18), that its value depreciated for him in some sense is clear.

[21] The opening of the sentence begins with a (possibly second) adversative conjunction (ἀλλά) then a rare emphatic particle (μενοῦνγε, constructed from μεν, οὖν, and γε) which = 'But then even more so ... '. The claim is amplified from the relative pronoun (ἅτινα) of v7 which referred to the qualifications of vv5-6 as πᾶς in v8a.

[22] The grammatical relationship is laboured, but it seems best to understand it as a further elaboration of the ἵνα-clause of vv8d-9a. Fee, *Philippians*, 327, points out that when Paul indicates a double purpose he tends to use ἵνα for both, which he does not do here (cf. 1 Cor 7.5; Gal 3.14; 4.5), and he argues that the lack of ἵνα in v10a lends to an interpretation of vv8d–9a as a 'penultimate purpose' towards the 'ultimate purpose' of v10a. Bockmuehl, *Philippians*, 213, and Holloway, *Philippians*, 163, see 'gain' and 'know' as synonymous if slightly different expressions of the same reality. Given the repetition of the theme of knowing Christ/knowledge of Christ, it seems likely that this is the dominant idea Paul wants to portray, with 'gain' present to complete the metaphor. Engberg-Pedersen, *Paul,* 119, confirms that Paul presents his τέλος in a variety of ways throughout the letter but here it is 'a state of full knowledge: the final "grasp" of Christ Jesus'.

pointedly *not* from Torah.[23] Presumably a righteousness from Torah is that which Paul laid claim to as a credential upon which he could potentially rely in v6b (κατὰ δικαιοσύνην τὴν ἐν νόμῳ γενόμενος ἄμεμπτος) and that he formerly considered a gain but now considers a loss. This, however, is not the requisite kind of righteousness: such Jewish practice is now regarded by Paul like a loss in comparison to 'knowing Christ' which is corollary with a faith-righteousness. V10 supplies the essential components of Paul's knowledge of Christ: Christ, the power of his resurrection, and the fellowship of his sufferings (further described with a rare verb, συμμορφιζόμενος).[24] V11 concludes the sentence which began in v8 with a note of hopeful yearning for the very last step in knowing Christ: resurrection.

With this, the shift of values is complete as the previously-considered gains are replaced by the newly-considered gain: knowing Christ. There are numerous features of this text worth commenting on, but several in particular are pertinent to the argument here. Paul's choice to adopt a metaphorical motif of value to discuss his Jewish credentials and his opponents' reliance upon them here is unexpected and anomalous with his typical discourse on Torah.[25] Why is this the way Paul wants to talk about these credentials and reliance upon them—of the *value* they have? I argue that the value-motif is prominent in his argument here because he shares Stoic-like assumptions regarding the criteria for assessing selections and activities, and their proper role in reasoning. Paul uses a financial metaphor, just as the Stoics did, to describe the category error evident in his opponents' reliance on circumcision. He then defends his shift in values by demonstrating that his first-order value—'knowing Christ'—contributes directly to salvation (here alluded to by δικαιοσύνη and ἀνάστασις). In doing so, he notes the inability of his Jewish credentials to do the same, explaining his comparative disvaluing of them—such credentials are unable to contribute directly to salvation as 'knowing Christ' does. He thus isolates the disposition which contributes directly to his τέλος of salvation while noting the inability of his credentials to do the same—this is why relying upon them is so problematic for him. The stark application of the metaphorical motif of value

[23] Dunn, *Theology*, 370, notes that Paul's description of the righteousness from the Torah as ἐμήν should not be over-interpreted as '"achieved by me" … all it need mean is "my own" as "belonging to me" … the contrast with the next phrases seem to be primarily between "which is from the law" and "which is through faith in Christ"'.

[24] Fee, *Philippians*, 333–4, sees the structure of vv10–11 as chiastic, while Holloway, *Philippians*, 27 section 3 in pre-publication manuscript, argues that this 'gives too much weight to form over substance and ignores the list's obvious emotional crescendo in item five'. This is to be preferred, given the direction the text heads next – it is primarily focused on the resurrection with the comments about suffering and death surfacing as an instinctive coupling with power/resurrection in Paul's mind (cf. Rom 6.8; 8.17,18; 2 Cor 1.5; 13.4; Phil 1.29; 2 Th 1.5).

[25] Dunn, *Theology*, 463, notices the lack of use of Phil 3 in such presentations.

warns against a false value system and establishes the incommensurable (i.e. ὑπερέχω) value of 'knowing Christ' which must be weighted differently in the believers' reasoning.[26]

In comparison to this 'good', other things—actually, *everything*—are not just less valuable, but its opposite: loss. The exceeding value of knowing Christ has caused a rearrangement in Paul's value system so dramatic that nothing else is allowed to be considered valuable in the same way—other types of considerations can be made regarding these things but not the type of consideration which the value of knowing Christ demands. The great divide Paul constructs between the weight of knowing Christ and everything else is indicated by the severe antithesis of his language.[27] It could be argued that since Paul's antithesis is *so* stark—labelling his previously-considered gains as σκύβαλα—he does not distinguish between the first-order value of a good and the second-order value of an intermediate, but between a good and an evil. This is not necessarily the case, however, if the functional dualism in Stoic ethics is remembered and some allowance made for rhetorical recklessness on the part of Paul and a mild translation of σκύβαλον.[28] Epictetus illustrates the functional dualism in Stoic rhetoric: only a few paragraphs after commenting on the importance of recognising the secondary value of intermediate practices, he can call them 'nothing of value'.[29] He can also speak of the sage's need to despise (καταφρονέω) the ἀδιάφορα.[30] Although he is more careful than Paul to delineate their neutrality, Epictetus can also speak of the ἀδιάφορα in a derogatory fashion. They are like: donkeys' burdens, fetters, cares fit for a worm, and pottery shards children toss about.[31] Another way he depicts this proper weighting is the sage's willingness to relinquish all intermediates: Diogenes' property

[26] Cf. the metaphors of sea in comparison to a drop, etc., and Cato's 'category jump', at section 2.4 above. As Sanders, *Palestinian*, 484–5, says speaking of Galatians and 2 Cor. 3.7-8: 'What is wrong with the old dispensation is not that it prescribes what cannot be fulfilled, nor even that fulfilling it leads to boasting and estrangement from God. Rather, "what once had splendor has come to have no splendor at all, because of the splendor that surpasses it" (3.10). We can see the same way of thinking in Phil. 3 …. Zeal and righteousness are not themselves bad …. This logic—that God's action in Christ alone provides salvation and makes everything else seem, in fact actually, *be* worthless—seems to dominate Paul's view of the law'. Although Paul's use of the Stoic framework does not mean that, speaking strictly, he regarded all else as 'worthless', the pattern of discourse when comparing intermediates to first-order value often led to such language.

[27] Here 'loss' and 'gain', but elsewhere he also uses 'nothing' as the Stoics also often did, cf. especially Rom 8.18, 27-39; 1 Cor 7.19; Gal 3.28; 5.6; 6.15. Cf. 2.5.1 above.

[28] See section 2.7.7 above.

[29] Epictetus, *Diatr.* II.23.30–35; 45. Cf. III.10.18; I.2.14.

[30] Epictetus, *Diatr.*, I.18.22; II.23.32. He also speaks of the danger of admiring intermediates: II.18.11; I.29.3.

[31] Epictetus, *Diatr.*, IV.4.38; I.9.11, 15; II.20.10; IV.7.5. At III.7.28, they are servants; at III.22.37, 42 the body is lifeless, clay, not worth mentioning; at III.24.85 they are like jars or glasses which break; at IV.1.87–8, our family and reputation are alien to us; at IV.5.28 the ἀδιάφορα are slavish and perishable.

and homeland were like things tied onto him, easily loosed.[32] Paul's depiction of 'forgetting things behind' in v13 may indicate that this is the kind of posture he has in view even with the language of σκύβαλον. His past credentials are not to be repudiated as evil or vile, but something which may have to be discarded or at least should be held loosely.[33] In the context of a direct comparison to the value of Christ, such rhetoric could be misread. Epictetus realises this after he describes an intermediate practice as 'nothing of worth': 'When I speak thus to some people they think that I am disparaging (καταβάλλω) … [it]. Yet I am not disparaging this, but only the habit of dwelling unceasingly on these matters and setting one's hopes in them … when I see that one thing is highest and supreme (τὸ κράτιστον καὶ τὸ κυριώτατον), I cannot say the same of something else'.[34] Such rhetoric, in other words, should not be misread as renunciation of the intermediates—it was meant to cultivate and reinforce the reserve necessary in their evaluation. Paul has noted in passing the unreliable nature of two of his Jewish credentials which either brought him into direct conflict with Christ or failed to contribute directly to salvation. He now counsels appropriate reserve towards them and warns of any comparison to Christ with forceful rhetoric.

It should be noted that the value shift is an epistemological one – it is not a refusal to have such credentials but an insistence that they not be *regarded* in the same way. As Fee points out, Paul could have said simply that what *was* gain *is* now loss but the cognitive distancing (ἡγέομαι) provides a precision to the description that must not be ignored.[35] 3.4-11 is an account of a cognitive transformation. Engberg-Pedersen has argued that this is a normative model similar to the re-identification of the self with reason in Stoicism. He views Phil 3 as Paul's account of his personal re-identification and a simultaneous normative 'logic of the call' which applies to other Christ-believers as well.[36] 'In Stoicism the move … was a

[32] Epictetus, *Diatr.* IV.1.153; cf. II.11.20; II.16.28; III.3.14–6; III.6.5; III.22.1–2; III.24.39; IV.1.111–2; IV.4.33; *Gnom*. 4.
[33] Such a translation is used in the epigram for the Peripatetic philosopher, Ariston of Chios, *The Greek Anthology* VI.303, describing figs as scraps of food. Curiously, Epictetus also uses figs to illustrate things of relative value which Nature may cast into your lap—perhaps this was a piece of stock rhetoric to illustrate this notion of something cast aside but still mildly useful; worth catching but not chasing after. Cf. *Diatr.* III.24.87; IV.7.24.
[34] Epictetus, *Diatr.* II.23.46–7, trans. Oldfather, LCL. Although here he describes the inappropriate posture as ἐνταῦθα τίθεσθαι τὰς αὐτῶν ἐλπίδας, in other places he can use the language of confidence (θαρρέω) and reliance (πείθω, in the perfect passive): I.18.20; II.1.39; II.11.20; II.20.26; III.26.24, 34.
[35] Fee, *Philippians*, 316.
[36] Engberg-Pedersen, *Paul,* 92–4; cf. 35.
[36] Engberg-Pedersen, *Paul,* 70. For Stoicism's emphasis on cognitive mechanisms for moral progress, cf. Engberg-Pedersen, 'On Comparison', 303–5; R. J. Hankinson, 'Stoic Epistemology', in *The Cambridge Companion to the Stoics* (ed. B. Inwood; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 59–84 (59), and M. Schofield, 'Ethics', 233–55 (246). Cf. LS1, 345, on the Stoic: 'It does not require him to give up his family or career or political allegiances, since its principal purpose is not to change his circumstances but his outlook'.

wholly cognitive matter of coming to see oneself (normatively) as a rational being and to understand the specific relation to the world that follows from this … In Stoicism it is "propositional knowledge" … in Paul it is "knowledge by acquaintance"'.[37] As discussed earlier, Stoic epistemology was fundamental to their ethics, creating an emphasis on the intensional disposition of an acting agent which Paul perhaps reflects. Despite the dramatic shift these credentials have made in comparison to Christ, the epistemological nature of the shift means that it is entirely possible that Paul retains use of them whilst weighting them differently in his reasoning. That he does retain a value for these customs and statuses is indicated by the fact that he does not state an actual loss of them (it is their 'being gain' that is in the past, v7), and that he repurposes one credential (περιτομή) as a label for the Christ-believers.[38] It is now reconceived as the ethical characteristics of v3: οἱ πνεύματι θεοῦ λατρεύοντες καὶ καυχώμενοι ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ καὶ οὐκ ἐν σαρκὶ πεποιθότες.

With different concerns, but a similar constellation of language and metaphor, Epictetus reprimands his students for their grief over the loss of intermediates. Virtue is the only loss worth considering, he urges—not the loss of money or an injury to your body! You regard (ἡγέομαι) the wrong things as loss, and yet when you lose modesty or dignity, you regard these matters as nothing.[39] Avoiding over-estimation of the value of intermediates is necessary to follow the orders of your commander, Zeus, who may post you wherever he wishes. Obedience to such a pre-eminent (ὑπεροχή) commander is beyond question—he is unlike any other general![40] If you call yourself a Stoic, then assess things for what they are truly worth,[41] and pursue the greatest prize which is virtue itself.[42] You must devalue

[37] Engberg-Pedersen, *Paul,* 95.
[38] Likewise Paul is still a Benjamite and almost certainly still circumcised. The only qualification he demonstrably no longer maintained was persecuting the church. One can also see Paul arguing for a continued identification with Jewish markers elsewhere, i.e. Rom 3:1–4; 9:1–5; 11:1–36; 1 Cor 7.18. Dunn, *Theology*, 466: 'Noteworthy is the fact that Paul found it necessary to contest circumcision as a critical identity marker … He does not deny that circumcision is indeed an essential identifying badge … it was evidently important for him to claim that identifying badge for his own largely Gentile mission'. N. Elliott, 'The Question of Politics: Paul as a Diaspora Jew under Roman Rule', in *Paul Within Judaism: Restoring the First-Century Context to the Apostle* (eds. M. D. Nanos and M. Zetterholm; Minneapolis: Fortress press, 2015), 203–43 (217–18), criticises essentialist Christian interpretations of assuming that the gospel 'caused a profound reversal in Paul's behavior, and in his attitude toward the law … the Christ-apocalypse was fundamentally incompatible with continued devotion to (the boundary-setting role of) the law'. This is not necessarily so if Paul views Jewish practices as intermediates—their value has shifted but is not set in reverse (which would be to consider any such practices a vice).
[39] Epictetus, *Diatr.*, II.10.14–29; this is my own truncated paraphrase. For more loss/gain language, cf. III.22.37; III.24.22-3; III.26.25; IV.3.1–8; IV.4.1–4; IV.9.10.
[40] Epictetus, *Diatr.*, III.24.35–6.
[41] Epictetus, *Diatr.*, III.24.47–9.
[42] Epictetus, *Diatr.*, III.24.50–3.

(ἀτιμάζω) such external things in your own judgements and avoid regarding (ἡγέομαι) them as your own.[43]

Epictetus ascribes value to the intermediates while simultaneously refusing them another kind of value and he is convinced that to assess without such categorical distinctions in mind is an ethical failure. Under some similar assumptions, Paul expresses his willingness to lose intermediates and no longer rely upon them—the only thing worthy of such confidence is knowledge of Christ. As he sees it, his readers must emulate (v17) this same value shift to be able to 'rejoice in Christ'; they also must consider 'knowing Christ' to have such weight in their considerations that they resist its comparison with anything else, even things with another kind of value. Paul warns against reliance upon these credentials, of misplaced confidence in them. In so arguing, his isolation of 'knowing Christ' as first-order value reveals to what end he perceives that his opponents rely on such credentials: salvation. Only 'knowing Christ' contributes directly to this end, and thus should be categorized and weighted as first-order value in Paul's dramatic use of a value motif which echoes Stoic criteria, analogies, and rhetoric. Paul now amplifies his emphasis on the correct estimation and weighting of the first-order value.

4.2.3 3.12–6: The pursuit dictated by the new value system

Beginning with the climax of v11 and until v15, Paul is focused on the end which has necessitated this radical shift in values. The culmination of the commodity, 'knowing Christ', is to reach, after being shaped by his death, the resurrection. All of the process Paul has described thus far constitutes 'knowing Christ', but he has yet to reach the pinnacle of that process.[44] V12 indicates that the resurrection, when reached, would be the completion or perfection of knowing Christ.[45] The attaining of the resurrection itself is rephrased as

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[43] Epictetus, *Diatr.*, III.24.54–6.

[44] That this is Paul's view is indicated by the language of 'arriving' or 'coming' (καταντήσω) and being 'completed' (τετελείωμαι). The connection to the previous section and the inclusion of the resurrection in the more holistic τετελείωμαι indicate that he has moved from discussing the resurrection alone to the 'whole package' (Dunn, *Theology,* 480). Despite the new sentence and the paragraph break typically given here by translations, the tight connection to the previous verses is vividly illustrated by the need to supply objects for two of the verbs in v12 (ἔλαβον and καταλάβω)—without vv7–11 we would not know what Paul is attempting to grasp.

[45] What Paul is hoping to receive is what he wanted to gain in vv7–11, which will be restated as the 'calling' in v13. There is a variant in v12 (which inserts 'or am justified' to read ἔλαβον ἢ ἤδη δεδικαίωμαι ἢ ἤδη τετελείωμαι; witnessed by P^{46} D^{*c} F G, Irenaeus and Ambrosiaster). However, the commonly-accepted reading which omits the additional phrase is witnessed by many (P^{61} A B D are the most significant). B. M. Metzger, *A Textual Commentary on the Greek New Testament*, 3 ed. (London: United Bible Societies, 1971), 615, also notes that the insertion dismantles the four-part structure of λαμβάνω :: καταλαμβάνω and τελειόω :: διώκω.

τετελείωμαι, referring to a completion of or arrival at the τέλος.[46] As he has not arrived yet, Paul pursues after grasping its completion (which is actually something Christ grasps him in).[47] In three ways Paul expresses his pursuit of this goal (the resurrection as the completion of 'knowing Christ'): he pursues to grasp (what Christ has grasped him for) in v12b–c, he stretches forward for what he has not yet grasped (forgetting what is past) in v13, and finally reiterates that he pursues after the target towards the prize of the high calling of God in Christ (v14).[48] The grammar of v14 is complex, but many scholars take the genitive phrase τῆς ἄνω κλήσεως as a subjective genitive (i.e. the calling gives or promises the prize).[49] The prize which Paul pursues is eschatological salvation (specifically, resurrection) and he argues that the orientation to Christ found in God's calling contributes towards this end. In his clearest statement thus far to this effect, Paul asserts that the orientation to Christ (primarily expressed in this text as 'knowing Christ' and in v14 as the 'calling of God in Christ') has singular ability to contribute directly towards his τέλος of salvation.[50] That this criterion for first-order value is in Paul's mind offers an explanation not only for his linguistic choices, but also for the close connection between vv7-11 and the eschatology of vv12-16, which some find difficult. Paul's description of God's calling as ἄνω might also be read to allude to the first-

[46] The noun is used of Paul's opponents (v19).

[47] This is not to be overlooked as a clear effect of Paul's apocalyptic theology, the possibility of direct divine intervention unlike the characterisation of Zeus or divine reason in Stoicism. Another evident difference in Paul's construction is that the resurrection is both an aspect of the orientation to Christ and an aspect of the τέλος. As Engberg-Pedersen, *Paul,* 95, noted, the figure by which Paul is 'struck' and then re-identified is a knowledge of a relationship, an historical person. The narrative of Christ's life and death as Paul's normative model creates numerous features in Paul's construction, of course, but here it results in a collapse of the disposition required *for* the τέλος and the τέλος itself, due to the way that being 'in Christ', as one who died and lived, leads to resurrection and includes resurrection in its narrative shape.

[48] It is possible that Paul echoes the Stoic 'kataleptic' impression (καταληπτικὴ φαντασία). Given the wide non-technical use of καταλαμβάνω, though, it cannot be established with certainty. If it is taken to refer to such an impression, Paul's point may be that he is striving for this type of impression which would lead to true knowledge (which actually has been attained by Christ's 'grasping' of him). Even if his use is not this precise, the overall point is that he is striving for real knowledge (some aspects of which are still outside of his experience) rather than mere opinion (which he sees his opponents having and leading to their mistaken confidence). Fee, *Philippians*, 340, finds the 'unusual language' of καταλαμβάνω a difficulty as well as understanding how this seems to interact with τέλος for Paul throughout the text. The Stoic assumption that the τέλος could not be obtained apart from the components of knowledge explain this interaction even if it is assumed by Paul (rather than systematically explained).

[49] The verse, which is not particularly clear, supplies a direct object of pursuit followed by two genitive, and one dative, modifying phrases with an adverb thrown in: κατὰ σκοπὸν διώκω εἰς τὸ βραβεῖον τῆς ἄνω κλήσεως τοῦ θεοῦ ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ. Some take the two genitives as appositional (Holloway, *Philippians,* 175) (i.e. thus essentially interpreting 'calling' and 'prize' as synonymous and 'of God' and 'in Christ' modifying both; the prize *which is* the calling and therefore a condition or state which is not completed until the eschaton, as Holloway conceives it). Fee, *Philippians*, 349, fn. 47 sees this as a 'result-means' subjective (i.e. the calling was the means to bring the result of the prize). Bockmuehl, *Philippians,* 222–3, rejects the apposition of prize and calling but in the end wonders whether it can be worked out so precisely anyway.

[50] In doing so, Paul obliquely reveals that which he believes his opponents rely upon Jewish credentials for.

order value of this orientation, thus giving it a significance that seems to elude many interpreters.[51]

Paul characterizes this culminating phase of 'knowing Christ' with imagery that is unmistakably athletic. With this, he echoes Stoic descriptions of the correct weighting of virtue by the wise, which were replete with athletic language. The metaphors of pursuing, straining to reach, and the prize and target all evoke the image of the athletic contest. In v.13 Paul states that there is 'one thing' he does: pursue after the target (σκοπός) of the prize (βραβεῖον) which the calling of God in Christ Jesus gives.[52]

What Paul describes pursuing is given two names: βραβεῖον and σκοπός. The latter seems slightly out of place in the athletic imagery, and it is further made noticeable by its rarity (a *hapax legomenon* in Paul's letters). It is possible, though, that it arises due to the Stoic distinction between the wise man's τέλος and σκοπός. While the wise man's end was always εὐδαιμονία, the end could be distinguished as 'being happy' (in terms of the 'incorporeal predicate') *from* the target of actual possession of 'happiness' (the 'corporeal disposition').[53] One aims at the objective state of affairs of 'happiness' by 'being happy' (i.e. aiming itself). If the use of τέλος in v12 has recalled these debates to mind, Paul may be making a distinction between the corporeal possession of salvation (the σκοπός: resurrection) and the process of 'being saved' more generally which he pursues by 'knowing Christ'. Even if he is not so precise, the imagery of a target (salvation instantiated in resurrection) being aimed at as an objective goal, but including the ultimate goal of 'knowing Christ', fits the text well. For Paul, 'knowing Christ' constitutes salvation and knowing him entails a pursuit of that salvation so that when he declares he does ἓν he cannot help but express this one thing with two conflated things: a target/prize (the external physical state of the resurrection which he aims at) and the singular good of the pursuit itself (the calling of God in Christ/knowledge

[51] Cognates of ἄνω (esp. ἀνωτάτω) can indicate 'higher' in the sense of levels or orders. Cf. DL VII.110, which describes the primary πάθη as ἀνώτατα. Stobaeus, *Ecl.* II.7.10 appears to cite the same Zeno fragment, but with the substitution of πρῶτος for ἀνωτάτος (thus indicating the meaning of superior classification; cf. II.7.5b5. Cf. Epictetus, *Diatr.,* III.24.84. In *Diatr.* II.11.12, 16, Epictetus questions whether there is a standard or measure higher (ἀνωτάτω) than one's opinion by which to measure. While the idea of 'heavenly' may not be entirely excluded from Paul's thought (especially given its appearance in v20), the word perhaps functions polysemically.

[52] Cf. Epictetus, *Diatr.* IV.12.15–17, trans. OldFather, LCL: 'First, therefore, we ought to … keep the soul intent upon this mark (σκοπός) … pursuing without hesitation the things that lie within the sphere of moral purpose'. Cf. Cicero, *Off.*, III.42, Epictetus, *Diatr.*, II.5.3, 15–23; II.17.29–32; III.12; III.20.9–12; III.24.108.

[53] LS1, 399–400, 410. Cf. B. Inwood, 'Goal and Target in Stoicism', *The Journal of Philosophy* 83 (1986): 547–556 (551). This was modified by Antipater in response to Carneades although he likely restated it for polemical purposes and did not mean it as Carneades then critiqued. Cf. Long, 'Carneades', 59–90.

of Christ which culminates in the target). Perhaps realising that he has departed from the imagery of the race, he returns with βραβεῖον to conclude the metaphor. Having warned against relying on anything incapable of directly contributing to salvation, and having laid out his own shift in values, he demonstrates the appropriate weighting of the first-order value he has argued for: unreserved pursuit.

4.2.4 3.15–4.1: Closing warnings and conclusion

In vv15-16, on the heels of his example, Paul urges his followers to adopt the same pursuit. To live 'worthy of the gospel' they must 'rejoice in the Lord', pursuing the 'one thing', the 'higher' first-order value of 'knowing Christ'. Paul's exhortation to continue in line with previous steps pivots his thinking full circle and he returns in vv17-21 to the tone of warning with which he began the chapter. Engberg-Pedersen's remark is pertinent: Paul's 'interest is recounting this experience here is not just "personal" or "psychological" as if he might be interested in merely telling about his own experience to whoever might be interested in *that.* Rather, he is using his own case as a model for a kind of normative change and transfer that has universal application (as he claims)'.[54] Whether these verses are warning of the same opponents as v2 is debated,[55] but Paul again builds up contrasting labels. The first negative descriptors are constructed as opposing corollaries of Paul's example. Rather than walking in the Christ-oriented way Paul does (culminating in the death and resurrection like Christ's), these walk as enemies of the cross of Christ. Among other things, their τέλος is destruction (not salvation). Rather than the earthly mindset of these opponents, those following Paul (v15) have a citizenship in heaven. Like the Stoics imagining a larger community of the virtuous across political lines, rendering them 'dual citizens' both of their native cities and of the world, Paul reminds of a higher, coinciding citizenship (regardless of political environment)[56] as a way of reinforcing his call to avoid mistaken value judgements

[54] Engberg-Pedersen, *Paul,* 95.
[55] Fee, *Philippians*, 374, thinks them a distinct group from those in v2, while Schenk, *Philipperbriefe*, 258–9, and Holloway, 39 of section 3 in pre-publication manuscript, think they are likely the same group although Paul's rhetoric prevents a precise identification.
[56] Van Kooten, 'Greco-Roman Strategies', 372–9, draws attention to the similarity between the Platonic-Stoic discourse of a 'heavenly city', the Stoic notion of dual citizenship, and Paul's description of a 'Jerusalem above' in Gal 4.21–31. There it is placed in antithesis with the political city Jerusalem, while here the antithesis is less precise, simply with the opponents concentrated on 'earthly things' (ἐπίγεια). Per van Kooten, Paul 'appropriates' (372) such Stoic strategies, 'depoliticizing politics' (382) for his own dual citizens, including in Phil 3 (381). Cf. the ethical-political paradoxes of the Stoics, 2.6.6. Wright, *Faithfulness*, 1297–8, is correct that Paul is 'advocating something much more subtle than either a "pro-Roman" or an "anti-Roman" stance'. Paul's is a complex 'qualified critique', a phrase which could be used to describe many of Paul's instructions (such as those on marriage or slavery), due to the intermediate status of many of the subjects of his instruction. If he echoes the notion of cosmopolitanism, though, Wright is wrong (1293) that it is impossible for Paul to avoid

towards such conventions.[57] Their orientation to Christ will culminate in the divine act by which they fully share in his likeness, being transformed from death to resurrection: the stakes for faltering in their allegiance are high. Finally, his concern that the Philippians 'rejoice in the Lord' and remain secure in their orientation to Christ *by* resisting the false values of his opponents is once again expressed: *this* is the way to stand firm in the Lord.

4.2.5 Summary of Phil 3.1–4.1

As so often in Paul's writings, the language is dense, the exact function of each phrase not undoubtedly clear and yet the overall purpose is unmistakable. 'Rejoice in Christ', which necessarily includes a refusal to be confident in the comparable value of anything else for salvation. Paul establishes the first-order value of 'knowing Christ', and the error of relying upon anything else for salvation, with a metaphorical motif of value, sharp rhetoric laced with epistemological details, and presupposed criteria for distinct categories. One of the concerns of the epistle is that the Philippians learn to evaluate what matters (1.10), which is developed in chs1–2 by demonstration of the Christ-orientation's ability to effect joy in suffering. In ch3, Paul warns against a categorical error, an opposing value system. 'Evaluating what matters' means rejoicing in Christ, by refusing to afford the same weight to anything else in one's reasoning—the value of 'knowing Christ' is such that it must stand in a category of its own. Rejoicing in Christ precludes relying upon or esteeming other things in the same way, and his opponents' reliance upon Jewish credentials indicated an incorrect estimation of their value. At the same time Paul expects to continue using the credentials at the heart of the debate while simultaneously refusing them the same status as 'knowing Christ'. Paul does not repudiate these credentials, nor cease to have them, but he ceases to regard them as he used to—they have now shifted dramatically in his estimation due to his recognition of the incommensurable value of 'knowing Christ'. He defends this shift and establishes the first-order value of 'knowing Christ' by demonstrating that it, and not his Jewish credentials, contributes directly to salvation. Having established this, he gives his

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any reference to Caesar and the Roman empire specifically. Although Stoic political theory was formed in critique and dialectic with current politics, it also was capable of sustained continuity through numerous political regimes and aimed at none more than any other. When Epictetus, *Diatr.*, IV.1.6–23 mocks allegiance to Caesar as a form of security, he aims to teach the wise man's pursuit of freedom from all forms of slavery: to a pretty woman or boy, to greed, *or* to Caesar. To Diogenes, Caesar is nothing; he only hears Zeus' commands—the point is to minimise the significance of such figures and loyalty to them as *neither* virtue nor vice (*Diatr.*, III.22.56). Cf. *Diatr.* I.9.5–8; III.13.9–13; IV.4.5–6.

[57] Garland, 'Composition', 160, notes that this (πολίτευμα) and Phil 1.27 (πολιτεύω) are the only undisputed Pauline usages of these cognates (he believes they support a chiastic structure from 1.27–4.3).

example and urges the Philippians to follow him in unreserved pursuit of 'knowing Christ', and likewise to regard all else as unworthy of comparison. To condense his argument to one sentence: you are not rejoicing in Christ and you will not attain the resurrection if you are convinced of the comparable value of anything else. An undercurrent of Stoic-like assumptions elucidates several aspects of this text: the strong language although opponents do not seem to be an imminent threat, simultaneous devaluing and retention of his Jewish credentials, the unexpected value motif, the close connection between the value motif and eschatological perfection, and the presence of epistemological terminology and athletic imagery. In *Euthydemus*, Socrates exhorted that only virtue should be pursued and warned of the danger of over-estimating the value of the conventional 'goods'. Like a gadfly to the Philippians, Paul insists that only 'knowing Christ' saves and warns of the perilous miscalculation of relying upon anything else to that end.

4.3 Gal 2.1–21

Galatians, of course, is well-trodden ground on the topic of Paul's view of Torah observance. It is not in the purview of this thesis to address all of the points of debate in Gal 2.1–21, but hopefully much can be illuminated by its argument.[58] While the value-motif of Phil 3 is not present here and the setting is more polemical, Paul argues in similar fashion to establish the first-order value of the Christ-orientation. Again he reacts to the over-estimation of Jewish practices and isolates the Christ-orientation to be regarded as a singular good. In Phil 3 he defended his shift in value towards his Jewish credentials by explaining the ability of 'knowing Christ' to contribute directly to salvation; in Gal 3 he defends his opposition to requiring circumcision by describing the ability of 'faith in Christ' to contribute directly to salvation. While Phil 3 was conspicuously polemical in comparison to the rest of the letter, the entire epistle to the Galatians, and the incident in Antioch which Paul recalls in this text, is infamously contentious; Paul is under attack and generous with his own counter-attacks. Sanders' advice to read Galatians 'out loud, shouting in an angry voice at the appropriate points', if not efficient, probably does convey the correct tone.[59] Paul states that his occasion

[58] Significant debates in the literature include the identity of the letter's addressees, the chronological place in Paul's ministry, its relation to the events of Acts 15, attempts to identify the figures from James in ch2, and the reasons for Peter's withdrawal from the meals in ch2, some of which will be referenced later. Regarding the first two, the view here is that the letter is probably written to the North Galatians at about 51 CE while Paul was in Corinth, following M. C. de Boer, *Galatians: A Commentary* (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 2011), 3–9.
[59] Sanders, *Life*, 475.

for writing is to oppose the pressure upon the gentile Jesus-believers in Galatia to be circumcised.[60] Paul further indicates that he views this as a threat to the 'truth of the gospel' (2.4, 14). Given these factors, Paul's argument takes on a strongly antithetical nature and he is likely wary, under the prevailing circumstances, of referencing any type of value for Torah observance. Even so, there are subtle gestures that demonstrate he regards Torah observance to have a neutral, rather than adverse, role towards salvation: the antithesis he describes is not between good and evil but between first-order and second-order value. To defend his opposition to gentile circumcision, Paul again employs Stoic criteria and analogies: he argues for the ability of 'faith in Christ' to contribute directly to salvation, for the inability of Torah observance to do the same, he uses athletic language to illustrate the appropriate weight 'faith in Christ' should have in reasoning as a first-order 'good', and he uses the metaphorical motif of slavery and freedom to describe the type of threat he perceives requiring Torah observance to represent.

4.3.1 2.1–10: Implicit agreement on the 'truth of the gospel'

The last Stoic analogy listed—the metaphor of slavery and freedom—permeates the entire epistle, beginning with 1.10.[61] Paul begins his autobiographical defence by contending that he would no longer be a slave of Christ if he pleased people and thus frames the controversy in terms of servitude to either divine or human norms.[62] 2.1–10 continues the narrative of ch1, but relays Paul's interaction with the other apostles during a visit to Jerusalem, and, importantly, introduces the topic of circumcision. [63] It is here, in reference to

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[60] Gal 5.2–3; 6.12–3.

[61] We find δοῦλος at 4.1, 7; δουλόω at 4.3; δουλεύω at 4.8, 25 and δουλεία at 4.24 and 5.1. The metaphor could include the related terms of παιδαγωγός at 3.24, 25, ἐπίτροπος at 4.2, and οἰκονόμος at 4.2. We find ἐλεύθερος at 4.22, 26, 30, 5.1, 13, and could also probably consider ἐξαγοράζω of 3.13; 4.5 along these lines as well.

[62] Commentators debate whether v11 or v12 is Paul's thesis statement. De Boer, *Galatians*, 15–6; Betz, *Galatians*, 16, interpret v11 as the thesis statement; R. A. Longenecker, *Galatians* (WBC; Waco: Word Books, 1990), 20–25, takes vv11–12 as the thesis. J. L. Martyn, *Galatians: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary* (London: Doubleday, 1997), 106, points out that the end of the doxology in v9 makes a clear break (he names vv10–12 as the thesis of his first argument, with vv6-9 the thesis for the letter as a whole). The thematic consistency of vv10–12 (denouncing any servitude or dependence on ἄνθρωπος) ties these verses together as an explanation for his rebuke and declaration that there is only one gospel, and the beginning of his defence of that gospel in chs1–2.

[63] Although circumcision was not an exclusively Jewish practice in the ancient world, it was associated with the Jewish community with a high degree of consistency (as was Sabbath observance, avoidance of idolatry and particular dietary practices [avoidance of pork in particular]). Cf. 1 Macc 1.15, 48, 60–1; 2.46; 2 Macc 6.9–10; Josephus, *A. J.* I.192, XII.241, XIII.257–8, 318; Tacitus, *Hist.* V.5.2. For any male Judaizers, it was considered by some to be the final step of proselytization (Josephus, *B. J.* II.17.10; *A. J.* XX.2.4), a notion only recently possible via Hellenisation and not clearly formalized until the Babylonian Talmud, cf. Cohen, *Beginnings,* 109–10, 126–7, 135, 140, 198–210. The category of 'proselyte' was not fixed, and the language of ἰουδαΐζω, 'God-venerators', and later discussion of 'Noahide laws' all demonstrate the liminal categories at play during this period. However, despite appreciation of gentile worship of the Jewish God and political support, as Cohen,

the proposed circumcision of Titus, a gentile, that the metaphor of slavery and freedom arises again. There are lingering questions, though, concerning Paul's usage. Why must Paul resist pleasing others to be a slave of Christ? Why is circumcision discussed in terms of slavery and freedom here?

Given that freedom could also be described as service to the first-order good (whether framed as virtue or harmony with Nature/Zeus), and as rational compliance with what was properly necessary (as opposed to irrational service to desires misjudged as necessary), Paul's description of his orientation to Christ as a form of slavery could be construed along the lines of the Stoic paradigm.[64] A Stoic-like use of the metaphor explains the mutually exclusive nature of 'serving Christ' and 'pleasing people': one could not give the same weight to a first-order good in one's reasoning towards anything else or it would be threatened. As Paul describes the meeting in Jerusalem and introduces the topic of circumcision, he builds on this notion of the mutually exclusive character of serving Christ, but inverts the metaphor back to freedom. With the nature of Socratic and Stoic ethical freedom in view (as the authority, based on wisdom, of unrestrained rational self-determination towards one's εὐδαιμονία), Paul's use of the metaphor here could be read to describe the believers' authority, based on the truth of the gospel, to exercise correct Christ-oriented self-determination towards salvation.[65] Likewise, with the nature of the ethical use of the metaphor of slavery in view (as vulnerability towards destructive misjudgements), Paul's use of the metaphor here could be read as the misjudging of something else as contributing towards one's salvation in the same way as the Christ-orientation. Paul is concerned to portray the pressure to circumcise as an overestimation of two related intermediates: the esteem of particular people and of the practices they are recommending. Thus, 2.1–10 follows from 1.10 in maintaining that his position preserves his freedom in Christ by properly judging the status of the Jerusalem

158, summarises, 'as far as is known no Jewish community in antiquity (including Philo's) accepted as members male proselytes who were not circumcised'. As far as Jesus-believing communities are concerned, it is unclear why circumcision did not arise as a focal point of debate in the earliest days of the movement, as queried by Fredriksen, 'Apocalyptic', 559. It is likely, as Fredriksen theorises (556, 561), that the shift from a Jewish majority to a gentile majority and the social threat that represented may have motivated 'the circumcision party' further (she is incorrect, though, that there was no pressure to circumcise in other ancient Jewish communities). It is plausible that there had been a contingent of Jesus-believers who felt circumcision should be required of gentile believers all along, and which became more entrenched over time. Another contributing factor may have been fear on the part of the Jews over losing their political status or fear that the Jesus-believing community would not have the same protection as Judaism without full proselytization of its members.

[64] Cf. 2.7.7.

[65] As J. M. G. Barclay, *Paul and the Gift* (Cambridge: Eerdmans, 2015), 364, notes, the descriptor ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ places constraints upon the freedom named there—it is not absolute but defined by the Christ-event, a point which will be especially important in 1 Cor 8.1–11.1.

leadership and by resisting a misjudgement of the value of circumcision. To serve Christ is to be free since the orientation to him gives one the authority to live to one's salvation—and to avoid the destruction of allowing anything else to have the same role in one's reasoning.

4.3.2 2.1–2, 6–10: The primary purpose and outcome of the meeting

Paul's account of the Jerusalem meeting begins (vv1–2) and ends (vv6–10) by describing the purpose of the meeting and its primary outcome: to have his gospel-work among gentiles considered and confirmed by the Jerusalem leadership.[66] He is careful, however, to portray his estimation of this support as measured, if appreciative. He begins by expressing his initial concern with an athletic metaphor envisioning pursuit of a goal: he wanted to avoid having run in vain.[67] He wants to ensure that the message he preached to gentiles was not a misjudgement, a self-determination towards something which was *not* the target. However, he immediately tempers the effect which the apostles' confirmation (or lack thereof) could have had on his work by asserting his indifference towards their status (ὁποῖοί ποτε ἦσαν οὐδέν μοι διαφέρει), followed by a statement of divine sanction of such indifference.[68] Paul further indicates his moderate esteem of the leaders' status by

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[66] J. D. G. Dunn, 'The Relationship Between Paul and Jerusalem According to Galatians 1 and 2', *NTS* 28 (Oct 1982), 461–78 (466–7), considers Paul's use of ἀνατίθημι here a careful choice which portrays presenting something for consideration, but avoids implying any status of the parties involved. He decides, 467, that Paul uses it to '*avoid* giving the impression that he went to Jerusalem "cap in hand" to gain an authoritative ruling on a matter (the validity of his gospel) on which he had insufficient competence to decide'. The stated purpose of this visit, along with the nature (private rather than public), and the outcome (approval of their mission rather than a position on circumcision or practices for the gentile believers) makes one hesitant to identify it with the event of Acts 15. Cf. J. Knox, *Chapters in a Life of Paul*, rev. ed. (London: SCM Press, 1987), 31–42. It is also easy to see how an informal understanding on circumcision (i.e. simply *not* requiring one individual, Titus, to be circumcised) could lead to the misunderstanding in Antioch. The hypothesis of G. Tatum, 'Galatians 2:1–14 / Acts 15 and Paul's Ministry in 1 Thessalonians and 1 Corinthians', *RB* 116 (2009), 70–81 (80), that the oblique reference to Jerusalem in Acts 18.22 might provide the chronological location of another meeting which is largely narrated in ch15, is an intriguing one. This would chronologically place an event in Jerusalem subsequent to the Antioch 'incident', the split between Paul and Barnabas, and the situation which is still simmering in the Galatian letter. In this scheme, the events of Gal 2.1–10 (chronologically lining up with Acts 15 but as a fundamentally different meeting in character) occur at approx. 45 CE, the conflict in Antioch very soon after, the second missionary journey (North Galatia) at approx. 48–49 CE, the letter to Galatians approx. 51 CE, and Paul's third visit to Jerusalem (the content of the meeting described in Acts 15, but located chronologically at 18.22) after Corinth (approx. 52 CE), after which he returns to Antioch and onto his third journey.

[67] Paul will use the same metaphor in 5.7, and athletic metaphors are used regularly by Paul (Rom 9.16; 1 Cor 9.24–7; Phil 2.16; 3.12–4). Paul's concern, i.e. what is threatened, is the completion or accomplishment of the task before him, not its validity. As Barclay, *Gift*, 363, says, 'Without this recognition, his work would be "in vain," not because it might be invalid before God (cf. 2:7–9) but because it could be complete only when Jewish and Gentile assemblies recognized the validity of each other, and thereby relativized their differences through their common allegiance to Christ'.

[68] This phrase is noteworthy on two accounts. First, Paul uses διαφέρω in similar fashion as his use in Phil 1.10 to indicate things which are worthy of concern or pursuit (here, what is *not*). (Noted by Jaquette, *Adiaphora*, 194–5). Secondly, Paul seems to have in mind some past situation which he must currently regard as 'nothing', as indicated by πότε and the change to imperfect tense ('what they once were'). It is difficult to know

consistently referring to them as οἱ δοκοῦντες (‘the esteemed ones’, vv2, 6a, 6d, 9), which some suggest is used deliberately to signal both respect and reserve towards the esteem their position garnered.[69] This careful balance between maintaining independence from the Jerusalem leadership while using its approval to defend his position continues throughout this section.[70] As others have pointed out, the metaphor and the meeting itself suggest that Paul considered agreement with the other apostles significant but, in light of the rest of the epistle, it would be going too far to say that he lacked confidence in the validity of his message: a failure to receive approval by the Jerusalem apostles could have rendered his message ‘ineffective’ but probably not ‘false’ in his estimation.[71] The conclusion of the meeting as described in vv6–10 appears to be the confirmation that Paul sought: a recognition of divine empowerment and assignment, the ‘right hand of fellowship’ for Paul and Barnabas, and an agreed division of labour.[72] Paul conveys that he is most concerned about the effectiveness of his gospel message, and the endorsement of the apostles is useful in his pursuit of this goal. rather than an end in itself.

Paul has claimed that what the opponents in Galatia teach is ‘another gospel’ and yet that there is no such thing. Here he claims the confirmation of *his* gospel by the Jerusalem apostles, and will vaguely link those apostles with those who require Torah observance of gentiles in v12 (i.e. a message similar to this ‘other gospel’ he opposes). In other words, while Paul claims agreement with the other apostles for the purposes of rhetorical leverage

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specifically what he must maintain indifference to: their eminence in the meeting at Jerusalem (more likely if Acts 15 = Gal 2.1–10) or, perhaps, their advantage in having known Christ personally and having ministered with him, cf. H. Schlier, *Galaterbrief* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1962), 75–6. Betz, *Galatians*, 94–5, argues the shift in tense indicates not a change from Paul’s past view of the Jerusalem leaders’ status, but that the present tenses are ‘proverbial presents’ which relativize the status in the present.

[69] This was a common label in political rhetoric for people of high status or reputation. Cf. Epictetus, *Diatr.* II.4.1, *Ench.* 33.12; Plato, *Euthyd.* 303c; esp. Plato, *Apol.* 21b–e; 22a–b; 41e, where Socrates displays the ironic potential of the term. Dunn, ‘Relationship,’ 467: (it is) ‘a phrase which acknowledges the high standing in which the pillar apostles were held (by others) without constituting an endorsement by Paul himself’. Although, as S. J. Gathercole, ‘The Petrine and Pauline *Sola Fide* in Galatians 2’, in *Lutherische und Neue Paulusperspektive: Beiträge zu einem Schlüsselproblem der gegenwärtigen exegetischen Diskussion* (ed. M. Bachmann, WUNT 182; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2005), 309-327 (316), points out, it is important not to take this too far—Paul’s description of the Jerusalem leadership is never straightforwardly critical.

[70] Cf. Dunn, ‘Relationship’, 467, who describes it as a ‘delicate balance … designed to characterize the balance between Paul’s recognition of the Jerusalem apostles’ eminence and authority and his even firmer assertion of independence in the authority of his gospel and apostleship’.

[71] Dunn, ‘Relationship’, 468.

[72] Vv7–8 have some peculiarities (e.g. Πέτρος rather than Κηφᾶς which everywhere else is Paul’s habit, even in v9!), which have led some to suggest an interpolation, or a citation on Paul’s part. Most suggestive is the idea that if this passage relays the events of Acts 15, Paul might be citing some part of the meeting’s resulting statement. But as Betz, *Galatians*, 97, argues, not only is this highly speculative but Paul’s use of first-personal grammar in these verses indicates it is still *primarily* his own construction. It is possible he references some agreement, or his unusual language is due to his memory of the events, but it is impossible to be more specific than that.

(giving the impression that all agree 'there is no other gospel'), he seems less then entirely sure of that agreement and thus also wants to mitigate any overestimation of their authority in comparison to his (which he describes as based on divine revelation). In this way, the two concerns are related, and Paul must establish the first-order value of faith in Christ by resisting an overestimation of the value of Torah observance *and*, to a lesser extent, of the status of these figures. Paul is concerned throughout his defence to maintain his independence and the divine authority for his message (and hence his authority to confront Peter in the following verses and to oppose those in Galatia).

4.3.3 2.3–5: The unintended outcome of the meeting

The middle of Paul's account of the Jerusalem meeting (vv3–5) is a rambling, disjointed attempt to convey another aspect of the meeting which is of interest to him at this point.[73] While many pieces are missing, it is clear that the possibility arose that Titus (a Greek) needed to be circumcised, and that Paul resisted this requirement.[74] Paul portrays this aspect of the event with language which will become significant and is worth noticing at this point: '(Although) being a Greek, Titus was not required (ἀναγκάζω) to be circumcised'. Paul uses ἀναγκάζω to describe both Peter's actions in Antioch (v14) and his opponents' position in Galatia (6.12), a pattern which elucidates what Paul envisions himself reacting so strongly to on all three fronts (and perhaps why he chose to recall the events from Jerusalem and Antioch to address the Galatian problem). Scholars have struggled over Paul's choice of

[73] Vv3–5 are a parenthesis in the narration of gaining the recognition of the Jerusalem leadership (vv1–2, 6–10). The relationship between the primary narrative and this parenthesis is never clearly stated (although the context will make Paul's purpose clear). V4 also begins a grammatical anacoluthon which is never given a subject or verb so that the reason Paul first brings this information into the narrative (διά) is never supplied. What the parenthetical content demonstrates, and what is relevant to the epistle as a whole, is the implied agreement on the part of the leadership in the meeting of Gal 2.1–10 on the topic of circumcision of gentiles.

[74] Paul's statement, on the whole, conveys that he did not submit to their demands. However, the textual variants of v5a offer a variety of routes to this conclusion. The bulk of MSS begin v5 with οἷς οὐδέ (P^{46} ℵ A B C D^1 F G Ψ 075 0150 6 33 81 104 256 263 365 424 436 459 1175 1241 1319 1573 1739 1852 1881 1912 1962 2127 2200 2464 *Byz* [K L P] *Lect* it $^{ar, f, g, o}$ vg syr $^{h, pal}$ cop $^{sa, bo}$arm (eth) geo slav Basil (Ps-Ignatius) Epiphanius Chrysostom Theodor ^{lat}; Jerome Augustine), but a sizeable minority of texts have variations. Some only have οἷς (D^2 Greek and Latin MSS $^{acc. to Jerome}$) *or* οὐδέ (Marcion$^{acc. to Tertullian}$; Latin MSS$^{acc. to Victorinus-Rome}$, Greek MSS$^{acc. to Ambrosiaster}$ Ambrose), and a few omit both words (D* it$^{b, d}$ Irenaeus^{lat}; (Tertullian) Greek and Latin MSS$^{acc. to Victorinus-Rome}$ Victorinus-Rome Ambrosiaster Pelagius) or the entire phrase (884). USB apparatus classifies the text beginning v5 with οἷς οὐδέ as {A} ('certain'). The interpretive possibilities the variants give are that (a) Paul states that 'to them not even for an hour did we submit', (b) 'to them we submitted for (only) an hour', (c) 'we did not submit for even an hour' or (d) 'we submitted for (only) an hour'. The general point (that Paul finds the pressure to circumcise Titus unacceptable) is made by any, but it has given rise to the question of whether there is a possibility that Paul did actually have Titus circumcised (i.e. in 'submitting for an hour') but this seems entirely contrary to the point Paul wishes to make against Galatian circumcision—it is hard to understand why Paul would even use this event in his argument in that case.

words here – why not simply say Titus was not circumcised?[75] The presence of ἀναγκάζω in this sentence may indicate the type of pressure from the ψευδάδελφοι which Paul resisted and which he also perceived to be present in both Antioch and Galatia – that circumcision was being considered *necessary* for believers.[76]

The second feature to note in Paul's description of the Jerusalem meeting is the reappearance of the slavery and freedom metaphor. His description in v4 of the otherwise-unidentified ψευδάδελφοι is heavily polemical,[77] and Paul asserts that the object of their 'spying' was the freedom which he, Barnabas, and Titus had in Christ Jesus.[78] Paul believes that their intent (ἵνα) was to enslave them, depriving them of this freedom. His continued use of this metaphor throughout the epistle indicates that Paul believes that at the heart of this debate over circumcision is an attack on a freedom which is related to the Christ-event. His alignment of ἀναγκάζω with the language of slavery and freedom demonstrates his assumption that to regard anything else as 'necessary' was like slavery and threatened the freedom of the believers to self-determine towards salvation. The believers' authority to exercise Christ-orientation is threatened by the misjudgement that circumcision is necessary—the type of language only properly used of something which has first-order value. The false brothers' pressure to circumcise attempts, to Paul's mind, to create incorrect compulsion towards an intermediate and threatens their correct compulsion towards Christ. Maintaining one's free service to Christ and regarding anything else as necessary for salvation are mutually exclusive. As Epictetus reminds us, 'The free person is the one who lives as he or she wishes, who is neither forced (ἀναγκάζω), hindered, nor pressed'.[79] 'No one has authority over me. I have been freed by God; I know his commands and no one is able to

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[75] Some have conjectured that this means Titus was circumcised, but voluntarily. As J. D. G. Dunn, *A Commentary on the Epistle to the Galatians* (BNTC; London: A & C Black, 1993), 96, says, for Paul to have admitted to Titus' circumcision 'would have wholly undermined Paul's argument and made his disavowal in ii.5 a piece of shameless apologetic'. Dunn finds the nuance which ἀναγκάζω brings is that the Jerusalem leadership may have been sympathetic to the pressure of the ψευδάδελφοι, but not insistent. Also, Betz, *Galatians*, 89, and Longenecker, *Galatians,* 50.

[76] Noted by Jaquette, *Adiaphora*, 161–65. 'How can Paul argue so strongly against circumcision in Galatians while at the same time evaluate the rite as an *adiaphoron*?... Precisely because the agitators in Galatia tout circumcision as an entrance requirement for the Christian community Paul excludes the rite for his gentile readers. By evaluating an *adiaphoron* (circumcision) as something essential, the opponents are guilty of mistaking what really matters and thus misrepresenting the gospel' (161).

[77] The indictment of deception in ψευδαδέλφους and the characterization of espionage in κατασκοπῆσαι.

[78] Paul does not mention another form of 'enslavement' they attempted to enforce, which leads to the inference that all of this concerns the proposed circumcision of Titus. Perhaps the anacoluthon began as an explanation (e.g. something like, 'But not even Titus with me, who was a Greek, was compelled to be circumcised, but because of the circumcision party who was present the question arose – but we did not submit to it '), but descends into scrappy defence and never recovers a precise explanation.

[79] Epictetus, *Diatr.* IV.1.1, 110. Cf. 2.7.7

enslave me'.[80] Or, to quote Seneca, 'The service of philosophy is freedom',[81] and 'to obey God is freedom'.[82]

Paul's objective in this episode, in resisting the demands of the false brothers, is that the 'truth of the gospel' will remain for the Galatians. The phrase ἀλήθεια τοῦ εὐαγγελίου will appear again in Paul's description of Peter's actions at Antioch (v14) as that with which Peter's actions did not conform, and is perhaps the antonym to the ἕτερον εὐαγγέλιον of 1.6 (i.e. another idea of what constitutes 'good news'). Paul portrays resisting the necessity of Titus' circumcision as crucial to establishing and preserving this 'truth of the gospel': if circumcision is regarded as necessary, this will not be preserved. It will be argued below that the phrase 'truth of the gospel' refers to vv15–16 and represents a tacit agreement which Paul thought resulted from the Jerusalem meeting and with which Peter's actions were out of line. In other words, when the possibility of Titus' circumcision arose and Paul successfully resisted this necessity in Jerusalem, to Paul's mind, this constituted an implicit agreement by those involved that circumcision was not necessary for salvation. This impression would, of course, be challenged in Antioch. However, beginning with his description of the meeting in Jerusalem, it is clear that the requiring of Judaizing amounts to slavery for Paul, and such a requirement would threaten the believers' free service to Christ. The first-order value of their orientation to Christ is the 'truth of the gospel', an agreed standard to which he is under the impression he is able to hold Peter accountable.

In line with his statement in 1.10 that service to Christ and pleasing others were mutually exclusive, Paul has portrayed overestimation of the value of status or the value of circumcision as a threat to this free service (as an aspect of the Christ-orientation). The believers' authority, based on the truth of the gospel, to orient themselves to Christ to the end of salvation will only survive as such if it resists judging anything else as necessary in the same way. Such destructive misjudgements are a form of slavery. Resisting the necessity of circumcision or of pleasing people preserves Paul's free service of Christ and the truth of the gospel for others to do the same. For this reason, and perhaps due to uncertainty over their connection to his opponents, Paul meticulously balances claiming the confirmation of this message by the Jerusalem leadership while moderating the value of their status. He bases his claim on the implication of some incidental events of his time in Jerusalem—an attempt to establish the necessity of circumcision for a gentile. To Paul's mind, his resistance to this, as

[80] Epictetus, *Diatr.*, IV.VII.17.
[81] Seneca, *Ep.*, VIII.7, trans. Gummere, LCL.
[82] Seneca, *Vit. beat.* XV.7.

well as the leaders' confirmation of his message, affirmed his efforts to establish the truth of the gospel and the crucial corollary of freedom to serve Christ and nothing else. Paul resists considering circumcision, an intermediate, as necessary, since this would constitute the slavery of overestimating something other than the Christ-orientation as a 'good'. This threatens everything for which Paul works and which he believes will save the Galatians.

4.3.4 2.11–14: The implicit agreement challenged

Vv11–21 contain the details (if they can be called that) of the 'Antioch incident',[83] providing Paul's view of the incident which carries him into a broader theological statement. Vv15–16 function as a key pivot within the epistle—Paul transitions from giving a personal account of an intense episode within his own life to stating the position which it drove him to formulate, a thesis statement which then drives the rest of the epistle. Sometime after the meeting in Jerusalem of vv1–10, Peter comes to Antioch and Paul confronts him for what he considers hypocritical behaviour. Paul claims that Peter had been regularly eating with gentiles.[84] But when 'certain men from James'[85] came to Antioch, Peter 'drew back and separated himself' (i.e. apparently stopped eating with gentiles). It is not clear which element of this situation was problematic for Peter.[86] Some find that the ancient literature on Jew-gentile commensality is focused on the food itself, with commensality with gentiles not an inherent problem.[87] There is no specific proscription in the Torah against eating with gentiles,

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[83] Coined by Dunn, 'Incident'.

[84] The imperfect συνήσθιεν of v12 indicates habitual action, and Paul's statement that Peter lived ἐθνικῶς in v14 supports this. As others have pointed out, commensality with Titus, a gentile, would have been necessary or otherwise noteworthy in Jerusalem. Cf. P. F. Esler, *Galatians* (London: Routledge, 1998), 130, Gathercole, 'Galatians 2', 315. Simply eating with gentiles itself was not necessarily problematic, though, and it is likely that the description of Peter as 'living ἐθνικῶς' denotes something else.

[85] It is entirely unclear what relationship these men have with James, why they arrive on the scene, or how their arrival garners the reaction which Peter has.

[86] The ambiguity has led to reams of conjecture. Reviews of ancient sources on observance of the Torah's dietary restrictions in the diaspora are given in E. P. Sanders, *Jewish Law From Jesus to the Mishnah: Five Studies* (London: SCM Press, 1990), 272–83 and J. M. G. Barclay, *Jews in the Mediterranean Diaspora: from Alexander To Trajan (323 BCE – 117 CE)* (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1996), 434–7. While no doubt many Jews in diaspora communities were not fully observant either by choice or constraint, the amount of evidence over large geographical areas and spans of time that Jews identified themselves with these dietary practices and were identified by outsiders by such practices speaks to their significance for most. Even when they could have easily done otherwise (Philo could have considered the food laws only allegorical), when practices were not even clearly required (such as the widespread concern over wine associated with libations, something never specified by Torah), there is a pattern, whether in politically-charged Palestine-based literature (*4 Macc* 5–6) or elite Hellenised literature (*Lett. Aris.*), that observance of the dietary restrictions of the Torah was regularly upheld. While the precise aspect of the situation that was problematic may be elusive, Sanders' conclusion, *Law,* 281, that Paul's position of just avoiding questions was perhaps common in Judaism doesn't take into account the evidence to the contrary and the tension which such a position caused.

[87] E. P. Sanders, 'Jewish Association with Gentiles and Galatians 2:11-14', in *The Conversation Continues: Studies in Paul and John* (ed. B. Gaventa; Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1990), 170–88 (172–6), clarifies that the impurity of gentiles themselves would not have prevented table fellowship (since even Jews in the diaspora

although dietary practices did at times extend beyond specific requirements (such as avoiding wine or oil which had potentially been involved in libations) and the interaction of food concerns with the social setting is often under-appreciated.[88] Whatever the specific element was that led to Peter's withdrawal, it is this withdrawal from the community that elicits Paul's reaction.[89] Paul claims that this action was motivated by fear of τοὺς ἐκ περιτομῆς, a group whose identity is unclear (except that it is some group within Judaism, Jesus-believing or otherwise).[90] The other Jews in Antioch followed suit 'acting hypocritically *with*' Peter—even Barnabas, which Paul points out with palpable pain.

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were considered impure since they could not visit the temple when needed), and tithing laws only applied within Palestine (not to food in Antioch). Thus, he concludes, contra Dunn, 'Incident', 151–4, that diaspora literature focuses on the food itself. This does not necessarily render things unproblematic, though. The literature evidences various solutions for dealing with gentile food when eating in gentile spaces: assimilating to gentile customs (e.g. Tobit 1.10–12, and presumably many in the Roman military, cf. Josephus, *A. J.* XIV.226), or asking gentiles to accommodate Jewish concerns (i.e. forgoing some foods and libations, sourcing Jewish meat and wine, cf. Josephus, *A. J.* XII.95; *Lett. Arist.* 184–5, possibly the Herodian dynasty when in Rome, cf. Macrobius, *Saturnalia*, II.4.11; Juvenal, *Satires*, VI.157–60). A Jew could avoid particular foods such as wine and meat, consuming only vegetables or water if sources were doubtful (e.g., Josephus, *Vita* 15; Dan 1.5–16; cf. Josephus, *A. J.* X.190), a Jew could bring their food to eat *with* gentiles (*Judith* 12.1–4, 19; 10.5, Tobit, 1.10–12), or both physically separate himself and have separate food (*Jos. Asen.* 7.1, to a less-clear extent, Add Esth 14.17), or perhaps remain socially separate to the point of never eating with gentiles or in a gentile space (Tacitus, *Hist.* V.5, but highly polemical).

[88] As Barclay, *Gift*, 368 fn. 46, states, there is an important distinction between 'general social interaction and the intimacy of meal-sharing' (cf. Josephus, *C. Ap.* II.209–10) which should be fully appreciated. The willingness to go to the effort of sourcing different food or avoiding typical practices, while portrayed most amicably in an imagined scenario like *Letter of Aristeas,* is often unrealistic for those with separate social circles and life experiences. Fredriksen, 'Apocalyptic', 542–3, correctly notes the voluntary nature of Torah observance within the Jewish community, but does not give sufficient weight to the social pressure involved, especially in antiquity where there was no neutral 'secular' option—to neglect Jewish dietary customs was to inherently adopt pagan customs. While Sanders is likely correct that the precise point of concern is food itself, rather than simply eating with gentiles, the interaction of the two dynamics could easily lead to the same result at points. *Joseph and Aseneth* is probably an extreme text, but shows clearly that for some within ancient Judaism, separation between Jew and gentile while eating *was* commendable, even when food requirements were met. The very ambiguity of the situation (Peter was at the table with those eating food and wine which was unclean or associated with idolatry) may have been the problem. The idea that Peter was only under pressure because he was the 'apostle to the circumcised' (Sanders, *Life*, 490) is contradicted by the fact that the other Jewish Jesus-believers followed suit (noted by de Boer, *Galatians*, 132). Rudolph, *Jew,* 46–7, concurs that the text says nothing about food in particular but addresses Peter's refusal to associate with gentiles, a 'traditional expansion of the law', 48. He notes that gentile people, not food, is the focus of Peter's vision in Acts as well (Acts 10.28; 11.12; 15.9), but this does not account for the description of his previous behavior as 'living ἐθνικῶς', which is strange as a description of simply associating with gentiles. Gathercole, 'Galatians 2', 324, says that it doesn't seem to be a particular aspect of the situation that is problematic for Peter, since the only acceptable solution is 'total withdrawal' (which speaks to the interaction between food and social setting). With no clear solution in sight (or while waiting for the gentiles to Judaize), Peter (and others) simply withdrew from the ambiguous scenario altogether. In conclusion, while eating with gentiles was not explicitly forbidden for Jews, and the foodstuffs involved was almost certainly the point of concern, the interaction between the social setting and food inevitably resulted in ambiguity in gentile spaces which would have been unacceptable for some.

[89] Rudolph, *Jew*, 49, is correct that Paul could hardly critique Peter for adapting to Jewish *and* gentile dietary practices as needed if this is what he claimed to do in 1 Cor 9.19–23. The argument here is not that Paul is concerned that Peter has any particular dietary practices, but that he has allowed those concerns to interrupt the commensality of the Jesus-believing community, an action which implied the necessity of such practices.

[90] The possibilities are: identical with the 'certain men from James' from Jerusalem (by F. Mußner, *Der Galaterbrief*, 2 ed. (Freiburg: Herder, 1977), 142), not identical with either the ψευδάδελφοι or men from James,

Paul describes their behaviour with a striking phrase which builds upon his explanation of his resistance to Titus' circumcision in v5. In separating themselves from the gentile believers the Jewish believers were not ὀρθοποδοῦσιν πρὸς τὴν ἀλήθειαν τοῦ εὐαγγελίου (v14). Paul portrays Peter's actions in contrast to his own: Peter displays fearful hypocrisy rather than the proper indifference towards others' status which Paul thought had previously preserved the 'truth of the gospel'. The withdrawal of Peter and others is not like Paul's unswerving race towards the goal (v2), but a deviation. Ὀρθοποδέω is a New Testament *hapax legomenon* and rare except in patristic sources dependent on this text (although there are cognates).[91] It is worth noting that Epictetus combines ὀρθός and περιπατέω in a rare metaphorical usage which uses athletic imagery to describe the person who avoids overestimating intermediates, invincible in the face of all so-called 'goods' which may test his moral purpose. The one who thus walks rightly is free.[92] Paul clarifies what he considers this behaviour a deviation from: their behaviour is not right in relation to (πρός) the 'truth of the gospel'. Ὀρθός can be translated 'straight' in a literal sense, like of a line or an angle, as well as metaphorically ('upright', 'true') but both carry the idea of a standard with which an angle or an action must conform.[93] In Paul's judgement, the decision to withdraw from table fellowship with gentile believers did not conform to this standard.

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but a Pauline term referring to a faction within Judaism generally (Sanders, *Life*, 489; Longenecker, *Galatians,* 74), or the Jesus-believing Jewish community (Betz, *Galatians*, 109; de Boer, *Galatians*, 133; Dunn, 'Incident', 158).

[91] Ὀρθόπους, an adjective meaning 'upright on their feet' LSJ, s.v. 'ὀρθόπους'. Ὀρθῷ ποδί, τιθέναι ὀρθὸν πόδα, εἰς ὀρθὸν τρέχειν, are all listed at LSJ, s.v. 'ὀρθός', but all appear to describe literal physical positions or actions. Cf. the short but comprehensive article by G. D. Kilpatrick, 'Gal 2.14 ὀρθοποδοῦσιν', in *Neutestamenliche Studien für Rudolf Bultmann* (BZNW 21; Berlin: Töpelmann, 1957), 269–74. Amongst other things, Kilpatrick looks at the few occurrences of the word that are unrelated to Gal 2.14 (there are three). He concludes that there is no inherent ethical sense of the word itself, but only as dependent on Gal 2.14 (in contrast to περιπατέω). Instead it has the sense of progress or success towards a goal or intended destination.

[92] Epictetus, *Diatr.* I.18.20: τούτοις τὸ λοιπὸν πεποιθὼς τοῖς δόγμασιν ὀρθὸς περιπάτει, ἐλεύθερος, οὐχὶ τῷ μεγέθει πεποιθὼς τοῦ σώματος ὥσπερ ἀθλητής. It is not absolutely certain this is a metaphorical usage; clearly, the freedom which the wise man is to have and the body he is not to rely on are not literal, so it seems possible his activity of 'walking rightly' could be as well, especially as it is accomplished by 'πεποιθὼς τοῖς δόγμασιν' (relying on these doctrines). Stobaeus, *Ecl.* II.7.11a defines ἁμαρτάνω as that which is παρὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον. So one could act contrary to right reason, perform a fitting action rightly (i.e. virtuously, in accordance with right reason), and even walk according to right reason 'like an athlete', all of which imply that ὀρθός carried moral connotations within Stoicism. cf. 2.5.2.2. Cf. Cicero, *Fin.* III.24, 59 where *recte* is used for κατορθώματα; Kilpatrick, 'ὀρθοποδοῦσιν', 270, cites early Latin translations of Gal 2.14 which use *recte.*

[93] This is similar to Mußner's analogy, *Galaterbrief,* 144, of a straight path and the 'detour' of works of the law. Both Mußner and Betz, *Galatians*, 111, point out that the natural lexicographical contrast would be χωλεύω (to be lame, limp) and this is confirmed by its occurrences in the analysis of Kilpatrick, 'ὀρθοποδοῦσιν', 272. The understanding of lameness, though, as a pattern of walking deviant from a correct standard of walking, and Paul's specific statement that it is not correct walking *in relation to* the truth of the gospel inclines me to find the metaphor of a standard by which the action is judged. As Barclay, *Gift*, 367 fn. 44, mentions, this is similar to Paul's concern later in the letter that the Galatians 'line up' to a 'standard' (5.25; 6.16), language also present

Paul confronts Peter before the group. He begins with a question meant to expose Peter's hypocrisy: 'If you, being a Jew, live gentilishly rather than Jewishly, how can you require the gentiles to Judaize'?[94] In other words, 'Has what formerly was acceptable for you, even as a Jew, suddenly become unacceptable for these gentiles'? Whatever is meant by 'live gentilishly', the point is that that same standard of practice is now implied to be unacceptable for gentiles, and that Jews who did 'not live Jewishly' (again, whatever that standard is) are ironically requiring this of gentiles.[95] The question is pointed and meant to expose the inconsistency of their withdrawal from table fellowship.[96] Paul highlights the irony of Peter's implied requirement of a level of Torah observance of the gentiles to which he himself, as a Jew, did not always adhere. But, given the reference to Peter's past behaviour in this verse and v12, the references (vv7, 8, 9) to Peter's presence at the Jerusalem meeting where Paul thought a tacit agreement had been reached, and the first person plural of vv15–16 which follow, the statement further draws attention to the theological irony in Peter's behaviour. Paul believes that Peter's behaviour is a deviation from the 'truth of the gospel' which he thought all the apostles agreed upon and which he formulates in the thesis of vv15–16: only

in Phil 3.16. This, per Barclay, *Gift*, 369, clarifies Paul's objection—Peter's behavior is not found wanting primarily because it entailed 'discrimination between Jew and Gentile' (Dunn, *Galatians*, 148) but because it deviated from something more fundamental to the nature of the gospel which Paul and Peter agreed upon.

[94] Ἰουδαΐζω means to adopt Jewish practices to a variety of extents (not to campaign for others to do so, as it is sometimes misunderstood by modern scholars). Cf. the discussion by Cohen, *Beginnings*, 175–96. Its use is well-attested in 2nd temple diaspora literature (e.g. Josephus, *B. J.* II.463; Esth. 8.17). Josephus, *B. J.* II.454, describes someone willing to Judaize καὶ μέχρι περιτομῆς ('even as far as circumcision') which demonstrates the term could describe adoption of practices without full proselytisation or the step of circumcision. The term 'denotes… the range of possible degrees of assimilation to Jewish customs, with circumcision as the end-point of Judaizing' (Dunn, 'Incident', 149). At minimum here it implies adopting Jewish dietary practices and possibly included pressure to circumcise.

[95] Rudolph, *Jew,* 50–1, argues that 'living like a gentile' does not indicate that Peter disregarded Torah requirements, but is rather intra-Jewish polemic similar to modern-day name-calling such as 'Jewish goyim'. In other words, Paul's point is that Peter's standards of observance were so low compared to his Pharisaic standards as to be equated with gentile behaviour. If this is Paul's point, though, his argument would most naturally continue by contrasting two different views of Torah observance and arguing for a stricter observance. In fact, Paul draws a contrast between Jews (ἡμεῖς φύσει Ἰουδαῖοι) and gentiles. There is no reason to conclude that the first-person plural does not include Peter. The designation of Jews 'by nature' is too broad to designate a segment within Judaism. The following argument then is based on the necessity of faith in Christ in contrast to Torah observance. M. D. Nanos, 'What Was at Stake in Peter's 'Eating With Gentiles' at Antioch'?, in *The Galatians Debate: Contemporary Issues in Rhetorical and Historical Interpretation* (M. D. Nanos; Peabody: Hendrickson Publishers, 2002), 282–313, understands Paul's portrayal of Peter's hypocritical behaviour (living ἐθνικῶς) as a reference to δικαιόω (i.e. Peter was declared righteous/made alive in the same way as the gentiles were—by faith in Christ), 310–14. This reading, though, cannot account for Paul's addition of καὶ οὐκ Ἰουδαϊκῶς, given that he then moves to immediately explain how they, specifically *as Jews*, are declared righteous (v15). There is no point of contrast available for that phrase if he is referring to δικαιόω. Paul nowhere advises that Jews abandon their Jewishness and become gentiles to be declared righteous—only that *both* Jews and gentiles are declared so by faith.

[96] Betz, 112: 'the apodosis presupposes Cephas' recent change of conduct as a self-contradiction'.

faith in Christ contributes directly to justification. If this is the 'truth of the gospel' then nothing else is necessary for salvation.

4.3.5 2.15–6: Paul's 'truth of the gospel': only faith in Christ contributes directly to salvation

Requiring gentiles, Paul says, to adopt Jewish practices undermines what we, even as practicing Jews, have acknowledged: Torah observance does not make one righteous except through faith in Christ. Verses 15–6 form the heart of Paul's appeal, a theological position on which he seems to assume rhetorically at least a measure of agreement, both with Peter and with the letter's recipients.[97] Paul frames the perspective of himself and Peter: by nature Jews (with all the attendant benefits and full membership in the covenant community) and not gentile sinners,[98] *knowing that* (despite their knowledge of and observance of Torah) no

[97] Betz's proposal that 2.15–21 form the *propositio* of a formal apology was the first to express this function of vv15-16 but others have agreed with him, even while departing from his interpretation of the entire letter as an apology. Dunn, *Galatians,* 132, 141; Longenecker, *Galatians,* 81–2. Mußner, 144, points out that Paul's charge of hypocrisy requires some agreement or at least knowledge of Peter and Barnabas' position: 'Der Apostel weiß, daß diese auch dem Petrus und Barnabas keineswegs verborgen ist (vgl. das pluralische εἰδότες in V 16). Deshalb ist ja ihr Verhalten für ihn "Heuchelei"'. B. Gaventa, 'Galatians 1 and 2: Autobiography as Paradigm', *NovT* 27 (Oct 1986) 309–26 (311), portrays Paul's experience as paradigmatic. Paul recounts part of the 'biography of reversal' which he, Peter (and the other Jewish Jesus-believers) have experienced and, in essence, charges Peter with reversing that reversal. 'Reversal' is too strong though—to frame it in the terms of Phil 3, the shift which such practices underwent in comparison to the Christ-orientation must not be forgotten.

[98] On ἁμαρταλοί to identify gentiles by Jews, cf. *Jub.* 23.23-24; 1 Macc 2.44, *4 Ezra* 3.28-36.

person is made righteous by works of the law[99] except[100] by faith in Christ Jesus,[101] *they believed* in Christ Jesus in order to be made righteous by faith in Christ Jesus and not by the works of the law—because of all flesh not one will be made righteous by the works of the law. Thus, in one long sentence Paul frames the identity of himself and his fellow Jewish Jesus-believers as those committed to the Jewish way of life but who have agreed that faith in Christ gives people the status of righteousness. Further, Paul argues that they agreed that this was something Torah observance could *not* directly do. As stated in v16, Paul and Peter knew

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[99] Ἔργα νόμου is only found in Paul and is a much-discussed phrase. Barclay, *Gift*, 373, reminds us of the context here, which has just mentioned specific dietary practices as Peter's failure to Ἰουδαϊκῶς ζῇς. He also notes that the phrase is reminiscent of Josephus' and Philo's description of the Torah (ἰουδαϊκοὶ νόμοι or ἰουδαϊκὰ νόμιμα; Cf. Josephus, *A. J.* XIV.258; XVIII.55; Philo, *Embassy* 159, 170, 256), and takes the phrase to mean simply 'the practice of the Jewish Law (the Torah)'. M. Bachmann, *Anti-Judaism in Galatians? Exegetical Studies on a Polemical Letter and on Paul's Theology* (trans. R. L. Brawley; Cambridge: Eerdmans, 2008), 9–12, makes the salient exegetical points that, first, Paul never uses the phrase ἔργα νόμου with a genitive of person and, second, while the phrase is never easily abbreviated as 'works' it can often be easily substituted with only 'law' (e.g. Rom 3.20–1). He concludes that the phrase can be understood to mean the 'individual regulations of the Torah'. Barclay, *Gift,* 374 fn. 60, notes that later in the epistle, the phrase ἐξ ἔργων νόμου (3.2, 5, 10) seems to be identical to ἐκ νόμου (3.18, 21). The aspect of activity which ἔργον expresses would then be in a possessive genitive relationship to νόμος or a genitive of source—they are the activities and practices belonging to the Torah, or the activities out of the Torah (which the semantic range of the word most naturally references rather than the regulations as such).

[100] It is debated whether this conjunction should be read as exceptive (i.e. 'knowing that a person is not justified by the works of the law *unless* through faith in Christ Jesus'; cf. Rom 10.15; 11.23; 1 Cor 15.36) or adversative (i.e. '… by works of the law *but only* through faith in Christ Jesus'; cf. Mt 12.4; Lk 4.26-7). Dunn, *Galatians*, 137–8, takes it in an exceptive sense to mean that works of the law and faith in Christ are not mutually exclusive in Paul's mind, and that Paul uses the grammatical ambiguity 'to gain Peter's assent'. Longenecker, *Galatians*, 83–4, says that the rest of Paul's argument belies allowing such an ambiguity. Gathercole's argument, 'Galatians 2', 326, that the ἐὰν μὴ can only be adversative because 'He clearly did not think that ἔργα νόμου and πίστις Χριστοῦ were both equally necessary means to justification' is not precise enough—Paul (and Peter) could think them *unequally* necessary and yet coexisting. It is that exact point of ambiguity that Paul could be exploiting, as A. A. Das, 'Another Look at ἐὰν μή in Galatians 2:16', *JBL* 119 (2000), 529–39, argues. The idea, of W. O. Walker, Jr., 'Translation and Interpretation of ἐὰν μή in Galatians 2:16,' *JBL* 116 (1997), 515–20, that the reference of the exception does not include ἐξ ἔργων νόμου, but only reference that no *person* is justified, is too unclear to be useful for Paul's purposes. De Boer, *Galatians*, 142–5, regards v16a as a quotation of material from the Galatian agitators and the ἐὰν μὴ as originally exceptive but held as adversative by Paul (which v16d makes clear). It is not necessary, though, to regard v16a as a quotation to acknowledge a significant level of shared content. If this statement consists of material all involved could agree upon, it is less likely to have been an adversative, and the exceptive reading fits Paul's grammatical pattern elsewhere (cf. Dunn). As stated above, Paul could regard faith in Christ as the only thing necessary for justification, whilst regarding it compatible with Torah observance, a position confirmed by 3.21—they are not contrary to each other.

[101] There is debate of course over whether the phrase is an objective or subjective genitive. Sanders, *Life*, 507–9, doesn't want to exclude the possibility of either subjective or objective reading in general, but finds that in this text it should be read as objective based on the interaction of v16a and v16b as well as v16c and v20. Similarly, Barclay, *Gift*, 380: 'The phrase is helpfully disambiguated by Paul himself in the center of 2:16 by the appearance of the verb, used not of Christ but of believers…'. The objective reading is therefore preferable in this particularly text, contra T. Morgan, *Roman Faith and Christian Faith:* Pistis *and* Fides *in the Early Roman Empire and Early Churches* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 271–3. However, her work on πίστις/πιστεύω has argued convincingly for the polyvalence and wide semantic range of these cognates, which lend themselves to notions of trust and belief as well as active fidelity and allegiance, which explains why both subjective and objective readings seem to work for the phrase in various Pauline texts and the term 'capture(s) his sense of the doubly reciprocal relationship of Christ with God and humanity', 272.

the inability of Torah observance to give righteousness, believed *in order to* receive righteousness by this faith rather than Torah observance – precisely *because* Torah observance could not accomplish this result for anyone. In three different ways Paul expresses the specific failure of Torah observance to make one righteous. Faith in Christ, on the other hand, being that which consistently accomplishes the intended result (whether alongside the potentially accompanying Torah observance or apart from it) is the righteous*ing* agent with unfailingly righteous*ing* properties. The ability of Torah observance to contribute to righteousness was dependent upon believing in Christ, the element which he then isolates as unconditionally able to contribute directly to righteousness. Paul has argued that an element of Torah observance should not be required of believers, and that to do so is like enslaving them to a false judgement. He explains that since only faith in Christ contributes directly to salvation (here, δικαιόω), it has first-order value: the argument assumes that only what gave righteousness should be considered necessary and that regarding anything else in the same way is a fatal error.

Paul ends the statement on a starkly negative, antithetical note concerning Torah-observance: no one will be made righteous by it. It is important, though, to recognise the strict limits which Paul has confined himself to in this argument: what constitutes or directly contributes to righteousness. He does not say that Torah observance cannot serve any other purpose or that it is itself problematic. As Dunn points out, '"works of the law" and "faith in Jesus Christ" are not necessarily being posed here as mutually exclusive antitheses',[102] which Betz also sees: 'it should be noted that the denial does not imply that "works of the Torah" do not need to be done. Denied only is that they produce justification before God'.[103] As argued concerning 1.10, Paul sees free service to Christ and pleasing others as mutually exclusive, but he also affords measured appreciation to the status of the Jerusalem leadership. As the exceptive ἐάν μη clause indicates, Torah observance itself and faith in Christ are not mutually exclusive, but Paul insists that the epistemological position of requiring Torah observance is. As Paul portrayed it, his seeking of the confirmation of the Jerusalem apostles was simultaneously *not* pleasing them, and similarly he might consider it possible to do the

[102] Dunn, *Galatians,* 137.
[103] Betz, *Galatians,* 117. However, I would deny that they could be considered necessary since Paul specifically criticizes Peter on this point. Paul's φύσις in v15 could signal the basis upon which such practice would continue, as participation in the 'natural' Jewish community rather than for salvation. Bonhöffer, *Epiktet,* 148–9, begs the question when he says that φύσις is never a measure of morality in Paul's usage. While this is not spelled out here, Paul might consider Torah observance normative for a Jew, for purposes other than righteousness, and under the proviso of the first-order good of orientation to Christ.

'works of the law' without considering them necessary. Just as in Phil 3, the antithesis being constructed is not between virtue and vice, good and evil, but between first-order and second-order value. The warning is against a particular epistemological categorical error of allowing improper weighting in one's moral reasoning towards an intermediate, an error described as slavery. Paul's argument is designed to establish the first-order value of faith in Christ, and prompts him to say only what Torah observance does *not* do; it is not a complete statement concerning the Torah.

The situation in Antioch is a reaction to some *lack* of Torah observance, an angle that is referenced by Paul's description of gentiles in v15b: ἔθνη ἁμαρτωλοί. In other words, requiring Torah observance is also to condemn its absence as sin and Paul's argument could be framed as a charge that Peter has treated gentile 'sin' (i.e. their lack of Torah observance) as a vice to be avoided. Peter's action of withdrawing from table fellowship with the gentile Jesus-believers implied to Paul that typical gentile practice was to be categorized as vice. This is demonstrated by the next move in Paul's argument: redefining 'sin'.

4.3.6 2.17–21: A paradoxical redefinition of sin

If only faith in Christ directly contributes to righteousness (regardless of one's Torah observance or lack thereof), and therefore Torah observance should not be considered necessary (and neither should a non-observant, i.e., gentile, practice be considered, ipso facto, a vice), then the scenario of a *righteous, but not Torah-observant* life becomes possible. In light of this possibility, Paul asks: if someone, in pursuit of the first-order good, should be found to fail to select the conventional 'good', should the first-order good be made subservient to the pursuit of this intermediate? In the absence of a consensus on v17's interpretation, and its resonance with the metaphor of slavery which is so redolent throughout the epistle, a new reading of this verse is proposed.

Paul's pattern of use with μὴ γένοιτο questions is to give *realis* clause(s) followed by a false conclusion which he denies, so that construction will be assumed.[104] Paul accepts the following two premises as true: he (and Peter at least) seek to be made righteous in Christ (verified by v16c,d), and they have been found as 'sinners'.[105] The meaning for ἁμαρτωλός most readily suggested by the context is that given in v15: those following Torah-proscribed

[104] E.g. Rom 3.5–6; 3.28–31; 5.20–6.2; 7.11–13; 10.21–11.1; Gal 3.21.
[105] J. Lambrecht, 'Paul's Reasoning in Galatians 2:11-21', in *Paul and the Mosaic Law* (ed. J. D. G. Dunn; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2001), 53–74; J. B. Lightfoot, *St. Paul's Epistle to the Galatians* (London: MacMillan and Co., 1881), 117.

behaviour and/or gentile practice. Paul indicates that he considers this a true premise with his description of Peter's behaviour in v14: living gentilishly. In other words, if the unreserved pursuit (ζητέω) of faith in Christ has resulted in a situation where they behave as gentiles, in a non-observant way, Paul conceives that these two premises could lead to the following conclusion: Christ is a servant of sin. Is has been a struggle, though, for scholars to make sense of this simple statement without further information: is this a charge from Paul's opponents which he must deny?[106] While that is possible, it is an anti-climactic conclusion to his thesis: denying that Christ promotes sin would seem to be assumed in the statement that faith in him gives people the status of righteousness. The ἆρα introduces a question, and it can furthermore be helpfully recognized that many of Paul's μὴ γένοιτο statements are in response to misconstrued moral implications of the previous premises (i.e. what Paul objects to is often the implication of a necessity or obligation rather than just the possibility of the statement being true in the sense of accurate).[107] Read in this sense, v17 can be understood as asking '*should* Christ be the servant of sin'? rather than '*is* Christ the servant of sin'?[108] In

[106] The views are that Paul is responding to a charge from his opponents, either that he and Peter are 'sinners' for their practices or that his gospel has 'made Christ a promoter of sin'. Cf. Dunn, *Galatians*, 141; Betz, *Galatians*, 119–20; Sanders, *Life*, 515; Mußner, *Galaterbrief*, 176–7), or that the process of seeking justification in Christ has led to the realisation that they are sinners (in the same way as the gentiles). Cf. M. Luther, *St. Paul's Epistle to the Galatians* (trans. 'Middleton', 1st ed. 1575; London: James Clarke and Co. Ltd., 1953), 146; Lightfoot, *Galatians*, 117; Longenecker, *Galatians*, 89–90, Lambrecht, 'Reasoning', 56–7. The debate also circles around whether or not both premises of v17 are *realis* or *irrealis*, with those arguing the first view (that typically aligns ἁμαρτωλοί with the usage of v15) claiming 17a as a *realis*, and 17b an *irrealis* and those of the second view (taking a broader, theological definition of ἁμαρτωλοί) classifying both 17a and 17b as *realis* clauses. It is possible that this text often falls prey to the escape route of mirror-reading merely by virtue of its impenetrability. On mirror-reading generally, cf. J. M. G. Barclay, 'Mirror-Reading a Polemical Letter: Galatians as a Test Case', *JSNT* 31 (1987), 73–93 (84–5). The interpretations of this verse offered often are only possible based on specific conjectures about the Galatian opponents based only upon 17c. The proposed position of the opponents is slightly odd, though—why would the opponents not simply blame Paul (or Peter), saying that *they* are promoting sin?

[107] See Rom 3.6, 31; 6.1, 15; 1 Cor 6.15. For examples of μὴ γένοιτο in response to epistemic aspects of modalities, cf. Rom 7.7, 13; 11.1. Even if there is a question of the accenting of ἆρα (as the particle ἄρα, attested to by B^2 H 0278 365 945 1175 1739 1881it; while αρα without an accent is attested by P^{46} א A B* C D F G record), the concluding μὴ γένοιτο indicates that what falls in between is meant to be read as a question.

[108] The answer to either would easily be 'no', but the latter (epistemic modality) is more easily debated by Paul's opponents —to the question of whether Christ actually serves sin, the easy retort is 'no, but you (Paul) do'. On the other hand, the idea of Christ being subservient or servile *to* sin is not so easily refuted. We should ask how the rejection of such a conclusion 'cashes out' in Paul's argument – what gain does he get from it in relation to his surrounding logical moves? Paul thus far has argued that only faith in Christ effects righteousness, so that even those who observe Torah must believe in him; after v18 he will argue that he has died to the Torah, that his epistemic relationship to it has been torn down, and must not be rebuilt. If Paul's primary point with v17 is that Christ could never be an agent of sin (which it does seem all involved would agree with), his argumentative point is that the gentile behaviour they have been found in cannot *be* sin since it was done in the process of seeking Christ—but this was precisely the point being debated and thus not something he could depend upon an assumed answer to a rhetorical question. Alternatively, his primary point with v17 could be that Christ could never be made subservient to concerns over gentile behaviour since seeking justification in Christ effectively achieves righteousness (and therefore must be pursued as the highest good rather than Torah-observance). This could be linked to the following argument that the Torah should not be re-

retrospect, this is how Paul views Peter's actions: Peter subverted the truth of the gospel to the perceived necessity of avoiding gentile practices.[109] Since virtue was pictured as free, and the intermediates as servants to virtue, this might be conceived as a Stoic asking, 'should virtue be made to serve (concern over) poverty'? As an example, Epictetus describes the need for pleasure to be subordinated to virtue as a servant (διάκονος) or attendant (ὑπηρέτης).[110] In another passage, he uses the metaphor of service to discuss the categories of value, a text which also uses the categories of second-order value:

> Zeus' gifts – fruit, wine, sight, hearing, etc. – cannot show their worth (ἀξία) on their own, but only as servants (διάκονοι) and slaves (δοῦλοι) to virtue which assesses (δοκιμάζω) their value and use. How could any of these be greater than the faculty which uses and evaluates the rest of them? Is there anything stronger (ἰσχυρότερος) than this? What then – do we dishonour (ἀτιμάζω) the other faculties (of the body)? Μὴ γένοιτο. Do we say there is no use or progress except in moral purpose? Μὴ γένοιτο. That would be ungrateful to God, who has given to each faculty a value – we do not dishonour other faculties of our bodies because the moral aspect is superior. In everything we earnestly pursue after what is the most excellent, making all else secondary to this but yet without being neglectful of them.[111]

Cicero asks, how can virtue ever secure happiness if anything else is regarded as good? Only if the wise man counts poverty and ill heath as nothing can he be free.[112] If these are counted as evils or goods, virtue is annihilated and the wise man has become a slave. Virtue will be done away with if *she herself* is not free.[113]

Paul's primary concern in v17 is the first-order value of the Christ-orientation, which is confirmed by v18: at stake is whether or not previous assumptions or conventions will be re-established. Their agreement, that only faith in Christ gives righteousness (and that Torah observance did not), has re-ordered the value of Torah observance (as Phil 3 indicated) and this leads to a paradoxical definition of παραβάτης.[114] The intermediate or conventional

established (*because* it does not successfully procure righteousness and should be subservient to means by which righteousness *is* effected), which seems more useful to Paul's argument.

[109] The paraphrase 'Torah-definition of sin' in v17 is based on this context. 'Sin' is a shorthand for the basis upon which Peter withdrew from table fellowship with the gentiles. Despite the lack of clarity on the specifics, the contrast portrayed by Paul between Jews and gentiles (v15), indicates that 'sin' is defined here as the failure of gentiles to observe the Torah in a manner acceptable to the Jewish community interacting with them. The 'sinners' are those living a lifestyle outside the boundaries of the community governed by the Torah. Due to their Torah-proscribed behaviour, they have been labeled 'sinners' so that 'sin' here is best viewed as that category of behaviour (i.e. failure to observe the Torah).

[110] Epictetus, *Diatr*. III.7.28.

[111] Epictetus, *Diatr.* II.23.5–8, 18, 23–5, 34, my condensed paraphrase.

[112] Cicero, *Tusc.* V.29-30.

[113] Cicero, *Tusc*. V.52-3.

[114] Barclay, *Gift*, 384: '…"righteousness" (and its antonym, "sin") have been recalibrated by the Christ-event'.

norm which is challenged by the Christ-orientation is Torah observance, but, given that this is the precisely the issue under dispute, it will not work rhetorically for Paul to ask 'should Christ serve Torah observance'? In order to obtain the negative reply that he wants to his hypothetical question, he compares Christ to a value judgement he can assume is negative. The negative value judgement of gentile practices is the inverse reality of the positive value judgement of Torah observance, and it is also the value judgement operative in the scenario at hand. The Stoics argue that neither pleasure could be counted a good, nor pain an evil, and Paul argues that gentile practice cannot be counted 'sin'. To do so was to make Christ serve this false judgement as, for a Stoic, to count pain an 'evil' would be to make virtue serve a false judgement. Conventional goods and evils are *both* 'nothing'. Rather than a Torah-based definition of sin (i.e. gentile practice, v15), the Christ-event has redefined sin as rebuilding what had been annulled (v18): the normativity of Torah (v19). Paul asks

> *Should Christ serve (this value judgement of) sin (by insisting upon Torah observance)? No! That would re-establish the Torah as necessary for righteousness and would be overturning our understanding of faith in Christ's ability to give righteousness! That would be a transgression against God – to nullify his action in Christ.*

In effect, perhaps Paul's formulation could be read as a Stoic asking, 'If, in seeking happiness by virtue, I fail to attain the conventional 'good' of wealth, then should the first-order good be made subservient to a concern over poverty'? Like a convicted Socrates declaring he would rather die nobly than live otherwise,[115] so we can imagine Paul's mindset: 'I would rather be found a "sinner" than fail to establish the righteousness available through faith in Christ'.

Paul has already shifted from first-person plural (in v17) to first-person singular (v18) and he continues in an increasingly personal tone. V19 can be read as Paul's personal restatement of vv15–16. He would be a transgressor to re-establish the Torah as first-order good since *through* the Torah itself he came to realize its annulment as the standard for righteousness in order to live to God.[116] The rupture of Paul's orientation to Torah is so radical he describes it as a death. All of this is highly-charged and personal—*Paul* refuses to abolish the grace of God, Christ gave himself *for him*. In his statement itself is the

[115] Plato, *Apol.* 38e; Seneca, *Ep.* 70.7: 'life is not to be purchased at any price'.
[116] A phrase which often has the force of δικαιόω based on Paul's reading of Hab 2.4; cf. Rom 1.17; 6.10; Gal 3.11–2. Betz, 122, states: '"To live for God" sums up Paul's concept of Christian existence, soteriology as well as ethics. Perhaps one may call it Paul's "telos formula", analogous to those found in the philosophical literature'.

explanation for this level of identification—through the experience relayed in vv15–16 of finding faith in Christ to be a saving reality, Paul's orientation to Christ is so deep, so thorough that he can say, 'I no longer live, but it is Christ in me' (v20). For Paul, to displace the grace of God in Christ by regarding salvation as found in anything else is not only a theological deviation, but a direct personal offence. He concludes chs1–2 with an ultimatum of sorts: we either establish the death of Christ as the gift of God contributing directly to righteousness or we displace it altogether. Righteousness through the law and the grace of God in Christ's death are two mutually exclusive positions.

4.3.7 Summary of Gal 2.1–21

Paul argues against the necessity of circumcision for the Galatians. In his direct address to them, and as he recalls his opposition to similar pressure in both Jerusalem and in Antioch, he describes this pressure as necessitating (ἀναγκάζω) Jewish practice, aligns this 'requiring' with the metaphor of slavery, and says that this threatens the 'truth of the gospel', or offers 'another gospel'. This constellation demonstrates Paul's Stoic-like assumptions that to regard anything which was not a first-order good as necessary was slavery, and mutually exclusive with the believers' free service to Christ. To establish the first-order value of faith in Christ (and the concomitant categorical error of requiring anything else), Paul uses Stoic criteria. He reiterates his perception of the apostles' previous agreement, emphatically states the inability of Torah observance to contribute directly to salvation, and isolates faith in Christ as the first-order good which is unconditionally able to contribute directly to salvation.

Paul's polemical objective of opposing circumcision lends the entire letter and this text itself an antithetical tone, but there are features which indicate that the antithesis is between things of first and second-order value (not between virtue and vice). Even within the constraints of his argument (determining only what gives righteousness), the exceptive clause of v16b allows for the conditional value of Torah observance for those oriented to Christ. Paul's statement in 3.21 that Torah is not κατὰ τῶν ἐπαγγελιῶν confirms that he assigns Torah observance a neutral, rather than negative, role: the law is not contrary to the divine purposes, only inadequate to give life. While he argued against enslavement *to* it, Paul's metaphor for the law as an 'enslaving slave' in ch3 allows it a vulnerable and ambiguous role, and avoids assigning full responsibility to Torah for its enslaving actions.[117] In 5.14–23,

[117] K. H. Burgett, 'The Enslaved Law in Gal 3–4' (paper presented at the annual meeting of the SBL, San Diego, 23 Nov 2019).

Paul will position the Torah on the same side as the Spirit in the struggle against flesh, and state that it is fulfilled by the believers' Spirit-orientation to Christ. The law is (again) not κατὰ τῶν τοιούτων which the Spirit produces (5.23). At other points in the epistle Paul sketches a broader picture in which Jewish practice is only one thing which must shift in value in comparison to the Christ-orientation: circumcision and Jewishness are now 'nothing', but so also is uncircumcision, Greekness, slavery, freedom, maleness and femaleness (3.28, 5.6, 6.15). In a distinct echo of the Stoic description of the ἀδιάφορα as 'neither' and 'nothing' towards the τέλος, Paul's antithesis disparages the value of these realities *in comparison to their orientation to Christ*.[118] Paul does not resist gentile Judaizing because he believes Torah observance to be contrary to faith in Christ, but because requiring it could be.

Paul's use of Stoic criteria demonstrates that *how* he argued for the first-order good of faith in Christ shows Stoic-like assumptions, and his use of the slavery and freedom metaphors shows *why* he thought this argument so crucial to make, also along Stoic lines. In Stoic thought, it was extremely important that one assessed and recognised the distinct weight in reasoning which the first-order good should have, and the contrasting reserve appropriate for the intermediates. The reason Paul so vehemently denies the circumcision of gentile believers, and so harshly confronts Peter, is that the confusion of a Torah observance (or any intermediate) with the first-order good endangered the gospel. An intermediate is meant to serve the good, and, in his view, they had made the good serve an intermediate. This is not merely incorrect but a threat to the very establishment and survival of the first-order good. In light of this, the stringency of Paul's rebuke of Peter is not due to perceived negative qualities of the Torah, but due to the threat to the gospel which he perceived Peter's actions to represent. If Paul is reasoning with Stoic-like assumptions, Peter's behaviour has undermined the gospel with potentially devastating consequences. Paul resists so that the

[118] On pairs of opposites, cf. 2.5.1. J. L. Martyn 'Apocalyptic Antinomies in Paul's Letters to the Galatians', *NTS* 31 (1985): 410–24. Martyn argues, 414–15, that with such statements Paul 'is *denying* real existence to a pair of opposites… the letter is about the death of one world, and the advent of another'. However, the Stoics referenced pairs of opposites not to deny that they existed, but to deny their ability to contribute directly to the τέλος. The same pairs were then reintroduced into their reasoning as the intermediates of second-order value. M. C. De Boer, 'The Meaning of the Phrase τὰ στοιχεῖα τοῦ κόσμου in Galatians', *NTS* 53 (2007): 204–24, argues correctly for reading τὰ στοιχεῖα τοῦ κόσμου as referring to the fundamental components of the physical universe, but misses the way in which such cosmological statements were also read in Hellenistic philosophy as contributing to ontological and ethical doctrines. The opening statements of Arius Didymus clearly illustrate the simply transfer from ontology to ethics. The reference to physical elements does not preclude social and ethical categories, and includes, in Paul's immediate context, the pairs of opposites listed at 3.28 as well as the calendrical observances he references in 4.10. To regard such elements as having first-order value is, precisely, to be enslaved (4.3).

truth of the gospel will be established and not nullified, as he expressly and repeatedly states (2.5,18, 21). In 5.2 Paul unequivocally and emphatically warns the Galatians: if they accept circumcision under these circumstances, they will not be benefitted by Christ. For their faith in Christ to *work*, to save them, it must resist regarding anything else as necessary to that end. If Paul's stress on the ability of faith in Christ to contribute directly to righteousness (and the converse inability of Torah observance to do so) is *how* he argued for faith in Christ as the first-order good, the metaphor of slavery and freedom indicates *why* he felt this argument so significant to make.

4.4 Conclusion

Epictetus imagines Socrates, standing in court, like a ball player tossing about imprisonment, his family's future, even death.[119] His ease belies the skill necessary for such studied reserve towards intermediates and resolve towards the good.

> What must I always hold on to? That no one else is master over me – this way I have nothing to fear from either externals or even others. I do not please (ἀρέσκω) someone held in high regard (δοκέω)? He must understand that I have only one I must please and submit to: God. He has made me subject to my moral purpose and given me standards (κανών) for its correct use (ὀρθὴ χρῆσις). So this is all I must pay attention to and these are my first principles, the target (σκοπός) which my soul strains for. Whenever we deviate from them, we suffer loss (ζημία).[120]

Paul's revelation of Christ gave him the one thing he could not lose, and he found language and criteria common to Stoicism to explain and defend his position. The logic is not as precise as we find in the philosophers, and the character of the God, doctrines, and target he referenced are certainly not the same. However, there is a discernible pattern of isolating one thing—the orientation to Christ—as contributing directly to his τέλος of salvation while acknowledging a second-order value for others. In Phil 3 and Gal 2, Paul exhibits this Stoic pattern of discourse on intermediates to establish the first-order good of the Christ-orientation. In both these texts, Paul is concerned to correct a categorical error of improper estimation of Jewish practices, indicated by the requiring of them or relying upon them. In both texts he explains that this estimation is faulty since only the Christ-orientation directly contributes to salvation, and he references the inability of Jewish practices and credentials to do the same. In Gal 2, the inability of Jewish practice to contribute directly to salvation is

[119] Epictetus, *Diatr.* II.5.18–20.
[120] Epicetus, *Diatr.* IV.12.7–18, my condensed paraphrase.

emphatically stated, while in Phil 3 this unreliability is expressed with the metaphorical motif of value which disparages these intermediates in comparison to ‘knowing Christ’. In both texts the unreserved pursuit of the first-order good is modelled and expressed, and the sharp rhetoric and (in Galatians) the metaphor of slavery and Paul’s direct statements demonstrate the significance of these concerns for him: these categorical errors will potentially prevent the establishment of the gospel message he preaches and its effectiveness. Despite this strong rhetoric, the texts give evidence that it is the neutrality of these practices in relation to salvation that is being argued. These strategies are not designed primarily to deny Jewish practices any value, or to abolish them, but to isolate and secure his communities’ unreserved pursuit of believing in and knowing Christ, which alone saved.

CHAPTER 5

Paul's Second Pattern of Discourse: Assessing and Selecting Intermediates in 1 Cor 8.1–11.1

5.1 Introduction

In Gal 2 and Phil 3 Paul addressed a failure to recognise the ethical neutrality of Jewish practices which he believed would threaten the gospel message and the believers' salvation. In 1 Cor 8–10 he expresses concern that an insistence on their *utter* neutrality will threaten the same. As the other Stoics responded to Ariston (who regarded the intermediates as utterly indistinguishable): without any further distinction, virtue is overthrown and left with no task.[1] The previous texts evidenced the first pattern of discourse on the intermediates, a pattern designed to warn of confusion between intermediates and the first-order good. 1 Cor 8–10 evidences the second pattern of discourse on the intermediates, used when they were compared with each other. Here Paul demonstrates the second-order value of some practices which should be discerned by those oriented to Christ. The Christ-orientation contributes directly to the τέλος, and thus is the only thing to be considered necessary or relied upon, but Paul also argues that some practices and selections have an objective, yet conditional second-order value.

Throughout these chapters, on the topic of idol food, Paul carefully maintains the neutrality of idol food, but is nonetheless concerned about the Corinthians' behaviour in using it. The intermediates were the material of virtue, and, as Epictetus states, 'materials are indifferent, but the use of them is not'.[2] Paul models and advises a reasoning pattern which assesses and defends intermediate activities for their objective second-order value based on a wide range of particulars. This reasoning process, however, must also assess whether such activities and selections conflict with the first-order good, in which case their second-order value is no longer the 'paramount consideration' to be made.[3] If Paul's position was (as argued in Gal 2) that gentile practice was acceptable *qua* gentile, and Judaizing was not to be required of them, it is plausible that the Corinthians' statement he echoes at 6.12 and 10.23—πάντα μοι ἔξεστιν—is actually derived (if mishandled, in his opinion) from his own teaching

[1] Cicero, *Fin.* II.43; III.11–13, 50.
[2] Epictetus, *Diatr.* II.5.1. Cited by Jaquette, *Adiaphora,* 144, in reference to this Pauline text.
[3] LS1, 358.

on the neutrality of such practices and the gentile believers' authority to make selections.[4] His rejoinder in both cases—that they must further evaluate whether any selection or activity is advantageous—is a reminder that any such authority they claim, to assess and select activities, is only valid insofar as it does not conflict with what they have judged to be truly advantageous: their orientation to Christ.[5]

Their authority and freedom, as gentile believers, to 'do all things' is grounded in the character of the Christ-event, which 'knows' (1 Cor 8.3) 'all' in order to 'save many', a project that does not depend upon conventional categories of worth and status. Paul has used the metaphor of slavery to warn of the category error of comparing anything to the Christ-orientation, or considering anything else as necessary as the Christ-orientation. The determination that only the Christ-orientation is necessary might lead to the conclusion that one can 'do all things'. Paul argues that freedom is not merely the ability to do 'all things', but, rather, is the authority to do 'all things' without any impediment towards the τέλος. In Paul's construction, this τέλος is salvation and any rightful authority to 'do all things' is only made possible by the Christ-orientation which contributes directly to that τέλος. Thus, any authority to 'do all things' is only valid as grounded in that orientation, and as grounded in the logic of that orientation, which has declared its purpose as that of 'saving many'. The neutrality of intermediates such as Torah observance was argued based on their inability to contribute directly to salvation, to deliver advantage unconditionally in the way in which the orientation to Christ could. It is nonsensical to argue that this neutrality justifies the use of an intermediate when it conflicts with this good and its advantage. For Paul, the assumed advantage of the first-order good means not only that nothing else is necessary in the same way, but that one must assess and select the things of second-order value in a way that does not conflict with the advantage of the first-order good. Any authority to regard the intermediates as neutral is derived from the orientation to Christ itself; any argument for the use of an intermediate when it conflicts with this orientation is therefore invalid.

Having argued against the necessity of gentile Judaizing based on its inability to contribute directly to salvation, Paul here instructs the gentiles to adopt a partial Jewish practice. The rationale offered for this practice, though, is the potential conflict their gentile

[4] There is debate about what can be identified as statements from the Corinthians cited by Paul, but there is consensus that this phrase is one. A. C. Thiselton, *The First Epistle to the Corinthians: A Commentary on the Greek Text* (NIGTC; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2000), 451–2; Fee, *Corinthians*, 251, 254, 365, 370; J. Murphy-O'Connor, 'Corinthian Slogans in 1 Cor 6:12-20', *CBQ* 40 (July 1978), 391–96 (394). Cf. the table by J. C. Hurd Jr., *The Origin of 1 Corinthians* (London: SPCK, 1965), 68.
[5] Cf. 2.5.2.5.

practices may have with their orientation to Christ, and the ability of the advised Jewish practice to contribute indirectly to the development of the Christ-orientation in all. Paul confirms their knowledge that such practices are neutral and that the believers are able to 'do all things', but he admonishes that this general knowledge is insufficient on its own. True knowledge arises out of the divine act of 'being known' which is inherent in the Christ-event, and which reconstitutes the believers as those belonging to God. The character of the Christ-event, as that which actively knows and saves 'many', demands that believers take others' development into account as part of their own Christ-orientation. Those known by God love him, a love that necessarily entails building, rather than dissolving, what is his. If the believers' selections and activities are used in a way which conflicts with the divine purpose to save many, this itself demonstrates a lack of orientation to Christ, thus thwarting any advantage not only for others but for themselves. In the Christ-event, God has known and appropriated these gentile believers, giving them the authority and freedom to select what is advantageous for them. This same action, however, reconstitutes them as those oriented to Christ and thus invested in building the body oriented to him, since herein lies what is genuinely advantageous for all.

5.2 Preliminary Matters

5.2.1 The topos *of 'idol food'*

8.1–11.1[6] falls within a section of the epistle traditionally understood to contain Paul's responses to a set of questions posed by the Corinthians in a previous letter.[7] The topics of these questions are introduced by the phrase περὶ δέ at 7.1, 25; 12.1; 16.1, 12, and at 8.1, which is where Paul's discussion of idol food begins: περὶ δὲ τῶν εἰδωλοθύτων….[8] The

[6] The integrity of 8.1–11.1 has been questioned, in large part due to the seemingly abrupt opening and lengthy off-topic defence of apostolic support in 9.1–27 and the differences between his instructions in 8.1–3 and 10.1–22. Most recent work, however, has maintained the location of ch9 as original, a position to which the argument of this chapter will lend support. For a summary of these debates, cf. W. L. Willis, '1 Corinthians 8-10: A Retrospective After Twenty-Five Years', *ResQ* 49 (2007), 103–12 (103–05); W. Schrage, *Der erste Brief an die Korinther*, 2 ed. (EvK; Zürich: Benziger, 1995), 212–14.

[7] Fee, *Corinthians*, 6–10, 274; Thiselton, *Corinthians,* 483; Schrage, *Korinther,* 50, mildly questions this consensus, pointing out that Paul has already introduced several of the themes of these 'questions' earlier in the letter. M. M. Mitchell, *Paul and the Rhetoric of Reconciliation: An Exegetical Investigation of the Language and Composition of 1 Corinthians* (Louisville: Westminster/John Knox Press, 1993), 191, also questions this consensus, noting that the phrase does introduce a topic familiar to both the reader and author, but not necessarily a point of discussion in previous correspondence. The notion that it refers to questions raised in Corinthian correspondence is based on 7.1.

[8] While Paul specifically mentions meat in 8.13, at other points it is only food in general (8.8) and later, the 'cup' and general 'table' is discussed (10.21) as well as the actions of eating (8.7, 8, 10; 10.25, 27, 31) and

term Paul uses to introduce the topic is used only by Jewish and Christian texts, and its mere two Jewish usages are contested.[9] It is a polemical term which would make sense only to those who viewed Graeco-Roman piety as idol worship. The term commonly used for something offered to a deity is used in 10.28: ἱερόθυτος (a sacred sacrifice). There are rare instances of Graeco-Roman worshippers referring to a cultic image as an εἴδωλον, but Jewish thought exploited the semantic range of the word (phantom, ghost) to reinforce the view that such gods had 'no more reality than the images used to represent them'.[10] Despite the infrequent extant usages of εἰδωλόθυτος and its polemical flavour, it clearly refers to pagan sacrifices.

One interpretation of 8.1–11.1 argues that with εἰδωλόθυτος Paul refers to something eaten within the temple area, and with ἱερόθυτος he refers to food consumed in a wider variety of settings.[11] Since Paul's instructions prohibit consumption of idol food at some points but allow it at others, this view attempts to reconcile both elements of his instructions in this text as referring to two different settings for the consumption of idol food. However, it seems unlikely that such a delineation would have been obvious or useful to Paul's readers within their setting.[12] First, the settings are not as clearly differentiated in the text as this reading

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drinking (10.31). Εἰδωλόθυτα itself does not even specifically refer to food, let alone meat – it is simply things offered to idols. A variety of foodstuffs were offered to deities, such as cakes and figs, as well as meat. Cf. M. Beard, J. A. North, and S. R. F. Price, *Religions of Rome: Volume 2: A Sourcebook* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 154–5. Cf. J. B. Rives, *Religion in the Roman Empire* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2007), 24–5. The references to the demon's cup and drinking certainly refer to the practice of libation. While it seems unlikely that sacrificial foods other than meat would be resold at the *macellum*, the translation of μάκελλον as 'meat market' (NIV, ESV, NKJV, NLT, RSV) is overly-precise and reinforces the idea that the discussion is only about meat.

[9] In the NT outside of this section of 1 Cor: Acts 15.29; 21.25; Rev 2.14, 20. The two possible Jewish (and potentially non-Christian) usages are *IV Macc* 5.2 and *Sib. Or.* 2.96, but both probably postdate 1 Corinthians, and have been argued to evidence Christian influence and revision. Cf. B. Witherington III, 'Not So Idle Thoughts About Eidolothuton', *TynBul* 44 (1993), 237–54 (238–9).

[10] T. Griffiths, '"ΕΙΔΩΛΟΝ" as "Idol" in Non-Jewish and Non-Christian Greek', *JTS* 53 (2002), 95–101 (101).

[11] Witherington, 'Idle Thoughts'; Fee, *Corinthians*, 359–60; and G. D. Fee, 'Εἰδωλόθυτα Once Again: An Interpretation of 1 Corinthians 8–10', *Bib* 61 (1980), 172–97, although Fee clarifies that while he considers food eaten in the temple to be the referent in this passage, it is not the only possible referent for the term.

[12] No dining facilities have surfaced in a distinct temple area in Corinth, it is debatable whether the dining facilities of the Demeter and Kore sanctuaries were even operational in the Roman period, and it is unclear whether the banqueting rooms near the Lerna were associated with the Asklepeion or not. P. D. Gooch, *Dangerous Food: 1 Corinthians 8-10 In Its Context* (Waterloo, Ontario: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1993), 3, 13, argues that dining continued uninterrupted in the Demeter and Kore sanctuary in the Roman period and that this is the setting Paul addresses in 1 Cor 10.14–22. This seems unlikely, however, due to recent archaeological finds. Although Roman pottery and votive offerings have been found in these sanctuaries, there is a very dramatic decrease in finds (i.e. 29 out of 24,000 votives), so that the dining rooms are described as 'abandoned' by N. Bookidis, 'The Sanctuaries of Corinth', in *Corinth: the Centenary, 1896-1996* (Corinth vol. 20; ed. C. K. Williams and N. Bookidis; Princeton: American School of Classical Studies at Athens, 2003), 247–78 (255, 257). Cf. G. S. Merker, *The Sanctuary of Demeter and Kore: Terracotta Figurines of the Classical, Hellenistic, and Roman Periods* (Corinth vol 18:4; Princeton, NJ: American School of Classical Studies at Athens, 2000), 311; N. Bookidis, 'Religion in Corinth: 146 B.C.E. to 100 C.E.', in *Urban Religion in*

requires. While the setting described in ch8 is a space public enough to be seen, this reading assumes that the setting in ch10 (which ἱερόθυτος supposedly references) is decidedly *not* public or near an idol. However, the unbeliever could just as well invite (καλέω, 10.27) to a meal hosted at a public facility such as that near the Lerna and Asklepeion in Corinth (the sacred status of which is ambiguous).[13] There is also no external evidence for such a distinctly different meaning between the two terms—the best explanation for the use of two terms is that within the text itself: the Jewish-Christian description used by Paul's community and the Graeco-Roman description of an ἄπιστος.[14] Without clear internal markers or external evidence for a linguistic distinction, this reading would only be plausible if such a delineation were readily apparent to the original auditors in their context. While this is possible, there is no archaeological evidence as yet for such clearly distinct spaces. As yet, there is no archaeological evidence for dining facilities directly within temple grounds in Corinth, and instead evidence pointing to numerous ambiguous spaces. This, however, is consistent with what is generally known of Graeco-Roman life: idols were everywhere (including a *lararium* in many homes) and the modern distinct categories of 'public and sacred' vs. 'private and secular' are often not applicable.[15] Thus, there is insufficient evidence for a reading based on two different referents for the two terms (idol food eaten in a public worship setting and food eaten in a private setting).

Indeed, it is probably anachronistic to assume such distinctions between public and private, sacred and mundane. Life in a Roman colony of the early empire would have offered

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Roman Corinth: Interdisciplinary Approaches (eds. D. N. Schowalter and S. J. Friesen; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Theological Studies, 2005), 141–64 (158–9). Gooch also argues that the banqueting facilities near the Lerna and Asklepeion embody the 'temple dining' of 8.10 in which the knowledgeable want to participate. Research indicates that the Asklepeion was in use in the Roman period, but there is no evidence regarding the use of the nearby dining facilities and, further, whether they would have been considered part of the temple facilities, cf. M. Melfi, 'Religion and Society in Early Roman Corinth: A Forgotten Coin Hoard and the Sanctuary of Asklepios', *Hesperia* 83 (Oct–Dec 2014), 747–76. In other words, any of these settings are tenuous as distinct settings for Paul's instructions. Most importantly, if Paul does have distinct settings in mind one wonders whether this is sufficiently marked in the text for his auditors to discern and thus how useful such analysis is.

[13] C. E. Still, 'Paul's Aims Regarding εἰδωλόθυτα: A New Proposal for Interpreting 1 Corinthians 8:1–11:1', *NovT* 44 (2002), 333–43 (336); D. G. Horrell, *The Social Ethos of the Corinthian Correspondence: Interests and Ideology from 1 Corinthians to 1 Clement* (Edinburgh: Clark, 1996), 145–6; and W. L. Willis, *Idol Meat in Corinth: The Pauline Argument in 1 Corinthians 8 and 10* (SBLDS; Chico: Scholars Press, 1985), 40–3, demonstrate the similarity of invitations to homes and temples.

[14] Some argue that this is spoken by a 'weak' believer but as Gooch, *Food*, 104, notes, it is difficult to imagine the weak putting themselves into such a situation. Furthermore, it is most likely the host who would inform regarding the origin of the food.

[15] E.g., shrines alongside catering facilities for theatre-goers, and the dining facilities adjacent to the Asklepeion make a clear delineation between 'public' dining and 'private' dining tenuous (as discussed by Gooch, *Food*, albeit with different conclusions). Cf. B. Nongbri, *Religion*, 3–5; Beard, et al, *Religions*: *Vol. 2*, 78–115, on 'Religious Places' including the use of groves and Roman household shrines.

innumerable intersections of Graeco-Roman piety with food or drink. Private homes contained shrines at which offerings were made to the *lares*, many meals incorporated expressions of piety which could be considered sacrifices (from a casual libation when a friend dropped by to a birthday feast centred around meat offered at a temple), and some public festivals routinely included sacrifices and public meals.[16] One did not have to be a priest to make a sacrifice—anyone could sacrifice their own offering.[17] It was also rare for an animal to be entirely burnt up in sacrifice.[18] This means that nearly any foodstuff, given the opportunity (which in some cases was simply a prayer in the home or with friends) could become an offering and that nearly all sacrifices were also eaten or drunk. Avoiding all association of food or drink with pagan expressions of piety would have been markedly difficult whether when sourcing food or eating outside one's own home.[19] Εἰδωλόθυτος, in other words, was ubiquitous rather than clearly limited to particular places and times—piety was grease to the empire's social wheels and food was then, as now, never far from any social event.

While idol food was ubiquitous the concern to avoid it was distinctly Jewish. Jewish avoidance of gentile meat (for multiple reasons) is well-known, but the wide range of configurations leading to the connection of foodstuffs with pagan piety is what lies behind the existence of Jewish *kashrut* wine, and possibly behind Jewish communities' concern over

[16] It is true, as Rudolph, *Jew*, 95, notes, that the home was 'not a place that people visited in order to worship', but neither is it true that the dining facilities we have evidence of in Corinth were clearly 'visited in order to worship'. While one could visit a temple primarily to worship and visit a home primarily for some other purpose, the point is rather than all such purposes were intertwined: a visit for worship could also entail social connections, and a visit to a home could also entail acts of piety. While 'Paul had to draw the line somewhere between idolatrous and non-idolatrous behavior' (95), his line is not the same as other evidenced Jewish positions: avoiding all idolatrous association.

[17] Beard, et al, *Religions*: *Vol. 2*, 152, citing Cato, *Agr*. 141, who details rituals performed on a household estate. The *paterfamilias* was responsible for the piety of his household, focused on the *lararium* (cf. Beard, et al, 30, 102).

[18] That is, in Graeco-Roman practice. Philo, *Spec.* I.194–256; *Sacr.* 110, points to the predominance of 'whole burnt-offerings' in the Jewish sacrificial system as a point of superiority and distinction between them and Greek sacrifices. Although the Graeco-Roman sacrificial systems included holocaust sacrifices, it seems they were far less common, and even a point of ridicule amongst some as a barbaric practice, cf. B. Bar-Kochva, *The Image of the Jews in Greek Literature: the Hellenistic Period* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2010), 24–30. The Jewish public offerings, such as the twice-daily burnt offerings, and the public offerings for festivals, were always holocausts. Individual offerings were not necessarily, and could be partially consumed. However, the limited evidence for such consumption portrays a banqueting practice typically confined to a family or those involved in the offering itself. Cf. M.–Z. Petropoulou, *Animal Sacrifice in Ancient Greek Religion, Judaism, and Christianity, 100 BC to AD 200* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 119–22, 180. As Petropoulou describes it, in Greek sacrifice the 'horizontal line, and mainly the aspect of the worshipper's relation to the community, is more manifest than the vertical line' (122).

[19] As Rives, *Religion*, 127, states of clubs or associations: 'Every meal shared by the members of an association, except in Judaean and Christian groups, also involved an offering to the gods, whether a full animal sacrifice or a simple libation. They were thus an inextricable bond between fellowship, group identity, and communal worship'.

oil from gentile sources: both were commonly offered as libations (possibly even during its production).[20] Paul's reference to Torah observance (9.19-21) and idol food's potential to cause offence to his fellow Jews (10.32) evidences that he is conscious of the relationship of Jewish practice to this topic and discussion. The relationship of this topic to Jewish dietary practice is also indicated by his instructions regarding food sold at the marketplace: if the discussion between Paul and the Corinthians is primarily concerned with temple attendance or participation in idolatry in general, this particular instruction is inexplicable.[21] The discussion is decidedly concerned with food, a concern that arises naturally if the topic is assumed by either Paul or the Corinthians to be related to Jewish dietary practices (which strenuously avoided association with idolatry in its dietary practices).[22] In other words, at the heart of the discussion going on is not *location* but *association,* which was familiar territory for Jewish communities. The necessary question to consider is not whether concern over idol food was intrinsically Jewish—it was—but where Paul's instructions fit within the evidenced

[20] Josephus, *A. J.* XII.119–0; *B. J.* II.591-2; *Vita* 74-6. Cf. also Jdt 10.5 and *m. Avodah Zarah* 2.6. On Jewish dietary practices in general, cf. 4.3.4 On dietary practices specifically related to the first command of the Decalogue and idolatry, cf. Tomson, *Law*, 151–86. The rationale behind prohibition of gentile oil is not entirely clear. The rabbinic comments in *m. Avod. Zar*. 2.6, which prohibit bread and milk produced without Jewish supervision indicate that some rabbis permitted gentile oil. S. B. Hoenig, 'Oil and Pagan Defilement', *JQR* 61 (1970), 63–75 (64–66, 72), argues that the use of oil in both Jewish and non-Jewish sacred rites was enough to cause concern over oil's potential idolatrous association. J. D. Rosenblum, 'Kosher Olive Oil in Antiquity Reconsidered', *JSJ* 40 (2009), 356–65 (362) disagrees that idolatry is the primary concern since oil does not appear as a primary subject in tractates on idolatry. Either way, the rabbinic comments make clear that the use of gentile oil was debated, and its prohibition was the position of some ancient Jews, but not all (359). In the absence of a clearly-stated rationale, and the mention of oil alongside foods associated with idolatry in the tractate it is plausible that some idolatrous association was perceived, if unexplained. Cf. *b. Avod. Zar*. 36b; Tomson, *Law,* 168–71.

[21] Tomson, *Law,* reads chs8–10 as corresponding to later halakha regarding idol food. He compares Paul's instructions to *m. Avod. Zar.* 3.4 where Rabbi Gamaliel explains his practice of bathing in a bathhouse with a statue of Aphrodite present. Gamaliel explains that the primary purpose of the space is not idolatry, and the actions of the pagans demonstrate that this is not their intention regarding the statue. Although Paul does prohibit their participation in temple meals in these circumstances, he does not give a blanket prohibition against their presence in such dedicated pagan spaces. V. Gäckle, *Die Starken und die Schwachen in Korinth und in Rom* (WUNT; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2004), 167, notes Paul's prohibitions are particular to the situation at hand. It is telling that Tomson, 196, must describe 8.10 as 'clearly rhetorical'. Paul is concerned to avoid idolatry, but he avoids identifying idolatry with specific practices or spaces.

[22] There was variety in practice amongst Jews, and it is possible that some regularly partook of idol food. Fredriksen, *Apostle*, 69, argues that eating idol food was regular practice for many: '*For all we know*, Paul's own flexibility on this point when advising Christ-following gentiles in Corinth and in Rome reflected a *standing diaspora Jewish practice*: go ahead and eat, unless it alienates someone else within the community'. Rudolph, *Jew*, 101, similarly asks 'how is it known that mainstream Jews never ate indeterminate food from the *macellum*'? It is certainly possible that many Jews did eat such food, but there is no evidence of this as a standing practice outside of Paul's writings. Instead, there is evidence of concern throughout the diaspora to avoid idol food (cf. 4.3.4 above for some examples). Even if many Jews regularly ate such food, the distinction must again be made between toleration (or simple incidence) and authoritative permission of the kind that Paul gives as a leader in the community. All other extant instruction in ancient Judaism is instead focused on careful avoidance of idol food (a possible exclusion to this being the second-hand report of the 'allegorizers' in Philo, *Migr.* 89–93). The fact remains that if there were such practices, we have no evidence for it, and it goes against the evidence which we do have of Jewish concerns in this regard.

patterns of Jewish practice concerning idol food. Does Paul prohibit or permit its consumption and why or why not? If he views this topic as related to Jewish practice, and he has argued against gentile Judaizing elsewhere, why does he seem to advise that they adopt some Jewish practices here?

5.2.2 Identity of 'the knowledgeable' and 'the weak'

The identity of the two parties labelled in this section as 'knowledgeable' and 'weak' is also significant for interpretation. Several factors are relatively clear regarding the weak. According to 8.7, they are a group characterised by a custom of eating idol food *as* idol food—in other words, up until this point (ἕως ἄρτι) they fit the common profile of someone accustomed to regularly partaking in such foodstuffs in line with typical Graeco-Roman social and cultic practice.[23] Further, it seems that it is a custom to which Paul imagines they could easily revert, perhaps indicating strong social ties to the larger community which use of idol food would have reinforced.[24] While it is more tenuous than the information in 8.7–13, Paul's move from the ἄνομος category directly to 'weak' in 9.21–22 reinforces the description so far of the 'weak' as those from a pagan background. The appellation given by Paul, though, emphasises the vulnerability of this group, a vulnerability due to their lack of knowledge. The 'weak' are not set in opposition to strength, but to knowledge, a point to be addressed further.[25]

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[23] M. D. Nanos, 'The Polytheist Identity of the "Weak" and Paul's Strategy to "Gain" Them: A New Reading of 1 Corinthians 8:1-11:1', in *Reading Corinthians and Philippians Within Judaism: Collected Essays of Mark D. Nanos*, vol. 4 (Eugene: Cascade Books, 2017), 3–35 (14), argues that the weak are unbelievers. Nanos reads ἀδελφός as the language of 'fictive kinship', but there is no other Pauline usage of this term for an unbeliever. His view also cannot account for Paul's statement that the weak eat idol food as to idols ἕως ἄρτι. Tomson, *Law,* 194–5, suggests that the 'weak' are those physically weak or delicate, as found in rabbinic discussions of physical health and diet; this does not, however, adequately explain the text's selection of knowledge as the contrast to weakness.

[24] Some have cast the weak as a Jewish contingent, but it is hard to imagine such a group partaking in idolatry regularly as συνήθεια implies. Cf. C. K. Barrett, *A Commentary on the First Epistle to the Corinthians* (BNTC; London: A & C Black, 1968), 188, 194, who argues that the week are gentiles, but under the influence of Jewish teaching. Another influential identification is that of G. Theissen, *The Social Setting of Pauline Christianity: Essays on Corinth* (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1982), 121–43, which identifies the groups along socio-economic lines. Although there is much that is appealing about this interpretation and that may be incidentally correct, it is not the focus of Paul's instruction and is also debatable historically. Theissen theorises that the 'strong' are those of more elite status, with the purchasing power to buy meat, and who have more at risk in missing such meals. However, it could be argued that the wealthy could have afforded meat to eat at home, whilst ceremonial meals may have been the only access to meat for those with lower economic means (and hence could be those arguing for its consumption). Stereotypes about restricted access to meat have been challenged by J. J. Meggitt, *Paul, Poverty, and Survival* (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1998), 107–12. As mentioned, while the mention of κρέας in 8.13 may indicate that this is the primary food in mind, εἰδωλόθυτα covered a wide range of foodstuffs, and it is thus best to avoid an interpretation which puts too much weight on the cost of meat in particular.

[25] The weak are only discussed indirectly by Paul, a fact which has given rise to theories about their role and even existence. Hurd, *Origin*, 123–31 argues that the 'weak' party is 'hypothetical' (125) and a front for Paul's

Those with knowledge,[26] on the other hand, are more difficult to identify. To begin with, it is widely agreed that Paul quotes the knowledgeable, but where the quotations begin and end are debated and thus it is not clear where we have a reliable description or source of information for their views. Based on statements which most scholars agree are sourced in the knowledgeable's own statements, it seems that they have presented themselves as those with 'knowledge' (8.1, 4) and that they have introduced the topic with the word εἰδωλόθυτα.[27] Many scholars consider portions of 8.4–6 to be from the knowledgeable—or at least material which they and Paul agreed upon—in which case they have a well-developed argument against idols along monotheistic lines. Clearly this group has established a level of distantiation from Graeco-Roman piety which the weak have not.[28] The likely means by which this has been achieved is either a highly-assimilated Jewish tradition or a philosophical influence.[29] Although the former cannot be ruled out completely, the latter is more likely for several reasons. Although similar monotheistic minimising of idolatry existed within Hellenistic Judaism, the use of such rhetoric to permit the consumption of idol food would be unprecedented in the extant literature.[30] In contrast, Stoic traditions which criticised irrational piety still promoted participation in its traditional forms as an element of the καθήκοντα. The

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true position (followed by Gooch, *Food,* 66). However, this is speculative with no other textual markers for such a reconstruction, and it does not sit easily with the ways in which the text portrays the knowledgeable favourably. The lack of direct address of the weak is likely explained by other factors, such as Paul's choice to respond to the group which has raised the question or which he views as the more significant group.

[26] The language of 'strong' is often imported in the literature from Rom 15.1, where a group is οἱ δυνατοί.

[27] They could have learned this word from Paul or others within the assembly, so this alone is not terribly informative. Cheung, *Idol Food*, 38, argues that it is difficult to imagine that this is the first time this topic has been addressed by Paul with this predominantly gentile assembly. He also,153, concludes that the topic resurfaces because the Corinthians found Paul's previous instructions impractical. However, Paul does not refer to previous instructions, which he often does elsewhere, and is more diplomatic than one would expect under such circumstances—it seems possible that Paul had not directly addressed this specific issue before. Perhaps it arises at this point because of disputes about how to interpret his previous letter's instructions about associating with evildoers (5.9–11). The fact that it almost certainly would have occurred to Paul to prohibit idol food, as Cheung notes, and yet there is no evidence that he did prior to this point supports the interpretation that he is not opposed to the knowledgeable's position as far as it goes, and that they perhaps even derive their position from his previous teaching.

[28] Noted by Willis, 'Retrospective', 112: 'those desiring to eat the meat must be assumed to have a view that actually minimizes the "religious" significance of their prior eating'.

[29] E. Wasserman notes, '"An Idol Is Nothing in the World" (1 Cor 8:4): The Metaphysical Contradictions of 1 Corinthians 8:1-11:1 in the Context of Jewish Idolatry Polemics', in *Portraits of Jesus: Studies in Christology* (ed. S. E. Myers; WUNT; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2012), 201–28, that the portrayal of idols in 8.4–6 is strongly consonant with other Jewish statements, as is the description of the idols as mere images whilst also demonic. Cf. E. Wasserman, *Apocalypse as Holy War: Divine Politics and Polemics in the Letters of Paul* (New Haven, Yale University Press, 2018), 151–2. Contra Wasserman, his portrayal of idols as mere images does not necessarily mean that 'Paul quite consistently maintains that they pose no threat to Israel's deity' (151), as 10.21–22 demonstrates. R. A. Horsley, 'Consciousness and Freedom among the Corinthians: 1 Corinthians 8-10', *CBQ* 40 (Oct 1978), 574–89; 'Gnosis in Corinth: 1 Corinthians 8.1-6', *NTS* 27 (Oct 1980), 32–51, identified the knowledgeable's background as 'Hellenistic Judaism' based on similarities with *Wisdom of Solomon* and Philo.

[30] As noted by Cheung, *Idol Food*, 119.

group's comfort level with temple activities and the philosophical undercurrents throughout the letter support this identification.

Excursus: Stoic motifs throughout the letter

Chapters 1–2 indicate that at the heart of Paul's communication with the Corinthians is a debate over the nature of σοφία.[31] His concern over their preoccupation with wisdom implies that some of them are likely familiar with aspects of Hellenistic philosophy.[32] In ch4, Paul mocks the Corinthians' self-perception—to his mind, they view themselves as already filled, rich and reigning. Similar descriptions of the Stoic wise man are common – by virtue and self-mastery, the wise have transferred power and authority to themselves so that they are subject to no one and nothing.[33] By portraying the Corinthians' self-perception as Stoic wise men, Paul probably hints at what their ideals might be and derides their attainment of them. As stated earlier, the πάντα μοι ἔξεστιν of 6.12 is typically ascribed to the Corinthians, and the emphasis on ἐξουσία (a cognate of ἔξεστι) is resonant with Stoic ethical reasoning.[34] The categorisation of sexual activity as an ἀδιάφορον by the Corinthians could explain the bewildering combination in the community of incest, use of sex workers, and celibacy.[35]

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[31] For discussion of the history of interpretation of this topic within the Corinthian historical context, cf. T. A. Brookins, *Corinthian Wisdom, Stoic Philosophy, and the Ancient Economy* (SNTSMS; Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 2014), 1–6. Brookins argues that Stoicism is the particular 'wisdom' of the Corinthians and can explain their positions, the '*pattern* of issues found throughout the letter as a *whole*' (7). He gives a helpful survey of five 'topical domains' in the letter in comparison to Stoicism in pp159–85, demonstrating the resonance throughout. G. H. van Kooten, 'Rhetorical Competition within the Christian community at Corinth: Paul and the Sophists', in *Cults, Creeds and Identities in the Greek City After the Classical Age* (eds. R. Alston, O. M. van Nijf, and C. G Williamson; Leuven: Peeters, 2013), 261–88 points to the similarities between Paul's portrayal of the Corinthians and those critiquing the sophists of the first century. These critiques constructed an antithesis between sophism as a performance and philosophy as an ethical way of life (cf. Dio Chrysostom, *Virt. (Or. 8)* 15–16; *Dei cogn.* 5; *Alex.* 39; *Cel. Phryg.* 8–10, which van Kooten cites amongst others). Paul's portrayal of himself as one enduring hardships (1 Cor 4.9–13) stands in contrast to the Corinthians, and his recognition of the critique of his rhetorical skills (2 Cor 10.10) evidences this backdrop as well. As van Kooten comments, 'It is important to note that Paul does not portray the gospel as anti-philosophical, as is often assumed, but that he constructs an opposition between the gospel and the sophists…' (283). The purported antithesis between philosophy and sophistry, though, was a fluid polemic and while there could be deep-seated suspicions on either side many figures would have been educated in and familiar with both. Thus, the possibility of sophistic activity at Corinth (or Paul's portrayal of such) does not preclude a Stoic context for their arguments and behaviour. Cf. G. W. Bowersock, *Greek Sophists in the Roman Empire* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1969), 11–12, 59–75; T. Whitmarsh, *The Second Sophistic*. Greece & Rome: New Surveys the Classics No. 35 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 15–19. Also cf. B. W. Winter, *Philo and Paul Among the Sophists: Alexandrian and Corinthians Responses to a Julio-Claudian Movement*, 2d ed. (Cambridge: Eerdmans, 2002), 109–237.

[32] As E. Adams, *Constructing the World: A Study in Paul's Cosmological Language* (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 2000), 85, notes, most of the contention between Paul and the Corinthians is caused by 'weak boundaries' socially and ideologically with the society around them. This could include Hellenistic philosophical schools, even if only at a popular level.

[33] Cf. 2.7.7 on self-mastery. Cf. DL VII.122, Epictetus, *Diatr.* III.22.49, IV.1.113–22, Cicero, *Fin.* III.75, IV.7, 74; *SVF* III.332 (*apud* Clement of Alexandria's *Strom*); Stobaeus, *Ecl.* II.7. 11i, 11m.

[34] Brookins, *Wisdom*, 175, notes the especially close similarity to a discourse by Dio Chrysostom on Stoic notions of freedom, *1 Serv. lib.* 18; cf. DL VII.125.

[35] As noted by Brookins, *Wisdom*, 177. W. Deming, *Paul on Marriage and Celibacy: The Hellenistic Background of 1 Corinthians 7* (SNTSMS; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995) illuminates the variety of positions on the advisability of marriage within Stoicism which was possible because it was a neutral intermediate. Those leaning towards the Cynic side of the tradition often found occasion to promote celibacy for the philosophical life.

Paul's rejoinder that the wise man's use of externals should lead to freedom also vividly echoes Stoic teaching,[36] so that both the Corinthians' statement in 6.12 and his reply appeal along Stoic lines.

On the first topic presumably raised by the Corinthians—celibacy—Paul has treated the issues (celibacy both within and outside marriage and the married state) as ἀδιάφορα (in debate with their description of it as καλόν, which may present it as participating in virtue, 7.1). Paul's categorisation of celibacy as ἀδιάφορον is evidenced in several ways. While he states his own preference for celibacy (7.7, 8, 26, 38, 40)[37] he also clarifies several times that those who select another option are not in error (7.9, 28, 36). In other words, celibacy and marriage are not clearly virtue or vice, but part of a range of options which one was free to select amongst (while he maintains a preference).[38] The chapter reiterates in myriad ways that the believer's status as married or celibate does not prohibit him or her from serving the Lord – no one in the assembly needs to avoid marriage if desired (v9, 28, 36, 39), nor leave an unbelieving partner (vv12–16), nor dissolve a marriage (v27), nor seek marriage (vv27, 38, 40). The conclusion that it is good to continue as they were (vv20, 26) is arrived at not because remaining is *itself* a good but because all such states were neutral.

On the *topos* of celibacy, Paul draws an analogy to other statuses: circumcision, uncircumcision, slavery, and freedom. In giving these analogies, he states this ἀδιάφορα-categorisation in his most-explicit fashion—ἡ περιτομὴ οὐδέν ἐστιν, καὶ ἡ ἀκροβυστία οὐδέν ἐστιν echoes the Stoic labelling of the ἀδιάφορα as 'nothing'.[39] Paul's language reflects the ἀδιάφορα category, and this is confirmed by his concern that they avoid the *pursuit of these states themselves*. Paul's instructions are that they must preserve self-restraint (vv5, 9) and their ἐξουσία (v37), and avoid enslavement (v15, 23)—his aim is to secure their advantage (σύμφορος) (v35) through undistracted service (v32).[40] In other words, Paul wants to persuade the Corinthians of the neutrality of these extensional activities and statuses (celibacy, marriage, circumcision, uncircumcision, slavery, freedom), but also of the significance of their intensional state in relation to them.[41] Their intensional freedom or slavery is not

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[36] DL VII.122 gives the definition of freedom: εἶναι γὰρ τὴν ἐλευθερίαν ἐξουσίαν αὐτοπραγίας, which is similar to Dio Chrys., *1 Serv. lib*. 18: Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὴν ἐλευθερίαν χρὴ λέγειν ἐπιστήμην τῶν ἐφειμήνων καὶ τῶν κεκωλυμένων, τὴν δὲ δουλείαν ἄγνοιαν ὧν τε ἔξεστι καὶ ὧν μη, and Epictetus, *Diatr.*, I.1.21; II.1.23.

[37] Paul similarly indicates a preference for freedom in v21c–d whilst stressing the neutrality of all statuses. This feature of Paul's reasoning in this chapter is noted by van Kooten, 'Paul's Stoic Onto-Theology', who says that Paul's argument here displays 'profound similarities with the Stoic views regarding the so-called ἀδιάφορα' (153).

[38] The only 'option' Paul considers a vice is πορνεία, which is indirectly related to marriage in the discussion (i.e. indefinite celibacy within marriage is likely to lead to ἀκρασία and thus vice) but he does not directly address it here.

[39] Cf. 2.5.1.2; Deming, *Marriage*, 116, is also of the opinion that Paul's rare use of ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ in 7.3, 4, is evidence of Stoic influence. A cursory glance at Arius Didymus' ethical section in Stobaeus, *Ecl.* reveals at least eight instances of the exact same phrase (II.7.5d; 5e; 5f; 6f; 7d; 7g; 8a; 11f; 11m), and there is a similar usage in Epictetus, *Diatr.*, IV.11.5 (cf. *Diatr.* III.24.35, III.25.10, IV.4.6, IV. 9.4).

[40] His concern is the lack of reserve in seeking any particular state (i.e. the intensional disposition), as indicated by: μέλω (v21), ζητέω (v27, 2xs), ἀμέριμνος (v32), μεριμνάω (vv32, 33, 34 2xs), ἀρέσκω (vv32, 33, 34), ἀπερίσπαστος (v35). Deming, *Marriage*, 202, highlights the rare ἀπερίσπαστος, calling it a 'Stoic watchword'. Cf. Epictetus, *Diatr.*, I.29.59; II.21.22; III.22.69 (here on marriage); M. Aur. *Med.* III.6.2.

[41] As van Kooten, 'Paul's Stoic Onto-Theology', 157, says of this text, 'Paul's… intention seems to be for the Corinthians, regardless of whether they are convinced by his preferential reason, to become aware of the attitudes they adopt towards the things that are ἀδιάφορα. This is exactly the point the Stoic ἀδιάφορα address'.

dependent on their legal status (vv20–3), a possibility emphasised by a representative list of extensional activities and mismatched intensional dispositions (vv29–31).[42] Thus Paul has treats the status of celibacy (and others) as an ἀδιάφορον, states a preference whilst maintaining the legitimacy of various selections, and promotes the significance of their intensional state in relation to such selections.

Later in the letter Paul urges diversity within unity, advocates a hierarchy of gifts based on their advantage (σύμφορος), and argues for the superiority ability of love to bring such advantage (12.1–14.40). Paul's use of the body metaphor in 12.12–31 emphasises acceptance of diverse gifting and activities within the group. He encourages the believers to view themselves as a divinely-managed whole and to understand that any particular status, gift or role must be evaluated and used in a way which brings advantage to all. Smit, in a rhetorical analysis of 1 Cor 12–14, comments that 'The reasoning of this section entirely hinges on the criterion of utility' (σύμφορος), the theme first given in the slogan of 6.12 and repeated in 10.23.[43] Paul's discussion of πνευματικά also gives priority based on advantage (especially in 14.1–40). Ch13 states the insufficiency of any pneumatic activities unless accompanied by an intensional state described as τέλειον. Paul states that these activities are insufficient on their own, in similar fashion to the need of καθηκόντα to be perfected by virtuous dispositions into the κατορθώματα. Without the necessary first-order goods (13.8–10), such activities give no benefit (13.3).[44]

From the beginning of this letter, it is clear that elements of philosophy are contested territory for Paul and his correspondents. Paul contends, on numerous topics of ethical behaviour, that their categorisation of particular selections or activities as ἀδιάφορα is underdeveloped and deficient, if not necessarily incorrect (although at points he also argues that a particular categorisation is faulty, such as 6.13, 7.1). Throughout his instructions, he demonstrates his concern that they grasp the necessity of the proper intensional disposition and that they assess any status or activity in a way that secures advantage for all. Advantage and benefit, in turn, are associated with pleasing the Lord, using oneself and any activities 'for the Lord', and with the language of the τέλος.

Those labelled as 'weak', then, are gentile Jesus-believers accustomed by their former practice to eat idol food as a form of piety to traditional deities. The 'knowledgeable' are likewise probably gentile Jesus-believers, whose practice was also to partake of idol food, but who had developed a level of distantiation from such practices under the influence of Stoic philosophy. Such practices, classified as καθήκοντα, had already been conceived as extensional activities potentially distinct from the agent's intensional disposition.[45] The direct

[42] Cf. Wimbush, *Ascetic,* 37–8; Braun, 'Indifferenz', 159–61; Adams, *Constructing,*130–1.
[43] J. Smit, 'Argument and Genre of 1 Corinthians 12-14', in *Rhetoric and the New Testament: Essays from the 1992 Heidelberg Conference* (eds. S. E. Porter and T. H. Olbricht; JSNTSup; Sheffield, JSOT Press: 1993), 211–30 (225). Cf. 1 Cor 12.7 and the related usages of ὠφελέω in 13.3, 14.6. Smit argues that the use of οἰκοδομή throughout is connected to this theme. Cf. *Rhet. Her.* III.2.3; Aristotle, *Rhet.* I.3.5.
[44] Cf. 2.5.2.2 above.
[45] Cf. 2.5.2.3.

identification of particular activities with accompanying intensional states would likely be seen by the 'knowledgeable' as uneducated. They may suspect Paul of harbouring such an identification on this topic (i.e. that partaking of idol food was identified as idolatry and the food itself ontologically vicious), given widespread stereotypes of Jewish practices. They offer a carefully-constructed position to defend their practice.

5.2.3 The knowledge of 'the knowledgeable' concerning idol food

There are indications that one feature of the 'knowledge' which some of the Corinthians claim is that idol food is an ἀδιάφορον. As he has throughout the letter, Paul confirms the neutral categorisation of such an extensional activity, but counters that this knowledge alone is insufficient and that the 'knowledgeable' are still failing to assess such selections correctly. As mentioned, there is considerable debate over the precise limits of Paul's quotations of the Corinthians, but there is consensus that 8.4 is primarily material from the Corinthians and that vv5-6 contain either quotations or Paul's summary of their position, a summary which may also cite other traditions.[46] Succinctly stated, this 'knowledge' is that idols are οὐδέν since there is only one God. For these believers, there is one God, out of whom are all things and to whom the believers are, and there is one Lord, through whom are all things and through whom the believers are.

The description of the idols as 'nothing' is a clear reference to an ἀδιάφορα-categorisation of the idols. Here it is presented as the logical conclusion based on the belief that there is one God and one Lord. The construction resonates with other ancient Jewish statements which, as the word εἴδωλον itself did, play on the tension between the existence of other gods within some spheres and their lack of ontological existence against the backdrop of monotheism.[47] Paul agrees with the knowledgeable on the ἀδιάφορα-status of the idols

[46] On the debate, cf. Thiselton, *Corinthians*, 628–32.

[47] Wasserman, 'An Idol is Nothing', draws parallels in particular to Deut 32, Jer 10, Isa 40-48. J. D. G. Dunn, *Christology in the Making: A New Testament Inquiry into the Origins of the Doctrine of the Incarnation*, 2 ed. (London: SCM Press, 2003), 179, 329, notes the similarity to Stoic doxologies, referencing Seneca, *Ep*. LXV.8; M. Aur. *Med.* IV.23. Cf. R. Bultmann, *Theology of the New Testament*, vol. 1 (trans. K. Grobel; New York: Scribner's, 1951), 70–2; A. Schweitzer, *The Mysticism of Paul the Apostle* (trans. W. Montgomery; London: Adam & Charles Black, 1967); E. Norden, *Agnostos Theos: Untersuchungen zur Formengeschichte religiöser Rede* (Leipzig: Reubner, 1923), 240–2. Dunn concludes that it is Paul's own construction, although containing pre-Pauline elements (namely, the *Shema* [Deut 6.4] and the 'splitting' of creative power between God and Wisdom in second-temple Judaism). W. Hill, *Paul and the Trinity: Persons, Relations, and the Pauline Letters* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2015), 64–6, argues Paul's construction here does not simply 'add' Christ to the *Shema*, but identifies Christ as the referent of the κύριος in the *Shema.* Further, the one God, which Paul says includes 'God the Father' and the 'Lord Jesus Christ', is then 'placed on the side of divinity in a contrast' (ἀλλά) all the so-called gods (65). At the same time, Hill notes that Christ remains 'recognizably distinct' from God the Father. Cf. N. T. Wright, *The Climax of the Covenant: Christ and the Law in Pauline Theology* (London: T & T

(and idol food), as indicated by his restatement of this position with apparent approval here and by his later remarks (8.8; 10.19). Paul feels no need to modify the fundamental components of this position; he does not indicate that he disagrees with this content of the 'knowledge' which they claim and from which they derive their authority to eat idol food. Paul's concern is not that this knowledge is technically incorrect but that they failed to take into account other crucial components which render the ἀδιάφορα-status inconsequential in the circumstances at hand.

Paul's approval of this position, as far as it goes, is confirmed by several other elements of the text. First, in v7 he makes a connection between a lack of this knowledge and the other group's 'weak' epistemological state: it has been corrupted by their customs but their failure to recognise that idols (and their food) are nothing is not portrayed positively. Further, while Paul disputes that the knowledgeable have correctly understood and applied the authority they claim, he does not exactly deny such authority. He is concerned that they evaluate their selections more carefully, but he seems to agree that their position, as thus stated and as far as it goes (i.e. as a general rule), grants them this power and authority. His reference to their ἐξουσία in v9 indicates this, and the discussion of his own ἐξουσία in ch9 (vv4, 5, 6, 12, 18) would only be applicable as an example if their ἐξουσία was also legitimate. If the Corinthians are arguing, based on their theology, that the practice of eating idol food can be categorised as neutral and that, within this categorisation, they have authority to select this practice, their position may be that the practice is part of their

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Clark, 1991), 125–35. As O. McFarland, 'Divine Causations and Prepositional Metaphysics in Philo of Alexandria and the Apostle Paul', in *Paul and the Greco-Roman Philosophical Tradition* (eds. J. R. Dodson and A. W. Pitts; London: T & T Clark, 2017), 117–33 (118–19), comments, there has been a perpetual worry that Paul's use of prepositions in this verse creates problems for traditional Christology. He concludes, 130, that Paul's use of Platonic 'prepositional metaphysics' assigns Christ an intermediary role that is, nonetheless, identified with divine causation. McFarland's argument draws on the work of G. E. Sterling, 'Prepositional Metaphysics in Jewish Wisdom Speculation and Early Christological Hymns', *SPhiloA* 9 (1997), 219–38. Contra Sterling, though, there is no need to conclude that Paul's prepositions here reference a Platonic 'instrumental' cause of Christ. In Stoicism, διά can also be used of the *single* cause of divine reason, who is both father of all generally, and has a 'part of him' that extends through to all, cf. DL VII.147; Marc. Aur. *Med*. IV.23. Seneca, *Ep.* LXV.2 explains that in Stoicism prepositions did not describe numerous causes as they did in the Academy or Peripatetic school—all the prepositions describe the same, single cause. The Stoics argued that the universe was sourced in only two things: matter and a (single) cause, identified as divine reason, described as that by which all is made (*a quo fiat*, *quod facit*), the craftsman of the universe (*artifex mundi)*, a leader surrounded, and a guide followed, by matter (*quae circumfuse rectorem secuntur et ducem*). Seneca concludes with a reminder of the functional hierarchy that existed even within their pantheistic system: that which makes is more powerful and valuable than that which is made (*Ep.* LXV.24). Paul's formulation here is compressed, likely combining elements which he and the Corinthians already know. Paul utilises the framework of multiple descriptions of power and title within both the *Shema*, and Stoic accounts of the single cause, to construct (or affirm) the inclusion of Christ in the 'one God' while maintaining distinction. The functional hierarchy reinforced Paul's non-pantheistic hierarchy between creator and created.

καθήκοντα. Paul's acknowledgement of the legitimacy of their ἐξουσία, coupled with his own example of an ἐξουσία and 'well-reasoned' defence of a practice (which is then to be deselected) in ch9 lends support to this possibility. His example assumes that their position and practice is likewise defensible as a general rule (although his concern is to persuade them not to select it under the circumstances).

Since Paul affirms the basic content of their 'knowledge', it is a possibility that the 'knowledgeable' draw upon Paul's previous teaching to formulate their position. As mentioned, Paul's arguments elsewhere for the ἀδιάφορα-status of gentile (and Jewish) customs could possibly have led to the slogan of 6.12 and 10.23 (πάντα ἔξεστιν). It should further be noticed that this slogan is consonant with the statement of v6 that πάντα is ἐξ God the father and διά Jesus Christ. If Paul has taught this monotheistic theology to the Corinthians, or at least holds it in common with them, the Corinthians' position that they are able to 'do all things' derives some force from this shared theology. The slogan's reference to this shared theology, and the potential connection to Paul's own teaching, may explain Paul's reticence to denounce it outright, despite his desire to significantly augment it. The monotheistic basis for the neutralising of such practices is evidenced in Paul's thought in Rom 3.29–30, and similar teaching could lie behind the Corinthians' 'knowledge' and position here. That Paul begins by dressing down their use of such knowledge—it is not as one 'ought to know'—is a reassertion of his apostolic authority and a fitting preamble to continuing instruction.

At the opening of this section on idol food, the 'knowledge' which the Corinthians claim is that their theology provides the basis (perhaps as taught by Paul) for assigning ἀδιάφορα-status to idols and their foods. They believe that this neutral status gives them the authority to select the practice of eating idol food as part of a general ability to 'do all things' since 'all things' are from God and through Christ. As will be discussed below, throughout this section Paul agrees with and carefully maintains the neutrality of idol food and their ability to 'do all things' as a general rule, provisos notwithstanding. His endorsement of the food's neutrality alongside the prohibitions he administers regarding its use has caused considerable confusion in the interpretation of this text.

5.2.4 The weakness of the συνείδησις *of 'the weak'*

Those without knowledge are not labelled by Paul as ignorant or foolish, but as ἀσθενής, a choice which is explicated by Stoic theory. Knowledge (expertise, ἐπιστήμη) was

characterised in Stoic epistemology not only by its truthfulness but by the steadfast (ἀσφαλής), firm (βέβαιος), and unchanging (ἀμετάπτωτος) manner in which the wise held it.[48] Zeno's illustration of the development of knowledge ended with one hand tightly grasping the other, held as a fist grasping an impression.[49] With such a characterisation of knowledge, it followed that epistemological error was often characterised as weakness.

Stoic epistemology argued that mere cognition, or grasping of impressions, was insufficient alone to build knowledge—the further required factors were described with the language of strength and their lack with the language of weakness. Weakness could be attributed to problems at various points in the epistemological process. Opportunities for weakness to develop included 1) assenting to a non-'kataleptic' impression, 2) assenting to a patently false impression, and 3) assenting non-securely to a 'kataleptic' impression (i.e. not assenting and acting further upon it in the steadfast, firm, unchanging manner of the wise).[50] Paul's specific statement is that it is this group's συνείδησις that is 'weak'.

Excursus: defining συνείδησις

In Stoic epistemology, impressions includes perceptions (αἴσθησις). Depending on whether rationality was available or mature in the perceiving animal, these perceptions could function at varying levels of cognition.[51] They could involve conceptualisation, but did not necessarily do so (as in the case of animals and pre-rational infants).[52] One particular perception plays a pivotal role in Stoic theory: self-perception. In a few Stoic texts, συνείδησις refers to this self-perception.

[48] Cf. 2.2.1. Sextus Empiricus, *Math.* VII.150–53=*Log.* I.150–53; DL VII.47; Cicero, *Acad. pr.* I.42.
[49] Cicero, *Acad. post.* II.145. Cf. LS1, 256–7.
[50] LS1, 258: '"Weakness" denotes the insecurity, instability and inconsistency of the inferior man's mental state, and seems to cover the following cases…' Cf. Stobaeus, *Ecl.* II.7.5b, 10; Sextus Empiricus, *Math.* VII.157, 247=Log. I.157, 247=*SVF* II.90; Plutarch, *Stoic rep.* 1056E–1057B; Cicero, *Acad. pr.* I. 41; *Acad. post.* II.60. Stobaeus, *Ecl.* II.7.10, 10b, defines δόξα as assent to the non-kataleptic impression as well as 'weak' grasping so that there seems to be some overlap on the type of weakness which the common person could have. In other words, an opinion could *be* an opinion (and not knowledge) either because it was based on a non-'kataleptic' impression or because it was simply held unsurely (untested). The confusion is noted by LS1, 257–8; Annas 'Epistemology', 186.
[51] LS2, 251, 315, 318. From simple sensory activity to even, at one point, being listed as part of the ἡγεμονικόν.
[52] M. Frede, 'Stoics and Skeptics on Clear and Distinct Impression,' in *Essays in Ancient Philosophy* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987), 151–76 (154–59).

Συνείδησις has traversed much scholarly ground.[53] As a word whose usages appear overwhelmingly in Jewish and Christian texts, it is of interest primarily to those in biblical studies.[54] Furthermore, it is a particular favourite of Paul's (over half of the NT uses appear in his undisputed epistles), and over half of his uses are in 1 Cor 8–10 (8 in total in this section). Despite the amount of effort expended, there is still considerable uncertainty surrounded its meaning. Eckstein dispelled any notions of συνείδησις as a technical Stoic term, a consistent reference to 'inward pain' (Pierce's reading), or as a 'divine voice' with infallible moral authority. His analysis, focused on Paul's usage, defined it as an 'inner entity', a 'neutral anthropological mechanism' available to all, which took on the role of assessing the inner life in accordance with given norms.[55]

The more recent work by Bosman confirms many of these conclusions, but its comparison to Philo's use throws into relief the remarkably neutral role the term played in Paul's writings.[56] Philo is able to indicate a positive συνειδός by means of qualifiers, but this developing neutrality hinted at in Philo's usage is surprisingly established in Paul's usage.[57] The polluted συνείδησις of 1 Cor 8.7 is similar to the neutral uses in Philo: the supplied qualification hints at other, non-negative, possibilities. However, it is 'strikingly' passive, an oddity that only increases with the effects of the knowleadgeable's behaviour in 8.10.[58] The ability of the knowledgeable to impact the weak's συνείδησις without any reflexive awareness *of transgression* is described by Bosman as 'a use not found anywhere in Greek literature before Paul'.[59] Bosman's survey demonstrates that the term, without qualification, normally refers to self-consciousness of one's *own* transgression. This does not always fit the pattern of Paul's use, though; it is especially difficult to account for the ability of a συνείδησις to be 'activated by the conduct of another' in 10.27–9.[60] The previous uses also 'shed little light' on Paul's ability to appeal simply διὰ τὴν συνείδησιν, absent any further qualification, in 10.25, 28, 29.[61] The mismatch Bosman notes between Paul's pattern of use and Philo's reflects the difficulties other

[53] The most significant recent research is that of H.-J. Eckstein, *Der Begriff Syneidesis bei Paulus* (WUNT; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1983); and P. Bosman, *Conscience in Philo and Paul* (WUNT; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2003). Other significant work includes C. A. Pierce, *Conscience in the New Testament* (London: SCM Press, 1955); Sevenster, *Seneca*; J. Stelzenberger, *Syneidesis* (Paderborn: Schöningh, 1963); R. Jewett, *Paul's Anthropological Terms: A Study of Their Use in Conflict Settings* (Leiden: Brill, 1971); R. A. Horsley, 'Consciousness', 574–89.

[54] Although there are a few extant uses of the substantive that predate Philo and Paul, the substantival constructions are far more common in Jewish and early Christian writings than anywhere else per Bosman, *Conscience,* 61–3.

[55] Eckstein, *Syneidesis*, 311–13.

[56] Bosman traces the formation of the substantive out of the verbal phrase σύνοιδα + A + B ('I know something with someone/myself, i.e. both reflexively and non-reflexively), which is first extant in the 6th century BCE. This verbal construction from which the substantives arose, as Bosman explains, almost always describes the reflexive knowledge of a transgression. In Philo's use of συνειδός and in many of the early usages of *conscientia*, this negative assumption is still evident. In fact, its developing ability to function as a neutral entity is usually indicated by qualifying phrases or genitive constructions in these texts—in other words, without such a qualifier the reader would probably assume a knowledge of something negative. For Philo, a 'pure conscience' is an entity without knowledge of such transgression.

[57] Bosman, *Conscience,* 66.

[58] Bosman, *Conscience,* 11, 214.

[59] Bosman, *Conscience*, 216.

[60] Bosman, *Conscience,* 224.

[61] Bosman, *Conscience,* 221.

scholars have had with Paul's use, especially older readings which assumed an identification of συνείδησις with *conscientia*. Paul's simple appeal to it at points (such as ch10) seems to assume its crucial role, and perhaps some type of moral authority (a 'regulative principle'). However, his description of its 'corruption' qualifies any such authority it might have—its possession by a non-believer at 10.29 further complicates this notion. In short, despite the fact that there is not much to compare it with, Paul's use of συνείδησις doesn't quite align with most other uses: his use refers to a neutral, permanent anthropological entity rather than a consciousness arising out of a transgression. In even shorter form, it may be some type of consciousness, but it does not seem to be a consciousness 'of something bad'.[62]

Another possible use of the term, and alternate meaning, is hinted at in Stoic texts. Although it is not a technical Stoic term, there is modest evidence that συνείδησις could refer to self-perception (συναίσθησις).[63] The most prominent Stoic use of συνείδησις is found in the account of Diogenes Laertius on the *topos* of οἰκείωσις—Pohlenz found it so unexpected there he recommended it be amended to συναίσθησις despite the lack of textual variants. However, there is a small handful of other Stoic uses,[64] and slight evidence of an association of *sensus* (the Latin equivalent for αἴσθησις in Stoic texts) with *conscientia*.[65] Given that the substantival construction was relatively recent (rising precipitously in the 1st century BCE), perhaps there were several strands of development and use. As Bosman notes, the substantive provided new grammatical and conceptual possibilities for the consciousness of transgression to function as an 'independent, almost personified inner entity or component of the soul'.[66] It is possible that this neutral use, as a component of the soul, was adopted by some Stoics to refer to self-perception, a notion already ensconced in their theory.

In Diogenes Laertius' account, συνείδησις refers to self-perception as the basis of οἰκείωσις, a relationship discussed further in fragments from Hierocles. Hierocles states that at birth each living being perceives itself (αἰσθάνεται ἑαυτοῦ), a self-perception (συναίσθησις) which extends to all its parts, their uses, vulnerabilities and strengths.[67] Long describes this notion as analogous to the sense of

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[62] P. Bosman, 'Why Conscience Makes Cowards of Us All', *AC* 40 (1997), 63–75 (69).
[63] DL VII.85. Engberg-Pedersen, *Paul*, 376, comments that he agrees Paul's use is not '(overtly)… technical', but that his 'apparently *non*-technical use... may still, as it were, *come alive*' within a philosophical framework.
[64] M. Aur. *Med*. VI.30 (εὐσυνείδητος); Stobaeus, *Ecl.* II.7.5b7, 5c, 7d; Epictetus, *Diatr.* III.22.94: the Cynic's συνειδός gives him his ἐξουσία.
[65] *Sensus* is the basic sensory awareness of the living being, including the self-perception upon which οἰκείωσις is based, cf. Seneca, *Ep.* CXXI.9; Cicero, *Fin.* III.16; cf. Gill, *Self*, 38–43. *Conscientia* typically aligns in Seneca's usage with the strand of development we see in Philo: consciousness of transgression unless qualified. However, at *Ep.* XCVII.12–13 a *sensus* of good and a good *conscientia* seem related. Meanwhile, Pliny the Elder, *Nat.* VII.111; XXVIII.22; XXXIII.40; XXXVII.50, seems to be able to use *conscientia* in a very neutral sense, sometimes of knowing something of oneself, at others simply knowing of something, as *scientia,* noted by G. Molenaar, 'Seneca's Use of the Term "Conscientia"', *Mnemosyne* 22 (1969), 170–80 (170).
[66] Bosman, 'Cowards', 69.
[67] Long, 'Hierocles', 256, 260. Cf. the description of non-rational animals' self-awareness in Seneca, Ep. CXXI.9. This is not, it must be stated, a Cartesian sense of self as rational being conscious of mental states (thoughts, memories, etc.), or the subjective, private sense of self as the basis of epistemic certainty, let alone any kind of metaphysical or 'spiritual' sense of self. As Seneca (11) realises, they do not speak of an animal having awareness of a *definition* of their constitution, but only of their constitution itself. However, this is further clarified as the pre-rational understanding of animals and children; presumably this would develop into a perception capable of linguistic expression as rationality developed.

proprioception and defines it as a pre-conceptual, invariant 'disposition to monitor every part of itself as its own property and special concern' which accompanies all other perceptions (i.e. external impressions).[68] Discussing a description of the same process in Seneca, Martin describes this self-awareness slightly differently. He defines it as a rudimentary, inarticulate, but innate bodily self-comprehension that answers the question 'what kind of being am I?'.[69] Seneca elaborates that as a human's constitution changes through life (i.e. from boy to man), the basic fact of one's awareness of it and relationship to it remain the same.[70] As one developed rationality, such self-perception could also include conceptual, propositional content which developed into cognitions as the range of use for αἴσθησις demonstrates.[71]

As the basis of οἰκείωσις, a being's perception of itself was the basis for a relationship of affinity and belonging with itself, which then extended to discrimination and appropriation of objects, activities and people from the being's environment. As the basis of a 'programme of impulsive activity' implanted by and grounded in cosmic Nature, self-perception was an ineliminable capacity in epistemological and ethical development. It was not, however, an error-proof capacity. Arius states that 'what moves impulse is nothing other than an impulsive impression of what is fitting',[72] and the connections between οἰκείωσις, impulses more generally, and the καθήκοντα generally illustrate the way Nature's 'programme' was used to ground normal customs and practices.[73] On the other hand, Epictetus can explain thievery as an action arising out of the impulse and belief that something is 'fitting' for one.[74] Impulses are based on self-perception, but as perception arises out of impressions, it is possible that such perception could at points be susceptible to the same weaknesses to which any impression was susceptible. This, coupled with the potential for weakness and error in grasping the impressions of externals meant that sensing 'what kind of being I am' and 'what is fitting for me' was not straightforward by any means.

If συνείδησις could refer to the Stoic notion of self-perception, this reference would fit Paul's pattern of use. More specifically, it explains its features as a universally-available, permanent 'anthropological' entity and its neutrality, features which are not as evident and established in other uses of the substantive. Its ineliminability as an epistemological capacity could explain Paul's ability to appeal directly to it as an assumed crucial entity, and its susceptibility to various epistemological weaknesses can explain its fallibility, and subjection to higher norms.[75] Its role in Paul's texts as supportive of other norms, and simultaneously unable to function independently as one, generally matches the role of self-perception in Stoic theory: an entity implanted by Nature to facilitate appropriate impulses, yet subject to reason as the final arbiter of any impulse. His general usage, in

[68] Long, 'Hierocles', 260. Cf. LS2, 310–1; A. A. Long, 'Stoic Philosophers on Persons, Property-Ownership and Community', *Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies Supplements* Vol 41: Supp 68 (1997), 13–31 (25–6).
[69] Martin, 'Self-Consciousness', citing Seneca, *Ep.* CXXI.5–15.
[70] Seneca, *Ep*. CXXI.16.
[71] Frede, 'Impressions', 158, 166.
[72] Stobaeus, *Ecl.* II.7.9.
[73] Long, 'Logical Basis', 94, 98.
[74] Epictetus, *Diatr.* I.18.1–3; Cf. I.22.9–15; II.26.1–3; Stobaeus, *Ecl.* II.7.8a, 9.
[75] Such as eschatological judgement, 1 Cor 4.4.

other words, fits the notion of a neutral, even positive (in the sense of crucial) self-consciousness rather than specific 'consciousness of something bad'.

In this text, the particular corruption which likely contributes to the weakness of the συνείδησις in 8.7 is the συνήθεια of pagan piety. They lack the knowledge that idols are 'nothing' due to the practice of pagan piety and their sense of self has been weakened and corrupted by assent to a non-'kataleptic' impression (that idols are 'something'). They eat idol food *as* idol food, with the impression that eating such is to a real, beneficent being. Such a reconstruction is consonant with the ability of self-perception to accompany all other impressions (of one's parts and external realities). With such a self-perception operative, the impression of the knowledgeable eating food in the temple, then, will create an obstacle (here πρόσκομμα) to grasping accurately that impression (that the knowledgeable are not eating the food *as to* the idols). In such a weak state, operating with false impressions, they will fail to grasp accurately the action of the knowledgeable, and their self-perception would be 'built up' to eat idol food (*as to* the idols as real, beneficent beings), thus reinforcing their sense of self as one who receives benefit from idols. Such an action, in the accompanying weak epistemic state, would be destructive. As Long and Sedley explain of the καθήκοντα, 'Neutral through trustworthy in themselves, they acquire positive or negative epistemic status from the strength or weakness of the mind to which they belong'.[76] Finally, in v12 Paul characterises the selection of this activity, under such circumstances, by the knowledgeable not only as sin, but as 'striking' (τύπτω) this weak self-perception. If he is portraying the knowledgeable's activity as an impression received by the weak (and which is prevented from being grasped in all its features by their previous impressions), he perhaps chooses a word similar to τυπόω, used by the Stoics to discuss the way impressions were made. Paul's reconstruction in not strictly correct in the details in Stoic terms. Namely, the obstacle in Stoic accounts seems to have referred to the previous, non-'kataleptic' impression which later blocks the grasping of a 'kataleptic' impression, while his refers to the latter. Clearly, the language is slightly different too, with his use of πρόσκομμα and τύπτω. This could possibly be attributed to either Paul's lack of familiarity with the particular Stoic terminology or his own rhetorical aims—it's particular easy to imagine the selection of the more violent τύπτω to heighten the sense of destruction such an action would cause.[77]

The 'weakness' of the weak, then, is specifically an epistemological weakness, attributed to their self-perception shaped in part by the false impression that idols are 'something', in direct contrast to the 'knowledge' of the knowledgeable. Such self-perception then would not result in the authority to 'do all things' as it conflicts with the knowledge that 'all things' were from God and through Christ, and to eat idol food with such impressions

[76] LS1, 257.
[77] The word means to 'beat, strike, smite', but could refer to the striking of a coin, which overlaps with the 'imprinting' meaning of τυπόω. LSJ, s.v 'τυπόω', I.5.

operative would be destructive. This epistemological weakness lies behind most of the prohibitions Paul gives regarding idol food.

Paul assigns theological weight to this weak self-perception and self-perception of others more generally in his reasoning on this topic. This is explained by, first, the ineliminable role he conceives it to have in epistemology and, thus, the believers' orientation to Christ. The second reason the self-perception accrues such significance is that the Christ-orientation itself necessarily involves the self-perception of others in its aim to 'save many'. The συνείδησις, in general, as self-perception and a component of the epistemological process, is an ineliminable part of the intensional disposition Paul is concerned for the believers to cultivate: orientation to Christ. The weak state of the συνείδησις of some in the assembly is, although accommodated, a detrimental state Paul's larger efforts address.[78] It is due, in part, to their lack of knowledge, and it seems that 10.25–6, with its citation of Ps 23.1 LXX supplies the kind of knowledge, corresponding to 8.4–6, by which a 'strong' συνείδησις would operate. As stated earlier, the simple appeals of διὰ τὴν συνείδησιν in ch10 demonstrate its crucial role. Further, Paul's disbelief in 10.29 that *another's* συνείδησις would judge *his* freedom implies that his συνείδησις should judge *his* freedom. His incredulity at the idea of the συνείδησις of ἄλλος judging his freedom perhaps arises out of the philological opposition of ἀλλότριος with οἰκεῖος, with which the συνείδησις would have been associated in Stoic theory.[79] In other words, part of Paul's disbelief is the idea that someone *else's* sense of self could make a judgement about what was appropriate for him based on his self-perception. It is nonsensical within Stoic theory to say that one found something fitting (i.e. eating with thanks) for oneself, or otherwise, based on someone else's self-perception. In fact, this operative assumption probably contributes to Paul's defence of his freedom at 9.1—at first glance, he has just appealed to the knowledgeable to de-select an activity based on the συνείδησις of the weak (someone *else's* self-perception). Freedom, as the authority of independent action towards the good, would develop from the evaluations of a correct self-perception, a relationship Paul's statements assume. It is clear that Paul assumed the presence and epistemological function of the συνείδησις in all, despite its fallible and perhaps rudimentary nature. Given that, he further expected it to play a crucial role in each believer's

[78] Although knowledge 'puffs up', the label 'weak', and the statement that they lack the 'knowledge' he agrees with and repeats indicate that this lack is also something he redresses obliquely.
[79] LS1, 351; cf. Annas, *Happiness*, 262.

global orientation to Christ, being informed by correct knowledge and leading to their freedom in that orientation.

Given its ineliminable role in each believer's orientation to Christ, the self-perception of others could not be ignored by anyone concerned to 'save many'. The Christ-orientation which a correct συνείδησις would support was one which aimed to 'save many', which required 'building' those from a variety of epistemological (and other) states. Despite his efforts to impart knowledge to the believers and address any epistemological weakness, Paul also asserts that knowledge is inadequate on its own. It is love that 'builds', and the only object supplied for this action here is, in fact, the συνείδησις (8.10). Although it is a negative example of 'building', it may perhaps reveal the implied object of the other two usages of the verb in this section (8.1; 10.23): among other things, what love 'builds' is the συνείδησις.

In 3.9, Paul has described the community as God's οἰκοδομή, and, taken with chs8-10, the texts portray a 'building' which belongs to God, collectively composed by the believers themselves, including their own self-perception. The statements in 8.6 that the believers are 'to' God and 'through' Christ, and in 8.3 that those who love God have been 'known by him', and that the weak are those for whom Christ died in 8.11,[80] all coordinate with the metaphor's aspect of belonging to God. As 3.4, 21–23 explain, it is incorrect to describe themselves as 'belonging to' apostles, and actually a downgrade considering that 'all things' are theirs as those belonging to God through Christ. The scenario Paul is concerned about, which might create the false impression for those with weak συνείδησις, would build them 'to' idols rather than the God to whom they belonged. If Paul's συνείδησις referenced the Stoic notion of self-perception, which would normally be the basis of οἰκείωσις, then he significantly shifts its role in this paradigm. The Corinthians' συνείδησις functions as the basis for their selections from their environment (i.e. appropriating what is fitting for them), but they themselves have simultaneously been appropriated by God. Thus God becomes the primary agent 'laying claim to' or 'appropriating' the believers, and this aspect of their self-perception—that they are 'to' God, 'known' by him—must now inform their own appropriation of all else. 'All' is theirs, but only by virtue of this primary relationship. The weak συνείδησις of those in ch8 in its current state can only appropriate the idol food to themselves as 'to' idols, rather than 'to' God, and thus contravenes this necessary orientation. Reinforcing and supporting this orientation of others to God through Christ is to participate in

[80] Cf. 6.19–20, where Christ's death, referenced as the τιμή which purchases believers, results in the divine ownership of them.

the divine appropriation, a participation which can hardly be avoided by those claiming such orientation.[81]

As people claiming to have accurate self-perception as those belonging to God, who 'saves many' through Christ, to reinforce the false self-perception of others as 'to' idols or food as from idols would be inimical to one's own self-perception. In other words, to be oriented to Christ, who saves many, is to take others' self-perception into account. Such Christ-oriented concern to reinforce correct self-perception (and avoid the opposite) provides the theological warrant for the prohibition in ch8: the weak are those for whom Christ died, and in disregarding their condition the 'knowledgeable' sin against Christ himself. In 9.22, Paul's accommodation to the practice of others when necessary explicitly names the weak as a group to which his practice sometimes adapts. This is in an effort to 'gain' them, to save some (v22), an effort which itself forms part of Paul's own participation in salvation (v23). A false self-perception, and thus weak epistemological state, is also indicated by the pagan's attempt to draw attention to the sacred nature of the food at 10.28 and a similar concern to prevent reinforcing such self-perception lies behind Paul's instructions to avoid eating there. In 10.33-11.1 the prohibition is again grounded in the effort to save many, in explicit imitation of Christ.

The weakness of the 'weak', then, is an epistemological weakness which lies behind most of Paul's prohibitions of idol food in this section due to the crucial role he conceives self-perception to have. As an ineliminable component of epistemology, the believers' self-perception must be 'built up' as belonging to God through Christ. This 'building' was accomplished by love, in imitation of Christ who 'saved many'. Thus the self-perception of one belonging to God through Christ would result in participation in the same aim, and the correlative significance of others' developing self-perception towards the same belonging. Paul's concern, as one invested in 'saving many', to reinforce correct self-perception and avoid reinforcing false self-perception in others (given its role as an epistemological component) results in the prohibitions and warnings against idol food in this section. The concern for others' self-perception interspersed with assertions of freedom and agreement with the arguments from the knowledgeable, though, has led to considerable vacillation in scholarship.

[81] As Paul portrays his work and that of the other apostles in 3.5–15. The model for the building metaphor resurfaces in ch9's description of Paul as one given a stewardship (οἰκονομία) and who gains (κερδαίνω) acquisitions for the master he serves. Cf. Epictetus' use of οἰκονομία to describe the divine management which places people in particular roles and statuses, *Diatr.* III.24.93.

5.2.5 Moving beyond two opposing readings

The simple question 'Does Paul prohibit or permit the use of idol food'? is surprisingly difficult to answer. Interpretations of this text are often beset with the challenge of attempting to resolve Paul's apparently contradictory instructions, which has elements lending themselves to both permission and prohibition. Many scholars, operating under the assumption that the freedom Paul referenced was primarily one from the Torah, prioritise the permissive elements of the text over the prohibitions.[82] The prohibitions are then construed as general 'other-regard' or concern over 'public' use rather than any kind of Jewish practice.[83] Scholarship more inclined to read Paul within the spectrum of ancient Judaism, especially in recent decades, has prioritised the elements of prohibition as instructions regarding Torah observance.[84] Regarding permissive elements of the text, scholars either leave significant features of the text unaddressed or account for them by assuming that partaking of idol food was clearly distinct from other Jewish dietary practices, or that partaking of idol food to some extent actually was typical Jewish practice (despite the lack of external evidence for this). All agree that idolatry is wholly unacceptable in Paul's opinion (although there is rarely any attempt to define what constitutes idolatry).[85] Aspects of all these readings are helpful: Paul is concerned to train gentiles to worship the true Jewish God and avoid idolatry, what he advises could have been regarded by other gentiles as some type of Jewish practice, and he certainly advocates something like 'other-regard' and upholds the freedom to 'do all things'. What is needed is a reading which can explain all these elements and their relationship to each other.

While the theological impetus and content of Paul's instructions are drawn from the Christ-event, many aspects of his instructions and reasoning will be rendered more coherent in view of an underlying set of Stoic assumptions. Underneath the specific instructions of this text, surfacing at points, lies a framework of ethical reasoning, some of the scaffolding by which Paul builds his case; or, as Engberg-Pedersen describes it, the old writing glimpsed

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[82] C. K. Barrett, 'Things Sacrificed to Idols', *NTS* 11 (1965), 138–53, 149, 52; Willis, *Idol Meat*, 231; J. Murphy-O'Connor, 'Freedom or the Ghetto', *RB* 85 (1978), 543–74 (544); Tomson, *Law,* 206–8, explains the contradiction, albeit with different conclusions; cf. similar discussions in Cheung, *Idol Food*, 16–20; 86–96; Gooch, *Food*, 135–55.

[83] D. G. Horrell, *Solidarity and Difference: A Contemporary Reading of Paul's Ethics* (London: T & T Clark, 2005), 180–242; Witherington, 'Idle Thoughts'; Fee, *Corinthians*, 359–60.

[84] Tomson, *Law,* 192; Fee, *Corinthians*, 378, despite asserting that food is 'a matter of indifference', says that 'the section as a whole has the net effect of prohibition'; Cheung, *Idol Food*, 108–9; Gooch, *Food*, 129–32.

[85] As Rudolph, *Jew*, 93, points out, even when there is agreement that Paul gives prohibitions in some settings and permission for others, 'there is little agreement over *why* Paul forbids the consumption of food from the temple and table of demons but not from the marketplace and table of non-Jesus-believers'.

through the new on a palimpsest.[86] If idol food is understood as a neutral ἀδιάφορον, it could be used correctly or incorrectly, permitted in some circumstances and prohibited in others. The freedom to 'do all things' (including using or avoiding idol food) is based on the argument that only the Christ-orientation contributes directly to the τέλος: since no particular practice is necessary, all are theoretically possible. Such freedom, however, should not be conceived as the modern notion of a freedom from constraint of any kind, but as an independent authority to attain the τέλος (the man lacking *all* constraint was simply a tyrant, slave to desire). Under such a scheme, anything that conflicts with this (i.e. is a constraint upon attaining the τέλος) is simply not part of that freedom and invalid. 'Αδιάφορα were neutral, or even 'preferable', but their selection was subject to a host of considerations, some which applied broadly and others which could be quite specific to the individual or scenario. In any case in which the selection of an ἀδιάφορον, even one normally preferred or appropriate, conflicted with the first-order value its value was rendered inoperative and its selection would no longer be part of a wise man's 'freedom'. The features of an intermediate which give them objective second-order value over other neutral selections are no longer the 'paramount consideration' if virtue or vice is in view. Overlaid on these assumptions, Paul's agreement that the Corinthians can 'do all things' is based on the neutrality of their gentile practices *qua* gentile, and his specific agreement on the neutrality of idol food and permission to use it in some circumstances acknowledges its objective value for them in general. Their freedom to 'do all things', though, was the freedom to attain salvation, constituted by the Christ-orientation, and could not conflict with this orientation—if it did, it would no longer be 'freedom'. Since only the Christ-orientation had first-order value, the objective value of idol food was conditional and rendered inoperative when it conflicted with their orientation to Christ. In such circumstances, any second-order value of idol food is no longer the 'paramount consideration' and Paul prohibits it. To answer the earlier question, the argument here is that Paul permits the use of idol food generally as a neutral ἀδιάφορον, but prohibits its use when it conflicts with the orientation to Christ, whether he suspects their own susceptibility to idolatry or their disregard for others' vulnerability. The reasoning process by which the use of idol food can be assessed for its objective second-order value, and conditioned by the first-order value, is what he expends his considerable effort explaining and modelling in 8.1–11.1.

[86] Engberg-Pedersen, *Paul,* 44.

5.3 1 Cor 8.1–11.1

5.3.1 8.1–3: The divine appropriation as the basis for ethical reasoning

Paul begins to address the *topos* of idol food twice, as marked by the repeated περὶ δέ of v1 and v4. He begins by acknowledging the 'knowledge' the Corinthians have likely presented their case with, and to which he will return in detail in vv4–6, but first detours with several cryptic sentences on the nature of knowledge itself. Whatever the content of the Corinthians' knowledge, he seems to think they have failed to grasp some fundamental elements of reasoning. Knowledge is first compared disparagingly to love, a term Paul has likely introduced. The metaphors of puffing up and building both give increase but one is solid (and already used positively by Paul in 3.9), the other ephemeral.[87] V2 then tempers the possession of knowledge by asserting that one who claims such does not know 'as one must know'. The nature of the knowledge which 'it is necessary to know' is then defined in v3 as a 'being known' by God, a knowing evidenced by love for him.[88] In similar fashion to Gal 4.9, Phil 3.12, and 13.12 later in this epistle, he corrects a previous statement describing the believer as an epistemologically-active agent by redescribing such human 'knowing' as a result of divine 'knowing': the subject is an epistemologically-active subject as a result of being an object of the divine epistemologically-active subject.[89] The primary relationship upon which any professed knowledge on the topic must be based, Paul asserts, is that of God knowing them.

This opening recalibrates the weight the Corinthians' knowledge about idol food, however technically correct it may be, should have in their reasoning. It is inadequate to stand alone, and the necessary kind of knowledge, which results in love, which is able to build, is only borne out of divine knowledge of the believer. It is God's action of knowing his people which provides the basis for any right use of knowledge to its proper end. This proper use is love which builds what is his. The proper end of such knowledge, used in love, is 'to

[87] Fee, *Corinthians*, 366, postulates that οἰκοδομέω was a Corinthian addition based on 8.10 and 10.23 but the language already appears in ch3, and Paul has reformulated the slogans of 6.12 and 10.23 to some extent. Cf. Thiselton, *Corinthians*, 620–1, on whether 8.1b (οἴδαμεν ὅτι πάντες γνῶσιν ἔχομεν) is a quotation of the Corinthians.

[88] There are textual difficulties in vv2–3 including two 2nd century texts (P^{46}, Clement of Alexandria) which omit [τὸν θεόν] and [ὑπ'αὐτοῦ], thus leaving v3 as 'if one loves, this one knows/is known'. Despite the quality of the witnesses, however, it is a minority and, contra Fee, *Corinthians*, 367, given the ensuing instructions, the inclusion of τὸν θεόν is arguably the more difficult reading which adds to its reliability. As will be argued, love for God would, to Paul's mind, include loving others as 'all' belong to him, and he 'saves many' through Christ.

[89] Cf. 4.2.3 on possible epistemological overtones for καταλαμβάνω in Phil 3.12.

God' as v6 and 10.31 will state. As people known by God, who love him, and are 'to' him, they have been appropriated by God to himself.

These sentences contain, *in nuce*, several ideas which Paul will develop or upon which he will rely in various ways throughout the section. The appropriation of the believers, as part of the divine project of 'saving many' through Christ (9.19, 22; 10.33), is predicated upon the monotheistic belief that they, along with 'all' else, are 'from' God and should be 'to' him. The divine knowing renders all equally acceptable—they belong *as* gentiles, or as weak or knowledgeable, since all that is necessary is the Christ-orientation which such knowing has produced. As such, their appropriation by God is the basis for their freedom to 'do all things' since 'all things' are from him, to whom they belong, even as gentiles.

However, as those known by him, and who love him, and are 'to' him, they are necessarily involved with others also known by him. The divine appropriation of believers in knowing them correlates to the more direct statement of Christ's death for the weak believer at 8.11 and lies behind a prohibition to eat idol food. Their love for God, to whom they belong, entails love for his 'building', so they will build, through love, what is his. Any so-called 'knowledge' which does not arise out of the divine appropriation is thus discounted by Paul. As those known by God, they are able to do 'all things' 'to him', but those known by God will then know others as his and therefore build what is his by seeking their advantage.

5.3.2 8.4–13: The knowledge of second-order value in conflict with the first-order value

In the remainder of ch8, Paul recaps the 'knowledge' those partaking of idol food have used to defend their position, but warns them that their evaluation is woefully insufficient as it stands. The content of their argument, or at least what Paul wants to discuss here, is given in vv4–6 and was discussed at length above. The Corinthians claim that their monotheistic theology (perhaps taught by Paul) provides the basis for assigning ἀδιάφορα-status to idols and their foods. This neutrality, their ability to 'do all things' as from God, has given them the authority to select the practice of eating idol food, attending meals where it is served, purchasing it for their use, and probably other possible scenarios, as part of their intermediates (one of the καθήκοντα or προηγμένα ἀδιάφορα). The statements of vv4–6 argue for its neutrality; that they argued for its selection is indicated by their action of partaking, and is implied by Paul's defence in ch9. That their knowledge gives them the ἐξουσία to such selections is asserted by the slogan of 6.12 and 10.23 and Paul's concession to it in 8.9. Such categorisation of selections and activities as intermediates, it will be recalled, while typified

in Stoic texts as general, could also contain quite particular selections, so that one person's intermediates could be different from another's in some respects while certainly overlapping in many. Procuring sustenance, for example, would be seen as selection of health, which applied to all, while avoiding idol food could be conceived as an intermediate for Jews, as part of their lawcode. It is not difficult to imagine the Corinthians arguing that procuring typical gentile foodstuffs, maintaining their social networks, attending events vital to their political and business success, etc., were appropriate activities and preferred selections. If Paul has explicitly taught them that they do not need to Judaize and reject their gentile practices *qua* gentile due to their faith in Christ, this argument could have easily been made. However, it will be remembered that such categorisations could only reference extensional activities, and did not address the intensional dispositions of virtue and vice. As such, any value they described stood under the proviso of the first-order value. However helpful such 'rules of thumb' might be, the wise man was the *ratiocinator officiorum* who assessed not only whether a selection or activity had second-order value, but whether the second-order value was the 'paramount consideration' to be made in such circumstances.

In vv7–13 Paul argues that while they are correct in their categorisation of idol food as an ἀδιάφορον, and possibly even as an intermediate for their selection, they have failed to assess all the relevant factors. The counterargument begins abruptly at v7 where Paul introduces the factor they have missed: the weak epistemological state of some in their fellow believers. Paul does not identify which specific portions of the 'knowledge' in vv4–6 are not possessed by the weak, but as they are described as those for whom Christ died (v11), it is likely they assent to belief of Christ as one Lord and even God as the one father (v6). What Paul likely refers to, then, as his description of their weak self-perception corrupted by the practices of Graeco-Roman piety confirms, is specifically the knowledge about idols and food in vv4–5. In other words, these weak believers know the theology about God and Christ, but have not yet drawn the correlated conclusions about idols. This puts them in a vulnerable position, as discussed above regarding the role of the συνείδησις, to conclude that their appropriation by God can be combined with the worship of other divine beings, idolatry.

Paul reiterates the neutrality of the food in v8, albeit in a form which still admonishes the knowledgeable. Food itself has no ability to present one to God (it is neutral)—if one does not eat particular foods, one does not lack (such standing, or even affinity), and if one

eats particular foods, one does not increase (such standing or affinity).[90] The statement confirms his agreement on the food's neutrality while simultaneously reminding them it is of second-, and not first-order value: it contributes nothing directly to their standing before God.

Given its second-order value, they should realise it is not the paramount consideration under the circumstances, where their selection would create an obstacle for the weak (v9). With their self-perception weakened by operative false impressions, their brother would be built up not 'to' the one God, but to appropriate themselves to a false deity through their eating. Although Paul does not describe this event with the language of idolatry, the dire outcome of destruction (ἀπόλλυμι) is one resulting from such sins, and the opposite of salvation.[91] Although the extensional activity of eating idol food does not have such power, when combined with the intensional disposition of doing it as 'to' idols, it constitutes destructive idolatry.[92] To cause this destruction is an act against them, but since they are also those who belongs to God through the death of Christ, the knowledgeable's action is also against Christ. As 6.19–20 straightforwardly explains, having been bought by the death of Christ, believers are no longer simply their own. On the heels of describing the community as a building, Paul delivers a similarly sharp warning in 3.16–7: the believers individually and communally belong to God, by way of Christ's death, and actions done by or to the believers thereby extend to God and Christ.

As those who claim to belong to God through Christ, there could not be a more flagrant conflict. Despite the potential second-order value of such food, Paul contends that it does not contribute directly to salvation and here it indirectly contributes to the destruction of a brother who belongs to one to whom they claim orientation. Under such circumstances, they can hardly claim that the second-order value of such food is their paramount consideration with any honour intact. The appropriation of the believer by God which results in the first-order good of Christ-orientation, is the only legitimate basis for any other knowledge or authority. If it does not arise out of this necessary 'knowing' it is invalid, not

[90] Fee, *Corinthians*, 382–3, finds v8bc odd, stating that the 'natural elaboration' of v8a would be to state that *abstaining* does not give any benefit. If, however, Paul has taught the Corinthians that they have authority to select gentile practices 'to God' on the basis of the Christ-event, this reading is an expression of the perceived 'advantage' of a perfected intermediate (which he counters is not possible under the current circumstances).
[91] Cf. Rom 2.12; 1 Cor 1.18–9; 1 Cor 15.18; 2 Cor 2.15; 4.3.
[92] In reference to Rom 14–15, T. Engberg-Pedersen, 'Logic', 25–29, notes the way Paul's claim that 'nothing is unclean in itself'/'everything is clean' in Rom 14.14, 20 and his claim that it was unclean for some in v14 can be understood in light of Stoic thought. 'Everything in God's world *is* clean and nothing is unclean in itself. But it may in fact *become* objectively unclean and bad *for* the one who *takes* it that way by, as it were, removing that *person from* God's world' (29).

'to' God, despite the fact that the food may be 'from' him. It certainly is not love which builds God's building as this use of authority builds 'to' another deity. Despite the neutrality and even second-order value of idol food, Paul portrays its use under such circumstances as in clear conflict with the first-order value, and the Corinthians' selection of it invalid.

Paul's impassioned personal statement in v13 is driven by the potential destruction of the weak brother. He has presented the outcome for the weak brother as the opposite of the τέλος of salvation, and the actions of the knowledgeable as contributing indirectly to it.[93] His portrayal of this action as a sin against Christ depicts the clear conflict with the first-order good he believes their selections have in the circumstances. The wise man's process of ethical reasoning, his authority and freedom to make selections, though, was towards attaining the τέλος unimpeded by anything, including others. As stated earlier, the idea that one would select what was fitting for oneself based on *another's* self-perception is also nonsensical. While οἰκείωσις included appropriating others and was the basis of justice, it was grounded by a teleology that could only secure εὐδαιμονία for the wise man: he primarily treated others justly and cared for his family because it contributed to his flourishing. His ability to do this unimpeded by anything is his freedom. As Diogenes Laertius says (possibly citing Zeno): the wise man alone is truly free (and the worthless always slaves) εἶναι γὰρ τὴν ἐλευθερίαν ἐξουσίαν αὐτοπραγίας.[94] Even if the Corinthians would not have stated this definition in precisely the same way, the importance in Stoicism of maintaining one's ἐξουσία in all circumstances, of demonstrating self-mastery and freedom from externals, could not be mistaken. Paul's warning to the Corinthians, and statement that he himself would deselect such food due to another's self-perception and potential destruction could easily elicit charges that he acts under compulsion, rather than freedom. The rhetorical questions of 9.1 are often read as a non sequitur, even to the point of finding the chapter an interpolation. However, if Paul and the Corinthians are operating on shared Stoic assumptions of the significance of freedom and its definition, Paul's defence merely anticipates their objection.

[93] Rudolph, *Jew*, 104–6, notes that σκανδαλίζω is not attested outside of Jewish literature. The noun σκάνδαλον in Lev 19.14 was interpreted metaphorically by the rabbis to warn against tempting a weak, or morally unaware, person, to sin—even, specifically idolatry.
[94] DL VII.122.

5.3.3 9.1–27: Paul's example of ethical reasoning: doing all things to save many

5.3.3.1 9.1–14: Paul's rational defence of his authority to select an intermediate

In 9.1 Paul initially responds to this anticipated objection, but rather than a simple response, he gives a demonstration of freedom that takes others' salvation into account and thereby provides a model of the reasoning he wants the Corinthians to emulate. He begins with a series of rhetorical questions and one concluding statement in vv1–2. The first rhetorical question imagines their accusation, and the remainder of vv1b–2 are designed to establish Paul's own self-perception as an apostle. While they may seem initially unrelated, it again probably relies upon an underlying assumption, namely, that one's freedom to select, unhindered, what would attain the τέλος is based, in the first instance, upon the knowledge of what is fitting for oneself. An identical statement in Epictetus' *Discourses* demonstrates the Cynic's authority, unlike those Epictetus excoriates a few lines earlier who do not know what is appropriate for them (καθήκοντος), and seek things which are foreign (ἀλλότρια) as if their own (ἴδια).[95] As v3 states, he offers a defence of his right to material support as an appropriate action, an intermediate for which he had a 'well-reasoned defence'.[96] Such a defence was one of 'impulsive action' which was fitting based on one's self-perception. Paul first, then, affirms his reasons (in Stoic terms, impressions) for his self-perception as an apostle, his συνείδησις as the basis for his authority, and then his freedom (10.29).

In vv3–14, Paul then gives his formal ἀπολογία of his ἐξουσία to material support as an apostle. Each element of Paul's defence has its own intrigue which cannot be delved into here. Vv3–6 list expected forms of support or maintenance provided for apostles: subsistence, the wherewithal to support a partner, and the sufficiency of support being such that other work is unnecessary. V7 makes the simple point, as Fee states, 'that one expects to be sustained by one's labours'[97] as a farmer or soldier does. Vv8–12a support the apostle's rights to such maintenance from the Torah, an analogy to farming and his personal history of work with the Corinthians. In v12b Paul first mentions where he is going with all this: that despite having a well-reasoned defence for his authority to solicit support as an apostle, he does not select support when it conflicts with the gospel. Before he fully lands on this point, however, vv13–14 give two more scriptural arguments: the Torah's prescription that those working in the temple share in the offerings and the arrangement made by Christ that those

[95] Epictetus, *Diatr.* III.22.39, 43, 48: οὔκ εἰμι ἐλεύθερος;
[96] Cf. 2.5.2.1.
[97] Fee, *Corinthians*, 405.

proclaiming the gospel 'live' by this work.[98] The reference to those working in the temple is worth noticing as it will appear similarly stated, albeit towards different ends, in 10.18. At this point Paul has more-than-adequately defended his authority to require material support, something which had plenty of 'reason-giving' second-order value for him. All this rhetoric, however, is to make the point that something so appropriate and fitting for him as an apostle, so naturally suited to meet his needs, even based on knowledge from Scripture and dominical traditions, is something he does *not* select when it conflicts with the gospel.

5.3.3.2 9.15–18: Paul's deselection of an intermediate when it conflicts with the gospel: a deselection which maintains freedom

At the conclusion of his defence of his authority to take material support, Paul makes clear that he does not want such support from the Corinthians. He reiterates this with sudden intensity, an intensity made apparent by his ruptured grammar. He begins to explain that it would be better for him to die than the alternative, but the comparison ends in an anacoluthon and he contends instead that 'no one will deprive me of my boast'. Verses 15–18 are a tortured argument, unclear at best, and yet by all markers of the text, this is where Paul makes a significant argumentative point and where he develops his analogy of material support in relation to the topic of freedom.[99]

One primary difficulty here is identifying Paul's 'boast', despite the apparent significance it holds for him, as indicated by the anacoluthon. The way Paul moves the argument forward seems to identify his boast with a reward, but whether or not Paul receives the reward, or what it is, is unclear. He explicitly states in v16a-b that the preaching of the gospel is not his boast, and explains that this is because it is required of him: ἐὰν γὰρ εὐαγγελίζωμαι, οὐκ ἔστιν μοι καύχημα, ἀνάγκη γάρ μοι ἐπίκειται· οὐαὶ γάρ μοί ἐστιν ἐὰν μὴ εὐαγγελίσωμαι.

This is followed, in v17 with two contrasting conditions: if he does this (the preaching of the gospel) willingly (ἑκών), he has a reward; if unwillingly (ἄκων), he is entrusted with an administration (οἰκονομία). The second primary difficulty of this section is deciding which of these contrasting conditions Paul applies to himself. In other words, given the previous

[98] Cf. Deut 18.1–3; Num 19.8–31; Lk 10.7. Paul's choice of διατάσσω is perhaps significant, signaling a less-authoritative directive (cf. Gal 3.19; 1 Cor 7.17; 11.34; 16.1). Cf. his usage of παραγγέλλω/παραγγελία (1 Cor 7.10; 1 Th 4.2, 11; 2 Thess 3.4, 6, 10, 12) and ἐπιτάσσω/ἐπιταγή (Rom 16.26; 1 Cor 6.7, 25; 2 Cor 8.8; Philm 8). Perhaps this language supports his categorisation of the practice as an intermediate, unlike Christ's 'command' regarding divorce in 1 Cor 7.6, 10.

[99] The four instances of γάρ indicate this, and one linking v19 back to this section.

verse's portrayal of his preaching as required, the condition that he preaches 'unwillingly' might apply. In that case, he would not expect a reward, but this seems to undermine the significance of his 'boast'.[100] This reading, in which Paul preaches 'unwillingly' also struggles to create a useful analogy to freedom. Given that he immediately draws the conclusion in v19a that he is 'free from all', this seems a notion he expects this section to support. Most problematically, this reading renders the question of v18a strange: τίς οὖν μού ἐστιν ὁ μισθός; If Paul's point in vv16–17 is that he does *not* receive a reward, why does he seem to think the reader expects him to have one in v18a? He begins by stating that he will not allow anyone to deprive him of his boast, which then is likely associated with the reward, and the concluding question of v18a seems to expect one. Instead of imagining that Paul asks this 'of one who is entitled to no reward', it is possible to read v18a as Paul's expectation of a reward because, as he gave the condition in v17ab, *he works willingly.*[101]

In other words, v18 shows that Paul expects a reward, and thus that he believes that the condition v17ab applies to him. Paul is working to clarify what his boast is, what it is that he does not want to lose by receiving compensation, and I argue that that is exactly what v17 defines: what Paul boasts in is his willingness in his gospel-work. His deselection of material support makes this clearer to himself and others. Paul's practice of supporting himself is designed to throw into sharp relief his intensional disposition in the extensional activity of preaching the gospel.[102] The problem of defining his reward still remains, but it is possible that the question of v18a should be read not as 'therefore what is my reward'? with an answer to follow, but as a rhetorical question 'therefore what is my reward'? under the conditions of v17c–d.[103] In other words, if I work willingly, I would receive a reward, but if I work

[100] Fee, *Corinthians*, 420–1, interprets: '"What then is my reward"? he asks of one who is entitled to no reward… his "pay" turns out to be his total freedom from all human impositions… the "weakness" of working with his hands to not hinder the gospel' and v18c is speaking of potential 'abuse' of his position which Paul's practice prevents. Similarly, D. B. Martin, *Slavery as Salvation: The Metaphor of Slavery in Pauline Christianity* (London: Yale University Press, 1990), 71–2.

[101] So A. J. Malherbe, 'Determinism and Free Will in Paul: The Argument of 1 Corinthians 8 and 9', in *Paul in his Hellenistic Context* (ed. T. Engberg-Pedersen; Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1994), 231–55 (249–51). J. K. Goodrich, *Paul as Administrator of God in 1 Corinthians* (SNTSMS; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012) 181–7, argues (like Malherbe) that Paul's language implies that he did expect a reward, but (differently) that, as a slave administrator, Paul still preached involuntarily (as some administrators could be both enslaved and rewarded). As Thiselton, *Corinthians*, 696, explains the conundrum for interpreters in v17: 'Paul makes a *logical* point that only acts carried out from self-motivation or self-initiative belong to the logical order of "reward", although he concludes that Paul's role as administrator precludes such self-initiative'.

[102] On the significance of volition in Stoicism, cf. 2.7.7.

[103] The construction here does not quite fit Paul's pattern, which tends to give terse and direct answers to τίς οὖν questions, which appear in sections where he is progressing a tight logical argument and wants to come to a conclusion. Cf. Rom 3.1, 9; 6.1, 15; 7.7; 8.31; 9.14; 11.7; 1 Cor 3.5; 14.15, 26; ἄρα οὖν functions similarly although not in question form. Cf. Gal 3.19; Rom 4.1; 9.30; and 1 Cor 10.19 for more lengthy responses to the question. Paul does not follow any of the above, though, with a ἵνα-clause.

unwillingly, ‘then where would be my reward’? In this case, v18b–c do not define the reward, but state his conclusion. So that, in preaching, he may present the gospel freely, he does not use his authority to take material support.

This conclusion brings his thoughts back to the larger section and the example of his own authority to receive support. To summarise, despite material support being a defensible intermediate selection for him as an apostle, he does not select it when it conflicts with the gospel. This conflict is, in v18b, further detailed as the possibility of preaching the gospel ‘with a price’, a problem his deselection avoids. To select material support, according to v15, would deprive him of his boast—his willingness in preaching—which he then expects a reward from, but which is not explained here. What is left unclear is the precise connection between his willingness in preaching and how selecting material support would deprive him of that in particular. It is possible that this imprecision and some of the convoluted grammar is due to the awkwardness Paul feels in discussing this topic with the Corinthians. If, as some have argued, the Corinthians propose a patronage of Paul, his refusal could revolve around pressures and strictures he was concerned to avoid. Namely, that their patronage would obligate him to preach only to certain people, or limit his preaching to those who could pay him, and this would hamper his own personal willingness in preaching. There remains an undefined relationship between the hindrance to the gospel, offering it without price, and Paul’s willingness in preaching, but the lack of precise definition does not render it incomprehensible.

Verses 15–18 are dense, but its place in Paul’s larger argument is important, especially as the example of reasoning he intends to give to the Corinthians. He makes clear that the reason he does not select the intermediate of material support, despite the fact that it has ‘reason-giving’ value and that he can offer a knowledgeable defence for it in general, is that in some circumstances such support would create a conflict with the gospel itself. In the case that selecting a second-order value conflicts with the first-order, such knowledge (of its second-order value) is no longer the paramount consideration to be made. As a defence of his freedom, though, Paul is at pains to explain this deselection as one which preserves his intensional disposition towards the τέλος. In response to the anticipated objection of the Corinthians, that to deselect what is fitting for oneself based on the self-perception of another would be enslavement, Paul argues that his deselection is an aligning of his intensional disposition with a divine compulsion. As Cleanthes’ hymn says, ‘Lead me on, O Zeus… if my will prove (μὴ θέλω) weak and craven, still I’ll follow on. Whoso with necessity (ἀνάγκη)

has rightly complied, we count him wise, and skilled in things divine'.[104] It is not his extensional activities of preaching (although necessary) or taking material support as an apostle that demonstrate his freedom, but his own orientation to Christ, as that which directly contributes to the τέλος. As v17 states, it is his willing disposition in performing such activities that gains him a reward. This reward, also described in 3.8, 14–5, is almost certainly an eschatological one, and is likely akin to the βραβεῖον of v24, also described as an ἄφθαρτος στέφανος. Paul assumes that it is his intensional disposition of willingness that will directly contribute to a reward—the activity of preaching is a divine obligation and whether he receives compensation or not is an intermediate. What he aims to describe is the perfection of an intermediate duty into a perfectly right action (κατόρθωμα) by the accompanying intensional disposition—but by the example of *de*selecting a defensible intermediate, as he wants the Corinthians to do. The combined desires to defend his freedom, offer an analogously defensible καθήκον, but one which he does not select *to* maintain his freedom, but a freedom defined in the terms of the Christ-orientation of the gospel-project result in a somewhat tangled explanation. He wants to defend his freedom as one who *does* take another into account, and he cannot explain his deselection along the already-accepted terms of preserving a virtue or avoiding a well-known vice, but instead must supply it in terms of willing *preaching* since the content of his first-order good and τέλος are his own construction. It is unlikely that a Stoic would view preaching as the kind of divine compulsion which one must maintain willing harmony with, but Paul's view is more influenced by other matters on this point. What is key to note at this point is the way in which he preserves the role of the intensional disposition, the agent's epistemological relationship to an action, in this section. As argued earlier, he assumes the component of self-perception as ineliminable, and it is the epistemological state of the weak in ch8 that results in their destruction in eating (when it does not for the knowledgeable), and the significance of the intensional disposition will continue as he warns the knowledgeable of their own vulnerability in ch10. Freedom, though, is being portrayed by Paul as the unimpeded maintenance of such an intensional state towards God, here defined in terms of the gospel project. Any authority which the believers claim, even that to live as gentiles, is an authority derived from the nature of the Christ-event and cannot be construed as freedom unless it is a demonstration of the Christ-orientation which saves. Maintaining this disposition of Christ-orientation, and thus 'freedom', at times requires

[104] Epictetus, *Ench.* 53, trans. Oldfather, LCL, 537.

deselecting what would normally be one's preference—such value is conditional. They have the freedom to 'do all things', but only to do all in willing pursuit of the τέλος, salvation, as Paul's next section explains.

5.3.3.3 9.19–27: Paul's freedom to 'do all things' as service which saves many

Despite the confusion at points, Paul has made clear the significance, for him, of maintaining his willing disposition whilst preaching, something which taking material support would somehow constrain (and thus conflict with the progress of the gospel). He has maintained this freedom 'from all' (i.e. constrained by no one's limitations upon his preaching), though, precisely to take others' concerns into account. In contrast to what he anticipated the Corinthians' objection would be following his statement in 8.13, Paul makes clear that it is possible for this freedom to coincide with concerns over others' self-perception. Even further, since the disposition which his freedom maintains—the orientation to Christ—is shaped by the divine aim of 'saving many', this freedom is actually demonstrated in the concern for others' self-perception which at times requires deselection of one's own practice.

With the opening words of v19, Paul plays on the well-known paradox of the 'free slave' which subverted the conventional values of status. Appealing to this well-known motif in self-mastery allows him to undermine the Corinthians' objections against his 'service' to others in the form of adapting his own practice in deference to others' (as he has asked them to do). No self-respecting Stoic would make the mistake of thinking that one could not maintain self-mastery towards the τέλος because of adaptation to external circumstances, and the language of freedom and slavery were especially potent on this topic in the tradition of Diogenes the Cynic.[105] Paul states his purpose in adapting his practice to others' practices, a reiteration of his own disposition: as he preached the gospel 'willingly', he now 'serves' others ἵνα τοῦς πλείονας κερδήσω.[106]

In a carefully constructed set of six parallel sentences containing a conclusion and description of his position within four different groups, Paul makes clear that he adopts the practice of various groups as he sees necessary to κερδαίνω them. As he did in Phil 3, Paul

[105] Epictetus, *Diatr.* III.24.67; IV.1.114. Socrates was also 'free' while imprisoned since he was there 'willingly', I.12.24.

[106] B. Fjarstedt, *Synoptic Traditions in 1 Corinthians* (Uppsala: Uppsala University, 1974), 86–94, notes the linguistic and thematic connections to Mt 25.14–30 where a slave is expected to work without reward, yet is rewarded for gaining (κερδαίνω) an increase.

turns to the language of value to express himself, a motif which can also be seen in the use of βραβεῖον in both texts. The 'gaining' is specified at v22d as σῴζω, but it builds on the metaphor of Paul as administrator in v17: in his role as apostle, Paul adds to the household which belongs to God, he 'builds' God's house by 'gaining' others through salvation. With a set pattern, he spells out the various groups he is willing to 'serve' and the practices he adopts to do so. At the same time, he meticulously indicates his own epistemological relationship to, and even differentiation from, the practices he adopts. The pattern of the clauses roughly follows that of v19: *being* ____ *to* _____ *in order to* _____. Verse 22c–d provides a chiastic conclusion, mirroring v19. The same ὡς-clause is used for each group in between, with the exception of the last (to the weak) and the same purpose clause to each.[107] He further qualifies his position, though, in reference to two groups, those 'under the law' (μὴ ὢν αὐτὸς ὑπὸ νόμον) and the 'lawless' (μὴ ὢν ἄνομος θεοῦ). With reference to the latter group, there is a further qualification added (ἀλλ' ἔννομος Χριστοῦ). It is helpful to see each phrase compared:

19	ἐλεύθερος γὰρ ὢν ἐκ πάντων		πᾶσιν ἐμαυτὸν ἐδούλωσα,		ἵνα τοὺς πλείονας κερδήσω
20ab	καὶ	ἐγενόμην	τοῖς Ἰουδαίοις ὡς Ἰουδαῖος.		ἵνα Ἰουδαίους κερδήσω
20cde			τοῖς ὑπὸ νόμον ὡς ὑπὸ νόμον		ἵνα τοὺς ὑπὸ νόμον κερδήσω
				μὴ ὢν αὐτὸς ὑπὸ νόμον	
21			τοῖς ἀνόμοις ὡς ἄνομος		ἵνα κερδανῶ τοὺς ἀνόμους
				μὴ ὢν ἄνομος θεοῦ	
				ἀλλ' ἔννομος Χριστοῦ	
22ab		ἐγενομην	τοῖς ἀσθενέσιν ἀσθενής		ἵνα τοὺς ἀσθενεῖς κερδήσω
22cd			τοῖς πᾶσιν γέγονα πάντα		ἵνα πάντως τινὰς σώσω

In a set that seems designed to convey comprehensibility (but also include the group he is most concerned for the Corinthians to adapt to via his example), Paul describes his ability to be *as* various groups (i.e. adopt their practice for their sake).[108] This freedom to do 'all' these practices is the freedom to maintain his purpose throughout without fail: 'to save'. Since the divine appropriation has neutralised such practices, the conclusion can be drawn that all are valuable and of potential use for God's 'building'. The value assigned to each believer in the divine appropriation through Christ's death is revealed as applying to all, with

[107] Perhaps at this point in the pattern Paul can rely upon its assumption. Paul uses similar ὡς-clauses to indicate varying levels of detachment or even 'mismatch' between extensional activities and intensional dispositions elsewhere: 1 Cor 7.29–31; 2 Cor 6.8–10. Cf. Epictetus, *Diatr.* III.24.95–102; III.22.82, IV.1.162–3.

[108] The inclusion of the 'weak' as a group Paul must 'gain' (i.e. save) has caused some to question whether the weak refers to believers within the community in ch8. Paul's concern to 'save' those he regarded as part of the community, however, only illustrates the concern he also has for himself in vv23, 27.

the logical conclusion that their self-perception and epistemological development must also be taken into account by those orientated to Christ. Thus the disposition of the believer, resulting from the divine act of knowing which gives objective value to their own self-perception and practices, demands that such practices be deselected if it would hinder the salvation of another or lead to their destruction. Paul's calling as an apostle necessarily makes the sheer sum and variety of his adaptations higher than most believers, but he provides the example he wants the Corinthians to emulate in their non-apostolic roles (which is indicated by the function of the entire chapter, and made especially clear by the reference to the weak at v22). The variety of practices to which Paul can adapt to serve others confirms his classification of such practices as neutral (here, the καθήκοντα of others): all are equally serviceable and all are practices of those equally valuable to 'gain'.

As his allusion to the 'free slave' asserts, Paul wants to make clear that such adaptation to others' practices does not impede his own intensional disposition. The purpose clauses attached to each group express this in an even, balanced manner, but it seems necessary for him to differentiate himself more clearly in reference to two groups and their practices: those 'under the law' and the 'lawless'. In giving his example as one who deselects a defensible intermediate, Paul has moved from explaining the particular intermediate of material support and the conflict it created to his more general perspective on intermediates. He explicitly returns to the topic of food in ch10, but he has already turned his attention towards the application of his example for the Corinthians. Since avoiding idol food was a well-known Jewish dietary practice associated with their law, Paul may feel the need to signal his awareness of the practice as Torah observance, and defend both his national law and his ability to override his obligation to the particulars of that law via a 'law of Christ'. As mentioned earlier, an identification of the extensional activity (of eating idol food) and intensional disposition (idolatry) may be a position the Corinthians suspect Paul operates by, given the perception of Jewish obligation to Torah.[109] If this is so, Paul wants to assert that he is not under the supervision of Torah, but that he is still obligated to a divine standard. Any

[109] Rudolph, *Jew*, 3–8, rightly objects that v20a should not be taken to mean that Paul no longer considered himself a Jew, or that his identity as a Jew was 'erased'. However, Paul is modelling a level of detachment even from one's own practice (i.e. for the Corinthians to be able to deselect their normal practice) which recognises its neutrality even when, or, in fact, especially, when it is one's own. Asking Paul how he, as a Jewish man, can become 'as a Jew' is a bit like asking Epictetus' wise man how he is 'playing the part' (ὑποκριτής) of the poor man when he is one, Epictetus, *Diatr.* IV.7.13. Cf. I.29.41–47 which intriguingly asks 'what happens if we take away the actor's mask' (i.e., the 'trappings' of his role), to which Epictetus answers: 'if he has a voice he abides'. Cf. M. Aur. *Med.* II.5; III.5, who describes himself making up his mind 'as a Roman'. There is an external role and function in relation to which he attempts to position his disposition.

activities done by Paul in service of others for the gospel that are technically 'lawless' are rendered lawful by a higher norm: the law of Christ.

The phrase ὑπὸ νόμον is a familiar one from Galatians, appearing at 3.23; 4.4; 4.21 and refers to the Jews, as those obligated to Torah, but also describes the state of supervision the law creates for those obligated to it, a supervision which Paul can construe quite negatively at points.[110] It also appears near the only other instance of Paul's reference to a νόμος 'of Christ' (Gal 6.2). In Gal 5.18 Paul states that those who are led by the Spirit are not ὑπὸ νόμον, but still manifest the virtues which no law is against (i.e. which laws are 'for'). Several verses later Paul describes the behaviour he is exhorting the gentile believers to adopt as that which fulfils the law of Christ (ἀναπληρώσατε τὸν νόμον τοῦ χριστοῦ). It is perhaps not surprising that he should describe his gentile auditors as those 'not under the law', but the qualifier that applies does not refer to their gentile status, but to their inhabitation by the Spirit. That Paul can describe himself, as Jewish man, as one not 'under the law' in 1 Cor 9.20 is more surprising, but not unreasonable since he would count himself as one 'led by the Spirit'. That he still considers himself obligated to the divine standard in some fashion is indicated by his need to specify that he is not lawless before God. Although he is ὡς ὑπὸ νόμον, he is simultaneously *not* ὑπὸ νόμον—despite his own Jewish identity, he does not need the law's supervision, just as he has said of the Spirit-led Galatians.[111] Paul is also ὡς ἄνομος, but simultaneously *not* ἄνομος θεοῦ but instead ἔννομος Χριστοῦ.[112] Paul argues that he can be

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[110] Johnson Hodge, *Sons*, 72, 124, argues that the phrase ὑπὸ νόμον refers to gentiles who are 'trapped' or 'burdened' by the law, which was not meant for them. In Paul's use here, it is unclear why he would need to specify that he is not a gentile, but even more problematic for this reading is his use of the phrase to describe Christ, Gal. 4.4. The Rudolph, *Jew*, 153–9, interprets ὑπὸ νόμον in this text as referring to the Pharisees' standard of practice in contrast to other Jewish standards of practice. The expectation of this type of insider language is difficult to sustain, though, without further explanation in a letter to gentiles. Despite the range Paul exhibits with this phrase, this is also difficult to reconcile with his usage elsewhere.

[111] Tomson, *Law*, 277, cites a MSS tradition which omits the clause of v20f: μὴ ὢν αὐτὸς ὑπὸ νόμον to defend his reading of the verse as an instance of *imitatio Christi*: 'Paul, following Christ, understands himself to be under the Law to save those under the Law' (279). The textual evidence is late, however, and his argument that the phrase disrupts the structure of the statements established in v20a-c disregards Paul's willingness to disrupt the structure in v21 (for which there is no textual variant). It is also, as Tomson acknowledges, 278, classic Pauline language. Tomson doesn't address the meaning of Paul's self-description τοῖς ἀνόμοις ὡς ἄνομος (v21a) except to say (276) 'it is impossible that Paul would accommodate to the extent of eating idol offerings in order to win Corinthian pagans… What we can suppose he did in order to communicate with gentiles and pagans, is to take a moderate view of their supposed idolatrous intention and eat with them as far as the flexibility of his tradition allowed him to do'. This is simply not what the word ἄνομος means. As Rudolph, *Jew*, 14, says, 'the seemingly extreme lengths to which Tomson went to make his argument only reinforced the impression that 1 Cor 9:19–23 precluded a Torah-observant Paul'.

[112] Rudolph, *Jew*, 160, suggests that v21b is a statement asserting 'Do not misunderstand the nature of my association with Gentile sinners. I remain fully Torah observant'. While Paul's desire to state that he does not regard himself as lawless is clear, Rudolph himself agrees that the descriptors refer to lifestyles and 'concrete changes' (15). If that is so, Paul's description of himself as ὡς ἄνομος most likely refers, then, to some aberration

lawless in reference to Torah but that this state is not lawless in reference to God, a paradox achieved because the 'law of Christ' prevents being lawless before God *while* being lawless in Torah's terms. In both Galatians and this text, the believers' (gentile or Jewish) behaviour is behaviour that corresponds in some way to the divine standard required (it fufils this law or avoids lawlessness before God), but avoids its supervision and even can consist of actions technically lawless (by Torah's terms). In both cases as well the higher norm by which this is accomplished and their behaviour grounded as divinely lawful is described as the 'law of Christ'.

Paul's phrase might, in fact, reflect the notion of a 'law of nature' which offered a higher-order norm in Stoicism while grounding the use of conventional lawcodes.[113] The re-imagining of law as the skill of wisdom allows the sage to 'craft' the conventional law by reason, including 'the authority to break general provisions…' when determined necessary, which is actually 'following nature in a higher, but more flexible sense'.[114] In this reading, Paul's reference to a 'law of Christ' is a paradoxical metaphor referring to a higher norm which governs his behaviour in congruity with the divine will. He portrays himself as having flexibility to deselect particular injunctions of Torah when determined necessary by this higher norm, the law of Christ, so that he is paradoxically 'lawfully lawless' before God.[115]

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from his normally Torah-observant lifestyle. It is further exegetically difficult to account for the qualifier attached to law in the phrase that follows (ἄνομος θεοῦ). The reading also loses the force of the contrast in v21c (ἀλλ' ἔννομος Χριστοῦ): Paul would not need to assert that he is 'in' a law if his actions of v21a are not outside the law's standards in some way.

[113] Cf. 2.7.4.

[114] Inwood, 'Striker', 101. Cf. Inwood, 'Target', 554.

[115] This does not necessarily mean that Paul considered himself without any obligation to Torah. The concern of Rudolph, *Jew*, 1, 12, that the nature of law as obligatory is often not kept in view when interpreting this text is a legitimate one to raise. Could Paul's language, though, be read as expressing that his obligation to the law has not been completely dissolved, but changed in character nonetheless? While he no longer considers himself under the supervision of Torah, could he consider himself obligated to Torah observance in a conditionally normative way. The Stoics illustrate the possibility, in ancient discourse on law, of maintaining the law as binding for a variety of important, but not ultimately determinative, reasons. Or, to put it alternatively, to accept the laws as binding through one's rational capacity (the sage's reason being the equivalent to 'natural law' and unconditionally normative). In Plato, *Crito*, 50–54, the laws of Athens are personified and appeal to Socrates to stay and accept his sentence. Socrates agrees not to escape based on his rational acceptance of the law—to renege on his agreement would render him ultimately unjust or foolish. Cf. Seneca, *Ep.* 70.9; B. Inwood, 'Natural Law in Seneca' *SPhiloA* 15 (2003) 81–99 (94–5). In the same way, perhaps Paul expects to be Torah observant, but does not consider it ultimately determinative when he perceives it to be in conflict with his apostolic calling and the progress of the gospel. He accepts the law's obligation for him, but this can be conditional at times, as it is now grounded in his faith in Christ, which is unconditionally normative. The Stoic construction shows that it was possible to conceive of a sense of obligation that is conditional, however odd that may sound to our ears. On a prosaic level, we understand that we expect to engender real obligation in children when we teach them 'you are never to lie', whilst also offering them the obligation embedded in the moral *exempla* of those who have lied to save lives. The notion of flexibility in laws to which one is generally obligated is pointed out by Rudolph, *Jew*, 102, when temporary exceptions are argued for on the principle of 'saving a life'. Hayes, *Law*, 286–326, also describes how later rabbinic exegesis argued for such flexibility and modifications through various strategies. Such cases do not remove the general obligation to the law, but

In response perhaps to the Corinthians' concerns, he clarifies that he does not identify the extensional activities commanded by Torah with the intensional disposition regarded as necessary before God. Despite the Corinthians' misgivings, this position itself is not unusual within ancient Judaism, which often recognised a divine standard beyond the commands of Torah. However, the identification of the necessary disposition with Christ, and the divinely-sanctioned ability of such a disposition to 'craft' the obligation to Torah with the result of lawlessness, is a notable departure. Paul places himself as a Jewish Jesus-believer under the same higher-order standard as the gentile Jesus-believers he addresses in Galatians. How this is possible in an embodied sense—how Paul can understand himself to be law-observant before God while, for example, eating idol food in the home of a gentile—can be grasped through the distinction between extensional activities and intensional dispositions which he has highlighted throughout. The inability of the weak to preserve their orientation 'to' God while eating idol food is a weak epistemological state. The extensional content of Paul's action (eating such food) is not *normally* appropriate for him as a Jew, but *how* Paul eats (to save others) as an expression of his Christ-orientation enables him to craft a variety of circumstance-dependent actions in a morally infallible way.[116]

Paul declares his freedom, which is meant to preserve and develop his own intensional disposition. That disposition, of orientation to Christ, is shaped by the divine

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recognise that its relationship to the divine will could make such obligations flexible or unpredictable at times. My reading agrees with Rudolph's emphasis on the comparative nature of Paul's rhetoric: 'being in Christ is *more important* than being Jewish… he is simply relativizing A to B' (*Jew,* 29–30, 45, italics original). By no means does Paul think the law 'indifferent' in the sense of disinterest or unimportance which haunts the English term (cf. 1.5), and to which Rudolph rightly objects (*Jew,* 9, 10, 41, 46, 211, *et passim*). Such a continuing, but altered obligation to the law could be conceived as Inwood, *Action*, 212–5, describes Stoic action. The same action can be described in terms of the extensional activity and the virtuous action: 'obeying Torah' can be construed as an action which can obey the 'law of Christ', but since such actions do not unconditionally do so, the Jewish believer would assent to the latter with unreserved choice and the former with reserve.

[116] Thanks to Isaac Soon for questions regarding Paul's embodied experience of this reconstruction. Rudolph, *Jew,* 12, also speaks to similar concerns that any interpretation be 'historically realistic' and argues that many overlook the simple fact that Paul's practice would have encountered mixed Jew-gentile settings, and any 'temporary' Torah observance could not have escaped the notice of his fellow Jews and likely been considered 'devious'. However, at least as Paul portrays it, he was apparently outspoken about his views of such practices as valid, but not ultimately determinative. In other words, Paul's default practice is Torah-observance, and he could consider this obligatory as Jewish law and so was not only observing law 'when he was around' other Jews. On the occasions that he did select to adopt gentile practices for the sake of his gospel-preaching, he presumably could have defended his actions along the lines given here—granting of course that not everyone would have found this acceptable, but that he probably would have found such criticisms invalid. In mixed Jew-gentile settings, it seems clear from his report of the Antioch incident that he expected his fellow Jewish Jesus-believers to accept commensality with gentile Jesus-believers, and presumably expected to defend whatever choices he made (maybe even to eat idol food in such settings, as his instructions here imply) on such grounds and the theological arguments explicated in this text. In other words, not all Jewish believers needed to make the same adaptations as Paul made, but he clearly expected them to accept that non-observant practices (or differing standards of observance) were permissible when grounded in the Christ-orientation. Whether or not other Jews would have found his adaptations justified or 'unprincipled' likely would have depended on whether or not they accepted his interpretation of the gospel, but there is no evidence that Paul tried to disguise his actions.

mission to ‘save many’ so that his freedom paradoxically results in service to many, often selecting others’ practices rather than his own. As a Jew who would normally expect to be Torah-observant, this even includes the deselecting of some of Torah’s injunctions, a selection justified, however, by the divine sanction found in a higher norm, the ‘law of Christ’. Thus he can be ‘all things’ to ‘all’ because of the Christ-orientation to ‘save many’, and construed as such, all his selections and deselections, even when in service to others, do not impede his freedom as they arise out of his disposition of Christ-orientation. After the closing of the chiasm with the purpose statement of v22cd (τοῖς πᾶσιν γέγονα πάντα, ἵνα πάντως τινὰς σώσω), Paul adds a further, although related, purpose in v23: πάντα δὲ ποιῶ διὰ τὸ εὐαγγέλιον, ἵνα συνκοινωνὸς αὐτοῦ γένωμαι. With this he indicates a further concern. Paul does all things in order to ‘save many’ as a demonstration of his orientation to Christ under the realisation that if he lacked such orientation he himself would not be included in the ‘many’ saved. As he asserted in 8.1–3, the necessary knowledge was the divine ‘knowing’, resulting in love. Paul has portrayed himself as an administrator building God’s house by gaining ‘many’ to salvation, and all such activity constitutes on his part a demonstration that he himself belongs in the house, a co-participant in the gospel. With this, Paul’s focus shifts from explaining the way in which his reasoning process for selection and deselection maintains his orientation to Christ, to persuading them of the high stakes in maintaining such a disposition.

Paul concludes the setting of his example with a common rhetorical motif, common not only in his wider philosophical and rhetorical milieu but, as was the financial metaphor, to Phil 3. He appeals to their knowledge of the games to underscore the striving required to maintain their orientation to Christ and the worthiness of such an aim. Paul communicates that, just as in a race, there is a clear focal point for all and that those engaged towards it demonstrate self-control in lesser matters. Vv24–5 notice basic features of the athletic race and in vv26–7 Paul applies these features to himself. The point made in v24ab—that all runners are racing but only one receives the prize—is clarified in v24c: run like the one who gets it (which, as v25 describes, and everyone knows, requires tremendous self-control). Within the setting of Paul’s example deselecting an intermediate, the athlete’s self-control illustrates the need to deselect something which would, under other circumstances, have value for him. He exercises such control in all things in order to receive a prize, a scenario which Paul compares to his own work to save many with the gospel. He has a clear goal in mind with his efforts and selections and there is an immortal prize awaiting him and those

who are likeminded. It is, however, this single-minded disposition which is highlighted here, and which must be maintained if the prize is to be won.

Verse 27's statement by Paul that ἀλλὰ ὑπωπιάζω μου τὸ σῶμα καὶ δουλαγωγῶ, need not be read as excessively derogatory towards his body. The specific reference to his body probably arises out of the athletic metaphor, but it is consonant with the example throughout the chapter on deselecting an intermediate. Appropriate actions were derived from κατὰ φύσιν impulses based on self-perception, including one's body, and to deselect what was normally fitting and appropriate for oneself could be described as the cohesive rule of reason over the whole of oneself. Paul's language is forceful, but he envisions a training regimen designed to desensitise oneself to deprivation and even pain, an image not unlike those used in Stoic accounts of the training for wisdom.[117] To enslave one's body is not to *be* enslaved, as v19 asserts (cf. 6.12). Under normal circumstances, what meets one's physical needs has 'reason-giving' value, but if it conflicts with the goal such value is to be disregarded: pain is not normally preferable, but for an athlete in training, the ordinary value of pleasure is inconsequential. Immediately following the depiction of his adaptation to a wide variety of practices, even those not normally appropriate for him as a Torah-observant Jew, he might have in mind the need to occasionally disregard his physical needs and tastes, realities relevant to both material support and dietary practices. The need to maintain his orientation to Christ means that he cannot allow such physical needs or tastes to impede his freedom to willingly preach to all, and he must desensitise himself to the value of such needs. Much depends upon maintaining his single-minded disposition. As he stressed regarding the weak in ch8, as he hinted at in v23, and as he explicitly states here regarding himself, the failure to preserve the orientation to Christ in one's actions could have severe consequences. He envisions the possibility of being disqualified from the race entirely if he does not train himself rigorously enough. This is the reason Paul's boast was so significant for him, to the point that he preferred death over losing it in v15. His boast was his willingness in preaching, the maintenance of his disposition of orientation to Christ, and this alone contributed directly to his τέλος. To endanger this Christ-orientation would have been to risk his own salvation, a final ominous note from his own example which launches him into a section of warning as he turns his attention back directly to the Corinthians and the topic of idol food. If one does not 'do all things' to the end of saving many, this demonstrates a lack of orientation to Christ and thwarts any advantage not only for others but also for oneself.

[117] Cf. 2.7.1 above.

5.3.4 10.1–13: Dangerous desires

In 10.1–22 Paul directly warns the Corinthians of the ruinous end they may face rather than the finish line of the τέλος if they continue in unabated confidence in their knowledge as it stands. With an exemplum drawn from the Jewish scriptures, Paul illustrates the vulnerability to destruction that the Corinthians have if they do not recognise the conditional value of their intermediates. Their 'knowledge', which categorised extensional activities and selections, was woefully inadequate without the necessary intensional disposition of Christ-orientation, as his own example has just emphasised. The ability to do 'all things', even undeniably correct things, was only valid and advantageous insofar as it is derived from the orientation to Christ. Apart from it, correct selection of intermediates would never amount to salvation and instead likely played into their destructive desires.

In vv1–4 Paul rapidly summarises the exodus from Egypt and wandering in the wilderness. He characterises these events in unusual ways, using the language of baptism, describing manna and water from the rock as πνευματικός.[118] This is explained by a description of the rock as πνευματική, since the rock 'was Christ'. This litany of fantastic benefits concludes with the recipients' destruction. In v6 Paul makes his point plain: this is a warning against evil desire.[119] He then goes on in vv7-10 to warn again four specific examples of desires they succumbed to in the wilderness: μηδὲ εἰωλολάτραι γίνεσθε... μηδὲ πορνεύωμεν... μηδὲ ἐκπειράζωμεν τὸν κύριον... μηδὲ γογγύζετε....[120] With v11 he explicitly states that these events happened τυπικῶς, for the instruction of those εἰς οὕς τὰ τέλη τῶν αἰώνων κατήντηκεν. The section concludes with an assurance of divine assistance during temptation.

Paul's example is chosen to amplify the powerlessness of food to effect standing or lack of standing before God (v5; cf. 8.8) by arguing from the lesser to the greater. Even those partaking of food anyone would correctly categorise as appropriate, even advantageous, found that the value of such extensional activities was conditional. As Paul will state

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[118] Paul draws together multiple events from the narrative of the wandering in the Jewish scriptures, cf. Exod 15; 17; 32; Num 20; 25.

[119] Thiselton, *Corinthians*, 731, notes that the δέ here introduces 'a summarizing proposition' and thus ἐπιθυμία is 'the general stance from which the specific four failures of vv7–13 flow'. Cf. G. D. Collier, '"That We Might Not Crave Evil": The Structure and Argument of 1 Corinthians 10.1-13', *JSNT* 17 (1994), 55–75 (74), who describes these verses as a 'self-contained midrash on ἐπιθυμία in Numbers 11 and… not a piece revised in the direction of idolatry per se…' Cf. his discussion of Philo's interpretation of the golden calf incident as ἐπιθυμία (68–72).

[120] Not only idolatry, which is a difficulty for some who read this passage as entirely focused on 'eating in the presence of an idol'.

elsewhere, the kingdom of God is not food and drink (Rom 14.17). The danger lurking is that the impulses, which arose out of self-perception and were related to the intermediate activities and selections as those things 'appropriate', ran the risk of becoming excessive impulses, the πάθη (one of which was ἐπιθυμία). In specific terms, Paul warns them of irrational opinions that an expected thing is a 'good' of the order that only their orientation to Christ could be (rather than merely 'appropriate').[121] Later, when Paul concludes his warning concerning the use of idol food, he will pointedly remark that while they can 'do all things', all things could hardly be judged advantageous. When intermediates are mistakenly judged as advantageous, they have become enslaving desires.

As many have commented, 10.14 could have easily come directly after v11, so it is worth asking what the significance of vv12–13 seems to be for Paul. First, Paul gives his blatant appraisal that the knowledgeable, despite their correct categorisation of idol food as neutral, have failed to exercise due caution and are also at risk. Given their foolhardy assertion of 'knowledge' on this topic, Paul wants them to realise the danger they pose not only to the weak but to themselves as his own example in ch9 has emphasised. He wants to emphasise the inadequacy of their knowledge about correct selection of intermediates apart from an orientation to Christ through such intermediates. He wants them to assess their circumstances at a deeper level than the food and to recognise the myriad situations in which evil desire expresses itself – after all, it is only human. The encouragement is that although even in the best of circumstances evil desires can rear their head, even in the worst of circumstances, they are able to avoid such evil desires via divine enablement (which is the direct exhortation of v14).[122] Paul corrects the inadequate assessments of the knowledgeable, but expects their ability to avoid destruction to be ensured by divine faithfulness. As he stated

[121] Cf. 2.2.2. DL VII.111–14. As Epictetus, *Diatr.* I.18.1–2 states, the passions which led to vice were false beliefs that an intermediate would be expedient (συμφέρω) for oneself: theft begins with the judgement that an item is good, useful or generally contributing to happiness.

[122] The statement of v13d is at first glance mildly confusing – what is meant by the provision of a 'way out' which enables one to 'endure' (which hardly seems to imply a 'way out' of a situation)? It is worth considering that what Paul intends to convey with ἔκβασις is something like the aversion (ἔκκλισις) the Stoic sage cultivated: the avoidance of vice. The wise man's correlate εὐπάθεια to the passion of fear was caution, which DL VII.116 paraphrases as 'rational aversion/avoidance'. Cf. 2.2.2. The sage knew where to proceed with caution and what to avoid: not to fear and worry over externals but over vice, passion, what was truly 'up to him' (in Epictetus' words). The root words of both (βάσις and κλίσις) are nouns of motion which are modified by the preposition ἐκ to convey a diversion or digression from the motion. Interestingly, both also are used to describe grammatical patterns (κλίσις to refer to inflexion and βάσις of metrical rhythm). The two words are strikingly similar grammatically and conceptually, and such a notion would make good sense of the statement—rather than the idea of escape it is an internal avoidance in the midst of the same outward circumstances (which one is still enduring).

in the opening words on the *topos*, the knowledge the Corinthians have presented is, in and of itself, inadequate unless based on divine action.

5.3.5 10.14–22: Warning against idolatry, the intensional disposition associated with the extensional activities

In the next section, which comprises the sternest warning from Paul against idol food, he explains how their knowledge, in its superficial accuracy, could lead them into a direct conflict with their orientation to Christ. Idolatry has already been named as one of the destructive desires, and it is explicitly labelled as the vice he is concerned they avoid here (v14).[123] Paul pointedly does not say to flee idol food and if he identifies use of idol food as idolatry he has utterly failed to make himself clear by this point, not least in 8.4–6.[124] In other words, he maintains the distinction between idol food and idolatry, but is still concerned that the Corinthians' intensional disposition will align disastrously with the extensional activity of eating idol food to constitute participation in idolatry. Passions, such as the desires he has just given examples of, were, in terms of Stoic reasoning, born of incorrect judgements.[125] As Cicero explains, Chrysippus' cure for a passion was showing the afflicted the incorrect assent involved.[126] Paul's stern treatment follows a similar path: sacred customs support and reinforce value judgements, and false value judgements place one in direct conflict with Christ.

After the clear warning of v14, Paul appeals to their sense of judgement and, more slyly, to their professed pre-eminence as the 'knowledgeable': ὡς φρονίμοις λέγω· κρίνατε ὑμεις ὅ φημι.[127] In vv16-20 he then lays out two mutually-exclusive sets of value judgements and the sacred customs which support those judgements. He begins with two parallel rhetorical questions to which he can safely assume a positive response: The cup/bread (of blessing) which we bless/break, is it not a participation in the blood/body of Christ? In other

[123] Cf. 2.5.1.4: φεύγω is the correct response to vice (an intermediate was 'selected' or 'deselected').
[124] As Horrell, *Ethos,* 145, says, 'What Paul does *not* say clearly is when eating idol food (εἰδωλόθυτα) is idol worship (εἰδωλολατρία)'. Vv14–22 are hardly an 'unequivocal denunciation of… eating idol food', as Tomson, *Law*, 189, describes them. Paul's warning is against idolatry, and the food of which they cannot partake is qualified as the 'cup of demons' and the 'table of demons' and by the setting described. Cf. Gäckle, *Starken,* 258: 'Für das oft diskutierte und als spannungsvoll empfundene Verhältnis zu den anderen Teilen von 1 Kor 8,1–11,1 ist von entscheidender Bedeutung, dass Paulus durchgehend zwischen der ethischen Qualität des Götzen*opferfleisches* und des Götzen*dienstes* unterscheidet (vgl. 10,19f.). Diese Differenzierung ist der hermeneutische Schlüssel für die Einheit der drei Kapitel' (cf. 265).
[125] Cf. 2.2.2.
[126] Cicero, *Tusc.* V.60.
[127] Σωφροσύνη, one of the four primary virtues, is a cognate of φρόνησις.

words, the communal act of taking the eucharistic cup and bread was participation in the blood and body of Christ, when accompanied by the collective judgement which the blessing and breaking implied.[128] Verse 17 clarifies how the bread facilitates the joint sharing: there is only one bread, and since all partake of the one bread the many are one body (of Christ, as v16 states). The main point seems to be that the community all share in the same body of Christ and are joined in that advantage through their joint participation in the extensional action of eating and drinking accompanied by the intensional value judgements which the blessing and breaking depict.

As he moves towards explaining the false value judgement implied in the standard practice of eating idol food, in vv18–19 Paul compares the eucharistic meal more generally with other sacred food. The example of Jewish altar-workers illustrates the general rule that the extensional activity of eating sacred food normally implies participation in the intensional disposition of the value judgement: customs are designed to give or reinforce impressions, whether true or false. That Paul here mentions the sacred altar itself (θυσιαστήριον) as correlated to the meals lends support to the view of Gäckle, that in this section Paul addresses not those participating in a meal, or merely eating sacrificed food, but those actually *making* offerings to pagan deities, as only priests would (or, in the Corinthian situation perhaps those involved in leadership of pagan associations).[129] This reading partly relies on assumptions on the part of Paul and his readers regarding the settings and vocabulary here, but that this is the distinction Paul wants to make is perhaps supported by his immediate clarification in v19. He again reiterates his agreement with the knowledgeable that the idol food and the idols are not 'something' (i.e. they are 'nothing'). Having drawn the connection between the sacred customs and the intensional participation they normally support, Paul recognises that he

[128] The resonance with the blessings pronounced over drinks during Jewish meals must not be missed (cf. *Jos. Asen.*, 8.5, 9; 19.5; E. R. Goodenough, *Jewish Symbols in the Greco-Roman Period*, *vol. 6: Fish, Bread, and Wine*; New York: Pantheon Books, 1956, 134–40). The 'sacramentalist' view that there are Graeco-Roman notions of eating with the deity (or even eating the deity itself) in this text cannot be dealt with in depth. However, the distinction between the objects and the judgements made about them must be accounted for, especially in light of 11.17–34 where it is the combination of consumption *and* incorrect judgement that imparts harm. Gäckle, *Die Starken*, 265–9, argues that Paul arrives at the sacramental depiction of the eucharistic meal by way of the analogy to pagan cultic rites, a parallel which fits the 'basic requirements' of his argument.

[129] Gäckle, *Die Starken*, 153–63, 271–3. If, as Petropoulou, *Sacrifices,* 119–22, 180, explains, Jewish sacrificial meals typically were for those who participated or were directly connected to the sacrifice, this could also be what Paul references with v18's analogy. In other words, as Philo emphasises, and historical evidence affirms, Jewish sacrifices and ensuing banqueting practices were more 'vertical', i.e. directly engaging the intensional disposition towards the deity involved. Graeco-Roman meals could have a similar nature at times (as Gäckle gives evidence for), but tended, on the whole to a more 'horizontal' nature, a divergence which Paul is attempting to grapple with here. When Graeco-Roman cultic meals were framed to engage the participants' worship in more direct fashion, as Jewish sacred meals were wont to, he views it as inherently more problematic given such settings' more sacred nature.

might be understood to deny the neutrality of cultic food and rebuffs that response with a rhetorical question. Regardless of whether such a distinction between those making offerings and those simply joining meals is in view, Paul reiterates a distinction he has drawn throughout between the selection or activity itself and the disposition of those selecting it.

With v20 Paul lands upon his concern: those who participate in such sacred meals normally do so not with the judgement that they are 'nothing', but with the judgement that they receive benefit from such divine beings. Such divine beings are indeed 'nothing' in comparison to God, but are also, in fact, demons in conflict with him.[130] The extensional activity alone may be nothing, but it can be used to reinforce dangerous false impressions. As the case of the weak in ch8 illustrates, the customs of pagan piety give false impressions to which some participants assent: that idols are 'something' to which they eat and from which they derive benefit. Eating 'to' anything besides the one God and lord is false, but Paul reveals the cosmological level of the threat to which they expose themselves. The knowledgeable thought they had achieved a coup d'état with their knowledge, but in fact had only been dealing with figureheads all along.

The very real conflict which, to Paul's mind, lay behind such value judgements explains why they could be so destructive, as the case of the weak and the *exempla* of vv1–10 demonstrated. The Stoic categories and paradoxes rhetorically minimise realities which need such treatment ironically because they *do* pose a threat. The distinction is that the threat impulses pose is an error on the part of the reasoning agent rather than an active agent in its own right. Paul's minimising rhetoric of calling the idols 'nothing' is an effective strategy to reorient the believers epistemologically towards the first-order value, but he will not allow it to deny the metaphysics his theology requires. Paul's appeal to the Corinthians' judgement here does not minimise the conflict, or locate the conflict within the Corinthians' inner selves

[130] As Tomson, *Law*, 156–7, notes, Paul reflects two different strands of Jewish thought on idols. The 'iconoclastic sarcasm', in the tradition of the prophets, is reflected in the minimising rhetoric of 'nothing', while the 'non-rational', associated with apocalyptic literature, surfaces in his view of the idols as demons. Whether this constitutes an unwitting 'contradiction' (202) on Paul's part, though, is debatable, as the parallel structure of Stoic thought can illustrate. In Stoicism, the minimising rhetoric towards intermediates did not eliminate the recognition of their ability to give impulsive impressions which could result in excessive impulses (πάθη), and ultimately, destruction. The distinction, of course, is that the Stoics conceived of opposition to divine reason in terms of passive error, rather than an active opposition, such as Paul's demons pose (cf. DL VII.89; Cleanthes, *Hymn*, 11–13). Paul's *cosmos,* in other words, is an open rather than closed one, but in ethical discourse, it was not necessarily contradictory to combine minimising rhetoric describing a selection, on the one hand, with description of a genuine risk it posed on the other. Despite its pantheistic closed system, there was a functional hierarchy and a functional dualism within Stoicism's ethical reasoning: vice and virtue, which constituted either κακοδαιμονία or εὐδαιμονία. Whether or not a neutral intermediate's selection would contribute towards either one was down to the intensional disposition of the ethical agent, a Stoic formula Paul can map onto a struggle he perceives within his open cosmology.

at the expense of the cosmos.[131] Rather, his call to the Corinthians to evaluate is an invitation to assess the true extremities of the conflicting judgements, which are not only errors but siren calls of divine foes, with saving or destroying ends. The demons pose a genuine challenge which Paul marshals the methods of ethical reasoning to combat. At the same time, Paul does not expect such methods alone to be sufficient: from 8.1 he has argued that any knowledge they claim is only valid insofar as it arises out of the divine knowing. The believers are vulnerable to impressions, even false ones, but God's faithfulness to his own makes it possible to avoid capitulation (vv12–13); temptation is human, and so is opposition with divine enablement.[132]

To participate in such extensional pagan customs with the intensional value judgements they support, to offer sacrifices 'to' another than the one God, is to commit idolatry (v20). Those who partake in virtue or vice, and the actions which partake of virtue or vice, are also vicious or virtuous.[133] The value judgement of the intensional disposition, which the extensional activity of pagan piety supports, is incontrovertibly contrary to the value judgement of the intensional disposition, which the extensional activity of the eucharist

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[131] Wasserman, *Apocalypse,* argues that 'The idea of dualistic ages and rulers continues to play an outsized role in the discussion about Christian apocalyptic thought, especially as it relates to Paul' (8), and that demons are presented by Paul as 'subordinates of the high god' (14), 'in fact divine beings of different ranks' (15). Paul's use of philosophical discourse, on the other hand, reveals that he gives 'pride of place to an intimate, inner conflict' (200), a discourse which he 'consistently organizes… around rather traditional notions of divine rule, election, and righteous victimization' (202). The inner ethical struggle urged by Paul, Wasserman argues, is not one engaged in a dualistic conflict, but one participating in the continuum of the *scala naturae* (173–4). Paul's use of ethical reasoning here, however, plays into a dualistic framework (cf. fn. 129 above), but one into which he weaves his perception of active agents in opposition to God.

[132] S. G. Eastman, *Paul and the Person: Reframing Paul's Anthropology* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2017) argues for Paul's view of the self as one which is 'always and irreducibly constituted interpersonally' (167) and 'intersubjective all the way down' (178). While it is agreed that Paul views the self as permeable to its environment, Paul also envisions a part of the self which is resistant to such elements, although only through divine enablement. This is alternatively the 'mind of Christ' or the Spirit's inhabitation of believers, etc.; at 9.19–23 it is the 'law of Christ' which enables him to participate in practices whilst holding his epistemological position before God.

[133] Cf. 2.4; 2.7.3 above. DL VII.94–5: τοιοῦτον δ'εἶναι τὴν ἀρετήν, ὥς τε μετέχοντα τάς τε πράξεις τὰς κατ' ἀρετῆν καὶ τοὺς σπουδαίους εἶναι... ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ τῶν κακιῶν... μετέχοντα δὲ κακίας τάς τε πράξεις τὰς κατὰ κακίαν καὶ τοὺς φαύλους. Epictetus, *Diatr*. II.19.13–5, 27–8; Cicero, *Fin.* III.69–70, Stobaeus, *Ecl.* II.7.5a; Philo, *Prob.* 150. It should be noted that this is one of the ways Plato portrays Socrates discussing the selections categorised by the Stoics as intermediates: they are things which could participate (μετέχω) in *either* virtue or vice, cf. Plato, *Gorg.* 468a. This is similar to Stoics' statements about people and activities which participate in virtue. As LS1, 376, explains, while such 'intermediate goods' as friends do not constitute happiness in the way that virtue does, they contain virtue as one of their parts and are thus compatible with virtue. This participation, also expressed with the terminology of κοινός/ κοινωνία was the joint participation in virtue and reason, and was the basis for true (strictly speaking, only) friendship and the notion of cosmopolitanism. The Stoics commonly stated that only the wise are really friends (κοινωνός) and that all things are common (κοινός) to the wise. What they meant was not that there were no relationships amongst the ordinary population, but that the possibility of any good society (κοινωνία) was predicated upon the underlying shared rationality of humanity (hence the possibility for cosmopolitanism). DL VII.95, 124; Epictetus, *Diatr.* I.9.5, II.20.6–8, 20, II.22, 9, 14, 31; Stobaeus, *Ecl.* II.7.11d; Cicero, *Off.* I.55, III.69; M. Aur. *Med.* X.24, XII.26.

supports. To eat or drink with the epistemological posture of the pagans, is to participate in the idolatry itself. The believers must understand that they cannot participate in such activities with the same epistemological posture with which the pagans participate in them. The food and the cup are 'nothing', but they are the 'cup of demons' when offered 'to' any other than 'to' the one God, the same destructive disposition which the weak had acquired through such customs at 8.7 (τινὲς δὲ τῇ συνηθείᾳ ἕως ἄρτι τοῦ εἰδώλου ὡς εἰδωλόθυτον ἐσθίουσιν). In v21 Paul states in unequivocal terms that the believers cannot drink the cup offered to the Lord and drink the cup offered to demons; a believer cannot partake of the table offered to the Lord and the table offered to demons. The assumption that to μετέχω or κοινωνέω in either table or cup depends upon value judgements, the intensional disposition rather than the extensional activity alone, is confirmed by Paul's move, in v23, to directly address their judgements on the basis of advantage and 'building' potential. 'It is impossible to judge one thing to be expedient (συμφέρω) and have impulse toward another at the same time', says Epictetus.[134]

Due to the incorrect value judgement, and the cosmic conflict embedded in such judgements, partaking in the two tables (i.e. participating in the extensional activity with the intended intensional disposition, such as would constitute virtue or vice) is mutually exclusive. One could not judge *both* that the meal of Christ gave advantage *and* that the meal of idols gave advantage. Both could not be truly advantageous, and to eat idol food with that disposition, as the weak were in danger of doing, was destructive. Paul prohibits idolatry—whether or not particular believers' use of idol food constituted such would be at times ambiguous to others, but Paul clearly thinks that anyone putting themselves in such a situation was in danger of overestimating their epistemological strength. The knowledge of some of the Corinthians, despite being technically correct, has 'puffed' them up with unwarranted confidence to the point that they act as if they can even challenge the Lord (v22).[135] If they are truly those known by God, why would they arouse his jealousy? As Paul concludes his warning, he leaves implications hanging heavy in the air: it may be possible for a believer to participate in the extensional activities of pagan cultic meals without the disposition of an idolater, but what advantage are they hoping to gain? If they judge, as their

[134] Epictetus, *Diatr.* I.18.1–3. Cf. IV.6.31: ἔργον ἔργῳ οὐ κοινωνεῖ. Cf. IV.10.24 where the same proverb is cited elliptically. He quotes the *Golden Verses* attributed to Pythagoras, a favourite of many, including the Stoics. Cf. J. C. Thom, 'Cleanthes, Chrysippus and the Pythagorean "Golden Verses"', *AC* 44 (2001), 197—219.
[135] A citation of Deut 32.21 (cf. Deut 32.17; 1 Cor 10.20).

participation in the eucharistic meal implies, the Christ-orientation to have first-order value, why are they contending for this?

5.3.6 10.23–11.1: Recapitulation of instructions on the topos

Paul begins a recapitulation of his instructions regarding idol food by repeating their slogan (again, possibly derived from him), but with the addition of two further evaluations he wants them to make in their reasoning on the topic. He affirms that they 'can do all things', but they need to realise that not all things give advantage (συμφέρω) or build (οἰκοδομέω). With this, Paul reiterates the neutrality of such practices, but reminds them that such value is irrelevant if it conflicts with the first-order value. The language of συμφέρω/σύμφορος, it will be recalled, describes the advantage associated with the good. As Cicero relays from Panaetius, anything which is not virtuous cannot possibly be advantageous[136]—if something is considered to be advantageous but conflicts with virtue, then it only *seems* to be advantageous.[137] Paul's first addition to their slogan, then, is a reminder that any assessment of an intermediate's second-order value is conditional. Their practices *qua* gentile are neutral, and they may select based on the objective value they perceive such practices to have (as his own example illustrated in 9.1–14), but such value does not give advantage if it conflicts with the orientation to Christ. The objective, 'reason-giving' value such selections may have is no longer the paramount consideration in such circumstances. As the first-order value, orientation to Christ, is shaped by the Christ-event, Paul adds a second evaluation to the slogan: they can do all things, but not when it fails to build what belongs to God. He further specifies (v24) that this entails not seeking one's own advantage/building, but that of others.[138] With these two statements Paul asserts that their freedom to 'do all things' is

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[136] Cf. 2.5.2.5; Cicero, *Off.* III.11. Long, '*De Officiis*', 321: 'The case against glory as an unconditional objective was that its pursuit had frequently been in conflict with justice. The case to be mounted in its favour will be that it is something "useful" (*utile*) if and only if it is secured on the basis of justice'. *Utilitas* is Cicero's equivalent for σύμφορος.

[137] Cicero, *Off.* III.11–13.

[138] A statement which, in my opinion, departs from extant Stoic thought. While a Stoic should never harm another in seeking advantage, and while the advantage of each should contribute to the advantage of all and vice versa, and thus it was preferred to seek the common good, it was assumed that each would naturally seek his or her own advantage, even when they sought the advantage of others. Οἰκείωσις was the basis for justice, but the second type of οἰκείωσις (appropriation of things outside oneself, including others) developed on the basis of the first type (self-perception and appropriating of oneself), and there is no evidence that the priority was reversed in similar fashion to Paul's statement. Stoicism stressed an understanding of one's interest which took others' into account, a fact which Hierocles' concentric circles of οἰκείωσις imagined—but self remained at the centre of the circles, not others. If Paul only said to 'seek the things of others' this could be read as a reminder that one's own advantage required one to be mindful of others as well (as Stoicism stressed)—but v24a's instruction that 'no one is to see his or her own things' admits of the possibility of a conflict between the interests of oneself and others *and* instructs that they are to give priority to the advantage of others *over* their own. The assumption,

grounded on the orientation to Christ, and is thus invalid if it conflicts with it. Further, that orientation demands that they, as those appropriated to God, build what is his: the many others to be saved. Inherent in their own Christ-orientation, the basis of their freedom, is a disposition to take others' development into account so they can be built up 'to' God—to cavalierly disregard this is to deny one's own orientation to Christ, and portend one's destruction. Nothing could be less advantageous to Paul's mind. With these two additions, then, Paul tempers the knowledgeable's simplistic assessment of the neutrality of all things by recalling an element of Stoic ethical reasoning (that selection of an intermediate cannot conflict with a good), but defines it in terms of the Christ-event.

Verses 25–30 give two more specific examples of the reasoning process Paul aims for the Corinthians to have on this topic. Vv25–6 describe the scenario of food purchased at the market and Paul offers the kind of scriptural knowledge which can be used to reinforce the proper self-perception, which echoes the thought of 8.6: all things are from God as the earth

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more at home in Stoic thought, that seeking others' advantage could also lead to one's own advantage is present in parts of Paul's argument (9.23, 27), but the injunction *not to seek one's own gain* is stronger than one finds any Stoic saying. While the Stoic doctrine of virtue was intrinsically other-regarding (i.e. justice), this cannot be conceived in opposition to one's own advantage in their pantheistic system. For example, Long, *Guide,* 3, says, comparing Epictetus' theology to Christian theology: 'His ethical outlook includes stark appeals to self-interest, which ask persons to value their individual selves over everything else…' Cf. Cicero, *Off.* III.42; Marc. Aur. *Med.* V.16. This is contra Engberg-Pedersen, 'Relationship', 52; *Oikeiosis*, 116–27; 'Radical Altruism in Philippians 2:4', in *Early Christianity and Classical Culture: Comparative Studies in Honor of Abraham J. Malberbe* (eds. J. T. Fitzgerald, T. H. Olbright, and L. M. White; Leiden: Brill, 2003), 197–214. Engberg-Pedersen cites Cicero, *Off*. III.64 in this regard as offering a form of 'radical altruism' based on οἰκείωσις, and in particular the development into rationality whereby one 'sees himself' as rational and other rational beings as belonging to him. While the development of rationality does lead to recognition of the common good, and desire for benefitting others, it is not clear that it leads to something like 'the movement of self-identification "from I to we"… [which] leaves behind the original focus on the self' ('Altruism', 202). As mentioned, Hierocles' circles (which Engberg-Pedersen does not reference) which illustrate οἰκείωσις place the self in the literal centre. In the text Engberg-Pedersen cites (*Off.* III.64) it is unclear that human rationality provides more than an elevation of an impulse: non-human animals are also said to 'do things for the sake of others' (*aliorum etiam causa quaedam faciunt*, III.63), and while we should 'prefer the common advantage to our own', this is because 'each one of us is a part in this universe'. A few lines later this thought is clarified: no one should betray the common advantage to seek his own advantage. Several paragraphs later, the wise man is described as one who might 'hold his friends' interests as dear as his own' but 'others say that a man's own interests must necessarily be dearer to him' (III.70, trans. LCL). The ideal expressed is that the wise will concern himself with others' interests perhaps, perhaps even as much as his own, and never defraud another (or the common good) for his own advantage. The only place where perhaps the ethical ideal suggests *not* seeking one's own advantage (without entailing obvious harm to another) is the statement to 'prefer the common advantage to our own' (*commune utilitatem nostrae anteponamus*), but given the previous sentence it likely assumes that one's own advantage is *also* served by the common advantage, or that the preference is required *on the occasion* that one's personal advantage would be at the expense of the common advantage (a reading which the ensuing statements support). Thus while it says to 'prefer' the common advantage over one's own, it likely does not mean something as strong as 'do not seek your own advantage'. Engberg-Pedersen rightly notes that Paul does not introduce altruism, even perhaps 'radical altruism' (and that neither Paul nor the Stoic forms of altruism demand a 'principled denial of self'), but the grounding and emphasis is different. While the Stoic ethical ideal explained that the centering of one's own advantage (happiness) demanded that others' advantage be taken into account (justice), Paul demanded the centering of others' advantage (the Christ-orientation) for any advantage for the self (salvation).

is the Lord's.[139] Given the knowledgeable's comfort with idol food, these verses are likely directed to the weak.[140] This food, consumed with this intensional disposition, as accepting it from God and informed by scripture, builds the believer up into eating 'to' God, as v31 will summarise. Paul instructs them to eat everything they find, without further evaluation since one can readily eat the food as from God, and, in fact, asking may cause them to doubt the knowledge which they should only strengthen.[141] Paul does not direct the knowledgeable to 'educate' the weak and he does not force the weak to partake knowingly of idol foods, but he

[139] 10.26 quotes LXX Ps 23.1b, differing only by Paul's addition of the argumentative γάρ.

[140] It cannot entirely be ruled out that the self-perception of the food-seller is not in view (as it is the self-perception of the host that is in view in vv27d, 28c). However, given the explanation of v26, unless the food-seller was identified as a believer, it is difficult to see how this could apply to their self-perception. Paul's description of his own self-perception in v30 in terms which reflect the knowledge he shares in v26 (with thanks), supports the interpretation that this is probably the believer's (i.e. buyer's) self-perception in view.

[141] The statement of Barrett, 'Things', 146, that 'Paul is nowhere more un-Jewish than in his μηδὲν ἀνακρίνοντες' puts a finger on Paul's departure from records of Jewish practice at the time. Cf. *m. Avod. Zar.* 2.3; *Jos. Asen.* 10.14; 12.5. Some texts, such as *4 Macc* 5.8; Dan 1.5–16; Josephus, *A. J.* X.190; *Vita* 15, specify meat as problematic without specifying the concern of idolatry. The conflation of concern over idolatry, the impurity it rendered, unclean animals and slaughtering methods create difficulty in specifying such concerns, but the conflation also contributes to more general statements to avoid gentile food, or concerns for Jewish sources for food generally; cf. 4.3.4. Of course this does not mean that no Jews ever purchased gentile foodstuffs, or even idol food—however, we have no record of such a position being advocated by someone in authority of a community such as Paul is here. As Tomson, *Law*, 153–4, says: 'But even if it was not observed by all, or not with equal strictness at all times, the concept of impurity caused by idolatry was a major theme both in the early and, though various transformations, in the later halakha governing relations with gentiles. Correspondingly early post-exilic sources mention Jews, either in Palestine or in the diaspora, abstaining from wine, oil, bread and other food deriving from or prepared by gentiles… The evidence both of external and internal literary sources and of archaeology indicates that Jewish idolatry was extremely rare, either in Palestine or in the diaspora'. Tomson, though, 208, describes 10.23–11.1 as Paul's attempt to 'define what is idol food in doubtful cases'. Rudolph, *Jew,* 97, 101, responds to Barrett's statement by arguing, similarly to Tomson, that Paul addresses food of 'indeterminate' or 'not specified' status. Tomson states that, as later rabbinic halakha would do, Paul's instructions are meant to delineate which food is prohibited when it 'is not clear and nobody is there to ask' (209). Tomson highlights the ways in which the halakhic literature defined idolatry, even in terms of using idol food, as idolatrous intention on the part of the gentile (or the gentile's perception of a Jewish individual's intention). The reading of συνείδησις along these lines is, in some ways, similar to the reading as self-perception. However, the halakha he surveys place responsibility on the part of the Jewish purchaser, or user (or person receiving benefit in other ways from it) to discern that intention. Paul's approach is not to develop rules by which the believer can discern the idolatrous intention of others, but to rely upon another's declaration of such intention. Even in such a case (v28), Paul takes pains to clarify that the concern is not that in eating the food the believer would then be participating in idolatry (vv29–30)—his 'intention' was correct! Paul acknowledges the role of intention in similar fashion to the rabbis (and which Philo emphasises somewhat differently), and is likewise concerned to avoid idolatry, but he isolates the intensional disposition (or intention) of the believer himself in defining idolatrous action. On the other hand, the believer is at risk of destruction if his or her disposition is not also concerned to support correct (i.e. Christ-oriented) self-perception in others. Thus while Barrett's classification of the instructions of Paul as 'un-Jewish' is problematic, his sense that they did differ significantly from other evidenced positions within ancient Judaism is correct. As M. Bockmuehl, in an appreciative review of Tomson, *Law*, *JTS* 42 (1991), 682–88 (688) notes, 'whether and why such a "halakhic" Paul would have been considered an apostate by his Jewish (and Jewish Christian) contemporaries' is not addressed. Cf. Gäckle, *Die Starken*, 276–79, who critiques Tomson's thesis and summarises that Paul departs from the rabbis' position when he allows limited participation in meals, but still stays firmly within a Jewish frame of reference by denouncing idolatry: 'Zusammenfassend lässt sich konstatieren, dass Paulus mit seiner Regelung in 1 Kor 8,1—11,1 zwar weit über die atl. und erst recht rabbinischen Speisegebote hinausgeht, aber mit seinem grundsätzlichen „Nein'' zum Götzendienst (1 Kor 6,9; 10,14–22; Gal 5,20) und bedingten „Ja'' zur Teilnahme an Kultmählern durchaus im Rahmen jüdischer Prinzipien bleibt' (279).

gently prods them to take the opportunity to grasp firmly the true impression that all belongs to God in a setting where their previous customs would not be available to provide temptation to false judgements.[142]

The second example Paul offers, in vv27–30, is that of an invitation to a meal hosted by an unbeliever where it is assumed that idol food is potentially served. It also is not patently stated, as most scholars seem to assume, that the invitation is to the unbeliever's home—the invitation could have been to a meal in a public space with ambiguous or indeterminate levels of cultic association which might make the temptation involved difficult to judge ahead of time.[143] Paul's instruction here includes the addendum that the believer should attend the meal 'if he wants to go' which creates flexibility based on what he knows about the setting, host, occasion and his own particular epistemological state and vulnerability to desire. If the guest wishes to attend, Paul's advice is the same as that for the market: eat whatever is placed before you without further evaluation in order to reinforce the self-perception as one receiving benefit from God.[144]

However, he follows this with one significant caveat: if someone pointedly highlights to you the nature of the food as sacrificial, you should not eat. This informant is not clearly labelled by Paul and because in v30 Paul speaks of hypothetical slander some have read this as a fellow believer.[145] However, it is difficult to understand under what circumstances a weak believer who would censure such consumption would be alongside the other at such a meal. The informant's description of the food as ἱερόθυτος rather than εἰδωλόθυτος confirms

[142] Since presumably no cultic practices or settings would be as prevalent or obvious in the market—although, given the configuration of the *macellum* in Pompeii where it seems the sacrificial slaughter was performed onsite, it is hard to rule this out completely.

[143] The dining facilities adjoined to the Lerna and Asklepeion as well as some of the facilities on the side of the Acrocorinth near the Demeter and Kore sanctuary could all have been such spaces as well as many private meals (which could have, as politically-motivated events or simply hosted by a particularly zealous host, included traditional piety).

[144] Rudolph, *Jew*, 183–90, demonstrates the close relationship of v27b (πᾶν τὸ παρατιθέμενον ὑμῖν ἐσθίετε) and Lk 10.8b (ἐσθίετε τὰ παρατιθέμενα ὑμῖν) and reads the instructions as following a 'rule of adaptation' from Jesus traditions. This is intriguing and persuasive, but must be read in the context of Paul's interpretation, which uses it in gentile contexts, adds πᾶς, and the following clause (μηδὲν ἀνακρίνοντες). The possible allusions to synoptic traditions elsewhere in this section (9.14 and Lk 10.7; cf. Lk 10.38–42 and 7.32–35's μεριμνάω, περισπάω, and ἀπερίσπαστος, cf.; σκάνδαλον in Lk 17.1, cf. 8.13) are suggestive, but cannot be handled in depth here. Cf. Fjarstedt, *Synoptic,* 65–96; P. Richardson, 'Gospel traditions in the Church in Corinth (with Apologies to B. H. Streeter)', in *Tradition and Interpretation in the New Testament* (eds. G. F. Hawhorne, O. Betz; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1987), 301–18.

[145] In favour of the identity of the informant as a fellow believer is Paul's use in v28 of μηνύω, which can have connotations of informing (in the sense of espionage). Cf. LSJ, s.v 'μηνύω', II. However this could simply mean that the believer was previously unaware of this fact (due to avoiding evaluation as Paul had instructed). Tomson, *Law*, 204, agrees that the 'informant' is best explained as a pagan rather than fellow believer, given the use of ἱερόθυτον, and the likely grouping of two pagan settings in vv23–30.

their identity as a pagan. It is also most likely the host, already described as an unbeliever, who would know the origin of the food. The pointed nature of the remark, in contrast to common knowledge or a prayer over the meal, is indicated by several markers in the text. In the first place, it is spoken directly ὑμῖν ('to you') and is an explicit description of the food (τοῦτο ἱερόθυτόν ἐστιν)—a rather strange description if Paul intended to reference something like a customary prayer or common knowledge. Indeed, since nearly every social occasion contained such a prayer or libation, Paul most likely has in mind a specific remark directed at the believer accentuating the sacred nature of the food. Paul explicitly states that it is the self-perception of this informant that is in view in avoiding the idol food, not the self-perception of the believer (that is the focus of the warnings in vv1–22). The believing guest, then, avoids the idol food in such circumstances to avoid reinforcing the false value judgement implicit in the unbeliever's statement—to eat the food on the heels of such an exchange would reinforce the unbeliever's incorrect self-perception as one receiving benefit from one other than God. This would impede the process of such a person being appropriated by the true God and thus be in conflict with the believer's own orientation to Christ.

Paul's forceful reaction in vv29–30 is revealing, as discussed above.[146] It is to be noted again that he can assume that his self-perception is part of the basis upon which he can evaluate what has conditional, second-order value for him. His description of partaking with thanks reflects, in reverse, the example of those participating in idolatry: he appropriates the extensional activity to himself with the intensional disposition that it is from God, thus perfecting an intermediate into a complete 'right action'. In brief, he reiterates that his use of

[146] Cf. the excursus above on συνείδησις. Vv29b–30 have been notoriously difficult due both to their unexpected tone and to confusion over how the two questions relate to each other. The γάρ of v29b evidences a logical connection between the statement of v29a and 29b 'as though he were about to go on to explain further how another's conscience, not one's own, modifies behaviour in this case' (Fee, *Corinthians*, 486), but he instead goes on to affirm the opposite, that one's behaviour is *not* based on the judgement of another's 'conscience'. Thiselton, *Corinthians*, 788–92, argues, based on interpretation of the larger context as deliberative rhetoric, that the shift to first person should be viewed as a generalising shift to 10.31-11.1 with additional 'vigor'. Cf. D. F. Watson, '1 Cor 10:23-11:1 In the Light of Greco-Roman Rhetoric: the Role of Rhetorical Questions,' *JBL* 108 (1989), 301–18. Taken this way, the idea expressed is that 'when I say to forgo eating on account of self-perception, I mean theirs of course, for our freedom to eat has already been determined by your own self-perception and judgements (that everything is of God)'. The question of v29b 'why would anyone else's self-perception judge my freedom'? is rhetorical, assuming that the Corinthians agree with him that no one *else's* self-perception could judge his freedom. This assumption is expressed then in another rhetorical question in v30: 'If I partake with thankfulness (i.e. proper intensional disposition), how could I experience shame (the opposite of freedom)'? In other words, since only my self-perception can determine my freedom—and I have determined so in this circumstance—I should have no shame. This construction then implies that following the judgement of others could bring shame, a conclusion which fits well within a Stoic frame of reference—freedom is the authority of independent action and slavery the negation of the same, Diogenes Laertius, *Lives*, VII.122.

such practices—even in the example of deselection due to another's self-perception—is freedom, not slavery to another's judgement, which would be shameful.[147]

Paul's description of his own perfection of an intermediate practice by way of the correct intensional disposition concludes the specific examples of ethical reasoning on idol food and he shifts to generalise his instructions. The statement of v31 encapsulates in grand simplicity the nearly limitless variety of intermediates which the Corinthians must assess and judge (in the sense of opinion which δόξα can carry), and the need to do all 'to' God, which have dominated Paul's instructions on the topic. In the briefest of forms, Paul's maxim exhorts the Corinthians to do all extensional activities with the proper intensional disposition, one reflecting the monotheistic theology of 8.4-6, but having been considerably augmented in the intervening text which explicates the reconfiguration demanded by the Christ-event. As 10.32–11.1 summarise, the disposition involved in doing anything 'to' God is that of the Christ-orientation: seeking to save many as Christ did.

This disposition precludes knowingly impeding the divine appropriation of others through the gospel, even if such impediments are their own weaknesses and embodied customs.[148] The three groups Paul lists map roughly onto the groups given in 9.19–23 although without the earlier emphasis on legal obligation.[149] To 'please others' is to have the recognition, as exemplified by Paul in 9.19–23, of the indirect, but ineliminable role that others' epistemological development, including their own customs and experiences, has in their appropriation by God. This recognition inevitably requires one to adapt at times to facilitate the divine appropriation of others, whose worth has been determined by the economy of the Christ-event. Paul summarises his own practice in selecting intermediates in v33 combining language of 9.19, 22, 23 (πᾶς, πολύς, σῴζω), 10.23 (σύμφορος) and 10.24 (μὴ

[147] This interpretation takes βλασφημέω in the sense of 'speak ill', LSJ, s.v 'βλασφημέω', 2, with the shame such actions would entail. This possibility then would stand conceptually opposed, both in terms of Stoic motifs of freedom and the motifs of boldness and freedom associated with συνείδησις. Cf. Bosman, 'Cowards', 70–1. Such a reading coincides with Paul's language in 9.15–18 which he is perhaps in part recapitulating here: Paul was concerned that he not be unduly influenced by others' opinions and lose his freedom to adapt as necessary in preaching the gospel, and be deprived of his boast. To follow the judgements of others rather than making selections based one's own self-perception is not freedom or a thing to boast in, but shameful and enslaving. The deselection Paul illustrates and wishes the Corinthians to adopt does not arise out of slavery to others' judgements but out of one's own self-perception as one belonging to God through Christ, which subsequently values others' progress towards the same self-perception.

[148] V32 explicitly reminds the knowledgeable of their responsibility, discussed in 8.1-13, to avoid causing stumbling in this progress. Ἀπρόσκοπος is cognate to πρόσκομμα of 8.9 and ἐγκοπή of 9.12, all derived in part from κόπτω, which is a synonym of τύπτω of 8.12. All of this indicates that Paul envisions a similar problem: the creation of a false impression which would be a spiritually destructive obstacle to others' progress in the gospel.

[149] Jews of 10.32 :: Jews and those 'under the law' of 9.20, Greeks of 10.32 :: the lawless of 9.21, the assembly of God :: the weak of 9.22.

ζητῶν τὸ ἐμαυτοῦ) which ties together many strands of the larger section. The statement also specifies the nature of the advantage Paul has in mind (salvation) which requires pleasing others,[150] and placing priority on the advantage of others over one's own (which, as ch9 explained, ultimately furthers one's own salvation and, thus, advantage). With his final statement on this topic (11.1), Paul not only reiterates the call to follow his example but states that his practice is grounded in the example of Christ himself. With this final note Paul challenges the Corinthians to again affirm the first-order value they have assented to. True knowledge arises out of the divine knowing, and any freedom to 'do all things' is grounded in the Christ-orientation to 'save many'.

5.4 Conclusion

In 8.1–11.1 Paul instructs the Corinthian believers that they must avoid idolatry and knowingly reinforcing the idolatry of others, and this means that they should avoid idol food in some circumstances. He does not clearly identify idolatry with particular foods or settings, but carefully maintains the neutrality of their gentile foods and practices throughout. This neutrality is based on the Christological monotheism which some of the Corinthians claim as 'knowledge', and Paul affirms that they have authority to 'do all things' as those who are 'to' the one God 'from' whom are all things. However, the authority to maintain such gentile practices is grounded in their orientation to Christ, 'through' whom 'many' are saved. This freedom, awarded to them by their Christ-orientation, is their unimpeded authority to use 'all things' towards salvation. The failure of their current use of idol food to demonstrate orientation to Christ thus cannot be defended as freedom since it would lead, unchecked, to their destruction. Paul is convinced that the Christ-event has rendered all practices neutral in comparison to itself, and he assiduously avoids requiring particular practices of the gentiles, but he prohibits their practice when it conflicts with their orientation to Christ. In his sternest warning, 10.1–22, Paul is concerned that some Corinthians are engaged in cultic activities and roles which unavoidably involve the false value judgements of idolatry, a direct conflict with the value judgement they have made about Christ. This, he makes clear, is more than epistemological error, but a genuine conflict with potentially destructive outcomes. In 10.23–30 and 8.7–13 he warns that disregard for the ineliminable epistemological development of

[150] This statement must be understood within the confines of Paul's example in ch9 as well as the stress on freedom being built upon one's own self-perception. In the context, to 'please' means accommodating oneself to others' known, indicated spiritual vulnerabilities to promote their salvation or prevent their destruction.

others is also a conflict with their orientation to Christ. Paul gives his own example as a pattern of reasoning in ch9: he can 'do all' (conceived here as 'serving all'), and select practices for their defensibly objective value, yet must deselect them if they conflict with the orientation to Christ (to 'save many')—this is freedom, he asserts. Any correct ethical reasoning—knowledge 'as one needs to know'—arises out of the divine appropriation to God through Christ. The believers are to do all things to God, to build what belongs to him, and seek the advantage of others, as those oriented to Christ, who 'saved many'.[151]

In these chapters Paul evidences the second pattern of discourse on the intermediates, which acknowledges the objective value of some practices and selections, such as the practice of material support for apostles, of gentile food purchased at the market, and shared meals with others, even unbelievers. The second-order value of such practices, however, is not the paramount consideration to be made when they conflict with the first-order value. In such cases, although the selections may appear advantageous (and even retain an objective value in general), they ultimately cannot be. Therefore, Paul advises the Corinthians to avoid idol food in some circumstances, a practice sure to be perceived as Jewish by those in their community.[152] Paul's comments indicate his awareness that the practice will be perceived this way, and his awareness of its association with the Torah, but grounds his instructions in the potential conflict idol food might create with the Christ-orientation. He never once states a general requirement that the believers are to refrain from idol food, which would be the

[151] Although it is not the stated aim of the section, Paul's inclusion of Christ into the *Shema* reconceives the nature of worship of the Jewish God to appropriate all people and customs. In short, to worship the one God now means to desire to save many. However, the shape of the divine appropriation, in its neutralising of all practices, does not render them useless but useful in their objective value for different people. The divine knowing of the weak, of gentiles, etc. preserves the 'reason-giving' force and second-order value of their practices, and Paul's reasoning acknowledges the indirect role they play in the ineliminable epistemological development of believers.

[152] In other words, I agree in part with the statement of Fredriksen, *Apostle*, 112: 'Paul's polarizing rhetoric in Galatians masks the degree to which his too, is a judaizing gospel, *one that would have been readily recognized as such by his own contemporaries.* "To Judaize" normally indicated an outsider's assumption of (some) Jewish customs. (It was an elastic term, and Paul for rhetorical purposes stretched it considerably in Galatians…)… By radically, exclusively affiliating to Israel's god, Paul's *ethne* were to assume that public behaviour universally identified, by pagans and Jews alike, as uniquely Jewish. That is to say, Paul's gentiles—by the normal and contemporary definition of the term—Judaized'. Gentiles in Pauline communities did 'Judaize' and would have been perceived as doing so by other gentiles. However, as the previous chapter argued, it was not simply the adoption of Jewish practices that Paul opposed there, but the necessitating of them as a first-order good, which supplanted the position he believed Christ-orientation should have in ethical reasoning. Paul avoids doing that in 1 Cor 8–10, so that while the behaviour he instructs could be described as 'Judaizing', it is grounded in their Christ-orientation. In other words, the rationale Paul offers both for avoiding Judaizing (and maintaining of gentile practices for gentiles) and for promoting Judaizing behaviour is not an eschatology that demands carefully delineated non-proselytised gentile worshippers of the Jewish God joining Jews in the final age, but the singular ability of the orientation to Christ to contribute directly to salvation. Paul's instructions on Judaizing were based on the extent that it (or any practice) threatened or supported that first-order good.

slavery he opposed in Gal 2, but he instead uses Torah as instruction to build the believers' sense of self as those belonging to God. For Jewish believers, avoiding idol food would be a standard dispreferred, as a command of their national law. Gentile believers are to use their foods 'to' God, and avoid idol food when it conflicts with this orientation, as informed by the theology of the Jewish scriptures. For these gentiles, Torah is inappropriate as national law since the Christ-event has legitimised their gentile practices as fitting for God's 'building'. However, it is an important source of instruction, one of several considerations to take into account in their ethical reasoning and assessment of circumstances. This is not to undermine its significance—for gentiles only recently appropriated by the one God, the instruction of Torah is particularly crucial. Furthermore, as the scriptures 'about' Christ in ways creatively reimagined by Paul, such as in 10.1–14, Torah is now a fundamental component of their orientation to him. Their ability to assess their circumstances, to recognize that idolatry was in inevitable conflict with Christ relies, for example, upon the monotheism they would learn there. For Jewish believers, as well, the Torah is now about Christ, even while it is their law. Regardless of the objective value any believers' practices might have, even Torah observance for Jewish believers, the divine standard which grounds all practices and their use is the law of Christ. Paul, who elsewhere stridently opposed gentile Judaizing, advises it here, not because it was Jewish, but because it was about Christ, who could not be conceived except in Jewish terms. He does not disparage Jewish practices as intermediates in comparison to the first-order good of orientation to Christ, but advises them as intermediate practices of second-order value when they indirectly contribute, in the hands of the Christ-oriented, to the salvation of many. If requiring them was slavery, then freedom was using Jewish practices—and gentile ones—to live to God (10.31; Gal 2.18–19).

CHAPTER 6

Conclusion

This thesis began with questions about Paul's inconsistency in ethical reasoning, and on the topic of the law and Jewish practices in particular. How could Paul speak so disparagingly of Jewish practices at some points, so strenuously oppose their adoption by gentiles, speak of his own shift in value towards them as a Jew, and yet clearly value them at other points? The argument of this thesis is that the similarities between Stoic ethical reasoning and Paul's reasoning regarding Jewish practices demonstrate that his concern was to establish the singular first-order good of the orientation to Christ in contrast to all other ethical selections and activities, including Jewish practice. Read in light of the Stoic use of similar arguments and criteria, Paul's disparagement of Jewish practices does not deprive them of all value or use. Instead, his arguments demonstrate a perceived misuse of these practices, a categorical error with disastrous consequences for his apostolic ministry and the 'truth of the gospel', as he defines it. These same practices at the heart of the confusion he attempts to delineate, are also afforded an objective, if conditional, value of a second-order by Paul. Although his rhetoric and even antithetical statements can lend themselves to readings which propose that Paul nullified any intrinsic value for such practices, these readings struggle to account for Paul's endorsement of the same practices at points. On the other hand, there lie interpretations which propose that Paul's disparagement of Jewish practices was only in reference to gentiles, and his evaluation of such practices as a Jew remained unaltered in relation to the 'truth of the gospel'. These struggle to account for Paul's statements which disparagingly reference his own Jewish practices and the lack of a clear rationale in Paul's texts for his opposition to gentile Judaizing. What is needed is a reading of Paul which can account for his evident regard for Jewish scriptures and the practices based in them as well as his denigration of those practices at some points. Paul does not want to eliminate the law, he does not want gentiles to follow it, and he does not think this an irrevocably inconsistent position. The ancient Stoics likewise had a class of intermediate ethical selections and activities which they endorsed, but disparaged, and a theoretical structure which they lauded as eminently coherent and logical. What appears to be inconsistency can be defence of neutrality.

Chapters one and two introduced the opening questions, the thesis, and the first part of the proposed structural comparison between Stoic reasoning on the intermediates and Paul's reasoning on Jewish practices. The compendium on Stoic ethics in chapter two was not comprehensive, but focused on elucidating the role of the intermediates, comprised of the 'preferreds' (προγημένα ἀδιάφορα) and the 'appropriate activities' (καθήκοντα), within the Stoic ethical structure. The 'bastion' of Stoic ethics was its claim that the only good was virtue, since only this could be argued to contribute directly to the τέλος. This claim for a *sui generis*, first-order value for virtue was buttressed by a pattern of discourse on the intermediates which disparaged them in contrast to virtue. The intermediates were demonstrated to be able to be used poorly *or* well in contrast to virtue's unconditional property of benefitting, and the intermediates were dependent upon virtue for any true benefit or contribution to the τέλος. They were thus classed as neutral in relation to the τέλος, and indistinguishable as virtue or vice. However, Stoic ethics endorsed these same conventional 'goods', the intermediates, as set types possessing second-order value, preferred and appropriate in comparison with other neutral things and activities. The objective value of these intermediates was conditional, but such token lists provided 'rules of thumb' to follow so long as their selection did not conflict with the first-order value of virtue. In practice, this meant that Stoic ethics endorsed most traditional social structures and values as useful and conditionally normative, but that the critique of those same structures remained deeply embedded within its ethical theory. The intermediates' value was always to be recognised and used under the proviso of reason.

With the brief third chapter, the thesis entered into the second part of the proposed structural comparison by suggesting terms of comparison for the following readings of Pauline texts. In chapter four, it was argued that Paul's discussion of Jewish practices in Phil 3.1–4.1 and Gal 2.1–21 exhibited a pattern of discourse which disparaged them as intermediates in relation to the singular good and incommensurable first-order value of orientation to Christ. This disparagement must be read in light of Paul's context, where these were the conventional 'goods' assumed to have value, and thus most likely to be, as he saw it, confused with the *sui generis* value of the Christ-orientation. Paul uses Stoic-like arguments to demonstrate the proper categorisation of Jewish practices and credentials as intermediates, and to establish the Christ-orientation as the only good and first-order value. In Phil 3, Paul argues to establish the first-order categorisation of 'knowing Christ' in contrast to his own Jewish credentials, which he believes should not be relied upon or esteemed in the

same way as ‘knowing Christ’. He uses a metaphorical motif of value and stark rhetoric to illustrate the incommensurable value of ‘knowing Christ’ in contrast to these credentials due to its singular ability to contribute directly to salvation, as instantiated in his future resurrection. His Jewish practices and credentials should not be relied upon, since they could not contribute directly to salvation, and could be used poorly, as his zeal illustrated. To rely on such unstable credentials was an incorrect value judgement, a categorical error, which could lead to spiritual destruction and failure to attain the resurrection.

Paul also exhibits this same Stoic-like pattern of discourse towards Jewish practice in Gal 2. In Galatians, he opposes gentile circumcision and against necessitating Judaizing generally, including some elements of table practice. His argument in ch2 is that requiring such practices was an enslaving categorical error which threatened the ‘truth of the gospel’ which he sought to establish. He portrays faith in Christ as unconditionally able to contribute directly to the status required for salvation, and Torah observance as dependent upon that faith for salvation. Given its singular ability to contribute directly to salvation, to regard anything else as necessary for salvation was a categorical error. The slavery metaphor demonstrates why this categorical error was such a concern for Paul; this error was capable of leading the believers away from the truth of the gospel, which would only ‘work’ if the orientation to Christ was afforded this singular status. This confusion threatened the establishment of the truth of the gospel, potentially preventing the believers from deriving benefit from the gospel, or being saved. Although there are allusions in Phil 3 and Gal 2 to the objective value which he ascribes more clearly to Jewish practices elsewhere, his efforts are concentrated in these texts on arguing for their neutrality in relation to salvation, and the hazard of confusing them with the first-order value of the orientation to Christ, which alone could save.

In chapter 5, it was argued that Paul exhibits a pattern of discourse on the topic of idol food which has similarities to Stoic patterns of discourse on the selection and performance of the intermediates. In 1 Cor 8.1–11.1, he addresses gentiles on a topic known to be associated with Jewish practice, an association he indirectly acknowledges in the text. The use of idol food is presented by the Corinthians as a neutral intermediate, a categorisation which Paul does not correct as a general type. He confirms that they have authority, as gentiles appropriated by God *as* gentiles, to ‘do all things’ ‘to God’, but counters that their ‘knowledge’ is still perilously insufficient as it stands. Their ‘knowledge’ of set types or general categorisations is inadequate, since any knowledge must be grounded in their experience of being known by God through the divine action in Christ. Any apparent

'advantage' which they think their selections have is void if they are not selected on the basis of their Christ-orientation, which alone is unconditionally advantageous. Their authority to make ethical selections is only valid on this basis. Paul has portrayed slavery to be the consideration of anything other than the Christ-orientation as necessary—they overestimate the value of an intermediate to their peril. Freedom is not merely the ability to 'do all things', he counters in Stoic fashion, but the ability to 'do all things' which lead to your wellbeing: salvation. The believers' ability to perform their gentile practices 'to God' is founded on the basis of the divine appropriation of them: they have been reconstituted with the self-perception that they are 'from' and 'to' God, 'through' Christ. This reconstitution, as those belonging to God through Christ, demands that they take others' epistemological development into account as part of the divine project of 'saving many', to which they belong and are oriented through Christ. If they knowingly disregard the salvation of others in their ethical reasoning, Paul warns that this may portend their own destruction.

Paul offers a model of ethical reasoning which evaluates intermediates based on the self-perception of one's particular nature, common sense, the Jewish Scriptures, and Christ-traditions to construct a 'well-reasoned defence' for their selection. However, such evaluations stand under the proviso of the higher-order logic of their orientation to Christ and the Christ-event generally. If the selection of an intermediate conflicts with this orientation, any objective value which may pertain is no longer the 'paramount consideration' to be made. This is the model Paul offers on the topic of his own financial support, and his adaptation to a variety of practices as an apostle, and it is the model lying behind the permission and prohibitions on the topic of idol food in this text. Based on the *shema* and Ps 23.1 LXX, the gentile believer can defensibly procure food as gentiles normally would so long as it does not conflict with their orientation to Christ. Paul details the ways it can conflict in his prohibitions. Firstly, idol food could create or reinforce false self-perceptions of receiving benefit or giving thanks to idols, which may form an obstacle to another's self-perception as belonging to God. Secondly, idol food could be used in actual idolatry, which is a vice. Paul does not identify all use of idol food as idolatry, but frames idolatry as a vice, and participation in it as a false value judgement in direct competition with their value judgement of Christ as those belonging to his body. Their gentile practices, like all practices, have been neutralised in relation to the first-order value of the Christ-orientation, and they are free to select defensible intermediates on that basis, so long as they do not conflict with it. They have been appropriated to God as gentiles, an event which reconstitutes them as those

belonging ‘to’ God—while they thus are granted authority to ‘do all things’, it is only on the basis of doing ‘all things’ ‘to God’, which includes ‘saving many’.

Paul indicates in his reasoning on idol food that he acknowledges objective value for some practices, both Jewish and gentile, but that this value is conditional. In this case, the gentiles are to deselect their normal gentile practice and adopt a Jewish one. However, in advising this, Paul carefully confirms the neutrality of such selections and activities as general types, and avoids prescribing or prohibiting extensional activities on the basis of commands from Torah. Despite strenuously opposing gentile Judaizing elsewhere, Paul advises it here for some circumstances where it would have conflicted with the believers’ orientation to Christ, who could not be conceived of except in reference to the Jewish scriptures and traditions.

Paul is not a Stoic, he is not concerned to contribute to philosophical debates, and he may not have even had any formal education in philosophy. His concern is to preach the gospel of Jesus Christ, especially to gentiles as he believes he has been called to do, and this revelation blinds him to all else in its urgency and power. However, there were numerous other teachers giving ethical instructions in the 1st century, and this shared environment has shaped Paul’s reasoning and instructions. Regarding Paul, this study has demonstrated that the inconsistencies in Paul’s ethical reasoning regarding Jewish patterns can be understood as evidence of their neutrality in relation to salvation. His texts, such as Phil 3 and Gal 2, which disparage them, could be designed, like Stoic patterns of discourse regarding the intermediates, to contrast them to the first-order value and *sui generis* quality of the orientation to Christ he is concerned to establish. Other Pauline texts, such as 1 Cor 8–10, could endorse the same practices in models of reasoning similar to Stoic patterns of discourse which defended the objective, yet conditional, second-order value of intermediates. The analysis of these three texts reveals that the rationale offered for the disparagement and then subsequent endorsement of practices is not one exclusive to Jews or gentiles, but a rationale concerned with what Paul is always concerned about: Christ. Whether cast as ‘faith in Christ’ or ‘knowing Christ’ or doing ‘all’ to God through Christ, even if it meant enslaving himself to others, or holding loosely what he had previously prized, Paul lived for Christ: this was Paul’s ‘one thing’.

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