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Title:

Global Development Governance in the 'Interregnum': Legitimacy and the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation

Abstract:

The Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (GPEDC) was created to address two deficits within the field of global development cooperation. First, through its inclusive and multi-stakeholder composition, the GPEDC was created to redress the legitimacy deficit associated with the 'old' Northern, donor-dominated governance of global development cooperation. Second, by leveraging the strengths of the 'new' actors that now comprise the field, the GPEDC was created to enhance the effectiveness of development cooperation. However, the GPEDC has faced consistent criticism, and currently, there is no space where all actors can convene to advance progress on the Sustainable Development Goals. This thesis explores stakeholder perspectives on, and dynamics within, this highly politicised and unique global partnership.

This thesis is research-driven, drawing primarily upon interviews with key public, private, and civic representatives, and it is complemented by insider-insight derived from having worked for the GPEDC. The thesis explores: how stakeholders evaluate the legitimacy of the partnership; whether it constitutes a transformative governance arrangement, or whether it re-inscribes power relations, and; what these perspectives tell us about broader prospects for global multilateral cooperation. This thesis finds that the field is characterised by competing dispositions towards multilateralism, approaches to 'development', and diverse perspectives on what legitimate and effective governance demands. This thesis contributes to two debates. First, it contributes to debates on the possibility for legitimate governance beyond the nation-state. In this regard, the thesis provides an original framework that can be used to explore diverse stakeholder perspectives. Second, it contributes to debates on the promises and pitfalls of multi-stakeholder governance within the field of development cooperation. Here, the thesis provides several policy recommendations that, if implemented, could provide more legitimate and effective governance in the post-2015 development era.

**Global Development Governance in the 'Interregnum':
Legitimacy and the Global Partnership for Effective
Development Cooperation**

By

Jack R. Taggart

Thesis Submitted in Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of
Philosophy

School of Government and International Affairs,
Durham University

2020



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List of Abbreviations

AAA	Accra Agenda for Action
AIIB	Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank
APRM	African Peer Review Mechanism of the African Union
BAPA+40	United Nations 2019 Conference on South-South Cooperation
BIAC	Business at the OECD
BRICS	Brazil, India, China, and South Africa
BLC	Business Leaders Caucus of the GPEDC
BOD	Busan Outcome Document
BRICS	Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa
CPDE	Civil Society Organisation Partnership for Development Effectiveness
CSOs	Civil Society Organisations
DAC	Development Assistance Committee of the OECD
DCD	Development Cooperation Division of the OECD
FOCAC	Forum on China-Africa Cooperation
G20	Group of 20
G7+	Group of Fragile and Conflict-Affected States
G77	United Nation's Group of 77
GPEDC	Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation
GPGs	Global Public Goods
HLF	High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness
HLM	High-Level Meeting of the GPEDC
HLPF	United Nation's High-Level Political Forum
ICC	International Chamber of Commerce
IMF	International Monetary Fund
JST	Joint Support Team of the GPEDC
LICs	Low-Income Countries
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MICs	Middle-Income Countries

MMR	Multi-Method Research
MSP	Multi-Stakeholder Partnership
NDB	BRICS New Development Bank
NECC	Non-Executive Co-Chair of the GPEDC
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organisations
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
PBIG	Post-Busan Interim Group
PIFS	Pacific Island Forum Secretariat
PSAs	Private Sector Actors
PSE	Private Sector Engagement
SADC	South African Development Community
SCM	Steering Committee Meeting of the GPEDC
SDGs	Sustainable Development Goals
SLM	Senior-Level Meeting of the GPEDC
SMEs	Small and Medium Enterprises
SSC	South-South Cooperation
UMICs	Upper-Middle Income Countries
UN	United Nations
UN-DCF	United Nation's Development Cooperation Forum
UNCTAD	United Nation's Commission on Trade and Development
UNDP	United Nation's Development Programme
WEF	World Economic Forum
WP-EFF	Working Party on Aid Effectiveness

Declaration

This thesis is the result of my own work. Material from the published or unpublished work of others which is used in the thesis is credited to the author in question in the text.

Jack R. Taggart [05/06/20]

Statement of Copyright

The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. No quotation from it should be published without the author's prior written consent and information derived from it should be acknowledged.

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Dedication

ॐ नमः शिवाय

To God, family, friends, and mentors.

1. Introduction

The Global Partnership will be an organisation that is unique: It will make equal partners of all its members: traditional donors, developing nations, new providers, civil society, parliamentarians and the private sector. Is this the wave of the future in a shared-power, multi-stakeholder world?

I would suggest that it is a model worth studying. We will know more in five years time whether this experiment in multilateral diplomacy produces a more results-oriented global development effort.
(Atwood, 2012: 28-29)

Brian Atwood, OECD-DAC Chair 2010-2012

This thesis examines stakeholder perspectives on the legitimacy of a highly politicised and unique global multi-stakeholder partnership (MSP). The Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (GPEDC) was created following the 2011 High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness (HLF-4) to address two deficits within the field of international development cooperation. First, the GPEDC was created to redress the legitimacy deficit associated with the 'old' club-based, Northern-dominated governance of international aid. Second, by convening and leveraging the strengths of the diversity of actors that now comprise the field, the 'new' GPEDC was created to enhance the effectiveness of development cooperation.

Despite these ambitions, the GPEDC has faced a slew of criticisms concerning its perceived legitimacy and effectiveness. The GPEDC has been unable to garner the political support necessary to supplant the previous 'old' governance of development cooperation. Currently, there is no forum whereby all development actors can convene to advance progress on the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Consequently, Gramsci's diagnosis captures the crisis facing the field of development cooperation: 'the old is dying, and the new cannot be born: in this interregnum, a great variety of morbid symptoms appear' (Gramsci, 1971: 276).

This thesis examines the legitimacy of the GPEDC through the eyes of the actors that comprise it: traditional donors, recipients of development cooperation, countries that both

provide and receive development cooperation, civil society organisations (CSOs), and private sector actors (PSAs). The thesis provides an appraisal of the GPEDC that is grounded in practitioner perspectives on what legitimate and effective governance requires in the post-2015 development era.

The thesis contributes to two overarching debates. First, it contributes to debates on the possibility for democratic or legitimate governance beyond the nation-state. In this regard, the thesis makes an original contribution through a framework that can be applied to the study of state and non-state actor's perspectives on legitimate multi-stakeholder governance. Second, this thesis contributes to empirical and policy debates on the promises and pitfalls associated with multi-stakeholder governance. This thesis finds that the GPEDC's ambition to provide more horizontal power relations is circumscribed by competing perspectives on legitimate governance. While aspiring for more inclusive governance has been a persistent rallying call for more equitable and effective development outcomes, the heterogeneity that characterises the development landscape has resulted in intractable dilemmas over the normative structures that should govern the field. As a global governance initiative that attempts to encompass the full breadth of state and non-state development actors that comprise the field, the GPEDC is one space wherein such tensions become manifest. In the absence of consensus over the form that global governance should take, there is an ongoing governance gap, and there are few signs of it waning.

1.1 Background

Recent studies within the field of 'Global Governance' have observed two tendencies across virtually all areas of global policy. First, traditional inter-state institutions responsible for providing and facilitating cooperation are no longer fit for purpose (Goldin, 2013; Hale, Held, and Young, 2013). Shifts in the global political economy have been facilitated and driven by the rise of new actors - both state and non-state - that have hitherto not been included within traditional institutions of global governance. Moreover, globalisation - the expansion of economic and social interdependence at global, national, and local scales - has contributed to harder challenges that cannot be accommodated by the existing frame of international

cooperation. Combined, these forces have led to criticism over the appropriateness of the traditional frames of inter-state governance within the contemporary era.

Second, in response to the deteriorating capacity of traditional institutions to provide global public goods (GPGs), there has been the rise of 'new' innovative institutional alternatives (Hale and Held, 2012). These institutional innovations attempt to encompass a greater number of actors than their traditional counterparts, and they offer a more nimble and informal form of governance more suited to the challenges resulting from contemporary globalisation. However, the success of these initiatives will be dependent on the degree that they are perceived to be legitimate, and on their capacity to provide GPGs in areas where their predecessors have failed.

The field of development cooperation is not an exception to these general trends. Traditional institutions responsible for providing cooperation - such as the OECD-Development Assistance Committee (DAC) - have faced consistent criticism based on its perceived illegitimacy due to its Northern-donor, club-based composition that is ill-suited to the heterogeneity that increasingly characterises the field. Furthermore, the DAC has been criticised based on its ineffectiveness in contributing to developmental outcomes. Concomitant with criticisms over the DAC's legitimacy and ineffectiveness has been the creation of 'new' institutional alternatives, such as the GPEDC, the United Nations Development Cooperation Forum (UNDCF), and a plethora of MSPs within the field (Reinsberg and Westerwinter, 2019). These innovations go beyond the traditional governance frame by convening a broader range of state and non-state actors that hitherto have not been included within institutional arrangements of global development governance. These actors include CSOs, PSAs, and states that provide South-South Cooperation (SSC) that diverges from DAC norms, modalities, and understandings of development cooperation.

The GPEDC is the culmination of the DAC-led Aid Effectiveness reform process that sought to redress critiques against its legitimacy and effectiveness. In responding to the rise and growing importance of the 'new' actors, the widely perceived *raison d'être* of the GPEDC was to provide a more inclusive, democratic and hence legitimate space wherein all relevant

actors could participate and constitute the 'new' multi-stakeholder governance of development cooperation.

However, the GPEDC has consistently faced a slew of criticisms related to its perceived legitimacy. Most pertinently, that it is not genuinely inclusive nor 'global' as it has failed to garner the engagement of critical emerging powers such as Brazil, India, China and South Africa (BRICS). It is most commonly claimed that the GPEDC is a donor-dominated institution that was created to co-opt the emerging powers into a Northern development system (Li and Wang, 2014; Li et al., 2018). Furthermore, the inclusion of PSAs within the GPEDC has prompted concerns over the privatisation of global development governance (IBON, 2014; Tiwana, 2014), while CSOs and recipient countries have expressed concerns as to the extent to which they are recognised as equal partners. Consequently, it is claimed that the GPEDC is 'business as usual' and that it continues to perpetuate pre-existing power disparities reminiscent of the preceding DAC-dominated development era (Abdel-Malek, 2014; Banks and Hulme, 2014).

Despite being an initiative that could fundamentally alter the governance of global development cooperation, research on the GPEDC is bewilderingly sparse. What research does exist is restricted to policy studies that explore the perspectives of China and India (Li et al., 2018). Little is known about the perspective of other stakeholders, including traditional donors, PSAs, CSOs, and most crucially, recipient countries. As noted by Besharati (2013) and Kindornay and Samy (2012), the GPEDC will be successful to the extent that it is perceived to be legitimate. To assuage the academic neglect of the GPEDC, this thesis examines the legitimacy of the GPEDC through the eyes of these various actors. In doing so, this thesis rigorously appraises the GPEDC and it determines the extent to which the GPEDC might transform the asymmetrical power dynamics that have plagued the field since its creation.

1.2 Legitimacy and Multi-Stakeholder Partnerships

As noted by Crick (1959: 150), legitimacy is the 'master question of political science'. All forms of governance must attain legitimacy in order to be secure and effective in the possession of power. However, despite its importance, legitimacy is an essentially contested and elusive concept. While definitions vary, Suchman (1999: 574) proposes that: 'Legitimacy is a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions.'

Questions surrounding legitimacy, namely its attainment and maintenance, are complex and urgent when posed towards governance beyond the nation-state. Since the end of the Cold War, there has been a general increase in discontent against the legitimacy of traditional global governance institutions, such as the IMF, World Bank, and WTO. There is, therefore, 'hardly an essay on international or global governance that does not at least mention the issue of legitimacy' (Schneider, 2005: 2; Steffek, 2004: 485). If institutions are to be capable of providing the GPGs that they were tasked with providing, they must be perceived to be legitimate. However, what legitimacy requires is subject to intense debate.

For many scholars, the 'dominant answer to what legitimacy requires in global governance is democracy' (Dellmuth and Tallberg, 2015: 470; Bernstein, 2011: 21). Much of the literature on legitimacy in global governance has therefore been normative in nature, whereby scholars have developed reasoned principles to serve as benchmarks to assess the democratic quality of global governance. As noted by Held (1995: 1): 'Democracy bestows an aura of legitimacy on modern political life: laws, rules, and policies appear justified when they are democratic'. However, a crucial difficulty in assessing the legitimacy of an institution is that often approaches 'presuppose a clear answer to the question "legitimacy for whom?"' (Cerutti, 2011: 122). Just as there are many forms of democracy (Held, 1981), there diverse perspectives on what legitimacy requires for global multi-stakeholder-governance (Take, 2008). Yet the 'idea that actors may have divergent views of what constitutes a legitimate institution has received surprisingly little attention' (Peters, 2013: 5).

While recognising the vital contribution made by normative-democratic approaches, this thesis adopts an empirical or 'sociological' approach to the study of legitimacy. Whereas normative scholars attempt to develop principles on what governance should meet to be normatively legitimate, empirical approaches seek to understand what agents themselves understand to be appropriate governance procedures. While this thesis adopts an empirical approach to the study of legitimacy, it does not abandon democratic normative values altogether. This project uses normative-democratic values as heuristics to research stakeholder perspectives on legitimate governance. To do so, the thesis adopts Scharpf's (1999) widely used input-output legitimacy schematic and adds to it Schmidt's (2013) 'throughput' component as an intermediary dimension of assessment.

Input broadly refers to the procedures in place to enable inclusive and participatory governance, throughput is concerned with the quality of procedures, and output examines the organisational effectiveness of governance. In this project's conception, input legitimacy is examined by exploring stakeholder perspectives on the *inclusivity*, *representativeness*, and *equality* of governance. Throughput is addressed by examining the *quality of debate and decision-making*, *transparency* and *accountability*. Output is examined with reference to the arrangement's capacity to produce behaviour change, and also stakeholder's own perspectives on what constitutes organisational effectiveness.

While this heuristic framework is useful for structuring inquiry, this project is not concerned with the measurement of legitimacy according to a set of *a priori* indicators. Instead, it seeks to comparatively appraise and understand what stakeholders themselves perceive to be appropriate inclusiveness, representativeness, and so on. The framework, therefore, provides a well-reasoned means to structure research and findings, while it ensures the applicability of this project's analysis to broader debates on the legitimacy of MSPs. In doing so, this project is primarily focused upon stakeholder perspectives and the contestations that exist between diverse actors in the post-2015 development era. Moreover, this framework yields important insights into the feasibility and possibility of legitimate governance beyond the nation-state, and these insights are grounded in the real-world dilemmas encountered in fostering democratic global governance in practice.

1.3 Research Design for Studying Empirical Legitimacy

This thesis is situated within the Pragmatist approach to social science research. It takes a 'real world' problematic situation as the starting point for inquiry, and it uses appropriate research methods to contribute to greater understanding that can, in part, contribute to the rectification of such. By way of research methods, this thesis has utilised an explorative survey (n=108) to gauge stakeholder perspectives, and to develop a sample for subsequent interviews. This thesis primarily draws upon findings from over fifty interviews with key representatives from donor, recipient, and emerging power countries, and also several representatives from CSOs, PSAs, academia, international organisations, and secretariat staff of the GPEDC.

Furthermore, while this thesis is research-driven, it is complemented with insider practitioner insight. The thesis also relies upon participant observations derived from having worked for six months for the OECD side of the GPEDC's secretariat. During the project, the opportunity arose to undertake a traineeship in the OECD in Paris to support preparations for the GPEDC's 2019 Senior Level Meeting (SLM). This high-profile event convened over 600 key stakeholders at the United Nations Headquarters on the margins of the High-Level Political Forum (HLPF). Observations were therefore attained on: the day-to-day functioning and governance of the GPEDC; participant observation at 'closed' DAC meetings, and; insights into the dynamics within several high-level working groups. Furthermore, this position provided unrestricted access to internal information held by the OECD, and regular interviews with colleagues and OECD staff. Having direct experience of working for the secretariat of the GPEDC, this project benefits from a first-hand understanding of how: the various auspices of the GPEDC function; how its various stakeholders perceive it in real-time, and; the consequences of perceptions upon the procedures and performance of the governance arrangement. Finally, this project also draws upon an extensive review of official Steering Committee documentation since the creation of the GPEDC.

1.4 Research questions

The research questions of this project are as follows:

Q1: How do stakeholders perceive and evaluate the legitimacy of the GPEDC? Why might there be variation in perspectives?

This question examines how stakeholders evaluate the GPEDC according to the heuristic framework of the project. For instance, it explores perspectives on the inclusivity, accountability, and effectiveness of governance. Furthermore, this question explores the tensions that exist among actors, such as whether there might be tensions over the desired degree of the GPEDC's inclusivity, or whether the participation of particular actors is detrimental to their perceived appropriateness of the governance mechanism. In doing so, it is possible to observe the normative preferences of stakeholders and the challenges that result from bringing together diverse actors into one setting.

Q2: To what extent does the GPEDC live-up to the promises, or succumb to the pitfalls, that are associated with multi-stakeholder governance?

Whereas the previous question explores stakeholder perspectives and the reasons why there might be variation, this question is concerned with appraising the GPEDC. Namely, this question explores the extent to which the GPEDC can be said to provide more horizontal and effective governance, or whether it serves to perpetuate asymmetric power relations that are characteristic of the 'old' traditional governance of the field.

Q3: What do stakeholder perspectives tell us about these actors' broader dispositions and preferences for global multilateralism within the field?

Despite this being a study that examines stakeholder perspectives on a particular governance initiative, this question enables exploration into what these perspectives tell us about different actor's broader dispositions towards global multilateralism. By using the

GPEDC as a reference point, it is possible to determine how various actors are seeking to use global and regional forums to alter the global consensus on the norms and governance structures of global development cooperation.

1.5 Structure of the Thesis

Chapter 2. Empirical Context and Rationale

This chapter sets out the key empirical information and debates that this project responds to and is embedded within. This chapter outlines several perspectives on the current condition of global governance and development cooperation in particular. Here, it is argued that the current governance of development cooperation is in a state of interregnum: a condition wherein the traditional institutions are in a state of decay, while new institutional innovations are struggling to establish themselves. Furthermore, the chapter examines debates surrounding the so-called 'new' and 'heterogeneous' actors that are arising within the field. Additionally, this chapter introduces essential empirical information and perspectives on the case of the GPEDC as a governance mechanism.

Chapter 3. On the Legitimacy of Multi-Stakeholder Partnerships: A Framework for Research and Analysis

This chapter justifies and outlines the framework that the thesis adopts to examine stakeholder perspectives. It does so by justifying why a legitimacy focus is warranted, and it provides a review of the dominant approaches to studying the legitimacy of global governance. Based on this review, the chapter outlines the heuristic framework that guides the research and analysis. Furthermore, the chapter outlines several contributions that the framework can provide when applied.

Chapter 4. On Research Methodology, Design, and Praxis

This chapter provides the ontological, epistemological, axiological and methodological underpinnings of the thesis. This chapter outlines the Pragmatist approach that the thesis adopts. The distinguishing characteristic of a Pragmatist approach to research is that it begins with a 'problematic situation' observed in practice, and it proceeds with research methods and approaches that may, in part, contribute to rectifying such. Furthermore, the chapter defends the use of a single case study approach and the use of multiple methods. For the latter, the approach to conducting research and analysing data is outlined and defended for each of the methods used.

Chapter 5. Input Legitimacy: Perspectives on Participation

This chapter outlines the main findings on stakeholder perspectives on the GPEDC's input legitimacy. For inclusivity, there is contestation over not only who is at the table but also over who should be at the table, and perspectives on whether there is any interest on behalf of key stakeholders to actually be present at the table of governance. For the indicator on representativeness, the lack of pre-existing coordinating mechanisms inhibit the participation of stakeholders that the governance arrangement sought to empower, and these relate to intractable challenges encountered by democratic governance at the global level. For equality, although there is clear evidence of *de jure* equality, *de facto* relations of inequality between stakeholders permeate throughout the partnership and these result in hierarchical domination by more affluent stakeholders. This chapter is thus concerned with perceived barriers and opportunities for participation, and the tensions that exist between actors.

Chapter 6. Throughput Legitimacy: Perspectives on Procedures

This chapter outlines the main findings on stakeholder perspectives of the procedural quality of the GPEDC's governance processes. This chapter examines stakeholder perspectives on three indicators: the deliberative quality of debate and decision-making, transparency, and accountability. For all three indicators, it is found that there are tensions among stakeholders over the procedural function that the GPEDC should take. Namely, stakeholders maintain varying degrees of emphasis over whether the GPEDC should primarily function as a forum

for knowledge-sharing, or whether it should serve as a forum for accountability. This chapter, therefore, explores how stakeholders perceive the quality of procedures that comprise the governance of the GPEDC and their preferences for procedurally legitimate governance.

Chapter 7. Output Legitimacy: Perspectives on Performance

While the previous two chapters address stakeholder perspectives on the democratic procedures that guarantee legitimate participation and procedures, this chapter provides stakeholder perspectives on organisational effectiveness. Here, stakeholder perspectives on the capacity of the GPEDC to produce behaviour change - or outcome effectiveness - are outlined. While all of the stakeholder groups maintain that the GPEDC's capacity to generate behaviour change is limited, particularly when it comes to traditional donor behaviour, they all maintain that organisational effectiveness is synonymous with a governance arrangement's capacity to generate behaviour change. Furthermore, this chapter explores how different stakeholders perceive, evaluate, and understand organisational effectiveness on their own terms. Here, we also see that different stakeholder categories maintain divergent perspectives over what they understand to be necessary for the arrangement to be organisationally effective.

Chapter 8: Analysis and Discussion

This chapter provides an analytical synthesis of how the findings relate to broader themes in the literature on the legitimacy of global governance and debates in the field of development cooperation. To do so, this chapter specifically addresses the research questions as laid out in the introduction of the thesis. This chapter presents three arguments. First, merely maximising particular indicators - such as inclusivity or transparency - does not lead to greater legitimacy perspectives. Instead, there is normative contestation between actors over the desired and appropriate level of inclusivity, transparency, and so on. Secondly, although the GPEDC constitutes a donor-dominated institution, the multi-stakeholder nature of the partnership has empowered weaker actors. However, the influence of the GPEDC upon the broader field - and structural inequalities - can be questioned. Third, using the

GPEDC as a vantage point, the field of development cooperation is characterised by the presence of competing projects which inhibit the emergence of a global multilateral mechanism that can effectively convene all relevant actors within the field.

Chapter 9. Conclusion

The concluding chapter provides reflections on studying legitimacy in the interregnum and on the project's methodology, as well as offering several policy recommendations and areas for future research. The concluding chapter of the thesis argues that in order to develop legitimate governance in the post-2015 era, it is neither feasible nor desirable to accommodate all preferences within a global governance setting. Due to the contemporary heterogeneity that characterises the field, it is necessary to 'put the furthest behind first' and focus on providing a governance mechanism that responds to the preferences of those that need it most. That is to say, it is necessary to focus on the preferences and perspectives of whom governance is intended to serve: the beneficiaries of development cooperation. While there may be qualms over who these beneficiaries are, who they should be, and crucially, who speaks for these beneficiaries, the suggested approach constitutes a progressive reform trajectory towards a more legitimate and effective institutional design.

In sum, this thesis uncovers how diverse stakeholders perceive a novel and contested global governance initiative within the complex field of development cooperation. Given the diversity of actors that characterise the field, the objective was not to provide a comprehensive account of how all development actors perceive the GPEDC. Instead, the objective was to uncover the principal perceptions and contentions that exist across different types of stakeholders. The thesis achieved this objective through not only interviewing key development actors but also through insider participant observation on how the partnership functions and how stakeholders perceive this partnership in real-time. In doing so, a vital aim of the thesis was to appraise the extent to which the GPEDC provides a transformative governance mechanism within a field that has long been characterised by a Northern donor-dominated system of governance. By engaging with the perspectives and preferences of practitioners that have engaged in the GPEDC, this thesis results in several concrete policy

recommendations that, if implemented, may improve upon the legitimacy and effectiveness of the GPEDC. Finally, the GPEDC is a governance mechanism that attempts to bring together the full swathe of actors that comprise the field. This thesis, therefore, uses the GPEDC as a vantage point to explore the prospects for global multilateral governance in the present development era.

2. Empirical Context and Rationale

2. Introduction

This chapter provides an overview of key empirical information and debates that this thesis responds to and is embedded within. The first section provides an overview of the challenges facing the governance of development cooperation. The second section goes into depth on the 'new' actors that are generating unprecedented shifts within the field. The third section examines the 'aid effectiveness' reform process that the traditional regime has undergone due to criticisms against its legitimacy and effectiveness. The final section outlines the characteristics of the GPEDC as a governance mechanism. This section outlines several key perspectives on the GPEDC, namely those that either view the GPEDC to be a 'business as usual' or a potentially transformative governance mechanism.

2.1 Global Development Governance in the Interregnum

Contemporary global governance has been described as 'unfit for purpose' (Goldin, 2013), 'unravelling' (Pegram and Acuto, 2015), 'gridlocked' (Hale, Held, and Young, 2013) and no longer capable of providing coordinated responses to the growing number of collective action problems facing the world. The breakdown of established patterns of global cooperation across virtually all areas of global policy is in stark contrast to the proliferation of trans-border social, economic, and environmental challenges that demand cooperative responses (Ocampo, 2015: 3).

As the 'gridlock' thesis asserts, the combination of growing multipolarity, institutional inertia, harder problems, and prolific fragmentation serve as structural mechanisms that inhibit the provision of legitimate and effective global governance by the traditional institutions of the post-war order (Hale, Held and Young, 2013). To illustrate, growing multipolarity refers to the dramatic increase of both state and non-state actors that require representation within institutions of global governance. Yet with more actors at the table, this results in increased transaction costs in generating consensus and solutions, not to mention the challenges

associated with accommodating a greater diversity of interests. Furthermore, institutional inertia refers to the formal lock-in of decision-making authority within traditional institutions. While the voting structures of the IMF and World Bank were perhaps appropriate in 1945, they no longer resemble the contemporary global balance of economic and political power that has seen a dramatic shift to the East (Quah, 2011). However, large bureaucratic organisations are slow to reform, further undermining their relevance to the contemporary era. Meanwhile, globalisation has resulted in harder problems both across borders and within societies, and some of these challenges - especially those related to climate - demand collective responses. However, there has been ever-increasing institutional fragmentation that results in an inefficient division of labour, and fragmentation raises the potential for forum shopping and the undermining of political will (Murphy and Kellow, 2013). If the institutions of the post-war order are no longer able to reflect shifts in the global political economy and provide GPGs, the legitimacy of the traditional institutions of global governance is in danger of being eroded (Maffettone and Di Paola, 2016: 9).

While research that examines the causes of cooperative breakdown within traditional institutions of global governance has been prevalent, there has also been an accompanying rise in studies that analyse the emergence of innovative institutional forms (Abbott and Snidal, 2010; Falkner, 2016; Dorsch and Flachslund, 2017). At a time when the adoption of formal multilateral treaties has stagnated, there has been an exponential rise in informal, flexible, and multi-stakeholder governance initiatives over the past 30 years (Abbott and Faude, 2020). Faced with 'gridlock' within the traditional institutions of global governance, states and non-state actors are increasingly turning to informal intergovernmental organisations and transnational public-private partnerships across issue areas and policy fields. For instance, transnational public-private partnerships have witnessed a 542% increase, from 26 to 167 in the past 30 years (Westerwinter, 2016: 2).

These 'new kids on the governance block' differ considerably in nature, design, and scope (Abbott and Faude, 2010). However, their rising prominence is attributed to the ongoing demand for global governance despite traditional institution's inability to respond to challenges, both old and new (Hale and Held, 2012). By relying on informal and non-binding

forms of governance, these institutional innovations can more nimbly incorporate the range and comparative strengths of emerging state and non-state actors. For Acharya (2017), the demand for new institutional forms is not only functional. It also reflects a desire for new principles and approaches to global problem solving that cannot be accommodated by extending the existing yet fading international order. These new forms of governance have the following characteristics: the emergence of new actors and forms of agency in addition to nation-states; the emergence of new governance mechanisms that go beyond traditional forms of state-led and treaty-based regimes, and; increasing segmentation and fragmentation across levels and functional spheres (Biermann and Pattberg, 2008: 280). These innovative governance mechanisms have not come to replace traditional or formal inter-state governance altogether. They have arisen to complement traditional institutions and provide a more diverse range of governance options in the face of mounting transnational challenges (Andonova, 2005). Nevertheless, these 'new' institutions are competitors for increasingly scarce political interest and funds. Moreover, despite the complementary benefits that can be derived from a greater range of governance options, they risk further fragmenting global governance and inhibiting the collective capacity of state and non-state actors to act in concert (Biermann et al., 2009).

Despite the lack of studies that engage the field of development cooperation from a 'global governance' perspective, the field is not an exception to these general trends. The governance of development cooperation is facing a 'systemic crisis' (Ashoff and Klingebiel, 2014). The 'old' institutions responsible for facilitating cooperation, such as the DAC, are in a state of declining relevance due to growing uncertainty and contestations from within, and 'new' actors and ideological challenges from without (Chin and Quadir, 2012; Ashoff and Klingebiel, 2014). As noted by Klingebiel et al. (2016: 10) 'the changing context for development cooperation is so profound that the architecture is being faced with a fundamental overhaul if it wishes to remain "fit for purpose"'. In response to the growing 'governance gap' within the field, there has been the emergence of new institutional innovations such as the multi-stakeholder GPEDC, the UNDCF, and a plethora of transnational MSPs (Reinsberg and Westerwinter, 2019). However, these innovations have faced 'more challenges than progress' in producing legitimate governance structures that

encompass both the 'old' and 'new' development actors that 'must [now] be included in a new architecture for development finance' (Pozos, 2014: 98).

Notwithstanding these ambitions, there is no global platform where all providers, recipients, and countries that both provide and receive development cooperation can convene to advance progress on the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). As Alonso (2018: 2) notes, 'in a word, the international reality is changing more deeply and rapidly than development aid [and its governance] has been able to'. Consequently, Gramsci's (1971: 276) diagnosis captures the crisis facing the field: 'the old is dying, and the new cannot be born: in this interregnum, a great variety of morbid symptoms appear'. As noted by Bauman (2012: 49):

Gramsci attached the idea of 'interregnum'... to the extraordinary situations in which the extant frame loses its grip and can hold no longer, whereas a new frame, made to the measure of newly emerged conditions responsible for making the old frame useless, is still at the designing stage, has not yet been fully assembled, or is not strong enough to be put in its place.

Here I follow critical development scholars in situating Truman's inaugural speech of 1949 as the birth of the modern development era, and the beginnings of the hegemonic development order (Sachs, 1992). Hart (2001) provides a useful schematic by which to understand the nature of this order by making a distinction between 'big D' and 'little d' development. The former refers to intentional efforts on behalf of national and international actors - such as Northern donor agencies, large international organisations such as the IMF and World Bank, and local and national CSOs - to generate welfare gains for countries and peoples, overwhelmingly in the Global South. The latter refers to the immanent - that is to say, the omnipresent and unfolding - economic, social, and cultural processes that create winners and losers through the spread of capitalism. As Hart (2001: 650) notes, 'little d' development is concerned with the 'development of capitalism as a geographically uneven, profoundly contradictory set of historical processes'.

It is important to note that the d/Development distinction is a heuristic device, and it does not suggest that these two forms of development are separate. To the contrary, 'big D'

Development is very much embedded within, and contained by, the broader forces of 'little d' development. Often, the actors and forces that comprise Development are informed by and act in service of the logics, modalities, and aims of 'little d' development. Moreover, it could be argued that the function of 'big D' development is to provide palliative relief to the more malign consequences of encroaching 'little d' development. Nonetheless, the point is that this thesis is concerned with the crisis facing the 'global governance' of what geographers term 'big D' development.

Within Development - as a field of study and one of practice - there has been longstanding ideological diversity as to what constitutes development and the means to achieve it. As noted by Chandy (2011: 4), it is a myth that development cooperation has a clear and narrow purpose. Development is a nebulous term that is perhaps universally understood. However, the term - and its constitutive means and ends - has been subject to intense contestation. The field has gone through several successive ideological shifts, from state-led modernisation orthodoxy in the mid-20th century towards neoliberalism, and subsequent variations of the so-called Washington Consensus, in the 1980s (Rostow, 1959; Williamson, 1989; Ruckert, 2007; Hart, 2009). Yet inversely, this orthodoxy has been contended by heterodox understandings of development, such as dependency theory in the late 1960s, and post-development scholars that have stressed the need for an abandonment of the post-war 'Development' project altogether in the late 1980s and 1990s (Franck, 1967; Escobar, 1995; Sachs, 1992). Whereas the orthodox position has been that the purpose of development cooperation has been to facilitate economic growth in developing countries for the end of poverty reduction, heterodox scholars and social actors maintain that development cooperation furthers the expansion of exploitative relations and, arguably, augments the position of Northern Industrialised states within the global order.

Despite these shifts and contestations, a stable feature of global development governance has been a clear demarcation between the rich, industrialised Northern donors on the one hand, and the 'poor', ostensibly 'under-developed' Southern recipient countries on the other (Six, 2009). This donor-recipient binary has long characterised the field and governance of development cooperation, and it is a direct consequence of colonial power relations. This

binary has produced a hegemonic order wherein the 'representational authority in diagnosing aid's [and Development's] problems, and prescribing solutions reside generally on one side of the aid binary' - the industrialised Northern donors (Nair, 2013: 631).

Since its creation in the early 1960s, the OECD-DAC has been the most visible and emblematic institutionalisation of this spatial demarcation in global development governance. As a club-based forum that has traditionally been comprised by rich industrialised donor countries alone, the DAC has evolved to become the preeminent development forum for donors and an 'intellectual leader' within the field (Boas and McNeill, 2004; Marcussen, 2003). Foreign aid - or Official Development Assistance (ODA) - has been the central financing mechanism by which Northern donors have provided resources to countries in the global South for 'Development', and the DAC has both organised itself around and been the 'guardian' of this modality (Griffiths, 2018). The purpose of the DAC is not to distribute ODA, but rather to provide a forum for dialogue, ODA definition and measurement, knowledge exchange, and 'innovative development thinking' (Masujima, 2004). Throughout the history of the field, it has been through the DAC that Northern donors have defined, measured, and set the terms for the provision and conduct of ODA. In a word, the DAC has operated as the fulcrum of global aid governance throughout the 20th and early 21st century.

Despite its long-standing pre-eminence, the legitimacy of the DAC has increasingly been under question. Since the early 2000s, the field of development cooperation has witnessed an exponential rise of new state and non-state actors, many of whom exist outside and diverge from the DAC's approach to development cooperation. Moreover, recipient countries have grown in voice and influence during this period. In this context, the DAC has faced over two decades of questioning over whether it is still 'suited for the task of managing the rapidly evolving aid system' given its antiquated composition (Brown and Morton, 2008: 2). The nature of the DAC's membership has meant that the DAC has faced a 'crisis of legitimacy' that sees criticism from recipients, non-state actors, and so-called 'emerging donors', thus 'challenging its very nature as the pre-eminent donor forum' (Fejerskov, Lundsgaarde, and Cold-Ravnkilde, 2016: 14).

The 'legitimacy gap' that the global development architecture faces are being exacerbated by actors who operate outside of the traditional governance structures. Most commonly, actors criticise the traditional DAC-led system for being unduly 'donor dominated' and that such is no longer appropriate to the multipolar and diversified global political economy (Kindornay and Samy, 2012). For Chin and Heine (2014), the institutional consequences of representational misalignment in key international development organisations are threefold: the modification of existing platforms; the creation of new and arguably contending platforms, such as the BRICS New Development Bank (NDB), and; the paralysis and decay of existing fora. For some, the continued relevance of the DAC - one of the most enduring nodes of the global development architecture - depends on its capacity to adequately engage and incorporate the 'new' actors within a legitimate and effective global governance mechanism (Zimmerman and Smith, 2011: 733).

The DAC-led system also faces criticism due to its perceived ineffectiveness. Ashoff and Klingebiel (2014) argue that the DAC-led system is facing a crisis of effectiveness for two reasons. First, despite over 2.4 trillion spent on ODA since 1945, there has been an unacceptable level of development for a large cohort of developing countries (Easterly, 2006). Secondly, although some studies - such as Galiani et al. (2014) suggest that aid does have a small yet positive impact upon recipient country growth, Doucouliagos and Paldam's (2007) review of 40 years of research on aid effectiveness reveals the 'sad result that aid has failed in its primary task'. Combined with critiques surrounding the legitimacy of its governance, and legitimate scepticism over the effectiveness of aid, the DAC faces considerable challenges regarding its suitability as one of the apex forums for the global development governance.

The decline of the DAC's pre-eminence as a governance mechanism comes at a time when the world faces unprecedented challenges. Growing interdependence has meant that global development challenges, such as food, financial and climate crises, transcend the capacity of the state to deal with alone, and therefore necessitate coordinated responses through collective mechanisms (Picciotto, 2007). Problematically, the 'growing number of global

negative externalities' is paradoxically producing inwardly focused policy prescriptions by governments (NSI, 2011: 4). Furthermore, the ongoing rise of populism and nationalism has particular salience for the field. Within donor states, domestic populations often regard ODA and development programmes with pejorative assumptions, and this reduces the political will of states to respond to new and more complex development challenges through multilateral mechanisms (Balfour et al., 2016). Furthermore, while self-interest in donor programmes has been a permanent feature of ODA, donors are becoming increasingly confident in expressing their self-interest in explicit terms. For Bermeo (2018), this may result in the promotion of development interventions that serve the interests of wealthy countries. However, there is a risk that a gap will emerge as those countries, regions, and sectors that are not explicitly targeted are left further behind.

The decay of traditional governance mechanisms for development cooperation and prolific fragmentation puts the capacity of the global development community to meet the demands of the SDGs under question. As Biermann et al. (2017) note, the SDGs constitute a novel type of global governance. Rather than relying on top-down forms of governance, the SDGs make use of non-legally binding global goals that function through weak institutional arrangements that offer greater flexibility for governments. While the previous Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) were widely criticised, among other things, for being 'insufficiently global in its approach' and that they were a Northern-contrived agenda¹, the SDGs seek to realign implicit power dynamics through insisting that sustainable development is a universal goal for all (Saith, 2006: 1184; Kanye and Biermann, 2017). Similar to the DAC, critical authors argue that the MDGs served to perpetuate the traditional binary of a top-down relationship between the industrialised North on the one hand (wealthy donors) and the under-developed South (needy, passive recipients) on the other (Six, 2009). Problematically, such an approach 'tends to ghettoize the problem of development and locates it firmly in the third world' (Saith, 2006: 1184). Rather than geographically framing development as something that 'happens' within the Global South, the universal nature of the SDGs recognise that 'in a globalising era all countries and regions are interlocked in a

¹ The MDGs bear remarkable similarity to the International Development Targets contained in the DAC's (1996) *Shaping the 21st Century Report*.

mutual process of development... [whereby] the planet as a whole [becomes a] sphere of development in its own right' (Gills, 2017: 156).

The erstwhile approach and power-relations implicit in the MDG agenda not only overlooks the deprivation and rising inequality in the North, but it also is insufficient given the changing nature of the 'poverty problem' in recent decades. Research by Sumner and Mallet (2012) has demonstrated that the geography of global poverty has changed in that the overwhelming majority of the world's poor do not live in Low-Income Countries (LICs), but rather within Middle-Income Countries (MICs). The MICs that have witnessed the most significant economic growth and poverty reduction in the past 50 years, such as China and India, are states that have not followed the standard liberal market-based approach promulgated by the OECD's member states (Held and McNally, 2014).

As will be developed in subsequent sections, Southern powers - such as China and India - have now become prominent development actors in their own right (Mawdsley, 2012). However, their development cooperation modalities and philosophies are discursively at odds with the DAC's approach. Moreover, these actors have neither operated within the traditional governance of development cooperation nor have they indicated a willingness to be included within it. Recent Southern institutional 'alternatives' in the form of the NDB and the Asian Infrastructure and Investment bank (AIIB) have substantiated concerns of a 'tug-of-war' between the DAC and a new structure centred around the emerging providers (Chin and Quadir, 2012; Takahashi, 2015). Likewise, Esteves and Assunção (2014) argue that due to increased fragmentation and divergent interests between DAC and Southern approaches to development cooperation, it is possible to speak of an emerging 'battlefield' between DAC and Southern-dominated UN fora.

Moreover, estimates for the number of resources required to meet the SDGs put the figure at around 3.3 to 4.5 trillion USD per annum (UNCTAD, 2014). This amount goes well beyond what traditional donors have provided through ODA, and mainstream discourse asserts that financing will require the mobilisation of funds from an array of public, private, domestic and international financing sources. While ODA will continue to be an essential source of

financing for sustainable development - particularly for LICs - its relative weight has diminished given the rise and need for alternative forms of public and private financing. A key slogan of the SDGs is that their attainment requires a shift from 'billions to trillions'. Whereas the MDGs emphasised the need for ODA contributions from DAC donor states, the current financing emphasis is upon investment from private businesses, sovereign wealth funds, and investment firms (Mawdsley, 2018). In this context, ODA plays a relatively minor role alongside a swathe of other state and non-state financing mechanisms.

Despite the SDGs providing a goal framework in the post-2015 era, there remains the perception that 'fragmentation remains a pervasive problem' for development cooperation provision and governance (Kindornay and Samy, 2012: 7). With well over 250 Multilateral Development Cooperation agencies now existing, fragmentation has produced substantive overlap, competing jurisdictions, contradictory policies, and ineffectual development outcomes (Linn, 2013: Chin and Quadir, 2012: 500). The extent of fragmentation within development cooperation has even prompted some to dispute the nomenclature of a global development 'architecture' for a policy field that is so complex and diversified (Killen and Rogerson, 2010). When considering the 17 Goals and 169 targets that comprise the SDGs, prolific fragmentation produces substantial transaction costs that serve to increase the difficulties in meeting this demanding agenda (Janus and Keijzer, 2016).

What emerges from this brief sketch is a picture of a greatly diversified development landscape that is beset by several governance challenges (Fejerskov, 2017). In responding to this dynamic field, Goal 17 of the SDGs (UN, 2020) states that:

A successful sustainable development agenda requires partnerships between governments, the private sector, and civil society. These inclusive partnerships built upon principles and values, a shared vision, and shared goals that place people and the planet at the centre, are needed at the global, regional, national, and local level.

One form of governance that responds to this demand and has (re)gained increasing salience in the field are MSPs (Reinsberg and Westerwinter, 2019). As will be substantiated, some scholars and practitioners argue that multi-stakeholder governance mechanisms

among donors, recipients, PSAs, CSOs, and other relevant development actors are a 'sine qua non for advancing sustainable development globally' (Ogunleye, 2017: 3). MSPs promise that they can respond to the demands of the SDGs and other related Development goals by convening a wide range of all relevant state and non-state actors. By leveraging the comparative advantages and insights of these actors, MSPs promise more legitimate governance and effective development outcomes. Such forms of governance may not only overcome the legitimacy and effectiveness deficits associated with the 'old' DAC-led system. Severino and Ray (2010) argue that such forms of collective action - or 'hypercollective' action - could also provide coherence to a prolifically fragmented field. To do so, Dodds (2015: 3) argues that a 'transparent, accountability, efficient, participatory, and qualitative governance structure is a must in order to increase the effectiveness of an MSP'. However, as Beisheim's (2014) review of 8 years on MSPs reveals, the governance structures of many are 'terra incognita'.

The days of DAC hegemony within development cooperation may well be in terminal decline (Chin and Quadir, 2012). However, the field faces the challenge of providing a governance mechanism that preserves elements of the old that are proven to be effective, while remaining inclusive and flexible enough to incorporate diversity and be capable of adapting to shifts in the global political economy (Janus et al., 2014). While innovative and evidence-based approaches are necessary to successfully overcome the plethora of challenges addressed by the SDGs, addressing legitimacy concerns head-on will be essential. A crucial question concerns what different state and non-state actors perceive to be an appropriate global governance mechanism in the current conjuncture. However, the challenge of creating a legitimate and effective global governance mechanism is daunting when considering the heterogeneity and complexity associated with the 'new' actors that comprise the field.

2.2 The 'New' Actors in Development Cooperation

The rise of new actors has fundamentally altered the field of development cooperation and challenged the legitimacy of established governance mechanisms. Following Fejerskov et

al. (2017), this section argues that there is a need to go beyond the mere documenting of new state and non-state actors and to question instead the apparent novelty and homogeneity of seemingly 'like-minded' groupings as they enter and interact with the field. Furthermore, while scholarly and policy attention has primarily focused on the impact of emerging state powers upon the field of development cooperation, there is a need to also recognise and engage with the impact of other state and non-state actors. Consequently, this thesis adopts a 'Cosmopolitan' understanding of global governance (Held, 2009): states do not monopolise social relations and multiple forms of human association are relevant and influential at local, national, regional, and global scales. Such an understanding disavows the neorealist (Waltz, 1979) assumption that states alone are the unitary actors within international politics. As will be demonstrated, the role of non-state actors is paramount in understanding the dynamics of governance. This section, therefore, examines debates surrounding SSC providers, CSOs and PSAs beyond the traditional donor-recipient dichotomy.

2.2.1 'Emerging Donors' and South-South Cooperation

As noted, the field of development cooperation is predicated upon a distinct and dichotomous relationship between the developed North (donors) and the underdeveloped South (recipients) (Six, 2009: 1102). However, recent shifts in the global economy have meant that Southern countries who were recipients of development cooperation are now prominent providers of development assistance in their own right (Quah, 2011; Mawdsley, 2012). While there have been considerable efforts to explore the 'rise' of China, Brazil and India, emerging powers such as Mexico, Indonesia, Turkey and Argentina have also become important providers of development cooperation. These countries now occupy the previously distinct roles of both 'recipient' and 'donor'. Consequently, the rise of these actors 'belies [the notion of] a unified epistemic donor community' as traditionally has been the case (Esteves and Assunção, 2014: 1782).

There have been persistent difficulties in adequately conceptualising these ‘new’ development actors². Despite being commonly referred to as ‘non-traditional’ or ‘emerging donors’, this overlooks the fact that states such as China and India have been engaged in development cooperation since the 1950s and 1960s when the DAC itself was in its infancy (Agrawal, 2007; Inoue and Vaz, 2008). While Six (2009) has instead termed these actors ‘Post-Colonial Donors’, it could also be argued that this categorisation is also applicable to Ireland and the United States. Furthermore, states such as China and India reject the suggestion that they are ‘donors’, and they instead insist that they are ‘partners’. These countries reject the term ‘donor’ as it is perceived to be associated with the unequal and hierarchical relationships associated with the traditional DAC-led regime. As Hattori (2001: 641) argues, the traditional donor approach to development assistance is constitutive of a form of symbolic domination ‘to signal and euphemise... the underlying condition of hierarchy between donor and recipient’. In contrast, these actors insist that they practice a distinct paradigm of SSC, characterised by horizontal power relations between equals (Woods, 2008), while they have espoused a discourse of being overtly anti-colonial in nature. For Mawdsley (2011: 256), the following features characterise the paradigm or ‘symbolic regime’ of SSC: the ‘assertion of a shared developing country identity; expertise in “appropriate” development; the rejection of hierarchical donor-recipient relations; and an insistence on mutual opportunity’ (as opposed to the hierarchical provision of charity).

What is novel is the scale and influence of these non-DAC state actors upon the field of development cooperation since the early to mid-2000s. Although it is difficult to attain exact figures - due to issues of transparency and differences in measurement between ‘new’ Southern Development agencies and traditional OECD approaches - it is estimated that the share of these so-called emerging donors development assistance has risen from 5% in the late 1990s to around 15-20% in 2013 (UNDP, 2013). However, as Mwase and Yang (2012: 3) highlight, development financing from these donors goes beyond concessional ODA, and comes as part of a package of ‘multi-year financing including grants, loans, and lines of credit with various participants’. While development cooperation from non-DAC actors has primarily been on a bilateral basis, there is evidence of increasing multilateral dispositions,

² This project refers to these actors as SSC providers and ‘dual category’ countries interchangeably.

both through the creation of new institutions and with varying levels of engagement with the traditional architecture (Wihtol, 2014).

The difficulty in adequately conceptualising these actors is not merely semantical. Rather, it reflects the uncertainty over the impact of these actors upon the governance of development cooperation. Principally, there has been uncertainty over how SSC providers will influence governance and the field of development, and whether this will be on an individual or a collective basis (Mawdsley, 2011: 2; Rowlands, 2012). Scholarship in this vein has typically provided descriptive accounts of these states as 'new' development actors, and it has examined the willingness and capacity of these actors to challenge the 'status quo' (Richey and Ponte, 2014; Rowlands, 2012). For instance, due to their resistance to the DAC-led order and the creation of their institutional alternatives, some maintain that SSC can be perceived 'as a coordinated challenge to Western dominance and supremacy in world politics and economics today' (Panda, 2013: 117).

As Hattori (2001) notes, the DAC has traditionally positioned itself as the 'moral book-keeper' within the field, thus serving as a site wherein traditional actors cooperatively align their programmes in an ethical, evidence-based, and effective manner. Consequently, the emerging powers SSC programmes that feature non-conditional lending may endanger the achievements made by donors in encouraging 'good governance' in recipient states (Naim, 2007). For these perspectives, there exists the apprehension that the SSC actors might use their increasing influence to pursue alternative visions of world order, whether it be through fundamentally altering existing institutions or through the creation of revisionist development institutions (Narlikar, 2006). It is perhaps unsurprising that such alarmist perspectives emphasise – implicitly or explicitly – the need to 'socialise' these actors into the DAC approach to ensure that recipients do not take on unsustainable debt or postpone governance reforms (Manning, 2006). Consequently, these research approaches mirror broader debates on the need to socialise emerging powers into the existing post-war system to safeguard established norms (Patrick, 2010).

While attempts to categorise SSC actors under a unitary analytical category are commonplace, Rowlands (2012) contends that the 'binary concepts of "emerging donors" and "traditional donors" may conceal more than they reveal'. In other words, attempts to categorise these so-called emerging actors under a unitary label may obscure multiple and distinct identities, perceptions, and practices. Despite the common SSC discourse espoused by the emerging donors, recent scholarship has sought to demonstrate the considerable heterogeneity that exists amongst this seemingly homogenous constellation of actors in terms of identity, modalities, and institutional engagement at the global level (Rowlands, 2012). As Gray and Gills (2016: 564) argue, SSC practices 'should not be understood as an unproblematic unitary force, but as constituted by complex and often contradictory national prerogatives and interests'. For instance, Renzio and Seifert (2014: 1869) argue that beneath the rhetoric, there does not exist a shared vision as to whether and how 'they [SSC actors] should act jointly to ensure that SSC as an emerging development cooperation modality is recognised and develops as an alternative to more traditional forms of development assistance'.

Instead, the common discourse promulgated by such actors tends to hide somewhat different ways of engaging with the traditional development cooperation architecture and in approaching relationships with recipients and the pursuit of their economic and political interests (ibid). Furthermore, the symbolic regime of horizontal relations expressed through SSC discourse may serve to problematically 'de-politicise' development through presenting a 'natural congruity' amongst states within the global south that are in fact rather different (McEwan and Mawdsley, 2012). For instance, despite the common principles and discourse espoused, the SSC programmes provided by Kenya are considerably different in scale and influence to those provided by China.

At the global institutional level, Xiaoyu (2012) argues that socialisation is not a one-way process. Socialisation is rather multidirectional or 'two-way', and emerging donors share several similarities with the DAC, while the DAC is converging upon Southern models and understandings. As Tortora (2011) reveals, both SSC and DAC actors emphasize recipient country ownership of development agendas, yet the nature of such ownership is interpreted

variously in practice. Furthermore, DAC actors have recently started to converge with SSC actors in terms of their explicit justifications for providing development assistance, such as utilising foreign aid in the pursuit of commercial interests and geostrategic advantage (Dreher et al., 2011). Speaking on the nature of this two-way convergence, Harris and Vittorini (2018: 375) note that: 'it was once thought that in the aid arena there would be a Northernisation of the South, but it looks increasingly like a Southernisation of the North'. That is to say, there was an expectation that these new emerging actors would converge upon the traditional Northern or DAC model. However, it seems that DAC providers are instead converging upon the norms, understandings, and modalities associated with the Southern providers. While a considerable number of commentators argue that SSC providers offer their assistance under the 'rhetorical guise' of 'solidarity' for purposes of self-interest alone, thus contrasting with the allegedly virtuous and altruistic intention of the DAC, Muhr (2016: 635) argues that 'solidarity and interests are not per se mutually exclusive'. Furthermore, according to Jeffrey Sachs, the notion that the DAC members act 'out of the goodness of their hearts' while the 'new donor countries are only in it for their own self-interest' is a deficient caricature (Schlager, 2007: 10).

Rather than there being a gulf in values that distance the Southern providers from the DAC actors - and despite heterogeneity amongst the emerging donors themselves - the evidence is pointing to trends of convergence. For instance, in a comparative review of both DAC and China's development assistance to the continent of Africa, Kragelund (2015) reveals that China has followed the trend of other emerging powers through increasingly playing by the DAC's rules. However, this convergence seems to be working to the detriment of African states' policy space, given that they can no longer play traditional and new providers against each other. Similarly, both emphasize private sector-led economic growth as the central analytic and goal of Development, rather than a formerly DAC focus upon poverty reduction and social spending that was characteristic of the early MDG era (Mawdsley, 2015). In sum, both heterogeneity and evidence of convergence are present. There may perhaps be too much heterogeneity amongst the emerging donors to produce a challenge to the traditional architecture in the form of a cohesive alternative order. However, the cumulative rise of the Southern Providers presents coordination and leadership challenges to the Northern DAC in

terms of setting the global development agenda (Rowlands, 2012: Chin and Quadir, 2012: 499). Nevertheless, ongoing questions remain as to the influence and preferences of these 'new' donors with regards to the governance of the field.

2.2.2 The Private Sector as a Development Actor

While it is apt to question the apparent novelty and homogeneity of the SSC providers, the same applies to the private sector as a development actor. It is a misnomer to argue that the private sector constitutes a 'new' actor in development: the private sector has long been a critical target for, and implementor of, development cooperation projects. Following the decline of Keynesianism and state-led modernisation as the guiding orthodoxy that guided development interventions, neoliberal orthodoxy asserted that the markets and PSAs were the most efficient actors within society and that state intervention was unnecessary and burdensome (Toye, 1991: Ruckert, 2006). Even before this ideological shift, the dominant understanding of development and the means to achieve it had been strengthening the market and facilitating economic growth. The private sector has thus long been believed to hold a key role (Rostow, 1960). However, what is novel about the role of the private sector in the current conjuncture is the scale of private sector engagement, the discourse around the 'private sector' being 'intentional' Development actors in their own right, and the role that the state plays *vis-a-vis* the market (Berthoud, 2010: 74–78).

Vaes and Huyuse (2015: 18-19) outline four manners in which PSAs are novel within the contemporary field of development cooperation. First, is the unprecedented level of investments that the private and financial sector in the South is attracting. Second, both Northern and Southern PSAs are producing sophisticated financial mechanisms and funds to channel development cooperation finance into the Global South. As a result, many recipient countries have increased access to private finance. Consequently, ODA takes on less centrality as a financing mechanism than it did previously (OECD, 2014). Third, and related to the role of the state *vis-a-vis* the market, state development agencies are reshaping themselves to both attract investment from the private sector and to promulgate the 'private turn' in development finance (Eurodad and CRBM, 2011: 7). As Mawdsley

(2016) argues, donors are increasingly acting as ‘handmaidens’ to financial interests through accelerating and promoting the process of financialisation. Donors are doing so by not only readjusting state development agencies to make them more amenable to private investment but also through encouraging a dominant narrative that private sector investment is the *sine qua non* for sustainable development. This discourse claims that it is necessary to go beyond the ‘billions’ of ODA that were needed for the MDGs and to use ODA instead to ‘unlock’ the ‘trillions’ of private sector investment (Benn et al., 2016). As Gavin Wilson – CEO of the International Finance Corporation’s (IFC) Asset Management – stated during the Annual Meetings of the IMF and World Bank in 2016:

A year ago, we all signed up to the SDGs. The only way to achieve these goals is if private capital funds them and private business implements them... we must convert billions of official assistance ... to the trillions in total financing.

Finally, Vaes and Huyuse (2015: 18-19) argue that PSAs are to play a critical role in meeting 21st-century development challenges within MSPs. Hence, they argue that development cooperation discourse today ‘may not be about state *or* business *or* civil society, but about state *and* business *and* civil society’.

Gavin Wilson’s framing above is characteristic of the dominant discourse promulgated around the financing the SDGs. The function of traditional ODA in this narrative shifts from providing direct budgetary and project support to recipient governments, and instead becomes a means by which to subsidise and de-risk Northern private investment. As Blowfield and Dowlan (2014) argue, the values of many PSAs are undoubtedly neoliberal in that they emphasise efficiency, competition and deregulation, and increasingly the notion of ‘inclusion’ itself has shifted from being a concern with poverty and social inequality, but rather towards ensuring that marginalised and deprived groups have access to markets, services and financial processes. As a consequence, poverty reduction is considered to be an eventual outcome of economic growth, rather than being an explicit objective in itself (Banks and Hulme, 2014: 191). Dominant actors in contemporary development cooperation are, therefore, reemphasising the superiority of market forces and faith in ‘ideas emanating

out of business schools' (Moran, 2014). Through transferring institutional logics proven to be successful in business, dominant actors assume that they will be more effective in producing economic growth and consequent poverty reduction rather than 'traditional' state or donor intervention (Fejerskov et al., 2016: 10). The consequence is that dominant actors regard economic 'underdevelopment' and poverty as issues of 'technical and neutral problem solving' (ibid), rather than recognising their structural origins due to power asymmetries at the domestic, national, and international level.

It is important to stress that the 'private sector' does not constitute a homogeneous force. While advancing financialisation has become an undeniable feature of the contemporary development cooperation landscape, the relevant actors comprising the private sector are diverse in nature, influence, and in the depth of their engagement within the field. Providing a clear picture of the various actors that comprise the 'private sector' in Development is a considerable and as yet unresolved task, given that 'there seem to be as many definition and typologies as there are publications' regarding private sector engagement (Vaes and Huyse, 2015: 24). Nonetheless, as Kharas (2012: 7) notes, the impact of PSAs upon development cooperation is often dependent upon the sector of engagement. For instance, natural resource companies contribute to development through subsidies to governments, while telecommunication companies may contribute by making financial services more accessible through mobile banking.

One form of a private organisation that has garnered considerable attention in recent literature on the (re)emergence of the private sector in development has been the rise of philanthropic, or 'philanthrocapitalist' (McGoey, 2014), foundations (Fejerskov, 2017). Estimates on private philanthropy suggest that in 2015 nearly half (USD 64 billion) of what DAC donors provided (USD 137 billion) was provided by foundations in 2015 (Hudson Institute, 2016). The immense rise of philanthropic, notably Northern-based actors such as the Gates foundation, within the field of development cooperation has served to diversify the nature and number of actors involved not only in financial resource provision but also in policy-making and agenda-setting. Problematically, for Banks and Hulme (2014: 187) it is essential to question and come to terms with a situation wherein philanthropic actors have

more significant say upon national and global health policy than government ministers and CSOs in developing countries. While traditional donors have played an indispensable role in encouraging both financialisation and private foundations, the consequence is that unelected and often unaccountable private stakeholders are gaining considerable voice and influence in shaping national and global development agendas.

Within global development governance, Northern donor agencies are increasingly - though incipiently - seeking to implement partnerships with the private sector not only as implementors of projects but also as architects of global development policy. However, these partnerships are advancing in an *ad hoc* and bilateral fashion. There has yet to be a substantial governance mechanism put in place that can facilitate more structured - and transparent and accountable - engagement with the private sector (Wehermann, 2018). However, despite their privileging within contemporary development discourse, much is unknown regarding the behaviours and preferences of these diverse PSAs within the governance of development cooperation.

2.2.3 Civil Society Organisations

The unprecedented role ascribed to the private sector in the post-2015 development cooperation context is in stark contrast to the increasing constraints faced globally by CSOs. Despite having been the 'darlings' of neoliberal development policy in the 1990s, the restrictions facing CSOs are phenomena that the 'Aid Effectiveness' agenda – or interpretations thereof – has in part contributed (Rutzen, 2015). In the years following the fall of the Berlin Wall, the so-called 'associational revolution' took place whereby CSOs were perceived in the international community to hold great potential in bolstering the 'democratisation' of national polities (Salamon, 1994). CSOs are private in form, in that they are not and have no desire to be part of the state apparatus, yet public in purpose in that their activities are not commercial (Reinalda, 2001). Instead, CSOs are issue-based, value-oriented, and they seek to provide direct contributions to the provision of public goods. The generally positive esteem that CSOs held in the eyes of the international community during the 1990s is reflected in the Millennium Declaration, whereby the declaration expounded

human rights and the role of 'non-government organisations and civil society' as crucial actors towards the realisation of the MDGs (UNHR, 2000).

The generally favourable context that CSOs enjoyed in the 1990s quickly began to wane following a series of geopolitical shifts in the early 2000s. A full account of the events and processes that led to the increasing restrictions faced by CSOs is beyond the scope of this chapter. However, we can say that in the post 9/11 context, CSOs faced increasing funding restrictions by the Northern donors due to concerns with terrorism and security within recipient countries. For instance, George Bush announced in the aftermath of 9/11: 'Just to show you how insidious these terrorists are, they oftentimes use nice-sounding, non-governmental organizations as fronts for their activities' (USDoS, 2001). The positive esteem in which the international community held CSOs thus began to give way to more cynical attitudes by countries aligned with the US during this era. Furthermore, in many national developing contexts, CSOs were considered with suspicion by some recipient governments that sought to consolidate their power rather than open up to further democratisation. Crucially, Rutzen (2015: 32) argues that the restriction of CSOs 'also gained momentum from international efforts to improve the performance of foreign aid'. As will be developed in further depth, with the adoption of the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, recipient states have exploited the principle of 'host country ownership' through interpreting it to mean 'host-government ownership' (ibid). Using this as a justification, some CSOs have been obstructed from receiving international funding. This, in combination with a swathe of restrictive laws and legislative constraints upon CSOs over the past two decades, has resulted in shrinking space and a decreasing enabling environment for civil society globally.

CSOs have nonetheless played an increasingly prominent role within the institutions and processes of global governance. Brown and Timmer (2006: 6) note that CSOs play five essential roles at this level: identifying emerging issues; communicating the voice of the grassroots; building bridges in order to link diverse stakeholders; increasing public visibility of the importance of issues, and; monitoring the actors, performance and institutions comprising global governance. Regarding the latter, this not only applies to public entities but, as Fassin argues (2009: 503), CSOs 'have taken up the mission of counterbalancing

the huge power of the multinational corporations'. Often wedded to championing democratic inclusion and human rights in development discourses, CSOs position themselves as counterweights to private sector logics and interests at the global level.

While there is a tendency to understand CSOs to be uniquely democratic agents, CSOs do not constitute a 'homogenous and democratic space that invariably represents those below the state' (Poskitt, Shankland and Taela 2016: 32). Frequently in global governance, CSOs are challenged based on their representative and legitimacy credentials. The challenge is ever-present for CSOs to 'clarify who they represent and what mandate they have to speak on behalf of the poor and marginalized groups when they engage in policy dialogue' (SIDA, 2007: 18).

Furthermore, within global civil society, there are power asymmetries and divergent interests, particularly between Northern and Southern CSOs (Srisakandharajah and Tiwana, 2014). Moreover, some argue that it would be naïve to assume that national CSOs can be divorced from the donor countries in which they operate (Manji and O'Coill, 2002), as Northern CSOs are notorious for pursuing similar interests to their respective donor countries. This latter point could also be said to apply for CSOs from emerging economies that engage in global dialogue and agenda-setting, who tend to be dominated by elite groups with close ties to the state (Poskitt, Shankland, Taela, 2016: 32).

It would also be naïve to presume that CSO and private sector interests and logics are invariably opposed at the global level. Undoubtedly CSOs tend to hold deep suspicions of the role of PSAs in development discourse. However, far from contesting hegemonic neoliberal norms at the level of global decision-making and discourse, Banks and Hulme (2014) argue that civil society has been increasingly 'hollowed out'. They argue that CSO participation in global development governance often serves as a veneer by which to maintain, rather than contest, the dominance of free-market capitalism, to the detriment of transformative social justice. Banks, Hulme, and Edwards (2015) forward three reasons as to why global CSOs are increasingly unable to produce long term transformative change. First, global CSOs tend to have weak roots within the countries that they are working within.

Second, CSOs have not been immune to increasing tendencies towards ‘specialisation’ and ‘technocracy’ within the field. Here, CSOs increasingly act as clients to work on a limited set of agendas – such as democracy promotion, or as implementers of specific donor projects - which inhibits the emergence of a vibrant civil society necessary for deep-rooted, structural transformation. Third, and as mentioned, the shrinking of civic space globally and in national contexts. The current position of CSOs within the field of development cooperation mirrors Munck’s (2006: 330) notion that civil society may comprise both an ‘arena in which capitalist hegemony is secured, but also where subaltern classes forge alliances and articulate alternative hegemonic projects’. We must, therefore, avoid ‘over romanticising’ CSOs or turning them into caricatures of the great collective defenders and agents of justice. Instead, and as is the case with public and private actors, we must also be attentive to the heterogeneity that characterises civil society actors within the field of development cooperation.

The discussion above reveals that a more complex and diverse field comprised of ‘new’ actors and approaches has replaced the old ‘landscape’ of international development cooperation (Gore, 2013). Throughout the recent history of the field, there has been a varying emphasis on the respective Developmental roles of the state, market, and civil society depending on the ideological orthodoxy present at the time (Hulme, 2013). Understanding the interaction and roles of these diverse actors can go some lengths in grasping the nuances and tendencies inherent within the current field. Although we can question their apparent novelty, these actors are highly heterogeneous in terms of their interaction with the established institutions responsible for facilitating development cooperation. However, as noted by Alonso (2018: 22):

...as the diversity of the actors engaged increases, so does the heterogeneity of interests and visions at play, thus opening the space for new conflicts. To avoid such pitfalls, it has become necessary to design an inclusive and legitimate structure for development cooperation governance.

Elements of convergence are present, particularly concerning the elevated role afforded to the PSAs amongst emerging and traditional providers. However, central questions over the

future of the global development architecture remain: what do these actors want in terms of global development governance? What institutional forms do different actors desire? Given the heterogeneity of interests, is it even possible to have a global multilateral mechanism? The crucial inquiry thus becomes not a focus upon descriptive accounts of the novelty of these supposedly 'new actors', but rather towards the multi-directionality of change and the 'processes of interaction among various actors, and contributions to, reshaping the global institutional framework for development cooperation (Fejerskov, 2016: 6). Furthermore, it is essential to question how current and emerging institutions 'can become more socially inclusive, and of the role of new actors and alliances in strengthening this process' (Banks and Hulme, 2014: 193). Nevertheless, the DAC has not been passive with regards to the apparent emergence of these 'new' heterogeneous actors. This chapter now turns to examine the 'Aid Effectiveness' reform process that the DAC has underwent to accommodate these actors and the difficulties that persist in engendering partnership.

2.3 The 'Aid Effectiveness' Reform Process

This section brings us closer to the case by examining the reform process that preceded and facilitated the formation of the GPEDC. This section demonstrates that due to the legitimacy critiques posed against the DAC, attempts to reform the system were made 'to an extent unparalleled in the history of aid in terms of ambition and international acceptance' (Ashoff and Klingebiel, 2014: 1). This reform process is most visible through several successive High-Level Fora (HLF) on aid effectiveness: Rome (2003), Paris (2005), Accra (2008), and Busan (2011) (Rogerson, 2011). As Schaaf (2015: 69) argues, these forums 'addressed the fundamental issue of why aid was not producing the outcomes intended and resulted in the GPEDC that is attempting to reshape the development landscape in order to coordinate and maximise the impact of development activities'. This reform process not only facilitated the inclusion and engagement of several non-DAC actors within development cooperation governance. This process has also substantiated claims about a 'paradigm shift' in development cooperation (Mawdsley, Savage, and Kim, 2014). This section examines the reform process by examining the key achievements of this process, and the supposed shift to this new 'development effectiveness' paradigm.

A concern with ODA's effectiveness has long featured within the field. As Fuhrer (1996: 8-9) notes, in preparatory documents for the Development Assistance Group (the precursor to the DAC), there was a discussion on the various ways that the effectiveness of ODA could be achieved through the exchange of information on aid projects and programmes. Efforts to ensure the effectiveness of aid are therefore not a 21st-century concern: they have their origins in the foundations of the DAC. Nonetheless, there are two novel elements regarding the DAC's more recent concern with 'aid effectiveness': a clear recognition that aid is ineffective and a greater openness towards new state and non-state actors.

During the 1990s, there was a recognition that aid was failing to produce the kind of social and economic development results that were sought by DAC donors and recipients. This 'aid fatigue' period witnessed a discernible fall in the real amount of ODA provided by DAC donors, and a lack of evidence that ODA was effective in the reduction of poverty (Bird, 2004). In response, there was increasing dialogue and focus on the 'challenges associated with aid both at the giving and receiving end' (Fosu, 2016: 3). Concurrently, the DAC's shift towards greater openness and inclusivity has its antecedents in the DAC's (OECD, 1996) flagship *Shaping the Twenty-First Century* report that emphasised partnership and recipient ownership in order to 'rebalance relations, moving from the highly conditioned donor mindset of the structural adjustment era' (Eyben, 2012: 84; Manning 2008: 3). In reviewing the practices of DAC donors, this publication led to the 'decisive innovation' of setting up a Task Force to include 15 recipient governments in the discussion on improving the effectiveness of aid (Manning, 2008: 3). In seeking to ensure that ODA was effective, there was thus a coupled recognition that greater inclusion of recipients was essential to this endeavour.

The 2003 Rome HLF initiated the DAC-led Aid Effectiveness reform process. The Rome Declaration on Harmonisation (2003) intended to enhance recipient country ownership of their development trajectories, and more than 40 multilateral and bilateral providers and 28 recipients agreed to harmonise their efforts (OECD, 2003b). The most significant institutional consequence of the Rome HLF was the creation of the Working Party on Aid Effectiveness

(WP-EFF) which evolved out of the DAC task force on donor practices. Despite being a 'classic subsidiary body of the DAC' (Manning, 2008: 7), the creation of the WP-EFF is significant. Its creation suggests an attempt on behalf of the DAC to distance itself from the 'aid effectiveness' agenda to engender participation from actors who see reputational challenges in associating with the OECD (Killen and Rogerson, 2010). While the distinction between the DAC and WP-EFF may be 'fuzzy', the roots of the aid effectiveness reform process nonetheless lie in an attempt by the DAC to ensure its ongoing relevance (Chandy and Kharas, 2011). However, the institutional separation between the DAC and the WP-EFF ensured that participation by other actors in the aid effectiveness agenda, beyond DAC members and a handful of recipients, grew substantially during the 2000s (Kindornay and Samy, 2012: 3).

The 2005 Paris HLF constituted the first most significant landmark in the aid effectiveness agenda, both in terms of scope and inclusivity. Paris marked the 'first time that donors and recipients both agreed to [time bound] commitments and to hold each other accountable for achieving these' (OECD, 2017). With the groundwork established in Rome, over 100 countries endorsed the Paris Declaration that stated their intent to 'take far-reaching and monitorable actions to reform the ways we deliver and manage aid... [and] we recognise that aid effectiveness must increase significantly' (OECD, 2005). Five principles constitute the spirit of the Paris Declaration that still have relevance to today: *ownership* of development agendas by recipients; donor *alignment*; *harmonisation*; managing for *results*, and; mutual *accountability*. Several Southern Providers also endorsed the Paris principles. However, they did so only in their capacity as recipients, as they rejected the application of these principles to their provision of development cooperation (Weinlich, 2014: 1830). As noted by Aschoff and Klingebiel (2014: 7), these principles were not necessarily new. For instance, the notion of ownership and alignment pertains to the 'old principle of helping people to help themselves'. Nonetheless, what is new about Paris is that for the first time in the history of international aid, 'it defines common principles and numerous procedural rules for a large number of donors and partner countries, thereby significantly expanding the international regulatory framework for aid' (ibid).

Despite constituting a landmark in the formation of a global framework for aid effectiveness, the Paris Declaration faced two principal criticisms (Eyben, 2012: 84). First, the Declaration was agreed in a closed setting (Steinle and Corell, 2008). Through privileging 'aid effectiveness', the DAC's managerial discourse 'inadvertently exposed the political question of who decides what is 'development': the DAC member states (Eyben, 2012: 84). The second criticism posited against the Paris Declaration was its undue focus on the means - ODA by traditional donors - rather than a more concerted focus on development ends within recipient states (Alemany et al., 2008). Moreover, CSOs - who claimed that they were 'ignored' at Paris - lambasted the Declaration for its exclusively intergovernmental nature that not only lacked CSO involvement but also failed to link means (aid) to development goals (Eyben and Savage, 2013: 459; ICSSG, 2008: 2). Paris thus did little to dispel the notion that the DAC constituted an elite donor club with excessive political influence. Despite gaining endorsement by over 100 countries, Kharas and Linn (2008: 3) point out that this endorsement only covered less than half of all development cooperation when we consider the contributions of private foundations, NGOs, and non-DAC donors.

In 2008, the G77 grouping in the United Nations challenged the DAC by establishing a parallel institution in the form of the Development Cooperation Forum (DCF) (Eyben, 2012: 85). Crucially, the DCF framed its agenda as being concerned with 'development effectiveness' - as opposed to being merely concerned with the effectiveness of aid - thus discursively challenging the DAC approach by considering a broader range of development modalities. The DCF's mandate was to 'work to enhance the implementation of the internationally agreed development goals... and [to] promote dialogue and to find effective ways to support it' (ECOSOC, 2012). The DCF's broader development effectiveness focus thus automatically encompasses modalities of development assistance, and it is thus not only concerned with ODA. Moreover, the associated legitimacy of the UN ascribed it with more significant support from development actors from the Global South. The creation of the DCF thus produced competitive pressure on the DAC-led Aid Effectiveness reform agenda both in terms of its inclusivity and mandate.

In responding to the criticisms facing the Paris Declaration, the DAC undertook a 'reflection exercise' with regards to its future relevance in the development landscape (OECD, 2009: 1). The WP-EFF sought to improve its inclusiveness through the extension of its membership from three to five categories of stakeholders for the 2008 Accra HLF: (1) countries receiving ODA; (2) countries both receiving and providing assistance; (3) donor countries reporting ODA to the DAC; (4) multilaterals; and (5) CSOs, foundations, local governments, and parliamentarians (DCD/DAC, 2012c). The 2008 Accra HLF culminated in the endorsement of the Accra Agenda for Action (AAA). For Aschoff and Klingebiel (2014: 7), with the AAA the Aid Effectiveness reform agenda developed in three regards. First, the process became more political in that CSOs and parliamentarians became involved. The inclusion of these actors suggested a partial shift from a managerial and DAC-dominated discourse on aid effectiveness, towards engaging in a critical and political dialogue process. Second, commitments made at Paris were developed and specified further, such as through ensuring the use of recipient systems to monitor aid effectiveness, while also ensuring greater emphasis towards the untying of aid. Third, and perhaps most significantly, the recognition of other actors such as CSOs, new donors, and the private sector suggested that the realisation of poverty reduction was only attainable through inclusive partnerships with a wide gamut of diverse actors. However, key SSC Providers still refused to engage in this process as providers of development effectiveness. It was at the 2011 Busan forum that considerable efforts were made by the DAC to secure the participation of these new state actors.

Monitoring surveys on the implementation of the Paris principles revealed that although recipients had made significant progress, only one out of twelve commitments had been met in full, thus leading to a dominant perception that aid effectiveness commitments made at Paris and Accra had been unsuccessful in generating behaviour change. As Chandy and Kharas (2011: 745) note, the areas that the Paris commitments had been the weakest – in the predictability of aid and the use of partner systems – were indicative of the persistent power imbalance between the donors and recipients. Consequently, Paris and Accra had done little to dispel assumptions that the aid effectiveness agenda was donor-dominated and not responding to the demands and expectations of recipients. A focus on results,

therefore, became a key theme for the Busan HLF, while the WP-EFF sought to imbue the aid effectiveness agenda with greater legitimacy through broadening the tent to include a more significant number of actors (Kindornay and Samy, 2012: 5-7).

The Busan HLF-4 was ground-breaking in terms of participation. The forum brought together the largest ever number of political leaders, CSO representatives, PSAs, and other non-state actors together to forge a new consensus on aid effectiveness (Abdel-Malik, 2015: 193). As noted by Kim and Lee (2013: 788), the goals of the forum were threefold: to take stock and assess the aid effectiveness agenda; to move towards a new more expansive paradigm of 'Development Effectiveness'; and to ensure that the new agenda was more inclusive of other actors. Furthermore, while large SSC Providers were party to the Accra HLF-3 as recipients of development assistance, HLF-4 would be the first global institutional 'meeting-point' between the traditional DAC donors and SSC actors as development cooperation providers (Xiaoyun and Carey, 2014: 17). The intent behind the HLF-4 was to form a global partnership that would encompass both the traditional donors and SSC actors, while also reflecting the increasingly diverse multi-actor field of development cooperation by acknowledging and actively engaging non-state actors and non-ODA development modalities (Russo, Cabral, Ferrinho, 2013: 4).

For many initial commentators, the Busan HLF-4 was successful in forging a new consensus and constituted a 'paradigm shift' within development cooperation, whereby Aid Effectiveness shifted towards a broader notion of 'development effectiveness' (Atwood, 2011; Mawdsley et al., 2014). Mawdsley et al. (2014) note that 'development effectiveness' goes 'beyond aid' in development cooperation: ODA merely serves a complementary and catalytic role alongside a suite of other public and private financial instruments. Furthermore, they argue that the Development Effectiveness paradigm goes beyond the prior 'poverty reduction' and 'rights-based' approach of the DAC in the 1990s and 2000s. It instead places greater emphasis on the private sector and economic growth as the means of achieving 'development' (Atwood, 2012: 2). Given this expanded scope, this shift 'also means recognising a more diverse set of development actors and their different roles and impacts' within the global development architecture (Kim and Lee, 2013: 792).

However, the challenges in forging a multi-stakeholder consensus are apparent when we examine the diverse interpretations of 'development effectiveness' by the actors present at Busan. As Eyben (2012: 79) argues, the term 'development effectiveness' is 'subject to so many possible interpretations that everyone could agree to the term, if not to its content'. For traditional donors, they conflated 'Development Effectiveness' modalities with ODA, while development effectiveness was perceived to be an auxiliary component - rather than a replacement - of the traditional Aid Effectiveness agenda (Esteves and Assunção, 2014: 1785). For CSOs, such as BetterAid (2010), the 'development effectiveness' paradigm is perceived to retain a focus on human rights, while CSOs presented concern over the elevated role ascribed to the private sector within this new paradigm. While Busan was the first international development forum to 'acknowledge and formalise [a] role for business', Kharas (2012: 7-8) argues that the private sector was perceived and engaged as a 'monolithic bloc' rather than a sectoral approach to private sector engagement. Consequently, this made it difficult for PSAs to have clarity on what exactly their role was within this paradigm.

Furthermore, whether the emerging powers – principally China – would sign up to the Busan Outcome Document and its new 'development effectiveness' agenda was of paramount concern for the WP-EFF (Desai, 2014). China and the main SSC partners eventually signed the Outcome Document with the last-minute inclusion of Paragraph 2: 'the nature, modalities and responsibilities that apply to SSC differ from those that apply to North-South cooperation... the principles, commitments and actions agreed... shall be the reference for South-South partners on a voluntary basis' (BOD, 2011). The shared principles yet 'voluntary and differential responsibilities' proviso should not be understated: it is regressive compared to the Paris Declaration's shared commitments-based approach to monitoring commitments. Consequently, this new approach risked merely constituting a 'lowest common denominator [agreement] without bite or focus by becoming more general and inclusive' (Kim, 2011: 2; Kharas, 2011: 7). Moreover, by differentiating between the commitments of SSC and traditional providers, this is argued to further 'reinforce the lines separating North and South' (Esteves and Assunção, 2014: 1785).

Nevertheless, the HLF-4 Outcome Document announced plans for the establishment of a new partnership that would encompass the full range of actors comprising the field of development cooperation: the GPEDC. The intent was that the GPEDC would herald an era in which ‘the old donor-recipient relationship is replaced by an equator-less landscape of a multi-stakeholder global partnership’ (Eyben and Savage, 2012). While the ‘aid effectiveness’ reform process described above reveals a process in which the DAC sought to ensure its relevance and legitimacy in a rapidly shifting development context, it was recognised by the OECD that the new consensus and partnership established necessitated ‘letting go’ on behalf of the DAC (DCD/DAC, 2011c: 4). What was ‘highly unusual’, was that the Busan Outcome Document (BOD) ‘closed the books’ on the WPEFF. For Kharas (2011: 4-5), this ‘provided a true break from the past and created an opportunity to forge a new partnership that better reflects the realities of the global poverty reduction challenge today’. Nevertheless, questions remain over the degree to which these aspirations have been met.

2.4 The GPEDC: Structure, Perspectives and Prospects

The GPEDC is guided by the core principles of development effectiveness to promote the effectiveness of all forms of development finance, i.e. not just ODA, towards the realisation of sustainable development (GPEDC, 2020). These principles include a commitment to: country ownership, a focus on results, mutual accountability and transparency, and inclusive partnerships. While the GPEDC does not have an explicit formal role concerning the implementation of the SDGs, it nonetheless positions itself as the forum concerned with ‘how-to-do’ sustainable development. To fulfil its mandate, it operates as a knowledge-sharing platform that promotes ‘action-oriented dialogue among relevant stakeholders’ that meets in full every two years (GPEDC, 2016). In support of its biennial meetings, the GPEDC also serves an accountability function by monitoring stakeholder progress on the implementation of development effectiveness principles.

By way of its structure, three bodies comprise the GPEDC’s governance. The main decision-

making body is its 22-member Steering Committee³ that meets twice a year to provide ‘strategic leadership and coordination’ over the partnership’s programme of work and its implementation (GPEDC, 2016a). Political oversight and leadership are provided by four Co-Chairs at the ministerial level, with one DAC country representative, one representative of recipients and providers (dual category), and one recipient country. In April 2019, the Steering Committee made a controversial decision to introduce a fourth co-chair to represent non-state stakeholders at the political level of the partnership. In an attempt to bridge the OECD with UN bodies, the secretariat staff of the GPEDC come from both the OECD’s Development Cooperation Directorate (DCD) in Paris and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in New York. The secretariat is responsible for supporting the work of the Steering Committee and Co-Chairs and it also provides substantive and logistical support to the Global Partnership’s work programmes.

The GPEDC has ‘global-light’ and ‘country-heavy’ governance structure, that provides room for ‘differential commitments’ and adequate monitoring mechanisms to encourage compliance (Atwood, 2012: 24). By being global light - that is to say, to have a streamlined global secretariat - it was hoped that this would offset the critique that the GPEDC constitutes a top-down process and that it would instead be reliant on voluntary bottom-up action by participating stakeholders.

In addition to its multi-stakeholder governance structure, the GPEDC boasts an endorsement from 161 countries and 56 international organisations. It convened 1500 senior delegates at the 2014 Mexico High-Level Meeting (HLM1), 4600 delegates at the 2016 Nairobi HLM (HLM2), and recently over 600 senior-level participants at its 2019 Senior Level Meeting (SLM) on the sidelines of the UN High-Level Political Forum (HLPF) on Sustainable Development. The GPEDC is perhaps one of the most ambitious attempts at multi-stakeholder governance yet attempted as it aims to reflect the full breadth and sheer diversity of the actors that exist within the contemporary development landscape (Schaaf,

³ To give a sense of its multi-stakeholder composition, the Steering Committee is comprised of representatives of: 6 recipient countries; 2 provider *and* recipient countries; 4 DAC provider countries; 1 business representative; 1 parliament; 1 CSO; 1 multilateral development bank; 1 Arab provider; 1 UNSDG; 1 OECD-DAC representative; 1 trade union; 1 foundation, and; 1 sub-national representative.

2015: 69). For some, the creation of the GPEDC marked 'the end of the traditional OECD dominance in development financing', while others have claimed that it may 'dismantle the dominance of DAC, in the same way that G20 did to the G7/8' (John, 2012: 17; Xiaoyun and Wang, 2014: 2). However, it is apt to question the extent that the various actors that comprise the field of development cooperation have engaged with the GPEDC. This thesis follows Ruckert's (2008: 111) approach to the DAC in understanding the GPEDC to be a 'social relation, a moment of crystallisation, and condensation of antagonistic social forces'. That is to say, that although they both constitute bodies that attempt to bring actors together in one setting, neither the DAC nor the GPEDC is a monolith: within each body there are diverse actors with various - and potentially conflicting - interests and dispensations.

The GPEDC has been the subject of both praise and criticism. For the sake of clarity, we can say that perspectives on the GPEDC are divided between those who see it as 'old wine in new bottles', and those who regard it as a potentially transformative governance innovation. For the former, critics argue that the GPEDC constitutes 'business as usual' in that it is a DAC initiated and dominated arrangement that has yet to garner significant engagement from key development actors such as the large SSC Providers. For instance, a great deal of debate has surrounded the reasons as to why India, China and Brazil have not participated in the GPEDC. Li et al. (2018) argue that critical emerging powers, principally China, have not participated within the GPEDC due to the perception that it constitutes a DAC-dominated institution, and that it is, therefore, ill-suited to the arguably distinct modality of SSC.

Moreover, critics argue that the GPEDC is a botched attempt by the DAC to co-opt and contain the rising powers, and these actors have been wary of being subsumed (Chin and Heine, 2014; Abdenur and De Fonseca, 2013; Li, 2014). Hence the major critique posited against the GPEDC is that it is a 'DAC-led process that could not be legitimated by actors outside DAC structures' (Esteves and Assunção, 2014: 4). China, India and Brazil, therefore, did not participate in the first HLM of the GPEDC in 2014 and have not visibly participated in GPEDC activities since its formation. Some suggest that these actors instead regard the UNDCF as the legitimate forum for discussions on development cooperation, leading

Esteves and Assunção (2014) to claim that the GPEDC and DCF 'have become two sites of the battlefield on which donors and partners are struggling to draw the new borders of the international development field'. Consequently, scepticism surrounding institutional innovations - such as the GPEDC - reflect the broader question as to whether the inclusion of Southern states and non-state actors in global development governance provides a mere 'fictional unity' in cosmetically reformed institutions rather than a genuinely transformative arrangement (Gray and Gills, 2016: 599).

While the large SSC providers have certainly not been present within the GPEDC, advocates would argue that the GPEDC nevertheless constitutes a decisive innovation within the field (Abdel Malek, 2015). Moreover, against the proposition that the Southern providers have not participated within the GPEDC, Shankland and Constantine (2014a: 110) note that there has undoubtedly been a degree of knowledge-sharing and cooperation in indirect ways through think-tank engagement. Arguably, undue emphasis upon the lack of participation of China and India overlooks the potential of the GPEDC in bringing together a broader range of actors, including smaller SSC providers, recipient countries, and non-state actors. Despite not having India, China and Brazil on board, small SSC providers such as Mexico and Indonesia have been active proponents and supporters of the process (Ulfsgard, 2017). Furthermore, CSO representatives Bena and Tomlinson (2017: 2) note that the 'the fact that such a diverse policy-making community is able to not just hold complex discussions about development cooperation, poverty and inequality, but also agree on a final outcome document [at Nairobi HLM2]' is both a remarkable achievement and a significant contribution to the development architecture.

Additionally, they argue that the GPEDC's monitoring framework provides recipients with 'one of the few tools available to hold each other to account in development cooperation today' (Ibid., 3). Arguably, due to state-centric tendencies latent within both the field of international relations and development cooperation, these tendencies lead to analyses that overlook the contributions of smaller state actors and non-state actors in constituting and acting within global development governance. A key question persists on the perspectives of recipient states. Namely, whether the GPEDC and the 'notion of partnership help[s] to

silence... [longstanding] criticisms by pretending to return power and responsibility to developing countries', and whether it serves to re-inscribe existing North-South power asymmetries (Ruckert, 2006: 45).

However, research into the internal dynamics and perspectives on the GPEDC is bewilderingly sparse. Despite a few policy papers here and there, there has been no systematic effort to explore how the diverse actors that constitute the field of development cooperation have engaged with, perceived, and sought to use the platform. Towards establishing a common platform for the attainment of the SDGs, Ulfgard and Chacon (2017) extend the challenge to researchers to explore how to improve legitimacy and participation within the GPEDC. Bostrom and Holmstrom (2013: 94) argue that achieving the 'unique potential' of MSPs requires that research examine the contributions of all stakeholders while paying attention to the fragile nature of establishing legitimacy and the 'problems and dynamics of participation within a multi-stakeholder context'.

As yet unexplored is whether the GPEDC marks a departure from the previously Northern donor-led, hierarchical power structure that is characteristic of the DAC style of governance. Alternatively, it is apt to question whether previously disenfranchised stakeholders - such as recipient countries, CSOs, and PSAs - have participated within the GPEDC to produce a more horizontal and effective form of governance. As noted by several commentators, the GPEDC's success will be dependent 'on the extent to which stakeholders see the governing mechanism as legitimate in terms of its inclusivity and representativeness (input legitimacy), quality of decision-making processes (throughput legitimacy) and effectiveness in achieving outcomes (output legitimacy)' (Besharati, 2013: 22; Kindornay and Samy, 2012). However, there is a swathe of promises and pitfalls associated with the legitimacy potential of multi-stakeholder governance, and we now turn to explore the challenges of studying the legitimacy of contemporary global governance initiatives.

3. The Legitimacy of Multi-Stakeholder Partnerships: A Framework for Research and Analysis

This chapter justifies and outlines the framework that this thesis adopts to examine stakeholder perspectives on the GPEDC's legitimacy. The structure of this chapter is fourfold. It first addresses why a focus upon legitimacy is warranted. It secondly reviews the two dominant approaches to assessing the legitimacy of global governance institutions, and it makes a case for the adoption of a framework that combines elements from both. The third section details and justifies the framework that this thesis adopts. The final section outlines several contributions that this framework can provide when applied.

3.1 Why a Focus upon Legitimacy?

It is essential to first address why a focus upon legitimacy is warranted. This section argues that legitimacy is not only an essential inquiry within political science and the social sciences more broadly, but this inquiry becomes all the more pertinent when posed towards governance beyond the nation-state. When examining the legitimacy of global governance institutions, and MSPs in particular, a focus upon legitimacy is warranted for three reasons. First, there is a widely perceived 'democratic deficit' associated with global governance structures. Second, there are unresolved questions over the 'promises and pitfalls' of MSP arrangements. Third, legitimacy assessments can offer a pragmatic contribution to policy debates within the post-2015 development context.

3.1.1 The Pertinence of the 'Legitimacy Question' in Social Science

As Brassett and Tsingou (2011: 1) state, legitimacy is an 'age-old' subject of political inquiry, while Crick (1959: 150) argues that it is the 'master question of political science'. Despite the pertinence attached to inquiries surrounding the legitimacy of all governance arrangements, it nonetheless continues to be a somewhat 'fuzzy' and 'essentially contested' concept (Hurrelmann, et al., 2007). For some, legitimacy is the political scientist's 'equivalent of the economist's invisible hand' in that 'we know that it exists as a force that holds communities

together, but we cannot give satisfactory explanations of how to create it or why it is sometimes strong and why it sometimes seems to disappear' (Bekkers and Edwards, 2016: 37; Stone, 2002: 285).

The pertinence of the concept is clear when we examine its relationship to the requirements and consequences of governance. Legitimacy is the 'glue that links authority and power' (Bernstein, 2011: 20), in that it enables rulers to be 'secure in the possession of power and more successful in its exercise' (Claude, 1966: 368). Consequently, there is an intimate relationship between legitimacy and politics, presuming that the nature of politics pertains to the question of 'who gets what, when, how' (Lasswell, 1936/1958). Rendered in such a manner, the task of assessing and facilitating legitimate societal relations 'takes us to the familiar (and hard) questions of political science, namely, power and justice' (Brassett and Tsingou, 2011: 2). Legitimacy is thus a concept of unparalleled analytical pertinence, prompting some to declare that 'to the degree that governance exists... the problem of legitimacy arises' (Bernstein, 2004a: 2). Despite the ambiguity, yet undoubtable importance, that is associated with the concept of legitimacy, the concept usually 'rears its head' when it is lacking (Guastafero and Moschella, 2012: 200; Habermas, 1976). As Schmitter (2001: 1) elaborates, the concept of legitimacy is best understood in the negative, in that 'only when a regime or arrangement is being manifestly challenged... do political scientists tend to invoke a lack of legitimacy as a cause for the crisis'.

While definitions may vary, a generally accepted definition is that 'legitimacy is a generalised perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions' (Suchman, 1995: 574). In other words, legitimacy constitutes a perception on behalf of actors (whether these be analysts or the subjects of governance) that a governance arrangement or action is appropriate or desirable. However, determining what legitimacy requires is fraught with challenges for global governance initiatives.

3.1.2 Global Governance and the 'Democratic Deficit'

Although all forms of governance rely upon legitimacy, questions concerning legitimacy are significantly more complex and nuanced when it comes to governance beyond the nation-state (Weber 1919/1977; Wolf, 2008). Within the field of International Relations, there exists a clear distinction 'between international legitimacy and the legitimacy of a domestic political order or government' (Bernstein, 2004a: 1). Indeed the 'governance gap' created by globalisation has resulted in a shift in governance that is being filled by new arrangements comprised of various non-state actors. However, these forms of governance cannot draw upon traditional democratic representation nor voting procedures to convey legitimacy (Hahn and Weidtmann, 2016). These new arrangements, therefore, throw our traditional understandings of the international community - and the basis from which the justification and acceptance of rules stem - into disarray (Bernstein, 2011: 27). While initial assessments of global governance institutions tended to fixate upon the effectiveness of these governance arrangements, there has been considerable change in the perception and importance of the legitimacy of global governance (Messner and Nuscheler, 2003; Hurd, 1999). Following on from the Habermasian (1976) notion that the question of legitimacy often arises when it is lacking, the consensus is that there exists an ongoing legitimacy crisis in global governance, and this makes the inquiry into its manifestations, causes and consequences an urgent task (Johan, 2013; Clark, 2004; Scholte, 2004; Keohane, 2003).

Initially brought about - or perhaps made most visible - by mass public protests against the WTO, IMF and G7, there has been a general increase in discontent against the legitimacy of global institutions, including the institutions and practices of Development (see section 2.1), since the end of the Cold War (Peters, 2013; Bernstein, 2011: 26). The criticism against global institutions since the turn of the millennium is arguably rooted in the over-development of the global economy, and the under-development of a global polity (Higgott and Erman, 2010: 452). That is to say, greater global economic interdependence has advanced exponentially without a concomitant advance in political or regulatory frameworks beyond those of the nation-state. Hence, the general contention and crisis lie in the perception that neoliberal globalisation has advanced in tension with democracy (Ake, 1999). As Higgott and Erman (2010: 452) note, there exists a strong disconnect between global governance as effective problem-solving in a given issue area and governance as

democratic and legitimate policymaking. Concerns regarding globalisation are now 'commonly expressed in terms of justice and democracy', following the logic that 'institutions of global governance are usurping domestic democratic institutions' (Bernstein, 2004a: 5). Consequently, and despite ontological and epistemological differences amongst scholars, there is 'hardly an essay on international or global governance that does not at least mention the issue of legitimacy' (Schneider, 2005: 2; Steffek, 2004: 485). However, 'passing references [to legitimacy] far outnumber systematic treatments' while 'empirical applications are even more rare' (Bernstein, 2004: 139).

The purported 'democratic deficit' as a general feature of global governance has meant that the question of how to create and maintain legitimacy is now arguably 'the greatest contemporary challenge to global governance and international order' (Bernstein, 2004a). Similarly, as Moravcsik (2004: 336) argues, the question of whether 'global governance is democratically legitimate, or [whether it suffers] from a democratic deficit is one of the central questions, perhaps *the* central question, in contemporary world politics'. However, addressing the deficit is made conceptually and empirically complicated since the multiple constituents that demand legitimacy do not form a coherent global demos (Scholte, 2011: 113). To elaborate, the affected publics from which legitimacy springs are heterogeneous in terms of their 'cultural, ecological, economic, and political contexts and outlooks... [while] the 'global polity - insofar as one can speak of such a collective - encompasses large variation across age, caste, class, (dis)ability, faith, gender, nationality, race, region and sexuality' (ibid.). Indeed the lack of such a demos has meant that some adhere to Easton's (1965) view that the international and global dimension of politics is not one in which the notion of democratic legitimacy is appropriate.

Nonetheless, Scholte (2011: 111) argues that 'the construction of larger and more effective global governance can be facilitated to the extent that the regimes enjoy legitimacy'. Global governance arrangements reduce transaction costs facilitate coordination, overcome commitment problems, and provide GPGs (Keohane, 2011). However, these valuable functions are possible only when the global governance arrangements that perform them are perceived to be legitimate (Buchanan and Keohane, 2006: 407). Legitimacy - perceived

or ascribed - is of the utmost importance for global governance institutions given that both inducements and coercion - 'two alternative tools of order maintenance or social control - are often unavailable, in short supply, or costly to use' (Bernstein, 2011: 20). While there is room for debate regarding the extent, legitimacy is bound to organisational effectiveness in that actors are more likely to conform to the norms, rules, and their commitments if they perceive the arrangement to be legitimate and normatively binding (Wolf, 2008: 243). However, the diversity and novel types of global governance arrangements do not 'sit easily' within traditional conceptions of democratic legitimacy and accountability, thus confounding the complexity and difficulty in ensuring their provision (Bernstein, 2004: 149; Quack, 2010; Zürn, 2004). In sum, while there has been no shortage of studies that attempt to explicate the purported 'democratic deficit' within global governance, there are outstanding challenges and questions over how this deficit can be amended in practice.

3.1.3 The Promises and Pitfalls of Global Multi-Stakeholder Partnerships

In the context of a widely perceived 'democratic deficit' within global governance, the emergence of MSPs as innovative forms of governance have been argued hold 'unique potential' in producing more democratically legitimate and effective governance than traditional inter-state institutions (Boström and Hallström, 2011: 108). As mentioned in the previous chapter (section 2.1), MSPs have become increasingly prominent forms of governance at the global level. MSPs are characterised by: informality, that is to say, that they often lack a dedicated secretariat; they are constituted by governance actors other than nation-states (PSAs, civil society actors, and so on), and; they have been set up to address a wide range of global issue areas and challenges in the 21st century.

Martens (2007: 3) argues that these partnership models have emerged as the new 'mantra shaping the discourse on global politics and are perceived by many as a new hope for multilateralism'. Khagram and Ali (2008: 252) hold that 'multi-stakeholder networks, as opposed to multilateralism, will or could be the future of world affairs'. Alongside other forms of governance arrangements, MSPs are proffered to 'enact democracy in distinctive ways' and thus can contribute towards amending the democratic deficit within global governance

(Bäckstrand, 2006: 474). In terms of producing more effective global sustainability governance, advocates promote MSPs as the 'solution to deadlocked intergovernmental negotiations... ineffective treaties, to overly bureaucratic international organisations... corrupt elites, and many other real or perceived current problems of the sustainability transition' (Biermann et al., 2007: 239). However, the proliferation of MSPs arrangements has not been without their critics. For instance, Scholte (2011: 12) cautions that 'some of the greatest shortfalls in legitimacy lie amongst the new multilateralism', such as with MSPs. There, therefore, exists ongoing uncertainty as to the extent to which MSPs live up to their purported promises of producing more legitimate and effective governance.

Proponents claim that MSPs promise to enhance the legitimacy and effectiveness of governance through various ways, while the very use of the term 'partnership' and 'multi-stakeholder' are themselves commonly invoked for legitimising aspirations (Boström and Hallström, 2013: 100). In many cases, multi-stakeholder approaches have been adopted 'in order to address the legitimacy deficit surrounding existing governance approaches' (Verhulst, 2016: 12). MSPs can be understood to be 'post sovereign, networked, and hybrid governance' that offer a new form of global governance with the 'potential to bridge multilateral norms and local action by drawing on a diverse number of actors in civil society, government, and business' (Bäckstrand, 2006: 290-291). The very principle underlying 'stake-holding' is central to the notion of 'transnational democracy', in that all those affected or having a stake in the issue at hand ought to have a voice in its resolution (McGrew, 2002: 223). The call for 'stakeholder participation' can be said to be intimately related to the critique of the legitimacy of traditional modes of international governance, in that they are suggestive of a shift from 'top-down [hierarchical] steering to informal, bottom-up and voluntary approaches' and 'governance from below' (Bäckstrand, 2006a: 268; Bäckstrand, 2006: 291). The prospect of greater inclusion offered by MSP arrangements promise more democratic credentials through theoretically involving all segments of society within their decision-making apparatus (Pattberg and Wilderberg, 2014: 18). Through addressing the demands for participation and inclusion of non-state actors, the multi-stakeholder ideal provides some resemblance with ideals of 'representative, deliberative and participatory governance' (Boström and Hallström, 2013: 100). As noted

elsewhere in debates on the promissory and transformative potential of participatory development and governance:

If participation is to (re)establish itself as a coherent, viable, and transformative approach to development, a more adequate theory of representation, and/or of alternative ways of conceptualising the ways in which popular agency is legitimately conferred to higher-level agents, is required (Hickey and Mohan, 2004: 28)

The multi-stakeholder ideal, arguably, responds to such aspirations. In addition to amending the democratic deficit of traditional international governance through inclusion, it has been argued by Bexell et al. (2010:90) that MSPs are institutional forms of 'deliberative democracy [more suited] for the global level'. Through providing highly transparent processes and innovative means in which to ensure greater participation from affected communities, Dingweth (2007: 9) suggests that MSPs 'frequently base their decisions on sincere and meaningful deliberation among participants'. Such deliberative processes stand in stark contrast to the bargaining tendency exhibited within traditional hierarchical state-based institutions. Instead, MSPs are arguably distinct in that they facilitate soft and 'non-hierarchical steering' within their institutional frameworks, and consequently follow the deliberative logic of reasoned argument and persuasion as the basis of rulemaking (Risse, 2004a). Additionally, through the inclusion of CSOs and other critical voices, it has been argued that MSPs can potentially increase the accountability of governance (Borzel and Risse, 2005). Proponents thus praise the deliberative quality of MSPs and often tout the possible outcomes of collaboration such as 'increased mutual respect, understandings, learning, and trust among stakeholders (Boström and Hallström, 2013: 100; Bäckstrand, 2006; Boström, 2006). As Pohle (2016) reveals, MSPs can serve as production sites whereby heterogeneous actors engage in dynamic processes that lead to coalition and shared meaning building. MSPs thus promise a more deliberative, transparent, accountable and thus democratically legitimate means of global governance.

MSPs not only offer the prospect of greater democratic legitimacy in the context of a democratic deficit at the global level, but they also promise greater organisational effectiveness (Boström and Hallström, 2013: 100). The critical promise of partnerships is

that they offer a 'win-win situation where effectiveness and the democratic credentials of global governance both increase' (Pattberg and Wilderberg, 2014: 18; Bäckstrand et al., 2012). MSPs promise greater effectiveness through the provision of two crucial public goods: expertise and compliance. First, through engaging with a broader range of actors with expertise (technical actors from business or civil society) in the decision-making and policy implementation of an MSP process, MSPs can produce more effective outcomes through drawing upon a greater pool of expertise than public officials alone (Wigell, 2008: 32; Verhulst, 2016: 12). Greater inclusion of experts thus 'satisfy the plea for an increased role of epistemic or knowledge communities' within global governance, and they therefore enhance the inclusive nature of governance while also contributing to 'better problem solving through enabling mutual learning processes' (Borzel and Risse, 2002: 14-6). Secondly, the inclusive nature of MSPs promise greater compliance through potentially empowering stakeholders while fostering 'broad ownership of a process among them, and such empowerment and ownership may, in turn, facilitate implementation and policies' (Beisheim and Liese, 2014: Boström and Hallström, 2013: 100). Consequently, MSPs are arguably a highly promising 'response to the functional demands for better governance, in issues where states and [intergovernmental] multilateral institutions fail' (Andonova, 2005: 4).

While the literature on the legitimising potential of MSPs tends to emphasise the potential of such arrangements in overcoming the democratic deficit of global governance, sceptics caution against viewing them as a panacea to the complexities that arise in producing legitimate and effective governance at the global level (Dodds et al., 2002: 2; Ivanova, 2003). For instance, Papadopoulos (2015) laments the uncritical tendency exhibited by some scholars and policy practitioners towards MSPs: he instead argues that MSPs have proliferated 'largely unmoored from the requirements of formal democratic checks and balances'. In terms of their legitimacy and promises, Hale and Mauzzerall (2004) argue that many maintain a warranted scepticism over partnership formation, in that they often come with laudable promises yet deliver poorly in terms of results. Instead of enhancing the legitimacy of global governance through including a broad range of non-state actors, a persistent critique of MSP arrangements is that the inclusion of private actors may lead to

more power being diverted toward private interests rather than to public and societal actors as a whole (Miraftab, 2004). Empirical studies have revealed that southern countries, CSOs, and southern private stakeholders tend to be underrepresented within MSP arrangements, while Northern states and businesses - and in keeping with the characteristics of global development more generally - tend to dominate (Pattberg and Wilderberg, 2014: 18). For critics, the inclusive and participatory language promised by MSPs is merely 'neoliberal regulatory models dressed in the language of participation' (Bäckstrand, 2006a: 468; Conca, 2006). To speak in terms familiar to Development scholars, we could argue that MSPs have been accused of constituting a 'new tyranny' within global governance (Cooke and Kothari, 2001). Far from living up to the participatory ideal of providing disenfranchised and marginalised actors with greater say within governance, MSPs have instead re-inscribed or even augmented pre-existing power disparities.

Martens (2007: 6) thus argues that 'to go along with the trend [of increased MSPs] uncritically might be in the interests of powerful business lobbies whose influence over shaping global policy can grow through such models, but not in the interests of the affected people'. Rather than producing a 'more level playing field', critics argue that partnerships run the risk of re-inscribing unequal power relations amongst actors, while even extending the influence of the powerful over weaker stakeholders via an ostensibly democratically legitimate process (cf. Vogel, 2010: 78). Furthermore, diverse and heterogeneous actors comprise MSPs in a networked form of governance, accountability is spread across members, and it is, therefore, more difficult to ascertain who exactly is accountable to who, and who should be responsible for monitoring one another, and how such progress should be measured (Bäckstrand, 2006).

With regards to producing more effective governance through deliberative processes, there is the risk that 'arguing instead of bargaining leads to agreed-upon dissent rather than reasoned consensus' (Börzel and Risse, 2002: 16). Likewise, there are definite grounds for scepticism regarding the extent to which MSPs are capable of escaping the 'legitimacy-effectiveness' dilemma faced by virtually all forms of governance beyond the state (Scharpf, 1999). In the words of Harlan Cleveland, 'how do you get everyone in the action and still get

action?’ (quoted in Keohane and Nye, 2001: 8). By vastly expanding the number of stakeholders to incorporate not only states but CSOs and private actors, increased transaction costs might undermine effective decision-making and debate due to the diverse interests and difficulties that come with generating consensus amongst large heterogeneous groups (Hale et al., 2013: 35-6). The promissory potential of MSPs in providing more legitimate and effective governance must, therefore, be tempered with an adequate appreciation of their potential pitfalls.

As noted in the previous chapter, development cooperation as a policy field has witnessed the exponential rise in MSPs alongside the persistence of more traditional forms of inter-state governance (Section 1.1). Of particular relevance to this thesis, Vershaeve and Orbie (2015) provide a comparative analysis of the legitimacy credentials of the DAC and the UN-DCF. Here, they note how the G77 conspired to respond to the legitimacy deficits associated with the ‘old’ governance of development cooperation, and created the multi-stakeholder UN-DCF as a ‘more legitimate alternative to the DAC’ in 2005 (ibid., 572). However, despite the DCF being broader in its composition of other actors, namely CSOs and Southern recipient and SSC provider states, they find that the DCF does not pose a challenge to the DAC’s preeminence within the field. They find that despite the comparative advantages of the DCF’s inclusivity credentials, the DCF’s informal, multi-stakeholder structure means that it cannot compete with the DAC in terms of encouraging compliance, accountability, and concrete decision-making procedures. Although the ‘old’ DAC may be exclusive in terms of its inclusivity credentials, it nonetheless retains preeminence by providing concrete outputs and pointing to its past achievements within the field. Consequently, some such as Fues, Sachin and Sidiropoulos (2012: 253) note that the ‘DCF looks more like a dead-end street of UN reform than a suitable platform for policy coordination between traditional and Southern providers and their development partners’.

The purported promises and potential pitfalls associated with MSPs as global governance arrangements raise significant questions over their legitimacy, accountability and effectiveness (Bäckstrand, 2006). Given that these global governance structures consist of overlapping and competing sources of authority - sovereign, private and hybrid - there is a

need to rethink our notions of legitimacy and to make them congruent with contemporary global governance (Bäckstrand, 2006: 291). This brief exploration of the promises and potential pitfalls of MSPs produce a need to check 'whether rule-making by [MSPs] is compatible with principles of democratic governance', and also to explore the consequences of participation within such arrangements on the prospects of more effective global governance (Papadopoulos, 2016: 1). As Bexell et al. (2010: 83) argue, what is needed are 'not more grandiose blueprints for global democracy' but 'assessments of the conditions under which transnational actors [in this case MSPs] may live up to the promises and avoid the pitfalls as forces for democratic global governance'. A focus upon legitimacy, therefore, provides a means to explore inquiries such as whether MSPs provide more legitimate and effective global governance, or whether they reinforce and mirror dominant norms and privilege more powerful private stakeholders (Bäckstrand, 2006: 303).

3.1.4 The 'Trojan Horse' Quality of Legitimacy Assessments

The final justification for the adoption of a legitimacy lens comes from the nature of the post-2015 development cooperation context. As the preceding chapter demonstrated, the field of development cooperation is purported to be undergoing a shift from a state-based, hierarchical or donor-dominated, and club-based tendency towards that of a multi-actor landscape of governance (Falkner, 2011). However, it is apt to question the extent to which such a transformation is taking place. For instance, Conca (2006) has argued that rather than MSPs offering a transformative and transnational sphere of governance, MSPs are deeply embedded and coopted by the preexisting system of inter-state regimes based predominantly upon state power. With regards to this study, one crucial criticism of the legitimacy of the GPEDC is that it merely constitutes a DAC-led process 'in disguise', rather than a transformative arena of discursive politics and neutral problem-solving. Therefore, the field of development cooperation can provide an 'excellent laboratory for probing a host of issues... such as legitimacy, accountability, and the participatory quality of various governance arrangements' (Risse, 2004a: 1).

As Bernstein (2011: 18) argues, the field of development 'is an area of rapid change and innovation in which to explore novel demands for legitimacy and their contingent nature'. However, the field has suffered from a discernible silence regarding the legitimacy credentials of novel forms of governance that are arising in response to the limits of conventional state-based multilateralism. This silence is unsettling given the ever-broadening tendency within the field of development cooperation to expand the role of the private sector. As Hazlewood (2015: 5) cautions, this endorsement is advancing 'without putting in place agreed rules and other measures to ensure private sector transparency and accountability'. The post-2015 sustainable development era is one in which MSPs are an increasingly important element of the development architecture, feature strongly in global dialogues, and are integral for achieving the SDGs (ibid: 2). However, if MSPs are to take root and ensure effective governance in the long term, it is essential that they empower weaker stakeholders through legitimate means and processes, rather than accentuating or producing asymmetrical power relations.

A legitimacy focus is warranted on the basis that critical legitimacy assessments carry with them a 'trojan horse' quality (Brassett and Tsingou, 2011). That is to say, legitimacy assessments 'can act as a pragmatically useful route into policy-making debates' through 'providing a benchmark from which to begin attaching larger principles of accountability, procedural fairness, and on some readings justice to the theory and practice of global governance' (ibid., 9-13). Questioning and appraising the democratic credentials of MSPs is not only an exercise in conceptual thinking. Doing so can lead to concrete suggestions for principled institutional reform (Stoker, 2006). As will be developed in the following chapter, legitimacy assessments enable the researcher to not merely consider themselves as a 'passive observer of international relations but also part of the reality that it seeks to describe - in particular when it comes to its role as a source of critical or affirmative argument about the legitimacy of governance' (Steffek, 2004: 485).

As Buchanan and Keohane (2006: 405) argue, legitimacy assessments carry with them a valuable social function in that they 'provide the basis for principled criticism... [and can] guide reform efforts'. Global governance institutions provide numerable public goods - and

potential 'bads' - and therefore, 'judgments about institutional legitimacy have distinctive practical implications' (ibid., 407). Recognising that determining whether particular global governance legitimacy are legitimate - and perceived as so - is an 'urgent matter' (ibid., 407), a legitimacy focus enables the researcher to proactively engage in crucial policy debates surrounding institutional reform and future design in the post-2015 development context. Given that the ability of global development governance arrangements to provide effective solutions to pressing challenges is dependent upon their perception as being legitimate, the focus of this thesis is therefore on legitimacy (Lindoso and Hall, 2016; Scholte, 2011: 111).

3.2 Which Conception of Legitimacy to Guide Assessment?

The preceding section established why a focus upon legitimacy is of crucial analytical and policy importance. However, when it comes to the question of what conception of legitimacy should guide inquiry, the researcher is confronted by a cacophony of perspectives and a seeming 'labyrinth' of academic debate (Wimmel, 2009). The question of which conception of legitimacy to adopt when assessing the legitimacy of governance is one that 'fundamentally divides sociology and political theory' (Thornhill, 2011: 135). For Gadinger (2013: 18), this division is analogous to the historical division between the privileged stratum of 'philosophers' on the one hand whom, in the spirit of Plato, invoke normative conceptions of the 'good life' and universalist standards based on reason to guide their social inquiry and critical reflection. On the other hand, there are the 'grubby urchin researchers' - or Aristotelians - who place greater emphasis on 'real politics' and people's everyday practices and perceptions.

This distinction is best captured by those who adopt either a 'normative' or a 'sociological' approach to the assessment of global governance institutions (Keohane, 2006). This section engages in a critical review of the main approaches. The review firstly addresses the debates surrounding the two dominant approaches to the study of legitimacy: normative, and sociological. This section then makes a case for an approach that takes its departure from commonly invoked dimensions in debates on normative legitimacy to structure an

investigation into empirical legitimacy. The following section (3.3) will provide further justification and specificity as to how this combined 'normative-sociological' approach will function.

3.2.1 Normative Approaches

Normative approaches to the assessment of global governance are the most frequently adopted, yet controversial and debated, approach to the study of political legitimacy (Bäckstrand and Kylsäter, 2014: 332; Wimmel, 2009: 187). Expressing the essence of the normative approach is best captured by the questions that it does, and does not, seek to ask. As noted by Dingwerth (2007: 15), the normative question is not 'when do people accept institutions as rightful?', but rather, 'when do people have good normative reasons to accept institutions as rightful?'. Consequently, normative approaches are concerned with what normative standards ought to be adopted to evaluate a global governance institution's right to rule, and how particular institutions fare when measured against such standards (Dellmuth and Tallberg, 2015: 454). The normative approach thus begins with the construction of *a priori* normative standards that are prescriptive and philosophically reasoned to judge the normative quality of institutions. The main concern for normative approaches is thus reasoning about normative structures in an attempt to 'formulate generalisable principles from which the legitimacy of any subject can be deduced' (Peters, 2013: 7). However, the primary role of these norm-sets is 'not to create models to be applied' *per se*, but instead to 'reflexively and critically examine legal, political and moral phenomena [and provide] a yardstick for principled criticism and change (Higgott and Erman, 2010: 454). Unsurprisingly, however, there does not exist universally shared criteria as to what should comprise these models or norm sets (Koppell, 2008: 192).

3.2.1.1 Justice as an Inappropriate Standard

Before further detailing the nature of the debate surrounding normative approaches, it is first necessary to disaggregate the concept of legitimacy from that of justice when it comes to the assessment of global governance institutions (Buchanan and Keohane, 2006). While the

issue of political justice is conceptually close to the issue of legitimacy, it is nonetheless distinct in the questions that each concept invokes (Held and Maffettone, 2017: 6). While there is a large corpus of debate over what constitutes 'justice' - there is a general agreement that the principles of justice 'establish people's rights, [and] they tell us who owes what to whom' (Valentini, 2012; Barry, 1991). The notion of justice sets a demandingly high standard by which to assess the normative quality of global governance institutions. Legitimacy, on the other hand, is a less demanding standard. To say an institution is normatively legitimate is to claim that an actor has 'weighty [normative] reasons to comply with its directives', even in the absence of perfect justice (Held and Maffettone, 2017: 6). In other words, just because a governance arrangement does not meet the demands of global distributive justice, does not mean that it cannot meet standards of legitimacy. For Buchanan and Keohane (2006: 412) collapsing the issue of legitimacy into political justice 'undermines the valuable social function of legitimacy assessments' while they claim that 'to mistake legitimacy for justice is to make the best the enemy of the good'.

There are two reasons why political justice is an inappropriate standard by which to evaluate institutions. First, there is little agreement as to the requirements of justice. Thus, such disagreement hinders the pragmatic goal of garnering support for valuable institutions. Second, in withholding support for an institution on the basis that it fails to meet the high demands of justice would itself work against the requirements of justice, given that progress towards the goals of justice necessitates legitimate and effective institutions. Consequently - and although some such as Valentini (2012) maintains that liberal justice conceptualised as equal respect of persons is not distinct from legitimacy - it is generally argued that legitimacy is a more apt and less demanding standard by which to assess global governance institutions.

3.2.1.2 Principled Democratic Approaches

Given this generally accepted line of argumentation, the tendency within approaches to the normative legitimacy of institutions is to derive normative standards that are less demanding than those of perfect political justice. Overwhelmingly, normative approaches to the

assessment of legitimacy focus on elements of legitimacy found in democratic theory, such as ‘accountability, transparency, [and] access to participation’ (Bernstein, 2004: 145). This approach is unsurprising, given the widespread perception of a ‘global democratic deficit that must be reduced if world-wide arrangements are to be legitimate’ (Linklater, 1999: 477). These approaches thus situate democratic principles at the centre of thinking and in their assessment of global governance institutions. As a consequence, the establishment of democratic procedures is deemed as essential for legitimacy, reflecting Bodanksy’s (1999: 612) claim that ‘in the modern world, democracy has become the hallmark of legitimate government’. Deriving procedural legitimacy standards from democratic theory thus marks a departure from normative demands for ‘global justice focused on substantive principles such as distributive justice, autonomy, and equality’, and instead looks at the acceptability of a governing arrangement (Bernstein, 2004a: 5)

While democratic values tend to dominate within normative approaches to the legitimacy of global governance, few would claim that national standards of democracy are appropriate for the global realm. As Koenig-Archibugi (2010: 1142) notes, ‘few fallacies are frowned upon by IR scholars more than those related to naive applications of the so-called ‘domestic analogy’. The ‘domestic analogy’ here consists of:

...presumptive reasoning... about international relations based on the assumption that since domestic and international phenomena are similar in a number of respects, a given proposition which holds true domestically, but whose validity is as yet uncertain internationally, will also hold true internationally (Suganami, 1989: 24).

While normative scholars may use concepts and principles derived from liberal democracies, Keohane (2011) argues that the threshold for when a global institution is legitimate ought to be lower than in a domestic setting given the lack of a global demos. In this regard, standards of normative legitimacy derived from democratic theory have proven to be somewhat flexible and adaptive. For instance, rather than demanding the direct accountability of an institution towards affected publics - as would be required from representative models of democracy - less demanding standards have been advanced

through advocating for deliberative democratic ideals to provide adequate bases of legitimacy at the global level (Hahn and Weidtmann, 2016: 100; Bernstein, 2004: 147).

Nonetheless, assessments and the benchmarks tend to diverge based upon the particular conception of democracy that normative scholars derive their principles and standards. For instance, 'liberal conceptions of democracy might privilege transparency and accountability as legitimate benchmarks while neglecting a critique of property relations' (Brassett and Tsingou, 2011: 3). Likewise, a neoliberal conception of 'global governance may privilege efficiency and problem-solving over the inclusion of critical voices' (ibid.). However, irrespective of the conception of democracy that normative scholars derive their benchmarks, there is the general tendency to hold global institutions to a less demanding standard than domestic institutions.

3.2.1.3 Critiques of Exclusively Normative Approaches

While standards derived from democratic theory tend to dominate within normative approaches to the legitimacy of global governance institutions, the use of exclusively democratic principles carries with it a host of problematic questions and critiques. Principally, some such as Risse (2004: 6-7) argue that it is by 'no means self-evident that there can be democracy beyond the state'. As Valentini (2014: 18) notes, democracy has necessary preconditions - such as 'mutual trust, ideological cohesion, and convergence of interests among individuals', not to mention a *demos*⁴ - all of which are lacking at the international level. Indeed, the problems with establishing a *demos*, or 'who or what constitutes a political community... is exacerbated... by the unresolved tensions between the community of states and broader transnational society' (Bernstein, 2004: 151).

Moreover, some normative-democratic approaches generally tend to regard the problem of legitimacy as 'self-evident' in that the problem of legitimacy is conflated with a lack of democratic procedures. For Peters (2013: 11), the equation of legitimacy and democracy is

⁴ Defining who constitutes the 'demos' or 'the people' is a perennial challenge for political philosophers and theorists. Here, I use it to refer to a clearly bounded political community.

problematic in that evoking 'democracy does not do much to clarify the [empirical] issues that global governance faces with regard to legitimacy', while democracy is by no means universally regarded as the sole legitimising force within global politics. Crucially, assessments from exclusively normative approaches based upon democratic criteria by no means 'guarantee that we will end up with institutions which are regarded as legitimate by the actors involved in them' (ibid. 12).

Instead, global governance institutions face considerable challenges in garnering support from affected populations, and there are other sources of legitimacy such as expertise, tradition, charisma, and legality that actors may also deem as central to formulating their legitimacy perceptions (Weber, 1968: 212-301). Additionally, Esty (2007: 511) notes that legitimacy may rest on 'expertise and the promise of social welfare gains; order and stability; checks and balances; and political dialogue and a 'right process' for decision-making'. When it comes to issues of legitimacy in international politics, the 'democratic deficit' discourse is thus only one of a plurality of issues that actors consider when reflecting on the legitimacy of global institutions (Dingwerth, 2014: 1132). Furthermore, Hobson (2009: 632) makes the case that the now widespread normative agreement on the desirability and legitimacy associated with democracy is 'noticeably different from the historically dominant understanding that regarded it as a dangerous and unstable form of rule which inevitably led to anarchy or despotism'. This critique points our attention to the position that the underlying ideals, and normative desirability of democracy itself, are historically contingent. An exclusively normative-democratic approach thus risks overlooking alternative perceptions and sources of legitimacy held by heterogeneous actors. That is to say, that despite the calls for diverse inclusion and participation, only those stakeholder perceptions that 'fit' with an Occidental understanding of democratic legitimacy are given serious attention within exclusive normative-democratic approaches. If the goal is to contribute to the design of governance that is perceived to be legitimate by those that an institution seeks to govern, then exclusively normative-democratic approaches have significant shortcomings.

3.2.2 Sociological Approaches

In contrast to normative approaches, sociological approaches to the study of legitimacy are surprisingly under-utilised and infrequently used within political science and global governance scholarship (Dellmuth and Tallberg, 2015: 452). What sociological studies that do exist primarily examine public opinion on the EU (Gabel, 1998; Hooghe and Marks, 2005). Research in the sociological vein can take two forms; it can firstly aim to determine the extent to which an institution is perceived by actors to be legitimate (Take, 2012: 51-3). Alternatively, it can, in a more profound sense, aim to explore the 'discursive basis of these beliefs... the social norms in which they are grounded and the discursive processes and practices through which they are brought about' (Peters, 2013: 7; Reus-Smit, 2007: 163). Following the Weberian approach to social science, sociological approaches regard legitimacy as 'an empirical fact that scholars can investigate and report' (Steffek, 2015: 265). In contrasting sociological to normative approaches, Keohane (2006: 2) suggests that sociological legitimacy is akin to the 'effects of power', while normative approaches offer a principled means in which to intervene in such effects (Mügge, 2011: 53). Different questions guide sociological approaches compared to normative approaches, such as: 'to what extent are institutions accepted by the people, and what explains variation in their perceived legitimacy?' (Dellmuth and Tallberg, 2015: 454). Legitimacy in this conception is not a quality that is 'owned' by an institution, but it is instead fluid, negotiated, and mutually constituted between international and world society (Clark, 2007). Legitimacy in this conception is, therefore, an 'inter-subjective quality defined by social perceptions', and it examines what values, goals, and practices of legitimacy hold sway within a historically contingent context (Dellmuth and Tallberg, 2015: 454; Bernstein, 2004a: 14).

While normative approaches to the assessment of the legitimacy of global governance have undoubtable merits - namely in terms of providing the basis for principled critique - they constitute a somewhat 'different exercise than critically assessing actual legitimacy demands [from actors] and what determines them' (Bernstein, 2011: 22). Indeed, the value of an empirical approach is of particular relevance to the contemporary context of the enormous shifts in power in global politics, whereby hitherto marginalised states and non-state actors are demanding and commanding more considerable influence in global governance. However, these actors carry with them understandings and legitimacy demands that

potentially diverge from those proliferated and rooted within an Occidentalist understanding of liberal democracy. Furthermore, Muppidi (2009: 293) makes the case that

Proponents or critics of global governance that do not offer a space for dissensus and difference, that do not encourage a self-reflexivity that engages and seeks to learn from various Others, can be seen as deeply complicit in the production of colonial [authoritarian, undemocratic] orders of global governance.

Understanding what constitutes legitimate governance from the perspective of various actors is therefore an essential endeavour in the contemporary era. As Mahbubani (2011: 133) opines: 'if a majority believes that a global institution is illegitimate, no intellectual sophistry can make that institution legitimate'. While we can contest this comment in that it conflates empirical acceptance with normative legitimacy, it nonetheless points attention to the need to understand and grasp the various perceptions and demands made within the complexities of global politics. It is thus essential that global governance institutions not only be normatively legitimate, but that they are also perceived to be legitimate (Buchanan and Keohane, 2006: 407). Otherwise, the institution in question would cease to be capable of producing any of the public goods it was tasked with providing. However, the notion that actors may have divergent views as to what constitutes a legitimate institution has, according to Peters (2013: 5), received 'remarkably little' attention. Yet if global governance is to merit the name, that being global, the argument follows that it must be responsive to the perspectives of those it seeks to govern.

3.2.2.1 A Critique of Exclusively Sociological Approaches

A sociological approach to the study of legitimacy can remedy some of the deficiencies latent in exclusively normative accounts. It can enable research and analysis that appreciates and explores the various legitimacy perspectives held by those that institutions seek to govern. However, an exclusively sociological approach is not without its faults. Crucially, it is entirely possible that 'sociologically legitimate institutions can be normatively illegitimate' (Westergreen, 2016: 49). As Wettstein (2010: 280) argues, although an actor may perceive an institution as legitimate, such a perception may or may not be justified. The

mere perception of legitimacy by actors cannot be an adequate basis for truly legitimate processes, given that it may 'succumb to a superficial 'mantle of legitimacy' (Raz, 1990: 3). As Valentini (2012: 595) argues, only genuine acceptance - rather than acceptance as a result of domination or coercion - can be said to be legitimate in that, 'a slave may regard his master as a "legitimate authority", yet the slave's acceptance of the master's authority hardly counts as legitimizing'. There is thus a need also to be cognizant of what constitutes normatively legitimate acceptance. However, an exclusively empirical approach does not aid in such an endeavour.

3.2.3 The Case for a Normative-Sociological Approach

Thus far, we have reviewed the debate on the merits and shortcomings of exclusively normative and empirical approaches to the assessment of legitimacy. As Nasiritousi (2017: 4) notes, these approaches to legitimacy highlight that assessments diverge 'depending on whether the focus of the study is to examine justifications of operations or the acceptability of those claims to a given constituency'. However, while most studies (implicitly or explicitly) adopt one or the other approach, it can be argued that partisan adherence to one approach need not be necessary - nor would doing so be fruitful 'if we are to gain a better understanding of the [legitimacy] crisis itself, and devise ways of resolving' such (Peters, 2013: 13). Instead, it is possible to combine the valuable insights of both approaches, and that such can complement each other's shortcomings, while also enabling for an analysis that examines the professed linkages between the two (see section 3.4.1). As Brassett and Tsingou (2011: 5) note, 'stark distinction between normative and sociological legitimacy is no more than an analytical device, and most academics and practitioners think in terms of both'. Moreover, Bernstein (2004: 139) makes the rather convincing case that legitimacy needs to be approached from the common perspective of democratic theory, but also from the sociological perspective: 'whereas these different conceptions of legitimacy can sometimes push in contradictory directions, the key to legitimate governance is in their convergence.'

A normative-sociological approach recognises that legitimacy ‘possesses both a normative and factual dimension’ and that combining these dimensions can produce a much more vibrant and in-depth understanding of the ‘legitimacy question’ in global politics (Thornhill, 2011: 135). As argued by Bernstein (2004a: 2), legitimacy contains both descriptive and injunctive dimensions. Therefore an ‘argument concerning why actors should accept a decision or rule as authoritative (as opposed to because they are coerced) necessarily includes possible reasons why the decision is accepted, and vice-versa’ (ibid.). The proposed approach thus follows those such as Take (2008, 2012) and Nasiritousi (2017) in that it attempts to ‘close the gap’ between normative reflections on what ought to constitute legitimate global governance and empirical investigation into stakeholder’s acceptance of an institution’s rule and differing perceptions on legitimate global governance.

3.2.3.1 In Defence of Democratic Values as a Guiding Heuristic

The above critiques of exclusively normative approaches do not undermine the utility and value of a normative approach informed by democratic theory for the assessment of the legitimacy of global governance institutions. Instead, they point out that there are several ‘blind spots’ that result from an exclusively democratic normative approach, such as the different conceptions of legitimacy that various actors bring to the table and how these actors themselves perceive the particular aspects of a governance arrangement (Peters, 2013: 13). We can concede that an exclusively normative approach to the assessment of the legitimacy of global governance may fail to take account of the multitude of legitimacy claims that emerge within the ‘multiple contestations and controversies of global politics’ (Gadinger, 2013: 18). However, altogether dropping the guiding ideals of democracy, or democratic values, as a means of assessing the legitimacy of global governance arrangements would be to ‘throw the baby out with the bathwater’. Indeed, it is essential to make a distinction between ‘democratic forms [institutions], on the one hand, and democratic values and ideals on the other (Held and Maffettone, 2017: 7). Rather than constituting an ahistorical means of assessment, democratic theory and approaches to assessing the normative legitimacy of governance have proven to be somewhat flexible and sensitive to developments in theory. As mentioned, models of deliberative democracy have

been proposed as more 'compatible with new forms of governance', and proven to be amenable to the normative desires of a broader range of stakeholders (Hahn and Wiedtmann, 2016: 99). Normative criteria derived from democratic theory can thus be more flexible than some critics would suggest.

As proposed by Gause (2013: 29), one condition for arriving at an appropriate means of assessing legitimacy is to refrain from presupposing the institutions of Western democracy. However, another condition is to treat the views of all concerned to ensure equal say in determining what constitutes legitimacy. Yet treating the views of all concerned in an equal way is in itself a democratic ideal and endeavour: to use the words of Dryzek (2000: 153), 'experimenting with what democracy can mean is an essential part of democracy itself'. The assessment of the democratic legitimacy of governance arrangements at the global level may require different 'yardsticks' than governance at the national level (Bäckstrand, 2006: 304). Crucially, a purely empirical approach uninformed by democratic criteria would be to overlook the normative and instrumental weight of democratic values that influence the creation of global governance arrangements in the first place.

While an exclusively democratic normative approach to the assessment of the legitimacy of global governance may overlook the varying perceptions on sources of legitimacy by actors, democratic values are nonetheless intimately related to 'real world' criticisms often directed at global institutions. Overwhelmingly, institutions can be criticised based on their inclusivity, representative credentials, accountability, or their iniquitous privileging of certain actors. As Scholte (2011: 115) notes, 'substantive publics now challenge the legitimacy of global regimes for their lack of democracy', thus wholly dropping democratic criteria from a legitimacy assessment would be misguided. Indeed, institutions themselves devote a considerable degree of their resources to advocate their democratic credentials, thus demonstrating the instrumental importance attached to ensuring their legitimacy as democratic actors (Beisheim and Dingwerth, 2008: 10). In sum, democratic procedures continue to be the 'gold standard' in that 'democratic legitimacy, rooted in justice or fairness, is the unavoidable substantive basis of legitimate governance, whatever the level' (Bernstein, 2004: 16). While democratic criteria of assessment may not reveal the full

picture, they are nonetheless of significant analytic value when it comes to assessing the legitimacy of global governance.

When it comes to the use of democratic values to guide inquiry, one objection to the use of a combined approach may come from Bernstein (2011: 42), who states that when adopting an empirical approach, ‘a checklist of legitimacy requirements cannot be developed *a priori*’. Given that a sociological conception of legitimacy seeks to uncover the diversity of legitimacy conceptions held by various actors, using a pre-determined framework derived from democratic theory and normative legitimacy literature may seem to inhibit the exploration of alternative sources that inform legitimacy assessments. However, rather than formulating a ‘fully-fledged’ theory of legitimate global governance, normative democratic values can instead be used as a guiding heuristic in which to provide structure to the empirical research, as well as to indicatively determine the legitimacy of the institutions in question in normative terms (i.e. the acceptability of procedures) (Take, 2012: 223). Consequently, by eschewing a fully formulated framework or theory of legitimate global governance, the ‘risk of neglecting important indicators of legitimate governance is minimised’ (ibid., 222). It is, therefore, possible to draw upon normative criteria and values in a more ‘relaxed fashion’, given that democratic values may not be central to the perceived legitimacy of a given institution (Peters, 2013: 7).

3.2.3.2 Empirical Research on Stakeholder Perspectives

A sociological approach to the assessment of legitimacy can offer two strands of insight within a normative-sociological framework. First, it can offer a means to determine the extent to which various stakeholders perceive an institution to be legitimate, i.e. how different stakeholders perceive the appropriateness of a global governance mechanism. Secondly, sociological research can also reveal what various stakeholders perceive to be the relative importance of particular sources – such as *input*, *throughput*, and *output* dimensions - in determining their legitimacy assessments. Again, we can determine whether this is based upon a congruence of values across stakeholder types, or whether particular groupings of

stakeholders hold particular sources to be more critical than other stakeholders. It is thus possible to highlight whether:

...different audiences of state, global civil society, or market may share different criteria or weightings of 'input' (procedural), output (performance, efficiency), or more traditional notion of substantive (values of justice and fairness) legitimacy (Bernstein, 2004: 157).

The combination of both a normative and sociological approach to the assessment of legitimacy is warranted in that, according to Zürn (2004: 278), 'in good social science, theoretical reflections are complemented with methodologically sound empirical analysis'. In many ways a sociological approach is necessary in order to complement normative approaches, in that 'there is a huge literature within the field of normative democratic theory that suffers from a shortage of empirical observations on actual process' (Bexell et al., 2010: 96). A combined approach, therefore, can provide 'insights regarding the conditions, prospects, and limits of [democratic] governance beyond the nation-state' (Take, 2012: 222). The idiosyncrasies and nuances of this combined approach will now be detailed and justified in greater depth.

3.3 The Framework

This section goes into depth on the justification for, and components of, the heuristic framework that will guide the inquiries and research of this thesis. As alluded to in the previous section, the conception of legitimacy adopted is 'multi-dimensional' in that it combines both democratic criteria in its normative assessment, while it also enables for engagement with a sociological conception of legitimacy (Take, 2012). This framework does so by drawing upon Sharpf's (2001) often used heuristic of 'input' and 'output' dimensions of legitimacy, yet the framework also includes 'throughput' legitimacy as an intermediary dimension (Hallström and Boström, 2010). Drawing upon indicators that comprise the core of most approaches to democratic governance beyond the state, democratic normative legitimacy is assessed *via* examining the institutions' 'input' and 'throughput' dimensions

(Beisheim and Dingwerth, 2008: 12). Recognising Kindornay and Samy's (2012) preliminary contributions on what factors ought to contribute a legitimate and effective global development mechanism in the 'post-Busan' era, institutional specific weighting is suffused throughout the dimensions of assessment. Kindornay and Samy's model is valuable, given that it applies to the global development architecture and GPEDC in particular. However, their model does not acknowledge the potential for a diversity of views as to what constitutes legitimate governance. Crucially, while some such as Take (2012) merely relegate the investigation of empirical legitimacy to a single indicator – by asking whether stakeholders comply or accept an institution – this thesis takes a different approach. Instead, it assesses the *input*, *throughput*, and *output* legitimacy of a governance arrangement through the eyes of the stakeholders themselves. Doing so is necessary if we are to understand the complex legitimacy demands that arise in MSPs beyond the level of the nation-state.

While there are grounds for debate surrounding the existence and extent, the literature generally assumes that a positive relationship exists between the three dimensions of legitimacy (Hatanaka and Konefal, 2012: 156). That is to say, the more an institution satisfies each legitimacy dimension, the stronger the overall legitimacy of an institution will be. However, this assumption is not taken for granted within the framework. Instead, it uses these dimensions and constitutive indicators as a heuristic device. This section will, therefore, provide an explanation and justification for the use of each dimension and their composite indicators. However, the following section will highlight issues and trade-offs that may arise between the various indicators and dimensions of assessment.

3.3.1 *Input Legitimacy*

The dimension of input legitimacy is arguably the oldest and most rigorously discussed dimension in which the democratic legitimacy of a governing mechanism can be assessed (Wimmel, 2009: 190). Linked to Republican ideals of 'direct democracy', input-oriented democratic legitimacy emphasises the notion of ensuring 'government by the people' (Bekkers and Edwards, 2016: 43). Input legitimacy conventionally seeks to question

who is entitled to make decisions, and who is to be represented within a governing and decision-making process (Scharpf, 1999; Bäckstrand, 2006: 292). Generally speaking, there are three ways of generating input legitimacy: direct participation; representational participation; and representation based on social, economic, or cultural groupings of stakeholders (Mügge, 2011: 5). However, the standard model of representational democracy as typical in domestic democratic settings is not directly transposable to governance at the transnational level, and, therefore, different mechanisms are required to ensure the input legitimacy of a governing arrangement via adequate stakeholder inclusion and equality (Risse, 2004: 2; Papadopoulos, 2016: 11; Little and MacDonald, 2013). In terms of assessing the input legitimacy in the context of this study, this thesis examines three indicators: inclusivity, representativeness; and the equality of stakeholders. This dimension and three indicators of legitimacy are not necessarily geared towards examining organisational effectiveness (output legitimacy) nor ensuring the quality of debate (throughput legitimacy). They are instead concerned with the crucial issue of stakeholder access to a governance arrangement.

3.3.1.1 Inclusivity

Inclusivity is a 'core element of any democratic theory' (Dingwerth, 2007: 27). It is hypothesised that the higher the extent that an MSP is designed towards ensuring the maximum possible inclusion of relevant stakeholders, that such will enhance the input legitimacy of a governance arrangement (Dahl, 1989). The formal participation rights of different and diverse stakeholders within a governing arrangement is a significant element of input legitimacy, for it conveys an image of impartiality and neutrality in debate and decision-making (Mele and Schepers, 2013). This concern reflects not only the normative issue of ensuring that those engaged in and affected by a governance arrangement have a say in the processes of decision-making (Scharpf, 1999). It also holds instrumental value in that including all relevant stakeholders may contribute to problem-solving through fostering a sense of shared ownership and consequently, greater compliance amongst stakeholders (Bäckstrand, 2006: 295). As noted by Dingwerth (2008: 55), the challenge of inclusion (for MSPs) is twofold. First, there is a need to ensure that stakeholders from developing

countries are included. Second, that the 'local-global' gap is addressed by the inclusion of actors whose primary level of action is at the national or even local level (i.e. Southern CSOs and local PSAs).

Within this thesis, this indicator examines how stakeholders perceive the inclusivity of the GPEDC's governance. Normative arguments in favour of enhanced inclusiveness within governance arrangements beyond the nation-state are commonplace. However, the notion that actors may have divergent views as to what constitutes a legitimate institution - in this case, what the desired level of inclusivity is for differing stakeholders - has received 'remarkably little' attention (Peters, 2013: 5). It would be naive to presume that the higher degree of inclusivity (in terms of greater and more diverse actors at the table) will invariably lead to more positive perceptions held by stakeholders (c.f. Dahl, 1989). Instead, different stakeholders may hold divergent views as to who should or should not be included within a governance arrangement. Furthermore, stakeholders may also hold different weightings of inclusivity as an indicator of legitimacy (Bernstein, 2004: 157). For instance, some stakeholders and groups thereof may perceive the lack of participation of another group of stakeholders as potentially fatal to the partnership's overall legitimacy. The question guiding this indicator is thus: 'how do stakeholders comparatively perceive the inclusivity of the GPEDC in terms of their inclusion and that of others?'.

3.3.1.2 Representativeness

In contrast to the principle of inclusivity that refers to the rules surrounding 'who can and should be at the table', representation is more-so concerned with the quality of the structures that enable for structured participation. Representativeness has been operationalised by Bäckstrand (2006a: 477) by questioning the extent to which an 'appropriately wide range of stakeholder groups [can formally participate] within a stakeholder arrangement'. Similar to inclusivity, the call for enhanced representation holds instrumental value in that 'participation by affected groups will generate more effective collective problem solving' through extending ownership (Bäckstrand, 2016: 295). This indicator, therefore, enables an exploration into the extent to which different stakeholders

perceive that they are represented appropriately within the decision-making processes of a governance mechanism. The normative principle underlying representation as a constituent component of legitimacy lies within the notion of 'making present' those who are not, and 'acting for' them also (Pitkin, 1967). Appropriate representation - when functioning per the normative ideal - ensures that ideas and preferences are represented in decision-making even when those beholden to such are not there.

In order to explore stakeholder perspectives on representativeness, it is necessary to examine whether certain stakeholder groups are formally - or informally - excluded as a consequence of an MSP's representative structures. Additionally, this indicator can be explored by examining the extent to which stakeholders perceive the MSP to tend to favour a specific individual or group of stakeholders in certain processes (Take, 2012: 223). The concomitant question guiding this indicator is, therefore, 'to what extent do stakeholders perceive that they are appropriately represented within decision-making?'.

3.3.1.3 Equality of Stakeholders

Formal inclusion rights and structures that ensure for the representative engagement of affected stakeholders are essential contributing factors to the perceived input legitimacy of a governance arrangement. However, these alone are insufficient in generating input legitimacy (Boström and Hallström, 2013: 94). As noted by Guastafero and Moschella (2012: 204), appropriate inclusivity and representation are not attained 'when [such] allows only those having the organisational structures and financial resources required to join and [to] try to affect the decision-making process'. This indicator makes this concern explicit by examining the extent to which stakeholders perceive there to be equality amongst actors within the case study under question. Here it is examined whether stakeholders perceive decision-making processes to be designed in such a way as to neutralise power relations between various actors (Mena and Palazzo, 2012: 16).

If no attempts are made to ensure the horizontality of relations, asymmetric power capacities undermine equality while contributing to the 'systemic under-representation' of particular

stakeholder groups (Take, 2012: 224; Schmitter, 2002: 65-66). For instance, the disproportionate human and financial resources that are held by powerful Northern state and private actors has meant that such tend to be over-represented within governance arrangements, while weaker Southern states, CSOs, and SMEs tend to be under-represented (Bäckstrand, 2012; Pattberg, 2010; Hale and Mauzerall, 2004). For a global multi-stakeholder partnership to live up to its transformative potential of harmonising power relations and putting stakeholders on an equal footing with one another, efforts to redress power and capacity imbalances are essential. Such efforts may come in the form of institutional provisions that enable capacity building or more overt forms of funds that enable weaker stakeholders to travel and attend relevant events. However, it is often the case that governance arrangements have scarce resources and thus simply lack the financial and human resources required in order to neutralise power asymmetries amongst stakeholders (Boström and Hallström, 2013: 28). It is, therefore, essential to examine whether stakeholders perceive the GPEDC to be a donor or DAC-led, or instead if it provides an 'equal playing field' for all actors.

3.3.2 Throughput Legitimacy

Often missing from most assessments of the legitimacy of governing arrangements 'is what goes on in the "blackbox" of governance between input and output' (Schmidt, 2013: 6). Throughput legitimacy builds upon a given input legitimacy, and it examines the 'quality of interactions' and 'precise features' of decision-making within a governance process (Iusmen and Boswell, 2017: 459; Hahn and Weidtmann, 2016: 101). Despite its under-theorisation and utilisation, the dimension of throughput legitimacy enables the researcher to investigate the 'way decisions are [perceived to be] made and how far decision-makers will be held accountable for their performance' (Lieberherr, 2013: 2; Take, 2008: 3). Throughput legitimacy thus seeks to examine the 'modalities of communication and decision-making as well as the transparency of the process and its underlying rules' (Hahn and Weidtmann, 2016: 101). Proponents of throughput legitimacy as a distinct dimension of assessment are often advocates of Habermasian (1990: 185) 'deliberative democracy', and thus seek to determine the extent to which a given governance process fares against the notion of an

'ideal discourse'. In order to determine the throughput legitimacy of a given governance arrangement, three indicators are of essential analytical utility, the perception of the quality of decision-making and debate; transparency; and, accountability.

3.3.2.1 Quality of Decision-Making and Debate

In line with proponents of deliberative democracy, the procedural and deliberative quality of debate and decision-making is a significant indicator to assess the perceived democratic credentials of a governance arrangement - particularly so in 'situations in which democratic representation and/or voting mechanisms are not available options' (Risse, 2004: 110). Given that the governance arrangement in question include a wide gamut of diverse actors with asymmetric power capacities, ensuring that weaker stakeholders perceive themselves to not only be included formally but are also not marginalised in debate and decision-making is a crucial determinant of legitimate governance processes (Mena and Palazzo, 2012: 16; Young, 2000). As noted by Kerkhof (2006: 282), the 'focus on deliberation helps to prevent relevant [stakeholder] information from being excluded... [and] the dialogue process from generating a... [limited] perception of the problem[s]'. The critical question to ask in this respect is the extent to which decision-making and debate follow the principles of *universality*, *rationality* and *reciprocity* (Chambers, 1996: 197-211).

The principle of universality suggests that there exist no barriers that systematically prevent particular stakeholders from engaging within deliberations, while it also suggests the need to examine the actual degree of participation (Dingwerth, 2007: 31). The principle of rationality suggests that deliberation and decision-making take place in a non-coercive manner, and it asks how consensus or decisions are perceived to be reached within a process. The principle thus points our attention to the role of power within the deliberative process, as to whether hierarchical bargaining or persuasion and argument constitutes the basis of decision-making (Chambers, 1996: 203). Indeed, measuring the principle of rationality is likely to result in 'methodological problems induced by both the complexity and internality of communicative processes' (ibid.). Dingwerth (2007:31) proposes that we can determine that the rationality of a process by focusing on 'distortions in communication and discourse

produced by existing power disparities'. The principle of reciprocity then refers to the 'extent to which impartiality and respect are present in a given discourse and participants approach deliberations with the aim of reaching consensus' (ibid.) However, a disposition towards consensus is not a necessary determinant of the legitimacy of a governance arrangement. In the case investigated by this study, the stakeholders constituting the GPEDC are likely to have 'different axioms, assumptions, and concepts with regard to the problem[s] under consideration' (Kerkhof, 2006: 282). Therefore, the principle of reciprocity can be explored as to whether stakeholders perceive that there exist dispositions towards openness and a willingness to engage in mutual learning and persuasion based on a logical argument (Beisheim and Dingwerth, 2008: 14).

3.3.2.2 Transparency

Ensuring accountability within a multi-stakeholder arrangement is perhaps the most essential, yet contentious, indicator of the perceived throughput legitimacy of an arrangement (Scholte, 2011: 15). However, an essential precondition for arriving at accountability is through ensuring that a governance arrangement is perceived to be as transparent as possible (Buchanan and Keohane, 2006: 426). In the context of global MSPs, 'an institution is transparent if it makes its behaviour and motives readily knowable to interested parties' (Hale, 2008: 75). Meeting transparency implies that stakeholders believe themselves to have 'unlimited and timely access' to information regarding decision-making and broader institutional processes at a reasonable cost (Keohane, 2011: 102). The transparency of a governance arrangement improves to the extent that relevant information is made available to stakeholders, ensuring that debates regarding rules and decisions are publicly available, and crucially, that decisions are attributable to decision-makers (Mason, 2005). In other words, this indicator corresponds to Louis Brandeis' maxim that 'sunshine is the best disinfectant'.

While access to information about decision-making processes is of crucial importance when exploring stakeholders perception of the throughput legitimacy of a governance arrangement, it is also important that stakeholders are 'able to do something with that

information - that they understand it, evaluate it in their own interests and act upon it if necessary' (Dingwerth, 2014: 1132). For instance, Hahn and Weidtmann (2016: 109) note that missing translations of documents can prove to be a 'potential impediment to democratic legitimacy' since it can result in the exclusion of 'those experts who lacked sufficient knowledge of English from participating effectively in direct communication'. Furthermore, it is not only crucial that participating stakeholders have access to information (internal transparency), but also to ask whether individuals outside of the process are also able to access information (external transparency) (Fuchs et al., 2011). In doing so, it ensures that more critical voices are also able to direct criticism and scrutiny towards the procedural dimension of an MSP process, thus enhancing the perceived accountability of an arrangement. This indicator, therefore, explores how stakeholders perceive the transparency of the governance arrangement in question, and issues arising from the access to information regarding its functioning.

3.2.2.3 Accountability

Analysing accountability mechanisms within a governance process is essential for assessing throughput legitimacy. As explored in the previous section, an essential precondition for such mechanisms is informational transparency (Hechler and Tostensen, 2012: 2). Accountability is understood to be both an internal and external requirement for so-called 'good governance' (Rosenau, 2000: 193). In its most general conceptualisation, accountability refers to the principal-agent relationships between actors (Bäckstrand, 2006: 294). Democratic accountability is a system whereby principals that are significantly affected by the actions of an agent can make demands on the latter to report on their behaviour.

Moreover, the principal is then able to impose (potential) costs or sanctions on agents for poor behaviour (Keohane, 2002: Held, 2002: 27). Over the past three decades, accountability has become an essential part of the global governance debate. Some scholars contend that what constitutes 'a robust accountability system' is one of the core problems confronting global governance (Cadman, 2012: 12). The emergence of new actors and institutions has led the reformulation of existing mechanisms to hold agents to account

within democratic institutions (Held et al., 1999: 447). Towards the aspiration for more democratic global governance, there have thus been attempts to develop principles and practices of accountability to satisfy democratic criteria or standards (Keohane, 2003: 132-133).

However, accountability mechanisms and relationships within MSPs are wrought with challenges and unresolved normative questions. MSPs are comprised of 'competing and overlapping authorities' - such as state, private, and moral authority (Bäckstrand, 2006: 293). Accountability within MSPs is not characterised by clear principal-agent relations. In national democracies, accountability is hierarchical in that electorates can hold decision-makers to account through voting and precise mechanisms of representation. In contrast, MSPs 'are diffuse, complex weakly institutionalised collaborative systems that are neither directly accountable to an electoral base nor do they exhibit clear principal-agent relationship[s]' (Benner et al., 2003: 3). With the absence of a clear demos, hierarchical modes of accountability based upon elections are therefore not deemed suitable for MSPs. Instead, horizontal mechanisms of pluralistic accountability relationships - such as peer, reputational, market, and financial/fiscal accountability - are considered to be more appropriate for MSPs (Steets, 2004; Witte et al., 2003: 75).

Even in the absence of hierarchical modes of accountability, the question of who should be accepted as a principal or agent remains unclear (Behn, 2001). For Dann and Sattelberger (2015: 68), for accountability to be provided by MSPs in practice, 'it needs to be clear who is accountable for what and to whom, and mechanisms need to be in place to provide clear review procedures for monitoring' of those that are accountable. Moreover, for MSPs to meet their 'promising rhetoric' and to match 'with progress and results on the ground', it has been proposed that there is a 'need for systematic monitoring [of] progress of partnerships' (Bäckstrand, 2006: 300). Hence, exploring stakeholder perceptions on monitoring frameworks is one practical means by which to assess the throughput legitimacy of a partnership. Nevertheless, beyond identifying concrete means by which to assess the accountability of a partnership, perceptions of appropriate principal-agent relationships are elusive. Therefore, uncovering how various actors perceive the accountability of a

partnership, and the relationships of accountability between one another, is a central line of inquiry.

3.3.3 Output Legitimacy

While the other dimensions and indicators of assessment pertain to the perceived democratic legitimacy of a governance arrangement, many scholars do not consider output legitimacy to be 'a constitutive element of democratic legitimacy' (Dingwerth, 2007: 15). Although some such as Steffek (2015: 263) argue that output legitimacy can contain an essential democratic dimension in that governance arrangements need to produce results that are in the global public interest, it is nonetheless typically addressed in the sociological or descriptive sense. Output legitimacy points our attention to 'efficient' or 'effective' problem solving, or in other words, that arrangements produce adequate 'government for the people' (Scharpf, 1998: 11). In contrast to input and throughput, output legitimacy pertains to utilitarian thought in that it is based upon the 'utilitarian/welfare economics-orientated criterion of the best possible attempt to achieve a particular political goal' (Lieberherr, 2013: 5). Indeed, the dimension of output is essential for the perceived legitimacy of a governance arrangement given that 'a political order that does not perform well will ultimately be considered illegitimate no matter how democratic the policymaking process' (Risse and Kleine, 2007: 74). However, like legitimacy, the notion of output 'effectiveness' is equally - if not more so - elusive and thus requires careful consideration of its components to operationalise the concept for the assessment of MSPs (Nasiritousi, 2017: 4).

Drawing from Easton's (1965) system analysis approach, Wolf (2010) usefully distinguishes between three dimensions of effectiveness: *outputs* as the governance products and self-commitments of actors; *outcomes* as the behavioural changes based upon such commitments, and; *impact* as clear evidence of a governance arrangement's contribution to or influence upon goal attainment. There are various approaches to assessing the output component of output legitimacy. For instance, Tallberg et al. (2016) present fivefold typology to comparatively assess the policy outputs of international organisations. They examine an international organisation's policy outputs concerning their volume, orientation, type,

instruments, and targets. While this approach may be suitable for macro comparisons of differing international organisations across space, fields, and time, mapping various stakeholder perceptions on these five indicators would prove far too complicated and unnecessary. Doing so would not only require that stakeholders have full knowledge of an MSP's policy outputs. It would also require that stakeholders hold specific assessments of these various sub-indicators.

Likewise, impact requires judgments 'about the extent to which [an] institution contributes to alleviating the problem it was tasked to resolve' (Nasiritousi, 2017: 10). It is, therefore, an extremely complex measure of assessment, given that it 'often involves the comparison with a counterfactual state of affairs without the regime [or arrangement] in place' (Schmelzle, 2012: 2; Underdal, 1992). Additionally, the field of global development cooperation is highly fragmented and comprised of innumerable institutional authorities and actors, therefore determining the precise causal linkages between the actions and consequences of an MSP upon a specific issue or host of challenges becomes a potentially impossible task. As noted by Bäckstrand (2006a: 479), within the context of the sustainable development determining impact 'may be hard to judge since the implementation of sustainable development goals is an extensive, conflict-ridden, and long-term process'.

Nevertheless, a useful analytical distinction can be made between policy outputs and outcomes (Cadman, 2012: 9). Outcome is understood to be the 'ability of an institutional arrangement to generate acceptance and to motivate actors to comply with rules' (Take, 2008: 3). For some such as Take (2012) and Mitchell (1996: 23), outcome is a suitable intermediate level for studying output legitimacy and can be understood to 'provide a valuable proxy for effectiveness'. As an intermediate level of assessment, outcome can be used to examine the extent to which a governance mechanism can encourage actors to comply with its recommendations and norms. Consequently, outcome is uniquely suited to this project's concern with empirical legitimacy: outcome enables for the examination of stakeholder's professed and actual degree of behaviour change. Outcome also provides for an examination into stakeholder justifications as to why they have - or have not - undertaken behaviour changes as a result of their engagement in a governance arrangement.

Consequently, this intermediate level of study can yield insight into the influence of other dimensions and components of legitimacy in generating output legitimacy.

As Lindoso and Hall (2016: 10) note, 'multilateral performance assessments should capture recipients' and other stakeholders' perceptions of effectiveness'. In assessing output legitimacy, this thesis draws upon Peters (2013) 'heuristic particularist' approach in that the researcher must listen to the various actors involved in a governance arrangement and to reconstruct what they understand to be legitimate [and also effective] governance. We can, therefore, ask stakeholders how they understand and evaluate the effectiveness of a governance arrangement. Consequently, this project's framework is open to the possibility that stakeholders may have different understandings and perceptions as to what constitutes effective governance. In addition to outcome as an indicator of output effectiveness, this thesis also explores effectiveness preferences, and it questions how stakeholders perceive and evaluate the governance mechanism under question on their terms.

As non-Western International Relations scholars might be quick to point out, one potential objection to this framework is that it risks straitjacketing and interpreting 'bottom-up' empirical data through a 'top-down' (Western, hegemonic, democratic) lens (Acharya and Buzan, 2017). However, while this framework draws upon indicators that are associated with democratic accounts of legitimacy, they are suitably broad enough in their application so as not to be overly restrictive in their framing of stakeholder perspectives. Moreover, it is entirely fallacious to argue that Occidental democratic approaches have a monopoly upon governance values such as inclusivity, accountability, equality, and effectiveness. Virtually all forms of governance must attend - in some form or another - to the questions associated with the indicators of this framework. Additionally, Muppidi (2009) proffers that post-colonial global governance - in contrast to authoritarian colonial global governance - would be characterised by the presence of democratic procedures, and the recognition and mediation of difference. Furthermore, this chapter has already mentioned that criticisms against global governance institutions are often stated in terms of their lack of democratic credentials. Crucially, what is important here is not uncovering how different actors rate the organisation in relation to a clear benchmark of democratic legitimacy (i.e. how recipients rate the

inclusivity of an arrangement in accordance with a set standard). It is instead concerned with how actors understand a principle in relation to an organisation (i.e. what recipients understand to be an appropriate level/nature of inclusivity). Nevertheless, this framework is still beholden to the Coxian (1981: 128) injunction, that 'theory is always for someone, and for some purpose'. Concerning purpose in relation to this thesis, this will be addressed in section 4.1 that deals with the project's axiological underpinnings.

3.4 Contributions of the Framework

The framework outlined above offers a means to explore and assess the perceived legitimacy of the governance arrangement addressed by this study. This section briefly outlines three contributions of this approach. First, it enables an exploration into how stakeholders perceive and evaluate the legitimacy of the governance mechanism under question and the tensions that may arise across actors and dimensions of assessment. Secondly, the framework also enables exploration into the professed linkages between dimensions of legitimacy, such as the impact of democratic procedures upon effective outcomes. Third, the framework enables for an exploration into the extent to which the case fulfils the promises, or succumbs and pitfalls, associated with MSPs. This section explores each of these contributions in turn.

3.4.1 Exploring Stakeholder Perspectives on Legitimate Governance

The primary contribution of this framework is that it facilitates a focused and comparative examination into stakeholder perspectives on legitimacy. Given the criticism of the GPEDC's legitimacy since its inception, it arguably constitutes a 'contested institution' that can potentially provide crucial insight given that such:

...are the contexts in which actors will articulate most clearly what they deem problematic about an institution and in which they will be most explicit in their arguments about what form a legitimate institution should take (Peters, 2013: 14).

We can anticipate several tensions that may arise from stakeholder assessments on the legitimacy of the case under question. Taking the example of input legitimacy, each stakeholder may have their own view as to who were actually the legitimate stakeholders... and to what extent a given stakeholder category should be represented (Boström and Hallström, 2013: 94). Some may argue that the inclusion of private stakeholders as equal partners within a governing arrangement may in fact 'enhance problems of democratic legitimacy in international institutions (rather than helping to alleviate them)' (Börzel and Risse, 2002: 17). Moreover, while CSOs may claim to represent the 'public interest', some may view their equal status as stakeholders problematic, given that they are often unelected and elite-driven (Keohane and Nye, 2001). Furthermore, sorting actors into groups of stakeholder categories may serve to 'obscure important differences between these actors' (Dingwerth, 2005: 73). It is thus of crucial importance to look beyond the formal groupings and categories and to inquire into how individual stakeholders position and perceive themselves within a broader MSP process (Kuchler, 2017).

As mentioned in previous sections, we can also anticipate tensions with regards to throughput legitimacy, such as who should be accountable to whom, and output legitimacy over what should constitute organisational effectiveness. The crucial point is that within each dimension of legitimacy, there is likely to be contestation over what constitutes legitimate processes. Rather than shying away from such contestations and complexities, the heuristic nature of this framework allows the researcher to explore differing stakeholder perceptions. In doing so, the framework can contribute to policy debates on institutional design through providing research in terms of 'what drives' stakeholders to support or oppose particular governing arrangements (Dellmuth and Tallberg, 2015), thus connecting 'largely deductive arguments with empirical analyses of real-world cases' (Mügge, 2011: 69).

3.4.2 Exploring the Linkages Between Dimensions of Legitimacy

A further contribution of this framework pertains to its ability to explore a recurrent assumption made in the theoretical debate on legitimate governance beyond the level of the nation-state. As formulated by Schneider (2005: 10):

The more democratic an international decision-making process is (e.g. the more democratic procedures such as inclusion, fair discourse and accountability it contains), the more probable is compliance to the rules generated by this process.

This hypothesis relates to the assumption that maximising democratic procedures leads to greater outcome effectiveness and sociological legitimacy (Dellmuth and Tallberg, 2015). Exploring the link between ‘normative validity and empirical belief’ (Zürn, 2004) has long featured in debates on legitimate governance beyond the state. However, empirical studies have revealed that input, throughput, and output dimensions of legitimacy do not always positively correlate (Hatanka and Konefal, 2012). Instead, there appear to be several trade-offs that exist between the three dimensions. Most notably, is the professed trade-off that exists between input legitimacy and outcome effectiveness, linked to broader debates surrounding the intractable challenges in attaining democratic governance. While some assume a ‘virtuous circle’ in that the quality of enhanced input legitimacy leads to enhanced outcome effectiveness (Schmelzle, 2012; Levi and Sacks, 2009), some such as Scharpf (1999) argue that there exists an inevitable trade-off between the two dimensions. The case for the former perspective is rooted in the notion that the inclusion of a broad set of stakeholders may serve to create a sense of shared ownership over a process that may lead to better compliance and acceptance (Beisheim and Dingwerth, 2008). However, a positive relationship between input and output effectiveness may not result if the inclusion of a full gamut of actors results in ‘significant transaction costs, difficulties in reaching an agreement or slow-down in decision-making, sub-optimal compromises, or the diffusion of accountability’ (Nasiritousi, 2017: 7; Risse, 2004; Scharpf, 1999).

Nevertheless, there is a need to explore the notion that enhanced legitimacy in one dimension will lead to enhanced legitimacy elsewhere. It is possible and necessary to explore potential trade-offs that may exist between the dimensions and indicators of the proposed framework. Moreover, many normative approaches do not acknowledge that stakeholders may have different conceptions as to what constitutes appropriate governance or legitimacy at the input, throughput, and output level. Only in approaching the framework with a reflexive and critical attitude is it possible not to assume a simple congruence

between the three dimensions of legitimacy. However, doing so enables the researcher to examine possible ways to potentially resolve potential trade-offs between democratic principles, sociological legitimacy, and output effectiveness (Risse, 2004: 312).

3.4.3 Exploring the Promises and Pitfalls of Multi-Stakeholder Partnerships

The final contribution of this framework is that it enables a focused exploration into whether a governance arrangement fulfils the promises, or succumbs to the pitfalls, associated with multi-stakeholder governance (see section 3.1). Short of recapitulating the arguments made earlier, there are numerous questions over the extent to which MSPs can provide more legitimate and effective governance. Although the language surrounding MSPs is often 'innocuous and even benign-sounding', it is essential to critically assess the perceived democratic credentials of these partnerships in order to ensure that they do not re-inscribe existing power asymmetries while promulgating the disproportionate wealth and influence of PSAs over that of public and civic stakeholders (Tiwana, 2014). By examining both the democratic credentials of the GPEDC through the perspectives that are held by stakeholders themselves - it is possible to contribute to academic and policy debate on how to ensure that MSPs are designed and function in more 'representative, accountable, and effective ways' (Bäckstrand, 2006a: 467). If the SDGs are to be achieved, it is essential that MSPs do not constitute 'neoliberal solutions in disguise' that, in practice, promulgate Northern donor and 'corporate power while aggravating social justice and environmental harm, rather than abating them' (Kuchler, 2017: 194; Lövbrand et al., 2009: 74-5). We now turn to explore how this framework will be applied, and how these inquiries will be explored in the following chapter that examines research methodology, design, and the conduct of research.

4. On the Methodology, Design, and Praxis of Research

This chapter moves from abstract reflections on methodology, to particular issues on the choice of methods, the conduct of research, and data analysis. This thesis is research-driven, drawing primarily upon information attained through interviews and document analysis, while it is enhanced by insider experience derived from extensive participant observation. During research, the opportunity arose to work for the GPEDC's Secretariat. The thesis, therefore, benefits from insider insight into the challenges and opportunities faced by this particular MSP, as it was possible to inhabit multiple spaces of observation as both a researcher and a practitioner.

The structure of this chapter is fourfold. The first section provides a defence of 'Pragmatism' as this thesis's research paradigm by addressing its ontological, epistemological, and axiological underpinnings. The second section defends the use of both a single Case Study Approach and a Multi-Method Research (MMR) design. The third section outlines the methods used by this thesis: an exploratory questionnaire, semi-structured interviews, document analysis, and participant observation. The final section concludes and highlights some limitations of the thesis.

4.1 Pragmatism as a Research Paradigm

4.1.1 Ontological Considerations

Before detailing this project's ontological underpinnings, it is necessary to briefly consider the nature of research paradigms in social science. It is hardly revelatory to state that the nature of the Western mind is fundamentally dualistic. It is, therefore, unsurprising that methodological discussions on research paradigms have followed this tendency. For Cox (1981: 126), the 'cutting up' of the seamless social world is necessary:

Contemplation of undivided totality may lead to profound abstractions or mystical revelations... [however] practical knowledge (that which can be put to work through action) is always partial or fragmentary in origin.

Dualisms serve important pedagogical and practical purposes for both making sense of, and acting within, the social world. However, such a tendency inherent in methodological considerations is of limited utility to the understanding and amelioration of complex social challenges. The problem with dualistic tendencies is that paradigms become venerated, and researchers tend to take an 'either/or' stance. Researchers often take an ontological position that reality is either mind-independent or mind-dependent, and subsequent inquiry and research proceeds from this 'either/or' assumption. Such a tendency fails to consider different paradigms as 'lenses' or 'tools' that can be useful for the research process (Maxwell, 2011). Instead, paradigms become exclusionary in terms of research inquiries, approaches, and designs (Biesta, 2010).

Fortunately, many scholars within IR and beyond have turned their back on the 'paradigm wars' of old, where unproductive debates raged on about the nature of being and knowing (Cochran, 2002; Haas and Haas, 2002; Bauer and Brighi, 2009; Katzenstein and Sil, 2010; Jackson, 2009; Sunley, 1996). Rather than devoting effort and resources towards determining what 'really' exists, scholars such as Friedrichs and Kratochwil (2009: 726) have argued that we instead:

...recognise that neither lofty theory bashing nor clueless research activism can provide secure foundations for our knowledge, and let us instead seek knowledge that will enable us to deal with relevant problems and, ultimately, to find our way through the complexities of the social world'.

The paradigm that they advocate towards such an end is Pragmatism (Dewey, 2008; James, 1987a [1907]). Though by no means a homogenous body of thought, the overarching principle amongst Pragmatist adherents is the 'primacy of practice' in any research endeavour (Baert, 2009: 49; Putnam, 1995: 52). Contrary to the prevailing tendencies, Pragmatists do not hold that 'ontology lies at the beginning of any inquiry' (cf. Cox, 1996: 52). The need to 'ontologically ground' claims in social science is only necessary if one concerns themselves with the 'really real' (Rorty, 1991: 52). From a Pragmatist perspective, it does not matter if, for instance, the state 'really' exists. What does matter, is that we act

‘as-if’ such ‘things’ do exist. As Hellman (2009: 641) notes, ‘the state is experienced as “real” when I pay taxes or refuse to go to war for it’. Likewise, credit scores are very much experienced as ‘real’ when one is unable to get a loan.

Moreover, it does not necessarily matter if reality is pure consciousness and subjectively constructed. What does matter is that individual perceptions and constructions of reality have discernible impacts upon social and political life. Individual perceptions are, therefore, deserving of our inquiry. Dispelling with Cartesian doubt, inquiry in the pragmatist paradigm begins with ‘real doubt... doubt that arises out of concrete situations that cannot be squared with previous assumptions’ (Bauer and Brichi, 2009: 4; Peirce, 1877).

Ontologically, therefore, pragmatism is anti-dualistic (Rorty, 1999: ix). It questions the seeming dichotomy in Positivist and Interpretivist approaches (Feilzer, 2010: 8). In doing so, it promises a way beyond ‘the Scylla of eternal repetition without any sensorium for novelty (positivism) and the Charybdis of aloof criticism without a sufficiently strong grounding in everyday real-life problems (postmodernism)’ (Hellman, 2009: 638-9). It does not propose solutions to apparent ontological and epistemological divisions. Pragmatism instead ‘radically demystifies’ their importance for social inquiry (Bauer and Brighi, 2009: 2).

Rather than basing inquiry in metaphysical discussions about the nature of truth (epistemology) or reality (ontology), pragmatists begin from a different premise: ‘life itself - a life that is inherently contextual, emotional, and social’ (Morgan, 2014: 1047). Such a disposition is not to suggest that we should cease metaphysical discussion altogether. It merely suggests that we downplay apparent metaphysical divides and presumptions of incommensurability. Instead, we begin with and engage in, inquiries that are more suited to the ‘messiness’ and ‘complexity’ of dilemmas facing actors in the ‘real world’ (Sil and Katzenstein, 2010).

As established in preceding chapters, the field of development cooperation is replete with complexity and dilemmas facing not only practitioners but also our analytical assumptions. For the former, traditional institutions responsible for the governance of international

development cooperation are no longer deemed 'fit for purpose' in a field characterised by unprecedented actor diversity. However, there has been a lacklustre degree of progress towards the establishment of a viable institutional alternative(s) that could bring together all the relevant actors into one setting. Moreover, little is known on the perspectives of these actors, and whether broadly legitimate and effective governance is possible given the legitimacy constraints and pitfalls associated with MSP initiatives. Pragmatist inquiry thus does not begin with ontological reflections on the nature of being and knowledge. We instead begin with a 'problematic situation' observed in practice, and work towards the production of knowledge that can contribute towards rectifying it.

4.1.2 On Epistemology

To consider research paradigms in purely dichotomous terms is misguided and a deficient caricature. There is ample nuance inherent in both Positivist and Interpretivist approaches, not to mention the various shades of 'grey' that exist 'in-between'. However, one area in which these two seemingly divergent approaches converge is with regards to a shared epistemological assumption. Namely, both ascribe to the view of truth as being an accurate representation of reality: both subscribe to a 'correspondence theory of truth' (Hellman, 2009: 640).

To elaborate, both positivist and interpretive approaches endeavour to produce knowledge that best represents or corresponds to reality (or realities) (Rorty, 1999: xxii). For the former, knowledge exists 'out there' in the 'real world'. For instance, in development studies research, an inquiry in the positivist vein might be: 'what is the impact of ODA upon economic growth over time?'. Consequently, the purpose of research is to uncover such 'truth' in the form of nomothetic laws or generalised mechanisms. For Interpretivists, multiple subjective realities may exist. Here, a critical development scholar might ask: 'what does "development" mean to different subaltern groups?'. The purpose of research is to accurately represent these various constructions, often in an idiographic capacity. The former may be praised for its practical or policy relevance, while criticised for its lack of nuance and overlooking of issues of discourse and power. The latter may be praised for its

ability to deconstruct taken-for-granted and power-laden assumptions, yet criticised for its lack of mainstream policy relevance. However, despite commonly being ‘pitted against’ one another, there is an epistemological affinity between both approaches: both seek to produce knowledge that accurately corresponds with ‘reality’ or ‘realities’.

Pragmatism takes an alternative epistemological approach to the correspondence theory of truth. For Pragmatists, knowledge is true to the extent that it satisfies two prerequisites. First, knowledge is ‘true’ if it corresponds to ‘consensus within and across communities’ (truth as consensus). Second, and crucially, knowledge is ‘true’ insofar as it serves a ‘particular kind of intellectual and/or practical purpose’ (truth as usefulness) (Friedrichs and Kratochwil, 2009: 706). This epistemological notion of ‘truth as usefulness’ suggests that an idea is true to the extent that it can:

...carry us prosperously from any one part of our experience to any other part, linking things satisfactorily, working securely, simplifying, saving labor; is true for just so much, true in so far forth, true instrumentally.
(James, 1987a [1907]: 512).

Pragmatism can thus be said to represent a form of ‘Epistemological Instrumentalism’ (Duhem, 1969 [1908]). In this conception, knowledge is true to the extent that it is useful, rather than satisfying some abstract metaphysical criteria of what ‘really’ exists.

The notion of truth as usefulness has intuitive and commonsensical appeal. It can alleviate some of the ‘unnecessary headaches’ associated with endless ontological and epistemological debates between Positivists and Interpretivists (Friedrichs and Kratochwil, 2009: 711). However, the crucial question to ask with regards to the notion of truth as usefulness is: ‘useful for what purpose?’. In response, we can say that purpose is an essential prerequisite for social scientific knowledge. However, purpose is not understood in terms of attaining knowledge for its own sake, nor the pursuit of wealth and power. Instead, the purpose of knowledge is to ‘enable orientation in the social world... its utility consists in helping us to understand complex social phenomena’ (Friedrichs and Kratochwil, 2009: 706). The notion of truth as usefulness to achieve orientation thus constitutes a rejection of a

‘causal, ontological, and realist view of concepts’ (Goertz, 2005: 5). In contrast, Pragmatism is concerned with the heuristic value of concepts in assisting understanding, and thus their intersubjective and constitutive quality (Bevir and Kedar, 2008: Friedrichs and Katrochwil, 2009: 717).

In this conception of truth, Pragmatism is endowed with a spirit of fallibilism: an opening of the researcher to the contingencies of knowledge, understanding, and context (Sil and Katzenstein, 2010). Our principles and concepts represent nothing more than mere ‘conveniences of the mind’, yet they do not impose restriction upon experience (Cox, 1981: 126; Franke and Weber, 2011: 684). The outcome of pragmatist inquiry is, therefore, not the production of knowledge that corresponds to a metaphysical ‘reality’. Instead, the outcomes of inquiry come in the form of ‘warranted assertions’ (Dewey, [1941] 2008). These ‘warranted assertions’ are contingent and provisional. As Cochran (2002: 527) notes, ‘to establish a truth pragmatically is to settle a controversial or complex issue for the time being’. However, this requires that we accept that something may eventually emerge to undermine the ‘comfort and reassurance’ that has been attained (ibid.). A commitment to Pragmatism is thus a commitment to uncertainty, and it denotes an understanding that all knowledge is provisional and relative (Feilzer, 2010: 13). Nonetheless, this is not to suggest that such knowledge in the form of ‘warranted assertions’ is not useful in terms of aiding understanding and in providing orientation.

4.1.3 On Reasoning and Inference

An ‘epistemic platform should openly and transparently bridge theory and phenomena’ (Malina et al., 2011: 60). Here, Pragmatism’s emphasis upon the heuristic value of concepts has clear relevance to the nature and purpose of this project’s inquiry. The heuristic framework conceived in the previous chapter provides a means to make sense of, or achieve ‘orientation’ within, a complex and problematic situation and field. The purpose of the framework is not to find ‘unvarying causal links or truths’, but rather to ‘interrogate a particular question, theory... [and] phenomenon’ (Feilzer, 2010: 13). Pragmatist inquiry is thus distinct from hypothesis testing approaches, such as positivism, as the latter presumes

that it is possible to test a hypothesis against a 'mind-independent' world (Jackson, 2009: 658). To illustrate, the question in a Pragmatist inquiry is not: 'do democratic procedures (invariably) produce empirical legitimacy?'. The question is rather: 'how is legitimacy produced in this particular situation?' (Jackson, 2009: 659). It may be the case that democratic procedures come into the explanation. However, they may do so as part of a broader and more complex configuration of mechanisms (Ragin, 2008: 112-4).

The application of an *a priori* conceptual framework can provide heuristic value in exploring this project's inquiries. However, the pragmatist approach necessitates that we are also attentive to 'context-specific tendencies' (Modell, 2009: 218). The impetus is on understanding 'particular situations and events, rather than addressing only general patterns' (Maxwell and Mittapalli, 2010: 156). To focus solely on the latter would risk producing theoretically abstract conclusions that are of little use to practitioners. To satisfy the pragmatist criterion of truth as usefulness, we must begin with practice itself in the form of a 'problematic situation'. We are then required to use the most appropriate conceptual and theoretical tools in order to deal with 'the respective problems at hand' (Hellmann, 2009: 638). Such an approach requires an 'engagement with the experiences of actors seeking to cope with real-world problems', and to understand that these actors and their actions are brought about by 'interaction and intersubjectivity' (Sil and Katzenstein, 2010: 417; Franke and Weber, 2011: 676). While an *a priori* conceptual framework may have heuristic value, there is also a concomitant need to engage with the 'messiness of human meaning' (Kaag, 2009: 63). The consequence is research that forgoes theoretical parsimony (Sil and Katzenstein, 2009).

Pragmatism breaks with the conventional dualism of pursuing either purely deductive or inductive approaches to reasoning (Rytövuori-Apunen, 2009: 641; Brennan, 1992). Again, it is arguably fallacious to suggest that researchers act in a purely inductive or deductive fashion. It is an unspoken truth that virtually all social research is a process of iteratively moving between theory and data in 'an endless cycle in which theory and research feed on each other' (Rosenau, 1988: 164). As Morgan (2007: 70) notes, the only time that researchers 'pretend' to be purely inductive or deductive 'is when we write up our work for

publication'. However, what makes the Pragmatist mode of reasoning and inference distinct is that it makes this process explicit. It does so through actively employing 'abduction' as an additional approach to theory and data (Peirce, 1998 [1903]: 216).

It would be disingenuous to suggest that we can approach inquiry without pre-established conceptual frameworks. All reasoning and understanding can be said to depend on pre-existent understandings (Franke and Weber, 2011: 674). Furthermore, it is theory that provides the means to mediate between, and 'make sense' of, a given situation and collected data (Ralston, 2011). However, to uncritically impose an *a priori* conceptual framework upon an area of inquiry would result in the filtering of participants' experiences and understandings (Coryn, et al., 2010). While theories help guide the research process, they are nonetheless partial and incomplete (Baker, 2016: 329): this is as much the case for general relativity as it is for a Realist account of state behaviour. Alternatively, to purely use an inductive mode of theorising would be to 'surrender all critical judgment to the practitioners in the field' (Friedrichs and Kratochwil, 2009: 714). Pure induction would also severely limit the transferability of a research study to other relevant contexts.

The use of abduction enables the researcher to attain 'the best of both worlds'. Theories can be used to guide the research process, while observed data can also inductively inform the theoretical framework and analysis. This occurs as an iterative process of going back and forth between the two levels of theory and observed data during analysis. Abduction ensures that 'comprehensiveness and complexity matter more than simplification and economy when it comes to explicating practice' (Franke and Weber, 2011: 678). For instance, data that falls outside the theoretical frame, rather than being dismissed as 'noise', becomes an integral component of the overall analysis (Meyer and Lunnay, 2013: 1).

The use of this approach means that it is not possible to develop a 'logically consistent plan in advance and [to] then systematically follow this plan' (Maxwell, 2011: 29). Instead, the iterative element of this thesis requests that one adapts to the emerging circumstances of the research process. Such an approach may undoubtedly introduce a much more complex combination of mechanisms into the analysis than parsimonious theory would provide.

However, such complexity is what practitioners have to contend with as they seek to address substantive challenges in contemporary politics (Sil and Katzenstein, 2010: 421). If researchers wish to have their research efforts 'speak to such problems [they] must also be willing to contend with [such] complexity' (ibid.). The outcome of such research is likely to be quite distinct from purely nomothetic research that seeks to uncover generalisable laws through deductive theory testing.

Furthermore, an abductive approach is likely to be distinct from inductive approaches that produce 'thick' idiographic descriptions (Friedrichs and Kratochwil, 2009: 715). The result is instead likely to be in the form of 'mid-level truths' and 'middle-range theoretical arguments that [can] potentially speak to concrete issues of policy' (Haas and Haas, 2002; Sil and Katzenstein, 2010: 412). Consequently, despite embracing abduction as a mode of reasoning, it is still nonetheless possible for this thesis to engage in ongoing theoretical debates on legitimacy beyond the nation-state.

4.1.4 Axiology

In naïve perceptions of Pragmatism, a common assumption is that the approach reduces the philosophical components of a research thesis to a purely instrumental consideration of 'what works' (Morgan, 2014: 1046). Pragmatism has faced the misguided 'accusation that it entails a naïve form of instrumentalism which yields only a complacent understanding of politics' (Bacon and Chin, 2016: 3). In common parlance, the adoption of Pragmatist mindset is assumed to 'tend dangerously toward rationalism uninformed by moral emotion' (Brooks, 2014). Such assumptions suggest that pragmatism contains little reflection on the ethical and axiological, or '*cui bono?*', aspects of our inquiry (Mertens, 2003: 159).

Contrary to these perceptions, pragmatist inquiry is not merely practical in its orientation towards aiding intellectual orientation within a complex field. Pragmatism is deeply axiological in that it is wedded to the 'realisation of normative goals, most especially those of democracy' (Bohman, 2002). Similar to Habermas, Dewey's concern was that 'we should evaluate our existing institutions and work to change what we find to be deficient in

them' (Cochran, 2002: 532). For Dewey, the purpose of Pragmatist inquiry is towards 'maximising the democratic inclusion of people of varying cultural communities' (Cochran, 2002: 547-8). Therefore, in axiological terms, there is an affinity between the Pragmatist approach and the underlying normative purposes of this thesis.

The fact that this thesis has identified the current governance challenges facing global development cooperation as a 'problematic situation' is not an objective claim. It comes from my subjective point of view that the level of inclusion of affected stakeholders in development cooperation governance is normatively problematic. Alternatively, one could - and many do - argue that development cooperation in the main constitutes a form of 'charity' from Northern domestic taxpayers, and that recipients and CSOs should have very limited say over to whom and how development cooperation is provided. However, I do not hold this latter normative position. The reasoning behind the provision of development cooperation is seldom purely altruistic. As is the nature of virtually any political or economic intervention, the allocation of development cooperation creates both winners and losers. Hence, it is the researcher's personal position that affected stakeholders should be able to influence the governance of this resource modality. Suffice to say that our personal feelings 'colour every aspect of the inquiry process' (Morgan, 2014: 148), or as William James (1907/1995: 26) put it 'the trail of the human serpent is thus over everything'.

In redressing this normatively problematic situation, this thesis follows Bohman (2002) in that such situations are approached best through 'multi-perspectival theories'. Such theories not only (attempt to) take into account all the dimensions of a problem, but they also (attempt to) engage with the perspectives of relevant actors. This project's framework is therefore not merely an analytical device that can expedite the research process. Instead, it serves as a viable entry point by which to encourage broad reflection on the democratic quality of the partnership in question. Pragmatism thus offers more than a means to 'side-step' metaphysical debates, or to prioritise expedience to the neglect of normative considerations. Instead, it is possible to use the Pragmatist approach for the realisation of a normative goal. The notion that Pragmatism does not provide a sufficient grounding in axiological considerations is unfounded.

However, there is a danger inherent in the adoption of Pragmatism as a research paradigm. Namely, that it may 'caress the vanity' of those who adopt it based on a self-aggrandising belief that they are 'ingeniously "sorting out" our problematic situations' (Friedrichs and Katochwill, 2009: 726). To claim that one can, even nominally, contribute to redressing the problematic situation at hand through a single research thesis is naïve. Nevertheless, to situate one's inquiry within the Pragmatist paradigm is merely a means in which to engage in what Aristotle referred to as 'Phronetic' social science. Such an inquiry is concerned with 'social betterment' and 'political interventions', rather than the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake (Ralston, 2011: Flyvberg, 2001: 163-164).

In sum, this thesis eschews adherence to a dualistic 'either-or' approach to social science research. It takes an 'as-if' ontological assumption: we act 'as-if' organisations and structures exist (mind-independent reality), and we act 'as-if' individual perceptions matter (mind-dependent reality). Therefore, it is necessary to proceed from an appreciation of both understandings. Moreover, inquiry begins with the consideration of practice in the form of a 'problematic situation': the governance 'crisis' facing the field of global development cooperation. This thesis takes an epistemologically instrumentalist view of knowledge: knowledge is true to the extent that it is useful in providing understanding and orientation, both intellectually and practically. The outcomes of the research will come in the form of provisional 'warranted assertions', yet their provisional character does not undermine their utility. Its primary mode of reasoning is abduction, whereby both theory and data reflexively inform each other. Finally, the rationale for the thesis emerged from a subjective discomfort with the current state of global development cooperation governance. It is thus axiologically welded to a normative desire to both understand and ameliorate democratic deficiencies within this context. This chapter will now detail and substantiate the research design of the thesis.

4.2 Research Design

As will be demonstrated, the utility of Pragmatism is made apparent by its ability to connect 'abstract issues on the epistemological to the methodological' issues of research design (Baker, 2016: 325). This thesis adopts both a single case study approach and a Multiple Methods Research (MMR) approach to data collection. For both these facets, this section provides a justification and rationale for their use. Furthermore, this section also addresses issues regarding the generalisability of the study. The following section on research methods will substantiate the issues raised here.

4.2.1 Case Study Approach

4.2.1.1 Justification and Approach

This thesis examines a single case study: the GPEDC. In short, the justification for this choice was due to the perception of a 'problematic situation'. This problematic situation arises from the fact that the 'old' governance of development cooperation has faced strong criticism based on its legitimacy (see 2.1). Furthermore, the GPEDC has also been subject to critique against its legitimacy credentials, and it has struggled to attain influence within the fragmented field of global development cooperation (see 2.4). Moreover, there are knowledge gaps on how actors perceive the legitimacy of the GPEDC. This thesis, therefore, seeks to explore how the legitimacy of the GPEDC manifests and is challenged, and the implications of these perceptions for the current global development cooperation context. The Pragmatist approach 'can provide a very powerful justification for the use of case studies since case studies... [offer] the possibility of studying a problem defined situation in great detail' (Easton, 2010: 119).

Rather than adopting a large-N case study analysis, this thesis seeks to examine a 'specific instance of a given phenomenon [global MSP processes] as a means of grasping the peculiarities of [the] case' (Tilly, 1984: 82). To add additional cases would potentially undermine the purpose of the thesis. This thesis does not seek to contribute solely to analytical or nomothetic theorising. Following Bauer and Brighi (2009: 12), the pragmatist intent is to produce research that is 'complete' or 'timely', rather than aspiring to naturalistic

standards of deductive 'rigour' and 'atemporal validity'. Furthermore, if we are to consider the two former dimensions as essential elements of social life, then they must also be taken seriously in our research designs (ibid.).

The assumption that multiple cases should be used in case study research reflects an innate positivist bias. The purpose of deductive case study research is to uncover causal 'laws' or generalisable mechanisms. However, this thesis takes its 'premise' or 'departure' from social practice. In this context, Friedrichs and Kratochwil (2009: 716) argue that 'orientation in a relevant field is more important than causal theorising'. They add that the latter is neither the only nor the most crucial purpose of research. To enhance 'cognitive understanding and/or practical manipulability', it is argued that it is 'sufficient to detect patterns of similarity and difference' (ibid). This is necessary given that the thesis seeks to understand the perspectives of highly heterogeneous stakeholders and their relationship to a complex organisational structure.

Consequently, these are objects/sites of empirical study where notions and logics of linear causality may not apply. The intent of case study research in this pragmatist vein is to reveal how factors matter (such as democratic procedures) concerning a specific case. The intent is, therefore 'not to generate an ever-expanding list of all imaginable causal factors that can influence world politics' (Sil and Katzenstein, 2010: 413). In sum, and in line with pragmatist thinking, it is the problematic situation that defines the question and approach, rather than the other way around.

4.2.1.2 Issues of Generalisability and Transferability

The above point is not to suggest that this thesis's case study approach and research is not eventually amenable to causal nor hypothetical theorising (Friedrichs and Kratochwil, 2009: 719). To the contrary, research is facilitated by the '*a priori* development of a theoretical position [the project's framework] to help direct the data collection and analysis process' (Gray, 2014: 267; Eisenhardt, 1989). Furthermore, the tentative hypotheses that guide this research derive from research that assesses democratic legitimacy beyond the

nation-state, and they can serve as lines of inquiry, rather than propositions to be proved. However, one should be cautious about the degree to which the findings of this research are generalisable. Nevertheless, 'case studies... are generalisable to theoretical propositions and not to populations or universes' (Yin, 1989: 21). The goal of case study research can, therefore, be analytical generalisation, rather than statistical generalisation. Rather than providing 'universal generalisations', theory can be applied in order to explain the specific case at hand (Bisman, 2010: 14). In turn, the observed data as a result of researching into the cases can provide 'analytic refinements' to theory reflexively and iteratively.

Nonetheless, it is open to doubt whether any research project can 'either [be] so unique that they have no implications whatsoever for other actors', or inversely, 'so generalised that they apply in every possible historical and cultural setting' (Morgan, 2007: 72). It is perhaps more suitable to speak of the 'transferability', rather than 'generalisability', of this project's research findings (Morgan, 2007; Lincoln and Guba, 1985). The concept of transferability is useful when considering the potential implications that Pragmatist research may have (Baker, 2016: 326). For instance, this research examines the perspectives of a broad range of stakeholders who regularly engage within global development governance. Although the research of this thesis focuses on a single institutional setting, it is possible to 'transfer' the research findings to other similar institutions within the field. Specifically, it may be possible to infer how these stakeholders perceive other OECD or UN development institutions and initiatives. However, it is necessary to not assume that the methods and approach used makes results either entirely idiographic nor fully generalisable. It is instead necessary to 'investigate the factors that affect whether the knowledge we gain can be transferred to other settings' (Morgan, 2007: 72). Ascertaining the 'transferability' of such knowledge is only fully possible following the conclusion of the study. 'Warranted assertions' can be made as to the extent and areas that the research findings are applicable. However, this transferability can only be conducted on a case-to-case, as opposed to a fully generalisable, basis (Tobin and Begley, 2004).

Nonetheless, a researcher cannot be fully aware as to the contexts that researchers may wish to transfer the findings of their study. Therefore, it is necessary that a sufficiently 'thick

description' is provided for the case. Those who wish to transfer findings of one study to their own can then judge the transferability of such information for themselves (Nowell et al., 2017: 3; Lincoln and Guba, 1985). To ensure the potential for transferability, the researcher also needs to provide an analysis of how the new empirical information enhances our previous understandings of both the overarching research question and extant theories (Ihantola and Kihn, 2011: 7; Golden-Bibb and Locke, 1993: 600). In doing so, 'inductively derived insights that may arise in a case can be distinguished from mere-story telling if they can be explained by extant theories' (Bennett, 2002: 45). In lieu of the latter, it is possible to generate novel hypotheses (through abduction) to account for patterns in the observed data.

4.2.2 Multi-Methods Research (MMR) Approach

This thesis uses an MMR approach. The justification for this firstly comes from this thesis's Pragmatist paradigm, of which is unperturbed by the search for 'epistemological purity' (Bauer and Brighi, 2009: 2). Secondly, this approach is justified given that this thesis is a form of case study research. As noted by Gray (2014: 272), case study research 'requires the use of multiple sources of evidence', and therefore multiple methods need to be employed. With regards to the former, an MMR approach is appropriate given that Pragmatism puts the impetus upon the 'primary importance of the question asked' (Creswell and Plano Clark, 2011: 41). To adequately address the overarching inquiry and research questions of this thesis, it is necessary to employ the most appropriate methods at the researcher's disposal in order to develop a holistic view of the phenomenon at hand. This implies that the researcher takes on the guise of a 'bricoleur': one who uses 'whatever tools and materials [that] are at hand to complete a project' (Maxwell, 2011: 29). However, it is necessary to be cognizant of the justification for, implications of, and linkages between each method.

As Denzin (1978: 302) notes, through MMR 'the flaws of one method are often the strengths of the other; and by combining methods, observers can achieve the best of each'. However, the use of MMR is not a license for an 'anything goes' disposition (Barnes, 2008: 1543). Despite the use of MMR becoming rather 'unexceptional and unremarkable' in recent years,

it is nonetheless necessary to be clear about why and how a study should use MMR (Bryman, 2006: 97). According to Bryman (2006), there are over 20 justifications invoked for the use of MMR in research projects. Rather than detailing them in full, there are four justifications which are particularly pertinent to this thesis: triangulation; complementarity; expansion; and development. First, triangulated data can enhance the reliability and validity of research by counteracting the innate weaknesses associated with the use of a single method (McEvoy and Richards, 2006: 72; Denzin, 1989). The thesis uses multiple methods to corroborate between data obtained via different methods (Risjord et al., 2001). MMR can also be used to achieve both 'complementarity' between methods and for the 'expansion' of the research inquiry (Greene et al., 1989: 259). Finally, it is possible to use one method for the 'development' of another. For instance, this thesis uses an exploratory questionnaire to develop a sample for interviews. Likewise, this thesis used document analysis to inform the interview scheme for interview participants. The following sections on the choice and application methods will detail how the use and findings of multiple methods informed one another in these regards.

4.3 Praxis of Research

This thesis uses four methods: an exploratory questionnaire; semi-structured interviews; document analysis, and; participant observation. This section details the justification and purpose for using each method, the approach taken to sampling, how the data was collected, and how data was analysed. The following section will provide some caveats and the most significant limitations of the research.

4.3.1 Exploratory Questionnaire

4.3.1 Justification and Purpose

The purpose of the questionnaire (in line with the 'Development' justification for MMR research) was to attain a sample for semi-structured interviews (Tongco, 2007: 151). One difficulty experienced in the initial stages of this project was in determining a broad sample

of relevant stakeholders that have had sufficient experience with - and judgements on - the case study. The questionnaire (see Appendix 5), therefore, asked respondents whether they were familiar with the case study and similar institutional arrangements such as the UNDCF. It then asked respondents if they would be willing to partake in a subsequent semi-structured interview. It was thus possible to identify respondents who have the most 'information-rich' experiences with the case study and to invite them to an interview.

4.3.1.2 Sampling

Developing an appropriate sample for the questionnaire proved challenging. Given that this questionnaire was hosted and distributed online and via email, it was essential to ensure that the sample was large enough given that response rates for online questionnaires can be 'depressingly low' (Gray, 2014: 352). This thesis adopted a non-probabilistic quota-based sampling frame that was bolstered by a snowball sampling technique. Non-probabilistic sampling approaches were appropriate, given that the total population of relevant development cooperation stakeholders was not known. Furthermore, this thesis is only interested in actors who have had experience with the case study. The intent was, therefore, not to draw a representative sample in order to make generalisations about the full population of professionals engaged in the field of development cooperation. The intent was to compose a sample that 'includes the most important political players who have participated in the events being studied' (Tansey, 2007: 765).

To ensure that key stakeholder groups were represented adequately, a quota-based sampling frame was initially developed (n=850). This frame was comprised of:

- 300 representatives from non-state organisations (circa 50/50 from both the North and South);
- 300 public sector representatives (circa 150 'recipient', 100 'donor' and 50 'donor and recipient');
- 150 private sector representatives (circa 50/50 North and South);
- 50 representatives of key international organisations;

- 50 stakeholders hailing from both academia and key think tank organisations.

In developing the sample, there was an immediate difficulty experienced in that the GPEDC does not have full participation lists of major High-Level Meetings available online, nor would they have been available on request. In Pragmatist fashion, it was necessary to employ a degree of 'bricolage' to attain the names of participants. This was achieved by examining: the proceedings of the high-level meetings and identifying participants; examining participant lists for symposia of the partnership; lists detailing steering committee members; members of voluntary initiatives for the GPEDC; DAC member lists; and references to actors in various sources of grey literature. The process was slow. However, it was possible to comprise a quota-based sample of 850 representatives. However, a degree of 'convenience sampling' was at work. Only those actors who had their emails available online in the public domain received an invite to participate.

4.3.1.3 Conduct and Administration

Sample members were asked to participate in the questionnaire via email. Given the large number of participants, MailMerge software (Thunderbird) was used to personalise and administer the emails, thus bypassing the respondent's junk folder. To enhance the response rate, a dedicated website (www.devcoopsurvey.com) and email domain (info@devcoopsurvey.com) were created. The website both directed participants to the questionnaire, while it also provided respondents with detailed information on the project. Bristol Online Surveys (BOS) hosted the questionnaire, and the questionnaire was integrated into the website HTML code. Furthermore, respondents were asked to read a consent statement before participating, and their confidentiality was assured (see Appendix 5 and 6).

Given the global scope, the questionnaire was made available in three languages (English, French, and Spanish). The questionnaire was written as clearly and concisely as possible. However, the use of some technical language was unavoidable. Consequently, it was

necessary to request the services of a professional language translation company to ensure accurate translation. Translation bolstered the response rate by ensuring that stakeholders who were not proficient in English were also able to participate. Following initial contact via email, two reminders to complete the questionnaire were sent at two-week intervals. These emails reiterated the importance of participation, while it also enabled the researcher to specifically target stakeholder groups who had low rates of participation.

4.3.1.4 Analysis of Questionnaire Data

The response rate to the questionnaire was a somewhat reasonable 12.7% (n=108). Although the questionnaire asked several questions that were amenable to statistical analysis in SPSS, such as asking respondents to evaluate aspects of the case on a 1-5 Likert scale, this thesis does not draw upon this data. As the thesis matured, it became clear that this is not a study that attempts to 'measure' legitimacy. It is instead concerned with understanding how different stakeholders perceive and evaluate the case. As a result, it was felt that statistical methods and analysis were not appropriate for the ultimate aim of this thesis, and their inclusion would have convoluted the overall analysis and presentation of findings. Questionnaire analysis was straightforward and is dealt with in further depth in section (4.3.2.2).

4.3.2 Semi-Structured Interviews

4.3.2.1 Justification and Purpose

The purpose of conducting semi-structured interviews followed the 'ubiquitous' intent to attain in-depth understandings and perspectives on the research questions and the case study (Cassell, 2009). Semi-structured interviews are useful, given that the research questions of this thesis 'centre on understanding experiences, opinions, attitudes, and processes' (Rowley, 2012: 262). As Tansey (2007: 767) notes, often there is 'no substitute for talking directly with those involved and gaining insights from key participants'. Given that

this thesis is concerned with stakeholder perspectives, semi-structured interviews provide the bulk of data obtained for this thesis.

4.3.2.2 Sampling

As mentioned, the initial sample for the semi-structured interviews was attained by asking participants in the questionnaire if they would be willing to take part in a subsequent interview (Tongco, 2007: 151). Informants who would both be representative of their broader stakeholder categories and the views of 'outliers' - those who were not necessarily representative of the general sample - were sought (Goering and Streiner, 1996) These 'outliers', or 'deviant cases', shed light on instances where representatives hold 'extreme' views on the legitimacy of the partnership. Furthermore, a degree of snowballing was at work in order to gain access to representatives of stakeholder groups who did not signify their willingness to participate in an interview in the questionnaire. In total, fifty interviews were initially conducted with key representatives (see Appendix 1). This included key representatives of:

- 8 DAC Donor Countries
- 10 Recipient Country Representatives (including representatives of coordinating networks)
- 6 SSC Provider Countries
- 8 CSOs (including representatives of coordinating networks)
- 5 Private Sector Organisations (including representatives from business associations)
- 6 Think-Tanks.
- 5 members of the GPEDC Secretariat (OECD and UNDP)
- 2 members of UN-based organisations.

Every effort was made to ensure that the interview sample included key representatives (prominent actors that have had a prolonged and notable engagement in the GPEDC), in ensuring regional coverage (e.g. Sub-Saharan, East, West Africa and Asia for recipients)

and variation within stakeholder groups (e.g. LICs, LMICs and UMICs for recipients). As will be developed in the section on participant observation, this initial figure of 50 formal interviews grew as 'interviews' became a daily occurrence with colleagues at the OECD and UNDP.

4.2.2.3 Conduct of the Interviews

Interviews took place through Skype. Although some interviews were conducted in-person in London and Paris, to solely rely upon in-person interviews would severely limit the scope and validity of this research. The high degree of dependence upon Skype as an interviewing technique is a salient aspect of this project's Pragmatist approach to research. Given the global scope, geographic distance could have proven to be 'a variable that prevents an international representation of participants' (Fleitas, 1998: 286). However, the reliance upon Skype as a data collection technique eliminated this barrier and thus provided 'an opportunity to talk to otherwise inaccessible participants' (Deakin and Wakefield, 2013: 5). In addition to eliminating the need to 'visit an agreed location for interview' (Rowley, 2012: 264), Skype proved useful for access given that 'many participants live busy lives' (Cater, 2011: 2). Thus, for high profile actors, Skype ensured that the interview process was flexible and open to the schedule of the participants themselves. As Lacono, Symonds and Brown (2016) argue the use of Skype can not only make the research more 'democratic', but also dramatically reduces the resources required to conduct interviews.

Skype interviews could be criticised in that they cannot provide the same experience as an in-person interview; it is not possible to pick up on nonverbal cues to the same extent. However, following Petralia (2011: 116): 'if the choice is to use a slightly imperfect set of technologies to facilitate working together or not to work at all, then I choose the former'. Furthermore, when one weighs up the environmental impact of air travel against the need to pick up on subtle non-verbal cues as part of an interview, the relative viability of Skype as an interviewing approach becomes apparent.

On average, interviews lasted approximately 60 minutes, and the length of interviews was dependent upon the level of information respondents wished to share and their time availability. The interview used the same 'interview scheme' for all participants (see Appendix 2). The interview was comprised of three parts. The first featured questions on the respondent's organisation and their role within it, and the level of engagement that their organisation has had with the case. The second asked respondents to provide their organisation's perspective on the case. For instance, the interview asked respondents how they assess the GPEDC's level of inclusivity, the appropriateness of its accountability mechanisms, and how they perceive and evaluate its effectiveness. The third then enabled respondents to raise questions with regards to the study, offer additional comments on the case, and note any additional information or lines of inquiry that they felt relevant. In following a broadly similar interview scheme for all interviews, it was then possible to obtain comparable data, although probing was used within particular interviews to gain additional insight on issues.

Before the interview, respondents were asked if they consented to have the interview recorded, and all of those interviewed consented. For in-person interviews, a dictaphone was used. For Skype interviews, the in-built software was used to record the audio of the interview, and this meant that respondents also received a recorded version of the interview. As per the data protection guidelines of Skype, this recording was available to both parties of the call before being deleted after 30 days.

Additionally, before the interview respondents received a consent form via email that contained information on the thesis and how their data was to be used (see Appendix 3 and 5). While the majority of those interviewed returned the consent form, some respondents chose to provide verbal consent during the Skype call before the interview took place. Respondents were initially asked as to whether they would like to be anonymous and identifiable only by stakeholder type (e.g. DAC donor, SSC Provider, CSO representative), be identifiable only as a representative of their organisation (e.g. DfID, USAID), or to be identifiable by their name. However, although many of those interviewed expressed a willingness to be identifiable by their name, a *post hoc* decision was made to only refer to

stakeholders by reference to their stakeholder category with some minor identifying information (see section 4.3.4.4).

4.2.2.3 Analysis of Interview Data

The interviews were transcribed verbatim, after which the recording was deleted. While transcription proved to be a slow, onerous, and quite frankly frustrating task, it nonetheless provided an added degree of rigour and prevented the omission of potentially relevant information. Moreover, the verbatim transcripts were coded using NVivo software. Given the high number of interviews conducted (n=50), it was necessary to analyse in-depth responses by 'breaking down' the data through 'grouping responses to questions and emerging themes' (Feilzer, 2010: 10). This approach took the form of a degree of 'quasi-quantification' of data by examining the degree (frequency) to which responses converged around common themes (McEvoy and Richards, 2006: 69). Specifically, this thesis employed 'thematic analysis' to aggregate responses and detect patterns within the data (Nowell et al., 2017). Thematic analysis was appropriate given that the intent behind conducting interviews was to examine 'the perspectives of different research participants, highlight similarities and differences, and generate unanticipated insights' (Nowell et al., 2017: 2; Braun and Clarke, 2006).

The use of thematic analysis ensured that a structured approach was taken to the use and management of interview data. Both a pre-coding scheme derived from this thesis's conceptual framework was used while emerging themes that arose from the data also became further categories for analysis (Fereday and Muir-Cochrane, 2006). The benefit of this approach was that it ensured the data was manageable through the use of an *a priori* framework, while themes could also be inductively derived (Braun and Clarke, 2006). For instance, interviewee responses on the inclusivity of the GPEDC were grouped according to their stakeholder type (e.g. DAC donor, recipient), and responses were coded by examining whether stakeholders held a positive, ambivalent, or negative perspective on a particular aspect of the case, and their reasoning. Furthermore, additional codes were iteratively

added to the initial coding scheme, such as stakeholder perspectives on particular aspects of the GPEDC's inclusivity.

4.3.3 Document Analysis

4.3.3.1 Justification and Purpose

As a source of supplementary data, this thesis draws from the analysis of institutional documents in the form of 'grey literature'. The use of documents is justified given that they contain 'rich descriptions' about the case study at hand (Bowen, 2009: 29). The purpose of document analysis was to provide context to the issues raised by the thesis. Document analysis also ensured that the researcher had sufficient technical knowledge. As Merriam (1988: 118) notes, documents can 'help the researcher uncover meaning, develop understanding, and discover insights relevant to the research problem'. Furthermore, document analysis was used to corroborate some of the findings of the semi-structured interviews. In general, organisational documents proved useful in understanding the evolution of the case study. In particular, it assisted in appreciating the evolution of the monitoring mechanisms of the partnership.

4.3.3.2 Sampling

The identification of relevant grey and organisational literature can be said to be 'limited only by one's imagination and industriousness' (ibid.). Fortunately, the GPEDC website (www.effectivedevelopment.org) contains an archive of a substantial amount of information about its evolution and functioning. The documents explored include: participant lists of events; administrative records; consultant technical reports; monitoring reports; outreach plans; draft documents; and, crucially, minutes of Steering Committee meetings and background documents (Gray, 2014: 518; Baake, 2007). The extent of data required that the researcher employed a degree of 'biased selectivity' towards identifying grey literature (Bowen, 2009: 32). In other words, only documents that pertained to this thesis's framework were examined. This approach was necessary due to the high number of documents

available, and that only a proportion was relevant to the inquiries of this thesis. Furthermore, and as will be explored in further depth in the section under participant observation, as a working member of the Steering Committee I had full access to all internal OECD documents on the GPEDC.

4.3.3.3 Conduct and Analysis

Documents were initially 'skimmed' in order to yield potentially relevant data in the form of quotations, passages, and contextual information (Labuschagne, 2003). As mentioned, data that corresponded to inquiries and conceptual framework of this thesis was primarily sought. However, 'pertinent observations' and data within documents that provided information on context was also noted and collected. This approach does introduce a degree of subjectivity on the part of the researcher: however, it is difficult to avoid given the considerable amount of documents available. Furthermore, given that document analysis formed only a supplementary role to the other research methods, such an approach is warranted. The documents identified were inserted into the NVivo database to provide supplementary information on the issues raised and codes developed from the semi-structured interviews.

4.3.4 Participant Observation

4.3.4.1 Justification and Purpose

The final research method used to inform this thesis was participant observation. As serendipity often goes, it was nearing the completion of conducting and transcribing interviews when the opportunity arose to work for the Secretariat in preparations for the 2019 Senior Level Meeting held in the margins of the UN HLPF on Sustainable Development, July 2019. This opportunity arose following an interview with the OECD head of the secretariat, and they therefore had full awareness as to the nature, scope, and inquiries of the thesis.

Although it was not initially envisioned to be a component of this thesis's research, the opportunity to conduct participant observation as a member of the secretariat provided 'the nearest possible vantage point to study [the] given problem' (Schatz, 2009b: 307). Consequently, a pragmatic decision was taken to jump at the opportunity and to immerse myself fully within the secretariat of the GPEDC.

As noted by Stepputat and Larsen (2015: 16), a core concern constituting Bourdieu's (1991) approach to understanding 'the field' is concerned with 'what legitimate principles, or rules of the game, define the social world of the field and the participation and exchanges herein'. The participant observation conducted for this thesis was done so to uncover what these 'rules of the game' were, how power relations played out in practice, and how legitimacy perspectives had an impact upon the 'real-time' functioning of the GPEDC. Moreover, I had a strong inkling that some of the data that I had attained from interviews constituted a partial picture: that is to say, that some respondents were - as requested - presenting their organisation's official perspective on the case. However, this is not a significant issue for the validity of this thesis's findings, as it is arguably official positions that overtly affect stakeholder justification for engaging with international fora. Nevertheless, engaging in the secretariat yielded an unprecedented degree of access, not only to working groups, meetings, documents, but also to the more off-record comments that capture the nature of individual and stakeholder engagement with a complex bureaucratic structure.

The purpose behind participant observation was not, therefore, to conduct an ethnography of the secretariat of the GPEDC. This thesis is concerned with stakeholder perspectives. It is not necessarily concerned with the relations of power, knowledge production, and bureaucratic hierarchies within the OECD side of the secretariat. As noted by Kuus (2013), too often the word 'ethnography' is used to describe participant observation and foreign policy fieldwork. Moreover, Kuus argues that a suitable degree of scepticism is warranted over the extent to which ethnographic fieldwork provides more nuanced data than the use of interviews alone. Nevertheless, the purpose behind conducting participant observation was simply to use my position as a member of the secretariat to gain greater access to documents, information, and meetings that I would not otherwise have had access to.

4.3.4.2 Sites of Observation

It must be understood that the GPEDC is not an organisation or institution in the conventional 'sign-on-the-door' sense. As mentioned, the GPEDC is comprised of numerous components and is best conceptualised as a policy-network or assemblage that has no bounded site as meetings take place across the world. The Secretariat - or Joint Support Team (JST) - of the GPEDC is based both across the OECD-Development Cooperation Division in Paris and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in New York. For the most part, participant observation took place in the OECD's offices in Boulogne Billancourt, Paris.

Nevertheless, as an organisation that is not territorially bound to a single location, the working groups and meetings that make up the day-to-day running of the GPEDC take place via video conferencing. Much of the multi-stakeholder work that does go on within the GPEDC takes place virtually through various working groups, stakeholder-specific meetings such as the Business Leaders Caucus (BLC), and Co-Chair calls. As a member of the secretariat, this offered unprecedented access to sit in, contribute, and prepare for these virtual meetings.

In addition to the observations made in the secretariat offices - both in secretariat meetings and virtual meetings with stakeholders - working within the Secretariat provided numerous opportunities to participate in related fora, meetings and events. For instance, it was possible to attend numerous DAC meetings held in the La Murette site of the OECD, primarily as a 'fly on the wall' listening in to DAC delegate deliberations over GPEDC developments and preparations for the SLM. Furthermore, and perhaps most significantly, it was possible to attend the SLM held in the UN Headquarters in New York, and also to attend stakeholder-specific caucusing meetings. Admittedly, as any of those who have worked on preparing a major intergovernmental forum can attest to, these frantic days were something of a whirlwind due to a combination of jet-lag, stress, and cathartic release following the successful conclusion of the meeting. However, access was not unlimited.

There were many instances and senior management meetings that - due to being in a junior traineeship position - I was not able to observe or attend. Nonetheless, attendance at these events provided a unique window into how the GPEDC functioned, both at the micro-level of small meetings, and at a major political event in the UN.

4.3.4.3 On the conduct of participant observation

In engaging in participant observation, research was conducted with 'eyes open' (Asselin, 2003) and following the sage advice of Shrunyu Suzuki (1970) of *Shoshin*: 'in the beginner's mind there are many possibilities, [but] in the expert[s] mind there are few'. In other words, the researcher should enter the site of observation with as few expectations as possible to remain open to unanticipated observations. However, it would be disingenuous to suggest that the observations were not framed through the lens of this thesis's framework, initial findings, and research questions. An utmost concern was with following leads gleaned through interviews to determine the challenges and difficulties in securing the engagement of various stakeholders, and how pre-existing relationships of power manifest themselves in the day-to-day prosaic encounters that are mediated by the secretariat of the GPEDC. To ensure congruence with the data obtained from other methods, situations where there were critiques expressed over inclusivity, accountability, and different understandings of organisational effectiveness were of particular concern.

To speak specifically on what the role entailed, and the types of observations that were made, my role involved three components: providing logistic and substantive support to SLM preparations; facilitating and augmenting the JST support on the development of the GPEDC's Principles for Private Sector Engagement, and; generic secretariat duties, where I was primarily responsible for communications. Here I will provide some brief illustrative examples and reflections on what the work and observations involved.

In supporting preparations for the SLM it was possible to make several pertinent observations. To take one example, I was responsible for assisting with invitations to different key stakeholders and overseeing the rates of responses from different groups.

Here, I could observe which stakeholders were particularly enthusiastic about attending the event, the level of delegation they were sending (i.e. government ministers vs. desk officers), and which stakeholder groupings required additional pressure in order to secure attendance. Interestingly, I found that the difficulties encountered in securing particular stakeholder responses to SLM invitations were similar to those I encountered with the project's questionnaire and interviews. This went a considerable distance in relieving my concern that it was the nature of the thesis that inhibited some stakeholders from wanting to participate in my research: it was rather due to their overall perspective and lack of political importance that they ascribe to the GPEDC itself.

In my second capacity, it was possible to become fully engrossed in the difficulties and controversies surrounding private sector engagement and participation in the GPEDC. Through supporting the private sector working group, I was able to observe the considerable challenges that are involved in communicating development effectiveness jargon to private sector audiences. Moreover, it was possible to observe first hand how different understandings, ways of working, and tensions came to a head between CSOs, the private sector, and other actors in a day-to-day setting. In particular, I was responsible for aggregating different stakeholder's feedback on various concept notes pertaining to the private sector working group. Furthermore, it was the JST's responsibility to incorporate these feedback suggestions, which proved a careful balancing act to ensure that all perspectives were fairly addressed. In this regard, it was possible to observe patterns in the types of responses and recommendations that different stakeholder groups made on both substantive and procedural issues concerning the partnership and private sector work.

Thirdly, providing generic secretariat support provided a panoramic view of how the GPEDC not only communicated with its composite stakeholders, but also how it positions itself within - and seeks to influence - the broader global development architecture. In this capacity, I was responsible for supporting and implementing the OECD's communication and outreach strategy for the GPEDC. Of particular relevance to this thesis, was my role in developing tailored communication to different stakeholder groups. Given the diversity of actors involved in the partnership, it was necessary to develop stakeholder-specific messaging in order to

both publicise the GPEDC and to ensure ongoing support and engagement. Here, I drew upon my own research-derived insights on stakeholder preferences, and I was also informed of additional sensitivities and messaging that was persuasive to different actors. In particular, I became acutely aware as to what was - and what was most certainly not - politically palatable for different stakeholder groups.

Furthermore, part of my role involved feeding inputs from the OECD side of the GPEDC into broader global fora and institutional processes. For instance, some of these processes were DAC related, such as the Latin American and the Caribbean (LAC)-DAC dialogue, while some were UN process, such as the 2019 United Nations Conference on South-South Cooperation (BAPA+40). Here, we had to meticulously scour through related documentation associated with different events and processes, and identify areas in which a reference to the GPEDC or development effectiveness could be inserted in outcome documents. These efforts revealed how the GPEDC sought to position itself as both a partnership and an agenda within a broader configuration of actors and global institutions. More than anything else, these exercises provided a deep insight into the political sensitivities surrounding the GPEDC as a governance arrangement, and the areas in which it could perhaps make a useful contribution.

As is perhaps commonly the case for those employing this method of research, research observations were jotted down in several 'field' notebooks (Bailey, 2007: 80). Initially, a coding scheme was developed that enabled for note-taking systematisation, such as keeping a record of the date, type of encounter (for instance a stakeholder meeting, a secretariat management meeting, or a chat over coffee), and how these observations related to the overall heuristic framework developed for this thesis. Furthermore, I made note of observations that raised additional questions or inquiries, and sought to answer and develop these reflections over time.

Written observations were primarily comprised of reflections on how a conversation, an email, or a comment on a draft corroborated or challenged a previous finding. However, as a secretariat member, this role provided access to the entire backlog of internal OECD

documents on the GPEDC. Upon taking up this, it was necessary to sign a non-disclosure agreement, and that this thesis, therefore, includes no direct quotation or reference to any of these documents. However, lunches and spare moments were used to review these documents. Although it is not possible to refer to these documents directly, it was still possible to make notes on how these documents informed, corroborated, or challenged pre-existing findings on the tensions and evolution of the partnership.

As being part of a team that was responsible for shepherding the GPEDC, there was ample opportunity to regularly pose questions to colleagues on topics that pertained to the thesis. These conversations were not 'interviews' *per se*, as these questions quite often arose naturally within broader conversations on secretariat-related tasks. While consent is a little bit tricky in this regard, I simply asked whether it would be okay to include a snippet of information in the thesis. Nevertheless, the head of the secretariat was clear and direct as to what types of potentially sensitive information should not be included in the research write-up. There were regular conversations both on the progress of the research, and any issues surrounding confidentiality were negotiated and addressed as needed.

Transitioning from being a distant researcher into the position of a secretariat member was challenging. As was made clear to the team upon arrival, I was present both in the capacity of a researcher and also as a professional, fully-contributing secretariat member. However, operating as a reflective researcher is an entirely different enterprise to functioning as a reactive secretariat member, and it took some time to adjust to the different demands of this role. It was necessary to shift from being the researcher that coveted participation lists, email addresses, and internal documents, to being an individual responsible for managing such information. Additionally, I was no longer the mere analyst of talking points, but the author of them.

Nevertheless, following a brief adjustment period, occupying both positions became not a problem to be resolved, but rather a balancing act to be managed daily (Kuus, 2013: 127). As mentioned, it was during my lunch hours and following work that I would devote specific time to reflect on research implications, thus freeing myself up to become completely

engrossed in secretariat related tasks and duties during working hours. Moreover, other members of the secretariat had completed PhD research and were aware of the demands that it required, and there was therefore significant lee-way afforded in this regard.

On the whole, the experience has instilled a deep appreciation, empathy and understanding of the sheer difficulty and hard-graft that is involved in facilitating global multi-stakeholder governance. The experience has revealed that beyond the policy-reports, analytical presuppositions, and realpolitik that is associated with development cooperation, comprising 'closed' and 'faceless' bureaucracies are individuals that have devoted their lives to improving the wellbeing of others. While the road to hell may very well be paved with good intentions, the information presented in this thesis is tempered by this understanding. The analysis presented in this thesis is therefore not critical for the sake of being critical, but instead to contribute to better understanding and prospects for more democratic and inclusive ways of working between diverse actors.

4.3.4.4 Analysis of findings

Through participant observation, a wealth of both empirical data and professional experience was obtained that went well beyond initial expectations. In the first instance, I transcribed all of my written research observations into a single word file, and then added this to the NVivo database that I used for both document analysis and interviews. In a similar vein to the other research methods, research observations were used to elaborate upon, corroborate and challenge, and qualify findings on stakeholder perspectives.

While I often refer to specific observations that I made during my experience of having worked for the secretariat, the research gathered through participant observation primarily serve to frame, challenge, and corroborate previous findings attained through interviews and document analysis. As mentioned, I gained a great deal of tacit knowledge as to how stakeholders perceive and evaluate the GPEDC, and where the normative tensions lie between actors in practice. As mentioned, in assisting in the SLM preparations, it was possible to see where there was greater enthusiasm to participate in particular auspices of

the GPEDC, or which actors were dragging their feet or required additional ‘arm twisting’. Moreover, it was possible to observe during meetings how different stakeholders attempted to obstruct, modify, or criticise particular elements of the GPEDC’s processes, and the justifications offered by them for doing so.

Consequently, although there may not always be explicit reference to these research observations, these observations informed decisions over which perspectives or points to emphasise in the write-up. Furthermore, although there was a great deal of information that cannot - for non-disclosure reasons - be referred to explicitly within this thesis, this confidential information nonetheless also informed the findings and analysis. While this approach may not necessarily satisfy the demands of fully transparent and replicable research, it nonetheless constitutes an appropriate concession to the conflicting demands of adhering to OECD confidentiality.

While adhering to OECD confidentiality is a formal requirement⁵, I also wish to emphasise here the reason as to why I decided to withhold information, particularly in terms of identifying information of certain participants. Although I had attained, in the vast majority of cases, consent from respondents to refer to them in either name or organisation, I do not feel that this would greatly add to the overall ambition of the thesis. Through working for the GPEDC, I was made acutely aware as to the difficulty that was involved in fostering sustained and constructive engagement between actors. I do not wish that this thesis or its resulting outputs contribute to any further difficulty in this regard. At times, some respondents raise criticism of other stakeholders, and revealing the identity of these participants has the potential to produce antagonism between organisations and groups. The lack of identifying information in this regard may hamper the nuance of the information that is referred to in this thesis’s findings. However, I maintain an axiological interest in this partnership working legitimately and effectively, and I do not wish to undermine professional reputations or working relationships.

⁵ Furthermore, this thesis was subject to an ethics audit by Durham University’s School of Government and International Affairs (SGIA).

4.4. Conclusion: Limitations, Caveats and on the Presentation of Findings

This thesis adopts a Pragmatist approach as its research paradigm. It utilises a case study design that involves the use of multiple methods. The semi-structured interviews form the primary sources of data, and participant observations and document analysis supplement this data. There are several limitations of this thesis. Firstly, this thesis explores the perspectives of the following stakeholders: donors; recipient countries; representatives from countries that both receive and provide development cooperation; CSOs, and PSAs. Several additional stakeholder categories are constituent members of the GPEDC, such as Trade Unions, MDBs, Local Governments, and Parliaments. However, this thesis does not address these perspectives. To add additional stakeholders would potentially serve to make this thesis unduly convoluted, while ultimately serving to hinder the exploration of stakeholder perspectives in-depth and the exploration of tensions between actors.

Furthermore, although there were substantial attempts to ensure that the stakeholders interviewed were representative of their broader stakeholder-category, it is difficult to determine if this is wholly the case. For instance, there are 86 recipient countries that participate in the GPEDC alone, and this thesis has only interviewed 10 recipient country representatives. However, this limitation was circumscribed through interviewing and engaging with representatives who have: had a prolonged engagement with the GPEDC; occupied a representative position within the GPEDC's Steering Committee, and; also by engaging with regional representatives or coordinating networks in the case of non-state actors. Furthermore, participant observation and document analysis served to 'fill in the gaps' and corroborate the more generalised perspectives presented in this thesis.

An additional point worth mentioning is that this thesis initially intended to comparatively assess the legitimacy of both the GPEDC and the UNDCF. Consequently, the questionnaire, interview scheme, and information provided to participants (see Appendix documents) include questions that also pertain to the UNDCF. The reason for abandoning this additional case study was due to the lack of comparable stakeholder perspectives on both forums. Quite often, respondents would have had experience with one of the forums, but not the

other. As a result, it was not possible to examine stakeholder's comparable assessments of these institutions. Furthermore, in the absence of a concomitant six-month stint working for the UNDCF, the information attained by this thesis would have been unduly lop-sided in favour of the GPEDC. Although this thesis took the pragmatic decision to focus upon stakeholder assessments of the GPEDC, this thesis remains comparative in that it focuses on inter-stakeholder perspectives rather than inter-institutional perspectives.

We now turn to the presentation of findings. For each indicator, a brief introduction presents findings on how GPEDC has sought to embody and operationalise the respective principle. Following this introduction, the main findings for each stakeholder group are presented and analysed. As this thesis places a premium upon accurately representing stakeholder views, it attempts to - where possible - provide stakeholder quotes directly. Links to relevant studies, additional documents, and reflections attained from participant observation are suffused throughout. Following the presentation of findings, Chapter 8 will aggregate this analysis and link these findings back to existing theory and the research questions of this thesis.

5. Input Legitimacy: Perspectives on Participation

Given the critiques levied against the DAC's Northern-donor composition (Section 2.3), enhancing the democratic inclusiveness of global development cooperation governance was a central concern during the 'aid-effectiveness' reform era. By aspiring towards a more plural and inclusive frame of governance, it was also hoped that the GPEDC would go beyond the North-South power asymmetry that has long characterised the field's governance. In doing so, the GPEDC was to constitute a more horizontal - that is to say equal - governance arrangement. These ambitions thus speak to the input-based quality of the GPEDC's legitimacy. Short of recapitulating the points raised in this thesis' framework chapter (Section 3.3.1), input legitimacy refers to the democratic inclusivity or participatory quality of a governance arrangement. This chapter examines the input legitimacy of the GPEDC with reference to stakeholder perspectives on inclusivity, representativeness, and the equality that exists between stakeholders.

5.1. Inclusivity

As noted at the GPEDC's first Steering Committee, 'regarding the working arrangements of the Steering Committee, inclusiveness was emphasised as a key element of the Global Partnership' (GPEDC, 2012: 10). Furthermore, members noted that 'inclusiveness was about much more than Committee membership [alone]', and it is a governance principle that is purported to permeate throughout all auspices of the GPEDC. The GPEDC's inclusiveness is argued to distinguish the GPEDC as a governance arrangement within the field, in that the 'GPEDC is broader than, and more inclusive of, other development actors, which distinguishes it from the OECD or G20' (GPEDC, 2015a: 6). The GPEDC's commitment and approach to inclusivity was again affirmed in its 2016 renewed mandate whereby the constituencies of the GPEDC's Steering Committee were outlined:

The Global Partnership brings together, on an equal footing, key stakeholders of the development cooperation agenda from developing countries (countries receiving development cooperation, as well countries of dual character that both receive and provide development cooperation); developed countries (countries providing development

cooperation); multilateral and bilateral institutions; civil society; parliaments; local governments and regional organisations; trade unions; private corporations; and philanthropic institutions... The partners are united by their shared commitment to [an] inclusive partnership founded on common principles and goals and building on the comparative advantage of each. (GPEDC, 2016e: 1)

The GPEDC thus aspires to be inclusive of a considerable range of actors. This includes not only Southern states that had hitherto not been included formally within global development governance, but also non-state actors. However, despite the reiterated commitment to inclusiveness as a governance principle in official documentation, the findings of this project reveal that there is divergence over how stakeholders perceive the GPEDC's inclusivity. This section outlines the dominant perceptions of each stakeholder category in turn.

5.1.1 Providers of Development Cooperation

Overall, traditional providers of development cooperation hold mixed perspectives on the GPEDC's inclusiveness. In terms of their own inclusion within the process, some representatives positively assert that DAC donors have been 'participating actively' and there has not been 'any difference over the past years in terms of participation alone' (DAC Member State Official, Interview 37). Donors overwhelmingly maintain no qualms over the *de jure* conditions that ensure their inclusion within the GPEDC. However, respondents were keen to note that, despite formal inclusion, there has been a waning of donor engagement and interest in the partnership. For instance, as one DAC Member State Official noted: 'the level of inclusivity within the GPEDC is appropriate, but it has room for improvement. Even among donor countries within the OECD DAC, the level of interest in [engaging] the GPEDC varies greatly' (Interview 49). Consequently, in terms of traditional provider perspectives, respondents differentiate between the rules and procedures that ensure their own inclusion, and the interest of those stakeholders themselves to be included in such processes.

With regards to the inclusion of other stakeholders, many traditional providers maintain that the inclusiveness of the GPEDC in terms of its attempt to include non-state actors as one of its core 'added-values'. Take for instance the following view by a former DAC Steering Committee representative:

Going all the way back to Paris, through Accra, and then Busan... our aspirations for the global partnership was that we were kind of democratising the aid effectiveness discussion.... Busan basically created a much bigger tent under which all stakeholders involved in development, private sector, NGOs, governments, you know, could coordinate together, instead of having it just be a government-government arrangement, which is pretty much where Paris was. (Interview 22)

Here, the GPEDC is commended in that it 'broadened the tent' to include other non-state actors who hitherto were not engaged in the governance of the 'aid effectiveness' agenda. Furthermore, another DAC representative noted that 'the "value-added" of the GPEDC lies in its unique structure and composition of various partnerships. So far the GPEDC is the only organisation that allows civil society equal status in the steering committee' (Interview 49). Similarly, for one European DAC representative, the 'broadening of the tent' of the 'aid effectiveness' agenda alongside the paradigmatic shift to development effectiveness is central to the entire reform project:

The idea was to have a really inclusive partnership with all stakeholders and [to have] 'development effectiveness'.... moving to looking at not only aid effectiveness but development effectiveness, looking at all kind of flows in development cooperation, and therefore having a process that is inclusive, and not only a DAC-driven process. I think this was one of the [core aims of] the project. Development effectiveness, and having all the other stakeholders. (Interview 36)

Switzerland - the new co-chair representing traditional providers - stated at a DAC meeting in the run-up to the SLM that the broad participation of non-state actors is what will 'really give justice to the multi-stakeholder nature of the GPEDC', and that 'if we start closing the club again it will never work' (Personal Observation, DAC Meeting, Paris, 29 March 2019). Furthermore, Canada at the same DAC meeting stated that the 'robust engagement of civil society and the private sector will be a critical success factor at the SLM' (ibid.). There is, therefore, evidence to suggest that the inclusiveness of the GPEDC, insofar as it is capable of garnering the engagement of non-state actors, holds considerable weight in generating positive traditional provider perspectives on this indicator.

The traditional providers interviewed expressed few concerns over the degree to which so-called partner [recipient] countries are included within the GPEDC. To the contrary, one DAC

representative notes that one of the main achievements of the GPEDC is the degree to which recipients are engaged in the GPEDC's monitoring process:

The Global Partnership in the international arena is still a fairly young institution. Well, it's not even an institution, or an institution yet, it's a platform and I think for for being a platform it has achieved quite a lot. It has maintained a certain level of momentum on the effectiveness debate and it [has] manage[d] to mobilise - this year for the third time - 86 partner countries, over 100 multilateral institutions for a regular monitoring process on the progress on the implementation of the Busan aid effectiveness principles. I think those those are achievements no doubt. (Interview 37)

While donors may be supportive of the GPEDC's ambition to 'broaden the tent' and include non-state actors and recipient countries, this does not suggest that they unanimously hold positive assessments of the GPEDC's degree of inclusivity. Here, two issues are paramount: the lacklustre engagement of the BRICS and PSAs.

Regarding the former, many traditional donors maintain that the lack of participation of key SSC providers considerably undermines the GPEDC's inclusivity credentials. Take for instance the following view:

It's not truly inclusive because it doesn't have the SSC providers. They are not around the table... The hope was that they would be around the table, but that did not materialise. So it is not as inclusive as it wanted to be, or was expected to be. And this remains one of the major weaknesses... I mean Mexico is involved, and the Arabic donors are involved in the Global Partnership. They are the one's that represent SSC, but of course, the absence of China, India, and Brazil is a major limitation of the Global Partnership. (Interview 36)

Similarly, when recounting the governance challenges encountered by the GPEDC, one donor responded that 'the biggest challenge remains the lack of involvement of the dual character countries. We have only a few countries of that category that are really committed to the global partnership' (Interview 37). They went on to state that 'I would not say it undermines [its] legitimacy, but it puts questions on the legitimacy of the Global Partnership [from] a certain perspective' (ibid.). Consequently, despite the engagement of some providers of SSC such as Mexico in the GPEDC, such is not sufficient insofar as satisfying donor demands for adequate inclusion. Rather, there exists the dominant perception that

key Southern powers such as Brazil, India, and China ought to be engaged in order to constitute an appropriate level of inclusivity.

Similar concerns over the GPEDC's inclusivity are expressed by donors when it comes to the level of inclusion of PSAs. As with their own level of inclusion, it is not the formal rules that ensure inclusion which are the issue. Rather, it is the interest and willingness on behalf of PSAs to participate. Providers argue that the GPEDC and the development effectiveness agenda has not proven sufficiently attractive enough to garner the active and broad engagement of the private sector. When asked on the degree to which they were satisfied with the degree of private sector inclusion, one representative provided the following response:

The whole development effectiveness debate... is something which is pretty far away from [the] private sector mainstream. I think even for people that work full time on Corporate Social Responsibility issues it's an issue that is not really familiar. In some talks we first have to explain what the issues that we are dealing with, and what the reasoning is behind them. So it's not something that is self-explanatory for many private sector people. (ibid.)

Inferred in this response is the notion that the GPEDC has yet to fully garner widespread substantive appeal amongst PSAs, hence the perceived lack of private sector inclusion with the GPEDC. Similarly, one former DAC Steering Committee member put forward the following concern:

So to the degree that we opened up spaces on the steering committee for non-government actors and non-donor actors? I think that was successful. I think what was less successful perhaps... was who in fact, represents the private sector? The fact that [the GPEDC] gives voice to private sector entities doesn't necessarily mean that [the GPEDC] successfully provided representation to the private sector. It is so large and diverse - some of them are still kind of stuck in social responsibility motivations, others are engaged in their own self interest. (Interview 22)

The constituency-based approach of the GPEDC that provides representative structures of engagement for stakeholders will be addressed under the following section on Representativeness. Nonetheless, the two perspectives provided above reveal that for some donors, formal inclusion alone is insufficient for guaranteeing an appropriate level of

inclusivity. Rather, there is a need to address substantive appeal and for more structured mechanisms that can facilitate inclusion.

5.1.2 Dual Category Countries

While traditional providers can be said to be rather homogenous in their evaluations of the GPEDC's level of inclusivity - in that they hold positive perspectives on the *de jure* attempt to include all relevant stakeholders yet there are concerns over the level of *de facto* inclusion - there is a greater degree of heterogeneity with regards to the perspectives of 'dual category' countries. A clear demarcation can be made between 'dual category' countries that have had minimal engagement with the GPEDC (e.g. India, China, Brazil), and those who have been highly engaged (e.g. Mexico, Indonesia, Chile).

'Dual category' countries that have been actively engaged hold a positive evaluation of the GPEDC's inclusivity. Take for instance the following view from a Latin American representative:

The GPEDC is a multi-stakeholder process which is unlike any other process that I am familiar with. It is unique in the sense that you have in its governing board - the Steering Committee - the participation, basically, on an equal footing of most development actors. You have the CSOs, the private sector, foundations, parliamentarians, local governments and so on. I think it's very inclusive and really an exemplar of a multi-stakeholder process... When you go to a meeting of the Global Partnership you have in every roundtable, in every dialogue, the multi stakeholder character of the of the process is reflected [and] needs to be reflected.... there is not one meeting where you have a significant difference in the participation of CSOs, the private sector, foundations, parliamentarians, and national and local governments.... (Interview 13).

Similarly, another Latin American country representative notes that the attempt 'to engage all these actors that traditionally have not been so much involved in development cooperation before' constitutes one of the core strengths of the GPEDC. Furthermore, they note that the attempt to engage CSOs and the private sector is the reason why 'we want to keep participating' (Interview 31).

Although the few 'dual category' countries that have been engaged in the GPEDC hold rather positive perspectives on its inclusiveness, the same cannot be said for those who have had limited or no engagement. In describing the demarcation between engaged and non-engaged 'dual category' countries, one CSO respondent noted the following:

An emerging economy like Mexico or Indonesia, for example, they highly participate in the global partnership. But when people talk about wanting emerging economies to be a part of the Global Partnership, they are talking about Brazil, India, China, and South Africa... So, there's kind of almost two levels of emerging economies or South-South cooperation providers, if you will, there's kind of the flashy BRICS, and then there's everybody else. (Interview 18)

There is ample reflection and work done elsewhere on the possible reasons as to why large Southern Providers do not wish to be included in the GPEDC, and we will return to these throughout the thesis (Bracho, 2017; Li, 2017). As one prominent Indian scholar and expert - Sachin Chaturvedi - on SSC notes, the lack of engagement by India and China has 'deflated the OECD-led efforts to create a global platform where north-south providers and south-south cooperation partners come together for addressing major global challenges and exploring possible collective solutions' (Development and Cooperation, 2014). He goes on to note that the main perceived reason for the lack of engagement is due to the fact that the 'OECD is not letting the GPEDC blossom on its own', and the consequence of such is that 'we have returned to the pre-Busan world', where there are clear dividing lines between Southern and traditional approaches to development cooperation (ibid.). The GPEDC, as Jonathan Glennie (2014) notes, is thus perceived to be encumbered by 'its original sin: it was conceived by the OECD, for the OECD'. These large providers of SSC ostensibly claim that the UNDCF is the more legitimate forum for discussions on development cooperation, and do not wish to be enmeshed in a Northern-dominated system (see Accountability 6.3.3.2).

One representative from a 'dual category' country that has not actively engaged with the GPEDC presents the following perspective on the lacklustre level of *de facto* inclusivity:

[The GPEDC] is supposed to be global... but evidently, following the Mexican HLM - there was this big split by China, India and Brazil... So

this ambition for being global, or to represent the global community on development cooperation is lacking... I think that it is mostly viewed as an OECD or a DAC centred platform. And once that happens, it's hard to detach that perception... this kind of non-engagement [of the BRICS]... it turns it into another regional or traditional donor country-driven platform. (Interview 43)

There is thus a clear perception amongst those dual category countries who have not engaged in the GPEDC that it constitutes an OECD-driven platform. This not only hampers the inclusivity of the GPEDC from their perspective, but it also fundamentally undermines its aspiration to be a 'Global' partnership: one of its most central legitimacy claims.

It is nonetheless necessary to question whether the perceived lack of participation of the large SSC providers undermines the inclusivity of the GPEDC for those 'dual category' countries that are actively involved. From the perspective of one Latin American country representative:

...while it would be good to have them... since the process is a national process and it needs to be reflected on the ground in the in the recipient countries, I think that it is not fatal that these BRIC countries are not part of the process, nor will they become unfortunately. [Their lack of engagement] is not something that hampers the ability of the GPEDC to fulfil its mandate. Nor do I think that it actually questions its legitimacy as a process. (Interview 13)

Similarly, the country representative from South East Asia noted that they did not believe that the lack of participation of the BRICS undermined the legitimacy derived from the GPEDC's inclusiveness. However, they noted that their participation 'would make the [GPEDC] more comprehensive, [so that] we can know more of the BRICS experience to tackle the same issues, and also with the presence of the BRICS I think it can be more inclusive' (Interview 23).

There is thus a divide evident in 'dual category' country perspectives on the inclusiveness of the GPEDC. On the one hand, there are those countries such as Indonesia, Mexico, and Peru who are engaged in the process and hold the inclusiveness of the GPEDC in high praise. In contrast, large emerging economies such as Brazil, India and China maintain the view that the GPEDC constitutes a 'business as usual' Northern donor-dominated approach

to global development cooperation governance. This for them not only precludes their participation. It also fundamentally undermines the allegedly 'global' aspirations of the GPEDC itself. Interestingly, however, the fact that the BRICS do not explicitly participate does not seem to have that much impact upon the perception of other dual category countries who do engage. Although they would prefer to have these large SSC partners included within the GPEDC, they nonetheless maintain positive perspectives on the GPEDC's inclusiveness and legitimacy.

5.1.3 Recipient Countries

Overwhelmingly, recipients are highly positive with regards to the level of their own inclusion insofar as it is an improvement upon prior donor-dominated arenas of governance. The following response from the G7+ Secretariat captures this sentiment:

The emergence of Global Partnership shows a positive sign of widening the partnership or bringing about more members, the emerging actors from the global south, and also very particularly, for the fragile and conflict-affected states where we can bring the first-hand experiences to such forums. In the past... principles were designed with a very minimal or less consultation with countries that were beneficiary of those partnerships. So I think this is a unique value of the global partnership. It has given a forum for countries which were rarely heard a forum where their concerns and their priorities can be heard on such a global level (Interview 46)

While many recipients maintain positive perspectives on the inclusiveness of the GPEDC insofar as it enhances the opportunities for recipient countries to participate, there are mixed perspectives on the inclusivity credentials that are derived from non-state actor engagement in the GPEDC. While noting that its 'inclusive and multi-partner nature' is a major asset of the GPEDC, one Central African country representative noted that:

Overall, it can be argued that the level of inclusiveness and representativeness of the GPEDC is appropriate. However, there is an overrepresentation of CSOs in GPEDC meetings to the detriment of other stakeholders. (Interview 48)

There is thus a concern over the alleged over-inclusion of CSOs within the partnership. There are also concerns regarding the inclusion of CSOs in GPEDC processes at higher

political levels in recipient countries. For instance, one Southern African country representative noted that when CSOs were invited to engage in their national-level monitoring process there were 'problems convincing the prime minister to include civil society on this table' (Interview 44). Nonetheless, it was possible in this instance to 'use the commitment that is actually in the paragraphs of the GPEDC to convince the political authority here, to accept the civil society to sit on the table. That is the kind of things that we have been benefiting from the global commitment [to the GPEDC]' (ibid.). However, it is important to note that the reservations expressed by recipients towards the elevated role of CSOs are by no means ubiquitous. Other recipient country representatives noted that the participation of CSOs bring benefits in terms of providing additional oversight of traditional providers (Interview 21). Furthermore, one West African country representative praised the capacity of the GPEDC to 'draw a lot of people [in] from all walks of life' and it is a positive development that 'outreach is ever on the increase' (Interview 29).

Nonetheless, it can be argued that having CSOs as equal partners in GPEDC meetings and auspices does not sit well with some recipient country representatives. This was also corroborated in my own experience at the secretariat, wherein secretariat staff were encouraged to be sensitive to invoking language surrounding 'civic space' in the production of documentation for, and in correspondence with, particular national governments.

The lack of participation of large Southern powers does not appear to negatively affect recipient perspectives on the GPEDC's inclusivity. As one Central African country representative noted, although the 'greater participation [of the BRICS] would be beneficial for other developing countries' - given their increasing importance in the field - 'the absence of the BRICS at the GPEDC does not alter the legitimacy of the partnership' (Interview 48). Furthermore, one West Asian country representative provides a highly illustrative comment on not only how the inclusivity of the GPEDC is perceived by recipient countries, but also on the perceived nature of the GPEDC. Speaking on the lack of Chinese engagement in the partnership, they note that:

It would help a lot to have the Chinese in. But China has its own agenda, modalities and implementation methods. [The] Chinese - they will give you win-win cooperation, they will give you support, they will give you everything. But in return they will need petrol, they need oil, they need logistic support and so on... But they are very flexible, in terms of loans they have soft loans and so on... But this doesn't affect the Global Partnership. The Global Partnership has more-so to do with the traditional donors. (Interview 42)

It is thus clear that the lack of participation on behalf of the BRICS, although their inclusion would be desirable, does not greatly affect recipient perceptions on the inclusivity of the GPEDC. Instead, there is a perception that the GPEDC is a forum that is more suited for dealing with traditional ODA rather than SSC. This is a perspective that is mirrored by one West African country representative who notes that the creation of GPEDC 'was meant to improve [traditional] development partner's engagement especially in recipient countries like us' (Interview 41). Likewise, another West African country representative asserted that the 'purpose of the GPEDC is to measure and evaluate aid-effectiveness at the country level' rather than development effectiveness more broadly (Interview 21). The latter would infer the consideration a broader range of financing mechanisms other than traditional ODA.

What does appear to be an issue for recipients insofar as inclusivity is concerned is not the lack of participation of the BRICS *per se*, but rather the waning engagement and interest that traditional providers have in the partnership. For instance, speaking on whether the lack of participation of the BRICS undermines the appropriateness of the GPEDC's level of inclusivity, the Southern African country representative noted the following:

It does not. It's not like the GPEDC is not willing to have them on board. And I think even for the traditional donors... If I give you the example of Portugal, or Spain - they are not very active... there are many of them [traditional donors] like that - many of the traditional donors, who are part of the GPEDC officially, but they are not very active. (Interview 44)

Today there seems to be an inversion of recipient and traditional donor perspectives on the GPEDC. As evidenced in early documentation that detail discussions on the governance arrangements of the GPEDC, it was noted by Timor-Leste on behalf of the G77 that there was initial hesitance and 'mixed reactions towards the GPEDC among member states' (GPEDC, 2013), with some New York Missions of recipient and 'dual category'

countries perceiving the GPEDC as an OECD plot to challenge the primacy of the UN. Recently, however, we see a near doubling of participation in the third monitoring round of 86 partner countries - up from 46 in 2014 (OECD/UNDP 2014; OECD/UNDP, 2019). However, as noted by the current Swiss co-chair at a DAC caucusing event at the SLM, a 'paradox' was apparent: 'at the moment when the DAC are having second thoughts' partner countries are increasingly engaging and 'realising the importance of this agenda'. Furthermore, this finding was deemed surprising by one expert who has been following the aid-effectiveness debates since they began:

The interesting thing I found was that the recipient countries are still really keen on this process. But, it doesn't really have any weight with donor countries. Now they [donors] will say that they care about it, but they are not turning up for meetings... My line was always - I wrote about this a lot in 2010-11 - the GPEDC will simply never fly as a genuinely Global Partnership because of its history, and that's been proved absolutely right, the major Southern donors just are not interested in getting involved. But what I didn't anticipate, was that the major Western donors are also now losing interest. (Interview 6)

As noted by a Southern African country representative: 'For the [traditional providers] countries who were not there at the beginning, they are still not in. But for the countries who were engaged, they are still interested I think, and they are continuing to be engaged' (Interview 44). My own observations with regards to SLM preparations corroborate this finding: there was undoubtable willingness on behalf of broadly all recipient countries to attend the meeting - including nine recipient countries that sent ministerial-level delegations despite it being a meeting that sought to convene representatives at the Directors-General level. This suggests the high importance that recipients ascribe to this agenda. In contrast, securing traditional provider attendance proved to be rather difficult. It required repeated attempts and persistent pressure to attain senior-level DAC country participation.

5.1.4 Civil Society Organisations

CSO perspectives on the inclusivity of the GPEDC can be said to be highly positive with regards to the level of their own inclusion. One Northern CSO representative noted the following:

Relative to a multilateral process, this process - if you go from Accra through to the present - the last 10 years has been an amazing, inclusive process. That I'm aware of, no other multilateral process has had this degree of engagement with not just civil society, but mainly civil society, in a what is essentially an intergovernmental process. So to that degree, it's remarkable. (Interview 12)

Similarly, one European CSO representative noted that 'in my view, the GPEDC is one of the best examples where CSOs have a very well-defined role which is very close to that governments have from a purely formal basis' (Interview 17). However, there are concerns regarding the degree to which the GPEDC has the capacity to equalise de facto power disparities and imbalances (ibid), and such will be more fully addressed in section 5.3 on Equality. Nonetheless, CSOs have highly positive perspectives on the GPEDC's inclusivity, given that no other space affords them with a similar level of formal inclusion rights.

However, despite these positive perspectives, one representative notes that the level of inclusion enjoyed by CSO is not due to the benevolence of other actors such as the DAC (Interview 20). Instead, they note that the level of inclusion enjoyed by CSOs in the GPEDC is due to the hard work that has been done by CSOs over the years to 'get us into this position [that] we are in' (ibid). Furthermore, some CSO representatives clearly express that the current level of inclusivity enjoyed by CSOs is not to be taken for granted. Rather, they note that:

There is no room for relax a bit. [We need] to assert for more space and representation in the global partnership. We should not be contented with just being given minimal spaces - we should be able to assert that we are rights holders, we are development actors, and we have probably more to say than others who are in that platform. (Interview 8)

As the above statement makes clear, despite broadly positive perceptions on the inclusion of CSOs, there are several areas that are deemed to be somewhat lacking in terms of inclusion. For instance, it is claimed that within the working groups of the GPEDC there is variation over CSO inclusion depending on the subject matter. With regards to the work of the GPEDC on the private sector engagement (PSE), one representative commented that:

Even though we are full members, CSOs often have to keep knocking at the doors to make sure that we're included on work streams that involve the ways in which the GPEDC relate to that (PSE) debate... we are included... but sometimes it's grudgingly and sometimes not in robust ways that we might be in other areas of the Global Partnership (Interview 12).

Similarly, one CSO representative remarked at a caucusing event that Busan and the resultant GPEDC has ultimately been inconclusive in ensuring inclusiveness. They noted that the 'ideology behind inclusiveness has been forgotten': inclusiveness is 'talked about in terms of 'are CSOs at the table?' rather than in terms of democratic openness (Personal Observation, CSO Caucusing Event, 12 July 2019, New York). Consequently, there is a generalised perception that CSO inclusion can sometimes be tokenistic, rather than being a genuine engagement of CSO actors.

Furthermore, one respondent noted that although there is CSO engagement at the global level:

...the ultimate beneficiaries of the development that we're talking right now in the 2030 Agenda, in the GPEDC, in the DCF, in other forums - are the people, the marginalised people, the vulnerable groups. But in all these discussions, you cannot find them. So these are the most excluded part and I think also the most crucial part of the discussion. (Interview 20)

While attempts have been made by CSOs to include grassroots perspectives, the issue seems to be the highly technical nature of the GPEDC's agenda that precludes more bottom-up inclusion:

It's important to have a range of civil society engaged, but this is a complex area: it's something that you can't just walk into and all of a sudden you strike up an informed conversation. So it's also difficult, frankly, for civil society to both be inclusive itself but also get the right people at the table who can actually carry forward the agenda and the politics of that agenda. (Interview 12)

With regards to their own level of inclusion, CSOs are aware that their presence is contested by other stakeholders in the partnership. For instance, one representative from CPDE notes that the degree to which CSOs are included within the GPEDC 'has really set a precedent, one that I think a lot of governments are uncomfortable with' (Interview 15). They note that this not only applies to some recipients and the BRICS, but also traditional donors in that 'western societies probably [would] give similar reactions to the way that the governance of

the GPEDC works' (ibid.). There is thus a recognition by CSOs within the GPEDC that their inclusion does incite some uncomfortableness for public stakeholders.

Some CSO representatives interviewed noted something of a conundrum as to whether the lack of engagement of China, India and Brazil negatively affects the GPEDC's level of inclusivity. As one respondent notes, 'you can't call yourself a global partnership without having those players involved, but [if they were to be included] they're just going to weaken the strength of the commitments of the partnership that exist... well good riddance then' (Interview 15). They go on to note that it is nonetheless possible to continue to press traditional donors to operate in a manner that is 'at least a little bit ambitious and consistent with the sort of norms and standards that civil society is constantly saying government[s] should uphold' (ibid.). In this regard, one CSO representative noted that in trying to achieve the inclusion of the BRICS, proponents of aid effectiveness 'hurt themselves by trying to enlarge the tent... because you kind of dilute, you change focus... just to be relevant to a few stakeholders' (Interview 18). Furthermore, they noted that:

At a theoretical and practical level I don't think that it matters. I think it matters more to people's perceptions. It matters more to that kind of egotistical part of the development community... that's kind of about posturing and reputation and these kinds of things, it matters for that. But I don't think it matters in really practical terms. And actually, I think their inclusion at this point now would not necessarily strengthen the Global Partnership (ibid)

It is thus clear from the perspective of some CSOs that the inclusion of the BRICS would not strengthen and may even weaken the potency of the GPEDC in terms of its commitments agenda and governance.

CSO perspectives on the inclusion of the private sector in the GPEDC are stated in starkly negative terms. One respondent noted that they 'strongly oppose why they are there' (Interview 12) while Azra Sayeed remarked - at the CSO caucusing event prior to the SLM - that the private sector is perceived to be a 'grotesque creature that is eating up our space' (Personal Observation, CSO Caucusing Event, 12 July 2019, New York). Moreover, one respondent noted that the achievement of the GPEDC in terms of 'stakeholders being

able to recognise civil society as an equal partner... is sort of slowly being eroded because there's a strong push to bring in the private sector - a private sector which is not clearly defined' (Interview 8).

CSO representatives, as well as other non-government organisation stakeholders, are very clear as to why they take issue with the inclusion of the private sector in the GPEDC. One parliamentary representative noted that when people refer to the private sector in global fora such as the GPEDC or in the UN, it is 'really a euphemism... they really mean the corporate sector' rather than national and local Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) (Interview 40). Similarly, one CSO representative asserted that:

[SMEs] should be part of development cooperation and in the global partnership, because they're definitely part of nation-building... But when we talk about the private sector, meaning the corporates, big corporations, and the transnational corporations, that's a different story... their main purpose in the first place is to have profit... so their interest is totally different from the interest of development... [therefore] we think that the private sector, the big corporations, are not supposed to be one of the development actors [in the GPEDC] (Interview 20)

CSOs very clearly distinguish between SMEs of whom they are supportive, and larger corporations or transnational private enterprises of whom they perceive are being 'aggressively invited in' to the GPEDC, without clear parameters as to their role within development (Interview 8). Although there is room for improvement, CSOs nonetheless present positive perspectives over the degree of their own inclusion within the partnership. However, there are concerns over the manner in which the private sector has been included within the partnership.

5.1.5 Private Sector Actors

The private sector representatives interviewed hold somewhat ambivalent perspectives over their own inclusion within the partnership. There are little qualms over whether the door is open and whether there are seats at the table for them. However, there is clear evidence to suggest a lack of overall private sector interest in the development effectiveness agenda. While engaging the private sector has been an ambition of traditional donors and the

GPEDC since its inception, it is only since the mandate change in 2016, and with the 2017-18 programme of work, that explicit and prolonged attempts at including the private sector have been made (GPEDC, 2017). What engagement does exist has been somewhat limited to those 10 members engaged in the so-called Business Leaders Caucus⁶ (Interview 35; Interview 32). However, the purpose of the BLC is not to enhance the inclusiveness of the GPEDC in terms of private sector engagement. Rather, it is to provide business guidance in the development and articulation of the Kampala Principles and Guidelines for Effective Private Sector Engagement. It remains to be seen whether the latter generates greater interest from the as of yet disinterested private sector.

Speaking positively on the inclusive nature of the GPEDC, one representative noted that at the global level the GPEDC is 'an inclusive process in the sense that the wide range of sectors or parties are at the table... [and] there has been a lot of support for business participation' (Interview 35). However, there seem to be contradictory expressions as to the degree to which PSAs wish to be included within the process. For instance, while the representative from Mastercard may affirm with great enthusiasm the deep interest that they have in development effectiveness as they did at the SLM (Personal Observation, GPEDC SLM, 14 July 2019, New York), such statements are not accompanied with broader evidence of private sector engagement.

Inclusion of the private sector within the GPEDC appears, from the perspective of one private sector representative, to exist on two levels. On the one hand, there a few individuals who are personally interested in the global development effectiveness agenda, understand its importance, and 'have a bit of free rein within their organisations to be able to engage' (Interview 47). In my own observations, it was clear that there are a handful of highly committed and engaged private sector representatives. However, these individuals are by far the exception rather than the norm. The second group of individuals who participate in fora and events such as the Nairobi HLM do so when there are opportunities to discuss specific private sector issues, '[and] not about the generality of [private sector]

⁶ Or as one participant referred to it during a BLC meeting - in an unfortunate Freudian slip - the 'business leaders circus'.

engagement with the government development cooperation actors' (ibid.). Speaking on the lacklustre interest of the private sector to be included in the GPEDC, the representative goes on to note that

...If you're looking globally, the GPEDC is an [yet] another forum, and it's a forum where there has to date been a lot of talk, and it's not clear how that talk leads to action. As business wants action, it's difficult to see how any individual company really benefits from it. (ibid.)

In terms of private sector perspectives on the inclusion of other actors within the GPEDC, the lack of participation of the BRICS does not significantly affect private sector perspectives. While one respondent noted that 'it would be great to have broader participation, and Southern participation... there's good work that we can do with the current active participants in a legitimate frame' (Interview 35). While notions of procedural inclusion are not deemed to be totally irrelevant, PSAs tend to be much more concerned with the efficacy and relevance of governance outputs to specific private sector activities.

Speaking on the inclusion of other non-state actors, one respondent lamented the 'zero-sum' tendencies and assumptions that are latent amongst some CSOs when it comes to CSO attitudes to private sector inclusion within partnerships such as the GPEDC. They go on to note that :

Active citizenship [is] not something that is unique to NGOs. It can be, let's say, some company or representatives, it can be some entrepreneurs who start new companies to help people... So in this way, I perceive these two as [having] some antagonism, but also some hope. (Interview 7).

Furthermore, the perspective put forward by some CSOs that private sector inclusion within the GPEDC and other fora constitutes a euphemism for profit-motivated transnational actors was not shared by PSAs themselves. As one respondent noted:

I think there is a sort of a general mistrust of business - and in some cases quite rightly so - in some parts of the development community. [However] the type of people from business who are going to these [GPEDC] meetings are the ones who genuinely want to try and drive forward sustainable development. So I think it's probably a little bit misguided. It's not like there are going to be decisions made that

somehow favour 'bad' business. It's just not that type of body. (Interview 47)

Although the GPEDC is perceived to be open to private sector inclusion, the benefits of actually being included are not yet fully apparent to PSAs. What inclusion of the private sector that does exist seems to be limited to a handful of committed individuals with long-standing or deep exposure to the development effectiveness agenda. It remains to be seen as to whether the ongoing work-stream of the GPEDC on Principles and Guidelines on Private Sector Engagement will improve perceptions, while the broad participation of PSAs at the SLM may indicatively suggest that it has the potential to do so. Nevertheless, the GPEDC has been generally perceived by a small handful of PSAs as but one forum among many that are currently vying for private sector interest and participation.

The perspectives above on the inclusivity of the GPEDC reveal that there is more to constituting evaluations than the mere consideration of stakeholder's own level of inclusion. Instead, stakeholders are not just concerned with the question of 'whether I am at the table', but also questions over 'who should also be at the table', 'who is not at the table', and whether there is any interest to actually be at the table.

5.2 Representativeness

From its inception, representation featured as a 'key element in the deliberations of the Post-Busan Interim Group' while it was noted that Co-Chairs were not responsible for representing their constituencies alone, but they were to represent the membership of the partnership as a whole (GPEDC, 2012). Rather, representation of the constituency groups is primarily the responsibility of the Steering Committee members who are responsible for:

...consulting with, and therefore providing inclusive and authoritative representation of, constituencies with a stake in the work of the Global Partnership... Members of the Steering Committee will be nominated by their respective constituencies for review and endorsement at Steering Committee meetings in order to ensure regional balance and continuity as a whole. The Steering Committee will represent all actors with a stake in development, wishing to engage in the work of the Global Partnership. (GPEDC, 2016a: 33)

Adjustments having been made to the Steering Committee in order to enhance its representativeness, such as initially expanding the number of seats from 18 to 24 to include additional constituencies - such as an additional African partner country representative, an additional dual country representative, foundations, and local governments (GPEDC, 2014: 5). However, 'many stakeholders recognise that the current model of representation on the Steering Committee is not functioning adequately' (GPEDC, 2014a: 2). While the 'constituency model was intended to allow each constituency to establish its own mechanisms for regular consultation, there is the recognition that this is only happening successfully in some cases (e.g. civil society), yet there is 'considerable concern that this is not happening sufficiently in several other constituencies' (ibid.). As a consequence, 'only those directly involved within the Steering Committee [are] up to date on its plans and progress, but others sitting just outside this inner circle [are] not informed' (GPEDC, 2015a: 16). The consequences of a dysfunctioning or lacking representative model is that many members of the GPEDC 'do not feel a direct stake in the process and have not been as actively engaged as they might otherwise be' (GPEDC, 2014a: 2). Hence, stakeholder ownership of the process is undermined and hence negative consequences for compliance with recommendations and norms. This section will now explore these challenges and concerns as they manifest in stakeholder perspectives.

5.2.1 Providers of Development Cooperation.

One would expect that traditional providers would be the most well-represented stakeholder categories within the GPEDC. Traditional DAC donors constitute a well-defined constituency and have pre-existing channels of close and regular communication vis-à-vis the DAC. For some donors that hold a representative position within the Steering Committee, this role is clear and adhered to:

...the rules of the game is that each stakeholder on the SC should involve its own constituency. So it is up to each to interrogate, inform, and get the option of its own constituency before each meeting. It's not the responsibility of the JST to do that. So we engage with our member states before each meeting. (Interview 36)

On the whole, the constituency system works well in terms of representing the traditional donor constituency, and this is clearly mirrored in positive traditional donor perspectives. However, there are still some issues concerning communication of the roles and responsibilities that Steering Committee members are to adopt. For instance, take the view of one East Asian DAC representative:

Each steering committee member state is supposed to represent its regional constituency but its effectiveness remains questionable. To improve representation within the GPEDC, we need standardised way of working for steering committee members to collect opinions across their constituencies. To do that, defining [the] constituency can be the first task to start with. For example, we just became a member at the steering committee representing Asia, which is a vast continent composed of diverse groups of countries. But it is not clear to us whether we are supposed to represent donor countries only in Asia, which means East Asia, or broader Asia. (Interview 49)

Part of the broader issue with stakeholder representation is the ill-defined nature of the stakeholder categories. For instance, while private sector and civil society actors may be active in particular debates and events, there is the view by one donor that 'the extent to which those particular representatives are representative of the broader group is impossible to tell' (Interview 25). Furthermore, despite there being 'representation of every type of development actor possible, except for village level leaders', one former DAC Steering Committee representative noted that 'diversity of voices I think we achieved, [but] clear cut direct representation for all development stakeholders, I don't think we got there' (Interview 22).

Two clear issues emerge from traditional provider perspectives on the quality of representation. First, is that there is poor communication over the roles that representatives are to adopt in their conduct as representatives on the Steering Committee. Second, there is a lack of clarity over the composition and boundaries of the stakeholder groupings. Regarding the former, the problem appears to be that the 'steering committee itself is not a democratic grouping based on [an] open electoral system... [rather] members get changed by recommendation of the outgoing committee members and even co-chairs get replaced by the same system' (Interview 49). Given this system, it is the responsibility of the incumbent

stakeholder representative to identify their replacement and communicate to them their roles and responsibilities. However, as noted by one of the Secretariat staff interviewed:

...we don't necessarily clarify what is expected of steering committee members before they join. We do have - it's an Annex in Nairobi outcome document - our working arrangement, but it's not necessarily the sort of a defined terms of reference... in that 'this is what's expected of you, and this is how it will be done'. Maybe that's asking too much, maybe if we asked more of steering committee members, they wouldn't want to engage at all, they wouldn't want to take on that role. (Interview 45)

There is thus not only a lack of clarity as to the roles and responsibilities expected of incoming steering committee members, but a danger of 'asking too much' that may put off potential representatives. This was also corroborated by my personal observations on the process for securing new representatives for the 2019-2021 period: stakeholders were certainly not 'banging down the door' to become steering committee representatives. There is thus a dilemma between having flawed representation, or not having representation at all. Nevertheless, traditional donors are one of the most well-represented constituencies within the Steering Committee, due in part to the prior existence of networks of communication provided through the OECD-DAC.

5.2.2 Dual Category Countries

The two issues raised above - on the lack of clarity over the roles and responsibilities of steering committee members as representatives, and the lack of clarity as to the composition and boundaries of constituency groupings - is also apparent in 'Dual Category' country perspectives on the representativeness of the GPEDC. However, the latter is undoubtedly a more pressing and complicated issue. It is apt to question how the incumbent representative of 'dual countries' can be said to be representative of the views of SSC providers, when countries such as Brazil, India, and China staunchly reject the GPEDC. With those states eliding engagement, there is a small handful of smaller and more modest providers of SSC that have to be consulted and coordinated. Furthermore, there are questions over who exactly should be consulted as part of the 'dual category' country

constituency, and whether we can say that states such as Bangladesh or Peru are representative of other actors that practice SSC (Interview 2).

Those represented within the partnership are countries who perceive themselves to be a 'mid-way in between the BRICS and the traditional donors on the issue of the GPEDC' (Interview 13), or Latin American countries that approach fora such as the GPEDC with the mindset of 'let's participate in everything, let's put out voice [forward], and let's aim for something more horizontal, something more global' (Interview 31). However, the few SSC providers that have been engaged with the GPEDC that have representation in the Steering Committee. The current nature of 'dual category' representation thus falls short of initial hopes and attempts to design the Steering Committee in such a way as to ensure that countries such as Brazil, India, and China would have a seat at the table. Instead, there is the 'weird case of Bangladesh' representing dual category countries at the Co-Chair level without 'really [being] a dual country yet' (Interview 2).

Nevertheless, some dual category representatives present issue with the representation of other stakeholders within the Steering Committee:

Sometimes I saw [that] the representative groups in reality do not represent specific group of interest. They just, you know, were invited from somewhere and then given an order to say something... I think that really only those who have been involved in several times in this arena that understand how to deliver their interests [appropriately]. (Interview 19)

There is thus not only issue taken with the difficulty over representing an already ill-defined constituency (that of 'dual category countries'), but also the perception that other members within the Steering Committee are not representing their respective constituency. The issue of who can, and whether it is possible, to represent the views of a heterogeneous range of SSC providers is thus far from resolved: this persists to be an issue insofar as the representativeness of the GPEDC is concerned.

5.2.3 Recipient Countries

Recipients present considerable concerns over the representativeness of the GPEDC, with some positing that the current system of representation is a regression to that which was provided in the prior WP-EFF system of governance. The 'recipient of development cooperation' category is by far the largest country category with the greatest diversity of membership. For fragile states that are a member of the G7+ Grouping, they benefit from being represented and consulted with the assistance of the G7+ Secretariat. The G7+ Secretariat has had over a decade of close linkages with the aid effectiveness process and can therefore adequately represent the views of the group. As noted by the G7+ Representative:

We have our own coordination mechanism among ourselves. If there is anything that needs a global consultation among our member countries, we do that because we the [G7+] Secretariat participates on behalf of the member countries of the constituency, and then we do have two to three members from the G7 countries where they bring the country's perspective and we complement that by giving the group's perspective. (Interview 46)

While the existence of the G7+ Secretariat ensures that fragile and conflict affected states are adequately represented, a more dismal picture of representation emerges for other recipients of development cooperation. For instance, although '[Central African Country] participates in many events organised by the GPEDC... it remains poorly represented in decision-making bodies of the GPEDC, such as the Steering Committee' (Interview 48). Although there is no issue here presented with the inclusion of the country in question in events and the GPEDC more broadly, it is the structures of representation at the decision-making level that are perceived to be lacking. Similarly, one Southern African country representative notes the following when questioned about the extent to which they are satisfied with their level of consultation and representation :

We haven't heard anything like that [consultations]. In the past, when we prepared to attend to the HLMs, like the one we had in Busan in 2011, Mexico in 2014, and Nairobi 2016.... It's only in preparation [for] our participation into these events that we have a meeting in Addis Ababa [for consultation], in order to shape the message from Africa as a continent. It's not even the partner countries from the whole planet, it's only the African partner countries just to shape the message. That is the only thing that we have heard (Interview 44)

It is thus clear that the appropriate representation of partner countries - beyond the G7+ - has yet to be achieved within the GPEDC. There is evidence of minimal consultation insofar as preparations for HLMs are concerned, but not with regards to the regular functioning of the Steering Committee. Moreover, speaking on the partner country caucus that existed under the previous WP-EFF arrangement, one Southern African country representative noted the following:

I think we are missing this. The WP-EFF - where everyone was sitting at the table, even a small country like mine had a seat, even if we had our co-chairs - we still had as a country, a space into the dialogues. It is something that is really missing. I think that it's one thing that if we want a full commitment and engagement of all these stakeholders, we need to bring back this kind of comprehensive representation of stakeholders. (Interview 44)

The request and suggestion for a return to the WP-EFF system of representing partner countries is by no means novel. During the final meeting of the WP-EFF in 2012 when the GPEDC was being established, the proposal to maintain the partner country caucus was undermined by 'inadequate (financial) support for such efforts... [and the] challenge has been compounded by the under-resourcing of the UNDP-OECD JST' (GPEDC, 2014a: 3). The partner country caucus was disbanded as traditional providers were unwilling to fund it, while they had hoped that the GPEDC would be a more 'global light' or streamlined governance structure than its predecessor (Personal Communication, OECD Offices). Nonetheless, the result of such 'streamlining' has been that partner countries are poorly represented within the GPEDC. Other than the G7+ grouping, there are no pre-existing structures - that are supportive of the GPEDC - that can help ensure that partner countries are appropriately represented in the GPEDC.

5.2.4 Civil Society Organisations

CSOs are the most well-represented non-executive (non-state) members of the Steering Committee due to the existence of an external network that supports consultation and engagement: the CSO Partnership for Development Effectiveness (CPDE). Created in 2012 as the Southern-led successor to the BetterAid platform (GPEDC, 2012: 2) - which provided

CSOs with a structured means by which to engage in the WP-EFF governance system - the role of CPDE in the GPEDC has been described by some CSO representatives in the following manner:

...the saving grace of the GPEDC is that it's multi-stakeholder and it has the benefit of the CPDE. And as far as I know, CPDE for the past years has been doing an active outreach and it has incorporated in its membership various civic sector organisations. So not only do we have indigenous peoples and rural communities, but [we] also have the youth, migrants, and diaspora. I think there is no parallel civil society global formation - the GPEDC enjoys that kind of exclusivity [sic] at the moment. (Interview 8)

For the CSO representatives interviewed, CPDE plays an instrumental role in ensuring the engagement of CSOs in not only the Steering Committee but also the entire work of the GPEDC. Furthermore, while the decision to implement the Fourth Non-Executive Co-Chair (NECC) will be explored in the following chapter, it was CPDE's repeated efforts to ensure the better representation of non-executive stakeholders that led to the formation of this position. The purpose behind the NECC is not to represent particular constituencies *per se*, however, it enables the views of non-executives to be better represented at the co-chair level, given that 'much of the political discussion of the Global Partnership happens among the Co-chairs and the JST' (Interview 12). Consequently, CSOs not only have a well-coordinated structure of representation within the Steering Committee, but also at the highest level of political decision-making.

However, there are limits upon the degree to which CSOs feel that they can be represented within the Steering Committee. For instance, one CSO respondent noted the following:

So we try, through CPDE, to bring voices and also to [bring] that political reality on the ground, which is not being captured in all these technical debates happening at the global level. So even for us who are trying, who have members from the ground, are also grappling. All the discussions at the global level are highly technical, you see. But and then when this goes to the country level, it's also difficult to find the relation to what's happening on the people themselves, because there's no way for them to get into the process. (Interview 20)

The high technicality of debates precludes the participation of more national and local level CSOs. However, such is perceived to be necessary 'sometimes for the sake of

expediency' (Interview 10). Although efforts have been made to represent and 'include a broader range of Southern CSO voices', in order to ensure effective engagement and broad representation CPDE tends to 'choose the most informed and most... legitimate in terms of a mandate' to attend on behalf of CSOs (Interview 12). The consequence is that those from CPDE who are engaging in the Steering Committee 'often become the same voices at the table' (ibid.).

Despite the challenges in representing more national and local perspectives, there are nonetheless attempts by CPDE to ensure more democratic representation:

I think it's also a matter of who puts these representations in place, and do we do it bottom up? I really don't know, I don't think there's a uniform to do it that would please everyone and say that, 'hey, we've done it equally'. But I think as long as we try to work on a more democratic participation, not just inclusion, but truly democratic participation, or representation I think that will be generally good for for CSOs in particular as well. (Interview 4)

While CSOs, therefore, hold broadly positive perspectives on the representation that is provided by CPDE, there is thus clearly room for continual reflection on how to better represent local perspectives.

CSOs tend to hold rather negative perspectives as to the nature of representation for other stakeholders. Speaking on the representation of partner countries within the GPEDC, one respondent notes the following: 'it seems like it's gotten very much more back to where it was before a little bit where it's like, it's quite donor driven, despite having very balanced representation at the level of the steering committee' (Interview 15). Thus, in spite of the formal representation of partner countries at the Steering Committee level, there is still the perception that partner countries are not appropriately represented and that the GPEDC is donor driven.

CSO perspectives on the representativeness and the private sector does little to dispel the notion that the 'private sector' - when approached within the GPEDC - is merely a euphemism for the corporate sector. Again, questions are continually raised over: 'who is at

that table? Are there SMEs? They say in the framework that they must be, but are they really? There's no assessment of that' (Interview 12). For instance, speaking on the International Chamber of Commerce whom is responsible for representing the private sector on the Steering Committee, one respondent notes that 'in reality, they are very much the voice of the corporate sector' (Interview 40). Similarly, one CSO representative noted that:

...the question of the private sector... it's really, really difficult, and especially in terms of representation. Because the people that are there as individuals can be quite committed, but I never quite understood who the hell they represent. There are these kind of private sector organisations but I do not know if they have direct links to multinationals or sort of chambers of commerce in countries or to employer's organisations. The thing about the private sector is that it's a hugely diverse and complicated non-state part of society... their role within the partnership is - I would say it's constructive... but I think that's on the basis of the person that's there. I don't know how they build consensus around their positions because a lot of times it seems like it's just the guy that's there [providing their perspective]... so it can sort of vary in terms of the positions they take. (Interview 15)

Positive perceptions on CSO representation in the GPEDC is primarily due to CPDE as a platform that supports CSO engagement and consultation. However, CSOs present concerns over the quality representation for recipients and PSAs. The former are perceived to be poorly represented in the Steering Committee, prompting claims that the Steering Committee is a donor-dominated platform. For the latter, the representative 'structure' in place for the private sector does little to dispel the perception that the private sector is a euphemism for the corporate sector when approached in the GPEDC.

5.2.5 Private Sector Actors

It is very well recognised by the PSAs interviewed, and all those encountered during my observations, that adequately representing the private sector in global fora is a gargantuan and complex task. Two issues are of paramount importance in hindering the representation of PSAs: the sheer size of the private sector, and the unclear relevance of development effectiveness for PSAs.

As recognised by one private sector representative regarding consultation and representation:

The consultation was very, very limited. So there was ICC, the BIAC Development Committee, and also CIPE now...We would pull together around views and consult with businesses. But relatively minor [consultation], because what was there to be concerned with businesses?... [For instance] I don't care if the next HLM is in Nairobi or in Mogadishu. Why would anyone care about businesses' view on where it's going to be held? As long as it's not holding it during Davos week. (Interview 28)

There is thus the view that the more procedural debates and discussions that take place at the Steering Committee are of little private sector interest. It could be argued that business perspectives are well-represented vis-a-vis the BLC - which is a regionally and gender-balanced constellation of key business actors. However, the BLC's role is limited to input on a specific work-stream on Principles and Guidelines for Effective Private Sector Engagement. The purpose of the BLC is not to bring about representation of PSAs to the Steering Committee, or for the GPEDC writ large (Interview 32).

For one representative of private foundations, the tension and difficulty in providing representation for private foundations globally was apparent:

It's difficult for me sitting on the steering committee to say, 'I can actually speak for foundations globally', because I don't speak for foundations globally... But I think that civil society would say the same thing, it's very hard for the civil society representative to sit there on behalf of civil society globally and say that, you know, he or she represents all of civil society... so I struggled with it a bit when I first was learning about the steering committee and the GPEDC and how I effectively represent foundations when I don't know what the foundations think. But that's where I closely cooperate with OECD and with the NetFWD... it's not always clear sometimes where are the voices coming from? Is it just the voice of that constituency? Or is it an individual voice that has an opinion? (Interview 27)

The representative for private foundations points to a key and general concern regarding representation in the GPEDC Steering Committee: the unclear line between representing one's own or one's own organisational viewpoint, and that of the broader constituency. In this instance, the representative was able to use the pre-existing OECD NetFwd - the OECD network of private foundations - network to receive inputs and better represent the

broader viewpoints of foundations. Nonetheless, there is little exacting guidance on how a representative is to conduct themselves in order to ensure the representation of the constituency.

The twin problems of having such a large constituency to represent, and the lack of clear relevance of development effectiveness to the private sector, thus seriously undermine GPEDC's claim to representing the private sector constituency. Nonetheless, there do exist representative networks in place around a handful of committed business organisations. If a particular company or business wishes to be consulted and have their view represented on the Steering Committee, this request would be undoubtedly met. However, the existence of such interested companies or businesses is few and far between.

The key finding emerging from perspectives on representativeness is that it is not possible to have a representative structure at the global level in the absence of pre-existing networks of consultation. Both traditional donors and CSOs are well-represented due to their pre-existing networks. However, the same cannot be said for other stakeholders. While it is possible to logically conceive and draw up a representative Steering Committee structure, ensuring quality representation in practice is much more difficult. It is not merely the case of 'if you build it, they will come': there is a need to invest in coordinating capacities, such as with the now-defunct partner country caucus. Nevertheless, it is well recognised by all stakeholders that the system of representation is not functioning adequately.

5.3 Equality

It is essential to examine whether stakeholders perceive that the GPEDC is either donor or DAC-led, or whether it lives up to its name of providing an 'equal playing field' for all actors. The GPEDC has, since its inception, been purported to constitute a 'coalition of equals working towards shared goals', yet there was nonetheless the recognition that the GPEDC risked being perceived to be 'a process driven by provider countries, and that special efforts are needed to reach out to these partners' (GPEDC, 2012a: 2). Transitioning from a previously hierarchical governance system to one characterised by equal and horizontal

relations can be said to be one of the *raison d'etres* of the 'aid effectiveness' reform process. In the nomenclature surrounding the GPEDC, and development cooperation writ large, it is in part why we now see traditional donors referred to as 'development partners' and recipients as 'partner countries'. The discursive shift to employ the language of partnership is thus a clear attempt to equalise relations. However, this section will explore the extent to which such an aspiration has been attained within the GPEDC in the eyes of stakeholders themselves.

5.3.1. Providers of Development Cooperation

Traditional providers recognise that ensuring adequate input legitimacy is 'not only about formality... but [also] the possibility to actually participate' (Interview 30). Traditional providers are highly aware of the disparate capacities that inhibit more equal relationships between stakeholders within the GPEDC. For instance, while one representative noted that 'what is beautiful about the GPEDC is that everybody comes together in a not-as-politicised way as they do in other international multilateral fora... there is always a hierarchy [between actors]' (Interview 39). The hierarchy that persists within the GPEDC can be said to be reflective of structural power imbalances that permeate global politics. As one former DAC Steering Committee Member notes, despite significant advances made during the aid-effectiveness reform process:

The Global Partnership was really meant to be a space, a platform where all actors could engage on an equal basis - really trying to eliminate that the hierarchy that was created around Paris... I mean, we try to mitigate against the disparity in influence based on resources... So we know that as donors, one of our responsibilities is to provide financial resources for programs and projects that move, and keep advancing the collective agenda. But it's the 'golden rule' - the person or the organisation with the gold makes the rule. So there was some of that, but I was really proud of our efforts to make decisions on an equal basis, I do think that we achieved that. (Interview 22)

Due to the voluntary nature of the GPEDC and its funding structure, it is wholly dependent upon the financial contributions of traditional donors in order to ensure the balanced participation of affected stakeholders. As the financiers of the GPEDC, this donor-dependence has concomitant impacts upon the degree of influence that donors have over

the form and function of the GPEDC. For instance, much of the partnership's events are funded by either the donor co-chair or another traditional donor, and this has consequences for the logistical arrangements and substantive issues that an event can address. The degree of influence that the traditional provider co-chair maintains over the GPEDC prompted one member - who understandably wishes to remain anonymous - to make the jibe that the GPEDC stands for the 'German Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation'. However, it is apt to question the extent to which this influence can be avoided, given the heavy dependence upon traditional provider funding that is necessary for the GPEDC to function.

Setting aside the issue of the 'golden rule', one respondent noted that there has been more movement towards inter-governmental equality, particularly between traditional providers and recipients. However, the same can not be said for the equality between government and non-state members of the GPEDC:

With regards to the collaboration between donors or traditional donors and recipient countries, I think we have come quite a long way. If I look at the way, for example, we interact with the other co-chairs... I think [that] we do work very much on the same level... Where we have not yet achieved the same level and where we are still working on - is the cooperation with the non-executive members of the Global Partnership (Interview 37)

The representative goes on to note that the addition of the fourth NECC is a positive development that is hoped to produce greater equality between the non-executive members of the partnership. Additionally, one East Asian DAC representative found that:

Since its inception, the GPEDC was meant to be not just an equal partnership between donor and recipient countries but also tried notably to give equal standing to civil society. It is true that civil society is a diverse community with distinct difference[s] so it makes such a daunting task to make a good representation of civil society. However, the GPEDC should get credit for having tried a partnership of equals by having a civil society representative as the fourth non-executive co-chair in the steering committee. (Interview 49)

However, one European DAC representative noted the following with regards to the level of equality within the GPEDC:

There's a partnership of equals in terms of how the dialogue is managed in those meetings...One voice was not superior to the other voice. Now in

terms of influence of course, governments still have the greatest influence, and civil society plays a very important role in advocacy, or in a challenging role. But governments are still accountable, you know, for the decisions that they need to make. (Interview 25)

Traditional providers are thus aware of the hierarchy that persists in the GPEDC due to the relative degree of capacity and power that they have over other stakeholders. Nevertheless, there is the perception that strides have been made towards equalising power and capacity relationships between providers and recipients of development cooperation. Where there is definite 'room for improvement', is in equalising the power relations between governments and non-executive stakeholders.

5.3.2 Dual Category Countries

On the whole, 'dual category' countries hold positive perspectives on the level of equality within the GPEDC. However, of exception are the dual category countries who have had limited engagement and would insist that the GPEDC it is a DAC-driven governance arrangement. For instance, it is argued that the GPEDC's approach to measuring and monitoring development cooperation is unabashedly OECD in approach, and thus inappropriate to the measurement of their SSC programs (see 6.3 Accountability). Given that the monitoring approach of the GPEDC is perceived to be derived from OECD practices, it is claimed that the GPEDC unequally favours OECD-DAC members.

Nonetheless, 'dual category' countries that participate within the GPEDC hold positive perspectives on both the promise and reality of equality within the GPEDC. As noted by one Latin American country representative:

It is unique in the sense that you have in its governing board - the Steering Committee - the participation, basically, on an equal footing of most development actors. You have the CSOs, the private sector, foundations, parliamentarians, local governments, so, I think it's a very inclusive and really an exemplar of a multi- stakeholder process. (Interview 13)

Likewise, one South-East Asian country representative notes that 'in the GPEDC forum countries are equal. So every country has the opportunity to showcase and be good models

for others. I think there is no problem related to the equality of members within the GPEDC' (Interview 23). For those dual category countries that have had both the willingness and capacity to engage in the GPEDC, a concern over the equality of members does not seem to be present. However, one representative from a country that has had limited engagement provides a rather nuanced view as to the degree to which recipient countries are equals within the GPEDC:

This recent monitoring framework has showed that there is definitely an appetite and ambition to revitalise the GPEDC, to make it more relevant - so the participation level showed that. So they [recipient countries] see some value in. But it is not simply about participation, it is also about all throughout that process - who is cooking that meal? Traditional donors are cooking it, and then presenting it. And it is not only their [donor's] fault, I have to say there is also a capacity problem in many of these other [recipient] countries. So they don't have this data base, they don't have the knowledge base, there may be additional capacity problems - this is a fact. They may have financial problems as well, which may not be compensated by the contribution of donor countries (Interview 43).

While differences in capacity are perceived to be the cause of unequal relations within the GPEDC, the blame is not placed entirely onto DAC countries: donors are not perceived as acting in a conspiratorial manner to ensure their dominance. Instead, unequal relations are a result of broader structural inequalities. These inequalities are therefore mirrored in initiatives that attempt to bring together different public actors with vastly different capacities. While 'dual category' countries who are engaged with the GPEDC are somewhat positive with regards to the level of equality that exists, there is nonetheless the recognition that other stakeholders may not perceive the same degree of equality.

5.1.3 Recipient Countries

Taken as a constituency as a whole, recipients of development cooperation present mixed views on the equality that exists within the GPEDC. Given that this is a diverse group, one that ranges from LICs to LMICs, recipients have varying capacity by which to participate within the GPEDC as full and equal members. One member of the secretariat breaks down the recipient constituency into two groups according to the degree of capacity support that they require in order to participate as equal members (Interview 2). The first group that

receives the most significant degree of capacity support are low-income countries, small island, and fragile states. This grouping is the most reliant on ODA, they often have small public administrations and they, therefore, require the most support. In supporting the monitoring process for these actors, the JST assists in 'carry[ing] out the heavy work' in retrieving and validating data in order to make up for lacking domestic capacity⁷. The second grouping of recipients are lower-middle-income countries comprising the likes of Kenya and Nigeria. These countries have greater capacity, ODA is still relatively important, yet their portfolio of available financing is ever-expanding into a 'more mixed bag of development financing' (ibid.). For instance, one West African LMIC representative noted that:

Yes everybody is given equal opportunity. Everybody is given the opportunity to provide information on their own... It is not dominated by donors. Donors are even afraid of joining, of providing information on the indicators of the GPEDC. Many of them are afraid because the GPEDC is a visibility point that exposes the irregularities of most of these donors (Interview 21)

For countries endowed with the capacity to engage fully in both monitoring and the various auspices of the GPEDC, this is accompanied with a positive perception on the equality of members within the partnership. However, for countries with less capacity - such as G7+ members - a more mixed picture emerges:

[On equality] it's not very much in line with the ambition that we would have... But, as I said, this is an improvement that we have seen, at least we have a space, at least we have a forum. Obviously, if you look at the structure, for example, the co-chairman structure... we have countries from least developed club where we have a leadership over there. But still the one thing I have to say, that we have observed, [is] that most of the times, we are more passive. Not because we don't know what our challenges are. But we are overwhelmed by the issues back home, we are overwhelmed by the challenges that we have... Nevertheless, as I said, this is a step forward in the right direction where we have more voices from these countries, more voices of the priorities of these countries. Despite the fact that yes, the global agenda is unfortunately to some extent led by the development partners [traditional providers]. (Interview 46)

Similarly, one country representative from Southern Africa notes the following on the level of equality between actors within the GPEDC:

⁷ While such support is provided by the JST in order to make up for the lack of recipient capacity, these efforts have then been criticised by some traditional providers on the basis that this support undermines the intended 'country-led' nature of the monitoring process.

It is donor-driven. But I think we have to share responsibility, because sometimes even if we as a partner country - we have our representatives in the steering committee, it is like we are just following whatever is decided by the big actors. If we have Germany and Uganda sitting there, we haven't heard anything from Uganda. It's like Uganda is coming to these meetings and just following what is put on the table by Germany, for example. We haven't seen any initiatives that comes from Uganda, even consultation among the countries - we haven't seen that. (Interview 44)

It is certainly my own experience that recipient countries are far more passive in the work-streams and meetings of the GPEDC than some of their traditional provider counterparts. Although there are great attempts to bring recipients on board and to have them engage more fully within the partnership, both the issue of lacking capacity and lacklustre leadership from the Recipient Co-Chair are claimed to be reasons for such passiveness. The consequence is that the GPEDC is indeed perceived as donor-led by some recipients, but the degree of equality is nonetheless an improvement upon alternative spaces and previous fora.

Moreover, while many recipients are supportive of attempts to ensure equality between public actors and non-executives such as CSOs, some recipients do not believe that there should be equality between all stakeholders within the partnership:

I think that the governments have the lead and I don't think there is equality between civil society for instance and the governments in the Global Partnership. The governments have the lead because it is they who gives the [money] and it is really the government that put in action the programmes. So I don't think that there is equality between all the stakeholders. (Interview 33)

For recipients, different capacities result in varying perceptions on the degree of equality within the GPEDC. Those with the capacity tend to regard themselves as equal as they can engage more fully. Whilst those who have less capacity receive some support to participate in the monitoring process, they are beset with considerable domestic challenges that inhibit their more equal participation within the GPEDC. The consequence is that the GPEDC is indeed perceived as donor-driven. Furthermore, there are differing perspectives amongst recipients as to whether non-executive stakeholders such as CSOs should be regarded as equal members alongside governments in the GPEDC.

5.3.4 Civil Society Organisations

CSOs present negative perspectives on the degree of equality within the GPEDC. CSOs do not only regard the GPEDC to be donor-driven, but also government-driven in that non-executive stakeholders do perceive themselves to have equal influence. Take for instance the following perspective:

I think much of the control is with governments. It is with states and even between states, I think there's still a disparity between donors and recipients. I mean, you know, much of developing countries, I think are still beholden to the donor countries, because I think much of this is also dependency, economically, and probably in terms of political influence. Much of the donors who will speak, they still have the control as far as economic and political matters are concerned (Interview 8)

Similarly, another representative speaks on the following regarding the role of recipients within the GPEDC:

It's a partnership of equals but it's the more active equals. So this is not a criticism, but just that the partner countries are just not nearly as active... I don't know if it's a question of resourcing capacity. You know, the GPEDC right now has a work plan, because this is the first time that they've had one, which had given it some momentum and giving it some kind of something concrete to hook into.... [but] the only people that really contribute in the working groups are a handful of committed donors (Interview 15)

It is again expressed here that donors are in control of the agenda but this is perceived to be more-so due to a lack of capacity on behalf of recipients rather than a conspiratorial attempt by traditional donors to dominate proceedings. However, speaking on the position of CSOs in the GPEDC and whether they perceive themselves to be on equal footing with other actors, one respondent noted the following:

[Towards] a genuine move of stakeholder partnership... we [would] have the same voice, you know, the bearing of our [voice] is taken equally with the other members of the multi-stakeholder partnership. But I can say that this is not the case. Because, you know, at the end of the day, it's still the voice of those in power who are really being taken on more than [our] voice, because we are the dissenting voice most of the time. (Interview 20)

While CSOs may perceive that their own voice is not treated on an equal playing field compared to that of other actors, the inverse can be said on their perspectives on the treatment of the private sector in that CSOs 'from developing countries... is not really on [an] equal footing with the policy makers and our engagement is not as influential as it is with the private sector['s] engagement with them' (Interview 4). Furthermore, it is again perceived that the position of the private sector within the GPEDC works to the detriment of CSO's position within the GPEDC:

...now there's this hype like you know, the private sector - they're more capable, they're more knowledgeable, they're more expert etc. - expert of what? It's not even clear and it actually undermines the contribution of the other stakeholders, especially the rights holders in development cooperation (Interview 8)

CSOs thus clearly perceive there to be unequal *de facto* power dynamics present within the GPEDC, despite many claiming that it is a rare space where CSOs are provided with *de jure* equality. Key amongst their concerns is that powerful traditional donors are dominating the agenda due in part to the comparatively weaker capacity that inhibits recipient countries from engaging more fully. Moreover, speaking on their own position within the GPEDC, there is the sense that their voice does not have the same degree of influence as donors and the private sector. For some CSOs, unequal power dynamics are likely to persist, given the different capacities that stakeholders wield:

...what's on paper differs from reality, right? I mean, ultimately, one side has all the money and the other side doesn't. So there will always be that power dynamic.... when it comes right down to it, they're the ones who have the money, they're the ones will always say, 'well, we have to be responsible to our taxpayers, not just to our partner countries', and, you know, even if even if you can give everyone a vote that dynamic will continue to exist. (Interview 10)

5.3.5 Private Sector Actors

PSAs present few qualms over the degree of equality that is afforded to them within the GPEDC. Nonetheless, private sector representatives are highly sensitive to the fact that other stakeholders may not also perceive the same degree of equality. Speaking positively on the equality experienced within the GPEDC, one BLC member notes the following:

I mean, I feel that way. [laughter] I certainly don't feel unequal in the process... I wouldn't have reason to say otherwise. I mean, again, I see it from from one lens. And I could imagine people coming from different lenses having different points of view, but certainly, like I say, [there] seemed to make an effort to accommodate our points of view. (Interview 28)

Most pertinently with regards to other actors, one respondent noted that they felt that it was likely that CSOs and NGOs may not experience the same degree of equality as felt by PSAs and private foundations:

I think [for] the NGOs... there is this feeling that there is this shrinking space for civil society... So, I believe that it is equal, but NGOs... they will say they're less equal. But of course, they have limited resources, and they need to fundraise and etc. So just I would say, almost equal. (Interview 7)

Private sector representatives thus view a lack of resources as the core reason as to why CSOs perceived there to be a lack of equality within the GPEDC. Furthermore, the following representative notes that the issue of resources are also an issue for PSAs themselves:

I think resources are going to be a challenge for many of the participants. I mean, that's just the practicality of it, in terms of flying to meetings, different parts of the world, even for us, that's something that we have to consider, you know, our costs, and we're fully supportive of the process. And, you know, there may be actors who are even less resourced than us. So I think in general, most of the non government actors are feeling a little bit, some of the costs of participating... Certainly, I know that Germany, and maybe others have been quite generous in supporting a number of participants. So I don't know, I don't know what an equal plane would be... We're not being paid out of a donor project to do this work. So yeah, it's kind of hard for me to say exactly what constraints other participants might be feeling. But for our part, we're making our contribution, but we are mindful of the resources because we don't have a large designated project for this. (Interview 35)

Regularly attending events and engaging in the GPEDC is highly time and resource consuming. It is thus of little surprise that those from the private sector who have had regular and prolonged engagement within the GPEDC have been a handful of predominantly Northern business associations who have the necessary resources. In my own experience, the following perspective on the nature of private sector presence at the first HLM still holds true today: the 'presence of a few handpicked African entrepreneurs

failed to disguise the heavily Northern-corporate feel of the private-sector presence at Mexico' (Shankland and Constantine, 2014: 106).

Furthermore, despite those interviewed expressing positive statements in that they do not feel unequal in the process - caveated with the sensitivity that others may not feel the same way - one respondent did have an interesting point to make regarding the nature of traditional provider or donor dominance within the GPEDC. They noted that such is the case 'because its kind of path-dependent... since they were big years ago, and they remain big - they have a bigger say... the partnership is not 100% equal because some of those [present] are donors, some of the parties are recipients, and so on' (Interview 7). Consequently, so long as there are actors with vastly different capacities, prospects for equality within the partnership are small.

This project's findings on equality are perhaps unsurprising. Perceptions of inequality persist due to the different resources that actors bring to the table, and this has clear impacts upon the degree to which stakeholders are able to participate in a sustained manner. Nevertheless, despite being broadly perceived to be a 'donor-dominated' platform, we do see an improvement of perceived power dynamics between governments (donors, 'dual category', and recipient). However, CSOs do not feel that their voice is on par with other government stakeholders and the private sector. Nevertheless, this indicator reveals that in order to generate input legitimacy it is necessary to not only examine formal procedures for participation but also the capacity to participate. In addition, and similar to inclusivity, it is necessary to be attentive to whether stakeholders believe that there should be equality among actors. Furthermore, in this regard it appears that the GPEDC is moving away from this normative ideal of equal partnership. During my time at the secretariat I observed a discursive shift away from the ambition to convene all actors on an 'equal footing', wherein documents for the 2019 SLM instead stated the intention to 'convene development actors on a *more* equal footing' (GPEDC, 2019). The justification for this was that many governments no longer feel beholden to the view that all non-state actors should be equal to the voice of governments within the platform. While the language of 'partnership', 'partner countries',

'development partners' is laudable, attaining procedural equality in practice is wrought with challenges.

5.4 Reflections

A full evaluation of these findings will be provided in chapter 8. Nonetheless, findings on the above three indicators shed light into the challenges associated with fostering more inclusive democratic governance within a multi-stakeholder setting. The inclusive structure of the GPEDC was formulated as a response to the critiques raised against the previous Northern-donor dominated governance of global development cooperation. Democratic inclusivity in governance can serve various aspirations: it can provide greater pluralism in voice and representation, greater consensus orientations in procedures and outputs, and it can be equality-oriented in that can serve as a tool of recognition. As the interviews reveal, the indicators used by this thesis clearly serve as important benchmarks in how stakeholders evaluate the GPEDC as a governance mechanism. However, different stakeholders maintain diverse interpretations of what values associated with democratic inclusivity should, and do, look like in practice.

The key take-away from the interviews and my observations on these indicators is that it is not possible to address concerns through technical 'quick fixes', and some of these concerns are, to an extent, mutually exclusive. For instance, it is not possible to reconcile the demand of CSOs to be fully included within the governance mechanism on an equal footing, with the view of some recipients and dual category countries that CSOs should be subordinate to the voice of governments. Furthermore, persistent asymmetrical power relations in the GPEDC - that is to say inequality - is primarily a consequence of the structural inequalities that exists between and within states. Suffice to say, these are intractable challenges that inhibit more democratic governance in practice. The next chapter will now examine stakeholder perspectives on the governance procedures of the GPEDC.

6. Throughput Legitimacy: Perspectives on Procedures

The previous chapter examined stakeholder perspectives on the inclusive and participatory quality of the GPEDC. This chapter moves on from participation to examine stakeholder perspectives on the procedural or throughput legitimacy of the governance arrangement. Throughput legitimacy sheds light into what has been depicted as the 'blackbox' of governance (Schmidt, 2013: 6). It is specifically concerned with the democratic quality of the procedures that constitute an arrangement. In other words, once the stakeholders are present at the table, how do they evaluate the quality of interactions that take place? To facilitate this, the chapter examines stakeholder perspectives on: the deliberative quality of decision-making and debate, transparency, and accountability.

6.1 Quality of Decision-Making and Debate

The GPEDC is constituted by a range of events and opportunities for deliberation and decision-making, ranging from: day-to-day virtual stakeholder meetings, specialised policy dialogues, regional mutual learning events, bi-annual steering committee meetings (SCMs), and global HLMs (GPEDC 2017). Furthermore, deliberation and decision-making takes place in different formats, either in-person or through teleconferencing, with different constellations of state, private, and civic actors. For instance, while HLMs are suited for bringing the community together and to 'generate political momentum', it is at SCMs that decisions are officially taken. Moreover, decision-making is consensus-based, and determining the provenance of particular decisions is often unclear. To counteract this, I have traced how particular deliberations have evolved over time before they were agreed and decided upon. In particular, presented here are differing stakeholder perspectives on the decision to implement the Fourth Non-Executive Co-Chair (NECC). This is warranted for several reasons. First, it constitutes one of the most decisive innovations in terms of the GPEDC's multi-stakeholder governance structure. Second, the proposition has existed since the GPEDC's formation, and it is possible to discern how different stakeholders have deliberated over the proposed position over time. Third, during interviews, debates were

ongoing regarding the position, and it was weighing heavily upon interviewees minds. Consequently, a pragmatic decision was taken to present stakeholder perspectives on it here to shed light on stakeholder perspectives on debate and decision-making. Furthermore, and as mentioned (see 3.3.2.1), this indicator draws upon additional heuristics by which to explore stakeholder perspectives. It does so with reference to perceptions of universality, rationality, and reciprocity (Chambers, 1996: 197-211).

6.1.1 Providers of Development Cooperation

Two findings emerge from traditional provider perspectives on the quality of decision-making and debate. First, debates and decision-making are perceived to be of a very high, inclusive quality relative to that of other inter-governmental fora. Moreover, it has been the efforts of some traditional donors – particularly the German Co-Chair - to improve upon the *universality* of decision-making and deliberation. Second, despite such inclusivity, the substance of some discussions is perceived to be lacking. Furthermore, the influence of debates and deliberations upon broader global processes and national actors, and hence their perceived relevance, is questioned by traditional providers.

The GPEDC is perceived by some traditional providers to provide a ‘unique space’ for deliberation and debate due to its openness and multi-stakeholder nature. For instance, one DAC representative noted the following on the quality of debate when reflecting on the issue of waning donor engagement:

I find it very healthy that the discussion of waning or not on donor engagement is out in the open... In other words, there isn't a little group that is 'donor-only' where the discussion is taking place. In the GPEDC it is literally out there for everybody... I think truly that the GPEDC occupies a unique space (Interview 39)

While deliberation within the GPEDC is perceived to be highly inclusive and open, there is the aforementioned issue of the ‘golden rule’ when it comes to decision-making (see 5.2.1 on Equality). Traditional donors do not deny (although perhaps not in a formal capacity) that due to their superior capacity and hence ability to engage within the GPEDC, decisions

taken by the Steering Committee often reflect the positions of traditional donors. While this undercuts the *rationality* of decision-making and the deliberative quality of the GPEDC, it has resulted in increasing the GPEDC's *universality*. The key instance in this regard was the active role of the European Commission and the German co-chair in driving forward the proposition to introduce the NECC to represent non-state constituencies (EU Common Position, 2016: para 32). In spite of sustained disagreement by many other stakeholders - including initial resistance from Japan (GPEDC, 2012) - it was due to the efforts of the German Co-Chair that this position was established. As noted by the IPU representative: 'I think we owe it very much to the German co-chair... who was very receptive from the beginning to the idea... that the non-executives should be part of and at the helm [of decision-making] with them' (Interview 40). Nevertheless, one DAC representative noted that sustained efforts were required to 'secure consensus by the whole steering committee' and that the donor co-chair did not unilaterally determine the position (Interview 37).

One of the reasons why traditional donors praise the GPEDC as a deliberative space is due to the GPEDC's lack of international visibility and profile. As a consequence,

...people feel that it is a space where they can talk and it's not going to be on the front pages of the papers... because there isn't that spotlight on it, people can maybe have more informal conversations, or take small risks [in what they say], and that might disappear if it was too high profile (Interview 39).

The GPEDC is perceived to offer a unique space for 'frank' debate compared to alternative intergovernmental fora such as those within the UN. Furthermore, one European DAC representative noted that 'the fact that it is a multi-stakeholder platform, so it's not an intergovernmental or an official setting if you like, that allows and it's easier to engage in conversation, and discussions go beyond official positions' (Interview 36). Consequently, that the GPEDC offers a less politicised space than other fora generates positive perspectives by traditional donors.

Nevertheless, there are explicit qualms about the substantive quality of debates and deliberations that take place in the GPEDC: 'there's a level of inclusivity [within the GPEDC]

that just means that nothing happens' (Interview 50). For traditional donors, the fact that the GPEDC is a multi-stakeholder space means that all stakeholders expect to have the opportunity to present their respective viewpoints. This puts clear and onerous demands in terms of setting up inclusive discussions, and it also limits interaction and the substantive depth in which issues can be addressed. This is particularly the case for panels at large events, such as at HLMs:

...essentially there's going to be a panel discussion in which you squish nine people into the panel, they all get 3 minutes to say their little bit - there is very little insight that you could contain into that. And then the questions are so squished and are [asked by] the people that you couldn't get into the panel, that you've given away all your first responders, and then the event is over and there hasn't been any discussion. But that's not just the GPEDC that's a development thing as well. (Interview 50)

Furthermore, smaller Steering Committee meetings are subject to the 'development problem' more broadly in that 'if you create a group you spend 90% of the time talking about the running of the group and 10% on what you can actually do as a group' (Interview 50). That Steering Committee meetings 'adopt more of a substantive debating and decision-making role' was put forward by the USA early on in the GPEDC's life in 2014 (GPEDC, 2014b: 4). However, there is the perception that Steering Committee meetings maintain a somewhat myopic focus upon procedural governance issues, thus undercutting the substantive quality of decision-making and deliberation that takes place. On the other hand, more general policy dialogues and events - and with the need to ensure inclusivity - are perceived to significantly curtail more substantive discussion on key issues.

6.1.2 'Dual Category' Countries

'Dual Category' perspectives on the quality of decision-making and debate present three findings. First, despite the irony that the BRICS are not present, the GPEDC is perceived to be a platform *par excellence* in terms of its universal quality in that it brings together a multi-stakeholder range of actors for debates. Second, that smaller, more technical and niche discussions are preferred by dual category countries. Third, DAC 'we-know-best' attitudes

are perceived to be prevalent, and these curtail the possibility for more reciprocity in terms of mutual learning.

Similar to traditional providers, the following Latin American representative holds the universal quality of the GPEDC's deliberations and decision-making to be unique and in high praise:

...there is not one meeting where you have a significant difference in the participation of CSOs, the private sector, foundations, parliamentarians, and national and local governments. The participation needs to be balanced, otherwise, it's an issue where if let's say you have a UN style balance in the GPEDC, everybody would be very unhappy... You need to have, most of the time, most of the stakeholders represented. And so for me, I think that the GPEDC is actually a very good example of how to involve the most multi-stakeholders... in the discussions, but also in the decision-making process because they are fully part of the steering committee. (Interview 13)

However, some members of this constituency have resisted efforts to improve universality by objecting to the creation of the NECC. In particular, both the Philippines and the Co-Chair Bangladesh repeatedly expressed reservations over the NECC position. The official justification for this resistance was due to questions over its 'added value', and the possibility of increased transaction costs that may result for the decision-making process (GPEDC, 2018: 7). However, the position was established and while official positions may differ, I found that the NECC and the Bangladeshi Co-Chair have a highly productive and jovial working relationship. Furthermore, it could be argued that the lack of BRICS presence has enabled the creation of this position, as CSOs insist that some BRICS members would not have acquiesced to participate on equal footing with CSO representatives at the ministerial level.

Speaking on the quality of debate, all 'dual category' representatives expressed clear preferences for smaller over larger meetings 'because we have a narrower topic and specific action to solve' (Interview 19). Given the arguable 'niche-ness' of SSC as a topic of discussion, insofar as development effectiveness is concerned, there is a preference for smaller, technical and more targeted discussion:

I believe there are some side events or more tactical spaces that, in my view, are more fruitful. There are some events at high level that the main goal is not to have the most fruitful discussion, but to make a statement. So it really depends on what the main goal is, but I appreciate a lot more some of the technical discussions and technical meetings that I was able to witness and participate in, because there is where we can really see people at the technical level saying, what is happening in terms of, for example, the challenges to have adequate data on SSC, for example... when we go to more technical, less political, also less compromised spaces, we can start unpacking the kind of assumed or rhetorical assumptions that we have been mentioning for ages in the aid effectiveness or in the development corporation debate. (Interview 26)

There are several reasons as to why SSC actors prefer smaller, technical, and non-politicised discussions. First, representatives from 'dual category' countries that attend GPEDC events tend to be technical experts from their respective bilateral agencies. Consequently, they prefer opportunities to share and learn from technical events and fora. Secondly, in the UN, deliberations on SSC tend to be politicised, and hence technical discussions in the GPEDC are refreshingly welcome. Moreover, when provided with spaces to speak on areas that they have expertise, this can offset concerns over rationality as detailed next.

For some 'dual category' representatives, the disposition of some DAC countries inhibit reciprocal discussions and equal exchange of knowledge. For instance, one representative from a 'dual category' country that has not participated in the GPEDC noted:

Some countries might especially feel that they have this upper hand in terms of development cooperation, because the whole story about development has emerged from the Western World, back from the 1960s. So the whole discourse has emanated from that world. There is a huge knowledge and experience base that those countries [have and] are able to talk about, but they have difficulty from learning from the other side... in the GPEDC, they might have some kind of resistance, about whether they can really learn from others. Yes, in discourse and discussion - we say we can learn from others. But it's always easier said than done. (Interview 43)

The perspective that DAC members may be recalcitrant to 'learn from the other side' is not solely directed towards the nature of debate and deliberation within the GPEDC. Rather, it is a general perspective that some 'dual category' representatives maintain when engaging with particular donor representatives and agencies. Consequently, this perspective has concrete impacts upon the degree to which some dual category countries perceive there to

be opportunities for reciprocity and mutual learning. In sum, there is little doubt that the GPEDC is adept at bringing a wide range of stakeholders together for discussion (Universality), and that dual category countries prefer smaller targeted discussions by virtue of the specificity of the issues that they are concerned with. However, the persistence of particular attitudes among some traditional providers undermine the reciprocity of discussions that take place at the GPEDC.

6.1.3 Recipient Countries

For recipient countries, there is a general perception that debate and decision-making is highly universal in nature. For instance, one West African country representative notes the following about the 'Reinvigorating Development Effectiveness' event held in Paris in November, 2018:

I think the level of engagement from the private sector, from NGOs from, you know, civil society was phenomenal. Because I could remember I attended most of the events, you know, in Paris, but clearly both in small groups, and in the plenary you could see the, the discourse on panels is quite mixed in the sense that they pick from different walks of life, different backgrounds, you know, different ideologies, and so on, bring them together and share their views. So, in my mind, I think the inclusion is good. (Interview 29)

However, not all recipients shared such sanguine views on the universal nature of the GPEDC's deliberation and decision-making quality. Some recipients argued that the GPEDC is in fact 'too global' in terms of its deliberation and decision-making quality (Interview 48). As the representative goes on to note, the deliberative quality is undermined in that 'there are so many actors, there are so many causes, and the more global you make it, the more this kind of requests you will find... I would say one of the challenges would be developing an agreement or consensus' (ibid.). Unsurprisingly, there was resistance by many recipient governments towards the creation of the NECC on the basis that such would increase the logistical difficulties in reaching consensus further and in turn delay decision-making (Interview 48). For recipient countries there is a fear that the greater inclusion of other actors might dilute their collective voice, and also undermine the procedural quality of decision-making by saturating the debate with too many perspectives.

On the rationality of the GPEDC's debate and decision-making, recipients argue that such proceeds on a hierarchical basis due to the superior capacity held by other actors. As noted by one Southern Africa country representative, it was only due to German capacity support that enabled the Ugandan Co-Chair to fulfil its role (Interview 44). Capacity differentials go a long way in explaining how donor dominance persists within the GPEDC: often it is not the result of a conspiratorial attempt by donors to dominate proceedings. Instead, hierarchy in decision-making results from the *de facto* realities of having actors with vastly different capacity engaging in a governance process. Despite the ambition to have debates and decision-making on an equal basis, I observed that the greatest impediments to receiving more sustained input by recipient representatives was not due to formal barriers to access. Instead, representatives from recipient countries who were responsible for engaging with the GPEDC had significant additional portfolios and work pressures on them, and this included the Ugandan co-chair representative. For instance, I recall the Ugandan co-chair representative being unable to attend several co-chair meetings as they were required to be in the Ugandan country-side for work unrelated to the GPEDC, and hence there was limited or no internet access. As one JST colleague remarked following a virtual co-chair meeting where the Ugandan seat was empty: 'you have to invest in capacity for these things to work, otherwise it's just for show and frankly a waste of time' (Personal Observation).

In addition to a lack of capacity that produces hierarchy in decision-making and debate, recipient representatives argue that the lack of a consultative mechanism for recipient countries undermines their collective contribution. The following perspective is highly illustrative in this regard:

In my experience - I think that the donors are well prepared when there are meetings. Some [partner] governments are not very well prepared. I think they [recipients] still are 'just' attending the meeting, not having a group they needed to prepare before the meetings to have the same opinion on all the matters that are in the meeting. But when you see how the donors are acting in fora, you see that they have organized - they have leadership and they know how to connect with the debates. But that is not for all the governments, just some governments are really prepared and others that we can say are less so. They [DAC countries] are on the same page when they are at the respective fora. (Interview 33)

Nonetheless, recipients hold a similar perception to that of donors when it comes to the ‘other side of the coin’ in terms having multi-stakeholder debates with a high level of universality. Namely, that universal or inclusive debates result in a lack of depth and substance due to time constraints. As noted by one Central African country representative:

The events organized by the GPEDC are considered insufficient to allow a productive exchange. Indeed, the time allotted to these events is [too] short enough to address sufficiently the density of the subjects during these meetings. (Interview 48)

However, on balance some recipient countries do perceive the meetings to be useful: ‘it’s something that is very helpful for us, because we are always picking up something from the event[s], and transform[ing] it at the national level to improve the change of behaviour’ (Interview 44). Nevertheless, and as will be mentioned in the section under Transparency (6.1.3), the representative does go on to note that there are occasions wherein they are not aware that events and debates are taking place.

6.1.4 Civil Society Organisations

CSO representatives provide mixed perspectives on this indicator. In terms of improving upon the *universality* of the GPEDC’s deliberative and decision-making quality, CSOs have fought since the GPEDC’s inception for the creation of the NECC position (GPEDC, 2016a). However, despite broad CSO support, there was a concern by some that the position would lead to the co-option of the independent voice of CSOs (Nilsson et al., 2019: 12). Nevertheless, the NECC was pursued with a view to increase the inclusivity and transparency of the GPEDC at ‘its highest decision-making level’, while it would enable non-state actors to shape the agenda of the Steering Committee and to counterbalance governmental priorities (CPDE, 2016: 4).

However, there are outstanding concerns over the degree to which the NECC position will alter the government and donor-led nature of the partnership. As one representative noted: ‘I’m so sorry to say this because on many grounds, we are very happy that we’re part of the

process... theoretically, this should be working well – but I think it's still problematic and it's still top-down' when it comes to decision-making (Interview 20). Furthermore, and as a more general reflection on government-CSO relations, one representative noted that 'CSOs are consulted to death, but decision-making is done by governments and donors' (Personal Observation, CSO Caucusing Event, 12 July 2019, New York). Additionally, one representative noted that there is only so much that can be done within the GPEDC in order to equalise power relations in agenda setting and decision-making:

...obviously there's a lot of decisions about the [aid] system that are not taking place there [at the GPEDC]... and the DAC is one space where you can see how the decisions are being made... there are lots of decisions being made in other spaces. However, it's really hard to know what these spaces are, donors coordinating with each other and so on.
(Interview 3)

Consequently, although efforts have been made to improve universality with the creation of the NECC, the process is still perceived to be highly hierarchical in its favouring of the voice of governments and donors.

Similar to the perspectives of other stakeholders, CSOs maintain that debates in the GPEDC often lack depth, and the influence of these exchanges upon behaviour change is questioned. For instance, Steering Committee meetings have been criticised for containing 'lots of talk of process but little talk of substance... how commitments are being met, and what are the blocks and how are we trying to overcome those blocks' (Interview 12). Despite the lack of substance, there are promising signs that engagement in working groups provide opportunities for stakeholders to engage in more substantive discussions. However, CSOs are cautious to 'overrate the influence that those [discussions] have in kind of directing behavioural change, but they are [nevertheless] necessary to lay a kind of common shared grounding... [that will] hopefully inform further debate' (Interview 12).

Nevertheless, for those who have had direct exposure to the preparatory processes that take place for the GPEDC debates and discussions, there is the perception that these:

...processes are more important [than the discussions themselves] because such preparatory processes are better positioned to offer avenues to influence the conclusions [and], to influence final decisions. And why so? Because CSOs are there on equal footing, [they] have some capacity to officially steer the discussion in some directions... to the question about the quality [of debate] I think that the quality is remarkable (Interview 17)

I heavily sympathise with the view presented above: the sheer degree of hard work, consideration and effort that goes into ensuring inclusive multi-stakeholder debates under the auspices of the GPEDC is considerable. The debates and discussions that took place at the SLM are the mere ‘tip of the iceberg’ of the profound efforts and multi-stakeholder collaboration that goes into their preparation. Profound efforts are made in ensuring that all stakeholder views – be it North, South, public, and private – are at least expressed on a given topic area. For CSOs, these efforts have not gone unnoticed, and there is the view amongst many CSOs that the quality of debate has improved over the years. For instance, ‘the discussions over time have gotten more interesting as partner countries have gotten more frustrated. People will say stuff that they wouldn’t have said before, and basically call out stakeholders on what they’re doing or not doing’ (Interview 18).

While preparatory processes are perceived to be of a highly inclusive and fruitful nature, CSOs argue that what is truly important is having debates and decisions that result in behaviour change. A critical contention is that high-level debates and discussions of the GPEDC are ‘largely back-patting exercises’ where ‘everything has been groomed well in advance’ (Interview 10). Consequently, although:

...we talk about these spaces for mutual learning, for sharing best practice and these kinds of things, I don't find that the form that they take, that the participants who are there, really show that they want that. So for me, you have this kind of the talking heads moment[s] where you have a couple heads of government, you have a civil society person kind of giving the reality check I guess you could say after the heads of government people speak, a private sector person may be doing the same, but I don't see how that contributes to pushing the organization forward in a positive way (Interview 18)

Hence for CSOs, there is a need for the GPEDC to go ‘beyond [being] a forum of interesting discussions and debates’ (Interview 8). Rather, there is much a greater concern with accountability for those who have taken on commitments and to ensure that action is taken

on the ground. Moreover, CPDE actively resisted the recommendation that the 'GPEDC's ultimate purpose should be a multi-actor knowledge hub at global, regional, and national level' (CPDE, 2016a: 4). They noted that efforts to transform the GPEDC into a primarily discussion and knowledge sharing forum 'would miss the main goal of establishing the GPEDC in the first place', which was 'to support and ensure accountability for the implementation of commitments at the political level', as per the Busan Partnership Agreement on paragraph 36a (ibid). This is not to suggest that CSOs believe the discussion and debating function of the GPEDC to be unimportant. It is rather an affirmation that the GPEDC should not solely focus upon deliberation and knowledge-sharing.

HLMs and political discussions are nonetheless regarded as essential for the governance process, as without having discussions at the political level would risk rendering the GPEDC overly technocratic. Without having such political exchanges in high-level fora: 'there's no moment of which the new political agenda can be renewed. The danger is that it [the GPEDC] becomes non-political and therefore non-important' (Interview 3). Moreover, the representative goes on to note how lapsing the GPEDC into a technocratic deliberative process would work in favour of some donor governments in terms of maintaining their control:

...it's a political strategy of donor governments. If it's technocratic, that's fine for them. If you're attending and you want to keep control, 'brilliant let's have a technocratic discussion', who can compete with you on a technocratic level? Nobody... That's what happened at Busan, basically, and I think that civil society bears some responsibility for not thinking politically enough. [We] used to have an aid effectiveness discussion, which was about how donors should behave, change their behaviour in order improve how the systems works. Suddenly it changed into 'how everyone should behave', i.e. development effectiveness, and then they cut out the regular high-level ministerial meetings [with the SLM]. So it's de-politicized the whole thing. (Interview 3)

6.1.5 Private Sector Actors

PSAs hold relatively negative views on the quality of the GPEDC's decision-making and debate. Furthermore, PSAs were unsupportive of efforts to enhance the universality of the GPEDC's decision-making and debate with the creation of the NECC. The lack of private

sector support is surprising, as the position would have ostensibly provided PSAs with greater decision-making power and influence. However, their objection is illustrative. Private sector representatives argued that the position would render the governance of the GPEDC even more inefficient than they already perceived it to be.

PSAs have long maintained that the decision-making and deliberative processes of the GPEDC are inefficient and an active deterrent to sustained business engagement. As the following statement from BIAC (Business at the OECD) makes clear:

The Abuja meeting is the fifth meeting to take place in a little over one year and in five different countries around the world. This means it has taken five senior-level meetings, combined with significant travel and expense, to prepare one high-level meeting in April 2014. This process is untenable in the longer-term and is not conducive to maintaining business interest. It is for this reason that the business participation in the Steering Committee meetings has been changing regularly. We strongly encourage the Steering Committee and Joint Support Team to consider ways to render the process as efficient as possible – both in terms of time and cost to participants. (BIAC, 2014: 2)

Broadly negative perspectives on the onerous quality of decision-making and debate have recently begun to improve. Such is due to enhanced perceptions of mutual learning (reciprocity), clearer outputs, and less suspicion held by other stakeholders towards PSAs. Yet as with dual category countries, PSAs overwhelmingly prefer targeted and specific debates that pertain directly to their interests. Furthermore, there is the perception that debate, deliberation and dialogue is not enough and there is a need for action. One respondent provides the following understanding as to why early GPEDC debates and deliberations were regarded negatively by PSAs:

I think things have changed over the last couple of years for the better, because the challenge was that when you're bringing people together in international processes, they immediately revert to a UN negotiation type approach, rather than what the GPEDC was [meant] to be: If we work more closely together, and align our approaches and work and bring our resources together, how can we achieve more? How can we achieve more transformational development? That is what it should have been about... The problem is everything from the way the meetings were set up, so they are in your standard UN negotiation type arrangement, often in UN style rooms, which are not rooms for innovative, creative collective thinking. So you'd have these steering committee meetings in which people would give their set speech that they were bringing to the table, and they have to say these three things. Rather than collectively

brainstorming, building on each other, actually getting stuff done.
(Interview 47)

The respondent goes on to note that the quality of debate has indeed improved, owing in part to the dissipation of the initial suspicion of business held by some stakeholders, of whom are professed to have ‘a complete lack of understanding both of the role of business as an actor in development and as a partner in development’ (ibid.). Other private sector representatives note that with regards to the Steering Committee meetings today that ‘there’s plenty of opportunity for open debate’ and that despite ‘a lot of time [being] spent on technical aspects... I don’t feel like anybody is unable to raise key issues from their perspective at any time’ (Interview 35). Even more positively regarded is the private sector engagement working group and BLC. For instance, the latter is lauded for enabling for ‘fairly intense, robust and engaging discussion that seemed to lead to a series of concrete actions’ (Interview 28).

As with the ‘dual category’ country representatives, private sector representatives therefore prefer technical discussions and debates that focus squarely on issues that are of interest to the private sector. As one respondent notes that ‘there’s been [a] constant refrain: “we’ve got to get the private sector more [involved]” without a concomitant understanding of ‘for what?’ (Interview 47). Hence discussions that speak to the generality of private sector engagement are perceived to be too broad and quite frankly a waste of time for PSAs, many of whom question as to why exactly they were even invited to certain events. In these regards, PSAs perceive many of the debates and deliberations to be rather shallow in substance, or as one respondent put it, ‘lacking in intimacy and intensity’ (Interview 7).

In their evaluation of the quality of deliberation and decision-making, PSAs are thus beholden to the view that ‘you’ll only engage business... where there is specificity of interest’, and that ‘dialogue is not enough... there needs to be much more focus on making stuff happen’ (Interview 47). Deliberation for deliberation sake without clear consequential action will not suffice. It is for this reason that one respondent requested, in frustration at the style of the GPEDC’s discussion at Steering Committee Meetings, ‘that there should be a parallel ‘doers’ type meeting, where those who want to get stuff done actually come together

to have that type of discussion' (ibid). Nevertheless, there is the impression that things have improved for the better, particularly with regard to specific groups on private sector engagement.

There are several key findings that emerge from stakeholder perspectives on the quality of decision-making and debate. First, there is substantial divergence over the preferred degree of inclusiveness and openness, hence universality, of the GPEDC's deliberation and decision-making processes. Moreover, there are concerns among actors that the number of voices included in deliberations produces inefficiency, particularly for recipient countries and PSAs. In terms of the rationality of the GPEDC's deliberation and decision-making processes, it is clear that donors continue to dominate. This is largely due to the disparity of capacity that donors wield over other actors, particularly recipient countries, and it is accentuated by the lack of an adequate representative mechanism around which recipient views could converge to develop consensus positions.

All stakeholders broadly perceive deliberation and decision-making to be reciprocal insofar as there is ample opportunity for mutual learning and decision-making is consensus-oriented. However, the former is circumscribed by the perception held by some dual-category representatives that DAC donors continue to maintain a 'we-know-best' disposition that undercuts genuine opportunities for mutual learning and exchange. Crucially, decision-making and deliberations within the GPEDC have been subject to increasing depoliticisation through an increasing emphasis upon technical debates within the GPEDC. It is argued by the more powerful traditional donors, PSAs, and 'dual-category' countries that technical debates are preferable as they enable for more substantive discussions. However, this is lamented by recipient countries and CSOs in particular who fear that such undermines the need for discussions on the politics surrounding aid and its distribution.

6.2 Transparency

Transparency is a core development effectiveness principle and continuous attempts have been made to operationalise transparency throughout the processes and functioning of the

GPEDC. At the first Steering Committee meeting, ‘there was broad agreement on the need for transparent processes, with clear indications to all stakeholders on the timing and mechanisms for consultations, inputs, consolidated positions, decisions and feedback’ (GPEDC, 2012: 10). In practice, this meant a commitment to publish minutes and records of Steering Committee and Ministerial meetings (GPEDC, 2012a). On translation, and given funding constraints, a pragmatic decision was taken to offer a ‘reasonable degree of accessibility to all audiences’ by translating detailed documents into English, French, and Spanish – and ensuring a wider set of languages for key ministerial documents (ibid.). Moreover, the GPEDC publishes online its codified information and outreach policies in advance of every major policy cycle. Nevertheless, despite tailored and concerted efforts to ensure that information is accessible, information transparency is an insufficient precondition for visibility. As noted by one respondent, ‘very few people know what the GPEDC is... one of the challenges that we have in terms of getting traction through these processes [is that] they are just not that important to the external public’ (Interview 10). This section explores the stakeholder perspectives on challenges and tensions surrounding transparent governance.

6.2.1 Providers of Development Cooperation

Traditional providers provide few qualms over access to information and the overall transparency of the GPEDC. On the whole, representatives provided rather bland statements on the GPEDC’s transparency, such as: ‘the information transparency within the GPEDC is appropriately sufficient. A sufficient amount of information is available on the website of the GPEDC’ (Interview 49). Furthermore, it was recognized by one European DAC representative that ensuring transparency requires active efforts on behalf of Steering Committee members:

I don’t see a major deficit of transparency... So it is up to each [Steering Committee member] to interrogate, inform, and get the opinion of its own constituency before each meeting. It’s not necessarily the responsibility of the JST to do that (Interview 36)

While no representative interviewed expressed criticism over access to information, there were concerns over the nature of some information provided by the GPEDC. As one DAC country representative noted:

I think there are some operational issues around the length and repetitiveness of the papers, they all come out in a similar style and they're just a little bit boring to be honest. You have to really go through them to get to the heart of the matter, which really makes engagement more time consuming than it needs to be. That's not the EC's fault, that's more the JST. They need to be persuaded that two pages would work - they shouldn't assume such a low base of knowledge, they don't need to set the scene every single time, they can actually go straight to the issue. And that is a genuine disincentive to engage, because it takes too much time (Interview 50)

The accessibility of information not only pertains to stakeholders being able to access information in a language and manner with which they are familiar. For some, accessible information is also understood to be documents that are not overly time-consuming or dense. For senior civil servants within donor agencies that have additional demanding portfolios, it important that voluntary initiatives such as the GPEDC strike a balance between ensuring transparency by providing sufficient information, and in ensuring that such information is not too excessive so as to overburden stakeholders.

6.2.2 'Dual Category' Countries

'Dual Category' countries present mixed perspectives on the GPEDC's transparency. Similar to the perspectives of traditional providers, the level of information that is available online is deemed appropriate. However, one respondent noted that it was incumbent upon third parties to translate information regarding the GPEDC into Chinese on an *ad hoc* basis. Crucially, it was noted that the Southern think-tank grouping NeST plays an important role in disseminating information regarding the GPEDC in their respective countries, many of whom are large Southern providers of development cooperation (Interview 24). For countries that do not speak English, French, and Spanish, the consequence is that there are clear limits upon the information that can be accessed and the extent to which Southern provider representatives can keep informed and abreast of ongoing developments.

The representative from Mexico noted that the lack of visibility of the GPEDC, which can in part be attributed to the lack of translation of information, contributes to skepticism surrounding the GPEDC endeavour (Personal Observation, DAC Meeting, New York, 14 July 2019). Hence, in order for such monitoring approaches to take root in Southern SSC provider countries, there needs to be clear information over how the results of the monitoring process do indeed affect development cooperation agencies from the North. It is thus worth questioning, from this perspective, as to why reluctant actors would engage in the auspices of the GPEDC if information is difficult to access due to a lack of translation, or because the relevance of the GPEDC work to the activities of Southern providers is unclear. Similarly, one Latin American representative expressed that it was difficult for their domestic PSAs to engage in the 2018 monitoring round, and that there was a clear ‘need to use a more friendly language or terms so [that] they can understand a little bit more... If they understand it more and clearly, they would probably be more engaged in this platform’ (Interview 31). There are therefore issues not only regarding the translation of information and documents, but also in ensuring information is accessible to different types of stakeholders.

6.2.3 Recipient Countries

Recipients maintain broadly positive perspectives on the GPEDC’s level of transparency. However, concerns were raised about regular communication and lacking translation. For the latter, one West Asian country representative expressed grievance over the fact that there is a lack of translation of documents into Arabic – and that this places severe limits on the extent to which national level stakeholders can be engaged and informed about GPEDC processes such as the monitoring rounds (Interview 42).

To its credit, the G7+ representative has the following to say about the GPEDC’s level of transparency:

I think, yes, just to be clear enough, we do receive information regarding the agenda, consultations, it's worth commending. Also reaching the

repository of information, you know, the platforms that they have, I think that's very transparent. I don't see any issue with that. (Interview 46)

Nevertheless, some respondents noted dismay on the level of communication between the JST and partner countries. For instance, one Southern Africa country representative noted that regarding smaller GPEDC events:

Sometimes you are not aware of it, because they have selected different countries. Sometimes you are attending because you have been selected. It's not all the time, [that] all the countries, all the stakeholders can participate. That is something that I think is problematic. When I attend one of the events, and I speak with my colleagues from Benin for example, about the event and the outcome of the event - that can be helpful, but sometimes we are surprised because we didn't know about it. So it may also happen to me next time. I do not know how they do that [select participants] (Interview 44)

Similar concerns were raised by one Central African representative:

All information from the GPEDC is available on their website and there are opportunities to contact them directly for more information. However, better communication between the OECD-UNDP Joint Secretariat and the Coordination of the GPEDC at the national level would facilitate the sharing of information and ensure optimal participation of Cameroon in international meetings on the Global Partnership and on issues of financing for development in general. (Interview 48)

There is thus a clear perspective on behalf of some partner countries that there are insufficient channels of communication regarding recipient participation in events at the GPEDC. This can in part be attributed to the lacklustre level of recipient consultation that takes place at the Steering Committee level as revealed in this project's findings on Representativeness (5.2.3). While the level of information available online is on the whole deemed appropriate by recipients, there are some concerns maintained by recipient countries over the need for translation into a broader number of languages and more appropriate and regular channels of communication.

6.2.4 Civil Society Organizations

Representatives from CSOs provide rather nuanced perspectives on the perceived level of transparency of the GPEDC. This is perhaps unsurprising given CSO's traditional role of

being advocates for more transparent governance processes in development effectiveness and in other issue areas. For CSO representatives, the issue with the GPEDC's transparency is not a lack of information *per se*. To the contrary, one respondent notes the following:

Transparency, I mean, you know, if you go to the to the GPEDC website, I'm pretty sure that everything [is] there, it might be more a problem of information saturation, than [a] lack of transparency. So, you know, you just look through all these documents and your brain just goes 'What the hell is going on?' (Interview 10)

The CSO representatives provided no qualms over the extent to which information was available to access either online or on request. However, one respondent noted that:

...the problem is that transparency, it's not just about giving out information... I think transparency is also making sure that the information that you're giving out is something that is understandable to your audience. So if that's not the case, then there's really a problem with transparency... (Interview 20)

For some respondents, the solution to the perceived issues surrounding the transparency lies in how the information is presented to affected stakeholders. For instance:

At the end of the day, we're accountable to the people. So probably you also need to improve on the kind of language that we have in the global partnership, to do away with all these political and technical language and make it more understandable or for wider engagement - and that could include, you know: how do we share data? How do we share information, how do we use all of this data, technology, wherein we're able to explain aid and development in more understandable terms? Or, how are we able to relate aid and development with the issue of national budgets? All of these [issues] that can be actually quite overwhelming for many. (Interview 8)

Clearly, the issue for CSOs is not the level of information that is available but rather its intelligibility to external stakeholders i.e. ensuring that information is understandable to affected populations and communities. For instance, some of those represented suggested that there was a need for information to also be understandable by indigenous peoples, local workers and other affected groups.

6.2.5 Private Sector Actors

PSAs presented little concern over the transparency of the GPEDC. However, as a process that is intergovernmental in provenance, much of the language surrounding development effectiveness appears quite foreign to the business world. This places limits on the extent to which PSAs are able to actually engage with information on the partnership.

Nevertheless, there is a general sense that the GPEDC attempts to adhere to transparency as a governance principle:

I think generally, the partnership is quite unique in how it is structured, how many stakeholders it has, and also actually from the global south. But generally, I have a feeling that it's trying to be transparent, [and in] having all people around one table... (Interview 7)

Despite there being a general level of transparency insofar as access to online information is concerned, it was nonetheless recognised by one representative that there is a degree of informational asymmetry in terms of accessing information on the decision-making process (Interview 47). However, this asymmetry was not perceived to be an issue. Total transparency and access to all the minutiae of day-to-day governance was not deemed desirable by PSAs, as such would further encumber the already inefficient governance and decision-making processes of the GPEDC (see Section 6.1.5).

Although there were no issues raised over the general quality of the GPEDC's transparency, a key challenge for the GPEDC is providing information that is intelligible for PSAs. The GPEDC is faced with the persistent challenge in that 'the business world is hardly aware of the existence of the Global Partnership and their goals' (GPEDC, 2016d). The challenge lies in not only translating documents, but ensuring that they are of interest, relevant, and understandable for key development actors that the partnership seeks to engage. The GPEDC's genesis as an intergovernmental process means that many business actors find much of what is discussed and produced at the GPEDC as both inaccessible and ultimately irrelevant to their own activities. It was for this reason that the BLC was created, in the hope

that the Principles for Effective Private Sector Engagement were designed, articulated, and communicated with business audiences in mind. While observing the process around the BLC and the Principles, it was clear that there were divergences between how the ‘development’ and the ‘business’ world understood and sought to articulate similar concepts. Notably, there was a lively ‘push-and-pull’ over whether the *raison d’être* of the principles was to achieve ‘shared value’ (as advocated for by the private sector) or ‘shared benefit’ (as understood by traditional development actors). The point being is that in ensuring transparency, it is important that stakeholders such as the private sector are actually able to engage and understand the information provided by a governance arrangement. However, providing documentation and information that is communicable to both the development and the business world is not an organic nor straight-forward matter of translation.

Although all stakeholders hold the GPEDC’s level of transparency in high praise, these findings reveal that transparency is more than the mere translation of documents and making them available online. There are qualms over the degree to which all information should be made available, with some arguing that too much information can be an active deterrent to participation. Furthermore, stakeholders argue that it should not only be possible to access information, but this information should also be accessible i.e. intelligible to diverse audiences of interest. However, the presence of diverse understandings, logics, and interests inhibit more clear cut and direct communication within multi-stakeholder governance.

6.3 Accountability

The GPEDC is a horizontal form of governance that is characterised by a ‘mutual accountability’ structure (Ocampo and Gómez-Arteaga, 2016: 311). The OECD (2009a: 1) has defined mutual accountability as the ‘process by which two (or multiple) partners agree to be held responsible for the commitments that they have voluntarily made to each other’. As noted, mutual accountability is one of the core development effectiveness principles. Therefore, effectively operationalising this principle is a crucial determinant of the GPEDC’s mandate fulfilment. Furthermore, the GPEDC has been described by some as a ‘major

global level accountability mechanism' for the policy field of development cooperation and the SDGs (Timo-Mahn, 2017: 22). As noted by the former DAC Chair Brian Atwood, the GPEDC was created with the intent to strengthen accountability as a central pillar of global development governance, or, as a 'way to hold governments' feet to the fire' through its biennial monitoring process (Abdel-Malek, 2015: iii).

Consequently, ensuring for accountability perceptions not only for active members of the GPEDC (internal accountability) but also for those without (external accountability) is crucial for the GPEDC's relevance as a global governance mechanism within the broader field. The critical question guiding this section is, therefore, concerned with how stakeholders perceive the appropriateness of the accountability mechanisms of the GPEDC. This question pertains not only to how stakeholders perceive the desired accountability of the GPEDC's governance structure (i.e. Co-Chairs, Steering Committee, JST) but more crucially on how they perceive the GPEDC's monitoring framework, and thus accountability to one another. Discussion on the ability of this process to generate behaviour change will be addressed in the following section on output legitimacy.

6.3.1 Providers of Development Cooperation

Traditional donors present considerable concerns over the appropriateness of the GPEDC's accountability mechanisms. Traditional donors overwhelmingly affirm that they are first and foremost accountable to their taxpayers/national agencies. This was made clear at the first Steering Meeting, where the donor Co-Chair at the time, the UK, insisted that 'development co-operation involves the use of taxpayers' resources, and that governments have a duty to ensure that "spending" on development is in fact an "investment" in development' to their tax payers. (GPEDC, 2012). Furthermore, as DAC members, traditional donors are also held accountable for their ODA programmes every 4-5 years through the DAC peer review process. For DAC members that are Co-Chairs, or part of the GPEDC's Steering Committee, it is also at DAC meetings where they will be held accountable for their actions and decisions within the GPEDC.

Insofar as the governance mechanisms of the GPEDC are concerned, DAC members present concerns over the accountability of the JST. One European DAC representative noted that while their critique ‘had nothing to do with any of the people working there... it [the JST] was a very frustrating model to work with’ (Interview 50). DAC representatives argue that neither the OECD nor UNDP members of the JST are directly accountable to the co-chairs, and they were instead accountable to their respective agencies. Consequently, ‘accountability is pointing in the wrong way and to the wrong goals’ (ibid.). DAC representatives that have held Co-Chair positions are thus dismayed with the fragmented accountability relationship that results from the current JST arrangement, and would prefer a situation in which the JST was directly accountable to them. There have, therefore, been repeated calls from some DAC members to create an independent JST, and to ensure instead that the JST ‘is directly accountable to the co-chairs’ (Interview 50). Moreover, one representative noted that the accountability of the SC and Co-Chair system is undermined by it not being an open electoral system, and that outgoing members are replaced by the existing co-chair or steering committee members (Interview 49).

Traditional donors’ concerns over the accountability mechanisms of the GPEDC come into clear view with regards to the biennial monitoring process. Since the GPEDC’s formation, traditional donors have exhibited an apparent reluctance against a monitoring framework that would monitor their behaviour (McIvor, 2014). While the monitoring process has been established as ‘the backbone and core product of the GPEDC’ (GPEDC, 2019), traditional donors have attempted to ‘downplay accountability in favour of less committal “learning exchanges”’ (Bena and Tomlinson, 2017: 3). Rather than focusing on an accountability mechanism through the monitoring process, traditional donors such as South Korea have suggested the GPEDC should be transformed into a Davos-like platform for ‘various stakeholders to share softwares’ and knowledge (Personal Observation, DAC Meeting, Paris, 29 March 2019). Similarly, as Co-Chair, the Netherlands suggested that ‘the GPEDC should focus more on its role as a platform to support mutual learning and knowledge sharing’ (GPEDC, 2015: 9).

There are several justifications offered for traditional donor recalcitrance towards the GPEDC's monitoring function and framework. Primarily, traditional donors contend that it is for technical reasons. Namely, DAC donors argue that the framework is outdated and inappropriate for measuring the full impact and nature of their development cooperation. As noted by one DAC country representative:

I think at the moment some of the indicators they don't analyse enough trends in the totality of ODA or the totality of let's say, if you look at the new TOSSD measure or the proposed measure. So in other words, there might be a trend away from using country systems, but the report at the moment may not capture that.... so it [the monitoring report] very much looks at the support that you give government in some of the indicators, but what about the broader trends? And what is the impact of that on development effectiveness? (Interview 25)

DAC providers thus claim that the framework 'does not give full justice to [the] changing environment and modalities' of development cooperation (Comment by Switzerland Representative, Personal Observation, DAC Meeting, Paris, 18 June 2019). Similarly, some DAC countries that primarily operate multilaterally question the relevance of the GPEDC's monitoring framework as the framework - that focuses on bilateral ODA - may only cover a small amount of their development cooperation activities (Interview 30). It is a continual refrain of traditional donors that the GPEDC monitoring framework focuses too much upon conventional ODA, and therefore needs to be substantively broadened to capture the full range of development finance that is provided to recipient countries. Consequently, there are repeated calls to extend the framework to cover other actors and flows - such as 'dual-category' countries, the private sector and multilateral flows. With regards to dual category countries, one Canadian representative at the SLM affirmed that 'it is not fair that DAC [members] are held accountable via peer review and China is not' (Personal Observation, SLM, New York, 14 July 2019). Consequently, it has been an ongoing effort by the traditional donors to insist that the GPEDC monitoring framework be extended to capture flows from other non-DAC providers.

Tensions between some DAC members and the JST - and DAC recalcitrance towards the GPEDC monitoring framework - became clear during my time working for the secretariat. Before the launch of the Third Monitoring Report in June 2019, there were efforts by Staff of

the German Co-Chair to frustrate the launch of the second part of the report that focused on donor progress towards meeting development effectiveness commitments. In the past, evidence from the monitoring rounds had described DAC progress in terms of aggregate performance - and thus not on individual DAC country progress towards aid effectiveness. The monitoring framework was, therefore, not 'designed to show up differences between, let alone within, groups of assistance providers' (Pickering et al., 2017: 4). However, the second part of the 2018 monitoring report was devoted to highlighting the lack of DAC member progress on many commitments, and to suggest policy recommendations based upon agreed language from previous GPEDC declarations. The German Co-Chair responded by insisting that the report should be delayed so that co-chairs could review it. Alternatively, they argued that the report should be relegated to that of a 'working paper' rather than an official report. However, due to pressure from the other co-chairs (primarily the Ugandan co-chair and the 4th NECC) that insisted upon retaining the independence of the JST in producing the monitoring report, the report was published as it was. Nevertheless, this instance reveals how sensitive and powerfully some DAC members feel about the nature of the monitoring process. DAC members would much prefer a 'light-touch' monitoring process that was broader in scope, focused upon mutual learning, and thus not directed towards 'naming and shaming' poor performance.

While the monitoring framework continues to be criticised by traditional donors for not encapsulating more actors and flows, the biennial monitoring process nevertheless continues to be funded and supported by traditional donors such as the European Union. However, that the DAC members of the Steering Committee can develop and adjust the standards by which they will be held accountable is recognised by the OECD as potentially undermining the credibility of the process (OECD, 2015: 71; Dann, 2013). Nevertheless, traditional donors continue to criticise the monitoring process on technical de-politicised grounds, and they continually seek adjustments so that it monitors a greater number of actors.

6.3.2 *'Dual Category' Countries*

For 'dual category' countries, it is the accountability mechanisms of the GPEDC that are the most contentious elements of the process. Similar to traditional donors, there is an insistence by 'dual category' representatives that they are primarily accountable to their bilateral agencies and taxpayers. However, unlike the traditional donors, there is no concomitant external peer review process to which they are held accountable for their actions within the GPEDC. As a 'fuzzy constituency', there is no multilateral space wherein 'dual category' co-chairs and Steering Committee members are required to account for their behaviour in representing this diverse constituency. For instance, Bangladesh holds the co-chair position for 'dual category' countries. However, there are questions over whether Bangladesh fits this role: 'which makes the job of Bangladesh hard to be accountable for donor-recipient countries which it is supposed to represent' (Interview 49). Consequently, these actors are held to less demanding peer accountability requirements than their DAC counterparts.

It is arguably the monitoring process of the GPEDC that constitutes the core reason as to why large Southern providers, such as China, India and Brazil, do not formally participate in the process. As with UN processes, the word 'accountability' is 'four lettered' for these actors, and hence the suggestion that they would be held accountable for their voluntary commitments to development effectiveness was met with considerable resistance (Bissio, 2015). The most commonly invoked justification for this resistance is that the monitoring process is perceived to be thoroughly DAC or Northern in provenance and that such is visible in the technical terminology of the GPEDC agenda and the monitoring framework (Interview 24). For large southern 'dual category' countries, they insist that the standards and indicators contained within the GPEDC's monitoring process apply solely to traditional DAC donors and that such do not apply to the practices of SSC (Li, 2017). As a result, Kharas (2011: 4) claimed that China and India, therefore, see 'little purpose in broadening the accountability frame' of development effectiveness. It is recognised by OECD staff that there is an OECD 'obsession with a need to monetise and quantify everything', and thus the monitoring process does not fully capture the qualitative elements of SSC (Interview 2). As a result, one 'dual category' representative notes the following with regards to large SSC

providers. They note that it is not the principles of development effectiveness that are hindering engagement, but:

The issue is the issue of the process. [It is] the issue of the monitoring... these actors [Southern BRICS] have the impression that the whole process was being established in order to put a framework on their actions in International Development Corporation. What they, I think, understand is that this process comes directly from the Paris process, which is very much an OECD DAC-led process, and that the GPEDC basically inherits these elements. (Interview 13)

At Busan, those present agreed that the standards and commitments of the development effectiveness agenda would apply to South-South Cooperation on a voluntary basis (BOD, 2011). Moreover, it was agreed that ‘dual category’ countries would amongst themselves develop a monitoring process that is suited to their unique characters as providers of development cooperation. However, the first monitoring exercise published by the GPEDC (2014) put SSC providers on the same footing as traditional providers⁸. Consequently, Bracho (2017: 22-3) argues that it was due to a perception of this ‘broken promise’ that large Southern partners refused to participate in future processes of the GPEDC. Furthermore, for countries such as Indonesia who have proactively engaged in the GPEDC, they have not since partaken in the monitoring process (Interview 23). Consequently, many ‘dual category’ countries are resistant to the monitoring of their development cooperation programmes.

Nevertheless, Mexico has been a vocal proponent of the monitoring process and has attempted to ‘make good’ on the initial Busan promise of developing a monitoring process suited to SSC providers. In this regard, concerted efforts have been made by Mexico to ‘show that it [GPEDC monitoring] is more global than just donor-led’ (Mexican Delegate Comments, Personal Observation, DAC Meeting, Paris, 18 June 2019). Consequently, at the 2019 SLM, Mexico presented its ongoing work to develop an approach to review and assess the development effectiveness of SSC. I was personally taken aback during this session by the degree of support expressed by ‘dual category’ representatives on the need to develop monitoring frameworks and enhanced transparency for SSC programmes. The

⁸ It is unlikely that this can be attributed to shrewd manoeuvring by the DCD or UNDP team responsible for producing the 2014 report. Recipient countries continue to report on development cooperation that comes from India and China, yet the JST decides not to publish it in their reports. The publishing of information on China in the 2014 report was most likely an oversight.

increasing openness of SSC countries to monitoring frameworks was also visible at the UN BAPA+40 Conference on South-South cooperation, where paragraph 11 of the Outcome Document notes the ‘need to enhance the development effectiveness of South-South and triangular cooperation’ (UNGA, 2019). While in the early 2010s China and India would have been vocal critics of such a statement, it was notable that they did not present any objections to the insertion of this paragraph. Nonetheless, given the failure to develop a common framework for the monitoring of SSC programmes in other fora such as the UN, it is warranted to doubt the success of Mexico’s endeavour to gain broader political buy-in for its attempt to formulate a broad platform for mutual accountability on SSC.

Small SSC providers hold similar perspectives to traditional donors in that they are supportive of attempts to broaden the monitoring process to better encapsulate flows from the private sector. For instance, one Latin American ‘dual category’ representative noted that: ‘I think that the GPEDC monitoring mechanism needs to broaden in scope. It is useful, [but] it can be even more useful, for instance, when we are able to include the perspective of the private sector’ (Interview 13). To do so, some Latin American representatives argue for a more streamlined process that has ‘more [business] friendly language’ so that they can understand and better engage (Interview 31). The point remains that the monitoring process of the GPEDC is highly contentious for most dual category countries who insist that they should not be held accountable to similar standards as DAC providers. Nevertheless, dual category countries that engage in the GPEDC aspire to a less demanding and differentiated monitoring process that could review the behaviour of SSC and PSAs.

6.3.3 Recipient Countries

Recipient countries are staunch supporters of the accountability mechanisms of the GPEDC, particularly the monitoring process. Moreover, recipient countries have continually sought to defend the integrity and frequency of the monitoring process. Recipient countries of all hues maintain that they are, similar to other country stakeholders, accountable to their taxpayers and respective bilateral agencies. Furthermore, co-chairs and Steering Committee members are, in theory, accountable for their actions in external regional peer bodies such

as the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) of the African Union and other regional bodies such as the South African Development Community (SADC). The APRM for instance 'is far more extensive and intensive in scale and ambition than the limited, sectoral peer reviews of the OECD' (Nmehielle and Wing, 2004; Gruzd, 2014: 6). However, it is not necessarily focused on aid effectiveness *per se*, although the questionnaire and forum raises questions on recipient ownership. Nevertheless, the presence of these peer forums reveals that there are multiple sites where recipients are held to account in horizontal peer forums.

While recipient country representatives are accountable to their taxpayers and to each other in peer forums, aid-dependent countries are also accountable to DAC donors. Cases of providers threatening to withdraw or postpone ODA are rife (Dann, 2013). Furthermore, in supporting the recipient GPEDC Co-Chair position, the incumbent DAC Co-Chairs have had to provide seconded staff to assist in capacity. Arguably, this introduces an informal and indirect form of accountability of the recipient co-chair to their donor co-chair counterparts, in that these Northern staff also are required to report to their agencies. Consequently, there are asymmetric power dynamics whereby recipients are indirectly (and directly) held accountable to their DAC donor counterparts within the GPEDC.

The asymmetric power dynamic inherent in the accountability relationship between donors and recipients is also visible within the GPEDC's monitoring process. The monitoring process requires recipient countries to provide the information on the development cooperation flows that enter their countries. As noted by the GPEDC (2018a), 'the [monitoring] process is led by partner countries, in consultation with development partners, including providers... and representatives from civil society, parliamentarians, and the private sector'. However, for some such as Jonathan Glennie, the 'recipient-led' nature of monitoring turns the initial vision of the GPEDC's accountability function on its head:

...this used to be a way of monitoring power and holding power to account, it used to be about holding donors to account and there is that element a bit, but it's very marginalised now - now [its] monitoring of the recipients! The disappointing thing about the partnership... is that it's

really lost what the point was: to actually hold donors to account in some kind of real concrete way (Interview 6)

The reason for directly monitoring recipients, rather than providers, is twofold. First, by monitoring donors ‘through the voice of the recipients... [it] is giving the voice, power, and ownership to developing countries’ (Interview 26). However, some would argue that ‘such a change responded to the need of the donor countries to be off the target... so to be less under the spotlight than they were with the previous system around Paris’ (Interview 17). Consequently, the recipient focused nature of the GPEDC monitoring system has been argued to ‘de-emphasise provider input, their role and contribution in achieving results, and can, therefore, be seen to perpetuate decade-old imbalances of power in the relationship between providers and recipients’ (Mahn, 2016: 13).

However, despite this above claim, it is telling that recipient countries are nonetheless increasingly engaged and supportive of the monitoring process. In the most recent monitoring round, Upper-Middle Income (24 out of 70), Lower-Middle Income (35 out of 52) and Low Income (29 out of 32) countries participated (OECD-UNDP, 2019). These figures suggest that the more dependent countries were upon ODA, the more likely they were to want to engage within the process due to the voice and empowerment that it offers as a global accountability mechanism. Key among the reasons offered for such engagement is the perception that the GPEDC monitoring process does indeed hold donors’ ‘feet to the fire’. As noted by one West Africa country representative: ‘Donors are even afraid of joining, of providing information on the indicators of the GPEDC. Many of them are afraid because the GPEDC is a visibility point that exposes the irregularities of most of these donors’ (Interview 21).

Furthermore, recipient countries have collectively sought to defend the integrity and frequency of the monitoring process. Firstly, recipient countries such as Malawi have continually underscored the ‘risk of engaging stakeholders in an overly technical exercise’, and have instead insisted that the monitoring process is inherently political (GPEDC, 2015). Moreover, African recipients and CSOs were able to push-back on the proposals to transform the GPEDC into a Davos-like forum and to reduce the frequency of monitoring at

the HLM2. They were instead able to affirm that that ‘this is an accountability agenda’ (ref.). Crucially, recipients resist the suggestion that the monitoring process should be broadened to include a broader gamut of actors, as proposed by donors and ‘dual category countries’. Recipients instead insist upon addressing the so-called ‘unfinished business’ related to ODA of the Paris Declaration and Accra Agenda, and towards developing time-bound targets in relation to these prior commitments.

Consequently, it is argued that extending the accountability framework may risk and diffuse donor responsibility for these as yet unmet commitments on ODA. Arguably, recipients are wary of attempts to create a monitoring process that may homogenise approaches between the DAC and the large Southern providers. As noted by Besharati (2013: 13), such may undermine the capacity of recipients to benefit from multiple donors in their respective countries, whether it be through the presence of different packages or by playing providers off one another. As mentioned, some recipients maintain that the GPEDC and its monitoring process has little to do with the ‘dual category countries’, and that it is primarily about the accountability relationship between DAC donors and recipient countries (Interview 42).

While recipient countries may hold the GPEDC accountability function and monitoring process in high regard for the voice and empowerment that it affords, there are nonetheless several issues regarding their capacity to engage within it. Principally, all recipient country representatives interviewed noted that capacity issues are a significant hindrance for the data collection and validation process of the monitoring rounds. Due to such constraints, it is incumbent upon the OECD monitoring staff of the JST to supplement capacity and to facilitate the monitoring process at its data collection and validation stage (Interview 2). As one former colleague noted, providing support is ‘a 24/7 job and a never-ending story’ (Interview 32). However, the volume of requests for support is nonetheless a positive sign that recipients are willing to be engaged and that they are supportive of the monitoring process.

There is, therefore, evidence of power asymmetries within donor and recipient accountability relationships. However, the monitoring process of the GPEDC affords recipient countries

with a viable means to hold donors to account for their commitments on development effectiveness. Notwithstanding issues surrounding capacity, the monitoring function of the GPEDC can thus account for greater recipient engagement and positive perceptions of legitimate governance. While ‘dual category’ and traditional donors would prefer a lighter touch and broader accountability framework, recipients are keen to ensure that it remains focused on traditional donor-recipient relations and undiluted by additional stakeholder inclusion.

6.3.4 Civil Society Organisations

Similar to recipient countries, CSOs are staunch supporters of, and advocates for, the accountability function of the GPEDC. Unlike their public counterparts, CSOs ‘are not meant to represent the public as a whole organically; else they would be elected officials themselves and would belong to the public sector’ (IBON, 2010). Instead, CSO accountability is characterised by multiple principal-agent relationships. They are accountable to: those that provide them with finance and legal status (donors and governments); their constituencies and beneficiaries; their organisation’s mission, values, and staff, and; to their fellow CSOs (IBON, 2014: 2). In terms of external peer accountability, CSOs within the Steering Committee are held accountable to CPDE. Furthermore, while the NECC is accountable to CSOs via CPDE and other interfaces, it is also accountable to the other non-state stakeholders involved within the partnership. There are thus substantial demands placed upon the NECC to represent and be accountable to the large number of diverse non-state actors and interests within the partnership.

Many CSOs, both Northern and Southern, perceive the accountability function of the GPEDC to be its primary *raison d’être* and the monitoring report to be its main product. Since early discussions on the GPEDC’s mandate, CPDE has affirmed that the ultimate purpose of the GPEDC is to hold actors accountable for their commitments on development effectiveness (CPDE, 2016). Moreover, the GPEDC is perceived to be ‘one of the best opportunities that we have to have a look, a close look, at the relationship between donors and recipients’ (Interview 17). Furthermore, CSOs perceive that the core merit of the

GPEDC's monitoring framework is that it is multi-stakeholder, rather than inter-governmental, in nature and hence affords opportunities for non-state actors to be involved (Rosario-Alonzo, 2014: 1).

CSOs through CPDE have, therefore, resisted attempts by donors and other actors to 'reduce [the] GPEDC to a mere knowledge hub', as such would 'miss the main goal for establishing the first place, which was "to support and ensure accountability for the implementation of commitments at the political level" (CPDE, 2016: 4). Consequently, some CSOs would argue that accountability within the GPEDC has been 'brought about by partners [recipients] and CSOs' despite the lack of overt donor support (Interview 1). Moreover, one respondent noted that the GPEDC is a 'success story of partners and CSOs of standing their ground' and ensuring against domination by traditional donors (ibid.). As mentioned, CSOs alongside recipient governments have resisted attempts to reduce the frequency of monitoring. Hence, CSOs argue that they engage in the GPEDC to ensure that 'accountability and inclusion remain the core characteristics of aid effectiveness at the international level' (Ahmad, 2014).

While CSOs and recipients are united in their resolve to ensure that accountability via the monitoring framework remains at the core of the GPEDC's work, CSOs are divided over the appropriate scope of the framework. On the one hand, CSOs argue that the monitoring framework should be expanded: 'I would say for all stakeholder and all countries, we need mutual accountability: there should be no exception... including civil society and including the private sector' (Interview 1). In particular, CSOs are keen to see the monitoring and accountability mechanisms of the GPEDC extended to cover PSAs. For instance, one IBON (2014: 59) publication notes that 'high standards for transparency and accountability must apply equally (if not more so) for private sector engagements for development compared to CSOs'. Consequently, at the HLM2 and the SLM, concerns were raised that the GPEDC 'enhances the role of the private sector without commensurate increases in transparency and accountability... [and it is] essential that all financing for development, whether public, private or blended, is published and accounted for' (Welford, 2016). Therefore, CSOs laud

the accountability and monitoring function of the GPEDC due to its 'multi-stakeholder' nature and that it has the potential to hold non-state actors to account.

While CSOs insist upon the need to bring greater accountability to the private sector within the GPEDC, those interviewed presented the concern that efforts to include the large SSC providers has diluted the accountability function of the GPEDC. For instance, one representative noted that 'the effort to enlarge the tent was done in a way... [that] they diluted the commitments or the focus around aid effectiveness that they thought would be relevant to these other stakeholders' (Interview 18). One consequence of this attempt at broadening has been the removal 'of all language related to human rights... because China would never [had] sign[ed] on' if it was retained (ibid.). There is thus the ongoing concern that 'accountability has been sacrificed at the altar of inclusiveness' (Cole, 2016). By attempting to formulate an accountability agenda that would be palatable to the large emerging powers, CSOs argue that much of the teeth of the earlier aid effectiveness commitment process has been 'filled down'. While CSOs would like to see a broadening of the accountability function of the GPEDC, reconciling this tension (between inclusiveness and accountability) is understood to be a challenge.

6.3.5 Private Sector Actors

Unlike other stakeholders that hold rather strong positions on the accountability and monitoring function of the GPEDC, PSAs hold rather ambivalent perspectives. PSAs who are engaged in the GPEDC maintain that they are accountable to their shareholders and organisations. However, given that the private sector is by no means a clear constituency, there is no external peer body to which private sector Steering Committee members are held accountable. What does exist is some 'very, very limited' consultation amongst engaged members, 'because what was there [that is] concerned with business?' (Interview 28). PSAs do not, therefore, perceive the agenda of the GPEDC to be of sufficient relevance to warrant peer accountability on their behaviour within the GPEDC. Nevertheless, the Nairobi Outcome Document (GPEDC, 2016b: 20-21) does refer to specific external criteria to hold business to account - such as International Labour Organisation standards, UN Principles

and Human Rights, and the OECD Guidelines for Multilateral Enterprises. However, the actual application of such external criteria have yet to be operationalised within the GPEDC.

While development effectiveness is officially not solely concerned with ODA, but also the effectiveness of development efforts and finance by all actors (BOD, 2011), PSAs are beholden to the view that commitments relating to transparency and accountability ‘relate mainly to public partners’ (GPEDC, 2016e: 3). While this is codified within the GPEDC’s (2016) mandate, CSOs criticise this and claim that ‘in practice, business needs not to be transparent nor accountable’ (Bena and Tomlinson, 2017: 6). Nonetheless, this is not to suggest that there is a complete lack of concern by PSAs over the accountability function of the GPEDC. As one private sector representative noted in an interview: ‘as soon as you start using the words “accountability mechanisms” my boredom levels just massively increased, which is unfair because accountability is absolutely essential’ (Interview 47).

PSAs are not necessarily opposed to private sector inclusion within the GPEDC’s monitoring process, provided that monitoring is constructive and not punitive. At present, the only indicator in the GPEDC’s monitoring framework pertains to mechanisms in place for public-private dialogue, which PSAs deem to be appropriate. However, if the monitoring framework was to be extended, it is argued that such should be focused on ‘learning and recommending good practice’ (Interview 35). Furthermore, one respondent noted that ‘it makes sense for PSAs [to be included in monitoring], just like it makes sense for public contractors for what they are doing to be assessed... [however] if it’s done as a kind of punitive thing’ then such would not be conducive (Interview 28). The reason being that if there was a more ‘naming and shaming’ approach to monitoring, such may serve as a deterrent for businesses to engage in risky country contexts that they would otherwise not be engaged in (ibid.). PSAs thus argue that monitoring should only be extended to PSAs insofar as it serves as a knowledge or best-practice sharing platform that is conducive to securing business engagement.

There are ongoing attempts to bring in greater accountability of the private sector through the development of the Principles and Guidelines for Private Sector Engagement. Through

observing the drafting of these principles, a clear cleavage was present between trade union representatives and CSOs who wanted maximal accountability mechanisms in place to monitor PSA activities, and private sector representatives who were keen to 'minimise reporting burdens'. While it is too soon to say how the GPEDC will operationalise these principles and guidelines, or whether this will result in private sector accountability, PSAs are not necessarily opposed to being included within the GPEDC's monitoring process. However, they are very insistent that they do not wish to be enmeshed in a process that would be overly critical nor punitive in its reporting.

6.4 Reflections

Similar to the findings on input legitimacy, and while a full analysis of this chapter's findings will be provided in Chapter 8, this chapter reveals the tensions that exist in terms of stakeholder perspectives both within and across indicators. In some cases, these tensions may simply require a better-balanced response to stakeholder demands. For instance, for transparency, it may well be possible to provide information that is sufficiently concise for actors that have long-standing engagement within the GPEDC, while also developing a communications strategy that ensures that those with limited engagement have sufficient and intelligible information. Notwithstanding the greater resource implications of this requirement, it is nonetheless achievable within the current frame of governance.

However, this chapter also highlights some intractable challenges. While we will return to this point in much greater depth in Chapter 8, there is a tension over the procedural function that the GPEDC should take. Namely, whether the GPEDC should primarily be a site for discussion and knowledge-sharing, or whether it should augment its accountability function. Furthermore, while transparency may be broadly considered to be a clear virtue when it comes to the general transparency of information, it can also be perceived to be a problem when it comes to decision-making and debate: pure transparency may work to encumber and frustrate the smooth running of governance. This suggests that even a seemingly 'straightforward' indicator such as transparency is highly nuanced and context-dependent in terms of stakeholder evaluations. Nonetheless, we now turn to explore stakeholder

perspectives on the capacity of the GPEDC and its monitoring framework to encourage behaviour change, and how stakeholders perceive and evaluate organisational effectiveness (output legitimacy).

7. Output Legitimacy: Perspectives on Performance

To live up to its name of being the Global Partnership for *Effective* Development Cooperation, it is essential that the partnership is perceived to be output legitimate. While the previous dimensions of this project have - *inter alia* - explored the extent to which the GPEDC has been successful in shifting governance away from a hierarchical North-South model towards one characterised by horizontality, this dimension of legitimacy examines the extent that the GPEDC has fulfilled its promise of being an effective global body and a 'visionary agreement on how to "do" development' (Coppard and Culey, 2015: 3).

As noted, questions have long been raised over the DAC's effectiveness in producing development results (see section 2.3). Though the DAC is recognised as an output legitimate institution - insofar as its impact upon traditional donors and policy outputs are concerned (Vershaeve and Orbie, 2016: 579) - it has been broadly deemed as ineffective in generating sufficient development impact in the broader field, i.e. poverty reduction and economic growth in LICs. The DAC embarked upon the 'aid effectiveness' reform process to not only address critiques against its legitimacy through being more inclusive, but also to redress concerns over the effectiveness of development cooperation by leveraging the insights and contributions of a broader range of actors. The logic was that by gaining greater buy-in from actors, different stakeholders would have a greater sense of 'ownership' of the agenda. Consequently, it was hoped that hitherto marginalised actors would be more willing to undertake voluntary behaviour change in accordance with the reforms implied by the development effectiveness principles⁹. In other words, there was a recognition that behaviour change could not be encouraged through a 'top-down' governance process. Instead, stakeholders would need to feel that they have a stake in the process in order to undertake reforms regarded necessary for improving development effectiveness.

⁹ There is scant evidence that the adoption of aid or development effectiveness principles lead to greater development impact, whether this is understood as economic growth or poverty reduction. However, the Wood et al. (2011) evaluation of the Paris Declaration finds that these principles have positive contributions when operationalised and adopted, particularly in sectors such as health. Nevertheless, recipients are resolute in the belief that these principles are effective in improving the quality of development cooperation (see section 7.2).

As noted in this project's framework chapter (section 3.3.3), this thesis takes outcome (behaviour change) to be a suitable intermediate indicator for studying output legitimacy. Following Take (2012) and Mitchell (1996: 23), examining outcome or behaviour change can 'provide a valuable proxy for effectiveness'. However, some such as Abdel-Malek (2015: 316) have argued that the 'toughest and overarching challenge [facing the GPEDC] is that of promoting and facilitating "behaviour change"'. Moreover, he notes that doing so is the 'master-key' that will replace 'business-as-usual' approaches (ibid). Generating behaviour change has long been a primary concern of the aid effectiveness agenda, and the monitoring of stakeholder behaviour change in implementing the Paris Declaration principles has featured in various surveys in 2007, 2008 and 2011. Here, these surveys demonstrated rather dismal results, with only one of twelve commitments on aid effectiveness being met in full by 2010, despite significant progress by recipient countries in implementing their respective commitments (OECD, 2011: 15). It is, therefore, of primary importance to question whether the GPEDC provides an effective governance mechanism in producing behaviour change amongst its composite stakeholders. For this purpose, the GPEDC's monitoring reports measure stakeholder behaviour change in accordance with the framework developed following the HLF-4, and this framework was revised in 2016 (OECD/UNDP, 2014; OECD/UNDP, 2016; OECD/UNDP, 2019; MAG, 2016).

While stakeholder perspectives of behaviour change (outcome effectiveness) guided the research of this project, this thesis is not merely concerned with stakeholder perceptions according to an *a priori* framework. Crucially, 'multilateral performance assessments should capture recipients' and other stakeholders' perceptions of effectiveness' (Lindoso and Hall, 2016: 10). In assessing output legitimacy, this project draws upon Peters' (2013) 'heuristic particularist' approach in that the researcher engage the various actors involved in a governance arrangement and reconstruct what they understand to be legitimate and effective governance. Consequently, this project's framework is open to the possibility that stakeholders may have different understandings and perceptions as to what constitutes effective governance. For each stakeholder category, this section begins by reviewing behaviour change progress *via* monitoring, before exploring stakeholder perspectives on the

ability of the GPEDC to generate compliance. Following a discussion on stakeholder evaluations on the extent to which the GPEDC generates behaviour change, this section also outlines stakeholder perspectives on their preferences on organisational effectiveness. While there is a case for presenting perspectives on outcome and effectiveness preferences under separate indicators, during interviews both of these facets were addressed together. They are therefore both presented under the following single section.

7.1 Providers of Development Cooperation

Successive monitoring reports, including the most recent in 2018 (OECD-UNDP, 2019), reveals highly limited - and in some cases reversing - trends of behaviour change by traditional donors towards the realisation of development effectiveness principles. To illustrate, with regards to country ownership (Indicator 9b), DAC countries in aggregate have modestly increased their use of country systems (from 47% in 2016 to 55% in 2018). However, there has been decreasing alignment with country priorities and plans (from 81% in 2016 to 80%) (Indicator 1). Moreover, the forward visibility of development cooperation by DAC countries has been decreasing in both the short and medium terms (Indicator 5). Furthermore, there has been stagnant progress towards improving upon the transparency of development cooperation, while there has been stalled progress since 2009 on reducing tied aid (Indicator 10). With regards to tied aid, the monitoring report notes that the situation may be worse than has been presented, as often *de jure* untied aid is *de facto* tied as the majority of ODA contracts go to domestic firms and agencies within donor countries (OECD, 2019: 120). In sum, the monitoring process of traditional donor behaviour change by DAC donors reveals that progress has been 'mixed' at best. For some, such as Lenny Wilde (Cole, 2016), 'mixed progress' in the field is a polite way of saying 'failure'.

That the GPEDC has been unsuccessful in generating aggregate behaviour change is well recognised by traditional donor representatives: 'it is not greatly successful. If we look at what happened to the development indicators since 2011, you can say that the results are stable with some improvements, but not very significant or substantial improvements' (Interview 36). Nonetheless, some traditional donor countries such as Ireland

and the EU tend to do quite well in the monitoring results, and thus they have internalised the principles of development effectiveness. However, on the whole, the GPEDC has not been successful in generating behaviour change by DAC members.

Overwhelmingly, the most common reaction to lacklustre progress in generating compliance by donors is to claim that the monitoring process is at fault and that it requires change. For instance, one European representative noted that, with regards to preliminary monitoring results, they 'will be rather weak' and there is a 'need to reflect on how to improve the monitoring process and ensure that it is relevant' (Personal Observation, DAC Meeting, Paris, 29 March 2019). Moreover, traditional donors emphasise that the lack of progress is not necessarily a consequence of poor behaviour change by donors, but that the nature of development cooperation has changed and the monitoring process has yet to capture that reality. For instance, the UK's DfID committed in 2015 to allocate 50% of its ODA to fragile and conflict-affected states (DfID, 2015). However, in these contexts, there may not be necessary country systems in place that a donor country could align their development cooperation with. As noted by one DAC representative: 'you cannot use them [country systems] if they do not exist... so in principle we are still committed, but we are not having the right kind of conversations about measuring the right things, about what effectiveness and country ownership really means now' (Interview 50).

While donors commonly argue that the monitoring process is an inadequate measure of donor behaviour, there is a recognition that the GPEDC process exerts little pressure on donors:

I don't know if your question is the right question [on the GPEDC's capacity to encourage behaviour change]. The question is, you know, what really is the influence of the development effectiveness process and their commitments? I mean how much influence do those have? And then I think it has less. But that's not necessarily got to do with the quality of the GPEDC, it fits within a much broader agenda, which is principally a political agenda. The process will be as good as the broader environment allows it to be. I think there's some good people working on the process, but I don't think it is going to be, let's say a counterweight to more negative self-interest trends that we see globally... it doesn't have that degree of power. (Interview 25)

Although there is the perception that the GPEDC's monitoring process requires adjustment to 'measure the right things', there is also the recognition that the GPEDC has less political influence on the policy decisions and behaviour trajectories of traditional donors. This issue is not necessarily to do with the inadequacies of the GPEDC as a governance process *per se*. However, it reveals that it is not sufficient to counteract the broader tendencies that see increasingly nationalistic and self-interested behaviour patterns within the field. Similarly, the incoming Swiss Co-Chair noted that traditional donors are characterised by 'self-interest and "what is in it for me"' attitudes, and a 'bit of short-sightedness that is coming in now' (Personal Observations, DAC Meeting, Paris, 29 March 2019). Although donors may, in their official statements, affirm that they adhere to development effectiveness in principle - or that 'effectiveness is in our DNA' (Interview, 50) - this is not backed up by evidence of behaviour change by DAC members.

While traditional donors recognise that the GPEDC has been broadly ineffective in generating behaviour change, they nonetheless regard outcome effectiveness as a critical determinant of their evaluations of the GPEDC's output legitimacy. For instance, one respondent noted the following on the question of what constitutes organisational effectiveness:

The aim is to ensure effective development cooperation. So it's actually allowing a wide variety of stakeholders to interact and to feed in on what is effective development cooperation in today's setting... and to follow up in order to ensure a change in how we act (Interview 30).

However, for the GPEDC to have greater output legitimacy, traditional donors argue that the GPEDC will be effective insofar as it 'becomes important for the other [non-ODA] flows of development cooperation' (Interview 36). Traditional donor preference for broadening the GPEDC's focus relates to both its ability to encourage 'partner countries to hold emerging economies to account', and perhaps more crucially, to its ability to promote the role of the private sector (*ibid.*). All of the DAC donor co-chairs have thus used their positions to advance the role of the private sector within development cooperation. For instance, in 2013 the UK Co-Chair shared their:

...vision of the GPEDC becoming the forum for global action on development effectiveness... pointing to the importance and relevance of more effective collaboration with the private sector, including through the removal of trade barriers, and the provision of a climate conducive to investment. (GPEDC, 2013).

Consequently, traditional donors have been highly supportive of the GPEDC's recent efforts to develop principles for engaging the private sector. As one East Asian DAC representative notes with regards to their preferences on the GPEDC's organisational effectiveness: 'the GPEDC's recent launch of Kampala Principles is meaningful [for the GPEDC's effectiveness] because it attempts to apply the Busan principles to the private sector' (Interview 49).

Closely linked to traditional donors preference for the GPEDC to engage both the emerging donors and private sector in order for it to be an effective platform, is their preference for the GPEDC to prioritise its knowledge-sharing function. For instance, and as mentioned, the Netherlands co-chair 'suggested that the GPEDC should focus more on its role as a platform to support mutual learning and knowledge sharing to remain meaningful in the 2030 agenda' (GPEDC, 2015: 8). Traditional donor preference for the GPEDC to take on the guise of a knowledge-sharing platform is evident since its inception, wherein the DAC expressed its desire for the GPEDC to be 'a "comfortable" space for dialogue among all actors including emerging economies' (GPEDC, 2012: 2). Similarly, traditional donors continue to emphasise that the GPEDC should focus on its capacity to provide 'a platform for various stakeholders to share softwares', similar to that of the Davos World Economic Forum (WEF) (Remark by South Korea, DAC Meeting, Paris, 29 March 2019). Here, the role of the monitoring framework would 'serve as a learning tool and not just for reporting [progress]... [and] to make better use of results to foster dialogue, learning, and behaviour change at country [as opposed to donor] level' (GPEDC, 2015: 4).

While traditional donors may criticise the capacity of the GPEDC to generate outcome effectiveness in the form of donor behaviour change, there is a clear preference for the GPEDC to prioritise its knowledge-sharing function. Although the vision of the GPEDC as a knowledge-sharing platform was evident at the GPEDC's inception as a means to

encourage the engagement of the large Southern providers, it has increasingly been put forward as a suggestion to garner the engagement of the private sector. Consequently, the extent to which the GPEDC can generate input legitimacy by securing the engagement of the emerging powers and the private sector contributes to traditional donor perspectives on output legitimacy. Nevertheless, there is a recognition by some of the inherent trade-offs that emerge with regards to the GPEDC's effectiveness: 'By its inherent nature, it is institutionally challenging for the GPEDC to be effective with its broad partnership of various stakeholders from governments to civil and private sectors' (Interview 49).

7.2 'Dual Category' Countries

As mentioned (see 6.3.3.2), the initial vision of the GPEDC was that providers of SSC would develop their separate monitoring framework appropriate to SSC as a development cooperation modality. For instance, the incumbent DAC-Chair at the time noted that 'these new providers are not expected to participate in the global monitoring system... their future participation is left to evolving and sovereign processes...' (Atwood, 2012: 25). A key contention for large SSC providers is that the GPEDC's monitoring framework is steeped in DAC-style indicators and language, such as the transparency indicator that relies upon upon DAC guidelines (see 6.3.2). Furthermore, the stipulation to untie aid is directly counter to the theory and ethos behind the provision of SSC (Glennie, 2014). The architects of the GPEDC originally envisioned at Busan that behaviour change by SSC actors would result from their own monitoring framework, and progress would have been visible in subsequent monitoring reports. However, there has been little interest by key emerging donors to formulate such a common framework, while incipient efforts by Mexico have yet to be operationalised and receive broad endorsement by large SSC providers. Consequently, it is not possible to identify concrete behaviour change by dual category actors as a result of their engagement in the GPEDC.

While there is a widespread belief shared by providers of SSC that they should not be subject to monitoring by the GPEDC, and thus held accountable for their behaviour change, they nonetheless share negative views on the GPEDC's capacity to generate traditional

donor behaviour change. For some of the representatives interviewed, the previous monitoring system under the WP-EFF is perceived to be more effective in generating donor behaviour change:

I think that the Paris declaration and Accra - that process really produced changes in the donors. But it was also a claim and it was also driven by developing countries. They were very vocal as well in the way that they were dissatisfied, if you will, with the way the development operation was working. So we saw more adjustments in the different agencies from the donors in the way that they were managing cooperation. But to some extent, I feel that that wave of institutional change, it has not stopped, but it's not as strong as it was then. (Interview 26)

The lack of behaviour change or compliance by donors is perceived to be a deterrent to engagement by large 'dual category' countries such as China and India. One SSC representative noted in a DAC meeting that, with regards to donor scepticism over the monitoring framework, 'if it is not clear how these results impact the DAC... why would other actors engage if it is not as evident?' (Personal Observation, DAC Meeting, New York, 14 July 2019). The core reason as to why 'dual category' countries perceive the GPEDC is weak in producing behaviour change amongst donors is the declining political interest that donors have in the process:

...formerly none of the traditional donors have stated that they have any less interest in the process. However, it is clear that the high level political participation has not been the same that we've had... in the case of the GPEDC, since you don't have a permanent structure, nor is the GPEDC tightened to for instance the OECD DAC or the board of the ECOSOC as other processes are, then I think that the political leadership of the members of the steering committee and in particular, the political leadership of the co-chairs is crucial. If you don't have that, if you don't have enough political leadership and demonstration and commitment starting from the members of the steering committee, but in particular from the co-chairs, then the process is in trouble. (Interview 13)

Declining political interest or engagement is understood to be one crucial hindrance to the GPEDC's capacity to generate compliance, owing to its procedural nature as an informal governance mechanism. However, some SSC provider representatives do not share the view of donors that the issue with lacklustre compliance is purely due to technical inadequacies with the monitoring process. Instead, they note that 'it is really hard to distinguish between the political and technical, or to put them in different boxes' (Interview

43). Consequently, the political is paramount in understanding compliance - or lack thereof - from the perspective of some dual category countries.

In terms of SSC provider preferences for effective governance, SSC providers are similar to donors in that they believe that effectiveness is defined by the capacity of the GPEDC to generate behaviour change:

...the GPEDC's effectiveness is to be measured by its relevance in decision-making, and [are] reflect[ed] in the decisions that are made by donors in their bilateral and multilateral aid. If we see that donor coordination improves at the national level, if we see that donor's aid and actions is more aligned with national frameworks for planning and monitoring, if we see that stakeholders do participate better in the decision-making processes related to development cooperation at the national level, then I think that the GPEDC is being effective. (Interview 26)

While encouraging behaviour change and compliance is essential for determining evaluations of output legitimacy, all of the representatives interviewed expressed a clear preference for closer alignment of the GPEDC with the UN in order to enhance its effectiveness. For instance, one representative notes the following: 'I agree with the idea to align the GPEDC with the UN and SDGs - because this is more inclusive. I think a lot of countries also adopted the SDGs, through the SDGs we can improve the GPEDC. And bringing in the BRICS I think - it can make the GPEDC more legitimate' (Interview 23). Similarly, one representative from an SSC country that has not participated in the GPEDC noted that:

I think on the GPEDC side, it might be at a crossroads right now. It might need to take a decision whether to become more global or remain as it is now. If it is to be more global, then engagement with the UN fora I think is crucial. Getting the sufficient momentum - it needs to be anchored maybe to a more global fora. This might maybe also help [their country] to reconsider its approach to the GPEDC. (Interview 43)

Consequently, providers of SSC put forward the suggestion for closer alignment with the UN to not only enhance the input legitimacy of the GPEDC but also to increase their perceptions of output legitimacy.

Similar to traditional donors, 'dual category' countries express a preference for the GPEDC to take on a more substantial knowledge-sharing platform or function. During Indonesia's time as co-chair, they did not advance a monitoring framework suited for SSC providers, but instead promoted the use of the platform for knowledge-sharing (Bracho, 2017: 18; GPEDC, 2014). Similarly, when South Africa was initially engaged in the GPEDC in its early formation, representatives welcomed [the] opportunity of the GPEDC as a platform for knowledge-sharing, and that the 'partnership offered an opportunity to engage emerging and middle income countries on an international dialogue on development' (GPEDC, 2013: 6). Furthermore, Brazil also expressed agreement on the GPEDC's emphasis on knowledge-sharing, and praised the opportunity that the GPEDC afforded in sharing experiences among all providers of development cooperation (ibid.) Hence, dual category countries would see value in a GPEDC that was both closer aligned to the UN and devoted to knowledge sharing. Providers of SSC argue that these two suggestions might generate greater engagement by other SSC providers that have not engaged in the partnership.

7.3 Recipient Countries

We see considerable evidence of recipient country progress in terms of behaviour change towards the operationalisation of development effectiveness principles. Overall, recipient countries have sought to develop systems that would afford them with greater ownership over their development trajectories. For instance, recipients have been proactive in improving the quality of their national development planning by putting in place more robust development strategies with results orientations (Indicator 1b). On this indicator, the number of countries that have a national development strategy considered to be 'high quality' has doubled since 2011 (from 36% to 64%) (OECD-UNDP, 2019: 39). Similarly, as of 2018, over 65% of recipient countries have improved upon the quality of their public financial management systems since 2016 (Indicator 9a).

Furthermore, there is evidence of greater transparency, with 67% of recipient countries in 2018 making the results of their mutual assessments publicly available (vs 58% in 2016). While recipient countries have very clearly demonstrated behaviour change towards the

principle of country ownership, a less sanguine picture emerges for other indicators and principles. On mutual accountability mechanisms, fewer than half have high-quality accountability mechanisms in place (OECD-UNDP, 2019: 83). Moreover, there are concerns over the inclusiveness of consultation frameworks, while there are claims that within recipient countries, there are negative trends of 'contracting space for civil society' (ibid., 65). Since 2016, there has been a decline in government consultation with CSOs, from 80% in 2016 to only 64% in 2018. Nevertheless, there is clear evidence from the GPEDC monitoring rounds that recipient countries have undertaken considerable behavioural change.

Many donors and OECD staff well recognise that recipients are taking on board the suggested behaviour changes implied by GPEDC monitoring:

...the partner countries are really integrating the monitoring - you know, it's not only that they do the monitoring, they've done it now, they do it for the third time. But they do more than that, they actually integrate it into the national processes, and so with that they have their own incentive structures, that basically trigger the whole process, and it doesn't require the external pushing. And we have over 85 partner countries that will contribute to the monitoring this time around, and even more than last time in terms of development partners that are engaged. (Interview 32)

Similarly, DAC donors recognise that recipients have been proactive in generating behaviour change: '... it seems to me that there is more enthusiasm among the developing countries side. You know some developing countries have developed systems around these processes and want to be in the driver seat in terms of coordination in their countries' (Interview 25). Representatives from recipient countries claim that the reason for their behaviour change is due to both a belief in the development effectiveness principles and that the GPEDC is a legitimate process with high buy-in from recipient countries. For instance:

...aid effectiveness is a reality, not a whim. With the growing uncertainties and needs around the world, a very good alternative to the decrease in aid is aid effectiveness... this is very particular and very true for the fragile and conflict affected states which are mainly, or maybe I will say, the major recipients of aid... unfortunately, because the other alternative means of financing are limited... So, we believe that aid effectiveness is a matter of life for these countries. And we also believe that if they are

executed in line with aid effectiveness, such as country ownership or the alignment, we can eradicate poverty, we can build institutions and we can move forward towards more stability or more resilience... I think this is a unique value of the global partnership, that it has given a forum for countries which were rarely heard, a forum where their concerns, and their priorities can be heard on a such a global level. (Interview 46)

Some representatives of recipient countries, such as the perspective noted above, place great value in the development effectiveness principles and the GPEDC as a governing mechanism. Considering the perceived importance of aid effectiveness, and the ability of the GPEDC to provide a space for recipients to voice their concerns, recipients are increasingly complying with the GPEDC's recommendations. Furthermore, one representative noted how the legitimacy associated with the GPEDC had instigated political behaviour change nationally in contentious areas such as CSO engagement:

...we use the paragraphs of the GPEDC to convince development partners at national level to comply with whatever we have been undertaking, like exchanging data, coming to the platform of dialogue. When we invited the CSOs the first time, we had problems with our Prime Minister... So we had problems convincing the prime minister to include civil society on this table, we use the commitment that is actually in the paragraphs of the GPEDC to convince the political authority here, to accept the civil society to sit on the table. That is the kind of things that we have been benefiting from the global commitments, we can say. (Interview 44)

Recipient countries claim that they are undertaking behaviour change due to the legitimacy of the GPEDC process and the value that they ascribe to the development effectiveness principles. However, many recipients hold negative views over the capacity of the GPEDC to generate compliance or behaviour change by traditional donors. For instance, one Central African country representative noted that 'the overall effectiveness of the GPEDC remains mixed as recommendations are largely unimplemented by donor countries and agencies (Interview 48). Similarly, one West African country representative noted that 'for those of them [donors] that do participate, it encourages behaviour change. But for those that are running away from it, they are losing a lot, because they think that they are hiding' (Interview 21). Consequently, there is a perception that the GPEDC is 'business as usual' in terms of generating donor behaviour change:

The Global Partnership emerging from Busan was meant to improve development partners [donor] engagement especially in recipient countries like us. The results have not have been as much as we had anticipated, because it's the same kind of 'business as usual' approach. Yes we're doing surveys and partners [donors] will say they are doing it too, but sometimes even just getting the data is so challenging. So in a sense it is good, but I think we need a bit more... to see clear added value over what had been previously before the Global Partnership came into being. (Interview 41)

While recipient countries have highly encouraging perspectives on the degree to which the GPEDC can generate behaviour change amongst themselves and other recipient countries, the same cannot be said for traditional donor countries. Recipient countries feel that the GPEDC may empower them to a degree. However, 'lots of donors do work past the governments, and they work past local communities. They think sometimes that the [recipient] governments are corrupt, they have their own agendas' (Interview 42). Consequently, the GPEDC is not perceived to be a sufficient counterweight to other self-interest trends that affect behaviour change within the field of development cooperation.

Similar to other country stakeholders, the output legitimacy of the GPEDC is evaluated by recipients with regards to the extent that it can generate behaviour change. For instance, on the question of what constitutes effective governance, the G7+ representative noted that:

...qualitatively speaking, whether the forum is inclusive, looking at the logistics of the form itself, or maybe the administration of the forum [is important]. But its real effectiveness should be measured in terms of the change in the narrative, in terms of the reforms in the aid industry, what reforms have you produced there? I think that should be considered as a main measure of the partnership's effectiveness. (Interview 46)

Both traditional donors and SSC providers would prefer to see the GPEDC enhance its output legitimacy by broadening its relevance to other actors, and through greater emphasis on its function as a knowledge-sharing platform. In contrast, recipients primarily evaluate the GPEDC's output legitimacy with regards to the strength of its monitoring process. Paramount for recipients is not necessarily a broadening of the GPEDC to other actors, but to continue its focus upon the so-called 'unfinished business' of the aid effectiveness agenda. For instance, surrounding the discussions on the GPEDC's role in the post-2015 SDG agenda, both the Pacific Island Forum Secretariat (PIFS) and El Salvador emphasised

that the GPEDC should avoid new commitments on the agenda, and to instead focus upon the fulfilment of the original Paris goals and principles (GPEDC, 2015: 13). Furthermore, while broadening via the participation of the BRICS and other stakeholders is welcomed in line with traditional donor preferences, recipient countries nevertheless maintain that ‘the number one priority should be to uplift its profile to make it able to pursue those reforms or those commitments that it set out to achieve’ (Interview 46).

Recipient countries thus advocate for a strengthened monitoring process that could generate donor behaviour change and progress on core development effectiveness principles. Those interviewed thus repeatedly stressed the need for the GPEDC ‘to move from being voluntary and be more obligatory upon other countries to provide information, and so on’ (Interview 42). Similarly, Florence Nazare of NEPAD stressed that ‘GPEDC commitments are still voluntary, [and] binding commitments would give the GPEDC more traction’ (Development and Cooperation, 2014). Nevertheless, there are doubts over the likelihood of this happening:

...we cannot be naive to think that this will happen. Do we talk about monitoring and evaluation for the sake of accountability, or then to execute that accountability? Is there any mechanism for example, punishing, you know commending for compliance or, you know, asking for more, which for understandable reasons, is difficult at the Global Governance level. (Interview 46)

Short of introducing sanctioning mechanisms or improving upon the obligatory nature of development effectiveness commitments, a common suggestion to improve upon the soft accountability nature of the GPEDC has been to revive the partner country caucus of the previous WP-EFF governance (GPEDC, 2016c: 10). Linked to this suggestion, is to strengthen the institutional structure of the GPEDC at the global level (Interview 33), and also to improve coordination between donor country headquarters and country offices. For instance, one Southern Africa country representative noted that

...we are losing the commitment or engagement of development partners between the headquarters who are very engaged, and then the country offices who, in some cases, they don't even know about how things are happening there... If the country offices come to us with the same commitment or the same engagement as the headquarters when they go

to the global forum... the change of behaviour will be very effective.
(Interview 44)

Recipients, therefore, display clear evidence of behaviour change and thus perceptions of outcome effectiveness of the GPEDC. While recipients claim that they change their behaviour due to the high legitimacy attached to the GPEDC and the value they place in the principles, they hold negative perspectives over the capacity of the GPEDC to generate compliance by traditional donors. In contrast to other country stakeholders that have differing preferences over the procedural function that the GPEDC should take to enhance its output legitimacy, recipient countries maintain that its current role as an accountability mechanism should be strengthened.

7.4 Civil Society Organisations

While the monitoring framework attempts to monitor the behaviour change of country stakeholders within the GPEDC, it does not necessarily attempt to monitor CSO and other non-state behaviour. However, CSOs do participate in the monitoring rounds and provide information on the consultative arrangements and engagement with their respective country-level stakeholders. Furthermore, the institutionalisation of the CPDE platform is testament to CSO commitment to internalising and supporting the development effectiveness commitments. Widespread and ongoing engagement in CPDE by many CSOs can thus be said to be a proxy for clear evidence of behaviour change by some CSO actors.

Nevertheless, of particular concern for CSOs in terms of monitoring is the rapidly shrinking civic space that CSOs claim to encounter in their national contexts. Here, it is possible to observe a discrepancy between recipient country government reporting on civic freedom versus that of CSO reporting. In the most recent monitoring round, 71% of governments reporters that 'CSO expression is generally free of government control' (OECD-UNDP, 2019: 64). However, in contrast, only 27% of CSOs noted that this was the case. Furthermore, the majority of CSOs in most countries report that consultations with governments are occasional, ad-hoc, and superficial (OECD-UNDP, 2019: 130). On the whole, CSOs present considerable concerns over the behaviour change that has occurred as a result of the

GPEDC process. For instance, one prominent CSO representative - Antonio Tujan - noted that with regards to the GPEDC: 'I think that things are generally moving in relation to donor-[recipient] country relations, if you will, but the situation is horrible for civil society' (Cole, 2016).

CSOs thus negatively perceive the GPEDC's capacity to ensure donor and partner country progress to meeting development effectiveness commitments and principles. As one representative at a CSO caucusing event noted, progress towards Busan commitments have been 'a flickering light, an inconsistent light, and a flame that burns unsteadily' (Personal Observation, CSO Caucusing Event, New York, 12 July 2019). The critical issue for the lack of progress for CSOs is not, in contrast to donors, based upon 'the false premise that bottlenecks lie in the development effectiveness principles... [instead it] lies in the actions (or lack thereof) that aim to operationalise those principles' (CPDE, 2016: 1). As a result, some CSOs have highly jaded and cynical perspectives on the GPEDC's capacity to generate behaviour change through its monitoring process:

The problem is that once the report is done, it's kind of thrown into the ether, and the expectation is that someone will grab it and do something with it... the follow up is largely non-existent, unless you can get national level CSOs to really bash, smash, name and shame governments in terms of their behaviour. But I mean, if you go a high-level meeting, they will look at the monitoring report and say 'this is a very, very valuable contribution to development effectiveness', and then they'll go off to their next meeting. (Interview 10)

Part of the reason why CSOs perceive the GPEDC to be weak in its capacity to generate behaviour change is due to its procedural design. For instance, the first HLM was described to be mostly as a 'forum for interesting presentations and initiatives but accomplished little in the way of stocktaking or holding its constituents to account for implementing commitment related to development effectiveness' (Kwakkenbos, 2014). Furthermore, it has been suggested that a better approach would have been to examine the monitoring report and to evaluate as to how to achieve Busan goals and targets, 'rather than focusing on the topics *du jour* in development cooperation that are being discussed in a multitude of other fora' (ibid.). CSOs do not, therefore, perceive the GPEDC to be adequately fulfilling its role

as a forum or partnership that engages directly in accountability and exploring pathways for action on development effectiveness.

For some CSOs, the previous WP-EFF system was superior to the GPEDC in generating behaviour change and hence outcome legitimacy: 'I do think the old monitoring framework was a bit better in the sense that I can remember there being so much more hype around the outcomes' (Interview 18). However, there is a perception that the teeth of the earlier aid-effectiveness agenda and monitoring frameworks have been undermined by a deliberate effort on behalf of traditional donors:

The forum was supposed to hold donors account, to get better. The donors managed to get it killed basically, in part by trying to make it about emerging donors. Yeah, okay, they need to improve. The whole point of this is to say that 'you've got responsibilities, you're the ones spending most of the aid, you're not doing it very well, and you should be meeting certain standards'. And for a while it was quite an effective mechanism of accountability, even with its limitations, but yeah, I think it's a massive distraction, or it was a massive political tactic to say, 'let's make it about everybody and let's make it about everything, and let's not have any real political involvement anymore'. So it's no wonder that it's not as effective as it should be. (Interview 3)

The capacity of the GPEDC to generate behaviour change is further encumbered by the declining political interest that donors have in the development effectiveness agenda. Whereas in earlier years some donor countries had 'whole departments focused on aid effectiveness... now [it] is basically two guys in the back of the room who raise their hands every now and again, to try and get everyone to remember the stuff we all agreed to do' (Interview 10). While donor country representatives may profess in official statements that they are still committed to development effectiveness, there is a perception that this commitment is not reflected in actual donor support and engagement with the process. Furthermore 'there's no expulsion from the GPEDC, there's a little bit of naming and shaming, but it doesn't really get much traction' (Interview 10).

CSOs do not, therefore, hold positive perspectives over the GPEDC's capacity to generate behaviour change. However, similar to other country stakeholders interviewed, CSOs also

hold that generating behaviour change is paramount for their perceptions of organisational effectiveness. As one respondent noted in no uncertain terms, the GPEDC:

...need[s] to be able to demonstrate that their monitoring framework is causing behavioural change. Like to me that is what they're supposed to do. For me that's their number one - the number one purpose is effective development cooperation, i.e. aid. For them to be effective, they should move the bar on that. And if they can't move the bar on that, then I think they're not being effective. (Interview 18)

Furthermore, similar to recipient countries, CSOs view the accountability function of the GPEDC to be paramount for their perceptions of output legitimacy or effectiveness. For instance, 'effectiveness for us is having an accountable mechanism', and this mechanism needs to have clear action points and post-monitoring follow up (Interview 20). Similarly, one Southern CSO representative notes that:

The way I would define effectiveness here is not different from the spirit of the global partnership. I mean from the four principles - accountability, alignment to country systems, transparency - all those four principles that get the GPEDC move - when they go together, and they are effectively enforced, then we have effectiveness. If any of those are missing, then we do not have effectiveness anymore. (Interview 1)

Nonetheless, CSOs do present rather strong perspectives on how the accountability function of the GPEDC should be improved. Key among them, is the suggestion to develop time-bound commitments and to 'invest in the post-monitoring process, that is to say that all stakeholders invest in the post-monitoring process at the country level, and to set an agenda derived from the outcomes at the country level' (Interview 12). At issue here is not necessarily improving upon the technicalities of the monitoring process as commonly invoked by traditional donors: 'you can improve to have the most perfect monitoring framework, but if all you do is produce a report at the end of it all, you've actually achieved nothing' (ibid.). Instead, the emphasis ought to be on actually using the results of the monitoring framework to have discussions on how to improve progress towards development effectiveness commitments.

With their emphasis upon accountability and monitoring as crucial determinants of their output-based evaluations, CSOs resist the suggestion that the GPEDC should focus more

on its discursive function of being a knowledge-sharing platform. Some CSOs claim that doing so would risk reducing the GPEDC to a talk shop which would:

lead to ruin... you're going to have nice regular conversations with a committed pleasant body of civil servants and politicians, what you're not going to have real impact, and you're certainly not going to make jump from aid effectiveness to development effectiveness (Interview 10)

Furthermore, some CSOs resist the suggestion that the GPEDC should be wholly aligned with the UN and post-2015 SDG agenda. The contention here is not that the GPEDC should not feed into debates on the post-2015 agenda. However, the proposal that the GPEDC would simply become a source of evidence for the follow-up and review process of the SDGs would risk undermining the integrity of the development effectiveness agenda, and it would 'undermine the GPEDC's monitoring exercise to incentivise behaviour change' (CPDE, 2016: 3). Similar to recipient countries, CSOs are also cautious regarding the suggestion that the GPEDC should unduly expand its focus and remit to cover other actors and flows. While CSOs certainly would like to see the GPEDC put in place accountability mechanisms for PSAs, there are concerns by non-state actors over the 'never-ending push to expand and broaden the agenda, somewhat arbitrarily', as this may hinder efforts towards meeting the 'unfinished business' of the aid effectiveness agenda (Interview 40). With their privileging of the GPEDC's monitoring and accountability function to incentivise behaviour change of donors and recipients, CSOs regard efforts by traditional donors and other country stakeholders to bring in the private sector with scepticism. For instance, one representative noted that

I just get the impression that especially with increasingly less available country programmable aid, increasing use of these [private sector] leveraging mechanisms, all these kinds of things, it's hurting the whole aid effectiveness world. The bid to leverage and work with the private sector for me, is a bit contra to what the aid effectiveness piece is supposed to be about. (Interview 18)

In sum, CSOs hold negative perspectives on the GPEDC's capacity to generate behaviour change and hence outcome effectiveness. Of issue is the GPEDC's procedural design that does not, in its current form, put sufficient pressure on donors and country stakeholders to modify their behaviour in line with development effectiveness principles. Furthermore,

broader changes in political interest serve to accentuate negative trends towards desired behaviour change. Moreover, CSOs perceive outcome effectiveness to be the crucial determinant of overall output legitimacy. Here, CSOs resist the suggestion that the GPEDC should focus more on its role as a discursive platform, while they are highly sceptical of efforts to align the GPEDC with the UN or to expand its remit to other non-ODA sources and flows. Instead, CSOs would prefer that the GPEDC strengthens its monitoring function by either adopting time-bound commitments or by focusing more heavily upon post-monitoring evaluation.

7.5 Private Sector Actors

Similar to CSOs, as non-state participants in the GPEDC PSAs are not subject to the monitoring of their behaviour change. However, there is an indicator in the monitoring framework that examines progress towards public-private dialogue (PPD). Here, evidence and reporting on PPD is highly limited, both by way of its substantive insight (in that it merely examines the quality of government's consultation with PSAs) and in that only a handful of partner countries reported on this indicator (OECD-UNDP, 2019: 164). Furthermore, there is little evidence to suggest that PSAs have changed their behaviour as a consequence of their engagement within the GPEDC. For instance, as one business representative notes 'little has been changed to my business organisation since the Busan congress, the business world is hardly aware of the existence of the Global Partnership' (GPEDC, 2016d: 19).

A discernible silence exists with regards to private sector perspectives on the outcome effectiveness of the GPEDC. Despite touted attempts to broaden the monitoring framework to include an indicator on blended finance (MAG, 2016), an indicator on new types of financing partnerships (Lonsdale, 2016), or even with the recent Principles for Private Sector Engagement, PSAs seem to reserve their judgement on the GPEDC's outcome effectiveness and its applicability to their actions and behaviour. As noted by Lanzet (2017: 17) 'private sector companies remain hesitant, waiting to see what effectiveness principles will mean for investments'. Moreover, despite the PPD indicator of the current monitoring framework, there is no 'one stop shop' for engagement with the private sector as there are

many different forums for private sector collaboration (Coppard and Culey, 2015: 13). In short, there is neither evidence nor willingness by PSAs to move towards a framework that would better include them within the monitoring rounds of the GPEDC.

Nevertheless, PSAs regard outcome effectiveness as the most crucial determinant of their perspectives on output legitimacy. As noted by one private foundation representative,

...in order for it [GPEDC] to be effective, they're gonna have to be able to demonstrate the outcome of all the work that they've been doing - the monitoring and all the results, and what difference it's made. Otherwise, it's just a lot of money poured into, you know, a big kind of multi-stakeholder partnership that doesn't lead to anything. (Interview 27)

While demonstrating outcome effectiveness is considered important for improving the output legitimacy of the GPEDC, there is a broad recognition that the private sector has been rather silent on conversations over monitoring. As noted by a former secretariat staff member, 'the private sector has remained silent in these conversations... [as they] have a completely different language and culture compared to what the private sector is used to engaging in' (Interview 2). While the BLC was created as an attempt to improve upon the quality of the GPEDC in engaging with the private sector in terms of developing language around principles that can be understood by the private sector, it is too soon to say whether such efforts have been successful. Nonetheless, there is the view that procedural and governance issues of the GPEDC have not been conducive to generating private sector interest:

International business organisations have been making a strong effort to represent company's interests in the Steering Committee, in order to lay the ground and create opportunities for company participation (of all sizes and sectors) in relevant events and activities... Nevertheless, the shortcomings in efficiency and governance... continue to fuel uncertainty and dissuade widespread business interest. (GPEDC, 2014a)

Although PSAs share the view with other stakeholders that outcome legitimacy is paramount for organisational effectiveness, those interviewed nonetheless forwarded several suggestions to improve upon the output legitimacy of the GPEDC. For instance, one

representative interviewed noted that the GPEDC and other stakeholders could emulate elements of the private sector in its governance:

...part of the reason why it's so important for the private sector to engage in development, is that the private sector has a market test on what it does. Things don't work, people don't buy the product, and then you get that feedback and immediately you have to rethink. The problem with so much of what we do in development is we don't get that feedback until it's too late. And so, you know, thinking about ways to bring that perspective in and thinking about ways to use the private sector so that you get that real time feedback the way a typical private company does, that's pretty key. (Interview 28)

Furthermore, the representative goes on to note that one of the deficiencies of the GPEDC and the field of development cooperation is that:

...so much time is spent on design and preparation... and in that time things can change dramatically... what happens is then you're so committed to a certain path, it's tough to make mid-course corrections... so there is a need to emulate the private sector in terms of being more reactive to market signals, and [to be] more nimble (ibid.)

While emulating the efficiency of the private sector in the above respects was put forward as a means to improve the output effectiveness of the GPEDC, other representatives interviewed placed a premium upon the GPEDC's capacity to generate new partnerships with the private sector. For instance, one representative noted that 'I think we need to see new partnerships come out of it, and then we need to see partnerships that are informed by what works... that will be success, there's so much room to grow' (Interview 35).

Nevertheless, numerable partnerships and fora attempt to engage the private sector at the global level, and there is the generalised perception that the GPEDC has yet to find its niche in this regard (Coppard and Culey, 2015: 3). Consequently, PSAs are somewhat ambivalent over the GPEDC's capacity to generate behaviour change, and there is scant evidence that PSAs have changed their behaviour as a result of their engagement. Nonetheless, behaviour change is considered to be highly important for generating perceptions of output legitimacy. PSAs remain sceptical over the GPEDC's procedural governance that is perceived to be overly discursive and insufficiently focused upon generating on-the-ground action. In improving upon the output legitimacy of the partnership, PSAs encourage the

GPEDC to emulate the private sector in terms of efficiency and to focus upon scaling up private sector partnerships and impact at country level.

7.6 Reflections

Stakeholder perspectives on output legitimacy reveal that all of those interviewed regard behaviour change (outcome effectiveness) as paramount for producing output legitimacy or organisational effectiveness. While there is a clear divergence between recipients and donors over the degree to which the GPEDC has been successful in generating behaviour change, there is nonetheless the shared recognition that the GPEDC is not functioning adequately in this regard. Despite the primacy of outcome effectiveness, stakeholders hold divergent and conflicting views on what constitutes organisational effectiveness. While donors would like to see the GPEDC broadened and the 'dual category' countries would prefer to see a greater alignment with the UN, recipients and CSOs advocate for a strengthening of the monitoring process in order to enhance effectiveness. However, this latter preference appears to be at odds with the donor emphasis that the GPEDC should emphasise its role as a knowledge-sharing platform. While there is clear evidence of divergence in stakeholder perspectives, particularly with regard to stakeholder preferences on effectiveness, there is common ground insofar as all stakeholders regard generating outcome (behaviour change) as essential for effectiveness. The preferences put forward, therefore, constitute alternative strategies on how to best to achieve behaviour change. The next chapter will present an analytical synthesis of the key findings presented over the last three chapters, and it will relate these findings to the research inquiries of this thesis and existing literature on legitimate global governance.

8. Analysis and Discussion

This chapter relates the findings to the research questions posited at the beginning of the thesis:

Q1: How do stakeholders perceive and evaluate the legitimacy of the GPEDC? Why might there be variation in perspectives?

Q2: To what extent does the GPEDC live-up to the promises, or succumb to the pitfalls, that are associated with multi-stakeholder governance?

Q3: What do stakeholder perspectives tell us about these actors' broader dispositions and preferences for global multilateralism within the field?

The first is concerned with intra- and inter- stakeholder perspectives and evaluations of legitimacy. Here, attention is devoted to the tensions that emerge between actors over the procedural functions and normative structures that the GPEDC should adopt, and the implications of these for theorising legitimate governance.

The second examines the extent to which the GPEDC fulfils its promise of providing a more horizontal and effective governance mechanism whereby all actors - North and South, state and non-state - convene on an equal basis to advance progress on development goals. Inversely, it is possible that the GPEDC succumbs to the pitfalls associated with MSPs. Namely, that it either contributes to re-inscribing long-standing power asymmetries or even augments the power of particular actors over others. This question requires that we depart from documenting stakeholder perspectives towards appraising the GPEDC in relation to pertinent questions on the legitimacy and effectiveness of multi-stakeholder governance.

The third requires that we take a step back to discern what these perspectives tell us about broader preferences on, and prospects for, global multilateralism. This final section of the analysis links the findings of this project to broader themes and ongoing changes within the field of development cooperation. This chapter will now analyse the project's findings in relation to each of these questions in turn.

8.1 Stakeholder Perspectives on Legitimacy: How and Why do They Differ?

The findings and analysis of this thesis challenge several core assumptions put forward by normative-democratic approaches to the assessment of legitimate governance. First, they challenge the view that the three dimensions of legitimacy - input, throughput, and output - complement one another, and that the 'more indicators a global governance arrangement satisfies and the higher the degree to which it satisfies them, the more legitimate is the organisation' (Take, 2012: 223). Additionally, the findings and analysis challenge the view that legitimacy is 'fundamentally dichotomous', i.e. an organisation is either legitimate or illegitimate (Deephouse and Suchman, 2008). What emerges instead from this analysis is a more nuanced picture. Against the first claim, simply maximising particular indicators - such as increasing the level of inclusivity or transparency - does not necessarily lead to more positive legitimacy perspectives. Furthermore, we can say that the DAC was primarily lacking in input legitimacy on the basis of its exclusive membership (Vershaeve and Orbie, 2013; Kindornay and Samy, 2012), and that the GPEDC was designed in such a way as to garner greater input legitimacy from engaging a much broader range of actors. However, the findings reveal that what matters for stakeholders is the *appropriate level* of certain indicators such as inclusivity, and this differs across actors.

Furthermore, an organisation is not merely either legitimate or illegitimate: empirical acceptance or legitimacy is more of a continuum, and perspectives are dependent on which stakeholder is asked. Stakeholders may take issue with particular elements of a governance arrangement, yet this does not necessarily detract from its overall appropriateness or legitimacy. Consequently, these findings and analysis corroborate Bernstein's (2004: 157) view that 'different audiences of state, global civil society, or market may share different criteria or weightings' of input, throughput, and output legitimacy. Key differences emerge from stakeholder preferences over the procedural function - and hence the normative structures - that the governance mechanism should adopt. The findings, therefore, suggest that given the contemporary diversity of the field of development cooperation, there is a need to engage constructively with the perspectives of stakeholders themselves when

appraising the legitimacy of novel global governance arrangements. Although all of the dimensions and indicators are deemed to be relevant to stakeholder's own assessment of legitimacy, there is evidence of divergence in the interpretation of these notions in practice. Moreover, these perceptions have concrete impacts upon the manner in which stakeholders engage with one another and hence upon the functioning of the partnership. This section analyses these findings and arguments for each indicator of this project's framework.

8.1.1 Input Legitimacy

Inclusivity: More is not the merrier

It is often put forward by advocates of democratic governance that processes ought to be designed to guarantee the maximum possible level of participation by affected actors (Dahl, 1989). For instance, Dodds (2015: 12) claims: 'the more inclusive [that] a partnership is, the more legitimacy and credibility it will have'. A key ambition of the Aid Effectiveness process was to expand the number of actors engaged in global development governance, and the institutional design of the GPEDC - in contrast to the DAC - sought to engage the full swathe of actors that comprise the field. The GPEDC's ambition to embody an 'inclusive' governance structure is well recognised. As Bena and Tomlinson (2017: 2) note, 'the global partnership is a uniquely inclusive global initiative in which non-state actors play a full role, alongside governments, in its governance and outcomes'.

All stakeholders interviewed recognised that the inclusiveness of the GPEDC is an improvement upon the previous DAC-style of closed, donor-only governance. However, there is variation over the desirability and appropriate level of inclusivity. Traditional donors recognise the importance of inclusivity as a guiding governance principle, and claim that the GPEDC's level of inclusivity is one of its core 'value-adds'. However, for these actors, two issues hamper the GPEDC's inclusivity. First, they take issue with the fact that the GPEDC does not have the engagement of the large SSC providers. Second, there are concerns over the disappointing level of engagement by PSAs. That the large SSC providers do not participate in the GPEDC is a core concern for traditional donors, and some would argue

that this puts questions on the overall legitimacy of the GPEDC as a governance mechanism. This finding lends credence to the claim that the overriding objective of the GPEDC's creation was to subsume, co-opt, or 'socialise' these 'new' actors into the DAC's sphere of influence and control (Chin and Heine, 2014; Abdenur and Fonseca, 2013; Li, 2014). For traditional donors, the failure to secure the participation of India and China is a failure of the original ambition and the purpose behind the partnership.

Similarly, those SSC providers that do not participate in the GPEDC maintain that the endeavour constitutes an OECD or Northern-led enterprise, and that it can not claim global legitimacy derived from their inclusion (Esteves and Assunção, 2014: 4). These actors instead argue that the UN (i.e. UNDCF) is the legitimate forum for discussions on development cooperation, and they therefore perceive the GPEDC to be an unwanted duplication of efforts.

However, while traditional donors and large Southern providers may view the GPEDC's legitimacy in negative terms due to the lack of engagement of the latter, this is not the case for other state and non-state stakeholders. Many recipients, small SSC providers, CSOs, and PSAs hold positive perspectives over the GPEDC's level of inclusivity. For these actors, while it would be desirable to have the large SSC providers on board, their lack of presence does not undermine the inclusivity and legitimacy of the partnership. Crucially, some CSOs maintain that the engagement of the large Southern providers might undermine the GPEDC's inclusivity, in that their presence might inhibit the recognition of non-state actors as equal partners, and may also dilute the commitments, accountability, and overall ambition of the process.

CSOs additionally present concern over how PSAs have been 'brought-in' to the partnership. The issue is not that the private sector should not be there. Instead, CSOs claim that the GPEDC is inclusive of transnational and Northern business organisations, but not necessarily of SMEs from developing countries. CSO criticism of the manner of private sector engagement in the partnership is hardly surprising given that CSOs are often highly suspicious of the role of the private sector in local and national contexts. These attitudes

are, therefore, reflected in CSO's normative perspectives on who the legitimate participants should be within the process. For PSAs that do not present many issues or concern over the GPEDC's level of inclusivity, this perhaps reflects their ambition to use this platform as one of action, and that the inclusion of a broad range of actors is only desirable to the extent that it instrumentally supports this ambition.

While recipients are on the whole positive about their own inclusion, there are tensions over the degree of CSO inclusion within the partnership, with some claiming that it is perhaps 'too inclusive'. By trying to engage too many non-state actors, recipients would argue that their influence and voice have been undermined. The recalcitrance of some recipients towards CSOs is perhaps reflective of the broader declining civic space that many recipient governments are contributing to in their national polities. Hence, these attitudes and inclinations are mirrored in the recipient's procedural perspectives and preferences on global governance.

Additionally, the pressing concern for recipient governments is not necessarily the lack of BRICS inclusion, but more-so the declining engagement of traditional donors in the partnership. For recipients, the lack of these actors' engagement does not affect the inclusivity of the partnership. Instead, recipients claim that the principal purpose of the GPEDC is primarily providing a forum for redressing issues in traditional donor and recipient relations. Namely, recipients are primarily concerned with addressing long-standing issues around the 'old' Aid Effectiveness agenda. Consequently, recipients express concern over the declining engagement of traditional donors in the partnership above all else.

The findings on inclusivity above challenge the view that merely maximising inclusivity will lead to greater legitimacy in terms of stakeholder perceptions. Instead, the findings and analysis corroborate Dingwerth's (2005: 75) view that 'the definition of legitimate participants is itself a central as well as a problematic element of democratic theory and practice'. Of key concern for many stakeholders is over who constitutes a legitimate stakeholder or participant, and simple inclusion alone is insufficient for generating perspectives of legitimate governance.

Furthermore, the analysis presented here challenges the popularly held view that the inclusion of non-state actors - such as CSOs and PSAs - directly address 'legitimacy issues by changing the composition of [governance] actors towards more democratic procedures' in so far as empirical legitimacy is concerned (Zanella et al., 2018: 3). As noted by Nasiritousi, Hjerpe and Bäckstrand (2016), different groupings place varying degrees of emphasis on the legitimacy that can be derived from non-state inclusion within international organisations. While maximising the inclusivity of a governance arrangement may be normatively desirable, this does not mean that this would be desirable in terms of sociological or empirical legitimacy. Consequently, it is essential to be attentive to trade-offs and tensions that exist in terms of stakeholder perspectives and preferences on inclusivity. Therefore, merely adhering to 'the more-the-merrier' principle is weak policy guidance (Weiss, 2014).

Representativeness: Representing a 'boundless' demos

Representativeness is tightly linked to inclusivity as an indicator of input legitimacy. However, while the latter pertains to a more general principle that runs through the procedures of a governance mechanism, representativeness speaks directly to stakeholder views on the formal procedures that guarantee participation and voice. Having all of those who are affected by a global governance mechanism participating within it is impossible. Consequently, in the absence of direct democracy, structures can be put in place so that representatives can 'act for' and 'make present' those who are not (Pitkin, 1967).

Suitable and appropriate representative mechanisms hold the promise of bridging global multilateral norms and local action, and can thus be said to potentially contribute to 'governance from below' in multi-stakeholder arrangements (Bäckstrand, 2006: 290-291). The intention to adequately represent all relevant development actors is reflected within the GPEDC's constituency-based model of its Steering Committee. However, rather than having divergent views as to what constitutes appropriate representation, the analysis and findings here reveal that there are considerable concerns over the current model.

Both traditional donors and CSOs perceive themselves as well represented within the GPEDC. For traditional donors, and barring some issues regarding the lack of clarity over the roles of Steering Committee members, representation is assured by the pre-existing communication networks of the DAC. For CSOs, representation is ensured by CPDE that attempts to coordinate diverse CSO views within the development effectiveness agenda. However, there are intractable issues over the extent to which CSOs are themselves representative of the amorphous space that is global and national 'civil society'.

In contrast to the traditional donors and CSOs, recipients, SSC providers, and PSAs have weak systems of representation within the GPEDC. Despite the intention and hope that the GPEDC would 'better reflect the views of the intended beneficiaries of development cooperation' (Carter, 2016), recipients are encumbered by fragmented and inadequate forms of representation within the GPEDC. Furthermore, and despite being commonly subsumed under the label of 'dual-category' providers, there is no natural congruence nor systems of consultation in place that can support the representation of SSC providers. Perhaps most significantly, there is substantial ambiguity over how to represent the private sector. As noted by Küblböck and Staritz (2014: 15), this is not merely an issue for the GPEDC. Within the UN and other international fora, the private sector is 'often approached as monolithic, but there are huge differences in scale and sectoral interests'.

While those with pre-existing structures in place - CSOs and traditional donors - perceive themselves to be well represented within the GPEDC, there is a recognition by these actors that the other stakeholders are inadequately represented. All stakeholders, therefore, perceive the current constituency model to be inappropriate, and lacking in legitimacy in this regard. The analysis and findings throw up several pertinent questions regarding the representation of these diverse 'constituencies'. For instance, there are questions over whether it is possible to represent such a varied range of actors denoted under the label of 'South-South Cooperation'. The difficulties in adequately conceptualising these actors, as noted in section 1.2.1, thus have parallel difficulties in representing these actors within institutions of global governance.

It is apt to question whether the current GPEDC model is a regression in terms of recipient representation compared to the WP-EFF era. During this period, there was a 'Partner Country Caucus' that enabled for recipient coordination and representation. However, there is no such mechanism in the GPEDC. Furthermore, these findings suggest that there is a need for further reflection on whether there should be a more disaggregated approach to representing the so-called 'private sector'.

The findings and analysis on representativeness reveal the difficulties inherent in having democratic governance beyond the nation-state. Adequate representation within the GPEDC is dependent upon stakeholders having both the networks and channels of communication in place that enable them to represent their constituencies. While *prima facie*, it may make sense to have a constituency-based on SSC or private actors, this runs the risk of obscuring significant differences within these categories (Dingwerth, 2005: 73). Similar to inclusivity in that there are diverse perspectives over who constitutes legitimate stakeholders, there are conflicting perspectives over to what extent a 'given stakeholder category should be represented' (Böstrom and Halmström, 2013: 103). For instance, tensions abound over how the private sector should be represented within the partnership, and how to ensure that it is not merely the voice of transnational or Northern stakeholders.

For some, these findings may not be surprising, as studies elsewhere affirm that Northern countries tend to be overrepresented, while the private sector and Southern countries are *de facto* underrepresented within MSPs (Pattberg and Widerberg, 2014; Bäckstrand 2012; Pattberg 2010; Hale and Mauzerall 2004). Nonetheless, issues around adequate representation are arguably intractable for democratic governance at the global level: without a clear and identifiable 'demos' in place, attempts to provide adequate representation at this level are likely to be plagued with significant gaps and subject to criticism (Erman and Nasstrom, 2013).

Equality: The 'Golden Rule' and the 'Shadow of Hierarchy'

Both inclusion and representation cannot be attained ‘when [such] allow only those having the organisational structures, and financial resources required [to] affect the decision-making process’ (Guastafero and Moschella, 2012: 204). In the absence of attempts to offset the power imbalances that result from resource disparity among actors with vastly different capacities, governance arrangements would merely reflect the preferences of the already powerful, and offer a thin veneer or partnership. Yet core to the GPEDC is the view that it constitutes a ‘coalition of equals working towards shared goals’ (GPEDC, 2012a: 2). Moving from a hierarchical donor-recipient model to one characterised by horizontality and equality in relations was one of the core promises of the aid effectiveness reform process, and it is also prevalent within the current discourse around the SDGs. As noted in the opening of this thesis, former DAC Chair Brian Atwood noted that the GPEDC would be ‘unique in that it will make equal partners of all its members’ (Atwood, 2012: 28). However, there are differences over the extent that equality is perceived to be present among actors within the partnership. Moreover, there are tensions and questions over whether there *should* be equality between the actors that comprise it.

Traditional donors are highly cognisant of the inordinate influence and power that they wield compared to other stakeholders within the GPEDC. However, despite attempts to offset power asymmetries, there is an understanding that the GPEDC and its decision-making is still beholden to the ‘golden rule’: those with the gold, make the rules. On the whole, stakeholders with more significant resources are more likely to perceive that there is equality within the partnership. However, for many recipients and CSOs, there is an overriding perception that the GPEDC is DAC-donor dominated.

Despite being an improvement upon the prior DAC system of governance, a significant constraint facing the more equitable engagement of actors such as recipients and CSOs are inadequate resource capacities. Whereas donor agencies can rely upon their institutional bureaucracies to support and facilitate their engagement within complex global processes such as the GPEDC, there is simply no comparable capacity at the disposal of many aid-dependent recipient governments.

In the ambition to have a 'global light' and 'country-heavy' institutional structure, there are significant limits on the GPEDC's secretariat capacity to offset power imbalances. In combination with the lack of an adequate representative mechanism, this puts recipient governments at a considerable disadvantage insofar as their engagement is concerned. Similarly, this disparity in resources could also be said to affect private sector engagement in the GPEDC, whereby only those larger private organisations with financial capacity can maintain sustained engagement within the partnership. Nevertheless, PSAs that do engage do not feel unequal within the process, although they recognise that other stakeholders may not feel the same.

While resource capacity - both human and financial - bears heavily upon stakeholder perceptions on the *de facto* equality within the partnership, there are also normative tensions over the extent to which all actors in the partnership should be regarded as equal. Some recipient governments maintain that since they are the primary duty bearers responsible for representing their citizens and in executing development policy, unelected and unrepresentative CSOs should not be on equal footing with them. The tension that exists between CSOs and some recipients lends credence to the claim that there is increasing state-state equality between donors and recipients. However, the situation is arguably deteriorating for state-CSO relations at the global level.

Furthermore, CSOs would contend that large PSAs should not have an equal voice to them within the partnership, as CSOs are closer to the concerns and livelihoods of 'ordinary people' on the ground. Consequently, there are diverse perspectives as to who should be equal to whom in practice. We can therefore invoke the Orwellian notion that some actors feel that specific stakeholders ought to be 'more equal' than others.

As noted by Wolf (2008: 237) on power relations in multi-stakeholder global governance: 'the shadow of hierarchy is [often] still present, but the shade may vary'. There have been efforts by traditional donors to offset the perception that the GPEDC is a donor-dominated governance mechanism. However, the GPEDC is characterised by a schism between those who have financial resources, and those who do not. While normatively desirable, it is apt to

question whether it is possible to have a genuinely equal partnership amongst actors who have radically different capacities. Some may argue that it is necessary to offset disparities that result from resource capacity by providing funds that can either enhance capacity or secure the engagement of weaker stakeholders (Take, 2012: 224; Kindornay and Samy, 2012: 14). However, who will provide such resources? At least in the development cooperation context, it will come from donors. Rightly or wrongly, these bureaucracies will use their funds and hence influence to affect governance processes in a manner that is conducive to their self-interest.

Democratic deficits, in this case, do not necessarily result from a lack of formal access, nor an explicitly conspiratorial attempt to maintain control by powerful actors. Instead, the issue is that such access 'is informally restricted through a plethora of democracy-relevant structural inequalities that pervade global politics' (Dingwerth, 2014: 1125.). As a global governance initiative that attempts to bring together a range of highly heterogeneous actors with diverse resource capacities, simple inclusion and formal structures of representation alone cannot countervail vast disparities in power. For instance, there is a gulf of difference between a well-funded German donor representative and a local Senegalese CSO representative. The former not only can rely upon substantial resources to have prolonged engagement and influence. They are also nested within broader channels of communication and influence - such as the DAC, and other processes of global governance - that determine their structural dominance and power. While the latter may very well be well informed of their own issue areas, and the development effectiveness agenda, there are limits upon the influence that they can have in comparison to more powerful actors.

Fundamentally, access is restricted for weaker actors who do not have the requisite capacity to participate on an equal footing to that of traditional donors that can rely upon extensive state bureaucracies. While having an equal partnership is normatively desirable, there are considerable tensions over whether 'all stakeholder interests ought to be treated as equally important and legitimate' (Dingwerth, 2005: 74). Similar to the other input indicators of assessment, merely maximising the degree of equality within a partnership is very difficult in

practice. Moreover, doing so would not necessarily be normatively desirable for all actors within the partnership.

8.1.2 Throughput Legitimacy

Quality of Decision-Making and Debate: Between the technical and political

For advocates, MSPs ‘most closely approximate the deliberative ideal’ (Schleifer, 2014: 28). Some have argued that MSPs ‘frequently base their decisions on sincere and meaningful deliberation among participants’ (Dingwerth, 2007: 9). To explore stakeholder assessments on the deliberative quality of debate and decision-making, this project adopted a few additional heuristics to ease and guide the exploration of stakeholder perspectives. In particular, it explored the degree of universality (openness), rationality (arguing rather than bargaining), and reciprocity (conducive environment to mutual learning) in deliberation and decision-making.

Traditional donors praise the universality of the GPEDC’s deliberative quality. However, there is a trade-off that results from this: ensuring openness can undercut the substantive quality of debate. On the matter of substantive quality, traditional donors argue that due to the non-politicised nature of the GPEDC - relative to UN fora - there is scope for more frank discussion that goes beyond the conventional exchange of official political positions. However, there is a generalised perception that the debates are rather hollow, and their influence upon broader global governance and national processes are questioned.

For SSC providers that are engaged in the partnership, they share somewhat similar views to that of the traditional donors in that they praise the universal nature of GPEDC’s debate and decision-making. However, there are concerns over reciprocity and dispositions towards mutual learning. The issue with reciprocity does not necessarily emerge from the procedural set-up of the GPEDC: they are more-so the result of the ‘we know best’ attitudes held by some DAC members that do not lend themselves to mutual learning and horizontal exchange. This finding corroborates that of Powers and Jablonski (2015: 136) in that ‘often

we see established actors engaging in inclusive negotiations in order to benefit from the perception of democratic decision-making while refusing to engage authentically in the deliberative process’.

Similarly, while many development organisations have, over the past decade, talked-the-talk of ‘co-learning’ with the emerging powers, there have been question marks over the extent to which northern donors hold a genuine willingness to critically reflect on their own development practices and ideologies (Mawdsley and McEwan, 2012: 1204). Nevertheless, SSC providers prefer technical rather than political debates, perhaps because this provides an opportunity for them to weigh in on areas and matters that they have significant expertise.

Recipients also maintain the view that the GPEDC is universal in terms of its debate and decision-making quality. While many do praise this, there is still the view held by some recipients that it is arguably ‘too universal’ and that this such makes consensus more difficult to attain. Moreover, recipients refer to their relative lack of capacity which inhibits equal engagement in debate and decision-making, leading to donor dominance. As noted in representativeness and equality, the lack of a convening mechanism by which to develop joint and common positions means that recipients do not have a more coordinated presence. In contrast, CSOs view the cleavage in terms of a government vs non-state divide: it is the governments whose voice is heard rather than CSOs.

Counter to the view that the non-politicised nature of GPEDC discussions is a progressive and desirable feature, these actors advocate for a more politicised space. Crucially, CSOs claim that donor and SSC provider preference for technocratic rather than politicised debate is a political strategy that enables them to maintain control, and to offset critique against their lack of behaviour change. PSAs also maintain negative perspectives on the deliberative style and quality of decision-making in the GPEDC. In essence, these actors feel that the GPEDC's decision-making and debate have been highly onerous, too formal and burdensome, and ultimately not conducive to maintaining business interest. Instead, PSAs advocate for less talk and more action on issues that specifically concern business.

Moreover, this perspective explains why PSAs dragged their feet on the introduction of the 4th NECC: it would arguably serve to encumber already inefficient decision-making and deliberative process.

Redressing stakeholder preferences for a universal style of open debate that also enables substantive engagement presents a dilemma. Panels are either slimmed down to enable a more in-depth discussion, or, as many viewpoints are included as possible, yet discussions remain somewhat superficial. Of course, the issue is not necessarily binary, but one of balance. However, getting this balance right is a quandary: the GPEDC is liable to considerable criticism for tipping the balance in either direction.

While there is normative disagreement over the degree to which debate and decision-making should be universal, a critical divergence in stakeholder perspectives comes from stakeholders who advocate for either a more politicised or technical style of debate and decision-making. A fundamental issue that has plagued the Aid Effectiveness agenda since Paris has been a failure by some actors to ‘grapple sufficiently with the political nature of development and foreign aid’ (Hyden, 2008). However, whether this is a conscious or deliberate avoidance of political issues is open to question. This finding on traditional donor preference for non-politicised and technical exchanges may nonetheless reveal how these actors maintain their dominance within the field: by relying upon their technical expertise, and setting up exchanges that enable them to direct and dominate such conversations.

As in many other areas of development, we see within the GPEDC attempts by traditional donors and other powerful actors to ‘render technical’ discussions that are perceived by CSOs and recipients to be fundamentally political (Ferguson, 1990; Li, 2011). Consequently, hierarchical dominance (attempts to) manifests itself in deliberation as it does in decision-making, yet such dominance can be implicit or informal. In sum, this indicator reveals that there can be within-indicator tensions between actors, and not only tensions across dimensions of legitimacy.

Transparency: Is too much ‘sunshine’ blinding?

Transparency is widely regarded as paramount to organisational legitimacy, based on the maxim that 'sunshine is the best disinfectant'. The logic follows that the more transparent a governance process is, in that it offers stakeholders 'unlimited and timely access' to information, the more legitimate an organisation will be (Keohane, 2011: 102). Within the GPEDC, transparency is not just a procedural concern: it is also a general development effectiveness principle that permeates throughout the partnership. Although visibility is not coterminous with transparency, interviewees repeatedly brought this issue up when questioned on this indicator.

All stakeholders interviewed regard the GPEDC as a transparent institution. However, a key concern is not over the formal access to information, but the accessibility of information for different types of audiences. Crucially, for some stakeholders, there is a perception that there is 'too much' information, and that issues around the GPEDC's transparency may relate to 'information saturation' rate than a lack of access to information. Some actors, such as traditional donors, argue that navigating the amount of information is burdensome and detrimental to the *de facto* accessibility of information regarding the partnership's functioning. Consequently, we can say that while sunlight (transparency) may very well be a good disinfectant, too much can be blinding.

Nevertheless, we also see an apparent tension and conflicting demands between those who would prefer less and more focused information, versus those who require additional translations not only into other languages but also written in such a way as to be understood by various audiences. While transparency is a highly sought and praised normative goal, 'realising transparency in a meaningful normative sense is indeed a far-fetched dream' (Dingwerth, 2014: 1132). Issues arise from attempting to engage and inform diverse audiences with various languages, operational and conceptual ways of operating, and ensuring that information is succinct enough to be digestible, yet also sufficiently in-depth. Hence with regards to transparency, we see how conflicting demands and perspectives pull the 'cart' of the GPEDC in different directions.

Accountability: 'Fly in the ointment' or 'Jewel in the crown'?

Accountability is arguably the most crucial indicator of throughput legitimacy. However, determining what constitutes a 'robust accountability mechanism' is one of the core problems confronting the design of legitimate global governance (Cadman, 2012: 12). As noted, at the global level, there are complex principal-agent relationships between actors, and normative disputes over who should be accountable to whom (Bäckstrand, 2006: 264). Within the development cooperation context, Hyden (2008: 259) questions whether mutual trust and accountability are even attainable: as they 'involve confronting issues of power in ways of which neither donors nor recipients have any experience'.

In the absence of conventional formal or hierarchical accountability mechanisms, MSPs are particularly prone to challenges and disputes, as they have to rely on more networked and horizontal forms of accountability. Nevertheless, mutual accountability is key to the development effectiveness agenda and the GPEDC. Moreover, the GPEDC situates itself as a vital accountability mechanism within the field for the SDGs, and it was created in order to hold government's feet to the fire (Abdel-Malek, 2015: iii). However, as yet unresolved questions relate to 'which governments?' and 'accountable to whom?'.

Traditional donors present several concerns regarding the accountability of the GPEDC, both as an institutional arrangement and also in its attempt to hold DAC donors accountable for their commitments. The critical issue is that DAC donors contend that they are first and foremost accountable to their domestic constituencies (Renzio, 2016). While DAC donors are already held accountable via peer review in the DAC, there are no hard sanctioning mechanisms in the international sphere that can coerce donors into amending their behaviour. Unsurprisingly, we see attempts by donors to downplay the accountability function of the GPEDC in favour of less committal learning exchanges and also to augment the scope of the monitoring to encompass a broader range of flows and actors. Both of these endeavours, if implemented, take the spotlight off the DAC donors by diluting the focus on conventional ODA.

We likewise see considerable resistance by large SSC providers against their inclusion in the accountability framework of the GPEDC. India and China perceive the Aid Effectiveness agenda and the GPEDC process as fundamentally DAC or Northern in origin, and thus the monitoring framework constitutes an illegitimate attempt to modify and manage their behaviour. Similar to traditional donors, PSAs are recalcitrant over their inclusion within the GPEDC's monitoring process: there is no appetite to be ensnared in a process that would be punitive in its declarations on private sector activities. Hence, those who provide development cooperation would rather see monitoring used to promote knowledge exchange and the learning of best practice, rather than 'naming and shaming' bad behaviour.

In contrast to providers of development cooperation, recipients and CSOs maintain that the accountability mechanisms of the GPEDC are the 'jewel in the crown' of the process. The GPEDC is perceived to provide recipients with one of the few tools available to hold donors to account over their prior commitments. While there is a recognised power asymmetry in the accountability relationship of donors and recipients, there is nonetheless a concerted and long-term effort by both CSOs and recipients to resist diluting the accountability and monitoring mechanisms by unduly extending it to encompass other actors and flows. Nonetheless, some tensions are apparent within the CSO constituency: with some who would like to see the monitoring framework expanded to include PSAs, and those who would prefer that it remains focused on traditional donor-recipient relations.

While the above findings may suggest a congruence between recipients and CSOs in their attempt to avoid dilution of the donor-recipient based model of the monitoring framework, it is essential to note that some recipients also resist being held accountable to CSOs nationally. Moreover, CSOs are not themselves immune from criticism over their accountability despite the assumption that CSOs are a force for democratising global governance (Bäckstrand, 2006a: 469). Some recipient governments would argue that CSOs represent particular local interests and are arguably not more accountable than the private sector or public sector.

There are therefore significant tensions over the scope of accountability mechanisms of the GPEDC, and these directly relate to unresolved questions over who should be regarded as a principal and an agent at the global level. Nevertheless, the findings of this thesis corroborate Bexell et al.'s, (2010: 91) view that 'through the lenses of representative democracy, partnerships are problematic because they make the division of power and responsibility more unclear'. There is a danger that by making all accountable, no-one is accountable. Arguably, the DAC's attempt to engage the large SSC providers at Busan led to a significant diminishment of the prior commitment agenda of Aid Effectiveness, and that with the GPEDC 'accountability [was] sacrificed on the altar of inclusivity' (Cole, 2016). There are, therefore, significant limitations and tensions over the scope of monitoring mechanisms, and challenges in meeting the normative ambition of a robust system of 'accountable' global governance.

8.1.3 Output legitimacy

Outcome (Behaviour Change): 'Rules for thee but not for me'?

As noted, this project uses outcome effectiveness (behaviour change) as a proxy to explore stakeholder perspectives on organisational effectiveness (Take, 2008; Mitchell, 1996: 23). As noted by Beisheim and Dingerth (2008: 7), a governance scheme's effectiveness can be assessed by examining 'the extent that it guides the behaviour of its addressees'. The effectiveness of the GPEDC is thus assessed by the extent to which its members perceive there to be a 'sufficient compliance pull' (Franck, 1990: 24) that encourages voluntary behaviour change. This indicator is, therefore, closely linked to accountability. However, while stakeholder perspectives on accountability explore who they believe should be held accountable, this indicator examines the capacity of the GPEDC to encourage behaviour change that results from stakeholder engagement.

Outcome or behaviour change is perceived by McEwen and Maiman (1983: 258) as one of the most crucial indicators for assessing legitimacy: 'voluntary compliance [by political subjects with rules] is the fundamental observable indicator of legitimacy'. Generating

voluntary behaviour change is paramount for the architects and advocates of the GPEDC. As noted by Abdel-Malek (2015: 316), it was hoped that the GPEDC would succeed over the 'dismal results' of the prior Aid Effectiveness agenda and generating behaviour change through broad buy-in would constitute its core *raison d'être*. The optimistic official position may persistently be that the glass is 'half-full'. However, both the results of successive monitoring rounds and the findings of the research findings reveal rather disappointing progress in this regard. There has been highly limited progress towards redressing criticisms around the aid system that date back to the 1990s, such as reducing transaction costs, and improving recipient ownership of development (Whitfield, 2008)

Traditional donors openly acknowledge that there has not been sufficient behaviour change on their behalf towards the realisation of the development effectiveness principles. However, traditional donors maintain that their poor performance is mostly a reflection of the technical faults of the monitoring process. Namely, these actors claim that the monitoring process does not reflect the current landscape of ODA financing. For instance, the current monitoring framework does not capture the development effectiveness of multilateral flows, nor does it recognise their contributions to fragile and conflict-affected states. Moreover, traditional donors are increasingly exploring modalities that enable them to support private sector engagement, yet GPEDC attempts to monitor and engage in such activities are nascent in this regard. Consequently, traditional donors claim that the GPEDC's monitoring approach is ill-suited to affect behaviour change, as it does not adequately reflect changes in the external financing environment.

Interestingly, there is a parallel between traditional donor perspectives on the inadequacies of the GPEDC's capacity to generate behaviour change and that of the large Southern providers. These latter actors have, since the creation of the GPEDC, maintained that the monitoring process of the GPEDC is ill-suited to capture the unique nature of their development cooperation activities. Although large Southern providers such as India and China claim that it is due to the GPEDC's DAC and Northern provenance that makes it irrelevant to them, both traditional donors and SSC actors share similar perspectives over its applicability to their development cooperation activities. This finding corroborates those of

elsewhere that recognise clear evidence of convergence between traditional DAC donors and SSC providers (Kragelund, 2015). Arguably, this suggests that the *de facto* behaviour of both traditional and 'new' providers have quickly outgrown the regulatory frameworks put in place over the past decade to guide their behaviour.

The lack of behaviour change by traditional donors is in stark contrast to the efforts of recipients to operationalise the development effectiveness principles in their national reform efforts. The key reason as to why recipients do change their behaviour is their belief in the development effectiveness principles as legitimate and vital, and perhaps perceived as a means to secure more aid by demonstrating compliance, and that the GPEDC itself is conducive to encouraging reforms domestically. However, recipients recognise that the GPEDC has been ineffective in generating behaviour change by donor states. Although recipients feel that the GPEDC empowers them to an extent, there is a perception that in terms of behaviour change it is mostly 'business as usual' in that it is incumbent upon recipients to change their behaviour. However, donor countries continue to pursue their development cooperation with little to no pressure on them to adhere to their commitments.

Similarly, CSOs hold negative perspectives over the GPEDC's capacity to encourage behaviour change for donors. However, at issue for CSOs is not only the worrying trends on donor (in)action but also the deteriorating civic space or enabling environments experienced by many CSOs within recipient countries. CSOs argue that 'everywhere excluded groups [are] attacked, so [is] progressive, rights-oriented civil society, because we stood up for rights' (CIVICUS, 2019: 6). Furthermore, 'anti-NGO laws, arbitrary inspections, harassment, and criminalisation all strike at the roots of civic space' (Buyse, 2018).

While there may be limited evidence of change between donor-recipient relations, there has been an increasing deterioration of CSO civic space despite the GPEDC's commitment to reversing this trend. The issue here is not with the technicalities of the monitoring process, nor its Northern provenance: it is instead due to the lack of political attention that the GPEDC and its monitoring rounds have within donor countries and headquarters. The

GPEDC is thus perceived by CSOs to be very poor in its capacity to encourage behaviour change.

PSAs are ambivalent in their perspectives on the GPEDC's capacity to generate behaviour change. Despite the fervour and energy devoted towards adapting development effectiveness principles to have relevance to PSAs, the findings of this project reveal that there is a general perception that the GPEDC is largely irrelevant to the operations and conduct of the private sector. While a case can be made for the relevance of particular development effectiveness principles to the private sector, this is likely to be heavily dependent on country context and the type of sector that a business is engaging in. Moreover, while it is too soon to provide comment on the relevance of the much-lauded Principles for Private Sector Engagement, there is no evidence that businesses have changed their behaviour as a result of their engagement in the GPEDC. Insofar as the GPEDC is concerned, the private sector continues to be a law unto itself.

While all actors recognise that the GPEDC has been rather weak in terms of generating donor behaviour change, yet has succeeded in encouraging recipient behaviour change, it is nonetheless telling that all actors regard outcome (behaviour change) as the crucial determinant of output or organisational effectiveness. Consequently, for the GPEDC to be successful, it must demonstrate clear results in this regard.

Effectiveness Preferences: In the eyes of the beholders

While outcome effectiveness is paramount, this project yields some noteworthy findings on additional factors that stakeholders refer to in formulating their judgements on the effectiveness of the GPEDC. Similar to Nasiritousi (2017: 4), my research finds that 'evaluations of effectiveness may vary amongst constituents depending on which goal fulfilment is favoured'. Traditional donors, for instance, emphasise that to be effective, the GPEDC needs to be able to garner the engagement of both SSC actors and the private sector. Consequently, the GPEDC's input-based quality inform traditional donor output-based evaluations. We cannot, therefore, entirely separate output legitimacy from other

indicators of assessment when understanding what informs stakeholder judgements on effectiveness.

Traditional donors also maintain similarities to SSC actors in that both advocate for the GPEDC to emphasise its discursive function as a knowledge-sharing hub. However, the latter would emphasise that to be output legitimate: the GPEDC would need to have a closer UN orientation if not entirely subsumed by the UN. Moreover, this closer UN alignment is necessary for the GPEDC to have buy-in by other recalcitrant SSC providers such as China, India, Brazil, and Turkey. Here, we therefore also see other dimensions of assessment - such as throughput and input - informing stakeholder evaluations of organisational effectiveness.

In contrast to traditional donors and SSC actors, CSOs and recipients are united in their privileging of accountability and outcome effectiveness as key to informing their evaluations of organisational effectiveness. While traditional donors and SSC actors advocate for greater input-based legitimacy and to downplay the GPEDC's accountability function in favour of less committal learning exchanges, both recipients and CSOs emphasise that the GPEDC needs to strengthen its accountability mechanisms. As noted, by expanding the GPEDC further - and hence contributing to its input legitimacy - there is a risk that this may dilute the GPEDC's accountability and monitoring scope. The onus is instead upon strengthening the current framework by introducing measures such as time-bound targets and post-monitoring evaluation and follow up. Crucially, the proposition that the GPEDC should emphasise its knowledge sharing function is treated with suspicion, as this may serve to neuter the GPEDC's accountability function further. Moreover, the 'dual category' suggestion that the GPEDC should have stronger linkages with the UN is also resisted by CSO actors who feel that this may undercut the independence of the aid effectiveness agenda.

In contrast to the perspectives above, PSAs advocate for a less discursive space and it instead promotes a vision of the GPEDC as one that draws upon private sector logics in terms of its innovation and capacity for quick action. Further, there is not a sense that the

private sector would necessarily advocate for greater input legitimacy, and that the emphasis instead is upon efficiency and problem-solving on the ground (Held and McGrew, 2002). Consequently, we see apparent tensions between actors over what constitutes effective governance and the procedural function and emphasis that the GPEDC should adopt.

The findings on output effectiveness reveal that behaviour change is paramount to informing stakeholder judgements. Consequently, these findings corroborate the view that 'outcome' is a viable proxy for assessing organisational effectiveness. However, too much focus on outcome alone may lead to a lack of attention on other sources of output effectiveness. As noted, stakeholders draw upon input- and throughput-based dimensions to evaluate organisational effectiveness. Moreover, there may be intractable tensions between actors over what needs to be put in place to generate effectiveness. For instance, traditional donor preference for a less stringent accountability mechanism is in stark contrast to recipient emphasis upon strengthening accountability: getting beyond this tension is something of a quandary in terms of formulating a partnership that is desirable by all those involved.

On the whole, we can say that variation in legitimacy perspectives exist due to the competing interests of the actors involved in the governance mechanism. Stakeholders base their evaluations and procedural preferences according to what institutional form would benefit them the most. For sure, democratic values and procedural principles inform these evaluations and perspectives. However, there is substantial variation over what these values and principles mean in practice. The analysis and findings presented above reveal that not only do there exist tensions between different dimensions of legitimacy but also in stakeholder evaluations of what constitutes legitimate and effective governance. It is therefore unsurprising that concerns around legitimacy encumber the GPEDC on several fronts.

8.2 The GPEDC and the Promises and Pitfalls of Multi-Stakeholder Governance

This section draws upon the research findings to determine the extent to which the GPEDC has provided more horizontal, democratic, and effective governance, or whether it has

served to re-inscribe existing power disparities between actors. As noted at the beginning of this thesis, development institutions - such as the DAC, World Bank, and the IMF - have been consistently criticised based on their legitimacy credentials, in that they merely represent the anachronistic North-South balance of power of the obsolete Western-centric world order (Dreher et al., 2011). However, global MSPs - such as the GPEDC - have been posited as potential correctives to the lacklustre legitimacy associated with 'traditional' development institutions. Consequently, Kharas (2011: 4-5) has questioned whether novel innovative initiatives such as the GPEDC have 'provided a true break from the past and created an opportunity to forge a new partnership that better reflects the realities of the global poverty reduction challenge today'. This section, therefore, questions whether the GPEDC constitutes a 'win-win situation where the effectiveness and the democratic credentials of global governance both increase' (Pattberg and Widerberg, 2014: 18).

This section first appraises the extent to which we can say that the GPEDC produces more democratic and horizontal governance, or whether it has served to re-inscribe power asymmetries. In other words, this section analyses whether MSPs such as the GPEDC constitute a 'new tyranny' within the governance of global development cooperation (Cooke and Kothari, 2001; Hickey and Mohan, 2004). It is argued that although the GPEDC is dominated by donors, there is nonetheless evidence of more equal relations between donors and recipients than previous iterations of governance. This section secondly appraises the extent of the GPEDC's success in producing more effective governance. Here, and although perceptions of effectiveness are stakeholder-dependent, funding struggles have undermined the GPEDC's potential as an effective governance arrangement. Moreover, this section argues that traditional donors may not necessarily desire for a more empowered GPEDC. In the final analysis, we are still no closer to a global platform to advance progress on the SDGs, and the GPEDC has become 'gridlocked' like other institutions and fields of global governance.

Although we may say that the GPEDC is *de jure* globally inclusive, in that it is open to a broad range of actors, the lack of participation of crucial Southern powers severely undercuts its democratic legitimacy and claim to be a *global* partnership. At best, the

GPEDC is a modified *de facto* regional organisation, whose primary constituencies are donors and recipients. Notwithstanding the critical contributions of small SSC providers such as Indonesia and Mexico, the GPEDC cannot claim legitimacy to speak nor represent the views of SSC as a development cooperation modality. Furthermore, the lacklustre degree of engagement by the private sector and large SSC providers detracts from its input legitimacy for some actors. However, this is not to suggest that the GPEDC is not a model worth emulating. It does nonetheless suggest that we should be cognisant of the limits of its claim of being a global platform.

Irrespective of its 'global' credentials, we can nonetheless evaluate the GPEDC on its ambition to produce more 'equal' and 'horizontal' governance. In its defence, the GPEDC is an improvement upon previous forms of governance, such as the DAC and WP-EFF, in terms of the formal equality that it provides to its members. This equal recognition applies not only to 'weak' recipient states, but also to civil society, trade unions, and local governments. The creation of the 4th NECC position affirms this and arguably positions it as an MSP *par excellence*. We can, therefore, say that it has produced a laudable degree of *de jure* horizontal governance. However, in practice, it is indisputable that there is a great degree of *de facto* inequality in its governance: that there is still a hierarchy of influence that traditional donors retain within the GPEDC.

It is important to emphasise that much of the hierarchy and influence that donors retain in the process is not necessarily due to a conspiratorial attempt to dominate proceedings. As mentioned, it is instead a consequence of long-standing path dependency and the broader inequalities that permeate global politics. Furthermore, with the lack of participation of large SSC providers, this essentially created a power vacuum that only traditional donors could fill. Had the likes of China or India taken up the Co-chair seat that was created for them, it is likely that this could have served as a counterweight to the influence and resources held by traditional donors. However, so long as it is traditional donors that are funding the GPEDC, this hierarchy is likely to persist: other stakeholders such as recipient governments and CSOs simply cannot fully countervail the human and financial capacity wielded by Northern state bureaucracies. Although all stakeholders may have formal recognition and equal

participatory rights within the GPEDC, the extent to which such reflect and contribute to genuine or transformative shifts in assumptions, attitudes and power beyond the initiative is circumscribed by the structural inequality that exists between actors. Despite laudable language around equal partnership, and the attempt to provide a space wherein all actors can convene on an equal footing, the GPEDC can be criticised on the basis that it constitutes a superficial mantle of partnership, in which the already powerful define the agenda (Hyden, 2008).

While 'weaker' actors may not be able to combat the influence of donors over the partnership fully, my research suggests that the GPEDC is somewhat more horizontal than the perspectives of large SSC actors would have us believe. As previously argued, it has been the consistent efforts of some traditional donors since the creation of the GPEDC to downplay its accountability function in favour of a discursive emphasis, such as with the suggestion that it should operate more-so as a knowledge-sharing forum (Constantine, Shankland, and Gu, 2016). The fact that CSOs and recipients have been able to consistently resist such an emphasis consistently and to instead protect, and one could argue to strengthen, the monitoring function of the GPEDC is testament to the greater strength, agency, and influence that these so-called 'weaker' actors have gained within the partnership. Hence while we can say that within the GPEDC the 'shadow of hierarchy' is indeed present, coordinated action by other stakeholders can lighten the shade of this influence (Wolf, 2008: 237).

Ongoing donor dominance is not inevitable. If the GPEDC were to instigate a coordinating mechanism akin to the partner country caucus of the prior Aid Effectiveness era, it would likely serve as a very powerful counterweight to donor influence. This may risk introducing to the GPEDC a politicised body that is similar to the G77 of the UN. However, it would nonetheless present a viable means to encourage better recipient engagement and cooperation within the platform. At present, although recipients have formal representation, they have a rather weak collective presence within the partnership.

One persistent criticism directed at multi-stakeholder governance initiatives is that they constitute the 'privatisation' of global governance by affording private actors with more significant influence to the detriment of public and civic actors (Zammit, 2003). However, similar to the findings of Bäckstrand (2006: 299) on MSPs, my research found that PSAs have been rather marginal or ambivalent about their presence in the GPEDC. Business actors themselves have been recalcitrant towards engaging in a more systematised and extensive manner in the GPEDC. It could be argued that PSAs need not participate in any sustained way in the partnership as traditional donors are representing and acting in their interests on their behalf. In this regard, it was around the time that traditional donors and the GPEDC began to abandon efforts to get the large SSC providers on board - following the 2016 HLM2 - that we see more serious attempts to engage the private sector. We can thus say that there was an attempt to supplement the lack of input legitimacy that would have been derived from the engagement of SSC providers, by instead focusing on private sector engagement. Nevertheless, claims that MSPs constitute the privatisation of global governance, insofar as it is private actors themselves that are driving this shift, are presently unfounded with regards to the GPEDC. Interestingly, it has been traditional donors who have been driving forward this private sector engagement agenda, albeit with a questionable degree of success.

The question of whether the GPEDC constitutes more effective governance remains. In this regard, we can challenge the working hypothesis put forward by Schneider (2005: 10):

The more democratic an international decision-making process is, the more probable is compliance with the rules generated by this process, even in the absence of a possibility to coerce actors to comply with its rules.

We can first challenge this hypothesis by first disputing that there is an objective standard by which to assess the democratic credentials of a governance arrangement. As my research makes clear, democratic credentials and their assessment are entirely contingent upon which stakeholder is asked. Nevertheless, what arguably influences the outcome effectiveness or behaviour change of stakeholders cannot wholly be ascribed to the procedural quality of a governance mechanism. Many intervening factors influence an

actor's behaviour change, and an MSP such as the GPEDC can only be as effective as the broader environment allows it to be. If, as with the case of the GPEDC, it is becoming more normatively acceptable amongst the community of DAC donors to conduct their development cooperation activities in line with their explicit self-interest, rather than international or multilateral normative frameworks, there are severe limitations on the influence that a process such as the GPEDC can have in guiding the behaviour of actors. We cannot assume a simple correlation between normative or democratic credentials of a governance arrangement and organisational effectiveness.

The GPEDC does not exist in a vacuum, and legitimacy assessments must be cognizant as to the broader international and domestic factors that influence behaviour change. Short of listing the numerable factors that influence donor behaviour - such as economic and political self-interest, political party priorities, foreign policy and national security considerations, broader normative frameworks - the point is that we cannot assume a 'simple translation of procedural legitimacy into success' or output legitimacy (Dingwerth, 2008: 25).

If we are to take McEwen and Maiman's (1983: 258) view that 'voluntary compliance is the fundamental observable indicator of legitimacy', then clearly the GPEDC does not yield legitimacy in the eyes of traditional donors. However, we may say that due to increasing behaviour change by recipient governments, that the inverse is true for these actors. While traditional donors may have made minimal progress towards compliance due to what they perceive as inadequacies with the technicalities of the GPEDC's monitoring framework, this does not mean that these actors perceive it to be wholly illegitimate and that they have not sought to engage and use the platform. As noted, DAC donors aspired to gain broad buy-in from crucial SSC providers and hence have an input-legitimate process. They have, however, since sought to engage PSAs and augment the knowledge sharing aspect of the GPEDC while playing down its accountability function. Consequently, although a governance mechanism may not have observable legitimacy with regards to the behaviour change of stakeholders, we can nonetheless witness attempts to modify institutions to better align with stakeholders' normative preferences in terms of procedural design and emphasis.

One detrimental consequence of traditional donors' negative perspectives on the GPEDC has been evident in terms of its persistent funding struggles. As noted by Dellmuth and Tallberg (2014: 453), institutions that are perceived to be legitimate can 'easily attract [the] resources required for their persistence and secure compliance with the principles they establish'. However, the secretariat has been beset with financing difficulties since the GPEDC's inception. The funding deficit is particularly acute for the UNDP-based side of the team, and this lack of funds has profoundly negative consequences for the procedural functioning of the GPEDC as a governance mechanism. Moreover, these funding issues not only reflect the lack of legitimacy that traditional donors ascribe the GPEDC. They also negatively affect the GPEDC's capacity to generate legitimacy perceptions by providing funds to offset power relations within the partnership. In order for the GPEDC to have more egalitarian power relations by providing additional finance to support strengthen the capacity of weaker members, it is necessary to have the support of traditional donors. Consequently, this shows how traditional donor support is integral to empower other stakeholders, yet gaining such must be tempered with caution, as unduly favouring the preferences of traditional donors may serve to only further the perception that the GPEDC is a DAC-dominated initiative. As with many other facets of the GPEDC's perceived legitimacy, attending to this conundrum is a careful balancing act and something of a dilemma.

It could be argued that the GPEDC constitutes a successful initiative in the eyes of traditional donors, at least in an unspoken capacity. In creating a 'separate autonomous space' in which the DAC is just one of many stakeholders (Eyben, 2012: 79), the GPEDC has served as a buffer that becomes an object of criticism rather than the DAC itself. Arguably, donors would not like to see a more empowered GPEDC, as this would place more significant pressure on them to reform in a manner that might be contrary to their self-interests as providers of development cooperation. It is telling that the DAC has not disbanded since the creation of the GPEDC, and that there are less vocal criticisms today against the DAC's existence than there were during the aid effectiveness reform process. If traditional donors wanted to have the emerging powers onboard, surely they would have either dissolved the DAC or at least handed the GPEDC process over to the UN as they did with the International Development Targets of the DAC's *Shaping the 21st Century* report

(OECD, 1996) and the MDGs? That traditional donors have not done so, and that they have made very little progress towards development effectiveness principles, suggest that the GPEDC is a mostly symbolic enterprise that has proved instrumental in securing the ongoing survival of the DAC.

Just as the Aid Effectiveness reform process has been depicted by Chandy and Kharas (2011) as a means for the DAC to ensure its ongoing relevance, so too has the GPEDC provided a buffer for criticism against the DAC's legitimacy and contributed to the DAC's endeavour. However, it is essential to note that it has increasingly been CSOs and the recipients of development cooperation that have been the most vocal supporters of this process. Yet, as will be discussed in further depth in the following section, these actors support and engage within the process for different ends.

On the whole, we can say that one of the core consequences of multiple legitimacy perceptions and tensions is that they contribute to 'pulling the cart in different directions', and that such contributes to the manifestation of 'gridlock' within governance initiatives such as the GPEDC (Hale, Held and Young, 2013). As the gridlock thesis asserts, a combination of growing multipolarity, institutional inertia, harder problems, and prolific fragmentation all contribute towards deepening the condition of gridlock within governance. Whereas the gridlock thesis was developed with regards to the traditional post-war institutions of global governance, this project suggests that the causal mechanisms that produce gridlock may also encumber newly founded institutions. With the case of the GPEDC, multiple legitimacy perceptions and demands upon the governance mechanism has fundamentally stifled the organisation's development.

With the GPEDC, it is as if the Busan HLF4 had never happened: the field of development cooperation is no closer to a global multilateral mechanism that can convene all relevant development actors to advance progress on sustainable development. Contrary to the 'universal' discourse surrounding the SDGs, providers of SSC are largely disconnected and independent from DAC approaches to development cooperation; DAC donors continue to dominate within the governance architecture, and; recipients are pressured to take on

reforms. At the same time, CSOs are sidelined in core institutions of development governance. Although we can say that there have been somewhat minor improvements in parity between these actors, to suggest that we have moved fundamentally beyond the long-standing power dynamics that have characterised the field would be premature.

Although the language around 'partnership', 'development partners', 'partner countries', and so on may be laudable, such fundamentally serves to obscure ongoing disparities in power and actual influence. However, what has undoubtedly changed has been the role afforded to the private sector in the present conjuncture. While being somewhat distant in terms of their overall engagement in the GPEDC, the private sector has been afforded an integral role in the current development financing landscape. To elaborate on this further, we now turn to how these stakeholder assessments of the GPEDC's legitimacy provide insight into actors' broader preferences on global multilateral governance in the post-2015 era.

8.3 Dispositions and Preferences towards Global Multilateral Governance

The GPEDC is a minor global governance mechanism with limited visibility even within the field of development cooperation. However, it serves as a unique vantage point by which to explore development stakeholder preferences and dispositions towards global multilateralism. As Alonso (2018: 22) notes:

...as the diversity of the actors engaged increases, so does the heterogeneity of interests and visions at play, thus opening the space for new conflicts. To avoid such pitfalls, it has become necessary to design an inclusive and legitimate structure for development cooperation governance.

The above perspective is a laudable rallying call. However, it fails to acknowledge that it is ostensibly 'inclusive' and 'legitimate' structures that provide the space for these conflicts to play out. In broad terms, we can observe the presence of four competing ideological projects currently vying for influence. To return to the notion of the interregnum as laid out at the beginning of this thesis, the 'old' order of international aid centred around the DAC is currently in a state of decay. However, rather than seeing the emergence of a new order

capable of replacing it, we can instead see the presence of different projects that are being pursued and supported by diverse actors: retro-liberalism, economic nationalism, neo-structuralism, and inclusive social development. Each project seeks to use (or not use) global multilateral platforms in different ways, and for different ends. However, the overall analysis of the GPEDC suggests that dispositions towards global multilateralism are in decline. Moreover, the presence of competing projects suggests that the field is becoming increasingly fragmented and 'balkanised' due to increasing tendencies towards nationalistic self-interest. This section outlines and explores these projects in turn.

8.3.1 Retroliberalism

The findings of this thesis take forward the suggestion put forward by Murray and Overton (2016) that there is the emergence of a so-called 'retroliberal' project among key DAC donors such as the UK, the Netherlands, and New Zealand. The 'retroliberal' thesis posits that due to reconfigurations of global power, the global financial crisis, and the influence of new SSC donors such as China and India, DAC donors are increasingly turning away from prior aid agendas and approaches, such as 'Aid Effectiveness' and an explicit focus upon poverty reduction. While Woods (2008) noted that there are few incentives for emerging donors to participate in the 'old' aid architecture entered around the DAC, it appears that today there are increasingly fewer incentives for traditional donors to participate in initiatives of their own making, such as the GPEDC. As noted by Murray and Overton (2015: 25):

A new aid regime is emerging, one that is turning away from the poverty-focused consensus paradigm that guided Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) donors from the late 1990s, reflected in the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and the "aid effectiveness" agenda'

What we instead see is an increasing emphasis upon the use of aid in the pursuit of explicit self-interest, and primarily as a means by which to 'catalyse' private sector investment in developing country contexts. Whereas a concern with poverty-reduction was paramount in the 1990s and MDG context, today the emphasis by traditional donors is more-so focused upon stimulating growth and the use of ODA to 'unlock' private sector investment.

Consequently, it is unsurprising that traditional donors have declining levels of interest and engagement in initiatives such as the GPEDC, of which are the off-shoots of the 'old' aid effectiveness agenda.

It is worthwhile questioning why traditional donors continue to participate in - and fund - the GPEDC. After all, the GPEDC does not have the participation of the large SSC providers, and it is unsuccessful in driving forward collective DAC progress towards development effectiveness principles. In their broader pursuit to use aid to catalyse private sector investment, there is increasing emphasis by DAC donors in fostering private sector engagement in the late-2010s, rather than attempting to apply OECD principles of transparency and accountability to the development cooperation of SSC providers. Some donors use the GPEDC to develop normative principles, and hence legitimacy, for the use of aid for private benefit. In this light, traditional donors are not necessarily abandoning global multilateralism. However, their justifications and strategies for engaging in such fora are changing.

Whereas some such as Küblböck and Staritz (2014: 14) and Blowfield and Dowland (2014) note how the private sector is moving from being an unintentional into an intentional actor, it is noteworthy that it is traditional donors that are driving forward this agenda. In this regard 'it is generally more appropriate to speak of shifting roles of government rather than of shrinking roles of government as part of such changing relationships' (Kooiman, 2000: 139). It is not the case that donors are ceding their power and influence to PSAs, but the role of DAC donors is changing towards being facilitators, interlocutors, and advocates who act on behalf of these private sector interests.

In many ways, this shift towards retro-liberalism by some donors is reflective of the so-called 'Southernisation' of the North in international development cooperation (Mawdsley, 2018a). Through this retroliberal project Northern donors are converging upon aid practices that are commonly associated with the large Southern providers: the use of development cooperation for explicit self-interest; the affirmation of economic growth as the central analytic of development, and; the blurring of the lines between public and private funds.

While there are undoubtedly grounds for normative disagreement with this supposed shift in traditional donor strategy towards the use of public ODA for private gain, it is too soon to say whether such a strategy will yield positive or adverse consequences for the world's poorest. There may very well be an uncritical promotion of the private sector by DAC representatives without clear evidence that this is effective in terms of development outcomes. However, the same can also be said for some critical approaches to the role of the private sector in development. Simply put, there is a lack of evidence on both sides as to whether this project will be successful in leaving no-one behind as per the requirements of the SDGs.

Nevertheless, the findings of this thesis suggest that it is important to highlight who the 'private sector' refers to within mainstream development agendas. As the concerns of CSOs made clear, quite often the term 'private sector engagement' is a euphemism for large Northern corporations and transnational actors. Hence, in international fora it is often the voice of these more powerful actors rather than SMEs based within developing countries. Furthermore, Küblböck and Staritz (2014: 16) cautions that merely 'following the market and avoiding riskier projects may also reduce the additional and development dimensions' of development interventions. Nevertheless, traditional donors continue to use governance mechanisms such as the GPEDC as a means by which to extend and legitimise their approach towards private sector engagement. However, increasingly it is donor countries' self-interest that is driving this ideological project within the field.

8.3.2 Economic Nationalism

In earlier literature on the rise of the so-called 'new' or 'emerging donors', a fulcrum of the debate was oriented around whether these powers would individually or collectively challenge the status quo within the field of development. For instance, Woods (2010: 51) questioned 'with the BRICS emerging... is a more multilateral era of governance emerging?'. Contrary to this proposition, what we instead see is the presence of arguably distinct and competitive approaches to development cooperation pursued by countries such as India and China.

While these states were most vocal against the GPEDC due to its professed DAC or Northern-led nature, we do not see concomitant attempts by these actors to formulate a competing approach nor set of standards and principles. As noted by Renzio and Seifert (2014: 1869), beneath the common rhetoric deployed by these actors there is not a shared sense as to how they as SSC actors 'should act jointly to ensure that SSC as an emerging development cooperation modality is recognised and develops as an alternative to more traditional forms of development assistance'. For instance, within the UN, attempts to develop a common framework for SSC continuously flounder, or merely result in the reaffirmation of long-standing principles, such as those established at Bandung and in the 1979 Buenos Aires Plan of Action (BAPA).

There is, therefore, neither a clear indication of interest on behalf of these large SSC powers to collectively come together to form an alternative vision nor order of development cooperation that would directly contend with the traditional approach promulgated by the DAC. In this regard, it is possible to dispute the claim that these Southern powers do not participate in the GPEDC as they perceive the UNDCF to be the more legitimate forum. We do not see much evidence of collective efforts by India, China and Brazil within the UNDCF to position it as *the* forum for discussions on development cooperation. Instead, Weinlich (2014) notes that these states have been 'ducking for cover' within the UN, whereby they continue to insist on their developing country status and avoid taking on the mantle of additional responsibilities or leadership positions.

While my research does not yield any evidence that suggests that the large SSC providers are building a collective challenge to the traditional order from without (cf. Panda, 2013), we can nonetheless see the influence of these actors within the traditional order. As noted, due to the competitive pressure of the large SSC actors, DAC donors are increasingly converging upon the models, understandings and modalities that have commonly been associated with the SSC paradigm. However, some geopolitical tensions and rivalries exist between India and China, and given that their development cooperation serves to respond

to their self-interested foreign policy explicitly, there is a reluctance to be held accountable by one another as well as the traditional DAC donors.

The field of development cooperation has often been depicted as a 'battlefield' or a 'tug-of-war' between the Southern providers and the traditional DAC members (Esteves and Assunção, 2014; Chin and Quadir, 2012). While such descriptions suggest the existence of two mutually competitive, cohesive sides, my findings and analysis suggest that the field is more-so akin to a moshpit: messy, confused, though not necessarily conflictual. There are certainly ideological differences between the Southern providers' paradigm of SSC and those of the traditional DAC providers. However, there is evidence of convergence between these two. Moreover, within each supposedly homogenous groupings are different understandings over development and the means to achieve it. While the debate on the impact of the emerging donors upon the 'traditional' system of governance has long been entered upon a DAC vs. non-DAC or SSC binary, the reality points to a much more fragmented and complex landscape (McEwan and Mawdsley, 2012: 1188). Simple depictions of a battlefield between two supposedly like-minded groupings may, in the words of Rowlands (2012), conceal more than they reveal.

Nevertheless, the with-holding of support and legitimacy from the GPEDC, with no joint effort to develop an alternative order or set of guiding principles within the UN, suggests that these actors are jealously guarding their independence as development actors. However, these actors are not wholly opposed to engaging in plurilateral or unilateral fora, as evident with the BRICS platform and the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation. Yet there does not seem to be an appetite for a global multilateral platform that would place additional burdens nor responsibilities on them in their capacity as providers of development cooperation.

8.3.3 Neo-Structuralism

In contrast to the large Southern providers that appear to be insistent on retaining their nationalist economic approach to development cooperation, the same cannot be said for smaller SSC providers such as Mexico and Indonesia. Given these countries' support for the

GPEDC, it is apt to doubt the appropriateness of the 'dual category' designation as a means to represent the views of SSC providers within global forums and institutions. There is simply too much heterogeneity between SSC actors to warrant banding them together under one constituency in institutions of global governance.

Rather than rejecting multilateralism, these smaller though significant providers of SSC appear to be wholeheartedly embracing it. Similarly, there is substantial support and positive legitimacy perspectives for the GPEDC held by many recipient countries, despite initial reluctance from the G77 in the early days of the partnership. It appears that these states are following the observation of Aaltola, Sipilä and Vuorisalo (2011: 7) in that 'small states are relying on multilateral institution-building and on participating in key international institutions'. As noted by Creutz (2017: 3) on informal institutions and the role of small states:

...whereas the rise of informality has been seen as a counter-reaction to the constraints imposed upon traditional major powers by formal international organisations, it has also been submitted that weak[er] states are more prone to create and use informal institutions than powerful states if their leverage in global politics is not reflected within existing formal institutional arrangements.

Moreover, it can be argued that these states have adopted and internalised the characteristics of the so-called 'neo-structuralist' paradigm as put forward by Murray and Overton (2011: 312). Characteristics of this paradigm include: an ostensible shift away from neoliberal orthodoxy; the handing back of control to the state through principles of ownership and sovereignty; the importance of concepts such as inclusiveness and participation; a shift in policy recommendations towards more holistic development approaches, and; attempts to include voices from across society to determine policy priorities (ibid.).

This proposed shift is claimed to have emerged in the late 1990s and is tightly bound to the emergence of the Aid Effectiveness agenda and the establishment of the MDGs (de Haan, 2009). These states have arguably internalised the principles of Aid Effectiveness, and they therefore also embody the characteristics that are associated with this ideological project. Recipients and small SSC providers thus welcome a multilateral initiative that intends to

provide them with greater national ownership over their development trajectories. For instance, throughout the 1990s and 2000s, there was a persistent attempt by the DAC community to promote the principles of 'good governance', 'transparency', and 'accountability' in recipient states to encourage reforms in the public financial management systems of recipient states (Murray and Overton, 2011: 315).

Given that many recipient countries have been taking on these reforms for over the past two decades, it is hardly surprising that they are enthusiastic and supportive of engaging in a process that promises them the prospective benefits of the development effectiveness agenda - such as donor harmonisation, the use of country systems, more forward visibility in ODA provision - in return for their reform efforts. These states are thus proponents of global multilateralism, as initiatives such as the GPEDC offer them more influence than they would otherwise have if they were to act bilaterally or alone.

8.3.4 Inclusive Social Development

The final ideological project that we see within the broader field of development cooperation is that of 'inclusive social development'. Whereas the previous projects pursued by states all contain a social component, yet mostly conceive of development as primarily an economic endeavour, those advocating for this ideological project put the social component front and centre. As noted by the prominent CSO representative Tony Tujan (2014: 3), Director of IBON International, this ideological project can be summed up by the following: 'economic growth, while crucial, must bring all-sided benefits to the whole of society, including ecological balance, promotion of human rights, and the equality of nations'. Whereas all of the other ideological projects pay lip service to the language of socially inclusive growth, ecology, and rights, the emphasis here is more-so upon ensuring that 'big D' development yields direct benefits for the poorest and most marginalised in society: such should not be the indirect consequence of promoting economic growth. While CSOs can indeed be said to be heterogeneous, the majority of CSOs subscribe to a rights-based and socially inclusive conception of development.

However, as noted by Mawdsley, Savage and Kim (2014: 33), such a rights-based perspective on development effectiveness was a minority view held at Busan, and increasingly it is under strain and attack due to the increasing civic repression that CSOs are facing globally. In terms of the broad ideological tenets pursued by the other projects, the findings of this project corroborate the view of Eyben and Savage (2013: 465): ‘development as social justice contrast[ed] with Neo-liberalism did not reflect a North-South divide, but rather create[s] a fracture between civil society and almost everyone else’.

While we can dispute the degree to which the other three ideological projects are indeed ‘neoliberal’, the point is that civil society nonetheless presents a conception of development that diverges from that of the other state actors within the field of development cooperation. In terms of CSO dispositions towards global multilateral governance, in straightforward yet clear terms, we can say that these actors will seek to use whatever fora that they can to advance their respective individual or collective agendas. The GPEDC yields particular support from these actors for it affords them with an unparalleled degree of parity, formal representation, and influence.

However, the rising role ascribed to the private sector in global development cooperation is a cause of great concern for CSOs. CSOs fear that with the greater emphasis placed on the private sector in the pursuit of the SDGs, CSOs are being ‘pushed out’ of critical institutions of development governance (Banks and Hulme, 2014: 190). As CPDE (2019) recently noted, current trends are not promising:

...with capitalism pursuing profit at an unprecedented scale in history, civil societies around the world can only expect businesses and their allies in the government to find new ways to restrict civic spaces even further. They are not about to stop, and from another standpoint, can even be described as just getting started.

Whereas the dominant aid orthodoxy of the previous MDG period was accompanied by considerable support for CSOs as both implementers and normative agents, the contemporary discourse surrounding the SDGs places a premium upon private sector logics and actors. This, in combination with the deteriorating legal environments that CSOs are

subjected to in many parts of the world, means that sustaining a rights-based, people-centred view of development as social justice is under considerable pressure the contemporary field of development cooperation.

8.4 Conclusion

The findings and analysis of my research shed light on the complex legitimacy challenges facing the field of development cooperation. What we see is a highly fragmented field that is characterised by various dispositions towards multilateralism, understandings of development, and competing perspectives on what legitimate and effective governance demands. We see not only tensions between dimensions of legitimacy, but also tensions between actors over the normative structures that should govern the field.

Despite the GPEDC constituting an innovative, novel governance arrangement - not only within the field but also within global governance writ large - it is telling that legitimacy indicators associated with 'old' systems of inter-state governance have crucial relevance. That is to say, the dimensions of legitimacy that have been used to appraise traditional inter-state governance - input, throughput, and output, and their associated indicators - are still highly applicable to new governance arrangements, such as the GPEDC and other MSPs. On a comparative note, then, it is possible to compare both 'old' and 'new' institutions using similar benchmarks, whether this be in a normative-democratic or a sociological/empirical capacity. However, as informal initiatives that are constituted by shifting and fluid constituencies, where both states and non-state actors can move in and out of an arrangement - it is worth questioning the robustness of findings that can be ascertained through a sociological approach to the study of the legitimacy of MSPs.

In other words, in contrast to formal state-based multilateral bodies, MSPs do not have a formal and consistent set of members. This means that empirical/sociological perceptions of legitimacy, which are held by the members involved in a governance arrangement, are also increasingly likely to be highly fluid, issue-based, and spatially and temporally bounded. If the world is to further move beyond traditional multilateralism towards informal governance

arrangements such as MSPs, then such fluidity has to be contended with by both scholars and practitioners. For the former, it is necessary to meet such fluidity and contingency with flexibility in their legitimacy frameworks, and be much more provisional in their assertions. The question is not 'how to improve the robustness of findings on sociological legitimacy?', but rather, 'how can we approach the study of sociological legitimacy in a world where truly robust findings may not necessarily exist?'. The approach of this thesis constitutes one such endeavour for studying the kaleidoscopic nature of empirical legitimacy perceptions within informal governance. For the practitioner, it must be recognised that attaining organisational legitimacy is no straightforward endeavour. Diverse stakeholders - both state and non-state - put forward equally diverse and potentially conflicting legitimacy demands, and the relative weight of these demands may change depending on the balance of actors that are involved in a given arrangement.

Although we may say that the GPEDC does not ultimately serve to transform relations from a hierarchical North-South donor-dominated system of governance, the most vocal advocates for the process are those that it intends to empower: recipient countries and CSOs. Yet, given the heterogeneity of the actors involved - in terms of their preferences, their motivations for participating in governance arrangements, and their nature as development actors - accommodating the preferences of all actors involved in the GPEDC is a herculean, if not impossible, task. The following chapter will provide some reflections on how we should think about reform efforts if we are to create legitimate and effective governance for those that need it most.

9. Conclusion

It has been nearly a decade since the Busan HLF-4 on Aid Effectiveness. This meeting marked the end of the Aid Effectiveness reform process, and it was to set in motion a new era of a universal and horizontal development partnership. However, in the following years, there have been profound changes within the development cooperation landscape, and the global economy, society and polity writ large.

The 2015 deadline for the MDGs has come and gone, and in their place, the world has adopted the SDGs. Whatever their faults, this agenda is the closest thing we have to a collective blueprint for a more sustainable and equitable future. In a world that is increasingly looking inwards, we should not overlook the profound political will that went into getting agreement on this ambitious agenda, and the promise that it holds in offering a more sustainable world. However, creating a menu is easier than cooking a meal, and throwing ingredients into a pan will not be enough to create something edible or nutritious. If we are to meet these goals, there is no substitute for careful, coordinated, and sustained collective action.

The SDGs put forward an agenda that is distinctly *universal*. In other words, the SDGs - in contrast to the MDGs - apply to *all* countries and societies equally. In tow, have been studies by some such as Horner and Hulme (2017) that suggest the North-South binary that has long characterised international development is no longer relevant. Instead, we need to embrace a more holistic understanding of *global* development that includes both between and within-country inequality. In this context, the old DAC-led model of governance looks starkly anachronistic and illegitimate. The world can no longer be neatly divided into rich Northern donors and poor Southern recipients. There is, therefore, a well-recognised need to develop governance that can more legitimately encompass the range of 'new' actors, in the hope that such might foster more sustained cooperation towards the fulfilment of the SDGs.

This thesis has examined one initiative that offered such a promise, albeit within the relatively niche field of development cooperation. However, it seems to have run into the sand. The problems with the GPEDC go beyond the issue of simply having too many cooks. The challenges in this regard reflect deeper issues surrounding values, incentives, and the intractable challenges of working in concert. It seems that we are no closer today to a global multilateral development effort than we were in the aftermath of the Busan forum. As a more varied range of actors enter - or come out of - the field, and we increasingly recognise the complexity of the challenges that lay before us, the landscape of development cooperation has grown more fragmented, messy, and confusing. While some such as Acharya (2017) may insist that fragmentation is inevitable, creative and positive, it is apt to question at what point the risks of fragmentation outweigh the potential benefits.

The crisis facing the governance of development cooperation is reflective of the broader crisis facing the world. The notion of the interregnum captures a dilemma that has faced humanity throughout history. It constitutes a situation where what has worked in the past is no longer working, but we can not agree on how to work differently together. In this liminal space between the past and the potential future, the ineffective and illegitimate 'old' continues to exist, yet the space opens up a new terrain for conflict and innovation. However, there is nothing to suggest that the 'new' will be better than what came before it, and the present interregnum may very well be the new normal for an indefinite period.

In this concluding chapter, I offer several reflections. Specifically, I provide some suggestions on the contributions of this project's framework for approaching the study of legitimacy; some methodological considerations, and; policy suggestions for improving the governance of development cooperation. Finally, I outline several areas for future research.

9.1 The Value of a Normative-Sociological Approach to Legitimacy

If we are to conduct research and inquiry into legitimacy that is to serve a valuable and relevant social purpose, we can no longer afford to ask the question 'what does legitimate governance require?', without the concomitant question, 'for whom?'. The crisis of the

interregnum is a crisis of legitimacy. It constitutes a situation where the means and ends of governance - the people themselves - no longer deem the existing frame to be appropriate. Attending to their preferences and understandings is long overdue as the focus of legitimacy scholarship in global governance.

The above statement is not to suggest that there is no place for normative thinking. To the contrary, to create governance that is not only acceptable to diverse actors, but also just, requires that we hone our capacities for normative reflection and thinking. However, the key takeaway from this project is that we cannot presuppose that the institutional designs associated with Western democracy will suffice in garnering support by the relevant actors that comprise the global polity. If we are to insist upon purely Western understandings of democracy and legitimacy in our institutional designs, we are doomed to failure: institutional innovations will continue to fail until this lesson is learnt.

However, there is a gulf of difference between imposing the institutions of democracy, and aspiring towards the values that are associated with them. As this project makes clear, values such as inclusivity, equality, and accountability hold normative weight in the eyes of all involved. Yet, it is how these values are interpreted in practice that matters. Furthermore, these values can be manipulated by actors facing a crisis of legitimacy, and they can cloak themselves in particular languages and discourses for legitimising aspirations. The danger with purely normative approaches to legitimacy is that they tend to overlook the nuanced ways in which different actors may interpret, employ and understand these values, and the contingent and dynamic nature of these perceptions. Often, these approaches simply do not sufficiently acknowledge that there can be many legitimate perceptions of what legitimacy requires: it is not a case that one interpretation is, or should be, clearly superior to all the others.

Nonetheless, I am not arguing here for an 'anything goes' disposition in terms of our theorising of legitimate governance. What I am arguing for is a much more open and flexible approach that can accommodate and engage with a plurality of perspectives on what actors perceive to be the 'good'. Hubris should have no place in our theorising of legitimate

governance, as the very pillars that have sustained the old model of international governance are beginning to crumble beyond disrepair. If we are to have any hope of facilitating an international order that can garner the support of those it seeks to govern, it must be able to accommodate and not exclude. It has been the exclusion of perspectives that has, among other things, led to this situation of interregnum.

I do not mean to suggest that by simply engaging with a greater plurality of conceptions of the good - and hence an empirical approach to the legitimacy - that such can necessarily resolve the structural crisis of the interregnum. The roots of the present crisis go deep. Any single attempt to offer a full and parsimonious understanding as to why we find ourselves in the current predicament should be treated with the utmost suspicion. Nonetheless, this project does provide an appropriate means to study legitimacy that is both normatively grounded and it can offer a pragmatic route into policy debates. By beginning with democratic values, we can start to nuance what is required in the eyes of those that governance seeks to govern, but also guide reform efforts to align with normative ideals.

Rather than shying away from contestations and tensions, the approach provided here is based upon uncovering them. The result of this approach may not come in the form of fully generalisable laws, causal mechanisms, or neat categorisations of what needs to be done. However, it does provide a deep and full understanding of the difficulties that are involved in garnering acceptance amongst diverse actors. If achieving legitimate governance was easy and straightforward, it would have already been done. It is necessary to enhance our efforts in engaging with the complexity that practitioners contend with on a daily basis.

One pertinent objection to this framework is that it constitutes nothing more than a modified attempt to impose the values of Western democracy through shrouding itself in the perspectives of diverse actors. By beginning with ostensibly Western values as heuristic lenses through which to explore the views of others, does this not otherwise tint and obscure what actors *really* believe to be legitimate governance?

I recognise this objection. However, I provide two rebuttals. First, while we certainly should be careful not to impose the institutions of Western democracy, that does not mean that democratic values should also be rebuffed. While we can aspire for complete objectivity in the physical sciences, we are nonetheless political and human beings. As mentioned, I hold an axiological intention to produce social scientific research that can contribute to fostering greater democracy at the global level. So long as we are upfront about these intentions, we can proceed with these endeavours in the spirit of openness and transparency.

Secondly, while these values may feature heavily in normative-democratic accounts of global governance, Western approaches do not have a monopoly upon them, while we should also be sceptical over the supposed 'Western-ness' or provenance of core concepts such as these in International Relations (Bilgin, 2008). Nevertheless, one striking finding was how treasured these values were for all concerned. It was, however, their interpretation of them that mattered. While many stakeholder understandings were perhaps 'almost the same, but not quite', such divergence produces challenges and tensions in governance (ibid.; Bhabha, 1994). Furthermore, one would be hard-pressed to find a critique of global governance institutions that is not framed in language related to their democratic credentials (Scholte, 2011: 115). Hence, it is entirely appropriate to engage in sociological or empirical research that is guided by these normative values.

Furthermore, it is important to be aware that democratic approaches are by no means homogenous (Held, 2006). Approaches to democratic forms range from majoritarian to minority-focused, and pluralist to consensus-based approaches. With the rise of social and organisational pluralism at the global level, and also within sub-fields such as development cooperation, some such as MacDonald and MacDonald (2020: 520) point towards the need for a new 'pluralist' imaginary of legitimacy and democracy in global governance, by 'opening institutional mandates to creative contestation by multiple distinct collectives, even when doing so is incompatible with achieving a fully rationalized global institutional scheme'. The empirical approach of this framework therefore complements such normative attempts, for it seeks to uncover what legitimacy means to diverse actors within a complex and plural global order.

Another objection may be that this framework merely contributes to efforts to massage consent. For those working within a critical or neo-Marxist approach to international political economy, 'one man's legitimacy is another man's domination' (Brassett and Tsingou, 2011: 2). By exploring actor's perspectives to uncover where tensions lie and whether there might be potential for them to be resolved, we are merely identifying areas where a few concessions can be made to secure the acquiescence of reluctant actors. In other words, rather than contributing towards truly transformative governance, is the pragmatic contribution of this framework anything other than the identification of a few areas of reform to secure consent? I accept this critique wholeheartedly, as that is precisely what this framework enables in terms of its policy contributions.

However, as Gramsci would have argued, forming a progressive new prince requires that alliances be formed among diverse groups of actors. Truly robust and effective leadership, that is to say, governance that does not rely upon coercion alone is not merely the domination of one group over another. Leadership is attained through fostering cooperation between diverse actors to work collectively towards one desired end. Forming governance that can accommodate a plurality of actors working towards the end of sustainable development will require concessions, and it will require consent on behalf of the governed. However, rather than shying away from attempts to bring actors together because of fear that it will lead to the cooption of subaltern groups, why not then instead aspire for more legitimate and democratic ways of working? Perhaps rightly so, this approach can be criticised as it is unlikely to result in governance challenges the status quo understanding of development as economic growth. However, I will return to this point when reflecting on the implications for policy.

9.2 Methodological Reflections

This thesis drew upon a range of methods to study the problematic situation outlined. By way of its methodology, the pragmatist approach proved entirely appropriate to the aims of this thesis. Above all else, the approach enables for a certain comfortableness with the

unknown from the beginning. By beginning with a problematic situation - which was defined by the researcher - it was possible to continually orient investigation towards uncovering blind-spots and emphasising areas that are deemed relevant to the practitioners that are under study.

While this thesis drew upon a range of data collection methods to address the research questions, the findings of some methods were used much more prominently than others. For instance, while this project initially set out to 'measure' legitimacy through the use of an exploratory questionnaire, the findings of this questionnaire are not contained within this thesis. This is because it became apparent that asking stakeholders to rate the case according to a pre-defined set of indicators seemed to be counter-intuitive to what was really being sought: an in-depth understanding of how stakeholders themselves evaluate and understand particular democratic values. To approach research, it was necessary - and to borrow the Chinese phrase popularised by Deng Xiaoping - to 'cross the river by feeling the stones' (He, 2016: 287).

Both interviews and participant observation formed the basis of this project's original research. For the former, I would like to emphasise the viability of online interviewing as a legitimate alternative to in-person interviews. Whereas in the past, distance has proven to be a continual barrier to research, the use of online interviews has, in large part, eliminated this issue. This project has been truly global in scope, and it has included participants from New York, to Beijing, to Antananarivo. There was not a single research interview that I encountered any barriers to access because of technological issues. For sure, the line was clearer for some interviews than others, and those that I was interviewing tended to be professionals working in capitals. However, it is still nonetheless possible to conduct research that is similarly global in scope by making use of advances in this technology. This is all the more necessary for research on global governance that seeks to engage participants beyond the usual Northern suspects, and in reducing the carbon footprint of research in this area.

While data attained from participant observation are suffused throughout the findings of this thesis, the core value of this experience was its ability to humanise the case and subjects of research. Desk-based research and analysing transcripts of interviews afford a certain degree of distance and 'objectivity' that is necessary for detecting patterns in the data and to develop themes. However, doing-so alone risks forgetting that what we are studying are human beings who, however imperfect, have devoted their lives to public service and 'development' in one form or another. I feel that to have a less antagonistic and more constructive style of governance, it is also necessary that we, as researchers, be less hostile and more constructive in our expectations and approaches. There is no better antidote for an undue, jaded, and cynical attitude than repeated exposure and interaction with the individuals that one is studying. In particular, I sympathise with many private sector representatives who are attempting to participate in the 'new' governance of sustainable development. Often, they are treated with the utmost suspicion - and outright hostility - by some public and non-state actors. Contrary to my initial prejudices, all of the private sector representatives I encountered were smart, intelligent, and sensitive human beings who are genuinely attempting to 'do good', albeit by ensuring that their organisations 'do well' as a result of their engagement.

A final point I'd like to mention is the importance of studying the 'unsexy' in global governance and development research. Often it is within the procedural and prosaic activities of governance initiatives where hierarchy is reproduced and re-articulated. As noted, hierarchy in the case of the GPEDC is not necessarily a result of a conspiratorial attempt to control, but rather the result of the humdrum and mundane processes of bureaucratic structures. Again, participant observation proved essential to recognising and appreciating this reality.

Nevertheless, the findings contained in this thesis are nothing but provisional 'warranted assertions' based upon the research methods that have been used to explore the inquiries outlined (Dewey, [1941] 2008). There is nothing to suggest that new information will not upheave what has been found. However, it is arguable that this is the case with all forms of

social scientific - and, for that matter, scientific - knowledge. Yet the pragmatist approach makes this reality explicit.

9.3 Policy Recommendations

In the face of mounting transnational challenges, and the floundering of traditional institutions' capacity to respond to them, there have been calls elsewhere that we focus on achieving 'good enough' global governance (Patrick, 2014). As much as I share this view, I again want to emphasise that we should not ask this question without also reflecting on 'good enough for who?'.

With regards to development cooperation and the first question, I share the mainstream view of the SDGs that the ambition should be to 'put the furthest behind first' (Fleurbaey, 2018). We should be focusing on the needs of those 'furthest behind' - the poorest, the most marginalised - in all of our development efforts. This thesis has demonstrated that there are several diverse and conflicting perspectives on what legitimate and effective governance requires. Accommodating the views of all those involved in one institutional setting is not feasible. It is, therefore, necessary to make a judgement on whose preferences should be 'put first' in terms of institutional reform and design. Perhaps obviously, it should be the perspectives of those that development ostensibly seeks to empower.

However, determining who the 'people' are is not a straightforward endeavour. To assume that the poor are homogenous in their needs and views is entirely misguided. There are also significant issues over who represents the 'people': is it the state? Local government or CSOs? Regional organisations? Moreover, this challenge of representation is tightly bound to changes in the geography of poverty in recent years that has served as an additional blow to the conventional 'developed' vs 'developing' country divide in global development governance. Whether one holds the view that the world is 'flat' (Friedman, 2005) or 'spiky' (Florida, 2005), we must contend with the reality that poverty now exists primarily within MICs rather than LICs (Kanbur and Sumner, 2011). However, that said, we must attend to current predictions that two-thirds of the world's most extreme poor are likely to be

concentrated in Fragile and Conflict-Affected States by 2030 (World Bank, 2020). These changes in the geography of poverty put additional strain on complex challenges around adequate representation and hence democratic governance at the international level. I do not offer any resolutions to these challenges. However, with the ambition to put the furthest behind first, I do provide several recommendations to improve upon the GPEDC as a governance mechanism.

First, there is an urgent need to reinstate the partner country caucus - or a similar initiative - within the GPEDC. The current constituency model is not working for recipient countries. The lack of a coordinating mechanism has led to a weakened recipient voice and ongoing donor dominance within the partnership. Without adequate recipient representative structures in place, there is not a sufficient level of indirect pressure on traditional donors to adopt reforms or behaviour change in line with their commitments. Let us not forget that the GPEDC was created to improve the effectiveness of development cooperation, and in the eyes of recipient countries, the effectiveness of ODA. It was not created to serve as a blueprint for a global parliament. Therefore, augmenting the collective voice of recipient countries is essential for ensuring that their preferences are heard when it comes to short- and medium-term goals on ODA and related interventions. Furthermore, elsewhere recipients do not have a place to come together to develop priorities and share ideas on their collective preferences. The GPEDC could be unique in providing this space, and it would also ensure its broader relevance within the field.

The constituency-based model of both 'dual category' countries and the 'private sector' also require revision. For the former, countries that practice SSC are poorly represented within the GPEDC: there is no natural congruence between the countries that are pertained to under this designation, and there are no sustained consultative or communicative arrangements in place to facilitate adequate representation. Though imperfect, one suggestion would be to have a regional-based model for dual category country representation. For instance, to have a representative from Latin America, Africa, and East Asia. This risks unduly increasing the size of the Steering Committee. However, if the GPEDC wants to be in any way relevant to SSC debates, the current model will not suffice.

Furthermore, it is not possible to adequately represent the 'private sector' with one seat on the Steering Committee. Again, if the GPEDC intends to be relevant to the role of the private sector in development, it needs to develop both a regional approach and also a seat that represents the views of SMEs explicitly. Having both the views of small businesses and large transnational corporations represented by one voice is wholly inadequate.

Insofar as the agenda of the GPEDC is concerned, the GPEDC needs to 'do more by doing less'. As noted, encouraging behaviour change is paramount for determining stakeholder evaluations of organisational effectiveness. It is, therefore, necessary that the GPEDC focus on how it can better encourage behaviour change among its constituent stakeholders. In this regard, we do not need to reinvent the wheel. The GPEDC needs to put in place a post-monitoring evaluation and follow-up procedure, or a reporting structure in place that encourages stakeholders to reflect on why progress hasn't been attained at the country level. However, given that the human and financial resources of the GPEDC are highly limited, putting in place an adequate follow-up and post-monitoring evaluation process require that less attention be devoted to 'horizon scanning' exercises that attempt to modify and expand the GPEDC's mandate and work programme. Until the GPEDC proves that it can encourage behaviour change among its core constituents - donors and recipients - additional efforts to take on new themes and work programme dilute its capacity to deliver on this core task.

While laudable in theory, the 'global light, country heavy' structure of the GPEDC is not working. This ambition reflects a desire to have a streamlined global process that is inherently voluntary and driven by countries themselves. However, to have an effective system of governance, it is essential to have a global institutional structure or secretariat that is funded properly so that it can provide capacity support to countries, and local SMEs and CSOs, who wish to participate in the GPEDC. Merely providing the space for participation is not sufficient to garnering the engagement of weaker stakeholders, many of whom are already facing significant capacity constraints in their own national and local contexts. There have been calls and suggestions elsewhere to create an independent secretariat that is separate from both the OECD and UN. However, doing so risks the

GPEDC lapsing into further irrelevance by detaching it from its strong institutional linkages to both bureaucracies. At issue here is inadequate funding, rather than an inherent problem with the secretariat structure itself. If you want to have strong country and stakeholder buy-in, you need to have a robust global secretariat. This is unavoidable.

One alternative and perhaps more ambitious recommendation is to have two parallel high-level fora or processes. One would be focused on the informal sharing of knowledge, and the other would be focused directly on monitoring. The structure for this is already in place. High-Level Ministerial Meetings could address issues as they directly relate to progress towards monitoring, and the contributions of the agenda towards the SDGs. Senior-Level Meetings could instead serve as an opportunity for informal knowledge sharing. By being informal opportunities for diverse stakeholders to come together to share development 'softwares', and not necessarily touching upon 'thorny' issues of monitoring, it would be possible to attain the engagement of the recalcitrant Southern providers. This would also serve as a sufficient incentive for traditional donor and private sector engagement, as many of them would like to see the GPEDC take on the guise of the WEF. Furthermore, by having a separate monitoring meeting linked to the SDGs, the process would strengthen the accountability function of the GPEDC, while it would not be diluted by 'squeezing in' discussions on knowledge sharing and emerging issue areas. If implemented, this recommendation would resolve the tension between the GPEDC's function as an accountability mechanism and its function as a knowledge-sharing platform.

9.4 Suggestions for future research

So long as the question of power persists, so too will the question of legitimacy. This thesis has examined stakeholder perspectives on legitimacy within a discrete policy field. A natural follow up would be studies that examine whether similar observations hold in other issue areas of global politics, and to explore tensions that may exist between actors. For instance, investigating stakeholder perspectives in climate, trade, security governance would yield fascinating comparative insights. So too, however, would be looking at these perspectives

within more niche and emerging governance fields such as biotechnology, surveillance, and ICT regulation. The framework put forward by this thesis can contribute towards these ends.

The SDG agenda attempts to engage the private sector not only as a source of funds but also as architects of global policy. There is a need for both constructive and nuanced research engagement with the preferences and roles of these actors in global fora. By constructive, I mean that we should suspend our critical judgements on these actors, and to engage with them on their own terms. The result of such analysis may very well be a critical Marxist deconstruction, but approaching the private sector with jaded and cynical views benefits no-one. There is a gulf of understanding as to how the private sector conceives of development challenges, and how these conflict or complement public actor's understandings. A more concrete suggestion in this regard is to examine the emergence of the so-called 'fourth sector' PSAs. This is a rapidly growing industry, comprised of actors that go beyond conventional public, private, and non-profit divides. Such actors 'combine market-based approaches of the private sector, the social and environmental aims of the public and non-profit sectors to address pressing problems' (Fourth Sector, 2020). Understanding how these actors function and engage in global fora may yield tremendous insight for both policy and the academic field of study.

Finally, it is important to maintain a regime-based perspective on the rise of informal or innovative institutions such as MSPs. Institutions such as the GPEDC do not exist in a vacuum, and they sit alongside traditional intergovernmental organisations. There is ample scope for future research on how innovative institutions interact and affect conventional governance sites. For instance, more exacting work is required on how innovative governance 'complements' traditional sites of governance, and at what stage the negatives of additional fragmentation outweigh the prospective benefits. Furthermore, the relationship between 'old' and 'new' is likely to be two-way. Exploring the interactions between these forms of governance may, in some part, contribute to developing a synthesis of cooperation approaches in a world marred by gridlock and uncertainty.

There is under a decade left until the 2030 deadline for the SDGs. The case of the GPEDC illustrates the profound political will and sheer difficulty that is involved in forging the semblance of consensus among the various actors that now comprise the field of development cooperation. If the SDGs are to be met - and no-one is anticipating that they will be - now is not the time to begin anew with institutional designs or initiatives. It is more expedient to take stock of the existing multilateral mechanisms that we presently do have and to make the best use of them and to reform them in a manner that is conducive to - and perceived to be so - by those who need it most. In this regard, the GPEDC needs to remain focused upon its primary function as an accountability mechanism within the field of development cooperation that can contribute to improving the effectiveness of development aid. That said, it is still possible for the GPEDC to have a knowledge-sharing function, but this should be secondary to its primary accountability and monitoring function. The GPEDC is not, and can not, be a silver bullet for the numerous governance challenges that persist in addressing poverty. However, through adopting the above recommendations, it can at least make a concrete and clear contribution to the governance of global development cooperation, rather than drifting into further irrelevance.

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Appendices

Appendix 1: List of Interviews

No.	Stakeholder Category	Region	Date
1	CSO	Central Africa	18/09/2018
2	GPEDC Secretariat	*	18/09/2018
3	CSO	Europe**	21/09/2018
4	CSO	South East Asia	25/09/2018
5	GPEDC Secretariat	*	27/09/2018
6	Private Sector	Europe	03/10/2018
7	Think-Tank	Latin America	03/10/2018
8	CSO	South East Asia	04/10/2018
9	Think-Tank	South America	04/10/2018
10	CSO	Europe	05/10/2018
11	Think-Tank	Europe	10/10/2018
12	CSO	North America	11/10/2018
13	Dual Category	Latin America	11/10/2018
14	GPEDC Secretariat	*	15/10/2018
15	CSO	Europe	16/10/2018
16	Think-Tank	Latin America	16/10/2018
17	CSO	Europe	20/10/2018
18	CSO	North America	22/10/2018
19	Dual Category	South East Asia	22/10/2018
20	CSO	South East Asia	24/10/2018
21	Recipient	West Africa	26/10/2018
22	DAC MS	North America	30/10/2018
23	Dual Category	South East Asia	30/10/2018
24	International Organisation	East Asia	03/11/2018
25	DAC MS	Europe	05/11/2018
26	Dual Category	Latin America	06/11/2018
27	Private Sector	Europe	07/11/2018
28	Private Sector	North America	07/11/2018

No.	Stakeholder Category	Region	Date
29	Recipient	West Africa	07/11/2018
30	DAC MS	Europe	12/11/2018
31	Dual Category	Latin America	16/11/2018
32	GPEDC Secretariat	*	16/11/2018
33	Recipient	East Africa	16/11/2018
34	Think-Tank	Europe	26/11/2018
35	Private Sector	North America	27/11/2018
36	DAC MS	Europe	06/12/2018
37	DAC MS	Europe	11/12/2018
38	Recipient	West Africa	11/12/2018
39	DAC MS	North America	17/12/2018
40	Parliamentarian	North America	17/12/2018
41	Recipient	West Africa	17/12/2018
42	Recipient	West Asia	18/12/2018
43	Dual Category	*	07/01/2019
44	Recipient	Southern Africa	10/01/2019
45	GPEDC Secretariat	*	15/01/2019
46	Recipient	South East Asia	15/01/2019
47	Private Sector	Europe	21/01/2019
48	Recipient	Central Africa	22/05/2019
49	DAC MS	East Asia	01/09/2019
50	DAC MS	Europe	25/09/2019

MS = Member State Official

* = region omitted so as to enhance anonymity.

**= Interview conducted in-person, London.

Appendix 2: Question Guide for Interviews

This guide provides an overview of the main questions that will be asked during the interview stage of the project's data collection process. The purpose of the guide is not to be fully exhaustive of the questions to be asked, but rather to provide a clear indication as to the types of inquiries that will be explored.

The interviews will last approximately 45-90 minutes, depending on the level of information that the respondent wishes to share. There are 12 main questions (presented in bold) that will be asked of each respondent, while there are several sub-questions and themes that will be tailored to specific respondents.

Section 1: General Questions

- 1. What is the nature of your role within your respective organisation[s]?**
- 2. How did you come to be involved in the work of the GPEDC? What is your level of familiarity and involvement now?"**

Section 2: Stakeholder Assessment of the GPEDC

- 3. In your/organisations view, what is the purpose of the GPEDC within the field of development cooperation? How well does the GPEDC succeed in fulfilling this purpose?**
- 4. Do you feel that the level of inclusivity within the GPEDC is appropriate?**
 - Do you feel that China, India, and Brazil's lack of presence at the GPEDC undermines its appropriateness as a site to discuss global development cooperation?
- 5. Do you feel that your organisation is well represented within the GPEDC?**
 - Do you feel that particular stakeholders (or groups of stakeholders) are over/under represented? If so, how does this over/under representation manifest within the GPEDC?
- 6. Do you/your organisation regard the GPEDC to be a partnership of equals?**
 - Has the GPEDC provided you with sufficient resources so that you/your organisation can participate on a level playing field with other actors? In what form do these resources take?
- 7. How would you/your organisation rate the quality of decision-making and debate that takes place under the auspices of the GPEDC?**
 - In the absence of consensus, is there evidence of sufficient mutual learning through the GPEDC?
 - Do you believe there to be any undue barriers to engaging in the deliberative and decision-making processes?

- Are any perspectives or voices excluded or neglected during the decision-making and deliberative processes?

8. Do you/your organisation feel that the GPEDC is appropriately transparent with regards to the information that it provides to its members?

- Has there been any forms of information that you haven't been able to access?
- Do you feel that this information is accessible for actors that haven't had a long standing engagement with the GPEDC or aid effectiveness agenda?

9. In your/your organisation's view, are the accountability mechanisms of the GPEDC 'fit for purpose'?

- Do you believe that all stakeholders should be held equally accountable?
- What do you consider to be the main challenges in terms of the GPEDC's accountability mechanisms?

10. What functions does the GPEDC need to perform in order for you to consider it to be an effective global body?

Section 3: Reflections and Concluding Remarks

11. What concrete recommendations would you/your organisation make to the GPEDC in order to enhance its overall legitimacy and effectiveness?

12. Are there any additional comments, or questions, that you would like to make with regards to this study?"

Appendix 3: Information Sheet for Interviews



Interviewee Information Sheet

Project Title:

“Global Development Governance in the ‘Interregnum’: The Legitimacy and Effectiveness of the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation”

Researcher: Jack Taggart (jack.r.taggart@durham.ac.uk)

Department: School of Government and International Affairs

Supervisors: Professor David Held (david.held@durham.ac.uk)

Professor Marcus Power (marcus.power@durham.ac.uk)

You are invited to take part in an interview for a study that I am conducting as part of a research project (PhD) at the University of Durham.

What is the purpose of the study?

The purpose of this study is to gather and analyse stakeholder perspectives of what they perceive to be legitimate and effective development cooperation in the post-2015 era. Specifically, it examines key stakeholder perspectives on the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (GPEDC). This project explores how stakeholders such as traditional donors, southern partners, South-South Development Cooperation actors, private sector actors, private foundations, and civil society organisations comparatively perceive this partnership.

Particular attention is given to how stakeholders perceive the GPEDC in terms of its: level of inclusivity and representativeness; quality of deliberation and debate; adequacy of accountability mechanisms, and; level of effectiveness and efficiency. This study will contribute to both academic and policy knowledge on what constitutes legitimate and effective global development cooperation governance in the post-2015 era.

Why have I been invited to take part?

You have been invited to take part because of your expertise in the field of global development cooperation and governance. Your participation is sought due to your ability to provide further insight and depth to the topics raised by the questionnaire and project more broadly.

Do I have to take part?

Your participation is voluntary and you do not have to agree to take part. If you do agree to take part in an interview, you can withdraw at any time, without giving a reason.

What will happen to me if I take part?

If you agree to take part in the study, you will be invited to take part in a semi-structured interview either in person, or if it is more feasible, over Skype/phone. The

interview will last anywhere between 45-90 minutes depending on your availability and the level of information that you wish to share.

You are free to omit any questions that you do not wish to answer. You are also free to raise any further issues that you deem pertinent to the issues at hand.

Are there any potential risks involved?

There are no known risks involved in the participation of this study. Nonetheless, if you would prefer to speak in a confidential capacity, rather than going on record, that is permissible. The interview process will be flexible and amendable enough to ensure that any potential risks are mitigated and that your concerns are met. If you choose to remain anonymous, there is a risk that the information you provide may be attributable to you. To mitigate against this possibility, only general characteristics (such as stakeholder type and region) will be used in reference to your information whilst ad verbatim quotes will be avoided.

Will my data be kept confidential?

All information obtained during the study will be kept in a confidential capacity. If the data is published, it will not be identifiable as yours if you request. However, if you grant consent to the use of your data, either as a representative of your organisation or directly attributable to yourself as an individual, then your data will not be fully confidential.

All data will be stored with appropriate security, and will not be available to anyone outside the research team. The recorded conversation will be transcribed by the researcher, and personal information will be coded and anonymised if requested. No-one else will have access to the recording, and it will be erased once the transcript has been completed.

Anonymised research data and records needed to validate the research findings will be stored for 10 years by the researcher after the end of the project.

What will happen to the results of the project?

We expect the full results of the project to be published in March, 2020. Anonymised data may be used in publications, reports, presentations, web pages and other research outputs.

Durham University is committed to sharing the results of its world-class research for public benefit. As part of this commitment the University has established an online repository for all Durham University Higher Degree theses which provides access to the full text of freely available theses. The study in which you are invited to participate will be written up as a thesis. On successful submission of the thesis, it will be deposited both in print and online in the University archives, to facilitate its use in future research. The thesis will be published open access.

By way of publication, the results of the project will inform approximately 3 academic journal articles, a monograph, and a number of policy dissemination papers. Your participation will help broaden both academic and policy understanding of legitimate and effective governance in the post-2015 era.

Who do I contact if I have any questions or concerns about this study?

If you have any further questions or concerns about this study, please speak to the researcher (jack.r.taggart@durham.ac.uk) or a member of the supervisory team. If you remain unhappy or wish to make a formal complaint, please submit a complaint via the University's Complaints Process.

Thank you for reading this information and considering taking part in this study

Appendix 4: Interview Consent Form

Interview Consent Form

Project title: Global Development Governance in the Interregnum: The Legitimacy and Effectiveness of Global Multi-Stakeholder Development Cooperation Partnerships

Researcher(s): Jack Taggart

Department: School of Government and International Affairs, University of Durham

Contact details: jack.r.taggart@durham.ac.uk

Supervisor name: Professor David Held

Supervisor contact details: David.Held@durham.ac.uk

This form is to confirm that you understand what the purposes of the project, what is involved and that you are happy to take part. Please initial each box to indicate your agreement:

I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet dated [xx/xx/xx] for the above project.	
I have had sufficient time to consider the information and ask any questions I might have, and I am satisfied with the answers I have been given.	
I understand who will have access to personal data provided, how the data will be stored and what will happen to the data at the end of the project.	
I agree to take part in the above project.	
I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time without giving a reason.	
I understand that anonymised (i.e. not identifiable) versions of my data may be archived and shared with others for legitimate research purposes.	
I consent to the processing of my personal information for the purposes of this research study. I understand that such information will be treated as strictly confidential and handled in accordance with the provisions of data protection legislation.	
I consent to being audio recorded and understand how recordings will be used in research outputs.	
I understand that my words may be quoted in publications, reports, and other research outputs.	
I agree to my real name being used in the above	
I agree to being identifiable only as a representative of my organisation	
I do not agree for any identifying characteristics (name, organisation, geographical location) to be used in the above	

Participant's Signature _____
Date _____

(NAME IN BLOCK
LETTERS) _____

Researcher's Signature _____ Date _____

(NAME IN BLOCK
LETTERS) _____

Appendix 5: Questionnaire

This is the English version of the online exploratory questionnaire that was used in the initial stages of this project. This questionnaire was hosted on onlinesurveys.co.uk. Please note, that this thesis does not draw upon this questionnaire data other than to develop an interview scheme and a sample for interviews.

Introductory message:

You have been invited to participate in the 2018 Global Development Cooperation Survey. This study is being conducted by Jack Taggart from the University of Durham and it is funded by the UK Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC).

The purpose of this study is to examine stakeholder perceptions of what constitutes legitimate and effective global development cooperation governance in the post-2015 era. It will take you approximately 10-15 minutes to complete. Your participation in this study is entirely voluntary and you can withdraw your information up to three weeks following the completion of this questionnaire. You are free to omit any question.

We believe there are no known risks associated with this research study; however, as with any online related activity the risk of a breach is always possible. To the best of our ability, your answers in this study will remain strictly confidential. However, at the end of the questionnaire, you will be asked if you are willing to engage in a further interview and to provide a contact email. If you consent to this, it will be possible that your questionnaire responses are attributable to you. Furthermore, through entering information in the free text boxes, it may be possible to identify you through the information that you provide. However, be assured that only the members of the research team will have access to your personal information.

Please note that by participating in this questionnaire, you are consenting for your non-identifying information to be used in this research study.

1. What type of organisation do you represent?

Please select no more than 1 answer(s).

National Government (Provider)	[]
National Government (Recipient)	[]
National Government (Provider and Recipient)	[]
Civil Society Organisation	[]
Intergovernmental Organisation	[]
Private Sector (Business)	[]
Private Sector (Foundation)	[]
Trade Union	[]
Think Tank / Academia	[]
Other (Please Specify)	[]

1.a. If you selected Other, please specify: _____

1.b. Please indicate your organisation's country of residence: _____

2. How would you rate the appropriateness of the following institutions as sites to discuss global development cooperation? (1) means highly inappropriate and (5) means highly appropriate.

Please don't select more than 1 answer(s) per row	1	2	3	4	5
OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC)					
Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (GPEDC)					

Please don't select more than 1 answer(s) per row	1	2	3	4	5
United Nations Development Cooperation Forum (UNDCF)					

3. In determining an institution as appropriate, how important is it for the following factors to be present? (1) means not important and (5) means very important.

Please don't select more than 1 answer(s) per row	1	2	3	4	5
High levels of inclusivity					
Provisions to ensure the equality of stakeholders					
Opportunities for mutual learning					
Decision-making is consensus based					
Information is accessible and transparent					
Strong accountability mechanisms					
The institution demonstrates high levels of effectiveness					
Association with broader institutional processes (e.g. UN, OECD)					
Developing country leadership					

3.a Please note any additional factors that you deem to be very important with regards to this question:

[Free text box]

4. How much confidence do you have in the effectiveness of the following institutions? (1) means a very low level of confidence, and (5) means a very high level of confidence.

Please don't select more than 1 answer(s) per row	1	2	3	4	5
OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC)					
Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (GPEDC)					
United Nations Development Cooperation Forum (UNDCF)					

5. How important are the following factors in enhancing your confidence in the effectiveness of a global development institution? (1) means not important and (5) means very important.

Please don't select more than 1 answer(s) per row	1	2	3	4	5
Inclusive procedures of governance					
Strong accountability and monitoring mechanisms					
The institution has the capacity to encourage compliance					
The institution's design is appropriate to meeting global goals (e.g Agenda 2030)					

Please don't select more than 1 answer(s) per row	1	2	3	4	5
High quality policy outputs (e.g research / advice / arranging meetings etc.)					
The institution has a broad mandate					
Adequate resources (financial and technical)					

5.a Please note any additional factors that you deem to be very important with regards to this question:

[Free text box]

6. Are you familiar with the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (GPEDC)?

Yes ☐

No ☐

6.a If yes, how would you rate the GPEDC against the following indicators? (1) Means very poorly and (5) means very strongly.

Please don't select more than 1 answer(s) per row	1	2	3	4	5
High levels of inclusivity					
Equality of stakeholders					
Opportunities for mutual learning					
Quality of debate					
Appropriateness of decision-making procedure					
Transparency of information					
Strong accountability mechanisms					
Ability to encourage compliance					
Problem solving capacity					
Overall quality of policy outputs (e.g research / advice / arranging meetings)					
Adequacy of resources (economic and technical)					
Developing country leadership					

7. Are you familiar with the United Nations Development Cooperation Forum?

Yes ☐

No ☐

7.a If yes, how would you rate the UNDCF against the following indicators? (1) Means very poorly and (5) means very strongly.

Please don't select more than 1 answer(s) per row	1	2	3	4	5
High levels of inclusivity					
Equality of stakeholders					
Opportunities for mutual learning					
Quality of debate					
Appropriateness of decision-making procedure					
Transparency of information					
Strong accountability mechanisms					
Ability to encourage compliance					
Problem solving capacity					
Overall quality of policy outputs (e.g research / advice / arranging meetings)					
Adequacy of resources (economic and technical)					
Developing country leadership					

8. How you rate your own organisation's level of compliance with the recommendations and norms of the following institutions? (1) means no compliance and (5) means a very high level of compliance.

Please don't select more than 1 answer(s) per row	1	2	3	4	5
OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC)					
Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (GPEDC)					
United Nations Development Cooperation Forum (UNDCF)					

9. Would you be willing to participate in an interview in order to go into further depth on the issues raised by this questionnaire?

Yes ☐

No ☐

10. If yes, please provide a contact email here:

10. Please provide any additional queries or comments that you may have regarding this study.

[Free text box]

Closing message:

Thank-You

Thank you for taking part in this questionnaire. Your participation will advance academic and policy knowledge on what constitutes effective and legitimate global development cooperation governance in the post-2015 era. If you feel that the issues raised by this project are important and relevant, please share this survey with your colleagues and other relevant stakeholders: www.devcoopsurvey.com.

Please visit www.devcoopsurvey.com for additional information on the project and to keep updated on the dissemination of findings. Furthermore, please contact info@devcoopsurvey.com or jack.r.taggart@durham.ac.uk for any additional comments, concerns or inquiries that you may have regarding this project.

Appendix 6: Questionnaire Information Sheet

Questionnaire Information Sheet

Project Title:

Global Development Governance in the Interregnum: The Legitimacy and Effectiveness of Global Multi-Stakeholder Development Cooperation Partnerships

Researcher: Jack Taggart (jack.r.taggart@durham.ac.uk)

Department: School of Government and International Affairs

Supervisor name: Professor David Held (david.held@durham.ac.uk) and Professor Marcus Power (marcus.power@durham.ac.uk)

You are invited to take part in a questionnaire for a study that I am conducting as part of my PhD at Durham University.

This study has received ethical approval from the School of Government and International Affairs Ethics Committee of Durham University.

Before you decide whether to agree to take part it is important for you to understand the purpose of the research and what is involved as a participant. Please read the following information carefully. Please get in contact if there is anything that is not clear or if you would like more information.

What is the purpose of the study?

The aim of this study is to examine stakeholder perceptions on what they perceive to be legitimate and effective development cooperation in the post-2015 era. Specifically, it examines key stakeholder perceptions of the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (GPEDC) and the United Nations Development Cooperation Forum (UNDCF).

This research is funded by the UK Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC). This study began on the 31/03/17 and will be completed on the 31/03/20

Why have I been invited to take part?

You have been invited to take part because of your expertise in the field of global development cooperation and governance. Your participation is sought due to your ability to provide insight to the topics raised by the questionnaire and project more broadly.

Do I have to take part?

Your participation is voluntary and you do not have to agree to take part. If you do agree to take part in an interview, you can withdraw your information up to three weeks following the completion of the questionnaire, without giving a reason.

What will happen to me if I take part?

If you agree to take part in the study, you will be invited to take part in an online questionnaire. The questionnaire will last anywhere between 10-15 minutes depending on your availability and the level of information that you wish to share.

You are free to omit any questions that you do not wish to answer. You are also free to raise any further issues that you deem pertinent to the issues at hand.

Are there any potential risks involved?

We believe there are no known risks associated with this research study; however, as with any online related activity the risk of a breach is always possible. To the best of our ability, your answers in this study will remain strictly confidential. However, at the end of the questionnaire, you will be asked if you are willing to engage in a further interview and to provide a contact email. If you consent to this, it will be possible that your questionnaire responses are attributable to you. Furthermore, through entering information in the free text boxes, it may be possible to identify you through the information that you provide. However, be assured that only the members of the research team will have access to your personal information.

Please note that by participating in this questionnaire, you are consenting for your information to be used in this research study.

Will my data be kept confidential?

All information obtained during the study will be kept in a confidential capacity. If the data is published, it will not be identifiable as yours.

All data will be stored with appropriate security, and will not be available to anyone outside the research team.

Anonymised research data and records needed to validate the research findings will be stored for 10 years by the researcher after the end of the project.

What will happen to the results of the project?

Anonymised data may be used in publications, reports, presentations, web pages and other research outputs.

Durham University is committed to sharing the results of its world-class research for public benefit. As part of this commitment the University has established an online repository for all Durham University Higher Degree theses which provides access to the full text of freely available theses. The study in which you are invited to participate will be written up as a thesis. On successful submission of the thesis, it will be deposited both in print and online in the University archives, to facilitate its use in future research. The thesis will be published open access.

Who do I contact if I have any questions or concerns about this study?

If you have any further questions or concerns about this study, please speak to the researcher (jack.r.taggart@durham.ac.uk) or a member of the supervisory team. If you remain unhappy or wish to make a formal complaint, please submit a complaint via the University's [Complaints Process](#).