Love, Self-Gift, and the Incarnation: Christology and Ethics in Galatians, in the Context of Pauline Theology and Greco-Roman Philosophy

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Abstract

This thesis argues that it is insufficient to define love in Paul as the rejection of all forms of self-interest for the sake of others. In certain scholarly works on Paul, foregrounding Paul's statements that contrast love with self-interest leads to an interpretative imbalance which distorts or ignores other aspects of love. Situating Paul in the context of Greco-Roman philosophical tradition will open up different interpretative possibilities: for some Greek and Roman authors, loving behaviour does not intend to benefit only the other but rather to construct or to reinforce a relationship of shared interests, in which multiple parties benefit, as an end in itself (chapter two). This thesis uses Galatians as a test case to consider whether Paul's christology and ethics bear any similarity to this view. Turning to the language of self-giving, chapter three argues that the key phrases *διδόναι ἑαυτόν* (1.4) and *παραδιδόναι ἑαυτόν* (2.20) refer in part to Jesus giving himself as gift; in light of other authors who discuss self-gifts, this language signals not that Christ gives himself away in death but that through his death he gives himself into relationship. Chapter four contends that Jesus, in his incarnation, participates in the Jewish human condition to establish believers as actors and to construct an irreducibly mutually beneficial fellowship between God and humanity. Chapter five claims that Paul's descriptions of prosocial behaviour in Galatians are patterned after his incarnational christology and encourage believers to identify with each other in order to reinforce a relationship of shared interests. This interpretation demonstrates that it is insufficient to describe love in Paul only in terms such as 'selflessness', or 'self-sacrifice', since they inevitably fail to capture how Paul idealises the 'sacrifice' only of the *competitive* self, and he portrays love as intended to gain the other to fellowship.

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Submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

at the

University of Durham

Department of Theology and Religion

2019

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Abbreviations

All abbreviations follow the forms signified in *The SBL Handbook of Style: for Biblical Studies and Related Disciplines* (2d ed.; Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2014) and S. Hornblower and A. Spawforth (eds), *The Oxford Classical Dictionary* (4th ed.; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012). In cases where they each prescribe different abbreviations for a single primary source, the latter is used.

Declaration

This work has been submitted to the University of Durham in accordance with the regulations for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. It is my own work, and none of it has been previously submitted to the University of Durham or to any other university for a degree.

Statement of Copyright

Translations

All translations of ancient texts are my own, unless otherwise noted.

Acknowledgments

The struggle of attempting to write this thesis would doubtlessly have resulted in failure had it not been for those who loved and supported me before and throughout writing this thesis. I am honoured here to express gratefulness for them.

A few of my past educators rightly deserve first comment. Special thanks are due to Craig Jacobs, Mickey Klink, and Darian Lockett for having far more confidence in me than I had in myself, and for pushing me in my academic abilities even after countless failures. John Anthony Dunne was a crucial figure in this process, and our stimulating conversations about Galatians over so many drinks sparked my interest to dive deeper into that text. Dialoguing with Crispin Fletcher-Louis produced some of the ideas which got me thinking about the ideas which ended up in this thesis, and his willingness to provide feedback for the past few years has been indispensable. Robert Song, my secondary supervisor, generously gave me his time and made crucial suggestions about how to go about proving some of the points in this thesis.

Friends outside of Durham have continued to support me, including Rob Johnson, Matt Hall, Jordan McCormack, Molly Swanson, Bobby Kvidt, Garrett McQueen, Chloe Legg, Rachel Loch, Morgan Koetting, Emily Reese Castro, Sabrina Strom, and especially Sophia Johnson. Brandon Hurlbert followed me all the way from California to Durham, and his friendship has been invaluable. As for those I met while in Durham, Tavis Bohlinger, Richard Rohlfing, Ben Coleman, Seth and Rachel Price, Anastasia Satterfield, Catriona Duffy, and all the members of Northern Lights a cappella have made life here deeply enjoyable.

John Barclay has been the supervisor most would usually only dream of. The insight, criticism, and clarity in his comments about my thesis work has made the present work what it is. Most of all, however, his supervising is only topped by his generosity and friendship. In many respects, I owe this thesis to him.

As this thesis is about love, it deserves to be dedicated to someone who embodies love. I have never seen someone demonstrate so clearly what 'bear one another's burdens' (Gal 6.2) means than my dear friend Joy Clarkson. Her eagerness to empathetically participate in the happiness and sorrows of others has put on vivid display an image of the incarnation and death of Jesus. Because she represents the kind of love I hope to describe in this book, I dedicate this thesis to her.

Logan Williams

Taunton, England

to Joy Clarkson

who gives herself as gift

and shares the burdens of others.

Χαρίζομαί σοι ἐν ὅλῃ καρδίᾳ μου

ὅτι ἐκοινώνησας ταῖς λυπαῖς πολλαῖς μου.

CHAPTER ONE

What do We Mean by 'Love'?

> L'âme … habite certes dans ce qui n'est pas elle, mais c'est par cette habitation dans l'«autre» (et non pas logiquement, par opposition à l'autre) que l'âme acquiert son identité.[1]

Throughout his letters Paul paints vivid, scintillating portraits of God's decisive saving action in Jesus the messiah. 'God', he climactically announces, 'did not spare his Son but gave him for us all' (Rom 8.32). Amongst the diverse Pauline retellings of this message, one recurring form depicts this event as the epitomized demonstration of divine love. 'God puts his love on display for us in that, while we were yet sinners, the messiah died for us' (Rom 5.8). This paradigmatic divine act is recast elsewhere as the loving act of Jesus himself. In one of Paul's most memorable statements, Jesus is called 'the Son of God, who loved me and gave himself for me' (Gal 2.20).

His letters are also riddled with exhortations of mutual love. 'Love one another with brotherly affection' (Rom 12.10), Paul urges his readers. 'Become enslaved to one another through love' (Gal 5.13). The famous personification in 1 Corinthians elucidates love as 'patient and kind', 'not rejoicing at wrongdoing', and 'rejoicing with the truth' (1 Cor 13.1–2). So much depends upon love that Paul hyperbolically claims that it constitutes not only his sole possession but also his very existence. If he loses love, he would not only *have* nothing, but he would also *be* nothing (*οὐθέν εἰμι*; 13.3).

These two elements of Paul's letters – the announcement of God and the messiah's saving love and the ethical injunctions for believers to love – have been catalogued under a number of different headings: grace and obedience, gift and obligation, divine action and human response, gospel and ethics. That it is possible and appropriate to identify some kind of distinction between these two aspects of Paul's letters should go undisputed. The more difficult task, however, is to fit these two

[1] E. Levinas, *Totalité et Infini: Essai sur l'Extériorite* (Paris: Kluwer Academic, 2017), 119.

together, to give an account of how gift entails obligation, gospel determines ethics, and (to bring love back into focus) how the creative event of God's love in Christ dictates the shape of believers' mutual love.[2] What exactly does Paul mean when he says that Jesus 'loved', what kind of action flows from this love, and how, if at all, does Jesus' love determine or inform the content of Paul's ethics?[3]

Scholarly discourse on love in early Christianity was deeply affected by Anders Nygren's answers to these questions in his seminal work on the subject, originally entitled *Den kristna kärlekstanken genom tiderna: Eros och Agape* but known more popularly by its English title *Agape and Eros*. While in Swedish the first volume appeared in 1930 and the second in 1936, English translations appeared in various parts in the 1930's, and a full single-volume edition was published in 1953.[4] Nygren's claims were anything but understated: Christianity invented 'an entirely new … fundamental motif of religion and ethics' by introducing the 'Agape motif'.[5] This 'distinctive and original' Christian idea provided an 'unselfish' and entirely 'self-sacrificial' definition of love which stood entirely antithetical to the idea of 'Eros' – the structuring motif of all Greco-Roman ethics – which Nygren portrayed as an 'acquisitive' and 'egocentric' desire to obtain things which the individual lacks.[6] Nygren thus defined Eros as entirely self-directed and Agape as entirely outwardly directed. 'Eros is essentially and in principle self-love', but Agape 'excludes all self-love'.[7]

While *Agape and Eros* exerted and still exerts a lasting and often unnoticed influence upon historical and theological treatments of love, it incited a plethora of critical responses. Amongst their various objections, nearly every critique of Nygren seeks to problematise the unqualified portrayal of early Christian views of love as purely other-regarding self-sacrifice and Greco-Roman views as

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[2] As Thomas Söding put it, we need to investigate 'wie die Gottes- mit der Nächstenliebe verbunden ist und was den Namen der Liebe wirklich verdient' (*Das Liebesgebot bei Paulus: Die Mahnung zur Agape im Rahmen der paulinischen Ethik* (Neutestamentliche Abhandlungen 26; Münster: Aschendorff, 1995), 2).

[3] Although some have suggested that we distinguish between 'morality' and 'ethics' (W. Meeks, *The Origins of Christian Morality: The First Two Centuries* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993), 4; D.G. Horrell, *Solidarity and Difference: A Contemporary Reading of Paul's Ethics* (2d ed.; T&T Clark Cornerstones; London: T&T Clark, 2016), 104-107), I will treat these terms as equivalent.

[4] Throughout I refer to the text of the more recent edition, *Agape and Eros* (trans. Philip S. Watson; Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982).

[5] Nygren, *Agape and Eros*, 53. According to Nygren, Agape has four primary characteristics: it is 'spontaneous and "unmotivated"', 'indifferent to value', 'creative', and the 'initiator of fellowship with God' (*Agape and Eros*, 75–80).

[6] Nygren, *Agape and Eros*, 61, 209, 180; cf. 175–177, 205.

[7] Nygren, *Agape and Eros*, 217.

essentially egocentric, selfish desire.[8] Did the early Christians think that love is totally *selfless*, in the sense that the self does not participate in some kind of positive end towards which acts of love are oriented? Is it possible that love for another can simultaneously intend to gain some kind of benefit for the self while not being purely self-interested? Asking this question, of course, would incite objections from those modern philosophers who follow Immanuel Kant's insistence that performing beneficent acts with a view to self-benefit results in instrumentalizing people as means for our own gain. For Kant, as well as for Nygren, either one treats others as ends with selfless disregard for one's own benefit, or one treats others as a means with only selfish interests in mind. By contending for this binary mode of morally classifying actions, Kant recognised that he starkly deviated from the Greco-Roman philosophical tradition. But is it the case, as Nygren argues, that Paul's theology was such an unparalleled religious phenomenon that he was one of the only religious thinkers in the Roman world who considered benevolence to have no end beyond itself? It is perhaps possible, but we ought to be deeply suspicious of such claims. At least we should contend that, if this binary way of morally evaluating behaviour does not align with any known views in Paul's world, then interpreters of Paul should not be too quick to evaluate his notion of love in such terms. While it is the case that Paul can contrast self-interest with other-regard in certain statements (e.g. 1 Cor 13.5), does claiming that love necessarily operates negatively towards the interests of the self and positively towards the interests of others provide a *sufficient* account of Paul's depiction of Jesus' love and of his ethic of love?

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[8] Those who point out that the antithesis between Christian and Greco-Roman views of love simply does not align with the extant evidence include e.g. C. Osborne, *Eros Unveiled: Plato and the God of Love* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1994); T. Irwin, 'Conceptions of Love, Greek and Christian', in *Love and Christian Ethics: Tradition, Theory, and Society*, (ed. F.V. Simmons and B.C. Sorrells; Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2016), 37–50. Oliver O'Donovan (*The Problem of Self-Love in St. Augustine* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990)) as well as John Burnaby (*Amor Dei: A Study of the Religion of St. Augustine* (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1938)) argued that Augustine held a more nuanced view than what Nygren outlines in his book. Gene Outka also critiqued Nygren's negative view of self-love from a more theological position (*Agape: An Ethical Analysis* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972), 55–74; cf. D.F. Weaver, *Self-Love and Christian Ethics* (New Studies in Christian Ethics; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). Without responding to Nygren directly, some feminist critics claim that a heavy emphasis on self-sacrifice might stem from a form of inverse patriarchal discourse. As Daphne Hampson argues, 'that it [*kenosis* – and we could add 'self-sacrifice' here as well] should have featured prominently in Christian thought is perhaps an indication of the fact that men have understood what the male problem, in thinking in terms of hierarchy and domination, has been' (*Theology and Feminism* (Signposts in Theology; Cambridge, Mass.: Basil Blackwell, 1990), 155).

This thesis provides an account of love in Paul beyond the dichotomy between self-interest and other-regard by investigating the christological and ethical material in Paul's letter to the Galatians. In order to situate and to orient the specific content of this thesis, I hope to do three things in this chapter: to provide a rationale for the present study in light of previous literature on Paul's letters (§1.1), to explain the methods which will govern my investigation (§1.2), and to provide an outline of the argument and how it differs from and aligns with previous accounts (§1.3).

1.1. Polarising Self and Other in Pauline Scholarship

Nygren's antithesis between self-interest and other-regard provides a helpful representation of a trend in Pauline scholarship: some scholars have proffered the rejection of self-interest as the primary or even sole definition for love. In order to demonstrate the impetus for the present work, I will suggest that interpreters of Paul who broadly align with Nygren's view have silenced, ignored, or distorted other texts in Paul. The following review is meant to provide neither an exhaustive presentation of scholarship on Paul's christology and ethics, nor even a representative account of what most Pauline scholars think; its purpose is simply to point out *that* this kind of self-other polarisation has been articulated in some interpretations of Paul within the last century, and that these interpretations call for a response.

In his extensive 1951 work, *Agape: Die Liebe als Grundmotiv der neutestamentlichen Theologie,* Viktor Warnach, following the lead of Nygren, thematises the distinction between Eros and Agape in describing early Christian texts.[9] While Warnach differs from Nygren in concluding that Eros is not entirely egoistic, he argues that Eros is 'unpersönlich' in the sense that it cares only for the instrumental utility or value of a person rather than the other *per se*.[10] By contrast, Agape – which describes Paul's position on love – is 'persönlich': 'Vielmehr ist die Agape als echt personale Liebe, als Liebe, die aus dem gotthaften Seinsgrund der Person stammt, *frei von egoistischen Absichten* – "sie sucht nicht das

[9] V. Warnach, *Agape: Die Liebe als Grundmotiv der neutestamentlichen Theologie* (Düsseldorf: Patmos, 1951).

[10] In his own words, 'Der unpersönlich Charakter ist sogar ein Wesensmerkmal der erotischen Liebe, für die das "Du" als solches ziemlich belanglos ist, weil es ihr weniger um die Person als um die ihr anhaftenden Werte geht. (Warnach, *Agape*, 24).

Ihrege" – und kann eben darum den anderen rückhaltlos bejahen. *Sie sucht nichts anderes als die Förderung des Geliebten*'.[11] Though Warnach derives this view from engaging with Paul's text (here 1 Cor 13.5), by starkly contrasting Agape with self-interest in this way, he leaves unclear what kinds of actions flow from 'egoistische Absichten' and what kinds of actions promote 'die Förderung des Geliebten'. For example, is it self-seeking when Paul says to the Corinthians, 'I do not want your things, but you (*οὐ γὰρ ζητῶ τὰ ὑμῶν ἀλλ' ὑμᾶς*)' (2 Cor 12.14)? Here Paul does not make a distinction between 'egoism' and seeking the prospering of the other, but rather between desiring things from others and desiring the other *per se*. Is it 'egoistic', moreover, for Paul to ask Philemon, 'let me benefit from you (*ἐγώ σου ὀναίμην*)' (Philem 1.20)? Earlier in the letter, Paul even says that he makes this request for benefit 'on the basis of love (*διὰ τὴν ἀγάπην*)' (1.3). Warnach's definition of love as seeking 'die Förderung des Geliebten', does not sufficiently account for those instances in which Paul correlates love with seeking his own interests, whether wanting the Corinthians or wanting some benefit from Philemon. Taking the phrase 'love does not seek its own' from 1 Corinthians 13.5 as the primary or sole definition of love will not be able to capture the diverse dynamics of what Paul says about love.

Making this contrast between self-interest and other-regard more explicit, Heinz-Dietrich Wendland claims that, in contrast to Greek philosophical ideas, neighbour-love in Paul must be set in antithesis to all forms of self-love:

> Deutlich ist aber der klare Gegensatz der Agape gegen jede Art von sich-selbst-Wollen und -Dienen. Nirgends macht Paulus die Selbstliebe zum Maßstab für die Nächstenliebe, wie dies spätere, christliche Ethiker in einer abwegigen Exegese der Worte 'wie dich selbst' taten, indem sie ein griechisch-philosophisches Verständnis des Selbst, der Person unkritisch zugrunde legten. Ist – wie bei Paulus – die Liebe Christi die höchste Norm, so wird es naturgemäß ganz unmöglich, ausgerechnet die Selbstliebe als solchen Maßstab zu benutzen Wahrscheinlich wäre Paulus der Gedanke des Rechtes der Selbstliebe als fleischliches Denken erschienen; jedenfalls reflektiert er nirdgends über sie.[12]

When referring to the later Christian ethicists who rely on Greek conceptions of the self, Wendland is probably referring to the fact that in some Greco-Roman sources, the extension of self-love to others

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[11] Warnach, *Agape*, 299 (emphasis mine); cf. 293-302. Warnach's section on Paul's letters is on pages 106-144, but he draws out most of his specific theological conclusions from that material in pages 181-651.

[12] H.-D. Wendland, *Ethik des Neuen Testaments: Eine Einführung* (Grundrisse zum Neuen Testament 4; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1970), 62.

was based upon considering another to be unified with the self in some way (I will treat this topic in chapter two). Wendland pits self-interest against other-regard on christological grounds, and he takes this christological grounding of love as *prima facie* evidence that self-love must be excluded as a 'highest norm'. What is crucial to notice is that he is forced to set these two principles (self-love and the love of Christ) in competition because he is using the superlative category of 'highest norm'. But is it possible that Paul thinks *both* that self-love can be a valid way of measuring how to treat others (as is suggested by the command 'love your neighbour as yourself' in Gal 5.14) *and* that believers should imitate the love of Christ? If there is an antithesis between all forms of self-love and imitating the love of Christ, this conclusion must be drawn from the evidence of Paul's letters itself. But Wendland posits *a priori* that they cannot co-exist, such that to make the love of Christ the standard of action is to reject all self-love (and thus, as Wendland says, to reject the ethics of the Greek philosophical tradition). Instead of coming to the text with the assumption that Paul could not have allowed both self-love and imitation of Christ to co-exist, we should leave this open as a possibility unless his texts indicate otherwise.

Without using the language of self-love, Michael Gorman expresses a similar thesis. He defines love as follows:

> Love, then, has for Paul an essential two-dimensional character, as summarized in 1 Corinthians 13:5 and 1 Corinthians 8:1. *Negatively*, it does not seek its own advantage or edification. It is characterized by status- and rights-renunciation. *Positively*, it seeks the good, the advantage, the edification of others. It is characterized by regard for them. Love, according to the apostle, is the dynamic, creative endeavor of finding ways to purse the welfare of others rather than one's own interest. It is not self-centered but others-oriented.[13]

Gorman presses into this definition by insisting that self-interest and other-regard are necessarily completely antithetical in Paul, and he appeals to a christological basis to support this: 'it is clear that for Paul there is a radical opposition between looking out for self and concern for others. These two opposites could not more be complementary than could Christ's self-emptying and his self-serving utilization of equality with God [referring to Phil 2.6-8].'[14] While this conclusion does, in one sense, flow from Paul's contrastive statements in (for example) 1 Corinthians 10.24, the unqualified and

[13] M. Gorman, *Cruciformity: Paul's Narrative Spirituality of the Cross* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2001), 160; cf. 215, 223.

[14] Gorman, *Cruciformity*, 257.

absolute antithesis between self-interest and love results in Gorman ignoring crucial elements of other Pauline statements. For example, when Gorman interprets Paul's claim that 'To each is given the manifestation of the Spirit for the common good' (1 Cor 12.7), he paraphrases this as meaning that 'one's own spiritual gift is not meant for self-aggrandizement or even self-edification, but rather for the good of *others*.'[15] In the context of 1 Corinthians, however, this 'advantage' is not the property of 'others' but rather of the body, which includes both the interests of self and of others, since all share in the prospering and suffering of each part of the body (1 Cor 12.26).[16] Even though Gorman utilizes the translation 'common good' for *τὸ συμφέρον*, he changes the corporate sense of *τὸ συμφέρον* here to refer to the advantage of everyone except the self. In other words, Gorman's antithesis between self-interest and other-regard leads him to distort Paul's claim about achieving the common benefit – the simultaneous benefit of the self *as well as* others – into a claim about benefitting others *instead of* the self.

In her 2015 book, *Liebe als Agape*, Oda Wischmeyer appeals to 1 Corinthians 13.5 as indicating 'Die Antinomie von Selbstliebe und Nächstenliebe', and she claims that in Philippians 2.4 this configuration of love comes to expression 'explizit im Sinne des Altruismus'.[17] This notion of love is coordinated with Paul's depiction of Christ 'als das Vorbild des Verzichts auf Selbstbewahrung und Selbstdurchsetzung'.[18] Such a disregard for the self in Paul's configuration of love, she claims, starkly contrasts with the emphasis on self-care in Greco-Roman ethics. Wischmeyer then inquires how this relates to the command in Leviticus to 'love your neighbour as yourself'. Whereas Paul might say 'Du sollst nicht dich selbst, sondern deinen Nächsten lieben', the Leviticus command 'formuliert gerade eine Parallele, keine Antinomie' between self-love and other-love and therefore makes 'die Selbstliebe gerade der Maßtab der Liebe zum Nächsten'.[19] Moreover, the result of making self-love central to ethics means that one should only love those within one's own community, not outsiders or enemies. But if for Paul

[15] Gorman, *Cruciformity*, 235–236 (emphasis mine).

[16] See further §2.2.

[17] O. Wischmeyer, *Liebe als Agape: Das frühchristliche Konzept und der modern Diskurs* (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2015), 170.

[18] Wischmeyer, *Liebe als Agape*, 170.

[19] Wischmeyer, *Liebe als Agape*, 170.

'Der Verzicht auf die Selbstliebe führt damit sachlich vom Gebot der Nächstenliebe und seiner Logik fort', and if he defines love 'geradezu durch Verzicht auf Selbstliebe', how has he come to a different view of love from Leviticus and his fellow Jews?[20] Wischmeyer suggests that, when Paul cites Leviticus, the word 'neighbour (*πλησίον*)' means anyone and everyone, rather than just the community of believers. He therefore reimagines the command to establish 'die Unbedingtheit der *ἀγάπη*'.[21] She concludes that Paul forms an 'Anti-Konzept' to the Jewish and Greco-Roman concept of love insofar as the latter coordinates self-love and other-love, but the former sets them in opposition.[22]

Wischmeyer's reading recapitulates the deeply concerning caricature of early Judaism as a particularistic and selfish religion which was unable to realise or even imagine a purportedly ideal 'universalistic' love (whatever that might mean), and it moreover traffics in the equally concerning hypothesis that Christianity marked the arrival of a universalistic religion in contrast to Judaism.[23] Beyond that, the argument is deeply convoluted: Paul says love your neighbour as yourself, but he means, in contrast to other Jews who cite this text, to love your neighbour and *not* yourself. It is one thing to claim that Paul could read texts differently than his fellow Jewish interpreters (he certainly did), but it is quite another thing to say that Paul *really* means the opposite of what the grammar of a text seems to indicate. It is important to note that Wischmeyer feels pressured (at least in part) to interpret Paul's use of Leviticus 19.18 in this way because of his contrastive statements about self-regard and other-regard in (for example) 1 Corinthians 13.5 and Philippians 2.4. Instead of arguing that Leviticus 19.18 doesn't really mean what it says when Paul quotes it, perhaps we ought to question the notion that these other Pauline texts directly map onto the modern ethical ideal of 'altruism' in contrast to 'egoism'.

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[20] Wischmeyer, *Liebe als Agape*, 171.

[21] Wischmeyer, *Liebe als Agape*, 171.

[22] Wischmeyer, *Liebe als Agape*, 172.

[23] This comparative trope goes at least back to F.C. Baur, who argued that Judaism was a nationalist and particularistic religion and was, therefore, egoistic (*Lectures on New Testament Theology* (ed. P.C. Hodgson; trans. R.F. Brown; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 106, 131, 214, 311, 363). This, for Baur, contrasted with the 'universalistic' and 'absolute' character of Christianity (*Lectures*, 245; cf. 236). Nygren also argued the same point: 'in Judaism love is exclusive and particularistic: it is directed to one's "neighbour" in the original and more restricted sense of the word, and it is directed to "neighbours only"' (*Agape and Eros,* 63).

In a more recent theological treatment of love, Edmund Santurri appeals to the Pauline literature to establish that love (or in his terminology 'agape') 'is essentially *self-sacrifice*' and consists in 'an agent's disposition to sacrifice the interests of the self for the good of the neighbour.'[24] Santurri is insistent that self-sacrifice is not just a *possible* actualisation of love but is essential and inherent to it: there is no such thing as loving another without subtracting something from the self. In particular Santurri appeals to Philippians 2.3-4, in which he sees Paul encourage his readers 'to abandon egocentric or prideful preoccupation; and more, to adopt an altruistic attitude utterly unqualified by self-concern'; this is then given christological warrant in Philippians 2.6, which depicts self-emptying, 'as a metaphor that captures vividly the moral and spiritual attitudes of humility and self-renunciation reflected in that incarnation'. In his own words, 'Incarnational kenosis is then in Pauline theology a prototype of love as self-sacrifice for the good of the neighbor.'[25] This contrast between self and other becomes even sharper when he writes, 'kenotic love for Paul is altruistic all the way down, it is the other rather than the self that is ever in love's view'.[26] In relation to the self, then, love is strictly defined in negative terms: Santurri gives an account of love with what we could call 'self-subtraction-language' – phrases that take the word 'self' and attach a negative word or morpheme to it (which would include language such as 'self-renunciation', 'self-sacrifice', and 'selfless').

As regards 'incarnational kenosis', as he puts it, is it the case that Jesus becomes incarnate with no view whatsoever to his own self? In the passage he cites, the Father responds to Jesus' act of obedience by exalting him (Phil 2.9-11). In other instances in which Paul discusses the incarnation, Christ's action leads to believers' obedience to God: in Romans, God sends the Son 'in the likeness of sinful flesh' so that believers 'fulfill the just requirement of the Torah' (Rom 8.3); in Galatians, the Son becomes human in order to give believers the Spirit (4.4-6) by which they satisfy the demands of the law (5.16; 6.2) and thus 'live to God' (2.19). These texts suggest that the incarnation is a loving act

[24] E.N. Santurri, 'Agape as Self-Sacrifice: The Internalist View', in *Love and Christian Ethics*, 171–189, at 171 (emphasis original).

[25] Santurri, 'Agape as Self-Sacrifice', 175.

[26] Santurri, 'Agape as Self-Sacrifice', 178.

which also enables believers to reciprocate that act. That being the case, it might not be entirely accurate to say that, in loving another, one is concerned *only* with the other and not the self.

In this brief overview of interpretations of love in Paul, we have seen that scholars have taken Paul's claims about Christ *not* doing something (e.g. in Philippians 2.6-7) as an indication that, when Paul limits self-interest in texts like Philippians 2.4 and 1 Corinthians 13.5, he is denouncing self-interest in an absolute way. The difficulty with this interpretation, however, is that it leads these authors either to bend what Paul says (as is the case with Wischmeyer's reading of Paul's use of Leviticus 19.18) or to downplay aspects of his claims (such as Gorman's paraphrase of 'the common benefit' as the benefit of *others*). The inability to make this antithesis between self-interest and other-regard cohere with other Pauline texts suggests that we need different categories to capture the interplay between self, other, and the nature of love in Paul's letters.

1.2. Methodology

The studies that insist that Paul encourages the rejection of all forms of self-love and self-interest call for a reading of love in Paul which pays particular attention to the relationship between self and other. The default position, it seems, is that love means the sacrifice of the self. This thesis intends to question this interpretation by asking: what kinds of actions (of both Christ and believers) are characterized as prosocial, and what is the relationship between these actions and the self? This leads to other sub-questions, such as: do loving actions require the absolute exclusion of any and all self-interest or self-love? Does love require the 'sacrifice' or 'renunciation' of the self? And if so, in what sense? Does love have any kind of *telos* that includes self-benefit?

To approach these questions, I will use Galatians as a test case. For a number of reasons Galatians is particularly suitable for looking at these questions about love and the self; Paul characterizes Christ as the one who 'loved and gave *himself*' (2.20), a phrase that is taken as a classic prooftext for defining love as self-sacrifice. He explains what this 'love' consists in by outlining in further detail Jesus' prosocial action towards believers (3.13–14; 4.4–6); Paul also correlates the love of Christ and the action of believers (2.20; 4.6, 19; 6.2), describes what prosocial behaviour looks like for them (4.12–

6.6), and invokes the command to 'love your neighbour as yourself' (5.14). The references to the self and the correlation between Christ's love and believers' love suggest that Galatians will provide a helpful test case for considering the content of loving behaviour and its relationship to the self.

To treat love as an object of study requires defining this term in such a way that delimits the scope of this investigation. Before offering such definitions, I should point out two mistakes that characterised a handful of studies on love in the twentieth century. First, some argued that Paul deviated from the standard language-patterns of his day by using the words ἀγάπη and ἀγαπᾶν.[27] Second, some contended (such as Nygren) that ἀγάπ-words came to have a technical meaning in Pauline theology that referred to a distinctive and new 'idea' of love that contrasted with other Greco-Roman ideas.[28] Setting aside how these studies often conflated words and concepts,[29] as well as how they contributed to the rather troubling trope of identifying early Christianity as a *sui generis*, unclassifiable, and absolutely distinctive religious movement,[30] a cursory look at the evidence easily undermines both of these positions: the words ἀγάπη and ἀγαπᾶν were common words that most Greek speakers used for love during Paul's time,[31] and those words were used to refer to all sorts of

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[27] For example, W. Barclay, *New Testament Words* (London: SCM Press, 1964), 20; C. Spicq, *Agapè: Prolégomènes a une Étude de théologie néo-testamentaire* (Studia Hellenistica 10; Leuven: E. Nauwelaerts, 1955), 32.

[28] So Spicq: 'Ce choix et ces exclusives suffiraient à signaler que la religion nouvelle s'est attachée à une notion très déterminée de l'amour et que, si elle a choisi délibérément le terme d'ἀγάπη, c'est qu'elle le considérait comme le plus propre à exprimer un amour authentiquement divin' (*Agapè*, 2). In a similar vein Norman Snaith claimed the Septuagint 'invented' the word ἀγάπη to represent the unique idea of love contained in the Hebrew bible, and that the use of ἀγάπη in the New Testament therefore shows that its authors were referring to a special kind of love (*The Distinctive Ideas of the Old Testament* (London: Epworth Press, 1944), 173). Snaith's claim that ἀγάπη does not occur before the LXX is simply false (see O. Wischmeyer, 'Vorkommen und Bedeutung von Agape in der außerchristlichen Antike', *ZNW* 69 (1978): 212-238). James Barr ('Words for Love in Biblical Greek', in *The Glory of Christ in the New Testament: Studies in Christology in Memory of George Bradford Caird* (ed. L.D. Hurst and N.T. Wright (Oxford: Clarendon, 1987), 3–18) and S.P. Swinn ('Ἀγαπᾶν in the Septuagint', in *Melbourne Symposium on Septuagint Lexicography* (SBLSCS 28; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1990), 49–81) have pointed out that ἀγάπη and ἀγαπᾶν do not refer to any special or particular kind of love.

[29] This was made explicit by Spicq when he wrote, 'Seule l'histoire du mot peut permettre de saisir l'évolution historique du concept, et de mieux pénétrer la densité de celui-ci' ('L'ἀγάπη de I Cor., XIII: un Exemple de contribution de la semantique a l'exégèse neo-testamentaire', *Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses* 31 (1955): 357-370, at 357).

[30] Jonathan Z. Smith rightly opined that notions of uniqueness in the study of Christianity inhibit the scholarly task by denying the possibility of comparison and smuggling in problematic attributions of 'superlative value' to Christianity (*Drudgery Divine: On the Comparison of Early Christianities and the Religions of Late Antiquity* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), 37; cf. 36-46).

[31] Robert Joly demonstrated that ἀγάπη and ἀγαπᾶν were already becoming prominent in the Greek literature of the time, and thus the early Christian preference for these lexemes is an example of a pre-existing linguistic shift; in his own words, 'Ce qu'on a pris pour une cause n'était en réalité qu'une conséquence: le vocabulaire chrétien … est tel parce que tel était déjà auparavant le vocabulaire païen' (*Le Vocabulaire chrétien de l'amour est-il original? Φιλεῖν et Ἀγαπᾶν*

behaviours and affections, both bad and good.[32] There is nothing distinctive or special about Paul's use of ἀγάπη and ἀγαπᾶν, and in themselves they tell us little about his theology.

Given the ambiguity of ἀγάπη and ἀγαπᾶν, interpreting Paul's depiction of Jesus' love and his love-ethic necessitates a method that does not myopically focus on lexemes. My method here will be to investigate Paul's notion of love by looking at what kinds of concrete *behaviours* are depicted as loving. Thus, while I will certainly not ignore instances of ἀγάπη and ἀγαπᾶν in Paul, I will use the word 'love' to refer to anything that falls within the purview of what social psychologists call 'prosocial behaviour', which includes any interpersonal action 'defined by society as generally beneficial to other people and to the ongoing political system', such as helping, cooperation, financial support, emotional care, conflict reduction, etc..[33] At least for my purposes, I will be looking not at what 'society' defines as beneficial but what particular authors (specifically Paul) portray as such. The emic nature of this definition is important, as it intends to encompass not what *we* but what an *author* considers to be beneficial. It is moreover crucial to note that this definition excludes the question of motivation and thus does not presuppose that prosocial behaviour is equivalent to 'altruism', a term which specifically indicates that the intention of an action excludes self-interest.[34]

The material of Galatians will not be treated in isolation but will be contextualised in two ways. First, before looking at the material in Galatians, I will look at how some Greek and Roman philosophers thought about the relationship between self-interest and prosocial action. The material in this corpus will sensitise us to reading Paul's letters outside the dichotomy between self-interest and other-regard. Looking at these Greco-Roman texts will provide us with different categories and concepts to work with when interpreting Galatians. Second, throughout my treatment of Galatians, I

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dans le grec antique (Bruxelles: Presses Universitaires de Bruxelles, 1968), 48); cf. C.C. Tarelli, 'ΑΓΑΠΗ', *JTS* 1 (1950): 64-67.

[32] Luke's Jesus critiques the Pharisees for loving (ἀγαπᾶν) their special seats of honour (Luke 11.23) and speaks of those who love (ἀγαπᾶν) discriminately rather than universally (6.32); loving (ἀγαπᾶν) can be the reason for not believing in Jesus (John 3.19); in 2 Samuel, ἀγάπη is even said to be the impetus for Amnon raping Tamar (2 Sam 13.1, 4, 14–15 LXX).

[33] J.A. Piliavin et al., *Emergency Intervention* (New York: Academic Press, 1981), 4.

[34] J.F. Dovidio et al. define altruism as 'a helpful act that is carried out in the absence of obvious and tangible rewards for the helper' (*The Social Psychology of Prosocial Behavior* (London: Psychology Press, 2012), 26); they distinguish this from the more generic category of prosocial behaviour (24–27).

will discuss elements of other Pauline letters in order to establish corroborating evidence for my reading of Galatians, to deal with potential objections, or to explore how Galatians might inform our understanding of his other letters. In moving across various letters, I do not assume that the theological content of each of Paul's letters must conceptually cohere with each other.[35] However, I venture into other letters in instances where they are illuminating for Galatians or where Galatians is helpful for understanding Pauline theology more broadly. For this reason, the subtitle of this thesis is *Christology and Ethics in Galatians, in the Context of Pauline Theology and Greco-Roman Philosophy.*

1.3. The Proposals in This Study

Stated succinctly, my thesis is that love for Paul (1) entails the renunciation of the competitive self and (2) intends to gain a non-competitive, mutually beneficial relationship with others. By the 'competitive self', I mean attitudes or behaviours that bring the self to benefit at the expense of the benefit of others. The Pauline alternative to this is not, I will argue, the denial of any and all self-interest, but rather the desire to exist *with* the other in such a way that the self and other both benefit by their participation in a relationship. In this sense, love requires 'sacrificing' not the entirety of the self but one possible way of actualizing the self; at the same time, love can have a telos: to unite the self and other into an irreducibly co-beneficial relationship.

This thesis could be seen as an attempt to integrate and to develop two points drawn from recent Pauline scholarship. First, the recent work of John Barclay, *Paul and the Gift*, argues that Paul shared the view of others in the Mediterranean world that beneficent acts place an obligation on their recipients to reciprocate. Within this context, the goal of giving a gift is to form relationship.[36] Second, David Horrell, in his reading of Paul's ethics in *Solidarity and Difference*, contended that 'solidarity' constitutes one of the 'metanorms' of Pauline ethics, and he rightly notes that this theme 'has been too

[35] I do not necessarily agree or presume that the differences of Paul's letters are merely formal – i.e. that across his letters the concepts cohere but are only expressed differently depending on the circumstance (my position therefore contrasts with J. Christiaan Beker, *Paul the Apostle: The Triumph of God in Life and Thought* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1980), 12).

[36] J.M.G. Barclay, *Paul and the Gift* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2015).

much overlooked as a basic foundation for Paul's ethics'.[37] To integrate these observations, what I hope to do in this thesis is explore how prosocial behaviour is, for Paul, oriented towards constructing and reinforcing a mutual relationship in which multiple parties stand in some kind of solidarity with one another.

The content of the primary chapters of this thesis are as follows: chapter two, 'The Self, the Other, and the *Telos* of Prosocial Action: Paul and Ethicists Ancient and Modern', discusses four ancient ethicists and argues that, in the Greco-Roman philosophical tradition, ideal moral acts were oriented towards creating and reinforcing relationships which cannot be interpreted in terms of individual's interests (whether self or other). The goal of prosocial behaviour was to establish and to contribute to a relationship in which all benefit, and this kind of relationship was considered to be an end in itself. I then look at a few aspects of Paul's letters that raise the possibility that he does, in fact, stand in agreement with these Greco-Roman philosophers. Lastly, I argue that the tendency to interpret Paul according to the antithesis between self-interest and other-regard is a result of certain developments in modern ethics that constructed 'altruism' as a moral ideal. Given that Paul exhibits more continuity with the Greco-Roman philosophical tradition than with modern ethics, this chapter functions as a way of calling for a reading of Paul's ethics outside of the antithesis between self-interest and other-regard.

The next three chapters turn to reading Galatians. Chapter three, 'The Self-Gift of a Crucified Christ', focuses on the language of self-giving in Galatians 1.4 and 2.20. This short phrase is given such a detailed treatment for two reasons: first, the phrase 'gave himself' is explicitly correlated with the love of the Son of God in Galatians 2.20 (the only text in Galatians which says that Jesus 'loved'); second, this phrase has been used as a prooftext for defining love only in the terms of self-sacrifice, selflessness, or other forms of self-subtraction language. My proposal in that chapter challenges this common assumption and argues that, if we interpret this language as including a reference to self-*gifting*, then it radically alters our understanding of what this text means: the phrase 'gave himself', I

[37] Horrell, *Solidarity and Difference*, 302. Horrell further argues that 'other-regard' is another metanorm of Pauline ethics (p. 302). Where I differ from Horrell is that he correlates love primarily with 'other-regard', but I will argue that solidarity is in fact integral to Paul's vision of love.

will argue, signals not that Jesus gives himself *away* in death, but that through his death he gives himself *into* relationship.

Chapter four, 'Uniting Divine and Human History', investigates the details of Christ's self-gift by looking at the material in Galatians that specifically describes his action and its effects on humans. In Galatians 3.10-14 and 4.1-7, the messiah positively takes up the condition of humans (particularly Jewish humans) by sharing in their corporeality and experience. If we can understand the various descriptions of Christ's prosocial activity through the category of *incarnation*, we can see Christ's loving action not in terms of self-subtraction but in terms of self-addition, as an act of positive solidarity with others. Furthermore, by sharing in the condition of humans, Christ gives to these believers all that belongs to him, including his Spirit, which enables them to reciprocate this act and to enter into a mutual fellowship with God as an end in itself.

Chapter five, 'Paul's Incarnational Ethic', investigates whether and how this way of reading Paul's depiction of the Christ-event informs his moral injunctions and descriptions of moral behaviour. By understanding Christ's love not as self-subtraction but as incarnation, then we can reinterpret how Paul's injunctions correspond to Jesus' loving action. More specifically, we can see that Paul encourages believers to share positively in the experiences of others and to share what they have with others, in the same way that Christ shared with believers all that belongs to him and shared in their condition. Read this way, we will be able to see more clearly that Paul does not contrast self-interest with other-regard in an absolute sense but rather contrasts the self that stands in competition with others and the self that stands in solidarity with others.

CHAPTER TWO

The Self, the Other, and the *Telos* of Prosocial Action: Paul and Ethicists Ancient and Modern

> Es sind die undurchschauten Vorurteile, deren Herrschaft uns gegen die in der Überlieferung sprechende Sache taub macht.[38]

As noted in the previous chapter, some interpreters of Paul have set him in contrast to the Greco-Roman philosophical tradition, contending that the latter constructs an ethic around self-interest, but the former encourages the renunciation of self-interest. This chapter intends to problematise this reading of the Greco-Roman philosophers and Paul in such a way that will call for a fresh rereading of Paul's notion of love along different lines. I begin by surveying the comments of four authors (Plato, Aristotle, Seneca, and Cicero) about prosocial action and self-other relation. As we will see, for these authors, ideal prosocial behaviour is ultimately neither self-interested nor other-regarding but rather aims at creating or reinforcing a connection between selves, a connection that results in the common benefit of numerous parties. As this material will sensitise us to texts in Paul which espouse similar ideas, I then provide a cursory reading of select Pauline texts to raise the suggestion that he might broadly align with the Greco-Roman philosophical tradition in this regard. The final section argues that the tendency to claim that Paul idealises the renunciation of all self-interest is an import of modern ideals into Paul.

In one sense, the purpose of this chapter is simply to suggest that Paul's thought is more ancient than modern. But within the purview of this thesis as a whole, placing Paul in his historical context

[38] H.-G. Gadamer, *Wahrheit und Methode: Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik* (Gesammelte Werke 1; Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1990), 274.

intends to suggest that it is possible to read Paul's notion of love not as a complete *negation* of the view of love in the Greco-Roman philosophical tradition but rather as a *particular instantiation* of it. This chapter therefore functions as a prelude to and justification for a closer analysis of Paul's christology (chapters three and four) and christologically-informed ethic (chapter five) in Galatians. Drawing upon this chapter's conclusions, chapters three through five will interpret his depiction of Christ's love and believers' love without positing an absolute contrast between self-interest and other-regard.

2.1. Case Studies in in Greco-Roman Philosophy

Anyone who studies the various literary and philosophical sources in Greco-Roman texts will recognise that they contain all sorts of divergent systems of thought, and deep disagreement often arises between them, even between those in the same tradition. Despite the differences that multiply within and across the various authors ad schools, there are certain points of contact that can be established between them. One of these contact-points that I want to draw out is that, for the authors I will look at (Plato, Aristotle, Seneca, and Cicero), selves can be intertwined and connected with others in such a way that prosocial behaviour is oriented towards creating and sustaining some kind of shared being amongst multiple parties, such that prosocial behaviour benefits not any single individual but rather an irreducible social whole.

2.1.1. Plato

In Plato's *Republic*, Socrates dialogues with Adeimantus about the best form of a city – how it should be organised and what laws it should have. To approach this issue, Socrates suggests that we first must know the origin of the city (*γιγνομένη πόλις*), because only once we understand why a city comes to exist in the first place will we understand what it should be like (*Resp.* 2.369a5–10). The assumption operative in this line of reasoning is that the origin of a thing structures and thus reveals its telos. The city's origin lies in the fact that 'each of us is not self-sufficient, but is in need of many things (*ἐπειδὴ τυγχάνει ἡμῶν ἕκαστος οὐκ αὐτάρκης, ἀλλὰ πολλῶν ὢν ἐνδεής*)'

(2.369b5–7). This basic state of human need provokes people to participate in the social world: 'One person associates himself another person to meet one need, and then another person to meet another need. Needing many things, they gather many fellows and helpers (*κοινωνοί τε καὶ βοηθοί*) into one location, and we give this co-habitation the name "city (*πόλις*)'" (2.369c1–4). Socrates stresses this point further by asking, 'When someone shares (*μεταδίδοναι*) something, does he share with or receive from (*μεταλαμβάνειν*) another because he supposes that it will be better for him?' (2.369c6–7). Adeimantus rightly answers in the affirmative.

Having concluded that the origin of the city is the reality of human needs which are met by the practice of mutual reciprocity, Socrates engages in a thought experiment: 'Let us hypothetically construct city from its beginning' (2.369c9). Drawing from the point that 'Our needs (*ἡ ἡμετέρα χρεία*)' are what 'creates the city (*ποιήσει δὲ αὐτήν*)' (2.369c10), he starts listing specific needs that individuals would need, such as food, housing, and clothing. These needs would be met by including within the city those who have the ability to meet them: a farmer is included for food, a builder for housing, and a weaver for clothing (2.369d1–9). This hypothetical city will naturally organize itself in such a way that the needs of the citizens will be most effectively satisfied. Instead of each person spreading their energies across different activities to produce food, housing, clothing, etc. for themselves, it would be more productive if each person devotes himself to one productive task and then shares the product with everyone else (2.369e2–370c7). In fact, Socrates is convinced that, 'If each person at the same time attempts to do all these things,' it would be 'ruinous for the city' (4.434b5–7). To be most effective, the farmer produces all the food for the citizens, the builder makes all the houses, and so on. In that system, each person is able to focus on a single task and the needs of each person in the city are thus met.

At this point in Socrates' argument, one could conclude that, because the needs of individuals form the impetus for the construction of a city, continued participation in the social dynamic of the city is therefore solely aimed towards self-interest. We could call this a 'cyclical' argument: the cities' origin in human need means that the city is only ever an instrumental good for meeting those needs. This form of reasoning, however, (to use Aristotle's terminology) posits an identity between

efficient cause and final cause. But Socrates distinguishes between these: when he says that the origin of the city will tell us its ideal form, he means that the ideal city is revealed by how human need incites humans to act. We could call this a 'teleological' argument. Because the lack of self-sufficiency brings humans to meet their needs through mutual reciprocity, sharing, etc., the ideal city is one in which the citizens share all things with one another, identify with each other's needs, and meet those needs by practising their particular skill and sharing what they produce with all. Thus, this kind of social cohesion is not valuable *only* as a means to satisfy individual self-interest, though it does do that.

The fact that the city is not merely an instrumental good for serving the needs of individuals is perhaps best illustrated by Socrates' insistence that the *εὐδαιμονία* of the city is more valuable than that of its individual citizens. This point arises in Socrates' discussion about the *εὐδαιμονία* of the city's guardians. When Socrates argues that the ideal city must have guardians who 'in all willingness do what they regard as beneficial for the city' (3.412e1–2; cf. 3.413c5–d2), Adeimantus raises the possible objection that Socrates is denying the guardians any possibility of flourishing in their own *εὐδαιμονία*: in Socrates' city, says Adeimantus, 'Though the city is actually theirs, they [the guardians] enjoy no good from it' (4.419a4–5). Socrates retorts that 'we founded the city not in order to make one group among us outstandingly happy, but so that the whole city might be as happy as possible (*μάλιστα ὅλη ἡ πόλις*) … What we are doing now, we believe, is forming the happy city, not by isolating a few of the inhabitants in the city, but by making the whole city (*ὅλη*) happy' (420b5–8, c1–4). Thus, though the city originates in human need, the *telos* of engaging in social interaction is not to make an aggregate of individuals happy but rather to achieve the corporate *εὐδαιμονία* of the city.

Socrates' assertions about the ultimate value of the happiness of the state have raised a longstanding question amongst scholars of Plato: is the *εὐδαιμονία* of the state ultimate over against that of individuals in such a way that the latter is always subsumed under the former and the former must always take precedence over the latter? The debate over this question is perhaps best represented by the disagreement between Karl Popper's 1945 work, *The Open Society and its*

Enemies, and Gregory Vlastos' response to Popper in 1977. Popper argued that, by subordinating the *εὐδαιμονία* of the individual to that of the state, Socrates' ideal city advocates a form of moral relativism which provides a dangerous rationale for establishing totalitarian regimes: 'Actions that serve [the state] are moral; actions that endanger it, immoral'; 'The criterion of morality is the interest of the state'; 'This is the collectivist, the tribal, the totalitarian theory of morality'.[39] This view has been labelled the 'organic'[40] interpretation because according to it the city is a metaphysical entity distinct from the individuals that produce it and thus possesses a *εὐδαιμονία* which is more valuable than and therefore must override the citizens' *εὐδαιμονία*.[41] In opposition, Vlastos argued that Plato's talk of the state's *εὐδαιμονία* is only a circumlocution referring to the aggregate happiness of individuals.[42] He writes, 'the *polis* whose happiness and excellence is the end of all just conduct within its frontiers can be nothing but the people themselves'; and so, 'the happiness of the whole *polis* is not treated as something distinct from the happiness of the citizens: it is collapsed with theirs'.[43] In other words, because there is no entity which is distinct from individuals – the state just *is* the sum of its individuals – there is no 'organic' entity that can have a happiness which can take precedence over the citizens.[44]

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[39] K.R. Popper, *The Open Society and Its Enemies, Volume I: The Spell of Plato* (4th ed.; London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1962 [1945]), 107 (emphasis removed).

[40] This term goes as far back as at least G. Grote, *Plato and Other Companions of Socrates* (London: Murray, 1865), 206.

[41] These two points are made clearer in R.C. Cross and A.D. Woozley, *Plato's* Republic: *A Philosophical Commentary* (London: MacMillan & Co., 1964), 131.

[42] G. Vlastos, 'The Theory of Social Justice in the *Polis* in Plato's *Republic*', in *Interpretations of Plato: A Swarthmore Symposium* (Supplements to Mnemosyne 50; Leiden: Brill, 1977), 1–40; cf. C.C.W. Taylor, 'Plato's Totalitarianism', *Polis* 5 (1986): 4–29, esp. 17.

[43] Vlastos, 'Theory of Social Justice', 13, 15.

[44] The precedent for this interpretative dichotomy might have been set by Grote, when he so closely connected two theses: (1) Plato wants to bring happiness not 'for the greatest number of individuals, but for the abstract unity called the City', and (2) this happiness exists 'apart from the individuals, many or few, composing it' (*Plato and Other Companions of Socrates*, 139). It is hard to know precisely what Grote meant by 'apart from'. Does this mean, in line with Popper's interpretation, something like 'disregarding'? Or does it mean only that the happiness of the city is not an aggregate but an emergent entity (see below), without the implication of Popper's concerns? Whereas both Popper and Vlastos seem to assume that thesis (1) necessarily entails thesis (2) in Popper's terms, Brown (in my view rightly) contends for (1) without Popper's version of (2).

With a careful reading of a few crucial texts in the *Republic,* however, Lesley Brown shows that both of these interpretations are, in fact, mistaken.[45] Brown points to the comparison between the happiness of the city and the beauty of a statue, in which Socrates argues that, if the eyes of a beautiful statue are not painted with a beautiful colour, nobody should complain that the eye lacks beauty. Rather, the eye, even though painted with a simple colour, contributes to the beauty of the statue, and thus the eye truly *is* beautiful, but not defined in isolation from the rest of the statute. Brown comments,

> The appropriate, and thus the only true *eudaimonia* for each type of person is to live the life in which they make their naturally fitting contribution to the *eudaimonia* of the *polis*, just as the appropriate beauty for an eye is not to be painted the most beautiful colour absolutely, but is that which allows it to contribute to the beauty of the whole statue. On this reading, true *eudaimonia* for a member of any class is to live a life in which they contribute the most their nature allows to the *polis*.[46]

If Brown's interpretation stands correct, Popper's 'organic' theory is grossly misnamed: the *εὐδαιμονία* of the city cannot unilaterally take precedence over the *εὐδαιμονία* of its citizens any more than an organism could care for its own health while ignoring a festering wound on one of its limbs. But Vlastos is equally wrong: to argue that Plato's speech about the city's happiness is a circumlocution for the citizens' happiness seems to confuse existence (of the state and its happiness) with dependence (just because the existence of the state and its happiness *depend* on the individuals and their happiness does not mean that the former simply *is* the sum of the latter). More importantly, Vlastos' reading fails to account for the function of Plato's statue illustration.

What will steer us clear of the false dichotomy between Popper and Vlastos and help us explain Socrates' view (as Brown sees it) is, I suggest, the ontological category of emergence.[47] Two things should be said about this. First, emergentism holds that in some circumstances the whole is an

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[45] L. Brown 'How Totalitarian is Plato's *Republic*?', in *Essays on Plato's* Republic (ed. E.N. Ostenfeld; Aarhus Studies in Mediterranean Antiquity 2; Oxford: Aarhus University Press, 1998), 13–27; In a more recent work, Malcolm Schofield expresses agreement with Brown's argument (*Plato: Political Philosophy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 220–221).

[46] Brown, 'How Totalitarian', 24.

[47] See Timothy O'Connor and Hong Yu Wong, 'Emergent Properties', *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, n.p. (cited 24 October 2019). Online: http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2009/entries/properties-emergent; cf. O'Connor, 'Emergent Properties', *American Philosophical Quarterly* 31 (1994): 91–104.

entity which is distinct but not independent from its parts.[48] In other words, certain entities are not just *constituted* by their composite parts but rather *produced* by them, and they are therefore *dependent* upon their parts but not *reducible* to them.[49] As such, emergent entities are able to have unique properties that are distinct from their parts. Thus, according to Pier Luigi Luisi's definition, 'The term "emergence" describes the onset of novel properties that arise when a higher level of complexity is formed from components of lower complexity, where these properties are not present'.[50] To apply this to Socrates' argument, the interactions between citizens generates the *πόλις* as an emergent entity distinct from its citizens. Perhaps the best evidence for this is that Socrates compares the relationship between the state and its citizens to a body and its body parts (see below). As an emergent entity, the city is able to have a *εὐδαιμονία* which is not identical to the aggregate *εὐδαιμονία* of isolated individuals (*contra* Vlastos). Rather, the ideal goal of social relationships is the achievement of an *emergent* property, the *εὐδαιμονία* of the *πόλις*. Second, emergentism holds that the properties of individual parts alter when integrated into an emergent whole. This seems to be the point of Socrates' illustration about the beauty of the eye: each part has beauty only insofar as it derives its beauty from the beauty of the statue which is produced by the relationships between its parts. Thus, Socrates means that the *εὐδαιμονία* of individuals must be understood as a property of a part which stands within and thus must be defined with reference to the emergent whole. It is not that the city's *εὐδαιμονία* must override the citizens' but rather that each citizen must understand their *εὐδαιμονία* as the property not of an individual but rather as the property of a part integrated into and functioning within an emergent whole. For this reason, the city's *εὐδαιμονία* can be considered more valuable than the *εὐδαιμονία* of the citizens (when the latter are conceived as isolated parts); but nevertheless (*contra* Popper), the city's *εὐδαιμονία* cannot

[48] In Mark Bedau's terms, I am using 'emergence' in the 'strong' sense as opposed to the 'weak' sense, the latter of which considers emergent entities as explicable in terms of the properties of their isolated parts ('Weak Emergence', in *Mind, Causation, and World* (vol. 11 of *Philosophical Perspectives*; ed. J.E Tomberlin; Malden: Blackwell, 1997), 375–399).

[49] On this distinction see T. Nagel, *Mind and Cosmos: Why the Materialist Neo-Darwinian Conception of Nature is Almost Certainly False* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 41.

[50] P.L. Luisi, *The Emergence of Life: From Chemical Origins to Synthetic Biology* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 112.

be enacted by constantly circumventing the *εὐδαιμονία* of the citizens (when conceived as integrated parts).

Because the goal of prosocial behaviour is the happiness of the state, Socrates uses the unity of the city as a criterion for morally evaluating actions: immoral actions are those which break the city apart and moral actions are those which reinforce the unity of the city. There is no 'greater evil for a city than that which shreds it apart and makes it into many instead of one (*ποιῇ πολλὰς ἀντὶ μιᾶς*)' and correspondingly no 'greater good than what binds it together and makes it one (*μεῖζον ἀγαθὸν τοῦ ὃ ἂν συνδῇ τε καὶ ποιῇ μίαν*)' (5.462a9–b2). The ideal unity of the city is brought about by and comes to expression as 'a commonality (*κοινωνία*) of pleasure and pain' in which 'all citizens, as much as possible, equally rejoice and grieve (*παραπλησίως χαίρωσι καὶ λυπῶνται*) over the same gains and losses (5.462b4–6). This solidarity is jeopardized when the members of the city each have isolated, distinct interests – when 'some grieve but others rejoice at the same occurrences which happen to the city and the people in it' (5.462b8–c1). Such an affective division is enacted only when 'words such as "mine" and "not mine"' are not used by the city in the same way' (5.462c4–5). If the people in the city mutually identified with each other in such a way that they did not make a distinction between the *meum* and the *tuum*, then they would all experience these emotions with each other. Socrates therefore concludes that 'in the best kind of city the most people as possible apply the words 'mine' and 'not mine' to the same things in the same way' (5.463c7–8).

To buttress this point, Socrates makes an analogy between the ideal state and the human person, arguing that 'the best state is the one that contains the most similarity to a single person (*εἷς ἄνθρωπος*)' (5.462c10). In a human being, what happens to one part of the body is experienced not just by the single part but by the entirety of the person. He explains:

> For example, when we have a finger with a wound, the whole fellowship stretches throughout the body to the soul, bringing about a single arrangement which is created by the ruling element of the body – it is this fellowship that feels in itself and, while feeling pain, the entire whole shares in the suffering of the parts. And

> thus we say that the *person* feels pain in his finger. The same thing happens with the other body parts of the person, concerning the pain felt in the members and the pleasure when it recovers.[51]

If the people relate to one another in this way, 'when one of the citizens experiences something either good or bad, such a city will most likely say that the affected part is a part of *itself*. The entire city will feel pleasure or pain at once (*καὶ ἢ συνησθήσεται ἅπασα ἢ συλλυπήσεται*)' (5.462d8–e2). The ideal city is the city in which all citizens share all things with one another – not only their possessions, but also their emotions and experiences, their failures and successes (5.463e3–5) – such that when one part of the city experiences good or evil, all members share in that experience. In fact, Socrates identifies this kind of relationship of shared interests as an expression of love: one 'loves (*φιλεῖν*) most the thing whose benefit he considers to coincide with his own benefit (*ᾧ συμφέρειν ἡγοῖτο τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ ἑαυτῷ*), the thing whose success or failure he thinks results in his own success or failure' (4.412d4–7; cf. *Leg.* 9.875a–c). This way of thinking about the state is dependent upon a particular understanding of human persons: if citizens can relate to each other in the same way as members of the human body, then they can and should be socially connected with one another such that the experience of one is the experience of all.

In sum, despite their origins in human need, the emergence of the city, the practice of mutual sharing, and standing in solidarity with the experiences of others are all *subordinate means* ultimately directed not towards the benefit of a single person, whether self or other, but towards the well-being of the unified state, an emergent entity produced by the connections between self and others but not reducible to them. Plato's account of Socrates' argument provides two insights that will be important for the rest of this chapter: first, connecting selves into a larger web of social relations is an end of prosocial action in itself; second, prosocial interaction within this larger emergent entity should contribute to and reinforce the state's unity and *εὐδαιμονία*, within which all benefit.

[51] *Resp.* 5.462c10–d5.

2.1.2. Aristotle

In his *Politics*, Aristotle begins, like Socrates, by discussing various kinds of human associations (*κοινωνία*) and their relationship to human need. Whereas Socrates argued that the city exists to meet those human needs, Aristotle sees the family as sufficient for this task. 'The family (*οἶκος*) is the association established by nature (*κοινωνία κατὰ φύσιν*) for the supply of men's everyday wants' (*Pol.* I 1, 1252b12–14).[52] That humans naturally make associations beyond the family-unit indicates that they seek to achieve something other than the satisfaction of human need (I 1, 1252b15–16). Tracing the development of human communities, Aristotle states that families inevitably unite with each other by forming a village (*κώμη*). Then,

> When several villages are united in a single complete community (*κοινωνία τέλειος*), large enough to be nearly or quite self-sufficing, the state (*πόλις*) comes into existence, originating in the bare needs of life, and continuing in existence for the sake of a good life (*τὸ εὖ ζῆν*). And therefore, if the earlier forms of society are natural, so is the state, for it is the end of them (*τέλος γὰρ αὕτη ἐκείνων*), and the nature of a thing is its end (*ἡ δὲ φύσις τέλος ἐστίν*). For what each thing is when fully developed, we call its nature, whether we are speaking of a man, a horse, or a family. Besides, the final cause and end of a thing is the best (*τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα καὶ τὸ τέλος βέλτιστον*), and to be self-sufficing (*ἡ αὐτάρκεια*) is the end and the best.[53]

From this ontogenetic account of society Aristotle derives what is perhaps his most famous thesis: 'it is evident that the state is a creation of nature (*φύσει ἡ πόλις ἐστί*), and that man is by nature a political animal (*ὁ ἄνθρωπος φύσει πολιτικὸν ζῷον*)' (I 1, 1253a1–3).[54] Like Socrates' argument, although human association originates in need, the emergence of the state, through which people can conduct 'the good life', constitutes the *telos* and final cause of natural human sociability and associations. Aristotle goes on to claim that the state not only contains all the other forms of relationships and prosocial behaviour but also therefore constitutes their goal: 'if all communities aim at some good, the state or political community, which is the highest of all, and

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[52] Unless otherwise indicated, translations of *Politics* are from S. Everson, ed., *The Politics and the Constitution of Athens* (Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

[53] *Pol.* I 1, 1252b27–1253a1.

[54] While *φύσις* can be a slippery term, Aristotle explains in his *Metaphysics* how he defines the word: 'the substance of those things that possess the power of movement in themselves *qua* themselves (*ἡ οὐσία ἡ τῶν ἐχόντων ἀρχὴν κινήσεως ἐν αὑτοῖς ᾗ αὐτά*)' (*Met.* Δ 5, 1015a14–15). The claim that humans are *by nature* political means that they are moved from within themselves – perhaps we might say 'automatically' – to form social associations whose end is the creation of the state.

which embraces all the rest, aims at good in a greater degree than any other, and at the highest good' (1252a3–7). Other activities are therefore only good in relation to the state, and even the practice of reciprocal exchange only constitutes a good if it is directed towards the creation and maintenance of the state (III 9, 1280b22–23). As A.C. Bradley elegantly articulates, the state 'is not a merely relative end of making possible the attainment of other ends' but rather 'the good at which it aims includes the subordinate objects of desire arrived at by the subordinate communities'; the state is thus a fellowship (*κοινωνία*) (I 1,1252a) which is 'nothing short of the final object of human life, the end of which alone gives value to all lesser ends and has no end beyond it'.[55]

This notion of the state as *telos* determines how Aristotle understands the ontology of the self. Insofar as human beings are naturally social animals, they must be conceived of as 'a part in relation to the whole' (I 2, 1253a26–27), and because 'the whole is of necessity prior to the part', the state is 'prior (*πρότερον*)' to the family and individual person (1253a19–20). The claim that the state is 'prior' to the individual and determines her functions and properties insinuates that Aristotle conceives of the state as an emergent entity. This is further demonstrated when Aristotle explains how the state is 'prior' to the individual by claiming that the persons relate to the state in a similar way to how body parts relate to the body: 'if the whole body be destroyed, there will be no foot or hand' (1253a20–21). As with Socrates' statue analogy, individual selves must be understood as entities connected with another and integrated into an emergent state, and their function (*ἔργον*) in relation to one another must therefore be defined in relation to that emergent entity (1253a23).

Accordingly, Aristotle further claims (following Socrates again) that the virtue of individuals must be understood in relation to the state: 'the excellence of the part must have regard to the excellence of the whole (*τὴν δὲ τοῦ μέρους πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ὅλου δεῖ βλέπειν ἀρετήν*)' (I 13, 1260b14–15). Again, this does not merely express the utilitarian point that it is better for many to achieve the good for many rather than one (such a quantitative contention would hardly require the attention Aristotle devotes to it). Like Socrates' illustration that the beauty of the eye must be

[55] A.C. Bradley, 'Aristotle's Conception of the State', in *A Companion to Aristotle's Politics* (ed. D. Keyt and F.D. Miller: Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 1991), 13–56, at 21.

understood not absolutely or independently but in relation to the beauty of the whole statue, for Aristotle the ideal is to achieve the good for humans conceived as integrated members of the state rather than as isolated persons. In a deeply revealing comment, Aristotle asserts that 'even if the good is the same for an individual as for a city, that of the city is obviously a greater and more complete thing to obtain and preserve. For while the good of an individual is a desirable thing, what is good for a people or for cities is a nobler and more godlike thing' (*Eth. Nic.* I 2, 1094b7–10).[56]

It comes as no surprise therefore that Aristotle considers the best forms of government to be those 'which have a regard to the common interest (*τὸ κοινῇ συμφέρον*)' rather than the isolated interests of particular individuals (*Pol.* III 6, 1279a17–19). Sometimes Aristotle can articulate this ideal in the terms of seeking 'what is beneficial for another (*ἀλλότριον ἀγαθόν*)' (*Eth. Nic.* V 2, 1130a3), but such seeking after the good of others, an activity through which one practises virtue and thus the good life (1130a7–13), is a way of enabling the whole state, and thus everyone within it, to live well. This means that prosocial actions towards others must be understood as subordinate means to creating and maintaining the ultimate good of the state, within which both self and other are connected and therefore flourish. Bradley offers another insightful comment in this regard: 'The antithesis of selfishness and disinterested action … had not so much prominence in Greek Ethics as it possesses for good and evil now. Aristotle never explicitly raises the question, so obvious to us, in what relation a man's happiness stands to the realisation of the same end in others'.[57] Aristotle's ideal is not to exclude self-interest in favour of benefitting others – benefitting only individual others would be insufficient to achieve the highest end; rather, 'what is beneficial' is the property of an irreducibly emergent reality, the property of the state in which individuals

[56] Translation here from R. Crisp, ed., *Nicomachean Ethics* (rev. and enl. ed.; Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014).

[57] Bradley, 'Aristotle's Conception of the State', 47.

participate and are connected; the good is therefore corporate, 'jointly constituted by the agent and others'.[58]

Aristotle's account of friendship presents a similar view of relationships. In order to fully understand how friendship works for Aristotle, we must first look at some aspects of his metaphysics.[59] For Aristotle, action or activity is coextensive with and identical to being, such that the actualisation (*ἐνέργεια*) of the self can extend beyond the individual self in cases where one creates or influence objects. Put differently, when one acts upon an object, the energy that the object receives from that person is still, in fact, *his own* actualisation, only expressed in that object. If people's *ἐνέργεια* can be contained in the things that they make and influence, and if *ἐνέργεια* and action are identical to being, this means that the things which they make or influence actually contain their very being. In his own words, 'Actuality exists in what is produced (*ἡ ἐνέργεια ἐν τῷ ποιουμένῳ ἐστίν*); for example the act of building in what is built, the act of weaving in what is woven, and so on. And, generally, motion exists in what is moved … It is therefore evident that essence (*οὐσία*) or form (*εἶδος*) is actuality (*ἐνέργεια*)' (*Met.* Θ 8, 1050a31–1050b3). Elsewhere he similarly contends that 'We exist by actuality (*ἐσμὲν δ' ἐνεργείᾳ*), since we exist by living and doing (*τῷ ζῆν γὰρ καὶ πράττειν*); and someone's product is, in a way, the producer in his actualization (*ἐνεργείᾳ δὲ ὁ ποιήσας τὸ ἔργον ἔστι πως*)' (*Eth. Nic.* IX 7, 1168a6–10).[60]

The last claim – that we *exist* in and as what we *produce* – is the natural conclusion of the double contention that our being is our *ἐνέργεια* and our *ἐνέργεια* is contained in what we make or influence. This configuration applies not only to one's relationship to objects but also one's relationship to people. Benefactors consider their beneficiaries as part of their own being because the former influences and produces the other in the same way as an artist makes and loves her art

[58] A. Madigan, 'Eth. Nic. 9.8: Beyond Egoism and Altruism?', in *Aristotle's Ethics* (vol. 4 of *Essays in Ancient Greek Philosophy*; ed. J.P. Anton and A. Preus; Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991), 73–94, at 87

[59] The proceeding interpretation of Aristotle follows the reading and argument in A. Carreras, 'Aristotle on Other-Selfhood and Reciprocal Shaping', *History of Philosophy Quarterly* 29 (2012): 319–336.

[60] My translation; cf. *Pol.* I 4, 1254a7: *ὁ δὲ Βίος πρᾶξις … ἐστιν.*

(*Eth. Nic.* IX 7, 1167b17–1168a10). When a teacher acts upon a pupil by transferring her knowledge to the pupil, the energy or activity of the teacher becomes contained in and expressed by the pupil. Thus, 'It is not paradoxical for the actualisation (*ἐνέργεια*) of one thing to exist in another thing. Teaching is the activity (*ἐνέργεια*) of the teacher; it is, however, actualised *in* something; it is not performed in isolation, but is the actualisation of one person in another person' (*Phys*. III 3, 202b5–8). In this sense, Aristotle believes that one's being can extend and actualise in another person or thing.

In *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle turns this metaphysical view (that existence resides in *ἐνέργεια* and therefore can be expressed in others) towards his vision of friendship. In the case of friends, it is not that one party influences another and not *vice versa* (as in the benefactor in beneficiary and teacher in student relationships); rather, friends mutually influence one another through a process that Anthony Carreras calls 'Reciprocal Shaping'.[61] 'Friends become better' Aristotle claims, 'through their activity (*ἐνεργεῖν*) and their improving one another (*διορθοῦν*)' (*Eth. Nic.* IX.12, 1172a12).[62] If, as we saw above, one's self becomes actualised in what it influences, then friends who influence one another would end up somehow sharing their existence. This is further implied by the conclusion that what characterizes friends is 'co-living (*συζῆν*)', which refers to how friends participate in the same activities with one another, such as drinking, playing sports, hunting, and studying (1172a3–5). Combined with the previously noted claim that we 'exist (*εἶναι*)' by 'living (*τῷ ζῆν*)', the claim that friends 'co-live (*συζῆν*)' implies that friends somehow share in a singular existence (*εἶναι*).

The notion that a friend is an 'other self (*ἄλλος αὐτός*)' seems to draw upon this point. Aristotle invokes this concept to explain why friends treat each other as they treat themselves. He observes that virtuous people let themselves experience grief and joy, and friends share that grief and joy with each other; virtuous people spend time with themselves, and friends spend time together; virtuous people wish for long, full lives, and friends wish for long, full lives for each other, and so

[61] Carreras, 'Aristotle on Other-Selfhood', 327.
[62] Translation here from Crisp, *Nicomachean Ethics*.

on (IX 4, 1166a10–29). To explain the material similarity between self-relation and other-relation in such examples, Aristotle states that 'because these activities are how the virtuous person relates to himself, and because he relates to his friend as to himself (*πρὸς δὲ τὸν φίλον ἔχειν ὥσπερ πρὸς αὑτόν*) – for a friend is another self (*ἔστι γὰρ ὁ φίλος ἄλλος αὐτός*) – friendship seems to be comprised of these things, and friends are those to whom these things apply' (1166a29–33).[63] As the *γάρ* indicates, the assertion that a friend is another self provides a *causal* explanation for the similarity between self-relation and other-relation. Aristotle is therefore making two distinct statements here and subordinating one as warrant for the other: there is a similarity between self-relation and other-relation in friendship *because* the friend is another self.[64] In friendship, the realm of the self is not restricted to a single individual but extended also to the other friend, and for this reason what is normally self-relation necessarily becomes other-relation. While we have no evidence of Aristotle actually saying this, in his *Lives of Eminent Philosophers*, what Diogenes Laertius attributes to Aristotle is probably correct in substance: a friend (*φίλος*) is 'a single soul dwelling in two bodies (*μία ψυχὴ δύο σώμασιν ἐνοικοῦσα*)' (Diog. Laert. 5.20). Elsewhere Aristotle makes similar arguments, such as when he claims that parents love (*φιλεῖν*) their children as themselves (*ὡς ἑαυτούς*) because their children are other selves (*ἕτεροι αὐτοί*) to them, or when he argues that brothers love one another because they are 'the same thing, though in different bodies (*εἰσὶ δὴ ταὐτό πως καὶ ἐν διῃρημένοις*)' (VIII, 12 1161b29–33).

In light of the above, we may ask whether for Aristotle prosocial behaviour amongst friends and kin is self-directed or other-directed. It should be clear by now that such a dichotomy obviously breaks down in light of Aristotle's notion of the self. Because friends share the same being, their prosocial actions are oriented towards achieving irreducibly common interests. As Anthony Carreras aptly concludes,

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[63] My translation; cf. *Eth. Nic.* IX 9, 1170b5–8.

[64] Julia Annas is therefore wrong to suggest that the passing comment about a friend being another self is a way of restating the point that friends relate to one another as they relate to the themselves; this reading seems to be motivated by the concern that, if self-love is included within other-love, it therefore makes this love selfish (see her 'Self-Love in Aristotle', *Southern Journal of Philosophy* 27, Supplement (1988): 1–18, at 1).

> Aristotle's view when it comes to friendship is *not* that all non-I-desires depend on I-desires, but *neither* is it that friendship requires independent non-I-desires. Rather, Aristotle's view is that reciprocal shaping in friendship evinces genuine *we*-desires. A we-desire also takes the form of "I want that *p*," but *p* is filled in by some "we" or related expression ("our," etc.). Friends have the thought "I want that *we* prosper," and this thought *irreducibly motivates* friends to love and benefit one another.[65]

The *εὐδαιμονία* of friends should therefore be understood as a shared entity, such that when one seeks *εὐδαιμονία* in friendship, it is ultimately neither selfish nor selfless, because one seeks a common *εὐδαιμονία*. Aristotle's account confirms the connection between selfhood and prosocial behaviour that we saw in Plato: because selves can be connected, either in the 'body' of the state or within friendship, their action within those relationships is oriented towards irreducibly social and common interests, whether that be the good of the state or the shared *εὐδαιμονία* of friends.

2.1.3. Seneca

Stoicism, according to Seneca, also holds that's every human is 'a social animal (*sociale animal*) born for the common good (*communi bono genitus*)' (*Clem.* 1.3.2).[66] For Seneca, this Stoic contention contains the explicitly pragmatic implication that one should love all humankind and contribute to the common benefit: '[N]o philosophical school', Seneca defends, 'is kindlier and gentler, nor more loving of humankind and more attentive to our common good (*commune bonum*), to the degree that its very purpose is to be useful, bring assistance, and consider the interests not only of itself as a school but of all people, individually and collectively (*nec sibi … sed universis singulisque*)' (*Clem.* 2.5.3). This suggests neither that humans should be concerned only with self-interest nor that ideal actions disregard self-interest, but rather the irreducible good of the community. Like Plato and Aristotle, Seneca retrieves the metaphor of the body to tease out how acts of love contribute to the whole city:

> It's unspeakably wrong to harm one's fatherland; therefore, it's unspeakably wrong to harm a fellow citizen too, for he is part of the fatherland – the parts (*partes*) are sacrosanct if the whole (*universus*) is worthy of our worship. Therefore it's unspeakably wrong to harm a human being too, for he is your fellow citizen in the cosmopolis. What if the hands wanted to harm the feet, the eyes the hands? As all our limbs are in harmony (*omnia inter se membra consentiunt*) because it's in the interest of the whole that the individual parts be

[65] Carreras, 'Aristotle on Other-Selfhood', 331 (emphasis original).

[66] Translations of *De Clementia* are from R.A. Kaster and M.C. Nussbaum, trans., *Anger, Mercy, Revenge* (The Complete Works of Lucius Annaeus Seneca; Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010).

> protected, so human beings will spare each individual because they've been born to form a social union, and a society cannot be sound save through the affectionate protection (*nisi custodia et amore*) of its parts.[67]

The appeal to the metaphor of the body, as well as the way individual acts are evaluated in relation to the health of the state, indicates that the well-being of the commonwealth is perceived as an emergent property, much like Plato's notion of the unity and *εὐδαιμονία* of the state. It is crucial to note that in this section Seneca articulates neither that benefitting others is good in itself nor that harming others is bad in itself. Both harm and benefit are considered bad and good, respectively, only in relation to the effect they have on the state: that which harms the state is bad, and that which contributes to its unity and health is good. Brad Inwood, noting that this form of reasoning is typical in Stoicism, writes that 'there is no determinate action type which is in itself right or wrong', such that deliberating how one should act in a particular situation requires 'bringing particular situations under a universal injunction and acting accordingly'.[68] Members should practise mutual love not *per* se because benefitting another is good but because of the 'universal injunction' to contribute to the harmony of the members of the unified body.

Whereas the previous passage constructs an analogy between a body and *society*, elsewhere Seneca argues that humans should practise mutual love because the *cosmos* amounts to an actual, unified body.

> This universe that you see, containing the human and the divine, is a unity (*unum est*); we are the limbs of a mighty body (*membra sumus corporis magni*). Nature brought us to birth as kin, since it generated us all from the same materials and for the same purposes, endowing us with affection for one another (*amor mutuus*) and making us companionable (*sociabilis*). Nature established fairness and justice. According to nature's dispensation, it is worse to harm than to be harmed. On the basis of nature's command, let our hands be available to help whenever necessary … Let us hold things in common (*habeamus in commune*), as we are born for the common good. Our companionship is just like an arch, which would collapse without the stones' mutual support to hold it up.[69]

Again, Seneca considers humans as subordinate members of an emergent whole, and contributing to the harmony of this whole provides the warrant for moral, loving action towards

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[67] Sen. *Ira* 2.31.7. Translations are from Kaster and Nussbaum, trans., *Anger, Mercy, Revenge*.

[68] B. Inwood, 'Rules and Reasoning in Stoic Ethics', in *Topics in Stoic Philosophy* (ed. K. Ierodiakonou; Oxford: Clarendon, 1999), 95–127, at 103, 93.

[69] Sen. *Ep. Mor.* 95.52–53. Translations of *Epistulae Morales* are from M. Graver and A.A. Long, *Letters on Ethics: To Lucilius* (trans. M. Graver and A.A. Long; The Complete Works of Lucius Annaeus Seneca; Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015).

others. Sustaining the common good, sharing with one another, and acting out love (*amor*) are all demanded by the fact that each self is only a part, a participant in a larger dynamic of the whole universal body.

Seneca deploys a similar argument in *De Clementia* to explain to Nero why emperors should be merciful to their constituents. The emperor and his people relate to one another as the mind does to the limbs of the body (*Clem.* 1.3.5). Emperors control all things in the empire: 'For he is the bond that holds the commonwealth together, he is the living breath (*spiritus vitalis*) drawn by the many, many thousands who would themselves be nothing but a dead weight, prey for the taking, absent the central authority's great intellect' (1.4.1). Thus, because the emperor holds the well-being of the empire together, when the members of the empire serve the king, they are simultaneously benefitting themselves (1.4.1). Moreover, just as the mind which controls the body is also a part of the body, so the emperor himself is a part of the empire, and for this reason, when an emperor bestows mercy upon a constituent, he also bestows mercy on himself. In Seneca's words: 'For if … you are the soul of the state and the state your body (*tu animus rei publicae tuae es*) – you see, I think, how requisite is mercy; for you are merciful to yourself when you are seemingly merciful to another (*tibi enim parcis, cum videris alteri parcere*)' (1.5.1). (The analogy between the empire and the body works on the basis of the Stoic view that the members of a body experience sympathy with one another through the spirit that conjoins them).[70] The wise emperor 'makes everything the object of his concern, watching over some things more, others less, but nurturing every element of the commonwealth as though it were part of himself (*partem tamquam sui nutrit*)' (1.13.4). Here Seneca grounds the coincidence of self- and other-relation in an ontological, emergent reality: *because* the emperor and his subjects are, as in a body, both constitutive elements of a larger,

[70] Alexander of Aphrodisias records that Chryssipus 'assumes that the whole of substance is unified (ἡνῶσθαι) by a breath (πνεῦμα) which pervades it all, and by which the universe is sustained and stabilized and made interactive [or sympathetic] with itself (συμπαθὲς … αὑτῷ) (Alexander of Aphrodisias, *De Mixtione* 216.14–16; text and translation from A.A. Long and D.N. Sedley (eds.), *The Hellenistic Philosophers* (2 vols.; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987); cf. *De Mixtione* 227.8–9 = *SVF* 2.475; Aetius 1.11.5 = *SVF* 2.340; Clem. Al. *Strom.* 5.8 = *SVF* 2.44; Gal., *De Causis Contentivis* 6.1–3 = *SVF* 2.716; Cic. *Div.* 2.33–34 = *SVF* 2.1211; *Nat. D.* 2.19; Diog. Laert. 7.140 = *SVF* 2.543). On this theme see R. Brouwer, 'Stoic Sympathy', in *Sympathy* (ed. E. Schliesser; Oxford Philosophical Concepts; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 15–35.

emergent reality of the empire, he does to himself what he does to the members of his empire. Such ontological inclusion in a larger whole not only establishes the identity of self-other relation but also the obligation to benefit others.

It is crucial to recognize that, while Seneca includes self-interest as a motivational factor in the passages discussed above, for Seneca doing good to others in these circumstances is in no way *reducible* to acting upon selfish motives.[71] In fact, in his criticisms of the Epicureans, he contrasts his own view with those who make 'virtue the instrument of pleasure' and thus 'dedicate the human being to pleasure and look to their own interests in all their words and deeds' (*Ep. Mor.* 90.35). Although his ethic very much involves the self and self-interest, unlike the Epicureans Seneca envisages other-benefit not as an instrumental means but rather as a *constitutive* means to self-benefit: it is not that benefitting another will lead to some independent achievement of self-interest, but rather that, in cases where the self is integrated into a larger reality of the state, the members of this state have common interests in such a way that other-benefit is identical to and constitutive of self-benefit (cf. *Ep. Mor.* 102.18).[72]

That Seneca is not espousing an ultimately self-interested conception of moral action is perhaps best illustrated when he recounts Posidonius' myth of the pre-civilization ideal society, which constructs a meta-contrast between ideal communitarian relationships of shared interests and immoral actions directed towards isolated self-interest. Before civilization and technology emerged, there was no private property and everyone's work was directed towards the common good (*Ep. Mor.* 90.36). As a result, everyone was 'supremely wealthy' and there was no lack in resources, no greed, no division, and no fighting. 'Things were shared in mutual harmony … Their concern for others was as great as for themselves' (90.40). But this society existed only 'when greed and self-indulgence had not yet divided human beings against one another and they had not yet learned to

[71] The reductionistic tendency to evaluate an action as ultimately 'selfish' if its motivation is even partly constituted by self-interest can be seen when Philip Esler, reading similar passage from Arius Didymus, who also speaks of the coincidence of self- and other-relation, accuses this ethic of being essentially 'self-centered' and 'self-directed' ('Paul and Stoicism: Romans 12 as a Test Case' *NTS* 50 (2004): 106–124, at 113).

[72] I take the distinction between instrumental means and constitutive means from A. Hills, *The Beloved Self: Morality and the Challenge from Egoism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 57.

abandon sociability for the sake of gain' (90.36), and the communitarian society was destroyed when 'companionship was pulled apart by greed, which impoverished even those whom it had made wealthiest; for once people opted for private ownership, they ceased to hold everything in common' (90.3; cf. 90.38). This story, which Seneca recounts positively, constructs a contrast not between selfishness and selflessness but between a society in which everyone acquired things for themselves and an ideal communitarian society in which all equally benefitted from their participation in it. In other words, Seneca constructs an antithesis between those who live with only a view to their own interests and those who live for the shared interests of people in a unified community of which they are a part.

As with Plato and Aristotle, it would be unhelpful to classify this as 'self-centered' or 'self-interested' merely because Seneca appeals to self-interest at points. While he appeals to self-interest, we must take into account the fact that such appeals assume an account of the self (and therefore its interests) as embedded within and connected to an emergent society or cosmic body. Therefore, as Runar Thorsteinsson puts it, Seneca's vision for moral behaviour is 'fundamentally community-oriented, and in it the distinction between self-interest and altruism is overcome'.[73]

2.1.4. Cicero

Cicero explains human relationships as an outworking of two fundamental tendencies given to all humans at birth by nature (*natura*): the tendency to preserve the self and the tendency to unite the self with others (*Off.* 1.11–12; cf. *Fin.* 3.16). Echoing Aristotle's argument that in friendship self-relation becomes other-relation, Cicero relays that when the impulse to unite with others 'drives him to desire that men should meet together and congregate' and thus 'unites one man to another for the fellowship both of common speech and of life', one then extends the former tendency of self-preservation outwardly to protect and care for others.[74] The argument follows the logic that goes all

[73] R.M. Thorsteinsson, *Roman Christianity and Roman Stoicism A Comparative Study of Ancient Morality* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 31.

[74] Translations from M.T. Griffin and E.M. Atkins, eds., *On Duties* (Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).

the way back to Plato, that humans are both born for social relations and therefore should consider such relations an end in itself. In Cicero's own words:

> we are not born for ourselves alone … but our country claims for itself one part of our birth, and our friends another. Moreover, as the Stoics believe, everything produced on the earth is created for the use of mankind, and men are born for the sake of men, so that they may be able to assist one another. Consequently, we ought in this to follow nature as our leader, to contribute to the common stock the things that benefit everyone together, and, by the exchange of dutiful services, by giving and receiving expertise and effort and means, to bind fast the fellowship of men with each other.[75]

As Cicero affirms that 'living according to nature' is the ethical ideal, his commitment to the naturalness of human bonding means that the creation of fellowship with other humans is a good in itself. Thus, according to Cicero, one of the four honourable things in the world is 'preserving fellowship among men' (*Off.* 1.15; cf. 1.7). This fellowship comes to expression in and as a relationship of shared interests. 'This, then, ought to be the chief end of all men, to make the interest of each individual and of the whole body politic (*universorum*) identical' (3.6). In one recounted dialogue, Antipater argues that one 'ought to be considering the interest of men and serving human fellowship … you have principles of nature which you ought to obey and to follow, to the effect that your benefit is the common benefit, and conversely, the common benefit is yours' (3.52; cf. 1.51). Honourable behaviour, Antipater insists, 'is necessary, if indeed you remember that men are bound together in fellowship by nature' (3.53). Like Seneca, this positions moral behaviour as a good only insofar as it contributes to the *telos* of human fellowship. In a similar vein, he writes,

> For when men have similar pursuits and inclinations, it comes about that each one is as much delighted with the other as he is with himself; the result is what Pythagoras wanted in friendship, that several be united into one. Important also are the common bonds that are created by kindnesses reciprocally given and received, which, provided that they are mutual and gratefully received, bind together those concerned in an unshakeable fellowship.[76]

It is striking that shared interests and mutual reciprocity are encouraged as the particular outworking to the more fundamental and universal commitment to the ideal that 'several be united into one' in an 'unshakeable fellowship'. Elsewhere, Cicero also evaluates the moral worth of individual acts in relation to this ideal when he argues that stealing from others for one's own gain

[75] Cic. *Off.* 1.22.
[76] Cic. *Off.* 1.56.

is not bad because it is selfish but rather because 'it destroys the common life and fellowship of men' (3.21). As we saw with the other authors, Cicero appeals to the metaphor of the body and says that stealing for one's own advantage is like if 'each limb were disposed to think that it would be able to grow strong by taking over to itself its neighbour's strength; necessarily the whole body would weaken and die' (3.21). The reason stealing is bad is not because it is bad in itself but because it jeopardises the health of the body, of which the self is a member.

At many points Cicero sounds as if he places virtue in contrast to self-interest. 'The man who defines the highest good in such a way that it has no connection with virtue, measuring it by his own advantage rather than by honourableness, cannot … cultivate either friendship or justice or liberality' (*Off.* 1.5). But Cicero does not hold a proto-Kantian view that self-interest must be entirely disregarded when considering what is virtuous. Indeed, Cicero is not willing to admit that what conflicts with the honourable is in fact beneficial – it is only 'apparently beneficial' (1.9; cf. 3.67). A closer look at Cicero's statements will demonstrate that the target of his critique is not acting with a view to self-interest but seeking one's own interests at the expense of the interests of the state. Cicero praises those who 'fix their gaze so firmly on what is beneficial to the citizens that whatever they do, they do with that in mind, forgetful of their own advantage'; yet his alternative encouragement is: 'let them care for the whole body of the republic, rather than protect one part and neglect the rest' (1.85). Thus, the virtuous man 'will devote himself entirely to the republic, pursuing neither wealth nor power, and will protect the whole in such a way that the interest of none is disregarded' (1.86). Even the virtuous action of dying for state is understood as virtuous not because it demonstrates a disregard for one's interests but because it expresses how much one has aligned one's own interests with that of the state: 'our country has on its own embraced all the affections of all of us. What good man would hesitate to face death on her behalf, if it would do her a service?' (1.57; cf. 1.154). Cicero places this in contrast with those who have 'savaged their country' with crime and have been 'engaged in destroying her utterly' (1.57). In both cases, moral actions are evaluated by whether they contribute to or jeopardize the interests of the state.

As with the previous authors, Cicero believes that selves are embedded and connected to others, both socially (in a state) and ontologically (as members of the cosmic body). The fact that selves are connected within larger wholes establishes the basis for beneficent actions towards others, which Cicero considers as a good only because they contribute to the higher good of sustaining harmony between members of the state or cosmos.

2.1.5. The Connected Self and the *Telos* of Fellowship

We can point out two kinds of ethical points made by the authors above. First, human beings are naturally social and therefore it is a good in itself to establish fellowship or friendship with others. Second, once people stand in that kind of relationship, prosocial actions such as caring for others, aligning interests between multiple parties, empathy, and mutuality are all understood as goods because they contribute to and sustain this unity between others. We could call the former the *initiation* argument and the latter the *reinforcement* argument. For example, Plato's argument that human beings are not sufficient and therefore they should enter into society is an initiation argument, but Cicero's point that human beings are already a part of a universal body and therefore should love one another aligns with the reinforcement argument. In both of these arguments, *loving behaviour is portrayed as a subordinate means to achieving unity and fellowship as an end in itself.*

Both the initiation and reinforcement arguments rely on some kind of concept of emergence, whether it was the city, the cosmic body, or friendship. Some emergent entity encompasses the relationships between various people. Every author we looked at understood this in terms of a 'body', which was produced by the many members but not reducible to them. Crucially, such an emergent entity was only produced because the self could be connected in one way or another to other selves. For Cicero and Seneca, this connection is more explicitly 'material', initially given by nature, since all humans are naturally connected in a cosmic body from birth. Aristotle and Plato, however, espoused a kind of social ontology in which people were connected *like* the members of the body. In either case, various selves were portrayed as connected, extended, and overlapping in one way or another, and this connection came to expression in certain behaviours such as sharing,

giving to others, emotional solidarity, and acting upon common interests, in such way that prosocial behaviour could be reduced neither to being motivated by self-interest nor to seeking only other-regard. Prosocial behaviour, for these authors, was irreducibly oriented towards the benefit of those who participated in the emergent whole.

2.2. Paul: Constructing and Reinforcing a 'We'

The above review of material from Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, and Seneca is not meant to set forth the 'sources' from which Paul derived his ethical views. Rather, it functions to show that there was, for many centuries throughout the Mediterranean world, a view of ethics according to which prosocial behaviour is conceived as oriented towards the *telos* of establishing and benefitting an emergent whole, within which the self must be understood as a part. As many studies have suggested that Paul's thought should be approached with reference to Hellenistic and Roman philosophy, we should consider the possibility that Paul's letters might exhibit a particular instantiation of this view of prosocial behaviour.[77] I hope to raise this suggestion this in two parts: first, I look at whether Paul, as some of the studies we saw above argued, actually denounces self-interest in an unqualified sense; second, I elucidate points of continuity between Paul's statements about self-other relation and the authors we reviewed above.

2.2.1. Does Paul Prohibit Self-Interest?

As we saw in §1.1 above, interpreters sometimes appeal to certain statements in his letters to establish that Paul idealises believers' prosocial actions as operating independently from, or even negatively towards, the interests of the self and positively towards the interests of others. There are a

[77] See for example Engberg-Pederson, *Paul and the Stoics*; Thorsteinsson, *Roman Christianity*. While C. Kavin Rowe might accuse this mode of scholarship as 'encyclopaedic inquiry' which insufficiently considers Paul and others as distinctively 'lived traditions' in the Roman world (*One True Life: The Stoics and Early Christians as Rival Traditions* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2016), 176–179), my hope is that considering how Paul participates in an ancient discourse about prosocial behaviour and how that ideal was lost in modernity will actually have its merits for understanding Paul.

number of texts from the Pauline corpus which could support this, mostly from 1 Corinthians: 'love … does not seek its own things (*τὰ ἑαυτῆς*)' (1 Cor 13.5); 'Let no one seek their own interests (*τὸ ἑαυτοῦ*), but the interests of the other (*τὸ τοῦ ἑτέρου*)' (10.24); 'I try to please everyone in every way, not seeking my own advantage (*τὸ ἐμαυτοῦ σύμφορον*), but the advantage of the other (*ἀλλὰ τὸ τῶν πολλῶν*) in order that they might be preserved' (10.33). Finally, in Philippians Paul tells the congregation to 'not seek your own interests, but even the interests of others (*μὴ τὰ ἑαυτῶν ἕκαστος σκοποῦντες ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ ἑτέρων ἕκαστοι*)' (2.4). As we saw, Oda Wischmeyer took these statements as indicating a fundamental *deviation* from the Greco-Roman philosophical tradition. What is entirely missing in her argument, however, is any acknowledgement of the fact that some Greek and Roman philosophers did, in fact, make similar pronouncements against self-interest, but they did not intend by these statements to denounce any and all forms of self-interest. It will be helpful here in this connection to juxtapose Paul with Aristotle's discussion of self-love. In his *Politics*, Aristotle writes,

> For it is not pointless that each self has love for itself (*πρὸς αὑτὸν αὐτὸς ἔχει φιλίαν ἕκαστος*), but rather this is natural (*φυσικόν*). But being a self-lover (*φίλαυτος*) is rightly blamed. This does not mean to love oneself (*οὐκ ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο τὸ φιλεῖν ἑαυτόν*), but rather loving oneself more than what is necessary (*ἀλλὰ τὸ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ φιλεῖν*).[78]

However, in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle brings more nuance to this point:

> Those who treat it [*φίλαυτος*] as a term of rebuke call those who apportion to themselves the majority of money, honours, and passions as *φίλαυτοι*. For most grasp after these things and are concerned for these things as the greatest goods; for this reason people fight for these things. Those who seek too much of these things gratify their passions and their feelings in general, as well as the non-rational aspect of their soul. But most people are like this, and for this reason this appellation has arisen from that which is very bad. It is indeed right that self-lovers are rebuked (*δικαίως δὴ τοῖς οὕτω φιλαύτοις ὀνειδίζεται*). It is evident that most people are accustomed to identifying those who apportion such things to themselves as *φίλαυτοι*.[79]

Aristotle goes on to suggest that if one is truly *φίλαυτος*, he will in fact act according to virtue. But what is important here is that the derogatory sense of 'self-lover (*φίλαυτος*)', at least as apparently employed by the masses, is not exactly the semantic sum of its lexical parts, *φιλεῖν* and *ἑαυτόν*. Whereas 'loving oneself (*φιλεῖν ἑαυτόν*)' refers to a *de facto* reality which is neither

[78] Arist. *Pol.* II 5, 1263a41–1263b3 (my translation).
[79] Arist. *Eth. Nic.* IX 8, 1168b15–25 (my translation); cf. IX 7, 1168a7–8.

inherently negative nor morally reprehensible, being a self-lover (*φίλαυτος*), at least by popular definition, is a kind of love of self which has turned excessive through greed, gluttony, and avarice.[80] The nuance here is instructive: just as Aristotle's negative evaluation of being a self-lover is not a condemnation of all love of self as such, Paul's prohibitions against self-interest in 1 Corinthians might not necessarily condemn any all actions which are self-directed. We should not be too quick to read his apparent denunciations of self-interest as unequivocal and absolute.

If Paul permits self-interest, or if we find him acting in his own interests in a way that portrayed as morally exemplary, then we should not conclude from these contrastive statements in 1 Corinthians and Philippians that self-love diminishes other-love or that other-love must eradicate and exclude all self-interest. In fact, we can see a hint of Paul seeking his own interests in 1 Corinthians itself. In a passage that seems to describe his entirely selfless commitment to others, Paul writes of how he has made himself 'a slave to all' and thus becomes 'all things to all people', even if that means becoming weak to the weak, so that he might win some of them (9.19–22). He does this, he says, 'for the sake of the gospel', but he curiously adds 'so that I might be a co-sharer of it (*ἵνα συγκοινωνὸς αὐτοῦ γένωμαι*)' (9.24). This kind of statement aligns with what we have seen above; the prosocial action of being a slave to all and preaching the gospel to all sorts of people is intended to bring Paul and others to be equal participants in the benefits of the gospel. This intimates that the rejections of self-interest in 1 Corinthians and Philippians deserve some qualification.

Given this text, it is highly suspect then that an account of love which defines it as the complete sacrifice of self-interest will sufficiently account for the evidence of Paul's letters. It seems best, then, to read the injunctions against self-interest as prohibitions against seeking excessive gain for the self *to the exclusion of caring for others*.[81] This is, in light of the previous section, not surprising. Plato

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[80] Similarly, Plutarch notes that 'For the man who is spoken of with opprobrium as a lover of flatterers is in high degree a lover of self (*σφόρδα φίλαυτός ἐστι*), he desires and conceives himself to be endowed with all manner of good qualities, but although the desire for these is not unnatural (*οὐκ ἄτοπος*), the conceit that one possesses them is dangerous and must be avoided' (*Mor.* 49A).

[81] It is unclear whether Paul thinks that self-love is natural or thinks that self-love must be cultivated. Dio Chrysostom seems to allow for the possibility that some might not love themselves: 'Or how could a person love me

bemoans the practice of selfishness (*Leg.* 731d–e), but he thinks that it is ideal for people to seek their own *εὐδαιμονία* when conceived of in relation to the entire state; Seneca contrasts the emergence of greed, private interests, and the establishment of private property with a communitarian state, in which everyone's needs were satisfied; Cicero argues that what is wrong with the selfish person is not that he fails to care for others *per se* but that such a person 'betrays the common advantage or security for the sake of his own advantage or security' (*Fin.* 3.19). Similarly, in 1 Corinthians and Philippians Paul contrasts a mode of self-regard which *competes* against other-regard; but this leaves open the possibility that there is a mode of self-regard which *cooperates* with other-regard.

2.2.2. The Body, the Self, and Shared Interests

Paul appears to share the view of other Greco-Roman philosophers that the self and its interests should be defined in relation to an emergent whole. This is perhaps nowhere clearer than when he deploys metaphors of the body to explain believers' relationship with Christ and with one another (1 Cor 12.1–31). At the outset of this section, Paul claims that 'to each the manifestation of the *πνεῦμα* is given for what is advantageous (*τὸ συμφέρον*)' (12.17). We should be wary of hastily translating *τὸ συμφέρον* as 'the common good' (as in e.g. the NRSV) here, not only because the word does not explicitly encode that notion (usually another modifier is required for it to mean something that specific, as with Aristotle's phrase *τὸ κοινῇ συμφέρον* in *Pol.* III 6, 1279a17), but also because this translation would put the cart before the horse in Paul's argument.[82] Paul leaves the precise content of *τὸ συμφέρον* ambiguous at first, only to then signal through the metaphor of the body that *τὸ συμφέρον* is the property not of individuals, whether self or other, but of the body.

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who does not love even himself (*ἢ πῶς ἂν ἐμὲ ἀγαπήσειεν ὁ μηδ' αὑτὸν ἀγαπῶν*)?' (D.Chr. 74.5 (Cohoon, LCL)). Although Aristotle thinks self-love is natural, he expresses a similar sentiment to Dio Chrysostom when he writes 'If, knowing and loving their own interests, they do not always attend to them, may they not be equally negligent of the interests of the public?' (Arist. *Pol.* V 9, 1309b912–14). The notion that self-love was good and natural was popular in Greco-Roman Philosophy (see e.g. Ps.-Arist. *M.M.* 2.14; Men. *Sent.* 560; Sen. *Ben.* 4.17.1; Cic. *Fin.* 3.18.59; Diog Laer. 7.85 (= *SVF* 3.178); Hierocles, *Elements of Ethics* 9.3.

[82] M.V. Lee, *Paul, the Stoics, and the Body of Christ* (SNTSMS 137; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 117–125.

So he goes on to claim that the people constitute the 'many members' of Christ's body, and as such they naturally stand in a relationship of mutual dependence and shared interests. 'God has so arranged the body', that 'the members may have the same care for one another. If one member suffers, all suffer together with it; if one member is honored, all rejoice together with it' (12.25–26). (The similarity to Plato's analogy is unable to miss here). As Lee rightly notes, 'Paul does not argue from the concept of the common good as much as teach the Corinthians to value the common good … The point of ch. 12 is to show the Corinthians how to evaluate what is beneficial to them, which Paul then defines as corporate, that is, related to their membership in the body of Christ'.[83]

The body here is clearly an emergent entity, and the latent specification of *τὸ συμφέρον* is meant to signal that it is the property of the body, and therefore that the manifestations of the *πνεῦμα* are oriented towards that reality. The argument is reminiscent of both Socrates, who held that it is good for individuals to actualise their *εὐδαιμονία* but then argued later that one's *εὐδαιμονία* must be understood in relation to that of the state (*Resp.* 420b5–8), as well as Aristotle, who held that people should act in *ἀρετή* but then specifies that one's *ἀρετή* must take its bearings from that of the whole (*Pol.* I 13, 1260b14–15). The more crucial edge of this insight, however, is that the moral injunctions to care for others must be understood as specific explanations of how each should contribute to the advantage of the ideal unified whole (12.25). In the material that follows, Paul argues that each member must honour and respect the function of the other members. The meditation on love in 1 Corinthians 13 – including the comment that love 'does not seek its own' (13.5) – will be deeply misunderstood if read in isolation from the metaphor of the body, which indicates not that one must sacrifice one's own interests but rather that one should seek that which benefits the whole body, including self and other. As we saw, Seneca and Cicero could speak of prosocial actions as good only insofar as they benefit the whole body. Similarly, as Lee again notes, the material in 1 Corinthians 13–14, which explains the content of love and outlines how those with different gifts should relate to one another in loving relationship, fills out the ethical

[83] Lee, *Paul the Stoics, and the Body of Christ,* 120.

'precepts' which are derived from the 'principle' that the members of the body stand in a relationship of shared interests and should therefore aim at benefitting the whole body.[84]

We can point out two other instances where this kind of relationship emerges. In his letter to Philemon, Paul encourages Philemon 'on the basis of love (διὰ τὴν ἀγάπην μᾶλλον)' to receive Onesimus back (Philem 9). Paul describes Onesimus in rather strikingly intimate language, identifying him as 'my very own child (τὸ ἐμοῦ τέκνον)' and even 'my own heart (τὰ ἐμὰ σπλάγχνα)' (10, 12). (The kinship language here is reminiscent of Aristotle's argument above that children are 'other selves' to their parents). By identifying himself as somehow deeply connected to Onesimus, he then appeals to his own relationship with Philemon: 'So if you consider me a partner (κοινωνός), take him in as if he were me (ὡς ἐμέ). If he has wronged you in some way or owes you something, charge this to me' (18-19). But this request to do good for Philemon is then suddenly turned into a request to benefit Paul: 'Refresh my heart (μου τὰ σπλάγχνα) in the messiah' (20). The use of τὰ σπλάγχνα is certainly intentional here, as it draws upon the identification of Onesimus as his own τὰ σπλάγχνα. If Philemon is indeed Paul's partner, then he should be ready and willing to refresh his 'heart'; but since Paul identifies *Onesimus* as in some way embodying his 'heart', to benefit Paul requires Philemon to benefit Onesimus. It is evident that Paul's deep connection with Onesimus establishes a relationship of shared interests, such that what brings good to Onesimus also brings good to Paul. And on this basis, Paul connects the relational dots and encourages Philemon, if he feels connected to Paul, to welcome Onesimus and in this way to bring benefit to Paul. In the end, this will work out for the benefit of Philemon himself, since Onesimus has become 'useful (εὔχρηστον)' to both Philemon and Paul (11).

This configuration of relationships is evident in Philippians. At the outset of the letter Paul lists numerous ways in which he is intimately connected with the Philippian assembly. Paul 'rejoices' at 'the fellowship they have in the good news (ἐπὶ τῇ κοινωνίᾳ ὑμῶν εἰς τὸ εὐαγγέλιον)' (Phil 1.5).

[84] Lee, *Paul, the Stoics, and the Body of Christ*; Thorsteinsson makes a similar comment about Romans: 'In Romans 14.1–15.14 Paul lists some of the principal ways in which the letter's recipients can and should actualize the community-oriented ethic of Christ-believers and their "love" of one another' (*Roman Christianity*, 100).

This joy is then correlated with how the Philippians hold Paul in their heart (*τὸ ἔχειν με ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ ὑμᾶς*) and they are 'co-sharers' with him in grace (*συγκοινωνοί μου τῆς χάριτος πάντες ὑμεῖς*) (1.7). The language of fellowship, co-sharing, and being 'in' another's heart all point to some kind of relationship in which Paul and the Philippians share in a unique social unity. Echoing the language of Philemon, Paul claims that he yearns for them even 'with the affection of messiah Jesus (*ἐν σπλάγχνοις Χριστοῦ Ἰησοῦ*)' (1.8).

Given such a connection, we should not be surprised that Paul sees his own well-being as somehow wrapped up with the well-being of the Philippians. At the outset of Philippians 2, Paul commands the Philippians to 'fill up my joy (*πληρώσατέ μου τὴν χαράν*)' (2.2). Isolated from its context, we could expect this command to introduce a straightforward request that they serve Paul's interest ('complete my joy by doing *p* for me'), but the curious element of this command is that what follows is the encouragement for the Philippians to 'be of the same mind, having the same love, being in full accord and of one mind' (2.2). In other words, Paul commands them to make him happy by encouraging them to be committed to their *own* flourishing as a group. Paul encourages them to satisfy his interests by seeking their own corporate interests.

We should pause here and consider a few things about these texts. First, in all of these texts the connection between self and other is christologically grounded. The body within which the Corinthians stand as members is 'the body of Christ', and these members are woven together by the Spirit of Christ (1 Cor 12.27, 13). The connection between Philemon and Paul is identified as *ἡ κοινωνία τῆς πίστεως* (Philem 6), and by welcoming Onesimus he will refresh his heart *ἐν Χριστῷ* (20). Paul's connection with the Philippians is based on their 'partnership in the grace' (Phil 1.7). We might say that, for Paul, Jesus replaces the function that Stoics would ascribe to nature in connecting people together.

Second, Paul indicates that the self can be in some ways deeply connected to others. In his treatment of the self in Greek and Roman philosophy, Christopher Gill argues that the ancient Greeks and Romans thought of the self as 'participatory', as open to the influences of the external

world and deeply connected with its surroundings.[85] This is as true for the authors whom we reviewed above as it is for Paul. As Seneca and Cicero imagined the cosmos as a body in which all are members, Paul argues that believers participate in an emergent reality of the body of Christ, and just as Aristotle can speak of having 'other selves', Paul can be connected to others so as to call another his own heart.

Lastly, as we saw with the Greek and Roman philosophers, Paul's depiction of prosocial behaviour is ultimate neither egoistic nor altruistic. He feels free to say that he performs actions so that they will result in his own benefit; he feels free to tell believers at Corinth to benefit others because their benefit is wrapped up in the well-being of others; he feels free to ask the Philippians to make him happy; he feels free to ask Philemon to refresh his heart. *All of these statements make some kind of appeal to self-interest*. And even though he can tell people not to seek their own interests, this is probably not some kind of absolute and unqualified restriction. At the same time, just as Plato argued that we must understand the happiness of the citizens only in relation to the happiness of the city, Paul understands his interests and the interests of believers in relation to those with whom they are connected: he labours for the gospel to be a *co*-sharer; to make Paul happy, the Philippians should increase their unity; to refresh his heart, Philemon must welcome Onesimus. Even in this cursory review, the trope that Greek and Roman ethics are ultimately egoistic and that Christian theories deviated from this by espousing a form of selflessness stands on questionable ground. The few lines of evidence adduced here suggests that Paul idealises moral behaviour which contributes to a relationship in which people are so connected that what is 'good' is defined only with reference to that relationship.

2.3. Modernity, Reductionism, and the Triumph of Isolated Interests

[85] C. Gill, *The Structured Self in Hellenistic and Roman Thought* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006) throughout. A similar thesis has been argued about Paul in D.B. Martin, *The Corinthian Body* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995); Engberg-Pederson, *Paul and the Stoics*; Pederson, *Cosmology and the Self in the Apostle Paul: The Material Pneuma* (Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2010); S.G. Eastman, *Paul and the Person: Reframing Paul's Anthropology* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2017).

It is far too simple to counter an opposing interpretation by accusing it of stemming from an Enlightenment context. Despite some emphatic continuities amongst the wide variety of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century thinkers scattered across Britain and continental Europe, the intellectual content of the Enlightenment remains vastly diverse, with numerous distinct and even contradictory threads which are unable to be helpfully captured by a single noun. 'The' Enlightenment is better conceived of as a time period rather than a unified ideological movement, and therefore a critique stating that a deficient or mistaken interpretation of Paul stems from 'the enlightenment' requires explaining *which* threads of the Enlightenment are woven into such interpretations and *how* these threads have affected and distorted our reading of ancient texts.[86]

The debate relevant here was initiated by the work of Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679). Hobbes rejected the notion that every human is sociable by nature, contending instead that human beings are essentially competitive against one another. Hobbes suggests that the most effective way of achieving self-preservation is to construct a commonwealth in which people agree not to harm one another.[87] Thus, we only desire society as a means to self-preservation.[88] Whereas for Aristotle, society is 'prior' to the individual and therefore the satisfaction of individual need is oriented towards the *telos* of creating a society, for Hobbes humans begin as fundamentally isolated creatures in the state of nature, and only secondarily enter into society as an instrumental means to achieve self-preservation. It is important to recognise, however, that Hobbes, by explaining human behaviour in terms of self-interest, attempted to give morality a firm foundation. Entering into and participating in the commonwealth is a moral obligation because it is the way to establish peace

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[86] So J.B. Schneewind points out that it is misleading 'to think in terms of a single movement of Enlightenment or *Aufklärung* or *Lumières,* still less of anything that might be called a single project involving all those who claim to be enlightened' (*The Invention of Autonomy: A History of Modern Moral Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 8).

[87] Hobbes, *Leviathan* [*Lev.* hereafter] (ed. R. Tuck; Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996) 1.13.

[88] Hobbes, *On the Citizen* [*Civ.* hereafter] (ed. R. Tuck and M. Silverthorne; Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997) 1.2. Hobbes' interpretation of human nature participated in and partially inaugurated what Albert Hirschman calls the 'reductionist enterprise' of interpreting, 'sometimes to the point of tautology', all of action in terms of self-interest (*The Passions and the Interests: Political Arguments for Capitalism before its Triumph* (Princeton; Princeton University Press, 1977), 42; cf. P. Force, *Self-Interest before Adam Smith: A Genealogy of Economic Science* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 7–47.

between otherwise naturally competitive humans and thus stands as the most effective means to self-preservation.[89]

Yet many would not accept this construal of morality. The reduction of morality to self-preservation implied, to some ethicists, the eradication of morality altogether: morality without a *telos* beyond pleasure and self-preservation is no morality at all. One key assumption in the debates after Hobbes was that, in order to prove the possibility of humans performing moral actions, one must prove that humans can perform non-self-interested actions. As Christian Maurer notes,

> the selfish hypothesis [that all human actions are ultimately self-interested] and questions of sociability are closely tied to the questions of whether human beings are capable of performing morally virtuous actions, and whether human nature is morally good or evil. This puts the debates on the selfish hypothesis in a wider context. If morality is conceived as depending on some kind of disinterested motivation, rather than on other features such as an action's accordance with some law or its consequences, then the truth of the selfish hypothesis entails that there are no morally virtuous actions at all.[90]

Amélie Oksenberg Rorty sets forth a similar thesis:

> While Hobbes himself thought that there was no conflict between egoistic prudence and morality … his successors thought the primary moral problem was that of locating an independent set of altruistic motives that could counterbalance the standard-issue equipment of ego-directed desires that he charted.[91]

Thus, many authors took Hobbes' conception of morality (as reducible to self-interest) as undermining moral realism, but they reacted by positing an identity between the moral actions and the complete exclusion of self-interest.[92] Thus, while Ryan Patrick Hanley cautions us that we should be 'skeptical of certain hyperbolic assertions that wish to find everything in the Enlightenment', he claims that that numerous Enlightenment thinkers 'deserve credit for inaugurating a genuine revolution of thinking about love – a revolution that both marked a decisive

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[89] Hobbes, *Civ.* 1.7–8.

[90] C. Maurer, 'Self-Interest and Sociability', in *The Oxford Handbook of British Philosophy in the Eighteenth Century* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 291–314, at 293.

[91] A.O. Rorty, *Mind in Action: Essays in the Philosophy of Mind* (Boston: Beacon, 1988), 277. Michael Gill traces this more as a reaction to Calvinist anthropology rather than Hobbes (*The British Moralists on Human Nature and the Birth of Secular Ethics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 7–11.

[92] For example B. Mandeville, 'Search into the Nature of Society', in *The Fable of the Bees: or, Private Vices, Publick Benefits* (2 vols.; ed. F.B. Kaye), 1.323–369; Mandeville, 'An Enquiry into the Origin of Moral Virtue', in *Fable,* 1.41–57. H.A. Forbes. *Essays Moral and Philosophical, on Several Subjects* (London, 1734), 231. H. More, *An Essay on Disinterested Love: In a Letter to Bishop Stillingfleet* (Glasgow: Foulis Press, 1756), 3. One could also see this play out in Kant's insistence that either one treats another as a means to self-interest or as an end without any view to self-interest. I. Kant, *Werke: Akademie Textausgabe* (9 vols; Berlin: de Gruyter, 1968), 4.428; cf. 5.130–131.

break with traditional conceptions and also laid a foundation for our contemporary understanding of other-directedness'.[93] In his analysis, it is only 'after the enlightenment' that 'love of others came to be conceived … as the occupation of a proper point on a flat continuum defined by the two poles of love of self and love of others'.[94]

Stefan Collini traces the effect that the notion of disinterested love (or what became known as 'altruism') had on moral discourse in Victorian Britain.[95] Moral behaviour, Collini argues, became increasingly defined in terms of its motivation, and the Victorians evaluated all actions in terms of two 'moral possibilities':

> The Victorians generally did not see a difference between seeking interests of the self in a way that harms others and seeking interests of the self while taking into account the good of others. In the first case, the distinction I am referring to is between, on the one hand, an action which, in benefiting the agent, also harm, or neglect an obligation towards, others (what we would now tend to call 'selfishness', strictly speaking), and on the other, actions which simply have one's own interests as their end. In the second case, the corresponding distinction is between positively directing out actions so that they benefit others rather than ourselves (the common usage of 'altruism' today) and simply taking the interests of others into account when framing our actions I am suggesting, in other words, that Victorian moralists tended to assimilate the second of each of these two senses to the first, and then to see the polarity between them as exhaustive of the moral possibilities.[96]

This way of morally evaluating actions is a form of what Margaret Gilbert calls 'strong analytic individualism', in which human action and relationships are 'analysable without remainder in terms of concepts other than collectivity concepts, in particular, in terms of the concept of an individual person'.[97] In the Hellenistic and Roman authors we saw above, they were able think of moral actions with respect to 'collectivity concepts', whether it be the happiness of the city, the common good, or the health of the social or cosmic body, but what was lost in the ethical debates after Hobbes was the possibility that people actually might have shared interests. As Dixon notes, 'altruism was from

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[93] Ryan Patrick Hanley, *Love's Enlightenment: Rethinking Charity in Modernity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2017), 14.

[94] Hanley, *Love's Enlightenment*, 17. Alasdair Macintyre sets forth the similar thesis (*After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory* (3d ed.; Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2007), 228–229).

[95] S. Collini, 'The Culture of Altruism: Selfishness and the Decay of Motive', in *Public Moralists: Political thought and Intellectual Life in Britain 1850–1930* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 60–90. On the coining of the term 'altruism' and its introduction into English in Britain, see T. Dixon, *The Invention of Altruism: Making Moral Meanings in Victorian Britain* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008), 41-89.

[96] Collini, 'Culture of Altruism', 66; cf. 61-62.

[97] Gilbert, *On Social Facts*, 435. On the relationship between methodological individualism and ontological individualism, see L. Udehn, *Methodological Individualism: Background, History, and Meaning* (London: Routledge, 2001), 125, 312, 348–349.

the outset, and continues to be, a word that draws its primary significance from the distinction between the interests of and of others. To the extent that this is a problematic distinction, "altruism" has been a problematic word'.[98] This insistence that interests are fundamentally isolated seems to draw upon a particular notion of the person. As Colin Grant notes,

> The development that is most responsible for the notion of altruism is the emergence of self-consciousness …. [T]he foundational assumption that shaped the modern west isolated individuals as entities in themselves, in contrast to a more communal outlook that had been taken for granted in the past …. People used to take for granted that they were bound up together in various ways; increasingly through the modern period, we have come to assume that we exist in isolation, and far from being connected with others, they are more apt to be seen as competitors for the goods, possibilities, or recognition we seek for ourselves. Altruism emerges and makes sense only in the latter context.[99]

One effect of this idealization of altruism was that ancient systems of thought – including Christianity – began to be interpreted on one side of the egoism/altruism divide.[100] Many considered Christianity to be fundamentally selfish and egoistic because it offers eschatological rewards to those who do good and punishments for those who do bad; others reacted against this accusation and argued that Christianity did, in fact, support the ideal of disinterested, altruistic morality.[101] Thomas Dixon describes these new interpretations as engaging in a 'process of reconstructing Christianity under the influence of altruistic social and secular movements' which ultimately resulted in 'the reduction of Christianity to morality and the identification of the latter with self-sacrifice'.[102] What should be highlighted here is that this discourse constituted a *reconstruction*. Even though, as we saw, Paul contrasts self-interest and other-regard at points he did not mean, as many after Hobbes took him to mean, that ideal behaviour must totally eradicate all self-interest in favour of altruism. The reinterpretation of Christian texts as espousing a form of altruism were generated less from the Pauline texts and more from the European moral revolutions which took place after Hobbes. In light of this historical analysis, we should recognise that modern interpretations of Paul asserting that the death of Christ and Paul's love-ethic express the ideal of a

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[98] Dixon, *Invention of Altruism*, 362.

[99] C. Grant, *Altruism and Christian Ethics* (New Studies in Christian Ethics 18; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 88.

[100] See the comments on these interpretative moves in Maurer, *Self-Love*, 14.

[101] For examples see Dixon, *Invention of Altruism*, 90–128.

[102] Dixon, *Invention of Altruism*, 127.

'disinterested', 'self-sacrificial', or 'selfless' love – or any kind of love that consists in a complete disregard for the self and sheer regard for the other – are in danger of distorting Paul's texts because these interpretations could tacitly flow from a particular stand of modern ethics which rejected precisely the ethical tradition in which Paul stood.[103]

2.4. The Path Ahead

The purpose of this chapter was to demonstrate that Paul's view of prosocial behaviour aligns with other ancient thinkers who consider ideal prosocial behaviour to e neither ultimately self-interested nor other-regarding, but oriented towards constructing or reinforcing fellowship and connections between people. Moreover, Interpretations that catalogue Paul as a proponent of 'altruism', 'selflessness' or 'self-sacrifice' might draw more upon the momentum of modern ethical debates rather than a careful and historically situated reading of the Pauline texts. Regardless of the precise definition of these terms, this self-subtraction language remains ambiguous and dangerously imprecise. Defining love with this negative terminology either generally perpetuates or fails to rule out configuring love within a zero-sum, antithetical economy in which benefit to another is enacted only by renouncing any and all self-interest, or even denigrating, diminishing, or eradicating the self. What this conclusion calls for, I suggest, is a close rereading of some key Pauline texts, being careful, in light of our modern context, not to *over*-emphasise the distinction between self-interest and other-regard and staying attentive to themes such as relationship, the connection between selves, and the possibility of relationships of shared interests. The rest of this thesis turns to Galatians to accomplish just that.

It will be helpful to remind my readers about the path ahead. In my reading of Paul above, I did not treat any his statements about or depictions of the love of the messiah. The next two chapters remedy that by turning to Paul's depiction of the Christ-event in Galatians. Chapter three provides

[103] To be sure, I am not suggesting that there are no traces of the contrast between self-interest and other-regard before Hobbes. But I am suggesting that this *absolute* antithesis which came to expression after Hobbes was something not native to the thinking patterns of Greco-Roman philosophers.

a focused linguistic and theological study of the phrase 'gave himself' in Galatians 1.4 and 2.20 in light of other authors' discourse on self-gifts. This will provide an alternative to and critique of studies which assume that the phrase indicates *only* the self-sacrificial character of Christ's death. Chapter four looks at Paul's statements about the Christ-event and its effects on human behaviour. Much like how the construction of a relationship in the city was an end in itself for the authors above, Paul conveys the construction of a mutual fellowship as the *telos* of Jesus' act of love. In chapter five, I look at how this reading of the Christ-event helps us to understand Paul's ethics; I will provide a reading of Paul's love-ethic in Galatians without thematizing self-subtraction concepts and instead highlighting how Paul encourages the Galatians to stand in a relationship of shared interests.

CHAPTER THREE

The Self-Gift of a Crucified Christ

Immo quantus deus est qui dat deum?[104]

Paul's brief yet emphatic announcement that the Son of God 'loved me and gave himself for me' grants Jesus the lead role in the drama of redemption (Gal 2.20; cf. 1.4). While he can equally characterize the Christ-event as the act of God the Father (Rom 8.32), this mode of framing the gospel, which stresses Jesus himself as the agent of salvation, recurs throughout Paul's letters: the messiah voluntarily 'became poor' (2 Cor 8.9), 'did not please himself' (Rom 15.3), and 'humbled himself' to become 'obedient unto death' (Phil 2.8). Paul further signifies his redemptive obedience in a climactic register with the compressed expression 'the one act of righteousness (ἓν δικαίωμα)' (Rom 5.18). This singular redemptive act, however, also constitutes the acme of divine gift-giving: Paul designates Jesus' voluntary impoverishment 'the gift (χάρις) of our Lord Jesus messiah' (2 Cor 8.9), substitutes 'the one act of righteousness' with the nouns χάρισμα and δωρεά (Rom 5.15), and celebrates Jesus' self-giving as the act of divine beneficence par excellence, ἡ χάρις τοῦ θεοῦ (Gal 2.21). These references to his soteriological agency, when coupled with the language of gift, suggest a christocentric refocusing of divine beneficence: Jesus *is* the gift. To press deeper into this equation, this chapter argues that, by employing the phrase 'gave himself' in Galatians 1.4 (διδόναι ἑαυτόν) and 2.20 (παραδιδόναι ἑαυτόν), Paul depicts the Christ-event as a *self-gift* – an act of beneficence in which a single person is simultaneously both gift and giver.

In chapter one, I noted how some Pauline interpreters have insisted that the death of Jesus is loving precisely because in this act he demonstrates a complete disregard for self and total commitment to the other. The standard terminology invoked to capture this interpretation often includes what I termed

[104] Augustine, *Trin.* 15.46.

'self-subtraction' language, such as 'selflessness', 'self-sacrifice', 'self-renunciation', etc.. Many Pauline scholars find particular support for this interpretation of Jesus' love in Paul's language of self-giving in Galatians 1.4 and 2.20.[105] The nearly ubiquitous assumption that the phrases *διδόναι ἑαυτόν* in Galatians 1.4 and *παραδιδόναι ἑαυτόν* in Galatians 2.20 indicate the self-sacrificial character of Jesus' death forms the impetus for the present chapter. In opposition to these accounts, I argue that the language of self-giving is more complex than is regularly imagined: while 'gave himself' in Galatians 1.4 and 2.20 includes a reference to Christ's death, it also simultaneously refers to Jesus giving himself as gift. Though numerous Pauline scholars might readily agree with this analysis, the theological implications of this reading have yet to be teased out – in part, I think, because the notion of a self-gift in antiquity has received scant attention in both Classics and New Testament scholarship.[106] Drawing from two of Paul's contemporaries who write about self-gifts, I will suggest that, if the language of self-giving also refers not only to his death to the bestowal of a self-gift, then 'gave himself' cannot be adequately described as an event in which Christ gives himself 'up' or 'away' in complete 'selfless' and 'self-sacrificial' disregard for himself. Since Christ is himself the content of the divine gift, it is crucial that he retains his own self through his act of self-gifting. In other words, Christ does not die in order to give just some*thing* to others, but some*one* – himself – and he therefore dies *for* others only so that, on the other side of death, he would come to exist *with* others. Given the proximity of 'love' and 'gave

[105] This is by far the most common explanation of the phrase 'gave himself'. Victor Paul Furnish takes the phrase as indicating his 'utterly selfless love' ('"He Gave Himself (Was Given) Up...": Paul's Use of a Christological Assertion', in *The Future of Christology: Essays in Honor of Leander E. Keck* (ed. A.J. Malherbe and W.A. Meeks; Minneapolis: Fortress, 1993), 109–121, at 115). Michael Gorman uses 'self-giving' interchangeably with 'total self-abandonment', 'self-surrender', and 'kenosis' (*Inhabiting the Cruciform God*: *Kenosis, Justification, and Theosis in Paul's Narrative Soteriology* (Grand Rapids, Eerdmans, 2009), 21, cf. 32; cf. Gorman, *Cruciformity*, 85, cf. 88, 92, 120; in this vein see also e.g. M.C. de Boer, *Galatians: A Commentary* (New Testament Library; Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2011), 163; A.A. Das, *Galatians* (Concordia Commentary; St. Louis: Concordia, 2014), 273; J.D.G. Dunn, *The Epistle to the Galatians* (Black's New Testament Commentary; London: A&C Black, 1993), 147; J.L. Martyn, *Galatians: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary* (AB 33A; New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004), 250; H.D. Betz, *Galatians: A Commentary on Paul's Letter to the Churches in Galatia* (Hermeneia; Minneapolis: Fortress, 1979), 125–126. Even according to the *Oxford English Dictionary*, 'to give oneself' means 'To sacrifice, offer up, submit to the loss of (one's life or possessions) for some object' ('give, v', *OED Online*, n.p. (cited 24 October 2019). Online: http://www.oed.com/viewdictionaryentry/Entry/78553.

[106] Those who see a reference to self-gifting in Galatians 1.4 and/or 2.20 include C. Eschner, *Gestorben und Hingegeben 'für' die Sünder: Die griechische Konzeption des Unheil abwendenden Sterbens und deren paulinische Aufnahme für die Deutung des Todes Jesu Christi* (2 vols; WMANT 122; Göttingen: Neukirchener, 2010), 1.434–435; Gorman *Cruciformity*, 84, 162; Barclay, *Paul and the Gift*, 1.

himself' in Galatians 2.20 – the only instance in this letter where Paul states that Jesus performs an act of love (*ἀγαπᾶν*) – how we interpret the language of self-giving will deeply influence, if not almost entirely determine, how we understand the meaning and content of his 'love' (and how we perceive Jesus' act of love will dictate how we configure the connection between Paul's love-ethic and the Christ-event). If that is the case, then Christ's 'self-giving', and therefore also his love (2.20), cannot be sufficiently captured by self-subtraction language. To state clearly the thesis of the present chapter, then: the phrase 'gave himself' signals not that Jesus gives himself *away* in death, but that through his death he gives himself *into* relationship.[107]

This argument unfolds in three parts, the first two of which might initially seem somewhat disjointed. First, I review two authors from antiquity who discuss self-gifts, Seneca and Philo of Alexandria. Second, I look at instances of 'gave himself' in classical Greek literature to deconstruct the notion that either *διδόναι ἑαυτόν* or *παραδιδόναι ἑαυτόν* is a fixed, technical phrase which indicates self-sacrificial behaviour. Lastly, I move to Galatians to demonstrate that Paul's language of self-giving refers both to his death and to the bestowal of a self-gift, and I tie these independent investigations together to suggest that this reading of Galatians 1.4 and 2.20 requires us to move beyond reading 'gave himself' as referring solely to self-sacrificial behaviour.

3.1. Self-Gifts in Ancient Discourse

There was no monolithic meta-idea of 'the' self-gift in the period of classical antiquity; but there are writers who talk about people who give themselves as a gift, either to God or to others. In order for my present argument – that the language of self-giving in Galatians 1.4 and 2.20 refers in part to the bestowal of a self-gift – not to be completely vacuous, it will help to take a look at other authors who

[107] It is rather striking that some Pauline scholars see the self-giving language as referring to Christ's selflessness, when the other instances of this phrase in the Pauline tradition indicate that Christ 'gave himself' to serve, in part, his own interests. The author of Titus writes that Jesus 'gave himself for us (*ἔδωκεν ἑαυτὸν ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν*) in order to redeem us from all lawlessness and to purify for himself a people for his own possession (*ἑαυτῷ λαὸν περιούσιον*) who are zealous for good works' (2.13). Similarly, Ephesians asserts that 'Christ loved the church and gave himself for her (*ὁ Χριστὸς ἠγάπησεν τὴν ἐκκλησίαν καὶ ἑαυτὸν παρέδωκεν ὑπὲρ αὐτῆς*) … to present the church to himself in splendor (*ἵνα παραστήσῃ αὐτὸς ἑαυτῷ ἔνδοξον τὴν ἐκκλησίαν*)' (5.25–27). If 'self-giving' in these texts is understood as self-sacrifice only for the benefit of the other, then the purpose clauses, which explicate that he gave himself in order to receive a community of people to himself, would be rendered completely unintelligible.

discuss forms of self-gifting. These examples will serve as a point of departure from which I will consider the significance of locating the Christ-event within the category of self-gift. The authors whom I choose to look at here are Seneca and the middle-Platonic Jewish philosopher Philo of Alexandria. There are a few reasons for isolating these two authors: both were contemporaries of Paul; both were prominent and influential thinkers and writers in major ancient Mediterranean cities; both wrote extensively about human and divine gifts. But most notably for my purposes, within their discourse on gift-giving both Seneca and Philo call special attention to one unique kind of gift: the self-gift. Here I will focus on their treatments of self-gifts and how their understanding of this act fits within the larger structure of their conceptions about gift-giving and social relationships.

3.1.1. *Dono Me Ipsum*: Seneca on Aeschines' Self-Gift

One of the key theses of Seneca's treatise on gift-giving, *De Beneficiis*, is that gifts unleash the power of social creativity. Throughout his work Seneca repeatedly asserts that the practice of bestowing benefits finds its *telos* in creating and sustaining positive relationships,[108] binding fellow humans together and upholding the structure of society (*Ben.* 1.4.2; 1.15.2; 2.18.5; 6.41.2; cf. *Ira* 1.5.2–3).[109] Because gifts are, for Seneca, 'the glue that [holds] society together'[110] as well as the 'sine qua non of social stability',[111] an integral aspect of gift-giving is that, after an initial gift is given, each party continues the practice of giving, with gift leading to return-gift (and so on), in order to create and reinforce the connection between two persons or entities.[112] In other words, gift-giving intends to make ties with others, and these ties are strengthened and sustained by both parties' ongoing participation in gift-reciprocity. Seneca's contention here, of course, does not amount to some wildly

[108] I use 'relationship' instead of 'friendship' throughout my treatment of Seneca, following Miriam Griffin's caution that Seneca's treatise cannot accurately be considered as a treatise on friendship *per se* ('*De Beneficiis* and Roman Society', *Journal of Roman Studies* 93 (2003): 92–113.

[109] For a helpful introduction on these matters and to *De Beneficiis* in general, see M.T. Griffin and B. Inwood, 'Introduction', in *On Benefits* (The Complete Works of Lucius Annaeus Seneca; Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011), 1–14.

[110] R. Saller, 'Status and Patronage', in *The High Empire, AD 70–192* (vol. 11 of *The Cambridge Ancient History*; ed. A.K. Bowman, P. Garnsey, and D. Rathbone; 2d ed.; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 817–854, at 838.

[111] Griffin, 'Introduction', 1.

[112] On how Seneca expects gifts to be returned, see T. Engberg-Pederson, 'Gift-Giving and Friendship: Seneca and Paul in Romans 1–8 on the Logic of God's Χάρις and Its Human Response', *HTR* 101 (2008): 15–44 and Barclay, *Paul and the Gift*, 45–51.

novel or divergent idea; here he stands in the company of a longer tradition of philosophers for whom it was axiomatic that gift-giving aims at constructing relational bonds with others through a rhythm of gift and countergift (e.g. Xen. *Mem*. 2.9.8; Arist. *Eth. Nic*. V 5, 1133a3–5). As one proponent of Aristotle's thought put it, 'the exchange and giving of a gift binds together the lives of men (*χάριτος ἀμοιβὴ καὶ δόσις συνέχει τοὺς τῶν ἀνθρώπων βίους*), some giving, others receiving, and others in turn reciprocating (*τῶν μὲν διδόντων τῶν δὲ λαμβανόντων τῶν δ' αὖ πάλιν ἀνταποδιδόντων*)'.[113] Similarly, for Seneca, one's expectation that another would respond to a gift with a countergift does not betray an ulterior 'selfish' motive underlying the initial gift but rather stems from the desire to cultivate a relationship with another. In other words, Seneca's vision of gift-exchange subordinates objects to people: the goal is not just to get an object from another, but to gain someone through the gift of an object.[114] As we saw in chapter two, such prosocial actions are subordinated to the *telos* of uniting two parties.

Because gift-giving aims at constructing relationships, we must, Seneca says, evaluate the quality of gifts not by what they contain *per se*, but by how and why they are given. In Seneca's vocabulary, we should judge gifts not by their content but by the giver's *animus* – her spirit, attitude, or intention with which she gives (1.5.2; 1.6.1–7.3; 6.9.2–3; cf. Arist. *Rhet.* II 7, 1385a17–19).[115] This axiological criterion plays out in a rather simple way: if one gives gifts eagerly, with lavish words of praise for the recipient, and indicates one's hope to deepen the relationship with the recipient (*Ben.* 2.3.1), then a giver has

[113] M. Plezia, ed., *Aristotelis Privatorum Scriptorum Fragmenta* (Bibliotheca Scriptorum Graecorum et Romanorum; Leipzig: BSB B.G. Teubner Verlagsgesellschaft, 1977), 31; cf. Arist. *Eth. Nic.* VIII 13, 1162b6–13. For a further treatment of the relationship between *De Beneficiis* and Seneca's philosophical predecessors and contemporaries, see Griffin, *Seneca on Society: A Guide to* De Beneficiis (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 15–24.

[114] We could contrast this kind of exchange-relationship with Aristotle's notion of a 'utility-friendship (*φίλια διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον*)'. In that kind of relationship, contact between two parties occurs solely for the purpose of acquiring a particular object, and in the event that each party in a utility-friendship receives the desired object, the relationship serves no further purpose and is thus severed (*Eth. Nic.* VIII 3, 1156a10–12). This form of exchange is distinct from Seneca's ideal gift-relationship (as well as Aristotle's ideal of friendship based on virtue), which is oriented towards people, not objects. This does not mean that exchange is excluded altogether in relationships but rather that exchange must be contextualized within and subordinated to reinforcing relationships.

[115] On the function of *animus* in *De Beneficiis*, see B. Inwood, *Reading Seneca: Stoic Philosophy at Rome* (Oxford: Clarendon, 2005), 65–93, esp. 86–92.

honourable *animus*; but if one gives begrudgingly and reluctantly (2.1.2), with pride (2.4.1; 2.13.2), or the intent to harm another (6.8.1–2), then the giver exhibits a dishonourable *animus*.[116]

Seneca repeatedly denies that a gift's size, monetary value, and material extravagance provide a basis for distinguishing a good gift from a bad one. For example, a rich man may bestow a large sum of money as gift, but if he felt no negative impact on himself by bestowing it, this gift is not as honourable as one who gave the same amount in much poorer conditions (3.8.2). Thus, two gifts that contain the same content but are 'given in different circumstances' will 'have a different weight' (3.8.3).[117] The 'what' (*res*) of a benefit is morally irrelevant; it is the who, the where, the when, and the why of a benefit that is definitive (1.6.1).

Since a willing *animus* may be possessed and exercised by anyone, one's social status does not dictate whether one can give good gifts (3.18.2–19.1; 3.28.1).[118] To provide some concrete examples, Seneca contends that one should not react in terror if sent an extravagant gift from a king. Though the king's gift will certainly outdo yours in size, you can still match his *animus* in your gratitude or counter-gift and thus preserve social equilibrium between you and the king (5.4.1–4). Even if one has nothing to repay as countergift, an act of public gratitude can function as a return equally honorable to the original gift (2.24.4), and so the *animus* can itself constitute a proper and equal return (2.22.1, 33.1). Thus, just as wealth does not ensure one gives worthy gifts, poverty restricts no one from giving good gifts and countergifts, granted they express an honourable *animus* (5.4.1).[119]

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[116] When a gift is given with this latter kind of *animus*, the object given does not constitute a gift, because the dishonourable *animus* contradicts the very point of giving itself, namely to create and sustain bonds with others. A gift given with a malicious *animus* makes no claims of obligation upon the recipient (6.7.1–9.3), because it does not establish but destroys relationship.

[117] Translations from Griffin and Inwood, *On Benefits*.

[118] Seneca's point was critically relevant in his time, given Rome's limited opportunities for social mobility. As P.R.C. Weaver notes, the early and late Roman empire operated with 'a rigid hierarchy of orders or "estates" with legal distinctions of status between them' which constituted a 'highly developed system of formal stratification' ('Social Mobility in the Early Roman Empire: The Evidence of the Imperial Freedmen and Slaves', *Past & Present* 37 (1967): 3–20, at 3; cf. Saller, 'Status and Patronage', 834–838). On the 'universalism' and 'egalitarianism' of *De Beneficiis*, see Griffin and Inwood, 'Introduction', 2.

[119] Inwood relays that 'Seneca fears, with good reason I think, that in a hierarchical society with dramatic disparities of wealth and power people will be reluctant to take on the potentially unsupportable burden (2.53.3) of such relationships. The feeling that one can never repay what one has been given is an oppressive one, which undermines the social bonds forged by *beneficia*' (*Reading Seneca*, 91).

Though the *res* of the gift is not determinative of the value of a gift, the content of the gift still actually matters to Seneca: being intentional, careful, and discerning about what we give can reflect a worthy *animus* (1.11.1–13.3). Seneca lays out a threefold hierarchy of gift-content, instructing that 'We should first give benefits that are necessary, next benefits that are useful, then benefits that are pleasant' (1.11.1). Necessary benefits can be gifts or acts of service, such as saving someone from a life-threatening danger, purchasing someone's freedom, or providing the basic needs of family life (1.11.3–4); useful benefits include things such as money or helping another advance in social standing (1.11.5); pleasant gifts are those which the recipient does not need but does not already have, and will bring consistent joy to the recipient (1.11.5). As a rule, Seneca suggests that we should 'consider what we can give that will bring greatest pleasure and what the recipient will think of frequently, so that we will be in his thoughts whenever the gift is' (1.11.6). This last point reveals that Seneca's instructions regarding how to choose the content of a gift remain subordinated to a relational *telos*. The better the gift, and the more it 'endures'. the more the recipient will be reminded of the giver (1.11.1). If we give gifts which are 'as immortal as possible' (1.12.1), then, we will ensure that our recipients will constantly recall our generosity. Thus, gifts which are picked with careful discernment are more likely to produce lasting relationships; they are, for this reason, the best kind of gifts.

As a supporting argument for these various points, Seneca recounts a story about Aeschines, a poor man who, despite having no possessions, gives himself as gift to his teacher, Socrates. The story unites Seneca's two contentions that the giver's *animus* defines the worth of a gift apart from social location and that the content of a gift can display an honourable *animus*. Given that this story comprises an integral role in my argument, and given simply the richness of the narrative itself, this section is worth quoting in full:

> Everyone used to offer Socrates gifts, each according to his own resources. Aeschines, who was poor and a student of Socrates, said, 'I cannot find anything worthy of you which I could give you; it is only in this respect that I feel poor. And so I give you the only thing I have: myself (*Itaque dono tibi, quod unum habeo, me ipsum*). I only ask that you appreciate my gift, such as it is, and reflect that although other people have given you a great deal, they have kept back more for themselves'. Socrates replied, 'Of course you have given me a great gift – unless, that is, you set a low value on yourself. So I will be sure to return you to yourself in better condition than I received you'. With this gift, Aeschines outdid Alcibiades, whose intentions matched his wealth, and the generous gifts of all the wealthy young men.

> Do you see how a well-intentioned donor (*animus*) can discover the raw material for generosity, even amidst straitened circumstances? In my opinion, Aeschines was saying, 'Fortune, your desire to make me poor has been ineffectual. Despite you, I will send this man a worthy gift; Since I cannot give it from your resources, I will give it from my own (*de meo dabo*)'. And there is no reason for you to conclude that Aeschines was undervaluing himself. He was willing to offer himself as payment for himself. This talented young man found a way to give Socrates to himself (*quemadmodum Socraten sibi daret*). You should not consider the magnitude of each gift, but the quality of the giver.[120]

Overcoming the apparently inhibiting circumstances of his poverty,[121] Aeschines presents an ideal gift with his virtuous *animus* by giving directly 'from himself (*de meo*)'. The contrast between Aeschines and the other pupils is not merely their economic status; the deeper and more fundamental contrast is that, whereas the other students gave 'according to [their] own resources', Aeschines did not pull from his surplus but gave to Socrates his sole possession as one who is poor – his very own self. By extension, what sets Aeschines' self-gift apart from others is that the entirety of his own self is placed in the possession of another without remainder. Aeschines' careful consideration of the content of his gift demonstrates a worthy *animus*: in desiring to give to Socrates so much, he found the most precious item to give – himself – without which he would have been unable to give.

Reflecting Seneca's insistence that gift-giving intends to establish a two-way mutual relationship, Aeschines' self-gift is praised because this event displays a paradigmatic expression of the circularity of beneficence. In response to Aeschines' self-gift, Socrates seeks to sustain some ongoing mutuality between them and promises to give a counter-gift to Aeschines: 'I will return you to yourself in better condition than I received you'. The content of both the gift and return, then, is Aeschines himself. Aeschines' extension of his own self to Socrates is curiously interpreted as 'a way to give Socrates to himself'. Here Seneca signals that Aeschines, by giving his own self to Socrates, also receives Socrates' own self in that same moment, such that in this single event Socrates also both receives and is given to

[120] *Ben.* 1.8.1–9.1.

[121] As David Briones claims, here Seneca praises Aeschines 'for rising above his disadvantaged predicament' ('Paul and Seneca on the Self-Gift', in *Paul and the Seneca in Dialogue* (ed. D. Briones and J.R. Dodson; Ancient Philosophy & Religion; Leiden: Brill, 2017) 127–149, at 131), and Griffin rightly notes that here 'Aeschines illustrates the true nature of a benefit' (*Seneca on Society*, 182). However, I see no reason to claim with Griffin that the point is 'not so much by the manner of his giving, but by the fact that he gives, not a material thing at all (an *indifferent*), but something truly good (*honestum*), that is, his moral being' (*Seneca on Society*, 182). Socrates *does* praise him for the manner of giving, as he was 'well-intentioned' in his gift (*Ben.* 1.9.1).

Aeschines. In this sense, Aeschines' self-gift enacts a coincidence of gift and countergift, an event in which Aeschines simultaneously gives himself and receives another.

3.1.2. Unspeakable Holiness: Philo on the Nazirite Vow

Unlike Seneca, Philo does not have a treatise on gift giving (though *Migr*. 53–126 may come close); but he theologises, philosophises, and interprets his scripture with particular attention to the theme of divine beneficence. For Philo, the essence of divine generosity lies in in his twin acts of creation and providence. Blending the concept of divine beneficence with the concept of divine causality (*Mut*. 15; *Abr*. 78; *Conf*. 124), Philo interprets God's causality in creation as the core demonstration of God's goodness and beneficence, indeed 'the eldest of all gifts (*πρεσβυτάτη τῶν χαρίτων*)' (*Deus* 108; cf. *Opif*. 21; *Fug*. 12; *Deus* 87, 108; *Mut*. 46).[122] The fact that 'the origin of creation' is 'the goodness and the grace of God' grounds Philo's theological axiom that 'all things exist by the grace of God (*χάριν ὄντα τοῦ θεοῦ τὰ σύμπαντα*)' (*Leg*. 3.78; cf. *Deus* 107). Accordingly, recognizing God as the efficient cause of creation comprises a crucial element of human piety. Ascribing due honor to God as the perfect giver requires one to reject both overestimating the significance of created things or claiming causality for oneself – a role reserved strictly for the divine (*Ebr*. 107–110; *Agr*. 173; *Mut*. 22; *Deus* 87).[123] Without a proper understanding of divine causality, humans will ignore the requirement to 'ascribe all things to God (*ἅπαντα … προσάπτειν θεῷ*)' (*Leg*. 3.29). In other words, because God is cause and giver, humans are recipients; and because humans are recipients, they are obligated to offer a response to God.[124] In harmony with Seneca, then, Philo assumes that a previous gift must be returned with a

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[122] See O. McFarland, *God and Grace in Philo and Paul* (NovTSup 164; Leiden: Brill, 2015), 26–34. Philo makes the caveat that all imperfect things – including, for example, the irrational element of human mind (*Opif*. 72–75) – cannot be caused by God, the perfect giver (cf. *Spec*. 4.187). Because 'all the gifts of God are good (*δωρεαὶ δ' αἱ τοῦ θεοῦ καλαὶ πᾶσαι*)' (*Post* 80), that which is not good cannot be God's gift. On this see D. Winston, 'Theodicy and Creation of Man in Philo of Alexandria', in *Hellenica et Judaica: hommage à Valentin Nikiprowetzky* (ed. A. Caquot, M. Hadas-Lebel and J. Riaud; Leuven: Editions Peeters, 1986), 105–111).

[123] Philo portrays Abraham as an *exemplum* of correct rationalizing: Abraham sings hymns of gratitude to God because he recognises God as the cause of all good things in creation (*Ebr*. 105).

[124] So D. Zeller, *Charis bei Philon und Paulus* (Stuttgarter Bibelstudien 142; Stuttgart: Katholisches Bibelwerk, 1990), 8. Philo finds Hannah exemplary in this regard. She bears a son and names him Samuel, which Philo translates as 'allotted by God' (*Deus* 5; cf. *Ebr.* 144), and in so doing she recognizes that her son was divine gift. By naming him as such, 'she took him and rendered him in due payment to the Giver, judging that no good thing was her own peculiar property, nothing, which was not a grace and bounty from God' (*Deus* 5 (Colson, LCL)).

new gift; since not to return a gift from God would be to act as though we are the source of ourselves, God is only fully and rightly acknowledged as cause and giver when his gifts are returned to him in thanksgiving (*Her.* 104; *Spec.* 2.97).[125] Divine διδόναι should always be echoed by an anthropological ἀποδιδόναι.

For Philo, cultic offerings operate within this dynamic of divine-human mutuality, as offerings demonstrate that the one who offers recognises God as creator of all. For example, the firstfruits offering gives thanks to God as the one who bestows fertility to the soil (*Spec.* 4.98) and functions as counter-gift for our own life, rationality, and sense, all of which are in essence 'divine gifts for which it is our duty to give thanks' (*Congr.* 96; cf. *Post* 36). These offerings manifest 'piety' and 'thanksgiving' as responses to God's goodness in creation (*Mos.* 1.317). Just as one consecrates the firstfruits as a recognition of God as giver of fertile soil, the consecration of a firstborn child functions as 'thanks-offering for fertility' (*Spec.* 1.138). The circular shape of these acts of thanksgiving is aptly summed up by Philo's assertion that an offering presents to God what we have already received from him (*Spec.* 2.219).

Sacrifice also functions within this relational dynamic (*Spec.* 1.169–170; 1.283–288; 1.296–298; *Migr.* 142; *Mos.* 2.146–158; *Her.* 200; *Deus* 57). In striking similarity to Seneca's point about the *animus* of giving, Philo asserts that 'what is precious in the sight of God is not the number of victims immolated but the true purity of a rational spirit in him who makes the sacrifice (τὸ καθαρώτατον τοῦ θύοντος πνεῦμα λογικόν)' (*Spec.* 1.277; cf. 1.290; *Somn.* 2.71; *Plant.* 126).[126] This does not negate the importance and need for the actual material sacrifice but rather provides a deeper interpretation of the significance and effect of sacrifices.[127] One's pure and rational spirit comes to expression through the act of sacrificing, which, like offerings, acknowledges God as cause and giver by offering back to him what he has given to us. God gives to humans what they need; humans respond, not by giving

[125] On thanksgiving see J. LaPorte, *Eucharistia in Philo* (Studies in the Bible and Early Christianity 3; New York: Edwin Mellen Press, 1983).

[126] Translation from Colson, LCL. On this see J. Leonhardt, *Jewish Worship in Philo of Alexandria* (TSAJ 84; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2001), 235–240.

[127] This does not mean that Philo 'spiritualizes' the notion of sacrifices and downplays the importance of actual sacrifice (see rightly D.M. Hay, 'Philo's References to Other Allegorists', *Studia Philonica* 6 (1979–1980): 41–75).

God what he needs, but by giving God his due with the honor and thanksgiving evinced through sacrifice.[128]

For Philo there are three kinds of sacrifices, namely the burnt-offering (*τὸ ὁλόκαυτον*), the salvation offering (*τὸ σωτήριον*), and the sin offering (*τὸ περὶ ἁμαρτίας*) (*Spec.* 1.194).[129] These three sacrifices have two functions: the burnt-offering is given to honour God, but the salvation-offering and sin-offering are given to benefit the one who sacrifices (1.196–197). Though each sacrifice is identified as *either* giving *or* receiving from God, taken together the general logic of sacrifice includes, as Paul Robertson puts it, 'both glorifying God and providing benefits in an open-ended circular relationship. The continual nature of the Temple activity … clearly maintains the "ongoing" nature of human-divine reciprocity'.[130]

There is, however, one instance where these two functions of sacrifice – giving thanks to and requesting from God – are united in one act. In Philo's interpretation of Numbers 6.1–21, the Nazirite vow (or 'the great vow') amounts to a combination of all three kinds of sacrifice (*Spec.* 1.247) and thus combines the two purposes of sacrifices – to give and receive. Philo begins to explain the impetus for the Nazirite vow by noting that firstfruits are usually offered by someone 'from any portion of their possessions (*ἀπὸ παντὸς μέρους κτήσεως*)'. However,

> when they have no longer any materials left in which they can display their piety, they then consecrate and offer up themselves (*αὑτοὺς ἀνατιθέασι καὶ καθιεροῦσιν*), displaying an unspeakable holiness, and a most superabundant excess of a God-loving disposition (*ἐπιδεικνύμενοι ὁσιότητα καὶ ὑπερβολήν τινα γνώμης φιλοθέου*), on which account such a dedication is fitly called the great vow; for every man is his own greatest and most valuable possession, and this even he now gives and hands over (*παραχωρεῖ καὶ ἐξίσταται*).[131]

Philo further explains that 'a vow also is, properly speaking a dedication, when it is said that not only someone offers his possessions (*μὴ μόνον τὰ ἑαυτοῦ κτήματα*) but also the possessor (*ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸν κεκτημένον*), offering himself, gives himself over as a gift to God (*ἀποδιδοὺς διδόναι λέγεται*

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[128] Strictly speaking, for Philo, God receives nothing from sacrifices; he already possesses everything and thus cannot 'receive' sacrifices in the sense of being supplemented by them (*Spec.* 2.180; *Cher.* 84–123). This reflects a point from Aristotle that gain is given where there is need (*Eth. Nic.* VIII 14, 1163b1–5).

[129] For an overview of Philo's views on sacrifices, see W.K. Gilders, 'Jewish Sacrifice: Its Nature and Function (According to Philo)', in *Ancient Mediterranean Sacrifice* (ed. Jennifer Wright Knust and Zsuzsanna Varhelyi; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 94–105.

[130] P. Robertson, 'Toward an Understanding of Philo's and Cicero's Treatment of Sacrifice', *Studia Philonica* 23 (2011): 41–67, at 51n63.

[131] *Spec.* 1.248; translation adapted from Leonhardt, *Jewish Worship*, 118.

θεῷ δῶρον)' (*Somn*. 1.252; cf. 243; *Deus* 87; *Mos.* 2.108; *Sacr.* 97).[132] Whereas sacrifices present only a portion of one's possessions, vows offer up the self *in toto* – both the possessor and all of his possessions – to God.

Since the vow is a combination of all three sacrifices, Philo finds elements of each sacrificial activity contained in the vow.[133] Insofar as the donor resembles all three sacrifices, the vow performs at once the two distinct functions of sacrifice: it engages both in giving to and requesting from God. While at times Philo characterizes this event primarily as an act of thanksgiving, at other times he suggests it is primarily a request for something from God. So Philo can say that the Nazirite vow recognizes 'that God Himself and by Himself is the cause of good things'; secondarily, it includes 'request for good things from God' (*Deus* 87; cf. *Plant*. 90).[134] But elsewhere Philo claims that a vow functions primarily to request from God; then, secondarily, if the request is fulfilled, it generates praise of gratitude for that gift (*Sacr.* 53). These two ways of framing the vow are not in tension, because they reflect Philo's interpretation that a vow unites all three sacrifices together and therefore includes within it requests and thanksgiving. Thus, the great vow is a self-gift which paradigmatically images the circularity between divinity and humanity contained within the logic of sacrifice by uniting the acts of gift and request.

3.1.3. Retaining the Self through Self-Gifting

These two examples from Seneca and Philo do not present the only possible ways of thinking about self-gifts in antiquity. But in light of the above, we should take note of some points of similarity between Philo's and Seneca's accounts. First, neither Seneca nor Philo convey that all gifts are 'really'

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[132] Translation from Leonhardt, *Jewish Worship*, 118. Though Nijay Gupta is partially correct to say that, in some sense, all sacrifices give the self to God (*Somn.* 1.248; 1.272), here Philo clearly distinguishes between the gift of sacrifices and the self-gift which occurs in a vow ('The Question of Coherence in Philo's Cultic Imagery: A Socio–Literary Approach', *JSP* 20 (2011), 277–297, at 290). To say that all gifts are 'really' self-gifts obscures how Philo evaluates the Nazirite vow as an utterly unique form of gift-giving (a similarly problematic tendency to categorize all gifts as self-gifts also occurs in Marcel Mauss' seminal work, *The Gift* (trans. W.D. Halls; London: Routledge, 1990), 59).

[133] The donor resembles the sin-offering because he can never be fully void of sin, the salvation-offering because he acknowledges God as the 'cause of his preservation', and the burnt offering because 'he surrenders not only the other first-fruits and gifts but also his own self (*διὰ τὸ μὴ τῶν ἄλλων μόνον ἀπαρχῶν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἑαυτοῦ παραχωρεῖν*)' (*Spec*. 1.252 (Colson, LCL)).

[134] Translation from Colson, LCL.

self-gifts; they rather consider a self-gift to be a unique kind of gift among others. Whereas all other gifts are given 'according to one's resources' (Seneca) or 'from one's possessions' (Philo), self-gifts offer the entirety of the self to another. For Seneca, this was demonstrated in Aeschines' willingness to give 'from himself', because his poverty disabled him from having any other possessions to give to Socrates. In Philo's case, the act of giving one's possessions is included within the single act of giving the self. Thus, at least for Philo, self-gifts do not offer the self *instead* of one's possessions but rather offer the self and *thereby also* one's possessions. The operative assumption here seems to be that the self is inclusive of one's possessions or anything within one's sphere of influence. Indeed, this kind of thinking is reflected in Aristotle, when he writes about the relationship between the person and his possession, 'The word "possession (*τὸ κτῆμα*)" is used just as the word "part (*τὸ μόριον*)" is used. For a part is not just a part of another thing but entirely belongs to another thing. So it is with a possession' (*Pol.* I 4, 1254a7–11).[135]

Second, both authors contend that gift giving aims at creating and/or reinforcing mutual relationships. Aeschines' self-gift initiated a mutual relationship between him and Socrates, who promised to 'return him to himself' as a counter-gift for his honourable gift; for Philo, the Nazirite vow, as catalogued within the sacrificial system, comprises a return to God for God's goodness in creating all things. Self-gifts press into, rather than cancel, the relational *telos* of gift-giving, as in both examples a self-gift unites the movement of the self towards the other with the movement of the other towards the self, creating a kind of symbiotic co-benefit in which each party simultaneously benefits by receiving from and giving to the other.

Third – and perhaps most importantly – there was no sense in which the self was in danger of destruction. Nowhere in Seneca's or Philo's understanding of self-gifts is there a hint that the giver of a self-gift dies, or even that his well-being is jeopardized in the act of giving. There is, I think, a particular logic that undergirds the absence of death, or even self-jeopardization, in these stories about self-gifts. One immediate difference between self-gifts and other gifts is that, whereas normal gifts operate according to (what we could call) a tripartite structure of giver, gift, and recipient, self-gifts

[135] My translation.

function according to a bipartite structure of giver/gift and recipient. In other words, when someone gives the self as gift, there is an identity between giver and gift. In a tripartite structure of gift-giving, one can die in the act of gift-giving, since the object bestowed would be external to the self and thus can be possessed by another without the presence of the giver. But to die in the act of giving *one's own* self – when that self is intended to be thereafter in relationship with the recipient of the self-gift – would simply nullify the gift itself, since in such an instance the material of the gift would be destroyed in the act of giving.

This point is well illustrated by one of Seneca's sections in *De Beneficiis.* Seneca spends a good deal of time arguing, against the apparent opinion of others, that slaves can in fact give benefits to their masters (3.18.1–29.1). In this section he poses a rhetorical question: if a slave dies to save his master's life, or if a slave does not give his master's secrets over to his enemies even in the face of bribes, threats, or torture, but then dies for his loyalty to his master, Seneca asks rhetorically, 'will you deny that he has conferred a benefit on his master, just because he is a slave?' (3.19.2). Seneca takes it as obvious that everyone will affirm that the slave has bestowed a gift on the master. But what in Seneca's mind is the *content* of the benefit bestowed by the slave in this example? When Seneca writes that, to remain loyal to his master in the face of danger, the slave *impendisse spiritum*, Griffin translates that the slave 'has given his life' (3.19.3). This translation, however, implies that, when the slave dies for his master's benefit, the content of the gift is the slave's own life (and thus potentially self-gift). But *impendisse spiritum* is better translated as 'has expended his life'. Using 'give' as a translation of *impendo* in a treatise on gift-giving is deeply misleading, since *impendo* never means 'to give something as gift'. What is more, Seneca goes on to claim that, when a slave dies to save his master's life, the slave in fact has given to the master *the master's own life*. This is clear when Seneca contrasts examples of slaves who benefit their masters, writing that 'One slave gave his master life (*Dedit aliquis domino suo vitam*); another gave him death (*dedit mortem)*. One saved his master from perishing, and if that is not enough, saved him by perishing. One helped his master to die; another tricked him out of dying (3.23.1; cf. the references to 'giving life' in 3.31.1–2). Thus, the slave, when he dies to save another, does not give his own self or life as gift to anyone; here we rather see a tripartite structure of giving, in

which a gift external to the self (the master's own life) is given through the death of the giver (the slave) to a particular recipient (the master). Indeed, how would it be coherent for the slave to give the gift of *his own* self, if the self is destroyed in the process of giving it, and the slave then does not enter into relationship with the master? Presumably for Seneca, one can die in order to give something *other* than the self to someone, but one cannot, by dying, give *oneself* as the content of the gift. To use a more contemporary example, it would not count as a gift to present a set of china to another if, while in the act of handing it over, the giver smashed all of the china into pieces on the ground. Thus, whereas in a tripartite structure one can die to give an object external to the self to another, in a bipartite structure of self-giving – in which gift and giver are identical – dying in order to give the self as gift would contradict the gift itself. Destruction of the self makes the self-gift impossible.[136]

3.2. On the 'Background' to Self-Giving Language in Galatians 1.4 and 2.20

Whereas the previous section outlined how some authors think about self-gifting, this section offers some more specific lexical considerations about *διδόναι ἑαυτόν* in Galatians 1.4 and *παραδιδόναι ἑαυτόν* in 2.20. There are generally two approaches to discerning the meaning of 'gave himself'. First, some interpreters see 'gave himself for our sins' (1.4) and 'gave himself for me' (2.20) as pre-Pauline formulae. Second, scholars have also appealed to other Greek literature to argue that *διδόναι ἑαυτόν* and *παραδιδόναι ἑαυτόν* are fixed, technical phrases for death and/or martyrdom. As a result of these methods, both approaches generally tend to argue that *διδόναι ἑαυτόν* and *παραδιδόναι ἑαυτόν* refer *only* to the death of Christ. But since my argument in this chapter is that the phrase also includes a reference to Christ giving himself as gift, I will critique the methods and conclusions of these other approaches before making a more constructive argument for the meaning of 'gave himself'.

[136] We could contrast this with the definition of self-gift offered by Jean-Luc Marion. Marion suggests that the self-gift makes someone *lose* the self: '"The gift of self" for the nation (death for the fatherland, etc.), for humanity, for a chosen fraternal order, and finally of the children cannot really be repaid (even if one claims symbolically the opposite). What is given – time, energy, life – will never be returned to the giver, since he *himself* and since this *self* that he loses cannot be given back to him by anyone' (J.-L. Marion, *Being Given: Towards a Phenomenology of Givenness* (trans. J.L. Kosky; Cultural Memory in the Present; Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002), 93.

3.2.1. A Pre-Pauline Formula?

In 1 Cor 15.3, Paul indicates that he has received a kind of traditional formula from other Christians and deployed this compact formula in his letter: 'Christ died for our sins according to the scriptures'. The phrase 'I handed over to you of first importance what I also received (*παρέδωκα γὰρ ὑμῖν ἐν πρώτοις, ὃ καὶ παρέλαβον*)' signals that this saying predates Paul. Many have argued that other pre-Pauline formulae emerge elsewhere in Paul's letters, even when he does not use this kind of formal introductory phrase. For example, some scholars claimed that the vocabulary and dense theology of Romans 3.25–26 is suggestive of pre-Pauline language[137], and others have asserted that the parallelism of 1 Corinthians 8.6 signals that it was originally a confession external to Paul.[138] Interpreters of Galatians have similarly suggested that (part or all of) Galatians 1.4 includes one of these pre-Pauline formula, and, though less often, others have argued the same for the phrase 'he loved me and gave himself for me' in Galatians 2.20.[139]

Johannes Weiss notably argued this case regarding Galatians 1.4 in his 1917 *Das Urchristentum*. Weiss concluded that Galatians 1.4 contained a pre-Pauline confession on the basis that it is among those Pauline sentences which 'sound formulaic'.[140] From this impression Weiss further suggests that Galatians 1.4 is semantically identical to 1 Corinthians 15.3: 'If one removes from these passages the specifically Pauline element, what is left amounts to the same thing as the statement in 1 Cor. 15:3, apparently derived from the primitive community'.[141] What is important for my purpose here is to note that, because Weiss's aim is to perform a 'thorough examination of the contribution of the primitive

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[137] B.F. Meyer, 'The Pre-Pauline Formula in Rom 3:25–26a', *NTS* 29 (1983): 198–208.

[138] See more recently C.H.T. Fletcher-Louis, *Christological Origins, The Emerging Consensus, and Beyond* (vol. 1 of *Jesus Monotheism*; Eugene: Wipf & Stock, 2015), 39–54.

[139] For various proposals regarding the possibility of a formula in 1.4 and 2.20, see W.R. Kramer, *Christ, Lord, Son of God* (SBT 50; London: SCM Press, 1966), 115–124; W. Popkes, *Christus Traditus: Eine Untersuchung zum Begriff der Dahingabe im Neuen Testament* (Abhandlungen zur Theologie des Alten und Neuen Testaments 49; Zürich: Zwingli, 1967), 196–200; K. Wengst, *Christologische Formeln und Lieder des Urchristentums* (Studien zum Neuen Testament 7; Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus. 1973), 57; V.P. Furnish, '"He Gave Himself …"'; G. Berényi, 'Gal 2,20: a Pre-Pauline or a Pauline Text?' *Biblica* (1984): 490–537); S. Kim, *The Origin of Paul's Gospel* (2d ed.; WUNT II/4; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1984), 119–120; W. Kirschläger, 'Zu Herkunft und Aussage von Gal 1,4', in *L'apôtre Paul: Personnalité, style et conception du ministère* (ed. A. Vanhoye; BETL 73; Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1986), 332-339. For a brief history and overview of this interpretative trend, see S. Gathercole, '"Sins" in Paul', *NTS* 64 (2018): 143–161.

[140] J. Weiss, *The History of Primitive Christianity* (2 vols.; trans. F. C. Grant et al.; New York: Wilson-Erickson, 1937), 1.104

[141] Weiss, *The History of Primitive Christianity*, 104.

community to the origin of Christianity', he attempts to interpret Galatians 1.4 in isolation from the rest of the letter.[142] The goal of interpreting Paul, in this particular scholarly task, is not exactly to interpret Paul; correct interpretation of Paul is meant to be a window through which Weiss can reconstruct the primitive Christianity that predates him: the task for Weiss is to identify the "'primitive christian' element in [Paul's] thought".[143] It is for this reason that Weiss wants to strip away the Pauline elements to discover the meaning of the phrase in isolation from its Pauline context. And so, in the end, his conclusion is that Galatians 1.4, *as deployed by the primitive community*, is semantically identical to the phrase 'Christ died'.

Apart from the questionable lack of evidence that Weiss provides for his contention that Galatians 1.4 is a pre-Pauline formula, there is nothing methodologically unsound about his project. But if Weiss' method is used for determining the meaning of the phrase *in Galatians*, rather than in the 'primitive community', then this becomes seriously problematic. We need to interpret Paul's words within the context in which they are deployed, not through the hypothetical reconstruction of the meaning of the phrase in a pre-Pauline tradition. The meaning of Paul's phrases, even if they are 'formulae' which predate him, cannot be ascertained in isolation from where and how Paul actually articulates them. In my present argument, this is significant because I want to argue, *contra* Weiss, that 'gave himself' means more than just 'he died'; but this argument, as we will see below, can only be made from the context of Paul's letter. To posit (with Weiss' own words), then, a different interpretative criterion: if one removes from a Pauline passage the specifically Pauline element, it is likely that we will misunderstand him.

In contrast to Weiss, others attempt to use the notion of a pre-Pauline formula as a benchmark against which they can interpret what Paul means by 'gave himself' in Galatians (not only in the 'primitive community'). For example, J.L. Martyn claims that 'Paul draws these words [of Galatians 1.4] from an early Christian hymn or (eucharistic?) confession'[144] and is convinced that, as they read

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[142] Weiss, *History of Primitive Christianity*, 2.

[143] Weiss, *History of Primitive Christianity*, 3. He also writes: 'A thoroughgoing examination of his religion and theology leads one to recognize that even where explicitly "Pauline" ideas appear, a primitive basis can be discovered which has not been exhaustively absorbed into the Pauline idea' (Weiss, *History of Primitive Christianity*, 3).

[144] Martyn, *Galatians*, 88.

Paul's letter, 'the Galatians will have sensed the quotation marks' surrounding Galatians 1.4.[145] Martyn then suggests that 'The formula is to a significant degree foreign to Paul's own theology', because the phrase 'for our sins (*ὑπὲρ τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν ἡμῶν*)' 'identifies discrete sins as humanity's (in the first instance Israel's) fundamental liability; and it sees forgiveness of sins as the remedy provided by God'.[146] By contrast 'Paul, when he is formulating his own view, consistently speaks not of sins, but rather of Sin, identifying it as a power that holds human beings in a state of slavery. and he sees liberation rather than forgiveness as the fundamental remedy enacted by God'.[147] Martyn concludes that Paul has quoted this 'Jewish-Christian formula', which includes theology 'partially alien to him', so that he can 'correct it by means of an additional clause' – namely 'in order to deliver us from the present evil age (*ὅπως ἐξέληται ἡμᾶς ἐκ τοῦ αἰῶνος τοῦ ἐνεστῶτος πονηροῦ*)'.[148] Paul takes a formula which originally focused on forgiveness of individual transgressions and alters it into a statement about deliverance.

In a similar vein, Martinus de Boer states that, in comparison to other Pauline 'confessional formulas' (e.g. 1 Tim 2.6; Titus 2.14), 'The wording of 1:4a ("for our sins") is most similar … to that of 1 Cor 15:3, where Paul quotes a known formula, one he had earlier passed on to the Christians in Corinth'.[149] De Boer concludes from this similarity that 'It is thus probable that in 1:4a Paul is adapting this particular confession [1 Cor 15.3], with which the Galatians are also probably familiar'.[150] The original confession, according to de Boer, meant '"to deal with our sins," to forgive them so that they can no longer form an obstacle between "us" and God'.[151] But Paul has made two changes to this original formula: first, 'He changes the finite verb construction (*Christos apethanen*, "Christ died") into a participial construction (*tou dontos heauton*, "the one who gave himself")'; second, 'he changes the notion of "dying for" to "giving himself for," whereby the active involvement and intentionality of Jesus

[145] Martyn, *Galatians*, 89.
[146] Martyn, *Galatians*, 89–90.
[147] Martyn, *Galatians*, 90.
[148] Martyn, *Galatians*, 90.
[149] de Boer, *Galatians*, 29.
[150] de Boer, *Galatians*, 29.
[151] de Boer, *Galatians*, 30.

Christ precisely as Lord comes to expression'.[152] The conclusion of this hypothesis is that 'Paul immediately interprets Christ's giving himself "for our sins" to effect not forgiveness but deliverance from an evil realm'.[153]

De Boer's hypothesis is, I think, more plausible than Martyn's, since unlike Martyn he does know the exact words of the text which Paul is editing (since Paul quotes it in 1 Cor 15.3). Yet the foundational hypothesis that the phrase 'for our sins' indicates that Paul is directly editing 1 Corinthians 15.3 is questionable itself. It is hard to see why the simple phrase 'for our sins' would indicate that behind this phrase is a longer formula which is then *edited* by Paul. The hypothesis that Paul is redacting the material in 1 Corinthians 15.3 is just not demanded by the data itself, and even if it is an adaptation of tradition, this should not affect our interpretation. In sum, then, we cannot overdetermine (or predetermine) the meaning of 'gave himself' through appeal to a hypothetical pre-Pauline formula, for which we have virtually no evidence in this instance.

3.2.2. Appeals to 'Gave Himself' in Greek Literature

There are a few interpreters of Galatians who refer to other Greek examples of *παραδιδόναι ἑαυτόν* and *διδόναι ἑαυτόν* in order to support a particular reading of Galatians 1.4 and 2.20. We should begin here with the commentary of Ernest de Witt Burton, since his discussion is picked up and developed by more recent interpreters.[154] Burton initially suggests that 'In itself the expression [*διδόναι ἑαυτόν*] may perfectly well refer to a devotion of one's self in service', but, in this particular context – because the phrase is immediately followed by the motif of 'deliverance' – the phrase *διδόναι ἑαυτόν* 'refers especially if not exclusively to Jesus' voluntary surrender of himself in death'.[155] Burton then cites a few texts which use *διδόναι ἑαυτόν* (or phrases that he considers to be equivalent) in the sense of 'devotion', and he refers to Polybius' *Histories* 8.18.11, 10.6.10, and 1 Maccabees 2.50 as evidence. Like Weiss, Martyn, and de Boer, Burton assumes that the self-giving language in Paul refers *only* to the

[152] de Boer, *Galatians*, 29.

[153] de Boer, *Galatians*, 30.

[154] E. de Witt Burton, *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Epistle to the Galatians* (ICC; Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1920).

[155] Burton, *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary*, 11–12.

death of Christ.[156] Both texts from Polybius do indeed use διδόναι ἑαυτόν to refer to an individual taking up a particular task.[157] However, the text from Maccabees uses the phrase διδόναι τὰς ψυχὰς ὑμῶν – which in context is referring to devotion to Torah (see more on this below). Burton does not acknowledge any difference between the use of ἑαυτόν and ψυχήν as the object of διδόναι; they are simply cited together. After referring to more examples from Theodor Nägeli's *Der Wortschatz des Apostels Paulus*, which catalogues a list of references to other instance of διδόναι ἑαυτόν and ἐπιδιδόναι ἑαυτόν,[158] Burton concludes that 'in none of [these examples] does it seem to mean to lay down one's life.'[159]

Two issues should be noted about Burton's analysis here. First, Burton's observation that none of his cited examples from Greek literature refer to death seems to imply that, prior to Paul (or early Christian communities), διδόναι ἑαυτόν was never used in connection with someone's death. This is correct only in a limited sense. In favour of Burton's assertion, I have found no examples in which the phrases διδόναι ἑαυτόν and παραδιδόναι ἑαυτόν, when used without an infinitive, double accusative, dative noun, or prepositional phrase attached to it refer to someone's death. However, many examples could be adduced in which these phrases are used in connection with death. The only caveat that should be made is that these phrases are always modified by another word or phrase. Zenobius records the proverb which 'concerns those who in virtue give themselves into death (ἐπὶ τῶν κατ' ἀρετὴν

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[156] Burton, *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary*, 12.

[157] Polyb. 8.16.11 reads: 'Bolis engaged to devote his energies to the matter and commune with Cambylus (δώσειν ὁ Βῶλις αὑτὸν εἰς τὴν χρείαν καὶ συμμίξειν τῷ Καμβύλῳ)' (Paton, LCL). (I use the numbering from Paton's Loeb edition, in which the text that Burton identifies as 8.18.11 is in Paton's edition 8.16.11), The other text reads: 'he, in the first place, undertook to accomplish what the magnitude of the previous disasters had made the world look upon as completely hopeless (πρῶτον μὲν ἐπὶ πράξεις αὑτὸν ἔδωκε τελέως παρὰ τοῖς πολλοῖς ἀπηλπισμένας διὰ τὸ μέγεθος τῶν προγεγονότων ἐλαττωμάτων)' (10.6.10 (Paton, LCL)).

[158] T. Nägeli, *Der Wortschatz des Apostels Paulus: Beitrag zur sprachgeschichtlichen Erforschung des Neuen Testaments* (Basel: Buchdruckereit zum Baster Berichthaus, 1904). Burton cites page 50, but since page 50 includes no examples of this language, he likely meant to write page 56, on which Nägeli documents instances of διδόναι ἑαυτόν and ἐπιδιδόναι ἑαυτόν.

[159] Burton, *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary*, 12. This is then followed by the brief note 'On the other hand, see Jos. *Ant*. 2.144'. It is unclear what the phrase 'on the other hand' prior to the citation of Josephus is meant to signal. One would expect that perhaps the text which he cites, in contrast to the others cited, uses διδόναι ἑαυτόν to refer to an event of death. But the Josephus text simply has someone saying, 'is a marvelous and a great thing to give our lives to us (δοῦναί τε ψυχὰς ἡμῖν)' (*Ant*. 2.133). It is unclear what this example is supposed to show, especially since the phrase here is not reflexive: someone is not giving his own life but is rather giving to *others* 'their lives' by preserving their lives. It seems that he simply misread this text.

διδόντων ἑαυτοὺς εἰς θάνατον)' (Zen. 2.61); Demosthenes writes about those who die as they 'offer themselves as sacrifice (ἑαυτὰς ἔδοσαν σφάγιον)' (Dem. 60.29); a fragment from Pherecydes recounts speaks of one who was 'desirous to give herself into slaughter (ἐθελούσιον δοῦναι ἑαυτὴν εἰς σφαγήν)' (*FHG* 1.36); and a fragment from Phanodemus refers to how 'Protogeneia and Pandora gave themselves to be slaughtered for the village (Πρωτογένεια καὶ Πανδώρα δοῦναι ἑαυτὰς σφαγῆναι ὑπὲρ τῆς χώρας' (*FHG* 1.366). Philo records how some spoke of 'giving themselves into destruction (παραδίδομεν ἑαυτοὺς εἰς ἀπώλειαν)' so that they 'may not live to experience an evil worse than death (ἵνα μὴ ζῶντες ἐπίδωμεν θανάτου χεῖρον κακόν)' (*Legat*. 233). Thus, to qualify Burton's point, both διδόναι ἑαυτόν and παραδιδόναι ἑαυτόν, can, outside of Christian contexts, refer to death; but this happens usually (perhaps only) when the phrase is modified by another word or phrase.

Second, Burton's use of διδόναι ψυχήν to determine the meaning of διδόναι ἑαυτόν (especially without acknowledging that the text which he cites does not use the same phrase) is problematic. When attempting to determine the phrase of διδόναι ἑαυτόν and παραδιδόναι ἑαυτόν, we should not look to phrases which we deem in advance as semantically identical. Of course, it is possible that these phrases could be used interchangeably; but we cannot *presume* that the phrase διδόναι ψυχήν, which might seem nearly equivalent, is semantically identical to διδόναι ἑαυτόν and παραδιδόναι ἑαυτόν and thus can be used to determine its meaning.

3.2.2.1. Against a Monolithic 'Secular' Sense of Self-Giving Language

Burton's commentary sets some of the parameters for others who take up the task of determining the meaning of διδόναι ἑαυτόν and παραδιδόναι ἑαυτόν**.** John Pobee, in his *Perseuction and Martyrdom in the Theology of Paul,* picks up the structure of Burton's argument and argues that there are two uses of 'gave himself' in Paul. In agreement with the interpreters discussed above, Pobee argues that the self-giving language as used by Paul only signals the death of Christ:

> These phrases appear in two senses in the Pauline Letters. They are used in their normal secular sense of 'to devote oneself to duty or service'. For example, at 2 Cor 8.5, Paul commends the churches of Macedonia for giving themselves over to the Lord (and to Paul) by caring for the poor saints. However, in most occurrences of the phrase it has the force of ἐσταυρώθη (1 Cor. 1.23; 2.2) or ἐσταυτωμένος or some form of ἀποθνῄσκειν (1 Thess. 5.10; Rom. 5.6f; 14.15; 1 Cor 15.3; 2 Cor. 5.15). For example, at Gal. 1.4 τοῦ δόντος ἑαυτόν can only [!] mean 'he who

> surrendered himself in death'. This special application of the phrase could have been obvious to the Christian conscience and have belonged to the apostolic tradition.[160]

As indicated above, the use of 'gave himself' in the context of death is not really a 'special application' of the phrase at all, since this is used elsewhere in Greek literature (although it always takes some kind of modifier to refer to death). What is more important here, however, is to deal with the evidence cited in support of the 'secular sense' of the phrase. In order to establish this definition, he cites Polybius' *Histories* (8.18.11 and 10.6.10) examples from Maccabean literature (1 Macc 6.44; 11.23; 14.29. 2 Macc 6.28; 3 Macc 2.31; 6.6), and Sirach 29.15.[161] As we saw, these two examples from Polybius do indeed refer to people committing to a particular activity. But things get a bit confusing when we look at the other evidence cited in support this 'secular sense'. First Maccabees 6.44 refers to someone offering themselves for a task in battle (more on this below), 1 Maccabees 11.23 refers to how Jonathan 'gave himself into danger (*ἔδωκεν ἑαυτὸν τῷ κινδύνῳ*)', and similarly 1 Maccabees 14.29 recalls how Simon and his brothers 'gave themselves into danger (*ἔδωκαν αὐτοὺς τῷ κινδύνῳ*)'. Second Maccabees 6.28 and 7.9 refer to people dying, but these texts do not use *διδόναι ἑαυτόν* and *παραδιδόναι ἑαυτόν* (nor a phrase close to that). Third Maccabees 6.6 refers to the story from Daniel in which the three men 'willingly gave their souls into the fire (*πυρὶ τὴν ψυχὴν αὐθαιρέτως δεδωκότας*)'. Lastly, Sirach 29.15 encourages its readers, 'Do not forget the kindness of your guarantor, for he has given his life for you (*ἔδωκεν γὰρ τὴν ψυχὴν αὐτοῦ ὑπὲρ σοῦ*)', referring to the guarantor's devotion to his beneficiaries. This seemingly random mass of texts is somehow meant to provide examples of the 'secular' sense of the 'gave himself' that means 'devote oneself to service', but it is unclear how it succeeds in doing this. One text uses *διδόναι ἑαυτόν* for entering a particular situation in a battle (1 Macc 6.44, more on this below), two texts (1 Macc 11.23, 14.29) use *διδόναι ἑαυτόν* to refer to a change in circumstance ('into danger'), two refer to instances of death without any hint of 'gave himself' language, one uses *διδόναι ψυχήν* to indicate entering into a particular location (fire) (3 Macc 6.6), and lastly one text uses *διδόναι ψυχήν* to refer to how a benefactor is dedicated to his

[160] J.S. Pobee, *Persecution and Martyrdom in the Theology of Paul* (JSNTSup 6; Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1985), 48. Pobee seems to have pulled some of this material from C.K. Barrett without acknowledgment. See note 167 below.

[161] Pobee, *Persecution and Martyrdom*, 127n6.

beneficiaries. As noted above, we should take the examples which refer to death without self-giving language and the examples that use *διδόναι ψυχήν* as irrelevant for establishing an argument that there is 'secular sense' of *διδόναι ἑαυτόν* which indicates 'devotion'. As for the examples which do use *διδόναι ἑαυτόν*, this set of texts, if anything, works *against* Pobee's claim that there is a monolithic 'secular sense' of the phrase that ubiquitously means 'devotion to service'.

Just to drill this point more strongly, we can note numerous other uses of *διδόναι ἑαυτόν* and *παραδιδόναι ἑαυτόν* well beyond the confines of any singular sense. As regards *παραδιδόναι ἑαυτόν*, Thucidydes uses the phrase for someone 'giving themselves into [good] fortune (*τύχῃ αὑτὸν παραδίδωσι*)' (Thuc. 5.16). Diodorus Siculus uses the phrase to refer to people initiating relationships of trust: for example, a country can 'give itself' to a king in submission because the leaders trust his 'justice' (Diod. Sic. 5.79.1; cf. 9.35.3; 11.40.2). Josephus uses *παραδιδόναι ἑαυτόν* to speak of giving oneself to a friend in relationship (*Ant.* 1.326), enslaving oneself to a master (13.330), handing oneself over to punishment (2.137), or offering oneself as help to another (2.159; also Diod. Sic. 18.58.1). This phrase can also refer to placing oneself in a particular situation: when Saul jeopardizes himself and his family, Josephus describes him as 'giving himself, as well as all his family and children to dangers (*ἀλλὰ παραδοὺς αὑτὸν πανοικὶ μετὰ τῶν τέκνων τοῖς κινδύνοις*)' (*Ant.* 6.345). Other uses in Josephus include people 'giving themselves into what others persuaded (*παραδόντες αὑτοὺς εἰς ἃ προεκαλοῦντο*)' (4.139) and people 'giving themselves into an uncertain future (*ἀδήλῳ τῷ μέλλοντι παραδόντας αὑτοὺς*)' (6.348). Authors can furthermore use this phrase to indicate handing oneself over to a judge (Plut. *Lys.* 6.32), entrusting oneself to another (Plut. *Flam.* 5.4; Isoc. *C. soph.* 16; Isoc. *Ep.* 4.10), establishing a relationship with another (Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 2.36.2), or giving oneself over to the control of the passions (Pl. *Phd.* 82c). As regards *διδόναι ἑαυτόν*, Herodotus uses this phrase to describe how Athena 'gives herself' in devotion to Zeus, who then adopts her (4.180.20; other instances of 'devotion' include e.g. Hdt. 2.113.2; Dem. 18.219, 274). But it can also be used to refer to something 'presenting itself' (in the sense of 'happening') to a person (Thuc. 1.33.2), offering oneself to help another (Dem. 25.97), surrendering in battle (e.g. Thuc. 2.68.7; see more examples below), or even simply acting in a certain way: one fragment from Zeno says that he 'rarely gives himself into

being accommodating for others because of bodily weakness (*σπανίως ἑαυτὸν διδοὺς [ὁ Ζήν]ων εἰς τὰς συμπε[ριφορὰς] διὰ τὴν τοῦ σώ[ματος ἀσθ]ένειαν*)' (*SVF* 1.31). The evidence from these examples suggests that the semantic potential of *διδόναι ἑαυτόν* and *παραδιδόναι ἑαυτόν* in non-Jewish and non-Christian Greek literature is rather vast. There is no monolithic, fixed meaning to these phrases in Greek literature.

3.2.2.2. Against a 'Martyrological' Sense of Self-Giving Language

A more common thesis regarding the background to Galatians 1.4 and 2.20 is that, as Michael Gorman puts it, 'the Pauline language of self-giving … derives from the tradition of martyrdom and thus reveals that Paul primarily understands Jesus' death as a martyrdom'.[162] Although Pobee argues that the self-giving language in Galatians 1.4 and 2.20 evinces a 'special' Christian use of the phrase, he also makes a more detailed case for supporting the view that this language derives from matyrological traditions.[163] I will again take him as my primary interlocuter here.

Pobee maintains that *διδόναι ἑαυτόν*, *διδόναι ψυχήν*, and *τίθηναι ψυχήν* are technical phrases for the death of martyrs. Paul's use of *διδόναι ἑαυτόν* is therefore 'synonymous with the dying or crucifixion of Christ', such that Jesus is 'depicted as a martyr with an emphasis on his self-surrender in obedience to the will of God'.[164] As noted with Burton, however, we cannot announce two (or in this case three) *different* phrases as equivalent and determine the meaning of a particular word or phrase in this way. Moreover, simply because these phrases *can* be used to refer to death does not determine in advance that this is the way that Paul must have used it.

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[162] Gorman, *Cruciformity*, 82n15. Gorman cites Pobee positively in this regard. Regarding the phrase 'loved me and gave himself for me' (2.20), Stephen Cummins has also emphatically argued that 'The latter [phrase, i.e. 'gave himself'] is evocative both of the deaths of the Maccabean martyrs on behalf of (*ὑπέρ*) Torah and Israel …. Together these mutually reinforcing phrases indicate that the obedient life and death of the Son of God give expression to God's own selfless love' (*Paul and the Crucified Christ at Antioch: Maccabean Martyrdom and Galatians 1 and 2* (SNTSMS 114; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 227–228). However, none of the texts which he cites in support of this thesis (2 Macc 7.9; 8.12; 4 Macc 1.8, 10) actually include the phrase *παραδιδόναι ἑαυτόν*. Because Cummins does not adduce any clear evidence for the contention that self-giving language is 'evocative' of martyrdom traditions, I do not engage with him extensively in this chapter.

[163] This is somewhat confusing, because if the 'Christian' sense of the phrase is 'special' (as he argued), then the appeal to Maccabean literature seems somewhat irrelevant.

[164] This is somewhat confusing again, since 1 Maccabees 6.44 is one of the texts which Pobee cites as evidence for the 'secular' sense of 'gave himself' which does *not* refer to death, so he seems to be using the same text evidence for two different proposed meanings of the phrase (Pobee, *Perseuction and Martyrdom*, 49).

We run into a number of problems when we look at the evidence cited in support of this contention. Pobee supports his martyrological understanding of 'gave himself' by claim that 'giving one's life' (as in dying) is present in 1 Maccabees 2.50. But in that text the author uses *διδόναι ψυχήν* not to refer to death, but to refer to devotion to the Torah: 'Now, my children, be zealous for the law, and give your lives for the covenant of our ancestors (*νῦν, τέκνα, ζηλώσατε τῷ νόμῳ καὶ δότε τὰς ψυχὰς ὑμῶν ὑπὲρ διαθήκης πατέρων ἡμῶν*)'. It is unlikely that this is a call for martyrdom, since Mattathias' sons are not in any sense of immediate or expected life-threatening situation. What this example shows is that *διδόναι ψυχήν* is, in fact, *not* a technical term for martyrdom. Pobee then notes that the phrase *διδόναι ψυχήν* is 'paraphrased' as *διδόναι ἑαυτόν* in 1 Maccabees 6.44 and refers to the death of a martyr. But a closer look at the text calls this into question:

> But Judas and his army advanced to the battle, and six hundred of the king's army fell. Now Eleazar, called Avaran, saw that one of the animals was equipped with royal armor. It was taller than all the others, and he supposed that the king was on it. So he gave himself to save his people and to win for himself an everlasting name (*καὶ ἔδωκεν ἑαυτὸν τοῦ σῶσαι τὸν λαὸν αὐτοῦ καὶ περιποιῆσαι ἑαυτῷ ὄνομα αἰώνιον*). He courageously ran into the midst of the phalanx to reach it; he killed men right and left, and they parted before him on both sides. He got under the elephant, stabbed it from beneath, and killed it; but it fell to the ground upon him and he died.[165]

There are two possible ways of reading *διδόναι ἑαυτόν* here. It could be that the sentence 'he gave himself to save his people and to win for himself an everlasting name' is a summary of the material following it, including his eventual death. In that case, the phrase 'gave himself' does refer (at least) to Eleazar's death, but it probably also includes the whole activity of attacking the elephant as well. If so, this would constitute the only instance that I have found in which this phrase refers to death without being grammatically modified by a word or phrase that explicitly signals this use (this is of course not impossible). Another way of reading this, which I find more plausible, is that Eleazar 'gives himself' in the sense that he offers himself for the particular task of attempting to kill the elephant that held the king. Then, though he succeeds in the task, he dies unexpectedly. In this reading, 'gave himself' does not refer to death but to Eleazar taking up a particular mission, and the phrase 'to save his people and secure for himself an everlasting name' signals what motivates him to do so. The NRSV translation

[165] 1 Macc 6.42-46 (NRSV).

(cited here) seems to follow this reading, as it includes 'but' before the final clause to indicate that his death was unexpected and thus neither anticipated by nor referred to by 'gave himself'.

Even if the text uses *διδόναι ἑαυτὸν* to refer to death, this only shows that it *can* be used to refer to an event in which someone dies or takes up a particular task. But it seems to stretch the evidence to take one instance of 'gave himself' and announce that Paul's self-giving language 'derives from the *tradition* of martyrdom'. The evidence only shows that one text (and *only* one) *might* include a reference to a martyrological death (1 Macc 6.44); but this set of texts uses the same phrase for other meanings as well. This does not necessarily mean that Paul is *not* using 'gave himself' to refer to death; but it does mean that we should not determine in advance what Paul means by the phrase through appealing to such scant data from the Maccabean literature.

3.2.2.3. Self-Giving Language and Surrender in Battle

The last appeal to Greek literature which I will look at is the argument in Friedrich Büchsel's *TWNT* article on *διδόναι*, in which he argued that in the language of self-giving 'Die Wendung ist für den Tod der Märtyrer bei den Juden und für den Tod der Soldaten bei den Griechen herkömmlich'.[166] The Greek source which Büchsel cited for the former point is 1 Maccabees 6.44, which we don't need to revisit. The latter point is supported with an appeal to Thucydides 2.43.2, which says, 'For this offering of their lives made in common by them all they each of them individually received that renown which never grows old (*κοινῇ γὰρ τὰ σώματα διδόντες ἰδίᾳ τὸν ἀγήρων ἔπαινον ἐλάμβανον*)'. Again, like we saw with other interpreters, here the meaning of 'gave himself' is posited to be a common phrase for death, but then *other* phrases are used then to support this thesis: the

[166] Friedrich Büchsel, '*δίδωμι κτλ*.', *TWNT* 2.168–175.This article is appealed to by Pobee (*Persecution and Martyrdom*, 49). In Pobee's text, however, he translates Büchsel in English, but it appears to be lifted directly from an article by C.K. Barrett, which he does not cite. Barrett's original quote reads: 'Büchsel (TWNT ii. 168) writes, "The expression is current among the Jews for the death of Martyrs, among the Greeks for the death of soldiers". It can also mean "to devote one's life in service"' ('The Background of Mark 10:45', in *New Testament Essays: Studies in Memory of T.W. Manson* (ed. A.J.B. Higgins; Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1958), 1–18, at 5. Though he echoes Burton here as well, Pobee seems to have also lifted his definition of the 'secular sense' of the phrase directly from this article. A thesis similar to Büchsel's might be present in Gorman's insistence that 'The vocabulary of Christ's self-giving …, in which the verb is often a form of the verb "give" [*διδόναι*] or "hand over" [*παραδιδόναι*] and the object of the verb is a reflexive pronoun (e.g. "himself"), are sometimes called "surrender formulae"' (*Cruciformity*, 84–85). Gorman does not provide any evidence for this 'pre-Pauline pattern', and despite his placement of quotation marks around 'surrender formulae' he provides no secondary literature which identify this language as such.

Thucydides text uses διδόναι σῶμα, but neither παραδιδόναι ἑαυτόν nor διδόναι ἑαυτόν. To support the notion that Greeks commonly used παραδιδόναι ἑαυτόν and διδόναι ἑαυτόν for the death of soldiers, one would have to prove this not from presumably equivalent phrases like διδόναι σῶμα but from uses of παραδιδόναι ἑαυτόν and διδόναι ἑαυτόν.

However, a look at the evidence will easily show that the most common use of these phrases in the Greek historical literature actually operates in precisely the opposite way: it is the 'standard phrase' for how someone *avoids* death in battle.[167] Παραδιδόναι ἑαυτόν is regularly used in Greek historical works to indicate when one party in a battle surrenders to another, and in the vast majority of these cases it is explicitly noted that those who surrender do so in order to *preserve* their own life (διδόναι ἑαυτόν can also be used in similar contexts, though it is less common; see e.g. Thuc. 2.68.7; Hdt. 7.130.3 Xen. *Cyr*. 5.1.28). In Polybius' *Histories*, he regularly makes use of the phrase παραδιδόναι ἑαυτόν to refer to surrender in battle (e.g. Polyb. 1.7.10; 16.22a.5; 5.71.11), and in many instances he notes that doing this spares the life of the surrendering party (1.21.1; 2.54.8; 4.75.6; 7.1.3; 9.42.4; 17.91.7–8). For example, in contrast to the Carthaginians who were 'cut down' (οἱ μὲν ἐφονεύοντο τῶν Καρχηδονίων), others 'surrendered (παρεδίδοσαν ἑαυτούς)' because they were terrified of the battle (1.23.6). Polybius also reports of a mutiny by the Cyrrhestae in which they occasioned 'considerable trouble for some time; but finally they were defeated in a battle by one of the king's generals, most of them being killed and the rest surrendering (παρέδοσαν ἑαυτοὺς) at discretion' (5.50.8-9 (Paton, LCL)). In both of these examples, those who did not surrender died; those who gave themselves did not die. In another instance, Polybius records that the Celts were going to besiege their enemies if their enemies did not 'voluntarily surrender (παραδῶσιν ἑαυτοὺς ἑκουσίως)', and if they did indeed 'give themselves' in this way, they would therefore not be attacked (2.25.10–11). When a village saw they were fully endangered, they therefore put down their weapons and 'surrendered (παρέδοσαν αὑτούς) so that they would be preserved (ὡς τευξόμενοι τῆς σωτηρίας)' (3.84.14).

[167] P. Cartledge, 'Surrender in Ancient Greece', in *How Fighting Ends: A History of Surrender* (ed. H. Afflerbach and H. Strachan; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 15–29, at 21.

In his *Library of History*, Diodorus Siculus also uses *παραδιδόναι ἑαυτόν* to indicate surrender (Diod. Sic. 11.22; 11.26.6; 12.56.5; 12.63.3; 13.193; 14.49; 14.105; 16.59.2–4; 17.78.3–4; 17.86.6), and, like Polybius, in numerous places this 'self-giving' is explicitly intended for, or results in, preserving life (17.86.6; 17.103.8; 36.10.2; 14.105.2–3). Diodorus records that many Iranian military leaders, threatened by Alexander the Great acquiring more territory, 'came to him and gave themselves up' 17.76.1).[168] In response, Alexander the Great 'received them kindly and gained wide repute for fair dealing' (17.76.1-2). he explains furthermore that 'the Greeks who had served with Dareius, one thousand five hundred in number, and accomplished soldiers, also promptly turned themselves over to Alexander, and receiving a full pardon for their previous hostility were assigned to units of his army on the same pay scale as the rest' (17.76.2). More explicitly, he records one instance in which the Iranians, being 'disheartened at the death of their commander … sought their safety in surrender and gave themselves up to Alexander (*λαβόντες τὴν ἀσφάλειαν παρέδωκαν ἑαυτοὺς τῷ βασιλεῖ*)' (17.83.6).[169] In fact Diodorus records a long speech about showing mercy to those who surrender, appealing to what the orator considers to be the common opinion that, when one jeopardised party 'gives themselves' to another party, the victorious party is morally obligated not to harm the surrendering party (13.26.2-5).

Josephus also mainly deploys *παραδιδόναι ἑαυτόν* for surrender (*Ant.* 4.139; 4.553; 6.71; 7.52; 7.128; 8.261; 9.285; 10.9; 13.185; 18.52; *Bell.* 5.433; 5.396) and often explicates that this intends to preserve one's life. For example, Josephus records that 'the inhabitants of Bethsura, being overawed by [Antiochus'] strength, and seeing how scarce their provisions were, surrendered to him, after receiving sworn assurances that they should suffer no harm at the hands of the king. (*παραδιδόασιν ἑαυτοὺς ὅρκους λαβόντες ὑπὲρ τοῦ μηδὲν πείσεσθαι κακὸν ὑπὸ τοῦ βασιλέως*). Then Antiochus took the city and did nothing to them beyond expelling them unarmed' (*Ant.* 12.376 (Thackeray, LCL)); cf. 13.140; 17.296). The above examples are only a small portion of the extensive examples, both within

[168] All translations of Diodorus Siculus are from Oldfather, LCL.

[169] Or again, Diodorus writes that 'Alexander prepared to attack and capture the city of Harmatelia, which was large and strongly fortified, but the inhabitants came to him with suppliant branches and handed themselves over (*καὶ παραδόντων ἑαυτοὺς*). He spared them any punishment (*ἀπέλυσεν αὐτοὺς τῆς τιμωρίας*)' (17.103.8).

and outside the historians discussed, that use 'gave himself' to indicate surrender in order to avoid death and to achieve a condition of safety (see also similarly e.g. Thuc. 7.85–86; Dem. 19.56; Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 4.51.4; 4.52.1–2; 11.17.4; 16.1.4; Plut. *Vit. Tim.* 24.2; 34.5; *Vit. Pyrrh.* 26.7; *Vit. Ser.* 27.1).[170]

It should be noted again that self-giving language *can* refer to instances of death, or even people surrendering ('giving themselves') with the result of death, though it is less common (cf. Hdt. 1.45,1; Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 5.60.1–3). The implication of the above data is not that that 'gave himself' can never be used to refer to death or surrendering unto death but rather that we cannot take these examples from Greek literature in order to argue that 'gave himself' is a recognizable formula in Greek literature which automatically signals when someone dies or 'gives himself away' in death.

3.2.2.4. The Wide Semantic Potential of Self-Giving Language

The foregoing section might have seemed unnecessarily detailed. However, given the pervasive assumptions and misuses of primary sources in connection with this discussion, a detailed deconstruction of the problematic approaches to Paul's language of self-giving was required. Interpreters of Paul are often too quick to assume that this phrase has some kind of special 'background' which, if ascertained, will entirely tell us what Paul's language means. But there is no evidence that the language derives from a 'special' use of the phrase in early Christianity; it does not derive from a technical phrase in Greek historical works for death; there is little to no evidence that it could derive from the Maccabean martyrdom traditions. We have seen that the language of self-giving can be used to refer to a wide variety of events, and for this reason we should not determine in advance what this language means by insisting (or assuming) that it must derive from a particular special use of the phrase which originates outside of Paul. Instead we should simply look closely at the context in which this language appears in Paul's letter. In the next section I offer a linguistic model that I think will help us understand Paul's language in its immediate context.

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[170] For texts which do not explicitly indicate that surrender is for one's own safety, see Hdt. 6.48; Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 3.50.1; 7.62; Plut. *Vit. Ser.* 17.7; *Vit. Tim.* 13.13; *Vit. Pomp.* 28.1; 33.3; Xen. *Cyr.* 3.3.47.

3.3. (Παρα)διδόναι: A Cognitive Linguistic Model

Here I want to build a case for the meaning of 'gave himself' in Galatians 1.4 and 2.20 from the ground up with a model taken from the school of cognitive linguistics. First, some preliminary explanations are warranted about this approach to language. One crucial contention in cognitive linguistics is that our speaking reflects not what we see in the world but how we conceive of the world; studies on cognition assert that the mind conceptualizes ideas by metaphorically projecting ('mapping') abstract concepts onto more concrete, 'prototypical' images, which we construct from our embodied experience.[171] For example, we usually think of states as containers, and because we think this way, we talk this way.[172] When someone says 'I fell in love' or 'I fell into depression', the metaphorical language of 'falling into' reflects the metaphorical conception that emotional states are containers. Exhibiting a different metaphor, phrases like 'the day has drawn near', 'winter is fast approaching', or 'summer is so far away' reflect how we think of time as a physical path along which objects move. As points in time become more imminent, we think of them as spatially closer, as if they are coming towards us or as if we are approaching them; if points in time will not happen for a while, they are further away and conceived of as physically distant. Thus, language reflects concepts, and concepts reflect percepts: how we speak represents how we think, and how we think is imaged after what we experience.

The simple 'prototypical' images of (for example) containers and paths, onto which we project or 'map' more abstract concepts such as emotions or time, are called 'image schemas'.[173] Though not all words bring up a single image schema, some words almost always conjure up one in particular. Take

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[171] Lakoff and Turner claim that 'we understand one concept in terms of another. Specifically, we tend to structure the less concrete and inherently vaguer concepts (like those for emotions) in terms of more concrete concepts, which are more clearly delineated in our experience' (G. Lakoff and M. Turner, *More than Cool Reason: A Field Guide to Poetic Metaphor* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), 112). For a summary of the developments in embodied cognition since Lakoff and Turner, see T. Rohrer, 'Embodiment and Experientialism', in *The Oxford Handbook of Cognitive Linguistics* (ed. D. Geeraerts and H. Cuyckens; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 25–47).

[172] For the theory that we conceive of states as containers, see M. Johnson, *The Body in the Mind: The Bodily Basis of Meaning, Imagination, and Reason* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987).

[173] As developed by Lakoff, *Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things: What Categories Reveal about the Mind* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987); cf. Lakoff, 'The Invariance Hypothesis: Is Abstract Reason Based on Image-Schemas?', *Cognitive Linguistics* 1 (1990): 39–74. For a general treatment, see V. Evans and M. Green, *Cognitive Linguistics: An Introduction* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2006), 176–201.

for example the word 'ascend'. Almost every time we use this word, the mind will immediately think in terms of vertical height. 'He ascended the social hierarchy' metaphorically conceives of social classes as vertically stratified. 'The tempo ascended' conceives of a difference in number and speed as difference in height. Given the concrete nature of the word 'ascend', it will almost always bring in this image schema and project a more abstract concept onto it.

I want to suggest that, like 'ascend', *διδόναι* and *παραδιδόναι* always invoke a particular image schema. The clear majority (if not virtually *all*) of the uses of these verbs can be easily explained by way of an image schema in which an object is transferred between two spaces. We could make the following diagram (this image schema only focuses on the object that is given; it does not depict those who are the agents of the giving):

Figure 1: Image-Schema for (Π*αρα*)*διδόναι*



The broad semantic potential of *διδόναι* and *παραδιδόναι* can, I think, be explained by this model. Any physical location, situation, or abstract concept can be mapped onto this concrete, prototypical image scheme. To show how this might work in a variety of cases, we can look at a few simple examples. First, consider this text from Josephus:

> *διηθήσας τε τὸ γλεῦκος δοῦναι τῷ βασιλεῖ πιεῖν.*
>
> After straining the wine, he gave it to the king to drink (Jos. *Ant*. 2.64).

Note the use of the dative *τῷ βασιλεῖ*, which implies some kind of directionality. Josephus is talking about shift of possession: one person has wine, and then gives it *to* the king. We could make the following diagram to represent this:

Figure 2: Image-Schema for Transfer of Possession

This of course is a very simple, physical example. However, more abstract notions can be mapped onto this schema. Take for example Paul's claim in Romans:

> *παρέδωκεν αὐτοὺς ὁ θεὸς … εἰς ἀκαθαρσίαν.*
>
> God handed them over … into impurity (Rom 1.24).

Here Paul is depicting 'them' as undergoing a change in state: they move *into* impurity from some other state (presumably the state of purity). In this sense, the state of being 'impure' is communicated as being inside a container or space called 'impurity'. Note the way Paul communicates this idea: 'becoming impure' is communicated as going 'into impurity'. Directionality is again indicated, but with the preposition *εἰς* instead of a dative. The verb *παραδιδόναι* signals that 'they' experience a metaphorical movement from one space to another, from the space of purity to impurity. The embodied notion of movement thus becomes a way of referring to change of state. Placed onto the image schema, Romans 1.24 looks like this:

Figure 3: Image-Schema for Change of State



I should note a potential objection in light of what I have said above: I argued that we should not assume semantic identity between two phrases which are distinct. Since the lexemes *παραδιδόναι* and *διδόναι* are different, we cannot assume these indicate the same thing. So why treat them together, as I have done here? This image schema can help us understand the semantic difference between *παραδιδόναι* and *διδόναι*. While it is not always the case that words are the sum of their lexical parts, I do think that this is the case here: *διδόναι* means 'to give' and *παραδιδόναι* means 'to give over'. The semantic difference between them is that *παραδιδόναι* highlights *directionality* more emphatically than *διδόναι*. That is, it emphasises that an object is moving towards, or *over to*, space B.[174] That is why essentially the same image schema can account for all uses of both words: they invoke the same image, but with *παραδιδόναι* one aspect of it is brought to the fore.

The broad semantic potential of *παραδιδόναι ἑαυτόν* and *διδόναι ἑαυτόν* is a result of how this image schema can have virtually any abstract idea or material reality (friendship, military, states of being) mapped onto it. Let us take a few examples that we saw above. The activity of surrender can easily be imaged as a movement into the space of another army or king, such that 'giving yourself' can mean moving over to the opponent's 'side', so to speak. If friendship can be conceived spatially (friends are 'close' and enemies are 'far'), moving from outside a relationship into a relationship can be called 'giving oneself' *to* another (Jos. *Ant.* 1.326). Plato warns against 'giving yourself' *into* passions

[174] See H.W. Smyth, *Greek Grammar* (rev. G.M. Messing; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1956), 383.

(*παραδιδόασιν αὐταῖς* [i.e. *ἐπιθυμίαις*] *ἑαυτούς*) because it imagines the state of being controlled by the passions as a container within which one can be trapped. In 1 Maccabees 11.23 and 14.29, the author can speak of people 'giving themselves *into* danger (*τῷ κινδύνῳ*)' because danger is being conceived of as a space into which people can move. If punishment is a conceived as a space, allowing yourself to be punished can be called 'giving yourself *into* punishment (*παραδιδόντων αὑτοὺς εἰς κόλασιν*)'. Even having a certain trait can be understood as being 'in' that trait; if that is the case, then Zeno saying that he can 'give himself into [acts of] accommodation (*ἑαυτὸν διδοὺς* [*ὁ Ζήν*]*ων εἰς τὰς συμπε*[*ριφοράς*])' makes perfect sense.

In order to interpret the meaning of particular instance of *διδόναι* and *παραδιδόναι*, we must look for any explicit identification of what 'Space A' and 'Space B' are on our image schema. Once we do that, we will be able to understand what should be under the dotted line ('movement into an area', 'transfer of possession', 'change of state', etc.).

3.4. 'Gave Himself' in Galatians 1.4 and 2.20

As we have seen in the above examples, usually a nearby dative noun or prepositional phrase which begins with *εἰς* will inform us what 'Space B' is, from which we can deduce 'Space A'. But in cases in which there is no stated 'Space B', we will have to look to context. Galatians 1.4 and 2.20 are sentences in which there is no dative noun or *εἰς* that explicates the content of 'Space B'. In the interpretation of most scholars, however, 'Space B' in Galatians 1.4 and 2.20 is death. There are a number of reasons for supporting this view. First, the immediate context of Galatians 2.20 refers to his death: Paul opens 2.20 with 'I have been co-crucified with Christ' (thus Christ also died), and then immediately after speaking of Christ 'giving himself' in 2.20, Paul says that 'if righteousness if through the law, Christ *died* in vain' (2.21). Second, the prepositional phrases in both 1.4 and 2.20 suggest a reference to death: Paul says that Jesus gave himself 'for our sins' and in 2.20 he uses the phrase 'for me (*ὑπὲρ ἐμοῦ*)'. Elsewhere in Paul's letters, the use of *ὑπέρ* after a reference to Jesus' death is commonplace, for example when he states that 'Christ died for our sins (*ὑπὲρ τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν ἡμῶν*)' (1 Cor 15.3), 'Christ Jesus redeemed us … by becoming a curse (i.e. dying) for us (*ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν*)' (Gal 3.13), 'Our

Lord Jesus Christ died for us (*ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν*) (1 Thess 5.10), and 'while we were yet sinners, Christ died for us (*ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν*)' (Rom 5.8).[175] Third, if, as many have argued, Paul is retrieving the theology and language of Isaiah, he could be leaving implicit what Isaiah makes explicit: Isaiah 53.12 LXX says that 'his soul was handed over into death (*παρεδόθη εἰς θάνατον ἡ ψυχὴ αὐτοῦ*)', which thus explicitly maps death onto 'Space B' in the image schema.[176] Fourth, Paul in 2 Corinthians 4.11 uses the phrase 'handed over into death (*εἰς θάνατον παραδιδόμεθα*)', and so Galatians 1.4 and 2.20 could simply be a shortening of that phrase. It is thus not a stretch to suggest that the unstated 'Space B' of the image schema is death. In that case, we could make this diagram of Galatians 1.4 and 2.20:

Figure 4: Image-Schema for Self-Giving into Death



But does this above image schema, in fact, exhaust the meaning of the phrase? Many have suggested just that. However, there is also evidence that this language also refers to Christ giving himself as gift. We can provide a few lines of evidence here. First, Paul, like most Greek speakers, uses *διδόναι* to speak of the transfer of gifts from one person ('Space A') to recipient ('Space B'). For example, Paul often speaks of 'the grace which was given (*ἡ χάρις ἡ δοθεῖσα*)' to himself or others (Rom 12.3, 6; 15.15; 1 Cor. 1.4; 3.10; 2 Cor 8.1; Gal 2.9; cf. Eph 3.7; 4.7, 29; 1 Tim 1.9). Second, Paul uses the phrase *διδόναι ἑαυτόν* to refer to the Corinthians' self-gift to God and to Paul. The 'grace of

[175] This does not mean (*pace* de Boer), that Paul is 'editing' a pre-Pauline formula, but rather that he is using a prepositional phrase which he regularly uses after various ways or speaking about the cross.

[176] For the suggestion that Paul is deploying Isaianic language here, see M.S. Harmon, *She Must and Shall Go Free: Paul's Isaianic Gospel in Galatians* (BZNW 168; Berlin: de Gruyter, 2010), 64–66; J.A. Dunne, *Persecution and Participation in Galatians* (WUNT II/454; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2017), 135–136; R.E. Ciampa, *The Presence and Function of Scripture in Galatians 1 and 2* (WUNT II/102; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1998), 51–59.

God' was exhibited when the Macedonians 'gave themselves (*ἑαυτοὺς ἔδωκαν*) first to the Lord (*πρῶτον τῷ κυρίῳ*) and then by the will of God to us (*καὶ ἡμῖν διὰ θελήματος θεοῦ*)' (2 Cor 8.5). In the phrase 'gave themselves' the destination ('Space B') on the metaphorical image scheme is not death or destruction, or any kind of state; rather, the destination is God and Paul since they are the recipients of this self-gift. Third – and here is where the evidence is far more substantial – in Galatians 2.21 Paul immediately interprets the 'self-giving' of Jesus Christ as 'the gift of God (*ἡ χάρις τοῦ θεοῦ*)'. Similarly, the claim that Christ is 'the one who gave himself … according to the will of our God and Father' (1.4) is followed by the statement that the Father is 'the one who called you in the gift (*ἐν χάριτι*)' (1.6). Fourth, just after referring to Christ's 'self-giving' in 2.20, Paul states that he does not 'reject (*ἀθετεῖν*)' the gift, implying a bilateral social circumstance in which someone has extended a gift and he has the choice to accept or reject what has been given. According to this language, furthermore, the self-giving of Jesus '*for* me' enacts, implicitly, a gift given '*to* me'. The fact that Jesus is the reflexive object of *διδόναι* in 2.20 further suggests that Jesus is in fact the content of this gift given to Paul. If therefore we interpret *διδόναι* and *παραδιδόναι* in Galatians 1.4 and 2.20 (respectively) as the extension and transfer of a gift, we could draw this image schema (note that Jesus is in one circle twice because he is both giver and object given):

Figure 5: Image-Schema for Self-Giving as Gift

Multiple lines of evidence support each view (either an image schema of moving a person from non-death to death, or moving an object from giver to recipient). How can we adjudicate between these options? Instead of taking one image schema over against the other, I want to suggest that

διδόναι ἑαυτόν in Galatians 1.4 and παραδιδόναι ἑαυτόν in Galatians 2.20 refer both to Jesus Christ 'giving himself' into death and to 'giving himself' as gift to Paul. In this reading, the phrase 'gave himself' – because it is not explicitly modified by a dative noun or a εἰς-phrase in either Galatians 1.4 or 2.20 – is ambiguous enough to signal both senses. The omission of 'Space B' in the phrase therefore allows Paul to imply two meanings of 'gave himself' at once. In this case, our image schema should look like this:

Figure 6: Image-Schema for Self-Giving into Death and Self-Giving as Gift



This does not amount to some kind of linguistic anomaly. This is a widely recognized phenomenon more commonly called a 'zeugma' in linguistic circles.[177] In short, a zeugma is where a single instance of a word is being used in two senses at once. Two classic examples in this regard are 'I went to the lake and *caught* a fish and a cold ('caught' in the sense of catching on a rod and 'caught' in the sense of acquiring something) and 'I *lost* my wallet and my mind' ('lost' in the sense of misplacing something and 'lost' in the sense of becoming irrational).[178]

[177] On blending image frames and conceptual blending, see G. Fauconnier and M. Turner, *The Way We Think: Conceptual Blending and the Mind's Hidden Complexities* (New York: Basic Books, 2002), 39–58; for applying this model to linguistics, see Evans and Green, *Cognitive Linguistics*, 400–440.

[178] Evans and Green, *Cognitive Linguistics*, 288.

But more importantly, this same zeugma – in which *παραδιδόναι* functions as a zeugma which both indicates the death of Christ and the bestowal of a gift – actually occurs in one other place in Paul's letters. Consider Romans 8.32:

> *ὅς γε τοῦ ἰδίου υἱοῦ οὐκ ἐφείσατο ἀλλ᾽ ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν πάντων παρέδωκεν αὐτόν, πῶς οὐχὶ καὶ σὺν αὐτῷ τὰ πάντα ἡμῖν χαρίσεται;*
>
> He who indeed did not spare his own son but gave him over for us all, how will he not also with him bestow all things to us?

Reading through the first clause would not present any kind of ambiguity. The claim that 'God did not spare' obviously anticipates the announcement of someone's death. Thus, when Paul says that God 'gave his son', it signals that God moved Jesus Christ from the state of life to the state of death. In the next clause, this act is interpreted *also* as a handing over of a gift. Along 'with him (*σὺν αὐτῷ*)' (his Son), God will *also bestow* (*καὶ … χαρίσεται*) all things *to us*. In this instance, the bestowal of all things is an event which happens 'with' the Son who is given by God. Like Galatians 2.20, where the self-giving 'for me' is immediately interpreted as gift 'to me', here the giving over 'for us (*ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν*)' immediately implies that all things *with him* will be the given as a gift 'to us (*ἡμῖν*)'. In the first clause, 'handing over' is another way of saying 'did not spare'; in the second clause, 'handing over' of the Son is interpreted as the initial gift from which all other things will be given as gift. As Christina Eschner rightly notes, the 'giving' of the Son here has a 'Geschenkcharakter'.[179] In light of Rom 8.32, then, we should not see it as a stretch that, in light of the contextual evidence in Galatians, this kind of linguistic phenomenon also occurs in Galatians 1.4 and 2.20.

3.5. The Impossible Possibility: The Self-Gift of the One who Died

We have come a long way in this chapter since the discussion of self-gifts. In the analysis of Seneca and Philo above, I noted that, for these authors, the purpose of the self-gift was to deepen and press into a mutual relationship, and that the destruction of the self makes this kind of self-gift impossible. This is not, of course, necessarily the case with every author; but Seneca notes that Aeschines gives

[179] Eschner, *Gestorben und Hingegeben*, 1.455.

himself as gift in order to become pupil of Socrates; for Philo the Nazirite vow enables one to enter into a special relationship with God by maintinng certain embodied activities (not drinking alcohol, cutting hair, etc.). Both understand the intention of the gift to be completed in an ongoing embodied relationship of reciprocity.

Paul also considers ongoing relationship to constitute one of the goals of Christ's death. Just after Paul announces Christ's self-giving in 1.4, he scolds the Galatians for quickly turning away from the one who called them in grace (*ταχέως μετατίθεσθε ἀπὸ τοῦ καλέσαντος ὑμᾶς ἐν χάριτι*). The danger of this 'other gospel (*ἕτερον εὐαγγέλιον*)' is that, if they accept it and get circumcised, they will be 'cut off from Christ (*κατηργήθητε ἀπὸ Χριστοῦ*)' (5.4). Similarly, Christ's self-giving in 2.20 is surrounded by references to Paul's positive acts towards God. Because Christ gives himself as gift – a gift that results in Christ living *in* him – Paul 'lives to God' (2.19), 'lives by faith in the Son of God' and does not 'reject the gift of God' (2.19–21). Paul ends up as a 'slave to Christ' on the basis of Christ's redemptive action (1.10), and he hopes that 'Christ will be formed' in the Galatian community (4.19). For Paul, then, Christ gives himself as gift in order to initiate a relationship of ongoing mutuality with believers in which he will continue to benefit them by being present and forming them as the one who lives 'in' them.

Recall the point made above that, in a bipartite structure of self-gifting, the giver is identical to the gift, such that the giver cannot be destroyed in the act of giving without nullifying the gift (that is, when the intention of the gift is that the self would benefit the other through relationship). Presumably, Christ could therefore 'give himself' into death in order to give something *external* to himself to believers as gift; but, if my reading of the self-giving language in Galatians 1.4 and 2.20 is correct, Christ just *is* the content of the gift. But the language of self-giving refers both to Christ's self-gift and entry into the state of death. To deconstruct (and reimagine) Derrida's language, then, Paul's language of self-giving in Galatians does not refer to a 'gift of death' but rather *to one who died in order to give himself as gift*.[180] But how is this not a complete contradiction? If Christ destroys himself in the act of giving, he, at least upon first glance, cannot be in continuing relationship with believers; he

[180] J. Derrida, *The Gift of Death* (trans. D. Wills; Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995).

cannot be the content of the divine gift if he is eradicated while being given. It is, I suggest, the opening divine announcement of Galatians – God is 'the one who raised him (Jesus Christ) from the dead' (1.1) – that permits Paul to declare what would otherwise be a sheer impossibility: the self-gift of the one who died. The only possible way that Christ can both die and give himself as gift in the same event is if Christ retains his identity, his existence, and his own self *through* death. Thus, Paul can say Christ both dies and gives himself as gift only if he presupposes resurrection. If Galatians 1.4 and 2.20 both refer to a giving into death and a self-gift which intends to create an ongoing relationship through the act of giving, then that means that the notion of relational mutuality between Christ and believers (and thus resurrection also) is, in fact, *internal* to the language of self-giving in Galatians 1.4 and 2.20. This does not mean that 'gave himself' refers directly to these realities; rather, it means that these other aspects of Paul's thought are a necessary reality for the language to make any sense.

The difficulty with many interpretations of 'gave himself' was that interpreters take it as an obvious indication of the 'selfless' character of Christ's loving death. But if my reading of the language is correct, then, it is emphatically incorrect to read the language of self-giving, as well as the language of love, as referring only to the 'self-sacrificial' or 'selfless' love exemplified in Christ's death. Christ's loving entry into death cannot be taken as 'selfless' – or a form of self-renunciation, pure self-destruction, etc. – because the language requires Christ's self to retain its existence through death. If Jesus' self-giving is a self-gift, Galatians 1.4 and 2.20 do not imply that Jesus gave himself *away*. Christ dies, he gives himself, in order to live *with* believers beyond his death, with those who become, through this self-gift, those who serve Christ as his 'slaves' (Gal 1.10).[181] To close with the words of John Burnaby: 'The love which endures, which offers [or 'gives'] itself to the unloving, is always the servant of its own high purpose – not to rest till the sundered fellowship is restored, till rejection is changed to response. Calvary is for the sake of Pentecost'.[182]

[181] Thus, any interpretation of Galatians 1.4 or 2.20, as well as language of self-giving, should not be treated as indicating *only* self-sacrificial behaviour.

[182] Burnaby, *Amor Dei*, 307.

CHAPTER FOUR

Uniting Divine and Human History

> The gift, to be true, must be the flowing of the giver unto me, correspondent to my flowing unto him. When the waters are at level, then my goods pass to him, and his to me. All his are mine, all mine his.[183]

In Cicero's *De Natura Deorum*, Marcus Cato engages in an incisive tirade against the theology of Epicurus. Amongst his extensive list of objections, Cato dismisses the Epicurean notion that 'deity possesses an excellence and pre-eminence which must of its own nature attract the worship of the wise' (*Nat. D.* 1.41). Rather, the nature of the gods, even if it were excellent, cannot comprise a sufficient warrant for human worship. 'How can you owe piety to a person from whom you have received nothing? … I fail to see why the gods should be worshipped if we neither have received nor hope to receive benefit from them… [W]hat reason is there for adoring the gods on the ground of our admiration for the divine nature, if we cannot see (*videmus*) that that nature possesses any special excellence?' (1.41–1.42). If we have received nothing from the gods, we cannot know what they are like; if we do not know what they are like, we have no reason to serve them. Cato's alternative account proffers, *contra* Epicurus, that divine nature is only unveiled through divine beneficence (*gratia)*. 'For what can be better or more excellent than kindness and beneficence (*bonitate et beneficentia*)? Make out god to be devoid of either, and you make him devoid of all love, affection, or esteem for any other being, human or divine' (1.43). In other words, because the gifts bestowed by the gods enable us to perceive (*video*) their loving nature, it is only when the love of the gods becomes visible through their concrete acts of beneficence that humans become obligated to worship.

[183] R.W. Emerson, 'Gifts', in *The Complete Essays and Other Writings of Ralph Waldo Emerson* (ed. by B. Atkinson; Modern Library College Editions; New York: The Modern Library, 1940), 402-405, at 404.

There is at once a deep consonance and a deep dissonance between Marcus Cato and Paul. While they resonate in their common affirmation that divine beneficence discloses God's love, Paul's christocentric definition of divine gift disrupts the apparent harmony between them. Whereas for Cato a variety of divine deeds could demonstrate the excellence of the nature of the gods and thus call forth human piety, Pauline theology insists that God's love reveals itself in the singular act of divine beneficence in Christ crucified: 'God puts his own love for us on display (*συνίστησιν δὲ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ἀγάπην εἰς ἡμᾶς*)' – or in Cato's words, we 'see (*video*)' his loving nature – when 'Christ died for us' (Rom 5.8). This chapter focuses on how that act of love unfolds in Paul's descriptions of the Christ-event in Galatians.

The previous chapter argued that Christ's self must retain its existence through death, because he is the content of the divine gift; and, second that his love and self-giving were oriented towards some kind of relationship. This chapter looks at how this relationship consists in connecting and enmeshing the selves of Jesus and believers. In Paul's description of the Christ-event, Jesus' own self is extended towards and shared with believers in such a way that they share in his existence and are thereby established as moral actors. The expression of Christ's love in the incarnation therefore enacts a relational dynamic not reducible to pure 'other-regard' or 'self-interest' but rather consists in a kind of divine-human fellowship, wherein both God and humanity simultaneously benefit through their active connection with each other. Instead of being solely oriented towards either the benefit of the self or the other, by sharing his own self with others, Jesus' redemptive act aims towards creating an irreducible divine-human fellowship as an end in itself.

This argument will unfold in three parts. First, because many scholars have objected to the notion that Paul describes Jesus as voluntarily sharing in the human condition, this chapter begins by contending that Galatians 4.4 refers to Christ's movement from pre-existence into incarnation. Second, it provides readings of the christological material in Galatians 4.1–7 and 3.10–14, which highlight how Jesus takes in the experiences of others in order to share himself with them. Lastly, it looks at how this mutual participation between Jesus and believers enables believers' moral behaviour.

4.1. Issues in Paul's Christology

Most early readers of Galatians read 4.4 as depicting God sending the pre-existent Son into the cosmos to take up human existence: *ὅτε δὲ ἦλθεν τὸ πλήρωμα τοῦ χρόνου ἐξαπέστειλεν ὁ θεὸς τὸν υἱὸν αὐτοῦ, γενόμενον ἐκ γυναικός, γενόμενον ὑπὸ νόμον*.[184] While he might not have been the first to object to this reading, F.C. Baur seminally argued that the phrase *γενόμενος ἐκ γυναικός* refers not to the transformation of a divine, pre-existent being into a human but instead to Jesus' ordinary birth as a human.[185] Numerous scholars have since followed Baur's reading, but the most detailed argument against an incarnational reading of Galatians 4.4 has probably been made in James Dunn's *Christology in the Making* (1980).[186] In this section I first outline and critique Dunn's framework for understanding the emergence of early Christology and his resulting interpretation of Galatians 4.4, and then present positive arguments for reading Galatians 4.4 as depicting Christ's movement from pre-existence to incarnation.

4.1.1. 'Monotheism' and the Diachronic Analysis of Early Christology

Studies on the shape of early Christology – particularly investigations concerning whether a divine Christology comes to expression in the New Testament – have consistently employed a diachronic method which asks and attempts to answer if and how early Christology emerged out of a Jewish theological matrix.[187] One task taken up by many of these works is therefore to inquire into the relationship between Jewish monotheism and early Christology. What was considered possible within Jewish monotheism, and how does that inform our reading of the origins of early Christology?[188] Did

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[184] For example Marius Victorinus, *Marius Victorinus' Commentary on Galatians: Introduction, Translation, and Notes* (ed. S.A. Cooper; Oxford Early Christian Studies; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 304; John Chrysostom *Hom. Gal.* 4.4; August., *Exp. Gal.* 4.4; Irenaeus, *Adv. Haer.* 3.16.3, 7; 3.21.1; 3.5.21.

[185] F.C. Baur, *Paul the Apostle of Jesus Christ: His Life and Works, His Epistles and Teachings: A Contribution to a Critical History of Christianity* (2 vols; Edinburgh, 1873–1875), 2.213; for his longer argument against Christ's pre-existence in Paul, see 2.239–253. It is important to note that Baur sees pre-existence in Philippians 2.6, but he considers this to be a 'gnostic' idea which proves that Philippians was not written by Paul (*Paul the Apostle*, 2.45–79).

[186] J.D.G. Dunn, *Christology in the Making: A New Testament Inquiry into the Origins of the Doctrine of the Incarnation* (2d ed.; London: SCM, 1989). Another notable argument which anticipates Dunn's is W. Bousset, *Kyrios Christos* (trans. J.E. Steely; Nashville: Abingdon, 1970), 446–453.

[187] See the methodological comments in the helpful review of scholarship in A. Chester, 'High Christology – Whence, When and Why?', *EC* 2 (2011): 22–50.

[188] Some have rightly called for extreme caution in using the term 'monotheism' (N. Macdonald, *Deuteronomy and the Meaning of 'Monotheism'* (FAT II/1; Tubingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2003), and others have opined that we should abandon

early Christology deviate from Judaism by ascribing divinity to a human? Or could Jewish monotheism accommodate something like a divine christology?

Making this diachronic method his starting point, Dunn opens the second edition of his *Christology in the Making* by insisting that Jewish monotheism comprises one of the essential elements of the 'historical context of meaning' which determines how we should interpret christological statements in early Christian texts.[189] Second Temple Jews, Dunn opines, had a 'fundamental' commitment to 'the oneness of God',[190] and, since the earliest Christians were also Jewish monotheists, it is unlikely that they would have held to a divine Christology. It is crucial to note that the word 'oneness' functions in two ways for Dunn: he interprets Jewish monotheism to mean that 1) there is one God as opposed to many, and 2) that there can be no individuation (i.e. distinctions) within this God. Put another way, monotheism entails, for Dunn, both a belief about the number of gods – there is only one – and a belief about the nature of the one God – there is no 'diversification within the divine unity'.[191] While Dunn never explicitly acknowledges this twofold interpretation of 'monotheism', close attention to his argument will show that both of these senses are operative within his work. For example, Dunn's contention that Jewish 'monotheism' entails a kind of inner unity within God (i.e. one*ness*) becomes clear when he responds to Christopher Rowland's suggestion that some Jews believed in divine individuation (in Rowland's words, some believed in 'a hypostatic development' within God).[192] Dunn retorts that 'Jewish monotheists would have found the talk of "hypostatic development" meaningless and denied what it attempts to affirm'.[193] The implication of this interpretation of monotheism is monumental: if monotheism means not only that there is one God

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the term altogether (P. Fredriksen, 'Mandatory Retirement: Ideas in the Study of Christian Origins Whose Time has Come to Go', *SR* 35 (2006): 231–246, esp. 241–243). I use 'monotheism' mostly because it is the term widely used in the christological enquiries that I am describing here. Although (as will become clear below) I believe the term can perpetuate deeply problematic presuppositions, I will continue to use the term throughout.

[189] Dunn, *Christology*, xiv; see also Dunn, 'In Defence of a Methodology', *ET* 95 (1984): 295–299.

[190] Dunn, *Christology*, xxv.

[191] Dunn, *Christology*, xxv. It is notable that Baur expresses a similar sentiment in *Paul the Apostle*, 2.240–241.

[192] C. Rowland, *The Open Heaven: A Study of Apocalyptic in Judaism and Early Christianity* (London: SPCK, 1982), 100.

[193] Dunn, *Christology*, xxxviin66–xxviii. Another move which indicates this interpretation of monotheism is when Dunn asks, 'Can we, should we, recognise some sort of diversification within the divine unity a kind of "binitarianism" already in Jewish thought before christology as such emerged?' (*Christology*, xxv). But the question is clearly rhetorical: if Jews were truly monotheists, they could not have believed that plurality existed within the one God.

but also that this God cannot be individuated, it is *a priori* unlikely that the earliest Christians, who were themselves Jewish monotheists, could have quickly identified Jesus as God without seriously jeopardizing if not also contradicting and undermining their fundamental commitment to monotheism. It is therefore, according to Dunn, unlikely that the earliest Christians would have understood the various christological statements in New Testament texts to convey something like the divinity of Jesus.

Yet Dunn admits that the later New Testament texts, namely John, do have an incarnational Christology. But because such a theological shift from Jewish monotheism to ascribing divinity to Jesus could not have happened overnight, he asserts that 'some form of development must be presupposed' in the emergence of New Testament incarnational Christology.[194] The pressing question is therefore 'not whether but how quickly the (or a) Christian doctrine of incarnation comes to expression within the period and range of Christian teaching spanned by the NT documents.'[195]

This developmental framework naturally determines Dunn's reading of the New Testament texts. If there is a plausible reading of an early Christian text (including Paul's letters) which does not require a divine christology, it should be preferred in order to fit his proposed developmental model. Turning to Galatians, Dunn raises two important points to argue that Gal 4.4 does not refer to the incarnation. First, the phrase *γενόμενος ἐκ γυναικός* matches a common phrase in Greek and Hebrew which refers to an ordinary human birth.[196] Furthermore, while some interpreters take the *ἐκ*-prefix in the verb *ἐξαποστέλλειν* as indicating that God sent *out* his Son from heaven into the cosmos, Dunn points out

[194] Dunn, *Christology*, xiii;

[195] Dunn, *Christology*, xiii. Dunn entertains the possibility that there was a quick, radical shift in which early Jewish Christians began to claim that a human being was God. But because there is 'no evidence from the period prior to the second or the first century that Jews in general, including Christian Jews, perceived [early christology] as a threat to their monotheistic faith', it is unlikely that Christians were ascribing divinity to Jesus at such an early stage (*Christology*, xxviii). If Jesus were understood to be the incarnation of God (and thus as a distinguishable 'hypostasis' included within the one God) this would have posed such a threat to monotheism that it would have sparked heated debates between Christians and other Jews. But because no such evidence of debate over this exists, Dunn takes this as evidence that the earliest Christians likely did not claim that Jesus was divine. However, my analysis will suggest that other Jews did not oppose early Christians on the basis of divine christology precisely because Jewish monotheism could already accommodate that kind of theology.

[196] Dunn cites Job 14.1; 15.14; 25.4; IQS 11.20–21; IQH 13.14; 18.12–13, 16; Matt 11.11 (*Christology*, 40). Strictly speaking, none of the texts which he cites use the Greek phrase *γίνεσθαι* + *ἐκ γυναικός*, but other texts do use this phrase to refer to birth, including Jos. *Ant.* 2.102; 7.21; 8.315; 16.203; Plut. *Mor.* 75E; 859A; *Vit. Aem.* 35.1–2; Philo *Ios.* 232; *QE* 2.3b; Hdt. 1.61.4–5; 5.94.1.

that this verb ἐξαποστέλλειν could be read as referring to God commissioning him rather than sending him into the world.[197] With these two moves, Dunn constructs an entirely plausible reading of Galatians 4.4 which does not include any reference to the incarnation.

What is crucial to recognize here is that the observation that Galatians 4.4 could be read as not referring to the incarnation does not by itself comprise a sufficient argument for that reading. But when Dunn's point that the language of Galatians 4.4 *could* refer to something other than incarnation is coupled with his developmental hypothesis – according to which the earliest Christians most likely did not have a divine Christology – then noting these semantic *possibilities* forms an argument for their *probability*.[198] Yet the crucial foundation upon which this movement from possibility to probability rests is his developmental theory, which itself is based upon his understanding of Jewish monotheism. Thus, if it turns out that Dunn's interpretation of what Jews meant by 'God is one' (Deut 6.4) is, in fact, a misinterpretation, then the impetus and arguments for his understanding of early christology and the relevant texts would be radically undermined.

4.1.2. The Plurality of the One God in Judaism and Paul

Dunn's interpretation of Jewish monotheism has been thoroughly challenged by Benjamin Sommer's notable work, *The Bodies of God and the World of Ancient Israel*.[199] Sommer argues primarily for two points which he considers to comprise 'two instances of a single theological intuition': in the J and E sections of the Hebrew Bible 1) God's self is 'fluid', and 2) God's self can become embodied.[200] By 'fluid' Sommer means what I mean by the term 'individuation' – that the self or identity of God is subject to a kind of 'fragmentation' and inner plurality. Pointing to numerous ancient Near Eastern

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[197] Dunn, *Christology*, (xvii, 39); see similarly C.M. Tuckett, *Christology and the New Testament: Jesus and His Earliest Followers* (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2001), 51, 67n21. This use of ἐξαποστέλλειν can be found in e.g. Jeremiah 1.7 LXX.

[198] See the argument in Dunn, *Christology*, xvii.

[199] B. Sommer, *The Bodies of God and the World of Ancient Israel* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009). Others have put forth a similar thesis about the embodiment or anthropomorphic nature of God, including e.g. E.J. Hamori, *'When Gods Were Men': The Embodied God in Biblical and Near Eastern Literature* (BZAW 384; Berlin: de Gruyter, 2008); M.S. Smith, *Where the Gods Are Spatial Dimensions of Anthropomorphism in the Biblical World* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2016); A. Wagner, *Gottes Körper: Zur alttestamentlichen Vorstellung des Menschengestaltigkeit Gottes* (Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlaghaus, 2010); A.K. Knafl, *Forming God: Divine Anthropomorphism in the Pentateuch* (Siphrut 12; Winona Lake: Eisenbrauns, 2014).

[200] Sommer, *Bodies of God*, 55.

texts, Sommer raises the discussion by pointing out that 'Some divinities have a fluid self in the sense that there are several divinities with a single name who somehow are and are not the same deity'.[201] Coming to the Hebrew Bible, Sommer contends that, in J and E, God can manifest himself in a particular embodied form without restricting God's existence to that embodiment. For example, in Genesis 18, when three men come to visit Abraham, one of the visitors 'clearly is and is not identical with Yhwh; more precisely, He is Yhwh, but is not all of Yhwh or the only manifestation of Yhwh; rather, He is an avatar, a "descent" of the heavenly God who does not encompass all of that God's substance'.[202] This also comes to expression in the fact that the 'name (שֵׁם)' of God can 'refer to a hypostasis, a quality or attribute of a particular being that becomes distinct from that being but never entirely independent of it. In many texts, God's *shem* embodies but does not exhaust God's self, and it also maintains some degree of separate identity'.[203] Sommer insists here that 'the conceptual categories of "equation" and "nonequation" are not really applicable to the ancient theological intuition behind these texts'[204] because in these texts God has 'overlapping selves' which cannot be captured or described through static notions of identity and non-identity.[205] Within God and in his embodiment(s), rather, there is 'separation *cum* identity'.[206]

According to Sommer, these notions of divine fluidity and embodiment do not jeopardise monotheism. Rather, the J and E segments of the Hebrew Bible attest to a kind of 'multiplicity in unity'[207] within the divine according to which a particular embodiment of God retains its 'individual existence', but this does not imply the existence of 'independent deities'.[208] In fact, the divine fluidity model serves to protect the notion of monotheism, because '[t]he conception of God as multiply embodied allows for the possibility that God can be anthropomorphically involved in the world even

[201] Sommer, *Bodies of God*, 13; cf. the similar analysis of the ancient Near Eastern material in M. Hundley, 'To Be or Not to Be: A Reexamination of Name Language in Deuteronomy and the Deuteronomistic History', *VT* 59 (2009): 533–555.

[202] Sommer, *Bodies of God*, 41.

[203] Sommer, *Bodies of God*, 59.

[204] Sommer, *Bodies of God*, 26.

[205] Sommer, *Bodies of God*, 125.

[206] Sommer, *Bodies of God*, 14.

[207] Sommer, *Bodies of God*, 16.

[208] Sommer, *Bodies of God*, 129.

as God is not identified with the world, because this God is bound to no one place'.[209] One of Sommer's final conclusions is that the incarnational christology of early Christianity continues rather than deviates from these traditions of ancient Jewish theology. 'The presence of God and of God-as-Jesus on earth is nothing more than a particular form of this old idea of multiple embodiment, and hence no more offensive to a monotheistic theology than J and E sections of the Pentateuch'.[210]

Sommer, however, contends that the 'fluidity model' is rejected in the D and P sections of the Pentateuch. The regular insistence in D that Yhwh dwells in heaven while only placing his שֵׁם on earth implies to Sommer a rejection of divine fluidity: 'God has a nonfragmentable self, and therefore God has only one body, located exclusively in heaven'.[211] Conversely, P contends for the inverse model. 'The priestly narrative in the Pentateuch tells us that God descended from heaven to Mount Sinai (Exodus 24.15b–16), but not that God returned to heaven'.[212] D and P thus both reject that God can be in two places at once, as the former keeps God in heaven and the latter in the tabernacle. Yet this interpretation of D and P does not seem to hold up under close scrutiny, and Michael Hundley critiques Sommer's reading and accuses him of over-interpreting the statements in P about God's presence in the tabernacle: 'it seems more likely that the Priestly texts are careful to establish presence to ensure divine rule and protection, yet have no intention of denying Yhwh's simultaneous presence elsewhere and limiting him to a single form in a single place'.[213] Similarly, Hundley suggests that the divine placement of the שֵׁם in the tabernacle should not be taken to imply that God's presence is only in heaven. 'Like the gods of the Ancient Near East who can be present in their various statues and in heaven YHWH can be present in two places at once, in heaven and in his sanctuary on earth. With his presence, God brings heaven to earth, yet does so without diminishing his presence in heaven or leaving the heavenly realm unattended. Instead, God on earth also remains enthroned above'.[214] If

[209] Sommer, *Bodies of God*, 141.

[210] Sommer, *Bodies of God*, 133. Sommer provocatively states that the trinitarian theologies of early Christianity make no essential deviation from these Jewish conceptions of fluid monotheism (*Bodies of God,* 135–136).

[211] Sommer, *Bodies of God*, 67.

[212] Sommer, *Bodies of God*, 75.

[213] M. Hundley, 'Divine Fluidity? The Priestly Texts in their Ancient Near Eastern Contexts', in *Text, Time, and Temple: Literary, Historical and Ritual Studies in Leviticus* (ed. L. Trevaskis, F. Landy, and B. Bibb; Sheffield: Sheffield Phoenix, 2015), 16–40, at 30.

[214] Hundley, 'To Be or Not to Be', 539–540.

Hundley is right, then all strands of the Hebrew Bible attest that God has a fragmented and individuated self. The fluidity model is therefore held alongside D's monotheistic confession that 'God is one' (Deut 6.4).

A growing number of scholars have argued that many Second Temple texts contain a similar kind of theology.[215] For example, in *Wisdom of Solomon*, the figure of Wisdom possesses numerous divine qualities – she is 'holy', 'invulnerable', 'all-powerful' – and performs divine acts – she is a co-worker of the divine, the 'active cause of all things', and the means by which God formed humanity (7.23–24; 8.4–5, 8; 9.2), and even to be taught by Wisdom is to be taught by God himself (7.15, 22). This characterization of Wisdom is not simply 'functional' in the sense that Wisdom does what God does; rather, her divine functions are expressions of her unique ontological connection to the divine: she is 'a breath of the power of God', 'a pure emanation of the glory of the Almighty', 'a reflection of eternal light, a spotless mirror of the working of God', and 'an image of his goodness' (7.25–26). 'she can do all things' and 'she renews all things' (7.27). Deborah Forger therefore concludes from these sapiential depictions that *Wisdom*'s Wisdom 'is not separate from God, but constitutes an essential component of God's very identity'; she is, in fact, 'a part of the creator God' and yet also 'able to become embedded in the material world that God has made'.[216]

A similar theology can be found in the *Similitudes of Enoch* (1 En. 37–71).[217] When the 'Son of Man' is introduced in 46.1, he is clearly distinct from 'the Lord of Spirits' ('another was with him (*waməslehu kāl*')'), yet he functions on God's behalf as both the saviour of the righteous and the eschatological judge (45.3; 52.4; 61.8; 62.2). Perhaps the most striking aspect of this text is that the Son of Man is the

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[215] So D.L. Forger, 'Divine Embodiment in Jewish Antiquity: Rediscovering The Jewishness of John's Incarnate Christ' (PhD Diss., University of Michigan, 2017); J.E. Fossum, *The Name of God and the Angel of the Lord: Samaritan and Jewish Concepts of Intermediation and the Origin of Gnosticism* (WUNT 36; Tübingen: Mohr, 1985); Rowland, *The Open Heaven*, 94–113; Fletcher-Louis, *Christological Origins*, 293–316; D. Boyarin, *The Jewish Gospels: The Story of the Jewish Christ* (New York: New Press, 2012); Boyarin, 'The Gospel of the Memra: Jewish Binitarianism and the Prologue to John', *HTR* 94 (2001): 243–284. On problems with the term 'binitarian' see note 222 below.

[216] Forger, 'Divine Embodiment in Jewish Antiquity', 181. This analysis contrasts with Dunn's argument that wisdom is not a divine figure and therefore that 'wisdom-Christology' is not a divine christology (*Christology,* 163–212; 'In Defence of a Methodology', 297).

[217] It is now a general consensus that the *Similitudes* is a non-Christian Jewish work, though debate still continues regarding a precise date. On the Jewish nature of the *Similitudes* see the essays in G. Boccaccini, ed., *Enoch and the Messiah Son of Man: Revisiting the Book of Parables* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2007); G.W.E. Nickelsburg and J.C. VanderKam, *1 Enoch 2: A Commentary, Chapters 37–82* (Hermeneia; Minneapolis: Fortress, 2012), 58–62.

recipient of worship. 'All who dwell on earth will fall down and worship before him (*yəwadqu wayəsagdu qədmehu*)' (48.5; cf. Dan 3.5: תפלון ותסגדון לצלם). Similar to *Wisdom*, his divine operations are not just 'functional' but rather correlated with this position he holds in relation to the Lord of Spirits. So, the Son of Man 'stands in the presence' of the Lord of Spirits and sits on 'the throne of his glory (*manāfāst diba manbaro səbḥatihu*)' (61.8; 62.2; cf. 55.4; Matt 25.31), which the Lord of Spirits explicitly identifies as 'my throne (*manbareya*)' (51.3).[218] The author furthermore posits that the Son of Man has been eternally pre-existent with God, writing that 'before the stars of heaven were made, his name was named[219] before the Lord of Spirits … he was chosen and hidden in his presence, before the world was created and forever' (48.3, 6).[220] Like *Wisdom*'s Wisdom, it seems that the Son of Man performs divine functions and receives worship because, while he is distinct from the Lord of Spirits, he is also the unique embodiment of the divine.[221]

We could explore other Second Temple texts which espouse forms of divine embodiment and/or divine individuation, such as Sirach[222] and Philo,[223] but suffice to say here that the theology which Sommer outlines in J and E continues through D and P and well into the Second Temple period. Thus, many Second Temple Jews affirmed both that the self of God could be fragmented and that God could be embodied, all the while remaining committed to the belief that there is one God. *Contra* Dunn, for

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[218] A number of Ge'ez manuscripts have *manbaro* ('his throne'), but here I follow the reading of the earlier manuscripts, namely Tana 9.

[219] This might even mean that the Son of Man is receiving the divine name (so C.A. Gieschen, 'The Name of the Son of Man in the Parables of Enoch', in *Enoch and the Messiah*, 238–249, at 240).

[220] Nickelsburg and VanderKam argue that, because the Son of Man is named after the creation of the world in 48.2 (cf. 'and in that hour', *wabay'əti sa'āt*), the naming which occurs before creation in 48.3 refers to the divine plan to name the Son of Man and thus does not indicate the pre-existence of the Son of Man (*1 Enoch 1*, 169–170; by contrast, see G. Schimanowski, *Weisheit und Messias: Die jüdischen Voraussetzungen der urchristlichen Präexistenzchristologie* (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1985), 153–194). But it is hard to see how the Son of Man could only be an 'idea' in the divine mind when God appears to *act upon* the Son of Man before creation (God 'hides' him in 48.6). A more satisfactory explanation for the apparent discrepancy between 48.2 and 48.3 is that the text is correlating *Urzeit* and *Endzeit*, protology with eschatology: 48.2 describes a public, eschatological naming of the Son of Man (cf. Rom 1.3–4; Phil 2.9) which corresponds to the event before creation when God named the Son of Man.

[221] See similarly S.R. Scott, 'The Binitarian Nature of the Book of Similitudes', *JSP* 18 (2008): 55–78. While I resonate with many of Scott's conclusions, I find the term 'binitarian' rather unhelpful, since it seems to presume a kind of direct similarity between trinitarianism and notions of divine embodiment in Judaism.

[222] See e.g. Fletcher-Louis, 'The Temple Cosmology of P and Theological Anthropology in the Wisdom of Jesus ben Sira', in *Of Scribes and Sages: Early Jewish Interpretation and Transmission of Scripture* (ed. C.A. Evans; LNTS 50; SSEJC 9; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic, 2004), 69–113.

[223] See e.g. Forger, 'Divine Embodiment in Philo of Alexandria', *JSJ* 49 (2018): 223–262.

ancient Jews, the confession 'God is one' did not mean that that God possesses an essential 'one*ness*' that makes divine individuation impossible. His unexamined assumption that monotheism entails the view that God cannot be individuated or embodied furthermore inhibits him from seeing that the Christian conception of the incarnation could be seen as 'an indigenous Israelite idea' which 'has its roots in Israelite thought'.[224] In Forger's words, 'In the early centuries of the Common Era, members of the Jesus movement were not the only Jews who articulated a means by which Israel's God could become embodied on earth,'[225] and therefore early Christian ideas about the incarnation of Jesus should not be 'viewed as so singular as to be fundamentally different from all other instances of God-humanhood'.[226] Or, as Daniel Boyarin puts it, 'the very highest of New Testament Christologies' can be located 'within the borders of what can be historically, phenomenologically described as Jewry'.[227]

Thus, Dunn's foundational contentions – that the earliest Christians most likely did not hold to an incarnational Christology on the basis of the limits of Jewish monotheism, and that the incarnation must have taken decades to emerge – are based upon a fundamental misunderstanding of what Second Temple Jews meant, and didn't mean, by the expression 'God is one'.[228] In fact, since many monotheistic Jews thought that God could be individuated and embodied, we can reverse the plausibility structure espoused by Dunn: instead of coming to Paul with the assumption that he likely does not espouse a divine Christology, and thus interpreting any possible non-incarnational reading as the most probable, we should approach the Pauline texts with the expectation that he might espouse some form of divine fragmentation and embodiment.

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[224] E.J. Hamori, 'Divine Embodiment in the Hebrew Bible and Some Implications for Jewish and Christian Incarnational Theologies', in *Bodies, Embodiment, and Theology of the Hebrew Bible* (ed. S.T. Kamionkowski and W. Kim; The Library of Hebrew Bible/Old Testament Studies 465; London: T&T Clark, 2010), 161–183, at 180, 182 cf. 161.

[225] Forger, 'Divine Embodiment in Philo of Alexandria', 255.

[226] A. Goshen-Gottstein, 'Judaisms and Incarnational Theologies: Mapping Out the Parameters of Dialogue', *JES* 39 (2002): 219–247, at 235.

[227] Boyarin, 'Enoch, Ezra, and the Jewishness of "High Christology"', *Fourth Ezra and Second Baruch: Reconstruction after the Fall* (Supplements to the Journal for the Study of Judaism164; ed. M. Henze and G. Boccaccini; Leiden: Brill, 2013): 337–361, at 338.

[228] So Hamori: 'there is no reason to assume that this idea [the incarnation] must have developed later. To be more specific, it seems a bit circular that some would assign a late date to the concept of divine incarnation in Jesus, based on the prior assumption that such an idea must be foreign to Judaism'; thus we need not appeal to Hellenistic influence to explain the Christian idea of the incarnation: 'The type of anthropomorphism evident in the incarnation, however, is not exactly like that in Greek thought. It is in fact more like the anthropomorphic realism from the Hebrew Bible itself' ('Divine Embodiment', 180).

There are two Pauline texts which emphatically show that Paul is working with this kind of theology.[229] First, it is now widely recognized that in 1 Corinthians 8.6 Paul 'splits' the language of the Shema, the classic confession of Jewish monotheism. Whereas the Greek text of Deuteronomy 6.4 predicates *κύριος* as *ὁ θεός* and then declares that *κύριος εἷς ἐστιν*, Paul says that, though some believe that there are 'many gods' and 'many lords', 'for us there is one God, the Father (*εἷς θεὸς ὁ πατήρ*) … and one Lord, Jesus Christ (*εἷς κύριος Ἰησοῦς Χριστός*)'. Instead of having 'one Lord' who is also 'God', Paul takes the two nouns from the Shema – *θεός* and *κύριος* – and applies the former to the Father and the latter to Jesus. As Wright summarizes, here 'Paul has placed Jesus within an explicit statement, drawn from the Old Testament's quarry of emphatically monotheistic texts, of the doctrine that Israel's God is the one and only God, the creator of the world … Paul has redefined [the Shema] christologically, producing what we can only call a sort of christological monotheism'.[230] The implication of distributing the divine titles in this way is not that there are multiple Gods – indeed, in the previous clause Paul distances himself from those who believe in 'many gods' – but rather that plurality exists within divinity, that divinity could be fragmented, individuated, and inclusive of (at least) Jesus and the Father.

Second, in Philippians Paul describes Jesus in his pre-incarnate[231] state as 'being in the form of God (*ἐν μορφῇ θεοῦ ὑπάρχων*)' and 'existing in a manner equal to God (*τὸ εἶναι ἴσα θεῷ*)'.[232] After recounting Christ's incarnation, death, and exaltation, Paul announces that 'at the name of Jesus every knee will bow … and every tongue confess that Jesus Christ is Lord, to the glory of God the Father'

[229] The view that Paul holds to a divine Christology can now be called an 'emerging consensus' (Fletcher-Louis, *Christological Origins*). Some notable works which espouse a form of this hypothesis include L. Hurtado, *Lord Jesus Christ: Devotion to Jesus in Earliest Christianity* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2003); R. Bauckham, *Jesus and the God of Israel: God Crucified and Other Studies on the New Testament's Christology of Divine Identity* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2008); C. Tilling, *Paul's Divine Christology* (WUNT II/323; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2012); recently A.T.E. Loke, *The Origin of Divine Christology* (SNTSMS 169; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017).

[230] N.T. Wright, *The Climax of the Covenant: Christ And the Law in Pauline Theology* (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1991), 129. See similarly Fletcher-Louis, *Christological Origins,* 39–56; Bauckham, *God Crucified*, 97–104; Loke, *Origin of Divine Christology*, 26–32.

[231] Dunn proposed that this text does not refer to Christ as pre-existent, arguing instead that this depicts a kind of Adam-Christology (*Christology*, 113–125). This reading has not been generally well-received, as it seems to press the language well beyond its breaking point. There is a clear sequence here in which Christ is 'in the form of God' before he 'becomes in the likeness of humans' (Phil 2.7).

[232] I translate the phrase this way to capture the adverbial function of *ἴσα* (I deal with this in more detail below).

(2.11). Like 1 Corinthians 8.6, the language draws from a classically 'monotheistic' section of the Hebrew bible which claims that there is one unique God (Is 45.6) to whom 'every knee will bow' and 'every tongue will confess' (45.23). Paul has again taken a monotheistic confession and used it to convey the embodied Jesus as the recipient of divine honours.[233]

4.1.3. Divine Christology in Galatians

In light of what we have seen from 1 Corinthians and Philippians, there is no *a priori* reason to think that Paul is not working with this kind of Christology in Galatians. The opening line of Galatians, in fact, seems to portray Jesus in this way. Paul refers to Jesus and the Father on the other side of an apparently all-encompassing anthropological negation by declaring himself to be an apostle 'not from humans, nor through a human, but through Jesus Christ and God the Father' (1.1). As many have suggested since at least the time of Marius Victorinus in the early or mid fourth-century, the structure of this negation implies the divinity of Christ: if to receive apostleship from Jesus can be considered receiving it 'not from humans', then Jesus is at least included within the reality of God.[234] At the same time, the proceeding identification of God as 'the one who raised him from the dead' implies that Jesus is also human, since only humans can exist among 'the corpses (*νεκροί*)'. Paul therefore implies not only that there is some kind of distinction between God and humanity but also that Jesus should be considered to exist on both sides of that distinction. In other words, the first words of Galatians signal both the divinity and humanity of Christ, implying that he is both *θεός* and *ἄνθρωπος* and therefore an – or better: *the* – embodiment of God.[235] If we already know that Christ is divine from Galatians 1.1, then Galatians 4.4 (regardless of how we understand Paul's use of *γίνεσθαι*) should be read as depicting the birth of a divine being.

This reading is strengthened when we consider how Paul's use of *γίνεσθαι* here aligns with how the word operates in Greek myths about divine self-transformation.[236] For example, Moschus tells a story

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[233] See e.g. Bauckham, *Jesus and the God of Israel*, 38; Wright, *Climax*, 94.

[234] Victorinus, *Marius Victorinus' Commentary*, 256–257.

[235] A divine christology also might be implied by the similar contrast in Galatians 1.10.

[236] On the pervasiveness of the divine self-transformation motif in Greek mythology, see the extensive sources in R. Buxton, *Forms of Astonishment: Greek Myths of Metamorphosis* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). The relevance of these Greek myths for early Christian language about the Christ-event was set forth in an essay by Lawrence DiPaolo

in which Zeus 'hid his godness, altered his shape, and *became* a bull (*κρύψε θεὸν καὶ τρέψε δέμας καὶ γείνετο ταῦρος*)' (*Europa* 72).[237] In the *Odyssey*, when Menelaos recounts how he and three others attempted to subdue Proteus, the sea God: 'At noon the old god came out of the sea as well … Then with a shout we rushed upon him and locked our arms about him; but the ancient god had not forgotten his craft and cunning. He *became* (*γένετο*) in turn a bearded lion, a snake, a panther, a monstrous boar then he *became* (*γίγνετο*) running water, then a towering and leafy tree' (Hom. *Od.* 4.454–459).[238] One tale from Nicander's *Metamorphoses* (extant only in Antonius Liberalis' *Metamorphoses*) claims that Dryope, the granddaughter of the god Spercheios, was taught by nymphs how to sing and dance to the gods. At one time 'Apollo, seeing her dancing, desired to have sex with her (*ταύτην ἰδὼν Ἀπόλλων χορεύουσαν ἐπεθύμησε μιχθῆναι*). So he first *transformed* into a tortoise (*καὶ ἐγένετο πρῶτα μὲν κλεμμύς*)' (Ant. Lib. *Met.* 32.2). Treating the tortoise as a toy, Dryope hides it in her bosom. In response, Apollo 'changed shape, and instead of a tortoise *transformed* into a serpent (*μεταβαλὼν ἀντὶ τῆς κλεμμύος ἐγένετο δράκων*)', which terrified the nymphs and scared them away (32.2–3).[239] Such stories which utilize *γίνεσθαι* as a key term to refer to divine self-transformation are widely prevalent in Greek mythology (Ant. Lib. *Met.* 5, 10, 28; Ap. Rhod. *Argon* 4; Apollod. *Bibl.* 3.1.1; 3.13.5; 3.14.3; Hom. *Od.* 4.417–418; Parth. *Amat. narr.* 15.5; Plut. *Mor.* 357C; Eur. *Bacch.* 3, 44; Callim. *Hymn* 6.57–58; Lucian, *Dial. D.* 16.2; 20.14; *Philops.* 14).[240]

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that has since gone mostly ignored ('The God Transformed: Greco-Roman Literary Antecedents to the Incarnation', in *From Judaism to Christianity: Tradition and Transition: A Festschrift for Thomas H. Tobin, S.J., on the Occasion of His Sixty-fifth Birthday* (ed. P. Walters; NovTSup 136; Leiden: Brill, 2010): 207–219).

[237] My translation.

[238] Translation adapted from Homer, *The Odyssey* (trans. W. Shewring; Oxford World's Classics; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980).

[239] My translation.

[240] So Buxton: 'many cases of metamorphosis involve not just a change of appearance but a process or a moment of "becoming". The most indicative word in these cases is usually *γίγνομαι*' (*Forms of Astonishment*, 23; however, see the discussion in pp. 169–170, in which he notes that *γίνεσθαι* is not the only word which can be used to refer to an actual 'becoming'). Buxton's analysis problematises Jörg Frey's contention that 'die mythologischen Erzählungen vom Herabsteigen der Götter werden philosophisch natürlich in dem Sinne erklärt, dass deren sichtbare Körper nur Scheinleiber waren, nicht reale Leiber aus Fleisch und Blut' ('Joh 1,14, die Fleischwerdung des Logos und die Einwohnung Gottes in Jesus Christus: Zur Bedeutung der "Schechina Theologie" für die johannesche Christologie', in *Das Geheimnis der Gegenwart Gottes: Zur Schechina-Vorstellung in Judentum und Christentum* (ed B. Janowski et al.; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2014), 231–256, at 239; cf. 241. Whereas DiPaolo agrees with Frey about the content of divine self-transformation myths when DiPaolo claims that 'In general, the classical authors were content to describe the transformed god as something that only "seemed like" or "looked like" this new form, whether human or animal' ('The God Transformed', 218), DiPaolo nevertheless thinks that these divine self-transformation myths provide a relevant

Outside of Galatians, Paul seems to use *γίνεσθαι* in the sense that these Greek myths do. In 1 Corinthians Paul states that 'Christ became (*ἐγενήθη*) for us wisdom from God, righteousness, sanctification, and redemption' (1 Cor 1.30). While this does not necessarily refer to the incarnation as such, it is clear that *γίνεσθαι* signals that Christ underwent some kind of transformation in order to benefit believers. A closer parallel to these Greeks myths shows up in Philippians, where Paul uses *γίνεσθαι* to refer to Christ's self-transformation to become a human being. From his state of pre-existence, Paul writes, Christ 'humbled himself … becoming (*γενόμενος*) in the likeness of men … becoming (*γενόμενος*) obedient to the point of death' (2.7–8). Many of the words deployed in Phil 2.6–8 are also used in connection with divine self-transformation myths.[241] Just as Paul speaks of the *μορφή* of Jesus, in Plato's *Republic* Socrates argues against the mythical traditions of divine self-transformation by stating that the gods cannot transform (*γίνεσθαι*) their form (*μορφή*) (Pl. *Resp.* 380D; cf. 377D).[242] And in the same way that Paul says that Jesus 'became in the likeness of humans (*ἐν ὁμοιώματι ἀνθρώπων γενόμενος*)' (Phil 2.7), a text from Apollodorus' *Bibliotheca* states that 'Zeus, coming in the night … became the likeness of Amphitryon (*ὅμοιος Ἀμφιτρύωνι γενόμενος*) and lay with Alcmena' (2.4.8; see also Apollod. *Bibl.* 3.10.7 with *ὁμοιοῦν*).[243] Lastly, Euripides recounts that Zeus transformed himself and 'took up the likeness of a swan (*κύκνου μορφώματ' ὄρνιθος λαβών*)' (*Hel.* 2.16–21), which is strikingly similar to Paul's claim that Jesus 'took up the form of a slave (*μορφὴν δούλου λαβών*)' in the incarnation (Phil 2.7). Turning to Galatians 3.13, Paul seems to be using *γίνεσθαι* in the same sense: 'Christ redeemed us … by becoming (*γενόμενος*) a curse for us'. Here *γενόμενος* clearly does not mean 'someone who was born a curse' or 'someone who had been a curse' but rather indicates that Christ voluntarily took on a condition which he previously did not have, that he has willingly changed himself to '*become* a curse'.

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background to early Christian language for the Christ-event. While I agree with DiPaolo's final conclusion against Frey regarding the relevance of this Greek material, Buxton's analysis demonstrates, *contra* both Frey and DiPaolo, that not all of the myths depict the gods as only 'appearing' in certain forms rather than actually becoming something.

[241] Cf. the discussion of this passage and divine self-transformation myths in P.A. Holloway, *Philippians: A Commentary* (Hermeneia; Minneapolis: Fortress, 2017), 119–123.

[242] With *μορφή* and *γίνεσθαι* see Lucian, *Dial. D.* 5.2; with *μορφή* see Eur. *Bacc.* 2.3; Plut. *Alex.* 3.4–6; cf. Verg. *Aen.* 9.645 (using *forma*).

[243] My translation.

To synthesize the foregoing discussion, then, and to come to a final conclusion: since Paul implies a divine Christology in Galatians 1.1, and since he uses *γίνεσθαι* to refer to Christ's voluntary self-transformation in Galatians 3.13[244] and to Christ's transformation from pre-existence to incarnation in Philippians 2.7, the phrase *γενόμενος ἐκ γυναικός*[245] in Galatians 4.4 should be read as referring not just to the birth of a human being but to the voluntary self-transformation of one who chose in his pre-existent state to enter the cosmos to become a human being – to 'become from woman'.[246]

4.2. Divine-Human Mutual Participation

In contrast to the compressed summary-statements of Christ's action in Galatians 1.4 and 2.20, Galatians 4.1–7 and 3.10–14 draw out the structure of the Christ-event, outlining in further detail humanity's and Israel's plight (4.3; 3.10–12), Jesus' action to redeem others from that plight (4.4; 3.13), and the soteriological benefits resulting from this occurrence (4.5–7; 3.14). The point of the following section is to show that, in Paul's descriptions of the Christ-event, Jesus takes up the 'stuff' of humans and thereby shares his own self with them. In other words, Jesus' sharing in the human condition enacts a dynamic of mutual participation between Jesus and believers, in which what belongs to humanity (and Israel) is absorbed by the Son of God and, thereby, what belongs to the Son of God is

[244] Moreover, the numerous similarities between Gal 3.10–14 and Gal 4.3–7 suggest that *γίνεσθαι* is being used also in a similar way (to refer to divine self-transformation). They both use the language of 'redemption (*ἐξαγοράζειν*)', have two *ἵνα*-clauses which explicate the soteriological benefits of the Christ event, and speak of the bestowal of the Spirit (I consider the similarities between these two texts in more detail below).

[245] While it could be argued that the aorist participle indicates that the birth of Jesus happens before God sends him, the aorist participle encodes only aspect, not time, and therefore we must determine the time of the participle relative to the main verb by context (B. Fanning, *Verbal Aspect in New Testament Greek* (Oxford Theological Monographs; Oxford: Clarendon, 1990); 406–407, 413–414). In light of the contextual factors outlined above, it seems best to see the divine sending as occurring prior to Jesus 'becoming from woman'.

[246] According to Grant Macaskill, in Galatians 4.4 Paul 'affirms his [the Son's] real humanity and his real divinity and, in affirming the latter, he forces us to speak of individuation in God' (*Union with Christ in the New Testament* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 223). See similarly B. Trick, *Abrahamic Descent, Testamentary Adoption, and the Law in Galatians: Differentiating Abraham's Sons, Seed, and Children of Promise* (NovTsup 169; Leiden: Brill, 2016), 230–246; M. Hengel, *The Son of God: The Origin of Christology and the History of Jewish-Hellenistic Religion* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1976), 10–11; Chester, *Messiah and Exaltation: Jewish Messianic and Visionary Traditions and New Testament Christology* (WUNT 207; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2007), 389–390; F. Mußner, *Der Galaterbrief* (HTKNT 9; Freiburg: Herder, 1974), 181, 272–273; R. Bring, *Der Brief des Paulus an die Galater* (Berlin: Lutherisches Verlagshaus, 1968), 170–171.

shared with humanity. This section thus provides a thicker account of the shape of the action which Paul summarizes as an act of 'love (*ἀγαπᾶν*)' in Galatians 2.20.

4.2.1. Galatians 4.1–7

This passage follows directly from Paul's climactic announcement that all those who are of Christ, whether Jew or gentile, are the seed of Abraham (*τοῦ Ἀβραὰμ σπέρμα*) and thus 'heirs according to promise (*κατ' ἐπαγγελίαν κληρονόμοι*)' (Gal 3.29). The notion that only belonging to Christ determines one's status as an heir requires the affirmation that possessing or obeying the Torah neither constitutes nor indicates one's being in Christ. To add supporting evidence for this point, Paul articulates that the Torah was set up 'on account of transgressions' and that its intended duration is limited. The Torah came 430 years after the promise and remains in effect only 'until Christ (*εἰς Χριστόν*)', and during that time it functioned something like a *παιδαγωγός* – a temporary guardian put in place by a father. These statements indicate that for Paul the Torah is both an essentially *contingent* and *temporary* reality: it was laid down in response to Israel's transgressions and meant only for limited time. To explain this in further depth, Paul brings in a legal example. 'What I mean is that, as long as the heir is a child, he is no different from a slave, albeit owner of all; but he is under guardians and taskmasters until the time set by the father'.[247] Rather than hyperbolically identifying sons and slaves in every way, the assertion that a young male heir 'differs in no way (*οὐδὲν διαφέρει*) from a slave' (4.1) identifies a single similarity between them: neither possesses an inheritance.[248] While a child, the heir differs therefore only hypothetically, because the son does not receive an

[247] For a summary of this legal example, see Betz, *Galatians,* 202–203.

[248] James Scott argues that that too many incongruities arise in the analogy between 4.1–2 and 4.3–7 if 4.1–2 is read as a metaphor from Roman or Hellenistic practice; he instead proposes that 4.1–2 is not a metaphor but a direct reference to Israel's time in Egypt (*Adoption as Sons of God: An Exegetical Investigation into the Background of ΥΙΟΘΗΣΙΑ in the Pauline Corpus* (WUNT II/48; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1992), 123; cf. 121–186). However, analogies have limits, and pointing out that there is not univocal correspondence between two things set in analogy does not imply that there is no analogy at all. For a sharp critique of Scott's rereading and his followers see J.K. Goodrich, 'Guardians, not Taskmasters: The Cultural Resonances of Paul's Metaphor in Galatians 4.1–2', *JSNT* 32 (2010): 251–84, and Goodrich, '"As Long as the Heir is a Child": The Rhetoric of Inheritance in Galatians 4:1–2 and P.Ryl. 2.153', *NovT* 55 (2013): 61–76.

inheritance until the predetermined time. Both slave and minor remain functionally identical, as neither possesses any real property.[249]

Paul uses this legal example to form one side of an analogy. In the same way that a minor son is legally no different than a slave, Paul claims that 'even we, when we were minors, were enslaved under the *τὰ στοιχεῖα τοῦ κόσμου*' (4.3). Given that the analogy directly follows an argument about the contingency and temporary nature of the Mosaic Torah, the 'we' in this instance probably refers to Jews in particular. According to this analogy, then, the relationship between a son pre-inheritance (4.1–2a) and a son post-inheritance (4.2b) bears some level of similarity to the relationship between Israel under *τὰ στοιχεῖα τοῦ κόσμου* (4.3) and the liberation of those 'under the law' in 4.5. Stated as a formula, a son pre-inheritance is to a son post-inheritance as Israel's history *ante Christum* is to Israel's history *post Christum*.

This analogy intends to support the contention that the Torah was unable to secure or actualize the bestowal of the inheritance. The point here is not that the Torah is identical to *τὰ στοιχεῖα τοῦ κόσμου*, nor that the Torah is a malevolent 'cosmic power'.[250] Rather, the thrust of the passage is that, if Israel possessed the Torah and yet was still enslaved to *τὰ στοιχεῖα τοῦ κόσμου* – and thus did not possess the promised inheritance – then the Torah was impotent to ensure the bestowal of the inheritance. With different imagery, the same point is delivered by Paul's shocking assertion that the Torah was essentially unable 'to make alive (*ζῳοποιεῖν*)' (3.21),[251] implying that Israel is, for all intents

[249] As Goodrich aptly summarizes, 'While there existed real differences between sons and slaves in treatment and privilege, their rights while in the power of the paterfamilias varied only minutely from a legal perspective' ('Guardians, not Taskmasters', 253).

[250] For the view that *τὰ στοιχεῖα τοῦ κόσμου* refer to evil cosmic powers, see e.g. Martyn, *Galatians*, 393–406 and de Boer, *Galatians*, 252–260. Josef Blinzler has however provided strong evidence for the view that the phrase *τὰ στοιχεῖα τοῦ κόσμου* refers to the physical elements which make up the cosmos ('Lexikalisches zu dem Terminus *Ta stoicheia tou kosmou* bei Paulus', in *Studiorum Paulinorum Congressus Internationalis Catholicus 1961* (2 vols; AnBib 17–18; Rome: Pontifical Biblical Institute, 1961), 2.429–443; cf. e.g. Philo *Aet.* 107; *Opif.* 146). De Boer agrees with this analysis but still insists that Paul is depicting these as cosmic powers. The movement from physical elements to demons seems problematic here, especially in light of Gerhard Dilling's study which shows that most early Christian commentators from the first two centuries held the view that they referred only to the physical elements, not to demons ('*Στοιχέω κτλ.*', *TDNT* 7.666–687). Notably, the earliest commentary on Galatians does not support the demonic reading (Victorinus, *Marius Victorinus' Commentary*, 302–303).

[251] This pushes back against the interpretation that the Torah helps Israel mature or develop to prepare for Christ's entry into the cosmos (4.4). It would stretch the metaphor to conclude, as Lightfoot does, that the Torah made the world or Israel 'more capable of apprehending the gospel than it would have been at an earlier age' (J.B. Lightfoot, *Saint Paul's Epistle to the Galatians* (London: Macmillan and Co., 1865), 266). Peter Garnsey likewise contends that, in the

and purposes, trapped in the realm of death even while she possesses the Torah. For this reason, the solution to Israel's plight cannot be located either in the Torah or in obedience to it – it cannot originate from anything already within the realm of Israel's history. To bring her out of slavery to *τὰ στοιχεῖα τοῦ κόσμου* requires 'an event which irrupts into history from without and is therefore not produced by forces operative on the surface of history', an event which breaks into the realm of slavery and possesses the power to bring life out of death.[252]

This life-giving event is enacted in Christ's participation in the human and Israelite condition: 'But when the fulness of time had come, God sent out his Son, the one who became from woman, the one who became under the law (*ὅτε δὲ ἦλθεν τὸ πλήρωμα τοῦ χρόνου, ἐξαπέστειλεν ὁ θεὸς τὸν υἱὸν αὐτοῦ, γενόμενον ἐκ γυναικός, γενόμενον ὑπὸ νόμον*), in order to redeem those under the law (*ἵνα τοὺς ὑπὸ νόμον ἐξαγοράσῃ*)' (4.4–5). Although the precise connection between the description of Jesus as 'from woman' and 'under the law' is not entirely clear, the explication that he became 'under the law (*ὑπὸ νόμον*)' at least means that the Son's assumption of human existence cannot be separated or understood in isolation from his human existence *as a Jew*.[253] Indeed, the objects of Jesus' redemptive activity in this text are specifically Jews, those whom Paul identifies as 'those under the law (*οἱ ὑπὸ νόμον*)'.[254] In any event, what is more crucial for our purposes is what Susan Eastman calls the

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metaphor of 4.1–2, the primary difference between the heir's time as a child and the heir receiving the inheritance is 'the *capacity* of the son to inherit' ('Sons, Slaves – and Christians', in *The Roman Family in Italy: Status, Sentiment, Space* (ed. B. Rawson and P.R.C. Weaver; Oxford: Clarendon, 1997), 100–121, at 106). Lightfoot and Garnsey's reading assumes that the heir's maturity-level provides a (if not *the*) criterion for the date of the Father's *προθεσμία*. But two things suggest otherwise. First, Roman practice was much more complex than this: determining the age of inheritance for a child could have been based on an inestimable number of factors. As Richard Saller put it, 'Perhaps the most important characteristic of the classical law of succession was its flexibility, which could be used to validate any number of patterns of devolution of property' (*Patriarchy, Property, and Death in the Roman Family* (Cambridge Studies in Population, Economy, and Society in Past Time 25; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994) 180; cf. 155–180; Saller, 'Roman Heirship Strategies in Principle and in Practice', in *The Family in Italy from Antiquity: From Antiquity to the Present* (ed. D.I. Kertzer and R.P. Saller; New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991), 26–47, at 43–46. Second, we should bring into focus what Paul actually says here in this metaphor, remaining cautious not to stretch the metaphor to draw out too many implications from what is left unstated. Paul deploys this example to explain the temporal restrictions of the Torah, and there is no indication from the context that Israel's maturity determines the time of *ἡ προθεσμία τοῦ πατρός*.

[252] The citation is from B.L. McCormack, *Karl Barth's Critically-Realistic Dialectical Theology: Its Genesis and Development 1909–1936* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1997), 146.

[253] D.J. Rudolph, *A Jew To the Jews: Jewish Contours of Pauline Flexibility in 1 Corinthians 9:19–23* (WUNT II/304; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2011), 177n13.

[254] Because gentiles are those *μὴ νόμον ἔχοντα φύσει* (Rom 2.14), it is hard to see how Paul would consider gentiles to be included within the category of 'those under the law' (*pace* de Boer, *Galatians*, 264). I take *φύσει* in Rom 2.14 as

'participatory logic' of Christ's action: in order to redeem the humans who lived under the Torah, the Son himself became a human who lived under the Torah.[255]

The first positive effect of the redemption accomplished by the incarnation is that 'we' receive 'adoption' (*ἵνα τὴν υἱοθεσίαν ἀπολάβωμεν*, 4.6).[256] The juxtaposition of filial relationships in the sequence 'God sent forth his Son … so that we might receive adoption' implies a correlation between the sonship of the Son and the sonship which believers receive through adoption. Yet we can see both similarity and dissimilarity between the sonship of the Son and the sonship of believers here. As Macaskill recognises, whereas 'the sonship of Jesus is presented as inherent' the sonship of believers is a derivative status given to them from without.[257] While Michael Peppard has argued that the distinction between a 'Son by nature' (Jesus) and a 'sons by adoption' (believers) reflects an inappropriate import of a Platonic being/becoming antithesis into early Christian texts, this distinction is, I think, insinuated in the text.[258] There is nothing here to imply that Jesus becomes the Son, either at his incarnation, death, or resurrection, or at any other moment; the Son is identified as Son *before* his incarnate existence (4.4). By contrast, the implication of the claim that 'we receive adoption' from the Son becoming 'from woman' and 'under the law' signals that 'we' were not sons in relation to God prior to the Son's entry into the human condition.[259] In this adoption-event, then, God places believers

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modifying *ἔχειν* rather than *ποιεῖν*, following S.J. Gathercole, 'A Law unto Themselves: The Gentiles in Romans 2.14–15 Revisited', *JSNT* 85: (2002): 27–49, at 35–37.

[255] S.G. Eastman, 'Apocalypse and Incarnation: The Participatory Logic of Paul's Gospel', in *Apocalyptic and the Future of Theology: With and Beyond J. Louis Martyn* (ed. J. Davis and D.K. Harink (Eugene: Wipf & Stock, 2012), 165–182; cf. R. Tannehill, *The Shape of the Gospel* (Eugene: Cascade, 2007), 223–237. This reading deeply problematises Rodrigo J. Morales' rather astounding claim that the phrase *γένομενος ἐκ γυναίκος* 'does not seem to play a significant role in the argument' (*The Spirit and the Restoration of Israel: New Exodus and New Creation Motifs in Galatians* (WUNT II/282; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2010), 123).

[256] It is unclear whether this 'we' refers to Israel or to all believers, since Paul immediately turns to speak of the gentile Galatians also being sons in 4.6.

[257] Macaskill, *Union with Christ*, 223; see further Macaskill, 'Incarnational Ontology and the Theology of Participation in Paul', in *"In Christ" in Paul: Explorations in Paul's Theology of Union and Participation* (ed. M.J. Thate, K.J. Vanhoozer, and C.R. Campbell; WUNT II/384: Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2014). 87–101, at 97–98; cf. Hurtado, 'Son of God', in *DPL* 900-906, at 906.

[258] M. Peppard, *The Son of God in the Roman World: Divine Sonship in its Social and Political Context* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 30 and throughout. This distinction was made by many of the fathers (e.g. Cyril, *Comm. John* 1.34). But since this distinction regarding sonship is also made by Polybius (18.35.9: *κατὰ φύσιν*/*κατὰ θέσιν*), I see no reason for suggesting that only Platonism could lead to asserting the difference between sons by nature and sons by adoption.

[259] Peppard comments that Jesus' natural sonship is irrelevant to this text because the thrust of the passage is 'eschatological, not protological' ('Adopted and Begotten Sons of God: Paul and John on Divine Sonship', *CBQ* 73 (2011):

into a relationship analogous to how the Son naturally relates to the Father. As Nickelsburg writes, the incarnation is 'the mechanism that facilitates salvation when humans become children of God like God's Son … It is possible to be "in Christ" because the Son became human.'[260]

Paul then claims that believers' status as sons forms the basis for receiving the Son's own Spirit: 'Because you are sons, God has sent the Spirit of his Son into our hearts, crying *αββα ὁ πατήρ*.'[261] The logic underwritten in the argument that believers receive the Spirit *of his Son* precisely *because* they are sons seems to be that whatever belongs to the Son also belongs to all those who share his status as son. The Spirit's entry into the hearts of believers furthermore produces the prayer-like cry of *αββα ὁ πατήρ*. The Aramaic form of this cry is likely used here because it hearkens back to the action of Jesus Christ himself and makes 'a deliberate echo of this expression of Jesus' relationship to his Father.'[262] Thus, not only do believers share in the Son's status as Son and his Spirit, but they also share in his *activity*. In other words, the way that Jesus as Son acts towards the Father is the same way that believers as sons act towards the Father by the power of the Son's Spirit. Seen from a wider angle, this final statement about the Abba-cry completes a kind of a soteriological *inclusio* in 4.4–6: the Father sends the Son to become incarnate and sends Christ's Spirit to believers, and this Spirit creates action which mimics Jesus' own prayers and is directed back to the Father. Thus, Jesus identification with human creatures enables believers to be 'brought into the sphere of Jesus' own intimate and obedient relationship to God.'[263]

93–110, at 98; cf. Dunn, *Christology*, 41). But this amounts to a circular argument: he can only say that the point of the passage is eschatological as opposed to protological because he sees no protological elements in the text. Under my reading, it is better to say that Paul *correlates* protology and eschatology: the status that believers eschatologically receive is the status analogous to that of the Son prior to him becoming human.

[260] Nickelsburg, 'The Incarnation: Paul's Solution to the Universal Human Predicament', in *George W.E. Nickelsburg in Perspective: An Ongoing Dialogue of Learning* (2 vols.; ed. J. Neusner A.J. Avery-Peck; JSJsup 80; Leiden: Brill, 2003), 1.590– 599, at 598. Or, in Augustine's memorable saying, *Hinc enim adoptionem recipimus, quod ille unicus non dedignatus est participationem naturae nostrae* (*Exp. Gal.* 4.4).

[261] I take the *ὅτι* here as causal, but this does necessarily mean that there is a temporal delay between receiving sonship and the Spirit. It appears that Paul is placing these two things in a *causal*, but not necessarily *chronological*, order. This causal reading of the *ὅτι* seriously endangers Matthew Theissen's thesis that *πνεῦμα* creates kinship between believers, Christ, and Abraham (*Paul and the Gentile Problem* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 105–128). Paul here espouses precisely the opposite view: kinship with God is the basis for receiving the Spirit.

[262] V. Rabens, *The Holy Spirit and Ethics in Paul* (2d ed.; WUNT II/283; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2013), 234.

[263] B.W. Longenecker, *The Triumph of Abraham's God: The Transformation of Identity in Galatians* (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1998), 234. In Kathryn Tanner's words, 'Jesus, as the human version of the Son in his relations with the Father and Spirit, is the means by which we are to receive the Spirit and be transformed thereby in our humanity, but this Spirit

The climax of this section, which ties together the threads about inheritance from Galatians 3, comes when Paul asserts that in the wake of the incarnation believers are now heirs: *ὥστε οὐκέτι εἶ δοῦλος ἀλλ᾽ υἱός· εἰ δὲ υἱός, καὶ κληρονόμος διὰ θεοῦ* (4.7).[264] As with 4.6, the logic here seems to be that believers are heirs precisely because they participate in the one who is the sole and true heir to the Abrahamic promises. As Paul claims in his exegetical *tour de force* in chapter three, it is Jesus who is the single seed of Abraham (3.16). The crucial contribution of Galatians 3.19 to this theme is however deeply obscured by the NRSV translation, which states: 'Why then the law? It was added because of transgressions, until the offspring would come *to whom the promise had been made* (*τὸ σπέρμα ᾧ ἐπήγγελται*)'. But this final relative clause more literally says, 'the offspring to whom *it* was promised'. This raises the question of what the subject of the passive verb *ἐπήγγελται* is. Whereas the NRSV implies a kind of redundancy here (the promise was promised), looking at Galatians 3.18 points in a different direction. There Paul writes that 'if the inheritance (*κληρονομία*) comes from the law, it no longer comes from the promise; but God granted *it* [i.e. *the inheritance*] to Abraham through promise (*τῷ δὲ Ἀβραὰμ δι᾽ ἐπαγγελίας κεχάρισται ὁ θεός*)'. This lends support to the view that the implied subject of *ἐπήγγελται* in 3.19 is, in fact, *κληρονομία*, and thus the final clause of Galatians 3.19 should be translated as 'the offspring to whom the inheritance was promised'. In light of this, it

is the Spirit of Christ who therefore works to conform us with the Son: our lives in and through the Spirit are to take on the shape of Jesus' own' (*Jesus, Humanity, and the Trinity: A Brief Systematic Theology* (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2001), 20). In a similar vein, Francis Watson writes that God sends the Spirit 'to enable participation in the life that the crucified and risen Jesus shares with the God he addresses as "Abba, Father"' ('The Triune Divine Identity: Reflections on Pauline God-Language, in Disagreement with J.D.G. Dunn', *JSNT* 23 (2001): 99–124, at 121); cf. Macaskill, *Union with Christ*, 222, 225

[264] The phrase 'heirs through God' seems to strike a direct contrast with the Torah, which was 'arranged through angels by the hand of an intermediary' (Gal 3.19). As Barclay recognises, while Paul does not strike a sharp antithesis between the Torah and God, this interpretation of the angels at Sinai does place some *distance* between God and the Torah: Paul 'uses the presence of angels at Sinai to make God's relation to the Torah less immediate and less direct than his relation to the promise' (*Paul and the Gift*, 403–404). To build upon this insight, in contrast to the arrangement of the Torah 'through' another party, the Father's sending out of the Son and the Spirit comprises a more direct, if not unmediated, mode of interaction with believers who become heirs 'through *God*'. This might imply that divine christology as well as a divine pneumatology plays a critical role in Paul's theological argumentation about the contrast between law and promise. See similarly S.R. Swain, '"Heirs through God": Galatians 4:4–7 and the Doctrine of the Trinity', in *Galatians and Christian Theology: Justification, the Gospel and Ethics in Paul's Letter* (ed. M.W. Elliott et al.; Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2014), 258–267.

seems that believers can be called *κληρονόμοι* only because they participate in the single offspring of Abraham to whom the inheritance was actually promised.[265]

To summarise our findings thus far, then, in Gal 4.1–7, what we find is a pattern of mutual participation: the Son is sent into the cosmos in order to take up the human condition and become 'under the law' as a Jew, an event which triggers the redemption of those under the law and results in believers sharing in the Son's own sonship, prayers, and inheritance.

4.2.2. Galatians 3.10–14

Galatians 3.10–14 is a notoriously thorny passage, containing numerous compressed arguments and curious turns of phrases that have long perplexed interpreters. Nevertheless, this section possesses a discernable structure and logic which is similar to 4.1–7. Like 4.3, Paul introduces a particular problem: 'Everyone who is from works of the law is under a curse', and as warrant for this claim, he appeals to the Deuteronomic assertion that 'everyone who does not observe and obey all the things written in the book of the law is curse' (3.10). One of the submerged premises here is that, for one reason or another, 'those from works of the Torah' in fact fail to obey Torah itself and thus incur the curse (cf. 6.13).[266] Given the context of Paul's citation from Deuteronomy, this likely focuses again on Israel's history in particular and highlights the outworking and final results of Israel's long history of covenant failure.[267] The law, again, is portrayed as impotent to bring Israel up from the curse, because 'nobody will be justified in the Torah'.[268] Thus, if 'those from works of the Torah are to be justified,

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[265] For an argument along these lines, see E. McCaulley, *Sharing in the Son's Inheritance: Davidic Messianism and Paul's Worldwide Interpretation of the Abrahamic Land Promise in Galatians* (LNTS 608; London: T&T Clark, 2019), 154-158.

[266] James Scott rightly argues that what is important here is that Paul assumes that the curse had already come upon Israel and become collectively realised ('"For as Many as are of Works of the Law are Under a Curse" (Galatians 3.10)', *Paul and the Scriptures of Israel* (ed. C.A. Evans and J.A. Sanders; JSNTSup 8; Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1993), 187–221). This should be set in contrast to Christopher Stanley's argument ('Under a Curse': A Fresh Reading of Galatians 3:10–14, *NTS* 36 (1990): 481–511), which states that being 'under a curse' means being under the *threat* of a curse.

[267] Thiessen suggests that this passage only refers to gentiles (*Paul and the Gentile Problem*, 130), but the invocation of the Deuteronomic covenant curses seems to problematise the notion that gentiles are somehow under these curses and the only subjects of discussion.

[268] This problematizes Todd A. Wilson's insistence that the way to avoid the curse is a new path of obedience (*The Curse of the Law and the Crisis in Galatians: Reassessing the Purpose of Galatians* (WUNT II/225; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2007), 112). Wilson's reading proposes that the curse avoided and undone by the creation of obedience in Christ. But Paul's soteriological logic works the other way: Christ's assimilation into the Israelite condition – which

blessed and made alive, what is needed is a disjunctive movement from curse into blessing. What is needed is a way to bring life out of death.'[269]

This movement from curse into blessing is enacted by Jesus' entry into the history of Israel which ruptures the state of accursedness by taking it up into himself.[270] Just as in 4.4–5, where Christ became 'under the law' to redeem those who were 'under the law', the fact that Christ becomes 'a curse' in order to redeem those who are 'under a curse' seems to express a participatory logic according to which Christ must assume the situation of those whom he wishes to redeem. As Gregory of Nazianzus famously put it, Christ must become a curse to redeem the accursed because 'that which is not assumed is not healed (*τὸ ἀπρόσληπτον ἀθεράπευτον*)'.[271]

The first result of this event of redemption is that 'the blessing of Abraham might come in Christ to the Gentiles'. Earlier in the letter Paul interprets the history of Israel *sub specie evangelii* when he makes a connection between the blessing of Abraham in Genesis with the Christ-event, claiming that God's promise to Abraham – 'All the nations will be blessed in you' – amounts to a 'pre-preaching of the gospel (*προευαγγελίζεσθαι*)' because it anticipates how God will justify the gentiles by faith (3.8). Those believing gentiles who are blessed 'in Abraham' are then said to be 'blessed *along with* Abraham the believing one (*οἱ ἐκ πίστεως εὐλογοῦνται σὺν τῷ πιστῷ Ἀβραάμ*)' (3.9) In the language of 3.14, however, instead of being blessed 'in Abraham' and 'with Abraham', Paul states that the gentiles receive 'the blessing *of* Abraham (*ἡ εὐλογία τοῦ Ἀβραὰμ*)' which comes to them *ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ*. This way of articulating things insinuates that the logic operative in 4.7 is also underwritten in this text. The blessing 'in Abraham' becomes the blessing which is located 'in Christ Jesus' because Christ is the

brings blessing out of curse – also bestows the Spirit which creates and effects ethical behaviour (more on this below). Ethical action is not the effective means but the outworking of the reversal of the curse and the creation of blessing.

[269] L. Williams, 'Disjunction in Paul: Apocalyptic or Christomorphic? Comparing the *Apocalypse of Weeks* with Galatians', *NTS* 64 (2018): 64–80, at 77.

[270] Dunn ('Works of the Law and the Curse of the Law (Galatians 3:10–14)', *NTS* 31 (1985): 523–542) and Normand Bonneua ('The Logic of Paul's Argument on the Curse of the Law in Galatians 3:10–14', *NovT* 39 (1997): 60–80) both argue that 'the curse of the law' is a particular psychological state. For Dunn the curse is a 'too narrow understanding of covenant and law held by most of Paul's Jewish contemporaries' which restricted the Abrahamic promises to one nation and/or ethnicity ('Works', 537), and according to Bonneua the curse of the law is the fear of transgressing the law ('Logic', 77–78). Both psychological accounts, however, fail to elucidate how it would make sense for Jesus to enter into that situation. For Christ to participate in the curse of the law, in this reading, would mean to adopt an ethnocentric or fearful psyche, which would seem strange for Paul to claim.

[271] Gregory of Nazianzus, 'To Cledonius the Priest against Apollinarius (Epistle 101)'.

primary recipient and possessor of the blessing. Participation in the person Christ is the only way to access this blessing because he is the rightful recipient and sole possessor of this blessing.

The second result of redemption could signal that the blessing of Abraham is the Spirit,[272] but elsewhere Paul speaks of the Spirit not as the content of the inheritance (i.e. it is not the thing promised) but as 'guarantee (*ὁ ἀρραβῶν*)' of what God will do in the future of believers (2 Cor 1.22; 5.5), and even in Galatians Paul claims that the spirit is the basis of *future* hope: *ἡμεῖς γὰρ πνεύματι ἐκ πίστεως ἐλπίδα δικαιοσύνης ἀπεκδεχόμεθα* (5.5). It is probably best therefore to translate *ἡ ἐπαγγελία τοῦ πνεύματος* as something like 'the promise ensured by the Spirit'.[273] In any event, what is crucial here is that, in either translation, the content of what believers receive is, originally, possessed by Christ: because he is the first and sole recipient of the promise. It is Christ's participation in the curse of Israel that enables all believers to participate in him and all that belongs to him.

What has emerged in this analysis is what Morna Hooker identified as the pattern of 'interchange'.[274] In both Galatians 4.4 and 3.13, Christ shares in some aspect of the human situation: in the former text Christ takes up human existence as a Jew, and in the latter text he assimilates to the situation of accursedness indicated in 3.10. In each text, the result of these actions is that believers share in the person of Christ: in Galatians 4.5–6 they become sons like him, become heirs with him, receive his Spirit, and pray his prayers; in Galatians 3.14 believers receive the blessing of Abraham and the promise of the Spirit, which both uniquely belong to Christ (3.16). This pattern of 'interchange' should be distinguished from 'exchange', in which one party gains what the other loses.[275] But in Galatians it is not that Christ *loses*, for example, his blessing and Spirit so that believers can receive them. In these retellings of the gospel, what belongs to humanity (and more specifically Israel) –

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[272] This translation is only possible if *ἡ ἐπαγγελία τοῦ πνεύματος* is read as an attributed genitive ('the promised Spirit'; cf. *καινότης ζωῆς* in Rom 6.4 and *καρπὸς ἔργου* in Phil 1.22) or as an appositional genitive ('the promise, which is the Spirit'; cf. *σημεῖον … περιτομῆς* in Rom 4.11). However the contextual factors mentioned presently suggest against this reading.

[273] *Pace* R.B. Hays, *Echoes of Scripture in the Letters of Paul* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), 84–121. In disagreement with Hays see Dunne, *Persecution and Participation*, 64–65.

[274] See the essays reprinted in M.D. Hooker, *From Adam to Christ: Essays on Paul* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).

[275] Hooker, *From Adam to Christ*, 4. Eastman remarks that 'The picture is not simply one of trading places, because Christ remains divine as well as human, and human beings do not take Christ's place in the Godhead' ('Apocalypse and Incarnation', 169).

human existence, Torah, death, and accursedness – is taken up by the Son of God, and what belongs to the Son of God – sonship, inheritance, promise, Spirit, and blessing – is given to believers. One common thread running between these texts is therefore that the Christ-event enacts a form of *mutual participation between divinity and humanity*: Christ participates in the human condition so that humans can participate in him. As Susan Eastman helpfully puts it:

> God in Christ enters into the human condition at its most desperate point …. This divine movement in turn instigates and enacts a reciprocal human entrance into fellowship with Christ. Christ came among us in full partnership, suffering the depredations of sin and the judgement of death, so that in and with Christ we might be united with God in a life-giving fellowship.[276]

From this analysis I want to make two further proposals about the shape of the Christ-event, which will be dealt with here in turn: 1) Christ's participatory action as described in Galatians 3.13 and 4.4 can be understood as a singular movement of sharing in the entirety of the human, and specifically Jewish, condition; and 2) Paul portrays Jesus' loving act as consisting not so much in self-loss as self-addition.

4.2.3. The Cross and the Incarnation

An earlier generation of Pauline scholarship asserted that Galatians 4.4 and 3.13 presented two contradictory and irreconcilable accounts of the Christ-event. The supposed discrepancy between the two texts lies in how, on the one hand, Galatians 3.13 attributes the event of salvation to the death of Christ, but, on the other hand, Galatians 4.4 attributes this to the incarnation.[277] Thus, Hans Dieter Betz claimed that these two texts contain two originally distinct pre-Pauline accounts of the gospel which were then integrated into Galatians but 'not smoothed out by the apostle', such that the theologies contained in these two sections 'cannot be harmonized'.[278] Utilizing Algirdas Greimas' method of actantial analysis, Richard Hays seminally argued, against Betz and others, that these two sections include 'consistent and complementary manifestations of a single story-pattern' on the basis of

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[276] Eastman, 'Apocalypse and Incarnation', 168–169. On this theme see also Eastman, 'Philippians 2:6–11: Incarnation as Mimetic Participation', *JSPL* 1 (2011): 1–22; *Paul and the Person* 126–150. In the oft-cited words of Irenaeus, Christ 'became what we are, in order that we might become entirely what he is' (*Adv. Haer.* 5.praef).

[277] E. Lohse, *Märtyrer und Gottesknecht: Untersuchungen zur urchristlichen Verkündigung vom Sühntod Jesu Christi* (2d ed; FRLANT 46; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1963), 156n2.

[278] Betz, *Galatians*, 144n57; 207n51.

their extensive structural and thematic continuities, such as the language of 'redeeming (*ἀγοράζειν*)' and the references to the bestowal of the Spirit.[279] In light of the readings provided in the previous section, I want to build upon Hays' observations and to argue that the continuities between these two texts suggest that the cross should be understood as a part of Christ's incarnation, his assimilation to the human condition.

Reading these texts within Hays' framework suggests that Galatians 4.4 and 3.13 recount the same event but from two different angles. While each section outlines a form of divine-human mutual participation, Galatians 4.4 depicts that event from the perspective of its initial moment, in which Christ takes on a human nature as a Jew, and Galatians 3.13 conveys just how far Christ's participation goes – not only from pre-existence into human existence but also into the depths of the accursed condition of death. We should therefore evaluate these texts not as containing two different soteriologies but rather as presenting two different perspectives on the singular Christ-event.[280] Paul perceives the incarnation and death of Christ as two aspects of a singular occurrence.[281]

Other Pauline texts can help support this point. Philippians 2.6–7 describes the Christ event in two parts, which are each connected via participial phrases: Jesus 'emptied himself (*ἑαυτὸν ἐκένωσεν*), taking the form of a servant (*μορφὴν δούλου λαβών*), becoming in the likeness of men (*ἐν ὁμοιώματι ἀνθρώπων γενόμενος*)'; then, this final participial phrase which refers to the humanity of Jesus is picked up in another participial phrase opened by *καί*: 'and being found in human form (*καὶ σχήματι εὑρεθεὶς ὡς ἄνθρωπος*), he humbled himself (*ἐταπείνωσεν ἑαυτόν*), becoming obedient unto death, even death on a cross (*γενόμενος ὑπήκοος μέχρι θανάτου, θανάτου δὲ σταυροῦ*)'. The

[279] R.B. Hays, *The Faith of Jesus Christ: The Narrative Substructure of Galatians 3:1–4:11* (2d ed.; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2002), 116, 109.

[280] Thus, Hays recognises that, in Galatians 4.3–6, 'the absence of an explicit reference to Christ's crucifixion and death … is of no particular importance because any allusion to a part of the story presupposes the story as a whole' (*The Faith of Jesus Christ*, 109). In a similar vein, Margaret Mitchell argues that, for Paul, the 'composite narrative [of the gospel] can be either compacted or expanded, depending on one's literary, rhetorical and theological purposes' and also that 'no single event in the narrative stands apart from or uninterpreted by the rest' ('Rhetorical Shorthand in Pauline Argumentation: The Functions of "the Gospel" in the Corinthian Correspondence', in *Gospel in Paul: Studies on Corinthians, Galatians and Romans for Richard N. Longenecker* (ed. L.A. Hervis and P. Richardson; JSNTSup 108; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic, 1994), 63–88, at 64. Referring to one aspect of the Christ-event assumes the entirety of the event itself.

[281] So Hooker, *From Adam to Christ*, 15, 20.

first action of self-emptying is followed by a participle describing the incarnation, and the second action of self-humbling is preceded by a participle describing the incarnation and then followed by a reference to his death. These nearly redundant indications of the humanity of Jesus which connect Christ's self-emptying in the incarnation to his self-humbling in death imply that Jesus' movement into the human condition possesses a momentum by which he continues all the way to the cross.

The same theological intuition can be seen in Romans 8.3, where Paul clearly connects Christ's death and incarnation: 'God sent his own Son in the likeness of sinful flesh (*πέμψας ἐν ὁμοιώματι σαρκὸς ἁμαρτίας*) and 'condemned sin in the flesh (*κατέκρινεν τὴν ἁμαρτίαν ἐν τῇ σαρκί*)' (cf. Phil 2.7: *ἐν ὁμοιώματι ἀνθρώπων*).[282] While it is not clear here whether *ὁμοιώμα* indicates that Jesus possesses flesh which is only similar to that of sinful flesh or means that he actually possess sinful flesh, what is clear is that this sentence conveys the death of Christ as the outworking or even the *telos* of God's initial act of sending his Son into the world.[283] As William Wrede noted about this passage over a century ago, because Jesus 'assumes flesh, and the flesh is in his case also, as Paul expressly says, the flesh of sin', from this 'the necessity of his death becomes clear. He must die because he is a man; for he has taken upon himself that which, in the case of all men, leads to death'.[284]

Philippians 2.6–7 and Romans 8.3 should lead us to read Galatians 4.4 and 3.13 not as two distinct, contradictory, and thus irreconcilable accounts of the Christ-event. Since Paul elsewhere can keep the incarnation and death of Christ in close connection, interpreters should not separate what Paul has united. Moreover, if Wrede is correct to state that the assumption of flesh means that the death of Christ is the appropriate outworking of Christ's participation in humanity, then we could say that, for Paul, the cross is an integral and even constitutive element of the act in which Christ shares in human

[282] For Rom 8.3 as a reference to the incarnation, see Nickelsburg, 'The Incarnation', 595–596; C.E.B. Cranfield, 'Some Comments on Professor J. D. G. Dunn's *Christology in the Making*, with Special Reference to the Evidence of the Epistle to the Romans', *The Glory of Christ in the New Testament*, 267–280, at 270–272.

[283] For the former view, see F.M. Gillman, 'Another Look at Romans 8:3: "In the Likeness of Sinful Flesh"' *CBQ* 49 (1987): 597–604; for the latter see V.P. Branick, 'The Sinful Flesh of the Son of God (Rom 8:3): A Key Image of Pauline Theology', *CBQ* 7 (1985): 246–262.

[284] W. Wrede, *Paul* (trans. E. Lummis; Eugene: Wipf & Stock, 2001), 97–99.

flesh. In short: the *assumptio carnis* entails and includes the *assumptio mortis*.[285] Or, as Vincent Branick puts it, 'Christmas is the dawn of Good Friday'.[286] Therefore, while we could say, on the one hand, that the incarnation and crucifixion are two aspects of the one Christ-event, we can, on the other hand, use the category of 'incarnation' to describe the entirety of Christ's participatory action, including his death, if by 'incarnation' we use this term to refer more broadly to Christ's participation in the human situation (which itself includes death).[287] For the rest of this thesis, I will use the word 'incarnation' in this broader sense.

This analysis leads us to add one further point to the interpretation of self-giving language outlined in chapter three. If the cross can be seen as constitutive of Christ's participation in the human condition, and if Paul portrays both of these actions as integral to his saving action in 4.4 and 3.13, then it is not a stretch to suggest that the language of self-giving in Galatians 1.4 and 2.20 indicates not only the death of Christ but also his incarnation. Werner Kramer argued that the self-giving language referred exclusively to the incarnation, but his thesis was rightly critiqued and generally fell out of favour, as interpreters have focused on how the self-giving language portrays the death of Christ.[288] Yet the foregoing investigation makes it plausible that *both* aspects of the Christ-event are summarised in 1.4 and 2.20. In that case, Christ's 'love' comes to expression not just in his participation in the human death, but in his assumption of the entirety of the human condition.

4.2.4. Christ's Action as Self-Addition

In chapter one, I presented a number of Pauline scholars who described Christ's act of love with 'self-subtration' language, such as 'self-renunciation', 'self-evacuation', 'the renunciation of status', 'self-

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[285] Martin Luther helpfully summarizes the point here: 'But just as Christ is wrapped up in our flesh and blood, so we must wrap Him and know Him to be wrapped up in our sins, our curse, our death, and everything evil' (*Lectures on Galatians, 1535: Chapters 1–4* (*LW* 26; St Louis: Concordia, 1963), 278).

[286] Branick, 'The Sinful Flesh', 253.

[287] I thus follow Macaskill's method here: 'The word "Incarnation" functions as a traditional shorthand for the union of God and man that Paul understands to have taken place in Jesus – whatever that may involve' ('Incarnational Ontology', 87).

[288] W. Kramer, *Christos Kyrios, Gottessohn: Untersuchungen zu Gebrauch und Bedeutung der christologischen Bezeichnungen bei Paulus und den vorpaulinischen Gemeinden* (Abhandlungen zur Theologie des Alten und Neuen Testaments 4; Zürich-Stuttgart: Zwingli Verlag, 1963), 109–111. His argument was explicitly critiqued by G. Berényi, 'Gal 2,20: a Pre-Pauline or a Pauline Text?' *Biblica* (1984): 490–537.

sacrifice' and other similar terms and phrases. I summarized this view in this way because these various phrases take a term that is conceptually negative ('sacrifice', 'renunciation', etc.) and attach it to the word 'self'. Chapter three argued that, because the language of self-giving in Galatians 1.4 and 2.20 communicates that Christ intends to create a relationship beyond death with believers and thus presupposes Christ's resurrection, the concept of 'self-sacrifice' – if it is the only concept used in this connection – is unable to capture accurately the various dynamics of the Christ-event. Now, in light of the above analysis of Galatians 3.10–14 and 4.1–7, and with my suggestion that the category of 'incarnation' can helpfully capture the shape of Christ's participation in the human condition, I will provide a further critique of this view.

When the concepts of 'self-sacrifice', 'self-evacuation', 'self-renunciation' are used to describe the Christ-event (specifically the death of Christ), we must be attentive to how the 'self' of Christ is being understood. If we consider the death of the Christ to be a constitutive element of the incarnation (broadly conceived), then this must qualify how we consider the relationship between the 'self' of Christ and his death. More explicitly, *our understanding of Christ's death must be determined by the fact that Christ's self is divine, and that his death is a result of his positive assimilation to the human situation*.

This point can become clearer if we consider how Greeks and Romans generally thought about the nature of the gods. One pervasive view in Greco-Roman religion was that the distinction between humans and gods could be understood as the difference between being mortal (*θνητός*) and being immortal (*ἀθάνατος*). The notions of immortality and divinity were functionally interchangeable, such that to be a god means to be immortal and to be immortal means to be a god (e.g. Pl., *Tim.* 41c–d; Diog. Laert. 10.123; Cic. *Nat. D.* 1.24.68; *Greek Anthology* 7.676).[289] Jewish traditions from the Hebrew Bible through the Second Temple period also affirmed this kind of definition of God (Deut 33.27; Job 36.26; Pss 9.7; 82.6–7; 90.2; 102.12, 26–27; Is. 57:15; Dan 4.34; 12.7; 1 En. 5.1; Sib. Or. 1.45; 3.283; 3.628, 693; 7.76; 12.232 etc.). Even the early Christians are not an exception to this rule; they also defined God as the immortal and eternal one (Rev 11.17; Heb 1.11–12; Rom 1.23; 1 Tim 1.17;

[289] See further, Ivan M. Inforth, 'ΟΙ ΑΘΑΝΑΤΙΖΟΝΤΕΣ', *Classical Philology* 13 (1918): 23–33, at 26; Hermann Kleinknecht, '*θεός κτλ.*', *TDNT* 3.65–79, at 70; M. David Litwa, *We Are Being Transformed Deification in Paul's Soteriology* (BZNW 187; Berlin: de Gruyter, 2012), 44-46.

6.16; Rev 4.9–10; 10.6; 15.17). If God or the gods are understood to be by definition immortal, then there is no such thing as a 'divine death', because a god is *ex vi termini* a being who does not die. The notion of a 'divine death' is just as nonsensical as the notion of a 'square circle'.

This generates a problem for Paul's theology: how is it possible for Paul to say that Christ 'gives himself' into death (1.4; 2.20) if the self which Christ gives into death is also divine (1.1)? Five options present themselves here: (1) Paul espouses the radically subversive idea there is actually such thing as a divine death; (2) Christ was never divine; (3) he was divine only after his resurrection, and thus he could die as an human on the cross; (4) he was divine, but lost his divinity when he became human and/or died; (5) Christ is both divine and human, and he is able to die as a human because he added the human experience to himself, without losing his divinity. Option (1) runs against Paul's description of God as *ἀφθάρτος* (Rom 1.23), which seems to affirm the popular definition of God as immortal (cf. 1 Tim 1.17; 6.16); while options (2) and (3) have been an attractive view for some in light of Rom 1.3–4, which states that Jesus was 'declared to be the Son of God' at his resurrection, Phil 2.6 and 1 Cor 8.6 press strongly against the view that Jesus was never divine or acquired divinity at the resurrection: Jesus was 'in the form of God' (Phil 2.6) before he became human and was the means by which the Father created all things (1 Cor 8.6); option (4) possesses a stronger coherence than (1), (2), and (3), but there is nothing in Paul's letters that would suggest this kind of shift (and, as I will argue further below, I find it implausible to read Phil 2.7 as indicating that Christ empties himself of divine properties). We are left then, with option (5): Jesus is both divine and human, and he can die because he has taken up the human condition into himself.

This last point can be substantiated by how the references to Christ's action in Galatians depict him as 'becoming' something (Gal 3.13; 4.4). If we can read Paul's use of *γίνεσθαι* within the context of divine self-transformation texts (as argued above), it suggests that, when Paul speaks of Christ transforming himself and 'becoming from woman', 'becoming under the law', and ultimately 'becoming a curse for us' (i.e. dying), he does not intimate that Christ loses anything – whether his status, divinity, self, or whatever – but rather conveys that Jesus Christ is a divine being who has taken up a particular form of human existence by absorbing something new. In other words, Christ's

participation in the human condition is portrayed as a positive event in which he takes up the situation of others to himself *by addition*. Therefore, any reading of Galatians which proffers that Galatians describes Christ's 'self-evacuation', 'renunciation of status' or 'self-negation' can only do so by importing a motif which is completely absent in these descriptions of the Christ event. The one place where we might expect this kind of self-subtraction motif is in the explicit reference to his death (3.13), but even there the vocabulary (*γίνεσθαι*) depicts the curse as something that Jesus positively takes up into himself.[290] Moreover, if (as also argued above) the Christ-event does not enact a total *ex*change or the trading of places between Christ and believers – such that believers gain life and Christ loses life – but rather an *inter*change (believers still die as humans, and Christ still retains his divine identity), then in Galatians Paul does not present the Christ-event as a story about something that Christ lost so that believers might gain something but rather conveys it an event in which both parties mutually participate and share in the condition of each other. To put it more simply, Christ's loving action consists not in self-subtraction, but in self-addition.[291] This interpretation therefore supports the proposal above: Paul can say that Christ is a divine being who can die only because he has added a human reality to his divine self. In Gregory of Nazianzus' famous words, *ὅ μὲν ἦν, διέμεινεν· ὅ δὲ οὐκ ἦν, προέλαβεν*.[292]

One possible objection to my reading would state that, outside of Galatians, Paul does portray Christ's movement into the human condition as a form of loss and self-sacrifice. The main texts which could be invoked to support this reading are 2 Corinthians 8.9, Philippians 2.6–8, and Romans 15.3. Here I will provide readings of these texts and then explain how these texts must deeply qualify, if not entirely subvert, the self-subtraction view.

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[290] We should note that no divine self-transformation text implies that the gods cease to be gods when they transform: for example, as we saw in Moschus' *Europa*, when Zeus takes up existence as a bull, he remains a god, but his appearance as a god is 'hidden' while in the form of a bull.

[291] My reading therefore broadly aligns with the proposals in B.L. McCormack, 'Karl Barth's Christology as a Resource for a Reformed Version of Kenoticism', *IJST* 8 (2006): 243–251.

[292] Gregory of Nazianzus, *Or.* 29.19 = PG 36.100. Or as Tertullian put it (though with different theological vocabulary from Paul): 'Now, although when two substances are alleged to be in Christ – namely, the divine and the human – it plainly follows that the divine nature is immortal, and that which is human is mortal, it is manifest in what sense he declares Christ died … In short, since he says that it was Christ (that is, the Anointed One) that died, he shows us that that which died was the nature which was anointed; in a word, the flesh' (Tert. *Prax.* 29.7–8 = PL 2.194).

In 2 Corinthians 8, Paul writes about 'the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ' and recounts that *δι᾽ ὑμᾶς ἐπτώχευσεν πλούσιος ὤν, ἵνα ὑμεῖς τῇ ἐκείνου πτωχείᾳ πλουτήσητε*. Most translations take the participle *ὤν* as concessive, and thus say something along the lines of '*although* he was rich, yet for your sakes he became poor, so that by his poverty you might become rich' (NRSV). As John Barclay summarizes, in this possible interpretation 'the "wealth" attributed to Jesus is something given up or renounced, in an act of self-dispossession by which Jesus, once wealthy, becomes poor'.[293] However, the context suggests that the 'wealth' in the passage consists in his generosity, not something that he had in his pre-existent state and then gave up in the incarnation and/or death. Numerous elements of this passage support this reading. Just prior to this passage, Paul speaks of the 'wealth of their [the Macedonians'] generosity (*τὸ πλοῦτος τῆς ἁπλότητος αὐτῶν*)' (2 Cor 8.2). As he encourages the Corinthians to be generous (8.6), Paul communicates how he hopes that they would 'abound' – another wealth metaphor – 'in this generous endeavour (*ἵνα καὶ ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ χάριτι περισσεύητε*)' (8.7). The section after this claims that 'God is able to provide every gift for you (*δυνατεῖ δὲ ὁ θεὸς πᾶσαν χάριν περισσεῦσαι*), in order that, having complete sufficiency, you might *abound in every beneficent act* (*περισσεύητε εἰς πᾶν ἔργον ἀγαθόν*)' (9.8). Here, it is the divine wealth of generosity that brings about the wealth of Corinthians, which itself also consists in generosity. Lastly, and most explicitly, Paul states that the Corinthians have been 'enriched in everything for all generosity (*ἐν παντὶ πλουτιζόμενοι εἰς πᾶσαν ἁπλότητα*)'.[294] Given the multiple references to wealth as generosity, Barclay concludes that in 2 Cor 8.9 'the *χάρις* of Christ consists not in giving up his wealth, to make himself poor, but in using his wealth (of generosity) in making himself poor … Paul is less interested

[293] Barclay, '"Because He was Rich He Became poor": Translation: Exegesis, and Hermeneutics in the Reading of 2 Cor 8.9', in *Theologizing in the Corinthian Conflict: Studies in the Exegesis and Theology of 2 Corinthians* (ed. R. Bieringer et al.; Biblical Tools and Studies 16; Leuven: Peeters, 2013), 331–344, at 335.

[294] Similarly, 1 Timothy 6.13 speaks of being 'rich in good words (*πλουτεῖν ἐν ἔργοις καλοῖς*)'. This metaphor can also be found in Clement of Alexandria's appraisal of (what he cites as) a statement from Plato (Strom. 2.5.22.4–5): greed is poverty and riches consist in freedom from greed (*πενίαν δὲ ἡγητέον οὐ τὸ τὴν οὐσίαν ἐλάττω ποιεῖν, ἀλλὰ τὸ τὴν ἀπληστίαν πλείω. οὐ γάρ ποτε ἡ ὀλιγοχρηματία ἀλλ' ἡ ἀπληστία, ἧς φροῦδος ὁ ἀγαθὸς ὢν καὶ πλούσιός γ' ἂν εἴη*). A similar claim about the relationship between wealth and generosity is made by Valerius Maximus, who writes, 'And certainly the most abundant and splendid wealth is the ability to be widely acclaimed as happily disbursing benefits (*et sane amplissimae et speciosissimae divitiae sunt, feliciter erogatis beneficiis, late posse censer*)' (Val Max. 5.2ext.4, my translation; cf. Cic. *Rep*. 1.17). However, in this assertion it is the reputation that is the best form of wealth, not the generosity per se.

here in what Christ gave up than in what he gave out, a momentum of generosity that is not tied solely to one form of giving (giving away) but could be expressed in a variety of forms (including sharing and mutual participation)'.[295] On this reading, the participial phrase *ἐπτώχευσεν πλούσιος ὤν* is causal rather than concessive, because it is not that Christ trades his wealth for poverty ('*although* he rich, he became poor'), but rather that in his poverty the wealth of generosity is seen ('*because* he was rich [in generosity], he became poor [in his incarnation and death]'). Christ remained 'rich' in this sense while he existed in poverty, because it is precisely *in* his poverty that we witness the content of the wealth. Thus, this text does not depict that Christ gave up anything that he possessed prior to the incarnation.

Paul's statement in Philippians 2.6 that Christ 'emptied himself (*ἑαυτὸν ἐκένωσεν*)' is often invoked to support the view that Paul depicts the Christ-event as a form of self-loss or self-subtraction. To provide an alternative account, I will look at three issues in this text: the meaning of 1) *τὸ εἶναι ἴσα θεῷ*, 2) *ἁρπαγμός*, and 3) *κενοῦν*.

Most translations interpret the phrase *τὸ εἶναι ἴσα θεῷ* as denoting a status (which Jesus could therefore either give up, retain, or refuse to exploit). However, against nearly every English translation of this phrase, the English noun-phrase 'equality with God' would require the Greek to read *τὸ εἶναι ἴσος θεῷ*, with the adjective *ἴσος* being masculine singular. The use of the neuter plural *ἴσα* makes it virtually impossible that this phrase is predicative – 'to be equal with God'. Rather, the construction *ἴσα* + dative, when modifying a verb or verbal noun, functions as an adverb and means 'to [verb] in the same way as (= *ἴσα*) someone or something (= dative noun)'. For example, a fragment from Sophocles says that 'It is good (*καλόν*) for a mortal to think (*φρονεῖν τὸν θνητόν*) in the same way that humans do (*ἀνθρώποις ἴσα*)'.[296] Numerous examples of this construction can be found in the Greek versions of Job: 'They eat grass (*χόρτον ... ἐσθίει*) in the same manner as a cow (*ἴσα βουσίν*)' (40.15); 'I am clothed with justice (*ἠμφιασάμην κρίμα*) in the same manner as [I would be clothed with] a cloak (*ἴσα διπλοΐδι*)' (29.14; cf. 5.14; 10.10, 11.12; 13.12; 13.28; 24.20; 27.16; 28.2; 29.14; 30.19; 40.15). If *ἴσα* should be taken adverbially, then the phrase *τὸ εἶναι ἴσα θεῷ* refers to a *manner, way, or*

[295] Barclay, '"Because He was Rich He Became poor"', 340–341.
[296] E.A.I. Ahrens, ed., *Aeschyli et Sophoclis Tragoediae et Fragmentae* (Paris: Ambroise Firmin-Didot, 1942), 325.

mode of being, not a status.[297] It therefore should be translated 'to exist in a manner equally with God', or 'to be in the same way as God'.

Most translations also take ἁρπαγμός either as 'something to be grasped' or 'something to be exploited'. However, it is unlikely that ἁρπαγμός refers to an object or status and more likely that it denotes an activity. There are a few reasons for supporting this. First, if τὸ εἶναι ἴσα θεῷ does not refer to a status (not 'equality with God') but rather a manner of being ('to be in the same manner as God') we should expect ἁρπαγμός to be a verbal noun, not an object noun. For example, it makes sense to say 'I consider *eating grass* to be acting in the same way as cows'. 'Eating grass' is a verbal noun (a gerund), and putting a verbal noun as the predicate of 'to act like x' forms a coherent statement. Thus, the adverbial reading of the phrase τὸ εἶναι ἴσα θεῷ fits well with anticipating that ἁρπαγμός is a kind of activity: Jesus did not consider being in a manner like God as doing this *action*. Second, the fact that generally 'Nouns expressing action are formed with -μος' should alert to us the possibility that we are dealing with a verbal noun, not a noun that denotes an object (this of course is only suggestive, not determinative of its meaning).[298] Third, we must take seriously that Paul did not use the term ἅρπαγμα ('prize', 'booty', the standard word which denotes the thing which one seizes).[299] As John Ross noted over a century ago, Paul 'would have used ἅρπαγμα if he had not meant the action of plundering'.[300] Fourth, and most importantly, two extant non-Christian uses of ἁρπαγμός confirm that other Greek authors clearly thought that the word referred to an activity. A text from Pseudo-Plutarch states that 'And while the sort of love (ἔρως) prevailing at Thebes and in Elis is to be avoided (φευκτέος), as well as the so-called ἁρπαγμός in Crete, that which is found at Athens and in Lacedaemon is to be emulated (ζηλωτέος)' (Ps.-Plut. *De Liberis Educandis* 11F-12A). The contrast between a form of ἔρως which can be 'avoided' and one which can be 'emulated' shows that we are

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[297] So Smyth (*Greek Grammar*, 275 = §1042): whereas 'The adjective is [usually] regarded as a quality of the subject', when the adjective is used adverbially it communicates 'the manner of the action'.

[298] BDF 58 = §109.

[299] BDF 59 = §109: 'Derivatives in -μα, exceedingly popular in Koine as in Ionic and arising from all sorts of verbs, specify the result of the action for the most part'. Accordingly, the 'thing grasped (ἅρπαγμα)' is the result of 'grasping (ἁρπάζειν)'. See also Smyth, *Greek Grammar,* 232 = §841.

[300] J. Ross, "ΑΡΠΑΓΜΟΣ (Philippians II 6)', *JTS* 10 (1909): 573–574, at 573: so also F.E. Vokes, 'Ἁρπαγμός in Philippians 2,5–11', *SE* 2 (1964): 670–675; D.E. Frederickson, *Eros and the Christ: Longing and Envy in Paul's Christology* (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2013), 86–90.

dealing with kinds of actions, not objects or a status (one emulates a behaviour, not a thing or a status). For this reason, Frank Cole Babbit's Loeb translation of this text glosses ἁρπαγμός as 'kidnapping' (a verbal noun). The verbal character of ἁρπαγμός becomes even clearer in Vettius Valens' *Anthologiarum Libri*, in which the author uses ἁρπαγμός (9.2.235) interchangeably with ἁρπαγή (9.2.224), which is a verbal noun meaning 'seizing' or 'rape'. Since the lexical evidence suggests that ἁρπαγμός is not an object or status but an activity, Philippians 2.6 should be translated: 'he considered being in a manner equal to God not as doing the activity of ἁρπαγμός.[301] More straightforwardly: 'Jesus did not think that it was God-like to do ἁρπαγμός'.[302]

With this point in place, we can make some suggestions about κενοῦν. The first thing that must be recognized in approaching this problem is that the phrase ἑαυτὸν ἐκένωσεν presents a metaphor, and, therefore, in order to determine its meaning, we must begin by deciphering the precise content of the metaphor being invoked. It will be helpful here to look first at Paul's other uses of κεν-words. Often Paul uses the adjective κενός to communicate that something is rendered ineffective. In this metaphor, a particular activity or object that is useless or without effect is portrayed as a container that is 'empty'. So, the grace of God is not 'empty (κενός)' because Paul continues to work hard (1 Cor 15.10), thus fulfilling the purpose of God's grace. If the Corinthians continue in their work, then Paul's labouring for them is not κενός, because it does not go without its intended result (15.58); Paul's coming to the

[301] So Vokes, 'Ἁρπαγμός'; Frederickson, *Eros and the Christ*, 86.

[302] This statement does not seem to be entirely irrelevant to Paul's audience, since in Greek mythology the gods often used their powers of self-transformation in order to rape women. Such stories often use terms such as μιγνύναι, ἐπιθυμεῖν, ἔρως, and other words that indicate sexual desire (Moschus, *Europa* 79; Apollod. *Bibl.* 2.4.8 3.8.2; Pausanias, *Description of Greece* 8.25.5; *Greek Anthology* 9.48 = LCL 84.26), but they can also use language similar to what Paul states here: Moschus deploys the verb ἁρπάζειν to describe Zeus raping Europa (ἣν θέλεν ἁρπάξας, *Europa* 79).

There seems to be an ongoing debate in Greek literature regarding whether the gods actually participated in activity of 'seizing'. To illustrate this with two contrasting stories: Plutarch records that Romulus and Theseus 'got the reputation of descent from gods, "Both were also warriors, as surely the whole world knows", and with their strength, combined sagacity ... Each resorted to the rape of women (ἁρπαγὴ γυναικῶν)' (Plut. *Vit. Thes.* 2.1 (Perrin, LCL)). In this text, the expression of divine kinship and power is rape. This account of Theseus, however, is denied in Plato's *Republic*. Plato insists that Theseus could never have committed rape (ἁρπαγή) because that is not what the gods are like: 'Neither, then ... must we believe this ... that Theseus, the son of Poseidon … attempted such dreadful rapes (ἁρπαγαί) nor that any other child of a god (θεοῦ παῖς) and hero would have brought himself to accomplish the terrible and impious deeds that they now falsely relate of him. But we must constrain the poets either to deny that these are their deeds or that they are the children of gods (θεῶν παῖδες) but not to make both statements or attempt to persuade our youth that the gods are the begetters of evil' (Pl. *Resp*. 391c-d). The logic here is that, if they performed rape, they cannot be children of the gods, because that is not what the gods are like. Paul seems to be contending for something in line with Plato's view, at least generally.

Thessalonians was not pointless or ineffective (*κενός*) (1 Thess 2.1), since it brought about their drastic transformation (1.6–10). The phrase *εἰς κενόν* calls forth the same metaphor ('into empty' = 'to become empty') and is used for the same meaning: so, for example, Paul hopes that the Philippians hold fast to the word of life so that Paul's work might not be 'in vain (*εἰς κενόν*)' – that is, so that it might not go without its intended result (Phil 2.16; cf. Gal 2.2; 2 Cor 6.1; 1 Thess 3.5).

When used literally, *κενοῦν* functions broadly in two ways, signaling either 1) that a container is emptied *of* a particular substance ('I empty the cup *of* its liquid') or 2) that a particular substance is emptied *from* a container ('I empty the liquid *from* the cup').[303] It is the former meaning, I suggest, which is at play when Paul uses the verb form metaphorically. For instance, in the assertion that 'if only those from the law are heirs, faith is emptied and the promise is void (*ἐκένωται ἡ πίστις καὶ κατήργηται ἡ ἐπαγγελία*)', faith is made empty because the purpose of faith – to justify and make people heirs – would not be realized if the protasis were true (Rom 4.14). A similar meaning is at play when Paul states that 'Christ did not send me to baptise but to preach, not in the wisdom of the word (*οὐκ ἐν σοφίᾳ λόγου*), so that the cross of Christ might not be emptied (*ἵνα μὴ κενωθῇ ὁ σταυρὸς τοῦ Χριστοῦ*)' (1 Cor 1.17). Because the function of the cross is, according to Paul, to destroy merely human wisdom (1.28; 3.19), if Paul preached 'with lofty words and wisdom (*καθ' ὑπεροχὴν λόγου ἢ σοφίας*)', it would have marked a fundamental contradiction between content (Christ crucified) and method (merely human wisdom which Christ crucified has brought low). Here then, the cross would

[303] Thus, on the one hand, Galen can speak of emptying the stomach of air (*κενοῦσί τε τοῦ πνεύματος αὐτήν* (= *γαστέρα*)); he recounts what happens when 'the parts in the entire animal are emptied of the nutriment congenial to them (*τὰ καθ' ὅλον τὸ ζῶον μόρια κενοῦσθαι τῆς οἰκείας τροφῆς*)'; and he records that 'With regard to the ventricles of the brain, when they were emptied of pneuma the whole animal lost the power of sensation (*πότερον ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν κοιλιῶν τοῦ ἐγκεφάλου κενωθέντος τοῦ πνεύματος ὅλον τὸ ζῷον ἀναίσθητον ἐγίνετο*' (Galen, *De Semine* 1.4.10; 1.16.27–28; *De Placitis Hippocratis et Platonis* 7.4.1; cf. *De Semine* 2.1.27). In these examples the object of the verb is the container from which something else is emptied, and a genitive phrase can explicate what is being taken out of the container (cf. *Supp. Aesch.* 660: *μήποτε λοιμὸς ἀνδρῶν τάνδε πόλιν κενώσαι*). On the other hand, he can speak of a drug which 'empties phlegm (*κενώσει φλέγμα*)' or 'the pneuma being emptied through wounds (*τοῦ κενωθέντος αὐτοῦ κατὰ τὰς τρώσεις αὐτίκα*)' (Galen, *De Elementis ex Hippocratis Sententia* 11.18; *De Placitis*, 7.3.30; cf. *De Elementis* 11.16; 13.17; 13.20–21; *De Semine* 1.8.7). In these examples the object of the verb is the material taken out of a container (i.e. the body).

therefore be 'empty' if Paul sought to counteract the intention of the cross by communicating the cross' destruction of human wisdom with human wisdom.[304]

One more note should be made here before turning to Philippians 2.7. With both the adjective and the verb, an adjacent genitive phrase can be added in order to specify what is lacking or being emptied from a particular metaphorical or literal container. So, one could be 'empty of understanding (*κενὸς φρονήσεως*)' (Eur. *Hec.* 230), 'empty of knowledge (*κενὸς ἐπιστήμης*)' (Pl. Ti. 75a) or you could speak of a 'plain empty of trees (*κενὸν δένδρων πεδίον*)' (Pl. *Resp.* 486c). In these examples, it is not that the person or plain is entirely empty, but rather than it is empty of something specific, lacking one particular thing. The same thing happens with the verb. For instance, Galen can speak of the ventricles of the brain being 'emptied of pneuma (*κενωθέντος τοῦ πνεύματος*)'.[305] However, at some points the specific item taken out of a literal or metaphorical container is left implicit. So, Sophocles' uses the phrase *λέαινα κενή* to refer to a female lion without mate (Soph. *Aj.* 986), Aeschines employs *κεναὶ χῶραι* to speak of places without garrison (Aeschin. *In Ctes.* 146), and Plutarch uses *σῶμα κενόν* to refer to a body without flesh (Plut. *Mor.* 831c). We can see a similar elision happen with the verb. For example, the phrase *κενωθεισῶν τῶν νεῶν* in Thucydides means that the ships have been emptied *of the sailors* (Thuc. 8.57.1). The ship is being 'emptied' only of a specific thing – it is emptied of people, not empty of everything. Thus, to call something 'empty' or to say it is 'emptied' does not necessarily mean that it is empty in every respect; sometimes context will show that the something is literally or metaphorically empty only of a particular thing.

Returning to Philippians 2.7, we can make a few points. First, given that Paul's metaphorical uses of the term assume that the object of the verb *κενοῦν* is the container from which something else is

[304] The other metaphorical sense of *κεν*-words comes to expression when Paul wants to communicate that something has no referent. So Paul also hopes that 'no one will empty my boasting (*τὸ καύχημά μου οὐδεὶς κενώσει*)' (1 Cor 9.15; cf. 2 Cor 9.3); to have an 'empty' boast means that it is 'hollow' – without reference to anything real about him. This is probably the sense operative in the words *κενοδοξία* (Phil 2.3) and *κενόδοξος* (Gal 5.26), which refers to an opinion about the self that has no actual referent in reality (see the similar use in Exod 5.9; Xen. *An.* 2.2.21; Pl. *La.* 196b7). It is unclear whether this is the sense invoked when Paul writes that 'If Christ is not raised, the preaching is pointless (*κενός*)' (1 Cor 15.14). It could be that this preaching is without purpose, or that it has no referent. However, Abrecht Oepke cautions that in this instance 'there can be no strict differentiation between content and effect' ('*κενός κτλ.*', *TDNT* 3.659–662, at 660).

[305] Galen, *De Placitis* 7.4.1.

emptied, in the phrase *ἑαυτὸν ἐκένωσεν* the 'self' of Christ is *being emptied of something else* (Christ's self is not the thing being emptied from something else, and it would not make sense to say that Christ's self is emptied from his own self). Second, as in the examples just discussed, what is emptied from the container of Christ's self is left implicit rather than explicit. Thus, we must ask: what is being emptied from the metaphorical container of Christ's self? On the basis of the fact that Paul uses the metaphor of being 'empty' (with both the verb and the adjective) to refer to when something does not fulfill a particular purpose or does not have a particular effect, I suggest that a similar, yet distinct, meaning is operative here: Christ 'empties himself' *of* the possibility of actualizing his God-equal manner of existence in the activity of *ἁρπαγμός*; Christ's 'self' is emptied in the sense that one possible function/result/effect/actualisation of being equally with God is rejected. Jesus might have done this action, but only if that is what God was like. But because God is not like this, Jesus considered being in a manner like God not as *ἁρπαγμός*. To exist equally with God entails rejecting this activity, and thus he 'emptied himself' of that possibility (*ἑαυτὸν ἐκένωσεν*). What is crucial about this interpretation is that what Christ gives up or 'emptied himself' of is only a *hypothetical*, a manner of being which would contradict the character of God. Jesus does not 'empty himself' of something that he actually possesses in his pre-existent state.[306]

We now come to the last Pauline text which could support the idea that Christ undergoes self-subtraction in his loving action in the incarnation. Paul writes in Romans that 'We who are strong ought to put up with the failings of the weak, and not to please ourselves (*μὴ ἑαυτοῖς ἀρέσκειν*) … For Christ did not please himself (*ὁ Χριστὸς οὐχ ἑαυτῷ ἤρεσεν*); but, as it is written, "The insults of those who insult you have fallen on me (*οἱ ὀνειδισμοὶ τῶν ὀνειδιζόντων σε ἐπέπεσαν ἐπ᾽ ἐμέ*)'" (Rom 15.2–3). In order to suggest here that Christ 'gives up' something that he already possessed, one would have to state that, prior to the incarnation and his death, Jesus was participating in the action of 'pleasing himself (*ἑαυτῷ ἀρέσκειν*)'. However, given that Paul elsewhere suggests that this kind of

[306] As Sarah Coakley puts it, the phrase *ἑαυτὸν ἐκένωσεν* signals that Christ chooses 'never to have certain (false and worldly) forms of power – forms sometimes wrongly construed as "divine"' ('*Kenōsis* and Subversion: On the Repression of "Vulnerability" in Christian Feminist Writing', in *Powers and Submissions: Spirituality, Philosophy and Gender* (Challenges in Contemporary Theology; Oxford: Blackwell, 2002), 3–39, at 11.

activity falls outside the scope of love (1 Cor 13.5), it is hard to see how he would affirm that Christ was pleasing himself but then chose to stop doing this in order to share in the human condition. In the next chapter I will suggest that Paul's apparent prohibitions against self-interest are, in fact, not complete condemnations of self-love and self-regard as such but are prohibitions against seeking one's own good to the exclusion of the good of the other. But at this point, suffice to say that, like Philippians 2.6–7, in Romans 15.3 Paul claims that Christ rejected a *hypothetical mode of existence*: Christ *could* have acted in such a way as to please only himself, but he chose not to exist in that way. And in further similarity to Philippians, the statement about what Christ chose not to do is juxtaposed with a positive statement about Christ adding something to himself: Christ chose not to please himself but, instead, chose to take up the reproaches of human beings.

If these interpretations are correct, then there is no text in Paul which states that Christ gave up anything substantial, real, or actual in the incarnation. Rather, what Christ rejects or 'loses' are only hypothetical ways of being which he chooses not to actualize. However, whereas these readings controvert the 'self-subtraction' view, the notion of 'self-limitation' does indeed apply to these readings, in the sense that Christ rejects certain possible actions such as *ἁρπαγμός* or self-pleasing. But the concept of 'self-limitation' does not adequately capture the statements of positive solidarity which follow Paul's statements about the rejection of hypothetical ways of being: Christ emptied himself *and* also 'became in the likeness of men'; Christ 'did not please himself' *and* also took on in the insults of humans. I want to suggest that, instead of 'self-limitation', we should use the category of '*self-specification*' to describe Christ's action, because the word 'specification' includes both positive and negative elements, indicating that certain actualisations of the self are *not* chosen and also that a particular form of existence is *positively* chosen. To say that one 'specifies' oneself inherently indicates not only that one has rejected certain ways of existence but also that one has taken up another way of being. 'Self-specification', unlike 'self-limitation', enables us to capture both the statements about what Christ chose *not* to be and the assertion about what he chose to become in the incarnation.

To conclude this section: because Christ can only die by virtue of him adding the human condition to himself, then any interpretation which describes the Christ-event only in terms of self-subtraction

and states that this is an event in which he gives himself *away* has not thoroughly considered the implications of Paul's divine Christology (in fact, stating that Jesus gives his own self away in the gospel functionally assumes that Jesus is *not* divine). Of course, on the cross Jesus 'loses' his human life (though only temporarily); but he does not lose him*self*, because his self is divine and by definition cannot die. This is the upshot of taking the death of Christ as constitutive of the reality of the incarnation: it helps us to qualify Christ's death with reference to his divine self which has taken on the reality of human existence.

4.3. Human Action and the Christ Event

The previous section primarily focused on the shape of Christ's action and contended that it consisted in him positively identifying with human creatures in order to create a relationship of mutual participation between divinity and humanity. What is left to do in this chapter now is to consider just what that divine-human relationship looks like on the human side. However, in so doing, I do not want to over-anticipate the content of the following chapter, which will focus on the material content of Paul's love ethic. For this reason, whereas the next chapter will consider the topic of normative ethics, here I will focus only on meta-ethical issues. Stated in less technical vocabulary, while chapter five looks at the 'what' of ethics, this section deals with the 'how' and 'why' of believers' moral action.[307]

My suggestion in the following section is that, for Paul, the Christ event both *enables* and *obligates* humans to act in correspondence to God's act in Christ. Put another way, while human action is not efficacious of salvation, redemption is nevertheless partially constituted by believers' reciprocal action towards God and obligates them to act. A number of Pauline scholars, however, might object that including human agency and obligation in the reality of salvation destabilizes the significance and

[307] For a more detailed explanation of the distinction between metaethics and normative ethics, see D. Copp, 'Introduction: Metaethics and Normative Ethics', in *The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory* (ed. D. Copp; Oxford Handbooks in Philosophy; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 3–35, at 4–5. While in one sense this distinction is somewhat artificial – how you deal with the normative issues will always deeply impinge upon the meta-ethical issues and *vice versa* – the distinction between these two modes of analysis can nevertheless be raised for heuristic purposes (so Copp, 'Introduction', 5–6).

centrality of the person and work of Christ. Regarding the former, for example, J.L. Martyn's work exhibited a general anxiety about including the activity of believers within the realm of divine action. Indeed, one of his opening assertions is that Galatians 1.1 posits an 'antinomy between the action of God and the action of human beings'.[308] Amongst his (few and brief) discussions of human action, he insinuates that, because human action is caused by divine action, it is therefore temporally subsequent and external to divine action.[309] As regards the latter point – that the Christ-event obligates believers to act – Douglas Campbell emphatically asserts that Paul's soteriology depicts 'unconditional actions by God that deliver salvation to a given constituency with no strings attached, as pure gift' such that 'reciprocity in response to this gift is appropriate but not necessary'.[310] For Campbell a rightly 'theocentric' and 'covenantal' rather than 'anthropocentric' and 'contractual' reading of Paul requires affirming that redemption does not obligate believers.[311] Here I will provide a reading that highlights the importance of human action and obligation.

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[308] Martyn, *Galatians*, 94. The portion of his commentary dealing with Galatians 4.12–6.18 (which largely deals with ethical matters) is significantly shorter than his section on 1.1–4.11, and certain opportunities to discuss human action are noticeably avoided. For example, whereas he has a discussion about 'Christ lives in me' in Galatians 2.20, he has little to nothing to say about Paul's claim 'I live' (*Galatians*, 258).

[309] Martyn, *Galatians* 227: 'Paul can even include faith in the list of the fruit that is borne by the Spirt of Christ (5:22), suggesting that the act of trust does not have its origin in the human being. On the contrary, as we have noted, that act springs from the proclamations of the risen Lord. It is incited by the preached message (Gal 3:2; Rom 10:17). It is empowered by the Spirit'. In a later essay, he writes, 'When, being the newly addressable agent, and being confidently exhorted, to do so, one of Paul's churches corporately follows the lead of the Spirit – infused by God into their hearts and thus already active among them (e.g., Gal. 5.16–26) – it is indeed taking a second step after God's first step. But in Paul's theology that second step is emphatically *not a separate step*, one that is separate from the continuing causative activity of the divine agent in the daily life of the community' ('Epilogue: An Essay in Pauline Meta-Ethics', in *Divine and Human Agency in Paul and his Cultural Environment* (ed. J.M.G. Barclay and S.J. Gathercole; London: T&T Clark, 2007), 173–183, at 181–182.

[310] D.A. Campbell, *The Deliverance of God: An Apocalyptic Rereading of Justification in Paul* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2009), 100, 956. In a similar vein, C.K. Barrett, analysing the connection between 'For freedom Christ has set you free' (Gal 5.1a) and 'stand therefore and do not submit again to a yoke of slavery' (5.1b), suggests that, because in Galatians 'Man's merit contributes nothing to his salvation, which is God's free gift', therefore 'Paul is not (apparently) making it easy for himself to pass over into the realm of ethics' (Barrett, *Freedom and Obligation: A Study in Paul's Letter to the Galatians* (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 1985), 54, 56). This unnecessarily problematizes the Pauline material by assuming that claims about reality are functionally non-moral and that the 'realm of ethics' should be restricted to explicit commands. Barrett rightly sees that it is difficult to move from non-moral premises to moral conclusions; but the notion that Paul's talk about the Christ-gift resides in a non-moral realm is assumed rather than demonstrated. I address this issue in further depth below.

[311] For the contrast between christocentric/theocentric and anthropocentric soteriologies, see Campbell, *Deliverance of God*, 1, 191.

4.3.1. Paul's Theanthropological Gospel

As Bultmann famously remarked in his *Theologie des Neuen Testaments* – though this point has since gone radically misunderstood and thus tragically underappreciated in Pauline studies – Paul does not portray God's act in Christ as an event or story that just exists somewhere 'out there', as a past legend detached from the tangible lives of his readers and which they may or may not encounter, appropriate, or activate at some later point.[312] Rather, Paul's creative re-narrations of the gospel consistently depict Christ's action as generating, determining, and impinging upon believers' present experience. Thus, as we have just seen in the previous section, the incarnation (4.4) and death of Christ (3.13) are depicted by Paul as the *historical* event which *presently* enacts the redemption of believers (*ἀγοράζειν*), brings the Spirit into their hearts, enables them to cry 'Abba Father', and makes them know and be known by God (3.14; 4.5–9). These christological pronouncements which immediately give way to descriptions of the Galatians' encounter with God signal that the redemption brought about by Christ is not something that occurs entirely independently of believers' subjective experience. For Paul, to speak the simple phrase 'Christ redeemed us' (3.13) is to fuse the present with the past, the objective with the subjective, Calvary with conversion.

This way of framing the Christ-event comes to acute expression in Galatians 3.23–25, which closely ties the 'coming of faith' to the 'coming of Christ'. 'Before faith came (*πρὸ τοῦ δὲ ἐλθεῖν τὴν πίστιν*)', claims Paul, 'we were held captive under the law, imprisoned until the coming faith would be revealed (*εἰς τὴν μέλλουσαν πίστιν ἀποκαλυφθῆναι*)' (3.23). This interim time refers to the period of the Torah, which functioned as a temporary *παιδαγωγός* for Israel (3.24). Yet the duration of this temporary period runs not only until the revelation of the coming faith but also 'until *Christ* (*εἰς Χριστόν*)'. The interchange between the 'the coming faith' and the Christ-event does not imply, as some have suggested, that *πίστις* refers exclusively to Christ and his 'faithfulness'.[313] Instead, the

[312] Bultmann, *Theology of the New Testament* (trans. K. Grobel; Waco: Baylor University Press, 2007), 190–191.

[313] D.A. Campbell, *The Quest for Paul's Gospel: A Suggested Strategy* (JSNTsup 274; Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 2005), 208–232. Joachim Rohde offers a similar suggestion, stating that, if Paul proclaims the gospel 'objective' event, then *πίστις* must refer to a pattern of 'gläublige Verhalten' which was 'erst in Christus offenbar geworden' (*Der Brief des Paulus an die Galater* (THKNT 9 Berlin: Evangelische Verlagsanstalt, 1989), 161). But the temporal association between the coming of *πίστις* and the coming of *Χρίστος* does not mean that *πίστις* and *Χρίστος* have the same referent. It is better to say that *πίστις* here is not identical to the Christ-event but rather 'presupposes the decisive action of Jesus

temporal scheme outlined here only posits an identity between the *time* of faith and the *time* of Christ. Teresa Morgan's suggestion – that in Galatians 1.6 and 6.10 the best translation for *πίστις* is '"the relationship of trust" (or even "the bond of trust") between God, Christ, and Christ's followers'[314] – fits quite well in this context: the coming of Christ is the time at which God establishes a relationship of trust with believers. This, however, has deep theological implications: the fact that the time of the 'revelation of the coming relationship of faith between God and believers' is identical to the time of the Christ-event suggests that Christ's participation in the human condition includes and effects the creation of believers' trust in God.

The inclusion of believers' action within the reality of Christ's action becomes more acutely visible in Gal 2.20. Paul's co-crucifixion with Christ (*Χριστῷ συνεσταύρωμαι*, 2.20; cf. 6.14, 17) depicts the 'then' of Christ's death irrupting into the 'now' of Paul's ongoing life.[315] Sharing in this crucifixion brings him to 'die to the Torah' such that he can confidently say 'I no longer live' (*ζῶ δὲ οὐκέτι ἐγώ*, 2.20), yet in place of his life now it is 'Christ who lives in me'. This is not a straightforward substitution or replacement; through, out of, and on the other side of Paul's death comes Paul's own resurrection: 'I died' and 'I no longer live' is followed by 'I live by faith in the Son of God'.[316] While it is the case that, as

Christ' (J.-P. Lémonon, *L'épître aux Galates* (Commentaire biblique: Noveau Testament 9; Paris: Les Éditions Du Cerf, 2008), 137).

[314] T. Morgan, *Roman Faith and Christian Faith:* Pistis *and* Fides *in the Early Roman Empire and Early Churches* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 266. In her section on Galatians (pp. 265–282), she does not discuss 3.23–25 in detail.

[315] As Barth articulates, because Paul shares in the past event of crucifixion as well as the present life of Christ, 'the history of Jesus Christ' is now 'as an irresistible consequence [Paul's] own history' (K. Barth, *Church Dogmatics* (14 vols.; ed. G.W. Bromiley and T.F. Torrance; trans. G.W. Bromiley; London: T&T Clark, 2004), IV/2, 277 [hereafter *CD*). Or, as he puts it elsewhere, 'the yesterday of Jesus is also his to-day' (*CD* III/2, 466–468). So also Eberhard Jüngel, in more etic terminology, claims that the narration of the Christ-myth 'narrates what occurs in illo tempore' and 'moves the mythical recipients of the myth into that time' ('Die Wahrheit des Mythos und die Notwendigkeit der Entmythologisierung', in *Indikative der Gnade—Imperative der Freiheit* (Theologisches Erörterungen 4; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2000), 40–57, at 55). See also the insightful comments on this theme in Galatians in D.W. Congdon, 'The Trinitarian Shape of *πίστις*: A Theological Exegesis of Galatians', *JTI* 2 (2008): 231–258, esp. 247n50.

[316] *Pace* François Vouga's claim that 'Behauptet wird nicht, daß das "ich" gestorben ist ... sondern vielmehr, daß der neue Mensch in ihm Subjekt ist' (*An Die Galater* (HNT 10; J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1998), 61) and Guy Wagner's similar assertion that 'Il ne s'agit pas de dépersonnalisation, mais d'une resurrection' ('La foi de Jésus-Christ', *ETR* 59 (1984): 41–52, at 47). Such a deemphasis on Paul's own deconstruction finds a more recent expression in Alain Badiou's assertion that 'l'événement n'est pas la mort, il est la résurrection' because Christ's death occurs only to provide the prerequisite 'site mortel' of resurrection (*Saint Paul: La Fondation de L'universalisme* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1997), 80, 89). But in Gal 2.19–20 the cross is itself partially constitutive of the christological and thus soteriological event. Indeed, as Franz Mußner notes, the perfect tense *συνεσταύρωμαι* signals that Paul's co-crucifixion

Theodor Zahn argues, 'Was an wirklichem Leben in ihm vorhanden ist, ist nichts selbsterzeugtes, von seinem autonomen Ich bestimmtes, sondern etwas von Christus gewirktes und geleitetes,'[317] it is crucial to recognize that in Christ Paul is here reconstituted as an *agent*, a subject who possesses and determines his own life and existence.[318] The 'Christ lives in me' at first deconstructs, *but then reconstructs*, the reality of the 'I' ('I do not live … but Christ lives … therefore I live'). To speak 'Christ' is to speak both the negation as well as the reaffirmation the self.[319] To adapt a suggestion from Tasmin Jones, we should recognise that in Galatians 2.20 'the "I" is both other-constituted and agential – that is, both responsive (to the other) and response-*able* (a self with enough integrity to be able to respond).[320]

Here there is no 'antinomy between divine and human action', because Christ's and believers' action are portrayed not in *inverse proportion* but in *direct proportion* to another: the more Christ acts upon and in Paul, the more Paul acts.[321] As in Galatians 3.23–25, in Gal 2.20 the objective reality of the

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with Christ is not, as Badiou asserts, only an event out of which Paul must be extracted but constitutes Paul's own 'existentiell Dauerzustand' (*Der Galaterbrief*, 181).

[317] T. Zahn, *Der Brief des Paulus an die Galater* (TVM; 3d ed.; Zürich: R. Brockhaus, 1990), 136.

[318] It is imperative not to ignore how Galatians 2.20 highlights the role of faith. Whereas the verb 'live' in 2.20 seems to refer to all of Paul's actions in his current existence, the claim that 'I live *by* trusting in the Son of God (*πίστει ζῶ τῇ τοῦ υἱοῦ τοῦ θεοῦ*)' picks out *πίστις* as a special kind of human act amongst others. While *πίστις* certainly refers to an action of the human, it does not refer to the conglomeration of human actions, and thus it should not be translated with the generic sense of 'faithfulness'. Rather, *πίστις*, as the act of trust, is the *sui generis* human act in which someone defers to the ability or action of another. If the dative *πίστις* is instrumental here, then 'I live by trust in the Son of God' could be paraphrased as something like 'All of my actions are brought about [or based on] trusting in the Son of God'. This aligns well with Gal 5.6: while it is difficult to pin down the precise sense of *ἐνεργεῖν* here, the phrase *πίστις δι' ἀγάπης ἐνεργουμένη* probably means something along the lines of 'faith realises [or 'actualises'] itself through love' (cf. the use of *ἐνεργεῖν* in Plotinus, *Enn.* 3.7.11). Thus, this *πίστις* is both a *distinct* human act (it is not a reference to general 'faithfulness'), but is nevertheless productive of further human acts, specifically love. As Susanne Schewe put it, love is not identical to faith but rather is the 'konstitutives Kennzeichen des Glauben' (*Die Galater zurückgewinnen: Paulinische Strategien in Galater 5 und 6* (FRLANT 208; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2005), 69.

[319] This accords well with what George Hunsinger calls a 'Chalcedonian pattern' of 'asymmetry', 'differentiation', and 'unity' (*How to Read Karl Barth: The Shape of His Theology* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 85): Paul does not live, but Christ lives in him (asymmetry and differentiation); yet because Christ lives in him, Paul also lives (unity). This way of reading Gal 2.20 pushes back on Martyn's unqualified assertion that in Gal 1.1 posits an 'antinomy between the action of God and the action of human beings'. What often goes unnoticed is that, while Paul conveys that divine and human origination (and not agency as such) are antithetical – he is 'an apostle *not from Man, but from God*' – he also implies in the same statement that this divine origination has established him as an actor – he is an '*apostle* … from God' (this was also recognized by Barth, *CD* IV/1, 637).

[320] T. Jones, 'Traumatized Subjects: Continental Philosophy of Religion and the Ethics of Alterity', *JR* (2014): 143–160, at 160.

[321] While some have appealed to Kathryn Tanner's proposal of 'non-contrastive transcendence' to interpret Paul (*God and Creation in Christian Theology: Tyranny or Empowerment?* (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2004), I do not think that her model is helpful for reading Pauline texts (even though the concept itself might be serviceable). Tanner is

Christ-event includes and effects the subjective actualization of salvation in the lives of believers. Put another way, Christ's determination of Paul's existence in the cross and resurrection thus incorporates within it Paul's own self-determination which corresponds to this extrinsic determination.[322] In light of this analysis, we could say, then, that Paul's gospel is both irreducibly *historical* and irreducibly *existential*: it occurs in history, independently of the experience of believers, but also restructures believers' lives in the present, propelling them into a christologically-oriented existence in which they themselves now live and act.[323]

Read this way, Paul's gospel is not straightforwardly 'theocentric', if that means a kind of 'theomonism'[324] which posits God-in-Christ as the sole subject and actor in the drama of salvation. Paul's talk about Christ does not amount to purely objective announcements about 'what is' in abstraction from the Galatians. But the alternative to a theomonist account of salvation is not, as Campbell's rhetoric would suggest, just an 'anthropocentric' gospel. To borrow one of Barth's neologisms, Paul's gospel is better conceived of as 'theanthropological'.[325] Because God's act in Christ entails believers' own action, the predicate 'God' cannot be made 'logically exclusive'[326] so as to posit redemption as operative independently of acting human partners. In this reading, while humans do

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constructing a *general* account of divine and human agency. That is, she does not provide any model for a *soteriological* account of how God's empowerment of *believers in particular* occurs through Christ's *saving* agency and the work of the Spirit. This becomes problematic when she interprets Paul's claim in Philippians 2.13 ('God works in you, both to will and to work for his good pleasure) as a *universal* principle of divine causality: this text, according to Tanner indicates that 'God's activity extends everywhere, even to cases where Christians are themselves supposed to be at work' (*God and Creation*, 19). However, for Paul, clearly, the statements about double agency (1 Cor 15.8–10; Gal 2.20; Phil 2.13) do not, as Tanner insinuates, apply to God's relationship with all of creation; they are rather descriptions of what happens in the unique relationship between believers and God in Christ.

[322] G. McKenny, *The Analogy of Grace: Karl Barth's Moral Theology* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 168. My reading here also aligns with the reading of Barth offered by Paul Nimmo, who suggests that for Barth God's determination of the human creature in Christ is *actualistic* (*Being in Action: The Theological Shape of Barth's Ethical Vision* (London: T&T Clark, 2007).

[323] Lémonon aptly notes that 'En effet, Christ vit en Paul, car ce dernier est devenu une nouvelle créature dont Christ est source et modèle ... L'apôtre donne un fondement christique à la vie du croyant' (*L'épître aux Galates*, 101). Lémonon's affirmation that Christ is the 'source and model' suggests that moral action is not only generated by the Christ-event, but also patterned after it (the former is explored here; the latter is the theme explored in chapter five).

[324] Barth, *CD* IV/2, 8–10.

[325] Barth, 'Evangelical Theology in the Nineteenth Century', in *The Humanity of God* (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 1992), 11–35, at 11. For a more thorough treatment of this theme, see Congdon, 'Theology as Theanthropology: Barth's Theology of Existence in its Existentialist Context', in *Karl Barth and the Making of Evangelical Theology: A Fifty-Year Perspectiv*e (ed. C.B. Anderson and B.L. McCormack; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2015), 30–66 and J. Webster, *Barth's Ethics of Reconciliation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 2–4.

[326] Barth, *CD* II/1, 5.

not effect salvation for themselves – *God* 'sends forth his Son', *Christ* is the one who 'redeems' (3.13) – the divine act in Jesus Christ is not as it were 'self-enclosed',[327] because redemption is in part constituted by human behaviour.[328] To qualify Martyn's interpretation of divine and human agency, then, it is not that God causes human action as an external subsequent event to divine action; rather, God's action both enables *and includes* human action. Ethical behaviour is not consequent and therefore *subsequent* to divine action but rather consequent and therefore *simultaneous* to it. In Watson's apt summary, 'the human act is enclosed within the divine'.[329]

4.3.2. The Obligation of Pneumatic Agents

The previous sub-section does not address a pertinent question: how precisely does this ethical behaviour come about? For Paul, the answer is the Spirit. In Paul's two depictions of the Christ-event (Gal 3.13–14; Gal 4.4–6) the bestowal of the Spirit to believers plays an indispensable role. In Galatians 3.14, the claim that believers have received the Spirit is located within a *ἵνα*-clause subordinated to the announcement of Christ's crucifixion: 'Christ redeemed us … by becoming a curse … so that (*ἵνα*) we might receive the Spirit' (3.13–14). In Galatians 4.6 the reception of the Spirit goes hand in hand with the adoption of believers in 4.5, though in this instance, 'redemption' and 'adoption' are the key terms located within parallel *ἵνα* -clauses which are subordinated to the announcement of the incarnation: 'God sent forth his son … so that he might redeem those under the law (*ἵνα τοὺς ὑπὸ νόμον ἐξαγοράσῃ*) … in order that we might receive adoption (*ἵνα τὴν υἱοθεσίαν ἀπολάβωμεν*)' (4.4). Yet this event of adoption, as we have seen above, includes the bestowal of the Spirit of his Son: 'Because (*ὅτι*) you are sons, God has sent the Spirit of his Son into our hearts crying "Abba! Father!" (*κρᾶζον· αββα ὁ πατήρ*)' (4.6). The fact that in both depictions of the gospel Christ's action is oriented towards (*ἵνα*) an outpouring of Spirit suggests that the Christ-event possesses what we could call a

[327] Webster, *Barth's Ethics of Reconciliation*, 98.

[328] Hunsinger, *How to Read Karl Barth*, 109: 'The objective validity and efficacy of salvation in Christ by no means eliminates the necessity of actively receiving it by faith, nor does the necessity of actively receiving it by faith eliminate the objective validity and efficacy of salvation'. God's action in Jesus Christ is not a human achievement, but divine redemption is itself is in part constituted by human actions.

[329] F. Watson, 'Response to Richard Hays', *ProEccl* 16 (2007): 134–140, at 137.

pneumatological teleology: an integral part of the *telos* of the gospel is to communicate the Spirit to believers.

The neuter participle *κρᾶζον* in 4.6 requires the Spirit (*τὸ πνεῦμα*) to be the subject who is crying *αββα ὁ πατήρ*. This of course should not be taken to imply that believers are not actually speaking these words, especially since Paul states in Romans that 'you have received the Spirit of adoption *by whom we cry* "Abba! Father!" (*ἐν ᾧ κράζομεν· αββα ὁ πατήρ*)'. Taken together, Paul's use of *ἐν ᾧ* in Romans and placing of *πνεῦμα* as the subject of *κράζειν* in Galatians imply that, while both the Spirit and believers cry *αββα*, the Spirit is the one who enables this cry to be made. In this context, then, the Spirit is an agent who participates in the creation of human behaviour.[330]

The Spirit's function as the empowering agent of human action comes to clearer expression in Galatians 5. Paul encourages his readers to walk *by* the Spirit (*πνεύματι περιπατεῖτε*) so that they will 'not gratify the desires of the flesh (*ἐπιθυμίαν σαρκὸς οὐ μὴ τελέσητε*)' (5.16); he claims that, if they are led *by* the Spirit (*πνεύματι ἄγεσθε*), they are not under the law (5.18); and he asserts that 'we live *by* the Spirit (*εἰ ζῶμεν πνεύματι*)'.[331] If we connect these statements with the agency of the Spirit in 4.6, then the repeated use of the instrumental dative *πνεύματι* here communicates that the Spirit empowers not only the Abba-cry but also moral behaviour in general. And the phrase *ὁ καρπὸς τοῦ πνεύματός* (5.22) – which is composed of a host of ethical actions – may be therefore best translated as 'the fruit produced by the Spirit'.[332] The agency of the Spirit in creating moral behaviour, however, does not imply that human action is sidestepped, downplayed, or overwhelmed in any regard.[333]

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[330] This point suggests that characterizing *πνεῦμα* as a 'material' needs to be at least supplemented by the affirmation that the Spirit is also an actor (on the *πνεῦμα* as material see e.g. Thiessen, *Paul and the Gentile Problem*, 105–160). This also problematizes Michael Wolter's suggestion that *πνεῦμα* and its cognates only function as general 'ontologische Kategorien' which Paul uses 'um die Wirklichkeit Gottes als seine Wirklichkeit zu kennzeichnen, die sich von der Wirklichkeit der Menschen kategorial unterscheidet' ('Der heilige Geist bei Paulus', *Heiliger Geist* (ed. M. Ebner et al.; Jahrbuch für Biblische Theologie 24; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2009), 93–119, at 103.

[331] The generic character of these sentences runs against Horn's assertion that the Spirit participates only in the creation of certain kinds of moral actions, namely love (F.W. Horn, 'Wandel im Geist: Zur pneumatologischen Begründung der Ethik bei Paulus', *KD* 38 (1992): 149–170).

[332] So G.D. Fee, *God's Empowering Presence: The Holy Spirit in the Letters of Paul* (Peabody: Hendrickson, 1994), 444. For a detailed examination of how Paul envisages the Spirit empowering others in Romans and Galatians, see the excellent treatment in Rabens, *The Holy Spirit and Ethics*, 203–237.

[333] Fee *God's Empowering Presence*, 443–444. Rabens rightly critiques Dunn's assertion that the Spirit is an 'overmastering compulsion' (*The Theology of Paul's Letter to the Galatians* (New Testament Theology; Cambridge:

Indeed, Paul can still speak of believers in Christ as *actors*: it is precisely 'those of Christ Jesus (*οἱ δὲ τοῦ Χριστοῦ Ἰησοῦ*)' who 'have crucified the flesh with its passions and desires' (Gal 5.24). Thus, like the relationship between Christ and Paul in Galatians 2.20 the agency of the Spirit and believers seems to operate not in inverse proportion to one another but in direct proportion: believers' existence 'in Christ', which is constituted by Christ living 'in them' and being empowered by the Spirit, brings them to act themselves.[334]

According to the grammatical structure of the exhortation 'If we live by the Spirit, let us also keep in step with the Spirit' (5.25), the reality that believers are empowered by the agency of the Spirit provides the basis for exhortation. In this theological logic, it is only because believers are enabled to live in a new moral existence in the Spirit that they should walk in correspondence with that new life that God has granted. Thus, if the gospel contains a *pneumatological teleology* – and if this pneumatological moral empowerment grounds the command to act – then the Christ-event also possesses an *ethical teleology*: part of the *telos* of the gift of Christ is to create Spirit-empowered moral agents who act in correspondence to this gracious act.[335] In theological terms, the gospel which occurs *extra nos* and *pro nobis* (*ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν*, 3.13) finds its *telos* only when it is morally realised *in nobis* (*ἐν ἐμοί*, 2.20), in believers' Spirit-produced ethical action. In short: the event of the soteriological is always oriented towards the emergence of the ethical.

This ethical teleology emerges also in Gal 5.1 and 5.13. Echoing his announcement that, in dying and giving himself as gift to sinful and unworthy humanity, Christ 'redeemed us from the present evil age' (Gal 1.4), in Gal 5.1 Paul announces that a radical event of liberation has happened to the Galatians: for freedom Christ has set you free (Gal 5.1a; cf. 2 Cor 3.17). The fronted dative phrase *τῇ ἐλευθερίᾳ* indicates that freedom just *is* the point, orientation, and goal of this gracious divine act. Paul thus urges the Galatians, who are in danger of evicting themselves from existence in freedom by

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Cambridge University Press, 1993), 106), which Rabens considers to be 'a formulation which seems to leave little room for the believer's own will and effort' (*The Holy Spirit and Ethics*, 291).

[334] While this does not require us to say that apostasy is impossible – it clearly is possible in Gal 5.4 – my reading does affirm, in a particular sense, the 'efficacy' of grace (*pace* Barclay, *Paul and the Gift*, 446).

[335] For Pauline ethics as correspondence to being-in-Christ, see U. Schnelle, 'Die Begründung und die Gestaltung der Ethik bei Paulus', in *Die bleibende Gegenwart des Evangeliums: Festschrift für Otto Merk zum 70. Geburtstag* (ed. R. Gebauer and M. Meiser; Marburg: N.G. Elwert, 2003), 109–131, at 117–122.

receiving circumcision, to remain in their freedom: 'stand therefore and do not return again to a yoke of slavery' (5.1b).[336] The form of this command implies that the point of liberation is not to open up an unlimited space for believers to do anything they wish (so 5.17) but to place them in a delimited space, not to establish an infinite license for any and all forms of self-realisation but rather to invite believers to become a particular kind of moral agent.[337] In this context, freedom is therefore both negative and positive, both a 'freedom from' and a 'freedom for'.[338]

But in what does this 'freedom for' consist? The event in which God liberates unworthy creatures from slavery establishes the basis for a human realization of this liberation in a radical community: it is because in his incarnation Christ has given himself as gift in discordance with human standards of value – without regard for 'merely human' criteria of circumcision, uncircumcision, ethnicity, gender, and so on (1.10; 3.26–28; 6.14) – that believers are liberated to live in a community which exists in suspension from these modes of evaluation. As Creston Davis eloquently puts it, because 'the Incarnational Event' is 'not determined by a set of predetermined a priori coordinates but is an unabashedly positive event not capable of being absorbed into the domesticated ideological fabric of our world', the Christ-event therefore creates 'an irreducible revolutionary possibility that ruptures with the predetermined coordinates of the world'.[339] Or, in John Barclay's apt summary, 'Because it is an incongruous gift, given without regard to worth, the Christ-gift neither reflects nor endorses the criteria of value operative in its context. Through "crucifixion to the world" (6:14), the community of the "new creation" has the freedom to follow its own system of values, unconstrained by the dominant systems of cultural capital'.[340] Put another way, the event of God's freedom – enacted in giving without

[336] Though of course the Galatians were not Torah-obedient prior to this, with his 'again (*πάλιν*)' in 4.9 Paul draws an analogy between the slavery that characterized their pagan way of life and the slavery of being 'under the law' in 4.3. See Barclay, *Paul and the Gift*, 408–409.

[337] *Pace* F.S. Jones' suggestion that freedom is freedom to do whatever believers please (*'Freiheit' in den Briefen des Apostels Paulus: Eine historische, exegetische und religionsgeschichtliche Studie* (GTA 34; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1984), 106). For a fuller account of freedom as self-limitation, see Webster, *Barth's Moral Theology: Human Action in Barth's Thought* (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1998), 99–123.

[338] So Söding, *Das Liebesgebot bei Paulus*, 218–223; cf. P.G. Ziegler, 'Some Remarks on Christian Freedom', in *Indicative of Grace – Imperative of Freedom: Essays in Honour of Eberhard Jüngel in His 80th Year* (ed. R.D. Nelson; T&T Clark Theology; London: Bloomsbury, 2014), 255–266, at 257.

[339] C. Davis, 'Introduction', in *Paul's New Moment: Continental Philosophy and the Future of Christian Theology* (ed. J. Milbank, C. Davis, and S. Žižek; Grand Rapids: Brazos, 2010), 1–17, at 2.

[340] Barclay, *Paul and the Gift*, 423.

regard to human criteria of value – establishes a new form of human freedom – which comes to expression in a community that lives in suspension from all forms of cultural symbolic capital.

Galatians 5.13 more specifically outlines the shape of existence in freedom. Drawing from his claim in 5.1, Paul again reminds the Galatians of the gracious divine act which has called them into being: *ὑμεῖς γὰρ ἐπ᾽ ἐλευθερίᾳ ἐκλήθητε*. Just as God 'called' Paul and extracted him from his former course of life (1.16), so God has 'called' the Galatians into a radical new existence *ex nihilo*.[341] Paul then provides a negation and affirmation of the purpose of this freedom: 'do not use your freedom as an opportunity for the flesh, but through love become enslaved to one another' (5.13). The same way that the Christ-event finds its *telos* in Spirit-empowered moral action which comprises 'living to God' (2.19), in Gal 5.13 the christologically bestowed freedom more specifically finds its *telos* when it is expressed in and as love, as mutual slavery, and as obligation to one another.[342] The obligation to live to God entails and includes the obligation to love one's sisters and brothers in Christ. For Paul, then, freedom does not stand in opposition to or in competition with obligation. The liberation bestowed by Christ is, rather, the very basis of obligation. In this regard, when believers express their freedom in acts of mutual love, they participate in the coincidence between freedom and obligation.[343]

The foregoing investigation suggests that what is first spoken to believers is a word of *permission*. Paul first depicts believers as passive recipients whom God has liberated, filled with the Spirit, and called *ex nihilo* into a radical and eccentric eschatological life. By the gracious self-gift of God, the Galatians now live in a new mode of moral existence otherwise impossible outside of the activity and presence of Christ and the Spirit. In this theological context, the emphatic declarations of human freedom and Spiritual empowerment – 'we live by the Spirit', 'for freedom Christ has set you free', 'you were called in freedom' – can be compactly captured by the simple permissive phrase 'you may'. The

[341] See Williams 'Disjunction in Paul', 75.

[342] Pascale Rondez helpfully notes that love is thus the 'Kriterium für Freiheit' ('Ein Zentrum paulinischer Theologie? Eine pneumatilogische Erschliessungdes Zusammenhangs von Soteriologie und Christologie anhand von Gal 5,25', in *Kreuzestheologie im Neuen Testament* (ed A. Dettwiler and J. Zumstein; WUNT 151; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2002), 59–72, at 63; see also Söding, *Das Liebesgebot bei Paulus*, 219.

[343] So McKenny rightly speaks of the 'identity of permission and obligation' and states that 'an act of obedience is also and as such an act of freedom, and vice versa' (*Analogy of Grace*, 187; cf. Ziegler, 'Some Remarks on Christian Freedom', 260).

subsequent exhortations – 'stand', 'do not submit', 'become enslaved to one another', and 'let us keep in step with the Spirit' – thus arise from (or better: are included within) the announcement of Christ's liberating action.[344] The Pauline imperatives thus summon believers to 'enact ontically what [they] are ontologically'.[345] In this logic, because what we are permitted to be in Christ is also what we should be, the 'you may' immediately takes the form of 'you must'.[346] We may therefore reverse another well-known formula: it is not that 'ought' implies 'can' but that 'can' establishes 'ought'. While this may at first appear paradoxical, it consists in a rather simple coherence. For example, if someone who has been in prison for years is now free to leave, in the unlikely event that she was deliberating on whether to leave, you would tell her that she *should* leave prison because she *can*: what awaits her outside of those bars is much more wonderous than the bleak mode of existence inside of prison.[347] For Paul, similarly, obligation is the product of freedom: because the gospel irrupts into history to liberate humans and to create them as new moral agents who can live in freedom, Paul's claims about what has been done *to* the Galatians in Christ, his announcements about what they are liberated, permitted, enabled, and empowered to be, immediately take the form of exhortations (or even invitations) to live in love through the power of the Spirit.[348] This reading dissolves any harsh distinctions between 'grace' and 'command or 'gospel' and 'ethics' and pushes back against any interpretation which posits that Paul assumes 'Eine Spannung zwischen Indikativ und Imperativ'.[349] As John Webster put it, 'To say "is" is to

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[344] As Samuel Vollenweider notes 'Freieheit gehört ausserdem hier wie dort nicht auf die Seite menschlicher Produktivität, sondern vielmehr auf diejenige der Rezepitivität. In dieser Rezeptivität erweist sich Freiheit aber als ungemein schöpferische Kraft, die den Menschen elementar verwandelt' (*Freiheit als neue Schöpfung: Eine Untersuchung zur Eleutheria bei Paulus und in seiner Umwelt* (FRLANT 147; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1989), 316).

[345] McKenny, *Analogy of Grace*, 187.

[346] This is an adaptation of McKenny's paraphrase of Barth, in which he writes, 'What we may be is what in Jesus Christ we are now free to be … yet what we may be is also what we ought to be' (*Analogy of Grace*, 187). *Pace* Horn's assertion that 'Vielmehr wird in Gal 5, 13–6, 10 selbst das Liebesgebot nicht mehr als Imperative verstanden, sondern als eine Frucht des Lebens im Geist' ('Wandel im Geist', 166).

[347] This pushes back against Bultmann's claim that Gal 5.25, because it derives the imperative from the indicative, amounts to a 'paradoxen Ausdruck' ('Das Problem der Ethik bei Paulus', *ZNW* 23 (1924): 123–140, at 123). In my reading there is nothing paradoxical here.

[348] So rightly Bultmann, 'Das Problem der Ethik bei Paulus', 126.

[349] D. Zeller, *Studien zu Philo und Paulus* (Bonner Biblische Beiträge 165; Göttingen: V&R unipress, 2011), 222. See also the various critiques of the 'indicative-imperative' model throughout Engberg-Pedersen, *Paul and the Stoics*; R. Zimmerman, 'Jenseits von Indikative und Imperative: Zur "impliziten Ethik" des Paulus am Beispel des 1. Korintherbriefs', *TLZ* 132 (2007): 259–284); cf. the comments in Barclay, *Paul and the Gift*, 440; V. Rabens, 'Indicative and Imperative as the Substructure of Paul's Theology-and-Ethics in Galatians?' in *Galatians and Christian Theology*, 285–305, esp. 298. Despite Rabens' critique of Victor Paul Furnish on this point, Furnish does state that Paul's

say "ought," to be obligated by reality'.[350] The christological word of permission is at once the christological word of obligation.[351]

Campbell's contention that a 'theocentric' account of soteriology must consider God's redemptive act as not obligating human action therefore seriously distorts Paul's theology. A crucial and indispensable aspect of Paul's theology is that the moral behaviour of believers is generated by the Christ-event and ultimately oriented towards the God who enacted this event in history. Human action is not simply 'appropriate, but not necessary' in Paul's theology but rather is itself a part of the *telos* and fulfillment of the divine act in Christ.[352] The redemption brought about by God's gift in Christ neither bypasses nor overpowers human moral action: the gift of Christ is a gift that brings about the realization of believers as pneumatic agents within the divine economy. And because in this economy they are obligated to reciprocate God's gift in Christ by means of God's gift in Christ, the commands which issue from the gospel can be called *gracious* commands: they both arise from and are fulfilled by the work of the gift.[353]

4.4. God with Us, We with God

This chapter has many threads which need now to be woven into the fabric of the main argument of this thesis. Here are four conclusions.

'indicatives so frequently have imperatival force that they must be regarded as one of Paul's primary means of exhortation' (*Theology and Ethics in Paul* (2d ed.; NTL; London: SCM, 2009), 97) and that 'The Pauline imperative is not just the result of the indicative but fully integral to it' (225).

[350] Webster, '"Where Christ Is": Christology and Ethics', in *Christology and Ethics* (ed. F. LeRon Shults and B. Waters; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2010), 32–55, at 46). Or as Hays puts it, 'Paul seems to see moral action as a logical entailment of God's redemptive action' (*The Moral Vision of the New Testament: Community, Cross, New Creation; A Contemporary Introduction to New Testament Ethics* (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1997), 39). The logical shape of Paul's ethics seems somewhat similar to the same way that the Stoics were convinced that all observations about nature informed ethics. For Paul all observations about the Christ-event impinge upon his ethics, because believers are to correspond to their existence in Christ. On this issue in Stoicism, see the helpful treatment in A.A. Long, 'The Logical Basis of Stoic Ethics', in *Stoic Studies* (Hellenistic Culture and Society 36; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 134–155.

[351] By using the concept of 'permission', my reading partially vindicates Bultmann's contention that in Christ the Spirit opens up the possibility of obedience (*Theology of the New Testament*, 336–337).

[352] To use Webster's words again, the Christ-event is a 'teleological act on the part of God, having as its end the life-act of the creature' (*Barth's Ethics of Reconciliation*, 49).

[353] To bring in Augustine's famous remark, in Galatians Paul suggests that God gives what he commands (*Conf.* 10.29).

1) *Christ's loving act of self-giving is his positive identification with human creatures.* Taking the death of Christ as part of his incarnation means that the outworking of Christ's 'love' does not come to expression as subtraction from or destruction of himself but rather works itself out in his positive solidarity in which he takes up the experience of humanity as his own.[354]

2) *Christ's self-gift includes the bestowal of all that is his.* As we saw in chapter three, in Philo's account of the Nazirite vow he claimed that in a vow (which is a self-gift) one gives not only his possessions but also the possessor (*μὴ μόνον τὰ ἑαυτοῦ κτήματα ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸν κεκτημένον*) as a gift to God. This way of framing the notion of a self-gift can help to explain the relationship between Christ's self-gift and the benefit which believers receive therefrom. Christ's participation in the human condition is the bestowal of himself to humanity, but the bestowal of that gift includes the bestowal of all that is within his sphere of being.[355] As a result, when Christ gives himself in the incarnation, he *ipso facto* bestows his inheritance, blessing, promise, status upon believers.[356] Sharing with Christ's possessions and benefits is therefore itself participation in Christ because these are not external objects but come from his very self. Put the other way around, sharing in Christ must therefore include sharing in what belongs to him and what has been given to him by the Father. To rephrase Melanchthon's famous theologoumenon, knowing Christ includes knowing his benefits, and knowing his benefits only occurs through knowing and being known by God in Christ (4.9).[357] Thus, Christ's love includes not only his positive assimilation of the conditions of others but also his positive *bestowal of himself* to humanity. He 'gives himself' in the sense of sharing himself *with* humanity by sharing *in*

[354] Martinus de Boer suggests that the *καί* which connects 'loved me' and 'gave himself for me' in 2.20 is epexegetical; in this reading, Paul refers to the same reality with these two phrases: 'The Son of God's love was thus not a disposition but a concrete act of self-sacrifice' (*Galatians*, 163). But Paul's claim that the death of Christ 'demonstrates (*συνιστάνειν*)' God's love (Rom 5.8) intimates that he makes a conceptual distinction between his love and his saving act, even if the latter reveals the former (stating that *x* reveals and demonstrates *y* does not mean that *x* is identical to *y*).

[355] As Barth summarises, 'Loving us, God does not give us something, but Himself; and giving us Himself, giving us His Son, He gives us everything' (*CD* II/I, 276).

[356] In this regard, it is probably not a coincidence that the reference to the Galatians' reception of the Spirit in 3.1–5 directly follows the indication that Christ 'gave himself' in 2.20 (so Macaskill, *Union with Christ,* 221).

[357] The original phrase is 'This is what it means to know Christ: to know his benefits' (P. Melanchthon, 'Loci Communes Theologici', in *Melanchthon and Bucer* (ed. Wilhelm Pauck; trans. L.J. Satre; The Library of Christian Classics; Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2006), 18–152, at 21).

humanity, with the result that the contrasts between divinity and humanity – between life and death, blessing and curse, slavery and inheritance – are dissolved. In Barth's memorable articulation,

> To put it in the simplest way: what unites God and us humans is that he does not will to be God without us, that he creates us rather to share with us and therefore with our being and life and act, that he does not allow his history be his and ours ours, but causes them to take place as a common history. That is the special truth which the Christian message has to proclaim at its very heart.[358]

3) Christ's self-giving is the means by which he gives humanity to the Father and himself. As we saw with both Seneca and Philo, the self-gift united giving and receiving in one act, forming a coincidence between self-benefit and other-benefit. In a similar way, the self-gift of Christ comprises the source of moral behaviour because in the incarnation God bestows believers with the Spirit, who liberates and propels them into a new mode of existence and enables them to perform ethical actions (4.6; 5.1, 13, 16, 25), and, being the recipients of the divine gift, believers are not only empowered but also obligated to act in coherence with God's radical reconstitution of their existence in Christ. In short, Jesus Christ is the establishment of ethics. Christ's love, therefore, not only *seeks* a response from humans; it also *gives* it. *Christ's bestowal of himself to humanity is the means by which humans give themselves to Christ.*[359] In theological terms, the reality of 'God with us' includes and effects a corresponding reality of 'we with God'.[360] Thus, in the economy of the incarnation, the event of Christ's giving *is* the means by which he receives, and the event of believers' reception of the gift *is* the means by which they are brought into the freedom of obedient love. The incarnation effects a coincidence of giving and receiving.

4) *The* telos *of Christ's act of love is the construction of a fellowship of shared selves.* A tendency in modern ethics which we saw in chapter two is to reduce all action to being ultimately either self-interested or other-regarding, to being either egoistic or altruistic. This trajectory feeds upon a certain modern atomism which insists on analysing reality only by reducing it to their constituent parts, and this kind of atomism, I argued, was based on a certain notion of the self as a fundamentally isolated

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[358] Barth, *CD* IV/1, 7; cf. *CD*. II/1, 274.

[359] We can find a similar view in 1 John 4.8: 'In this love of God is made manifest among us, that God has sent his only Son into the world, in order that we might live through him'.

[360] In Nimmo's words, the believer's 'human self-determination by grace corresponds to her divine determination' and thus 'In the exercise of her true freedom in this vocation, the Christian reflects the activity of the God who determined Godself' (*Being in Actio*n, 238).

entity. But precisely in Paul's account of the incarnation, Christ's self is malleable, permable, and shareable. He can transform himself, absorb the properties of human beings, and extend his own self to others, and the result of the Christ-event is that he 'lives' in others (such a claim exhibits similarity to Aristotle's claim that the actualisation of one person can be in another person). Because Jesus' act of love is oriented towards establishing this kind of shared selfhood in which Christ dwells in believers and believers are established as human actors, capturing the essence of the love of Christ *only* with the language of self-sacrifice is reductionistic, since it takes one crucial element of the Christ-event (his death) as exhaustive of the event itself, and thereby eclipses how the death of Christ is, for Paul, an act of love which is always oriented towards the creation of a mutual fellowship between God and humanity.

CHAPTER FIVE

Paul's Incarnational Ethic

> In pure love there's a union of the heart with others, a disposition to feel, to desire, and to act as though others were one with ourselves.[361]

'After the initial declaration', asserts Alain Badiou, 'love too must also be "re-stated"'.[362] The previous two chapters have elucidated what for Paul comprises the initial and definitive declaration of divine love: the self-gift of Jesus Christ, in which he shares in the condition of flesh, accursedness, and death, and by which believers share in his blessing, sonship, and life. This, I argued, results in the creation of a fellowship in which both parties participate in one another and simultaneously benefit through their active relationship with each another. But if Paul portrays the incarnation as such a singular, unique, and thus unrepeatable event of divine love, why does he also utilize this same love-language to depict how the Galatians should treat one another? By employing the words ἀγάπη and ἀγαπᾶν to characterize both the action of Christ (2.20) and interactions between community members, Paul seems to hint, to adapt Badiou's phrase, that believers must 'restate' the love of Christ in an analogous form by embodying the shape of his self-gift in their interactions with one another.[363]

The operative assumption underlying this interpretation of Paul's ἀγαπ-language is that 'love' can helpfully designate the various forms of believers' prosocial behaviour towards one another. But the fact that ἀγαπ-lexemes emerge only four times throughout the so-called 'paraenesis' of Galatians (5.6; 5.13, 14; 5.22) might call this assumption into question.[364] One potential objection could take this

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[361] J. Edwards, 'Of Natural Conscience, and the Moral Sense', in *Ethical Writings* (ed. P. Ramsey; Works of Jonathan Edwards 8; New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), 589–599, at 589 (adapted).

[362] A. Badiou with N. Truong, *In Praise of Love* (trans. P. Bush; London: Serpent's Tail, 2012), 51.

[363] Deploying the same word to refer to two distinct phenomena does not always indicate a relationship of analogy between their *res significatae*. But given that ἀγαπ-words are used in Galatians in connection with prosocial behaviour, then in this particular instance Paul's use of love-language both to depict Jesus Christ and to command the Galatians implies that their behaviour bears some kind of resemblance (cf. Barth, *CD* IV/2, 751–752).

[364] This exhortative material has often been identified as a unique section comprised of 'paraenesis', though scholars have divided over where this paraenetic section begins, whether at 4.12 (H.D. Betz, 'The Literary Composition and

somewhat restricted use of ἀγάπη and ἀγαπᾶν as definitive evidence that love (and the love exhibited by Christ) is just not truly the 'centre' of Pauline ethics and is therefore inadequate for capturing the essence of his contingent and diverse prosocial ethical exhortations. This objection would jeopardize the possibility of connecting Paul's various exhortations, beyond those which use ἀγάπη and ἀγαπᾶν, with Christ's act of love (ἀγαπᾶν) so designated in Galatians 2.20. To mitigate such a critique, this chapter will take a different approach. Taking my cue from Leander Keck's suggestion that to get to 'the real "stuff" of ethics' we 'must bring to the surface, make explicit, the rationale or "moral reasoning" built into [an] exhortation,'[365] I intend to argue that Christ's act of love functions not so much as the 'centre'[366] of Pauline ethics but rather as a pattern that is only sometimes explicated and laid out but usually just dictates the shape of his ethics even without being explicitly acknowledged.[367] To this end, this chapter investigates the ethical material in Galatians in order to draw out how Paul's exhortations and prohibitions are informed and shaped by his incarnational Christology. Thus, while Paul

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Function of Paul's Letter to the Galatians', *NTS* 21 (1975): 353–379, at 376), 5.1 (G.W. Hansen, 'A Paradigm of the Apocalypse: The Gospel in the Light of Epistolary Analysis', in *Gospel in Paul,* 194–209, at 196), or 5.13 (H. Hübner, 'Der Galaterbrief und das Verhältnis von antiker Rhetorik und Epistolographie', *TLZ* 109 (1984): 241–50, at 244–246; O. Merk, 'Der Beginn der Paränese im Galaterbrief', *ZNW* 60 (1969): 85–104, at 104). An earlier generation of scholarship took the supposed difference between the 'theological' and 'ethical' sections to signal that Paul was fighting against two different kinds of opponents in Galatia, namely libertines and legalists (W. Lütgert, *Gesetz and Geist: Eine Untersuchung zur Vorgeschichte des Galaterbriefes* (BFCT 22.6; Gütersloh: Bertelsmann, 1919), 16, 27–28; J.H. Ropes, *The Singular Problem of the Epistle to the Galatians* (HTS 14; London: Oxford University Press, 1929), 10). Others have suggested that Paul was fighting not against two opponents but only the twin 'tendencies' of libertinism and legalism within the Galatian congregation (R. Jewett, 'The Agitators and the Galatian Congregation', *NTS* 17 (1971): 198–212, at 210–212; R. Longenecker, *Galatians* (WBC 41; Dallas: Word, 1990), 187). These readings have generally fallen out of favour through the influence of works such as J.M.G. Barclay, *Obeying the Truth: A Study in Paul's Ethic in Galatians* (Studies of the New Testament and its World; Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1988) and F.J. Matera, 'The Culmination of Paul's Argument to the Galatians: Gal 5:1–6:17', *JSNT* 32 (1988): 79–91.

[365] L.E. Keck, 'Rethinking "New Testament Ethics"', *JBL* 115 (1996): 3–16, at 7. His quotation of 'moral reasoning' draws from J.P. Sampley, *Walking Between the Times: Paul's Moral Reasoning* (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1991).

[366] *Pace* Thomas Söding's assertion that 'Das Liebesgebot bildet zwar die Mitte der paulinischen Ethik' and that 'Mit Gal 5,14 ... hat Paulus der gesamten christlichen Ethik im Liebesgebot eine alles bestimmende Mitte gegeben' (*Das Liebesgebot bei Paulus*, 24, 225, cf. 1, 290) and Victor Paul Furnish's claim that for Paul 'love is … the central content of the gospel's gift and demand' (*The Love Command in the New Testament* (NTL; New York: Abingdon, 1972), 130); similar to Söding and Furnish is Wischmeyer *Liebe als Agape*, 9. Helpful cautions and critiques regarding the use of 'centre' in Pauline scholarship are provided in J.A. Linebaugh, 'The Grammar of the Gospel: Justification as a Theological Criterion in Reformation Theology and Paul's Letter to the Galatians', *SJT* (2018): 287–307; S.E. Porter, 'Is there a Center to Paul's Theology? An Introduction to the Study of Paul and his Theology', in *Paul and his Theology* (ed. S.E. Porter; Pauline Studies 3; Leiden: Brill, 2006), 1–19, at 6–12; Beker, *Paul the* Apostle, 16.

[367] This is similar to identifying what Seyla Benhabib's concept of a 'metanorm' (*Situating the Self: Gender, Community and Postmodernism in Contemporary Ethics* (Cambridge: Polity, 1992), 45. This term is repeatedly utilized by David Horrell, who asserts that 'solidarity' and 'other-regard' are the two metanorms of Pauline ethics (*Solidarity and Difference*, 302).

sometimes explicitly indicates that believers' behaviour should conform to Christ, such as Paul's claim that 'Christ lives in me' (2.20), that Christ should be 'formed' in the Galatians (4.19), and that they should obey the 'law of Christ' (6.2), my scope also includes Paul's exhortations and descriptions of moral behaviour in those texts which do not explicitly invoke conformity to Jesus. My main thesis here is therefore that in Galatians Paul's various exhortations conform to a kind of christological pattern, even in instances where there is no direct appeal to the Christ-event. More specifically, Jesus Christ's loving identification with human creatures in the incarnation not only creates a mutual relationship between God and believers but also enables and obligates believers to conform their behaviour to this event by *sharing in the reality of one another*. In other words, Paul proffers what could be called an 'incarnational' *ethic*: because God has refused to be God without us, I must refuse to be me without you.

In this chapter I first treat five sections of text (4.12–16; 5.13; 5.26–6.1; 6.2; 5.14), elucidating how Paul's incarnational Christology informs each of them, and then show how Paul intentionally portrays the agitators' behaviour as contradictory to the love of Christ in the incarnation. I then respond to some of those who object to positing an analogy between human behaviour and Jesus' incarnation.

5.1. A Moment of Shared Love (4.12–16)

Up until the time when he heard the news of the Galatian crisis, Paul had deeply cherished his friendship with the Galatians. He had been, in fact, the one from whom they first heard the good news (4.13), and the memory of their initial encounter – in which Paul gave birth to the Galatians through his preaching, and they warmly welcomed him despite his weakness (4.12–13) – only sharpens the tragedy of their present relationship, which, because of the Galatians' affinity for the agitators' message, stands in jeopardy of shattering entirely. As they (according to Paul) are in danger of rejecting the gospel by accepting circumcision (5.3–4), they are thereby in danger of rejecting Paul himself, even positioning him as their enemy (4.17). It is no surprise that Paul, feeling a sense of deep personal betrayal and emotional turmoil, deploys an abundance of relational language in this paragraph: the filial terms (*ἀδελφοί* and *τέκνα μου*), personal pleas (*δέομαι ὑμῶν*), relational despair (*ὥστε ἐχθρὸς*

ὑμῶν γέγονα), and recollection of old memories (ἐδέξασθέ με) all indicate that one of his most treasured friendships hangs in the balance.[368]

The emotional and relational appeals deployed in this section have led some interpreters to conclude that 4.12–16 remains devoid of any coherent argumentation. In this vein, Franz Mußner claims that 'Paulus arbeitet in diesem Abschnitt nicht mehr mit sachlich-theologischen Argumenten, sondern mit ganz persönlichen, die seine starke, innere Bewegung nicht verbergen können',[369] and Heinrich Schlier similarly considers this section to be 'ein Argument des Herzens, das mit starker Affekt vorgetragen wird, wie der sprunghafte Gedankengang verrät'.[370] There might be a problematic assumption lurking under the surface of these interpretations, namely that relational and emotional appeals *ipso facto* diminish or exclude rational argumentation.[371] In any event, if this paragraph seems so disjointed to us, exploring different interpretative avenues might help to decipher the flow of the argument. I hope here to give such a reading.[372]

Paul initiates his plea to the Galatians by exhorting them to 'become like me, even as I became like you (γίνεσθε ὡς ἐγώ, ὅτι κἀγὼ ὡς ὑμεῖς)' (4.12). The second compressed clause (ὅτι κἀγὼ ὡς ὑμεῖς), though notoriously difficult to translate,[373] probably refers to Paul's freedom to live outside the

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[368] L. Michael White provides a thorough explanation of how Paul engages in various friendship-*topoi* in this section ('Rhetoric and Reality in Galatians: Framing the Social Demands of Friendship', in *Early Christianity and Classical Culture: Comparative Studies in Honor of Abraham J. Malherbe* (NovTSup 110; Leiden: Brill, 2003), 307–350.

[369] Mußner, *Der Galaterbrief*, 304.

[370] H. Schlier, *Der Brief an die Galater* (KEK 14; Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1971), 208. This evaluation seems overstated, since the flow of Gal 4.12–20 does not starkly contrast with some of Paul's arguments elsewhere which are compressed almost to the point of obfuscation (so 3.10–11).

[371] Similarly, Troy Martin claims that, because Paul here attempts to persuade the Galatians by inciting their emotion, he is making an argument from *pathos* rather than *logos*, but the possibility that Paul combines emotion and reason is rejected simply by way of assumption ('The Voice of Emotion: Paul's Pathetic Persuasion (Gal 4.12–20)', in *Paul and Pathos* (ed. T.H. Olbricht and J.L. Sumney; SBL Symposium 16; Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2001), 181–202, at 184, cf. 189). Ernest DeWitt Burton also claims that Paul is 'dropping argumentation' (*A Critical and Exegetical Commentary*, 235; so also P. Bonnard, *L'Épitre de Saint Paul aux Galates* (2d ed.; CNT 9; Paris: Delachaux et Niestlé, 1972), 90).

[372] Scholars who interpret the section as logically sensical include e.g. Betz, *Galatians*, 221; Longenecker, *Galatians*, 188; A. Suhl, 'Der Galaterbrief – Situation und Argumentation', *ANRW* 2.25.4: 3067–3134, at 3130; Hansen, 'A Paradigm of the Apocalypse'.

[373] While the second clause κἀγὼ ὡς ὑμεῖς contains no verb, I have supplied the past tense 'became' because Paul goes on immediately to recall his past preaching to the Galatians. Moreover, as I will discuss presently, the connection between preaching to gentiles and becoming like gentiles is also evident in 1 Corinthians 9.20–22, where Paul uses the same language (γίνεσθαι ὡς).

Troy Martin suggests that the best translation of 4.12 is 'Become as I am because I, inasmuch as you are brothers, need nothing from you. You wronged me' ('The Ambiguities of a "Baffling Expression" (Gal 4:12)', *Filologia*

authoritative frame of the Torah, to live 'like a gentile (ἐθνικῶς)' (2.14) and hence like the gentile Galatians (κἀγὼ ὡς ὑμεῖς). His hope that the Galatians should become 'like' him in this way seems to draw upon his own self-portrayal in Galatians 1.10–2.10, in which he depicts himself as living 'not according to human norms' (1.10) and thus not according to the demands of the Torah (1.17; 2.3).[374] Moreover, that 'I became as you' refers to Paul's willingness to live outside of the norms set by the Torah is suggested by the preceding reference to Galatians obeying a Jewish calendrical system: Paul expresses his utter astonishment they following a Jewish calendrical system, what he calls 'days and months and seasons and years' (4.9–11), and then calls them to 'become like him', implying that being like him would entail that they do not follow such a calendar.[375] Thus, Paul encourages the Galatians to imitate him by living in suspension from the all 'merely human' standards (including the Torah) – by letting 'Christ be formed' amongst them (4.19)[376] – with an appeal to the fact that he himself expressed his detachment from all cultural systems of value by 'becoming like' the Galatians when he first preached to them.

The transition here from 'I became like you' (4.12) to his recollection of preaching to the Galatians (4.13) echoes the assertion in 1 Corinthians that his freedom from all merely human constructs enables him to 'become (γίνεσθαι) all things to all people' in order to 'win (κερδαίνειν)' others to the

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Neotestamentaria 12 (1999): 123–138; A.A. Das follows Martin in *Galatians*, 454). The impetus for Martin's translation is that he considers it awkward for Paul to state that 'You wronged me nothing' when he clearly thinks the Galatians have now wronged him ('Ambiguities', 127–128). But the use of the aorist to denote a simple past act ('you did not wrong me *back then*') makes fine sense in this context. More importantly, neither Martin nor Das explain how it could make sense in this context for Paul to say 'I need/am pleading nothing from you' (the resulting translation of 4.12b). In a letter filled with exhortations, pleas, and fierce objections, such a sentence would be rather strange.

[374] For Paul's biography as a paradigm for other believers instead of as a defense of his apostleship, see B.R. Gaventa, 'Galatians 1 and 2: Autobiography as Paradigm', *NovT* 28 (1986): 309–326; J.M.G. Barclay, 'Paul's Story: Autobiography as Testimony', in *Narrative Dynamics in Paul: A Critical Assessment* (ed. B.W. Longenecker; London: Westminster John Knox, 2002), 133–156.

[375] Justin Hardin has argued that 4.10 refers to the imperial calendar (*Galatians and the Imperial Cult: A Critical Analysis of the First-Century Social Context of Paul's Letter* (WUNT II/237; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2008), 116–147). This would make for a quite confusing shift in topic, especially given that before and after this verse, Paul is seriously concerned mostly with circumcision, giving no other hints that the Galatians are participating in the imperial cult.

[376] Though some see the notion of a sudden, invasive, apocalyptic birthing referred to here (B.R. Gaventa, 'The Maternity of Paul: an Exegetical Study of Galatians 4:19', in *The Conversation Continues: Studies in Paul and John in Honor of J. Louis Martyn* (ed. R.T. Fortna and B.R. Gaventa Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1990, 189–201), James Davies has problematized this characterization of the apocalypses ('What to Expect when you're Expecting: Maternity, Salvation History, and the "Apocalyptic Paul"', *JSNT* 38 (2016): 301–315; see also my critique of the notion that 'disjunction' is uniquely apocalyptic in my 'Disjunction in Paul'.

gospel (1 Cor 9.19). In that passage, it is Paul's detachment *from* all cultural norms that permits him to be a missionary *in* any cultural setting: being 'free from all things (*ἐλεύθερος γὰρ ὢν ἐκ πάντων*)', he can 'become like' Jews, gentiles, and even the 'weak' – those who would regularly be regarded as worthless and detestable (9.20–22; cf. 1.28) – in order to preach to them.[377] But Paul's refusal to commit unilaterally to one cultural mode of existence and his corresponding willingness to adapt himself to various cultural settings stems from his conviction that God has called believers without regard to merely human indexes of quality. In his own words:

> Consider your own calling, brothers and sisters: most of you were not wise according to mere fleshly standards (*κατὰ σάρκα*), most were not powerful, most were not of noble birth. But the foolish things of the world – God chose them, so that he might bring shame upon the 'wise'; the weak things of the world – God chose them, so that he might bring shame upon the 'strong'; the inferior and dejected things of the world – God chose them, the nonexistent things, in order to abrogate the things that exist, so that all flesh will not boast to the face of God.[378]

In Galatians, Paul's missionary strategy of assimilation comes to expression in the fact that in his 'apostleship to the gentiles (*ἀποστολὴ εἰς τὰ ἔθνη*)' (Gal 2.7–8) he is free to live like a gentile in order to preach to gentiles (4.12–13). But, as in 1 Corinthians, Paul can only become like the gentile Galatians because God has given the gift of Christ without regard to the worth of its recipients. The divine disregard for human worth is evident in Paul's announcement that Christ, by participating in the curse, redeemed those who were cursed by their transgressions (3.10–13). As a corollary to this, God calls people by disregarding whatever positive or negative value they might have possessed, including disregarding whether they are Jew or gentile. In Paul's autobiography, he notes both his positive social worth amongst his peers and negative worth in relation to God – he was advancing in Judaism beyond his contemporaries, but he was persecuting the church of God (1.13) – but both of these realities 'are only dramatically identified to point out, rather ironically, their complete

[377] This should not be taken to imply, as Peter Richardson and Paul W. Gooch conclude, that Paul does not consider himself to be a Jew ('Accommodation Ethics', *TB* 29 (1978): 89–142, at 96). Indeed, Paul's self-identifications in Galatians 2.15 (*ἡμεῖς φύσει Ἰουδαῖοι*) and Romans 11.1 (*ἐγὼ Ἰσραηλίτης εἰμί, ἐκ σπέρματος Ἀβραάμ, φυλῆς Βενιαμίν*) push strongly against this. It is rather better to say that for Paul being Jewish is an *adiaphoron* – hence 'neither circumcision nor uncircumcision are anything' (6.14) – even if a preferred *adiaphoron* (so Rom 3.1–2). But even so, his identity as a Jew is nonetheless *real*. What is crucial but sometimes overlooked is that Paul does *not* say in 1 Corinthians 9.20 *ἐγενόμην τοῖς Ἰουδαίοις Ἰουδαῖος* but rather *ἐγενόμην τοῖς Ἰουδαίοις ὡς Ἰουδαῖος*. That is, Paul asserts that he becomes 'like' other Jews – in the sense that he acted like them – but not that he 'becomes a Jew', which would imply that he did not identify as one. For a critique of the view that 1 Corinthians 9.20 implies that Paul does not consider himself to be a Jew, see Rudolph, *A Jew To the Jews*.

[378] 1 Corinthians 1.26–29.

irrelevance: God set him apart from birth, and thus nothing in Paul's prior life either occasioned or inhibited God's revelation to him'.[379] By calling believers into existence while utterly disregarding their positive or negative cultural status, God has demonstrated that 'neither circumcision nor uncircumcision are anything' (6.15; cf. 5.6). But, as mentioned in the previous chapter, the event of divine freedom in giving without regard to human norms establishes a corresponding human freedom in which believers can live in suspension from any permanent allegiance and conformity to one cultural ethos: thus, it is the incongruity of God's grace, given to the unworthy, that enables Paul to live outside of his inherited cultural norms (*αἱ πατρικαὶ παραδόσεις*, 1.13) and thus permits him to preach to and enter into fellowship with gentiles by becoming like them.

Paul's language in 4.12 – that he had become like the Galatians in order to benefit them and that the Galatians are to reciprocate by becoming like him – bears numerous striking resemblances to the mutual participation between the Son and believers in Galatians 3.10–14 and Galatians 4.4–7. Three points of continuity come to the surface here. First, Paul's assimilation to gentiles by living outside the authoritative frame of the Torah exhibits a structural analogy to how Christ redeemed others by participating in their condition, becoming a curse to redeem the accursed (3.13) and becoming under the law to redeem those under the law (4.4–5). In this sense, Paul's missionary strategy for preaching the gospel is itself patterned after the gospel. As David Rudolph notes, 'Paul understood the pattern of Christ's life – that Christ's accommodation to the situation of others for the sake of others – and this served as Paul's model of accommodation-oriented ministry'.[380] Second, the common use of the key term *γίνεσθαι* is therefore likely not a coincidence: Paul *became* (*γίνεσθαι*) like the gentile Galatians to benefit the gentiles, just as Christ *became* a curse (*γενόμενος ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν κατάρα*)' to redeem the accursed (3.13), and '*became* under the law (*γενόμενος ὑπὸ νόμον*)' to redeem those under the law (4.4–5; cf. Phil 2.7–8; 1 Cor 1.30; 9.20, 22).[381] It seems that Paul deploys the same word in 4.12 as in 4.4 and 3.13 to emphasise the incarnational shape of these acts of 'becoming'. Third, the plea for the

[379] Williams, 'Disjunction in Paul', 75.

[380] Rudolf, *A Jew to the Jews*, 178.

[381] The use of *γίνεσθαι* in 4.12 does not *per se* substantiate a connection to the shape of the Christ-event, but the broader similarities noted here make a cumulative case for seeing a thematic connection contained in the use of common lexemes.

Galatians to respond to Paul by assimilating to his own behaviour images how Christ's participation in the human condition brings believers to participate reciprocally in him, as they receive his blessing, Spirit, sonship, inheritance, and life (2.20; 3.14; 4.6–7,). Just as Christ became what Israel was in order that believers might become what he is, Paul became what the Galatians were in order that they might become what he is. Morna Hooker captures this:

> Paul saw this pattern [of interchange between Christ and humanity] as a model for his own missionary strategy: he is willing (as Christ was) to become what men and women are for their sake. He identifies with their situation. Thus in Gal 4.12 he declares that he has become what the Galatians are – that is, outside the Law; it is worth noting that this passage follows immediately after the statement that God sent his son 'born under the Law, to redeem those who were under the Law' … Here we see exactly the pattern of interchange statements … [Paul] sees himself as in some sense sharing in what we today would call the paradox of the incarnation.[382]

Just after his exhortation to 'become like me', Paul notes that he first preached the gospel to the Galatians 'because of a weakness of the flesh (*δι' ἀσθένειαν τῆς σαρκός*)' (4.13).[383] The seemingly stark shift from exhorting the Galatians to live outside of human norms ('become as I am') to recalling that he preached to them due to persecution might lead one to sympathize with Schlier's evaluation that this paragraph is characterised by 'sprunghafte Gedankengang'. But this shift is not so perplexing when considered in light of Paul's claim that living 'not according to human norms' (1.10) is precisely what incites opposition to him. Indeed, the rhetorical question 'If I am still preaching circumcision, why am I still being persecuted?' (5.11) seems to be underwritten by the assumption that he is the

[382] Hooker, *From Adam to Christ,* 8. Others who see a resemblance between 4.4 and 4.12 include R.B. Hays, 'Christology and Ethics in Galatians: The Law of Christ', *CBQ* 49 (1987): 268–290, at 281; Horrell, *Solidarity and Difference*, 229; W.P. De Boer, *The Imitation of Paul: An Exegetical Study* (Eugene: Wipf and Stock, 2016), 188–196); S.G. Eastman, *Recovering Paul's Mother Tongue: Language and Theology in Galatians* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2007), 46.

[383] This weakness could have counted as a 'temptation in [his] flesh' and thus was immediately apparent and recognizable to the Galatians. Since his weakness marks the occasion for his ministry to the Galatians (*διά* + accusative), it seems that it was somehow unexpected and thus likely not some kind of chronic illness, *pace* Scot Hafemann's suggestion that Paul *always* preached through weakness and thus no unexpected problem occasioned his visit to the Galatians ('"Because of Weakness" (Galatians 4:13): The Role of Suffering in the Mission of Paul', in *The Gospel to the Nations: Perspectives on Paul's Missions* (ed. P. Bolt and M.D. Thompson; Downers Grove: Intervarsity Press, 2000), 131–146, at 134). In light of the other statements about persecution in the letter (5.11; 6.12), it is probably best to follow the compelling case made most recently by John Anthony Dunne for taking the weakness to be 'a form of suffering of some kind that resulted from persecution' (*Persecution and Participation*, 164). Dunne also points out weaknesses in the chronic illness view and suggests that we should connect 4.13 with the statements about suffering in 5.11 and 6.17 (a reading which goes at least as far back as Chrysostom). This argument builds upon the work of A.J. Goddard and S.A. Cummins, 'Ill or Ill-Treated? Conflict and Persecution as the Context of Paul's Original Ministry in Galatia (Galatians 4.12–20)', *JSNT* 52 (1993): 93–126; see similarly J. Murphy-O'Connor, 'Gal 4:13–14 and the Recipients of Galatians', *RB* 105 (1998): 202–207). However, I do not share Dunne's contention that the primary thrust of the exhortation in 4.12 is about suffering rather than transcending Torah-norms (*Persecution and Participation,* 155–171).

target of harassment for being a Jewish 'apostate' because he does not encourage gentiles to obey the 'ancestral traditions (*αἱ πατρικαί μου παραδόσεις*)' (Gal 1.15; cf. 2 Cor 11.24). In this letter, then, Paul transforms from being the persecutor to the persecuted, meeting violent opposition for the very same reason that he had violently opposed the church. In this light, the transition from 4.12 to 4.13 does not amount to any coherence-jeopardizing disjunction. Paul calls the Galatians to 'become like him' in living outside of the norms set by the Torah, and then he reminds them that his suffering for being a perceived apostate – for living apart from Torah – marked the occasion for the Galatians hearing the gospel. Galatians 4.13, then, illustrates the utter irony of their affinity for the agitators' message: by adopting the norms of Torah they are attempting to express their identity in Christ in a way that contradicts the initial conditions within which they came to know God.[384]

The level of Paul's astonishment is intensified when we consider how he frames his willingness to undergo suffering and persecution as an act of love towards the Galatians. In 2.4–5, Paul recounts that 'false brethren' entered into his proximity with the intention of 'enslaving' them, attempting to make them live under the norms prescribed by the Torah. The language of 'submission' and 'yielding' (2.5) indicates that there was a situation where Paul endured social pressure, likely similar to the persecution referenced in 4.13 and 5.11. He adds that he did not 'submit' to this pressure 'in order that the truth of the gospel might remain for you (*ἵνα ἡ ἀλήθεια τοῦ εὐαγγελίου διαμείνῃ πρὸς ὑμᾶς*)' (2.5). This is curious, given that the Galatians are in no way directly involved in the scene which Paul recounts in this passage, but nevertheless it indicates that Paul interprets his resistance to extrinsic persecution as a direct act of beneficence for the Galatians. In light of his other letters, this is not so perplexing. In 2 Corinthians, he interprets his own sufferings as the means by which his community is benefitted (2 Cor 1.6–7) and as subordinate to his 'anxiety for all the churches' (2 Cor 11.28). Thus, in a similar way to how Jesus' sufferings are a subordinate means to creating a relationship with others (see §3.5), Paul understands his own sufferings as oriented towards producing and sustaining a

[384] Paul's insistence that their original experience with the gospel should cohere their present behaviour reflects Meeks' observation that 'Conversion stories and conversion rituals thus serve several functions in the attempts of early Christian groups to form their adherents into moral communities' (*The Origins of Christian Morality*: *The First Two Centuries* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993), 36).

relationship with other believers.[385] For Paul, then, we could say that *τὰ στίγματα τοῦ Ἰησοῦ* (Gal 6.17) produced by his experience of persecution are also *τὰ στίγματα τῆς ἀγάπης*. It is no surprise therefore that, in coming to them on account of a weakness, he remarks that the Galatians welcomed him even 'even as Christ Jesus' (4.14).[386]

Paul is not the only one who acts in conformity to Christ's love; he also depicts the Galatians' past behaviour in a way that hearkens back to the descriptions of Christ. Initially, Paul's weakness amounted to a 'testing' for the Galatians, but they 'did not scorn or despise him' (4.14) since, though they may have been tempted to see Paul's marred physical state as evidence of divine judgment, the Galatians refused to judge Paul according to these merely human standards.[387] In response, the Galatians were able to welcome Paul, and they identified with him to the point that they were willing to pluck out their eyes and give them to him (4.15: *εἰ δυνατὸν τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς ὑμῶν ἐξορύξαντες ἐδώκατέ μοι*). Just as Paul's detachment from common cultural standards of evaluation permits him to bring benefit to the gentiles, here it is the *Galatians'* refusal to judge Paul and his physical condition as detestable that enables them to identify with him and his circumstance. While it is unclear if the 'weakness' of which Paul speaks included or caused some kind of eye problem, the Galatians' hypothetical eye-plucking imagines that such an act could have benefitted him[388] in his time of weakness. In this sense, Paul insinuates that the Galatians had totally identified with his plight. They were willing, quite literally, to give themselves as gift to Paul, just as Christ 'gave himself'.[389] The appeal

[385] In David Horrell's words, Paul's suffering does not function as 'a means to bring tribulation upon oneself, as if such suffering were per se morally commendable, but rather as a means to give to others in the interests of their benefit … Just as is soteriologically the case with Christ's self giving … the point of self-lowering is to bring benefit to others' (*Solidarity and Difference*, 244). However, my reading here requires that we add a further point: the intention of Paul's suffering is not just to bring benefit *to* others but to create and sustain relationships *with* others. 'Benefit' cannot be understood apart from the *telos* of fellowship.

[386] So Barclay, 'Paul's Story', 145.

[387] I keep this translation, following the NRSV, *pace* T.W. Martin, 'Whose Flesh? What Temptation? (Galatians 4.13–14)', *JSNT* 74 (1999): 65–91.

[388] So de Boer, *Galatians* 281.

[389] We should note here that Paul is quite careful with his use of *διδόναι* throughout Galatians. Paul uses *διδόναι* to describe Christ's self-gift (1.4, 2.20), the event of the giving of grace personally to him (2.9), and the bestowal of the promise upon those who believe (3.22). He also deploys it to describe how the pillars gave to Barnabus and Paul 'the right hand of fellowship' (2.9), signifying their commitment to Paul's gospel. Paul once uses it with reference to the Torah (3.21), but it is located within a second-class conditional sentence and is thus presumed to be false. In the other statements he makes about the Torah, he painstakingly avoids the language of *διδόναι*, instead using *προστιθέναι* and *διατάσσειν* (3.19). Given the care with which he uses *διδόναι* throughout, its presence here should not be taken lightly.

that they would 'become like him' *now* is therefore an appeal for them to continue how they once acted (cf. 3.1–4), because when they accepted Paul and his message, they had 'become like him', as well as like Christ (4.19).

The cumulative weight of the preceding reading lends towards the conclusion that each party is portrayed as imitating Christ's identification with human creatures in the incarnation: Paul, because he stands detached from his ancestral traditions, assimilates to living like the gentile Galatians in order to establish a relationship with them even under pain of suffering, and the Galatians reciprocated by welcoming him and identifying with his pain to the point that they were willing to give a part of their own body to him. The resulting dynamic between them was therefore a relationship of *co-interest*, in which both parties mutually identified with the situation of the other by 'becoming like' each other.[390] As Susan Eastman recognizes, this relationship is christologically grounded, as their mutual imitation in part constitutes their 'shared existence' in Christ.

5.2. Mutual Slavery for the Common Good

Galatians 5.13 opens with an announcement of liberation: 'you were called in freedom, brothers (*ὑμεῖς γὰρ ἐπ᾽ ἐλευθερίᾳ ἐκλήθητε, ἀδελφοί*)'; but this Pauline emancipation proclamation is immediately qualified, as he explicates a new form of slavery as the proper expression and actualisation of freedom in Christ: 'only do not use your freedom as an opportunity for the flesh, but through love become enslaved to one another (*μόνον μὴ τὴν ἐλευθερίαν εἰς ἀφορμὴν τῇ σαρκί, ἀλλὰ διὰ τῆς ἀγάπης δουλεύετε ἀλλήλοις*)'. To understand how perplexing and indeed shocking this exhortation is, it will be helpful to look at how others could conceive of the relationship between slave and master. In his *Politics*, Aristotle asserts that 'a slave is a living possession (*ὁ δοῦλος κτῆμά τι ἔμψυχον*)' who functions as a 'minister of action (*ὑπηρέτης τῶν πρὸς τὴν πρᾶξιν*)' for the master.[391] Because a possession is a subordinate part of the one who possesses it, the relationship between slave and master is fundamentally asymmetrical, insofar as the slave is the property of the master and thus

[390] Eastman, *Paul's Mother Tongue,* 27. Here Eastman is arguing against J. Louis Martyn's claim that 'Paul speaks not of an imitation, but of a shared existence' (*Galatians*, 420).

[391] Arist. *Pol.* I 4, 1253b33, 1254a7.

serves the master's interests. As Aristotle articulates, 'The master is only the master of the slave; he does not belong to him, whereas the slave is not only the slave of his master, but wholly belongs to him'.[392] In short, the relationship is not symmetrical. These observations bring Aristotle to the conclusion that, while a slave and a master can possess shared interests on account of their shared being (*καίπερ ὄντος κατ᾽ ἀλήθειαν τῷ τε φύσει δούλῳ καὶ τῷ φύσει δεσπότῃ ταὐτοῦ συμφέροντος*), the master will always rule for the benefit of himself more than for the benefit of the slave. Nevertheless, the slave will regularly find benefit through this relationship, yet such benefit only occurs 'incidentally (*κατὰ συμβεβηκός*)', because he is a subordinate and dependent part of the master.[393] That is, as the master pursues his own interests, the slave comes into a form of well-being only as (what we could call) positive collateral damage. What is crucial to note about this account is the fundamentally *unidirectional* nature of the flow of power and how interests are actualized. While it is not necessarily the case that every slave in antiquity was regularly maltreated or harmed by their masters (Plut. *Vit. Crass.* 2.6), and while perhaps it may even be in the interests of the slave owner to take good care of a slave, Aristotle explains that it is always the master who dictates the actions of the slave, and never vice versa, because the slave is an extension of the master's existence and thus serves only to fulfill the interests, purpose, and intents of the master's various endeavours. In the end, only one party's interests are realised and thus these interests control the shape of an essentially asymmetrical relationship.

Aristotle's notion that slave and master exist within a relationship of shared and yet still asymmetrical interests illuminates just how breathtaking Paul's command that the Galatians should engage in *mutual* slavery is. As John Barclay rightly notes, this injunction presents a 'paradoxical' and 'creative' notion which 'adjusts an inherently hierarchical relationship (slavery) not by canceling it, in the name of "equality," but by making it reciprocal, a hierarchy that turns both ways. The simple but powerful word *ἀλλήλοις* turns a one-way relationship of power and superiority into a mutual relationship of reciprocal deference, where each seeks to promote the interests of the other'.[394] If the

[392] Arist. *Pol.* I 4, 1254a11–14.
[393] Arist. *Pol.* III 6, 1278b32–35; cf. IV 11, 1291a10–11.
[394] Barclay, *Paul and the Gift,* 435.

practice of slavery normally entails that the interests of one party unliterally dictate the operations of the slave-master relationship, Paul's description of mutual slavery envisages a relationship in which the interests of others dictate each individual's actions. However, the overall effect of this command is not to require that each member refuses to permit their own interests to be served; rather, the result of everyone being enslaved to one another is that everyone's interests become *shared*. To speak of mutual slavery insinuates that each member of the community must both serve and *be* served, and without the willingness for everyone to engage in both realities, the exhortation could never come to fruition. In this regard, using freedom for the 'flesh' does not represent just any permission of fulfilling self-interest but rather seems to entail, in Paul's own words 'doing whatever you want (ἃ ἐὰν θέλητε ταῦτα ποιῆτε)' (5.17), to the point where the interests of others are entirely disregarded, or even opposed.[395]

The fact that they are to become mutual slaves *through love* (διὰ τῆς ἀγάπης) hearkens back to the description of Christ as the one who 'loved me and gave himself for me' (2.20) by participating in the human condition. Paul's appeal to love to encourage believers to identify with the interests of others is apt here, because becoming a slave to another is about becoming, in Aristotle's terms, a 'minister for [others] actions' who serves their interests. Similarly, in Paul's descriptions of Christ's act of love, he identifies with the situation and needs of others in order to enact a mutual relationship with them.

5.3. Non-Competitive Relations (5.26–6.1)

With a self-inclusive exhortation, Paul urges the community, 'Let us not become conceited (μὴ γινώμεθα κενόδοξοι)' (5.26). The two subordinate participial phrases attached to this exhortation indicate that being κενόδοξος amounts to more than just a thinking pattern, insofar as it also comes to pragmatic expression in the divisive behaviour of 'provoking one another and envying one another (ἀλλήλους προκαλούμενοι, ἀλλήλοις φθονοῦντες)'. The prohibition against 'provoking' is not just some irrelevant hypothetical. As recent studies have emphasized, social competition for honour was a

[395] Barclay has convincingly argued that this phrase indicates that the Spirit will not permit them to act upon whatever desires they experience (*Obeying the Truth*, 110–116; cf. *Paul and the Gift*, 428n17).

common part of Roman social relations.[396] The world *προκαλεῖν* likely invokes this possible aspect of social life. In its usage elsewhere, people often provoke or challenge (*προκαλεῖν*) others 'into a struggle (*εἰς τὸν ἀγῶνα*)',[397] 'into a battle (*μαχεῖν/εἰς μάχην*)',[398] or even to one-on-one combat to the death (*μονομαχεῖν/εἰς μονομαχίαν*).[399] Unsurprisingly, then, the object of *προκαλεῖν* in such contexts is often 'enemies (*πολεμίοι*)'.[400] While this sense naturally lends itself to warfare settings,[401] competitive provoking and challenging could also occur amongst friendly peers.[402] In Aelian's *Varia Historia*, for example, Lepreas challenges Hercules to a number of contests, such as discus and drinking games, but upon losing 'Lepreas became indignant and, taking up weapons, challenged Hercules to one-on-one combat (*διανιώμενος δὲ ὁ Λεπρεύς, λαβὼν ὅπλα ἐς μονομαχίαν προκαλεῖται τὸν Ἡρακλῆ*)', but in the end Lepreas dies in the battle (Ael. *VH* 1.2). What thematises these various antagonistic encounters is the attempt to gain victory over against another, whether in warfare or in sport, such that one considers the loss of another as gain. As Julian Pitt-Rivers puts it, 'The victor in any competition for honour finds his reputation enhanced by the humiliation of the vanquished'.[403]

The following prohibition against 'envying each other (*ἀλλήλοις φθονεῖν*)' pushes back against a different problem, but one which still operates within the same kind of competitive attitude. Whereas

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[396] On general concern for honour in the Roman world, see C.A. Barton, *Roman Honor: The Fire in the Bones* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001); J.E. Lendon, *Empire of Honour: The Art of Government in the Roman World* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1997); Lendon, 'Roman Honor', in *The Oxford Handbook of Social Relations in the Roman World* (ed. Michael Peachin; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 377–403; cf. the anthropological comments in J.G. Peristiany, 'Introduction', in *Honour and Shame: The Values of Mediterranean Society* (ed. J.G. Peristiany; The Nature of Human Society; London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1965), 9–18, at 10. Though most of the evidence for Romans' concern with honour is from aristocratic circles, the same issue seemed to be at play in all levels of Roman society, though the shape of each might differ in different social contexts (see Barton, *Roman Honor*, 11–14, 75; Lendon, *Empire of Honour*, 95–103; Pitt-Rivers, 'Honor and Social Status', 24). While Francis Watson rightly cautions that we should not see the concern for honour as 'dominat[ing] Greco-Roman society as a whole' ('Review of J.M.G. Barclay, *Paul and the Gift*', *EC* 8 (2017): 529–536, at 535), the evidence adduced by the studies mentioned here show that it was at least common enough to the point that it is not unlikely that Paul could have considered such attitudes and behaviour as real dangers.

[397] Luc. *Symp*. 20; Xen. *Mem*. 2.3.17; Plut. *An. Viti.* 3.

[398] Diod. Sic. 6.6.2; 14.62.4; 18.17.3; Plut. *De glor. Ath.* 2; *Vit. Aem*. 9; *Vit. Rom*. 16.

[399] Arrian, *Tactica* 17; Plut. *Vit. Eum*. 14; *Vit. Alc*. 28; *Vit. Dem*. 20.

[400] Luc. *Dial. meret*. 13.2; *Nav*. 37; Plut. *Vit. Marc*. 2; *Vit. Sert*. 13; *de Herod. malig.*15.

[401] So Plut. *Cleom*. 14.

[402] Barton claims that 'The most closely bound unity, the family, was also, necessarily, the focus of competition' (*Roman Honor*, 89).

[403] Pitt-Rivers, 'Honour and Social Status', 24. Furthermore, because 'The claim to excellence is relative', it is also 'always implicitly the claim to excel over others' ('Honor and Social Status', 23).

'provoking' is comprised of an attempt to gain honour through the defeat of another, 'envy' is comprised of detesting others for their own successes in contrast to one's own comparative lack. To feature a more fleshed-out perspective from one of Paul's contemporaries, Seneca asserts that too much ambition (*ambitus*) and conceit (*tumidus*) can bring us to envy (*invidia*) (*Ep. Mor.* 84.11), which, he opines, makes us 'want others to be made unhappy and take delight in strokes of bad luck' (*de Ira* 3.5.3). Envy, Seneca warns, poses a particular social danger because it could prompt us even to injure or harm the peers who excel beyond us (*Ep. Mor.* 105.1).[404] Similarly, Aristotle writes that 'envy is defined as a certain kind of distress (*ἐστὶν ὁ φθόνος λύπη τις*) at apparent success on the part of one's peers in attaining the good things.'[405] Aristotle also considers *φθόνος* a danger amongst close peers, because it is most naturally a response to those who are similar: we envy those who are after the same ends, who outdo us at our own practices.[406] The danger is therefore that experiencing pain at the sight of our close peers who prosper might give way to an antagonistic attitude which destroys relationships. In his own words, 'one who is malicious is also envious; for when someone is distressed at the acquisition or possession of something, he necessarily rejoices at its deprivation or destruction.'[407] What Seneca and Aristotle notice is that envy is always built upon a competitive premise: when you have what I don't, I feel pain; when you prosper at what I fail to do, I am angered.[408] In other words,

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[404] We should note that for Seneca the prohibition against envy does not, as in Paul, flow from his attempt to sustain the unity and social cohesion of a particular group; rather, it is an expression of Seneca's commitment to having Stoic contentment in all things (*Ep. Mor.* 115.17–18). For Seneca's further prohibitions against envy see *Ep. Mor.* 14.10; 94.60; 107.6.

[405] Arist. *Rh.* II 9, 1387b24–25. Aristotle also adds that 'What is similarly present in all cases of indignation or envy is … a feeling of pain because of what good befalls his neighbor' (*Rh.* II 9, 1386b18-21; translation adapted from *On Rhetoric: A Theory of Civic Discourse* (2d ed.; trans. G.A. Kennedy; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). For similar definitions of *φθόνος* see Stob. *Flor.* 2.92.7 = *SVF* 3.413: *φθόνος δὲ λύπη ἐπ' ἀλλοτρίοις ἀγαθοῖς*; Stob. *Flor.* 2.7.10c; Galen, *De Propriorum Animi Cuiuslibet Affectuum Dignotione et Curatione*, 35. For a helpful collation of the Greek material on envy, see E.B. Stevens, 'Envy and Pity in Greek Philosophy', *The American Journal of Philology* 69 (1948): 171–189.

[406] This should be distinguished from Aristotle's treatment of *νέμεσις*, which is anger at the sight of undeserved prosperity or undeserved misfortune. Whereas *νέμεσις* is a virtue which demonstrates a commitment to justice, *φθόνος* is pain at what others possess without injustice. On *νέμεσις* see H.J. Curzer, 'Aristotle's Account of the Virtue of Justice', *Apeiron: A Journal for Ancient Philosophy and Science* 28 (1995): 207–238, esp. 235.

[407] Arist. *Rh.* II 9, 1386n34-1387a3.

[408] As one recent analysis provocatively put it, *φθόνος* is 'not aroused by a process of identification with the other' (D. Bonanno and L. Corso, 'What Does Nemesis Have to do with the Legal System? Discussing Aristotle's Neglected Emotion and its Relevance for Law and Politics', in *Aristotle on Emotions in Law and Politics* (ed. L. Huppes-Cluysenaer and N.M.M.S. Coelho; Law and Philosophy Library 121; New York: Springer, 2018), 236–260, at 241).

envy brings people to consider the benefit of others not as constitutive of their own good but rather as a threat to it. Envious people do not share the interests of those whom they envy.

Being envious of others and challenging others are, then, just two sides of the same coin: in challenging another, one benefits through the other's loss or harm; in envy, one is harmed by the benefit of the other. Given their grammatical placement, Paul implies that both actions express the condition of being 'conceited (*κενόδοξος*)' – the possession of an overblown opinion of the self which sets the self in competition with others, a self-perception always potentially threatened by the prospering of peers and potentially enhanced by winning challenges over others.[409] Thus, such conceit constructs a relationship of *inverse* proportion rather than *direct* proportion between the good of the self and the good of the other. Such competitive behaviour constitutes the practical outworking of the vices Paul lists as 'the works of the flesh' (5.21–22) which include all sorts of competitive attitudes and actions such as enmity (*ἔχθραι*), strife (*ἔρις*), zeal (*ζῆλος*) quarrels (*ἐριθεῖαι*), dissensions (*διχοστασίαι*), factions (*αἱρέσεις*) and envy (*φθόνοι*).

At one level, we can see that Paul agrees with a broader ethical tradition which argues that kin should consider the honour of one brother as constitutive of the honour of all the others. In his *De Fraterno Amore*, Plutarch urges his readers not to envy their brothers but rather to consider the exaltation (*δόξα*) of one brother as the exaltation of another: 'But a brother should not, like the pan of a balance, incline the opposite way and be himself lowered when his brother is raised on high; but just as lesser numbers multiply greater and are multiplied by them, so should he give increase to his brother and at the same time be increased along with him by their common blessings (*ὥσπερ τῶν ἀριθμῶν οἱ ἐλάττονες τοὺς μείζονας πολλαπλασιάζοντες καὶ πολλαπλασιαζόμενοι, συναύξειν ἅμα καὶ συναύξεσθαι τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς*)' (Plut. *Mor.* 855E-F).[410] We can also see this ideal play out in narrative form when 1 Maccabees recounts the reunification of the Jews with the Spartans. The Spartans send a letter to the previous high priest Onias, telling him that they 'found in writing concerning both the Spartans and the Jews that they are brothers and that they are from the family of

[409] Relevant here is that Aristotle states that those who want to have a reputation of being wise (*δοξόσοφοι*) are simply 'lovers of honour (*φιλότιμοι*)' and associates them with envy (*φθόνος*) (Arist. *Rh.* II 9, 1387b32–1388a3).

[410] Translation from Babbitt, LCL.

Abraham (*εὑρέθη ἐν γραφῇ περί τε τῶν* Σπαρτιατῶν *καὶ* Ιουδαίων *ὅτι εἰσὶν ἀδελφοὶ καὶ ὅτι εἰσὶν ἐκ γένους* Αβρααμ)' (1 Macc 12.22). As a result, the Spartans declare that all things are common between them: 'your livestock and your possessions are ours (*τὰ κτήνη ὑμῶν καὶ ἡ ὕπαρξις ὑμῶν ἡμῖν ἐστιν*)' (12.23). Though Onias does not issue a response, after Jonathan becomes high priest, he decides that he wants to renew his 'friendship and alliance (*φιλία καὶ συμμαχία*)' with the Spartans and so responds to this initial letter to the Spartans. In that letter, he indicates that the Jews not only recognise the Spartans as kin but also that the they 'remember you constantly on every occasion, both at our festivals and on other appropriate days (*ἡμεῖς οὖν ἐν παντὶ καιρῷ ἀδιαλείπτως ἔν τε ταῖς ἑορταῖς καὶ ταῖς λοιπαῖς καθηκούσαις ἡμέραις μιμνησκόμεθα ὑμῶν*), at the sacrifices that we offer and in our prayers, as it is right and proper to remember brothers. *And we rejoice in your glory* (*εὐφραινόμεθα δὲ ἐπὶ τῇ δόξῃ ὑμῶν*)' (12.13–14). In this exchange, we can see how kinship entails that what belongs to one family member belongs to all, such that even the abstract social capital of honour is shared amongst kin. Similarly, since the community of believers is all 'one in Christ Jesus' (3.28), and because they are kin by virtue of their adoption in Christ (4.5), they should not compete for the honour which should be common amongst them.

But the similarity between Paul and his contemporaries regarding such notions of kinship-obligation does not exclude the possibility that there are christological dimensions lurking beneath the surface of this exhortation. Here it will be best to take another look at Galatians through the lens of the motif of glory in Romans and Philippians. Using similar kinship language, in Romans Paul makes a series of deductions about believers' identity: 'if we are children, then we are also heirs – heirs of God and co-heirs with Christ, if indeed we suffer with him so that we may also be co-glorified (*εἰ δὲ τέκνα, καὶ κληρονόμοι· κληρονόμοι μὲν θεοῦ, συγκληρονόμοι δὲ* Χριστοῦ, *εἴπερ συμπάσχομεν ἵνα καὶ συνδοξασθῶμεν*)' (8.17). With a similar turn of phrase, Paul declares that God has predestined believers 'to be conformed to the image of his Son, in order that he might be the firstborn of many brothers', and the result of this conforming will be that believers are also 'glorified (*δοξάζειν*)' (8.29–30). The key terminology of *συγκληρονόμοι* (co-heirs) and *συνδοξάζειν* (co-glorify) signal that the inheritance and glory which Jesus possesses are not exclusive to him: indeed, as I have argued in chapter four, all those who participate in Christ also share in everything that is done to and belongs to

him, because in the incarnation he gives all of himself to believers. Thus, because believers are tied to Jesus through participation and kinship, Jesus and believers are both equally heirs to the inheritance and will both equally be glorified. Even though it is only by virtue of believers' participation in Christ that they have this status, they share fully in Jesus' glorification. His glory is their glory.

Though Philippians does not use the provocative language of *συγκληρονόμοι* and *συνδοξάζειν*, we can see a similar dynamic play out in that letter. In response to Jesus' life, death, and resurrection, God 'super-exalts (*ὑπερυψοῦν*)' him and gives him the gift of 'the name above every name (*τὸ ὄνομα τὸ ὑπὲρ πᾶν ὄνομα*), with the result that 'every knee will bow and every tongue confess that Jesus Christ is Lord' (2.9–11). Though this section of Philippians does not speak directly about the effects, results, or implications of the events of Jesus' incarnation, death, resurrection, and exaltation, later in the letter Paul links Jesus' exaltation and his exalted body with believers' eschatological bodies: Jesus Christ 'will transform our body of humility into the likeness of his body of glory, according to the power which enabled him to subject all things to himself (*ὃς μετασχηματίσει τὸ σῶμα τῆς ταπεινώσεως ἡμῶν σύμμορφον τῷ σώματι τῆς δόξης αὐτοῦ κατὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν τοῦ δύνασθαι αὐτὸν καὶ ὑποτάξαι αὐτῷ τὰ πάντα*)' (3.21). The phrase 'subject all things to himself' recalls the prediction of eschatological submission in 2.11 that everyone will bow and honour Jesus Christ as Lord. It should be noted that translating *ἐνέργεια* in 3.21. as 'power' hardly captures the deep complexity of this claim. To risk being overly literal, the language communicates that the energy which causes the lordship of Christ to be actualised is not suddenly canceled once Jesus is exalted but continues on both to exalt believers and to transform their bodies into bodies of glory. What emerges in this connection is a corollary of the *συνδοξάζειν*-language in Romans: the glory given to Jesus is (or will be) the glory given to believers. The connection between these aspects of Philippians and Romans is strengthened by the fact that in Romans Paul connects the co-glorification of believers with 'the redemption of our bodies (*ἡ ἀπολύτρωσις τοῦ σώματος ἡμῶν*)' (Rom 8.23) Thus, the exaltation and glorification of Jesus at the right hand of the Father is inseparable from – or even better: *entails* – the transformation and exaltation of believers' physical bodies to become co-glorified with him.

Though Paul does not use the language of glory or exaltation in Galatians, his Christology in Galatians still exhibits a similar pattern. In Paul's descriptions of the Christ event in 4.1–7 and 3.10–14,

he presents a stark contrast between Israel and Jesus: Jesus is the recipient of the promise, the blessing of Abraham, and the inheritance (3.16, 21), but Israel is under a curse (3.14); Jesus possesses sonship (4.4), but Israel was no better off than a slave (4.1–3). Yet these stark contrasts between Jesus and Israel are not exploited by Jesus to exalt himself over against others. Rather, he participates in their condition to the extent that he shares all of his positive possessions with them. As a result, Jews and Gentiles are both adopted to become sons of God – and thus brothers of Jesus – who share in his identity and what belongs to him, including his Spirit, life, blessing, and inheritance (3.14; 4.5–6). For this reason, it is impossible to contrast what belongs to Christ over against the benefit of believers, because they mutually share all things with one another. Seen in this light, it is not a stretch to see this form of mutuality underwritten in the prohibition against being 'conceited (*κενόδοξος*)' to the point of envying and provoking. Indeed, it is suggestive that in Philippians the prohibition against acting *κατὰ κενοδοξίαν* (2.3) is supported by an appeal to the incarnation of Jesus Christ (2.6–8). But to return to the actual prohibition in Galatians 5.26: whereas Christ's act of love deconstructed the contrasts between himself and Israel and constructed a relationship of *direct proportion* between his own goods and the goods of believers, the actions of 'challenging' and 'envying' referred to in Galatians 5.26 position the good of the other in a relationship of *inverse proportion* to the good of self, and thus such behaviour is prohibited for those participants of the new creation whose lives are to be conformed to the shape of Christ's love.

Though there is a chapter break after 5.26, Galatians 6.1 likely builds upon the prohibition in 5.26 against forms of competitive relations which posit a stark separation between the honour of different members of the community. Here Paul imagines a hypothetical situation and provides a corresponding exhortation: 'if someone is caught in a transgression (*ἐὰν καὶ προλημφθῇ ἄνθρωπος ἔν τινι παραπτώματι*), you who are spiritual should restore such a person with a Spirit of gentleness, taking care that you are not also tempted (*ὑμεῖς οἱ πνευματικοὶ καταρτίζετε τὸν τοιοῦτον ἐν πνεύματι πραΰτητος, σκοπῶν σεαυτὸν μὴ καὶ σὺ πειρασθῇς*)'. The language of being 'caught (*προλαμβάνειν*)' in this hypothetical scenario seems to imply that this individual's transgression has gone public to the community of believers, or possibly even beyond it. As such, the transgressor would

be exposed and placed in a dangerously vulnerable position, potentially subject to public ridicule, dishonour, and scorn. Indeed, in Roman culture, instilling fear of public shame functioned as a form of peacekeeping, and some Roman legal punishments for law-breaking consisted solely in the public announcement of a crime in order to disgrace the transgressor.[411] What seems to be at the forefront of Paul's concern is that the community might be tempted to employ such tactics of open ridicule as a means to social rehabilitation.[412]

As with Galatians 5.26, though Paul does not directly appeal to Christ's example in 6.1, some more specific christological foundations to this exhortation can be unearthed. The designation 'you who are spiritual (*οἱ πνευματικοί*)' identifies them specifically as recipients of the Spirit. Such an identification provides warrant for the exhortation to restore transgressors, since, according to the list of the fruit of the Spirit in 5.22–23 those who are *πνευματικοί* are expected to be practicing 'love' and 'peace' amongst the community; most importantly, Paul notes that this restoration should be enacted with 'a spirit of gentleness (*ἐν πνεύματι πραΰτητος*)', an attitude which reflects one part of the fruit of the Spirit (*πραΰτης*). Given that that the Spirit brings about behaviour that conforms to Christ (4.6; 5.22), the designation *οἱ πνευματικοί* is probably underwritten with the force of something like 'you who have the Spirit of the Son and therefore should imitate Christ in love and gentleness'. Indeed, Paul's description of Christ's action could provide a basis for arguing that believers should gently restore those who are caught in transgression. In response to those who as a result of transgression remained under a curse (3.10), Christ as it were resocialised others into communion by sharing in their condition (3.13), not only bringing them into fellowship with God (4.9) but also empowering them to act in correspondence to their new creational existence (2.20). By restoring the transgressor in gentleness, the Galatians demonstrate that the 'Spirit of his Son' (4.6) is at work in the community as they love and restore those who have gone astray, just as Jesus loved accursed transgressors in the incarnation and brought them into fellowship with the divine.

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[411] Lendon, *Empire of Honour*, 90–92; for various examples of public moral shaming see Barton, *Roman Honor*, 22–23.

[412] Barton, *Roman Honor*, 240.

5.4. Bearing Burdens and the Law of Christ

The command 'bear the burdens of one another, and so you will fulfill the law of Christ (*ἀλλήλων τὰ βάρη βαστάζετε καὶ οὕτως ἀναπληρώσετε τὸν νόμον τοῦ Χριστοῦ*)' (6.2) is arguably the ethical culmination of the letter, as it makes an explicit appeal to Christ. Two things need to be dealt with here: 1) the meaning of the 'law of Christ' and 2) why and in what way mutual burden-bearing fulfills the law of Christ.

Though numerous proposals have been made about the meaning of *ὁ νόμος τοῦ Χριστοῦ* – whether a new messianic law or a tradition about Jesus' own teaching[413] – I find Barclay's hypothesis most convincing: fulfilling the law of Christ means to satisfy the demands of the mosaic Torah through imitating Christ's love.[414] Though this could be argued in many different ways, two particular points of evidence stand out. First, the references to *νόμος* throughout Galatians unanimously refer to the mosaic Torah (2.16, 19, 21; 3.2, 5, 10–13; 17–19, 21, 23–24; 4.4–5, 21; 5.3–4, 14, 18, 23; 6.13). One may point out that with the added genitive phrase *τοῦ Χριστοῦ* Paul signals that he is speaking of a different kind of *νόμος* in this instance, but the second line of evidence problematises this: Galatians 6.2 uses strikingly similar language to Galatians 5.14. Whereas Galatians 6.2 says *ἀναπληροῦν τὸν νόμον τοῦ Χριστοῦ*, in Galatians 5.14 Paul states that 'the whole law is fulfilled in one word, in the "you will love your neighbour as yourself" (*ὁ γὰρ πᾶς νόμος ἐν ἑνὶ λόγῳ πεπλήρωται ἐν τῷ· ἀγαπήσεις τὸν πλησίον σου ὡς σεαυτόν*)' (5.14). The use of the word *πληροῦν* strikes a contrasts with 'doing (*ποιεῖν*)' (5.3) or 'guarding (*φυλάσσειν*)' (6.13): as Barclay argues, this intentionally ambiguous word is deployed to communicate that believers can satisfy the demand of the Torah by loving, even without obeying all of the commands of the law.[415] Given the numerous overlaps between

[413] For an overview of the numerous proposals, see T.A. Wilson, 'The Law of Christ and the Law of Moses: Reflections on a Recent Trend in Interpretation', *CBR* 5 (2006): 123–144; cf. the overview in de Boer, *Galatians*, 378–379.

[414] Barclay, *Obeying the Truth*, 126-135.

[415] Barclay *Obeying the Truth*, 135-142. I therefore disagree with those who have suggested that Galatians 5.14 refers to Christ's fulfillment of the Torah (e.g. Martyn, *Galatians*, 486–491; Eastman, *Recovering Paul's Mother Tongue*, 171–172; M.K.W. Suh '"It has been brought to completion": Leviticus 19:18 as Christological Witness in Galatians 5:14', *JSPL*

5.14 and 6.2, it does not seem likely that Paul is saying that there are two laws – the mosaic Law, and then the law of Christ – which are both equally yet independently fulfilled by these acts of love; rather, it seems more plausible that Paul is referring to the mosaic Torah in both instances, but the phrase *ὁ νόμος τοῦ Χριστοῦ* more explicitly articulates that it is imitating Christ by bearing one another's burdens that satisfies the demand of the mosaic Torah. We could therefore nuance Richard Hays' position: the law of Christ is not *per se* the pattern of Christ's self-giving love, but it is the mosaic Torah, which is fulfilled by acting in conformity to the pattern of Christ's self-giving love.[416]

If the notion of 'fulfilling the law of Christ' entails imitating Christ's love, then that implies some sort of analogy between burden bearing and the Christ-event.[417] This however naturally raises the question: what exactly about bearing burdens actually displays conformity to the action of Christ? Or rather, in what does the similarity between this act and the Christ-event consist?

The noun *τὰ βάρη* seems to be a catch-all term for various negative circumstances, hardships, or difficultyies.[418] As noted in the introduction (§1.1), the impulse of some scholars is to state that what is

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2 (2012): 115–132). The strongest piece of evidence against this is that in the other instances that Paul uses this language, it refers to believers performing the fulfillment of the Torah (Rom 8.3; 13.8).

[416] See Hays, 'Christology and Ethics'.

[417] Betz pointed out that the language of 'bearing burdens' is not unique to Paul, but the mere presence of linguistic parallels should be hermeneutically subordinate to interpreting Paul's commands as they come to expression and are placed within the logic of this letter (Betz cites Xen. *Mem.* 2.7.1 (*χρὴ δὲ τοῦ βάρους μεταδιδόναι τοῖς φίλοις: ἴσως γὰρ ἄν τί σε καὶ ἡμεῖς κουφίσαιμεν*) Men. 534 (*νόμιζε πάντα κοινὰ τῶν φίλων βάρη*), and 370 (*ἰδίας νόμιζε τῶν φίλων τὰς συμφορᾶς*) as direct parallels (*Galatians*, 299). As a result, Betz asserted that this set of commands amounts to nothing more than gnomic '*sententiae*' (*Galatians*, 291; cf. 295–306), disparate moral proverbs (similarly, Mußner, *Der Galaterbrief*, 396; T. Söding, *Das Liebesgebot bei Paulus*, 192; J.C. O'Neill, 'The Holy Spirit and the Human Spirit in Galatians. Gal 5,17', *ETL* 71 (1995): 107–120). There is, of course, nothing *prima facie* unlikely about this hypothesis. But if we can uncover a christological pattern underwritten within these commands, then this analysis is insufficient. Hays rightly critiques Betz's invocation of various parallels, writing that 'If Paul employs conventional language about friendship (a friendship *topos*) here, the *topos* becomes a formal vehicle for the expression of an ethic which is radicalized and transmuted by the kerygma of Christ crucified' ('Christology and Ethics', 288). Noting parallels to Paul is not sufficient for interpreting the internal theological logic of the letter.

[418] The argument of John Strelan, that *τὰ βάρη* refers to financial difficulties, runs into a number of problems ('Burden-bearing and the Law of Christ: A Re-Examination of Galatians 6:2', *JBL* 94 (1975): 166–176). Strelan mostly only establishes the possibility that this *can* refer to financial burdens (267–70), but then assumes his conclusion when he speaks of the 'so many words with a financial reference' (271) in Gal 6.2–10 before proving that 6.2–5 addresses financial problems in the first place. This is further confusing when these 'so many words' – including *παράπτωμα*, *ἀναπληροῦν* and even *λόγος* (!) – would not contain any financial sense even if read in the manner he suggests (270–271). The point that 'In at least fifty percent of the Pauline uses of the *baros* word-family, a "financial" sense is intended' (275) is misleading, since this only establishes possibility and not probability of the financial meaning. Lastly, Strelan suggests that, because Paul is dealing with financial issues in 1 Cor 9, the use of *ἔννομος Χριστοῦ* should lead us to read *ὁ νόμος Χριστοῦ* in Gal 6.2 in a financial sense (274). What Strelan never argues is why the discussion of finances in 1 Corinthians 9 should lead us to read *ἔννομος Χριστοῦ* in Cor 9.21 in a financial sense in the first place (a 'financial

common between this believers' love and Christ's love is the notion of loss or self-subtraction: in the same way that Christ sacrificed himself on the cross, when one bears the burdens of others, one is giving up something for the benefit of the other. This way of framing the analogy between Christ's love and burden-bearing is not entirely misguided, but it is likely reductionistic. In support of this interpretation, when Paul invokes similar language in Romans, he speaks of rejecting the possibility of self-pleasing: 'We who are strong ought to bear the failings of the weak (*ὀφείλομεν δὲ ἡμεῖς οἱ δυνατοὶ τὰ ἀσθενήματα τῶν ἀδυνάτων βαστάζειν*) and not to please ourselves (*καὶ μὴ ἑαυτοῖς ἀρέσκειν*) … For even Christ did not please himself (*καὶ γὰρ ὁ Χριστὸς οὐχ ἑαυτῷ ἤρεσεν*)' (Rom 15.1–2). But, as argued in the previous chapter (§4.2.3), these statements about Christ's self-limitation (i.e. not pleasing the self) must be understood in contrast to the *positive* description of Christ's action: it is not just that Christ did not do *x*, but he also *did* do *y*. For this reason, the language of 'self-specification' is more helpful than 'self-sacrifice' or 'self-limitation', because 'self-specification' includes both positive and negative elements. Similarly, in Galatians 6.2, it is insufficient to speak of the analogy between Christ and believers' burden-bearing only in the negative terms of self-sacrifice. It is probably better to speak of mutual burden bearing as *mutual participation*. Just as Paul speaks of Christ's death in terms of him positively assimilating the condition of others to himself – he *became* a curse, in the sense that he added the curse to himself (see §4.2.4) – he also portrays bearing the burdens of one another as a form of taking up the responsibilities of the difficulties of others into the self. As Luther recognised here, by bearing the burdens of one another, believers 'put on their neighbours (*proximum suum induat*)' in the same way that Christ 'put us on (*nos sic induit*)' in the incarnation.[419]

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context' is not enough to suggest that every word has a financial referent). Presenting a different line of argument, Jan Lambrecht argues that in 6.2 'the injunction of mutual help [is] an alternative to provocation and envy' in 5.26–6.1 and that therefore the reference to 'bearing one another's burdens' refers in particular to the circumstance in which someone is caught in a transgression ('Paul's Coherent Admonition in Galatians 6,1–6: Mutual Help and Individual Attentiveness', *Biblica* 78 (1997): 33–55, at 43); see similarly D.W. Kuck, 'Each One will Bear his Own Burden: Paul's Creative Use of an Apocalyptic Motif', *NTS* 40 (1994): 289–97); W. Harnisch, 'Einübung des neuen Seins: Paulinische Paränese am Beispiel des Galaterbriefs', *ZTK* 84 (1987): 279–296. However, the various disparate commands peppered throughout this section (5.26–6.11) lend the impression that these are not all dealing with the same issue.

[419] M. Luther, *D. Martin Luthers Werke: kritische Gesammtausgabe* (136 vols.; Weimar: Hermann Böhlau, 1883-2009), 7.69; cf. Augustine, *Conf.* 7.9.13.

5.5. Neighbour-Love and the Love of Christ (5.14)

It may appear strange that, earlier in this chapter, I skipped over Galatians 5.14 after I treated 5.13 and moved straight on to 5.26–6.1. The impetus for this delay is that my suggestions about 5.14 will be the most plausible in the light of my reading of Galatians 6.2. Although I do not follow the view that Paul invokes Leviticus 18.19 as a christological prophecy in the sense that Jesus is the implied agent of the perfect passive *πεπλήρωται* in 5.14, this does not mean that his invocation of this text has nothing to do with his Christology whatsoever.[420] In fact, I think there are a few reasons for seeing 'love your neighbour as yourself' as a summons to imitate Christ in his incarnation.

We should recall the point in chapter two that Aristotle argues more that virtuous friends are other selves to each other and therefore share their self-relation with others.[421] Chrysippus writes something similar when he suggests that in a relationship of *κοινωνία* friends treat one another as they treat themselves because all things are common to friends.[422] Placing Galatians 3.28 in juxtaposition with Galatians 5.14 might suggest that Paul is making an argument similar argument. In the same way that Chrysippus says that *κοινωνία* between friends should lead them to share their self-relation with their friends, the notion that believers are all 'one in Christ Jesus' could be underwritten in the appeal to Leviticus 19.18 as the basis for extending self-love to others.

But this does not exclude the possibility there is also a christological warrant for this behaviour. The that there is an analogy between Jesus' love and believers' act of neighbour-is suggested not only by the common language of 'love' in 5.14 and 6.2: if indeed the 'law of Christ' is the mosaic Torah whose demands can be satisfied by imitating Christ's act of love (6.2), then Paul's claim in 5.14 that one can fulfill the law by 'Loving your neighbour as yourself' implies that there is some kind of analogy between *this* command and Christ's love. The point of connection between both bearing one another's burdens and neighbour-love is that they both correspond to the theme of participation that we have

[420] For arguments against this view see note 416 above.

[421] Arist. *Eth. Nic.* IX 4, 1168a. See 2.1.2.

[422] So: 'They say that friendship exists only amongst the excellent, due to their mutual likeness (*λέγουσι δὲ καὶ τὴν φιλίαν ἐν μονοις τοῖς σπουδαίοις εἶναι, διὰ τὴν ὁμοιότητα*). And by friendship they mean to have commonality of all the things in life, treating friends as ourselves (*φασὶ δ' αὐτὴν κοινωνίαν τινὰ εἶναι τῶν κατὰ τὸν βίον, χρωμένων ἡμῶν τοῖς φίλοις ὡς ἑαυτοῖς*)' (*SVF* 3.631 = Diog Laer. 7.124).

seen throughout the letter. Just as Christ both shared himself along with all of his benefits with believers and took up their situation of accursedness, believers must share what goods they have and take up the negative burdens of others. Understood in this light, whereas 'love your neighbour as yourself' corresponds to the notion that believers must positively extend to others what belongs to them, 'bear one another's burdens' corresponds to the notion that believers must take up the hardship of others as their own. In other words, believers must both share *in* and share *with* one another. If this reading is correct, then it is *both* burden-bearing and the extension of self-love to others that imitate Christ's love in the incarnation.

5.6. The Galatian Agitators as Ἀντίχριστοι

Treatments of Pauline ethics regularly concern themselves with positive descriptions of the moral life and thus focus on how Paul exhorts believers to behave and to act with and towards one another. But if to give an account of the good is also to give an account of the bad – or, as Leander Keck puts it, if 'morality describes and prescribes proper behavior as well as proscribes what is unacceptable' – then the task of ethics must explicitly include outlining the logic which gives rise to both right and wrong behaviour, and a holistic reading of Pauline ethics requires elucidating not only the kinds of actions which he recommends but also those which he classifies as morally unacceptable, as illicit, and as deviant.[423] More specifically, and to locate this point within the purview of this chapter, a holistic explanation of Paul's injunctions to love calls for a corresponding explanation of his explicit descriptions of those who do not love. The task of this section is therefore to show that Paul's negative portrayals of the agitators are particularly oriented towards demonstrating that their actions *contradict* the shape of Christ's action in the incarnation. To be sure, the most fundamental threat that the agitators present for the Galatians is not their behaviour *per se* but rather the fact that they jeopardise the Galatians' connection to Christ. The agitators' message is a 'contorting' or 'twisting (*μεταστρέφειν*)' (1.7) of the gospel to such an extent that, if the Galatians have their foreskin cut off, then 'Christ will not at all benefit you (*Χριστὸς ὑμᾶς οὐδὲν ὠφελήσει*)' (5.2) and they would in turn

[423] The citation is from Keck, 'Rethinking', 7.

'be cut off from Christ (*κατηργήθητε ἀπὸ Χριστοῦ*)' (5.4). But while this may be the deepest danger presented by the activity of the agitators, Paul does not hesitate to cast their other social behaviours in a negative light. Here I look at two aspects of Paul's description of the agitators' actions which, I will argue, are designed to portray them as acting in a way that is deeply contradictory to the characterisation of Jesus in the rest of the letter: 1) the agitators seek to gain benefit at the expense of the Galatians, and 2) they engage in the act of compulsion to force the Galatians to accept their message.

5.6.1. The Agitators' Enactment of a Zero-Sum Relationship

The epithets which Paul uses to label those preaching circumcision at Galatia can serve as a point of entry here. Paul labels these individuals as 'those who agitate you (*οἱ ταράσσοντες ὑμᾶς*)' (1.7) and 'those who stir you up (*οἱ ἀναστατοῦντες ὑμᾶς*)' (5.12). What is not always considered is the possibility that these epithets suggest that the agitators bring more than just psychological or theological distress to the Galatians. In fact, these descriptions might indicate that the agitators are being harmful beyond the fact that they preach a dangerous message.[424] While *ταράσσειν* can often refer to psychological distress (Mt 2.3; 14.6; Mk 6.50; Lk 1.12, 24.38; Jn. 11.33; 12.27; 13.21; 14.1; 14.27; 15.24; 17.8; 17.13, 1 Pet 3.14), it also can indicate when one stirs up chaotic social disorder (Hdt. 4.125; 9.51). As for *ἀναστατοῦν*, the author of Acts uses this word to refer to how Jason created a mob in the city (Acts 17.6) and when Paul gets accused of stirring up a revolt of some four thousand people (21.38). Daniel claims that a kingdom will stir up (*ἀναστατοῦν*) the whole earth and grind it down (*ἀναστατώσει αὐτὴν καὶ καταλεανεῖ αὐτήν*, Dan 7.23 LXX), and in addition to this clause Justin Martyr's citation of Daniel says that this kingdom will not only 'stir it up' but also 'devour the whole earth (*καταφάγεται πᾶσαν τὴν γῆν*)' (*Dial.* 31.6). One fragment from Euripides depicts Athena as commanding Poseidon to turn his trident away from the earth so as to not stir it up (*μηδὲ γῆν*

[424] Those who think that the agitation of the Galatians is purely theological include de Boer, *Galatians*; Longenecker, *The Triumph of Abraham's God*, 16; Dunn, *The Epistle to the Galatians*, 42–43; Martyn, *Galatians*, 111–112. Others, however, think that they are being more socially aggressive. See e.g. F.F. Bruce. *The Epistle of Paul to the Galatians: A Commentary on the Greek Text* (NICTG; Exeter: Paternoster, 1982), 242; S.C. Keesmaat, *Paul and His Story: (Re)interpreting the Exodus Tradition* (JSNTSup 181; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1999), 197; P. Oakes, *Galatians* (Paideia: Commentaries on the New Testament; Grand Rapids: Baker, 2015), 171–172.

ἀναστατοῦν)' (frag. 65.67). While we should of course be careful to avoid the illegitimate totality transfer here, in the light of these examples a cumulative case could be made for seeing the agitators' behaviour as more forceful and socially disruptive than is usually conceived, if in fact the context suggests it.

Two sections of text (4.17 and 6.12–13) attribute a particular motive to the agitators' aggressive action.[425] In 4.17, Paul writes, 'They [the agitators] court you, not in a good way. They want to exclude you, so that you may emulate them (*ζηλοῦσιν ὑμᾶς οὐ καλῶς, ἀλλ' ἐκκλεῖσαι ὑμᾶς θέλουσιν, ἵνα αὐτοὺς ζηλοῦτε*)'. Given the other indications that the agitators are harming the Galatians, it seems that the qualification 'not in a good way' means at least in part it is not good *for the Galatians'* well-being. In Paul's view, the agitators engage in this harmful behaviour for their own interests: they treat the Galatians not in a good way in order that the Galatians would emulate them. The Galatians' emulation of the agitators seems to imply that they would benefit from such emulation. In Plutarch's *De Fraterno Amore*, he suggests that emulation is a result of affection: 'an immediate consequence of affection for others (*τῷ γὰρ φιλεῖν ἑτέρους εὐθὺς ἕπεται*) is to take pleasure in others (*τὸ χαίρειν ἑτέροις*), to emulate others (*καὶ ζηλοῦν ἑτέρους*), and to follow the lead of others (*καὶ ἄγεσθαι ὑφ' ἑτέρων*)' (Plut. *Mor.* 490E). Thus, 4.17 portrays the agitators as seeking to benefit from the Galatians by doing something that is 'not good' for them.

The sinister nature of this social relationship becomes more acute in the closing section of the letter. Paul makes the shocking accusation that 'those who desire to make a good showing in the flesh, they compel you to be circumcised only so that they might not be persecuted for the cross of Christ (*ὅσοι θέλουσιν εὐπροσωπῆσαι ἐν σαρκί, οὗτοι ἀναγκάζουσιν ὑμᾶς περιτέμνεσθαι, μόνον ἵνα τῷ σταυρῷ τοῦ Χριστοῦ μὴ διώκωνται*)' (6.12). Highlighting their purely self-interested motives, he

[425] What is particularly difficult about 4.17–18 are the three uses of *ζηλοῦν* in close proximity to one another, but which seems to have distinct meanings in each instance. For some helpful proposals regarding the triple use of *ζηλοῦν* in 4.17–18, see B.J. Lappenga, 'Misdirected Emulation and Paradoxical Zeal: Paul's Redefinition of "The Good" as Object of *ζῆλος* in Galatians 4:12–20', *JBL* 131 (2012): 775–796. The use of different senses of *ζηλοῦν* and *ζῆλος* in such close proximity does not seem unlikely, given that authors easily recognised their different uses. For example, in his discussion about *ζῆλος* Arius Didymus takes time to acknowledge its various meanings: it means both 'a benediction of what is lacking (*μακαρισμὸς ἐνδεοῦς*)' as well as 'the imitation of another who is greater (*καὶ ἔτι ἄλλως μίμησιν ὡς ἂν κρείττονος*)' (Stob. *Flor.* 2.7.10c = *SVF* 3.413).

claims that they 'do not themselves guard the law, but they want you to be circumcised in order that they might boast in your flesh' (6.13). There are numerous dynamics at play here, but what is important for my purposes is to note that Paul seeks to persuade the Galatians that the agitators are using them as an *instrumental means* to achieve their own interests: they seek to boast in the flesh of the Galatians, and they compel them to be circumcised *only* (*μόνον*) to avoid persecution.[426] Indeed, the word *μόνον* before the purpose clause in 6.13 excludes any possibility that the agitators are interested in the well-being of the Galatians. Thus, when these various portraits of the agitators in 4.17, 4.29, and 6.12–13 are taken together, it suggests that the agitators are persecuting the Galatians for the purposes of their own interests.

It is crucial to note that Paul is not faulting the agitators for being self-interested *per se*; what Paul portrays as so destructive about the agitators is not that they hope to gain benefit for themselves (as argued in §2.2, Paul often seeks his own benefit in various ways) but rather that they seek to benefit themselves *at the expense of* the benefit of the Galatians. The language of 'selfishness' to describe the agitators' actions is therefore not precise enough. One of the primary problems with the agitators' social actions is that they construct a zero-sum relationship between themselves and the Galatians. The actions of the agitators make it so that their own good and the good of the Galatians relate by way of inverse proportion: the agitators intend to make a good showing in the flesh and thus avoid persecution by stirring up and troubling the Galatians.

At one level, this strikes a contrast with Paul, who was willing to bear the 'marks of Jesus' (6.17) and endure persecution in order to construct a relationship with Galatians (2.5; 4.12–13). But the agitators' persecution of the Galatians for their own benefit means that they do not care to construct a mutually beneficial relationship with the Galatians. On the contrary: the interests of the agitators can only be accomplished at the expense of the Galatians. When set in juxtaposition with Paul's description of the Christ-event, in which Christ was willing to be crucified so that he and believers would come to

[426] For some provocative hypotheses concerning why getting the Galatians circumcised could alleviate persecution for the agitators, see Hardin, *Galatians and the Imperial Cult*, 85–115.

mutually participate in one another, his depictions of the agitators as persecuting the Galatians to avoid persecution strikes an intentional contrast to Christ's love in the incarnation.

5.6.2. Compulsion as Antithetical to Love

Earlier in the letter Paul distances himself from the activity of compulsion (*ἀναγκάζειν*). He informs the Galatians that Titus was not 'compelled to be circumcised (*ἠναγκάσθη περιτμηθῆναι*)' and recalls reprimanding Cephas with the incisive question 'How can you compel the gentiles to adopt Jewish customs? (*πῶς τὰ ἔθνη ἀναγκάζεις ἰουδαΐζειν;*)' (2.9, 2.14). As we have just seen, in the final part of the letter, Paul explicitly characterizes the agitators with this language, calling them 'those who compel you to be circumcised (*ἀναγκάζουσιν ὑμᾶς περιτέμνεσθαι*)' (6.12). A closer look at Paul's language of 'compulsion' elsewhere and concepts related thereto will shed light on how this characterisation of the depicts the agitators actin in a way that inverts the structure of the messiah's loving action.

We can begin here with taking a look at Seneca, who gives an account of the relationship between volition and virtue. For Seneca, actions cannot be truly virtuous if they do not flow from the agent's own will:

> For if matters external to virtue can either diminish or augment it, then what is honorable ceases to be the sole good. If you concede that, then the honorable ceases to exist altogether. Why? I'll tell you: because no action is honorable when performed by one who is unwilling or under compulsion (*quia nihil honestum est, quod ab invito, quod coactum fit*). Everything that is honorable is voluntary (*Omne honestum voluntarium est*). Mingle with it any reluctance, any complaint, any second thoughts, any fear, and it loses its best feature: it is no longer self-determined (*sibi placere*).

As we saw in §3.1.1, Seneca considers the *animus* – the giver's intention, spirit, and willingness – to make a gift what it is. We should not be surprised, then, that Seneca also takes compulsion to be antithetical to mutual relationship: if one is compelled either to give or to receive, then one cannot operate with and according to one's *animus*, and thus relationships cannot be formed by 'gifts' which are so forced. This argument is also implicitly at work in Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*: because the best kind of friendship is based upon virtue (VIII 1, 1155a4), and because acts of virtue must be 'voluntary (*ἑκούσιος*)' (III 1, 1109b30–1110b4), involuntary actions cannot create or sustain the meaningful, mutual relationships. To the extent that friendship is based on virtue, non-virtuous

actions that flow from compulsion, force, or reluctance cannot form or contribute to friendships. As Seneca explains,

> When I talk about choosing whom to be in debt to, I make an exception for cases involving force majeure and intimidation, which eliminate genuine choice. If it is open to you, if it is up to you, then all on your own you will weigh the question of whether you are willing or not. But if compulsion removes choice, you should be aware that you are obeying rather than receiving. No one is bound by accepting something that they were not allowed to reject. If you want to find out whether I am willing, then make it possible for me to be unwilling … It does not matter what was given unless it was given by a willing giver to a willing recipient.[427]

The argument operative here is that the prosocial actions which each party performs within a gift-relationship, whether giving or receiving, are meaningful precisely because they are expressions and demonstrations of the desire to be connected with a particular other. Compulsion disqualifies the possibility of real relationship because in such a situation one cannot express a good will towards another. Friendship cannot be predicated upon compulsion insofar as it suffocates the volition of one party.

Turning to Paul, we can see that he seems to agree with Seneca's sentiment, and this view comes to expression in his personal relationships, as he ensures that people do not feel compelled or forced to be generous to him or others. For example, Paul informs Philemon that, while he could 'command (*ἐπιτάσσειν*)' Philemon to do 'the appropriate thing (*τὸ ἀνῆκον*)', he would rather entreat Philemon to do something for him 'on the basis of love (*διὰ τὴν ἀγάπην*)' (Philem 8–9). Paul contrasts his ability to 'command' forcefully with his own 'love (*ἀγάπη*)' for him. This contrast occurs again when he informs Philemon, 'I wanted to keep him [Onesimus] with me, so that he might be of service to me in your place during my imprisonment for the gospel; but I preferred to do nothing without your consent (*χωρὶς δὲ τῆς σῆς γνώμης οὐδὲν ἠθέλησα ποιῆσαι*), in order that your good deed might not be done according to compulsion (*κατὰ ἀνάγκην*) but according to volition (*κατὰ ἑκούσιον*)' (13–14). We can already see that something similar to Seneca's and Aristotle's position is also operative here (and it is telling that Paul uses *ἑκούσιος*, which is Aristotle's choice term in his discussion of

[427] Seneca, *Ben.* 2.18.7; cf. 2.19.2: 'For it is not a benefit to be compelled to accept it, and it is not a benefit to be in debt to someone to whom you do not wish to be. You should give me my choice first, and then a benefit' (cf. 6.21.3). Seneca also makes this point about his relationship with God: 'I don't obey God, I agree with him. I follow him by my own choice, not because I must' (*Ep, Mor.* 96.2). The same point in relation to gift-giving is made in Arist. *Rhet.* II 7, 1385b2–3).

volition). Philemon is Paul's friend, and for their friendship to remain meaningful, Paul does not think that compelling him to do something will reinforce their friendship. Because Philemon needs to be willing himself to do what Paul asks, he creates room for Philemon's own volition by not appealing to his own authority, so that the mutual reciprocity between them would be genuine – so that their friendship would be real. In short, love is antithetical to compulsion.

Turning to 2 Corinthians, we see that Paul makes similar cautious moves to ensure that he is not forcing the Corinthians to be generous. Throughout chapters eight and nine, Paul praises those who demonstrated their own volition in being generous. Titus is commended for having a deep earnestness (*σπουδαιότερος*) to come willingly (*αὐθαίρετος*) to the Corinthians (8.17, 22). God, Paul recounts, had granted the Macedonians grace so that they gave not only according to their means, but also gave willingly (*αὐθαίρετοι*) beyond their means to the collection for the saints (8.3). When he encourages the Corinthians to excel in their generosity towards the saints in the same way (8.7), he brings a nuanced qualification to this exhortation: 'I say this not as a command (*κατ᾽ ἐπιταγὴν*), but to prove by the earnestness of others the genuineness of your love (*τὸ τῆς ὑμετέρας ἀγάπης γνήσιον*) (8.8). Whereas in Philemon, Paul contrasts his *own* love with his ability to force another party to give, here he contrasts his ability to compel with the *Corinthians*' ability to demonstrate their own love. In other words, if they gave generously only because Paul had commanded it, then it would not be an expression of their genuine love (cf. 1 Pet 5.2). Paul then takes the necessary measures to ensure that they are acting out of their own volition: 'So I thought it necessary to urge the brothers to go on ahead to you and arrange in advance for the gift that you have promised, so that it may be ready as a willing gift (*οὕτως ὡς εὐλογίαν*), not as extortion (*καὶ μὴ ὡς πλεονεξίαν*)' (9.5). A theological dimension is imported into this motif when he writes that 'Each of you must give as you have made up your mind, not reluctantly or under compulsion (*μὴ ἐκ λύπης ἢ ἐξ ἀνάγκης*), for God loves a cheerful giver (*ἱλαρὸν γὰρ δότην ἀγαπᾷ ὁ θεός*).

A closer look at the descriptions of Christ in 2 Corinthians will show that Paul's practice of avoiding compulsion has christological roots. Just after Paul says that he avoiding 'commanding' the Corinthians in order to test the genuineness of their love (8.7), Paul appeals to the Christ-event: 'For

you know the gift of our Lord Jesus Christ, that because he was rich in generosity, for your sakes he became poor, so that by his poverty you might become rich in generosity' (8.9).[428] The appropriate result of the Corinthians being enriched in generosity is that the Corinthians not only *be* generous, but *want to be* generous (*οὐ μόνον τὸ ποιῆσαι ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ θέλειν*, 8.10). Thus, Paul justifies the fact that he avoids compelling the Corinthians to give (8.8) by appealing to the fact that the grace of Jesus Christ enabled others to be generous (8.9) and even to will to be generous (8.10). In other words, Paul avoids the activity of compulsion, which suffocates the volition of others, because Jesus' act of grace did not suppress the volition of others but enabled it to flourish in the desire to be generous.

While 2 Corinthians 8.8 correlates generosity with how Christ enables others to will, in Philippians we can see a further christological basis for rejection of the activity of compulsion in social interactions. As we saw in the last chapter, Philippians 2.6 describes how Jesus does not consider being-like-God to do the action *ἁρπαγμός*. In that section, I argued that *ἁρπαγμός* should be interpreted as semantically closer to the verbal noun *ἁρπαγή* (seizing) rather than the object-noun *ἁρπαγμά* (the thing seized). What is often characteristic about the various words that use this root, such as *ἅρπαξ* (thief) and *ἁρπάζειν* (to seize, steal) is that such activities involve taking *against* the will of another.[429] This is especially the case for the word *ἁρπαγή*, which normally denotes either rape or an act of theft (e.g. Hdt. 1.2; Thuc. 6.52). In Philippians 2.6, then, Paul conveys Christ as one who does not take for himself against the will of another person, in the same way that Paul refuses to 'extort (*ὡς πλεονεξία*)' the Corinthians or force Philemon to get what he wants.[430] This implication in 2.6 is further strengthened when Paul describes the activity of God later in the chapter. Whereas in 2.6 Paul claims that Jesus did not consider it God-like to take against the will of another, in 2.13 we actually see why this is is not God-like: 'God is the one who works in you, both to will and word for his good pleasure (*θεὸς γάρ ἐστιν ὁ ἐνεργῶν ἐν ὑμῖν καὶ τὸ θέλειν καὶ τὸ ἐνεργεῖν ὑπὲρ τῆς εὐδοκίας*)'. This aligns with Paul's claim that the Christ-event has enabled the Corinthians 'not only to do, but also to

[428] For an explanation of this translation, see §4.2.4 above.

[429] Expressing a similar sentiment, Publilius Syrus writes, *Rapere est, non petere, quicquid invito auferas* (*Sententiae*, 639, cf. 195).

[430] Philo often juxtaposes in hendiadys *ἁρπαγή* and *πλεονεξία*, implying that they are two very similar, if not identical, vices (*Agr.* 83; *Dec.* 171. *Spec. Leg.* 1.204; 3.158).

will (*τὸ ποιῆσαι ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ θέλειν*)'. God is portrayed as enabling the Philippians to *want* to act, as opposed to compelling them, controlling them, or forcing them to act.

In light of the above, we can see that, Paul's depiction of the agitators as 'those who compel you to be circumcised' has a particular critical force to the word 'compel'. While Paul does not speak of Christ enabling the will of others with the same language as 2 Corinthians and Philippians, the same theological dynamics are at play. As we have seen in the previous chapter (§4.3), in Galatians it is Christ's self-gift that empowers others to engage in moral action. The self-gift of Jesus Christ brings him to live 'in' Paul, with the result that Paul can declare that he now 'lives to God' in his own agency by virtue of Christ's agency. Furthermore, Christ's participation in the human condition triggered the outpouring of the Spirit, which comprises the source of their moral action and their reciprocation of God's gift in Christ. Thus, whereas Christ enables the activity of others in order to establish a relationship of mutual beneficence with them, the agitators force the Galatians to do a particular action (circumcision) in order not to establish a mutual relationship but in order to serve their interests at the expense of the Galatians. In the same way that Paul contrasts love with activities that place people under compulsion, so also he contrasts Christ, who loved (*ἀγαπᾶν*) and enabled humans to flourish in their volition by sharing in the human condition (Gal 2.20), with the agitators, who compel (*ἀναγκάζειν*) the Galatians to be circumcised (6.12).

5.7. The Analogy of the Gift

In closing, I should consider two particular critiques which push against the proposal that human ethical behaviour can imitate the incarnation. Considering such objections will bring clarity to the claim that Paul has an 'incarnational' ethic. The first critique comes from James Dunn, who, in his argument against pre-existence in Philippians 2.6–7, writes that 'a Jesus who makes an Adamic choice is more of a model for Christian behaviour … than a pre-existent Christ'.[431] Dunn's statement must be interpreted as a sub-argument within his attempt to erase any and all notions of pre-existent christology in Paul. Since most interpreters, including Dunn, consider Philippians 2.5–11 to be

[431] Dunn, *Christology in the Making,* xxxiv.

oriented towards Paul's ethical concerns, Dunn is pointing out that it would seem too strange for Paul to encourage his readers to imitate Christ by appealing to his movement from pre-existence to incarnation. Human beings can and never will be pre-existent themselves, so why would the incarnation be relevant to Paul's ethical concerns?

For Dunn, the movement from pre-existence to incarnation would be ethically irrelevant since Christians cannot imitate Christ entirely in that act. However, what is tacitly assumed in this argument is that judgments of similarity – and, thus, imitation – must be predicated upon an absolute identity between two events or objects.[432] In this interpretation, speaking of believers' 'imitation' of a pre-existent Christ is a non-starter. But for believers to imitate the incarnation does not require them to perform the same act as Jesus did – indeed, if identity is the criterion of imitation, then no act could be said to imitate another, since every particular act is only ever identical to itself. Even one of Paul's near-contemporaries recognised that judgments of similarity do not require identity. The author of *Rhetorica ad Herrenium* (~80 B.C.) outlines the art of comparison as follows: 'Comparison is a manner of speech that carries over an element of likeness from one thing to a different thing (*Similitudo est oratio traducens ad rem quampiam aliquid ex re dispari simile*)' (*Rhet. Ad. Her.* 4.48.59). But in order to establish parallels between two things, the author insists that 'The resemblance between the two things need not apply throughout, but must hold on the precise point of comparison (*Non enim res tota totae rei necesse est similis sit, sed id ipsum quod conferetur similitudinem habeat oportet*)' (4.48.61). To borrow this phrasing, the resemblance between Christ's act of love and believers' love need not apply throughout in order to say that the latter must imitate the former. Indeed, there are many asymmetries between believers and Jesus in this regard: unlike Jesus, the Galatians are never the subject of *ἐξαγοράζειν* (3.13), never sent directly from God (4.4), never the explicit source and cause of ethical action (2.20), and never the definitive revelation of God (1.16). Nonetheless, the connections elucidated in this chapter between Christ's participation in the human condition and believers'

[432] This has been emphasized by cognitive studies on how humans think about analogical relationships. See D. Gentner, 'Structure-Mapping: A Theoretical Framework for Analogy', *Cognitive Science* 7 (1983): 155–170, at 156: 'The strength of an analogical match does not seem to depend on the overall degree of featural overlap; not all features are equally relevant to the interpretation. Only certain kinds of mismatches count for or against analogies'; cf. C.A. Clement and D. Gentner, 'Systematicity as a Selection Constraint in Analogical Mapping', *Cognitive Science* 15 (1991): 89–132.

participation in one another imply not that they *repeat* Christ's action in every respect but rather that they act *analogously* to it. The Son's movement from pre-existence to incarnation comprises the event which they are to imitate in their interactions with one another, but this imitation consists in actions only *analogous* to the self-gift of Jesus Christ.

The second critique is, I think, more forceful, and it comes from more theological concerns. John Webster argued that 'any extension of the notion of incarnation (in ecclesiology or ethics, for example) … can be Christologically disastrous, in that it may threaten the uniqueness of the Word's becoming flesh by making "incarnation" a general principle.'[433] Webster's concern is that, if we call ethical action 'incarnational', this implies that the similarity between believers' action and Christ's action must be predicated upon their common similarity to a more fundamental, abstract pattern which exists over and above both Christ and believers. But does claiming that believers imitate the incarnation require such a conclusion? When speaking of believer's imitation of Christ's incarnation, is the 'incarnation' just an *idea*?

The adjective in the middle of this chapter's title – 'Paul's *Incarnational* Ethic' – might give the impression that 'incarnation' is most fundamentally a concept or an abstract pattern which is more essential than the event of the incarnation itself. Avoiding Webster's critique can only be accomplished by introducing some conceptual terminology which can enable us to construe the relationship between Paul's Christology and ethics with the utmost precision. Because the incarnation of Jesus Christ is both the means by which believers are empowered to act (see §4.3) and the act which they are summoned to imitate, we might say that Jesus Christ is the *material criterion* of Paul's love ethic. That is to say, Jesus Christ does not reveal an abstract idea which the Galatians are meant to imitate; rather, they are called to imitate Christ the *person* as he acted the event of the incarnation. To adapt Linebaugh's way of putting it, 'the Christ-event is not an example or even paradigmatic instantiation of a reality more foundational than itself; it is that towards which [ethics] points and that from and

[433] J. Webster, *Holy Scripture: A Dogmatic Sketch* (Current Issues in Theology; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 22–23.

through which [ethics] makes sense'.[434] But in order to identify *how* the Galatians are meant to actualise this call for imitation, we must specify, to use the words of *Rhetorica ad Herrenium*, the 'precise point of comparison' between their love and Christ's love. Because we see that believers correspond to the love of Christ in the incarnation by sharing in others and sharing themselves with others, we could say that *mutual participation* is the *formal criterion* of Paul's love-ethic which is derived from the *material criterion* of the event of the incarnation.[435] Thus, when believers correspond to this formal criterion, they are doing so only because they are called to correspond to the *person* of Christ. This conceptual model enables us to speak meaningfully about how believers' action can be called 'incarnational' without implying that the incarnation is most fundamentally an idea or that believers are meant to correspond to an abstract concept that is not christocentrically grounded. Thus, we can summarise the thesis of this chapter in fresh terminology: Paul's exhortations for the Galatians' prosocial behaviour are consistently controlled by the formal criterion of mutual participation because Paul's ethics are derived from the material criterion of Jesus' incarnation. It is in *this* sense that Paul proffers an 'incarnational' ethic.

[434] J.A. Linebaugh, *God, Grace, and Righteousness in Wisdom of Solomon and Paul's Letter to the Romans: Texts in Conversation* (NovTSup 152; Leiden: Brill, 2013), 225.

[435] I take this distinction from Linebaugh, *God, Grace, and Righteousness*, 225.

CHAPTER SIX

Conclusion

Gott als Liebe zu denken, ist Aufgabe der Theologie.[436]

This thesis has provided a reading of ethics in Galatians that has sought to move beyond depicting the love of Christ and believers in terms of the dichotomy between self-interest and other-regard. In chapter two, I argued that, for some Greek and Roman philosophers, prosocial behaviour for these thinkers was neither purely self-interested nor purely other-regarding but rather oriented towards connecting and enmeshing people into a larger whole, within which their prosocial action contributes to strengthening and reinforcing those connections. Some of these authors did contrast self-interest with other-regard in a specific sense: one should not seek to gain *at the expense of others*, but that does not mean that loving action does not intend to gain some kind of benefit for the self. We saw that some elements of Paul's letters suggest that his contrasts between self-interest and other-regard are not absolute, and he agrees with those in the Greco-Roman philosophical tradition who consider a relationship of shared interests with others to be an end in itself.

Chapters three and four intended to show that Paul's depiction of the love of Christ exhibits a similar structure. Chapter three argued that the language of self-giving in Galatians 1.4 and 2.20 signals not, as many scholars argue, that Christ gives himself away in selfless disregard through his death but rather that through his death he gives himself as gift, and thus that he gives himself *into* relationship. Chapter four pressed into how Paul describes the shape of Christ's love; Christ gives himself as gift and shares in the human condition in order to establish humans as moral agents and thus in order to construct a mutual relationship with them, not purely as a means to achieve self-benefit nor as an act that treats others as ends in themselves, but rather an event of love which aims at

[436] E. Jüngel, *Gott als Geheimnis der Welt: Zur Begründung der Theologie des Gekreuzigten im Streit zwischen Theismus und Atheismus* (8th ed.; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2010), 430.

a relationship as an irreducible end in itself. We saw that in Paul's statements about what Jesus did *not* do, Jesus is depicted as negating possible actualisations of himself, not renouncing or annihilating his entire self. Furthermore, Christ's loving action was also depicted in *positive* terms: he took up and identified with the situation of others in order to be with them.

Chapter five intended to show how this depiction of the Christ-event informs Paul's ethics. The intention was to provide a close reading of various texts which thematized not self-sacrifice but rather participation, sharing, and mutual benefit. In light of the reading in that chapter, can see why the language of self-subtraction – such as 'selflessness', 'self-sacrifice', and 'self-renunciation' – will ultimately fail to capture the full dynamic of Paul's love-ethic. Paul sees his suffering in a positive light, not only because it benefits the Galatians but because it is the means by which he constructed a mutual relationship with them (4.12–13); the goal of mutual slavery (5.13) is not only that one person would serve the interests of the other but that all of the interests of the community would become shared; the prohibition against honour fights is not just a call to disregard one's own honour but a summons to consider the honour of one brother or sister as a common good (5.26). The exhortation to bear one another's burdens does not just entail the rejection of self-pleasing but must include one's positive assimilation to the needs of others, such that the burdens of one become the responsibility of all (6.2). Interpreted through the perspective of incarnational Christology, Paul's various commands can come to be seen in terms other than the antithesis between self-interest and other-regard, between egoism and altruism. Of course, as we have seen, regard for the other is a necessary part of the relationship between believers; and, to be sure, Paul encourages against certain forms of competitive self-interest. But this other-regard is always oriented towards the construction and reinforcement of a community that is 'one in Christ Jesus' (3.28), a fellowship that is not reducible to its constituent parts. In other words, Paul might say that love is not just about benefitting 'the other' *per se* but is intended to overcome the fundamental distinction between the self and the other.

We can close with a few resulting conclusions:

1. *Paul's love-ethic is both thoroughly christological and can be properly contextualized within the Greco Roman philosophical tradition.* As we saw in §1.1, some scholars claimed that, if Paul constructs

an ethic around the love of Christ, then he *must* have deviated from the Greco-Roman philosophical tradition. This point seems to be both formal and material: the formal point is that Paul could not have derived his ethics from two different sources, and the material point is that, when Paul summons believers to imitate the death of Christ, it must entail the denial of all forms of self-interest. In response to the formal point, we might say that *even Paul's understanding of Christ's love is not necessarily detached from common views about prosocial behaviour at the time.* There does not need to be only one answer to the question of why Paul holds his particular ethical principles. In response to the material point, we could say that there is not sufficient evidence to suggest that Paul's view of love deviates in every way from other ideas about love at the time. As we have seen in this thesis, part of the way Paul portrays Christ's love as ideal is that he enables believers to act and thus initiates a mutual relationship of shared selves as an end in itself. Plato, Aristotle, Seneca, and Cicero all espoused similar ideas. The fact that Paul correlates his ethics with his christology does not mean that his ethical ideas are *sui generis*.

2. *Love entails losing not the entirety of the self, but a possible, competitive actualisation of the self.* Using self-subtraction language (such as 'selflessness', 'self-renunciation', 'self-sacrifice') to describe Paul's notion of love will inevitably fail to be clear about what is precisely being lost in the act of love. Christ's act of love only brings him to reject certain *possible* actualisations of the self. It was not the entirety of the self that was lost, renounced, or destroyed in the act of love. Similarly, Paul does not call for believers to avoid any and all forms of self-interest, but he asks them only to 'sacrifice' the *competitive* self, not the whole self.

3. *Paul did not idealise 'altruism' but rather prosocial actions that establish or contribute to a relationship of shared interests through which multiple parties benefit.* Christ's act of love in the incarnation and believers' corresponding love for each other are oriented towards establishing and reinforcing relationships which are not reducible to the benefit of a single party, because in his act of love Jesus shares himself so sufficiently with others and establishes them as moral actors that any talk of Jesus doing this act *only* for the benefit himself or others becomes nonsensical. The incarnation disrupts any presupposition that the final end of action must terminate in the benefit or the self or the

benefit of the other. My interpretation of Paul's christology and ethics problematises interpretations of Paul which portray him as idealising altruism, insofar as those systems tacitly presuppose an essential separation between the interests of individuals for such language to be meaningful. Whereas altruism, as Dixon put it, 'draws its primary significance from the distinction between the interests of self and of others', for Paul believers' love is oriented towards reinforcing a form of fellowship in which believers are 'all one in. Christ Jesus' (3.28) and thus whose interests are not fundamentally isolated and distinct but essentially shared. [437] Approaching his love-ethic from the perspective of incarnational Christology forces us to recognise that for Paul love can intend not just to benefit the other but also to bring two parties into a mutually beneficial relationship of shared interests. In short, the *telos* of love *for* another is to be *with* the other, to unite the 'I' and the 'you' so that they become an irreducible 'we'.

[437] The citation is from Dixon, *Invention,* 362.

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