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Samuel Weber

**Pining for Stability: The Borromeo Family and
the Crisis of the Spanish Monarchy, 1610–1680**

A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of
Doctor philosophiae (Dr. phil.) at the University of Bern, Switzerland

and

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Within the Framework of a Doctorate under the Joint Supervision of

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Abbreviations

ABIB	Archivio Borromeo dell'Isola Bella, Stresa
AGS	Archivo General Simancas, Simancas
ASCM	Archivio Storico Civico Milano, Milan
ASDM	Archivio Storico Diocesano Milano, Milan
ASM	Archivio di Stato Milano, Milan
ASR	Archivio di Stato Roma, Rome
ASV	Archivio Segreto Vaticano, Vatican City
FB	Famiglia Borromeo collection, ABIB
FCS	Fondo Crivelli Serbelloni, SSL
BAM	Biblioteca Ambrosiana Milano, Milan
BAV	Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vatican City
BNB	Biblioteca Nazionale Braidense, Milan
BNE	Biblioteca Nacional de España, Madrid
EST	Estado collection, AGS
SSP	Secretarías Provinciales collection, AGS
SSL	Società Storica Lombarda, Milan
<i>b.</i>	<i>busta</i>
<i>cart.</i>	<i>cartella</i>
<i>fasc.</i>	<i>fascicolo</i>
<i>leg.</i>	<i>legajo</i>
<i>p.a.</i>	<i>parte antica</i>




Fig. 1: Map of the State of Milan




Fig. 2: Map of Lake Maggiore

Introduction

The Borromeo's Hidden Spanish Connection

In the 1670s Antonio Renato Borromeo (1632–1686), the scion of one of Spanish Milan's leading houses, commissioned new art for the refurbished family home on the city's central Via Rugabella. The centerpieces of his budding collection were two paintings that he had hung in the foyer of the palace: a pair of canvasses portraying Philip IV of Spain (r. 1621–1665).¹ By far the more significant of the two was Ercole Procaccini's now lost depiction of an encounter between Philip IV and his bastard son, Juan José of Austria, the man who after many travails had attained a position of influence as Charles II's first "prime minister" at the time the painting was commissioned.² The message this ensemble sent to visitors to the family mansion was twofold. At one level, the paintings indicated to whom the Borromeo had hitched their wagon and owed their exalted position in a city that many still considered the linchpin of Spain's European empire. At a deeper level, though, the portraits of the Habsburg family were designed to dislodge memories of the considerable turbulence that the Borromeo's association with the rulers in Madrid had produced in the middle decades of the century. To those in the know, the painted homage to the monarchy that Juan José embodied marked the endpoint of a tortuous trajectory out of a crisis that had been of the Borromeo's own making. How that crisis came about, how it unfolded and how it was eventually resolved will be the questions at the heart of this dissertation on Antonio Renato and his two elder brothers, Giovanni (1616–1660) and Federico Jr. (1617–1673).

The close association of the Borromeo family with the house of Habsburg postulated here defies conventional knowledge. The main source of that has long been Alessandro Manzoni's portrayal of the Borromeo brothers' great-uncle, cardinal archbishop Federico Sr. (1564–1631), in what is arguably the most important novel of the nineteenth century written in the Italian language, *The Betrothed* of 1827.³ Inspired by the nationalist struggle for a united Italy of his own lifetime, Manzoni painted a gloomy picture of seventeenth-century Milan under Spanish rule. In his rendition, Lombardy in the *Seicento* was a place run down by tyrannical Spanish governors, corrupt local elites, and a depraved clergy who feasted on the plight of the masses. The only beam of light in this "età sudicia e sfarzosa" was the cardinal archbishop of the city, Federico Borromeo, the representative of an increasingly influential family and the cousin of that most paradigmatic of Counterreformation saints, St. Charles (1538–1584).⁴ Having risen above their lowly origins as merchant-bankers through the ranks of the Catholic Church, the Borromeo, in the early seventeenth century, were fast becoming the most resplendent part of Milan's nobility, shining thanks to their exceptional moral

¹ Galli and Monferrini, *I Borromeo d'Angera*, p. 83.

² Galli and Monferrini, *I Borromeo d'Angera*, pp. 45, n. 221; 51.

³ The final Italian version was published in 1840. Manzoni, *I promessi sposi*, pp. 264–270.

⁴ Manzoni, *I promessi sposi*, p. 266.

integrity, Manzoni argued. Not only did archbishop Borromeo put up fierce resistance to Spanish misrule, he spent most of his inherited wealth to help the poor and needy, putting the collective good before the particular interests of his clan.⁵ In an age of rampant *malgoverno*, Manzoni seemed to suggest, cardinal Borromeo embodied the prototype of a national elite who could chaperon the masses out of the predicament of foreign rule and exploitation at the hands of complicit local potentates. Read by generations of Italian high-school students, Manzoni's account of events has since been cemented into a staple of the national imagination of the period, seemingly obviating the need for further research into the character and the wider clan to which he belonged.⁶

Based on never-before-seen archival material, this thesis challenges the oft-relayed story. It argues that Federico Borromeo and his nephews were, in fact, deeply implicated in Spanish rule in northern Italy. This is not to say that the family did not initially resist the *pax hispanica* that had descended on Italy by the 1550s. As they styled themselves as an ecclesiastical dynasty, the Spanish had very good reasons to label them "His Majesty's greatest rebels," as they routinely did. Yet, as I reveal here for the first time, in the early decades of the seventeenth century, the family embarked on a slow transformation from ecclesiastical rebels into warriors and then into courtiers of Philip IV and Charles II, a transformation to which the paintings commissioned in the 1670s bore eloquent testimony. Given the family's past and the long shadow cast by Manzoni's idealized depiction of the clan, the Borromeo's rapprochement with the crown appears to be of particular interest here, although theirs is ultimately a story shared by many houses of their time and station: that of how the turbulence of the seventeenth century birthed the reinvention of the warrior nobility as princely servants who staked their future on a close relationship with the house of Habsburg.

Abandoning their parochial outlook as a Milanese family, the Borromeo's integration into the Spanish system evolved in unexpected ways. Much of their initial involvement hinged on the rise of that new figure in the court of Madrid, the minister-favorite, and the Borromeo's hope that the patronage that was being funneled into Italy would trickle down to them. If the Borromeo were in control of their refashioning as military entrepreneurs in the service of the Habsburgs in the early decades of the seventeenth century, popular opposition to their pay-to-play and the nefarious effects of Olivares's Union of Arms rerouted their entanglement with the house of Habsburg into an altogether different direction at midcentury. The Borromeo, betraying their uncomfortableness with their new role as clients of the Habsburgs, had been careful to portray their dynastic ambitions as conducive to the collective good of all the subjects over whom they ruled. But as decades of war exposed the incongruity between dynastic aspirations and the commonwealth, their vassals, in a

⁵ Manzoni, *I promessi sposi*, pp. 266, 268.

⁶ For a critical engagement with the limited historiography based on Manzoni's novel, see Lezowski, *L'Abrégé*, p. 24. Two recent revisionist treatments on limited aspects of Federico's biography include Jones, *Federico Borromeo*, and Zunckel, *Handlungsspielräume*.

clever appropriation of their lords' rhetoric, became more vocal in asking that the family align their actions with their words. Aghast at the revolts that had engulfed much of the Spanish monarchy by the late 1640s, the Borromeo felt impelled to course-correct and reinvent themselves as members of an imperial elite devoted not to dynastic greatness but to delivering good government in the name of a benevolent king.

In advancing this narrative, this thesis offers a new interpretation of the "courtization" of the warrior nobility in the seventeenth century. If historians have weaned off the once popular story of monarchs subduing a powerful nobility to combat the grievous disruption of the age, the transformation of warriors into a state nobility in the early modern period is still too often chalked up to the nobility's intrinsic motivation. All the punts at bold revisionism notwithstanding, scholars are still stuck within the bubble of a small elite which is fathomed to be the sole source of change. If dynasticism—the idea that the early modern nobility's primary motivation was self-aggrandizement—is now an acceptable lens through which to examine seventeenth-century elites, the resistance it generated is still routinely overlooked.⁷ Yet, as the Borromeo's tribulations make plain, any serious investigation into this seismic shift in the nobility's self-positioning needs to take stock of the subalterns most affected by the consequences of elite social reproduction. Doing so complicates our understanding of a key stage in Norbert Elias's civilizing process.⁸ As I argue here, what drove the Borromeo and others' reinvention as courtiers was neither a crown stage-managing change from above nor a nobility enticed by the pomp and pageantry of the court, but utter despair at the sudden appearance of common folks on the political scene. Elite families like the Borromeo may have craved a world in which the privileged few could run roughshod over their subjects but, as they learned the hard way in the seventeenth century, such aspirations met with contestation from those who were no longer content to act as props for narrow dynastic ambitions. Much as the Borromeo wished otherwise, many of their strategic decisions in the seventeenth century were conditioned by the village communities for whose wellbeing they claimed to be responsible and who forced them to live up to the good government to which they had pledged allegiance.

Putting ordinary people into the study of the nobility also affords new insights into what I see as the catalyst of that group's transformation: the crisis of the Spanish monarchy. Focusing on one of the few territories not affected by the uprisings of the 1640s, this thesis looks at the *longue durée* before and after what contemporaries perceived as the near collapse of the Spanish empire. By teasing out the dynamic relationship between the nobility and the populace, it is shown that the crisis began to take shape when village communities emerged to defy the large-scale redistribution of material resources engineered by the count-duke of Olivares and his predecessors, forcing the

⁷ The key text here is Rowlands, *The Dynastic State*.

⁸ Elias, *The Civilizing Process*.

warrior elite to invest in the construction of a new incarnation of monarchical government that emerged under Charles II. *Pace* the current consensus on early modern state-building, I posit that the emergence of the baroque monarchies of the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was only indirectly the result of the coercion-extraction cycle. What lent them their ultimate shape were empowering interactions between subalterns with their bold vision of a commonwealth based on distributive justice, and those who wanted to concede them as little as possible. Harnessing concepts that were lying around after more than a century of engagement with humanistic ideas of magnificence, the novel monarchies with their symbolic fanfare alleviated a crisis of legitimacy that was felt as deeply within the elite as outside the august circle of those whose entitlement to mold the world in their own image had clashed with the dreams and aspirations of laboring people and legally trained professionals in royal courts of law. Unbeknownst to most scholars in the field, two of the most popular items on the research agenda in recent years—networks and symbolic communication—were umbilically linked to one another. It was only when the latter superseded the former that some semblance of stability and order was recuperated, and the long “struggle for stability” (Theodore Rabb) came to an end.⁹

The Borromeo’s journey into the orbit of the *Austrias menores* was far from exceptional for families from Spanish Italy at the time; it needs to be placed in the context of the many forms of participation that the monarchy opened up to early modern Italians. Over the last three decades or so, a rich revisionist historiography has shown that Spanish dominion in the Italian peninsula cannot be likened to the imperial conquest of the Americas, where Spanish might was ruthlessly imposed upon native populations.¹⁰ Challenging the black legend of the nationalist historiography of the nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries, research has renewed credibility in the thesis that Spanish hegemony was imposed relatively peacefully on the Italian peninsula, with the empire resorting mostly to soft power tactics to consolidate its authority. As the Catholic kings extended their rule to Milan and much of southern Italy in the sixteenth century and incorporated them into their budding global empire, they were careful not to imperil the legal framework governing each of these territories. The local elites who staffed the institutions that the Spaniards captured were accorded a leading role in the making of the emerging “composite monarchy.”¹¹ Titillated by the

⁹ Rabb, *The Struggle*.

¹⁰ For a comparative discussion, see Dandele, *Spanish Rome*, pp. 12–15. For an overview, see the contributions in idem and Marino (eds.), *Spain in Italy. An early interpretation along these lines was Hernando Sánchez, Castilla y Nápoles*.

¹¹ The original formulation of the concept was suggested by Elliott, *A Europe*. The most recent update can be found in idem, *Scots and Catalans*.

promises of the empire on which the sun never set, families from across the Italian peninsula built a profile as pro-Spanish dynasties.¹²

The advantages of this connivance were formidable, though they remained very much conditioned by a family's original position within local society. As recent research has shown, the early modern Italian nobility was an extremely fragmented group, ranging from old feudal clans to arrivistes from the merchant-banker milieu and upstarts from the legal profession.¹³ The latter two, including members from marginalized groups, hoped to turn rapprochement with the Catholic kings into an opportunity to lift themselves up into the restricted circle of nobles.¹⁴ However, the real beneficiary of Spain's hegemony was the puny upper tier of the nobility that Italian historians call dynasties.¹⁵ If that term usually refers to sovereigns alone, in early modern Italy sovereignty was a relative concept. As the work of Angelantonio Spagnoletti and others has shown, the nominally sovereign rulers of imperial fiefs in northern and central Italy were so reliant on the protection of the superpower of the day that it is difficult to argue that they commanded more authority than the baronial families of Rome or the high nobility of the territories directly governed by Spain.¹⁶ By appealing to that group's thirst for competition with their peers, the Spanish crown was able peacefully to extend its powers beyond the three kingdoms and the duchy under its direct jurisdiction, building a support base that in turn benefited from the material and symbolic riches of the *monarquía*.

The burgeoning networks between local elites and the imperial center were bolstered at the dawn of the seventeenth century with the rise of a new figure, variously known as *valido* or minister-favorite, a member of the Castilian high nobility who monopolized royal patronage and parceled it out to a growing group of clients across the globe. His role was social as much as political. He provided the high nobility of Spain's sprawling empire with the kind of stature they believed they merited by dint of their social standing, transforming the royal court into the center of a network of nobles impatient to access the king's riches (while excluding other members of the nobility from the dominant faction).¹⁷ The system was fine-tuned over time. If the first *valido*, the duke of Lerma (r. 1598–1618), reached out to Italians through his sub-patrons from the Castilian nobility, his successor, the count-duke of Olivares (r. 1623–1643), cut out the middlemen and transformed Italian nobles

¹² The classic study is Hernando Sánchez, *Castilla y Nápoles*.

¹³ The foundational text was Donati, *L'idea di nobiltà*. For a more recent overview, see Black, *Early Modern Italy*, chap. 8.

¹⁴ Visconti, *Il commercio dell'onore*; Mazur, *The New Christians*.

¹⁵ Spagnoletti, *Le dinastie*.

¹⁶ Spagnoletti, *Principi italiani*. The studies on Neapolitan families in particular are legion. I mention three recent ones which contain bibliographical references to earlier monographs and articles: Astarita, *The Continuity*; Sodano, *Da baroni*; Noto, *Élites*. On Milan, see Cremonini, *Le vie*.

¹⁷ On this point, see in particular the works of Francesco Benigno, such as *L'ombra del re* and, more recently, *Mutamenti*, pp. 111–112. On the court of Madrid, see the detailed collections edited by José Martínez Millán and María Antonietta Visceglia on the courts of Philip III and Philip IV: *La Monarquía de Felipe III*. For an innovative approach to courts as the center of elite networks, see Duindam, *Vienna*.

into stakeholders in the imperial project.¹⁸ The “cannibalization” of royal patronage that ensued turned Madrid into a marketplace. Established and aspiring noble families from across the monarchy converged on the capital in the hope of converting loyalty and princely service into material and symbolic monikers of dominion, monikers ranging from offices to an array of new aristocratic titles (spawning an inflation that, ironically enough, proved their attractiveness as successive minister-favorites came and went over the course of the first half of the century).¹⁹

The haggling in the court reflected the priorities of the nobility. If the accumulation of material wealth was important, contemporaries tended to see this as a mere stepping stone to what really mattered in the perpetuation of social inequalities: predominance in ceremonial rank.²⁰ The resulting distinction outweighed the sometimes considerable investments that preceded it.²¹ Thus the rise of the court allowed the self-proclaimed worthies to enact the distinguishing characteristic of the nobility—honor—in exciting new ways.²² Although they had to accept the king as an arbiter over these exchanges, the intervention of such a regulatory figure had its advantages in an increasingly competitive field. For the upper strata of Italian society, Spanish rule over much of the peninsula was not the beginning of quasi-colonial subjugation but a source of empowerment that helped them assert their elevated social status within an emerging pan-Hispanic society of gentlemen.²³

Exploiting the Italian nobility’s craving for distinction, Spanish monarchs were able to build a support base of Italian clients which historians have come to refer to as the Italian “subsystem” of a larger “Spanish system.”²⁴ One of its strongest components was the State of Milan, which successive minister-favorites perceived as strategically essential to the preservation of Spain’s European empire. The wish to reinforce royal authority in northern Italy fell on receptive ears. As a flurry of studies published since the 1990s has revealed, if Milan morphed into the linchpin of the monarchy, certainly in the Italian peninsula, this was because its elites became hooked on royal patronage.²⁵ In pioneering studies of Milanese politics, Gianvittorio Signorotto and Antonio Álvarez-Ossorio Alvariño have demonstrated how the monarchy was able to harness the dynastic ambitions of Milan’s leading families for the empire’s grand strategy and thus guarantee the kind of stability that the Habsburgs failed to achieve elsewhere in the composite monarchy.²⁶ Positing social collaboration among a transnational elite as the central feature of Spanish rule in Italy, these interpretations mark a

¹⁸ On the system under Lerma, see Enciso, *Nobleza*.

¹⁹ Benigno, *Mutamenti*, pp. 108–110. The term “cannibalization” is borrowed from Levy Peck, *Court Patronage*, p. 4.

²⁰ Pečar, *Status-Ökonomie*, p. 93.

²¹ On distinction, see Daloz, *The Sociology*.

²² Mozzarelli, *Onore*; Maria Antonietta Visceglia, “Non si ha da equiparare.”

²³ Spagnoletti, *Principi italiani*; more generally, Yun Casalilla (ed.), *Las redes*.

²⁴ For an overview, see Musi, *L’Italia*, and idem, *L’impero*, 2013, esp. chap. 3.

²⁵ The two pioneering collections of essays are Pissavino et al. (eds.), *Lombardia borromaica*, and Brambilla and Muto (eds.), *La Lombardia spagnola*.

²⁶ Signorotto, *Milano spagnola*; Álvarez-Ossorio, *La república*. One particularly serviceable transmission belt was the military apparatus. See Rizzo, *Centro spagnolo*; Maffi, *Il baluardo*, and idem, *La cittadella*.

stunning turn in historiographical debate. Where Milanese nobles and institutions were once studied as hotbeds of resistance to Spain's allegedly oppressive rule over Italy, this nationalist reading has been ditched for one emphasizing the intense cooperation between elites glued together by patronage across linguistic and cultural boundaries.²⁷ The once-dominant story of fierce opposition to rapacious foreign rule has been substituted by narratives stressing consensus resulting from local governing elite's and the imperial center's shared interest in stability.²⁸

If the Spanish presence in Italy was essentially an extended patron-client network, this reveals much about the unspoken assumptions undergirding seventeenth-century societies. As a generation of scholars has now shown, early modern societies were essentially familist entities in which diverging conceptions of "family interest" collided in royal courts, the nerve center of politics.²⁹ Scholars such as Toby Osborne and Peter Campbell have argued that early modern nobles inhabited a world in which elite households were the default unit of society, leading to much of politics being dominated by the interests of noble heads of household and the competition between houses.³⁰ The prevailing dynastic mindset of both princes and their nobility gave seventeenth-century monarchies their particular imprint. To the extent that concrete policies played a role in the wrangling between elite factions, these were frequently trounced by the more narrow dynastic concerns of a faction's members.³¹ As sociologist Julia Adams has explained, elite's conception of society as a set of "arrangements among the family heads" fostered a patrimonial conception of institutions as the property of officeholders who had few concerns other than the well-being of kith and kin.³²

The best studied example of such a patrimonial oligarchy is the court of Rome during the pontificate of Paul V (1605–1621).³³ Wolfgang Reinhard and his students have shown conclusively that the early modern papacy was not a conglomerate of autonomous institutions but a network of elites extending across the Italian peninsula and into the wider Catholic world.³⁴ As one can easily imagine, this had inevitable repercussions on papal policy. When push came to shove, the nobles staffing Church institutions revealed themselves to be more loyal to kith and kin than to abstract ideas of public service.³⁵ Reinhard's work on the Roman curia has led him to challenge one of the central narratives of early modern history: that of the period as one dominated by an ineluctable drive toward state-building. In Reinhard's reading, the ascent of state institutions was not the

²⁷ D'Avenia, *Élite senza frontiere*.

²⁸ For an overview, see D'Amico, *Spanish Milan: A City*, pp. 1–4.

²⁹ Spagnoletti, *Dinastie italiane*, pp. 190–193.

³⁰ Osborne, *Dynasty and Diplomacy*; Campbell, *Power*, pp. 21–23.

³¹ Horowski, *Die Belagerung*, chap. 6.4.

³² Adams, *The Familial State*, p. 4.

³³ Reinhard, *Freunde*; idem, *Amici e creature*.

³⁴ See the synthesis in Reinhard, *Paul V. Borghese*.

³⁵ Emich, *Bürokratie und Nepotismus*, chap. V.3.

product of a grand plan but incidental to a process of network building between central and peripheral elites under the auspices of Rome's incarnation of the minister-favorite, the papal nephew.³⁶ The minister-favorites in the secular monarchies performed a similar function. In France, David Parrott and Guy Rowlands, overturning a stubborn consensus, have argued that the much-vaunted fiscal-military state of the seventeenth century was not the result of a plan well executed but the unintended by-product of strategies of social affirmation.³⁷ In this thesis I want to make a similar argument about Olivares's Union of Arms and show how his government, too, did not necessarily portend modernization.³⁸ Inasmuch as his flagship program fueled institutional growth, this development can primarily be pinned down to the entitlement of the nobility who built extensive clienteles spanning Spain's global empire which, however, failed to achieve much for the monarchy as a distinct entity.

Such a nobility-centered vision of the Spanish monarchy sits uneasily with the recrudescence of monarchical institutions, especially in the form of symbolic representations of power, after Olivares's fall. Much of the scholarship on this aspect of early modern governance builds on ideas first developed by Peter Burke in his now classic treatment of the symbolic representation of Louis XIV of France.³⁹ As recent research has shown, the Spanish monarchy under Charles II experienced a similar leap toward the symbolic exaltation of its monarch. As the real power of a decrepit monarch declined, the pictorial representations of royalty became more intense. Much of this did not originate in the imperial center; it had its roots in the empire's Italian provinces and reached Madrid only gradually when painters from Italy were called to Castile to adorn various *alcázares*.⁴⁰ Inspired by the commissioning activity of Italian elites, most notably papal families, the king's representatives in Italy were among the first to develop a preoccupation with proffering a symbolic share in the monarchy's splendor to its Italian subjects, an approach that later spilled over to Iberia where the symbolic exaltation of the frail Charles II was inversely proportional to his waning authority.⁴¹

The exact function of this dog and pony show remains a moot point. Some scholars have seen this primarily as a ploy to extend the powers of the monarchy down to the lower orders of an extremely volatile social formation.⁴² Others have seen the symbolic manipulation as a way of manufacturing consent among a restive nobility.⁴³ What unites both perspectives is the idea that this was an initiative that was administered from the top and grafted upon an impressionable public. A

³⁶ For a concise summary, see Reinhard, *Storia dello stato*. Also see the contributions to Asch and Freist (eds.), *Staatsbildung als kultureller Prozess*.

³⁷ Parrot, *Richelieu's Army*, and Rowlands, *The Dynastic State*.

³⁸ This is the central argument in Elliott, *The Count-Duke*.

³⁹ Burke, *The Fabrication*.

⁴⁰ Wellen, *Bilder*.

⁴¹ Carrió-Invernizzi, *El gobierno*.

⁴² Fernández-Santos, *The Politics*.

⁴³ Minguito Palomares, *Oñate*; Guarino, *Representing the King's Splendour*.

more productive approach informs Barbara Stollberg-Rilinger's work on the Holy Roman Empire. Unlike most historians working on the Spanish monarchy, Stollberg-Rilinger suggests that the investment in symbolism was a joint venture of the nobility and the monarch who reinforced their hold on power in this way. She argues that the need for the symbolic construction of authority flowed directly from the fact that the Empire was not primarily a state but a network of elite actors who adduced these contraptions to render the invisible ties between them visible.⁴⁴ To be efficacious as a regulatory figure overseeing the fierce competition between rivaling families, the might of the emperor needed to be reenacted and brought forth, time and time again, through pomp and circumstance.⁴⁵

What is particularly useful about her work is Stollberg-Rilinger's recent suggestion that this process was conditioned by external forces. The emperor and his nobility, she contends, built what she calls the "baroque state" because the elaborate "frontstage" created by monarchical institutions and symbolic displays of power helped conceal the backroom deals of a politics that was still predominantly "dynastic action."⁴⁶ Stollberg-Rilinger's inferences dovetail with Peter Campbell's earlier characterization of eighteenth-century France as a "baroque monarchy." As he saw it, the "grandiose schemes" and the "flamboyant display" of royal splendor acted as a "trompe l'oeil" that distracted from the fact that the early modern "state was a socio-political entity, whose structures were interwoven with society, which it tried to rise above but with which it inevitably had to compromise."⁴⁷ Taking this further, Stollberg-Rilinger suggests that the baroque state was an attempt to address the "fundamental tension between ideal order and factual disorder" that had emerged from the "extraordinary shocks" of the age, leaving the elite hankering after "clarity, stability, and security" from the seventeenth century forward.⁴⁸

It is this last argument that I intend to develop further in this thesis, in which I ascribe the rise of symbolic politics to the vagaries of dynasticism. It is, of course, fair to say that the symbolic politics that came to dominate in the late seventeenth century had been centuries in the making, with their origins rooted deeply in the rediscovery of humanistic magnificence in the Renaissance.⁴⁹ However, as I argue here, what lent such ideas new urgency was what historians used to refer to as the crisis of the seventeenth century, which in its Iberian incarnation coincided with the crisis of the Spanish monarchy. If scholars have long seen the reign of the *Austrias menores* as an age of decline, that downward trend was punctuated by the revolts that broke out in rapid succession in four constituent parts of the monarchy: if Catalonia and Portugal rose in 1640, the crown's most

⁴⁴ Krischer, *New Directions*.

⁴⁵ Stollberg-Rilinger, *The Emperor's Old Clothes*; eadem, *The Holy Roman Empire*.

⁴⁶ Stollberg-Rilinger, *The Baroque State*.

⁴⁷ Campbell, *Power and Politics*, p. 4.

⁴⁸ Stollberg-Rilinger, *The Baroque State*.

⁴⁹ See Orme, *The Education*.

important southern Italian possessions, Sicily and Naples, followed suit in 1647, pushing the once venerable empire to the brink of collapse and accelerating the decay of Habsburg power in Europe and overseas. While often widely divergent among themselves, the most authoritative interpretations of this turmoil all agree that it was caused by the nobility's entanglement with the government of the minister-favorite, and that the way out of it was paved by a readjustment of the nobility's relationship to the crown.

The two original explanations of the genesis of the revolts emerged out of debates on the general crisis of the seventeenth century.⁵⁰ The two polar opposites are represented by John H. Elliott and Rosario Villari. Elliott's classic argument posits that the crisis was woven into the nature of the composite monarchy.⁵¹ In his study of the Catalan revolt and his subsequent work on the count- duke of Olivares, Elliott contended that the uprising was the violent response of peripheral elites arrayed against the ambitious centralization agenda of the minister-favorite. Fearful of losing local privileges, the nobility rebelled, heralding a return to the jurisdictional fragmentation that scholars of the crown of Aragon referred to as *neoforalismo*. A different interpretation was offered by Rosario Villari. In his account of the events leading up to the insurrection in the kingdom of Naples, he made the case that the leaders of the revolt were not nobles, who had in fact benefited from the integration into the emerging fiscal-military state, but a coalition of a growing middle class of professionals and the laboring masses who sought to institute a constitutional monarchy (and, when that failed, a republic) to free themselves from the nobility's clasp.⁵² Thus, by focusing on the agency of single groups, these two veterans have attributed the uprising to two distinct sections of society to whom they have ascribed diametrically opposed motives and goals.

Subsequent interpretations have, to a varying extent, emphasized elements of both analyses, taking the centrality of favoritism from Elliott and combining it with Villari's emphasis on commoners as leaders of the opposition to the empowerment of the nobility in local society. Geoffrey Parker, while stressing the Little Ice Age as the root cause of the crisis of the seventeenth century, has argued that its devastating consequences were exacerbated by the jingoism of the nobility. The rapid decline of living standards brought about by endless wars and the need to finance them fostered opposition from village and town communities who were made to endure the consequences.⁵³ Francesco Benigno has even more explicitly linked the revolts to the "governo straordinario e di guerra" that the minister-favorites embodied, maintaining that the fiscal-military state created to

⁵⁰ The two foundational texts, representing the two polar opposites in the debate, are Hobsbawm, *The General Crisis*, and Trevor-Roper, *The General Crisis*.

⁵¹ For a succinct rendition of Elliott's thesis, see *El programa de Olivares*. The extended version is in his *The Revolt of the Catalans and The Count-Duke of Olivares*. A similar argument undergirds Thompson, *Aspectos*.

⁵² Villari's latest statement is his *Un sogno di libertà*.

⁵³ Parker, *Global Crisis*.

extract resources to fund these military endeavors reared social movements that stood up to the profiteers of the Olivares regime and battled with them over the future of the commonwealth.⁵⁴

What was the outcome of these battles? As early as 1975, Theodore Rabb suggested that the real contours of calamitous events became visible only once a crisis is settled, urging historians to focus not only on “periods of rising up,” but also on “periods of winding down.”⁵⁵ Without explicitly linking their work to Rabb, a number of scholars have turned their attention to the period of restoration following the insurrections, seeing them a catalyst for a major shake-up in the Spanish monarchy. To the extent that there is a common thread knitted through these interventions, they all defy the narrative of decline and stress the “resilience” of the Spanish monarchy in the face of formidable odds.⁵⁶ New studies of Spain’s governing elite after the departure of the count-duke of Olivares yield the sense that the monarchy in the latter half of the reign of Philip IV entered a period of transition during which the minister-favorite was sidelined and ultimately replaced by a collective of nobles who captured monarchical institutions.⁵⁷ These tendencies were exacerbated after Philip’s passing when the monarchy descended into a precarious regency in the name of the underage and frail Charles II during which the high nobility steadily increased their power.⁵⁸ The nature of power changed, too. In fact, the tendency toward oligarchization was bedded on a ubiquitous concern with rendering the monarchy more responsive to instances from below, involving the masses in the symbolically charged performances of royal grandeur that came to dominate in the latter half of the seventeenth century.⁵⁹ While the monarchy did not exactly become popular in the final decades of the century, it certainly was a more populist entity than it had been before, with its elite careful to offer ordinary subjects a share in the royal splendor that was projected across Spain’s global empire. Heeding Rabb’s advice, my goal is explicitly to link the historiographies on the origins of the crisis and its denouement. As I do so, I contend that the sudden thirst for symbolic representations of monarchical power came from the unsettling events that earlier incarnations of the monarchy as an elite free-for-all had unleashed. For a nobility under pressure, I submit, the symbolic politics of the baroque monarchy offered a way out of the cul-de-sac into which their cruder affirmations of preeminence had gotten them.

Such an endeavor is intimately tied up with a related historiographical debate: that on the Spanish nobility’s involvement in government. Historians used to contend that that social group had entered a terminal economic crisis by the middle of the seventeenth century, which drove many of them to embark on a campaign of vicious “señorial reaction” against their tenants and a quixotic

⁵⁴ Benigno, *Il fato*. Also see Benigno, *Specchi della rivoluzione*; idem, *Favoriti e ribelli*.

⁵⁵ Rabb, *The Struggle*, p. 147.

⁵⁶ Storrs, *The Resilience*. For an early iteration, see Kamen, *Spain in the Later Seventeenth Century*.

⁵⁷ Malcolm, *Royal Favouritism*.

⁵⁸ Álvarez-Ossorio, *El favor real*.

⁵⁹ Hermant, *Guerres de plumes*; Carrió-Invernizzi, *El gobierno*.

battle against up-and-coming parvenus sapping their erstwhile power from them.⁶⁰ That view, inspired by discussions of the crisis of the nobility elsewhere, was challenged almost immediately by others, most notably José Antonio Maravall who maintained that late seventeenth-century Castile witnessed a renaissance of feudal power as the nobility put itself on a firmer footing after the cataclysm of the 1640s.⁶¹ Maravall's "refeudalization" thesis is too simplistic, though in light of recent writing on the tendency toward oligarchization under Charles II his hunch of a resurgence of noble power certainly has more to commend it than the old narrative of decline. Rather than the big picture, it is the details that appear less convincing now. As recent research has revealed, the reconstructed aristocracy of the latter half of the seventeenth century simply did not have enough in common with the warrior elite of old to warrant Maravall's moniker of choice, "refeudalization."⁶² Rather than yearning to return to an imagined feudal past, as Maravall suggested, the new nobility favored what I. A. A. Thompson aptly called a "monarcho-señorial regime."⁶³ Having stared into the abyss, the nobility did not seek to reclaim lost power but underwent a process of reinvention that is usually referred to as the "courtization" of the warrior nobility. Mirroring developments in France, the feudal barons preened themselves as princely servants.

What is less clear, both in France and in Spain, is how these changes came about. Scholars writing in the tradition of Norbert Elias's *Court Society* of 1969 used to assume that the "domestication" of the nobility was foisted upon that group by farsighted monarchs who ushered in their inexorable decline by trapping them in the "gilded cage" of the princely court.⁶⁴ In the last three decades or so, historians have stressed the nobility's own agency in that transformation, pointing to a profound shift in attitudes toward the crown.⁶⁵ Jeroen Duindam and Ronald Asch have argued that nobles refined their manners and resorted to distinction rather than warfare to assert their privileged status in society because there were strong incentives to do so.⁶⁶ Repudiating the old crisis narrative, the new consensus posits that the second order consolidated its power thanks to its reinvention as a state nobility in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.⁶⁷ Far from opposing it, the high nobility had a vital interest in the growth of state institutions centered on the court because they broadened the array of public resources available to them.⁶⁸ King and nobility were not

⁶⁰ For a succinct discussion of the merits of this thesis, see Thompson, *The Nobility*, pp. 210–224.

⁶¹ Maravall, *La cultura*.

⁶² See Jago, *The "Crisis."*

⁶³ Thompson, *The Nobility*, p. 204.

⁶⁴ Elias, *The Court Society*; for an example, see Schalk, *The Court*.

⁶⁵ Bonahan, *Crown, and Rowlands*, *The Dynastic State*, pp. 7–9.

⁶⁶ Asch, *Nobilities in Transition*, and Asch and Birke (eds.), *Princes*.

⁶⁷ See the Introduction to Scott (ed.), *The European Nobilities*.

⁶⁸ Duindam, *Myths*, pp. 43–44, 79.

antagonists, the argument goes, but constituted an “oligopoly” that met in the court so as to better secure “a bigger piece of the pie.”⁶⁹

If the incentives of the court account for much, I want to suggest that historians have perhaps made too much of them as an explanation for the nobility’s reinvention as a courtier elite. In their thought-provoking work on the French monarchy, William Beik and David Parker have suggested that the nobility did not opt for its courtization out of its own free will but was shoved down that road as it sought to avoid the much worse repercussions that challenges from below might inflict on its reproduction as an elite. The rise of the absolute monarchy of Louis XIV that resulted from this was, in their reading, a direct consequence of the crisis of French society in the early half of the seventeenth century.⁷⁰ The limitations of Beik and Parker’s work have been discussed at length, not least their assumption that the monarch and the nobility were battling over access to the surplus value of the peasantry’s labor and that that struggle was an end in itself rather than a stepping stone to the *gloire* that awaited those who had sufficient means to invest in its external signifiers.⁷¹ Yet, schematic though it may be, the idea that nobles’ transformation was conditioned by their subjects is one worth exploring, especially in the context of the Spanish monarchy where such an effort has never been made.

One important starting point for such an endeavor is recent work on “empowering interactions” between subaltern actors and the emerging bureaucratic institutions, which has accorded ordinary people a role in shaping what would eventually become the modern state.⁷² What this scholarship has not allowed for was that these institutions were infiltrated, if not captured, by elites who would have been the primary focus of that change. As Wolfgang Reinhard has helpfully suggested, if we accept that early modern institutions were emanations of noble interests in the context of a familial state, we need to focus on the nobility itself before we can reach any meaningful conclusions about institutions.⁷³ This is what I intend to do here, though not without building on some promising earlier studies. Caroline Castiglione’s work on the Papal States, for instance, has addressed how ordinary people, through their intervention, changed not only the institutions of the state but those whose bidding they did—the nobility.⁷⁴ My intention is to take the dialogue between ordinary people and nobles seriously, and to interrogate what impact it had on the nobility’s relationship to the crown. What arguments did commoners mobilize against the nobility’s use of state resources—and what counterarguments did the nobility develop in the process? Like Luis Corteguera in his work on Barcelona artisans, I posit that ordinary people and elites inhabited a

⁶⁹ Duindam, *Myths*, pp. 79, 95.

⁷⁰ Beik, *Absolutism and Society*; Parker, *Class and State*.

⁷¹ For a balanced critique, see Rowlands, *The Dynastic State*, pp. 4–5.

⁷² Blockmans et al. (eds.), *Empowering Interactions*.

⁷³ On this point, see Reinhard, *Zusammenfassung*, pp. 429–430, and Rowlands, *The Dynastic State*, p. 9.

⁷⁴ Castiglione, *Patrons and Adversaries*.

shared mental world that allowed them to draw on similar intellectual traditions, most notably a notion of the collective good, to make their case, although they often drew radically divergent inferences from it.⁷⁵ My goal is to show that ordinary people, long written out of the history of the nobility, challenged and queried ruling-class ideas, working upon the premises on which that group's predominance rested and thereby contributing to the transformation of a nobility that saw itself compelled to adopt the pose of princely servants committed to the collective good following the breakdown of favoritism.

To make that case, I study the genesis of the crisis as well as its settlement. The extended chronological framework has proven fruitful for the study of the nobility of Spanish Italy, as evidenced by Giuseppe Mrozek's recent monograph on the archbishop of Naples, Ascanio Filomarino, which deliberately straddles the revolt of 1647–48 and adopts a *longue durée* perspective that chooses the settlement rather than the crisis itself as the focal point of the narrative.⁷⁶ Such an approach seems even more apt to a study of the crisis in Milan. Historians have always treated Spain's northern Italian possession as something of an "enigma" because even though Lombardy was hardest hit by the direct impact of the war, it failed to rebel.⁷⁷ However, as this thesis will show, this absence of an insurrection should not distract from the fact that Milan was crisscrossed by the same tensions as other entities of the Spanish monarchy.⁷⁸ Far from being a drawback, the absence of open conflict with all the confusion that usually entailed makes Milan heuristically attractive for a study that aims to chart the fault lines within seventeenth-century society and link them to the new monarchy that emerged as the crisis wound down. As Ruth MacKay's work on Castile, another non-rebellious part of the *monarquía*, has taught us, the apparent tranquility of its politics made the changes wrought by ordinary subjects on the makeup of monarchical institutions stand out in especially stark relief.⁷⁹ Precisely because Milan was less affected by the chaos that held sway elsewhere, the progression and the outcome of the crisis as I frame it become particularly visible there. The relatively peaceful transition in Milan makes plain that the establishment of a monarchy symbolically devoted to the pursuit of the collective interest was a direct riposte to the protest that earlier and cruder forms of usurpation of monarchical institutions had elicited.

⁷⁵ Corteguera, *For the Common Good*. For earlier uses of the "common good" as a rhetorical weapon, see Blickle, *From the Communal Reformation*.

⁷⁶ Mrozek, *Ascanio Filomarino*.

⁷⁷ Parker, *Global Crisis*, p. 434.

⁷⁸ This has recently been highlighted by historians such as Bueno, *Esercito*.

⁷⁹ MacKay, *The Limits*.

Theoretically, my approach is informed by the anthropology of James Scott and the sociology of Pierre Bourdieu. While historians have used some of Bourdieu's theoretical tools to flesh out aspects of early modern society, they have often severed them from the broader framework in which Bourdieu first developed them.⁸⁰ The fundamentals of his thought have on the whole been ignored by more eclectically-minded researchers, and are therefore worth spelling out here. To understand societies, Bourdieu contends, we need to conceptualize them as hierarchically stratified systems regulated by structures and processes that reproduce extant inequalities.⁸¹ Eschewing the economic reductionism of most elite theories, Bourdieu fathoms influence as a variety of valued resources called capital, which includes educational credentials and social contacts, as well as financial means.⁸² These forms of capital can be traded against each other, the ultimate goal of such exchanges being to convert base capital into symbolic power, or prestige, which is recognized as such by peers and social inferiors.⁸³

To Bourdieu, this is not an exercise in futility, with symbolism a fanciful flight of the imagination that is disconnected from more tangible forms of power. As he sees it, power reproduces itself not primarily through coercion and the threat of physical violence but, rather, through processes that naturalize authority by transubstantiating it. Symbolism is constitutive of, and crucial to the maintenance of, social differences, serving as a tributary to the stability of elite rule by lending it an aura of inevitability.⁸⁴ It is this "misrecognition" that helps "symbolic violence" to work on the hearts and minds of subalterns who become privy to the perpetuation of social hierarchies whose legitimacy they only question in moments of crisis.⁸⁵ The powerless are imprisoned in a corset of received ideas and practices (known as *habitus*), which accounts for the slowness of social change but at the same time indicates where it could potentially materialize: in struggles over the symbolic value of specific resources, which is not fixed but subject to negotiation between in-groups and out-groups within specific networks (or fields, to use Bourdieu's preferred terminology). Although the playing field is never level, ordinary people can take on a transformative role in elite rule such as when they compel the in-crowd to refine the symbolic sublimation of power to win ongoing "classification struggles," most notably within a fissiparous elite itself.⁸⁶

If scholars of contemporary society have challenged Bourdieu's reading of social conflict as too individualistic, it does make sense for the societies of the early modern period that were in

⁸⁰ For an overview, see Füssel, *Die feinen Unterschiede*, pp. 37–38.

⁸¹ Swartz, *Metaprinciples*, p. 21.

⁸² Bourdieu, *The Forms of Capital*, pp. 241–258.

⁸³ Bourdieu, *Rethinking the State*, p. 8; Füssel, *Die feinen Unterschiede*. For an excellent use of Bourdieu's theory, see MacHardy, *War, and Loewenich*, *Amt und Prestige*.

⁸⁴ Swartz, *Symbolic Power, Politics, and Intellectuals*, p. 4; also see Stollberg-Rilinger, *Emperor's Old Clothes*, pp. 3–4.

⁸⁵ Swartz, *Metaprinciples*, p. 21; Bourdieu, *Rethinking*, pp. 8, 15.

⁸⁶ Swartz, *Metaprinciples*, p. 22; Swartz, *Culture and Power*, pp. 180-181, 185.

Rudolf Schlögl and Barbara Stollberg-Rilinger's view permeated by a "culture of presence."⁸⁷ In this instance, Bourdieu's approach helps to elucidate the ways in which dynasties operating on what Bourdieu calls the "family mode of reproduction" perpetuated their privileged positions in society and how this was resisted by their subjects in classification struggles.⁸⁸ His approach fits with the work of anthropologist James Scott who states that "[r]elations of domination are, at the same time, relations of resistance. Once established, domination does not persist of its own momentum," but rather forces rulers into "continuous efforts at reinforcement, maintenance, and adjustment," with much of that "maintenance work consist[ing] of the symbolization of domination" by relegating the less savory aspects of elite rule to a "hidden transcript."⁸⁹ As we will see over the course of this thesis, breaking that resistance with symbolic weapons was a crucial step toward the attainment of hegemony in the symbolic production of the social order and an ever more sophisticated naturalization of the status quo.⁹⁰ Toward the end of the trajectory described here, the Borromeo's clout was still undergirded by a rich array of capital in the Bourdieusian sense of the term, but the family was increasingly reliant on symbols to engender what Barbara Stollberg-Rilinger calls the "collective belief in the necessity, self-evident nature, and inviolability of an institutional order."⁹¹

As for sources, this thesis is based on the untapped correspondence of Federico IV Borromeo (1617–1673) which consists mainly of epistolary exchanges between the family cleric, his lay brothers in Milan, and their mother. Historians have highlighted that advancement in early modern society was often a "gioco di squadra" in which multiple genders played distinct yet complimentary roles.⁹² The letters, preserved today at the family archive on Isola Bella, offer a rare glimpse into the strategic thinking that went into the preservation of a noble family and the parts played by gendered actors as they mobilized their identities to advance the cause. To round off this picture, I have consulted additional correspondence of other family members, some of which is stored in Milan's Biblioteca Ambrosiana. Regrettably, very few sources written by women have survived, but it is my hope that the twin focus on masculinities and maternity as resources which I have adopted in lieu of a properly gendered perspective will make up for some of this omission.⁹³

If the family correspondence tells us much about the clan's internal dynamics, the full scope of their planning becomes appreciable only through institutional records. I have, therefore, consulted

⁸⁷ On the criticism of Bourdieu, see Swartz, *Culture and Power*, pp. 187–188; Schlögl, *Kommunikation*; Barbara Stollberg-Rilinger, *Emperor's Old Clothes*, pp. 269–273.

⁸⁸ On the "family mode of reproduction," see Bourdieu, *The State Nobility*, pp. 278–283.

⁸⁹ Scott, *Domination*, p. 45. For uses of Scott by early modernists, see Walter, *Public Transcript*.

⁹⁰ Bourdieu, *Rethinking*, p. 16.

⁹¹ Stollberg-Rilinger, *The Emperor's Old Clothes*, p. 5.

⁹² The phrase is Renata Ago's. See her *Giochi di squadra* and cognate essays in the bibliography.

⁹³ The key texts were Connell, *Masculinities*, Ago, *Giovani nobili* (on masculinity), Castiglione, *Accounting* (on maternity).

additional material in state and church archives, including the repositories of the ducal tribunals in Milan, the archives of the Spanish monarchy, and the Vatican Secret Archives. Counterintuitively perhaps, the latter warrant particular attention with regard to the Borromeo's Spanish connection. While the Borromeo's ties to Rome have usually been studied through the lens of the jurisdictional conflicts between the monarchy and the Church in Milan, I posit that the family's relations to Rome are cast in new light if they are understood in the context of the Borromeo's Spanish connection.⁹⁴ Thanks to the research of Hillard von Thiessen and Maria Antonietta Visceglia, the interconnectedness and complementarity of the papal and the Spanish courts is well known for the pontificates in the early decades of the seventeenth century.⁹⁵ The material sifted for this dissertation allows me to show that this evolution continued through the travails of the seventeenth century. As the juxtaposition of Roman sources with the family correspondence makes plain, the two courts remained fundamental to the social reproduction of Milanese families, even if the circumstances underwent profound changes as Madrid came to dominate Rome in the clan's priorities over the course of the seventeenth century.

As I am painfully aware, this set of sources offers a heavily filtered vista on the Borromeo family. While the family correspondence is frequently candid, the deliberate omissions are often equally palpable. I have tried to control the inherent bias of the main source by reading broadly in other archives. The fragments left behind by the Borromeo's opponents within the elite often cast a very different light on their complacent depictions of themselves. What has been much harder to capture are the illiterate commoners who I argue inflected the Borromeo's social reproduction in more ways than historians have previously acknowledged. Although the broad swath of subalterns is ever present in the sources as resisters, they very rarely spoke in their own voices—even when they ostensibly wrote petitions to their social betters, these were usually penned by a literate member of the community who asserted to be speaking in their name. Since eliding them seemed impossible, I have attempted to deal with this intractable problem by reading against the grain and contextualizing the words and actions that the literate few attributed to the illiterate many in the broader literature on social relations.⁹⁶ If this does not bring the Borromeo's vassals to life as full-fledged individuals, I do hope to have done their ideas—and their role in the historical process—justice.

⁹⁴ For an overview of the current historiography, see Borromeo, *The Crown*. For a recent study studying a family from Spanish Italy and its ties to Rome, see Mrozek, *Filomarino*.

⁹⁵ Von Thiessen, *Diplomatie und Patronage*; Visceglia, *Roma papale e Spagna*.

⁹⁶ The work of Andy Wood, Alexandra Shepard, and John Walter has been central.

In terms of historiography, the thesis treads uncharted territory. If cardinal-archbishop Federico Sr. has recently elicited some interest among scholars, the history of successive generations is still shrouded in almost complete mystery.⁹⁷ While Cinzia Cremonini has written an extremely detailed essay on the main branch of the family in the early half of the seventeenth century, Sergio Monferrini has published some material on the cadet branch of Angera.⁹⁸ Individual representatives of the generation studied here have only had cameos in publications on other topics. The eldest of the brothers, Giovanni, is mentioned in passing in a few publications on the military history of seventeenth-century Milan.⁹⁹ His younger brother, Federico, has not fared much better. Barring a few hints in publications on papal-Spanish diplomacy, there only exists a monograph on his ten-year stint as nuncio to the Swiss Confederacy from 1645, with all the methodological limitations that that publication date suggests.¹⁰⁰ The only aspect of the family history that has attracted some attention in the last two decades or so is the patronage of the arts of two of the brothers studied here.¹⁰¹ As Arne Karsten reminded us some time ago, art commissioned by early modern nobles needs to be understood as a “gezielt eingesetztes Instrument zur Legitimation, Fundamentierung, Intensivierung und Dynamisierung von Macht und Status.”¹⁰² It is as a part of the symbolic dimension of power that I want to study the Borromeo’s artistic commissions in this thesis. My aim is to provide the backstory of the Borromeo’s Spanish connection that often found its most eloquent expression in the art they commissioned and which I have repeatedly used as a source to corroborate what is often only hinted at in the written record: the twists and turns in the Borromeo’s deepening ties to the house of Habsburg.

Reflecting these aims, the thesis consists of three parts. Part I explores how the Borromeo became clients of successive minister-favorites in the early decades of the seventeenth century in a bid to accede to the inner circle of an emerging pan-Hispanic high nobility. Particular attention is paid to the question of how a family once associated with Counterreformation orthodoxy negotiated the siphoning off of collective resources that the new elite networks of the *valido* in Madrid propagated. As we will see, the Borromeo’s own justification of their participation in the bonanza contributed to a growing chasm between their lofty rhetoric and an unsavory reality, supplying robust arguments that their opponents could later seize on to browbeat them into submission. For if the Borromeo initially succeeded in fashioning themselves as purveyors of the collective good while pursuing narrow

⁹⁷ Jones, Federico Borromeo, and Zunckel, Handlungsspielräume.

⁹⁸ Cremonini, Storia d’un eclissi apparente; Monferrini and Galli, I Borromeo d’Angera.

⁹⁹ See Maffi, Il baluardo, pp. 293–304

¹⁰⁰ De Gennaro, La crisi; Giovannini, Federico Borromeo.

¹⁰¹ Zuffi, La pittura; Galli, Federico IV Borromeo; Spiriti, Identità.

¹⁰² Karsten, Künstler und Kardinäle, p. 124.

dynastic ambitions, the inherent contradiction would make their trajectory unsustainable in the long run.

The Borromeo's rapprochement with the crown had been a cause for concern among their subjects from early on. What eventually sparked mass protests against their social upward mobility was their reinvention as a military dynasty under the aegis of the count-duke of Olivares. As Part II will reveal, the crown's Union of Arms policy promised swift access to the in-crowd in Madrid but came at the cost of war and destruction which the Borromeo willy-nilly inflicted on their subjects. Rather than go along with the Borromeo's self-fashioning as mercurial *olivaristas*, village communities across Lombardy began to challenge their self-image as protectors of the defenseless by forcing the family to measure up to their own professed ideals. Benefiting from the turmoil elsewhere in the monarchy, they succeeded in shifting existing classifications of princely service in their favor as the Borromeo's rivals within the elite keen on ousting them annexed the criticism first voiced by villagers living under the Borromeo's iron fist.

Struck down by their own subjects when they were about to clinch the fruit that successive minister-favorites had been dangling before them, the Borromeo spent the better part of the 1660s and 1670s regrouping, trying to live up to the common good ideology that the popular movements had foisted on Spain's governing elite. Part III will flesh out some of the strategies adopted by the family in a bid to turn a world turned upside down back on its feet. Using moral panics and symbolic politics, the Borromeo gave ordinary people a role as spectators in the new regime of Juan José of Austria. Fashioning themselves as purveyors of good governance, they sought to restore the stability that the elite themselves, through their covetousness, had imperiled. Grounded on symbolism as it was, the authority the Borromeo now commanded was a more credible incarnation of the common good ideology than what had gone before, allowing them to become princely servants as they left behind the deepest crisis of the monarchy.

That crisis, then, is the story of how the nobility created the conditions for widespread discontent in the first half of the seventeenth century and then spent much of the latter half of the century to wrest back the authority it had lost to the popular movements. If, as a generation of scholars has shown, dynasticism is the right lens through which to examine early modern elites, we ought not to overlook the agitation that this way of conceiving society sparked among the vast majority of the working population who were made to shoulder the financial burden of the nobility. The growing dissonance between the public and the hidden transcript of elite dominion in the early decades of the *Seicento*, the careening between dynastic logic and common good arguments, empowered ordinary subjects to request conformity to their own proclaimed ideals, thereby throwing their social betters into a deep crisis that left them pining for stability throughout the

central decade of the century. The transformation of the Spanish monarchy and its nobility by the 1670s was one of the unintended outcomes of this hankering. The pomp and pageantry of the baroque monarchy was a reluctant response to widespread dissent to the open self-enrichment that had preceded it.

Part I

Prodromes

Chapter 1

The Unraveling of an Ecclesiastical Dynasty: The Borromeo, Religious Capital, and the Rise of Favoritism

The surprise came toward the end. In the summer of 1610, the Milanese were out and about celebrating the recent canonization of Carlo Borromeo (1538–1584), archbishop extraordinaire and scion of one of the city’s leading families. Leading the cortege of ecclesiastical and secular dignitaries that was snaking its way toward the city’s massive gothic cathedral, the *Duomo*, was Carlo’s successor and cousin, Federico (1564–1632). Few among the public milling about that day were prepared for what transpired as the procession reached its destination. Shortly before they paraded onto the square in front of the *Duomo*, the high and mighty passed under a triumphal arch adorned with depictions of Carlo as the protector of king Philip III (r. 1598–1621), duke of Milan and lord of the Spanish empire. Adding to the astonishment, the Borromeo coat of arms had been altered overnight: the usual crest was now surmounted by a crown. Lest contemporaries mistake these insignia for the family’s old claim to sovereign status, the inscription informed a surprised public that the crown betokened the Borromeo’s new understanding of themselves as *Regni decora alta potentis*—the high splendor of powerful royalty. As a Jesuit pamphleteer later explained the ephemeral arch’s message, St. Charles was the “singolarissimo fregio e protettore del re cattolico, di cui in terra fu vassallo.”¹⁰³

Historians may be as astonished as the Borromeo’s contemporaries to learn about the family saint’s reinvention as the jewel in the crown of the Spanish Habsburgs. Today, as then, the Borromeo are best known for the two protagonists of the parade, Carlo, and his cousin, Federico. The familiar tale recounts that, in the late sixteenth century, the Borromeo metamorphosed into an ecclesiastical dynasty, a family that was able to weaponize the legacy of Tridentine reform in the quest for distinction in local society. By securing the exceedingly rare honor of a family saint, we are told, Carlo’s descendants hoped to humble the self-described Catholic king into a more lenient treatment of the pert Borromeo who went on to capitalize on that self-image for centuries to come. The problem with this oft-old story is that it has turned the exception into the rule: it obscures the fact that the reign of the two cardinal-archbishops, still known as the “age of the Borromeo” in Milanese history, was an intermezzo, an exceptional period bracketed by the family’s deep involvement in the worldly affairs of their state.

This chapter explores the rise and fall of the Borromeo as an ecclesiastical dynasty. Contrary to a widespread consensus, the religious turn in the family history was not a given, but rather a clever response to a particular juncture in Milan’s history: the onset of Spain’s rule in Italy. Having

¹⁰³ Angelo de Grossi S.J., *Relazione della festa fatta in Milano per la canonizzazione di san Carlo card. di S. Prassede et arcivescovo di detta città (Milan 1610)*, quoted in Turchini, *La fabbrica*, p. 12.

risen from the ranks of merchant-bankers in the late Middle Ages, the Borromeo had sought to establish themselves as a sovereign dynasty ruling over a small territory centered on Lake Maggiore northwest of Milan. These dreams, however, were crushed when the vagaries of dynastic reproduction turned the king of Spain into the lord of Milan and forced the Borromeo to adopt religion as a marker of distinction lest they be rendered nugatory by the *monarquía*. Successful as it was in its time, by the dawn of the seventeenth century, this strategy had run its course. Momentous changes in the Spanish monarchy itself made it clear to the Borromeo that only the integration into the mushrooming Spanish elite networks would allow them to entrench their preeminence. As the celebrations on the occasion of Carlo's canonization showed, the Borromeo needed to convert their rebellious legacy into an asset of Spanish power in Italy. Although the Catholic Church remained crucial to the family's overall strategy, its ecclesiastical capital would henceforth be integrated into a broader framework of loyalty to the king of Spain.

This chapter introduces a number of key concepts for the study of the Borromeo family. If, as a generation of scholars have shown, elite networks held sway in early modern society, it is imperative to focus on the strategies nobles deployed to maintain their position in the social order.¹⁰⁴ In a world marred by internecine jockeying, dynasties needed to affirm their status in order to safeguard their hegemony not so much vis-à-vis social inferiors as among their peers.¹⁰⁵ Even though contemporaries were deeply invested in the notion of living in an unequal society, hierarchies within the nobility were very much in flux, making it incumbent upon families constantly to reposition themselves, a fact that turned the early modern Italian peninsula into a sandbox for elaborate strategies of status affirmation.¹⁰⁶ Fame hinged on the successful mobilization of base capital, or valued resources, in an unrelenting struggle for influence.¹⁰⁷ As Thorstein Veblen averred, "In order to gain and to hold the esteem of men it is not sufficient to merely possess wealth or power. The wealth or power must be put in evidence, for esteem is awarded only on evidence."¹⁰⁸ The trick was to misrecognize power: to transubstantiate it into, and enshrine it as, symbolic predominance.¹⁰⁹ As we will see throughout this dissertation, this was of particular concern to early modern elites whose success as rulers was defined to a large extent by the ability to convince others of their performance of preeminence.¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁴ Reinhard (ed.), *Papal Power*; Rowlands, *The Dynastic State*.

¹⁰⁵ Daloz, *Elite (Un)Conspicuousness*, p. 214.

¹⁰⁶ Swartz, *Culture and Power*, p. 180.

¹⁰⁷ Daloz, *Elite (Un)Conspicuousness*, p. 213; Füssel, *Die feinen Unterschiede*, pp. 32–33.

¹⁰⁸ Veblen, *Theory*, p. 24.

¹⁰⁹ Swartz, *Symbolic Power*, p. 4.

¹¹⁰ Osborne, *Language and Sovereignty*.

In the age of the Catholic Counterreformation religion in general and sainthood in particular was arguably a particularly prized resource in the quest for distinction.¹¹¹ Not only did religion have the social function of legitimizing inequalities by offering ordinary people a cogent explanation for the status quo; it also helped elites stand out from their peers by dint of the aplomb that religious virtuousness conferred upon its holders.¹¹² In the self-styled Catholic monarchy, religious capital was of particular use to relatively low-ranking families like the Borromeo who tried to compete with higher-ranking dynasties. Still, like other forms of capital, its uses were circumscribed by context. As this chapter reveals, religious virtuousness was a weapon that was being blunted by the king of Spain's efforts to tighten his network across the Italian peninsula through the rising star in the court of Madrid, the minister-favorite. Thus, if the canonization of Carlo Borromeo had initially been a project to withstand Spanish hegemony, the altered balance of power between the king of Spain and peripheral elites made it necessary, in the early seventeenth century, for the Borromeo to turn their religious capital into an asset to the Spanish crown. The re-styling of the family's most valued resource, St. Charles, as a faithful "vassal" of the Catholic king in 1610 foreshadowed the dynasty's transformation into loyal servants of the Spanish king and their posing as pillars of Spanish power in Italy that would texture the clan's history in the seventeenth century.

While these long-term developments are of significance, I argue that the immediate cause of this volte-face was a shift in the Church's attitude to the Spanish monarchy. If Rome's support of the Borromeo's project to rival the Spanish king in Milan had always been lackluster, things took a turn for the worse under Clement VIII Aldobrandini (pope, 1592–1605) and Paul V Borghese (1605–1621). Although these two pontiffs went along with Federico Borromeo's plans to canonize his cousin, allowing him to forge ahead to full-fledged sainthood with extraordinary speed, the price the archbishop paid in return for this preferment was substantial. To safeguard his family's relations with the king of Spain, Paul V in particular was careful to prevent the Borromeo from using the family saint as a bargaining chip in their dealings with the Spanish monarchy. To accomplish this, the Borghese pontiff and his entourage scurried to foist a revised interpretation of the saint's life upon the family. Precluding as this did the uses that the Borromeo had been planning to make of St. Charles, the clan was forced to opt for the unthinkable: rapprochement with the house of Habsburg. Thus, while that of the pugnacious ecclesiastical dynasty is the right lens through which to read the family's history in the late sixteenth century, it becomes an increasingly inadequate category of analysis as we move into the seventeenth century when the Borromeo as an ecclesiastical dynasty unraveled, and began to pose as Habsburg surrogates.

¹¹¹ Cabibbo and Modica, *La santa dei Tomasi*.

¹¹² Rey, Bourdieu, p. 77.

If the Borromeo went down in history as an ecclesiastical dynasty, the family's beginnings were much more worldly. Although they later liked to trace their origins to Troy and ancient Rome, the first reliable information on the Borromeo dates back to the late Middle Ages when they were active as merchants and bankers in San Miniato, a town a few miles outside Florence. The family's destiny changed forever when the infighting and civil strife among Tuscan merchant families forced them to leave central Italy and settle in Milan in the 1370s.¹¹³ The duchy in northern Italy, straddling the area between the Alps and the fertile Po Valley, was then ruled by the Visconti family. Famed for their opulent lifestyle, the dukes of Milan were forever short of cash. This was the Borromeo's golden opportunity. As wealthy financiers who controlled a trading empire spanning from Flanders and London all the way to the Mediterranean Sea, they worked their way up to become money-lenders in chief for the cash-strapped ruling dynasty, serving as treasurers of duke Filippo Maria Visconti (r. 1412–1447) from 1418 through 1430.¹¹⁴ In acknowledgment of their vital role, the Visconti showered the family lavishly with land around Lake Maggiore in the 1430s and early 1440s, enabling them to lay the foundations of an agglomerate of fiefs.¹¹⁵ By mid-century, the Borromeo were making decisive steps forward. Although they did not belong to the original feudal nobility of the State, they were morphing into that second-tier nobility which derived its power from investitures and landed titles they had acquired thanks to wealth generated in long-distance commerce and through speculation on financial markets.¹¹⁶

The transition of power from the Visconti to the Sforza in the middle decades of the fifteenth century was serendipitous for the Borromeo. As other leading families of the old and new nobility scrambled to establish a republic governed by an oligarchy of merchants modeled on the example of Venice and Genoa—the so-called Ambrosian Republic—in the wake of the death of the last Visconti in 1447, the Borromeo kept themselves to the sidelines. Their neutrality was duly rewarded by the family who managed to impose themselves as the new dukes of Milan in 1450: the Sforza. Having to defend their position against domestic and foreign enemies, the Sforza were even more dependent on the Borromeo's credits than the Visconti. In return, the Borromeo, still insecure in their social status, demanded that some of the fiefs that the Sforza had requisitioned from rivaling clans be allocated to them.¹¹⁷ By the 1460s, the Borromeo held an almost contiguous fiefdom centered around Lake Maggiore and stretching up to the border with the Swiss Confederacy. Endowed with expansive jurisdictional privileges, including the right to control the major trade flows between the Mediterranean and central Europe that were shipped through the area, the collection of fiefs had so

¹¹³ Annoni, *Lo Stato*, p. 30.

¹¹⁴ Annoni, *Lo Stato*, p. 31.

¹¹⁵ Annoni, *Lo Stato*, pp. 31–32.

¹¹⁶ Cremonini, *Le vie*, p. 19.

¹¹⁷ Annoni, *Lo Stato*, pp. 33–35

many trappings of a Renaissance state that contemporaries came to refer to it as the *Stato Borromeo*.¹¹⁸

What the Borromeo attempted to do in the fifteenth century was to invest their economic capital to achieve distinction within an emerging power elite. Thanks to the right investments it had taken them less than four decades to acquire an impressive fiefdom.¹¹⁹ The Borromeo's was by all accounts a staggering tale of social upward mobility. Yet all was not well. Impressive though it was, the *Stato Borromeo* had clearly been bought with money rather than acquired through military service, a major flaw in the eyes of contemporaries.¹²⁰ Rather than through heroic deeds on the battlefield, the Borromeo had been buoyed to the top as loan sharks, lending money to the ruling dynasties out of narrow self-interest and greed. As they entered the sixteenth century, the family carried the whiff of usury that stood in the way of the ascent to the highest heights of local society. To maintain their social position, they needed to convert their economic capital into assets that were more attuned with the conditions of social reproduction of the age.¹²¹ The acquisition of fiefs had marked an important first step toward that goal. But for them to leave behind their unsavory past and shed the skin of social parvenus, the Borromeo needed to attain that elusive marker of distinction in the Italian Renaissance: sovereignty, which was not an abstract political principle so much as a social status that was indicative of someone's appreciation by their peers.¹²² If they were seen as ruling over a small but sovereign territory, the Borromeo could hope to stand out within an emerging society of Renaissance princes.

Unbeknownst to many, the Borromeo came within a whisker of realizing that goal in the early decades of the sixteenth century. As the Sforza dynasty caved under the combined pressures of repeated foreign invasions and imminent extinction of the male line, the Borromeo finally acted on their instincts. After more than a century of loyal service to successive dukes of Milan, the Borromeo seized their gravest crisis to elevate themselves to the rank of sovereign rulers. Perhaps emulating another ennobled merchant family from Tuscany, the Medici of Florence, the Borromeo enlisted the support of the Swiss cantons to carve their own statelet out of the territories of the dukes of Milan.¹²³ The head of the dynasty, Ludovico, went to work to ramp up the thirteenth-century fortress of Cannero on an island in Lake Maggiore, transforming the water castle into the *Rocca Vitaliana* that would be the defensive center of the future independent *Stato Borromeo*.¹²⁴ By 1520 the Borromeo were on the verge of stripping themselves of the blemished image as nouveaux riches and enter the

¹¹⁸ Annoni, *Lo Stato*, p. 27.

¹¹⁹ Annoni, *Lo Stato*, p. 39.

¹²⁰ Annoni, *Lo Stato*, pp. 29–30.

¹²¹ Bourdieu, *The State Nobility*, p. 277.

¹²² Krischer, *Souveränität*.

¹²³ Zunckel, *Das schwere Erbe*, p. 72.

¹²⁴ De Caro, *Borromeo, Ludovico*.

ranks of the restricted group of sovereigns who lorded over a contiguous territory they had conquered by force of arms.

Unfortunately for the Borromeo, that pipe dream was crushed by dramatic changes in the geopolitics of Italy. If the dynastic makeup of the peninsula had been unstable throughout the Renaissance, the first few decades of the sixteenth century saw the consolidation of the dynastic system that would hold out for much of the early modern period.¹²⁵ Even though some residual mini-states in the Po Valley would survive well into the seventeenth century, outside that restricted area, the widespread ambitions to sovereignty floundered on the rise of a new dynasty—the Habsburgs of Madrid—who swept away countless minor sovereigns and dashed the hopes of many more families harboring aspirations to elevate themselves to sovereign status.

This transition was particularly dramatic in Milan which, as a devolved imperial fief, fell into the hands of Charles V upon the passing of the last Sforza in 1535. No sooner had the emperor and king of Spain taken possession of Milan did he begin to consolidate the Habsburgs' hegemony over this territory. There were sound strategic reasons behind this move. In the rivalry between the Habsburgs and the Valois over Italy, Milan became a territory of utmost strategic importance. Internal documents referred to it as the “key to Italy,” meaning that whoever possessed the State was likely to rule over the rest of the peninsula.¹²⁶ Given this, the emperor launched a crackdown on the influential families in the State of Milan, including the Borromeo, who were rightly or wrongly accused of colluding with the king of France to overthrow the new rulers of Lombardy in their quixotic quest for an independent statelet on Milan's northwestern border. Blacklisted as a potential safety hazard, the Borromeo had to turn elsewhere if they did not want to end up completely under the thumb of the new duke of Milan. As the treaty of Cateau-Cambrésis consigned Lombardy to the king of Spain, Philip II, in April 1559, the Borromeo risked shrinking down to the status of a secondary elite family forever trapped under the weight of the Prudent King.¹²⁷

It was in these circumstances that the Borromeo positioned themselves as an “ecclesiastic dynasty” with firm links to the center of the Catholic world, Rome. The term “ecclesiastical dynasty” was coined by J.A. Bergin to describe members of the French nobility who employed the wealth they drew from benefices of the Church to condition the actions of the Most Christian monarchy.¹²⁸ Here, it is used to describe dynasties that weaponized high-profile ecclesiastical offices in an attempt to put themselves in the way of the rapidly expanding institutions of the Spanish monarchy. Beginning in the 1560s and well into the first decade of the seventeenth century, the Borromeo would leave their

¹²⁵ Spagnoletti, *Le dinastie italiane*, pp. 13–28.

¹²⁶ Fernández Albaladejo, *De “Ilave de Italia”*.

¹²⁷ Almut Goldhahn used the term “blockierte Sekundärelite” to describe the Rezzonico family of Venice. See her *Von der Kunst*.

¹²⁸ Bergin, *The Decline*.

mark on Spanish Milan as representatives of the local church, fighting what they perceived as the illegitimate onslaught of the Spanish crown and the pruning of their position within local society with the help of a militant interpretation of Tridentine Catholicism.

Spearheading this radical transformation was Carlo Borromeo. Born in 1538, he had made the break of his career at the tender age of 22 when his maternal uncle, Giovanni Angelo de Medici, was elected pope Pius IV in December 1559 and called his nephew to Rome. Like other papal nephews before and after him, Carlo assisted the pontiff in the administration of the Papal States and the universal Church, whose contours he would reshape in fundamental ways as he reopened the Council of Trent. The Council had first been convened in 1545 as the papacy's delayed response to pleas for ecclesiastical reform that had crystallized in the Protestant reformation and the split of western Christianity. By the time it finally reconvened at Trent in 1561, the Council had been convoked and dissolved three times. It was Carlo who would oversee the concluding sessions of the assembly that lay the foundations of Counterreformation Catholicism.

One of the reasons for the repeated breakdown of the negotiations were two opposing visions of the Council's goals. Since the late Middle Ages councils had met on a regular basis to discuss urgent matters of ecclesiastical policy. Bringing together members of the clergy from most of Europe, it was generally understood that this body represented the universality of the Church and that its decisions were binding on the papacy even if individual pontiffs might not agree with them.¹²⁹ When the Council of Trent gathered, these conciliarist ideas were alive and well among the group of prelates who saw the assembly as an opportunity to rein in the worldly splendor of the papacy that had come in for so much criticism from Protestants and reform-minded Catholics. They faced off holy fathers who were disinclined to give up on the amenities of the curia and therefore tried to curtail the influence of those prelates they deemed overly zealous. Their goal was to reroute the Council in the direction of limited reform that would leave the court of Rome untouched. Massimo Firpo has rightly foregrounded the role of the infamous Inquisition in this: ostensibly set up to quell heretical movements afoot in many Italian cities in the first half of the sixteenth century, its principal function was to silence dissent within the Church hierarchy itself and to use the threat of legal proceedings to keep reform-minded prelates in check.¹³⁰ Equally as important as the threat of repression through the Inquisition, though, were the inducements offered to the conciliar fathers gathered at Trent. Putting them on offer was the reigning pontiff's young nephew, Carlo Borromeo, who not only marginalized oppositional voices through a mixture of persuasion and coercion but

¹²⁹ Proserpi, *Il Concilio*, pp. ix–xiii.

¹³⁰ Firpo, *La presa*.

cajoled the conciliar fathers who most strenuously defended Pius's positions and arguably won the day.¹³¹

The reforms that were passed at Trent were portentous and would shape the Roman Catholic Church for centuries.¹³² For our purposes it suffices to note the role that the conciliar fathers assigned to the bishops in the renewal of the Church. Where the renewers had wanted to break down the barriers between clergy and laity, the Council of Trent shored up the privileges of the first order.¹³³ In about the only concession the hardliners made to the reformers, they obliged bishops to take up residence in their dioceses. As if to compensate them for that inconvenience, the Tridentine fathers strengthened the bishops' hands by making them the central players in the mooted reform of the clergy and, by extension, the laity. Though clearly subordinate to a papacy that saw them as the executioners of its policies, the members of the episcopate gained in social standing in their respective dioceses; they acquired new powers to discipline their flock as they led the charge on the implementation of the Tridentine decrees across the Catholic world.

Inspired by the Council of Trent, Carlo Borromeo weaned himself off the comforts of the court of Rome, eager to start a new life as a Tridentine model bishop in the archdiocese of his native Milan. This at least was the authorized version, though it seems likely that the decision was spurred not so much by a true conversion as the desire to escape the fate that his uncle had visited upon the nephews of his predecessor, Paul IV Carafa (r. 1555–1559). (He had them tried for the embezzlement of papal nephews, including Carlo, routinely committed while their uncle was in office.¹³⁴) By adopting the posture of a reform-minded bishop, Borromeo was not just able to leave a hostile Roman environment, where he potentially risked imprisonment, but to sublimate his earlier incarnation as a venal papal nephew. Beginning in 1566, he embarked on a mission to reform the religious landscape of what was then the largest archdiocese in the Italian peninsula, extending across 753 parishes and comprising 560,000 souls.¹³⁵ His was a radical effort to clean up a society that, from the 1530s forward, had been rattled by a groundswell of calls for religious renewal.¹³⁶ Although Borromeo responded to some of the demands from below, his overhaul of the Milanese archdiocese was ultimately driven by the concern to contain the more radical groupings within the Catholic reform movement and to channel protests from below into the safer direction of Tridentine piety. To instill the new religious model in the faithful, Carlo Borromeo made deft use of awe-inspiring public processions for which he is now best remembered. In fact, and contrary to what his Protestant critics

¹³¹ Trisco, Carlo Borromeo, p. 51.

¹³² O'Malley, Trent.

¹³³ See Prosperi, *Il Concilio*, pp. 73–87, for a discussion of these issues.

¹³⁴ See Pattenden, Pius IV.

¹³⁵ The figures are from 1559, see D'Amico, *Spanish Milan*, p. 93.

¹³⁶ Baernstein, *A Convent Tale*, chaps. 1–2, offers a glimpse into the world of Catholic reform in Milan during the first half of the sixteenth century. See also Firpo, Juan de Valdés.

thought, his innovations envisaged much more than outward conformity: they were geared toward winning over hearts and minds through a conscious attempt to “penetrate the intimacy of the private sphere in the interest of what he considered the public good” through penance and the regular administration of the sacraments.¹³⁷

As behooved a nobleman of his time, Carlo placed religion at the service of restoring the hierarchies that reform-minded clerics had questioned earlier in the century. His program was explicitly designed to instill the notion that every person should accept their place in a divinely ordained, elite-led society.¹³⁸ By offering ordinary people an explanation for their suffering, religion acted as part of the symbolic arsenal of elites which helped lend new legitimacy to the existing political order.¹³⁹ He skillfully exploited the plague that rattled Milan in 1576–1577 to drive this point home. Defying the authorities who had prohibited the gathering of large crowds so as to prevent the spread of the disease, Carlo urged the faithful to line the streets of Milan to drive out the scourge.¹⁴⁰ In an appeal to the “peccatogenic outlook” of contemporaries: their tendency to attribute disasters to human misconduct, the epidemic was reinterpreted as a sign of divine providence which was, at once, punishment meted out to a community that had been insufficiently cohesive to withstand the rise of subversive elements in its midst and a catharsis for the faithful which reestablished the old order led by Carlo.¹⁴¹ The lesson was a stark one: as a religiously virtuous member of the nobility, Carlo served as proof of the vanity of the world and, in so doing, conveyed to subaltern members of society the inevitability of privileges and the futility of resistance.¹⁴² In the words of one of the experts who co-wrote the brief for his canonization, Carlo’s entire project was to build a Church that buttressed the “piena hierarchia di tutti i stati et gradi, che sono tra fedeli.”¹⁴³ To counter the egalitarian impulses that had buffeted the religious landscape in northern Italy, Carlo sought to convince his flock of the rightness of social hierarchies.

Regressive as it was, Carlo’s reform was not, as historians used to assume, a particularly impressive instance of social disciplining foisted upon unwitting people. In building his hold on the popular imagination, Carlo generally preferred persuasion to coercion. The secret of his efficacy lay in the symbolic rather than the physical violence he exerted. His nobility legitimized his leadership qualities, and his particularly virtuous comportment confirmed them.¹⁴⁴ What was most helpful to his cause, however, was the fact that the compliance he demanded was religious and therefore

¹³⁷ De Boer, *The Conquest*, p. 45.

¹³⁸ See Zardin, *La “perfettione.”*

¹³⁹ Rey, Bourdieu, pp. 77–78.

¹⁴⁰ Burzer, *San Carlo*, p. 88.

¹⁴¹ Zardin, *La “perfettione,”* pp. 117–118. On the “peccatogenic outlook,” see Parker, *Global Crisis*, pp. 9, 512.

¹⁴² Andretta, *La venerabile superbia*, p. 39.

¹⁴³ Zardin, *La “perfettione,”* p. 121.

¹⁴⁴ See Rey, Bourdieu, p. 91.

emanated from a higher fount. The appeal to a higher instance allowed him to impose his view of the world as so self-evident that few dared question it.¹⁴⁵ As Pierre Bourdieu puts it, “religion conserves the social order by contributing [...] to the ‘legitimation’ of the power of the ‘dominant’ and to the ‘domestication of the dominated.’”¹⁴⁶ More than other forms of authority, religion had the potential to turn authority into something un-arbitrary and natural. As such, it encouraged ordinary people to espouse the creeds that perpetuated their own subjection in a particularly stunning instance of what Bourdieu calls the “paradoxical submission” of the ruled.¹⁴⁷

The reliance on an emollient approach should not, however, distract from the oppressive core of Borromeo’s project. As Adriano Prosperi has argued, the ideology behind the archbishop’s radical plans bore more than a fleeting resemblance to the ideals that had inspired the establishment of the more infamous Inquisition and the attempt to contain the Catholic reform movement it stood for.¹⁴⁸ Deeply concerned about what he took to be the breakdown of social order, the notoriously ascetic archbishop embarked on a crusade to turn Milan into a haven of Christian decorum. In his vindictive fervor, he clamped down on all sorts of perceived vices; with the list of behaviors needing discipline ranging from the debauchery of secular holidays, most notably Milan’s infamous carnival, to parents letting their newborns sleep in the marital bed. In one famous instance, Carlo condemned eleven women suspected of witchcraft to burning at the stake.¹⁴⁹ Such was his repressive streak that even sympathetic colleagues like the archbishop of Bologna, Gabriele Paleotti, became alarmed and urged Carlo Borromeo to tone it down: “*Ella numquam parcit sibi, né cessa mai, et in questo modo non vi durerà,*” he wrote and went on to explain: “verso gli altri ella è troppo austera et rigorosa, et poco meschie la clementia et lenitade, il che odo da tutte le bande ...”¹⁵⁰

Undeterred by such calls for moderation, Borromeo bolstered his reputation as a scourge of heretics by enlisting the help of the bishops and priests all the way down to junior members of the secular clergy in order to commit broad swathes of the population to the Tridentine orthodoxy. His conviction was that only a thoroughly reformed clergy led by their bishop could impart the teachings of the Tridentine Church to the laity. Hence, “Borromeo sought to establish a hierarchical structure that corresponded to his interpretation of the Tridentine precepts on episcopal authority.”¹⁵¹ Religious capital, to use Pierre Bourdieu’s phrase, became a coveted resource in the hands of specialists who relied on other specialists below them to enforce a new hegemony.¹⁵² To facilitate

¹⁴⁵ Swartz, *Culture*, p. 89; Stollberg-Rilinger, *The Emperor’s Old Clothes*, p. 4.

¹⁴⁶ Quoted in Rey, Bourdieu, p. 79.

¹⁴⁷ Rey, Bourdieu, pp. 77–78.

¹⁴⁸ Prosperi, *Tribunali della coscienza*, p. 284.

¹⁴⁹ De Certeau, *Carlo Borromeo*.

¹⁵⁰ Quoted in Alberigo, *Carlo Borromeo*, p. 1036.

¹⁵¹ Tomaro, *San Carlo Borromeo*, p. 71.

¹⁵² Bourdieu, *Rethinking the State*, pp. 15–16.

this, Carlo regularly convoked his subordinates to assemblies known as synods and provincial councils in which problems on the ground were discussed and policies to address them formalized. The outcome of these debates was passed on to the laity through education, which fastened particularly on the youngest and the most impressionable.¹⁵³ As time wore on, Borromeo succeeded in building a streamlined chain of command through which he extended his control to the most distant corners of his extensive archdiocese, overcoming significant opposition from entrenched interests within the Milanese church in the process.¹⁵⁴ As he told his subordinates, “Voi siete i miei occhi, le mie orecchie, le mie mani,” in a transmission belt of the new orthodoxy that was to reach every single household in Lombardy.¹⁵⁵ The power he thus acquired, personal ties that took on a bureaucratic semblance, was formidable.¹⁵⁶

Indeed, the archbishop’s pursuit of a well-ordered Christian society soon spilled over into the secular sphere, with the archbishop’s authority hobbling that of the king’s representatives in Milan, the governors. This rivalry had a moral dimension: the incorruptible Carlo elevated himself above the turpitude of the members of the Castilian high nobility who were sent in to administer the State of Milan.¹⁵⁷ However, that superiority was underpinned by the institutional makeup of the State. In early modern societies the powers to levy taxes and enforce laws were not monopolized by the state but, just like other aspects of sovereignty, shared by a multitude of actors who controlled rivaling apparatuses of law enforcement. Thus, the archbishop of Milan staked a successful claim to his own constables and prisons (something that, despite being envisioned at Trent, was granted to no other bishop at the time).¹⁵⁸ The consequence of this jurisdictional pluralism was that the unclear delimitation of spheres of responsibility gave rise to conflicts with other members of the local elite. Actors staffing the secular institutions in Milan were alarmed at the archbishop’s idea that he held jurisdiction over some members of the laity, as well as the clergy. They feared that Borromeo would mobilize his jurisdictional prerogatives to pervert the course of royal justice, and the numerous run-ins that the archbishop had with successive Spanish governors only seemed to prove them right.

Sympathetic historians have read Borromeo’s attempts to build a parallel network of power and influence as a largely defensive response to an encroaching monarchy. As Robertino Ghiringhelli has put it, “Carlo Borromeo è fermamente convinto che in un’epoca come la sua, in cui al concetto universale di cristianità si sta lentamente, ma ormai inesorabilmente sostituendo quello di Stato, solo un’organizzazione salda, gerarchicamente disciplinata dalla Diocesi di Milano è in grado di consentire alla Chiesa locale di resistere davanti allo strapotere temporale ed alle ingerenze dei governatori

¹⁵³ Bianchi, *Le scuole della dottrina*.

¹⁵⁴ On the opposition to Borromeo’s project, see De Luca, “Havendo perduta la vergogna.”

¹⁵⁵ Quoted in De Certeau, *Carlo Borromeo*.

¹⁵⁶ D’Amico, *Spanish Milan*, p. 100.

¹⁵⁷ Zunckel, *Das schwere Erbe*, p. 71.

¹⁵⁸ Castiglione, *Il cardinale*, p. 92; Luigi Prodocimi, *Il diritto*, p. 312; Wright, *Relations*, p. 388.

spagnoli.”¹⁵⁹ This reading is charitable to a fault, although it does alert to the rationale behind Carlo’s rule. Not only did the archbishop revive the medieval doctrine of *plenitudo potestatis Ecclesiae*, he also made no secret about his conviction that secular authorities should at all times be subservient to ecclesiastical power.¹⁶⁰ This was not just a reversal of centuries of legal precedent; it was a creative reinterpretation of canon law which went far beyond accepted readings at the time.¹⁶¹ All this had enormous implications for Spanish governance in Italy.

The task of spelling them out fell on no less a figure than Giovanni Botero (1544–1617), best remembered today as the godfather of reason of state. Before he became a bestselling author of political treatises, he had served as Carlo Borromeo’s secretary, and it was in this capacity that he developed most of his later ideas.¹⁶² Indeed, the archbishop and his Counterreformation project are recurring characters in many of Botero’s texts. His *Delle cause della grandezza e magnificenza delle città*, for example, contained an unabashed celebration of the Milan of Carlo Borromeo. “Milano attesterà sempre mai quanto splendore, e quanto incremento ella ricevesse dalla pietà, e religione del gran Cardinal Borromeo, i Prencipi venivano sin da gli ultimi termini di Settentrione a visitarlo.”¹⁶³ And he added, “non finirei mai, s’io volessi raccontare i modi, co’ quali egli amplificando il culto Divino, e la Religione; aggrandiva anco la Città, e raddoppiava la frequenza di Milano.”¹⁶⁴ In the book he is best known for, *Della ragion di stato*, published five years after Borromeo’s death, Botero further fleshed out the argument that Church leaders were indispensable to smooth governance. The populace was naturally inclined to pursue “novità”, unless it was bridled by its social betters. The example of Carlo Borromeo, who had “trattenuto l’infinito popolo di Milano con feste celebrate religiosamente e azioni ecclesiastiche”, proved that religion was most suitable for this purpose.¹⁶⁵ Worldly leaders, Botero concluded, had to recognize that they lasted in power only so long as they cooperated with religious leaders.

It is fair to say that Botero was merely replicating ideas that Carlo Borromeo had championed as archbishop. In a letter written in 1581 to Philip II, Borromeo reminded the king that he had a duty to aid bishops in achieving the spiritual goals laid down in the Tridentine reform documents.¹⁶⁶ This, Borromeo stressed, was because only properly religious subjects could ever be loyal to the Catholic king. The Spanish authorities therefore better had delegate the disciplining of the populace to the archbishop and his awesome ecclesiastical apparatus. As he framed it, the religious revival that Carlo

¹⁵⁹ Ghiringhelli, Introduzione, p. xxvii.

¹⁶⁰ Annoni, Giurisdizionalismo, pp. 141, 151–152. Also see Prosdocimi, Il diritto, p. 15.

¹⁶¹ Prosdocimi, Il diritto, p. 310.

¹⁶² Gotor, I beati, pp. 17–18; Ghiringhelli, Introduzione, pp. xxiv–xxv.

¹⁶³ Botero, Della ragion di stato, pp. 336–337.

¹⁶⁴ Botero, Della ragion di stato, p. 337.

¹⁶⁵ Botero, Della ragion di stato, p. 105. On this cynical view of processions, see Burke, The Fabrication, p. 6.

¹⁶⁶ Borromeo, Archbishop Carlo, pp. 90–91.

Borromeo was spearheading was not detrimental but beneficial to the allegiance of the local population to the crown, helping it stabilize its still precarious hold on power in northern Italy. The Spanish governors of Milan willy-nilly accepted this argument, even if they theoretically rejected the underlying premises. As outsiders who stayed in Milan for a limited number of years, they could only dream of ever achieving the same degree of control over the territory that Carlo Borromeo had secured through his control of the networks of the church. The crown was more than alive to the fact that the open flank that was Milan could only be held with the active support of the local church.¹⁶⁷

For the crown, the implicit acceptance of this division of the labor of domination came at a cost: it put the king of Spain increasingly at the mercy of one of the most influential feudal families in the state. The Spanish authorities were forever frightful of members of the clergy whom they deemed “tan poderosos para mover los afectos y inclinaciones del pueblo” against the crown.¹⁶⁸ The archbishop was singled out as a particularly grave danger, liable to use his ecclesiastical capital to foment an anti-Spanish uprising and place himself at the helm of the State of Milan.¹⁶⁹ By 1573 the Spanish monarchy was actively seeking to expel Carlo from Milan.¹⁷⁰ One governor warned that Borromeo was “the most dangerous rebel that Your Majesty has ever had.”¹⁷¹ This might have been an exaggeration: it is very likely that the Borromeo never considered rebellion a serious option, though they did take care not to disabuse the Spaniards. In fact, families like the Borromeo could wrest many more concessions from the monarchy by issuing threats that seemed remotely credible rather than by acting on them.¹⁷² As a bargaining tactic it certainly worked: Philip II repeatedly agreed to compromise with the archbishop and his clients, openly admitting that he did so “in ossequio al Borromeo.”¹⁷³

Carlo’s oppositional stance, then, saved the Borromeo from oblivion. Nobles who challenged the crown needed legitimizing strategies that enabled them to portray their insurrectionary behavior as a justified rebellion.¹⁷⁴ One way of achieving this was to question the authority and legitimacy of the monarch directly; the other, and the one chosen by the Borromeo, was to use the new religious ideas coming out of Trent to preserve some of their former autonomy. In a deeply religious society, this was a winning proposition. As Hillard von Thiesen notes, early modern societies were governed by a number of overlapping, and at times opposing, normative orders, and although a clear hierarchy of orders failed to materialize, there was widespread agreement that religious norms often trumped

¹⁶⁷ Giannini, *Politica spagnola*, p. 224.

¹⁶⁸ Quoted in Borromeo, *La Chiesa milanese*, p. 94.

¹⁶⁹ Borromeo, *Archbishop Carlo*, p. 95.

¹⁷⁰ Giannini, “Con ser santo,” p. 23.

¹⁷¹ Quoted in Borromeo, *Archbishop Carlo*, p. 95.

¹⁷² Cremonini, *Ritratto politico*, p. 27.

¹⁷³ Annoni, *Giurisdizionalismo*, p. 154.

¹⁷⁴ Kühner, “Il va de ma vie,” p. 117.

demands derived from other normative frameworks.¹⁷⁵ This was particularly true in the context of the Spanish monarchy of Philip II who saw himself as the sword that defended the cross.¹⁷⁶ Appealing to religious norms was therefore an almost airtight alibi for opposition to a monarch. Many families in Spanish Italy resorted to a variation of this strategy to stay on top in these difficult years. The archbishop of Palermo, Cesare Marullo, the representative of an eminent family from Messina, turned his back on his past as a servant at the court of Philip II and espoused the Tridentine agenda with a determination that embarrassed his colleagues and enraged Spanish viceroys.¹⁷⁷ The pioneering model of the Borromeo was attractive to other dynasties interested in deploying their religious capital for private ends, but it was undoubtedly the Borromeo who made most of this particular meal ticket.

By the 1580s, the Borromeo had come a long way: their key representative had done much to transform Milan into a Catholic model society.¹⁷⁸ Historians have long pointed out that the implementation of Carlo's reforms fell far short of his original plans, highlighting numerous examples of priests who continued to be, in the words of the authorities, "scandalosi, furboni, et più presto secolari, che religiosi," as well as the tenacious persistence of unorthodox beliefs among the laity.¹⁷⁹ Yet if we conceive of his religious agenda in the broader context of Carlo's dynastic aspirations, it becomes clear that the failure to enforce his ambitious reforms did not necessarily detract from the overall image of himself and his family that he wanted to project. In spite of all the practical shortcomings of the Borromeo reforms, the fact remained that, in the face of an existential crisis in the wake of the Spanish conquest of Milan, the Borromeo had convincingly dressed up as an ecclesiastical dynasty.

Even if one granted that this was a mere by-product of his Tridentine fervor, Carlo Borromeo's new position as someone able to condition Spanish governance was without doubt a very desirable outcome for his family.¹⁸⁰ When the archbishop died in 1584, the family rightly acknowledged him as the man who had snatched them from the jaws of almost certain annihilation and repositioned them as a force to be reckoned with. Less than a century earlier, the Borromeo had been little more than social parvenus from the merchant-banker milieu that proliferated in Italy at the time; now they were part of the third tier of the Italian nobility, just below the two distinct but interrelated groups of sovereign dynasties ruling over more or less extended territories.¹⁸¹ If they had once aspired to be part of that august group, the instrumentalization of religious capital had allowed

¹⁷⁵ Von Thiessen, Normenkonkurrenz.

¹⁷⁶ Signorotto, *Milano spagnola*, p. 229.

¹⁷⁷ Scalisi, *Il controllo del sacro*, pp. 75–76.

¹⁷⁸ D'Amico, *Spanish Milan*, p. 93.

¹⁷⁹ Quoted in Agnoletto, *L'azione pastorale*, p. 229.

¹⁸⁰ On the role of clerics in the defense of family interests in Milan, see Signorotto, *Milano spagnola*, p. 232.

¹⁸¹ Spagnoletti, *Le dinastie italiane*, p. 168.

them to eschew the fate of many other strivers who punched above their weight and were swallowed up by the onset of Spanish rule in Italy. Amidst rampant corruption and heresy, the self-fashioning as vehement defenders of the perfect Christian society in a world that placed great value on this ideal but strained to live up to its own standards allowed them rapidly to overtake former rivals from a similar social milieu, such as the Durini and the Litta.¹⁸² The Borromeo might not have become sovereigns akin to the Medici of Tuscany, but they still found themselves in the excellent company of such illustrious dynasties as the Orsini and Colonna of Rome or the Fieschi and the Doria of Genoa.¹⁸³

Upon Carlo's death, the family rushed to write the next chapter of their saga. Carlo's cousin, Federico, was desperate to cement the Borromeo's legacy as an ecclesiastical dynasty as he succeeded Carlo as archbishop of Milan. This smooth transition had hardly been a foregone conclusion. Born in 1564 when the Borromeo were rattled by fears of imminent extinction, Federico received a religious education that nourished the aspiration to join the Society of Jesus and die a martyr in the New World that had been opened up to Catholic missionary activities.¹⁸⁴ This aspiration was, of course, far from unique among men of his social background and generation.¹⁸⁵ If, for them, the decision to join the Jesuits was often an act of rebellion against their parents or guardians, Federico never mustered the courage to follow through with his plans.¹⁸⁶ When his cousin Carlo sensed that Federico was dodging the awesome responsibility of following in the footsteps of the man who was most closely associated with the implementation of the Tridentine reform, he immediately called him back from Bologna, where Federico was studying.¹⁸⁷ Gesturing to the significance the Borromeo now attached to the preservation of the family as an ecclesiastical dynasty, Federico was forced to submit to his cousin. Lying prostrate at Carlo's feet, he vowed that his wish to join a religious order had been a passing fancy and that his true aspiration was to become a secular cleric.¹⁸⁸ After Carlo's untimely death at the age of 46, the archdiocese was at first conferred upon Gaspare Visconti, the representative of another leading Milanese family, before Federico grudgingly accepted the nomination as archbishop of Milan in 1595.

Only too aware of the burden that had been placed on his shoulders, the second archbishop from Borromeo house tried his best to shore up the family's position vis-à-vis the Spanish monarchy in what was by now taking on the form of a distinct family tradition. Federico's more original contribution to the trans-generational status affirmation was his patronage of the arts, which

¹⁸² See Canosa, *La vita quotidiana*, p. 17.

¹⁸³ Spagnoletti, *Le dinastie italiane*, p. 168.

¹⁸⁴ On Federico Borromeo: Prosperi, *La vocazione*, p. 156.

¹⁸⁵ Roscioni, *Il desiderio*.

¹⁸⁶ Prosperi, *La vocazione*; Diefendorf, *Give Us Back Our Children*.

¹⁸⁷ See Zunckel, *Das schwere Erbe*, pp. 75–76.

¹⁸⁸ Rivola, *Vita di Federico Borromeo*, pp. 32–33.

culminated in the founding of a picture gallery, an art academy, and a library, now known as the Ambrosiana (named after Milan's legendary fourth-century bishop, St. Ambrose). An expression of Federico's interest in humanistic learning, this cultural institution was also a provocation. Beginning in the sixteenth century, libraries had become important markers of distinction for ruling dynasties: the Vatican Library in Rome, the Laurentian Library in Florence, and the San Lorenzo Library in Escorial near Madrid all date from this period.¹⁸⁹ Part of the patronage of arts and science, these institutions of learning also served as testimonies to their founders' greatness and, crucially, sovereignty. Indeed, by copying the patronage practices of popes and princes, the Borromeo sent yet another defiant message to the king of Spain, making it known that they were determined not to bow to their worldly overlord. As if that were not incendiary enough in itself, Federico Borromeo made sure that his library was bigger than anything the world had ever seen before.¹⁹⁰ When the *Biblioteca Ambrosiana* opened to the public in 1609, Federico Borromeo let it be known that his library possessed seven times as many printed books as the Vatican library in Rome.¹⁹¹ It was a stark reminder to the king of Spain that the Borromeo had not yet given up on the idea of wielding their religious capital to stand their ground against what they viewed as his potentially tyrannical power.

In his quest to sabotage Spanish power in Milan, Federico also trod more familiar ground. Even before he took office, the Spanish governor in Milan warned that the new archbishop would follow the lead of Carlo who had courted the “riesgo de descomponerse mucho esta ciudad y estado.”¹⁹² Federico did not disappoint. Shortly after assuming office, the new archbishop escalated the jurisdictional conflicts that he had inherited from his charismatic cousin, giving rise to the old accusations of his instrumentalizing the episcopate to assert the family's power.¹⁹³ In its internal memos, the monarchy counted Federico Borromeo among those cardinals who, despite being vassals of the king of Spain, “aspiran por la Iglesia a cosas maiores.”¹⁹⁴ With the bar of expectations set this low, Spanish officials soon came to see the constant bickering over jurisdictional prerogatives as a litmus test. As the Venetian ambassador to the court of Madrid noted, “non è tenuto per buon ministro quell'alcalde o corregidor che non sia stato almeno dieci mesi scomunicato, e quello è tenuto per miglior ministro che fa maggior forza contra la giurisdizione ecclesiastica.”¹⁹⁵ As this mockery of Borromeo indicated, Federico's ramping up of the simmering controversies was much less incisive than his cousin's battle had been.

¹⁸⁹ See Jones, Federico Borromeo, p. 42.

¹⁹⁰ For a social history of the library, see Lezowski, *L'Abrégé*.

¹⁹¹ Jones, Federico Borromeo, p. 44.

¹⁹² Juan Fernández de Velasco y Tovar quoted in Giannini, “Con ser santo,” p. 20.

¹⁹³ Wright, *Relations*, pp. 394, 388.

¹⁹⁴ Istruzione a Gastón de Moncada, marchese di Aytona, 1606, in: Giordano, *Istruzioni*, pp. 43–67 (p. 63).

¹⁹⁵ Quoted in Gotor, *I beati*, p. 65. On the excommunication of Spanish ministers, see Giannini, *Politica spagnola*, p. 206.

If Madrid came to deride his dogged fight, Rome also grew wearier to support the archbishop of Milan in his defense of recondite medieval privileges. This dip in enthusiasm needs to be situated in the context of the dwindling influence of the reformist fraction within the college of cardinals as a new generation for whom the Council of Trent no longer was a living memory took over the reins of power in the curia.¹⁹⁶ So much had things changed that archbishop Federico's motives were increasingly called into question and doubts arose that his was really a vanity project hiding behind the defense of honorable principles. Writing on behalf of none other than pope Clement VIII, the influential cardinal Baronius let it be known that the archbishop was not doing enough to convince the pontiff that he was not acting "per punta, ma per obbligo della conscientia."¹⁹⁷

It must have been the loss of credibility among his Roman allies that forced Federico Borromeo to steam ahead with the canonization of his cousin in a transparent attempt to harness Carlo as a new source of legitimacy. The moment seemed propitious. After a lull of several decades, the Catholic Church had just begun to lose its fear of Protestant mockery of the cult of saints and was rewiring the veneration of holy men and women into Roman Catholicism, thus driving up the value attached to sanctity as a form of capital for those associated with a cult.¹⁹⁸ If religious norms easily trumped all other normative frameworks within early modern hierarchies of distinction, sanctity was without doubt the highest mark of superiority. In the late Middle Ages towns and local communities, locked in a permanent competition over symbolic preeminence with their neighbors up and down the Italian peninsula, had pushed for the canonization of men and women who had died in the odor of sanctity.¹⁹⁹ Yet, as the decline of Renaissance city-states set in, in the wake of the rise of the dynastic system in the sixteenth century the major proponents of new cults became families rather than town councils.²⁰⁰ The arms race among elite dynasties led some of them to start lobbying for the canonization of a particularly virtuous family member.²⁰¹ Much sought after by royal houses, sanctity became a coveted resource for noble families alive to the fact that a family saint would bolster their prestige vis-à-vis both their subordinates and their peers.²⁰² The Tomasi of Sicily are an obvious example of an elite family who convinced the Roman Catholic Church to bestow the honor of the altars upon a family member as part of a "progetto d'ascesa sociale segnato da un singolare fervore religioso."²⁰³ However, the earliest and no doubt most successful self-affirmation of this kind

¹⁹⁶ Zunckel, *Das schwere Erbe*, pp. 80–81.

¹⁹⁷ Quoted in Franzosini, *Sotto il nome del cardinale*, p. 67.

¹⁹⁸ On the "revival in saint-making" as a result of the "recovery of confidence" of Roman Catholicism in the 1580s, see Simon Ditchfield, *Tridentine Worship*, pp. 205–206.

¹⁹⁹ Zarri, *Le sante vive*.

²⁰⁰ Andretta, *La venerabile superbia*, pp. 38–39. For a relatively late example of a civic cult in seventeenth-century Palermo, see Cabibbo, *Santa Rosalia*.

²⁰¹ Spagnoletti, *Le dinastie italiane*, pp. 239–243.

²⁰² Volker Reinhardt, *Krieg um die Erinnerungs-Hoheit*, p. 281.

²⁰³ Cabibbo and Modica, *La santa*, p. 8.

remains the Borromeo family's project to have the first archbishop of the house admitted to the pantheon of Counterreformation saints.

Betraying the family's discomfort with their lowly origins as financiers, the spin doctors set out to depict Carlo as a religious overachiever who had shunned the world with its messy conflicts of interest. As one hagiographer phrased it, "[N]on conosceva denari; né toccò mai denari, se non con occasione di farne limosine. Anzi haveva in horrore il denaro."²⁰⁴ Such grandiose claims beggar belief given both the family history and Carlo's prior appointment as cardinal-nephew, a role which returned the handsome sum of 48,000 *scudi* every year.²⁰⁵ What lent credence to the yarn that was being spun was the fact that, following the unexpected passing of his brother and the subsequent relocation to Milan, Carlo had indeed tried to give off the impression that he had drastically cut back on his expenditures and committed himself to a far less lavish lifestyle.²⁰⁶ If that self-serving myth was now pushed to its limits, this was because it was valuable to the family. In a society where the ideal of Christian virtues and the reality of dynastic aspirations constantly clashed with each other, saints (along with members of religious orders) were widely recognized as the only ones able to turn their backs on worldly greed and devote themselves fully to perfecting Christian society.²⁰⁷ Having one such person among one's ancestry could potentially act as an insurance policy against accusations of profiteering for multiple generations. A dynasty associated with money-grubbing therefore had a vested interest in revising the public image of Carlo and using his canonization to lay claim to that most prized sign of distinction in the early modern world: disinterestedness. In a new climate in which men and women who enjoyed a saintly reputation (*fama sanctitatis*) were gaining traction, the Borromeo could expect to be catapulted to the rank of the leading families of the Italian nobility if this message found enough true believers for the Roman Catholic Church to give it its official seal of approval.

A cult centered on archbishop Carlo had sprung up in the immediate aftermath of his death in 1584. His grave in Milan's cathedral became the site of popular devotion, and relics, most notably shreds of the linen in which he had died, began to circulate in elite circles.²⁰⁸ Although this devotion was spontaneous, there can be no doubt that Carlo's descendants tried to mold it from early on, in the hope of leveraging it in the ongoing battle against Spain. Carlo Bascapé, superior general of the Barnabites and later bishop of Novara, soon emerged as the family's principal propagandist. The Latin hagiography he produced even before Federico became archbishop had a heavy focus on Carlo's episcopate, depicting him as an uncompromising reformer of the Church who was not afraid

²⁰⁴ Quoted in Coppola, Fisco, p. 307.

²⁰⁵ Rimoldi, *L'età dei Borromeo*, p. 401.

²⁰⁶ Rimoldi, *L'età dei Borromeo*, p. 402.

²⁰⁷ Von Thiessen, *Familienbande*, p. 106; *idem*, *Normenkonkurrenz*, pp. 275–276.

²⁰⁸ These elements of the nascent popular devotion to Carlo were documented by someone in the Borromeo's entourage and sent as a memo to Philip III of Spain. The memorandum is reproduced in Burzer, *San Carlo*, pp. 261–263.

to challenge entrenched interests in both Madrid and Rome in pursuit of his mission. In Rome Bascapé's framing of the life and times of Carlo Borromeo was an early indication to what uses the Borromeo were going to put the aspiring saint, and they did not like what they saw.

So explosive was Bascapé's hagiography from the papacy's point of view that it produced the first rift between the Borromeo family and the pontiff who would ultimately have to grant their wish. Gregory XIV Sfondrati (r. 1590–1591), himself a member of the Milanese nobility, was disinclined to compromise his family's excellent relations with Philip II and refused to grant permission to print the booklet in Rome unless Bascapé agreed to scrape the jurisdictional conflicts from his account.²⁰⁹ In a letter to the author, the Master of the Sacred Apostolic Palace, the papal theologian, had urged the author to sanitize the highly charged issues of Carlo's episcopate, including the "contesa di giurisdizione tra il cardinale e il re, ovvero i suoi ministri," and focus on the bishop's private virtues instead.²¹⁰ Yet, this caricature of Carlo went against the most deeply held interests of his family who wanted to build lasting fame off of the memory of the man who had stood up to the king of Spain. Given the stakes, eliding the jurisdictional controversies was not an option. Federico therefore made arrangements to have the hagiography printed in Bavaria, the heartland of the Wittelsbach dynasty who were particularly active in promoting the veneration of old and new saints.²¹¹ The only one to demur was Bascapé who confessed to feeling "un poco di dolore di dover fuggire alle Germanie quasi per dar fuori un'opera eretica o scandalosa."²¹² Federico, on the other hand, remained steadfast, forging ahead with his plan.

When the newly founded Congregation of the Beati formally opened an informative process on Carlo ten years later, in 1601, Federico, now archbishop, made sure his version of events prevailed. Although the formal proceedings were ostensibly initiated by the city of Milan to make the canonization look more attuned to older models of elevations pursued by city councils, Federico Borromeo worked behind the scenes to ramp up pressure on key decision-makers in Rome. Without seeking proper authorization from the papacy, Federico marked the momentous event with celebrations aimed at swaying the outcome of the canonization in his favor.²¹³ In Milan, the *Duomo* was adorned with a rapidly produced cycle of ten paintings on canvas depicting selected scenes from Carlo's life. The scenes that had been chosen were revelatory. As though the debate between the papacy and the early promoters of the cult of Carlo had never happened, the entire cycle was an unabashed celebration of Carlo as the heroic archbishop of Milan who defiantly stood up to everyone

²⁰⁹ Giannini, "Con ser santo," p. 25.

²¹⁰ Quoted in Alberigo, Carlo Borromeo, p. 1043.

²¹¹ See Ditchfield, *Thinking with Saints*, p. 574.

²¹² Quoted in Alberigo, Carlo Borromeo, p. 1045.

²¹³ Giannini, "Con ser santo," p. 31.

who obstructed his vision of a good Christian society.²¹⁴ Attentive to the importance of visual representations in an illiterate society, Federico Borromeo took his spin on the aspiring saint from the limited audience of Bascapé's hagiography to a mass public, in the hope that Rome would be unable to impose its watered-down version of Carlo on a flock that had already been convinced otherwise.²¹⁵

Sheer numbers and the cult's growing local entrenchment ultimately supplied unassailable arguments. As reproductions of paintings from the cycle were circulated to households in Milan and beyond, the number of the faithful who flocked to Carlo's sepulcher in Milan's cathedral exploded. In the absence of concrete figures, the windfall generated by the mass of visitors speaks for itself: in the first five years, between 1601 and 1606, the alms left by pilgrims returned profits well in excess of 120,000 *lire*.²¹⁶ In reports on the growing cult, Carlo's acolytes were careful to emphasize the "grande concorso del popolo."²¹⁷ As any other self-respecting member of the early modern nobility, Federico Borromeo understood that if he drummed up enough support from the populace on his home turf, he could condition the actions of his overlords.²¹⁸ If Carlo Borromeo and his chief propagandist Botero had alerted everyone to the power of religious leaders to subdue popular unrest, Federico Borromeo reminded Rome of the flipside of this argument: people in his position might as easily stir up the populace to obtain what they wanted from central authorities. Harnessing the force of numbers, the archbishop no doubt exerted considerable pressure on the cardinals of the Congregation of the Beati who were brooding over the legitimacy of Carlo's candidacy to sainthood. In so doing he masterfully gamed a special committee set up to address the thorny issue of interest groups, including religious orders and noble clans, lobbying for the canonization of people who had become objects of local cults without the papacy's approval.²¹⁹ When he was faced with this show of force, pope Clement VIII admitted defeat. He conceded that there was little the Church could do "se una donna voleva dare, per esempio una libra di cera per sua [Carlo's] devotione," even if there was reason to suspect that the cult was an orchestrated astroturf movement to cow the papacy.²²⁰

Manipulating a system ostensibly set in place to forestall such outcomes, the Borromeo family succeeded in having Carlo recognized as a saint in 1610, just six years after the beginning of formal proceedings in the Congregation of Rites. In a lavish ceremony in St. Peter's in Rome, pope Paul V raised the former archbishop of Milan to the glory of the altars. What had allowed the

²¹⁴ For an in-depth analysis of the cycle, see Burzer, *San Carlo*, pp. 73–93.

²¹⁵ On the use of cheap art for the promotion of the cult, see Gerken, *Entstehung*. For a more general account, see Niccoli, *Vedere con gli occhi*.

²¹⁶ Turchini, *La fabbrica*, p. 17.

²¹⁷ Burzer, *San Carlo*, p. 20.

²¹⁸ This was a widespread idea in the political literature of the time. See Villari, *Il ribelle*, pp. 105–107, 115.

²¹⁹ Ditchfield, *Worship*, p. 209.

²²⁰ Quoted in Giannini, "Con ser santo," p. 31.

Borromeo to pull off this remarkable feat was the fact that sanctifications were at this point in time still a largely unregulated business where the influence wielded by an aspiring saint's acolytes could still win the day.²²¹ Indeed, Carlo had been canonized with such alacrity that the inquisitor of Milan suspected that, given the questionable nature of the miracles attributed to St. Charles, one could only conclude that "fu l'abondanza de danari che haveva fatto l'effetto."²²² While the relitigation the inquisitor urged never came to pass, contemporaries agreed with him that the successful canonization needed to be pinned down to the organizing talent of a group of dogged individuals in Milan, not least Carlo's heir, archbishop Federico.²²³

Tempering his delight was the incontrovertible fact that the papacy had taken control over the process for reasons of expediency. The decision to canonize Carlo Borromeo came in the wake of a decade of growing unease at the exponential growth of the number of miracles that were being ascribed to the former archbishop of Milan. The outburst of popular piety posed a threat to the papacy's project of tightening its control of the faithful. To contain the unregulated cult, the papacy had first attempted to stifle it through the Inquisition, a popular stratagem at the time.²²⁴ When it became clear that it was too late to stuff the genie back into the bottle, the cardinals of the Congregation of Rites went into damage-control mode and sought to rein in the cult's disruptive potential. If they could no longer decide whether or not Carlo was to be canonized, they could at least determine on what terms the canonization was going to transpire.²²⁵ Untrammelled by the legal-historical criteria that would make or break future saints, they charged ahead, conceding the canonization without taking the detour via beatification that would soon become a mandatory intermediate step on the road to sanctity.

As well as in commanding the process, the papacy was interested in control of the narrative. From the moment it decided to forge ahead, Rome waged a relentless campaign to counter the Borromeo family's narrative of Carlo as a principled and defiant bishop.²²⁶ When Carlo Bascapé ventured to have his controversial vita published in an Italian translation a few years after the publication of the Latin original, he was told in no uncertain terms that "il Mondo e Roma aspetta" a book which focused on Carlo's "virtù" rather than his actions, "perché delli fatti se ne ha grande cognizione, e molti vivono che li hanno visti."²²⁷ Bascapé, and presumably the people for whom he wrote, grew increasingly desperate at Rome's attempts, as he put it, to "per una parte santificare la

²²¹ See Prodi, Prefazione, pp. vii–xii.

²²² Quoted in Giannini, "Con ser santo," p. 39.

²²³ Gotor, *I beati*, p. 68.

²²⁴ Gotor, *I beati*, p. 133.

²²⁵ Reinhardt, *Krieg*, p. 281.

²²⁶ Reinhardt, *Krieg*, p. 282.

²²⁷ Quoted in Burzer, *San Carlo*, pp. 49–50.

persona, e per l'altra riprovarsi gli atti."²²⁸ Much to Bascapé's chagrin, it was this version that ultimately carried the day. By the time the energetic Jesuit cardinal Robert Bellarmine presented his brief for Carlo's canonization in 1610, the aspiring saint had been bereft of his politics and diluted down to a standard-bearer of Christian piety and moral integrity: "La dottrina di Christo si contiene in quattro capi, amore di Dio, amore del prossimo, disprezzo del mondo, & disprezzo di se stesso; le quali cose non pure furono tutte in Carlo Cardinale di buona memoria, mà vi risplenderono a maraviglia, come a tutto il mondo è manifesto."²²⁹

What made this reading particularly galling to the Borromeo was the insistence that Carlo had been the religious arm of Philip II in Lombardy, with the jurisdictional conflicts that had caused so much friction between these two men conveniently glossed over.²³⁰ In fact, the picture of a hispanophile Carlo that emerged out of the canonization process fit the dynastic aspirations of the papal family who were expecting to tap into the patronage pool of the Spanish monarchy.²³¹ By gifting the new figure in the court of Madrid, the minister-favorite, a Spanish saint, the Borghese hoped finally to make some headway in their pursuit of a fief in the kingdom of Naples as one of the duke of Lerma's high-profile Italian clients. Thus a combination of the papacy's interest in tightening the screws on local cults and radical changes in the administration of royal patronage in Madrid produced a new narrative of St. Charles, one that disrupted the Borromeo's original project of weaponizing him for their opposition to Spanish designs in northern Italy. When Philip III of Spain threw his weight behind the sanitized image of St. Charles of Roman lore as part of the back-and-forth with the Borghese, the Borromeo were done for, quashed by the radical transformation of the Spanish monarchy as it entered the age of the *valido* and a cunning papal family's swift adaptation to new circumstances.²³²

The irony of all this was acute. What had been the be-all and end-all of the Borromeo's efforts over the last decades—the canonization of Carlo—had yielded nothing but embarrassment. Granted, the family name had entered the pantheon of holy men, and in the months and years following the canonization, the new saint rapidly sidelined his peers. In 1611, Paolo Sarpi reported to a French correspondent from Venice that St. Charles was so ubiquitous that "egli adesso fa tutti li miracoli, sì che li vecchi hanno perso la piazza."²³³ And yet, the newfound fame must have seemed almost worthless to Carlo's descendants themselves. Having built much of his own reputation on the carefully crafted image of Carlo as a belligerent archbishop, Federico now had to swallow a vita of a model cardinal that provided anything but a mandate for continuing his crusade against the Spanish

²²⁸ Quoted in Alberigo, Carlo Borromeo, p. 1050.

²²⁹ Quoted in Burzer, San Carlo, p. 50.

²³⁰ Giannini, "Con ser santo," p. 41.

²³¹ See von Thiesen, *Diplomatie und Patronage*, chap. 4.4.2.

²³² Giannini, "Con ser santo," p. 32.

²³³ Burzer, San Carlo, p. 9.

crown.²³⁴ While they had increased their religious capital on paper, they were unable to spend it quite the way they had intended to: in the on-going battle against the Spanish monarchy. The papacy may have granted the Borromeo's wish, but this was a poisoned gift indeed. For reasons to do with the Borghese's dynastic interests, the Borromeo's preferred vision of Carlo as a combative ecclesiastical dignitary had been jettisoned for a new image of the family saint as a well-behaved subject of the king of Spain, thus making St. Charles worthless as a legitimizing argument in the Borromeo's planned assault on Spanish power in Italy.

Having overplayed his hand, Federico Borromeo was determined to turn defeat into victory. As he realized, Philip III's espousal of St. Charles as a protector of Catholicism under Spanish auspices opened up a loophole. If the Borromeo were willing to give up on a cherished conceit, they could potentially reinvent themselves as Spanish loyalists. Thus, the new coat-of-arms that was unveiled during the festivities for the canonization of St. Charles in Milan did mark the unraveling of the old family strategy but it also sent a signal to the court of Madrid and the new king that the Borromeo were willing to play the card they had been dealt. Rather than continue to weaponize St. Charles to oppose the king of Spain, they were ready to take up the offer and rebrand the family saint as one of the jewels in the crown of the Catholic monarch. Hoping that Philip III would welcome St. Charles in the still small circle of Spanish subjects who had been elevated to sainthood, and the symbolic capital that conferred upon their lord on earth, the Borromeo wove their most important claim to fame into a new narrative of themselves and their relations to the house of Habsburg.²³⁵ What the family had intended to be the coronation of their affirmation as an ecclesiastical dynasty spelled the unspooling of that project. Yet, it also functioned as the *mise-en-scène* for the repositioning of the clan as Spanish loyalists.

If these telltale signs have any meaning at all, they change almost everything we have believed to know about the Borromeo family. What historians have come to think of as the very essence of their saga in the early modern period turns out to be a brief interlude: the self-presentation as an ecclesiastical dynasty was short-lived, lasting a mere half century. In fact, and as I have shown here, it was a contingent response to the crisis that the Borromeo's preferred strategy of distinction—sovereignty—faced in the wake of the advent of Spanish preponderance in Italy. The accumulation of religious capital allowed them to stay afloat despite their obvious lack of a territorial base in the crucial decades that saw the hardening of Italy's dynastic system and the disappearance of most families of the Borromeo's ilk. Yet, far from being a timeless resource, as most treatments of the family's history imply, religious capital had an expiry date. By the beginning of the seventeenth century, the affirmation as an ecclesiastical dynasty had run its course; acquired religious capital

²³⁴ Zunckel, *Handlungsspielräume*, p. 454.

²³⁵ On the canonization of Spanish subjects, see Dandele, *Spanish Rome*, pp. 170–171.

needed to be put to new uses. Dramatic changes in the court of Madrid at the turn to the seventeenth century made it incumbent on the Borromeo to revert to their old vocation as courtiers in the service of Milan's ruling dynasty. As they lumbered toward rapprochement with Philip III, the self-image of the religiously motivated rebel was superseded by that of the loyal princely servant. Reinterpreting the meaning of St. Charles, the Borromeo would opt, once again, for a new strategy of social reproduction.

Chapter 2

From Détente to Rapprochement: The Borromeo and the Monarchy of Philip III

St. Charles's career as a mascot for Spanish imperialism began in earnest three years after his canonization. In 1613 the famed painter Orazio Borgianni (1574–1616) unveiled an altar painting of the saint in the church of Sant'Adriano in Rome, commissioned by none other than the Spanish ambassador to the papal court, the count of Castro.²³⁶ Its motif was eloquent. Offering a classic depiction of the saint as an indefatigable champion of the poor and the sick, *San Carlo tra gli appestati* remained firmly within the narrow confines of the orthodox version of the saint's life and deeds that had prevailed over the family's wishes in the canonization process. Although the allusion to the plague that had wrought havoc in Milan in 1576 was evident, the painter was careful to wipe out the political implications of the epidemic during which archbishop Carlo had openly defied the Spanish authorities and cemented his reputation as a rebellious man of the Church.²³⁷ In fact, through a skilled intervention, Borgianni had transferred the entire episode to Rome—the Castel Sant'Angelo is clearly visible in the background. Carlo himself is portrayed not as an archbishop tending to his flock of city-dwellers—the way the family liked to see him—but as a cardinal, dressed in red from head to toe, hunched over a gaggle of poorly clad peasants and cradling a naked baby in what was reminiscent of a nativity scene.²³⁸ Placing the noble archbishop next to an actual shepherd and an ass, the painting pushed the narrative, beloved by both the papacy and the Spanish crown, of St. Charles as the standard-bearer of Tridentine Catholicism who had no care for the messy world of dynastic politics, the role for which his family tried to commemorate him.²³⁹

Paintings with oblique references to political events and skillfully encoded messages regularly changed hands between patrons and clients in the seventeenth century.²⁴⁰ While canvasses with a dedication were generally considered an honor, they could also convey symbolic subtexts that turned them into tainted gifts. As contemporaries knew well, paintings, like other presents, could be offered with the aim of putting the recipient in their place.²⁴¹ Such was the nature of the early modern gift economy: even if they were deliberately offensive and deeply humiliating to the recipient, the often stunningly beautiful works of art could not be turned down, thus compelling the giftee into tacitly accepting the canvasses' message of subordination.²⁴² Borgianni's depiction of St. Charles commissioned by the Spanish ambassador to Rome performed exactly that function. With its obfuscation of Carlo's political role in the jurisdictional conflicts, the painting was a sign of the extent

²³⁶ Gallo, Orazio Borgianni, p. 73; Anselmi, *Le chiese spagnole*, pp. 69–70.

²³⁷ On the incident and its representation in family-commissioned portraits, see Burzer, *San Carlo*, p. 88.

²³⁸ On the depiction of Carlo Borromeo as archbishop of Milan after his canonization, see Burzer, *San Carlo*, pp. 201–202.

²³⁹ On the related depiction of Borromeo in his “dimensione contemplativa, irraggiungibile ed astorica, lontana dal secolo e dal popolo,” see Gallo, Orazio Borgianni, p. 70.

²⁴⁰ Keblusek, *The Embassy*, pp. 16–17; Adamson, *Policy and Pomegranates*, p. 145.

²⁴¹ On tainted gifts offered to reinforce existing social hierarchies, see Windler, *Tributes and Presents*.

²⁴² Colantuono, *High Quality Copies*, p. 111.



Fig. 3: Orazio Borgianni, *San Carlo tra gli appestati*, ca. 1613–1614, oil on canvas, Rome, Curia Generalizia dei Padri Mercedari (Gallo, Orazio Borgianni, p. 7.)

to which the balance of power had tipped in the monarchy's favor and the tide had turned against the Borromeo family: not only had the king of Spain appropriated the memory of the man the house of Habsburg had once considered a rebel, the monarch's representative was now in a position to foist the officially sanctioned version of St. Charles on the family.²⁴³ Unhappy though they must have been with this latest rendition of their saint, the Borromeo had no other choice than to come to terms with what to them must have been little more than a parody of Carlo.

Rather than as a gratuitous taunt, the painting should be read as a peace offering. Since the Borromeo had already volunteered to portray St. Charles as the jewel in the Spanish crown in the

²⁴³ Reinhardt, Krieg, p. 283; Giannini, "Con ser santo," pp. 21, 45.

official procession that had taken place in Milan in 1610, the painting needs to be construed as the monarchy's response to the Borromeo's overtures. Through it the Spaniards reached out to the archbishop of Milan, presenting him with an opportunity to bury the hatchet and throw his lot in with the Habsburgs. Borromeo took the bait. As I show in this chapter, the Borgianni portrait marked the beginning of the Spanish ambassador's ultimately successful mission to make the most of their openness to change and woo the Borromeo as clients of Philip III. As we will see, the rapprochement between the Borromeo and the crown involved complex negotiations during which dynastic aspirations intersected with political objectives. The path to détente was lined with a marriage alliance, contracted under the careful watch of the Spanish ambassador, and the signing of the infamous *concordia* treaty with the king of Spain, whose final stages were overseen by the ambassador's elder brother, the duke of Lemos. Arduous as it was, the close cooperation with the Lemos brothers paid off. By 1618, the Borromeo had all but disowned their former oppositional stance and were moving closer than ever to the imperial center, laying the groundwork for the unlikely reinvention of the dynasty as Spanish loyalists that had commenced during the celebrations to mark Carlo's canonization in Milan in 1610.

What made the astonishing rapprochement between the erstwhile "rebels of His Majesty" and the king of Spain possible were momentous changes in the makeup of the Spanish monarchy itself. The Lemos brothers who oversaw the Borromeo's transition from a fiercely independent ecclesiastical dynasty to outriders of the house of Habsburg were close allies of the man who had taken over the reins of the Spanish monarchy, Philip III's minister-favorite, the duke of Lerma.²⁴⁴ Having put in place a network of close relatives and allies to govern the sprawling empire, Lerma set up his cronies as sub-patrons and tasked them with recruiting powerful families from outside the monarchy's Castilian heartland.²⁴⁵ The goal was to build a clientele that, thanks to multiple layers of sub-patrons, would enhance his efficacy in governing the monarchy.²⁴⁶ Thus, at the exact moment when the narrative of the Borromeo as an ecclesiastical dynasty unraveled before their eyes, the rise of Lerma and his clan in Spain afforded them an opportunity to reinvent themselves as part of an ascendant "base di massa del potere asburgico" (Angelantonio Spagnoletti) in Italy.²⁴⁷ Fortunately for them, the crown's aspiration to ensconce the nobilities in the composite Spanish monarchy came to dovetail with the Borromeo's interest in reneging on their religiously charged obstruction to Spanish governance in Milan, welding the former nemeses into an alliance that would turn out to be mutually beneficial over the following decades.

²⁴⁴ Enciso, *Nobleza*, pp. 14–15, 27–29.

²⁴⁵ For a similar process in Flanders, see Esteban Estríngana, *Flemish Elites*.

²⁴⁶ Engels, *Die Geschichte der Korruption*, p. 52.

²⁴⁷ Spagnoletti, *Principi italiani*, p. 43.

This chapter tells the story of how Federico Borromeo, the redoubtable archbishop of Milan, came to sign a peace treaty with the king of Spain, ending the contradicting loyalties to the courts of Rome and Madrid that had so troubled the Borromeo family in the latter half of the sixteenth century.²⁴⁸ Surprising though it may sound to Borromeo insiders, the metamorphosis of former rebels into docile subjects was an all-too familiar tale at the time. As a generation of scholars have shown, members of the French high nobility were eager to seek rapprochement with the king after having weaponized religion to withstand what they perceived as the onslaught of an encroaching monarch. The Condé family, for instance, forswore their Protestant beliefs, an oppositional posture that had delivered splendidly well into the seventeenth century but was proving increasingly inconvenient under the new regime of cardinal Richelieu. In giving up on old beliefs, they moved closer to the king's minister-favorite and built an impressive network of surrogates which resulted in a hundredfold boost to the family income over the following three decades.²⁴⁹ As this and other examples suggest, the kowtowing of noble mutineers to the new figure of the minister-favorite was often a highly lucrative investment in the material prosperity of the family. In this chapter, I would like to turn the spotlight on similar, though much less studied, processes in the Spanish monarchy where nobles also softened their religious intransigence to inch closer to the *valido*. As will become clear, it is hard to think of a more fitting example and a better case in point than the Borromeo. In fact, while they confirm broader trends, they also act as a corrective to recent historiographical treatments which have perhaps made too much of the nobility's role in its own transformation from feudal lords into choristers—what was once known as the “courtization” of the nobility.²⁵⁰ Advancing that literature, I will stress that these processes were at least as beneficial to the crown as they were to the nobility whose interests came to dovetail considerably in the early decades of the seventeenth century.

In January 1615 Rome was abuzz with the news of a wedding. As the *avvisi*, the Roman precursors of modern-day newspapers, reported, Giovanna Cesi (1598–1672) had been married off to Giulio Cesare Borromeo (1593–1638). The bride was the daughter of a family of eminent cardinals; the groom, the great-nephew of the cardinal-archbishop of Milan, Federico Borromeo. The deal between the two families had been struck in mid-December, right before Christmas, when Giulio Cesare asked for Giovanna's hand in the presence of “alcune Dame principali di q[ue]sta Città, et parenti più stretti” of the bride, three cardinals, and the Spanish ambassador.²⁵¹ As one ally of the

²⁴⁸ D'Avenia, *Lealtà alla prova*.

²⁴⁹ Béguin, *Les princes*, chap. 1 and p. 387.

²⁵⁰ The obvious references would be Duindam, *Myths*, and Asch, *Nobilities*.

²⁵¹ Paolo Emilio Sfondrati to Federico III Borromeo, Rome December 19, 1614: BAM, mss. G 218 inf 38; Andrea Cesi to Federico III Borromeo, Rome December 17, 1614: BAM, mss. G 218 inf 34.

groom's family informed the latter's great-uncle, Federico, "La sposa riuscì compitissima, et per essere stata ottimam[en]te allenata."²⁵² The haphazard and secretive engagement was followed by a very public wedding, which was celebrated a mere two weeks later, after Epiphany, in the bride's home, the impressive Cesi palace behind what would soon be transformed into the Trevi fountain.²⁵³ The gathering drew cardinals and Roman aristocrats who stood and watched in awe as the newlyweds were showered with gifts from the groom's uncle. According to a chronicler, Federico offered his nephew "un cintiglio gioiellato da cappello" and the spouse "una collana gioiello di diamanti et alcune vesti ricamate."²⁵⁴ Once all gifts had changed hands, the festivities went on for days, if not weeks, sliding almost seamlessly into the Carnival season, which commenced at the beginning of February.

Lavish get-togethers of illustrious cardinals, foreign diplomats and Italian aristocrats were a common occurrence in seventeenth-century Rome. As one contemporary remarked, the Eternal City acted like a "magnet," pulling the who's who of the Italian principalities and republics to the *caput mundi*.²⁵⁵ In the territorially fragmented peninsula, the papal court functioned as a hub where Italian elites met, struck deals, and hobnobbed with other families.²⁵⁶ Weddings were an integral part of the wheeling and dealing. As is typical of close-knit networks, marriage was not primarily a union between two isolated individuals but a way of establishing or cementing links between two kin groups.²⁵⁷ Dynastic weddings served to preserve families, as noble clans were acutely aware of the fragility of their power which could be wiped out at any moment by the accidents of biology. More importantly still, marital alliances multiplied a family's chances of securing access to the spoils on offer in the court. In fact, the expansion of monarchical institutions was a major driving force behind these unions. As competition grew, so did the urge to huddle together in factions, and the most efficient glue, sticking two families together literally till death did them part, was marriage.²⁵⁸ Matrimony consecrated the bonds between dynasties at the same time as it signaled to rivaling cabals that the fight was on.²⁵⁹ Under these circumstances, something as seemingly personal as a wedding could have far-reaching political ramifications, which explains the widespread attention they often garnered.

Weddings between families from different states were common, too. As court historians elsewhere have shown, the expansion of princely households in the early modern period helped

²⁵² Paolo Emilio Sfondrati to Federico III Borromeo, Rome December 19, 1614: BAM, mss. G 218 inf 38.

²⁵³ Peretti, *Le residenze romane*, pp. 654–658.

²⁵⁴ The presents are described in Gigli's *Diario Romano* cited in Terzaghi, *Caravaggio*, p. 19.

²⁵⁵ Agnolo Cardì, *La calamita*.

²⁵⁶ Pellegrini, *Corte di Roma*; Osborne, *The House of Savoy*.

²⁵⁷ Bott, *Family and Social Network*, pp. 99–100.

²⁵⁸ Delille, *Marriage. On factions in court society*, see Benigno, *Conflitto politico*, pp. 123–125.

²⁵⁹ Elliott, *The Political Context*, pp. 6, 16.

centralize transactions such as marriage alliances in the court of the ruler.²⁶⁰ In a similar vein, the papal court became the major point of contact and the principal marriage market for the peninsula's elites.²⁶¹ Beginning in the sixteenth century families from Rome began to tie the knot with dynasties from the Papal States and other Italian territories. Considering the prevailing attitude to the expanding institutions of state and Church as spoils systems, such cross-border weddings made sense: a bond between two families from two territories allowed clans to tap two distinct patronage pools and maximize the chances of enrichment and aggrandizement. To make sense of this functionalist conception of wedlock, P. Renée Baernstein has shown, the Italian nobility told themselves the story of the Sabine women who had been abducted by Roman men in order to forge an alliance between the two tribes. "The protean story of wife-stealing legitimated the implicit violence of marriages contracted between families primarily for economic or political reasons; it emphasized women's roles as property to be exchanged at the will of men; and, finally and most importantly here, it vindicated the utility of those marriages—forced or otherwise—in making political alliances between tribes and nations."²⁶²

This *mentalité* explains the Borromeo's interest in the Cesi match. The primary value of a bride lay in what Melissa Campbell Orr calls "dynastic capital"—her connection to her family of origin.²⁶³ For non-Roman families like the Borromeo, ties to a respectable Roman clan guaranteed continued access to Church institutions for at least another two generations—that of the bride's husband and that of the couple's children.²⁶⁴ The archetypical Roman bride "brought with her an unquantifiable patrimony that represented her real value: a dense family network of ecclesiastics over several generations with numerous connections within the curia."²⁶⁵ Thanks to the latter, she could shepherd legal matters through relevant Roman courts, such as the datary. Beyond these practical advantages, marital ties to the court of Rome might turn out to be a rain check that families from Spanish Italy in particular could cash when they fell on hard times.²⁶⁶ (As we will see in chapter 10, Giovanna's social capital turned out to be of enormous service to the family once the military career of her eldest son had run aground in the 1650s.) A bride like Giovanna Cesi was, in short, a valuable asset for a family that was intent on putting a lock on their future relationship to the papacy.²⁶⁷

²⁶⁰ MacHardy, *War*, pp. 161–162.

²⁶¹ Baernstein, *Roma Caput Italiae*.

²⁶² Baernstein, *Roma Caput Italiae*, p. 348.

²⁶³ Campbell Orr, *Introduction*, p. 12.

²⁶⁴ Ago, *Carriere*, p. 41.

²⁶⁵ Visceglia and Fosi, *Marriage*, p. 213.

²⁶⁶ Cremonini, *Ritratto politico*, p. 20.

²⁶⁷ Spagnoletti, *Le dinastie italiane*, pp. 163–164.

It is much harder to see why the Cesi would have assented to a wedding alliance with the Borromeo. Giovanna Cesi was the third daughter of Andrea Cesi and Cornelia Orsini, two scions of Rome's most eminent families vaunting a long line of cardinals.²⁶⁸ Writing in the 1640s, the Flemish author Theodor Ameyden would explain that Rome's nobility consisted of four distinct groups: the top tier including the old feudal barons and papal families, followed by the much less glorious Roman patriciate and merchant-bankers from other parts of the Italian peninsula who had benefited from the notoriously porous social structure of the Eternal City.²⁶⁹ Both the Cesi and the Orsini belonged to the upper tier of the Roman barons. If the Orsini traced their origins back to times immemorial, the Cesi hailed from Umbria and had embarked on their rise in the fifteenth century. Though ignored by scholars until very recently, contemporaries viewed the Cesi as an eminent family of legal scholars and cardinals with interests in the arts and sciences, ranking just beneath the Colonna and the Orsini, the oldest and most influential baronial families.²⁷⁰ As Ameyden put it with characteristic hyperbole, "Stimo questa famiglia la più fortunata, non diremo di Roma, ma di tutta Italia, comeché in pochissimo tempo, senza avere ottenuto il pontificato in casa, abbia acquistato molte ricchezze e veduto finora cinque cardinali."²⁷¹ The resemblance with the Borromeo was only skin deep. Granted, both families were relatively recent newcomers to the high nobility, and both had chosen religion as their gateway to the elite. But the Cesi carried less baggage. As we have seen in chapter 1, the Borromeo had invested heavily in the accumulation of religious capital because they needed to rid themselves of the whiff of their unrespectable origins as merchant-bankers and loan sharks. The Cesi, on the other hand, had no such past to cover up, having pursued the ecclesiastical route from the outset without first trying their hand at banking.²⁷²

There was little in a marital alliance with the Borromeo that seemed attractive to the Cesi. To be sure, the two families were linked by long-standing ties dating back to the time when Carlo was the cardinal-nephew of Pius IV.²⁷³ It seems equally undeniable that affinity to a family with a saint among their recent ancestors was serviceable for the future advancement of the clan in the devout court of Rome. The cardinal hopefuls in the Cesi camp certainly hoped, as Giovanna father's put it in a letter to Federico Borromeo, that the wedding would convert the Cesi's "divota servitù" toward the house of Borromeo into that "sicurezza di migliore stabilim[en]to" they had long pined for.²⁷⁴ Nevertheless, these advantages were overshadowed by a number of inconvenient truths about the Borromeo, the least of which being their dramatic loss of influence in the curia after the botched

²⁶⁸ On the Cesi, see the clearly dated Martinori, *I Cesi*, and De Petra and Monacchia (eds.), *I Cesi di Acquasparta*. For a short portrait of Giovanna's parents, see Guerrieri Borsoi, *Villa Belpoggio*, pp. 40–41.

²⁶⁹ Karsten, *Distinktionsmerkmale*, pp. 291–292.

²⁷⁰ For an overview, see de Petra and Monacchia, *Introduzione*, pp. xx–xxvii.

²⁷¹ *La storia delle famiglie romane di Teodoro Ameyden*, p. 304.

²⁷² Peretti, *Le residenze romane*, p. 629.

²⁷³ Nocchi, *Il cardinale*, pp. 245–247.

²⁷⁴ Andrea Cesi to Federico III Borromeo, Rome December 17, 1614: BAM, mss. G 218 inf 34.

canonization of Carlo.²⁷⁵ In the hierarchical world of the Italian nobility, the Cesi were simply in a different league. Giovanna's mother may have written to Federico that she was the only one of the two who should feel "consolazione di questo accasamento," "poi che io son quella, che guadagno."²⁷⁶ But such pious assurances fooled no one. In spite of all the pretense, Giulio Cesare had quite simply overreached.

Not that there had not been any warning signs. Giulio Cesare had been a penny-pincher from the start. In a letter to the head of the family, archbishop Federico, written shortly after the engagement, a cardinal from Milan, Paolo Emilio Sfondrati, sounded the alarm. Sfondrati reminded Federico that Giulio Cesare had just married into one of "the most eminent houses of this city," which made it imperative for him to treat his wife-to-be "con qualche splendore corrispondente [...], massime stando in cospetto delle corti." Couched in the most diplomatic language possible, he accused the family of the mother of all sins in early modern court society: stinginess. Although Sfondrati was careful to lay the blame on "qualche Ministro, ch'il S[igno]re Conte hà appresso," he was adamant as he encouraged Giulio Cesare to be more generous while he was in Rome: "al fine saranno tre mesi; è egli tanto commodo che puoco fastidio gli può dare la spesa di duemila scudi di più nella presente occ[asio]ne."²⁷⁷

Partly to distract from his bleak financial situation, Giulio Cesare was keen to rush things. Other suitors from such eminent Roman families as the Gallio and the Cesarini had turned Giovanna down, citing her meager dowry.²⁷⁸ (If Anna Maria contributed a dowry of 160,000 *scudi* when she married Michele Peretti, her younger sister Giovanna's dowry amounted to less than a third of that sum.²⁷⁹) Giulio Cesare, on the other hand, remained undeterred by Giovanna's lack of a trust fund. On the contrary, he "mostrava desiderio s'abbreviasse il tempo" between the formal engagement and the wedding.²⁸⁰ Things happened in such rapid succession that the bride's father, who was bedridden with an unnamed condition, was unable to turn up to his daughter's engagement and had to send his wife, Cornelia Orsini, instead.²⁸¹ The latter thought that Giulio Cesare had shown "tanto affetto verso" Giovanna that "è stato forza scartar il tempo."²⁸²

The wedding that followed must have caused them pause. The fete for Giulio Cesare and Giovanna provided a stark contrast to the wedding of Giovanna's elder sister just one year earlier. When Anna Maria Cesi had married Michele Peretti in 1614, the groom's family spared no expense to

²⁷⁵ Monferrini, *I duchi di Ceri*, p. 316.

²⁷⁶ Cornelia Orsini Cesi to Federico III Borromeo, Rome January 3, 1615: BAM, mss. G 221 inf 12.

²⁷⁷ Paolo Emilio Sfondrati to Federico III Borromeo, Rome December 19, 1614: BAM, mss. G 218 inf. 38.

²⁷⁸ Zunckel, *Handlungsspielräume*, pp. 447–448.

²⁷⁹ Zunckel, *Handlungsspielräume*, p. 446; Terzaghi, *Caravaggio*, p. 19.

²⁸⁰ Paolo Emilio Sfondrati to Federico III Borromeo, Rome December 19, 1614: BAM, mss. G 218 inf. 38.

²⁸¹ Andrea Cesi to Federico III Borromeo, Rome December 13, 1614: BAM, mss. G 218 inf 33.

²⁸² Cornelia Orsini Cesi to Federico III Borromeo, Rome January 3, 1615: BAM, mss. G 221 inf 12.

arrange a ceremony with all the thrills that baroque Rome had to offer. The groom's older brother, the still influential and fabulously wealthy cardinal-nephew of pope Sixtus V (r. 1585–1590), Alessandro Peretti, patronized a musical spectacle which contemporaries described as the most impressive Rome had seen to that day.²⁸³ Combining music, dance, and theater, *Amor pudico* was staged in one of the Eternal City's most impressive Renaissance palaces, the Palazzo della Cancelleria. The story of the pageant that the Peretti had arranged for Anna Maria was an allegory on the family the Cesi bride was about to join. An unapologetic exaltation of the past and present grandeurs of Rome as the capital of world, one expert maintains that *Amor pudico* was a not-so covert celebration of the man who had until recently governed the Eternal City—pope Sixtus V—and his descendants.²⁸⁴ To Anna Maria the performance signaled that she had just been admitted to the privileged rank of papal families who held uncontested sway in the court.²⁸⁵ In comparison to this lavish celebration, the ceremony that was put in place for Giovanna clearly paled. Not only did the groom's family fail to organize a proper wedding; they did not even care to turn up for the carousing when they should have dug deep into their pockets to match the Peretti's expenditure. As she took in the few paltry gifts they had sent from Milan, it must have dawned on Giovanna and her parents that she was marrying down.

Turning on the groom's family, Giovanna's mother, Cornelia Orsini, later accused Federico Borromeo of having milked the Borromeo's reputation to hoodwink the Cesi into a marriage alliance to which they would never have agreed if they had been in possession of all the relevant information. Given the enormous respect she had for the cardinal-archbishop of Milan, the bride's mother lamented, she had desisted from sounding out others on Giulio Cesare, basing her decision to marry Giovanna to Giulio Cesare solely on Federico's ringing endorsement of his nephew.²⁸⁶ But, she complained, in so doing, her family had clearly been pulled over the barrel. As they found out by accident almost a year after the wedding, Giulio Cesare was so mired in debt that he had little more than 3,000 *scudi* to his name. As she saw it, the Cesi had been tricked into marrying their daughter to a pauper unable to offer her the "protettione" she deserved.²⁸⁷ The Borromeo had abused the Cesi's "gran servitù per la quale partic[ola]re haveva sentita consolat[ion]e del parentado, e lasciata voluntieri uscir sua figlia di Roma in paesi così lontani."²⁸⁸

Although they never mentioned him specifically in their long list of grievances, there is much to suggest that the Cesi felt they had been turned into pawns in the long game of the Spanish ambassador in Rome. All chroniclers of the wedding took pains to point out that the two families had

²⁸³ Rosa, *Curia romana*, p. 68; Hill, *Roman Monody*, p. 279.

²⁸⁴ Hill, *Roman Monody*, p. 282.

²⁸⁵ Reinhard, *Papal Power*, pp. 333–334.

²⁸⁶ Cornelia Orsini Cesi to Federico III Borromeo, Rome January 3, 1615: BAM, mss. G 221 inf 12.

²⁸⁷ Benedetto Beolco to Federico III Borromeo, Rome December 19, 1615: BAM, mss. G. 220bis inf 330.

²⁸⁸ Benedetto Beolco to Federico III Borromeo, Rome December 19, 1615: BAM, mss. G. 220bis inf 330.

decided on their merger in the presence of the ambassador of the king of Spain and his wife.²⁸⁹ This was more than happenstance, attributable perhaps to noble diplomats mingling with the local elite in the places in which they served.²⁹⁰ The ambassador had skin in the game. If the match came about at all, this was thanks to the decisive intervention of the Spanish ambassador to Rome.²⁹¹ His role needs to be placed in the context of the deep transformations of the Spanish monarchy that we need to focus on before we can move on to explain his presence at the Cesi wedding and the contracting of what the bride's family would later denounce as a *mésalliance*.

For the Spanish monarchy, 1598 was not just the year of the death of Philip II and the enthronement of his successor, Philip III; it also marked the rise of a new figure in Spanish politics. Various known as the king's *privado* or *valido*, Francisco Gómez de Sandoval, the duke of Lerma, became the monarch's minister-favorite. As the title suggests, the duke was Philip's favorite courtier who assisted him in all aspects of government, leading one of the most full-throated defenders of the new figure, Baltasar Alamos de Barrientos, to liken Lerma to a "principal minister."²⁹² The instruction of successive papal envoys to the Spanish court explained that Lerma "non è solo la seconda persona dopo il re, ma quello che consiglia, che maneggia e che risolve tutto, da chi dipende il moto di tutte le cose et senza chi non si eseguisce niente."²⁹³ Given the early modern elite's understanding of royal institutions as spoils systems, the foremost task of the favorite was to regulate who was admitted to the prince and his patronage.²⁹⁴ While the tendency to limit access to monarchs was common to all Western European monarchies at the time, it was particularly pronounced in the Spanish empire. There, the Habsburg monarchs were trading in the medieval image of Iberian kingship with its ideal of accessible monarchs for a conception of a ruler who ideally stood aloof from the masses of petitioners.²⁹⁵ Under these circumstances, the new figure of the minister-favorite could present himself as the solution to the problem of a king who had chosen to withdraw from the public stage at a time when a strong monarch was most needed to coalesce the elites of the monarchy's increasingly diverse territories.²⁹⁶ As early as December 1598, contemporaries noted that the duke of Lerma was the only one who could "consultar a boca con el rey."²⁹⁷ From this, contemporary defenders of the figure inferred that the minister-favorite enabled the king's subjects to "representar con mayor

²⁸⁹ Terzaghi, Caravaggio, p. 19.

²⁹⁰ Anderson, *The Rise*.

²⁹¹ Monferrini, *I duchi di Ceri*, p. 315.

²⁹² Feros, *Kingship*, pp. 118–119.

²⁹³ Quoted in Visceglia, *Roma papale e Spagna*, p. 59.

²⁹⁴ Asch, *Patronage, Friendship and the Politics of Access*.

²⁹⁵ Feros, *Kingship*, pp. 71–84.

²⁹⁶ Feros, *Kingship*, p. 91.

²⁹⁷ Quoted in Muto, "Mutation di corte," p. 158.

facilidad y menor tremor sus necesidades y suplicas,” with the favorite acting as a moderating influence on “la magestad natural del Rey absoluto Monarca.”²⁹⁸

What these blithe justifications obscured was the self-interestedness of Lerma’s project. Although he gamely claimed to be the king’s man, aloof from the profane pursuits and aspirations of the other heads of dynasty that he sought to manage, he was as much a representative of the Castilian high nobility as the next nobleman.²⁹⁹ What set him apart from others was not his position above the fray but that he had temporarily had the better of his rivals. Indeed, the precariousness of his position enjoined it on him constantly to shore up his preeminence through the exclusion of rivals and the cooptation of friends and family. Over time, he enlisted the support of clans to whom he was related, either by blood or marriage, to serve him in various subordinate roles. Thus, a system emerged in which Lerma not only acted as a gatekeeper but in which he placed a number of confidants in key positions that regulated admission to the minister-favorite.³⁰⁰ Lerma’s cronies acted as additional filters through which all requests for honors and rewards had to pass in order to reach the minister-favorite at the top of the pyramid. By delegating the doling out of favors to his cronies, Lerma cemented a new hierarchy of patrons and sub-patrons in what would become a close-knit network of clients.³⁰¹

That transmission belt was a clever response to a simple problem of logistics. The monarchy was still governed according to the logic of patron-client relationships, that is to say, chains of exchange among socially unequal individuals between the imperial center and the periphery.³⁰² But, by the early seventeenth century, the original patron-client cluster had extended its reach so far that intermediaries had to intercede with the minister-favorite at the top and liaise with his clientele in the far-flung provinces of the empire.³⁰³ Historians have used various terms to describe these go-betweens, with “brokers” and “patrons” being the most common ones. Sharon Kettering, the foremost authority on this issue, has argued that, although contemporaries did not distinguish between the two, brokerage was qualitatively different from patronage proper: only the latter cohered around a personal bond between patron and surrogate.³⁰⁴ There is much to be said for this definition, not least Kettering’s implication that, depending on context, the same person could act in both capacities. What seems more problematic is that Kettering grounds the difference in the quality of the relationship, seemingly ignoring that personal ties were as often absent from patronage as

²⁹⁸ Francesco Lanario, *Breve discurso donde se muestra que los Reyes han de tener privado*, quoted in Muto, “Mutation di corte,” p. 174.

²⁹⁹ On Lerma’s self-image, see Feros, *Kingship*, p. 117.

³⁰⁰ Von Thiessen, *Diplomatie und Patronage*, p. 95.

³⁰¹ Béguin, *Les princes*, pp. 177–184.

³⁰² Flap, *Patronage*, pp. 225–226; Kettering, *Patrons, Brokers*, p. 4; Sharon Kettering, *Patronage*, p. 839.

³⁰³ Levy Peck, *Court Patronage*, p. 40.

³⁰⁴ See Sharon Kettering, *Brokerage*, pp. 73, 78.

they were present in brokerage.³⁰⁵ A much better differentiator would be the motives of the parties involved—what intermediaries expected to get out of their intercession. Hence, I use the term “brokers” to describe persons who negotiated concessions for emoluments in either cash or kind without expecting some long-term benefit for their services. Conversely, “patrons” saw their intercession not as a one-off in which they had no personal investment but as an opportunity to forge or cultivate ties from which they stood to benefit, either economically or symbolically, in the long term. Under the new regime of the minister-favorite, such expectations proliferated, leading to the emergence of what I term “sub-patrons,” noblemen acting as intermediaries between the minister-favorite and the provincial nobility lower down the social ladder.

In Philip III’s court, this dynamic had far-reaching consequences as the cluster of sub-patrons Lerma had built took on a life of its own. As contemporaries familiar with the work of the sixteenth-century writer Antonio de Guevara might have put it, every Castilian high noble worth his salt stirred to become the “favorite’s favorite” (*el privado del privado*), employing his post and power to nominate people to offices in a bid to build his own coterie of clients.³⁰⁶ What transpired was a logical consequence of the growth of any patron-client system: the original cluster of clients become sub-patrons in a pyramid that extended downward to include yet another, inferior order of clients.³⁰⁷ As Katia Béguin explains in her study of similar developments in the French monarchy, these sub-patrons did not draw their powers as protectors from their direct control over resources as much as from effective mediation between their clients and the king as the real holder of the spoils.³⁰⁸ While mediation of this sort was of undoubted value to the beneficiaries of a sub-patron’s liaising between the top and the bottom of society, a typical sub-patron could himself earn considerable social capital whose value was directly proportional to the honorability of the surrogates he amassed.³⁰⁹

The transformations this pyramid scheme birthed were momentous. As Bartolomé Yun Casalilla has shown in a seminal essay, the reigns of Philip II and his son marked a crucial period of transition during which the Castilian nobility became a vital part of the budding monarchical institutions.³¹⁰ As he sees it, the Lerma regime was the embodiment of an idea that had been taking hold during the reign of Philip II in the late sixteenth century: the axiom that political hierarchies ought to reflect social hierarchies, and that the socially pre-eminent families should therefore dominate the government of the monarchy.³¹¹ Baltasar Alamos de Barrientos, one of the main proponents of transforming the Spanish empire into a “monarchy of aristocrats,” had ventured that

³⁰⁵ Emich et al., *Stand und Perspektiven*.

³⁰⁶ Antonio de Guevara, *Aviso de privados o despertador de cortesano* [1539], quoted in Feros, *Kingship*, p. 38.

³⁰⁷ For an excellent summary, see Flap, *Patronage*, p. 229.

³⁰⁸ Béguin, *Les princes*, p. 78.

³⁰⁹ Béguin, *Les princes*, p. 157.

³¹⁰ Yun Casalilla, *La aristocracia castellana*.

³¹¹ Benigno, *L’ombra*, pp. 19, 26–27; idem, *Figure del potere*, p. 25.

the king should accord prominent positions in government to the grandees who were positioned just beneath the sovereign in an imaginary social hierarchy.³¹² Such ideas gained new traction under Philip III and Lerma. If, during the reign of Philip II, the grandees had been “tenuti dalla Maestà Sua molto bassi,” the Venetian ambassador Francesco Soranzo put it, “a tempo del re presente, sono pur assai respirati perché mostra Sua Maestà di vederli volentieri, si serve di loro, gli accarezza, e col numero grande, che n’ha posto in consiglio di Stato, pare, che nelle lor mani stia rassegnato il governo di quell’Impero, memori della passata oppressione, non lasciano d’andar gonfi della presente loro sollevazione.”³¹³ The new system erected by Lerma and his cronies put the Castilian high nobility back where it felt it had always belonged: in charge of the monarchy.³¹⁴

If historians used to see this process (sometimes referred to as “refeudalization”) as a balkanization of the state, Casalilla has convincingly argued that, rather than undermine a nascent bureaucratic infrastructure, the inclusion of the high nobility propelled that project forward and helped enshrine monarchical power in the first half of the seventeenth century. Holding prestigious royal offices, such as viceroalties in Spanish Italy, the Castilian nobility invested heavily on behalf of the crown in the hope of gaining influence over the future course of the monarchy.³¹⁵ Hence, the growth of institutions and the pursuit of dynastic aspirations were not mutually exclusive but, on the contrary, joined at the hip; they traveled parallel with each other as Lerma and his cronies who acted as his sub-patrons away from the center of power channeled dynastic ambition into efforts to homogenize the nobility of the composite Spanish monarchy.³¹⁶

One of the most avid clusters of sub-patrons were the members of the Lemos clan. Fernando Domingo Ruiz de Castro (1548–1601), the sixth count of Lemos, was one of the main beneficiaries of the Lerma regime.³¹⁷ The excessively close ties between the minister-favorite and the Lemos family had been fostered within the first two weeks of Lerma’s accession to power in 1598. Since the clan’s head was already married to a sister of Lerma’s, the new minister-favorite decided to deepen the existing ties by wedding his daughter, Catalina de la Cerda, to the count of Lemos’s eldest son, Pedro Fernández de Castro.³¹⁸ In return for the marital bond, the count of Lemos, who was not particularly wealthy at the time, was rewarded with one of the main sources of enrichment that the Spanish monarchy had to offer: the viceroyalty of Naples.³¹⁹ Taking office in 1599, Lemos Sr. would lure members of the southern Italian elite into the *valido*’s network, as is demonstrated by his

³¹² Quoted in Benigno, *L’ombra*, p. 19.

³¹³ Soranzo, *Relazione*, p. 49.

³¹⁴ Mrozek, *Bajo acusación*, p. 79.

³¹⁵ Yun Casalilla, *La aristocracia castellana*, p. 216.

³¹⁶ Feros, *Kingship*, pp. 125–126.

³¹⁷ Favaro, *Carriere in movimento*. On the Lemos clan’s ties to Lerma, see Enciso, *Nobleza*, pp. 14–15, 27.

³¹⁸ Mrozek, *Bajo acusación*, p. 67.

³¹⁹ Williams, *The Great Favourite*, p. 56.

commission of a new royal palace in Naples which was to serve as a center of attraction for a nascent hispanophile nobility.³²⁰

If their father had laid the groundwork at the turn of the century, Lemos's sons cultivated even closer ties to the Italian nobility.³²¹ Pedro Fernández de Castro (1576–1622), who would become known as the seventh count of Lemos, followed in the footsteps of his father and served as viceroy of Sicily and Naples from 1610 forward.³²² In this capacity, Lemos acted as a crucial sub-patron of his father-in-law, helping the minister-favorite enlist the support of potential allies among the Italian nobility. So central was this role to his self-image that he commissioned the artist Battistello Caracciolo with a ceiling fresco for the new royal palace. Titled *The Exploits of the First Viceroy of Naples*, the idealized depiction of the partnership between his predecessor and the local elite in establishing Spanish hegemony in the sixteenth century anticipated the integration of Italian noble families into the Spanish system he was spearheading.³²³

Lemos's younger brother, Francisco Ruiz de Castro (1579–1637), performed a similar role in Rome where he served as ambassador to the Apostolic See. The city of the pope had long served as a hub of diplomacy.³²⁴ While the "theater of the world" had lost much of its luster since the Reformation, its significance for the territorially fractured Italian peninsula remained unquestioned well into the seventeenth century.³²⁵ For the Spanish monarchy in particular, Rome was so essential to the management of the crown's clienteles across the Italian peninsula that plans were being devised to transform the ambassador in the papal court into a figure coordinating the elites within the remit of the crown's formal and informal Italian possessions.³²⁶ The count of Castro was cut out for this position. Even though he was the second son in a post that was usually allotted to the first born of the Castilian nobility, his marriage to Lucrezia Legnano di Gattinara (1590–1623), from an eminent Italian dynasty related to the Colonna, Acquaviva, and Caracciolo families, made up for the perceived lack of social status.³²⁷ It was thanks to her writing to the crown's clients in their own language that Castro was able to liaise with potential protégés of the monarch.³²⁸ Like his brother, he seemed to have been eminently successful at this task, especially when they worked together

³²⁰ See De Cavi, *Architecture*.

³²¹ On the Lemos's longstanding ties to Italy, see Enciso, *Nobleza*, chap. I.3.

³²² See Enciso, *Nobleza*, for a comprehensive account of his stint as viceroy of Naples.

³²³ Palos, *La mirada*, pp. 194–195.

³²⁴ Fletcher, *Diplomacy*, pp. 1, 15–35; Osborne, *Diplomatic Culture*.

³²⁵ Rosa, *Per "tenere alla futura mutatione,"* pp. 154–157, 170–171.

³²⁶ Musi, *L'impero*, pp. 95–96; Spagnoletti, *Le dinastie italiane*, p. 127.

³²⁷ Thiessen, *Diplomatie und Patronage*, p. 134; Mrozek, *Service*, p. 5.

³²⁸ Mrozek, *Service*, p. 3.

between Naples and Rome³²⁹ Contemporaries concurred that “havere questi due ministri uniti” was “di molto servitio a Sua Maestà nelle cose d’Italia.”³³⁰

One of the more high-profile clients that Castro wanted to win over was the archbishop of Milan, Federico Borromeo. Although Lerma saw them as an influential family who he preferred to have on his side, there were considerable obstacles to their joining the minister-favorite’s clientele. An ambitious diplomat, Castro was determined to overcome them. He first tried to ingratiate himself with the Borromeo. Soon after arriving in Rome in 1609, Castro had sought to build rapport with the archbishop of Milan. After touting the canonization of St. Charles, he had marched alongside Federico Borromeo on the day it was announced to the public in Rome in 1610.³³¹ The next step in his charm offensive, following hot on the heels of the commissioning of the Borgianni painting, was his taking a prominent part in the wedding of a scion of the house of Borromeo. This was, of course, part of his brief to keep the Italian nobility in check by keeping an eye on their alliances, marital or otherwise, but the carrot was as important as the stick here.³³² As Katia Béguin has shown, the arrangement of prestigious weddings was one of the prerogatives of actual or potential patrons who derived power and influence from that sort of brokerage.³³³ It stands to reason that this explains Castro’s prominent role in the Cesi wedding. From the perspective of the groom’s family, brides of slightly higher social status were perceived as particularly desirable in that they could assist their husbands in the accumulation of capital that would otherwise remain elusive.³³⁴ Thus by facilitating a wedlock that the family of the bride thought verged on a *mésalliance*, Castro not only made his influence felt, but he did the Borromeo a favor that they would have to reciprocate.

Castro’s intention was to produce a domino effect. The wedding alliance that he coerced out of the Cesi was to render the Borromeo sufficiently grateful for the ambassador to attain the prime objective of his mission: the settlement of the festering jurisdictional controversies in the State of Milan. The instruction he had been issued when he left for Rome specified that, while the jurisdictional controversies in Naples and Sicily had been settled, they were still roiling in Milan, “donde los años pasados se vino a términos rigurosos de la una y otra parte.”³³⁵ Castro seemed ideally placed to change that. He had earned his spurs as a special envoy to Venice, when the republic’s jurisdictional conflict with the papacy was at its height in 1606.³³⁶ As is well known, this

³²⁹ For a very generic assessment of the cooperation between the Lemos brothers while they were posted in Italy, see Enciso, *Nobleza*, pp. 511–515. A careful analysis of the brothers’ correspondence is likely to yield further insight into their contribution to integrating Italian dynasties into the Spanish system.

³³⁰ *Uditore* of the papal nuncio to Madrid quoted in Visceglia, *Roma papale e Spagna*, p. 113.

³³¹ Gallo, *Orazio Borgianni*, pp. 60–61.

³³² Visceglia, *L’ambasciatore spagnolo*, pp. 14–16.

³³³ Béguin, *Les princes*, p. 81.

³³⁴ Spagnoletti, *Le dinastie italiane*, pp. 163–164.

³³⁵ Istruzione a Francisco de Castro, conte di Castro. San Lorenzo del Escorial, 1609 aprile 27, in: Giordano (ed.), *Istruzioni*, p. 68–93 (p. 73).

³³⁶ Favaro, *Carriere in movimento*, pp. 46–56.

controversy played out between secular and ecclesiastical authorities who quarreled over the right to prosecute criminal members of the clergy. When he was appointed ambassador to Rome in 1609, Castro could therefore style himself as something of an authority on matters jurisdictional. As his mission rumbled on, the settlement of the Milanese jurisdictional controversies became intensely personal. Not only would success on that front mend his fraught relations with pope Paul V; it would restore him to his rightful stature in Spanish noble circles where he had been accused of not being a particularly effective diplomat.³³⁷ By settling the decades-old controversy, Castro would kill two birds with one stone: not only would he be recognized as a successful negotiator, he would overcome the obstacle that stood in the way of the Borromeo's becoming distinguished members of the "base di massa del potere asburgico" in Italy.³³⁸

The conditions were ripe for a settlement.³³⁹ As Massimo Carlo Giannini has shown in his detailed study, by 1607 the doves had trounced the hawks in the court of Madrid. When the visitor dispatched by the Spanish monarchy attempted to escalate the simmering jurisdictional conflicts in Milan that year, he was left hung out to dry. While the Spanish authorities were still careful not to hand archbishop Borromeo a legal victory, they did go out of their way to contain what could have lapsed into another blowout.³⁴⁰ By the early 1610s, the conciliatory stance had created the climate for a permanent solution. The Spanish now offered the archbishop of Milan a treaty that would regulate the controversies not on an ad hoc, one-case-at-a-time basis, as had been standard practice for the better part of half a century, but on a more stable basis. In throwing down this offer, the Spanish side hoped to put to bed what the papacy considered an issue "che hà un'infinità di capi, anzi si può dire sia come la testa dell'Idra che quanti più se ne procura di estinguere, più ne sorgono."³⁴¹ The crown, in other words, offered archbishop Borromeo a peace treaty in the hope that détente would entail some sort of rapprochement.

The crown's aspirations cohered with the interests of the archbishop of Milan. The currency the Borromeo could spend—the family saint—in the quest for distinction had witnessed a dramatic devaluation as it became clear that the papacy was not going to grant them the coveted canonization on their preferred terms. With Rome having put paid to the narrative of St. Charles as a scourge of Spanish regalism, the Borromeo had no choice other than to run with what they had been offered: the sanitized version of St. Charles as a jewel in the Habsburg crown. Grateful for the Cesi match, they threw themselves into the negotiations that the Spanish ambassador expected to grow out of the successful marriage alliance. The sequencing of events was perfect. After a slow start in late

³³⁷ Zunckel, *Handlungsspielräume*, p. 547; Visceglia, *Roma papale e Spagna*, p. 165.

³³⁸ Spagnoletti, *Principi italiani*, p. 43.

³³⁹ On the papacy's assessment of the situation, see Visceglia, *Roma papale e Spagna*, p. 69.

³⁴⁰ Giannini, *Politica spagnola*, p. 223.

³⁴¹ Quoted in Visceglia, *Roma papale e Spagna*, p. 69.

1614, work on settling the jurisdictional conflicts commenced in earnest after the wedding in January 1615. From that point on, Castro began meeting pope Paul V on a regular basis to review a draft treaty, known as the *concordia jurisdictionalis*, which had been drawn up by a special committee composed of five cardinals.³⁴² Throughout this process, the archbishop of Milan was kept abreast of the latest developments by the ambassador's wife, the countess of Castro, who assured him of the "continua mia volontà di servirla."³⁴³ Things moved along quickly. By early 1616, she announced that the final draft had been posted to Madrid for further amendments.

The draft treaty was, by all measures, a major triumph for Castro. The ambassador had accomplished what everyone else had thought impossible: he had come within a hair's breadth of solving the vexing issue of jurisdictional rights and prerogatives. Part of his success can be pinned down to his deft use of the carrot where others had resorted to the stick. Alive to the fact that the Borromeo had maneuvered themselves into an impasse with the botched canonization of St. Charles, he offered them a way out by helping them transform the family saint and then themselves into pillars of Habsburg power in Italy. Unlike others, Castro had understood that, to wrest this concession from the proud Borromeo family, he had to offer them something in return. Using his close ties to the man at the heart of the Spanish court, Castro lured the Borromeo into submission by promising them that they, too, could soon buzz around the honeypots in Madrid. For this exploit he was rewarded. In February 1616, shortly after the draft treaty had reached Madrid, Castro was on his way to Sicily where he had been appointed viceroy, a critical rung on the career ladder.³⁴⁴

Castro's elder brother fared even better: the count of Lemos was appointed president of the Council of Italy in the fall of the same year where the *concordia* was awaiting its ratification. Picking up where his sibling had left off, the count of Lemos worked with the Borromeo's brokers in Madrid, Ercole Ramusio and Benedetto Beolco, to overcome the opposition to the draft treaty from Milan's highest court, the Senate.³⁴⁵ Although Ramusio complained that "le cose giurisdictionali qua caminano con molta tepidezza," the resolution came forth quickly enough.³⁴⁶ By late 1616, Lemos and Ramusio met Lerma to finalize the treaty.³⁴⁷ In July 1617, the Milanese *reggente* of the Council of Italy wrote to Federico Borromeo that the treaty had been ratified to the satisfaction of His Majesty, the people of Milan, and their archbishop.³⁴⁸ Working in lockstep, the Lemos brothers had cleared the way for the Borromeo's partaking of the Spanish system.

³⁴² Giovanni Garzia Mellini to Federico III Borromeo, Rome September 6, 1614: BAM, mss. G 219 inf 41; Rimoldi, *L'età dei Borromeo*, p. 397.

³⁴³ Countess of Castro to Federico III Borromeo, Rome November 20, 1615: BAM, mss. G 221 inf 119.

³⁴⁴ Count of Castro to Federico III Borromeo, Rome February 25, 1616: BAM, mss. G 222 inf 35.

³⁴⁵ Ercole Ramusio to Federico III Borromeo, Madrid May 22, 1616: BAM, mss. G 222 inf 233.

³⁴⁶ Ercole Ramusio to Federico III Borromeo, Madrid May 22, 1616: BAM, mss. G 222 inf 233.

³⁴⁷ Ercole Ramusio to Federico III Borromeo, Madrid October 16, 1616: BAM, mss. G 223bis inf 347.

³⁴⁸ Gerolamo Caimo to Federico III Borromeo, Madrid July 9, 1617: BAM, mss. G 224 inf 24.

Unbeknownst to most observers at the time, their apparent victory was a product of their incipient downfall. After serving as Lerma's most powerful sub-patrons in the Italian peninsula, the Lemos were on the way out. The patronage system that had bolstered their standing was now coming back to haunt them. If they had benefited from a close relationship to Lerma, others felt left behind and stirred against real or imagined rivals. Thus, instead of working toward a shared goal in the service of the benefactor at the top of the pyramid, Lerma's sub-patrons had begun to vie with each other for access to the minister-favorite.³⁴⁹ By 1616, the rivaling faction was making headway as their leader, Lerma's son, the duke of Uceda, moved against the Lemos. In a sign of his impending triumph, the Italian firewall which the Lemos had erected was showing more than a few cracks: Castro may have secured the viceroyalty of Sicily, but the two important posts—the viceroyalty of Naples and the governorship of Milan—went to Uceda's men.³⁵⁰ Fretting at their loss of authority, the Lemos had to make strategic use of their final lifeline—the presidency of the Council of Italy—to defang those who threatened their monopoly over the monarch's Italian clientele. No doubt to weaken the marquis of Villafranca, who had been appointed governor of Milan, Lemos went ahead and reinstated the man who had the wherewithal to hold him in check: archbishop Federico Borromeo.

Lemos's patron Lerma, too, had strictly personal reasons to wrap up the *concordia*. Aware of the storm that was brewing against him, the minister-favorite was going through the motions of obtaining a cardinalate, hoping that the red hat would allow him to get off scot free when his past would eventually catch up with him. (He was, of course, prescient. While some of his closest allies were later convicted on corruption charges, the first *privado* made it out unscathed.³⁵¹ As one courtier quipped, "El mayor ladrón del mundo para no morir ahorcado se vistió de colorado."³⁵²). To pull this off, Lerma needed to have done some favor to the papacy. Hillard von Thiessen contends that Lerma's bid proved successful because the papal family, the Borghese, were interested in landing a Spanish grandeeship, although his own evidence would suggest that the grandeeship was the quid pro quo for the canonization of St. Isidore, which took place later, in 1621.³⁵³ In fact, Lerma's correspondence with Borromeo and his entourage yields the sense that Lerma lobbied back the red hat in part as compensation for the *concordia*. After the bestowal of the biretta, Lerma wrote one of only three surviving letters to Federico Borromeo in which he seemed to draw a clear link between the settlement of the jurisdictional conflicts and his cardinalate, expressing hopes that the old

³⁴⁹ Benigno, *L'ombra*, p. 34; von Thiessen, *Diplomatie und Patronage*, p. 112.

³⁵⁰ Williams, *The Great Favourite*, p. 217.

³⁵¹ Von Thiessen, *Familienbande*, p. 121.

³⁵² Quoted in Mrozek, *Bajo acusación*, p. 254.

³⁵³ Von Thiessen, *Familienbande*, pp. 122–123; idem, *Diplomatie und Patronage*, pp. 427–428.

cardinal “se sirvirá de darme muchas ocasiones de su servicio en que poder emplearme en conformidad de las obligaciones que yo reconozco a V[uestra] S[enoría] I[lustrísima].”³⁵⁴

The *concordia* treaty itself reflected the widening power differential between Lerma and the Borromeo. Scholars studying the document from an institutional perspective have often interpreted it as a failure of the monarchy to assert itself. Agostino Borromeo has concluded that “[t]he range of this document was more restricted than had been hoped, both because the agreement failed to resolve all pending questions and because it regarded only the diocese of Milan” rather than the entire archdiocese.³⁵⁵ The final treaty remained riddled with loopholes, leading one legal historian to opine that the *concordia* was a “vero capolavoro di sottigliezza giuridica” that opened as many new frontlines as it closed old ones.³⁵⁶ Yet, in spite of the deliberately wooly wording, the treaty was a serious attempt to put the Borromeo’s relationship to the monarchy on a new footing. In a reflection of what had been the most contentious issues between the crown and its aspiring clients, the treaty honed in on some of the notorious hot-button issues, including the archbishop’s militia and his judicial powers, both markers of sovereignty that the king of Spain was no longer willing to share unconditionally with his subjects, however powerful they may have been. Countering the prevailing narrative of doom, one might point out Madrid’s successful attempts to restrict Borromeo’s right to unleash his own guards on the laity and to bring them to trial before his own courts.³⁵⁷ In attacking these two legal tenets, the monarchy put paid to the Borromeo’s abuse of ecclesiastical institutions. Henceforth they would no longer be able to pose as rivals of the king for the control of Lombardy.

Still, for the Borromeo, these losses were easily outweighed by the substantial concessions they had wrested from an enfeebled minister-favorite. Rather than taking any significant prerogatives from the archbishop, the treaty redefined the broader framework within which he would be able to continue to exercise these powers in the future. Reading through the document one is struck by how much emphasis is placed on adapting the role of the archbishop to the profoundly changed structure at the top of the monarchy. The entire treaty throbbed with professions to the cooperation of worldly and ecclesiastical leaders for the good of Christendom, although men of the Church were now clearly relegated to operating within the narrow confines laid down by the monarchy. The main impetus behind the document seems to have been the strengthening of the role of the archbishop as an administrator of royal justice. In return for accepting the king of Spain as the uncontested lord of Lombardy, Federico Borromeo was formally

³⁵⁴ Duke of Lerma to Federico III Borromeo, Madrid April 23, 1618: BAM, mss. G 227 inf 230.

³⁵⁵ Borromeo, *The Crown and the Church*, p. 553.

³⁵⁶ Prosdocimi, *Il diritto*, p. 320.

³⁵⁷ Rimoldi, *L’età dei Borromeo*, p. 397. Also see *Concordia giurisdizionale tra il foro ecclesiastico e il foro secolare di Milano*, p. 144.

granted ample jurisdictional privileges over the clergy and the laity that had hitherto been disputed, with the proviso that he accepted that these powers were not innate but emanated from the king.³⁵⁸

In this respect the process underway bore more than a passing resemblance with similar changes afoot in France. As Katia Béguin explains, the integration of the high nobility into the king's patronage pyramid turned them into dispensers of royal largesse which in turn fortified the loyalty to the ruling house in the peripheries.³⁵⁹ Yet, if Borromeo's French counterparts often had to trade in their religious beliefs in return for continued supremacy, the archbishop of Milan was being asked, not to disavow long-held religious convictions, but to adapt them to the era of the minister-favorite. Far from depriving Federico Borromeo of his regional power base, the *concordia* engineered the transformation of the former ecclesiastical maverick into a royal sub-patron, administering ecclesiastical justice at the behest of the Catholic king.³⁶⁰ What had once seemed mutually exclusive was fast coalescing to become that joint governance of the Spanish crown and the papacy that was to dominate the seventeenth century in the Italian peninsula. An enfeebled Lerma-Lemos faction, desperate to prop up their crumbling power, had created propitious conditions for the Borromeo to place their powers on a new footing, one more attuned to the realities of the new century.

In coming to terms with the bare facts of seventeenth-century reality, the Borromeo were following broader trends. The novel form of government of the minister-favorite that the seventeenth century had heralded made resistance to royal authority a steadily less effective way of preserving pre-eminence. Traditionally it used to be assumed that nobles were browbeaten into submission by farsighted monarchs.³⁶¹ More recently, scholars have pointed out that there were strong incentives for the nobility to lead the charge in this process. As Ronald Asch has shown, in the seventeenth century, noble status was derived primarily from elite's association with various functions of the princely courts, including political offices, as well as shares in the income generated through taxation and state bonds.³⁶² Nobles who did not partake of the staggering array of monikers of royal grace that were being handed out in the court would no longer be able to keep up with local rivals who scaled to ever higher heights thanks to the rewards with which they were being showered. As well as by rivalry with other families, these changes were driven by the realization that, as Pierre Bourdieu phrases it, dominion "has no value or social efficacy unless conceded by an independent power," a realization that would deepen over the course of the *Seicento*.³⁶³

³⁵⁸ Prosdocimi, *Il diritto*, pp. 321–322.

³⁵⁹ Béguin, *Les princes*, p. 55.

³⁶⁰ Zunckel, *Handlungsspielräume*, p. 532.

³⁶¹ For a classic statement, see Schalk, *The Court as "Civilizer,"* p. 257. This argument harkens back to Elias, *The Court Society*.

³⁶² Asch, *Nobilities in Transition*, p. 126.

³⁶³ Bourdieu, *The State Nobility*, p. 383.

The composite Spanish monarchy had anticipated the drift toward “courtization.”³⁶⁴ The Catholic kings had utilized patronage to secure the loyalty of the Italian nobility from the very beginning of Spanish rule over Italy. As early as in the 1550s, Giovanni della Casa scoffed at the Spanish practice of distributing titles which were little more than “sembianti senza effetto” and “parole senza significato” to buy off local potentates.³⁶⁵ By the turn of the seventeenth century, snark of the sort was no longer an option. In a steadily more competitive climate, even families wielding as much clout as the Borromeo could no longer dispense with what others thought of them.³⁶⁶ The rise of the new regime of Lerma made it clear in the first decade of the 1600s that to be cut off from the royal well of grace could have disastrous effects in a political marketplace that was rapidly being restructured, with those who had failed to enter Lerma’s circle being shut out of power and facing the prospect of social suicide in a society that placed growing value on court-issued markers of distinction.³⁶⁷ While some of the excluded grumbled, most strained to follow the example of their Castilian sub-patrons and cozied up to the minister-favorite in Madrid. As a result, more and more nobles from Spanish Italy ditched their rugged individualism and deepened their links to the sovereign as the alluring resources of the Spanish monarchy beckoned.³⁶⁸ With the king of Spain hovering over them as a protector, families like the Borromeo, who had prided themselves on their independence, were in a position to maximize their power on their home turf.³⁶⁹

While the current historiography has stressed the agency of the nobility in this process, perhaps even too much so, it has overlooked that the crown was equally as interested in securing the loyalty of families like the Borromeo. Instances of ecclesiastical dynasties who had not come around like Borromeo served as an object lesson of what that failure meant for the stability of the empire. In Sicily Giannettino Doria, of the noble Genoese family, served as archbishop from 1609 through 1642 and although he enjoyed the full confidence of the monarch (serving twice as interim viceroy during his mandate), the lack of a binding rulebook regulating the jurisdictional purview of the Church vis-à-vis the monarchy comparable to the Milanese *concordia* entailed negative consequences. In 1611, when the Borromeo were intent on rapprochement with the monarchy, Doria prided himself on having elevated the status of the archbishopric of Palermo “quasi al paro di quello del viceré.”³⁷⁰ By the late 1610s, as Borromeo in Milan signed the *concordia*, the facilitator of that process, the count of Lemos, groaned that Doria, “por ser tan dependente de Roma, al fin como cardinal y arcobispo de

³⁶⁴ The original formulation of the idea is in Elias, *Court Society*. For a reinterpretation, see Duindam, *Myths of Power*, and Asch, *Nobilities in Transition*.

³⁶⁵ Quoted in Spagnoletti, *Principi italiani*, p. 105.

³⁶⁶ Dewald, *Status, Power, and Identity*, p. 197.

³⁶⁷ Asch, *Nobilities in Transition*, p. 117.

³⁶⁸ Sodano, *Le aristocrazie napoletane*, p. 134.

³⁶⁹ Noto, *Élites transnazionali*, p. 19.

³⁷⁰ Quoted in D’Avenia, *La Chiesa del re*, p. 15.

Palermo, se muestra poco afecto a la Monarquía.”³⁷¹ If this was true of the representative of a family in whose reproductive strategy Rome had always played second fiddle, it is not difficult at all to imagine how the Borromeo, a family who had long banked on their ties to the papal court, might have conducted themselves if their conflict with the monarchy had not been deescalated.³⁷²

In Doria’s case, failure to entangle him in the elite networks of the Spanish Habsburgs redounded on the monarchy after the election of a pro-French pope, Urban VIII Barberini, in 1623. In fact, Doria’s detractors argued, the election of a francophile pontiff encouraged the archbishop to give free rein to his anti-Spanish instincts.³⁷³ If some members of the Council of Italy initially propended to dismiss his critics as envious left-behinds, the monarchy slowly came to the realization that Doria’s close ties to the Barberini family allowed him to wage war on the *Regia Monarchia*, a royal court overseeing ecclesiastical affairs on the basis of the legal fiction of the Apostolic Legacy which put the king of Sicily in charge of the island’s Church.³⁷⁴ Although he had been cooperative on some of the jurisdictional issues, Philip IV in 1639 determined that Doria was too tied to a Roman curia that had been colonized by Genoese merchants to be amenable to royal orders issued in Madrid.³⁷⁵ In a memorandum written in his name, the king accused Doria of having “gettato a terra ciò che è stato riguardato come il più essenziale di questa mia giurisdizione.”³⁷⁶ As the Spanish monarchy entered its worst crisis of the century, the archbishop of Palermo was a liability in Sicily the Borromeo might easily have become in Lombardy if they had not signed the *concordia* in 1618. The rapprochement between the crown and the Borromeo was beneficial to both parties. By making a few token concessions, the Borromeo built a lasting relationship with the Spanish monarchy whose subsequent minister-favorites would count on them in the dark times that lay ahead.

The men who had admitted the Borromeo to the august circle of the imperial nobility did not fare that well. Realizing that he would not be able to influence Lerma, the duke of Uceda tried to cut out the middleman. He connived with Philip III’s confessor and sought to overthrow his father to place himself and his followers at the top the social pyramid.³⁷⁷ As the Lemos brothers basked in the glory of winning over the Borromeo, the duke of Uceda was plotting to lift himself into his father’s position. Although he never established himself as an uncontested favorite, he succeeded in forcing his father to leave the court.³⁷⁸ The ship of the Lemos brothers sank alongside Lerma’s, with the

³⁷¹ Quoted in D’Avenia, *Lealtà alla prova*, p. 58.

³⁷² On the Doria’s family strategy, see D’Avenia, *Lealtà alla prova*, pp. 59–60.

³⁷³ Scalisi, *Il controllo del sacro*, p. 149.

³⁷⁴ Scalisi, *Il controllo del sacro*, p. 160; D’Avenia, *La Chiesa del re*, p. 128.

³⁷⁵ Scalisi, *Il controllo del sacro*, p. 163.

³⁷⁶ Quoted in Scalisi, *Il controllo del sacro*, p. 163.

³⁷⁷ Von Thiessen, *Diplomatie und Patronage*, pp. 113–115.

³⁷⁸ Von Thiessen, *Diplomatie und Patronage*, p. 116.

count of Castro hanging on by his fingernails as viceroy of Sicily and the count of Lemos being forced to retire from the Council of Italy.

Their clients, the Borromeo, were the only ones to survive the transition of power unscathed. They had pounced on the chance that had been offered to them, come clean with the monarchy, and were now poised to embark on a splendid future as Habsburg surrogates. Having hit rock bottom in their relations to the papal family with the bungled canonization of St. Charles, the Cesi wedding proved to be the way out of the stand-off with Philip III: it was the first step of the Borromeo's rebranding as clients of the Habsburgs. In engineering the transition from intractable rebels to courtiers, they availed themselves of the Lemos brothers who acted as the most influential sub-patrons of the patron-in-chief, the duke of Lerma, in Italy. By letting the count of Castro act as a facilitator and witness to a pivotal wedding with a Roman dynasty, the Borromeo paved the way for the signing of a peace treaty between the king of Spain and one of his most wayward subjects, and the subsequent admittance of the dynasty to the circle of the monarch's Italian protégés.

With the Uceda interregnum lasting a mere two years, the close association with Lerma and the Lemos brothers turned out to be more helpful than hurtful. Although they were deprived of the influence they had just won at the court of Madrid, the exclusion did not last long. When Philip III died in 1621, the Uceda clan was replaced by a new family, the Zúñiga. In keeping with what Birgit Emich has identified as the A-B-A pattern of patronage, according to which the clients of a particular patron were duly reinserted into the patronage market when his successor fell from grace and a third patron came to power³⁷⁹, the Borromeo made a successful attempt to catch up lost power after the death of Philip III. As they donned the mantle of Spanish loyalism under Philip IV and his new minister-favorite, the count-duke of Olivares, the Borromeo's climb toward the top of the social ladder became unstoppable.

Although historians of the Spanish monarchy have up until now shown little interest in such trajectories, they were exceedingly common in Europe at the time. In France, the integration of truculent aristocrats was a particularly painful process, with the nobility having to go so far as to abandon their Reformed faith and convert to the Catholic orthodoxy of the royal dynasty that had come out on top in the Wars of Religion. In the Spanish empire, where (with the notable exception of the Netherlands) elites remained faithful to the Catholic Church, the same transition was much less disruptive. Although dynasties such as the Borromeo had espoused a particularly militant form of Tridentine Catholicism to buttress their power vis-à-vis the monarchy, their opposition remained within the confines of Roman orthodoxy. As a result, the monarchy could be much more lenient in its treatment of former aristocratic rebels, asking them to make minor adaptations of their religious

³⁷⁹ Emich, *Karrieresprung*, p. 135.

ideas to accommodate the new reality of court society rather than to disavow everything they used to believe in. This may well be one of the reasons why the transformation of religiously motivated noble rebels into courtiers has thus far been overlooked by historians of Spain. Yet, as the example of the Borromeo shows, this was a fundamental shift in attitudes, and one that was deeply rewarding for clans like them. The marriage alliances they entered in Rome, their old point of reference, prepared the ground for their ascent in the court of Madrid, an ascent that would allow them to leave behind the nagging doubts about their not really belonging to the high nobility and enable the monarchy to keep hold of one of its key territories in the troubling decades that lay ahead.

Chapter 3

***Olivaristas* on the Make: The Borromeo and the Government of the Minister-Favorite**

Lake Maggiore has long spellbound travelers. Located some 40 miles northwest of Milan, it is the second largest of a group of glacial lakes in the hilly area between the flat Po valley and the snow-capped peaks of the Alps. Things were hardly different in the early seventeenth century. Vaunting a Mediterranean clime, bountiful flora, and flourishing trade in one of Europe's most advanced economies, Lake Maggiore was uncontested Borromeo territory. Journeying north from Milan, early modern travelers first encountered the lake at Sesto Calende, where its southern tip is squeezed between two hills, each topped with a medieval fortress: Arona to the left, Angera to the right. The medieval castle of Angera had belonged to the ruling Visconti family before they enfeoffed it in 1449 to their financiers, the Borromeo. When the Spanish took over in Milan in 1535, they saw the castle on the border of the Duchy of Savoy as a potential safety hazard, and for this reason, they proceeded to confiscate the castle in 1577 (officially on the grounds that the feudatory had killed his wife but quite possibly in retaliation for archbishop Carlo's conduct during the plague).³⁸⁰ Crestfallen about losing what they considered the heart of the impressive *Stato Borromeo*, the Borromeo never lost sight of the fortress. By the early 1620s, in the wake of the rapprochement with the Spanish Habsburgs, the moment seemed to have come for them to launch a renewed bid to recover the castle.

The mastermind behind this intricate plan was archbishop Federico's nephew, Giulio Cesare. As we have seen in the previous chapter, his marriage to Giovanna Cesi had facilitated the reconciliation between the Borromeo family and the Spanish crown which had culminated in the signing of the *concordia* treaty in 1618. As the archbishop's favorite nephew, Giulio Cesare was eager to parlay the détente he had helped bring about into a stepping stone to buttress the still precarious cadet branch of the Borromeo that he headed. In doing so, Giulio Cesare speculated on the monarchy's growing desire to bind the elites in the far-flung Spanish empire closer to the center through the use of the crown's considerable patronage. As the new monarch, Philip IV, settled in and his minister-favorite, the count-duke of Olivares, asserted himself as his patron-in-chief, aspirational dynasties like the Borromeo could hope to improve their lot by acquiring strategic fiefdoms, such as the castle of Angera, which put them in a position where they could serve the monarch as sub-patrons. Gaming the new mechanisms of social upward mobility that were opening up at the court, Giulio Cesare hoped to put his young family on the map as *olivaristas*, supporters of the new minister-favorite. In this he succeeded: in 1623, a mere five years after the signing of the *concordia*, Giulio Cesare shelled out a considerable sum of money and got ahold of Angera.

³⁸⁰ Cremonini, *Storia di un'eclissi*, p. 484.

The quid pro quo between the Borromeo and the minister-favorite was part of broader developments in Western European monarchies at the time: the use of patronage on an unprecedented scale to form massive clienteles smitten with the expanding monarchies. Having long viewed it as a vestige from the Middle Ages and an obstacle to modernization, historians now understand the “bastard feudalism” or “refeudalization” of the seventeenth century as instrumental to the inclusion of noble elites. As Wallace MacCaffrey phrased it in a now-classic essay on Tudor England, Henry VIII (r. 1509–1547) “had to take on the difficult task of mastering an established political elite, of securing their loyalty and cooperation, for it was through these men that he would be able to govern England.” To achieve this, he relied on his charisma as much as “very tangible material rewards” such as offices, pensions, and estates.³⁸¹ Subsequent research has revealed that this bartering grew steadily more sophisticated over the course of the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. Linda Levy Peck, in her study on the early Stuart court, has shown how, at the turn of the seventeenth century, the exchange of material rewards in return for loyalty was both monetized and marketized. Although contemporaries held on to the outdated notion that these honors were gifts for loyal services rendered, the reality was much less uplifting.³⁸² A monarchy desperate to fill its chronically empty coffers, Levy Peck has demonstrated, gave in to the temptation of “cannibaliz[ing] its patronage and bounty in the form of sale of honors, titles, licenses and offices.”³⁸³ The same can be said of the regime of the count-duke of Olivares. Knowing full well that he would not be able to govern the vast Spanish empire, much less implement his ambitious plans to unify its disparate territories, without the active cooperation of the nobility in the provinces, Philip IV’s minister-favorite continued to rely on the well-oiled patronage machine of his predecessors, luring elite families like the Borromeo into joining that mass base of Habsburg power that he was building. In return for a sizeable sum of money, clans from across the monarchy could become surrogates of the crown with privileged access to its collective resources.

Historians differ in their assessment of this process. Scholars pursuing a functionalist approach to patronage have pointed to the obvious practical advantages of such arrangements, with some of the cruder interpretations viewing them as conducive to that be-all and end-all of early modern history: the formation of the modern state. While such readings have been a welcome corrective to the moralistic condemnation of earlier accounts, which faulted early modern elites for the inherent corruption of their rule, functionalist accounts often fail to embed patronage in its broader social context and therefore brush aside contemporaries’ own discomfort with the rule of

³⁸¹ MacCaffrey, *Patronage and Politics*, p. 21.

³⁸² See Biagioli, Galileo Courtier, pp. 37–38. For an excellent overview of this inherent contradiction, see Levy Peck, *Court Patronage*, chap. 1

³⁸³ Levy Peck, *Court Patronage*, p. 4.

the minister-favorite.³⁸⁴ As the evidence presented here reveals, contemporaries agonized over the fact that their actions were at variance with their own neostoic ideas of the monarchy as a union committed to the preservation of the commonweal, and this fretting gave rise to charges of undue preferment and administrative malpractices that fit contemporary definitions of corruption.³⁸⁵ Ruling class practices, then, were far from uncontroversial, even in their own times. As I show here, Olivares and his cronies strained to negotiate the chasm between their ambitious ideals and the persistence of favoritism. But rather than address the contradiction head on, Olivares and his clients ostentatiously denied the unsavory reality of rampant malfeasance and chose to traffic in myths about the just government of the minister-favorite instead. The Borromeo, the latest high-profile addition to the crown's protégés, were no different. Even though they knew from their own experience of the extent to which the monarchy deviated from the promotion of the common good, Federico Borromeo published a treatise on the court of Philip IV in which he portrayed Olivares and his entourage as disinterested servants of the king, whose only preoccupation was to uphold the commonweal.

What is one to make of such blatant contradictions? I argue, counterintuitively perhaps, that these should not be construed as the willful distortions of a cunning social climber. Using Pierre Bourdieu's concept of "misrecognition," I submit that the mischaracterization of the Olivares regime in Borromeo's treatise are a half-conscious effort to negotiate the yawning gap between the lofty rhetoric, to which the family subscribed, and the sobering reality of the regime. The misrecognition of the less than ideal governing practices of the contemporary elite was an efficacious coping mechanism for a family ill at ease with the perceived corruption of the court. But it was also, and primarily so, an act of "hypocrisy" as theorized by Nils Brunsson where the conflict between ideology and action worked to the benefit of the regime's short-term stability.³⁸⁶ As such it was built on sand. It helped stabilize the Olivares for a while, but as time wore on, the reneged promises supplied a discursive weapon to those who had remained shut out of the massive redistribution of collective resources that the Olivares regime ushered in. The elites' continued betrayal of their own professed ideals galvanized opposition from below that would bring down the system on which the Borromeo had hoped to feast when Giulio Cesare set out to acquire the castle of Angera and become lord of Lake Maggiore.

Born in 1593, Giulio Cesare Borromeo was an unlikely contender for that title. His deportment as a youth growing up in the shadows of his two elder brothers bore all the trademarks

³⁸⁴ See Benigno, *Conflitto politico*, p. 124.

³⁸⁵ Grüne, *Anfechtung und Legitimation*, p. 412.

³⁸⁶ Brunsson, *The Organization of Hypocrisy*, p. vii.

of a third son of a family of his station. As was typical at the time, Giulio Cesare's elder brothers had been assigned distinct roles: the eldest, Giovanni (1580–1613) was reared to succeed his father as seigneur of Lake Maggiore, while Carlo (1586–1652) was groomed for an ecclesiastical career. Giulio Cesare, on the other hand, was struggling to find his way. As a student he seems to have been something of an underachiever. When he was sent away from home to stay with the Paleotti and the Pepoli, two of Bologna's senatorial families who called the shots in the second largest city of the Papal States, at the age of 18, his hosts were embarrassed to report to his guardian, cardinal Federico, that he was not the most industrious student—certainly not as busy as his uncle had been—and begged that the old cardinal “qualche volta con sue l[ette]re l'animasse, et spronasse ad essi studij.”³⁸⁷ If such admonitions ever came forth, they were to little avail. The longer Giulio Cesare stayed in Bologna, the more restless and skittish he grew. No sooner had he settled in than he wanted to travel back to Milan and celebrate Easter with his family.³⁸⁸ In the following months, his uncle was flooded with letters begging him to grant his nephew permission to travel to a variety of places, ranging from Rome to Ferrara to Florence and Pisa, where he hoped to “prendere qualche gusto dalla novità de luoghi, et effettuar il mio pensiero di provare varie pratiche d'altri paesi mentre me ne stò longi da Casa.”³⁸⁹ While his brothers seemed to have their work cut out for themselves, Giulio Cesare appeared disorientated.

All this changed suddenly in 1613 when the first in line to inherit the family fief died unexpectedly. With Carlo having been slated for an ecclesiastical career, Giulio Cesare was expecting to obtain the family landholdings. Much to his chagrin, Carlo had abandoned his ecclesiastical vocation. After telling his confessor as a teenager that he had no intention of becoming a cleric, he had left the Collegio Borromeo, a prestigious seminary set up in Pavia by archbishop Carlo, and in 1612, to the dismay of his uncle, embarked on a costly education as a gentleman at the court of the Farnese at Parma.³⁹⁰ When his eldest brother died, he was, therefore, as keen as Giulio Cesare to become the new lord of Lake Maggiore. Conflict between the brothers seemed inevitable as the intractable Giulio Cesare had finally found a purpose and was unwilling to give up without a fight.

Giulio Cesare's last best hope was the family patriarch, archbishop Federico. Giulio Cesare had long been cultivating a special relationship with his uncle, a relationship that even by the standards of the times was extraordinarily subservient. During his stay in Bologna he wasted no opportunity to ingratiate himself with the cardinal and to demonstrate his reverence to the head of

³⁸⁷ Galeazzo Paleotti to Federico III Borromeo, Bologna June 22, 1612: BAM, mss. G 212 inf 177. On Bolognese families, see Reinhardt, *Macht und Ohnmacht*, p. 66.

³⁸⁸ Galeazzo Paleotti to Federico III Borromeo, Bologna April 15, 1612: BAM, mss. G 212 inf 128.

³⁸⁹ Giulio Cesare Borromeo to Federico III Borromeo, Bologna September 3, 1612: BAM, mss. G 211 inf 293.

³⁹⁰ Cremonini, *Storia di un'eclissi*, pp. 482–483. Carlo and Giulio Cesare's mother was Ersilia Farnese, a sister of the duke of Parma.

the household.³⁹¹ Consider this example. After months of pleading, Federico had grudgingly granted his nephew permission to travel to Tuscany. However, when Giulio Cesare sensed that it was not “di tutto suo gusto ch’io facci questo,” he decided, “di non movermi di qua,” “volendomi conformare sempre col gusto di V[ostre] S[ignoria] Ill[ustrissi]ma.”³⁹² As he geared up to challenge his brother’s claim to the *Stato Borromeo*, Giulio Cesare adduced a combination of his long history of loyalty toward the family cardinal and pointed reminders of Carlo’s unreliability to nudge Federico into compliance. Not only did he evoke Carlo’s refusal to accept the family’s decision to turn him into the archbishop’s designated successor, he also made most of Carlo’s obstreperous ways and wasteful spending in Pavia and Parma.³⁹³ Such accusations fell on receptive ears. The archbishop appears to have been particularly worried about the potential fallout from Carlo’s unrefined manners, which were so legendary an emissary of the house of Medici had mocked them in a letter back home.³⁹⁴ Concerns about his conduct were not exactly unfounded, not least because the archbishop was in the midst of trying to make peace with the Spanish crown, a delicate process during which Carlo’s unpredictable behavior threatened to jeopardize the settlement on the jurisdictional disputes that Borromeo was negotiating with the Spanish ambassador to Rome.³⁹⁵ With both Giulio Cesare and Federico anxious to keep Carlo’s hands off the family jewels, Giulio Cesare scored an easy victory.

Alas, the legal framework in place did not give them much leeway. Recent developments in inheritance law militated against them. As Antonio Álvarez-Ossorio Alvarino has shown in an article on the State of Milan, the reign of Philip III witnessed a major push toward enforcing primogeniture, a tenet from Roman law which dictated that the first-born son inherit the entirety of his father’s possessions. Members of the Council of Italy in Madrid were making impassioned arguments that if the current practice continued unabated and a fief was bequeathed to all sons of its first recipient, the monarchy would in due time end up with “fifty lords” owning a single estate.³⁹⁶ What such fear-mongering alluded to was the fact that Milanese elites still cling on to a set of Lombard inheritance laws which allowed for estates to be divided up between brothers so long as this suited the purposes of the dynasty’s social reproduction.³⁹⁷ In some cases, in the city of Milan for instance, it was expressly forbidden to privilege one descendant over others, making titles of nobility shared (*condivisi*) between brothers exceedingly common.³⁹⁸ It was to this increasingly contested legal precedent that Federico Borromeo needed to appeal to please his younger nephew, Giulio Cesare.

³⁹¹ This hyperbolic rhetoric was, of course, characteristic of letters written in the seventeenth century. See Sternberg, *Status Interaction*, chap. 6.

³⁹² Giulio Cesare to Federico III Borromeo, Bologna September 17, 1612: BAM, mss. G 211 inf 282.

³⁹³ Cremonini, *Storia di un’eclissi*, pp. 482–483.

³⁹⁴ See Besozzi, *Cronistoria*, p. 277.

³⁹⁵ Cremonini, *Storia di un’eclissi*, p. 485.

³⁹⁶ Quoted in Álvarez-Ossorio, *The King and the Family*, p. 193.

³⁹⁷ Cremonini, *Le vie*, pp. 91–92, 131.

³⁹⁸ Álvarez-Ossorio, *The King and the Family*, pp. 194, 199.

While he was unable to short-circuit the law of primogeniture, the estates division was not yet entirely off the table and still offered a loophole that could save Giulio Cesare from being left out in the cold. To block Carlo's rise, Federico had to request that the *Stato Borromeo* be divided between him and Giulio Cesare. He succeeded against considerable odds.

Still, the settlement reached early in 1614 reflected the growing imbalance of power between first-borns and cadets. According to a notarial act drawn up in March of that year, Carlo inherited the lion's share of the *Stato Borromeo*, including the most prestigious fiefs on Lake Maggiore such as the castle of Arona.³⁹⁹ Giulio Cesare, on the other hand, had to make do with two castles, Origgio and Peschiera, to the east and the west of Milan, respectively. As for the territories around the all-important lake, he received two towns on the western shore, Intra and Cannobio, two valleys bounded by the Swiss Confederacy and the Valais, the Valle Vigezzo and the Valle Anzasca, and an island where the lake widens to form the aptly named Golfo Borromeo.⁴⁰⁰ To Giulio Cesare, all this must have smacked of a consolation prize, and certainly did not suit someone who had as strong a sense of entitlement as he did. Piqued, he, instead of cooperating with his elder brother on the lake and beyond, as the spirit of the Lombard law on estates division would have dictated, was determined to set up a new branch of the Borromeo. Thus, the estates division of 1614, far from putting an end to the rivalries between Carlo and Giulio Cesare, portended an arms race on Lake Maggiore as each of the two brothers sought to outdo his rival.

The strategy Giulio Cesare came up with centered on making the most of his uncle and protector's rapprochement with the Spanish crown which his own marriage to Giovanna Cesi had helped deliver. From the moment the young couple returned to Milan from Rome in 1615, Giulio Cesare contrived to turn the détente between the Borromeo and the monarchy to his branch's advantage. As Carlo made the worst fears of his family members come true and became embroiled in endless conflicts with the monarchy that resulted in two arrests (see chapter 6), Federico's favorite nephew seized on the chance that the new government of the minister-favorite in Madrid offered, and courted the minister-favorite in Madrid to set up a pro-Spanish cadet branch that soon outdid the recalcitrant main line of the family in status and prestige.

In this he was ably assisted by his wife, Giovanna. Despite her initial misgivings, Giovanna must have realized soon after their wedding how much she had in common with her husband. Like Giulio Cesare, she was the third born child and, like Giulio Cesare, the resulting sense of having been sold short by an arbitrary birth order goaded her on to excel. Thus, shortly after settling in Milan, she enlisted in her husband's project of using strategic planning to overcome the shortcomings of the

³⁹⁹ Besozzi, *Ritratti*, p. 43.

⁴⁰⁰ The Spanish monarchy was more than happy to go along with this as it suited its policy of dismantling the powerful houses lest they "be tempted into joining forces with the princes bordering on the State of Milan" and toppling Spanish rule. Álvarez-Ossorio, *The King and the Family*, p. 206.

cards they had been dealt. Their audacious plan to defy fate and establish a cadet branch of the Borromeo was almost unheard of at the time. Today's societies make much of the rivalry between brothers and sisters, viewing competition between siblings as crucial to the formation of selfhood.⁴⁰¹ The dynastic societies of early modern Europe, on the other hand, did not encourage such fancies: in order for the family unit to function, the individual had to submit their will to the well-being of the household.⁴⁰² Siblings in particular were expected to perform individual but ultimately complementary roles in the service of the family unit. If they were rivals at all, they were rivals united by the shared goal of preserving the dynasty's power.⁴⁰³ Where they did occur rebellions against cherished conventions often came at the cost of exclusion from the family group. If Giulio Cesare was nevertheless able to pursue his plans, this was only possible because he and his wife enjoyed the backing of the head of household who had a deep appreciation of Giulio Cesare and his wife.⁴⁰⁴ It was only thanks to the support of archbishop Federico that the couple succeeded in getting on the social mobility ladder.

The first rung of that ladder was to acquire a fief to rival Carlo's Arona with its fortress. Historians have come to challenge the once widespread notion that the early modern Italian nobility was essentially made up of urban dwellers, showing instead that noble families continued to draw legitimacy from their possessions in the surrounding countryside.⁴⁰⁵ Possessing a fief, or a part of the kingdom the monarch had alienated to a member of the local elite, was an essential prerequisite of nobility in early modern Europe. Castles, reminiscent as they were of the original medieval rewards for military service, continued to be especially coveted assets. Although contemporaries harked back to an imagined medieval past, this should not detract from the many changes that the advent of Renaissance monarchies had wrought.⁴⁰⁶ Historians differ on the exact nature of what some have dubbed the "bastard feudalism" of the early modern period. There is some agreement that, in Mediterranean Europe, fiefs were a share of the king's jurisdiction over people and land that was outsourced to feudatories within a broader patrimonial logic.⁴⁰⁷ What is contested is the relationship of fiefs to the emerging monarchical state. Aurelio Musi has argued that fiefs rivaled a rising "stato moderno," although he also grants that the "sviluppo dello stato moderno come affermazione della sovranità unica e indivisibile e persistenze feudali" were not a "processo di contrapposizione" but rather an "osmosi e un complesso intreccio fra collusione e collisione."⁴⁰⁸ While Musi's model is perhaps adequate to describe Spain's possessions in southern Italy, where feudatories held extensive

⁴⁰¹ These ideas about sibling relationships are discussed in Davidoff, *Thicker Than Water*, chap. 1.

⁴⁰² Dallett Hemphill, *Siblings*, pp. 17–18.

⁴⁰³ See Harris, *Siblinghood and Social Relations*; Ruppel, *Verbündete Rivalen*; Borello, *Il posto di ciascuno*.

⁴⁰⁴ See Vester, *Renaissance Dynasticism*, for an example of a successful affirmation of a cadet branch of the house of Savoy.

⁴⁰⁵ Astarita, *The Continuity of Feudal Power*, p. 120.

⁴⁰⁶ Ago, *La feudalità*, p. ix. On medieval feudalism, see White, *Service for Fiefs*.

⁴⁰⁷ Musi, *Il feudalesimo*, p. 36.

⁴⁰⁸ Musi, *Il feudalesimo*, p. 37.

jurisdiction, the “contrapposizione” between fiefs and the state he posits seems vastly overblown in the State of Milan. There, it is, in fact, more convincing to argue, as Renata Ago and others have done, that feudatories acted as brokers between the monarch and local society, using this role to display their pre-eminence rather than to undermine monarchical power, as Musi seems to imply.⁴⁰⁹

Irrespective of the interpretation of early modern landholding one favors, it appears indisputable that fiefs performed a vital social function, adding to the status of their holders. But in this regard, too, there were significant differences between the Catholic king’s Italian possessions. As Katia Visconti has argued, in the southern kingdoms of Naples and Sicily, the investiture with a fief, complete with extensive jurisdictional and economic rights to exploit the labor of the peasantry, tended to mark the end of a long process of upward mobility. In the State of Milan, on the other hand, securing a fief and the noble title attached to it were not the end of a process of social upward mobility but, rather, the sine qua non that laid the groundwork for further advancement toward higher rank and status.⁴¹⁰ This insight tallies with the findings of numerous case studies on the so-called new nobility, commoners who began their trajectories in the seventeenth and entered the small circle of the established nobility in the following century.⁴¹¹ The same applied, of course, to cadet branches, even if their representatives hailed from dynasties as established as the Borromeo, and so it should not come as a surprise that Giulio Cesare Borromeo and Giovanna Cesi developed a strong interest in acquiring a fief from the king of Spain. They quickly set their eyes on the castle of Angera when it was put up for sale in the early 1620s.

As every Milanese dynasty eager to obtain a favor from the Catholic king, Giulio Cesare and Giovanna dispatched an agent, Giovan Battista Besozzo, who was to broker the sale of Angera on their behalf. The letters that survive from his commission are well known, although historians who have studied them before have done so under the assumption that Besozzo was negotiating the sale of the castle on behalf of archbishop Federico.⁴¹² However, a careful re-reading of the epistles suggests a different interpretation: Besozzo was trying to recover the castle of Angera for Federico’s favorite nephew Giulio Cesare and his wife Giovanna. In fact, the secrecy that has misled historians was part of his strategy: the Spanish authorities were to be hoodwinked into believing that the old archbishop wanted the castle all for himself, for, as Besozzo put it to the archbishop, “questi Regij non vogliono far niente, se non lo fanno in gratia di V[ost]ra S[ignoria] I[llustrissima].”⁴¹³ Early on in the negotiations the agent therefore pressed the old cardinal to agree “che si dimanda in nome suo” on the understanding that his name was little more than a smokescreen concealing the real

⁴⁰⁹ Ago, *La feudalità*, pp. 5, 117, 121-123.

⁴¹⁰ Visconti, *Il commercio dell’onore*, p. 9.

⁴¹¹ See the case studies in Cremonini, *Le vie*, and Tonelli, *Investire con profitto*.

⁴¹² Cremonini, *Ritratto politico*, pp. 37-41.

⁴¹³ Giovanni Battista Besozzo to Federico III Borromeo, Madrid June 1, 1623: BAM, mss. G 254bis inf 217.

beneficiaries.⁴¹⁴ Further corroborating this is the fact that Besozzo was in regular epistolary contact with Giulio Cesare and Giovanna, who seems to have been a particularly astute strategist (a talent she would put to great use after her husband's death, as we will see in chapter 10).⁴¹⁵ Although these letters do not survive, Besozzo acknowledged on multiple occasions that Giovanna was the driving force behind the negotiations over Angera, something that was later ascertained by Besozzo's negotiating partners, with one of them assuring the broker that he had "molto à petto questo particolare" because Giovanna Cesi had promised him "un bello donativo" if the negotiations went well.⁴¹⁶

Giovanna's work behind the scenes is best explained as a result of the power-sharing arrangements typical of couples of Giulio Cesare and Giovanna's time and station. Much like siblings, married couples were expected to pool their talents and cooperate toward the goal of social advancement for the family unit. Heide Wunder coined the term "working couple" to describe the husband-and-wife teams who managed and ran everything from humble workshops to the increasingly complex administration of landed estates and government offices.⁴¹⁷ In more recent years historians have become particularly interested in the "division of labor" among noble couples. Historians like Barbara Harris, Elaine Chalus, and Sara Chapman have stressed the significant contribution of women to the management of property, household and networks of kin and kith.⁴¹⁸ Wives had to liaise with middlemen of all sorts to guarantee the smooth running of the family enterprise, and were widely accepted in that role.⁴¹⁹ As Renata Ago has argued of marriages in noble families from Rome, "la moglie è il primo e più fido 'ministro' del marito."⁴²⁰

In light of these expectations it is surprising to see just how illiterate many of these women were. In seventeenth-century Italy, the letters of noble women were written in shaky hands and often barely grammatical.⁴²¹ Giovanna was no exception. Her earliest letters which she wrote shortly after arriving in Milan reveal that her formal education must have been rudimentary.⁴²² Laced with dialectal expressions and spelling errors, the missives with their long-winded sentences she scribbled in the early years of her marriage to Giulio Cesare show a woman more at ease with the spoken than the written word.⁴²³ (Indeed, someone in her entourage, possibly her husband, must have deemed

⁴¹⁴ Giovanni Battista Besozzo to Federico III Borromeo, Madrid June 1, 1623: BAM, mss. G 254bis inf 217.

⁴¹⁵ See for example Giovanni Battista Besozzo to Federico III Borromeo, Madrid June 1, 1623: BAM, mss. G 254bis inf 217; Giovanna Cesi to Federico III Borromeo, Origgio September 19, 1623: BAM, mss. G 254 inf 278.

⁴¹⁶ Giovanni Battista Besozzo to Federico III Borromeo, Madrid July 2, 1623: BAM, mss. G 254 inf 278.

⁴¹⁷ Wunder, *He is the Sun*, chap. 4.

⁴¹⁸ Harris, *English Aristocratic Women*; Chalus, *Elite Women*; Sara Chapman, *Patronage as Family Economy*.

⁴¹⁹ Borello, *Trame sovrapposte*.

⁴²⁰ Ago, *Maria Spada Veralli*, p. 64.

⁴²¹ Chiomenti Vassalli, *Donna Olimpia*, p. 15.

⁴²² I am referring to Giovanna's letters to cardinal Federico III Borromeo, which she wrote to him from 1615 until his death in 1631 and which are preserved at the Biblioteca Ambrosiana in Milan.

⁴²³ This pattern can be found among other women from Giovanna's milieu. See for example, D'Amelia, "Una lettera a settimana."

her wording so unacceptable that they sometimes visibly corrected her letters before they were sent off.⁴²⁴) But, as Giovanna herself must have realized, written communication was a vital instrument in the world of the baroque court. Not only were letters useful to bridge the gap between distant correspondents, they were also indispensable to keep up with the increasingly formalized interactions of court society. Giovanna admitted as much when she wrote to cardinal Federico: “N[ostro] S[ignore] Idio haveria da renderli molte gratie de tanti favori che V[ostra] S[ignoria] Ill[ustrissi]ma me hà fatti, ma per non infastedirla mi sarbo di farlo a boccha.”⁴²⁵

No doubt to assist her husband in the realization of their project for the cadet branch of the Borromeo, Giovanna turned things around in just a few years. In the absence of a more voluminous correspondence it is impossible to determine the specifics but there can be few doubts that she undertook an ambitious program of self-improvement after relocating to Milan. In a pattern not uncommon among women of her generation, Giovanna dramatically refined her writing in just a few years after her wedding. As P. Renée Baernstein has written of another Roman transplant to Lombardy, “over time she gradually acquired the usual ceremonial flourishes and the more self-conscious literary tone, perhaps borrowed from the letters she received, and those she saw written for her.”⁴²⁶ Giovanna’s letters certainly reveal a similar pattern of on-the-job training. By the time agent Besozzo made for Madrid, she was more than ready to take charge of the negotiations over the castle of Angera.

Besozzo’s role as the broker at the wheel in Madrid is just as symptomatic of early modern politics as that of noble women. Although the dispatch of agents was exceedingly common for seventeenth-century dynasties, they have received scant attention from scholars. Most studies have approached the issue from a purely functionalist perspective. Antonio Álvarez-Ossorio Alvariño and Christian Windler have both stressed the importance of municipal agents who welded the interests of city councils to those of the monarch in Madrid and were, therefore, crucial in bringing about the integration of the sprawling network of cities into the composite Spanish monarchy.⁴²⁷ It could be argued that the agents dispatched on behalf of noble families performed a similar function: by advancing the interests of elite families in the various territories of the king, they helped to supply them with a steady trickle of rewards and thus secure their loyalty to the king of Spain. As actors in their own right, however, agents remain an understudied group.

The relative neglect of the subject has deprived us of a convincing explanation for as to why agents saw such a heyday in the early modern period. In a case study of the agents of the Colonna

⁴²⁴ See, for example, Giovanna Cesi to Federico III Borromeo, Origgio September 16, 1616: BAM, mss. G 223 inf 72.

⁴²⁵ Giovanna Cesi to Federico III Borromeo, Milan March 3, 1621: BAM, mss. G 254 inf 156.

⁴²⁶ Baernstein, *Roma Caput Italiae*, p. 351.

⁴²⁷ Windler, *Städte am Hof*; Álvarez-Ossorio, *La república*, chap. II.

family of Rome, Thomas Dandeleet has argued that intermediaries were an answer to the considerable distance between the Italian and Iberian peninsula, which in a time of intensifying exchanges could no longer be bridged through epistolary communication alone.⁴²⁸ This argument is not entirely satisfying: after all, Dandeleet's own evidence shows that agents rarely acted before being ordered to do so by their masters who regularly exchanged letters with them. Rather than by the geographical distance between Italy and Spain, the rise of the court agent seems to have been inspired by the realization that the increasingly complex bureaucracies in Madrid needed to be lobbied constantly by a representative of the family on the ground. Families from Spanish Italy were coming to the same conclusion as the nobility of the British Isles studied by Linda Levy Peck. "While the king promised that those who were away from court would still be thought of, out of sight all too often proved out of mind."⁴²⁹ Although much more research needs to be done to account for the sudden popularity of agents in the early modern period, this is certainly the picture that emerges from the surviving correspondence of the agent who the Borromeo dispatched to Madrid to negotiate the sale of the castle of Angera early in 1623.

While it must in part be chalked up to the lack of adequate source material, the neglect of agents obscures something fundamental about the workings of early modern patronage.⁴³⁰ As Marika Koblusek writes summarizing recent research by scholars from a number of countries, agents were extremely flexible actors whose "main characteristics" included their "chameleon-like versatility."⁴³¹ If this finding is exciting in its own right, it also gestures to the epistemic usefulness of their correspondence for historians interested in the inner workings of early modern societies. Working on behalf of the nobility, they were trusted members of the family entourage, often clerics, who had familiarity with multiple courts and a surprising grasp of the legal aspects they were sent to negotiate on behalf of their principals.⁴³² Besozzo, for instance, seems to have been a member of the highly selective College of Jurists, as well as a protonotary apostolic and *abate concistoriale* at San Pietro in Tasso in Milan.⁴³³ He also had some experience in dealing with institutions of the court. When he had served the Borromeo family in the papal court, one of Federico's informants described him as "ben visto in questa Corte, e particolarmente dal Papa."⁴³⁴ Trusted collaborators though they were, their relationship was not the quasi-feudal one that the semantics of their letters often suggest but, rather, one grounded in economic self-interest: Besozzo was a commoner acting in the expectation of being paid for his services, performing the role I have described as "broker" in chapter

⁴²⁸ Dandeleet, *Between Courts*, p. 30.

⁴²⁹ Levy Peck, *Court Patronage*, p. 37.

⁴³⁰ See Álvarez-Ossorio, *La república*, pp. 251–252.

⁴³¹ Koblusek, *Introduction: Double Agents*, p. 6.

⁴³² See the nuggets of information in Dandeleet, *Between Courts*, pp. 34–35.

⁴³³ Besozzi, *De Besutio*, p. 34. On the College of Jurists in Milan, see D'Amico, *Spanish Milan*, p. 37.

⁴³⁴ Quoted in Zunckel, *Handlungsspielräume*, p. 488.

2. For all their proximity to the well-heeled, agents, like other brokers, were mercenaries with a limited investment in the services they procured on behalf of a group to whom they did not belong.⁴³⁵ As we will see, that disconnect often reveals much about the hidden assumptions of elite power in early modern Europe. While agents seemed to mirror their masters' attitudes to power, they often interpreted them so clumsily that they inadvertently lay bare the reasoning that their commissioners would rather have kept to themselves. Like other liminal figures and subaltern actors, then, their attempts to negotiate the unwritten laws of their social betters have much to tell us about the fault lines of the society they lived in.⁴³⁶

As we will see shortly, Besozzo's letters paint a lively picture of the changes that the rise of the minister-favorite had wrought. In order to make sense of them, some context is in order. As we have seen in the previous chapter, the *validos* in the Spanish court set out to tether the peripheral nobilities to the imperial center. Their preferred methodology to achieve this goal was to hand out the landed titles over which the king presided to potential new sub-patrons. The first minister-favorite, the duke of Lerma, was the most notorious plunderer of royal resources as he transformed the court of Madrid in a highly complex patronage market in which money could buy various material and immaterial tokens of royal preferment.⁴³⁷ So stunning was this mutation of the court that the Venetian ambassador wrote in his end-of-term report that Lerma's government was reducible to "la dispensa delle grazie," seeing as he did to "tutto il bene e il male di chi pretende alcuna cosa a quella corte."⁴³⁸ As such, the new institution of the minister-favorite as the patron-in-chief was a clever response to a problem that had emerged late in the reign of Philip II.⁴³⁹ Like his predecessors, Philip II liked to style himself as a fountain of infinite bounty. Liberality was a marker of early modern kingship, indicating the sovereign's ability to cater to the needs of his subjects, but, as Philip II found out the hard way, it required the monarch to strike a balance between the factions at court that was more and more difficult to maintain.⁴⁴⁰ Exacerbating the problem was that, as the tokens of royal grace swelled in the late sixteenth century, so did the pleas from the king's subject which flooded the court of Madrid.⁴⁴¹ Philip II grew increasingly desperate, fearing that, "With many asking and little to give, most people will remain discontented."⁴⁴²

It is easy to see how the minister-favorite solved, temporarily at least, that vexing problem, the impossibility of satisfying every petitioner. The favorites who entered the scene in Madrid in the

⁴³⁵ See Kettering, *Brokerage*, p. 70.

⁴³⁶ For the use of the writings of subaltern actors to elucidate fundamental shifts in early modern politics and religion, see Windler, *Missionare in Persien*.

⁴³⁷ On the rise of favorites as a result of the centralization of royal patronage, see Jouanna, *Des réseaux d'amitié*, pp. 34–35.

⁴³⁸ Quoted in Benigno, *L'ombra del re*, p. 8.

⁴³⁹ Levy Peck, *Court Patronage*, p. 44.

⁴⁴⁰ Feros, *Kingship*, p. 55.

⁴⁴¹ Von Thiessen, *Herrschen mit Verwandten*, p. 184.

⁴⁴² Quoted in Feros, *Kingship*, p. 55.

early seventeenth century allowed monarchs to outsource the messy and divisive handling of royal patronage to an external arbiter and thus figure as impartial shepherds to all subjects.⁴⁴³ When the favorite predictably failed at the envious task of satisfying every subject and the nobility began to grumble, the monarch could direct festering discontent toward the favorite.⁴⁴⁴ The English courtier Philip Sidney (1554–1586) had anticipated the favorite’s function as a lightning rod as early as the late sixteenth century when he wrote, “[E]vil minded persons, before the occasion be ripe for them, to show their hate against the prince, do vomit it out against his counsellors.”⁴⁴⁵ If the favorite became untenable, the monarch could simply dismiss and replace him with a new one.

This is exactly what had happened to Lerma a few years prior to agent Besozzo’s arrival in Madrid. As we have seen in the previous chapter, the duke was not, as he liked to suggest, a neutral third party but part of a network of relatives and cronies whom he favored at the expense of his rivals. Part of the reason why he was forced to retire in 1618 was his partisan distribution of royal rewards. Although Lerma did not stand trial thanks to his last-gasp promotion to the cardinalate (courtesy, it seems, of none other than Federico Borromeo), the main figure heads of the regime were prosecuted on charges of corruption. Lerma’s son, the duke of Uceda, for instance, felt the full force of the law. The charges brought against him intentionally read like an indictment of the entire system: “[F]altando a las obligaciones de su oficio, y a la confiança que su Magestad hazia de su persona, convirtio todo el poder que tuvo en beneficio suyo, y de sus deudos, encaminando sus pretensiones y causas en perjuizio de la causa publica, y de la recta administracion de justicia.”⁴⁴⁶

These trials were a response to opposition from rivaling factions. Throughout Lerma’s ascendancy, the “common good” (*causa pública*) cited in the indictment against Uceda had been the clarion call of the disenfranchised whose discontent had welled up in the face of Lerma’s unrestrained enrichment.⁴⁴⁷ When they took over and tried to assert themselves, Baltasar de Zúñiga and his coterie harnessed that protest and accused some of Lerma’s closest allies of having used public office for private ends.⁴⁴⁸ The defendants promptly blamed their self-enrichment on king Philip III who had bestowed the crown jewels upon his most loyal servants, something he was entitled to do as an absolute ruler.⁴⁴⁹ But these desperate attempts to shift the blame on the dead king no longer had much truck in the face of a new philosophy that was placing individual responsibility toward the common good at the center of noble preoccupations.

⁴⁴³ Von Thiessen, *Herrschen mit Verwandten*, p. 183.

⁴⁴⁴ Windler, *Arbitrismo*, p. 23.

⁴⁴⁵ Sidney, *A Discourse in Defence*, p. 258.

⁴⁴⁶ Quoted in Mrozek, *Bajo acusación*, p. 375.

⁴⁴⁷ On the notion of the common good among ordinary subjects, see Corteguera, *For the Common Good*, chap. 2.

⁴⁴⁸ Corteguera, *Loyalty and Revolt*, pp. 89–91.

⁴⁴⁹ See Mrozek, *Bajo acusación*, pp. 400–417.

That philosophy was neostoicism, an ideology that animated a large number of political actors during the period running roughly from 1580 to 1650 and saw its heyday in the early decades of the seventeenth century. Based on a selective reception of the Greek Stoa via the Roman writers Seneca and Tacitus, Justus Lipsius (1547–1606) had posited that because humans are by nature driven by passions generally and greed specifically, it was a sign of superior being to strive for spiritual happiness through submission to God. As a practical system of ethics for a time of massive upheavals, neostoicism appealed to Protestants and Catholics, monarchists and republicans alike, but the Spanish monarchy and its wider world proved particularly receptive to Lipsius's teachings. There neostoicism really became, as Gerhard Oestreich put it in his classic treatment of the movement, "the theory behind the powerful military and administrative structure of the centralized state" into which the minister-favorites and their allies were trying to transform the monarchy.⁴⁵⁰

In the wake of the perceived ravages of the Lerma regime, the new ideology seemed to hold all the right answers for a group of nobles eager to reform their attitudes toward monarchical institutions. Neostoicism encouraged them to view institutions not as an opportunity for self-enrichment so much as an instrument to further the well-being of the monarchy as a whole. Of no one was this truer than of Lerma's successor. After the scandals under Philip III, Baltasar de Zúñiga wanted to infuse favoritism with new legitimacy, a tendency that became even more pronounced when the count-duke of Olivares took over from his uncle.⁴⁵¹ In the early years of his dispensation, Olivares pushed hard for anti-corruption measures.⁴⁵² Tackling the malpractice of his predecessor head on, he painted himself as a principled defender of the common good. If he was indeed, as John Elliott has opined, a politician "unusually clean by seventeenth-century standards," his propagandists feted him as a "new Seneca" who had done away with the cronyism of Lerma and was striving to defend the common man.⁴⁵³

The legal action that was taken against Lerma's cronies was a way of advertising the new regime's credo.⁴⁵⁴ The judicial proceedings were show trials, designed to make a point without challenging the powers-that-be. The bogeyman of the Lerma regime, the over-ambitious social climber and notorious kleptocrat Rodrigo Calderón was executed in the center of Madrid.⁴⁵⁵ But others, some of whom were accused of high treason, were let off the hook with sometimes excessively light sentences.⁴⁵⁶ This exemplary punishment of a commoner elicited widespread protests which made clear that this was not a principled defense of the commonwealth but a settling

⁴⁵⁰ Carrasco, *El conde duque de Olivares*, pp. 246, 248; Oestreich, *Neostoicism*, p. 14.

⁴⁵¹ Carrasco, *El conde duque de Olivares*.

⁴⁵² González Fuertes and Negro del Cerro, *Mecanismos de control*.

⁴⁵³ Elliott, *Quevedo*, p. 198.

⁴⁵⁴ Mrozek, *Bajo acusación*, p. 326.

⁴⁵⁵ Mrozek, *Bajo acusación*, chap. 4; Martínez Hernández, *Rodrigo Calderón*.

⁴⁵⁶ Mrozek, *Bajo acusación*, pp. 337, 362–363.

of scores between rivaling factions of the elite. As Giuseppe Mrozek puts it, “Más allá de la codicia y del incuestionable enriquecimiento que marcó toda la carrera de los acusados, éstos no fueron juzgados sólo por unos pocos y clamorosos casos de corrupción, sino, sobre todo, por ser la clase dominante que había gobernado la Monarquía durante el reinado de Felipe III.”⁴⁵⁷ For all the appearances to the contrary, this was not a serious crackdown on embezzlement. What had materialized in the trials, instead, was a pattern that Jean-Claude Waquet first identified in his now classic study of corruption in early modern Tuscany: rather than tackle what was a systemic and structural problem, contemporary elites preferred to moralize the issue, ascribing it to the depravity of single officeholders.⁴⁵⁸

Moralizing the issue and clamping down on single perpetrators had obvious advantages for the new regime: “It brought what was a permanent *coup d'état* down to the level of minor morality issues of no consequence,” which could be dealt with in the court of laws.⁴⁵⁹ What is more, the trials allowed the new rulers to use their predecessors as a foil. By pressing charges against Uceda and a number of high-profile associates of his government, they aimed to contrast the self-aggrandizement of their predecessors with their own purported understanding of public office as a vehicle for the advancement of the collective good. By putting them on trial, the new regime sent a message that the time of enrichment was over and a new age of disinterested service in the name of the common good was beckoning.⁴⁶⁰ But in so doing, the regime created massive expectations which would later come back to haunt it and precipitate Olivares’s downfall in the early 1640s amidst widespread frustration at the self-proclaimed savior’s own corruption.

When he took over from his uncle, Olivares did much more to consolidate his power. Olivares’s plan to save the *valimiento* consisted of dressing up old practices in a new discourse of professionalism. To exonerate themselves from the charges of corruption, the duke of Lerma and his son had made the argument that they were not ministers but *privados*, friends and confidants of the king who were not bound by existing laws.⁴⁶¹ Convenient as it was to the ruling group, this idea came under criticism in the last years of Lerma’s regime, with Juan de Santa María going so far as to argue that since *privado* was synonymous with “amigo particular” and “como la amistad ha de ser entre yguales, no parece que la pueden tener los que son vassallos, o criados, con su Rey, y Señor.”⁴⁶² Anxious to recast his role, Olivares appropriated this line. He insisted that he was, not a *privado*, but a “minister,” “emphasizing the official, and not the personal, character of the high position in which

⁴⁵⁷ Mrozek, Bajo acusación, p. 419.

⁴⁵⁸ Waquet, Corruption, pp. 94–95, 191.

⁴⁵⁹ Waquet, Corruption, p. 96.

⁴⁶⁰ Rivero Rodríguez, El conde duque de Olivares, p. 67.

⁴⁶¹ Benigno, L’ombra, pp. 85, 90–91.

⁴⁶² Juan de Santa María, Tratado de república y policía christiana, quoted in Mrozek, Bajo acusación, p. 240.

he found himself.”⁴⁶³ Indeed, the self-fashioning of the count-duke consciously honed in on the idea of disinterested service, and as his opponents mounted increasingly effective attacks on his power, he went to considerable lengths to legitimize his role as Philip IV’s servant who worked tirelessly to preserve a crumbling monarchy.⁴⁶⁴ As his *valimiento* rumbled on, he privileged his public and political role over the personal relationship to the king, which had been central to Lerma’s defense.⁴⁶⁵ One of Olivares’s more vociferous advocates in Italy, the author of a *Breve discurso donde se muestra que los Reyes han de tener privado*, which was published in Palermo in 1624, saw his rule as legitimate exactly because Olivares allegedly put “el honor de su Rey” before his own, “no entendiendo a sus particulares aumentos, sino al bien común.”⁴⁶⁶

To convince a skeptical public, Olivares made attempts to put the administration of patronage on a more formal footing and outsourced its handling to a number of bespoke councils, or *juntas*. As has been pointed out, this was a project that had begun to take shape under his predecessor when political theorists of contractual government close to the Lerma regime had made convoluted arguments that the king’s ministers were indispensable for good governance.⁴⁶⁷ In the words of one of them, ministers were the “understanding, memory, eyes, ears, voice, feet, and hands” of the monarch, in some instances even “his tongue.”⁴⁶⁸ As disinterested interpreters of the law, so the reasoning went, councilors were much less amenable to bring clientelistic considerations to bear on decision-making.⁴⁶⁹ While this sounded good in theory, the much-touted control function was undermined by the fact that the key positions in the councils were without fail entrusted to Lerma’s relatives and allies.⁴⁷⁰ Much as he asserted otherwise, this state of affairs did not change under Olivares. Although he succeeded in lending the councils a veneer of bureaucratic independence that they had clearly lacked under Lerma, this ultimately only hid the fact that the perusing of patronage-related requests had been outsourced to a number of councils and unregulated special committees (*juntas*) headed by Olivares’s close associates.⁴⁷¹

The evidence unearthed here shows that, at the level of everyday practices, the reforms of the Olivares regime were little more than cosmetic. The letters in which the Borromeo’s agent detailed his negotiations in the court of Madrid certainly drive this point home. The first step he undertook upon arriving in the capital is indicative of how little things had changed. As he reported to his masters, Besozzo wasted no time approaching the president of the Council of Italy, the count

⁴⁶³ Elliott, *The Count-Duke of Olivares*, p. 169.

⁴⁶⁴ Elliott, *Staying in Power*, pp. 114–116; Hillard von Thiessen, *Der entkleidete Favorit*.

⁴⁶⁵ Bengino, *L’ombra del re*, p. 166.

⁴⁶⁶ Quoted in Muto, “Mutation di corte,” p. 174.

⁴⁶⁷ Feros, *Kingship*, p. 139.

⁴⁶⁸ Quoted in Antonio Feros, *Kingship*, p. 25.

⁴⁶⁹ Rivero Rodríguez, *El conde duque de Olivares*, p. 82.

⁴⁷⁰ Von Thiessen, *Herrschen mit Verwandten*.

⁴⁷¹ Gil Martínez, *Las hechuras; Amadori, Privanza*.

of Monterrey. While this was formally unfaultable, Besozzo was careful to point out that this interlocutor was Olivares's brother-in-law, strongly implying that the minister-favorite still ruled the roost. In addition to Monterrey's secretary, Francesco Bonetto, he also contacted another Olivares ally, the member (*reggente*) for Milan, Gerolamo Caimo, whose influence, he pointed out, went far beyond the Council of Italy: "Col Caimo è di necessità mostrare di confidare, perché qui è l'oracolo d'Apolline, interviene à tutte le Gionte non solo del Consiglio di Stato, mà di tutti li altri."⁴⁷² Such unthinking assertions of inconvenient truths testify to the value of the correspondence of brokers for studying the tacit assumptions of elite ruling practices. Much as the *olivarista* avant-garde would have liked to sweep these things under the rug, Besozzo in his naiveté inadvertently exposed that behind the shiny new councils the old networks of friends scratching each other's backs was alive and well.

As he explained his next steps, Besozzo also debunked the myth of the councils under Olivares as institutions adhering to formal bureaucratic procedures. One of the *valido's* favorite spin doctors, Francisco Quevedo, may have likened royal councilors to the disciples of Christ who "tenían que estar dispuestos a renunciar a sus bienes y a sus familias, anteponiendo el servicio al soberano a cualquier cosa y no utilizarlo para enriquecerse o para promover las carreras de sus amigos o criados."⁴⁷³ Besozzo seems to have had no time for this sort of self-hypnosis. Undercutting the pretense of his social betters, the broker's sole preoccupation was constantly to court and ingratiate himself with relevant councilors, easing them into an advantageous decision for his masters. Belying the flashy self-image of the council and its members, Besozzo was extremely worried that his interlocutors might renege on earlier promises at the last moment, writing for instance that "il Bonetto secr[etari]o [...] mi dà per sicuro il neg[oz]io, mà io stò con gran timore che il demonio non faccia delle sue."⁴⁷⁴ Besozzo was constantly on edge, fearing that the Borromeo's "emuli invidiosi" were seeking to sway his contacts.⁴⁷⁵ As Besozzo saw it, his interlocutors were, not bureaucrats implementing routine procedures, but extremely volatile individuals, liable to change their minds in favor of whatever party offered them most in return for a favorable verdict.

As he vied for attention, Besozzo grew increasingly convinced that there was only one way to extract a favorable decision from the erratic council members: in a letter to his patrons, he suggested to help the negotiations along by "regaling" (*regalare*) the secretary of the Council of Italy. By forking out a small sum of money, Besozzo claimed, the secretary would accord this order of business preferential treatment. Not only would he speed up the procedure, he would let Besozzo see the

⁴⁷² Álvarez-Ossorio, *The King and the Family*, p. 205; Giovanni Battista Besozzo to Federico III Borromeo, Madrid May 26, 1623: BAM, mss. G 254bis inf 232.

⁴⁷³ Mrozek, *Bajo acusación*, p. 251.

⁴⁷⁴ Giovanni Battista Besozzo to Federico III Borromeo, Madrid June 3, 1623: BAM, mss. G 254bis inf 219.

⁴⁷⁵ Giovanni Battista Besozzo to Federico III Borromeo, Madrid July 2, 1623: BAM, mss. G254bis inf 320.

final draft of the privilege for the castle of Angera before it was ratified, “acciò [io] l’accomodi come pare à me, il che si farà con puochi.”⁴⁷⁶ What Besozzo was suggesting, in as many words, was the payment of what Valentin Groebner has dubbed “access fees,” small sums to be disbursed to an subordinate official who would in turn expedite a case.⁴⁷⁷

This raises the question of how contemporaries felt about these practices, something historians have discussed at length in recent decades. In her study on Renaissance France, Natalie Zemon Davis has argued that early modern people tended to think of gifts to officials as “perfectly acceptable, however much they were intended to bring favor upon the donor.”⁴⁷⁸ In fact, this was the unstated goal of all gift-giving: offerings created a bond of reciprocity between the petitioner and the official, and, though this was rarely acknowledged, it would have been inappropriate for the official not to take the present that had been proffered into consideration when he made a decision. Gifts were ties that bound for a long time to come, even if they were tendered by a social inferior, such as the clients of a king. Indeed, as Lisa Klein has argued of Elizabeth I of England, her “subjects offered her gifts with an eye toward what they could expect in return” and they were under no illusion that a present was “an attempt to purchase her favorable intervention” on their behalf.⁴⁷⁹

By the seventeenth century, things had changed considerably. Gifts were now associated with bribery and venality, and contemporaries went to considerable lengths to deny that the function of presents was to insinuate the donor into the good graces of the recipient. In fact, many now asserted that gifts to officials were not bribes but a sign of disinterested reverence toward social superiors whose function it was to set the stage for, rather than influence, the final outcome of a procedure.⁴⁸⁰ Gifts were only condemnable when they were offered “intentionally.”⁴⁸¹ So convincing has this argument been that even modern historians have been led astray. One scholar has likened such “fees” to “modern tipping of taxi-drivers and waiters,” vigorously denying that they should be seen as “attempts to bribe officials into doing something they otherwise would not have done or something illegal.”⁴⁸² Federico Borromeo went even further. He was adamant that small presents to officials were “un certo segnale di amore, e di amicitia” which were part of “conservar le amicitie antiche, ma non già il farne delle nuove,” concluding that “quantunque piccolo sieno le utilità, che da essi ne possono venire, tuttavia troppo brutto in se stesso è il traffico, e troppo indegno.”⁴⁸³

⁴⁷⁶ Giovanni Battista Besozzo to Federico III Borromeo, Madrid June 30, 1623: BAM, mss. G 254bis inf 320.

⁴⁷⁷ Groebner, *Liquid Assets*, p. 62.

⁴⁷⁸ Davis, *The Gift in Sixteenth-Century France*, p. 87.

⁴⁷⁹ Klein, *Your Humble Handmaid*, p. 460.

⁴⁸⁰ Von Thiessen, *Normenkonkurrenz*, p. 266.

⁴⁸¹ Andújar Castillo et al., *Corrupción y mecanismos de control*, p. 290.

⁴⁸² Bernard, “A Water-Spout,” p. 130.

⁴⁸³ Borromeo, *Il libro*, pp. 133–134.

Comforting though such fictions may have been to seventeenth-century elites (and sympathetic historians), disinterested contemporaries knew better, and a guileless agent like Besozzo inadvertently let it show. In one of his epistles, he urged the Borromeo to allow him to give his contact a backhander, stating openly that “è bene tenerne conto perche è amico et può fare delli altri serviggi” at some later point.⁴⁸⁴ He may have been particularly crude in his phrasing, but the absence of a reprimand from his patrons suggests that they agreed with him that this transaction was far more than a fee that made no appreciable difference. They did not cavil once at Besozzo’s *modus operandi*; on the contrary, they encouraged him to go through with his plan.

Contrary to what the regime’s propaganda suggested, once the money had changed hands, Besozzo found his interlocutors much more forthcoming. Dealing with opposition to the Borromeo’s plans from rivaling Milanese clans was now easier. As Besozzo informed his masters, the Borromeo’s “emoli” had trotted out “certe ragioni di stato benché frivole,” bandying about rumors about the family’s supposed pro-French leanings and arguing that “facilmente con l’occasione de tanti feudi uniti in quelle parti haverebbero potuto tirare in Italia li Francesi.”⁴⁸⁵ However, Besozzo’s stopped them in their tracks, as the *reggente* of the Council of Milan bounced to the family’s defense. In a letter to Olivares Caimi informed the minister-favorite that the gossipmongers “sono maligni, et che non bisogna darli orecchie,” stressing that the house of Borromeo had been unflinchingly supportive of the monarchy. Indeed, what had once been the family’s major liability—the cardinal’s “good works” as archbishop of Milan—was now, in the wake of the *concordia* treaty, turned into proof of the “affetto che [la casa] porta al Re.” In his newfound fervor Caimi was eager to explain away the archbishop’s relentless legal battles against the crown over matters of jurisdiction, arguing that “se deffendeva la giurisdittione ecclesiastica lo faceva per l’obbligo che hà per esser Arciv[escov]o.”⁴⁸⁶ (These sentiments were echoed by a Spanish hagiography of St. Charles published at the time in which it was argued that many of his run-ins with the Spanish authorities in Madrid needed to be imputed to “el governador pervertido por malos consejeros” rather than the saint’s intransigence.⁴⁸⁷) What had once been considered a deliberate attempt to destabilize the monarchy was now being reinterpreted as an indication of the archbishop’s conscientious handling of his ecclesiastical responsibilities, and as conducive to the good governance of Spanish Milan.

All this goodwill did not spare the Borromeo the considerable expenses associated with the acquisition of a fief. In the seventeenth century enfeoffments were pricey affairs. In order to bask in the glory of a castle and the title attached to it, the nobility needed to dig deep into their pockets.

⁴⁸⁴ Giovanni Battista Besozzo to Federico III Borromeo, Madrid June 30, 1623: BAM, mss. G 254bis inf 220.

⁴⁸⁵ Giovanni Battista Besozzo to Federico III Borromeo, Madrid September 6, 1623: BAM, mss. G 254bis inf 289; Giovanni Battista Besozzo to Federico III Borromeo, Madrid May 27, 1623: BAM, mss. G 254bis inf 210.

⁴⁸⁶ Giovanni Battista Besozzo to Federico III Borromeo, Madrid May 27, 1623: BAM, mss. G 254bis inf 210.

⁴⁸⁷ Giannini, “Con ser santo,” p. 46.

This was because, as Linda Levy Peck explains in her study of early Stuart England, with the advent of the minister-favorite, the monarchies had begun “marketing favor.” Forced to confront mushrooming expenses, early modern monarchs resorted to stripping their assets on an unprecedented scale, selling them to a nobility eager to advance in the social hierarchy.⁴⁸⁸ This met considerable psychological resistance. Uncomfortable with the marketization of what they wanted to think of as a gift, the nobility went to considerable lengths to sugarcoat this reality. The court of Madrid in the wake of Lerma was no exception. Officially the alienation of parts of the royal demesne in the form of land was still a token of royal favor for loyal service: the relation between king and feudatory was dressed up in the language of patrons and clients which structured most early modern ties.⁴⁸⁹ Neostoicism, too, helped crowbar the most mundane transaction into a framework of contemporary values and assumptions about royal bounty and the monarch’s obligation to reward his subjects as part of an unwritten contract.⁴⁹⁰ As Levy Peck explains, “Crucial to the success of court patronage was its disguise. While contemporaries were frank with one another about their desire for court office and titles, the rhetoric between patron and client drew on another language, one which stressed the free gift of royal patronage, the magnanimity of the patron, and the dependence of the client.”⁴⁹¹

These language games distracted from the fact that the nobility had good reasons to prefer the payment of a substantial sum of money for a fief to accepting it for free. In fact, when the Council of Italy tendered the coveted castle of Angera as a gift to the Borromeo, “dicendo che V[ostra] S[ignoria] I[llustrissima] merita altro che Angera,” Besozzo was instructed to turn down the offer.⁴⁹² Although contemporaries had an investment in the collective fiction that fiefs were rewards for loyal service, they also understood the practical advantages of treating enfeoffments as a one-off transaction. Presents enact extant social hierarchies, and, as anthropologists have long argued, asymmetrical gifting from social superiors to inferiors cements a “‘gentle’ domination” over dependents and produces new obligations toward social superiors.⁴⁹³ Accepting a gift from a monarch in financial dire strait would have reduced the Borromeo to puppets of Philip IV and Olivares, something they wanted to avoid at all costs.⁴⁹⁴ Paying seemed a preferable option, because while the acceptance of a gift resulted in a duty to reciprocate the favor, a simple transaction of money came with the comforting sensation of “being quits once and for all.”⁴⁹⁵ The Borromeo seemed to be alive to the negative feelings that their desire to disburse money for the castle might

⁴⁸⁸ Levy Peck, *Court Patronage*, p. 6.

⁴⁸⁹ Renata Ago, *La feudalità*, p. 97.

⁴⁹⁰ Levy Peck, *Court Patronage*, p. 14.

⁴⁹¹ Levy Peck, *Court Patronage*, p. 18.

⁴⁹² Giovanni Battista Besozzo to Federico III Borromeo, Madrid June 29, 1623: BAM, mss. G 254bis inf 213.

⁴⁹³ Webster, *The Enigma of Christmas*, p. 150.

⁴⁹⁴ Bourdieu, *Outline*, p. 6.

⁴⁹⁵ Davis, *The Gift*, p. 66.

elicit among the mighty. As the handsome sum of 2,500 *scudi* changed hands in Madrid, the agent of the Borromeo reassured his interlocutors that the archbishop “restava con med[esim]a obligacione à Re et à suoi Ministri come se [il feudo] fosse titolo gratuito.”⁴⁹⁶

Besozzo’s correspondence is an extraordinary source. Not sophisticated enough to obfuscate in quite the same way his social betters did, the clumsy agent inadvertently laid bare the unspoken assumptions of the emerging *olivarista* ruling class, lifting the curtain on the inconsistency between their rhetoric and their actions. His letters reveal that, despite the concerted propaganda effort of the new regime, not much had changed at the court of Philip IV. Belying all their public utterances to the contrary, leading clients of the monarchy continued to regard the royal demesne as spoils for them to plunder and squeeze: provided they were willing to pay enough money, both to obtain a privilege and to bribe royal officials along the way, the monarchy’s resources were theirs to take. The court under Olivares remained honeycombed with corrupt officials and greedy petitioners, though this only sprang to the attention of the losers of the change of power, such as Matías de Novoa, who fumed at the blatant double standards of a regime that was putting members of the old governing elite on trial for crimes they continued to commit themselves.⁴⁹⁷ As Besozzo’s letters indicate, the superstitions of the new dispensation had even less traction with those who stood no chance of ever benefiting from the spoils system. Agents like Besozzo perceptively described the system as entirely monetized and marketized, pointedly reminding his patrons that “non pagandosi qui il danaro non si farà niente.”⁴⁹⁸

To this it could of course be retorted that Olivares’s men—the councilors and petitioners such as the Borromeo—were acting without the count-duke’s knowledge. But that argument, too, does not stand up to closer scrutiny. The shadow of Olivares hovered over the whole negotiations. In fact, Besozzo’s interlocutors repeatedly reported back to the *valido*, fine-tuning their tactics in consultation with him. Besozzo himself entertained few doubts as to who was ultimately responsible. As he noted curtly in one of his first letters home, “Tutto questo Governo stà in mano di Olivares, il Re non fà cosa alcuna se bene dà audienza.”⁴⁹⁹ Once the negotiations were wrapped up, Olivares himself no longer seemed to have an interest in keeping up the pretense, either. In a note to Federico Borromeo, he thanked him “muchas vezes por la reliquias y retrato de S[an] Carlos Borromeo” which the archbishop had apparently sent him to acknowledge his role in the sale of Angera. Indeed, Olivares now admitted freely “que se ha procurado encaminar los neg[oci]os que [Besozzo] trazo a su cargo,” and reassured him that “lo mesmo será siempre en todas las demás ocasiones,” in a sign of “la volunt[a]d que ay en esta Casa de todo lo que toca al serv[ici]o de

⁴⁹⁶ Giovanni Battista Besozzo to Federico III Borromeo, Madrid June 29, 1623: BAM, mss. G 254bis inf 213.

⁴⁹⁷ Mrozek, *Bajo acusación*, p. 416.

⁴⁹⁸ Giovanni Battista Besozzo to Federico III Borromeo, Madrid July 2, 1623: BAM, mss. G 254bis inf 320.

⁴⁹⁹ Giovanni Battista Besozzo to Federico III Borromeo, Madrid June 1, 1623: BAM, mss. G 254bis inf 217.

V[uestra] S[eñoría] Il[ustrísi]ma.”⁵⁰⁰ Olivares may have essayed to install the councils as a “good governance façade” so as to preempt the charges that he and his coterie had leveled at his predecessor, Lerma.⁵⁰¹ Yet, as John Elliot argues, “for all his desire to avoid some of the duties which had given earlier favourites a bad name, he could not really hope to escape for long either the appearance, or the responsibilities, of power.”⁵⁰²

In fact, Olivares had neither the authority nor, arguably, the will to overhaul the system. As far as he himself was concerned, he was convinced that he, like any nobleman worth his salt, was not just bound to serve the king but also to try to be as “useful to his family” (*provechoso a su familia*) as possible.⁵⁰³ What set him apart from his predecessor was that he combined the pursuit of dynastic greatness with the advancement of the common good imposed on people of his station by the new neostocist philosophy. As the integration of elites from the monarchy’s far-flung territories continued apace, the beneficiaries of his largesse readily pounced on the new justifications. If Besozzo’s letters are representative at all—and, in light of the absence of protests from any of Besozzo’s interlocutors, there is no reason to believe otherwise—it seems that the commitment of the regime and its clients to uphold the public good was brandished in public but junked as soon as they started wheeling and dealing far away from public scrutiny. But in so doing, they ensnared themselves in irresolvable contradictions and rendered themselves vulnerable to charges of duplicity.

Early modern elites were only too aware of this liability, and they dealt with it in various ways. As Jean-Claude Waquet has shown in his case study of the Grand Duchy of Tuscany, the aristocracy staffing the ducal institutions devised their own coping mechanisms to rationalize their sinful corruption and still think of themselves as upstanding Christians. To escape what many perceived as a moral dilemma, Waquet maintains, many resorted to lying to themselves and others.⁵⁰⁴ As they reared a self-serving culture of dishonesty, corrupt officials were aided and abetted by cunning jurists and theologians who supplied them with a steady stream of arguments to justify their unethical behavior. “Casuistry and probabilism thus joined forces to offer relief to consciences which would otherwise have been overwhelmed by the rigorous [religious] principles that obviously conflicted with the administrative practices in force.”⁵⁰⁵ Like so many coping mechanisms, these arguments “made them feel that their much criticized actions were in fact honest and that they would not fall under the censure of either divine justice or human laws.”⁵⁰⁶ Objectively, though, this

⁵⁰⁰ Olivares to Federico III Borromeo, Madrid November 19, 1623: BAM, mss. G 254bis inf 300.

⁵⁰¹ Moene and Soreide, Good Governance Facades.

⁵⁰² Elliott, *The Count-Duke of Olivares*, p. 132.

⁵⁰³ Quoted in Gaston, *All the King’s Men*, p. 170.

⁵⁰⁴ Waquet, *Corruption*, pp. 106–107.

⁵⁰⁵ Waquet, *Corruption*, p. 139.

⁵⁰⁶ Waquet, *Corruption*, p. 192.

did little to change the fact that when a corrupt official came to stand “face-to-face with his own conscience,” it was “lies [that] afforded him the chance to rebuild it as he wished.”⁵⁰⁷

It is with this last proposition that I want to take issue here. Tempting though it is, it would be too simplistic to dismiss the ways in which venal nobles accounted for the failure to live up to their own moral standards as mere gaslighting. Even the vast majority who did not resort to the sophistry and mental gymnastics which Waquet has reconstructed came up with more than what he seems to brush off as bald-faced lies. In fact, what strikes us as mendacity was often a half-conscious way of whitewashing a reality that would otherwise have been unbearable. The self-deception of venal elites forms part of a process which sociologist Pierre Bourdieu has dubbed “misrecognition,” a concept that redirects the futile debate around intentionality toward the structures that are being perpetuated. If we focus on the latter rather than individual fault, the “lies” become “second-order strategies” accompanying profit-driven behavior, “whose purpose is to give apparent satisfaction to the demands of the official rule, and thus to compound the satisfactions of enlightened self-interest with the advantage of ethical impeccability.”⁵⁰⁸

A treatise which Federico Borromeo published in the aftermath of the acquisition of the castle of Angera provides a vivid illustration of these “strategies through which the agent seeks to put himself in the right.”⁵⁰⁹ Unbeknownst to most, Federico Borromeo had ambitions to go down in history as an accomplished writer. The aging archbishop had long set his eyes on a career as a public scholar, and apparently he would stop at nothing to achieve this dream. His zeal had tragic consequences for at least one man.⁵¹⁰ Since Federico Borromeo had an insufficient command of Latin to measure up to his aspiration, he hired a ghostwriter, Giuseppe Ripamonti, to produce the treatises that soon rolled off the printing presses and flooded the market with the archbishop’s name on the cover. As the years went by and the lie grew bigger, Borromeo sensed that Ripamonti might become a hazard to his confected image. In 1622, the archbishop, no doubt fearing that Ripamonti would outlive him and give the show away, had the ghostwriter arrested on trumped-up charges of possession of prohibited books and sodomy. Writing from his dungeon in the episcopal palace, Ripamonti did not mince his words, “Questi signori, che aspirano a guadagnarsi fama immortale con lavori faticati da mani che non sono le loro, ed ai quali appongono il proprio nome, comprendon benissimo che la loro immortalità si scioglie in fumo s’io riesco sottrarmi al loro giogo, e fuggire da qui; e per questo la loro rabbia disperata somiglia al furore dei demonii ...”⁵¹¹ Detained without a trial, Ripamonti only emerged from prison four years later, after Rome had given the archbishop an

⁵⁰⁷ Waquet, *Corruption*, p. 142.

⁵⁰⁸ Bourdieu, *Outline*, p. 22.

⁵⁰⁹ Bourdieu, *Outline*, p. 22.

⁵¹⁰ My reconstruction of the events in this paragraph is based on Franzosini, *Sotto il nome*.

⁵¹¹ Quoted in Franzosini, *Sotto il nome*, p. 86.

ultimatum to either open formal proceedings against him or set him free. Unable to pursue the first option, Borromeo released his ghostwriter, though not without putting him on what was essentially lifelong probation.

That Borromeo's most productive period as a writer came under Olivares was, perhaps, no coincidence. The count-duke of Olivares understood the importance of propaganda, mobilizing painters and hacks to put the right spin on his ambitious project. "He was a man with an acute sense of the power of the pen, and was always alive to the opportunities for image-making. He knew that poets, playwrights and artists could confer lustre on his regime; and he was anxious to prevent them, in so far as possible, from placing their services at the disposal of his critics."⁵¹² The 1620s saw the birth of a cottage industry of publications written by ambitious noblemen who hoped to make headway by adulating the new minister-favorite.⁵¹³ Federico Borromeo shared his contemporaries' understanding of writing and publishing as an important tool of status politics. Not only did it show the writer's own nobility and refinement but written and published texts performed an important function in shaping political outcomes.⁵¹⁴ Thus in 1625, when Olivares was at the height of his power, he put out a treatise titled *La gratia de' principi* (The Grace of Princes).⁵¹⁵ Possibly ghostwritten by the imprisoned Ripamonti, it was mildly successful: unlike Borromeo's other treatises, this one seems to have left the close circle of friends who usually read his books.⁵¹⁶

Historians who have studied the treatise have usually placed it within the tradition of Renaissance publications on the court and the perfect courtiers in the tradition of Baldassare Castiglione's *Courtier* of 1528.⁵¹⁷ The abstract language of the treatise may have contributed to scholars overlooking the many allusions to the time in which it was written. In fact, as I argue here, *La gratia de' principi* was Borromeo's contribution to the debate on favoritism that the fall of the Lerma regime and the rise of the government of the count-duke of Olivares had ushered in. For all the deliberate abstraction, the treatise contains a thinly veiled attack on Lerma and an extolling of his successor, denying through omission and insinuation, instead of actively doing so, any continuities between the two regimes: while one is portrayed as a cesspit of corruption, the other is presented as the panacea to humanity's ills. Rather than another lackluster treatise on the court in the Renaissance tradition, then, *La gratia* is an abstruse, yet effective intervention in the debate on the regime of the minister-favorite.

⁵¹² Elliott, Quevedo, p. 193.

⁵¹³ Elliott, Olivares, pp. 174–176; Rivero Rodríguez, El conde duque, p. 101.

⁵¹⁴ Dewald, Status, Power, and Identity, p. 72.

⁵¹⁵ I am quoting from the Italian version which was published in 1632. It is unclear, though likely, that this treatise was ghostwritten by Ripamonti. Borromeo, *Il libro*.

⁵¹⁶ Mozzarelli, L'antico regime in villa, p. 408.

⁵¹⁷ See, however, Continisio, *Il libro*, p. 106.

Tucked among obscure disquisitions about princely rule was a savage condemnation of Lerma and the beneficiaries of his regime. Borromeo started out with a characterization of the clients of the dispensation, of whom he had himself been a prominent member, castigating them for their bottomless greed which wrecked the monarchy: “essi sudditi premono e stringono troppo i loro Signori, e vogliono cavar troppo grandi utilità da quella loro benivolenza, non havendo riguardo a cosa veruna. E sono in ciò simiglianti a quell’ingordo contadino, che ricerca dal campo il frutto, primaché venga la stagione della ricolta.”⁵¹⁸ While their cronies were hardly without blame, the real culprits were the ministers who enabled them: Borromeo was relentless in his clobbering of “ministri [...] che ardiscono di far un segreto traffico e mercato della gratia e benivolenza di que’ Principi e Signori, ne’ cui servigi dimorano; e senza alcun freno di vergogna, o di rimordimento, quella comprano, e la rivendono a chi più ad essi piace.”⁵¹⁹ The king they nominally served was a helpless victim, oblivious to how his ministers and their surrogates helping themselves to the monarchy’s riches because the plunderers presented themselves as hard-working princely servants: “l’animo del Principe rimane come abbagliato e sopito dal gusto, ch’egli hà, in vedendosi tolta da’ suoi ministri la fatica; sì che non vede, e non sente il danno della loro avaritia, e delle loro ruberie.”⁵²⁰

If the criticism of behavior the Borromeo had themselves engaged in is remarkable enough, it is perhaps even more significant that these excesses were treated as a thing of the past with no bearing on the present moment. The incriminated practices were reminiscent “d’un ministro, cui in una gran Corte, non sono ancora diece anni, fù tolto un’incredibile tesoro da lui ammassato in brevissimo tempo.”⁵²¹ Anonymous though these aspersions were, the vigorous debate about Lerma’s mismanagement that had helped stabilize the Olivares regime must have made it clear that Borromeo was traducing none other than his former protector, the man who had cleared the ground for the Borromeo to become part of the house of Habsburg’s Italian retinue. Still, rather than as ingratitude this polemic should be read as expressive of a desire to efface the continuities between Lerma’s government and the system that had landed the Borromeo the castle of Angera.

In his deliberate obfuscation Borromeo went much further than even intellectuals in the pay of Olivares. The count-duke’s favorite spin doctor, Virgilio Malvezzi, did not even so much as contrive to cloak the undeniable continuities between Lerma and Olivares, openly admitting that Olivares’s government was not structurally different from his predecessor’s. What had changed, in Malvezzi’s version of reality, was the character of the man at the helm. As he lectured his readers: “[T]he *privanza* is like the monarchy; if it is in good hands, it is very good; if it is in bad hands it is terrible.”⁵²²

⁵¹⁸ Borromeo, *Il libro*, p. 38

⁵¹⁹ Borromeo, *Il libro*, p. 116.

⁵²⁰ Borromeo, *Il libro*, p. 131.

⁵²¹ Borromeo, *Il libro*, p. 130.

⁵²² Feros, *Images of Evil*, p. 213.

Borromeo did not seek to justify the disturbing continuity; he glossed it over. He penned a damning indictment of the haggling over patronage resources under Lerma but neglected to mention that these practices were alive and well under Olivares and that he and his family had been among the main beneficiaries. Operating through omission rather than outright lie, he seemed to imply that new dispensation in Madrid had nothing to do with the depredations of its predecessor.

Borromeo did not leave it at omitting inconvenient truths; he actively invented a much more appealing counter model. Although his portrait of the ideal court was anonymous, the author suggested, through implication rather than declaration, that he was describing the court of Madrid. The model he created bore more than a passing resemblance with how the count-duke himself liked to see his court. In Borromeo's rendition the court was no longer the site of messy bargaining between the prince and self-aggrandizing courtiers, but had been elevated to the status of a model for a well-ordered society in which problems were resolved through civil conversation.⁵²³ With its ceremonies and "certi vicendevoli uffici, ed honori, e rispetti," the court had established modes of engagement that "vogliono assai per non rompere le amicitie" and "servono quasi di riparo, e di scudo, come se combatter volessimo di lontano, e non venir alle prese."⁵²⁴

As such the court comprised in itself the seeds to overcome the free-for-all that had marred its earlier incarnations. Its *vivere civile* had upended the vices that were threatening the social order—avarice and pride—and replaced them with the principle of Christian love between the higher and the lower orders, patrons and clients, who were now working together to create the perfect society: "L'inferiore sarà amato quando il superiore conoscerà ch'egli è utile a sé: e l'utilità sarà allora maggiore quando esso inferiore sarà maggiormente habile e disposto ed inclinato a recar quest'utile che da lui si aspetta, ovvero si gode in parte."⁵²⁵ The cooperation between all orders of society within the royal court had created the conditions for the common good to prevail.

Cryptic and recondite, contemporaries inclined toward a favorable view of Olivares would nevertheless have had no trouble identifying an idealized version of his regime in this description. Indeed the anonymity and vagueness which have stood in the way of a proper contextualization of the work as an apology for Olivares served a distinct purpose at the time. Although important to Borromeo's self-image as a nobleman, writing for a great public came with particular risks, not least the author's foes pointing out the inconsistencies between his thoughts and actions.⁵²⁶ Instead of stating his ideas openly, Borromeo elected to trade in omission and insinuation, implying continuities and discontinuities rather than declaring them, as he penned a treatise that was going to be to Olivares's liking.

⁵²³ Continisio, *Il libro*, pp. 106–107.

⁵²⁴ Borromeo, *Il libro*, p. 191.

⁵²⁵ Continisio, *Il libro*, pp. 111, 113–114. The quote is in Borromeo, *Il libro*, p. 16.

⁵²⁶ See Dewald, *Status, Power, and Identity*, p. 72.

The treatise was certainly an expression of self-interest. Whether deliberately or not, *La gratia de' principi* was part of a tradeoff between Borromeo and Olivares, the final act of reconciliation between the erstwhile rebels and the Spanish crown. Olivares had redeemed Borromeo from his pariah status by ascertaining that what had gotten him into hot water—his dogged defense of ecclesiastical immunities—was a sign of his conscientiousness as a dignitary of the church and a subject of the Catholic king, thereby removing the last obstacle to the Borromeo's reinvention as loyal clients of the Spanish crown that had begun when the aging archbishop had agreed to sign the *concordia* treaty. If Olivares had volunteered to distort Borromeo's past, Federico Borromeo's treatise returned the favor. Satisfying the count-duke's yearning to reinvent the *valimiento* as a rules-bound government for the common man, the treatise portrayed Olivares as he would have wanted the world to see him (although thanks to Borromeo's *modus operandi* of omitting and insinuating rather than stating it left the backdoor open for the author to cop out at a later moment). Knowingly or not, Borromeo beguiled a credulous public with the count-duke's pieties about government dedicated to the preservation of the collective good which both men seemed to forget as soon as they felt unobserved. What Linda Levy Peck has argued of the English court rings true for the Spanish monarchy as well: "[T]he language of benefits existed alongside commercial practice."⁵²⁷

In recent years historians have been trying to make sense of what strikes us as a glaring inconsistency. In a wide-ranging essay on competing and conflicting normative demands thrust upon early modern men and women, Hillard von Thiessen specifically mentions the gap between actions and written accounts of them which is often noticeable in the seventeenth century. Living under the spell of neostoicism, he argues, nobles often claimed to profess avocation for the ideal of the common good in writing only to ditch this norm for the advancement of the narrow interests of kith and kin in social interactions with their peers.⁵²⁸ Exactly which normative ideal was given precedence over the other depended very much on the situation at hand: as writers were expected to comply with certain literary standards, noblemen negotiating with each other were required to uphold the norms regulating social relations. "Der Akteur schaltet also zwischen Diskursebenen und mit ihnen verbundenen Handlungserwartungen hin und her. Er erweist beiden Normensystemen in ihren jeweiligen Kommunikationskontexten die Reverenz."⁵²⁹ The constant switching between norms was possible, von Thiessen argues, because contemporaries were far more "tolerant of ambiguities" than we tend to be today.⁵³⁰

⁵²⁷ Levy Peck, *Court Patronage*, p. 29.

⁵²⁸ Von Thiessen, *Normenkonkurrenz*, p. 266.

⁵²⁹ Von Thiessen, *Normenkonkurrenz*, pp. 266–267.

⁵³⁰ Von Thiessen, *Normenkonkurrenz*, p. 266.

Rather than the unfettered cynicism of a man who had figured out how to game the system and was lying himself to the top, the professions to the common good in Borromeo's treatise were not an attempt to deceive so much as what Pierre Bourdieu would call an attempt to "misrecognize" privilege. Defined as "the deliberate oversight" of objective realities, misrecognition is "the collectively maintained and approved self-deception" among elites.⁵³¹ While this can occur in many social situations, misrecognition usually operates wherever elites feel compelled to elaborate new mental frameworks to rationalize and normalize what they would otherwise regard as shameful behavior at variance with their values.⁵³² These coping mechanisms are rarely the "result of rational calculation or even strategic intent" but nevertheless "objectively organized in such a way that they contribute to the reproduction of the capital at hand, without having been explicitly designed and instituted with this end in mind."⁵³³

For the beneficiaries of the venality of the Olivares system, the stubborn defense of an unachieved ideal helped make sense of the selfish bargain they had struck with the regime. As a former ecclesiastical dynasty who had sought to build a reputation on their disinterestedness in worldly affairs, the transition to the corrupting climate of the court of Madrid must have been particularly difficult to navigate for the Borromeo. Their actions clearly contravened the new norm of preserving the common good to which they were committed, and it was this circumstance that led Federico to idealize the system in order better to cope with his own violation of the rules. As much as being the willful distortion of a shameless sycophant, the treatise was an expression of an investment in the idea of Olivares as the epitome of disinterested princely service when reality—and the Borromeo's own actions—had long made that view untenable.

In this sense, the misrecognition of men like Federico Borromeo was always more than a valuable coping mechanism; it helped stabilize the Olivares regime as a whole. To make sense of this apparent paradox, it is instructive to turn to the vibrant historiography on political patronage in southern Europe in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In France, for example, the Radical Party responded to public criticism of the corruption that was rife within its ranks by encouraging its members to couch their request for personal favors in the language of republicanism. In the long haul, Frédéric Monier has demonstrated, this gave rise to charges of "hypocrisy" which ultimately helped undermine the Third Republic.⁵³⁴ Yet, in the short run, this duplicity enabled party members to negotiate the gap between the republican ideal, with its inherent commitment to equality before the law, and the reality of favoritism, and this in turn propped up a system that

⁵³¹ Bourdieu, *Outline*, p. 6.

⁵³² Fitzpatrick, *Everyday Stalinism*, pp. 104–105; Swartz, *Symbolic Power*, pp. 37–38, 81–82.

⁵³³ Bourdieu, *The State Nobility*, p. 272.

⁵³⁴ Monier, A "Democratic Patronage," p. 106.

would otherwise have collapsed much sooner.⁵³⁵ This edifice is best described as “hypocrisy,” though not in the moralistic sense of the term deployed by the party’s detractors, but, rather, in the way Nils Brunsson has employed it to make sense of the seeming paradox that “ideology and action can systematically conflict with one another” and still lend legitimacy to organizations.⁵³⁶ Through the verbal commitment to a norm that is constantly violated in action, hypocrites convince themselves and others of their investment in an unachievable ideal.⁵³⁷

It barely needs mentioning that there exist glaring differences between modern, nominally democratic societies and the Old Regime. Yet, as the example of the Borromeo family reveals, the same hypocrisy permeated *olivaristas’* approach to the regime of the count-duke. Behind closed doors they engaged in the very horse-trading that they publicly denounced as an assault on the common good. In the process, they brought forth a disconnect between ideas and actions which, paradoxically, helped stabilize the Olivares regime. The misrecognition of the corruption in which they themselves participated helped reinforce their commitment to a regime that sat at odds with their own values. In the same way it allowed the Borromeo smoothen the transition to the Olivares government, it probably enabled many others in the regime’s noble mass following. The collective delusion of the emerging elite buttressed the system much longer than it would have survived if its inner contradictions had been addressed openly. What Pierre Bourdieu wrote of Kabyle society seems to be equally true of the Spanish monarchy under Olivares: “In social formations in which the expression of material interests is heavily censored and political authority relatively uninstitutionalized, political strategies for mobilization can be effective only if the values they pursue or propose are presented in the misrecognizable guise of the values in which the group recognizes itself.”⁵³⁸ In fact, the system began to crumble only when forces that had been left outside the new patronage market began to query the ruling class’s sincerity and demanded that the powers-that-be live up to their own ideals.⁵³⁹

Thanks to the publication of the treatise, then, the Federico Borromeo completed the long transition from enemy of the crown to faithful *olivarista*.⁵⁴⁰ It is only fitting that the main beneficiaries of this reconciliation were the two people who had made it possible in the first place: the archbishop’s nephew and niece, Giulio Cesare and Giovanna. No sooner had Olivares handed over Angera to the Borromeo did they take possession of the fortress. Judging by their letters, the couple spent most summers in the castle high above the lake and seemed to enjoy the revenues it

⁵³⁵ Monier, A “Democratic Patronage,” p. 112.

⁵³⁶ Brunsson, *The Organization of Hypocrisy*, p. vii.

⁵³⁷ Stollberg-Rilinger, *The Emperor’s Old Clothes*, p. 244.

⁵³⁸ Bourdieu, *Outline*, p. 22.

⁵³⁹ Grüne, “Gabenschlucker,” p. 232.

⁵⁴⁰ On the *olivaristas*, see Elliott, *Staying in Power*, p. 119. On reconciliation between representatives of the high nobility and the French crown, see Kühner, “Il va de ma vie,” p. 123.

generated, even though they inherited the noble titles attached to it only after Federico's death, in 1632.⁵⁴¹ After that moment there would be few doubts that Giulio Cesare and Giovanna along with their numerous offspring had formed a new branch of the Borromeo that was there to stay: the acquisition of the castle officially marked the birth of the Borromeo of Angera.

Thanks to the acquisition of the castle, the Borromeo entrammeled themselves in the elite networks of the Spanish monarchy that the rise of the minister-favorite had spawned. Historians differ on the meaning of these networks. Some argue that they were inevitable at this particular juncture. In the absence of what Michael Mann calls "infrastructural power," seventeenth-century monarchs needed to resort to ceding parts of their sovereignty in order to accrue their power in the far-flung provinces of their realms.⁵⁴² Although such schemes clearly appealed to elites' self-interest, they were not necessarily at variance with the neostoic idea of the preservation of the common good. As Wolfgang Reinhard has written with reference to the court of Rome, contemporary elites believed that the sovereign's appeasement of powerful subjects could be conducive to "[g]ute Politik im Dienste des Gemeinwohls."⁵⁴³ The new figure of the minister-favorite was expressly instituted to place people with sufficient social capital in positions of influence so as to deepen subjects' loyalty to the sovereign. Thus, Reinhard concludes, these networks were not an "Abgrund der Korruption" but, rather, "eine notwendige und durchaus funktionale und zweckmässige Entwicklungsstufe auf dem Weg zum modernen Staat."⁵⁴⁴

The Borromeo's own behavior seems to contradict this. Not only does the surviving record show that the court of Spain was rife with the administrative malpractices that contemporaries themselves referred to as corruption. The lengths to which the Borromeo went to misrecognize the circumstances behind the acquisition of Angera suggests that they themselves were uncomfortable about the goings-on in the court of Madrid. Their desperate attempt to reconcile their venality and the urge for dynastic aggrandizement with a nominal commitment to the common good engendered a hypocrisy that "reflected and responded to the unresolvable contradiction between two fundamental values," as Barbara Stollberg-Rilinger puts it in her study of the elites of the Holy Roman Empire.⁵⁴⁵ If treatises such as Federico Borromeo could pull the wool over the eyes of nobles who were equally invested in the idea of keeping the patronage market humming, it proved a much tougher sell when it came to the Borromeo's own subjects in their fiefdom. As rhetoric and action drifted apart, their hypocrisy fostered searching questions about the elite's conception of good governance.

⁵⁴¹ Besozzi, *Ritratti*, p. 43.

⁵⁴² Adams, *Familial State*, p. 14.

⁵⁴³ Reinhard, *Amici e creature*, p. 330.

⁵⁴⁴ Reinhard, *Amici e creature*, p. 333.

⁵⁴⁵ Stollberg-Rilinger, *The Emperor's Old Clothes*, p. 244.

The notion of government peddled by successive minister-favorites in the court of Madrid was constitutively reliant on the self-interest of the few dynasties admitted to positions of power. The Borromeo tried to reconcile their self-serving actions with the ideology they piously swore to uphold: the notion of the monarchy as a commonwealth where every subject, depending on their social status, had a right to a commensurate share of the king's bounty. Betraying their own discomfort, the Borromeo spent the 1620s immunizing the system in which they had become entrapped from criticism from below. If economic prosperity mitigated some of the resulting tensions, the Borromeo's open embrace of war as a vehicle for social upward mobility would galvanize resistance to the elite network that they found increasingly hard to restrain. As their hypocrisy stirred subordinates into action, even the most sophisticated misrecognition failed to do the trick, leaving the Borromeo pining for the sort of stability they had sought to attain when they had forged an alliance with the king of Spain and his *valido*.

Chapter 4

The Lords of Lake Maggiore: Economic Control and Symbolic Power

A local notable writing at the turn of the seventeenth century extolled the virtues of Lake Maggiore thusly, “[I]n questa Riviera, e suoi contorni, non mancano luoghi civili, nobili, & commodi, e delitiosi. Onde ci habitano molti gentil’huomini, e feudatarij, e Dottori, che convenevolmente si possono pareggiar a quei di molte Città della nostra Italia tanto per nobiltà di sangue, quanto per ricchezze, civiltà, creanza, e virtù.”⁵⁴⁶ As if the richness of its cultural life were not enough, the lake had been blessed by nature. The *Verbano*, as the lake was also known, had all the trappings of an earthly paradise. The climate was temperate, with mild winters and breezy summers turning the area into a land of eternal spring. Thanks to this boon, food abounded. The lake’s crystalline waters offered up an impressive variety of freshwater fish; its shores were lined with vineyards and citrus groves that gave way to rolling hills studded with chestnut and apple trees. The villages and towns dotting the shore were bustling marketplaces in which the area’s bounties were traded alongside meat and dairy from the surrounding mountains and crops from the fertile Po Valley. Lake Maggiore was not only the biggest lake in Italy by surface area, as its appellation suggested, but also in terms of the “grandissima utilità, e comodo” its rich nature afforded to the entire State of Milan.⁵⁴⁷

What reads like an enthusiastic travelogue was, in fact, a spin on a popular contemporary genre known as mirror for princes. Mirrors for princes were pieces of advice literature for future rulers, in which learned subjects pieced together information on the territories that their underage readers would one day govern. Our treatise was no different. Its author, a local resident by the name of Paolo Moriggia, dedicated his paean to the 19-year-old Giovanni Borromeo. As the author pointed out in the dedication, Giovanni’s father was “Signor della maggior parte del Lago.” In addressing the heir apparent of the “Casa Borromea” which “è conosciuta, & havuta in molta stima, & pregio, non solo in Lombardia, mà in tutta Europa,” the author made it clear that he had set himself the task of familiarizing the future lord of Lake Maggiore with the base from which the dynasty’s other powers sprang.⁵⁴⁸

As the Borromeo moved into the orbit of the count-duke of Olivares and his project of allowing the leading families of the realm to activate royal patronage to aggrandize themselves, Lake Maggiore became pivotal to the Borromeo’s status affirmation. Throughout the 1620s and 1630s the cadet branch used the castle of Angera as a base to make the most of the lake’s bounties, careful to employ the newly won authority to defuse any lingering doubts about their motives. Guided by a paternalistic understanding of the area’s rich natural resources as God’s gift that they had been

⁵⁴⁶ Moriggia, *Historia*, p. 22.

⁵⁴⁷ Moriggia, *Historia*, p. 227.

⁵⁴⁸ Moriggia, *Historia*, n. p. Both passages feature in the long but unpaginated dedication at the beginning of the treatise.

called upon to administer, the fledgling dynasty set out to govern the flow of goods from the lake to the wider State of Milan and beyond. As the author of the encomium to Lake Maggiore had implied, the judicious management of the trade in agricultural produce from the area to other parts of the State of Milan was conscripted into the family's project of drawing legitimacy from their sprawling fiefdom as they thrust their hegemonic outlook upon commoners around Lake Maggiore and elites in Milan alike. Thanks to its symbolic potency, the fiefdom on the *Verbano* became central to the misrecognition of the power with which the Borromeo felt uncomfortable: fiefs, ironically, allowed them to embed their dynastic ambitions in the neostoic common good ideology to which they subscribed.

This reading offers a fresh answer to an old historiographical conundrum: why was the Lombard nobility in the seventeenth century so keen on acquiring fiefs? Historians used to assume that the nobility of Spanish Milan, much like their counterparts in the kingdoms of Naples and Sicily, used fiefs to finance their conspicuous consumption: by enacting sadistic sentences on the peasantry through seigneurial courts, it was thought, nobles were able ruthlessly to extract labor from the local population and fund their lavish lifestyle.⁵⁴⁹ This consensus was first shattered in the 1970s when Domenica Sella, presenting the results of painstaking research in the files of the treasury of the State of Milan, showed that Milanese feudatories held no jurisdictional prerogatives to speak of, nor did they usually own most of the land in their fiefs. Indeed, Sella concluded, far from investing them with any real authority, fiefs amounted to little else than the payment of a "tax on vanity" in return for a noble title that satisfied little else than an irrational quest for distinction and deference among Milan's leading families.⁵⁵⁰

Writing at a time when social history was in vogue, Sella may have been too dismissive of the motives of the early modern nobility who acquired fiefs in such great numbers. Operating on twentieth-century assumptions about what was a desirable outcome of social upward mobility, he gave short shrift to anyone who did not see monetary gain as the be-all and end-all of social advancement. In the meantime, however, a growing number of studies have shown that seventeenth-century nobles did not share these priorities. Exhuming Norbert Elias's long-forgotten writings on court society, scholars have shown how early modern nobles viewed economic resources not as an end in themselves but as a means to acquire a distinctive status within the wider society of gentlemen.⁵⁵¹ The early modern economy was about more than tangible benefits for the well-heeled: in its symbolic dimension, it was a way of thinking about and verbalizing relationships of

⁵⁴⁹ Classical studies include Villari, *Mezzogiorno e contadini*, and Lepre, *La Terra di Lavoro*.

⁵⁵⁰ Domenico Sella, *Crisis*, p. 172.

⁵⁵¹ Stollberg-Rilinger, *Gut vor Ehre*; Pečar, *Status-Ökonomie*, p. 93; Visceglia, "Non si ha da equiparare l'utile."

protection and dependency.⁵⁵² Thus, on a symbolic plane, economic interventions were particularly interesting to elites in search of “credit,” which denoted not so much a monetary value as the esteem and reputation one enjoyed among one’s peers.⁵⁵³ If managed paternalistically, a local economy could contribute a great deal to a family’s social standing as paternalist rulers, even when monetary proceeds failed to come forth.

This argument advances research into the nature of noble paternalism in early modern Italy. In studies of two papal families in Latium, Bertrand Forclaz and Caroline Castiglione have fleshed out the benefits that the Borghese and the Barberini reaped from their paternalistic rule, focusing in particular on the administration of justice.⁵⁵⁴ As they see it, the value of jurisdictional rights resided not primarily in the revenues that feudal lords were able to skim off from their estates, but in “inculcating noble values in the villagers” and constructing a power differential between the nobility and the rest of the population.⁵⁵⁵ In her work on the Caracciolo family and their jurisdictional prerogatives in Apulia, Elena Papagna also stresses that “la valutazione della loro rilevanza non andrebbe esclusivamente legata agli introiti in denaro che ne derivavano,” highlighting instead their “spiccata valenza simbolica.”⁵⁵⁶ Interestingly, Papagna also suggests that symbolic capital could be derived from the administration of the local economy.⁵⁵⁷ Her hunch is confirmed by recent work on the Farnese which has revealed that the management of nature’s bounty in their fiefdom north of Rome performed the same function as the Borghese and the Barberini’s administration of justice: it corralled their subjects into accepting them as thoughtful guardians.⁵⁵⁸

Building on these attempts to study the economic aspects of noble rule through the lens of their symbolic import, this chapter makes a similar argument about the Borromeo’s approach to the local economy on Lake Maggiore. As I show, the family enlisted arguments about rulers’ obligation to look after the wellbeing of subalterns to figure as kind and just fathers of the people and natural resources that they had inherited from their forebears.⁵⁵⁹ More perhaps than in the realm of the law, where they, like other Lombard families, were severely constrained by impositions from above, the economy was the primary field in which the Borromeo could and did manufacture consent from the ruled and admiration from their peers.⁵⁶⁰ In the process, they created what James C. Scott has called a “public transcript”: “the self-portrait of dominant elites as they would have seen themselves.”⁵⁶¹

⁵⁵² Windler, *Missionare in Persien*, chap. 6.3.

⁵⁵³ Muldrew, *The Economy of Obligation*; Fontaine, *The Moral Economy*.

⁵⁵⁴ Forclaz, *La famille Borghese*, pp. 44–46, 58, 88–89; Castiglione, *Patrons*, pp. 19, 124, 127.

⁵⁵⁵ Castiglione, *Patrons*, p. 124.

⁵⁵⁶ Papagna, *Sogni e bisogni*, p. 34.

⁵⁵⁷ Papagna, *Sogni e bisogni*, pp. 30–31.

⁵⁵⁸ Luiten, *Friends*.

⁵⁵⁹ Corteguera, *King as Father*; Parker, *David or Goliath?*

⁵⁶⁰ On the restrictions in the administration of justice, see Sella, *Crisis*, p. 165.

⁵⁶¹ Scott, *Dominion*, p. 18.

Set in this context, the Lombard nobility's craving for social distinction was not a preposterous distraction from the real deal but in some ways a more sophisticated form of capital maximization than the one pursued by their counterparts in southern Italy.⁵⁶² Rather than ruling over the peasantry with an iron fist, squeezing the very last of their scarce resources out of them, Milanese dynasties like the Borromeo sought to appeal to the hearts and minds of their vassals. In so doing, they accomplished what every ruling group that aspires to hegemony needs to do: they were able to make the "case that they rule, to some degree, on behalf of their subjects."⁵⁶³ The Borromeo persuaded others that their close ties to Olivares and the power sharing he represented ultimately served the well-being of all subjects of the king. It would take repeated disappointments and labor from the alleged beneficiaries of that paternalism to undo the public transcript and lift the curtain on a hidden annex of calculated exploitation.

The Borromeo's fastening on the economy was an accident of geography. To the south of their sprawling fiefdom lay the Lombard plains with their state-of-the-art agriculture and the manufacturing towns dotting them, one of the economically most advanced regions in Europe. So prosperous was the area that Giovanni Botero, in his treatise on contemporary cities and towns written at the end of the sixteenth century, professed that he would be hard pressed to name "a duchy more abundant in victuals, grain, rice, livestock, cheese, wines, and flax, more replete with artificers and traffic, more densely populated, or more conveniently located."⁵⁶⁴ This thriving market was linked to equally flourishing centers of production and consumption north of the Alps. Thanks to its strategic position at the foot of two important alpine passes, the Simplon and the Gotthard, the area around Lake Maggiore thus morphed into a natural place of exchange for good circulating between Lombardy and Central Europe.⁵⁶⁵ As well as being a crucial hub along one of the age's salient north-south corridors, the Borromeo's fiefdom was a producer of foodstuff in its own right. As we have seen in the introduction, contemporaries waxed lyrical about the variety of perishables produced on the Borromeo's home turf, ranging as they did from meat and dairy to fruits and vegetables, which were bartered, along with goods from central Europe, to Milan and other centers of the Po Valley.

This last point was the one that mattered. Consider, for instance, how Moriggia described the Saturday market in Intra: what took place in one of Giulio Cesare's fiefs on a fortnightly basis was "un grosso mercato à sembianza di Fiera" that attracted not just shoppers from around the lake, but

⁵⁶² Classic studies include Villari, *Mezzogiorno e contadini*, and Lepre, *La Terra di Lavoro*. More recent interventions are Astarita, *The Continuity of Feudal Power*; Spagnoletti, *Il governo del feudo*

⁵⁶³ Scott, *Domination*, p. 18

⁵⁶⁴ Quoted in Sella, *Crisis*, p. 1.

⁵⁶⁵ Cavallera, *Angera*, pp. 170–71.

hawkers from as far as the Valais and the German-speaking parts of the Swiss Confederacy who brought with them “gran quantità di grassine, che non solo servono à detto Borgo, & à i luoghi del Lago, mà ancora apportano gran beneficio alla Città di Milano, & ad altri luoghi.”⁵⁶⁶ This was not just hyperbole on Moriggia’s part. His assertions are borne out by the records of the toll house at Sesto Calende, where goods on their way to Milan were screened: in a typical year in the late sixteenth century, 300 heads of cattle, 1,900 calves, 4,800 goats, almost 1,000 *quintali* of cheese, 300 *quintali* of butter, and 45,000 hectoliters of wine were exported from the area around Lake Maggiore.⁵⁶⁷ Considering these impressive numbers, Moriggia could be forgiven for thinking that Lake Maggiore was one gigantic marketplace offering all sorts of “utilità e comodo” to the world.

The lords of the lake actively basked in the glory of it all as they totted up the market towns in the area. In addition to Intra, Giulio Cesare was seigneur of Cannobio, a town on the Swiss border which similarly drew in marketgoers on a fortnightly basis.⁵⁶⁸ He obviously thought of these places as his trump card. As the Angera branch asserted itself, Giulio Cesare and Giovanna set out to add more market towns to their portfolio. They soon set their eyes on Pallanza, whose fortnightly market was by far the most important in the area and complimented the fair in neighboring Intra that took place on alternating Saturdays. As the author of our treatise explained, the auction owed its attractiveness mainly to local grain merchants, “li quali con la licenza dell’Illustrissimo Magistrato Straordinario di Milano conducono à casa loro gran copia de grani, che comprano nello Stato, e fuori d’esso,” leading Moriggia to conclude that the “Borgo sia il granaio del Lago Maggiore, e d’altri molti luoghi. E specialmente de Sig[nori] Svizzeri [...] quali vanno à detti mercati, per fornirse di grano.”⁵⁶⁹ Thus when the town was advertised as a fief by the treasury in Milan in 1620, Giulio Cesare Borromeo threw his hat in the ring of potential buyers, offering 4,000 *ducatoni* before bumping up his offer to 5,000.⁵⁷⁰

The Pallanzotti fiercely opposed the well-heeled local feudatories, deploying a culture of resistance that they had been honing since the Borromeo’s first stab at purchasing the prosperous town in 1466.⁵⁷¹ The local notables put forth robust political arguments in the hope that they would flatter the king of Spain enough to preserve their old privileges. In a memorandum the *sindico*, the town’s representative, trotted out the old specter of the Borromeo as a French Trojan horse who would unduly increase their heft on the Milanese State’s sensitive western border if they were allowed to acquire another fief on Lake Maggiore. In fact, if Pallanza was sold to the Borromeo, the

⁵⁶⁶ Moriggia, *Historia*, p. 122.

⁵⁶⁷ Frigerio, *Territorio*, p. 462.

⁵⁶⁸ Moriggia, *Historia*, pp. 89–90 (Cannobio), p. 122 (Intra).

⁵⁶⁹ Moriggia, *Historia*, p. 143.

⁵⁷⁰ The following figures and quotes are from ASM, *Atti di governo, Feudi camerali p.a.*, cart. 428, fasc. 9f. The process of how a fief was sold is described in Visconti, *Il commercio*, pp. 60–62.

⁵⁷¹ Cavallera, Angera, p. 173.

king would lose “quella sola Terra immediatamente sua nel mezzo di molti Feudatarij.”⁵⁷² Having milked the security argument, the *sindico* went on to appeal to Philip III’s instincts and his self-image as a fair ruler, arguing that the king should “trattar i Sudditi come figli,” who would never condone an unnecessary and potentially harmful intermediary being thrust between the king and his subjects. As a just king, the *sindico* concluded, Philip III could not help but respect the Pallanzotti’s wish to “vivere sotto l’immediato governo del Prencipe,” where they would continue to thrive as the Habsburgs’ loyal vassals. Poor though they claimed they were, they offered the king of Spain 3,000 *ducatoni* if he spared them a future under the Borromeo’s cudgel.

Rhetoric of this kind has led historians to assume that communities who “redeemed” themselves from being enfeoffed did so to avoid the yoke of feudalism. Students of Spain’s southern possessions in particular have generally read the stiff opposition to enfeoffment that towns and villages put up as the resistance of ordinary subjects who feared that they would be squeezed out of their livelihood by predatory nobles.⁵⁷³ As they see it, there was considerable merit to these concerns: southern Italian feudatories were notoriously rapacious in the appropriation of the peasantry’s labor and sadistic in the administration of justice.⁵⁷⁴ However, the same cannot be said of Spanish Lombardy, where Domenico Sella’s exhaustive research has shown that, since Milanese feudatories’ economic and judicial powers were much more limited than their southern counterparts’, laboring people were often indifferent and sometimes even openly in favor of enfeoffment, because living under the paternalistic rule of a distant feudatory often offered tutelage from the more immediate exploitation of local elites.⁵⁷⁵ In fact, Sella has found, resistance to enfeoffment often came, not from the peasantry, but from local landlords and, in the case of market towns, from local notables reluctant to share their city’s riches with distant seigneurs.⁵⁷⁶ This seems to have been the case in Pallanza as well: if the Borromeo were interested in bringing the market under their control, the local merchant community was eager not to be swallowed up by the powerful feudal lord on the lake.

Their resistance paid off. Although the treasury in Milan initially gave the all-clear to the enfeoffment in 1621, the Pallanzotti lodged a successful appeal with the Council of Italy in Madrid where the sale was relitigated two years later in the context of the Borromeo’s acquisition of the castle of Angera. Liaising with the family cardinal and Giovanna Cesi, agent Besozzo worked hard to add Pallanza to the growing list of Giulio Cesare’s fiefs, although the Pallanzotti ultimately outdid him. As Besozzo viewed it, the town elders had resorted to bribery to get their way: “I detti

⁵⁷² ASM, Atti di governo, Feudi camerali p.a., cart. 428, fasc. 9f.

⁵⁷³ Villari, *Un sogno*, pp. 238–240; also see Nader, *Liberty*.

⁵⁷⁴ Sodano, *Le aristocrazie*, pp. 149–157. For a case study of an extreme example see Spagnoletti, *Giangirolamo Acquaviva*.

⁵⁷⁵ Sella, *Crisis*, pp. 169–170.

⁵⁷⁶ Sella, *Crisis*, p. 154.

Pallanzotti pagarono 4m[ila] scudi d'oro qui, de quali si servirono per fare un letto alla Regina che era gravida, acciò non fossero infeudati.”⁵⁷⁷ In light of what we know from other documents, it seems likelier that Pallanza’s “redemption” was the product of a compromise. When the treasury had assigned the fief to Giulio Cesare three years earlier, it had done so on the understanding that Pallanza was a consolation prize. As the author of an internal document put it, acting fast on Giulio Cesare’s claim to Pallanza would allow them to “sit out” (*soprasedere*) the thorny issue of Giulio Cesare’s desire to get ahold of the castle of Angera.⁵⁷⁸ A few years down the line, the Council of Italy apparently came to the opposite conclusion: now that Giulio Cesare had been invested with the fortress, they were unwilling to hand over Pallanza to the Borromeo. Instead the town went under the hammer once again, and it was only when the Pallanzotti coughed up a redemption fee of 4,000 *scudi*—significantly higher than the sum the Borromeo had shelled out for Angera—that they were able to thwart the lord of Lake Maggiore’s ambition of total control of trade in the area.

This seemed like an economic setback for the family. Unlike other towns on the lake, Pallanza levied its own *dazio* (duty) from the ships that entered its port, which given the town’s trade volume must have been sizeable.⁵⁷⁹ The Pallanzotti had few doubts that it was this source of revenue that the Borromeo were after. An incident that had occurred a few years earlier seemed to prove them right. Early one Saturday morning in 1616, as marketgoers were approaching the town from the lake, they were stopped by an “armed boat” manned by seven or eight men from the Borromeo’s retinue. As the *podestà* of Pallanza later reported to the authorities in Milan, Borromeo’s goons, holding their victims at gunpoint, asked them to show the receipt from the toll house of Arona which taxed all goods traveling on ships between Sesto Calende and Laveno. (In the *podestà*’s view, this move was clearly unlawful because “le mercantie, che vengano di questi luochi circonvicini, et particularm[en]te da Arona in su non siano obbligate à dacio alcuno.”) When the hawkers were predictably unable to produce the required documents, Borromeo’s men extorted them by robbing them of their goods “à usanza de corsari.”⁵⁸⁰ The incident, the *podestà* pointed out, had ominous consequences. Not only did the market fall through on that day, the exaction imperiled the “royal jurisdiction of His Majesty”: since the Borromeo had wrung an illegal tariff from the vendors before they reached the shore, the harbormaster at Pallanza was unable to collect the duty on goods that were traded in the market, which spelled losses for the royal treasury. Though the raid in the early morning hours was ostensibly masked as an attempt to levy a different tax, the *podestà* was certain that the Borromeo were trying to cash in on this particularly lucrative *dazio*.

⁵⁷⁷ Giovanni Battista Besozzo to Federico III Borromeo, Madrid July 24, 1623: BAM, mss. G 254bis inf 242.

⁵⁷⁸ ASM, Atti di governo, Feudi camerali p.a., cart. 428, fasc. 9f.

⁵⁷⁹ ASM, Atti di governo, Feudi camerali p.a., cart. 65, fasc. 9.

⁵⁸⁰ ASM, Atti di governo, Feudi camerali p.a., cart. 65, fasc. 9.

He seemed to have a point. The Borromeo were already in control of most other duties levied on goods that traveled through the area. The toll station they operated at Arona was paradigmatic in that respect. The town located at the southern tip of Lake Maggiore may have been the home turf of the antagonistic main line, but the cadet branch still held shares in the *dazio*.⁵⁸¹ Additional revenue came from a similar source: the toll stations at Vogogna, on the access road to the Simplon Pass, and its counterpart at Cannobio, on the border to the Swiss Confederacy and en route to the Gotthard Pass. Consequently, jurisdiction over the *dazio* of Pallanza would have enabled the Borromeo of Angera to benefit twice over from the goods that were sold in that market before they were transported across the Alps or toward the Po Valley: by controlling both the marketplace and the outlets from the lake, they would have been able to tax the same merchandise at two different points.⁵⁸²

On paper, the revenues thus generated looked impressive. Although exact figures are hard to come by, the *annata* levied on the Borromeo's *regalie* give a fairly good idea of the dimensions. (The sum levied for the *annata* usually amounted to half the annual revenue from all *regalie* attached to all fiefs in a nobleman's possession.⁵⁸³) Two tax bills, from 1620 and 1641, respectively, would indicate that the Arona toll station provided the lion's share—80 percent—of the cadet branch's income from fiefs. When the *dazi* of Vogogna and Cannobio are factored in, that percentage rises to 90.⁵⁸⁴ Seen in this light, there is enough to assume that the Borromeo, like the Rohan studied by Jonathan Dewald, drew their income from taxing commerce rather than from exploiting agricultural labor.⁵⁸⁵ Given this, it would be no surprise if they should take an active interest in additional revenue generators of the sort.

A closer look punctures that theorem, however. The *dazio* at Arona, for instance, looks less impressive when one looks at the actual figures. A number of acts of investiture, drawn up when the Borromeo leased the toll house to a local notable, show that the alleged goldmine yielded approximately 8,000 *lire imperiali* per annum.⁵⁸⁶ If that paltry sum was the going rate in the 1610s and 1620s, when the Milanese economy was thriving, it dwindled and ultimately plummeted when the economy crashed in the 1630s and 1640s. The rates they cashed at Vogogna and Cannobio were significantly lower still and subject to the same downward trend over time. In other words, the proceeds from tolls may have made up the bulk of the Borromeo's income from their fiefs, but this did not change the fact that in the grand scheme of things such income counted for very little indeed.

⁵⁸¹ Annoni, Angera, p. 16.

⁵⁸² Zanetta, Navigazione, p. 210.

⁵⁸³ Visconti, Il commercio, p. 126.

⁵⁸⁴ ASM, Atti di governo, Feudi camerali p.a., cart. 673.

⁵⁸⁵ Dewald, Status, Power, and Identity, p. 121.

⁵⁸⁶ ASM, Atti di governo, Feudi camerali p.a., cart. 65, fasc. 8, 14, 25, 26.

Like their Castilian counterparts, the Borromeo derived most of their riches from the crown.⁵⁸⁷ The revenues from their estate were negligible, and not even the lush *dazio* at Pallanza would have altered that incontrovertible reality. Contrary to the Pallanzotti's premonitions, the Borromeo were not primarily interested in tariffs because of the monetary gains they promised but because they held inherent value as a marker of their tutelage of the local economy.

That they were interested in symbolic dominance rather than economic profit becomes apparent elsewhere, too. The Borromeo refused to collect the new excises that Spanish governors imposed on their subjects around Lake Maggiore. In a legal brief against plans to introduce a tax on basic foodstuffs in and around Intra in the 1650s, for example, the Borromeo averred that the levy being mooted "sarebbe la rovina totale del Paese, di quelle genti, e di quelle poche famiglie." The Borromeo's lawyers argued that although the family had had the right to collect taxes, they had chosen to desist, "stimandole impossibili, impraticabili, e troppo perniciose al Paese."⁵⁸⁸ As the family saw it, the excise would have broken the "povere donne" "che vengono ai Mercati, et alle terre più grosse [...] dalle montagne vendendo poco pane, che portano seco, e così portano di la su gl'huomini, e le Donne pezzi di Carne de Castrati, e di Vitelli di Montagna."⁵⁸⁹ To defend their livelihoods the Borromeo volunteered to pay 300 *scudi* in damages to the treasury, lest a tax shouldered by their subjects stifle trade in the area.⁵⁹⁰

As this last point indicates, this was not, as David Parker's research on the French nobility might suggest, an indication of "a self-interested concern that their tenants would be unable to pay their dues and rents" to feudatories who competed with the state for the product of the peasantry's labor.⁵⁹¹ Rather, the dogged defense of the local community against the fisc needs to be explained as an outgrowth of the Borromeo's self-ascribed role as advocates of the destitute. "Questa sollecitudine verso la componente meno *poderosa* della società rispondeva alla sensibilità ideologica dell'*élite* ed era nel contempo il frutto di una prudenza politica che mirava alla conservazione – non grettamente statica né miope, bensì intelligentemente dinamica e attenta agli sviluppi della società – dello *status quo*."⁵⁹² What they were sticking up for was the halcyon world of yesteryear that formed the basis of stability in their fiefdom. As long as goods, however insignificant, continued to be exchanged, the Borromeo could uphold the fiction of prosperity. The provisioning of the local population with victuals was worth more than the monetary gain that might have been derived from

⁵⁸⁷ MacKay, *The Limits*, p. 117.

⁵⁸⁸ 1657 30 Agosto. Sopra ricorso delli Conti Borromei nel quale aducono nuove ragioni per escludere la redenzione [...]: ASM, Atti di governo, Feudi camerati p.a., cart. 50.

⁵⁸⁹ 1657 30 Agosto. Sopra ricorso delli Conti Borromei nel quale aducono nuove ragioni per escludere la redenzione [...]: ASM, Atti di governo, Feudi camerati p.a., cart. 50.

⁵⁹⁰ 1657 30 Agosto. Sopra ricorso delli Conti Borromei nel quale aducono nuove ragioni per escludere la redenzione [...]: ASM, Atti di governo, Feudi camerati p.a., cart. 50.

⁵⁹¹ Parker, *Class and State*, p. 93. Also see Castiglione, *Patrons*, p. 15.

⁵⁹² Rizzo, *Il processo di perequazione*, p. 485.

taxing these trade flows. Standing up for the free flow of produce to local markets and, by extension, to Milan meant feeding the cherished image of the *Verbano* as Milan's breadbasket. This symbolism seems to have been more important than the few *lire* the family might have been able to extort from the local population had they elected to tax them.

There was a distinct rationality to the seeming irrationality. In Milan, as elsewhere, noble status prohibited families from engaging in trade directly⁵⁹³, but overseeing commerce was not only perfectly acceptable; it served them as valuable social credit. In seeking the stewardship of markets the Borromeo were animated by beliefs that ran much deeper than our contemporary profit motive. In their eyes they had been blessed by nature's bounty as part of a larger plan devised by God. To them, nature with all its creations was, as Pamela Jones has shown in her study of archbishop Federico and his intense interest in landscape painting, a sign of God's goodness and special favor.⁵⁹⁴ "To Borromeo, created things had essentially two main purposes: to keep human beings alive by providing them with food, drink, and shelter, and to attract contemplative minds by appealing to human beings' senses."⁵⁹⁵ Without intending to dismiss the latter completely, it is fair to say that the former prevailed in the Borromeo's administration of the local economy around Lake Maggiore. Those who had been blessed with such abundance were morally required to preserve it and share its fruits with the lower orders. Like their protectors, the Spanish Habsburgs, the Borromeo saw feeding the indigent as part of the benign regard for social inferiors on which contemporary elites prided themselves.⁵⁹⁶

While this self-image radiated far beyond Lake Maggiore, it was most valuable in Milan itself where the family resided and exerted power through dominance of the ecclesiastical hierarchy. Milanese elites made much of plenty. A chronicler writing in the late thirteenth century was enthralled with the range of food available Milan, a telltale sign, to his mind, of the city's wealth.⁵⁹⁷ Abundance continued to enjoy pride of place in the baroque imagination. Whereas the Milanese of the Borromeo's station had access to a wide variety of exotic foodstuffs, they were afraid enough of food riots that they took pains to cater to at least the populace's basic needs. Noted one contemporary in Naples, "The plebs is like Cerberus: to prevent it from barking, one must fill its jaws with bread. ... [I]n a city as crowded as Naples, one must keep the multitude friendly [and therefore] make sure that foodstuffs are abundant, especially bread."⁵⁹⁸ With this in mind, most cities and towns in Italy set up so-called *annone*, public agencies that ensured ravenous paupers did not lack in

⁵⁹³ Álvarez-Ossorio, *The King and the Family*, pp. 185–86.

⁵⁹⁴ Jones, *Federico Borromeo*, p. 8.

⁵⁹⁵ Jones, *Federico Borromeo*, p. 76.

⁵⁹⁶ See Elliott, *Power and Propaganda*, p. 165.

⁵⁹⁷ Dickie, *Delizia!*, p. 41.

⁵⁹⁸ Fabio Frezza quoted in Sabatini, *Economy and Finance*, p. 94.

wheat and other grains that could be kneaded into loaves.⁵⁹⁹ Sitting at the intersection between the city and the countryside where they held land, the nobility had both the resources and the responsibility to cart these supplies into town.

The Borromeo fully subscribed to this mindset, and took their role very seriously indeed. The family saint, Carlo, owed much of his moral stature as a protector of the dispossessed to his swift action when a particularly bad harvest in 1570 had threatened to spawn a full-blown famine. In one of the hagiographies commissioned by his successor, archbishop Federico, the author gushed over how Carlo “soccorresse a tutti quelli, c’havevano di bisogno,” ordering his staff to distribute bread, rice, and legumes to the famished masses.⁶⁰⁰ The commissioner of these lines was equally as concerned about potential unrest resulting from empty stomachs. He sensed that the esteem the family enjoyed among both peers and social inferiors could be enhanced if they were seen to be tapping resources from their estates to feed the Milanese. That paternalism was, quite blatantly, about crowd control. The Borromeo’s in-house intellectual, Giovanni Botero may have asserted that there had never been a “popolo, o più allegro, o più contento, o più quieto di quello che erano i Milanesi,” and ascribed this to the constant entertainment of the population with religious processions and rituals, courtesy of the house of Borromeo.⁶⁰¹ The archbishop knew full well that the much-vaunted social order hinged on sufficient supplies from the countryside pouring into town.

This realization was reinforced by events that shook Milan in 1629 after the economy had collapsed in the wake of an outbreak of the bubonic plague which had killed one-quarter of the population.⁶⁰² In November of that year the hungry masses of Milan rose against rising food prices and incipient scarcity. As one contemporary described the events, the mobs “fecero incredibilmente insulti tanto enormi, che non si ponno, ne si devono raccontare,” as they took aim at the cities’ bakeries where they “non solamente svaligiavano il pane, la farina, li denari, et la mobilia di Casa, ma anco percotavano mortalmente li patroni, e servitori del Prestino, dando il fuoco alla Casa per ultimo refrigerio.”⁶⁰³ In line with a long-established pattern, the protesters then staged the arrest of the *vicario della provvisione*, the official who, according to the paternalistic narrative peddled by the governing elite, was in charge of providing the city population with sufficient bread but had obviously reneged on that promise. As these attacks on bakers and government officials show, the protesters were animated, as William Beik puts it in his study on similar insurgencies in France, by a “culture of retribution” which meted out punishment to those the dissenters deemed directly responsible for

⁵⁹⁹ Dickie, *Delizia!*, p. 148; Reinhardt, *Überleben*.

⁶⁰⁰ Giussano, *Vita di S. Carlo Borromeo*, p. 190.

⁶⁰¹ Quoted in Villari, *Il ribelle*, p. 99.

⁶⁰² Parker, *Global Crisis*, p. 258.

⁶⁰³ *Storia della peste*, p. 97.

their misery.⁶⁰⁴ Yet, whoever their primary targets were, their protest was a damning indictment of the governing elite who had failed to measure up to the self-ascribed role as protectors of the poor.

The Martinmas uprising, as it became known, caught the Borromeo unawares. Federico's panicked reaction spoke volumes. As the Venetian ambassador reported, the archbishop lifted the ban on trade on Sunday so that "carri et carrettoni potessero condurre, ove bisognasse robbe d'ogni sorte di mangiare," and those in need were allowed to work "senza carico di coscienza," abandoning one of the most hallowed principles of the Counterreformation orthodoxy.⁶⁰⁵ The truth was that the Martinmas uprising had lain bare the shortcomings of the Borromeo's rule. In a sign of the efficacy of the paternalist hegemony they had built, their self-fashioning had made them vulnerable to extortion from below.⁶⁰⁶ In the hands of subordinates, benefaction became "a tool which, if used carefully, could win important concessions."⁶⁰⁷ The events fit the broader pattern of a bread riot. Revealing the mental limits that the ideology had inflicted on them, early modern subjects often manipulated the paternalist discourse to shame authorities into action.⁶⁰⁸ If this failed to produce the desired outcome, as it had in Milan, subordinates resorted to more drastic means, such as riots. Far from being the uncontrolled outbursts of popular fury as which contemporary elites liked to depict them, insurrections were part of a dialogue between rulers and the ruled.⁶⁰⁹ As William Beik has shown, crowds took the professions of their social betters seriously and raised against urban elites when they felt they had betrayed them. "By rioting, these crowds were participating in a dialogue about the management of their city and calling the authorities to task for failing to handle things properly."⁶¹⁰ In Milan, the rioters who had no voice in the city's government tried to force the urban elite to make good on their promises. Capitalizing on the geopolitical instability in northern Italy, they chanted, "Se non ci daran del pan, chiamerem francesi e venetian."⁶¹¹ By threatening to undermine Spanish hegemony, the people they regarded as little more than a rabble in need of disciplining ultimately succeeded in wresting lower bread prices from the Borromeo and their peers.⁶¹² It was an admonishment of the things to come.

The Martinmas uprising sparked intense soul-searching in the Borromeo family. In the process they came to understand that they could meet the expectations they themselves had raised only so long as the population in the fiefs had an economic incentive to sell their products to Milan. They realized that if they wanted to continue to provide the city of Milan with natural resources from

⁶⁰⁴ Beik, *Urban Protest*, pp. 50–51, 70.

⁶⁰⁵ Quoted in be, *Il "tumulto,"* p. 217; Muto, *Noble Presence*, pp. 295–296.

⁶⁰⁶ See Thompson, *The Patricians*, pp. 72, 85; Scott, *Domination*, p. 54.

⁶⁰⁷ Wood, *Deference*, p. 238.

⁶⁰⁸ Walter, *Public Transcripts*.

⁶⁰⁹ Walter, *Public Transcripts*, pp. 123–125.

⁶¹⁰ Beik, *Urban Protest*, p. 51.

⁶¹¹ Quoted in Nicolini, *Il "tumulto,"* p. 179.

⁶¹² Nicolini, *Il "tumulto,"* pp. 165–166.

the lake, they needed more powers to steer trade movements in and from their fiefdom. Their chance came when archbishop Federico's favorite nephew, Giulio Cesare, was appointed as an official of the health board of the State of Milan. In this capacity, he was possessed of special powers to enforce laws designed to halt the spread of the contagion and ensure trade between Lake Maggiore and Milan continued despite the adverse conditions.⁶¹³ With the stroke of a pen, Giulio Cesare was no longer just the lord of Lake Maggiore who presided over the bountiful nature of the area; by dint of this emergency appointment, he now commanded wide-ranging powers to enforce the flow of produce from the lake and into Milan.

Upon his appointment Giulio Cesare worked swiftly to decree new regulations and safety measures for the markets around Lake Maggiore, including the one at Pallanza. Having failed to secure jurisdiction over the fair under normal circumstances, the health emergency endowed him with the authority to post his own guards in the town and oversee the exchange of goods.⁶¹⁴ More importantly, his new role afforded him jurisdiction over the lake's only outlet, the Ticino river, across which the merchandise reached Milan. In the name of ensuring smooth trading conditions, he prohibited the towns and hamlets along the river from imposing measures that prevented "le mercantie e vettovaglie che da coteste parti vengono, siino impedito in qualcun modo."⁶¹⁵ Indeed, his main concern was to ensure that "la città di Milano conforme al solito abbondi delle solite mercantie che da questo lago vi sogliono esser condotte" and threatened to "cominar pene sì pecuniarie come corporali ancora – sino alla morte inclusivamente, con confiscatione de' beni" to those who refused to ferry them to Milan.⁶¹⁶

As this edict indicates, under the altered circumstances of the 1630s, the Borromeo's self-appointed role as providers could only be performed if they threatened the frightened merchants and boatmen in the area of Lake Maggiore. In the words of Giulio Cesare's agent, it was crucial that "si procuri che da' barcharoli et altri non si faccino concussioni a pregiuditio de' passeggeri et de' mercanti che conduchino robba alla città."⁶¹⁷ When a number of coal and wine traders from the valleys around the lake refused to ship their goods to Milan lest they be infected with the disease, Giulio Cesare fired off one of his infamous orders. Although he had himself confessed to fearing for his life, he callously forced his social inferiors to embark on the treacherous journey to the capital.

⁶¹³ Johnsson, *La peste*, pp. 154, 181–182.

⁶¹⁴ Grida of July 8, 1930: Frigerio and Pisoni (eds.), *Per una storia*, p. 317.

⁶¹⁵ President of the Tribunale della Sanità to Giulio Cesare Borromeo, Milan July 6, 1630: Frigerio and Pisoni (eds.), *Per una storia*, p. 314.

⁶¹⁶ Frigerio and Pisoni (eds.), *Per una storia*, p. 315.

⁶¹⁷ Pietro Paolo Terzagio to Giulio Cesare Borromeo, Milan July 4, 1630: Frigerio and Pisoni (eds.), *Per una storia*, p. 311.

Unless the traders left for Milan within the following three days, he ruled, they would incur imprisonment of up to three years and a ten-year ban to engage in trade with the capital.⁶¹⁸

While there is no indication that Giulio Cesare profiteered from the plague economically, he certainly made the most of his new role as an official of the health board better to administer the paradise he had inherited. As the crisis deepened, so did his commitment to steering trade and facilitating the movement of goods to Milan. To keep up the pretense of paternalist rule in the city, the Borromeo, much like the Rohan family studied by Jonathan Dewald, increasingly needed to have recourse to the institutions of the state, something with which their patron, the count-duke of Olivares, wholeheartedly agreed.⁶¹⁹ Thus, it was through control of the enforcement mechanisms that the Borromeo sought to live up to what has been identified as a way of guaranteeing social stability: the successful response to “emergencies arising from such variables [outside] the system’s control as food shortages arising from an imbalance between population and resources.”⁶²⁰ The family were no longer able to bring about the conversion of economic capital into symbolic power on their own; institutions of the state now needed to act, in Pierre Bourdieu’s words, as the “central bank” of symbolic credit.⁶²¹

The resort to state-sanctioned mechanisms allowed them to adapt the paternalist narrative to the new age as the Borromeo took a renewed interest in the monarchy’s tax farming schemes. In these schemes the collection of taxes was outsourced to anyone willing to disburse the equivalent of the prospected shortfall in tax revenue to the treasury in Milan.⁶²² A particularly well documented case is the intricate plan that Giorgio Sorino, an agent of the house of Borromeo, devised to tax bread (*dazio del pane*) in Angera and other communities on the lake sometime in the 1650s.⁶²³ Surviving documents reveal that the Borromeo levied different rates for bread made from pure wheat flour and loaves containing a mix of cheaper grains. To keep track of bread sales, every baker was required to “notare giornalmente nel libro, che li sarà consignato [...] tutta la quantità delle cotte, & la giusta quantità del pane, che giornalmente fabbricherà” and have it ready for monthly inspections by agents of the house of Borromeo. Offenders faced punishment. If they fiddled the figures, bakers were liable to pay a moderate fine of 10 *scudi* for every undeclared *moggio* (roughly 2 dry barrels) of flour and risked “la perdita del pane.” The farming of the tax was equally well regulated. When the agents came to collect the money, bakers had to swear “nelle mani di un Notaro, nel luogo dell’habitatione di detti Prestinari, di non haver fabricato maggior quantità di pane di quello sarà notato in detto libro.”

⁶¹⁸ Grida of July 17, 1630: Frigerio and Pisoni (eds.), *Per una storia*, p. 337.

⁶¹⁹ Dewald, *Status, Power, and Identity*, pp. 196–97.

⁶²⁰ Muto, *Noble Presence*, p. 296.

⁶²¹ Bourdieu, *On the State*, p. 217. Also see Swartz, *Symbolic Power*, p. 27.

⁶²² Sella, *Crisis*, pp. 171–172.

⁶²³ ASM, *Atti di governo, Feudi camerale* p.a., cart. 675, fasc. 4.

Social historians used to view these schemes as particularly glaring examples of noble irrationality, proving that the return on investment was more often than not a net loss.⁶²⁴ The logic seems irrefutable. Although the surviving documentation from the Borromeo's bread tax does not disclose exactly how much money could be raised in a typical year; all indications are that the revenues thus generated must have been minimal, especially if one bears in mind that in a time of a dramatic economic meltdown feudatories could at best hope to take in the sum they had disbursed to obtain the privilege in the first place. From a purely financial point of view, the bread tax was probably a loss, even if one considers that the Borromeo were probably influential enough to buy their tax collectors' license at below the declared price.⁶²⁵ If this adversity nevertheless did not deter them, this was because the value of the tax-farming scheme was not primarily monetary. Besides the moderate punishment meted out to transgressors (who would have been difficult to find out in the first place), the procedures put in place and the labor power invested to levy a few *lire* are the main giveaway here. In fact, the value of collecting excises on bread and other staples resided in its symbolism. The staff of life had a strong religious significance in Tridentine Catholicism, and it happened to be one of the basic foodstuffs at the time.⁶²⁶ To oversee its sale afforded symbolic preeminence to those who had the material and human wherewithal to do so.

The Borromeo's collection of what to them was a preposterously small sum of money was part of what E. P. Thompson has called the "studied theatrical style" of paternalist rule.⁶²⁷ In his classical study, *Patrician Society, Plebeian Culture*, Thompson contended that although elites invested heavily in the "theatrical" display of their paternalist credentials, only rarely did they succeed in convincing their subordinates who challenged them whenever they had a chance to.⁶²⁸ This argument has been rehearsed by James Scott who claims that ruling classes are unable to establish hegemony without the dominated seeing right through it and resisting it when it seems strategically warranted.⁶²⁹ More recently, Andy Wood in his studies of early modern paternalism has reached much less uplifting conclusions.⁶³⁰ Unlike Thompson and Scott, Wood sees elite theatrics as part of an ultimately successful attempt to inflict a paternalist hegemony on subordinates, a preponderance that was robust enough to severely limit what sort of defiance subordinates thought possible.⁶³¹ While ordinary people may have been aware of the holes in the prevailing narrative, they ultimately accepted it, if only for strategic reasons, and sought to weaponize the incongruities in their protests. His ideas echo those of sociologist Stuart Hall who argued that the domination of

⁶²⁴ Sella, *Crisis*, p. 165.

⁶²⁵ On this practice, see Faccini, *La Lombardia*, p. 77.

⁶²⁶ Montanari, *Mangiare*, pp. 28–34.

⁶²⁷ Thompson, *The Patricians*, p. 67.

⁶²⁸ Thompson, *The Patricians*, p. 67.

⁶²⁹ Scott, *Domination*, chap. 4.

⁶³⁰ Wood, *Subordination*, p. 42.

⁶³¹ Wood, *Subordination*, pp. 44, 66.

elites “lies precisely in the power they have to contain within their limits, to frame within their circumference of thought, the reasoning and calculation of other social groups.” They rule by imposing their own ideas as “the horizon of the taken-for-granted: what the world is and how it works, for all practical purposes.”⁶³² Paternalism perpetuated existing inequalities by imbuing the system with an “aura of necessity.”⁶³³ Protesters’ deportment during the Martinmas riot seems to prove them right, as would subsequent events.

The complicated tax collecting ritual was an integral part of establishing hegemony. It entrenched the Borromeo’s beloved public transcript: the story that James C. Scott defines as “a highly partisan and partial narrative [...] designed to be impressive, to affirm and naturalize the power of dominant elites, and to conceal or euphemize the dirty linen of their rule.”⁶³⁴ It is an example of what Bourdieu scholar David Swartz has described as “the labour of dissimulation and transfiguration (in a word, of *euphemization*) which secures a real transubstantiation of the relations of power by rendering recognizable and misrecognizable the violence they objectively contain and thus by transforming them into symbolic power.”⁶³⁵ What historians have long mistaken for an empty ceremony turns out to be a key ingredient of contemporary ways of constituting and maintaining social hierarchies and asserting power, without raising the danger that unruly subordinates would complain and thereby deflate the family’s image as just rulers. In a society that was deeply invested in the idea of social hierarchies, the collection of excises, however insignificant they might be in monetary terms, was symbolic labor par excellence: it effected the transubstantiation of administrative power into seemingly “legitimate demands for recognition, deference, [and] obedience” from social inferiors.⁶³⁶

As any other elite, early modern nobles understood that, “No power can be satisfied with existing just as power, that is, as brute force, entirely devoid of justification – in a word, arbitrary – and it must thus justify its existence, as well as the form it takes, or at least ensure that the arbitrary nature of its foundation will be misrecognized and thus that it will be recognized as legitimate.”⁶³⁷ Actors with power interested in preserving it thus deploy “symbolic strategies aimed at legitimating the social foundation of their dominion.”⁶³⁸ This was particularly true of ecclesiastical dynasty such as the Borromeo who must have been concerned about their public perception after the turn to coercive extraction in the 1630s. Rather than being seen as rapacious usurpers, they needed to paint themselves as facilitators of bounty through subtle intervention in the local economy, infusing their

⁶³² Hall, *The Toad*, p. 44.

⁶³³ Stollberg-Rilinger, *The Emperor’s Old Clothes*, p. 4.

⁶³⁴ Scott, *Domination*, p. 18.

⁶³⁵ Swartz, *Culture and Power*, p. 93.

⁶³⁶ Swartz, *Culture*, p. 90.

⁶³⁷ Bourdieu, *The State Nobility*, p. 265.

⁶³⁸ Bourdieu, *The State Nobility*, p. 265.

paternalism with a heavy dose of religion.⁶³⁹ With this in mind, the Borromeo usually eschewed short-term economic gain, treating such ostensible generosity as an investment in symbolic power. By ostentatiously forgoing what was allegedly theirs, they hoped to convince both their subjects and peers of their unstinting commitment to the collective good.

Such credentials were necessary because in other areas the Borromeo were inadvertently sabotaging the message they wanted to convey. Their handling of fishing rights, for example, brought forth the profit-driven nature of their paternalism, casting doubt on the sincerity of their motives. Fishing was part of the privileges that the monarchy had begun to outsource to feudatories, allowing them to raise fees from local fishermen and indict violators for poaching. Angling was lucrative. The author of our mirror of princes rhapsodized about the wide variety of freshwater fish that could be found in the lake: he dedicated an entire chapter of his paean to the “*sorti di Pesci che produce questo Lago, e che si prendono in esso, col peso della loro maggior grossezza,*” a chapter that is considerably longer than all the other disquisitions on the area’s natural resources.⁶⁴⁰ Not only were fish prized perishables which “sp[oke] of a distinctly *noble* culture of feudal barons,” as Loek Luiten has argued.⁶⁴¹ Moriggia’s attention to detail gestured to the economic potential of freshwater fish for the finances of his intended readers, the lords of Lake Maggiore.

The reasons for this were to do with the lake’s function as a primary provider for the city of Milan. At a time when Catholic dietary restrictions on fast days and during lent were strictly enforced, fish became a staple, albeit one that remained something of a luxury in a landlocked city.⁶⁴² In the late Middle Ages a religious chronicler had lamented the fact that, apart from the ubiquitous eel and salt cod, fish were so rare that city dwellers regularly had to make do with frog’s legs and snails on fast days.⁶⁴³ By the seventeenth century the situation had improved somewhat. Thanks to an elaborate system of canals Milan was now linked to Lake Maggiore via the Ticino river, which guaranteed a steady supply of fresh fish from the lake.⁶⁴⁴ (By the end of the sixteenth century, 170 *quintali* of pisces passed through the toll house at Sesto Calende en route to Milan.⁶⁴⁵) This became particularly relevant after the Council of Trent when Catholic bishops like Federico Borromeo began to enforce the dietary prescriptions of the Church with renewed vigor.⁶⁴⁶ As if by serendipity, the new orthodoxy put the Borromeo in a position where they could potentially manage both ends of

⁶³⁹ On the role of religion in legitimizing paternalist rule, see Castiglione, *Patrons*, chap. 5, part. pp. 124–125.

⁶⁴⁰ Moriggia, *Historia*, p. 32.

⁶⁴¹ Luiten, *Fruit*, unpag.

⁶⁴² Also see Luiten, *Fruit*, unpag.

⁶⁴³ Dickie, *Delizia!*, p. 91.

⁶⁴⁴ Cavallera, *Angera*, p. 162.

⁶⁴⁵ Frigerio, *Territorio*, p.462.

⁶⁴⁶ Montanari, *Mangiare*, pp. 107, 119.

the food chain—provided the archbishop’s nephews extended their jurisdiction over the waters that supplied the only protein permissible on fast days.

Their alliance with Olivares afforded them the means to do so. Angling used to be a right granted to locals by the Visconti and Sforza rulers. After they took power in Lombardy in the sixteenth century, the Habsburg authorities redefined the waters of Lake Maggiore and the fish in them as part of the royal demesne. This meant that the right to trawl could now be alienated to anyone willing and able to pay for it. As the monarchy entered into one of its cyclical spending crises in 1605, the Spanish authorities in Milan began to force local feudatories and communities to produce documentation showing they were the rightful holders of permits to down their nets in the lake. Failure to comply would lead the authorities tacitly to assume that those concerned were illegally usurping royal prerogatives; if they wanted to continue to make use of them, they would be made to pay for the privilege.⁶⁴⁷ The smaller players on the lake offered fierce resistance to the idea of ponying up money for what they thought of as an inviolable right.⁶⁴⁸ However, these efforts against the commodification of one of the few vital resources available to the local population were undermined by the single most holder of fishing privileges on the lake, the Borromeo family. Although they, too, had initially taken a firm stand against the idea of paying for angling rights, they quickly turned around once they caught a glimpse of the opportunities offered by the new regime of Olivares in Madrid. Keen on rapprochement with the count-duke, the up-and-coming Borromeo of Angera changed tack: instead of continuing to stand firm against Spanish impositions on their subordinates, they tried to secure a trawling license encompassing the entire lake and thus to become monopolists who resold permits at a profit.

When he traveled to Madrid to broker the sale of Angera in 1623, the Borromeo’s agent Besozzo was tasked with relitigating the fishing rights in the lake, which were being separated from fiefdoms proper.⁶⁴⁹ To nudge Madrid along, the Borromeo touted cash that others on the *Verbano* would never have been able to scrape together. Unfortunately, the extent of the privilege that Besozzo ultimately secured on behalf of the lords of Lake Maggiore cannot be inferred from the surviving correspondence, though the amount paid—15,200 scudi⁶⁵⁰, or a little over six times the sum disbursed for the castle—suggests that the new privilege applied to the entire lake, thus allowing the Borromeo of Angera to sell off multiple angling licenses to local fishermen and turn what was by all accounts a growing market into a windfall.⁶⁵¹

⁶⁴⁷ Annoni, Fisco, p. 90; Cavallera, Angera, p. 163.

⁶⁴⁸ Annoni, Angera, p. 33.

⁶⁴⁹ Visconti, Il commercio, p. 99.

⁶⁵⁰ Giovanni Battista Besozzo to Federico III Borromeo, Madrid August 17, 1623: BAM, mss. G 254bis inf 309.

⁶⁵¹ Annoni, Fisco, pp. 72, 90; Cavallera, Angera, p. 164.

By taking over the commons, the Borromeo undermined their credentials as purveyors of good government, a fact to which they seem to have been alive. As they approached Philip IV and Olivares, they immediately offered to make a concession: if they were granted fishing rights for the entire lake, they would exempt “il territorio di Angera sino à mezzo il lago” from the privilege.⁶⁵² Like other communities around the lake, Angera had had its trawling privileges revoked and been forced to pay a tribute for continued access to the lake in 1617.⁶⁵³ As they sought to seal the deal of a lifetime, the Borromeo pledged to restore the *status quo ante*. Invoking the memory of St. Charles, they contended that the proposed act of magnanimity would be of much use to the “poveri di Angera.”⁶⁵⁴ The Council of Italy seemed to welcome such farsighted benefaction. As Besozzo reported, “in Consiglio hanno stabilito che attesa la povertà, et sterilità di buona parte di quel paese, si lascia libero il Lago come sempre era prima.”⁶⁵⁵ This exemption was later extended to other hamlets belonging to the *pieve* (a group of rural parishes centered around a church with a baptistery) of Angera on both shores of the lake.⁶⁵⁶ Aside from winning over Madrid, the purpose of this measure seems to have been to allay the anxieties of the local population who had been battling the enclosure of the lake for decades. Agent Besozzo ventriloquized his masters in the crudest terms imaginable, writing of the *pesca*, “Io hò havuto per bene che la [l’ha] donata alli poveri perche sarà sempre più amorevole alla Casa.”⁶⁵⁷ With characteristic carelessness, he lifted the curtain on the family’s “hidden transcript,” “the practices and claims of their rule that cannot be openly avowed.”⁶⁵⁸

This gracious concession may have been a clever ruse to hoodwink uninformed circles in Madrid. If those who had hatched the plan genuinely believed that it would win hearts and minds on the lake as well, they were seriously mistaken.⁶⁵⁹ The “poveri di Angera” whom the lords of Lake Maggiore had wanted to buy off with an act of ostentatious charity saw right through it. In petitions to the Spanish authorities in Milan they argued that the Borromeo’s tokenism served only their public image and failed to bring substantive improvements to its alleged beneficiaries. Presaging the practice of later oppositional movements, a local notary wrote to the governor of Milan on behalf of the village community, lamenting the fact that the privileged status of Angera had encouraged fishermen from the surrounding area “furtivamente et di notte” to cast their hooks in Angera’s waters.⁶⁶⁰ The nightly incursions of outsiders was far from the only problem. Earlier the *sindico* of

⁶⁵² Giovanni Battista Besozzo to Federico III Borromeo, Madrid June 29, 1623: BAM, mss. G 254bis inf 213.

⁶⁵³ Cavallera, Angera, p. 163.

⁶⁵⁴ Giovanni Battista Besozzo to Federico III Borromeo, Madrid June 29, 1623: BAM, mss. G 254bis inf 213.

⁶⁵⁵ Giovanni Battista Besozzo to Federico III Borromeo, Madrid July 18, 1623: BAM, mss. G 254bis inf 239.

⁶⁵⁶ Annoni, Angera, p. 33.

⁶⁵⁷ Giovanni Battista Besozzo to Federico III Borromeo, Madrid June 29, 1623: BAM, mss. G 254bis inf 213. See Scott, *Domination*, p. 10.

⁶⁵⁸ Scott, *Domination*, p. xii.

⁶⁵⁹ Also see Castiglione, *Patrons*, p. 175.

⁶⁶⁰ Quoted in Besozzi, *Famiglie*, p. 140. On the role of literate members in interactions with monarchical institutions, see Castiglione, *Patrons*, pp. 60–61.

Angera had divulged what was apparently an open secret: the waters that the Borromeo had so charitably opened up to local anglers were so barren of fish that “qualche volta (i pescatori) si trovano a guadagnare 30 o 40 soldi al giorno et altre volte stavano settimane intere senza guadagnare un soldo.”⁶⁶¹

This episode adds to ongoing debates on the nature of early modern paternalism. In his classic essay on the subject, E. P. Thompson implied that displays of paternalism were a calculated move on the part of the high and mighty. Interventions of the sort, he contended, were ultimately inconsequential concessions that needed to be made for the grand narrative of “responsibility to the poor” to remain credible. Throughout his writings, Thompson seemed to imply that acts of benevolence were part of a deliberate strategy: “occasional dramatic interventions” helped conceal the fundamentally exploitative nature of the relationship between lords and the local population.⁶⁶² Though sympathetic to Thompson’s argument, scholars have recently cautioned against reading early modern paternalism as little else than a cynical ploy to preserve power. Andy Wood has suggested that many members of the early modern elite had a genuine investment in the idea of themselves as paternal protectors and may not always have been fully conscious of the objective outcomes of their paternalist practice.⁶⁶³

Helpful as it is, this reminder should not deter us from questioning self-style paternalists’ sincerity when the sources suggest that they were indeed acting in bad faith. In the case at hand, the Borromeo were indisputably conscious of the fact that the alleged generosity toward the inhabitants of Angera went hand in hand with a drive to impose licenses on the vast majority of the remaining fishermen on the lake. The letters the Borromeo exchanged with their agent indicate that this sop was part of a deliberate plan to curb resistance to the impoverishment of laboring people whose very livelihood depended on unrestricted access to the commons.⁶⁶⁴ Nor was this a secret that is only revealed to us who have the benefit of hindsight. In fact, it was the intended beneficiaries of the Borromeo’s benevolence who raised serious doubts about the true extent of the family’s commitment. As they made clear in their petitions to the government, they strongly suspected that this act of magnanimity served to cover up the impoverishment of the local communities that was the inevitable outcome of the Borromeo’s drive to monopolize fishing rights. The accusations had first been articulated by the Borromeo’s own subjects, who in doing so had undermined the public transcript.⁶⁶⁵

⁶⁶¹ Quoted in Besozzi, *Famiglie*, p. 140.

⁶⁶² Thompson, *The Patricians*, p. 46.

⁶⁶³ Wood, *Deference*, pp. 237–238, 244–245.

⁶⁶⁴ See Cavallera, *Angera*, p. 164.

⁶⁶⁵ Scott, *Dominion*, p. 18.

Their vassals were not the only ones that called the Borromeo's sincerity into question. As elsewhere in early modern Europe, the Borromeo's vassals seem to have viewed Milanese courts as "offering legal opportunities for sorting out class conflict" in the countryside, opportunities they readily seized.⁶⁶⁶ Prodded by their relentless protests, the Spanish authorities began to look into alleged irregularities in the Borromeo's administration of fishing privileges on the lake. By the 1650s, they initiated legal proceedings against the family accusing them of not being the rightful proprietors of the angling rights they had been outsourcing to local fishermen for the last four decades.⁶⁶⁷ According to legal documents prepared by the lawyers of the *Magistrato Straordinario*, the tribunal in charge of feudal privileges, the Borromeo had been selling trawling licenses and raking in substantial profits without formally having been granted the right to do so. If they wanted to continue to exercise it, the lawyers concluded, the lords of Lake Maggiore first needed to come clean on the hefty arrears that had been building up and then follow the standard procedure to properly acquire the privilege.

Given the nature of the surviving evidence, it is impossible to determine whether this was in fact true. The episode certainly needs to be placed in its proper context. As we will see in chapter 8, in the 1650s the coffers of the state were empty and the authorities anxious to find new ways to finance the ongoing war effort against the French crown, something the Borromeo's lawyers were only too keen to point out in their briefs. Yet the fact remains that the arguments of the authorities must have been compelling enough for a family as influential as the Borromeo to cave in to the mounting pressure. Guilty or not, when the authorities threatened to sell the privilege to the highest bidder in 1658, the Borromeo settled with the *Magistrato*, obtaining angling privileges for all villages and towns in their possession, including the right to sublet them to local fishermen.

As a substantial sum of money changed hands, lawyers stood by to sell the settlement as a legal victory for the Borromeo. Invoking once again the imagery of the descendants of St. Charles as protectors of the destitute, the Borromeo's attorney depicted the family as the saviors of fishermen who would otherwise have been exposed to the ravages of a new feudatory or the possibly even more predatory state.⁶⁶⁸ The same message was amplified through the publication of a hagiography of archbishop Federico in which the author commissioned by the family eulogized the "affetto particolare, che a' poverelli portava." Such was his love, the author claimed, that when he acquired the fief of Angera he, unlike "altri" who cared about their "interessi soli," the archbishop had explicitly requested that "da mezzo il Lago infin' alla Rocca liberamente pescar potesse chi che si

⁶⁶⁶ Castiglione, *Patrons*, p. 62. Also see *ibid.*, pp. 175–176.

⁶⁶⁷ The whole episode is told in Annoni, *Fisco*, pp. 91–94, on the basis of material in ASM, *Atti di governo*, *Acque*, cart. 296.

⁶⁶⁸ Annoni, *Fisco*, pp. 91–94.

fosse, e massimamente i poveri.”⁶⁶⁹ If one wanted to be charitable, this propaganda feat could be construed as a sign of the Borromeo’s heart-felt concern for the well-being of the local population, but all indicators point in the opposite direction. It seems more plausible that they were trying to prop up the narrative they had been peddling of themselves in the face of a robust case against their paternalism. The publication was a stunt to misrecognize an inescapable conclusion: that the family’s relationship to their subjects was textured by exploitation, not benevolence.⁶⁷⁰

While the restoration of consent on the lake was crucial, it seems that it was even more important to launder a reputation that had been tarnished by the intervention of the ruled.⁶⁷¹ Fishing rights stood in for the control of the natural resources of the lake and the distribution of God’s bounty to the local population which was constitutive of the family’s prestige within the wider society of gentlemen. If they paid good money to put an end to the trial and used the occasion of the settlement to vent their commitment to paternalism, this was not so much to woo over their subjects on the lake as it was to avert a public relations disaster brought on by decades of war and destruction. The hegemonic discourse of paternalism usually kept ordinary people at bay, but the violation of an unwritten contract had caused them to raise their voice, striking hard at the family’s standing among their peers in Milan and beyond. Although paternalism was undoubtedly useful to guarantee order in the fiefdom, the conspicuous display of benevolence was often also intended to send strong signals to the wider society of gentlemen. What was at stake for the Borromeo at that point was much more than their fishing privileges. As we will see in the following part of the dissertation, the assault on their privileges was part of a larger movement that had grown in opposition to their paternalism on Lake Maggiore and, by the 1650s, had reached the leading institutions in Milan.

In this chapter I have argued that historians have misread seventeenth-century nobles’ interest in the economy. Baroque elites tended to think of the economy primarily as an exchange of nature’s bounties. As a result, monetary gain was at least as important to them as the symbolic power that could be derived from overseeing a prospering local economy. Deeply concerned about the moral implications of their dynastic ambitions, early modern nobles’ approach to all matters economic was informed by a paternalist preoccupation with abundance and plenty. Their role was to steward, if not quite literally, then at least figuratively, the provisioning of the population with nature’s treasures and thus act as good and just administrators who had the best interests of their subjects at heart.

⁶⁶⁹ Rivola, *Vita di Federico Borromeo*, p. 531.

⁶⁷⁰ Swartz, *Symbolic Power*, p. 104.

⁶⁷¹ On this point, see Scott, *Domination*, p. xii.

This paternalist self-image relied as much on theatrics as it did on actual responsibility toward impoverished social inferiors. Still, it created a set of expectations the family found increasingly difficult to meet. If they had been able to combine economic *laissez-faire* in the fiefdom and an urban economy steered from above in times of prosperity, this precarious balance proved unsustainable when the bubonic plague and war brought Milan's economy to its knees. Upholding the fable of the family as protectors of the dispossessed necessitated tightening the screws in the countryside. The Borromeo did so by relying on institutional roles bestowed upon them by a reinvigorated monarchy. As they sought new ways of converting their role in managing the local economy around the lake into social preeminence in Milan, they fell back on the "central bank" of symbolic power—the state—to ensure that Lake Maggiore continued to be of as much "utilità, e comodo" to the city of Milan as before.⁶⁷²

This new arrangement cast light on the exploitative underbelly of the Borromeo's paternalist rule. Until the 1630s, they had successfully held the balance between their particular and collective interests. The privileging of the symbolic over the substantive had been their way of convincing ordinary people that their aggrandizement as a dynasty dovetailed with their subordinates' interest in a well-functioning local economy. But the issue of fishing rights laid bare the economic interests that the family had previously been able to misrecognize. The attendant conflicts were emblematic of large-scale opposition to the Borromeo who were no longer able to convince anyone that their dynastic ambitions were compatible with the collective good. Like all public transcripts, the Borromeo's paternalism remained at heart "a kind of self-hypnosis within ruling groups to buck up their courage, to improve their cohesion, display their power, and convince themselves anew of their high moral purpose."⁶⁷³ Reflecting its tenacious hold on the collective imagination, subordinates did not query this ideology as such but limited their protests to pointing out those instances where the Borromeo had fallen short of the public transcript. For that to change, a qualitative leap in the Borromeo's exploitation would first have to materialize.

In their dynamics, these tussles foreshadow much of what will be at the center of the second part of this dissertation: the heightening of the contradictions in the Borromeo's alliance with successive minister-favorites and the popular opposition it garnered. For the time being, the conflicts over fishing rights were what medical scientists call prodromes: the early symptoms of an imminent crisis. For the grumbling at the bottom to take on more concrete form, the Borromeo needed completely to turn their back on the religious capital that had hitherto stopped them from going completely rogue. As we will see shortly, the Franco-Spanish war that transformed the area around Lake Maggiore into a battlefield was a direct product of the militarization actively pursued by the

⁶⁷² Moriggia, *Historia*, p. 227.

⁶⁷³ Scott, *Domination*, p. 67.

Borromeo. As they espoused Olivares's Union of Arms, they unintentionally shattered the narrative of the family as well-meaning paternalists. Goaded into action by the destruction that repeated military incursions left in their wake, commoners across Lombardy became a thorn in the side of the family. The stage was set for the crisis of the Spanish monarchy to unfold.

Part II

Boom and Bust

Chapter 5

Becoming Military Leaders: The Borromeo, the Union of Arms, and the Franco-Spanish War in Italy

About midway along its western shore, Lake Maggiore widens to form the aptly named Golfo Borromeo, a gulf studded by an archipelago of four islands, of which Isola Madre was the most conspicuous one in the early seventeenth century. The islet was an integral part of the Borromeo fiefdom. After acquiring it in the late sixteenth century, Giulio Cesare Borromeo's father, Renato, had it transformed into a luscious garden dominated by a new Renaissance palace. By the time Giulio Cesare was invested with the lordship over Isola Madre, the island was one big orchard in which Mediterranean fruit such as citrons, lemons, oranges, and prickly pears imported from Genoa held pride of place among numerous fountains.⁶⁷⁴ Writing in the 1610s, Paolo Moriggia described the isle as a garden Eden within the larger paradise that was Lake Maggiore. As he reported in his ode to the lake, the island's garden boasted "pergolati di tal nobiltà di piante, che cuoprono le vie, & le rendono ombrose, per passeggiarvi sotto per fuggire il caldo, di modo che quivi si gode il fresco, e si prende conforto per la soavità dell'odore di quei confortativi fiori, e frutti."⁶⁷⁵

As a microcosm of the area over which the Borromeo lorded, the garden had long served as a springboard for the family's ambition to become part of a pan-European governing elite. As Moriggia reminded his readers, the island with its palace was a "luogo delizioso, e da Prencipe," where the Borromeo had hosted such eminent members of the European society of princes as the duke of Savoy, Charles Emmanuel, who had stopped over on the island in 1599 when he returned from a trip north of the Alps.⁶⁷⁶ In 1633 Giulio Cesare tried to capitalize yet again on the island's lush nature to hobnob with Europe's leading lights. This time he welcomed Ferdinand (1609–1641), the younger brother of king Philip IV. After an extensive hunt in the Ticino valley south of the Lake, the cardinal-infante, as Ferdinand was known, set out for the island which had been revamped for the occasion.⁶⁷⁷ When he reached Isola Madre, the cardinal-infante was met "principalissimamente" by Giulio Cesare and his seventeen-year-old son, Giovanni.⁶⁷⁸ After a trip to Santa Caterina del Sasso, a monastery perched on a rocky precipice high above the waters of Lake Maggiore, the cardinal-infante was wined and dined on the island before he took a boat back to Milan.⁶⁷⁹

The cardinal-infante's visit was part of his new duties. By the 1630s, Ferdinand and the king's other brother, Carlos, had become central players in the administration of the composite Spanish monarchy.⁶⁸⁰ Philip IV's favorite, the count-duke of Olivares, had long feared them because, unlike

⁶⁷⁴ Buratti Mazzotta, *L'Isola Madre*, p. 38.

⁶⁷⁵ Moriggia, *Historia*, p. 159.

⁶⁷⁶ Moriggia, *Historia*, pp. 158, 160.

⁶⁷⁷ Galli, *I Borromeo d'Angera e l'Isola di San Vittore*, p. 218.

⁶⁷⁸ *Storia della peste avvenuta*, p. 101.

⁶⁷⁹ *Storia della peste avvenuta*, p. 101.

⁶⁸⁰ Esteban Estríngana, *Los Estados de Flandes*.

himself, they were relatives of the king and could stake a claim to power that the *valido* could not. The count-duke spent the best part of the 1620s trying to find a proper role for them to fill. Offering them appointments as viceroys seemed a particularly good solution: not only would it keep them away from Madrid and the king, it would also secure the loyalty of notoriously unruly provincial elites. Thus Carlos was dispatched to Lisbon, while the cardinal-infante was sent to that other hotbed of resistance and rebellion, Brussels, with the express order to consolidate the ties between the local nobility and the court of Madrid. En route to Flanders, the cardinal-infante passed through another strategically important component of the monarchy, Milan, where he courted powerful families like the up-and-coming Borromeo of Angera.

The Borromeo were at least as eager to meet the cardinal-infante. Their invitation rode on the effect the lush nature of Isola Madre was going to have on the king's brother as much as it did on the mechanisms of social upward mobility in seventeenth-century Milan. These were still centered on landholding, with the proper administration of fiefs frequently paving the way for institutional appointments in Milan and the wider Spanish monarchy.⁶⁸¹ Contemporaries agreed that governing a fiefdom encompassed three things: in addition to administering justice (*giustizia*) and providing sufficient foodstuff (*grascia*), feudatories had a duty to protect their subjects from harm (*protezione*).⁶⁸² The latter was perhaps the one facet of landholding most strongly reminiscent of medieval feudalism when fiefdoms used to be awarded in return for military service, making feudatories liable to contribute to the defense of that part of the royal demesne which had been bestowed on them.⁶⁸³ To a nobility in thrall to medieval ideas about feudalism, convincing their peers that they were able to stick up for their land was, therefore, of particular relevance. The 1630s seemed an auspicious moment to show their commitment through active performances: the latent conflict between the French and the Spanish crowns heating up again sparked hopes among social strivers like the Borromeo that military prowess would enable them to climb the social ladder via the army. Given these appetites, inviting an influential military leader certainly did not hurt.⁶⁸⁴

In offering up their military services to the king, the Borromeo latched on to shifts under way in the court of Madrid. Throughout the 1620s the count-duke of Olivares had been pursuing an ambitious plan to incorporate the disparate territories of the Spanish crown through closer military cooperation. Historians have had little time for Olivares's Union of Arms, which they have viewed as a pipedream that ultimately spelled the *valido's* downfall as the monarchy reached breaking point in the early 1640s.⁶⁸⁵ The evidence presented here reveals that they might have been too dismissive of

⁶⁸¹ Visconti, *Il commercio*, chap. II.

⁶⁸² Spagnoletti, *Il governo del feudo*, p. 61.

⁶⁸³ Ago, *La feudalità*, p. 9.

⁶⁸⁴ Jiménez Estrella, *Servicio y mérito*, pp. 91–92.

⁶⁸⁵ Elliott, *El programa*.

the project. If we shift focus from the Iberian peninsula to Spanish Italy, Olivares's policies seem to have elicited much more support than has hitherto been acknowledged. The example of Giulio Cesare Borromeo and his son Giovanni seems to suggest that in Milan in particular the Union of Arms was not seen as the bogeyman that it was elsewhere. In Italy, precarious nobles like the Borromeo of Angera seemed to have gleaned a road map to success in Olivares's intention to weld the imperial nobilities together through a shared defense of the commonwealth.

The military aspirations of Milanese noblemen are an understudied topic. Historians examining the local elite have generally focused on the Milanese nobility's central role in the administration of the state and their appointments to the patrician institutions dating back to the ducal period. Yet, in so doing, they have overlooked military careers as one of the thoroughfare on which Milanese families traveled to power.⁶⁸⁶ Outsiders in particular often envisioned military careers as a stepping-stone into these offices, and it is hard to find a better illustration of this than the father-and-son team of the Borromeo of Angera. To Giulio Cesare and Giovanni, Olivares's plans to reform the monarchy and the military emergency in the 1630s and 1640s created the conditions for a cadet branch to affirm itself as the *valido's* faithful executioners in hopes of achieving that ultimate goal of securing a seat in one of Milan's institutions.⁶⁸⁷ Capitalizing on their strategically sensitive fiefdom on the state's western border, the Borromeo harkened back to the old imagery of the nobility as military servants and, as the Franco-Spanish war reached Milan, they laid the groundwork for a military career that would catapult them into the ranks of Milan's most respected nobility.

Having made peace with the king of Spain, the Borromeo had laid the foundations for a successful rise through the consolidation of an exemplary fiefdom. The need to preserve the paradise they had been entrusted with drove Giulio Cesare and his son to cleave to the count-duke's plans to further the integration of peripheral elites through military service. They did so thinking that this allowed them to combine the two goals to which they had pledged allegiance—dynastic aggrandizement and the advancement of the collective good—at one and the same time. Little did they know that the militarism they propounded on Isola Madre precipitated them into one of the most destructive conflagrations of the century, a conflict which undercut their claim to be acting as protectors of their subjects. In due course, the irresolvable contradiction at the heart of the pseudo-feudalistic fantasy they sought to reenact would galvanize the opposition of the alleged beneficiaries of the elite's wars, busting, prematurely, what the Borromeo had expected to herald a new boom in the family's history.

⁶⁸⁶ Donati, *The Profession*, p. 314.

⁶⁸⁷ D'Amico, *Spanish Milan, 1535–1706*, p. 64.

The Borromeo's self-assertion as military leaders needs to be situated in the context of developments in the Spanish monarchy since Olivares's rise. As he consolidated his hold on power, Philip IV's new minister-favorite faced an uphill battle against what he perceived as the decline of the empire on which the sun never set. Convinced that the legacy of Philip IV's grandfather, Philip II, could only be salvaged if the monarchy underwent fundamental changes, the *valido* pushed for a program of radical reform.⁶⁸⁸ Some of these policies were measures to rekindle the ailing economy of Castile, the heartland of the monarchy, but the most ambitious aspect of Olivares's platform was his plan to deepen the ties between the disparate territories of the composite Spanish monarchy by creating a "stakeholder culture" among the elites of its constituent parts.⁶⁸⁹

What animated this project was Olivares's analysis of the policies of his predecessor, the duke of Lerma. In Olivares's reading, Lerma had integrated the Castilian nobility into the government of the monarchy, but in so doing, he had opened the floodgates to corruption and undermined the authority of the king.⁶⁹⁰ To turn this negative trend around, the count-duke worked hard to invigorate the power of Philip IV vis-à-vis the nobility who were to continue to play a vital, albeit more limited, role in the new monarchy the count-duke was trying to build. In the overhaul he envisioned, participation in government would be opened up to the aristocracies from the monarchy's far-flung territories outside its Castilian heartland. This was smart politics. When Olivares came to power, the monarchy's institutions were dominated to an unprecedented degree by the great houses of Castile whom his predecessor, Lerma, had elevated to positions of influence. This state of affairs had long attracted critics who feared that this concentration of authority in the hands of one constituent territory could precipitate the monarchy's downfall. At the end of the sixteenth century, a representative of the reform movement in the kingdom of Naples, the Dominican Tommaso Campanella, had argued that the Spanish monarchy's only chance of surviving in the long run was if "there may be all fair correspondence and friendship betwixt the Castilians, Arragonians and the Portuguese." To facilitate this, Campanella suggested that the king "bestow[] preferments upon the Portuguese in the Kingdom of Castile; and upon the Castilians in the Kingdom of Portugal."⁶⁹¹ Olivares revived these suggestions for closer cooperation to defeat what he referred to as the predominant "dryness and separation of hearts."⁶⁹² Partly to enfeeble Lerma's Castilian cronies, Olivares tried to increase the clout of families from the non-Castilian territories of the monarchy. His stratagem was to "familiarize [...] the natives of the different kingdoms with each

⁶⁸⁸ Elliott, *The Count-Duke*, pp. 179–181.

⁶⁸⁹ Elliott, *A Europe of Composite Monarchies*. The term "stakeholder culture" to describe the Spanish elite is used in Malcolm, *Royal Favouritism*, p. 110.

⁶⁹⁰ Elliott, *The Count-Duke*, p. 186.

⁶⁹¹ Quoted in Elliott, *The Count-Duke*, p. 199.

⁶⁹² Quoted in Elliott, *A Europe of Composite Monarchies*, p. 62.

other so they forget the isolation in which they have hitherto lived.”⁶⁹³ In return for a deepening integration, Olivares offered them a share in royal patronage that had hitherto been monopolized by Castilians.⁶⁹⁴ Olivares believed that this diversification of the monarchy’s power base would not only buttress the nobility’s loyalty to the monarchy, but the concomitant fragmentation of authority would inevitably potentiate that of the king.⁶⁹⁵

One of the first policy areas in which Olivares tried to implement his project was the military. In 1625 Olivares unveiled a proposal, the Union of Arms, whose premise was simple enough: the nobilities of the composite Spanish monarchy should all contribute monetary and human resources to the defense of the empire. By rallying the disparate parts of the monarchy against common enemies, he hoped to initiate the cooperation that would deepen the union between the kingdoms and duchies that constituted the empire.⁶⁹⁶ The Union of Arms was, in Olivares’s own words, a “camino por donde se pudiese conseguir que todos los reinos de Su Majestad fuesen entre sí cada uno para todos, y todos para cada uno.”⁶⁹⁷ Defense was to blaze the trail for the transformation of the *Monarquía* into a “a supra-national Monarchy, its focal point of loyalty a king who commanded the obedience of a cosmopolitan service nobility, and who governed a complex of kingdoms which recognized their obligations to each other, and shared a common set of laws and institutions.”⁶⁹⁸

Historians have not been kind in their treatment of the Union of Arms and the integration of the nobility it stood for. Ever since John Elliott’s influential work, the conventional wisdom holds that if Olivares’s ambitious plan was not exactly dead on arrival, it certainly foundered on the stark realities of noble and corporate particularism in the territories it was supposed to lift up.⁶⁹⁹ Instead of uniting the monarchy, the mooted Union of Arms produced a growing polarization between a reform-minded but authoritarian minister and a nobility hostile to his agenda. In the long run, the Union of Arms, rather than bring the monarchy together, ended in large-scale disruption and set the stage for a return to the regional prerogatives Olivares had been so impatient to overcome.⁷⁰⁰ His attempts to discipline the nobility and to nudge it into accepting “a greater responsibility for the defence and solvency of the kingdom” came to naught, giving rise to perilous centrifugal forces in the latter half of the seventeenth century.⁷⁰¹

The policy’s collapse has been imputed to a mix of unfavorable circumstances and Olivares’s stubbornness. Even though the count-duke’s proposal met with fierce resistance from the moment it

⁶⁹³ Quoted in Parker, *General Crisis*, p. 255.

⁶⁹⁴ Benigno, *L’ombra*, p. 121.

⁶⁹⁵ Benigno, *L’ombra*, p. 100.

⁶⁹⁶ Elliott, *El programa*, p. 375–376.

⁶⁹⁷ Quoted in Elliott, *El programa*, p. 376.

⁶⁹⁸ Elliott, *The Count-Duke*, pp. 199–200.

⁶⁹⁹ Elliott, *El programa*. A similar argument is made by Thompson, *Aspectos*.

⁷⁰⁰ Elliott, *El programa*, p. 335.

⁷⁰¹ See Jago, *The “Crisis,”* p. 82.

was unveiled, necessity forced him to follow through with it anyway. As tensions between France and Spain flared and the crown became embroiled in the Thirty Years' War, the militarization of society was rammed through against the explicit wish of such peripheral territories as Aragon, Catalonia, and Valencia. In the medium term this dogged pursuit of an unpopular policy had dramatic effects for the monarchy Olivares had pledged to solder together. In 1640, Catalonia and Portugal, facing mounting pressure from the imperial center, cracked and rebelled against the iron-fisted rule of the count-duke who they portrayed as a tyrant threatening to undo the constitutional makeup of the monarchy.⁷⁰² The protesters' vindication came three years into the uprising, in 1643, when Philip IV, in a desperate bid to prevent the worst crisis of his reign from spiraling, dismissed Olivares.

Although most rebellions could be quelled (with the exception of Portugal, which would become an independent kingdom), Elliott insists that the uprisings and the propaganda war they unleashed turned the clock back to the situation before Olivares's maiden days as Philip IV's new *valido* in the 1620s. The upshot of the Union's failure lent heft to intractable forces, usually described as *neoforalistas*, who insisted on the preservation of the vastly diverging traditions of the territories making up the Spanish monarchy. If Olivares had called for "many kingdoms, but one set of laws" (*multa regna, sed una lex*), he emboldened the paladins of local particularisms and privileges he had sought to overcome.⁷⁰³ Instead of fostering a pan-Spanish elite out of the nobilities in the far-flung territories, Olivares scared away many dynasties who were unwilling to vacate local positions of power.

This narrative has become so entrenched that its premises have never come under close scrutiny. Rarely have the top-down perspective on the Union of Arms and the hindsight that undergird this reading of events been seen for what they are: a major obstacle to reckoning with the nobility's response to Olivares's project. Historians have by and large concluded that the Union of Arms marked a low-point in a concomitant "crisis of the nobility."⁷⁰⁴ Yet, a glimpse across the border into France suggests something else. There, David Parrott's research on Olivares's opposite number, cardinal Richelieu, offers a fresh perspective on a similar attempt at elite interpenetration through the army, a perspective which indicates that these plans were less hierarchical and less confrontational than the predominant reading of Olivares's Union of Arms implies. Parrott first debunks the myth that Richelieu enacted military cooperation as a part of a grand strategy from the top on down, showing instead that the cardinal portrayed himself as a member of a noble warrior elite within whose hierarchies he sought to advance the interests of his own dynasty and those of

⁷⁰² Elliott, *El programa*, p. 505.

⁷⁰³ Elliott, *El programa*, p. 521.

⁷⁰⁴ See Thompson, *The Nobility*, p. 213.

allied families.⁷⁰⁵ Viewing the minister-favorite as a part of the caste he was trying to draw closer to the throne rather than as a minister above the fray has important implications for the way Parrott assesses the nobility's response to Richelieu's plans. As he goes on to show, the nobility's reaction was not exclusively hostile, but ranged from open rejection to enthusiastic support depending on individual "status, aspirations, and traditional rivalries" with other families. While "some families or individuals proved consistently hostile to the cardinal," Parrott concludes, other dynasties "gave him their explicit cooperation" because "their individual interests within the competitive world of the high aristocracy complemented, and coincided with," Richelieu's.⁷⁰⁶

Taking his cue from Parrott, Guy Rowlands has gone on to revise our understanding of the French army in the seventeenth century more generally. Far from being launched on a path of inexorable "modernization" and "rationalization" by far-sighted monarchs, the impressive standing army that was built up, especially in the latter half of the century, received its particular imprint from "the private interests of thousands of members of the propertied elites."⁷⁰⁷ For both the king and his noble servants, the primary concern was not the construction of a modern state but the advancement of their own dynasties.⁷⁰⁸ Even though this shared dynastic outlook undoubtedly strengthened the army, it is worth noting that that outcome was a by-product of what was first and foremost a struggle for preeminence based on honor and *gloire*.⁷⁰⁹ While one does not have to accept his conclusion that "the concept of 'state-building' should be discarded" completely, Rowlands is certainly right that there was no conscious program other than the pursuit of narrow family interests by both the king and his servants.⁷¹⁰

There is reason to believe that the same dynastic mindset shaped Olivares's Union of Arms. Challenging the old orthodoxy of Olivares as a modern statesman *avant la lettre*, Manuel Rivero Rodríguez has made the argument that Olivares's project was not driven by the desire to promote state-building but a wish to advance the interests of the Habsburgs and the noble families in their tow, including his own.⁷¹¹ The resemblance with Richelieu is striking. Like the cardinal in France, Olivares seems to have seen himself as a member, albeit a precarious one, of the aristocracy he was essaying to mold into a pan-Spanish service elite. Rather than as a prime minister who administered the monarchy from above, Olivares should be seen as the head of a dynasty tethered to a small circle of fellow nobles who, as his relatives and clients, expected him to further their interests by rewarding

⁷⁰⁵ Parrott, Richelieu, *The Grands*, p. 142.

⁷⁰⁶ Parrott, Richelieu, *The Grands*, pp. 140, 172.

⁷⁰⁷ Rowlands, *The Dynastic State*, p. 1.

⁷⁰⁸ Rowlands, *The Dynastic State*, p. 9.

⁷⁰⁹ Rowlands, *The Dynastic State*, pp. 10, 13, 157.

⁷¹⁰ Rowlands, *The Dynastic State*, p. 361.

⁷¹¹ Rivero Rodríguez, *El conde duque*, pp. 9–10.

them with the resources to which he had temporarily gained access.⁷¹² This mutual dependence enabled Olivares to wheedle fellow nobles into royal service. His preferred method was to appeal to the nobility as a warrior caste, always ready to come to the monarch's succor, which the revival of the feudal ideology in the period abetted. His lack of military experience did not deter the count- duke from fancying himself a military leader.⁷¹³ In the famous Velázquez painting, Olivares is pictured tall in the saddle riding into the distance and blazing the trail to the battlefield for his fellow noblemen. Commissioned to commemorate the siege of Fuenterrabía of 1638, an important milestone in the Franco-Spanish war, the portrait stresses the importance of Olivares as a strategic mastermind able to nudge his fellow nobles into closer military cooperation.⁷¹⁴

In his push for military networking, his strategy seems to have been to divide and rule the nobility. As he explained in the Great Memorial of 1624, a document many view as his manifesto, the king could happily ignore the high aristocracy if he chose to “strengthen, favor and encourage” the second tier of the nobility, “endeavoring to employ most of them in war, where they are extremely useful.” Indeed, if they were led “to believe and expect that their conduct will promote them, that they will obtain the first and most honorable military ranks,” this would “restore the reputation of Spanish arms by land and sea” and turn Philip IV into “the most glorious monarch ever known in these kingdoms in any era.”⁷¹⁵ Such plans accorded well with the perceived need to reconcile clientelism with the neostoic ideology of public service. Military cooperation allowed to combine dynastic ambitions with the common good: what was to entice the nobility was the old idea of lesser nobles basking in the glory of their social betters by envisioning themselves in a relationship of service to the king and his minister-favorite for the wellbeing of the realm.⁷¹⁶

Since research into the question remains paltry, the nobility's response to the count-duke's call to arms continues to be a matter open to speculation. Within the Iberian and certainly the Castilian context, historians have probed the Union of Arms strictly from the vantage point of the high aristocracy who appear to have been impervious to the idea. Yet, more recent scholarship has painted a more nuanced picture. Luis Salas Almela, in his study of the duke of Medina Sidonia, has shown that although they later rebelled against what they took for the tyrannical rule of Olivares, the dynasty initially embraced the count-duke's platform which “fit very nicely with the concerns and priorities” of this important Andalusian family.⁷¹⁷ In fact, it could be argued that families of the

⁷¹² Von Thiessen, *Der entkleidete Favorit*, p. 135.

⁷¹³ González de León, *The Road to Rocroi*, pp. 146–147.

⁷¹⁴ Stradling, *Spain's Struggle*, p. 122.

⁷¹⁵ Quoted in González de León, *The Road to Rocroi*, pp. 161–162. Manuel Rivero Rodríguez has recently questioned the authenticity of the Great Memorial, arguing that what historians have long treated as a secret instruction which Olivares penned sometime in the 1620s was one of the many French propaganda tracts that circulated in the 1640s to foment the insurgency in Catalonia. See Rivero Rodríguez, *El “Gran Memorial.”*

⁷¹⁶ Neuschel, *Word of Honor*, pp. 94–96.

⁷¹⁷ Salas Almela, *The Conspiracy*, p. 25.

caliber of the Medina Sidonia only began to turn their backs on the minister-favorite when he began to tinker with consecrated hierarchies and to promote families of lesser status.⁷¹⁸ His weaknesses were also Olivares's strengths. For every grandee who felt alienated by the count-duke, a new member of the lesser nobility was waiting in the wings, eager to be conscripted as a component of Olivares's new support base.⁷¹⁹

This is certainly the picture that has emerged from detailed studies on more precarious and peripheral noble families, especially from Spanish Italy, where nobles were lured by the promise of integration into an emerging pan-Spanish elite. Rather than turn down Olivares's plans for a Union of Arms, noble families from Spain's Italian possessions seem to have appropriated and transformed them in a bid to gravitate toward the heart of power in Madrid. As open conflict between the French and Spanish crowns became likelier in the 1630s, some of the more precarious families began to see participation in the fight against the king of France as a vehicle to appointments in the court of Madrid.

It needs to be stressed that this research is in its infancy, and that the picture that has been painted to date is far from monochrome. The Sicilian nobility who had long cultivated marital ties to the Castilian nobility appears to have been receptive to Olivares's plans for military cooperation, although the local parliament never engaged with the Union of Arms directly.⁷²⁰ Nobles from the kingdom of Naples seem to have been divided on the project, with some of the more eminent families pursuing ambitions to put the Neapolitan aristocracy on an equal footing with its Castilian counterpart so as to avoid having to blend in with an emerging pan-Hispanic elite.⁷²¹ But other sections of the nobility were keen to rise within an emerging pan-Spanish hierarchy, espousing the offer to integrate into the military structure of the house of Habsburg with gusto.⁷²²

It was, however, in Milan that the Union of Arms was least controversial. In the north, joining the ranks of the Spanish army was seen as a way of gaining the "trust" (*confianza*) of the crown and thereby lay the groundwork for a reputation that could lift the most valiant out of the state and potentially out of Italy to Madrid.⁷²³ Although Angelantonio Spagnoletti limits his discussion of noble involvement in the Spanish military to the kingdom of Naples, the State of Milan offers the most vivid examples of, as he puts it, "una serie di comportamenti individuali e di strategie familiari che avevano visto nell'esercizio delle armi lo strumento per acquisire o consolidare rilevanze."⁷²⁴

⁷¹⁸ Benigno, *Il fato di Buckingham*, p. 84.

⁷¹⁹ See the few hints in Jiménez Moreno, pp. 328, 336; del Mar, *Hacia la nobleza*, p. 24.

⁷²⁰ Ribot García, *La época*; Benigno, *Aristocrazia e stato*.

⁷²¹ Sodano, *Le aristocrazie*, pp. 154, 157, 160–161.

⁷²² Spagnoletti, *Principi italiani*, pp. 183, 196.

⁷²³ Signorotto, *Milano spagnola*, p. 177.

⁷²⁴ Spagnoletti, *Principi italiani*, p. 196.

It is not entirely clear what accounted for this difference between Spain's southern and northern Italian possessions. One reason may have been the diverging mechanisms of upward social mobility. The Union of Arms was redolent with the promise that military service would fill the prestige vacuum created by the rise of the minister-favorite which must have been much more palpable in Milan than in Naples or Palermo. If noble dynasties of southern Italy were largely compensated for their loss of power by an increase in influence in their fiefs, where their jurisdictional powers were extended, the Lombard nobility had no such reservoir to fall back on: patrician institutions operating out of Milan had long curbed their jurisdictional rights in their fiefs. As a counterweight, Milanese dynasties relied on symbolic forms of domination to affirm their superior status, as we have seen in the previous chapter. The Union of Arms enabled them to pursue and intensify this strategy of distinction by means of that most noble of all status affirmations: the military defense of subject populations on their home turf.

Such aspirations were propelled and shaped by the belligerent climate that would degenerate into the Franco-Spanish war, which broke out in 1635 and would last intermittently until 1659, when the two crowns signed the treaty of the Pyrenees. The war was an offshoot of the latent confessional divides in the Holy Roman Empire which had erupted into a bloody conflict from 1618 until 1648 that would become known as the Thirty Years' War. What started as a local skirmish soon took on international ramifications. The uprising of German princes had inflicted a blow to the imperial Habsburgs as the new minister-favorite in the court of France, cardinal Richelieu, relished the opportunity to undermine the European hegemony of the two branches of the house of Habsburg who had thrived by capitalizing on France's self-inflicted wound, the wars of religion of the late sixteenth century.⁷²⁵

Olivares was equally obsessed with war. Driving him was the conceit that the relatively pacifist foreign policy of his predecessor Lerma had brought the Spanish empire close to collapse. Lerma's approach to the rebellious provinces in the Low Countries, with whom he had signed a twelve-year truce in 1609, was a particularly grave concern to him.⁷²⁶ Some of this opposition to Lerma's appeasement was rooted in the firm belief that the Spanish monarchy risked falling apart if one of its constituent parts, however insignificant it might seem, seceded from the empire.⁷²⁷ Specifically it was thought that the secession of the United Provinces could have knock-on effects on the Franche-Comté and the monarchy's Italian possessions, whose loss would in turn debilitate the Iberian center.⁷²⁸ Yet, even though such strategic arguments carried some weight, the decisive consideration was firmly anchored in the social world of the nobility: what Olivares and his inner

⁷²⁵ Hanlon, *Italy 1636*, pp. 14–17.

⁷²⁶ Thompson, *Aspectos*, p. 249.

⁷²⁷ Villari, *Un sogno*, pp. 145–146.

⁷²⁸ Rizzo, *Prosperità economica*, p. 191.

circle feared most was loss of what they referred to as *reputación*, the respect and esteem they commanded, most notably among their peers.⁷²⁹ That value had universal appeal. If nobles had to uphold their reputation in front of fellow aristocrats, the king of Spain had to prove himself to his fellow princes, and the “campo ideal para tal empresa era la política internacional, donde un rey se encontraba con y frente a otros del mismo rango y con los mismos anhelos.”⁷³⁰ To preempt the much-feared “final downfall” (*última ruina*) of the monarchy, the *reputacionistas* around Olivares escalated the conflict with the United Provinces. This was only the beginning. In his drive to consolidate his still weak position and to elevate Philip IV to *Felipe el Grande*, Olivares soon set his eyes on the monarchy’s old archenemy, the king of France, with whom Spain had been fighting a number of proxy wars over the Monferrato since the 1610s, setting the stage for the conflagration of the century.

What drove these skirmishes toward the Franco-Spanish war was the government of the minister-favorite in both kingdoms. As David Parrott put it in a thoughtful discussion of the causes of the hostilities between the kings of France and Spain, on both sides “[t]he game was played both for national interests and power, and, as contemporaries recognized, for the authority, prestige and profit of the chief ministers and their supporters.”⁷³¹ The shaky government of two minister-favorites led both of them to seek glory on the battlefield and European hegemony for their king.⁷³² The ensuing brinkmanship increasingly made war seem the quickest possible resolution to two superpowers locked in a stalemate and desperate to ward off what its governing ministers took for unmistakable symptoms of rapid decline.⁷³³ A prominent member of the Council of State, the count of Benavente, was convinced that the monarchy needed “una buena Guerra, o si no se irá perdiendo todo.”⁷³⁴

As in the previous century, northern Italy was going to be one of the main battlegrounds of the looming Franco-Spanish conflict, and Milan was to be of particular strategic importance to both. The French viewed Milan as Spain’s Achilles heel, and after years of fighting on Milan’s borders, Richelieu and his spin doctors were working tirelessly to get king Louis XIII (r. 1610–1643) behind an all-out war in northern Italy. Not all propagandists went as far as the one particularly vociferous apologist of the cardinal’s expansionism who argued that, as the heir to the legacy of Charlemagne, the king of France was entitled to the territories over which the two branches of the house of Habsburg held tenure, including large swathes of Germany, Italy, and Spain. But many more pushed

⁷²⁹ Schumacher, Felipe IV, p. 126.

⁷³⁰ Schumacher, Felipe IV, p. 126.

⁷³¹ Parrott, *The Causes*, p. 89.

⁷³² See Malcolm, *Royal Favouritism*, pp. 13, 181, 188.

⁷³³ Parrott, *The Causes*, p. 105.

⁷³⁴ Quoted in Elliott, *El programa*, p. 340.

the narrative of Louis XIII as the “liberator” of Italy from the Spanish yoke, primed to pick up where Francis I (r. 1515–1547) had left off.⁷³⁵

Rhetoric of this kind targeted the duke of Savoy, Victor Amadeus. As the ruler of a duchy wedged between France and Milan, he could either stand in the way of or facilitate France’s access to northern Italy thanks to his control of the decisive Alpine passes.⁷³⁶ More importantly, unlike some other statelets in northern Italy, his duchy was populous enough to recruit an army that would be able to buttress a French effort against Milan.⁷³⁷ To whet his appetite, Victor Amadeus I (r. 1630–1637) was promised the State of Milan in exchange for Savoy, the mountainous territory between France and Piedmont.⁷³⁸ In putting forth this offer, the French hoped to coax him into an alliance that would allow him to weave his plans for dynastic expansion into an anti-Spanish narrative that would resonate well beyond Piedmont.⁷³⁹ Cardinal Richelieu explicitly linked the two. The French minister-favorite agreed to get behind the house of Savoy’s campaign for royal status if the dukes accepted to beef up their case through participation in a French-led war of conquest against territories that were either directly (Milan) or indirectly (Genoa) ruled by the Spanish Habsburg.⁷⁴⁰

As the Franco-Savoyard alliance took shape, Milan scrambled to prepare for an imminent attack. Within Spanish military circles, the Duchy had long been known as the “key to Italy,” suggesting that if the French army conquered Milan, they would be able rapidly to expand their control to the other Spanish possessions in the Italian peninsula. To shore up its power, the monarchy, from the sixteenth century forward, had invested heavily in the defense of this bastion in northern Italy. As animosities in the Low Countries heated up, the State of Milan became an important hub for soldiers before they were dispatched to the battlefields in central Europe along the Spanish road.⁷⁴¹ As a Venetian ambassador put it in 1581, Milan “can never be without feeling the results of war, seeing that it is the receptacle of all the soldiers who serve His Catholic Majesty in Italy, in Flanders, or in Spain itself.”⁷⁴² Yet, Lombardy had always been more than an entrepot for soldiers. Even in the relatively peaceful decades of the late sixteenth century, when France was embroiled in its own wars of religion, the monarchy invested heavily to maintain sizeable garrisons of about 5,000 foot in Lombardy, the largest one of which was housed in the former Sforza castle in the

⁷³⁵ Hanlon, *Italy 1636*, pp. 20–21.

⁷³⁶ Hanlon, *Italy 1636*, p. 27.

⁷³⁷ Hanlon, *Italy 1636*, p. 27.

⁷³⁸ Hanlon, *Italy 1636*, p. 30.

⁷³⁹ Musi, *Antiespañolismo*, pp. 57–129.

⁷⁴⁰ Oresko, *The House of Savoy*, p. 307.

⁷⁴¹ Parker, *The Army of Flanders*.

⁷⁴² Quoted in Donati, *The Profession*, p. 310.

center of Milan, with smaller contingents stationed in fortresses in Valenza, Alessandria, Mortara, and Novara along the State's critical western border.⁷⁴³

The new hostilities between France and Spain led Spanish officials to notch up the defense of the Milanese State. In 1626 a military specialist close to Olivares and the future *maestro di campo generale* in Lombardy, Carlos Coloma, penned a note in which he stressed the importance of Milan for military offensives against Spain's enemies, France chief among them. As he saw it, there was no other part "en toda la Monarchia" that needed to be as alert as Milan, which served the crown's enemies as an "escalera" and an "estribo" to conquer its other European possessions.⁷⁴⁴ The Coloma memorandum set off a drive to transform Milan into a launch pad for military interventions that were fought over the future not of Spain's Italian possessions alone but the monarchy as a whole: as tensions between the French and the Spanish crowns mounted in the late 1620s, the "key to Italy" was morphing into the "heart of the monarchy" (*corazón de la monarquía*).⁷⁴⁵ Throughout the 1620s, the Spanish monarchy beefed up its regiments in Lombardy. In 1631, Philip IV announced to dispatch 33,500 foot and 4,000 horse to Lombardy, and troops were maintained at that level until the conflict against France broke out in 1635.⁷⁴⁶ Impressive though these numbers seem, they hardly sufficed to win a war on a flat territory open to attacks from all but one side, as would soon become clear.⁷⁴⁷

The Spanish army's baptism of fire came in 1636 when French troops allied with the duke of Savoy invaded the State of Milan from Piedmont. After an unsuccessful siege of the fortress of Valenza in the southern Po valley, the coalition army led by the duke of Créquy moved northward to the area around Novara. From there they trudged further east until they reached Oleggio, a town on the Ticino river which served as a natural ditch shielding the western front of the heartland of Milan from attacks. The plan was to cross the river and chug along toward Milan, counting on the aid of the French troops led by the duke of Rohan who were marching toward the city from Lake Como in the north and the army of the duke of Parma who were closing in on the capital from the south.⁷⁴⁸ Once they had crossed the Ticino, the Franco-Savoyard troops set up a base in Tornavento on the eastern bank. After setting up a camp on the banks of the Ticino, the invading Franco-Savoyard army found itself trapped. The sandy ground in the area did not allow the troops to fortify the place, making it impossible for them to move on toward Milan, lest they leave supplies exposed to a Spanish foray.⁷⁴⁹ Exploiting their indecision, on July 22, troops led by the governor of Milan, Diego Mejía de Guzmán, the marquis of Leganés, launched a surprise attack on the Franco-Savoyard encampment. Leganés

⁷⁴³ Maffi, *Il baluardo*, p. 78; Hanlon, *The Hero of Italy*, p. 90.

⁷⁴⁴ Coloma, *Discurso*, p. 5.

⁷⁴⁵ Fernández Albaladejo, *De "llave de Italia,"* pp. 41–42.

⁷⁴⁶ Ribot García, *Milano*, pp. 353, 355.

⁷⁴⁷ Maffi, *Il baluardo*, p. 80.

⁷⁴⁸ Hanlon, *Italy 1636*, pp. 69–70.

⁷⁴⁹ Hanlon, *Italy 1636*, p. 83.

was one of the count-duke's cousins, and had been parachuted into Lombardy after the ousting of his predecessor for his quavering response to the mounting danger of a French attack on Milan. Driven by the desire to deliver quick results in order to shore up his faltering support among Milanese nobles, the governor dove headfirst into what could only end in disaster as he attacked the Franco-Savoyard army stationed at Tornavento. As in so many battles of the Thirty Years' War, there was no decisive winner. Leganés averted catastrophe by fighting on until nightfall to then retreat into the State of Milan. If the French decided not to strike back on the following day, this was only due to the sweltering heat and infestation of insects in the area. As one contemporary observer noted sardonically, "Hanno puotuto piu le Mosche, et li Tavani, che il Governatore di Milano."⁷⁵⁰ What was supposed to end in an unmitigated success for the Spanish had weakened the new governor's crumbling position.

As the Franco-Savoyard troops counted their losses at Tornavento, they plotted revenge. The plan was to conquer the fortress at Arona and the castle of Angera so as to secure control of the access to Lake Maggiore.⁷⁵¹ This had more than incidental value: since Lake Como was blocked by a powerful French commander, the duke of Rohan, Lake Maggiore remained the only way for the German mercenaries called in by the governor of Milan to reach the capital.⁷⁵² These plans to cut Lake Maggiore off from the State of Milan brought the conflict into the heart of the Borromeo's fiefdom. These fears came true when on June 23, in the wake of the battle of Tornavento, a motley crew of surviving foot, leaving the cavalry behind, followed the Ticino northward toward the lake. When they reached Sesto Calende at the southern tip of the lake, they split into two, with some inching along the western shore toward Arona and others heading toward Angera on the other side of the lake where the Borromeo were holding out. Governor Leganés's blunder at Tornavento had inadvertently put the family in charge of the defense of Milan, the State's future resting on their shoulders.

The Borromeo stepped up to the plate. As the enemy fighters closed in on Angera, Giulio Cesare and his son, Giovanni, awaited them along with a peasant militia of 4,000 that had been hastily recruited to make up for the loss of the garrison at Arona that had been dispatched to the front.⁷⁵³ Accomplishing what was by all accounts no mean feat, the father-and-son team drove the enemy fighters back into the moor between Lake Maggiore and Tornavento, convincing them to vacate the area for good. Later chroniclers attributed much of the success to the rising star of the Borromeo family, Giovanni. According to the most authoritative of them, Gualdo Priorato, it was Giovanni along "with his subjects" who had valiantly defended the castle of Angera and driven the

⁷⁵⁰ Storia della peste, p. 122.

⁷⁵¹ On the strategic importance of Arona and Angera, see Anselmi, "Conservare lo Stato," p. 39.

⁷⁵² Hanlon, Italy 1636, p. 79.

⁷⁵³ On the recruitment of peasant militias, see Rizzo, I cespiti, p. 464, n. 4.

French out of the Borromeo's fiefdom.⁷⁵⁴ In so doing, he had achieved what the governor and commander of the official army had not: they had dealt the Franco-Savoyard alliance a decisive blow. News of this exploit spread rapidly. Giovanni's younger brother, Federico Jr., reported from Rome that the Spanish ambassador had stopped by to thank the family "perché facesse tanto bene il serv[izi]o di S[ua] M[aestà]." ⁷⁵⁵ The representatives of the monarchy could not help but acknowledge Giovanni's role in driving out the coalition army, lauding him for his loyal service "en las ocasiones que se han ofrecido especialmente en la defensa de la Roca de Angera todas las vezes que los enemigos la acometieron disponiendo la gente al combate y gobernando aquel puesto con mucho valor."⁷⁵⁶

Giulio Cesare and Giovanni's intervention in the war raises important questions about their motives. A direct attack on one's fiefdom was, of course, reason enough to fend off enemy troops. For the Borromeo, the intrepid resistance to the Franco-Savoyard onslaught was an ideal opportunity to live up to the contrived image of the family as lords of Lake Maggiore. Yet, while resisting the Franco-Savoyard troops performed an eminently "technical function," to use Pierre Bourdieu's helpful distinction, it also had a "social function" which the technicalities helped legitimate.⁷⁵⁷ Within the matrix of the Union of Arms, the courageous defense of one's fiefdom was not just an end in itself but a means to social advancement for the entire family.⁷⁵⁸ Thus a surprise attack on the land they had been endowed with could be turned into an opportunity for the Borromeo to display their commitment to the house of Habsburg and the paternalist ideology underlying it. Military service became particularly attractive because it allowed the noble military entrepreneur to "regard his professional standing" in the army as yet another "component of his personal worth and his family's dignity."⁷⁵⁹

The idea of coupling military service with social upward mobility had been promoted by the monarchy itself. Coloma, the mastermind behind the plan to mold Lombardy into the military bastion of the empire, was close enough to Olivares's faction and the mindset that guided its approach to Italy that he understood that the success of this strategy hinged on the integration of the local nobility into the project. In his memorandum Coloma had written that, given Milan's designated role, it was crucial to safeguard the economic and social stability of the State, which was still a vital financial center for the entire monarchy. The imperial center needed to mobilize "todos los medios posibles de la buena correspondencia" to ensure that the Milanese continued to show "tanto amor

⁷⁵⁴ Gualdo Priorato, Giovanni, unpag.

⁷⁵⁵ Federico IV to Giulio Cesare, Rome August 26 1636: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, Corrispondenza 1635–1644:

⁷⁵⁶ Patente de Capitán, Milan n.d.: ABIB, FB, Giovanni V, Carrieria militare, fasc. Sua Carrieria Militare da Capitano a Commissario Generale degli Eserciti.

⁷⁵⁷ Bourdieu and Passeron, *Reproduction in Education*, p. 164.

⁷⁵⁸ Jiménez Estrella, *Servicio y mérito*, pp. 91–92.

⁷⁵⁹ González de León, *The Road to Rocroi*, p. 313.

y fidelidad a su rey y señor natural” as in the past.⁷⁶⁰ Even before the attack on Angera would prove his point, Coloma understood instinctively that the war against France could only be fought successfully if the monarchy cantered after the active collaboration of elite families in Lombardy.⁷⁶¹

The effort that the crown was requesting was substantial, but so were the potential rewards. The monarchy was unable to raise sufficient troops on its own and had to rely on local military entrepreneurs instead.⁷⁶² Those nobles who raised *tercios* (early modern infantry companies of 3,000 men comparable to modern-day regiments⁷⁶³) in Lombardy did so at their own expense and without any guarantee that they would ever be reimbursed. But in return for these services, the Milanese nobility were promised a share of the glory that the Catholic king would win in battle against his French counterpart, with the *reputación* thus won trickling down to the military nobility who fought for the king.⁷⁶⁴ The monarchy banked on the fact that war drove up the value of a military career, and the symbolic capital that could be gained from it, thus coaxing the nobility to enlist as army commanders in a bid to boost the legitimacy of their social predominance.⁷⁶⁵ Ultimately nobles who had made a name for themselves on the battlefield could hope for increased access to the king’s graces, most notably the habits of the chivalric orders of the crown, grandeeships, and collars of the Golden Fleece, which were not usually parceled out to those who had not shown commitment to the sovereign.⁷⁶⁶ War could lock them into an alliance with the leading dynasties of the Spanish monarchy and boost their dynastic capital in ways they would not previously have thought possible.

The example of the Borromeo’s closest rivals, the Trivulzio family, drives this point home.⁷⁶⁷ The Trivulzio controlled vast swathes of land in the Po valley along the state’s vulnerable western border. Having been excluded from power throughout the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, they used the new climate under Olivares to cozy up to the inner circle of the Spanish governing elite and cruise to ever higher heights.⁷⁶⁸ After 1636 the head of the family paid the fortification of two towns in the Po Valley out of his own pockets, thus securing his place among the irreplaceable nobles without whom the Spanish crown could not enforce law and order in the war-ravaged State of Milan.⁷⁶⁹ Their economic and social capital in the region gave them access to new political powers in an emergency situation that in turn must have enriched them considerably.⁷⁷⁰ The profits were not

⁷⁶⁰ Coloma, *Discurso*, p. 6.

⁷⁶¹ Also see Hanlon, *Italy 1636*, p. 33.

⁷⁶² Parrott, *Richelieu, the Grands*, p. 143.

⁷⁶³ Maffi, *Il Baluardo*, p. 81.

⁷⁶⁴ Signorotto, *Milano spagnola*, p. 127.

⁷⁶⁵ Alessandro Buono, *Esercito*, p. 65.

⁷⁶⁶ Spagnoletti, *Principi italiani*, p. 181.

⁷⁶⁷ Rizzo, *I cespiti*.

⁷⁶⁸ Signorotto, *Milano spagnola*, chap. VIII.

⁷⁶⁹ Signorotto, *Milano spagnola*, p. 132.

⁷⁷⁰ Rizzo, *I cespiti*, p. 475.

material alone, however. In return for his fealty, Teodoro Trivulzio was appointed interim governor of Milan for a short while in the mid-1650s.

Although they were barely looming on the horizon in the 1620s and early 1630s, such career prospects fostered a military culture among Milanese nobles that shared many traits with similar developments in the rest of Europe. In France, as in Spain and Italy, nobles fell over themselves to enter princely service as military leaders, engendering a bellicosity that inspired many a nobleman to cheerlead for a war between the hegemonic powers of the day. One of the Borromeo's antagonists on the battlefields of Lombardy, the duke of Rohan, put it well. War, he believed, did not only help preserve the established order as it "chases out idleness, gives everyone something to do, and especially satisfies ambitious and discontented spirits." It also helped the nobility reinforce its position vis-à-vis subordinates and peers, giving noblemen "such a reputation among your neighbors as to make you the arbiter of all their conflicts."⁷⁷¹ The result of this edifice was incessant warmongering on the part of the nobility which fueled the reckless plans of kings and princes to attain glory on the battlefield, emboldening them to start disastrous conflagrations.

The Borromeo looked forward to fighting in a war as much as the next aristocrat. Giulio Cesare first experienced battle during the Franco-Savoyard war against Genoa in 1625. The letters he wrote back from the front betray his cavalier attitude to armed conflict. Far from being wary of the risks on the battleground, Giulio Cesare seemed to have mistaken the tug-of-war in which he was involved as an outing that allowed him to socialize with fellow noblemen, including the governor of Milan, who luckily "si porta cortesemente" with him.⁷⁷² Like the French warrior nobility studied by Brian Sandberg, Giulio Cesare seems to have been oblivious to the horrors of war and reveled in the opportunity to build rapport with his armored confreres instead.⁷⁷³ Although he did brag about "scacciar li Francesi d'Italia," it seems that the commitment to the foreign policy of the monarchy helped mask the private interests that primarily motivated Giulio Cesare.⁷⁷⁴ In light of David Parrott's research on French army commanders, it remains unclear whether he identified with the official war aims or whether he simply viewed them as a way to his own betterment.⁷⁷⁵

His eldest son Giovanni was eased into that mindset from a young age. When he spent a few years in the Holy Roman Empire in the mid-1620s (more on this in the following chapter), he took a vivid interest in the early stages of the Thirty Years' War. In his letters to his great-uncle, the aging cardinal Federico, he wrote glowing accounts of the latest developments in the conflict. On August 28, 1625, for example, Giovanni penned a missive on "queste grandi guerre, et sollevamenti di ribelli,

⁷⁷¹ Quoted in Dewald, *Status, Power, and Identity*, p. 58.

⁷⁷² Giulio Cesare to Federico III, Alessandria May 21, 1625: BAM, mss. G 244 inf 105.

⁷⁷³ Sandberg, *Warrior Pursuits*, pp. 254, 268–271. Also see Smith, *The Culture of Merit*, p. 38.

⁷⁷⁴ Giulio Cesare to Federico III, Alessandria May 21, 1625: BAM, mss. G 244 inf 105. Swartz, *Symbolic Power*, p. 104.

⁷⁷⁵ Parrott, Richelieu, the *Grands*, p. 150.

et di Principi heretici contra di Cesare, et i stati del Rè Catholico nostro Signore.”⁷⁷⁶ Although his account of recent events in the Empire is sometimes muddled, it goes to show how a Manichean view of a battle between good Catholics and evil Protestants intent on “metter [...] le cose della Christiana Republica sottosopra” had been inculcated in him.⁷⁷⁷ Although it is hard to believe that the letter was written by a nine-year-old boy (as we will see in the following chapter, it is probable that Giovanni was made to copy them by his tutors), it seems likely that innocuous writing exercises like these fostered a bellicosity that would shape his career goals in profound ways.

Events in the Empire certainly made a lasting impression on Giovanni. Upon his return to Lombardy, he yearned to join the Imperial troops in Germany, a longing that he shared with many scions of the noble houses of Spanish Italy of his generation.⁷⁷⁸ The count of Monterrey, who served as viceroy of Naples in the early 1630s, generally had a low opinion of the military prowess of the nobility of the kingdom, but even he had to admit that many of them had won their spurs on the battlefields of the Empire.⁷⁷⁹ In the aftermath of the battle of Nördlingen of 1634, which seems to have goaded many Italian nobles into taking up arms against the Swedes and which was to live on in the collective consciousness of Spanish Italy, Giovanni was more eager than ever to leave Milan for Germany and fight in the army of the cardinal-infante who had visited them the year before.⁷⁸⁰ In his letters to his younger brother, Federico, he repeatedly hinted at that possibility. More significantly, his sibling saw this as a more than respectable path to glory: where other family members essayed to deter him, Federico threw his full support behind his warrior brother and his vision of dynastic boom.⁷⁸¹ Alas, Giovanni’s dream of fighting his own war only came true when the Franco-Spanish conflict reached the Borromeo’s home turf in 1636. In the aftermath of the battle of Angera, Federico vented his “gusto particolare perché il S[igno]r Co[n]te Gio[vanni] sento si sia fatto valere et il desiderio delle guerre di Germania si sarà potuto sopire con le domestiche.”⁷⁸² Federico was quite possibly being facetious, but there was truth in jest: as many others of their station, the Borromeo genuinely welcomed the Franco-Spanish war and its inherent promise of social upward mobility.⁷⁸³ When other battles failed to materialize, Federico expressed regret at “il non esser succedute altre faccende militari come si desidera” for the advancement of the dynasty.⁷⁸⁴

⁷⁷⁶ Giovanni to Federico III, Augsburg August 28, 1625: BAM, mss. G 254 inf 368.

⁷⁷⁷ Giovanni to Federico III, Augsburg August 28, 1625: BAM, mss. G 254 inf 368.

⁷⁷⁸ Hanlon, *The Twilight*, p. 118.

⁷⁷⁹ Spagnoletti, *Principi italiani*, p. 184.

⁷⁸⁰ On the legacy of the battle of Nördlingen in Spanish Naples, see Carrió-Invernizzi, *El gobierno*, p. 388. On its importance as a mobilizer, see Spagnoletti, *Principi italiani*, p. 208.

⁷⁸¹ Federico IV to Giovanni, Rome July 21, 1635: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, *Corrispondenza 1635–1644*:

⁷⁸² Federico IV to Giulio Cesare, Rome September 23, 1636: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, *Corrispondenza 1635–1644*:

⁷⁸³ Sandberg, *Warrior Pursuits*, pp. 145–146.

⁷⁸⁴ Federico IV to Giovanni, Lucerne July 6, 1656: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, *Cariche*.

As this last quote indicates, the merging of the technical function of war with its social function did more than galvanize the most mercurial elements within the nobility: it prodded them to fight tooth and nail once war had broken out. If the Franco-Spanish war erupted because the minister-favorites of the French and the Spanish kings saw an open conflict over European hegemony as a way of winning prestige, the same mindset helped protract the bloodletting. The Thirty Years' War was perpetuated because of the impossibility to attain what contemporaries referred to as an "honorable peace": all parties involved feared that opting out of what they understood to be an unwinnable war would be detrimental to their standing within the European society of princes if they were unable to secure a peace treaty that was considered an unmitigated success by everyone.⁷⁸⁵ In these circumstances war became a self-perpetuating force which no one could stop lest they lose face among their peers- This was true not just of kings and princes but also of the warrior nobility who staffed their armies and shared the same dynastic *mentalité*. A few years later Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679) would argue in his *Leviathan*, "All men that are ambitious of Military command, are enclined to continue the causes of warre; and to stirre up trouble and sedition: for there is no honour Military but by warre ..."⁷⁸⁶

All this sheds new light on the relationship between the Union of Arms and the Franco-Spanish war. Historians have long argued that Olivares continued to pursue the unpopular project of a Union of Arms when the nobility had long rejected it. The count-duke is said to have irresponsibly stoked the flames of conflict with France to then use the war as a pretext to further his obsession with military cooperation through the backdoor.⁷⁸⁷ However, evidence from Lombardy suggests that Olivares pushed the nobility to war as much as career-hungry nobles pulled him into the conflict. The nobility saw the minister-favorite as one of their own, and those among them who identified with his goal of forming a Union of Arms egged him on as tensions between him and Richelieu seethed. Indeed, one thing led to another. Those sections of the nobility who took Olivares's call for military cooperation seriously were also desperate to prove their commitment to the Union of Arms not just in words but in deeds. The war against France was, therefore, not so much a sign of Olivares's inflexibility as it was a measure of the success of the supposedly doomed common defense policy. What caused the Franco-Spanish war to rage on for as long as it did was an alliance between Olivares and a faction of the nobility who hoped to increase their power by unleashing a destructive conflict with disastrous outcomes for the populations they had sworn to look after. Signs of this contradiction cropped up everywhere, and the Borromeo were among the first to be haunted by the consequences of the conflict they had helped unleash. The battle of Angera, which laid the foundations of Giovanni's fame as a military leader, was a dramatic experience for the local population he purported

⁷⁸⁵ Malcolm, *Royal Favouritism*, pp. 183, 240.

⁷⁸⁶ Quoted in Parrott, *The Causes*, p. 73.

⁷⁸⁷ Olivares, *El programa*.

to keep safe from the French enemy. Days after French troops had officially been driven out of Angera, they continued to wreak havoc in the region. While the castle remained unscathed, the *pieve* was subjected to repeated pillaging and marauding by enemy fighters.⁷⁸⁸ As Giovanni reaped the glory, his subordinates bore the brunt of the Franco-Savoyard attack.

One source that allows us to get a sense of the scale of the effects of the war is a report written by an agent of the Serbelloni family, another military dynasty who held property in Taino, a village in the *pieve* of Angera. The document was drawn up a year after the attack to claim damages from the Spanish government, and is interesting for a number of reasons.⁷⁸⁹ For one, it bears eloquent testimony to the inequalities in a local community which the war both exacerbated and cemented. Most inhabitants claimed no more than 2,000 *lire imperiali* in damages; many requested much smaller sums. By contrast, the local lord, Giovanni Serbelloni, whose career had thrived since the Franco-Spanish war had reached Lombardy, claimed no less than 17,000 *lire imperiali*, roughly one-fourth of the total of 66,000 *lire* that the community requested. The system seemed to reward those responsible for the war, and the destruction it wrought, twice over, while leaving everyone else worse off.

However, the report does more than shed light on how the social function of military careers had come to triumph and in some ways negate their putative technical function. The supporting documents show the tribulations of the ordinary people on whom the Borromeo and other families in the area had foisted their military adventurism. The interviews that were conducted with villagers give a sense of the life-threatening situation they had lived through during the raid. As one 44-year-old man recounted, “detto esercito nemico arrivò tanto all’improvviso, che niuno l’aspettava.”⁷⁹⁰ All of a sudden, the village was at the mercy of enemy soldiers who ransacked every single household. In addition to livestock and animal fodder, they deprived the community of vital foodstuff, including “gran quantità di polaria, et grassine de quali questa terra abondava.” While they found little wine, the region was rich in grains, which the soldiers ground at the village mill.

These were familiar scenes wherever the Thirty Years’ War struck. Historians agree that the looting of village communities by enemy soldiers was not a sign of greed but the outcome of a combination of necessity and war tactics.⁷⁹¹ War in the seventeenth century featured few sieges and even fewer battles, and armies spent much of the time between them idle. Because it was ultimately unwinnable, the war dragged on for decades, and those who had unleashed it were increasingly

⁷⁸⁸ Calco, Un diario, p. 479.

⁷⁸⁹ Francesco Pigola, Relazione del Danno fatto da Francesi alla Terra di Taijno P.e d’Angera l’anno 1636, Milan June 3, 1637: ASM, Archivio Serbelloni, serie I, cart. 55, fasc. 85.

⁷⁹⁰ Francesco Pigola, Relazione del Danno fatto da Francesi alla Terra di Taijno P.e d’Angera l’anno 1636, Milan June 3, 1637: ASM, Archivio Serbelloni, serie I, cart. 55, fasc. 85.

⁷⁹¹ Mortimer, Eyewitness Accounts, pp. 12–13.

unable to provide the soldiers with sufficient foodstuff. As the war rumbled on, commanders began selfishly to look after their own, while soldiers were forced to plunder the areas in which they stayed and were indeed often actively encouraged to do so by officers at their wit's end.⁷⁹² In other words, the rampant plundering and pillaging was not something that took place outside the established methods for maintaining troops; extortion at the hands of soldiers was built into the overall effort to provision troops in the field with adequate resources.⁷⁹³

Yet, as the evidence from Taino reveals, survival was not the only reason for the ravages that soldiers unleashed on civilians. As one eyewitness told officials, after looting food and animal fodder, the soldiers went on to destroy whatever they could not carry away.⁷⁹⁴ This was a pattern that was familiar enough. As one diarist from nearby Busto Arsizio wrote of the same troops, they "scorrevano ogni giorni per li Villaggi assassinando li Paesani, et doppo haverli rubato quanto havevano, et dissipato il Vino che non potevano condurre nell'armata, lo gettavano tutto per le Cantine."⁷⁹⁵ In Taino, they burned grains and animal feed, while the hay that was still drying out in the sun was later found "tutto strappato."⁷⁹⁶ Aside from food and fodder, the soldiers went after possessions in private homes. Two eyewitnesses reported that the troops took away "biancheria, panni, rami et altre cose di casa."⁷⁹⁷ What are we to make of this? Evidence from Germany suggests that since seventeenth-century soldiers often traveled with wife and children in tow, they stole household goods to impress family members.⁷⁹⁸ Yet, if the extortion of houseware may have gone toward improving the living standards in the encampments, the soldiers who had plundered Taino seem to have disposed of these objects just outside the village. One interviewee told the report's author that when he took a walk in the countryside after the raid, "vedevo ancora letti in campagna con la penna per terra, lenzuoli stracciati, lavelli rotti."⁷⁹⁹ The charitable argument that soldiers were helping themselves to much-needed commodities is further undermined by the fact that the looting was followed by an arson attack on the dwellings of civilians, many of which burned to the ground. As the author of the report summarized his findings one year later, the community "è restata totalmente distrutta, et

⁷⁹² Medick and Marschke, *Experiencing*, p. 13.

⁷⁹³ Asch, "Wo der soldat," p. 294.

⁷⁹⁴ Francesco Pigola, *Relatione del Danno fatto da Francesi alla Terra di Taijno P.e d'Angera l'anno 1636*, Milan June 3, 1637: ASM, Archivio Serbelloni, serie I, cart. 55, fasc. 85.

⁷⁹⁵ *Storia della peste*, p. 119.

⁷⁹⁶ Francesco Pigola, *Relatione del Danno fatto da Francesi alla Terra di Taijno P.e d'Angera l'anno 1636*, Milan June 3, 1637: ASM, Archivio Serbelloni, serie I, cart. 55, fasc. 85.

⁷⁹⁷ Francesco Pigola, *Relatione del Danno fatto da Francesi alla Terra di Taijno P.e d'Angera l'anno 1636*, Milan June 3, 1637: ASM, Archivio Serbelloni, serie I, cart. 55, fasc. 85.

⁷⁹⁸ Asch, "Wo der soldat," p. 305.

⁷⁹⁹ Francesco Pigola, *Relatione del Danno fatto da Francesi alla Terra di Taijno P.e d'Angera l'anno 1636*, Milan June 3, 1637: ASM, Archivio Serbelloni, serie I, cart. 55, fasc. 85.

saccheggiata dall'esercito francese [...] che restano abbruciate le case, e destrutto quello che si possedeva dagli abitanti."⁸⁰⁰

To make sense of the destructive fury visited upon Taino, we need to connect it to contemporary ideas about honor. Fire was part of psychological warfare, employed to punish those who failed to comply with the soldiery's requests for food and fodder, and to impart a lesson to innocent bystanders.⁸⁰¹ But there was potentially more to this than intimidation. The rowdy behavior of the French troops at Taino was a sign that contemporary ideas of honor, which animated much of the nobility, had trickled down to the lower strata of society where they were reinterpreted in new, destructive ways. The humiliation of local communities was a way for soldiers to assert their rank.⁸⁰² By burning the household goods and dwellings of their victims, soldiers who were often precarious members eking out an existence on the margins of society gratuitously destroyed the foundation of the livelihoods of almost equally weak members of society. The targets they chose were not coincidental. As Alexandra Shepard's research has shown, non-elite people tended to define their status by dint of their material possessions. When ordinary people rated their own and others' worth, they regularly listed "moveable property—the goods and chattels in people's possession ranging from livestock to linens, tools to trading goods, tables to tubs, clothes to cushions."⁸⁰³ For soldiers, destroying property was, therefore, not only an attack on people's livelihoods but an assault on their victims' honor.⁸⁰⁴

Military leaders at the time were keen to harness the nexus between property and honor in their soldiers' imagination for their own purposes. It is probably true that, as John Walter has written in an entirely different context, violent outbursts such as the one at Taino "reveal the high psychic and material costs of poverty and subordination" in the early modern period.⁸⁰⁵ But military leaders of the day seemed to encourage these excesses against civilians. While there was a growing consensus that friendly civilians should be spared, no distinction was made between enemy combatants and civilians. The latter in particular remained fair game for atrocities of all sorts throughout the Thirty Years' War.⁸⁰⁶ Antoine de Ville, a military theorist who was particularly influential in the French camp, argued that commanders should incite their troops to destroy the livelihoods of civilians.⁸⁰⁷ (It is worth clarifying that writers on the Habsburg side made similar arguments. In fact, Giovanni Borromeo himself, far from being an innocent bystander, at one point

⁸⁰⁰ Francesco Pigola, *Relatione del Danno fatto da Francesi alla Terra di Taijno P.e d'Angera l'anno 1636*, Milan June 3, 1637: ASM, Archivio Serbelloni, serie I, cart. 55, fasc. 85.

⁸⁰¹ Hanlon, *The Hero of Italy*, p. 171.

⁸⁰² Asch, "Wo der soldat," pp. 296–297.

⁸⁰³ Shepard, *Accounting for Oneself*, p. 1.

⁸⁰⁴ Medick and Marschke, *Experiencing*, p. 63.

⁸⁰⁵ Walter, *Public Transcripts*, p. 145.

⁸⁰⁶ Asch, "Wo der soldat," pp. 298–299.

⁸⁰⁷ Hanlon, *Italy 1636*, p. 75.

ordered his troops to “abbruggiare i foraggi, grani e farine” of enemy fighters.⁸⁰⁸) The military leadership was fully cognizant of the fact that this was about the only satisfaction that the wars they had instigated held in store for people outside the elite: the humiliation of civilians were the spoils of war that ordinary soldiers could aspire to.

The testimonies of the people of Taino are a stark reminder that the desire for glory and greatness of the elite wrecked the lives of the people that the same elite purported to look out for. Ironically, then, the Borromeo’s embrace of the Union of Arms called into question their self-assigned role as guardians. According to the official transcript, the family, as feudatories, had a duty to offer shelter to the vassals in the area around Lake Maggiore, a duty that included warding off attacks by enemy forces.⁸⁰⁹ But this defensive function of feudalism collided with the fact that, under Olivares, military entrepreneurship had become a vehicle of social upward mobility. While the Borromeo had an interest in maintaining public order so as to maintain the fiction of themselves as magnanimous patriarchs, the other projection—that of their being military leaders—drove them toward conflict in which they could display their credentials as heroic fighters. Seeing the opportunity to attain glory on the battlefield and to demonstrate their courage as the only way forward in the climate of the 1630s, they ended up secretly rooting for an enemy attack on their landholdings.⁸¹⁰ Not unlike the late medieval feudatories studied by Gadi Algazi, the Borromeo depended on conflicts with other noblemen to legitimate the need for the shield they offered the peasantry around the lake: in order to act as knights in shining armor, they had to produce the very violence from which the local population needed to be saved.⁸¹¹

The Borromeo, engrossed in their war-induced *jouissance*, were at best half conscious of this contradiction.⁸¹² Much of the irony was, indeed, lost on them. In 1636 Giovanni’s younger brother, Federico, deplored “i danni che hanno fatto i Francesi” around Angera in the same letter he congratulated his brother on his military success, seemingly unaware that his family’s desire for glory produced, almost inevitably, the wholesale destruction of large swathes of the territory around Lake Maggiore.⁸¹³ This was not as inconsistent as it seems to us today. People of the Borromeo’s station treated the commonwealth “as a theater for individual greatness, rather than as an object to be advanced for its own sake.”⁸¹⁴ In the familist society of the seventeenth century, individual achievements always added to the credit of an entire family group, and since the family was the largest social unit that most nobles could conceive of, such blatant self-regard took on collective

⁸⁰⁸ Gualdo Priorato, Giovanni, unpag.

⁸⁰⁹ Scott, *Domination*.

⁸¹⁰ Sandberg, *Warrior Pursuits*, pp. 175–177.

⁸¹¹ Algazi, *Herrengevalt*, pp. 133–134.

⁸¹² See also Algazi, *Herrengevalt*, pp. 134–135.

⁸¹³ Federico IV to Giulio Cesare, Rome September 23, 1636: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, *Corrispondenza 1634–1644*.

⁸¹⁴ Jonathan Dewald, *State, Power, and Identity*, p. 38.

significance.⁸¹⁵ Thus, to contemporary elites, the well-being of the majority of the population became expendable if it stood in the way of self-aggrandizement.⁸¹⁶ Before new forces in society pushed a new definition of the commonwealth in the late 1640s and early 1650s, the Borromeo could get away with what strikes us as hypocritical. Even though fighting wars on one's home turf was counterproductive on many levels, it was nevertheless an investment in the family's symbolic preeminence, for which the devastation of their fiefdom was little more than collateral damage.⁸¹⁷

The truth was that the Borromeo's ploy to use war to forge ahead in the social hierarchy seemed to pan out. Shortly after the battle of Angera, Giulio Cesare was promoted to the rank of *maestro di campo*, which is comparable to today's colonel and was usually seen as the first rung of the career ladder within the Spanish army in Lombardy.⁸¹⁸ As some military historians have pointed out, posts as *maestri di campo* were usually reserved to members of the nobility, who made up forty-four out of a total of forty-nine *maestri di campo* appointed during the first half of the seventeenth century.⁸¹⁹ The recruitment process was heavily skewed in favor of noblemen without any military training, so much so that the great military specialist of the age, Carlos Coloma, is said to have complained that noblemen "wanted to begin to be Generals and soldiers on the same day."⁸²⁰ Still, most contemporary military theorists remained steadfast in their belief in this sort of affirmative action. They argued that because nobles were driven by a distinct "zelo d'onore," they were better placed to command troops than commoners.⁸²¹ Contemporary elites, too, established a direct link between noble identity and military valor. Galeazzo Gualdo Priorato, a writer to whom Giovanni Borromeo would become heavily indebted (see chapter 6), made the genealogical argument explicit, advising princes to pick military leaders on the basis of "la stirpe de' condotti, non altrimenti, che osservasi da' cozzoni alle razze de' polledri."⁸²² Compounding such convictions was the urgency of the moment. As Gianvittorio Signorotto has noted, the emergency after 1635 was forcing Madrid to coopt the leading families from the Spanish empire's peripheries through tried-and-tested clientelistic mechanisms in an effort to retain the loyalty of the most influential Milanese dynasties.⁸²³

Giulio Cesare, at first glance, seems to have been awarded this rank on solely meritocratic grounds, for his role in averting a Franco-Savoyard assault on the capital of Milan. But appointments on the basis of past merit and in return for future fealty were not as mutually exclusive at the time as

⁸¹⁵ See Álvarez-Ossorio, *La república*, pp. 237, 784–785.

⁸¹⁶ Schumacher, *Felipe IV*, p. 132.

⁸¹⁷ Elena Papagna, *Sogni e bisogni*, p. 122.

⁸¹⁸ Signorotto, *Guerre spagnole*, p. 378.

⁸¹⁹ Hanlon, *Italy 1636*, p. 64.

⁸²⁰ Quoted in González de León, *The Road to Rocroi*, p. 166.

⁸²¹ Spagnoletti, *Onore e spirito nazionale*, p. 214.

⁸²² Priorato, *Guerriero prudente e politico*, quoted in Donati, *L'idea*, p. 279.

⁸²³ Signorotto, *Guerre spagnole*, p. 371.

they seem today. Even seemingly meritocratic appointments could be guided by the ulterior motive that they might energize the clientelistic link between important families and the crown. The act of bravery for which Giulio Cesare was ostentatiously being rewarded had, after all, revealed an inconvenient truth: it had been the Borromeo and their militia, not the Spanish army led by governor Leganés, who had driven the enemy troops out of Milan. Like the Trivulzio further down the Ticino, the Borromeo had proved themselves indispensable to the defense of the State's sensitive western border.⁸²⁴ While rewarding them for their role, the monarchy also had to contain what had for all intents and purposes been a military campaign outside the ranks of the army and channel it toward the established mechanisms of social upward mobility.⁸²⁵

The Borromeo certainly knew how to make the most of their new found role as military commanders. After 1636, the Franco-Savoyard front crumbled quickly before it was finished off by the premature death of the duke of Savoy, Victor Amadeus, in 1637. Still reeling from his rout at Tornavento, governor Leganés seized the moment to strike back at Piedmont. The monarchy felt it was stronger than ever before: according to the count-duke of Olivares there were 40,000 troops ready to attack Savoy stationed in Lombardy.⁸²⁶ When Leganés marched toward Turin in the summer of 1638, conquering the town of Vercelli, Giulio Cesare and Giovanni were by his side as *maestri di campo* and heads of a *tercio* comprising 3,000 foot who they had enlisted themselves.⁸²⁷

Their capacity to recruit *tercios* was one of the reasons why the Spanish authorities promoted nobles to the rank of *maestri di campo*.⁸²⁸ Local feudatories like the Borromeo lorded over the human resources to raise entire regiments for what were usually seasonal campaigns, and they were the only ones to command sufficient respect to meet the demands of the ongoing war effort.⁸²⁹ Thanks to their widespread network of clients and sub-clients, local noblemen were best placed to pluck new soldiers.⁸³⁰ As Giulio Cesare and Giovanni set out to raise their own *tercio*, they must have scouted the entire region around Lake Maggiore. Even before the war, the Borromeo had complained to the Spanish authorities that owing to the seasonal migration of many able-bodied men from the area to cities on both sides of the Alps, they were unable to fulfil the government's recruitment quota.⁸³¹ Famines, the bubonic plague, and the war conspired to render this reality even grimmer. By 1643 a Spanish memo noted that the area around the lake had seen a dramatic decrease in population due to the Borromeo's repeated recruitment drives along the shores and in

⁸²⁴ Hanlon, Italy 1636, p. 43.

⁸²⁵ Rizzo, I cespiti, pp. 465–466, 475.

⁸²⁶ Maffi, Il baluardo, p. 21.

⁸²⁷ Maffi, Il baluardo, p. 149.

⁸²⁸ Signorotto, Guerre spagnole, p. 375.

⁸²⁹ Sandberg, Warrior Pursuits, p. 142.

⁸³⁰ Parrott, Richelieu, the *Grands*, p. 143; on the embeddedness of the warrior nobility, see Sandberg, Warrior Pursuits, pp. 117, 140.

⁸³¹ Frigerio and Pisoni, Le fortificazioni borromeo, p. 280.

the valleys toward Switzerland.⁸³² The population whom they claimed to be protecting thus risked being decimated by the Borromeo's wars. Even when the front had shifted eastward toward Turin and enemy soldiers no longer ravaged their homes, they continued to be forced to fight for lords of Lake Maggiore for whom these recruitment campaigns were a sign of their integration into the Spanish system where offering up one's property, including one's subjects, was an act that carried high symbolic value.⁸³³

The Borromeo were in desperate need to prove themselves during the campaign of 1638. One year earlier, the count-duke of Olivares had complained to the Council of State, "En quanto a Milán es menester resolver vien [sic] porque aquello no está bien como está oy, y aquí entra lo que no es posible que tenga otro fundamento que mis pecados que es la esterilidad de sujetos."⁸³⁴ The Borromeo of Lake Maggiore had worked consistently to become subjects worthy of the count-duke's esteem, trying to carve out a position for themselves close to the sovereign, in the hope that he would shower them with both material and symbolic emoluments.⁸³⁵ The new offensive against Piedmont was the chance for them to put their money where their mouth was. If they had claimed to be defending the commonwealth on their home turf, they could dispel the potential charge of self-interestedness by putting their lives on the line on a battlefield far away from home.

The conquest of a fortified town like Vercelli, located in the Po Valley midway between Novara and Turin, was critically important to the Spanish effort in northern Italy.⁸³⁶ Not only was the town surrounded by a lush countryside which offered lodging to troops, the conquest of a strategically sensitive outpost also dealt the Franco-Savoyard military establishment a heavy blow.⁸³⁷ Contemporary propagandists celebrated the siege and conquest of the Piedmontese town as a major triumph for the Catholic king, not least because it was the only conquest of that summer that the Spanish were able to retain throughout the war.⁸³⁸ In an edict dated July 15 the governor declared all citizens of Vercelli "veri, e naturali Vassalli, e Sudditi di S[ua] M[aestà]," the king of Spain, urging them to return to their homes and "ripigliar il traffico, agricoltura, e commercio, & aprire le botteghe con quella sicurezza, che farebbero in tempo di ferma, e sicura pace." To celebrate the town's transition under the protection of Philip IV, it was ordered that, "dal suono dell'Ave Maria fino alle

⁸³² Maffi, *Il baluardo*, p. 122. This problem was exceedingly common in Lombardy at the time. See Faccini, *La Lombardia*, pp. 30–37.

⁸³³ Signorotto, *Guerre spagnole*, p. 377.

⁸³⁴ Quoted in Maffi, *Il baluardo*, p. 22.

⁸³⁵ Papagna, *Sogni e bisogni*, p. 122.

⁸³⁶ On the strategic significance of Vercelli, see Anselmi, "Conservare lo Stato," pp. 96–97. More generally on the importance of the conquest of fortified towns to seventeenth-century warfare Hanlon, *The Hero of Italy*, p. 96.

⁸³⁷ Maffi, *Il baluardo*, p. 24.

⁸³⁸ See Buono, *Frontiere politiche*, p. 151.

tre hore di notte si esponghino, & tenghino continuamente accesi diversi lumi sopra tutte le finestre, che riguardano le Piazze, & Strade di questa Città, & suoi Borghi.”⁸³⁹

Giulio Cesare Borromeo did not live to see this triumph of Spanish arms. He was among those who had lost their lives during the siege, being hit by a cannonball to his head on June 6.⁸⁴⁰ But his untimely death helped him secure eternal glory, for he had sacrificed his life in what contemporaries thought of as a momentous event in the still young Franco-Spanish war. Giulio Cesare had died as the one thing he had striven to become: a loyal servant of the Catholic king and his favorite, the count- duke of Olivares.⁸⁴¹ The family felt emboldened by Giulio Cesare’s martyrdom for the Spanish cause.⁸⁴² They scrambled to ensure his son Giovanni would inherit his position and privileges. Giulio Cesare’s intrepid widow, Giovanna, penned a letter to governor Leganés in which she urged him to reward her son for her late husband’s services. She first reminded the governor of the “affettuoso desiderio, col quale il Conte mio che sia in Cielo applicò l’animo al Real serviggio [...] posponendo quello de figli, et della Casa sua sino ad haver in esso persa la vitta.”⁸⁴³ She then skillfully argued that his martyrdom, along with “la prontezza con la quale egli ed il Co[n]te Gio[vanni] nelle mag[gio]ri urgencie dell’Inimico in questo Stato” had acted, were unmistakable indications of “quanto sia stato’l zelo di questa Casa verso la Real Corona 14 anni in qua.” Constructing a narrative in which the Borromeo’s story of royal service duly began when they became lords of Angera, she drew the inescapable conclusion that “mio figlio” should be allowed to “seguire l’orme del P[ad]re” and serve the house of Habsburg, as she herself was committed to doing as a widow who had “addossata il peso di questa Casa.”

By the time this letter was posted, the monarchy had long taken Giovanni’s “calidad, auctoridad y serv[itu]d” into consideration and put him in charge of his father’s *tercio*.⁸⁴⁴ After that, Giovanni went from strength to strength. Taking to heart Baldassare Castiglione’s lesson that nobles should attempt to stand out from their peers in battle, he led his *tercio* on to Trino, a fortress on the northern bank of the Po river near Casale Monferrato, which he allegedly entered as the first man of his regiment.⁸⁴⁵ A skilled manager of his publicity, news of this exploit was spread quickly in the hope that it would reach the count-duke. Giovanni’s brother, Federico, wrote from the papal court to assure him that he was being complimented “da tutte le parti” for his sibling’s deeds of derring-do.⁸⁴⁶ Giovanni was the rising star of the Spanish army in Lombardy. He embodied the new military ethos of

⁸³⁹ ASM, Atti di governo, Militare p.a., cart. 164, fasc. Minute di alcuni Manifesti pubblicati all’uscire delle Reali armi di Sua M.tà sopra Vercelli l’anno 1638.

⁸⁴⁰ Patente de Capitán, Milan n. d.: ABIB, FB, Giovanni V, Carriera militare, fasc. Sua Carriera Militare da [...].

⁸⁴¹ Smith, *The Culture of Merit*, p. 37.

⁸⁴² On the centrality of martyrdom for the king in the warrior nobility, see Sandberg, *Warrior Pursuits*, pp. 143, 147.

⁸⁴³ Giovanna Cesi to the marquis of Leganés, Origgio October 15, 1638: ABIB, FB, Giovanni V, cart. Carriera militare.

⁸⁴⁴ ABIB, FB, Giovanni V, cart. Carriera militare, fasc. 1638 6 Giugno creato Maestro di Campo [...].

⁸⁴⁵ Storia della peste, p. 130; Smith, *The Culture of Merit*, p. 38.

⁸⁴⁶ Federico IV to Giovanni VII, Rome June 4, 1639: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, Corrispondenza 1636–1644.

the warrior nobility that his father had worked so hard to join when he first wined and dined the cardinal-infante on Isola Madre in 1633. He spearheaded the run of victories that the Spanish overenthusiastically celebrated as an “inundación” in Piedmont, moving the borders of the State eastward to the gates of Turin.⁸⁴⁷ To reward him, the military establishment appointed him governor of Vercelli and Ivrea, goading him to levy another 2,000 men from his subjects around Lake Maggiore to reconquer the lost town of Tortona in the southern Po Valley.⁸⁴⁸

These exploits on distant battlefields translated to more power at home. If his father had flirted with public office to enforce the family’s will around Lake Maggiore, Giovanni went full throttle. In 1642 he was appointed governor of Lake Maggiore and the Ossola (the valley linking the Lake to the Valais via the Simplon pass). This military office came with the task of military organization in this strategically sensitive area, with Giovanni acting as the long arm of the Spanish governor in Milan in things both military and civil.⁸⁴⁹ According to a surviving letter-patent from an earlier period, governors were in charge of “la milicia que se halla en aquellas partes, dándoles las ordenes [...], para que rehinchan y armen sus compañías, así mismo a los Consules, Sindicos, y Diputados de todas las Comunidades, para todo lo que se ofreciere del servicio de su Mag[esta]d.”⁸⁵⁰ It was an extraordinary sign of the monarchy’s trust in the Borromeo of Angera, especially given that such posts were usually assigned to Spaniards.⁸⁵¹ Militating in his favor was the fact that Giovanni indisputably had “la experiencia y platica [...] de aquellos confines,” which had been one of the criteria for the appointment of his predecessors.⁸⁵² As in Como, another fortress on the border with the Swiss Confederacy, the authorities seem to have put particular confidence in members of families with a long history of “good correspondence” with the Swiss.⁸⁵³ Still, the appointment at a time of war and a festering domestic crisis tells us much about how far the deceased Giulio Cesare Borromeo and his son Giovanni had come.⁸⁵⁴ Giovanni now held formal military control over the area his father had set out to protect in the name of the king as he muscled his way into the orbit of the count-duke of Olivares.

Indeed, the Borromeo’s trajectory was an example of the military cooperation that Olivares had dreamed of when he put forth his plans to form a Union of Arms in the 1620s. Giovanni Borromeo was the key representative of, as Claudio Donati phrased it, a “tendency on the part of the Italian nobility subject to the crown of Spain to embrace a military career in the service of their own

⁸⁴⁷ Maffi, *Il baluardo*, p. 26.

⁸⁴⁸ Gualdo Priorato, Giovanni, unpag.

⁸⁴⁹ Anselmi, “Conservare lo Stato,” pp. 104–106.

⁸⁵⁰ 1625 9 Luglio. Patente del Governo del Lago Mag.e [...]: ASM, Atti di governo, Militare p.a., cart. 230, fasc. Borromeo.

⁸⁵¹ Anselmi, “Conservare lo Stato,” pp. 116, 129.

⁸⁵² 1625 9 Luglio. Patente del Governo del Lago Mag.e [...]: ASM, Atti di governo, Militare p.a., cart. 230, fasc. Borromeo.

⁸⁵³ On Como, see Anselmi, “Conservare lo Stato,” pp. 226–227.

⁸⁵⁴ Also see Parrott, Richelieu, *The Grands*, p. 144.

natural sovereign [...], which was, as is known, one of the principal objectives of the Count-Duke of Olivares.”⁸⁵⁵ It is easy to see why the Borromeo should have chosen this avenue to power. Under the specific conditions in Lombardy, landholdings conferred few real powers on local feudatories, necessitating them to turn to symbolic domination instead. While forms of symbolic domination came with the unquestionable benefit of radiating beyond the fiefdom into the wider society of gentlemen, they were also vulnerable to challenges from below. By the 1630s, the subjects around Lake Maggiore were openly questioning the Borromeo’s self-assigned role as paternalist providers, jeopardizing their carefully crafted reputation among their peers. Aside from a growing reliance on state offices, the wars that were brewing in northern Italy appeared to be a convenient way out of that impasse. Invoking the noble duty to watch over vassals, Giulio Cesare Borromeo and his son Giovanni enthusiastically embraced the count-duke of Olivares’s plan to forge a Union of Arms and fashioned themselves as military leaders who defended the defenseless from the French enemy.

This is a fresh appraisal of the Union of Arms. Historians have tended to study Olivares’s proposal as a top-down project that foundered on the resistance of the nobility. In this chapter I have tried to focus on the nobility itself to show that not all nobles experienced the Union of Arms as an imposition from above: some espoused Olivares’s initial designs and twisted them to their own ends. Dictating the nobility’s response were not uniform corporate interests but the dreams and aspirations of single families. Where more established dynasties might have recoiled at such upward social mobility, precarious dynasties willing to cash in on triumphs on the battlefield, such as the Borromeo of Angera, yoked themselves to Olivares’s military adventures in the hope of improving their lot on the coattails of the rising star in the court of the Madrid.

At a time when the civilian population was beginning to puncture the paternalist hegemony their social betters had set up, armed struggle looked like a welcome opportunity for elites to style themselves as guardians of the poor. Yet, as so often, the seeming expedient carried the seeds of its own undoing. This chapter has already gestured to the new contradictions to which the reinvention of the Borromeo as military leaders gave rise: the desire to fight in the army to bring sheen to the family name, willy-nilly, led the clan to cheerlead for a destructive conflict, which in turn unleashed the ravages of seventeenth-century warfare on the populations whom the family were supposedly protecting. For the time being, these incongruities could be held at bay thanks to impressive military exploits, as the next chapter will show, but in the long haul, they were going to dog the Borromeo and jeopardize what they cherished most: access to the inner circle of an emerging pan-Spanish governing elite.

⁸⁵⁵ Donati, *The Profession of Arms*, p. 313.

Chapter 6

The Hero of Arona: Military Service and Noble Heroism in the Age of Olivares

Visitors to the castle of Angera are struck today by its interiors, most notably in the room in which the lord of the castle used to preside over ceremonies and entertain guests. Overlooking the lake toward the Po valley and into Piedmont, the *Sala del Buon Romano* hosts a cycle of paintings depicting the splendors (*fasti*) of the house of Borromeo. Most paintings adorning the castle today were commissioned in the latter half of the seventeenth century by Giovanni's younger brother, Antonio Renato (see chapter 13). There is, however, one significant exception, the painting after which the room is named. Titled *Giovanni Borromeo che scaccia i goti da Roma e viene insignito del titolo di Buon Romano*, this canvas was painted by Melchiorre Gherardini, a student of Giovanni Battista Crespi's, sometime in the late 1640s.⁸⁵⁶ As the title suggests, it depicts a battle scene in ancient Rome in which, to the sound of trumpets, horsemen in armor gallop over drummers and the bodies of dead or seriously injured soldiers lying on the ground. It was the *pièce de résistance* of a personal collection of paintings and tapestries centered on military themes in line with Giovanni's vocation for the arms.⁸⁵⁷

Like many seventeenth-century works of art, the Gherardini painting was the product of "a culture used to reading events in terms of 'type and antitype'—in which earlier events could be seen as prefiguring occurrences in the present or future."⁸⁵⁸ To contemporaries, the allusions to the present would have been tangible. Ever since the episcopate of Carlo, the Borromeo family had seen the State of Milan as a second Rome, and a hint at the two family clerics' efforts to transform the Duchy into a land of exemplary Tridentine piety.⁸⁵⁹ Yet, that peaceful Christian harmony was being disturbed by the Goths of the day, the French. The only one able to drive them out of the second Rome was the man named after the progenitor, Giovanni, who had proved his commitment to the cause twice, in 1636 and 1644, when the French army besieged the Borromeo's possessions around Lake Maggiore. For the Borromeo, as for many other parvenus in the early seventeenth century, a long pedigree seems to have remained key to legitimizing their claim to fame.⁸⁶⁰ In fact, the depiction of the mythical Giovanni placed the deeds of the living Giovanni in a venerable family tradition of dedication to the anti-French cause and the military. The invented Roman ancestor helped create a martial tradition of which there were few traces in the annals of a family who had risen to the top as merchant-bankers and bishops, not, as they now wished, as military leaders.

⁸⁵⁶ Zuffi, *La pittura*, pp. 395–396; Natale, *Le Isole Borromeo*, pp. 140–141.

⁸⁵⁷ On Giovanni's collection, see Galli and Monferrini, *I Borromeo d'Angera*, pp. 23–24.

⁸⁵⁸ Adamson, *Policy and Pomegranates*, p. 166.

⁸⁵⁹ D'Amico, *Spanish Milan*, chap. 4.

⁸⁶⁰ On this point, see Karsten, *Künstler und Kardinale*, p. 7.



Fig. 4: Melchiorre Gherardini, *Giovanni Borromeo scaccia i goti da Roma e viene insignito del titolo di Buon Romano*, c. 1650, oil on canvas, Angera, Rocca di Angera, Sala del Buon Romano (Natale, *Le Isole Borromeo*, p. 141)

The painting at Angera was commissioned at a time when that commitment was being questioned by Giovanni's rivals. Capitalizing on the insurgencies that were threatening to tear the Spanish monarchy apart in 1640s, his uncle, Carlo, spread rumors that the tyrannical rule of Giovanni in his fiefs on Lake Maggiore was sowing the seeds of social unrest. Although the Spanish authorities never seem to have lent credence to these accusations, Giovanni nevertheless was under pressure to present himself as a paladin of the anti-French cause. The opportunity to do so came in 1644 when Franco-Savoyard troops laid siege to the fortress of Arona, forcing Giovanni Borromeo, as the governor of Lake Maggiore, to prove his worth in the defense of this strategically important citadel. In salvaging Arona with virtually no help from the military establishment, Giovanni Borromeo demonstrated not only his loyalty to the Spanish monarchy but also his investment in the Union of Arms and its undergirding idea of elite integration through military service. Despite the count-duke's fall from grace the year before, Giovanni Borromeo remained committed to the idea of adding luster to his own *casato* by serving the dynastic interests of the house of Habsburg.⁸⁶¹

However, to accede to the pan-Spanish elite that Olivares had had in mind, the Borromeo needed to convince increasingly skeptical gatekeepers of their worthiness. In order to excel, precarious nobles like Giovanni Borromeo needed to do more than win military battles: they needed

⁸⁶¹ Also see Sandberg, *Warrior Pursuits*, pp. 147–148.

to ensure that their exploits garnered the attention of those peers who could promote them to higher offices.⁸⁶² This was nothing out of the ordinary. As Gianvittorio Signorotto suggests in his studies of two Milanese families, the Trotti and the Visconti seized the wars of the early seventeenth century to rise to the top thanks to military service.⁸⁶³ To persuade key decision makers in the court of Madrid, they resorted to writing *papeles de servicio*, memoranda detailing their records of military service, often over multiple generations, a medium that had been in use at least since the conquest of the Americas.⁸⁶⁴ The Borromeo chose a different tack. Betraying the precariousness of his position, Giovanni Borromeo deployed more public media to portray himself as the guardian of his vassals on Lake Maggiore and, by corollary, a loyal servant of Philip IV. Much like the future king Louis XIV of France studied by Peter Burke, the Borromeo manipulated their image through the “symbolic construction of authority” with the help of new media, of which the Gherardini painting was just one example.⁸⁶⁵

In all this Giovanni Borromeo was very much a product of the Olivares government. Historians have recently concluded that the count-duke’s legacy outlived him by at least a decade, and Giovanni Borromeo is a case in point.⁸⁶⁶ Both his actions at Arona and their later depictions indicate that he had internalized Olivares’s project to create a new nobility to such an extent that he continued to act like an *olivarista* even after many fellow nobles had repudiated the minister-favorite. In his efforts to convince dubious peers of his military credentials, Giovanni Borromeo consistently portrayed himself as a military hero of a new kind. Reviving the old tradition of the noble warrior, he reinvented himself as a courtier warrior who had strategic and logistic savvy but was equally brilliant off the battlefield in conversation with fellow gentlemen. The model of noble heroism he emulated was heavily indebted to the core assumptions that underpinned Olivares’s project: that the nobility’s pursuit of military glory, far from being an egotistical enterprise, fed the *reputación* of the king and was, therefore, conducive to the common good.

Focusing on the public image that military entrepreneurs projected, this chapter adds nuance to the story of military heroism in the early modern period, a story that is still told as one of inexorable decline.⁸⁶⁷ In his state-of-the-art treatment Ronald Asch argues that while seventeenth-century monarchs continued to rely on the imagery of the heroic noble warrior to goad the nobility into military service, they were ultimately unable to stave off the decline and fall of that figure. As the nobility entrammeled itself in the emerging absolute monarchies and kings became the heroes of

⁸⁶² Hanlon, *The Hero of Italy*.

⁸⁶³ Signorotto, *Milano spagnola*, pp. 180–193.

⁸⁶⁴ Maffi, *La cittadella*, p. 124; on the *informaciones de méritos y servicios* in the context of the conquest of the Americas, see Huber, *Beute und Conquista*, chap. 3.

⁸⁶⁵ Burke, *The Fabrication*, pp. 8, 11.

⁸⁶⁶ See González Fuertes and Negrodo del Cerro, *Mecanismos de control*, p. 433.

⁸⁶⁷ The classic formulation is Schalk, *From Valor*.

the day, Asch maintains, the imagery of the fearless nobleman yielded to that of a new, national hero.⁸⁶⁸ However, the Borromeo discussed here indicate that the decline of the military hero was neither as steep nor as straightforward as Asch suggests. For Giovanni Borromeo, the inclusion into the king's army did not spell the end of noble heroism but allowed him to fashion himself as a hero in the king's service, a fabrication that was convincing enough for the family to temporarily accede the commanding heights of the monarchy in Lombardy.

Giovanni Borromeo's aggressive propaganda campaign was born from a perceived loss of control over the family's cherished image that had its origins in events that played out in Arona in the early 1640s. Located opposite Angera, on the southern tip of Lake Maggiore, Arona was one of the fifteen garrisons along Milan's borders and vital to the defense of the state from French and Savoyard incursions. As one French commander put it, Arona "ouvre l'entrée du Milanois et confine quasi avec le Piémont; au moins est-il vrai qu'il n'y a point de place qui l'en sépare."⁸⁶⁹ When Milan was in the midst of its transformation into the strategic center of the monarchy in the 1620s, the mastermind of this overhaul considered the fortress to be significant enough that "conviene mucho fortificarla" with ramparts that rendered the town "inexpugnable."⁸⁷⁰ When the governor, Antonio Sancho Dávila y Toledo, marquis of Velada, inspected the citadel in the aftermath of the attack of 1636, he ordered that "se reparó y probeyó lo que se pudo, siendo mucho lo necesario y de suma importancia aquel puesto."⁸⁷¹ No doubt to live up to his budding reputation as a military leader, Giovanni Borromeo seems to have coordinated the subsequent repair works.⁸⁷² In return for his efforts, the Spanish authorities entrusted him with the governorship of the fortress in the early 1640s.⁸⁷³

This decision enraged the erstwhile *castellano* (lord of the castle), Giovanni's uncle, Carlo. As we have seen in chapter 3, when the estates of the house of Borromeo were divided between Carlo and Giovanni's father, Giulio Cesare in the 1610s, the cadet branch had inherited a palace in Arona, but the fortress had remained in the hands of the main line.⁸⁷⁴ It is therefore no surprise that Carlo protested vehemently with the military command in Milan against a youngster "in grado di parentela tanto à lui inferiore" usurping what he considered his post.⁸⁷⁵ To buttress his case, his lawyer invoked

⁸⁶⁸ Asch, *Herbst des Helden*, pp. 25–26, 140–142.

⁸⁶⁹ *Mémoires du maréchal*, p. 199.

⁸⁷⁰ Coloma, *Discurso*, p. 12.

⁸⁷¹ Dávila y Toledo, *Relación de algunas cosas*, p. 31.

⁸⁷² Anselmi, "Conservare lo Stato," p. 103.

⁸⁷³ *Relatione d'Arona: ASM, Atti di governo, Militare p.a., cart. 230, fasc. Borromeo*. On governors and castellans, see Anselmi, "Conservare lo Stato," chap. 4.

⁸⁷⁴ Besozzi, *Ritratti*, p. 43.

⁸⁷⁵ 7 febbraio 1643. Letter of Carlo Borromeo's attorney to the governor of Milan: *ASM, Atti di governo, Militare p.a., cart. 230, fasc. Borromeo*.

the still shaky law of primogeniture, which had been introduced in Milan during the reign of Philip III.⁸⁷⁶ Carlo's attorney argued that the castle of Arona had belonged to the first-born sons of the house of Borromeo "for hundreds of years"; "perciò per vigore irrefragabile delle Leggi non ne può il Legittimo possessore esser spogliato." Anything other than respect of the birth order would result in "grandissimo pregiudizio, non solamente del diritto delli suoi più importanti interessi, mà anche della reputatione della persona sua et de suoi figliuoli."⁸⁷⁷ To give added emphasis to this point, Carlo's eldest son, Vitaliano, wrote another petition to the governor. In his epistle he stressed his right as the first son of Carlo's to "servire S[ua] M[ae]stà nelli luoghi di Arona, et sua Rocca," to which his father was entitled by virtue of a "diritto concessoli da Dio, dal Principe, dalla Natura, et dalla legge," which could not be revoked "senza manifesto torto, et apperta violenza."⁸⁷⁸

As Carlo knew only too well, this line of argument could easily be construed as the self-serving cant of a power-hungry nobleman, grappling to come to terms with the new reality of a more assertive monarchy and inclined to put his interest above those of the king. The new ideology of royal service in the name of the collective good probably convinced Carlo to switch from arguments centered on primogeniture to complaints about the "prepotenze del Co[n]te Gio[vanni]" against social inferiors. In a legal brief prepared by his lawyers in February 1643 he claimed that Giovanni was "un giovine d'età" who was utilizing the powers with which he had been furnished to "essercitare tutti quelli effetti che le passioni, et li propri interessi in vicinanza de beni, et di feudi gli somministrano, ricoprendoli col pretesto del mag[gi]ore serv[izi]o della M[ae]stà S[ua]."⁸⁷⁹

This reasoning was in line with the petitions from subordinates that had started to pour in from the lake, and Carlo was careful to attach a detailed report listing other examples of Giovanni's egregious treatment of his vassals. The situation had gotten out of hand, especially in Arona where "esso Co[n]te Gio[vanni], con altrettanto danno del serv[izi]o di S[ua] M[ae]stà, con pregiudizio notabile delli interessi del Co[n]te Carlo Borromeo feudatario d'Arona, et con disgusto grand[issi]mo de paesani, et de terrieri, mette mano à novità così inconvenienti, et stringe gl'operarij con comandi così impropri."⁸⁸⁰ All this, Carlo insisted, was undermining the good order on the lake. The preferential treatment accorded to Giovanni was an assault on the stratified society, which had inflicted an "evidente percossa mortale" and "brutta macchia" on the "riputatione" of the eldest Borromeo, and had caused him "tanto danno, et strapazzo" as the population on the lake had lost

⁸⁷⁶ Álvarez-Ossorio, *The King and the Family*.

⁸⁷⁷ 7 febbraio 1643. Letter of Carlo Borromeo's attorney to the governor of Milan. ASM, Atti di governo, Militare p.a., cart. 230, fasc. Borromeo.

⁸⁷⁸ 15 gennaio 1643. Letter of Vitaliano Borromeo's attorney to the governor of Milan. ASM, Atti di governo, Militare p.a., cart. 230, fasc. Borromeo.

⁸⁷⁹ 7 febbraio 1643. Letter of Carlo Borromeo's attorney to the governor of Milan. ASM, Atti di governo, Militare p.a., cart. 230, fasc. Borromeo.

⁸⁸⁰ Relatione d'Arona. ASM, Atti di governo, Militare p.a., cart. 230, fasc. Borromeo.

their “rispetto” toward the local lords.⁸⁸¹ The illicit promotion of Carlo’s inexperienced nephew had produced a topsy-turvy situation which was causing a great deal of confusion among the population around the lake.

It was easy for the authorities to dismiss Carlo’s faux concern for social inferiors. Over the years he had been arrested multiple times over allegations of violent conduct toward tenants on Lake Maggiore.⁸⁸² In September 1614, for example, the Spanish authorities had requisitioned the castle of Arona and arrested Carlo on charges of violent extortion and murder. The background to this arrest remains blurry. Cinzia Cremonini and Julia Zunckel have argued that it was a ploy of the Spanish authorities to exert pressure on the archbishop who was then negotiating the terms of the settlement in the age-old jurisdictional disputes.⁸⁸³ But given the growing rift between the archbishop and Carlo, it seems likelier that Federico Sr. was a beneficiary rather than the injured party. This is certainly how Carlo saw it. The charges of extortion, he claimed in a pardon plea to the governor of Milan, were “cose tutte inventate per distorlo dal litigare, [e] far conoscere le sue ragioni” against his younger brother, Giulio Cesare.⁸⁸⁴ While it is impossible to determine whether or not this was true, the fact remains that accusations of this nature kept resurfacing in the following years. In 1621 Carlo was yet again placed under house arrest, this time for the violent enforcement of hunting privileges in Arona’s hinterland.⁸⁸⁵ Historians have made much of the instrumental nature of these accusations, arguing that they served the purpose of intimidating Carlo to pay outstanding taxes.⁸⁸⁶ While they may have a point, the image of a local feudatory prone to violent outbursts must nonetheless have had some basis in reality for his adversaries repeatedly to invoke it against him.

The man who Carlo accused of the same conduct in the 1640s fancied himself a paragon of restraint. In the years before Carlo’s accusations Giovanni had been working hard to distance himself from his irascible forebears. One of the first things he did when he took over the helm after his father’s death on the battlefield was to whitewash the latter’s reputation. In 1633 Giulio Cesare had been accused of hiring a killer to assassinate one Francesco Moriggia of Pallanza.⁸⁸⁷ The *Magistrato Ordinario* had proceeded to draw up an inventory of Giulio Cesare’s possessions with a view to confiscating them in case of guilty verdict, though the charges against him were later dropped. This was apparently not enough for Giovanni. In 1640, two years after Giulio Cesare’s death on the battlefield, he wrote an appeal to the *Magistrato Ordinario* in which he requested that since his

⁸⁸¹ 7 febbraio 1643. Letter of Carlo Borromeo’s attorney to the governor of Milan. ASM, Atti di governo, Militare p.a., cart. 230, fasc. Borromeo.

⁸⁸² See Parachini and Pisoni, La “razza de’ cavalli, p. 481.

⁸⁸³ Zunckel, *Handlungsspielräume*, p. 445; Cremonini, *Storia di un’eclissi*, p. 487.

⁸⁸⁴ Quoted in Cremonini, *Storia di un’eclissi*, p. 486.

⁸⁸⁵ The incident is described in Cremonini, *Storia di un’eclissi*, pp. 490–492.

⁸⁸⁶ Cremonini, *Storia di un’eclissi*, p. 489, 491.

⁸⁸⁷ ASM, Atti di governo, Feudi camerali parte antica, cart. 677, unnumbered b.

father had been cleared of “l’indebita imputat[i]one dattali d’haver fatto ammazzare Fran[ces]co Moriggia di Pallanza,” the magistrate “accomodi li libri per d[ett]a causa, acciò per l’avvenire niuna persona ne possi sentir travaglio.”⁸⁸⁸ Unlike his uncle, Giovanni was visibly ashamed of the violent outbursts of men of his station and sought to conceal them whenever possible.

This points toward a profound generational rift over attitudes to violence and the need to channel it toward more controlled outlets, such as war. The local feudatory liable to pangs of uncontrollable rage toward his tenants personified by Carlo was an image that had once been worn as a badge of honor but seemed increasingly grotesque to the generation of noblemen who came of age in the early seventeenth century.⁸⁸⁹ This change of heart was symptomatic of a much broader shift in the outlook of the seventeenth-century nobility. If in the past noblemen had relied on local power over social inferiors to assert their noble status, noblemen of Giovanni’s generation, moving as they did in broader social circles, were more interested in impressing the peers with whom they were competing for princely honors and rewards.⁸⁹⁰ As the political stage moved from the countryside to the princely court, a humanistic education and courtly manners superseded violence as a sign of social pre-eminence. “To succeed at court or to shine among one’s equals in society,” explains Ronald Asch, was now seen as “a higher mark of distinction than to permanently demonstrate one’s ability to exercise power over inferiors or to use physical force against one’s enemies.”⁸⁹¹

To understand this profound change in attitudes, we need to rewind to the 1620s when the count-duke of Olivares launched an oft-overlooked education reform as part of his plans to reconfigure the nobility and its relationship with the court in Madrid.⁸⁹² These efforts to promote the education of noblemen were born out of the recognition of Olivares and his closest advisers that although they claimed a role for themselves in leading the monarchy, most noblemen were woefully unprepared to do so.⁸⁹³ The military in particular was stricken by a ruinous “lack of leaders” (*falta de cabezas*).⁸⁹⁴ To focus on education was key to ushering in the new monarchy built on princely service and devoted to the common good that Olivares had in mind. “If these reforms are implemented,” Olivares promised Philip IV, “Your Majesty will be served by the greatest military leaders, and will become the most glorious King ever known in these kingdoms in any era.”⁸⁹⁵

⁸⁸⁸ ASM, Atti di governo, Feudi camerali parte antica, cart. 677, unnumbered b.

⁸⁸⁹ Asch, *Nobilities in Transition*, p. 70.

⁸⁹⁰ Asch, *Nobilities in Transition*, p. 78.

⁸⁹¹ Asch, *Nobilities in Transition*, p. 126.

⁸⁹² Elliott, *The Count-Duke*, p. 199.

⁸⁹³ Gaston, *All the King’s Men*.

⁸⁹⁴ González de León, *The Road to Rocroi*, p. 9.

⁸⁹⁵ Quoted in González de León, *The Road to Rocroi*, pp. 9–10.

The challenges these reformers faced were formidable. The nobility had long resisted the idea of acquiring a thorough education, and was unwilling to follow Olivares's lead.⁸⁹⁶ As the *valido* put it in one of his more pessimistic moments, nobles felt so entitled that despite "the greatest vice, the loosest lifestyle and most repugnant behavior they can obtain the highest rewards and request them only to complain if they do not receive them."⁸⁹⁷ Olivares therefore concluded that his plans would only gain traction if he placed the nobility's preoccupation with lineage and heredity into the service of his project to forge closer cooperation between the king and his blue-blooded subjects.⁸⁹⁸ To this end, Olivares pushed for a conception of nobility according to which noble status was innate but in need of validation through the actions of the clan's individual representatives. This was a novel idea: where nobles had conceived of their status as something essential, the emerging courtier nobility were now made to think of it as something needing constant refinement.⁸⁹⁹ In order to live up to the greatness of their ancestors, noblemen had to hone a set of skills spanning from proper courtly behavior to military savvy, which would help them regain what Olivares feared they had lost: their *milicia*, or military valor.⁹⁰⁰

Many were willing to take up the offer. Scholars who have studied Olivares's educational reforms have usually deplored the failure of his military academies to take root.⁹⁰¹ Yet, this may be too narrow a view on the long-term effects of the count-duke's push for noble education. As the example of Giovanni Borromeo shows, although they did not necessarily attend the institutions touted by the monarchy, noblemen of the generation that was coming of age under Olivares nevertheless espoused the curriculum that was to be taught in them. Like countless others of his background, Giovanni thrived in the new climate and went on a grand tour during which he acquainted himself with martial and liberal arts. If these two disciplines had once been seen as mutually exclusive, noblemen of Giovanni's generation embraced them as reinforcing each other, a realization that hinted at the changes that had taken place since the turn of the century. As the art of war, the business of the nobility, became more technical and required more logistic planning, nobles realized that a good education in courtly conventions and (foreign) languages was critical to the conduct of war. Unlike the warlords of old, the distinguishing characteristic of the courtier warrior that was taking shape under Olivares was not mere bravado but heroism combined with careful administrative and logistical work to sustain the war effort. With an emerging service nobility becoming more assertive, the traditional warrior nobility and those who wanted to join it were

⁸⁹⁶ González de León, *The Road to Rocroi*, pp. 150, 167.

⁸⁹⁷ Gaston, *All the King's Men*, p. 186.

⁸⁹⁸ For a succinct discussion of these fears, see Tucker, *Early Modern French Noble Identity*, pp. 275–281.

⁸⁹⁹ See MacHardy, *War*, p. 174.

⁹⁰⁰ Gaston, *All the King's Men*, p. 170; Kagan, *Olivares y la educación*, p. 227.

⁹⁰¹ González de León, *The Road to Rocroi*, p. 152.

making a conscious effort to subsume the qualities of the new nobility into the traditional image of the warrior.

Until his uncle tried to insinuate otherwise, Giovanni had been a standard-bearer of this new conception of nobility. His early schooling, which had been entrusted to archbishop Federico, focused on providing Giovanni with a courtly education through a tutor. As soon as he was able to put quill to paper, the young boy regularly wrote short letters to his great-uncle, which were meant to introduce him to the style and form common in epistolary exchanges among courtly elites. Progress was slow but steady. As his teacher informed Giovanni's mother, "Se bene l'ill[ustriss]imo Sig[no]re Co[n]te pare sia lento et pigro nell'attendere al studio delle hore tre tuttavia considerando la poca età et la bona memoria del figlio, spero nel Sig[no]re con qualche poco di patientia habbia da far qualche buon profitto."⁹⁰² Learning the convoluted epistolary style of the time was no easy feat. At one point Giovanni's tutor had to explain that his student had not been as forthcoming with his replies to missives from his aunts as expected because he needed extra time to "ridurre i discorsi immaturi à qualche forma piacevole alle signore."⁹⁰³ Exacerbating an already forbidding situation, the stern great-uncle soon demanded that Giovanni write to him in Latin. His tutor felt compelled to pen an awkward apology, writing that the boy was, suddenly and inexplicably, "poco meno che habile, come che si sia dimenticato delle regole et termini." To brush up on his Latin he had therefore been forced to "write and rewrite" the "concetti" that he had forgotten and would soon be able to respond "di sua mano."⁹⁰⁴

This draconian punishment points to something else. Courtiers in the seventeenth century were expected to master these skills with a mixture of ease and nonchalant contempt which the godfather of the immensely popular treatises on the court, Baldassare Castiglione, had described with the untranslatable term *sprezzatura*.⁹⁰⁵ Much energy was expended on sustaining the impression that a broad general education and courtly manners had been acquired without any effort.⁹⁰⁶ Indeed, like other forms of artistic expression, appropriate manners were worthless unless they "appeared to be effortless" (*non paion fatte con fatica*), as the Renaissance art critic Giorgio Vasari put it with reference to Michelangelo's paintings.⁹⁰⁷ As parvenus were to learn the hard way, the countless rules governing interhuman relations had to be internalized from a young age in order to be displayed without appearing pedantic.⁹⁰⁸ In the world of the baroque which placed much

⁹⁰² Nicolò Cattaneo to Giovanna Cesi, Augsburg October 24, 1624: ABIB, FB, Giovanni V, Carriera militare, fasc. 1624 al 1626. Studente in Augusta.

⁹⁰³ Carlo Maria ? to Federico III Borromeo, Augsburg September 6, 1624: BAM, mss. G 243bis inf 191.

⁹⁰⁴ Carlo Maria ? to Federico III Borromeo, Augsburg September 6, 1624: BAM, mss. G 243bis inf 191.

⁹⁰⁵ Peter Burke, *The Fortunes*, pp. 30–31.

⁹⁰⁶ Dewald, *The European Nobility*, p. 151.

⁹⁰⁷ Quoted in Burke, *The Fortunes*, p. 53.

⁹⁰⁸ Asch, *Nobilities in Transition*, p. 151.

emphasis on the display of effortless grace, this “knowingness” was meant to be an innate quality of those of noble birth, and the nobility did much to keep up this pretense for fear of being outperformed in the area of vocational training by university-educated commoners.⁹⁰⁹ Many continued to maintain that erudition was exclusive to the nobility, and that exercise was for those of low birth.⁹¹⁰ Yet, as the letters of Giovanni’s desperate tutors reveal, learning and mastering this courtly cultural capital required intense labor at an early age.

If great-uncle and tutors invested heavily in the boy’s letter-writing skills, this was because the ceremonial that was characteristic of seventeenth-century letters mirrored the face-to-face interaction in the princely courts of the time.⁹¹¹ It is, therefore, no surprise that the primer on epistolary ceremonial was soon followed by the introduction to a real-life court. In 1624 Giovanni was dispatched to Augsburg where he attended the court of empress Eleonore (1598–1655). Aged barely eight, his mother Giovanna was sad to see him leave but, as she later wrote to archbishop Federico, it was all for the good of the house: “vado sperando, che questo figliolo nel andare crescendo in età così andarà crescendo in dar gusto à V[ostra] S[ignoria] Ill[ustrissi]ma.”⁹¹² What Giovanna was alluding to was the widespread belief among nobles that first sons, as future heads of household, needed to build a strong and assertive personality and that this was best achieved if they were sent far away from home where they had to fend for themselves at an early age.⁹¹³ If parting was emotionally difficult for her as a mother, Giovanna understood that this was a formative experience for her oldest son if he was ever to become an influential member of the governing elite.

Traveling was increasingly seen as an activity that helped young noblemen to learn about the world which they would one day shape as politicians and military commanders.⁹¹⁴ If his father Giulio Cesare was only reluctantly dispatched to nearby Bologna when he was 18, Giovanni enjoyed a more thorough education in the Empire, which exposed him to a different political culture and gave him the opportunity to learn a new language when he was still a child. The investment in Giovanni’s education was a sign of broader changes underway. While younger sons who were groomed for legal or ecclesiastical careers now traveled abroad to attend universities abroad (and Giovanni’s younger brother is a case in point, as we will see in chapter 9), first-born sons spent their grand tour in noble households where they were taught by private tutors along with other children of their station. Compared to what had been commonplace a generation earlier, the education of the scions of noble houses was now taken more seriously. If Giulio Cesare’s schooling had at best been haphazard, Giovanni’s had much sounder moorings.

⁹⁰⁹ Bannister, *Condé*, p. 217; MacHardy, *War*, p. 175.

⁹¹⁰ Martínez Hernández, “En la Corte,” p. 42. Also see MacHardy, *War*, pp. 169.

⁹¹¹ Sternberg, *Status Interaction*, chap. 6.

⁹¹² Giovanna Cesi to Federico III Borromeo, Angera July 17, 1624: BAM, mss. G 243 inf 5.

⁹¹³ Asch, *Nobilities in Transition*, p. 58.

⁹¹⁴ Dewald, *Status, Power, and Identity*, p. 46.

Among the many grand-tour destinations open to families of the Borromeo's aspiration, appointments as pages to kings and queens were particularly sought after.⁹¹⁵ Such posts were considered mutually beneficial. Within the context of the Spanish monarchy, the house of Habsburg developed a keen understanding of the importance of hosting the sons of the nobility in the court of the king. As Baltasar Álamos de Barrientos, an intellectual closely associated with the court of Philip III and the duke of Lerma, put it when he urged the king to invite the offspring of the preeminent families from the crown's Italian possessions to Madrid, this would allow the monarch "to become acquainted with their talent, their understanding, their inclinations, in order to use and employ them in different ministries."⁹¹⁶ But the deal was equally lucrative for nobles. To them, court appointments as pages were vital for introducing their sons to the world of the court: not only did they allow them to deepen the courtly education in practice by interacting with others of their class but, more importantly, they helped them build ties to the reigning sovereigns and the rest of the high nobility, and weave a social network that they could rely on for the rest of their lives. The court was the place where cultural and social capital were corralled and one was put in the service of the other.⁹¹⁷

Milanese families were eager to take up this offer. The Borromeo's closest rivals, the Trivulzio, sent their Ercole Teodoro (1620–1664) to the court of the cardinal infante when the latter served as governor of Milan in 1633–1634. The Borromeo seemed to have aimed even higher. There is evidence to show that the lords of Lake Maggiore did pursue plans to offer Giovanni an education in Madrid, betraying archbishop Federico's allegiance to the Spanish cause and Giulio Cesare's growing trust in Olivares and his entourage. In a letter dated April 6, 1625, from one Daverio Tiberio to an agent of the Borromeo family it is mentioned in passing that queen Elisabeth (1602–1644) "hà accettato [Giovanni] per menino."⁹¹⁸ There is nothing to suggest that anything ever came of this, and it is impossible to work out why the Borromeo turned down this prestigious offer. The most convincing explanation is that, at the time the decision was handed down, Giovanni had been away at the Imperial Court in Augsburg for the better part of a year and the family was now unwilling to foot the bill that a transfer to Spain would have entailed.

Although decidedly second rate, Augsburg was not without its attractions. For one, sending Giovanni to empress Eleonore, a Gonzaga from Mantua, allowed them to keep their allegiances as broad as possible at a time when the rapprochement with the Spanish crown was still fresh and insecure.⁹¹⁹ At the same time, close ties to the Imperial court were not necessarily at odds with the Borromeo's newly found fervor for the king of Spain: this was, after all, the court of the other branch

⁹¹⁵ Ago, *Giovani nobili*, p. 395.

⁹¹⁶ Quoted in Esteban Estríngana, *Flemish Elites*, p. 126.

⁹¹⁷ MacHardy, *War*, p. 169; Spagnoletti, *Le dinastie italiane*, pp. 310–314.

⁹¹⁸ Tiberio Daverio to Pietro Paolo Terzago, Madrid April 6, 1625: ABIB, FB, Giovanni, *Carriera militare*, fasc. Carica di Menino della Regina conferita al Conte Gio. V di Giulio Cesare III.

⁹¹⁹ On the Gonzaga match, see Spagnoletti, *Le dinastie italiane*, pp. 175–176.

of the house of Habsburg, to whom the family's loyalty seemed primarily to have extended. As the example of other leading families in Milan had shown, cultivating ties to both houses of Habsburg put them in a position in which they could increase their bounty. The Trivulzio, the Borromeo's closest rivals, for instance, repeatedly flaunted their (materially worthless) title as imperial princes of Mesocco to reap benefits from the Spanish monarchy.⁹²⁰ By accepting the position in Augsburg and securing one of the limited posts at the Imperial court, Giovanni was still slated to find favorable treatment in Madrid and the wider society of that court.⁹²¹

If Augsburg was only the second-best option for networking purposes, it was on par with Madrid for the attainment of cultural capital. As his letters back home reveal, Giovanni, in addition to social skills and fluency in German, was introduced to what contemporaries called "chivalric arts," including dancing and fencing.⁹²² He was also invited to the country seats of other nobles where he went hunting and horse-riding, which sparked a lifelong passion for mounts, something that was eminently useful both in terms of the accumulation of social and cultural capital, including the impulse control on which noblemen of Giovanni's generation prided themselves. Equines performed multiple functions. For one, they enabled the nobility to think about their place in the hierarchical society of the early modern period.⁹²³ As contemporary theorists from their own ranks argued, horses were to the animal kingdom what nobles were to other humans: they were the aristocracy of their respective groups.⁹²⁴ The division of steeds into breeds offered inspiration to noble discourse on lineage, pedigree, and dynastic capital.⁹²⁵ One does not necessarily have to agree with Norbert Elias's contention that early modern nobles tended to think about social difference in almost zoological terms.⁹²⁶ It is, however, undeniable that the Borromeo brothers negotiated hierarchies between humans by transposing them onto the animal world.⁹²⁷ In its most extreme form, this became apparent when Giovanni's brother referred to horse breeds from republican Switzerland as weighed down by a "grevezza tutta svizzera," unable to display the same elegance of their counterparts from noble stables.⁹²⁸

Stallions and mares were also crucial to the accumulation of social capital. They helped break the ice in conversation with other nobles, but as Giovanni's correspondence suggests, they were equally propitious to the exchange of animals between families, an activity in which Giovanni's

⁹²⁰ See Signorotto, *L'apprendistato*, pp. 343, 354–357.

⁹²¹ On the positions available at the Habsburg court, see MacHardy, *War*, p. 168.

⁹²² Carlo Maria ? to Federico III Borromeo, Augsburg September 6, 1624: BAM, mss. G 243bis inf 191.

⁹²³ Muto, "I segni d'honore," pp. 181–182.

⁹²⁴ Quondam, *Cavallo e cavaliere*, p. 194.

⁹²⁵ Historians have only just begun to trace the origins of modern racism to noble discourse about hierarchies between human beings. See Schaub, *Pour une histoire*.

⁹²⁶ See Duindam, *Myths of Power*, pp. 14, 52.

⁹²⁷ Saracino, *Der Pferdediskurs*, p. 353.

⁹²⁸ Federico IV to Giovanni, Lucerne April 4, 1657: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, Cariche.

younger brothers who stayed in different parts of Italy were involved. Before he relocated to Switzerland, Federico regularly went horse scouting in the kingdom of Naples and imported mounts from as far as North Africa.⁹²⁹ Thoroughbreds were often named after noble families' fiefdoms, and Federico was particularly proud when he managed to secure a Conversano horse from the infamous Acquaviva of Conversano in Apulia.⁹³⁰ The Borromeo engaged in the same back-and-forth. On one occasion, for instance, Giovanni would provide horses of his own to the Altemps, a family with close ties to the emperor and "benemerita della nostra [casa]."⁹³¹ Like other gifts between nobles, animals performed a phatic function, establishing and keeping open channels of communication among an emerging pan-Italian elite. As such, they "allowed for a continuous exchange of not only communication, but also of obligation, of affection and emotion, that could be renewed over and over again reinvigorating kinship ties and ties of friendship."⁹³² In fact, some passages in Giovanni's correspondence indicate that the symbolism that was attached to horses was not unlike that of brides who were similarly traded between noble houses. In one telling passage, Giovanni's younger brother wrote of the Sersale family from the kingdom of Naples, one of the main breeding centers within the Spanish monarchy, "Chi me l'ha venduto me l'hà più presto donato che venduto havendomelo dato più per termine d'amicitia e per ambitione che un cavallo della sua razza venga in stalla di V[ostra] S[ignoria] Ill[ustrissi]ma che per altro."⁹³³

If talk about the breeding of horses helped negotiate anxieties about the place of nobles in social hierarchies, the proper training of horses spoke to contemporary preoccupations about the nobility's role in court society. In the kingdom of Naples, numerous authors published treatises in which they mulled over the relationship between the nobleman and his steeds. Pasquale Caracciolo, the author of what was by far the most popular of these manuals, made this link quite explicit. In the dedication of his *La gloria del cavallo*, which was first published in 1566 and then reprinted multiple times until well into the seventeenth century, Caracciolo reminded his two "amati figliuoli" that they needed a proper training in the arms, of which horsemanship was the most consequential part.⁹³⁴ If this seemed to harken back to the old imagery of the noble warlord, Caracciolo was adamant that horse-riding was conducive to something much more than success on the battlefield. For Caracciolo, the winged horse in particular was a potent metaphor of the need to combine "l'essercitio dell'armi"

⁹²⁹ See e.g. Federico IV to Giovanni, Rome February 28, 1640: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, Corrispondenza 1627–1644; Federico IV to Giovanni, Rome May 20, 1645: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, Cariche.

⁹³⁰ Federico IV to Giovanni, Benevento February 26, 1647: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, Corrispondenza 1645–1655. Giovanni's uncle, Carlo, seems to have bred his own "Feriolo" horses (named after the location of the stables on Lake Maggiore), see Parachini and Pisoni, La "razza."

⁹³¹ Federico IV to Giovanni, Rome August 6, 1639: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, Corrispondenza 1635–1644.

⁹³² Luiten, *Friends and Family*, pp. 4–5.

⁹³³ Federico IV to Giovanni, Atella February 28, 1646: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, Corrispondenza 1645–1655. On the Sersale, see Todaro, Palazzo Sersale.

⁹³⁴ Caracciolo, *La gloria del cavallo*, "Pasqual Caracciolo a Giovambattista, e Francesco [...]" unpag.

with “quello delle lettere.”⁹³⁵ Only if both wings were equally strong, the horse would carry the horseman “degnamente al pregio immortale della gloria equestre.”⁹³⁶ As a metaphor horsemanship was therefore crucial to adapting the old aristocratic values of the noble warrior to the new reality of the court. What had once seemed mutually exclusive—the world of war and the world of learning—was now coming together thanks to noblemen’s engagement with equines, as it dawned on them that “non meno le cose militari, che l’altre appartenenti alla vita civile, mal si possono amministrare senza le buone lettere.”⁹³⁷ Horses bridged the gap between the old chivalric ideal and the emerging courtier *mentalité*.⁹³⁸

The conflation of the chivalric and courtier model of nobility peaked in the years of the count-duke of Olivares. Chivalric novels, soldering letters and arms, aggressively promoted the new image of the military man with a broad humanistic education. One particularly illuminating example is *El Caballero Perfecto* (The Perfect Knight) of 1620, a classic coming-of-age story in which the scion of a noble dynasty grows into a model of the new nobleman who was, at once, a professional on the battlefield and a man of the princely court.⁹³⁹ This transformation reflected the changing requirements of nobles in war. The advent of large armies made individual combat anachronistic, redirecting military leaders toward the logistics of war.⁹⁴⁰ “Noblemen were now expected not only to be polished in manners and proficient in the military arts, but also to have a knowledge of the law, to speak foreign languages and to display book-learning and organizational talents.”⁹⁴¹ Although there is no direct evidence showing that Giovanni Borromeo actually read the *Caballero Perfecto*, he must have been exposed to similar novels. The scions of the nobility of Spanish Italy generally read them from an early age to hone their Spanish, and his actions certainly suggest that he had internalized the underlying message of the importance of good horsemanship for both knights and courtiers.

Most important for our purposes, though, horsemanship was not just a powerful metaphor for the combination of arms and letters: for the *olivarista* nobility, the well-trained horse came to stand as a symbol for the transformation of the nobility. Treatises with telling titles such as *Cavallo frenato* (The Harnessed Horse), which was published in 1622, allude to this new reality.⁹⁴² Equines were by nature boisterous beasts but the right rider could tame them, much like kings could subdue unruly subjects. Political theorists like Jerónimo de Ceballos argued that men who controlled an unbroken horse “with prudence and art” were ready to discipline the unruly masses under their

⁹³⁵ Caracciolo, *La gloria del cavallo*, “Pasqual Caracciolo a Giovambattista, e Francesco [...]” unpag.

⁹³⁶ Caracciolo, *La gloria del cavallo*, “Pasqual Caracciolo a Giovambattista, e Francesco [...]” unpag.

⁹³⁷ Caracciolo, *La gloria del cavallo*, “Pasqual Caracciolo a Giovambattista, e Francesco [...]” unpag.

⁹³⁸ Hernando Sánchez, *La gloria del cavallo*, p. 279.

⁹³⁹ Gaston, *All the King’s Men*, p. 174.

⁹⁴⁰ Amon, *Masculine Virtue*, pp. 35–36.

⁹⁴¹ MacHardy, *War*, p. 165.

⁹⁴² Ferraro, *Cavallo frenato*.

thumb. The count-duke of Olivares was convinced that governing, “like good horsemanship, was a matter of skill, cunning and control.”⁹⁴³ His protégé, Giovanni Borromeo, probably lapped up these ideas, and so his brother Federico paid him no small compliment when he sent him a horse from Switzerland and expressed confidence that “V[ostra] S[ignoria] Ill[ustrissi]ma [...] non manca comodità di fargli domare quella testa dura,” when the republican Swiss had failed to subdue its “forza e spirito.”⁹⁴⁴

Interesting though these connections between horsemanship and the nobility’s role as a governing elite appear, the person most in need of disciplining was the noble rider himself.⁹⁴⁵ In the wider culture of the time, the well-trained horse therefore morphed into a powerful symbol for the control over base instincts to which the nobility was now aspiring. Horsemanship gestured to such cherished neostoic virtues as stalwart discipline and self-control.⁹⁴⁶ Riding was deemed to be crucial to developing the good posture that contemporaries equated with “moral rectitude to such an extent that physical training aimed to produce spiritual benefits.”⁹⁴⁷ Thus horsemanship spoke to a broader transformation in the outlook of the nobility: it promoted the “kind of self-censorship that checked aggression before it erupted,” which was so central to the “explicit goal of the monarchy to monopolize the control of armed aggression.”⁹⁴⁸ For noblemen of Giovanni’s generation, the harnessed horse stood for “la asociación entre ímpetu y dominio que servía para ejemplar la aplicación de la soberanía sin abandonar un marco heroico donde alentaba la más acendrada tradición caballerisca.”⁹⁴⁹

The ability to harness temper tantrums was one of the major concerns of contemporary noblemen. It was crucial to the evolution from warrior to courtier that was at the heart of Olivares’s project. One need not embrace Norbert Elias’s simplistic domestication thesis to see that the outlook of nobles was modified in important ways within just one generation.⁹⁵⁰ In France in the early 1650s, a writer looking back on the not-so distant past at the turn of the century shuddered at the brutality which had characterized many noblemen’s interactions with social inferiors. Just a few decades on the violence of his forbears seemed unfathomable to a nobleman who, like many of his peers, saw himself as part of an educated courtly elite.⁹⁵¹ The jettisoning of brute force was thus the last leg of what Shifra Amon has referred to as a long “process of transformation from men of arms to men of

⁹⁴³ Elliott, *The Count-Duke*, p. 189.

⁹⁴⁴ Federico IV to Giovanni, Lucerne April 4, 1657: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, Cariche.

⁹⁴⁵ Parker, *Class and State*, p. 144.

⁹⁴⁶ Saracino, *Der Pferdediskurs*, p. 352.

⁹⁴⁷ Van Orden, *From Gens*, p. 205. The foundational text here is Vigarello, *The Upward Training*.

⁹⁴⁸ Van Orden, *From Gens*, p. 205.

⁹⁴⁹ Hernando Sánchez, *La gloria*, p. 288.

⁹⁵⁰ For a critique of Elias, see Duindam, *Myths of Power*.

⁹⁵¹ Asch, *Nobilities in Transition*, p. 70.

arms and letters” that had set in during the Renaissance.⁹⁵² Baldassare Castiglione had laid the groundwork for this shift in the early sixteenth century. In his *Courtier*, one character, count Lodovico da Canossa, averred, “the first and true profession of the courtier must be that of arms.”⁹⁵³ In practice, however, the welding together of military prowess and courtly manners took its time to take root. It was only in military leaders of Giovanni’s generation that courtly manners became a ubiquitous sign of distinction.

We can glean the transformation of the warrior nobility from Giovanni’s letters which he wrote to his younger sibling, Federico Jr., in the 1630s. In them he shared his poetic compositions with his brother who promptly lauded him for the “buon profitto che vedo hà fatto nelle rime e ne’ versi,” adding that his poems were so “a proposito” that they could not have been “cavate da altro libro che dalla sua testa.” In fact some of his writing was so elaborate that Federico was unable to “arrivare [...] col mio intelletto all’altezza di quel stile.”⁹⁵⁴ Some of this flattery may well have been fishing for good will, but it also goes to show that the days of the uncouth nobleman were over. Still, the changes were hard to make sense of. While Federico complimented Giovanni for writing like a “forbito cortigiano,” he was evidently struggling to think of a soldier and a courtier as the same person.⁹⁵⁵ The following passage from a letter Federico wrote Giovanni shows this clearly: “Mi lamento bene che lei con troppi ringraziamenti hà più del cortigiano che del soldato.”⁹⁵⁶ Indeed, Federico seemed to entertain doubts about the thoroughness of these changes, still fearing that “il troppo maneggiare le armi e la spada facesse perder l’usanza di maneggiar la penna.”⁹⁵⁷ Despite these lingering doubts, the example of Giovanni Borromeo suggests that Olivares’s education policy may have been much more successful than historians have allowed. One of the reasons for this is that, rather than being imposed upon the nobility, Olivares’s program came with considerable incentives attached to it. It offered nothing less than a remedy to what had stood in the way of earlier projects of a similar nature: it did away with the fears of emasculation and powerlessness that were rampant as a consequence of the rise of the court. The count-duke’s vision of a generation of courtly military leaders brought together what had once been an oxymoron—administrative work and war—into a coherent whole, and thus helped solve an impending identity crisis. In allowing the nobility to serve as princely administrators in a military setting, the traditional site where noble honor was defended and accrued, Olivares offered a way out of the impasse: the pressure to acquire courtly cultural capital was eased by connecting the new imperative to the old chivalric concept of

⁹⁵² Amon, *Masculine Virtue*, p. 36.

⁹⁵³ Quoted in Donati, *The Profession*, p. 304.

⁹⁵⁴ Federico IV to Giovanni, Rome March 24, 1635: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, *Corrispondenza 1635–1644*.

⁹⁵⁵ Federico IV to Giovanni, Rome March 24, 1635: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, *Corrispondenza 1635–1644*.

⁹⁵⁶ Federico IV to Giovanni, Rome January 23, 1638: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, *Corrispondenza 1635–1644*.

⁹⁵⁷ Federico IV to Giovanni, Rome February 6, 1638: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, *Corrispondenza 1627–1644*.

honor, which was being redefined as princely service.⁹⁵⁸ Olivares's model of integration allowed noblemen to hold on to old commitments to exaltation and military heroism at the same time as it subsumed the desire for sublimity under the broader designs of the monarchy. To precarious nobles like Giovanni Borromeo, this was an offer he could not pass up, and his curriculum certainly goes to show that he did not. Yet when Giovanni Borromeo was on the cusp of becoming the most powerful man on Lake Maggiore, his uncle Carlo was sabotaging his public persona with charges of violent behavior toward his subjects. For a rival like Carlo, eager to take him down, to accuse Giovanni of what he was repudiating was a particularly effective sleight. For by accusing him of being unable to harness his temper, Carlo was implicitly questioning the seriousness and thoroughness of Giovanni's education, which constituted the cultural capital that was now the prerequisite for royal service. If he abused the powers that had been bestowed upon him in an emergency situation, this raised questions about his allegiance to the model of the courtier warrior that he had been so desperate to emulate. In a society concerned with people's public image, such charges, however unfounded, were sure to hit the mark.

With his attacks on Giovanni's character, Carlo pandered to the sense, widely shared in elite circles at the time, that the monarchy was coming apart at the seams. As Carlo realized, choleric tendencies were not damning in and of themselves; they certainly would not goad the Spanish authorities into action. For that to happen, such charges had to be linked to credible rumors of seditious intent.⁹⁵⁹ Carlo seems to have grown aware of this fact. Thus, in addition to questioning Giovanni's commitment to the new model of the courtly nobleman, Carlo raised the specter of social unrest in his smears. Giovanni's blatant disrespect of the "ragione del buon governo," he admonished, could encourage some vassals to take up arms and form an alliance with the monarchy's enemies. "[I]n congiunture tali quali sono le presenti, nelle quali la fede, et la divotione de buoni Vassalli gl'obligha à sacrificare la vita, et le facultà in serv[izi]o del suo Principe," it would be unwise for the monarch to disappoint ordinary people with verdicts against an honorable subject like Carlo Borromeo. In fact, if the monarch went down this path of showing "al Mondo che contro sudditi qualificati di questo stato s'habbino di quelle ombre," this could well empower the "nemici della M[aestà] S[ua]" who were ready to set in motion their "pernicious designs" of seceding from the monarchy and running into the arms of the king of France.⁹⁶⁰ Echoing contemporary theories about how political change materialized when cunning elites channeled popular discontent, Carlo strongly implied that his nephew would place himself at the helm of such an insurgent movement in

⁹⁵⁸ Ago, *La feudalità*, p. 12.

⁹⁵⁹ Spagnoletti, *Giangirolamo*, p. 5.

⁹⁶⁰ 7 febbraio 1643. Letter of Carlo Borromeo's attorney to the governor of Milan: ASM, *Atti di governo, Militare p.a.*, cart. 230, fasc. Borromeo.

a bid to realize his long-held dream of establishing a sovereign *Stato Borromeo* with the backing of the king of France.⁹⁶¹

What lent such accusations credence were the events that were shaking Europe at the time, signaling the advent of the general crisis of the seventeenth century. In the early 1640s, the Spanish monarchy was among the most affected by what one of Olivares's confidants, Francisco Manuel de Melo, described as "the epilepsy of republics and disobedience of princes" convulsing Europe.⁹⁶² In spring 1640 Catalonia rose against the monarchy only to be followed by Portugal in December. Of these events the Reapers' War in Catalonia seems to have resonated most with Lombard nobles who quickly read about it in letters, pamphlets, and books (see chapter 7).⁹⁶³ In Barcelona in 1640 an insurgency had led to the toppling of Castilian government and a takeover of the Catalonia by the French king, whose army was aided and abetted by the rebels.⁹⁶⁴ In their defense the insurgents argued that Philip IV had repeatedly failed them. As one French pamphlet put it at the time, "Puesto que el Rey de España ya no los trataba como a los suyos, no creyeron estar obligados a obedecerle más."⁹⁶⁵ As the research of Gianvittorio Signorotto has shown, in the 1640s, a number of disaffected Milanese nobles tried to broker a similar deal with the king of France and install him as the rightful duke of Milan.⁹⁶⁶ By early 1643 rumors of an imminent, Catalan-style insurgence circulated in Milan, and Carlo promptly hijacked the resulting angst to implicate Giovanni in the supposed French plot against Philip IV.⁹⁶⁷

To Carlo's credit, this scenario was not as far-fetched as it appears in retrospect. In the southern Netherlands, a territory bearing many structural similarities with the State of Milan, representatives of the local nobility had conspired against the house of Habsburg and sought to form an alliance with the king of France and the United Provinces to topple Philip IV.⁹⁶⁸ Although the Flemish elite failed to achieve independence from Spain, this did not lay waste to similar conspiracies elsewhere. Even in the heartland of the monarchy, former loyalists were beginning to pursue ambitions to appeal to outside help to install themselves as sovereign rulers over small territories. The duke of Medina Sidonia, who enjoyed a status comparable to that of the Borromeo around Lake Maggiore in Lower Andalusia along the border with Portugal, had turned from a staunch ally of the count-duke of Olivares to a rebel planning on being elevated to the status of a *potentado* with the aid of the Portuguese rebels across the border. Animated by discontent at the monarchy which he felt

⁹⁶¹ On contemporary ideas about revolts, see Villari, *La cultura politica*, p. 16; idem, *Elogio*, pp. 9–10.

⁹⁶² Quoted in Salas Almela, *The Conspiracy*, p. 53.

⁹⁶³ Parker, *Global Crisis*, p. 564.

⁹⁶⁴ The classic account remains Elliott, *The Revolt*.

⁹⁶⁵ Quoted in Rivero Rodríguez, *El "Gran Memorial"*, p. 67.

⁹⁶⁶ Signorotto, *Stabilità politica*.

⁹⁶⁷ Signorotto, *Stabilità politica*, pp. 729–730.

⁹⁶⁸ Vermeir, *L'ambition*, pp. 90, 100–104.

had reneged on its end of the covenant between the family and Olivares, he hatched plans to mobilize his tenants against the king of Spain.⁹⁶⁹ Although Medina Sidonia's coup aborted, it was the peak of what has been referred to as the "strike of the nobility" (*huelga de nobles*), the sabotage and obstructionism of Olivares's plans in the face of mounting costs and diminishing hopes of material reward.⁹⁷⁰

Structural similarities notwithstanding, it is important to recognize what set Giovanni Borromeo apart from Medina Sidonia and their ilk. While it is true that the Borromeo had harbored ambitions to become *potentados* over the area around Lake Maggiore in the sixteenth century, these no longer fit easily with the family's overall reproductive strategy. Unlike the Castilian grandees who felt they had lost more than they had gained under Olivares, the Borromeo of Angera were an up-and-coming dynasty and part of the base of Olivares's regime in the later years. As the direct beneficiaries of the count-duke's plans for military cooperation and his vision of the future of the Spanish empire, they were the most unlikely candidates for instigating a rebellion against the king. As a matter of fact, and despite Carlo's dire predictions, Giovanni remained steadfast in his support of Olivares's program even after the count-duke's ejection, in part because, as elsewhere, the notion of service became increasingly depersonalized and took on a more abstract meaning, ensuring that the "stakeholder culture" that Olivares had created lived on among his creatures long after this departure.⁹⁷¹

Although the Spanish authorities never seem to have bought into these allegations, Giovanni nevertheless had to defend his reputation as a protector of the poor and a loyal servant of the king of Spain, both of which were on the line. It was just as well that the opportunity to do so came sooner rather than later. In 1644, the fortress of Arona was targeted for the second time in eight years by enemy troops who were marching toward Milan.⁹⁷² One of the early warning signs of the duke of Medina Sidonia's rebellion against the crown had been his obstructionism of Castilian efforts to quash the uprising in Portugal early in 1641.⁹⁷³ Giovanni Borromeo therefore had every reason to believe that the Spanish authorities were watching his reaction to a French incursion like hawks. With the suspicion of treason hovering above him, Giovanni had to rise to the occasion, bolstering his credentials both as a defender of the local population under his tutelage and the king's possession, the State of Milan. As he rose to the occasion, he set himself up as Milan's leading *olivarista*, shrewdly combining his administrative and logistical talents with military defense in the service of the house of Habsburg.

⁹⁶⁹ Salas Almela, *The Conspiracy*, pp. 56, 125–127, 167–168.

⁹⁷⁰ Salas Almela, *The Conspiracy*, p. 76.

⁹⁷¹ Fosi, *All'ombra dei Barberini*, pp. 96–97, 137–138, 152–153.

⁹⁷² Leonida Besozzi has reconstructed the siege in painstaking detail, using the same set of sources, though he does not contextualize the events as I attempt to do here. See his *Cronistoria*.

⁹⁷³ Salas Almela, *The Conspiracy*, p. 68.

On July 31, 1644 Giovanni Borromeo wrote to Valeriano Sfondrati, the commissioner-general of the army in Lombardy, that the Franco-Savoyard troops who had regrouped around prince Thomas and consisted of 12,000 foot soldiers and 3,000 horse were closing in on Arona from the south.⁹⁷⁴ The siege began that night. One day into the occupation, the enemy had blocked all the access roads to Arona, was within a musket shot of the castle, and was attacking the walls that protected Giovanni and his militiamen.⁹⁷⁵ All parties involved were aware that they would be able to hold out only as long as supplies such as ammunition, manpower, and foodstuff could be shipped into Arona from Angera across the lake. In an internal paper the Spanish authorities stressed that they had to remain “*Patrones del lago*” if Giovanni Borromeo was to sit out the Franco-Piedmontese onslaught.⁹⁷⁶ On the other side of the battlefield the French commander was equally convinced that to win it was crucial to become “*maître de toutes les barques du lac en les tirant de notre côté, afin que les ennemis en arrivant à l’autre n’en trouvassent plus pour jeter des gens de guerre*” into Arona.⁹⁷⁷ Although they failed at that, they plodded on undeterred, trying to gain control of the lake. On the fourth day of the attack, Giovanni Borromeo’s secretary, Gerolamo Cignardi, wrote that there was a real risk that the enemy troops would blockade the harbor of Angera under cover of darkness, pinching off important supplies from the opposite shore of the lake.⁹⁷⁸ Little did both sides know that the supplies and reinforcement from inside the State of Milan would be a long time in reaching Lake Maggiore, as the military establishment left Giovanni to his own devices.

Thus abandoned, Giovanni Borromeo was the sole responsible for the defense of Arona. Two problems soon emerged. One was provisioning the troops trapped inside the fortress with sufficient food at a time when victuals were in short supply. The legacy of endless dynastic wars was catching up with the lords of Lake Maggiore. What had once been extolled as a paradise in which fresh produce abounded had turned into a food desert by extreme weather, disease, and a decade of war. The earliest symptom of the malaise that would ensue was the acceleration of the economic downturn that had set in almost a decade earlier. As early as 1629, when the war drums were still beating in the distance, the Venetian ambassador to Milan had warned of the adverse effects of the warmongering of the local elites. As he reported to the Senate, many “*poveri contadini*” had abandoned the fields “*per non haver di che vivere,*” whereas those who stayed “*sospirano più che mai.*”⁹⁷⁹ Peasants were failing to plant crops vital for the survival of the community, a situation that was bound to worsen once local elites started to recruit them as soldiers. Thus, before the war had

⁹⁷⁴ Besozzi, *Cronistoria*, p. 278.

⁹⁷⁵ Giovanni Borromeo to Valeriano Sfondrati, Arona August 1, 1644; Gerolamo Cignardi to Valeriano Sfondrati, Arona August 2, 1644: SSL, FCS, vol. 15 (VIII).

⁹⁷⁶ Juan Vázquez de Coronado to Valeriano Sfondrati, Mortara August 3, 1644: SSL, FCS, vol. 15 (VIII).

⁹⁷⁷ *Mémoires du maréchal*, p. 200.

⁹⁷⁸ Gerolamo Cignardi to Valeriano Sfondrati, Arona August 3, 1644: SSL, FCS, vol. 15 (VIII).

⁹⁷⁹ Quoted in Nicolini, “*Il tumulto,*” p. 217.

even reached the State of Milan, its economy, which had been one of the most advanced in Europe a few years prior, was heading for collapse.

Amidst the economic chaos grain soon scarced. Although they dipped for a short period after the famine of 1629, bread prices rose steadily thereafter, reaching a new peak in 1644.⁹⁸⁰ The root cause of this was the change in climate that Geoffrey Parker has identified as the backdrop to the crisis of the 1640s.⁹⁸¹ In May 1635, a notary in Milan wrote in his diary, “La campagna mette gran paura per esser rara, per il sutto grande et per il freddo straordinario con brina la mattina in Milano.”⁹⁸² As a result of this unexpected cold snap, the harvest fell through, initiating the vicious circle of skyrocketing crop prices and famine. The consequences of the Little Ice Age were exacerbated by human greed. The main culprits for the subsequent shortages were the grain merchants who had let vital supplies “uscire dallo Stato indiscretamente et incautamente.”⁹⁸³ One of the areas most affected by these shady practices was Lake Maggiore. As our diarist reported, the free town of Pallanza found itself mired in a relentless competition over grain exports to Switzerland with the Borromeo fief of Intra, while the local population went hungry. When the authorities finally inspected the local storehouses, the granaries of both towns contained a total of 5,000 *moggia*, or 10,000 dry barrels, of wheat hidden away from the starving masses.⁹⁸⁴ While the Borromeo of Angera cannot be held accountable for the actions of the notables of Pallanza, as feudatories of Intra, they were as guilty as the Pallanzotti of keeping the arms race between the two towns going even if it deprived their subjects of vital foodstuff.⁹⁸⁵

These problems compounded Giovanni’s difficulties as he scrambled to prepare for the Franco-Savoyard attack on Arona. As he wrote to the commissioner-general of the army, Valeriano Sfondrati, he had failed to source more than “cento sacchi di robba, il che al consumo, che hò alle spalle, è giustam[en]te niente.”⁹⁸⁶ What is worse, to achieve even that, he had had to resort to violent means. After straining to scour anything from the markets at Pallanza and Intra, he apparently seized them directly from the merchants who were headed to the market, bragging to Sfondrati that the “cento sacchi, che n’hò presi, erano de q[ue]lli, ch’andavano à quei mercati.”⁹⁸⁷ To feed his troops, he also looted the area around Arona, requisitioning rice, oil, cheese, and rye, “che si v[er]à introducendo alla meglio si può, con quel poco formento che si è ritrovato.”⁹⁸⁸ Things were bound to deteriorate once the attack was under way. As Giovanni’s secretary reported on the fourth day of

⁹⁸⁰ De Maddalena, Prezzi, pp. 96, 101–102.

⁹⁸¹ Parker, *Global Crisis*, p. xxiii.

⁹⁸² Calco, *Un diario*, p. 475.

⁹⁸³ Calco, *Un diario*, p. 475.

⁹⁸⁴ Calco, *Un diario*, p. 475.

⁹⁸⁵ Also see Parker, *Global Crisis*, p. xxix.

⁹⁸⁶ Giovanni Borromeo to Valeriano Sfondrati, Arona July 31, 1644: SSL, FCS, vol. 15 (VIII).

⁹⁸⁷ Giovanni Borromeo to Valeriano Sfondrati, August 1, 1644: SSL, FCS, vol. 15 (VIII).

⁹⁸⁸ Giovanni Borromeo to Valeriano Sfondrati, August 1, 1644.: SSL, FCS, vol. 15 (VIII).

the siege, “mi è spiaciuto come la batteria è l’acqua delli molini, che ci hà levata, si che mio Sig[no]re è forza menar le mani con inviar lor Sig[no]ri farine che qui non ci sono.”⁹⁸⁹ It was not until August 4, five days into the attack, that Juan Vázquez de Coronado, the *maestro di campo generale*, assured Valeriano Sfondrati that two hundred bags of flour from Novara and Breme were on their way to Lake Maggiore.⁹⁹⁰

Insufficient provisions were not the only problem that haunted Giovanni. Equally as nagging was the lack of manpower to hold the fortress. As elsewhere, the Spanish garrison usually stationed in the castle of Arona had been freed for operations in the battlefields and replaced with a militia recruited from the local peasantry.⁹⁹¹ Not only were these soldiers untrained, they were deemed unreliable, and with good reason. Local peasants and fishermen were, after all, the same people who had experienced the violent excesses of Giovanni’s uncle in the early decades of the century, and, from the late 1620s on, had had to deal with a devastating famine, the plague, and repeated incursions of Franco-Savoyard troops who regularly looted the area. To stave off these attacks, many had been marshaled to fight against them, putting additional pressure on the local communities whose economy broke down as a result of the continuous recruitment drives.⁹⁹² Very little evidence survives of the impact of the continuous warfare on the local population in the first half of the seventeenth century, but the diary of an anonymous canon from Busto Arsizio, a market town halfway between Milan and the lake, gives us some idea of the hardship ordinary people went through: “regnavano continuamente le guerre sanguinolente, crudeli, et tremende in Italia [...] le quali havevano talmente distrutto, dissipato, et consumato li paesi, che erano ridotte tutte le Terre; tutti i Popoli, e tutti i paesani in estrema miseria.”⁹⁹³

Besides being on the receiving end of the war their social betters had unleashed upon them, other factors called into question the dependability of militia. Contemporary military theorists were convinced that while the nobility fought to increase its status, the only thing that goaded lowly soldiers to action was the promise of monetary gain.⁹⁹⁴ Giovanni Borromeo and his entourage seem to have shared this outlook. As his agent wrote to Valeriano Sfondrati on the second day of the siege, “queste militie non sono di quelle dell’ultra Po, ma più tosto rassomiglianti a quelle del Borgo delli hortolani,” hinting at the supposed qualities of recruits from these areas.⁹⁹⁵ Writing in his own hand, Giovanni repeatedly urged Sfondrati to send him dragoons and foot soldiers from the Duchy’s

⁹⁸⁹ Gerolamo Cignardi to Valeriano Sfondrati, Arona August 3, 1644: SSL, FCS, vol. 15 (VIII).

⁹⁹⁰ Juan Vázquez de Coronado to Valeriano Sfondrati, Mortara August 4, 1644: SSL, FCS, vol. 15. (VIII).

⁹⁹¹ Hanlon, *The Hero of Italy*, p. 143; Rizzo, *I cespiti*, p. 464, n. 4.

⁹⁹² Maffi, *Il baluardo*, p. 121.

⁹⁹³ *Storia della peste avvenuta*, pp. 5–8.

⁹⁹⁴ Spagnoletti, *Onore e spirito nazionale*, p. 213.

⁹⁹⁵ Gerolamo Cignardi to Valeriano Sfondrati, Arona August 1, 1644: SSL, FCS, vol. 15 (VIII).

heartland to defend the fortress of Arona.⁹⁹⁶ He explicitly requested “gente pagata,” arguing that they were more trustworthy than the troops he had recruited by force in the area.⁹⁹⁷ As the enemy closed in on the castle, he called on Sfondrati not to waver “se vole che la piazza si conservi.”⁹⁹⁸ Three days into the assault, Gerolamo Cignardo wrote once more, “Stiamo aspettando la gente di frà Giovanni come li hebrei il Messia, per licentiar parte di quelle militie, prima di che lo faccino da per sé.”⁹⁹⁹

The “gente di frà Giovanni” were the troops of Giovanni Pallavicino, a knight of Malta, who were supposed to be sneaked into the castle of Arona from across the lake under the cloak of darkness.¹⁰⁰⁰ Valeriano Sfondrati would later boast that this move had brought as much “alliento” to the Spanish troops as it had caused “dolor” to prince Thomas.¹⁰⁰¹ The truth was that this emergency plan was dead on arrival. Since Pallavicino held the same military rank as Giovanni Borromeo, his arrival on the lake sparked a row over precedence. Both agreed that they could not fight side by side in Arona. In the end Pallavicino decided to stay put in the castle of Angera across the lake.¹⁰⁰² In a long list of similar occurrences, this sparring match was only the latest addition of the social function of the military trumping its technical one to the detriment of the success of the military operation.¹⁰⁰³

Thus, five days into the siege, Giovanni was still on his own. In the meantime, he had had to fend off a clumsy attempt by the Swiss to spy on him on behalf of the French. On the fourth day of the siege, Giovanni Battista Orelli, a local notable from Locarno, a town on the Swiss side of the lake, arrived in Arona. On the pretext of offering help and support with “barche armate,” Orelli “[h]à mostrato una curiosità strana di veder la Rocca, mà con bel modo non li hò n’anco voluto condescendere le muraglie della Terra.”¹⁰⁰⁴ What weighed even heavier was the sense that, like in 1636, the royal army had forsaken Giovanni. Although Vázquez de Coronado promised to send in “cien barriles de polvora, cien balas de cuerda y cien caxetas de balas, en carros y diez mulos que tenía aquí para mi bagaxe,” Giovanni felt that he could not hold out much longer.¹⁰⁰⁵ On the fifth day Giovanni fired off a desperate plea to the commissioner-general of the army, “Il Torrione balla e

⁹⁹⁶ Giovanni Borromeo to Valeriano Sfondrati, Arona July 31, 1644: SSL, FCS, vol. 15 (VIII).

⁹⁹⁷ Giovanni Borromeo to Valeriano Sfondrati, Arona August 1, 1644: SSL, FCS, vol. 15 (VIII).

⁹⁹⁸ Giovanni Borromeo to Valeriano Sfondrati, Arona August 1, 1644: SSL, FCS, vol. 15 (VIII).

⁹⁹⁹ Gerolamo Cignardo to Valeriano Sfondrati, Arona August 2, 1644: SSL, FCS, vol. 15 (VIII).

¹⁰⁰⁰ Besozzi, *Cronistoria*, pp. 280, 283, 289.

¹⁰⁰¹ Quoted in Besozzi, *Cronistoria*, p. 289.

¹⁰⁰² Quoted in Besozzi, *Cronistoria*, p. 289.

¹⁰⁰³ See Maffi, *Il baluardo*, pp. 209–210, 215–216; for similar problems in Flanders, see González de León, *The Road to Rocroi*, pp. 207–208.

¹⁰⁰⁴ Giovanni Borromeo to Valeriano Sfondrati, Arona August 3, 1644: SSL, FCS, vol. 15 (VIII).

¹⁰⁰⁵ Juan Vázquez de Coronado to Valeriano Sfondrati, Mortara August 4, 1644: SSL, FCS, vol. 15 (VIII).

dimani con dieci cannonate se ne anderà, sì che questa notte bisogna sudare: et bisogna fare anco tagliata.”¹⁰⁰⁶

On the sixth day Valeriano Sfondrati finally arrived on the lake ahead of his troops. The picture he painted in his report to the governor’s left-hand man in Milan was gloomy. Before he would be able to bring in his own troops, he talked to the much-maligned militiamen who, he reported with understatement, “no están enteram[en]te desconfiados de mantener la Villa” if properly supported by professional troops.¹⁰⁰⁷ This never materialized. On the same night, Giovanni Borromeo reported to Sfondrati, the enemy “si retirò più alla collina, mettendosi fra le vigne.”¹⁰⁰⁸

As the enemy troops flounced off to Vercelli, Giovanni Borromeo could be proud of himself. He had defended the castle of Arona all by himself. As internal documents show, the Spanish military authorities knew that Arona “podría ser un Ostende, o, un Verrua, quando no le supimos quitar el socorro.”¹⁰⁰⁹ Yet, despite the haunting imagery of garrisons which had resisted the onslaught of powerful occupiers before they had to surrender lest they be starved to death, the military establishment proved unable to marshal the necessary wherewithal within a reasonable period of time. Many sought to whitewash this failure of the military establishment at the time. Writing a few years after the siege, Philip IV’s spin doctor, Pier Giovanni Capriata, claimed that Arona was saved thanks to the backup sent in from the heartland of the State of Milan. Prince Thomas would have conquered the fortress of Arona “per la gran debolezza delle sue mura, non habili a resistere lungamente alle percosse dell’artiglierie, se il Mastro di Campo Frà Giovanni Pallavicino, partendo col suo Terzo da Mortara, e marchiando con incredibile celerità, non havesse i fini, e disegni del Principe pervenuto.”¹⁰¹⁰ In the 1650s, a soldier and affiliate of the Sfondrati family was still peddling the solipsistic myth that “fù per la diligenza del Conte della Riviera DON VALERIANO SFONDRATI la piazza da noi soccorsa.”¹⁰¹¹ But the record seems to suggest the opposite: when the troops from Milan eventually reached Lake Maggiore, the enemy troops had already retreated toward Piedmont.

Although they ostensibly attempted to explain away the rout of the troops of prince Thomas, the writings from the Franco-Savoyard army offer a more convincing analysis of what they rightly viewed as Giovanni’s exploit. These authors argued what had given Giovanni the edge over the attackers was information. Having gotten wind of the coalition army’s plans, he had been able to make sure that most ships were moved to Cannobio before the French could requisition them.¹⁰¹²

¹⁰⁰⁶ Giovanni Borromeo to Valeriano Sfondrati, Arona not dated: SSL, FCS, vol. 15 (VIII).

¹⁰⁰⁷ Valeriano Sfondrati to the Gran Cancelliere, n. p. August 5, 1644: SSL, FCS, vol. 15 (VIII).

¹⁰⁰⁸ Giovanni Borromeo to Valeriano Sfondrati, Arona August 6, 1644: SSL, FCS, vol. 15 (VIII).

¹⁰⁰⁹ Juan Vázquez de Coronado to Valeriano Sfondrati, Mortara August 3, 1644: SSL, FCS, vol. 15 (VIII).

¹⁰¹⁰ Capriata, *Dell’historia*, p. 945.

¹⁰¹¹ *Diario dell’Assedio di Valenza [...]*: SSL, FCS, vol. 29, f. 3r.

¹⁰¹² As early as July 27, 1644, Giovanni wrote to a local notable that “[i]l nemico sen viene: non ci è tempo da perdere.” See Besozzi, *Cronistoria*, p. 278. On the plans to move the ships up to Cannobio, see *ibidem*, p. 280.

The French commander of the Savoyard troops would later write that the siege of Arona had been a lost cause from the outset because his troops had failed to “avoir surpris les portes de la ville ni aucunes barques.”¹⁰¹³ Contemporaries were fully cognizant of the fact that siege warfare with its massive requirements of food and fodder to fuel the besieging army was doomed to abort unless the attacking troops were able to swiftly turn the tide in their favor.¹⁰¹⁴ Giovanni knew that the retreat of the coalition army was a matter of time if the militia he commanded held out long enough.

Even though chance was a major factor in determining this outcome, the retreat of the enemy forces afforded Giovanni an opportunity to vindicate himself. He would argue, with some justification, that his preparation as a new military leader in the Olivares mold had helped Spanish arms triumph over the Franco-Savoyard coalition army. Having overcome the fears of emasculation that had held earlier generations of noblemen back and having wed the warrior tradition to the new model of the courtier, Giovanni Borromeo was in an ideal position to do the coordinating work necessary to fend off a military attack in the seventeenth century. It was his talent as an organizer and his strategic knack that had helped him make the right choices, recruit sufficient militiamen, and provide them with sufficient foodstuff and ammunition for them to hold out until the attack was over. As if to prove the gainsayers wrong, he had not only shielded his vassals, he had saved the Spanish army in Lombardy from a major rout when men of his station elsewhere in the composite Spanish monarchy had taken up arms against the monarch and entered into alliances with the French king to topple the rule of the house of Habsburg.

This reading of events was patently self-serving. Giovanni’s victory was not his alone: the much-maligned militias had played an important role in driving out the enemy troops. As an author close to the French admitted, the “Francesi abbandonarono l’impresa,” when “le militie de loro feudi” came to the Borromeo’s rescue “per via del Lago.”¹⁰¹⁵ Plans to form militias recruited from the peasantry had first been drawn up in 1635. They were regularly used to guard village castles, where inhabitants squirreled away grain and fodder, and, as in our case, to add to the permanent garrisons of the State’s fifteen fortresses.¹⁰¹⁶ Studies of the local militias that were forcibly recruited in many areas of Lombardy in the late 1630s have shown that disaffection was rife among the soldiery.¹⁰¹⁷ Although much more research needs to be carried out in this regard, one of the drivers of the disgruntlement seems to have been popular attitudes to Olivares’s government. “What is war, in short?” asked the anonymous author of an anti-Olivares pamphlet published in 1642. “For many it

¹⁰¹³ Mémoires du maréchal, p. 2E1.

¹⁰¹⁴ Hanlon, *The Hero of Italy*, p. 101.

¹⁰¹⁵ Gualdo Priorato, *Relatione*, p. 142.

¹⁰¹⁶ Hanlon, *Italy 1636*, pp. 65–66.

¹⁰¹⁷ Pedretti, *Ai confini*, p. 185.

means losses, but for others it is a good harvest.”¹⁰¹⁸ Although they rarely phrased it that way, many ordinary people in Milan saw the war as a rivalry for higher rank and status between the kings of Spain and France, and the nobility allied with them. Feeling that the conflict had little in store for them, many proved understandably reluctant to fight on behalf of their social betters.

Yet, while this was true in the abstract, it was not necessarily so when the threat became more concrete. Gerolamo Cignardi, Giovanni’s secretary, wrote at one point: “il paese [Arona] per non essere sostenuto da gente pagata come l’altra volta [1636] fugge a più parti né v’è rimedio humano sì che puoco mi prometto di cosa buona.”¹⁰¹⁹ Directly contradicting this, Leonida Besozzi, the tireless local historian, has unearthed anecdotal evidence that contemporaries deemed militias much more efficient than Giovanni and his secretary made believe in their desperate calls to the army establishment.¹⁰²⁰ A notable from a hamlet near Angera requested that he be sent 100 men to protect life and limb from marauding French troops, showing that they were thought to be effective enough to stave off an impending attack. When it suited them, the Borromeo themselves championed the local militias. At the height of the battle over the future of the Borromeo’s fiefdom between the crown and the family in the 1650s (more on this in chapter 8), their lawyers shamelessly argued that the local fishermen whom the authorities were intent on taxing were vital to “la difesa del Stato da quella parte altre volte sostenuta da quelli poveri abitanti con tanta fedeltà, et prontezza, et ultimam[en]te dell’anno 1644 contro gli Esserciti Francesi, et Savoiardì.”¹⁰²¹ All this suggests that, when their livelihoods were on the line, local militias rose to the occasion. Local militiamen were only too aware of the consequences of not standing up to defend their community; the memory of the ravages of 1636 was still fresh in 1644. As David Parrott has shown of French civilians, “local communities were prepared to risk taking defence into their own hands” as “confidence in the capacity of the formal administration to defend them” dipped.¹⁰²² They may have had the smallest stake in the war that their social betters had foisted upon them but they were the ones who salvaged Arona from the assault of the coalition army in a desperate bid to save what little was left of their livelihoods.¹⁰²³

If Giovanni Borromeo nevertheless questioned their motives, this was because, like all men of his station, he could not conceive of the militia members as people with aspirations of their own. As Jonathan Dewald reminds us, portrayals of military heroes in the seventeenth century were steeped in the values of the society of orders: “Only those who had significant deeds to present had the right to speak of themselves, and only those of high social standing were likely to perform such

¹⁰¹⁸ Quoted in Salas Almela, *The Conspiracy*, p. 126.

¹⁰¹⁹ Gerolamo Cignardo to Valeriano Sfondrati, Arona August 1, 1644: SSL, FCS, vol. 15 (VIII).

¹⁰²⁰ Besozzi, *Cronistoria*, p. 301. For the following examples see *ibid.*

¹⁰²¹ Brief of July 26, 1653: ASM, *Atti di governo*, Acque p.a., cart. 296.

¹⁰²² Parrott, *Richelieu’s Army*, p. 551.

¹⁰²³ See Asch, “So der soldat,” p. 300, on peasant resistance to soldiers during the Thirty Years’ War.

deeds.”¹⁰²⁴ Indeed, in order for his favored narrative of the Borromeo clan as guardians of the poor and defenseless to stick, he had to deliberately efface the agency of ordinary people and reduce them to grateful executioners of his commands. Precisely because war to him had a social, as well as a technical, function, his desire to elevate himself consigned the people who fought under his supervision to the role of props in a vicarious display of power.¹⁰²⁵ The very thought of the tenants acting independently of the local lord was unfathomable because it undermined the edifice on which the Borromeo’s dominion rested. Rather than being recognized as human beings who had a livelihood to protect, the militiamen became external signs of distinction who needed to be kept at bay so as not to interfere with the signal Giovanni was trying to send to his peers. Not unlike the natural bounty around Lake Maggiore, the people who lived in the area “function[ed] as badges of social rank, denoting the superior status of elites against the groups below or vis-à-vis outsiders.”¹⁰²⁶ His unofficial mouthpiece later described Giovanni as recompensing “con suoi danari quei soldati che generosamente lo servirono in quell’occasione,” revealing that to him they performed a support role in the play in which he, the hero of Arona, was the main act.¹⁰²⁷ As his secretary had made clear during the siege, “qui si gioca la riputatione di un Cavaglier,” of which his subjects were an integral part.¹⁰²⁸ The siege of Arona had been the primary site for him to prove his role as protector of the local population and his loyalty to the Spanish monarchy which had earlier been questioned. Once the smoke set on the castle of Arona, Giovanni was impatient to set the record straight and restore his honor for the whole world to see.

Nobles in the seventeenth century were sensible of the elusiveness of the twin concepts of honor and loyalty. Part of this was to do with the fact that theirs was a society that placed much more value on concrete and tangible facts than on abstract ideas.¹⁰²⁹ Indeed, at the beginning of the century a French writer had lamented, “Beauty could be seen, riches could be touched, but nobility had to be imagined or to be taken on faith.”¹⁰³⁰ In the Spanish context, such fears were exacerbated by Counter-Reformation theology with its emphasis on the need for performative enactments of otherwise invisible truths.¹⁰³¹ Much like salvation, nobility as the inner being came to life only if it was performed in the public arena and, crucially, recognized as such by one’s peers.¹⁰³² In order to influence how others saw them, nobles in the seventeenth century developed an increasing awareness of the importance of public relations. French nobles became convinced that actions as

¹⁰²⁴ Dewald, *Writing Failure*, p. 24.

¹⁰²⁵ On the role of servants to the self-affirmation of Milan’s leading families, see Cremonini, *Le vie*, pp. 74–75. More generally, see Daloz, *The Sociology of Elite Distinction*, chap. 6, in part. pp. 105–107.

¹⁰²⁶ Daloz, *The Sociology of Elite Distinction*, p. 61.

¹⁰²⁷ Gualdo Priorato, *Giovanni*, unpag.

¹⁰²⁸ Gerolamo Cignardi to Valeriano Sfondrati, Arona August 3, 1644: SSL, FCS, vol. 15 (VIII).

¹⁰²⁹ Neuschel, *Word of Honor*, p. 22.

¹⁰³⁰ The writer is Guez de Balzac, quoted in Asch, *Nobilities in Transition*, p. 10.

¹⁰³¹ Amon, *Masculine Virtue*, pp. 7–8.

¹⁰³² Osborne, *Language and Sovereignty*; Stollberg-Rilinger, *The Baroque State*.

such were “of little merit if they are not considered by the Prince” and his entourage.¹⁰³³ Action therefore became as important as the public portrayal of it through publications and paintings. As Ronald Asch has pointed out, economic power and jurisdictional rights to rule over vassals remained crucial parts of noble identity in the seventeenth century, but there is no denying that “the social rhetoric which gave meaning and significance to these facts” grew more and more important during the period.¹⁰³⁴ Within an increasingly unstable social hierarchy, noble families saw a need to control their public image as they competed with other dynasties who were equally hungry for the esteem of their peers.¹⁰³⁵

In the Spanish monarchy, the count-duke of Olivares had acted as a trail-blazer in this area. As John Elliott and Jonathan Brown have shown, the count-duke was exceedingly conscious of the importance of his public persona and enlisted the help of writers and painters to mold public opinion in his favor. “Faced by what he regarded as a systematic campaign of vilification, he had no hesitations about mounting a counter-offensive which would set the record straight for contemporaries and posterity alike.”¹⁰³⁶ Like his benefactor Olivares, Giovanni felt a strong urge to swing the opinion, not so much of the masses on his estates, but certainly of the social elite who mingled in the courts of Europe.¹⁰³⁷ Not only had his tenants repeatedly objected to his treatment of them, his uncle had accused him of tyrannical rule over the subjects that he was secretly mobilizing for a seditious insurgence against Spanish rule in Lombardy. It was this traducing by another member of respectable society that set him on edge, and the pluck he had shown during the siege of Arona was a welcome opportunity to call his critics’ bluff.

The sources of this public relations campaign have long gone missing. But the portrait of Giovanni Borromeo in Gualdo Priorato’s *who’s who* of the great military leaders of the period allows us to uncover some aspects of the image that Giovanni Borromeo wanted to convey of himself. Gualdo Priorato, a Venetian who spent a good part of his life in the service of the king of France, by all accounts did not know Giovanni Borromeo personally, though they might have met in 1649 when both attended the ceremony for Philip IV’s second wife-to-be, Mariana of Austria, on her way to Madrid, in whose organization Giovanni seems to have been actively involved.¹⁰³⁸ Priorato’s account relies entirely on information making the rounds among the European elite at the time. What makes his portrait particularly revealing, however, is that the author was adamant that his was an unfiltered

¹⁰³³ Smith, *The Culture of Merit*, pp. 137, 156–157.

¹⁰³⁴ Asch, *Nobilities in Transition*, p. 12.

¹⁰³⁵ Dewald, *Status, Power, and Identity*, p. 14.

¹⁰³⁶ Brown and Elliott, *A Palace for the King*, p. 171.

¹⁰³⁷ Peter Burke makes a similar argument about the audience of the “fabrication” of Louis XIV. See Burke, *The Fabrication*, pp. 151–153.

¹⁰³⁸ Federico IV to Giovanni, Montalto January 2, 1649: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, *Corrispondenza 1645–1655*; Gualdo Priorato, *Relatione della Città, A chi legge*. On the ceremony, see Cremonini, *Le vie*, pp. 67–68.

account of the accomplishments of those portrayed: “Io non intendo però di delinear ombre; mà splendori.”¹⁰³⁹ His panegyrics, written in the latter half of the seventeenth century and following the conventions of a genre popular at the time, were to be understood as a sign of his uncritical “divotione” to the men who had made history in the particularly bloody first half of the century.¹⁰⁴⁰

The portrait of Giovanni Borromeo was no exception. Much space was devoted to the military feats of Giovanni whom Priorato praised as “uno de più generosi, e splendidi cavalieri de nostri giorni.” The account Priorato gave was of dubious accuracy. As a matter of fact, the descriptions of Giovanni’s actions were often so isolated from the battles the author described that it was next to impossible to assess his contribution to the victorious outcome. As Angelantonio Spagnoletti explains, this was part of the conventions of the genre: “la prolissa e ripetitiva letteratura del genere sminuzzava le campagne e le battaglie stesse in una serie di episodi all’interno dei quali risaltava solo il valore di colui al quale il medaglione era dedicato.”¹⁰⁴¹ What is more, Priorato used Giovanni’s exploits to draw far-reaching conclusions about his qualities as a military man. He had “pochi pari in tutti li requisiti, che possono render conspicuo un Cavaliere.” He shone as both a military strategist and a paternalist commander of his troops: “Fu patientissimo nelle fatiche militari, affabile con soldati, e benefico co’ meritevoli.” If his education at the Imperial court was meant to prime him for courtly interactions off the battlefield, judging by Priorato’s spin, it had served its purpose: Giovanni was an “amatore delle virtù, e fautore de virtuosi” whose “Casa era sempre frequentata da Cavalieri, ove solo di virtù à loro spettanti si discorreva, cattivandosi co’ suoi manerosi tratti alla sua benevolenza ogni conditione di Persone.”¹⁰⁴²

After Arona, no one could doubt that Giovanni was the embodiment of the new noble hero envisaged by Olivares. “Disinteressatissimo in tutti gl’affari,” the sole driving force behind his actions was, in Gualdo Priorato’s rendition, the “propria riputatione” and “gloria.”¹⁰⁴³ Ambiguous as it may sound, this formulation was anything but indicative that Giovanni was pursuing individual dynastic aspirations. In fact, contemporaries labored under the illusion of a contrived opposition between selfish “interests,” meaning monetary gain, and the pursuit of “reputation” and “glory,” which were understood as part of a collective endeavor in which the glory of the king reflected on the nobility and that of the nobility added to the credit of the ruling dynasty. It was the pinnacle of the philosophy that had inspired Olivares’s Union of Arms policy: the aggrandizement of the house of Habsburg through the elevation of the dynasties who served Philip IV. As Priorato’s condensation of a large number of now lost manuscript sources shows, the quest for fame and renown was a

¹⁰³⁹ Gualdo Priorato, *Vite*, p. 1.

¹⁰⁴⁰ Gualdo Priorato, *Vite*, p. 1. Mark Bannister and Katia Béguin have made a similar use of panegyrics to reconstruct the self-fashioning of the prince of Condé. See Bannister, *Condé*, p. 5, and Béguin, *Les princes*, pp. 57–60

¹⁰⁴¹ Spagnoletti, *Principi italiani*, pp. 210–211.

¹⁰⁴² Gualdo Priorato, *Giovanni*, unpag.

¹⁰⁴³ Gualdo Priorato, *Giovanni*, unpag.

perfectly acceptable pursuit; it was the “ultimate *desideratum* of a noble life.”¹⁰⁴⁴ So much so that the Jesuit writer Baltasar Gracián (1601–58) placated the conscience of those who might have entertained doubts about the pursuit of preeminence in his *Aphorisms*, “The desire for reputation springs from virtue.”¹⁰⁴⁵

Still, Giovanni’s renown drew its legitimacy from stunts of derring-do, a fact that gestured to potential tensions. His younger brother, Federico, praised Giovanni for his extraordinary bravery, writing: “la sua indefessa applicat[ion]e m’insegna che ella non si satisfa se non di quelle diligenze che siano impossibili ad ogn’altro.”¹⁰⁴⁶ Federico lauded him as a hero, willing to put his life on the line for his subjects and his king. Reviving ancient myths surrounding the heroic Alexander the Great popular among nobles at the time, Federico extolled him as a new “Alessandro.”¹⁰⁴⁷ Alexander served as a model for nobles who put “their military genius at the service of his king and country” in a bid to heighten the glory of the king’s, as well as their own dynasty.¹⁰⁴⁸ It is no surprise that the Borromeo found themselves in such descriptions. Far from being a sign of an aspiration to outbid the king, as his uncle had insinuated earlier, his self-styling as Alexander was meant to convince the gainsayers that, although he acted heroically, he did so as a loyal servant of the king of Spain.

If on the one hand he stressed his embrace of the model of the courtier warrior, Giovanni was equally concerned with fitting his exploits into the family history. It is revealing that Priorato began his entry on Giovanni with a 15-page family history, detailing the “Sommi Pontefici, e Santi Martiri, e Confessori,” as well as military leaders with dubious track records, who were allegedly Giovanni’s ancestors.¹⁰⁴⁹ Giovanni himself was equally interested in fabricating a useable past. As Jonathan Dewald has noted, noble identity in the seventeenth century drew on the merits of earlier generations, but contemporary preoccupations often had an influence on how these were molded. In order to make their history useful, families felt a need to reframe their stories, emphasize certain aspects while deemphasizing others in the face of changing circumstances.¹⁰⁵⁰ If the Borromeo had long relied on the saint and the other clerics in the family to visualize their superiority, they were now resurrecting an all-but forgotten military tradition to legitimize the family’s reinvention as a military dynasty. Noble families were alive to the fact that dynastic fictions were crucial to family’s status—all the more so when dynasties were relatively new to the sort of distinction they wished to be known for.¹⁰⁵¹

¹⁰⁴⁴ Amon, *Masculine Virtue*, p. 44.

¹⁰⁴⁵ Quoted in Amon, *Masculine Virtue*, p. 62.

¹⁰⁴⁶ Federico IV to Giovanni, Benevento April 20, 1647: ABIB, FB IV, *Corrispondenza 1645–1655*.

¹⁰⁴⁷ Federico IV to Giovanni VII, Benevento March 10, 1647: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, *Corrispondenza 1645–1655*.

¹⁰⁴⁸ Bannister, *Condé*, p. 83. Also see Sandberg, *Warrior Pursuits*, p. 117.

¹⁰⁴⁹ Gualdo Priorato, *Giovanni*, unpag.

¹⁰⁵⁰ Dewald, *Status, Power, and Identity*, pp. 12–13.

¹⁰⁵¹ Dewald, *Status, Power, and Identity*, pp. 12–14.

The urge to invent a new family tradition is perhaps most discernible in the paintings Giovanni Borromeo commissioned for the castle of Angera. Exploiting the propaganda value of the medium, Giovanni had his family depicted as a military dynasty with a long history of fighting the French and their ancient ancestors.¹⁰⁵² The most famous canvas, *Giovanni che scaccia i goti da Roma*, consciously played on a double entendre, mixing history with allegory: the past helped produce the image that the family liked to convey of itself in the present moment.¹⁰⁵³ During the sack of Rome of 410 the first Giovanni Borromeo supposedly rose to the occasion and put an end to the Visigoths' looting and pillaging of the Eternal City.¹⁰⁵⁴ (This story was predicated on the belief, shared by many nobles at the time, that the Borromeo's ancestry went all the way back to the Trojans who fled Troy with Aeneas and later founded Rome.¹⁰⁵⁵ In reality, the Borromeo's origins could be traced back only to the fourteenth century when they eked out a meager existence as merchants outside Florence. If the family nevertheless sought to trace its ancestry back to antiquity, this was because seniority conferred legitimacy upon its claim to power.¹⁰⁵⁶) The other analogy was to an event much closer to home: contemporaries believed that Angera had been "messa a sacco, ed atterrata da' Goti, nell'anno di Cristo Signor Nostro quattrocento sessanta, o circa."¹⁰⁵⁷

When combined with recent events, the message must have been clear enough to visitors to the castle: in driving the French out of the State of Milan, the first Giovanni's eponymous descendant had carried forward a venerable family tradition of military activism against the Goths or their present-day incarnation, the French. Lest there be any misunderstanding, the painting was later placed next to a portrait of another Giovanni, this time a historically documented one, from the Borromeo line: Giovanni III (1439–1495) who had repelled an attack by another invader of the Borromeo fief, the Valaisans, in 1487. Together these two namesakes, one invented, the other one real enough, were to establish the military tradition the family so sorely lacked and to legitimize the military pursuits of the Giovanni who lived in the 1640s in a representational strategy common among parvenus with no military past.¹⁰⁵⁸ Genealogy provided the context for the volition of an individual.¹⁰⁵⁹ If the battle of Arona had proved in action that he stood up to the French, the cycle in the castle of Angera placed Giovanni's triumph into a long-established family tradition and reiterated his commitment to the Spanish cause for every visitor to the castle to see. While these might have included the representatives of local communities who were sometimes received in the august

¹⁰⁵² Zuffi, *La pittura*.

¹⁰⁵³ Adamson, *Policy and Pomegranates*, p. 166.

¹⁰⁵⁴ See Giovannini, *Federico Borromeo* pp. 15–16.

¹⁰⁵⁵ See Dewald, *Status, Power, and Identity*, p. 31, on the popularity of linking dynastic histories to Virgil's *Aeneid*.

¹⁰⁵⁶ Spagnoletti, *Le dinastie italiane*, p. 316.

¹⁰⁵⁷ Vagliano, *Le rive*, p. 292.

¹⁰⁵⁸ Thompson, *The Nobility*, p. 181.

¹⁰⁵⁹ Dewald, *Aristocratic Experience*, chap. 1.

rooms of the castle, the main addressees of this were the members of the Milanese and, more broadly, Spanish elite who were regularly wined and dined in Angera.¹⁰⁶⁰

As always, it is difficult to gauge the impact of this “fabrication” of a new family image. Still, there is every reason to believe that the panegyrics that circulated within elite circles were powerful enough to sway the opinion of key decision makers. In the aftermath of the battle at Arona, an official of the Spanish military administration admitted that “el retirarse con perdida de gente” of the enemy troops had transpired “con mucha reputacion del conde Juan Borromeo Gobernador de Arona y Roca que con salidas hizo daño considerable al enemigo.”¹⁰⁶¹ Soon thereafter, the results of this gain in reputation started rolling in. The commissioner-general of the army in Lombardy, Valeriano Sfondrati, died in 1645 and was succeeded by the man who felt he had been failed by him and the military establishment: Giovanni Borromeo.¹⁰⁶² Borromeo’s rise from powerful feudatory to the most important office awarded to a member of the local elite was by all accounts stunning, outshone only by his accession to the politically decisive Secret Council one year later for his services to the crown.¹⁰⁶³ The weaponization of his military exploits and their public portrayal as daring acts had catapulted him, the son of the founder of the cadet branch of the family, into the ranks of the local elite.

While his rapid ascent may have followed a pattern typical of the early modern period as a whole, it was firmly embedded in the context of its time. Its underlying assumption was the one that had been at the heart of Olivares’s program: that to advance the interests of one’s family by seeking glory on the battlefield was not inconsistent with royal service but, rather, that the shared urge for elevation welded the king and his nobility together.¹⁰⁶⁴ It was this idea that had spurred nobles to overcome fears of emasculation that allegedly awaited those who joined the new military service elite. As they welded the chivalric ideal of medieval lore to the new model of the courtier and forged a new nobility of courtier warriors, they developed a new form of heroism that parted company with earlier incarnations. They put the nobility’s bellicosity at the service of sovereign dynasties in return for the aggrandizement of their own family’s glory. In the age of dynasticism, the heroism of a single nobleman on the battlefield thus reflected on the monarch and added luster to the sovereign, as well as the nobleman’s own family. While it may be tempting to dismiss this as a pit-stop on the road to the inevitable faltering of the nobility as a warrior caste, the phenomenon is too important to

¹⁰⁶⁰ On this point see Brown and Elliott, *A Palace*, pp. 200–201.

¹⁰⁶¹ Quoted in Besozzi, *Cronistoria*, p. 302.

¹⁰⁶² Besozzi, *Cronistoria*, p. 303.

¹⁰⁶³ De Vit, *Il Lago Maggiore*, p. 241.

¹⁰⁶⁴ Bannister, Condé, p. 94; Sandberg, *Warrior Pursuits*, pp. 147–148.

developments at mid-century for us to overlook it as nonchalantly as recent works on the issue have done.¹⁰⁶⁵

The sort of heroism espoused by Giovanni Borromeo inspired many to have a shot at upward social mobility. For a time this reproductive strategy seemed to pay off. Challenges to it would come from unexpected quarters. Many, including Giovanni, failed to register that social advancement through military entrepreneurialism was more controversial than they had thought. If he had successfully dealt with the challenge posed by his uncle, Giovanni's subjects were much harder to win over. Over time they became more vocal in their criticism of his conflation of the technical and the social uses of the military. In their petitions to the courts of law in Milan, they lifted the curtain on what went on behind the shiny façade of Giovanni Borromeo as a magnanimous protector of the defenseless, exposing his endeavor as a self-serving ploy. It was in this context that new ideas arose, ideas that equated noble heroism with naked ambition and the attempt to undermine the authority of the king.¹⁰⁶⁶ If the growling of the subject population could be quelled, their ideas proved much harder to put to bed. Indeed, they would come to haunt him when Giovanni finally tried to redeem the promise of the Union of Arms and sought to accede to the Spanish governing elite.

¹⁰⁶⁵ Asch, *Herbst des Helden*.

¹⁰⁶⁶ Bannister, *Condé*, p. 94.

Chapter 7

Saving the Monarchy? Giovanni Borromeo as Commissioner-General of the Army in Lombardy and the Crisis of the Seventeenth Century

“Aviso più fortunato non mi poteva giungere di quello, per mezzo di cui s’è publicato la giustizia Reg[i]a à favore di V[ostra] S[ignoria] Ill[ustrissi]ma nella causa del Commiss[ariat]o Gen[era]le.”¹⁰⁶⁷

Thus one Giovanni Battista Olginati from Arona toadied up to Giovanni Borromeo, congratulating him on the appointment as commissioner-general of the army against a raft of formidable competitors.

This letter from a local notable in the Borromeo fief was exceptional in one regard only: its provenance. For the new position had drastically increased the geographical reach of Giovanni’s might, and his correspondence reflected this: letters now poured in from all over Lombardy.¹⁰⁶⁸

Many correspondents were as courteous as Olginati, though others took fewer pains to conceal the ulterior motives behind their letters of congratulation: many did not shy away from putting their names forward as potential clients. Writing from Mortara, a town outside the Borromeo fiefdom, Giuseppe Corio came straight to the point. Having “confidato, non meno nella gentilezza sua, che nell’honestà della mercede, sono à pretenderne la mancia solita darsi da Padroni a Ser[vito]ri.”¹⁰⁶⁹

Whether they acknowledged it or not, all well-wishers assumed that Giovanni Borromeo had landed a position that enabled him to dish out favors to willing surrogates ready to offer their services to the rising star of Spanish Milan.

The hopes and wishes of Giovanni’s petitioners were not misplaced. As commissioner-general of the army he did indeed preside over impressive funds to be parceled out to potential clients. According to the instruction prepared for Giovanni Borromeo’s predecessor, his main task was to act as a coordinator and transmission belt of material used to provision the troops stationed across Lombardy. Besides collating information on the wherewithal available in the State and heading a retinue of officials, the main function of the commissioner resided “nell’assegnare gl’alloggiamenti alla gente di guerra,” which included negotiating the billeting of troops with local notables.¹⁰⁷⁰ For Giovanni Borromeo satisfactorily to perform this task, he needed to be well-connected throughout the State of Milan and able to call on all the guns at his disposal, a fact that may well explain why this sensitive position was without fail conferred on high-ranking members of the local nobility.¹⁰⁷¹ As Davide Maffi has argued, these charismatic figures were necessary because

¹⁰⁶⁷ Giovanni Battista Olginati to Giovanni Borromeo, Arona April 27, 1646: ABIB, FB, Giovanni V, Carriera militare.

¹⁰⁶⁸ See ABIB, FB, Giovanni V, Carriera militare, fasc. Conte Giovanni V del Conte Giulio Cesare III. Maestro di Campo. 1646 Consig.e Segreto, Commissario Gen.le degli Eserciti di S. M. Catt.

¹⁰⁶⁹ Giuseppe Corio to Giovanni Borromeo, Mortara April 29, 1646: ABIB, FB, Giovanni V, Carriera militare, fasc. Conte Giovanni V del Conte Giulio Cesare III. Maestro di Campo. 1646 Consig.e Segreto, Commissario Gen.le degli Eserciti di S. M. Catt.

¹⁰⁷⁰ Instruction to Valeriano Sfondrati, in: De Carichi dello Stato, vol. III, f. 164v: ASM, Atti di governo, Militare p. a., cart. 406.

¹⁰⁷¹ Maffi, *Il baluardo*, pp. 296–297.

commissioners-general needed to assert themselves against entrenched local interests who vigorously opposed the billeting of troops in their communities.¹⁰⁷² This view, pitting an official of the crown against society writ large, is not entirely convincing in an Old Regime setting. Granted, Giovanni Borromeo's incoming correspondence reveals some evidence of resistance, such as when one town petitioned him to be "sollevata nell'occorrenze d'alloggiamenti di soldati," a plea that was usually followed by the offer of a substantial bribe.¹⁰⁷³ Still, such requests were easily offset by other members of local communities trying to make profits off the lodging of troops, as the letters quoted here clearly show. If Maffi is right to suggest that the stationing of troops was detrimental to a community as a whole, individual members within them seemed to clamor for more troops being sent their way. Rather than in terms of the state versus monolithic communities, this problem should be viewed through the lens of early modern patronage which, Katia Béguin reminds us, was at once predatory and protective.¹⁰⁷⁴

Giovanni Borromeo's handling of patronage was an attempt to staunch the opposition that the *olivarista* vision of the Spanish monarchy was garnering. When he took over in 1646, the monarchy was in the clutches of a profound crisis: not only had several Iberian cities, including Valencia and Seville, been ravaged by the plague, but two of the empire's constituent parts, Catalonia and Portugal, had risen against the king. As we have seen in the preceding chapter, it was the Reapers' War in Catalonia in particular that captured the Milanese elite's imagination. What made this instance of sedition particularly worrisome was that it had been galvanized by the stationing of troops in a territory bordering France, and there were signs that, given the chance, Milanese subjects would be capable of staging a similar uprising. Milan having been left to its fate as a result of the troubles in the Iberian peninsula, the task of preventing a revolt against troops from occurring in the heart of the monarchy was essentially forced onto members of the local establishment such as Giovanni Borromeo. With the responsibility for nothing less than the future of Spanish Italy resting on his shoulders, Giovanni cautiously proceeded to organize the punishing billeting of troops so as to nip a Catalan-style upheaval in the bud. Sensing the unpopularity of the quartering of soldiers, he mapped out a strategy that delivered just enough benefits to those sections of society most prone to revolt without compromising the makeup of society he had found to be so beneficial for himself.

¹⁰⁷² Maffi, *Il baluardo*, p. 295–296.

¹⁰⁷³ Annibale Somaglia to Giovanni Borromeo, Piacenza April 24, 1646: ABIB, FB, Giovanni V, *Carriera militare*, fasc. Conte Giovanni V del Conte Giulio Cesare III. *Maestro di Campo*. 1646 *Consig.e Segreto*, *Commissario Gen.le degli Eserciti di S. M. Catt.* On communities' attempts to bribe officials, see Anselmi, "Conservare lo Stato," p. 190.

¹⁰⁷⁴ Béguin, *Les princes*, p. 391.

Giovanni Borromeo's response to the impending crisis was a mobilization of state resources worthy of his erstwhile protector, the count-duke of Olivares.¹⁰⁷⁵ Although commissioners-general usually hailed from the ranks of the military, they were also skilled administrators who interacted closely with the various bureaucracies in the State of Milan to deliver results.¹⁰⁷⁶ On paper they had always had considerable powers, but in the emergency of the 1640s Giovanni Borromeo extended his in unprecedented ways.¹⁰⁷⁷ To preempt the social unrest that the stationing of troops had engendered in Catalonia, he unearthed decades-old plans to use tax payers' money to fund so-called *case erme* (protected houses) for soldiers. Fretting at the consequences, he backed down on the unpopular practice of allocating soldiers to private households. Instead of foisting this hidden impost on civilians, Giovanni argued, the State ought to collect a bespoke levy which would then be forwarded to private providers of adequate housing and provender. Not only would this be more efficient, it would help keep the unruly populace at bay. Ingenious as this outsourcing and privatization of billeting was, the underlying divide-and-conquer strategy was to produce new divisions in society that ultimately became more arduous to handle than the widespread discontent with the previous system. The new system, constitutively reliant as it was on the division of society between a small in-group of clients and a vast out-group of net contributors, was even less commensurate with Borromeo's cherished common good ideology than what had gone before.

Giovanni Borromeo's gamble backfired spectacularly in the early 1650s. As he realized, to fight patronage with more patronage was a losing proposition. While the large-scale redistribution of public funds benefited a few, it did so at the cost of many more, inspiring those left behind to work tirelessly to unmask the *case erme* as an intricate mechanism to funnel resources to the private providers who raked in huge profits at the expense of the vast majority who paid for them. As a result of these campaigns, by mid-decade, Giovanni Borromeo and his clients stood exposed as war-profiteers whose recklessness had jeopardized what they were pretending to safeguard: the Spanish monarchy. Rather than stabilize the realm, Giovanni's divide and conquer fostered opposition to an increasingly skewed distribution of patronage that threatened to shake to its foundations the kind of unequal society the Borromeo had helped build. Although he claimed in his own defense that his approach had been necessary to prevent a revolt in Milan, Giovanni's blatant disregard of the common good ultimately cost him his career.

Viewed in a broader perspective, the episode of the *case erme* complicates our understanding of what Francesco Benigno has called the crisis of the "governo straordinario e di

¹⁰⁷⁵ Elliott, *The Count-Duke*, pp. 146, 181.

¹⁰⁷⁶ Maffi, *Il baluardo*, p. 295.

¹⁰⁷⁷ See Sandberg, *Warrior Pursuits*, pp. 117–122.

guerra” of the 1640s.¹⁰⁷⁸ Its essence was that a crown desperate to raise money for the war into which it had maneuvered itself entrusted an increasingly unhinged nobility with the generation of new revenues to keep the military conflicts going.¹⁰⁷⁹ As is well known, the extraction of resources by a nobility employing institutions of the state effectively altered and superseded more traditional forms of communal organization, changes that were rebutted by the revolts that broke out in the Spanish monarchy in the 1640s.¹⁰⁸⁰ Yet the example of Milan suggests that the same ruling technique that was considered problematic in Catalonia could pose as a temporary solution elsewhere. In Milan, the administrative acumen of a cunning *olivarista* helped wed relevant sections of the local population to the Spanish cause until the crisis receded in the 1650s. Like Castile and Flanders, the other famously non-revolting societies within the empire, Milan failed to rebel because the “governo straordinario e di guerra” was successfully deployed to foster the allegiance of the wealthier and well-connected sections of the “middling sorts” and thus incapacitate those who would have been most prone to rebel.¹⁰⁸¹ This was no mean feat but, as the following chapter will reveal, it was not enough to afford Giovanni Borromeo the prominence he was anticipating in return for his efforts.

When Giovanni Borromeo was nominated commissioner-general of the army in 1646, his foremost concern was to prevent a rerun of what had happened on the shores of Lake Maggiore five years earlier. Late in February 1640, as the company of Juan de Astor trudged toward the hamlet of Brebbia, not far from the Borromeo’s castle of Angera, the *sindico* of the community, Francesco Besozzi di Cocco, ordered the church bells to be rung out to convoke the village’s population.¹⁰⁸² Before long, men from Brebbia and the surrounding settlements had gathered to stage a guerrilla attack on the approaching Spanish troops, hindering them from entering the village.

Spurring them to action were villagers’ well-founded fears of the nefarious consequences of the indiscriminate billeting of troops. With adequate infrastructure all but inexistent, the authorities regularly allocated soldiers to private homes in communities across the Milanese State.¹⁰⁸³ Although general guidelines on how many troops could be stationed in a single location existed on paper, in reality the soldiers were often left to their own devices, with many forcing villagers at gun point to put them up for extended periods of time.¹⁰⁸⁴ This was a long-festering sore. As early as 1629, the Venetian ambassador to Milan reported from a trip he took from the capital to Alessandria on the

¹⁰⁷⁸ Benigno, *Il fato di Buckingham*.

¹⁰⁷⁹ Rovito, *La rivoluzione*, p. 373.

¹⁰⁸⁰ Benigno, *Specchi*, p. 199.

¹⁰⁸¹ Corteguera, *Loyalty and Revolt*, p. 82; Esteban Estríngana, *Deslealtad prevenida*.

¹⁰⁸² Decree of February 21, 1640: ASM, *Registri delle cancellerie dello stato*, serie XIV, registro 21. Little is known about the ringleader, Francesco Besozzi di Cocco, although it seems likely that he was the man of the same name who was convicted for the murder of Francesco Baldone in 1660. See Besozzi, *De Besutio*, p. 134.

¹⁰⁸³ Maffi, *Il baluardo*, p. 247.

¹⁰⁸⁴ Buono, *Esercito*, pp. 22–23; Maffi, *Il baluardo*, p. 248.

State's western border that "non vi è villaggio né terra che non soccomba al travaglio et danno di alloggiare soldati in qualche numero."¹⁰⁸⁵ By 1633, another Venetian diplomat informed the Senate that the Milanese were "insofferenti della dura tirannica vessazione di tanti anni sotto il peso dell'armi ed alloggio degli eserciti."¹⁰⁸⁶ Sources closer to the population on the ground confirmed this. A canon from Busto Arsizio, a town near Brebbia, wrote eloquently about the burden that the billeting of troops had been for ordinary people. Not only did troops occupy 40 to 50 houses out of a total of 800 in the community, they also put a strain on the town's inhabitants with excessive demands for dwindling foodstuff and fodder at the trough of an economic depression.¹⁰⁸⁷ Over the years, communities repeatedly complained about soldiers "che si facevano dar da mangiare et da bere alla peggio, et portorno via robbe mangiative."¹⁰⁸⁸ Rather than discipline their troops, army commanders were often complicit in these abuses, sometimes even spearheading the soldiers' depredations.¹⁰⁸⁹ In a grim vindication of the fears that had catalyzed the spontaneous uprising, this promptly transpired at Brebbia. In the legal proceedings against him, the *sindico* gave a deposition against captain Juan de Astor whom he accused of having entered his house "con quantità de soldati armati," who then proceeded to beat him "sopra la testa, con ingiurie gravissime di piccaro [e] becco."¹⁰⁹⁰ De Astor later confessed to these charges.¹⁰⁹¹

As we have seen in chapter 5, the plundering of civilians was a built-in mechanism of seventeenth-century warfare, the direct result of what one contemporary referred to as the "usanza di guerreggiare senza le dovute paghe" for the soldiery, which made it incumbent on them to subsist at the expense of the peasantry.¹⁰⁹² What compounded the problem in Lombardy, as elsewhere, was that the pillaging was not circumscribed to enemy fighters, but practiced by Spanish troops as well.¹⁰⁹³ As some governors freely admitted in their correspondence with the court, Milanese subjects felt that the army that was supposed to protect them was often their worst enemy.¹⁰⁹⁴ Having always thought of the war as a calamity that a self-aggrandizing elite had inflicted upon them, ordinary subjects strained to see the difference between French and Spanish fighters: both engaged in indiscriminate looting of communities, especially toward the end of winter when food and fodder were in short supply. After decades of forced militarization and five years into a devastating war, civilians were no longer going to put up with the negative consequences of their social superiors'

¹⁰⁸⁵ Quoted in Nicolini, Il "tumulto," p. 218.

¹⁰⁸⁶ Valier, Relazione, p. 85.

¹⁰⁸⁷ Storia della peste, pp. 13–14.

¹⁰⁸⁸ Deposition to the *giunta per gli eccessi delle soldatesche* made on January 15, 1640, quoted in Buono, Esercito, p. 96.

¹⁰⁸⁹ Parrott, Richelieu's Army, p. 551.

¹⁰⁹⁰ Statement given to the *giunta per gli eccessi delle soldatesche* on March 10, 1640: ASM, Atti di governo, Militare p. a., cart. 2.

¹⁰⁹¹ Minute of the *giunta per gli eccessi delle soldatesche* of March 29, 1640: ASM, Atti di governo, Militare p. a., cart. 2.

¹⁰⁹² Corrado Confalonieri, quoted in Buono, Esercito, p. 25.

¹⁰⁹³ Maffi, Il baluardo, pp. 235–236.

¹⁰⁹⁴ Signorotto, Il marchese, p. 149.

quest for supremacy. As a tract published in Madrid that same year noted, “The common people will prefer rebellion in order to avoid destitution.”¹⁰⁹⁵

In the eyes of the authorities, the act of insubordination at Brebbia could be quashed only through a massive show of force. To curtail the “*eccessi*” of sindaco Besozzo and his “*unione di gente*,” the *auditor general*, the supreme military judge of the State of Milan, was sent in to arrest “*i delinquenti*” and ferry them to Milan.¹⁰⁹⁶ While the punishment meted out to most remains shrouded in mystery, the *sindico* stood trial on charges of lese-majesty and sedition, his name being added to a long list of representatives of towns and villages who faced the full force of the law for standing up for their communities.¹⁰⁹⁷ However, the defusing of the protests failed to dislodge an inconvenient truth: incidents such as the rising in Brebbia offered irrefutable proof that civilians would no longer swallow whatever was dished out to them. Although such incidents were by now a common occurrence across a continent ensnared in a deadly war, the insurrection was the first of its kind in the region.¹⁰⁹⁸ Up until that moment, civilians had regularly become enmeshed in petty warfare against enemy troops, but never before had they risen against soldiers of the Catholic king. For the first time, the supposed friendly fighters faced the active pushback of a population who believed that Spain’s war was not in the interest of the communities around Lake Maggiore. As would emerge even more clearly in later investigations, ordinary people perceived the massive concentration of troops, even friendly ones, in the area as damaging to what they, appropriating the vocabulary of the *olivarista* elite, came to refer to as the “common good”—a shorthand for the peaceful and prosperous society they believed had existed before members of the nobility, including the local lords, the Borromeo, embarked on a destructive and unwinnable war in the scrum for influence in the court of Madrid.¹⁰⁹⁹

Adding to the Milanese elite’s nervousness at the riots on Lake Maggiore were parallel developments in another part of the Spanish empire. In Catalonia, the early months of 1640 had seen similar popular movements afoot against the stationing of troops. In April and May, peasants had gathered to the sound of church bells in the mountainous regions in the east of Catalonia around Girona to chase away troops that were lodged along the French border.¹¹⁰⁰ As the authorities’ apprehension of marauding troops in Catalonia grew, the cooler heads in Madrid established that soldiers had begun pillaging local communities because they had been insufficiently furnished by the military command, and urged the central government to assist local authorities in easing the

¹⁰⁹⁵ Quoted in Parker, *Global Crisis*, p. 37.

¹⁰⁹⁶ Decree of February 21, 1640: ASM, Registri delle cancellerie dello stato, serie XIV, registro 21. On the auditor general, see Maffi, *Il baluardo*, pp. 267–268.

¹⁰⁹⁷ Villari, *Un sogno*, pp. 288–290.

¹⁰⁹⁸ David Parrott, *Richelieu’s Army*, pp. 522–523.

¹⁰⁹⁹ Corteguera, *For the Common Good*, chap. 2.

¹¹⁰⁰ Elliott, *The Count-Duke*, p. 577.

burden.¹¹⁰¹ Alas, Madrid failed to react, and the peasant protests against the billeting which had originated in the northeast of Catalonia rapidly spread to the rest of the principality, sprouting into violent riots in Barcelona which ended in the assassination of the Spanish viceroy on Corpus Christi.¹¹⁰² All this did not bode well for the ruling elite of Milan, a territory that shared many structural features with Catalonia. Carlo Visconti, the emissary of the city of Milan who, ironically, was on his way to Madrid to relitigate the billeting of troops with Philip IV, witnessed the early days of the Catalan revolt and informed his peers in Milan.¹¹⁰³ In his letters, he singled out the problem of billeting as one of the main drivers behind the uprising: “La causa vera et reale et motivo di questa rissoluzione di questi paesani è perché non vogliono assolutamente dare la paga alla soldatesca.”¹¹⁰⁴ Visconti warned that Milan’s elite could soon meet the same fate as Catalonia’s, a tocsin to which the revolt against Spanish troops on Lake Maggiore lent additional urgency.¹¹⁰⁵

Chastened by the unsettling events in Catalonia, the Milanese elite grew conscious of the incendiary potential of the billeting and provisioning of troops. Based on the understanding that the Catalan rebels had not rioted to topple the monarchy but rather to force the hand of a hesitant local elite, Milan’s leading lights were desperate to show that they took the concerns of ordinary people seriously. Eager to accord the population an outlet for their remonstrances, they instituted a new body of leading nobles and influential patricians, the *giunta per gli eccessi delle soldatesche*, which was tasked with listening to the grievances of civilians and redressing them in the name of the king.¹¹⁰⁶ As in Castile, the local elites opened up channels for protest that gave a broad swath of the population a feeling that their social betters heard and investigated their complaints.¹¹⁰⁷ As Alessandro Buono has argued, the *giunta* performed important “symbolic labor” in dampening the widespread discontent at the sacrifices that the ongoing war effort foisted upon the majority population, by opening up an avenue to the monarch for vassals who never got to see the ultimate arbiter of justice, king Philip IV.¹¹⁰⁸

Although the early 1640s saw a surge in the *giunta*’s activity, the body proved ineffective in repressing the violence of Spanish troops against civilians.¹¹⁰⁹ The “excesses” that had led to a riot on Lake Maggiore in 1640 continued unabated throughout the early years of the new decade and took a turn for the worse after Olivares’s ouster in 1643. The power vacuum created by the departure of the

¹¹⁰¹ Rivero Rodríguez, *El conde duque*, pp. 258–259.

¹¹⁰² Rivero Rodríguez, *El conde duque*, pp. 259–260.

¹¹⁰³ Parker, *Global Crisis*, p. 564.

¹¹⁰⁴ Quoted in Buono, *Il governo*, p. 62.

¹¹⁰⁵ Buono, *Esercito*, p. 119.

¹¹⁰⁶ Corteguera, *Loyalty*, p. 93; Buono, *Esercito*, pp. 67, 70–72, 75. On royal justice as a bond between Philip IV and his subjects, see Corteguera, *For the Common Good*, p. 140.

¹¹⁰⁷ On Castile, see MacKay, *The Limits*.

¹¹⁰⁸ Buono, *Esercito*, p. 71.

¹¹⁰⁹ Maffi, *Il baluardo*, pp. 262–263.

count-duke after two decades at the helm of the monarchy and the subsequent wrangling among elites unleashed unprecedented levels of indiscipline among the soldiery, exacerbating conflicts between the army and civilians on the ground.¹¹¹⁰ By 1644 these skirmishes had reached fever point as troops in Spanish employ regularly “mal trattavan à los Paisanos [...] y quisieron esforzar las mugeres” on Lake Maggiore.¹¹¹¹ There was a real risk that the situation would slip out of control, with a Catalan-style uprising appearing likelier by the day.

For Giovanni the time was ripe for a radically new approach to the vexing issue of looting Spanish troops. The earlier incident at Brebbia, where an entire village community led by local notables rose against the army of the Catholic king and the broader vision of the monarchy they embodied, had taught the Borromeo that their power was contingent on the complicity of commoners. To avert a new uprising of village communities upset at a local lord unable to protect them from attacks from their own side, Giovanni Borromeo realized, he needed to deliver some sort of respite. Others in Milan seemed to have a similar epiphany. With a large-scale revolt in the air, Felice Casati, a Capuchin monk, was dispatched to the court of Madrid to do the bidding of Milan’s frightened elite.¹¹¹² In Madrid, Casati pushed for an overhaul of the organization of the stationing of Spanish troops in Lombardy.¹¹¹³ Philip IV obliged, and thanks to his orders, Giovanni Borromeo, the newly appointed commissioner-general, rolled out his solution to what, to him and his family, had ballooned into a status-threatening problem: villagers’ opposition to the militarization of their communities.

Giovanni Borromeo’s response to the crisis was an intrusion of the state in what had previously been unregulated territory.¹¹¹⁴ As the white paper detailing the *case erme* policy pointed out, Spanish soldiers had hitherto been dispersed across the State where they were allotted to private accommodations owned by subjects who had to provide them with all essentials for the duration of their stay. The new project that Giovanni adumbrated sought to coordinate the allocation of “la gente di guerra” centrally through the commissioner-general and to limit it to select towns, “ne quali si habbino à formare le Case herme.”¹¹¹⁵ Instead of hosting troops in private dwellings, they were to be quartered in bespoke buildings, many of which had remained empty in the aftermath of the plague of 1629–1631 and the ensuing war.¹¹¹⁶ While the *case erme* had little to do with purpose-built army barracks (called *caserme* in modern Italian), they were a first step toward a neater

¹¹¹⁰ These developments mirror those in France during the *Fronde*. See Parrott, *Richelieu’s Army*, p. 545.

¹¹¹¹ Antonio Briceño Ronquillo to Giovanni Borromeo, Milan June 24, 1644: ASM, Registri delle cancellerie dello stato, serie XVI, registro 23, f. 135v.

¹¹¹² Signorotto. La “verità,” p. 206.

¹¹¹³ Signorotto, La “verità,” p. 208, and Buono, *Esercito*, pp. 134, 195.

¹¹¹⁴ On previous experiments with *case erme* in the State of Milan, see Buono, *Esercito*, chap. 3.1.

¹¹¹⁵ Ordine del Sig. Commissario generale, de 26 Aprile 1645, per far le Case Erme nel Ducato: BNB, Ordini, vol. 1. Although it was announced by Giovanni Borromeo’s predecessor, it was Borromeo who oversaw the roll-out of the *case erme*.

¹¹¹⁶ Maffi, *Il baluardo*, pp. 254, 256.

separation between civilians and military personnel whose goal was to ensure that the soldiery would “maggiormente contenersi nelli ordini, & sostentarsi con minor danno, & disturbo de sudditi.”¹¹¹⁷

The centralization of troop allocation begot a whole new bureaucracy. To fund the ambitious project, the *Magistrato Ordinario* (part of the treasury in Milan) was tasked with raising a new tax in the long-suffering communities.¹¹¹⁸ These revenues would then be used to compensate contractors who rented properties to house the troops and provided them with hay, oats, and straw for the horses, as well as fire wood, food, and furnishings for the troops.¹¹¹⁹ What had hitherto been organized on a case-by-case basis was now administered through rapidly expanding state institutions. An *impresaro* was in charge of the coordination of a mushrooming number of private contractors who provided vital services to implement the new policy.¹¹²⁰

Its architects liked to describe the policy as a complex “macchina” fueled by “danaro contante” and administrative acumen.¹¹²¹ As such, the *case erme* were possibly the last but perhaps also the most characteristically *olivarista* reform, patterned on the use of state infrastructure to deal with and better to coordinate the war that the count-duke had fomented. The defenders of the project praised it in glowing terms as a mechanism that ensured that soldiers received their fair share without this being overly taxing on the other subjects of the king. To its devotees, it was a way to guarantee that “ogn’uno pagasse la sua parte, e con giustitia distributiva si sopportasse questo carico.”¹¹²² Not only was the policy efficient, it was just: it emanated from the good kingship that had been theorized since the advent of the Spanish Habsburgs but was seeing a revival in the wake of Olivares’s fall.¹¹²³ In their own view, the administrators of the *case erme* could pride themselves on delivering a program that responded to the governing elite’s neostoic commitment to the collective good while buttressing their own profile as conscientious rulers.

As behooved good administrators, the policy’s masterminds never tired of stressing its benefits to the broader public. In a brief penned in 1645, community leaders from the Duchy of Milan claimed it was “indubitato” that, thanks to the *case erme*, the soldiery would behave in a more

¹¹¹⁷ Ordine del Sig. Commissario generale, de 26 Aprile 1645, per far le Case Erme nel Ducato: BNB, Ordini, vol. 1.

¹¹¹⁸ Memoriale primo presentato à Sua Ecc., Milan May 14, 1645: BNB, Ordini, vol. 1.

¹¹¹⁹ Ordine del Sig. Commissario generale, de 26 Aprile 1645, per far le Case Erme nel Ducato: BNB, Ordini, vol. 1; Lettera Magistrale al Sig. Co: Georgio Rainoldi per la visita delle Cas’erme del Ducato per prevenirle per il prossimo alloggiamento, Milan September 13, 1652: BNB, Ordini, vol. 1.

¹¹²⁰ Capitoli sopra quali dalli Sindici generali del Ducato di Milano è stata deliberata à Cesare Magno l’Impresa di provvedere, & mantenere le Case herme nelle Terre segnalate nel Ducato: ASCM, Materie, cart. 159. Also see Maffi, Il baluardo, pp. 254–255.

¹¹²¹ Consulta Magistrale a S.E. de 24 Febrero 1649 in cui si espone il stato delle Case Erme, e la difficoltà di sostenerle: BNB, Ordini, vol. 1.

¹¹²² Consulta Magistrale à S.E. de 3 Agosto 1647 rappresentando lo stato delle Case Erme: BNB, Ordini, vol. 1.

¹¹²³ See Feros, Kingship; Malcolm, Royal Favouritism, pp. 36–37.

orderly fashion and that the extortions of their hosts would cease for good.¹¹²⁴ Two years later, in a memorandum to the governor of Milan, the *Magistrato Ordinario* highlighted that the king's subjects could finally “restarsi [...] alle loro case quieti, & attenti al lavorerio senza il disturbo del Soldato.”¹¹²⁵ What was good for business was equally positive for the taxpayer. The centralized coordination by the commissioner-general ensured that the billeting of troops was more cost-effective.¹¹²⁶ The *vicario della provvisione* of Milan voiced the sentiments of many in the governing elite when he lauded the “paterna cura” that his institution and others were showering on communities across the State of Milan, offering the public at large some let-up.¹¹²⁷ Yet, such technical arguments could not easily be severed from rationales to do with social status. In an age still overshadowed by the count- duke of Olivares, state-centered solutions appealed to a nobility who were trying to tighten their hold on power through evidence of their organizing capacity in the interest of the prince. Self-interest played a major role here. To Giovanni Borromeo, the *case erme* provided a welcome opportunity for him once again to prove those organizational and logistical skills that were the lifeblood of the military elite to whom he felt he belonged. The savvy as a guardian of the population he had demonstrated during the battle of Arona he could now display to a much larger audience. The daredevil of Arona was on the verge of becoming the hero of Milan, the man who prevented the State of Milan from going down the same slippery slope as Catalonia. On both a practical and a symbolic level, the *case erme* were of vital importance to his self-preservation.

Whatever technical advantages the *case erme* may have had, those soon yielded to their social uses. Giovanni handed out the patronage he had been entrusted with according to a pattern that had little to do with the bureaucratic rationalization that the scheme's proponents had promised. This became apparent when he selected the locations of future *case erme*. The communities chosen to host the cavalry were all located in the grass-rich Po valley that provided sufficient hay and oats for the horses (although research suggests that agricultural production was in steep decline, with many communities barely able to cultivate half the acreage they had planted before their population hemorrhaged from the 1630s onward¹¹²⁸). It is the nineteen towns and villages picked for the soldiery that is more revelatory. As Alessandro Buono explains, *case erme* needed to be located in towns that were large enough to withstand the impact of a conspicuous number of soldiers and sufficiently connected to regional markets to provide the soldiery with

¹¹²⁴ Beneficij raccordati da Sindici, & Insetti nel loro memorial de 10 Maggio 1645 per l'erectione delle Cas'Erme: BNB, Ordini, vol. 1.

¹¹²⁵ Consulta Magistrale à S.E. de 3 Agosto 1647 rappresentando lo stato delle Case Erme: BNB, Ordini, vol. 1.

¹¹²⁶ Beneficij raccordati da Sindici, & Insetti nel loro memorial de 10 Maggio 1645 per l'erectione delle Cas'Erme: BNB, Ordini, vol. 1.

¹¹²⁷ Risposta della Città [di Milano] della sodetta lettera Magistrale, in cui si preme nell'erectione delle case Erme, e si superano le difficoltà, Milan July 22, 1645: BNB, Ordini, vol. 1.

¹¹²⁸ Faccini, *La Lombardia*, pp. 123–125.

adequate foodstuff.¹¹²⁹ While the State of Milan offered many such places, Giovanni seems to have focused on communities on and around Lake Maggiore, along with a few towns between Milan and the lake, an area the Borromeo considered part of their informal dominion.¹¹³⁰ *Case erme* were instituted in cities such as Abbiategrasso, Busto Arsizio, and Monza, sizeable market towns with excellent trade links.¹¹³¹ The highest concentration, however, was reached around Lake Maggiore, where Arona, one of the centers of the Borromeo's fiefdom, and Pallanza, the last remaining free town on the lake, shifted the battlefield in their arms race from the control of transalpine trade to the hosting of troops.¹¹³² Smaller clusters of *case erme* were set up in Varese, Gallarate, and Lonate Pozzolo in the immediate surroundings of the Borromeo's home turf. Much to the chagrin of the petitioners from the rest of Lombardy, Giovanni was determined to prefer the northwest of the State of Milan. While there were some strategic reasons for this, Alessandro Buono is right to suggest that this decision needs to be situated in the context of the Borromeo's strategy of affirming themselves as clients of the Spanish Habsburgs.¹¹³³

It is worth noting that this was not some irrational pork-barrel spending. What reinforced Giovanni Borromeo in this course of action was alarm at the rapidly deteriorating state of the Spanish monarchy in the aftermath of the 1640 riot on Lake Maggiore. It was common knowledge among ruling elites, as the author of a Spanish memorandum put it, that, although the Milanese were "los más sencillos de Italia," "la continuación de las guerras [...] ha stragado los naturales."¹¹³⁴ By 1647 Sicily and Naples had followed the example of Catalonia and Portugal. Their rebellion heightened the risk of the revolt spreading to Milan. In the early years of Olivares's government, an experienced military strategist had warned that the interconnection of the crown's Italian possession could potentially produce a domino effect that might bring down Spanish rule very quickly.¹¹³⁵ The events unfolding in the kingdom of Naples did not bode well for Milan. In the capital the populace had organized behind a fishmonger called Masaniello and risen against the war-profiteers and the imposition of new taxes to finance an endless military conflagration. From Naples, the revolt rapidly spread to the countryside. If the risk of a mutiny in Milan had been high in the early 1640s, it was even higher by mid-decade as more parts of the composite monarchy rebelled.¹¹³⁶

¹¹²⁹ Buono, *Esercito*, p. 260.

¹¹³⁰ On the significance that patrons attributed to the region of origin, see Campbell, Power, p. 136.

¹¹³¹ Buono, *Esercito*, p. 258.

¹¹³² Visita fatta dall' Ill.mo S.r Conte Giorgio Raynoldo Delegato dall' Ill.mo Magistrato Ordinario dello Stato di Milano di tutte le Case herme d'esso Ducato con l'assistenza del S.r Landio, Gio. Battista Colnago, et S.r Carlo Busso Ingegnier Collegiato di Milano [1652]: ASCM, Materie, cart. 160.

¹¹³³ Buono, *Esercito*, p. 269.

¹¹³⁴ Noticia general de el Estado, p. 39.

¹¹³⁵ Coloma, *Discurso*, p. 5.

¹¹³⁶ Parker, *Global Crisis*, pp 562–563.

Giovanni Borromeo was cognizant of the revolt taking place in Naples through newspapers and pamphlets but particularly thanks to his younger brother, Federico, who was stationed as a papal governor in Benevento, an exclave of the Papal States in the kingdom of Naples. From his post Federico wrote regular letters to his brother in Lombardy in which he informed him of the revolt's dire consequences for people of their social condition. As the insurrection raged on inside Naples, the kingdom's nobility made for the border, with some of them stranding in Benevento. "[E]ra compass[i]onevol[e] a vedere un Sig[no]re di sessanta mila scudi d'entrata ridotto in quella forma," Federico Borromeo wrote of the brother of Diomedes Carafa, duke of Maddaloni, who had been decapitated by the crowd in Naples.¹¹³⁷ What Federico failed to mention was that Carafa had been anything but an arbitrary target of popular fury: he stood for the return of a regime of violence to extract resources for the ongoing war from the lower orders who were desperate to restore some balance between the elite and the rest of society.¹¹³⁸

On other counts he was much clearer. While many strained to make sense of the events that were unfurling around them, Federico Borromeo offered a surprisingly prescient reading of the revolt. As he explained to Giovanni, "Un venditore di pesce che veste con quelle brache sino a mezza gamba e collo berrettino è capo della fattione del popolo. Il consiglio però si vede che viene da gente buona e savia."¹¹³⁹ It is hard not to underestimate the acuity of this insight. At a time when the nobility still tended to think of the "popolo" as the indistinct mass of all non-nobles, Federico was among the few to admit the existence of people of the middling sort who stood out from both the nobility and the plebs.¹¹⁴⁰ Granted, this realization had been dawning on the elites of Spanish Italy at least since the late 1610s when a memorandum on the kingdom of Naples for the Spanish court acknowledged the existence of "gente [...] mediana entre la nobleza y la plebe," such as "ciudadanos" and "mercadores."¹¹⁴¹ But the elite generally refused to countenance the implications of this until it was too late and the up-and-coming class of merchants, doctors, and lawyers came to play a leading role in the upheavals of the 1640s.¹¹⁴² In fact, as Rosario Villari has shown in his work on the events that shook Naples in 1647–48, the masterminds behind the revolt of the fishmonger were representatives of a *ceto civile* who used the masses to implement a radical reformist agenda that would curtail the nobility's privileges and reestablish the powers of the third estate in the kingdom's political institutions.¹¹⁴³ In a comparative study of the revolt in towns scattered across the kingdom, Giovanni Foscari has underscored the role of professionals, lawyers, notaries, and

¹¹³⁷ Federico IV to Giovanni, Benevento July 13 1647: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, Corrispondenza 1645–1655.

¹¹³⁸ Villari, *Un delitto*, p. 141.

¹¹³⁹ Federico IV to Giovanni, Benevento July 13 1647: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, 1645–1655.

¹¹⁴⁰ Villari, *La cultura politica*, p. 20.

¹¹⁴¹ *Relacion del Arcobispo de Capua Gaetano para el Confesor del Rey N.S.*, quoted in Comparato, *Uffici*, p. 302.

¹¹⁴² Mrozek, *Ascanio Filomarino*, p. 113.

¹¹⁴³ Villari, *Un sogno*, chap. 13, in part. pp. 350–351, 366–371.

entrepreneurs in what was a quest for a more equal representation of their interests in a government that had placed undue tax burdens on commoners.¹¹⁴⁴ Although the revolt soon segued into a full-blown revolution to topple the monarchical order, Federico was quite right in arguing that, initially, the revolting masses “si mantengono con pretesto di fedeltà inviolabile al Rè, solo vogliono la liberat[ion]e dalle gabelle da Carlo V in qua.”¹¹⁴⁵

Unfortunately Giovanni’s response to these poignant letters has not survived. But if actions speak louder than words, it is clear that he drew more than a few lessons from the exchange with his younger brother. Federico’s account of the events in Naples resonated with the much smaller uprisings that had rocked the area of Lake Maggiore earlier: there, too, the masses had been tricked into a revolt against the army, that emblem of Spanish authority, by a cunning local notable, the *sindico* no less. Giovanni read this as an admonishment that Milan’s own *ceto civile* was capable of harnessing the grievances against an oppressive system of war finance and undermining the established order.¹¹⁴⁶ As he pondered Federico’s letter, things must have fallen into place. The only way to stop the looming revolt was to divide and disaggregate the coalition between the “gente buona e savia” and the lower orders. The *case erme* turned out to be the stratagem he was looking for. The policy had the potential to coopt these wealthier sections of the community by giving them access to funds raised from the poorest members of the community.¹¹⁴⁷ Thanks to the *case erme* scheme, it was possible to court the ringleaders of the uprising that had taken place on the shores of Lake Maggiore in 1640, and their peers elsewhere, and turn them into government contractors, funded by the very people who, under different circumstances, would act as foot soldiers in an uprising against the warrior nobility. By placing the burden of military expenses on the poorest elements of society and funneling these scarce resources to the notables in the towns of Lombardy, Giovanni Borromeo would enable them to continue to rake in the profits that the war had swallowed up and secure the loyalty of that section of the population that had become most dangerous to the nobility’s continued domination. Through the *case erme* and their built-in redistribution it might be possible to buy off the most radical elements of the populace.

The area most in need of a bailout was the swath of land stretching from Milan to Lake Maggiore now known as the Alto Milanese. An anonymous diarist from Busto Arsizio, a town that would soon host a *casa erma*, noted that the peasantry lived in such utter misery that they “erano restati come vermicelli, à guisa di fanciulli allhora allhora nati ignudi, tali quali la natura gli haveva creati.” Their clothes were rags that failed to cover “le nude carni del corpo.” They slept on the floor,

¹¹⁴⁴ Foscari, *La rivolta*, p. 327.

¹¹⁴⁵ Federico IV to Giovanni, Benevento July 13, 1647: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, *Corrispondenza 1645–1655*.

¹¹⁴⁶ Also see Parker, *Class and State*, pp. 78–79.

¹¹⁴⁷ On the aspirations of this nascent social group, see Tonelli, *Investire con profitto*.

using “le paglie per piume; l’aria per coperta.”¹¹⁴⁸ An area that had once prided itself on its bounty could no longer feed the majority of the population: “una buona parte della poveraia” subsisted on a diet of bran bread and turnips which had become so rare that riots broke out on the rare occasion they were on sale.¹¹⁴⁹ The woes of the destitute were the result of the collapse of trade in the region.¹¹⁵⁰ Unlike the agriculture-rich plains of the Po Valley, this area at the foot of a number of Alpine passes was heavily dependent on trade and commerce between Italy and central Europe. As a document on Gallarate, another future site of a *casa erma*, noted in 1574, the Gallaratesi “sono quasi tutti artisti [...] et la maggior parte tengono il suo haver in mercantia per esser luogho di trafigho.”¹¹⁵¹ But that trade had seen an all-too noticeable slump since the war set in.¹¹⁵² With most of the infrastructure laying barren, local notables were desperate for some relief. The billeting and outfitting of troops offered an alternative source of income to the social group who was particularly hard hit by the war and most likely to rebel against the elite cartel that had an interest in perpetuating the conflict. What Giovanni Borromeo proffered was no substitute for the trade they had lost but it was better than anything else on offer at the time.

Giovanni, by all accounts, did not skimp as he began to funnel resources into the hard-hit communities in and around his fiefdom. The surviving account books of Cesare Magno, the man he had delegated to oversee the administration of the *case erme*, show him handling sizeable figures between 1645 and 1650. The annual patronage which he could pass on to contractors and subcontractors ranged from 750.998.2 *lire* in 1648 to 1.125.361.3.1 *lire* in 1650. The same chart also turns up an impressive number of people up and down the Alto Milanese and Varesotto profiting from the policy. Throughout the five-year period covered by the balance sheet, substantial sums were handed over to landlords for refurbishing, as well as renting, their houses to the army, with payments to single individuals ranging from as little as 50 *lire* to (more commonly) sums in the low three figures.¹¹⁵³ To the impoverished notables in the northwest of the State of Milan who had nowhere else to go, this was enough to secure their loyalty.

That they were the main beneficiaries of the *case erme* is beyond doubt. While some of the houses used as *case erme* were owned by the communities, most were private properties. Consider for example Arona, the town that had made Giovanni as a military man and which, at the height of the war, hosted 2.5 soldiers per inhabitant.¹¹⁵⁴ According to the report of an official dispatched to monitor the situation on the ground in the fall of 1652, Giovanni Borromeo and his cousin, Renato,

¹¹⁴⁸ Storia della peste, p. 14.

¹¹⁴⁹ Storia della peste, p. 15.

¹¹⁵⁰ For a detailed account of the economic breakdown at midcentury, see Faccini, *La Lombardia*, pp. 17–39, esp. pp. 24–25.

¹¹⁵¹ Quoted in Vigo, *L’economia lombarda*, p. 208.

¹¹⁵² Vigo, *L’economia lombarda*, pp. 199–210.

¹¹⁵³ *Ristretto del debito e credito di Cesare Magno, Impres.o delle Case herme: ASCM, Materie, cart. 160.*

¹¹⁵⁴ *Buono, Esercito*, p. 263.

alone hosted about half the soldiery in their properties in the *borgo*.¹¹⁵⁵ Below them was a sprawling class of local notables who profited from the quartering of troops in equal measure. While it remains unclear whether Giovanni Battista Olginati, the man who congratulated Giovanni Borromeo on his appointment, was among the beneficiaries, many others were. Old clients of the Borromeo had a field day when the *case erme* came along. One family with close ties to the Borromeo were the Berna who were active as innkeepers and merchants in the area around the southern tip of Lake Maggiore.¹¹⁵⁶ The Borromeo's family correspondence is littered with references to the Berna acting as financial brokers between Italy and Switzerland, passing along money to members of the Borromeo family on both sides of the Alps.¹¹⁵⁷ When the *case erme* were established, the Berna seem to have viewed them as yet another opportunity to ride the Borromeo gravy train. Anna Berna of Arona topped up her annual income by 200 *lire* which she cashed for renting out property to the army.¹¹⁵⁸ Other beneficiaries included "dottori" (lawyers and notaries, as well as medical doctors) and members of the clergy.¹¹⁵⁹

A similar picture emerged in nearby Pallanza, where notables such as the Moriggia, towering figures within the town, and the local merchant community seem to have been particularly prominent among the beneficiaries of the patronage of Giovanni Borromeo (who must have relished the idea of finally having gotten the better of them).¹¹⁶⁰ This pattern repeated itself in another market town not far from Lake Maggiore, Gallarate, where the Masera family, one of the two leading local clans, controlled a third of the properties used as *case erme*.¹¹⁶¹ It was the same in all the other communities: wherever the landlords' social position can be gleaned from the documents, they were, if not members of the two leading local families, then certainly merchants, members of the clergy, or professionals. For the notables of these towns the quartering of troops was a welcome source of revenues.¹¹⁶² From the perspective of the governing elite, the stationing of troops helped to keep these "gente buona e savia" reasonably content, lest they stage a revolt against people of Giovanni Borromeo's station. Scooping up the bounty, they became stakeholders of his vision of the

¹¹⁵⁵ Visita fatta dall'III.mo S.r Conte Giorgio Raynoldo Delegato dall'III.mo Magistrato Ordinario dello Stato di Milano di tutte le Case herme d'esso Ducato con l'assistenza del S.r Landio, Gio. Battista Colnago, et S.r Carlo Busso Ingegner Collegiato di Milano [1652]: ASCM, Materie, cart. 160.

¹¹⁵⁶ Besozzi, Angera. Il Santuario, pp. 8–9.

¹¹⁵⁷ As discussed in chapter 10, Giovanni's brother, Federico, was nuncio in Lucerne from 1655 through 1665, in constant need of money from Rome and Milan. See, for example, Federico V to Antonio Renato, Rome October 29, 1661: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, Corrispondenza 1656–1664.

¹¹⁵⁸ Petition from Anna Berna, Arona: ASCM, Materie, cart. 160.

¹¹⁵⁹ Visita fatta dall'III.mo S.r Conte Giorgio Raynoldo Delegato dall'III.mo Magistrato Ordinario dello Stato di Milano di tutte le Case herme d'esso Ducato con l'assistenza del S.r Landio, Gio. Battista Colnago, et S.r Carlo Busso Ingegner Collegiato di Milano [1652]: ASCM, Materie, cart. 160.

¹¹⁶⁰ Visita fatta dall'III.mo S.r Conte Giorgio Raynoldo Delegato dall'III.mo Magistrato Ordinario dello Stato di Milano di tutte le Case herme d'esso Ducato con l'assistenza del S.r Landio, Gio. Battista Colnago, et S.r Carlo Busso Ingegner Collegiato di Milano [1652]: ASCM, Materie, cart. 160.

¹¹⁶¹ Buono, Esercito, pp. 266–267.

¹¹⁶² Buono, Esercito, p. 267.

Spanish monarchy as a vehicle for dynastic aggrandizement.¹¹⁶³ Whereas their peers in Catalonia and Naples rose against the king of Spain, the discontent notables of Milan were transformed into constituents of the Catholic monarchy: the mass base of the Spanish Habsburgs in Lombardy.

Adroit as it must have seemed to Giovanni Borromeo, the system he put in place was much shakier than anticipated. The *case erme* soon sparked resistance. The initial catalyst of the opposition was a number of instances of administrative malpractice at the hands of Giovanni Borromeo's officials. The city of Milan warned that the large sums of money involved were liable to attract all sorts of "abusi" and "pregiudizi."¹¹⁶⁴ This structural problem was exacerbated by the fact that the people involved in the running of troops allocation were, in the words of Philip IV, "personas de poca confianza, y susistencia" who topped up their salaries by plundering whatever source of additional income they had access to.¹¹⁶⁵ Embezzlement was rife at all levels. The people tasked with farming the *case erme* tax made up additional levies for their own enrichment, while those less prone to fantasy tried to collect the same tax multiple times.¹¹⁶⁶ Contractors were not much better. According to internal documents, they pocketed the money given out to them but failed to deliver the services they had promised. Others seem to have sold the victuals, furniture and bedding (matrasses and blankets) they had been issued by the *impresaro* at a profit before the soldiers arrived.¹¹⁶⁷ By 1651 an internal document of the *Magistrato Ordinario*, the champion of the *case erme* as a great bureaucratic achievement, stated that "le supposte defficienze de mobili, Case et foraggi rischiorno di sconvolgere questa macchina," expressing concerns that such irregularities were not just uncomfortable for the soldiery, but risked undermining the "publico beneficio" of the policy.¹¹⁶⁸

With the misconduct of minor officials fomenting discontent, some members of the elite tried to placate the population by proposing antidotes. In the early 1650s the city of Milan demanded to see the account books of the contractors of the *case erme* "senza haver gli a mendicare" and urged for the appointment of an auditor (*contrascrittore*) who would review all expenses.¹¹⁶⁹ This was necessary, they argued, because the expenditures on the *case erme* were such that it was incumbent on the authorities to "disingannare non con probabilita ma con evidenze il publico" who was growing convinced of the corrupt nature of the whole operation.¹¹⁷⁰ Toothless to start with, such control mechanisms were swiftly derailed by Giovanni Borromeo and his clients. Yet, refusing accountability

¹¹⁶³ Also see Béguin, *Les princes*, pp. 202, 230–231.

¹¹⁶⁴ Circa l'admettersi un Controscrittore al Commiss.o delle Case Erme, Milan January 19, 1650: ASCM, Materie, cart. 160.

¹¹⁶⁵ Dispatch of Philip IV dated August 19, 1638, quoted in Buono, *Esercito*, p. 98.

¹¹⁶⁶ Decree of the Magistrato Ordinario, Milan December 13, 1650: ASCM, Materie, cart. 160.

¹¹⁶⁷ *Syndiconem Ducatus contra Franciscum Garischettum Impresarium Domorum Heremanum et contra Civitatem Mediolani*: ASCM, Materie, cart. 160; City of Milan to the governor, Milan December 10, 1650: ASCM, Materie, cart. 160.

¹¹⁶⁸ Memoriale del 30 settembre 1651 di Annone Presidente delle R. D. Entrate Ordinarie: ASCM, Dicasteri, cart. 51, fascicolo Consiglio Generale – Ordinazioni.

¹¹⁶⁹ Circa l'admettersi un Controscrittore al Commiss.o delle Case Erme, Milan January 19, 1650: ASCM, Materie, cart. 160.

¹¹⁷⁰ Circa l'admettersi un Controscrittore al Commiss.o delle Case Erme, Milan January 19, 1650: ASCM, Materie, cart. 160.

was perhaps his biggest mistake: it spurred the losers to organize, not against the petty corruption of his officials, but against the policy that had allegedly been put in place to help them.

Many began to take matters into their own hands. If the repeated exhortations of the authorities are anything to go by, the vandalizing or looting of designated *case erme* were exceedingly common.¹¹⁷¹ The willful destruction of the property of people deemed to be war profiteers matched a pattern of popular protest that was widespread at the time: in Naples, the enraged masses had set fire to the property of the collectors of the hated war taxes and in France, too, assaults on people who had enriched themselves through the war were legion.¹¹⁷² Reflecting a hegemonic “culture of retribution,” vandalism was not the riposte of blinkered curmudgeons but a way of countering the negative impact of a small group of locals who many saw as the enemies of the established social order.¹¹⁷³ As William Beik has explained of similar riots in France, by targeting local war profiteers, crowds sought to “punish the people responsible for selling out the community.”¹¹⁷⁴

While some took revenge on Giovanni Borromeo’s clients, others struck at the root of their woes: they simply refused to pay the special tax that had been introduced to finance the *case erme*. There were sound economic reasons for this. Large swathes of land were so ravaged by war and economic breakdown, their inhabitants were unable to shoulder the new imposition. The authorities themselves conceded that the collapse of food prices made it well-nigh impossible to generate enough wealth that could be skimmed off as taxes.¹¹⁷⁵ In 1651 the representatives of the city of Milan marveled at the fact that despite the catastrophic state of the economy and repeated incursions of enemy troops for more than one and a half decades, the authorities had still been able to raise 1,800,000 *lire* from local communities.¹¹⁷⁶ In reality, such triumphalist news distracted from a general picture that was much bleaker. By 1650, tax farmers regularly reported that, although they had resorted to “diverse diligenze per riscuodere, nulladimeno niun rimedio hà giovato,” and clamored for more coercive powers that would allow them to corral local communities into compliance.¹¹⁷⁷ Their demands were promptly heeded. As early as 1646, plans had formed to dispatch soldiers to debtor communities to proceed to the forced recovery of outstanding obligations.¹¹⁷⁸ By the summer of 1647, the *Magistrato Ordinario*, citing “servitio publico,”

¹¹⁷¹ Decree of the President of the Magistrato Ordinario, Milan July 3, 1647: ASM, Militare p.a., cart. 406, De Carichi dello Stato di Milano, vol. III, f. 246r.

¹¹⁷² Villari, *Un sogno*, pp. 312–313; Parker, *Class and State*, pp. 100–102.

¹¹⁷³ Beik, *Urban Protest*, p. 62.

¹¹⁷⁴ Beik, *Urban Protest*, p. 70.

¹¹⁷⁵ Memoriale del 30 settembre 1651 di Annone Presidente delle R. D. Entrate Ordinarie: ASCM, Dicasteri, cart. 51, fasc. Consiglio Generale – Ordinazioni.

¹¹⁷⁶ City of Milan to Carlo Cassina, Milan June 9, 1651: ASCM, Materie, cart. 160.

¹¹⁷⁷ Consulta a S. E. de 20 Febraio 1652, & sua rissoluzione sopra il memoriale del Commissario del Ducato in cui richiese la trasmissione de Soldati in poenam rifiutata dal Magistrato: BNB, Ordini, vol. 1.

¹¹⁷⁸ Lettera à Sindici del Ducato, & al Sig. Lattuada Patrimoniale de 23 Novembre 1646 per la trasmissione de Soldati in disconto: BNB, Ordini, vol. 1.

authorized aggressive forays into the “Terre renitenti” to speed up them paying their fair share of taxes.¹¹⁷⁹ Judging by the belligerent response, non-compliance had become a major issue.

Adding impetus to these protests was the realization that, contrary to all the promises of the elites, the new scheme did not dispense villagers of the old obligation of hosting and outfitting troops in their communities. In the designated sites of *case erme* taxpayers were regularly asked to step into the breach for contractors who had failed to deliver. In 1648, for example, Giovanni Borromeo issued a stern order that the people of Melegnano, a town south of Milan, prepare hay and oats for the cavalry, specifying the rations he expected them to proffer to His Majesty’s army.¹¹⁸⁰ In other communities soldiers helped themselves to food and wine as if under the new regime they were not provided with such necessities by contractors.¹¹⁸¹ The situation was not much better outside the official sites of *case erme*. Communities that failed to scrape together enough money for the *case erme* tax were still compelled to lodge troops, a breach of the stated aims of the policy that was openly supported by Giovanni Borromeo. As part of the coercive powers he was endowed with to counter the problem of insolvent communities, Borromeo ordered that soldiers be dispatched to debtor villages to stay there for “*tanti giorni, quanti bastino per sodisfare il debito.*”¹¹⁸² By 1651 the commissioner-general regularly stationed entire companies in “*tierras deudoras en desquento de lo que deven.*”¹¹⁸³

Apologists for the harsh reprisals within the ruling elite had claimed that they were necessary to go after recalcitrant local potentates who had always refused to host troops in their communities and were now mobilizing kin and friends to avoid defraying taxes to finance the *case erme*.¹¹⁸⁴ Yet internal documents laid bare that the real victims of the crackdown were the tenants of said potentates.¹¹⁸⁵ In fact, if troops were sent to debtor villages and towns, the better-off members of the community could usually avoid the punitive allocation of troops by forking out a kickback to the *impresaro*.¹¹⁸⁶ Given all this, the pieties of the authorities that they were just ensuring that “*ciascuno*

¹¹⁷⁹ Magistrato Ordinario, Milan July 17, 1647: BNB, Ordini, vol. 1.

¹¹⁸⁰ Decree dated September 3, 1648: ASCM, Materie, cart. 12; Faccini, La Lombardia, p. 124.

¹¹⁸¹ Buono, Esercito, p. 277.

¹¹⁸² Magistrato Ordinario, January 21, 1647 in De Carichi dello Stato di Milano, vol. III, f. 254r: ASM, Atti di governo, Militare parte antica, cart. 406. Also see Decreto di S.E. perché si possino mandar li Soldati ad alloggiar nelle Terre renitenti à pagar l’imposte, per il mantenimento delle Case herme, per discontar il loro debito: ASCM, Materie, cart. 159. In a letter to the governor, Giovanni Borromeo “agreed” with this course of action. Letter of Giovanni Borromeo to the governor of Milan, Milan March 24, 1648: ASCM, Materie, cart. 159.

¹¹⁸³ Edict of the governor of Milan dated January 16, 1651: BNB, Ordini, vol. 1; Consulta a S.E. de 20 Febraro 1652, & sua rissoluzione sopra il memoriale del Commissario del Ducato in cui richieste la trasmissione de Soldati in poenam rifiutata dal Magistrato: BNB, Ordini, vol. 1.

¹¹⁸⁴ Lettera alla Congregatione del Patrimonio de 20 Aprile 1648 in cui si significa il stato delle Case Erme, e gli rimedij, che sono di bisogno: BNB, Ordini, vol. 1.

¹¹⁸⁵ Magistrato Ordinario, Milan July 17, 1647: BNB, Ordini, vol. 1.

¹¹⁸⁶ Buono, Esercito, p. 237, n. 130. On contemporary notions of fairness in contributing to the war effort, see MacKay, The Limits, p. 147.

paghi la sua portione per qualificato, o potente, che si fosse” simply did not wash.¹¹⁸⁷ For many the rapacious old billeting system continued unabated, but in addition to victualing soldiers in their own homes, communities now also had to shoulder a new tax that should have alleviated their strains. In the eyes of the vast majority of the population, the *case erme* were a black hole for war-profiteers that left them worse off than when they were asked to host troops in their homes.¹¹⁸⁸ In these circumstances, many seemed to believe that a return to the previous system of allocating troops to private dwellings was preferable to the *case erme*.¹¹⁸⁹

What made their protest so effective was the skilled use many village communities made of the institutions of the monarchy, most notably the *Magistrato Ordinario*.¹¹⁹⁰ The exact composition of the anti-*case erme* movement remains a mystery, but where individuals do not disappear behind the deliberately hazy collective terminology employed in the petitions, it is clear that the protests seemed to be driven by village communities who availed themselves of the few literate professionals (most often notaries) in their midst to articulate their protest. (The dichotomy between the many versus the few they constructed in their entreaties was deliberately blurry, intended as it was to project the image of the petitioners as the voice of a majority.¹¹⁹¹) What is certain, though, is that they were motivated by the idea of “active obedience” to the king, a notion they had learned from elites in the debates over the legitimacy of opposition to the government of the minister-favorite.¹¹⁹² Citing their status as vassals of the king, which they shared with members of the nobility, commoners reinterpreted the much-vaunted duty to impart advice.¹¹⁹³ If nobles were obligated to bring problems in his realm to the king’s attention, commoners were similarly bound to inform His Majesty if and when one of his ministers failed to live up to the standards of good governance.¹¹⁹⁴ Much like the Barcelona artisans studied by Luis Corteguera, the subjects of the lord of Lake Maggiore came to see justice as a right that they could demand from the sovereign against the particular interests of their social betters.¹¹⁹⁵ Resorting to what Caroline Castiglione has called “adversarial literacy,” commoners sought to bend the legal system to their advantage.¹¹⁹⁶

Adding to the protest’s success was the borrowing of arguments from the proponents of the policy.¹¹⁹⁷ Unlike earlier when they had engaged in arbitrary vandalism against what the elites could

¹¹⁸⁷ Consulta a S.E. de 31 Agosto 1648 ripigliando il Stato delle Case Erme, con inserto un papele delle ragioni, che militano intorno ad esse: BNB, Ordini, vol. 1.

¹¹⁸⁸ Parker, *Class and State*, p. 102.

¹¹⁸⁹ Letter by Giorgio Rec.o?, Milan 1652: ASCM, Materie, cart. 160.

¹¹⁹⁰ MacKay, *The Limits*, p. 172.

¹¹⁹¹ Parker, *Class and State*, p. 109.

¹¹⁹² Corteguera, *For the Common Good*, p. 47.

¹¹⁹³ See Benigno, *Un país lejano*, p. 91. On the tradition of the duty to counsel, see Windler, *Arbitrismo*, pp. 19–41.

¹¹⁹⁴ MacKay, *The Limits*, p. 133.

¹¹⁹⁵ Corteguera, *For the Common Good*, p. 126.

¹¹⁹⁶ Castiglione, *Patrons*, chap. 6, and eadem, *The Politics of Mercy*, p. 89.

¹¹⁹⁷ On these dynamics, see Grüne, “Gabenschlucker,” p. 232.

dismiss as a few rotten apples, the protesters now seemingly accepted the premises of their social betters: they conceded, using one of the *olivaristas'* favorite buzzwords, that troop movements were a "necessity."¹¹⁹⁸ In so doing, they were able to question the chosen approach. As they did so, they limberly couched their defiance in the political language of the ruling elite, harnessing the values of their social betters as a benchmark with which to pass judgment on their rulers.¹¹⁹⁹ Discourses centered on practices of good governance, once flaunted by those in power, were now weaponized by the masses over whom they lorded.¹²⁰⁰ Surely, the masses argued through their mouthpieces in Milan's institutions, the "zelo delle S[ignorie] V[ostre] verso il ben publico di questa Città et Duc[at]o di Mil[an]o" would not allow the elite to let the *case erme* continue to exist in the current form.¹²⁰¹ The preservation of the "beneficio pubblico," the powerless across Lombardy asserted, required each member of society to contribute their fair share to the well-being of all, but, surely, the nobility had a special obligation to protect the defenseless.¹²⁰² Without saying as much, laboring people were arguing that not only had the nobility failed to contribute significantly to the war effort, they had made the weakest members of society shoulder the heaviest burden thanks to the regressive taxation that underlay the entire project. The ruling elite were exposed as driven not by the notion of the common good but by brazen self-interest. It was a highly effective political strategy, for it worked through "the symbolic universalization of particular interests," which "even if it is undertaken for the purpose of legitimation or mobilization, inevitably leads to the advancement of the universal."¹²⁰³

As these protests made clear, the purported solution to the riots against looting soldiers was creating intractable problems of its own.¹²⁰⁴ The *case erme* may have placated local notables who could line their pockets as contractors, but the policy was now threatening to stoke discontent among the masses who were asked to chip in for the *case erme*. What had been sold as a plan to protect civilians from the ravages of marauding soldiers had degenerated into a system of redistribution of wealth and income from the bottom of society to the middling sorts. Indications abounded that broad sections of the population were no longer willing to put up with the iniquities of the patronage-heavy approach to governance of the minister-favorites and his clients. Contemporaries outside the elite understood that the main issue with the policy was rooted in its structure: the *case erme* remained wedded to the logic of patronage, and, *pace* the Borromeo and their apologists, the latter was revealing itself to be incompatible with ideas about organizing society

¹¹⁹⁸ See Elliott, *The Count–Duke*, p. 593.

¹¹⁹⁹ Corteguera, *For the Common Good*, p. 192.

¹²⁰⁰ Calabria and Marino (eds.), *Good Government*.

¹²⁰¹ See, for example, *City of Milan to Magistrato Ordinario*, Milan June 18, 1650: ASCM, Materie, cart. 160.

¹²⁰² On this point, see Corteguera, *For the Common Good*, pp. 38, 43.

¹²⁰³ Bourdieu, *The State Nobility*, p. 389.

¹²⁰⁴ On the situation in France, see Parrott, *Richelieu's Army*, p. 544.

around the preservation of the common good.¹²⁰⁵ Amidst deteriorating economic conditions, they were clamoring for the promises of the restoration of the common good and distributive justice from the early days of the Olivares government finally to be honored.¹²⁰⁶ Among an elite wedded to the belief that revolts came from the top, it was a shocking discovery that they could originate with the bottom of the pile and, more importantly, be inspired by an alternative vision of the monarchy: without ever acknowledging it openly, laboring people strongly implied that the king's resources were really the product of their toil and that the least they could expect was that royal ministers distributed them fairly among the king's subjects.¹²⁰⁷ Not only did they stake a claim to participation in government, they forced open the premises of ruling-class ideology, fostering new ideas about how the Spanish monarchy ought to be run in the process.¹²⁰⁸

That movement formed part of a broader context. Historians have been wont to stress the differences between Milan and Spain's possessions in southern Italy. Yet, upon closer inspection, the conflicts and the debates rattling these societies were strikingly similar. Looking back on the revolt in Naples, an anonymous member of the clergy wrote that the ruled had risen due to the "gravezze [che ...] si andavano a calare solamente sopra i poveri perché la maggior parte delli potenti non solamente havevano trovato il modo da esentarsene, ma di locupletarsi con la iattura altrui."¹²⁰⁹ The king's Milanese subjects would have recognized themselves in that description. What differed was their response. They echoed the anti-elite sentiments of insurrectionary movements elsewhere in the Spanish monarchy, but instead of rioting, they went a distinct path. They resorted to obstruction and litigation to bring down the legacy of the Olivares age: its intricate tax-farming systems and the huge potential for self-enrichment these offered to a tiny minority.¹²¹⁰ By unmasking the doublespeak about the common good, communities committed to a vision of distributive justice chipped away at the most salient legacy of the Olivares regime. If this seemed a far cry from the more violent uprisings elsewhere, the Milanese protesters nevertheless shared the grievances and aspirations of the king's subjects in other parts of the monarchy.

The main addressee of these grievances, the *Magistrato Ordinario*, slowly but inexorably came around to the protesters' opinion. If its members had been among the loudest champions of the *case erme*, they progressively changed their minds in the face of the growing volume of petitions

¹²⁰⁵ On the tensions between these two ideals, see Jens Ivo Engels, *Die Geschichte*, p. 60. Also see Béguin, *Les princes*, p. 394.

¹²⁰⁶ Hillard von Thiessen has interpreted this as the uneasy balance between "social norms"—officeholders' commitment to friends and family—and norms which put the commonwealth at the center of political action (*gemeinwohlorientierte Normen*). Von Thiessen, *Der entkleidete Favorit*, pp. 136, 147. I will discuss the ramifications of this in the following chapter.

¹²⁰⁷ Villari, *Discussioni sulla crisi*, p. 46.

¹²⁰⁸ Benigno, *Specchi*, p. 285.

¹²⁰⁹ Quoted in Rovito, *La rivoluzione*, p. 461.

¹²¹⁰ Benigno, *Specchi*, p. 199.

that flooded their offices.¹²¹¹ If they had warned from the beginning that the regressive taxation for the policy could “spaventare di prima faccia la Provincia, & diffcultar la pratica delle Case Erme,” by 1649, they had come to believe that the model was unsustainable.¹²¹² In a memorandum to the governor, the body for the first time voiced serious concerns about the financial dire straits in which most communities languished. Given the insolvency of many, tax farmers needed to be escorted by soldiers to extract what few revenues were left. While such coercive measures were temporarily helpful, the *Magistrato* opined, they heightened the desperation of the king’s subjects and risked driving them away from the monarchy.¹²¹³

For administrators steeped in the theories of Giovanni Botero and his many epigones about the fickleness of the populace, this was reason enough to halt the policy.¹²¹⁴ Those in power knew that, unless they wanted to run the risk of a rebellion, their position was contingent on “their ability to compel their subjects to obey,” which meant that they could not afford not to listen to local communities’ opposition to royal ministers and policies.¹²¹⁵ In a confidential report of 1651 the *Magistrato* concluded, with characteristic dithering, that although the *case erme* were undoubtedly beneficent, continuing the program at this point “apportarebbe l’evidente precipitio al Ducato in vece di recargli solievo.”¹²¹⁶ It was for this reason that the body advised against the continued use of force to extract outstanding debts which Giovanni Borromeo seems to have vigorously promoted.¹²¹⁷ Unlike the hardliners in Borromeo’s inner circle, the *Magistrato* understood that good governance rested on the compliance of the lower orders of society. They seem to have embraced the growing consensus that the revolts in the Spanish monarchy had been triggered by the magistrates’ failure to protect the peasantry from a rapacious nobility, and were scrambling to live up to what they were belatedly understanding to be their duty.¹²¹⁸

By 1652, the tribunal openly advocated jettisoning the *case erme*. Its officials argued that since those subjects who refused to pay taxes were made to host troops in their own homes, in one way or the other, “l’alloggiamento v’è.”¹²¹⁹ This admission was nothing short of a ringing endorsement of the argument of those taxpayers who had been hectoring institutions into the

¹²¹¹ Signorotto, *Milano spagnola*, chap. 6, esp. pp. 109–110; Buono, *Esercito*, p. 202.

¹²¹² Risposta della Città [di Milano] della sodetta lettera Magistrale, in cui si preme nell’erettione delle case Erme, e si superano le diffcultà, Milan July 22, 1645: BNB, Ordini, vol. 1.

¹²¹³ Consulta Magistrale a S.E. de 24 Febbraro 1649 in cui si espone il stato delle Case Erme, e la diffcultà di sostenerle: BNB, Ordini, vol. 1.

¹²¹⁴ Villari, *La cultura politica*, pp. 16, 18–19.

¹²¹⁵ Corteguera, *For the Common Good*, p. 197.

¹²¹⁶ Memoriale del 30 settembre 1651 di Annone Presidente delle R. D. Entrate Ordinarie: ASCM, Dicasteri, cart. 51, fasc. Consiglio Generale – Ordinazioni.

¹²¹⁷ Consulta a S. E. de 20 Febbraro 1652, & sua rissoluzione sopra il memoriale del Commissario del Ducato in cui richiese la trasmissione de Soldati in poenam rifiutata dal Magistrato: BNB, Ordini, vol. 1.

¹²¹⁸ Rovito, *La rivoluzione*, p. 371.

¹²¹⁹ Consulta a S. E. de 20 Febbraro 1652, & sua rissoluzione sopra il memoriale del Commissario del Ducato in cui richiese la trasmissione de Soldati in poenam rifiutata dal Magistrato: BNB, Ordini, vol. 1.

restoration of the status quo ante. In line with the countless petitions they had received from across Lombardy, the *Magistrato* now argued that by returning to the old system, “gli alloggianti haveranno poco più pregiudizio, che nel concorrere alle Cas’Erme.”¹²²⁰ Without ever phrasing it in these stark terms, the *Magistrato* accepted common people’s notion that the *case erme* were a boondoggle for the military establishment and its surrogates. They conceded that, as the representative of the Duchy of Milan, Carlo Francesco Ridolfi, pithily put it in a memorandum to the king, “nobiltà e ricchezza” had turned out to be “due mezzi molto efficaci per opprimere i poveri.”¹²²¹ The *Magistrato*’s about-face was a triumph for the Borromeo’s subjects on Lake Maggiore and common folk throughout the State of Milan: by turning Giovanni Borromeo’s own arguments into a stick to beat him with, they had taken his flagship policy down.

Why would the *Magistrato* stab a member of Milan’s high nobility into the back? Concerns about the preservation of social peace are certainly part of the explanation. In light of research on the kingdom of Naples, it seems legitimate to assume that magistrates were all too willing to ride the tide of popular entreaties for distributive justice to beef up their own position in the administration, something for which the climate after the revolts of the 1640s provided sufficient legitimation.¹²²² Yet, there was also a more sordid backstory to the *Magistrato*’s righteousness, one to do with jealousy and rivalries within the Milanese nobility. As scholars of the subject have warned us, charges of corruption coming from inside the elite should be taken with a grain of salt. As one of them summarizes the growing consensus, “courtiers and ministers who accused others of corruption were not engaged in a moral crusade intended to purify public life, but rather were out to seize a moral advantage and to embarrass their rivals.”¹²²³

The cast of character and the timing in the high-profile dispute between the *Magistrato Ordinario* and Giovanni Borromeo suggest that this was the case here, too. The *Magistrato Ordinario* was headed by Bartolomeo Arese who, in 1652, had married his eldest daughter, Giulia, to Giovanni Borromeo’s rival on Lake Maggiore, his cousin, Renato (the son of Giovanni’s *bête noire*, his uncle Carlo).¹²²⁴ For all his self-stylization as the “anima delle leggi, e viva legge del governo civile,” Arese’s concern for the well-being of the ruled was about as genuine as Giovanni’s.¹²²⁵ An unlikely candidate to channel the great unwashed, Arese nevertheless showed no qualms about weaponizing popular protest against Giovanni Borromeo’s iron-fisted rule to take him out. Behind the apparent triumph of

¹²²⁰ Magistrato Ordinario to Città di Milano, no date [but 1652]: BNB, Ordini, vol. 1.

¹²²¹ Quoted in Signorotto, *Il marchese*, p. 159.

¹²²² Rovito, *La rivoluzione*, pp. 401–402. For a more general account of these dynamics, Engels, *Die Geschichte der Korruption*, pp. 76–82.

¹²²³ Bernard, “A Water-Spout,” p. 135.

¹²²⁴ On Arese, see Signorotto, *Milano spagnola*, chap. 9.

¹²²⁵ The quote is from one of Arese’s sycophants, Pietro Crescenzi Romano, in his *Monarchia spagnola* (1650), quoted in Signorotto, *Milano spagnola*, p. 114.

the powerless, therefore, lurked the vendetta of the embittered main branch of the Borromeo family in whose shadow Giovanni Borromeo had risen to the top. Thanks to a marital alliance with the “God of Milan,” as Arese was known, the Borromeo of Arona exact revenge on him and blocked the *case erme*. By 1653, the policy that was to immortalize Giovanni Borromeo as a loyal servant of the house of Habsburg was effectively dead. That year governor Caracena allowed communities to choose between continuing to transact the *case erme* tax or return to the billeting of troops in private homes. The following year, the *case erme* were discontinued, and with them, Giovanni’s Borromeo seemingly unstoppable rise to the commanding heights of the Spanish monarchy.¹²²⁶

Although the role of common folk in bringing down Giovanni Borromeo was decisive, the circumstances that led to that event are also a potent reminder about the painful “limits of popular agency” in the early modern period.¹²²⁷ Historians sympathetic to non-noble actors have perhaps been too enthusiastic about the potential of popular politics. If the example discussed here has any merit, the shameless weaponization of popular concerns by rivals within the governing elite paints a more somber picture of the possibilities open to the common man and woman in the age of Philip IV. As Wayne te Brake contends, “ordinary people, by breaking their rulers’ exclusive claim to political and cultural sovereignty and boldly entering the arenas that were legally closed to them, helped to shape the cultural and political landscape of modern Europe.”¹²²⁸ While this undoubtedly true, it is also clear that they often lacked control over the outcome of their political activism. For their resistance to be effective, laboring people needed to exploit divisions within the ruling group.¹²²⁹ They depended on rivaling groups within the elite harnessing their resistance to oust competitors. More often than not, their voices were heard only when their social superiors turned the protesters into pawns in their own self-interested battles.

What is more, the fight for distributive justice came at a high cost. In retaliation for their campaign against the *case erme*, village communities faced the full force of repression from Giovanni Borromeo and his clients when the *Magistrato Ordinario* recommended discontinuing the project. If they had a fleeting awareness of the impossibility of extracting resources from impoverished communities, they did not so much as flinch once. With the bonanza all but over, their greed became unfettered. With entire regions refusing to stump up his great design and aching for a return to the stationing of troops in private residences, Borromeo’s men resorted to vindictive reprisals against insolvent communities. In the summer of 1654, eleven debtor communities were chosen by lot to host soldiers in private accommodations in the hope that this would serve as a lesson to other

¹²²⁶ Buono, *Esercito*, pp. 254–255.

¹²²⁷ Wood, *Subordination*.

¹²²⁸ Te Brake, *Shaping History*, pp. 3–4.

¹²²⁹ See Parker, *Global Crisis*, p. 534.

recalcitrant villages.¹²³⁰ For the ruled, the revenge for challenging the power of the lord of Lake Maggiore was arbitrary extraction that was much worse than what they had experienced before.

And yet, their vision of a monarchy rooted in distributive justice was not so easily defeated. As the *case erme* went out of business in the winter of 1654, Giovanni Borromeo was called upon to defend his legacy as commissioner-general and the credo that had undergirded it. Like all *olivaristas*, he was not good at facing up to the consequences of his action.¹²³¹ Backing him in his obduracy were his cronies who were on hand to support him. In 1655 a number of *sindici* from around Lombardy—the very group who had engaged in guerilla warfare against Spanish troops fifteen years earlier—penned a letter to Philip IV in which they extolled Giovanni Borromeo for how he had “maneggiata l’ardua distribut[ion]e degli alloggi in queste Città, e Prov[inc]e.” In their eyes he was an exemplary noble hero who combined military bravery with cool-headed administrative savvy. Not only had he performed his function “con l’inalterabile suo preavedimento,” his “paterno amore” had “resi li n[ost]ri mali più soffribili, e meno penosi.” Inflamed by his “zelo al servitio di V[ostra] M[ae]stà,” he was a beacon of “incorruttibile giust[iti]a, merito et valore” who had always made sure that “questi officij nostri [were] ricompensati con tanto universal utile.” All this, to their mind, went to show “l’universal sodisfatt[io]ne [which] riceve q[ues]to stato dall’esatiss[im]a et indefessa applicat[io]ne con la quale egli v[er]à continuando nel servire questo Posto di Commissario Generale.”¹²³² Regurgitating standard *olivarista* talking points, theirs was a defense oddly out of kilter with the vision of the monarchy that had triumphed with the abrupt end of the *case erme*.

Thanks to the alternative vision defended by ordinary people, Borromeo’s opponents among the elite could easily dismiss this tone-deaf letter as a last-gasp effort to counter the prevailing narrative by people who had no leg to stand on. As local notables they matched the profile of the group who village communities up and down Lombardy had exposed as interested chancers. So clumsy was their endorsement of Borromeo that they repeated, both in words and in deeds, the main charge that had been leveled against Giovanni: that he had “compensated” a small but articulate and well-connected section of Milanese subjects for their services as contractors, inadvertently driving home the point of Giovanni Borromeo’s accusers—that he had enriched himself and his cronies to the detriment of the common good.

Unable to make the charge of self-interest go away, the people around Giovanni Borromeo began to change the yardstick against which his actions ought to be measured. In March 1653 the cash-strapped authorities of Milan spent 1,685 *libras* to celebrate the reconquest of Barcelona,

¹²³⁰ Consulta Magistrale a S. E. perché si serva il far trasmetter li Soldati contro alcune Terre debitorici di Cas’erme, che si sono cavate a sorte, Milan July 9, 1654: BNB, Ordini, vol. 2.

¹²³¹ Parker, *Global Crisis*, p. 258.

¹²³² Sindici to Philip IV, Milan June 20, 1655: ABIB, Famiglia Borromeo, Giovanni V, Carriera militare.

complete with paintings being unveiled in the square in front of the *Duomo* and a lavish banquet offered in the royal palace.¹²³³ Such feats of propaganda aimed at exalting the unity of the monarchy in the face of manifold challenges to its integrity had been enacted across the Spanish empire ever since the revolt of Naples had been successfully subdued in the spring of 1648.¹²³⁴ What was exceptional about the pomp and pageantry in Milan was the fact that there were no precedents of such celebrations being paid from the public purse: public spending of this kind was usually allowed only to mark the birth, visit, or passing of prominent members of the royal family. Yet, as the king himself hastened to explain, these were “*circunstancias particulares*.”¹²³⁵ In fact, Giovanni Borromeo and his cronies needed to underscore with some urgency that, thanks to their crowd control, Milan had been spared the same lot as Catalonia and was one of few territories of the Spanish monarchy that had desisted from rebelling. In the face of mounting criticism of their cronyism, Borromeo and his clique were settling on their role in keeping the social peace in Milan to sell their pilfering as a necessary means to a higher end: the preservation of the monarchy.

Thus, by the mid-1650s Giovanni believed to have found the winning argument against his critics. His defenders and, incidentally, the benefactors of his policy lauded the *case erme* policy as a great project in the tradition of Olivares. Giovanni Borromeo had deployed the considerable symbolic resources in his hands to coerce communities to become tributaries to the project of the Spanish monarchy. In his apologists’ eyes, it was thanks to the trickle-down effect of the *case erme* policy that Milan had remained stable. A foresighted member of the elite, Giovanni Borromeo had created a stakeholder culture, lacking in other territories, that was strong enough to survive the turbulent 1640s. If nothing else, the large-scale profiteering that those who had to bankroll it were now mauling had prevented Milan from ending up in the same turmoil as Catalonia.

This argument is not without merit, and adds nuance to current explanations as to why Milan, unlike Spain’s other possessions in Italy, did not revolt in the 1640s. In his attempt to explain Milan’s stability, Gianvittorio Signorotto has argued that the monarchy had cultivated a network of families who, as clients, became dependent enough on the monarchy that they were better off with the king of Spain than with the king of France.¹²³⁶ In times of crisis, such as the 1640s, the king and his entourage understood the need to woo the most influential members of the old nobility and secure their loyalty.¹²³⁷ While these attempts to court local elites go a long way toward explaining why Milan did not rise, it is only one part of the story, as the work of Giovanni Borromeo as

¹²³³ Lettera di S. M. de 17 Luglio 1653, approvando spese fatte nelle Feste per la resa di Barcellona: ASMi, Registri delle cancellerie, serie XI, pezzo 5, p. 34.

¹²³⁴ Minguito Palomares, Nápoles, p. 150; Guarino, *Representing the King’s Splendour*, pp. 69–70, 182.

¹²³⁵ Lettera di S. M. de 17 Luglio 1653, approvando spese fatte nelle Feste per la resa di Barcellona: ASMi, Registri delle cancellerie, serie XI, pezzo 5, p. 34.

¹²³⁶ Signorotto, *A proposito*, p. 278.

¹²³⁷ Signorotto, *Il marchese*, p. 145.

commissioner-general suggests. To understand Milan's loyalty, we need to look at the elite's interaction with commoners during the emergency. Realizing that the field of power now had to accommodate the interests of people who had formerly been left outside the realm of politics, the more far-sighted elements of Milan's elites understood the need to make concessions to the lower orders to guarantee the stability of the empire.

Giovanni Borromeo was undoubtedly at the helm of these efforts. He defied the conventional wisdom of the time and understood from early on that the revolts that were jolting the Spanish monarchy in the 1640s were spearheaded neither by rebellious nobles nor by the populace, but by an up-and-coming group contemporaries referred to as the *ceto civile*. These merchants stood to lose most from the breakdown of the economic system but, at the same time, were also best equipped to push back against a devastating war that the nobility had unleashed on seventeenth-century society. Amidst the growing discontent at marauding Spanish troops on his doorstep, Giovanni Borromeo, coached by his younger brother, realized that he could break the insurrectionary spirit of this group if he succeeded in forming an alliance between the local notables in Lombardy's ravaged northwest and the warrior nobility. Once in power as commissioner-general, he proceeded to neutralize the group in society most likely to oppose the emergency government by outsourcing the provisioning of designated *case erme* to merchants and professionals in towns and villages of the Alto Milanese. The intense exchange of favors between Giovanni Borromeo and notables in the communities on the ground helped create a climate that kept the population engaged enough not to rebel against a state of endless war. In so doing, Giovanni Borromeo helped lend the Spanish monarchy new legitimacy and played a part, however mediocre, in restoring the power of the Catholic king during the monarchy's deepest crisis in the seventeenth century. If the Catalans had rebelled against the lodging of troops in their principality, the Milanese had not.¹²³⁸

Giovanni's opponents, on the other hand, were quick to point out that his use of state resources did little more than put off the problem. His attempt to outsmart the ruling elites in other parts of the Spanish monarchy by throwing money at the problem ricocheted. His reliance on patronage may have placated some elements within Milanese society but it ended up fomenting a much larger movement of opposition. Giovanni Borromeo's divide-and-conquer policy radicalized the large majority of the population who not only remained outside the enrichment cycle which the *case erme* had launched but were asked to supply the much-needed cash to keep the machine humming. The communities who railed against the *case erme* were arguably less organized than local notables would have been but they still convinced the governor to shut down the *case erme*. Even more significantly, their main allegation—that the *case erme* were detrimental to the common good—was

¹²³⁸ Buono, *Esercito*, p. 142.

to stick. The *case erme* were increasingly construed as a cynical ploy to trade on the emergency of the 1640s to further the particular interests of a nobleman and his clientele with the help of public money. A potent counter-narrative had emerged, which went thusly: as the monarchy was dealt one blow after another, a group of chancers in Milan had hijacked the *case erme* plan to transform it into a gold mine for themselves. Although few expected it at the time, these voices would ultimately prevail. As Giovanni Borromeo's rivals became more determined to stop his forward march, they snatched these arguments to advance their own narrow ends.

In the mid-1650s, Giovanni Borromeo was about to meet the same fate as his role model and erstwhile protector, the count-duke of Olivares. Like his nemesis over in France, cardinal Richelieu, Olivares's ministry generated stiff opposition to its characteristic exploitation of the will to power of a new crop of elites who were impatient to embark on a journey of social upward mobility. Citing the "necessity" of the Franco-Spanish conflict, the favorite had introduced new taxation which "made the poor poorer," but crucially also "created spectacular opportunities for others to grow rich" as a small group of clients "saw an opportunity in the crown's embarrassment to feather already well-feathered nests."¹²³⁹ As his tenure in government wound down, public opinion subjected his unjust distribution of justice to bracing criticism, with Francisco Quevedo, a former supporter of Olivares's, telling Philip IV, "We are all children consigned by God to your care; / To kill us like beasts of burden is unfair."¹²⁴⁰ Diego de Saavedra Fajardo, a writer widely regarded as favorable to the institution of the *valimiento*, was warning of the dire consequences that awaited those who handed out the king's resources without regard to elementary notions of distributive justice.¹²⁴¹ His words, first published in 1640, were to be prophetic: three years later, the minister-favorite was ousted by popular resistance to his endless demands for more money and sacrifice to fatten up his cronies.¹²⁴²

Though not quite as dramatic, Giovanni's stint at the top of Milan's government was headed for a similarly cataclysmic end a decade later. Having been endowed with unprecedented patronage resources, he tendered them to a growing set of clients in the name of the king. But to those who missed out on the bonanza Giovanni's administration seemed to be a self-serving ploy to preserve, and possibly enhance, his own power at the expense of the commonwealth. Much like the count-duke in Barcelona in the early 1640s, Giovanni Borromeo in the 1650s was engulfed by increasingly shrill calls for the king to step in, reseize the power that had been alienated, and redress a balance that had been knocked askew by a self-seeking section of the elite and their clients who benefited from their unequal distribution of patronage. As the restoration of justice, a demand first voiced at the bottom of society, was annexed by some of the rulers, Giovanni was on the way out.

¹²³⁹ Elliott, *The Count-Duke*, p. 514.

¹²⁴⁰ Quoted in Elliott, *The Count-Duke*, p. 556.

¹²⁴¹ See Malcolm, *Royal Favouritism*, pp. 36–37.

¹²⁴² Von Thiessen, *Der entkleidete Favorit*, p. 146.

These overlooked dynamics fit established definitions of the crisis of the Spanish monarchy in the seventeenth century. The masses who revolted against Giovanni Borromeo over the *case erme* undeniably represented what Hugh Trevor-Roper in a classic essay somewhat simplistically referred to as the “country” that rose against the “gilded merry-go-round” of the elites.¹²⁴³ While Trevor-Roper’s suggestion that these were two monolithic blocks, springing from society fully formed, is deeply problematic, the dichotomy does capture something essential.¹²⁴⁴ The movement against Giovanni Borromeo was spiked by the taxation to keep the endless wars of the elites going, and the increasingly sophisticated arguments his adversaries deployed against what they came to see as a waste of resources on a war that brought nothing but disaster to their communities propelled them forward. Few contemporaries had doubts about this. Indeed, even as rabid an apologist for the nobility as Carlo Calà was unable to deny that behind the revolt of Naples lurked the “peso di gravissime, et infinite gabelle.”¹²⁴⁵ Milan was no exception. If the Borromeo’s subjects had had doubts about the *olivarista* model of social upward mobility from the very beginning, it took the large-scale upheavals of a deadly war to convince them that their instincts had been right all along. The need to feed an unwinnable dynastic war had led the governing elites to impose tax burdens on those who had nothing to gain from it.¹²⁴⁶ As elsewhere, that plan backfired.

Historians have long debated the ideological underpinnings of the popular movements that sprang up across western Europe (and whose existence in Milan is uncovered here for the first time). While Marxist historians used to see these insurgencies as harbingers of a brave new bourgeois world, conservative and revisionist scholars have been united in their dismissal of the popular movements of the 1640s.¹²⁴⁷ In his essay on the general crisis of the seventeenth century, Trevor-Roper famously gave the opponents of the courtly elite short shrift, writing of them: “These men were not politicians or economists, and when the Court foundered under their blows, they soon found that they could neither govern nor prosper.”¹²⁴⁸ Trevor-Roper’s most vociferous antagonist, the Marxist Rosario Villari, was probably quite right in suggesting that the whole point of the essay was to write off the English civil war as a meaningless hiccup in history.¹²⁴⁹ Still, Villari’s implication that the movements afoot during the six contemporaneous revolutions were representatives of a coming bourgeois society is not convincing either. Rather than represent fully formed classes at the outset, interest groups were constituted through conflict. The battle over the *case erme* was not one

¹²⁴³ Trevor-Roper, *The General Crisis*, p. 45.

¹²⁴⁴ Cust and Hughes, *Introduction: After Revisionism*, pp. 5, 19–21.

¹²⁴⁵ Carlo Calà, *Istoria della vera cagione et de’ principali motivi della sollevazione napoletana accaduta nel 1646* [sic], quoted in Comparato, *Uffici*, p. 430.

¹²⁴⁶ Parker, *Global Crisis*, pp. 53–54.

¹²⁴⁷ For a historiographical overview, see Francesco Benigno, *Specchi*, chap. 1.

¹²⁴⁸ Trevor-Roper, *The General Crisis*, p. 80.

¹²⁴⁹ Villari, *Discussioni*, pp. 37–38.

that revealed existing cleavages in society but one that produced them.¹²⁵⁰ The fight for distributive justice gained much of its momentum from the fact that some members of the community were drafted into the project of perpetuating what Trevor-Roper called “that gilded merry-go-round which cost society so much more than society was willing to bear.” It was the coopting of the “gente buona e savia” that stoked the rancor of the masses who continued to believe in the official script of the monarchy as a community in which the nobility vouched for the welfare of all the king’s subjects. Given this genesis, it is little surprising that the popular movement in Milan did not question the fundamentals of the existing social order: much to the disappointment of Marxist historians, they did not envision a liberal-democratic order. What they did offer, however, was an alternative vision of Old Regime society. Even though their takedown of the idea of patronage was not always consistent, they were agreed on clamoring for a fair distribution of the burden of war. *Pace* conservative and revisionist historians, commoners were able to envisage how society ought to be run: in the interest of the common good, with the king’s resources distributed equitably among his subjects.¹²⁵¹

The popular movements of the seventeenth century also raise the question of the agency of non-nobles. As this chapter has revealed, the simplistic binary pitting the country against a supposedly monolithic elite, shared by both Marxists and their ideological adversaries, has potentially stood in the way of a proper reckoning with how ordinary people exerted influence in the seventeenth century. In the absence of formal representation, the only way for them to effect change was to exploit the divisions within the elite. The masses had to bank on their alternative vision galvanizing certain elements within the elite scheming to liquidate their competitors by hijacking the fight to redress a balance thrown out of whack. While they did not oppose the “gilded merry-go-round” in principle, they were keen to exploit the popular rhetoric against it to oust unwanted rivals. It is only by ignoring this plundering of popular ideas that historians have been able to argue that the movements of the 1640s did not offer an alternative vision of society and that their stirring remained inconsequential. Though more eager to topple their rivals than transform society, the nobles who stole the ideas from below effected wide-ranging changes to the upper crust of society. If they had no interest in ending the exploitation of large swathes of the population and, given the chance, may well have been as ruthless as Giovanni, they did scuttle the careers of those like Giovanni Borromeo who had ridden the “merry-go-round” to advance their dynastic interests.

Giovanni Borromeo may have prevented the revolt of civilians on Lake Maggiore from spreading to the entire Milanese State; he would prove unable to salvage a social order that rested upon the self-seeking of a tiny minority. The Borromeo’s cherished trickle-down theory, according to which the greater good for all was best ensured when the family were put in charge of the

¹²⁵⁰ Benigno, *Specchi*, pp. 186–187, 290–294.

¹²⁵¹ On this point, see Parker, *Class and State*, p. 102.

population on the lake, stood exposed for what it was: a fiction that propped up their dominion. In the eyes of their subjects, the equation of patronage and the common good had been proven untenable. Under strain from below, the contradictions at the heart of the Borromeo project started to unravel, sweeping away Giovanni Borromeo along with a vision of the Spanish monarchy he had played a part in devising. The career that he continued to portray as an attempt to add luster to his own and the king's dynasty was now regarded as crude opportunism. If the *Magistrato Ordinario*, with help from below, had begun to chip away at Borromeo's reputation as a protector of the poor and plant the image of a shameless war-profiteer, subsequent events would make this uncomplimentary label even more compelling. At a time when the restoration of justice and the pursuit of the common good shorn of dynastic aspirations triumphed as the be-all and end-all of politics, a self-consciously minority cause like Borromeo's *olivarista* career stood no chance of surviving.

Chapter 8

The Common Good Restored: The Decline and Fall of Giovanni Borromeo

A curious treatise rolled off the printing presses in Piacenza in 1650. Titled simply *La Monarchia di Spagna*, it placed Milan at the heart of the Spanish system, extolling the virtues of the Milanese nobility on the heels of the victorious siege of Cremona, the State's second largest city. As its author, Giovanni Pietro Crescenzo Romani, argued, the recent streak of Spanish victories in Lombardy had come about because Milan's aristocracy had imbibed the notion that "la Gloria della stirpe, se non è accompagnata dalla fedeltà, e dall'altre Virtù Civili, perde ogni lustro."¹²⁵² Having finally accepted that power was derivative of their dependence on the Spanish Habsburgs, Milanese nobles were no longer afraid to rally to the defense of the monarchy. In fact, by yoking the destiny of their families to that of the monarchy, Milan's leading lights had morphed into the "veri Tesori delle più stabili Monarchie."¹²⁵³ Although Milan had been "lo scopo delle nimiche saette," it had never "preso crollo per quanti urti gli habbiano dati con gli sforzi maggiori d'ogni forza terribile quelli c'hanno sempre invidiate, o temute le felicità della Monarchia di Spagna."¹²⁵⁴

The last passage was, of course, a thinly veiled reference to the events that were taking place elsewhere in the Spanish empire. For as Milan's elite vouched for the stability of the monarchy, the nobilities of other territories had severed their ties with Philip IV. Catalonia had blazed the trail in 1640, and Portugal had followed suit that same year. By 1647 the wave of discontent had stirred up enough animosities for revolts to break out in the crown's Italian possessions, the kingdoms of Naples and Sicily. With the notable exception of Castile and Flanders, Milan, by the late 1640s, was the only constituent part of the *monarquía* that appeared calm. Though he never explicitly mentioned the current political climate, Crescenzo Romani's effusive depiction of Milan's loyalty to the crown would undoubtedly have stood out to contemporaries familiar with, and worried about, the ubiquitous discontent in the realms of the Catholic king.¹²⁵⁵ Indeed, it was only against the backdrop of a monarchy teetering on the brink of collapse that one truly understood Crescenzo Romani's pointed reminder to Philip IV, "Felice quel Monarca, à cui non mancano Vassalli grandi per sostenere la sua grandezza."¹²⁵⁶

There was another thing that was only implied. The professions of loyalty by the Milanese nobility were inversely proportional to the lack of an adequate response from the king and his entourage to the State's needs. The bitter reality was that the repression of the uprisings to which Crescenzo Romani alluded were consuming the crown's resources to such an extent that the

¹²⁵² Crescenzo Romani, *La Monarchia*, p. 32.

¹²⁵³ Crescenzo Romani, *La Monarchia di Spagna*, p. 32.

¹²⁵⁴ Crescenzo Romani, *La Monarchia di Spagna*, p. 32.

¹²⁵⁵ On these fears, see Rovito, *La rivoluzione*, p. 368.

¹²⁵⁶ Crescenzo Romani, *La Monarchia di Spagna*, p. 33.

erstwhile “heart of the monarchy” had been left to its own devices. As a battered monarchy cut its losses by retreating to the Iberian peninsula, the State of Milan was compelled to fend for itself. Reminding the powers in Madrid of the fealty of Milanese elites when they could easily have betrayed the monarch was, therefore, one way of setting the stage for what the nobility was gearing up to in the early 1650s. With the worst over, they were bracing to cash in on the rewards and honors that they assumed would be beckoning those who had kept the faith when others—the Catalans and the Neapolitans—had stabbed the king in the back.¹²⁵⁷ As the dust settled, the local nobility expected the leading decision makers in Madrid to wrest back control and proceed to elevate Milan’s illustrious families in acknowledgment of their role in the preservation of the empire.¹²⁵⁸

One of the most high-profile fortune-seekers was Giovanni Borromeo. By the standards he was most familiar with, there was much he could expect of the monarchy. Not only had he recast himself as a hero in Habsburg service, he had put his considerable administrative and military savvy at the disposal of his protectors. By the 1650s, he fully anticipated that his role in keeping the pesky populace at bay would virtually guarantee him access to more power within the Spanish empire, crowning a trajectory of upward mobility that had begun some four decades earlier. These assumptions, nurtured in no small part by the Olivares model of which he considered himself an heir, led him to push his luck too far, however. As I show in this chapter, his investment in the *olivarista* ideology of royal service nourished a sense of entitlement that goaded him into formulating demands that ultimately spelled his downfall. Betraying his cavalier attitude, he withdrew, without consultation and consideration, from his appointment as commissioner-general of the army, only to turn around and ask to be admitted to the Order of the Golden Fleece, which would have procured him a prominent role in the government of the Spanish empire. That act of derring-do backfired however, with Giovanni unceremoniously ejected from the august circle he had worked so hard to join.

As well as his chutzpah, it was Giovanni’s inability to read the signs of change in the governing structure of the monarchy that did him in. Not only did he miss the departure of the last minister-favorite, he failed to recognize that the abolition of the *valimiento* had given rise to a new conception of princely service. This obliviousness would seal his fate. Giovanni, like all *olivaristas*, plied his mind to believe that the elevation of the sovereign houses whom the nobility served was a result, a byproduct almost, of the self-aggrandizement of their servants. Yet, the count-duke’s fall had made clear that such ideas had alienated the masses who took to the barricades to clamor for the restoration of the commonwealth that the nobility had so piously pledged to defend. In response to pressure from the streets, more adaptive elements within the ruling elite, not least an influential

¹²⁵⁷ On this understanding of royal service, see del Mar, *Hacia la nobleza*, pp. 20–21.

¹²⁵⁸ Signorotto, *Il marchese*, p. 138.

class of legal experts, made political hay out of the rhetoric from below, deploying it to stake a claim to the governance of the monarchy. Armed with the language of the common good, they proceeded to outflank those like Giovanni Borromeo who had raked in during the Olivares free-for-all and were too slow to adjust to the new climate in which the misrecognition of the pursuit of private ambitions proved vital to survival.

In probing the downfall of Giovanni Borromeo, this chapter addresses two related historiographical concerns. It seeks to link new work on the regime of the last minister-favorite, Luis de Haro, to reinvigorated debates on the nature of charges of corruption in the early modern period.¹²⁵⁹ As far as the latter go, Spanish historians have usually focused more on Latin America than on the crown's Italian possessions and have been mostly interested in the surprisingly complex anti-corruption measures adopted by successive governments from Olivares forward. Through their research they have shown that in these policies the king took on an overweening role as the protector of the collective good from the voracity of his ministers, a view that the nobility itself eagerly lapped up.¹²⁶⁰ All this begs the question of where that anti-corruption consensus came from. In her work on Spain's overseas empire, Pilar Ponce Leiva has argued that rivaling factions often used accusations of corruption—understood as the appropriation of the king's resources by officeholders—to tweak the balance of power in their favor.¹²⁶¹ As a number of scholars have shown, this was certainly the case in the struggles over the legacy of the Lerma regime (chapter 3), but I would argue that charges of corruption were even more of a stick to beat rivals with in the aftermath of the fall of the last minister-favorite.¹²⁶² Drawing on recent German scholarship on corruption as a discursive sleight of hand, I see debates about corrupt behavior as emanating from classification struggles within a governing elite eager to respond to challenges from below in order to save face with other nobles.¹²⁶³ What precipitated Giovanni's downfall was the breakdown of the uneasy balance between the common good and the well-being of one's dynasty that had characterized the rule of the minister-favorite.¹²⁶⁴

To make sense of Giovanni's inglorious end, then, we need to focus on the rhetorical clash between "self-interest" and dedicated service in the name of the common good that played out in the court of Madrid in the 1650s.¹²⁶⁵ Though central to debates on the future of the monarchy at the

¹²⁵⁹ The two most significant publications are Malcolm, *Royal Favouritism*, and Valladares (ed.), *El mundo de un valido*.

¹²⁶⁰ González Fuertes and Negro del Cerro, *Mecanismos de control*; Amador González, *Mecanismos*, p. 449.

¹²⁶¹ Ponce Leiva, *Acusaciones de corrupción*.

¹²⁶² Andújar Castillo et al., *Corrupción y mecanismos*, p. 296; for literature on earlier debates, see Mrozek, *Bajo acusación*.

¹²⁶³ Engels, *Die Geschichte*; Bernsee, *Moralische Erneuerung*.

¹²⁶⁴ Engels, *Die Geschichte*, pp. 28, 74.

¹²⁶⁵ Contemporaries viewed "disinterestedness" as a commendable personal trait, while "interest" connoted self-seeking behavior that was routinely condemned as sinful. See Sharon Kettering, *Patrons*, p. 31. To date there is no study of the term's changing meaning over time, although Haug (*Ungleiche Aussenbeziehungen*, chap. 4.2), in a study on its uses in Franco-Imperial relations at midcentury, suggests that the decades after Westphalia were a crucial period in its shift from an overwhelmingly negative to a more positive connotation. For a limited contextualization of its uses in Italy and Spain, see

time, this contrast has yet to receive sustained scholarly attention along the lines suggested by Tilman Haug in his work on Franco-Imperial relations.¹²⁶⁶ Until such time as this materializes, our best bet is the substantial body of scholarship on the court of Rome which points to similar contradictions building up and coming to a head around that time. In a now classic essay on the premodern papacy, Wolfgang Reinhard argued that pontiffs were torn between two competing norms: the idea of disinterested service for the commonwealth and a notion of *pietas* which required them to keep a lookout for their friends and family.¹²⁶⁷ All that changed in the middle decades of the seventeenth century. As Irene Fosi, Antonio Menniti Ippolito, and Francesco Benigno have shown, the scale of *pietas* and the commonwealth tipped in favor of the latter in the 1650s.¹²⁶⁸ Similar developments can be gleaned in the Spanish monarchy. If the commitment to the commonwealth and the pursuit of particular interests had hitherto led an uneasy coexistence¹²⁶⁹, the inherent contradiction became untenable in the 1650s and princely service was being redefined as disinterested devotion to the collective good.

While the significance of the redefinition of public service should not be underestimated, it is equally important to recognize its limits. Enveloping as it was, the anti-corruption discourse of the 1650s did not query the fundamentals of seventeenth-century society: insofar as critics of patronage from within the elite pointed out glitches in its administration rather than the system of resource distribution itself, patronage as a fundamental remained unchallenged.¹²⁷⁰ What was restored was a semblance of good governance in the form of a more just distribution of the crown's resources.¹²⁷¹ As the monarch and sympathetic nobles tried to impose the king as the sole arbiter of the common good, initiatives of his officeholders geared toward the material enrichment of their dynasties became unpalatable. These developments, then, should not be confused with the birth of modern definitions of corruption, bereft of dynastic concerns and centered exclusively on the common good, though they undoubtedly marked an important step on the road to the present-day anticorruption consensus.¹²⁷²

In the summer of 1655, the governor of Milan, the marquis of Caracena, penned a letter to Luis Mendez de Haro, Olivares's successor as minister-favorite, in which he praised the track record of the king's commissioner-general of the armies in Lombardy, Giovanni Borromeo. According to the

Emich et al., *Stand und Perspektiven*, pp. 236–237, and von Thiessen, *Der entkleidete Favorit*, p. 131. For clarity's sake, I have chosen to translate contemporary accusations of "interés" (in Spanish) and "interesse" (in Italian) as "self-interest."

¹²⁶⁶ Haug, *Vormauern*.

¹²⁶⁷ Reinhard, *Papa Pius*; idem, *Amici e creature*, p. 329.

¹²⁶⁸ Fosi, *All'ombra dei Barberini*, pp. 159–170; Menniti Ippolito, *Il tramonto*; Benigno, *Nipoti*. See chapter 10.

¹²⁶⁹ For the Olivares' government, see von Thiessen, *Der entkleidete Favorit*, pp. 136, 147.

¹²⁷⁰ Engels, *Die Geschichte*, p. 82.

¹²⁷¹ For contemporary perceptions of "fair" and "unfair" patronage, see Pilar Ponce Leiva, *Percepciones*, p. 204.

¹²⁷² See Engels, *Corruption, and Knights, Anticorruption*, for two opposing views on these issues.

governor, Borromeo had held that function for the past nine years during which he had always attended “con grande estudio al bien de los soldados, y al mayor Alivio del Estado, con que unos y otros quedan contentos.”¹²⁷³ In an enclosed letter to the king, Caracena went even further. In particular he extolled Giovanni’s work on “los alojam[ien]tos” where he had excelled at “disponiendo las materias de manera que los soldados puedan parar, y los naturales tolerar el preso,” doing so “con tanta igualdad que los unos, y los otros quedan contentos.”¹²⁷⁴ Indeed, it was thanks to his “gran limpieza, y atención” that “se ha podido tirar adelante tanto más en tiempo de tantos, y tan grandes trabaxos.”¹²⁷⁵ It was, Caracena concluded, therefore only appropriate for His Majesty to “hacerle muchas honras, y mercedes.”¹²⁷⁶

The letters’ content was a mixture of old and new tropes, an ambiguity that foreshadowed the conflicts at the top of the monarchy that would ultimately grind Giovanni Borromeo down. On the one hand, the governor stressed Giovanni’s “limpieza de manos” and his sense of “igualdad” in the administration of troops, and most notably their billeting in local communities, underlining how this had helped keep Milan stable when other parts of the Spanish monarchy had gone up in flames. All this echoed the new good governance ideology that was rapidly gathering pace as the monarchy sought to wrest back control of the territories that had rejected the policies of Olivares. On the other hand, though, Caracena, like Giovanni, was very much a creature of the count-duke’s.¹²⁷⁷ As such, he was unable to conceal his investment in Olivares’s conception of service. His letters of recommendation rested on the premise that loyal service to the ruling dynasty was not an end in itself, but rather a means to something bigger: precisely because Giovanni Borromeo had contributed to the preservation of the monarchy, Caracena seemed to argue, he was now entitled to “muchas honras y mercedes.” Clinging on to *olivarista* verities about royal service, both men struggled to keep up with new ideas that were taking shape, and so, in due course, the equation of merit with deservedness oozing out of every line of Caracena’s letter was going to dent Giovanni’s ambitions.¹²⁷⁸

As he sought to collect his bounty, Giovanni Borromeo committed a number of fatal errors. In his letter to Haro, Caracena announced that Borromeo had decided to “embiar persona a los pies de Su M[ajesta]d” to discuss matters further.¹²⁷⁹ Where other noblemen would have taken their promotion seriously enough to head to the court themselves, Giovanni Borromeo tasked one of his

¹²⁷³ Luis de Benavides Carrillo, marquis of Caracena, to the count of Haro, Milan June 20, 1655: ABIB, FB, Giovanni V, *Carriera militare*

¹²⁷⁴ Luis de Benavides Carrillo, marquis of Caracena, to Philip IV, Milan June 20, 1655: ABIB, FB, Giovanni V, *Carriera militare*.

¹²⁷⁵ Luis de Benavides Carrillo, marquis of Caracena, to the count of Haro, Milan June 20, 1655: ABIB, FB, Giovanni V, *Carriera militare*

¹²⁷⁶ Luis de Benavides Carrillo, marquis of Caracena, to the count of Haro, Milan June 20, 1655: ABIB, FB, Giovanni V, *Carriera militare*

¹²⁷⁷ Malcolm, *Royal Favouritism*, pp. 117, 121, 123. On Caracena, see Signorotto, *Il marchese*, pp. 141–142.

¹²⁷⁸ On Caracena’s standing in the court in 1655–1656, see Signorotto, *Il marchese*, pp. 162–163.

¹²⁷⁹ Luis de Benavides Carrillo, marquis of Caracena, to the count of Haro, Milan June 20, 1655: ABIB, FB, Giovanni V, *Carriera militare*

agents with convincing Philip IV of the accomplishments and loyalty of the Borromeo dynasty.¹²⁸⁰ The man in question was Giorgio Sorino, Giovanni Borromeo's right-hand man. Originally from a valley not far from Lake Maggiore, Sorino had served the family in various capacities over the years, most recently as Giovanni's tax collector and fiduciary (see chapter 4).¹²⁸¹ Experienced though he might have been, he was clearly out of his depth in the court of Madrid where he arrived in April 1656. Quite apart from his overall bumbling attitude, the message he was to deliver in Madrid did not help either. According to his instruction, he was to argue that Giovanni Borromeo had been serving the house of Habsburg as commissioner-general, "del qual carico per il corso d'undici anni il Co[n]te è hormai stanco."¹²⁸² Weighed down by the end of his flagship policy, the *case erme*, he asked to be promoted to a "maggior carico militare."¹²⁸³

Which office Giovanni wanted remained unclear. Sorino's initial brief was to push Giovanni's name for the post of general of the cavalry and "Generalato degl'Huomini d'Armi" in the Milanese State, which was held by Juan de Borja y Aragón. The gamble seemed to pay off at first. Rehearsing the now familiar model of liaising via the king's minister-favorite, Sorino cajoled the successor of the count-duke of Olivares, Haro.¹²⁸⁴ Haro seemed to be sympathetic to Giovanni's ambitions. As the anonymous author of a written report later put it, "Don Luiggi d'Haro con molta stima del Co[n]te promette al Sorino ogni assistenza et protettione," even granting him the right to make his case to the king in three private audiences.¹²⁸⁵ With the assistance of Paolo Spinola, the marquis of Los Balbases, Haro moved quickly to arrange a marriage between Borja and the duchess of Nachera y Macheda, which would have compelled Borja to vacate his position for Giovanni Borromeo. Unfortunately, Borja's bride died before her spouse could leave Italy for Castile. As he lingered on in Milan, Giovanni's prospect faltered. Undeterred, he charged ahead with his plan to resign, egged on by his brother, Federico, who, despite admitting to not being "informato dell'intavolatura de negotij di Spagna," urged Giovanni to retire and put in a "dimanda del 3.o fisso, honorevole, utile e non difficile ad ottenersi" for the "serviti prestati."¹²⁸⁶ Entitlement had clearly trounced substance as Giovanni hoped to fail upward.

Giovanni's entourage cautioned against such a reckless move. Upon hearing the "rumors" that were making the rounds in Milan, Giovanni's cousin, Renato, buried the hatchet and besought him to "pesar bene la risolut[i]one della rassegna del suo posto di Com[missa]rio G[e]n[er]ale."¹²⁸⁷ He conceded that Giovanni's current appointment "veram[en]te è d'imbarazzo, e di fastidio." But to give

¹²⁸⁰ Spagnoletti, *Giangirolamo*, p. 4.

¹²⁸¹ On the Sorino brothers, see Galli and Monferrini, *I Borromeo*, p. 126, n. 204.

¹²⁸² Written report in ABIB, FB, Giovanni V, *Carriera militare*.

¹²⁸³ Written report in ABIB, FB, Giovanni V, *Carriera militare*.

¹²⁸⁴ On Haro, see Malcolm, *Royal Favouritism*, pp. 3–5 and *passim*.

¹²⁸⁵ Written report in ABIB, FB, Giovanni V, *Carriera militare*.

¹²⁸⁶ Federico IV to Giovanni, Lucerne July 25, 1656: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, *Cariche*.

¹²⁸⁷ Renato Borromeo to Giovanni Borromeo, Peschiera Borromeo October 28, 1656: ABIB, Giovanni V, *Carriera militare*.

it up without solid guarantees was too much of a risk to run. There were, in fact, many who aspired to inherit Giovanni's position and would probably be able to secure it "per la strada de favori di personaggi grandi, et anco del danaro," which would tempt more than one government minister to take Giovanni's wishes seriously and dump him in "qualche Posto aereo, e di apparenza pura honorifica, come ve ne sono alcuni esempi di fresca ricordanza." After having worked for decades to reach the top of the Spanish monarchy, Renato believed, Giovanni ought to think twice before turning himself into an object of the "derisione delli nostri poco amorevoli, che non sono pochi."

Renato's fear would turn out to be well founded. After three years of Giovanni's flirting with resigning, the new governor of Milan, the count of Fuensaldaña, called Borromeo's bluff and in the spring of 1658 appointed his successor as commissioner-general of the armies. Kicking into damage control mode, Giovanni sought to salvage his career, bending over backwards to stress his continued willingness to serve the Habsburgs. Where he had once cited ennui and tedium as the main reason for his plans to resign, he now stressed the health issues that had allegedly precipitated his decision: when he announced to step down, he had just fallen from a horse, "y con tal cayda estuvo cerca de quatro meses con el brazo derecho al pecho." Besides this he was "lleno de achaques de cuerpo, y de ánimo," which had necessitated him to seek permission from the governor to leave Milan twice "a curarse." Adding insult to injury, his wife had fallen ill, only to pass away soon thereafter without having produced any offspring.¹²⁸⁸ Still, Giovanni went on, all this had not diminished his "deseo de continuar en el R[ea]l serv[icio]," as he had done "hasta la edad de 42 años." He therefore urged the monarch that he "remediase a los menos con alguna aparenca" given the serious "razones, que causaran [Giovanni] al retirarse."¹²⁸⁹ Regretting his bluffing, he stressed that he had "hecho todo lo que ha podido, ni haber sido su intención de dexar el R[ea]l serb[icio]."

The gaffe he made next only compounded his problems. Rather than be modest and wait to be reinstated in a new military position, Giovanni solicited the admittance to the Order of the Golden Fleece.¹²⁹⁰ In an audience with the king, Sorino portrayed Giovanni Borromeo as a "Caballero de tantas partes, y de tantos meritos heredados, y propios, y de Casa tan calificada, y tan esclava al R[ea]l servicio" that he deserved nothing less than being granted access to what was arguably the most prestigious chivalric confraternity within the Spanish monarchy.¹²⁹¹ The Order of the Golden Fleece was a tight-knit and exclusive community of high nobles united by aristocratic values that manifested themselves in the order's precious collar consisting of 55 golden rings.¹²⁹² For all the faux traditionalism that its members affected, the order had undergone significant changes over time, and

¹²⁸⁸ 5.o memorial presentado miercoles 14 Ag.o 1658: ABIB, FB, Giovanni V, Carriera militare.

¹²⁸⁹ 5.o memorial presentado miercoles 14 Ag.o 1658: ABIB, FB, Giovanni V, Carriera militare.

¹²⁹⁰ Written report in ABIB, FB, Giovanni V, Carriera militare.

¹²⁹¹ Written report in ABIB, FB, Giovanni V, Carriera militare.

¹²⁹² Spagnoletti, *Principi italiani*, pp. 52 (community), 51 (chain).

these differing conceptions about the significance of its symbolism were bound to clash in Giovanni's application for admission.

Giovanni's candidacy was in line with his *olivarista* background and that group's understanding of the Golden Fleece. To them, what had initially been an imperial order had been thoroughly hispanized as the Spanish Habsburgs began to rely on it to lure the nobilities from its spheres of formal and informal influence into their orbit. By the early decades of the *Seicento* and concomitant with the rise of the minister-favorite, access to the order was widened to relatively minor members of the nobility, including the leading families of Spain's Italian possessions.¹²⁹³ As the integration of the peripheral nobility proceeded, "crescevano le richieste e le pretese dei 'nazionali' italiani i quali approfittavano così delle difficoltà incontrate dalla monarchia iberica sugli scacchieri europei, per ritagliarsi un posto nella gerarchia degli onori governata dagli Asburgo ben più consistente del passato."¹²⁹⁴ As a result of the crown's attempt to reach out to provincial nobilities, the number of titles awarded grew exponentially. Research has shown that the award of honorary grants first doubled, then trebled during the reign of Philip IV.¹²⁹⁵ The once rarified commodity had become much more widespread as noble interest in the involvement in the crown's wars peaked.¹²⁹⁶

The conferring of symbolic markers of distinction became an integral part of the reconstructed relationship between the king and his nobility which the figure of the minister-favorite epitomized.¹²⁹⁷ Among a nobility preoccupied with the visibility of interior qualities, orders of knighthood were tangible signs of what *olivaristas* sought to attain through royal service: symbolic capital.¹²⁹⁸ Betraying the group's rapprochement with, and submission to, the king, the monarch was now regarded as the "central authority of nomination" (Pierre Bourdieu), able to endow the leading dynasties of his realm with the unequivocal signifier of their top position within an emerging pan-Spanish nobility.¹²⁹⁹ Thanks to the bestowal of orders like that of the Golden Fleece, Philip IV and his minister-favorites had secured a role as exclusive arbiters in the arms race among the nobility: they alone had sufficient authority to augment noblemen's status.¹³⁰⁰ As Bourdieu puts it, "The symbolic capital of the nobility (honor, reputation), which hitherto rested on social esteem tacitly accorded on the basis of a more or less conscious social consensus, now finds a quasi-bureaucratic statutory objectification."¹³⁰¹ Not unlike in France, the widespread clamoring for military orders signaled that the nobility were pining for a special relationship with the king for whom they had made the ultimate

¹²⁹³ Donati, *L'idea*, pp. 279–280.

¹²⁹⁴ Spagnoletti, *Principi italiani*, p. 57.

¹²⁹⁵ Hanlon, *The Twilight*, p. 118.

¹²⁹⁶ Storrs, *The Resilience*, p. 38.

¹²⁹⁷ Spagnoletti, *Principi italiani*, p. 70.

¹²⁹⁸ Sabbadini, *La grazia*, p. 294.

¹²⁹⁹ Bourdieu, *Rethinking the State*, p. 10.

¹³⁰⁰ Stollberg-Rilinger, *The Holy Roman Empire*, p. 112.

¹³⁰¹ Bourdieu, *Rethinking the State*, p. 11.

sacrifice.¹³⁰² It was in this spirit that Giovanni's request was put in, although in doing so, he had failed to take stock of the changes in the monarchy which turned this standard plea into an affront.

In the 1650s, the Spanish court was in the midst of a dramatic palace revolution that would leave its makeup fundamentally altered: the minister-favorite, that fixture on the Madrid scene, was about to be obliterated, and the high nobility was waiting in the wings to fill the vacuum. As Alistair Malcolm has shown, the count of Haro who had taken over from his uncle Olivares was to be the last such figure in the Spanish monarchy. His hold on government had always been more tenuous than his predecessors', with considerable power remaining in the hands of a group of high nobles whose power, for the first time, was not derivative solely from their close relationship with the *valido*.¹³⁰³ The minister-favorite was no longer the focal point of one all-encompassing patronage network. In fact, this model was being superseded by "a framework of different clientage networks led by a group of men who were united in their loyalty to the *valido*, but also by their close connections with each other."¹³⁰⁴ In the long run, this entailed the erosion of the figure who had been central for the first half of the seventeenth century. As the Franco-Spanish war wound down from the mid-1650s, Haro was shrinking into a *primus inter pares*. By decade's end, "*valido* and governing elite had fused into an oligarchy of equals" who collectively ran the monarchy that had been the purview of the minister-favorite for more than half a century.¹³⁰⁵

This oligarchization had direct repercussions on the function of habits and similar rewards. Though the group of noblemen now at the helm of the monarchy brandished various emblems to signal their distinguished status, the Order of the Golden Fleece was fast becoming an important token signaling their belonging to an emerging pan-Spanish elite.¹³⁰⁶ By applying for admittance to the order, Giovanni Borromeo was effectively demanding to join the new elite that was forming in the wake of Haro's fall. Though born out of ignorance, this was an affront that the in-crowd was not going to forgive. Giovanni's brother, with privileged access to the Spanish ambassador in Rome, was prescient in his foreboding when he fretted, "Il C[onte] G[iovanni] va à pericolo di disgusti gravi, e con maggiori rotture solo perché in cos'alcuna non vuol cedere [...] il che Dio non voglia sia la rovina della Casa, alla quale il C[onte] Gio[vanni] dovrebbe haver riguardo."¹³⁰⁷

The one man who should have alerted Giovanni to all this—his agent—did no such thing. Although his brother warned Giovanni that this was the time "per mostrare la sua Prudenza, e constanza," he and his agents did the exact opposite.¹³⁰⁸ Barely registering the changes taking place

¹³⁰² Sodano, *Le aristocrazie*, p. 172; on France, see Smith, *The Culture of Merit*, pp. 32, 42.

¹³⁰³ Malcolm, *Royal Favouritism*, pp. 138–139.

¹³⁰⁴ Malcolm, *Royal Favouritism*, p. 139.

¹³⁰⁵ Malcolm, *Royal Favouritism*, p. 244.

¹³⁰⁶ Spagnoletti, *Principi italiani*, p. 88.

¹³⁰⁷ Federico V to Isabella Arcimboldi Borromeo, Rome March 29, 1657: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, *Corrispondenza 1656–1664*.

¹³⁰⁸ Federico V to Giovanni, Rome June 9, 1657: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, *Cariche*.

before his very eyes, the hapless Sorino relied on outdated information on the court and continued to lobby the figure most closely associated with the earlier model of elite integration—the minister-favorite—at a time when Haro had long lost his former influence. Rather than advise Giovanni Borromeo to retract his demand, Sorino followed through with a plan destined to fail under the altered circumstances he found at court. As it was, the jejune pursuit of the Golden Fleece went to show just how out of touch Borromeo and his collaborators had become with the way politics worked after the fall of the minister-favorite. Accustomed to navigating a political system centered on the *valido*, the workings of a multipolar court eluded him and resulted in a series of blunders that were grist to the mill of those who wanted to depict Giovanni as an uppity vassal who needed to be put in his place. (What may have strengthened their resolve was Sorino’s ham-handed attempt to bribe himself into a post in one of Milan’s courts of law, an act of venality that reflected badly on his principal who was suspected of the same sin.¹³⁰⁹)

If the *valimientos* had relied on the fiction that the minister-favorite observed noblemen’s behavior and rewarded them accordingly, the new oligarchy in Madrid was eager to take on the role of supreme judge.¹³¹⁰ In the Spanish court, the eclipse of the last minister-favorite seems to have fostered what Jay Smith has called “the ideal of autosurveillance, a surveillance exercised over and by the servants of the king,” who were to pass judgment on the actions of their peers and, if necessary, block their advancement.¹³¹¹ Their approach was informed by the altered balance of power between the crown and provincial nobilities. In the early 1600s, chivalric orders had enabled sovereigns to fashion themselves, in the words of Roberto Sabbadini, as “supremo dispensatore di grazie e benefici” and “dimostrare concretamente il proprio potere profondendo e dispensando fortuna, status e ricchezza” to their subjects whom they wanted to “attrarre nella loro orbita.”¹³¹² While it had been tremendously successful, this form of elite integration seems to have run its course by the 1650s. Now that Spanish power was seemingly the only thing that stood between the nobility and the populace, the monarchy was more interested in withholding honors than in perpetuating the largesse of earlier decades. For the first time, the monarchy could afford to be more selective in parceling out these tokens of symbolic superiority. Hence, in the wake of the crisis of 1640s and in spite of expectations to the contrary, rebuffs proliferated, in Milan and elsewhere.¹³¹³ With noble clans pining for royal protection, the monarchy was finally in a position to drive home the point that the earlier power differential between the king and his nobility had often obscured: that the flashy

¹³⁰⁹ See the consulta of the Council of Italy dated Madrid April 20, 1658: AGS, SSP, leg. 1811, f. 126.

¹³¹⁰ On similar developments in France, where the function was taken on by Louis XIV himself, see Smith, *The Culture of Merit*, chap. 4.

¹³¹¹ Smith, *The Culture of Merit*, p. 268.

¹³¹² Sabbadini, *La grazia*, p. 22.

¹³¹³ Grassi and Grohmann, *La Segreteria*, p. 271.

gadgets were a “[g]razia, appunto, e non qualcosa che si poteva rivendicare come contropartita di una prestazione, come automatica ricompensa del proprio servizio.”¹³¹⁴

Anxious to drive this point home, the governing elite in Madrid took a look at his record and the circumstances that had led him to resign from the position of commissioner-general. It did not take them long to come across a spat between the former commissioner-general and governor Fuensaldaña. In September 1656 the Spanish army had been thrashed in battle at Valenza, a garrison in the Po Valley wedged between Piedmont and the republic of Genoa.¹³¹⁵ The more brash elements within the military establishment had been as optimistic as ever that, as one diarist put it, “il Giglio Francese non può radicare sul terreno di q[ues]to clima, ancorché mai sempre spalleggiato da più d’un Principe di q[ues]te contrade.”¹³¹⁶ The subsequent shellacking choked Spanish superciliousness, making plain, as the anonymous author of a treatise on the military phrased it, that “l’essercito di S[ua] M[ae]stà in questo Stato [...] corre à gran diminutione.”¹³¹⁷ Reeling from the rout and under vicious attacks on his character from his rivals¹³¹⁸, Fuensaldaña pressed for sweeping reforms, which soon spawned open conflict over the billeting of troops with Giovanni Borromeo. When two of his officers disobeyed Borromeo’s orders, he appealed to the governor who, however, refused to back him up. After enduring the “ludibrij” of his officers without the governor intervening, Giovanni “non vole lasciar più oltre esposta la propria riputatione, e si ritira alla sua Villa d’Origgio” north of Milan.¹³¹⁹ Ventriloquizing his outrage, someone from Giovanni’s coterie in a manuscript that was probably destined for circulation lambasted the governor for insisting that “il Co[n]te come tutti li Capi sottoposti al suo Governo non sijno altro, che nome, voce, e braccio del med[esi]mo Gov[ernato]re, e che à nissuno convenga appassionarsi, mà ubedire à occhi chiusi.”¹³²⁰

This tone-deaf retort provided sufficient arguments for a governing elite that was aching to block his forward march. Giovanni, they claimed, had refused to show sufficient deference to His Majesty’s representative, wrongly believing that his accomplishments for the crown gave him carte blanche to make decisions on his own. Despite his merits, the oligarchy in Madrid averred, his obligation remained to “obey” the governor and the man he represented, king Philip IV.¹³²¹ His conduct had been, if not quite an act of rebellion, then certainly one of insubordination which did not deserve the kind of reward to which Giovanni Borromeo seemed to think he was entitled.

¹³¹⁴ Sabbadini, *La grazia*, p. 288. Also see MacHardy, *War*, p. 151, and Rowlands, *Patronage*, p. 63.

¹³¹⁵ See Signorotto, *Milano spagnola*, pp. 78–79.

¹³¹⁶ *Diario dell’Assedio di Valenza, dall’armi del Rè Christianiss.mo sotto il comando delli Duchi di Modena, e di Mercurio l’anno 1656 del Sargente Maggiore Gasparo Berretta Ingegnero Reg.o e Camerale: SSL, FCS, vol. 29, f. 1r.*

¹³¹⁷ *Considerat. ni sincere intorno l’Essercito di S. M.tà nello Stato di Milano (1657): ASM, Atti di governo, Militare p. a., cart. 2.*

¹³¹⁸ Maffi, *Il baluardo*, p. 386.

¹³¹⁹ Written report: ABIB, FB, Giovanni V, *Carriera militare*.

¹³²⁰ Written report: ABIB, FB, Giovanni V, *Carriera militare*.

¹³²¹ Written report: ABIB, FB, Giovanni V, *Carriera militare*.

Indeed, as the author of the manuscript cited above put it euphemistically, Giovanni was now subjected to “dimostrazioni più tosto di diffidenza, che di stima verso [his] disinteressate, e zelanti operationi.”¹³²² Little did he know that the conflict would soon spiral into an active interrogation of Giovanni Borromeo’s alleged disinterestedness.

Doubts about the self-interested nature of Giovanni Borromeo’s service did not arise from nowhere. They were the most tangible sign that the monarchy was changing its terms of engagement with the nobility. If a succession of minister-favorites from Lerma to Olivares had, to varying degrees, peddled the idea of the monarchy as a wellspring for the nobility, the collapse of the Olivares system in the 1640s gave birth to a new understanding of the realm. Sobered by the Spanish empire’s crisis, many came to think of it as a commonwealth in which each and every member was to contribute according to their means. In this matrix, the nobility was required to chip in more than what Olivares had encouraged them to regard as their one and only contribution: tutelage of the defenseless.¹³²³ The ruling elite was reminded of the common good ideology to which it had subscribed. While such calls were initially articulated by the masses who fought against the billeting of troops, they were soon espoused by an increasingly influential group of lawyers within the sprawling courts across the monarchy’s territories. As they scrambled to save the empire from calamity, they swapped the notion of the monarchy as a source of bounty for the privileged for a novel idea of the realm as a just society to whose proper functioning the nobility needed to contribute their fair share. The earliest sign of this for the Borromeo was a court battle over their feudal privileges in which they became ensnarled in the late 1640s.

The backdrop to the trial were the pressing financial needs that the State of Milan was facing in the 1640s when the monarchy had retreated to the Iberian peninsula in the wake of the Catalan and Portuguese revolts. This decision left Milan fully dependent on payments from the kingdom of Naples where Spanish viceroys had no qualms about squeezing the lower orders “sino a che loro non resti un reale ed una goccia di sangue dentro le vene.”¹³²⁴ The revolt that broke out in response to the viceroys’ depredations in 1647 cut Milan off from the stream of money that had been funneled into northern Italy (and which strained to resume once the revolt was over).¹³²⁵ “In the late 1640s and early 1650s, the government of Milan achieved the incredible feat of holding off the armies of France, Modena, and Savoy, without so much as receiving any significant assistance from either Spain or Naples.”¹³²⁶ In the face of rapidly emptying coffers, the authorities first launched a massive feudalization drive in which they attempted to sell off the last remaining hamlets to the highest

¹³²² Written report: ABIB, FB, Giovanni V, Carriera militare.

¹³²³ On this last point, see Dewald, *The European Nobility*, p. 15.

¹³²⁴ Count of Monterey, *Relazione diretta al sig. duca di Medina de las Torres intorno allo stato presente di varie cose del regno di Napoli*, quoted in Comparato, *Uffici e società*, p. 377.

¹³²⁵ Maffi, *Milano in guerra*, p. 354; Minguito Palomares, *Nápoles*, pp. 396–397.

¹³²⁶ Malcolm, *Royal Favouritism*, p. 113.

bidder.¹³²⁷ Although there were some social climbers active in the banking and trading sectors relishing the idea of acquiring a fief, the massive sale of common lands failed to generate the windfall that had been anticipated. “Nowadays,” lamented one official, “there is little inclination to invest in land.”¹³²⁸

The tepid response to the feudalization project drove the *Magistrato Straordinario* (the tribunal in charge of fiefs) to focus on earlier sales, probe potential irregularities in the documents, and, if need be, relitigate the transaction with the fiefs’ current owners.¹³²⁹ If the authorities found there were no documents offering unassailable evidence that the current feudatory had rightfully obtained his estate, it could be inferred that they were usurping privileges that were not lawfully theirs. In that case the monarchy was entitled to repossess the fiefs in question and resell them to the same individuals (or, less likely, to an alternative bidder). The prospected windfall was massive, not least because the *Magistrato Straordinario* was not going to treat the wealthy and powerful with kid gloves. In fact, as we shall see shortly, many of the legal professionals staffing its ranks saw the campaign as a way of asking the nobility to contribute more to the defense of the monarchy than that elusive resource, protection. Buoyed by the masses who had risen elsewhere clamoring for the respect of the commonwealth, some in the royal courts were encouraged to question, for the first time, the fiction on which noble power and privilege rested.

Among the many illustrious names who had legal proceedings initiated against them, the Borromeo held pride of place. “[N]on tralasciandosi mezzo imaginario con quale si possi trovare forma di unir danaro nelle occas[ion]i presentanee di tanta necessità,” announced Matteo Francesco Rosales in a legal brief penned on behalf of the *Magistrato Straordinario*, that body had set out to look into the Borromeo’s past acquisition of fiefs. It did not take Rosales long to identify the first irregularity. As he reported, he had dug up a royal letter by Philip II from 1577, “con la quale si potrebbe ricavare considerabile frutto in servizio della R[eal] C[amera].”¹³³⁰ According to his reading, this epistle strongly suggested that the Borromeo had been in the unlawful possession of large portions of demesne land, reaping profits and enriching themselves to the detriment of the king and the commonwealth he represented. Many of these landholdings had been in the Borromeo’s possession since the Visconti and Sforza periods, but in the opinion of the court, the royal letter of 1577 offered unmistakable evidence that some of them, including Angera and Intra on Lake Maggiore, had been leased to the family for a ten-year period, after the expiration of which they

¹³²⁷ Signorotto, *Il marchese*, p. 146.

¹³²⁸ Quoted in Sella, *Crisis*, p. 54.

¹³²⁹ On the *Magistrato Straordinario*, see Gualdo Priorato, *Relazione*, p. 18.

¹³³⁰ 1648. 2 Maggio. Consulta al Governatore, rimettendo per duplicato quella del g.no 6 Luglio 1648 rassegnata al suo Antecessore: ASM, *Atti di governo, Feudi camerati p.a.*, cart. 49.

would have been “obligados a volverlos en Cámara liberamente.”¹³³¹ Given that many years had gone by since that cut-off date, the authorities were not only in their right to “redeem” said fiefs but they could compel the family to pay arrears for the years during which they had unduly occupied the land. If they wanted to avoid a hefty fine and the loss of their feudal property, Rosales concluded, the Borromeo needed to produce the original documents proving that the fiefs had been granted in perpetuity.

As the proceedings got under way, the Borromeo were less than cooperative. They seem to have held on to a deep disdain of lasting records. Although they occasionally produced legal briefs in their defense, they preferred to drop in to the *Magistrato's* offices in person or send a legal representative, forcing scribes to waste precious time recording what was said during these visits. Much of this was a delaying tactic. While the family had initially been granted fifteen days to submit the necessary paperwork, that deadline was repeatedly extended over the following years, with their agents typically arguing that it was necessary for them to “haver molto tempo a fare le debite diligenze trattandosi di cose antiche, e prescritte.”¹³³² More than two years into the proceedings, the court complained about these tactics in a *consulta* to the governor: “non è stato possibile, che li [gli atti] habbino voluto esibire sotterfugendolo sempre hor con una comparit[ion]e, hor con un mem[oria]le dimandando termini, et dicendo non esser tenuti, et con altri pretesti per non venir già mai alla produzione de Privilegi.”¹³³³

Further hamstringing the proceedings was the Borromeo's feigned inability to understand the importance of original documents. Seeing as early modern jurisprudence relied heavily on legal precedent, both sides in a proceeding often adduced privileges and prerogatives that dated back many decades, if not centuries. Legally minded contemporaries therefore saw good archival practices as an important part of establishing the truth, and this is one of the main reasons why the period witnessed a drive toward rationalizing the repositories of noble families and public institutions. Although this process was in part driven by the nobility itself, the Borromeo elected not to partake of this trend.¹³³⁴ Mirroring this attitude, in the early stages of the trial, they failed to produce any documents at all. After numerous injunctions from the court, they swore they were neither trying to “recusare” nor to “differire l'essibitione” of the documents, settling instead for the rather fanciful claim that the key to the family archive had been lost as a result of the depredations of the war.¹³³⁵

¹³³¹ 1648. 7 Novembre. Annotazioni in margine alla Lettera Reale del 1577 sopra diversi punti riguardanti l'esecuzione della medesima, fra le quali vi è quella di doversi eccitare i Conti Borromei a giustificare il titolo de feudi, che possiedono: ASM, Atti di governo, Feudi camerati p.a., cart. 49.

¹³³² 1649. 29. Feb.o: ASM, Atti di governo, Feudi camerati p.a., cart. 49.

¹³³³ 1649 19 Agosto. Consulta al Governo, intorno all'operato nella Causa Borromea, concludendo competere al Fisco la facoltà di obbligare le Parti a produrre i privilegi de' feudi, e Regalie: ASM, Atti di governo, Feudi camerati p.a., cart. 49.

¹³³⁴ Friedrich, *The Rise of Archival Consciousness*.

¹³³⁵ 1649. 23 settembre. Ricorso: ASM, Atti di governo, Feudi camerati p.a., cart. 49.

Even when they eventually turned around, the lords of Lake Maggiore showed little appreciation of the value that their opponents in the courts attached to documents “in forma autentica.” Two years into the investigation, they came forward to produce a number of copies of privileges asking not to be “molested” any further.¹³³⁶ When the *Magistrato*’s lawyers insisted on seeing the originals, the Borromeo stubbornly professed that they had done more than could reasonably be asked of them by producing copies (in some cases) and confirmations by later dukes of Milan (in others) which allegedly proved that they were the rightful owners of the land around Lake Maggiore. Yet, as the *Magistrato* pointed out, in most cases these documents were mere confirmations of existing documents, most of them signed by Charles V who had reinstated all existing feudal privileges when the duchy of Milan had devolved to the Holy Roman Empire in 1535, which were insufficient “se non si esibiscono li privilegi, che si suppongon confirmati.” As the lawyers went on to explain, “per delucidare le ragioni fiscali, è necessario vedere l’originale della concessione de loro feudi sop[r]a quale soppongono fondare la loro intent[ion]e et possesso,” seeing as only these contained the contentious redemption clause.¹³³⁷

Opportunistic though it was, this back-and-forth offers a window into two differing worldviews: that of the nobility and that of an up-and-coming class of legally trained bureaucrats. The lawyers’ insistence that they be shown original documents militated against deeply held beliefs among the nobility. Whereas legal specialists seem to have become more and more convinced of the inherent worth of written documents, the nobility continued to value action over words, spoken communication over written records.¹³³⁸ The Borromeo’s response to the court’s insistence on original documents was telling: they argued that they had possessed the fiefs since time immemorial. The confirmations they had submitted clearly showed that “la Casa Borromea era sino d’all’hora in possesso di d[ett]i feudi à tanto tempore citra, cuius memoria hominum in contrarium non extat.” They cited the *Novae Constitutiones* of Milan, claiming that the “Prescriptione tanti temporis, cuius initij non sit memoria in contrarium” applied to their case.¹³³⁹ Surely, they seemed to imply, hard facts weighed more than an elusive piece of paper. Given that so many years had gone by since the land in question had been enfeoffed to the family, it was inconceivable that “possino esser molestati li possessori de feudi” on such frivolous grounds.¹³⁴⁰

The differences ran much deeper. What clashed were two different conceptions of the monarchy. To the Borromeo, stuck in the mindset of the Olivares years, the *Magistrato*’s inquiry was a blatant attack on their well-deserved privileges, which they enjoyed because they had signed up to

¹³³⁶ 1649.19 Lug.o: ASM, Atti di governo, Feudi camerati p.a., cart. 49.

¹³³⁷ 1649 19 Agosto. Consulta al Governo, intorno all’operato nella Causa Borromea, concludendo competere al Fisco la facoltà di obbligare le Parti a produrre i privilegi de’ feudi, e Regalie: ASM, Atti di governo, Feudi camerati p.a., cart. 49.

¹³³⁸ Neuschel, Word of Honor, chap. 4.

¹³³⁹ 1649. 23 settembre. Ricorso: ASM, Atti di governo, Feudi camerati p.a., cart. 49.

¹³⁴⁰ 1649. 23 settembre. Ricorso: ASM, Atti di governo, Feudi camerati p.a., cart. 49.

shield the masses from the ravages of war.¹³⁴¹ Interrogating the righteousness of their possessions around Lake Maggiore, on which much of their social standing was premised, was tantamount to an assault on their dignity as a noble family who sat perched above everyone else as a reward for their contribution to society.¹³⁴² To the prosecutors, on the other hand, this was a battle over who had how much access to the royal demesne, and the need for everybody, including the high nobility, to contribute materially to a monarchy in dire straits. In the magistrates' view, the time of the comforting fiction of the nobility as the protectors of the poor was over, and the moment had arrived for them to walk the walk. On the strength of the rhetoric of the popular movements that had rocked the monarchy, some legal professionals were reorganizing the fundamental tenets of the monarchy, toiling slowly but inexorably from inside the institutions to spread the new vision of the Spanish empire that had emerged out of the crisis. As part of a near universal push to chip away at noble tax privileges, they redefined the responsibilities of the nobility as a social group.¹³⁴³

In the legal proceedings against the Borromeo, it was Francisco Ramos, a former law professor at the prestigious university of Salamanca and now serving in the *Magistrato Straordinario*, who most clearly embodied the new approach to governance.¹³⁴⁴ Like many of his colleagues, Ramos saw himself as a representative of the vassals before the king, but more importantly perhaps, as the mouthpiece of the monarch in front of recalcitrant noble subjects.¹³⁴⁵ Propelled by his conviction, he came down hard on the Borromeo. Writing in Latin, he had no time for the pettifoggery of the Borromeo's agents who clearly knew very little about law.¹³⁴⁶ Ramos's second brief in particular was a powerful indictment of the underhanded methods of the defendants and their lawyers, lamenting as it did the fact that they had spent the better part of four years opening new frontlines which served no other purpose than to add to the paper trail. Instead of settling the case, they had been dragging their heels, speculating that they would be able to win the trial through social power rather than on the basis of sound juridical arguments.

Having taken down the legal strategy of the Borromeo, Ramos went on to address the substance of the case. He argued that the statute of limitations which the defendants claimed had expired applied only in cases of a "possessione longissimi temporis, cuius memoria penes homini[s] non extet." Yet, in this case, the very documents the Borromeo had produced mentioned the year in which the family had acquired the fiefs in question and thus constituted "certa [...] memoria originis acquisitionibus horum feudorum." The same could be said of the fact that "praescriptionem

¹³⁴¹ Dewald, *The European Nobility*, p. 15.

¹³⁴² Dewald, *The European Nobility*, pp. 1, 28.

¹³⁴³ Dewald, *The European Nobility*, pp. 32, 120.

¹³⁴⁴ Signorotto, *Milano spagnola*, p. 121.

¹³⁴⁵ Rivero, *The Court of Madrid*, p. 71; Comparato, *Uffici*, pp. 166–167.

¹³⁴⁶ *Primum votum in causa Feudorum Comitum Borromaeorum. 1650 8 Decembris: ASM, Atti di governo, Feudi camerali p.a., cart. 49.*

allegatam saepe interruptam esse,” as evidenced by the royal letter of 1577. “Itaque,” he determined, “credit Fiscus praefatos Comites praescriptione ista nullo iure uti posse.”¹³⁴⁷ In the post-Olivares age the old subterfuges no longer seemed to work. The nobility who had long built success in court on demonstrations of strength rather than legal argument could no longer win trials through a combination of delaying tactics and half-baked counterarguments as officials like Ramos stood up to them.

Ramos’s two briefs, at long last, made the Borromeo’s lawyers come around. After disdainful written communication for so long, they suddenly embraced both proof through original documents and the legal brief as their preferred method of defense. In a memorandum drawn up in response to Ramos, they reiterated an earlier request to see the royal letter of 1577 on which the magistrate based its claims to the Borromeo’s fiefs. Adopting the tactics of their opponents, the lawyers argued that since they were not allowed to see the “copia autentica” of the letter, they had no way of knowing whether the printed letter they had received was a legally binding royal order. Preempting the *Magistrato’s* response, they proceeded to refute said royal letter. Their analysis was an exercise in sophistry. They argued that since most sentences in the document began with “we hear,” the whole case rested on hearsay. Rather than investigate these unsubstantiated claims, as the king had ordered them to do, the magistrate had taken them at face value and continued to hound the Borromeo even though in the legal documents that they had submitted “non si vede alcuna ragione di patto à redimere, & à recuperare li feudi.”¹³⁴⁸

For that argument to be effective, the Borromeo also needed to supply the original documents. After holding them back “nel timore che potessero offrire cavilli al regio fisco,” they now went on the offensive.¹³⁴⁹ Early in 1651, the Borromeo visited the magistrate and produced a number of supporting documents, including a few original investitures, and attached a detailed brief on the proper interpretation of the material. They argued that even if one were to read the royal letter as an order, these documents proved that “la Redemibilità suggerita dalla Maestà del Rè Filippo secondo riguardi il solo feudo di Angera, non già li altri.”¹³⁵⁰ Yet, if Intra was off the table, so was Angera because the terms and conditions as they had presented themselves in 1577 no longer applied seeing as the fief had in the meantime been confiscated and been resold to the Borromeo in the 1620s. In light of this, the defendants urged the *Magistrato* to “imporre perpetuo silentio a questa Causa, e che non siamo più molestati.”¹³⁵¹

¹³⁴⁷ Primum votum in causa Feudorum Comitum Borromaeorum. 1650 8 Decembris: ASM, Atti di governo, Feudi camerati p.a., cart. 49.

¹³⁴⁸ 1654. 1 Marzo. Informatione della causa de Feudi Borromeo: ASM, Atti di governo, Feudi camerati p.a., cart. 49.

¹³⁴⁹ Annoni, Fisco, p. 97.

¹³⁵⁰ 1654 13 Marzo: ASM, Atti di governo, Feudi camerati p.a., cart. 49.

¹³⁵¹ 1655 13 Gennaio. Decreto del Magistrato interlocutorio sopra nuovo ricorso delli Conti Borromei che addimandano doversi imporre perpetuo silenzio di questa Causa: ASM, Atti di governo, Feudi camerati p.a., cart. 49.

As it turned out, the seeming compliance was yet another ruse. Behind the scenes, the family were maneuvering to bring an extra-legal end to the trial. In what can only be described as an attempt to pervert the course of justice, governor Caracena, a close ally of Giovanni Borromeo's, in 1654 wrote a letter to the *Magistrato Straordinario* urging the court to drop the case. Soon thereafter Philip IV himself wrote in to press for a settlement within six months' time.¹³⁵² The *Magistrato* duly knuckled under. On January 21, 1655, the court ruled in the Borromeo's favor. The sentence largely adopted the family's own vista, arguing of the castle of Angera in particular that "la causa resta terminata, anche nel merito, poiché per parte di detti Conti Borromei, [...] essendo stata prodotta nelli atti di questo Magistrato Investitura di nuova concessione fatta dalla Maestà Vostra sotto il dì 16 Luglio 1623."¹³⁵³ The emphasis put on the uncontroversial fief of Angera was an attempt to save face. Still, and despite their best efforts, the magistrates were unable to conceal that the court was still susceptible to pressure from on high. As they had done in other cases, such as when they demanded an exemption from emergency taxation in 1648¹³⁵⁴, the Borromeo had once again mobilized their network in the courts of Milan and Madrid to avoid contributing their share to a monarchy in crisis.

For the *Magistrato* this was an utter defeat. The crop of community-conscious lawyers had been unable to force a powerful family to fight on their terms, let alone comply with the rules of engagement between the monarchy and the nobility that the *Magistrato* championed. Rather than face up with reality, the Borromeo had conspired with their cronies to make sure that even the best legal argument ultimately had to yield to the reality of a hierarchical society in which powerful dynasties ruled the roost. What triumphed in this miscarriage of justice was a vision according to which monarchical institutions ought to be in the hands of the nobility who were entitled to use them to run roughshod over the rest of the population.

Yet, one doughty lawyer in the *Magistrato* did not give forfeit that easily. In the mid-1650s, Carlo Bellone, an *avvocato fiscale*, was again poring over the documents, on the lookout for a loophole that would allow for a retrial.¹³⁵⁵ In 1656 he zeroed in on the Borromeo fiefdom of Intra and relaunched an investigation into the market town on Lake Maggiore. Bellone went much further than his predecessors, actively questioning the legal basis on which the fiefdom had ended up in the Borromeo's possession. In so doing, he took down the defense on which the Borromeo had settled in the earlier litigation. As he revealed, the Borromeo, for all their investment in the rhetoric of

¹³⁵² Copies of both letters are in 1656 28 Settembre. Consulta a Sua Maestà in evasione degli articoli nella lettera Reale primo Giugno 1655: ASM, Atti di governo, Feudi camerati p.a., cart. 49.

¹³⁵³ 1656 28 Settembre. Consulta a Sua Maestà in evasione degli articoli nella lettera Reale primo Giugno 1655: ASM, Atti di governo, Feudi camerati p.a., cart. 49.

¹³⁵⁴ See the letter of governor de Haro to Philip IV, dated Milan January 1, 1648, in which he urged the monarch to "suspend" the tax that had been levied on the Borromeo: ABIB, FB, Giovanni V., Carriera militare.

¹³⁵⁵ Little is known about Bellone, though he later became president of the Magistrato Ordinario. See Gualdo Priorato, *Relatione*, pp. 18, 209.

medieval feudalism, treated the acquisition of fiefdoms as a simple transaction, with the king representing the seller and the Borromeo the buyers. Fiefs, they seemed to believe, were subject to contract law like any other purchase: once they had changed hands, they could only be redeemed by the king if a clause to that effect had been included in the original investiture. Under no circumstance was the seller able retrospectively to change the terms and conditions, let alone reclaim a fief, as the *Magistrato* was doing.¹³⁵⁶

It was this idea of the royal demesne as a marketplace, so central to the rule of the *valido*, that Bellone called into question in his legal brief. Kings, he argued, were unlike any other seller: the agreements between feudatories and princes could not be compared to a sales contract. Although princes entered into compacts like private individuals, they were within their rights to back out of an agreement. Even when they had been alienated to the king's subjects, fiefs remained part of the royal demesne and could therefore be reclaimed at any moment. As long as he agreed to reimburse the feudatories, "Princeps redimens [non] dicitur impugnare contractus."¹³⁵⁷ This applied to fiefs which had been granted free of charge, but particularly to those that had been sold, for the latter were proffered under duress, not out of royal largesse, to raise funds when the king's war chest was empty. Hence, Bellone insisted, sales were always a temporary matter. Princes were liable for the "bona Reipublicae," and when they "ex necessitate" alienated a part of the royal demesne, they were required to recover it at the earliest opportunity in the interest of the entirety of their subjects, without special consideration for their noble vassals. "Licet enim Princeps ligetur suis contractibus instar private, tamen non prohibetur quin ex causa possit ab illis recedere."¹³⁵⁸

Bellone's brief was the most powerful sign yet of the winds of change that were howling in the institutions of the monarchy. His was not just a call for more predictable legal decisions; it was an impassioned defense of distributive justice. Reviving medieval conceptions of kingship, men like Bellone reiterated that the administration of the public domain comprised the running of public institutions, the courts, and the patronage of the monarchy, but stressed that all these tasks should be expedited with a view to "justice."¹³⁵⁹ It was particularly in the last area—the administration of patronage—that royal officials had abandoned that lodestar, and it was high time for the king to wrest back control and restore some balance.¹³⁶⁰ As Bellone pointed out in his harangue, in a monarchy composed of multiple jurisdictions, the king was the ultimate arbiter of justice. And, as such, he had the right, indeed the obligation, to defend what was in the interest, not of particularly

¹³⁵⁶ 1657 30 Agosto. Sopra ricorso dei Conti Borromei nel quale aducono nuove ragioni per escludere la redenzione [...]: ASM, Atti di governo, Feudi camerali p.a., cart. 50.

¹³⁵⁷ Votum Regi Fiscii in causa Feodorum Possessorum per Comites Borromaeus. 1657 die 5 Maij: ASM, Atti di governo, Feudi camerali p.a., cart. 50.

¹³⁵⁸ Votum Regi Fiscii in causa Feodorum Possessorum per Comites Borromaeus. 1657 die 5 Maij: ASM, Atti di governo, Feudi camerali p.a., cart. 50.

¹³⁵⁹ Malcolm, *Royal Favouritism*, pp. 94–95.

¹³⁶⁰ Ponce Leiva, *Percepciones*, pp. 203–204.

influential vassals, such as the Borromeo, but of all his subjects and “to make sure no unreasonable demands were placed on” some subjects at the expense of others.¹³⁶¹ Echoing reformist ideas from the early decades of the century, Bellone believed that justice sometimes required the monarch to revoke privileges that had been obtained by unjust means.¹³⁶²

One historian has read this brief as royal absolutism being foisted upon the Borromeo in all its ugly arbitrariness, and the latter would certainly have been inclined to agree.¹³⁶³ A more charitable reading would, however, recognize that men like Ramos and certainly Bellone seem to have been committed to a more inclusive vision of the monarchy as a commonwealth that should cater to the needs of all its members. As was the case elsewhere, they were wary to question feudalism per se, but they did interrogate feudal “powers that lacked clear legal authority” and were therefore perceived to be eating away at the social fabric.¹³⁶⁴ Inspired by the popular movements who had raised their voice against the deep-seated creed in the monarchy as a fountain of endless grace for the privileged, these lawyers defended a vision of the Spanish empire according to which “from the king to the lowest of the royal servants, all were obligated [...] to defend and serve the common good.”¹³⁶⁵ They themselves had made a significant contribution toward the war effort whereas the established nobility had been reluctant to follow suit. If sixteenth-century theorists had posited the common good as a moral obligation of the well-heeled¹³⁶⁶, this generation of lawyers seemed to believe the commitment to the commonwealth was a legal requirement by which all were bound. To realize the monarchy’s full potential, they were willing to prop up the king as the guarantor of the common good against the powerful and endow him with ample powers to force even the most influential nobles to contribute to the wellbeing of all his subjects.

Bellone and others like him staffing the Milanese bureaucracy were following in the footsteps of their much better studied colleagues in Catalonia and southern Italy.¹³⁶⁷ In Naples, the reign of Olivares witnessed the rise of a group of *doctores* manning the institutions of the kingdom. Known as *togati* in Italian, or *letrados* in Spanish, some certainly exaggerated their influence, such as the Castilian jurist who boasted in 1641, “If before, grandees were greater than *letrados*, now *letrados* have become the grandees.”¹³⁶⁸ Still, the traditional nobility was right to perceive them as a threat to the status quo.¹³⁶⁹ Their mouthpieces in Naples had been arguing since the 1620s that only an alliance of the monarch and jurists could put to bed the rapacious rule of the nobility before an

¹³⁶¹ MacKay, *The Limits*, p. 146. On the idea of the “monarquía jurisdiccional,” see Álvarez-Ossorio, *El duque de Osuna*, p. 167.

¹³⁶² On similar *arbitrista* arguments, see Windler, *Arbitrismo*, p. 37.

¹³⁶³ Annoni, *Fisco*, p. 100.

¹³⁶⁴ Rovito, *La rivoluzione*, p. 387. Also see Dewald, *The European Nobility*, p. 74.

¹³⁶⁵ Andújar Castillo et al., *A Sick Body*, p. 142.

¹³⁶⁶ Andújar Castillo et al., *A Sick Body*, pp. 142–143.

¹³⁶⁷ On Catalonia, see Amelang, *Barristers*.

¹³⁶⁸ Quoted in Dewald, *The European Nobility*, p. 38.

¹³⁶⁹ Comparato, *Uffici*, p. 278.

enraged populace did so with violent means.¹³⁷⁰ This brewing conflict came to a head in the 1640s. Although the Spanish court's intransigence eventually cornered them into anti-Spanish and anti-monarchical positions, the *togati* had initially been reformers who wanted to restore those powers to the judicial apparatus that the necessities of the Franco-Spanish war had undermined.¹³⁷¹ As Pier Luigi Rovito concludes, "Napoli s'era sollevata per riaffermare l'ordine giuridico tradizionale, minacciato dalla rimonta politica della nobiltà e da una fiscalità 'iniusta'."¹³⁷² Indeed, the popular rallying cry "Long live the king, down with bad government!" offered a succinct description of the *togati's* program of curtailing the powers of the nobility and strengthening their own authority as the faithful executioners of the king's will.¹³⁷³ This they accomplished. Although they did not succeed in changing the institutional framework of the monarchy, they came out of the crisis of the 1640s as the winners, imposing themselves as the arbiters of the common good.¹³⁷⁴

By the 1650s, throughout the Spanish empire, control of the monarchy's central institutions was in the hands of a new nobility of *togati* who laid claim to leadership roles and noble status not by dint of their noble birth but their virtues as administrators.¹³⁷⁵ As an ascendant elite who did not fight wars, these lawyers tried to impose their own understanding of royal service on the more traditional warrior nobility who had risen under successive minister-favorites. Deeply influenced by Roman law, which formed the core of their training, they firmly believed that only the king at the top of social pyramid had enough of an understanding of society as a whole to defend the collective good.¹³⁷⁶ While most of them did not question the "bastard feudalism" of the age, they did demand a return to a more equitable distribution of royal resources that had supposedly prevailed under Philip II, the last monarch who had governed without the participation of the high nobility.¹³⁷⁷ Their role as servants was to use the law to course-correct what they viewed as the excesses of the Olivares regime, including the cannibalization of royal assets as the privileged helped themselves to the treasures of the monarchy without any regard for the commonwealth.

It would be wrong to idealize these lawyers by likening them to modern anti-corruption forces. To borrow Jens Ivo Engels's useful distinction, the lawyers who questioned the Borromeo and others' privileges wanted to "fight the corruption of individuals or a given group of individuals," not "fight corruption by changing structures."¹³⁷⁸ It is probably true that they weaponized the issue of clean government for not entirely selfless reasons, though it would be unfair to claim that their

¹³⁷⁰ Comparato, *Uffici*, pp. 316–317, discussing Francesco Imperato.

¹³⁷¹ Rovito, *La rivoluzione*, pp. 373, 383–85, 423.

¹³⁷² Rovito, *La rivoluzione*, p. 387.

¹³⁷³ Rovito, *La rivoluzione*, pp. 403–404 (quote on p. 403).

¹³⁷⁴ Rovito, *La rivoluzione*, pp. 368, 447.

¹³⁷⁵ Rovito, *La rivoluzione*, pp. 417, 419; Kamen, *Spain in the Later Seventeenth Century*, p. 32.

¹³⁷⁶ Dewald, *The European Nobility*, p. 139.

¹³⁷⁷ Villari, *Discussioni sulla crisi*, pp. 47–48.

¹³⁷⁸ Engels, *Corruption*, p. 173.

accusations were merely tactical: they did seek to achieve more than oust political opponents with high-sounding arguments.¹³⁷⁹ While their criticism of corruption was not systemic, they did want to right rampant administrative malfeasance and redress a balance that had been tilted in favor of the elite for too long.¹³⁸⁰ As the leader of the revolt in Naples had put it, “li pesi sono tutti del popolo et gli onori tutti della Nobiltà,” before he concluded, “Queste sono male spartenze” which needed to be readjusted.¹³⁸¹ Unlike later reformers, the lawyers of Spanish Italy at midcentury did not think of patronage and the pursuit of the common good as mutually exclusive goals; in fact, the common good could be attained if and when patronage was handled fairly by an enlightened monarch and trusty ministers such as themselves, though not necessarily the masses whose rhetoric they had purloined.¹³⁸²

Even so, this transformation goes to show the astonishing influence of ordinary people in Milanese politics at the end of the emergency. The language of accountability they had crafted in the fight against the unequal *case erme* policy was resonating with sections of the administrative apparatus of the state. This should not, of course, be mistaken for a triumph of the interests of common people, which came much closer to being realized elsewhere.¹³⁸³ In fact, ordinary people in the Borromeo’s fiefs may have won the argument but not much else. Rather than a full-blown victory, this seems to be a classic case of sections of the elite promulgating the aspirations of ordinary people to rein in the power of competitors.¹³⁸⁴ Nevertheless, Bellone’s harangue against the Borromeo remains one of the clearest statements against the nobility capturing monarchical institutions and a rallying cry for monarchs to step in and curb the power of the elite if and when it imperiled the commonwealth.

What is more, these arguments won support in other quarters. As Bellone formulated his ideas on the commonwealth, powerful elites in Madrid were marshaling similar arguments to prevent Giovanni Borromeo from entering the highest ranks of the monarchy. This is not to suggest that Borromeo’s opponents in the court of Madrid were cognizant of the *Magistrato’s* proceedings against him; they most likely were not, although one of the conspirators, governor Fuensaldaña, must have had some familiarity with the case. Rather, the arguments that were rehearsed in the *Magistrato* resonated with a broader political culture that was rapidly changing in the aftermath of the crisis of the 1640s. At the court of Madrid, the high nobility was taking stock of its reckless self-enrichment. In 1650, an English statesman had remarked that the Spanish elite were “a wretched,

¹³⁷⁹ I borrow this distinction from Asch et al., *Einleitung*, p. 22; Bernsee, *Moralische Erneuerung*, p. 30.

¹³⁸⁰ Bernsee has argued that systemic criticism of Old Regime administrative practices emerged only in the late 1700s as a result of the communication revolution of the eighteenth century. See his *Moralische Erneuerung*, chap. 1.

¹³⁸¹ Quoted in Rovito, *La rivoluzione*, p. 376.

¹³⁸² Engels, *Corruption*, p. 175; Villari, *Discussioni sulla crisi*, pp. 48–49.

¹³⁸³ On the radical possibilities of popular organization in the 1640s, see Rees, *The Leveller Revolution*.

¹³⁸⁴ Corteguera, *For the Common Good*, p. 44.

miserable, proud, senseless people,” adding that “if some miracle do not preserve them, this crown must be speedily destroyed.”¹³⁸⁵ By the mid-1650s, the “senseless people” were cottoning on to the idea that something needed to change. In response to the breakdown of authority, the emerging oligarchy in Madrid was trying to install the Habsburg dynasty as the custodians of the common good, forcing fellow members of the nobility who had hitherto thought of the pursuit of their own glory as congruent with that of the Catholic monarch to seek legitimacy in selfless service to the house of Habsburg.¹³⁸⁶ Those who failed to go with the script risked being swept away by the ascendancy of the compelling new vision of the Spanish empire as a commonwealth that had first been articulated by village communities in Milan and the wider monarchy.

The dynamics that played out are remarkable indeed. In an unexpected twist of events, arguments first voiced at the bottom of the pile nourished ideas that would become useful for Castilian grandees itching to dump the Borromeo and their ilk. Having enticed them with flashy symbols and the prospect of joining the in-crowd, the leading voices in Madrid now needed to fabricate a subterfuge that allowed them to renege on their earlier promises. The arguments of the masses supplied unexpected materials to those who were keen on blocking the Borromeo’s access to the highest echelons of power. In fact, Giovanni’s detractors made much of the notion of “entrusted power,” the idea that, although crown officials had some leeway, they had to exercise authority in the interest of all the king’s subjects, a standard of which Giovanni Borromeo had clearly fallen short.¹³⁸⁷ Not only had Borromeo failed to live up to their responsibility and provide financial help to the monarchy when it was most needed, they concluded. Borromeo had not even matched up to the traditional responsibility of the nobility: rather than fight to protect the king’s subjects, he had torpedoed the war effort to increase his own power vis-à-vis the governor.¹³⁸⁸

Indeed, as the Council of State pondered Giovanni’s ten-year stint as commissioner-general, a picture emerged of someone more interested in his own prerogatives than in royal service. Hindsight made plain that the incident involving governor Fuensaldaña that had first attracted their attention was only the last in a long list of similarly unedifying episodes. From the ruling elite’s angle, Giovanni’s entire career now looked like a succession of points of honors that were a dangerous distraction from a war threatening to tear the monarchy asunder. Upon taking office in 1646, Giovanni took on the highest ranked military officer, the *maestro di campo generale*, openly questioning the latter’s prerogatives to oversee the movement of officers across the State.¹³⁸⁹

¹³⁸⁵ Quoted in Parker, *Global Crisis*, p. 290.

¹³⁸⁶ Engels, *Corruption*, p. 175.

¹³⁸⁷ On the notion of “entrusted power” in 1650s Britain, see Knights, *Anticorruption*, pp. 191–192.

¹³⁸⁸ Maffi, *Il baluardo*, p. 209.

¹³⁸⁹ Decreto del Sig. Contestabile di Castiglia sopra la differenza verte tra il Castellano di Milano don Gio. Vazquez Coronado, & il Commissario Generale dello Stato Conte Giovanni Borromeo in: ASM, *Registri delle cancellerie*, serie XI, pezzo 2, p. 292.

Around the same time, he started a similar feud with Antonio Arias Sotelo, the newly appointed governor of the fortress of Alessandria.¹³⁹⁰ Given the remoteness of the area and its sensitive location between the territories of minor potentates, the *castellano* of Alessandria had traditionally been possessed of powers to allocate troops in the area south of the Po.¹³⁹¹ Giovanni Borromeo in a plea to the Spanish authorities claimed that this prerogative of the governor of Alessandria stunted his authority as commissioner-general which, he argued, extended to the entire State of Milan.¹³⁹² Although Borromeo initially received a favorable verdict from the Secret Council in Milan (of which he had recently become a member), the Council of State in Madrid felt compelled to enjoin “este cavallero” to seek “moderación, conteniéndose en los límites que le toca, sin pretender más que sus antecesores.”¹³⁹³ It was after this reprimand by a royal court that many began to think of Giovanni’s bickering as a waste of time. By the mid-1650s, as one scholar familiar with the case puts it, the “commissario aveva fatto di tutto per inimicarsi l’*establishment* militare, cercando di ampliare i propri poteri.”¹³⁹⁴ This view was becoming axiomatic. Writing in from the court of Rome, Giovanni’s brother alerted the family in Milan to “gente che spargono” rumors about Giovanni’s “ostinationi e punti cavillosi.”¹³⁹⁵

For Madrid’s reconstructed governing elite, it was striking to register that, in all these skirmishes, the social function of military service had triumphed over its technical function. If the quest for self-aggrandizement and reputation had been compatible with the ideal of royal service under the count-duke, the Olivares model seemed increasingly out of kilter with a resurgent commitment to the collective good.¹³⁹⁶ What had once been standard practice was now deeply offensive. With the benefit of hindsight on the most dramatic years of the monarchy, it was impossible to argue in good faith that Giovanni’s pursuit of individual power and grandeur had furthered the larger cause he proclaimed to be advancing. In the face of his refusal to contribute financially to the war effort and his drag on the army with needless points of honor, the movers and shakers in Madrid found it impossible to buy into Giovanni’s professions of “disinterestedness.” The image of the *olivarista* hero he continued to affect no longer convinced at a time when that figure was exposed as a self-serving fiction that bore no resemblance to what was now viewed as a solipsistic quest for power detrimental to the king and the commonwealth.

See also the letter of governor Caracena to Philip IV dated Milan May 22, 1649, and the edict of Philip IV to Giovanni Borromeo, dated 30 January 1649, in ABIB, FB, Giovanni V, Carriera militare.

¹³⁹⁰ Maffi, *Il baluardo*, pp. 302–303.

¹³⁹¹ Anselmi, “Conservare lo Stato,” pp. 167–170.

¹³⁹² Anselmi, “Conservare lo Stato,” pp. 170, 173–174.

¹³⁹³ Quoted in Maffi, *Il baluardo*, p. 304, n. 217.

¹³⁹⁴ Maffi, *Il baluardo*, p. 307.

¹³⁹⁵ Federico V to Isabella Arcimboldi Borromeo, Rome March 29, 1657: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, Corrispondenza 1656–1664.

¹³⁹⁶ On this shift, see Malcolm, *Royal Favouritism*, p. 182.

Giovanni Borromeo's experience was hardly atypical, as research on southern Italy in the immediate aftermath of the revolt of 1647-1648 shows. If the viceroy of Naples, the count of Oñate, first showered loyal clans with the usual honors, his largesse soon came under criticism from a crown eager to seize the opportunity to rein in the nobility.¹³⁹⁷ Among the many losers of the restoration of Spanish power in Naples, Giangirolamo Acquaviva (1600–1665), a nobleman who lorded over large swathes of land in and around Conversano and Nardò in Apulia, stood out. The clan's history with the crown had been marred by bouts of disloyalty, with the Acquaviva repeatedly threatening that they would side with the French to topple the Catholic king as ruler of southern Italy. By the 1640s, however, the counts of Conversano had come around, reinventing themselves as vehement supporters of the Habsburg cause. When Acquaviva's subjects rebelled in 1647–1648 as part of the large revolt that was sweeping Naples and laid bare his track record of gratuitous violence against his vassals, he joined forces with other nobles in the kingdom to quash a rebellion that was calling into question his own predominance in the region. Once law and order were restored, Acquaviva made a bid for a Spanish order, in his case a grandeeship, citing his services to the crown in putting down the insurgency of 1647–1648. This plea, however, was rejected, with the crown arguing that although Acquaviva maintained to have fought for the king, the “squinter of Apulia” (*il guercio delle Puglie*), as his cowed subjects called him, was really fending off an attack of his peasants against his brutal rule.¹³⁹⁸ What he and his secretary were trying to sell as loyal royal service was, in actuality, brazen self-interest. In the crown's view, the fact that Acquaviva's own narrow interests dovetailed with those of the monarch was not sufficient grounds for him retrospectively to argue that he had been acting for the king alone. As Elena Papagna paraphrases the crown's reasoning, Giangirolamo may have stood up “per soccorrere la corona, ma, ancor più, per tutelare se stessi contro le spinte eversive di altri gruppi sociali.”¹³⁹⁹

Although the exact circumstances of the refusal to grant Giovanni Borromeo the habit of the Golden Fleece remain unclear, it seems plausible that Giovanni Borromeo fell victim to a more extended purge that was taking place in Madrid in the late 1650s. There are, after all, two surviving *consultas* from the Council of State dating from the summer and fall of 1658 in which it was recommended to the king that he confer the coveted habit on Giovanni Borromeo; then, all of a sudden, the documentary trail breaks off.¹⁴⁰⁰ It is of course possible that this was one of the usual delaying tactics of the crown through which the authorities guarded themselves from having to hand

¹³⁹⁷ See Minguito Palomares, Nápoles, pp. 144–147, 175, on the post-revolutionary settlement in the kingdom of Naples. On Oñate's handling of the nobility, see *ibid.*, pp. 227–229, 232–233.

¹³⁹⁸ Spagnoletti, Giangirolamo, pp. 10–11.

¹³⁹⁹ Papagna, *Sogni e bisogni*, p. 123.

¹⁴⁰⁰ 5.o memorial presentado miércoles 14 Ag.o 1658 [...] and 6.o memorial se presentó lunes 23 de septiembre 1658 [...]: ABIB, FB, Giovanni V, *Carriera militare*.

out too much to the already powerful so as not to upset a precarious balance.¹⁴⁰¹ Quite possibly, though, there was more to this than the usual non-decision of a royal council, a conclusion borne out by the Borromeo's reaction. As far as they were concerned, there was no doubt that Giovanni had been stopped cold by a courtier elite who had weaponized the notion of disinterested service and were applying it as a benchmark retrospectively to exclude competitors from access to the court. His agent Sorino backed him up on this, arguing that all the recommendations of a succession of governors and the *consultas* of the Council of State in Giovanni Borromeo's favor were "superfluo durando il Governo in Fuensaldagna."¹⁴⁰² Unable to cope with what was happening around them, the Borromeo perceived the unexpected turn of their fortunes as evidence of the crown's ingratitude.¹⁴⁰³

Giovanni Borromeo felt as though the monarchy had failed its end of the deal. By accusing him of egotism, Madrid called into question the terms of the unwritten contract on which Giovanni Borromeo had become entangled with the Spanish monarchy. The *olivarista* conception of royal service—the idea that the pursuit of private interests would somehow reflect on the house of Habsburg itself—was negated as private interests were being more neatly separated from public ambitions.¹⁴⁰⁴ What is more, the paragons of the new orthodoxy now maintained that the king as the supreme arbiter over the commonwealth had an obligation to punish those who, in the past, had failed to live up to the standards of the present. It was a classic case of new powers shifting and readjusting the prevailing value system through "a classification struggle [...] over the right to monopolize the legitimate definition of what is to be the most valued form of capital."¹⁴⁰⁵ Giovanni Borromeo appears to have been left behind by one of the most significant "transformations in the structure of the field of power" of his time.¹⁴⁰⁶ As a recomposed nobility captured the monarchy, they used their weight to confer their own self-interested "classifications and categories official legitimation" and to reject alternative claims to predominance.¹⁴⁰⁷ In their quest for power, charges of corruption, as Robert Bernsee has shown in an altogether different context, proved particularly effective to delegitimize an old order (and lend implicit legitimacy to a new one), as a dismayed Giovanni Borromeo was learning in the 1650s.¹⁴⁰⁸

It was more than a little ironic that Giovanni's forward march was halted, if not by the commoners whom he had exploited to make his way to the top, then at least by the arguments they had brought forth. What leaves a bitter aftertaste is the fact that these universal claims had opportunistically been repackaged by those who had an interest in keeping unwanted rivals away

¹⁴⁰¹ On this point, see Rizzo, *I cespiti*, pp. 476–477.

¹⁴⁰² Written report: ABIB, FB, Giovanni V, *Carriera militare*.

¹⁴⁰³ Federico IV to Giovanni, Lucerne April 24, 1659: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, *Corrispondenza 1656–1664*.

¹⁴⁰⁴ For similar developments in France, see Rowlands, *The Dynastic State*, p. 341.

¹⁴⁰⁵ Swartz, *Symbolic Power*, p. 35.

¹⁴⁰⁶ Bourdieu, *The State Nobility*, chap. IV.3.

¹⁴⁰⁷ Swartz, *Symbolic Power, Politics*, p. 36.

¹⁴⁰⁸ Bernsee, *Moralische Erneuerung*, p. 29.

from the resources of the monarchy. Having made it to the top just in time, the emerging post-*valido* elite were not keen on letting others share in the power they had acquired. As the truly powerful in the field, they were “in a position to make it function to their advantage” by adapting “the immanent rules of the game.”¹⁴⁰⁹ When the *olivarista* service nobility came knocking on the door, they had recourse to a new conception of princely service to discredit as corrupt what had once been a perfectly acceptable way of engaging with the monarchy, indeed one that had been encouraged by the center. As a nobleman from the kingdom of Naples, who was equally unfortunate as Giovanni Borromeo, remarked at the time, the political leaders of the restoration had effectively destroyed “tutta la macchina delle nostre speranze, quando ciascuno de’ meritevoli aspirava a gli dovuti onori e fabbricò l’esaltatione delle sue glorie sopra la ruina del credito e de meriti nostri appresso S[ua] M[ajestà],” leaving “veruna parte della nostra fedeltà libera dalle calunnie.”¹⁴¹⁰

The aftermath of the 1640s crisis witnessed the rise of nobles invested in an ethic of royal service with which Giovanni Borromeo’s *olivarista* track record was bound to clash. Despite his best efforts, the sort of capital he was able to invest could no longer be converted into symbolic power. Without his realizing it, the portfolio he had built had lost most of its value.¹⁴¹¹ In the ongoing “struggles over the imposition of a new definition of legitimacy,” Giovanni Borromeo’s understanding of public service had failed to prevail.¹⁴¹² Having banked on a military career to be lavished with the highest honors the king of Spain had to offer, Giovanni ended up going home empty-handed. A combination of greed and unfavorable circumstances had prevented him from entering the closed ranks of a pan-Spanish governing elites that was taking shape during the second half of Philip IV’s reign. With the Olivares route to power and dynastic aggrandizement blocked, a change in strategy was in order.

As Giovanni Borromeo headed for defeat, something unexpected happened. At the height of summer 1656, reports reached Milan of a miracle that occurred in the heart of the Borromeo’s fief on Lake Maggiore. When two young women stopped to pray before an image of the Madonna on Angera’s lakefront, the effigy next to Giovanni’s palace began to shed tears of blood. After the archbishop of Milan had declared the weeping Madonna a miracle, pilgrims started to flock to the site in such numbers that the town of Arona across the lake purportedly ran out of bread to feed them. In a letter to Giovanni, one of his surrogates waxed effusive about the “grazie insigni [sic] di infermità sanate, di stroppiati redrizati e d’ossessi liberati.”¹⁴¹³ As students of miracles keep reminding us, prodigious events usually occur in the vacuum left in the wake of traumatic collective

¹⁴⁰⁹ Bourdieu and Waquant, *An Invitation*, p. 99.

¹⁴¹⁰ Quoted in Rovito, *La rivoluzione*, p. 456.

¹⁴¹¹ Eribon, *Returning*, pp. 175–180.

¹⁴¹² Bourdieu, *The State Nobility*, p. 338.

¹⁴¹³ NN to Giovanni Borromeo, Angera August 14, 1656, quoted in Besozzi, Angera. *Il Santuario*, p. 10.

experiences.¹⁴¹⁴ The area around Lake Maggiore had certainly had more than its fair share of catastrophes in the preceding decades. Recovering from economic collapse and war, the local population was understandably susceptible to the transcendent. Genuine though the groundswell of popular piety may have been, powerful interests soon stepped in and kept the momentum going, harnessing the miraculous occurrence for their own ends.¹⁴¹⁵ The miracle of Angera was soon propagated through pamphlets, such as a *Vero ritratto della miracolosa Vergine Maria nel borgo di Angera sopra il Lago Maggiore*, for maximum effect.¹⁴¹⁶ Once the outburst of piety receded, the Borromeo family set out to transform the area around the southern tip of the lake into a sacred landscape. In 1662 architect Gerolamo Quadri commenced building works for a sanctuary commemorating the miracle of the weeping Madonna. Clearly the Borromeo were shifting towards a religious consecration of their waning power. Like the Spanish Habsburgs whom they had served, seemingly in vain, for the last four decades, they now insisted that God had blessed their holdings and, by extension, its lords as they pivoted back to their religious roots.¹⁴¹⁷

The aftermath of the miracle of Angera was a sign that the Borromeo had finally found their own response to the puritanical age that the deposition of the last minister-favorite in Madrid had heralded. Sketching out the strategy, Giovanni retreated to religious life. As a founding member and patron of the Accademia dei Faticosi, which was housed inside the Theatine monastery of Sant'Antonio Abate in Milan, he dedicated himself to intellectual pursuits, producing a number of erudite treatises in which he put his sophisticated intellect on show.¹⁴¹⁸ In fact, as Cinzia Cremonini reminds us, academies were not just “luoghi di diffusione di cultura e di confronto”; these activities often opened up spaces for the “elaboraazione di stile, che si traduceva immediatamente in una sorta di cerimoniale interno all'Accademia stessa.”¹⁴¹⁹ Giovanni thus foreshadowed the move toward more symbolic displays of distinction that would be perfected by his brothers over the following decades. As his brother Federico wrote in 1659, trying to lift Giovanni's mood, “La caccia, la cavalleria et la nova Architettura del gioco di palla sono tutte attestazioni per far mentire chi dicesse esser lei inferior a qual si sia mutation d'aria e così prego il Sig[no]re a conservarla per più fortunato e prospero tempo che finalm[en]te non mancherà.”¹⁴²⁰

Alas, these “more fortunate and prosperous times” never materialized. Giovanni died unexpectedly the following year, aged forty-five, a broken and childless man, unable to come to

¹⁴¹⁴ Luzzatto, Padre Pio, chap. 3.

¹⁴¹⁵ Rey, Bourdieu, pp. 45–46.

¹⁴¹⁶ The pamphlet is mentioned in Galli and Monferrini, I Borromeo d'Angera, p. 38. I have not been able to locate the source.

¹⁴¹⁷ See Elliott, Power and Propaganda, p. 165.

¹⁴¹⁸ Carpani, Drammaturgia, pp. 9–11; Cremonini, Le vie, pp. 64–65.

¹⁴¹⁹ Cremonini, Le vie, p. 67.

¹⁴²⁰ Federico IV to Giovanni, Lucerne April 24, 1659: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, Corrispondenza 1656–1664.

terms with a world that had changed.¹⁴²¹ The torch passed to the family cleric, Federico, who was in a much better position to push the family agenda forward in an age in which the more ethical standards of a member of the secular clergy were required to make headway. What Loïc Wacquant calls the “social division of the labor of domination” swung into action as “ecclesiastical authority was deployed to justify and thereby solidify the rule of the new warrior class” that had sowed division and been toppled by a powerful popular movement.¹⁴²² The old trick dating back to the Middle Ages worked a treat. In a stunning reversal of fortunes, Federico would use the last thirteen years of his life to carry his brother’s pro-Spanish legacy forward and ensure that the Borromeo family finally got a seat at the negotiating table in Madrid.

Federico’s was no small feat for a family that had been brought to its knees by the opposition to their self-aggrandizement. As we have seen in the preceding chapters, the Borromeo came to venerate military entrepreneurship as a road map to success in the age of the minister-favorite. Yet that career choice made it steadily more untenable for them to argue that they were protectors of the poor and the needy when their own dynastic interests pulled them toward a catastrophic war against the French crown. Much as Giovanni tried to capitalize on the battles he fought in the family’s fiefdom on Lake Maggiore, going as far as to style himself as the hero of Arona in an impressive propaganda campaign, his efforts were brought to naught by the people in whose name he was supposedly acting. The blatant contradictions that had marred the Borromeo’s project of social affirmation from the outset were rendered unmissable by the family’s jingoistic pursuit of a war, with the sanguinary horrors unleashed on ordinary people spurring them into unprecedented activism for what they, borrowing the language of their social betters, referred to as the common good.

If such demands originated at the bottom of the pile, they soon traveled up the social ladder, and it was then that they became dangerous to the Borromeo. Fully aware that the middling sorts could endanger their dynastic pursuits, as they had in Naples and elsewhere, Giovanni Borromeo sought to use clientelism to buy off a significant portion of the potential ringleaders of a revolt against his militarism. While the merchant milieu did calm down after his intervention, legally trained experts in the courts of Milan backed the popular campaign against the Borromeo, waging legal battles of their own against the lords of Lake Maggiore in a bid to force them to measure up to the tenets of their neostoic ideology. Thanks to them, by the mid-1650s, the notion of the common good had become so hegemonic that the nobility could either swim along or sink. As the first members of the elite adopted the new language, others willy-nilly followed suit, initiating an arms race that gave birth to a reconstructed oligarchy at the top of the monarchy keen on administering good

¹⁴²¹ Bosca, *De origine et statu*, p. 159.

¹⁴²² Wacquant, *Foreword*, p. x.

governance to all the king's subjects. While it was too late for Giovanni to turn the ship around, his brother, Federico, would deploy his credentials as a man of the Church and thus save the house of Borromeo from what, for a short moment in the late 1650s, looked like certain oblivion.

The task ahead was formidable. Federico not only had to live up to the new ideal of good government. He also had to reconcile a disappointed merchant community in Milan with the Borromeo family and stave off the forays that the *togati* were making into the territory the Borromeo still considered their exclusive domain. Informed by a much wider focus than Giovanni's parochial outlook on Lake Maggiore and the Milanese State, Federico adopted the pose of a servant of the Catholic king who had the latter's global empire at heart. If he achieved this toward the end of his life, this was only because he masterfully engaged in what his education in the court of Rome had predestined him to: symbolic politics. The pomp and circumstance that Federico unleashed would help him make Giovanni's dream come true: to gain a foothold in the court of Madrid and establish the Borromeo as servants of the house of Habsburg.

Part III

Denouement

Chapter 9

The Education of a Family Cardinal: Federico Borromeo, Clerical Masculinity, and the Rome of the Barberini and the Pamphili

Federico Borromeo Jr.'s first gig as the new head of the family eager to prove the house's loyalty to the Habsburgs did not go well. His first encounter with a representative of the Spanish high nobility almost ended in disaster. In the fall of 1665 Federico had finished a ten-year stint as papal nuncio to the Swiss Confederacy and was on his way to Rome where he had been appointed secretary of the Congregation of Ecclesiastical Immunity. As he passed through the State of Milan, he stopped over in the family's holdings at Origgio and sent a messenger to the Spanish governor in the capital, Luis Ponce de León. In his letter he requested to meet His Majesty's representative, not "en público y en la forma que es costumbre," but rather "incognito y sin las ceremonias que se estilan con aquella representación."¹⁴²³ Referencing a specifically early modern ceremonial practice, the nuncio asked the governor in so many words that both men strip themselves temporarily of their identities in order to steer clear of conflicting claims to rank that would otherwise arise.¹⁴²⁴ While this was standard practice at the time, in Federico's case, such a plea was controversial because, in addition to his role as a representative of the papacy, Borromeo was also a subject of the king of Spain. His request could therefore be construed as an audacious move on the part of a Milanese feudatory keen on interacting on a par with the Catholic king's alter ego in Milan.

This is exactly how Ponce de León chose to read it. Even though Borromeo had cited important precedents of governors meeting him while resting in their bed (a token of respect in contemporary society¹⁴²⁵), don Luis had no time for what he perceived as a brazen request for special treatment and an attack on his credentials as a representative of the king.¹⁴²⁶ In a memorandum to his principals, the governor tried to establish that Borromeo no longer enjoyed diplomatic status. Since Borromeo had been called back to the court of Rome, where he had been appointed to a new post, Don Luis maintained, Federico could not expect to be treated like a papal envoy, for "todos los [offices] de Roma no imprimen carácter, de suerte, que acabado los Oficios, solam[en]te conservan los Títulos de los que actualm[en]te ocupan."¹⁴²⁷ For all his posturing, don Luis concluded, Borromeo was traveling as a simple subject of the king of Spain and should therefore stop demanding that he be received as anything other than a simple "súbdito, y Vassallo."¹⁴²⁸

¹⁴²³ Pedro de Aragón to the Council of State, Rome September 29, 1665: AGS, EST, leg. 3038, unfol.

¹⁴²⁴ For a history of incognito encounters, see Barth, *Inkognito*.

¹⁴²⁵ Karsten, *Künstler und Kardinäle*, p. 219.

¹⁴²⁶ On the self-image of Spanish viceroys in Italy, see Guarino, *Representing the King's Splendour*, p. 18; on ceremonial conflicts with ambassadors, see *ibid.*, pp. 31–32.

¹⁴²⁷ Zapata to Ponce de León, Milan September 24, 1665: AGS, EST, leg. 3038, unfol.

¹⁴²⁸ Zapata to Ponce de León, Milan September 24, 1665: AGS, EST, leg. 3038, unfol.

As Ponce de León saw it, Borromeo's impudent request was an attempt to avoid bowing to the governor's authority. He also furnished a juicy explanation for Borromeo's uppity behavior. To make sense of Federico's outrageous request, one only needed to take a closer look at the family's recent past. Federico's brother, Giovanni, he reminded the king, had served as commissioner-general of the army before he "hizo dexación por algunos disgustos que se le ofrecieron en tiempo del conde de Fuensaldaña."¹⁴²⁹ The family prelate's stubborn insistence on specious prerogatives needed to be chalked up to "la quexa común de la Casa, procedida de la comisaría general del conde Juan."¹⁴³⁰ Rather than eat humble pie, as he ought to, the new head of household was trying everyone's patience with his insensible demands. Contrary to the governor's expectations, Federico's patience was not endless. Instead of accepting defeat, the nuncio simply sneaked off to Rome without bothering to meet the king's alter ego. With Borromeo's surreptitious departure things had taken a turn for the worse. There was now a real risk, Ponce de León warned, that the Borromeo family would revert to their old ways and revive the simmering jurisdictional conflicts in Lombardy to wage war on the house of Habsburg, the foundations of which had already been laid with Federico's appointment as secretary of the Congregation of Ecclesiastical Immunity in Rome.

Both Ponce de León and Borromeo were immersed in a culture in which ceremonials did not merely reflect power, but were also "a way to create power and be recognized by one's peers as being powerful."¹⁴³¹ It was only logical that a governor invested in illusions of royal grandeur would perceive Borromeo's request as an affront, a shrewd manipulation of ceremonial rules to alter existing political hierarchies between the Borromeo family and the representative of the Spanish crown.¹⁴³² Yet, as this and the following chapters will show, subsequent events should prove Ponce de León's assessment wrong on most counts. What the governor did get right was that Federico was determined to use his ecclesiastical offices, and the status they conferred upon him, to advance the interests of the clan of whom he was now in charge. Equally importantly, though—and here Ponce de León clearly missed the mark—Federico was adamant to achieve this within the broader context of the Spanish monarchy. Unable and unwilling to roll back decades of rapprochement with Spain's ruling elite, Giovanni's debacle did not deter Federico from pursuing his late brother's dream of placing the family at the heart of the Spanish system. Far from a return to a rebellious past, Federico's weaponization of his ecclesiastical capital marked the beginning of a new phase in the family's history. Henceforth its religious exponents would work their connections to the court of Rome to further their interests not to the detriment but under the umbrella of the house of Habsburg. True to the spirit of the *concordia* that had portended their ascent within the Spanish

¹⁴²⁹ Ponce de León to Philip IV, Milan September 27, 1665: AGS, EST, leg. 3038, unfol.

¹⁴³⁰ Ponce de León to Philip IV, Milan September 27, 1665: AGS, EST, leg. 3038, unfol.

¹⁴³¹ May, *Staged Sovereignty*, p. 82.

¹⁴³² On this point, see Guarino, *Representing the King's Splendour*, pp. 43, 53.

system (see chapter 2), the Borromeo were to chip in their religious capital to advance the interests of the king of Spain.

Federico's affray with Ponce de León was not an exercise in bad faith, as the governor suspected, but a blunder, a hiccup in his project of carrying on, as a member of the clergy, his late brother's legacy of loyal service to the Spanish cause. To understand the incident, we need to dig deep into Federico's socialization as a child and his early steps as a prospective cardinal in the court of Rome during the papacies of Urban VIII Barberini (r. 1623–1644) and Innocent X Pamphili (1644–1654). Groomed for the cardinalate from birth, Federico developed a specific habitus in which noble birth was so inextricably linked to his credentials as a legally trained administrator that the latter were deployed in the service of the advancement of his clan, with sometimes deleterious effects. Although historians have taken an interest in the role of cardinals in the social reproduction of their families, few have probed the specific requirements that needed to be inculcated in them to perform this task satisfactorily.¹⁴³³ As I show in this chapter, the court of Rome was a highly competitive field, and in order to make it to the very top without giving up, future cardinals needed to acquire a sense of entitlement and a ruthlessness against rivals which often translated into an obsession with rank and status that occasionally broke through at the wrong moment.

To account for the formation of Federico's personality, I draw on Pierre Bourdieu's concept of habitus. An individual's habitus is the sum total of internalized norms and practices that are reflective of a specific social milieu.¹⁴³⁴ It is, in Bourdieu's own words, "necessity internalised and converted into a disposition that generates meaningful practices" and, by corollary, the preservation of inherited social position.¹⁴³⁵ While a specific habitus is to some degree amenable to change over a lifetime, it is often the product of unconscious biases inculcated through socialization that lends a veneer of reasonableness to arbitrary lifestyle and career choices. In that sense habitus become self-enforcing over time, as specific dispositions predict behavior that in turn entrenches existing dispositions. In this chapter, I show how Federico's habitus was reflective of the educational background of the prelates who flocked to the court of Rome in the early seventeenth century. Imbibed with a sense of innate superiority and predestination soaked up through their schooling, they charged ahead because they accepted the competitive world of the papal court as a challenge thrown at them in order to validate the idea that they deserved the place in the sun they were striving for. Their predisposition was often reinforced by the environment for which they had been prepared, but ironically also through conflicts with other males in the family of origin, most notably fathers and elder brothers. When the latter changed their minds and suddenly opposed a cleric's

¹⁴³³ Ago, *Giovani nobili*, p. 403; Ago, *Carriere*, p. 42; Giulio Sodano, *Da baroni del Regno*, p. 42; Papagna, *Sogni e bisogni*, p. 132.

¹⁴³⁴ MacHardy, *War*, p. 166.

¹⁴³⁵ Bourdieu, *Distinction*, p. 170.

career, they got a taste of the medicine they had administered to the family prelate when they had readied them for the court. Using a rare source—the correspondence between an aspiring cardinal and his non-celibate brother, I show that identity formation was inextricably bound up with gender, and these spats were integral to the production of a distinct clerical masculinity. I will conclude that the outcome of this socialization was ambivalent. As all *habitus*, this one helped perform well in certain situations, less so in others. While it had its uses in the peculiar environment of the papal court, it often turned out to be counterproductive when it was universalized and applied to other settings, as Federico Borromeo found out when he clashed with governor Ponce de León in 1665. As he conquered the bigger stage of the Spanish monarchy, his *habitus* as a family cleric sometimes stood in the way of the unmitigated success he had hoped for.

One day in 1625, Federico Borromeo Jr., then aged eight, put quill to paper and announced a momentous decision to Federico Sr., his great-uncle and cardinal archbishop of Milan. In the missive, he voiced his wish “che [lei] mi mantenesse in quest’habito da prete; perché (a non gli dir bugie) io me ne sento grandiss[im]a voglia.”¹⁴³⁶ Where did this “grandissima voglia” come from? Boys like Federico came of age in a society to which the idea of the family as a unit of labor was constitutive. Inhabiting small-scale societies in which there was no collective body beyond kith and kin and families needed to pool resources and work for a common cause, early modern elites developed a rigid understanding of roles within the family unit, an understanding that had begun to impinge on the legal framework of the period.¹⁴³⁷ Indeed, the years in which Federico grew up saw the hardening of primogeniture as an organizing principle for families.¹⁴³⁸ This legal framework tacitly assigned the male offspring of noble families distinct, yet complementary roles in the social reproduction of the clan.¹⁴³⁹ Primogeniture inscribed what Loïc Wacquant calls a “social division of the labor of domination” which allowed for “separate pathways of transmission of privilege” within a single family.¹⁴⁴⁰ Lombardy was relatively late to turning primogeniture into law, but beginning in the seventeenth century, Milanese families grasped the importance of establishing succession through one line and the differentiation between the eldest and cadet sons who were prepared for careers in the Church or the growing bureaucracies of the monarchy.¹⁴⁴¹

Underwriting primogeniture laws was the order of birth. In theory the idea of concentrating a family’s wealth in the hands of one son did not dictate that first-borns became heads of household

¹⁴³⁶ Federico IV to Federico III, [Siena] December 13, 1625: BAM, mss. G 254 inf 370.

¹⁴³⁷ Bott, *Family and Social Network*, pp. 63–73, 198.

¹⁴³⁸ Álvarez-Ossorio, *The King and the Family*.

¹⁴³⁹ Borello, *Il posto di ciascuno*.

¹⁴⁴⁰ Wacquant, *Reading Bourdieu’s “Capital,”* p. 156.

¹⁴⁴¹ Álvarez-Ossorio, *The King and the Family; Ago, Ecclesiastical Careers*.

and cadets became priests. Indeed, it was widely accepted that some sons might have inclinations that were not commensurate with the role the order of birth had assigned them. Thus some members of the elite remained convinced that decisions on the division of labor within the family unit should not be finalized until the age of 12 or 13 when the gifts and proclivities of each son had fully emerged.¹⁴⁴² In practice, however, the growing importance of specialist training for specific career tracks militated against this idealism, forcing families to make these decisions much earlier and before individual talents could be detected with any degree of certainty. Under these circumstances, the only factor parents could reliably defer to was the order of birth.

Such arbitrary choices could not always be enforced without fostering resistance from malcontent sons. The Borromeo knew this from experience. As we have seen in chapter 3, Federico's uncle, Carlo, had refused to join the ranks of the clergy and had successfully established himself as a feudatory on Lake Maggiore, fueling near-constant strife with Federico's father, Giulio Cesare throughout the early half of the seventeenth century. As Giulio Cesare's sons were born in rapid succession, the head of the family, Federico Sr., was desperate to preclude a rerun of what had transpired in the preceding generation when the family failed to produce a cardinal able to carry on his legacy.¹⁴⁴³ Federico Sr.'s great-nephews, Giovanni and Federico Jr., were therefore expected to fill two distinct roles: Giovanni as a military entrepreneur and head of household, and Federico as a cardinal of the Roman Catholic Church.

Enforcing the destinies chosen by their elders proved much easier in this generation than in the previous one. The only, albeit fleeting, cause for concern was the third born, Antonio Renato. Antonio was primed for the military and spent time in Valletta as a member of the Order of Malta in the early 1650s when Federico was posted there as inquisitor. During his stay on the island, he had difficulties fitting in, spending time with the Discalced Carmelites, a Catholic reform order, and eschewing other interlocutors, most notably fellow knights from the order.¹⁴⁴⁴ Federico, who acted as his chaperon, feared that he, as a "povero e sfortunato preterolo," had not done enough to make sure "acciò la mia sorte cattiva non si renda contagiosa" to his younger brother.¹⁴⁴⁵ In a bid to stymie his fanciful ideas, Federico used all his "patienza e dissimulate[ion]e" "per non aggiugner legna al foco" of a religious life that seemed to be burning in Antonio.¹⁴⁴⁶ Everyone seemed relieved when Antonio suddenly announced his desire to return to the battlefields of Lombardy, which they concluded was risky but still "meno male che vederlo sotto ad un cappuccino."¹⁴⁴⁷

¹⁴⁴² Ago, *Giovani nobili*, p. 396.

¹⁴⁴³ On the special relationship between clerical uncles and nephews, see Fosi, *All'ombra dei Barberini*, pp. 249–258.

¹⁴⁴⁴ Federico IV to Giovanni, Malta March 28, 1654: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, *Corrispondenza 1645–1655*.

¹⁴⁴⁵ Federico IV to Giovanni, Malta April 7, 1654: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, *Corrispondenza 1645–1655*.

¹⁴⁴⁶ Federico IV to Giovanni, Malta March 28, 1654: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, *Corrispondenza 1645–1655*.

¹⁴⁴⁷ Federico IV to Giovanni, Malta April 7, 1654: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, *Corrispondenza 1645–1655*.

If Antonio Renato needed some nudging along, Federico embraced his destiny with gusto, soon passing the wishes of the family cardinal off as his own. As his Christian name suggests (names of illustrious ancestors were often used to assign distinct roles to nobles, especially cadet sons and daughters¹⁴⁴⁸), Federico Jr. was the pet project of his great uncle. Even at an advanced stage in his career, he never forgot to whom he owed his privileged position, such as when he told the newly elected pope Innocent X in 1645 of “la dipendenza e dispositione che io nelle mie attioni havevo havuta dal S[igno]r Card[inale] Borromeo in riguardo di havermi con le sue regole, avvertimenti e beni di Chiesa incaminato alla Corte.”¹⁴⁴⁹ When Federico Sr. was still alive, Federico Jr. never tired of assuring him, as he did when he was barely six years old, that he observed his admonishments, “come farò sino che vivrò.”¹⁴⁵⁰ Emancipating himself from his protector in the family was simply inconceivable to him, “Mi rimetto però sempre al suo savio, e prudente giuditio, e volere; dal quale intendo sempre, e pretendo che dependa ogni mia attione; e massime questa, nella quale ha da consistere tutto il corso di mia vita.”¹⁴⁵¹ He internalized the expectations placed in him, asking his great-uncle to keep him in his prayers “per poterlo servire perfettam[en]te, e difendere e mantenere quest’aspettatione, che di me ha mossà.”¹⁴⁵² The aging cardinal’s aspirations had transmuted into his own.

Cadets’ proud proclamations that they wanted to become clerics at a very young age need to be ascribed to their early education whose goal was to ensure that they internalize the aspirations of their elders and subordinate their own wishes to the preservation of the family’s status. The period witnessed the publication of a host of education manuals touting “una pedagogia tutta tesa a disciplinare la volontà dei bambini, in modo da renderli docili e obbedienti alle disposizioni paterne.”¹⁴⁵³ In reality, though, such drastic enforcements of the fifth command were seldom necessary. As sociological research on the intergenerational reproduction of status has shown, guardians rarely need to resort to coercion: it usually suffices to use implicit emotional blackmail, to which children, eager to please, respond with preemptive obedience.¹⁴⁵⁴ In the early modern period even less was needed for the sons of the nobility to anticipate the wishes of their parents. As Karin MacHardy puts it, “in the ideal case, when properly inculcated with noble culture, new generations of nobles will view their society as self-evident, and perceive opportunities for, and collaborate in, the requirements of social and dynastic reproduction.”¹⁴⁵⁵

¹⁴⁴⁸ Galli and Monferrini, *I Borromeo d’Angera*, p. 42. On names more generally, see Borello, *I segni del corpo*, p. 12, and Noto, *Élites transnazionali*, p. 22.

¹⁴⁴⁹ Federico IV to Giovanni, Rome December 31, 1644: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, *Corrispondenza 1627–1644*.

¹⁴⁵⁰ Federico IV to Federico III, Siena February 5, 1623: BAM, mss. G 237 inf 42.

¹⁴⁵¹ Federico IV to Federico III, [Siena] December 13, 1625: BAM, mss. G 254 inf 370.

¹⁴⁵² Federico IV to Federico III, [Siena] December 13, 1625: BAM, mss. G 254 inf 370.

¹⁴⁵³ Ago, *Giovani nobili*, p. 380.

¹⁴⁵⁴ Preisser, *Muster der intergenerationalen Statusreproduktion*, p. 212.

¹⁴⁵⁵ MacHardy, *War*, p. 166.

This was certainly true in Federico Jr.'s case. To avoid the same crisis that had plagued the family in the 1610s, his elders made sure that Borromeo received a bespoke education. When he was six years old, his family packed him off to Siena in Tuscany, where Federico Sr. had long-standing contacts and where his great-nephew was educated in the Congregazione dei SS. Chiodi.¹⁴⁵⁶ The early separation from the family setting and the transfer to a religious institution was seen as a character-building exercise: it was to stiffen his resolve to pursue an ecclesiastical career.¹⁴⁵⁷ This sheltered upbringing far away from the temptations outside the world of organized religion seems to have been sufficient to bring about what Renata Ago calls the "interiorizzazione degli interessi familiari" and to foster his "spontanea adesione al destino" that the order of birth had wrought for him.¹⁴⁵⁸ Testifying to the strategy's success are the letter which Federico sent to his benefactor a mere two years after arriving in Siena quoted earlier. Throughout it all he remained steadfast in his commitment to serving his family "conforme alla promessa e l'obligatione che ne tengo."¹⁴⁵⁹

As well as persuading Federico to accept his destiny, the education in Siena was to lift him up to the top of the competitive status hierarchy of the court of Rome. In the early decades of the seventeenth century, dynasties from Spanish Italy had begun to shift focus from ecclesiastical careers in the local church to the paths of social upward mobility that were opening up in the rapidly expanding papal court.¹⁴⁶⁰ If Carlo and Federico Sr. had crowned their trajectories as bishops of the strategic archdiocese of Milan, the next generation of the Borromeo family was to accede to the red hat through a curial career. This refocusing had assumed new urgency in part due to commoners' entering the field of the local Church in growing numbers, forcing families bent on preserving their distinction to move up a few notches and seek access to the much lusher benefices and the more prestigious positions of the papal court.¹⁴⁶¹ The downside of this was that they now needed to spend heavily on the education of the son destined to become the family cardinal. As the court of Rome turned into a patronage market for Italian dynasties, massive investments in cultural capital became de rigueur.¹⁴⁶²

The rigorous training of second sons drafted for curial careers mirrored the nobility's recent conversion to the cause of education. As discussed in chapter 6, nobles were growing persuaded that even though much of their distinction derived from birth and the venerable tradition of their ancestors, these inclinations nonetheless needed to be honed. This was particularly true of cadets who were often better educated than their elder brothers who had only recently begun to embrace

¹⁴⁵⁶ Galli, Federico IV Borromeo. *Scelte artistiche*, pp. 297–298.

¹⁴⁵⁷ Fosi, *All'ombra dei Barberini*, p. 252.

¹⁴⁵⁸ Ago, *Giovani nobili*, p. 406.

¹⁴⁵⁹ Federico IV to Giovanni, Siena January 17, 1635: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, *Corrispondenza 1627–1644*.

¹⁴⁶⁰ Elena Papagna, *Sogni e bisogni*, p. 132.

¹⁴⁶¹ Ago, *Carriere*, p. 46.

¹⁴⁶² On this point, see MacHardy, *War*, p. 167.

academic learning.¹⁴⁶³ Defined almost exclusively by their professional status as either clerics or military men, cadets could not rely on material wealth that is easily bequeathed from one generation to the next in order to stay afloat. Each generation of cadets needed to invest time and effort in the acquisition of educational credentials, renewing their capital through commitment to hard work and unremitting discipline in the early years of their lives. The challenge for parents and guardians was to convince them to invest heavily in an ambitious curriculum when all they had to offer in return was the prospect of deferred gratification. Unlike earlier, the Borromeo seemed to succeed this time around. Young Federico, for one, seems to have embraced his program of study, informing his great-uncle that, “in quanto poi agli studij, io seguito con buon progresso allegram[ent]e ma questo non dico per inalzarmi, e vantarmi; ma perche e vero.”¹⁴⁶⁴

The sudden attention to education was not without its problems, not the least of which was that it drove nobles dangerously close to aspiring commoners. In response to this threat from below, the nobility roused to redefine the educational standards for its cadets destined to serve in the sprawling princely courts by “reinscribing traditional social distinctions in educational practices.”¹⁴⁶⁵ To survive as a distinct social group, it was incumbent on the nobility to reconfigure the cultural capital of their younger sons as “merely a manifestation of that mental and physical superiority that entitled them to leadership.”¹⁴⁶⁶ Some of this mindset can be gleaned in Federico’s correspondence. In a letter to Federico’s father, his tutor assured Giulio Cesare that his son had the “migliore volontà d’incaminarsi per la strada delle virtù ad imitation de suoi mag[gio]ri.”¹⁴⁶⁷ Federico himself was adamant that “con li studij e cognitione delle cose faccio un vero acquisto delle virtù” that were already in him.¹⁴⁶⁸ As if to prove him right, his tutor confirmed that Federico had formulated this statement with all the wisdom of his eight years, and that he would be fully capable of making the same utterance in Latin had he not been bridled by his teachers who wanted to avoid “l’affaticar tanto.”¹⁴⁶⁹ Like his brother Giovanni, Federico was a rough diamond in need of polishing for his innate qualities to shine.

The consequence of this understanding of cultural capital as an innate disposition was an education whose main focus was to instill a sense of being worthy of the bright future that awaited Federico as the scion of one of Italy’s leading families. What Karin MacHardy writes of the Imperial nobility certainly rings true of Federico’s learning: “Passed down through generations and acquired early in life, cultural competence, complemented by scholastic learning, was to confer self-certainty

¹⁴⁶³ Ago, *Ecclesiastical Careers*, p. 274.

¹⁴⁶⁴ Federico IV to Federico III, [Siena] December 13, 1625: BAM, mss. G 254 inf 370.

¹⁴⁶⁵ MacHardy, *War*, p. 166.

¹⁴⁶⁶ MacHardy, *War*, p. 182.

¹⁴⁶⁷ N. N. on Federico IV to Giulio Cesare, Siena March 20, 1634: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, *Corrispondenza 1627–1644*.

¹⁴⁶⁸ Federico IV to Federico III, [Siena] December 13, 1625: BAM, mss. G 254 inf 370.

¹⁴⁶⁹ N. N. on Federico IV to Federico III, [Siena] December 13, 1625: BAM, mss. G 254 inf 370.

in the legitimacy of aristocratic culture.”¹⁴⁷⁰ Rather than the acquisition of a set of narrowly defined skills the main thrust of such schooling was a particular elite culture that enabled the sons of noble families to signal their belonging to an exclusive club.¹⁴⁷¹ In fact, as Renata Ago concluded in her study of the career paths of future cardinals, the most surprising aspect of their training is the paucity of specialization in the fields they would end up working in.¹⁴⁷² What counted was a sense of distinction and intimacy with elite culture rather than specific skills, which were associated with the instruction of non-noble professionals. In elite education, more emphasis was placed on bluff and bluster than on expertise, which may well account for the glaring absence of theological teaching from his curriculum.

Federico’s curriculum reflected this need for generic cultural capital. Latin, for example, featured heavily in the early years. At the tender age of six Federico informed his great-uncle that “il Padre M[aest]ro mi fà imparare le regole à mente, e fare le concordanze,” suggesting that he was already busy studying the language of the ancient Romans.¹⁴⁷³ By the age of eight, he was reading “un poco di Vergilio, o qualche altro poeta.”¹⁴⁷⁴ He was also expected to draft letters in the new language, something he apparently did on a regular basis from the age of nine, when his tutor informed Federico Sr. that his student had translated earlier drafts “senza alcun errore di grammatica.”¹⁴⁷⁵ Useful as it was in the curia, Latin was also a major sign of distinction, separating the elite from the rest of the population unable to sprinkle their letters with Latin phrases.¹⁴⁷⁶ Federico repeatedly lauded his elder brother Giovanni for “quei heroici e più divini che humani versi che m’invia.”¹⁴⁷⁷ Conversely, when he served as nuncio to the Grisons in the 1650s and 1660s, Federico would note with shock and horror that one of his interlocutors from a leading local family “non hà né men lingua latina havendo io dovuto parlar seco in francese.”¹⁴⁷⁸ To early modern elites, Latin was one way among many of showing off their superiority.

A similar argument could be made of Federico’s studies in law which he completed with a degree *in utroque iure* (in both canon and civil law) at the age of 18, in 1635. It is, of course, true that a law degree was an entry requirement for the low-ranking offices in the Roman curia that would lead to the cardinalate. But at the same time it was widely understood that the technical notions acquired in law school forged a “knowingness” that allowed nobles to navigate princely courts,

¹⁴⁷⁰ MacHardy, *War*, p. 174.

¹⁴⁷¹ Also see Ho, *Liquidated*, pp. 42, 50.

¹⁴⁷² Ago, *Carriere*, p. 43.

¹⁴⁷³ Federico IV to Federico III, Siena July 2, 1625: BAM, mss. G 237 inf 3. Also see Federico IV to Federico III, [Siena] December 13, 1625: BAM, mss. G 254 inf 370.

¹⁴⁷⁴ Federico IV to Federico III, [Siena] December 13, 1625: BAM, mss. G 254 inf 370.

¹⁴⁷⁵ N. N. on Federico IV to Federico III, Siena November 15, 1626: BAM, mss. G 254 inf 370bis.

¹⁴⁷⁶ Bonahan, *Crown and Nobility*, p. 14.

¹⁴⁷⁷ Federico IV to Giovanni, Siena June 26, 1634: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, *Corrispondenza 1627–1644*.

¹⁴⁷⁸ Federico IV to Giulio Rospigliosi, Lucerne November 4, 1655: ASV, *Segr. Stato, Svizzera*, vol. 48, f. 437v.

making them more amenable to pursuing peaceful solutions to conflicts rather than resort to the authoritarian means of their brothers who still struggled to reconcile the demands of life at court with the chivalric ideals of yesteryear.¹⁴⁷⁹ As Renata Ago and Maria Antonietta Visceglia have shown, legal training predisposed men of the Church to persuasion as the main weapon to obtain results, a skill that was particularly useful in a court setting.¹⁴⁸⁰ Thus, “[t]he study of law was supposed to be coincidental” to, rather than an essential part of, an education geared toward honing “the young nobleman’s natural capacity for prudence, valour, grace and refined taste, all of which entitled them to serve the ruler.”¹⁴⁸¹ Instead of taking an exclusively utilitarian approach to legal studies, as commoners would have, young men of Federico’s station saw them as a consecration of their worthiness as courtiers and their entitlement to the privileges that, with some luck, awaited the members of Italy’s leading dynasties in the court of Rome.

Such notions were encouraged by the setting of their education. With their boarding school character, the Church-run colleges preferred by seventeenth-century elites had the hallmarks of a monastery in which their progeny was quite literally cloistered from common folk. One of the main reasons for this segregation was that such institutions shielded the scions of noble families from disturbing encounters with the lower orders such as the ubiquitous servants who bustled around aristocratic homes.¹⁴⁸² Socially homogeneous it may have been, but this study environment did not predispose Federico to an acute understanding of what would be his main field of activity for much of his career: to lord over the masses who were excluded from formal politics, something that would become apparent over the course of his lifetime. As an adult, the lack of understanding of commoners would yield startling results in his encounters with his servants in Rome.¹⁴⁸³ One of them had the misfortune of being involved in a traffic accident. As Federico told the story to his brother, when his horses “non erano anco ben domati,” “uno di essi mentre era sotto la carrozza [...] tirò un par di calci al cocchiere tanto in alto che lo colse nel stomaco perché stava in piedi e così in poche hore morì.” Rather than mourn his passing, Federico worried that “io bisognò che mi servisse d’un Staffiere per cocchiere.”¹⁴⁸⁴ This lack of empathy toward social inferiors was arresting though not unintended: this solipsism, nurtured by a childhood and adolescence spent in isolation from common people, was to be of service in the court of Rome.

The socially exclusive environment taught Federico the ruthlessness needed to advance in the court of Rome. To be sure, during his stay in Siena he met important patrons that would constitute valuable social capital in the court. In addition to influential cardinals, including those from

¹⁴⁷⁹ Ago, *Carriere*, p. 70; eadem, *La costruzione*.

¹⁴⁸⁰ Ago, *Carriere*, p. 71; Visceglia, *Roma papale e Spagna*, p. 91.

¹⁴⁸¹ MacHardy, *War*, p. 172.

¹⁴⁸² Ago, *Giovani nobili*, p. 393.

¹⁴⁸³ On Roman servants, see Nussdorfer, *Men at Home*, p. 125.

¹⁴⁸⁴ Federico VI to Giovanni, Rome July 21, 1635: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, *Corrispondenza 1627–1644*.

the house of Medici, Federico seems to have encountered the grand-duke of Tuscany on multiple occasions.¹⁴⁸⁵ Important as the networking aspect of these meetings was, they were also meant to teach him another crucial skill: the ability to look at his fellow nobles through the lens of competition and rivalry. It was one of the guiding assumptions of the age that everyone was motivated by a combination of self-interest and envy in the scrum for limited resources.¹⁴⁸⁶ As contemporary manuals explained to anxious parents, sons kept in the family home for too long risked turning into spoiled brats, too slack for the harsh world of the court.¹⁴⁸⁷ This applied especially to cardinal hopefuls who had to make it to the top in the hypercompetitive environment of the papal court. For them, guardians thought, it was essential to acquire a habitus that allowed them to evolve into “individuals who were well suited to the competitive, often violent world” that would make or break their careers.¹⁴⁸⁸ A salient ingredient of their education was learning how to behave in elite society, read between the lines, and glimpse behind the masks of dissimulation so proudly worn in baroque courts. In the merciless environment that awaited them, they needed to be ready, in Federico’s words, “a sentir giornalmente la percossa.”¹⁴⁸⁹

To survive in the dog-eat-dog world of the court elite, future cardinals needed to acquire a disdain of people outside the in-crowd which would allow them to ace out potential rivals. Thus, in the education of boys like Federico, the genuflecting in front of the great and the powerful went hand in hand with the devaluation of members of the out-group.¹⁴⁹⁰ To survive the inevitable counterattacks, future cardinals needed to develop a sense of entitlement profound enough not to be intimidated by the smear campaigns that would inevitably be launched against him. Federico did not doubt that one of his main duties was not to let himself “passare da gli emuli,” and, if necessary, to play dirty.¹⁴⁹¹ When push came to shove later in life, Federico would routinely declare, “[I]o non lascio di farmi franco appresso agli altri perché tanto è havere perso come mostrar paura.”¹⁴⁹² To stay afloat meant to be ready to keep a stiff upper lip in the face of saboteurs lurching to deprive him of what was rightfully his.

An unshakable belief in the prerogative to shape society offered comfort during the inevitable setbacks on the long haul to the pinnacle of Roman court society, beset as it was with nerve-racking uncertainty.¹⁴⁹³ In her research on Wall Street, another “cultural system [...] that

¹⁴⁸⁵ ? Vercelloni to Giulio Cesare, Siena November 29, 1634: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, Corrispondenza 1627–1644; Galli and Monferrini, *I Borromeo*, pp. 26–27; Federico IV to Giovanni, Rome February 18, 1645: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, Corrispondenza 1645–1655.

¹⁴⁸⁶ Dewald, *Writing Failure*, p. 30; Dewald, *Status, Power, and Identity*, pp. 74–75; Béguin, *Les princes*, p. 110.

¹⁴⁸⁷ Dewald, *The European Nobility*, p. 173.

¹⁴⁸⁸ Dewald, *The European Nobility*, p. 168.

¹⁴⁸⁹ Federico IV to Giovanni, Malta January 7, 1654: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, Corrispondenza 1645–1655.

¹⁴⁹⁰ Duindam, *Myths of Power*, p. 32.

¹⁴⁹¹ Federico IV to Giulio Cesare III, Siena April 2, 1634: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, Corrispondenza 1627–1644.

¹⁴⁹² Federico IV to Giovanni, Rome March 11, 1645: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, Corrispondenza 1645–1655.

¹⁴⁹³ Ago, *Carriere*, p. 81.

promotes the volatile combination of unplanned risk-taking with the search for record profits,” ethnographer Karen Ho has come up with a persuasive explanation of why competitive environments help consecrate a sense of entitlement rather than undermine it.¹⁴⁹⁴ Ho contends that the conviction of being the best and the brightest, fostered in elite institutions of higher education, spurs investment bankers to accept “the necessity of constantly performing in notoriously insecure work environments.”¹⁴⁹⁵ In fact, the more the odds appear to be stacked against them, the stronger their sense of entitlement becomes. Eventual success validates what they have known all along: that they are part of the chosen few who deserve to belong to the elite. A similar process was discernible in the court of Rome where nephews of powerful clerics from all over the Italian peninsula congregated in the early seventeenth century and hoped to parlay their innate privilege into profit for their families, a process that profoundly changed the face of the court of Rome over the course of the century.¹⁴⁹⁶ As Pierre Bourdieu reminds us, a particular habitus is reinforced through practices in a congenial field.¹⁴⁹⁷ In the case of prospective cardinals, if their sense of superiority was pronounced enough, setbacks did not deter aspiring cardinals; they made them more tenacious. Federico’s sense of entitlement shines through in many moments, but perhaps most clearly so when his brother suggested that he bribe the papal family to give his career a much-needed boost.¹⁴⁹⁸ Federico, unshaken in his sense of worthiness, simply replied, “[N]on conviene alla qualità nostra che s’habbia da dire essersi procurato con mezzi di denaro e d’interesse ciò che per altro ci fusse dovuto.”¹⁴⁹⁹

This attitude stood Federico in good stead as he undertook the first steps in the court of the Barberini and the Pamphili popes. By the time he arrived in Rome in 1635, a distinct career path had taken form.¹⁵⁰⁰ The odds against him were formidable. Cardinal hopefuls were made to run the gauntlet of a succession of administrative posts before they could gun for the coveted red hat. After a five-year apprenticeship in curial tribunals, they were, with some luck, sent on assignment as governors (representatives of the pope as the secular head of state) in the towns of the Papal States.¹⁵⁰¹ In these positions they would ensure the correct administration of papal justice, disciplining the lower orders to preserve established hierarchies, if necessary through torture.¹⁵⁰² Pending satisfactory performance in these minor offices, they were then dispatched to represent the pope as the head of the universal Catholic Church in the permanent diplomatic missions, the

¹⁴⁹⁴ Ho, *Liquidated*, p. 6.

¹⁴⁹⁵ Ho, *Liquidated*, p. 11.

¹⁴⁹⁶ Rosa, *Ethos feudale*, pp. 243–244.

¹⁴⁹⁷ Swartz, *Culture*, pp. 140–141.

¹⁴⁹⁸ Visceglia has found that venal offices were as likely to lead to the cardinalate as the administrative career Federico was pursuing, although only the latter secured the loyalty of the papal family beyond the latter’s pontificate. See her, “La giusta statera,” pp. 207, 209–210.

¹⁴⁹⁹ Federico IV to Giovanni, Rome March 25, 1645: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, *Corrispondenza 1645–1655*.

¹⁵⁰⁰ See Visceglia, “La giusta statera,” pp. 185, 190–191.

¹⁵⁰¹ Ago, *Carriere*, pp. 16–17; Köchli, *Urban VIII.*, pp. 27–28.

¹⁵⁰² On papal governors, see Fosi, *Papal Justice*, pp. 177–178, 192–193. I have not been able to locate Borromeo’s official correspondence from this period.

nunciatures, in the courts of Europe.¹⁵⁰³ Although this pattern had asserted itself by the early decades of the seventeenth century, it did not necessarily make careers more predictable and more inclusive, as Mario Rosa has suggested.¹⁵⁰⁴ Federico's correspondence indicates that progression had little to do with specific achievements, supporting Renata Ago's claim that "i passaggi di grado hanno cause molto più spesso esogene che endogene, sono legati cioè a promozioni di altri, a spostamenti originati dalla necessità di sistemare qualcuno, se non addirittura all'esigenza di colmare un vuoto aperto dalla morte."¹⁵⁰⁵ Federico's letters reveal that preferment was wholly dependent on good relations with the ruling papal family who, not unlike secular princes, bestowed offices and career advancement as signs of their grace rather than as automatic rewards for loyal service.¹⁵⁰⁶ As Federico's cousin explicated, "dalla qualità del Governo che [Federico] haverà [se] ne farà giudizio se il Papa voglia caminar di passo, o di salto."¹⁵⁰⁷

The root cause of the insecurity and precariousness of young prelates was the rat race among the offspring of the nobility and urban patriciates who huddled in Rome, all eagerly awaiting promotions to the offices that would pave the way to the cardinalate. It has been estimated that, at any given moment in the seventeenth century, there were about 150 prelates in the papal court who all ultimately aspired for a position that would allow them to replicate the social upward trajectory of their ecclesiastical forebears (most often their uncles), while blissfully ignoring that many more would fall by the wayside.¹⁵⁰⁸ The competition turned the curia into a snake pit, as a flurry of how-to manuals for prospective cardinals since the dawn of the seventeenth century readily attested. Contemporaries customarily referred to the curia as a sea, difficult to navigate and frequently battered by unpredictable storms that could throw up existing arrangements and power relations in no time.¹⁵⁰⁹ Federico Borromeo wholeheartedly agreed, "il cercar carica qui, è fuor di tempo. Non vi è carta di navigare per alcuno."¹⁵¹⁰

The safest bet was to seek the proximity of the reigning pontiff and his associates, all the while vigorously fighting one's rivals. To win the favor of Urban VIII and his family, Federico skillfully used his law degree, which was cultural and social capital rolled into one. His dissertation, both as an attestation of his educational attainment and a material object, built a bridge between his studies and the first position in the court of Rome. Once in the Eternal City, Federico offered the thesis, with a dedication to Urban VIII and a frontispiece by Niccolò Tornio, to his future benefactor in the hope

¹⁵⁰³ Visceglia, "La giusta statera," pp. 207–209.

¹⁵⁰⁴ Rosa, *Ethos feudale*, pp. 251–254.

¹⁵⁰⁵ Ago, *Carriere*, p. 42.

¹⁵⁰⁶ Weber, *Familienkanonikate*, p. 169; Visceglia, "La giusta statera," pp. 185, 207.

¹⁵⁰⁷ Giberto to Carlo, Rome January 29, 1639: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, *Corrispondenza 1627–1644*.

¹⁵⁰⁸ Weber, *Familienkanonikate*, pp. 171–172.

¹⁵⁰⁹ Quoted in Mrozek, *Ascanio Filomarino*, pp. 46–47.

¹⁵¹⁰ Federico IV to Giovanni, Rome October 10, 1654: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, *Corrispondenza 1645–1655*.

that the early modern “gift register” would ensure his present would not go unrequited.¹⁵¹¹ In so doing, he was following a well-established pattern of ingratiating himself with potential patrons in order to empower them to throw their weight behind him.¹⁵¹² As a near-contemporary of Borromeo remarked on the court of Rome, “There is something that holds true everywhere in the world: you need to give gifts [*donare*] to those in power. [...] Blessed are those who can accelerate their success by giving gifts!”¹⁵¹³ A present such as a dissertation which was the fruit of the client’s labor helped evoke the presence of the gifter, something that was crucial in a society steeped in a “culture of presence.”¹⁵¹⁴ As anthropologist Dorothy Zinn explains, gifts of this sort are particularly effective when clients and potential patrons do not know each other: “il dono riesce a imporre una compiutezza maggiore al sé alludendo al donatore, ri-presentandolo, e può dunque accrescere la probabilità della risposta.”¹⁵¹⁵ In fact, gifts allow both parties to “nascondersi dietro il dono per suggerire un rapporto personale che in realtà è molto debole, se non inesistente.”¹⁵¹⁶

A gift created a moral obligation for the recipient to return the favor at some point in the future. As the anonymous author of a treatise on the Barberini court explained, “servitori, i quali consumando Thesori pretiosi per farli ossequio, cioè il Tempo, e la Libertà, saranno ben meritevoli della benefica ricompensa del P[ad]rone, co’ quali dovrà essere essercitata largamente non solo col somministrar loro beni di fortuna, mà quando se ne habbino tali, che ne siano capaci, col procurar di promoverli à gradi, e dignità.”¹⁵¹⁷ In Borromeo’s case, the gift register worked its magic. After arriving in Rome, Federico spent much time in the papal antechamber, but remained upbeat, claiming that he had no reason to “rin crescer troppo il tempo, et l’assistenza all’anticamera del Papa benché agli altri paia aggravio à me serve più presto di trattenimento.”¹⁵¹⁸ His patience paid off almost a year after his first appearance on the Roman scene when he was wined and dined by the cardinal nephew who “m’hà sempre tenuto alla sua Tav[ol]a” alongside other important members of the college of cardinals.¹⁵¹⁹

As Federico knew, these contacts were equally important. Although the fiction of the pope as a fountain of grace still maintained a powerful hold on the collective imagination, the web of potential recipients of papal rewards was simply too thick for one single person to disentangle.¹⁵²⁰ In order to forge ahead in the long line of pretenders, one needed more than one broker from the

¹⁵¹¹ Galli and Monferrini, I Borromeo, p. 34; on gifts, see Davis, *The Gift*, p. 14 and passim.

¹⁵¹² Klein, *Your Humble Handmaid*, p. 461.

¹⁵¹³ Biagioli, *Galileo Courtier*, p. 39.

¹⁵¹⁴ Zinn, *La raccomandazione*, pp. 64, 130; Barbara Stollberg-Rilinger, *The Emperor’s Old Clothes*, pp. 269–273.

¹⁵¹⁵ Zinn, *La raccomandazione*, pp. 60, 74 (quote).

¹⁵¹⁶ Zinn, *La raccomandazione*, p. 66.

¹⁵¹⁷ *Discorso della Corte* [...] 1626: BAV, Bonc., C.20, f. 363.

¹⁵¹⁸ Federico IV to Giulio Cesare, Rome March 20, 1635: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, *Corrispondenza 1627-1644*.

¹⁵¹⁹ Federico IV to Giulio Cesare, Rome November 3, 1635: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, *Corrispondenza 1627-1644*.

¹⁵²⁰ Reinhard, *Amici e creature*, pp. 325–328.

pope's inner circle willing to drop a word in the pontiff's ears.¹⁵²¹ What took hold as a consequence was what Dorothy Zinn has described as a culture of recommendation (*raccomandazione*) whereby influence and prestige can only be acquired through intermediaries close to the ultimate source of patronage.¹⁵²² Styling themselves after Counterreformation saints who interceded with God on behalf of the faithful¹⁵²³, cardinals close to the reigning pontiff fashioned themselves as the amplified voice of the deserving and meritorious in front of a pope too busy to keep abreast of the many young prelates flocking to Rome.¹⁵²⁴

Among the Barberini's clients such practices were uncontroversial. A *Discorso della Corte di Roma, e come si debba governare un Cardinale* from the early years of the Barberini papacy (1626) laid down the informal rules that should govern the relationship between powerful cardinals and their clients. Its anonymous author cut right to the chase, announcing that a "gran cardinale" "che aspira alla stima, et opinione del Mondo, deve impiegare ogni suo potere" to prefer his clients "in tutte quelle occasioni, che se le presenteranno."¹⁵²⁵ In fact, it was "suo officio di rappresentare continuam[ent]e al Prencipe le necessità altrui."¹⁵²⁶ Ideally he lent support "come [un] generoso Cavallo à cui si mostrava la via del Pallio, senza ch'alcuno lo stimuli."¹⁵²⁷ But he was certainly obliged to help out clients when he was asked to do so, not least because recommendations were an ingenious way to increase one's clout in Rome: a successful broker not only "riporterà gloria d'essere adoperato," but "si crederà ch'egli habbi confidenza in Palazzo, cosa da esser ambita, e procurata assiduamente da chi posto in quell'Ordine havrà in stima la propria reputatione, e desiderio di giovare altrui."¹⁵²⁸

Aspiring prelates could exploit this dynamic, and Federico certainly did so. He had made the acquaintance of two powerful cardinals when he was still in Siena. During a visit of cardinal Luigi Caetani (close relatives of Federico's mother, Giovanna Cesi, revealing the importance of maternal families for curial careers), Federico made sure "d'intendere il suo sentimento circa il mio andar à Roma."¹⁵²⁹ The cardinal promptly doled out "avvertimenti di quello dovevo fare in Roma e di tutto il modo nel quale mi bisogni stare e regolarmi in quella Corte."¹⁵³⁰ These ties could be reactivated once Federico reached Rome in 1635. As well as cardinal Caetani, cardinal Cesarini constituted social capital of immeasurable value, providing much-needed intercession with the papal family every time

¹⁵²¹ Ago, *Carriere*, pp. 52–60.

¹⁵²² Zinn, *La raccomandazione*, p. x.

¹⁵²³ On the relatedness of the two phenomena, see Reinhard, *Amici e creature*, pp. 315–316.

¹⁵²⁴ Reinhard, *Amici*, pp. 319–328.

¹⁵²⁵ *Discorso della Corte* [...] 1626: BAV, Bonc., C.20, f. 361.

¹⁵²⁶ *Discorso della Corte* [...] 1626: BAV, Bonc., C.20, f. 362.

¹⁵²⁷ *Discorso della Corte* [...] 1626: BAV, Bonc., C.20, f. 363.

¹⁵²⁸ *Discorso della Corte* [...] 1626: BAV, Bonc., C.20, f. 363.

¹⁵²⁹ Federico IV to Giulio Cesare, Siena October 25, 1634: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, *Corrispondenza 1627–1644*.

¹⁵³⁰ Federico IV to Giulio Cesare, Siena November 29, 1634: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, *Corrispondenza 1627–1644*.

Federico's career seemed to stall, as it did many times over the years. Both cardinals were members of old established Roman families, comparable to the Cesi, whose influence they amplified on Federico's behalf.¹⁵³¹ Their recommendations were especially serviceable during the transition period between two pontificates. In the wake of Urban VIII's death and Innocent X's ascent to the papal throne in 1644, two old acquaintances, cardinals Cesi and Medici, worked tirelessly for Federico.¹⁵³² Indeed, had it not been for the "frequenti offitij di questi Cardin[al]i," he would not have been able to "superare o almeno raffreddare quella vehemente inclinat[ion]e [...] del Supremo" to bar him from lucrative offices and appointments he deemed rightfully his.¹⁵³³ Without a "banca degli appoggi" (Renata Ago) prospective cardinals risked staying behind.¹⁵³⁴

Equally as important as friends in high places was the other ingredient of Federico's education: the ability to keep rivals in check. Viewing advancement in the court as a zero-sum game, the major concern of the social strivers in the curia was to keep real and potential rivals from positions of influence.¹⁵³⁵ As the author of a manuscript opined, careerists in the Eternal City, "scordati del publico bene, à cosa niuna più s'affaticano, in niuna più studiano, à niuna più anelano, che di trapassar il compagno, che inoltrato rimirano."¹⁵³⁶ Federico's main rival was his cousin, Giberto, from the main branch of the family. Alive to the fact that the pope would not prefer two Borromeos at once, both watched the other's every move with a jaundiced eye, transposing the conflict raging between their fathers on Lake Maggiore to the court of Rome. In so doing, they acted "secondo la logica di gentiluomini attenti al patrimonio di onore, dignità e reputazione della propria casa."¹⁵³⁷ Family clerics were the embodiment of their clan's honor, and their sense of *pietas* deterred them from, as Federico put it, "cedere il campo alli miei nimici."¹⁵³⁸ This inevitably resulted in an arms race between the two cousins which only one of the two competitors could win.

Although this kind of competition was typical of all courts in the seventeenth-century, the nature of the papacy as an elective monarchy in which everyone could ascend to the highest position in the monarchy—the apostolic see—exacerbated these tendencies. As one contemporary explained, "[E]ssendo maggiore il fine, sono più potenti li mezzi, che s'adoprano, e maggiori sono l'emulationi, e le discordie, l'ire più implacabili, benché più riposte, e dissimulate, li sdegni più ardenti, benché più nascosti, le rabbie più accese, benché più occulte sotto le ceneri dell'hipocrisia, e d'una finta

¹⁵³¹ On the position of the Caetani and the Cesarini, see Visceglia, "La giusta statera," pp. 179–180.

¹⁵³² Federico IV to Giovanni, Rome April 22, 1645: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, Cariche. The cardinal Cesi mentioned is Pierdonato Jr. (1585–1656). See de Petra, Bartolomeo, pp. 304–308.

¹⁵³³ Federico IV to Giovanni, Rome April 22, 1645: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, Cariche.

¹⁵³⁴ The term is borrowed from Ago, *Carriere*, p. 55.

¹⁵³⁵ Ago, *Carriere*, pp. 84, 109.

¹⁵³⁶ Che il Pontificato non si può ben'amministrare senza l'aiuto d'alcuni delli Nepoti, o Parenti del Pontefice. Discorso: BAV, Chigiani, I.II.55, f. 9r.

¹⁵³⁷ Sodano, *Da baroni del Regno*, p. 42.

¹⁵³⁸ Federico IV to Giovanni, Rome October 13, 1640: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, *Corrispondenza 1627–1644*. On the notion of *pietas* understood as a duty toward one's family, see Ago, *Carriere*, p. 50, and Reinhard, *Papa Pius*.

modestia stà sopito il fuoco della loro indignatione, che poi à suo luogo, e tempo scoppia, e s'avallora.”¹⁵³⁹ As they vied for the pope’s grace, Federico and Giberto used all these weapons in the arsenal of baroque careerists. Their techniques ranged from dissimulation to the traducing of the other’s reputation. In public Federico played innocent, explaining to his family that although he did not deny “che con qualche Cardin[al]e confidente o altra persona amorevole io non habbia detto qualche sentimento di questa mia depressione,” “[m]i son tenuto però sempre con questi assiomi che non mi dolevo dell’avanzamenti di Giberto, che haverei solo desiderato qualche impiego per dimostrazione che io non havessi demeritato.”¹⁵⁴⁰ He even went so far as to pen an unctuous letter to Giberto’s father in which he claimed that he was “con molto desiderio” waiting for “l’arrivo alla Corte del Sig[no]r Conte Giberto [...] per poterlo servire come devo.”¹⁵⁴¹

Behind Giberto’s back, however, Federico fought a no-holds-barred campaign to denigrate an opponent to whom he usually referred as “quell’altro.” Federico’s preferred methodology was spreading fake news through which he carefully managed expectations both in Rome and at home. He constantly inveighed against Giberto, diminishing his achievements. Federico downplayed news of Giberto’s exploits as “vane pompe,”¹⁵⁴² and assured his family that “Molti Prelati l’odiano e lo sfuggono perché è satirico”, insisting that of the news of the “gran cose” that “costì si spargeranno,” “non è vera una.”¹⁵⁴³ During the difficult transition of power from the Barberini to the Pamphili in the winter of 1644–1645, a “Cardinale grande e nostro parente” apparently claimed to “sapere di sicuro, dicendomi anco le circostanze e gli autori, che il Cugino non era di gran lunga riuscito all’aspettatione” of the new pope who had apparently understood that Giberto’s reputation as a skilled administrator was the fruit of the “violenti offitij” of Giberto’s patrons rather than an accurate characterization of his abilities.¹⁵⁴⁴ This story was given the lie shortly thereafter when Innocent X promoted Giberto to important offices and, eventually, to the cardinalate. Federico was distraught: “Mi confesso vinto in questo accidente.”¹⁵⁴⁵

Historians have only just begun to study the power of rumors in court settings, pointing out that deliberately planted false reports could influence rulers and precipitate the demotion of opponents, thus allowing even minor players in the courtly game to condition its outcome.¹⁵⁴⁶ David Coast has shown that the brash confidence of a hopeful appointee might convince others to lobby on

¹⁵³⁹ Che il Pontificato non si può ben’amministrare senza l’aiuto d’alcuni delli Nepoti, o Parenti del Pontefice. Discorso: BAV, Chigiani, I.II.55, ff. 8v–9r.

¹⁵⁴⁰ Federico IV to Giovanni, Rome April 22, 1645: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, Cariche.

¹⁵⁴¹ Federico IV to Carlo, Rome February 28, 1637: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, Corrispondenza 1627–1644.

¹⁵⁴² Federico IV to Giulio Cesare III, Siena March 26, 1634: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, Corrispondenza 1627–1644.

¹⁵⁴³ Federico IV to Giovanni Battista Besozzo, Rome September 5, 1637: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, Corrispondenza 1627–1644.

¹⁵⁴⁴ Federico IV to Giovanni, Rome February 4, 1645: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, Corrispondenza 1645–1655.

¹⁵⁴⁵ Federico IV to Giovanni, Montalto January 1, 1651: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, Corrispondenza 1645–1655.

¹⁵⁴⁶ Coast, *News and Rumour*, chap. 4, esp. pp. 116–119, 132.

his behalf.¹⁵⁴⁷ The same dynamics might also work the other way round. Much like flattering news about one's own impending promotion to a better position, rumors of the imminent downfall of an opponent could induce their allies to distance themselves from them.¹⁵⁴⁸ The Borromeo certainly placed extraordinary expectations in information management of this kind. So strong was the belief in its effectiveness that when it failed to produce the desired outcome, his family accused Federico of not spreading enough negativities about Giberto, something he readily conceded, "Mi si potrebbe (non lo contrasto) in termini negativi aggravare qualche omissione perché alcuna diligenza o tentativo non si sia da me intrapreso che potendosi effettuare haverebbe posta in forse quella altrui fortuna che si stima pregiudiziale alla nostra."¹⁵⁴⁹

Those contemporaries who placed so many hopes in malicious campaigns were not wrong. The court of Rome was what sociologists describe as a close-knit network, whose members all knew each other and formed a homogenous sub-culture in which they "tend to reach consensus on norms and they exert consistent informal pressure on one another to conform to the norms."¹⁵⁵⁰ Within this group, there is very little privacy.¹⁵⁵¹ Members' "activities are known to all and they cannot escape from the informal sanctions of gossip and public opinion."¹⁵⁵² Pending the results of an in-depth study of Giberto's career, we do not know how effective Federico's indictments of his cousin were, but Federico's own correspondence reveals that the false accusations that Giberto peddled in his turn yielded devastating results. Over the years Federico lost countless hours casting around to remove this or that "macchia che, se bene a torto tuttavia dalli non informati, che sono i più, [has been] attribuitaci a gran mancamento."¹⁵⁵³ Fresh rumors forced Federico again and again to obliterate "dalla mente del Papa quelle nuvole che con tanto mio danno mi fanno restar appresso."¹⁵⁵⁴ Hyperbole notwithstanding, such campaigns could certainly stall careers in the court of the Barberini and the Pamphili.

Hence spitefulness toward peers was as constitutive to the culture of recommendation in the court of Rome as was its members' incorrigible upward identification. Putting down one's opponents was the other side of the craven forelock-tugging necessary to forge ahead. Noted one seventeenth-century observer of the Roman scene, "Il camino [to the top] è lastricato di servitù e sudori, è guerreggiato dalla forza, e dalla frode."¹⁵⁵⁵ He forgot to mention the other crucial requirement in the absence of which all the social and cultural capital of a prelate was useless: wealth. To win over the

¹⁵⁴⁷ Coast, *News and Rumour*, p. 120.

¹⁵⁴⁸ Coast, *News and Rumour*, pp. 123–125.

¹⁵⁴⁹ Federico IV to Giovanni, Malta May 28, 1654: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, *Corrispondenza 1645–1655*.

¹⁵⁵⁰ Bott, *Family and Social Network*, p. 60.

¹⁵⁵¹ Bott, *Family and Social Network*, p. 99.

¹⁵⁵² Bott, *Family and Social Network*, p. 99.

¹⁵⁵³ Federico IV to Giovanni, Rome March 11, 1645: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, *Corrispondenza 1645–1655*.

¹⁵⁵⁴ Federico IV to Giovanni, Fermo November 3, 1644: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, *Corrispondenza 1627–1644*.

¹⁵⁵⁵ Pellegrini, *Che al savio*, p. 3.

papal family as the promoters of their careers, it was of the utmost importance to be seen as being able to afford a noble lifestyle and thus adequately to represent the papacy in the towns of the Papal States and, after that, in the nunciatures in European courts.¹⁵⁵⁶ Before they could as much as think of reaping profit from offices, prelates needed to put in significant investments with uncertain and deferred return.¹⁵⁵⁷ The emoluments of papal governors and nuncios were often so low that they ended up paying a significant share of their considerable expenses out of their own pockets.¹⁵⁵⁸ To shoulder the expenses they would typically incur, aspiring prelates in the 1650s needed an annual income of at least 1,500 *scudi*, which presupposed private assets to the tune of 25,000 to 30,000 *scudi*.¹⁵⁵⁹ Federico himself calculated that he needed 2,000 *scudi* to perform his duties as the governor of a low-ranking town in the Papal States.¹⁵⁶⁰ The salary he formally received for his services must have been much lower if we consider that the compensation for such a prestigious government as Benevento came to a little more than 400 *scudi*.¹⁵⁶¹

It is impossible to calculate how much Federico Borromeo had to chip in on the basis of the surviving documentation, but it is clear that, during his first years in Rome, he had to spend massively to be seen as keeping up with his major competitors.¹⁵⁶² The main source of his worries was his greatest rival, Giberto, who “potria portarmi danno grande se potessero puntarmi di questo stato, massime che i fautori di quest’altro danno nome di ricchezze immense.”¹⁵⁶³ Indeed, after Giberto’s arrival in Rome in 1637, Federico grew increasingly despondent, “Qua le spese riescono tante che non si può dire et bisogna fare come fanno gli altri: chi ci vuol stare e andare innanzi e se bene l’entrate non corrispondono bisogna mostrar quel che non è.”¹⁵⁶⁴

In an attempt to get back on track, Federico limited his expenses to “quello sia solito e richiede la covenienza” and assured his family that he never spent money on “un mio capriccio.”¹⁵⁶⁵ He bitterly complained that he had had to dismiss most of his servants, including a painter, hanging on to a mere “undici o dodici persone in Casa che non posso mai far meno” (which was still well within the norm of seventeenth-century prelates at Federico’s stage of the career).¹⁵⁶⁶ His meals, too, had shrunk to a frugal affair. At his most desperate he whined that “più presto bisogni andar a

¹⁵⁵⁶ Weber, *Familienkanonikate*, pp. 15–16.

¹⁵⁵⁷ Ago, *Carriere*, p. 91; Teodori, *I parenti del papa*, pp. 47–48; Pečar, *Status-Ökonomie*, pp. 94–95.

¹⁵⁵⁸ Köchli, *Urban VIII.*, p. 34.

¹⁵⁵⁹ Ago, *Ecclesiastical Careers*, p. 274.

¹⁵⁶⁰ Federico IV to Giovanni, Rome 1645: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, *Corrispondenza 1627–1644*.

¹⁵⁶¹ Federico IV to Giovanni, Rome November 14, 1645: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, *Corrispondenza 1627–1644*.

¹⁵⁶² Papagna, *Sogni e bisogni*, p. 140.

¹⁵⁶³ Federico IV to Giulio Cesare, Rome December 6, 1636: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, *Corrispondenza 1627–1644*.

¹⁵⁶⁴ Federico IV to Giulio Cesare, Rome November 20, 1635: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, *Corrispondenza 1627–1644*. Also see Ago, *Carriere*, p. 115.

¹⁵⁶⁵ Federico IV to Giulio Cesare, Rome November 20, 1635: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, *Corrispondenza 1627–1644*.

¹⁵⁶⁶ Federico IV to Giulio Cesare, Rome September 23, 1636: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, *Corrispondenza 1627–1644*; see Völkel, *Römische Kardinalshaushalte*, pp. 63–63, 67

cavar la cicoria,” a bitter green associated with poverty, “che far altro debito.”¹⁵⁶⁷ Fortunately for him, he never did sink quite as low. At a time when ordinary Romans scraped by on a diet of vegetables and subsidized non-white bread (although the consumption of fish and meat appears to have been on the rise), Borromeo had to contend with the fact that he ate “non più di un antipasto, una minestra, due pietanze e due pospasti e la sera ordinariam[en]te un par d’uova ò cosa simile.”¹⁵⁶⁸ Still, for all his private parsimony, the more public expenditures could hardly be scaled back.¹⁵⁶⁹ If he could skimp on his own food, the more conspicuous luxury items still needed to be purchased, albeit “per reputatione più della Casa che mia propria.”¹⁵⁷⁰

The governorships he was aspiring to were a mixed bag. While they kept him away from Rome and helped lower expenses on conspicuous consumption, they generated new costs of their own. Thus, although the promotion to his first government, five years into his stay in Rome, was a relief, he still needed a “carrozza a sei” horses because the town he had been assigned, Todi in Umbria, was a “luogo montuoso.”¹⁵⁷¹ One way to keep expenses to a minimum was to ask for specific governorships. Federico distinguished the towns of the Papal States to which he might be dispatched on the basis of whether they provided modest monetary gain (*utile*) or were conspicuous investments that enhanced the officeholder’s honor (*honorevolezza*) and good standing with the papal family.¹⁵⁷² Ideally he sought out a post “che per l’honorevolezza e molto più per l’utile è sommam[en]te stimato,”¹⁵⁷³ and once he had secured it, refrained from asking for a promotion “perché se a caso mi fussi data cosa più dispendiosa che utile.”¹⁵⁷⁴ The flipside of such austerity was that his inability to shell out the sums everyone expected of him kept him stuck in minor offices when he should have elbowed his way on to the more prestigious nunciatures.

By far the most inconvenient expenditure, both in Rome and in the provinces, remained wining and dining patrons who had the reigning pope’s ear and could therefore not be let down.¹⁵⁷⁵ Granted, Federico could opt to stay away from the court in the center of Rome. As he explained, “sfuggo con questo nome di star come in villa tanti corteggi massime del Card[inale] de Medici e d’altri che se stesse nel mezzo di Roma non li potrei sfuggire e andandoci mi rovinarei a Palazzo in tutto e per tutto.”¹⁵⁷⁶ When he was offered to return to Rome from a governorship in the provinces,

¹⁵⁶⁷ Federico IV to Giovanni, Rome December 30, 1645: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, Corrispondenza 1645–1655.

¹⁵⁶⁸ Federico IV to Giovanna Cesi, Rome June 24, 1636: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, Corrispondenza 1627–1644. On the eating of habits of ordinary Romans, see Reinhardt, *Im Schatten von Sankt Peter*, pp. 133–134.

¹⁵⁶⁹ Pečar, *Status-Ökonomie*, pp. 102–103.

¹⁵⁷⁰ Federico IV to Giovanni Battista Besozzo, Rome October 3, 1637: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, Corrispondenza 1627–1644.

¹⁵⁷¹ Federico IV to Giovanni, Rome April 6, 1641: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, Corrispondenza 1627–1644.

¹⁵⁷² Federico IV to Giovanni, Rome May 20, 1641: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, Corrispondenza 1627–1644.

¹⁵⁷³ Federico IV to Giovanni, Città di Castello March 28, 1643: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, Corrispondenza 1627–1644.

¹⁵⁷⁴ Federico IV to Giovanni, Benevento February 26, 1647: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, Corrispondenza 1645–1655.

¹⁵⁷⁵ Ago, *Carriere*, p. 122.

¹⁵⁷⁶ Federico IV to Giovanni Battista Besozzi, Rome August 8, 1637: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, Corrispondenza 1627–1644.

he preferred not to “andar a Roma per non mi rimetter in spesa.”¹⁵⁷⁷ The drawback of this was, of course, the risk of his not being taken into consideration for promotions. Thus in order to garner the attention of potential patrons, he reluctantly hosted them from time to time. When the archbishop of Milan, cardinal Cesare Monti, stopped by in Montalto, where Federico was stationed as governor, he wisecracked, “Consideri come mi giunga opportuno questo rinfresco di spesa et incommodo, trà quali stimo il minore il cedergli l’habitat[ion]e con tutte le cose necessarie.”¹⁵⁷⁸ Condemned to endure the powerful sponging of him in return for uncertain favors, he groaned, “alli cavalli magri corrono le mosche.”¹⁵⁷⁹

Being a scrawny horse, forced to get ahead on a bootstrap budget, had more than just financial repercussions. In a system where the well-heeled rather than the truly meritorious were skimmed off the pool of applicants¹⁵⁸⁰, his competitors could easily use his financial situation as a cudgel against him. Indeed, the Barberini soon gave credence to rumors that Federico was punching above his weight, although he repeatedly tried convincing them that he had “un fratello amorevole che all’occasioni non sarebbe mancato.”¹⁵⁸¹ By the early 1640s, the papal family openly acknowledged that Federico’s finances were in desperate need of reform, assigning him a well-remunerated governorship far away from Rome, “acciò io veda di rinfrancarmi.”¹⁵⁸² Under Innocent X, he was in such dire straits that his career stalled. The Pamphili rated his chances of sustaining the costs of a nunciature so low that they parked him in the governorship of Montalto, a town in the Marches, for the better part of five years. As Federico himself lamented, “Le mie passate sciocchezze e le difficoltà e longhezze” in servicing his creditors “servono di scala agli emuli e di pregiudizio a me, che a Roma si tiene per massima assoluta che [io] non sia per poter risorgere.”¹⁵⁸³

His faltering career prospects pushed him into risk-prone financial decisions. Unbeknownst to many today, Rome in the early seventeenth century was still one of the foremost centers of European finance, and Federico did not hesitate to make ample use of the innovative financial products on offer in the city of the popes.¹⁵⁸⁴ He became increasingly dependent on loans, and while he initially settled on the safer fixed interest rates, he soon opted for loans at variable interest rates (*al cambio corrente in fiera*).¹⁵⁸⁵ He also availed himself of a new financial product to restructure his debt. Weaving a partnership with Giovanni Battista Tartagna, a businessman from the Novara region

¹⁵⁷⁷ Federico IV to Giovanni, Benevento April 13, 1647: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, Corrispondenza 1645–1655.

¹⁵⁷⁸ Federico IV to Giovanni, Montalto July 2, 1648: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, Corrispondenza 1645–1655.

¹⁵⁷⁹ Federico IV to Giovanni, Montalto July 2, 1648: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, Corrispondenza 1645–1655.

¹⁵⁸⁰ Weber, Familienkanonikate, p. 174.

¹⁵⁸¹ Federico IV to Giovanni, Montalto May 20, 1643: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, Cariche.

¹⁵⁸² Federico IV to Giovanni, Città di Castello March 28, 1643: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, Corrispondenza 1627–1644.

¹⁵⁸³ Federico IV to Giovanni, Ascoli December 8, 1649: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, Corrispondenza 1645–1655.

¹⁵⁸⁴ For an overview, see Ago, *Politica economica e credito*.

¹⁵⁸⁵ Federico IV to Giulio Cesare, Rome February 4, 1636: ABIB, FB, Giovanni, cart. Corrispondenza con diversi, fasc. Corrispondenza 1636.

in Lombardy, he took a stab at investing assets borrowed from loan sharks in a *società accomandita*, a legal construct that promised windfall from risky trade deals, particularly in the currency market, which were concealed behind ordinary business transactions to circumvent the canonical ban on usury.¹⁵⁸⁶

These ventures went predictably wrong, and as Federico slid deeper into debt, he was necessitated to take out new loans to defray interests on previous borrowings. As he moaned, “li debiti sono come l’hidra.”¹⁵⁸⁷ Two years after arriving in Rome he already owed 4,000 *scudi* to Giovanni Battista Forti, a shady character who it later turned out charged the same interests multiple times.¹⁵⁸⁸ Throughout the 1630s, Federico’s pyramid scheme of pursuing new debts to pay off old ones spiraled further and further out of control, heightening the risk of his falling foul of the usury ban.¹⁵⁸⁹ As all pretenses were dropped, a mysterious “amico” offered him “quattro mila scudi a cinque per cento purché si convertino in estint[ion]e di altro debito.”¹⁵⁹⁰ As it turned out, this was a drop in the ocean. His speculation rested on projections of a stable income from his ecclesiastical benefices, but in the wake of the economic downturn of the 1630s and 1640s these had nosedived, cutting his regular income in half within just five years (see chapter 10).¹⁵⁹¹ His dwindling income caused major disruption when his creditors suddenly asked to be serviced, such as when the Lante della Rovere family “per haver comprato un feudo per scudi cento novantacinque mila vâ esigendo tutti li suoi effetti per pagarne il prezzo.”¹⁵⁹²

Five years after arriving in Rome, Federico was in deep trouble: not only was he destitute but he also fretted that he would lose vital access to the city’s blossoming credit market. As Laurence Fontaine and Craig Muldrew have shown in studies of the early modern economy, “creditworthiness” was not exclusively a question of ready access to liquid assets but reflected on the person’s character more generally.¹⁵⁹³ In the entangled world of the early modern court, Federico’s creditors were often the same nobles who could act as his protectors in the curia and would have qualms to throw his hat in the ring if they got wind of his financial distress. It was therefore of the utmost importance to hide the fact “d’haver debito per non rimanere sceditato appresso alla Corte e P[ad]roni.”¹⁵⁹⁴ This need for secrecy made him susceptible to lenders who demanded high interest rates in return for discretion. Yet, even these precautions were not enough. In the late 1640s “i nostri emoli, e poco

¹⁵⁸⁶ Federico IV to Giulio Cesare, Rome September 23, 1636: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, Corrispondenza 1627–1644. On Tartagna, see Ago, *Economia barocca*, pp. 39–43. On the *società accomandite*, see eadem, *Politica economica e credito*, pp. 244–245.

¹⁵⁸⁷ Federico IV to Giovanni, Rome 1645: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, Corrispondenza 1627–1644.

¹⁵⁸⁸ Federico IV to Giovanni Battista Besozzi, Rome August 8, 1637: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, Corrispondenza 1627–1644; Federico IV to Giovanni, Rome 1645: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, Corrispondenza 1627–1644.

¹⁵⁸⁹ See Vismara, *Oltre l’usura*.

¹⁵⁹⁰ Federico IV to Giovanni, Rome April 22, 1645: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, Cariche.

¹⁵⁹¹ Federico IV to Giovanni, Rome April 28, 1640: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, Corrispondenza 1627–1644.

¹⁵⁹² Federico IV to Giovanni, Rome 1645: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, Corrispondenza 1627–1644.

¹⁵⁹³ Muldrew, *The Economy of Obligation*; Fontaine, *The Moral Economy*.

¹⁵⁹⁴ Federico IV to Giulio Cesare II, Rome September 23, 1636: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, Corrispondenza 1627–1644.

amorevoli e qualche più mi doglio tal uno di quelli, che stimavo più amico” caught up with him and spread rumors among Rome’s creditors of Borromeo’s imminent bankruptcy.¹⁵⁹⁵ Partly because of the resulting “congiura di tutti li creditori,” partly because of his preoccupation with secrecy, Federico was driven into the arms of pawnbrokers who usually offered their services to the impoverished plebs of the city, not future cardinals.

Among these, the Jewish payday lenders in the ghetto stood out. This walled neighborhood along the Tiber had been instituted in the 1550s to seclude the Jewish minority from the Catholic majority. What drove this process, which was distinct from the expulsion of all Jews from the territories of the Spanish monarchy, was Catholic doctrine which saw the continued presence of a Jewish minority amidst Catholics as both an admonishment of the terrible consequences facing those who remained impervious to the Christian gospel and a pool of potential converts to the one true faith.¹⁵⁹⁶ Another, much less lofty reason, however, were worries about excluding the lowest strata of society from credit markets which had long been in Jewish hands. Thus the high-water mark of the Counterreformation ironically witnessed a surge in Jewish loan banks in Rome and across the Papal States.¹⁵⁹⁷ Ingeniously alleging that money lending was an integral part of Jewish religious practice, the papacy allowed Jewish credit institutions to flourish, so long as they did not lend outside the remit of what was creatively defined “not immodest usury.”¹⁵⁹⁸

The Borromeo family had lent full support to the papal policy toward the Jews. When Philip II took over Lombardy in the 1550s and proceeded to expel the Jewish minority from the State of Milan, as he had done elsewhere in the Spanish empire, archbishop Carlo Borromeo resisted these plans, proposing to adopt the papal solution of the ghetto in Lombardy. While the wholesale expulsion of all Jews would disperse them to neighboring territories, he argued, their ghettoization might facilitate their conversion.¹⁵⁹⁹ Borromeo’s position should not be romanticized; he was more than fine with forcing the Jewish minority to wear yellow hats which stigmatized them and often put their lives at greater risk.¹⁶⁰⁰ Rather than coming from a place of solidarity with an embattled minority, his suggested approach emerged from a desire to lend a voice to business interests in Milan and beyond who depended on Jewish credit. Thanks to the Borromeo’s help, they were able to postpone the expulsion of the Jewish minority from Spanish Milan until 1597.¹⁶⁰¹

¹⁵⁹⁵ Federico IV to Giovanni, Santa Vittoria September 3, 1648: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, Cariche.

¹⁵⁹⁶ Caffiero, *Storia degli ebrei*, pp. 100–102.

¹⁵⁹⁷ Stow, *The Good of the Church*, p. 245.

¹⁵⁹⁸ Stow, *The Good of the Church*, p. 242.

¹⁵⁹⁹ Cassen, *Marking the Jews*, p. 107.

¹⁶⁰⁰ Cassen, *Marking the Jews*, pp. 103–104, 108–109.

¹⁶⁰¹ On the resistance to Philip II, Cassen, *Marking the Jews*, pp. 108–123.

In the Eternal City, meanwhile, the Jewish loan banks remained open for business until 1682.¹⁶⁰² For Carlo Borromeo's descendant, Federico, an aspiring cardinal desperate enough to cover his tracks, their services were indispensable, not least because the promise of confidentiality outweighed the exorbitant interest rates. Indeed, recent studies suggest that Borromeo was not their only client in Rome's high society, though that fact might not have allayed the embarrassment of a good Catholic and a proud member of the nobility who was forced by circumstances to rely on Jewish backstreet lenders for the poor.¹⁶⁰³ As Federico himself admitted, "M'arrossisco a dirmi che havendo tanta robba agli hebrei mi si consuma ogni cosa con i frutti."¹⁶⁰⁴ By the mid-1640s, he seems to have been a regular customer in the ghetto. A balance sheet listing debts settled between 1643 and 1645 shows his total repayments amounting to 14,446 *scudi* "senza somme pagate per frutti de med[esi]mi debiti", which were worth another 6,000 *scudi*. With the exception of 2,000 *scudi* in mortgage payments, the sums were small, mostly credits granted by fellow noble families (the Lante della Rovere stand out) and Catholic financiers like the Andosilla which ranged from 100 to 1,000 *scudi*. By far the largest single amount—3,500 *scudi*—went toward servicing Federico's "interessi con Hebrei."¹⁶⁰⁵ As this balance sheet shows, Federico, operating the antisemitic distinction between legitimate Christian and illegitimate Jewish finance that had gained purchase among Italy's ruling elites since the Renaissance, listed his Catholic creditors by name while Jewish lenders figured simply as "Hebrei."¹⁶⁰⁶ In Borromeo's twisted imagination, as the years went by, the Jews as a group morphed into a powerful emblem of the forces working to undo him. In his own letters he was wont to describe himself as being "consumato da frutti de cambi" of Catholic bankers "e dagli hebrei" whom he chided as a collective rather than for the financial services they offered.¹⁶⁰⁷ (His brother went even further, slandering Christian lenders as "hebrei dal cappello negro"—a cruel pun on the yellow hat Jews were made to wear in the Papal States—before he made it a habit to malign anyone who stood in the way of the Borromeo's grand designs as "hebrei," openly trafficking in the Catholic antecedents of the anti-Jewish conspiracy theories at the root of modern antisemitism.¹⁶⁰⁸)

The money with which Federico speculated came from disparate sources. Some of Federico's income was derived from ecclesiastical benefices which he had inherited from his great-uncle,

¹⁶⁰² Stow, *The Good of the Church*, p. 247.

¹⁶⁰³ On the Orsini as clients of Jewish financiers, see Caffiero, *Il grande mediatore*, pp. 12, 22.

¹⁶⁰⁴ Federico IV to Giovanni, Montalto May 20, 1643: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, *Cariche*.

¹⁶⁰⁵ Federico IV to Giovanni, Rome 1645: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, *Corrispondenza 1627–1648*.

¹⁶⁰⁶ See Todeschini, *La banca e il ghetto*.

¹⁶⁰⁷ Federico IV to Giovanni, Montalto May 20, 1643: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, *Cariche*. On the the notion of "l'ebreo al singolare collettivo che è totalmente smaterializzato," see Caffiero, *Legami pericolosi*, p. 325.

¹⁶⁰⁸ Federico V to Antonio Renato, Rome July 30, 1664: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, *Corrispondenza 1656–1664*. Legally required to wear a yellow hat, Jews were prosecuted in the Papal States when they wore a black hat to pass as Catholics. See Stow, *Delitto e castigo*, p. 189. For examples of "hebrei" as an epithet, see Federico V to Antonio Renato, Rome December 3, 1661: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, *Corrispondenza 1656–1664*; Federico V to Antonio Renato, Bologna January 18, 1662: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, *Corrispondenza 1656–1664*. On the Catholic Church's contribution to the genesis of modern and secular antisemitism, see Marina Caffiero, *Legami pericolosi*, pp. 322–330.

Federico Sr.¹⁶⁰⁹ Yet, as lush as these prebends may have been, a curial career was only viable when it was underwritten by the prelate's family. This arrangement was based on an unwritten social norm. In the short run, cardinals could provide the family with convenient resources from Rome, including relics and favorable rulings from ecclesiastical tribunals. Yet, the money they needed to invest far outweighed the immediate use of a family member in Rome.¹⁶¹⁰ If families nevertheless advanced the money for a career in the papal court, this was due to the idea of family solidarity "che fa ricadere su tutti i suoi membri l'onore o il disonore di ogni singolo" and made it impossible to "ignorare il problema dei figli cadetti."¹⁶¹¹ The entrenchment of primogeniture, which entrusted the succession of the household to the eldest son, while leaving mere scraps for all cadets, was softened by the promise that the first born son would provide financial assistance to his younger brothers until they were able to stand on their own feet.¹⁶¹² In fact, Renata Ago has argued, the advent of primogeniture and the enforcement of celibacy in the wake of Trent should be viewed as parallel processes propping up a single project: "La carriera prelatizia risponde così perfettamente ai bisogni delle famiglie che hanno adottato il principio della primogenitura: impedisce ai cadetti di prender moglie e in più li dota di rendite" and, if their career was successful, allowed them to return the favor as cardinals.¹⁶¹³ Until such time, however, the head of household acted as a patron and protector of his younger brother who, like every client, sought to please him in whatever way possible.

Federico repeatedly relied on his elder brother, Giovanni, to help him out, not least for his speculative investments. As Federico explained, "per esser io figlio di famiglia e non tenendo beni stabili nessuno si arrischiarebbe a darmi denaro."¹⁶¹⁴ Thus Giovanni was roped in to provide vital securities, sending Federico regular "allowances" (*assegni*) and "remittances" (*rimesse*), sometimes worth one-tenth of his prospected yearly expenditures, to support his lavish lifestyle in the papal court. While these were hardly sufficient to service his creditors, they nevertheless helped to "almeno acquietarli per qualche tempo con dargline parte."¹⁶¹⁵ Money from his brother was also the only way to safeguard that "riputat[ion]e che col sdebitare si sia sin' hora acquistata."¹⁶¹⁶

Much to Federico's disappointment, Giovanni's support was never sufficient to pull him out of the sorry situation into which he had maneuvered himself. While everyone in the Borromeo family subscribed to the mutual obligations of brothers, the extent of Giovanni's duty toward the cadet were fiercely contested. Upon the premature death of their father, Giulio Cesare, Giovanni may have

¹⁶⁰⁹ On Federico Jr.'s benefices, see De Gennaro, *Vicende patrimoniali*, p. 25. On benefices more generally, see Weber, *Familienkanonikate*, pp. 169–170.

¹⁶¹⁰ Federico IV to Giovanni, Rome September 29, 1635: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, *Corrispondenza 1627–1644*.

¹⁶¹¹ Ago, *Giovani nobili*. Also see eadem, *Carriere*, p. 46, and Fletcher and DeSilva, p. 510.

¹⁶¹² Pollock, *Younger Sons*, p. 24.

¹⁶¹³ Ago, *Giovani nobili*, p. 403.

¹⁶¹⁴ Federico IV to Giulio Cesare II, Rome September 23, 1636: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, *Corrispondenza 1627–1644*.

¹⁶¹⁵ Federico IV to Giovanni, Santa Vittoria September 3, 1648: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, *Cariche*.

¹⁶¹⁶ Federico IV to Giovanni, Rome December 30, 1645: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, *Corrispondenza 1645–1655*.

slipped into the role of the head of household.¹⁶¹⁷ Nevertheless, he was often less than forthcoming with money, often not even bothering to respond to Federico's plaintive requests for more funds. The reasons for his stinginess were probably a mixture of real financial distress and a growing uneasiness with Federico's close association with the notoriously pro-French Barberini as he was trying to reinvent himself as a loyal servant of the king of Spain. Be that as it may, Federico routinely felt that his family did not support him enough, and he tried to prod them to more largesse by warning them of the bad reflection it would have on the clan if they were seen as unsupportive of a family member.¹⁶¹⁸ One of his greatest fears was that others in Rome might "credere che non passino quelle dovute corrispondenze che si ricercano" between siblings.¹⁶¹⁹ Brandishing the potentially negative opinion of other courtiers to exert pressure, Federico sought to elicit compliance with the social script. He regularly recurred to this argument when he excoriated his brother for increasing the risk of "perdersi gli amici" (Federico's patrons in the college of cardinals) as others called into question "la fortuna [...] ne fratelli."¹⁶²⁰

Over the years, the idealized cooperation between head of household and family cleric was mobilized again and again to cajole Giovanni into opening his purse. Betraying his training in courtly behavior and the law, Federico deployed elaborate language, modeled on the patron-client rhetoric so common at the time, to nudge his brother. He indefatigably pushed the narrative that "[i]n[ost]ri desiderij sono differenti perché il mio debito [è] di riverirla, il suo è eccesso di benignità in degnarsi di ricordarsi d'uno che non fù mai atto a servirla."¹⁶²¹ The more dispiriting the situation grew, the lower he stooped, portraying himself as a helpless dependent unable to cope without the aid and assistance of his brother. He offered to always "rimettermi al suo parere," as behooved someone of the "debolezza del mio giudizio."¹⁶²² Given Federico's hands-on experience of the court of Rome, this sounded more than a little off, though self-deprecation was of course a popular argumentative strategy that social inferiors wielded to elicit a favorable response from patrons.¹⁶²³ Like other clients, Federico characteristically claimed, "Io non son nato per altro che per darli fastidio."¹⁶²⁴ More interestingly, though, he added weight to these acts of subordination with references to his identity as a member of the clergy: "[M]i compatisca se sempre le scrivo qualche cosa di fastidio, perché li

¹⁶¹⁷ On this particular dynamic, see Severditt, pp. 119–128.

¹⁶¹⁸ Pollock, *Younger Sons*, p. 29.

¹⁶¹⁹ Federico IV to Giovanni, Rome September 1, 1635: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, *Corrispondenza 1627–1644*.

¹⁶²⁰ Federico IV to Giovanni, Malta May 28, 1654: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, *Corrispondenza 1645–1655*.

¹⁶²¹ Federico IV to Giovanni, Montalto June 24, 1648: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, *Corrispondenza 1645–1655*.

¹⁶²² Federico IV to Giovanni, Rome November 24, 1645: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, *Corrispondenza 1645–1655*; Federico IV to Giovanni, Rome December 30, 1645: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, *Corrispondenza 1645–1655*.

¹⁶²³ Daybell, *Women Letter-Writers*, p. 101.

¹⁶²⁴ Federico IV to Giovanni, Rome April 22, 1645: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, *Cariche*.

preti non fanno altro voto che d'esser fastidiosi e io per mia disgrazia l'ho fatto più solenne di quello haverei voluto e l'osservo tanto che vengo a noia a me med[esi]mo.”¹⁶²⁵

Historians have long quibbled over whether such ploys should be taken literally. In France, Roland Mousnier and, more recently, Kristen Neuschel have maintained that contemporaries tended to think of society as crisscrossed by a network of patrons and clients, many of whom believed in the submissive rhetoric they used to achieve their aims.¹⁶²⁶ Sharon Kettering, on the other hand, has convincingly shown that once the layers of flowery rhetoric have been duly peeled back, the base material interests of clients surface.¹⁶²⁷ In a quest out of this deadlock, Arthur L. Herman Jr., has steered a more productive middle course. He posits that the rhetoric typical of patronage relations should be read as formulations of shared aspirations rather than faithful descriptions of the relationship between the two correspondents. Drawing on J. L. Austin's theory of speech acts, Herman argues that the recourse to highly formalized boilerplate helped contemporaries express their intentions and reassure their interlocutors with references to a well-known cultural subtext.¹⁶²⁸ Parallel to this, German scholars have shown how contemporaries' preoccupation with constantly redefining their particular relationship in letters not only glued them together, but the invocation of predefined social roles was also a convenient way of building trust in the sense of a “Sich-Verlassen auf die Erfüllung vorgegebener sozialer Rollen.”¹⁶²⁹

It is easy to see this at work in Federico's self-styling as a vulnerable cleric worthy of the protection of his soldier brother. The rhetoric of patron-client ties was convenient to remind Giovanni of his obligations toward his younger brother.¹⁶³⁰ As the powerful in society, so the head of the family had certain duties toward the weaker members of the clan, and the latter were adamant to lay claim to their dues. Rather than take Federico's rhetorical flourishes literally, we should understand them as an attempt to assign and enforce distinct, yet complementary roles within the family unit.¹⁶³¹ Although the tone in Federico's letters was sometimes meek, it came from an overweening sense of entitlement to the material support of his elder brother. This became apparent when Federico dropped the particular rhetorical ploy of patron-client relations and assumed a more confrontational tone. When Giovanni refused to answer Federico's pleas, the latter promptly switched register, warning that “mi comincia a scappare la pazienza” and accusing Giovanni of deliberately “colmarmi di rabbia e disgusto.”¹⁶³² Thus, when the carrot failed, Federico easily

¹⁶²⁵ Federico IV to Giovanni, Rome February 18, 1645: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, Corrispondenza 1627–1644.

¹⁶²⁶ Mousnier, *Les concepts*; Neuschel, *Word of Honor*.

¹⁶²⁷ Kettering, *Patronage in Sixteenth- and Seventeenth-Century France*.

¹⁶²⁸ Herman, *The Language of Fidelity*, p. 6

¹⁶²⁹ Emich et al., *Stand und Perspektiven*, p. 242; Haug, *Vertrauen und Patronage*.

¹⁶³⁰ Pollock, *Younger Sons*, pp. 28–29.

¹⁶³¹ Ruppel, *Verbündete Rivalen*, p. 97.

¹⁶³² Federico IV to Giovanni, Città di Castello October 19, 1642: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, Corrispondenza 1627–1644; Federico IV to Giovanni, Rome November 14, 1645: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, Corrispondenza 1645–1655.

resorted to the stick, sulking: “Mala cosa, fratello, esser fuor di Casa con entrate lontane e quelle diminuite, con Parenti più crudeli che Nerone, con amici hormai stanchi di far servitio et haver un fratello che ancor non si mova, che volete che dica? Mi tocca haver mazzate e corna.”¹⁶³³ Although he sometimes apologized for the “asprezza delle mie lettere passate,” he remained adamant that “è dovere che mi compatite.”¹⁶³⁴ Thus even if they sometimes resorted to submissive rhetoric to portray themselves as witless dependents, clerics were in fact highly skilled men able and willing to stand up for what they felt was rightfully theirs. Federico himself put it best, “[S]e havessi voluto dimandar quotidianamente la pagnotta per l’amor di Dio mi sarei fatto Cappuccino.”¹⁶³⁵

Betraying the entitlement instilled in him as a prospective member of the secular clergy when he was a child, Federico was ready openly to fight the decisions that Giovanni took on his behalf. In 1640, after five years in Rome and with his prospects barely improved, Giovanni, unwilling to throw more money in what he considered a black hole, urged Federico to stop frittering away precious family resources on a useless career. Given the “stato in che le disgratie de tempi costituiscono la Casa n[ost]ra,” Federico ought to do the responsible thing and move back to Milan.¹⁶³⁶ The otherwise demure Federico stood his ground. As a trained lawyer, his oratory was vastly superior to Giovanni’s, which came in handy as he sought to persuade his elder brother that he would be turned into a laughing stock in the court of Rome if he gave up at this point. Reminding Giovanni of the unwritten contract between brothers, he assured him that “il mio bisogno non sarà continuo,” and if he had sufficient means to hoist himself on to the career ladder, “potrò se Dio mi darà vita resarcire quanto di presente e per qualche anno io porti di danno.”¹⁶³⁷ To make his case airtight, he turned the tables on Giovanni and invoked that favorite shibboleth of future cardinals from the high nobility, the good of the *casato*.¹⁶³⁸ Federico was adamant that he expected Giovanni’s support not only for “l’avanzamento mio,” but that the latter was directly conducive to “l’utile della Casa.”¹⁶³⁹ As he clarified, “Che io mi ritiri non comple né a me, né alla Casa e in ogni caso che io stessi costì pure darei spesa.”¹⁶⁴⁰ In fact, given “quanto pregiud[izi]o e poco honore mi sarebbe,” he would comply with Giovanni’s order only if he had “del tutto perso il cervello.”¹⁶⁴¹

This open conflict over money, so far removed from the patron-client rhetoric in other letters, revealed how the division of labor between brothers instituted through primogeniture had sometimes unintended consequences. To prepare cadets for the toxic environment of the court, they

¹⁶³³ Federico IV to Giovanni, Rome August 11, 1640: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, Corrispondenza 1627–1644.

¹⁶³⁴ Federico IV to Giovanni, Rome August 25, 1640: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, Corrispondenza 1627–1644.

¹⁶³⁵ Federico IV to Giovanni, Lucerne July 5, 1655: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, Corrispondenza 1645–1655.

¹⁶³⁶ Federico IV to Giovanni, Rome April 28, 1640: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, Corrispondenza 1627–1644.

¹⁶³⁷ Federico IV to Giovanni, Rome March 24, 1640: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, Corrispondenza 1627–1644.

¹⁶³⁸ Rosa, *Ethos feudale*, pp. 236–238, 241.

¹⁶³⁹ Federico IV to Giovanni, Ascoli August 2, 1644: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, Corrispondenza 1627–1644.

¹⁶⁴⁰ Federico IV to Giovanni, Rome March 24, 1640: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, Corrispondenza 1627–1644.

¹⁶⁴¹ Federico IV to Giovanni, Rome April 28, 1640: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, Corrispondenza 1627–1644.

were imbued with a sense of entitlement that would allow them to overcome adversity on the way to the top of the heap, a habitus that was then molded further through their encounters with competitors. But when conflicts over their future emerged with their own families, they were able and often willing to use the cultural capital they had acquired in the court against their own guardians. When the aspirations that he had internalized through education were called into question by his own brother, Federico did not hesitate to weaponize his legal training, and the command of the written word it afforded him, to debunk the specious arguments on which the head of household's demand that he jump ship rested.¹⁶⁴² It was the hallmarks of his upbringing and later experience of the court—the intolerance of failure and the resolve to continue against all odds—that turned Federico against his family when they wanted him to bury the dreams they had encouraged him to internalize from a young age.¹⁶⁴³

These dynamics have been studied primarily in relation to noble women, whose lot bore more than a passing resemblance with the situation of family clerics. Both were called upon to manage their dynasty's capital of honor, and to this end, both were subjected to rigorous training in their youth, training that allowed them to take on the responsibilities that came with their particular role in the family. Yet, this arrangement could, in the worst case, carry the seeds of its own destruction such as when these subaltern actors wielded their particular habitus against members of their own family. As Jonathan Dewald has written in relation to aristocratic women, their “freedom directly benefited the family, but the family could never entirely delimit it or guarantee that it would only serve collective interests. Inevitably, women used their freedom also to pursue personal desires, and occasionally family disruptions ensued.”¹⁶⁴⁴ The individual aspirations described by Dewald are more reminiscent of the eighteenth than the seventeenth century, when family members haggled, not over individual destinies, but the best interest of the *casato*. Still, the stakes in the Borromeo family were equally high. The debate between the two brothers unfolded over Federico's aspirations as a cadet son. Federico's was not the protest of a younger sibling who felt he had been sold short by an arbitrary birth order and was plotting revenge against his elder brother. In fact, he seemed to be comfortable in the role which required him to excel in the court setting but stripped him of the countless other responsibilities which the role of head of household entailed, most notably the duty to provide for dependents.¹⁶⁴⁵ His was, in fact, a defense of primogeniture: a plea that the head of household honor his obligations and throw his weight behind his younger brother. As Linda Pollock has argued of the cadets of the English nobility, “Younger sons [...] strove to ensure that their elder

¹⁶⁴² On this point, see Ago, *Carriere*, p. 70.

¹⁶⁴³ Papagna, *Sogni e bisogni*, p. 138.

¹⁶⁴⁴ Dewald, *Status, Power, and Identity*, pp. 86–87.

¹⁶⁴⁵ Ago, *Giovani nobili*, p. 404.

brother fulfilled his promises not, though, from motives of rivalry but from a strong sense of entitlement.”¹⁶⁴⁶

The *bellum domesticum* in the house of Borromeo was far from unique, although the trail of documents it left in its wake possibly is. The memoirs of eminent cardinals popular in Roman circles at the time were replete with episodes of conflicts between clerics and other males in their family, regularly portraying such squabbles as a baptism of fire befitting a future cardinal.¹⁶⁴⁷ Their authors certainly had a point. Intentionally or not, such skirmishes did not only lay bare the habitus of family clerics, they reinforced it through conflicts with laymen who represented an alternative expression of masculinity, fitting with recent scholarly debates on the subject. The first attempts to engage these questions drew inspiration from sociologist R. W. Connell’s groundbreaking 1995 text, *Masculinities*, which showed that male identity was not primarily the opposite of female identity but the outcome of discursive struggles between men. As such, masculinity is multifarious, with hegemonic masculinity being the one that triumphs over other manifestations that are then duly “expelled from the circle of legitimacy.”¹⁶⁴⁸ Although Connell came out strongly against role theory in her own writing, medievalists working on societies in which social roles were much more binding have focused on chivalric and clerical masculinities as two ideal-typical manifestations of masculinity emanating from the division of labor within the contemporary elite.¹⁶⁴⁹ Recent years have seen new studies of the formation of clerical masculinities in particular, as scholars have shown that members of the clergy, far from constituting an emasculated third gender perilously close to femininity, were understood to engage in a gender practice distinct from chivalric masculinity but nonetheless unambiguously connoted as male. Distancing herself from earlier treatments of members of the clergy as quasi-women and summing up recent insights, Jennifer Thibodeaux has argued that the masculinities of the medieval clergy emerged out of the latter’s active engagement with the gender practices of laymen with whom they shared class and other allegiances.¹⁶⁵⁰

Early modernists have been more reluctant to embrace this field. The standard text on early modern masculinities shows how male identities in the period were affected by other factors, most notably social status, and accordingly diverse, but it focuses on Protestant England where the neat separation of knights and clerics disappeared after the Reformation.¹⁶⁵¹ The treatments focusing on Catholic Europe inevitably zoom in on members of religious orders and low-ranking representatives of the secular clergy, stressing the importance of celibacy as the defining feature of clerical

¹⁶⁴⁶ Pollock, *Younger Sons*, p. 27.

¹⁶⁴⁷ Rosa, *Ethos feudale*, pp. 225–227.

¹⁶⁴⁸ Connell, *Masculinities*, pp. 76–86. The quote is on p. 79.

¹⁶⁴⁹ See the contributions to Thibodeaux (ed.), *Negotiating Clerical Identities*.

¹⁶⁵⁰ Thibodeaux, *Introduction*, pp. 4, 8.

¹⁶⁵¹ Shepard, *Meanings of Manhood*.

masculinity.¹⁶⁵² Meanwhile, high-ranking clerics such as cardinals have received scant attention from scholars of gender. The evidence marshaled here suggests that this particular form of masculinity was less defined by sexual abstinence than by the stereotypical confrontation of the qualities of the “soldato” and the “Ecclesiastico” about which Federico was wont to harp on.¹⁶⁵³ The masculinity of high-ranking clerics emanated from rivalries with other males, most notably non-celibate fathers and brothers. Although the source of these spats was a sense of entitlement that originated in clerics’ education as administrators born to rule over social inferiors, the wrestling matches with their elder brother cemented a habitus acquired in the court, adding a gendered dimension to it and readying the family cleric for the day when he would outshine his lay brother, as many did once they became cardinals.¹⁶⁵⁴

Not only did Federico emerge victorious from his spat with Giovanni, who grudgingly accepted to invest in his advancement in the court of Rome, ushering in a period of détente between the two brothers that allowed them to return to the more jesting tone that had characterized their earliest letters.¹⁶⁵⁵ The dispute also strengthened the habitus of a headstrong character that paved the way for his first breakthrough in the court of Rome. In October 1654, almost twenty years after arriving in the Eternal City, Federico was ordained to the major orders and appointed patriarch of Alexandria in Egypt, a see “in the region of the infidels” (which meant that although he now enjoyed the rank of bishop, he could circumvent the Tridentine obligation to reside in his diocese while still collecting its benefices).¹⁶⁵⁶ The appointment was an enormous boost to his standing in the court, not least because it signaled his imminent departure for the first diplomatic mission as nuncio to the Swiss Confederacy and the Grisons.¹⁶⁵⁷ But it also meant that he could no longer abandon the habit and marry, something that became a major problem when Giovanni died unexpectedly in 1660 and Federico slipped into the role of (informal) head of household.¹⁶⁵⁸ If he was to defend his family’s interests, he had to do so as a prelate.

As Federico took over the reins of the household, his socialization turned out to be an obstacle. So blinded was he by his triumphs that he strained to see the local specificity of a habitus that had been forged through a particular brand of elite training and decades of interaction in the hypercompetitive court of Rome. To his mind, having excelled in the papal court gave him the gravitas to do so elsewhere: his success consecrated the sense of superiority of which his early education had

¹⁶⁵² Strasser, *The First Form and Grace*; Amsler, *Jesuits and Matriarchs*, part. chap. 1; Flüchter, *Der Zölibat*.

¹⁶⁵³ Federico IV to Giovanni, Rome August 6, 1639: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, *Corrispondenza 1627–1644*.

¹⁶⁵⁴ Ago, *Giovani nobili*, p. 404.

¹⁶⁵⁵ This is another reminder that sibling relationships were not stable, but subject to change over time. On this point, see Pollock, *Rethinking Patriarchy*, p. 4.

¹⁶⁵⁶ Köchli, *Urban VIII.*, p. 37.

¹⁶⁵⁷ Federico IV to Giovanni, Rome October 24, 1654: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, *Corrispondenza 1645–1655*.

¹⁶⁵⁸ Weber, *Familienkanonikate*, p. 37; Köchli, *Urban VIII.*, p. 30, n. 27.

convinced him through closely supervised interactions with the members of an elite who alone thought it was privy to the *arcana imperii*. As his run-in with governor Ponce de León revealed, he was unable to bridle his haughtiness. Believing, as many nobles did, that the governor sent in from Spain was at best a *primus inter pares*, he confronted the governor as he would any other rival.¹⁶⁵⁹

As we have seen, the conflict with Ponce de León boiled down to whether Borromeo was a representative of the papacy or a member of the local elite. In its setup it mirrored similar squabbles in that period. Historians used to assume that the peace of Westphalia saw the birth of international diplomacy and the consequent rise of professional diplomats. In recent years historians of foreign relations have done much to out this as a myth. Matthias Köhler and Niels May, among others, have made forceful arguments for the coexistence of two roles—that of the diplomat and that of the nobleman—well into the latter half of the seventeenth century. Not only was noble identity not trumped in favor of diplomatic status during the Westphalian and Nijmegen peace negotiations, its continued existence was critical to the congress's success: the coexistence of these two roles enabled negotiators to slip out of their professional functions and defer to their social credentials as noblemen to achieve results on the political stage.¹⁶⁶⁰ Now, the example of Federico Borromeo suggests that the opposite was also possible: noblemen with an axe to grind could harness their diplomatic credentials to advance the agenda of their clan. The Spanish governor of Milan certainly claimed as much when he justified his refusal to accept Borromeo's suggestion that he be received in private as a diplomatic representative of the pope. Ponce de León's position seemed sensible. It is hard to deny that his contested credentials as a papal representative were the only way for Borromeo to interact on par with a member of the Spanish high nobility, a group to whom the Borromeo felt they belonged but from which his brother had been ejected.

Yet, persuasive as the theorem seems, there is no indication in the sources that Borromeo's insistence on his professional credentials was a diabolical plot to advance naked family interests. In fact, a focus on the habitus of family clerics seems to supply a more banal but also a more convincing explanation of Federico Borromeo's behavior. Historians interested in the gender identity of members of the clergy have long focused on celibacy as a distinct marker of clerical masculinity.¹⁶⁶¹ But, as I have argued in this chapter, the forces shaping the habitus of high-ranking clerics were others than sexuality: an education that instilled a sense of social superiority derived from an odd concoction of blue blood and cultural capital accumulated over many years of study. What set secular clerics apart from male heads of household was their reliance on professional status to lift themselves above the great unwashed. If they amassed any wealth at all, the latter was but the

¹⁶⁵⁹ On contemporary conceptions of viceroys and governors as *primi inter pares*, see Minguito Palomares, Nápoles, pp. 190–192.

¹⁶⁶⁰ Köhler, *Strategie und Symbolik*; May, *Staged Sovereignty*.

¹⁶⁶¹ For an eloquent critique of this approach to clerical masculinity, see Thibodeaux, Introduction, pp. 1–15.

“risvolto materiale di un successo acquisito su altri piani.”¹⁶⁶² Over their long careers, their social and professional identities thus fused into one, making it impossible for them to determine where one ended and the other began. All this resulted in a patrimonial conception of office that precipitated conflicts with the holders of rivaling jurisdictions.¹⁶⁶³ As the polarization between private and public sharpened in the latter half of the seventeenth century, clerics’ particular identity predestined them to conflicts over rank and status without this necessarily being their intention.

As the following chapters will make abundantly clear, the incident in Milan was not the affront to the Spanish crown from the latest representative of a notoriously wayward family that both the governor and later historians made it to be.¹⁶⁶⁴ Indeed, if the ruckus had been a deliberate provocation on Borromeo’s part (as opposed to an accident due to his habitus), it would have been out of kilter with decades of rapprochement to the Spanish crown, a process that was probably irreversible at that point. More importantly still, it would have been out of character for Federico who had worked hard to establish himself as a pro-Spanish prelate over the previous two decades. In fact, as subsequent events would make clear, if his ancestor of the same name had sought to use the Church to sabotage Spanish power in Lombardy, Federico was going to employ it to tighten the crown’s grip on its possessions in the Italian peninsula. As I explain in the following chapter, for those who cared to look for it, there was mounting evidence of Borromeo’s loyalism to the crown, and it was probably his record of achievement in Switzerland that led the Council of State in Madrid to reprimand the governor for his rash judgment. Reminding him that Federico “no habiendo faltado en sus palabras y representaciones a la modestia [...] pudo D[o]n Luis no estar tan entero en su resistencia” to the nuncio’s demands, they forced him into an embarrassing climb-down.¹⁶⁶⁵ Meanwhile, Federico, armed with his habitus as a secular cleric and his impressive track record, was about to embark on the reconciliation between the monarchy and his family.

¹⁶⁶² Ago, *Carriere*, p. 48.

¹⁶⁶³ For an in-depth analysis of such conflicts, see Ago, *Carriere*, chap. 5.

¹⁶⁶⁴ Giuseppe de Gennaro, after a thoughtful analysis of the Spanish records on the run-in, expresses surprise at pope Clement IX Rospigliosi decision to dispatch Borromeo, “un milanese ritenuto dai responsabili del governo spagnolo in Italia irrequieto e diffidente verso la Spagna,” as nuncio to Madrid. See de Gennaro, *La crisi*, pp. 27–33 (on the incident), 92 (on Federico’s appointment as nuncio).

¹⁶⁶⁵ Consulta of the Council of State, Madrid November 26, 1665: AGS, EST, leg. 3038, unfol.

Chapter 10

“A Faithful Vassal of His Majesty”: Federico Borromeo as a Papal Nuncio and the Ideology of Disinterested Service

As the conflict between Federico Borromeo and governor Ponce de León escalated in 1665, His Majesty’s representative fired what he thought would be the silver bullet. In an increasingly desperate attempt to convince his higher-ups of the righteousness of his uncompromising stance, he accused Federico of nothing less than *lèse-majesté*. As Ponce de León saw it, Federico’s brother, Giovanni, had not been the only one with a problematic relationship to the monarchy; Federico, too, had a history of disloyalty to the Catholic king. During his ten-year stint as nuncio in Switzerland, Ponce de León averred, Borromeo had consistently furthered French interests and actively undermined Spain’s ever more parlous position in this crucial battleground. The most incriminating piece of evidence he could muster was Borromeo’s treatment of the Spanish envoys to the Swiss Confederacy and the Grisons. According to the governor, Federico had addressed the ambassador of the French king as “Excellency” while denying the same honor to his Spanish counterpart, Borromeo’s fellow Milanese Francesco Casati. In the governor’s eyes, the “*diferencia con que este Nuncio en Esguizaros trató al Conde Casati Embajador de V[uestra] M[a]g[esta]d allí con el del Rey [Cristianísi]mo*” was ultimate proof of the Borromeo’s “*quexa*” with the king of Spain.¹⁶⁶⁶

Without realizing it, Federico had become ensnared in the governor’s machinations. Not content with Giovanni’s comeuppance, Ponce de León was not only out to relitigate the Borromeo’s relationship with the crown, but he chose to do so with the same arguments that Giovanni’s opponents had used to frustrate his aspirations. Everything was on the line. If spun in the right way, the accusations of disloyalty to the king of Spain could stick at a man who owed his career to the pro-French Barberini, pushing him off the stage of Spanish high politics before he had entered it. Lest there be a rerun of Giovanni’s booting, complete with accusations of self-interest and disloyalty, Federico needed to go on the offensive. He needed to marshal his specific capital as a member of the clergy to avert the risk of his brother’s old dream of placing the Borromeo at the top of the imperial hierarchy being over before it even began.

In a deposition given to the Spanish ambassador in Rome, Federico admitted that he had never addressed Casati as Excellency, though he hastened to clear himself of all charges of favoritism toward the French ambassador by pointing out that “ningún Nuncio jamas [h]a dado tal título al Conde” Casati and that Casati himself “[h]a tratado indiferentem[en]te con todos [nuncios] sin pretenderlo.”¹⁶⁶⁷ (As it turned out, the Spanish authorities were themselves unsure whether Casati

¹⁶⁶⁶ Pedro de Aragón to the Council of State, Rome 09.29.1665: AGS, EST, leg. 3038, unfol.

¹⁶⁶⁷ Deposition of Federico Borromeo to the Spanish ambassador, Rome [no date but fall 1665]: AGS, EST, leg. 3039, unfol.

was an ambassador or simply a resident, though most propended for the latter rank.¹⁶⁶⁸) The ambassador leapt to Borromeo's defense. As Pedro Antonio de Aragón saw it, the "demérito que se pretende aderir al d[ic]ho Mons[eñ]or Borromeo" had never occurred. Borromeo was, quite the contrary, "un fiel vasallo de S[u] M[ajestad] que le es aficionado y súbdito."¹⁶⁶⁹ Not only was he the son of a man who "sacrificó la propia vida" for the Catholic king, his brothers, too, had "[h]echo todo fiel y aprobado serv[ic]io a S[u] M[ajestad]."¹⁶⁷⁰ As for Federico himself, he had "en varios y bien frequentes ocas[i]one[s] en la Nunciatura de Helvecia" shown his devotion to the Spanish cause, deploying his considerable clout as a papal envoy to advance the interests of the crown in what was a critical buffer-zone separating "the heart of the monarchy"—Milan—from the twin evils of France and Protestantism. There could be no doubt, ambassador Aragón concluded, that Federico was a disinterested servant of the pope who had the best interests of the Spanish monarchy at heart.

As governor Ponce de León was eviscerated for his overzealous hounding of Borromeo, Federico tried to make a broader point and place himself firmly on the map as a force to be reckoned with in Spanish politics. To assert himself he drew on his considerable capital as a member of the clergy which made him a better fit for the new, more austere climate that had descended on the court of Madrid after the departure of the last minister-favorite (see chapter 8). Part of his bid relied on the persuasive power of norms that contemporaries ascribed to clerics: the myth that members of the clergy, precisely because they had no immediate descendants, stood above the narrow interests of heads of household.¹⁶⁷¹ This belief was widespread in the self-proclaimed Catholic monarchy and could be readily mobilized to lob back favors from the court, as evidenced by the fact that, throughout the emergency, the city of Milan had regularly dispatched members of religious orders to lobby the king, explicitly describing these emissaries as men "d'approvata vita, d'ardente carità e privo d'ogni interesse."¹⁶⁷² While this was truest of members of mendicant orders, some of that veneer of disinterestedness seems to have rubbed off on members of the secular clergy. Federico, for one, repeatedly toyed with this trope, claiming that "come Prete" he did everything "senza interesse."¹⁶⁷³ Significant as these norms were, there was a second, even stronger argument militating in his favor: his track record as a papal officeholder in Switzerland.

In his reinvention, Federico had undoubtedly benefited from being in the right place at the right moment. His career took off at exactly the same moment as the puritan climate of the 1650s reached the court of Rome and imposed a new ethic of papal service on budding careerists in the curia. In the wake of the dispiriting loss of international standing at the Westphalian peace

¹⁶⁶⁸ See Behr, *Diplomatie als Familiengeschäft*, pp. 118–127.

¹⁶⁶⁹ Deposition of Federico Borromeo to the Spanish ambassador, Rome [no date but fall 1665]: AGS, EST, leg. 3039, unfol.

¹⁶⁷⁰ Deposition of Federico Borromeo to the Spanish ambassador, Rome [no date but fall 1665]: AGS, EST, leg. 3039, unfol.

¹⁶⁷¹ Ago, *Giovani nobili*, p. 413.

¹⁶⁷² Signorotto, *La "verità"*, p. 204.

¹⁶⁷³ Federico VI to Giovanni, Rome August 6, 1639: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, *Corrispondenza 1627–1644*.

negotiations, the papacy embarked on a profound transformation from vehicle of dynastic self-aggrandizement to an institution committed to the defense of Catholicism. Within a few short years, Rome did away with the outward signs of the institution that, in the eyes of many, had brought it into disrepute within the society of Catholic princes: nepotism, the Roman manifestation of favoritism. As in Madrid, so in Rome, the 1650s saw the unraveling of the most blatant forms of self-enrichment and the emergence of an ethic of disinterested public service. Instigated by secretary of state Fabio Chigi, who later became pope Alexander VII (r. 1655–1667), the moral clean-up buoyed up a new generation of cardinal hopefuls who made the most of their training as papal administrators. Grabbing the mantle of disinterested service, they advanced their careers in the nunciatures which were fast becoming the preferred track to the papacy. Built up to strengthen the papacy's ties to the Catholic crowns, the emerging diplomatic apparatus laid the foundation for Rome's rapprochement with the Spanish crown.

Federico Borromeo was one of the rising stars of a reinvigorated papacy. Upon his first appointment to a nunciature, that in the Swiss Confederacy and the Grisons, he was enough of an unknown quantity to convincingly present himself as a dispassionate papal servant. A veteran of the Roman court, he had not been implicated enough with the nepotism of the Barberini and the Pamphili pontificates for his refashioning to be unconvincing to outsiders. In fact, his long haul to the first major office and his exemplary patience in Switzerland, where he spent a decade when others were eager to leave after less than two years of service, were evidence of his commitment to the cause. So were his pointed interventions against French forays as part of a papal-Spanish diplomatic front to defend common interests (which dovetailed with the Borromeo family's long-standing dynastic ambitions in the area just north of their fiefdom on Lake Maggiore). It was this record of accomplishment, as much as his habitus as a member of the clergy, that put Federico in a position where he could continue, as a cleric, where his brother, as a knight, had been forced to give up. If Giovanni's family-oriented conception of social upward mobility had run aground after the eclipse of the last *valido* and the conception of royal service he embodied, Federico's service ethic was bound to make a splash in the reconstructed court of Madrid. As in the Sacchetti family studied by Irene Fosi, Federico Borromeo became "la rappresentazione positiva, sicura e prestigiosa che la casa può offrire di sé" in an age when the privileged felt an urge to legitimize their existence in novel ways.¹⁶⁷⁴

The changes wrought under Alexander VII, which made Federico's surge possible in the first place, are not entirely uncharted territory, although scholars remain divided on the meaning of the reforms of the Chigi papacy. Some have seen this pontificate as a quantum leap in the modernization of papal institutions, as the last pit stop on the road to the abolition of formal nepotism in 1692,

¹⁶⁷⁴ Fosi, *All'ombra dei Barberini*, p. 192.

while others have shed light on the messy sketchiness of the overhaul.¹⁶⁷⁵ This chapter comes down firmly on the side of the second argument. The example of Federico Borromeo, a prelate on the make, reveals that the Alexandrine reforms were a form of misrecognition of the persistence of familist practices akin to the rationalizations of favoritism in the early years of the count-duke of Olivares's rule. What changed most dramatically under Alexander VII was not the substance of papal governance but the way its central actors intellectualized it as they sought to integrate the participation of family members and the enrichment of officeholders into a reinvigorated ideology of public service and good governance (*buon governo*).¹⁶⁷⁶

This transformation bore a close resemblance to the concurrent revolution in government in Spain. Building on the comparative on the courts of Madrid and Rome by other scholars, this chapter aims to bring this research up to the profound changes of the 1650s and 1660s. In her study of Roman nepotism in the age of Paul V (1605–1621), Birgit Emich has drawn attention to the structural parallels between the rule of the pope's nephew and the royal favorites who rose to power in most Western European monarchies at the dawn of the seventeenth century: both the cardinal-nephew and the minister-favorite were the heads of complex patronage systems put in place to further the integration of local elites, and both systems morphed into potent vehicles for self-enrichment for the clients of the figure at the top of the social pyramid.¹⁶⁷⁷ To contemporaries such comparisons came naturally; Spaniards regularly described the cardinal-nephew in Rome as "his uncle's minister-favorite" (*el valido de su tío*).¹⁶⁷⁸ More importantly still, the analogy pointed to the interdependence of the two courts. A systematic comparison of the two Catholic courts reveals the intertwined nature of the two. As Hillard von Thiesen and Maria Antonietta Visceglia have shown, the *valido* of the duke of Lerma and the nepotism of Paul V's nephew supplied a growing clientele with complementary sets of material and immaterial capital that could be exchanged and converted from one court to the other.¹⁶⁷⁹ That osmosis, I argue, continued as both system gave rise to new modes of engagement for the nobility in the wake of the crisis of the 1640s.¹⁶⁸⁰ In fact, if the evisceration of the *valido* figure saw the recrudescence of disinterested service as an ideal that entranced nobles in Madrid, the implosion of nepotism in Rome marked the advent of a similar ethic in the curia. As had been the case earlier in the century, those who embodied the new virtuousness required of officials had capital that was expendable in both courts, as this and subsequent chapters detailing Federico's upward trajectory will reveal.

¹⁶⁷⁵ The two extreme positions are Rodén, Church Politics, and Signorotto, The Squadrone Volante.

¹⁶⁷⁶ Swartz, Symbolic Power, p. 134.

¹⁶⁷⁷ Emich, Bürokratie und Nepotismus, chap. I.1. and VI.3.

¹⁶⁷⁸ See Visceglia, Factions in the Sacred College, p. 114. On the analogies between nepotism and other systems of patronage, see Menniti Ippolito, Il tramonto, pp. 9–10, 17.

¹⁶⁷⁹ See von Thiesen, Diplomatie und Patronage, pp. 117–119 and the case studies in chap. 4; Visceglia, Roma papale e Spagna, pp. 120–144.

¹⁶⁸⁰ Minguito Palomares, Nápoles, p. 119.

Federico Borromeo's first major breakthrough came when he had almost given up hope: in 1654, after almost two decades in lowly governorships, Innocent X appointed him to his first real test, the nunciature in the Swiss Confederacy and the Grisons at Lucerne. To Federico, the nomination was a vindication for years of resilience in the face of adversity. Over the decades he had put up with indignities ranging from unsupportive kin to unresponsive pontiffs. The final stretch under Innocent X had been particularly taxing. His first appointment to Benevento took a toll on his health. The climate, a common concern of noblemen of his generation, was such that he had to spend most of the day indoors "perché si sente un'aria così humida e penetrante che trafigge le tempie."¹⁶⁸¹ Rattled by ill-health, Federico was about to admit defeat when he was moved to Montalto, a town in the Marches, only to be parked there for another excruciating five years. The first real promotion beckoned when Innocent appointed him inquisitor of Malta in 1652. Although this last post was usually seen as a trainee program for future nuncios, the Pamphili pope still wavered in Federico's case, retracting an earlier appointment to Lucerne on the grounds that "non possa esser forse espediente la persona d'un milanese per un impiego che gli stà su li confini."¹⁶⁸² It would be another two years before Innocent reconsidered and finally appointed Federico to the nunciature in the immediate proximity to his own family's fief. After two long decades he had coaxed a post out of a hesitant pope in a place where "Casa n[ost]ra" was "ben vista" by dint of the Borromeo's long-standing ties with the Swiss cantons and St. Charles's role as patron saint of Catholic Switzerland.¹⁶⁸³

Federico's unanticipated streak of luck came on the heels of momentous changes in the Roman curia. Two years earlier, in 1652, Fabio Chigi had been appointed secretary of state and shortly thereafter become a member of the college of cardinals.¹⁶⁸⁴ Although he was not the first secretary of state to wear the biretta, his rapid ascent marked a historic shift in the balance of power at the top of the Roman hierarchy, as the secretariat of state imposed itself as the most powerful ministry in the fledgling papal bureaucracy.¹⁶⁸⁵ Until fairly recently the secretaries of state (the men in charge of the papacy's correspondence with nuncios and other representatives outside Rome) had been scribes of minor noble or patrician extraction under the thumb of the second most powerful man in the curia, the pope's nephew. This had begun to change under Urban VIII as a new generation of legally trained prelates with careers in the administration of the papacy scaled the upper echelons

¹⁶⁸¹ Federico IV to Giovanni, Benevento February 26, 1647: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, *Corrispondenza 1645–1655*.

¹⁶⁸² Federico IV to Giovanni, Rome August 27, 1652: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, *Corrispondenza 1645–1655*.

¹⁶⁸³ Federico IV to Giovanni, Rome August 27, 1652: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, *Corrispondenza 1645–1655*. On Carlo Borromeo's legacy in Catholic Switzerland, see Sidler, *Heiligkeit aushandeln*, pp. 157–167, and Fink, *Die Luzerner Nuntiatur*, pp. 55–56.

¹⁶⁸⁴ On Chigi, see Fosi, Fabio Chigi.

¹⁶⁸⁵ Emich, *Die Karriere des Staatssekretärs*.

of power.¹⁶⁸⁶ By the 1650s, the secretariat was regularly headed by seasoned diplomats who became cardinals upon taking office and often crowned their distinguished careers by being elevated to the papacy.¹⁶⁸⁷

To understand the ascent of the secretary of state, we need to zoom in on the early 1650s when the long-term process that was the rise of the secretary of state witnessed an undeniable acceleration. In the early 1650s the papacy languished in its profoundest crisis since the Protestant Reformation in the sixteenth century. The Westphalian peace talks, which had finally been wrapped up in 1648, made it plain that the pope, the erstwhile arbiter and common father of Christendom, had lost much of his standing even within the Catholic society of princes.¹⁶⁸⁸ The ensuing search for the underlying causes of the papacy's malaise quickly turned up a culprit: Rome's version of favoritism, nepotism. Nepotism was distinct from favoritism in dynastic courts in that the role of the favorite was taken over by a close family member of the ruling pope, usually his nephew (*nepos* in Latin). On the face of it, the cardinal-nephew's task bore more than a passing resemblance to that of favorites elsewhere: like the *valido* in Spain, he was to parcel out the papacy's resources to integrate the nobility into networks of dependency. But, unlike in Spain, the nature of the papacy as an elective monarchy without dynastic continuity sharpened the cardinal-nephew's focus on the well-being of his own family. Since each papal family expected to spend at best a few years at the top of the Roman hierarchy before the elderly pope died, his relatives made sure to amass as much wealth as possible before they were forced to pass the torch to a rivaling clan.¹⁶⁸⁹ As Wolfgang Reinhard puts it, "the function of the cardinal-nephew as far as the [papal] family was concerned consisted in skimming off ecclesiastical income and transforming it into a secular fortune."¹⁶⁹⁰ More than its cousins elsewhere in western Europe, then, Roman nepotism was rooted in a familist mentality, which anthropologist Edward Banfield famously defined as "the inability" of a community "to act together for their common good or, indeed, for any end transcending the immediate, material interest of the nuclear family."¹⁶⁹¹

Given the particularly pronounced familism of its ruling elite, it is hardly surprising that Rome, too, was enveloped by the protests of the popular movements that were afoot across Europe in the late 1640s. When Innocent X was elected to the Holy See, the mounting criticism that favoritism was meeting elsewhere left the new pope wavering on whether to appoint a nephew. It

¹⁶⁸⁶ Visceglia, "La giusta statera," p. 174.

¹⁶⁸⁷ Emich, *Die Karriere des Staatssekretärs*, pp. 347–348; Emich, *Bürokratie und Nepotismus*, p. 418.

¹⁶⁸⁸ Karsten, "Nepotismus," pp. 267–268.

¹⁶⁸⁹ Reinhard, *Papal Power*, pp. 329, 339–341.

¹⁶⁹⁰ Reinhard, *Papal Power*, p. 337.

¹⁶⁹¹ Banfield, *The Moral Basis*, p. 10. Banfield's work with its sweeping generalizations about southern Italian society has rightly been questioned by social scientists, but his definition of "amoral familism" gives a clear idea of the prevailing attitude to the common good in the court of Rome of the early seventeenth century.

was only when elites began complaining about the absence of a close relative who had their ear that he obliged.¹⁶⁹² Lacking a capable male relative, yet unable to eschew the inner logic of a system predicated on a gatekeeper who had the full trust of the pope, he appointed his sister-in-law, Olimpia Maidalchini.¹⁶⁹³ This deft move was to spell the system's undoing, as a nascent public sphere was flooded by screeds against the pope's sister-in-law. According to her critics, Donna Olimpia was bad government personified. They lamented her disturbing tendency to flout "tutte le buone regole d'una vera Politica, calpestando gli Innocenti, et innalzando i Rei."¹⁶⁹⁴ In their eyes, there was a worrying preferment for relatives and old friends of the family, such as when she showered a "giovine incapace [...], inesperto, senza merito nessuno, innocente di cognitione Ecclesiastica" with a red biretta.¹⁶⁹⁵ Compounding her favoritism was Olimpia's unrestrained venality. Under her aegis, cardinals' hats were doled out to the highest bidder and bishoprics exchanged hands not on the basis of the candidate's "merito della virtù, mà ben sì con la quantità de gli argenti."¹⁶⁹⁶ Her greed was the stuff of legends. She was insatiable like the "fondo del mare, che quanto in sé riceve ricchezze, tanto più se ne mostr'affamato."¹⁶⁹⁷ Her avidity was such that she imperiled the salvation of the faithful when she left entire bishoprics vacant for periods as long as five years so as to be able to stuff their revenues into her own pockets.¹⁶⁹⁸

A more dispassionate reading suggests that Olimpia did not differ from her predecessors: she administered papal patronage, divvying it out to friends, withholding it from foes, and she looked after her own, transforming the resources under her control into opportunities to enrich the Pamphili family.¹⁶⁹⁹ Also, cronyism, venality, and misappropriation figured among some of the most tired charges leveled at all papal relatives. And yet, something was radically different this time around. Nepotism had morphed into *cognatismo* (the rule of the sister-in-law) and raised the dangerous prospect of a woman lording it over the Vatican. As the anonymous author of one of the most stinging indictments of Olimpia put it, she was "l'unica Papessa."¹⁷⁰⁰ Olimpia's gender exacerbated long-standing fears that, as one author put it, popes "non governano, ma sono governati da' loro Parenti."¹⁷⁰¹ Such charges were, again, familiar enough and cropped up occasionally even outside Rome (in the Spanish monarchy of Philip III, for example), though in Olimpia's case they came with the whiff of the subversion, not just of the social order, but of gendered hierarchies. By the time of his election, Innocent was an old and frail man battling ill health, and during his reign, the biting

¹⁶⁹² Teodori, I parenti del papa, p. ix.

¹⁶⁹³ D'Amelia, Nepotismo al femminile, p. 387.

¹⁶⁹⁴ La caduta di Donna Olimpia, f. 264v: BAV, Vat. lat. 9729, ff. 263r–288v.

¹⁶⁹⁵ La caduta di Donna Olimpia, f. 264v: BAV, Vat. lat. 9729, ff. 263r–288v.

¹⁶⁹⁶ La caduta di Donna Olimpia, f. 283r: BAV, Vat. lat. 9729, ff. 263r–288v.

¹⁶⁹⁷ La caduta di Donna Olimpia, f. 266v: BAV, Vat. lat. 9729, ff. 263r–288v.

¹⁶⁹⁸ Nascita, vita e fortuna, quoted in D'Amelia, La nuova Agrippina, p. 55.

¹⁶⁹⁹ D'Amelia, Nepotismo al femminile, pp. 364–365.

¹⁷⁰⁰ La caduta di Donna Olimpia, f. 266v.: BAV, Vat. lat. 9729, ff. 263r–288v.

¹⁷⁰¹ Leti, Il nipotismo, p. 9.

satire of the court sometimes depicted him in women's garments, while his beautiful and charming sister-in-law "girava, e raggirava la mente della mole Pontificia a suo gusto, e piacere."¹⁷⁰² As one contemporary summed up the prevailing imagery of the henpecked pope, "nel comando Pontificio d'Innocentio Decimo fu vista una luna, quasi prima del sole."¹⁷⁰³

In the warped imagination of Olimpia's critics, the pope's subservience to his sister-in-law undermined the entire institution by trickling right down to papal officeholders. The most shocking example of such emasculation was the hapless governor of the town of Fermo in the Marches, whom demonstrators, enraged about his lack of a "cuore virile, abbracciando e somministrando gli ordini abominevoli di una femina," cut off his genitals.¹⁷⁰⁴ It was, however, on the international stage that the fact that "una Donna facesse da huomo, e che una femina dominasse S[an] Pietro" yielded its most worrying results.¹⁷⁰⁵ The presence of Olimpia, her opponents feared, undermined the pontiff's authority among the princes and sovereigns of Europe, the terrifying consequences of which became plain at the peace talks in Westphalia. This was certainly true among Protestant leaders who, according to a Calvinist pamphleteer, were more shocked at the "Parenti de' Pontefici" than at the "Pontefici istessi."¹⁷⁰⁶ But even among Catholic princes, Olimpia's gender stoked a moral panic about the monstrous regiment of women in the court of Rome that diminished their respect for the institution.

It is important to understand the function of gender in these debates. Although it certainly was a concern in its own right, gender also acted as a catalyst for a wider conflict over nepotism. As Natalie Zemon Davis argued long ago, gender often served to vocalize a deep-seated malaise at social processes on which gender had, at first sight, no objective bearing.¹⁷⁰⁷ This was certainly the case with Olimpia where the rhetoric of the opposition to her regime was undoubtedly gendered but pointed to a larger problem. In developments mirroring those in the France of the Fronde, the "woman on top" metaphor encapsulated and symbolized a rotten system that had been depleted by decades of relentless nepotism.¹⁷⁰⁸ In the explosive atmosphere of the 1640s when masses clamoring for the restoration of the common good rocked Europe and the rest of the world, the focus on gender helped to explicate criticism of an institution which was seen as undermining the commonwealth.¹⁷⁰⁹

¹⁷⁰² D'Amelia, *La nuova Agrippina*, pp. 58, 63. The quote is from Leti, *Il nipotismo*, p. 87.

¹⁷⁰³ *La caduta di Donna Olimpia*, f. 263r: BAV, Vat. lat. 9729, ff. 263r–288v.

¹⁷⁰⁴ *La caduta di Donna Olimpia*, f. 276v: BAV, Vat. lat. 9729, ff. 263r–288v.

¹⁷⁰⁵ The quote is from *La caduta di Donna Olimpia*, f. 266r: BAV, Vat. lat. 9729, ff. 263r–288v.

¹⁷⁰⁶ Leti, *Il nipotismo*, p. 16.

¹⁷⁰⁷ Davis, *Women on Top*, p. 127; see also Burghartz, *Frauen – Politik – Weiberregiment*.

¹⁷⁰⁸ D'Amelia, *La nuova Agrippina*, pp. 45–47.

¹⁷⁰⁹ On the global dimension of the crisis, see Parker, *Global Crisis*.

By the early 1650s, the situation was gloomy enough for Innocent X to oust Olimpia, and strengthen the person who many perceived as her natural antagonist: the secretary of state. Without altering the secretariat of state as a body, the pope boosted its standing by appointing Fabio Chigi, a man who represented everything Olimpia was not.¹⁷¹⁰ Where her track record had been one of cronyism and greed, his was that of an austere professional. At the time of his appointment, he had been a seasoned diplomat who had risen from the Tuscan patriciate and won his spurs as a mediator at the Westphalian peace talks. He also had no particular association with the Pamphili: they had inherited him from the Barberini and left him to fend for himself as nuncio in faraway Cologne, so that Innocent had never met him in person before he appointed him.¹⁷¹¹ His lifestyle had been frugal, with Pasquino, Rome's talking statue, commenting approvingly, "Entrò con pochi soldi in prelatura e vita fé da monsignor sparagno."¹⁷¹² Once in office, he cultivated the image of a qualified papal servant unaffected by the venality that had held sway in the court of Rome prior to his appointment. Gregorio Leti, no friend of the papacy, described him as "talmente donato alla vita evangelica" that he seasoned his meals with ashes and slept on a bed of straw "come il più vile Cappuccino del Mondo," while he "abominava le ricchezze, la gloria, e la pompa."¹⁷¹³ In short, Chigi was the puritan the pope needed to rehabilitate an institution that had received a blow when the papacy became associated with the selfish plundering of its coffers by successive papal families.¹⁷¹⁴

Parachuted into office to salvage the papacy, Chigi made the most of his unexpected surge. He imposed his own austerity on a court that was hankering for change. Living up to his reputation as an experienced official, he rationalized the secretariat of state, introducing a filing system for outgoing and incoming correspondence.¹⁷¹⁵ But this innovation in government only served as a launch pad for a more ambitious project: the modernization of papal diplomacy. In the Westphalian peace talks the reigning pope had, in the eyes of many in Rome, behaved "piuttosto [like a] Signore privato che Principe universale," turning the papacy into a laughing stock not just among the Protestants but also Catholic rulers.¹⁷¹⁶ Still reeling from the rout which he had experienced first-hand, Chigi set out to restore Rome to its former glory as the "theater of the world."¹⁷¹⁷ The most visible part of this ambition is perhaps the urban redevelopment in Rome that he patronized when he became pope Alexander VII, but his program was to radiate beyond the Papal States.¹⁷¹⁸ As Marie-Louise Rodén has shown, the advent of Chigi marked an attempt to redefine the papacy's relations to

¹⁷¹⁰ Rodén, *Church Politics*, p. 47.

¹⁷¹¹ On the circumstances of his appointment, see Emich, *Bürokratie und Nepotismus*, p. 419, and Menniti Ippolito, *Il tramonto*, pp. 50–51.

¹⁷¹² Quoted in Teodori, *I parenti del papa*, p. 46.

¹⁷¹³ Leti, *Il nipotismo*, p. 166.

¹⁷¹⁴ Rodén, *Church Politics*, pp. 13–14.

¹⁷¹⁵ Rodén, *Church Politics*, p. 197.

¹⁷¹⁶ *Nascita, vita e fortuna*, quoted in D'Amelia, *La nuova Agrippina*, p. 52.

¹⁷¹⁷ Osborne, *Diplomatic Culture*.

¹⁷¹⁸ See Krautheimer, *The Rome of Alexander VII*.

secular Catholic powers amidst growing challenges from Spain and France in particular.¹⁷¹⁹ As one of Chigi's close allies, Francesco Albizzi, summarized his vision (quoting Desiderius, a Benedictine abbot of Monte Cassino), "Sedes Apostolica Domina est nostra, non ancilla, nec alicui subdita, sed omnibus praeclara."¹⁷²⁰ Not only was the papacy to respond to the calls for the restoration of the common good that had jolted the Papal States and much of Europe, it was to place itself at the helm of the efforts to rid the Catholic world of the self-seeking behavior that had ended in war and destruction in the 1640s. (Little did it matter that Alexander VII had not much to show for himself. His incompetent handling of the *annona* conspired with the outbreak of the plague in 1656/1657, leaving approximately 15,000 Romans dead, while he had the church of Santa Maria della Pace covered in Virgil quotes that celebrated him as a just ruler.)¹⁷²¹

In this project, the permanent missions of the papacy, known as nunciatures, were to provide the face of a resurgent papacy capable of standing up to the rapidly expanding secular monarchies as the voice of the Christian commonwealth.¹⁷²² Even though they dated back to the sixteenth century, the papal missions underwent profound changes in the middle decades of the seventeenth century. As a result of the more rigorous education of future cardinals and catalyzed by the profligacy of the Pamphili pontificate, the 1650s saw an increase in career diplomats staffing the nunciatures, often handpicked after many years of studies in preparation for a specific diplomatic mission.¹⁷²³ Changing the incentives, Chigi deliberately employed the nunciatures to identify the scions of the Italian nobility that were committed enough to disinterested service to pull through diplomatic missions with sheer grit and determination. As a consequence, in the latter half of the seventeenth century, diplomatic service in the nunciatures became not only the preferred road into the college of cardinals but, increasingly, the only one to the papacy. After the pontificate of Innocent X, few pontiffs did not owe their election to the Apostolic See to a career in the papacy's diplomatic service.¹⁷²⁴ For all its shortcomings, the Chigi pontificate was "a period of transition between two generations in the papal administration," and, one might add, two distinct visions of service.¹⁷²⁵

One of Chigi's charges impatient to build a track record as a disinterested servant was Federico Borromeo. This was not as straightforward as it sounds. As we have seen in the preceding chapter, Borromeo was far from a clean slate. He had joined the merry-go-around under the Barberini, and when Innocent X was elected with the votes of the Spanish faction, he exulted that

¹⁷¹⁹ Rodén, Church Politics, p. 27.

¹⁷²⁰ Quoted in Rodén, Church Politics, p. 101.

¹⁷²¹ Reinhardt, Pontifex, p. 646.

¹⁷²² Rodén, Church Politics, pp. 195–196.

¹⁷²³ Visceglia, "La giusta statera," p. 208.

¹⁷²⁴ Rodén, Church Politics, p. 72.

¹⁷²⁵ Rodén, Church Politics, p. 46.

“l’esser Suddito di Spagna hormai non sarà più peccato originale, come è stato per il passato.”¹⁷²⁶

Buoyed, he approached “la Sig[no]ra D[onna] Olimpia” as one of many fortune-seekers, even sending her precious silk from Messina on Sicily (and bragging that while it had cost him less than “trecento cinq[uan]ta scudi,” it “apparirebbe molto più.”)¹⁷²⁷ What militated in his favor was that these gifts had failed to produce the desired outcome “per esser [io] creatura di Barberini e loro ben affetto.”¹⁷²⁸ If others tried to keep their bonds to one particular family to a minimum so as to be able to jump on the next bandwagon, as Mario Biagioli explains, Federico’s close association with the Barberini would penalize him for many years to come.¹⁷²⁹ Indeed, he would spend much of the 1640s joking about his stalling career, “Meno male che io almeno posso starmene col tappeto alla finestra a vedere la giostra degli altri insino che si muta la scena.”¹⁷³⁰

When the long-anticipated changes did materialize, Federico was enough of a dark horse to reinvent himself in order to fit the profile required of a papal servant under the new dispensation. As Chigi emerged as the star of the court, he realized that his moment had come.¹⁷³¹ Sensing the puritan turn underway, Federico quickly embraced the posture of the disinterested papal servant. What had once been his greatest shortcoming—his slow advancement over the previous two decades—was now construed as a sign of his willingness to defer gratification and put in long years of hard graft on missions far away from Rome.¹⁷³² In pointing this out, Federico made sure to show himself as taking the drudgery of diplomacy in an alien and sometimes hostile environment in stride. He portrayed himself as a martyr to the cause of Roman Catholicism, saddled with private debt and suffering from intermittent fever attacks and hemorrhoids.¹⁷³³ As he geared up for the long-awaited promotion, he fashioned himself as a tireless toiler who deserved a promotion but had been ignored by the powers-that-be for shunning their corrupt practices.

A man who clearly knew how to sift private ambition from public vocation, Chigi quickly set his eyes on the forgotten Borromeo, actively helping him revamp his image.¹⁷³⁴ In an audience with Innocent X and the secretary of state shortly after the latter’s appointment, the pope spun Borromeo’s tenaciousness in the face of adversity as “portamenti disinteressati,” and argued that his “buon servizio” in the provincial administration of the Papal State cut him out for the diplomatic

¹⁷²⁶ Federico IV to Giovanni, Fermo September 22, 1644: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, Cariche.

¹⁷²⁷ Federico IV to Giovanni, Rome December 30, 1645: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, Corrispondenza 1645–1655; Federico IV to Giovanni, Malta October 9, 1653: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, Corrispondenza 1645–1655.

¹⁷²⁸ Federico IV to Giovanni, Offida April 29, 1651: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, Corrispondenza 1645–1655.

¹⁷²⁹ Biagioli, Galileo Courtier, p. 261.

¹⁷³⁰ Federico IV to Giovanni, Rome March 11, 1645: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, Corrispondenza 1645–1655.

¹⁷³¹ Federico IV to Giovanni, Rome August 3, 1652: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, Corrispondenza 1645–1655.

¹⁷³² Federico IV to Antonio Renato, Lucerne December 21, 1656: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, Corrispondenza 1656–1664.

¹⁷³³ Federico IV to Giovanni, Montalto July 21, 1650: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, Corrispondenza 1645–1655.

¹⁷³⁴ Federico IV to Giovanni, Malta September 2, 1653: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, Corrispondenza 1645–1655; Federico IV to Giovanni, Rome October 24, 1654: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, Corrispondenza 1645–1655.

service that Chigi was launching.¹⁷³⁵ As the two men saw it, Federico was exactly what the papacy needed after Westphalia: a “soggetto che con la nascita riguardevole e con altre parti rimettesse in stato la reputation” of the pope’s diplomatic network.¹⁷³⁶ Although they first appointed him to the inquisition of Malta, they promised him “an impiego più adeguato e di maggior conseguenze,” as soon as the first nunciature became available.¹⁷³⁷ The once hapless Federico left the room a new man, drunk on the “mille attestazioni delle lodi ben singolari che N[ostro] S[ignore] non senza taccia della sua giustitia distributiva assegna a miei servitij, la sodisfat[ion]e costante de popoli che hò governati, il compatimento della corte tutta verso la mia sofferenza, l’universalità dell’amici et il numero delle dipendenze che mi sono acquistate e mantenute.”¹⁷³⁸

When he eventually was appointed nuncio in Lucerne, Federico did not disappoint. Not only did he accept the inclement weather north of the Alps, which seemed to alternate between “l’inverno con freddo moltissimo che molto mi affligge” and torrential rains that made him feel trapped “in questo veramente orinale delle nuvole.”¹⁷³⁹ He also accepted that he would have to spend many years—ten, it turned out—“sequestrato dalla pratica de’ galanhuomini [...] tra questi monti.”¹⁷⁴⁰ Only in his letter to his brother and confidant did he occasionally vent his frustration with the new meritocratic order in Rome which privileged service over recommendations. In one of his more desperate moments he confided that “se io fussi un pallone sarei un pezzo fa crepato, tanto vento m’hanno dato.”¹⁷⁴¹ On the whole, however, he seemed accepting of the new culture in which, instead of friends in high places, “il ben servire sia quello che [si] dimandi” for a promotion, and urged his relatives not to lobby on his behalf, especially because “io [...] stimo di non demeritar nel servire.”¹⁷⁴² As in contemporary France, Chigi’s vanguard understood merit to be talent and application that needed to be spotted by the sovereign himself.¹⁷⁴³

The new culture of privileging “Persone meritevoli” in lieu of the well-connected became even more entrenched when Chigi was elected pope in 1655.¹⁷⁴⁴ A court dismayed at, in Pasquino’s words, “l’empio tiranno che alla Chiesa fu di danno” (Innocent X) elevated the austere secretary of state to the apostolic see.¹⁷⁴⁵ His enthronement as Alexander VII owed much to his pledge to continue the work initiated as secretary of state and to restore the “reputazione della Sede

¹⁷³⁵ Federico IV to Giovanni, Rome August 3, 1652: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, Corrispondenza 1645–1655.

¹⁷³⁶ Federico IV to Giovanni, Rome August 3, 1652: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, Corrispondenza 1645–1655.

¹⁷³⁷ Federico IV to Giovanni, Rome August 3, 1652: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, Corrispondenza 1645–1655.

¹⁷³⁸ Federico IV to Giovanni, Malta May 28, 1654: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, Corrispondenza 1645–1655.

¹⁷³⁹ Federico IV to Antonio Renato, Lucerne April 9, 1661: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, Corrispondenza 1656–1664; Federico IV to Giovanni, Lucerne April 24, 1659: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, Corrispondenza 1656–1664.

¹⁷⁴⁰ Federico IV to Antonio Renato, Lucerne December 21, 1656: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, Corrispondenza 1656–1664.

¹⁷⁴¹ Federico IV to Giovanni, Lucerne April 29, 1656: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, Cariche.

¹⁷⁴² Federico IV to Giovanna Cesi, Lucerne March 12, 1656: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, Corrispondenza 1656–1664.

¹⁷⁴³ See Smith, *The Culture of Merit*, pp. 4–5.

¹⁷⁴⁴ Federico V to Giovanni, Rome June 26, 1655: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, Corrispondenza 1645–1655.

¹⁷⁴⁵ Quoted in D’Amelia, *La nuova Agrippina*, p. 75.

Apostolica, e levar le ciarle” on the papacy’s corruption.¹⁷⁴⁶ This, along with his moral clean-up and the professionalization of the court in his former role, had earned him the votes of a new faction in the college of cardinals, the *Squadrone Volante*, who had vowed to elect “one of the most deserving” members of the body.¹⁷⁴⁷ To be sure, the *Squadrone* was much more than the faction of cardinals created under Innocent X. Gianvittorio Signorotto has warned against accounts emphasizing the group’s internal cohesion and purported principled stance on the issues of the day to the exclusion of the opportunism that informed the actions of its members.¹⁷⁴⁸ While these words of caution are well taken, we should not lose sight of the forest for the trees. The formation’s members, including its sympathizers outside the college of cardinal, were, in the eyes of their contemporaries, “the most talented members of the Sacred College.”¹⁷⁴⁹ Many of the faction’s original adherents had impressive records of accomplishment in the administration of the Church and did constitute an antidote to the cronies who had been running the curia before Chigi came along. They embodied the transformation of the cardinal, “ormai non più principe rinascimentale, ma fedele servitore politico” who had made it to the top on merit and talent alone, and this self-perception informed their every move.¹⁷⁵⁰

Historians once tended to view the *Squadrone Volante* as a group of chancers from Spanish Italy intent on exploiting Spain’s weakness in the 1650s to wrest concessions from the crown.¹⁷⁵¹ Gianvittorio Singorotto has done much to skewer this myth, arguing instead that its members’ interests aligned with those of Spain.¹⁷⁵² By the 1650s, most elite families from Spanish Italy had welded their destinies to the Catholic king to such an extent that rebellion through the Church was simply off the table. The pushback against French and Spanish power that historians have mistaken for signs of an insurrection should be seen as a corollary of these cardinals’ commitment to restoring Rome’s lost supremacy over Catholic monarchs and putting the Church at the helm of an ambitious reformist agenda. The *Squadrone*’s mainstay was a commitment to disinterested service in the name of good governance which bore more than a fleeting resemblance with ideas that were maturing in the Spanish monarchy at the time. As such, the ideology was not the exclusive purview of the relatively small number of cardinals who made up the original formation. Rather, these ideas trickled down to the prelates who served in the nunciatures across Catholic Europe, in the hope that they, too, would one day ride into the select circle of cardinals on the strength of their commitment to ending corrupt government and restoring the common good across the Catholic world.

¹⁷⁴⁶ The words are those of the resident of the Medici family in Rome, quoted in D’Amelia, *La nuova Agrippina*, p. 62.

¹⁷⁴⁷ The quote is from the founding document of the *Squadrone Volante*, written by Francesco Albizzi, quoted in Signorotto, *The Squadrone Volante*, (p. 181). Also see, *ibid.*, p. 186.

¹⁷⁴⁸ Signorotto, *The Squadrone Volante*, p. 187. Also see Pattenden, *Electing*, p. 53.

¹⁷⁴⁹ Signorotto, *The Squadrone*, pp. 181–182.

¹⁷⁵⁰ Visceglia, “La giusta statera,” p. 191; Fosi, *All’ombra dei Barberini*, p. 253.

¹⁷⁵¹ Signorotto, *The Squadrone*, pp. 186, 184.

¹⁷⁵² Signorotto, *The Squadrone*, p. 190.

Scholars differ on the depth of the changes wrought by the *Squadrone*. Marie-Louise Rodén has pronounced that the election of Alexander VII marked the beginnings of a “conscious policy towards the professionalization of the papal administration” that had been initiated at Trent but interrupted during the first half of the seventeenth century.¹⁷⁵³ Conversely, Gianvittorio Signorotto has cautioned against such sweeping claims, arguing that while the 1650s and 1660s witnessed limited professionalization, the latter coexisted with a nepotism that remained the linchpin of the curia.¹⁷⁵⁴ This is certainly true, and becomes clearer as we move down the hierarchy. Indeed, the example of Federico Borromeo shows that the much-touted changes were at best skin-deep: some of the papacy’s structural necessities could not be easily undone, and some of Olimpia’s more glaring transgressions—the involvement of female relatives in government and the plundering of ecclesiastical resources for private ends—persisted beneath the cloak of the new service ideology. Contrary to the revisionist assertions of the anti-nepotists of the 1690s, the 1650s were not the beginning of the struggle they so valiantly brought to its just end.¹⁷⁵⁵ What changed under Chigi was not the substance of papal government but the way its actors thought about what they had come to view as unethical behavior. Torn between their commitment to rational government and an unsavory reality, they learned to misrecognize the structural givens of papal government, integrating the old ills into the new ideology of disinterested service. Like the self-styled “disinterested defenders of universal causes” studied by Pierre Bourdieu, the new crop of papal officials had “an interest in disinterestedness.”¹⁷⁵⁶

The career of Federico bears this out. Much as he liked to depict himself as a monad propelled exclusively by merit and talent, he owed his decisive promotion to the nunciature of Lucerne to his mother, Giovanna Cesi, who had returned to Rome in the early 1650s and become Federico’s most vocal advocate. The record is unequivocal on this point. While he was stationed in Malta awaiting his next promotion, Chigi mailed to inform Federico that “[i]l desiderio, e le preghiere della Sig[no]ra Madre, e de’ più congiunti di V[ostra] S[ignoria] Ill[ustrissi]ma hanno mosso la benignità di N[ost]ro S[igno]re à chiamarla a Roma alla Carica di Consultore del S[an]to Ufficio.”¹⁷⁵⁷ However, “perché non si sà il senso proprio di V[ostra] S[ignoria] Ill[ustrissi]ma se più godesse di attendere costà in cotesto posto, ò qua in questo altro, qualche maggior suo avanzamento, è condescesa S[ua] B[eatitudi]ne à questo favore di lassarne à lei la elezione totalm[ent]e libera.”¹⁷⁵⁸ Federico quickly replied that he was more interested in a prestigious nunciature, which he was promptly awarded a few months later. In a letter to his brother, Giovanni, Federico confirmed that

¹⁷⁵³ Rodén, *Church Politics*, pp. 24–27 (the quote is on p. 26).

¹⁷⁵⁴ Signorotto, *Il ruolo politico*, p. 245.

¹⁷⁵⁵ On the self-justificatory reading of events among anti-nepotists of the 1690s, see Benigno, *Nipoti favoriti*, pp. 80–82.

¹⁷⁵⁶ Bourdieu, *The State Nobility*, p. 382.

¹⁷⁵⁷ Chigi to Borromeo, Rome March 14, 1654: ASV, Segr. Stato, Malta, 82A, f. 2v.

¹⁷⁵⁸ Chigi to Borromeo, Rome March 14, 1654: ASV, Segr. Stato, Malta, 82A, ff. 2v–3r.

his mother and another brother, a Theatine monk whose name was, confusingly, also Federico, deserved all the credit for his big break.¹⁷⁵⁹ If it had not been for their “continua sollicitat[ion]e di q[ues]ta sorte,” “gli amici[,] benché siano buoni e molti[,] poco haverebbero fatto.”¹⁷⁶⁰

The exchange shows two things, and both are at variance with the public image that Federico projected in those years. First, the old recommendation culture of the Barberini court seemed to be alive and well in the age of meritocracy, and second, female relatives still ran the show for the male clerics of their families. The incident cannot be excused as a slipup either. The following years would repeatedly turn up instances where the disinterested nuncio’s mother went to bat for him. All his letters indicate that Giovanna became a decisive factor in Federico’s success. Evidence of this was his concern about her wellbeing. Over the years Federico repeatedly urged his brother to treat their mother well: “non vorrei che la Sig[no]ra M[ad]re restasse in bisogno e disgusto in tempo che per tutti noi e per me particolarm[en]te importa molto che adesso stia a Roma.”¹⁷⁶¹ Thus, while cardinal hopefuls now hewed to the idea of making it on their own, they simultaneously had to recognize that female family members remained crucial to their advancement. The resulting cognitive dissonance needed to be negotiated in complex ways.

Before Olimpia’s dislodging, the presence of family members in Rome lobbying at the bidding of aspiring clerics had been seen as an ingenious solution to an insidious problem: in order to be promoted, future cardinals needed to spend significant amounts of time away from Rome, which in turn kept them from campaigning for their preferment.¹⁷⁶² Before the meritocratic turn, Federico had openly acknowledged the problem posed by his long absences in his correspondence. While he was still governor in the Papal States, he repeatedly blamed his inability to tend to court business for his failure to advance his career. To contemporaries it was axiomatic that, as Federico’s brother phrased it, “l’esser lontano li nuoce, et urget presentia, come s’è veduto con l’esperienza.”¹⁷⁶³ The main reason was the system of recommendations in the papal court. As Federico explained at one point, “per l’absenza mia non si maravigli se [i negozi] patirono naufragio perché io ancora son necessitato raccomandarmi ad altri e passar per mano di persone che nelle cose commessegli premono si et in quantum et non alias, aliter, nec alio modo.”¹⁷⁶⁴ Those who could afford to stay in Rome therefore resisted promotions away from the court out of fear of losing touch with the pontiff.¹⁷⁶⁵ Those, like Federico, who depended on governorships to stay afloat made every effort at least occasionally to return to Rome to “ravvivar la memoria dell’amicitie e dependenze vecchie e di

¹⁷⁵⁹ On Federico V, see Galli and Monferrini, *I Borromeo*, p. 21.

¹⁷⁶⁰ Federico IV to Giovanni, Rome October 10, 1654: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, *Corrispondenza 1645–1655*.

¹⁷⁶¹ Federico IV to Giorgio Sorino, Bellinzona March 15, 1655: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, *Corrispondenza 1645–1655*.

¹⁷⁶² Ago, *Carriere*, pp. 51–60.

¹⁷⁶³ Federico V to Antonio Renato, Rome December 13, 1664: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, *Corrispondenza 1656–1664*.

¹⁷⁶⁴ Federico IV to Giovanni, Todi January 21, 1642: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, *Corrispondenza 1627–1644*.

¹⁷⁶⁵ Ago, *Carriere*, p. 92.

stabilir le nove.”¹⁷⁶⁶ If he could not be present in Rome, he at least needed trusted brokers operating on his behalf. For the only way for an absent cleric to make any headway was to “mandarsi in mano a persona confidente in Roma nota di quelle cariche alle quali potesse haversi la mira acciò facendosi apertura ad una di esse potesse” put in a request.¹⁷⁶⁷

Women seemed cut out for this role for a number of reasons. As we have seen in chapters 2 and 3, female members of noble families were expected to carry out important work in managing dynastic capital as part of an informal “office-holding couple.”¹⁷⁶⁸ Facilitating this was, ironically, the misogyny of early modern society. Officially barred from holding office, women’s politicking was relegated to the sphere of the informal and thus perceived as innocuous by the male representatives of rivaling clans.¹⁷⁶⁹ (Federico’s correspondence turns up plenty of evidence to that effect. He consistently portrayed his female relatives as either distracted by the “pensiero femminile della raccolta” or wary of any “applicat[ion]e fuor di quella dello specchio”—in short, unreliable.¹⁷⁷⁰ The women of the house were belittled as “femmine senza uso di ragione”; their political interventions with other female heads of household, trivialized as “far un poco di piagnisteo con quest’altre femmine.”¹⁷⁷¹) Hence women of preeminent families could engage more freely in exploratory talks than the men of the house whose word was considered binding. In court societies across western Europe this role was usually assigned to spouses. The celibate clerics in the Roman curia, however, were forced to fall back on either their mother or their sister-in-law (the wife of their elder brother).¹⁷⁷² As all holders of informal positions, these women had to affect an uneasy balancing act.¹⁷⁷³ The papal court in the early seventeenth century had developed a fairly clear idea of what the so-called “maneggi femminili” included: in addition to the arrangement of advantageous marriages for their daughters, women of noble houses were expected to look after the well-being of the family clerics.¹⁷⁷⁴

But, as the example of Donna Olimpia had made clear, this last task could easily be taken too far. Granted, much as later critics tried to depict Innocent X’s sister-in-law as an outlier, Donna Olimpia’s political activity was in some sense a logical progression of the increasingly prominent role

¹⁷⁶⁶ Federico IV to Giovanni, Rome August 3, 1652: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, *Corrispondenza 1645–1655*.

¹⁷⁶⁷ Federico IV to Giovanni, Malta September 2, 1653: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, *Corrispondenza 1645–1655*.

¹⁷⁶⁸ Ludwig, *Verwaltung*.

¹⁷⁶⁹ For an overview, see the relevant contributions to Bastian et al. (eds.), *Das Geschlecht der Diplomatie*.

¹⁷⁷⁰ Federico IV to Giovanni, Rome June 17, 1645: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, *Corrispondenza 1645–1655*; Federico IV to Giovanni, Rome August 27, 1652: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, *Corrispondenza 1645–1655*.

¹⁷⁷¹ Federico IV to Giovanni, Todi June 27, 1642: ABIB, FB, *Corrispondenza 1627–1644*; Federico IV to Giovanni, Rome May 6, 1645: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, *Cariche*.

¹⁷⁷² Borello, *Trame sovrapposte*, pp. 122–125; Nater Cartier, *Zwischen Konvention*, p. 16.

¹⁷⁷³ Dewald, *Status, Power, and Identity*, p. 85.

¹⁷⁷⁴ D’Amelia, *La nuova Agrippina*, p. 91; eadem, *Nepotismo al femminile*, p. 362; also see Nater Cartier, *Zwischen Konvention*.

female members of papal families had taken on in the court of Rome.¹⁷⁷⁵ Still, in the perception of many men, she had taken things too far by putting herself in charge of the family finances and helping herself to the papal coffers.¹⁷⁷⁶ Her purportedly scandalous violation of established norms precipitated a rollback that conditioned women's activity in important ways in the 1650s. In a court still reeling from the shock of a female relative who had transcended the narrow boundaries set on women's political work, contemporaries were advised to police the women in the family, keeping their influence-peddling under wraps whenever possible. While he was painfully aware that it was still indispensable, Federico had every interest in obscuring the role of his mother in his preferment when he invited Giovanna to come and "levar gli ostacoli" to his advancement.¹⁷⁷⁷

As his prospects looked up in 1652 and he organized his mother's coming to Rome, Federico was careful to hatch an alibi. As he explained to his brother, Giovanni, their maternal uncle, Francesco Maria Cesi, was terminally ill. He might therefore be convinced that it was "necessario che presso di sé o almeno non lontano avesse persona così interessata nella di lui salute et autorevole per i riguardi del sangue che non potesse in qualsisia caso d'infirmità negarglisi l'adito e l'assistenza."¹⁷⁷⁸ Such an arrangement, Federico reasoned, had two advantages. It would help the Borromeo brothers ensure that, upon their uncle's death, "le più belle pezze che habbia quella Casa e per disposit[ion]e degli Antenati a noi spettanti" were not snatched from the Borromeo by "estranei."¹⁷⁷⁹ Secondly it would "prescindere" Giovanna's stay in Rome "apparentem[en]te da ogni interesse di Casa Borromea." By giving off the impression that she was in the Eternal City to look after her ill brother, she would be able to do Federico's bidding without incurring the wrath that Olimpia had faced.¹⁷⁸⁰

Tellingly, this hypocrisy lasted only so long as it was politic. Desperate to live up to his reputation as the man who vanquished nepotism, Chigi, upon being elected Alexander VII, took a principled stance against the involvement of his family in government. In a letter to his brother, Mario, and his nephew, Flavio, he advised his close family members to stay put in their hometown of Siena.¹⁷⁸¹ Within a year, this decision was reversed and the Chigi assumed control of the Vatican. As Pasquino taunted, "Con finto zelo e con pietà fallace molto al mondo promise e nulla attese: disse che i suoi sarebbero al paese, ma a capo all'anno si trovò mendace."¹⁷⁸² What had led to the sudden

¹⁷⁷⁵ D'Amelia, *La nuova Agrippina*, pp. 56–57; eadem, *Nepotismo al femminile*, p. 353.

¹⁷⁷⁶ D'Amelia, *Nepotismo al femminile*, p. 367.

¹⁷⁷⁷ Federico IV to Giovanni, Rome August 27, 1652: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, *Corrispondenza 1645–1655*.

¹⁷⁷⁸ Federico VI to Giovanni, Rome August 27, 1652: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, *Corrispondenza 1645–1655*.

¹⁷⁷⁹ Federico VI to Giovanni, Rome August 27, 1652: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, *Corrispondenza 1645–1655*. The documents pertaining to the litigation between the Cesi and the Borromeo after Giovanna's brother's death, which I cannot examine here, are in ASR, Archivio Massimo d'Aracoeli, buste 245–251.

¹⁷⁸⁰ Federico IV to Giovanni, Rome August 27, 1652: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, *Corrispondenza 1645–1655*.

¹⁷⁸¹ Rodén, *Church Politics*, p. 133; Teodori, *I parenti del papa*, p. 58.

¹⁷⁸² Quoted in Teodori, *I parenti del papa*, p. 57.

U-turn was the work of a special committee of cardinals who, tasked with looking into the issue of nepotism, had found that Alexander's stance against the involvement of relatives was commendable but wildly impractical. In the cardinals' view, a competent secretary of state, as the pope seemed to believe on the strength of his own experience, by no means replaced the direct access to the pope that only his relatives could provide.¹⁷⁸³ The Venetian ambassador put it most succinctly, "the papacy seems to totter when it is deprived of the help of a close blood relation" of the pontiff.¹⁷⁸⁴ Predictable as its findings were, the committee nevertheless shows that, after the Pamphili's shenanigans, new arguments needed to be wheeled out to justify the continuation of nepotistic practices.¹⁷⁸⁵

With the participation of relatives in government established as a necessity, Chigi and his men set out to make this inconvenient truth fit with their own beliefs in clean government. Their rationalization quickly settled on the papacy's peculiar status as an elective monarchy, which meant that the members of the college of cardinals were much more than rivaling aristocrats: at the end of the day, each of them strove to be elected to the papacy and, therefore, had every interest in sabotaging potential competitors. One member of the committee the pope had instituted put it as follows: "Vostra Maestà non può durare senza aiuto considerabile, e questo ella ha provato di non poterlo conseguire da ministri estranei, ai quali manca se non l'autorità, l'amore e la confidenza, l'ardore."¹⁷⁸⁶ To contemporary elites deeply wedded to the Tacitan ideology of the time, the only truly reliable collaborators were the ones who stood to benefit most from a cardinal's success: the members of his own clan. As the author of a pamphlet titled *Che il Pontificato non si può ben'amministrare senza l'aiuto d'alcuno delli Nepoti, o Parenti del Pontefice* put it, "[È] certo che da niuno sarà servito con più affetto, et amore quanto da quelli del proprio Casato, fra li quali la natura hà intestato una così benigna inclinazione d'amore scambievole."¹⁷⁸⁷ Even as acerbic a critic of the papacy as Gregorio Leti stated that the pope's only loyal servants were those who "ha[nno] parte alle sue grandezze," and concluded, "[D]ifficilmente possono i Pontefici conservarsi lungo tempo in vita, nel governo del Ponteficato, senza l'assistenza de' più intimi de' loro Parenti, mentre da questi dipende in certa maniera, quasi tutta la conservatione della loro persona, invidiata da tutte le parti."¹⁷⁸⁸

The justificatory language soon traveled down the hierarchy. Uneasy about his earlier duplicity on his mother's involvement in his career, Federico Borromeo lapped it up with relish. By

¹⁷⁸³ Rodén, *Church Politics*, p. 135.

¹⁷⁸⁴ Quoted in Signorotto, *The Squadrone Volante*, p. 197.

¹⁷⁸⁵ Karsten, *Künstler und Kardinäle*, p. 182.

¹⁷⁸⁶ Sforza Pallavicino quoted in Benigno, *Nipoti favoriti*, p. 90.

¹⁷⁸⁷ *Che il Pontificato non si può ben'amministrare senza l'aiuto d'alcuno delli Nepoti, o Parenti del Pontefice*. Discorso: BAV, Chig., I.II.55, ff. 17r–v.

¹⁷⁸⁸ Leti, *Il nipotismo*, pp. 45–46, 48–49.

1657, he freely admitted that his mother “hà sempre per fine particolare li miei avanzamenti,” and that without “la stanza della S[igno]ra M[ad]re in Roma [...]” nothing had ever become of his promotion.¹⁷⁸⁹ But equally as interesting were the terms in which he couched Giovanna’s complicity. Using the language that the Chigi pope and his milieu offered to their charges, he passed off her work as a labor of maternal love and affection. As Federico wrote to Giovanna herself, “[N]on posso esprimere quanto mi conosca obligato all’applicat[ion]e e pensiero che V[ostra] S[ignoria] Ill[ustrissi]ma mi hà con tanto affetto [the past participle is missing from the original].”¹⁷⁹⁰ Her services were cast as acts of motherly love, her political work subsumed under care work, thus providing a convenient distraction from a reality that the court after the fall of Donna Olimpia still found hard to swallow.¹⁷⁹¹

With this new cover in place, Giovanna’s role rapidly expanded in the late 1650s as Federico struggled to fund his career. If governorships had been a drain on Federico’s scant resources, nunciatures were an altogether different league.¹⁷⁹² Renata Ago has calculated that the average mission set aspiring cardinals back at least 6,500 *scudi* a year.¹⁷⁹³ Although Lucerne, a city without a court, might have been less punishing, Federico had a long list of additional expenses imposed on him as nuncio to the Swiss Confederacy and the Grisons. While the office provided some opportunities for self-enrichment, such as the sale of matrimonial dispenses, these hardly offset the expenditures.¹⁷⁹⁴ In order to represent the papacy in all its splendor, Federico needed to hold regular banquets for his hosts in Lucerne, as well as present himself with a copious retinue of servants.¹⁷⁹⁵ It has generally been difficult to reconstruct the exact number of members of the average nuncio’s household.¹⁷⁹⁶ In Federico’s case, a balance sheet from June 1655 suggests that the lion’s share of his expenses went toward the “salarij della servitù,” who were supposedly also responsible for the copious amounts of bread, wine, and meat he spent money on.¹⁷⁹⁷ To promote the invigorated Catholicism of his principals, he also funded the religious education of sons of the local nobility in Milan and supported converts from Protestantism—“spese grandi,” with “nessuno [who] me le rimborsa.”¹⁷⁹⁸ Unlike in earlier posts, he was also required to travel extensively across the Catholic cantons, and during these outings he was expected to distribute devotional objects and other gifts to

¹⁷⁸⁹ Federico IV to Giovanni, Lucerne July 17, 1657: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, Cariche.

¹⁷⁹⁰ Federico IV to Giovanna, Lucerne May 16, 1656: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, Corrispondenza 1656–1664.

¹⁷⁹¹ See Daybell, *Women Letter-Writers*, pp. 29, 255–256.

¹⁷⁹² Also see Pečar, *Status-Ökonomie*, p. 103.

¹⁷⁹³ Ago, *Carriere*, p. 121.

¹⁷⁹⁴ Federico IV to Antonio Renato, Bellinzona February 8, 1655: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, Corrispondenza 1645–1655.

¹⁷⁹⁵ Federico IV to Giovanni, Lucerne May 18, 1655: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, Corrispondenza 1645–1655; Federico IV to Giovanni, Lucerne June 2, 1655: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, Corrispondenza 1645–1655.

¹⁷⁹⁶ Fink, *Die Luzerner Nuntiatur*, p. 124.

¹⁷⁹⁷ Spesa ordinaria per un mese calcolata per Giugno passato [1655]: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, Corrispondenza 1645–1655.

¹⁷⁹⁸ Federico IV to Antonio Renato, Lucerne May 23, 1658: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, Corrispondenza 1656–1664; Federico IV to Giovanna Cesi, Lucerne October 12, 1662: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, Corrispondenza 1656–1664.

local elites and the faithful.¹⁷⁹⁹ The balance sheet from June 1655, for instance, mentions “spese straord[inarie]di passaggi di Pellegrini” and “altre limosine.”¹⁸⁰⁰

With nuncios in Lucerne earning no more than 320 *scudi* per annum, Federico had to fall back on his own resources.¹⁸⁰¹ Given this it did not help that his brother was less and less willing to fund him as his relationship with the Spanish crown turned sour. As Federico noted wryly from his haunt in Switzerland, “[P]otevo quanto a quelli di Milano morirmi di necessità che tanto si movono per lettere e preghiere quanto facci una statua.”¹⁸⁰² Giovanni was less forthcoming with money than ever before. He initially tried “destreggiando dal non far visita.”¹⁸⁰³ But when it became impossible to “ricoprire presso del Papa la mia tardanza,” his mother in Rome was his last best hope. She was the only person able to help him tap alternative sources of income, not least access to ecclesiastical benefices which required constant lobbying in the curia.¹⁸⁰⁴

Besides his family trust fund, one of Federico’s most important sources of income were a number of commendatory abbeys that he had been gifted by his famous great-uncle, Federico Sr., in 1628.¹⁸⁰⁵ As other prebends, abbeys could not technically be bequeathed without this giving rise to charges of simony. But their holders could resign them to a specific individual during their lifetime, and many high-ranking clerics did so in favor of their nephews, fostering the creation of “curial dynasties” which together formed an “ecclesiastical feudal nobility.”¹⁸⁰⁶ To future cardinals, such gifts were invaluable. Even though they did not exercise any authority over the regular clergy in the abbey, commendatory abbots still held authority over the abbey’s lands and, more importantly, were allowed to draw revenues from their estates without having to reside there.¹⁸⁰⁷ Commendatory abbeys could also be cumulated. All these factors conspired to turn them into extremely sought-after sinecures that enabled future, as well as current, cardinals to finance their lavish lifestyle and defray the costs accruing from diplomatic missions.¹⁸⁰⁸ Scipione Borghese, the cardinal-nephew of Paul V, drew almost half of his income from commendatory abbeys, and that percentage rose as high 70 percent for the ill-fated cardinal-nephew of Innocent X, Camillo Astalli Pamphili.¹⁸⁰⁹ All saw them as

¹⁷⁹⁹ Federico IV to Giovanni, Lucerne July 7, 1655: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, Corrispondenza 1645–1655; Federico IV to Giovanni, Einsiedeln August 26, 1655: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, Corrispondenza 1645–1655; Federico IV to Giovanna Cesi, Lucerne October 12, 1662: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, Corrispondenza 1656–1664; Fink, *Die Luzerner Nuntiatur*, p. 212.

¹⁸⁰⁰ Spesa ordinaria per un mese calcolata per Giugno passato [1655]: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, Corrispondenza 1645–1655.

¹⁸⁰¹ On the nuncio’s salary, see Fink, *Die Luzerner Nuntiatur*, p. 111.

¹⁸⁰² Federico IV to Giovanna Cesi, Muri August 24, 1656: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, Corrispondenza 1656–1664.

¹⁸⁰³ Federico IV to Giovanna Cesi, Lucerne August 27, 1656: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, Corrispondenza 1656–1664.

¹⁸⁰⁴ Federico IV to Giovanna Cesi, Lucerne March 14, 1656: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, Corrispondenza 1656–1664.

¹⁸⁰⁵ De Gennaro, *Vicende patrimoniali*, p. 25.

¹⁸⁰⁶ Mario Rosa, *Curia romana*, pp. 70–71 (on “dinastie curiali”); D’Avenia, *La Chiesa del re*, p. 22 (“feudalità ecclesiastica”).

¹⁸⁰⁷ Reinhard, *Papal Power*, p. 337.

¹⁸⁰⁸ Rosa, *La “scarsella di Nostro Signore”*, p. 48.

¹⁸⁰⁹ Rosa, *Curia romana*, p. 83.

vital means to top up their income, because, one contemporary explained, even the office of cardinal did not generate “emolumenti sufficienti al congruo mantenimento proporzionato alla dignità.”¹⁸¹⁰

Many of the lush prebends of this kind were situated in Spanish Italy, in Milan and Naples.¹⁸¹¹ Since Neapolitan feudalism gave feudatories much more leeway in extracting the labor of their tenants than its northern Italian counterpart, many preferred southern Italian estates, which by all indicators contributed significantly to supporting the lifestyle of both laymen and clerics from outside the region.¹⁸¹² Federico was no exception. By far the most important of his abbeys was that of Sant’Angelo in the Vulture region near Melfi in what is today Basilicata. Its extensive lands provided the future cardinal with a sizeable income over the years (of which he left a mere 200 *scudi* to the abbot).¹⁸¹³ As was common in the area, Federico seems to have generated most of his income through rent contracts (*affitti*) which regulated land leases for three-year periods (as opposed to payments in kind known as *terraggi*, which were also common in the area).¹⁸¹⁴ The surviving data does not allow us to quantify the income the abbey washed into his coffers. A letter from 1636 suggests that the abbey earned him 1,400 *scudi* a year, although this sum could be significantly higher if sales of grains and legumes went well and Federico was able to generate additional income from surplus production.¹⁸¹⁵

The source of his riches lay in the extraction of his tenants’ labor, and his correspondence indicates that this created more than a few problems. Being permanently absent from the abbey, he had to rely on local agents who turned out to be less than trustworthy.¹⁸¹⁶ One of them deported himself as a “Padrone assoluto,” stoking discontent among the peasantry, whereas others were quite simply “ladri.”¹⁸¹⁷ To Federico’s dismay, the rampant indiscipline did not stop at the overseers: it stretched all the way down to the lower orders. If his great-uncle had to defend the jurisdictional rights of the abbey against the encroachment of other feudatories, Federico Jr. wrestled mostly with an impoverished peasantry.¹⁸¹⁸ A balance sheet from 1642 and 1643 yields a glum picture. The sums single tenants paid to Borromeo for pastures, arable land, mills, and privileged access to natural

¹⁸¹⁰ G. B. De Luca, *Il cardinal della S. R. Chiesa pratico*, quoted in Visceglia, “La giusta statera,” p. 206.

¹⁸¹¹ Reinhard, *Papal Power*, p. 355.

¹⁸¹² On ecclesiastical benefices from the region, see Rosa, *Curia romana*, and Reinhardt, *Kommenden*, p. 167.

¹⁸¹³ *Relat.e dell’Abb.a di S. Angelo in Vultu nelle Provincie di Puglia, et Basilicata visitata da Paolo Camillo Bianco Gentilhuomo milanese dell’Anno 1628*: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, *Benefici ed Abbazie*. Some information on the Federico Sr.’s administration of Sant’Angelo in Vulture can be gleaned from Marcora, *Il cardinal Federigo*, and the clearly dated account in Fortunato, *La badia*, pp. 256–257.

¹⁸¹⁴ Zotta, *Agrarian Crisis*, pp. 141, 144–145.

¹⁸¹⁵ Federico IV to Giulio Cesare, Rome February 4, 1636: ABIB, FB, Giovanni V, *Corrispondenza con diversi*, fasc. *Corrispondenza 1636*; Federico IV to Giovanni, [Todi] [spring 1642]: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, *Corrispondenza 1627–1644*. On the agricultural produce, see *Relat.e dell’Abb.a di S. Angelo in Vultu nelle Provincie di Puglia, et Basilicata visitata da Paolo Camillo Bianco Gentilhuomo milanese dell’Anno 1628*: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, *Benefici ed Abbazie*. On income from surplus production, see Tommaso Astarita, *The Continuity of Feudal Power*, p. 70.

¹⁸¹⁶ For similar problems in the Barberini’s feudal holdings, see Castiglione, *Patrons*, pp. 108–113.

¹⁸¹⁷ Federico IV to Giovanna Cesi, Lucerne March 6, 1664: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, *Corrispondenza 1656–1664*; Federico V to Federico IV, Rome May 15, 1655: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, *Corrispondenza 1645–1655*.

¹⁸¹⁸ Marcora, *Il cardinal Federigo*, p. 40.

resources would be laughable if they were not a tragic indicator of their poverty. Federico, instead of showing mercy, thought that such destitution warranted ruthless policing. As the same document indicates, the various rents of pastures and woodlands returned to the feudatory amounted to less than what was spent on the complex administration of all the privileges that needed to be renewed on a regular basis and the security detail put in place to make sure that peasants respected enclosure.¹⁸¹⁹ Betraying his commitment to gutting the commons, Federico hired two guards to keep people from picking up firewood and acorns (a popular food item among the poor) in the extensive forests of the region as part of a “señorial reaction” (I. A. A. Thompson) that engulfed much of the king of Spain’s realm at the time.¹⁸²⁰ This inflexibility did not necessarily defy economic logic. Strenuously to defend existing feudal prerogatives not only secured profits, it paved the way for more stockades and potential new sources of income.¹⁸²¹ However, the surviving evidence suggests that Federico’s complicity in the squeeze that had been applied to the peasantry in the kingdom of Naples since the economic crisis of the late sixteenth century was becoming counterproductive.¹⁸²² As elsewhere, exacerbated tenants voted with their feet. They gave up on agriculture and sought their fortune elsewhere, quite possibly in Naples whose population swelled in the years leading up to the revolt of 1647.¹⁸²³ In a labor-intense economy in which a sizeable population correlated with economic growth, this was bad news.¹⁸²⁴

To counter the hemorrhaging of *massari*, Federico followed the example of other feudatories in the area and made sizeable investments in his fief.¹⁸²⁵ After his first visit to the abbey in the 1640s, he had concluded that “la universale malagevolezza de’ tempi non è più in termine che possa render il frutto senza alcuna industria, ma bisogna andarla aiutando.”¹⁸²⁶ The centerpiece of his economic betterment plan was the acquisition of new livestock “per non perdere certi campi che sono restati senza massari” after the mass exodus that Federico’s voracity had provoked.¹⁸²⁷ With money from his brother he spent “centovinti scudi in tante scrofe con gli allevi,” joking that he was now “econo-
massaro, pecoraro, e direi anco porcaro se non v’andasse aggiunto cum reverentia.”¹⁸²⁸ Livestock, Tommaso Astarita explains in a study of a neighboring fiefdom, was “usually farmed out to local

¹⁸¹⁹ Bilancio, et levamento dell’Introito, et exito di tutte l’Intrate dell’Abadia di Sant’Angelo In Ulto [...]: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, Benefici ed Abbazie, fasc. Stato dell’Abbazia di S. Angel in Volto, et Suoi Membri. 1644.

¹⁸²⁰ Bilancio, et levamento dell’Introito, et exito di tutte l’Intrate dell’Abadia di Sant’Angelo In Ulto [...]: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, Benefici ed Abbazie, fasc. Stato dell’Abbazia di S. Angel in Volto, et Suoi Membri. 1644. On the drive to enclose common lands in the area, Zotta, *Agrarian Crisis*, p. 142. On the “señorial reaction,” see Thompson, *The Nobility*, p. 214.

¹⁸²¹ Astarita, *The Continuity of Feudal Power*, p. 234.

¹⁸²² Astarita, *The Continuity of Feudal Power*, pp. 103–104.

¹⁸²³ Sabatini, *Economy and Finance*, p. 94.

¹⁸²⁴ Astarita, *The Continuity of Feudal Power*, pp. 70, 88.

¹⁸²⁵ Astarita, *The Continuity of Feudal Power*, p. 104. Also see Thompson, *The Nobility*, p. 213.

¹⁸²⁶ Federico IV to Giovanni, Benevento August 24, 1647: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, *Corrispondenza 1645–1655*.

¹⁸²⁷ Federico VI to Giovanni, Benevento February 26, 1647: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, *Corrispondenza 1645–1655*.

¹⁸²⁸ Federico VI to Giovanni, Benevento February 26, 1647: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, *Corrispondenza 1645–1655*; Federico IV to Giovanni, Benevento August 24, 1647: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, *Corrispondenza 1645–1655*.

peasants for rent or under agreements to share the profits.”¹⁸²⁹ Borromeo likely did the same, although the exact nature of the products thus obtained and their marketing remain shrouded in mystery. What is less elusive is the positive effect this investment had on his purse. The direct involvement of the lord in the running of his estates and the concentration on pigs and sheep ginned up Borromeo’s revenues to 4,000 *scudi* in the best years.¹⁸³⁰

The improved extraction cycle broke down almost as soon as it was up and running. The reason for this was the revolt of 1647–48 which spread from Naples to the countryside where it took on the form of an antifeudal uprising against predatory landlords.¹⁸³¹ Although the population of Basilicata was, in the words of one contemporary, among “le più contumaci del Regno,” Borromeo’s tenants could just about be kept in abeyance.¹⁸³² Still, the euphemistically named “cose del Regno” had been a near miss.¹⁸³³ As Federico explained to his brother, if “questo fracasso” had lasted longer than it did, “si riducevano a tal termine l’entrate di quei paesi” that he would have been forced to “supplicarla d’un luogo o di m[aest]ro di stalla o di giardiniere o di altro off[ici]o a che la mia poca abilità si fusse potuta stendere.”¹⁸³⁴ He would have turned into one more “bocca disutil” that his brother was forced to feed.¹⁸³⁵

If peasant resistance was one obstacle to the extraction of the area’s riches, the Spanish monarchy soon turned out to be the more formidable antagonist. When he had a particularly good harvest, “la Corte [vicereale] hà fatto sequestrare tutti li grani e li vuole [comprare] a carlini dicidotto il tomolo mentre vogliono trenta comunem[en]te.”¹⁸³⁶ But his main nemesis was the sheep customhouse (*dogana delle pecore*) at Foggia which was encroaching on his land and curtailing his rents.¹⁸³⁷ The customhouse had been set up by the Spanish monarchy to oversee and regulate the yearly migration of hundreds of thousands of sheep from the snowy mountains of the Apennines toward the plains of Apulia. In addition to other prerogatives, customhouse officials had been granted special powers to requisition land from private landowners (categorized as *erbaggi straordinari*) and turn it into temporary pasture for wintering sheep in times of need.¹⁸³⁸ This is what happened to Borromeo in the winter of 1655/1656. With the population of Naples decimated by the

¹⁸²⁹ Astarita, *The Continuity of Feudal Power*, p. 96.

¹⁸³⁰ Federico IV to Giovanni, Rome 1645: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, *Corrispondenza 1627–1644*.

¹⁸³¹ Villari, *Un sogno*, pp. 358–366.

¹⁸³² Domenico Antonio Parrino quoted in Fortunato, *La badia*, p. 280.

¹⁸³³ Federico IV to Giovanni, Rome April 24, 1648: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, *Corrispondenza 1645–1655*.

¹⁸³⁴ Federico IV to Giovanni, Rome April 24, 1648: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, *Corrispondenza 1645–1655*.

¹⁸³⁵ Federico IV to Giovanni, Rome April 24, 1648: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, *Corrispondenza 1645–1655*.

¹⁸³⁶ Federico IV to Giovanni, Montalto January 2, 1649: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, *Corrispondenza 1645–1655*.

¹⁸³⁷ On the *Regia Dogana delle Pecore* see Marino, *Pastoral Economics*.

¹⁸³⁸ As John Marino explains, the land which the sheep customhouse could turn into pasture was divided into two distinct categories: *fondi ordinari*, which were made up of a mixture of demesne and private land, and *erbaggi straordinari*, which were requisitioned from private landowners in times of need. See Marino, *Pastoral Economics*, pp. 45, 49.

plague (which killed a quarter of the population in Borromeo's fief¹⁸³⁹) and demand for wheat in free fall, the sheep farming interests were on the ascent. As a result, customhouse officials were planning to turn some of the abbey's lands over to the public domain and levy a pasture tax on Borromeo's tenants in the swampland of Monticchio.¹⁸⁴⁰ Borromeo fought this imposition tooth and nail, as did other landlords in the area.¹⁸⁴¹ Heart-rending though it often was, their defense of the peasantry should not be romanticized: what they were opposing was not the taxation of their tenants, but the fact that they were being supplanted as the beneficiaries of the fruits of the peasantry's labor.¹⁸⁴² As Federico's last reliable source of income risked drying up, he needed to make sure that "li Cavalieri et essecutori della Dohana [...] non dovessero molestare l'affitto."¹⁸⁴³

Enter Federico's mother, Giovanna. In the spring of 1656, the nuncio in Lucerne and his mother in Rome were in close epistolary contact plotting to find the right legal strategy to stop Federico's tenants' land being taxed by the royal sheep customhouse. Contrary to contemporary expectations, Giovanna's work was not limited to the normal secretarial duties, although she did trawl the family archive in Rome to put together the necessary paperwork and liaised with local notaries before the case against the customhouse was filed.¹⁸⁴⁴ Belying earlier denigrations, she also advised her son on the best legal strategy to win the case.¹⁸⁴⁵ As she reminded him, the abbey was under the direct jurisdiction of the Roman curia.¹⁸⁴⁶ This made it possible for Federico to appeal to the Roman courts to defend his interests. She also seemed to know exactly which ecclesiastical tribunal would be most likely to hand down a favorable verdict. If a secular body such as the royal sheep customhouse levied taxes from tenants of ecclesiastical lands, she mulled, this constituted a violation of ecclesiastical immunity. The case should therefore be brought before the Congregation of Ecclesiastical Immunity, a body made up of a select group of cardinals commissioned to investigate alleged infractions of Church immunity at the hands of secular authorities.

As this episode makes clear, Giovanna had always been more than the witless mother she was portrayed as. As we have seen in chapter 3, she seems to have taken an early interest in legal procedures, overseeing the Borromeo's acquisition of their first fief on Lake Maggiore in the early 1620s. The legal knowledge she must have internalized in the process stood her in good stead when

¹⁸³⁹ Fortunato, *La badia*, p. 282.

¹⁸⁴⁰ Federico IV to Giovanna Cesi, Lucerne May 4, 1656: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, *Corrispondenza 1656–1664*; Giulio Rospigliosi to Giulio Spinola, Rome January 22, 1656: ASV, *Segr. di Stato*, Napoli, vol. 331, f. 44v.

¹⁸⁴¹ Marino, *Pastoral Economics*, p. 22.

¹⁸⁴² Parker, *Class and State*, pp. 93, 103; Villari, *Un sogno*, p. 293; Collins, *Classes*, pp. 12–13.

¹⁸⁴³ Federico IV to Giovanna Cesi, Lucerne May 4, 1656: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, *Corrispondenza 1656–1664*.

¹⁸⁴⁴ ABIB, FB, Federico IV, *Corrispondenza 1656–1664*: Federico IV to Giovanna, Lucerne April 13 1656. ABIB, FB, Federico IV, *Corrispondenza 1656–1664*: Federico IV to Giovanna, Lucerne June 14.1656. ABIB, FB, Federico IV, *Corrispondenza 1656–1664*: Federico IV to Giovanna, Lucerna March 14.1656.

¹⁸⁴⁵ Federico IV to Giovanna Cesi, Lucerne May 4, 1656: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, *Corrispondenza 1656–1664*; Federico IV to Giovanna Cesi, Lucerne May 11, 1656: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, *Corrispondenza 1656–1664*.

¹⁸⁴⁶ On this point, see Fortunato, *La badia*, p. 17.

her husband died on the battlefield in 1638 and her eldest son wanted her to remarry. Appealing to the law courts in Milan, she fought for her right as a widow to a portion of her late husband's property.¹⁸⁴⁷ So tenacious was she that Giovanni welcomed Federico's suggestion that Giovanna be dispatched to Rome, seeing his move as an opportunity to hobble her independent spirit and compel her to put her legal acumen in the service of the social reproduction of the Borromeo clan. He concurred with his younger brother that such a move would be beneficial to both. Not only would it rid him of "una grand'inquietudine e uno stecco negli occhi," it also allowed Federico to "esperimentare più fruttuosa l'opera" of a successful litigator.¹⁸⁴⁸

Since her move to Rome, Giovanna had done much more than humor potential patrons on behalf of her son; she had proved a vital asset in the legal battles that Federico as a papal officeholder inevitably had to wage to stay afloat. Behind the façade of the caring mother, Giovanna had, for all intents and purposes, become what Caroline Castiglione has termed a *mater litigans*. Combining legal acumen and tenacity, mothers from the Roman nobility regularly waged legal battles on behalf of their sons, explicitly justifying such an unwomanly occupation with the well-being of her child.¹⁸⁴⁹ Preening themselves as caring mothers rather than the hard-nosed legal experts they often were was a limber adaptation to the hostile reaction that women in public life faced after the fall of Donna Olimpia. Not only did this new role offer families like the Borromeo a new strategy to tame the women in their family, channeling their gifts into the social reproduction of the house at a time when women threatened to use it to pursue their own ambitions.¹⁸⁵⁰ It was also a clever way of misrecognizing the inconvenient truth that women in the family remained crucial to the consolidation of elite power, making them at once victims of patriarchy and accomplices in the exploitation of the peasantry's labor on which the Borromeo subsisted.¹⁸⁵¹

If Federico ultimately decided against Giovanna's strategy, this was not because her arguments were entirely unconvincing to him. In fact, he argued that while "tirar a Roma il negotio dell'herbaggi [...] saria ottimo," it would nevertheless not be "riuscibile perché quelli che fanno in contrario si mantellanno dell'interesse Regio" and the case would remain stuck forever in the courts of law.¹⁸⁵² It seemed therefore more advisable to try and settle the matter through direct intervention. In a closely coordinated move, Federico wrote to the nuncio in Naples, Giulio Spinola, asking him to convince the Spanish authorities in the city that the customhouse officials would depart from legal precedents if they attempted to collect a pasture tax from his tenants.¹⁸⁵³ To put

¹⁸⁴⁷ The material pertaining to these proceedings is in ABIB, FB, Giovanni V, Atti diversi, cart. 881.

¹⁸⁴⁸ Federico IV to Giovanni, Rome March 25, 1645: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, Corrispondenza 1645–1655.

¹⁸⁴⁹ Castiglione, *Accounting for Affection*, p. 15.

¹⁸⁵⁰ On these conflicts, see Dewald, *Status, Power, and Identity*, chap. 3.

¹⁸⁵¹ Dewald, *Status, Power, and Identity*, pp. 118–119; Böhnisch, *Gruppenbild ohne Damen?*, p. 191.

¹⁸⁵² Federico IV to Giovanna Cesi, Lucerne May 4, 1656: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, Corrispondenza 1656–1664.

¹⁸⁵³ Federico IV to Giovanna, Lucerne April 06, 1656: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, Corrispondenza 1656–1664.

his colleague under even more pressure, he also got the new secretary of state, Giulio Rospigliosi, on the case. In his letter to Rospigliosi, Federico followed Giovanna's lead and framed the conflict as a jurisdictional controversy, lamenting "[l]e molestie, che ben spesso mi accade ricevere, massime in materia di giurisd[izio]ne, nell'affari dell'Abb[azi]a che godo in Regno di Napoli"¹⁸⁵⁴ The secretary promptly obliged and wrote to the nuncio in Naples. After briefing him on the situation, Rospigliosi suborned Spinola to have a word with the Spanish viceroy "perché non venghino molestati gli Affittuarij di d[ett]a Abbatia, né aggravati contro il solito stile di tal pagamento."¹⁸⁵⁵ The nuncio quickly reported back to Rome that he had done everything in his power and was confident that "saranno quanto p[ri]ma rimossi tali pregiuditij"¹⁸⁵⁶ The nuncio's intervention was not all it took, however. What sealed the deal was a formal censure from the papal treasury threatening to excommunicate any sheep customhouse official who violated the abbot's right to charge his tenants.¹⁸⁵⁷ If the nuncio's mother had wanted to appeal to a Roman congregation to give her son's pretenses a veneer of legitimacy, the nuncio himself understood that he could have his way much more easily: by wielding the papacy's whip against secular officials who threatened to slash his revenues.

On the face of it, this put Federico and his mother in the same league as Innocent X and the much-maligned Olimpia. Like Federico, Innocent had instigated a female relative, Donna Olimpia, to plunder the Church's resources for their own enrichment. The Pamphili's milking of ordinary people had become one of the focal points of the criticism leveled at them. The author of a popular anti-Olimpia screed argued that the pope's sister-in-law had a habit of "fabricare i suoi fasti sopra la destruttione de Sudditi."¹⁸⁵⁸ Oblivious to the common good, Olimpia had recklessly governed "con il danno, e distruttione dei Popoli, rimirando solo il proprio interesse."¹⁸⁵⁹ The main charge against her was that her plundering of helpless subjects had unleashed uprisings which culminated in a deadly attack on the governor in Fermo in 1648.¹⁸⁶⁰ Echoing other movements committed to restoring the common good, Olimpia's critics turned the frightening rising of the masses in parts of the Papal States into propaganda material to peddle the image of the pope's female relative as a new Nero who feasted on the "sangue de meschinelli."¹⁸⁶¹ In his own abbey, Federico and his own mother not only mimicked this behavior, squeezing the peasantry out of the last *scudo*, revealing that they still regarded the "Church as property."¹⁸⁶² The mother-and-son team also waged legal battles against an

¹⁸⁵⁴ ASV, Segreteria di Stato, Svizzera, 49, 120r: Federico Borromeo to Giulio Rospigliosi, Lucerne 02.12.1656.

¹⁸⁵⁵ Giulio Rospigliosi to Giulio Spinola, Rome January 22, 1656: ASV, Segreteria di Stato, Napoli, vol. 331, f. 44v.

¹⁸⁵⁶ ASV, Segreteria di Stato, Napoli, 54, 134r: Giulio Spinola to Giulio Rospigliosi, Naples 02.08.1656.

¹⁸⁵⁷ The *monitorio* issued by the Apostolic Camera can be found in Fortunato, La badia, p. 24.

¹⁸⁵⁸ La caduta di Donna Olimpia, f. 278v: BAV, Vat. lat. 9729, ff. 263r–288v.

¹⁸⁵⁹ La caduta di Donna Olimpia, f. 274v: BAV, Vat. lat. 9729, ff. 263r–288v.

¹⁸⁶⁰ Bercé, La sommossa di Fermo.

¹⁸⁶¹ La caduta di Donna Olimpia, f. 278v: BAV, Vat. lat. 9729, ff. 263r–288v.

¹⁸⁶² McClung Hallman, Italian Cardinals.

important institution of the Spanish crown, the sheep customhouse in Foggia. Not only was Federico and Giovanna's behavior apparently out of sync with the new age committed to the promotion of the common good; it also put them on a collision course with the Spanish monarchy at a moment when the family's relations with Philip IV had reached a new low for similar depredations in Lombardy.

What let Federico off the hook was the clever contextualization of his actions. If the crown did not oppose Borromeo's desire to keep the sheep customhouse out of his fiefdom, and the Spanish viceroy in Naples seemed to grant his wish, this was because he had found a new rationale for the exploitation of the king's subjects. Unlike his elder brother, Giovanni, Federico found a way to fit his self-seeking behavior into the new hegemonic narrative. As he and his entourage in the Rome of Alexander VII demonstrated, with sufficient mental acrobatics, the collection of ecclesiastical benefices (and the aid and assistance of female family members in this endeavor) could be justified in the name of that contemporary buzzword, good governance.¹⁸⁶³ In writing to the nuncio in Naples, Alexander's secretary of state had cited the "danno, e pregiud[izi]o notabile, che riceverebbe il d[ett]o Mons[ignor] Nuntio, quando quei beni dovessero soggiacere à tal datio," and argued that Federico's tenants needed to be exempted from the pasture tax so that they could contribute toward Borromeo's work as nuncio in Lucerne.¹⁸⁶⁴ In his negotiations with the viceregal court in Naples, the papal nuncio implied that "il merito di Mons[ignor]e Patriarca Borromei" was reason enough "perché non sia gravata la sua Abbazia di S[ant']Angelo con la gabella degl'herbaggi."¹⁸⁶⁵ Federico and his Roman allies thus portrayed his gouging of the peasantry as a means to a higher end: although it was mostly implied in the correspondence, it was clear enough that the money thus extracted would serve the defense of an embattled Catholicism on the border with Protestant heresy, something the Catholic crown could not oppose. Federico ingeniously argued that his defense of enclosure through Church institutions helped shore up his social standing, which was widely recognized as the prerequisite of effective governance for a resurgent papacy ready to leave its mark on Catholic Europe. This attitude had a long track record. As Barbara McClung reports, Renaissance popes regularly waived all sorts of questionable financial practices, citing the prelates' need for adequate means to perform the duties of ecclesiastical office.¹⁸⁶⁶ At a time when the plundering of ecclesiastical resources came once again under fire, ecclesiastics were eager to argue, as Philipp Zwysig has shown, that the "Macht- and Familienpolitik" of single clerics, while hardly ideal, ultimately served the deepening of Catholic reform.¹⁸⁶⁷

¹⁸⁶³ On the shared preoccupation with *buon governo*, see Fosi, *All'ombra dei Barberini*, pp. 152–158 (on Rome) and Calabria and Marino (eds.), *Good Government (on Spain)*.

¹⁸⁶⁴ Giulio Rospigliosi to Giulio Spinola, Rome January 22, 1656: ASV, Segreteria di Stato, Napoli, vol. 331, f. 44v.

¹⁸⁶⁵ Giulio Spinola to Giulio Rospigliosi, Naples February 8, 1656: ASV, Segreteria di Stato, Napoli, vol. 54, f. 134r.

¹⁸⁶⁶ McClung Hallman, *Italian Cardinals*, p. 69.

¹⁸⁶⁷ Zwysig, *Katholische Reform*, pp. 156, 161, 166.

Federico and Giovanna's legal battle against the sheep customhouse marked a watershed in the history of nepotism, understood as the participation of (female) relatives in the self-enrichment of members of the Roman curia. In his seminal work on papal nepotism, Wolfgang Reinhard famously posited that the complicity of family members in papal governance and the plundering of ecclesiastical resources served both to govern the universal Church (*Herrschaftsfunktion*) and to enrich the pope's relatives (*Versorgungsfunktion*). By the turn of the seventeenth century, Reinhard argued, nepotism as a function of government had become entirely dysfunctional as successive papal nephews retreated to the more private concern of securing their families' future after the pontiff's passing.¹⁸⁶⁸ In her detailed study of Paul V's nephew, Scipione Borghese, Birgit Emich has shown conclusively that the alleged *Herrschaftsfunktion* of nepotism was a convenient "fiction" held up to conceal the self-enrichment to which Borghese directed most of his energy.¹⁸⁶⁹ What has often been ignored, however, is Reinhard's reminder that the relative weight of the two functions of nepotism was not stable, but subject to change over time.¹⁸⁷⁰ As the evidence marshaled here shows, the late 1650s saw such a change in priorities. On the rhetorical plane at least, the balance clearly tipped in favor of the *Herrschaftsfunktion*. Although their attempts were not necessarily successful, Alexander VII's relatives sought to establish themselves as the pope's diplomats-in-chief and the main interlocutors of the diplomatic representatives of the Catholic superpowers so as to legitimize their self-enrichment with the tribulations of keeping up with the ruling dynasties of Catholic Europe.¹⁸⁷¹ As if to underline this, Alexander VII's family were not just less profligate than their predecessors; they also perceived a significantly higher percentage of their income as emoluments for official duties as opposed to from sinecures.¹⁸⁷² Both adaptations were quite obviously a pragmatic response to the papacy's empty coffers—ecclesiastical rents saw a steep decline in the 1650s—but they cannot be shorn of the other crucial context: the papacy's efforts to regain the upper hand after the peace of Westphalia.¹⁸⁷³

As with the participation of relatives in government, the new ideology legitimizing the self-enrichment of members of the papal family was quickly passed down the hierarchy. As the example of Federico shows, instead of denying the importance of ecclesiastical resources to their well-being, Chigi's vanguard openly acknowledged their need for sinecures but rationalized them as indispensable to their ability to perform what they had subscribed to: the effort to build a Catholic

¹⁸⁶⁸ Reinhard, *Papal Power*, p. 332.

¹⁸⁶⁹ Emich, *Bürokratie und Nepotismus*, pp. 400, 415–416.

¹⁸⁷⁰ Reinhard, *Papal Power*, pp. 330–331.

¹⁸⁷¹ My own sources show that papal nuncios regularly wrote to the pope's relatives rather than the secretary of state. On the nephews' new role in the diplomacy of Alexander VII, see Karsten, "Nepotismum," pp. 280–281, 283–284.

¹⁸⁷² Teodori, *I parenti del papa*, pp. 209–212.

¹⁸⁷³ Teodori, *I parenti del papa*, p. 218. Teodori argues that the "evoluzione delle finanze pontificie" under Chigi were a response to the "condizioni economiche generali."

commonwealth through papal diplomacy.¹⁸⁷⁴ Where Federico's great-uncle had skirted the thorny issue of self-enrichment in his published reflections on favoritism (see chapter 3), Federico Jr. addressed it head on before dismissing it as a minor distraction from the greater good. Excavating arguments he had first rehearsed during the Pamphili papacy, he claimed that access to ecclesiastical benefices would enable him to "meglio servire alla Sede Apost[oli]ca," misrecognizing the profit motive thanks to a language centered on service and good governance.¹⁸⁷⁵

If the Spanish authorities had any residual qualms about Federico Borromeo, he wasted no time to show that he put the *scudi* from his southern Italian benefices to good use in Switzerland.¹⁸⁷⁶ Although the Swiss cantons stood outside the European society of princes, the republican entity in the heart of Europe became a major battleground for the great powers over the course of the early modern period.¹⁸⁷⁷ Especially in the parts of the Confederacy that had remained Catholic, pensions from the two superpowers of the day remained a vital source of revenue for elites, and as a consequence, a French and Spanish faction were vying for hegemony in each canton.¹⁸⁷⁸ In the late sixteenth century, Spain had benefited from the French wars of religion and deployed its diplomatic network to acquire predominance over the ruling elites of Catholic Switzerland, enticing them with annuities and educational opportunities in Milan.¹⁸⁷⁹ By the time Federico Borromeo made for Switzerland, Spain's honeymoon had long been over. A reinvigorated French monarchy had wrenched back control as the main patron of the patriciates of most cantons, commanding a much larger following, as the resident of the Spanish crown proved unable to "contrapesare" the French crown with "pensioni, e pagamenti" from Milan.¹⁸⁸⁰ In internal correspondence, Philip IV was fretting about "el riesgo en que se esta de perder aquella nacion a causa de las muchas diligencias que franceses hacen para apartarlos de mi servicio."¹⁸⁸¹

The papacy was equally interested in curtailing France's angling in the confessionally mixed territories on Milan's doorstep.¹⁸⁸² Alexander VII in particular shared Spain's assessment of Catholic Switzerland as part of its sphere of informal influence, a vital cordon sanitaire protecting Italy from Protestant heresies (and a potential pool of recruitment for mercenaries to staff the papal armies, as an exchange of letters between Borromeo and the cardinal-nephew reveals).¹⁸⁸³ The Italian nobles

¹⁸⁷⁴ Also see Scott, *Images*, p. 4.

¹⁸⁷⁵ Federico IV to Giovanni, Rome December 31, 1644: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, *Corrispondenza 1627–1644*.

¹⁸⁷⁶ Federico's nuncature has been studied in depth in Giovannini, *Federico Borromeo*, although the author's account is ideologically tinged and fails to contextualize most of his activities in the broader family strategy.

¹⁸⁷⁷ Christian Windler, "Ohne Geld keine Schweizer"; Behr, *Diplomatie als Familiengeschäft*, p. 143.

¹⁸⁷⁸ Behr, *Diplomatie als Familiengeschäft*, pp. 143–144.

¹⁸⁷⁹ Behr, *Diplomatie als Familiengeschäft*, pp. 28–29.

¹⁸⁸⁰ Federico Borromeo to Giulio Rospigliosi, Lucerne July 15, 1655: ASV, *Segr. Stato, Svizzera*, vol. 48, f. 151r.

¹⁸⁸¹ Philip IV to the viceroys of Naples and Sicily, quoted in Minguito Palomares, *Nápoles*, p. 397.

¹⁸⁸² Federico IV to Giulio Rospigliosi, Lucerne November 30, 1656: ASV, *Segr. Stato, Svizzera*, vol. 50, f. 294v.

¹⁸⁸³ Zwysig, *Täler voller Wunder*, pp. 111–116. On the recruitment of Swiss mercenaries, see the letters of Flavio Chigi to Federico Borromeo in BAV, Chigiani, E.I.27, ff. 111r–112v and 118r.

staffing the papacy's ranks maintained that French money might lead even the best of Catholics astray and tended to see giving guidance to the Catholic side as an urgent necessity.¹⁸⁸⁴ With the interests of the Catholic king and the holy father dovetailing, both powers resuscitated what Paolo Sarpi had once polemically referred to as the *diacatholicon*: a dispositif "colorato di religione, ma indorato anco di doble spagnole" designed to crawl back control from the French crown.¹⁸⁸⁵

The resurgence of the *diacatholicon* in Switzerland was reflective of the political climate at the time. Beginning in the late 1650s, the Spanish crown was leaving behind its initial misgivings about the *Squadron Volante*. It became clear that whatever threat the new cardinals posed to the interests of the Spanish crown was best managed through the usual patronage mechanisms. The Spanish ambassador in Rome was instructed to woo the members of the *Squadron*.¹⁸⁸⁶ As Madrid discovered to its considerable relief, most were not as opposed to Spanish interests as French propaganda had insinuated. Upon closer inspection, most *Squadron* supporters turned out to be like Pietro Ottoboni, a Venetian with no formal ties to the Spanish crown, of whom it was somewhat cryptically said that he "loves France but still knows how to speak Spanish."¹⁸⁸⁷ He was bought off like others as part of a complex plan to reinforce Philip IV's ties to Rome in the face of France's inexorable rise as a superpower.¹⁸⁸⁸

If the Spanish monarchy had some interest in good relations with the Apostolic See, Alexander VII understood that his vision of the papacy as a standard-bearer for Catholic good government depended entirely on a close alliance with Spain. After the low point of the Barberini pontificate, Chigi attempted to revive the old coalition between Spanish arms and the Church's spiritual weapons against heresy and irreligion that had existed since the ascent of Spanish power in Italy in the sixteenth century.¹⁸⁸⁹ Current events lent this plan additional urgency. A skirmish between the pope's Corsican mercenary army and the retinue of the French ambassador in Rome in 1662 compounded Louis XIV's opposition to Chigi's idea of elevating the papacy to supreme arbiter of Catholic princes.¹⁸⁹⁰ As the two powers teetered on the brink of war, the papacy sought to win over Spain for the eventuality of an armed conflict with France.¹⁸⁹¹ Although this elicited at best a tepid response in Madrid, the fact remained that the two powers achieved most when they stayed wedded

¹⁸⁸⁴ Federico IV to Giulio Rospigliosi, Lucerne January 10, 1664: ASV, Segr. Stato, Svizzera, vol. 58, f. 7v. On Federico's perception of local political culture, see Weber, *Ein Verteidiger*.

¹⁸⁸⁵ Quoted in Tarpley, Paolo Sarpi, p. 193.

¹⁸⁸⁶ Signorotto, *The Squadron Volante*, pp. 191–192.

¹⁸⁸⁷ Quoted in Signorotto, *The Squadron Volante*, p. 193.

¹⁸⁸⁸ Carrió-Invernizzi, *El gobierno*, pp. 116, 169–170, 419.

¹⁸⁸⁹ Dandeleit, *Spanish Rome*, pp. 208–209. For an overview of the ideology, see Visceglia, *Roma papale e Spagna*, pp. 99–100.

¹⁸⁹⁰ Karsten, "Nepotismum," p. 268. On the fraught relationship between Alexander VII and Louis XIV, see Rodén, *Church Politics*, pp. 124–133.

¹⁸⁹¹ Karsten, "Nepotismum," pp. 277–279.

together and sought to rein in France.¹⁸⁹² For the papacy this meant that Rome had to temper its ambitions as a leading light among Catholic princes and accept that its playing second fiddle was the necessary compromise the Church had to swallow if it was to revive the *diacatholicon*.

Given his family history and Milanese background, Federico Borromeo subscribed to these priorities. One of his first acts as nuncio in Switzerland was to commission Johann Christoph Storer with an altar piece for the Jesuit Church in Lucerne which afforded pride of place to the family saint, St. Charles, and his role as a Spanish saint bulking up Catholicism in Switzerland in the late sixteenth century, a mission Federico was set on continuing.¹⁸⁹³ In his correspondence to Alexander VII's secretary of state, he regularly informed him of the activities of the French ambassador, Jean de la Barde. His main objective was to avoid the renewal of a defense league which would have required Swiss elites to provide Louis XIV with mercenaries. Since "li Fattionarij di Francia hanno sempre mostrato qualche mala soddisfazione de Nuntij sudditi della M[aes]tà Catt[oli]ca," Federico thought it wise to keep himself "appartatiss[im]o da questi affari" and watch from afar as the negotiations failed, gloating at the ambassador's inability to recruit troops.¹⁸⁹⁴ As he knew full well, such a treaty might after all imperil "i passaggi di soldatesche nel Stato di Milano" and Swiss soldiers in the employ of the king of France could be unleashed against Italy.¹⁸⁹⁵ In his correspondence he stressed the religious concerns to which such an agreement might give rise. What made de la Barde's diplomacy particularly suspicious was his tendency to "guadagnare con qualch'arbitrio gl'anime de Protestanti" of Bern and Zurich, calling into question the French monarchy's commitment to Catholicism.¹⁸⁹⁶ His "principal cura" as a nuncio was "il procurare, che à spese della Religione non venga comprato qualche vantaggio Politico."¹⁸⁹⁷ Such fears were vindicated in the midst of the Corsican affair and the French invasion of Avignon, a papal exclave in the south of France, when rumors surfaced that "tra le soldatesche francesi comandate per Italia (come si dice) erano incluse alcune Compagnie di Guardia di questi Cantoni Catholici."¹⁸⁹⁸

As he sought to bridle French ambitions in Switzerland, the papal nuncio deepened the cooperation with the representative of the Spanish king. From the moment he set foot on Swiss soil he built rapport with the Spanish resident, Francesco Casati, regularly sending him such exclusive gifts as "un paio di calzette di seta di colore" to the "M[aest]ro di Casa del Co[n]te] Casati per molti

¹⁸⁹² Signorotto, *Milano spagnola*, pp. 229–230.

¹⁸⁹³ Appuhn-Radtke, "Ad augendam devotionem."

¹⁸⁹⁴ Federico IV to Giulio Rospigliosi, Bellinzona April 28, 1655: ASV, Segr. Stato, Svizzera, vol. 48, ff. 32v–33r; Federico IV to Giulio Rospigliosi, Lucerne May 19, 1655: ASV, Segr. Stato, Svizzera, vol. 48, ff. 56r–56v.

¹⁸⁹⁵ Federico IV to Flavio Chigi, Lucerne February 20, 1659: ASV, Segr. Stato, Svizzera, vol. 53, f. 74r; Federico IV to Giulio Rospigliosi, Lucerne January 11, 1663: ASV, Segr. Stato, Svizzera, vol. 57, f. 10r.

¹⁸⁹⁶ Federico IV to Giulio Rospigliosi, Lucerne November 11, 1655: ASV, Segr. Stato, Svizzera, vol. 48, f. 468r; Federico IV to Giulio Rospigliosi, Lucerne January 7, 1656: ASV, Segr. Stato, Svizzera, vol. 49, f. 8v.

¹⁸⁹⁷ Federico IV to Giulio Rospigliosi, Lucerne July 20, 1656: ASV, Segr. Stato, Svizzera, vol. 50, f. 20v.

¹⁸⁹⁸ Federico IV to Giulio Rospigliosi, Lucerne January 11, 1663: ASV, Segr. Stato, Svizzera, vol. 57, f. 10r.

incomodi che hà in mio riguardo.”¹⁸⁹⁹ The Casati had the Spanish mission in Switzerland on lock, with residents from that family regularly bequeathing the office to their sons or nephews for most of the seventeenth century.¹⁹⁰⁰ As specialists with deep ties to local society, the Casati were certainly a valuable contact for Federico Borromeo who had little prior knowledge of the Swiss Confederacy. But his letters suggest that the Spanish resident was much more than that: he was a close ally, an essential part of a coalition of the sword and the cross in which Federico believed. Contrary to what the Spanish governor later claimed as he assailed Federico Borromeo, the nuncio saw Casati as “un mio pari” in administering the *diacatholicon*.¹⁹⁰¹ (Much to the disappointment of the Casati, he seems to have forgotten about the good relationship once the Casati ceased to be useful to him: when they asked Federico for favors after his elevation to the cardinalate in the 1670s, their wishes fell on deaf ears.¹⁹⁰²)

The *diacatholicon* was strongest where the French were weakest, and so Casati and Borromeo increasingly concentrated their activities on the Grisons. Unlike in the Swiss Confederacy where France, much to Borromeo’s disappointment, became the hegemonic power after renewing its alliance with the Swiss in 1663, the Three Leagues remained firmly in the Habsburg camp.¹⁹⁰³ In Casati and Borromeo’s view, the most important measure to stave off the French juggernaut was to strengthen the diocese of Chur, which Borromeo described as “bloccato all’intorno da heretici, et in sé medesimo lacerato dalle fattioni de Catholici, che dove si tratta d’interesse sono talvolta in quel Paese peggiori de primi.”¹⁹⁰⁴ In a society where Catholics and Protestants lived next to each other, both the papacy and Spain had every interest in stabilizing the bishop’s position as a major political actor on Milan’s border.¹⁹⁰⁵

The first thing Federico tackled was to relieve the local bishop, Johann Flugi von Aspermont, of the debts he had run up since his election in 1636.¹⁹⁰⁶ With Flugi being a leading figure in the Spanish faction in the Grisons, it made sense for Borromeo to rope in Casati as he set out to convince the bishop to implement the same economic development plan the nuncio had used to improve his extraction rate in his prebends in southern Italy.¹⁹⁰⁷ The feudal reaction soon bore fruits. Flugi was the first bishop of Chur to insist on being addressed as lord of Grossengstringen, his fief in Swabia, where he fashioned himself as the protector of his subjects, claiming to shield them from the

¹⁸⁹⁹ Federico IV to Antonio Renato, Chur March 1, 1661: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, Corrispondenza 1656–1664.

¹⁹⁰⁰ Carlo Carafa to Francesco Casati, Wettingen September 6, 1654: ASV, Arch. Nunziatura Lucerna, vol. 118, f. 6r. On the Casati, see Behr, *Diplomatie als Familiengeschäft*, chap. II.1.

¹⁹⁰¹ Federico IV to Giovanni, Bellinzona April 4, 1655: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, Corrispondenza 1645–1655.

¹⁹⁰² Behr, *Diplomatie als Familiengeschäft*, p. 112.

¹⁹⁰³ Behr, *Diplomatie als Familiengeschäft*, p. 33

¹⁹⁰⁴ Federico IV to Chigi, Lucerne October 20, 1661: ASV, Segr. Stato, Svizzera, vol. 55, f. 272r.

¹⁹⁰⁵ Zwysig, *Katholische Reform*, p. 165.

¹⁹⁰⁶ Giovannini, *Federico Borromeo*, pp. 66–67.

¹⁹⁰⁷ Behr, *Diplomatie als Familiengeschäft*, p. 160; Federico IV to Giulio Rospigliosi, Lucerne August 3, 1656: ASV, Segr. Stato, Svizzera, vol. 50, f. 46v; Federico IV to Giulio Rospigliosi, Lucerne May 17, 1657: ASV, Segr. Stato, Svizzera, vol. 51, f. 286r.

overreach of the dukes of Württemberg.¹⁹⁰⁸ Emulating Borromeo, Flugi argued that, if it had not been for his wise investment, “non sarebbe né gallo né gallina che in quelle parti cantasse.”¹⁹⁰⁹ The letters of his entourage were more ambiguous: they yield the distinct sense that the alleged good deeds served the exclusive purpose of adding to the bishop’s bottom-line. In a tone reminiscent of Borromeo’s, the bishop’s agents urged the local prefect to crack down on the “villani, che non sanno usare la cortesia.”¹⁹¹⁰ As his men dragooned others “acciò la loro malitia venga castigata,” Flugi framed the heightened exploitation as conducive to the renewal of Catholicism: far from stuffing the money thus generated “nella propria borsa,” he claimed, he had invested it to erect a new episcopal palace, a representative building that allowed him to reside in his diocese and stand his ground in the Protestant town of Chur.¹⁹¹¹ By encouraging the bishop’s self-enrichment and rebranding it as vital to Catholic reform, Federico and Casati had resolved one of the issues that had beleaguered the diocese for many years.

Their *pièce de résistance* had to wait until bishop Johann Flugi von Aspermont died in 1661. While his relationship to a succession of nuncios had been fraught with tension, Flugi von Aspermont shared their basic outlook. He had been educated in Spanish Milan before he returned home and acted as a guarantor of the *pax hispanica* in the Three Leagues, proudly flashing his title of prince of the Empire.¹⁹¹² Both Borromeo and Casati, therefore, pined to replace him with a candidate equally beholden to Habsburg interests. Thanks to their persuasive powers, Ulrich de Mont von Villa was elected bishop. Although he had been schooled in the Grisons and in southern Germany, Borromeo viewed him as much more reliable than the runner-up, Christoph Mohr, an intellectual lightweight (“imprudente e volubile”) with a perilous penchant for the French and Protestants.¹⁹¹³ His unconventional training notwithstanding, de Mont had been friendly with the Casati since their endorsement had earned him the post of cantor of the cathedral chapter in 1657.¹⁹¹⁴ In a letter to his principal written upon de Mont’s triumph, Casati lauded himself for his unremitting defense of Habsburg interests in the Grisons.¹⁹¹⁵ Borromeo himself reported to Rome that he had brought light to the “torbidezze d’un Paese constante solo nell’instabilità.”¹⁹¹⁶

His perceived meddling in the election was to have a long sequel for Borromeo. The man outgunned by de Mont, Christoph Mohr, blasted out a cantankerous letter to the pope and the

¹⁹⁰⁸ Zwyszig, *Katholische Reform*, p. 161.

¹⁹⁰⁹ Johann Flugi von Aspermont to Federico IV, Chur March 19, 1656: ASV, Arch. Nunz. Lucerna, vol. 118, f. 12v.

¹⁹¹⁰ Bernardino de Gaudentiis to Federico IV, Chur November 16, 1655: ASV, Arch. Nunz. Lucerna, vol. 118, f. 31r.

¹⁹¹¹ Bernardino de Gaudentiis to Federico IV, Chur November 16, 1655: ASV, Arch. Nunz. Lucerna, vol. 118, f. 31r; Johann Flugi von Aspermont to Federico IV, Chur March 19, 1656: ASV, Arch. Nunz. Lucerna, vol. 118, f. 13r; Giovannini, *Federico Borromeo*, p. 72.

¹⁹¹² Maissen, *Die Bischofswahl*, pp. 209–210; Zwyszig, *Katholische Reform*, pp. 156, 159–161.

¹⁹¹³ Federico IV to Giulio Rospigliosi, Lucerne November 18, 1655: ASV, Segr. Stato, Svizzera, vol. 48, f. 483v.

¹⁹¹⁴ Maissen, *Die Bischofswahl*, pp. 216–217.

¹⁹¹⁵ Maissen, *Bischofswahl (Nachtrag)*, p. 388.

¹⁹¹⁶ Federico IV to Chigi, Lucerne May 26, 1661: ASV, Segr. Stato, Svizzera, vol. 55, f. 161r.

secretary of state in which he denounced Borromeo as a Spanish Trojan horse. Styling himself as a “picciolo vermicciolo,” certainly no “Geronimo, ò Bernardo,” he immediately went back on his word to mimick these two saints who “mossi dal spirito santo sollevano con christiana libertà avertire le attioni, che repugnavano alla buona dirett[ion]e del christianes[im]o.”¹⁹¹⁷ Both the Swiss Confederacy and the Grisons, he explained, were deeply divided along factional lines. In this nunciature (“la più considerabile di tutte”), the representative of the pope performed a critical function in staving off the “eresia sempre intenta à diffondere suo veleno per le viscere dell’istessa Italia, unico santuario della purità Apostolica.”¹⁹¹⁸ The envoy’s main task was to “accoppiare l’animo delli duoi Ambasciatori francese, et spagnuolo ad una meta, ad un bersaglio, che è la protett[ion]e de Cattolici Svizzeri contra Zurigo, Berna, et Cantoni protestanti di lunga più potenti delli primi.”¹⁹¹⁹ Thus if it was “lodevole” to dispatch “Nuntij grati à quel Ré” to the courts, it was equally imperative to send “Nuntij padri communi in paese diviso in diverse fattioni.”¹⁹²⁰

When Mohr compared Federico to this ideal, he could not help but find him wanting. Being a prominent subject of the king of Spain, Borromeo was unable to act as a neutral arbiter. Quite the contrary, “Tutto quello parlava, diceva, et esclamava, era pigliato come dettame de Spagnuoli.”¹⁹²¹ His biases shone through in his every interaction, although, Mohr hastened to add, this was no fault of his. If even the powerful Roman curia had “per l’addietro” had trouble “à resistere a dispotico volere de alcuni” monarchs, it was hardly surprising that a lonely nuncio was completely “suddito à suo prencipe naturale.”¹⁹²² Seeing as “la conservat[ion]e ò destrutt[ion]e di Casa sua” rested entirely in the hands of “suo signore naturale,” it was unavoidable that his lodestar in office was his prince rather than “l’obbligo di carico.”¹⁹²³ Hence, while in theory the “occhi d’un Nuntio devono [...] essere velati in occasione de promotioni, per non riguardare di quale fattione sia la persona promovibile,” papal emissaries from Spanish Italy inevitably preferred their king’s “confidenti, ancorché inhabili,” whereas “quei di contraria fattione, qualunque meritevoli,” did not get a look-in.¹⁹²⁴

¹⁹¹⁷ Discorso di Christofforo Moro circa l’indipendenza che dovrebbero haver dalle Corone li Nuntij, che si mandano a Svizzeri: ASV, Segr. Stato, Svizzera, vol. 58, f. 101r.

¹⁹¹⁸ Discorso di Christofforo Moro circa l’indipendenza che dovrebbero haver dalle Corone li Nuntij, che si mandano a Svizzeri: ASV, Segr. Stato, Svizzera, vol. 58, f. 101r.

¹⁹¹⁹ Discorso di Christofforo Moro circa l’indipendenza che dovrebbero haver dalle Corone li Nuntij, che si mandano a Svizzeri: ASV, Segr. Stato, Svizzera, vol. 58, f. 101v.

¹⁹²⁰ Discorso di Christofforo Moro circa l’indipendenza che dovrebbero haver dalle Corone li Nuntij, che si mandano a Svizzeri: ASV, Segr. Stato, Svizzera, vol. 58, f. 103v.

¹⁹²¹ Discorso di Christofforo Moro circa l’indipendenza che dovrebbero haver dalle Corone li Nuntij, che si mandano a Svizzeri: ASV, Segr. Stato, Svizzera, vol. 58, f. 102r.

¹⁹²² Discorso di Christofforo Moro circa l’indipendenza che dovrebbero haver dalle Corone li Nuntij, che si mandano a Svizzeri: ASV, Segr. Stato, Svizzera, vol. 58, f. 101v.

¹⁹²³ Discorso di Christofforo Moro circa l’indipendenza che dovrebbero haver dalle Corone li Nuntij, che si mandano a Svizzeri: ASV, Segr. Stato, Svizzera, vol. 58, f. 101v.

¹⁹²⁴ Discorso di Christofforo Moro circa l’indipendenza che dovrebbero haver dalle Corone li Nuntij, che si mandano a Svizzeri: ASV, Segr. Stato, Svizzera, vol. 58, f. 101v.

Mohr claimed to be speaking from experience. Over the years he had been a reliable interlocutor of Borromeo's predecessors in the nunciature of Lucerne. His woes only began under the second-to-last nuncio, Carafa della Spina (1653–1654), from Naples, who, like Borromeo, happened to be a subject of the king of Spain.¹⁹²⁵ Since the advent of hispanophile nuncios there had been no place for him, a cleric who “in paese diviso in varie fattioni brama vivere senza fattione, et con la sola dipendenza da suo Capo supremo,” the pope. As a true believer in the bold vision informing Alexander VII's papacy as a guardian of Catholic Europe, he had been “esposto à mille maledicenze,” with the effect “che il bene publico vada di mezzo.”¹⁹²⁶ To repeat a rerun of this dangerous precedent, it was absolutely urgent that Borromeo's successor hail from the ranks of the “prelati, che non fossero sudditi d'uno delli duoi Re Confederati con essa Elvetia.” What Switzerland needed now was “prelati indipendenti da Corone, et dependent dal solo capo Ecc[lesiasti]co.”¹⁹²⁷

Not only was Mohr oblivious to the rapprochement between the papacy and the Spanish crown that had taken place since Alexander VII came to power. The supporting documents he sent in to Rome also poked holes in his self-fashioning as a man of God above factional strife. As a biographical note attached to his lengthy complaint revealed, his family was a product of the very *diacatholicon* he was railing against. The document, clearly written for a different purpose, proudly proclaimed that his uncle had been an alumnus of the *Collegio Elvetico*, a school in Milan set up in 1579 by Carlo Borromeo to train Swiss clerics, where he had graduated in theology and law, “fuora d'ogni stile et usanza di detto Collegio.”¹⁹²⁸ Ever since, Mohr's family had been among the many Swiss beneficiaries of cardinal-archbishop Federico Borromeo Sr., “quale cognoscendo il bisogno del Vescovato di Coira in materia legale,” had made arrangements for Christoph's uncle to be tutored in canon law.¹⁹²⁹ Since succeeding him as provost, his nephew had fought on to meet the “bisogni di questo Vescovato, che come posto ne confini d'Italia, debitam[en]te deve da patroni essere il più riguardato, acciò che da santuario non si renda seminario d'errori, et un'altra Geneva tanto più nociva, quanto più vicina.”¹⁹³⁰ The diocese's proximity to Italy was, of course, a popular trope, liberally deployed to curry favor in Rome at the time and further the integration of the Catholic part of the Grisons into the broader sphere of influence of Italian Catholicism in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.¹⁹³¹ Yet here it takes on the character of an involuntary confession of Mohr's

¹⁹²⁵ Christoph Mohr to Giulio Rospigliosi, Chur April 22, 1664: ASV, Segr. Stato, Svizzera, vol. 58, f. 99v.

¹⁹²⁶ Christoph Mohr to Giulio Rospigliosi, Chur April 22, 1664: ASV, Segr. Stato, Svizzera, vol. 58, f. 99v.

¹⁹²⁷ Discorso di Christofforo Moro circa l'indipendenza che dovrebbero haver dalle Corone li Nuntij, che si mandano a Svizzeri: ASV, Segr. Stato, Svizzera, vol. 58, f. 101r.

¹⁹²⁸ Informatione delle qualità e deportamenti del Sig.r Preosto Moro di Coira data à Papa Innocentio X dal Sig.r Carlo Pestalozzo, Canonico di Coira: ASV, Seg. Stato, Svizzera, vol. 58, f. 118r. On the *Collegio Elvetico*, see Ulsamer, Zur Geschichte.

¹⁹²⁹ Informatione delle qualità e deportamenti del Sig.r Preosto Moro di Coira data à Papa Innocentio X dal Sig.r Carlo Pestalozzo, Canonico di Coira: ASV, Seg. Stato, Svizzera, vol. 58, f. 118r.

¹⁹³⁰ Christoph Mohr to Giulio Rospigliosi, Chur April 22, 1664: ASV, Segr. Stato, Svizzera, vol. 58, f. 99r.

¹⁹³¹ Zwysig, Täler, pp. 110–116.

identity as a product of Spanish Milan's cultural hegemony in the Three Leagues. (Further evidence of this was Mohr's flawless Italian. Borromeo in an earlier verdict had characterized him as having "tratto Italiano più d'ogn'altro" member of the chapter.¹⁹³²) As well as his family history, such slips made it easy to see Mohr's protest as the grumbling of a sore loser who had until recently believed at least as strongly in the righteousness of the *diacatholicon* and who had only begun to pose as a man above the fray when the coveted title had not "caduto in sua testa."¹⁹³³

In the face of what he regarded as "scandalose propositioni che tal volta con gravissimo pregiudizio della S[an]ta Sede gli cadono di bocca," Federico Borromeo, with characteristic ruthlessness, prepared a brief that should have provided proof of Mohr's crypto-Protestantism.¹⁹³⁴ In the end, wielding these spiritual arms turned out to be unnecessary: Mohr did himself in when his secret correspondence (tellingly written in Italian) with the French ambassador and members of the court of France surfaced, precipitating his flight to Paris.¹⁹³⁵ Federico survived the incident unscathed; if anything, the accusations of Spanish bias probably boosted his standing with a papacy that was actively pursuing an alliance with Spain after its relations with France had turned sour. The Spanish king himself must have been even happier. While Federico's tireless work was no substitute for the influence that Spain had once enjoyed in the Swiss Confederacy, his tenure in Switzerland helped advance Spanish interests in the Grisons at a time when France was perilously close to becoming the hegemonic power in that contested buffer zone. As his own nemesis, the hapless Christoph Mohr, admitted in a letter to the French ambassador, Borromeo and Casati had ensured "che tutto il mondo, anche quei che si supponevano buoni erano fatti spagnoli."¹⁹³⁶ The grudging admiration of a member of the French faction was the best propaganda Borromeo could hope for as he took pains to portray himself as a faithful vassal of the king of Spain.

By the time Federico returned to Rome in 1665, few doubted his commitment to disinterested service and devotion to the Spanish cause. He had served the pope in a hostile and culturally alien territory for more than a decade (when others were parachuted into Switzerland for one to two years). Beefing up an already impressive résumé as a career diplomat, he, according to one panegyric, "[a]morzò gli incendij di guerra accesi fra quelle nevi, da non spengersi che con fiume di sangue Cattolico."¹⁹³⁷ He had also made the most of his spiritual credentials to rein in France's worrying influence in what the Spanish considered a cordon sanitaire between Louis XIV and their

¹⁹³² Federico IV to Giulio Rospigliosi, Lucerne November 18, 1655: ASV, Segr. Stato, Svizzera, vol. 48, f. 483v. On Italy's influence in the Grisons, see Zwyssig, *Täler*, esp. pp. 80–81, 155–156.

¹⁹³³ Federico IV to Chigi, Lucerne October 20, 1661: ASV, Segr. Stato, Svizzera, vol. 55, f. 272v.

¹⁹³⁴ Federico IV to Giulio Rospigliosi, Chur June 2, 1664: ASV, Segr. Stato, Svizzera, vol. 58, f. 138r. The brief is in *ibid.*, ff. 149r–151r.

¹⁹³⁵ Felici Maissen, *Zur Bischofswahl Ulrichs VI. de Mont* (Nachtrag), pp. 391–392.

¹⁹³⁶ Quoted in Felici Maissen, *Zur Bischofswahl Ulrichs VI. de Mont* (Nachtrag), p. 391, n. 7.

¹⁹³⁷ Quoted in Galli, *Federico IV Borromeo (1617–1673)*, p. 375.

Italian possessions. In so doing, he laid the foundations for his future career, limberly combining the deepening of Spanish power with the concerns of the Catholic Church, while passing it off as a selfless sacrifice. Seen in this perspective, the clash with governor Ponce de Leon over his treatment of the Spanish resident in Switzerland was a minor hiccup in a trajectory that was pointing steeply upward.

This had hardly been a foregone conclusion in the early 1650s. Given that the crisis of the 1640s consumed the papacy as much as the Spanish monarchy, Federico's career could have ended on the same note as Giovanni's: amidst accusations of self-enrichment to the detriment of the common good. Federico was lucky in that he had been aloof enough of the merry-go-round of the Roman court under the Pamphili and the Barberini to be able to draw on his particular habitus as a cleric and reinvent himself as an exemplary papal servant when Alexander VII Chigi ushered in a new era. It is important to ponder the extent of this transmutation. Innovative as it was, the Chigi papacy hardly constituted a clean break with the more problematic aspects of nepotism, including the involvement of relatives in government and the need to live off the treasure chest of the Church. Still, as the example of Federico shows, Chigi's vanguard had learned to rationalize familist practices as a necessary means to a higher end: a world in which the Roman curia and the king of Spain helmed the effort to build a truly Catholic commonwealth. If the Spanish monarchy frowned on Federico's continued exploitation of southern Italian benefices, his actions in the Swiss Confederacy and the Grisons must have convinced them to turn a blind eye to the less savory aspects of his governance. By the end of his stint in Lucerne, few dared to gainsay his self-fashioning as a stern defender of the *diacatholicon*, a clergyman who also happened to be a "faithful vassal of His Majesty."

As someone with an impeccable track record as a votary of the Catholic and Spanish cause, Federico Borromeo had imposed himself as the ideal candidate to promote the future of the Borromeo family in the more austere climate after the end of the *valimienta*. In fact, Federico with his particular biography enabled the family to preserve power by adopting the habitus of the critics who had taken down Giovanni: as a legally trained cleric with a commitment to public service, Federico met the expectations of the new era much better than his chivalric brother who fancied himself something of a military hero. Drawing on the culture of the Chigi papacy, Federico wed the ambitions of his dynasty to those of the house of Habsburg in ways that would allow no one to accuse him of pursuing particular interests in quite the way they had done with his late brother. His service far away from Lombardy had endowed him with an understanding of Spanish interests that transcended the narrow confines of Milan and allowed him to stake out a vision for both Spanish Italy and the king's global empire.

Chapter 11

Moral Panics and the Restoration of Consensus: Federico Borromeo and the Jurisdictional Controversies in Spanish Italy

In March 1665 the collegiate church of San Nazaro in Milan became the scene of a spectacular raid.¹⁹³⁸ The chief justice (*capitano di giustizia*) of the State had ordered his officers to blow up the door “con certo ordigno portato à posta” and search the property “con li schioppi alla mano in atto di spararli.”¹⁹³⁹ The suspect they were looking for was, by all accounts, a dangerous individual. A member of the minor nobility, Ludovico Landriani was accused of having hired a killer to eliminate a rival. Upon learning that he was under investigation, he had made for the closest church where he hoped he would enjoy immunity from arrest. As the 30 officers in the chief justice’s tow cornered Landriani, he allegedly “gridava, che era in luogo sacro,” to which the officers responded that they “havevano ord[in]e di pigliarlo, se fosse sopra l’Altare.”¹⁹⁴⁰ When they eventually managed to place him under arrest, Landriani was seated in a carriage with the chief justice and escorted to the Sforza castle, “accompagnato da tutti li Sbirri à piedi, et à Cavallo.”¹⁹⁴¹

Such cases of violent arrests in churches and other consecrated places proliferated in the 1660s. Few contested that such raids constituted a violation of what contemporaries referred to as ecclesiastical immunity.¹⁹⁴² The idea behind this legal construct dated back to the Middle Ages and revolved around the concept of religious asylum.¹⁹⁴³ According to eminent legal scholars, places of worship acted as sanctuaries where alleged criminals were immune to arrest. The two main arguments buttressing this legal institute was the Church’s mercy toward sinners and the inviolability of consecrated places.¹⁹⁴⁴ Entrenched as it was, in the eyes of many in Milan, ecclesiastical immunity had been taken too far and was the principal cause of the continued state of lawlessness in which the State found itself even after the war between France and Spain had come to an end. In their opinion, ecclesiastical asylum had become a means for felons to delay and, in some instances, escape prosecution at the hands of the secular courts.¹⁹⁴⁵ It was therefore right for law enforcement to override a legal tenet detrimental to the common good, and proceed to arrest known criminals. Under the circumstances, they argued, the surprise raids on churches were often the only way for

¹⁹³⁸ Carlo Francesco Gorani, *Libro di memorie, nel quale si fa annotazione delle cose più considerevoli che succedono alla giornata*: BNE, ms. 2671, f. 135r.

¹⁹³⁹ Undated report: ASV, Arch. Nunz. Madrid, vol. 7, f. 59v.

¹⁹⁴⁰ Undated report: ASV, Arch. Nunz. Madrid, vol. 7, f. 59v.

¹⁹⁴¹ Undated report: ASV, Arch. Nunz. Madrid, vol. 7, f. 59v.

¹⁹⁴² For an overview, see Jemolo, *Stato e Chiesa*, chap. 7.

¹⁹⁴³ In addition to places of worship, immunity also extended to certain persons, especially members of the clergy, and included exemption from taxation. Local immunity was the more contested form of immunity of the two. Jemolo, *Stato e Chiesa*, p. 211.

¹⁹⁴⁴ Latini, *Il privilegio*, 2002, p. 1.

¹⁹⁴⁵ See Mrozek, *Ascanio Filomarino*, p. 212, for similar arguments from Naples.

secular authorities to restore some semblance of public order and justice in a deeply troubled society.¹⁹⁴⁶

Stoking the moral panic about criminals loitering in churches was the distinct sense among many that members of the clergy aided and abetted common criminals' attempts to pervert the course of justice. The archbishop of Milan, Alfonso Litta (1608–1679), in particular had become a household name across Lombardy for his die-hard opposition to secular authorities arresting felons in places of worship. If secular law enforcement captured criminals in churches, he argued, this was a blatant disrespect of the archbishop's own police force, the *famiglia armata*, which he had been granted as a privilege in the *concordia* signed between Federico Borromeo Sr. and Philip III (see chapter 2).¹⁹⁴⁷ To Litta, this was not just a matter of enforcement. As archbishop, he presided over one of the most authoritative courts of law in the State of Milan, and in this capacity he laid claim to a disputed right to try fugitives over competing secular tribunals, most notably the Senate.¹⁹⁴⁸ The highest court in the land, its representatives opposed such an extensive reading of the archbishop's prerogatives.¹⁹⁴⁹ As they saw it, Litta was unique among his colleagues in the State of Milan in his desire to adjudicate on a raft of crimes without so much as taking heed of the evidence culled by secular courts.¹⁹⁵⁰ All this, they claimed, constituted an obstruction of justice detrimental to law and order which was reminiscent of the jurisdictional disputes in which Litta's counterpart in Naples, Ascanio Filomarino, had become embroiled.¹⁹⁵¹

In light of the wave of jurisdictional strife engulfing Spanish Italy in the 1660s, the Church faced a stark choice: it could either side with cherished legal principles (the archbishops) or the restoration of the common good in the face of rampant anarchy (the Spanish authorities). Ever the pragmatist, Federico Borromeo knew whose side he was on. After ten years of unwavering commitment to the *diacatholicon* in Switzerland, he understood instinctively that only an alliance between the Spanish crown and the Catholic Church could settle what he perceived as by far the most dangerous offshoot of the whole debate: the impunity that the strenuous defense of ecclesiastical immunity among his colleagues had unleashed. Borromeo bitterly complained about Litta's "vetriolo," portraying him as "insofferentissimo che niuno esserciti Giurisd[izion]e superior dove egli habbia un zampetto," heedless of the far-reaching consequences of his actions.¹⁹⁵² As he relocated to Rome from Switzerland in 1665, Borromeo was determined to put paid to the anarchy in

¹⁹⁴⁶ On these points, see Latini, *Il privilegio*, pp. 1, 328. For parallel developments in France, see Greenshields, *An Economy*, p. 216.

¹⁹⁴⁷ Signorotto, *Milano spagnola*, p. 260.

¹⁹⁴⁸ Signorotto, *Milano spagnola*, p. 234.

¹⁹⁴⁹ Undated brief: ASV, Congr. Immunità Eccl., Acta an. 1665 giu. –dic., fasc. Novembre.

¹⁹⁵⁰ Undated brief: ASV, Congr. Immunità Eccl., Acta an. 1665 giu. –dic., fasc. Novembre.

¹⁹⁵¹ Mrozek, *Ascanio Filomarino*, pp. 78–79, 96.

¹⁹⁵² Federico IV to Giovanni, Bellinzona March 25, 1655: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, *Corrispondenza 1645–1655*.

Milan, even if this meant that the Church had to ruffle a few feathers and bishops had to accept some restrictions on their freedom.

His unequivocal stance within the ecclesiastical camp paid off. The moral panic in Spanish Italy catapulted Federico Borromeo into the center of Spanish power and put him in charge of the sensitive issue of ecclesiastical immunity. From 1665 to 1666 he served as secretary of the Congregation of Ecclesiastical Immunity, which laid the groundwork for a whirlwind career. Treading the same path as his beneficiaries from the Chigi faction, he was promoted, within less than five years, to the nunciature in the court of Madrid (under Clement IX Rospigliosi) and the secretariat of state, crowning it all with the elevation to the cardinalate and the appointment as prefect of the Congregation of Ecclesiastical Immunity in 1671 (under Clement X Altieri).¹⁹⁵³ Few contemporaries doubted that the late and unexpected surge of the hapless Federico Borromeo was intimately connected to his handling of the issue of ecclesiastical immunity. As the instruction handed to Borromeo when he sallied out to Spain in 1668 made clear, Federico was dispatched to redress a conflict between the archbishop of Milan and the Spanish authorities that was getting out of hand.¹⁹⁵⁴ As a man in the pope's and the king of Spain's graces, he was well-placed to square that circle and finally grasp the nettle of ecclesiastical immunity.¹⁹⁵⁵

For Federico these appointments offered a chance to redeem himself and his dynasty. If he put the right spin on it, his work for the settlement of the jurisdictional conflicts in Italy could be seen as a continuation of the cooperation between Spanish power and papal authority that he had commenced in Switzerland. This sometimes led him dangerously close to abdicate the papacy's primacy in favor of the more powerful and effective Spanish counterpart. But, in so doing, he could prove, through his actions, that, while he was a man of the Church, he was aware that, in the difficult climate of the 1660s, it was in the Church's best interest to stand shoulder to shoulder with the Spanish monarchs and to support the innovations in government that viceroys and governors were implementing in the monarchy's Italian possessions at the time. By turning himself into an unexpected Roman asset to the good government programs that were being rolled out across Spanish Italy, he was able to launder his family's reputation even if that came at the cost of disowning St. Charles and his approach to jurisdictional disputes (see chapter 1). In fact, Federico's repositioning as a staunch defender of royal jurisdiction in Milan and other parts of Spanish Italy was dictated by the contradictions that the family's close association with the house of Habsburg had produced. As we have seen over the course of this thesis, the Borromeo had sought to justify their privileged links to the crown and the minister-favorites of Philip III and Philip IV as conducive to the

¹⁹⁵³ On Borromeo's career, see ASV, Congr. Immunità Eccl., Libri Litterarum, vol. 11, f. 3.

¹⁹⁵⁴ Memoria delle Scritture, che si lasciano à Mons.re Ill.mo Nuntio Borromeo, e ristretto dello stato dei negotij, dated June 17, 1668: ASV, Arch. Nunz. Madrid, vol. 16, f. 10v.

¹⁹⁵⁵ On the qualities required of nuncios sent to Madrid, see Visceglia, *Roma papale e Spagna*, pp. 56–57, 72.

realization of the common good. Decades of war and Giovanni's partisan dispensing of royal patronage had poked holes in that narrative. The only way for Federico to make amends for a discredited system of governance was to throw his lot in with the forces in Spanish Italy that promised the restoration of the commonwealth after decades of military conflict and predatory self-enrichment at the hands of a tiny elite and their clients.

The issue of ecclesiastical immunity lent itself particularly well to such an exercise in penance. Bishops defending criminals from prosecution were widely seen as the epitome of favoritism gone wrong, and consequently those within the Church hierarchy who sided against them could style themselves as the defenders of law and order, which was widely understood to be a precondition for the realization of the collective good. Knowingly or not, Borromeo used the moral panic surrounding rampant crime to twist the debate over patronage in his favor. Whittling a complex question down to law and order, he moved the debate on patronage from the uncomfortable realm of economic power relations to where it hurt much less: the symbolic plane. The crackdown on criminals and their purported allies in the Church rerouted the vexing debate over a system of power distribution that the Borromeo's subjects had initiated toward a more acceptable outcome for the family, while still allowing them to be seen as engaging with a key plank of the bold reformist agenda that popular movements and the *togati* had formulated in the trough of the crisis. Token legal reform was the lowest common denominator that even noble hardliners such as Borromeo could subscribe to as they fought for their comeback.

This chapter offers a new perspective on jurisdictional conflicts in Spanish Italy. Much recent writing on ecclesiastical prerogatives has concentrated on the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries and has read the attendant conflicts as the result of recalcitrant clerics defending economic privileges from the onslaught of a burgeoning fiscal state.¹⁹⁵⁶ However, in the period I focus on here, the defense of exemptions from taxation was superseded by skirmishes over legal privileges, most notably the clergy's role in administering justice, privileges that belonged firmly to the realm of symbolic manifestations of power. If the Church remained uncompromising in the defense of economic privileges, I argue, some members of the Roman curia, Federico Borromeo chief among them, were willing to put the clergy's symbolic rights up for negotiation with the Spanish monarchy. Doing so allowed them to portray themselves as going after much-maligned prerogatives without undermining the more tangible benefits on which their status as members of the clergy hinged. If the clergy's economic privileges had been at the center of debates in Spanish Italy during the first half of the seventeenth century, the focus on local immunity was a way finally to overcome the contradiction between the nobility's avowed commitment to the commonwealth and their clinging

¹⁹⁵⁶ Giannini, *Tra politica*, p. 86; De Marco, *L'immunità*, p. 123.

on to mechanisms of self-enrichment that had been vigorously contested. Legal reform allowed to couch the defense of privilege into the language of good government that was now seen as essential to popular consent.¹⁹⁵⁷

As the 1650s turned into the 1660s, few questioned the urgency of solving the jurisdictional conflicts that had broken out in Milan. The crime wave that engulfed the State was one thing; what was even more worrisome was the position of the archbishop, Alfonso Litta. The Landriani case from the introduction to this chapter was only the tip of the iceberg—Litta had stooped much lower before in what to many contemporaries reeked of the defense of common criminals. The archbishop had first stuck his neck out for Giovanni Angelo Ponte, also known as Ravarino, in 1663, as he himself detailed in a vivid report to the nuncio in Madrid. Accused of murder, Ravarino had fled to the Scala church in Milan, a place of worship under royal patronage and of high symbolic value to the Spanish presence in the State as the site where the Habsburg rulers sanctified their power.¹⁹⁵⁸ Ravarino had first hidden “in un Camerino sotto l’Archivio, contiguo al Choro, mà vedendo dopo il Vespro entrare in Chiesa il Vicario di Giustitia con grossa Comitativa de Fanti,” he asked to be spirited off to the bell tower where he “si ricoverò tirando appresso la scala.”¹⁹⁵⁹ When the officers of the Senate tried to reach the spire via an adjacent roof, Ravarino climbed up to the bells and “cominciò con la sinistra a toccare la campana” (which would earn him additional charges of lese-majesty and sedition).¹⁹⁶⁰ Upon hearing the bells ring out, people from the neighborhood took to the streets and tried to keep the chief justice from arresting Ravarino, which the authorities later construed as obstruction of law enforcement in a “Luogo del Rè.”

Litta was adamant that Ravarino’s arrest was a “patentissima violatione d’Imm[uni]tà Eccles[iastic]a fatta con ogni maggiore strapazzo da Ministri Regij.”¹⁹⁶¹ As he reiterated to the nuncio in Madrid, the chief justice’s men had no business entering the church, which might have been under the patronage of Philip IV but was by the king’s own admission “soggetta all’arcivescovo.”¹⁹⁶² The charges of lese-majesty and sedition were bogus, because Ravarino had touched the bells by accident. It was therefore clear that the chief justice’s men had arrested Ravarino “without authorization” from the real lord of the Scala church, the archbishop of Milan.¹⁹⁶³

¹⁹⁵⁷ Bireley, *The Counter-Reformation Prince*, p. 200.

¹⁹⁵⁸ On Santa Maria della Scala, see Álvarez-Ossorio, *La república*, p. 14, and Borromeo, *The Crown*, p. 529, n. 30; Carlo Francesco Gorani, *Libro di memorie, nel quale si fa annotazione delle cose più considerevoli che succedono alla giornata*: BNE, ms. 2671, ff. 5v (on the significance of the Scala) and 94r–v (on the Ravarino case).

¹⁹⁵⁹ Alfonso Litta to Carlo Bonelli, Milan November 15, 1663: ASDM, Carteggio ufficiale, cart. 86, unfol.

¹⁹⁶⁰ Alfonso Litta to Carlo Bonelli, Milan November 15, 1663: ASDM, Carteggio ufficiale, cart. 86, unfol.

¹⁹⁶¹ Alfonso Litta to Carlo Bonelli, Milan November 15, 1663: ASDM, Carteggio ufficiale, cart. 86, unfol.

¹⁹⁶² Alfonso Litta to Carlo Bonelli, Milan November 15, 1663: ASDM, Carteggio ufficiale, cart. 86, unfol.

¹⁹⁶³ Alfonso Litta to Carlo Bonelli, Milan November 15, 1663: ASDM, Carteggio ufficiale, cart. 86, unfol.

Things spiraled when the authorities proceeded to a similar arrest a few years later. Pompeo Visconti, who had been sentenced to prison for premeditated murder, was arrested in “un Camerino sopra la Porta della Chiesa Parochiale di Saronno,” north of Milan, and “condotto à Milano in quelle Carceri Secolari.”¹⁹⁶⁴ As in the Ravarino case, Litta contested the lawfulness of this arrest, asking that Visconti be brought back to the immune locality from which he had been abducted, so that he could be transferred to the archbishop’s own prison.¹⁹⁶⁵ This time, however, the king’s ministers believed they had even more compelling arguments on their side. Although Litta continued to assert the opposite, Visconti had been taken from the private home of the curate of Saronno, which was clearly not a consecrated place.¹⁹⁶⁶ Even if it had been, the Senate argued, premeditated murder did not fall under the remit of crimes eligible for ecclesiastical immunity. In fact, the laws on the book stated that secular authorities were obliged to apprehend known felons in consecrated buildings in order to preserve the peace. Buttressing the Senate’s case was the spectacular find of the original bull from Sixtus V Peretti (r. 1585–1590) “dentro una scatoletta di tela,” which, as one of the reform-minded pens in Milan argued, lent “à S[ua] M[aestà] per lo Ducato di Mil[an]o ampla facultà di poter far levar da qualsivoglia luogo sacro le persone imputate di delitto capitale, etiandio chierici.”¹⁹⁶⁷ Since this rule had fallen into abeyance, the Senate also formulated new demands. Previous clashes with the archbishop had shown that, for the court to perform its functions, it was necessary to change the rules: the Senate would henceforth place suspects under arrest and then decide in a pretrial whether they were worthy of ecclesiastical immunity.¹⁹⁶⁸ Exasperated by what they regarded as Litta’s sabotage, the Senate elevated itself to the sole authority on decisions relating to whether individuals enjoyed ecclesiastical immunity.¹⁹⁶⁹ Yet, in so doing, they directly queried a bull issued by pope Gregory XIV Sfondrati (r. 1590–1591) which regulated ecclesiastical immunity in Lombardy, setting the stage for an escalation of the conflict that would only come to an end when that bull was for all intents and purposes revoked.

To Litta, this was a new low in his fraught relationship with the crown. Things had not been bound to end this way. Hailing from a similar milieu as the Borromeo, the Litta had sought their fortunes in Spain much earlier. Litta’s late brother, Agostino, had been admitted into the order of the knights of Santiago, and Alfonso himself had been educated at the university of Salamanca and continued to pepper his Italian letters with Spanish expressions throughout his life.¹⁹⁷⁰ Reflecting this

¹⁹⁶⁴ Undated brief: ASV, Congr. Immunità Eccl., Acta an. 1669 gen.–mag., fasc. Febbraio.

¹⁹⁶⁵ Consulta of the Council of State, Madrid July 30, 1669: AGS, EST, leg. 3043, unfol.

¹⁹⁶⁶ Consulta of the Council of State, Madrid July 16, 1669: AGS, EST, leg. 3043, unfol.

¹⁹⁶⁷ Carlo Francesco Gorani, Libro di memorie, nel quale si fa annotazione delle cose più considerevoli che succedono alla giornata: BNE, ms. 2671, f. 245v.

¹⁹⁶⁸ Undated brief in ASV, Congr. Immunità Eccl., Acta an. 1669 gen. –mag., fasc. Febbraio.

¹⁹⁶⁹ Consulta of the Council of Italy, Madrid April 17, 1669: AGS, Secretarías provinciales, leg. 1815, doc. 19.

¹⁹⁷⁰ Rodén, Church Politics, p. 203; Signorotto, Milano spagnola, p. 240; Alfonso Litta to Federico Borromeo, Milan July 1, 1669: ASV, Arch. Nunz. Madrid, vol. 4, f. 443r.

background, as a young prelate, he had been an enthusiastic supporter of Spanish designs in Italy. In the 1640s, when he served as governor in the Papal States, he earned the trust of the Spanish crown by informing them of the Barberini's collusion with Mazarin to install a French puppet government in Naples.¹⁹⁷¹ When he became archbishop of Milan in 1652, he saw his role as critical to restoring consensus for a faltering monarchy. In a memorandum he later drew up in his defense, he insisted on the spiritual support he had provided during the monarchy's darkest times, the multiple invasions of 1655. While the "Popoli e Cittadini" of Milan were "soprafatti dal timore" of the French, Litta kept the faith "et ordinò nella Città, e diocesi molti pij essercitij, Processioni, et Orationi, acciò con queste placato il giusto sdegno d'Iddio [...] si degnasse la Maestà sua divina proteggere, e difendere questa Città, e Stato da sì imminenti pericoli."¹⁹⁷²

If he had thrown his weight behind Habsburg interests with his eyes firmly on the prize, the expected payback for his loyalty never materialized. In a letter addressed to Charles II in 1667, Litta apologized for the "defensa que está obligado hacer por la Inmunidad eclesiástica," but insisted on the "amor y buena ley que siempre ha profesado al R[ea]l servicio," placing his career in a long family tradition reaching back to his grandfather, father, and brother who had all given "iguales muestras de su afecto y vasallaje derramando su sangre en la guerra."¹⁹⁷³ It was, he concluded, time for him to be rewarded. As a man of the Church, he explained, he needed little for himself, but he would hope that the monarch would lend a helping hand to his nephew, Alonso, who "por su pobreza necesitara [...] de la R[ea]l protección."¹⁹⁷⁴ The Council of State agreed with Litta's reasoning, writing of the archbishop in an internal document "que no conviene disgustarle sino mantenerle confianza." A decision was reached "que se queda mirando en que poder hacer m[e]r[ce]d a su sobrino," albeit with the proviso that the size of the reward should be consistent with "según procediere en el conclave" and Litta's role in electing a hispanophile pope.¹⁹⁷⁵

The lack of a swift response magnified Litta's alienation from the powers-that-be in Madrid. Fast forward a few years to the election of Clement X Altieri in 1670, and we find Litta writing another missive to the queen regent, Mariana. Reminding her ministers of their earlier promise, he portrayed himself as a crucial player in the election of a pope favorable to Spanish interests, claiming that "cadauno y mas particularmente los Card[ena]les del Partido Español y sobre todos el Card[ena]l de Medici," had witnessed his efforts as a "fino Vassallo de V[uestra] Mag[esta]d."¹⁹⁷⁶ Yet by that time, the monarchy was dredging up an excuse to dump Litta, and they eagerly jumped on anonymous reports of Litta's disloyalty. Although the ambassador in Rome clarified that there was

¹⁹⁷¹ Signorotto, *Milano spagnola*, p. 240.

¹⁹⁷² Undated memorandum: ASDM, Carteggio ufficiale, cart. 83.

¹⁹⁷³ Consulta of the Council of State, Madrid April 6, 1667: AGS, EST, leg. 3040, unfol.

¹⁹⁷⁴ Consulta of the Council of State, Madrid April 6, 1667: AGS, EST, leg. 3040, unfol.

¹⁹⁷⁵ Consulta of the Council of State, Madrid June 1667: AGS, EST, leg. 3040, unfol.

¹⁹⁷⁶ Alfonso Litta to queen Mariana, Rome August 16, 1670: AGS, EST, leg. 3044, unfol.

“indicio alguno que califique la sospecha” and imputed the rumor to French attempts to blackmail Litta (“cosa que aquí se platica mucho”), this did not change the fact that Litta was by now an isolated pariah whom the governing elite were unwilling to honor for his purported services.¹⁹⁷⁷ As the archbishop himself lamented, so deep had he sunk in the monarchy’s estimation that even “se [io] conquistassi nuovi Regni alla Monarchia, né meno ciò basterebbe” to restore his good name.¹⁹⁷⁸

What had precipitated Litta’s fall from grace were the archbishop’s conflicts with the civil authorities in Milan. As the 1660s went on, Litta became convinced that everyone had conspired with the Spanish governing elite to “travagliarmi per più strade” and “metter piede sopra la giuridittione dell’Arcivescovo.”¹⁹⁷⁹ Acting out of vitriol and hurt pride, his opponents in the governor’s mansion and the Senate were out to take revenge on him and his family. This conflation of the political and the personal needs to be explained in the context of the juridical culture of the period.¹⁹⁸⁰ As legal scholar Carlotta Latini explains, premodern societies thought of legal tenets in terms not of universal rights but of privileges which granted exemptions to certain groups within the broader framework of the common law.¹⁹⁸¹ The privilege to grant asylum to criminals was one way for members of the clergy to express their otherness and their liberty as representatives of the first order.¹⁹⁸² Within the logic of favoritism, bishops, as other dignitaries, were vested with certain prerogatives by their patron—the pope—as a reward for their virtuousness, prerogatives which they were in turn allowed to dole out to their own clients (a function of their office which both the bishops themselves and Rome viewed as more important than pastoral duties¹⁹⁸³). This understanding fed a patrimonial conception of office which, Renata Ago explains, “non stabilisce dei precisi confini tra l’amministrazione della cosa pubblica e l’esercizio delle prerogative del detentore della carica.”¹⁹⁸⁴ In fact, “anche quando dichiarano di agire in rappresentanza e in nome del principe, gli ufficiali romani lasciano chiaramente trasparire il loro coinvolgimento personale, e la sostanziale continuità che lega ai loro occhi l’esercizio della funzione pubblica alla persona privata.”¹⁹⁸⁵

In this culture any attempt to whittle away at their prerogatives was seen as an assault on the officeholder’s honor, an attack to be fended off on pain of the complete loss of reputation.¹⁹⁸⁶ In that sense conflicts over privileges mirrored the patterns of the feud, something Litta inadvertently admitted when he attributed to his opponents the view that they grudgingly accepted tribunals

¹⁹⁷⁷ Astorga to queen Mariana, Rome December 27, 1667: AGS, EST, leg. 3041, f. 59.

¹⁹⁷⁸ Alfonso Litta to Vitaliano Visconti, Rome July 12, 1667: ASV, Arch. Nunz. Madrid, vol. 4, f. 318v.

¹⁹⁷⁹ Alfonso Litta to Vitaliano Visconti, Rome April 5, 1667: ASV, Arch. Nunz. Madrid, vol. 4, ff. 301r–v.

¹⁹⁸⁰ Also see Mrozek, Ascanio Filomarino, pp. 14–15 and chap. 4.

¹⁹⁸¹ Latini, *Il privilegio*, pp. 1–2.

¹⁹⁸² Latini, *Il privilegio*, pp. 5–6.

¹⁹⁸³ Ago, *Carriere*, p. 161; Menniti Ippolito, 1664, pp. 160–161.

¹⁹⁸⁴ Ago, *Carriere*, p. 14.

¹⁹⁸⁵ Ago, *Carriere*, p. 15.

¹⁹⁸⁶ Ago, *Carriere*, p. 144.

because they could not “stracciare i Brevi Pontificij, né sfidar in duello” the papal nephew.¹⁹⁸⁷ The gendered language deployed to characterize curbs on jurisdictional prerogatives similarly makes clear how much was at stake. As Andrew Miller has shown in his research on bishops in medieval England, assaults on deer in bishops’ parks were often seen as symbolic warfare that laymen waged to “emasculate” prelates and “expose his inability to protect his household and prized beasts.”¹⁹⁸⁸ In the context of the monarchies of the seventeenth century, bishoprics with their privileges were similarly seen as “externalizations” of personal honor. Since bishops were wedded to their church, any attack on its integrity was *ipso facto* one on their reputation. Just like spouses, jurisdictional prerogatives were visible markers of prestige. This logic cut both ways. As Litta said of his adversaries, “[S]e la pigliano meco con rabbia canina come se à cias[un]o rubassi la moglie.”¹⁹⁸⁹

As Litta’s reference to cuckoldry indicates, the equation of administrative responsibilities with personal honor was bound to turn jurisdictional skirmishes into dramatic affairs. Like all other goods, administrative powers were believed to be finite resources and, as Jeroen Duindam has pointed out, disputes over them were therefore widely seen as “a zero-sum game” whereby the gains of one nobleman were the losses of another.¹⁹⁹⁰ “Each man sought to protect the privileges of his group, seeing those privileges as his fundamental shield against others.”¹⁹⁹¹ Litta made no bones about his fear of losing the “comando” that he was exercising as a sub-patron of the papacy.¹⁹⁹² As he wrote of the Senate’s proposed changes to the bull of Gregory XIV to give it powers to adjudicate on ecclesiastical immunity: “[S]’abbraccia tutto nel modo di facenda laica, onde noi altri Eccles[iasti]ci e Min[ist]ri delegati dal papa, siamo esclusi da ogni, benché minimo comando.”¹⁹⁹³ Litta stood to lose his powers as a purveyor of papal justice, as ascertained by his stern prediction that “tutte le Carceri Laicali si riempiranno d’huomini estratti con trionfo dalle Chiese, e Luoghi Immuni.”¹⁹⁹⁴

Operating within a family-centered framework, Litta never saw jurisdictional conflicts exclusively as a battle about ideas. To him, they were a brawl over his identity as the representative of a noble dynasty. If his opponents impugned him as a “violatore delle Regie prerogative,” their only objective, in his mind, was to “distruggere la Ragione della Chiesa et offendere me in specie.”¹⁹⁹⁵ Thus abstract concepts were tied up with social concerns, and the former were little else than weapons against competitors, as Litta made plain when he wrote of his opponents: “Si sono

¹⁹⁸⁷ Alfonso Litta to Federico Borromeo, Milan May 20, 1669: ASV, Arch. Nunz. Madrid, vol. 4, f. 410r.

¹⁹⁸⁸ Andrew G. Miller, Knights, Bishops and Deer Parks: Episcopal Identity, Emasculation and Clerical Space in Medieval England, in: *Negotiating Clerical Identities. Priests, Monks and Masculinity in the Middle Ages*, ed. Jennifer D. Thibodeaux, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010, pp. 204–237 (p. 205).

¹⁹⁸⁹ Alfonso Litta to Federico Borromeo, Milan April 1, 1669: ASV, Arch. Nunz. Madrid, vol. 4, f. 422v.

¹⁹⁹⁰ Duindam, *Vienna and Versailles*, p. 187.

¹⁹⁹¹ Collins, *Classes*, p. 282.

¹⁹⁹² Alfonso Litta to Federico Borromeo, Milan June 24, 1669: ASV, Arch. Nunz. Madrid, vol. 4, f. 390v.

¹⁹⁹³ Alfonso Litta to Federico Borromeo, Milan June 24, 1669: ASV, Arch. Nunz. Madrid, vol. 4, f. 390v.

¹⁹⁹⁴ Alfonso Litta to Federico Borromeo, Magenta September 24, 1668: ASV, Arch. Nunz. Madrid, vol. 4, f. 438v.

¹⁹⁹⁵ Alfonso Litta to Federico Borromeo, Milan April 1, 1669: ASV, Arch. Nunz. Madrid, vol. 4, f. 423v.

agguzzati con belle frasi latine e volgari, e con falsi supposti per ridurmi in polvere.”¹⁹⁹⁶ In Litta’s view, the animus that motivated his opponents was confirmed when two companies of Spanish soldiers marched on Valsolda on Lake Lugano, a fief belonging to the archdiocese, to take up their lodgings there, something that after Giovanni Borromeo was widely associated with punitive expeditions.¹⁹⁹⁷ Stoking the flames, the Senate then ordered in spring 1667 the requisition of Litta’s fiefs.¹⁹⁹⁸ To turn up the pressure, they put Litta’s nephew under arrest, showing that the patrimonial conception of office was still widespread at the time.¹⁹⁹⁹ As Litta complained, this was an assault “contro della mia Chiesa, persona, e Casa.”²⁰⁰⁰

Never one to knuckle under, Litta fought back, ready to “die a martyr:” “Anzi per qualunq[ue] oppressione, ò sorte di conculcatione, qual’io sia per ricevere, vadino pure alla malhora tutti li miei interessi, si carcerino i Parenti, si tolghino l’entrate, si demolischino le Case, si eserciti ogni altro atto più barbaro, che non cessarò per q[ue]sto dall’uso delle mie ragioni. Rimarrò povero, sarò abbandonato da miei, è vero; ma morirò honorato.”²⁰⁰¹ In the process, his adversaries did not spare as much as a thought on the consequences of their actions. As Litta lamented, writing of himself in the third person, “Qua con la rabbia, et indiscretezza de sentim[en]ti testuali profani, purché si vinca la picca contro il Card[ina]le Litta, e che à q[ue]sti si faccia odio, non importa un iota, che il Papa diventi francese, che la Monarchia si spianti, e che profundino le Flotte.”²⁰⁰²

That argument cut both ways. From the monarchy’s vantage point it was Litta who jeopardized the established order. As they saw it, the archbishop, in retaliation for the unjust treatment he felt he had experienced at the hands of the king’s officials, threw his weight behind a common criminal like Pompeo Visconti. As the Council of State lamented, “aunque por haver pasado muchos años desde que havia sido condenado a muerte [...] parecia que los Eccles[iásti]cos siempre declararían a su favor la immun[ida]d.”²⁰⁰³ Worse still, Litta had joined the felon’s family’s call for a retrial, and insisted that such a trial take place in the archbishop’s court.²⁰⁰⁴ The Council of Italy expressed surprise at all this, noting that Litta was attempting to resuscitate the bull of Gregory XIV “en virtud de la qual no hay delito, por enorme que sea, que no pretendan los eclesiásticos comprehender en su inmunidad, de que resultaría mayor insolencia a los delinquentes con la

¹⁹⁹⁶ Alfonso Litta to Federico Borromeo, Milan March 25, 1669: ASV, Arch. Nunz. Madrid, vol. 4, f. 424r.

¹⁹⁹⁷ Flavio Chigi to Vitaliano Visconti, Rome March 15, 1667: ASV, Arch. Nunz. Madrid, vol. 7, f. 36r; Report dated Milan March 9, 1667: ASV, Arch. Nunz. Madrid, vol. 4, ff. 300r–v.

¹⁹⁹⁸ Flavio Chigi to Vitaliano Visconti, Rome March 15, 1667: ASV, Arch. Nunz. Madrid, vol. 7, f. 36r; Report dated Milan March 9, 1667: ASV, Arch. Nunz. Madrid, vol. 4, ff. 300r–v.

¹⁹⁹⁹ Alfonso Litta to Vitaliano Visconti, Milan March 15, 1667: ASV, Arch. Nunz. Madrid, vol. 4, f. 288r; Report dated Milan March 9, 1667: ASV, Arch. Nunz. Madrid, vol. 4, ff. 300r–v.

²⁰⁰⁰ Alfonso Litta to Vitaliano Visconti, Milan March 15, 1667: ASV, Arch. Nunz. Madrid, vol. 4, f. 287r.

²⁰⁰¹ Alfonso Litta to Vitaliano Visconti, Milan March 29, 1667: ASV, Arch. Nunz. Madrid, vol. 4, f. 304r.

²⁰⁰² Alfonso Litta to Federico Borromeo, Milan March 25, 1669: ASV, Arch. Nunz. Madrid, vol. 4, f. 424v.

²⁰⁰³ Consulta of the Council of State, Madrid July 16, 1669: AGS, EST, leg. 3043, unfol.

²⁰⁰⁴ Consulta of the Council of State, Madrid July 16, 1669: AGS, EST, leg. 3043, unfol.

seguridad de no tener el castigo, grave ofensa a la quietud pública, y a la administración de la Justicia.”²⁰⁰⁵ Members of the clergy like Litta “son tan contra las Regalías de V[uestra] M[a]g[esta]d y servicios de Dios” that they recklessly let major crimes go unpunished, oblivious to the dangers of providing “mal exemplo a otros que pueden incurrir en semejantes delitos que con el miedo de la pena se contuvieran en términos más ajustados y abstuvieran de cometer tan enormes culpas.” The resulting impunity entailed “perjuicio en la quietud pública” and the “detrimento de los vasallos.”²⁰⁰⁶

Litta’s war against a resurgent monarchy was a high-risk strategy that presupposed Rome’s full support for the archbishop’s confrontational approach. In the early seventeenth century this would have been guaranteed. As governor Caracena warned his successor in the mid-1650s, the typical clergyman from Milan and Naples had a tendency to forget “de aver nacido súbdito de S.M.,” which often made him pursue the monarchy’s interests, not “como debe un vassallo,” but only “quanto le combiene para los suos,” in the knowledge that the cardinal-nephews would always have his back.²⁰⁰⁷ The jurisdictional conflicts that erupted after Caracena’s departure seemed to prove him right. When the Ravarino incident first broke in the early 1660s, the secretary of the Congregation of Ecclesiastical Immunity urged the nuncio in Madrid to “assistere efficacem[en]te” Litta to obtain “la remissione di Gio[vanni] Angelo Ravarino” pursuant to the bull of Gregory XIV, and to “insistere virilm[en]te perché si diano l’ordini necessarij per la reintegrat[i]on[e] della violata Imm[uni]tà della Chiesa.”²⁰⁰⁸ In a sign of the prevailing goodwill in Rome, in the early stages of the conflict, the Church generally entertained few doubts about Litta’s reading of events, explaining in an internal document for the nuncio in Madrid that Litta was doing what he was “tenuto di fare” and that the royal ministers, “non havendo altro modo d’abbattere S[ua] Em[inenz]a hanno pensato indirizzar la vendetta contro i suoi parenti, et amici.”²⁰⁰⁹ As one historian familiar with the documents has concluded, “pope and Curia were solidly behind the irascible Cardinal Litta.”²⁰¹⁰

By the late 1660s, however, Rome’s enthusiasm for the bull of Gregory XIV had evaporated. Writing to Federico Borromeo, the new nuncio in Madrid, Litta complained in 1669: “Sono proprio fatali le mat[er]ie giurisdittionali di q[ue]sta Chiesa; q[ua]ndo in Roma, ò non vogliono risolvere, ò s’infadano, ò pensano dar ad intendere d’operare, senza far cosa veruna, intoppano col dire, S’è dato conto à Spagna. Il Nuntio farà le fortune, s’accudisca à lui, V[ost]ra S[ignoria] l’informi pienam[en]te e che so io?”²⁰¹¹ In fact, the cardinals on the Congregation of Ecclesiastical Immunity had “voluto ch’io

²⁰⁰⁵ Consulta of the Council of Italy, Madrid February 21, 1669: AGS, Secretarías provincials, leg. 1815, doc. 23.

²⁰⁰⁶ Consulta of the Council of State, Madrid July 16, 1669: AGS, EST, leg. 3043, unfol.

²⁰⁰⁷ Benavides Carrillo, Copia, p. 76.

²⁰⁰⁸ Bernardino Rocci to Carlo Bonelli, Rome May 6, 1664: ASV, Congr. Immunità Eccl., Libri Litterarum, vol. 9, f. 274r;

Berardino Rocci to Vitaliano Visconti, Rome July 21, 1665: ASV, Congr. Immunità Eccl., Libri Litterarum, vol. 10, unfol.

²⁰⁰⁹ Memoria delle Scritture, che si lasciano à Mons.re Ill.mo Nuntio Borromeo, e ristretto dello stato dei negotij, dated June 17, 1668: ASV, Arch. Nunz. Madrid, vol. 16, f. 10v.

²⁰¹⁰ Rodén, Church Politics, p. 207.

²⁰¹¹ Alfonso Litta to Federico Borromeo, Ponte di Magenta June 12, 1669: ASV, Arch. Nunz. Madrid, vol. 4, f. 388r.

m'affatichi come un Cane" to collate the necessary paperwork, but once Litta had complied with their orders, the response was underwhelming: "Si fece applauso al fascicolo, poi non s'è aperto mai più."²⁰¹² As Litta's exasperation makes clear, bishops were deeply disappointed by the Congregation of Ecclesiastical Immunity, a body that had been set up in 1626 with the promise that it would strengthen their hand in conflicts with secular authorities.²⁰¹³ Forty years later, the archbishop of Milan was far from the only dignitary to find the Congregation's support wanting.

The Congregation's reluctance challenges entrenched narratives about jurisdictional conflicts. Generations of historians have accustomed us to see the disputes between the ecclesiastical and secular leaders of Spanish Milan as battles in a war between a militant Counterreformation Church and a rapidly expanding monarchy.²⁰¹⁴ One consequence of that story has been that the role of the actors in the trenches has been reduced to that of willing executioners of orders issued in Rome and Madrid. Yet, if we shift focus from the white papers drawn up in the centers of power to the letters and memoranda of the movers and shakers in Milan, evidence abounds that the initiative for jurisdictional conflicts came from the periphery, not the center. It seems simply wrong to frame jurisdictional conflicts as "una lotta fra istituzioni pilotata ora da Madrid, ora da Roma," as Lina Scalisi sums up the traditional reading.²⁰¹⁵ Local sources reveal that, much to the chagrin of the Milanese power elite on both sides of the fray, the wheels of the papal and royal bureaucracies only started grinding when prodded to do so by political actors on the ground. There was, in fact, a pervasive sense that Roman congregations and Madrid councils had to be petitioned to the point of exhaustion before they prosecuted alleged violations of jurisdictional prerogatives. This was certainly true of the Congregation of Ecclesiastical Immunity which even when it could be pressured into looking into matters rarely followed through.²⁰¹⁶ Pope Clement IX may have concurred with Litta that the "presuntione del Senato" was "distruttiva affatto della Bolla Gregoriana, e dell'autorità Pontificia."²⁰¹⁷ But when push came to shove, he was unwilling to provide the necessary wherewithal for Litta to enforce the bull.

Besides these structural givens, there were reasons of expediency that account for the Congregation's disinclination to get its hands dirty. To make sense of them, we need to turn to the man who became its secretary and, given the functioning of congregations at the time, its informal head in the mid-1660s, Federico Borromeo, a man deeply marked by the travails of his family in the

²⁰¹² Alfonso Litta to Federico Borromeo, Ponte di Magenta June 12, 1669: ASV, Arch. Nunz. Madrid, vol. 4, ff. 388r–v.

²⁰¹³ Latini, *Il privilegio*, pp. 159–161.

²⁰¹⁴ For a concise critique of this narrative, see Rurale, *Clemente VIII*, pp. 325–326, and Scalisi, *Il controllo del sacro*, pp. 7–8.

²⁰¹⁵ Scalisi, *Il controllo del sacro*, p. 11.

²⁰¹⁶ Menniti Ippolito, 1664. For a similar argument on other congregations, see Zwysig, *Täler voller Wunder*, and Windler, *Missionare in Persien*.

²⁰¹⁷ Undated brief: ASV, *Congr. Immunità Eccl.*, *Libri Litterarum*, vol. 11, f. 1243.

middle decades of the seventeenth century.²⁰¹⁸ Although he had spent much of his early life ridiculing the ham-handed ways of the pert populace, his own experiences in the kingdom of Naples and the Papal States of the late 1640s radicalized him. In his imagination, commoners had become liable to criminal conspiracy, with the downfall of his brother providing clinching evidence to that effect. As with others, the popular mobilization against his social group buttressed Federico's commitment to the monarchy in unprecedented ways, realizing as he did that the Borromeo needed the monarchy more than the monarchy needed them.²⁰¹⁹ As a member of the clergy, it was his mission to strengthen the monarchy by making the Catholic Church side with the empire's political objectives.

Much to his disappointment, some members of the clergy continued to obstruct the realization of the *diacatholicon*. During the revolt in Naples in 1647–8, Federico had witnessed how some clerics tried to negotiate with the insurrectionary populace. To him this was playing with fire, for “il popolo è gionto a termine di troppa temeraria insolenza,” which needed to be nipped in the bud.²⁰²⁰ What was particularly galling for him to see was that now that the dust had settled some of his colleagues continued to engage in what he saw as the cajoling of criminal elements. With secular and religious courts battling over jurisdictional primacy, felons rubbed their hands with glee as the prosecution of their crimes stalled.²⁰²¹ Borromeo most probably agreed with Nicolás de Antonio, the secretary of the Spanish ambassador to Rome²⁰²², who in a treatise titled *Riflessioni sopra l'immunità ecclesiastica e bulla gregoriana* argued that the situation was so dramatic “che non si puol passare avanti senza cadere in un abbandono generale della Giustizia.”²⁰²³ Bishops acting out of spite for promises broken were contributing to the climate of lawlessness that had almost cost the Borromeo and others their place in the sun.

Viewing him as a traitor to the nobility, Borromeo did not buy into Litta's justifications. Throughout the years Litta had claimed to be carrying on the legacy of the two archbishops of the house of Borromeo, writing in a letter to Rome that his robust defense of ecclesiastical immunity marked a return “alli primi principij, ventilati da S[an] Carlo, e col Card[inal] Fed[er]ico Borromeo.”²⁰²⁴ Yet in making this argument, Litta conveniently overlooked the fact that the latter of the two had, in the final decades of his life, made a U-turn and sworn off jurisdictional controversies. In the eyes of his great-nephew Federico, intervening events had lent additional urgency to this repositioning. Given the widespread impunity of the 1640s and 1650s, Federico Jr. bristled at what he perceived as

²⁰¹⁸ On the informal power of secretaries, see Windler, *Missionare*, pp. 52–54.

²⁰¹⁹ Sodano, *Da baroni del Regno*, pp. 73–74, 76–77, 85; for similar developments in France, see Parker, *Class and State*, p. 108, and Beik, *Absolutism*, chap. 13.

²⁰²⁰ Federico IV to Giovanni, Benevento August 27, 1647: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, *Corrispondenza 1645–1655*.

²⁰²¹ D'Avenia, *La Chiesa del re*, pp. 122–123.

²⁰²² Carrió-Invernizzi, *El gobierno*, pp. 60, 127.

²⁰²³ Quoted in De Marco, *L'immunità*, p. 125, n. 7.

²⁰²⁴ Alfonso Litta to Vitaliano Visconti, Milan July 2, 1665: ASV, Arch. Nunz. Madrid, vol. 7, f. 54r.

Litta's recklessness. His family's experience made him hesitant about continuing to humor Litta in his standoff with the Spanish authorities. If the recent turmoil had taught them one thing, it was that the nobility could only survive if it ditched what were petty quests for preeminence within local society and stopped playing Madrid and Rome off against each other in its factional strife.

The appointment as secretary of the Congregation of Ecclesiastical Immunity afforded Borromeo unprecedented powers to effect the change toward the *diacatholicon* he wanted to see. This was hardly a foregone conclusion. The Congregation had been established by Urban VIII Barberini in 1626 in a period that witnessed the birth of a distinct "reason of Church" which Paul V Borghese had first mobilized against Venice's "reason of state" during the Interdict crisis of 1606 and 1607.²⁰²⁵ More specifically, the Congregation's foundation needs to be seen as part of the Barberini's affirmation as a ruling dynasty willing to defend the papacy's jurisdiction vis-à-vis other sovereigns in the Italian peninsula, most notably the Habsburgs of Madrid.²⁰²⁶ Although more research needs to be done on the early years of the congregation, it seems reasonable to assume that the Barberini thought of it as a battering ram in the fight against plans, pursued by a number of secular princes, to establish local churches in the Italian peninsula, the only part of the world where the papacy was in a position to interfere with the administration of the Church.²⁰²⁷ The Congregation had, in short, been designed as an instrument of radical opposition to Spanish interests in Italy.

By the 1660s, all this had changed. As actors on the ground were learning the hard way, institutions in Rome and Madrid now had an overwhelmingly positive view of the cooperation between the Church and the monarchy and were unwilling to compromise that by lowering themselves to the unseemly haggling over details in the relationship between secular and religious authorities in the peripheries.²⁰²⁸ As Litta's jurisdictional squabbles with the Senate headed for the next round, this position gained new traction in a papal court devoted to reviving the *diacatholicon* and restoring order. As early as 1657, the Congregation of Ecclesiastical Immunity had informed Litta that although Alexander VII "prema, quanto si deve, che l'Imm[uni]tà Ecc[lesiasti]ca sia inviolabilmente custodita, et osservata," he would not accept "che le Chiese, et altri luoghi Immuni servano per asilo à Malviventi, e facinorosi, i quali abusando ben spesso di quel privilegio, vi si ricorrono, anco talvolta, per uscirne à commetter nuovi delitti."²⁰²⁹ Vittorio De Marco in his research on the kingdom of Naples has shown that while the Church encouraged ecclesiastics to mount a principled defense of economic privileges, it grew increasingly wary of coming out in support of

²⁰²⁵ D'Avenia, *La Chiesa del re*, p. 10.

²⁰²⁶ Signorotto, *Milano spagnola*, p. 236.

²⁰²⁷ Menniti Ippolito, 1664, pp. 42, 71, 192.

²⁰²⁸ Rurale, Clemente VIII, pp. 327–328.

²⁰²⁹ Bernardino Rocci to Alfonso Litta, Rome July 10, 1657: ASDM, Carteggio ufficiale, cart. 83.

clerics who deployed ecclesiastical immunity as a cover for illicit activities.²⁰³⁰ In a world turned upside down, the return to social stability was a more pressing need than the points of honor of archbishops. By the 1660s that position had hardened. Nicolás de Antonio in his treatise argued that, “La Sacra Congregazione dell’Immunità credendo fare il giusto [...] contribuisce in gran parte alli disordini che quotidianamente nascono in questa materia.”²⁰³¹ Federico Borromeo would probably have agreed. Building on the nascent consensus for change, the new secretary of the Congregation disavowed his erstwhile protectors, the Barberini, and transformed the Congregation into a weapon to be used for, rather than against, the consolidation of Habsburg power in Italy.

To most in the Spanish establishment this came as a surprise. When Borromeo had refused to meet governor Ponce de León in 1665 (see chapters 9 and 10), many feared that this was the beginning of all-out war on the monarchy’s jurisdictions. In fact, the Spanish ambassador in Rome had initially advised actors in Milan and Madrid to go easy on Borromeo because he had been appointed secretary of the Congregation of Ecclesiastical Immunity. In a letter to his principals, Pedro de Aragón reminded the hawks on his side that, as the new secretary, Borromeo “podrá ser de perjuicio a los muchos negocios que de los Reynos de V[uestra] M[a]g[esta]d concurren en aquella congregación.”²⁰³² Fueling these concerns was the fact that Borromeo had taken time out of his schedule for a conspiratorial meeting with Alfonso Litta. When documenting this encounter, a Milanese chronicler sympathetic to the governor speculated that Litta had seized the opportunity to “inzupparlo [Federico] bene delle sue male massime, che qui dal Canto de Regij non si pensi ad altro che a combattere co’ Preti e sminuir loro la giurisd[izion]e.”²⁰³³ In fact, Gorani suspected that the governor had initiated the public scandal surrounding Borromeo’s refusal to meet him to discredit the designated secretary before he made it to Rome. Anxious that Borromeo would travel to Rome “malamente impresso delle pendenze giurisdizionali che vertono,” he wanted preemptively to “dichiararlo diffidente, acciò che nelle occorrenze fosse sempre sospetto e non havessero credito le sue insinuationi.”²⁰³⁴ If this had been Ponce de León’s intention, as seems probable, his turned out to be unnecessary precaution.

Given his background Borromeo quickly sided with Litta’s adversaries in the ecclesiastical hierarchy against the overzealous archbishop. The new secretary wasted no time to do what officials in his position did to resolve an issue: he instituted a special committee (*congregazione*

²⁰³⁰ De Marco, L’immunità, p. 148.

²⁰³¹ Riflessioni sopra l’Immunità e Bulla gregoriana, quoted in Latini, Il privilegio, p. 164.

²⁰³² Pedro de Aragón to the Council of State Rome September 29, 1665: AGS, EST, leg. 3038, unfol.

²⁰³³ Carlo Francesco Gorani, Libro di memorie, nel quale si fa annotazione delle cose più considerevoli che succedono alla giornata: BNE, ms. 2671, f. 154r.

²⁰³⁴ Carlo Francesco Gorani, Libro di memorie, nel quale si fa annotazione delle cose più considerevoli che succedono alla giornata: BNE, ms. 2671, f. 154r.

particolare).²⁰³⁵ The reasons behind this move were explained by Borromeo's successor, Giacomo Altoviti. In a short treatise written in July 1668, Altoviti concluded, "La sperienza dimostra che l'essersi nelle Sacre Cong[regazio]ni accresciuto il numero de Cardinali, hà reso la spedizione delle Cause più dispendiosa, più lunga, più trascurata, e più esposta à palesar il Segreto."²⁰³⁶ The issue was important enough to warrant close scrutiny by a restricted circle of experienced cardinals, a strategy to override the potential opposition of entrenched interests in larger institutional bodies popular in the seventeenth century.²⁰³⁷

Things seemed to get off to a good start. Its members were all eminent cardinals, many of whom hailed from families with long-standing ties to the crown, such as the Spinola from Genoa, the Brancacci from Florence, the Omodei from Milan, and the Acquaviva from Naples.²⁰³⁸ Ideologically the committee was steeped in the *diacatholicon*. According to its founding document, its task was to alleviate the "continue doglianze de' Precipi che le Chiese, ò Luoghi Immuni servino in effetto per sicurezza de' tristi."²⁰³⁹ In a stunning about-face, it accepted the claim of secular princes that the Church "viene guardata da medesimi tristi per salvezza loro, ancorché ne sijno indegni," and stated that consecrated spaces offered felons guaranteed "scampo da quel castigo, che per altro haverebbono essemplarmente havuto, se la Chiesa non havesse impedito il corso della Giustitia."²⁰⁴⁰ Such was the Church's obstructionism that it was producing "manifesti pregiuditi del buon governo."²⁰⁴¹ If they had fretted about Borromeo's ascent, the Spanish authorities now exulted. They rejoiced at the prospect of finally being able to wrest "una regla fixa a satisfacción de los Príncipes" on how "se escusen controversias y castiguen los delinquentes" from the papacy.²⁰⁴²

If they anticipated a quick fix, their patience was put to a severe test. In its original formation, the special committee first met in September 1668. But the first two years were spent mapping out the territory and discussing arcane questions, such as the proper definition of the word "loca" to determine local immunity.²⁰⁴³ Committee members also gathered intelligence on "tutti quei casi, de quali si habbia memoria [...] in ordine all'osservanza della Bolla della S[ant]a mem[oria] di Greg[ori]o XIV dall'anno 1591 ch'essa fù pubblicata, sino al corr[en]te."²⁰⁴⁴ Things began to budge when the Spanish monarchy was asked to nominate two envoys, one from Milan and the other from

²⁰³⁵ See Dell'Oro, *Il regio economato*, pp. 157–174.

²⁰³⁶ Giacomo Altoviti, *Discorso ò Riflessioni sopra la molteplicità de Card.li nelle Congreg.ni, e se si dividessero in più, come tornerebbe ciò meglio*: BAV, Vat. Lat., 11733, ff. 225–226 (f. 225).

²⁰³⁷ On Spain under Olivares, see the comments in Benigno, *Specchi*, p. 235.

²⁰³⁸ Congregazione Particolare sopra le doglianze de' Precipi secolari circa l'osservanza della Bolla di Gregorio XIV: ASV, Congr. Immunità Eccl., Varia 34, ff. 5r, 9r.

²⁰³⁹ Congregazione Particolare sopra le doglianze de' Precipi secolari circa l'osservanza della Bolla di Gregorio XIV: ASV, Congr. Immunità Eccl., Varia 34, f. 6r.

²⁰⁴⁰ Congregazione Particolare [...]: ASV, Congr. Immunità Eccl., Varia 34, f. 6v.

²⁰⁴¹ Congregazione Particolare [...]: ASV, Congr. Immunità Eccl., Varia 34, f. 7r.

²⁰⁴² Consulta of the Council of State, Madrid August 17, 1669: AGS, EST, leg. 3043, unfol.

²⁰⁴³ Session of July 12, 1669 in Congregazione Particolare [...]: ASV, Congr. Immunità Eccl., Varia 34, f. 15v.

²⁰⁴⁴ Congregation of Ecclesiastical Immunity to Alfonso Litta, Rome May 10, 1667: ASV, Arch. Nunz. Madrid, vol. 7, f. 17r.

Naples, to represent its interests on the committee. Danese Casati was dispatched from Milan, while Antonio di Gaeta stumped for the kingdom of Naples. As they explained to the Congregation of Ecclesiastical Immunity, immunity for criminals was “non solo in disprezzo manifesto” of royal justice being served, but constituted also an “evidente abuso della stessa Casa di Dio, mentre i malfattori dopo esservisi posti al coperto vi si trattengono con dishonesti commertij sin nella notte, vi continuano le pratiche con Banditi[,] vi negoziano, e vi concertano i ricatti.”²⁰⁴⁵ This continued tolerance of lawlessness was all the more surprising, they maintained, seeing as in the Papal States the papacy had no qualms about swiftly removing suspected criminals from churches.²⁰⁴⁶ Given this, the two envoys wanted nothing less than see the bull of Gregory XIV rescinded. They made it absolutely clear that the Spanish king requested to see “l’allargare i capi de’ delitti” falling under the remit of the monarchy’s prosecution, a restrictive definition of “luoghi immuni,” and the “custodia [in secular prisons] del Reo estratto, mentre si vede la Causa.”²⁰⁴⁷ Few would have bet that they would eventually get their way. Torn between excessive demands from both sides, the committee would only come into its stride after Borromeo’s return and his promotion to secretary of state of Clement X and prefect of the Congregation of Ecclesiastical Immunity in the early 1670s.

Much of Borromeo’s belated success needs to be attributed to the appointments as governor of Rome from 1666 through 1668 and as nuncio in Madrid from 1668 to 1670 that he held before his return to the Congregation. Unfortunately, there are no surviving documents from his stint as governor, but it seems likely that this post should have heightened his awareness of the dangers that criminal elements posed to the makeup of society.²⁰⁴⁸ As Irene Fosi’s research into the *governatorato* in the late sixteenth century has shown, one of the main concerns of this tribunal was the fight against “bandits.”²⁰⁴⁹ By the time Federico held the appointment, the *governatorato* increasingly acted as a court committed to eradicating crime across the Papal States and building that “moral and social order” which Fosi points to as the essence of the administration of justice in the Papal States.²⁰⁵⁰ This likely exposed Borromeo to the extent of the corrosive effects of lawlessness that his past appointments as papal governor in Umbria and the Marches had not.²⁰⁵¹

Yet, these earlier experiences seem to have been formative in their own way. As the representatives of the Spanish king on the special committee had pointed out, popes, in their role as heads of state, were much more intransigent than secular princes in jurisdictional matters,

²⁰⁴⁵ Congregatione Particolare [...]: ASV, Congr. Immunità Eccl., Varia 34, ff. 7r–v.

²⁰⁴⁶ Congregatione Particolare [...]: ASV, Congr. Immunità Eccl., Varia 34, ff. 7v–8r.

²⁰⁴⁷ Congregatione Particolare [...]: ASV, Congr. Immunità Eccl., Varia 34, f. 39r.

²⁰⁴⁸ Some criminal sentences handed down by Federico Borromeo are in ASR, Tribunale criminale del governatore di Roma, Registri di sentenze, vol. 14.

²⁰⁴⁹ Fosi, *La società violenta*, pp. 12–13, 15–16.

²⁰⁵⁰ Fosi, *Papal Justice*, p. 111.

²⁰⁵¹ Fosi, *La società violenta*, p. 27; eadem, *Papal Justice*, pp. 28, 33.

delegating much of the “giurisdizione spirituale ai rappresentanti temporali.”²⁰⁵² Precisely because the men staffing the governorships across the Papal States were members of the clergy, they could undermine the authority of the episcopate in ways that would have been unfathomable to officials of other Catholic states.²⁰⁵³ In a development that first peaked under Sixtus V, the Counterreformation papacy pared back ecclesiastical privileges in the Papal States that popes, in their capacity as spiritual leader, would never have accepted from other princes.²⁰⁵⁴ After the Congregation of Ecclesiastical Immunity was instituted under Urban VIII, the body consistently applied a different yardstick to cases from the Papal States in comparison with petitions from the kingdom of Naples, displaying particularly egregious double standards when it came to religious asylum.²⁰⁵⁵ By the 1660s, many acknowledged that the status quo was unsustainable. The work of one of the curia’s finest jurists of the age, Giovanni Battista de Luca, offers a glimpse into this new awareness. Finding Rome’s exceptionalism hard to justify and unconvinced by the legal arguments for the immunity of members of the clergy he could summon, de Luca was riven with worry and concern that secular princes would jump on his arguments for papal *plenitudo potestas* to make the case for their own right, as secular heads of state, to prosecute criminals in consecrated places.²⁰⁵⁶ The subjects of the Spanish king in the pope’s service appear to have had a similar epiphany. In Federico Borromeo his own experience of trying criminals against the wishes of more lenient bishops seems, ironically, to have helped him mature the conviction that a strong prince was necessary to guarantee order.²⁰⁵⁷ From there it was a short step to the realization that that the Spanish king needed the same extensive powers in his realms.

The promotion to the nunciature in Madrid in 1668s only deepened that commitment. Arriving late in his career, the appointment to Madrid under Clement IX Rospigliosi was seen as demonstrative of the pro-Spanish leanings of a pope who had dabbled in the writing of drama based on Spanish productions of the Golden Age and had himself held down the nunciature in the court of Madrid for nine years.²⁰⁵⁸ Originally dispatched as an extraordinary nuncio to negotiate a peace settlement between the French and the Spanish crowns that was being wrapped up in Aix-la-Chapelle, Borromeo was Rospigliosi’s nuncio of choice.²⁰⁵⁹ In his letter of accreditation, Clement IX’s secretary of state, Decio Azzolini, informed the queen regent, Mariana, that Borromeo’s “qualità” provided “palese argomento della stima e dell’affetto paterno di S[ua] B[eatitudin]e” toward the

²⁰⁵² Prodi, *Il sovrano principe*, p. 253.

²⁰⁵³ Prodi, *Il sovrano principe*, pp. 289, 293.

²⁰⁵⁴ Prodi, *Il sovrano principe*, pp. 231–232.

²⁰⁵⁵ Prodi, *Il sovrano principe*, pp. 233–234.

²⁰⁵⁶ Prodi, *Il sovrano principe*, p. 141.

²⁰⁵⁷ I have been unable to locate Borromeo’s official missives from this period. However, his private correspondence contains some letters to the secretary of the Sacra Consulta (the appeals court for governors) in which he detailed the crimes he prosecuted as governor of Montalto in the early 1650s. See ABIB, FB, Federico IV, *Corrispondenza 1645–1655*.

²⁰⁵⁸ Pastor, *The History*, p. 321.

²⁰⁵⁹ Pastor, *The History*, pp. 416–417.

crown.²⁰⁶⁰ Borromeo, he informed the queen, combined the “splendore della nascita” with a “lunga prova di sperimentato valore” which would be most beneficial to the monarchy.²⁰⁶¹ The Council of State duly rejoiced at the news, lauding Federico “así por ser Milanés, como por sus buenas prendas, y deudo del Cardenal Borromeo quien ha dado tantas experiencias de su zelo.”²⁰⁶²

Much had changed since the days of Federico Sr., and these changes were reflected in Borromeo’s instruction as he headed to Spain. At the height of Federico Sr.’s conflicts with the crown, the nuncios in Madrid were regularly instructed that, for the preservation of ecclesiastical immunity, it was of the utmost importance “che stiano continuamente, anzi perpetuamente, con lo scudo et spada in mano per defenderla et reprimere coloro, che vi vogliono far gravi et irreparabili pregiuditii.”²⁰⁶³ Internal documents from the same period had blamed the Spanish side for its ill-advised “zelo che tengono della Grandezza et gratia delli Principi.”²⁰⁶⁴ Now, half a century after the signing of the *concordia*, the nuncio of the house of Borromeo stood on the side of the monarchy rather than the archbishop of Milan, trying to resolve jurisdictional conflicts in favor of the “Grandezza et gratia” of the king of Spain. Unlike his predecessors, Federico Borromeo was deeply committed to the *diacatholicon*, the idea that since the crown was the only one to have the material wherewithal to intervene, the papacy and other ecclesiastical actors had to rely on it to preserve society the way they wanted it to be.²⁰⁶⁵ When discussing Litta, who regularly wrote to rope in his support, he grew increasingly dismissive of what he considered obstruction to royal justice and the careless wrecking of public order. If the *governatorato* in Rome had taught him the importance of good governance, the nunciature in Madrid buttressed his commitment to the *diacatholicon* as critical to enforcing justice in Spanish Italy.

That commitment became apparent in his patronage of the arts, most notably in his push for the erection of a place of worship for the Milanese community in Rome that was inching toward completion in the late 1660s.²⁰⁶⁶ The foundations for what would become San Carlo al Corso had been laid in 1612 when ambassador Lemos was trying to make the most of the recent canonization of St. Charles in his bid to woo over the Borromeo (see chapter 2).²⁰⁶⁷ After grinding to a halt, building works received a new boost in the 1660s when Luigi Alessandro Omodei, the cardinal of a family of Milanese financiers (*hombres de negocios*) who had risen to the top during the preceding emergency, invested his considerable wealth to add the final touches to the new church.²⁰⁶⁸ Federico

²⁰⁶⁰ Decio Azzolini to Vitaliano Visconti, Rome January 10, 1668: ASV, Arch. Nunz. Madrid, vol. 16, ff. 375v, 375r.

²⁰⁶¹ Decio Azzolini to Vitaliano Visconti, Rome January 10, 1668: ASV, Arch. Nunz. Madrid, vol. 16, f. 375r.

²⁰⁶² Consulta of the Council of State, Madrid February 21, 1668: AGS, EST, leg. 3041, f. 81.

²⁰⁶³ Instruction to nuncio Millini dated June 21, 1605, quoted in Von Thiessen, *Diplomatie und Patronage*, pp. 402–403.

²⁰⁶⁴ Quoted in Visceglia, *Roma papale e Spagna*, p. 180.

²⁰⁶⁵ Signorotto, *Milano spagnola*, p. 230.

²⁰⁶⁶ Anselmi, *Le chiese spagnole*, p. 49.

²⁰⁶⁷ Anselmi, *Le chiese spagnole*, p. 70.

²⁰⁶⁸ Spiriti, Luigi Alessandro Omodei, pp. 270–272; on the Omodei, see Signorotto, *Milano spagnola*, pp. 146–149.

seems to have been in close epistolary contact with him from the time he took over as nuncio in Madrid.²⁰⁶⁹ Thanks to his role he was able to ensure that the king endowed the church with a pension of 500 *scudi*.²⁰⁷⁰ When San Carlo neared completion, Federico Borromeo sought to leave his mark on the church's interior design. Snatching the family saint's public image from Litta and other intransigents, he promoted the family's preferred narrative of Carlo as a humble servant of the Spanish empire by donating what soon became the center of attraction: a reliquary containing Carlo's heart.²⁰⁷¹ Placing it on the altar, he recentered the cult of St. Charles an expression of loyalty to the Spanish crown in a church that was itself to become a monument to the *diacatholicon*.²⁰⁷²

By the time he was promoted to the secretariat of state under Clement, Federico had what it took to turn around what many thought were lost negotiations on the jurisdictional conflicts in Spanish Italy. Upon his return to Rome in 1670, he plodded tirelessly to broker a settlement, working himself into a frenzied activity after his elevation to the cardinalate and the subsequent appointment as prefect of the Congregation of Ecclesiastical Immunity. A *consulta* of the Council of State dated February 1672 acknowledged that Federico Borromeo had been exemplary in "facilitar mucho lo que resistían los demás Cardenales."²⁰⁷³ Willing to compromise, he helped draw up a catalog of the most heinous crimes that would henceforth be exempt from immunity to apprehension in churches and other ecclesiastical buildings. The result was a bonfire of exemptions. Under the new scheme, "Publicos Latrones, et Grassatores," murderers and their instigators, arsonists, parricides, those accused of lese-majesty, including conspirators against the king, and counterfeiters would now be arrested "ab ecclesia vel Loco immune."²⁰⁷⁴ A revived special committee also extended the list of buildings that did not fall under the purview of ecclesiastical immunity.²⁰⁷⁵ Most importantly, secular tribunals were put in charge of determining whether an alleged criminal was exonerated from arrest.²⁰⁷⁶ As secretary of state, Federico Borromeo in early 1672 proceeded to send this proposal to his successor in Madrid, Galeazzo Marescotti, adamant that these were "le finali risoluzioni di questa particular Congregatione," which had finally agreed tacitly to revoke the bull of Gregory XIV.²⁰⁷⁷

The committee's resolution was a compromise spawned by the tacit recognition that Rome was in no position to roll back decades of legal precedent. As Gianvittorio Signorotto explains, "Sullo

²⁰⁶⁹ See for example Decio Azzolini to Federico Borromeo, Rome August 3, 1669: ASV, Segr. Stato, Spagna, vol. 351, f. 317v.

²⁰⁷⁰ Federico Borromeo to Decio Azzolini, Madrid October 3, 1668: ASV, Segr. Stato, Spagna, vol. 137, ff. 589r–v; Decio Azzolini to Federico Borromeo, Rome March 12, 1669: ASV, Segr. Stato, Spagna, vol. 351, ff. 274v–275r; Spiriti, *La chiesa nazionale*, pp. 884–885.

²⁰⁷¹ Anselmi, *Le chiese spagnole*, p. 52; Spiriti, *La chiesa nazionale*, p. 884.

²⁰⁷² Spiriti, *La chiesa nazionale*, pp. 886, 878.

²⁰⁷³ *Consulta* of the Council of State, Madrid February 16, 1672: AGS, EST, leg. 3046, unfol.

²⁰⁷⁴ *Congregatione Particolare* [...]: ASV, Congr. Immunità Eccl., Varia 34, ff. 127r–129r.

²⁰⁷⁵ *Congregatione Particolare* [...]: ASV, Congr. Immunità Eccl., Varia 34, ff. 129r–129v.

²⁰⁷⁶ *Respuesta al informe que hicieron al Marqués de Velada y Astorga, los dos Ministros de Nápoles y Milán, en orden a su comisión en 9 de Mayo de 1671*: AGS, SSP, leg. 2041, doc. 83.

²⁰⁷⁷ *Congregatione Particolare* [...]: ASV, Congr. Immunità Eccl., Varia 34, f. 141v.

sfondo dei lavori della Congregazione speciale, si profilavano mutamenti di grande portata. Mentre la ragion di Stato e le ‘necessità’ della guerra avevano spinto le potenze ad infrangere sempre più frequentemente, nei loro domini, i privilegi della Chiesa, la dimensione politica del papato, con gli importanti trattati del 1648 e del 1659, era decisamente ridimensionata sul piano internazionale.”²⁰⁷⁸ The proposal with which the special committee headed by Federico Borromeo came up in early 1672 meant that Rome had caved in to Spanish pressure and vacated its old position. An enraged Litta offered a cogent reading of the events that had prepared the ground for the proposal now on the table: the Spanish had determined that ecclesiastical privileges “sono ragioni Regie perse, mortificate, obliterate nel corso di 50 anni di guerra, e perciò in tempo di pace intendono di rimetterle in piedi, come tracollate dall’usurpatione de Preti.”²⁰⁷⁹ Litta’s problem was that the voices that mattered in Rome outwardly agreed with the crown rather than the archbishop. The cardinals around Federico Borromeo had come to the painful realization that the Apostolic See’s illusions of omnipotence in the ecclesiastical sphere were no longer sustainable and had to yield to bilateral negotiations.²⁰⁸⁰ The work of the special committee had for all intents and purposes paved the way for a concordat between the Apostolic See and the king of Spain.²⁰⁸¹

The offer that the special committee put forward showed that its members had overturned centuries of canonical scholarship on the pope as Christ’s vicar and arbiter of secular princes and had, for all intents and purposes, accepted the reasoning of Catholic monarchs on the role of the Church in society.²⁰⁸² The second half of the seventeenth century was a period during which monarchs sought to overcome the fragmentation of power that a social order built on privileges and exemptions had wrought.²⁰⁸³ They did so by imposing themselves as the sole arbiters over all subjects, including clerics over whom they watched as supreme protectors of religion and the God-given order.²⁰⁸⁴ While the Church argued that the *libertas ecclesiae* had been granted by God, monarchs increasingly asserted that privileges such as sanctuaries had in fact been proffered by worldly leaders who were within their rights to rescind them when they were deemed detrimental to the *respublica*.²⁰⁸⁵ Antonio di Gaeta, the envoy for Naples to the committee, put the reasoning succinctly in a legal brief: “Ecclesia est in Republica, non autem Republica in Ecclesia.”²⁰⁸⁶ Although he did not state it directly, di Gaeta questioned the primacy of the pope over territorial princes, pushing the Catholic monarchy toward the Gallican positions popular in the France of Louis XIV.

²⁰⁷⁸ Signorotto, Milano spagnola, p. 264.

²⁰⁷⁹ Alfonso Litta to Vitaliano Visconti, Milan March 29, 1667: ASV, Arch. Nunz. Madrid, vol. 4, f. 305r.

²⁰⁸⁰ Signorotto, Milano spagnola, p. 264.

²⁰⁸¹ Signorotto, Milano spagnola, p. 262.

²⁰⁸² Pattenden, Electing, p. 4.

²⁰⁸³ Latini, Il privilegio, pp. 14–15; for a discussion of early modern privileges, see Bosenga, The Politics.

²⁰⁸⁴ See Jemolo, Stato e Chiesa, p. 92.

²⁰⁸⁵ Latini, Il privilegio, pp. 18, 34; Lauro, Il giurisdizionalismo, p. 31.

²⁰⁸⁶ Quoted in Latini, Il privilegio, p. 146; Lauro, Il giurisdizionalismo, p. 42.

Betokening Rome's weakness, the Spanish monarchy was working toward achieving the same primacy over the papacy in Milan and Naples that it enjoyed in Sicily and the Iberian peninsula where the Habsburg monarchs were in a position to rule as "re-papa" without outside interference.²⁰⁸⁷

The members of the college of cardinals remained divided on what was a capitulation to royal arguments. The *curialisti*, as the Roman hardliners were known, remained faithful to a vision in which the papacy had to lead the charge because the Church was the epitome of the perfect and universal society founded by God to further the spiritual good of the faithful.²⁰⁸⁸ Even though these ideas had been flaunted under Alexander VII, some of his charges, including Federico Borromeo, were rapidly moving on in light of the Church's dramatic loss of standing and the worrying lawlessness in Spanish Italy. While some theologians and jurists continued to argue for the extraterritoriality of the Church, others like Federico Borromeo sided with secular leaders in arguing that the Church could only subsist under the protective umbrella of the Catholic monarchy.²⁰⁸⁹ Still reeling from his brother's defeat, Federico Borromeo opted for what contemporaries referred to as a more "prudent," or moderate, approach to the issue.²⁰⁹⁰ Although he did not go as far as secular critics of ecclesiastical jurisdictions (some of whom were beginning to argue that monarchs had the right to interfere with religious precepts that undermined their absolute powers), the fight against religious asylum became one of the fields in which Federico Borromeo was willing to boost the power of the monarch to the detriment of the papacy in order to preserve the good Christian society.²⁰⁹¹ It was for this reason that they came around to a comprehensive settlement of the jurisdictional disputes, or as the Spanish ambassador in Rome phrased it, "un temperamento che metta tutte queste differenze in concordia, [...] dandosi regola ferma circa la forma di procedere se si vuol curare questa piaga e non saldarla in modo che torni ad aprirsi con maggior malattia e pericolo."²⁰⁹²

The rise of regalist sentiments among some cardinals jars with older interpretations of jurisdictional controversies as a rift between a forward-thinking state and a reactionary Church. In much of the existing literature the default assumption remains that ecclesiastical office dictated clerics' opposition to the Spanish crown as they privileged their loyalty to Rome over that to the Habsburg family.²⁰⁹³ While this seems to be true of the latter half of the sixteenth and the early decades of the seventeenth centuries (see chapters 1 and 2), that loyalty steadily dwindled as the

²⁰⁸⁷ D'Avenia, *La Chiesa del re*, pp. 9, 16.

²⁰⁸⁸ Lauro, *Il giurisdizionalismo*, p. 30.

²⁰⁸⁹ On the arguments for extraterritoriality, see Latini, *Il privilegio*, pp. 124–126.

²⁰⁹⁰ Bireley, *The Counter-Reformation Prince*, p. 201. This argument also enjoyed popularity in Spanish diplomatic circles in the 1660s, see Carrió-Invernizzi, *El gobierno*, p. 19.

²⁰⁹¹ Jemolo, *Stato e Chiesa*, chap. 3; Latini, *Il privilegio*, p. 385.

²⁰⁹² Nicola D'Antonio [sic], *Riflessioni sopra l'immunità ecclesiastica e bulla gregoriana (1670)*, quoted in De Marco, *L'immunità*, p. 125, n. 7.

²⁰⁹³ D'Avenia, *Lealtà alla prova*, part. pp. 45–46.

seventeenth century progressed. Gesturing to the growing importance of dynastic ties to the court of Madrid, the individual stance clerics took in these conflicts was often determined by their interests as representatives of a noble family rather than by their position in Rome.²⁰⁹⁴ By the 1660s, men of the Church from Spanish Italy were primarily subjects of the Catholic king, and even if they held important positions within the ecclesiastical hierarchy, they needed to take stock of their family members who lived under the direct rule of the monarch.²⁰⁹⁵ Given this, Litta could no longer be said to be representative of the Church's position. Rather, he was an outlier who found himself in the comfortable position that he had nothing to lose in a no-holds-barred assault on the monarchy. Borromeo and others did not have that luxury. Unlike Litta who had given up all hope, Federico Borromeo staked the future of his dynasty on a strong monarchy, and for that reason he was determined to make concessions at which his ancestors would have recoiled. Federico understood that it was ultimately suicidal not to embrace the prevalent ideology of *conservación* in the guise of the *diacatholicon*.²⁰⁹⁶ Only the defense of Roman interests under the mantle of Spanish power, he reckoned, could preserve the society built on privilege and hierarchy the Borromeo were so invested in.

As has become evident throughout this chapter, Borromeo's leading role in the settlement of the jurisdictional conflicts in Milan needs to be placed in the context of the resolution of the crisis of the 1640s and attempts to restore Spanish hegemony in Italy. After the loss of Portugal and the United Provinces, Spain focused on holding on to its last European bastion outside the Iberian peninsula, dispatching skilled politicians to restore the stability that had been lost. This was most visible in Naples. In the late 1640s and early 1650s, the count of Oñate was widely praised for establishing a government that reined in the worst excesses of the nobility, especially its arbitrary rule over defenseless subjects.²⁰⁹⁷ His work was continued by successive viceroys, most notably the two representatives of the house of Cardona, Pascual and Pedro Antonio de Aragón who governed Naples in the 1660s and the early 1670s. As the closest surviving descendants of the house of Aragon, Pedro in particular fashioned himself as the heir to Alfonso the Magnanimous (1396–1458), Naples's famed Renaissance ruler. Aragón's panegyrists depicted him as a purveyor of good government, ascribing him the Virgilian maxim *parcere subiectis et debellare superbos* (to protect the subjected and vanquish the proud).²⁰⁹⁸ He invested heavily in poor relief by founding a hospital for

²⁰⁹⁴ Mrozek, Ascanio Filomarino, pp. 15, 115–116.

²⁰⁹⁵ Signorotto, *The Squadrone*, p. 190.

²⁰⁹⁶ Álvarez-Ossorio, *Corte*, p. 310.

²⁰⁹⁷ Minguito Palomares, *Nápoles*, pp. 201–202.

²⁰⁹⁸ Carrió-Invernizzi, *El gobierno*, pp. 249–250.

the indigent, openly associating these efforts with the reign of the new king, Charles II, in an effort to placate a city that had been rocked by one of the most frightening revolts of the 1640s.²⁰⁹⁹

The Aragón brothers initiated a tradition in Spanish Naples. The last four decades of the seventeenth century saw a succession of viceroys that were attentive to the needs and aspirations of ordinary subjects whose particular focus was “the so-called ‘civic class’ (*ceto civile*), a socially heterogeneous urban intelligentsia comprising magistrates, lawyers, jurists, physicians, government officials, university professors and several aristocrats,” who had been leading the reformist movements of the 1640s.²¹⁰⁰ Attention to this constituency translated to a platform whose main planks included the rationalization of the tax system and the reduction of feudal and ecclesiastical privileges and immunities.²¹⁰¹ This drive toward good government peaked under Gaspar de Haro y Guzmán, the marquis del Carpio and the son of Philip IV’s last minister-favorite, who administered Naples in the 1680s, and understood the importance of that elusive Renaissance ideal of government based on a commitment to justice and rational administration in order to reintegrate the masses behind the revolt of 1647–48.²¹⁰²

Serving as a powerful source of legitimation for these changes was the adroit association of criminality with the nobility. Traditionally historians highlighted the endemic problem of bandits in the pay of the most unruly elements of the nobility, which epitomized that group’s anarchy in the first half of the seventeenth century.²¹⁰³ Only recently has the problem of the clergy’s lending support to criminal elements attracted scholarly attention. As Giuseppe Mrozek has shown, many of the controversies between secular and religious authorities swirled around what contemporaries referred to as “*chierici selvaggi*”: members of the clergy who aided and abetted “bandits” or, in some instances, engaged in illicit acts themselves.²¹⁰⁴ The flames of this latent conflict were fanned when successive viceroys in the 1650s and 1660s proceeded to arrest criminals from churches and other consecrated buildings in the name of the law-and-order plank they used to restore consensus.²¹⁰⁵

In Milan, where banditry of the sort that plagued the southern Italian countryside was negligible, that crackdown on ecclesiastical jurisdictions soon moved to the center of the good government programs that were put in place there. The Cardona brothers’ counterpart in Milan, governor Luis de Guzmán Ponce de León (r. 1662–1668), initiated a tradition of forceful interventions in the established hierarchies of the State of Milan, giving the lie to the argument that the latter half

²⁰⁹⁹ Carrió-Invernizzi, *El gobierno*, pp. 267, 270–271.

²¹⁰⁰ Fernández-Santos, *The Politics of Art*, p. 199.

²¹⁰¹ Fernández-Santos, *The Politics of Art*, p. 199.

²¹⁰² Calabria and Marino (eds.), *Good Government*.

²¹⁰³ Minguito Palomares, *Nápoles*, pp. 230–231; Villari, *Un sogno*, chap. 11.

²¹⁰⁴ Mrozek, *Ascanio Filomarino*, pp. 97–100. For a general account of the “*chierici selvaggi*,” see Mancino and Romeo, *Clero criminale*.

²¹⁰⁵ Mrozek, *Ascanio Filomarino*, p. 182.

of the seventeenth century saw a decline of government power in the Spanish monarchy when compared to the supposedly absolutist France.²¹⁰⁶ Indeed, Ponce de León's program bore more than a passing resemblance with the reining in of rogue nobles and the strengthening of the justice system pursued by France's Louis XIV at the time.²¹⁰⁷ It was hardly a coincidence that Litta saw Ponce de León's government as a clobbering of the nobility, as part of "una nuova guerra al paese, levando i privilegi e togliendo molti *ius acciocché* la nobiltà, pingue in tempo di pace, non insolentisca."²¹⁰⁸ Among the privileges he pursued most doggedly were those of the Church, earning him credit from both friend and foe. Carlo Francesco Gorani, a representative of Milan's up-and-coming bureaucratic elite, lauded Ponce de León as a scourge of vested ecclesiastical privileges.²¹⁰⁹ On the opposite side of the fray, Litta accused the governor of spreading "puzza d'atheismo."²¹¹⁰ Ever the polemicist, Litta quipped, "[F]inita la guerra co Francesi, era cominciata l'altra all'Arcivescovo."²¹¹¹ Ponce de León had "bravado il suo sollazzo," betraying his disdain for "Roma" and the Catholic Church, but most importantly his anger "contro chi hà giuriditt[ion]e in faccia di lui."²¹¹² Ponce de León, he averred, was pursuing sinister plans to "à forza di tirannia sottoporre" the archbishopric "alle sue chimere" and "renderselo tributario, pensando con questo d'acquistar al Rè una nuova Fiandra."²¹¹³ Litta saw the Senate's "sfogo rabbioso" against himself as an emanation of the governor's "sete tirannica," highlighting, albeit polemically, the strengthening of monarchical institutions against particular interests pursued in those years.²¹¹⁴ The archbishop explicitly likened the assault on ecclesiastical privileges to what "il Parlamento di Londra" had done to privileges after the proclamation of the Republic.²¹¹⁵ Terrifying as this subversion of time-honored privileges must have been to a Borromeo, Federico instinctively realized that these conflicts could be turned into something positive for the ruling elite provided they were properly managed from Rome. Though Ponce de León died in office in 1668 and did not see the rollout of the entire program, Federico Borromeo became an unexpected ally in the execution of his regalist restructuring of Milanese society.

In backing Ponce de León's efforts, Borromeo took control of the situation and imposed his own solution on it. Borromeo's strategy is best explained as a calibrated riposte to a "moral panic." This term was popularized by sociologist Stuart Hall who borrowed it from anthropologists to describe reactions to social ills that are disproportionate to the threat that problems actually

²¹⁰⁶ For a critical assessment of that comparison, see Álvarez-Ossorio, *La república*, pp. 74–75.

²¹⁰⁷ For an overview, see Greenshields, *An Economy*, chap. 6, esp. pp. 219–220.

²¹⁰⁸ Quoted in Grassi and Grohmann, *La Segreteria*, p. 270.

²¹⁰⁹ Carlo Francesco Gorani, *Libro di memorie, nel quale si fa annotazione delle cose più considerevoli che succedono alla giornata*: BNE, ms. 2671, f. 246r. On Gorani himself, see Signorotto, *La politica vista*.

²¹¹⁰ Rodén, *Church Politics*, p. 205.

²¹¹¹ Alfonso Litta to Vitaliano Visconti, Milan March 29, 1667: ASV, Arch. Nunz. Madrid, vol. 4, f. 305r.

²¹¹² Alfonso Litta to Vitaliano Visconti, Milan March 29, 1667: ASV, Arch. Nunz. Madrid, vol. 4, ff. 303r–v.

²¹¹³ Alfonso Litta to Vitaliano Visconti, Milan January 24, 1668: ASV, Arch. Nunz. Madrid, vol. 4, ff. 339r–v.

²¹¹⁴ Alfonso Litta to Vitaliano Visconti, Rome April 5, 1667: ASV, Arch. Nunz. Madrid, vol. 4, f. 301r.

²¹¹⁵ Alfonso Litta to Federico Borromeo, Milan February 4, 1669: ASV, Arch. Nunz. Madrid, vol. 4, f. 392r.

pose.²¹¹⁶ In his own work on the perception of street crime, Hall went on to argue that moral panics involved the fabrication of scapegoats onto which deep-rooted social ills are displaced.²¹¹⁷ The task of the student of societies is to interrogate the underlying causes of the malaise that is being projected onto potent symbols and whose interests such projections serve.²¹¹⁸ Referencing Antonio Gramsci, Hall argues that moral panics surface when the common sense of a society has been busted by counter-cultural movements, and rulers have to revert to coercion so as not to lose their grip on power.²¹¹⁹ While they cannot be induced from above, moral panics can be helped along and nudged into being by building on a perceived breakdown of societal norms. They are a way of misrecognizing the roots of a social unease, which comes with the added benefit that an intractable problem appears to be solvable through intervention from on high. In resorting to this strategy, Hall finds, the powers-that-be do not need to deploy violence across the board; instead, exhausted consensus is recuperated through an exaggerated response to select forms of deviance within society.²¹²⁰ Outrage at certain felonies at the expense of others helps to construct “complex ideologies of crime” that “provide the basis, in certain moments, for cross-class alliances in support of authority.”²¹²¹

The situation in Lombardy in the 1660s fits almost perfectly Gramsci’s definition of a “crisis of authority.” The latter “occurs either because the ruling class has failed in some major political undertaking for which it has requested, or forcibly extracted, the consent of the broad masses (war, for example), or because huge masses [...] have passed suddenly from a state of political passivity to a certain activity, and put forward demands” for radical change.²¹²² In Lombardy the values gluing society together had become brittle. The common good arguments on which the Borromeo had built their power had been exposed as a myth as movements from below vociferously contested the Borromeo’s administration of the *case erme* and appealed to the king to force the nobility finally to make good on its promises. Now that the war was over, there was hunger for change in Milan. The divide-and-conquer policy of the Borromeo had left behind a discontent *ceto civile* struggling with an economic base destroyed by decades of war and the trickling out of alternative sources of income from war profiteering as repeated attempts to stabilize the economy went awry.²¹²³ As Hall stresses, “Such moments signal, not necessarily a revolutionary conjuncture nor the collapse of the state, but

²¹¹⁶ Hall, Policing, p. vii.

²¹¹⁷ Procter, Stuart Hall, pp. 76, 80.

²¹¹⁸ Hall, Policing, p. 29.

²¹¹⁹ Hall, Policing, p. 216; Procter, Stuart Hall, p. 87.

²¹²⁰ Procter, Stuart Hall, pp. 87–88.

²¹²¹ Hall, Policing, p. 177.

²¹²² Gramsci, Selections, p. 210.

²¹²³ See Canosa, Milano nel Seicento, chap. 16.

rather the coming of ‘iron times.’”²¹²⁴ In fact, the challenge to the old hegemony could be neutralized if it was channeled toward a concrete “articulator of the crisis,” such as a crime wave.²¹²⁵

Federico Borromeo did not have to look far. Crime was rampant in a State where a well-established weapons industry and decades of armed conflict had led to a wide circulation of firearms.²¹²⁶ Unable to quash crime in its entirety, the Spanish authorities seemed to have zeroed in on those who supposedly assisted criminals. Confecting a moral panic that relied heavily on age-old fantasies about feral priests, Borromeo painted parts of the clergy as colluding with felons out to destabilize the good order. He and others instinctively understood that such public outrage could be used as an “ideological conductor” of the crisis to reboot the debate on patronage.²¹²⁷ As one of his inspirations, Nicolás de Antonio, phrased it, they recast the breakdown of social order as the symptoms of times “ne quali pare, che habbiano fatto à gara di prevalere le trasgressioni” of the populace and “le convenienze, ò connivenze” of parts of the clergy.²¹²⁸ Such a redefinition of the crisis had the potential of effacing fault-lines stemming from the social upheavals of the 1650s and ushering in a period of restoration. By espousing a tough-on-crime stance, the Borromeo would be seen to respond to a particularly outrageous form of patronage—religious asylum—without jeopardizing the mechanism as such. In so doing, they stood an excellent chance of winning back the favor of the propertied middling sorts.

Viewed in this broader perspective, Borromeo’s work for a settlement of the jurisdictional conflicts was a concession to the group of merchant-bankers who had fed off the war that had recently come to an abrupt end. Federico’s relationship with that group dated back to his stint in the Swiss Confederacy when he had relied on the financial services of transalpine traders to provide him with much-needed cash.²¹²⁹ His contacts included the Tiberini and the Arbona families, who had rapidly risen from their humble origins as “bottegari di bindelli e telerie” to small bankers in the seventeenth century.²¹³⁰ By far his most important partners, however, were the Annoni and the Perego.²¹³¹ The more established of the two families, the Annoni, had amassed great wealth as traders active along the Gotthard route that linked Milan to Basel in the Swiss Confederacy and Antwerp, where the Annoni acted as art agents for themselves and other Milanese dynasties of higher social status, purchasing and reselling paintings by Peter Paul Rubens, Jan Brueghel, and other

²¹²⁴ Hall, Policing, p. 217.

²¹²⁵ Hall, Policing, p. viii.

²¹²⁶ Canosa, Milano nel Seicento, pp. 223–224.

²¹²⁷ Hall, Policing, p. viii.

²¹²⁸ Congregazione Particolare [...]: ASV, Congr. Immunità Eccl., Varia 34, f. 34r.

²¹²⁹ The Annoni had begun to work in that capacity as early as the late sixteenth century when they acted as creditors for the Gonzaga of Mantua. See Tonelli, Investire con profitto, p. 20.

²¹³⁰ See for example Federico IV to Antonio Renato, Lucerne January 4, 1658. On the Arbona, see Visconti, Il commercio, p. 153. I have been unable to find information on the Tiberini.

²¹³¹ The letters are too numerous to mention here. Mentions can be found in letters in both ABIB, FB, Federico IV, Corrispondenza 1645–1655 and *ibid.*, Corrispondenza 1656–1664.

Flemish painters.²¹³² The Perego, on the other hand, had only recently entered the Milanese scene, though they would later merge with the Annoni to form the *Annoni e Perego*, Milan's most important bank in the eighteenth century.²¹³³

The upswing of these banking dynasties reflected profound changes in Milan's economy over the course of the seventeenth century. The Franco-Spanish war was a boon for a growing group of merchants operating in a trade network that connected Venice and Genoa to central Europe.²¹³⁴ Rather than choke trade, the conflagration offered this group new business opportunities as providers of military supplies (in fact, it cannot be excluded that many of them were clients of Giovanni Borromeo's when he was in charge of provisioning the troops stationed in Lombardy).²¹³⁵ More significantly, the war allowed them to absorb the shock of the unrelated collapse of the market for small credit. As interest rates for small money lenders plummeted from an average of 8% in the 1620s to as low as 4% by the late 1650s, the more successful businessmen transitioned to bailing out struggling Spanish governors and members of the local nobility.²¹³⁶ Profiting off the dire financial situation of the ruling elite, they earned themselves a privileged position in Milanese society.²¹³⁷ In demonstration of their power, they built impressive palaces in the area east of the *Duomo* in Milan, where the more established nobility resided, and purchased noble titles from cash-strapped Spanish officials.²¹³⁸ Further confirming their integration into Milan's nobility was a number of successful marital alliances. The Annoni married into the Visconti family, while Federico's younger brother, Paolo Emilio, contracted marriage with Maddalena Durini, the daughter of another successful financier, though not without eliciting major misgivings in the family itself (see chapter 13).²¹³⁹ As the conflict with France raged on, the two groups fed off of each other, with the nobility depending on ennobled bankers to finance the war effort on which that group had staked its illusions of grandeur.²¹⁴⁰

As soon as the war was over, that cozy arrangement collapsed. Like the nobility that had leeches off the military conflict, the merchants who had invested in war bonds faced bleak times, of which a number of spectacular bankruptcies in the early 1660s were only the most telling sign.²¹⁴¹ Certain representatives of the warrior elite, therefore, took their plight extremely seriously, as evidenced by governor Ponce de León's program to promote trade in Milan.²¹⁴² Merchants were

²¹³² See Tonelli, *Investire con profitto*, chap. 1–2.

²¹³³ See Tonelli, *Investire con profitto*, chap. 3–4.

²¹³⁴ Tonelli, *The Economy*, pp. 158–159.

²¹³⁵ Tonelli, *Investire con profitto*, p. 76.

²¹³⁶ On the collapse of the market for small credit, see Faccini, *La Lombardia*, pp. 49–50, 56, 68.

²¹³⁷ D'Amico, *Spanish Milan*, p. 79.

²¹³⁸ Tonelli, *The Economy*, p. 161; Tonelli, *Investire con profitto*, pp. 80–81, 115–119.

²¹³⁹ Tonelli, *Investire con profitto*, pp. 38–39; Cremonini, *Le vie*, pp. 163–186, esp. pp. 171–173, 176.

²¹⁴⁰ D'Amico, *Spanish Milan*, p. 79.

²¹⁴¹ D'Amico, *Spanish Milan*, p. 87.

²¹⁴² D'Amico, *Spanish Milan*, p. 60; Tonelli, *Investire*, p. 103.

offered other forms of participation, too. In 1662, the Banco di Sant’Ambrogio, Milan’s public bank, was about to crash, with its major debtors, including the city of Milan, unable to service their debts accrued during decades of war and the bank unable to pay out interests to its creditors, including Milan’s growing merchant community.²¹⁴³ In response, Ponce de León appointed representatives of the merchant-banking dynasties, such as Giovan Pietro Arbona, to the oversight committee (*congregazione*) that was to avert the bank’s economic collapse.²¹⁴⁴ In addition to this hands-on measures, Ponce de León dished out symbolic rewards, such as when he ordered the Senate to revise the rules that had hitherto applied to the ennoblement of merchants, essentially fast-tracking the nobilitation of particularly meritorious traders.²¹⁴⁵ While this drew the ire of Milan’s patriciate, the representatives of the most powerful families in Milan, including the Borromeo, seem to have been supportive of that measure, understanding as they did that this group needed to be offered a new stake in the system lest they abandon the ruling consensus.²¹⁴⁶

Though fully on board with Ponce de León’s policies, Federico went much further, reaching out not just to eminent bankers but small traders as well. He had had been the first to alert Giovanni to the revolutionary potential of the “gente buona e savia,” and now that they had been let down by his brother, he was desperate to make at least a token concession to this section of society. To accomplish this, he accepted the lowest common denominator of what had once been a sweeping reformist program narrowing the quest for change down to curbing a particular form of patronage: the granting of religious asylum by members of the clergy. Seemingly responding to the clamoring for good governance, he sluiced it toward a minimalistic law-and-order agenda.²¹⁴⁷ Crime had repeatedly been signaled as a major obstacle to smooth trade, and, as his singling out of crimes against property made plain, Borromeo intuited that to guarantee order was to ensure that traders did not side with other elements that might revolt against the unreformed rule of a self-seeking elite.²¹⁴⁸

If what happened in Naples is any indication, the ploy seemed to work. In southern Italy, the jurisdictional conflicts elicited enormous interest among the educated population, leading to a proliferation of newspapers and the formation of an early incarnation of a public sphere. One of the most influential pundits at the time, Innocenzo Fuidoro, commented that the people of Naples had seen “gran cose per la guerra civile del Regno e per quelle di tanti anni fatte tra le due Corone e con altri precipi d’Italia,” which had duly been serviced by “appassionati novellieri e gazzettari.” As they eased into the post-war settlement, many would not let go of their “infame curiosità” and were

²¹⁴³ Canosa, *Milano nel Seicento*, p. 206; Faccini, *La Lombardia*, pp. 75, 108.

²¹⁴⁴ Carlo Francesco Gorani, *Libro di memorie, nel quale si fa annotazione delle cose più considerevoli che succedono alla giornata*: BNE, ms. 2671, ff. 22v, 45r; Malcolm, *Luis Ponce de León*; Signorotto, *Milano spagnola*, pp. 289–290.

²¹⁴⁵ Tonelli, *Investire con profitto*, pp. 100–101.

²¹⁴⁶ Maravall, *La cultura*, p. 72. Also see Collins, *Classes*, pp. 258–259.

²¹⁴⁷ See Jemolo, *Stato e Chiesa*, chap. 8.

²¹⁴⁸ D’Amico, *Spanish Milan*, p. 82; Collins, *Classes*, pp. 17–20.

eager to “sapere le novelle di quelle cose che passano tra regi et ecclesiastici di jurisdizione.”²¹⁴⁹ As the authorities proceeded to arrest criminals in churches, Fuidoro cheered them on for suppressing what he viewed as dens of crime.²¹⁵⁰ As the spectacular *Grands Jours* over in France had demonstrated, the defanging of an unruly nobility could help establish the monarchy as the guarantor of order.²¹⁵¹ In Spanish Italy, the campaign against priests in cahoots with common criminals similarly cemented the monarchy’s popular appeal, paving the way for establishment of what Antonio Álvarez-Ossorio has called a “monarquía judicial” in which a “gobierno de los jueces” ensured stability akin to France’s robe nobility.²¹⁵²

The parallels with developments in France are remarkable. In Brittany, social upheavals had marred much of the early seventeenth century and in their wake the nobility and merchants were fast developing a consciousness of their shared interest in the preservation of the established order which both legitimized existing inequalities and promised much-sought stability.²¹⁵³ To quote Patrick Collins, “Contemporary elites accepted the king’s absolute ability to make law because they believed it guaranteed order, that is, both property and inequality.”²¹⁵⁴ In the Spanish monarchy, a similar realization seemed to be maturing among some members of its elite, Federico Borromeo chief among them. By turning to the monarchy to impose order from above, he hoped to impose the kind of stability that had gone missing in the crisis of the monarchy. If the baroque state was, as Barbara Stollberg-Rilinger has contended, a strategy to address the “fundamental tension between ideal order and factual disorder,” Federico’s handling was a prime example of its smooth management.²¹⁵⁵

Indeed, what Federico tried to bring into being through the moral panic surrounding a criminal clergy was the old alliance between the established nobility and merchants that Giovanni had first tried to forge through patronage. With that mode of coalition building discredited, Federico tried to rally the *ceto civile* behind him on the symbolic issue of the prevention of crime. By boiling a complex reformist agenda down to jurisdictional issues, Federico transposed the debate over patronage to the symbolic level where the Borromeo were free to make concessions without imperiling the system itself. What Giuseppe Galasso has written of the reformist movement in Naples in the 1660s is equally true of the *ceto civile* in Milan, “i contrasti giurisdizionali di questi anni erano pur sempre stati l’unico terreno sul quale si erano potute riversare le energie delle forze che, dopo le vicende del decennio precedente, rimanevano sulla scena napoletana ancora vitali.”²¹⁵⁶ Federico’s role in the settlement of the jurisdictional conflicts in Milan was an impressive example of how the

²¹⁴⁹ Quoted in Galasso, *Napoli spagnola*, p. 70.

²¹⁵⁰ Mrozek, *Ascanio Filomarino*, p. 257.

²¹⁵¹ Beik, *Absolutism; on the Grands Jours*, see Greenshields, *An Economy*, p. 228.

²¹⁵² Álvarez-Ossorio, *La república*, p. 49.

²¹⁵³ Collins, *Classes*, pp. 1–2, 249.

²¹⁵⁴ Collins, *Classes*, p. 15.

²¹⁵⁵ Stollberg-Rilinger, *The Baroque State*, unpag.

²¹⁵⁶ Galasso, *Napoli spagnola*, p. 70.

governing elite of the seventeenth century leveraged arguments from social movements to defeat them.

Even more crucially, however, the issue of law and order helped redeem the Borromeo in the eyes of the ruling elite in Madrid who had ejected Giovanni Borromeo from their ranks. With the advent of the new service ideology in the latter half of the seventeenth century, power could no longer be secured through greed. Under the new dispensation, good service meant good government, whose backbone was the administration of justice. To restore God's good order, it was necessary to thwart the elements within society that stood ready to unsettle it.²¹⁵⁷ Unlike Litta, Federico Borromeo understood that the preservation of the nobility's power rode on this issue. The perpetuation of his position as a preeminent member of the Milanese society of gentlemen was predicated on his ability to pass off the preservation of his family's social position as a contribution to the common good. To pacify the *ceto civile*, a crucial ally in the family's bid to stay on top, he reinvented himself as a champion of law and order. It was a small price to pay when so much more had been on the line, for this promised to be a way for the Borromeo finally to live up to the self-ascribed task of preserving the common good and guaranteeing good government while leaving the foundations of their power intact. Borromeo's fight for the settlement of the jurisdictional conflicts in Milan helped defuse the last lingering doubts about his place at the top of the imperial hierarchy.

²¹⁵⁷ Fosi, *Papal Justice*, p. 2.

Chapter 12

In Search of Good Government: Federico Borromeo and the Reinvention of the Spanish Monarchy

The only surviving portrait of Federico Borromeo was painted by the Flemish artist Jacob Ferdinand Voet (1639–1689) shortly after Federico’s elevation to the cardinalate on December 26, 1670. The conferring of the red hat marked the end point of a belated rise to the upper echelons of the ecclesiastical hierarchy. It was not wholly unexpected. After decades in the doldrums, Federico had been promoted to the nunciature in Madrid, which was informally known as “il cardinalato di chi non può essere cardinale,” before Clement X appointed him secretary of state and cardinal.²¹⁵⁸ By early 1671 he was at the height of his influence, championing the *diacatholicon* ideology as one of the Altieri pontiff’s closest collaborators in the Apostolic Palace. The Voet portrait exuded how Borromeo wished others to see him: as a courtier with aplomb and a conscientious official of the papacy who, quill in hand, was ever-ready to put his expertise in the service of the alliance between the papacy and the Catholic monarchy that he had helped foster. Capitalizing on the contacts he had made in Madrid, Borromeo used his new role in the curia to deepen his involvement with the inner circle of the Spanish governing elite with which he was by now inextricably bound up.

In fact, his lavish lifestyle as cardinal-secretary of state in Rome made clear that he was as much a papal servant as he was a subject of the king of Spain. Upon his return from Madrid, he had brought with him a host of treasures hauled from across the seas that gestured to his strong identification with Spain’s global empire. His collection of exotic animals included race horses from Iberia, parrots from Latin America, and a number of predatory felines that evoked Spain’s links to Asia. Betraying contemporaries’ interest in *Wunderkammer* steeped with objects from outside Europe, the tiny apartment Federico inhabited in the Quirinal palace was crammed with objects hinting at the Spanish monarchy’s global span: his cabinet of curiosities included ivory lamps and gilded statues of black boys (*moretti*) from Africa, as well as two flasks made from “Indian” gourd, presumably from Latin America.²¹⁵⁹ This was a secretary of state deeply committed to the well-being of the Spanish monarchy and its overseas empire, and one who would make his influence felt as the monarchy crept out of the crisis it had been thrown into in the 1640s.

The last stage of Federico Borromeo’s career in Madrid and Rome was the most revealing sign yet of the intertwining of Spanish and Roman interests in his trajectory. As I have argued throughout this part of the thesis, the courts of Rome and Madrid were communicating vessels: the accomplishments in one center of power boosted noblemen’s standing in the other.²¹⁶⁰ The

²¹⁵⁸ The dictum is attributed to Camillo Caetani. See Visceglia, *Roma papale e Spagna*, p. 55.

²¹⁵⁹ On *Wunderkammer* in contemporary Rome, most notably that of Borromeo’s patrons, the Chigi, see Karsten, *Künstler und Kardinäle*, pp. 217–220. On Federico’s possessions, see Galli and Monferrini, *I Borromeo*, p. 33.

²¹⁶⁰ Bravo Lozano, *A berretta*. Also see Visceglia, *Roma papale e Spagna*, pp. 99–100.



Fig. 5: Jacob Ferdinand Voet, *Ritratto del cardinale Federico IV Borromeo o il giovane*, 1670, oil on canvas, Milan, Pinacoteca Ambrosiana (Galli and Monferrini, *I Borromeo d'Angera*, p. 70)

representatives of the leading Italian families knew that acquiring a cardinal's hat could secure them advantages in Spain as well.²¹⁶¹ A diarist in Milan noted in the 1660s that a family cleric's "buoni favori in Roma" could help deepen a clan's relationship with the court of Madrid.²¹⁶² In fact, high-profile roles in papal diplomacy were often crucial to increasing a family's visibility in the court of Madrid. Given the papacy's global projection, family cardinals were often in a better position to advance dynastic interests outside the narrow confines of a clan's place of origin, something that was particularly true of families from Spanish Italy.²¹⁶³ Thanks to select appointments—most notably to the nunciature in the court of Madrid—they were able to build rapport with the Spanish governing

²¹⁶¹ Spagnoletti, *Le dinastie italiane*, pp. 271–294. On the centrality of Rome for the reproductive strategies of Italian dynasties, see Osborne, *The House of Savoy*.

²¹⁶² Quoted in Signorotto, *La politica*, pp. 324–325.

²¹⁶³ Ago, *Carriere*, p. 42; eadem, *Giovani nobili*, p. 403.

elite, with some even joining it as honorary members.²¹⁶⁴ In the absence of major military conflicts in the peninsula in the late seventeenth century, families from Spanish Italy increasingly availed themselves of this ecclesiastical route to power.²¹⁶⁵

The career of Federico Borromeo studied here provides a particularly eloquent example of the successful use of Church resources by a family from Spanish Italy intent on securing social advancement in the Spanish empire. Thanks to his appointments as nuncio in Madrid and secretary of state, Federico became an integral part of the imperial elite to which his brother had been denied access, allowing him for a limited amount of time to shape the future of the monarchy. The goals he pursued remained dictated by the priorities of his clan, and their desire to solve the contradiction at the heart of their strategy of dynastic affirmation. Building on his reputation as a man of law and order, Federico employed improved and more refined governing techniques to act as a handmaiden to the reinvention of the Spanish monarchy in the late 1660s and the 1670s as it sought to reemerge as a major European power.

Federico's experience in the notoriously volatile Roman court and his long years in Switzerland shaped an approach to power that turned out to be particularly well suited to the new climate in the court of Spain after the fall of the last minister-favorite, the count of Haro, and the transition to rule by a noble oligarchy. Having been inducted to the Roman curia with its frequent about-turns, he was well prepared to pick up signals of shifts in power relations and to adapt accordingly. His time in Switzerland prepared him to make concessions to demands for more popular involvement in the administration of the commonwealth. Vanquishing his lifelong apprehension of the populace, Federico came to realize that by resorting to surreptitiousness he would be able to forestall the perceived deleterious effects of popular participation in government. As a member of the clergy he could play a role in the reinvention of the Spanish monarchy, most notably its overtures to wider sections of the population which he had initiated in his work on ecclesiastical privileges in Spanish Italy, while it also granted him the power to defuse the threat that this posed to his family's status as subjects of the king of Spain. Both during and after his stay in Madrid, Federico was instrumental to redefining the monarchy so as to make it at once more responsive to the aspirations of ordinary people and cement a tiny elite's hold on power.

Federico's search for good governance sheds new light on historiographical debates about the nature of monarchical government in the late seventeenth century. Much has been written about the rise of the baroque state, with historians typically pointing out that the actions of the ruling elites often fell far short of the "grandiose schemes" that they elaborated.²¹⁶⁶ The resulting gap

²¹⁶⁴ Sodano, *Da baroni del Regno*, pp. 42–44.

²¹⁶⁵ Sodano, *Da baroni del Regno*, pp. 24, 85–88; Papagna, *Sogni e bisogni*, p. 132.

²¹⁶⁶ Campbell, *Power and Politics*, p. 4. Also see Horowski, *Die Belagerung*, pp. 38, 42.

was bridged in various ways, with dissimulation and secrecy becoming indispensable as techniques of rule.²¹⁶⁷ Peter Campbell in his work on the French monarchy has gone so far as to draw a direct link between the failure of the ruled to live up to their own standards and the “flamboyant display” of power that are often associated with the age: in his reading, the latter was a “*trompe l’oeil*” that, intentionally or not, distracted from the fact that the early modern “state was a socio-political entity, whose structures were interwoven with society, which it tried to rise above but with which it inevitably had to compromise.”²¹⁶⁸ Persuasive as his argument is, Campbell fails to account for the perceived need of such intricate misrecognitions.

This chapter maintains that the contradiction between aspiration and reality came to be perceived as problematic because elites had been alerted to the discrepancy between words and actions. The example of Federico Borromeo reveals that in the aftermath of the challenge to established power in the 1640s and 1650s, elites became ever more conscious of the need to separate public policy from personal strategy, and the way to achieve this was by bolstering what anthropologist James Scott has referred to as the hidden transcript.²¹⁶⁹ The expansion of popular participation in government fostered a need for offstage spaces where privilege could continue unabated despite public declamations to the contrary. Such had been the change wrought by the popular movements of the mid-seventeenth century: elites were now compelled into adopting intricate mechanisms to shield practices that contravened the public transcript centered on a commitment to the restoration of the commonwealth. It was this operation, I submit, that brought about the rise of the baroque state, an artefact “designed to counter the ubiquitous political chaos” in a society governed by personal networks and favoritism.²¹⁷⁰

The difficulties started piling up as soon as Federico Borromeo reached Madrid in 1668. As if the jurisdictional conflicts in Italy had not been enough of a headache, the internal turmoil of the Spanish monarchy posed an even more grievous problem. Three years earlier, Philip IV, the only monarch Borromeo had any recollection of, had passed away. He had left the Spanish empire in the hands of his second wife and cousin, Mariana of Austria (1634–1696), who was to shepherd it through a regency that was to last until the heir apparent, Charles II (1661–1700), turned fourteen. Although she had received some education in government, Mariana struggled to keep the monarchy together due to a combination of inexperience and misogynist opposition to her rule.²¹⁷¹ Philip IV, alive to this eventuality, had drawn up contingency plans for a special committee, the so-called *junta*,

²¹⁶⁷ Snyder, *Dissimulation*; Villari, *Elogio*.

²¹⁶⁸ Campbell, *Power and Politics*, p. 4.

²¹⁶⁹ Scott, *Domination*.

²¹⁷⁰ Stollberg-Rilinger, *The Baroque State*, unpag.

²¹⁷¹ Oliván, *Mariana de Austria*, part II, chap. 1.

which would advise the queen regent. Its members included such illustrious names as Gaspar de Bracamonte y Guzmán, the count of Peñaranda, who had served in Naples and Vienna and now presided the Council of State, and Pascual de Aragón, the elder brother of Pedro, who had served the monarch as ambassador in Rome and viceroy in Naples.²¹⁷²

Comprising the major exponents of all the important Spanish houses, the junta compounded the tendency toward rule by a tiny oligarchy that had become apparent after the eclipse of the last minister-favorite in the late 1650s.²¹⁷³ Having emerged victorious from the melee that followed Haro's occlusion, the new governing elite formed a noble collective who saw themselves as being in charge of the empire's future.²¹⁷⁴ They were well aware that this rule by oligarchy was an insufficient guarantor of stability. As one contemporary pamphletist described the arrangement, "porque siendo imposible en lo humano y constitución actual hallar modo y personas que conspirasen al mayor bien, se consiguiese el menor mal."²¹⁷⁵ To outside observers, the monarchy seemed rudderless, in the hands of a queen mother obviously out of her depth and a nobility running amok. The Venetian ambassador to Madrid predicted "discapiti e conseguenze non meno per la Spagna che per il rimanente d'Europa minacciose e fatali" as a result of the "pestifero seme d'affetti privati che ha preso possesso e profunduta radice nelle viscere principali del governo politico."²¹⁷⁶ Modern historians agree, with the most authoritative of them concluding, "By the late seventeenth century Spain was probably the only west European country to be so completely and unquestionably under the control of its titled aristocracy."²¹⁷⁷ Although they went to considerable lengths to misrecognize their rule as that of an aristocratic elite, the oligarchical tendency were hard to miss.

This small elite was keen to foreclose the rise of another nobleman concentrating all power in his hands, as had been the case with successive royal favorites in the first half of the century.²¹⁷⁸ The man who had the best shot at copying their success was, ironically enough, the latest addition to the junta, a man whom many regarded as outside the in-crowd. When one of the members appointed by Philip IV died in 1666, the queen regent had nominated her confessor, Johann Eberhard Nithard (1607–1681), to the junta. A Jesuit father, Nithard had tutored Mariana as a child and chaperoned her to Madrid when she was married to Philip IV in 1649. The difficult early years of her wedding when she was unable to produce a much-needed heir to the throne welded her closer to her former tutor who now acted as her confessor.²¹⁷⁹ It was therefore natural for her to turn to this trusted confidant when she was unexpectedly put in charge of a global empire. To formalize his role,

²¹⁷² Zorzi, *Relazione di Spagna*, pp. 340–342.

²¹⁷³ See Oliván, *Mariana de Austria*, pp. 61–63; on the origins of this development, see Martínez Hernández, *La cámara*.

²¹⁷⁴ On these debates, see Carrasco, *Los grandes*, part. p. 82.

²¹⁷⁵ Quoted in Ruiz Rodríguez, *Don Juan José*, p. 260.

²¹⁷⁶ Bellegno, *Relazione di Spagna*, p. 364.

²¹⁷⁷ Kamen, *Spain*, p. 226.

²¹⁷⁸ Novo Zaballos, *De confesor*, pp. 781, 790.

²¹⁷⁹ Oliván, *Mariana de Austria*, p. 83.

Nithard was appointed Inquisitor General and became a member of the junta, eliciting the ire of some members of the established nobility who feared that the confessor would morph into a new *valido* capable of gutting their power.²¹⁸⁰

It remains debatable whether Nithard could have attained the same clout as Lerma or Olivares. Unlike the more prominent minister-favorites of the first half of the seventeenth century, Nithard was not recognized as a member of the Castilian nobility whose representatives regarded him as a German interloper usurping Castilian power to the detriment of the common good.²¹⁸¹ (Nithard had only become a member of the junta after a shady naturalization process that was rammed through to short-circuit a stipulation in Philip IV's testament that excluded "extraños de estos reinos" from posts in government.²¹⁸²) In fact, some of the confessor's fiercest enemies hailed from the group who would have to rally behind a new *valido*. These included members of the junta such as the count of Peñaranda and Pascual de Aragón. Other opponents were a number of influential noblemen such as Luis Guillén Moncada, a Sicilian aristocrat who was a prominent member of the Council of State, a body that sought to outstrip the junta in the power vacuum that Philip IV's passing had left behind.²¹⁸³

Not only did Nithard lack the recognition as a *primus inter pares* among the governing elite, the other path to power—that of a close bond with the ruler—was equally barred. He may have won the trust of the queen regent but if this had once been an advantage, a close relationship with the sovereign could easily become a liability post-Lerma (see chapter 3). Nithard's opponents were determined to turn his only asset against him. Hence, rumors surfaced in the court that the confessor frequented the queen in private, speaking to her in German and "comiendo en su real presencia sentado y cubierto, entrando tal vez en lo más interior de su retrete."²¹⁸⁴ Resorting to sexual innuendo, anti-Nithard propagandists began to evoke the specter of cardinal Mazarin, his evil influence on the regent of France, and the turmoil that had ensued during the Fronde.²¹⁸⁵ Not content with warnings of impending doom, the same elite conglomerate actively fomented opposition to the confessor. By December 1668, they were actively conspiring to dislodge Nithard. The Council of State under Moncada ruled that Nithard should be asked to leave the court, and the junta followed suit.²¹⁸⁶ By late 1668, the presence of an illegitimate minister-favorite had eroded the

²¹⁸⁰ Contreras, Carlos II, p. 93; Álvarez-Ossorio, *El favor real*, p. 394.

²¹⁸¹ Carrasco, *Los grandes*, pp. 96–97. These arguments had earlier been deployed against Mazarin in France, see Benigno, Specchi, p. 142.

²¹⁸² Contreras, Carlos II, p. 93.

²¹⁸³ On Aragón, see Carrió-Invernizzi, *El gobierno*.

²¹⁸⁴ Quoted in Contreras, Carlos II, p. 101.

²¹⁸⁵ Oliván, Mariana de Austira, p. 88; Reinhardt, *Voices*, p. 341.

²¹⁸⁶ Oliván, Mariana de Austria, p. 215.

traditional fragmentation of the Spanish nobility who was forming a coherent social bloc against the foreign parvenu in Madrid.²¹⁸⁷

Unable to see eye to eye on a candidate from their own ranks, the Spanish grandees fled into the arms of the underage king's stepbrother, Juan José of Austria. Born in 1629 as the son of Philip IV and the popular actress María Calderón (also known as La Calderona), Charles II's half-brother harbored more than a few grievances against the regency. He had been recognized as Philip's bastard from early on and received an excellent education that primed him for military roles in the hotspots of the monarchy.²¹⁸⁸ During the crisis of the 1640s, he made a name for himself as a man of peace. After suppressing the revolt in Naples at the tender age of 18, he resolved the conflicts in Sicily and went on to reintegrate rebellious Catalonia into the monarchy in 1652.²¹⁸⁹ To round off his achievements, he became viceroy of the Spanish Netherlands from 1656 through 1659 and in 1661 he was promoted commander of the forces in charge of recapturing the last rebellious province, Portugal (as luck would have it, the rout of that campaign and Spain's formal recognition of Portugal's independence in 1668 happened long after Juan José had handed over the command to his successor).²¹⁹⁰ He was, by all accounts, a vital asset to Philip IV. Yet, if he expected some form of recognition from his father, Philip, anxious about Juan José's shaky relationship with the queen regent, did not even deign to mention him in his testament.²¹⁹¹ Locked out of government, Juan José was growing impatient with Nithard who he saw as a usurper of a place that was rightfully his as a blood relative of the king in waiting.

Juan José's profile appealed to the high nobility who wanted to replace Nithard.²¹⁹² As a member of the royal family, he could lay claim to a prominent role in the government of the Spanish monarchy which tied in nicely with the common good ideology of the ruling class. As we have seen in chapter 8, the debates on the commonwealth at midcentury had severed the king from the nobility in the imagination of both elites and commoners. While nobles were thought to be pursuing particular interests, often to the detriment of everyone else, the royal family in the social imaginary stood above the fray of factional infighting, embodying the collective good.²¹⁹³ Mimicking the rhetoric of France's Louis XIV, Juan José, as a member of the royal family, preened himself as a disinterested servant of all the king's subjects. As he himself put it, unlike earlier favorites from the ranks of Castilian nobility, he, as a component of the ruling dynasty, had no "hijos que acomodar,

²¹⁸⁷ Álvarez-Ossorio, *El favor real*, p. 395.

²¹⁸⁸ On Juan José, see Kamen, *Spain*, pp. 329–330.

²¹⁸⁹ See Ruiz Rodríguez, *Don Juan José*, chaps. 2–3.

²¹⁹⁰ Ruiz Rodríguez, *Don Juan José*, chaps. 4–5.

²¹⁹¹ Ruiz Rodríguez, *Don Juan José*, pp. 243–246.

²¹⁹² Contreras, *Carlos II*, p. 97.

²¹⁹³ See Burke, *The Fabrication*, pp. 9–10.

parientes que beneficiar, casas que hacer o a quién emular.”²¹⁹⁴ To a power elite increasingly concerned with optics, it seemed reasonable to assign the future king’s closest male relative a leading role in the oligarchy. In the Venetian ambassador’s estimation, the Castilian nobility used him, a “principe tanto interessato di sangue col re,” as a “scudo contro i colpi del gesuita” who was inflicting “mille ingiustizie al più illustre e chiaro sangue di Spagna.”²¹⁹⁵

Like the rest of Nithard’s opponents, Juan José realized that the coup against Nithard would be efficacious only if he and the heads of household behind him succeeded in portraying this as an act to restore a commonwealth under attack. To build consensus, Juan José launched a propaganda effort to sway public opinion in favor of his assessment.²¹⁹⁶ Such campaigns had been waged before, of course, but, unlike on the eve of Olivares’s fall, the authors of the manuscripts that circulated against Nithard no longer remained anonymous. More crucially still, they appealed to an imagined public that went beyond court society. As one representative of the *ceto civile* in Spanish Naples noted, the crisis of the monarchy had drawn many an ordinary subject to “deluding and fantasizing,” which, worryingly enough, had “turned the people into princes, the ignorant into experts, the simpletons into sages, and the obedient into disobedient.”²¹⁹⁷ Alive to this nascent public sphere, Juan José and his allies among the high nobility understood that, in order to pursue their ambitions, they needed to remodel the monarchy so as to make it seem more responsive to the needs of an engaged public. Their success was contingent on the ability to turn a feud within the elite into a “cause publique et affaire d’État” which was of interest to a wider public outside the court.²¹⁹⁸ In their campaign against Nithard they therefore paid lip-service to ideas of the common good and provided ordinary subjects with a sense of empowerment that would encourage them to view the battle against the confessor as more than factional bickering, spurring them to join the movement. Mobilizing legitimations of justified resistance, Nithard was cast as a public enemy who posed a danger to the integrity of the monarchy, whereas Juan José was self-consciously portrayed as the spokesman of all Spaniards suffering under the yoke of the confessor’s misrule.²¹⁹⁹ Deliberately toying with what David Parker has called ordinary subjects’ “sad faith in the capacity of the king to save them from their oppressors,” Juan José styled himself as that blood relative of the monarch who could restore justice after it had been ravaged by a regent hoodwinked by her evil confessor.²²⁰⁰

Juan José’s framing of his and his cronies’ aspirations fell on receptive ears. Spain was reeling from an economic slump. The Venetian ambassador reported that the monarchy’s debts were so

²¹⁹⁴ Quoted in Contreras, Carlos II, p. 97.

²¹⁹⁵ Bellegno, Relazione di Spagna, p. 362.

²¹⁹⁶ Hermant, Guerres.

²¹⁹⁷ Quoted in Parker, Global Crisis, p. 571.

²¹⁹⁸ Hermant, Guerres, p. 23.

²¹⁹⁹ Reinhardt, Voices of Conscience, p. 341; Hermant, Guerres, pp. 3, 18, 47.

²²⁰⁰ Parker, Class and State, p. 102; Hermant, Guerres, p. 51; Contreras, Carlos II, p. 101.

high, they ate up “buona parte di quell’alimento che dovrebbe nutrire la mole vasta della monarchia di cui viene spolpata.”²²⁰¹ Petitions sent to the junta in Madrid deplored the “miserable estado de esta Monarquía,” informing the governing elite of large swathes of uncultivated land and depopulated villages as the poor moved to towns and cities where they were forced into begging.²²⁰² As in Spanish Italy, many attributed the breakdown of the social order to a loss of faith, whose precipitant was, among other things, the clergy’s collusion with criminal elements.²²⁰³ Invoking widespread beliefs about dangerous priests, the rampant lawlessness was skillfully linked to the fact that the monarchy’s future was in the hands of a depraved Jesuit.²²⁰⁴ As Federico Borromeo, the new nuncio in the Spanish court, astutely observed of the bastard’s demagoguery, Juan José was exploiting “la naturale sofferenza di questa Povertà” to raise hopes that he could be the “restauratore della Corona.”²²⁰⁵

Reflecting these proclivities, commoners were invited actively to participate in the assault on Nithard through a letter campaign. Juan José initiated it in Catalonia, where he was still revered for putting a non-violent end to the rebellion in the principality in 1652. From Barcelona Juan José late in 1668 asked for Nithard’s immediate removal from power and departure from Spain.²²⁰⁶ Drawing support from municipalities across Spain, he animated communities to petition the queen regent and members of the junta to add heft to his demands. Initially cautious, many cities soon overcame their trepidation, effectively creating a public sphere in which the future of single representatives of the monarchy was, for the first time, up for debate. Still, for all the engagement it afforded, the intervention remained centered on Juan José who was careful to use it as an instrument to buy social peace. The bastard styled himself as the only one who could save commoners from their predicament. Borromeo inadvertently gave a succinct summary of this project when he described his supporters as “Popoli [who] attendono d’esser per mezzo suo liberati da un tal Ministro di mal Governo.”²²⁰⁷ Many took him up on the offer. At the beginning of January 1669, a letter was found nailed to the door of the cathedral sacristy in Spain’s second-largest city, Granada, whose anonymous authors vowed to support the “just claims” of Juan José, who they described as “moved at seeing the oppression of these poor subjects” of the monarchy, and warned that Juan José’s detractors would end up with their heads cut off and stuck on battlements “as a warning to others” if they did not “act justly and support his cause.”²²⁰⁸

²²⁰¹ Contarini, *Relazione di Spagna*, pp. 387–388.

²²⁰² Contreras, *Carlos II*, p. 94.

²²⁰³ Contreras, *Carlos II*, p. 95.

²²⁰⁴ Reinhardt, *Voices of Conscience*, p. 340.

²²⁰⁵ Federico Borromeo to Decio Azzolini, Madrid March 30, 1669: ASV, Segr. Stato, Spagna, vol. 138, f. 258r.

²²⁰⁶ Kamen, *Spain*, p. 333.

²²⁰⁷ Federico Borromeo to Decio Azzolini, Madrid March 6, 1669: ASV, Segr. Stato, Spagna, vol. 138, f. 165v.

²²⁰⁸ Quoted in Kamen, *Spain*, p. 334.

Promising ordinary subjects a stake in the future of the monarchy, this campaign ideologically prepared the ground for a military coup against Nithard.²²⁰⁹ It seemed to work. Betraying his top-down approach, Juan José had spent the fall of 1668 recruiting a private army, and when it finally set in motion, the bastard was met with enthusiasm along the route from Barcelona to Madrid by people who recognized him as powerful enough to jolt the system. As the papal nuncio reported to his principals, Juan José was “complimentato, e con straord[inari]e dimostrationi di cordialità, et ossequio per molta strada accompagnato da quella Nobiltà, e Popolo.”²²¹⁰ Many must have felt that the ruling elite had finally heard their voice.

By early January 1669 Juan José’s army had reached Torrejón de Ardoz. From his haunt outside Madrid, the bastard openly challenged the queen regent, threatening to attack Madrid if she did not dismiss Nithard. On February 24, 1669, Juan José issued an ultimatum, warning that if the confessor did not leave the royal palace “through the door,” he would make sure that he did so “through the window.”²²¹¹ It remains doubtful whether this really was, as Henry Kamen argued some time ago, the “first modern military revolt (the Spanish word is *pronunciamiento*) against the central government” in an age when the latter was little more than the conglomerate of elites who had captured it.²²¹² What is certainly true, though, is that Juan José was the first *caudillo*, a military man embarking on a coup as a self-proclaimed representative of the collective interests against a corrupt administration. In that sense his was perhaps really the “first attempt in Spanish history to stir up mass popular support, on a nation-wide scale, for a particular man and party.”²²¹³

Having made it to Madrid the summer prior, Federico Borromeo watched all this from the sidelines. The image of a cunning elite cynically playing with the emotions of the populace must have awakened uncomfortable memories from his time in Switzerland. Historians have only just begun to study how early experiences shaped the political work of nuncios and cardinals.²²¹⁴ In Borromeo’s case, it seems undeniable that the decade he had spent in the Confederacy inflected his assessment of the crisis of the Spanish monarchy after the death of Philip IV. To him, the parallels between Juan José’s campaign and the events he had witnessed in Switzerland must have been striking. When posted in Lucerne in the 1650s, Federico Borromeo had seen first-hand how the elites of the Catholic cantons in central Switzerland deliberately mobilized popular resentment against rivals, unleashing the “turba inesplicable” against a well-respected nobleman close to the house of Habsburg, Sebastian

²²⁰⁹ Hermant, *Guerres*, p. 3.

²²¹⁰ Federico Borromeo to Decio Azzolini, Madrid February 9, 1669: ASV, Segr. Stato, Spagna, vol. 138, f. 94r.

²²¹¹ Federico Borromeo to Decio Azzolini, Madrid March 6, 1669: ASV, Segr. Stato, Spagna, vol. 138, f. 165r; Novo Zaballos, *De confesor*, p. 765.

²²¹² Henry Kamen, *Spain’s First Caudillo*, p. 585.

²²¹³ Kamen, *Spain’s First Caudillo*, p. 586.

²²¹⁴ See Rivero Rodríguez, *A Peace in Context*.

Peregrin Zwyer von Evibach.²²¹⁵ As events unfolded, they confirmed Borromeo's long-held belief that popular involvement in politics was, at best, a messy affair and, at worst, a fiasco for the small section of society he saw as the natural rulers. As he had come to believe on the back of his experiences in Naples in the 1640s, such experiments usually ended with "genti che non tutte conoscono il suo bene" wanting to "far romore senza causa."²²¹⁶ If they had their way, "l'instabilità, e la torbidezza de genij, la vehemenza delle private passioni, e l'inconsiderati procedimenti" would prevail.²²¹⁷ Thus in early 1669, Borromeo feared that the Spanish monarchy might be going down the same slippery slope. As he informed the secretary of state in Rome, "si può dubitare, che ad essemplio di Catalogna che segue il Sig[nor]e D[on] Gio[vanni] con tutta dipendenza, anco altri Regni si dichiarino per il suo partito non ostante che qui si lusinghino à creder in contrario, che Dio voglia sia con fondam[en]to."²²¹⁸ In what had all the appearances of a rerun of the 1640s, the monarchy was once again unspooling, but this time not because of the impertinent populace but because of a cynical elite who had given in to the temptation of demagoguery.

Frightening as it had been, his time in republican Switzerland had taught Borromeo that papal diplomats were in a unique position to preserve order when local elites opportunistically rose the rabble for their own narrow ends. When he realized that the local patriciates were going to go through with their subversive actions "senza altra consideratione del pericolo, che sovrasta alla Republica," he activated his own secret diplomacy to move Zwyer out of the firing line and to defend what he, in the language of the time, saw as vital "interests," interests imperiled by the "passions" of political dilettantes.²²¹⁹ Such a reading of events was, of course, influenced by Diego de Saavedra, whose *Politico-Christian Prince* Borromeo might have read in its Milanese edition of 1642.²²²⁰ In that treatise, Saavedra had famously characterized republics as systemically unstable because of the factionalism resulting from what he deemed mob rule.²²²¹ Amidst a storm of passions, prudence was the one quality that lifted good administrators above the masses and made it imperative for them to act in the name of what contemporaries referred to as the common interest.²²²² As Borromeo understood it, those in the know sometimes had to "operar sottomano."²²²³ As his closest confidant, the Spanish resident in Switzerland had assured him that it was sometimes commendable to "tirare il

²²¹⁵ Borromeo to Rospigliosi, Lucerne July 20, 1656: ASV, Segr. Stato, Svizzera, vol. 50, f. 21r. For an in-depth analysis of the Zwyer affair, see Weber, *Ein Verteidiger*.

²²¹⁶ Federico IV to Giovanna Cesi, Lucerne June 6, 1656: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, *Corrispondenza 1656–1665*; Borromeo to Rospigliosi, Lucerne July 13, 1656: ASV, Segr. Stato, Svizzera, vol. 50, f. 12r.

²²¹⁷ Federico IV to Giovanna Cesi, Lucerne June 6, 1656: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, *Corrispondenza 1656–1665*; Borromeo to Rospigliosi, Lucerne July 13, 1656: ASV, Segr. Stato, Svizzera, vol. 50, f. 12r.

²²¹⁸ Federico Borromeo to Decio Azzolino, Madrid January 5, 1669: ASV, Segr. Stato, Spagna, vol. 138, f. 12r.

²²¹⁹ Borromeo to Rospigliosi, Lucerne December 9, 1658: ASV, Segr. Stato, Svizzera, vol. 52, f. 393v. On the rhetoric and its function in the self-affirmation of an elite under attack, see Weber, *Ein Verteidiger*, pp. 58–59.

²²²⁰ Snyder, *Dissimulation*, p. 141.

²²²¹ Bireley, *The Counter-Reformation Prince*, p. 197.

²²²² Bireley, *The Counter-Reformation Prince*, p. 201.

²²²³ Borromeo to Rospigliosi, Lucerne July 13, 1656: ASV, Segr. Stato, Svizzera, vol. 50, f. 12r.

sasso e nascondere la mano.”²²²⁴ In an age of unprecedented public scrutiny of the mighty, governance needed to become more manipulative: “carácter dirigista y carácter masivo,” as José Antonio Maravall phrases it, were two sides of the same coin.²²²⁵ This lesson he now applied to Spain. The prestige he enjoyed as a member of the clergy and a papal envoy allowed him to outmaneuver the official channels of local politics and use negotiations behind closed doors to prevent the populace from wreaking irreparable damage to the well-ordered society.

Late in December 1668 Borromeo had asked pope Clement IX for authorization to defuse the storm that was brewing. Little did he know that Juan José had previously sought the pope’s approval for his march on Madrid. In a letter to the pontiff, he had argued that the “flagelos continuados” which the confessor had visited upon Spain made it incumbent on him to “encaminarme a la Corte, asistido y apoyado de la primera nobleza de estos reinos,” concluding that he was doing so “con la presunta bendición de Vuestra Santidad a quien humildemente suplico me la hecho efectiva.”²²²⁶ A fretting pontiff welcomed Borromeo’s initiative. Upon receiving his request, secretary of state Decio Azzolini responded that Clement IX was so worried about the latest developments in Spain, he would like to “poter esser costì per adoperarsi in ogni modo possibile à ristabilirvi l’intera quiete, mà poichè non l’è permesso, crede che sarà per gradirsi da S[ua] M[ae]stà” if Borromeo filled in for the absent pope.²²²⁷ Azzolini suggested that the nuncio offer his services as a mediator between Juan José and the queen regent who was at that point still unwilling to let go of Nithard. In Azzolini’s view, Borromeo was in an ideal position to mobilize his ecclesiastical capital to intervene as a disinterested arbiter who cared deeply about the future of the monarchy. While he should pander to the queen’s piety and portray himself as a representative of the holy father, Azzolini wagered Borromeo should also make the point that he was extending his services “col solo fine del servitio della Corona e della M[ae]stà Sua,” whom he wanted to support first and foremost as a loyal vassal.²²²⁸ In January 1669, the Council of State suggested to the queen regent that she take up Borromeo’s offer. Should it become necessary to “interponer la autoridad de su Sant[ida]d, y sus oficios, se valdrá V[uestra] Mag[esta]d” of the nuncio.²²²⁹ In a private encounter with the secretary of the Council of State on February 5, 1669, Federico Borromeo reiterated his commitment to “executar todo aquello que pareciere más conveniente para la quietud destos Reinos.”²²³⁰ After that, Pascual de Aragón put

²²²⁴ Maissen, *Bischofswahl (Nachtrag)*, p. 390.

²²²⁵ Maravall, *La cultura*, p. 200.

²²²⁶ Quoted in Ruiz Rodríguez, *Don Juan José*, p. 289.

²²²⁷ Decio Azzolini to Federico Borromeo, Rome December 30, 1668: ASV, Segr. Stato, Spagna, vol. 136, f. 81v.

²²²⁸ Decio Azzolini to Federico Borromeo, Rome December 30, 1668: ASV, Segr. Stato, Spagna, vol. 136, f. 81v. On Mariana’s religious education, see Oliván, *Mariana de Austria*, pp. 31–32.

²²²⁹ Consulta of the Council of State, Madrid January 1669: AGS, EST, leg. 3043, unfol.

²²³⁰ Secretary of the Council of State to queen Mariana, Madrid February 5, 1669: AGS, EST, leg. 3043, unfol.

Borromeo in charge of the negotiations with Juan José, asking him to broker an agreement with the bastard in the name of the junta and the queen regent.²²³¹

As Federico shuttled between Torrejón and downtown Madrid, he came up with the same solution that he had deployed to calm down the explosive Zwyer affair in Switzerland. To appease the populace that others had roused, he would recur to the secret channels of papal diplomacy to find a new post for Nithard outside Spain, thus honoring the wishes of the junta while allowing the confessor to save face. For this plan to succeed, he needed to win the trust of all parties involved. His first concern was to “*guadagnarsi l’animo della Regina,*” with whom the Borromeo seem to have been acquainted since she passed through Milan on her way to marry Philip IV and attended a baroque festival co-organized by Federico’s brother, Giovanni, in 1648.²²³² Once he had done that, he needed to convince Nithard of “*la quasi evident’impossibilità di sua sussistenza*” in the court of Madrid.²²³³ While his departure was inevitable, Borromeo had found a way to sweeten the deal for the confessor. If he resigned from his post on the junta and left Spain for Rome, Borromeo pledged, Nithard would be made cardinal of the Roman Catholic Church at the next opportunity. One historian has pointed out that, following the legal proceedings against Lerma and the banishment of Olivares, this was an unprecedented way of ridding the court of a discredited minister-favorite.²²³⁴ Not so for the stratagem’s mastermind, Borromeo. The deal he tendered to Nithard was the same golden handshake that he had proffered to Zwyer. It seemed to work again. Before the month of February was up, Nithard was en route to Rome, and Borromeo was openly celebrating the sacrifice of the confessor as a major step toward avoiding the outbreak of a popular rebellion.²²³⁵

The ringleader, however, was still camped outside Madrid. The first encounter between Borromeo and Juan José had been frosty. The bastard was suspicious of the nuncio, fretting that he was too close to Nithard who was, after all, a fellow member of the clergy.²²³⁶ Borromeo’s request that he retreat from Madrid and dismiss his militia as long as the talks were on seemed to vindicate him.²²³⁷ Juan José therefore made it clear to the nuncio that “*sin’à tanto non fusse quello [Nithard] fuora de Regni, e non havesse fatta l’abdicatione del grado d’Inquis[itor]e non poteva né allontanarsi da Madrid, né togliersi dallo Stato, che dice esser di sua difesa.*”²²³⁸ Yet, as Borromeo grew more intransigent toward Nithard, things looked up. Signaling the growing trust between the two, Borromeo became increasingly sympathetic to Juan José’s self-fashioning as Spain’s savior.

²²³¹ Federico Borromeo to Decio Azzolini, Madrid March 6, 1669: ASV, Segr. Stato, Spagna, vol. 138, f. 165r.

²²³² Federico IV to Giovanni, Montalto January 2, 1649: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, Corrispondenza 1645–1655.

²²³³ Federico Borromeo to Decio Azzolini, Madrid February 9, 1669: ASV, Segr. Stato, Spagna, vol. 136, f. 352r.

²²³⁴ Lozano Navarro, *Una embajada controvertida*, p. 271.

²²³⁵ Novo Zaballós, *De confesor*, p. 794.

²²³⁶ Federico Borromeo to Decio Azzolini, Madrid March 6, 1669: ASV, Segr. Stato, Spagna, vol. 138, f. 165v.

²²³⁷ Federico Borromeo to Decio Azzolini, Madrid March 6, 1669: ASV, Segr. Stato, Spagna, vol. 138, f. 165r.

²²³⁸ Federico Borromeo to Decio Azzolini, Madrid March 6, 1669: ASV, Segr. Stato, Spagna, vol. 136, f. 168r.

This change in opinion reared from Borromeo's close contact with Spain's ruling elite that the negotiations afforded him. Proving considerable chutzpah, he self-consciously began to present himself as a peer of the men with whom he interacted during the crisis. Among them cardinal Moncada stood out. Luigi Guglielmo, or Luis Guillén, as he preferred to call himself, was a thoroughly hispanized noble from an old Sicilian family.²²³⁹ One of the beneficiaries of the opportunities the monarchy had opened up to provincial nobles during the first half of the century, Moncada had worked as viceroy of Sardinia and Valencia before becoming a prominent member of the Council of State and a cardinal in the 1660s.²²⁴⁰ Borromeo soon identified him as "quello che apertamente fa le parti del Sig[no]r D[on] Gio[vanni]."²²⁴¹ Shedding his initial role as a neutral diplomat, Borromeo began to extol himself for his close contact to Moncada, writing that he had "continuum[en]te comunicato quanto accadeva" to Moncada.²²⁴² As Moncada and Borromeo grew friendlier, the nuncio came to accept Moncada's view of Juan José.

What united the two men was not just their past as clients of the Barberini and the fact that both were clerics from the Italian peninsula in charge of their families' destinies.²²⁴³ What really brought them together was their shared interest in placing their houses from the empire's periphery at the center of the *monarquía*. By hitching their fate to Juan José, they speculated, this dream might finally come true. If they supported the bastard's bid to become the new *valido*, he, the man who was renowned for his lenient treatment of rebels in Italy and Catalonia, might finally let their dynasties sit at the negotiating table in Madrid. Both Moncada and Borromeo saw the rise of Juan José as a way of acceding a system from which they had hitherto been left partially shut out.²²⁴⁴ On the strength of this insight, Federico urged the queen to bury the hatchet and offer Juan José a position in government.²²⁴⁵ (Juan José would ultimately accept to serve as vicar general of the crown of Aragon.)

Borromeo's outwardly enthusiastic support concealed lingering doubts about Juan José. In letters to his principals Borromeo voiced his misgivings about the bastard's moves after Nithard's departure. He was unsure "se dopo l'espulsione del P[ad]re Everardo [Juan José] stava fisso nella propositione di non pretender altro."²²⁴⁶ His fear was that the ejection of the confessor was to be followed by a purge of the confessor's real and alleged allies. On March 16, 1669, Borromeo reported to Rome that a number of high nobles' careers were on the line, including that of Peñaranda who

²²³⁹ On the Moncada family, see Scalisi (ed.), *La Sicilia dei Moncada*.

²²⁴⁰ Ligresti, *I Moncada*, p. 211.

²²⁴¹ Federico Borromeo to Decio Azzolini, Madrid February 9, 1669: ASV, Segr. Stato, Spagna, vol. 136, f. 352f.

²²⁴² Federico Borromeo to Decio Azzolini, Madrid February 9, 1669: ASV, Segr. Stato, Spagna, vol. 136, f. 352f.

²²⁴³ Novo Zaballo, *De confesor*, p. 780.

²²⁴⁴ Hermant, *Guerres*, p. 31.

²²⁴⁵ Federico Borromeo to Juan José, Madrid May 30, 1669: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, Cariche: Nunzio a Madrid. Also see Kamen, *Spain*, pp. 331–332.

²²⁴⁶ Federico Borromeo to Decio Azzolini, Madrid March 9, 1669: ASV, Segr. Stato, Spagna, vol. 138, f. 212r.

was rumored to have “detto, ch’il Sig[nor]e D[on] Giovanni era peggiore di Massaniello,” the leader of the Naples uprising of 1647.²²⁴⁷ Their crime was that they had not been quick enough to rally behind Juan José’s coup.²²⁴⁸ As Federico put it in a ciphered letter to Clement IX, “l’espulsione del confessore è il principio, non il fine delle pretensioni di don Gio[vanni] d’Austria [...] che dopo scacciato il confessore” pursued plans to “farsi capo di tutto.”²²⁴⁹ As these letters make clear, Borromeo no longer questioned the fundamentals of Juan José’s platform, which he fully backed. His only fear was that Juan José was unwilling adequately to reward his allies and recognize them as members of a governing elite. He ought not to have worried. As Laura Oliván points out, “Don Juan José, sin desestimar en ningún momento su carismática personalidad y su valía como estratega político, fue siempre un instrumento en manos de la nobleza.”²²⁵⁰ He would have been unable to get his way if he had not enjoyed the backing of the high nobility. His bid for power was inextricably linked to the good fortune of his cronies who had fielded him as their standard-bearer in the fight against Nithard.

As these anxieties about his share of the pie reveal, Borromeo was fast slipping into the rank of an honorary member of that power elite. In his memoirs written in exile in Rome, Nithard maintained that Borromeo had cozied up to Juan José to further his career. Clement IX, the deposed confessor averred, had promised “al señor Nuncio Borromeo el capelo en caso que en cualquier manera compusiese las inquietudes de España, dignidad que sumamente deseaba conseguir dicho señor Nuncio.”²²⁵¹ In reality, Borromeo was aiming much higher, as others quickly understood. Alfonso Litta, the archbishop of Milan who was still expecting Borromeo to back him in his battle against the monarchy, lauded Federico for his role in resolving “la scabrosità de negotiati frà la Regina e D[on] Gio[vanni]” and wished him “ogni gran retribut[io]ne”²²⁵² To Litta, it was clear that Federico had rendered the monarchy a huge service: “la quiete di cotesta Corte, e Monarchia patentem[en]te s’habbia da riconoscere dall’aut[orit]à, prudenza, e sapere di V[ostra] S[ignoria] Ill[ustrissi]ma.”²²⁵³ After highlighting the “conseguenze decorose, che ne riceve la n[ost]ra Corte di Roma,” the archbishop alluded to the “vantaggi” that the “sperate gratitudini generose di coteste M[aes]tà” would furnish “[la] di lei Casa.”²²⁵⁴ Unlike Nithard, Litta intuited that Federico was to convert his exploit as a man of the Church into symbolic capital for his family. Others agreed. The secretary of state was similarly full of praise for Borromeo’s role in shaping the future of the monarchy. Throughout the crisis, Azzolini opined, Borromeo had turned out to be a skillful handler of

²²⁴⁷ Federico Borromeo to Decio Azzolini, Madrid March 16, 1669: ASV, Segr. Stato, Spagna, vol. 138, f. 234v.

²²⁴⁸ See Federico Borromeo to Decio Azzolini, Madrid January 5, 1669: ASV, Segr. Stato, Spagna, vol. 138, f. 12r.

²²⁴⁹ Federico Borromeo to Decio Azzolini, Madrid January 2, 1669: ASV, Segr. Stato, Spagna, vol. 136, f. 314r.

²²⁵⁰ Oliván, Mariana de Austria, p. 219.

²²⁵¹ Pilo (ed.), Juan Everardo Nithard, p. 242.

²²⁵² Alfonso Litta to Federico Borromeo, Milan March 25, 1669: ASV, Arch. Nunz. Madrid, vol. 4, f. 426r.

²²⁵³ Alfonso Litta to Federico Borromeo, Milan June 24, 1669: ASV, Arch. Nunz. Madrid, vol. 4, f. 390r.

²²⁵⁴ Alfonso Litta to Federico Borromeo, Milan June 24, 1669: ASV, Arch. Nunz. Madrid, vol. 4, f. 390r.

the “passions” and “interests” that were running wild in the court of Madrid.²²⁵⁵ He feted him for the “ottima costituzione di quiete ristabilita in cotesta Corte.”²²⁵⁶ What stood out to the secretary of state were Borromeo’s interactions with the Spanish high nobility, ranging from Juan José and the queen to the cardinals Aragón and Moncada, and “ogni altro, col quale è a lei convenuto di trattare.”²²⁵⁷

A Borromeo in close contact with the leading lights of the court, being praised for his part in preserving the empire, was a stunning reversal of fortunes. If his brother had been accused of self-interest, Federico was now gratefully acknowledged for his disinterested mediation as queen Mariana thanked the pope “ch’in congiunture sì aspre gli avesse dato un Nuntio, con chi potesse confidare.”²²⁵⁸ Thanks to his ecclesiastical office, Federico was catapulted into the position that Giovanni had dreamed of but had been unable to attain fifteen years earlier. Federico had limberly mobilized the papacy’s symbolic capital to ingratiate himself with Spanish grandees, turning into a full-fledged member of the in-crowd in Madrid in the process. Drunk on these attestations from others, Federico adopted this role. As he reiterated in his correspondence with Juan José, he had “contribuito le mie parti” to a resolution to the crisis “secondo la confidenza, di che m’honora V[ostra] A[ltezza]” (using a title that Juan José yearned for but had never been granted).²²⁵⁹

As he inched closer to the center of power, Federico grew more appreciative of Juan José’s vision for the future of the monarchy. If he had any misgivings about his strategy, he broadly agreed with his agenda: “per quello toccava il ben publico” in Juan José’s plank, Borromeo admitted to being “di ottimi sentim[en]ti.”²²⁶⁰ As the unrest died down, the nuncio matured the conviction that Juan José was not, as he had first feared, a member of the high nobility who was willing to make common cause with the populace (*farsi popolare*).²²⁶¹ Despite his penchant for demagoguery, Juan José turned out to be pursuing restorationist ends. As the bastard himself put it, he wanted the “bien de los pobres y firme conservación de esta Monarquía, que es la columna más estable de su fe.”²²⁶² Once the populist rhetoric and the military posturing were peeled back, Federico believed to discern another version of the *diacatholicon* with its good government programs championed by far-sighted elites so dear to Borromeo.

As winter turned to spring, Borromeo espoused Juan José’s overhaul of the monarchy. In a letter to the queen, which Borromeo handed over to her, the bastard demanded the formation of a

²²⁵⁵ Decio Azzolini to Federico Borromeo, Rome May 25, 1669: ASV, Segr. Stato, Spagna, vol. 351, f. 229r.

²²⁵⁶ Decio Azzolini to Federico Borromeo, Rome July 20, 1669: ASV, Segr. Stato, Spagna, vol. 351, f. 316v.

²²⁵⁷ Decio Azzolini to Federico Borromeo, Rome May 25, 1669: ASV, Segr. Stato, Spagna, vol. 351, f. 229r.

²²⁵⁸ Federico Borromeo to Decio Azzolini, Madrid March 9, 1669: ASV, Segr. Stato, Spagna, vol. 138, f. 210v.

²²⁵⁹ Federico Borromeo to Juan José, Madrid March 25, 1669: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, Cariche: Nunzio a Madrid; on the title, see Kamen, *Spain’s First Caudillo*, p. 585.

²²⁶⁰ Federico Borromeo to Decio Azzolini, Madrid March 9, 1669: ASV, Segr. Stato, Spagna, vol. 138, f. 211v.

²²⁶¹ On these fears, see Villari, *Elogio*, pp. 9–11.

²²⁶² Quoted in Álvarez-Ossorio, *La república*, p. 311.

junta de alivios comprising “soggetti idonei per trovare le forme d’alleggerir i Popoli dalle gravezze, e di migliore l’amministrazione dell’hazienda Reale.”²²⁶³ The situation was dramatic indeed. In July 1668, the newly appointed president of the Council of Finance had written to Mariana that all the revenues for 1667 and 1668 had already been spent, most of them to defray debt accrued during the wars against the French crown.²²⁶⁴ Late in March 1669, a new committee was set up consisting of Pascual de Aragón, the president of the council of Finance and others who came together to “trattar del sollievo de Sudditi, e dell’Hazienda Reale.”²²⁶⁵ Their task was to identify measures to “migliorar la conditione de Popoli, e del Governo,” so as to avert future rebellions.²²⁶⁶ It was a campaign reminiscent of Louis XIV’s attempts in France to snuff out the financial malpractice of the regency in the wake of the *Fronde*.²²⁶⁷ The intervention’s main use was as a propaganda tool. From an economics standpoint, the initiative could hardly be taken seriously.²²⁶⁸ What made it so convenient was its symbolism.

Owing to his family’s past dabblings with symbolic interventions in the economy of their fiefs (see chapter 4), Borromeo hardly needed to be persuaded of the program’s value. He shared the belief of one of his Roman colleagues that “impassioned gentlemen are highly effective in making the people believe the impossible, especially when clothed in zeal for the public good.”²²⁶⁹ Clothed in the zeal for the public good, the economic interventions formed part of the good government philosophy to which Borromeo subscribed. A letter he sent his younger brother was indicative of his continued terror of the masses. It was crucial, he instructed Antonio Renato, that the Borromeo continue to “essercitare l’opera di carità verso quei sudditi quali la supplico in visceribus Christi sentire con pazienza essendo opera di merito grandissimo ancorché tal volta siano o insulsi o impertinenti nell’esponer le loro necessità.”²²⁷⁰ In his mind the economic planks of Juan José’s agenda were a continuation of the law-and-order policies he was supporting in Spanish Italy. The crackdown on wasteful spending, like the fight against jurisdictional overreach, fit into Borromeo’s broader plans to win the *ceto civile* over for rule by a small elite. It was leading grandees’ project to upend “la (a su juicio) mala gestión del patronazgo real” by Nithard and to restore the “distribución de la gracia real” to its old glories as they tried to demobilize a politically engaged section of the populace.²²⁷¹

As Borromeo had intuited, Juan José’s monarchy was populist rather than popular. The bastard deliberately derailed the hunger for involvement which was seen as undermining the

²²⁶³ Federico Borromeo to Decio Azzolini, Madrid March 9, 1669: ASV, Segr. Stato, Spagna, vol. 138, f. 211r.

²²⁶⁴ Kamen, Spain, p. 357.

²²⁶⁵ Federico Borromeo to Decio Azzolini, Madrid March 30, 1669: ASV, Segr. Stato, Spagna, vol. 138, f. 258r.

²²⁶⁶ Federico Borromeo to Decio Azzolini, Madrid March 30, 1669: ASV, Segr. Stato, Spagna, vol. 138, f. 258r.

²²⁶⁷ Benigno, Specchi, pp. 196–197; Parker, Class and State, p. 181.

²²⁶⁸ Contreras, Carlos II, p. 121; Kamen, Spain, p. 336; Ribot, Historia y memoria, p. 214.

²²⁶⁹ Quoted in Parker, Global Crisis, p. 533.

²²⁷⁰ Federico IV to Antonio Renato, Rome December 4, 1666: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, Corrisponenza 1665-1670.

²²⁷¹ Oliván, Mariana de Austria, p. 227.

established order. As early as 1665, the marquis of Aytona, a member of the junta, had complained that, “El mayor riesgo en que estamos es la falta de justicia y la desautoridad de ella, atraviéndose el pueblo a hablar tan liciosamente como manifiesta tanta multiplicidad de pasquines contra el gobierno.”²²⁷² Don Juan tapped that potential but turned it into an advantage for the powers-that-be. The premise of his intervention was that Nithard’s misrule had undermined ordinary people’s trust in the ruling elites.²²⁷³ As a disinterested member of the royal family he would be able to enhance communication between the monarch and his subjects.²²⁷⁴ Thus, under the new regime ordinary people only seemingly gained what they had been clamoring for: influence. As Héloïse Hermant explains, the populace became onlookers rather than political actors, as many of them had hoped. Although Juan José’s campaign assigned them the role of a critical public, whose interest in the monarchy was actively elicited, the people were understood to be spectators with no agency of their own: they were “un théâtre d’ombres au service des puissants.”²²⁷⁵ If this has more than a few traits in common with the Borromeo’s earlier understanding of their vassals as spectators in the theater of great men (see chapters 5 and 6), the motivations of said great men had changed quite dramatically since the days of the battle of Arona: no longer committed to individual acts of heroism, the rulers of the day proffered their talent and acumen to improve the lot of ordinary people.

Despite ordinary people now watching them with a keen interest, decision-making remained the remit of members of a small elite of political experts who made sure to keep the masses from voicing their aspirations outside carefully policed boundaries.²²⁷⁶ Juan José and his supporters dreamed of an aristocracy, a nobility born to rule in the interest of all, assisting the king in his delicate task of delivering justice. The view of society predominant among Juan José’s noble followers was in line with Borromeo’s own understanding of the world: humanity was divided into a small elite and the masses over whom they lorded, and it was the task of the former to deliver the collective good for the latter, while also ensuring that that pursuit did not run counter to the elite’s own interests.²²⁷⁷ For Federico the new monarchy envisaged by Juan José held the key to reconciling what he had come to think of as mutually exclusive priorities: the commonwealth and his dynastic aspirations. As the Venetian ambassador wrote of Juan José’s project, “L’affabilità, la gentilezza e le rare sue doti unite alla memoria di tante gloriose azioni, gli conciliarono l’applauso de’ grandi, la stima e venerazione de’ popoli.”²²⁷⁸

²²⁷² Quoted in Hermant, *Guerres*, p. 206, n. 24.

²²⁷³ Hermant, *Guerres*, p. 415.

²²⁷⁴ Hermant, *Guerres*, pp. 195, 228–229, 331–332.

²²⁷⁵ Hermant, *Guerres*, p. 423.

²²⁷⁶ Hermant, *Guerres*, p. 422.

²²⁷⁷ On these tensions, see Rosario Villari, *La cultura politica*, pp. 5–31.

²²⁷⁸ Bellegho, *Relazione di Spagna*, p. 362.

An attempt to balance two contradictory interests, this new form of government required able administrators willing to ensure that popular involvement did not handicap the continued rule of Spain's elite. Given his strong belief that his social group should have an exclusive hold on power, Federico Borromeo, as a papal official, put his considerable talent at the service of that project. Indeed, he was determined to continue to condition developments in the Spanish monarchy even after the promotion to secretary of state forced him to relocate to Rome in 1670. This decision was a response to not so tacit expectations in Madrid. The Council of State, in a *consulta* discussing Borromeo's imminent departure from Madrid, suggested to the queen regent that given "el afecto, y buena conducta con que ha procedido," and seeing what he could accomplish for the monarchy in his new post, it would be "muy conveniente" to offer him a gift that made it clear "quan grato ha sido a V[uestra] M[a]g[esta]d la forma con que se ha portado en este Reyno," and more importantly what she "se promete de su inclinaz[i]o[n] a los mayores intereses de esta Corona."²²⁷⁹ The task that his cronies of the governing elite set him through the limber use of the gift register was clear: as secretary of state, he was to torpedo Nithard's planned elevation to the cardinalate.

If one is to believe the extant historiography, the defense of such particular interests was to founder on the rocks of a new conception of papal power. Emilio Altieri, the descendant of a family of Roman patricians, was elected on April 29, 1670 after an excruciatingly long conclave and took the name Clement in honor of his protector and predecessor Clement IX.²²⁸⁰ Altieri had clearly been a compromise candidate. He was eighty years old on his election, and few expected him, as he would end up doing, to govern the universal Church for six years. What cemented his hold on power was his common touch. Clement X espoused the populist spirit that was hovering over Catholic Europe. His election was saluted by ordinary Romans. If they expected a continuation of the clean government of his predecessors, Clement X did not disappoint. Unlike the papal families of the first half of the century, the Altieri reined in the self-enrichment that had usually followed a family's elevation to the pontificate. The special envoy of the house of Savoy, Bigliore di Lucerna, duly lauded the new pontiff for the "Riforma di molte spese superflue, che si facevano da suoi Antecessori tanto nel Palazzo Ap[osto]lico, come in altre essorbitanti spese fuori di esso," which set him apart from his "Predecessori, che hanno havuto più riguardo ad arricchire i proprij Parenti con immense ricchezze, che alla Pietà, e Zelo verso i Sudditi della Chiesa."²²⁸¹ As Bigliore di Lucerna reported, the pope admitted to feeling "grand'avversione all'aggrandire di soverchie ricchezze i suoi parenti," and hated "l'essorbitanti rendite di S[igno]ri Chigi, et opulenza di Pamfilio, e Barberino, e l'immensi Tesori di Borghese." As he censured the bonuses of his predecessors' nephews as "immoderati, e superiori alla

²²⁷⁹ Consulta of the Council of State, Madrid June 27, 1670: AGS, EST, leg. 3044, unfol.

²²⁸⁰ Unlike earlier pontificates, Clement X's has escaped historians' attention. I have had to rely on source materials such as ambassadors' reports to sketch the countours of a pontificate that deserves an in-depth study.

²²⁸¹ Relazione della Corte di Roma fatta dal Sig.r Marchese Bigliore di Lucerna stato Amb.re Straordinario d'obbedienza à Papa Clemente X.o per l'Altezza Reale di Savoia: BAV, Vat. Lat., 12530, f. 91v.

condizione de privati,” Clement X displayed a new understanding of responsibility of people in power, marking a departure from the profiteering that had blighted politics.²²⁸² Bigliore di Lucerna therefore concluded, “se quei santi proponimenti, che li passano per la mente non restaranno contaminati, non si possono sperare dalla Santità Sua, se non considerabili effetti a beneficio della Christiana Republica.”²²⁸³

Clement’s nephew, Paluzzo Paluzzi degli Albertoni, shared his uncle’s commitment to good government. Having been adopted by the pope in the absence of a suitable male relative, Paluzzi Altieri was eager to demonstrate his worthiness, and the way to do this was to embrace his uncle’s good government philosophy. Critics described him as an illegitimate nephew who held the papacy hostage for his own personal gain, pointing to his tendency to profligacy that led him to help himself to a generous 1.2 million *scudi* during his uncle’s pontificate, 300,000 in excess of the sums appropriated by Chigi’s more restrained family.²²⁸⁴ In reality, Paluzzi Altieri had little in common with the earlier cardinal-nephews, with the notable exception perhaps of Gregor XV’s spirited nephew, Ludovico Ludovisi, who was equally goaded into action by his uncle’s old age.²²⁸⁵ An anonymous author of a who’s who on the court of Rome described Paluzzi Altieri as “modesto nel governo, cortese, capace, ama la fatica, applicato.”²²⁸⁶ The envoy of the house of Savoy noted that he made it a point to “dirigere il Governo del p[rese]nte Pontificato con somma prudenza.”²²⁸⁷ Indeed, ever since the advent of Chigi, showing restraint and taking responsibility in government seem to have been part of a deliberate strategy to use the papacy for symbolic aggrandizement rather than self-enrichment amidst growing protests at the devastating impact of nepotism on the papacy’s finances.²²⁸⁸ This change in the political culture became most apparent in the family’s country house in Oriolo Romano which boasted a gallery of all preceding pontiffs.²²⁸⁹ If such a maneuver made up for the elusive splendors of the house of Altieri and helped dodge the criticism that the far-fetched genealogies of previous papal families had attracted, it was, first and foremost, indicative of a new conception that placed the officeholder above the family he hailed from.²²⁹⁰ As his uncle, the

²²⁸² Relatione della Corte di Roma fatta dal Sig.r Marchese Bigliore di Lucerna stato Amb.re Straordinario d’obbedienza à Papa Clemente X.o per l’Altezza Reale di Savoia: BAV, Vat. Lat., 12530, f. 92v.

²²⁸³ Relatione della Corte di Roma fatta dal Sig.r Marchese Bigliore di Lucerna stato Amb.re Straordinario d’obbedienza à Papa Clemente X.o per l’Altezza Reale di Savoia: BAV, Vat. Lat., 12530, f. 94v.

²²⁸⁴ Lloyd, *Adopted Papal Kin*, p. 261; *Nuovo governo di Roma sotto il Pontificato di Papa Clemente Decimo [...]*: BAV, Barb. Lat. 5114, ff. 157r–160v.

²²⁸⁵ Büchel, *Raffe und regiere*; Karsten, *Künstler und Kardinäle*, pp. 44, 63.

²²⁸⁶ *Compendioso Ragguaglio delle Fattioni. Nascita, età, costume, et inclinazioni di tutti i Cardinali viventi nel Pontificato di Clemente Decimo*: BAV, Barb. Lat., 4704, f. 23v.

²²⁸⁷ Relatione della Corte di Roma fatta dal Sig.r Marchese Bigliore di Lucerna stato Amb.re Straordinario d’obbedienza à Papa Clemente X.o per l’Altezza Reale di Savoia: BAV, Vat. Lat., 12530, f. 96r.

²²⁸⁸ Pattenden, *Electing the Pope*, p. 204. Other authors, most notably Arne Karsten, stress the continuity between the Altieri papacy and the reign of earlier papal families. See his *Künstler und Kardinäle*, p. 13.

²²⁸⁹ Cipollone (ed.), *Palazzo Altieri*, pp. 24–25.

²²⁹⁰ Spagnoletti, *Le dinastie italiane*, pp. 316–318.

cardinal-nephew closely identified with the office he held and wanted to go down in history as an administrator of the common good rather than a family man looking after his own.

All this was reportedly bad news for Federico. Traditional historiography has argued that his interest in government set Paluzzi Altieri on a collision course with Clement's secretary of state. According to Antonio Menniti Ippolito, the Altieri pontificate stamped a temporary return to the nepotistic practice of the early seventeenth century when papal nephews were in charge of government and secretaries of state were lowly scribes. As we have seen in chapter 10, from Chigi onward, the office of the secretary of state had witnessed a "deciso rafforzamento": secretaries of state were now cardinals who acted as the "principale interlocutore del pontefice" and "suo principale tramite con l'organismo curiale e con l'esterno."²²⁹¹ While this pattern holds true for most of the latter half of the seventeenth century, Menniti Ippolito argued, this general evolution proceeded in leaps and bounds, which were the result of "la maggiore o minore energia del pontefice nonché le qualità e le ambizioni del cardinal nipote e dello stesso Segretario."²²⁹² The pontificate of Clement X was one which saw a weak pope and a strong-willed nephew, and these two factors allegedly conspired to push the secretary of state from the scene.²²⁹³ As Menniti Ippolito summarized, "dopo Clemente IX, il filo comune che aveva caratterizzato l'esperienza degli ultimi tre Segretari si spezza. Il nipote di Clemente X, Paluzzi Altieri, annullò di fatto le figure dei titolari formali dell'ufficio e ricoprì quel ruolo in prima persona, appropriandosi di ogni loro spazio."²²⁹⁴

Much of Menniti Ippolito's argument is based on Georg Lutz's unsupported claims about secretary of state Federico Borromeo. Lutz maintained that Borromeo was unable to "assumere la direzione effettiva della segreteria di Stato" as Clement X had entrusted the "disbrigo di gran parte della corrispondenza diplomatica al cardinal nepote Paluzzi-Altieri, che lo tenne saldamente in mano."²²⁹⁵ While this is not inaccurate, the Altieri pontificate was hardly unique in this regard. Chigi's own nephew, for instance, was at least temporarily in charge of the correspondence with the nuncios during the pontificate of Alexander VII, something that was now an essential part of papal families' strategy of presenting themselves as administrators of the collective good.²²⁹⁶ More importantly, though, the bold assertion that Federico lacked influence betrays ignorance of the workings of the secretariat of state and the cooperation between cardinal-nephews and secretaries of state in the seventeenth century. As Birgit Emich has shown in her study of the pontificate of Paul V, these two figures were not rivals but complemented each other thanks to a supple division of labor in which

²²⁹¹ Menniti Ippolito, *Il tramonto*, pp. 52, 23.

²²⁹² Menniti Ippolito, *Il tramonto*, p. 53.

²²⁹³ Menniti Ippolito, *Il tramonto*, p. 53.

²²⁹⁴ Menniti, Ippolito, *Il tramonto*, p. 53.

²²⁹⁵ See Lutz, *Federico Borromeo*.

²²⁹⁶ See for example the letters in ASV, *Segr. Stato, Svizzera*, vol. 238. For context, see Karsten, "Nepotismus," pp. 280–281, 283–284.

one of the two men deliberately chose to work in the shadows, leaving almost no traces in the correspondence of the secretariat of state and exerting influence through alternative channels instead.²²⁹⁷ Indeed, Emich contends that an exclusive focus on the correspondence of the secretariat of state is likely to yield a wrong impression of the effective influence of members of the pope's inner circle.²²⁹⁸

This is definitely true in Borromeo's case. For if one looks beyond the record of the secretariat of state, there is precious little evidence of Borromeo's lack of influence in the papal court. Other than elusive signatures on the secretariat's correspondence with the nuncios (Lutz's smoking gun), there is no indication that the Altieri did not think highly of Borromeo. Like his immediate predecessors in the secretariat of state, he was awarded the red hat in the second consistory after Clement X's election, with the pope allegedly uttering: "Ora potremo sospirare un poco che habbiamo un Capo Borromeo per sostenere il Vaticano."²²⁹⁹ The special envoy of the house of Savoy concurred, lauding the pontiff for having "saputo scegliersi così ottimo e punt[ua]le Ministro, nelle braccia del quale hà gettato tutto il suo arbitrio."²³⁰⁰ Evidence abounds that Borromeo acted as a trusted confidant and advisor to the pope and his nephew. Bigliore di Lucerna praised Borromeo as an "uomo atto à qualunque maneggio per azzardoso, che sia"; his experience in the Spanish court had turned him into a "soggetto atto à governare un Mondo intero."²³⁰¹ Yet another author vaunted Borromeo as a "soggetto molto sperimentato" and referred to him as "uno dei Confidenti di Sua Santità."²³⁰² So close were they that even if he did not sign the official letters sent through the secretariat of state, he played an important role in drafting them. Bigliore di Lucerna was certain that Borromeo wrote "le minute delle lettere in quei affari, ne quali molto preme il Papa."²³⁰³ Contrary to what later historians have claimed, contemporaries concurred with the Venetian ambassador when he wrote of Borromeo, "Il Papa l'ama e gli crede."²³⁰⁴

The truth was that Federico Borromeo was indispensable for the Altieri to perform the social functions attached to the papacy. What they sought in him was not just his political experience but his dynastic and social capital. Despite all the radical changes in government over the last two decades, papal families in the late seventeenth century still needed to join the ranks of the small elite

²²⁹⁷ Emich, *Die Karriere des Staatssekretärs*, pp. 343, 350.

²²⁹⁸ Emich, *Die Karriere des Staatssekretärs*, p. 344.

²²⁹⁹ Quoted in Galli, *Federico IV Borromeo (1617–1673)*, p. 377.

²³⁰⁰ *Relatione della Corte di Roma fatta dal Sig.r Marchese Bigliore di Lucerna stato Amb.re Straordinario d'obbedienza à Papa Clemente X.o per l'Altezza Reale di Savoia*: BAV, Vat. Lat., 12530, f. 103v.

²³⁰¹ *Relatione della Corte di Roma fatta dal Sig.r Marchese Bigliore di Lucerna stato Amb.re Straordinario d'obbedienza à Papa Clemente X.o per l'Altezza Reale di Savoia*: BAV, Vat. Lat., 12530, f. 103r.

²³⁰² *Compendioso Ragguaglio delle Fattioni. Nascita, età, costume, et inclinazioni di tutti i Cardinali viventi nel Pontificato di Clemente Decimo*: BAV, Barb. Lat. 4704, f. 33r.

²³⁰³ *Relatione della Corte di Roma fatta dal Sig.r Marchese Bigliore di Lucerna stato Amb.re Straordinario d'obbedienza à Papa Clemente X.o per l'Altezza Reale di Savoia*: BAV, Vat. Lat., 12530, f. 103v

²³⁰⁴ Grimani, *Relazione di Roma*, p. 359.

of Europe's sovereign dynasties.²³⁰⁵ Like his predecessors, Clement X thought to anchor his clan to the Italian high nobility through the marriage of one of his nieces to a powerful Roman or Neapolitan family, preferably one with a papal genealogy. However, negotiations with other dynasties repeatedly foundered as both the Colonna and the Pamphili turned down what they must have considered a *mésalliance* between a family from the Roman patriciate and the high nobility.²³⁰⁶ Things only started to budge when the secretary of state took on the matter. Unlike the Altieri, Federico Borromeo was widely recognized as hailing from a “*famiglia nobilissima per conto de Padri di S[an] Carlo Borromeo[,] per vie di donne d'una Dama Principessa de Cerri*” (the papal fief Giovanna had inherited from her brother).²³⁰⁷ It was thanks to his social standing as a Milanese subject of the king of Spain that the secretary of state succeeded in arranging a marriage between the pope's niece and Domenico Orsini, the duke of Gravina, from a cadet branch of the powerful Orsini family from the kingdom of Naples.²³⁰⁸ As Borromeo saw it, his work “*porta un parentado qui in Roma et in Napoli di tanta conseguenza,*” hence why “*è stato stimato per un molto bel negotio in vantaggio di questi S[igno]ri Altieri che non si satiano di ringratiarmene.*”²³⁰⁹ Gesturing to the powers that secretaries of state wielded in the latter half of the seventeenth century, Federico Borromeo almost single-handedly provided the papal family with the social capital the Altieri so obviously lacked.²³¹⁰ Far from being a scribe, as Menniti Ippolito implied, Federico Borromeo was an equal partner in an exchange of favors that was beneficial to both parties.

While Federico Borromeo was crucial to the papal family's dynastic aspirations, he was equally important to the cultivation of the papacy's relations with the great powers of Catholic Europe. Bigliore di Lucerna saw this clearly, reporting that Borromeo was “*prattico à sì alto segno degl'interessi de P[ri]n[ci]pi, che non stimo possi haver pari in questo secolo.*”²³¹¹ Signaling the rise of the secretary of state as a cardinal and a member of a dynasty in his own right, Borromeo put the Altieri in contact with the European high nobility, especially Spain's governing elite.²³¹² He did so not through the official channel of the secretariat of state, but through the correspondence he entertained as a patron.²³¹³ Borromeo may have been absent from the records of the secretariat of state, but a cache of letters preserved in the National Library at Madrid, as well as his

²³⁰⁵ On the position of papal families in Italy's dynastic system, see Spagnoletti, *Le dinastie italiane*, p. 169.

²³⁰⁶ *Relatione della Corte di Roma fatta dal Sig.r Marchese Bigliore di Lucerna stato Amb.re Straordinario d'obbedienza à Papa Clemente X.o per l'Altezza Reale di Savoia*: BAV, Vat. Lat., 12530, ff. 101r–v.

²³⁰⁷ *Compendioso Ragguaglio delle Fattioni. Nascita, età, costume, et inclinazioni di tutti i Cardinali viventi nel Pontificato di Clemente Decimo*: BAV, Barb. Lat. 4704, f. 33r.

²³⁰⁸ Monferrini and Galli, *I Borromeo*, p. 33. For a more general appreciation of the social capital of Roman officeholders in the service of the ruling papal family, see Visceglia, *Roma papale e Spagna*, p. 57.

²³⁰⁹ Federico IV to Antonio Renato, Rome February 21, 1671: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, *Corrispondenza 1671–1680*.

²³¹⁰ See Daloz, *The Sociology*, pp. 96–98.

²³¹¹ *Relatione della Corte di Roma fatta dal Sig.r Marchese Bigliore di Lucerna stato Amb.re Straordinario d'obbedienza à Papa Clemente X.o per l'Altezza Reale di Savoia*: BAV, Vat. Lat., 12530, f. 103r.

²³¹² Emich, “*Der Hof,*” p. 81.

²³¹³ Emich, *Vincoli informali*, p. 134.

correspondence in the family archives, shows him to have been an assiduous correspondent who kept in touch with various members of the Spanish nobility. Unbeknownst to historians who have fixated on the correspondence of the secretariat of state, Borromeo left his mark on the pontificate of Clement X through his informal epistolary network with members of the Spanish nobility.

What is one to make of such informal letters? Recent research has shown that epistles of this nature were crucial to building and consolidating networks in the early modern period and were therefore eminently political. In the words of James Daybell, “In a personal political system, where individual relationships were paramount, privy communications lent a degree of confidentiality to exchanges between correspondents, which was central to cultivating and maintaining social and political contacts.”²³¹⁴ Holograph letters constituted a tangible sign of well-wishers’ benevolence and a material symbol of the relationship between correspondents.²³¹⁵ As a material object that was crafted expressly for the recipient, letters were a gift that needed to be reciprocated at some point.²³¹⁶ In this sense, missives built ties that could be activated when the need for them arose. Letters of courtesy were particularly useful to that effect.²³¹⁷ Many correspondents let Borromeo know of marriages in their family, while others wrote to him to offer their condolences when his mother, Giovanna Cesi, died in 1672.²³¹⁸ Other letter-writers took the opportunity of the high holidays to congratulate Borromeo on his career achievements and woo him as a potential patron, as was standard practice at the time.²³¹⁹ One well-wisher tendered Borromeo “buenas Pasquas y el año nuevo mui feliz” and felicitated him on “la Purpura que corone sus grandes méritos, y servicios hechos a la Santa Sede.”²³²⁰ He then added, tongue-in-cheek, that his desire to wish him well came straight from “mi agradecido coraçon en donde vivirá siempre firme, independiente de mis aumentos.”²³²¹ Others were more straightforward. Letters requesting a specific favor from Borromeo abound, revealing his influence as a barterer of ecclesiastical resources, both material and not. Many hoped he could provide a close relative with lucrative benefices. Alternatively, Doña Lemos de Velasco requested a papal brief “para que pueda hacer decir Missa en casa, en qualquiera parte a donde estuviere.”²³²²

In a nod to his influence people from across the Spanish monarchy wrote in to show appreciation for his work as a broker in the secretariat of state, with one typical petitioner thanking

²³¹⁴ Daybell, *Women Letter-Writers*, p. 108.

²³¹⁵ Daybell, *Women Letter-Writers*, p. 108.

²³¹⁶ Daybell, *Women Letter-Writers*, p. 160; Schneider, *The Culture of Epistolarity*, pp. 27, 61–63.

²³¹⁷ Daybell, *Women Letter-Writers*, p. 157.

²³¹⁸ Duke of San Germán to Federico Borromeo, Cagliari March 16, 1672: BNE, ms. 12877, f. 230r.

²³¹⁹ See for example Francisco de Jerez to Federico Borromeo, Naples December 19, 1671: BNE, ms. 12877, ff. 106r–v. Also see Biagioli, *Galileo Courtier*, p. 26.

²³²⁰ ? Jacinto to Federico Borromeo, Madrid December 3, 1670: BNE, ms. 12877, f. 350r.

²³²¹ ? Jacinto to Federico Borromeo, Madrid December 3, 1670: BNE, ms. 12877, f. 350r.

²³²² Doña Lemos de Velasco to Federico Borromeo, Madrid June 15, 1672: BNE, ms. 12877, f. 566r.

Borromeo for “haber hablado con su Santidad y el S[eñor] Cardenal Altieri tocante a lo que suplicava con mi memorial.”²³²³ Federico himself confirmed the significance of his letter-writing, frequently complaining in missives to family members that he had been writing “dall’Ave M[ari]a sino alle dieci della notte.”²³²⁴ Especially after the elevation to the cardinalate, Federico was inundated with letters from old acquaintances “che mai più hanno scritto et non sò chi siano.”²³²⁵ He therefore constantly fretted that “tal’uno non resti contento per i trattam[en]ti.”²³²⁶ There was a clear and present danger that his clients would overestimate his influence and that they could end up believing “che io possa più di quello, che non voglia potere,” when in reality “io non posso quanto si crede.”²³²⁷

To date, such epistolary networks have mostly been studied in relation to women. In his study of female correspondents in Tudor England, James Daybell has identified letter writing as a “secondary patronage function” which helped “to oil the wheels of kinship and patronage networks.”²³²⁸ Daybell rightly insists that this work was eminently political, something that becomes plain when one adopts a “wider definition” of politics “that acknowledges the primacy of interpersonal relationships and informal channels of power.”²³²⁹ Early modern elites, Daybell contends, preferred “writing personally to political allies regarding a particular suit” to “operating through official routes and following formal procedures.”²³³⁰ As I argue here, the same is true of male letter-writers who, even though they also controlled official correspondence networks, resorted to informal channels akin to those of women. Borromeo’s privy correspondence is a case in point. Nestled between the petty requests for favors are letters that touch on the sphere of high politics. Among the hundreds of letters from minor nobles there are the missives from the who’s who of the Spanish nobility, including prominent members of the governing elite who petitioned Borromeo as one of their own.

The letters from Juan José are telling in this regard. As early as 1670, soon after his return to Rome, Juan José wrote to Federico Borromeo: “En todo lo que pueda tocar a mis particulares, y haya de pasar por mano de V[uestra] S[eñoría] I[lustrísima] bien cierto estoy de experimentar siempre el afecto que V[uestra] S[eñoría] I[lustrísima] me deve.”²³³¹ As a client of the man who could elevate the Borromeo to one of the leading dynasties in the Spanish empire, Federico Borromeo was made to understand in no uncertain terms that he owed Juan José. The latter’s main request was that Borromeo block Nithard’s nomination. In his epistles to Borromeo Juan José kept reminding the

²³²³ Prince of ? to Federico Borromeo, Milan, July 27, 1672: BNE, ms. 12877, f. 234r.

²³²⁴ Federico IV to Antonio Renato, Rome January 24, 1671: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, Corrispondenza 1671–1680.

²³²⁵ Federico IV to Antonio Renato, Rome January 17, 1671: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, Corrispondenza 1671–1680.

²³²⁶ Federico VI to Antonio Renato, Rome January 31, 1671: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, Corrispondenza 1671–1680.

²³²⁷ Federico IV to Antonio Renato, Rome November 14, 1671: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, Corrispondenza 1671–1680.

²³²⁸ Daybell, *Women Letter-Writers*, p. 1.

²³²⁹ Daybell, *Women Letter-Writers*, p. 28.

²³³⁰ Daybell, *Women Letter-Writers*, p. 30.

²³³¹ Juan José to Federico Borromeo, Zaragoza December 6, 1670: BNE, ms. 12877, f. 2r.

secretary of state that if Nithard was created cardinal, he would return to Spain to wreak more havoc. Appealing to Borromeo's own stake in the monarchy, he warned that Nithard would pursue his "ambición para acavar de construir el Trono que tiene disegniado formarse de n[uest]ra ruina, y perdición."²³³² It was therefore of the utmost importance that he convince the pope "de evitar con su autoridad vigorosamente esta buelta."²³³³ When he felt Borromeo's resolve lessen, his letters became shriller, equating Nithard's elevation to simony, and warning of the dire consequences of the world seeing "Juan Everardo Principe, y Coluna de la Iglesia Catholica, y (lo que no es menos ponderable) por la Corona de España."²³³⁴ As he appealed to Borromeo's interest in the "quietud de España," Juan José seemed to assume that the secretary of state was able to sway the pope.²³³⁵

Important as such letters were, Borromeo's privy correspondence was not limited to such overt and clumsy requests for favors. In fact, the network's real potential becomes visible only when it is juxtaposed with the official correspondence of the secretariat of state, a point Birgit Emich has made repeatedly in her studies on the pontificate of Paul V.²³³⁶ As Altieri and his secretary of state took office, the queen regent took them up on Borromeo's vow that her confessor would be furnished with a red hat in Rome, renewing her earlier request to Clement IX. Such was her right. In the early modern period, the major Catholic crowns were entitled to present candidates for the cardinalate every time a new pope took power. Birettas were, as Hillard von Thiesen and Maria Antonietta Visceglia have shown in their work on papal-Spanish relations, part of the quid pro quo between the Habsburgs and the ruling papal family who in turn expected noble titles from the Spanish monarchs (usually attached to Neapolitan fiefs).²³³⁷ Although the Spanish kings' wishes were usually granted, popes did try to oppose certain nominations by insisting on the independence of the papacy. The Altieri were no exception. As they saw it, they had inherited Nithard's candidacy from the preceding papal family, the Rospigliosi, whose head of household, Clement IX, had died too early to elevate the confessor during his brief pontificate. In the Altieri's reasoning, there was no obligation for the current holders of the apostolic see to follow through with the confirmation of candidates who had been nominated under their predecessor.²³³⁸ The queen did of course have the option of representing Nithard's candidacy, they contended, but even then she ought to be aware that cardinalates were "una materia di tutta gratia, e che unicam[en]te dipende dalla Pontificia libertà, e liberalità."²³³⁹

²³³² Juan José to Federico Borromeo, Zaragoza April 24, 1672: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, Corrispondenza 1671–1680.

²³³³ Juan José to Federico Borromeo, Zaragoza April 24, 1672: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, Corrispondenza 1671–1680.

²³³⁴ Juan José to Federico Borromeo, Zaragoza May 21, 1672: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, Corrispondenza 1671–1680.

²³³⁵ Juan José to Federico Borromeo, Zaragoza June 4, 1672: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, Corrispondenza 1671–1680.

²³³⁶ Emich, *Die Karriere des Staatssekretärs*, pp. 343, 350.

²³³⁷ Von Thiesen, *Diplomatie und Patronage*, chap. 4.4.3, esp. pp. 363–364; Visceglia, *Roma papale e Spagna*, pp. 144–171.

²³³⁸ Paluzzi Altieri to Marescotti, Rome April 23, 1672: ASV, Segr. Stato, Spagna, vol. 139, f. 43v.

²³³⁹ Paluzzi Altieri to Marescotti, Rome April 23, 1672: ASV, Segr. Stato, Spagna, vol. 139, f. 43v.

In putting forth this argument, the papal nephew set the tone that would dominate his correspondence with Borromeo's successor as nuncio in Madrid, Galeazzo Marescotti. In the first instance, the cardinal-nephew adduced a number of procedural arguments against Nithard's elevation. Invoking time-honored precedent, he first argued that Nithard could at the earliest be nominated in the third consistory. As Paluzzi explained to the nuncio in Madrid, popes conferred red hats to their relatives in the first consistory and to particularly meritorious subjects in the second one. Only in the third consistory would they take the candidates of the Catholic crowns into consideration.²³⁴⁰ This delayed Nithard's elevation for at least a year.

As the third consistory loomed, Paluzzi Altieri needed to turn to sophistry. He now argued that Nithard had never been nominated, only recommended for promotion. As he explained to Marescotti, Catholic princes had two options to have their candidates elected in the third consistory. One of them was a recommendation, the other a nomination. If less powerful monarchs could only recommend candidates, Paluzzi Altieri claimed, the two leading crowns, France and Spain, also had the right to nominate candidates. In their case, the two procedures had distinct meanings. If the pope accepted a recommendation, this was a "grazia speciale e straordinaria" due entirely to his "benignità."²³⁴¹ Nominations, on the other hand, were more binding; they created an obligation for the pope to reciprocate the nominating prince. Having established this distinction, Paluzzi Altieri then went on to remind the nuncio that the papacy was trying to reduce the number of recommendations from princes who had the right to nominate candidates. If the pope were responsive to such a request from Spain, this would compel him to elevate another candidate for France. "[A]ccordandosi alla Corona di Spagna un Cardinale [...] i Francesi pretendessero la promozione di un altro soggetto in corrispondenza di quello, che à gli Spagnuoli si desse, e il processo delle pretensioni diverrebbe infinito," forcing the papacy into "una detestabile schiavitù."²³⁴² As the nephew's long-winded disquisitions revealed, contemporaries had hitherto used these terms interchangeably. The distinction seems to have been concocted, among other things, to bolster the argument that Clement X was in no way bound to prefer Nithard because he had never been nominated. In fact, the queen ought to be aware of the "insuperabile difficoltà" that "aprire la strada alle raccomandazioni comporta": "per lo essemplio, e per la uguaglianza pretesa dalle Corone [le raccomandazioni] havrebbero un passaggio infinito, e distruggerebbono la Corte di Roma col pregiudizio perpetuo dei suoi operai."²³⁴³

²³⁴⁰ This tallies with the description in a treatise written in the early half of the century quoted in Visceglia, "La giusta statera," pp. 172–173.

²³⁴¹ Paluzzi Altieri to Marescotti, Rome August 29, 1671: ASV, Segr. Stato, Spagna, vol. 139, f. 19r.

²³⁴² Paluzzi Altieri to Marescotti, Rome September 12, 1671: ASV, Segr. Stato, Spagna, vol. 139, f. 20v.

²³⁴³ Paluzzi Altieri to Marescotti, Rome February 24, 1672: ASV, Segr. Stato, Spagna, vol. 139, f. 275r.

Marescotti's investigations gave the lie to this last claim. As the nuncio found out, the queen had explicitly been advised to recommend rather than nominate Nithard. The high nobility in Madrid continued to ask for Nithard's advancement but insisted that they were recommending, not nominating, him. Marescotti feared that these were machinations against the queen, with the *grandees* who "non desiderano la promozione del P[ad]re Everardo" actively trying to "far credere alla Regina che loro la desiderano, e la procurano," while doing the exact opposite.²³⁴⁴ To Marescotti's shock, the members of the Council of State did not even deny this. When Pascual de Aragón opposed the motion to recommend Nithard, the count of Peñaranda sought to assuage his concerns by clarifying that "questa non era nomina, mà una lettera di raccomandazione, che non haverebbe havuto effetto."²³⁴⁵ Upon learning this, Marescotti took it upon himself to "disingannare" the queen regent by sending her a confidential letter that would "aprirgli l'intelletto acciò che gli dicono li Ministri."²³⁴⁶

It was at this point that the sophisticated division of labor within the secretariat of state became visible. Paluzzi Altieri feigned surprise at the fact that "si vorrebbe costì collo strepito ingannar la Regina, e farle credere, che si desidera una cosa, che non vuole."²³⁴⁷ In reality he must have been privy to the plans of the high nobility deliberately to opt for the wrong procedure. His was a cunning plan. Thanks to the uninitiated Marescotti the cardinal-nephew was able to keep up the façade of the secretariat of state as a rules-bound organization, which was particularly useful for him as he was under constant attack from rivals who accused him of pursuing his own agenda as an illegitimate nephew of the pope.²³⁴⁸ Behind the scenes, however, he was colluding with the elites in the Spanish monarchy to block Nithard's promotion. His channel to do so while keeping the records of the secretariat immaculate was the underestimated secretary of state with his extensive epistolary network to Spain's *grandees*. While the cardinal-nephew and the new nuncio in Madrid haggled over the technicalities of the nomination process, Borromeo used his privy correspondence to instruct his cronies in Madrid on how to sabotage Nithard's nomination.

One of Borromeo's main correspondents was cardinal Moncada. Moncada certainly was no friend of Nithard's who, incidentally, named him as the instigator of his woes, qualifying him as "entre los demás mis persecutores" and "mi mayor, y más cruel enemigo."²³⁴⁹ According to the confessor, Moncada had long shown an interest in becoming a member of the junta, and to accomplish this, he had conspired with Juan José to sack Nithard and take his post.²³⁵⁰ Nithard's

²³⁴⁴ Marescotti to Paluzzi Altieri, Madrid October 13, 1671: ASV, Segr. Stato, Spagna, vol. 139, f. 275r.

²³⁴⁵ Marescotti to Paluzzi Altieri, Madrid September 23, 1671: ASV, Segr. Stato, Spagna, vol. 139, ff. 264v–265r.

²³⁴⁶ Marescotti to Paluzzi Altieri, Madrid October 13, 1671: ASV, Segr. Stato, Spagna, vol. 139, ff. 275v–276r.

²³⁴⁷ Paluzzi Altieri to Marescotti, Rome February 24, 1672: ASV, Segr. Stato, Spagna, vol. 139, f. 40r.

²³⁴⁸ Lloyd, *Adopted Papal Kin*, p. 276.

²³⁴⁹ Pilo (ed.), *Juan Everardo Nithard*, p. 154.

²³⁵⁰ Novo Zaballós, *De confesor*, p. 781; Pilo (ed.), *Juan Everardo Nithard*, p. 160.

sneaking suspicion was confirmed by the Venetian ambassador who wrote that Moncada “si fece autore di quelle macchine che atterrarono l’alma fortuna di quel buon padre.”²³⁵¹ Given his history, it seems likely that he played a key role on the Spanish side in torpedoing Nithard’s cooptation, but there is little to suggest he would have been able to do it on his own. After all, even the nuncio in Madrid found it hard to believe that the members of the Council of State were familiar with the difference between recommendations and nominations.²³⁵² Although Moncada was a cardinal, he was hardly initiated enough to have been able deliberately to choose the wrong procedure. He had not set foot on Roman soil for many decades, and as a thoroughly hispanized Sicilian who had become a cardinal late in life, he was unlikely to be familiar with such hairsplitting. Indeed, given even the nuncio’s ignorance of the matter, it seems reasonable to assume that this legal sophistry was fed to him from where it originated: the secretariat of state.

Moncada and Borromeo corresponded on a regular basis. From the moment of his departure from Madrid, the two Italian members of the Spanish ruling elite maintained epistolary contact, with Moncada acknowledging receipt of Borromeo’s letter, stating his continued “obligación” and wishing him good health, making it clear that they had entered a relationship of mutual assistance.²³⁵³ As was to be expected, Borromeo’s correspondence contains a number of letters from Moncada in which they exchanged news about Nithard’s fate. Unfortunately, the critical missives from 1671 and 1672 do not survive²³⁵⁴, though Borromeo’s letters from 1670 do show he was trying to park Nithard in an archdiocese, possibly Agrigento in Sicily, which the Jesuit promptly turned down.²³⁵⁵ In a letter dated November 22, 1670, Borromeo assured Moncada, “Il Padre Everardo non anderà à Girgento, perché la Regina non vuole che si violenti, et egli col titolo di persuasiva non vuole andarvi.” Contrary to Nithard’s expectations, this slimmed his chances of obtaining the coveted red hat. As Federico scoffed, “Spera continuare nella Regina l’impegno di nominarlo Cardinale, et così non sarà né Cardinale, né Vescovo.”²³⁵⁶ Given the tone of this correspondence, it seems plausible that Borromeo later instructed Moncada on how to avert Nithard’s preferment. Indeed, all the sophistry in the official correspondence of the secretariat of state only makes sense once it is set against the backdrop of Borromeo’s particular correspondence through which he fed the Spanish side the very arguments over which the secretary of state then wrangled with the nuncio. In so doing, Borromeo was able to loosen the constraints of an official channel while undermining his earlier promises through informal vehicles.

²³⁵¹ Bellegno, *Relazione di Spagna*, p. 372.

²³⁵² See Marescotti to Paluzzi Altieri, Madrid October 21, 1671: ASV, Segr. Stato, Spagna, vol. 139, f. 280v.

²³⁵³ Moncada to Borromeo, Zaragoza, December 30, 1670: BNE, ms. 12877, f. 12r.

²³⁵⁴ According to Lina Scalisi, the Archivio Moncada in the Archivio di Stato of Palermo does not hold letters from these two years. Private correspondence with the author dated May 19, 2017.

²³⁵⁵ Altieri to Marescotti, Rome September 13, 1670: ASV, Segr. Stato, Spagna, vol. 353, ff. 21v–22r; Novo Zaballos, *De confesor*, p. 794.

²³⁵⁶ Quoted in Scalisi, *In omnibus ego*, p. 562.

Such two-facedness was linked to the ubiquitous dissimulation of the age. To contemporaries, dissimulation was related to deceit, and many a Catholic scholar in the early seventeenth century sought to separate equivocation from straightforward mendacity. The main thrust of the argument was that the ability to keep “secrets by rendering them unreadable or invisible to others” was a problematic, though indispensable, governing technique.²³⁵⁷ As such, it cut both ways. Originally a form of self-management of elites, dissimulation could be appropriated by marginalized actors plotting to overthrow the elite-centered order of the day. In Spanish Italy, one of the more well-known treatises on the subject, Torquato Accetto’s *Della dissimulazione onesta* (1641), can indeed be read as a primer of dissimulation as a “tecnica di opposizione politica.”²³⁵⁸ According to one scholar, in this booklet, dissimulation, a “strumento che finora è stato proprio delle classi dominanti,” morphed into “una via per tentare di uscire dalla subalternità e dall’impotenza.”²³⁵⁹ What this reading elides, though, is that dissimulation proved equally valuable to the other side as it labored at a way out of the crisis of the 1640s. For elites trying to wrest back control while seemingly giving in to the widespread clamoring for transparency and participation in monarchical government, dissimulation became again de rigueur, leading to the strange rebirth of a concept that was supposedly dead as soon as calls for publicity became more insistent.²³⁶⁰ As José Antonio Maravall noted long ago of baroque elites, they “están atentas siempre a tomar en cuenta – no a seguir, desde luego, más bien lo contrario – los pareceres” of the vast majority of commoners.²³⁶¹

Critics of the oligarchy at the helm of the Spanish monarchy started to pick up on this in the late 1660s, lambasting the master dissimulators in the court as “cortezanos políticos.” In contemporary parlance, “politics” was usually associated with the pursuit of cynical self-interest and coded as incompatible with Christian values.²³⁶² The “cortezano político” strenuously sought to square that circle. As the author of a pamphlet written during the Nithard crisis in 1669 saw it, this new courtier did not deny that the substance of “la política” was the ability to “desviar a los otros para introducirse a sí.”²³⁶³ But he took great care to couch his self-seeking behavior in religious language: he “se valdrá de lo christiano como de ançuelo para pescar lo que pretende la loca codicia de la ambición.”²³⁶⁴ As a clergyman, Federico Borromeo was well placed to embrace the new model, basking in descriptions of himself as a “gran Politico [...] sciolto affatto da ogni interesse,” which he

²³⁵⁷ Snyder, *Dissimulation*, p. 6.

²³⁵⁸ Villari, *Elogio*, pp. 25, 29, 34-35.

²³⁵⁹ Villari, *Elogio*, p. 41.

²³⁶⁰ This is the argument of Snyder in his *Dissimulation*, pp. xv, 138.

²³⁶¹ Maravall, *La cultura*, p. 221.

²³⁶² On the negative connotation of the term, see Stollberg-Rilinger, *The Baroque State*.

²³⁶³ Quoted in Carrasco Martínez, *Los grandes*, p. 88.

²³⁶⁴ Quoted in Carrasco Martínez, *Los grandes*, p. 88.

supposedly took to mean possessing the ability to align narrow dynastic ambitions with the common good.²³⁶⁵

With the assistance of clergymen like Federico Borromeo, dissimulation was being rebooted as an ingenious response to the new and austere climate that had descended upon Catholic Europe. As Irene Fosi has shown in her study of cardinal Giulio Sacchetti, and as my own research on Borromeo confirms, papal offices were no longer perceived as entities that single officeholders could capture to further the interests of their families.²³⁶⁶ As a Spanish political writer would put it in the 1680s, “Ha de procurar un príncipe que sean tales las máximas de su gobierno que tengan el aplauso de los súbditos.”²³⁶⁷ But appearance counted for more than substance: necessary though it was to shield government from contestatory outside forces, adroit dissimulation was perhaps even more essential to elites who had to negotiate the mismatch between the rhetoric and action. As public institutions became nominally committed to the collective good, the particular interests of officeholders needed to be advanced outside the formal channels of government.²³⁶⁸ To keep up the good government front, it became necessary to operate behind closed doors, through alternative correspondence networks that rivaled the increasingly formalized ones that the Chigi reforms in the Roman curia had introduced.²³⁶⁹

This finding accords with ongoing historiographical debates on informal channels in seventeenth-century institutions.²³⁷⁰ In her work on the curia, Birgit Emich has stressed the role of informality in the creation of formal institutions. Emich sees informal channels as functional to state-building, arguing that they strengthened “la lealtà del personale, conferendo ai poteri ancora deboli un’ autorità, che, senza l’integrazione di questi aspetti informali, non avrebbero avuto.”²³⁷¹ In her mind, the early modern period was not one of formalization per se but one that witnessed the increased institutionalization of informal governance which was harnessed to reinforce budding administrative bodies.²³⁷² Yet, as I argue here, the same process could produce opposite effects as well. As sociologists of organizations have noted, invigorated institutions engender informal processes precisely to evade the constraints of formality.²³⁷³ Thus, while informal networks

²³⁶⁵ Relazione della Corte di Roma fatta dal Sig.r Marchese Bigliore di Lucerna stato Amb.re Straordinario d’obbedienza à Papa Clemente X.o per l’Altezza Reale di Savoia: BAV, Vat. Lat., 12530, ff. 103r–v

²³⁶⁶ Fosi, *All’ombra dei Barberini*, pp. 138, 152–153.

²³⁶⁷ Juan Alfonso de Lancina, *Comentarios políticos* (1687), quoted in Maravall, *La cultura*, p. 204.

²³⁶⁸ See Béguin, *Les princes*, p. 328.

²³⁶⁹ Campbell, *Power*, p. 307.

²³⁷⁰ Emich, *Vincoli informali*, pp. 128–129.

²³⁷¹ Emich, *Vincoli informali*, p. 137.

²³⁷² Emich, “Der Hof,” p. 79.

²³⁷³ Emich, *Vincoli informali*, p. 129; Emich, “Der Hof,” pp. 78–79.

sometimes complement the stated mission of formal organizations, informality can as easily become a weapon to undermine it.²³⁷⁴

The papal institutions of the late seventeenth century are a case in point. To the Roman elite, institutions were at once necessary and inconvenient. Institutionalized processes conferred legitimacy to governing elites, consecrating their actions as disinterested in an age when they were subject to scrutiny in a nascent public sphere.²³⁷⁵ As Günther Wassilowsky's work on the reform of the conclave in the 1620s has illustrated, Rome's governing oligarchy developed an early interest in lending legitimacy to the clientele that crisscrossed the papal court by crowbarring them into institutionalized procedures.²³⁷⁶ Even so, formalization was barely compatible with seventeenth-century elites' patrimonial conception of office.²³⁷⁷ As clientele networks were subjected to a "Visibilisierungsverbot," informal channels needed to be instituted to manipulate established procedures and nudge them toward the desired outcome.²³⁷⁸ Birgit Emich's work on grain exports from the Papal States shows that papal families increasingly operated two parallel channels to meet the contradicting requirements of rational-bureaucratic governance and patronage.²³⁷⁹ The small group of beneficiaries of clientelism came to see the strictures of formal proceedings as a shield from the rancor of the vast majority of left-behinds, and accepted to relegate their dealings to an emergent informal sphere.²³⁸⁰

The necessity to square that circle offers a new explanation for the rise of the baroque state, whose *raison d'être* was the realization, as Barbara Stollberg-Rilinger puts it, that "there could be no front stage without a backstage, no formality without informal backdoors."²³⁸¹ In other words, the new public script, to adopt James C. Scott's apt phrases, gave birth to a hidden transcript. Although Scott's concept has mostly been applied to the study of the hidden resistance of subordinate actors, Scott himself stressed that dominant groups equally resort to stealth in order to preserve their domination. As he notes, "Dominant groups often have much to conceal, and typically they also have the wherewithal to conceal what they wish."²³⁸² Baroque institutions were as impressive an example as any of such a project. They became "a performance designed to conceal an offstage arena of politics that would contradict" their stated aims, and as such were a tribute to the nobility's keen

²³⁷⁴ Emich, "Der Hof," p. 80; Wassilowsky, *Vorsehung*, p. 72.

²³⁷⁵ On this process, see Bernsee, *Moralische Erneuerung*, although he attributes it to the rise of enlightened clubs and societies in the late eighteenth century.

²³⁷⁶ Wassilowsky, *Vorsehung*, pp. 70, 76.

²³⁷⁷ On these tensions, see Rowlands, *Dynastic State*, and Krischer, *New Directions*.

²³⁷⁸ Emich, "Der Hof," p. 80. Also see Wassilowsky, *Vorsehung*, p. 72.

²³⁷⁹ Emich, "Der Hof," p. 77.

²³⁸⁰ Emich, "Der Hof," p. 78.

²³⁸¹ Stollberg-Rilinger, *The Baroque State*.

²³⁸² Scott, *Domination*, p. 12.

understanding that, “Actions by elites that *publicly* contradict the basis of a claim to power are threatening.”²³⁸³

The Altieri whose service Federico Borromeo had entered embodied the hypocrisy of the age, and their family home in Rome exemplified this. Surrounded by narrow alleys, the Altieri mansion appeared to be excessively modest from outside when compared to the sumptuous palace of the Pamphili on Piazza Navona, marking a turn toward ostentatious unconspicuousness among papal families.²³⁸⁴ The bounty was hidden behind this unobtrusive façade. After crossing two courts of honor, visitors accessed an impressive staircase. The insides were decorated by up-and-coming artists such as Carlo Maratta, many of whom owed their lasting fame to the orders from the papal family.²³⁸⁵ The impressively large building was richly decorated with frescoes and stucco work depicting the city of Rome’s pagan and Christian history (often combining the two), boosting the social standing of a family whose claim to fame was its ancient membership of Rome’s patriciate who had steadily been losing power to outsiders as families from other Italian towns and cities conquered the papacy.²³⁸⁶ A visitor described the audience hall of the palace as “parata tutta di fondo d’oro e velluto cremisi,” and added, “sulle volte di queste camere vi sono diversi festoni e cavalli di stucco fatti da ottimi artisti.”²³⁸⁷ Rounding it all off was the appropriately named *Sala della Clemenza*, an unabashed celebration of the good government of Paluzzi Altieri who was portrayed as the barely disguised deliverer of such bounty.²³⁸⁸ All this suggested a clear contrast between inside and outside which set palazzo Altieri apart from the residences of previous papal families, marking a turn toward ostentatious inconspicuousness among papal families.²³⁸⁹ The overall impression is that of a “contenitore architettonico apparentemente ‘contenuto’ dal punto di vista morfologico” which nevertheless hosted “interni di una straordinaria ricchezza decorativa, divenendo così uno scrigno di meraviglie capace di folgorare, stupendolo, il raffinato gusto dei visitatori di qualità.”²³⁹⁰ The Altieri’s palace was an exercise in outward understatement whose treasures were accessible only to the initiated who were exposed to the celebration of a complacent elite committed to good governance.

Federico had come to share this approach to power. Given his experience in the Spanish court, he understood that if governing elites invited public scrutiny, government needed to resort to secrecy. The transition from “un régime du secret et de la conspiration à un régime de la publicité” (Héloïse Hermant) that he had helped usher in in Spain spawned the necessity of informal

²³⁸³ Scott, *Domination*, pp. 11, 12.

²³⁸⁴ Cipriani, *Un programma*, p. 178.

²³⁸⁵ Cipriani, *Un programma*, p. 179.

²³⁸⁶ Reinhardt, *Pontifex*, p. 651.

²³⁸⁷ Pinaroli, *Trattato delle cose più memorabili di Roma [...] (1725)*, quoted in Cipriani, *Un programma*, p. 184.

²³⁸⁸ Mezzetti, *Palazzo Altieri*, p. 14; Lloyd, *Adopted Papal Kin*, pp. 269–278.

²³⁸⁹ Daloz, *(Un)conspicuousness*.

²³⁹⁰ Morolli, *L’“anfiteatro”*, p. 112.

government channels hidden from public scrutiny where the *arcana imperii* could be stowed away.²³⁹¹ In the papal court, patronage needed to be effaced from the official record of the secretariat of state and be relegated to informal correspondence networks. Given all this, Borromeo's absence from the official record was not a sign of a lack of influence. Instead, it is indicative of a new division of labor between the cardinal-nephew and the secretary of state, one that was suitable to the populist age that the courts of Madrid and Rome had entered with the rise of Juan José and the Altieri family. Unlike in earlier times, the secretary of state worked behind the scenes and produced the desired outcomes for his clients, allowing the papal nephew to tend to the good government façade that was erected to misrecognize the powerful social interests that still dominated papal institutions. If Paluzzi Altieri was the public face of papal diplomacy, Federico Borromeo was the one who coordinated it behind the scenes while paying lip-service to the idea that "non si può quello, che non si deve."²³⁹²

With their division of labor Paluzzi Altieri and Borromeo contributed to the ongoing debate on dissimulation. If early proponents of this governing technique, such as Niccolò Machiavelli, had seen it as one for princes, seventeenth-century reason-of-state thinkers in Italy and Spain came to see it primarily as a quality of government ministers. Federico Borromeo appears to have been particularly influenced by Giovanni Botero, the godfather of reason of state who had temporarily served as Carlo Borromeo's secretary and Federico Sr.'s tutor.²³⁹³ In an oft-quoted passage on secrecy among diplomats, Botero in his *Della ragion di stato* (1589) had made a case for dissimulation, arguing that "the designs of princes work well and smoothly while they are hidden, but as soon as they come to light they lose their ease and effectiveness."²³⁹⁴ If Botero had assigned counselors and ministers an important role in safeguarding the *arcana imperii*, Diego de Saavedra Fajardo wanted to free princes of the constraints of dissimulation and instead burden his ministers with this arduous chore. Dissimulation, he argued, offended the sacredness of kingship, and it was therefore the task of his ministers to use dissimulation to shield kings from potential criticism.²³⁹⁵ To his mind, a prince's counselors and ministers were required to help conceal the vices of the ruler, so as not to imperil his hold on power.²³⁹⁶ Convinced of the necessity of dissimulation, Borromeo played his part well, hoping that his sacrifices would eventually pay off for his family as well.

In the Nithard affair, the success of the division of labor between the cardinal-nephew and the secretary of state lasted for two years. In early 1672 the delaying tactics no longer worked. In a bid to force the papacy's hand, the queen regent had nominated Nithard ambassador extraordinary

²³⁹¹ Hermant, *Guerres*, p. 15. On contemporary preoccupations with secrecy, see Burke, *The Fabrication*, p. 8.

²³⁹² Federico IV to Antonio Renato, Rome November 14, 1671: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, *Corrispondenza 1671–1680*.

²³⁹³ On Botero's association with the Borromeo, see Bireley, *The Counter-Reformation Prince*, pp. 46–47.

²³⁹⁴ *Della ragion di stato*, book 2, chap. 7, quoted in Snyder, *Dissimulation*, p. 122.

²³⁹⁵ Snyder, *Dissimulation*, p. 141.

²³⁹⁶ Bireley, *The Counter-Reformation Prince*, p. 200.

as soon as he arrived in Rome. As appalled as everyone else in Madrid at the prospect, the sitting ambassador, the marquis of Astorga, himself a member of Spain's governing elite, had done everything in his power to prevent Nithard from serving in his new capacity.²³⁹⁷ Still, this undesired outcome became a reality when Astorga became viceroy of Naples in October 1671 and Nithard was nominated interim ambassador until the arrival of his successor, the marquis of Carpio.²³⁹⁸ Resigning himself to this *fait accompli*, Borromeo was now working toward keeping Nithard in Rome, where he was expected to be less damaging to his clients' interests, and urged the pope to furnish the Jesuit with the titles he needed to act as ambassador. In January 1672, Nithard received the title of archbishop of Edessa, a archdiocese *in partibus infidelium* that did not require him to reside there.²³⁹⁹ After Astorga had left for Naples, the cardinal's hat followed suit.²⁴⁰⁰ Following two years of successful stonewalling from Borromeo, Nithard became a member of the college of cardinals.²⁴⁰¹

Borromeo's patron, Juan José, was unhappy with this turn of events. In a last-ditch effort to upstage Nithard, the bastard had written a letter to Borromeo in which he acknowledged the "mudanza de escena" in Rome, which made it almost impossible for the pope to decide against Nithard's elevation. As he himself admitted, "para una total negativa bien advierto que se [h]an dado ya demasiados pasos."²⁴⁰² Nevertheless, he urged Borromeo for "una prudente y justa dilazion tal qual baste a esperar los obstáculos que el mismo tiempo subministrará."²⁴⁰³ That request came too late. As Federico lamented in a candid letter to his brother, many potential beneficiaries of the Borromeo family "compatiscono di non vedere così libera l'autorità, che io tengo, come forsi la crederebbono alcuni proficua al Pubblico."²⁴⁰⁴ Nithard's belated preference put him in the uncomfortable position of having to explain to his patron that "il mio grado è di servire, non di comandare."²⁴⁰⁵

This low profile was not without its perks. Shortly after his appointment, Antonio Grimani, the Venetian ambassador to Rome, had remarked that Borromeo actively sought to give the impression that he was unimportant, toying with the faux modesty popular among Roman officeholders steeped in a culture of dissimulation: "Col signor cardinal Altieri [Borromeo] pratica

²³⁹⁷ Novo Zaballos, *De confesor*, pp. 807–808, 832; consulta of the Council of State, Madrid August 3, 1669: AGS, EST, leg. 3113, unfol.

²³⁹⁸ Novo Zaballos, *De confesor*, p. 811; Nithard to queen Mariana, Rome November 21, 1671: AGS, EST, leg. 3113, unfol.

²³⁹⁹ Novo Zaballos, *De confesor*, p. 814.

²⁴⁰⁰ See consulta of the Council of State, Madrid August 3, 1669: AGS, EST, leg. 3113, unfol.

²⁴⁰¹ Oliván, *Nithard en Roma*, pp. 588–589.

²⁴⁰² Juan José to Federico Borromeo, Zaragoza April 24, 1672: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, *Corrispondenza 1671–1680*.

²⁴⁰³ Juan José to Federico Borromeo, Zaragoza April 24, 1672: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, *Corrispondenza 1671–1680*.

²⁴⁰⁴ Federico IV to Antonio Renato, Rome September 17, 1672: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, *Corrispondenza 1645–1655*, fasc. 1652.

²⁴⁰⁵ Federico IV to Antonio Renato, Rome September 17, 1672: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, *Corrispondenza 1645–1655*, fasc. 1652.

tutto il rispetto, et leva l'ombre di volersi avanzare in autorità."²⁴⁰⁶ Such a self-fashioning distracted from the shadow diplomacy he conducted outside the remit of the official correspondence of the secretariat of state. In line with the *modus operandi* he had been perfecting ever since he had served as nuncio to the Swiss Confederacy, he actively strove to remain undetected, certain that this would allow him to achieve much more than when he worked in broad daylight. As he himself wrote of his informal epistolary network, "questa non è mercanzia da metter in piazza, et il più delle volte giova più l'haverla in capitale, che il farne la mostra."²⁴⁰⁷ It was capital that was much more effective when it remained hidden. Donning the mantle of the lowly scribe helped him distract from the fact that he was doing Juan José's bidding. In fact, he was able to deceive most. Upon Nithard's elevation, the confessor's allies thanked Borromeo for his efforts, oblivious to his role in delaying it.²⁴⁰⁸ Pedro Fernández, for instance, acknowledged Borromeo's "tan gran parte" in "este buen suzeso de que Su Mag[esta]d (Dios la g[uar]de) se halla tan gustosa y satisfecha."²⁴⁰⁹ Borromeo's duplicity helped his side without uniting its adversaries against him.

His obscurantism also saved him from the wrath of his patron and his cronies in Spain when he failed to deliver. After Nithard's nomination, it was not Borromeo who took the brunt of the blame; Juan José's anger was directed against the pope and his nephew. In a letter to the secretary of state he railed against "el Padre común en quien residen las vezes de Dios, que declara que no puede impedir aún con prudentes dilaciones que un hombre de las calidades de Everardo lleno de ambición, tiranía, e impiedad [...] sea en un momento hecho Príncipe de la Iglesia Cathólica [...]"²⁴¹⁰ This blame-shifting fit a broader pattern. According to Gregorio Leti, "Borromei impegnava facilmente il Papa in certe cose, che sapeva esser poco grate al Cardinal'Altieri, per tirar sul dosso di questo la mala sodisfattione de' Prencipi."²⁴¹¹ He added, "Borromei si scaricava sopra le Spalle del Cardinal Nipote di tutte le difficoltà che li Rappresentanti trovavano al Palazzo [Apostolico] nel proseguimento degli interessi de' loro Padroni."²⁴¹² When he failed to deliver, he could simply claim, as he did, that he "non era ch'un Ministro con la dipendenza al Nipote, senza il quale non poteva far nulla, né avanzar cosa alcuna."²⁴¹³ His role in the background allowed him to shrug off responsibility and still continue to claim to be an influential representative of the *diacatholicon*. Indeed, after Nithard's elevation, he passive-aggressively wrote to his brother, "io posso sodisfarmi, che non si sia ancora visto un Sec[reta]rio di Stato, che habbia havuto maggior confidenza col Papa, et con li

²⁴⁰⁶ Grimani, *Relazione di Roma*, p. 359; Karsten, *Künstler und Kardinale*, pp. 9–10.

²⁴⁰⁷ Federico IV to Antonio Renato, Rome September 17, 1672: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, *Corrispondenza 1645–1655*, fasc. 1652.

²⁴⁰⁸ Count of Villaumbrosa to Federico Borromeo, Madrid June 7, 1672: BNE, ms. 12877, f. 574r.

²⁴⁰⁹ Pedro Fernández to Federico Borromeo, Madrid June 12, 1672: BNE, ms. 12877, f. 580r.

²⁴¹⁰ Juan José to Federico Borromeo, Zaragoza June 4, 1672: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, *Corrispondenza 1671–1680*.

²⁴¹¹ Leti, *Il livello*, p. 106.

²⁴¹² Leti, *Il livello*, pp. 106–107.

²⁴¹³ Leti, *Il livello*, p. 110.

Dominanti di quella [corte], che tengo io.”²⁴¹⁴ So persuasive had his self-fashioning been that some had begun to believe it, leading Borromeo to clarify that the “ciarle [...] che possono inventarsi o masticarsi” in Milan about his lack of influence were “tutte favole.”²⁴¹⁵ Although he helped spin the legend that he was uninfluential, Borromeo was anything but. The secretary of state may once have been a lowly scribe; Borromeo acted as a patron unto himself in charge of his own clientele that he sought to satisfy as a proud holder of one of the most eminent offices in the curia.

The belated triumph of the family cardinal was a rare second shot at self-affirmation after Giovanni’s bid for power had failed. Following decades of stumbling to get back on their feet, Federico’s self-conscious involvement in the power struggles in Madrid and his assistance in bringing about a more populist monarchy helped to solve the family’s own contradiction between a commitment to the common good and the need to preserve their own privileges. His reputation as a disinterested member of the clergy helped to lodge him firmly on the Spanish scene when his family had almost given up hopes of recuperating what had been lost under Giovanni.

Federico’s curial career was an example of how, in the seventeenth century, capital acquired in the court of Rome could be spent in the Spanish court. If the Borromeo had initially seen Federico’s Roman career as an investment to swell their net worth, it became their last best hope to exert the influence in Madrid that his brother had been denied. After Giovanni’s self-aggrandizement had foundered, Federico brilliantly converted the symbolic power acquired thanks to his crucial work in the settlement of the jurisdictional conflicts in Spanish Italy and the crisis in the monarchy’s central government into influence in Spanish high politics. In so doing, he achieved what his brother had not accomplished: he had, almost by accident, morphed into an integral part of the small elite shaping the future of the Spanish empire.

Princely service, despite all the restrictions it imposed on the nobility, had become the only way for that group not to be swept away by the forces that they had unleashed. Standing shoulder to shoulder with the king’s family and assisting them in enforcing good government was all that separated them from calamity, something Federico Borromeo had learned in the early years of his career and that successive events in Switzerland and Madrid seemed to confirm over and over again. Given his repeated brushes with popular discontent, it was only natural for Borromeo to become a willing executioner of Juan José’s populist regime. It did not take long for him to recognize the potential for social stability intrinsic to a new political model that outwardly addressed the crisis of legitimacy of elite rule. Although the nobility had to feign to be more amenable to the calls for justice from below, Juan José’s monarchy did not empower ordinary people. In fact, they were made to look

²⁴¹⁴ Federico IV to Antonio Renato, Rome September 17, 1672: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, Corrispondenza 1645–1655, fasc. 1652.

²⁴¹⁵ Federico IV to Antonio Renato, September 3, 1672: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, Corrispondenza 1671–1680.

up to the nobility to improve their fate. Borromeo quickly realized that the top-down nature of the dispensation, a benevolent prince and his noble helpers showering the populace with good governance, could help to strengthen the power of a tiny elite of political experts to whom he belonged.

The learning curve had been steep. Federico's brother Giovanni had captured political institutions to further his dynastic interests and had done so in broad daylight. Federico, thanks to his training and experience, understood that, in an age when popular movements had forced institutions to act in the common good, such an explosive agenda could be advanced only by subterfuge. Where his brother had viewed the commonwealth as a "theater for individual greatness," to quote Jonathan Dewald, Federico was well aware that such ambitions needed to be subsumed under a public commitment to the collective wellbeing.²⁴¹⁶ In a pivot reminiscent of France's state nobility studied by Pierre Bourdieu, he and other components of Spain's governing elite increasingly relied on institutions committed to lofty ideals to transfigure their stake in a system whose main function was to misrecognize the perpetuation of privilege.²⁴¹⁷ As the monarchy was no longer able to act openly as a delivery mechanism for a tiny elite, families like the Borromeo were forced to resort to backroom deals if they wanted to preserve their interests and those of their cronies. The informal structures set up within institutions pointed a way out of the quandary into which the Borromeo had maneuvered themselves when they had given up resistance and become loyal servants of the house of Habsburg. Like so many other Italian families, they had come to realize that "a monarchy that seemed highly successful and seemed to display a capacity for expansion was a better guarantee of their own existence" than the rugged individualism that had failed to deliver the desired outcome.²⁴¹⁸ The price they paid for this was substantial, however. Federico's membership of the club of Spanish grandees was ephemeral and borrowed, inseparable from his position as a cardinal of the Roman Church: after his death everything gained would be lost. He may have come as close to power as no Borromeo before him, but most of it would vanish upon his passing. In a society that prided itself on inherited privilege, this was a major blow, one that Federico and his brother, Antonio Renato, would spend the better part of the 1670s to soften.

²⁴¹⁶ Dewald, *Status, Power, and Identity*, p. 38.

²⁴¹⁷ Wacquant, *Foreword*, p. xiii.

²⁴¹⁸ Muto, *Noble Presence*, p. 292.

Chapter 13

Stability Triumphant: The Borromeo as Loyal Servants of the House of Habsburg

Nowhere did Federico's elevation to the cardinalate late in 1670 attract more attention than in his hometown of Milan. There, in the "heart" of the Spanish monarchy, his younger brother Antonio Renato set out to felicitate the belated honor in public festivities designed to rival those that customarily accompanied special events in the royal family. Taking place sometime in 1671 and lasting three consecutive days, the pageant was recorded for wider consumption by Pietro Paolo Bosca, a scholar who had been made prefect of the Borromeo's preferred cultural institution, the Biblioteca Ambrosiana, a few years earlier.²⁴¹⁹ According to Bosca's encomium, Antonio Renato spent his days moving from one lavishly decorated church to the next, shaking hands with throngs of well-wishers, before he proceeded every night to light torches whose "missilibus flammis rutilare caelum," reflecting in the surrounding windows as they illuminated the night sky above Milan.²⁴²⁰ Fascinating in their own right, these spectacles were only meant to set the stage for Antonio Renato's masterstroke—the "officia" that were celebrated at Sant'Antonio Abate, the church of the Theatines, a Counterreformation order of which four other brothers were members: combining the sword and the cross, symphonies were followed by canon shots, "ut religiosus Mars, & Martia religio videretur," in a moving tribute to the *diacatholicon* so treasured by the new cardinal.²⁴²¹

The massive investment in performative magnificence had been necessary because the strategic tilt toward princely service that Federico embodied was far from uncontroversial within the family. As Federico soared, his younger brother, Paolo Emilio, sought to revive the family's failed military tradition, tendering his services as a military entrepreneur to the powers-that-be. A self-proclaimed victim of an arbitrary order of birth, Paolo Emilio cozied up to Fernando de Valenzuela (1630–1692), the new strongman in the court of Madrid, and his local representative, Gaspar Téllez Girón, duke of Osuna, who had crafted a new social bloc by bringing together social parvenus from the financial sector and malcontents from the ranks of the established nobility. Predicting the incipient collapse of that regime, Federico in 1671 was determined to employ the festivities for his elevation to force the family to stay the course he had sketched out for them. Quite apart from the disreputability of the military option, he was appalled at the association of members of his clan with a regime of social strivers. Rather than indulge Valenzuela and his cronies, as Paolo Emilio was trying to do, the other Borromeo brothers labored at the removal of that clique and the restoration of a semblance of stability and social order, all in an attempt to bring Federico's reinvention of the Spanish monarchy under the leadership of Juan José of Austria to its intended conclusion.

²⁴¹⁹ Petrucci, Bosca.

²⁴²⁰ Bosca, *De origine et statu*, pp. 179–180.

²⁴²¹ Bosca, *De origine et statu*, p. 179.

The festivities for Federico's elevation to the cardinalate marked the moment when the latent conflict on the future orientation of the Borromeo family broke out one last time—and ended in a decisive victory for Federico and Antonio Renato, who moored the family's fortunes to the notion of princely service that they had espoused in the wake of Giovanni's ouster. Following Federico's sudden death two years after the conferral of the cardinalate, in 1673, Antonio Renato sought to immortalize the cardinal's immaterial legacy of princely service.²⁴²² Whether through the attempted canonization of a second family member, Federico Sr., or the commission of a pictorial cycle, Antonio Renato emphasized his family's ecclesiastical legacy but reinterpreted it as conducive to the consolidation of Spanish power in Italy. His patronage of the arts in particular drew heavily on the representational strategies of papal families which Federico had picked up through his close contact with that milieu, enabling the Borromeo to stake a claim to governance when Paolo Emilio's participation in the Valenzuela regime had undermined such aspirations. Thus, when Valenzuela was toppled by Juan José of Austria and the Spanish high nobility put itself back in the saddle in the late 1670s, the Borromeo's artistic patronage created a *fait accompli*: representing Federico's close association with the royal bastard and the populist monarchy he epitomized, the Borromeo thrust themselves forward as committed purveyors of good governance who deserved to be reinstated under the new regime. This rehabilitation they duly obtained, and much else, too: as Federico and Giovanni's heirs affirmed themselves at the pinnacle of power, they not only cemented the Borromeo's position as servants of the house of Habsburg; as members of a governing aristocracy, they were, finally, able to crack down on the *togati* who had made their lives miserable, and secure that stability that had eluded them for too long.

Detailing the Borromeo's consolidation as a leading family of princely servants, this chapter explores how patronage of the arts was put in the service of the reinvention of the established nobility in the latter half of the seventeenth century. Building on Diana Carrió-Invernizzi's work on the influence of the patronage of papal families on the representational strategies of the Spanish monarchy under Charles II, I show how art could be weaponized to create illusions of grandeur by a pan-Hispanic elite under duress.²⁴²³ As I argue here, advancing Arne Karsten's seminal work on papal dynasties, for a family who felt crowded out by a new vision of the monarchy as a commonwealth, art was a way of fabricating a tradition of princely service in whose name they could wrest back control in the face of multiple challenges to their rule.²⁴²⁴ Misrecognizing as it did the self-interested nature of their public service, patronage of the arts served as a handmaiden of a new governing elite whose power rested on an arrangement between the monarch and the nobility that was not too

²⁴²² See Levi, *L'eredità*.

²⁴²³ Carrió-Invernizzi, *El gobierno*.

²⁴²⁴ Karsten, *Künstler und Kardinäle*.

dissimilar from contemporaneous processes in France.²⁴²⁵ As in the realm of Louis XIV, so in the Spain of Charles II, social collaboration between a symbolically exalted monarch and an emerging state nobility restored a semblance of stability after decades of intense uncertainty.²⁴²⁶ In putting forth this narrative, I challenge the old *neoforalista* interpretation of Spanish history, arguing instead that the comeback of the traditional elite was not a return to a feudal past but, rather, a reinterpretation of the failed Olivares model of elite integration through military service. In a recognition of errors past, symbolic performances of fealty to the ruling dynasty and its stated mission supplanted the pursuit of material interests as the traditional nobility reaffirmed itself in the baroque monarchy of Charles II and his stepbrother, Juan José of Austria. It was a chance the Borromeo could not let slip by.

The major obstacle to the fabrication of the Borromeo as disinterested servants was the baby of the family, Paolo Emilio. Born in 1633, he was almost a generation younger than his elder brothers, Federico and Antonio Renato. In the family there seems to have been a consensus that he was not the sharpest knife in the drawer (“poco cervello”) and that he had a disturbing tendency to act insensibly, exposing the family to public embarrassment.²⁴²⁷ As Federico phrased it in a particularly despairing moment in 1656, “Dice e scrive spropositi che dimostrano propriam[en]te esser fuori di sé.”²⁴²⁸ What had set off his handwringing was Paolo Emilio’s recent imprisonment at Pizzighettone, a fortress on the state’s southern border.²⁴²⁹ The reasons for his incarceration remain unclear, though evidence suggests that Pizzighettone was regularly used to jail rebellious members of the high nobility who had become embroiled in feuds. The conditions reflected the prisoners’ social standing: they were accommodated in relatively comfortable cells, where a limited number of servants, including a personal chef, took care of them.²⁴³⁰ Whatever the reasons that led to his arrest, Paolo Emilio’s family had mixed feeling about it. On the one hand, they appear to have seen his imprisonment as a welcome respite from his shenanigans, with Federico rejoicing that a grave “pericolo di riputat[ion]e” had been averted.²⁴³¹ He did have a point. At the time Giovanni was seeking admittance to the order of the Golden Fleece, and the wayward behavior of the black sheep in the family was thought to hamstring his candidacy (see chapter 8). On the other hand, Federico cautioned against unduly prolonging his incarceration, seeing as the Borromeo’s rivals in Milan might lobby for his release in order to feed the narrative of the Borromeo brothers as shameless grifters,

²⁴²⁵ Kühner, *Il va de*, pp. 126–127; Béguin, Condé, p. 267.

²⁴²⁶ Burke, *The Fabrication*; Beik, *The Absolutism*.

²⁴²⁷ Federico IV to Antonio Renato, Lucerne March 12, 1656 and Federico IV to Giovanna Cesi, Lucerne August 3, 1656: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, *Corrispondenza 1656–1664*.

²⁴²⁸ Federico IV to Giovanna Cesi, Lucerne October 28, 1656: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, *Corrispondenza 1656–1664*.

²⁴²⁹ Federico IV to Giovanna Cesi, Lucerne October 28, 1656: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, *Corrispondenza 1656–1664*.

²⁴³⁰ Rizzo, *I cespiti*, p. 474; Carlo Francesco Gorani, *Libro di memorie, nel quale si fa annotazione delle cose più considerevoli che succedono alla giornata*: BNE, ms. 2671, f. 8r.

²⁴³¹ Federico IV to Bartolomeo Sorino, Lucerne December 26, 1656: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, *Cariche*.

willing to sacrifice one of their own on the altar of their ambitions.²⁴³² Aware of his mediating role as the family cleric, Federico sent his closest collaborator, auditor Bartolomeo Sorino (the brother of Giovanni's hapless agent, Giorgio Sorino) to Pizzighettone to reconcile the Borromeo brothers.²⁴³³ As a gesture Federico offered to host Paolo Emilio in Lucerne, where he hoped to "levarlo dall'ozio" and thus "divertire questi sconcerti e mali capricci dannosi alla Casa."²⁴³⁴ Much to Federico's relief, nothing ever came of this, and Paolo Emilio was launched on a military career instead.

The *pax domestica* was not to last. After Giovanni's death in 1660, Paolo Emilio picked another fight with his brothers. Like their father, he wanted to divide the family inheritance, something Federico and Antonio Renato vigorously resisted. Feeling he was losing out, Paolo Emilio threatened to take his brothers to court. Federico duly reprimanded him for having "cominciato a prendersi gusto di far andare in publico et per i Tribunali tutte le miserie della n[ost]ra Casa."²⁴³⁵ He reminded Paolo Emilio that if his and Antonio Renato's allowance exceeded Paolo Emilio's, this was because they had to shoulder expenses that "riguardano tutta la Casa."²⁴³⁶ (Outside observers estimated that by the early 1670s Federico was spending well in excess of 10,000 *scudi* per annum to keep up with the demands of life in the papal court.²⁴³⁷) A compromise was struck when the two elder brothers agreed to support Paolo Emilio financially.²⁴³⁸ Dependent on the mercy of his elder brothers in the same way Federico had once been, Paolo Emilio's fate was made worse by the fact that he was being put out of business by the peace of the Pyrenees and the end of the war in Lombardy. As a result, Paolo Emilio turned to a spendthrift lifestyle, frittering away his brothers' hard earned cash on what one of his critics called "l'unico diletto di questo bravo Cavagliere": "la Cavallerizza."²⁴³⁹ Like his late brother, Giovanni, Paolo Emilio was the head of one of two factions centered on horsemanship, and this got him into brawls with other noblemen, heightening the risk of yet another jail sentence and yet more public embarrassment for the family.²⁴⁴⁰

His brothers' other grouse was Paolo Emilio's *mésalliance* with Maddalena Durini which had been concluded in 1660.²⁴⁴¹ Though they had relied on their financial services, the Borromeo felt squeamish about such gregariousness with *nouveaux riches*. Maddalena's father, Giovan Giacomo, had only recently obtained admittance to the Milanese nobility thanks to his services as a financier of

²⁴³² Federico IV to Bartolomeo Sorino, Lucerne December 26, 1656: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, Cariche.

²⁴³³ Sorino is mentioned in Cotta, *Museo Novarese*, p. 79. On the role of the auditor, see Fink, *Die Luzerner Nuntiaturs*, pp. 129–130.

²⁴³⁴ Federico IV to Giovanna Cesi, Lucerne December 7, 1656: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, *Corrispondenza 1656–1664*.

²⁴³⁵ Federico IV to Paolo Emilio, Lucerne November 10, 1661: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, *Corrispondenza 1656–1664*.

²⁴³⁶ Federico IV to Paolo Emilio, Lucerne November 10, 1661: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, *Corrispondenza 1656–1664*.

²⁴³⁷ Galli and Monferrini, *I Borromeo d'Angera*, p. 32.

²⁴³⁸ Galli and Monferrini, *I Borromeo d'Angera*, p. 38.

²⁴³⁹ Arconati, *Il governo*, p. 75.

²⁴⁴⁰ Arconati, *Il governo*, pp. 76–83.

²⁴⁴¹ Cremonini, *Le vie*, p. 176; Federico IV to Giovanna Cesi, Konstanz September 26, 1656: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, *Corrispondenza 1656–1664*.

the Spanish crown. A typical upstart who had moved to Milan from Lake Como in the early decades of the century, Durini had indulged heavily in conspicuous consumption and the acquisition of a fief, the prosperous town of Monza, which he purchased at a bargain price in 1648.²⁴⁴² Through the marital alliance with the Borromeo, the family hoped to replicate that trajectory of social upward mobility on which many of their peers had embarked over the last decade or so.²⁴⁴³ By the early 1670s things seemed to be looking up. The Spanish governor who was sent to Milan in 1670, the duke of Osuna, seemed particularly responsive to the wishes of these up-and-coming financiers on whose behalf he attempted to forge an alliance with discontent elements of the established nobility such as Paolo Emilio Borromeo.

Osuna's government was part of the consolidation of Spanish power after the crisis at midcentury. In some respects, Osuna continued the legacy of his predecessor Ponce de León and promoted a form of governance indebted to the common good. As in Naples in the latter half of the seventeenth century, the distribution of basic foodstuff to the poor combined with elaborate ceremonials was meant to evoke a reinvigorated monarchy, with the strengthening of monarchical authority serving as a smokescreen for the promotion of particular interests in ways that bore a striking resemblance to the models of monarchical government envisaged by Federico Borromeo.²⁴⁴⁴ What they differed on was the exact composition of the small circle of its beneficiaries. Osuna openly courted recently ennobled financiers as his core constituency. This became most discernible in his appointments to the courts of law in Lombardy. On the pretext of the monarchy's desperate financial situation, Osuna booted out the traditional *togati*, patricians from towns outside Milan who had acquired judicial offices through university education, and began selling offices in Milan's tribunals to the highest bidder, preferring them to qualified candidates with law degrees.²⁴⁴⁵ Not satisfied with what was on offer, he hatched a number of vanity offices that were equally auctioned off to the nouveaux riches. As an investigation launched after Osuna's departure would reveal in 1676, during his tenure, the governor had created a high number of "supernumerary" posts that had little practical value other than buttressing the symbolic capital of their buyers.²⁴⁴⁶ Under Osuna's watch, then, Milan saw jostling for higher offices on an unprecedented scale, earning the town the unflattering moniker "the great marketplace of the world" (a riff on Rome as the "great theater of the world") to brand it as the territory of the monarchy where venality was most rampant.²⁴⁴⁷

This policy was in lockstep with developments in the imperial center. After Nithard's forced departure, the reins of power were taken over by the queen-regent's court familiar, Fernando de

²⁴⁴² Cremonini, *Le vie*, pp. 165, 170–171.

²⁴⁴³ Cremonini, *Le vie*, p. 177.

²⁴⁴⁴ Canosa, *Milano nel Seicento*, pp. 225–226; Álvarez-Ossorio, *El duque de Osuna*, p. 180.

²⁴⁴⁵ Álvarez-Ossorio, *¿Los límites*, pp. 174–175, 177.

²⁴⁴⁶ Álvarez-Ossorio, *La república*, pp. 184, 187, 190–191; *idem*, *¿Los límites*, p. 177; Storrs, *The Resilience*, p. 209.

²⁴⁴⁷ Álvarez-Ossorio, *La república*, p. 183; D'Amico, *Spanish Milan. A City*, p. 147.

Valenzuela, who was mockingly described as her goblin (*duende*) because he had cut his teeth as Mariana's secret informant.²⁴⁴⁸ A figure eerily reminiscent of Rodrigo Calderón under Philip III (see chapter 3), Valenzuela was the son of an impoverished *hidalgo* from Andalusia who had climbed up the social ladder in the power vacuum created by Nithard's expulsion.²⁴⁴⁹ As a jumped-up commoner, he was maligned by Spain's governing elite who accused him of usurping their place in the sun and held him culpable for an unprecedented sale of offices in royal courts in the monarchy's American and Italian possessions.²⁴⁵⁰ As the author of a broadsheet argued, Valenzuela's venality lent credence to his sobriquet, "duende, o demonio para vender la justicia, todos los puestos seculares y dignidades sagradas."²⁴⁵¹ In other words, the "marketplace of the world" thus enjoyed full sanction from the powers-that-be in Madrid.

Their antagonists among Milan's traditional elite, including parts of the Borromeo family, were spellbound, and it is easy to see why. The changes to the social structure wrought were impressive by any standard. In the State of Milan alone, the three decades following the collapse of Spanish power in 1647 witnessed the creation of well over a hundred new fiefs.²⁴⁵² As the 1660s turned into the 1670s, new families spent money acquired through banking during the preceding wars to get hold of a seat in one of the royal institutions, demoting the established nobility from its preeminent position.²⁴⁵³ (At the dawn of the eighteenth century, almost two thirds of Milan's 273 noble families would be unable to "rivendicare un'antichità precedente al regno di Filippo II."²⁴⁵⁴) To the traditional nobility, the Osuna regime was the logical conclusion of a power grab by an up-and-coming clique of financiers who had been holding the monarchy to ransom since its collapse in the late 1640s, using its leverage to further their individual trajectories of social upward mobility.

Trying to explain the unexplainable, a writer close to Federico and Antonio Renato Borromeo attributed Osuna's venality to his greed.²⁴⁵⁵ The latter came in more than one guise, with the private and the public inextricably bound up together. The author of *Il governo del duca d'Osuna* indulged in wild fantasies about Osuna's sex life, a common trope of slanderous campaigns against rulers in the early modern period.²⁴⁵⁶ Not only was the governor a serial womanizer, he did not disdain the *pecado nefando*, a common reference to sodomy, either.²⁴⁵⁷ Rather than constituting accurate reporting, the alleged sexual escapades signified the unease about the topsy-turvy world with this systematic

²⁴⁴⁸ Kamen, Juan José, p. 589; Álvarez-Ossorio, *La república*, pp. 196, 257, 273; Ruiz Rodríguez, Don Juan José, p. 375.

²⁴⁴⁹ Kalnein, *Die Regentschaft*, p. 322; Álvarez-Ossorio, *El favor real*, pp. 406–407.

²⁴⁵⁰ Kalnein, *Die Regentschaft*, pp. 322–323, 356; Ruiz Rodríguez, Don Juan José, p. 402.

²⁴⁵¹ Quoted in Ruiz Rodríguez, Don Juan José, p. 376.

²⁴⁵² Donati, *L'idea*, p. 280.

²⁴⁵³ Cremonini, *Le vie della distinzione*, p. 35; Álvarez-Ossorio, *La república*, p. 183.

²⁴⁵⁴ Donati, *L'idea*, p. 280.

²⁴⁵⁵ Álvarez-Ossorio, *El duque de Osuna*, p. 169.

²⁴⁵⁶ See Crawford, *The Politics of Promiscuity*.

²⁴⁵⁷ Arconati, *Il governo*, pp. 94, 96.

devaluation of noble titles that the governor had created. Indeed, his lavish lifestyle as a *picaro* afforded a credible explanation for his social engineering and subversion of time-honored hierarchies: the Venetian emissary to Milan speculated that the social strivers were made to cough up excessive sums for vanity offices to support the governor's philandering.²⁴⁵⁸ It was a damning indictment at a time when sexual self-control was seen as the epitome of virility and good government, and promiscuity called into question a nobleman's judgment.²⁴⁵⁹

Sharply aware of the undercurrents of opposition to his government, Osuna made overtures to the established nobility, not least to those like Paolo Emilio Borromeo who had entered marital alliances with the emergent moneyed interests. The governor's preferred methodology was an appeal to that group's military instincts.²⁴⁶⁰ It used to be argued that the Spanish nobility gradually lost its appetite for armed service. That claim has been overhauled in two ways. Not only is the army now seen as much more resilient than was once thought, the nobility also continued to crave the symbolic distinction that military service afforded.²⁴⁶¹ Latching on to a tradition that many thought dead, Osuna created new honorary military ranks to reward the scions of Milan's established nobility in an attempt to revive the honors system that had done so much to integrate Milan's nobility in the first half of the century.²⁴⁶² To reward local oligarchies, Osuna with the stroke of a pen bumped the number of cavalry companies from 32 up to 42.²⁴⁶³ Paolo Emilio was one of the beneficiaries. In 1671, shortly after Federico's elevation, he was appointed as officer of the newly established *compagnia alemanna*, a tribute to the monarchy's continued ability to recruit troops outside the Catholic king's realms.²⁴⁶⁴

Although Osuna cited Federico's merits as "Nuncio de España (que fue) y secretario del Pontífice," the latter was anything but happy about his brother's preferment.²⁴⁶⁵ In an indignant letter to Paolo Emilio, Federico tried to appeal to his sense of self-worth, arguing that "l'impresa e la fontione in che lei crede poter servire" the duke of Osuna "ne porta un carattere di sì poco rilievo, che mi arrossirei alla considerat[i]one]" that the Borromeo had not been asked to fill a more prestigious role.²⁴⁶⁶ Behind the scenes Federico began to maneuver against Paolo Emilio's "cabale:" his association with governor Osuna and his regime of uncouth parvenus.²⁴⁶⁷ When the Council of State in Madrid refused to confirm Paolo Emilio's nomination and the latter hatched plans to do what

²⁴⁵⁸ Canosa, *Milano nel Seicento*, p. 232.

²⁴⁵⁹ Crawford, *The Politics of Promiscuity*, pp. 227, 238.

²⁴⁶⁰ Álvarez-Ossorio, *El duque de Osuna*, p. 231.

²⁴⁶¹ Storrs, *The Resilience*, pp. 60–61; Maffi, *Cittadella*, p. 121.

²⁴⁶² Maffi, *Cittadella*, pp. 53, 128, 131–32.

²⁴⁶³ Maffi, *Cittadella*, p. 131.

²⁴⁶⁴ Galli and Monferrini, *I Borromeo d'Angera*, p. 38; Storrs, *The Resilience*, pp. 46–49.

²⁴⁶⁵ Álvarez-Ossorio, *La república*, p. 28; Spiriti, *Identità*, p. 326.

²⁴⁶⁶ Federico IV to Paolo Emilio, Rome July 26, 1672: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, *Corrispondenza 1671–1680*.

²⁴⁶⁷ Federico IV to Antonio Renato, Rome August 13, 1672: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, *Corrispondenza 1671–1680*.

Giovanni had never done—travel to Madrid, Federico and Antonio Renato worked overtime to deprive this dangerous “climaterico” of funding.²⁴⁶⁸ As Federico saw it, if Paolo Emilio got his way, he would accomplish one thing only: “discreditar colà la Casa con le sue pezzenterie, e leggieresse,” jeopardizing “tutto ciò, che ho procurato d’acquistar io nella Nuntiatura”—to wit, the Borromeo’s hard-won reputation as princely servants and purveyors of the common good.²⁴⁶⁹

As this response suggests, Federico saw the association with Osuna and his regime as a dangerous regression to the old military ways that had gotten Giovanni into hot water. There was indeed reason to worry. By the time Federico sought to course-correct, opposition to Osuna’s cronyism and its beneficiaries was already stirring. His apologists may have lauded the governor for “la justicia en la administración, y en el repartimiento de los premios Políticos, y Militares.”²⁴⁷⁰ Yet, a growing majority was no longer willing to swallow the militarism that had inflicted decades of war on them, as demonstrated by the dwindling number of volunteers and the move toward more coercive recruitment practices throughout the monarchy.²⁴⁷¹ Voicing widespread wrath at what many viewed as irresponsible military brinkmanship (and in a sign of how much the body itself had come under the spell of the movements against the *case erme* which they had once vigorously defended), the *vicario della provvisione*, acting on behalf of the Congregation of the State of Milan (the body representing the lesser towns and communities across Lombardy²⁴⁷²), sent a letter to the Congregation’s agent in Madrid in which he denounced the newly minted military dignitaries around Paolo Emilio as “voraci usurpatori delle sostanze de popoli.”²⁴⁷³ Governor Osuna, the *vicario* went on, needed to be halted, lest he continue to concoct military roles to heap costly honors upon the nobility.²⁴⁷⁴

He certainly had a point. In the early 1670s, Milan continued to be vital to Spain’s defense of its other Italian territories, most notably the rebellious Sicilian city of Messina, as well as the Franche Comté (which was eventually conquered by France in 1674).²⁴⁷⁵ While local communities clamored for a rapid demilitarization, the growing threat posed by Louis XIV’s France made Milan’s governors hesitant to slash the army too quickly. If Philip IV had initially agreed to trim the armed forces down to 4,000 foot and 2,000 horse after the signing of the peace of the Pyrenees, the actual numbers remained at least twice as high throughout the 1660s.²⁴⁷⁶ Much to the chagrin of a weary local population on whom the costs of war were offloaded, Milan throughout the reign of Charles II

²⁴⁶⁸ Federico IV to Antonio Renato, Rome August 13, 1672: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, Corrispondenza 1671–1680.

²⁴⁶⁹ Federico IV to Antonio Renato, Rome July 16, 1672: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, Corrispondenza 1671–1680.

²⁴⁷⁰ Quoted in Álvarez-Ossorio, *El duque de Osuna*, p. 253.

²⁴⁷¹ Storrs, *The Resilience*, pp. 35, 46.

²⁴⁷² D’Amico, *Spanish Milan, 1535–1707*, pp. 64–65.

²⁴⁷³ Letter dated November 13, 1670, quoted in Álvarez-Ossorio, *La república*, p. 27.

²⁴⁷⁴ Álvarez-Ossorio, *El duque de Osuna*, p. 205.

²⁴⁷⁵ Maffi, *Cittadella*, pp. 17, 20; Storrs, *The Resilience*, pp. 2, 208.

²⁴⁷⁶ Maffi, *Cittadella*, pp. 46–48.

remained part of Spain's defensive triangle that stretched from Catalonia to Flanders.²⁴⁷⁷ Still, there was no denying that the social uses of the military trumped its technical necessity in a time of relative peace. The *vicario* could be forgiven for thinking that the military dignitaries were interested in little else than "ingrassar se stessi con il sangue de sudditi."²⁴⁷⁸

The *vicario's* statement foreshadowed the arguments that were traded during a legal battle against the ad hoc military positions. The powers-that-be in Madrid took the intervention from the queen's Milanese subjects very seriously indeed.²⁴⁷⁹ Shortly after Paolo Emilio's promotion, Mariana citing the Congregation of the State of Milan ordered that Osuna retract the new cavalries, though the councils of State and Italy ultimately came to the governor's rescue.²⁴⁸⁰ It was only when Osuna left Milan in shame in 1674 that the Congregation finally triumphed and the honorary military posts were abolished.²⁴⁸¹ After being intimidated by Osuna and his surrogates, the Congregation was vindicated.²⁴⁸² Proving the durability of the changes that the upheavals of the 1640s had wrought, the Congregation, a corporate body within the State of Milan, was now able to leverage its good connections to the court of Madrid in order to undermine the orders of a sitting governor. By ventriloquizing the will of the monarchy's Milanese subjects, it was able to rein in men as powerful as Paolo Emilio who ended up walking away empty-handed and outed as "voraci usurpatori delle sostanze de popoli."

The more astute of the two brothers, Federico had anticipated that outcome. Anxious that the past they had left behind might come back to haunt them, the newly elected family cardinal rebuffed Paolo Emilio's ambitions and seized the moment of his elevation to remind Milanese society of the Borromeo's other tradition—that of public service. Exploiting his ecclesiastical capital, Federico with the help of Antonio Renato sought to extricate the dynasty from the association with poseurs from the merchant milieu and yoke their future to a self-fashioning as members of a state nobility.²⁴⁸³ The monarchy may have been restored but for the Borromeo to be accepted as part of its natural rulers, they needed to rely on new means to manufacture consent.²⁴⁸⁴

During the public celebrations for the family cardinal, the new strategy was rolled out for the first time. The broader context in which it needs to be situated was the reopening of the Ambrosiana a few years earlier. Founded in 1620 by archbishop Federico to instruct young artists in the Tridentine canons on painting, the art academy and the gallery had fallen into abeyance during the

²⁴⁷⁷ Maffi, Cittadella, p. 48.

²⁴⁷⁸ Letter dated November 13, 1670, quoted in Álvarez-Ossorio, *La república*, p. 27.

²⁴⁷⁹ Álvarez-Ossorio, *El duque de Osuna*, pp. 209, 211–212.

²⁴⁸⁰ Álvarez-Ossorio, *El duque de Osuna*, p. 216.

²⁴⁸¹ Álvarez-Ossorio, *El duque de Osuna*, p. 219.

²⁴⁸² Álvarez-Ossorio, *El duque de Osuna*, p. 220.

²⁴⁸³ Bourdieu, *The State Nobility*.

²⁴⁸⁴ See Maravall, *La cultura*, p. 203.

emergency. In a sign of the peace that had descended on Milan, it was finally reopened in 1668, the year Federico departed to Madrid.²⁴⁸⁵ When Federico was admitted to the college of cardinals two years later, the Ambrosiana became the central locus of the festivities. The Voet portrait Federico had commissioned in Rome was exhibited in the foyer, signifying, in both form and content, the Borromeo's transition toward a new form of social reproduction based on the symbolic appropriation of princely service. To lend this enactment a veneer of tradition, the portrait of Federico Jr. was exhibited next to a painting of the academy's founder, Federico Sr., quite possibly the one by an anonymous painter that showed the cardinal-archbishop in a pose reminiscent of the evangelists: seated at a table, quill in hand, gazing into the distance.²⁴⁸⁶ Hung next to each other, the two canvasses underlined the similarities between the two men, though in case the propinquity was not enough, the caption for the ensemble reiterated that the commonalities between the two cardinals went far beyond their first name: "Murice quae tyrio Federici vibrat imago, / Non una est: senior nam Federicus inest. / Ore quidem distat Federicus uterque: senili / Iunior ast eadem pectore corda gerit."²⁴⁸⁷ Eager to decontaminate their toxic brand, the orchestrators of the fanfare, Federico and Antonio Renato, deliberately mobilized the symbolic capital that Federico had acquired as a career diplomat in Spain and linked it to that of his great-uncle, Federico Sr.

Exactly what kind of tradition was being established became clearest in four *quadroni* of Federico Sr. that were unveiled on the same occasion. The choice of motifs was telling. Federico Sr. was depicted in the company of saints (most notably Filippo Neri with whom Federico had been friendly during his time in Rome in the 1590s, ending up deeply influenced by Neri's idea of bishops as Christian thinkers²⁴⁸⁸). Another *quadrone* immortalized Federico during a visit to the lazaretto for victims of the plague outside Milan's city walls in an episode that would later be expatiated upon by Alessandro Manzoni in his literary tribute to the archbishop.²⁴⁸⁹ The intent was clearly to give off an impression of a learned man of the church committed to protecting the poor.²⁴⁹⁰ As such, the paintings had more to do with Federico and Antonio Renato's agenda than with the actual living person. As Andrea Spiriti has argued, "la stessa operazione dei Quadroni e della festa risultano frammenti di una precisa strategia di prestigio, capace di usare la storia come potente arma politica e di servirsi per gli stessi scopi delle più raffinate istituzioni culturali."²⁴⁹¹ The ensemble with its limber juxtaposition of past and present was not a simple "enunciazione di decisioni politiche," but rather a "via di elaborazione-diffusione delle medesime, in un ferratissimo gioco d'interagenze."²⁴⁹² The latter

²⁴⁸⁵ Bosca, *De origine et statu*, p. 160. On the founding of the Ambrosiana, see Jones, *Federico Borromeo*, pp. 39, 45–47.

²⁴⁸⁶ Jones, *Federico Borromeo*, p. 1.

²⁴⁸⁷ Bosca, *De origine et statu*, p. 183.

²⁴⁸⁸ Jones, *Federico Borromeo*, p. 9.

²⁴⁸⁹ Specifically on the *quadroni*, see Spiriti, *Identità*, p. 325; more generally, see Jones, *Federico Borromeo*, p. 1.

²⁴⁹⁰ Jones, *Federico Borromeo*, pp. 2, 19, 24.

²⁴⁹¹ Spiriti, *Identità*, p. 330.

²⁴⁹² Spiriti, *Identità*, p. 327.

comprised the cut-throat competition between Milan's leading families which Spiriti had in mind as much as the bickering within the Borromeo family itself over the clan's strategic outlook and self-positioning.

Besides making a powerful public intervention about the Borromeo's future orientation, the *quadroni* were the first step toward the mooted canonization of Federico Sr. which would have given papal sanction to Federico Jr.'s preferred representational strategy. The canonization of the second cardinal-archbishop from the house of Borromeo had been a pet project of his namesake's since his early days in Rome. Fully understanding the import of the immaterial legacy of his great-uncle, Federico sought to "aiutarsi con li meriti degli altri già che mancano li proprij."²⁴⁹³ He therefore took a first stab at his beatification when his own chances began to look up during the pontificate of Alexander VII. In 1656 he coordinated the publication of Francesco Rivola's hagiography which not only laid down the arguments for the cardinal-archbishop's sainthood but was incidentally dedicated to Federico Jr.'s new patron, Alexander VII.²⁴⁹⁴ As they had done in the case of Carlo, the Borromeo also leveraged numbers to push Federico's candidacy to sainthood. The Milanese clergy, in a letter dated 1656 and probably sent to Rome, argued that "non si può contenere l'ardenza delli affetti, che non trabochi in voci di bramare glorificata in terra quell'Anima che hora piamente e si crede operatrice di grazie e miracoli."²⁴⁹⁵ It was, the missive concluded, therefore incumbent on the pope to "unire al Catalogo dei Santi Federico con Carlo a cui fu già congiunto di sangue e molto più di meriti," citing values consonant with the ideology of the Chigi pontiff.²⁴⁹⁶ Behind the scenes, Federico did his own petitioning. Throughout the late 1650s and early 1660s he was in epistolary contact with Francesco Maria Febei who was not just related to the Borromeo (and later built a chapel with relics of Carlo Borromeo), but, crucially, a Barberini intimus who served as secretary of the Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith and, judging by his later publications, took a vivid interest in canonizations.²⁴⁹⁷ He was one of the men able to further the beatification of a clergyman who in the last decade of his life had painted himself as a defender of the common good and meritocracy, and whose descendants were now hoping that he would be taken into consideration by the pontiff who subscribed to the same values.²⁴⁹⁸ Still, at a time when even royal houses could not claim two saints to their name, nothing ever came of this.

²⁴⁹³ Federico IV to Giovanni, Todi April 25, 1642: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, Cariche.

²⁴⁹⁴ Rivola, *Vita di Federico*, Introduction, unpag.

²⁴⁹⁵ Quoted in Tamborini, *Il processo*, p. 104.

²⁴⁹⁶ Quoted in Tamborini, *Il processo*, p. 105.

²⁴⁹⁷ See letters dated January 10, 1658, and January 14, 1662 in ASR, Fondo Cartari-Febei, vol. 24, unfol. Mayer, *The Roman Inquisition*, p. 139. Febei is the editor of Domenico Cappello's *Acta canonizationis s. Petri de Alcantara et s. Mariae Magdalena de Pazzis*, which was published in 1669.

²⁴⁹⁸ Wassilowsky, *Vorsehung*, pp. 73–75.

By the early 1670s, however, things had shifted in the Borromeo's favor. In 1671 Federico, as a hispanophile secretary of state, was instrumental in a new wave of canonizations of Spanish subjects. Though much less well known than the famous mass canonization that took place in 1622, before the reform of the canonization process passed under Urban VIII Barberini, the 1671 event marked another triumph of Spanish saint-making in what has been called the "century of Spanish saints."²⁴⁹⁹ As Clare Copeland explains, canonizations functioned as matters of exchange and, as such, "offered the papacy an opportunity to strengthen its ties with a saint's supporters."²⁵⁰⁰ Given his family history, Federico Borromeo was certainly aware of canonizations' potential for rapprochement between the papacy and a frail Spanish monarchy keen to benefit from the symbolic capital that Spanish saints afforded the crown. Working in lockstep with two old allies, Pedro and Pascual de Aragón, the cardinal-secretary of state oversaw the canonization of such well-known saints as Rosa of Lima, the first holy woman from Latin America.²⁵⁰¹ By far the most prestigious canonization to transpire under Borromeo's watch was that of Ferdinand III (1199–1252), king of Castile and mastermind of one of the most prominent military campaigns of the *Reconquista*, who was fast-tracked from beatification to canonization within a few short months in early 1671.²⁵⁰² With the Spaniards having finally been granted a saint to rival St. Louis, France's crusader king, the chances of the Borromeo adding a second family saint to the pantheon of holy men rose exponentially.

Things also looked up for Federico Sr. because of the profile of the men and women who were added to the catalog of *beati* at the time. Ludovica degli Albertoni (1473–1533), a Franciscan tertiary related to the cardinal-nephew, Paluzzo Paluzzi, was beatified by the Altieri pontiff in January 1671. The unprecedented elevation of an ancestor of the cardinal-nephew to the group of potential saints was more than an attempt to secure symbolic benefits in the absence of the material wealth to which earlier papal relatives had been able to help themselves.²⁵⁰³ The move was also indicative of the Altieri's overall strategy of social affirmation. Ludovica was known not only for the ecstatic experiences that were later immortalized by Gianlorenzo Bernini in his famous sculpture, but for a life lived to serve the poor and needy of Rome, an ideal role model for the good government that her descendants claimed to embody. The representation of Federico Sr. in the *quadroni* saw the Borromeo respond to this new climate, with the four paintings of the cardinal-archbishop to be inscribed among the saints of the Roman Catholic Church adorning the Ambrosiana focusing on similar episodes from his record of public service. Much had changed since they lobbied for the first cardinal-archbishop in the early years of the century. If they had pursued the canonization of Carlo to

²⁴⁹⁹ Gotor, *Le canonizzazioni*, p. 621. On the canonizations of 1622, see *ibid.*, and Copeland, *Spanish Saints*.

²⁵⁰⁰ Copeland, *Spanish Saints*, p. 105.

²⁵⁰¹ Carrió-Invernizzi, *El gobierno*, pp. 405–406.

²⁵⁰² Álvarez-Ossorio, *Santo y rey*.

²⁵⁰³ Reinhardt, *Pontifex*, p. 653.

stand their ground against an overweening Spanish monarchy, Federico was to be beatified as a defender of the commonwealth and a loyal servant of the king of Spain.

Although much militated for them, the beatification came to a standstill when Federico Jr. died unexpectedly. In March 1673, his life-long hypochondria finally got the better of him. After a strict diet with no salami and no chocolate, he died from the complications of one of his regular blood-letting sessions, putting a bathetic end to the aspirations of a man who stood an excellent chance of being elected the next pope.²⁵⁰⁴ With the death of the family's strategic mastermind, the baton was passed on to his younger brother, Antonio Renato. Under his guidance, the Borromeo's acolytes continued to gather evidence of the cardinal-archbishop's acts of grace. By the late 1670s the vicar general of the archdiocese of Milan was scrambling to, as he put it in a letter to the clergy of the archdiocese, "cominciare li processi della di lui vita, fra tanto che vivono li testimonii, e quelli che ad esso lui [Federico Sr.] sono obbligati per le gratie ricevute."²⁵⁰⁵ Harnessing these actors as a front, Antonio Renato continued to push behind the scenes for the canonization of a prominent family member whose reputation would cement his own generation's self-styling as disinterested public servants.

Antonio Renato took a third and final stab in 1676 when Innocent XI Odescalchi was elected to the papal throne. The Borromeo and their allies in Milan expected that a pope from Lombardy—the first in over eighty years—would further the interests of one of the most influential dynasties of his home state.²⁵⁰⁶ Indeed, in March of the following year, the pope agreed to marry off one of his nieces, Giovanna Odescalchi, to a Borromeo, Carlo from the Arona branch. Yet, Federico Sr.'s beatification, which the Borromeo had hoped would follow suit, never materialized. In a twist of irony, their attempt to weaponize the cardinal-archbishop for their own self-fashioning as dispassionate public servants clashed with the papal family's performative disinterestedness. Historians have recently questioned the extent of the so-called *svolta innocenziana*, which used to be seen as a pit stop on the road to clean government and the abolition of nepotism in 1692. Antonio Menniti Ippolito in particular has challenged the idea that the future Innocent XI had always been a disinterested papal official, pointing out that during the pontificate of Alexander VII Benedetto Odescalchi had traded the diocese of Novara for a more prestigious post in Rome by handing it down to his younger brother, though not without previously diverting half of the bishopric's revenues to his own pocket.²⁵⁰⁷ Even the pope's ostentatious choice not to elevate his nephew to the cardinalate—

²⁵⁰⁴ Federico IV to Antonio Renato, Rome April 11, 1671: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, Corrispondenza 1671–1680. See *Compendioso Ragguaglio delle Fattioni. Nascita, età, costume, et inclinazioni di tutti i Cardinali viventi nel Pontificato di Clemente Decimo*: BAV, Barb. Lat. 4704, f. 33r. His last will is in ASR, Notai del tribunale dell'Audior Camerae, F. Serantonious, vol. 6562, f. 226r.

²⁵⁰⁵ Letter dated February 23, 1678, quoted in Tamborini, *Il processo*, p. 105.

²⁵⁰⁶ Signorotto, *A proposito dell'intentato processo*, p. 319.

²⁵⁰⁷ Menniti Ippolito, *Papa e santo*, pp. 30–31.

once considered clinching evidence of Innocent's commitment to reform—has been reinterpreted. Contemporaries famously deplored the fate of Livio Odescalchi, pointing to the cruelty of his uncle who forced him to eke out a meager living when others in his position had been granted unrestricted access to the papacy's coffers. However, new research has shown that Livio had more than enough means of his own which made the opportunities for self-enrichment that the papacy could have provided redundant.²⁵⁰⁸ In other words, if the Odescalchi, unlike earlier papal families, did not view the papacy primarily as a vehicle for social upward mobility, this needs to be attributed to the fact that they were already extremely affluent rather than be construed as a sign of any deeply held beliefs. Their wealth allowed them to live up to the script of disinterested service at a time when it had become *de rigueur* for families in their position. As a consequence, those who expected Innocent XI to parcel out favors were deeply disappointed, such as the exasperated cardinal who noted trenchantly of the Odescalchi pontiff, "il suo interesse è di non essere interessato."²⁵⁰⁹ For their erstwhile allies in Lombardy, the new papal family's ostentatious disinterestedness meant that Innocent was unwilling to grant any favors to powerful dynasties, including the one to which he had just married one of his nieces.²⁵¹⁰

If Antonio Renato failed to secure the papal seal of approval for the Borromeo's good services, the monarchy was further undermining that claim. After governor Osuna's departure from Milan, the Borromeo felt the full force of the crackdown on his regime. A special prosecutor sent in as part of the first royal visit since the 1620s shed light on the wheeling and dealing of the previous governors, uncovering a group of parvenus who had coalesced around vanity offices of little practical value in a network that was promptly dubbed the "árbol del parentesco."²⁵¹¹ Composed of social strivers and select members of the established nobility, the latter were considered just as guilty of their involvement in the new patronage market, if not more so. In the words of prosecutor Cosme Forno Zermelli, families like the Borromeo were the "trunk" of the "árbol del parentesco," without whose aid the branches and twigs from the banking milieu would never have grown as fast as they did.²⁵¹² Still reeling from Paolo Emilio's implication in the free-for-all, the Borromeo stood to lose everything unless they worked overtime to recuperate lost standing.

Setting the stage for this crackdown were momentous shifts in Madrid itself. As the college of cardinals elected the Odescalchi pope, the nobility in Spain was in open revolt against the queen-regent's familiar, Valenzuela, and his cronyism, of which the Osuna government in Milan had been a

²⁵⁰⁸ Menniti Ippolito, *Papa e santo*, p. 32.

²⁵⁰⁹ Quoted in Menniti Ippolito, *Papa e santo*, p. 34.

²⁵¹⁰ Signorotto, *A proposito dell'intentato processo*, p. 329. This explanation is far more convincing than Signorotto's other hunch: that the Spanish were still suspicious of the powerful family and would have blocked the Borromeo's attempt to gain a second family saint. As this thesis shows, this was clearly no longer the case in the 1670s.

²⁵¹¹ Álvarez-Ossorio, *La república*, pp. 337–338.

²⁵¹² Álvarez-Ossorio, *La república*, p. 432.

particularly egregious example. While the *duende* had lifted up a new cohort of social strivers, the established nobility, including Borromeo's friend Pascual de Aragón, remained shut out of the political process. Coming on the heels of Nithard's dispensation, the trust that had traditionally linked the Spanish nobility to successive minister-favorites was at an all-time low.²⁵¹³ Frightened of grifters gobbling up political offices, the established nobility reactivated the negative campaign they had waged against Nithard. While they did not openly question the patronage management of the queen and her favorite, they did remind her that "las acciones reales" ought to be "deudas de la aprobación pública," as one pamphlet put it.²⁵¹⁴ If illegitimate outside forces manipulated the monarch's dispensing of royal favor, the high nobility, as the natural elite and the guardian of aristocratic meritocracy, had a duty to intervene and reestablish order and excise the sick parts of the body politic.²⁵¹⁵ Thus, by the mid-1670, the nobility were confecting a Spanish edition of the day of the dupes, the uprising against an inexperienced foreign queen regent at the mercy of cunning clergymen and financiers that had shaken France during the minority of Louis XIV.²⁵¹⁶ What soldered the Spanish aristocracy together was not a coherent set of ideas or a shared vision of the future of the monarchy so much as a deep-seated entitlement to its spoils.²⁵¹⁷ What ultimately spurred them to action was, tellingly, Valenzuela's helping himself to a grandeanship.²⁵¹⁸

As in 1668, Juan José was to be their leader in the revolt against the excesses of the *duende*. His decisive role in suppressing the revolt of Messina in Sicily had further enhanced his moral standing in the court.²⁵¹⁹ After a failed coup in November 1675, Juan José finally succeeded in ejecting Valenzuela in January 1677.²⁵²⁰ Having recently come of age, Charles II was won over by the broadsides from the streets which accused him of letting his mother and her favorite sell out the kingdom.²⁵²¹ Worn down by the nagging criticism of his stepbrother, the young monarch gave the bastard what he had always hankered after: a prominent position as a prince of the blood overseeing the disinterested distribution of royal patronage which Valenzuela had been unable to guarantee.²⁵²² In this capacity Juan José was able to revive the populist monarchy he had first sketched out ten years earlier, dressing himself up as a member of the royal family and the embodiment of the collective good. If Lerma and Olivares had been the "sombra del rey," Juan José claimed to be the "retrato del rey," whose interests dovetailed with those of the monarch and, by corollary, all his

²⁵¹³ Carrasco, *Los grandes*, pp. 94, 97.

²⁵¹⁴ Quoted in Álvarez-Ossorio, *El favor real*, p. 393.

²⁵¹⁵ Álvarez-Ossorio, *El favor real*, pp. 407–408, 425.

²⁵¹⁶ Kalnein, *Die Regentschaft*, pp. 328, 347, 372–373, 394; Álvarez-Ossorio, *El favor real*, pp. 394–395; Smith, *The Culture of Merit*, pp. 119–120.

²⁵¹⁷ Kalnein, *Die Regentschaft*, pp. 364, 373–374, 377, 393.

²⁵¹⁸ Carrasco, *Los grandes*, pp. 97–100.

²⁵¹⁹ Storrs, *The Resilience*, p. 155.

²⁵²⁰ For a detailed account, see Kalnein, *Die Regentschaft*, chaps. V and VI.

²⁵²¹ The satire is quoted in Ruiz Rodríguez, *Don Juan José*, p. 429.

²⁵²² Kamen, *Spain*, p. 27.

subjects.²⁵²³ To mark the passage to a new era, the term *valido* was dropped in favor of “prime minister.”²⁵²⁴ Henceforth, and as he had anticipated when he had first launched his bid against Nithard, a coalition of high nobles led by Juan José was to govern the realm as a self-proclaimed “aristocratic republic.” As he disposed of the pervasive venality at the lower levels of administration, imputing it to the parvenus who had been running the show, the prime minister lifted up a *juanista* nobility of long-standing loyalists.²⁵²⁵

As in the first coup against Nithard, Juan José’s success depended on his ability to drum up support from the lower orders.²⁵²⁶ In line with his much-vaunted common touch, Juan José implemented the reforms he had first sought to enforce some ten years earlier, albeit with minimal success.²⁵²⁷ Most importantly, however, he squelched what was decried as the corruption of the holders of venal offices. Identifying Milan as a hotbed of illegality, Juan José dispatched a royal visitor to Lombardy and instituted a *junta para el alivio de Milán* which was tasked with looking into the “marketplace of the world” whose venality was now cast as a “perjuicio del Público y de V[uestra] Mag[esta]d.”²⁵²⁸ Juan José adroitly presented himself as the stentorian voice of the king’s oppressed subjects, ready to put the “árbol del parentesco” to book.²⁵²⁹ Packaged as the restoration of royal power against uppity local oligarchies, the criminal investigation made for excellent propaganda. The Milanese certainly embraced the bastard as a savior. The Congregation of the State in Milan which had fought tirelessly against Osuna’s cronyism wrote in to felicitate him, “Viva pure V[ostra] A[ltezza] S[erenissima] a secoli, che così lo desiderano li popoli dello Stato di Milano, così lo necessita il bene della R[ea]l Corona, e così lo richiede il buon servizio del S[an]to Iddio, e della Christianità tutta.”²⁵³⁰

The less informed sections of the nobility frowned at such enthusiastic reactions from the populace. William Gondolphin, the English ambassador to Madrid, fretted about Juan José’s populist proclivities, noting that, “Beyond the great men, he has on his side that great Monster the People.”²⁵³¹ But Gondolphin was quite simply unaware of what went on behind the populist façade. Far from constituting an attack on the local nobility, the investigation into the venality of the Osuna government in Milan was a transparent attempt to restore the power of the traditional nobility. The rhetoric that the chief inspector in Milan, Cosme Forno Zermelli, deployed, describing the buyers of venal offices as ambitious chancers, was indicative of the transfer of power that was being couched

²⁵²³ Hermant, *Guerres*, p. 424.

²⁵²⁴ Hermant, *Guerres*, p. 394; Storrs, *The Resilience*, p. 156.

²⁵²⁵ Kalnein, *Die Regentschaft*, pp. 414, 416, 422; Ribot, *Historia y memoria*, pp. 214–215; Carrasco, *Los grandes*, pp. 105–106.

²⁵²⁶ Ruiz Rodríguez, *Don Juan José*, p. 411.

²⁵²⁷ Ruiz Rodríguez, *Don Juan José*, p. 540.

²⁵²⁸ Álvarez-Ossorio, *La república*, pp. 201, 220.

²⁵²⁹ Ruiz Rodríguez, *Don Juan José*, p. 443.

²⁵³⁰ Quoted in Álvarez-Ossorio, *La república*, p. 352. On the Congregation, see Bueno, *Representation*, p. 93.

²⁵³¹ Quoted in Kamen, *Juan José*, p. 590.

in the semantics of anti-corruption.²⁵³² As in the coup against Nithard, Juan José's *restauración* in the wake of Valenzuela was not an attempt to empower commoners but the high nobility's bid to wrest back control from aspirational nouveaux riches.²⁵³³ It was certainly no coincidence that his second coup had gained traction among sections of a well-connected imperial nobility. If Andrea d'Avalos, prince of Montesarchio, from the kingdom of Naples lent military wherewithal, many others of his league threw their moral support behind Juan José as he replaced Valenzuela's cronies at court and in the provinces.²⁵³⁴ Galvanized by the rallying cry of *limpieza*, that favorite buzzword of the *olivaristas*, charges of corruption paved the way for the restoration of the high nobility who was reinventing itself as an aristocracy.²⁵³⁵

In Milan, the criminal investigation into the "árbol del parentesco" fomented a battle of ideas over meritocracy which were itself an outgrowth of debates on the role of the nobility in the Spanish monarchy.²⁵³⁶ As he came down on Osuna and Valenzuela's Milanese clients, the crown's prosecutor, Pedro de Ledesma, concluded that their patronage had elevated "los indignos, o menos dignos," to the detriment of "los que deberían ser premiados por sus méritos, con común clamor y desconsuelo de los que experimentaban despreciada su razón."²⁵³⁷ This was a thinly veiled assault on a new conception of meritocracy that had arisen out of the turmoil of the 1640s. In Naples, the main ideologue of the reformist movement, Camillo Tutini, had argued, that "la nobiltà non istà nel nascer nobile, ma nell'acquisto della virtù."²⁵³⁸ This argument saw a revival under Valenzuela who himself maintained that rewards should be awarded on the basis of services rendered rather than birth.²⁵³⁹ As one of his favorite authors had put it, "Es mucho mas honroso el hazerse, que el nacer noble."²⁵⁴⁰ In Milan, Conrado Confalonieri, a member of the Jesuits who were among the most vociferous supporters of Valenzuela and his cronies, detailed the outlook of the social strivers favored by the Osuna regime with the clear intent of whitewashing the "marketplace of the world."²⁵⁴¹ In his *La Sapienza de' Cavallieri*, which seems to have circulated among the beneficiaries of the Valenzuela regime after the *duende's* fall, Confalonieri defended venality as long as the mighty assigned offices and other honors on the basis of the individual candidate's merits.²⁵⁴² The allocation of offices, he wrote, fell within the remit of a sovereign's discretionary powers, and even if mistakes had been

²⁵³² Álvarez-Ossorio, *La república*, p. 338.

²⁵³³ Álvarez-Ossorio, *La república*, p. 513; Ribot, *Historia y memoria*, p. 212.

²⁵³⁴ Storrs, *The Resilience*, pp. 155–157.

²⁵³⁵ On the use of *limpieza* as an argument, see Ruiz Rodríguez, Don Juan José, pp. 454–455. On aristocratic concepts among Spain's high nobility, see Storrs, *The Resilience*, pp. 158–159.

²⁵³⁶ See Carrasco, *Los grandes*, p. 82.

²⁵³⁷ Quoted in Álvarez-Ossorio, *La república*, p. 273.

²⁵³⁸ Tutini, *Dell'origine e fundatione de Seggi di Napoli*, quoted in Donati, *L'idea*, p. 278.

²⁵³⁹ Álvarez-Ossorio, *El favor real*, pp. 428–430.

²⁵⁴⁰ Francisco Garau, *El Sabio instruido de la naturaleza*, quoted in Álvarez-Ossorio, *El favor real*, p. 429.

²⁵⁴¹ On the Jesuits' support for Valenzuela, see Ruiz Rodríguez, Don Juan José, p. 542.

²⁵⁴² Signorotto, *A proposito dell'intentato processo*, pp. 333–334; Rurale, *Un inedito di fine Seicento*, p. 236.

made in the past, the king was not obliged “alla restituzione [...], né conseguentemente dalli offesi si può fare alcuna compensazione, come succede nella commutativa giustizia.”²⁵⁴³

Confalonieri’s treatise was a direct engagement with countervailing ideas that were on the rise after a new *juanista* governor, Juan Tomás Enriquez de Cabrera y Toledo, count of Melgar, took over in 1678. If Confalonieri reduced merit to efficiency and utility, the established nobility fathomed it as hereditary distinction.²⁵⁴⁴ In light of the proliferation of new nobles, the traditional ruling elite took a renewed interest in definitions of nobility and aggressively promoted an “esaltazione della nobiltà di sangue come l’unica degna di onore.”²⁵⁴⁵ The truly meritorious were not just those who had served the king but those who did so out of a long family tradition.²⁵⁴⁶ What really counted was the “méritos heredados.”²⁵⁴⁷ A treatise published in Naples in 1673 argued that royal patronage should be distributed to the king’s subjects on the basis of birth. As the author, Pedro de Avilés, saw it, “[L]as dignidades mayores ... siendo de la primera Hierarchia deben darse a los nobles, aunque no sean tan idoneos, ni tan amados de el Principe como otros.”²⁵⁴⁸ If, instead, these were liberally parceled out to “gente humilda,” they were inevitably devalued by the “baxeza de quien las tubo.”²⁵⁴⁹ His was a two-pronged attack: born out of the battle against the social strivers of the “árbol del parentesco,” it soon expanded into an attack on the conception of merit sustained by the established nobility’s other nemesis: the *togati* who had been the first victims of the “grupos sociales emergentes enriquecidos con ocupaciones más o menos viles según las categorías patricias.”²⁵⁵⁰ If the *togati* had risen to the challenge by stressing the university-based *corso delle lettere* as the only acceptable form of social upward mobility, the established nobility upstaged them by embracing a fully hereditary conception of merit.²⁵⁵¹

Juan José of Austria was the ideal standard-bearer of a nobility eager to retrieve purloined privileges. In the words of the author of *Il governo del duca d’Osuna*, a bracing polemic against Valenzuela’s stooge in Milan, the bastard embodied the winning formula of “nascita, e merito” that made him an ideal purveyor of good governance.²⁵⁵² As the stepbrother of the king who had finally come of age, he was a “Principe non meno bravo, e generoso, che nobile” who had had the misfortune of being “deredato d’una carica, che doveagli esser conferita senza contestazione” by Valenzuela and his clients.²⁵⁵³ Embodying the values that the governing elite ascribed to itself, he

²⁵⁴³ Rurale, Un inedito di fine Seicento, p. 237.

²⁵⁴⁴ Carrasco, Los grandes, p. 96. Also see Smith, The Culture of Merit, p. 120. More generally, *ibid.*, esp. chaps. 5–6.

²⁵⁴⁵ Donati, L’idea, pp. 266–267, 279 (quote).

²⁵⁴⁶ Álvarez-Ossorio, El favor real, p. 419. Also see Donati, L’idea, pp. 266–267 and chap. 4.

²⁵⁴⁷ Álvarez-Ossorio, El favor real, pp. 407, 419.

²⁵⁴⁸ Pedro de Avilés, Advertencias de un político a su Príncipe, quoted in Carrasco, Los grandes, p. 82.

²⁵⁴⁹ Pedro de Avilés, Advertencias de un político a su Príncipe, quoted in Carrasco, Los grandes, p. 82.

²⁵⁵⁰ Álvarez-Ossorio, ¿Los límites, p. 178.

²⁵⁵¹ Álvarez-Ossorio, ¿Los límites, p. 175.

²⁵⁵² Arconati, Il governo, p. 6.

²⁵⁵³ Arconati, Il governo, p. 5.

lifted himself above the *duende*.²⁵⁵⁴ His successful elevation to the role of prime minister in 1678 paved the way for the restoration of the old order, spelling the end of the topsy-turvy world that had shaken the foundations of noble existence since the 1640s. Here, at long last, was a sign that stability was about to return.

The Borromeo hoped to benefit from their long-standing alliance with the bastard son of Philip IV. To distract from Paolo Emilio's involvement with governor Osuna which had resurfaced in the liquidation of the Valenzuela regime in Milan, Antonio Renato foregrounded Federico's loyalty and his counter-strategy based on the family's invented tradition of disinterested service through ecclesiastical institutions. His preferred propaganda tool was the patronage of the arts. Building on Federico's experience with artistic commissions in the final years of his life, Antonio Renato invested heavily in the depiction of his clan as loyal servants of the Spanish crown who by dint of their seniority stood high above the social strivers who had intermittently ruled the roost in Milan and Madrid. With the strategy centered on the exaltation of Federico Sr. having met the resistance of the papacy, Antonio Renato's representational project put Federico Jr.'s service front and center, making him the star of a series of paintings that were commissioned in the late 1670s. For the skeptics who deemed the Borromeo too gregarious, the family had their very own response at the ready.

Antonio Renato's frantic commissions revealed that his elder brother, Federico, must have done a stellar job of tutoring him on the propaganda value of art. When Federico had arrived in Rome in the mid-1630s, the city of the popes was a thriving center of the arts. The rivalry between papal families, many of whom hailed from relatively humble backgrounds before they were catapulted to the papacy, drove the artists in their pay to ever higher heights. Wary of their critics, papal nephews sought to sublimate their self-interested rule into works of art that misrecognized the chronic violation of the public good ideology to which they pledged allegiance.²⁵⁵⁵ Federico's first patrons, the Barberini, had taken the art of silencing their critics through impressive pictorial feats to a new level.²⁵⁵⁶ Pietro da Cortona's fresco in the Barberini palace, the *Divine Providence*, persuaded through form and content, pushing back against those members of the papal court who questioned the merits of the Barberini, provincial upstarts from the banking milieu.²⁵⁵⁷ A masterpiece in its own right, the painting's obscure hints at the new electoral process which had elevated Urban VIII to the papal see portrayed the election of the Barberini pontiff as God's manifest destiny.²⁵⁵⁸ Far from giving the Barberini an unfair advantage over their competitors, the painting suggested, the new

²⁵⁵⁴ Carrasco, *Los grandes*, p. 95.

²⁵⁵⁵ Swartz, *Symbolic Power*, pp. 4–6, 37–38.

²⁵⁵⁶ Karsten, *Künstler und Kardinäle*, p. 116.

²⁵⁵⁷ Scott, *Images of Nepotism*, pp. 193–195.

²⁵⁵⁸ On the reform of the conclave, see Wassilowsky, *Vorsehung*, and Pattenden, *Electing*.

secret ballot had portentous consequences for the rest of humanity, who prospered in the peace and harmony that the Barberini's preeminence had heralded.²⁵⁵⁹

This obscurantism through art grew in importance as the papacy's fortunes waned. Federico Borromeo's second patron, Alexander VII Chigi, turned to massive commissions in an attempt to bolster the papacy's loss of international standing in the wake of Westphalia.²⁵⁶⁰ Cast in the mold of the *diacatholicon* dear to Borromeo, his artistic strategy inspired Federico's old friends, Pascual and Pedro de Aragón, who would put it to use to prop up a sagging Spanish monarchy. Their interest in visual strategies had been piqued by the crisis of the 1640s, which they had experienced in their native Catalonia, and their subsequent travels through Italy.²⁵⁶¹ As ambassadors in Rome and viceroys in Naples, the Aragón brothers softened the blow that Philip IV's death had dealt the monarchy "con una hábil actividad cultural y simbólica que consistió en aumentar los espacios de visibilidad del monarca español" in the Italian peninsula.²⁵⁶² Their *gobierno de las imágenes*, as Diana Carrió-Invernizzi has dubbed this new approach to governance, was a cost-effective alternative to the repressive rule that seemed increasingly impossible to sustain in the latter half of the seventeenth century.²⁵⁶³ Convinced that Spain had "no king," as Pedro put it, the Aragón brothers sought to evoke him through art in public spaces.²⁵⁶⁴ What is more, their work in Italy served as an inspiration to the "panegyrisches Sicherheitsnetz" that was being woven in Madrid in a bid to conceal the power vacuum that the advent of a frail monarch, Charles II, had created in the Spanish monarchy.²⁵⁶⁵ As France under Louis XIV went from strength to strength, the Spain of Charles II benefited from the exposure that some members of its ruling elite had had to the artistic feats of the papacy. It was thanks to their expertise in hiring Italian painters like Luca Giordano that the decline of Habsburg power could be put off for longer than would otherwise have been possible.²⁵⁶⁶ Unable to reign through brute force, the house of Habsburg and its servants did what José Antonio Maravall identified as the essence of the baroque: "una cultura en la que predominarán, congruentemente, los elementos de atracción, de persuasión, de compromiso con el sistema, a cuya integración defensiva se trata de incorporar a esa masa común que de todas formas es más numerosa que los crecidos grupos privilegiados, y pueden amenazar su orden."²⁵⁶⁷

The import that Spain's ruling elite came to accord to symbols ties into ongoing debate on the role of art in the preservation of privilege. While some early modernists indebted to the work of

²⁵⁵⁹ Karsten, *Künstler und Kardinäle*, pp. 117–118.

²⁵⁶⁰ Krautheimer, *The Rome of Alexander VII*.

²⁵⁶¹ Carrió-Invernizzi, *El gobierno*, pp. 54–56, 83–106, 130.

²⁵⁶² Carrió-Invernizzi, *El gobierno*, pp. 17, 218, 233.

²⁵⁶³ Carrió-Invernizzi, *El gobierno*, pp. 16, 427.

²⁵⁶⁴ The quote is in Storrs, *The Resilience*, p. 165.

²⁵⁶⁵ Wellen, *Bilder*, p. 335.

²⁵⁶⁶ Wellen, *Bilder*, p. 18.

²⁵⁶⁷ Maravall, *La cultura*, pp. 88–89.

anthropologist Clifford Geertz on the Balinese “theater state” have taken the view that power served artistic representation rather than the other way round, most would consider such a stance overly naïve.²⁵⁶⁸ There is, after all, no denying that elites whose tastes had been formed by the papal court of the early seventeenth century had an excellent grasp of arts’ capacity to construct authority over others.²⁵⁶⁹ They appear to have been thoroughly aware of its persuasive powers, though Peter Burke and Volker Reinhardt’s point that early modern master manipulators were less cynical than we suppose is well taken: most did indeed believe to some degree in the tales they spun, not least because such representational projects responded to a deeply held psychological need in a society that valued convincing decorousness more than authenticity and sincerity.²⁵⁷⁰ Indeed, as Burke suggests, art commissioned to glorify the high and mighty ought to be read as re-presentations, as having the power to evoke something that remained elusive, bridging the gap between excessive expectations and a reality that many found wanting.²⁵⁷¹ Seen in this light, paintings were not just valuable to the proponents of a particular self-serving representation. Since others relied on the same stratagems, they had to at least superficially claim to believe in their rivals’ yarns. Trapped in a prison of their own making, early modern elites engaged in solipsistic misrecognition—a collective self-delusion that was mutually reinforced in the face and despite of mounting counterevidence.

As far as late seventeenth-century Italy is concerned, scholars are divided on the efficacy of such strategies. Arne Karsten in his work on papal families has questioned the success of art at concealing the “Widersprüche zwischen dem schönen Schein der brillanten Bilder und der rauhen Realität vielfältiger politischer Probleme.”²⁵⁷² While that claim is itself debatable, it is beyond doubt that the strategies of papal families could be adopted to give a new lease of life to a foundering Spanish monarchy. Members of the Spanish governing elite with close ties to Italy learned from Roman families how to camouflage an unsavory reality through art.²⁵⁷³ Still others operationalized the stratagem for their own clans. Federico Borromeo was a case in point. Knowing that his brother was probably going to die without an heir, he began to invest heavily in image-making. As early as 1671, Giulio Cesare Beagna, the secretary of the Arona branch in Rome, reported that Federico “spenderà alla grande poiché suppone che il suo ramo non habbi d’haver suessione.”²⁵⁷⁴ The Barberini, his earliest protectors, had taught him that the power of images was such that they had the potential to trounce alternative narratives, both in the present and in the future.²⁵⁷⁵ It was a

²⁵⁶⁸ Geertz, *Negara*. One example is Rietbergen, *Power*.

²⁵⁶⁹ Maravall, *La cultura*, pp. 132, 175.

²⁵⁷⁰ Burke, *The Fabrication*, pp. 11–13; Reinhardt, *Kreise*, p. 22.

²⁵⁷¹ Burke, *The Fabrication*, pp. 5, 8, 11.

²⁵⁷² Karsten, *Künstler und Kardinäle*, p. 224.

²⁵⁷³ Carrió-Invernizzi, *El gobierno*.

²⁵⁷⁴ Quoted in Galli and Monferrini, *I Borromeo*, p. 33.

²⁵⁷⁵ Burke, *The Fabrication*, p. 153.

stark lesson, and he passed it on to Antonio Renato who would use it to maximum effect as he set out to stifle lingering doubts about his family's disinterestedness.

Antonio Renato had long been active in the patronage of the arts in Milan. His success was considerable. Thanks to his involvement in the reopening of the Ambrosiana and the celebrations for Federico's elevation to the cardinalate, by the early 1670s, he was feted as a connoisseur of the arts who dominated Milan's cultural production.²⁵⁷⁶ When the first guide on the city's art, *L'immortalità e gloria del pennello*, was published in 1671, the author dedicated it to Antonio Renato, "Gran Cavaliere e Protettore dell'Accademia de' pittori, che fiorisce oggidì in Milano sotto gli autorevoli auspici di V[ostra] S[ignoria]." ²⁵⁷⁷ While he had presumably been active as a patron of the arts on earlier occasions, the piece de resistance was commissioned in the context of the family's attempt to cast themselves as Juan José's natural partisans. Beginning in the late 1670s, Antonio Renato ordered a series of paintings that documented the family's Spanish connection, to be exhibited in the castle of Angera where their liaison with the house of Habsburg had begun.²⁵⁷⁸ The genre he picked for this fanfare of self-congratulation was telling: history paintings were widely appreciated for their pedagogical value at the time and lent themselves perfectly to "un progetto di esaltazione della famiglia."²⁵⁷⁹ Mimicking similar pictorial representations of family deeds such as the *fasti farnesiani* in the Farnese's villa in Caprarola outside Rome, the *fasti borromei* centered on that family's dynastic glories, working predominantly through allusions to ancestors in order to establish continuities between the past and the present.²⁵⁸⁰ As Antonio Renato knew well from Federico, allegories were not only useful to make grandiose claims about the family without these resulting in charges of delusion. They were also more convincing than direct references to the present: „wem es gelang, seinen Weg durch den unüberschaubaren Bedeutungs- und Anspielungsdschungel zu finden, mochte über seine Leistung an sich bereits so begeistert sein, dass er die Botschaft der Bilder umso bereitwilliger akzeptierte."²⁵⁸¹ It was the learnedness of the canvasses that made their crude propaganda palatable to rivaling families.

Among the allegorical paintings realized by Filippo Abbiati, an epigone of Mattia Preti's and a rising star on the Milanese scene, in the late 1670s and early 1680s, two stand out in particular: the *Banchetto solenne offerto da Vitaliano I al re di Napoli, Alfonso d'Aragona, e al duca di Milano, Filippo Maria Visconti*, and the *Solenne entrata di Isabella d'Aragona, sposa di Gian Galeazzo Sforza*

²⁵⁷⁶ Cremonini, *Le vie*, pp. 52, 65.

²⁵⁷⁷ Quoted in Galli and Monferrini, *I Borromeo d'Angera*, p. 47.

²⁵⁷⁸ Zuffi, *Angera*, p. 392.

²⁵⁷⁹ Galli and Monferrini, *I Borromeo*, pp. 44–45.

²⁵⁸⁰ Galli and Monferrini, *I Borromeo*, p. 45. Antonio Renato's grandmother on his father's side was a Farnese. On the *fasti*, see Robertson, "Il Gran Cardinale," pp. 95–103. Partridge, *Divinity*.

²⁵⁸¹ Karsten, *Künstler und Kardinäle*, pp. 25–26; *ibid.*, p. 226.



Fig. 6: Filippo Abbiati, *Entrata solenne in Milano di Isabella d'Aragona guidata da Giovanni Borromeo*, 1683–1685, oil on canvas, Angera, Rocca di Angera, Sala dei Fasti Borromeo (Natale, *Le Isole Borromeo*, p. 143).

condotta a Milano da Giovanni Borromeo, depicting two documented events in the early and late fifteenth century, respectively.²⁵⁸² Although conceived as a continuation of the earlier pictures commissioned by Giovanni in the 1650s (see chapter 6), the paintings of the 1670s were indicative of the profound transformation that the family's conception of themselves had undergone since midcentury. Not only did most of the new paintings allude to historical episodes more solidly moored in reality than the ones commissioned under Giovanni (which was itself quite possibly a response to contemporary criticism of the inventive genealogies of the early half of the seventeenth century).²⁵⁸³ The new *fasti* also spoke more clearly to the Borromeo's vocation as courtiers. Gone were the days when the lords of Lake Maggiore sought to lay claim to a heritage of military valor with references to invented Roman ancestors: the new series of paintings emphasized the clan's role as brokers of peace and marital alliances working on behalf of Milan's ruling dynasties.²⁵⁸⁴

In that sense the *fasti* bore eloquent testimony to Federico Jr., who had made the most of his curial career to deepen the family's ties to the Madrid Habsburgs. The past that was being drafted in the service of the family's representation reflected the Borromeo's comportment as members of a courtly elite in the latter half of the seventeenth century, inserting Federico's relatively short-lasting princely service into a much longer line of continuity of service to Milan's ruling families, be they the Visconti, the Sforza, or the Habsburgs.²⁵⁸⁵ What is more, the choice of two references to the Neapolitan house of Aragon was far from accidental. Betraying Federico's chumminess to Pascual and Pedro de Aragón, who had been trying to revive the Aragonese heritage in Italy (see chapter 11),

²⁵⁸² Zuffi, Angera, pp. 393–394, 396; Natale, *Le Isole Borromeo*, pp. 142–143.

²⁵⁸³ See Spagnoletti, *Le dinastie italiane*, pp. 316–318.

²⁵⁸⁴ On the continued import of military entrepreneurship, see Maffi, *La cittadella*, pp. 120–121.

²⁵⁸⁵ On the need to create continuity, see Dewald, *Status, Power, and Identity*, p. 13.

the paintings brought back to life what was seen by many as the earliest contact between Iberia and Italy.²⁵⁸⁶ As such the canvasses were not just a glowing tribute to the friendship that linked Federico to the Aragón brothers and a reminder of their cooperation in Nithard's ouster; they cast the Borromeo as the Iberian kings' earliest servants, no doubt alluding to Federico's own record of service to the current rulers of Spain.

In fact, to the initiated, the marital alliance between the house of Aragon and the Sforza was a direct reference to the project Federico was pushing before his untimely death. Throughout 1672 the papal secretary of state seems to have been in close epistolary contact with Robert Spencer, second earl of Sunderland and English ambassador to the court of Madrid. Sunderland had been entrusted with a secret mission to arrange a marriage alliance between the brother of the king of England, the duke of York, and Claudia Felicitas, the archduchess of Innsbruck, with queen Mariana of Spain acting as a broker between the English and the Habsburg courts.²⁵⁸⁷ The backdrop to this secret diplomacy was Louis XIV's imminent war against the United Provinces which broke out in May 1672.²⁵⁸⁸ While England supported France, the United Provinces had pried the backing of the two branches of the Habsburgs. Hopes were that a wedding between the Stuarts and the Habsburgs would spur the British to switch sides. Had the union come to pass, it would have upset decades of alliance-building among Europe's ruling dynasties and, more significantly, opened up the possibility of the English royal family converting to Catholicism.

Things were off to a good start. Mariana, who was the sister of emperor Leopold, agreed to dispatch a special envoy to Innsbruck and Vienna. But when the English court got wind of Sunderland's shadow diplomacy, the regular ambassador to Vienna was instructed to stonewall and push for a more conventional French match instead.²⁵⁸⁹ Faced with the inevitable, the Spaniards lost interest in the idea, too. At this point Sunderland, then still a crypto-Catholic, reached out to Federico Borromeo with whom he "*carteggiava secretam[en]te*" until the latter's death, hoping that the cardinal-secretary of state might pave the way for an Anglo-Spanish alliance and the restoration of Catholicism in the British Isles.²⁵⁹⁰ There had been precedents of this, with nuncios in the Spanish court repeatedly taking an active interest in the weddings of the house of Habsburg.²⁵⁹¹ But Federico's involvement was unparalleled. As an informal member of Spain's governing elite and a cleric, Borromeo was asked to curry favor with the queen given that "*senza il continuo impulso di*

²⁵⁸⁶ Carrió-Invernizzi, *El gobierno*, chap. 3. On the revival of the legacy of Ferdinand the Catholic during Charles II's reign, see Carrasco, *Los grandes*, pp. 92–93.

²⁵⁸⁷ Domenico Millanta to Federico Borromeo, Madrid September 22, 1672: BAV, Barb. Lat. 9867, f. 496r; on the planned wedding alliance, see Feiling, *British Foreign Policy*, pp. 334–335.

²⁵⁸⁸ See Storrs, *The Resilience*, pp. 1–2.

²⁵⁸⁹ Wolf, *Fürst Wenzel Lobkowitz*, p. 364.

²⁵⁹⁰ Marescotti to Paluzzi Altieri, Madrid June 14, 1673: ASV, Segr. Stato, Spagna, vol. 143, f. 289r.

²⁵⁹¹ González Cuerva, *The Austrian Match*, p. 272.

Spagna” it was nigh impossible to “passare all’effettuazione del matrimonio.”²⁵⁹² Borromeo in turn argued that it was irresponsible for the Spanish to let the once-in-a-lifetime chance of a Stuart-Habsburg alliance go to waste.²⁵⁹³ He believed that Mariana’s role as an intermediary would stand the queen-regent in good stead, “tanto più conoscendo il mondo che tutte le guerre fattesi con la Spagna si sono poi felicemente aggiustate col nuovo parentado.”²⁵⁹⁴ Imbued with the *diacatholicon*, the Austrian match was Federico’s final contribution to the strengthening of the alliance of the Spanish sword and the Roman cross he had done so much to promote. It was quite possibly doomed to fail from the start. The truth was that the boosting of Habsburg ambitions and Catholicism was a destabilizing project that had little appeal to anyone not as invested in the *diacatholicon* as Borromeo.²⁵⁹⁵ It is therefore no surprise that, after his death, the duke of York married Maria Beatrice d’Este, the candidate favored by Louis XIV of France, whereas Claudia Felicitas was married to emperor Leopold in October 1673.²⁵⁹⁶

Yet, in Abbiati’s allegorical rendition, Federico’s ultimately unsuccessful brokerage performed a crucial part in securing the family’s survival. By stressing their close association with the house of Habsburg and emphasizing Federico’s role in continuing that legacy, the family highlighted their leading role in restoring the divinely ordained order that their own policies had threatened to tear apart in the 1650s. In putting Federico at the center of their self-fashioning (rather than the discredited military model embodied by Giovanni), the Borromeo asserted their membership of the pan-Hispanic elite that had emerged out of the ashes of the crisis of the 1640s and had found its leader in Juan José, as shown by the paintings Antonio Renato had hung in the family palace in Milan (see Introduction). Using allegory Antonio Renato showed that his family was so knotted up with the house of Habsburg that its members arranged their weddings. Unlike the Viennese nobility studied by Andreas Pečar, who were in denial about their growing dependence on the ruling dynasty, the Borromeo stressed their proximity to the Spanish Habsburg.²⁵⁹⁷ Reinventing themselves as courtiers and princely servants, the Borromeo took a punt at distancing themselves from the social strivers of the “árbol del parentesco” whose legacy was threatening to torpedo the Borromeo’s own ambitions.

To the Borromeo, then, artistic patronage was laden with political meaning.²⁵⁹⁸ It created a *fait accompli*, silencing their critics and foisting their own reading on a skeptical public. Repressing their own recent past, the Borromeo pinned their hopes on artistic commissions, believing that they would tear them away from the whiff of money and place them firmly into a small elite who owed its

²⁵⁹² Domenico Millanta to Federico Borromeo, Madrid September 22, 1672: BAV, Barb. Lat. 9867, ff. 497r–v.

²⁵⁹³ Quoted in de Gennaro, *La crisi*, p. 111.

²⁵⁹⁴ Quoted in de Gennaro, *La crisi*, p. 112.

²⁵⁹⁵ De Gennaro, *La crisi*, pp. 108–109, 111–112.

²⁵⁹⁶ Spagnoletti, *Le dinastie italiane*, p. 174.

²⁵⁹⁷ Pecar, *Status-Ökonomie*, p. 104.

²⁵⁹⁸ Stollberg-Rilinger, *The Emperor’s Old Clothes*, p. 7.

position not to venality but to its close connection to the ruling dynasty. Like the family histories in vogue in contemporary France, the Borromeo's pictorial representations of their past "reminded themselves and everyone else who listened that they rendered the king personal service and that the merits most essential to that service came from a culture to which only some families belonged."²⁵⁹⁹ Rather than as crass propaganda the *fasti borromei* ought to be read as a legitimation of the Borromeo's will to power in the radically altered circumstances of the 1670s where they needed to lift themselves above the social parvenus with whom the crown prosecution had lumped them.

Form was as decisive as content, reinforcing as it did the message the family wanted to convey. As the lines between the established nobility and parvenus blurred, the ability to convert economic into cultural capital had become indispensable to status affirmation.²⁶⁰⁰ As in Spanish Naples, where artistic commissions peaked in the 1660s and 1670s, taste in art became a pattern of classification that signaled membership of an elite within the elite.²⁶⁰¹ For families like the Borromeo, an ostentatious sense of discernment was the easiest way to distance themselves from moneyed interests and stake their claim to higher status through the asserted "Zugehörigkeit zur geschmackbildenden höfischen Adelselite."²⁶⁰² Inscrutable as it was to outsiders unfamiliar with the subtle finesse of its message, art in and of itself created a *fait accompli*, furnishing evidence of the Borromeo's exalted social position in Milan. It was in their form, as well as in their content, that the *fasti* delegitimized the Borromeo's rivals who were arrogantly trying to outbid them from a position they had paid for rather than earned through graft, as really meritorious nobles did.²⁶⁰³ For the Borromeo, the paintings commissioned for the castle of Angera were their silver bullet as they sought to win the contest of ideas that had erupted after the breakdown of the Osuna regime.

The picture gallery at Angera represented the family's power at a time when their real influence was on the wane. In the castle that the count-duke of Olivares had gifted them, Antonio Renato eternalized the family's Spanish connection at a time when these ties had been weakened by the death of the family member who had done most to give the clan's image the much-needed makeover in the name of the *diacatholicon*. The interior of the fortress above Lake Maggiore was to represent the family's deeds for future generations to come, allowing them to reactivate the immaterial legacy of Federico and wallow in glories past when real deeds no longer spoke for themselves. Betting on the reproductive strategies of papal families was a huge gamble for a Milanese family in the latter half of the seventeenth century but the Borromeo seemed to be winning that bet.

²⁵⁹⁹ Smith, *The Culture of Merit*, p. 91.

²⁶⁰⁰ Pečar, *Status-Ökonomie*, p. 96.

²⁶⁰¹ On Naples, see Carrió-Invernizzi, *El gobierno*, pp. 341–342; on Milan, see Cremonini, *Le vie*, p. 30. Also see Pečar, *Das Hofzeremoniell*, p. 398.

²⁶⁰² Pečar, *Status-Ökonomie*, p. 96; also see Cremonini, *Le vie*, p. 30.

²⁶⁰³ Smith, *The Culture of Merit*.

The Borromeo's ultimate goal had always been to settle the thorniest of all issues—the pending legal action of the *Magistrato Straordinario* against their family (see chapter 8). When he was still alive, Federico had come within a hair's breadth of putting the matter to rest. Thanks to his status as a pro-Spanish cardinal and an informal member of the Spanish governing elite, Federico by 1672 had made significant inroads. As early as 1671, he had been cautiously optimistic, telling his brother that “la Casa è assistita da due Card[ina]li,” Moncada and Aragón. He trusted that “le mie Amicitie in Spagna” would help the Borromeo secure “quello, che in altri tempi non facilment[en]te si riportarebbero.”²⁶⁰⁴ By April 1672, Federico assured his cousin, Renato, that Moncada was doing everything in his power to “guadagnare gl'arbitrij per l'occorrenze della n[ost]ra Casa.”²⁶⁰⁵ Moncada's unexpected passing in the summer of 1672 threatened to reopen old wounds. Once his protective hand was gone, the Council of Italy announced it would take a new look into the matter, something the Borromeo had hoped to avoid, knowing full well that they stood no chance of winning the case legally.²⁶⁰⁶

Scrambling for alternative protectors, in the summer of 1672 Federico wrote to the new grand chancellor in Milan, Antonio Juan de Centellas, with whom he had been friendly since the latter had taken up that position earlier that year.²⁶⁰⁷ In his letter he reminded Centellas that he “por orden de Su Mag[esta]d tiene [...] la superintendencia” of the *Magistrato Straordinario* and asked him to keep “debajo su protección” the house of Borromeo “principalmente en las causas, que penden” in that tribunal.²⁶⁰⁸ To justify that request, he cited “la buena correspondencia y amistad particular” that the two men had enjoyed in Madrid.²⁶⁰⁹ Luis Carrillo of the Council of Italy similarly leaned on Centellas to “mirar esta Casa con propensión particular, por ser la base, y columna de la Nobleza de ese estado, y los Vassallos, que en las ocasiones de aprieto han dado grande exemplo de firmeza, y fidelidad.”²⁶¹⁰ After the setback they had suffered under Giovanni, this was proof that the Borromeo were back on the scene and were fast becoming what they had always wanted to be: props of the Spanish Habsburgs.

Federico's sudden death in 1673 put the Borromeo back to square one, and it was only in the late 1670s that things started looking up again. In 1678, a new governor, the count of Melgar, was dispatched to Milan. Fortunately for Antonio Renato Borromeo, Melgar was an old family friend. He had hobnobbed with Federico in Madrid in the late 1660s, and when Melgar was first assigned a post

²⁶⁰⁴ Federico IV to Antonio Renato, Rome July 4, 1671: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, Corrispondenza 1671–1680.

²⁶⁰⁵ Federico IV to Renato, Rome April 16, 1672: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, Corrispondenza 1671–1680.

²⁶⁰⁶ Federico to Renato, Rome April 16, 1672, and Federico IV to Renato, Rome June 16, 1672: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, Corrispondenza 1671–1680.

²⁶⁰⁷ See Antonio Juan de Centellas to Federico Borromeo, Milan May 4, 1672, and Antonio Juan de Centellas to Federico Borromeo, Milan June 1, 1672: BNE, ms. 12877, f. 559r. On Centellas, see Álvarez-Ossorio, *La república*, pp. 331–332.

²⁶⁰⁸ Luis Carrillo to Antonio Juan de Centellas, Madrid August 24, 1672: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, Corrispondenza 1671–1680.

²⁶⁰⁹ Luis Carrillo to Antonio Juan de Centellas, Madrid August 24, 1672: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, Corrispondenza 1671–1680.

²⁶¹⁰ Luis Carrillo to Antonio Juan de Centellas, Madrid August 24, 1672: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, Corrispondenza 1671–1680.

in Milan, Federico had urged Antonio Renato to treat him with the utmost respect, “essendo egli figlio di uno de maggiori, e più affettionati amici, ch’io havessi in Spagna.”²⁶¹¹ He was also an emissary of the new strongman in Madrid, Juan José of Austria. To get in his good books, it was necessary for the Borromeo to persuade him of their superior lineage and long record of public service to the Habsburgs, and to remind him of Federico’s role in facilitating Nithard’s ouster in Juan José’s first coup. It was just as well that Abbiati set to work on the paintings for the castle of Angera as Antonio Renato sought to inscribe his clan among the early followers of the new dispensation that had descended upon Milan and the monarchy as a whole. The gamble seemed to work. Resuscitated thanks to the *fasti borromei*, Federico’s specter worked miracles for Antonio Renato as his family became the main beneficiaries of the new regime.

Juan José’s government turned out to be just as Federico and others had theorized it: outwardly committed to the common good, inwardly bent on ensuring that the powers-that-be always prevailed. In July 1679, the *junta del alivio* which had been set up in Milan to look into the “malgoverno” of the Valenzuela years ordered a thorough investigation into the “opresiones, y excesos que la casa Borromea usa en sus dilatados Feudos contra los Pobres súbditos, que se quexan amargamente,” adding that if a settlement had not been reached, this was only because of “el poder de la parte, o por la falta de Ministros.”²⁶¹² That of committing “excesses” was a generic charge, usually brandished by royal courts of laws to defang the nobility.²⁶¹³ In practice, the junta soon proved unwilling to go beyond virtue-signaling for Juan José’s popular base. One of its members and an intimus of Juan José’s, Vincenzo Gonzaga, argued that Carlo Borromeo, the heir apparent of the Arona branch, “esta casado con sobrina del Papa.”²⁶¹⁴ As their own patronage of the arts suggested, and as other members of the governing elite seemed to believe, the Borromeo now had too much symbolic heft to be prosecuted by the crown. As Antonio Álvarez has concluded, “El programa de *alivio* manifestaba su verdadero alcance al desistir en su intento de amparar a los súbditos del *Stato Borromeo* y de preservar los intereses del Regio Fisco en el principal pleito que se trataba en los tribunales del Estado. La alta aristocracia feudal y patricia de los Borromeo salía victoriosa de la discreta pugna de argumentos que tuvo lugar en el palacio real gracias a sus vínculos de ... parentesco.”²⁶¹⁵

Their membership of the in-crowd did not just spare the Borromeo from criminal prosecution; it helped them remove potential prosecutors. Instead of the Borromeo, some of the most radical opponents of their rule in the law courts, including Belloni who had most aggressively

²⁶¹¹ Federico IV to Antonio Renato, Rome March 7, 1671: ABIB, FB, Federico IV, Corrispondenza 1671–1680.

²⁶¹² Quoted in Álvarez-Ossorio, *La república*, p. 433.

²⁶¹³ Fosi, Niccolò Orsini, p. 276.

²⁶¹⁴ Quoted in Álvarez-Ossorio, *La república*, p. 434. On the marriage alliance between the Borromeo and the Odescalchi, see Cremonini, *Ritratto*, pp. 71–79. On Gonzaga, see Carrasco, *Los grandes*, p. 106.

²⁶¹⁵ Álvarez-Ossorio, *La república*, p. 435.

pushed charges against them in the first litigation on their fiefs in the 1650s, found themselves embroiled in the inquiry into the “árbol del parentesco,” accused of holding venal offices. The denouement of the mother of all conflicts between the Borromeo and their subjects was an object lesson in how the new regime of Juan José operated. It has been argued that Juan José’s reformist intents ran aground on the shoals of noble opposition to changes to the status quo, most notably his policing of conspicuous consumption.²⁶¹⁶ Contemporaries never labored under such illusions. As the anonymous author of a pamphlet in Madrid quipped, “Vino S[u] A[lteza], sacó la espada, y no ha hecho nada.”²⁶¹⁷ Episodes like Juan José’s treatment of the Borromeo point in the same direction. In this instance, the project, shedding its disguise as a measure to restore good governance, revealed itself for what it had been all along: the old nobility’s punishment of the service nobility who, riding on the coattails of popular insurgents, had thrown them into an existential crisis. Betraying the full extent of the *restauración*, the Borromeo had successfully extended the fight against the holders of venal offices to the traditional service nobility.

The defeat of the *togati* marked the ultimate triumph of the double-faced monarchy that Federico had helped build and signaled the renaissance of noble power in the 1660s and 1670s in other parts of Spanish Italy.²⁶¹⁸ Capitalizing on the family cardinal’s role in the making of Juan José’s regime, the Borromeo had clawed back control over the narrative by deposing the *togati* who had held their feet to the fire when their threnodies to the common good appeared vacuous. Beating them with their own weapons in the ongoing classification struggle, the Borromeo had changed the rules of the game. What the *togati* had brandished as an unmistakable sign of their commitment to royal service—the fact that they had chipped in for a monarchy in dire straits—was now held against them and branded as the venality of social climbers. Unable to outstrip the Borromeo in the field of culture, a sanctimonious nobility exposed them as money grubbers with questionable motives.

The Borromeo’s apotheosis raises important questions about the persistence of noble power in the early modern period. Spurning the old trope of a progressive blurring of the differences between the traditional nobility and the nobility of the robe, recent writing on early modern elites has highlighted the traditional nobility’s obsession with upholding such subtle distinctions.²⁶¹⁹ Yet, if most authors still implicitly dismiss such caviling as immaterial nitpicking, the above episode showed that such subtleties were expressions of very tangible material interests: riding on them was nothing less than the perpetuation of the monarchy as a spoils system for the chosen few in lieu of a commonwealth whose resources were shared equitably among the king’s subjects. By crushing the defenders of that alternative vision, the *togati*, the established nobility lifted itself back into the

²⁶¹⁶ Kalnein, *Die Regentschaft*, pp. 429–430.

²⁶¹⁷ Quoted in Kalnein, *Die Regentschaft*, p. 476, n. 19.

²⁶¹⁸ Carrió-Invernizzi, *El gobierno*, p. 253.

²⁶¹⁹ Horowski, *Die Belagerung*, pp. 73–74.

saddle after decades of intense uncertainty.²⁶²⁰ Creating the cosseted environment in which they could thrive, the Borromeo reigned supreme, fancying themselves an integral part of that benevolent elite who helped the royal family deliver good government, a claim that their cultural patronage both made and confirmed through its skilled use of allegories.²⁶²¹ This acute awareness of the importance of art and symbols which the Borromeo had pioneered came to distinguish Juan José's regime as a whole. As an anonymous critic of the dispensation rhymed with reference to Juan José's iconoclasm against his enemies in Madrid, "La carne el año pasado / valía a solo catorce; / el pan se vale a sus once; / y en este no se ha bajado / más que el caballo de bronce."²⁶²² What had changed was the fabrication of authority, not the power structure itself. If the trick never quite washed with their subjects, the Borromeo's spiel seemed compelling enough to other members of the elite in Madrid who had by all indications come to espouse their self-fashioning.²⁶²³

The Borromeo's trajectory was typical of a family of their station. Historians have often noted the similarities between the kingdom of Aragon and the Milanese state under Charles II, placing heavy emphasis on the centrifugal forces at work in both territories. They are not entirely wrong. The late 1670s did see a strengthening of the local nobility, not least in response to the very real decline of what had once been the imperial center—Castile—at the expense of peripheral regions, including the crown's American possessions, in what is usually described as *neoforalismo*.²⁶²⁴ What is far less convincing in the standard narrative is the underlying assumption that the push toward oligarchization meant a return to the times at the beginning of the seventeenth century, before successive minister-favorites made ultimately unsuccessful attempts to unite the composite Spanish monarchy. Seen from the standpoint of local elites, the developments of the 1670s were not a return to a glorious past of local autonomy but a logical reinvention of the Olivares project after the original version had floundered on the resistance of the king's ordinary subjects. Understanding that elite integration could not be achieved through clientelism alone, the eminent families of Aragon and Lombardy fought their way back to a preeminent position by other means, through artistic depictions of the good government that they were allegedly showering on the king's subjects.

In fact, not only were the families from the various kingdoms now more closely linked together than ever before, they, crucially, rationalized their quest for preeminence by citing a tradition of fealty to the Habsburg dynasty.²⁶²⁵ What the proponents of *neoforalismo* have mistaken for the strengthening of the local nobility was, really, a strengthening of a reconstructed Spanish nobility who, redefining Olivares's dream of an integrated pan-Hispanic elite and making it fit for a

²⁶²⁰ Álvarez-Ossorio, *The Legacy*, p. 27.

²⁶²¹ Karsten, *Künstler und Kardinäle*, pp. 25–26.

²⁶²² Quoted in Ruiz Rodríguez, *Don Juan José*, p. 541.

²⁶²³ Burke, *The Fabrication*, pp. 151–153.

²⁶²⁴ Storrs, *The Resilience*, pp. 11, 191–194, 229; Carrasco, *Los grandes*, pp. 110–113.

²⁶²⁵ As demonstrated by Aragonese authors' enthusiasm for Charles II. See Storrs, *The Resilience*, p. 192.

new age, saw themselves as purveyors of good government acting in the name of the royal family on whom they relied as much as the monarch did on his local oligarchies.²⁶²⁶ With the rise of a courtier elite, many others, including aspiring *togati*, were pushed aside in a process that had more in common with Louis XIV's France than has hitherto been allowed. As Anglo-American revisionists have shown, that of Louis XIV was a regime based on the "social collaboration" between the high nobility and a king whose might was symbolically constructed in new media outlets.²⁶²⁷ Not unlike its twin in France, the nobility of the composite Spanish empire had transformed the *monarquía* into an "aristocratic republic" that relied on projections of a strong monarch to pacify the twin threat of commoners and the nobility of the robe.²⁶²⁸ The Borromeo who muscled themselves back into Madrid's good graces through investment in symbolic power exalting the monarchy and a loyal aristocracy were only the most prominent example of a fundamental shift in seventeenth-century politics.

Their redemption in Madrid paved the way for the final stage of the Borromeo's climb to the top. As it turned out, the brokering of the Stuart-Habsburg match which the painting in Angera depicted also secured the family's long-term survival. Anticipating the imminent extinction of the Madrid Habsburgs, the Borromeo, like other Milanese families, seem to have been actively looking to Vienna and Innsbruck as a new source of patronage in the final decades of the seventeenth century.²⁶²⁹ With the future of his family in mind, Federico sought to reactivate the old ties to the Austrian branch that his brother Giovanni had forged when he served as a page in the Imperial court in the 1620s. His brother, Antonio Renato, later paid homage to the emperor by commissioning *Federico, mitico antenato dei Borromei, riceve in moglie Agnese figlia di Enrico IV*, a depiction of an invented marriage alliance between the Borromeo and an emperor from the eleventh century.²⁶³⁰ The beneficiaries of this careful cultivation of old ties were others. The Angera branch became extinct after Paolo Emilio's death in 1690, but the main line would go on to reap the fruits of the hard work that their nemeses from across the lake had invested in building a bond to the house of Habsburg. When the Austrian Habsburgs became lords of Milan in the war of the Spanish succession, the fledgling career of Carlo IV (1657–1734) from the main branch took off for good. Thanks to Federico's forays, Carlo was nominated viceroy of Austrian Naples in 1710 before being appointed

²⁶²⁶ Jago, *The "Crisis,"* pp. 86–87.

²⁶²⁷ For a comparative view of France, see Horowski, *Die Belagerung*, pp. 39–43, 47–53. The classic formulation of "absolutism" as a form of "social collaboration" is Beik, *The Absolutism*. The standard text on the "fabrication" of Louis XIV is Burke, *The Fabrication*.

²⁶²⁸ See Storrs, *The Resilience*, pp. 166, 190 who rejects the qualifier to argue that the monarchy was more "absolute" than historians had hitherto allowed. For a similar reading, see Thompson, *The Nobility*, p. 218. The evidence presented here points in the opposite direction.

²⁶²⁹ See Cremonini, Pirro Visconti; Signorotto, *A proposito dell'intentato processo*, pp. 322–323; D'Amico, *Spanish Milan. A City*, p. 148.

²⁶³⁰ On the painting, see Zuffi, *Angera*, p. 395, and Galli and Monferrini, *I Borromeo d'Angera*, pp. 48–49.

plenipotentiary of the imperial fiefs in Italy, serving the emperor, who was an oft-overlooked but still influential feudal overlord in the Italian peninsula, as a central coordinator.²⁶³¹

After a century of unremitting struggle for stability, the Borromeo were, at long last, respected servants of the Habsburgs. The sumptuous palace in the shape of a large ship that the family built in the latter half of the seventeenth century on Isola Bella in Lake Maggiore bore eloquent testimony to their ambitions as courtiers and princely servants. When Carlo's father, Vitaliano, had commissioned its interiors in the late seventeenth century, he explicitly wanted them to overshadow "gli addobbi di Genova e delle grandi Corti, la stanza degli specchi in [Palazzo Ducale] a Modena."²⁶³² If the palace had exuded the clan's desire to rival the heads of the smaller Italian states from the outset, these aspirations became a reality in the early eighteenth century when one of them lorded over a territory that was much more substantial than the statelets that the republic of Genoa or the duke of Modena controlled.

By the early eighteenth century, their efforts at integration into the imperial nobility were finally paying dividends. Thanks to the alliance with the house of Habsburg, the Borromeo had joined the ranks of (vice)royalty and were quite possibly enjoying more standing within Europe's society of gentlemen than they would have if their original plan to erect a sovereign mini-state around Lake Maggiore had come to fruition in the early sixteenth century. Where they had once trembled at the prospect of scraping by under the whip of the Habsburgs, they had made a virtue of necessity. Turning the Spanish connection into a source of empowerment and dynastic ascendance, they came to accept the Habsburgs as the crucial external authority able to adjudicate over noble status and regulate the intense competition at the pinnacle of the society of gentlemen and shield them from attacks below.²⁶³³ The costs involved had been considerable but so were the rewards. Morphing from rebels into warriors and courtiers, the Borromeo defied the odds and asserted themselves as a dynasty respected across the continent. After many a self-inflicted setback, stability, that elusive thing, was now within their grasp.

²⁶³¹ See Cremonini, *Ritratto*, pp. 177–213; eadem, *La mediazione*, pp. 47–48.

²⁶³² Quoted in Natale, *Le Isole*, p. 27.

²⁶³³ For parallel developments in France, see Parker, *Class and State*, pp. 203–205.

Conclusion

The Crisis of Patronage, the Rise of Baroque Monarchies, and the Transformation of the Nobility

This thesis has reconstructed how, in the seventeenth century, the Borromeo brothers of Spanish Milan ditched their rebellious stance and reinvented themselves as courtiers and servants of the house of Habsburg. The path that led them there had not been one entirely of the Borromeo's choosing. If they started the transition on their own terms, in the later stages, they were shoved down the road toward princely service by others. As with so many of their peers, the Borromeo had seized the opportunities of the government of the minister-favorite and partaken of the drive toward military cooperation that the regime of the count-duke of Olivares initiated. Yet, in so doing, they unwittingly unleashed popular opposition to their rule, opposition that shattered the illusion of superiority and forced the family to course-correct lest they forfeit their preeminence as one of Milan's leading houses. Pushed to the brink at midcentury, the Borromeo bounced back by annexing the demands from below and turning them into benevolent initiatives from above. Dreading the verdict of fellow nobles who might appropriate the radical rhetoric of enraged village communities, the Borromeo placed themselves at the helm of a project to overhaul the Spanish monarchy, nudging along the birth of a more populist regime whose elites exerted power through symbolism. Thus, the more nakedly opportunistic ways of the first half of the century gave way to rule in the name of good government in the final decades of the *Seicento*. This trajectory is worth retelling in some detail before we explore its implications for the history of Spanish Milan, the wider Spanish monarchy, and ultimately such fundamental processes as state building and the transformation of early modern elite rule.

For the nobility, everything changed with the rise of the minister-favorite in the Spanish court at the dawn of the seventeenth century. Having been relegated to the sidelines of politics for much of the sixteenth century, the high nobility of Spanish Italy was easily sold on the dream peddled by successive *validos*: that of finally having a share in the king's power commensurate with their social status as part of a pan-Hispanic imperial aristocracy. For the Borromeo, however, that dream rapidly descended into a nightmare. As they accrued power as members of Olivares's network, the family became vulnerable to challenges from the ruled. Soon enough, the beacon of integration and dynastic aggrandizement turned into a source of endless trouble, leaving them pining for stability and protection from the Habsburgs for the best part of the middle decades of the seventeenth century.

The Borromeo's close association with the minister-favorite was probably doomed from the start. The authorized *raison d'être* for their chumminess with Olivares had been the defense of the collective good, but, as they soon discovered, that noble goal did not tessellate neatly with their

desire for dynastic greatness. At first the Borromeo had, rather naively, assumed that they would be able to overcome that contradiction. Taking the cue from the count-duke himself, the clan enthusiastically embraced the trickle-down theory at the heart of the Olivares regime which posited dynastic ambitions as the vehicle to the realization of a monarchy that worked for everyone. As they built a powerbase around Lake Maggiore, the part of the Milanese State that they had been entrusted with, and tussled for the resources dispensed to them by the *valido* in Madrid, they went to exceptional lengths to misrecognize their hankering for self-aggrandizement as conducive to the common good. If their grandstanding persuaded skeptical elites, they strained to convince the alleged beneficiaries, their subjects in their fiefdom.

The onset of the Thirty Years' War made the incongruity at the heart of the Olivares project inescapable. The grumbling of village communities in the Borromeo's fiefs gained momentum when their alleged benefactor, Giovanni Borromeo, signed up for Olivares's war against France and inflicted a trail of devastation on the area around Lake Maggiore. Things went downhill from there. With the Spanish empire imploding around him in the 1640s, Giovanni Borromeo sought to stave off the wave of protest which had ended in revolts elsewhere by parceling out military contracts to the so-called *ceto civile*, the social group that had been at the forefront of the insurgent movements elsewhere in Spanish Italy. That solution birthed problems of its own. In the eyes of Giovanni's opponents, this divide-and-rule politics was such a blatant abuse of the powers conferred on the Borromeo by the crown that the family now faced something unprecedented in history: a powerful popular movement that appropriated the rhetoric of their social betters to demand that they live up to their self-appointed role as defenders of the collective good. For the Borromeo and their peers, the rise of a new subject on the political stage was a traumatic experience. Having tried solving the crisis of patronage with yet more patronage, they now realized that favoritism was built on sand. Subaltern actors with no prior experience in politics not only scuppered the massive redistribution of public resources that the conflagration had spawned across Lombardy. Fighting through the courts for the restoration of the well-ordered society to which they felt entitled, village communities terminated a career that had been crafted on the usurpation of collective resources to further the interests of the Borromeo and their clients. As the Borromeo came crashing down, so did the form of government that they had seen as their meal ticket: that of the minister-favorite.

It is important to dwell for a moment on the exact dynamics that produced this unexpected outcome. What brought Giovanni Borromeo down were the arguments that the social movements adduced against his approach to power more than the movements themselves. Lapping up ideas first voiced among elites, those who protested the Borromeo and their ilk transformed elite ideology into an alternative vision of the monarchy as a commonweal based on distributive justice. Indeed, the resistance from the bottom of the pile helped shape criticism of favoritism, and the elite free-for-all it

engendered, within the ruling group itself. In the wake of the instability of the 1640s, some members of the elite realized that they could preserve acquired privilege only if they fed at least some scraps to the populace. Hammering home the same point as the popular movements that had rocked the monarchy, they went about ousting rivals and sought to create a new monarchy for the post-*valido* age, one in which the king imposed himself as an arbiter of justice and the nobility helped him achieve that goal rather than undermine it through a narrow fixation on the social reproduction of their respective clans. As the monarchy unspooled before their eyes, the powers-that-be came to the painful conclusion that they were unable to govern against the interests of their vassals. This is not to say that the playing field was ever level: the power differential between the high nobility and commoners remained all too real. But subjects making their voices heard and demanding that the governing elite live up to its purported values were now a force to be reckoned with, compelling the nobility to abandon their ambitions of military grandeur and fashion themselves as royal servants outwardly committed to the public good if they were to salvage their preeminent position in society.

Adapting to the new climate, the Borromeo lurched to align their interests with those of the ruling Habsburg dynasty. They spent much of the 1660s and 1670s effacing their record as military entrepreneurs, taking ownership of the concomitant problems and becoming part of the solution by grabbing the mantle of purveyors of good governance. In the process, the two sources of power that the family had long played off against each other—the monarchy and the Roman Catholic Church—were knitted together into a potent ideology, the *diacatholicon*, with the Church being put in the service of propping up the king’s might in Spanish Italy. Betraying the continued centrality of the curia to the Borromeo’s social reproduction, it was thanks to the family cardinal that they took an active role in reshaping the Spanish monarchy into a more populist body, one that claimed to be attentive to the needs of ordinary people. As a papal diplomat, Federico Borromeo Jr. actively lifted up Juan José of Austria, the stepbrother of king Charles II, who promised to reorganize the dispensing of royal patronage in a more equitable way and invited the population to subject the ruling aristocracy to public scrutiny through a nascent public sphere. Federico was equally on hand when it came to containing the deleterious effects of that publicity, leading the charge on the transformation of the Spanish monarchy into a baroque state. Mobilizing his capital as a member of the clergy, he helped erect good governance façades, protecting inherited privilege through institutions that were publicly committed to the preservation of the common good, while shielding the persistent “promotion of private interest” that went on behind the lavish displays of royal munificence.²⁶³⁴ Having stared into the abyss, the Borromeo proved instrumental in stabilizing Habsburg power in Lombardy, making the monarchy fit for what had always been its purpose: the defense of the interests of a small minority.

²⁶³⁴ Campbell, *Power*, p. 4; Rowlands, *Dynastic State*, p. 10.

If the story told here has any merit, it challenges entrenched ideas about Milanese exceptionalism, most notably the notion that while many parts of the Spanish monarchy revolted in the 1640s, Milan remained peaceful. The most popular explanation for this has been that Milan's nobility was so deeply imbricated in the patronage networks of the crown that Milanese heads of household were reasonably happy to cooperate with Philip IV when other peripheral elites rebelled.²⁶³⁵ It seems hard to disagree with the bare facts of this statement. As the evidence marshaled here indicates, the Milanese elite's alliance with Philip IV's monarchy went probably much further than even the most enthusiastic champions of the network theorem of social stability would have previously believed. Unlike their confreres elsewhere, Milanese nobles seem to have jumped at the chance of Olivares's bold plans for military cooperation when this program of elite integration was unveiled in the 1620s. The Union of Arms satisfied a demand as much as it shaped noble strategies of affirmation. If Giovanni Borromeo is anything to go by, a generation of noblemen invested heavily in military training, adopting the pose of military entrepreneurs ready to tender their services as skilled administrators to the minister-favorite in the hope that such a move would speed up their integration into an emerging imperial elite. Noteworthy as this process is, the problem is that it does not account for Milan's relative stability.

The revisionist work emphasizing stability, courtesy of royal patronage, has been an important corrective to a black legend which portrayed Milanese society as constantly at daggers drawn with its quasi-colonial Spanish overlords. Yet, the intense focus on transnational elite cooperation, innovative as it was at the time, might have papered over cracks in Milanese society itself. Upon closer inspection, it is questionable whether patronage really was the source of stability as which it has been touted. While it might have pacified the nobility, the integration of Milan's leading families in Olivares's Union of Arms wreaked havoc with the territory's established order: as they reinvented themselves as military leaders, noblemen like Giovanni Borromeo and many of his peers developed a vested interest in war which brought not only destruction and devastation to ordinary people in Lombardy but hobbled the precarious balance within towns and communities. My own data shows that, rather than fostering cohesion, the elite networks of the Olivares age gave birth to a new adversarial subject in Milanese politics: the often anonymous leaders of the popular opposition to the cartel of military entrepreneurs who pursued narrow dynastic interests to the detriment of the collective good that the ruling elite had sworn to uphold when they made common cause with the minister-favorite. Granted, there was no such thing in Lombardy as the proto-national opposition that earlier nationalist historians were scouring for, but it is undeniable that the connivance of local elites with the imperial center brought on strong pushback. From the vantage

²⁶³⁵ See Signorotto, *Milano spagnola*, pp. 292–293; idem, *A proposito*; Storrs, *The Resilience*, pp. 211–212.

point of the elites, the much-touted networks heralded unrest, launching them on an unexpected “struggle for stability” (Theodore Rabb).²⁶³⁶

Indeed, rather than provide new arguments for its exceptionalism, a closer analysis of local elite’s entwinement underlines Milan’s commonalities with other parts of the Spanish empire, including those that did revolt. As research on Catalonia and Naples has made plain, the revolts of the 1640s were driven by local communities who, quite apart from having their lives turned upside down, were called upon to pony up for the militarization of local elites in thrall to Olivares’s grandiose project.²⁶³⁷ These social dynamics map neatly onto the fault lines crisscrossing Milanese society. If the revolts elsewhere were unleashed by the billeting of troops or a tax hike, in Lombardy the two came together in a perfect storm, weighing down heavily on the vast majority of the population who remained outside the circuits of redistribution that the emergency government brought into being.²⁶³⁸ Unbeknownst to most scholars, the prolonged war fostered significant opposition from village communities. Unlike their peers elsewhere, they may have expressed themselves predominantly through the courts of law rather than through violent uprisings, but they nevertheless drove home the same message: that the Spanish monarchy was in the grips of a crisis of patronage.

If the structural givens in Milan were identical to those in Catalonia or Naples but yielded very different outcomes, Milan’s exceptionalism has to be attributed to local elites’ handling of the breakdown of trust.²⁶³⁹ Drawing on news that trickled in from Catalonia and Naples, Milan’s leading lights were able to avoid the rebellions that the militarization of society had produced there. Local *olivaristas* realized, as their protector had once put it to Philip IV, that the powers-that-be sometimes needed “to think about bending in order to avoid breaking.”²⁶⁴⁰ Thanks to personal contacts to the rebellious territories of the monarchy, Milanese *olivaristas* understood that the men leading the charge against the nobility’s pay-for-play hailed from the educated mid-section of society that contemporaries referred to as the *ceto civile*. If these men had many grievances elsewhere, they must have been even more desperate in Milan where a flourishing local economy based on agricultural production and trade had caved under the pressure of military conflict. Building on the experience of their peers in southern Italy and Catalonia, Milan’s elite cottoned on to the idea that they had to give this group a share in the business of war lest they incite a popular insurgency. Thus, exploiting the networks they commanded, elites turned the billeting of troops into a bonanza for the section of the population that, in their eyes, was most susceptible to revolt, employing war taxation

²⁶³⁶ Rabb, *The Struggle*.

²⁶³⁷ Corteguera, *For the Common Good*; Villari, *Un sogno di libertà*.

²⁶³⁸ Parker, *Global Crisis*, p. 513.

²⁶³⁹ Also see Muto, *Noble Presence*, pp. 295–296.

²⁶⁴⁰ Quoted in Parker, *Global Crisis*, p. 442.

to redistribute scarcening resources to a widening group of clients.²⁶⁴¹ As the work of Alessandro Buono has shown, and as this dissertation confirms, it was this stakeholder culture that Milan's elites created among parts of the king's non-noble subjects that accounts for Milan's stability.²⁶⁴² What spared Milan's elite the fate of their peers in Catalonia and southern Italy was not their integration into the monarchy's networks per se but their adroit use of clientelistic mechanisms to get an influential minority of commoners on board. *Pace* the revisionists of the 1990s and the early 2000s, stability in Milan was not achieved through the nobility's dependence on the crown's graces but, rather, on the crown giving them free rein in distributing collective resources on the ground with a view to both preserving the monarchy and the dynastic system that undergirded it.²⁶⁴³

Milanese nobles had a good line in bringing about the changes that became necessary after the collapse of the *valido*-centered networks. Unlike their southern Italian peers, Milanese nobles had long staked a claim to the fruits of the labor of their subjects by deploying the "intangible 'magic'" (William Beik) of hegemony rather than brute force.²⁶⁴⁴ After the formation of the haphazard alliance of common folk and *togati*, the nobility could revive their studied aloofness as purveyors of good governance for their subjects. The *ceto civile*, disappointed by the breakdown of the redistribution mechanism instituted by the *olivaristas*, were bought off with a combination of moral panics and a crackdown on the more symbolic aspects of patronage, laying the groundwork for the reforms that engulfed the empire in the 1670s when Milanese nobles proved instrumental in transforming the Spanish monarchy into a commonwealth committed to the wellbeing of all the king's subjects that is most commonly associated with the government of Juan José of Austria. Milan was exceptional, though not because of the absence of social conflict; what made it stand out from the rest was how the ruling elite addressed structurally similar social imbalances and sought to manage the fallout of these conflicts: by offering their nemeses a symbolic stake in the monarchy. It is this ability to secure the consent of the ruled through paternalistic and largely symbolic interventions that set the Milanese elite apart from other nobilities in the composite Spanish monarchy, a specificity (and flexibility) that merits further exploration in future research.

In fact, Milan, the putative exception to the rule, can teach us much about the crisis of the Spanish monarchy and how the nobility got out of it. Historians used to read the breakdown of authority in the 1640s as the result of peripheral nobilities withdrawing their support for the count- duke of Olivares's ambitious centralization program.²⁶⁴⁵ The popular movement in Milan and the changes it wrought suggest a different story. To the extent that the crisis of the Spanish monarchy

²⁶⁴¹ Parker, *Global Crisis*, pp. 51–52.

²⁶⁴² Buono, *Esercito*.

²⁶⁴³ Muto, *Noble Presence*, p. 296.

²⁶⁴⁴ Beik, *Absolutism and Society*, p. 332.

²⁶⁴⁵ The most succinct version of that narrative is in J.H. Elliott, *El programa de Olivares*.

was one of fealty, it was the loyalty of the lower orders that crumbled, not that of the nobility. On the contrary, the unrest at the bottom strengthened the peripheral nobility's identification with the crown. Even in Portugal, which came closest to conforming with the model of an elite revolt against the central government²⁶⁴⁶, some noble families made for the protection of the crown during the revolt in the hope that Philip IV would offer them protection from the masses.²⁶⁴⁷ Such tendencies were even more marked in Spanish Italy, where Neapolitan and Sicilian elites ran for cover under the wing of the monarchy when the third estate revolted.²⁶⁴⁸ As they met the wrath of common folk, the nobility was driven into the arms of Philip IV rather than away from him, and one would be hard pressed to find a more fitting example than the Borromeo family and their leading role in the reinvention of Spanish power.

As well as attributing the crisis to the nobility's discontent with Olivares, the standard narrative posits that the revolts ushered in a period of stasis as the monarchy returned to the particularisms of the pre-Olivares days. As the example of Milan's nobility indicates, this was clearly not the case. Instead, the assault on patronage from below triggered a frantic search for a new rationale for noble power which families like the Borromeo identified in a strong monarchy as whose servants they reinvented themselves. Hypocritical though it may have been, the myth of public service proved more sustainable than the naked ambition that had reared its head before. Demonstrating a surprising degree of flexibility, elites weaponized ideas that were lying around and rescued a desperate situation for themselves. As they sought to reimpose their authority and buy social peace, they built what Barbara Stollberg-Rilinger has called the "baroque state" that transformed both the Spanish monarchy and its nobility as they struggled to attain some degree of stability.²⁶⁴⁹

The notion of the baroque as a shorthand to describe the period between the Counterreformation and the Enlightenment in southern Europe has recently seen a revival. Peter Hersche has argued that it could serve as a moniker to denote the economic and social setup of Catholic Europe between c. 1600 and 1750.²⁶⁵⁰ Although he does suggest it as an alternative to "absolutism," he remains noncommittal on its use to describe the political developments, seemingly rejecting it as a descriptor for the settlement that emerged out of the "general crisis" of the seventeenth century.²⁶⁵¹ That was of course the argument of José Antonio Maravall. In a now classic text from 1975, Maravall argued that "the baroque" emerged out of the "general crisis" of the seventeenth century. While it was all-embracing, it was most pronounced in the domains of the

²⁶⁴⁶ Valladares, *Fidelidad*, p. 34.

²⁶⁴⁷ Martínez Hernández, "En los maiores."

²⁶⁴⁸ Villari, *Un sogno*.

²⁶⁴⁹ Stollberg-Rilinger, *The Baroque State*.

²⁶⁵⁰ Hersche, *Musse*, pp. 935, 940.

²⁶⁵¹ Hersche, *Musse*, p. 933.

Spanish king where the social and economic crises of the age were compounded by bad decision-making among the political elite whose grip on power loosened as a result.²⁶⁵² This climaxed in the 1640s in the “espectacular y problemático desajuste de una sociedad en cuyo interior se han desarrollado fuerzas que la impulsan a cambiar y pugnan con otras más poderosas cuyo objetivo es la conservación.”²⁶⁵³ Unable to stuff the genie back into the bottle without at least acknowledging the aspirations of contestatory forces in their midst, traditional elites established a new monarcho-aristocratic regime which claimed to be answerable to the masses that had forced themselves into the public spotlight.²⁶⁵⁴ Beguiling them with pomp and pageantry, the baroque state was, in Maravall’s reading, “la respuesta [...] dada por los grupos activos en una sociedad en dura y difícil crisis.”²⁶⁵⁵

This thesis has built on this reasoning by arguing that the symbolic displays that went up in the decades after the crisis were a studied reaction to the assault that oppositional movements had inflicted on the elite’s free-for-all. By investing heavily in the symbolic representation of power, the nobility hoped to engage the populace in what had hitherto been a closed-off elite network. Seeking the consent of the ruled through a heavily policed public sphere, they offered them some dividends of the elite’s responsible handling of the economy and criminal justice which served to reassure a scared nobility as much as the supposed beneficiaries of these initiatives. All this was, needless to say, an exercise in “pious hypocrisy” (Pierre Bourdieu).²⁶⁵⁶ At the same time that the baroque frontstage was set up, elites retreated to the backstage on which they continued to look after their own.²⁶⁵⁷ In 1705, an English diplomat in Madrid wisecracked that the Spanish ruling elite’s “only ability consists in the petty intrigues they conduct through the secret channels of the Court.”²⁶⁵⁸ What he saw as their flaws—the fact that they had “neither credit, money, nor influence over the people”—was ultimately inconsequential in light of what they did have: outwardly strong monarchical institutions that shored up their privileges while giving them an allure of outward conformity to the good government script that had become *de rigueur*.²⁶⁵⁹

That outcome of elites’ pining for stability was a familiar one across western Europe. Indeed, the reading of the rise of the baroque monarchy offered here accords well with a familiar version of French history. In studying the nobility of that realm in the latter half of the seventeenth century, Marxist historians such as William Beik and David Parker made the argument that the regime of Louis

²⁶⁵² Maravall, *La cultura*, pp. 24, 29, 49, 121.

²⁶⁵³ Maravall, *La cultura*, p. 69.

²⁶⁵⁴ Maravall, *La cultura*, pp. 203–204.

²⁶⁵⁵ Maravall, *La cultura*, p. 55.

²⁶⁵⁶ Bourdieu, *Rethinking*, p. 18.

²⁶⁵⁷ Stollberg-Rilinger, *The Baroque State*.

²⁶⁵⁸ Quoted in Thompson, *The Nobility*, p. 219.

²⁶⁵⁹ Jago, *The “Crisis,”* p. 87.

XIV was a response to the popular unrest that the favoritism of Richelieu and Mazarin had bred.²⁶⁶⁰ The absolute monarchy of Louis XIV was the product of a “social collaboration” between the Sun King and an elite craving royal protection in order to ward off even more radical change from below.²⁶⁶¹ Louis may have been more effective in ruling his realm than Charles II, but both relied heavily on symbolic power to affirm themselves and be seen as ideal kings by their subjects.²⁶⁶² Far from being “domesticated” by a powerful monarch, the French nobility actively contributed to the symbolic construction of flattering images of their king in the hope of using him as a good governance façade shielding their restorationist ends. Seen in this revisionist perspective, the Spanish monarchy, that supposed antidote to Louis’s “absolutism,” looks much more like its French counterpart than historians have allowed. In fact, in the absence of a strong monarch, the real nature of the regime as an oligarchy becomes even more apparent than in France where revisionist scholars have chipped away at the image of the absolute monarch. To varying degrees, both regimes rested on an up-and-coming elite of courtiers who relied on projections of a strong monarch to weed out rivals from their own ranks and stave off radical visions of a monarchy dedicated to the commonwealth of all subjects that had come to light in the insurgencies of the 1640s and the 1650s. The formations that emerged both in France and in Spain in response to these forces were shadow theaters for the powerful that were indeed more baroque than absolute.

The widespread pining for stability also casts the concomitant transformation of the nobility from warriors into courtiers in new light. Beginning with Norbert Elias’s book on court society a venerable historiographical tradition argued that the taming of the nobility was foisted upon nobles by a farsighted monarch.²⁶⁶³ More recently historians have stressed the strong incentives the second estate had to recast themselves as princely servants in the latter half of the seventeenth century.²⁶⁶⁴ Still, given the sheer scale of the change, it seems unconvincing to assume, as many still do, that this was entirely voluntary. If recent arguments stressing the agency of the nobility have been an important corrective to accounts that attributed too much power to “absolute” kings, they have been oblivious to the fact that the nobility was conditioned by social forces outside the elite as well. Indeed, as the evidence marshaled here suggests, the “courtization” of the nobility came about because of ordinary people’s protest at that group’s self-interested behavior and the resulting peer pressure within the elite to adjust to the new circumstances. If anything, the nobility disciplined itself. A creeping awareness of the frailty of its rule led them to invest heavily in educational attainment and the patronage of the arts as they squeaked through one of the worst crises in the

²⁶⁶⁰ Beik, *Absolutism and Society*; Parker, *Class and State*.

²⁶⁶¹ Beik, *The Absolutism of Louis*.

²⁶⁶² Burke, *The Fabrication*.

²⁶⁶³ Elias, *Court Society*.

²⁶⁶⁴ Béguin, *Les princes*, pp. 26, 38, 54, 265; Asch, *Nobilités*.

second estate's existence.²⁶⁶⁵ The flight into princely service helped stabilize the nobility's power, in the Spanish monarchy and elsewhere, and as such it met the reproductive needs of an emerging elite of courtiers. In the process, power became more relational, dependent on the monarch and the affirmation of peers, but for this reason also more tangible in impressive monarchical institutions which were by now the only safe bet for a nobility keen to avoid the uprisings that had buffeted Spanish Italy, and indeed much of western Europe, at mid-century.

The interpretation of the crisis of the seventeenth century presented here raises questions about how historians should think about patronage and its relationship to symbolic communication. The first point ties into the ongoing debate on the nature of early modern patronage and its affinity to corruption.²⁶⁶⁶ It has been noted that societies based on dynasticism had a particular propensity for siphoning off revenues via state-sanctioned mechanisms.²⁶⁶⁷ So ubiquitous was embezzlement, we are told, that charges of corruption were only ever weaponized for tactical (as opposed to strategic) reasons.²⁶⁶⁸ Far from constituting a principled assault on venality, the argument goes, accusations of corruption were a rhetorical sleight of hand that was artfully deployed to moralize the competition over scarce resources at the pinnacle of society.²⁶⁶⁹ How self-enrichment was seen depended on one's perspective: what was "useful" to some was "corrupt" to others, to quote the title of a recent collection of essays on the subject.²⁶⁷⁰

While this relativism rings true for elites and their cronies, such a perspective elides the views of the vast swathes of contemporaries who, by dint of their social status, stood no chance of benefiting from the bonanza. As this thesis has shown, patronage was certainly advantageous to some, but it created an even larger number of losers, most notably those who produced the resources over which the elites and their outriders squabbled.²⁶⁷¹ If we broaden the purview of the debate to include people who stood little to no chance of entering the circuits of patronage, it is possible to detect systematic criticism of what historians have rightly understood to be the fundamental governing technique of the age. Especially in times of societal breakdown such as the middle decades of the seventeenth century, the increased resort to patronage could, and did, breed fundamental debates about the makeup of society that a historiography perhaps too indebted to anthropology and its assumption of monolithic cultures may have overlooked.²⁶⁷²

²⁶⁶⁵ Duindam, *Myths of Power*, p. 180.

²⁶⁶⁶ For a recent overview, see the relevant essays in Kroeze et al. (eds.), *Anticorruption*.

²⁶⁶⁷ Rowlands, *The Dynastic State*, p. 16.

²⁶⁶⁸ Asch et al., *Einleitung*, p. 22.

²⁶⁶⁹ For an overview, see Grüne, "Und sie wissen," and idem, *Anfechtung*.

²⁶⁷⁰ See Karsten and von Thiessen (eds.), *Nützliche Netzwerke und korrupte Seilschaften*.

²⁶⁷¹ Also see Béguin, *Les princes de Condé*, p. 391.

²⁶⁷² On this point, see Benigno, *Conflitto politico*, p. 124.

²⁶⁷² Grüne, *Anfechtung*, pp. 412, 421–422.

The contours of that debate have been mapped by Hillard von Thiesen in a number of essays on the Spanish monarchy during the reign of the minister-favorite. As he argues, the dynastic ideology of the ruling elites was far from universal; rather, it led an uneasy coexistence with ideas centered on the common good.²⁶⁷³ One of the core findings of this dissertation is that the collective good as an argument could be mobilized in fights against a *modus operandi* at the top that veered toward the preferment of kin and kith by people with a real stake in a different commonwealth (as opposed to cynical elites) and that that had a profound impact on elites themselves. If “corruption” rarely entered contemporaries’ vocabulary, opposition from the losers of the system nevertheless fostered a widespread consensus that the unfair distribution of the king’s resources epitomized “bad government” on the part of elites, an aberration so egregious it called for urgent correction from a powerful monarch and allied elites. The idea of the collective good supplied a coalition of laboring people and trained lawyers with a stick they could use to beat the nobility with, browbeating them into desisting from the cruder forms of patronage they had engaged in to swerve toward more symbolic expressions of distinction. There seems to be truth in James Scott’s adage that deep transformations in elite rule often “originate in critiques within the hegemony,” when subaltern actors appropriate the values of ruling elites and hold their failure to live up to them against them, and historians would do well not to dismiss these dynamics, not least because early modern elites most certainly did not.²⁶⁷⁴

This is not to suggest that we ought to return to the facile condemnation of early modern elite rule that blighted interpretative debates on corruption in the past.²⁶⁷⁵ Rather, it is an invitation to recognize that resistance was constitutive to patronage and to focus on how elites responded to criticism of their handling of patronage from people outside the circle of (potential) clients by engaging in “classification struggles” (Pierre Bourdieu).²⁶⁷⁶ The continuous refinement of patronage is proof that they were less comfortable with their preferred governing technique than has hitherto been assumed.²⁶⁷⁷ The chasm between rhetoric and reality at the top gave way to “empowering interactions” through which the powerless compelled the mighty to accommodate their demands.²⁶⁷⁸ If many of these adaptations were tactical, introduced with a view to preserving a system built on dynastic ideas, the adoption of standards of best practice and their constant reiteration created a yardstick for acceptable elite behavior that helped delegitimize patronage in the long run.²⁶⁷⁹ The constant pillorying undermined the system by making the elite adhere to self-

²⁶⁷³ Thiesen, *Herrschen*; idem, *Korruption*.

²⁶⁷⁴ Scott, *Domination*, p. 106.

²⁶⁷⁵ Wacquet, *Corruption*.

²⁶⁷⁶ Swartz, *Metaprinciples*, p. 22; Swartz, *Culture and Power*, pp. 180-181, 185.

²⁶⁷⁷ González Fuertes and Negrodo del Cerro, *Mecanismos*.

²⁶⁷⁸ Holenstein, *Introduction*.

²⁶⁷⁹ Andújar Castillo et al., *Corrupción y mecanismos*, p. 296.

imposed protocols of good government.²⁶⁸⁰ The ways they went about this call for further investigation that might yet change our understanding of political dynamics in the eighteenth century and the lead-up to the dismantling of the Old Regime.

The nifty adaptations of elites to pressure from below segue into the second debate: that on the place of symbolic communication in early modern political history. If older works used to describe the rise of symbolic politics as an inscrutable folderol concocted by early modern elites with no bearing on politics, it is now clear that symbols became an increasingly important weapon in the arsenal of elites precisely because they visualized hierarchies that were very material indeed.²⁶⁸¹ What is less certain is where the noticeable spike in its use over the course of the early modern period came from. It is, of course, true that many of the ideas that were implemented in the aftermath of the crisis of the seventeenth century had had a long gestation, many of them even deriving from a genuine interest in humanism among nobles like the Borromeo. Yet, as Barbara Stollberg-Rilinger has shown in her most recent work, these concepts were instrumentalized as elites grew aware of the deep-rooted imbalances within seventeenth-century society and sought to address the “fundamental tension between ideal order and factual disorder” of their age.²⁶⁸² Building on this idea, I have contended that the rise of symbolic politics was the result of “empowering interactions” between commoners who queried the dynastic system and a nobility bent on preserving it. In the face of robust challenges from below, seventeenth-century elites sought to corral their critics “under the spell of a collective fiction” that operated through bold assertions and was therefore infinitely more difficult to challenge, “even if many, quietly and in their own minds, might not believe in it at all.”²⁶⁸³ If the pattern identified here holds true, this has far-reaching consequences for how historians ought to treat symbolic politics in the future: as inseparable from the power relations in which it was bedded down. While many more case studies are needed to elucidate the dynamics at play in other contexts, patronage and symbolic politics seem to be inextricably bound up with one another in ways that only become apparent to those who do not ignore the voices and aspirations of subaltern actors whose ideas about a different sort of commonwealth the heavy symbolism of the late seventeenth century aimed to put to book.

To conclude, the crisis of the seventeenth century was one of patronage. Its motor was the nobility’s quest to lift itself up through the enhanced governing techniques offered by the regime of the minister-favorite.²⁶⁸⁴ Unsustainable from the outset, this model of social reproduction was propelled by the misguided belief, inculcated through elite education, that the nobility were born to

²⁶⁸⁰ See Bernsee, *Moralische Erneuerung*.

²⁶⁸¹ See Windler, *Performing*; Osborne, *The House of Savoy*, and idem, *Language*.

²⁶⁸² Stollberg-Rilinger, *Baroque State*.

²⁶⁸³ Stollberg-Rilinger, *The Emperor’s Old Clothes*, p. 2.

²⁶⁸⁴ Benigno, Specchi, pp. 107, 140, 143–148, 181–182, 290.

rule and could therefore ask ordinary subjects to put up with almost everything, from taxes to the wanton destruction of their livelihoods in war. This conceit came to cost the elite dearly as non-nobles began to mobilize against the “governo straordinario e di guerra” of the nobility (Francesco Benigno), forcing the elite’s hand in their own transformation into a state nobility that concealed its true interests behind good governance façades. If competition with other nobles had spurred the elite into the jingoism of the first half of the century, fear of more adaptable peers now convinced them to give “universal form to the expression of their vested interest, to elaborate a theory of public service and of public order, and thus to work to autonomize the *reason of state* from dynastic reason.”²⁶⁸⁵ Yet, in so doing, they gave birth to a “pious hypocrisy” that made it easier to question the elite networks that the heavy symbolism was supposed to misrecognize.²⁶⁸⁶ As they pined for stability, they inadvertently heightened the contradiction at the heart of their project and quite possibly speeded up the process that would eventually bring down a social order based on inherited privilege.²⁶⁸⁷

²⁶⁸⁵ Bourdieu, *Rethinking*, p. 16.

²⁶⁸⁶ Bourdieu, *Rethinking*, p. 18.

²⁶⁸⁷ See Stollberg-Rilinger, *The Emperor’s Old Clothes*, p. 5.

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