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**Adopted Power:  
The Rise of Qatar, and the Potential of the Rentier State**

**Diana Rinatovna Galeeva**

**A thesis presented in candidature for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy**

**The Faculty of Social Sciences**

**The School of Government and International Affairs**

**Durham University**

**2019**

## Abstract

In 1995, Shaykh Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani, the new Amir of Qatar, attempted to bring Qatar out from under Saudi Arabia's shadow and to fill the power vacuum in the Middle East. Though current Amir Shaykh Tamim bin Hamad al-Thani has been seemingly less outward-looking, Qatar appears to continue to have these ambitions. While scholars recognise Qatar's emergence as a regional power between 1995 and 2019, the means Qatari policy makers employed to achieve this remain uncertain. The central focus of this thesis is to determine what types of power Qatar exercised during this period, and the circumstances that enabled the small but wealthy state to do so. Although informed by theories of power established in the social power debates and International Relations (IR) theory as a whole, this investigation recognises the limitations of these existing conceptualisations, which invariably rely on a single aspect of Qatar's state structure to explain its rise to political power (e.g. authoritarian rule, geographical/population size, or military strength). Instead, this study demonstrates that while Qatari leaders have relied upon a number of the conditions rightly recognised in existing IR literature as essential to the growth of its power, Qatar's capacity as a gas-rich *rentier state* to exploit these conditions solely explains Qatar's emergence as a regional power. Wealth distribution within rentier states is a concept that is well understood, but the Qatari case demonstrates a state's ability to establish patron-client relationships with non-state actors, overcoming limitations set by size or military strength to gain international influence. The process by which this is achieved, and the product of this investment, is through what this thesis terms *adopted power*. The study demonstrates Qatar's use of adopted power through alliances with non-state actors, such as political Islam, tribes, media, and sport.

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## List of Abbreviations and Acronyms

A.S. Roma	Associazione Sportiva Roma
BP	British Petroleum
C'ships	Championships
FIFA	Fédération Internationale de Football Association
FIG	Fédération Internationale de Gymnastique
FINA	Fédération Internationale de Natation
GCC	Gulf Cooperation Council
HBJ	Hamad bin Jasim bin Jabr al-Thani
IEA	International Energy Agency
IHF	The International Handball Federation
IOC	International Olympic Committee
IQ	Industries Qatar
IR	International Relations
LNG	Liquefied Natural Gas
LIFG	Libyan Islamic Fighting Group
Malaga CF	Malaga Club de Futbol
MEE	Middle East Eye
NTC	National Transitional Council
OCA	Olympic Council of Asia
OIC	Organisation of Islamic Cooperation
PSG	Paris Saint-Germain F.C.
QA	Qatar Airways
QAFAC	Qatar Fuel Additives Company Limited
QAFCO	Qatar Fertiliser Company
QAPCO	Qatar Petrochemical Company
QCB	Qatar Central Bank
QDB	Qatar Development Bank
QF	Qatar Foundation
QFC	Qatar Financial Centre
QIA	Qatar Investment Authority

QIC	Qatar Insurance Company
QNB	Qatar National Bank
QP	Qatar Petroleum
QSI	Qatar Sports Investment
SWF	Sovereign Wealth Fund
UCI	Union Cycliste Internationale
UEFA	The Union of European Football Associations

## **Note on Transliteration**

The *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* guidance on transliteration was used as a guide for this thesis. For transliteration of personal names, these standards were followed, though some names have been applied as they have been written in websites, publications, or in social media.

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## **Dedication**

*To the memory of my father*



## **Part I. Adopted Power: Main Features**

### **Chapter One**

#### **Introduction of the Concept of Adopted Power**

##### **1.1. Introduction**

Qatar is one of the rentier states<sup>1</sup> in the Arabian Peninsula that form the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) along with the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Oman, Bahrain, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia. It is the richest state in the world; by 2017 it had the highest per capita income in the world—its GDP per capita was USD 124.5k in purchasing power parity terms (QNB, 2018). This is mainly because the country ‘is endowed with major hydrocarbon reserves, especially in relation to the size of its population’ (ibid, 2018:2). In 2017, its population totalled 2,639,211 (The World Bank, 2017), but of these, only approximately 300,000 were deemed Qatari citizens (Wright, 2016). Qatar’s economy relies on the hydrocarbon sector, and even diversification efforts are energy-driven (Gray, 2011). It has the world’s largest gas reserves (Krane and Wright, 2014), and is the world’s largest exporter of liquefied natural gas, as well as oil. This vital power resource became a key driver for Qatar’s political growth, which, similar to other rentier states’ economies, relies on revenues from external rents specifically from the energy sector. Due to its size and geographic population, enormous wealth thus became available for national prosperity and for increasing Qatar’s regional power.

Qatar has risen to prominence on the world stage since 1995, when Shaykh Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani replaced his father, Shaykh Khalifa bin Hamad al-Thani, as the Amir in a bloodless coup (Barakat, 2012; Kamrava, 2013). The causes for this power transition remain uncertain. While one group of observers believes that Shaykh Hamad saw his father as an obstacle to economic development (Rabi, 2009), others suggest that it revolved around Qatar’s relationship with Saudi Arabia. This view contends that Shaykh Hamad was unhappy with the perception that Qatar was a feudal vassal of Saudi Arabia, following former Amir Shaykh Khalifa’s payment for Saudi

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<sup>1</sup> A rentier state is a state in which a large proportion of income is generated from rents (specifically from oil and gas revenues) or externally-derived, unproductively-earned payments (Gray, 2011:1).

Arabian protection (Crystal, 1995). Shaykh Hamad's efforts to bring Qatar out from under the shadow of Saudi Arabia, and to fill the power vacuum in the Middle East, was an idea shared by Hamad bin Jasim bin Jabr al-Thani (HBJ), the former Foreign Minister and the former Prime Minister, former Vice-Chairman and CEO of the Qatar Investment Authority (QIA), also the former Chairman of Qatari Diar (QIA's real estate arm), and Qatar Holding (QIA's direct investment arm) (Moore, 2013).

Additionally, the role of other inner-circle elite representatives was key to the transformation of Qatar from a secondary player into a powerful state. This includes Shaykh Hamad's wife, Shaykha Moza al-Missned, the Chair of Qatar Foundation for Education, Science and Community Development (referred to as the Qatar Foundation (QF) in later chapters), among other high-ranking positions. The transition of power from Shaykh Hamad to his son Tamim, in late June 2013, happened peacefully, in contrast to the previous three leadership shifts in 1949, 1960, and 1995, which were forced abdications (Kamrava, 2009:412). The policies under Shaykh Tamim remained as ambitious, but seemingly less active than they were during his father's era. Consequently, between 1995 and 2019, the inner-circle elites behind Qatar's ambitious foreign policies, are the former Amir Shaykh Hamad, the former Prime Minister Hamad bin Jasim, Shaykh Hamad's wife and the mother of the current Amir Shaykha Moza, and the current Amir Shaykh Tamim. The realisation of such ambitions became possible due to the close links of these inner-circle elites with other Qatari elites who obtained leadership posts in political and economic fields, particularly in state-owned companies as explained below.

Qatar is a 'state capitalist' (Ulrichsen, 2014:86), or as Gray (2013:10) puts it, an 'entrepreneurial state capitalist'. In Qatar, on behalf of the state, the al-Thanis emerged in effect as a 'business meta-actor' (ibid, 2013:8), with commercial actions being an essential component of Qatar's and the al-Thanis' political role and purpose. Qatar's ruling family is central to Qatari politics as a result of their authoritarian rule, their prominence in the community, in many governmental departments and other political institutions. Likewise, business is highly penetrated by al-Thani representatives since the main state-owned and private companies have royals as board members or CEOs, and public funds are spread via joint ventures through both private firms and state-owned companies to individual members of the family and members of other vital tribes and families (ibid, 2013:56). As a result, Qatar's inner-circle elites,

through having close connections with other Qatari elites, hold wealth revenues for power projection.

Such political power and economic power in the inner-circle elites' hands became possible due to Qatar being a rentier state, where the pre-existing bonds of patronage and clientelism between rulers and the ruled (Kamrava, 2012:40) established new links tied to a social contract (Herb and Lynch, 2019:5). The fundamental idea of this social contract is that 'rulers would provide citizens with oil revenues and citizens would provide allegiance, or political quiescence, to their rulers' (Herb and Lynch, 2019:5). However, applying the domestic social structure of the state, Qatar's inner-elites applied rentier states' basic principles but engaged well-established, non-state actors for power projection. For example, since 1995, Qatar has tried to benefit from the transnational nature of non-state actors from different spheres: political Islam, tribalism, media, and sports, among others.

Examples of this include an understanding of Islamists emergence as a powerful force in the Middle East and beyond. Due to their transnational networks, Qatar has started to consider Islamists as strategic allies. Beginning in 2000, indirect efforts to take advantage of Islamists' popularity during mediation efforts, and during the Arab Spring, Qatar's open support of Islamists demonstrated efforts to take advantage of alliances with them, through assisting them to power. An example of this is Qatar's financial support of the Muslim Brotherhood (Khatib, 2013), and the media coverage provided by al-Jazeera. These contributed to the coming to power of Mohamed Morsi, a representative of the Islamist group (from 30 June 2012 to 3 July 2013), as the outcome of the Arab Spring in Egypt. Observers (Hroub, 2012; Khatib, 2013) point out that al-Jazeera and the Muslim Brotherhood are the first-choice tools for Qatari leaders since 1995, and should be seen as two elements of a single approach.

Illustrations of Qatar trying to gain advantage from non-state actors has not been limited to the Muslim Brotherhood and al-Jazeera, as among political Islam non-state actors, Qatar also built alliances with Hamas, the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, al-Nahda, al-Nusra Front (Jabhat Fateh al-Sham), Lebanese Hizbullah, the Houthi Movement, and Islamists in the northern Mali. Qatar built alliances with media non-state actors such as Middle East Eye, Arabi Post (*HuffPost Arabi*), Arabi21, al-Araby TV, Libya al-Ahrar TV, and *The New Arab (al-Araby al-Jadeed)*. Other examples of Qatar benefiting from the transnational nature of well-established non-state actors might include: Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) and several

major sports clubs, such as FC Barcelona, Paris Saint-Germain (PSG) F.C., Malaga CF, A.S. Roma, and FC Bayern Munich. Qatar has also tried to attract the loyalties of tribesmen who, due to the political history and geography of the Arab states, have lived across borders as their tribes' traditional territories were split between several modern states. Qatar takes advantage of their transnational nature by targeting tribesmen from neighbouring GCC states, and more widely, from the Middle East region, such as from Iraq and Syria. Consequently, Qatar's inner circle-elite, similar to the social contract between its citizens domestically, uses wealth as a key driver for power projection, and with this wealth, tried to adopt well-established non-state actors for power projection.

For example, Shaykh Hamad is the main driver for development of oil and gas sectors which were key to making Qatar the wealthiest state. Money from both sectors accumulated in the Qatar Petroleum, which is usually run by elites who have close relations with the ruler. During Shaykh Hamad's leadership it was chaired by his close friend and cousin, 'Abdullah bin Hamad al-'Attiya, who also held high governmental positions - he was a former deputy prime minister, and former minister of energy and industry. By appointing elites for the leading positions of Qatar Petroleum, it made it easier to have access to the state's wealth through Qatar's inner circle elite representatives, and to use this money to build alliances with media entities and noble tribesmen. In both cases the role of Shaykh Hamad is particularly crucial for projecting Qatar's power by building alliances with non-state actors (media and tribes). Both Hamad bin Jasim and the current Amir Shaykh Tamim run the Qatar Investment Authority (QIA), where the board of directors - representatives of al-Thani and other important families (such as al-Emadi, al-Kaabi, al-Kuwari), obtain political and economic power due to their high governmental positions. QIA's entities played important role for building alliances with political Islam non-state actors: Qatari Diar in Sudan and Yemen, and the Qatar National Bank (QNB) Group in Libya. Finally, Shaykha Moza runs the Qatar Foundation for Education, Science and Community, also known as the Qatar Foundation (QF), which is a governmental fund and has its own SWF (Sovereign Wealth Fund). The Qatar Foundation was important for building alliances with sports non-state actors, such as FC Barcelona.



Though many scholars argue that Qatar emerged as a regional power between 1995 and 2019, the means Qatari policy makers employed to achieve this remain uncertain. A review of existing concepts of power, in particular ‘soft’, ‘hard’ (Nye, 1991; 2004) and ‘smart’ powers (Nye, 2011), ‘subtle’ power (Kamrava, 2013), ‘sharp’ and ‘sticky’ (Mead, 2009), ‘sharp’ power (Walker and Ludwig, 2017), ‘civilian’ power (Duchêne, 1972), ‘military’ power (Bull, 1982), and ‘normative’ power (Manners, 2002), demonstrates that Qatari power cannot be fully explained with reference to any of the most widely accepted types of political power. Particularly, none can explain Qatar’s alliances between well-established non-state actors, as mentioned above, and which have been vital for the country’s power projection.

## **1.2. Aims, objectives and a working hypothesis**

The main research question that this study attempts to answer is: as a wealthy rentier state monarchy, what type of power did Qatar wield between 1995 to 2019?<sup>2</sup>

This is supported by the following secondary research questions:

1. Can any of the existing types of power in social power and International Relations (IR) theory literature be applied to Qatar?
2. Considering wealth as a key driver for power projection, in which state-owned companies was Qatar’s wealth accumulated, and distributed for wielding power?
3. How did Qatar use political Islamic non-state actors for wielding power?
4. How did Qatar use tribal loyalties of tribes that live cross-border for wielding power?
5. How did Qatar use media non-state actors for wielding power?
6. How did Qatar use sports non-state actors for wielding power?

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<sup>2</sup> Until 20<sup>th</sup> March, 2019, the date which marks Qatar’s announcement of its plan to launch the largest energy bank, which clearly demonstrates that it continues to be a rentier state that relies heavily on the energy sector, and developing an energy – driven diversification of its economy.

The thesis' overall aim is to respond to these questions with a theory-development effort based on using Qatar as an empirical case study. The hypothesis is that Qatar wielded what can best be described as *adopted power* between 1995 and 2019. *Adopted power* is a type of power that can be developed by wealthy rentier states whose inner-circle elites ally with well-established non-state actors in order to take advantage of their transnational nature, to rapidly gain influence over other states.

### **1.3. The significance of the research**

Power has been always one of the most discussed and examined central concepts within social science and the International Relations (IR) theory. Despite prepositions that modern politics is based on a liberal world order, which contradicts the concept of power, different examples of states which behave based on lust of power (such as modern Russia, Iran, Saudi Arabia and Qatar) can be observed. Examination of power projection by these states might show gaps of well-established concepts of power, specifically while analysing the political rise of Qatar between 1995 and 2019. Examination of Qatar's case may then assist in suggesting a new type of power concept, *adopted power*, which considers Qatar's growth predominantly due to its unique feature of being a rentier state. An explanation of the importance of establishing another concept of power will now be explained.

Most understanding of the types of power are based on the divisions that have existed in the international system, and propose an analysis of either great powers, middle, or small states. For example, Nye's (1991; 2004) investigation into the means of success in worldwide politics ('hard' power and 'soft' power) was based mainly on the policies of the US during the Cold War and the subsequent unipolar world era which emerged following the collapse of the USSR. Mead's (2009) 'sharp' and 'sticky' power has been introduced also based on examining great powers, mainly with a focus on the US and the British Empire. Walker and Ludwig' (2017) give examples of 'sharp' power focusing on authoritarian China and Russia, which are also great powers. Introduction of 'civilian' (Duchêne, 1972), 'military' (Bull, 1982), and 'normative' (Manners, 2002) power of Europe should be viewed as considering great powers and middle powers. By contrast, Kamrava's (2013) *Qatar: Small State, Big Politics*, presented Qatar as a regional power and introduced the idea of 'subtle power' as the power of the small state. Though only Nye's 'smart power' (2011) can be

applied by small, middle, and great powers, Nye provides limited examples of usage of smart power by small states. By contrast, *adopted power*, clearly demonstrates that either great, middle, or small states can project power, though they should be rentier states.

Most existent types of power identify specific features that assist in power projection, such as ‘sharp’ power (Walker and Ludwig, 2017) that features authoritarian regimes’ power projection, and ‘subtle’ power (Kamrava, 2013) that focuses on the fact that small states can demonstrate power in their unique way. ‘Soft’ power (Nye, 1991; 2004) focuses on state values that can attract others. An alternative, *adopted power*, adds the value that this power type is wielded by a rentier state. In other words, a rentier state would be expected to act this way due to its unique style for power implementation. Similarly, as a domestic structure between rulers and ruled / patrons and clients, is based on a social contract; rentier state inner-circle elites also build alliances with their ‘clients’ – non-state actors for power projection. Though the concept of adopted power is based on a single case study-Qatar; as will be discussed in Chapter Eight, this concept can be extended to any rentier states. Consequently, adopted power adds value to power analyses in social science and IR literature, specifically focusing on rentier states’ power projection.

The addition of the term *adopted power* to the vocabulary of IR theory, as well as Middle East studies, will contribute to a new understanding of rentier state behaviours that for increase power internationally. Despite the calls of scholars to rethink rentier state theory in the present context (Herb and Lynch, 2019), most of the research focuses on an examination of domestic features of rentier states that divides the development of the rentier theory into three phases (Gray, 2011). These are: the first phase, or classical rentier state theory (Mahdavy, 1970; Beblawi, 1987; Luciani, 1990). A second phase consists of specialised rentier theory, which nuances a sophisticated version of the theory (Davidson, 2008; Hertog, 2010), and a conditional rentier state theory, which argues that the theory should be studied in collaboration with other approaches (Herb, 1999; Schwarz, 2008; Jones, 2010). In the third phase, Gray (2011) outlines an emergence of ‘late rentierism’ which he identifies as the theory focused on a special type of state which is more globalised, responsible, and strategic in thinking. Among the features of ‘late rentierism’ is an active and innovative foreign policy, wherein the main focus remains on rentierism as ‘a dynamic of state-society relations, not a structural characteristic of the state’ (ibid, 2011:24).

By contrast, *adopted power* fills the gap and focuses on power projection by a rentier state, thus combining the basic idea of rentier state theory with the prevailing perspectives from IR theory and social science.

This study adds value to a limited number of academic works focusing on examples of Qatar adopting well-established non-state actors, such as Islamic political groups, media entities, sports organisations, and tribes. Especially, it focuses on the conceptualisation of Qatar's loyalty attraction of tribes from other countries. Additionally, Qatar's use of media non-state actors is made through discourse analysis in this work. Finally, in general, as Qatar will be hosting FIFA 2022, the international community is paying far more attention to this country, especially as the event is being prepared during the ongoing Gulf Crisis involving its neighbours. Therefore, the concept of *adopted power* will be increasingly more useful for IR theorists, researchers, and the lay audience.

#### **1.4. Methodology and research methods**

This research adopts an interpretive approach, which allows for the explanation of 'the complex world of lived experience from the point of view of those who live it' (Schwandt, 1994:118). An interpretive researcher's ontological assumption is that social reality is built locally and specifically (Guba and Lincoln, 1994) 'by humans through their action and interaction' (Orlikowski and Baroudi, 1991:4). Interpretive researchers view the world as restricted by the specific time and context (Neuman, 1997). Therefore, the epistemological assumption is "'findings" are literally created as the investigation proceeds' (Guba and Lincoln, 1994:111). This means that in light of the aims and objectives discussed above, a case study design (Yin, 2003) and grounded theory systemic process (Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Charmaz, 2006) are combined, as the study aims at theory building through a deductive thinking process (Andrade, 2009). Grounded theory is understood as follows: 'theory that was derived from data, systematically gathered and analyzed through the research process. In this method, data collection, analysis, and eventual theory stand in close relationship to one another' (Strauss and Corbin, 1998:12). Bell, Bryman and Harley (2019:23) explain that there are two main features of grounded theory: it focuses on development of theory out of data and data collection and analyses, in progress in tandem, and that continually refer back to each other.

With regard to the unit of analysis, this research adopts an embedded single case design (Yin, 2003). Specifically, the selection of Qatar as a case study relates for two reasons: Qatar, despite being assumed to be a small state due to its geography and population, demonstrates that either small, middle, or great powers can project power. Due to its indicative size, Qatar has had to find an alternative way to project its power. Considering that it has been able to project power despite its limitations, and had only wealth as a key power tool to do so, Qatar illustrates clearly how it adopts non-state actors for political purposes. Qatar as a rentier state applies the basics of rentier state theory as a social contact for foreign policies. However, rather than solely to its citizens, it also provides wealth to well-established non-state actors in an effort to wield adopted power. As discussed above examples of Qatar's adopted power can be viewed in forming alliances with political Islam groups, media organisations, sporting organisations and events, tribes, among others.

This project applies a qualitative research strategy (Bryman, 2016). A chain of evidence (Wisdom and Creswell, 2003) was collected through micro-ethnography (observation), online ethnography, semi-structured interviews, document analysis, and discourse analysis. Fieldwork was conducted in Qatar (February, 2017), as well as in other states, such as Lebanon (August, 2017), the UAE (November, 2017), and Egypt (March, 2018). Though the study is focused only on the single case study of Qatar, fieldwork in these countries was necessary because Qatar's political interests contradicted those of the UAE and Egypt, especially after the Arab Spring, which led to two crises in 2014 and 2017, between Qatar and its neighbours/ the Anti-Terror Quartet (UAE, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Bahrain). In other words, fieldwork in the Anti-Terror Quartet states assisted in obtaining data and understanding the demands that the Quartet issued. Moreover, fieldwork in Lebanon was essential for data collection on Qatar's relations with one of the main founders and developers of political Islam, the Lebanese Hizbullah.

During fieldwork, data was collected through a micro-ethnography (Wolcott, 1990). Micro-ethnography occurs in short episodes in order to focus on specific topics (Bryman, 2016). Due to the frailties of human memory (ibid, 2016), jotted notes (known as scratch notes) written in a small notebook were taken in order to write down 'the facts of what was happening' (Adler and Adler, 2009:227). Being a passive participant (Van Maanen, 1978), I observed citizens' attitudes to domestic policies, their attitude to the ongoing Gulf Crisis, and evidence of Qatar's leadership's usage of

power tools for their political rise. For example, on my flight to Doha I noticed a Qatar Airways flight safety video which featured FC Barcelona; this was additional to the data I collected to illustrate that Qatar deals with famous sports non-state actors and has tried to benefit from their popularity, as discussed in Chapter Seven. At the beginning of the Gulf Crisis I observed how it affected the people's behaviour in the West, especially in London, collecting visual materials (Banks, 2001; Pink, 2001) of Qatari support of their leadership, in the streets of London as demonstrated in Chapter Five. Moreover, in order to increase my knowledge of the views of political elites and stakeholders, public opinion on policies of Qatar, the GCC states and especially within the context on the Gulf Crisis, online ethnography<sup>3</sup> was used, especially via Twitter.

Between November 2016 and October 2018, 43 semi-structured, face-to-face, conversational, and online interviews (using open questions) were conducted (Kvale, 1996; Roulston, deMarrais and Lewis, 2003; Yin, 2003). Interviews were conducted with the political elite (Dexter, 1970; Richards, 1996) as well as other political stakeholders (academics, journalists, and former Islamists). Among the challenges of conducting interviews with political elites is access to them (Harrison, 2001; Kvale and Brinkmann, 2009). However, Appendix A demonstrates the list of political elites and stakeholders interviewed, including representatives of political elites of the GCC states (Qatar, the UAE, Bahrain), who were contacted through snowball sampling and who agreed to be interviewed. In addition, Harrison (2001) states the possibility of the reliability, and therefore validity, of data could be questioned as interviewees might provide inaccurate material deliberately or inadvertently. In order to overcome this challenge, I attempted to include representatives of the different GCC states, Middle Eastern states in the list of respondents, and not solely Qatari stakeholders.

The interview was one of the main methods of data collection chosen for this project, and to do so required substantial preparation. According to Kvale and Brinkmann (2009:99) there are no rules or standard procedures for conducting interviews, however, there are standard techniques and approaches at different phases of interview investigations. A strategy was taken following seven suggested stages of the interview inquiry (ibid, 2009): thematising, designing, interviewing, transcribing, analysing, verifying, and reporting. After making arrangements with the interviewees,

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<sup>3</sup> Online ethnography is understood as observation of the internet for examination of societies in the form of online communities or virtual communities (Hine, 2000; Bryman, 2016:447).

I began to prepare to interview high-profile individuals. Studying the biographical data of interviewees, including education, previous careers, home constituency, the interviewees' positions on, and concerns about, the issues in which they are historically and currently involved, was vital for establishing trust and rapport with interviewees. Arksey and Knight (1999) also suggest familiarising oneself with the elite's published material (books or articles), their speeches, and secondary sources (specialised publications, details from the histories of community leaders and their families). In order to prepare, I read all available background information about the respondents from both primary and secondary sources, specifically on their attitudes to Qatari policy since 1995, including their positions on the ongoing Gulf Crisis and other issues related to Qatar's activity since 1995.

After studying the available information about the interviewees, questions were developed for the interviews. Briggs (1986) suggests that failing to design questions can lead to the possibility of an interview being biased, which can diminish the reliability and validity of findings. Cicourel (1982) highlights the importance of the concept of ecological validity, which means implementing the circumstances formed by the researcher's procedures equivalent of the everyday world of the subjects. In order to promote reliability of the findings, Briggs (1986:24) suggests adopting standardisation of presentation of each question in exactly the same manner to each respondent. By contrast, Kinsey, Pomeroy and Martin (1948:52) believe that: 'Standardized questions do not bring standardized answers, for the same question means different things to different people. In order to ensure that questions mean the same thing to different people, you must modify them to fit the vocabulary, educational background, and comprehension of each subject'. The reliability and validity of data depends on the design of the interview questions, which should interrelate with the form of the interview that is applied. The opposing view put forward by scholars about reliability and validity of data made it difficult to design questions, so the following strategy was chosen to overcome this difficulty.

Taking into consideration that the interviews were focused on political elites and other political stakeholders, semi-structured interviews were adopted. The rationale of using semi-structured interviews is that elites are usually resistant to structured interviews (Arksey and Knight, 1999). 'They do not want to be pigeon-holed into particular categories, or become part of some statistical aggregates' (ibid, 1999:124). In any case, regarding question design, Arksey and Knight (1999:124)

suggest that broad differences between elites can exist, and asking each participant the same questions would be inappropriate. With this, and controversies that arise from designing interview questions, as discussed, a guide was created which included an outline of subjects and suggested questions. Taking into consideration the importance of asking standardised questions in order to avoid biased answers and to get reliable and valid data, the value of personalising questions to ensure that interviewees are comfortable and cooperative, and the strategy for designing questions was as follows: a guide was prepared which organised questions thematically, and then background information was prepared about interviewees. Because semi-structured interviews are flexible, it was possible to ask specific questions in which respondents were experts.

The interviews were done in the offices of interviewees, or if that was socially unacceptable, in a public place. The location was discussed with the interviewees who made the final decision regarding the setting. Some interviews were conducted online via Skype. I was clear and open about the purposes of the interview and asked direct questions throughout. The interview questions were thematic (related to producing knowledge) and dynamic (related to maintaining an interpersonal relationship in the interview). Kvale and Brinkmann (2009:131) suggest that good interview questions have to be dynamic in order to ensure collaboration, and must be thematic to ensure that the relevant information is attained. While conducting interviews, introductory questions were used, then probing questions, specifying questions, and direct questions, depending on the situation and topic. Interviews were conducted in English when possible. If interviewees preferred to give interviews in Arabic, I worked with a professional interpreter.

During the interview briefing, along with a brief discussion about the main goal of the interview, ethical guidelines were discussed with interviewees, and consent forms signed. The interviewees had the option to withdraw from the process at any time, or to retract a specific statement. With interviewees' consent, the interviews were recorded with a standard digital voice recorder. Taking into consideration that interviews were conducted with representatives of authoritarian states, modern approaches incorporating ethical principles were applied, based primarily on moral duty and utilitarianism (Barnes, 1979; Bulmer, 2001). Therefore, the following strategy was implemented: interviews were anonymous (Blaxter, Hughes and Tight, 1996) and were not recorded if interviewees stated they did not want to be identified (Yin, 2003; Bryman, 2008).



During the transcription process, interview material was prepared for analysis. In accordance with the 1988 Data Protection Act (Legislation.gov.uk., 1998), the audio recording was transferred to an encrypted device and deleted from the voice recorder after the completion of each interview. Hard copies, such as transcribed audio tapes and interview notes were locked in a safety deposit box. Files, including computer files, which included personal and identifiable data were encrypted. Computer files containing anonymous respondents' information were held securely and shared according to the terms of the consent forms. Computer-assisted qualitative data analysis was key for corroboration of the findings (Gubrium and Holstein, 1997; Bryman and Burgess, 1999; Seale, 1999; Denzin and Lincoln, 2000; Silverman, 2000; Andrade, 2009). One of the most used qualitative data analysis software is Nvivo (Bazeley and Richards, 2000; Binger, Johnson and Blackenridge, 2004). Having undertaken preliminary assessment, Nvivo was used to assist in the management of data, and facilitated the data analysis progression. In order to prevent hacking during the data analysis process, computers were used off-line. Afterwards, data was verified and reported.

Document analyses are a systematic method for evaluating and revising electronic and printed documents (Rapley, 2007; Corbin and Strauss, 2008; Bowen, 2009). The method includes skimming, reading, and interpretation. This iterative procedure coincides with components of thematic analysis (Fereday and Muir-Cochrane, 2006) and content analysis, which also includes conventional mass media content analysis (Bryman, 2008; Bowen, 2009). Moreover, discourse analyses were applied (Foucault, 1977; Fairclough, 1992). Discourse analysis is 'a system of communicative practices that are integrally related to wider social and cultural practices, and that help to construct specific frameworks of thinking' (Macdonald, 2003:1). It was applied in this study as it 'offers a variety of insights into the media's current strategies for communicating with their publics' (ibid, 2003:2). Along with the two diplomatic crises of 2014, and the ongoing 2017 between Qatar and its neighbours/Anti-Terror Quartet, media-linked confrontation also exists. This necessitated an investigation of the main editorial policies of Middle East Eye. Discourse analyses were made by the researcher that focused on the pieces written by the Editor-in-Chief, David Hearst, between 15 April 2014 and 20 July 2018.

After data collection, grounded theory was adopted in regard to coding the data and developing a theoretical model as follows: initial coding (Glaser, 1978; Strauss,

1987; Miles and Huberman, 1994), then focused codes, categories and themes (Strauss and Corbin, 1990; Charmaz, 2006). After reaching theoretical sufficiency, the process of coding and categorising data ended (ibid, 2006; Andrade, 2009). As a result, the main aim of the research was reached—to present a theory-development effort based on the case of Qatar.

### **1.5. Structure of project**

The thesis is split into three parts, with eight chapters including an introduction. Part One explains the main features of adopted power. Chapter Two discusses different approaches of power in IR theory, social power, and considers different types of power with an effort to position Qatar as a rentier state in the existing literature. The chapter details where the study adds value, illustrating that none of the existing concepts of power fully explain Qatar's power projection since 1995. It then introduces the main features of adopted power. Considering that wealth as a key driver for wielding adopted power, Chapter Three illustrates why, despite diversification initiatives, Qatar still relies on hydrocarbon revenues and remains a rentier state. The chapter clearly identifies how adopted power was implemented, and illustrates the accumulation of wealth in state-owned companies, particularly Qatar Petroleum, and its distribution by other state-owned companies. These entities include: the Qatar Investment Authority, Qatar Sports Investment, the Qatar Foundation, Qatar Petroleum International, the Qatar National Bank, the Doha Bank, the Qatar Development Bank, Qatar Airways, the Qatar Insurance Company, the Qatar Exchange, and the Qatar Financial Centre. All of these are used directly and indirectly to distribute money for wielding adopted power.

Part Two of the study (Chapters Four to Seven) examines Qatar's wielding adopted power, and offers examples of building alliances between Qatar and different non-state actors for power projection. These chapters follow a similar structure for clearly demonstrating measurement of adopted power; they illustrate the emergence of Qatar's alliances with non-state actors for political objectives and provide an illustration of scope, domain, weight, and cost. Chapter Four examines how building alliances with political Islam non-state actors became essential for adopted power projection. It examines Qatar's relations with the Muslim Brotherhood, the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, al-Nahda, Hamas, al-Nusra Front (Jabhat Fateh al-Sham),

Islamists in northern Mali, the Lebanese Hizbullah, and the Houthi Movement. Chapter Five explains how Qatar built alliances with important tribesmen from representatives of tribes that exist across borders of modern states, specifically from the GCC states, and further away, including Syria. Chapter Six shows Qatar's alliances with media non-state actors, such as al-Jazeera, Arabi Post (*HuffPost Arabi*), al-Araby TV, *The New Arab (al-Araby al-Jadeed)*, Arabi21, Middle East Eye, and Libya al-Ahrar TV, all of which help Qatar gain political leverage through their transnational networks. Chapter Seven indicates how Qatar built alliances with well-established sport non-state actors such as FIFA, FC Barcelona, Paris Saint-Germain (PSG) F.C., Malaga CF, A.S. Roma, and FC Bayern Munich, for political purposes.

Finally, in Part Three, Chapter Eight presents *adopted power* as the central finding of the study, which fully explains Qatar's emergence as a regional power between 1995 and 2019. Chapter Eight offers conceptual conclusions about the role of power in the case of Qatar and in the study of IR more generally, and it argues that Qatar will continue to wield adopted power in the future. The conclusion discusses lessons that might be learned from Qatar's adopted power implementation. It also suggests widening the scope of research, and proposes further research that examines other non-state actors with which Qatar has built alliances for wielding adopted power. Finally, the conclusions recommend investigating other rentier states which might benefit from alliances with well-established non-state actors for wielding adopted power.

## **Chapter Two**

### **Adopted Power: Theoretical Foundations**

#### **2.1. Introduction**

The political rise of Qatar, a wealthy rentier state, is widely acknowledged, but the type of power it exploited to achieve this remains uncertain. While some scholars examine the evolution of Qatar through the lens of *soft* power (Nye, 1991; 2004; 2011), others believe that economic and military force, or *hard* power (ibid, 1991; 2004; 2011), is behind the country's political progress. Some claim that only a combination of soft and hard power, or *smart* power (ibid, 2011), explains the change; while others will suggest that the uniqueness of Qatar's case requires the recognition of *subtle* power (Kamrava, 2013), defined as the ability of a state to exert power from behind the scenes, one that only small states can use to maximise to their advantage.

Though this chapter acknowledges the value of well-established theories of power in social sciences and IR theory, it proposes an alternative power theory. It distinguishes itself by providing a new way of understanding rentier states' behaviours, especially, the interaction of rentier states with well-established non-state actors as a means to project power. This chapter offers the concept of *adopted power* to explain Qatar's political successes. Adopted power is a type of power that can be developed by wealthy rentier states whose inner-circle elites ally with well-established non-state actors in order to take advantage of their transnational nature, to rapidly gain influence over other states. In order to demonstrate this, the chapter places Qatar within the context of existing IR theory and social power debates. Following this, different types of power are examined, concluding with the conceptualisation of adopted power that addresses the type of power Qatar exercised between 1995 and 2019.

#### **2.2. The concepts of power in IR theory and social science**

### 2.2.1. National power and relational power

The relationship between power<sup>4</sup> and statehood has long been discussed, and can be found in canonical theoretical works by Thucydides (1950), Machiavelli (1998), and Hobbes (1651), and continuing with modern schools in IR theory. These theoretical approaches include: realism and neorealism, neoclassical realism, liberalism and neoliberalism, and constructivism. Broadly, the liberal position is that violent conflict can be avoided, and that global prosperity can be increased, earning the description, *utopian* or *idealist* (Mearsheimer, 2001). The liberal view holds that political and economic issues are more important in governing state behaviour than considerations of power. By contrast, constructivists argue that global political relations between countries are socially constructed (Friedberg, 2005:34). State relationships are thus based on three categories: norms (beliefs about what is successful and what is right in worldwide politics); strategic cultures, ('sets of beliefs about the fundamental character of international politics and about the best ways of coping with it, especially as regards the utility of force and the prospects for cooperation') (ibid, 2005:34); and identities (Wendt, 1994; 1995; 1999).

In realism, neorealism, and neoclassical realism, the most famous approach to defining political power is the concept of 'elements of national power' (Morgenthau, 1954:97). Morgenthau explains these components, sometimes termed 'power resources' or 'capabilities', which are comprised of: geography, natural resources, industrial capacity, military preparedness, population, national character, national morale, the quality of diplomacy, and the quality of government. Similarly, applying

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<sup>4</sup> This thesis focuses on 'power' and therefore it is important to distinguish between the term 'power' and other terms such as 'influence', 'authority' and 'control' (Weber, 1925; Parsons, 1963; Buckley, 1967; Dahl, 1957; Bierstadt, 1960). Just as foundational scholarship does not outline a common definition of the term 'power', there also remains a need to introduce clear distinctions between 'power', 'influence', 'authority' and 'control'. For instance, Dahl's (1957:202) effort to 'explicate the primitive notion that seems to lie behind all of these concepts' provides only a vague distinction between these terms. He states 'I should like to be permitted to use these terms interchangeably when it is convenient to do so, without denying or seeming to deny that for many other purposes distinctions are necessary and useful.' He further explains: 'unfortunately, in English language power is an awkward word, for unlike "influence" and "control" it has no convenient verb form, nor can the subject and object of the relation be supplied with noun forms without resort to barbaric neologisms'. Although Bierstedt (1960:731-2) states that 'influence' and 'power' have an 'intimate connection', he suggests a distinction between the terms in that 'influence is persuasive while power is coercive'. For example, he states that 'influence attaches to an idea, a doctrine'; while 'power attaches to a person, a group, or an association'. Given the focus of this thesis on the wielding of power by Qatar's ruling elite, 'power' will be used across the research, and we will use the term 'influence' sparingly so as to minimize confusion.

the 'elements of national power' approach, neorealists, or structural realists (sometimes divided between 'defensive' and 'offensive' realism), view state power through its tangible resources, with military power as an essential element. Waltz (1979:131), the founder of defensive realism, considers a state's power to be the combination of the tangible resources used to serve its interests. These elements he lists as: military strength, the size of population and territory, resource endowment, economic capability, political stability, and competence.

Mearsheimer (2001:55), the founder of offensive realism, sees power as derived from material capabilities, but defines two types: latent and military. Latent power refers to a state's overall population, and wealth. Great powers need this raw potential (money, personnel, technology) to construct armed forces and sustain combat in competition with rivals (ibid, 2001:55). He defines power mainly in military terms, considering force as the *ultima ratio* of international politics, and therefore emphasises the importance of population as the foundation of military power. Realists consider the power of great states as a collaboration of power resources, while neorealists view it as a set of tangible resources, dominated by armed capacity rather than latent power.

The varying definitions of power led to the development of 'balance of power' and 'balance of threat' theories. The contribution of 'classical realists' or 'human nature realists' is the belief that international anarchy – the absence of a leading authority – drives states' concerns about balance of power (Claude, 1962; Guzzini, 2000). For this reason, Morgenthau (1954) characterises international and internal politics as settings for power struggles. Policy must therefore be intended to maintain power, to increase it, or to demonstrate it. Contrary to the realists' 'balance of power', the theory of 'balance of threat' was developed by Walt (1987).

Structural realists or neorealists argue that great powers are naturally aggressive in seeking to guarantee their survival (Waltz, 1979:91). If, for classic realists, human nature is the key cause of competition for security, for neorealists it is anarchy. Neorealists accept that in the anarchic circumstances of world politics, where there is no authority above that of the national government, security-seeking states race for power, the key instrument for survival. Walt (1987:5) suggests that 'states ally to balance against threats rather than against power alone'. While Morgenthau justifies alliances as 'a necessary function of the balance of power operating in a multiple state system' (ibid, 1987:7), Walt understands alliances as formal or informal procedures

for security collaboration (ibid, 1987:12). Walt sees threats as defined by aggregate power, geographic proximity, offensive power, and aggressive intentions.

Neoclassical realism draws its theoretical foundations from *Innenpolitik* (domestic policy) theories that emphasise domestic factors' influence on foreign policy (Rose, 1998:146), adding a base of neorealism and classical realism. Neoclassical realism considers politics, 'a perpetual struggle among different states for material power and security in a world of scarce resources and pervasive uncertainty' (Lobell, Ripsman and Taliaferro, 2009:4). States must change their policies to counter opportunities and threats within this environment (Ripsman, Taliaferro and Lobell, 2016:2). Neoclassical realists also believe that foreign policy is driven by actual political elites and leaders (Rose, 1998:146-7), so their views on relative power is important. However, these leaders do not always have complete freedom to direct national resources as they might wish. Consequently, as Rose (ibid,1998:147) clarifies: 'power analysis must ... also examine the strength and structure of states relative to their societies, because these affect the proportion of national resources that can be allocated to foreign policy'. Zakaria (1998:9) even calls neoclassical realism, 'state-centred realism', wherein what matters is state power, not national power, because foreign policy is created by its government. Consequently, neoclassical realism can be thought of as a combination of *Innenpolitik* theories, with a realist and neorealist foundation. Work in this field develops the idea that state behaviour within an international system is determined, more or less, by external opportunities and threats. Typically, neoclassical realists also emphasise the importance of elite-driven policy. They are interested in the extent to which national wealth in the hands of elites can be used to implement foreign policy and exercise power.

Although there are disagreements about the keystones of realism, neorealism, and neoclassical realism, realists of these three kinds are generally united in centralising national power in their efforts to understand political power. Others have developed an interpretive framework based on Dahl's work (1957), a 'relational power' approach. Lasswell and Kaplan (1952) demarcated the understanding of 'power as resources' and a 'relational power' approach, which considers power as a relationship where the behaviour of A causes changes in that of B (Baldwin, 1985) as rooted in Dahl's (1957) work. The relational approach is supported by the classical realist idea of power balance by characterising international politics as a struggle for

power by fundamentally violent means, between states categorised as powers in a hierarchical system (Sprout and Sprout, 1965:20). Many conflicts, according to Sprout and Sprout (1965:45), can be resolved without violence; such methods are described in terms of ‘affect, control, coerce, produce, pull, influence, determine, compel, prevent, push, or press’.

Ultimately, scholars who follow a relational power approach, disagree with the realist perception of violence as the ultimate form of power (Carr, 1939; Gilpin, 1975). For example, Baldwin (1985), advocates the concept of economic statecraft based on Dahl’s relational concept of power (1957), understanding the power projection of states mainly in terms of wealth or economic power, rather than violence. Baldwin (1985:115) considers statecraft as methods by which decision-makers influence other state and non-state actors, internationally. Though a national approach is widely acknowledged by the realist school of thought, followers of relational power, from social power debates, provide useful alternatives to keystones of realists’ traditions. Although the balance of power and threat theories emerged out of the national power approach, adherents of the relational power approach consider wealth, rather than violence, as the primary force behind foreign policy implementation; this places Dahl’s, and his intellectual successors’, work within the context of balance of power theory. The next section examines Dahl’s work in depth, and within the context of the social power debate because his contribution is central for building theoretical foundations of adopted power.

### **2.2.2. Sectional and non-sectional social power concepts**

In the development of the social sciences, two main social power concepts emerged: sectional and non-sectional, referred to as Weberian and Parsonian (Scott, 1994; Martin, 1971). The non-sectional, or non-zero sum concept, views power as operating through legitimation (Lukes, 1974). This understanding of power builds on the approaches of Plato and Aristotle, and contemporary scholars such as Parsons (1937; 1951; 1963), Arendt (1970), and Bierstedt (1950). In contrast, the sectional, or Weberian concept, understands power in terms of relationships wherein A affects B, and the relationship contradicts B’s interest. Weber (1978:53) states: ‘[P]ower is the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which this probability rests’.



Machiavelli (1998), Hobbes (1651), Dahl (1957), and Wrong (1979) conceptualise power as based on this sectional concept. This concept of power is especially relevant for this investigation into foundations of relational power approaches.

Scholars who follow the sectional approach to defining power have contributed significantly to the foundations of power embraced by modern scholars. While Hobbes and his intellectual successors might be said to have ‘endlessly legislated on what power is’, Machiavelli and his philosophical descendants ‘interpreted what power does’ (Clegg, 1989:5). The main difference between their approaches is that Machiavelli seemed clearly interested in serving power considering he was employed by it, rather than fixing power, as Hobbes intended. Hobbes’ mechanistic view of a causation and ‘agency’ model is aligned with ‘modern’ scholars’ (ibid, 1989:22), such as behavioural scientists like Dahl. Based on these two different perceptions of power, the community power debate emerged between followers of the sectional power approach.

### **2.2.3. The community power debate**

The community power debate emerged between pluralists or behaviour science-oriented scholars, and scholars of elitism, sometimes referred to as neo-Machiavellians, whose concern was elite rule (Hunter, 1953; Mills, 1956; Pareto, 1935; Mosca, 1939). One of the founders of elitism, Mosca (1939), suggests that elite rule is a necessity, and unthinkable in any other context. This necessity produces a social order organised on obligation and planning. It is an elite groups’ gift to produce order and concentrate power in their own hands. As Clegg (1989:50) states, elitists hold a very imprecise perception of what power is. Dahl (1957; 1958; 1961; 1968), who suggests a relational concept of power, was the first to challenge elite theory and open the community power debate.

Dahl (1957:202-3) introduced the intuitive idea behind his approach of power with the example of a traffic policeman. While a normal person attempting to control traffic flow might be considered ‘mentally ill’ by passers-by, he noted, it is considered perfectly natural for a traffic policeman to do the same. From this, he concluded that, ‘A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do’. Dahl (1957:203) considers power as a relationship. The objects of the relations of power are termed ‘actors’, who can be groups, governments, individuals,

roles, offices, or other human aggregates. Pluralists believe that power in the worldwide system is broadly distributed (Baldwin, 1985), and thus consider nation-state and non-state actors as equally important. This approach considers power to be multidimensional; it can grow in one dimension while simultaneously decline in another.

The main dimensions of power are *means*, *scope*, *domain*, *weight* and *cost*, as defined and refined by numerous scholars. The *means*, according to Dahl, is ‘a mediating activity by A between A’s base and B’s response’ (1957:203), where the base includes all resources (e.g., acts, objects, and opportunities) that can be exploited to affect another’s behaviour. For Clegg, the relationship can be expressed via any instruments or means, such as money, fear, or love. Dahl defined *scope* as B’s range of responses to the relationship (1957), which Baldwin (2013) refined to the possibility that an actor might respond differently to various matters. Japan, for example, has more power in economic matters than military, and would select its responses to pressures accordingly.

*Domain*, meanwhile, is the field within which one actor’s power is considered relative to that of others. A nation-state may have a great deal of power within one regional domain, but little power globally, or within other regions. Dahl (1957) also outlines *weight*, the possibility that B’s behaviour is or can be influenced by A. A state with a high chance of achieving its goals in trade negotiations is more powerful than one with low chances (Baldwin, 2002). Finally, the *cost* to A and B are relevant when measuring power (Harsanyi, 1962; Dahl, 1968), which means ‘how “cheap” is it for state A to exert power?’ (Sherwood, 2017:146). Dahl’s explanation of power provided a framework for the emergence of a relational power approach, which contradicts the idea of social power presented by elitists. Moreover, the main dimensions of relational power such as means, scope, domain, cost, and weight assist in measuring power.

Dahl (1958:463) critiqued the ruling elite hypothesis that the existence of a definable group of people within the political system may have a greater level of power than others, noting that the assertion that, ‘A has more power than B’, is meaningless without defining the scope of responses that this power affects. Where two actors always perform the same actions towards the group being influenced, their relative power cannot be compared nor can they be identified as ‘elite’ actors. To identify an elite, he suggests, it is necessary to identify those individuals within a group whose

viewpoints regularly ‘prevail’ in issues where there is disagreement. These he termed ‘a controlling group’.

These elitist and pluralist assumptions are disputed in the community power debate, however Bachrach and Baratz (1962:947) argue that ‘there are two faces of power, neither of which the sociologists see and only one of which the political scientists see’. They (ibid, 1962:952) suggest that the researcher of power will not begin as sociologists do, by asking, ‘who rules?’, nor as pluralists do, by asking ‘does anyone have power?’, but by learning about the specific ‘mobilization of bias’ in the institution under scrutiny. This social power approach was counter-attacked by pluralists, specifically Polsby (1960), Wolfinger (1971), and Merelman (1968). Wolfinger (1971) considered this a new stage of the debate, while Merelman (1968) termed the approach ‘neoeitist’. The community power debate contributed to the emergence of new assumptions about social power. The ideas discussed, provide a foundation for new theories of types of power, including the three-dimensional framework of power.

#### **2.2.4. The three-dimensional framework**

Lukes’ (1974) entry into the community power debate proposes comparative definitions of contrasting perspectives on social power. In his formulation, the prevailing perspectives are one-, two-, or three-dimensional views of power. The one-dimensional approach can be seen in the works of pluralists, such as Dahl (1957, 1958, 1961), Polsby (1960), Wolfinger (1971), and Merelman (1968). Their main focus is the use of observable behaviour, and conflict, in which actors’ interests should be interpreted as policy preferences (Lukes, 1974). Lukes (1974:15) concludes that the one-dimensional face of power: ‘involves a focus on *behaviour* in the making of *decisions* on *issues* over which there is an observable *conflict* of (subjective) *interests*, seen as express policy preferences, revealed by political participation’. The two-dimensional view, in contrast, has its roots in ‘neoeitist’ thinking (Bachrach and Baratz, 1962; 1963; 1970; Frey, 1971) and is anti-behavioural:

involv[ing] a *qualified critique* of the *behavioural* focus of the first view [...] and it allows for consideration of the ways in which *decisions* are pretended from being taken on potential issues over which there is an

observable *conflict* of ... interests, seen as embodied in express policy preferences and sub-political grievances (Lukes, 1974:20).

Lukes (1974) champions the 'three-dimensional', 'radical' view of power based on 'objective interests', the recognition of 'latent conflict', and the awareness of collective forces (Clegg, 1989:90). The main differences of the one-, two-, and three-dimensional faces of power are illustrated in *Figure 2.1*. (Clegg, 1989:90). Ultimately, a one-dimensional face of power is rooted in Dahl's (1957) understanding of power, thus based on the relational power approach.




Figure 2.1. The three-dimensional framework (Clegg, 1989:90)

Therefore, the elitist perception of power aligns with neoclassical realism, especially in regard to the importance of elites in implementing foreign policy. The relational power approach is rooted in Dahl's work (1957). The importance of Dahl's understanding of power is related to the fact that his relational power approach provides the foundation for the one-dimensional face of power. Both elitist and pluralist understandings of power should be united for building foundations of adopted power. This will be explained in later sections by placing Qatar within IR theory and social science, after revising theoretical assumptions on which states (great, middle, or small) can wield power, and their strategic behaviour for doing so.

### **2.2.5. Great, middle or small: who can exert power?**

Discussions of national power and relational power approaches are important to determine which states can effectively build and use their power: great powers, middle powers, small states, and micro-states. Even until the twentieth century states were regularly described as 'powers' in European languages (e.g., German *Macht*, French *puissance*, Russian *derzhava*). In modern parlance, this term is applied to 'great powers', and, though rarely, 'middle powers', but not those now referred to as 'small states' (Neumann and Gstöhl, 2004:3). Middle power can be understood as meaning that a small state has reached 'greatness in one specific regard' (ibid, 2004:3). The literature of micro-states focuses on issues of sovereignty and action capacity (Reid, 1974; Plischke, 1977; Harden, 1985), and to differentiate these from small states, a lack of resources is assumed (Neumann and Gstöhl, 2004).

Realists, neorealists, and neoclassical realists applying the national power approach believe that only great powers are able to obtain power. As Morgenthau (1954:61) concludes, 'states with a small population cannot be great powers'. Moreover, a state can obtain the status of great power through the intersection of population size and economic performance, both essential components in the construction of armed power. Neoclassical realists following the realist perception (Rose, 1998; Ripsman, Taliaferro and Lobell, 2016) fix their attention on great powers, rather than small states. Generally, the outlook of neoclassical realists aligns with Thucydides' aphorism that, 'the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must' (Rose, 1998:146).

An absolute power approach, based on quantitative criteria, is part of the realist tradition that considers ‘small states’ as ‘weak powers’, more preoccupied with survival than great powers, and without real power in international relations (Keohane, 1969; Elman, 1995). This absolute definition is a sign of ‘size’, that is, area, armed capacity, population, and GNP (Masaryk, 1966; Benedict, 1967; Keohane, 1969). Vital (1967:8) takes a size-group approach and argues that the global community is divided into great, middle, and small-sized states. He describes the ‘rough upper limits’ for the latter as: a population of 10 to 15 million in economically advanced countries and a population of 20 to 30 million in underdeveloped countries.

Vellut (1967), takes a similar approach, combining population with GNP to divide states into three categories:

- 1) 10 to 50 million inhabitants and/or USD 2-10bn GNP;
- 2) 5 to 10 million inhabitants and/or USD 1-2bn GNP; and
- 3) less than 5 million inhabitants and USD 1bn GNP (Handel, 1981:31).

Micro-states have been understood as states with populations of less than one million (Clarke and Payne, 1987).

The qualitative approach is a response to the quantitative perspective, falling into the neoliberal tradition; the belief that international institutionalism provides opportunity for cooperation, and a focus on the influence that small players can apply within a group (Rothstein, 1968; Keohane, 1969; Jakobsen, 2009). For constructivists, smallness is a function of perception (Barnett, 1999; Knudsen, 2007; Almezaini and Rickli, 2017) through self-image, or perception by other states (Hey, 2003:3).

Small states can also be viewed through the relational power approach discussed above; the idea that a state’s power is defined by, and expressed in relationships ‘in which the behaviour of actor A influences the behaviour of actor B’ (Baldwin, 2013:274). The ‘specific spatio-temporal context’ (Thorhallson and Wivel, 2006:654) that identifies the nature of its challenges and opportunities, leaves it ‘struck with the ... power configuration and its institutional expression’ (Mouritzen and Wivel, 2005; Sherwood, 2017:146) and connects to Baldwin’s explanation of power, whose foundation derives from Dahl (1957). Rather than focusing on the primary explanatory factors of ‘smallness’ or ‘weakness’, such as population or size, this approach focuses on the power that the state can, or cannot, exert regardless of the

factors that the absolute power approach considers as indication of power (Rickli, 2008). Mouritzen and Wivel (2004) argue that the degree of power a state can exert within a specific time and context is the defining factor (Wright, 2016:2). In other words, small states within the context of a relational power approach might exert power. Simply put, according to the relational power approach, all states, either great powers, middle, or small states, can exert power.

#### **2.2.6. A state's strategic options**

The strategic behaviours of states can be exercised through alliances, offensive, defensive, or hedging strategies (Almezaini and Rickli, 2017). Morgenthau (1954) suggests that only great powers compete within international relations, as small states are able to maintain independence only through another power's protection, or by influencing the balance of power through appearing less attractive to ambitious imperialists. The balancing process is possible through several methods: dividing and ruling, compensation, armaments, and building alliances. Where nations A and B are in competition with each other they can:

- Increase their own power;
- Prevent their competitor from building alliances; or
- Supplement their own power by allying with other states.

In the context of the balance of threat theory, when challenged by a substantial external threat, states have two options: to balance or to *bandwagon*. Bandwagoning means allying with the threat, while balancing is allying with others against the threat (Walt, 1987:17). Walt expects weaker states to favour bandwagoning rather than balancing, as they provide only a tiny supplement to defensive coalitions and may not affect the outcome. Weaker states choose to balance only when threatened by states with approximately equal capacities (ibid, 1987:30). Walt highlights two types of balancing: one directed by armed means for particular military ends, and another, by political means, focused on a rival's legitimacy and image. Foreign aid seldom gives a patron huge political leverage over their clients, the patron will exercise significant leverage only in such cases where they have a monopoly on the desired form of aid,



where they can influence internal issues by manipulating aid levels, or where relations are asymmetric (ibid, 1987:241).

Defensive and hedging strategies are favoured by small states. To protect autonomy, small states are inherently defensive; they do not expect protection from greater powers and are therefore especially reluctant to enter into wars. Many scholars consider neutrality to be a common and positive behavioural norm for small states in relation to competing great powers; this contributes to national and international security (Wicker, 1911; Raymond, 1997). ‘Hedging’ is an alternative strategy often adopted by small states that may be threatened by a rising power. It describes the deliberate display of ‘ambiguity’ towards the more powerful, or increasingly powerful state (Lim and Cooper, 2015:703). Hedging is a multi-component strategy which encompasses everything other than pure-balancing and pure-bandwagoning (Cheng-Chwee, 2008:165). In other words, where a state feels immediately threatened, it will seek a balancing strategy to mitigate concerns, but at other times will bandwagon to gain advantages. Hedging maintains integration and engagement mechanisms while also applying the realist assumption of balancing, and external security cooperation (Kamrava, 2013:52). Consequently, the ‘specific spatio-temporal context’ (Thorhallson and Wivel, 2006:654) based on the relational power approach (Dahl, 1957), allows great powers, middle, and small states to exert power. This ability to increase their power is possible through alliances, the protection of autonomy through neutrality, and hedging, which includes bandwagoning and balancing.

### **2.3. Qatar, through the lens of IR theory and social science**

#### **2.3.1. National or relational power approaches?**

Focusing mainly on IR theory, and in order to locate Qatar’s place within it, Qatar’s national and relational power approaches should be examined. Qatar has the enormous wealth advantage that realist/neorealist/neoclassical schools view as an indicator of power; its economic power is its status as a state with the highest GDP per capita in the world (QNB, 2018). However, applying other indicators, Qatar’s capacity to demonstrate greater power is limited. Qatar is only 11,437 square km (BBC News, 2018), or 4,247 square miles in area (Fromherz, 2012). In 2017, Qatar’s population totalled 2,639,211 (The World Bank, 2017), so by applying the absolute approach

based on quantitative criteria, it is viewed as a small state. However, with only approximately 300,000 of the population deemed to be Qatari citizens (Wright, 2016), Qatar is, perhaps, a micro-state. As for military capacities, these are also limited, with 20 to 30 per cent of Qataris in the armed forces (Roberts, 2017a).

By contrast, the relational power approach accepts that small states are able to exert power, and considers this in terms of capabilities and relationships. In this light, Qatar's power can be said to 'punch above its weight' (Roberts, 2017a:1). Although neoclassical realism is based on the national power approach, as Rose asserts (1998:146), the parameters of a country's foreign policy are determined by their material power, neoclassical realists tend to acknowledge the strengths of relational definitions of power, as identified in Dahl's work (1957), but they find it 'so fraught with theoretical and empirical difficulties as to be practically unusable' (Rose, 1998:151). Scholars find that the practical use of the relational power approach within neoclassical keystone is useful in examining Qatar (Almezaini and Rickli, 2017; Soubrier, 2017), and putting Qatar within IR neoclassical realism lens will be vital for the development of adopted power theory.

### **2.3.2. Qatar as a rentier state**

According to the neoclassical school of thought, foreign policy is created by political leaders and elites. The relationship between the latter and their societies decides how much freedom could be exercised to use national resources to implement foreign policies. This refers to a rentier state like Qatar. Qatar's political economy is based on 'rentierism', a concept introduced by Mahdavy (1970) and developed by Beblawi (1987) and Luciani (1990) and other scholars (Crystal, 1990; Herb, 1999; Davidson, 2008; Schwarz, 2008; Hertog, 2010). Introducing the defining characteristics of rentier states, Beblawi (1987:51-2) states that there is no pure rentier economy, because every economy has some element of rent. A rentier economy should instead be distinguished as one in which rent (wealth) conditions prevail. Secondly, Beblawi states that the rentier economy relies on extensive external rent (Mahdavy, 1970:428), and that in a rentier state a small minority is responsible for the generation of this rent, while the greater majority is simply engaged in the consumption, or allocation of it. Finally, in a rentier state the government is the major recipient of the external rent and this is simply because so few control it. Beblawi (1987:52) concludes

that: ‘In fact, the “economic power” thus bestowed upon the few would allow them to seize “political power” as well, or else induce the political elite to take over the external rent from them without major political distribution’. In other words, a rentier state such as Qatar, has political economy that rely on revenues from an endowed hydrocarbon sector, thus conditions are such that inner-circle elites have almost unlimited access to political and economic power.

This connects with neopatrimonialism theory, which explains a ‘particular style of leadership where a sovereign-a monarch or president-is at the center of an elite web, with subordinate elites that are submissive to the leader but between which the leader encourages competition’ (Gray, 2011:7). In the Arabian Peninsula, due to historical ‘shaikhly rule’ (Onley and Khalaf, 2006:189-208), rentier activities took direct shape by reinforcing the pre-existing bonds of clientelism and patronage between the ruled and rulers, and establishing new connections between them (Kamrava, 2012:40). Clientelism means ‘a political or social system based on the relation of client to patron with the client giving political or financial support to a patron in exchange for some special privilege or benefit’ (*Merriam Webster*, 2019). Clientelism promotes a two-way relationship of mutual dependence. As a result, a social contract between rulers and ruled occurs within the rentier state, meaning that rulers offer citizens oil and gas revenues in exchange for political quiescence (Herb and Lynch, 2019:5). Such relationships between rulers and ruled, clients and patrons, provide the freedom to access natural resources to inner-circle elites (patrons) who may implement foreign policies.

Rentier state theory and the neoclassical school of thought, focus on through whose hands national wealth is distributed. While rentier state theory explains domestic dynamics as due to existing social contracts between rulers and ruled in the rentier state, the inner-circle elite obtain political and economic power. Neoclassical realists project power as: the more wealth in hand, the more freedom for power projection the elites will have. Inner-circle elites in rentier states obtain economic and political power in their hands, and have freedom to benefit from national wealth revenues to project power. The next section describes the role of inner-circle elites, and their close connections with other elites in Qatar in high-ranking positions in political and economic fields, thus allowing inner-circle elites access to political and economic power, and freedom to enact power projection through the use of national wealth.

### 2.3.3. The inner-circle elite-driven policies of Qatar

The elites in Qatar can be divided into three categories: the inner-circle elite (which includes the key decision-makers in Qatar); elites who have close relations with the inner-circle elites and obtain important economic and political positions in Qatar (which includes mainly representatives of al-Thani family, but also representative of other important families in Qatar); and the third category that includes businessmen, mainly al-Thani, who obtain leading positions in the economic sector of Qatar, who are also close to Qatar's leadership, though less close than the second group. The inner-circle of top policymakers is only a handful of decision-makers. Focusing on Shaykh Hamad's era, Kamrava (2013:118) includes the following individuals: the amir; his son Tamim (deputy amir and heir apparent at the time); Shaykha Moza, Shaykh Hamad's wife and official consort; 'Abdullah bin Hamad al-Attia, the amir's childhood friend and former deputy prime minister; and Hamad bin Jasim al-Thani, the former prime minister and minister of foreign affairs. During the current Shaykh Tamim's era the key policy-makers are Shaykh Tamim and Shaykha Moza. This thesis includes Shaykh Hamad, Hamad bin Jasim al-Thani, Shaykha Moza, and Shaykh Tamim in the inner-circle elite group, as their contribution is key to transforming a formerly small and weak Qatar into an influential state between 1995 and 2019.

Shaykh Hamad played an essential role in transforming Qatar into an important economic and political actor with a global presence. One anecdote indicates Shaykh Hamad's intentions; describing the first time he visited the UK and his passport was unfamiliar to passport control, at that moment Shaykh Hamad determined to 'put Qatar on the map'. In 2013, Shaykh Tamim described his father as the transformer of Qatar 'from a state that some people could barely locate on a map into a major player in politics, economy, media, culture, and sport, worldwide' (Soubrier, 2017:131). Gaining a leadership position in the region became possible mainly due to the consolidation of power and wealth among the Shaykh's inner-circle of trusted family members (Kamrava, 2013:117; Fromherz, 2012:134), a key factor for projecting power. For example, describing Shaykh Hamad's era, Fromherz (2012:125) states that the amir followed the progress of his own family's interests and his worldwide and commercial actions, and his policy of encouraging the state to access the wider world:

In this way the whole state of Qatar has become almost a kind of corporation, with the Sheikh as CEO. At the same time, the level of control that the Sheikh has over the governance of Qatar is unparalleled by that of the CEO of any major corporate entity.

The role of Shaykh Hamad in Qatar's progression was essential because, in placing the amir and his close circle in senior positions of state-owned firms, he claimed direct access to, and personal control over Qatar's industry and economy, allowing him to pursue his vision of regional leadership.

Such a state structure allowed Shaykh Hamad to back the following policies. Although Qatar developed relations with Islamists before, under Shaykh Hamad's vision such relations become pragmatic. As Wright (2017) explains, under Shaykh Hamad, Qatar believed that it could bring about its pan-Arab agenda by incorporating a common Islamic agenda. Baabood (2017) also states that Shaykh Hamad leaned between Arab nationalism and political Islam. Observers acknowledge the personal contribution of Shaykh Hamad's view on political Islam as a pan-Arab agenda, and Shaykh Hamad's vision of building pragmatic relations with Islamists in order to project power in the region (Stephens, 2017). Additional to being the influencer behind the usage of political Islam for pragmatic reasons, he also tried to bolster his and his country's legitimacy amongst tribes. He claimed that his great-grandfather is Mohammad bin 'Abdul Wahhab, who is the founder of Wahhabism, or Salafist movement within Islam, a doctrine which both Qatar and Saudi Arabia claim to be pre-eminent. Moreover, under Shaykh Hamad's leadership, al-Thani claimed connection to al-Qa'qa' ibn 'Amr, trying to assert the leadership of the Bani Tamim tribe, to which the al-Thani family belongs (Al-Qassemi, 2012). Finally, Shaykh Hamad was behind the establishment of al-Jazeera, the media outlet which put Qatar onto the world map, and contributed to its emergence as a regional player.

Hamad bin Jasim (HBJ) was Qatar's long-serving Foreign Minister (1992-2013) and Qatar's Prime Minister (2007 to 2013). He was the key supporter of Shaykh Hamad's vision of leadership in the region and was a key implementer of Shaykh Hamad's turn to pragmatic relations with Islamists. For his active involvement during mediation efforts, academics such as Barakat (2012) nicknames him 'the Peacemaker', and Gulbrandsen (2010:17) describes him as 'a politician-cum-businessman' and an archetypal 'state capitalist' (Ulrichsen, 2014:81). His emergence

as a main policy-maker during Shaykh Hamad's tenure also links with the following reasons.

Along with high-ranking governmental positions, HBJ served on the Supreme Council for the Investment of the Reserves of the State, and the Ruling Family Council. He was also the vice-chairman and CEO of the Qatar Investment Authority (QIA), chairman of Qatari Diar (QIA's real estate arm), and Qatar Holding (QIA's direct investment arm). According to Gray (2013:63) the combination of private wealth and a public role is usual in the GCC states for such high-ranking political actors. However, few obtained the same level as HBJ. At different times, directly or via his family, he has held investments in Qatari Diar Real Estate Investment, Qatar Airways, and one of largest trading firms, Al-Fardan, an artificial island real estate project, The Pearl, media, foreign banks, and hotels (ibid, 2013:63). In addition, his sons engaged in top-level positions: Jasim bin Hamad al-Thani, his eldest son, is chairman of Qatar Islamic Bank S.A.Q (QIB) since April 2005 and serves as chairman of Qinvest LLC. By appointing his sons to such important positions, HBJ has 'strengthened his influence in the state capitalist structure' (Ulrichsen, 2014:82). His leading positions in state-owned companies made the process of wealth distribution by inner-circle elites extremely dynamic, which helped to quicken the distribution of wealth, an important requirement for the implementation of Qatar's foreign policy.

Another powerful political figure of the Shaykh Hamad and Shaykh Tamim eras is Shaykha Moza, the chairperson of the Qatar Foundation for Education, Science and Community Development, and, among other high-ranking positions, she was the vice chair of the Supreme Council of Health (2009 to 2014), and the vice chair of the Supreme Education Council (from 2006-2012). The Qatar Foundation, a private non-profit organisation founded in 1995 (Diab, 2018), concluded a five-year deal to become the first ever sponsor of FC Barcelona's uniform kit in 2011. Shaykha Moza's personality and leading roles in the state's institutions assisted to increase Qatar's leadership position regionally.

Shaykh Tamim, the current Amir of Qatar, was an heir apparent from August 2003 until 25 June 2013. In 2005, Shaykh Tamim founded Qatar Sports Investments, he also headed the Qatar Investment Authority board of directors, and held other high-rank positions: vice-president of the Supreme Council for Economic Affairs and Investment, chairman of the Supreme Council for the Environment and Natural Reserves, and chairman of the Supreme Education Council (Diab, 2018). His close

connections to state-owned companies helped realise Qatar's regional ambitions of leadership. Shaykh Tamim generally followed the ambitious course of his father, though sometimes not openly demonstrating it. It appears he will continue to do so. His role is very important in the continuation of his father's ambitious policies, and his previous positions in state-owned companies allowed him access to wealth for ambitious foreign policy implementation. Since 2013, as amir of Qatar, he has consolidated more personal economic and political power than before.

Along with the inner-circle—including the main decision-makers and/or founders of the prominent state-owned companies who consolidate and wield the power of Qatar—there is another group of elites which includes prominent figures in political and economic fields. Though less powerful than the inner-circle, the vital positions occupied by the ruling family within the state apparatus guarantees the al-Thani's presence, and, as a result, the means to gather information at many levels of policymaking. In collaboration with the top leadership, during both eras under Shaykh Hamad and Shaykh Tamim, they help to ensure the al-Thani maintain their dominance.

During the Shaykh Tamim era, however, there are other influential figures closely related to Qatar's efforts that take advantage of sports-related non-state actors. For example, 'Abdullah bin Nasir al-Thani is a chairman of NAS Group and owns the football club Malaga FC (Elkington, 2010; Smith, 2018). Other influential non-al-Thani who are closely connected with members of the ruling family include: Nasir al-Khelaifi, the president of Paris St-Germain (PSG), the French football team that was bought by Qatar in 2011. He is a childhood friend of Shaykh Tamim. He also heads up Qatar Sports Investments and runs beIN Sports (Panja, 2017). Additionally, in 2011 Hasan al-Thawadi was appointed secretary-general of the Supreme Committee for Delivery and Legacy and CEO of the Local Organising Committee of the 2022 FIFA World Cup. Before that, he was CEO of Qatar's 2022 Bid Committee, working closely with the bid chairman, Shaykh Mohammad bin Hamad al-Thani. He also served on the Qatar Investment Authority (QIA) and Qatar Holding (Diab, 2018).

Finally, in the third group, al-Thani businessmen are essential, particularly in state-owned companies, on boards, and leading, or connected to, state-led initiatives; they 'are serving to a large extent at the pleasure of the Emir' (Gray, 2013:63). By assuming control over important positions in the political and economic structure of Qatar, the inner-circle has direct access to state-owned companies, as well as any other

institutions, and to use its wealth to fund foreign policy objectives. The inner-circle elite's access to national wealth is possible thanks to the rentier system in Qatar; this aligns with the neoclassical standpoint.




Figure 2.2. Qatar's elites between 1995-2019 (source: personal collection).



#### **2.3.4. Building balancing alliances with non-state actors: Qatar's strategic choices for the implementation of foreign policies**

Neoclassical realists argue that a state's foreign policy must counter its threats and opportunities. Qatar has been threatened by many of its regional neighbours, including larger neighbours, notably Saudi Arabia and Iran (Roberts, 2017a). Its fears are linked to the possibility the country might experience what occurred to a similarly small neighbour, Kuwait, when it was invaded by Iraq in 1990 (Kostiner, 2009). Saudi Arabia has always been perceived as the main threat by the Qatari leadership, especially since 1995, and despite Qatar building relations with Western powers. Shaykh Hamad believed that a fully independent foreign policy, which has been variously described as 'ambitious' (Dargin, 2007), 'independent' (Blanchard, 2008), 'intricate' (Rabi, 2009), and 'chaotic' (De Lage, 2005), could provide security and put the state on a level with traditional powers in the Middle East. Such policies continue under Shaykh Tamim's leadership. Qatari-Saudi relations seem to have been affected by either a fear, or dislike of Saudi Arabia within this generation of Qatari leaders (Kamrava, 2017). The 'unique moment' of Qatar's emergence as an influential regional power between 1995 and 2019 could not have occurred outside of this historical context.

At the same time, there have been unprecedented opportunities for the redistribution of power in the region as a result of events in the Middle East, such as the Iraq War, and the aftermath of the Arab Spring. A power vacuum emerged regionally, and was especially visible within the Arab League between 2010 and 2012 (Abdullah and Al-Nasiri, 2014). The decreasing role for traditional leaders, Iraq, Egypt, and Syria, provided leadership opportunities for the GCC states, with Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE being the most dominant in the Middle East since 2011; this has led scholarly debate over the terms 'weak' and 'strong' (Kamrava, 2016).

Qatar's behaviour of strategic choices have thus been chosen by its leadership based on concerns over security, especially from Iran and Saudi Arabia, and the opportunities that the region provide for developing power. While this point is generally agreed upon, there is disagreement between scholars about the extent to which Qatar's strategic options have been determined by hedging, or centralised foreign aid. One group of scholars argue that Qatar chose a combination of influence

and autonomy (Soubrier, 2017:125), or autonomy and protection (Gervais, 2017: 41), due to a hedging strategy. At the GCC level, cooperative strategies have mostly addressed security threats, but have been undermined by small states' concerns over Saudi Arabia. To avoid any external threat to the status quo, the GCC states have sheltered under the US security umbrella (ibid, 2017). But in order to act within the Saudi orbit they have used their own resources and capacities to transform regional dynamics and influence political expansion across the region. While according to some scholars, Qatar has hedged towards several actors, it has done so to differing scales, making a greater investment in the security provided by the US than in friendly ties with Iran or Islamist groups (Kamrava, 2013:52).

When the GCC states do not use alliances to maintain autonomy or exert power (Watanabe, 2017:170), they have often applied foreign aid as a core element (Almezaini, 2011) either in competition for power, or to address security issues. Since the Arab Spring, Arab aid has changed the dynamics of the region as different states support rival factions (Almezaini, 2017). Although the UAE has more experience than Qatar in using aid and providing military support, both states aim to be active in international relations in the Middle East, and to build reputations as regional powers (ibid, 2017). Qatar, Saudi, and the UAE have been the most significant donors of foreign aid to North Africa since the Egyptian uprising in 2011. It is not clear, though, why foreign aid is separated by scholars (Watanabe, 2017) who explain Gulf state behaviours, from the balance of threat theory as clearly stated by Walt (1987), as part of balancing threat.

However, Qatar's actions might be allied with the balance of power theory supported by scholars who follow the relational power approach which, as described (Sprout and Sprout, 1965; Baldwin, 1985), considers wealth the ultimate form of power (ibid, 1985). Although the motivations for supplying foreign aid vary between states, the UAE and Saudi Arabia's are rooted in concerns over the Muslim Brotherhood as a threat to internal security. In contrast, Qatar provided support to the Muslim Brotherhood to increase its own regional influence and autonomy from the GCC (Watanabe, 2017). The UAE, with strong concerns over the effect of regional Islamist militias on its internal security, took part in joint air strikes with Egypt in Libya in 2014. In contrast, Qatar has engaged with militias and politically Islamic non-state actors. My interview (2017) with Ambassador al-Mazrou'i of the UAE to the UK clarifies the situation:

Again I don't want to emphasise the issue that we are against Islamists, we are not against, we are all Muslims. We are against Islamists with very conspicuous agendas. Islamists that aim at creating instability and pursuing the very dangerous aims of political Islam, mainly. So, if Qatar wants to support Islamists in Libya, post-Qaddafi, and we know that [the] Muslim Brotherhood and Islamists took over in Egypt, and there was change in the Egyptian leadership, now Libya with its oil revenues and money could be utilised by Islamists in Libya to actually destabilise Egypt. Immediately you will see if Islamists take over post-Qaddafi in Libya, you will see trouble in Egypt. Because political Islam has an agenda, they are not as straight as they seem. They always have that agenda, and their agenda is [one that they] 'must spread throughout', cross border towards Egypt and towards other countries.

The differences between how the GCC states approach internal and external threats suggest that Qatar can be viewed through the theoretical lens of it as a modified version of the balance of power model. Rather than other states, Qatar chooses to create balancing alliances with non-state actors. Neoclassical realists consider the international system as mainly state-centric, although they also do not reject the significance of different actors such as transnational criminal organisations, multinational corporations, terrorist networks, and international nongovernmental organisations, which can be defined as non-state actors (Ripsman, Taliaferro and Lobell, 2016). Adopting Almezaini and Rickli's argument (2017:18): 'strong states will be able to use these actors as force multipliers in their foreign policy, while weak states will be penetrated and influenced by transnational forces', it can be concluded that Qatar chose the first. Qatar, through its domestic structure of ruled and rulers/clients and patrons, builds balancing alliances with non-state actors, and makes them Qatar's clients for the projection of power.

Consequently, Qatar's behaviour can be understood through the neoclassical realist stance, applying the relational power approach. This is especially close to the neoclassical realist position on the role of elites in foreign policy, and their importance in forming relations between elites and society, as elites are not always free to access the wealth they need to consolidate power. The inner-circle elites in Qatar who implement power projection have access to wealth either because they founded and occupy high-ranking positions in state-owned companies, or because they have been made representatives of the al-Thani family and other important tribe members in state-owned companies and government institutions. Simply put, due to its being a

rentier state, Qatar's elite has political and economic power in their hands, which clearly facilitates the ambitious policy that has characterised the inner-circle since 1995.

Finally, Qatar's strategy with regard to protecting its autonomy and furthering its influence is debated, some assert that it has favoured hedging, while others believe that it has appropriated foreign aid, an aspect of the balance of threat theory. By contrast, the valuable contribution of foreign aid can be interpreted as evidence of the balance of power applying the relational power approach. This might also demonstrate a new way of understanding rentier state power implementation, the same patron-client structure as in domestic society. But for power projection, Qatar builds balancing alliances with non-state actors. Taking into account Qatar's main characteristics, the type of power the wealthy rentier state wielded between 1995 and 2019 will be examined in the next section.

## **2.4. Typologies of power in IR theory**

### **2.4.1. Hard/soft power and smart power**

Theories of hard, soft, and smart power were introduced by Nye (1991; 2004; 2011), and have become popular within academic and political discourse. Hard power consists of the use of tangible resources, money, and force to exert power (Nye, 2011), while soft power is the ability to use 'attraction, rather than coercion' to achieve objectives (Nye, 2004). However, a successful strategy depends on the utilisation of both soft power and hard power in an effective collaboration, which Nye calls 'smart' power.

The one-dimensional face of power that occurs as the result of the 'community power debate', is the basis of hard power (Nye, 2011:6). From the theoretical point of view, the basis for hard power is command, and the attempt to achieve desired results through payment and coercion (ibid, 2011:16). Unintended effects, although not leading to the preferred outcome, can still produce harmful, or, beneficial consequences. In contrast, the co-optive power of two- and three-dimensional power adds to soft power as the ability to obtain preferred results with co-optive means of persuasion, agenda-setting, and attraction (ibid, 2011:16). Soft power consists of three resources: political values, culture, and foreign policies (Nye, 2004:11). Concepts of

hard, soft, and smart power are well-established and among the most commonly used by academics and politicians. However, reviewing these concepts demonstrates that unique features of states can be united under different concepts of power, leading to form new types of power as discussed below.

#### **2.4.2. Sticky and sharp power**

Mead (2009) criticises Nye's conceptualisation of the soft and hard power binary. He argues that the core elements of hard power, economic and military capability, do not represent a comprehensive account of the methods used by states such as the contemporary United States or the British Empire before the 20th century. Mead offers the ideas of 'sharp' and 'sticky' power, to be considered alongside Nye's concepts, which he argues have maintained US hegemony. Mead (2009) defines *sticky power* as 'economic power, which contains a set of economic policies and institutions that attract other states to the US system and then trap them in it'. American sticky power has two bases: free trade and an international monetary system. An example of the *stickiness* of the US economic system is the possibility of foreign acquisition of a majority of direct and portfolio private investments, government and private bonds. The possibility of a run on the dollar and collapse of the American economic system would challenge and rattle the financial strength of every state's economic system (ibid, 2009). Mead's 'sharp power' is a variation on the traditional idea of armed power; Mead explains that to address challenges 'the United States maintains a system of alliances and bases intended to promote stability in Asia, Europe, and the Middle East.' The valuable contribution of conceptualising sharp and sticky power is that it distinguishes between the elements of Nye's hard power.

#### **2.4.3. Sharp power**

In 2017, a revision of Nye's soft power led to the introduction of sharp power (Walker and Ludwig, 2017). The distinctive feature of this concept is its focus on authoritarian regimes' influences over the democratic world, particularly Russia and China. Authoritarian state initiatives to influence through media, culture, and academic output, rather than soft power persuasion and attraction, is often perceived as manipulation and distraction (National Endowment for Democracy, 2017:6). The

authors conclude, ‘authoritarian “soft power” is better characterised as “sharp power” that pierces, penetrates or perforates the political and information environments in the targeted countries’ (ibid, 2017:6). The term *sharp power* captures the aggressive and harmful nature of authoritarian projects that have limited similarity to the attraction of soft power. With sharp power, the common, unattractive values of authoritarian regimes (censorship, top-down control, a monopoly on power, purchased, or coerced loyalty) are spread externally and affect their victims (Walker and Ludwig, 2017). The central distinction of sharp power (2017) is that it focuses on the ways domestic regimes manipulate other regimes’ values. The major contribution of the authors that have studied this type of power is an appreciation for how internal policy drives foreign policy.

#### **2.4.4. Civilian power Europe, military power Europe, normative power Europe**

The prevailing theories about the types of power that the European Union (EU) has exercised since its formation are intimately related to the historical development of the union, and to external factors that demanded a transition from civilian power to military power and then normative power. Duchêne (1972) suggestion is that in the 1970s, Europe demonstrated ‘civilian power’ that was ‘long on economic power and relatively short on armed force’ (Manners, 2002:236). Civilian power was described as the core of economic power to obtain national aims; the desire to apply legally-binding supranational institutions to obtain global progress; and finally, the priority of diplomatic co-operation to resolve global problems (Twitchett, 1976; ibid, 2002). However, Bull (1982) criticised the adoption of civilian power due to the limits it set on self-sufficiency in military power during the Cold War. His resolution was to adapt the European Communities (EC) into a military power. Though considering the outcomes of the end of the Cold War as an illustration of the role of ideas and norms, Manners (2002:235) suggests that a better conceptualisation of the EU might be ‘normative power Europe’. Normative power consists of the following theoretical bases: ideational, principles, actions, impact, and broader consequences in global politics (Manners, 2009). These powers are based on the EU’s emphasis on the importance of paying attention to external factors while wielding different types of power.

### 2.4.5. Subtle power

Studies of Qatari power since 1995 illustrate that the traditional categorisation of soft, hard, or smart power is insufficient, and that while still relevant, new and evolving international events must be considered (Kamrava, 2013). Kamrava conceptualises and proposes a new type of power based on the Qatari case, ‘subtle’ power. Subtle power is power that may be exercised behind the scenes. It consists of four elements:

1. Security and safety through physical and armed defence;
2. Prestige derived from brand recognition and developing a positive reputation;
3. Positive reputation as a proactive presence on the global stage, and
4. Wealth.

These can be considered respectively as hedging, branding, state autonomy, and a comparative economic advantage (ibid, 2013:66). Kamrava suggests that Qatar, as a ‘small state [with] ‘big politics’, demonstrates that small states, despite their limited capacities, can also play an important role in power competition, and that Qatar provides an example of how new theories of power emerge.

Subsequently, examination of the theoretical grounds of hard, soft, and smart power demonstrates the importance of considering the abovementioned social power foundations. This is because, as demonstrated, hard power is based on the one-dimensional face of power, whereas soft and smart power are based on two and three-dimensional faces of power, respectively. Hard, soft, and smart power, due to their wide applicability and insufficiency, have been revised by scholars, leading to the introduction of new concepts of powers. Mead suggests that hard power may comprise of elements of ‘sharp’ (military) and ‘sticky’ (economic) power (2009), whereas Walker and Ludwig’s (2017) own conception of ‘sharp’ power is drawn from their investigations into the relationship between domestic and foreign policy. Manners and others developed the related concepts of civilian, military, and normative power to explain these relationships within the EU, and Kamrava’s ‘subtle power’ acknowledges the wide spectrum of methods by which power can be accumulated and exercised to prove that small states should not be excluded from the conversation about power competition, offering Qatar as a case-study. Indeed, Qatar’s methods for

projecting power have been widely acknowledged, as some, Kamrava included, seek to understand how the state has become so influential in such a relatively short time.

## **2.5. What type of power did Qatar exercise?**

While scholars largely agree that Qatar's status has been rising since 1995, the issue of how, and through what means, remains controversial. Nye (2011) attributes it to the adoption of smart power. Freer (2016a) and Hamed (2017) identify the use of soft power, while Abdullah (2015) states that while Qatar used soft power from 1995 to 2011, since 2013 when Shaykh Tamim came to power, Qatar has started to apply smart power. In contrast, Kamrava (2013) states that the use of soft, hard, and smart power is outdated, and suggests the new concept of 'subtle power', after studying Qatar. In addition, Barakat (2012) believes that the combination of successful strategies (political and economic liberalisation, independence in foreign policy, and state branding) was crucial for Qatar to find a unique role for itself as an impartial mediator and a bridge between the contemporary Arab and Western worlds. Similarly, Ulrichsen (2012) points out that Qatar and the UAE, can be seen as regional powers, and that this became possible due to their ambitious state branding strategies, and as a result of their confidence that they could lead in the Arab world.

In contrast, when Peterson (2006) took as an example the implementation of the concept of branding microstates, he describes state branding as an essential survival strategy for small states. In short, while Barakat (2012) and Ulrichsen (2012) describe Qatar's successful tools for implementing power without applying any particular concept of power, Nye (2011), Freer (2016a), Hamed (2017), Abdullah (2015), and Kamrava (2013) consider theories of soft power, hard power, smart power, and subtle power. Though concepts such as Mead's sharp power and sticky power (2009), and Walker and Ludwig's sharp power (2017), European's civilian (Duchêne, 1972), military (Bull, 1982), and normative power (Manners, 2002) have not been discussed in Qatar's case, their theoretical foundations are valuable and will be examined below.



### 2.5.1. Qatari power: hard, soft, sharp, or sticky and sharp?

Although wealth has consistently been considered an essential prerequisite for Qatar wielding power since 1995, scholars seem conflicted about whether Qatar—with economic but not military power—could possibly possess hard power. For example, the UAE International Renewable Energy Agency MENA Programme Officer Hamedi (2017), stated that Shaykh Hamad clearly identified wealth, a hard power resource, as an essential component of Qatar's power, but Shaykh Hamad had to distinguish between hard power and soft power. 'Qatar ... cannot have hard power', as it is very small country, very small population, the locals are no more than 300,000 inhabitants, geographically it is very small, thus 'the only tools that Qatar could use as power are the tools of soft power.' While analysing the main sources of power, Hamedi highlights the important role of wealth, without which all activities would not be possible, however he believes that soft power is the only means for success.

Such discussions are relevant to the division of hard power between sticky power (economic power) and sharp power (military power) suggested by Mead (2009). Though Qatar does not possess military power, therefore, its rise cannot be understood through sharp power. Although identifying wealth or economic power as the main driver for Qatar's power, this cannot be considered as achieved through sticky power, because Qatar has not established such sticky economic policies and institutions in the international monetary system, or free trade, and other states have not engaged with its system. Despite this, hard power is valuable for understanding the power of Qatar, as it consists of both payment and coercion as based on the one-dimensional face of power rooted in Dahl's relational power approach (1957). Although Qatar does not have significant military power (or coercion), Qatar's wealth represents a one-dimensional face of power. This idea is particularly relevant because, as discussed, Qatar is best understood through Dahl's (1957) relational power approach.

Qatar's power might be linked to soft power. Explaining how soft power operates, Nye (2004:7) argues that 'co-optive power – the ability to shape what others want – can rest on the attractiveness of one's culture and values [...]', meaning that a state should attract others with its own product of culture or value. While Qatar has tried to use soft power, rather than benefit from its own products of soft power in culture, it 'copied' successful Western examples of soft power. Qatar's cultural

initiatives have also been interpreted as soft power in academia, but not all cultural tools that work as soft power in one country can serve another. The Qatari government has implemented several initiatives to create a cohesive policy towards making Qatar a cultural hub (Roberts 2017a), for example, hosting film festivals in association with the Tribeca organisation between 2009 and 2012, to catalyse the beginning of a Qatari film industry (Bardsley, 2009), with some degree of success (Roberts, 2017a:106). Moreover, the Doha Film Institute demonstrate this, for example, it co-financed two 2019 Oscar-nominated films *Capharnaum* and *Of Fathers and Sons* (*The Peninsula*, 2019a).

Film production has been cited as a key element of US soft power. Nye (2004) cites the example of the importance of US cultural references to court cases in normalising the idea of a strong legal system to Chinese viewers, and the impact of Hollywood is seen as greater than economic or political endeavours. If Qatar produced movies introducing their unique domestic values to the world, or presenting its traditions and history, in support of defined foreign policy objectives it would be possible to argue that Qatar uses film production as soft power tool, but this is not the case. One of the goals in the creation of popular culture is its potential as a political tool to engage with counterparts, and to create a 'counter argument' to a state's competitors. For example, in Qatar's case, films can be applied as soft power, demonstrating why Qatar has been interested in escaping the shadow of its bigger brother Saudi Arabia since 1995, or sending messages to the international community on why the Muslim Brotherhood should not be viewed as a terrorist organisation. Qatar could respond to criticism with its successful bid to host the 2022 World Cup, demonstrating how it has emerged as a sports hub, however, the film festivals it has established and produced have mainly been focussed on developing a film industry, without regard to its use as a tool of power. Consequently, Qatar did not use films effectively as utilisation of soft power.

Another argument (Roberts, 2017a) is that Qatar has developed a world-wide reputation in the art world as a form of soft power, but this again does not stand up to scrutiny. It is true that it established the National Museum of Qatar, the Museum of Islamic Art, the Museum of Modern Art (Mathaf), and the Katara Cultural Village, and was the leading buyer in the global art market from the late 2000s to early 2010s (ibid, 2017a). However, as Nye (2004:11) explains, some scholars treat soft power simply as popular cultural power. It is a mistake to link soft power behaviours with

the cultural resources that sometimes help create it. Some misinterpret cultural resources with the behaviour of attraction. For example, the popularity of Pokemon games has not been leveraged by Japan to assist in achieving policy goals. The effectiveness of any power resource depends on the context. Establishing world-class museums does not guarantee Qatar the power of attraction and influence over others, and the preservation of culture can be seen as a normal process in every state, particularly in developing a tourist industry.

A similar argument can be made regarding Qatar's education initiatives. As well as establishing Qatar University, several international universities have established branches in Qatar, largely American and British that include: Georgetown University, Carnegie Mellon University, Virginia Commonwealth University, Weill Cornell Medical College, Northwestern University, Texas A&M University, and University College London (UCL) (Kamrava, 2013). Each has set up a school in a field within which it is world renowned, in a development named Education City. While the intention of Education City seems to have been to highlight the willingness of international actors to become stakeholders in the 'Qatari Dream' (Ulrichsen, 2017), the result has been the opposite, to build the soft power of the institutions' home nations, whose values they represent. Qataris criticised the spending on Education City over Qatar University (ibid, 2017). Rather than bringing Western institutions into Qatar, an effective use of soft power would have been to invest in increasing Qatar University and Hamad al-Khalifa University's reputations as leading schools of the same calibre as Harvard, Oxford, or Cambridge. Simply put, while such initiatives were easy or quick attempts to benefit from the soft power that other states use to 'win hearts and minds', they did not create new means to achieve this end that would be unique to Qatar. As the outcome of these efforts might be seen in years to come, it may be said in the future that Qatar benefitted from these attempts at soft power, but this is not the case from 1995 to 2019.

Similarly, Qatar, rather than spreading its own political values, tried to benefit from spreading Western political values. Considering political values as an element of Qatari soft power requires an analysis of the role Qatar played during the Arab Spring. Studies of American policy during the Iraq War have shown that internal and external opinions of policies are a vital element in building soft power. Policies which are seen to be hypocritical can undermine soft power (Nye, 2004:31). In Qatar's case, for example, its claims to support democracy were undermined by its own non-

democratic political structure. For this reason, Qatar's actions during the Arab Spring cannot be understood as evidence of a soft power. This example might demonstrate that Qatar's power is not sharp (Walker and Ludwig, 2017), as it spread Western values while continuing to be ruled by a highly autocratic regime (Davidson, 2012:1).

Though other influential tools have been suggested, Hamed (2017) believes that Qatar's rise was possible due to soft power, through tools such as 'cheque book diplomacy', media, sports, charity organisations and 'relations with certain movements in the Arab world, especially political Islam, and when we talk about political Islam, we talk especially about the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt'. The research fellow at the LSE, Freer (2016a), mentions that Qatar used all mediation means first, and 'then this kind of backing an ideology or, I do not know how to put it succinctly, but essentially choosing to bet on one ideological force [...] and another part of their power as a small state was al-Jazeera [...]'. Qatar's efforts to align itself with Islamist groups, using ideology as a form of soft power (Freer, 2016a), were limited by the nature of Qatari leadership. As the former General Manager of al-Jazeera Wadah Khanfar (2016) points out 'Qatar, as a regime, ha[s] nothing to do with political Islam', as its leaders are not recognised members of any Islamist group, they work with existing groups rather than establishing any specific organisation. Furthermore, rather than working with groups promoting the Wahhabi interpretation of Islam which they espouse domestically, they have ties to a range of both Sunni and Shi'a actors.

This might align with the balancing alliances that Qatar has benefited from with well-established non-state actors. In addition to its alliances with political Islamic non-state actors, Qatar has also taken advantage of relationships with non-state actors of a transnational nature. For example, Qatar did not create and spread its own ideology. Qatar built alliances with political Islam non-state actors to build its power, and was involved in mediation attempts between non-state actors and governments. Although al-Jazeera became the most famous product of Qatar, it is viewed as a media non-state actor with a transnational nature, along with other media outlets that have been linked with Qatar. Additionally, Qatar's deals with FC Barcelona, FIFA, FC PSG, FC Malaga, enable its attempt to benefit from the transnational nature of sports non-state actors. Moreover, Qatar's attempts to make use of the transnational nature of tribalism for political purposes provides another example of how it builds alliances

with non-state actors, and tries to benefit from the already established power of non-state actors.

In order to identify non-state actors used by Qatar for developing power, a broad definition of non-state actors is important. One such definition has been offered by Arts, Noortmann and Reinalda (2001) and Josselin and Wallace (2001). Rather than considering only NGOs or supranational organisations as non-state actors, they identify three categories: public-interest-oriented non-governmental actors, profit-oriented corporate actors, and public inter-governmental organisations (Arts, Noortmann and Reinalda, 2001). Josselin and Wallace (2001:3-4) apply a broad definition, considering non-state actors as:

autonomous from central government funding and control: emanating from civil society, or from the market economy, or from political impulses beyond state control and direction; operating as or participating in networks which extend across the boundaries of two or more states – thus engaging in ‘transnational’ relations, linking political systems, economies, societies; acting in ways which affect political outcomes, either within one or more states or within international institutions – either purposefully or semi-purposefully, either as their primary objective or as one aspect of their activities.

Consequently, they include actors driven by instrumental, mostly economic goals (corporations), specialists motivated by an obligation to rational analysis and professional values (epistemic communities, think-tanks), actors encouraging principled ideas (advocacy groups, churches), and actors presenting a shared ethnic foundation (diasporas). Therefore, examination of soft power within the context of Qatar might demonstrate limitations, however, the value based on examinations of soft power might be seen as in accordance with the idea that Qatar build alliances with well-established non-state actors for power projection.

### **2.5.2. Qatari power: smart, civilian power European, military power European, or normative power European?**

The concept of smart power also has its limitations in explaining Qatari power. Small states, like greater powers, can apply smart power, utilising both hard power and soft power resources into well-defined strategies under skilful leadership. Nye offers Qatar as an example of one such state. Qatar reinforced its relationship with the

United States by providing a military airbase during the US-Iraq war, while al-Jazeera was used as a soft power resource. Though it is not clear how Nye suggests that Qatar has military power, as described above (Hamedi, 2017), scholars who focus solely on the Middle East strongly disagree. As smart power is a combination of hard and soft power, if Qatar cannot be seen to have strategically employed either hard or soft power, then smart power cannot be fully applied to Qatar's case. Additionally, important features of smart power are well-defined strategies under skilful leadership, which also fails to describe Qatar's case.

Qatar is a new player in the international arena. Its active foreign policy is determined by wealth advantages from oil and gas rents, which strengthen the key description of Qatar's political economy as rentier, especially under Shaykh Hamad's leadership (Gray, 2013:22). Qatar's desire to become an influential player in the Middle East emerged with Shaykh Hamad and the ruling family's ambitions, and thanks to the social contract of the rentier state such wealth capacities are in the al-Thani family hands (Hamedi, 2017; Kamrava, 2017). However, due to the combination of a lack of experience and a desire to rapidly gain international power, Qatar's policies have been personally driven, and are limited by the capacity of individual personalities (Wright, 2017a), Qatar's inner-circle of elites.

The absence of a well-defined strategy indicates a limited capacity for skilful leadership. Qatar's policies have been considered in several different ways: from a total absence of strategy (ibid, 2017a) to non-strategic actions (Hamedi, 2017). An alternative is that its relationships with regional and global powers such as Saudi Arabia, Iran, Turkey, and the US have been strategic, while intervention in Libya, and Syria was opportunistic (Baabood, 2017). Stephens (2017), a research fellow for Middle East studies at RUSI, is experienced in dealing with Qatari diplomats and describes their opportunism:

They were very realist in many ways, but ... you cannot attach a coherent foreign policy doctrine to them. ... they were opportunistic but without strategy. ... Where you cannot ascertain a doctrine, there is no doctrine, it is just them dealing with issues as they see them, five yards out in front of them there is no like, 'in 30 years we will get here'. Yes, they have vision, Vision 2030, [...] if you ask them where they want to be in foreign policy in 30 years, they cannot tell you. I know this because I have asked them for the last five years and I have taught 50, 60 of their diplomats in intensive courses.

Smart power focusses on outcomes rather than resources, and therefore it is important to consider ‘contexts and strategies’ (Nye, 2011:11). Smart power is not just a combination of soft and hard power, but for long-term smart power projection it requires well-defined strategies and skilful leadership that Qatar does not have. Although smart power is compatible with elite-driven policy making, as described, it seems that the opportunistic nature of Qatar’s policies might demonstrate unskilful leadership and the lack of well-defined strategies. In contrast, it suggests that Qatari policy-makers prioritise speed over strategy in achieving their political ambitions. The concepts of power previously described as ‘civilian power Europe’ (Duchêne, 1972), ‘military power Europe’ (Bull, 1982), and ‘normative power Europe’ (Manners, 2002), cannot be applied in Qatar’s case. But their valuable contribution is based on acknowledging the need to adapt to external factors utilising power means. In order to get out of the shadow of Saudi and emerge as an influential actor, Qatar, as a wealthy rentier state with limited capacities in other areas has had to react to regional and international events and opportunities, then rapidly find tools of power, including investing financially in seemingly beneficial relationships with well-established non-state actors.

### **2.5.3. Was it subtle power?**

Kamrava (2013) considers Qatar a case study for the development of a new theory of ‘subtle’ power. The first component of subtle power is safety, through physical, armed defence. This type of safety cannot be internally produced in Qatar and must originate from armed and physical defences provided by an influential patron, for example, the US (ibid, 2013). Qatar began a survival strategy due to its vulnerability, lack of military power, and existing external threats (Gray, 2013; Figenschou, 2013), and required a secure protector with which to create reliable relations. When the US needed to vacate Saudi Arabia’s Prince Sultan Air Base in 2001, this provided an opportunity for Qatar to host The United States Central Command (CENTCOM)’s new forward headquarters, becoming home for a range of Special Forces and a CIA outpost (Davidson, 2016:78). Shaykh Hamad oversaw the process of increasing bilateral relations with the US, and the high construction cost of the al-Udaid Air Base and its increased capability demonstrated the strategic significance of being under the US security umbrella (Figenschou, 2013).

Such close relations, especially the US military presence in the country, support the argument that Qatar has bandwagoned with the US at the cost of the ability to make independent choices in foreign policy. For example, the events of, and following, the Arab Spring suggest that Western strategies have not changed towards the region and were related with ‘interests of influential powers and their local clients’ (Davidson, 2016:xii). Though this also might explain relations between the US and other Western states. A number of states bandwagon with the US on international security issues. Immediately after the Second World War, the US played a key role in the formation of European economic institutions, participating in the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), as a condition for obtaining Marshall Aid (Peterson and Pollack, 2003:3). With the US behaving as the region’s vital security supplier through NATO, Western European countries were able to commit to economic rebuilding without fear of armed confrontation with the USSR (Joffe, 1984). The US reaction even to the Franco-British European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) initiative was a ‘yes, but ...’ approach (Sloan, 2000:14-20) suggesting overall support for this proposition, while emphasising that it should not cause decoupling of the European Union and the US, duplication of established NATO assets or discrimination against non-EU NATO members. The bandwagoning behaviour of Qatar can be seen as similar to alliances between the US and other allies.

The dependence on US goodwill for Qatar’s international security highlights weakness, rather than strength, which might contradict its use as an element of power. Additional challenges to Qatar come from opening itself to criticism from American counterparts, and from changes in American policies. The policy changes resulting from the Trump administration have caused a shift, refocusing US strategy in the Middle East towards radical Islam (Wright, 2017a). As a result, the public response by President Trump to the ongoing Gulf Crisis in May 2017 was to ‘call on Qatar to end this funding ... and its extremist ideology’ (Smith, Siddiqui and Beaumont, 2017). Though relations may have returned to normal (Finn, 2017). Plans for the expansion of the al-Udeid Air Base took place, as Qatar and the US signed a memorandum of understanding to enlarge and renovate the base following a ‘generous offer’ from Qatar (Sputnik, 2019). Rather than identifying the armed and physical defence provided by the US as elements of Qatari power, this example demonstrates Qatar’s vulnerability.



A second element of subtle power is prestige from state brand recognition, (Kamrava, 2013) which Qatar is recognised as having used (Peterson, 2006; Ulrichsen, 2012; Barakat, 2012). From a theoretical stance, state branding is usually seen as part of the soft power model that Kamrava rejects when explaining Qatari power projection (van Ham, 2008). However, as it is focussed on concepts such as norms, values, and rules in global politics, branding is not only about 'selling' products, ideas or services, and gaining attention, it is about reputation and identity. While soft power is a tool of influence and control, place-branding is an essential component of forming an identity on the international stage, and overlaps Nye's soft power and Kamrava's subtle power.

The third element of subtle power is a proactive presence on the worldwide stage. This is also a branding endeavour, to present a country as a global good citizen (Kamrava, 2013). Qatar has used a hedging strategy to balance and bandwagon between multiple actors who are antagonistic to each other, for example the US and Iran, and is seen to have maintained friendly relations with every actor with whom it is possible, a strategy referred to as *diplomatic hyperactivism*. However, as we have seen, bandwagoning with the US demonstrated Qatar's vulnerabilities and limitations. For this reason, as proactive presence in the international affairs subtle power, which is implemented through a hedging strategy, weakness of the state rather is suggested rather than strength. Finally, the defining element of subtle power is wealth. Money provides power via ownership and control of valuable economic possessions, internationally, mainly through global investments. This element is consistent with the hard power foundation based on Dahl's explanation of a one-dimensional face of power.

From this analysis, there is no doubt that the evidence supports Kamrava's (2013) identification of Qatar as a regional power. However, the elements of subtle power as seen by Kamrava do not demonstrate all the means that were used by Qatar for power projection effectively. Similarly, as Kamrava used the term 'subtle power' to describe the power behind the scenes with regard to Qatari foreign policy achievement and worldwide power, Russell (1938) coined this phrase to describe the power of courtiers, spies, intriguers, and string-pullers in the domestic power base. This suggests that there are limitations to the concept of subtle power, not only in its elements, but also in the definition of subtle power itself; Russell and Kamrava refer to the same title of power, but do not have the same understanding of it.

#### 2.5.4. Adopted power

The Qatari case cannot be explained with a single approach in IR theory, social power theory, and existing types of power. Analyses of these ideas suggests that Qatar's power should be viewed through a neoclassical realism tradition while also applying a relational power approach, which derives its core from Dahl's (1957) understanding of power. The fundamental importance of wealth must be acknowledged, as proven in the case of both hard and subtle power frameworks in which the Qatari case is examined. Consequently, the pluralist view of social power based on Dahl's one-dimensional face of power (1957:202-3; Lukes, 1974), which is described as follows: 'A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something B would not otherwise do', holds particular relevance for Qatar's case, and should be considered central in understanding Qatar's particular type of power.

Qatar's strategy for foreign policy implementation includes balancing and bandwagoning behaviours. Bandwagoning, however, has demonstrated Qatar's vulnerability rather than its strength, and for this reason cannot be considered a successful element of the strategy Qatar has used to consolidate power. Qatar's behaviour should be understood through the balance of power theory, but rather than balancing with other states, it allied itself with well-established non-state actors, applying the social power foundations of the one-dimensional face of power '[Qatar] A has power over B [well-established non-state actors] to the extent that he can get B to do something B would not otherwise do'. The main means for such relationships Qatar has used is its wealth; Qatar has made use of its rentier economy to establish relationships with 'clients' with whom it has sought to protect its interests, and gain power.

The important role of Qatar's leadership has been demonstrated, which is consistent with the underpinnings of social power elitism. As a rentier state, Qatar's wealth is the main driver for the power implementation of the inner-circle elite. Following the sudden emergence of wealth capacities and the boost to Qatar's economy under Shaykh Hamad's leadership, Qatar emerged as a new-comer in world politics, however rapid development was required to realise the ambitions of Qatar's leadership. For this reason, Qatar seemed to focus on taking advantage of the transnational nature of non-state actors.

It is within this context that I am seeking to articulate the concept of *adopted power*. Adopted power is a type of power that can be developed by wealthy rentier states whose inner-circle elites ally with well-established non-state actors in order to take advantage of their transnational nature, to rapidly gain influence over other states. The theoretical foundation of this idea combines pluralist Dahl's theory of a one-dimensional face of power (1957), with the underpinnings of elitism. A state's behaviour while wielding adopted power should be viewed from the perspective of neoclassical realism, however, rather than applying the national power approach, relational power should be centralised. With this in mind, this thesis seeks to prove that great, middle, or small states, with rentier-economies, can exert adopted power.

Applying the foundation of Dahl's definition of power, wealth is considered a primary *means* which can be used to create alliances with a state's *clients*, and adopted power should be measured through scope, domain, weight, and cost, although modified. Similar to Dahl (1957), I suggest that *domain* focuses on where a nation has influence, geographically: A (rentier state) building an alliance with B is able to project influence geographically. *Scope* identifies the aspect of B's behaviour affected by A, in other words, A (rentier state) builds an alliance with B (non-state actors) using the stronger sides of B (in where it has power), and tries to benefit from this. *Weight* will be identified by demonstrating the influence on other states, or, how A (rentier state) is able to influence using its alliance with B (non-state actor). Finally, I identify *cost* as what price A (rentier state) has to pay for building an alliance with B (non-state actor). The theoretical foundation of adopted power is presented in *Figure 2.3*.




Figure 2.3. The theoretical foundations of adopted power (source: personal collection).

## 2.6. Conclusion

Given the numerous concepts of power in social power and IR literature, a legitimate question might concern the value of contributing new terminology. While well-established rentier theory focuses on wealth distribution within states, the idea of *adopted power* shines a light on the ability of rentier states of all sizes to consolidate and project their power. Existing literature on the subject tends to prioritise domestic affairs, while adopted power is concerned with foreign policy objectives. Adopted power develops the rentier theory by demonstrating the similar nature of domestic relations which exist between patrons and clients, and the relations that exist between the leaders (inner-circle elites) of states (as patrons), and well-established non-state actors (as clients), especially as related to patrons' personal and political ambitions for power projection. While distributing wealth among them, a rentier state is able to use the transnational nature of non-state actors to influence other states. It is for this reason that this power is called *adopted power*; rentier states adopt the already-existing power of well-established non-state actors and so emerge vicariously as a more influential state. It is the central proposition of this thesis, that adopted power, alone, fully explains Qatar's emergence as a regional power between 1995 and 2019.

## **Chapter Three**

### **Wealth as a Key Means of Qatar's Adopted Power**

#### **3.1. Introduction**

The key driver of adopted power is wealth. Despite diversification efforts, Qatar, as a rentier state, relies on the hydrocarbon sector. Its main wealth-accumulating companies, state-owned, are linked with the energy sector, specifically oil, gas, and petrochemical, and operate via Qatar Petroleum. While Qatar Petroleum has become essential for accumulating revenue for wielding adopted power, state-owned companies in a variety of sectors of Qatar's economy directly and indirectly distribute money for wielding adopted power. These include: the Qatar Investment Authority, Qatar Sports Investment, the Qatar Foundation, Qatar Petroleum International, the Qatar National Bank, the Doha Bank, the Qatar Development Bank, Qatar Airways, the Qatar Insurance Company, the Qatar Exchange and Qatar Financial Centre. In order to demonstrate this, the chapter focuses first on Qatar's economy and its structure, showing that Qatar remains a rentier state despite diversification efforts. Secondly, it focuses on Qatar Petroleum's activities, as an example of a state-owned company where money is accumulated for national prosperity and power projection. Following this, the state-owned companies, mentioned above, are examined to see which was important for distributing money for power projection. Finally, considering that wealth is the key driver for adopted power implementation, the future of Qatar's wealth is considered.

#### **3.2. Qatar's rentier political economy**

Despite diversification initiatives, Qatar's rentier state economy is based primarily on the hydrocarbon sector. In 2017, Qatar's reserves of crude oil, gas, and condensates equated to 172bn barrels of oil equal (boe). This equals 62.8k boe per capita, the highest in the world (QNB, 2018:2). Oil exports and energy have dominated the economy since at least the 1950s, however since the main focus of this thesis is Qatar's rise since 1995, *Figure 3.1* (BP, 2017; 2018) demonstrates that between 1996

and 2006 the production of oil increased, and that by the end of 2017, it had slightly decreased, being 25.2 thousand million barrels by the end of 2017.

	At end 1996	At end 2006	At end 2015	At end 2017			
	Thousand million barrels	Thousand million barrels	Thousand million barrels	Thousand million barrels	Thousand million tonnes	Share of total	R/P ratio
<b>Qatar</b>	<b>3.7</b>	<b>27.4</b>	<b>25.2</b>	<b>25.2</b>	<b>2.6</b>	<b>1.5%</b>	<b>36.1</b>

Figure 3.1. Qatar's oil: total proven reserves (1996 – 2017) (amended from BP (2017; 2018)).

Consequently, by the end of 2017 Qatar held the sixth position in comparison with other states in the region, where the top six oil total proven reserves belonged to Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, and the UAE; Qatar having shares in the world oil proven reserves as 15.7%, 9.3%, 8.8%, 6.0%, 5.8%, 1.5% respectively, as Figure 3.2 (BP, 2018:2) illustrates.

Country	Thousand million barrels	Thousand million tonnes	Share of total	R/P ratio
<b>Saudi Arabia</b>	<b>266.2</b>	<b>36.6</b>	<b>15.7%</b>	<b>61.0</b>
<b>Iran</b>	<b>157.2</b>	<b>21.6</b>	<b>9.3%</b>	<b>86.5</b>
<b>Iraq</b>	<b>148.8</b>	<b>20.1</b>	<b>8.8%</b>	<b>90.2</b>
<b>Kuwait</b>	<b>101.5</b>	<b>14.0</b>	<b>6.0%</b>	<b>91.9</b>
<b>United Arab Emirates</b>	<b>97.8</b>	<b>13.0</b>	<b>5.8%</b>	<b>68.1</b>
<b>Qatar</b>	<b>25.2</b>	<b>2.6</b>	<b>1.5%</b>	<b>36.1</b>
<b>Oman</b>	<b>5.4</b>	<b>0.7</b>	<b>0.3%</b>	<b>15.2</b>
<b>Yemen</b>	<b>3.0</b>	<b>0.4</b>	<b>0.2%</b>	<b>156.6</b>
<b>Syria</b>	<b>2.5</b>	<b>0.3</b>	<b>0.1%</b>	<b>278.4</b>

Figure 3.2. Middle East countries' oil: total proven reserves (as of 2017) (amended from BP (2018:12)).

After Russia and Iran, Qatar has the third largest gas reserves in the world at approximately 866tn cubic feet (cf) (QNB, 2017). Qatar's strong macroeconomic indicators were bolstered in the second half of the 2000s when the LNG sector experienced rapid development. Due to Qatar's investments in LNG production in the 1990s, it became the world's top LNG exporter (more than a quarter of the globe's

market share in 2017) and the second largest gas exporter after Russia once pipeline exports are integrated (ibid, 2017). Qatar is one of the top five natural gas producing states (US, Russia, Iran, Canada, and Qatar) which together represent 53.2% of the globe's production, and in 2016, with a small increase of 0.8%, Qatar was the fifth largest producer of natural gas (IEA, 2017).

Such high economic indicators in the hydrocarbon sector assisted Qatar to use energy revenues for diversifying its economy through subsidising other sectors (Gray, 2011:31). *Qatar National Vision 2030* is a key strategic document for socioeconomic development and other development initiatives. One of the 'Four Pillars' on which the National Vision (2008) is based is economic diversification: 'The development of a competitive and diversified economy capable of meeting the needs of, and securing a high standard of living for, all [Qatar's] people for the present and for the future' (Al-Ghorairi, 2010:3). *Qatar National Vision 2030* has a goal of transforming Qatar into a knowledge-based economy (KBE) (QNB, 2017:2). Achieving this requires the distribution of large resources for education, innovation, and training.

Despite the existence of this driving force, there are different perceptions of Qatar's diversification efforts concerning some essential structural limitations, and it has encountered problems during the course of attempts to achieve this. Despite Qatar's progress in education, its performance in information and communication technology (ICT), competence and literacy has still not reached the requirements of KBE (Fetais, 2013). By contrast, the Qatar National Bank report (QNB, 2018:3) demonstrates that Qatar's economy grew by 22% between 2011 and 2017, where the share of non-hydrocarbon sector (manufacturing, construction, finance, insurance, public administration, other non-oil/gas) increased dramatically, while hydrocarbon GDP decreased from 60.1% to 48.2% (ibid, 2018). Subsequently, as Qatar's economy derives from hydrocarbon and non-hydrocarbon sectors, its wealth which became the key driver for adopted power implementation, accumulated in both sectors. However, considering that Qatar is the richest state in the world, mainly due to rent from hydrocarbon sector, and that diversification of Qatar's economy occurred due to its energy sector, its wealth primarily accumulated through state-owned energy companies, specifically, Qatar Petroleum, as discussed below. The distribution of Qatar's wealth for wielding adopted power predominantly occurred through companies involved in Qatar's diversification initiatives, especially through Qatar's



banks, the Sovereign Wealth Fund, other smaller funds, and other companies as the next sections explain.

### **3.3. Qatar's energy sector as the key accumulator for wielding adopted power**

#### **3.3.1. Qatar Petroleum**

Qatar Petroleum, established in 1974, is Qatar's state-owned national oil company (QP, 2018a). Qatar Petroleum manufactures of crude oil and condensate into refined domestic and export petroleum products, and the manufacturing and the export of Gas-to-Liquids (GTL), Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG), and Natural Gas Liquids (NGL) (QP, 2018b). Qatar Petroleum is vital to the inner-circle elites of Qatar, and as Gray (2013:90) suggests, given its substantial managerial autonomy, there should be no illusions about its strong connections with the upper echelons of the political system. Its former chairman and managing director, 'Abdullah bin Hamad al-'Attiya, is a deputy prime minister, and former minister of energy and industry from 1999 to 2011. He is also a maternal cousin (Shaykh Hamad's mother is from the al-'Attiya clan) (Fromherz, 2012), and close friend of the former Amir since childhood. He is known as a loyal and trusted advisor (Kamrava, 2013). Al-'Attiya is an important figure in Qatar's development as one of the key architects of Qatar's oil and gas policy, loyal to Shaykh Hamad. In a 2011 cabinet reshuffle, al-'Attiya was appointed Director of the Amiri Diwan. He was replaced by Mohammad Salih 'Abdullah al-Sada as a chairman of the board of Qatar Petroleum, before joining the ministry, and worked for Qatar Petroleum for twenty-three years, and for RasGas (70% of which was owned by Qatar Petroleum). He also was the former Minister of Energy and Industry (Gray, 2013:90).

Since November 2018, after restructuring the board of directors of Qatar Petroleum, the Deputy Amir Shaykh 'Abdullah bin Hamad al-Thani, the brother of the current Amir Tamim, became the chairman, and the Minister of State for Energy Affairs Sa'd al-Ka'bi became vice chairman and president and chief executive officer (*The Peninsula*, 2018a) as *Figure 3.3*. (QP, 2018c) shows. This has put Qatar Petroleum in the hands of the ruling family. The leadership of Qatar Petroleum during both Shaykh Hamad's and Shaykh Tamim's eras were replaced by powerful figures in the economic and political landscape of Qatar, all with close connections to Qatar's

inner-circle policy makers. Qatar Petroleum became an important state-owned company for wielding adopted power, as it accumulates revenues for power projection from operating oil, gas and petrochemical sectors in Qatar as demonstrated.



Position	Name
<b>The Deputy Amir Chairman of the Board</b>	H.H. Sheikh Abdullah bin Hamad Al Thani
<b>Minister of State for Energy Affairs Vice Chairman and President &amp; CEO</b>	H.E. Saad Sherida Al-Kaabi
<b>Minister of Finance Member</b>	H.E. Ali Shareef Al-Emadi
<b>Minister of Commerce and Industry Member</b>	H.E. Ali bin Ahmed Al-Kuwari
<b>Member</b>	Mr. Nasser Khalil Al-Jaidah
<b>Member</b>	Sheikh Khalid bin Khalifa bin Jassim Al-Thani
<b>Member</b>	Mr. Saeed Mubarak Al Muhannadi

Figure 3.3. Board of Directors, Qatar Petroleum (as of March, 2019) (QP, 2018c).

Qatar Petroleum manufactures from one large onshore field and two large offshore fields (Gray, 2013). Onshore, Dukhan is a large oil and gas field enlarging about 80kms by 8kms and positioned about 800km to the West of Doha (QP, 2018d). Dukhan oil field has the capability to manufacture up to 335,000 barrels per day (b/d) (ibid, 2018d). The offshore fields are operated directly by Qatar Petroleum Bul Hanine and Maydan Mahzam (Gray, 2013). Crude oil from three other offshore fields managed by Qatar Petroleum's joint venture partners on a production sharing agreement with Qatar Petroleum is processed, stored, and exported at Halul Island. Occidental Petroleum of Qatar Ltd (OPQL) operates PS-1 (Idd El-Shargi Field, North and South Domes), Qatar Petroleum Development-Japan (QPD) works A-Structure and Al-Karkara Fields, and TOTAL Exploration & Production-Qatar (TEPQ) runs al-Khalij field (QP, 2018e).

While the oil sector plays an important role in Qatar's economy, the key driver behind Qatar's rapid domestic economic development is Qatar's gas production. Qatar Petroleum plays the key role in this process. Most of Doha's gas reserves are located in the offshore gas field, the North Dome (or North Field), which crosses the maritime borders of Qatar and Iran (Dargin, 2007). The main gas reserves were identified by Shell in the 1970s, however at that time there was no market for LNG. In order to develop LNG, a market and massive capital investment was needed (Interviewee A, 2017). Scholars highlight that the important role of developing the LNG sector in Qatar belonged to Shaykh Hamad, identified in Chapter Two as among Qatar's inner-circle elites of adopted power implementation. Shaykh Hamad had responsibility for Qatar's gas and oil development since 1992, and as Amir, the strategic development of sectors was continued (Coleman, 1998:24).

However, it was not without the involvement of foreign powers. A former British diplomat, interviewed anonymously (Interviewee A, 2017), states: 'When I first met Shaykh Hamad who was then Crown Prince, I mentioned that I had taken a particular interest in LNG. He looked at me and smiled, and said "well that's very interesting, can you tell me what it is, because everyone talks about it, and I have no idea what LNG actually is"'. But LNG wasn't developed for at least 10 years, when the market became sufficiently active to generate the necessary investment. Consequently, since the 1980s the decision to exploit the North Dome was made in phases and Qatar Petroleum's LNG joint ventures with international companies led the process, which means as Gray (2013:94) explains, that the gas sector was developed differently than the oil sector – more collaboratively and internationally, and with the use of technology to focus on gas exports. Therefore, it was Shaykh Hamad's strategic decision to develop LNG that helped Qatar become the global leading exporter of LNG, which bolstered domestic prosperity and offered revenues for power projection. Despite the decision to develop gas manufacturing joint ventures, Qatar Petroleum played a key role as key stakeholder in all projects.

### **3.3.2. Qatargas and RasGas**

Qatar Petroleum founded two key phased projects, Qatargas and RasGas (Gray, 2013) to enlarge gas production. QatarGas runs 14 Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) trains with an annual manufacturing capability of 77 million tonnes (Qatargas,

2019a). Qatar Liquefied Gas Company Limited, Qatargas 1, was established in 1984 to manufacture LNG and linked manufacturing from three trains with a capacity to produce 3.3 million tonnes per annum: Trains 1, 2, 3 (Qatargas, 2019b). It involved two streams (Gray, 2013). The first was an upstream joint venture with Qatar Petroleum holding 65% of the equity and other shares by global companies Mitsui and Marubeni (2.5% each) (Qatargas, 2019b), ExxonMobil (10%), and TotalFinaElf (20%). The second, a downstream joint venture, included operation and construction of an LNG processing plant; the equity was as follows: Qatar Petroleum (65%); Mitsui and Marubeni (7.5% each); ExxonMobil (10%); and Total (10%) (Qatargas, 2019b).

The Qatar Liquefied Gas Company Limited (2) – Qatargas 2 project, was the world's first entirely integrated value chain LNG venture (Qatargas, 2019c). It was founded in 2004 to manufacture LNG, and linked products from two trains: Train 4 and Train 5. Train 4's shareholders were Qatar Petroleum (70%) and ExxonMobil (30%). In Train 5 Qatar Petroleum held (65%), with ExxonMobil (18.3%) and Total (16.7%) (Qatargas, 2019b). The Qatar Liquefied Gas Company Limited (3) – Qatargas 3 project founded in 2005, included the manufacture of a new LNG mega-train (Train 6), with production begun in November 2010 (ibid, 2019b); where Qatar Petroleum held 68.5%, 30% belongs to ConocoPhillips and 1.5% to Mitsui (ibid, 2019b). In 2007 Qatar Liquefied Gas Company Limited (4) – Qatargas 4 was established to produce LNG and linked manufacture with its mega train, Train 7, with Qatar Petroleum (70%) and Royal Dutch Shell (30%) (ibid, 2019b), in order to construct a further train of liquefied gas for export to Asia and Europe (Gray, 2013). It began manufacturing LNG in 2011 (Qatargas, 2019c).

The other Qatari joint stock company is RasGas Company Limited (RasGas) founded in 2001 by Qatar Petroleum and ExxonMobil RasGas Inc (QP, 2018f). RasGas operates for and on behalf of the holders of the liquefied natural gas (LNG) projects: Ras Laffan Liquefied Natural Gas Company Limited (RL), founded in 1993 to manufacture LNG and related products from Train 1 and 2, has 6.86 million tonnes of LNG per annum capability. RL's main consumer is Asia; Ras Laffan Liquefied Natural Gas Company Limited (II), RL (II), produces LNG since 2001 delivering it to Europe and Asia through Trains 3,4, and 5. Trains capabilities manufacture 4.7 Mta of LNG; Ras Laffan Liquefied Natural Gas Company Limited (3), RL (3), established in 2005, manufactures LNG and related products. It owns Trains 6 and 7 with a capability each for 7.8 Mta of LNG, and distributing it mainly to America, Europe,

and Asia (ibid, 2018f). For gas pipeline sales to the domestic market, RasGas also functions the al-Khaleej gas projects, AKG-1 and AKG-2, also complementing its production capability with the Barzan Gas Project. RasGas also runs the Ras Laffan Helium Plant which extracts, purifies, and liquifies helium from the North Field (ibid, 2018f). Despite joint ventures with well-known international companies in developing gas production, Qatar Petroleum holds the major stakes in important gas initiatives, such as Qatargas and RasGas, enlarging the financial capacity of the state-owned firm and the state of Qatar. Ultimately, Qatar Petroleum serves as one of the key companies for national prosperity, as a result of accumulating revenues, for the wielding Qatar's adopted power.

### **3.3.3. The Dolphin Project**

As the main identified purpose of Qatar Petroleum is to accumulate money for wielding adopted power, other gas ventures with Qatar's involvement but without its share should be examined. For example, a well-known gas venture is the Dolphin Project which supplies two billion standard cubic feet of gas from Qatar to the UAE and Oman every day (Dolphin Energy, 2018a). A unique feature of this project includes upstream, midstream, downstream, and main stages of the production chain (Dolphin Energy, 2018b). The upstream stage operates mainly in Ras Laffan Industrial City, established in 1996, and fully owned by Qatar Petroleum (QP, 2018g), where the company's gas handling and compression plant obtains gas from Qatar's North Field and strips valuable by-products before the lean gas is transported to Abu Dhabi (Dolphin Energy, 2018b) at the midstream stage. Finally, in the downstream stage, operations connect with receiving, metering, and allocating gas to clients in the UAE and Oman (ibid, 2018b). Considering the important role of gas processing and the compression plant at Qatar's Petroleum-owned Ras Laffan Industrial City, vital to Dolphin Energy (ibid, 2018b), this project contributes to Qatar's national economy with additional revenues from the project, and as a result contributes to Qatar's power implementation. This is despite shareholders of this project, including the UAE state-owned company, the Abu Dhabi Sovereign Wealth Fund, Mubadala Development Company (51%), and Total and Occidental Petroleum (24.5 % each) (Dolphin Energy, 2018c).

Political implications of the project contributing to regional integration between the GCC states are, as Roberts (2017a:50) highlights, ‘would increase regional integration between Qatar, the UAE and Oman’. Dargin (2008:38) believes that 2004 was ‘a truly historic moment in that it was the first ever cross-border gas transmission in the history of the GCC’. However, the ongoing Gulf Crisis suggests that such integration and economic interdependence might serve economic prosperity to countries but harms political objectives. At the beginning of the ongoing Gulf Crisis 2017 discussions appeared on the possibility of Qatar’s closure of the Dolphin pipeline. ‘All is normal. There are no plans to close it’, an official at Qatar Petroleum states (Finn and El Gamal, 2017), however.

The GCC elites clarify these assumptions. In June 2017, while visiting Chatham House, the Qatari Foreign Minister Mohammad bin ‘Abdulrahman al-Thani (2017) was asked in which circumstances he could see Qatar cutting off gas supplies to the UAE and Oman through the Dolphin project, and he answered:

I think Qatar supplies to the UAE and Oman is around 30-40% of the UAE electricity is coming from Qatar, 80% of Dubai electricity is coming through Dolphin project. As we have mentioned earlier that even if we have any political conflict we cannot mix the cards [...] because this is Qatar’s reputation; secondly, we do not see that people of Dubai or of the UAE deserve to be affected because of this political conflict.

The UAE Minister of Culture and Knowledge Development al-Ka’bi, formerly in management at Dolphin Energy, was asked during my interview (2017) to clarify Qatar’s counterpart statement. She believes the closure decision should be made by shareholders, and the major shareholder of the Dolphin Energy project is the UAE state-owned company. Secondly, she argues ‘it’s is an oriented contract, and it is not just a year or two years, it’s tens of years of contracts [...]’.

In other words, despite Qatar elite’s speculations about concerns of its reputation and UAE citizens, it is clear that Qatar cannot cut the pipeline, firstly, because this decision should be made by shareholders, and secondly, by cutting the pipeline Qatar will break legal obligations. At the same time, the project brings additional income for Qatar’s national economy thus adding revenues for potentially wielding adopted power. This means while the UAE government wins economically, and receiving electricity from this project, it contradicts political objectives, because this project assists to strengthen Qatar’s key power tool – wealth, which is a key to

adopting well-established non-state actors. These Qatari policies were boycotted by the Anti-Terror Quartet where the UAE holds a leading position as discussed in later chapters. Consequently, all initiatives launched with the involvement of Qatar Petroleum, either as shareholder or not, strengthens Qatar's position in the energy market, bringing revenues from the energy sector which are the key to domestic prosperity, and accumulated revenues in this sector crucial for wielding adopted power.

### **3.3.4. Qatar Fertiliser Company (QAFCO), Qatar Petrochemical Company (QAPCO), Qatar Fuel Additives Company Limited (QAFAC)**

Additionally, despite the petrochemical sector identified as Qatar's diversification efforts, the sector closely connects with the hydrocarbon sector and the key company, Qatar Petroleum, which operates oil and gas production. Petrochemical production in Qatar includes three main types of petrochemicals: aromatics, olefins, and synthesis gas (Gray, 2013:104). Broader energy-connected diversification has been Qatar's long-term policy, and though Qatar Petroleum has been at the forefront of integration and diversification, other firms have also played an important role (Gray, 2013). One such firm is The Qatar Fertiliser Company (QAFCO), the annual production capacity of this company is 5.6 million MT of urea and 3.8 million MT of ammonia, allowing it to become the main player in the worldwide fertilizer market and one the largest exporter of urea globally (QAFCO, 2019).

QAFCO is a joint venture between the government of Qatar and a number of international shareholders. Specifically, it is owned by Industries Qatar (75%) and Yara Netherland (25%) (ibid, 2019). It is important to note here that Qatar Petroleum is the largest shareholder of Industries Qatar, and that the QAFCO Board of Directors includes Shaykh Khalifa bin Abdulla al-Thani, as vice-chairman, as illustrated in *Figure 3.4*. (QAFCO, 2016:3). This suggests that Qatar Petroleum, along with operating the oil and gas sectors, is also key in Qatar's petrochemical sector. Considering that Qatar Petroleum's management has close connections with Qatar's inner-elite and that QAFCO's board of directors includes members of the Qatari ruling family, QAFCO is also important to the diversification of Qatar's economy, as well as being the company with revenues crucial for strengthening Qatar's economy. The result is the accumulation of money to be used for adopted power implementation.




Position	Name
<b>Chairman</b>	<b>Mr. Said Mobarak Al Mohannadi</b>
<b>Vice-Chairman</b>	<b>Sheikh Khalid Bin Abdulla Bin Mohammed Al-Thani</b>
<b>Director &amp; Chief Executive Officer</b>	<b>Mr. Abdulrahman Mohamed Al-Suwaidi</b>
<b>Director</b>	<b>Mr. Alvin Rosvoll</b>
<b>Director</b>	<b>Mr. Fahad Mohammed Abdulla Al-Khater</b>
<b>Director</b>	<b>Mr. Hamad Salah Al-Baker</b>
<b>Director</b>	<b>Mr. Ivan de Witte</b>
<b>Director</b>	<b>Mr. Khalid Khalifa Mubarak Al-Jalahma</b>

Figure 3.4. Board of Directors, QAFCO (as of 2016) (QAFCO, 2016:3).

Qatar Petrochemical Company (QAPCO) was incorporated in 1974 as a joint venture between TOTAL Petrochemicals (20%) and Industries Qatar (80%). QAPCO has two joint ventures: Qatar Vinyl Company Limited QSC, and Qatofin Company Limited QSC, an associate of Qatar Plastic Products Company W.L.L. (ID, 2019a). QAPCO produces the following petrochemicals: ethylene, Low Density Polyethylene (LDPE) and Linear Low Density Polyethylene (LLDPE) (ibid, 2019a). QAPCO has the same board members as QAFCO’s board of directors, including Vice-Chairman Shaykh Khalid ‘Abdullah bin Mohammad al-Thani, and Board Directors Hamad Salah al-Baker and Fahad Mohd al-Khattar, as Figure 3.5. (QAPCO, 2019) illustrates. This once again illustrates that the petrochemical sector has been essential for the accumulation of wealth for Qatar’s wielding adopted power.





Position	Name
<b>Chairman</b>	Mr. Abdulaziz Jassim Al-Muftah
<b>Vice Chairman</b>	Sheikh Khalid Abdullah M.A. Al-Thani
<b>Managing Director &amp; CEO</b>	Dr. Mohammed Yousef Al-Mulla
<b>Board Director</b>	Mr. Hamad Salah A.M. Albaker
<b>Board Director</b>	Mr. Fahad Mohd A. Al-Khater
<b>Board Director</b>	Mr. Khalid Khalifa M. K. Al -Jalahma
<b>Board Director</b>	Mr. Yousef Mubarak A.B. Al-Sulaiti
<b>Board Director</b>	Mr. Francois Good
<b>Board Director</b>	Mr. Philippe Legrand

Figure 3.5. Board of Directors, QAPCO (as of March, 2019) (QAPCO, 2019).

Qatar Fuel Additives Company Limited (QAFAC) also belongs to Industries Qatar, with 50 % shares, and OPIC Middle East Corporation (20%), International Octane Limited (15%), and LCY Middle East Corporation (15%) (IQ, 2019b). Considering Industries Qatar’s largest shareholder is Qatar Petroleum, Qatar Petroleum has become the key state-owned company for accumulating revenues from Qatar’s oil, gas, and petrochemical sectors (IQ, 2019b). This means that attempts to diversify petrochemical production in Qatar ensured that companies are highly connected with Qatar’s institutions such as Industries Qatar and Qatar Petroleum, which in turn contribute to Qatar’s financial capabilities and accumulating wealth for wielding adopted power by the inner-circle elites.

Consequently, accumulation of Qatar’s wealth for adopted power implementation occurred mainly through Qatar Petroleum. Considering the close connection between Qatar Petroleum management and the inner-circle elite during the

Shaykh Hamad and Shaykh Tamim eras, Qatar's inner-circle elites obtained enormous wealth for wielding adopted power.

### **3.4. Distributors of Qatar's Wealth for Wielding Adopted Power**

#### **3.4.1. The Qatar Investment Authority (QIA)**

As a result of Qatar's gas ventures and oil revenues, the country accumulated more money than it could spend, and in 2005 established the Sovereign Wealth Fund (SWF) – the Qatar Investment Authority (QIA), known as the 'surplus fund' (Mishrif, 2017). According to Sovereign Wealth Fund Rankings by March 2019, it is the tenth largest Sovereign Wealth Fund in the world (SWFI, 2019). The Qatar Investment Authority distinguished a variety of entities: Qatar Holding focuses on strategic private and public equity or direct investments; Diar, Qatar's real-estate development company, and Hassad Food focuses on agribusiness investments. Qatar Investment Authority invests domestically and internationally. Qatar's USD 17bn Hamad International Airport, and Qatar Airways, are supported by the Qatar Investment Authority. The Qatar Investment Authority is the largest investor in Qatar's stock market, with significant shares in Qatar National Bank and Ooredoo, the telecom provider, which operates in 12 states (*Arabian Business*, 2017).

The Qatar Investment Authority also made substantial investments in the West. According to the faculty member of Qatar University Mishrif (2017), it has been investing in Europe and the US financial markets due to their high degree of predictability, and where legal systems are also more efficient. *The Telegraph* reported in 2017 that 'Qataris own more of London than the Queen' (Curry, 2017). According to research from Datscha, Canary Wharf Group Investment Holdings, co-owned by Qatar Holding and the American investment group Brookfield, is London's largest property owner, with 21.5 million square feet of space on its books. Since a further 1.8 million square feet is owned by the state of Qatar, it is indisputable that Qatar is a key force in London property. By comparison, the Queen owns less than 7.3 million square feet. Currently, for its Western investments, Qatar focuses mainly on the US market. In January 2019, Qatar Investment Authority stated goals to invest USD 45bn in the US over the next two years, taking its assets from Europe (Knecht, 2019). The


Qatar Investment Authority opened an office in New York in 2015 (Finn and Franklin, 2017). Though it also invests in Asia and Russia, as Appendix B demonstrates.

The establishment of the Qatar Investment Authority is related to the country's long-term strategic diversification objectives. Government expenditure was saved from oil and gas rents, and was put aside as an investment or venture fund. Its main purpose is 'to be saved for future generations, not meant to be used now, because in order to make an efficient use of this, the Gulf States or Qatar needs to re-invest this sort of capital. Reinvest it in a more strategic, sustainable long-term investment', states Mishrif (2017). Additionally, Young (2019:44) identifies the goals of the Sovereign Wealth Funds in the GCC as gaining political power. She considers the aim of a sovereign wealth fund (SWF) views efforts for domestic investments, and 'most in the Gulf are meant to be deployed abroad in an effort to grow wealth, but more frequently also used to extend political reach', therefore, 'the deployment of SWFs as a tool of economic statecraft (using economic means to achieve foreign policy goals) [...]'. Commenting specific on the Qatar Investment Authority she considers it as 'more glamour-and identity-driven than earnings-driven', stating that more lately Qatar made investments 'clearly for political motivation' (ibid, 2019: 49). With diversification initiatives, the role of Qatar Investment Authority is identified as being dedicated to political objectives. So, the Qatar Investment Authority became essential for distribution wealth for power projection.

Considering the fact that the Qatar Investment Authority is owned by the Government of Qatar and has been in the hands of Qatar's inner-circle elite, and especially those who implement foreign policies, it is not surprising that Qatar Investment Authority emerged as the key wealth distribution, state-owned company for wielding adopted power. The Qatar Investment Authority was run by Qatar's inner-circle elite, including the former prime minister and former Foreign Minister Hamad bin Jasim until 2013. After the transition of leadership, Deputy Amir Tamim became the Chairman of QIA and promoted Ahmed al-Sayed to Chief Executive Officer. In 2014, Shaykh Tamim stepped down from the board of directors and 'Abdullah bin Mohammad al-Thani replaced al-Sayed (French, 2014).

Appointed in November 2018, a board of directors led by the Minister of Foreign Affairs includes key ministers from leading financial, economic and energy sectors, and members of the ruling family, as demonstrated in *Figure 3.6*. (QIA, 2016). Foreign Minister Shaykh Mohammad bin 'Abdulrahman al-Thani became the

Chairman of Qatar Investment Authority (Reuters, 2018). The board includes members of al-Thani family, close with the inner-circle elites, such as Shaykh Tamim's brother Mohammad bin Hamad al-Thani, and 'Abdullah bin Saoud al-Thani, who is the governor of the Qatar Central Bank, along with serving as the chairman of the board of directors of Qatar Development Bank and a member of the board directors of the Supreme Council for Economic Affairs and Investments (QCB, 2014). Additionally, Minister of Finance Ali Shareef al-Emadi also serves as the president of the executive board of Qatar Airways, and as chairman of Qatar National Bank's (QNB) Board of Directors (Government Communication Office, 2019), with Minister of State for Energy Affairs Sa'd Sherida al-Ka'bi who is also vice-chairman and president and CEO of Qatar Petroleum (QP, 2018c). This illustrates that Qatar Investment Authority is in the hands of the inner-circle elites, and the board of directors consists of ministers responsible for foreign policy implementation who obtain economic power, with the Qatar Investment Authority emerging as an essential wealth distributor for wielding adopted power as the following examples suggest. An example of this is the role Qatari Diar played during mediation efforts in Yemen and Sudan. As another example is that of Qatar National Bank (QNB) Group in Libya, 50% of which belongs to Qatar Investment Authority. Both examples are discussed in Chapter Four.



Position	Name
<b>Chairman</b>	H.E. Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman bin Jassim Al-Thani
<b>Vice Chairman</b>	H.E. Sheikh Mohamed bin Hamad bin Khalifa Al-Thani
<b>Member</b>	H.E. Mr. Ali Shareef Al-Emadi
<b>Member</b>	H.E. Sheikh Abdullah bin Saoud Al-Thani
<b>Member</b>	H.E. Mr. Saad Sherida Al-Kaabi
<b>Member</b>	H.E. Mr. Ali Ahmed Al-Kuwari
<b>Member</b>	H.E. Dr. Hussain Ali Al-Abdulla
<b>Member</b>	Mr. Nasser Ghanim Al-Khulaifi

Figure 3.6. Board of Directors, QIA (as of March, 2019) (QIA, 2016).

### 3.4.2. Qatar Sports Investment (QSI), Qatar Foundation (QF), Qatar Petroleum International (QPI)

Other smaller funds are worth considering as they play an important role in the distribution of Qatar’s wealth for wielding adopted power. For example, the Qatar Sports Investment (QSI) fund founded by the then Crown Prince Tamim bin Hamad. A member of Qatar Investment Authority, Nasir Ghanim al-Khelaifi, heads QSI, in addition to being the president of Paris St-Germain (PSG), the French football team that was bought by Qatar in 2011. He is, as mentioned earlier, a childhood friend of Shaykh Tamim. The role of QSI was crucial for Qatar’s alliances with sports non-state actors as a method of adopted power projection as Chapter Seven demonstrates. Moreover, the charitable entity, the Qatar Foundation for Education, Science and Community, also known as the Qatar Foundation (QF), was established and run by Qatar’s inner-circle elite identified as Shaykha Moza, and has its own SWF (Roberts, 2017a:84). The Qatar Foundation holds the state’s stake in the Vodafone telecoms

operation in Qatar, and a 5% stake in Bharti Airtel, India's largest mobile phone operator, worth USD 1.26bn (ibid, 2017a). The role of the Qatar Foundation in adopting sports non-state actors is demonstrated in the example of FC Barcelona. This is discussed in more detail in Chapter Seven. Additionally, aiming to enlarge Qatar Petroleum's worldwide presence in different states, Qatar Petroleum International (QPI) was established in 2007, and integrated into Qatar Petroleum in 2015 (QP, 2015). This is a Doha-based state institutional investor (Roberts, 2017a). The activities of Qatar Petroleum International became important for building alliances with political Islam non-state actors and led to relations flourishing between Qatar and the Islamist-led government in Tunisia after the Arab Spring, as Chapter Four illustrates.

### **3.4.3. The Qatar National Bank (QNB), Doha Bank, Qatar Development Bank (QDB)**

Qatar's banking sector has also played a crucial role in the distribution of wealth for adopted power implementation. Qatar's banking sector includes foreign and domestic banks, and the recent emergence of Islamic banks. There are three types of operating banks in Qatar: commercial banks (national and foreign), Islamic banks, and specialised banks (al-Ghorairi, 2010). Among the national commercial banks there are the Qatar National Bank, Doha Bank, Commercial Bank, International Bank of Qatar, Ahli Bank, and al-Khaliji. Islamic banks include Qatar Islamic Bank, Masraf al-Rayan, and the International Islamic Bank. The foreign commercial banks are HSBC, Arab Bank, BNP Paribas, Standard Chartered, Mashreq Bank, United Bank, and Bank Saderat Iran (al-Ghorairi, 2010).

The top five domestic banks (as of March 2019) are: Qatar National Bank (QNB), Qatar Islamic Bank, Commercial Bank of Qatar, Masraf al-Rayan, and Doha Bank (QNB, 2019a). Despite the variety of top banks, Qatar National Bank (QNB) founded in 1964, dominates the banking sector, and it is therefore not surprising that it has been key to the distribution of money for adopted power implementation as discussed. Along with domestic dominance, according to QNB's Relations Presentation (2019a), it is the number one bank in the Middle East and Africa across all financial metrics, with an international network in more than 31 states. Considering that QNB is owned by Qatar Investment Authority and the Qatari public (50% each) and its board of directors includes members of the al-Thani ruling family and other

important Qatari political and economic figures, as *Figure 3.7.* illustrates (QNB, 2019b), for the Qatar’s inner-circle elites it became easy to use financial institutions to distribute money for power projection.



Position	Name
<b>Chairman of the Board of Directors</b>	H.E. Ali Shareef Al-Emadi
<b>Vice Chairman</b>	H.E. Shiekh Fahad Bin Faisal Bin Thani Al-Thani
<b>Member</b>	H.E. Sheikh Abdulrahman Bin Saud Bin Fahad Al-Thani
<b>Member</b>	H.E. Sheikh Hamad Bin Jabor Bin Jassim Al-Thani
<b>Member</b>	Mr. Ali Hussain Ali Al-Sada
<b>Member</b>	Mr. Bader Abdullah Darwish Fakhroo
<b>Member</b>	H.E. Fahad Mohammed Fahad Buzwair
<b>Member</b>	Mr. Mansoor Ebrahim Al-Mahmoud
<b>Member</b>	Mr. Abdulrahman Mohammed Y Jolo
<b>Member</b>	Mr. Adil Hassan H A Al-Jufairi

*Figure 3.7.* Board of Directors, QNB (as of March, 2019) (QNB, 2019b).

Another Qatari bank is Doha Bank, which important to mention within the context of adopted power implementation by elites. It was inaugurated in 1979, and is internationally represented in Mumbai, Chennai, and Kochi (India), Dubai and Abu Dhabi (UAE), Kuwait, with representative offices in Japan, South Korea, China, Australia, Singapore, Turkey, Hong Kong, the UK, Canada, Germany, Bangladesh, South Africa, Sri Lanka and Nepal (Doha Bank, 2019a). Among its shareholders is a subsidiary of Qatar Investment Authority – Qatar Holding (16.7 %) and other shareholders (83.3%) (ibid, 2019a). Members of the ruling family with influential members of the local business community are also represented on the board, as *Figure*

3.8. (Doha Bank, 2019b) demonstrates. ‘Abdullah bin Nasir al-Thani, who has been appointed a non-executive member of the board of directors of Doha Bank in 1996, as the owner of FC Malaga (Countrylicious, 2015). According to Puerto al-Thani (2018), he is the one who runs a diversified conglomerate employing more than 3000 workers, and as vice-president, ‘shareholder and board member of Doha Bank’, plays in important role in building alliances with sports non-state actors as Chapter Seven demonstrates.



Position	Name
<b>Chairman</b>	Sheikh Fahad bin Mohammad bin Jabor Al Thani
<b>Vice Chairman</b>	Mr. Ahmed Abdul Rahman Yousuf Obaidan Fakhroo
<b>Managing Director</b>	Sheikh Abdul Rehman bin Mohammad bin Jabor Al Thani
<b>Member</b>	Mr. Hamad Mohammad Hamad Abdulla Almana
<b>Member</b>	Sheikh Fatah bin Jassim bin Jabor bin Mohammad Al-Thani
<b>Member</b>	Sheikh Abdulla bin Mohammad bin Jabor Al Thani
<b>Member</b>	Mr. Ahmed Abdullah Al-Khal
<b>Independent member</b>	Mr. Ali Ibrahim Abdullah Al-Malki
<b>Independent member</b>	Mr. Nasser Khalid Nasser Abdullah Al-Mesnad

Figure 3.8. Board of Directors, Doha Bank (as of March, 2019) (Doha Bank, 2019b).

Other banks should be identified in order to demonstrate the close connections between banks and state-owned companies that distribute money for wielding adopted power. For example, specialised banks include the Qatar Development Bank (QDB), established by the Government of Qatar in 1997 and aimed at financing small and medium scale industrial projects through encouraging capital-intensive projects. The business activities of Qatar Development Bank grew following other services that are



encouraging the development process in industries, services, agriculture products, tourism, housing, and other sectors (QCB, 2015). Though as mentioned earlier, ‘Abdullah bin Saoud al-Thani, the chairman of the board of directors of the Qatar Development Bank, the governor of the Qatar Central Bank (QCB, 2014), is also a member of the Qatar Investment Authority board of directors.

This suggest that the banking sector is closely connected to Qatar’s inner-circle elites, especially considering that Qatar Investment Authority, which owns 50% of Qatar National Bank, has operated under the leadership of Qatar’s inner-circle of rulers. This demonstrates the mechanisms by which money easily circulate from Qatar’s institutions to non-state actors in order to project adopted power. Moreover, connections of other banks to Qatar Investment Authority, either belonging to it as the Doha Bank case illustrates, or through the chairmen of banks who are also members of Qatar Investment Authority board of directors, as the Qatar Development Bank case shows, it is possible to see how Qatar moves money for wielding adopted power.

#### **3.4.4. Qatar Airways (QA)**

Qatar’s state-owned companies in the aviation sectors are also key for wielding adopted power. Qatar Airways, founded in 1993, started to operate in 1994. It was a small airline at the beginning, managing leased aircraft, and privately owned by members of the al-Thani family (Gray, 2013: 148). Qatar Airways transformed itself in 1997, remaining privately owned at this stage, but receiving state loans (Hindley, 1997). Qatar officially bought a 50% stake in the carrier in 1999. Qatar Airways was named Airline of the year in 2011, 2012, 2015, and 2017 according to a Skytax Global Survey (QA, 2018). By March 2019, the worldwide network of Qatar Airways covers more than 160 destinations in Europe, the Middle East, Africa, South Asia, the Indian Ocean, Asia Pacific, North America, and South America. Despite Qatar Airways’ expansion, the number of its destinations, and winning valuable awards, the question of its profitability is debatable. Before the beginning of the current Gulf Crisis, MENA programme officer at International Renewable Energy Agency, Hamedi (2017), stated that most Qatari companies are not profitable. He claims that ‘Qatar Airways, was not making any profits until today’, however it should be noted that, as stated by CEO Akbar al-Baker on 14 June 2017 (al-Jazeera, 2017a), Qatar Airways announced a profit of USD 541m in 2016, a record profit in the history of the Qatar Airways, and

a robust growth in the number of passengers (+20.1%). However, with the imposed blockade in June 2017, Qatar Airways lost access to 18 cities in Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt, and Bahrain, and it also increased costs and operated longer flights on some routes in order to escape the ‘Anti-Terror’ airspace (al-Jazeera, 2018a). Commenting on Qatar Airways’ losses in February 2018, CEO al-Baker stated: ‘We have increased maintenance costs because we are flying longer routes, we have more fuel consumption, so the cost to the airline is rising and I have already stated that airline will post a loss this year due to the blockade, but it does not mean that we are going to shrink’ (*Khaleej Times*, 2018).

In March 2018, al-Baker promised to announce ‘a very large loss during the current financial year’, and suggested the possibility that Qatar Airways would call state owners for extra funds, ‘not for the foreseeable future, but if it continues long term our shareholders will have to put additional equity into the company’, he stated to Reuters TV (al-Jazeera, 2018a). Though by the end of March 2018, it proclaimed USD 69m annual loss because of the Crisis (Dudley, 2018). Despite this, in April 2018, Qatar Airways announced its purchase of a minority stake in JetSuite in order to expand the semi-private model across the US (al- Jazeera, 2018b). Then, on February 2018 the Italian airline Meridiana renamed itself Air Italy, with the backing of its new shareholder, Qatar Airways. Qatar Airways declared plans to purchase a minority stake in Russia’s Vnukovo Airport. Qatar Airways also became essential in the adopting of sports non-state actors, such as FC Barcelona, FC Bayern Munich and FC AS Roma, as Chapter Seven demonstrates.

#### **3.4.5. The Qatar Exchange (QE), Qatar Insurance Company (QIC), Qatar Financial Centre (QFC)**

There are other sectors of Qatar’s economy which indirectly assist for wielding adopted power by the inner-circle elites. These include non-banking financial services. Due to the development of the insurance sector, the establishment of a stock market to facilitate the equity market, and expansion in the issuance of corporate bonds (particularly in *sukuk*, Islamic bonds) in the debt market, the sector is diversifying and having an impact on the enlargement of the private sector in Qatar’s economy (al-Ghorairi, 2010). The development of Qatar’s equity market became possible due to the establishment of the Doha Securities market (DSM) in 1995, now known as the

Qatar Exchange (QE). The Qatari government sold a 20% stake USD 200 million to Euronext, operator of the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), Paris Bourse, and other European centres, with Qatar Holding as owner of the remaining 80% in the Qatar Exchange and part of the Qatar Investment Authority (QIA). This partnership with the NYSE aided the development of the Qatari market into a multi-asset class exchange that includes shares, exchange-traded commodities (ETCs), exchange-traded funds (ETFs), bonds, *sukuk*, and index products (al-Ghorairi, 2010). This chain of ownership also reveals the power that the inner-circle elites has in the Qatar Exchange, indirectly contributing to diversification efforts and also assisting in accumulating revenues for adopted power implementation.

The Qatar Insurance Company (QIC) was established by Amiri decree in 1964. This was due to the rise of foreign trade and local investments' demand for insurance companies, such as al-Khaleej Insurance in 1978, Doha Insurance in 1999, and Islamic Insurance in 1993. As a result of the 2003-2008 economic boom, the sector developed further (Gray, 2013:144), and as the largest insurance firm in the GCC, the Qatar Insurance Company was the best-linked insurer to the political elite. Qatar Insurance Company's board was heavily represented by al-Thani representatives and others from Qatar's commercial and political elite, as *Figure 3.9* (QIG, 2005) demonstrates. One of them is Chairman Jasim bin Hamad al-Thani of the Qatar Islamic Bank (among other positions), whose father HBJ is identified as an inner-circle elite in Chapter Two. This demonstrates the direct access, through relatives, of Qatar's inner-circle elite to money in banking and non-banking financial sectors. This money the inner-circle elite enjoyed access to, was distributed for wielding adopted power.




Position	Name
<b>Chairman &amp; Managing Director</b>	Sheikh Khalid bin Mohammed bin Ali Al-Thani
<b>Deputy Chairman</b>	Mr. Abdullah bin Khalifa Al-Attiya
<b>Board Member</b>	Mr. Hussain Ibrahim Al-Fardan
<b>Board Member</b>	Mr. Jassim Mohammed Al-Jaidah
<b>Board Member</b>	Sheikh Hamad bin Faisal bin Thani Al-Thani
<b>Board Member</b>	Mr. Khalaf Ahmed Al-Mannai
<b>Board Member</b>	Sheikh Jassim bin Hamad bin Jassim bin Jabor Al-Thani
<b>Board Member</b>	Sheikh Faisal bin Thani Al-Thani
<b>Board Member</b>	Sheikh Saoud bin Khalid bin Hamad Al-Thani
<b>Board Member</b>	Sheikh Abd El Rahman Bin Saoud Bin Fahed Al Thani
<b>Board Member</b>	Mr. Ali Youssef Hussain Kamal
<b>Group President &amp; CEO</b>	Mr. Khalifa Abdulla Turki Al-Subaey

Figure 3.9. Board of Directors, QIC (as of March, 2019) (QIG, 2005)

The main objectives of the Qatar Financial Centre (QFC), created in 2005, are operations and maintenance of the Qatar Financial Centre’s legal and tax environment, and the licensing of firms to conduct business in, or from, the centre. A main advantage of QFC firms is that they obtain 100% repatriation of profits, 10% corporate tax on locally sourced profits, and a legal and judicial framework based on English Common Law (QFC, 2019a). In March 2019, Qatar announced the launch of the world’s biggest Islamic bank by the fourth quarter of 2019, with a focus on the energy sector, and under the Qatar Financial Centre’s umbrella (RT, 2019). This bank will offer finance, not solely in gas and oil sectors, but also in the petrochemical and renewable energy, proving that Qatar’s diversification is energy-driven. This illustrates that despite diversification initiatives, Qatar remains a rentier state. Considering that the board of

directors, as illustrated in *Figure 3.10*. (QFC, 2019b) also includes important political figures and businessmen, such as the Chairman Ali Shreef al-Emadi, the Minister of Finance of Qatar, the Qatar Financial Centre will indirectly continue to be involved in adopted power implementation through the newly launched Islamic Bank.



Position	Name
<b>Chairman</b>	H.E. Ali Shareef Al Emadi
<b>Deputy Chairman</b>	H.E. Ali Bin Ahmed Al-Kuwari
<b>Board Member</b>	Rashid Ali Al-Mansoori
<b>Board Member</b>	Ahmad Abdulla Ahmad Jassim Al-Jamal
<b>Board Member</b>	Dr Arnab Banerji
<b>Board member</b>	Bob Wigley
<b>Chief Executive Officer and Board Member</b>	Yousuf Al-Jaida

*Figure 3.10.* Board of Directors, QFC (as of March, 2019) (QFC, 2019b).

Qatar Exchange, Qatar Insurance Company, and Qatar Financial Centre activities point to and indirect involvement in adopted power projection. They are part Qatar’s ongoing efforts to develop the non-banking sector which contributes to the growth of its wealth, and that members of the board of directors have close links to the inner-circle of Qatar’s elite who wield adopted power. The newly launched energy-focused Islamic Bank is essential for the distribution of money after accumulating it from the energy sector, and then distributing it for future adopted power implementation.

### 3.5. Qatar's wealth future

As has been demonstrated, Qatar's wealth is mainly derived from the hydrocarbon sector and attempts to diversify the economy have been energy-driven. Consequently, the wealth for wielding adopted power mainly was accumulated in a state-owned company from the energy sector, especially Qatar Petroleum; while distribution of Qatar's wealth was by state-owned companies aimed to diversify Qatar's economy. In other words, the future of adopted power depends from: firstly, how long Qatar will continue to remain a rentier state, as adopted power illustrates rentier states' power projection. But this depends on how long Qatar will continue to be one of the richest states in the world, with spare revenues to use as a key driver for adopted power. The two questions are interconnected, as demonstrated below.

The ongoing Gulf Crisis has not significantly damaged the state's economy, but rather, demonstrates that despite diversification initiatives, in the time of political tensions and being blockaded or boycotted, Qatar still heavily relies on revenues from the energy market; this is the expected behaviour of a rentier state, though the first days of the ongoing Gulf Crisis the outlook was not so optimistic. Considering the effect of the Gulf Crisis, Qatar's economy was initially impacted in two ways. First of all, trade; while hydrocarbon exports were undisrupted, imports were affected between June and July 2017 because Qatar depended on the UAE and Saudi Arabia for construction materials and food. Nonetheless, by August 2017, imports were almost back to 'pre-blockade' amounts after finding new partners, redirecting trade routes and private sector supply. As a result, new sectors for investment emerged; logistics, transport, food, and other basic materials (QNB, 2017).

Before the Gulf Crisis, most fresh milk and dairy products were imported from Saudi Arabia (Sergie, 2017). However, due to the air, sea, and land restrictions by the Anti-Terror Quartet, Qatar had to import milk from Turkey and later from Morocco. A new purpose-built dairy was established in Qatar by Power International and aimed to supply about 30% of the country's needs. In July 2017, 165 Holstein dairy cows arrived from Germany – the first of about 4,000 cattle to be imported (BBC News, 2017a). According to the reports, by the end of the first half of 2018, local companies aimed to meet 92% of the domestic demand for milk (al-Jazeera, 2018c). Moreover, Greece shared its agro-tech expertise in support of Doha's self-sufficiency plans (ibid,

2018c). By January 2019, Qatar reached self-sufficiency in the production of eggs and chicken, and the amount of locally produced milk and meat increased under the food security program in Qatar, with officials aiming to start exporting dairy and poultry products by the end of 2019 (Ataullah, 2019). Even if Qatar's local production emerges due to political circumstances, it is unclear how the country that aimed to compete for leadership in the region with its GCC neighbours, relied heavily on dairy products from Saudi Arabia. By contrast, with its wealth capacities and freed up money, Qatar could buy cows, and become a main global exporter of milk and dairy production. If Doha thought strategically it would have set goals much earlier to be independent from importing goods, and perhaps would emerge as a leading exporter in the food security sector, overcoming the challenge of weather conditions with new innovations and technologies, all of which were supposed to be created by the knowledge-based economy that Qatar has been unable to realise.

Another negative outcome of the beginning of the Gulf Crisis relates to the liquidity that was affected by the removal of deposits from banks. However, the outflows have upturned and were more than offset by public sector liquidity injections that made the total liquidity in the banking sector stronger, states QNB (2017). According to Moody's Investors Service Limited, Qatar injected around USD 40bn to support its financial system between June and July 2017. The Qatar Investment Authority, which is the product of gas and oil revenues (Young, 2019), injected deposits into domestic banks to shore up liquidity as weakening operating conditions and continued funding pressures faced lenders in the wake of the Gulf Crisis (Narayanan and Martin, 2018). According to Moody's, capital outflows from Qatari banks were about USD 30bn in June and July, downgrading their outlook to negative from stable. While Qatar Investment Authority injected deposits into local banks, it also started to sell its shares in different companies. For example, Qatar Investment Authority decreased its direct shareholding in Credit Suisse, Switzerland's second biggest bank, to 4.49% in August 2017. The Qatar Investment Authority and Glencore Plc also agreed to cut most of the stakes from Rosneft Public Joint-Stock Company (PJSG). Qatar Investment Authority will be left with a 4.7% holding. In September 2017, Qatar Investment Authority sold USD 4.4m shares in the luxury jewellery retailer Tiffany & Co. raising about USD 417m (Martin and Singer, 2017). In March, Qatari Diar sold USD 26.1m shares in Veolia Environment for approximately USD

640m. In March 2018 Qatar Holding sold its stake in Lifestyle China Group and Lifestyle International Holding for USD 662m.

This might suggest negative outcomes of the Crisis, though Qatari officials were positive. For example, Qatar's Minister Ali Shareed al-Emadi commented in October 2017 that the Qatar Investment Authority, whose assets under management are estimated to be USD 300 bn, had brought back more than USD 20 bn into the state since the beginning of the Gulf Crisis (Kassem, 2017). In September 2018, Qatar Economic Insight (QNB, 2018) confirmed that Qatar's economic performance remains resilient. Despite the Crisis the economy grew by 1.6% in 2017. Not only did Qatar-based politicians and institutions state this, even Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman, at the investment summit in Riyadh, acknowledged that 'Even Qatar, despite our differences with them, has a very strong economy', explaining his vision on the Middle East's place globally in next five years (Khraiche, 2018). Consequently, despite the Crisis and negative outcomes at the beginning, Qatar's economy has remained strong mainly due to injected deposits made by Qatar Investment Authority. Considering Qatar Investment Authority as diversification efforts, through the product of oil and gas production, it seems Qatar survived due to huge revenues from the hydrocarbon sector, confirming it as rentier state that still relies on energy sector.

Though Qatar's economic performance remains resilient despite the Crisis relying mainly on energy revenues, challenges such as the development of renewable energy might affect the future of Qatar's wealth and status as a rentier state in the mid and long term. The primary cause is the cost of renewable energy for producing electricity, which is important because gas is most commonly used in the industry, especially in the power generation sector. Recently the cost of producing electricity from renewable energies is cheaper than the cost of producing electricity from oil, or gas or even coal. The International Energy Agency (IEA, 2010) predicted in 2010 that the cost of renewables would start to become competitive only after 2030, however a MENA Programme Officer at International Renewable Energy Agency Hamedi (2017) argues that this started in 2015, 15 years earlier. *British Petroleum Statistical Review of World Energy* (BP, 2017:2) indicators support this view, suggesting that in 2016 renewable power increased by 14.1%, below the 10-year average, however it was the largest increment on record. In the introduction of the British Petroleum's Group, Chief Executive Bob Dudley declared that worldwide renewable energy 'grew



strongly'. While the amount of renewable energy within overall energy was in 2016, only 4%, it 'accounted for almost a third of the increase in primary energy' (ibid, 2017:1). Most of the studies and research that produced recently regarding the future of renewables expected that by 2017 it will be a turning point where most of the energy used for producing electricity will come from renewable sources, argues Hamed (2017). According to the International Energy Agency (IEA) predictions, renewable electricity production will grow by over one-third by 2022 (IEA, 2018).

Previously, renewables required the policy and financial support of governments in order to be able to compete against combustible energies, such as oil, gas or coal. Nowadays renewables do not require governmental support in order to be developed, and they are cost-competitive and can develop independently without the support of governments. According to Hamed (2017) 'this is a very big turning point in the history of energy industry', even in the medium to long-term the future revenues of the GCC countries, and especially Qatar as a gas producer, are not going to be as important as they used to be. Therefore, the region will definitely undergo very serious challenges in the mid and long term, which will also affect the future of Qatar's economy.

Another challenge relates to Qatar's leading position in the LNG sector, which is still clearly the strongest part of Qatar's economy. Qatar Petroleum remains the most influential global player in the LNG market with its annual production of 77 million tonnes, and in May 2018, Sa'd al-Ka'bi, CEO of Qatar Petroleum, stated that the company will push ahead with its production growth despite the Anti-Terror Quartet's 'blockade' (al-Jazeera, 2018c). However, in the mid and long term, there are challenges related to the upcoming changes in the global energy market, which, according to predictions, will take place over the next three to five years. For example, according to Wright, an associate professor at Hamad bin Khalifa University in Qatar (2017a), 'the type of role that Qatar has had in that market is going to fundamentally change'.

Over the last 10 to 15 years, it has been very much a sellers' market, and Qatar has been the main player when it comes to LNG. As the market begins to change, this will have a negative economic impact on Qatar's society, however the last 15 years have also led to investments taking place and new technology coming into play. As Wright (2017a) explains:

what we are now seeing is that over the next 5 years, Australia, probably as early as next year [2017], will be overtaking Qatar as the leading LNG producer. In addition to that, so will the US. The US will have gone from being predicted as the world's largest importers of LNG, to one of the world's largest exporters. Potentially even the world's largest exporter, if you take an optimistic position.

Indeed, it seems that these predictions have already become reality, since according to the report from International Energy Agency (IEA, 2017), despite a reduction in imports from Qatar, it is still the key supplier of LNG for the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), with 24.1% of the total share. Nonetheless, Qatar is no longer the key supplier of OECD Asia Oceania after being surpassed by Australia, which is the second largest supplier of the LNG for all OECD (ibid, 2017).

Due to the heightened level of competition that will take place within the next three years, many countries around the world, especially Japan and South Korea, who are currently the world's largest importers of LNG and for their own consumption, are less likely to sign long-term agreements with Qatar (Wright, 2017a). This is related to the desire to diversify their own sources of energy security. Additionally, these states are also interested in signing more flexible supply contracts (Wright, 2017b). Consequently, as Wright (2017a) believes that 'if you take the perspective through the concept of complex interdependence theory, then you will see that will then have an impact on the foreign policy, of the country concerned'. Therefore, according to these negative predictions (for Qatar), the country's essential role in the LNG market will change due to the possibility of losing its leading role in the LNG, and its potential failure to sign long-term contracts with its current suppliers, as a result, it will affect its ability to implement adopted power in the future.

However, there are positive predictions for Qatar's economy. QNB (2017) predicts that with the recent extraction rates, Doha's oil reserves will last for 36 years, and proven gas reserves for another 136 years. In 2005, the officials imposed a moratorium on additional gas export developments in the North Field. However, the moratorium was lifted in April 2017 and plans for a 30% growth in LNG production in five to seven years were declared by Qatar Petroleum (ibid, 2017). Subsequently, Qatar will continue to get revenues from hydrocarbons. Moreover, as scholars (Roberts, 2017b) argue, due to Qatar's investments, primarily made through oil and gas revenues, 'the Qatari state will be always fine', it is undoubtable that 'there is

nothing equivalent to gas, it was an astonishing gift, effectively that they enjoyed in the 2000s particularly'. That means that despite diversification efforts, and even further initiatives by government to diversify economy, including diversification of the tax base, such as introduction of a VAT in 2019 (QNB, 2018), Qatar will remain a rentier state, at least for another 20-30 years as explained below.

Finally, Hertog (2019:33), examining Saudi Arabian ambition to shift from hydrocarbons dependence is 'valid', but 'even under ideal conditions it will be impossible to become 'post-rentier' by 2030 and hard to imagine even by 2050. The mathematics is quite similar for other high-rent countries, including those of the GCC', meaning that Qatar's ambitions to diversify their economy might not be fully reached for the long run. Accepting the predictions that development of renewables and their replacement of oil and gas and challenges for Qatar's place at the LNG market, remains in the mid and long run. However, considering the financial wealth that Qatar has obtained since 1995 from the hydrocarbon sector, and its energy-driven diversification, it seems that Qatar will continue to rely on the energy market for at least 20-30 years, keeping its status as a rentier state. Therefore, it will continue to wield adopted power in the future, taking advantage from its main driver – wealth.

### **3.6. Conclusion**

Qatar is per capita the richest country in the world, and the main source of revenue for its national economy is from the energy sector, which facilitates its use for wielding adopted power. Despite Qatar's efforts to diversify their economy by building a knowledge-based economy, developing banking and non-banking financial services, aviation, and private industry, Qatar still heavily depends on the hydrocarbon sector, so remains a rentier state. In order to wield adopted power, Qatar's state-owned companies, especially Qatar Petroleum, has been essential in accumulating revenues, which has been distributed for power projection by other state-owned companies such as Qatar Investment Authority, Qatar Sports Investment, Qatar Foundation, Qatar Petroleum International, Qatar National Bank, Doha Bank, Qatar Development Bank, Qatar Airways, Qatar Insurance Company, the Qatar Exchange, and the Qatar Financial Centre. This became possible because Qatar's inner-circle elite, whose main goal is for projection of power, has close connections to the leadership of these state-owned companies. It is also worth mentioning that all state-owned companies with

close links to the inner-circle elites of Qatar are technically involved in accumulating or distributing Qatar's wealth for power projection. The following chapters clearly demonstrate how these state-owned companies are essential for distributing wealth among the non-state actors with which Qatar formed alliances. In other chapters, it is demonstrated that all state-owned companies (directly or indirectly) are essential in this process.

## **Part II. Wielding Adopted Power**

### **Chapter Four**

#### **Adopted Power in Use: Political Islam**

##### **4.1. Introduction**

This chapter examines how Qatar builds alliances with well-established political Islam non-state actors for the purpose of wielding adopted power. Qatar has adopted both Sunni and Shi'a movements, including: the Muslim Brotherhood, the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, al-Nahda, Hamas, al-Nusra Front (Jabhat Fateh al-Sham), Islamists in northern Mali, the Lebanese Hizbullah, and Houthis. The aim of this is to gain advantage from the transnational nature of these groups for power projection. The aforementioned is demonstrated firstly in this chapter, with a focus on the theoretical stance of political Islam from Qatar's perspective, explaining that its alliances with Islamists was for pragmatic reasons. Secondly, the scope of adopted power outlines Qatar's two methods: indirect and direct alliances with Islamists movements. Thirdly, the chapter illustrates the domain of Qatar's adopted power, which is due to transnational networks of Islamists spread internationally. Then it discusses the weight of adopted power that Qatar reached due to building these alliances with non-state actors, e.g. benefiting from the popularity of Islamists, challenging the power of regional heavyweights, and the opportunities for regional leadership and for countering the power of Qatar's political rivals. Finally, the chapter looks at the cost that Qatar has paid because of alliances with Islamists; this includes the criticism it received because of its support to these groups during the Arab Spring, two Gulf Crises with its neighbours, and being accused of sponsoring terrorism.

##### **4.2. Qatar's clients: political Islam non-state actors**

Observers identify political Islam as a political ideology, and a religious-cultural-political framework or a tool for power. Key moments in this trajectory was the establishment of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt in the late 1920s, and the creation of the Indo-Pakistani Jamaat-e-Islami party in 1941 (Roy, 1994:viii). From these came the concept of Islam as a political ideology, Islamism. Whether this can be

categorised alongside concepts such as Lutheranism, monarchism, liberalism (Owen, 2015), or not (Hroub, 2010; Fuller, 2011) remains contested. Critics of this view argue that political Islam ‘cannot be put anywhere clearly on an ideological spectrum’ (Fuller, 2011: 413). Political Islam can be understood as a religious-cultural-political framework for engagement on matters that mainly concern politically involved Muslims (ibid, 2011). Despite this, political Islam remains widely viewed as a means of power for Islamists who pursue a goal of projecting their power, and creating an Islamic state, and is more concerned with power than religion (Denoeux, 2002:63). Sayyid Ali al-Amin (2017) defines political Islam as shifting Islam from a stage of preaching and advocacy to another where it is exploited by people aspiring to power.

Though Dalacoura (2001:235) considers political Islam an ideology, she identifies Islamist movements as non-state actors and defines them as transnational actors with global power, stating: ‘Islamist movements are powerful political actors in the Middle East and ... at the global level. [...] Islamist movement[s] help create multiple links, from social and cultural to terrorist and criminal ones, between members of societies, thus bypassing governments’. Qatar built alliances with Islamists for pragmatic reasons; Qatar’s inner-circle elites considered political Islam advocacy as a means of attaining power by Islamists, which, through funding them, would allow Qatar to project its own power in the region and beyond. Thus, the definition of political Islam suggested by Sayyid al-Amin (2017) will be applied. In addition, Dalacoura’s (2001) consideration of Islamists movements as non-state actors with transnational networks will also be applied; Qatar’s alliances with political Islam non-state actors allowed the country to spread its power globally, wherever transnational links of Islamists exist, as will be demonstrated. Consequently, building alliances with political Islam non-state actors emerged and is another example of Qatar’s wielding adopted power.

Observers conclude that Qatar built alliances with Islamists for pragmatic reasons. The head of the al-Jazeera Center for Studies, al-Zein, states: ‘Islamists came [to the region] in the 1980s, and Qatar was trying to ally itself with the forces that it saw as those most likely to be the dominant force for the future’ (Dickinson, 2014). Additionally, the director of Gulf Studies at Qatar University, Zweiri (2017), believes Qatar build alliances with Islamists, ‘... because it will give popularity to Qatar, [and] give [the] impression that Qatar is taking care of Muslims’. Moreover, Sayyid al-Amin (2017), states that Qatar adopts several movements which practice political Islam ‘not

[from] a religious or doctrinal point of view, but from a pragmatic and beneficial point of view, according to the political interests which consolidate its position and role'. Subsequently, pragmatic reasons led Qatar to adopt political Islam clients in order to project power. To demonstrate this, the next section will specify Qatar's indirect and direct ways of building alliances with Islamists, which can be identified as within the scope of adopted power.

### **4.3. The scope of Qatar's adopted power: building alliances with political Islam's non-state actors**

#### **4.3.1. Indirect alliances with Islamists as a scope of adopted power**

As the scope of adopted power focuses on aspects of 'B's behaviour affected by A' (Dahl, 1957), it can be identified in the context of building alliances with political Islam non-state actors into two ways: indirect (through mediation or conflict resolution) and direct. This section examines indirect way of building alliances with political Islam non-state actors which allowed Qatar to benefit from the transnational nature of Islamists.

Qatar mediated and participated in conflict resolution, particularly between the mid-2000s to 2011. It mediated between the Houthi rebels and the Yemeni government in 2008, 2010, and 2011. It engaged in the political conflict in Lebanon in 2008 (between Hezbollah and Lebanese political factions) and mediated between Hezbollah and the al-Nusra Front in 2014. It further mediated between the Islamists and Sudanese governments in Darfur (Barakat, 2014), Hamas and Fatah, between Eritrea and Djibouti in 2010, and in Darfur between 2008 - 2011 (Minich, 2015). Qatar is also involved in the Afghan Peace Process (Ibrahimi, 2018). Qatar's mediation and conflict resolution efforts can be viewed as an indirect way of building alliances with Islamists for wielding adopted power. As cited, Qatar mediated between Islamists from one side and governments or other Islamists on another. These mediation efforts provided an opportunity to position Qatar as a 'neutral broker', and also to keep the door open or strengthen alliances with Islamists, which can be identified as the scope of adopted power. By doing so, despite the failure of mediation efforts, Qatar, similar to most states, considered 'the strategic benefits when deciding whether to take on the

mediator role' (Melin, 2013:80). Qatar's weight from wielding adopted power will be demonstrated below.

As an example of the implementation of adopted power, Qatar's mediation efforts by inner-circle elites occurred using wealth as the key driver for power projection. Qatar's way of mediation was in many ways the opposite to how most other countries and international organisations would mediate, that is, by applying bottom-up grassroots attempts to bring people together in a reconciliation. By contrast, the Qatari's method was top-down; they worked with the leadership of the main ruling part and opposition groups at a leadership level (Ulrichsen, 2017). Many scholars emphasise the significance of Qatar's wealth as the key driver of adopted power in mediation efforts, referring to such actions as 'business diplomacy' (Gulbrandsen, 2010), 'chequebook diplomacy' (Rabi, 2009), or 'dollar diplomacy' (Kamrava, 2011:554), and its usage of 'reward power' (Minich, 2015:122).

The role of inner-circle elites and state-owned companies in the distribution of wealth for projecting adopted power can be seen in the following examples. Often there were targeted investments by: Hamad bin Jasim, who formerly controlled Qatar Investment Authority, its derivative subsidiaries, for example, Qatari Diar. There were also active engagements by banks such as the Qatar Islamic Bank (chaired by Hamad bin Jasim's son, Jasim). Gulbrandsen (2010) identifies such examples in Lebanon, Sudan, and Yemen mediations as follows: Qatar Islamic Bank's joint venture in Lebanon with the Beirut-based Arab Finance House being developed in Sudan by Qatari Diar, a USD 400m residential and hotel project. In Yemen, a planned joint project between Qatar Diar and the local Shibam Holding to develop the al-Rayyan Hills project, could potentially be the largest residential construction in Sanaa, a USD 600m mixed-use development. However, work was suspended in March 2011 due to the growing political crisis in Yemen. The following examples demonstrate how involvement in mediation efforts assisted Qatar to open the door to dialogue with Islamists such as Hizbullah, the Houthis, and Hamas in order to wield adopted power.

#### **4.3.1.1. The Lebanese Hizbullah**

Before mediation attempts, Qatar had already maintained open lines of communication with all parties in Lebanon as its foreign policy was characterised in the 2000s (Barakat, 2014). This included Hizbullah, an Islamist movement and so-



called *Party of God*, a military and political organisation of mainly Shi'a Muslims (BBC News, 2010; Gaub, 2013). After the 33-day war between Hizbullah and Israel in 2006, Qatar guaranteed its assistance in the reconstruction of South Lebanon's Hizbullah-held territories. According to the Islamic Resistance in Lebanon's official website, Doha, through 'Qatar Rehabilitation Program of South Lebanon, pledged USD 300m towards Lebanese rebuilding projects, including the reconstruction of four entire towns. A number of villages in the south saw 'Thank you, Qatar' banners and Qatari flags after Qatar guaranteed to rebuild infrastructure and mosques damaged by the war (Khatib, 2013:425). In 2010, on the fourth anniversary of the war, Shaykh Hamad became the first Arab leader to tour and visit the reconstructed areas of Lebanon which Qatar had partly paid for.

Doha also maintained 'taboo international relations with Israel' (Roberts, 2017a:71). Qatar, within a term on the UN Security Council (2006-2007), requested and received Israeli support for its campaign in 2005 (Ulrichsen, 2014), though it openly criticised Israel for its actions regarding the war with Hizbullah (Barakat, 2014). At the same time, Qatar, despite unanimous Arab criticism, hosted an Israeli trade office in Doha (since 1996); it closed in 2000 and 'reopened' from 2006 and 2009 (Roberts, 2017a:75). Qatar officially broke off diplomatic ties and closed the office in response to Israel's December 2008 Operation Cast Lead in the Gaza Strip. Qatar, however, still maintains contact with the Israelis, primarily because it wants their technology, especially in cyber-security, as Israel often provides such technology through third parties (Jones, 2017). Moreover, despite the turmoil of the region, interactions in series of multilateral organisations across the Middle East over the last two decades, have served as means by which the Arab Gulf states, including Qataris, have met with their Israel counterparts (ibid, 2017). Despite Qatar's relations with Israel, it supported Hizbullah in the war against Israel mainly for strategic purposes and due to the popularity of Hizbullah among Arabs, as discussed below.

The war between Hizbullah and Israel also led to domestic political conflict in Lebanon (Barakat, 2014). Lebanese politicians could not agree on the candidate for the presidency (Kamrava, 2011). This terminated when Siniora's (former Lebanese Prime Minister, 2005-2008) government determined the Hizbullah telecommunication network illegal (Barakat, 2014:16). On May 2008 in Doha, 14 negotiators representing Lebanese political factions—Hizbullah and the March 14 Movement, formed the government run during that time by Prime Minister Siniora. Following six days of

negotiations, the attendees agreed that General Suleiman be appointed the next president. This mediation demonstrates Qatar's wielding adopted power. Qatar contributed to the reconstruction of destroyed villages in South Lebanon's Hizbullah-held territories, by committing up to USD 150m in rebuilding funds (Barakat, Zyck and Hunt, 2008). Additionally, the inner-circle elite-driven policy can be seen as both Shaykh Hamad and Hamad bin Jasim were actively involved in these negotiations.

Different opinions were voiced on the Doha agreement and the role of Qatar during the mediation period. During the interview with the director of the Center for International and Regional Studies at Qatar's Georgetown University, Kamrava (2017), shared his view that Qatar's mediation efforts remained fairly neutral to all sides, believing that Hizbullah did not want to sign up, but thanks to the mediation efforts through Syria, Qatar put pressure on Hizbullah to agree. This view suggests that Qatar's mediation efforts saved Lebanon from civil war. By contrast, others consider the failure of Qatar's mediation efforts, pointing out that the Doha agreement was reached by the conditions of the strongest party, Hizbullah (al-Amin, 2017). Beirut-based al-Amin (2017) explains that this agreement has not resolved the Crisis but instead has provided a legal coverage for rulership by Hizbullah. Professor Jones of Durham University (2017) agrees that 'Lebanon is just an adjunct to the state that is Hizbullah', and that the latter is 'far stronger than the Lebanese state'. Jones argues that the mediation that took place legitimised Hizbullah's position, that it 'already had amongst the Lebanese political dispensation'. Ultimately, time showed that Qatar's mediation efforts failed and strengthened the position of Hizbullah in Lebanon, making the Islamist movement not solely the Lebanese domestic problem, but a regional one.

The outcome of the Doha agreement as legitimisation of Hizbullah is seen in the case of Hizbullah's intervention in the Syrian war (Al-Amin, 2017). Though Hizbullah's interference in the Syrian war was unpopular in the Arab world (Al-Hasan, 2017; Kamrava, 2017). Despite the unpopularity of Hizbullah, Qatar again participated in mediation, in this case, during the Syrian war between Hizbullah and al-Nusra Front in 2014 (Barakat, 2016). This again demonstrates how Qatar uses its relationships with Islamists for political purposes. Stephens (2017) argues, '... because they had links to al-Nusra ... they can come to Hizbullah and say "... we can do this and it's fine, and we'll work it out [...]" they were trying to show themselves to be useful and pragmatic ... I just don't think they were'. Consequently, Qatar's

mediation efforts in 2008 assisted in strengthening an alliance with Hizbullah after establishing ties in 2006, after supporting Hizbullah in the war against Israel. Even in the Syrian war, though Qatar's strategic interests contradicted those of Hizbullah, (Hizbullah supported al-Asad regime, while Qatar funded al-Nusra Front, one of al-Asad's counterparts, as will be discussed below), Qatar still has had an opportunity to keep relations with the group. This was demonstrated in Qatar's mediation role between Hizbullah and al-Nusra Front and as will be discussed, this kept relationship has been used for gaining political advantages in the future.

#### **4.3.1.2. The Houthi movement**

In 2007, Qatar offered mediation between the Yemeni government and the Houthi rebels, Ansar Allah (*Partisans of God*), which emerged in the 1990s as a 'youth-orientated revivalist movement that wanted to defend the religious traditions of a branch of Shi'a Islam known as Zaidism' (Schmitz, 2015). This group became 'by [the] 2000s a leading stubborn military insurgency', with the fourth stage of fighting between them beginning in 2004 (Barakat, 2014). Qatar offered to contribute funds to the reconstruction of much of the Sa'ada governorate if both parties agreed to end the war. The peace agreement was reached in February 2008. The core of this agreement was the Qatari pledge of an estimated USD 300-500m. Qatar also agreed to serve as home to several Houthi rebel leaders who would go into exile in Doha (Kamrava, 2011:550); this further identifies that mediation efforts assisted Qatar to establish relations with the Houthi leadership. Though mediation efforts failed and fighting restarted (Barakat, 2014).

In 2010 Qatar resumed its mediation initiatives and a new agreement was signed in Doha when the former amir of Qatar made a call to encourage President Saleh to assist move the agreement forward (Kamrava, 2011). Though the role of the inner-circle elites of Qatar was limited in the Houthis and the Yemeni government mediations, compared with other examples of alliances with Islamists, most mediations were made by Qatari foreign ministry diplomats (ibid, 2011); Qatar's attempt to mediate further still illustrates the scope of adopted power. This is because, again, wealth was the key driver of policy implementation, as stressed by the former President Saleh of Yemen: 'Qatar has so much money they don't know what to do with it, and are setting a financial foundation to become one of the big players in the

Middle East by funding all the unrest' (*Yemen Post*, 2012:91). Moreover, mediation efforts assisted Qatar in strengthening its relations with the Houthis, something that possibly could be used against Qatar's political competitors.

The situation changed in March 2015, as Qatar started to fight the Houthis. Decisive Storm was launched aiming 'to restore the legitimate government of President Hadi from takeover by Houthi militias' (Lackner, 2018:1), and Qatar also joined the Saudi-led coalition to aid in this. Qatar's changing position is identified with the coming to power of Shaykh Tamim and the outcomes of the Gulf Crisis of 2014. The former Qatar University member, Hamedi (2017), shared in an interview: '... from my discussions with some of the Qataris here, they went with Saudi Arabia and they joined the coalition, forced, not willingly'. Though during the ongoing Gulf Crisis 2017, the Anti-Terror Quartet (Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain and Egypt) accused Qatar of playing both sides, being a coalition against the Houthis while also providing them with information. Al-Binmohammad (2018), a member of the Shura Council in Bahrain explains this position: '... they were double-agents [...] UAE official statements were very clear on the Qatari['s] negative role, and providing the Houthis with information that led to the death of UAE soldiers and Saudi soldiers and Bahraini soldiers during the interaction at that time ...'.

Accusations remain uncertain, as Kinninmont (2017) states: '[there is] no independent evidence to corroborate that.' She adds:

... one government diplomat who I spoke to was arguing that Qatar was now trying to undermine the coalition in Yemen by using al-Jazeera to portray the coalition in a very negative light, but when I asked him whether there was any direct Qatari involvement beyond that, he said 'no, no, they're not supporting the Houthis'. On the other hand, there are probably even various different opinions within the government of Yemen, so it's difficult to be certain.

Although there is another view, as Baabood (2017) states: '... their relationship with the Houthi yes, do they have relationship? [sic.] Yes, they do. Do they have [a] back door channel to the Houthis? Yes, they do. [...]'. Ultimately, Qatar's mediation efforts in Yemen assisted to establish and keep an open interaction with Islamists. Though there are disagreements on Qatar's role against the Anti-Terror Quartet in the current war in Yemen, such an open door with Islamists which was established during the mediation efforts between the Yemeni government and Houthi rebels, makes it highly

possible that Qatar provided information to the Houthis about the Anti-Terror Quartet, its officers and locations. Eventually, such retained relations may always help Qatar to ally with Islamists against its political counterparts in the future.

#### **4.3.1.3. Hamas**

Qatar has been involved in the Hamas-Fatah reconciliation process, where Fatah is Harakat al-Tahrir al-Filistiniya (the Palestinian Liberation Movement), and Hamas, is the Islamic Resistance Movement (established in 1987), and the first elected Islamist group in the Arab world from 2005 (BBC News, 2017b). Qatar's debut in Palestinian affairs began in 2006, joining Egypt, Syria, Israel, the US, Turkey, Iran, and Saudi Arabia (Pettengill and Ahmed, 2011) when the former Qatari foreign minister Hamad bin Jasim shuttled between Prime Minister Haniya of Hamas and the Palestinian Authority President Abbas (Myre, 2006). The goal was to have both leaders form a united government. The negotiation did not bring success at the time though.

In 2012, an agreement was signed in Qatar between Fatah and Hamas to form an interim unity government. As the outcome, Palestinian Authority president and the leader of Fatah Abbas would be the prime minister. This was the further stage in realisation of the so-called reconciliation agreement which Hamas and Fatah signed in Cairo in 2011 (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2012). Due to ongoing disagreements, in 2016, lower-level reconciliation talks also took place in Doha, but they were cut short (*The New Arab*, 2016). In 2017, Hamas and Fatah signed a reconciliation agreement in Cairo in which Hamas agreed to yield power to the Fatah-backed Palestinian Authority. Despite reports that Hamas was dissatisfied with Qatar's role in reconciliation with Fatah, the Hamas leader praised Qatar's 'pioneering role' in improving the lives of Palestinians who live in Gaza (al-Jazeera, 2017b). Qatar's involvement in the reconciliation process between Fatah and Hamas assisted in strengthening relations with Islamist Hamas and is further evidence of Qatar's scope of adopted power implementation.

Building alliances with Hamas as Qatar's client became possible due to the role of Qatar's inner-circle elites and the funding of Islamists through Qatar's state-owned companies and charitable organisations. On October 23, 2012, the former Amir, Shaykha Moza, and the former prime minister were the first Arab Leaders to

visit Gaza since Hamas assumed power in 2007 (Ulrichsen, 2014:74-5); their intention was to make financial investments (Khatib, 2013:425-6). The Amir reciprocated by pledging more Qatari investment (from USD 250m to USD 400m) for urgently needed health, housing, and infrastructural projects in Gaza (Rudoren, 2012). However, Palmor, an Israeli spokesman for the Foreign Affairs Ministry, stated that ‘most of the money that he’s [the Amir’s] pouring in Gaza will go to Hamas’ pockets, directly or indirectly’ (ibid, 2012). He states: ‘We find it weird that the Amir does not support all of the Palestinians but sides with Hamas over the Palestinian Authority ... The Amir has chosen his camp and it is not good’ (*The Telegraph*, 2012).

Additionally, there were some reports that support was provided to Hamas through charitable organisations. In the ‘Hamas Money Laundering Scheme Explained’ (Wikileaks, 2007), the Qatar-based Eid Charity transferred funds through JP Morgan Chase. In 2008, the Israeli Defence Minister signed an order proclaiming 36 worldwide funds, members of the ‘Union of Good’, and banned organisations due to their Hamas-fundraising connections. The Chairman of the ‘Union of Good’ is Shaykh Yusuf al-Qaradawi, based in Doha, and whose importance in Qatar’s foreign policies will be discussed in the following section on the Muslim Brotherhood, of which Hamas is the affiliated Palestine branch (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2008).

Moreover, the Qatari Red Crescent raised more than USD 1m at the event where Husam Badran, a former leader of Hamas’s military wing, appeared and spoke (August 8, 2013). In December 2013, Badran tweeted his support of the bombing attacks in Tel Aviv. The Eid Charity set a goal to raise USD 30m for the Gaza Strip (Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, 2014). Finally, to maintain Qatar’s adopted power, the country also kept relationships with Hamas leadership. The former Hamas leader Khalid Mesh‘al has lived periodically in Qatar since 1999 (Roberts, 2017a). Though officially designated by the US Treasury as a ‘Specially Designated Global Terrorist’ in 2003 (U.S. Department of the Treasury, 2003), he even gave a public address at Qatar University (Wright, 2017a). Consequently, the inner-circle of Qatar’s elite funded Hamas through state-owned companies and government-linked charitable organisations, as will be discussed later in detail, and kept relationships with Hamas leadership, providing platforms for public speeches at Qatar University and in Qatar’s media as examined in Chapter Six.

There are still discussions whether Qatar supports Hamas or the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip though. Kubovich (2019) argues that between 2012 and 2018 Qatar transferred more than USD 1.1bn to the Gaza Strip, controlled by Hamas, investing in 44% for infrastructure, 40% for health care and education, and ‘the rest went to support Hamas and other groups in the Gaza Strip’. By contrast, the Qatari Committee for the Reconstruction of Gaza claimed that Qatar funded USD 700m against USD 1.1bn as argued in the *Haaretz* (ibid, 2019). Hamas spokesman Qassem stated that ‘Qatar has played an important role in supporting the infrastructure of the Gaza Strip for many years, but it does not support Hamas’ (Amer, 2019).

In November 2018 Israel allowed Qatar to start a six-month cash infusion of USD 90m into Gaza in order to pay civil servant wages and for fuel, in January 2019 the third cash donation as USD 15m for Gaza civil servants was held by Israel (*The Jerusalem Post*, 2019) due to violence on the border. The former defence minister said that Qatari payments are ‘the continuation of the process of surrendering to terrorists and Hamas’ (ibid, 2019). Qatar Foreign Minister Mohammad bin ‘Abdulahman al-Thani stated in his speech at the Munich Security Conference in 2019 (Amer, 2019): ‘[Qatar] will continue to support the Gaza Strip’, though denying that it funds groups that are labelled as terrorist, including Hamas, but rather ‘trying to put an end to the humanitarian crisis in Gaza’. Consequently, Qatar’s role in the reconciliation process between Hamas and Fatah assisted in keeping an open relationship with both parties. Though Qatar funds the Hamas-controlled Gaza Strip, but denies directly supporting Hamas, which contradicts Israel’s stance, it indicates that Qatar’s ongoing support of the Gaza Strip territories is for political purposes as will be discussed.

#### **4.3.2. Direct alliances with Islamists as a scope of adopted power**

Another way Qatar builds alliances with political Islam non-state actors is through direct client-alliances. For example, during the Arab Spring, Qatar significantly assisted Islamists with whom they had long cultivated links, and who came to power in Egypt and Tunisia. They further supported Islamists in their efforts to gain power in Libya and Syria. Moreover, not limited to the Arab Spring, Qatar directly built alliances with other Islamists, as will be discussed in the section on Qatar’s assistance to Islamists who came to power in northern Mali in 2012.

#### 4.3.2.1. The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt

The Muslim Brotherhood (*al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun*), originated in Egypt and emerged as Qatar's main client for wielding adopted power. This alliance presented an opportunity for Qatar's political rise in the region as it became the key backer of the Muslim Brotherhood for decades (Khatib, 2013). The alliance became especially possible due to hosting Muslim Brotherhood in Doha. For example, from the 1950s and 1960s, Qatar gave jobs to exiles from Iraq, Egypt, Syria because of their Muslim Brotherhood sympathies. Muslim Brotherhood members and sympathisers were welcomed in Qatar (including all the GCC states) which used their higher level of education to create and staff the main ministries, particularly the pro-education ministry in Qatar. Among Muslim Brotherhood sympathisers hosted in Doha and who influenced the education system in Qatar include: Kamal Naji, 'Abd al-Mu'az 'Abd al-Sattar, and Yusuf al-Qaradawi (Roberts, 2017a). For example, the role of Shaykh al-Qaradawi in developing the education sector in Qatar can be viewed in his leading and renovating the established Religious Institute, and later founding and emerging as the dean of the College of Shari'a and Islamic Studies at Qatar University (Freer, 2016b). While in that time, the Muslim Brotherhood influence had intellectual and social impact in Qatar's society (ibid, 2016b), during the Arab Spring the Qatar-Muslim Brotherhood extensively cultivated links that allowed Qatar to benefit from both media and political Islam non-state actors for wielding adopted power.

Specifically, as discussed in Chapter Six, al-Jazeera was a crucial platform for the popular religious appeal of Shaykh al-Qaradawi, the spiritual leader of the Doha-based Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, an outspoken supporter of the Tunisian, Egyptian, Libyan, and Syrian uprisings and also championed by Qatar (Khatib, 2013). There is consensus among scholars of the important role al-Qaradawi plays in Qatar's objectives and wielding adopted power. As associate professor at Hamad bin Khalifa University, Wright (2017a) describes him, '... [he is] well-connected with the elites and he will be seen as someone who has a network that Qatar elites can draw from'. Therefore, Wright concludes that al-Qaradawi 'help[ed] Qatar achieve a foreign policy goal'.

Moreover, the research fellow at LSE, Freer (2016a), specifies that Qatar's inner-circle elite-driven policies and the specific characterisation of adopted power



implementation, is based on the unique position of Shaykh al-Qaradawi in Qatar. She states:

I do think it also has something to do with personal links with members of the al-Thani family. Shaykh Khalifa [Amir of Qatar, 1972-1995], for instance, was very close with him, was not a Muslim Brotherhood supporter, but was very close with him, kind of [al Qaradawi was his] spiritual advisor. So, I think he still has a very close position and if you see the members of al-Thani family greet al-Qaradawi, they do the tribal greeting, rather than a more formal one which you would expect from some who is not Qatari.

Despite such connections there is a lack of evidence that Muslim Brotherhood members received financial support from Qatar before Islamists attained power in Egypt, though it is likely, considering the close links between the Qatari inner-circle elites and members of the Muslim Brotherhood. Though, in April 2016 the Qatar National Bank was hacked, and information related to Qatari finance was leaked online. The 1.4 GB of data were organised into nine folders: ‘al-Jazeera’; ‘al-Thani’; ‘Defence etc.’; ‘Gov’; ‘Mukhabarat’ (Arabic for intelligence services); ‘Policy, Security’; ‘Spy, Intelligence’, and a separate folder called ‘al-Qaradawi’ (Tomlinson, 2016). From one side, hacked information might serve as evidence that Qatar executed long-term strategic aims in allying with the Muslim Brotherhood members to assist Islamist representatives come to power. However, according to some sceptics (Hamedi, 2017) this incident might be questioned.

Consequently, even with no clear evidence of financial support Qatar’s inner-circle elite’s links with the Muslim Brotherhood individuals, as demonstrated in the example of al-Qaradawi, is important to consider vis-à-vis Qatar wielding adopted power. Thanks to providing him refuge in Doha, they benefited from his status as a spiritual leader of the Muslim Brotherhood and so contributed to the adoption of the Muslim Brotherhood—a political Islam non-state actor—as a client of Qatar. Moreover, Qatar also benefited from al-Qaradawi’s networks among Islamists and followers in the Middle East who acted to bring Islamists to power after watching coverage of him by al-Jazeera. Therefore, the media coverage of al-Qaradawi and other Islamists provided by al-Jazeera contributed to the Mohammad Morsi, a representative of the Muslim Brotherhood, coming to power in Egypt; then by providing financial, diplomatic, and material support of Islamists in power (Roberts,

2014), Qatar tried to get political advantage from the Muslim Brotherhood in power as this opened opportunities for regional leadership as discussed later.

When the Muslim Brotherhood came to power in Egypt, Qatar adopted Islamists even more clearly, through state-owned companies and with inner-circle elite-driven policies. In 2012 the former prime minister, one of the inner-circle of Qatar's elite (see Chapter Two), Hamad bin Jasim, proclaimed during a state visit that Qatar would invest USD 18bn in Egypt over five years, stating that there would be 'no limit' to Qatar's support for the Muslim-Brotherhood-ruled state that was struggling to seek conventional funds to balance Egypt's budget. Hamad bin Jasim said that USD 10bn was planned to fund the building of a tourism marina complex on the Mediterranean coastline, and another USD 8bn would be invested in an integrated natural gas, power plant, and iron steel project in Port Said. This proclamation was limited in detail, and did not explain how such investments would be distributed nor was there mention of aid (Ulrichsen, 2014). Financial connections were established between Qatar and Egypt, however, a partnership between the private equity firm Nile Capital and one of Hamad bin Jasim's sons, Jabir, was declared with the stated goal to establish a USD 250m fund to invest in education within MENA (ibid, 2014). However, with the Muslim Brotherhood's failure, and with al-Sisi coming to power, everything changed in 2013. With failure of the Muslim Brotherhood, Qatar's ambitious plans also 'failed to materialise' (Khatib, 2014:4), as will be discussed in a later section.

#### **4.3.2.2. Al-Nahda in Tunisia**

Qatar also developed relations with Tunisian al-Nahda, originally inspired by the Muslim Brotherhood ideology from Egypt, though officially referred to as Islamic rather than an Islamist party (Lewis, 2011). Roberts (2017a:131) correctly explains relations between Qatar and al-Nahda, stating: 'According to the logic of "we know it happens, but there is no proof"'. Different interpretations exist in academia about Qatar and al-Nahda's relationship as well. Mezran (2017), the resident senior fellow from the Atlantic Council's Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East, suggests, 'It is possible. Qatar has used its network for definite in Tunisia, there is a lot of talk of Qatar supporting al-Nahda'. In contrast, Doha-based Georgetown University Professor Kamrava (2017), believes that 'al-Nahda has proven to be an independent

actor'. Similarly, as discussed above in the Muslim Brotherhood case, the Qatar and al-Nahda alliance became possible due to a lot of important personal connections and shared histories between Qatar and al-Nahda politicians (Roberts, 2017a). For example, Rached Ghannouchi (co-founder of al-Nahda) was often a visitor to Doha and regularly appears in al-Jazeera, along with Moncef Marzouki (president of Tunisia, 2011 to 2014). The former director general of al-Jazeera, Khanfar, during our interview (2016) also acknowledged that 'Like Marzouki in Tunisia', whom Mr Khanfar identifies as 'not an Islamist, but also Qataris have very good relations with him, because he proved, he is a choice of the public. When he became the President in Tunisia'. Though with limited clear evidence of financial support of al-Nahda before the Islamists reached power, it is highly possible that Qatar developed links with al-Nahda representatives.

Qatar's strong financial support of Tunisia occurred when they came to power. Commercial relations between Qatar and Tunisia boomed after the Arab Spring in 2011 and the coming to power of the al-Nahda (Islamist)-led government. In 2012 Qatar declared plans to build a refinery on Tunisia's Gulf of Gabes coast at La Skhira with a production of 120,000 barrels per day. The USD 2bn project would permit Tunisia to refine oil from Libya and develop an export hub for refined products, hugely improving on the aging Bizerte refinery which produces 35,000 barrels per day. Also, in 2012 Qatar supported the rebalancing of Tunisia's central bank in order to overcome a failing external balance problem, and Qatar Petroleum International supported vocational training in Tunisia's hydrocarbons sector (Ulrichsen, 2014). Ultimately, al-Nahda emerged as another Islamist group with which Qatar built an alliance to wield adopted power.

#### **4.3.2.3. Libyan Islamic Fighting Group**

Qatar built alliances with political Islam non-state actors in Libya before the Arab Spring as well, and such connections gave it confidence to intervene and provide military support for Libyan rebels in their efforts to come to power. Qatar also wanted to see Doha-backed Islamists in power though it did not happen as expected. Qatar was the first Arab state to acknowledge the rebel government, the National Transitional Council (NTC). Qatar also played a vital role within the Arab League in removing Gaddafi's representatives from the League in February 2011 and

influencing the United Nations to create no-fly zones in Libya in March (Krauss, 2011). Qatar provided key legitimacy to NATO coalition forces in Libya by facilitating six Mirage jets to oversee the no-fly zone. It also provided rebels with weapons, assault rifles, and anti-tank missiles, while Qatari Special Forces offered key infantry training in Libya (Roberts, 2017a). At the culmination of Qatar's military intervention in Libya after it was stormed, Qatar's flag was raised in Gaddafi's Bab al-Aziziya compound in Tripoli (Davidson, 2016). Qatar contributed to removing Gaddafi from power, and then developed old and established new links with political Islam non-state actors, its Libyan clients, again, for power projection. In doing so, Qatar continued to take advantage of its wealth as the key driver of adopted power.

Qatar's investments in Libya increased after the fall of the Gaddafi regime and the coming to power of the Qatar-backed National Transitional Council (NTC). Having transferred USD 400m to NTC to support their war effort, Qatar National Bank (QNB) Group bought 49% of Libya's Bank of Commerce and Development. This once again demonstrates how Qatar wielded adopted power using political Islam non-state actors, considering that the Qatar Investment Authority owns 50% of the QNB Group (Ulrichsen, 2014), and former Prime Minister Hamad bin Jasim's active role during the Libyan revolution, as former vice-chairman and CEO of the Qatar Investment Authority. Davidson, (2016:299) comments on Qatar's relations with Islamists: 'Seemingly also underpinning the deal was an agreement, made only a day before Doha recognized the NTC as Libya's official government, in which Qatar was granted exclusive access to rebel-held oil and was allowed to market and sell it on behalf of the new Libya'. As Takin asks: 'is this [NTC] representing the Libyan people? Only two countries have accepted that' (Al-Jazeera, 2011). Tarhouni, the NTC's oil and finance minister similarly stated that Qatar provided armaments to 'people that we don't know' and 'paid money to just about anybody ... they intervened in committees that have control over security issues' (Kenner, 2011). All of this indicates that Qatar's financial support of Libyan Islamists were attempts to bring them to power, or, in other words, to empower their clients in Libya.

Thought it seems the number of clients might not be clearly identified, as the personal stories of scholars travelling to, or spending time in Doha at the time suggest, many Libyans came to Qatar in order to get support from the Qataris. The lecturer at King's College London, Roberts (2017b), states: 'I attended dinners in Doha where people were openly asking for money and weapons, just in the name of the revolution.

It was a crazy time, so you know, it was disorganised, so money and God knows what just poured in ...'. Similarly, the research fellow at Middle East Centre at LSE, Freer (2016a), remembers: 'When I was in Qatar in 2010-2012, there were tons of Libyans around, coming in and out, and I think there were attempts at mediating that conflict to a certain extent. But there was also a sense that they were trying to shape it. [...]'

Exeter University Professor Emeritus Niblock (2017) states that after the fall of the Gaddafi regime there was:

A center for Libyan studies or something like that which was established in Qatar ... I went to one of their conferences, and it was quite clear to me that the people running this were Libyan Islamists, and they were clearly getting money from the Qatar government. But to try to understand who it was actually who was funding them, and who had decided this, was very difficult. Because I went to the conference [...] and I knew one of the Libyans who was involved in it, and, the financing of it all seemed to take place through suitcases of money, and who was producing this money and how it was coming there...

Qatar aligned with different Libyan groups with Islamist ideologies, however, since money is distributed between people, evidence of its final destination is difficult to determine.

Though observers conclude that the al-Qaeda-affiliated Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, (*al-Jama'a al-Islamiyyah al-Muqatilah*) (TRAC, 2019a), is a long-time client of Qatar. Similar to the Muslim Brotherhood and al-Nahda, as mentioned, Qatar's building of alliances with Libyan Islamists became possible mainly due to long-term connections with individuals. For example, Ali al-Sallabi lived in Doha in 1999, afterwards he accepted a settlement with Gaddafi led by Qatar and returned to Libya to establish an Islamist de-radicalisation programme (Khatib, 2013). Personal connections made by the inner-circle elites in order to build alliances with Islamists for adopted power implementation can be considered in the following example. The Resident Fellow at the Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East at the Atlantic Council, Mezran (2017) suggests, 'I remember al-Sallabi telling me in 2011 that the Amir of Qatar told him that between him and Qaddafi was a personal issue, and he would support anybody to get rid from Qaddafi [...]'. Mezran continues:

Ali al-Sallabi is still in Doha, he is protected by them [Qatar] and he is supported by them [Qatar] and from there [Qatar] he travels all over, to Libya as well in other European countries and Turkey, spreading his

books and trying to maintain ideological strength to his position. His position which is also the Qatari position is that of creating a strong network of Islamist organisations, which includes, and I should say, some of the jihadists groups, because al-Sallabi [is] convinced that he can talk to them, because he told me personally, I was in jail for 8 years with these people, I know all of them, I know how to talk to them, so he is trying to create a political network of Islamist organisations to play a role in the Libyan transition. Now as of today I don't know what his plan is, or [if] it [has] any chance of success.

Other representatives of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (Doha-linked but not hosted) are Ali's brother Ismail who played a role as a rebel after the 17 February Revolution, and Abdul Hakim Bilhaj who became the commander of the Tripoli Military Council during the 17 February revolution. In 2011 Qatar organised a meeting between Bilhaj and NATO officials, even while the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group was designated a terrorist organisation in 2004 by the US (Khatib, 2013). Cultivated links between Qatar's inner-circle elite with individuals from the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group became important for building alliances with the political Islam non-state actor.

Therefore, observers have identified the active Islamist groups in Libya which they believe are supported by Qatar, the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, the Libyan Ferrari 17 Brigade, and the Rafallah al-Sehati militia (Davidson, 2016; Ulrichsen, 2014). Though at the beginning of the ongoing Gulf Crisis the Anti-Terror Quartet also identified Saraya Defend Benghazi, which has a similar ideology to al-Qaeda (TRAC, 2019b), as linked with Qatar among others (see Appendix C). Analysing Qatar's policies under Shaykh Tamim, Mezran (2017) believes: 'The substance of Qatari policy is in my opinion to continue to support the al-Sallabi and militias in Misrata. Whether they do it openly or hidden, it is hard to say. I am sure there is a lot of hidden support for it'. Though there might be different clients in Libya that Qatar tried to benefit from, the long-term cultivated alliances might be identified between Qatar and the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group.

#### **4.3.2.4. Al-Nusra Front (*Jabhat Fateh al-Sham*) in Syria**

Developing the trend of attempting to gain advantage through relationships with political Islam non-state actors, Qatar also tried to adopt clients in Syria. Qatar distributed money to the rebels through relatively straightforward channels,

sometimes funding the Free Syrian Army and the Syrian National Council directly. In 2012, after the former Prime Minister Hamad bin Jasim's promise of Qatar's intention to assist 'Syrian opposition [...] by all means', in two days 'anti-Assad officials' received USD 100m by the Qatar-backed Libyan National Transitional Council, presented as humanitarian aid from Libya to Syria (Chulov, 2012). After further funding by Qatar, the Syrian National Council stated that they would prevent any confusion by serving as the 'link between those who want to help and the revolutionaries' (Davidson, 2016:322). Hamad bin Jasim stated that, 'We should do whatever necessary to help them, including giving them weapons to defend themselves' (Chulov, 2012). Qatar's inner-circle elites openly stated the importance of supporting Islamists in Syria, and Davidson's (2016:323) clarification on meetings between Qatar's inner-circle elite and Islamist representatives illustrates adopted power implementation: '...while perhaps even more remarkably others reported that al-Nusra's leaders had begun to visit Doha in person and, according to both US officials and those of other Arab governments, had held meetings with senior Qatari officials and key financiers'. In other words, Qatari inner-circle elites acknowledged supporting opposition groups, and held meetings with them, especially with al-Nusra Front with the purpose of projecting Qatar's adopted power.

As Qatar's client, al-Nusra Front received media coverage and financial support from the state, as will be discussed in Chapter Six. The roles and identities of individual fundraisers for the Syrian Islamists are worth investigating, since some appear to have connections with Doha-based charities, which were important for money distribution. Shaykh Eid's Charity has been implicated in Qatar's attempts to raise and channel money to Madid Ahl al-Sham, ostensibly a Doha-based online charity set up in August 2013, and frequently accused of masking as a fundraising campaign for al-Nusra, al-Qa'ida's affiliate in Syria. It is one of the preferred channels for donations for those loyal to al-Qa'ida leader Ayman al-Zawahri (Warrick and Root, 2013). The fundraising campaign is led by Sa'd bin Sa'd Muhammad Shariyan al-Ka'bi and Abd al-Latif Bin Adallah Salih Muhammad al-Kawari, both in the US Treasury's Specially Designated Global Terrorists list. According to CNN's Burnett's (2014) documentary *Are Terrorists Raising Money in Qatar?*, Kabi's Facebook profile requested donations of USD 1,500 to prepare fighters by arming, feeding, and treating al-Qa'ida-linked groups and advocates of al-Nusra Front: 'Whoever wished to support the jihadist factions ... vua@mdd\_sham'. CNN states, just days after they aired the

report, al-Ka‘bi removed his poster from his profile claiming that ‘he would not tell us how much he raised, but in sum he asks Allah to bless people of Qatar for raising USD 1.4m’.

In addition, according to the Qatari newspaper, *al-Arab*, Madid Ahl al-Sham worked with a Qatari Volunteer Center on a project to help Syrian refugees. The centre was supervised by the Qatar Ministry of Culture. Zarate, the former National Security advisor for combating terrorism, comments that this incident stresses the role of inner-circle elites in adopted power implementation: ‘Qatar operates as a monarchy, its officials, its activities [are] following [the] orders of [the] government. And to the extent [that] there is [a] policy of supporting extremists in the region, that’s a policy [which] comes from the top’ (Burnett, 2014). However, it should be noted that in 2014 Qatari authorities shut down Madad al-Sham on the grounds that it ‘was suspected of sending funds to violent extremist elements in Syria’. Indeed, some individual fundraisers are difficult to link to the government’s activities, though it seems al-Nusra Front received money from Qatar-based fundraisers, which are linked with Doha-based charities.

Qatar’s inner-circle elite tried to avoid defining the al-Nusra Front as a terrorist organisation. For example, during his first interview with CNN, Shaykh Tamim stated that it would be a ‘big mistake’ to identify all Islamists in Syria as extremists, and as Dickinson (2014) clarifies in 2014, ‘in all its recent statements rejecting extremism, Doha has mentioned the Islamic State but never al-Nusra Front by name’. Moreover, Weinberg (2017:6) argues, ‘it is particularly vital to evaluate Qatar’s record on terror finance in light of the Nusra Front’s July 2016 decision to rebrand itself as Jabhat Fateh al-Sham (JFS), which purports to have “no relationship with any foreign party”’. Weinberg (2017:6) refers to Reuters’ (Karouny, 2015) cited sources, and states: ‘Qatar led an effort starting in 2015 to bolster the Syrian opposition by persuading Nusra to distance itself from al-Qaeda’. The Middle East research fellow at RUSI, and the head of RUSI Qatar, Stephens (2017), does not clarify al-Nusra as Qatar’s client, believing that Qatar did not achieve strategic objectives from building alliances with al-Nusra though explaining their engagement with al-Nusra as possible due to popularity of Islamists: ‘[...] Qatar saw where the wind was blowing ... looked at Nusra [which] ... were kind of the big player at that point’. He continues:



[...] I think they thought they could control Julani [the leader of al-Nusra Front]. I think they thought they could turn Nusra into Ahrar al-Sham. And it went the other way ... they got the calculation wrong. I think that they tried and I know that they have tried to make Nusra divorce itself from al-Qaeda and become a kind of Syrian front group. Through which they would have influence in the whole of Syria, which they could then I guess merge into Ahrar al-Sham, they wouldn't be nice guys, but they wouldn't be terrorists.

He concludes by arguing that, 'The question in my mind is did they get anything strategic from this, and the answer is "no"'. Indeed, Qatar's building alliances with al-Nusra Front was far more costly as the later section of this chapter on costs demonstrates. Still, considering that Qatar provided financial support, and media coverage of al-Nusra Front, it tried to avoid identifying the group as terrorist, al-Qa'ida-affiliated, which illustrates another example of them as Qatar's client.

#### **4.3.2.5. Islamists in Northern Mali**

Finally, there have been strong suggestions with regard to Qatar's role in the Islamist takeover in northern Mali in 2012, indicating that the funding of Islamists was facilitated by the Qatar Red Crescent. Khatib (2013:426) believes that the Qatari Red Crescent in Mali was active supporting refugees and centring humanitarian interventions otherwise rejected by Islamists in the north, who rejected collaboration with the International Red Cross. Qatari Red Crescent's privileged access, as the only humanitarian organisation granted passage to the north by the Islamists, is what led to the emergence of allegations about the nature of their work. The most explicit criticism came from Algeria and France (Ulrichsen, 2014). The French satirical and investigative magazine, *Le Canard Enchaîné*, published a stream of allegations that the Qatari Red Crescent team was a front, and that Doha was intervening to fund militias in northern Mali. One accusation even said that Qatari Special Forces were training rebels connected to Ansar Dine, in a way reminiscent of their actions in support of Bilhaj's Tripoli Brigade in Libya. It was alleged that information was created by the French Military Intelligence Directorate, however no evidence was presented (ibid, 2014:152). Qatar was also accused of having connections to Ansar Dine (Lambert and Warner, 2012). Consequently, French newspaper claims seem fairly credible allegations uniting the factions under the umbrella of adopted power as

how Qatar builds alliances with political Islam non-state actors. Charitable organisations played an essential role in funding Islamists in northern Mali as well.

#### **4.4. Qatar's adopted power domain: building alliances with political Islam non-state actors**

Considering the scope of Qatari adopted power, specifically alliances with Hizbullah, Houthis, Hamas, the Muslim Brotherhood, al-Nahda, the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, al-Nusra Front, the Islamists in northern Mali, Qatar's adopted power is thus identified towards the Islamic world (Lebanon, Yemen, Palestine, Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, Syria, Mali). And this is because of worldwide transnational networks of Islamists, that Qatar's domain is global. For example, due to alliances with the Muslim Brotherhood as Qatar's main clients, Qatar influenced not only Egypt, where the organisation was launched in 1928 by Hasan al-Banna (Nada and Thompson, 2012), but also the Muslim Brotherhood's well-established international network, within and beyond the Islamic world (Parliament. House of Commons, 2015). These include branches in: Yemen, Palestine, Afghanistan (Helbawy, 2010), Algeria, Bahrain, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Libya, Morocco, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, and Turkey (Counter Extremism Project, 2019a), Indonesia, Lebanon, Pakistan (Hroub, 2010), the US, Europe (Spain, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Scandinavia (Bakker and Meijer, 2013), Sweden, Italy, Switzerland, and the UK (Vidino, 2005).

There are at least 39 organisations under the umbrella of the Muslim Brotherhood in the UK, including human rights NGOs, charities, media companies, community service associations, and think tanks (Parliament. House of Commons, 2015; Liberal Democracy Institute, 2017). Such a transnational network has provided an opportunity for Qatar to have a domain of adopted power with supporters and affiliates in the above-mentioned countries, while building alliances with the Muslim Brotherhood as its client. Consequently, the transnational network of political Islam non-state actors assisted in developing a domain of adopted power of Qatar internationally: from the Islamic world to Europe and the US as *Figure 4.1.* illustrates.



Figure 4.1. Qatar’s adopted power domain: building alliances with political Islam non-state actors (personal collection).

#### 4.5. The weight of Qatar’s adopted power: building alliances with Political Islam non-state actors

##### 4.5.1. Taking advantage of the popularity of Islamists as weight of Qatar’s adopted power

As an indirect way of allying with Islamists, weight through mediation should not be viewed as a result of mediation alone as demonstrated above, because they all failed. But there were opportunities provided by mediation to keep relationships with Islamists and gain advantage from alliances with them. As Khatib (2013:418) argues: ‘While it can be argued that painting an image of the country as a benevolent mediator is a public diplomacy move by Qatar - since neutrality makes it easier to cultivate credibility among multiple audiences - there are more profound motivations behind Qatar’s expansive approach to mediating conflict and, by extension, its foreign policy’. Qatar’s involvement in mediation attempts assisted its self-portrayal as a neutral

broker while also keeping or strengthening relations with Islamists, as demonstrated earlier. This also assisted Qatar in gaining political advantages such as receiving Arab popularity, thanks to the popularity of Islamists, and therefore, increasing its power as a regional player as illustrated by Qatari alliances with Hizbullah and Hamas, and connected with the Arab support of these actions against Israel as well.

Focusing on the first case, as discussed, before the 2008 mediation attempts, Qatar had already developed relations with Hizbullah, supporting it in the war against Israel. Qatar's behaviour is connected with the popularity of Hizbullah among Arabs at that time, an attempt to take political advantage from this support. The MENA programme officer at Emirati International Renewable Energy Agency, formerly Qatar University member, Hamedi (2017), explains: 'I can tell you myself for example, I am a Muslim, Sunni, I am from Algeria, and I was totally supportive of Hizbullah, in all its wars ... against Israel, as long as it was fighting Israel. And I think the opinion, the general opinion in the Arab world ... was very supportive of Hizbullah'.

Moreover, a former deputy head and senior research fellow at Chatham House, currently working at the Elders Foundation, Kinninmont (2017), connects the support of Hizbullah with support of Hamas by Qatar, which will be discussed below. She believes it is 'quite strongly, to some extent they [Qatar] have probably had some sympathy with Hizbullah against Israel'. However, along with its stance on the Israel conflict, which will always be popular, RUSI Research Fellow Stephens (2017) also states '[it] was going to show [some] sort of leadership'. Highlighting the role of inner-circle elites, such as the former amir and the prime minister, Stephens (2017) continues: '... Hamad being Hamad, he wanted to lead, he wanted to do something good, and it was ... It wasn't the Palestinian cause for saving, but ... it was a good ego-stroking mission for him. And I think it was a highly personal for him and Hamad bin Jassam'. Consequently, as an added value for the purpose of adopted power, Qatar received popularity thanks to that of Islamists amongst Arabs, especially in the 2000s.

#### **4.5.2. Competing with regional heavyweights for influence as weight of Qatar's adopted power**

Qatar's mediation attempts, and keeping relationships with political Islam non-state actors can be considered as evidence of efforts to challenge the heavyweights'

power in the region, particularly Iran and Saudi Arabia, with the result being the enlargement of Qatar's regional power. As Khatib (2013) explains, during the mediation between Iran-backed non-state actors (Hizbullah and Houthis) and their rivals, Qatar attempted to counter Iranian influence in the Middle East, while keeping cordial relationships with Iran. By contrast, another interpretation emerged such as Qatar's mediation efforts with participations of Hizbullah. This feeds into the narrative that Qatar somehow is an accomplice of Iran in undermining the rest of the Arab Gulf states, and this is part of the reason why Qatar is often seen as being complicit with Iran's regional expansionist foreign policies and its hegemonic ambitions (Al-Hasan, 2017).

Considering this interpretation, Qatar's policies might be viewed as alliances with Iranian-backed militias to counter Saudi Arabia, and Saudi's allies' power, while destabilising their domestic stability. Finally, though Qatar's actions also might indicate competition with Iran. For example, along with gaining popularity through alliances with Hamas, the visit of the former amir to Gaza in 2012 also made Iran 'the central loser in this drama' (Roberts, 2012). As Ulrichsen (2014:75) explains, replacing Iran as the main funder of Hamas and supporting the Islamists assisted in its departure from Iranian-allied Syria, and assisted in weakening Iran's power. Consequently, either to counter or weaken Iranian power, or ally with it against other Arab states, all interpretations of Qatar's actions might suggest an open opportunity to increase Qatar's own regional power, as a weight of adopted power.

At the same time, the outcome of mediation that helped keep relations with Islamists, assisted in increasing Qatar's political leverage in contrast to Saudi Arabia. Historically, Saudi played an important role in the conflicts in the Middle East (Khatib, 2013). However, due the perception of mediation efforts in the Lebanese case, as to the limited neutrality of Saudi Arabia, as Khatib (2011:419) concludes: 'Qatar thus perceived a vacuum in the Arab international relations which it has been attempting to fill. Its involvement in conflicts across the Middle East and beyond represents an effort to present itself as a viable alternative to Saudi Arabia and a potential new leader in the Middle East'. As a result, with the decreasing political role of Saudi Arabia and neighbours, Qatar increased its own political leverage.

### 4.5.3. Emergence as a regional power as weight of Qatar's adopted power

Direct alliances with Islamists provided an opportunity for regional leadership, when Islamists came to power, especially the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. As inner-circle elite-driven policies identifies adopted power, the former Amir Shaykh Hamad saw that the: 'Arab Spring is going to change the Middle East, the Arab World, he [Shaykh Hamad] believed that it is going to succeed, the time has come that this is history in the making, and he wanted to be on the right side of the history', as formerly Doha-based academic Baabood states (2017). Consequently, Qatar supported the Muslim Brotherhood as a strategic tool and partner (ibid, 2017), as they believed that they could use Egypt as a sphere of influence even though they did not realise how small a group they were (Kamrava, 2017). Qatari's calculations that Khatib (2014:4) presents are as follows: 'Qatar's desire to be a stakeholder in the new governments in transitioning countries drove it to wholeheartedly financially and best chance of getting to power and thus of safeguarding Qatar's interests'.

Though former Director General Khanfar (2016) of al-Jazeera disagrees, believing that

all these accusations against Morsi of communication with Qatar [in 2017, the Egyptian court sentenced ousted president Morsi of the Muslim Brotherhood accusing him of spying for Qatar (Ahmed and Markey, 2017)], it is nonsense, because Morsi had independent policies and Qataris had supported the results of elections in Egypt, but they never really drew a map for Morsi how to handle Egypt, or for al-Ghannouchi how to handle Tunisia.

Consequently, the alliance between Qatar and the Muslim Brotherhood provided an opportunity to apply the sphere of influence in the country which has historically been the regional heavyweight. Though only for a short-term, as discussed later, Qatar-allied Islamists' power was not long-term.

The transnational network of Islamists, especially the Muslim Brotherhood with all its affiliated branches, provided Qatar with the opportunity to emerge as a state with powerful forces within political Islam. Research fellow at LSE, Freer (2016a), believes that by supporting Islamists abroad, Qatar can gain support from their followers while also expanding their power not only in the Middle East but also in other parts of the Muslim world – becoming, to some extent, a voice for Sunni nationalism. Moreover, Baabood (2017) observes that Shaykh Hamad saw that he

could not control other groups, and the only active groups are political Islam, because all other groups have been discredited. He explains: ‘within political Islam you have Salafism, almost controlled by Saudi Arabia, we have the Shi’a, controlled by Iran, so he has only the Brotherhood, and, to be able to use them [...] and also, he enjoys this relationship with them, [...]’. Consequently, alliance with the Muslim Brotherhood has been expected to bring wider support of the state of Qatar from supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood, as a result, it has emerged as a regional power, with a leading, influential force within political Islam.

Alliance with the Muslim Brotherhood also offered an opportunity to compete with other regional powers, such as Saudi Arabia and Iran. The MENA programme officer at the Emirati International Renewable Energy Agency, Hamedi, claims (2017) that the Muslim Brotherhood is the main power in the region on which they could rely: ‘In Qatar’s calculations is the following: if Islamists arrive to power, Qatar is building for themselves a network of relationship and alliances with powerful countries in the region, through which Qatar will be able to liberate themselves from the Saudi hand and Saudi control over them’. Hamedi (2017) strongly believes that Qatar’s alliances with Islamists are an issue of power. If Qatar can help political movements like those in Egypt or Tunisia to accede to power, Qatar would strengthen its regional relationships and become more autonomous from Saudi Arabia and Iran. Moreover, Freer (2016a) argues that alliance with the Muslim Brotherhood is expected to help challenge the Saudi role as a guardian of Sunni Islam, the guardian of the Faith and guardian of the proper means to be a Muslim, a Sunni Muslim. Therefore, political Islam serves as a means of extending a state’s power, and due to the transnational nature of the Islamists and popularity of the Muslim Brotherhood, specifically during the Arab Spring, this assisted Qatar’s weight in the region as well.

#### **4.5.4. Counter actions against its political rivals as weight of Qatar’s adopted power**

Qatar’s alliances with Islamists during the Arab Spring led to other regional events in which Qatar also tried to benefit from alliances with political Islam non-state actors, specifically to counter its political rivals’ power. The support of the Muslim Brotherhood and alliances with other Islamists are viewed as some of the reasons behind the two crises between Qatar and its neighbours in 2014, and ongoing since

2017, as discussed later. Despite the first dispute with its neighbours, Qatar kept alliances with Islamists and its backed their governments, such as Iran. As discussed, Qatar officially developed cordial relations with Iran, and at the same time followed the Saudi-led block to counter Iranian, destabilising behaviour in the region. However, as Doha-based Zweiri (2017) explains: '[Qatar has] no interests to close the door completely with any partner. So, they may keep the door just ten percent open and they can't close the door. This applies to Iran'. In other words, despite conflicts of interest with Iran (such as the Syrian war), and following the Saudi's block against Iran, Qatar and Iran still developed pragmatic relations even after the first Gulf Crisis.

However, during the ongoing Gulf Crisis 2017, Qatar has changed its policies, trying to benefit from alliances with Islamists with whom it left the door open, using such alliances against the Anti-Terror Quartet. In December 2018 in the Doha Forum, rather than discussing the destabilising behaviour of Iran, the Iranian Foreign Minister Zarif said: 'Unfortunately, Saudi Arabia does not want to reduce tension. Actually, Saudi Arabia believes that it is [in its] interest to increase tension' (Press TV, 2018). In January 2019, only the two heads of state, including Qatar, of all other Arab League member-states, attended the Arab Economic and Development Summit in Lebanon (Ahmad and Houssari, 2019), and afterwards, Qatar announced its investing USD 500m for the purchase of Lebanese bonds to support the Lebanese economy (Al-Lawati and Fattah, 2019). That might be interpreted as another way of interaction and indirect support of Hizbullah. This is because Hizbullah was expected to increase in strength and increase their share of seats in Lebanon's parliamentary elections in May 2018 (Yee and Sa'd, 2019), the first state parliamentary elections in nine years (El Deeb, 2019). Consequently, in Lebanon's newly formed government, which coalesced after about nine months of deadlock (Yee and Sa'd, 2019), Hizbullah and its allies' gained control with two-thirds of all key government ministers (Maksad, 2019). Though such a political deadlock deepened economic woes (El Deeb, 2019), Qatar assisted in them overcoming this. By doing so, wielding adopted power, Qatar helped to bolster the economy of the state where the Islamists gained political power and lead the key ministerial positions.

It seems that Qatar is attempting to take over Saudi Arabia's influence in Lebanese politics. This culminated in 2017, when Lebanese Prime-Minister Sa'd al-Hariri, under pressure of Saudi Arabia, announced his resignation (though afterwards he rescinded his resignation). Such an incident was considered an effort from Saudi



Arabia to counter Iranian power ‘by collapsing Mr. Hariri’s government, which includes Hezbollah, the Shiite militia and political party that is Iran’s Lebanese ally’ (Barnard, 2017). Subsequently, Qatar’s purchase of Lebanese bonds in the country ruled by a Hizbullah-influenced government, might identify Qatar’s counter-influence policies towards the Anti-Terror Quartet, especially Saudi Arabia.

Qatar’s actions are also connected with strengthening the Islamist block in the region. The ongoing Gulf Crisis clearly divided involved states into two blocks: the Anti-Terror Quartet following moderate Islam (Salama, 2015), and Qatar which used to be and decided to remain friends with Islamists. This assists it to continue with an independent policy and to counter the power of the Anti-Terror Quartet. Despite sectarian conflicts in the region, it seems that Islamists always have pragmatic alliances with each other. An example of this is Sunni extremist connection to Iranian militias. Documents released ‘secret dealings’ between Iran and al-Qa’ida. A 19-page document written by a senior member of al-Qa’ida discuss arrangements to strike American interests in ‘Saudi Arabia and the Gulf’, and Shia Iran provided Sunni militias with ‘money, arms’ and ‘training in Hizbullah camps in Lebanon’ (Ensor, 2017). The CIA-released Bin Ladin files (in 2017) demonstrate insight into al-Qa’ida and Iran as a pragmatic alliance against Saudi Arabia and the US (Stancati and Fitch, 2017).

Analysing the behaviour of Qatar towards the organisations mentioned earlier, Qatar appears to have had no known difficulties in dealing with them. For example, though Doha still denies connections with al-Qa’ida and the Islamic State (IS) (Keatinge, 2017), as discussed above, Qatar funded its affiliated groups (such as the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, formerly al-Qa’ida-affiliated al-Nusra Front). Moreover, another Sunni group, the Taliban, has an office in Doha, and Doha participates in the Afghan conflict resolution process, including assistance in negotiations between the US and the Taliban, e.g., Qatar orchestrated the prisoner exchange between five Taliban prisoners in Guantanamo Bay and a US soldier (Dickinson, 2014); though the Taliban is trained by Iran (Loyd, 2018). So, Islamists and their back states build alliances with each other for pragmatic reasons, and Qatar in this case is still welcomed and continues to stay in this block, because being in the block assists in countering the moderate Islam block led by the Anti-Terror Quartet. Support of the Lebanese Hizbullah-led government in 2019, and the ongoing support of Hamas might be explained as strategic alliances to counter the Anti-Terror Quartet’s

actions. Moreover, during the ongoing Gulf Crisis, Qatar strengthened its relations with Iran, supporter of Shi'a militias, and Turkey, a main ally in support of the Muslim Brotherhood for Qatar. Therefore, Qatar will continue to support Islamists in order to make the Islamists block stronger, as with a stronger presence, Islamists in the region make up the stronger weight of Qatar's adopted power.

#### **4.5.5. Overcoming geopolitical and geostrategic limitations as Qatar's weight of adopted power**

Finally, alliances with political Islam non-state actors as a weight of adopted power provided an opportunity to gain power where Qatar, due to geopolitical and geostrategic limitations, cannot. Al-Hasan (2017) believes Qatar 'invests in both Shi'a and Sunni extremist groups and organisations to project power ... where it does not have the geopolitical, geostrategic depth to do so'. Indeed, Qatar, which follows Sunni Islam thanks to alliances with Islamists, benefited from them as discussed in this section, however, not solely from Sunni ( Hamas, the Muslim Brotherhood, al-Nahda, the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, al-Nusra Front, Islamists in the northern Mali), but also from Shi'a groups (Hizbullah, Houthi) which are Iranian-backed militias. As discussed in the domain section, due to the transnational network that the Islamists have, Qatar has enjoyed global power which would have not been possible with the geopolitical and geostrategic limitations that it has as a small country. Therefore, alliances with Islamists provided an opportunity of a global power as weight of adopted power.

#### **4.6. The cost of Qatar's adopted power: building alliances with political Islam non-state actors**

##### **4.6.1. Criticism of Qatar during the Arab Spring as a cost of adopted power**

With the opportunity to gain political leverage from alliances with Islamists who came to power during the Arab Spring, Qatar also paid a price. Qatar's role during the Tunisian, Egyptian, Libyan, and Syrian uprisings is a core issue, and one of the most controversial matters in studies on Qatar. Qatar, although not a democratic

country, stated that supporting rebels and providing humanitarian aid was aimed at promoting democracy in the region and supporting the voice of public. Qatar ruling family member's comments on the intervention in Libya demonstrate the inner-circle elite-driven policies in aiding adopted power: 'We believe in freedom, we believe in dialogue, and we believe in that for the entire region ... I am sure the people of the Middle East and other countries will see us as a model, and they can follow us if they think it is useful' (Krauss, 2011). Some academics and politicians (Khanfar, 2016; Almezaini, 2017) claim that Qatar's role during the Arab Spring was related to a desire to support common people and their political choices, and that Qatar was not interested in supporting a particular group or movement.

However, while Article 1 of Qatar's constitution states that Qatar's 'political system is democratic', in reality Qatar is a constitutional monarchy (Freer, 2016b), and according to Article 67 of the constitution, the majority of executive powers belong to the amir, who is able to 'override legislation, rule by decree, and even dissolve elected bodies'. Previously, Doha-based Baabood (2017), states that this is a contradiction as Qatar is ready for change within the region but not at home: 'They are happy to see the change somewhere else, and support it. They are not doing the change themselves. If you are really serious about democracy then you should start at home'. Pointing out these contradictions, Research Fellow Freer at the LSE (2016a), also believes that 'They [Qatar] like democracy in theory and in the abstract, but not for them'. In other words, Qatar wished to promote liberal values within the region as foreign policy during the Arab Spring, but this was contradicted by their domestic policies.

Article 7 of Qatar's Constitution forbids meddling in the affairs of other countries. Qatar's support for the Muslim Brotherhood in other countries, but not at home has been cited as one example of such meddling (Al-Ka'bi, 2017). Qatar policy has been self-contradicting on several levels, with involvement in other states that run contrary to the constitution, and actions that broke from the Arab League just when Qatar was aspiring to regional leadership (Wright, 2017a). Qatar's discourse promoting democracy was chosen to gain popularity among Western states (Almezaini, 2017; Kamrava, 2017), but both Qatari citizens and politicians seem to have recognised the discourse as a pretence (Kamrava, 2017), and Doha-based academics have identified Qatar's actions as PR, tools for increasing popularity. Democracy became a convenient tool for assisting Islamists to come to power

(Pargeter, 2016), which is the only tool for Islamists to come to power, and supposed Qatar's goals. Along with the loss of power by Islamists, Qatar failed to convince that their actions were connected with the promotion of democracy and to support the choice of public; this is one of the costs that Qatar has paid for alliances with Islamists to wield adopted power.

#### **4.6.2. The Gulf Crisis of 2014 as a cost of alliances with political Islam non-state actors**

While alliances with Islamists provided an opportunity for emerging as a regional power, with the failure of Islamists Qatar started to pay the price. Considering 'Egypt is a red line' (Kamrava, 2017) the Qatari connections were cut in Egypt. Saudi Arabia funded the military-backed, popular coup against Morsi on July 2013, that removed the Muslim Brotherhood and brought al-Sisi to power. While Qatar lost its ally in power, it began to pay a price at the GCC level, such as a dispute with its neighbours. Qatar's foreign policy differs from that of other GCC states to such an extent that tensions have occurred, particularly in response to Qatar's support for the Muslim Brotherhood. Consequently, on the 5<sup>th</sup> of March 2014, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain withdrew their ambassadors from Doha (Black, 2014). This marked the start of a period of unprecedented political tensions between the GCC states. Qatar was accused of not honouring the handwritten agreement signed on November 23, 2013 by the King of Saudi Arabia, the Amir of Qatar, and the Amir of Kuwait (Sciutto and Herb, 2017). The so-called Riyadh agreement clearly states that no support should be offered to the Muslim Brotherhood, nor backing opposition groups in Yemen which could threaten neighbouring states (ibid, 2017). A supplement document in 2013 was signed by the state's foreign ministers, mentioning banning support of the Muslim Brotherhood, including groups in Saudi Arabia and Yemen that pose a threat to the stability and security of the GCC states. The full demands from Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Bahrain are demonstrated in Appendix D, in comparison with demands made during the Gulf Crisis 2017 by the Anti-Terror Quartet, as discussed below.

Ultimately, the cost that Qatar paid for alliances with Islamists was the first Gulf Crisis with its neighbours and the following Qatari concessions: relocation of the Muslim Brotherhood figures in Doha to Turkey and ordering the Emirati dissidents to leave Qatar (Mourad, 2014); Qatar thus had to stop allying with Islamists for wielding

power. Other demands were made, such as enforcing the GCC Internal Security Pact and operating closely with GCC partners on matters of intelligence and policing. This meant that Qatar should follow the policies that do not contradict other GCC states policies, such as Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain. Consequently, Qatar, as a cost of wielding adopted power, had to stop making alliances with Islamists, which had provided opportunity for regional power. As a result, Qatar signed a ‘top secret’ agreement on November 16, 2014 which outlines the commitment to support Egypt’s stability, and the first Crisis was resolved (Sciutto and Herb, 2017). However, it seems that Qatar clearly understood how alliances with political Islam non-state actors brought political leverage; Qatar disagreed with the classification of the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organisation, but rather continued to give them, ‘quiet and generous support’ (*The Economist*, 2014:1) for pragmatic reasons. Moreover, as discussed earlier, it continued allying with Islamists, and this led to the second Crisis with its neighbours, ongoing since 2017.

#### **4.6.3. The ongoing Gulf Crisis of 2017 as a cost of alliances with political Islam non-state actors**

The second current Crisis started in May 2017, when several days after the US-Arab Islamic Summit the official Qatar News Agency ran a report quoting positive comments by Shaykh Tamim about Iran and Hamas (Arab News, 2017a). Qatar stated that the Qatar News Agency was hacked. Though again, this connects with abovementioned secret agreements signed in 2013 and 2014, or being specific, Qatar was accused of not complying with these two agreements (Sciutto and Herb, 2017). As a result, on June 5th, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Yemen, Egypt, the Maldives, and Bahrain cut ties with Qatar, stating that Qatar’s foreign policies had been undermining stability and security in the region by supporting various terrorist and sectarian groups (such as the Muslim Brotherhood, ISIS, and al-Qa’ida) (Wintour, 2017a; *The Peninsula*, 2017a). On 22 June, thirteen demands were issued by the Anti-Terror Quartet to end the Crisis (see Appendix D). Again, as a cost of aligning itself with political Islam non-state actors, among their demands were cutting ties with the Muslim Brotherhood and downgrading relations with Iran, the main state which backs Shi’a militias. These demands were rejected by Qatar. On 19 July, six broad principles for Qatar were suggested by the Anti-Terror Quartet to restart the negotiation process

(Khan, 2017). The demands expose the alliance that Qatar has with Islamists, which the Anti-Terror Quartet call *terrorist* groups (Wintour, 2017b).

After the beginning of the Gulf Crisis in 2017, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt, and Bahrain collectively designated 59 individuals and 12 institutions that have financed terrorist organisations and received support from Qatar (see Appendix C). Among the organisations included on this list are a number of famous Doha-based charities: the Qatar Volunteer Center, Qatar Charity, Shaykh Eid al-Thani Charity Foundation (Eid Charity), and the Shaykh Thani bin ‘Abdullah Foundation for Humanitarian Services (Al-Arabiya, 2017a). Though there are different interpretations of activities in these organisations. Al-Binmohammad (2018), a member of Bahrain’s Shura Council, comments on the role of charitable organisations in assisting the implementation of Qatar’s foreign objectives states:

There was a documentary that was published or aired on Dubai TV and also other channels that interviewed people that were linked and dealt with these organisations and they explained in detail how these so-called charitable organisations used to work. How basically amounts of money would end up in terrorist hands through these vehicles.

Despite academics’ observations regarding activities of such organisations, and the limitations of claims that Qatar-based charity organisations support terrorism (such as highlighting the lack of evidence) (Mishrif, 2017), limits of regulations on the charitable organisations (Ulrichsen, 2017), and the professionalism of civil services of Qatar (ibid, 2017)), the role of both charitable organisations and state-owned companies that they play in funding Islamists, are seen as adopted power implementation. This, despite the fact that the aforementioned groups being viewed internationally as terrorist groups, as Appendix E demonstrates, and will be discussed below in detail. Analyses of the details of such organisations leads to consideration of their links to Qatar’s inner-circle elites who implement adopted power.

For example, Qatar Charity, once known as ‘Qatar Charitable Society’, was founded in 1992 and is one of the largest nongovernmental organisations in the GCC (Qatar Charity, 2019a). Again, demonstrating inner-circle elite-driven policy, Shaykh Hamad bin Nasir al-Thani, a member of the ruling family, is the current chairman of the charity (Qatar Charity, 2019b). Moreover, a leaked cable emphasises that the charity organisation has close links with the government and emerged as mechanism

for distributing Qatar's money for funding Islamists-held territories. 'Qatar reached [an] agreement in late April to contribute USD 40 million to several UN agencies working on Gaza [administrated by Hamas] reconstruction and humanitarian relief operations'. This leak also states that the 'The GOQ [Government of Qatar] is using a private organization, Qatar Charity, as its agent for interfacing with the UN agencies' (Wikileaks, 2009a). Therefore, Qatar Charity has 'historically benefited from close ties to the Government' (ibid, 2009a) and Qatar Charity attempted to show itself 'as a humanitarian partner', as the government wish to utilise 'aid money to support its political initiatives' (Wikileaks, 2009). Consequently, Qatar Charity lead by a ruling family member, and the activity of the organisation, connects it to Qatar's policies. Such a leak might suggest that Gaza, Hamas-held territory, and reconstruction was possible also due to distribution of money from Qatar Charity.

Another organisation, the Qatar Red Crescent, a volunteer organisation founded in 1978, and recognised worldwide in 1981 by the International Committee of the Red Cross in Geneva, united with the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent (IFRC) the same year (Qatar Red Crescent, 2019). According to its website (ibid, 2019) it is headquartered in Doha and operates throughout the country. The Qatar Authority recognises it as the organisation that represents the Red Crescent and the International Red Cross locally and internationally. The role of the Qatar Red Crescent in adopted power implementation was demonstrated in the section on funding Hamas, and Islamists in northern Mali. Moreover, as mentioned, the Red Crescent launched projects in partnership with the Qatar Foundation, chaired by an inner-circle Qatari elite, Shaykha Moza. Despite its partnership with state institutions, the Qatar Red Crescent's leadership raised concerns. In 2017, al-Arabiya (2017b) reported that 'the ruling regime in Qatar [...]' appointed Diab as director of the Qatar Red Crescent International Relief and Development Department, despite his historically-frenzied handling of global issues. Diab, an American of Syrian descent, and financier of armed militias in Syria, is involved in terrorist activity in Yemen, Iraq, Djibouti, and Mauritania. Consequently, the Qatar Red Crescent was crucial in the support of Islamists (Hamas, Islamists in northern Mali) and engaged in a partnership with the state-owned company led by the inner-circle of elites in Qatar.

The most controversial Doha-based charitable organisation is Shaykh Eid al-Thani Charity Foundation (Eid Charity), which is clearly related to the royal family and operates as a government organized non-governmental organisation (Shideler,

Froehlke and Fischer, 2017). As an example of implementation of adopted power, the role of this charitable organisation was discussed earlier in its funding Hamas and al-Nusra Front. Moreover, in this case, its founding members have been implicated in terrorist activity. Al-Nuaymi, who is a co-founder of Alkarama, a Geneva-based human rights organisation that closely works with the UN, became a founding member of Shaykh Eid bin Mohammad al-Thani's Charity. According to the US Department of Treasury (2013), in 2013, Nuaymi ordered the transfer of approximately USD 600k to al-Qa'ida through Abu Khalid al-Suri, al-Qa'ida's representative in Syria, and planned to transfer nearly USD 50k more. Nuaymi provided a huge financial support to al-Qa'ida in Iraq, and operated as an intermediary between Doha-based donors and al-Qa'ida leaders in Iraq. Reportedly, Nuaymi oversaw the funding of more than USD 2m per month to al-Qa'ida in Iraq for a period of time. He also operated as an intermediary between Qatari citizens and al-Qa'ida leaders in Iraq, and in 2012, he offered around USD 250k to two US-designated al-Shabab representatives, Shaykh Hassan 'Aweys 'Ali and Mukhtar Robow. In 2012, Nuaymi supplied financial funding to a charity headed by Yemen-based Abd al-Wahhab Muhammad 'Abd al-Rahman al-Humayqani, who transferred money to AQAP (al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula).

Despite the controversial leadership of the organisation, Qatar's government serves as a partner in some of its activities. In 2016 for example, the Ministry of Economy and Commerce launched the project, 'al-Baraka (Blessing)', with the Eid Charity (*The Peninsula*, 2016). Moreover, some personal relationships may be viewed between Qatar's elites and leadership of the organisation. After the designation of al-Nuaymi as financier of terrorism, by the UK, US, and the United Nations Security Council, reports appeared that the prime minister of Qatar attended a wedding of one of Nuaymi children, with Nuaymi also at the wedding (Malnick, 2018; Green, 2018). Though the governmental explanation confirmed the state's elite attendance the wedding, as Shaykh 'Abdullah had been invited 'personally' by the groom, 'a government employee of the state of Qatar' (Green, 2018), although such connections demonstrate Qatar's elites' relationship with the head of the charitable organisation. Therefore, examining the close links with Qatar's charities, such as Qatar Charity, Qatar Red Crescent, Shaykh Eid Charity, and the government of Qatar, and especially links with the elites, suggests that similarly to distributing the state's wealth through state-owned companies, charitable organisations also were used by Qatar's inner-circle elites for funding Islamists in order to wield adopted power. Moreover, as



demonstrated, such organisations funded designated terrorist organisations as will be discussed below, making the Anti-Terror Quartet’s claims of terrorism-links as being the highest cost to Qatar for wielding adopted power.

#### **4.6.4. Qatar, a terrorist safe haven, or *Ka’ba al-Madiyoum*?**

The list includes 59 individuals connected with Qatar and designated terrorists by the Anti-Terror Quartet. As Appendix C demonstrates, the list includes individuals designated as global terrorists and sanctioned by the U.S. Treasury Department and UN Security Council Sanctions. In the interview with UAE Minister of Culture al-Ka’bi (2017), she cites the reasons for the creation of the list by the Anti-Terror Quartet, and states that ‘Qatar operates as a “safe haven” for terrorists and extremists who have links to terrorist organisations around the region, and also inspires and glorifies those individuals in a way that leads to many attacks, one of the reasons for that of Manchester’—the Anti-Terror Quartet officials accused Qatar of having links with the terrorists of Manchester attack in 2017 (Coughlin, 2017). The list include Qatar-linked and based, al-Qa’ida terrorism support networks, some of whose activities were identified above; these include: Al-Ka’bi , al-Nuyami, Libyan individuals connected with al-Qa’ida (*Gulf News*, 2017), members of the Egyptian Gamaa Islamiyya, who found refuge in Qatar, and Muslim Brotherhood members and their sympathisers, who ‘all are financed by Qatar and serve their agenda to spread the seeds of sedition, incitement and sabotage in Egypt’ (Al-Arabiya, 2017c).

This list also overlaps with the concept introduced by the poem of Qatar’s modern founder, Jasim bin Mohammad al-Thani. Qatar is referred to in its proto-state, as the ‘*Ka’ba al-Madiyoum*’, or ‘*Ka’ba* of the dispossessed’, a place to which exiles gravitate (Zweiri, 2017). Roberts (2017a) explains that this concept appeared because of the lawless nature of peninsula. The hospitality and protection will be given for someone who had cause to flee. Doha-based Zweiri (2017) argues of importance of differentiation between two groups of Islamists, such as whom Qatar believed will be ‘they want to be in political process’ and groups who ‘appear to others of being more radical, like groups in Syria’. Zweiri believes that Qatar’s focus on those who wanted to be a part in the political process in their countries. He links it with the concept of *Ka’ba al-Madiyoum*, as when the grandfather of the current amir received Muslim Brotherhood members and offered them citizenships as discussed above. Though it

also should be noted that Qatar not only hosted Islamists, but also, for example, Pan-Arabist Azmi Bishara (Roberts, 2017a).

The identification of Qatar as a ‘safe haven for terrorists’ or ‘*Ka’ba* of the dispossessed’ remains controversial and ongoing, similarly as the ongoing Crisis between Qatar and the Anti-Terror Quartet. Though Islamists identified in the terrorist list are hosted in Qatar (e.g., the Doha-hosted spiritual leader of the Muslim Brotherhood, al-Qaradawi; representatives of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Groups, such as Ali al-Sallabi, Bilhaj, Ismail al-Sallabi, former leader of Hamas Mesh‘al; financier of al-Nusra Front al-Ka‘bi), the concept of *Ka’ba al-Madiyoum* has been crucial for wielding adopted power in alliances between Qatar and political Islam non-state actors. Moreover, the differences of point of view, whether Qatar is a ‘safe haven for terrorists’ or ‘*Ka’ba* of the dispossessed’, demonstrates that alliances with Islamists harboured in Qatar, assisted Qatar to project power, while Qatar’s policies challenged the Anti-Terror Quartet’s domestic security.

Therefore, Anti-Terror Quartet accusations of Qatar’s support of terrorism are reasonable. In Appendix E the international stance on Islamists with whom Qatar allied for wielding adopted power is presented; these include the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas, Hizbullah, al-Nusra Front (Jabhat Fateh al-Sham), Houthis, Taliban, and the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group. Even though Qatar might not consider some of them terrorists, its position on these organisations is controversial and these organisations are mostly listed internationally as terrorist organisations by the US, the European Union, Russia, and Canada. Ironically, even Qatar designated, for example, Hizbullah a terrorist organisation, with the Gulf Cooperation Council in 2016 and the Arab League in 2016 (Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon rejected or protested the designation) (Al-Jazeera, 2016a). This, despite Qatar still financially supporting the Lebanese government where Hizbullah dominates, as discussed earlier. As a result, Qatar’s alliances with political Islam non-state actors paid a price, not solely being boycotted by the Anti-Terror Quartet, or Qatar’s side being presently ‘blockaded’, but also being identified as a terrorism sponsor which is indeed the highest cost of Qatar’s adopted power.

#### 4.7. Conclusion

Qatar has a long historical relationship with Islamists, particularly while harbouring its representatives in Doha since 1950s. Since 1995, Qatar's inner-circle elite has understood that Islamists should not be viewed as a threat to their regime's stability, as they started to adopt political Islam non-state actors for pragmatic reasons, particularly to project adopted power. As a scope of adopted power, Qatar allied with Islamists indirectly and directly. In the 2000s, using indirect ways to deal with Islamists such as mediation efforts, Qatar built and strengthened the already developed relations with Islamists (with the Lebanese Hizbullah, the Houthis, and Hamas). Considering the opportunity that the Arab Spring provided with bringing Islamists to power, though, Qatar used cultivated links and directly supported them (the Muslim Brotherhood, al-Nahda, the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, and al-Nusra Front), and even became involved in the Islamist takeover of northern Mali in 2012, as demonstrated.

Due to transnational networks of Islamists, Qatar's adopted power domain has spread globally, from the Islamic world to Western countries. As far as being a popular force in the region, especially in the 2000s, alliances with political Islam non-state actors provided a range of opportunities for Qatar's increasing power in the region and continues to challenge the power of regional heavyweights, emerging as a regional player. This, despite Qatar being 'boycotted' or 'blockaded', alliances with political Islam non-state actors still provides an opportunity for Qatar to advocate independent foreign policies and counterinfluence its political rivalries, currently, the Anti-Terror Quartet. Though with increasing political importance, thanks to alliances with Islamists, Qatar has also paid a high cost for such policies, including criticism for bringing democracy to the region yet not being a democratic state domestically, two Gulf crises with its neighbours, and being accused of being a sponsor of terrorism, which as discussed is a reasonable argument. Despite being labelled a terrorist supporter, Qatar seems to continue to ally with Islamists and will probably do so in the future. The Gulf Crisis demonstrates not only the rivalry between the Gulf neighbours, but also the fights between Islamist-friendly states and moderate Islamic forces, and from the winning side it will depend how Qatar's alliances with Islamists will be viewed in the future—has it brought more weight to, or cost Qatari adopted power.

## **Chapter Five**

### **Adopted Power in Use: Tribalism**

#### **5.1. Introduction**

Although tribalism has been taken advantage of by all GCC leaders, it has also been used by Shaykh Hamad and the Qatari inner-circle elite for power projection since 1995. This elite group have actively used the transnational nature of tribalism to increase the legitimacy of the al-Thani family beyond Qatari society, as a power tool. The wealth capacity that is the main driver for wielding adopted power is the main means for building patron-client relations between Qatar elite and tribes, non-state actors, in order to exert power on the region. To demonstrate this, the chapter examines tribes as non-state actors that became essential for the implementation of adopted power. Secondly, it investigates the domain in which building alliances with tribes projected adopted power, mainly towards the GCC states and the wider Middle East region, such as attempts to attract the loyalty of tribal groups in Syria. Thirdly, the chapter examines the scope that was presented by the Qatar elite to attract tribal loyalties, including claims of descent from the legendary Arab warrior al-Qa'qa' ibn 'Amr al-Tamimi and Shaykh Mohammad bin 'Abdul Wahhab, the founder of Wahhabism. The chapter then identifies the cost that Qatar has paid for attracting tribal loyalties—these policies are one of the reasons for Gulf Crisis 2014 and ongoing 2017—and the risks of regime challenge by the tribes. Finally, the chapter demonstrates the weight that Qatar's inner-circle elite has been able to exert by attracting tribal loyalties, which have become key to the regime's resistance to the demands of the Anti-Terror Quartet, and its continuing implementation of independent foreign policies.

#### **5.2. Qatar's clients: tribes as non-state actors**

Due to the political history and geography of the Arab states around the Gulf, the traditional territories of several tribes were split between several modern states. Consequently, these tribes are transnational. Among the tribes are several which Fromherz (2012:140) considers nomadic: al-Murra, al-Na'im, Ka'ban, Bani Hajir, and al-Manasir. The al-Murra have traditionally ranged over a huge area of eastern and south-eastern Arabia, with a core territory termed, the dirat-al-Murra rights, that access

outlying winter and spring pastures shared with other tribes (Cole, 1975:28). The *dirat-al-Murra* comprises 250,000 square miles that is mainly located within Saudi Arabia in the Rub' al-Khali, or Empty Quarter (ibid, 1975:30). To the north of the Rub' al-Khali, it runs into the contiguous Jafurah Desert, located at the base of the Qatar Peninsula, and north to the al-Hasa (Cole, 1975:32). Beyond the strict understanding of the *dirat-al-Murra*, Cole (1975:33) also considers al-Murra territory to include the area from al-Hasa, as far north as southern Kuwait and Iraq, the Qatar Peninsula, and areas neighbouring the Rub' al-Khali in the extreme southwest. Consequently, there is a transnational and fluid nature to the territory, one that underlies the modern states of Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the UAE, Kuwait, Iraq, Bahrain, and Yemen (Crystal, 2016:37-48).

The Na'im tribe are spread across a number of territories. In the early twentieth century they occupied land in Bahrain and Qatar, according to the season, wintering in Qatar and moving to Bahrain in the summer (Lorimer, 1908). During the same period, the Ka'ban had a similar reach, with thirty families in southern Bahrain, and sixty families in Qatar (ibid, 1908), while the Bani Hajir ranged from southern Arabia into Qatar (Al-Freih, 1990), and the al-Manasir travelled to winter pastures in Bahrain from their normal territories in the UAE and Oman (Ferdinand, 1993). The independence of the GCC monarchies caused the pre-existing tribal territories to be divided across several modern states, again, with the result of tribal identity as transnational. While attracting the loyalty of transnational tribes is cited by many scholars as an example of how tribalism can be used for political purposes, it is far from the only 'arrow in the quiver' (Peterson, 2018). Among the other reasons for cross-border movement of tribesmen, that Peterson identifies, are tribal kinship, marriages, and individual circumstances. The historic distribution of tribes across the region has left branches scattered throughout the GCC states, with ties interlinking them. To this may be added marriages between family members or allied families where the groom is from one country and the bride from another. As a result, the movement of people across borders is not historically unusual in the region.

While there are several reasons for tribes to engage in cross-border movement, this chapter focuses Qatar's attempt to build alliances with tribesmen in order to increase the country's power in the region. Qatar, like the other GCC regimes, uses cross-border tribal identity and kinship links for political purposes (Hertog, 2018a). While some tribes became the core identities for the emergent Gulf states, others

played a supporting role, and Qatar's shaykhs realised the significance of maintaining the loyalty of other tribes for their political, social, and economic gain (Al-Shawi, 2002). Several tribes, holding citizenship of several modern states, have historically evidenced divided loyalties. While the al-Murra supported the al-Thani in establishing the state of Qatar (ibid, 2002), they have since been among the key supporters of the Saudi royal family (El-Farra, 1973:189) and have served as border guards for Saudi Arabia (Crystal, 2016). Conversely, the Bani Hajir, who have historical links to Saudi Arabia, supported the al-Thani family against the Ottomans during the Battle of Wajbah. Finally, although the al-Na'im generally support the al-Khalifa family of Bahrain, one branch remained loyal to the al-Thani (ibid, 2016:41). Their transnational nature has led to the Gulf states attracting the loyalty of tribes through client-patron relationships (Ferdinand, 1993:359), to add to their own strength while detracting from a neighbour's.

Qatar's inner-circle elites built alliances with tribesmen for political purposes, especially since 1995, under Shaykh Hamad and Shaykh Tamim (Hertog, 2018a). As an inner-circle elite-driven policy, Qatar's alliances with tribes for political purposes comes from the top. The anonymous Qatar-based academic (Interviewee B, 2017) maintains that personal connections to Shaykhs Hamad or Tamim, or to key decision-makers such as former Prime Minister 'Abdullah bin Hamad al-'Attiya, can facilitate the gaining of citizenship. This is exemplified by al-'Attiya's hunting trip in Iraq, through which relations were built with tribes, who were encouraged to come to Qatar, the academic notes, and were given citizenship 'right away' (ibid, 2017). The anonymous academic concludes that only those who can be useful to Qatar, such as tribal leaders or representatives of important tribes, are attracted in this way. This criterion supports the interpretation of naturalisation as a defined policy in support of Qatari political purposes. Alongside offers of citizenship, tribesmen and their relatives from noble and important tribes have been enticed with economic and social benefits such as lands, loans, jobs, and opportunities for their children with the army or in government (Interviewee C, 2018). Qatar's wealth is again seen to be the main driver for the Qatar's inner-circle elite's alliances with tribesmen for wielding adopted power, as it is essential for creating patron-client relationships.

### **5.3. Qatar's adopted power domain: building alliances with tribes**

### 5.3.1. Influence towards the GCC states as a domain of adopted power

Qatar's exploitation of the transnational nature of tribalism means that it has mainly attempted to exert power on direct neighbours with which Qatar has shared borders, the GCC states. Qatar targeted tribes located in northern Saudi Arabia that are either marginalised or disaffected. The Doha-based academic (Interviewee D, 2017) states that Qatar supports these tribes financially, especially tribes in northern Saudi Arabia or Iraq, such as the al-Shammar and Anazah. The Anazah tribe are spread across Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Jordan, and Syria. The al-Shammar tribe have a similar reach, their territory enlarging and contracting with 'varied political and economic conditions' (Eickelman, 2016:224). The Saudi writer and journalist Mansour al-Noqaidan (2017) similarly confirms that Qatar hands out money to tribes in the south and north of Saudi Arabia because 'these areas are important, and many Saudi writers wrote about them'.

Enticements to these tribes include Qatari citizenship, jobs, financial support, and scholarships. The Qatari national academic (Interviewee C, 2018) states that in the mid-1990s, the shaykh of the al-Shammar requested citizenship from Amir Hamad for himself and 200 others. During the same period, Qatar provided citizenship for two leaders of the Anazah. Moreover, the anonymous Doha-based academic (Interviewee B, 2017) recalls meeting three Iraqi members of the Anazah tribe who were studying in California. These three students had scholarships from Qatar and had already been awarded Qatari citizenship. Additionally, Qatar gains by providing social and economic benefits to tribesmen who are Islamist activists. According to the Qatari national academic (Interviewee C, 2018), Qatar offered citizenship to an Islamic activist from the al-Ahmari tribe in southern Arabia. Along with citizenship, he was offered ownership of the charitable al-Muntada Trust, an organisation that has been accused of supporting Islamic fundamentalists. At the same time, his brother was serving in the Saudi army and their tribe had a limited presence in Qatar, of 'just four or six houses' (ibid, 2018). Saudi tribes have not been the only focus of Qatari attention, however.

Qatar has also tried to build alliances with tribes from its GCC neighbour Bahrain. In 2014, Bahrain accused Qatar of offering certain Bahraini families Qatari citizenship in exchange for renouncing their Bahraini citizenship. Middle East Eye (MacDonald, 2014) reported that Bahrain's foreign minister openly accused Qatar of

engaging in a ‘sectarian naturalization’ programme, a view also held by al-Hasan (2017), the former senior analyst at the office of the Bahrain’s first deputy prime minister. The naturalisation of Bahraini tribes was eased by changes to legal procedures, with a process that once required the renunciation of Bahraini citizenship and three year residence in Qatar being replaced by ‘ [...] decisions ... being made in just 24 hours’ (al-Nuaimi, 2014), a statement that MacDonald (2014) considers indicative of Qatari policy. Al-Binmohammad (2018), a member of Bahrain’s Shura Council, states that Qatar engaged with Bahraini families of well-known Sunni tribes, offering them Qatari citizenship and financial packages to give up their Bahraini nationality. These families include individuals of high military ranks, or in other words, political stakeholders. The anonymous Gulf security expert (Interviewee E, 2017) also highlights Qatar’s financial advantages as essential in attracting tribes, particularly in providing wealth that Bahrain could not offer. In 2017, the GDP of Qatar was USD 167.61bn (Trading Economics, 2019a), while that of Bahrain was USD 35.31bn (Trading Economics, 2019b). From 1980 to 2017, the average GDP of Bahrain was USD 13.09bn (ibid, 2019b), and the equivalent figure of Qatar between 1970 and 2017 was USD 42.81bn (ibid, 2019a). Qatar’s wealth advantages are key to creating patron-client relations with tribes in order to wield adopted power.

There are several interpretations for Qatar’s targeting of Bahrain’s tribes, such as demographic shifts, naturalisation attempts, economic factors, geographical disputes, attempts to present the legitimacy of the al-Thani, and policies against Bahrain. It is possible that the rationale is threefold, combining demographic weight, legitimisation, and the destabilisation of Bahrain (al-Hasan, 2017). Alternative views have been presented. The argument that Qatar is acting to increase its population is undermined by accusations that Bahrain in turn has ‘purloined’ Qatar subjects (Peterson, 2018). The historian and political analyst of the contemporary Arabian peninsula and Gulf, Peterson (2018), identifies economic concerns about Bahrainis employed in Qatar as one reason, in conjunction with the settlement of boundary disputes and the proposed causeway, with the tribal aspect of the bilateral dispute as a minor part of a multi-faceted complex of Bahraini-Qatari contention. Indeed, Qatar and Bahrain have long-standing territorial disputes over the Zubara region on the Qatar peninsula, and the Hawar Islands.

Targeting tribes can be explained as Qatar gaining power through weakening Bahrain’s regime. Due to the bilateral history of relations between al-Khalifa and al-



Thani families, a weaker Bahraini regime means a stronger al-Thani legitimacy, and Qatar has been able to use its wealth capacity to attract loyalty. By offering financial benefits (citizenship, land, loans, jobs), Qatar can attract Bahraini citizens and decrease the numbers of Sunnis, and the population in general, in Bahrain (Interviewee E, 2017), and consequently weaken the royal family. Due to the proximity of Qatar, it is an attractive destination for any Bahrainis emigrating due to the weakness of the Bahraini government, such as during the 2011 uprising (Stephens, 2017). These Bahrainis emigrated for more secure business prospects elsewhere in the Gulf, in Dubai or Doha, which presents an opportunity, in Qatar's case, for them to gain economically and in prestige (ibid, 2017). The research fellow for the Middle East and head of RUSI Qatar, Stephens (2017), sees the business environment in the Gulf as a 'zero-sum competition', where establishing a business in Bahrain means it has not been established in Dubai or Doha. Thus, any perceived weakness of the al-Khalifa or Bahrain might be used by Qatar to increase their power. Finally, as a tool used against Bahrain, targeting tribes is an ongoing process dependent on the state of bilateral relations between Qatar and Bahrain. When Bahrain opposes Qatar on the GCC or international stage, Qatar acts to reduce tensions, but then increases pressure on Bahrain at other times, a 'rhythm' that has been used more widely than at key points such as 1995 or 2014 (Al-Binmohammad, 2018). It is clear that Qatari inner-circle elites target Bahraini tribes for political gain. A similar process beyond the Gulf countries domain is demonstrated below.

### **5.3.2. Wider influence in the Middle East as a domain of adopted power: Syrian tribes as a case study**

Qatar has tried to influence the wider Middle East region by building alliances with tribes. At the beginning of the Arab Spring in Syria, and after the crackdown on peaceful demonstrators, the tribes of Deir al-Zor in eastern Syria asked the GCC for a firm economic and diplomatic position concerning Syria. According to reports, Qatar (and Saudi Arabia) used tribal links to transport arms and materiel to Damascus; while the Arab tribes in Syria made appeals for defence from al-Asad regime (Dukhan, 2014). These alliances can be clearly seen in the competition between Qatar and Saudi Arabia for regional power. This competition for control of the Syrian opposition movement has had tribal repercussions, with Saudi Arabia supporting Ahmad al-Jarba

to win over Qatar-backed Riad Hijab (Sayigh, 2014) for the presidency of the National Coalition in July 2013 (Dukhan, 2014:18). Hijab is a member of the al-Sukhne tribe, located in the Deir al-Zor Governorate, while Jarba is a member of the Shammar, and a close cousin of the interim Iraqi president (between 2004-2005), Ghazi al-Yawar. Qatar has similarly tried to build alliances with tribesmen in Syria since before the outbreak of the war, with Qatar and Turkey engaging with Syrian tribal leaders at conferences organised in Turkey. The intent of this was to undermine tribesmen relationships with Saudi Arabia (Dukhan, 2018a). However, such policies failed to produce long-term results for a number of reasons, including the Saudi-Qatari rivalry over Syria (Dukhan, 2018b). The reasons for this are considered along with the scope in the next section.

As *Figure 5.1.* demonstrates, alliances with tribes can be identified as the domain of Qatari power—the country’s efforts to wield adopted power in order to gain power in the Gulf countries and the wider Middle East.



*Figure 5.1.* Qatar’s adopted power domain: building alliances with tribesmen (source:personal collection)

#### **5.4. The scope of Qatar's adopted power: building alliances with tribes**

In order to project power in different domains within the GCC, or the wider Middle East, Qatar must present its scope, that is, Qatar is sufficiently strong or appealing enough to attract the loyalty of tribes. In order to attract tribal loyalties, Qatari elites focused on the genealogical connections of the al-Thani family, as an important element of assertions of legitimacy in the Gulf (Eickelman, 2016: 235-7), thus bolstering their position as an important ruling family in the historical development of Arabia. A common trend in the Gulf is the lack of 'local knowledge' required for many young adults to manipulate details of their genealogical connections, and an increase in 'invented' traditions of genealogical heritage that links many inhabitants to the modern country (ibid, 2016); holding a claim to a 'noble' tribal origin is an indicator of higher social status and prestige, but this does not inevitably reproduce the capacity to connect to wider claims to hierarchy, heritage, and 'tradition' with local generations and knowledge. Following this trend, Qatari elites have claimed genealogical connections with important figures in Arab history in order to demonstrate the importance of their ruling family and advance their political purposes. However, despite these attempts to present an attractive scope, wealth continues to appear to be the main factor for attracting tribal loyalties, as explained in later sections.

##### **5.4.1. Restoring the glory of a legendary warrior as the scope of adopted power**

Several attempts have been made by Qatar's inner-circle elite to obtain important status within the GCC community by demonstrating legitimacy through claims of al-Thani descent from important figures in Arab history. The first example is their claim of descent from al-Qa'qa' ibn 'Amr al-Tamimi, a legendary warrior who assisted in spreading Islam throughout the Levant. A traditional story tells that a besieged Muslim army leader wrote to Medina for support, asking for a thousand warriors. In response, they received al-Qa'qa' ibn 'Amr, with a letter stating that he alone was worth a thousand warriors (Al-Hasan, 2017). In 2010, Qatar provided USD 8m towards the production of a thirty-two-episode soap opera about al-Qa'qa' ibn 'Amr for broadcast during Ramadan. While the former Amir Shaykh Hamad stated his intent

was to ‘restore glory to his ancestor’ (Al-Qassemi, 2012), this also added to Qatar’s adopted power.

Qatar’s aim in promoting the al-Thani connection to al-Qa’qa’ ibn ‘Amr may have been to assert leadership of the Bani Tamim tribe, to which the al-Thani family belongs (Al-Qassemi, 2012). This tribe has no clear leader, however, the Bani Tamim are notably dispersed, and an impractical attempt to claim their leadership may not have been a Qatari aim (Ingham, 2017). Within the current Qatari perception, the al-Thani family emphasise that their *badū* (nomadic Bedouin) history rather than *ḥaḍar* (settled) history, ‘while at the same time ignoring the fact that for much of that history the al-Thani of the Bani Tamim were no more important than any other tribe’ (Crystal, 2016:42). Qatar’s claims of al-Thani descent from al-Qa’qa’ ibn ‘Amr al-Tamimi can be seen as scope for their wielding adopted power, as the policy was inner-circle elite-driven, and required wealth to implement (e.g., funding television productions). However, attempts to present al-Thani descent from al-Qa’qa’ ibn ‘Amr al-Tamimi have not made too strong, or appealing, scope within the region.

#### **5.4.2. Claims that Mohammad bin ‘Abdul Wahhab was the Great-Grandfather of Shaykh Hamad, as an example of scope of adopted power**

Another attempt among Qatar’s inner-circle elite to bolster al-Thani legitimacy was through claims that al-Thani are heirs of Shaykh Mohammad bin ‘Abdul Wahhab. Bin ‘Abdul Wahhab founded the Wahhabi, or Salafist movement within Islam, a doctrine which both Qatar and Saudi Arabia claim to be pre-eminent (Interviewee B, 2017). The former British diplomat (Interviewee A, 2017) confirms this idea, sharing his experience that he:

had many discussions with Qataris who believe that they are the true followers of Mohammad ibn Abdul Wahhab, both in kin, i.e., by birth, but also in philosophy, that their brand of Wahhabism, which is different in a number of ways from Saudi Arabia’s, is more true to its origins.

Claims of being a descent of Bin ‘Abdul Wahhab are related to the rivalry with Saudi Arabia over the adoption of Salafism. Al-Hasan (2017) states that Qatar is made up largely of tribes that have come from the Arabian Peninsula, from Najd and other places that can be considered the ‘Arab heartland’, so the discourse of claiming of

being descent of Bin ‘Abdul Wahhab resonates with them. Al-Hasan notes that ‘Qatar often says “... we are [a] second Wahhabi state”’. The former British diplomat (Interviewee A, 2017) commented on the rivalry between Qatar and Saudi Arabia over recognition as the legitimate successor of Wahhabism, stating that although Shaykh Mohammad bin ‘Abdul Wahhab lived long before Qatar and Saudi Arabia existed, he was a member of the Bani Tamim, who ‘are well represented in Qatar, so why should they not see themselves as the natural heirs of Mohammad ibn Wahhab?’. Wahhab’s political alliance was with the al-Sa‘ud but he was not a member of the same tribe. Instead his descendants are the Ahl al-Shaykh, whose alliance with the al-Sa‘ud is the basis of the Saudi state. These two groups are defendants of the doctrines of Wahhabism, and consequently, as the former British diplomat concludes, there is an intense rivalry between Qatar and Saudi Arabia as to who are the ‘real’ Wahhabis.

Al-Thani claims to descent from Bin ‘Abdul Wahhab, after whom they have named the Grand Mosque, are a further claim to legitimacy (Al-Hasan, 2017). Shaykh Hamad’s speech during the opening of Imam Mohammad Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhab Mosque, on 16 December 2011, was also positioned to compete with Saudi Arabia, emphasising Qatar’s intention to represent and promote Wahhabism (Al-Noqaidan, 2017):

Our founding grandfather Sheikh Jasim bin Mohammed bin Thani [...] was a religious scholar and a ruler at the same time, and among those who were receptive of the call of Sheikh Ibn Abdul Wahhab, and adopted and disseminated it in our country and abroad throughout the Muslim world. He shouldered the responsibility of spreading the books of the call of Wahhabism and other books [...]. Still, to this day, we follow in the footsteps of those great ancestors [...]. We will spare no effort to continue carrying the message and spreading the tolerant teachings of Islam in the whole world. We believe that the Ummah is now in need of renovation and to be inspired by the resolve and experience of Wahhabism in a way that complies with the current age and its developments (Amiri Diwan State of Qatar, 2011).

However, when Qatar invited over 114 members of the al-Shaykh family of the Bin ‘Abdul Wahhab to the opening of the mosque, only seven attended (Al-Noqaidan, 2017). Shaykh Hamad’s visit to the home of the al-Shaykh family in May 2017 was interpreted by one interviewee as another attempt to connect the al-Thani family to Bin ‘Abdul Wahhab in order to attract supporters (Interviewee C, 2018). However, others suggest that the importance of the trip was ‘overplayed by some people, by the

media', and that Hamad's stated intentions of helping the al-Shaykh family, and the al-Thani's ancestral village, were genuine (Baabood, 2017). Saudi elites may also have been involved, with former Crown Prince Mohammad bin Nayef facilitating the visit, before realising it might assist Shaykh Hamad's political aims (Interviewee C, 2018).

There is no clear agreement on whether Shaykh Hamad is descended from Bin 'Abdul Wahhab. Bin 'Abdul Wahhab was part of the al-Musharraf family within the al-Wuhabah group of the Bani Tamim tribe (Al-Freih, 1990). Although some of the al-Wuhabah did emigrate from Ushaiqir to Qatar, it is unclear whether any of Bin 'Abdul Wahhab's descendants were among them. The main contribution of the al-Wuhabah migrants in Qatar, as in other parts of Arabia, seems to have been the deepening of settled life (ibid,1990:104-5). The connection between the al-Thani and al-Shaykh families can only be demonstrated by their shared membership of the Bani Tamim, linked by common ancestry from Amr Ibn Midad, ten generations further back than al-Wahhab (Abu Nab, 1977:85). Scholars have demonstrated a relationship between the al-Thani and al-Shaykh families, however there is limited consensus on whether Bin 'Abdul Wahhab is in fact the 16-times grandfather of Shaykh Hamad.

The Saudi position is that Shaykh Hamad is not a descendant of Bin 'Abdul Wahhab. The Saudi writer and journalist, al-Noqaidan (2017), believes that 'this is impossible if we do the calculations', but accepts that the al-Thani family, as members of the Bani Tamim, are more distantly related to Bin 'Abdul Wahhab, and revered in Wahhabism. More than 200 members of the al-Shaykh family, led by Mufti of Saudi Arabia Shaykh 'Abdul'aziz al-Shaykh, issued a statement denying that Shaykh Hamad is descended from Bin 'Abdul Wahhab, and calling for Qatar to change the name of its state mosque as 'it does not carry the teachings' of Bin 'Abdul Wahhab and 'its imams and preachers are not committed to the moderate Salafist teachings' (*Arab News*, 2017b). Consequently, the actions that Qatar's elite have taken to demonstrate descent from Bin 'Abdul Wahhab, such as naming the state mosque after him, and travelling to Saudi Arabia to attract al-Shaykh family loyalty, are connected with presenting scope. However, such genealogical claims seem to have been established for political gain, in this case legitimacy, rather than present realities.

Qatar's use of claims of Wahhabi descent may not be a coincidence, as Qatar's alliances with tribesmen and political Islam movements to project power is similar to the process by which Saudi Arabia was established. This can be seen as a deliberate

emulation of the processes by which a centralised Saudi state emerged (Interviewee D, 2017). In 1157 AH (1744 CE), a treaty signed between Muhammad ibn Saud, the ruler of the town of al-Diriyya in central Najd, and Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, forms the basis of both Saudi Arabia and Wahhabism (Al-Freih, 1990:1). As a result, a unique feature of Saudi Arabia in the Gulf is the combination of tribal loyalty and religious doctrine (Said, 1980:128). In the early 20<sup>th</sup> century, Ibn Sa'ud controlled religious doctrine to establish authority over the Bedouin tribes (El-Farra, 1973:133). It has been suggested that religious rule was the only way of unifying fractious tribal groups (Berger, 1962:46), and therefore Ibn Sa'ud promoted his leadership as following the 'true precepts of Islam' (Said, 1980:138). Qatar's strategy has similarly been to build alliances with the traditional social forces of tribes and religious sects (Al-Naqeeb, 1990:91), using tribalism and political Islam non-state actors for their purposes.

Qatar's aim was to challenge Saudi Arabia's position of leadership and eventually establish themselves as a leader of these two main social forces. The long-term target of Qatar has been to overtake Saudi dominance in the region (Al-Noqaidan, 2017). Qatari rhetoric has focussed on the downfall of Saudi Arabia, which will be 'demolished' or 'destroyed somehow [...] so Qatar will be the home of those in the religious way and the tribalism', and that Qatar 'will have the supporters, religious scholars and tribal leaders' (Interviewee C, 2018). In this way, Qatari elites' learning from the Saudi establishment, and recognising that the traditional social forces in the Gulf were tribes and religious sects (Al-Naqeeb, 1990:91), Qatar has sought the loyalty of tribes and tried to use religion or political Islam for political purposes. Qatar competed with Saudi Arabia in these two main areas in which the kingdom was established and strongly supported. Qatar also started to attract the loyalties of tribes, mainly transnational; and as demonstrated in Chapter Four with non-state actors from political Islam, client-patron relationships were also built in order to wield adopted power.

Therefore, Qatar's inner-circle elite has used the claims of al-Thani being a descent of Bin 'Abdul Wahhab as scope for wielding adopted power. Such claims closely relate to challenging Saudi's dominance, and the support that the Saudi royal family gets from tribesmen and religious scholars. Qatar has attempted to lead these two main social forces in the Gulf society. Due to the fact that Qatar historically has not led in these main transnational social forces, since 1995, Qatar's inner-circle elite have increased their ambitious influence in the region, and because they have the

wealth capacity to do this, they have built patron-client relationships with well-established non-state actors of tribalism and political Islam. According to Qatar's calculations, if changes happened in Saudi Arabia, Qatar is ready to challenge Saudi dominance, as stated anonymously by Qatar and Saudi national academics (Al-Noqaidan, 2017; Interviewee B, 2017). At the same time, while the GCC counterparts realised Qatar's strategic usage of tribalism and scope was presented to attract tribal loyalties, there were rejections of such claims by tribes. Consequently, the scope of claiming descent from important Arabian historical figures presented by Qataris, found its place. However, the most important factor for attracting loyalties of tribes remains the economic factor, with wealth as the main driver for wielding adopted power. This will be specifically demonstrated below, after discussing the cost of adopted power.

## **5.5. The cost of Qatar's adopted power: building alliances with tribesmen**

### **5.5.1. The Gulf Crises of 2014 and 2017 as a cost of building alliances with tribes for adopted power**

Qatar's efforts to attract the loyalties of tribes from neighbouring states and naturalise them as citizens was also one of the reasons for the 2014 Gulf Crisis. If Qatar calculated that attracting of tribes would allow it to project power, in contrast, this policy created security concerns for other GCC states. Bahrain considered Qatar's attraction of Sunni tribes as an 'extremely hostile move' (Interviewee B, 2017), a view, observers have concurred with (Al-Hasan, 2017). Due to the delicate ethnic and religious balance in Bahrain, this was an important issue in the Crisis that took place between the GCC states and which led to the signing of the Riyadh Declaration (ibid, 2017). Indeed, as mentioned in Chapter Four, the leaked documents published by CNN in July 2017, and known as the 'Riyad agreements' (Sciutto and Herb, 2017), were signed by the leaders of Qatar and their Gulf neighbours in 2013 and 2014, where it was stated that Qatar would stop giving refuge or citizenship. The handwritten 2013 document outlined requirements that included: 'no interference in the internal affairs of the Council's states, whether directly or indirectly. Not to give asylum/refuge or give nationality to any citizen of the Council states that has an activity that opposes his country's regimes, except with the approval of his country' (Sciutto and Herb,



2017). The 2014 agreement similarly agrees that states would not: ‘give, employ, or support whether directly or indirectly, whether domestically or abroad, any persons or media apparatus that harbors inclinations harmful to any Gulf Cooperation Council state’ (ibid, 2017). These requirements reflect the concerns of the GCC states over Qatar’s strategy of attracting tribal loyalties, and the implications of Qatar’s tribal policies on their national security (Interviewee C, 2018). Attracting tribes was one of the reasons for the Gulf Crisis in 2014, and Qatar paid the cost for this policy through this dispute with its neighbours.

Although the Crisis in 2014 was resolved, or arguably postponed till 2017, Qatar continued to implement such policies. As a result, this issue became central again during the current Gulf Crisis, becoming one of the issues referred to by the Anti-Terror Quartet (Al-Hasan, 2017). Among the six broad principles that the Anti-Terror Quartet submitted to Qatar on 19 July 2017 in order to end the Crisis, Qatar was requested to refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of states and from supporting illegal entities, and to make a full commitment to the 2013 Riyadh Agreement and supplementary agreement (Stewart, 2017). Qatar’s government has not accepted these conditions, and due to the ongoing dispute, it seems the main price has been paid by Qatari tribesmen and their relatives in other GCC states. Due to the number of tribes that are transnational, a great number of families have been separated by the blockade, as ‘every single house has an uncle or cousins in other country’ (Interviewee C, 2018). Indeed, according to Human Rights Watch (2017), the isolation of Qatar by its neighbours, is ‘precipitating serious human rights violations’, including separating families, infringing in the right to free expression, and interrupting medical treatment. It is clear that it is tribesmen (whether Qatar’s citizens, citizens of neighbouring states with relatives in, or connections to, Qatar), and to some extent, non-nationals living in Qatar, who are paying the high cost of Qatar’s policies since 1995.

### **5.5.2. Risk of challenges from tribes against the Qatari regime as a cost of adopted power**

While the Qatari elite has established patron-client relationships with tribes for political purposes, the negative side of this is that tribesmen may be able to challenge the regime. In order to maintain control, the al-Thani do not want any single tribe to

be ‘too powerful’, or to have ‘linkages with other countries’ (Baabood, 2017). The al-Thani’s understanding of tribal politics in general, and of the tribes with which they are dealing, leads them to act differentially, avoiding pushing some tribes ‘too far’ (Baabood, 2017). As the attraction of tribal loyalties is a strategy used by neighbouring Gulf states as well, Qatar has paid the cost of always being fearful of large tribes allying with other GCC ruling families who might then challenge the al-Thani. For example, the al-Murra tribe occupies territory divided between Qatar and Saudi Arabia, and were enticed to support the Saudi royal family, causing security concerns in Qatar (El-Farra, 1973:189). By attracting the al-Murra tribe, Saudi Arabia attempted to challenge the political system of Qatar. In 1996 the al-Murra tribal leadership were involved with the Saudi government in coup attempts against Shaykh Hamad (Crystal, 2016:48). As a result, relations between Qatar and the al-Ghaftan clan of the al-Murra have been tense.

Between October 2004 and June 2005, Qatar revoked the citizenships of 5000 to 6000 members of the al-Ghafran tribe (Crystal, 2016; AFHR, 2018). According to an *Amnesty International Report - Qatar* (Amnesty International, 2006), Qatar’s decision was based on the dual citizenships these individuals had. With al-Murra tribe also associated with a role in border policing for Saudi Arabia, Qatar claimed that the tribe was primarily Saudi (Crystal, 2016:48). Since then, the Qatari government has allowed some of these people to return but has not returned their citizenship (Interviewee C, 2018). Despite Qatar’s rationalisation of their action, scholars consider it a collective punishment for al-Murra participation in the 1996 coup attempt (Al-Qassemi, 2012). Many other individuals hold dual citizenship of Qatar and other Gulf countries, Iran, or Yemen (Interviewee C, 2018). The situation demonstrates the tribal factor in the relationship between Qatar and Saudi Arabia: Saudi Arabia used al-Murra to ‘undermine the Qatari political system’, using its power over tribes that share ancestry with al-Sa‘ud (Al-Kuwari, 2018), and Qatar’s response was mediated through tribal relations. Despite the failure of the coup, Qatari inner-circle elite have remained concerned that Saudi Arabia may use tribal loyalties for regime change.

The tribal factor arose again during the ongoing Gulf Crisis when the Anti-Terror Quartet, specifically Saudi Arabia and the UAE, mobilised tribal opposition, including representatives from the al-Thani family to ‘weaken, if not topple’ the current Qatari regime (Dorsey, 2017). The leaked emails of the Emirati ambassador to the US also revealed that Saudi Arabia came close to ‘conquering Qatar’ (Alabaster,

2017). The GCC regimes used cross-border tribal identity and kinship links for political purposes during the Qatar boycott (in both directions) (Hertog, 2018a). Associate Professor in Comparative Politics Hertog (2018b), at LSE, believes that ‘moments of crisis often trigger tribal reflexes’, stating in order to demonstrate tribal loyalty in the eastern province, the Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman mobilised tribes at the beginning of the Crisis.

As a result, Shaykh Tamim stripped the nationality of several Qatari tribal leaders and froze the assets of others, including: Shaykh Sultan; Shaykh ‘Abdullah bin ‘Ali al-Thani; members of the Qatari royal family; Shaykh Talib bin Mohammad bin Lahoum bin Sherim, leader of the al-Murra tribe, and more than 50 people from his family; and Shaykh Shafi Nasir Hamoud al-Hajri, the elder of the tribe of Shaml al-Hawajer, along with several of his family (Dorsey, 2017). Twenty members of the Qatari ruling family were jailed for criticising Amir Shaykh Tamim (*Arab News*, 2017c). These leaders had condemned the actions of the Qatari government towards its neighbours in the Gulf, stressing their rejection of Doha's actions, and refusing to condemn Saudi Arabia. Despite this, the efforts of Emirati and Saudi leadership to mobilise dissident tribal groups against the Qatari ruling elite ended up ‘with little success’, and instead resulted in Qatari ‘tribal leaders openly assured their loyalty to Qatari Emir’ (Hertog, 2018b). There has always been a potential for other GCC states to use the tribal card against Qatar’s ruling elite, and this happened during the Gulf Crisis in 2017. Though the ruling regime remained in power, the risk of being challenged by tribes was high. If it would happen, al-Thani family would indeed pay the highest cost for their policies of attracting tribes since 1995. However, as the 2017 efforts for regime change was unsuccessful, Qatar has benefited from that by adding to its weight of adopted power, as will be discussed.

## **5.6. Qatar’s adopted power weight: building alliances with tribes**

### **5.6.1. The failure of tribal mobilisation by the Anti-Terror Quartet as a weight for Qatar’s inner-circle elite**

At the beginning of the Gulf Crisis 2017 the Anti-Terror Quartet, particularly Saudi Arabia and the UAE, tried to attract loyalty and support from leaders of the largest transnational tribes with links to Qatar. A leaked video purports to show a

meeting between the Saudi crown prince, the deputy prime minister and defence minister, shaykhs and members of the Qatari al-Murra tribe (*Egypt Today*, 2017). It was also claimed that Mohammad bin Salman invited the leaders of al-Murra and Bani Hajir to a discussion (Interviewee C, 2018). The motivation for this was the special status that shaykhs hold among their tribe's members. Both leaders of al-Murra and Bani Hajir hold Saudi nationality and live in Saudi Arabia, and have authority over certain villages, especially in Saudi Arabia, and a legislative role because they stamp the documents of their tribes' members. One of the immigration requirements for tribal members is an identification document stamped by the relevant shaykh. The Saudi leadership believed that this legislative and governing role meant that these tribal leaders had control over their tribe members. However, this authority was insufficient 'any more. Every individual of the tribe has his own life and [for] his own benefit will not obey [just] anything', believes a Qatari national academic (Interviewee D, 2017).

But leaders of the largest tribes in Qatar demonstrated loyalty to the Saudi leadership. While Qatari media stated that the meeting between the Saudi Crown Prince and the tribal leaders was leaked without their knowledge, others reported that the participants knew the meeting was being filmed (*Egypt Today*, 2017). While the leak may have been unplanned, al-Murra and Bani Hajir leaders knew that their conversation was being recorded, and their criticism of Qatar should be interpreted in that context (Interviewee C, 2018). The anonymous Doha-based academic (*ibid*, 2018) suggests it was knowing this criticism that caused anger amongst Qatari leadership: '... there is strong criticism from the Amir of al-Murra, of what al-Thani or what Shaykh Hamad do, and that make Shaykh Tamim and his father very angry ... So right away they took his citizenship'. This strong reaction is a feature of the current climate in which 'the tensions and emotions generated by the actions of the last year [2017] have created an atmosphere of "either you are with us or you are against us"', believes the historian and political analyst on the contemporary Arabian peninsula and Gulf, Peterson (2018). Certain tribes such as al-Murra, have been caught up in this, and their leaders and members can, and have, been manipulated by inducements to declare for one side or the other, a pattern seen in previous crises, such as the Buraimi Crisis of the 1950s (*ibid*, 2018). The leaders of the largest tribes showed loyalty to Saudi Arabia, but this was the only battle that Qatari inner-circle elites lost in their policy of attracting tribes.

The Anti-Terror Quartet have tried to mobilise opposition tribesmen based in the West. However, these have been less successful than their efforts in the Gulf. In September 2017, an ‘opposition conference’, the ‘Qatar Global Security and Stability Conference’, was organised in London by Qatari businessman and reformist, Khalid al-Hail, along with other exiled Qataris (Al-Arabiya, 2017d). The representatives of tribes played a role as a leading member of al-Murra tribe was the keynote panellist (McElroy, 2017); however, most speakers were Western speaker-circuit regulars. The subjects discussed were synchronised with the Anti-Terror Quartet’s demands against Qatari leadership, such as Qatar’s relationship with political Islam and terrorist groups, Qatar and Iran’s foreign policy, democracy and human rights, global prestige, al-Jazeera, and Qatar’s economic and geopolitical power (Al-Arabiya, 2017d). According to *The Guardian* (Waterson, 2018), the conference in London advocated a ‘bloodless coup’ in Qatar. The conference remained uncertain with its main goals, however, it demonstrates that Qatar tribesmen did not support the opposition’s initiatives, with the exception of a limited number of tribesmen such as al-Murra opposition groups.

With the support of the largest tribes, the main threat to the Qatari elite has always been other members of the al-Thani family, as historically regime change has been due to family pressure. During the reign of Shaykh Abdallah, authority was in practice in the hands of his brother Mohammad bin Jasim al-Thani (Crystal, 2016:47). Due to pressure within the family, ‘Abdullah stepped down in 1949. The next ruler, ‘Abdullah’s son, Shaykh Ali bin ‘Abdullah al-Thani, struggled with conflicts within the family over access to the growing oil income and responded by restricting the civil list to al-Thani and formalising the custom of permitting larger payments to those closest to him (Crystal, 1995:129). Despite this step, ongoing family opposition eventually led him also to abdicate in 1960 in favour of his son Ahmad. Ahmad was removed from power by Khalifa bin Hamad in a bloodless coup in 1972. In 1983, Khalifa resisted an attempted coup with suspect links to Libya. Although Khalifa named his son Hamad as a crown prince in 1977, Hamad removed his father from power in 1995 in another bloodless coup. An attempted counter-coup in 1996 failed, and there were rumours of coup attempts in 2002 and 2009 (Fromherz, 2012:144). Shaykh Tamim came to power peacefully as a result of Shaykh Hamad’s abdication, with Shaykh Hamad remaining visible as the ‘father-emir [sic]’ (Ramesh, 2017), seemingly breaking the cycle. However, with each transfer of power, members of the

ruling family used different tribes for support, including al-Murra in 1996, or formed alliances with rulers of neighbouring countries (Crystal, 2016:47). Therefore, while each new coup shifted the balance of tribes, it also deepened the power and importance of tribes in Qatar as a whole, differentiating it from other Gulf states that did not experience these series of takeovers.

In line with this trend of family conflict, several members of the al-Thani family emerged from the Gulf Crisis with high profiles, as potential opposition to the amir. Shaykh ‘Abdullah bin Jassem, a senior member of the al-Thani family, is regarded as having a distant claim to the throne despite the fact that his grandfather, father, and brother all ruled the emirate (Al-Arabiya, 2017e). Shaykh ‘Abdullah brokered a deal with Saudi Arabia to allow Qatari pilgrims into the kingdom while meeting with Saudi King Salman and the Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman (BBC News, 2017c), promptly dismissed by Doha as ‘a personal mission’ (*Gulf Times*, 2018). In January 2018, a video was released in which a seated Shaykh ‘Abdullah stated that he was being held, rather than hosted, in the UAE, and absolving Qatar should anything happen to him (BBC News, 2018b). Reactions on social media were divided, with one group supporting the Anti-Terror Quartet conspiracy theory that the video was filmed at al-Jazeera rather than in Abu Dhabi, and the other supporting the Qatari position that a similar video of Lebanese Prime Minister Sa’d al-Hariri from November 2017, whom some Lebanese officials claimed had been held hostage by Saudi authorities (Bassam and Perry, 2017).

A few days later, a source at the UAE ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation (WAM, 2018) issued a statement saying that Shaykh ‘Abdullah ‘has come as a guest to the UAE, at his own behest’ and he ‘enjoyed the warm welcome and gracious hospitality at the country’ and ‘had unrestrained mobility and freedom of movement during his stay’. The statement concluded expressing ‘regret over the fabrication of facts, which is ... the general trend in which ... Qatar continues to fabricate lies and half truths’. Abdullah’s deal with Saudi Arabia did raise his profile, as prior to this, ‘most in Doha had either never heard of him or simply forgotten who he was’ (Davidson, 2017). However, he has not emerged as a real threat to the Qatari elite. There is uncertainty in considering Shaykh ‘Abdullah a real opposition figure within the al-Thani family, and his apparent connections with the Anti-Terror Quartet.

The business connections with Saudi Arabia of another member of the ruling family, Shaykh Sultan bin Suhaim, seems to present a stronger threat to the Qatari regime. A resident of France and the eighth son of Qatar's founding foreign minister, Shaykh Sultan is 'a heavyweight in the Al Thani family', although neither his father nor his brothers were amirs of Qatar (Moubayed, 2017). Sultan runs SST Holdings, which was awarded a USD 8.8bn contract for developing 1.4m m<sup>2</sup> of real estate in Riyadh in 2016 (Dorsey, 2017). Moreover, it seems the Qatar ruling elite took action against him, raiding his Doha home in October and confiscating his father's archive (Saudi Gazette, 2017). In retaliation, Sultan released statements against the ruling regime in Qatar, supporting the Anti-Terror Quartet's position, blaming actions of the Qatari inner-circle for the Quartet's blockade (*Arab News*, 2017d). In September 2017, Shaykh Sultan travelled to Saudi Arabia to participate in a tribal conference in order to support al-Murra tribe (Maguid, 2017). In November 2017, he addressed thousands of members of Bani Hajir branch of the Qahtan tribe that gathered in the Eastern province of Saudi Arabia, calling for 'a purge in his home country', albeit to limited support (Dorsey, 2017). On February 2018, Shaykh Sultan was welcomed by the UAE leadership (*The National*, 2018a). Despite these efforts to engage within Qatar with elements from family members and the larger tribes opposing the ruling regime, it seems that the Anti-Terror Quartet's policies failed to create regime change. The reasons for this will now be discussed.

### **5.6.2. Miscalculation of the Anti-Terror Quartet**

A military coup in Qatar was not plausible due to the lack of historical precedents and caution over the manipulation of army officers. While the al-Thani have dealt with security concerns from among their own family as described above, they 'have not faced any serious challenge to their power from military officers outside their own families' (Fromherz, 2012:144). The central government firmly controls the military, with loyal leaders 'distributed throughout the high ranks' (ibid, 2012:144), and most officers are dependent on their government-paid wages. Despite efforts to attract al-Murra and Bani Hajir leaders to support the Anti-Terror Quartet, a coup was not a realistic outcome as Qatar's army does not consist of members from a single tribe (Interviewee C, 2018). Qatar successfully balances groups within the military with key figures drawn from different tribes (ibid, 2018). This is in part perhaps due

to the ‘largely symbolic and ceremonial’ role of the military, which acts largely as a bodyguard for the amir himself (Fromherz, 2012:144) and therefore has always avoided allowing any single tribe to control the safety of the amir (Interviewee D, 2018).

Wealth, the key driver for wielding adopted power and building patron-client relationship with tribesmen, has become the key factor for attracting loyalties and maintaining loyalty to the current al-Thani decision-makers. Even if the Anti-Terror Quartet assumed that historical trends suggest that tribes would support Saudi Arabia, in contrast, economic factors have been crucial for loyalty to the Qatari regime. The miscalculation was not made only by the Saudis or the Anti-Terror Quartet, but also by the Qatari government who was also afraid that the largest tribes, such as al-Murra, would support their opponents. The Qatari national academic (Interviewee C, 2018) states that before the Gulf Crises, based on historical examples, there was speculation among government officials, even in Qatar, over the loyalty of al-Murra tribe in the event of any dispute with Saudi Arabia.

However, tribes such as al-Murra and Bani Hajir, despite being the most powerful tribes in Qatar, have strong relationships with the al-Thani due to the many benefits they have already gained from Qatar. Wealth and authority gained from military or government positions, for example, are greater than can be had from similar positions in other GCC states, due to Qatar’s wealth. The Doha-based academic (Interviewee C, 2018) states: ‘Those who are commanders in the army will be able [to], everyone, become wealthy because ... [of] his army position, or the government, he has salary like one of the Prince[s] or a minister of Saudi Arabia or [the] UAE’. For this reason, potentially disloyal tribes are motivated to preserve the status quo in Qatar and avoid turmoil (Interviewee C, 2018), and the al-Thani regime is now realising that al-Murra and Bani Hajir are among the staunchest defenders of the Qatari government. Therefore, al-Murra and Bani Hajir remain the most represented groups in the army, and ruling elites ‘put their trust in them’ (ibid, 2018), despite their historic connections to Saudi leadership. Despite the historical trend of the largest tribes, such as al-Murra supporting Saudi leadership in actions against Qatar’s ruling elite, in this instance, tribesmen resident in Qatar support the al-Thani ruling elite, mainly due to the wealth advantages provided by the government.

The tension caused by the Anti-Terror Quartet’s failed attempt to undermine the loyalty of entire tribes by influencing their leaders caused the splitting of clans.



For example, while Qatar revoked the citizenship of Shaykh Shafi Nasir Hamoud al-Hajri, elder of the Shaml al-Hawajer tribe, his cousin Salem bin Mubarak al-Shafi is the ambassador of Qatar in Turkey (Qatar Embassy in Ankara-Turkey, 2018), and another cousin is a newspaper editor (Interviewee C, 2018). Similarly, the nephew of the amir of al-Murra whose comments to the Saudi Crown Prince were leaked, has remained, ambassador to Sri Lanka (Qatar Embassy in Colombo, 2018). Rather than uniting tribes under the Qatari or Saudi banners, the Crisis has split the clans, or the families within clans (Interviewee C, 2018). The Gulf Crisis has exposed a situation in which the transnational nature of tribes could not be used for political purposes, as the clans were divided. Rather than supporting their shaykhs or leaders, Qatar-based tribesmen chose to demonstrate their loyalty to the ruling Qatari elite, in order to preserve their social and economic benefits.

Qatar's wealth has allowed the inner-circle elite to win the battle against the Anti-Terror Quartet in their attempts to use tribalism against the current regime. Potential challengers at all social levels within Qatar have been unwilling to jeopardise their own 'economic and human investment', and will hide this self-interest in the guise of loyalty, according to a Qatari national academic (Interviewee C, 2018). Many of these benefits depend on national citizenship, and as a result, the fear of losing citizenship is another reason to show loyalty to the current regime (Interviewee D, 2017). This loyalty can be expressed by public criticism of the UAE and Saudi Arabia and to defend Qatar, to the exclusion of any objectivity that might be mistaken as disloyalty by the Qatari leadership (ibid, 2017). As a result, the main weight Qatar's inner-circle elite are able to create, is to attract the loyalty of tribes that have a transnational nature, and who were historically targeted by other states but now show solidarity with the state of Qatar. In most cases, historically, the tool of tribalism was used as a Saudi strategy for regime change in Qatar; now, however, as the current Gulf Crisis demonstrates, this is not an ongoing trend.

Qatari leadership has succeeded in emphasising to the public the external threat from the Anti-Terror Quartet. In a speech on 22 July 2017, Shaykh Tamim lauded the Qatari people for 'instinctively and naturally [defending] the sovereignty and independence of their homeland' and claiming disingenuously—as this thesis demonstrates wealth being the key driver for adopted power implementation—that it is the other GCC states that thought 'money can buy everything' (The Peninsula, 2017b). Narratives in Qatar during the Crisis have focused on the threat that the

Quartet would destroy Qatar, and that Qatar would no longer have the highest incomes in the Gulf (Interviewee C, 2018). Therefore, the Gulf Crisis has increased the popularity of, and support for the current regime, uniting Qatar against the Anti-Terror Quartet as a threat not only to the current regime in Qatar, but also to the nation.


Support by the Qatari people for the ruling regime was also demonstrated in the West. In Qatari-owned Harrods, women wore badges supporting Shaykh Tamim, cars with Qatari number plates that were parked near Harrods similarly placed in windows his picture in support for Shaykh Tamim. The same image was put in the windows of very expensive central London private apartments (presumably owned by Qatari citizens) and the same image was even placed in the Grosvenor Casinos, as demonstrated in *Figure 5.2*. There were further signs supporting Qatar, possible as a result of funding by the Qatari government, such as slogans on black cabs and an advertisement near Selfridges' rickshaws on 18 December, Qatar's National Day. Consequently, Qatar won the battle against the Anti-Terror Quartet in tribal loyalties, with the result that the Qatari elite remained in power and were able to reject the demands of the Anti-Terror Quartet, allowing Qatar to continue to implement their policies independent from the GCC in the future.



London, Westminster-  
Embankment,  
26 December 2017



London, Kensington and  
Chelsea- Belgravia,  
3 January 2018



London, Kensington and Chelsea-  
South Kensington,  
25 December 2017



London,  
Westminster-  
Mayfair,  
22 December 2017

Figure 5.2. Supporting Qatar's ruling regime in the West (source: personal collection).

## 5.7. Conclusion

Since 1995, attracting tribes has become an essential tool for the Qatari inner-circle elite to wield adopted power. As the evidence presented in this chapter, the central role of this policy can be seen in the roles of the inner-circle of Qatar, such as Shaykh Hamad, Shaykh Tamim, and other elites, such as ‘Abdullah bin Hamad al-‘Attiya . Wealth has become essential as the key means of attracting tribal loyalties. Due to the transnational nature of tribes, Qatar has tried to attract tribes from the GCC countries and also the wider Middle East region, as the Syrian case demonstrates.

As a scope for attracting tribal loyalties, Qatar claimed al-Thani descent from important figures in Arabian history, such as Al-Qa’qa’ ibn ‘Amr al-Tamimi and Shaykh Mohammad bin Abdul Wahhab. Despite such efforts, economic factors remain the main means for attracting tribal loyalties. Along with the advantages of the use of cross-border identity and kinship links, Qatar also accrued costs. The naturalisation of tribes became one of the important reasons for disputes between Qatar and its neighbours in 2014 and the ongoing Gulf Crisis. Moreover, there has always been a fear of larger tribes, as historically most coups were implemented by foreign countries supporting both tribal groups and disaffected members of the al-Thani family against the ruling regime.

Although Qatar has constantly attracted other tribes since 1995, and naturalised important or noble tribes when they might be useful for political purposes, they have been able to create the most weight from such policies during the ongoing the Gulf Crisis. Despite the Anti-Terror Quartet’s attempts to attract the largest tribes and support opposition within the al-Thani family, their policies for regime change failed. This is mainly because economic factors divided clans within tribes. As a result, the al-Thani inner-circle has been able to cement the loyalty of tribesmen and unite the country against what they have perceived to be an external threat, the Anti-Terror Quartet. This assisted Qatar to reject demands from the Anti-Terror’ Quartet, allowing it to continue its independent foreign policies and wield adopted power in the future.

## **Chapter Six**

### **Adopted Power in Use: Media**

#### **6.1. Introduction**

This chapter examines Qatar's wielding adopted power through alliances with media non-state actors in order to influence other states. Qatar, openly or otherwise, funded media non-state actors, including al-Jazeera, Middle East Eye, al-Araby TV, Arabi21, Libya al-Ahrar TV, *The New Arab (al-Araby al-Jadeed)*, Arabi Post (formerly known as *HuffPost Arabi*). These media non-state actors emerged as Qatar's clients for adopted power implementation, using them to project power worldwide due to their transnational nature, as domain illustrates. Vis-à-vis scope, Qatar benefits from these media non-state actors who reach viewers that support Pan-Arab, Arab nationalist, Pan-Islamic, Islamist, and liberal agendas. Building alliances with them, allows Qatar to spread its own narratives and political interests, and significantly contributes to the state's political transformation from a tiny country without a voice to emergence as a regional player that challenges the narratives of regional heavyweights. However, building alliances with media non-state actors also comes at a cost for Qatar, as being associated of funding a 'mouthpiece of Al Qaeda' (Zayani, 2005:23), along with deteriorating relations with states in the Middle East, particularly with its neighbours. In order to demonstrate this, the chapter analyses al-Jazeera, Qatar's most heavily funded media platform, and its establishment and emergence as a well-known non-state actor which Qatar has been able to benefit from. Secondly, the chapter examines other less well-known media non-state actors that emerged primarily after the Arab Spring, and their contribution to Qatar's power in the region and worldwide.

#### **6.2. Qatar's client: al-Jazeera**

In 1995, Shaykh Hamad signed a decree establishing an independent news outlet al-Jazeera. In 1996, Qatar provided al-Jazeera a loan, cited in different sources as USD 150m (Zayani, 2005) or USD 137m (Samuel-Azran and Pecht, 2014), due for repayment by 2001. Al-Jazeera intended to generate the income needed to repay this loan through advertising from big corporations such as Unilever, Gillette, Procter &

Gamble, and General Motors (Wheeler, 2003). However, market conditions in the Middle Eastern advertising industry were not favourable, and Arab conglomerates feared that al-Jazeera's unstable relations with regional governments might damage their own business interests (Sharp, 2003). As a result, by 2001, al-Jazeera failed to generate a positive cashflow and the channel's advertising income accounted for only 35- 40% of its costs (ibid, 2003). Still, the former amir prolonged the loan indefinitely. In 2009, Qatar had covered more than USD 100m in losses per year for al-Jazeera Arabic and invested more than USD 1bn in al-Jazeera English (Helman, 2009). Thus, al-Jazeera remained a parastatal company.

Scholars highlight different reasons Qatar funded the channel. But most agree on the importance of Shaykh Hamad's need to demonstrate the inner-circle elite-driven policies in Qatar. While Miles (2006) believes that al-Jazeera's establishment was related to the amir's new strategy for improving relations with the West, El-Nawawy and Iskandar (2002:33) consider the establishment of al-Jazeera as 'part of [Shaykh Hamad's] move to introduce democratization to his tiny state'. El-Nawawy and Iskandar (2002:33) claim that the former amir 'planned for al-Jazeera to be an independent and nonpartisan satellite TV network free from government scrutiny, control and manipulation'. However, it seems that al-Jazeera as a parastatal company became an essential tool for the implementation of adopted power by the Qatari government, who were able to create an 'independent' channel in the hands of representatives of the ruling family. In reality, a parastatal company such as al-Jazeera was in official state hands: since 1996 the chairman of the board of directors has been Shaykh Hamad bin Thamer al-Thani (Al-Jazeera Media Network, 2019a). Along with this position, Shaykh Hamad bin Thamer became the chairman of the board of directors of Qatar Media Corporation (QMC), which was created in 2009 to oversee Qatari radio and TV operators. Other high-ranking positions at QMC are held by representatives of the ruling family, such as Chief Officer Shaykh 'Abdulrahman bin Hamad al-Thani (*The Peninsula*, 2019b).

Furthermore, al-Jazeera was officially run by a representative of the ruling family, Shaykh Ahmed al-Thani, who was the director general between 2011 and 2013, before being appointed Minister of Economy and Trade. As El-Zayat (2012) reports at the time: 'Al Jazeera is not only financially supported by Qatar, but the content is now officially in the royal hands as well'. The preceding Director General

Wadah Khanfar held the position from 2006 until his unexpected resignation in 2011, after a stint as managing director from 2003 to 2006. Mr Khanfar states (2016):

... Qatar like any other state in the world, is driven by interest, not by charity. In a way it is not a charitable organisation, that only simply spending money for the sake of God and heaven. Normally people spend money at any state for the sake of amplifying and maximising their power or protecting themselves. Simple, that's realism in politics, which I agree on.

Mr Khanfar also highlighted the interesting relations between al-Jazeera and Qatar, in which al-Jazeera was allowed a degree of separation from Qatari foreign policy to avoid hindering its development as a powerful international influence. This allowed al-Jazeera to develop editorial policies aimed at increasing popularity, rather than income (Khanfar, 2016). For Mr Khanfar, the unique quality of the newsroom was its international diversity, representing 55 nationalities once the English channel had been established, and preventing the editorial policy from being 'the voice of Qatar'. Therefore, he concludes: 'I don't think that a director general from the ruling family meant that al-Jazeera has become under [its] control. Because he didn't change editorial policies, he came from a background of business and economics, and he dealt with the corporate level'. Al-Jazeera management denies any state interference in the editorial policies of the channel and rejects suggestions that it serves as a Qatari tool.

Despite the clarity of the former director general's statements on Qatar and al-Jazeera relations, Qatar's use of the channel's for its own objectives is still discussed. One group of scholars share Mr Khanfar's understanding of al-Jazeera as independent media (Bahry, 2001; Lynch, 2006), while others focus on the coverage of important events by al-Jazeera and the policies of the state of Qatar, believing that al-Jazeera serves Qatar's interests. Samuel-Azran and Pecht (2014) evaluate the accusation by Wikileaks on Qatari usage of al-Jazeera for political purposes (LeBaron, 2009), by examining the five-year rift (September 2002 to September 2007) between Qatar and Saudi Arabia, and argue that while there was little difference in coverage of Saudi policies in al-Jazeera English during and after the conflict, the al-Jazeera Arabic website had a dramatically higher volume of articles during the conflict that presented Saudi policies in a negative light, especially concerning support of terrorism and violations of human rights. The authors conclude that al-Jazeera Arabic production is

closely harmonised with Qatari foreign policy interests, which calls to question the independence of the channel. Zayani (2005:9) comments on the channel's coverage of Qatar, noting that 'it offers a sparing coverage of its host country and is careful not to criticize it'. Moreover, El-Zayat (2012:6), analysing al-Jazeera coverage during the Arab Spring, argues that even when al-Jazeera was reporting independently and freely, coverage was partially 'unbalanced' and 'biased', and echoed Qatar's desired outcomes for the revolution, and concludes that 'Al Jazeera's freedom reaches only as far as the Emir [sic] allows'. In addition, Samuel-Azran et al. (2016) examine coverage of the allegations of bribery in Qatar's successful 2022 World Cup bid, noting that while al-Jazeera English and Arabic both maintained high journalistic norms on this issue, al-Jazeera Arabic avoids criticism of Qatar.

Indeed, scholars consider al-Jazeera Arabic to demonstrate a more biased pro-Qatari agenda compared with al-Jazeera English. Youssef (2009) demonstrates that al-Jazeera English offered more balanced coverage of the Iraq War, while al-Jazeera Arabic's website spread propagandist messages about Iraqi civilian losses. HaLevi (2007), analysing coverage of US affairs found that 'the Arabic version included the language of a terror organization, while the English version was cleaned [up] with changes and omissions, including changes to the language of direct quotes' (Samuel-Azran and Pecht, 2014:222). The head of programmes at the Elders Foundation, Kinninmont (2017), believes that the difference in professional standards stems from the tendency for al-Jazeera English to hire journalists from a variety of Western news outlets, with corresponding values, at a time when other Western media were cutting back their foreign reporters. Therefore, she concludes that the outlet 'has a very high status among other Western journalists, because everybody knows people who have worked for them', and because al-Jazeera offered opportunities to report on issues which other Western media did not.

Due to high professional standards and balanced coverage, observers consider al-Jazeera English as a non-state actor, which emerged as the main alternatives to well-known media non-state actors, such as the BBC, CNN, Fox News, and MSNBC (Nasr, 2014:398). There is no such consensus on al-Jazeera Arabic though. Due to the reasons given above, it might not be viewed as a non-state actor because it has a close relationship with Qatar's inner circle elites, and the explicitly pro-Qatar views and ideas that it broadcasts. In contrast, there is a group of scholars who highlight al-Jazeera Arabic's transnational reputation due to the history of its establishment.



Qatar's strategy of taking advantage of well-established non-state actors in the region began with the BBC television network. Even the al-Jazeera satellite channel can be considered Qatar's creation of transnational media, as it was initially created 'from the ashes of the BBC' (Ayish, 2005:108), a well-established channel with transnational influence. In 1994, the BBC World Service formed a partnership with Orbit, a private Saudi TV channel, to establish an Arabic language TV outlet. This eventually broke down due to an editorial disagreement (El Oifi, 2005). Al-Jazeera's founders took advantage of this situation by recruiting the BBC Arabic network's former employees. Most programming employees stationed in London were relocated to Doha. This decision was as crucial for the outlet as for its newly recruited staff. The staff of reporters, producers and editors, representatives of different Arab nationalities, 'were grafted into what seemed like an experiential station in an obscure location' (El-Nawawy and Iskandar, 2002). El Oifi (2005:72) argues that by recruiting established journalists, al-Jazeera brought professionalism and the tradition of the BBC to an 'environment that is characterized by more freedom and where the conditions for a commitment to Arab viewers are more favorable'. Scholars point out that the former BBC employees became the core responsible for the emerging state-owned al-Jazeera gaining a transnational reputation.

The position of scholars who agree on al-Jazeera Arabic's transnational nature is linked with its ability to unite individuals from the Arab states and the wider Arab diaspora. It supplies a transnational regional audience that in variety of ways can be seen as heterogeneous, bound by history, culture, language, and to a lesser extent, geography, and religion. In doing so, al-Jazeera reinvigorated Pan-Arabism, albeit in a different manner from Nasir's Arab nationalism. As Zayani (2005:7) and Hirst (2001) note, while the outlet may be seen as the 'closest successor' to Cairo's Voice of the Arabs, it cannot be compared 'in style nor content'. Al-Jazeera has played a central role among Arab outlets in creating a 'pan-Arab consciousness' or a Pan-Arab 'imagined community', to use Benedict Anderson's term, including people who have a sense of kinship and belonging with other individuals who speak the same language but whom they have not met, and are located in different places (Zayani, 2005:8).

Moreover, Zayani (2005) argues that al-Jazeera, among other transnational channels, unites Arab states and their diaspora in a continuing public discussion on current Arab matters. This happens through two different processes: by appealing to Arab audiences outside their homelands, and by tapping into Arab intellectual figures

and journalists outside the Arab states, for example, those living in Europe. Similarly, El Oifi (2005) believes that al-Jazeera operates in an undefined geo-political framework in that there is a trend for the controversial ideology of the nation-state to disappear in favour of transnational identities. The author (ibid, 2005:69) sees Qatar as a state which has gained advantage from the transnational nature of the Pan-Arab or Pan-Islamic message that al-Jazeera has spread, stating:

to legitimate its very existence - which is often viewed with bitterness by Arab nationalists who consider it as a historical mistake and a sign of the weakness of the Arab nation - Qatar has tapped into these transnational sentiments, whether they be pan-Arab or pan-Islamic, and it has capitalized on them to serve its own interests.

El-Nawawy and Iskandar (2002:44) believe that al-Jazeera supplies ‘the Arab world with its own version of CNN, as a transnational – not just regional – network broadcasting real news and conducting free dialogues’. In other words, the transnational reputation of al-Jazeera Arabic was reached due to its ability to unite Arabs under a pan-Arab and pan-Islamic agenda. Though al-Jazeera Arabic’s contribution to Qatar’s projection of adopted power will be discussed further, the central focus of this chapter will be on al-Jazeera English, which emerged as a transnational non-state actor that Qatar used as a client. In the next section Qatar’s ability to exert power via al-Jazeera will be examined through domain, scope, weight, and cost.

### **6.3. Qatar’s adopted power domain: building alliance with al-Jazeera**

Al-Jazeera’s domain, through which Qatar has influenced regional and worldwide narratives, consists, or consisted of more than twenty channels, including outlets in Arabic and English, the regional channels for the Balkans, Turkey, al-Jazeera America, and specialist channels such as the Egypt-focused al-Jazeera Mubasher, AJ+, AJ+ Araby, and al-Jazeera Documentary (Al-Jazeera Media Network, 2019b). Not all of these have operated simultaneously. There are more than 70 al-Jazeera bureaus around the globe (Al-Jazeera Media Network, 2019c). According to a 2007 survey, 98% of viewers of the Arabic-language news site are from 20 Arab and two non-Arab Muslim states (Pakistan and Afghanistan) (Fahmy and Johnson, 2007;

Fatmy and Emad, 2011). The English-language website's viewers are mainly from the West (81.4%), with over half from the US (47%), while 14% of viewers of al-Jazeera English come from 20 Arab and five other Muslim countries (Johnson and Fatmy, 2008). In order to influence the American audience, al-Jazeera America was launched in August 2013, but it closed in April 2016 due to poor ratings, financial tenseness, ideological bias, and a notably antagonistic media industry (Labiste, 2016).

While al-Jazeera Arabic and English gained advantage from their transnational nature, being available for those in diaspora to watch in their native languages, AJ+ has used the transnational nature of social media to a greater extent, to present news on its website, YouTube, Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram, with written content on Medium. AJ+ available in English, Arabic, Spanish, and French, passed one billion viewers in 2015. In other words, the domain of AJ+ is difficult to identify based on statehood, but can be considered through its access to English, Arabic, Spanish, and French speakers. Therefore, by using its transnational nature as a non-state media actor, al-Jazeera implemented adopted power over a domain in the Arab world, Muslim states (Pakistan and Afghanistan), Western countries (US, UK, Australia, Canada), Balkan states (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, Slovenia), and both Western and Arab audiences who get news information from AJ+. In the past, this domain included a Turkish audience (until 2017) and an American audience (between 2013 and 2016).

#### **6.4. The scope of Qatar's adopted power: building alliance with al-Jazeera**

If domain identifies in which parts of the world Qatar has been able to spread its power through al-Jazeera's presentation of its narratives, scope discusses which issues Qatar uses al-Jazeera for in order to influence public opinion. For al-Jazeera to emerge as a non-state actor it required a niche with which to attract viewers. This also allies with Qatar's foreign policy objectives. Al-Jazeera has attracted viewers by providing the Pan-Arab, Arab nationalist, Pan-Islamic, Islamist and liberal agendas, as analysed below.

### 6.4.1. Pan-Arabist, Pan-Islamist

The first agenda through which al-Jazeera targeted viewers that Qatar benefited from, was the Pan-Arab agenda—with 73.3% of al-Jazeera’s broadcasting as Pan-Arab (El-Nawawy and Iskandar, 2002:49). El Oifi (2005) states that Arab nationalism appears to be the channel’s unifying factor, with al-Jazeera journalists primarily identified as Arabs, and the network advocating Arab nationalism by presenting rhetoric such as ‘Arab nation’ and ‘Arab solidarity’ along with images shown on programmes about nationalist struggles against Zionism and colonialism. Additionally, Zayani (2005) argues that al-Jazeera found its niche discussing issues that touch on the Middle East specifically, and the Arab and Muslim world in general. This includes the Palestinian Intifada, the Anglo-American bombing of Baghdad, the war in Afghanistan and the invasion of Iraq. Not only does the channel focus on the Arab world, but its ‘Arabness’ is paramount. Kasim (2015) suggests that al-Jazeera talk shows unite Arab audiences under a Pan-Arab identity, and that the channel ‘played a nationalist role by narrowing and sometimes bridging divides’. El-Nawawy and Iskandar (2002) state that a diversity of employees from different Arab states assisted in building a Pan-Arab identity which also echoes with al\_Jazeera's editorial commitment. Al-Jazeera thus became an essential tool for increasing Pan-Arab communication across national borders.

Additionally, scholars have considered the network's broader effect on the Muslim world, considering not only a Pan-Arab, but a Pan-Islamic agenda. Rinnawi (2012a) merges Pan-Arab and Pan-Islamic to describe the agendas adopted by the channel. Having a goal of increasing its ‘patriotic image’, al-Jazeera has implemented the Palestinian cause as a vital subject for the Arab ‘nation’; Arabs from the Arab World and the wider Arab and Islamic diaspora find the subject appealing. Moreover, Rinnawi (2012a) states that al-Jazeera uses broadcasting and media technologies to advance Pan-Islamic and Pan-Arab issues, for example, by showing dramatic images of Lebanese, Iraqis, and Palestinians suffering as victims. Other scholars believe that al-Jazeera’s agenda goes beyond Pan-Arabism, terming it ‘McArabism’ (Rinnawi, 2006) or ‘imagined Watan’ (Pintak, 2009), describing the immediate effect on Arabs elsewhere when they consume Arabic coverage on television, or other transnational media such as the internet. By using the transnational nature of the non-state actor, al-Jazeera influences Pan-Arab and Pan-Islamic-oriented viewers. Moreover, under the

umbrella of ‘patriotic image’ and ‘imagined Watan’, al-Jazeera influences Muslim communities across the globe.

#### **6.4.2. An Islamist agenda**

The second feature of al-Jazeera’s scope is the Islamist agenda that has been essential for bringing global recognition and its emergence as a global non-state actor. Al-Jazeera provides a platform for leaders of different Islamist groups, such as the Taliban, al-Qa’ida, the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas, and al-Nusra Front. In 1999, al-Jazeera was the sole outlet to accept the Taliban regime’s offer to establish an office in Afghanistan, an offer rejected by Reuters, CNN, and APTV due to a perceived lack of importance (Rugh, 2004:217). Therefore, at the time of the 9/11 attacks in the US there was no international media presence other than al-Jazeera inside Taliban-controlled territories. When the war started in Afghanistan in 2001, the first US attacks on Afghanistan were shown live by al-Jazeera broadcasting from Kabul through a live, permanent, twenty-four-hour satellite link (El-Nawawy and Iskandar, 2003:144). Former al-Jazeera Director General Mr Khanfar (2016) states that the Taliban’s access to the world was through al-Jazeera, and this access during the Afghanistan War made al-Jazeera a global media player ‘because it was the only TV station in Afghanistan, and then al-Jazeera’s name started to be quoted internationally’.

Al-Jazeera’s emergence as a global media player was specifically associated with al-Qa’ida leadership through numerous exclusive broadcasts with Usama bin Ladin. For example, it became the first media outlet to conduct a TV interview with Bin Ladin in Afghanistan in 1998, by the outlet’s journalist in Pakistan, although the interview was not aired until 10 June 1999 (El-Nawawy and Iskandar 2003:149). In that interview Bin Ladin denied responsibility for the 1998 attacks on US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, but stated his admiration for the attackers of US bases in Saudi Arabia in 1995 and 1996. Despite the channel’s early coverage of him, global recognition of al-Jazeera is due to the well-known broadcast of Bin Ladin on 7 October 2001, the first interview with the al-Qa’ida leader after 9/11, which was then rebroadcasted by CNN and other Western channels (ibid, 2003:144). Additionally, by positioning itself as a mediator between al-Qa’ida and CNN, the channel placed itself at the same level as well-known media non-state actors. Al-Qa’ida representatives contacted al-Jazeera to give interviews, though in collaboration with other media

outlets. For example, on 17 October 2001, representatives of al-Qa'ida invited CNN and al-Jazeera to submit questions to the group. Al-Jazeera submitted 25 questions while CNN submitted six, although no responses were received. On 21 October 2001, Tayser Allouni, the al-Jazeera journalist in Kabul, was invited by Bin Ladin to conduct an interview (ibid, 2003:151), although the channel denied the existence of this interview until excerpts were aired by CNN on 31 January and 1 February 2002 (ibid, 2003:152). Therefore, coverage of Bin Ladin's jihadist speeches helped the channel gain international recognition; this contributed to broadcasting of other Islamist groups, such as Hamas.

Hamas's leadership also became guests of al-Jazeera programmes. In 1999, al-Jazeera released an interview with Shaykh Ahmed Yassin, the spiritual leader of Hamas, in which he accused the Palestinian leadership of assassinating opposition members (El-Nawawy and Iskandar, 2003:126), angering the PLO leader, Yasir Arafat. Further controversy over coverage of the PLO's involvement in the Lebanese Civil War led to a Palestinian security presence at al-Jazeera's bureau in March 2001 (Tatham, 2006:69). On 25 January 2017, senior Hamas leader and spokesmen, Osama Hamdan, appeared on al-Jazeera English's show *UpFront*, addressing antisemitic statements in their 1988 charter, while in another interview on *Talk to al-Jazeera*, on 6 May 2017, the former Hamas leader Khalid Mesh'al discussed Hamas' attitudes towards Israel and Jews, and relations with the Muslim Brotherhood. Al-Jazeera became a platform for the spiritual and secular leadership of Hamas to promote their organisation's agenda, adding to the Islamist narratives broadcast by the channel.

Al-Jazeera is also known for providing coverage for al-Nusra Front. The first ever interview of al-Nusra founder and leader, Abu Mohammad al-Julani, was released by al-Jazeera on 19 December 2013, titled 'Al Qaeda leader in Syria speaks to Al Jazeera' (Al-Jazeera, 2013). The interview was conducted in English with Arabic responses, and with al-Julani's face hidden due to security fears. On 27 May 2015, al-Jazeera's Ahmad Mansour conducted another exclusive interview with al-Julani in the program, *Without Borders*, where he was introduced with an emphasis on liberation, rather than terrorism (Al-Jazeera, 2015). Former director of al-Jazeera's branch in Cairo Mohammad Fahmy, interviewed by Saudi *Asharq al-Awsat* (Lake, 2017), commented on it saying that al-Jazeera journalists had been told not to refer to al-Nusra as a terrorist organisation. During the interview al-Julani stated that al-Nusra's main aim was to topple the 'grossly oppressive' Syrian regime and had no intention to

fight the West (Al-Jazeera, 2015). He also made an unusual claim that al-Nusra's association with al-Qa'ida indicated that it was more moderate than other sectarian fighting groups in Syria (Davidson, 2016:341). Together, the coverage of al-Nusra and other Islamist groups, and their portrayal as liberation forces rather than terrorists, demonstrate an editorial position.

Al-Jazeera Arabic's relations with other Islamist organisations such as the Muslim Brotherhood appear to be deep-rooted and long-term. Ambassador Haqqani, who is also the Middle East terrorism expert for the documentary *Qatar: a Dangerous Alliance* (Mirage TV, 2017) sees al-Jazeera as the inevitable consequence of Qatar's policy of eliciting support from the Muslim Brotherhood and engaging with Islamist narratives. Similarly, leaked cables revealed that Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Zayed highlighted the relationship between Qatar, the Muslim Brotherhood, and al-Jazeera. For example, at Abu Dhabi's largest defence exhibition (IDEX) he told US delegates that Qatar is 'part of the Muslim Brotherhood' and that '90% of the staff [are] affiliated with the Brotherhood' (WikiLeaks, 2009b); while in a meeting with a US senior advisor on Iraq, Jeffrey stated that al-Jazeera was 'managed by the Muslim Brotherhood' to manipulate Islamic movements (Wikileaks, 2005). The Muslim Brotherhood ideology was spread through al-Jazeera by the organisation's spiritual leader, media journalists, and was supported by high-ranking management as discussed below.

As mentioned in Chapter Four, the Doha-based cleric, al-Qaradawi, played an important role in building alliances with political Islam non-state actors to project Qatar's adopted power. The importance of the spiritual leader of the Muslim Brotherhood was demonstrated by the platform he was given through his al-Jazeera coverage on the weekly talk show *Shari'a and Life*. Al-Qaradawi exploited this media platform to argue that Islamic law justifies acts of violence and terrorism against Israelis and US soldiers (MEMRI, 2018), including the claim that the Holocaust was one of series of periodic 'punishments' for the Jewish people (Mirage TV, 2017). Providing this platform for al-Qaradawi to justify violence divided political analysts. The vice-president of the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies, Schanzer, believes that al-Jazeera contributed to the development of radical Islam (ibid, 2017), and states:

there was a moment, according to some officials, [where there] were talks of taking out al-Jazeera ... [but] ... that is probably not the case now [...] they see al-Jazeera as exercising its right for free speech, and the problem is that it is [...] adding to the challenge of radical Islam [...] Qaradawi [...] normalises Hamas suicide bombings.

In contrast, Doha-based academic, Zweiri, believes that al-Qaradawi played ‘a good role in al- Jazeera for years’, until he took a position on Iran and Shia, when his public profile was noticeably reduced (2017). Al-Qaradawi’s contribution to the channel is debatable: while spreading Islamist propaganda and fomenting violence, he also promoted Qatar’s official interests, for example, voicing support for Qatar’s policies in Syria, Libya, and Bahrain during the Arab Spring (Steinberg, 2012:4).

Al-Jazeera journalists, especially from al-Jazeera Arabic, cannot be considered disconnected from al-Qaradawi as there is a consensus in academia that the majority of them are sympathetic to the Muslim Brotherhood, of which he is a spiritual leader. Alex Vatanka, a senior fellow at the Middle East Institute, states in *Qatar: a Dangerous Alliance* (Mirage, 2017), that many al-Jazeera journalists are members of the Muslim Brotherhood. This is an opinion supported by Kinninmont (2017) who observes: ‘it does seem that there were quite a high proportion of Muslim Brotherhood people who inevitably would end up hiring people that they knew that would also have a similar outlook’. Therefore, when the Arab uprisings happened, the coverage on al-Jazeera was very sympathetic, often reported by journalists who had been political refugees from the countries where uprisings were now happening. Kinninmont highlights biased coverage of the Arab Spring by other media, not solely al-Jazeera, with each channel having ‘their own biases against the uprisings’ reflected in their coverage. That al-Jazeera spread a Muslim Brotherhood narrative is not a coincidence as most of its journalists have been members of the organisation and indirectly supported the Islamist narrative.

Understanding the regional architecture of al-Jazeera leadership, together with the foundation of Muslim Brotherhood ideology, suggests that al-Jazeera’s correspondents and also its leadership have been ideologically affected by the Muslim Brotherhood. Al-Banna, the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, states that ‘Islam rejected narrow geographical nationalism’ (Lia, 1998:78). The nation of Islam, the *umma*, is believed to be connected by ties of brotherhood and creed that extend far beyond the geographical restrictions of Egypt. Moreover, the Muslim Brotherhood



advocates returning to the bygone prominence of Islam and to rebuild an Islamic empire. The same ideas were raised during my interview with Wadah Khanfar (2016), the former general director of al-Jazeera who now plays an essential role in other Qatar-linked institutions. When asked about the possibility of introducing a new ideology which reflects the distinctive characteristics of the region, Khanfar suggests that such a theory would need to be developed with three features in mind. First, the ideology would need to be democratic, but rather than a Western liberal democracy, simply a ‘system of sharing power’. Second, it would have to recognise regional distinctiveness, ‘respecting the role of religion in public life’. Finally, Khanfar proposes that there should be an emergence of ‘a regional architecture, not only a nation state philosophy’. This, he proposes, is in lieu of a nation state for the Arab world, which he does not believe could exist in the foreseeable future, but rather, a ‘regional architecture’ similar to the European Union ‘which maximises communication ... and economic integration, and minimises political and security contradictions’. If this structure is realised, Khanfar proposes that stability can be achieved. Therefore, al-Jazeera has broadcast different Islamist and even jihadist groups' narratives such as those of al-Qa’ida, the Taliban, Hamas, al-Nusra, and the Muslim Brotherhood. This can be viewed as al-Jazeera presenting an Islamist agenda. Additionally, the core of al-Jazeera, especially the Arabic network, includes Islamist sympathisers who have been particularly affected by Muslim Brotherhood ideology.

#### **6.4.3. Democratic narratives**

The third aspect of al-Jazeera’s scope is democratic narratives. Some scholars consider al-Jazeera as the only channel that promotes freedom of expression, human rights, and democracy, which other Arab media have generally avoided or dismissed (Miladi, 2006; Nasr, 2014:401), and the idea that authoritarianism in the region can be ended by a more enlightened Arab people (Fandy, 2007:122). In this view, Qatar and al-Jazeera are seen by Nasr (2014:398) as ‘beacons for freedom and democracy’ advocating for a new Arab world, and helping to boost Qatar’s regional and global policies. In contrast, is the contradicting opinion that ‘the myth of Al Jazeera Effect promotes the idea that the channel is “the only free Arab independent station” and “the most credible source of information for the Arab people”’ (El-Ibiary, 2011:199). El-Ibiary (2011:202) also argues that al-Jazeera achieved its reputation by discussing

taboo issues in the Arab world, ‘pushing at the limits of free media expression’, for example, being the first Arab channel to show Israeli officials, including Shimon Peres and Ehud Barak. Nonetheless, El-Ibiary (2011) concludes that as al-Jazeera is a tool for democratisation serving Qatari ends, it is not the most reliable source of information for the Arabs who are not represented democratically.

Supporting this view of a ‘democratisation agenda’, scholars highlight al-Jazeera’s ‘criticism campaigns’ against Arab regimes under the slogans: ‘The opinion and the other opinion’, and ‘Democratising the Arab world’ (Rinnawi, 2012:128). El Oifi (2005) states that al-Jazeera’s liberal credentials were presented in programmes such as *More Than One Opinion* by the Jordanian Sami Haddad, in which at least three experts with different political views and ideological orientation discussed issues. According to El Oifi (2005:73), the channel offers ‘a radical and often sarcastic critique of Arab regimes and a commitment to both democratic claims and national sovereignty’. Scholars express different opinions on the democratic agenda promoted by al-Jazeera, considering it the only channel to express freedom of speech, or use democratisation narratives for Qatar’s political interests; however, scholars agree that these democratic narratives served as a scope alongside Pan-Arab and Islamist agendas. Moreover, these agendas are inter-connected, rather than independent. Al-Qa’ida’s leadership speeches fit within the Islamist narrative, but are also Pan-Arab or Pan-Islamic, as they differentiate Muslims from non-Muslims. At the same time, the only way for Islamists to come to power is to spread democracy or democratic narratives, as discussed in Chapter Four.

## **6.5. Qatar’s adopted power weight: building alliance with al-Jazeera**

### **6.5.1. Bringing a recognisable, worldwide-known voice to the state of Qatar as weight of Qatar’s adopted power**

Applying the scope of effort as described, al-Jazeera generated influence both regionally and globally for Qatar. Using a democratic agenda, al-Jazeera succeeded in politicising the Arab audience (Ayish, 2002:151). The network was associated with breaking taboos, promoting freedom of speech, and bringing openness to the Arab world (Zayani, 2005; Lynch, 2006), and it outperformed media outlets from the West in measures of credibility in the Arab world (Fahmy and Johnson, 2007; Nasr,

2014:400). Due to such characteristics, the channel has been viewed as a key driver in the modernisation of Arab broadcasting (Zayani, 2005:1). Having politicised the audience, Zayani (2005:5) concludes that al-Jazeera capitalised on this by ‘providing food for an audience that is hungry for credible news and serious political analysis’. Similarly, El-Nawawy and Iskandar (2002:206) believe that al-Jazeera revolutionised the Arab world, challenging the censorship enforced by the government-controlled media, focusing on subjects that involved weak democratic fundamentalism, political inequality, state corruption, and violation of human rights. By doing so, al-Jazeera gained regional and international recognition for itself and the state of Qatar.

Al-Jazeera emerged as a political phenomenon, labelled ‘big voice, tiny country’ by Tatham (2006:64). The phenomenon was referred to as the ‘Al Jazeera era’ (Lynch, 2006:125), and in Western media as a ‘window to democratic expression’, or ‘the CNN of the Arab world’ (Awad, 2005:81). Applying the concept of the ‘CNN Effect’, or the potential for media to drive foreign policy in the West, Seib (2008:ix) suggests the concept of the ‘Al Jazeera Effect’ as a ‘paradigm of new media’s influence’ on global politics (El-Ibiary, 2011:199). This comes from: more focus on influence of the channel, and the internet, on Arab politics; involving the proliferation of terrorism; and processes of Islamic-led change and democratisation by pushing at the limitation of free media expression in the Arab/Muslim world. Having gained such a position, it is not surprising that al-Jazeera also gained influence in the region, aligning with Qatar’s aim of becoming a powerful state, able to change regional dynamics. Al-Jazeera became not only a media phenomenon, but a political phenomenon (Tatham, 2006:63). As a result, al-Jazeera became an essential client for projecting adopted power to bring a recognisable voice to the small state of Qatar.

### **6.5.2. Competing with regional heavyweights’ narratives as weight of Qatar’s adopted power**

Alliances with al-Jazeera allowed Qatar to break the stranglehold on the media held by Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, and Egypt, and consequently gain the ability to use its own narrative to compete with the discourses presented by other regional media outlets. Due to historical Saudi domination of Arab media, Qatar remained culturally vulnerable in the shadow of its larger neighbour. Building al-Jazeera into a competitive media outlet allowed Qatar to compete with Saudi Arabia (Rugh, 2004),

supporting a narrative and discourse that suited Qatar's interests, in opposition to Saudi policies. Even the coverage of Bin Ladin's videotapes cannot be considered anti-American, but as anti-Saudi (El-Ibiary, 2011:203). Fandy (2007:51) sees Bin Ladin as an anti-Saudi actor before targeting US interests, and states that 'in Qatar's conflict with Saudi Arabia bin Laden is the only credible force that could undermine the Saudi royal family', especially with the anti-Saudi rhetoric of his statements—at the time al-Jazeera broadcast interviews with Bin Ladin he was a useful ally against Saudi Arabia. By finding different ways to confront Saudi media, including airing terrorists and extremists, 'Al Jazeera broke Saudi Arabia's virtual lock on the international Arab media' (El-Nawawy and Iskandar, 2002:115), and allowed Qatar to begin using media in a wider discourse. Through this use of adopted power, Qatar was able to become competitive with its main political rival and present its own narratives to suit its interests. Moreover, using al-Jazeera's transnational nature, Qatar was able to emerge as a media capital with its own culturally 'unique voice', despite this voice being through Islamists, terrorists and 'rebels'.

### **6.5.3. Contributions to regime changes during the Arab Spring as weight of Qatar's adopted power**

The 'unique voice' of al-Jazeera assisted not only in competing with Saudi's dominant cultural and media presence, it also became the voice of revolutionaries during the Arab Spring. Consequently, this contributed to regime changes in other Middle East states, a process where Qatar played an important role as demonstrated in Chapter Four. Scholars consider the role of al-Jazeera during the Arab Spring to have been vital (Abdul-Nabi, 2015:271), highlighting that al-Jazeera and the internet 'had a significant impact on the political and socio-cultural transformation in different Arab countries' (Rinnawi, 2012b:118). However, rather than providing neutral coverage, or simple support for democratic change, al-Jazeera's influence was associated with the interests of its state backer, Qatar, another example of its use of political Islam non-state actors for its own purposes (Khasib and Ersoy, 2017). Al-Jazeera was able to use its position as a key media outlet in the Arab states, derived from its unique identity, to promote the state's policy while being supportive of the Arab Spring in Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, and Syria (Khasib and Ersoy, 2017). This use of media influence to

shape political structure in different Arab states demonstrates Qatar's alliances with al-Jazeera.

A number of social, economic, and political reasons were critical to the occurrence of the Arab Spring, many of which were not due to al-Jazeera. Live coverage on al-Jazeera combined with messages on social media networks such as Twitter and Facebook played an essential role (Zayani and Migrani, 2016) in mobilising protestors, as the transnational nature of social media networks made it much easier to spread information. However, other crucial factors led to demonstrations of anger over political, social, and economic grievances, indicating that media alone did not create protest activities (ibid, 2016; El Issawi, 2016).

Admitting the range of reasons for Arab uprisings in Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt, Rinnawi (2012b:119) states that this 'can be attributed to a long list of reasons, but there is no doubt that transnational media have had a crucial role in these political tsunamis'. This 'political tsunami', with the transnational, non-state actor al-Jazeera as a key element, was essential for filling the Arab streets. While it is important to acknowledge the argument of some scholars that other factors led to the uprisings, the role of al-Jazeera must still be considered crucial as since its establishment the channel has increased public readiness to express demands and opinions on democratisation, human rights and other narratives. Al-Jazeera was preparing Arab audiences to get rid of their 'authoritarian' rulers, and helping to bring Islamists into power, in line with Qatar's main political alliances.

As early as 2001, CBS's *60 Minutes* programme aired an interview with a former spokesman for the Egyptian president, Mohammad Abdul Monem, in which the official stated that 'Al Jazeera was subversive and trying deliberately to destabilize Arab governments' (El-Nawawy and Iskandar, 2002:137), a line of argument nowadays familiar from the Anti-Terror Quartet. Similarly, as far back as 1997, al-Jazeera was criticised as having 'a veiled hostility toward Egypt', demonstrated by funding Islamist militant organisations, and leading to an incident between the two nations (ibid, 2002:131). As time has shown, Egyptian scepticism that Islamists had become the main strategic ally for the Qatari government was borne out, as the state used them for their political purposes, just as al-Jazeera played a crucial role in removing Mubarak's regime from power. Mubarak's anecdotal quote from a 1998 visit to al-Jazeera's offices in Qatar, 'all this noise from this box?' can be juxtaposed with the role of the 'box' as an influential non-state actor that assisted in bringing

down his regime in 2011 (Rinnawi, 2012b:118). Rinnawi makes a clear and important argument that al-Jazeera played a crucial role in the uprising, not only in the short-term, but over an extensive period (2012b:130). From 1996, al-Jazeera's promotion of Pan-Arab, Pan-Islamist, and democratic agendas contributed to preparing the Arab public for the rebellion—a 'tiny country's voice' changed Arab regimes within the Middle East.

When the Arab Spring occurred, it was an opportunity for al-Jazeera to fuel public anger by giving a platform for public points of view and presenting opposition interests. In the Egyptian case, al-Jazeera focused on communication amongst the crowds who protested through the distribution of videos, ideas, and photos via social networks such as Facebook, using individual and group pages (Campbell and Hawk, 2012). Al-Asad regime in Syria recognised this and during the first three weeks of the Syrian uprisings prevented al-Jazeera from broadcasting. Consequently al-Jazeera relied on videos and reports from citizens, which were then dismissed as biased coverage by al-Asad regime (Khasib and Ersoy, 2017:2653). These examples demonstrate that al-Jazeera widely shared and supported the voice of rebellions across the region, relying on citizen and rebel accounts for its broadcasting, and in doing so, challenged state accounts of the uprisings (Nasr, 2014:398). The outlet provided a platform for opposition movements, actively engaged with the most-ready force for change: Islamist groups the state of Qatar actively supported during the Arab Spring (Rinnawi, 2012b). Al-Jazeera's broadcasting provided Islamists a platform and assisted them in coming to power as the only force capable of quickly mobilising in the new democratic arena. Alongside the assertion that al-Jazeera served Qatar's foreign policies, it can be seen as a powerful weapon for regime change in the region, as in Egypt where it strengthened its role as a 'useful weapon in Middle Eastern politics' (Abdul-Nabi, 2015:271-2). Rinnawi (2012b:130) states that through al-Jazeera coverage, Qatar acted effectively 'as a regional power (equivalent to Egypt or Saudi Arabia) in imposing and removing regimes in the region - not with a military army, but with an army of journalists and one solitary broadcaster'. Rather than conventional powers, at this time it was a small state using adopted power that was able to influence and thus project power.

#### **6.6. The cost of Qatar's adopted power: building alliance with al-Jazeera**

### **6.6.1. Qatar accused of being the ‘mouthpiece of al-Qa’ida’ as a cost of Qatar’s adopted power**

For all the weight that al-Jazeera had accrued to help Qatar wield adopted power, it also paid a high price. Al-Jazeera was heavily criticised, considered to fall short of professional standards, seen as being al-Qa’ida’s mouthpiece, hacked, bombed, and blocked by other states. One of the central criticisms of the channel was its Islamist coverage. Despite the channel denying that it has an agenda and asserting its claims to provide multiple opinions and to work to professional standards, it was accused of ‘galvanizing Arab radicalism’ and ‘feeding anti-western sentiments’ (Rinnawi, 2012b:119-20). Indeed, during the ‘War on Terror’, US officials particularly criticised al-Jazeera’s coverage from Afghanistan and Iraq for ‘serving as a mouthpiece of Al Qaeda’ (Zayani, 2005:23) or Bin Ladin (Meltzer, 2012:663), glorifying Bin Ladin and presenting him as a ‘romantic ideologue’ (Zayani, 2005:23). Al-Jazeera was seen as giving Bin Ladin an outlet for spreading his propaganda and giving him a platform to preach jihad in the West (ibid, 2005). Moreover, the channel was criticised for rushing to broadcast unscreened information and lacking a ‘reviewing safety net’ or ‘editing process’ in order to maintain its competitive position (Zayani, 2005:23). Bessaiso (2005:162) highlights the absence of clear evidence that al-Jazeera supported the Taliban, ‘simply that it enjoyed greater access than other stations’. Nonetheless, the channel was not only considered as a mouthpiece of al-Qa’ida, but was also accused of providing biased coverage for other Islamists.

Indeed, enjoying relationships with Islamists and helping them to come to power led not only to al-Jazeera being seen as the mouthpiece of al-Qa’ida, but also as directly spreading jihadist discourse. El-Ibiary (2011:199) believes that al-Jazeera’s relations with al-Qa’ida broadly propagated the idea that al-Jazeera is ‘pro-Islamist and Islamic fundamentalism’. Similarly, Kinninmont (2017) believes that one of al-Jazeera’s key features is its sectarianism and relative sympathy to some jihadi narratives. Kinninmont stresses that this developed in al-Jazeera Arabic though not al-Jazeera English, each divided by different management and editorial structures. Saudi journalist Adnan (2017) believes that such coverage of Islamists was a miscalculation on Qatar’s part. In this, perhaps, they repeated what Saudi Arabia and Egypt had tried to do before. Through their broadcasts of clerics such as Anwar al-Sadaat, Saudi officials thought that they might control Islamists, ‘but in the end the Islamists turned

on Saudi and al-Sadaat' (ibid, 2017). This criticism has not only been expressed by academics, but through the actions taken against al-Jazeera; some of the high costs which are an inevitable consequence of power projection.

One of the actions taken against al-Jazeera was a hacking campaign that resulted in the English and Arabic websites taken down for several days and suffering further intermittent outages (Miller, 2004:248-9). Nonetheless, hacking attacks were not so serious in comparison with other actions taken or threatened against the channel. The American press suggested that the only way to deal with al-Jazeera was with an armed response, with Zev Chafets, for example, stating: 'Dealing with Al Jazeera is a job [for] the military. Shutting it down should be an immediate priority because, left alone, it has the power to poison the air more efficiently and lethally than anthrax ever could' (Chafets, 2001). Speech led to action, and al-Jazeera offices were bombed in Iraq and Afghanistan, although there is no evidence to determine who was responsible. On 12 November 2001, US jets apparently bombed the al-Jazeera office in Kabul hours before Northern Alliance forces arrived in the Afghan capital (Miller, 2004:249), leaving the building completely destroyed (Bessaio, 2005:161). American sources deny that the offices were deliberately targeted (ibid, 2005:161), while others see the attack as a deliberate response to the network's coverage of Afghanistan which did not please the US administration in its attempts to build a coalition (Bessaio, 2005; Zayani, 2005). The satellite broadcasts emitted from the offices could have provided targeting information (Bessaio, 2005:161). On 9 April 2003, al-Jazeera's Baghdad office was bombed, resulting in the journalist Tarek Ayyoub's death, and wounding the cameraman Zouhair al-Iraqi (Zayani, 2005; Miller, 2004). This was not the first attack in Iraq, as on 2 April, the Sheraton hotel in Basra, being used as a base by al-Jazeera journalists, took four direct shell hits during a heavy artillery bombardment, although in this case no staff were injured (ibid, 2004).

Other Western states took more diplomatic measures against al-Jazeera. The UK government and British tabloids initiated a 'propaganda war' against al-Jazeera (Bessaio, 2005:158). Number 10 Downing Street was seriously concerned about the influence of al-Jazeera, according to Bessaio (2005:158), as since August 2011 the outlet had been freely available to the six million British homes subscribing to Sky Digital. The UK issued a warning to al-Jazeera on 15 October over their role in the 'increasingly jittery propaganda war between the US-led coalition and Osama bin Laden and the Al-Qaeda network' (ibid, 2005:158-9; White, 2001). At that time Tony



Blair's communications chief, Alastair Campbell, expressed concerns that coverage would undermine the long-term, anti-terrorist strategy of the UK and the US. During a meeting between key staff from British broadcasters, Campbell advised his audience to be cautious in their use of information available at al-Jazeera, emphasising the importance of the media's moral judgment in selecting for whom to provide a platform (Bessaiso, 2005:159). British media outlets started their own war with al-Jazeera, with the *Daily Telegraph* suggesting that al-Jazeera could be prohibited in the UK if its broadcast of Bin Ladin's videotaped declaration was viewed as provoking religious and racial hatred (O'Neill, 2001). British tabloids criticised al-Jazeera's relationship with al-Qa'ida, with the *London Evening Standard* reporting governmental concerns over the network, and both *The Mirror* and *The Sun* referring to al-Jazeera as Bin Ladin's station (Bessaiso, 2005:158-9). Though Qatar kept its diplomatic relations with its Western allies, and the actions mainly were against al-Jazeera, Qatar still paid the cost of being associated as al-Qa'ida mouthpiece.

#### **6.6.2. Assisting the deterioration of relations with the Middle Eastern states as a cost of Qatar's adopted power**

While Western states found ways to challenge al-Jazeera, Middle Eastern states responded in their own ways to al-Jazeera coverage. Al-Jazeera was accused of undermining Arab and Middle Eastern regimes (Tabar, 2002) and consequently, several states approved measures to deal with al-Jazeera and its backer. Al-Jazeera made disparaging comments on Jordan during coverage of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and accused King Hussein of cooperating with Israel to deprive Syria of water reserves (El-Nawawy and Iskandar, 2002:125). Consequently, on November 5, 1998, Jordan cancelled the accreditation of al-Jazeera journalists in the country and closed the bureau in Amman until apologies were received from Qatar (ibid, 2002). Morocco accused al-Jazeera of leading a 'hostile' campaign against its monarchy (ibid, 2002:123). As a result of discomfort among Moroccan diplomats over al-Jazeera broadcasts regarding Moroccan-Israeli relations and Islamic fundamentalism, Morocco withdrew its ambassador from Qatar from 20 July 2000 until October 2000 (ibid, 2002:124). Similarly, Libya recalled its ambassador from Doha on 24 April 2000 due to criticism of the al-Qaddafi regime (ibid, 2002).

It is clear that al-Jazeera coverage was perceived as hostile against Qatar's Gulf monarchy neighbours as well. For example, Kuwait was critical of al-Jazeera, which it saw as biased towards Iraq. Al-Jazeera frequently invited officials and other speakers from Iraq onto its talk-shows. As a result, Kuwait accused al-Jazeera of supporting Iraq at Kuwait's expense (ibid, 2002:118). Moreover, in June 1999, a viewer of the live program, *al-Shari'a wal Hayat (Islamic Law and Life)*, identifying himself as an Iraqi national living in Norway, criticised Shaykh Jabr al-Ahmed al-Sabah, the former Amir of Kuwait, as a man 'who embraces atheists and permits foreign armies to enter Kuwait' (ibid, 2002:119-20). Consequently, al-Jazeera was banned in Kuwait, although its Kuwaiti bureau was reopened, on July 29, 1999. Al-Jazeera's focus on Islam and the Qur'an, were particularly criticised in Saudi Arabia. The unrelated Saudi newspaper, *al-Jazeera*, published criticism of the media channel by a prominent Saudi cleric on March 14, 1998, over its use of non-Muslims to discuss faith issues, and programs he considered to 'make fun' of Islam (ibid, 2002:116). As a result, al-Jazeera was fined by the Saudi government. In July 1999, Saudi officials closed all satellite transmissions at Riyadh's public coffeehouses, 'apparently to keep Al Jazeera from the public eye' (ibid, 2002:116).

In each of these cases al-Jazeera's coverage in favour of opposition movements and Islamists, acting as Qatari power projection, were perceived as security concerns. Later cases suggests that al-Jazeera started to be viewed as deliberately destabilising other GCC states. Bahrain provides a further illustration of this. Despite Western narratives suggesting that al-Jazeera did not broadcast Bahraini unrest as fully as that in Egypt, Libya, Syria, or Tunisia, Bahraini officials take a different view. Al-Hasan (2017), the former senior analyst at the Office of the First Deputy Prime Minister, sees this as a misconception by Western states, and that while coverage may not have been as aggressive as in Egypt, it was far from 'silent'. Al-Binmohammad (2018), a member of the Shura Council in Bahrain, observes a difference in the use of al-Jazeera's English and Arabic channels during the Arab Spring:

When they could, they would use the Arabic version to interfere and incite violence in Bahrain. When Bahrain complained, they switched to pressuring this on the English-version al-Jazeera network, while using the Arabic one every once in a while to pressure Bahrain as well and interfere in local Bahraini local matters, while they used the Arabic one more [against] Egypt than in Bahrain, and they used the English more [against] Bahrain than Egypt.

Al-Hasan (2017) also points to the documentary, *Bahrain: Shouting in the Dark*, produced by al-Jazeera English (2012), which he considers ‘one of the most damaging and [...] one-sided documentaries on Bahrain, and one instance of the platform al-Jazeera provided for opposition in Gulf States over several years. A Gulf security expert (Interviewee E, 2017) highlighted the broad distribution of this documentary on Qatar Airways as rubbing ‘salt on the wounds’ felt by Bahrainis who expected Qatar to behave as a ‘brotherly state’. Coverage given to individuals declared as terrorists within Bahrain, add to the impression that al-Jazeera was used ‘as a destabilising platform towards Bahrain’ (Al-Hasan, 2017). As a result, the aggressive coverage was seen as a hostile gesture aimed at destabilising other GCC states. This was extremely disappointing for Bahrain, but also for the Gulf States in general, due to the perception of brotherly relations among the GCC states (ibid, 2017). Al-Jazeera’s coverage of Bahrain was seen as extremely damaging, extremely surprising, and unprecedented. Such coverage became a cause for the Gulf Crises of 2014 and 2017, putting Qatar on one side, and the Anti-Terror Quartet of Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, the UAE, and Egypt, on the other.

While the GCC’s position was that al-Jazeera is a destabilising platform for the GCC states, Egypt had its own motivations. After the collapse of the Muslim Brotherhood leadership, and a few hours after Sisi came to power, al-Jazeera’s coverage Mubasher was interrupted, the bureau raided, and some journalists arrested (Al-Najjar, 2016:155). Officially al-Jazeera was declared ‘illegal’ on August 25, 2013 by the Ministry of Communications and Information Technology (ibid, 2016:155). Four more journalists from al-Jazeera English were arrested by Egyptian security on ‘suspicion of using unlicensed equipment, broadcasting false news and possessing fake footage’ (BBC News, 2014) in December 2013. The channel was accused by Egyptian state media as ‘distorting Egypt’s image abroad, damaging its political standing, and making the international public believe that the unreal footage showed what was happening in Egypt and that the country was witnessing a civil war’, and after several trials, the Al Jazeera journalists were eventually freed’ (Al-Najjar, 2016:155). In June 2016, al-Jazeera journalists were accused, along with former president Morsi, of leaking state secrets to Qatar (Al-Jazeera, 2016b).

As a result of the 2014 Gulf Crisis, the Egyptian branch of al-Jazeera was closed, and the closure of the channel and its affiliate stations were among 13 demands

made by the Anti-Terror Quartet on 17 July 2017. However, as Qatar did not accept the demands, al-Jazeera is still in operation. Kinninmont (2017) asserts that Western observers have underestimated how different al-Jazeera Arabic and English were, and have assumed that the whole channel was quite professional. ‘To me’, she states:

the Quartet could have done more to undermine al-Jazeera Arabic by airing more specific critiques about what was problematic about its coverage. Unfortunately for them, just calling for it to be shut down has not played very well with international public opinion, for obvious reasons.

As a result, al-Jazeera was blocked by the Quartet only in their respective states (Alkhalisi, 2017).

While al-Jazeera continued broadcasting it lost credibility among viewers. Although the channel is just over twenty years old, its importance is declining in the Arab world (Seib, 2016:186). Its leadership as the main regional media outlet has been assertively contested by al-Arabiya, a Saudi-backed media outlet, although al-Jazeera and other Middle Eastern media stations consider the main threat to their influence to be localised outlets such as Dream TV and ONTV that emerged in post-Mubarak Egypt (Seib, 2016: 186). Due to being associated with Islamists, and associated with biased coverage for destabilising other Middle Easter regimes, al-Jazeera started to lose its position. With al-Jazeera’s decline, as a cost for wielding adopted power, Qatar lost the main non-state actors through which it spread its narratives. As a result, Qatar began building alliances with other non-state media actors to spread its narratives.

### **6.7. Qatar’s clients: Qatar-linked other media non-state actors**

Though other Qatar-funded outlets might be less recognisable compared with the international leverage that al-Jazeera achieved, examination of other Qatar-linked media outlets is essential in understanding how Qatar uses the transnational nature of media non-state actors to wield adopted power. In contrast to al-Jazeera, where the non-state actor was established by Qatar, and with relation to BBC Arabic, Qatar applied different strategies in using other media non-state actors. For example: it used well-established media outlets that had already built a reputation as reliable news sources, such as *The Huffington Post*; it established and funded media channels located outside Qatar, such as *The New Arab (al-Araby al-Jadeed)*; or it covertly supported ‘independently-funded’ outlets, which have links to Qatari representatives. And as this

research demonstrates, they share a similar agenda with Qatar's foreign objectives, such as Middle East Eye. As a result, Qatar implements adopted power through the army of media outlets that support its narratives.

With the criticism that al-Jazeera received after the Arab Spring, Qatar needed to find new strategies to use media non-state actors (Roberts, 2017b). Rather than openly admitting funding al-Jazeera, and while clearly gaining advantage from transnational outlets, Qatar has not admitted to backing them. For this reason, the information provided by Qatar-based academics on what other media outlets Qatar funds is important. Zweiri (2017), a Jordanian academic at Qatar University, believes that Qatar has use of at least 10 media outlets other than al-Jazeera, including Arabi21, Arabi Post, *al-Watan*, and al-Araby TV, and that Qatar is still trying to find new media outlets to promote its narratives (2017). These outlets have attempted to create an illusion that they do not have connections with the state of Qatar, (ibid, 2017), but are considered to support the agenda of their Qatari backers (Hamedi, 2017). For Zweiri (2017), the change relates to the use of social, rather than conventional media, which he sees as more efficient. By supporting different media outlets located in different parts of the world, Qatar gained the advantages of transnational media, but could avoid those media being criticised as being biased towards Qatar.

Due to the transnational nature of the internet through which the social media operates, there are challenges in providing clear evidence of Qatari financial support for these outlets. Al-Binmohammad (2018) highlights links between individuals connected to media outlets and the Qatari government with 'the same people that are either advisors for the amir or that are a part of the government' leaving al-Jazeera and setting up these new media outlets. Additionally, a source working at one of the Qatari-funded outlets, who wish anonymity, suggests that the key figures in these outlets are affiliated with Qatar, with perhaps three individuals 'controlling everything' (Interviewee F, 2017). Two of these are Wadah Khanfar and 'Azmi Bishara, both linked to Qatar.

#### **6.7.1. Arabi Post (formerly known as *HuffPost Arabi*)**

Wadah Khanfar, the former general manager of al-Jazeera, is a key media figure in the Middle East. In 2015, Khanfar launched a platform led by Integral Media, named *HuffPost Arabi*, a collaboration with the well-known outlet *The Huffington*

*Post*. In 2018, *HuffPost Arabi* declared that ‘it will no longer be publishing content’ (*HuffPost Arabi*, 2018) and instead Arabi Post (Aldroubi, 2018) emerged. The idea behind establishing *HuffPost Arabi* was to develop ‘integral media’, blending the best parts of interactive media, such as decentralisation, participation, variety, and speed with the best elements of traditional media - editorial priorities, professionalism, clarity and contextualisation (Khanfar, 2015). Dealing with *HuffPost* (between 2015 and 2018) is an example of how Qatar-linked individuals tried to build alliances with well-established non-state actors for promoting their own narratives to wield adopted power.

The prominent role of Khanfar, formerly of al-Jazeera, in the new media outlets, and the partnership between *The Huffington Post* and Integral Media Strategies, Khanfar’s firm, can be combined with the assertion of the anonymous source that Khanfar’s media operations are funded by Qatar (Interviewee F, 2017). Another important figure in *HuffPost*, former Editor-in-Chief (Arabic Edition) Anas Fouda, also has connections with al-Jazeera. As well as a current role as the manager of online content at al-Jazeera, he was previously an executive producer for New Media (Al-Jazeera Media Network) (LinkedIn, 2019). Fouda had previously worked for Dubai-based MBC Group in several managerial roles, before attracting government attention when his writing was perceived as supportive of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood (LinkedIn, 2019). Therefore, *HuffPost Arabi* can be seen as illustrating links between Qatar, al-Jazeera, and new media outlets, as well as its potential to provide a platform for Islamist narratives aligned with Qatar’s foreign policy.

### **6.7.2. *The New Arab (al-Araby al-Jadeed)***

*The New Arab (al-Araby al-Jadeed)* is a media outlet based in London, rather than Doha, and demonstrates an attempt to avoid affiliation with the state of Qatar. The media conglomerate comprises a daily newspaper, an English version of the website, and a television station (Kilani, 2014). The two sister companies, al-Araby TV and *The New Arab (al-Araby al-Jadeed)* belong to the umbrella company, Fadaat Media (Fadaat, 2019). *Al-Araby al-Jadeed* leadership acknowledge that ‘Our [*al-Araby al-Jadeed*] funding is from a Qatari-owned private holding company’ (Kilani, 2014). Moreover, it is supervised by ‘Azmi Bishara, ‘who is close to the Emir of Qatar,

Shaykh Tamim bin Hamad Al-Thani' (ibid, 2014), with Bishara being central to *The New Arab (al-Arab Al-Jadeed)* (Roberts, 2017b). In an anonymous interview, an al-Araby TV reporter (Interviewee F, 2017) described the origin of the network as the result of three Egyptian-nationals presenting the idea to the Qatari amir and attracting the interest of Bishara. One of the attractive features of the idea for Bishara, according to the reporter, was that the initiative came from former Muslim Brotherhood supporters who had changed their views. Initially the project was meant to focus on Egypt, but after the military coup of 2013, the three founders were in London and unable to return to Egypt due to active arrest warrants. As a result they decided to launch the TV channel in the UK, and shifted from a focus on Egypt to one that is Pan-Arabic. Both the CEOs of al-Araby TV Network and *The New Arab (al-Araby al-Jadeed)* have stated that there is no editorial influence from Qatar, and that their funding is from a private holding company (Kilani, 2014).

### 6.7.3. Middle East Eye

An example of how Qatar has denied any connections with an outlet can be seen in the case of Middle East Eye (MEE). There are differing opinions about the source of funding for the MEE company, as they refuse to disclose this information. Again, there appears to be at least some links between al-Jazeera and Middle East Eye management, who are also close to Qatar's political elites. The paper *Muslim Brotherhood in Britain* (Liberal Democracy Institute, 2017) noted that the founding director is al-Jazeera executive Jonathan Powell, who works directly for al-Jazeera Chairman Hamad bin Thamer al-Thani, cousin of former Amir Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani. James Langton of the UAE state-owned newspaper, *The National* (2014), links Mr Powell, Mr Bassasso, and the Editor-in-Chief Mr Hearst, with Islamists and argues that MEE funding is from Qatar. The editorial tendencies of the MEE support a Qatari affiliation.

Though anonymous, an al-Araby TV reporter (Interviewee F, 2017) states: 'If we analyse the content, since for example, The Middle East Eye always focus[es] on criticising Saudi Arabia, then it's not a Saudi-funded organisation, and since it [has] a blind eye on Qatar, and [is] not talking about Qatar, it might be a Qatari-funded'. As part of a strategy of obfuscation, it has been described that MEE has 'some people [...] who write for them [who are] very, very good and very balanced' (Davidson,

2018), making the effort much more subtle than al-Jazeera has been. Both Davidson (2018) and Kinninmont (2017) themselves have written articles for MEE in the past. Davidson (2018), the British academic interested in the Middle East, noted, however, that his work always seemed to be published with a message stating that ‘the views did not necessarily reflect the editorial policies of the website’. In order to identify the main editorial policies, discourse analyses were made by the researcher focusing on pieces written by David Hearst. The research examined his articles between 15 April 2014 and 20 July 2018 and demonstrate a very strong bias towards Qatar, including often heavy criticism of Qatar’s political enemies. These analyses will be presented below to demonstrate the domain, scope, weight, and cost that Qatar achieved by using media non-state actors for wielding adopted power.

### **6.8. Qatar’s domain: building alliances with other media non-state actors**

By using other media non-state actors, Qatar gained power, over both a Western and MENA audience. Middle East Eye covers 24 countries according to its website (2019). Al-Araby TV’s ratings vary from country to country. Despite the fact the channel does not focus on Algeria or Morocco, it is one of the top five broadcasters in these countries, and consequently bureaus were opened there, indicating the domain of the channel in Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia. Based in London, the channel operates only in Arabic, and has large offices in the US, Tunisia, Istanbul, Beirut, and Doha, and smaller offices in Yemen, Libya, Algeria, Ramallah, Gaza, and Jerusalem, with a Moroccan office expected. The channel has little or no presence in Egypt, with an al-Araby Tv reporter (Interviewee F, 2017) citing difficulties with al-Sisi regime. *Figure 6.1.* demonstrates Qatar’s adopted power domain through forming alliances with media non-state actors, including al-Jazeera (discussed in Section 6.3.) and other media non-state actors.





*Figure 6.1. Qatar’s adopted power domain: building alliances with media non-state actors (Source:personal collection).*

### **6.9. The scope of Qatar’s adopted power: building alliances with other media non-state actors**

By funding several outlets with varying agendas, Qatar uses different ideological stances to present appealing narratives for audiences with a range of ideologies; this suits Qatar’s interests, either pro-Qatar, or against its political competitors. According to the anonymous al-Araby TV reporter (Interviewee F, 2017), the channel is seen as liberal or Pan-Arab, differentiating itself from al-Jazeera which has been labelled as ‘affiliated with Islamism, if you want, with [the] Muslim Brotherhood in particular’. Al-Araby TV began with entertainment making up 60% of its content and only 40% news. The main aim of the channel was to send its messages to youth in a coded, rather than overt, way. Rather than cover political news ‘they went to the street, and they started recording normal people, just like you and me’, demonstrating that ordinary people can change politics (Interviewee F, 2017). The formerly Doha-based academic Hamedi (2017) states that when al-Araby TV was established, he ‘was part of the discussions that took place’. The differentiation from al-Jazeera meant that after 2013, when al-Jazeera was perceived as responsible for the chaos in Libya, Syria, and other countries, al-Araby TV, ‘would not have the same

connotation, the same ideological orientation'. The role of 'Azmi Bishara can be seen as important in the ideological stance of al-Araby TV. The al-Araby TV employee (ibid, 2017) notes that while Bishara is Christian, his son has a traditional Islamic name, and that Bishara's position is of an equivalence between religious and secular individuals. Al-Araby TV understand secularism in the American rather than French sense, which means accepting religious influence in social, but not state affairs (ibid, 2017). Therefore, al-Araby TV's scope includes liberal or Pan-Arab ideas but is clearly opposed to Islamist discourse.

Middle East Eye takes a different position, divided between pro-democratic and pro-Islamist discourses, particularly in favour of the Muslim Brotherhood. Appendix F indicates how analyses of a set of articles by David Hearst, the managing editor of MEE, discusses the importance of democracy building. It might not be a coincidence, but the articles focus mostly on Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Egypt under Sisi, all political competitors of the non-democratic Qatari state, calling them 'Sunni Arab dictatorships' (Hearst, 2015a). Focusing on Saudi Arabia, for example, the MEE managing editor argues that 'a democratic alternative' is a major concern for the Saudi monarchy (Hearst, 2014a), and suggests that Saudi Arabia's main concern is stability rather than democratic efforts (Hearst, 2015b), with the Egyptian military being the strongest influence on national stability (Hearst, 2015c). He sees Saudi Arabia as among the least democratic and most unequal Arab societies (Hearst, 2014b), and connects the 2015 Hajj incident with the absence of democracy in the kingdom, with ministerial portfolios 'handed down as the goods and chattel from prince to princeling' (Hearst, 2015d). Similarly, he published the article (Hearst, 2017a), 'What the UAE Fears Most: Democracy', in which he asserts the Emirati perception of al-Qaradawi as a threat stems from the latter's claim that 'the Muslim Brotherhood continues to have democratic legitimacy' (Hearst, 2017a). His publications contain a pro-democratic discourse towards the GCC states (Hearst, 2014c), sending a message that monarchies 'fear democracy' (Hearst, 2014a; 2014b; 2014c; 2017a), oppose the leaders of groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood which have 'democratic legitimacy' (Hearst, 2016a; 2016b; 2017b; 2017c) and violations of Egyptians human rights under Sisi leadership (Hearst, 2014d). The focus of this discourse seems to be to undermine Gulf regimes, rather than to promote democracy itself.

The MEE, or at least its managing editor, also appear to have a pro-Islamist agenda, specifically the pro-Muslim Brotherhood, as presented in Appendix G. This

can be clearly demonstrated in the case of Egypt, with the Sisi government being consistently attacked (see Appendix I and analysis in the section on ‘Weight’ below). The Pro-Islamist agenda can be viewed in several instances. The managing editor of MEE repeatedly refers to former President Morsi as the first to be democratically elected, e.g., in the articles, ‘Israel has Egypt over a barrel’ (Hearst, 2014e), ‘The many faces of Sisi’ (Hearst, 2015e), and ‘The frantic intrigue of Abdullah’s final hours’ (Hearst, 2015f). He also advises supporting political Islam as the choice of the Arab people, over ‘jihadists’ and ‘fascist military generals’ that are the alternatives (Hearst, 2014f). In ‘Blair and the Gulf neo-cons’ (ibid, 2014f), he questions whether it is in the interest of Western powers to support extremists such as Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi to suppress the Muslim Brotherhood. In his article, ‘Management that is doomed to fail’ (Hearst, 2014b), he emphasises the potential chaos ‘What if the Muslim Brotherhood gives up and the voice of millions of Egyptians, Libyans, Tunisians are silenced ...’. Finally, the managing editor of MEE links pro-democratic and pro-Islamist agendas in his article ‘It’s open season on the Muslim Brotherhood’ (2016b) and identifies political Islam as the strongest force for establishing democracy in the Middle East. It is clear that as the managing editor of the MEE tries to send a positive message about political Islam (Hearst, 2014g; 2014h; 2014i; 2017a), he is linking it to the democratic agenda supported by a Western audience; therefore, by doing so, political Islam can be construed as a positive force to non-affiliated audiences. Using such a broad scope, Qatar-linked, non-state actors attract different audiences over which it can wield adopted power.

#### **6.10. Qatar’s adopted power weight: building alliances with other media non-state actors**

The key goal of funding different media non-state actors is viewed as the diversification of media outlets to provide different narratives that suit the political interests of the state of Qatar. This is not new in media strategies, with American and British-funded media organisations present in the Arab world, presenting their preferred agendas (Hamedi, 2017). The diversification of different outlets meant that Qatar created an impression of plurality. At the same time, the funding of different media outlets was connected to competition with other GCC states, such as the UAE and Saudi Arabia. This gives an impression of a diversity of views and of the

importance of Arab media, when in fact the channels belong to only ‘one or two players’ (Hamedi, 2017).

It also means that Qatar-funded media could quote each other, creating a sense of credibility. For example, as the analysis of MEE articles in Appendix H demonstrates, the managing editor of MEE relied on different sources in published articles, which can be divided between Qatar-funded, Anti-Terror Quartet, MENA, and international outlets. Qatar-funded outlets were presented as neutral, for example, an expression such as: ‘according to the Arabi 21 website’ (Hearst, 2014j; 2017d); ‘a member of the Houthi Political Council told Al Jazeera’ (Hearst, 2015q); ‘Arabi 21 quotes sources’ (Hearst, 2015g); ‘a security source quoted by Arabi 21’ (Hearst, 2016c) and ‘the interview, published in UK-based Al-Araby al-Jadeed’ (Hearst, 2015h). In most cases the affiliation to Qatar was not mentioned (Hearst, 2015t; 2015j), except the following: ‘Jordan did, however, close the office of Al Jazeera, the Qatari television network which Saudi has called on Doha to shut down’ (Hearst, 2017e). These examples demonstrate how by funding different media outlets, an illusion of diversity was created, while not clearly mentioning who these channels were funded by, heightened their apparent reliability. In contrast, other outlets were approached differently. The international media was referred to neutrally, such as, ‘There was one detail that Reuters, *The Wall Street Journal* and *The New York Times* omitted to mention’ (Hearst, 2017f), and ‘*The New York Times* published’ (Hearst, 2017g). MENA outlets were linked to their state-sponsors, such as ‘Iran’s Press TV published reports claiming that over 4,000 pilgrims had been killed’ (Hearst, 2015d) and ‘[...] quoted a figure of 412 troops killed, including 14 officers to the Sudanese newspaper *Al Akhbar*’ (Hearst, 2017h).

The media of Qatar’s political competitors, the Anti-Terror Quartet, were explicitly associated with a state-sponsor, or even referred to as ‘mouthpieces’. The presentation of Egyptian media was divided and based on which regime each outlet supported, such as pro-Brotherhood, ‘Turkey-based Egyptian satellite TV channel *Mekamellen*’ (Hearst, 2015e; 2015k; 2015l; 2017i), and ‘pro-regime Egyptian newspaper *Al Fajer*’ (Hearst, 2017j). Emirati outlets were presented as state-controlled: ‘*Erem News*, which like every Emirati news outlet is controlled by the royal court’ (Hearst, 2015m), and ‘the Allegiance Council, the UAE mouthpiece noted’ (ibid, 2015m). Saudi outlets were mostly affiliated with the state-sponsorship, for example, ‘the Saudi-owned *Asharq al-Awsat* suggesting’ (Hearst, 2016d), ‘The

Saudi newspaper al Eqtisadiyah tweeted' (Hearst, 2017b). Qatar's main media competitors, al-Arabiya News Channel and Sky News Arabic, were described neutrally, for example: 'Al Arabiya News Channel aired' (Hearst, 2016c); at the same time, state-sponsors were highlighted: 'pan-Arab media based in Dubai including Sky News Arabic and Al Arabiya' (Hearst, 2016e), 'Saudi-owned Al Arabiya TV' (Hearst, 2017c); and suggestions were even made that outlets provided 'fake news' during the Gulf Crisis. For example: 'The hacking of Qatar News Agency on May 24 was just the starting pistol. Within minutes of the hack at 12:14 am, Al Arabiya TV and Sky News Arabia quoted the text of the fake material' (Hearst, 2017b), 'Fake news or not, the Saudi and Emirati-controlled media went to town. Saudi-owned Al Arabiya, Al Ekhbariya and the Emirati-co owned Sky News Arabia cancelled their schedules and gave the fake news piece wall-to-wall coverage throughout the night' (Hearst, 2017k), 'Al Arabiya published "proof" that the emir's speech was not hacked' (ibid, 2017k). While creating a diversity of different media increased the credibility of Qatar-funded outlets, using this media it also referred to Qatar's competitors' media outlets as 'mouthpieces'. This increased their weight of Qatar's adopted power.

Despite the variety of Qatar-linked, non-state actors, they presented narratives that aligned with Qatar's foreign policy objectives. Appendix I demonstrates that the titles of the MEE managing editor's articles have a pro-Qatar agenda, generally, against the Anti-Terror Quartet. Articles focusing on Saudi Arabia include the following titles: 'Saudi Arabia's crocodile tears over Gaza' (Hearst, 2014a); 'Saudi crapshoot in Yemen' (Hearst, 2014k); 'Blowback in Yemen: Houthi advance is a Saudi nightmare' (Hearst, 2014l); 'The slaying of the Saudi spider' (Hearst, 2015m); 'Saudi Arabia reaps what it has sowed' (Hearst, 2016f); 'Why Saudi Arabia would rather pay a ransom to Trump than support its own people' (Hearst, 2017l); 'Mohammed bin Salman, Saudi Arabia's prince of chaos' (Hearst, 2017m); 'For Saudi Arabia, it's been Operation Shoot Yourself In the Foot' (2017h), and 'When will the Saudis learn that Trump is toxic' (2018). All of these took a negative position on Saudi Arabia.

Articles examining Egypt under the leadership of Sisi show an aggressive approach, with articles titled: 'The many faces of Sisi' (Hearst, 2015e); 'Sisi is pushing Egypt to the brink' (Hearst, 2015n); 'Sisi must go, before it is too late' (Hearst, 2015o); 'Who are you, Sisi?' (Hearst, 2016g); 'Sisi's stature melting away' (Hearst, 2016h), and 'Sisi is a dead man walking' (Hearst, 2016i). Similarly, Abou-Khalil and

Hargreaves (2015) conducted a ten-day monitoring exercise in May 2014, focusing on al-Nabaa, Libya Awalan, and the Qatar-funded Libya al-Ahrar TV, starting from Haftar's launch of Operation Dignity in Eastern Libya, and observed the most significant transformation in Libya al-Ahrar TV, with the editorial shifting 'from being relatively balanced to espousing the cause of the revolutionary-Islamist camp' (Abou-Khalil and Hargreaves, 2015:3). As mentioned in Chapter Four, this assisted Qatar's essential role in the Libyan Arab Spring.

The Gulf Crisis demonstrates the importance of diversification in Qatar-funded media outlets, supporting Qatari views. The Al Araby TV employee (Interviewee F, 2017) states that the channel openly supported the Qatari position, shifting from its initial eight hours of live programming to a 24/7 broadcast when the Crisis began. The 'dose' of news was increased to include hourly news bulletins and a more extensive news programme every two hours, defending 'the Qatari position' (ibid, 2017). MEE provided different perspectives of the Crisis through the balanced articles of different scholars, but the managing editor's articles clearly were pro-Qatar, with titles such as 'Three potential motives behind the tension between Qatar and the its Gulf neighbours' (Hearst, 2017b), and 'Why the campaign against Qatar is doomed' (Hearst, 2017n). Saudi Arabia was particularly criticised, with articles such as 'Mohammed bin Salman, Saudi Arabia's prince of chaos' (Hearst, 2017m), and 'Saudi Arabia tried to host Taliban office, says former mujahidin' (Hearst, 2017g), clearly associating Saudi Arabia with the actions the Anti-Terror Quartet alleged against Qatar. Other articles seem aimed to harm political cooperation between Saudi Arabia and the UAE, such as "'F\*\*\*in' coo coo": UAE envoy mocks Saudi leadership in leaked emails' (Hearst, 2017o) and 'What the UAE fears most: Democracy' (Hearst, 2017a). While using other non-state media actors, Qatar has tried to create an illusion of a diversity of non-affiliated channels which it can use to present its political competitors negatively.

### **6.11. The cost of Qatar's adopted power: building alliances with other media non-state actors**

This diversification strategy brought criticism for the state as a cost of gaining power in the region. Qatar's strategy was recognised by its political opponents and criticised as a waste of Qatar's investment, or as a project that served figures such as

Bishara more than the state itself (Adnan, 2016). The strategy was interpreted as a sign of Qatar's ambition to play a greater role in the region than its size and population would indicate (Al-Ka'bi, 2017). It is not a coincidence that among the 13 demands issued by the Anti-Terror Quartet was the closing of al-Jazeera and other news outlets funded directly and indirectly by Qatar, such as Arabi21, *The New Arab (al-Araby al-Jadeed)* and Middle East Eye (Al-Jazeera, 2017c). The demands were not accepted by Qatar. Qatar's political opponents clearly understood the strategy of adopted power the state was implementing by directly and indirectly funding different non-state actors, and acted to counter it. Additionally, Qatar-linked media started to lose credibility among the public. As Libya al-Ahrar TV's editorial line shifted towards the revolutionary-Islamist camp in summer 2014, well-known journalists, including Mahmud Shamman, resigned in August 2014 in protest. The channel has 'lost much of its prestige' (Abou-Khalil and Hargreaves, 2015:3). Some non-state actors that Qatar tried to use to implement adopted power cut relations with the main outlet. For example, *The Huffington Post* closed its Arabic platform *HuffPost Arabi*, and cancelled their agreement with Integral Media Strategies as mentioned earlier. Therefore, Qatar paid the cost of losing its associations with international partners once its political competitors accused it of directly and indirectly funding these outlets. As a result, some outlets were closed entirely, and the reliability and credibility of others decreased.

## **6.12. Conclusion**

Building alliances with media non-state actors like al-Jazeera is essential for Qatar to wield adopted power. Al-Jazeera reached a global-level of recognition and emerged as a non-state actor uniting disparate viewers under a Pan-Arab/Pan-Islamic agenda, along with supporting Islamists and democratic agendas. The supporters of these narratives make up al-Jazeera's scope, adding to Qatar's adopted power scope, while due to its transnational nature, its domain comprises the Arab, Muslim, Western, and Balkans states, including Muslim and non-Muslim communities accessing AJ+ in English or French. As a result, al-Jazeera emerged as a 'political phenomenon', the 'Al Jazeera effect', a 'big voice' for a 'tiny country'. Putting both itself and the state of Qatar on the map, al-Jazeera emerged as a competitor to global media outlets, such as the BBC, CNN, and Fox News. Regionally, it was able to break Saudi Arabia's,

Egypt's, and Lebanon's monopolies that have historically been the main establishers of media outlets. By doing so, al-Jazeera became a crucial tool for presenting Qatar's narratives in competition with Saudi Arabia, its main political competitor. During the Arab Spring, as well as providing a platform for opposition around the Middle East, al-Jazeera assisted in bringing Islamists to power, a crucial example of how a tiny state such as Qatar was able to wield adopted power to bring its allies to power. At the same time, al-Jazeera, because of its coverage, was criticised, hacked, blocked, and bombed. As a result, the state of Qatar paid a high cost by forming an alliance with al-Jazeera, which brought tensions with other regional countries, and for being associated with a media outlet that was labelled as an 'al-Qa'ida mouthpiece'. Al-Jazeera having lost its reputation as a reliable source, Qatar had to create a new strategy with new outlets to spread the state's narratives.

Qatar built alliances with other media non-state actors for wielding adopted power, such as engaging with well-known entities to launch Arabic outlets (e.g., *HuffPost Arabi*); launching new outlets located in different countries (e.g., *The New Arab (al-Araby al-Jadeed)*; al-Araby TV); and denying connections to other outlets (e.g., Middle East Eye). Despite avoiding the appearance of connections between Qatar and these non-state actors, these outlets share the state's agenda and have clear connections with representatives of Qatar's inner-circle elites. As with al-Jazeera, these actors have influence in MENA and Western societies, using their transnational nature, which demonstrates domain, and present the same scope of Pan-Arab, Islamist, and democratic agendas. As weight of adopted power these non-state actors became essential by presenting the illusion of diverse media outlets. Qatar-linked media presented each other as unbiased and reliable sources, while undermining their competitors' outlets and defending Qatar's position during the ongoing Gulf Crisis. However, Qatar had already begun to pay the cost for building alliances with these media non-state actors: as Qatar's political competitors realised Qatar's strategy of denying links with such outlets, they started to respond by casting light on their direct and indirect affiliations with Qatar. As a result, they have been accused of presenting pro-Qatar discourses and being biased against Qatar's political competitors.



## **Chapter Seven**

### **Adopted Power in Use: Sports**

#### **7.1. Introduction**

In comparison to other nations, Qatar lacks a sporting tradition, starting comparatively late in developing elite sports policies. For this reason, it built alliances with well-established, non-state actors in sport, making them their clients for power projection, using the main driver of adopted power, wealth. Wealth is distributed through state-owned firms, such as Qatar Sports Investments (QSI), Qatar Airways (QA), and Qatar Foundation (QF), all led by the inner-circle elites (or close representatives). This chapter demonstrates that sports non-state actors emerged as another example of Qatar wielding adopted power. In order to illustrate this, it demonstrates how sport entities emerged as non-state actors of a transnational nature, with which Qatar uses its wealth to gain advantage. This includes governing bodies that organise large-scale sports events, the transnational presence of famous clubs, and the phenomenon of global migration. Secondly, the chapter identifies the domain of adopted power created by Qatar's use of sports non-state actors.

Although attempts have been made by Qatar to use different sports, the influence comes mainly from alliances with football, such as FIFA itself, and several major clubs: FC Barcelona, Paris Saint-Germain (PSG) F.C., Malaga CF, AS Roma, and FC Bayern Munich. These alliances emerged as scope of adopted power and are examined in the 'scope' section of the chapter. The chapter then examines how Qatar builds alliances with sports non-state actors and influences three different forms of political leverage on states: at the highest level with France, on a middle level in Germany and the UK, and finally, in Spain and Russia. It argues that building alliances with sports non-state actors is a contributing factor in developing bilateral relations with states and assisted in neutralising responses to the ongoing Gulf Crisis. Finally, the cost that Qatar pays for its alliances with sports non-state actors is analysed, mainly focusing on the criticism it receives and concerns related with the FIFA World Cup 2022, and football clubs PSG, Malaga, and Barcelona.

## 7.2. Qatar's clients: sport non-state actors

Building alliances with sport non-state actors emerges as another example of how Qatar wields adopted power. While Amara believes that Qatar is becoming a 'small state with a big sport ambition' (Amara, 2013), Even stresses the public or journalistic view, quoting headlines referencing Qatar and its use of sports for power projection, such as 'Qatar, sports super-power?', or 'In Paris, the Emirate invests in real estate and sports' (2014:81). Campbell (2011:49) highlights the global network strategies that Qatar used for its sports and other geopolitical projects, i.e., the transnational nature that Qatar gains from different non-state actors in order to wield adopted power. Qatar benefits from this transnational nature by hosting sport mega events, making deals with famous football clubs, and taking advantage of the phenomenon of global migration, that contribute to relationships with other countries from where migrants originate.

Qatar hosted several worldwide sport competitions, including the 2006 Doha Asian Games, the 2011 Asian Football Cup, the annual Qatar Open Tennis Tournament, and the upcoming 2022 FIFA World Cup (Appendix J illustrates the more extensive list of international sporting events hosted in Qatar). While doing this, it has benefited from the transnational non-state nature of governing bodies that organise tournaments, such as the Olympic Council of Asia (OCA), the Asian Football Confederation (AFC), and the Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA), which can all be considered non-state actors (Murray and Pigman, 2014:1099); Garcia (2018) refers to them as non-governmental sport organisations. Giulianotti and Robertson (2004:559) suggest that if profitability were prioritised, FIFA could be seen in the same light as its 'Swiss neighbour, the World Trade Organization', while Murray and Pigman (2014:1115) believe that FIFA and the IOC (International Olympic Committee) are learning from other non-state actors such as the WTO (World Trade Organization) how to engage as a diplomatic actor. Therefore, considering the political importance of these non-state actors, having alliances with them assists Qatar's desire to gain power, especially with FIFA and the opportunity to host the 2022 World Cup.

Deals with, or the purchase of, football clubs have become possible due to two ongoing processes in European society and in the field of sport in the last twenty to thirty years—globalisation and commercialisation (Allison, 1998; Garcia and Amara,

2013). Giulianotti's conceptualises the evolution of football from 'traditional' and 'modern' football to a 'post-modern' era (Giulianotti, 1999; Garcia and Amara, 2013:4). This is defined by major commercialisation of sporting activities and the impact of television in control and financing clubs and the game (Giulianotti, 1999:168). One of the features of the 'post-modern era' of European football is commercialisation (Garcia, 2010; Hamil, Walters and Watson, 2010; Garcia and Amara, 2013). Garcia and Amara (2013:2) argue this transformation due 'to the development of the audiovisual industry, from a relatively minor commercial venture to a multimillion euro business sector'. Among the first phases of football being globalised as a business, was the expansion of the leagues to international markets such as the Far East, where the English Premier league was a forerunner. At the same time, the interest of international broadcasters in major European football competitions increased. Amara and Garcia (2013:3) state that 'one of the last fortresses of "traditional football"' fell when European clubs began to accept their first foreign capital, and then full foreign ownership. Both Liverpool and Manchester United now have American owners, while the Italian Pozzo family own Udinese in Italy, Granada in Spain, and Watford in England (BBC Sport, 2012), and the Venky family (Indian poultry tycoons) control the English club, Blackburn Rovers (Harris, 2011). Globalisation, and especially commercialisation, of European football provides an opportunity for Qatar to build alliances with sports non-state actors for its adopted power projection using wealth to gain political leverage from the transnational nature of sports non-state actors. Shaykh 'Abdullah bin Nasir al-Thani, of the Qatari ruling family, became the owner of Malaga CF, and Qatar Sports Investments (QSI) took control of Paris Saint-Germain (PSG) F.C. (Garcia and Amara, 2013), as discussed later.

Giulianotti and Robertson (2004:550) highlight the most dynamic agents in football's current globalisation. They observe that this includes different 'transnational corporations' (TNCs), large football clubs such as the European G-14 clubs, or the European Club Association that replaced it in 2008, merchandise companies such as Nike, and media complexes such as BSkyB and its sister companies. Giulianotti and Robertson (2004:551) consider Juventus, Bayern Munich, and Manchester United as transnational clubs. Major clubs play internationally during the off-season in the Americas, Asia, and Australia, for international fans (Batuev, 2018). Similarly, transnational scouting is usual in the Premier League (Campbell,

2011: 52). Premier League clubs, such as Chelsea, Manchester United, and Arsenal, have transnational fans ‘that are similar in size, if not patterns of identification, with the citizenry of nations’ (Giulianotti and Robertson, 2004:551). With more than 41 million fans in Asia, Manchester United publishes an official homepage in Mandarin. In some sports, in-season league games are now played in international markets, with Barcelona playing in the US in 2018, and NBA teams already play internationally in the UK, Mexico, and China, a practice which Mikhail Batuev (2018), a lecturer at Northumbria University, believes will continue in the future, despite the reservations of fans in countries such as the UK. The increasing globalisation of ‘sports allows sponsors from the Middle East to appear on the shirts of a team in Italy, playing in a third location’ (ibid, 2018). Within this globalised market, Qatar can purchase football clubs and make deals with others, and use the transnational nature of sports to wield adopted power.

Elite sports in Qatar are related to their transnational nature, specifically due to global migration and the benefits that Qatar receives from the transnational labour market. The result has been the realisation of the following projects: Doha Sports City, which includes the Aspire Sport Academy and ASPITAR; Qatar’s Orthopaedic and Sports Medicine Hospital (Amara, 2013); the Khalifa Sports Complex; the creation of the Q-League (currently known as Qatar Stars League); and the establishment of Qatari training centres in Spain, Kenya, and South Africa (Campbell, 2011:51). Emerging as an elite sports training destination, Qatar takes advantage of top athletes, experts, and coaches to recruit further talent (ibid, 2011:51), creating transnational social networks, or ‘talent pipelines’ (Elliot and Maguire, 2008:484; Castells, 2001). For example, the managers in the Qatari Q-League’s first division are not Qatari nor Middle Eastern (Amara, 2005:501). Transnationally-recruited coaching staff help develop connections locally through in-person contacts, but also build relationships globally through social networking with colleagues and players around the world (Elliot and Maguire, 2008:492). Finally, the Aspire Academy Qatar, which focuses on developing new athletes, also takes advantage of transnational networks, with ‘500,000 boys born in 1995 in seven different countries – Algeria, Cameroon, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Senegal and South Africa’ invited to Qatar in 2007 as part of a talent search (BBC Sport, 2007). Qatar has used a naturalisation policy to create a national pool of elite athletes, coaches, and sports administrators (Amara, 2013:1). However, using data from the *Annual Bulletin of Youth and Sports Statistics* (Planning and

Statistics Authority, 2017), Appendix K demonstrates that there are numerous Qataris serving as sports team officials, while transnational skilled labour dominates positions such as coaches and assistant coaches. Therefore, global migration allows Qatar to develop bilateral relations with other states, as the section on weight demonstrates, in the cases of Spain and Russia.

### **7.3. Qatar's adopted power domain: building alliances with sport non-state actors**

When hosting mega-events such as the 2006 Asian Games, the 2016 Union Cycliste Internationale (UCI) Road Cycling World Championships, or the 2018 Fédération Internationale de Gymnastique (FIG) Artistic World Gymnastics Championships (illustrated fully in Appendix J), Qatar's adopted power domain has technically spread worldwide. This is because the main bodies who organise such events are transnational and include associates or international teams. By organising the 2006 Doha Asian games, Qatar used its organiser, the Olympic Council of Asia (OCA), to gain power in the 45-member OCA countries (see Appendix L) (OCA, 2018). While hosting the 2014 Fédération Internationale de Natation (FINA) Short Course World Championships, Qatar's domain spread to 209 countries with FINA membership (FINA, 2018a), its hosting of the 2015 International Handball Federation (IHF) Handball World Championships reached 209 countries with IHF membership (IHF, 2015), and by hosting the 2018 FIG Artistic World Gymnastics Championships, 147 members of the Fédération Internationale de Gymnastique were influenced (FIG, 2018) (see Appendix L). Consequently, the transnational nature of sports governing bodies allows Qatar to influence a broader domain for its adopted power by hosting sports mega-events.

The main worldwide domain which Qatar aims to spread its influence through, is football, a truly 'global game' (Giulianotti and Robertson, 2004:545). FIFA has more social media followers than any other sports governing body. By the end of December 2018, FIFA had 12.4m followers on Twitter (FIFA, 2018a) and 11.8m followers on Instagram (FIFA, 2018b). In contrast, the UCI had 250,000 followers on Twitter (UCI, 2018a) and 600,000 on Instagram (UCI, 2018b). FINA had 69,201 followers on Twitter (FINA, 2018b) and 121,715 followers on Instagram (FINA, 2018c), and the IHF had 24,500 followers on Twitter (IHF, 2018a) and 62,300 on

Instagram (IHF, 2018b). It is not a coincidence that Qatar competed for and won the bid to host the 2022 FIFA World Cup. By doing so, Qatar’s power could spread to 211 associations affiliated with FIFA (FIFA, 2019) (Appendix L). Having deals with, or purchasing European football clubs helped increase the domain of Qatar’s adopted power. As *Figure 7.1.* illustrates, due to the transnational nature of sports non-state actors, Qatar’s adopted power is spread worldwide. Specifically, the section on *weight*, below, demonstrates that usage of sports non-state actors emerged as a contributing factor for developing bilateral relations, such as with France, the UK, Germany, Spain, and Russia. This is examined after the section on scope.



*Figure 7.1.* Qatar’s adopted power domain: building alliances with sports non-state actors (source: personal collection).

#### 7.4. Qatar’s adopted power scope: building alliances with sports non-state actors

As demonstrated, Qatar tried to project power through a range of sports non-state actors, representing several sports; however, Qatar benefits mainly through football. Despite its attempts to join the Olympic network after organising the Asian

Games (Attali, 2016), Qatar's bids for the 2016 and 2020 Olympic Games were unsuccessful (Brannagan and Giulianotti, 2015), and as of yet, Qatar has been unable to make use of the 'global event power' of the IOC (Garcia and Meier, 2017:4). Instead, it turned to the second most important sporting event and won the bid to host the 2022 World Cup. Consequently, Qatar gained advantages from its alliance with FIFA, also benefiting from its other 'clients', football clubs, such as FC Barcelona, Paris Saint-Germain (PSG) F.C., AS Roma, FC Bayern Munich, and Malaga CF.

#### **7.4.1. The World Cup 2022 as a scope of adopted power**

In 2010, FIFA awarded Qatar the right to host the 2022 World Cup. As the main driver of Qatar's adopted power is wealth, this bid was unexceptional. Due to its wealth, Qatar spent large sums lobbying and attracting international sport superstars as ambassadors, including the French World Cup winner Zinedine Zidane, and legendary Barcelona player and manager Pep Guardiola (Even, 2014). But Qatar's successful bid for hosting the World Cup was surprising and drew criticism. Accusations of corruption led to official investigations by FIFA's ethics committee into the bidding process for the 2018 and 2022 World Cups, which occurred after corruption allegations regarding payments to Jack Warner, a former FIFA vice-president (Rumsby, 2015). However, potential accusations of corruption against Qatar's leadership shows similarities to how Qatar wields adopted power, as the inner-circle elite-driven policies use wealth as the key driver for implementation.

For example, it was reported that a lunch meeting was held on 23 November 2010 in the Élysée Palace between French President Sarkozy, then-Crown Prince of Qatar Shaykh Tamim, and the UEFA President Michael Platini (Syed, 2013). There has been no public confirmation on whether the meeting took place and Platini denies allegations that he was asked by Sarkozy to support Qatar in the FIFA vote (UEFA) (Gibson, 2014a). At the same time, Platini's son Laurent was offered the job of chief executive of Burrda, the Qatar Sports Investments-owned sports clothing company, which Platini stated was completely unrelated to supporting Qatar's bid. A week after, Qatar won the bid to host the World Cup on which USD 4bn would be spent, and the following summer the Qataris bought PSG, and al-Jazeera extensively boosted the revenues of French football by entering the broadcast market (Gibson, 2014b). Moreover, among other corruption accusations were reports that appeared in May

2011, stating that Qatar had rewarded African FIFA Committee members in excess of USD 1m in exchange for support in the World Cup bidding process (Brannagan and Giulianotti, 2015). Mohammad bin Hamman, a FIFA executive committee member from Qatar, was suspended in 2011 due to handling more than USD 1m in bribes for Caribbean voters (Bond, 2014). Additionally, in 2018, FIFA ethics judges applied a four-year ban from football for African football official, Seedy Kinteh, for accepting cash gifts from Mohammad bin Hamman (*Arab News*, 2018a).

In contrast, Garcia's FIFA report concluded there were 'no explosive revelations of bribery' in the World Cup 2022 (and 2018) bidding processes. Some facts emerged from the report which still remain unclear, e.g., a USD 2m payment was made into the savings account of the 10-year old daughter of FIFA member, Teixeira. The report states that this payment was made by the former Barcelona president Sandro Rosell, but that 'there is no evidence it was related to the Qatar bid' (Conn, 2017). Moreover, this report was produced based on evidence from only five of the 22 FIFA ExCo members who voted for the 2018 World Cup (and 2022). Finally, Sepp Blatter is described as presiding over a 'culture of expectation and entitlement' (ibid, 2017). As the section on cost demonstrates, these corruption allegations are one of controversies linked to winning the bid. However, such allegations also suggest how Qatar's adopted power operates: the inner-circle of Qatari policy-makers use state-owned companies to apply its wealth to bring sport non-state actors, in this case FIFA, to align with Qatar's aims.

#### **7.4.2. Paris Saint-Germain F.C. (PSG) as a scope of adopted power**

The state-owned Qatar Sports Investments (QSI), launched by Shaykh Tamim, bought 70% of Paris Saint-Germain F.C. (PSG) in 2011. The club had been making losses under its previous owners, the US private equity real estate fund Colony Capital. Dissatisfied with owning 70% of PSG, QSI purchased the remaining 30% in 2012, becoming sole owner (Dillon, 2018; Even, 2014). In 2012, the Qatar Tourism Authority signed a sponsorship deal with the club to pay up to EUR 200m (USD 224m) a year, for four years, in order to pay the 'galactic wages' of players such as Zlatan Ibrahimovic, and Edinson Cavani (Conn, 2013). Al-Jazeera bought the rights to show the French League football worldwide, and three weeks after QSI bought PSG, al-Jazeera paid EUR 510m (USD 660m) a year for the domestic broadcast rights



from 2012 to 2016, in cooperation with French broadcaster Canal+, which had been the only bidder (Conn, 2011). As mentioned in Chapter Two, the president of PSG, the head of al-Jazeera Sport, and Shaykh Tamim's friend, Nasir al-Khelaifi (Garcia and Amara, 2013), is one of the favoured and privileged people who has close relations with the inner-circle who wield adopted power. With the chair of the board of directors of QSI, Qatar will continue to take advantage of dealing with PSG, along with owning it. Reports in 2018 suggested that state-owned Qatari companies such as Qatar Airways were interested in PSG shirt sponsorship, replacing the Dubai-based airline, Emirates, because 'the deal [between Qatar-owned PSG and Emirates] has become an "uncomfortable fit" after the ongoing Gulf Crisis' (Friend, 2018). PSG emerged as another important sport non-state actor in the scope of adopted power.

#### **7.4.3. Malaga CF as a scope of adopted power**

In 2010, Malaga CF was the subject of a takeover at an anticipated cost of EUR 36m (USD 40m), including the club's debt, with the promise to invest EUR 70m (USD 78m) in building a new stadium (Garcia and Amara, 2013). The new owner is a member of the ruling family, Shaykh 'Abdullah bin Nasir al-Thani, who according to Puerto al-Thani (2018), runs a diversified conglomerate employing more than 3000 workers, and is vice-president, shareholder and a non-executive member of the board of directors of Doha Bank (Countrylicious, 2015). This example demonstrates the involvement of Qatari elites in wielding adopted power, while Doha Bank, as illustrated in Chapter Three, is one of the state-owned companies that assists Qatar in implementing adopted power.

#### **7.4.4. FC Barcelona as a scope of adopted power**

Using football as the main method for wielding adopted power, Qatar built another alliance with FC Barcelona. In 2011, the Qatar Foundation paid EUR 150m (USD 168m) for a five-year deal to become the first ever sponsor of the Barcelona shirt. Likewise, Qatar Airways was the main sponsor of FC Barcelona between 2011 and 2017, following a EUR 96m (USD 107m) deal (Conn, 2013). In 2011 the airline initially signed a five-year deal with Barcelona for EUR 215m (USD 241m), and extended it another year in 2017 (Dillon, 2018). The tie-in included football references

and Barcelona players featured in Qatar Airways' onboard safety videos, such as one in which a football referee shows a red card to smokers. Barcelona players were referenced by name in the videos (Qatar Airways, 2017). After the completion of the deal between FC Barcelona and Qatar Airways, the airline used a picture with the slogan, 'All together now', and the logos of the airline and the 2018 World Cup in Russia in its passenger announcements (Qatar Airways, 2018). Qatar Airways plays a key role in the engagement with sport non-state actors for wielding adopted power, acting as an official partner of the cycling Tour of Qatar and Qatar Open tennis tournament in Doha in 2011, the title sponsor of the EuroHockey Nations Championships in 2007, and official airline for English Test cricket and Formula E motor racing (Garcia and Amara, 2013:11). That two state-owned firms were essential in building alliances with FC Barcelona – Qatar Airways and the Qatar Foundation – again, this demonstrates how Qatar wields adopted power: the inner-circle elites (or closely-connected elites) lead state-owned entities and fund sports non-state actors to increase Qatar's power.

#### **7.4.5. FC Bayern Munich as a scope of adopted power**

Qatar Airways signed a five-year partnership agreement with Bayern Munich to become its 'platinum partner' until June 2023 (Dillon, 2018). The airline, which operates from Hamad International Airport (HIA) will take over the sponsorship contract that Bayern signed with the latter in 2016, and extended it to include a sleeve sponsorship in 2017. Bayern's sponsorship arrangement with HIA was estimated to cost at least EUR 10m (USD 11m) and is even more profitable for the Bavarian team. Both Hamad International Airport and Qatar Airways are state-owned. However, Andreas Jung made it clear that Bayern Munich's partnership with Qatar Airways would not make the Qatari company one of Bayern's 'main partners and stakeholders', consisting of their shirt sponsor Deutsche Telekom, and their shareholders Adidas, Allianz, and Audi, which hold 8.33% each of the club's shares (ibid, 2018).

#### **7.4.6. AS Roma as a scope of adopted power**

Another example of adopted power was Qatar Airways' announcement on 23 April 2018 of a multi-year collaboration agreement with the Italian football club, AS

Roma. This was the largest deal signed by the club and it ensured that Qatar Airways would become Roma's main worldwide partner, with the airline's logo adorning the team's shirts through the 2020-21 season (AS Roma, 2018). Consequently, while building alliances with sports non-state actors, state-owned companies lead by Qatari inner-circle elites became essential in wielding adopted power. Qatar's power became possible mainly due to its alliances with football non-state actors, which once again illustrates how Qatar's adopted power operates. The weight that was produced by the use of these non-state actors will be demonstrated below.

## **7.5. Qatar's adopted power weight: building alliances with sports non-state actors**

### **7.5.1. Influence in France**

By engaging with non-state actors, such as PSG, FIFA, and the media outlet, BeIn Sports, Qatar created sufficient political weight to influence the domestic affairs of France. These engagements assisted in making France consider foreign policies, for example, to take a neutral position on the ongoing Gulf Crisis. Qatar was able to push for domestic issues in France through sports non-state actors and through fans of PSG. Before the purchase of PSG by QSI, hooliganism was damaging the image of the club (Shea, 2018), and French legislation was enacted to try to deal with law-breaking fans and hooligans, or 'ultras'. 'Ultras', according to the *Cambridge Dictionary* (2018) are 'extreme supporter[s] of a football club ... [and] part of an organised group that may also have extreme political opinions'. Thus the chronology of France's legislative reforms may explain why the Qatari purchase of PSG found such a receptive audience among French politicians. From the 1990s, achievable results in crackdowns on football hooliganism had acted as a surrogate for less successful attempts to crack down on first Algerian, and later Islamist terrorism. Allowing Qatari power over PSG's fans had the potential to reduce hooliganism further.

Such initiatives allowed Qatari intervention over the rights of PSG fans in France. For example, the Collectif Ultras Paris (CUP) are the only group of fans who are tolerated by PSG's President Nasir al-Khelaifi, as in October 2016 their leader, 'promised never to criticize the club's Qatari owner nor to question the Gulf state's geopolitics' (Shea, 2018). There are several other examples of fans being affected by

the PSG leadership. On 5 May 2014, Yoann Seddik, a PSG supporter, attended a PSG-Monaco match, and during a quiet moment: began to sing ‘Season tickets too pricey, supporters angry’. Within minutes he was removed from his seat and banned from the stadium (ibid, 2018). After the incident, the news outlet Mediapart conducted an experiment on the club’s policies towards dissent on social media. A Mediapart journalist and PSG season-ticket holder tweeted criticism of the club and its leadership’s restrictions of freedom of speech with the hashtag #ShameOnPSG. After three days, the journalist received a letter from PSG’s Director General threatening legal proceedings (ibid, 2018). Consequently, PSGs actions in dealing with hooliganism have allowed Qatar, as the owners of the club, to have an effect on domestic French issues, such as human rights, through blacklisting fans in 2013, and allegations of breaching data protection in 2015.

A final example of influence on French domestic issues is Qatar’s attempts to change French public opinion of Qatar. As part of a synchronised application of adopted power through sports and media non-state actors, Qatar owns the other media non-state actors as examined in the previous chapter, including BeIn Sports, the television company which controls television rights to Ligue 1. Such relationships affect French football bodies. For example, when AS Saint-Etienne supporters showed a banner criticising Qatar for financing terrorism, the club received a huge fine. Strasbourg supporters displayed a similar banner some weeks later, and a complaint from BeIn Sports to the Ligue de Football Professionnel (LFP) produced the same punishment (Shea, 2018). Therefore, by building alliances with sports non-state actors, Qatar has power within France, limiting the public right to fully express opinions on Qatari investment in France, or on Qatari policies. Moreover, Qatar’s important investments in France allowed it to close down allegations that it supported terrorism, one of the main arguments of the Anti-Terror Quartet. This shows that Qatar’s alliances with sport and media non-state actors assisted in shaping French public opinion.

The weight of adopted power resulting from building alliances with sports non-state actors can also be seen as helping French policy-makers consider their foreign policies towards Qatar and its neighbours. The sports policy expert, interviewed anonymously (Interviewee G, 2018), stated that the purchase of PSG can be analysed at a national level involving bilateral relations between Qatar and France:

that go back a good few years, [...] for example, the connections between Sarkozy and Qatar, and some of the allegations regarding the connections that Sarkozy had with Platini, and also the investment that led. I think Blatter highlighted this, recently, regarding Qatari investment in France, and also with purchasing BeIN Sports, or generating BeIN Sports becomes the dominant TV sports platform and identified the Qatar-France relationship as different from that Qatar has with the UK.

As noted earlier, the corruption allegations remain officially unproven.

Nonetheless, evidence supporting the academic's allegations can be seen in official publications (France Diplomatie, 2018a), which demonstrates the political benefits that France reaped from the World Cup being hosted in Qatar. One example of economic relations which the publication cites is that 'French businesses have a strong presence in Qatar in the areas of infrastructure (preparation of the 2022 FIFA World Cup)' and other fields (ibid, 2018a). Moreover, close relations with Qatar during the Sarkozy presidency is a common argument. The visiting scholar at George Washington University, Soubrier (2018), clarifies that French-Qatari relations have 'evolved a little bit, depending on the French president that was in power at the moment', with Sarkozy being the President 'who was the most close to Qatar', 'while Hollande's administration tried to balance a little more and people usually say that Hollande tried to move closer to Saudi Arabia'. Building alliances with sports non-state actors thus helps establish a different level of bilateral relations between Qatar and France, as seen especially during the Sarkozy presidency. Moreover, Soubrier (2018) sees Qatar and other GCC states, especially Saudi Arabia and the UAE, as connected to France in a co-dependent relationship, in which both parties will 'try to take the other one's interest into account' on issues. However, Soubrier (2018) feels that 'maybe at some point in the future it would be possible for Qatar to have an actual direct influence on French foreign policy, but we are not there yet.' Such a co-dependent relationship gives Qatar the opportunity to influence French domestic policies to some extent and make France consider the outcomes of its foreign policies on bilateral relations. The response to the ongoing Gulf Crisis demonstrates this.

Qatar's alliances with sports non-state actors have strengthened bilateral relations between France and Qatar and helped it retain the support of French partners during the ongoing Gulf Crisis, with France keeping a neutral position. However, the Anti-Terror Quartet are also important French partners. Thanks to investments such as the purchase of football clubs, the development of connections ahead of Qatar's

hosting of the 2022 World Cup is one of the main fields where Qatar prevails compared with the Anti-Terror Quartet, as comparative analyses of French relations with Qatar, and with the Anti-Terror Quartet, demonstrates in Appendix M. Through investments, including alliances with sports non-state actors, Qatar was able to work within the economic structure of France (France Diplomatie, 2018a), which is the main strength of Qatar in its relations with France, compared with the Anti-Terror Quartet.

As Appendix M illustrates, Qatar was the main Gulf investor in France, with investments estimated at approximately EUR 25b (USD 28m) in 2016. The UAE is the second largest investor in France from the GCC states (France Diplomatie, 2018b), while Saudi Arabia's Vision 2030 provides for a range of cooperation in the future and new prospects for French companies (France Diplomatie, 2018c). Analysis of other sectors demonstrates how Qatar is dominant, or at least equal, compared to the Anti-Terror Quartet. Bilateral trade between Qatar and France is more than EUR 2bn (USD 2.2bn) (by 2016) (France Diplomatie, 2018a), towards the higher end for relationships with Gulf countries: France had trade valued at EUR 25bn (USD 28bn) with Egypt (in 2017) (France Diplomatie, 2018d), EUR 4.5bn (USD 5bn) with the UAE (in 2017) (France Diplomatie, 2018b), EUR 348m (USD 390m) with Saudi Arabia (in 2016) (France Diplomatie, 2018c), and EUR 26.1m (USD 29m) with Bahrain (in 2016) (France Diplomatie, 2017).

France's cultural, scientific and technical ties with Qatar and the Anti-Terror Quartet are comprehensive as the following illustrates. Qatar invited several academic French institutions to set up branches in Education City; a French architect designed the National Museum of Qatar; and 2020 will be the year of French culture in Qatar (France Diplomatie, 2018a). Similarly, a scientific cooperation agreement was signed between the French National Centre for Scientific Research and the King Abdulaziz City Centre of Science and Technology in Saudi Arabia (France Diplomatie, 2018c), and the Louvre Abu Dhabi Museum was launched in 2017 in the UAE (France Diplomatie, 2018b). The French-Arabian Business School was opened in Bahrain in 2011 (France Diplomatie, 2017), and France has the leading position in the field of archaeology in Egypt (France Diplomatie, 2018d). A full list of these initiatives is found in Appendix M.

Defence cooperation between France and Qatar, and France and the Anti-Terror Quartet, is also close. Qatar signed a contract for the purchase of 24 Rafale fighter aircrafts, with the option of purchasing 12 additional fighters, and implemented

regular military exercises between Qatar and France (France Diplomatie, 2018a). However, French naval air forces are stationed in Abu Dhabi (France Diplomatie, 2018b), while Egypt signed a EUR 5.2bn (USD 5.8bn) contract for the purchase of 24 Rafale fighters in 2015, and signed further agreements to purchase frigates and missiles and two Mistral-class force projection and command vessels (France Diplomatie, 2018d).

Considering partnerships between Qatar and the Anti-Terror Quartet, the French position on the Crisis has been neutral, ‘affirming that it won’t pick side[s]’, that all of the ‘Arab Gulf states are partners to France’, and ‘France is still as close to Qatar as it used to be’ (Soubrier, 2018). France officially declared this, through a government spokesman’s statement: ‘It’s not about taking sides. We are a country that is friends with these states and with which our cooperation is historic and deep’ (Vey and Irish, 2017). France even offered to become a ‘facilitator’ in talks supporting a Kuwait-led mediation in 2017 (Le Drian, 2017). Although all the economic, cultural, and defence partnerships are important, the main strength of Qatar versus the Anti-Terror Quartet is the country’s investments in France, including sports non-state actors; such investments helped establish France’s neutral position on the Gulf Crisis, which can be seen as weight of Qatar’s adopted power, as it alone is as important as the other four French allies together.

### **7.5.2. Influence in Germany**

The Qatar-Germany relationship demonstrates the second level of political leverage that Qatar has exerted from alliances with sports non-state actors, especially through FIFA and the Qatar Airways deal with the German FC Bayern Munich. These can be seen as responses to German foreign policies towards Qatar and its neighbours. In response to the Gulf Crisis, Germany has taken a more pro-Qatar position, as the German Foreign Minister repeatedly criticised the Saudi-led coalition’s behaviour towards Qatar (Vagneur-Jones, 2017). Relations between Saudi Arabia and Germany between November 2017 and September 2018 were tense. This prompted Saudi Arabia to pull its ambassador from Berlin and punish German firms working in Saudi Arabia (Bayoumy, Irish and Barkin, 2018). However, as Appendix N illustrates, German bilateral visits with Qatar and the Anti-Terror Quartet indicate productive relations with both sides. Cultural, scientific and technical cooperation has been

fruitful, exemplified by the 2017 Qatar-German Cultural Year (Federal Foreign Office, 2017) and a range of partnership agreements with Qatar and the Anti-Terror Quartet in education (Federal Foreign Office, 2018; 2019a; 2019b; 2019c). However, such partnerships are limited by the number of German speakers worldwide, with students preferring English-speaking countries for overseas education. Again, Qatar is the highest Gulf investor in Germany, investing EUR 25bn (USD 28bn) (Pathak, 2018). However, Qatar has a weaker position in trade exchange with Germany relative to the Anti-Terror Quartet. While in 2017, the Egyptian trade with Germany was worth EUR 6bn (USD 6.7bn) (Federal Foreign Office, 2018), Qatar's was EUR 2.5bn (USD 2.8bn) (Qatar Embassy in Berlin, 2017). German companies have a strong presence in the Anti-Terror Quartet, with 900 companies operating in the UAE (Federal Foreign Office, 2019b).

Although there are only 112 companies owned by Qatar-German interests, 27 companies in Qatar are 100% German owned (Seetharaman, 2018). A contributing factor to economic relations between Germany and Qatar, is Qatar's use of FIFA to host the 2022 World Cup (Qatar Embassy in Berlin, 2017), which gives opportunities for German business as well. In September 2018, Hasan al-Thawadi (2018), the secretary general of the Supreme Committee for Delivery and Legacy of the 2022 World Cup, among policy-makers during the Shaykh Tamim leadership, tweeted 'I am in the Qatar German forum today to explain Qatar's plans for the FIFA World Cup and explore how German companies can contribute further to 2022, drawing on the country's expertise in hosting the tournament in 2006.' Over 30 companies have already played an essential role in Qatar's preparation for the World Cup: German companies have been involved in contractual works on five of the eight stadia, and over 100 German companies are operating in Qatar on projects worth around QR 309bn (USD 84bn) (Pathak, 2018).

Finally, sports non-state actors such as Bayern Munich, Borussia Dortmund, and Schalke, are using the Aspire Academy at Doha for training camps. This demonstrates how alliances are made with sports non-state actors by providing them with world-class facilities for training, and how Qatar strengthens bilateral relations between Qatar and Germany (Qatar Embassy in Berlin, 2017). There is no doubt that tense relations between Germany and members of the Anti-Terror Quartet—often called Saudi-led coalition against Qatar—positively effects bilateral relations between Qatar and Germany. However, the business advantages gained by Qatar's relationship



with FIFA and its organisation of the 2022 World Cup has also increased the partnership between the two states. The engagement of German companies for construction of five of the eight World Cup stadiums, the presence of over 100 German companies operating projects in Qatar (Supreme Committee for Delivery and Legacy, 2018a), and Qatar Airways' deal with German club Bayern Munich, assisted in getting German support as a first response to the Gulf Crisis in 2017. This can be considered as demonstrating Qatar's weight. The further example of the UK demonstrates the second level of political leverage that Qatar established by building alliances with sports non-state actors for implementing adopted power.

### **7.5.3. Influence in the UK**

Relations between the UK, Qatar, and the Anti-Terror Quartet states are historically rooted, with the Gulf States formerly under the British umbrella of armed and political suzerainty. Prior to 1914, Britain was the dominant naval power in the Mediterranean, the Red Sea, and the Gulf, and it controlled Egypt and the Sudan (Kolinsky, 1999:1). Its influence was extended after the First World War, and imperial control of sea passage through the Suez Canal combined with overland links to the Gulf (ibid, 1999). This dominance of the region was challenged between 1936 and 1942 (ibid, 1999), and by 1963, Britain was no longer the dominant power in the Middle East (Gat, 2003:xiv). In the 1960s, the British revealed to the Gulf rulers their plan to totally withdraw from the Gulf. Following independence, the Gulf states have maintained close relations with the UK, with the Amir of Qatar Shaykh Khalifa (1972-1995), considering Britain as the guardian of Qatari sovereignty (Interviewee A, 2017). The former British diplomat (ibid, 2017) states:

Most importantly, Mrs Thatcher had developed a close relationship with Shaykh Khalifa. So, for example, I arranged for Shaykh Khalifa to be invited on a state visit in London before Shaykh Zayed or Shaykh Rashid or Shaykh 'Isa of Bahrain, and that was an enormously important event for him. I was involved in the event in London and I saw him at the end of it, and I had never seen him so happy, because for the first time he had been seen on the international stage as a serious player, of the first rank, not a backwater. Because of course at that time few people in Britain had even heard of Qatar and none of them could actually pronounce the name.

Half a century after independence, the Gulf states, including Qatar, appreciated the need, like the UK, for much-improved relations. It is unsurprising that the UK position on the ongoing Gulf Crisis has been to urge its ‘Gulf friends’ to find a path to de-escalation, and it supported Kuwait mediation initiatives (Parliament. House of Commons, 2018).

It has been suggested that the UK’s response to the Gulf Crisis ‘paled before even that other European states, despite its position as the top importer of Qatari liquefied natural gas (LNG) in Europe’ (Vagneur-Jones, 2017:7). In 2011 gas imports from Qatar, mainly LNG, reached GBP 4.3bn (USD 5.6bn), which was equal to 40% of UK gas imports. However, the gas imports from Qatar have broadly decreased since then, reaching GBP 0.8bn (USD 1bn) in 2017, the lowest figure since 2009 (Parliament. The House of Commons, 2018). Consequently, gas imports remain an important factor for bilateral cooperation, although not a key one. Indeed, there is close cooperation in other fields such as the military: the two countries signed a statement of intent in 2017 for the UK to supply Qatar with 24 Typhoon fast jets and a package of missile and laser-guided bombs worth GBP 6bn (USD 8bn) (Chuter, 2017); the UK maintains an Royal Air Force (RAF) base at al-Udeid; and Qatari cadets train at Sandhurst. There are also cultural and economic relationships. In 2016, UK exports to Qatar were valued at GBP 3bn (USD 3.8bn), while it imported GBP 2.2bn (USD 2.8bn); in 2017 British imports of oil from Qatar were worth GBP 0.4bn (USD 0.5bn) (Parliament. House of Commons, 2018). These relationships are detailed in Appendix O, which presents UK relations with Qatar and the Anti-Terror Quartet.

Qatar’s use of sports non-state actors has opened further opportunities for cooperation. Appendix O describes Qatari investments in the UK worth GBP 40bn (USD 51bn) (Thompson, Espinoza and Mance, 2017), including the 2012 purchase of the London Olympic Village by QIA subsidiary Qatari Diar for GBP 557m (USD 720m) (Amara, 2013:1). In order to facilitate knowledge-sharing in the 2022 World Cup, the English Football Association signed a Memorandum of Understanding with its Qatari counterpart in 2018 (Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2018). The continuity of support needed for Qatar to deliver a successful World Cup is based on the expertise of UK companies that organise sports mega-events. This was discussed between the Qatari amir and British prime minister during Shaykh Tamim’s official visit to the UK in July 2018 (Prime Minister’s Office, 10 Downing Street and Rt Hon, 2018). As a result, British companies are expected to be involved in deals worth GBP

1.5bn (USD 1.9bn) ranging from building new stadiums to cutting the grass and delivering pitch-side security guards. The Department for International Trade has already assisted UK companies to secure GBP 940m (USD 1.2bn) in Qatar World Cup-linked exports, and targets at least an extra GBP 500m (USD 646m) before the tournament begins (Department for International Trade, 2018a). Qatar's use of FIFA to obtain hosting rights for the World Cup contributed to business deals between Qatar and the UK, which strengthened bilateral relations.

The Anti-Terror Quartet are also important partners for the UK, as Appendix O illustrates. During the official visit of Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman to London in 2018, discussions were held with former Prime Minister May over capitalisation on Saudi Arabia's plans to diversify its economy with GBP 65bn (USD 84bn) in mutual investment and trade opportunities over the next 10 years, and an important role for the UK in advising on the modernisation of the kingdoms' school system (BBC News, 2018c). Despite international pressure over the Khashoggi case, former Prime Minister May met Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman at the G20 Summit in Buenos Aires in 2018 (Merrick, 2018). Moreover, the UAE leadership also held several important meetings with UK representatives during the Gulf Crisis. For example, Shaykh Mohammad bin Zayed met with the former UK Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson to discuss how Brexit provided the UK with a unique opportunity to renew links with the worldwide community by refocusing on rebuilding 'global Britain' (Jones, 2018). The UAE ambassador to the UK, Sulaiman al-Mazrou'i, (2017) also suggested that the UK and the UAE have 'good relations and very credible issues that we have between us, that benefits both in terms of political, economic, security, cultural, social', and noted that trade exchange between the UAE and the UK is worth GBP 15bn (USD 19bn), emphasising how the UAE's shipping facilities could be of use to the UK in the event of Brexit. Consequently, the Anti-Terror Quartet remains important for the UK in the economic, defence, and cultural fields (presented in detail in Appendix O); making them as important to the UK as Qatar.

Consequently, in a time of uncertainty over the UK's future leaving the EU, in any situation it seems that as much as both Qatar and Anti-Terror Quartet need support from the UK in their current dispute, the UK also needs future bilateral cooperation with these states, especially economic partnerships. The UK will continue to develop relations with Qatar and the Anti-Terror Quartet. Qatar is still an important LNG exporter, and is an important partner in bilateral military and cultural cooperation, with

investments in the UK worth GBP 40bn (USD 51bn), and plans to invest a further GBP 5bn (USD 6bn) over the next three to five years (Thompson, Espinoza and Mance, 2017). The Anti-Terror Quartet countries are also among the UK's important partners. The UK and UAE agreed upon investments and potential cooperation in different fields worth up to GBP 75bn (USD 97bn) (GOV.UK., 2019c), balancing Qatar's relations with the UK. However, Qatar has used its relationship with FIFA as a sports non-state actor to assist in building future cooperation with the UK, involving British companies benefiting from Qatar's hosting the World Cup. While this is not the dominant area of the partnership, it remains an important vector for developing bilateral relations with the UK, and it contributes to the weight gained from implementing adopted power: the UK response to the Gulf Crisis was quite neutral, supporting neither side in the dispute.

#### **7.5.4. Influence in Spain**

Qatar-Spain relations are an example of the third form of political leverage that sports non-state actors contribute to it wielding adopted power. While the second form of political leverage that Qatar was able to exert with Germany and the UK, involved offering business deals to companies, the third form exerts leverage mainly through cooperation by giving advantage to sports coaches, experts, and volunteers. It can be seen in the relations with Spain and Russia, and demonstrates use of sports non-state actors to a lesser extent.

As a response to the Gulf Crisis, Spain supported Kuwait's effort to mediate the dispute (*The Peninsula*, 2018b). Appendix P, analyses Spanish relations with Qatar and the Anti-Terror Quartet and demonstrates that both sides have frequent bilateral visits by officials, including Spanish monarchs, Qatari and Anti-Terror Quartet leadership, prime ministers, ministers and other officials (Arnold, 2014; State Information Service, 2017; Taha, 2017; *The Gulf Time Emirates Business*, 2018; Trade Arabia News Service, 2014; Qatar Embassy in Madrid – Kingdom of Spain, 2019). Egyptian-Spanish bilateral visits are more frequent compared to other states. Defence cooperation with the Anti-Terror Quartet seems more substantial, and economic cooperation between Qatar and Spain is less than that with the combined Anti-Terror Quartet. However, since the beginning of the Crisis, Spanish food exports

to Qatar have increased by 48 per cent, and cooperation has also occurred in the healthcare sector (Appendix P provides details).

Among the most important ties between Spain and Qatar is cooperation in sports, thanks to Qatar's alliances with sports non-state actors, such as FC Barcelona, Malaga CF, and FIFA. The Spanish ambassador reports that the two states 'enjoy strong co-operation in the field of sports', especially in the lead-up to the 2022 World Cup. Many Spanish technicians, coaches, experts, and psychologists, are working with the Aspire Zone Foundation and Aspetar, including assistance in the design of host stadia (Aguilar, 2017). Such cooperation is possible thanks to the global migration phenomenon: coaches, technicians, and experts come to work in Qatar through a range of non-state entities. While it is clear that Qatar has not established close cooperation in sports with Spain, as was shown in France, Germany, or the UK, it should be noted that Spain's weight in international affairs is less than those European states. Consequently, although the Anti-Terror Quartet also provides opportunities for cooperation in other sectors, especially military and economic, Qatari cooperation with sports entities assists in building cooperation between Qatar and Spain and contributing to Spain's neutral position on the Gulf Crisis.

#### **7.5.5. Influence in Russia**

The Russian case is another example of the third level of political leverage where Qatar has applied the weight of its adopted power through alliances with sports non-state actors, especially through FIFA. This has contributed to partnerships between the two states, although relations have not always been close. Post-Soviet Russia is 'much weaker than its predecessor [USSR]', however, under Putin's leadership Russia has returned to the Middle East (Sapronova, 2014:31), with a 'pragmatic approach' (Kreutz, 2007:39) or 'tactical move' (Malashenko, 2009:325) towards oil monarchies, in order to achieve a multi-polar system of international relations (cited in Kreutz, 2009:40). The GCC is an important source of foreign investment, a market for Russian weapons, and potential allies in oil and gas (Malashenko, 2009). Gulf monarchies also help address domestic security concerns, as Putin's rise to power in the early 2000s was characterised by the threat of religious extremism from the Independent Islamic Republic of Dagestan, and Chechen separatists (ibid, 2009, Kreutz, 2009). These groups use connections with the GCC

states to implement jihad in Russia, such as the 1995 arrival of Jordanian-born, Habib ‘Abdul Rahman Khattab, who also holds Saudi dual nationality. Khattab became the main commander of the foreign Islamic extremists in Chechnya (Dobaev, 2000; Fredholm, 2009), and was the channel for Gulf-based patrons funding the jihad in Caucasus, such as the Qatar Charitable Society, accused of funding extremists in Dagestan in 1999 (ibid, 2009). As a result, Russia took the first step towards the Muslim world by joining the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (Kreutz, 2009) through Saudi Arabia which ‘held special prestige and influence among the Islamic nations due to its wealth and unique position as the guardian of the holiest Muslim sites’ (ibid, 2009:44-5).

The 9/11 attack assisted in building relations with Saudi Arabia, with the US seeing the kingdom as ‘the center of evil’ (Rahr, 2004; Kreutz, 2009:45). Saudi capital began to flow out of the US, and Saudi leadership showed interest in buying Russian weapons (ibid, 2009). Energy cooperation developed during the 2000s, with Russia becoming an observer at Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) meetings, and after 9/11 it agreed to decrease oil supplies to the market (Malashenko, 2004). After the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, Russia increased its efforts to become a member of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and Saudi Arabia acknowledged Moscow’s dominance over Chechnya and supported the Russian bid to join the OIC (Kreutz, 2009). After his famous speech at the 43<sup>rd</sup> Munich Conference on Security Policy, Putin (2007) stated that unipolarity is impossible in today’s world and this model of international relations ‘itself is flawed’; Putin visited Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Jordan between 11 and 13 February 2007, during a Middle East tour (Kreutz, 2009).

Though the importance of other small GCC states is considerable due to their financial resources and connections with Muslim co-religionists in Russia (Kreutz, 2009), Russia’s strongest connection has been with the UAE due to its geopolitical location and its rapid economic development (ibid, 2009). Among the GCC states, the UAE was the largest purchaser of Russian weapons: between 1998-2005, Russia supplied the UAE with USD 900m in weaponry (ibid, 2009), and the UAE and Russia cooperate in defence and security. Relations have also been developed with other Gulf states however, including the establishment of a Russian-Bahrain Business Council (Barabanov, 2009). Bahrain was interested in building cooperation with Moscow in

the 2000s due to the threat of Iranian nuclear development and a new US, armed intervention.

Relations between Qatar and Russia have not been smooth. As Fredholm (2009:345) observes, the Chechen war involved several diplomatic crises between Qatar and Russia, because Gulf citizens were involved fighting Russia, as well as the bomb attack that killed Yandarbiyev, the Chechen separatist living in Qatar. Qatar was Putin's second stop on his Middle Eastern tour in 2007 (Dannreuther, 2012). Among Russia's goals in returning to the region in the 2000s, were to regain the Russian position, especially in the economic field (Sapronova, 2014), to develop cooperation economically and in the energy sector, and increase trade and investment. Energy cooperation has been a vital area for cooperation, while Qatar and Russia are global leaders in gas reserves; they avoided competition by operating in different markets, and represent a 'special interest to Russia', in the Putin's words (Kreutz, 2009:55). During his visit, energy agreements were signed between Qatar Petroleum and Lukoil for joint ventures in gas and oil exploration (Dargin, 2009). The idea of setting up a 'gas cartel' (Malashenko, 2009:313), or 'Gas OPEC' (Dannreuther, 2012:553), was discussed. This was expected to include Russia, Iran, Qatar, Algeria, and Libya, and to build a united Russian-Muslim 'gas front' (Malashenko, 2009:313). However, efforts resulted only in a meeting of the Gas Exporting Countries Forum in Doha in 2007, and no documents were signed. In 2010, there was a bilateral agreement on Qatari investments worth USD 500m proposing to investigate polymetallic deposits in Russia's Yamalo-Nenets and Sverdlovsk regions. The real estate fund was completed by the investment of USD 75m, by Qatar's Barwa Real Company and Gazprombank, in January 2011 (Oskarsson and Yetiv, 2013).

Qatar has become one of the biggest foreign investors in Russia (Kozhanov, 2018). There have been significant political conflicts between Russia and Qatar after the Arab Spring, including Russia's support for al-Asad regime in the Syrian War (Allison, 2013). Since 2015, Russia has contracts with Haftar in Libya, which provides tactical diplomatic cooperation with the UAE, and to an extent, Saudi Arabia (Stepanova, 2018). Despite such conflicts of interest, during the Gulf Crisis, Russia 'has pursued an even-handed approach' and offered to mediate between the states (Katz, 2018:18). The interaction of Russian leadership with Qatari policy-makers and the Anti-Terror Quartet leaders during the ongoing Crisis, and the deals concluded in their bilateral visits, demonstrate this 'even-handed approach' (detailed in Appendix

Q). Russia enjoys relations with both sides and will continue to do so as seen in: the interaction of leaders, such as the unprecedented visit of the Saudi Arabia King Salman to Russia in 2017 (Wintour, 2017c); Shaykh Tamim's visit to Moscow in March 2018 (President of Russia, 2018); Putin's demonstration of the brand-new Russian-made Kortezh (Cortege) to the Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi (Sputnik, 2018); the friendly greeting between Putin and Mohammad bin Salman at the G-20 (Taylor, 2018); the interaction between leaders attending the Russia-Saudi match at the World Cup in Russia (Lemon, 2018), and Shaykh Tamim's attendance of the final at that tournament (RT, 2018).

Although as Appendix Q illustrates, Russia-Qatar relations have mainly been based on energy cooperation, investments, military cooperation, cultural, scientific, and technical partnership, thanks to alliances with sports non-state actors, especially FIFA, Russia and Qatar have another field for cooperation. In 2017, Qatar Airways became an official partner and official airline of FIFA until 2022, and sponsored the 2017 FIFA Confederations Cup 2017, the 2018 FIFA World Cup in Russia, the FIFA Club World Cup, the 2019 FIFA Women's World Cup 2019, and the 2022 FIFA World Cup in Qatar (FIFA, 2017), also joining Gazprom, Coca-Cola, Wanda Group, Adidas, Visa, and Hyundai partnerships. During the 2018 World Cup a number of exhibitions were hosted by Qatar or Qatari organisations, including Majlis Qatar in Gorky Park, Elements Qatar located on the Moskva River, near Gorky Park, the Qatar@Roadto2022 Exhibition at the historic GUM department store in Moscow, and Qatar-Russia Portals placed across Doha, Moscow. Saint Petersburg aimed to introduce fans to the country, and update them on progress in the preparation for the tournament (Supreme Committee for Delivery and Legacy, 2018b). In October 2018, a delegation from the Supreme Committee for Delivery and Legacy attended a 2018 FIFA World Cup debrief at FIFA headquarters, where they met with Russian counterparts to integrate lessons learned from the final tournament (Supreme Committee for Delivery and Legacy, 2018c).

In July 2018, during Shaykh Tamim's visit to Russia, Ingushetian President Evkurov, met with the Qatari amir to discuss investments in the republic (Kurskiev, 2018). In February 2018, President Evkurov wrote on his Instagram page after meeting with the prime minister of Qatar, that Ingushetia is ready to provide the required number of volunteers for the implementation of the 2022 World Cup (TASS, 2018). However, heads of other Russian republics with Muslim populations, specifically



Chechnya and Tatarstan, have deepened ties to boost trade, investment, energy cooperation, and development with the Anti-Terror Quartet, especially the UAE and Saudi Arabia, as Appendix Q shows. Such cooperation is limited compared to France, the UK, and Germany. However, between 2000 and 2010, there was differentiation between Saudi Arabia and other small monarchies, and difficult relations between Russia and Qatar, particularly after the Arab Spring when there have been conflict of political interests in both states' foreign policies. Qatar nevertheless used the weight of adopted power to win Russia's neutral position on the Gulf Crisis. Despite the Anti-Terror Quartet being Russia's key partners in defence, energy, and economic cooperation, Russian volunteers have been exchanged for Qatari investment in Ingushetia, and Qatar's introduction at the 2018 World Cup in Moscow and Saint Petersburg demonstrates that Qatar's alliances with sport non-state actors assists in developing Russia-Qatar bilateral relations, finding new ways to interact.

## **7.6. The cost of Qatar's adopted power: building alliances with sport non-state actors**

### **7.6.1. Cost for building an alliance with FIFA to wield adopted power**

Hosting the 2022 World Cup allows Qatar to gain advantage from the transnational nature of FIFA, although winning the hosting rights continues to bring criticism and concerns. Since December 2010, when FIFA awarded the World Cup to Qatar, there have been controversies on how the bid was won. The main controversies are bribery and corruption (Rumsby, 2014), although Qatar was cleared of wrongdoing (BBC Sport, 2017). Along with this, according to the *Sunday Times* (2018), leaked documents demonstrate that Qatar's bid team employed a US PR firm and ex-CIA agents to smear rivals from Australia and the US (cited in *The Times*, 2018). The 2022 World Cup has generated concerns over the human rights of migrants, especially between 2013 and 2014. *The Guardian* (Pattison, 2013) revealed that thousands of Nepalese workers had died in Qatar during 'forced labour' to prepare for the World Cup in Qatar. The report illustrated the conditions South Asian migrants face on a daily basis, including lack of pay, confiscation of passports, limited access to drinking water and food, abuse, and exploitation, considering it 'modern-day slavery'. Additionally, sexual-diversity activist groups asked FIFA and the IOC to stop any

sports-linked tournaments in states enacting discriminatory legislation. Consequently, FIFA's Anti-Discrimination Taskforce asked FIFA to put pressure on Qatar to relax its anti-gay legislation (Brannagan and Giullianotti, 2015).

Other controversies followed the award of the World Cup to Qatar, including summer weather conditions in Qatar (BBC Sport, 2015). UEFA's 54 member states suggested that the 2022 World Cup should not be played in Qatar during the summer due to the heat (Rumsby, 2014a). The decision was made to move the tournament to winter, from 21 November to 18 December, as announced by FIFA President Infantino before the final match of the 2018 event (Winterburn, 2018). This could change the schedule of domestic leagues (Brannagan and Giullianotti, 2015), with English football needing to cancel its traditional Christmas calendar (Platt, 2018). Such changes will disrupt major leagues playing in the northern hemisphere but will be convenient for southern hemisphere teams as their schedules will not be disrupted, and consequently could expose 'the "taken for granted" perspectives of northern hemisphere soccer' and force these nations to reconsider their priorities (Edgar, 2018). Holding the 2022 World Cup in winter might also result in calling off the 2023 African Cup of Nations, normally held in January (Platt, 2018).

Among other concerns is the issue of Qatar's readiness for the World Cup, and with the Gulf Crisis, these concerns increased. The cost Qatar paid for wielding adopted power for its power projection, especially through alliances with political Islam non-state actors, tribes, and media non-state actors, brought about the Gulf Crisis. This in turn brought a high cost to alliances with sports non-state actors.

At the beginning of the Gulf Crisis there were discussions over whether Qatar would be ready for the World Cup, as the blockade was expected to affect the building of stadia and other infrastructure needed to host the World Cup (Amara, 2018). Before the Gulf Crisis there were negotiations over the potential use of the infrastructure of neighbouring states. Al-Binmohammad, a member of Bahrain's Shura Council (2018) states that part of Qatar's successful World Cup bid was the construction of a bridge or a causeway linking Qatar and Bahrain, allowing the World Cup to make use of infrastructure in both nations, and concluded, 'It was clear that Qatar, on its own, would not be enough to host the World Cup'. Again, wealth is the key driver for the implementation of policies, as Qatar's financial capacities allow it to build the required infrastructure. Before the Crisis in February 2017, *The Guardian* (Agence France-Presse, 2017) reported that Qatar was spending almost USD 500m every week on

infrastructure for the World Cup, with the total spending of around USD 100bn (We Build Value, 2018).

While the Gulf Crisis affected early World Cup preparations, Qatar has overcome the challenges. Whereas the blockade forced Qatar to increase its budget, due to finding alternative markets and transportation routes for raw materials, it continues to make progress (Amara, 2018). Along with stadia, a Doha subway system was developed, as well as ‘soft infrastructure’, including an overhaul of the sewage system, and improvements to road transport including the Expressway Programme and New Orbital Highway. Qatar built a new city, Lusail, from scratch (We Build Value, 2018). Scholars are positive that the 2022 World Cup will be hosted in Qatar as its financial capacity allows for infrastructure development. ‘Things did not stop, it is going the same with as before the blockade. Maybe the rhythm is going even higher’, concludes Amara (2018), from a perspective within Qatar. Other reports from outside Qatar agree that preparations are on course and that ‘money is no object’ (Interviewee G, 2018), as well as noting that FIFA is unlikely to withdraw from Qatar when so much investment has already taken place, or set a precedent by doing so (Batuev, 2018). FIFA reports also suggest that everything is running smoothly: according to the FIFA website in October 2018, Infantino visited the Qatar 2022 venues. Qatar declared the first venue, the Khalifa International Stadium, ready in May 2017, and the other venues, including the Lusail Stadium (80,000 person capacity), which will host the opening match and final, are scheduled to be complete by 2020. Despite concerns and challenges, Qatar will host the World Cup in 2022, despite all impediments.

One possible cost for Qatar hosting the World Cup 2022 is the limited attendance of fans. The November-December schedule of the tournament is close to Europe’s Christmas celebrations which might encourage fans to watch the tournament from home. There are also concerns over travel to Qatar for several reasons that might affect the usual routines of fans during the World Cup. Batuev (2018) states that visiting fans attend the World Cup ‘not only because of football, [but] to go to the bars, to see some places’, and Qatar’s reputation as a small country means that fans ‘don’t know what they are going to do apart from watch football’. Furthermore, fans ‘think because this is Muslim country, there is going to be some limitation what they can do’ (ibid, 2018). One of concerns for fans is the introduction of the ‘sin tax’, a 100 per cent tax on alcohol sales. Consequently, ‘alcohol prices will likely be a sensitive

subject in the run-up to the controversial World Cup 2022' (*The Independent*, 2019). The timing of the tournament, the small host country, and uncertainty over alcohol in a conservative Muslim society might affect fans' decisions to travel to the World Cup 2022.

The Qatar World Cup has generated a lot of controversy (Platt, 2018), which represents the cost of building alliances with sports non-state actors for political purposes. Brazil and Russia also received a lot of criticism before hosting the tournament. Brazil's 2014 World Cup attracted concerns over security issues, crimes, ongoing anti-corruption protests, heavy taxes, chaotic urban transport, poor health services, and poor public education (De Onis, 2014). Russia's was preceded by allegations of corruption, racism, hooliganism, and doping (Kazakov, 2018, Roth, Moore, Fox et al., 2018). Despite such criticism, opinions changed after the World Cup, as 'Russia surprised us all' (Edgar, 2018). The high level of preparation for the World Cup, the attendance, the presence of fans from Latin America, and constant positive feedback brought a positive image to Russia as the host (Interviewee G, 2018), and Qatar may be hoping for a similar effect. However, Batuev's (2018) research indicates that while 'overall for the period of the World Cup and for a few weeks after' Russia maintained a positive image, after this period the 'predominantly negative stories about Russia' returned. ... To be able to really give an answer on this, probably we need to speak in 3-4 years' time'. All World Cup host countries come under scrutiny by the international community, and in most cases the international community has some concerns before the start of the tournament. It is arguably too early to predict whether Qatar's alliance with FIFA, as a tool for wielding adopted power, will result in higher cost or weight. The alliance with FIFA attracted a lot of controversy and concerns which should be considered as part of the cost Qatar pays for wielding adopted power. There are links with bribery accusations, sabotage of rivals, timing of the tournament, criticism over rights abuses, concerns over Qatar's preparedness, and uncertainty over whether fans will choose to travel to Qatar, or not.

#### **7.6.2. Cost for building an alliance with Paris Saint-Germain F.C. to wield adopted power**

The cost that Qatar paid for using PSG is connected to the acquisition of the club by Qatar Sports Investments and the financial deals which followed. A

sponsorship deal signed between PSG and the Qatar Tourism Authority in 2013 (Rumsby, 2014b), with continuing sponsorship by Qatar National Bank and the Qatar Tourism Authority's engagement in PSG, have 'raised serious questions from the European community as to whether such a relationship looks to find a loophole in UEFA's Financial Fair Play regulations' (Brannagan and Giulianotti, 2015:714). In the summer of 2017, after the beginning of the Gulf Crisis, PSG's purchase of Neymar for a world-record fee of GBP 203.6m (USD 263m), and a further deal for Mbappe worth up to GBP 165.1m (USD 213m), resulted in an investigation by European football's governing body into whether PSG complied with UEFA's Financial Fair Play rules (Burt, 2017). The relatively small fines that such infringements attracted from the governing body, may be insufficient to deter further occurrences (Batuev, 2018). As a leading team in the French national league, PSG operates in the transnational European football system, including potential participation in any future European league.

This transnational nature, and Qatar's attempts to benefit from it through adopted power, might increase football inflation, which also increases concerns over PSG's actions (Interviewee G, 2018). Qatar's investment into PSG's player purchases has 'affected the football market', with Barcelona using part of the GBP 200m (USD 258m) that they received for Neymar, to purchase Coutinho from Liverpool for GBP 142m (USD 183m), where 'even the bizarre normal inflation in football through media rights ... it would have been more like GBP 70 [USD 90 million] or GBP 80 million [USD 103 million]' (ibid, 2018). Although that might be viewed as dynamism of sport, that rules are continually being changed for economic reasons, or it is making sports more spectacular, like, for example, the mid-match breaks that have become standard in tennis and which allow time for advertising (Edgar, 2018), it seems that Qatar's main driver, wealth, has become the main means of paying its cost, as well as Qatar's huge financial opportunities have allowed it to change rules in sport, which might increase criticism.

The concerns that arose with the purchase of PSG and attraction of famous players with enormous contracts can be added to concerns from the French public, including loss of club identity. France is a major football nation in Europe, among the 'big five' leagues (alongside England, Italy, Germany, Spain) (Statista, 2019), and there is a strong regional football identity. French clubs, at least until the recent cases of PSG and Monaco, were more conservative with international funding and

especially foreign ownership (Garcia and Amara, 2013:17). The public reaction has been mixed, with some focussing on the benefits that the club's new financial strength has provided, and others are less-enthused (Soubrier, 2018). Fans' concerns include the 'complete loss of identity for PSG' as 'they don't feel like the club is still belonging to them somehow' (ibid, 2018). Part of this concern stems from PSG's position as the only top club in Paris (Garia and Amara, 2013).

Analysis of the media perceptions of Arab investment in European football clubs, focused on PSG and that use thematic analysis of written sources, mainly *Marianne Magazine*, suggests that one of the main themes arising from French media coverage of Qatar's investment in PSG is the connection between 'money and geopolitics' (Garia and Amara, 2013). Qatar is described as 'a mini-petro-monarchy', 'authoritarian' with the ambition of becoming 'a hyper sport power' (ibid, 2013:18-9). French coverage also questions the logic behind offering Qatar the 2022 World Cup, and highlights the privileges that Qatar received from highly-placed French politicians. Such analyses do not comprehensively demonstrate all French public opinion or media coverage of Qatar, however, it shows that there is a mixed perception of Qatar Sports Investments having ownership of a French club with a unique identity, and some concerns over Qatar's power on French politics, media, culture, and sports. The mixed public perception might also serve as a cost associated with building alliances with PSG as a sports non-state actor for political purposes.

### **7.6.3. Cost for building an alliance with Malaga CF to wield adopted power**

Building an alliance with Malaga CF also generated some concerns over its ownership by Qatari Shaykh 'Abdullah. Adding to the analyses mentioned above, Garcia and Amara (2013:20-4) also focus on Malaga's perception among the Spanish audience, analysing the local newspaper *Sur*, and the national newspapers *El Mundo* and *El Pais*, again finding a mixed perception of Spanish clubs, and asking if they were more open to foreign investment than French clubs. The Spanish press considered 'threat versus opportunity', with the possibility of sporting success connected to new capital being viewed as a positive result, but anxiety over whether Arab owners would respect the identity of the club, its history, and reports that the new owners would change the internal ownership. Again, the second case

demonstrates that the purchase of football clubs divides public opinion, as it increases concerns over the identity of the club. That might suggest that clubs have concerns over being associated with the State of Qatar, and all the criticism that it faces as a cost of wielding adopted power might create further costs, as the case below demonstrates.

#### **7.6.4. Cost for building an alliance with FC Barcelona to wield adopted power**

In 2016, FC Barcelona replaced Qatar Airways as their main sponsor with Rakuten in a USD 59m deal. The president of the Barcelona club suggested that although ‘four years ago we signed for economic reasons’, the club had been looking for alternatives as ‘other social issues’ had to be taken into consideration (Associated Press, 2015). Scholars have different interpretations. One view is that a change of sponsors is routine, and that contracts are limited, ‘you either renew or you don’t renew it’ (Amara, 2018). Other beliefs include that it avoids Qatar being seen as having interests in ‘clubs that compete with each other, because it’s seen as threatening the credibility of tournaments’ (Interviewee G, 2018). Qatari involvement was also at the maximum, in terms of sponsorships, some associations, and recruiting former players (ibid, 2018). For example, former Barcelona and Spain legend, Xavi, played for the Qatari club al-Sa’d SC, since 2015, and assisted in the development of their players (*The Guardian*, 2015). Finally, Qatar might pay for building alliances with FC Barcelona as a sports non-state actor for wielding adopted power, with clubs being put off from being associated with it. Divisions emerged within the Barcelona hierarchy, with ‘some of the former president’s supports ... critical of the involvement with Qatar, saying that it [has] ... had such a negative press in terms of treatment of workers and these things, minority groups and so on’ (Interviewee G, 2018). One of the costs of being associated with Qatar’s policies might also attract criticism of the club.

### **7.7. Conclusion**

This chapter highlights the example of Qatar building alliances with sports non-state-actors to wield adopted power. State-owned companies, led by or connected with the inner-circle decision-makers, and wealth advantages that accumulated in such

state-owned companies, have allowed Qatar to heavily invest in sports non-state actors. The use of sport non-state actors, and the transnational nature of sports governing bodies, create a worldwide domain of adopted power. Although Qatar dealt with sports non-state actors in several types of sports, such as organising the Asian Football Cup, FINA Swimming World Cup, the IHF Handball World Championships, and the UCI Road Cycling World Championships, the main political advantages are gained from dealing with football entities. This demonstrates the scope of adopted power. Winning the FIFA 2022 World Cup bid deals with FC Barcelona, PSG F.C., Malaga CF, AS Roma, and FC Bayern Munich are crucial for Qatar realising adopted power.

Qatari alliances with sports non-state actors is a contributing factor to the development of bilateral relations with other states and has assisted in the country gaining influential political leverage over other states. Three different levels of political leverage emerged from using sports non-state actors: the highest was Qatar influencing internal and foreign affairs in another country by using sports non-state actors, as demonstrated in France. The second level was seen in relation to Germany and the UK, where building alliances with sports non-state actors helped develop bilateral relations mainly through business deals made possible through Qatar's alliances with FIFA; and finally, Qatar's relations with Spain and Russia show how alliances with sports non-state actors assist in strengthening bilateral relations, to a lesser extent.

Analysis of relations with these states demonstrates that the use of sports non-state actors appears to be the contributing factor in neutral reactions towards the Gulf Crisis from different states, both middle and great powers, especially in Europe. It should be mentioned that these states have a neutral position on the allegations that Qatar supports terrorism, or even supported the Qatari agenda against its Gulf opponents at the beginning of the Gulf Crisis. This can be perceived as the main weight that Qatar receives from alliances with sports non-state actors. Qatar also paid a price for the alliance with FIFA for political purposes, through accusations of bribery, sabotage, and human rights violations, a general concern over the preparation for the tournament; it paid further costs for the alliance with PSG, for violating the rules of European football, and changing the identity of the club; with Malaga, there was a mixed public and media reaction to foreign ownership, and with FC Barcelona, where



contract renewals failed due to the club's concerns over association with Qatar and the criticism that the state receives.

## **Part III. The Future of Adopted Power**

### **Chapter Eight**

#### **Concluding Notes on Adopted Power**

##### **8.1. Introduction**

This study demonstrates that despite a general acknowledgment in the field that Qatar's regional power has increased since 1995, the means by which it achieved this remains uncertain. Well-established concepts of power such as 'hard', 'soft', 'smart' (Nye, 1991; 2004; 2011), 'subtle' (Kamrava, 2013), 'sharp' and 'sticky' (Mead, 2009), 'sharp' (Walker and Ludwig, 2017), 'civilian' (Duchêne, 1972), 'military' (Bull, 1982), and 'normative' (Manners, 2002), do not adequately explain this phenomenon. The main argument of this thesis is that Qatar's regional leadership was secured with *adopted power*. Adopted power is a type of power that can be developed by wealthy rentier states whose inner-circle elites ally with well-established non-state actors in order to take advantage of their transnational nature, to rapidly gain influence over other states.

To prove that the main research aims of this study have been reached, this chapter presents the findings of the thesis by suggesting conceptual assumptions about the role of power in Qatar's case. It examines the lessons that Qatar's example offers in wielding adopted power that academics in the field may benefit from, and considers whether Qatar will continue to exercise adopted power in the future or not. Finally, the chapter discusses widening the scope of the study by suggesting further research opportunities and potential new research methods. The chapter also recommends research into other examples of Qatar's attempts to build alliances with non-state actors. The concept of adopted power might then be tested by examining power projection of other rentier states. Adopted power was employed by Qatar, but may also have been used by other rentier states.

##### **8.2. The emergence of adopted power**

An examination of Qatar's rise to power helped to develop the concept of adopted power. The concept of adopted power was developed by closely examining

Qatar within the context of a comprehensive analysis of social power and IR theory. In particular, the idea was informed by the social power debate and an investigation into policies employed by states of varying sizes to project their power. Rentier state theory is the thread that ties these topics together and provides the base upon which the adopted power theory is built. *Figure 2.3.*, presented in Chapter Two, illustrates the theoretical foundations of adopted power.




Figure 2.3. The theoretical foundation of adopted power (source: personal collection).

Established types of power in IR literature, and the concept of adopted power, are drawn from debates that have occurred within the field of social power. One such

debate is between proponents of ‘sectional’ or ‘non-sectional’ approaches to power. The non-sectional power debate, or non-zero sum concept, holds that power operates through legitimation (Parsons, 1937; 1951; 1963; Bierstedt, 1950; Arendt, 1970;), while the sectional power approach considers power as a relationship in which A affects B, and the relationship contradicts B’s interest. This concept is based on work by Machiavelli (1998), Hobbes (1651), Wrong, (1979), and especially Dahl (1957), whose work is central to the concept of adopted power. Dahl (1957; 1958; 1961; 1968) began a ‘community power debate’ by challenging the ‘elitists’ theory (Pareto, 1935; Mosca, 1939; Hunter, 1953; Mills, 1956). Pluralists, or behavioural science-oriented scholars, suggest a ‘relational’ understanding of power in which ‘A has power over B to the extent he can get to do something that B would not otherwise do’. The dimensions of power Dahl identifies are means, scope, domain, weight, and cost.

The *means* is ‘a mediating activity between A’s base and B’s response’ (Dahl, 1957), or, ‘How many of the means of power (economic, symbolic, military, and diplomatic) are available to the state?’ (Baldwin, 2002; Sherwood, 2017:146). *Scope* connects with the aspect of B’s behaviour affected by A (Dahl, 1957), or, ‘where is the power?’, e.g. Japan’s power is economic, while North Korea’s is military (Baldwin, 2013:275). *Domain* is where a sector’s power project influences, or, ‘how many are affected by the power? How big is B, and how many Bs are there?’ (Dahl, 1957:215). *Weight* recognises that B’s behaviour might be influenced by A, or, ‘How credible is the actualisation of the ‘threat’?’, e.g. ‘does state A have a 30 per cent or a 90 per cent chance of achieving its aim in negotiations?’ Finally, *cost* is a consideration: ‘how cheap’ is it for state A to exert power? How easy? (Harsanyi, 1962; Sherwood, 2017:146).

This understanding of power has been criticised by neoeconomists (Bachrach and Baratz, 1962). Lukes (1974) based the community power debate on three dimensions of power, identifying, respectively, pluralists ideas, whereas Dahl’s idea is at the core, a one-dimensional face of power (Dahl, 1957; 1958; 1961; 1968; Polsby, 1960; Merelman, 1968; Wolfinger, 1971), or a two-dimensional face of power based on the neoeconomist analysis of power (Bachrach and Baratz, 1962; 1963; 1970; Frey, 1971), and a three-dimensional face of power (Lukes, 1974).

As discussed, the elitists view of power developed further in the work of neoclassical realists who, in contrast to realists and neorealists, emphasise the relevance of internal factors to foreign policy. Like the realists, they assert that foreign

policy is driven by political elites and leaders. In acknowledging that elites can distribute national revenue to support foreign policy, neoclassical realists argue that the strength and structure of states relative to their societies should take into consideration. This idea is very close to the foundation of rentier state theory, which recognises the existence of a social contract between rulers and the ruled in which rulers offer a share in the revenues from oil, for example, in exchange for citizens' political quiescence. This relationship takes direct shape by strengthening pre-existing bonds of clientelism and patronage between ruled and rulers. In the case of Qatar, the rentier state inner-circle elites obtain wealth from hydrocarbon revenues for their power projection.

Neoclassical realists acknowledge the strength of the relational power approach, as introduced by the pluralist Dahl (1957), an idea central to the one-dimensional face of power. Though neoclassical realists believe that a relational power approach is practically unworkable (Rose, 1998), others, such as Baldwin (1985), Sprout and Sprout (1965), have found it useful. Their resolutions are related to the main concepts of the balance of power theory; however they reject the realist perception that violence is the ultimate form of power, arguing that wealth holds this position, instead. This is supported by one of the other premises of rentier state theory, that the rentier political economy is based on endowed revenues from oil and gas (Herb and Lynch, 2019).

Applying a relational power approach is also useful to understand that great, middle, or small states can project power. Rather than focusing on factors of quantitative criteria that apply an absolute power approach, as realists/neorealist/neoclassical realists do (Vital, 1967, 1971; Vellut, 1967), the liberal/neoliberal qualitative approach states that in collaboration with each other, states can influence other states (Neumann and Gstöhl, 2004; Rothstein, 1968). The constructivist perception is that a state's importance depends on their self-perception, such as, if small states view themselves small they are perceived by others as so (Hey, 2003). The 'specific spatio-temporal context' (Thorhallsson and Wivel, 2006) relies on the conceptual core of Dahl's work (1957), and this approach focuses on whether a state can project power (Rickli, 2008). Applied to the context of the rentier state, limitations, such as size of the state, their populations, are unimportant, providing the rentier state's wealth is abundant. In other words, the relational power approach allows large, middle, or small rentier states to project power.

Applying Dahl's (1957) understanding of power through a relational power approach means that the rentier state that obtains wealth for power projection, might build balancing alliances, however, through a modified version of the balance of power theory. The rentier state can build alliances with non-state actors (Arts, Noortmann and Reinalda, 2001; Josselin and Wallace, 2001) in order to project adopted power. This is because not every rentier state can hold power over any state, using wealth as a key driver, however, 'A [rentier state] might have power over B [non-state actors] to the extent he can get to do something that B would not otherwise do'. As a result, A will build alliances with B, using its wealth, in order to project power in any region, or even globally.

*Adopted power* offers a new understanding of rentier state foreign policy and power projection. It develops the already recognised concept of a social contract between patrons and clients, or the rulers and the ruled, adding to this contract the elements of an inner-circle of elites as patrons, and established, non-state actors as clients. In practical terms, the rentier state, while distributing wealth accumulated predominantly through rents from oil and gas revenues, uses non-state actors and transnational networks for its own power projection in the region. In these contracts, such non-state actors become adopted *clients* rather than family *relations*. In relationships such as these, there is an assumption that by distributing money to these actors, and so building alliances with them, the rentier state will benefit from their influence.

Measurement of adopted power should be multidimensional in focus, as demonstrated. The means of adopted power should be viewed always as wealth, as adopted power focuses on wealthy rentier states; wealthy A (rentier state) builds alliance with B (non-state actor) and with a *domain*, as suggested by Dahl (1957), that focuses on where a nation has power. A (rentier state) builds alliances with B and is able to project power geographically. *Scope* identifies the aspect of B's behaviour affected by A: A (rentier state) builds alliances with B (non-state actors) using the strong sides of B (where it has power) and tries to benefit from this. *Weight* refers to the ability to influence other states: A (rentier state) is able to influence because of its alliance with B (non-state actor). Finally, *cost* identifies what price A (rentier state) has to pay for building alliances with B (non-state actor).

While Qatar's rise is acknowledged by scholars, efforts to explain Qatar's type of power fail, through definitions such as: 'hard' (Nye, 1991; 2004); 'soft' (ibid, 1991;

2004); 'smart' (ibid, 2011); 'subtle' (Kamrava, 2013), Meads's 'sharp' and 'sticky' power (2009); Walker and Ludwig (2017)'s 'sharp' power, 'civilian power' (Duchêne, 1972); 'military power' (Bull, 1982), and 'normative power' Manners (2002), as the analysis revealed in Chapter Two. The thesis argues that Qatar used adopted power from 1995 to 2019, a type of power that can be developed by wealthy rentier states whose inner-circle elites ally with well-established non-state actors in order to take advantage of their transnational nature, to rapidly gain influence among other states.

### **8.3. Wealth, the main means of Qatar's adopted power**

Qatar is the richest country in the world, mainly from the hydrocarbon sector. However, despite its diversification efforts, Qatar illustrates the example of a rentier state which relies on rents from energy revenues. Qatar has two sectors: the hydrocarbon and non-hydrocarbon, divided into state-owned companies which accumulate wealth for the projection of adopted power and through which the distribution of wealth occurs. Moreover, close links between state-owned companies' management made it possible for inner-circle elites to obtain as much wealth as they want for power projection. An example of this: since 1995, Qatar Petroleum has been dominated by the leadership of a close friend of the former Amir Shaykh Hamad, 'Abdullah bin Hamad al-'Attiya, who gave up the leadership position to former Minister of Energy and Industry, Mohammad Salih 'Abdullah al-Sa'da. In 2018, Qatar Petroleum management was given to the brother of the current Amir, Deputy Amir 'Abdullah bin Hamad al-Thani. Qatar Petroleum's largest shareholders belong to petrochemical companies, such as Qatar Fertiliser Company (QAFCO), Qatar Petrochemical Company (QAPCO), Qatar Fuel Additives Company (QAFAC), and revenues from these sectors are easily used for distribution to non-state actors in order to build alliances with Qatar's clients.

The distribution of Qatar's wealth occurs through the following state-owned companies: The Qatar Investment Authority, created from oil and gas revenues has been run by the inner-circle elites of Qatar or by Qatar's elites who implement foreign policies. This includes the former prime minister and the former Foreign Minister Hamad bin Jasim, identified as inner-circle elites. The current Amir Shaykh Tamim became a chairman, and currently the foreign minister of the state, is from the ruling family, while Mohammad bin Abdurahman al-Thani, is a chairman of the Qatar



Investment Authority. Not surprisingly, the Qatar Investment Authority heavily invested around the globe, as is identified as having not only economic goals, but also political. For wielding adopted power, money is distributed through this state-owned company, illustrating Qatar's building alliances with political Islam non-state actors.

Other small funds run by the inner-circle elites, created by or managed by them or close friends follow suit. Qatar Sports Investments was founded by the crown prince, now amir of Qatar, while his friend, Nasir Ghanim al-Khelaifi, heads the fund. Qatar Foundation is run, and was founded by another inner-circle elite, Shaykha Moza. The role of the fund has been essential for building alliances with sport non-state actors. Qatar Petroleum International, which was integrated into the abovementioned Qatar Petroleum, was also essential for building alliances with political Islam non-state actors.

Obviously, another sector was crucial for the distribution of wealth for the projection adopted power – the banking sector. Qatar National Bank (QNB) which dominates the banking sector, is owned by the Qatar Investment Authority and the public (50% each), having on its board of directors, members of the al-Thani family and other influential political elites; this makes it easier to distribute money for activities by the Qatar Investment Authority, along with others wielding adopted power. The Doha Bank, a subsidiary of Qatar Investment Authority – Qatar Holding (16.7%), has among its board of directors, important influential elites such as 'Abdullah bin Nasir bin 'Abdullah al-Ahmed al-Thani (Countrylicious, 2015). The latter is described by another source as '[a] shareholder and board member of Doha Bank' (Puerto Al-Thani, 2018), who had and continues to have the role of being a personal investor in Malaga CF. Again, this follows Qatar's adopted power implementation. Considering examples where banking elites are very closely connected to the inner-circle elites, as discussed, this suggests that easy access of inner-circle elite to the banking sector gives them the authority to transfer money for wielding adopted power.

Another important state-owned company used for the distribution of wealth is Qatar Airways. Despite discussions of its profitability, it plays a key role in building alliances with sports non-state actors. Other sectors of Qatar's economy, such as the non-banking financial sector, indirectly assists in wielding adopted power. Qatar Exchange, Qatar Insurance Company and Qatar Financial Centre are all part of diversification efforts that are energy-driven. The latest example of this is the current

initiative to launch an Islamic banking giant focused on energy, to be opened under umbrella of the Qatar Financial Center. It should be noted that the management teams of all state-owned companies have close connections with the inner-circle elites, meaning that all companies in Qatar's economy are directly or indirectly involved in the accumulation or distribution of wealth for building alliances with non-state actors for adopted power projection.

The next part of the chapter summarises examples of adopted power implementation by Qatar and demonstrates how non-state actors emerged as Qatar's clients. The measurement of adopted power will be discussed through scope, domain, weight, and cost.

#### **8.4. An example of wielding adopted power: building alliances with political Islam non-state actors**

Despite choosing to host Islamists since the 1950s, particularly the Muslim Brotherhood, since 1995 Qatar's inner-circle elite have considered Islamists to be a strong presence in the region and have built alliances with political Islam non-state actors for pragmatic purposes, specifically for power projection. They embraced Islamists to serve their own political interests and consolidate their political position. As a scope of adopted power, Qatar adopted Islamists indirectly (through mediation or conflict resolution), and directly. Mediation efforts should be viewed as part of adopted power implementation. On the whole, this is seen in Qatar's mediation efforts with Houthi rebels and the Yemeni government in 2008, 2010, and 2011. Other efforts have been between Hizbullah and Lebanese political factions in 2008, and Hizbullah and al-Nusra Front in 2014, as well as mediation between Islamists and Sudanese governments in Darfur. Further reconciliation efforts by Qatar have been made between Hamas and Fatah, mediation between Eritrea and Djibouti in 2010, in Darfur between 2008-2011, and being involved in the Afghan Peace Process. Qatar mediated between Islamists and governments or other Islamists, and in doing so became a 'neutral broker' in the public eye, but at the same time kept open relations or strengthened them with Islamists. Consequently, due to mediation efforts in various Middle Eastern countries, as will be shown, Qatar built alliances or strengthened relations with political Islam non-state actors.

In Lebanon, Qatar's relations with the Lebanese Hizbullah were strengthened by mediation efforts in 2008, along with other efforts that took place before and after, such as in the aftermath of Hizbullah's war with Israel in 2006, and during the Syrian war when Qatar mediated between al-Nusra Front and Hizbullah. For building alliances with Hizbullah to wield adopted power, the role of inner-circle elites and Qatar's financial capacities were essential. The indirect way of dealing with Hizbullah, thanks to mediation efforts in 2008, assisted in keeping and strengthening relations with the non-state actor, and using it for Qatar's own political interests, as the section on weight identified.

In Yemen, Qatar mediated between the Yemeni government and Houthi rebels in 2007, and promised to reconstruct the Sa'ada governance if negotiations succeeded. Qatar also agreed to host Houthi rebels. In short, mediation helped build relations with the Houthis. However, despite Qatar's involvement as part of the 2015 Saudi-led coalition fighting Houthi rebels, the Anti-Terror Quartet accused Qatar of playing both sides, which suggests that the relations between both parties has never been fully cut. Yet as previous analyses reveal, Qatar-funded al-Jazeera started to negatively portray the Saudi-led coalition, and in doing so assisted in countering the power of Qatar's political opponents.

In Palestine, Qatar was involved in the Hamas-Fatah reconciliation process which assisted in its keeping relations with both parties, especially Hamas. Despite Qatar still denying its financial support of Hamas, as adopted power implementation, as the analyses suggests, Qatar funded Hamas through state-owned companies and charitable organisations. The role of Qatar's inner-circle elites (former Amir Shaykha Moza and former Prime Minister Hamad bin Jasim) in building alliance with Hamas was significant, as argued in Chapter Four.

When it comes to direct alliances, Qatar built them with the Muslim Brotherhood, al-Nahda, the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, al-Nusra Front, and supported Islamists in northern Mali. It has been a key backer of Muslim Brotherhood for decades, especially while providing them long-term refuge, such as, hosting their spiritual leader, al-Qaradawi, who has close connections with the inner-circle elites of Qatar. However, considering their popularity, since 1995 Qatar started to view them as an important ally for power projection.

In Egypt, Qatar helped bring Islamists to power as an outcome of the Arab Spring. When the Muslim Brotherhood ruled Egypt, Qatar-Egypt economic relations

boomed. The former Prime Minister Shaykh Hamad bin Jasim proclaimed USD 18bn investment in Egypt. However, with Islamists losing power, Qatar's regional place decreased.

In Tunisia, analyses reveal that there are personal connections between Qatar and al-Nahda politicians such as Ghannouchi and Marzouki, who appeared numerous times on al-Jazeera. When Islamists came to power, Qatar-Tunisia commercial relations boomed. Among other negotiated activities, in 2012 Qatar supported the rebalancing of Tunisia's central bank and Qatar Petroleum International supported vocational training in Tunisia's hydrocarbon sector.

In Libya, Qatar intervened in the uprisings and contributed to the removal of al-Qaddafi, trying to bring its own clients to power. Qatar investment in Libya increased after the fall of the regime, and when the Qatar-backed National Transitional Council came to power, Qatar transferred USD 400m to it. The Qatar National Bank Group bought 49% of Libya's Bank of Commerce and Development. Though Qatar's influence decreased in Libyan politics compared to the first days of the revolution after the intervention of other regional powers in the war. It should be identified that Qatar expected to benefit from the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, a long-term ally and a member of the forces behind the revolution, in case they come to power after al-Qaddafi. Although there are discussions that Qatar supported other Islamists such as the Libyan Ferrari 17 Brigade and the Rafallah al-Sehati militias, the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group emerged as a main Qatar client.

In Syria, Qatar also tried to benefit from the uprisings that led to the civil war. Qatar adopted clients which were expected to replace al-Asad regime. Qatar's client, al-Nusra Front (rebranded Jabhat Fateh al-Sham) was provided with media coverage by al-Jazeera. Meanwhile, Qatar's inner-circle elites avoided calling it a terrorist organisation. The support of al-Nusra Front was also through Qatar-based charitable organisations. Analyses reveal that despite Qatar's alliance with al-Nusra, it brought more cost than weight. Still, the group should be viewed as Qatar's client. In Mali, Qatar also supported Islamists in the takeover in 2012, using charity organisations such as the Qatar Red Crescent.

Qatar tried to gain power from Islamists by building alliances with them, including Hizbullah, Houthis, Hamas, the Muslim Brotherhood, al-Nahda, the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, the al-Nusra Front, and Islamists in northern Mali. The domain, or geography of influence with Islamists, by wielding adopted power, spread

towards the Islamic world (Lebanon, Yemen, Palestine, Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, Syria, Mali, Afghanistan, and Syria)— due to the transnational network of Islamists from the Islamic world to Europe and the US as well.

As the weight of adopted power implementation, Qatar influenced as follows: Qatar increased its popularity due to involvement in mediation efforts with Lebanon and Palestine and thus using the popularity among Arabs in the 2000s of Hizbullah and Hamas. Building alliances with political non-state actors assisted in its competition with regional players Iran and Saudi Arabia, and influencing efforts in the region. The Muslim Brotherhood, in power, provided opportunities to apply Qatar's sphere of influence towards the regional heavyweights, to challenge the place of Saudi Arabia and Iran, who lead Wahhabi and Shi'a forces in the region. Qatar, as another important state in the Muslim world, led the Muslim Brotherhood, but with the failure of the Islamists in Egypt its domination plans miscarried. Attempts to bring its clients to power in Libya, Syria, theoretically, would have brought Qatar dominance to the region. However, with the failure of Islamists in coming to power (such as in Syria), or completely coming to power (in Libya), Qatar could not use the transnational nature that Islamists might offer for a complete dominance of the region, rather than a partial influence.

Building alliances with political Islam non-state actors provided an opportunity to counter the power of its political rivals such as the Anti-Terror Quartet. Qatar's purchase of Lebanese bonds in January 2019, the country ruled mainly by a Hizbullah-influenced government, is another example of Qatar's alliances that attempt to replace Saudi influence in the country. Finally, in another weight gained through alliances, Qatar is overcoming geopolitical and geostrategic limitations. For example, it is gaining political advantage from alliances with Iran-backed militias such Hizbullah and Houthi who serve to increase the Iranian power in the region.

But Qatar paid a high cost for wielding adopted power, such as being criticised for supporting rebels during the Arab Spring by explaining it as bringing democracy and supporting public choice to the region. The criticism was related to the fact that Qatar is not a democratic state itself. Moreover, Qatar's alliances with Islamists led to two Gulf crises in 2014 and 2017. During 2014, Qatar's neighbours were unhappy with Qatar's alliances with the Muslim Brotherhood. Following the 2017 Crisis, Qatar was accused of supporting terrorism. The Anti-Terror Quartet designated 59 individuals as terrorists and 12 institutions, as terrorist organisations, funded and

supported by Qatar. As analyses demonstrate, organisations, particularly those of charitable nature, and individuals from this list, especially those hosted in Doha, were crucial for wielding adopted power by Qatar. Moreover, Qatar's political clients, Hizbullah, Houthis, Hamas, the Muslim Brotherhood, al-Nahda, the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, al-Nusra Front (Jabhat Fateh al-Sham), and Islamists in northern Mali, are all controversial organisations, and most of them are named on the terrorist lists of the US, EU, Russia, and Canada.

### **8.5. An example of wielding adopted power: building alliances with tribes**

To increase the al-Thani's importance in the region, not solely domestically, Qatar's inner-circle elites used tribal connections. This became possible due to the political geography and history of the region, while traditional territories of several tribes were split into different modern states, and as a result, tribes became transnational. So as a form of adopted power implementation, Qatar used cross-border tribal identity and kinship connections for political purposes. As elite-driven policies, Shaykh Hamad and Shaykh Tamim and other elites, such as the former Prime Minister 'Abdullah bin Hamad al-'Attiya, built personal connections with important tribesmen, who might be useful for political purposes. In return, tribesmen were given citizenship, economic (land), and social benefits (scholarships for their children or relatives to study abroad, providing the ownership of charitable organisations, and jobs).

Due to the transnational nature of tribalism, Qatar was able to attract tribesmen from the GCC states and across the Middle East, allowing Qatar to attempt to spread power as a result of attracting tribal loyalties. In order to do so Qatar had to present scope. It focused on genealogical connections of the al-Thani family, and bolstered their positions in the history of Arabia. The inner elites claim they are descended from al-Qa'qa' ibn 'Amr al-Tamimi, a legendary warrior who helped spread Islam to the Levant. However such claims are not much supported by regional tribesmen.

Additionally, the former Amir Shaykh Hamad tried to claim descentance from Shaykh Mohammad bin Abdul Wahhab. Qatar even named the grand mosque after him in support of these claims. The naming of the state mosque of Qatar was also connected with Shaykh Hamad's visit to the Ushaiqir, Saudi Arabia, where bin Abdul Wahhab was born. These claims have political purposes in order to compete with Saudi Arabia for the adoption of Salafism. The analysis concludes that some observers

show connections between the al-Thani and al-Shaykh family, however, there is limited consensus on whether bin Abdul Wahhab is in reality the great-grandfather of Shaykh Hamad. The al-Shaykh family issued a statement denying descentance from them. Additionally, analyses also reveal that Qatar, by attracting tribal loyalty and funding political Islam non-state actors, tries to compete with Saudi Arabia, as historically, Saudi's importance in the region is connected with the support that the Saudi royal family enjoys from tribes and religious scholars.

Qatar paid a cost for its attempts to build alliances with tribesmen. Its attraction of tribal loyalty was among the reasons for the both Gulf crises. Such policies challenged the security of the GCC states, such as the effect on the ethnic and religious balance in Bahrain. While the first dispute was resolved, Qatar continued to build alliances with tribesmen. The cost of the 2017 Gulf Crisis was paid by tribesmen, as due to their transnational nature many families were separated because of the dispute.

The al-Thani family, however is always at risk that the tribal connections might be used against them, and consequently, could challenge their regime. For example, Saudi Arabia built alliances with al-Murra tribe in an attempt to challenge Qatar's political system in 1996, and during the ongoing Gulf Crisis the Anti-Terror Quartet attempted to mobilise tribes for regime change in Qatar. To do so they relied on tribal leaders of the al-Murra and Beni Hajar, and supporting members of al-Thani members, such as Shaykh 'Abdullah bin Jassem and Shaykh Sultan bin Suhaim, did not bring success.

The failure of the Anti-Terror Quartet connects with the unwillingness of tribal members to lose citizenship and benefits that come with Qatari citizenship. So with the economic factor dividing clans, subsequently, al-Thani inner-circle elite became able to strengthen the loyalty of their tribesmen and unite the latter against what was seen as the Anti-Terror Quartet threat. Furthermore, it assisted in rejecting the Anti-Terror Quartet's demands, meaning that Qatar will continue its active policies and projection of power. Therefore, it can be argued that during the Gulf Crisis the inner-circle of al-Thani won the loyalty of its own tribesmen; this might be identified as the weight of adopted power implementation.

## **8.6. An example of wielding adopted power: building alliances with media non-state actors**

Despite al-Jazeera being a parastatal company, it emerged as a non-state actor with a transnational nature, as it united Arabs and the Arab diaspora internationally. Analyses conclude that al-Jazeera serves the political interests of Qatar. Among other media non-state actors that Qatar built alliances with: Middle East Eye, al-Araby TV, *The New Arab (al-Araby al-Jadeed)*, Arabi Post (formerly *HuffPost Arabi*), Arabi21, Libya al-Ahrar TV. The creation of these coincides with the criticism that targeted al-Jazeera after the Arab Spring, but without demonstrating clear links with Qatar, they supported the agenda of their Qatari backers. Qatar's adopted power domain, through alliances with these media clients, should be understood regionally and globally, thanks to the transnational nature of media non-state actors. Al-Jazeera has a global influence: in the Muslim world (Pakistan and Afghanistan), Western countries (the US, the UK, Australia, Canada), the Balkan states (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Serbia, Slovenia, Montenegro), and with Arab and Western audiences who watch AJ+. Building alliances with other media non-state actors, Qatar's domain spread towards both the West and MENA.

Al-Jazeera attracted viewers by providing Pan-Arab/Arab nationalist/Pan-Islamic, Islamist and liberal agendas. Under the Pan-Arab/Pan-Islamic agenda, al-Jazeera's coverage of the 'imagined Watan', united Arabs from the Arab and Islamic world and diaspora, increasing patriotic feelings. Serving the Islamist agenda, al-Jazeera hosted representatives of the Taliban, al-Qa'ida, the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas, and al-Nusra Front. Under the democratic agenda, al-Jazeera emerged as the channel that expresses freedom of speech. These agendas of al-Jazeera can be understood as inter-connected, and are identified as a scope of Qatar's adopted power wherein Qatar benefited politically, as discussed in the weight section. *Vis-à-vis* other media non-state actors linked with Qatar, they present different ideological stances: al-Araby TV follows a liberal or Pan-Arab agenda; Middle East Eye takes a stance on pro-democratic and pro-Islamist discourses in favour of the Muslim Brotherhood, as its managing editor's by-line suggests. The aforementioned narratives of other Qatar-linked media can be identified as a scope of Qatar's adopted power.

Al-Jazeera's weight in politicising the Arab audience and breaking taboos, revolutionised the Arab world; consequently, with regional and global



acknowledgement, it made itself a ‘big voice, [for a] tiny country’ (Tatham, 2006:64), and received other titles such as: ‘the CNN of the Arab world’ (Awad, 2005:81), and the ‘Al Jazeera Effect’ (Seib, 2008:ix). Subsequently, al-Jazeera became crucial for Qatar’s inner-circle elites as it expressed narratives that suit Qatari political objectives. Analyses suggest that al-Jazeera was vital for coverage of the Arab Spring with an opportunity to fuel public anger by giving a platform for public viewers, supporting the voice of rebels and assisting Islamists to power. By building alliances with other Qatar-linked media non-state actors, Qatar diversified and provided different narratives that suit its political objectives in order to give an impression of plurality. Qatar-linked media outlets followed editorial policies that are connected with Qatar’s political objectives, as the analyses in Chapter Six revealed (such as, narratives against the Anti-Terror Quartet, Qatar’s political competitor).

Qatar also paid costs for alliances with al-Jazeera and other media. As discussed, Qatar’s connection with al-Jazeera, accused of being a ‘mouthpiece of Al Qaeda’ (Zayani, 2005:23), contributed to political tensions and diplomatic disputes with numerous Middle Eastern states. Other Qatar-linked media non-state actors were criticised for presenting Qatar’s view. As a result, the Anti-Terror Quartet demanded closure of al-Jazeera and other news outlets that are directly or indirectly funded by Qatar. Additionally, Qatar-linked media outlets began to lose credibility with the public, e.g., the Qatar-funded, Libya al-Ahrar TV, while others closed, such as *HuffPost Arabi*. Therefore, Qatar’s cost for wielding adopted power by building alliances with media non-state actors is that they have been considered biased towards Qatar.

### **8.7. An example of wielding adopted power: building alliances with sports non state actors**

Qatar benefited from the transitional nature of sports non-state actors by hosting sport mega events, making business deals with famous football clubs, and the phenomenon of the global migration, all of which strengthened relationships with the states from where the migrants to Qatar originate. Qatar wielded adopted power especially through building alliances with clients such as FIFA, FC Barcelona, Paris Saint-Germain (PSG) F.C., Malaga CF, A.S. Roma, and FC Bayern Munich, which can be identified as scope. Qatar won the bid to host the World Cup 2022, though there


are still some speculations about it. The role of the inner-circle elites is revealed in analyses of corruption efforts to win the bid. PSG F.C. was bought by Qatar Sports Investments and Malaga CF was bought in 2010 by an al-Thani family member, Shaykh ‘Abdullah bin Nasir al-Thani. Alliances with FC Barcelona were built by Qatar Foundation in 2011, having a five-year deal to become the sponsor for the Barcelona shirt. However, between 2011 and 2017, Qatar Airways replaced the Qatar Foundation. Qatar Airways also signed a partnership contract with FC Bayern Munich and announced the deal between Qatar Airways and A.S. Roma.

Due to the transnational nature of mega-events that allow the domain of adopted power of Qatar to spread globally, the weight specifically identifies that power from building alliances with sports non-state actors, is viewed as a contributing factor for developing bilateral relations with France, the UK, Spain, Germany, and Russia. By building alliances with sports non-state actors, Qatar influence domestic affairs in France (such as limiting the public right to fully express opinions on Qatar’s policies, backlisting PSG fans in 2013 and allegations of breaching data protection in 2015) and foreign policies (specifically on keeping its neutral response to the ongoing Gulf Crisis). Building alliances with FIFA and the Qatar Airways deal with FC Bayern Munich serve as contributing factors for receiving a pro-Qatar response at the beginning of the Gulf Crisis from Germany. Building an alliance with FIFA, assisted Qatar in developing other cooperation with the UK, along with military, cultural, economic cooperation, deals worth GBP 1.5bn (USD 1.9bn), ranging from construction of new stadiums and cutting grass, among other cooperation in sports. Such cooperation played a contributing factor to the UK’s somewhat neutral response towards the ongoing Gulf Crisis. Building alliances with FC Barcelona, Malaga CF, and FIFA contributed to developing cooperation in the sports field between Qatar and Spain, while building alliances with FIFA contributed to Qatar-Russia relations, keeping both Spain and Russia in neutral positions on the Gulf Crisis.

Among the costs of Qatar’s adopted power are controversies and accusations of corruption for winning the successful World Cup 2022 bid, including human rights abuses, especially labour in Qatar. Some additional concerns are related to the fact that Qatar might not be ready to host the World Cup 2022 under the circumstances of the ongoing Gulf Crisis. Questions related to the size of the state, in contrast to the trend in cooperation between countries for hosting mega sports events are also a concern. The cost of building alliances with PSG is linked to questions from the European

community about a signed deal between PSG and the Qatar Tourism Authority in 2013, and whether it ‘f[ou]nd a loophole in UEFA’s Financial Fair Play regulations’ (Brannagan and Giulianotti, 2015:714). Moreover, the purchase of Neymar, and a further deal with Mbappe, also resulted in an investigation by the European football’s governing body. Among other concerns are those of French public about losing the club’s identity. The cost of building an alliance with Malaga CF is also connected with a concern with public of associations with Qatar, the same as with FC Barcelona.

Therefore, between 1995 to 2019 (20 March) as a rentier, wealthy monarchy state, Qatar wielded adopted power, whose inner-circle elite allied with well-established non-state actors in order to take advantage of their transnational nature, to rapidly gain influence over other states, as *Figure 8.1* demonstrates.



*Figure 8.1.* Qatar’s adopted power: building alliances with political Islam, tribesmen, media, sport non-state actors (source: personal collection).

## 8.8. The implementation of adopted power: lessons from Qatar

An examination of how Qatar adopted power provides the following lessons. The two Gulf Crises, especially the 2017 Crisis, illustrate the Anti-Terror Quartet’s desire to limit Qatar’s independent foreign policy. Though, as discussed, the core of adopted power measurement is the cost (along with scope, domain and weight). All

states that aim to project power will eventually pay a price for it, but it depends on the inner-circle elites to calculate all outcomes and try to increase their weight, rather than having to pay a higher price. As demonstrated, Qatar paid a large cost for wielding adopted power, especially having two disputes with its neighbours, and being accused of supporting terrorism. Though not connected with adopted power itself, this is an outcome of the inner-circle elites' miscalculations. Adopted power provides an opportunity for any rentier state that has wealth as a key means of wielding power. This depends upon the inner-circle elites' calculations as to which non-state actors is it better to build alliances with in order to achieve more weight and decrease the possible costs.

### **8.9. The future of Qatar's adopted power**

The future of Qatar's adopted power mainly depends on wealth as a key means for wielding adopted power. As this study's analyses conclude, it depends on two questions: firstly, how long can Qatar remain a rentier state (adopted power illustrates rentier states power projection), and secondly, how long can Qatar pay non-state actors for building alliances with them? The beginning of the ongoing Gulf Crisis made observers investigate how Qatar's economy would react to a boycott or blockade from the Anti-Terror Quartet, and it revealed that despite diversification initiatives, Qatar's economy still relies on the energy sector because of the following. Qatar's economy has remained strong due to liquidity injections from the Qatar Investment Authority, the result of revenues from oil and gas among other measures, so Qatar's economic indicators remain resilient. In April 2017, the lifting of the moratorium, which increased LNG sector production (QNB, 2017), means that the state's plans for relying on the energy sector and revenues from it, continues. The decision to launch an Islamic bank that focuses on energy, suggests that energy-driven diversification efforts will continue as well. This, despite the hydrocarbon sector making up 48.2% of Qatar's economy, makes it highly possible that Qatar will remain reliant on the energy sector for at least the next 20-30 years. Even considering expectations of the development of renewables and their replacement of oil and gas, and even predictions of upcoming challenges to Qatar's leading place in the LNG market, Qatar will continue to remain a rentier state and have the revenues necessary to build alliances with non-state actors for power projection.

Despite the high cost that Qatar paid for adopting political Islam non-state actors, as demonstrated, it continues to build alliances with them. Qatar's closer relations with Iran and Turkey unite it to a block of Islamist-friendly states, against a moderate block, the Anti-Terror Quartet. The following are reasons for this. Firstly, building alliances with non-state actors brings Qatar influence regionally, and thanks to the transnational network of Islamists, globally. Secondly, the Anti-Terror Quartet became a political rival to Qatar. That means leadership of one block in the region, and power of states within the block will increase; and opposite, if influence of a block is decreased, power of states within blocks also will decline. Thirdly, if moderate Islamist discourses succeed in condemning organisations such as the Muslim Brotherhood and Hizbullah as terrorists, Qatar will not only be accused by its neighbours, but the global community will consider Qatar a funder of terrorism. This would crush any efforts to increase Qatar's power.

It is doubtful that Qatar's efforts to attract tribal loyalty will continue as the ongoing Gulf Crisis splits tribes and clans and has made tribesmen prioritise political and economic benefits within each state. Qatar's alliances with sports non-state actors will continue at least until 2022, that is, building an alliance with FIFA and the implementation of the World Cup. Qatar also continues to build alliances with media non-state actors, as this is a strong weapon which Qatar uses to spread its discourses.

#### **8.10. Further research on adopted power**

The study's scope can most easily be expanded by developing its methodology. For example, the implementation of discourse analyses of other Qatar-linked media outlets such as Arabi21, Libya al-Ahrar TV, and Rassd, would be useful. The coverage of specific events in the region might be worth focusing on as well. For example, al-Jazeera and other Qatar-funded media coverage of the murdered Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi (Al-Jazeera, 2019) was a significant opportunity to harm the image of Saudi Arabia and its leadership. In order to enlarge the scope of this study, examining other examples of adopted power implementation by Qatar would also be useful, especially as Qatar continues to build alliances with other non-state actors to wield adopted power. Among other non-state actors to study are: think-tanks, such as the Brookings Doha Center, the Gulf International Forum (Allen-Ebrahimian and Dubin, 2018), and the al-Sharq Forum. An analysis of Qatar's alliances with other

NGOs, such as Human Rights Watch, might be the focus for another study. By expanding the scope, it will further develop our theoretical understanding of Qatar's relationship with other non-state actors through its use of adopted power. Additionally, it will strengthen an empirical case that between 1995-2019 Qatar wielded adopted power. It will also further contribute to Qatar studies.

Finally, further research might demonstrate other rentier states' utilisation of adopted power for power projection. Such states might include high-rent states such as Bahrain, Brunei, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Kuwait, Libya, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Trinidad and Tobago, and the UAE; and mid-rent states, such as Algeria, Angola, Azerbaijan, Congo-Brazzaville, Ecuador, Iran, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Russia, Syria, Turkmenistan, Venezuela (Hertog, 2017). Further research on adopted power might investigate Iran's efforts to build alliances with political Islam non-state actors such as al-Ashtar Brigades, Hizbullah, the Lebanese Resistance Brigades, Hamas, the Islamic Jihad Movement in Palestine, the Popular Mobilisation Forces, 'Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq, Badr Organisation, Kata'ib Hizbullah, Muqawimun, Kata'ib Sayyid al-Shuhada', Kata'ib Al Imam 'Ali, Harakat Hizbullah al-Nujiba', Liwa' Fatemiyoun, Liwa' Zainebiyoun, and the Houthis of Yemen. Another example could be the UAE's use of adopted power in alliances with sports non-state actors such as Arsenal, Paris Saint-Germain F.C., A.C. Milan, Real Madrid C.F., and media non-state actors such as Sky News and CNN. Saudi Arabia also wields adopted power by building alliances with tribesmen such as, al-Murra tribe, and media non-state actors such as MBC. Further research will help to test this new concept of power suggested in this thesis, adopted power. The examination of rentier states' ability to exercise adopted power would advance this research by further developing the theory and understanding similarities and possible differences of rentier states' power projection.

## Appendices

### Appendix A

#### Political elites and political stakeholders interviewees

No.	Name	Position/Activity	Country
1.	Ahmed Adnan	Saudi journalist who writes on Middle Eastern issues	Saudi Arabia
2.	H.E. Sayyid 'Ali al-Amin	Senior Muslim religious authority in the Middle East.	Lebanon
3.	Dr. Shady 'Abdul Wahhab	Executive Editor-in-Chief Trending Events Periodical Head of Security Studies Unit at FARAS (Future for Advanced Research & Studies)	UAE
4.	Bassam al-Binmohammad	Member of Shura Council	Bahrain
5.	Hasan al-Hasan	Former senior analyst at the Office of the First Deputy Prime Minister	Bahrain
6.	H.E. Noura al-Ka'bi	Minister of Culture and Knowledge Development for the UAE.	UAE
7.	Dr. Rashid al-Khayyoun	An Iraqi scholar and lecturer in Islamic philosophy, religion, and history.	Iraq/Lebanon

8.	H.E. Sulaiman H al-Mazrou'i	Ambassador of the United Arab Emirates to the UK (Court of St. James's)	UAE
9.	Dr. Mahfoud Amara	Assistant Professor Director of Sport Science Program, Qatar University	Qatar
10.	Dr. Khalid Almezaini	Formerly Assistant Professor at Qatar University	Qatar
11.	Mansour al-Noqaidan	Saudi writer, journalist, formerly a radical imam	UAE/Saudi Arabia
12.	Dr. Mikhail Batuev	Lecturer, Northumbria University	UK
13.	Dr. Christopher Davidson	Associate Fellow, Royal United Services Institute (RUSI)	UK
14.	Andrew Edwards	Emeritus Reader, Cardiff University	UK
15.	Dr. Courtney Freer	Research Fellow, Middle East Centre at LSE	UK
16.	Dr. Justin Gengler	Research Program manager at the Social and Economic Survey Research Institute (SESRI) at Qatar	Qatar
17.	Dr. Zoheir Hamedi	MENA Programme Officer at International Renewable Energy Agency	UAE



18.	Dr. Steffen Hertog	Associate Professor in Comparative Politics, LSE	UK
19.	Prof. Bruce Ingham	Emeritus Professor of Arabic Dialect Studies at SOAS	UK
20.	Prof. Clive Jones	Professor of Regional Security in the SGIA, Durham University	UK
21.	Prof. Mehran Kamrava	Professor and Director of the Center for International and Regional Studies at Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service in Qatar.	Qatar
22.	Wadah Khanfar	Former General Manager of al-Jazeera Media Network. Currently, he is the President of al-Sharq Forum	Qatar/Turkey
23.	Jane Kinninmont	Head of Programmes at The Elders Foundation. Former Deputy Head and Senior Research Fellow of the Middle East and North Africa Programme at Chatham House.	UK
24.	Dr. Karim Mezran	Senior Fellow in Rafik Hariri Center for the	USA

		Middle East, Atlantic Council	
25.	Dr. Ashraf Mishrif	Assistant Professor in International Political Economy, Qatar University	Qatar
26.	Prof. Tim Niblock	Emeritus Professor, Exeter University	UK
27.	Dr. James Onley	Director of Historical Research and Partnership, Qatar National Library	Qatar
28.	Dr. J.E. Peterson	Historian and political analyst specialising in the Arabian Peninsula and Gulf	US
29.	Dr. David Roberts	Faculty Member, Defence Studies Department, King's College	UK
30.	Dr. Emma Soubrier	Visiting Scholar, George Washington University	US/France
31.	Michael Stephens	Research Fellow for Middle East Studies and Head of RUSI Qatar	UK
32.	Dr. Kristian Coates Ulrichsen	Research Fellow, the James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy at Rice University;	US

		Associate Fellow, Middle East and North Africa Program at Chatham House.	
33.	Dr. David Weinberg	Director for International Affairs at the Anti-Defamation League	US
34.	Dr. Steven Wright	Associate Professor, of International Relations and an Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and Research, in the College Humanities and Social Sciences at Hamad bin Khalifa University.	Qatar
35.	Dalia Ziada	Founding Director of the Liberal Democracy Institute of Egypt	Egypt
36.	Dr. Mahjoob Zweiri	Associate Professor in Contemporary History and Politics, Director of Gulf Studies Center, Qatar University	Qatar
37.	Interviewee A	Former British diplomat	UK
38.	Interviewee B	Anonymous Qatar-based academic	Qatar
39.	Interviewee C	Anonymous	Qatar

		Qatari-national academic	
40.	Interviewee D	Anonymous Qatar-based academic	Qatar
41.	Interviewee E	Gulf-based security analyst	Bahrain
42.	Interviewee F	Anonymous al-Araby TV reporter	UK
43.	Interviewee G	Sport policy expert	UK

*The names of abovementioned political elites and political stakeholders are in alphabetical order.*

## Appendix B

### Qatar Investment Authority Investments (by May, 2018)

Institution	Investments
UK	
<b>Canary Wharf Group (CWG) –ownership Qatar Holding and American investment group Brookfield</b>	879 commercial and residential properties in London
<b>Qatar Holding</b>	Barclays (6%)
<b>QIA</b>	HSBC Tower
<b>QIA</b>	Savoy Hotel (through owning 10% of the French hospitality group Accor)
<b>QIA</b>	Shard (95%)
<b>QIA</b>	Harrods
<b>QIA</b>	Sainsbury’s (22%)
<b>QIA</b>	Heathrow Airport Holdings (20%)
<b>QIA</b>	London Stock Exchange (more than 10%)
<b>QIA</b>	Shell
<b>QIA</b>	London-listed miner, Xstrata
<b>Qatari Diar</b>	Converting the US Embassy on London’s Grosvenor Square into a luxury hotel
<b>Qatari Diar</b>	Building homes at the former Chelsea Barracks
<b>Qatari Diar</b>	With partnership with the real estate investment company Delancey and the Dutch pension fund asset manager, APG to develop and rent the 2012 Olympic Athletes’ Village, and the Elephant and castle development.
<b>Qatar Investment Bank</b>	The venerable London stockbrokers Panmure Gordon (44%)
France	

<b>Qatar Diar</b>	Cegelec
<b>Qatar Holding</b>	Lagardere Group
<b>QIA</b>	Vinci SA
<b>QIA</b>	‘Future French Champions’ (a joint initiative with French CDC International)
<b>QIA</b>	Investments to hotels: Deuxieme shareholder group AccorHotels (10.17% by December 31, 2017 according to Shareholding Structure)
<b>SCI Q Neo and SCI Q Retiro (subsidiaries of the QIA)</b>	<p>SCI Q Neo owns properties: at 14 Boulevard Haussmann, at 13,13 bis, 15 and 15 bis Rue Laffitte; and 1,3,3bis, 5,7 and 9 Rue Pillet-Will. Tenants at the properties include the Paris Marriot (Hotel Ambassador) and the French daily morning newspaper Le Figaro;</p> <p>SCIQ Retori owns properties: a 1 to 13 Cite du Retiro, 4 bis to 14 Cite du Retiro, 33 to 37 rue Boissy d’Anglas, volume 2 located in a property complex located 28-30-2 rue du Faubourg Saint Honore, and 1,2,2bis and 4 Cite du Retiro. Tenants at the properties include, Cartier, Hermes, and Givenchy.</p>
Germany	
<b>QIA</b>	Volkswagen
<b>QIA</b>	Porsche
<b>QIA</b>	Siemens
<b>QIA</b>	Hochtief
US	
<b>Qatar’s BeIn Media Group</b>	Miramax Films (Selling stakeholders of Miramax involved QIA and Colony Capital in 2016)
<b>QIA</b>	Empire State Building

<b>QIA</b>	With Brookfield Property partners LP partnership on a USD 8.6 bn mixed-use project on New York's far west side
Latin America	
<b>QIA</b>	Santader Brazil
Switzerland	
<b>QIA</b>	Credit Suisse Group (4.94%)
<b>QIA</b>	Glencore (Anglo-Swiss multinational company)
Netherlands	
<b>QIA</b>	Royal Dutch Shell (0.9%)
Spain	
<b>Qatar Holding</b>	Iberdrola
Russia	
<b>QIA</b>	With Glencore investments to Russian oil giant Rosneft
China	
<b>QIA</b>	Agricultural bank of China
Singapore	
<b>QIA</b>	Asia Square Tower 1

Source: Compiled by author using data from Accor Hotels (2017), Arabian Business (2017), Douglas Emmet Tenants (2017), Finn (2016), Kottasova (2017), Moore (2017), Robertson (2017).

### Appendix C

The list of Qatar-linked organisations and individuals designated by the Anti-Terror Quartet as terrorists

The list of Qatar-linked organisations designated as terrorist by the Anti-Terror Quartet

<b>Title</b>	<b>Country</b>
<b>Qatar Volunteer Center</b>	Qatar
<b>Qatar Charity</b>	Qatar
<b>Shaykh Eid al-Thani Charity Foundation (Eid Charity)</b>	Qatar
<b>Shaykh Thani bin ‘Abdullah Foundation for Humanitarian Services</b>	Qatar
<b>Qatar Doha Apple Company (Internet and Technology Support Company)</b>	Qatar
<b>Saraya Defend Benghazi</b>	Libya
<b>Saraya al-Ashtar</b>	Bahrain
<b>February 14 Coalition</b>	Bahrain
<b>The Resistance Brigades</b>	Bahrain
<b>Hizbullah Bahrain</b>	Bahrain
<b>Saraya al-Mukhtar</b>	Bahrain
<b>Harakat Ahrar Bahrain</b>	Bahrain



The list of Qatar-linked individuals designated as terrorist by the Anti-Terror Quartet

N.	Name	Country	Affiliation/ Activity (financial, logistical, and other support of groups)
1.	Khalifa Mohammad Turki al-Suba'ie	Qatari	al-Qa'ida
2.	'Abdulmalek Mohammad Yousef 'Abdel Salam (AKA Umar al-Qatari)	Jordanian, with Qatari ID	al-Nusra Front (Jabhat Fateh al-Sham)
3.	Ashraf Mohammad Yusuf Othman 'Abdel Salam	Jordanian, with Qatari ID card	al-Nusra Front (Jabhat Fateh al-Sham) al-Qa'ida
4.	Ibrahim 'Issa al-Hajji Mohammad al-Baker	Qatari	al- Qa'ida Taliban
5.	'Abdul'azizbin Khalifa al-'Attiya	Qatari	al-Qa'ida
6.	Salem Hassan Khalifa Rashid al-Kawari	Qatari	al-Qa'ida
7.	'Abdullah Ghanem Muslim al-Khawar	Qatari	al-Qa'ida
8.	Sa'd bin Sa'd Mohammad al-Ka'bi	Qatari	al-Nusra Front (Jabhat Fateh al-Sham)
9.	'Abdullatif bin 'Abdullah al-Kawari	Qatari	al-Qa'ida

10.	Mohammad Sa' idbin Helwan al-Sakhtari	Qatari	al-Qa'ida
11.	'Abdul Rahman bin Omair al-Nuaimi	Qatari	al-Qa'ida
12.	'Abdul Wahab Mohammad 'Abdul Rahman al-Hmeikani	Yemeni	al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)
13.	Khalifa bin Mohammad al-Rabban	Qatari	al-Qa'ida
14.	'Abdullah bin Khalid al-Thani	Qatari	al-Qa'ida
15.	'Abdul Rahim Ahmad al-Haram	Qatari	A close associate and personal assistant to ''Abdullah bin Khalid al-Thani
16.	Hajjaj bin Fahad Hajjaj Mohammad al-'Ajmi	Kuwaiti	Militants in Syria
17.	Mubarak Mohammad al-'Ajji	Qatari	Militants in Syria
18.	Jaber bin Nasir al-Marri	Qatari	al-Qa'ida
19.	Yusuf 'Abdullahal-Qaradawi	Egyptian	Muslim Brotherhood
20.	Mohammad Jasim al-Sulaiti	Qatari	Militants in Syria
21.	Ali bin 'Abdullahal-Suwaidi	Qatari	al-Qa'ida affiliated terrorist cells in Syria

22.	Hashem Saleh 'Abdullahal-Awadhi	Qatari	The Chief Executive Officer of Retaj Marketing and Project Management (partially owned by Eid Charity and Qatar's Ministry of Endowments)
23.	Ali Mohammad Mohammad al-Sallabi	Libyan	Libyan Islamic Fighting Group
24.	'Abdelhakim Bilhaj	Libyan	Libyan Islamic Fighting Group
25.	Mahdi Harati	Libyan	Tripoli Revolutionaries Brigade
26.	Ismail Mohammad Mohammad al-Sallabi	Libyan	Benghazi Defense Brigades Libyan Islamic Fighting Group
27.	Al-Sadiq 'Abdulrahman Ali al-Ghuraini	Libyan	Benghazi Defense Brigades
28.	Hamad 'AbdullahAl-Futtais al-Marri	Qatari	Qatari Special Forces officer; deployed to Libya in 2011 to coordinate the Qatari government's support of Libyan militias in the uprisings in 2011
29.	Mohammad Ahmed Shawky Islambouli	Egyptian	Gamaa Islamiyya

30.	Tariq 'Abdelmagoud Ibrahim al-Zomor	Egyptian	Gamaa Islamiyya Sympathiser of the Muslim Brotherhood
31.	Mohammad 'Abdelmaksoud Mohammad Afifi	Egyptian	Gamaa islamiyya
32.	Mohammad el-Saghir 'Abdel Rahim Mohammad	Egyptian	Gamaa Islamiyya
33.	Wagdy 'Abdelhamid Ghoneim	Egyptian	Gamaa Islamiyya al-Qa'ida
34.	Hassan Ahmed Hassan Mohammad al-Dokki al- Houti	UAE	Jihadist militias in Syria
35.	Hakem al-Humaidi al-Mutairi	Saudi / Kuwaiti	al-Nusra Front (Jabhat Fateh al-Sham) Jund al-Aqsa
36.	'Abdullah al-Muhaysini	Saudi	al-Nusra Front (Jabhat Fateh al-Sham)
37.	Hamed 'AbdullahAhmed al- Ali	Kuwaiti	al-Qa'ida affiliated groups (mainly Kuwait and Iraq)
38.	Ayman Ahmed 'Abdel Ghani Hassanein	Egyptian	Muslim Brotherhood
39.	Assem 'Abdel-Maged Mohammad Madi	Egyptian	Sympathiser with the Muslim Brotherhood
40.	Yahya Aqil Salman Aqil	Egyptian	Muslim Brotherhood
41.	Mohammad Hamada al- Sayed Ibrahim	Egyptian	Muslim Brotherhood

42.	'Abdel Rahman Mohammad Shokry 'Abdel Rahman	Egyptian	Muslim Brotherhood
43.	Hussein Mohammad Reza Ibrahim Youssef	Egyptian	Muslim Brotherhood
44.	Ahmed 'Abdelhafif Mahmoud 'Abdelhady	Egyptian	Muslim Brotherhood
45.	Muslim Fouad Tafran	Egyptian	Muslim Brotherhood
46.	Ayman Mahmoud Sadeq Rifat	Egyptian	Muslim Brotherhood
47.	Mohammad Sa'd 'Abdel- Naim Ahmed	Egyptian	Muslim Brotherhood
48.	Mohammad Sa'd 'Abdel Muttalib 'Abdo Al-Razaki	Egyptian	Muslim Brotherhood
49.	Ahmed Fouad Ahmed Gad Beltagy	Egyptian	Muslim Brotherhood
50.	Ahmed Ragab Ragab Soliman	Egyptian	Muslim Brotherhood
51.	Karim Mohammad Mohammad 'Abdul'aziz	Egyptian	Muslim Brotherhood
52.	Ali Zaki Mohammad Ali	Egyptian	Muslim Brotherhood
53.	Naji Ibrahim Ezzouli	Egyptian	Muslim Brotherhood
54.	Shehata Fathi Hafez Mohammad Suleiman	Egyptian	Muslim Brotherhood
55.	Mohammad Muharram Fahmi Abu Zeid	Egyptian	Muslim Brotherhood
56.	Amr 'Abdel Naşir 'Abdelhak 'Abdel-Barry	Egyptian	Muslim Brotherhood

<b>57.</b>	Ali Hassan Ibrahim ‘Abdel-Zaher	Egyptian	Muslim Brotherhood.
<b>58.</b>	Murtada Majeed al-Sindi	Bahraini	al-Ashtar Brigades
<b>59.</b>	Ahmed Al-Hassan al-Daski	Bahraini	N/A

Sources: Compiled by author using data from al-Arabiya (2017a; 2017b; 2017c), Gulf News (2017), Shideler, Froehlke and Fischer (2017), Weinberg (2017).

## Appendix D

### The Gulf Crises 2014 and 2017: Main Actors and Demands

<b>2014 Gulf Crisis March-November</b>	<b>2017 Gulf Crisis May to Present</b>
<p>Main actors of the Crisis: Qatar and Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain</p>	<p>Main actors of the Crisis: Qatar and Anti-Terror Quartet (Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt, Bahrain)</p>
<p>Qatari Concessions:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Relocating Muslim Brotherhood figures from Doha to Turkey;</li> <li>-Ordering the Emirati dissidents to leave Qatar;</li> <li>-Closing al-Jazeera's Egyptian branch;</li> <li>-Enforcing the GCC Internal Security Pact;</li> <li>-Cooperating closely with GCC partners on matters of intelligence and policing</li> </ul>	<p>2017, June 22<sup>nd</sup>. - 13 demands:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Shutting down the al-Jazeera news network;</li> <li>-Closing a Turkish military base;</li> <li>-Cutting ties with the Muslim Brotherhood;</li> <li>-Downgrading relations with Iran;</li> <li>-Deadline – 10 days;</li> </ul> <p>Rejected, but ready for dialogue;</p> <p>2017, July 19<sup>th</sup> – 6 broad principles:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Commitment to combat terrorism and extremism;</li> <li>-Denying financing and safe heavens to terrorist groups;</li> <li>-Stopping incitement to hatred and violence;</li> <li>-Refraining from interfering in the internal affairs of other countries;</li> <li>- No specific deadline</li> </ul>

Source: Compiled by author using data from al-Jazeera (2017c), Black (2014), Mourad (2014), Sciotto and Herb (2017).

## Appendix E

Qatar's 'clients' of political Islam non-state actors and their designation as terrorist organisations (by March, 2019)

No.	Organisation	Declared as a terrorist organisation or banned from operating in the following states:
1.	Muslim Brotherhood	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Syria</li> <li>- Russia</li> <li>- Egypt</li> <li>- Saudi Arabia</li> <li>- United Arab Emirates</li> <li>- Bahrain</li> </ul>
2.	Hamas	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- US</li> <li>- European Union – 15 member states froze Hamas' assets</li> <li>- Canada</li> <li>- Israel</li> <li>- Japan</li> <li>- Jordan</li> </ul>
3.	al-Nusra Front (Jabhat Fateh Al-Sham)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- US</li> <li>- European Union (listed the al-Nusra Front as a sanctioned group of persons, group, and entities)</li> <li>- Australia</li> <li>- Canada</li> <li>- France</li> <li>- New Zealand (listed the al-Nusra Front as an organisation associated with Al-Qaeda)</li> <li>- Russia</li> <li>- Saudi Arabia</li> <li>- Turkey</li> <li>- United Arab Emirates</li> <li>- United Nations (listed the al-Nusra Front as an entity associated with Al-Qaeda)</li> </ul>



		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- United Kingdom</li> </ul>
4.	Hizbullah	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- US</li> <li>- Israel</li> <li>- European Union (listed the Hizbullah Military Wing as a terrorist organisation)</li> <li>- United Kingdom (banned Hezbollah's military wing and political wing)</li> <li>- Canada</li> <li>- The Netherlands</li> <li>- Australia (listed Hizbullah's External Security Organisation as a terrorist organisation)</li> <li>- Bahrain</li> <li>- Gulf Cooperation Council</li> <li>- New Zealand</li> <li>- France</li> <li>- The Arab League (designated Hizbullah as a terrorist organisation. Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon rejected or protested the designation).</li> </ul>
5.	Houthis	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- US (The U.S. Department of the Treasury designated Houthi leader Abdul Malik al-Houthi and former commander of Yemen's Republican Guard Ahmed Ali Saleh as a Specially Designated Nationals).</li> <li>- Saudi Arabia</li> <li>- The United Arab Emirates</li> <li>- United Nations (The UN Security Council designated Abdul Malik al-Houthi, 'Abdullah Yahya al-Hakim)</li> </ul>
5.	Afghan Taliban	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- US</li> <li>- The European Union (The EU implemented United Nations Security Resolution 1267 (1999), 1390 (2002), which imposed 'certain</li> </ul>

		<p>specific restrictive measures directed against certain persons and associated with Usama bin Ladin, the Al-Qaeda network and the Taliban’ and froze ‘funds and other financial resources in respect of the Taliban of Afghanistan’)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Kazakhstan</li> <li>- New Zealand</li> <li>- Russia</li> </ul>
	<p>Libyan Islamic Fighting Group</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- US</li> </ul>

Source: Compiled by author using data from Counter Extremism Project (2019a; 2019b; 2019c; 2019d; 2019e; 2019f), The Investigation Project on Terrorism (2010), Khatib (2013).

Appendix F  
 Pro-democracy discourses  
 Articles by Middle East Eye Managing Editor  
 between  
 15 April 2014 and 20 July 2018

Article title/ Published Date	Quote	Referred country
<p><b>‘Saudi Arabia’s crocodile tears over Gaza’ (30.07.2014)</b></p>	<p>‘Saudi Arabia’s leading pollster Rakeen found that 95 percent out of a representative sample of 2,000 Saudis supported the continuation of the Palestinian resistance factions. Only three per cent did not. Eighty-two percent supported the firing of rockets into Israel and 14 percent opposed it. The kingdom’s hatred of Islamism stems not from the fact that it presents a rival interpretation of Islam. It is that it presents to a believer, <b>a democratic alternative. That is what really scares the monarchy</b>’.</p>	<p>Saudi Arabia</p>
<p><b>‘Management that is doomed to fail’ (22.09.2014)</b></p>	<p>‘Security services of Britain, France and the US are quaking at the prospect of British, French and US nationals returning home on flight from Turkey as trained jihadi fighters. But the countries with the greatest fear of cross-infection <b>are those Arab autocracies where basic democratic rights are a distant dream and where wealth is not shared</b>. The largest contingents of foreign jihadis come from Saudi Arabia,</p>	<p>Saudi Arabia</p>

	and rural heartland of Tunisia where the revolution has failed to deliver basic economic gains’.	
<p><b>‘Sisi can stall but cannot hide his crimes’ (05.11.2014)</b></p>	<p>‘There is no connection, proven or otherwise between Hamas in Gaza and Ansar Beit al Maqdis, the takfiri militants who have, according to Jane’s Intelligence Review inflicted around 85 casualties among the Egyptian military.</p> <p>And yet the US State Department spokesman Jen Psaki said Egypt had the right to use a buffer zone along its border with Gaza to boost security.’”</p> <p>Certainly we believe that Egypt has the right to take steps to maintain their own security. And we understand the threat that they are facing from the Sinai,”</p> <p>State Department spokeswoman. The International Criminal Court is dormant on the issue of Egypt.</p> <p>That leaves only one international forum in which <b>Egypt’s human rights violations can be raised</b> – and that is taking place for one day only in Geneva on Wednesday’.</p>	<p>Egypt (under Sisi’s leadership)</p>
<p><b>‘Sisi can stall but cannot hide his crimes’ (05.11.2014)</b></p>	<p>‘Then there are the arrests, anywhere between 16,000 and 41,000 people; <b>the overwhelming and well documented evidence of torture in custody gathered by Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International; the failure of due legal process such as</b></p>	<p>Egypt (under Sisi’s leadership)</p>

	<p><b>the mass death sentences, trials of 545 people concluded in less than an hour.</b> These too are not small numbers. In less than 7 months, 1243 people have been sentenced to death in proceedings which “<b>grossly violate all guarantees provided under Egyptian law and under Egypt’s international obligations to fair trial standards</b>” according to the lawyers’ report.</p> <p>Then there is <b>state repression against journalists</b>, the protest law.</p>	
<p><b>‘What does the New Year have in store for the Middle East?’ (31.12.2014)</b></p>	<p>‘Despite Abdullah’s best efforts, millions of Saudis continue to regard <b>democracy as the way out.</b> Even in Egypt, the stock of the Muslim Brotherhood has actually risen, according to successive Zogby polls’.</p> <p>‘The ideas themselves of 1848 lived to see another day. The same will happen throughout the Arab world. Unless of course we are to <b>accept democracy as a stable form of government fore everywhere bar the Arab world.</b> This is what the those who cast their veto in the UN currently argue. Like the status quo, that too is untenable’.</p>	<p>Saudi Arabia;</p> <p>Egypt (under Sisi’s leadership)</p>
<p><b>‘Iran and the Sunni dictators are the best</b></p>	<p>‘The rise of IS was anything but linear. When a political alternative presented itself in the elections which followed the Arab Revolution, both al-Qaeda and</p>	<p>Saudi Arabia, UAE</p>

<p><b>recruiters for IS' (02.08.2015)</b></p>	<p>IS were on their uppers. If they were mortally wounded by the rise of political Islam, IS was quick to see the recruitment potential of Egypt's military coup. That coup was fully supported and funded by <b>Sunni Arab dictatorships, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates</b> to defeat the Muslim Brotherhood. In contrast, Iran have its full support to the Shia groups across the Arab world.'</p>	
<p><b>'The Middle East's crisis is Europe's too' (09.09.2015)</b></p>	<p>'What's happening in <b>Egypt, gripped by a military dictatorship and the start of a nation-wide insurgency</b>, is the direct consequence of the British, French, German and American <b>abandonment of the democratic process</b>. As I wrote earlier this year, migration from North Africa was actually dropping until the military coup in 2013, according to Frontex the European Border Agency. If Egypt fails as a state – as it could well do - Egyptians would have no other direction to turn than northwards. The numbers taking to the boats would increase exponentially.</p>	<p>Egypt (under Sisi's leadership)</p>
<p><b>'The tragedy of the Hajj goes deeper than sectarian politics' (30.09.2015)</b></p>	<p><b>'Only when this legitimacy is earned in free elections, when citizens have rights, and guests have even more, when ministerial portfolios are awarded on merit</b>, rather than handed down as the goods and chattel from</p>	<p>Saudi Arabia</p>

	prince to princeling will the problems of the Hajj be addressed’.	
<b>‘The Emirati plan for ruling Egypt’ (21.11.2015)</b>	‘In his conversations with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, King Salman has made no secret of his wish to keep the military in charge of Egypt. Saudi Arabia regards the Egyptian military as the only guarantor the country’s stability, and it is <b>stability rather than democracy that concerns Riyadh.</b>	Saudi Arabia
<b>‘The king’s speech’ (30.03.2016)</b>	‘As long as there is <b>no real democratic</b> solution in the Middle East, the Islamic State group will continue to mutate like a pathogen that has become antibiotic-resistant in the body politic of the Middle East. Each time it changes shape, it will become more virulent.  The struggle, conflict and the chaos will continue until the peoples of the region manage to break their shackles and rediscover the spirit of Tahrir square. By that time, the likes of Abdullah, Mohamed bin Zayed, Sisi and Dahlan will be long gone.’	Saudi Arabia  UAE  Egypt (under Sisi’s leadership)  Libya
<b>‘It’s open season on the Muslim Brotherhood’ (20.04.2016)</b>	‘IS’s attack on the ‘Murtadd Brotherhood’ rested on two counts: ‘Meeting “tyrants” such as the Iranian supreme leader and maintaining a relationship with Shia nations through Hamas is one. The second one was more interesting. <b>It was that the</b>	Egypt (under Sisi’s leadership)

	<b>Brotherhood was guilty of the sin of democracy.</b> This, it defines, as a “religion that gives supreme authority to people rather than Allah”.	
<b>‘Three potential motives behind the tension between Qatar and its Gulf neighbours’ (02.06.2017)</b>	‘The first motive is that both Mohammed bin Salman, the deputy crown prince of Saudi, and Mohammed bin Zayed, the Crown prince of Abu Dhabi, see Trump as an opportunity to finish the job started in June 2013 when Morsi was toppled. <b>The counter-revolution against freely elected governments have not been going that well.</b> Egypt still has not stabilised after the billions of dollars spent on it. Three different governments vie for power in Libya. The Egyptian and Emirati place man Khalifa Haftar is taking his time marching towards Tripoli and the Houthis are still in control of Yemen’s capital, Sana’a.’	Egypt (under Sisi’s leadership)
<b>July 3: The end of one revolution and the start of another (06.07.2017)</b>	‘It is no coincident that the deadline Qatar was given to comply with Saudi Arabia’s 13 demands fell on 3 July, <b>the fourth anniversary of the military coup in Egypt that ousted the country’s first democratically elected president.</b>	Egypt (under Sisi’s leadership)
<b>What the UAE fears most: Democracy (23.08.2017)</b>	<b>‘What makes Qaradawi a threat to the ruling elites has nothing to do with Islam. It is the fact he provides an alternative reading and that the</b>	UAE



	<p><b>Muslim Brotherhood continues to have democratic legitimacy’.</b></p> <p><b>‘That is what Otaiba and his like fear. It is called democracy.</b> And that is why their plans are doomed. They can intervene, install dictators, and arrange coups. They can apply maximum force. They can never, however, govern with consent.’</p>	
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Source: Compiled by author using data from Hearst (2014a; 2014b; 2014c; 2014d; 2015a; 2015b; 2015c; 2015d; 2016a; 2016b; 2017a; 2017b; 2017c).

## Appendix G

Bias in favour of the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas, or other Islamists in Middle East  
Eye articles by Managing Editor between 15 April 2014 and 20 July 2018

Article title/published date	Quotation
<p><b>‘The bubble bursts in Egypt’ (30.05.2014)</b></p>	<p>‘A few days before the election the US polling organisation, Pew published a remarkable poll which found that only 54 percent of Egyptians said they favoured the military takeover; <b>and while its popularity has declined, 38 percent of Egyptians still have a favourable impression of the Muslim Brotherhood, which is now officially branded as a terrorist organisation. This means that despite everything that has happened to them this year, mass arrest, mass death sentences, the support for the Brotherhood has remained constant.</b> Pew found that dissatisfaction in Egypt was back to pre-revolutionary levels’</p>
<p><b>‘Israel has Egypt’s over a barrel’ (09.06.2014)</b></p>	<p>‘It took the US Central Intelligence Agency 60 years to admit its involvement in the 1953 overthrow of Mohammad Mossadeq, Iran’s first democratically elected prime minister. The circumstances around the overthrow of <b>Egypt’s first democratically elected president Mohamed Morsi</b>, many not take as long to come to light, regardless who is behind it’.</p>
<p><b>Blair and the Gulf neo-cons (03.07.2014)</b></p>	<p>‘A year ago, the Brotherhood had three clear options. They could, as the Egyptian army expected them to do, have gone quietly to prison. This happened at least four times before in history when faced with major state repression in 1948, 1954, the 1980’s and under Mubarak. Reformism, the belief the state can be changed from within, was all too deeply ingrained in the Brotherhood’s thinking and they could have accepted the military yoke.</p>

	<p><b>They didn't, to their credit. But neither did they dissolve, and nor they chose violent resistance. They chose a forth path – to keep struggling in peaceful demonstrations and set-ins, and in campaigns of civil disobedience. By doing this, the Brotherhood have kept their political base in fact. All reliable polls such as Pew attest to this'.</b></p> <p>'So its not just the Saudis, Emiratis and Sisi who seek the end of the Brotherhood. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi wants to join in as well. Is it really in Western interests for him to succeed? <b>Is it really wise to reduce the choice of Arabs to jihadists and fascist military generals?</b> Is that a recipe for peace in the Middle East? Is that what David Cameron wants, if he stopped to think it through? <b>Does he really want to suppress the one political Islam force capable of calming the situation down?</b></p>
<p><b>'The bitter fruits of Egyptian mediation on Gaza' (08.08.2014)</b></p>	<p><b>'For Hamas and the other militant groups in Gaza the situation is crystal clear: they are confident of their ability to continue; they have the support of the people of Gaza, and they see international opinion on the siege changing.</b> They can also see the hesitancy in Israel about unleashing another round of <i>sturm und drang</i> on Gaza'.</p>
<p><b>'Management that is doomed to fail' (22.09.2014)</b></p>	<p>'Sawers should ask himself what happens if Sisi succeeds? What if political Islam is crushed and made irrelevant? <b>What if the Muslim Brotherhood gives up and the voice of millions of Egyptians, Libyans, Tunisians are silenced in a series of hard or soft coups?</b> Would any European security service be up to managing the follow?'</p>
<p><b>'Defeat could turn out an advantage for Tunisia's Islamists' (29.10.2014)</b></p>	<p><b>Considering what has been thrown at it in the last two years –all the money at the command of the Saudis and Emiratis, the media campaign, the arrests, imprisonment and torture, the Brotherhood enjoys a hard and</b></p>

	<b>increasingly hardened core of support across the Arab World.</b>
<b>‘The many faces of Sisi’ (08.02.2015)</b>	‘Abdel Fattah al-Sisi is an actor of some talent. To the revolutionary leaders in Tahrir square, and to the youth leaders he met, he was the general who told them the army was on their side. To <b>Egypt’s first democratically elected president, Mohamed Morsi</b> , he was the religiously observant officer, whose hands shook when told he would replace Hussein Tantawi as commander-in-chief. To liberals like Mohammed ElBaradei, Sisi was the man who would get rid of Morsi and hand over power to a civilian government. To America, Europe and Israel, he was a Westerner, to Nasirites, and Arab nationalist.’
<b>‘It’s open season on the Muslim Brotherhood’ (20.04.2016)</b>	‘IS’s attack on the ‘Murtadd Brotherhood’ rested on two counts: ‘Meeting “tyrants” such as the Iranian supreme leader and maintaining a relationship with Shia nations through Hamas is one. The second one was more interesting. <b>It was that the Brotherhood was guilty of the sin of democracy.</b> This, it defines, as a “religion that gives supreme authority to people rather than Allah”. <p>‘Each has different motives to crush representative democracy. IS fears it as an enemy, more lethal than any precision-guided bomb. And they are right to do so. <b>The Arab autocrats fear the Brotherhood because it challenges their legitimacy.</b> Western powers have little desire to deal with a movement which is intellectually and politically independent of it, and which challenges a Middle East order founded on the maintenance and protection of Israel at the cost of regional peace.’</p>
<b>‘The frantic intrigue of</b>	‘The story of the court intrigues in Abdullah’s last days, and the leaked recordings in Egypt which have come out since then, show something that was not immediately apparent in

<b>Abdullah’s final hours’ (16.02.2015)</b>	<b>June 2013, when Egypt’s first elected president Mohammed Morsi was overthrown</b> by his army, after mass demonstrations against his rule.
<b>‘What the UAE fears most: Democracy’ (23.08.2017)</b>	<b>‘What makes Qaradawi a threat to the ruling elites has nothing to do with Islam. It is the fact he provides an alternative reading and that the Muslim Brotherhood continues to have democratic legitimacy’.</b>

Source: Compiled by author using data from Hearst (2014b; 2014e; 2014f; 2014g; 2014h; 2014i; 2015e; 2015f; 2016b; 2017a).

## Appendix H

Bias against the Anti-Terror Quartet in Middle East Eye articles by Managing Editor  
from 15 April 2014 to 20 July 2018, categorised by media origin

Article title	Quote	Referred source
<i>Qatar-funded media</i>		
<b>‘Playing with ceasefires’ (2014)</b>	‘So now we know. The Egyptian ceasefire initiative was neither an initiative – in the sense that anyone had consulted one of the combatants – nor was it Egyptian. According to the <b>Arabi 21</b> website, the initiative was concocted by the Israelis and Tony Blair. Further, it was published, against US wishes, to stymie a rival proposal being hammered out by Qatar’.	Arabi21
<b>‘Has Iran overreached itself in Yemen?’ (2015)</b>	‘Mohamed Bukhaiti, a member of the Houthi Political Council told <b>Al Jazeera</b> on Monday: ‘I say to Saudi Arabia, it will bear the responsibility of any intervention, and we stress that any intervention will be end of the Al-Sa‘ud regime in the Arabian Peninsula’.	al-Jazeera
<b>‘Has Iran overreached itself in Yemen?’ (2015)</b>	‘This question was put, intriguingly, by another Iranian proxy on whom the Houthis are modelled – Hezbollah. <b>Arabi 21</b> quotes sources in the ‘upper elements within the party’s	Arabi21

	<p>leadership” as expressing concern at the repercussions of the Houthi take over in Yemen’.</p> <p>‘Obviously there is not one Iran, but power blocks within it pursuing their own, at times contradictory, agenda. The same <b>Arabi 21</b> article mentioned criticism within political levels of Hezbollah of the behaviour of Qassim Suleimani, the famed commander of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards, whom they accused of ‘no longer reading the scene (in Iraq) except through the mindset of a martyrdom seeker’.</p>	
<p><b>‘How Yemen’s Saleh danced on the heads of the CIA’ (2015)</b></p>	<p>‘The claims that Hani Muhammad Mujahid makes control be verified. What he said about his time as a foot soldier for al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and Waziristan “tracks” with what a former director of counter-terrorism for the CIA knew at the time. But no one can confirm the claim itself. But neither can they ignore it. For it just part of the investigation carried out by <b>Al Jazeera’s</b> Clayton Swisher is true, it throws a rather large spanner into the works of the war on terror’.</p>	<p>al-Jazeera</p>

<p><b>‘Al Jazeera’s Ahmed Mansour 1:Sisi 0’ (2015)</b></p>	<p>‘In 2004, only news organization stayed in Fallujah to report one of the bloodiest battles the US fought in the Iraq War. It was only thanks to <b>Al Jazeera’s</b> reporter Ahmed Mansour and its cameramen Layth Mustaq that the world knew what was going on in the city. Their reports so upset the US military, that it made Mansour’s exit from the city a condition of a ceasefire. Donald Rumsfeld called his reporting “vicious and inaccurate”. There can be no higher accolade for a war reporter.’</p>	<p>al-Jazeera</p>
<p><b>‘ Hamas leader says group, Israel holding peace talks’ (2015)</b></p>	<p>‘The interview, published in UK-based <b>Al-Araby al-Jadeed</b>, comes on the back of mounting speculation that talks between long-times foes Israel and Hamas about a lasting ceasefire were ongoing’.</p>	<p>(published in UK-based) <i>al-Araby al-Jadeed</i></p>
<p><b>‘Sisi’s Egypt pushes migrants into the sea’ (2016)</b></p>	<p>‘A security source quoted by <b>Arabi 21</b> named the Al-Tabu tribe, allied with Haftar, as being active in the transportation of thousands of illegal emigrants from south to north, using routes under their protection. While 40 percent of the human traffic goes northwards, the same source said that 30 percent travelled westwards from the</p>	<p>A security source quoted by Arabi21</p>



	<p>Egyptian border. Further he said Egyptian army officers get a cut of this traffic, as indeed they do from any trade done in Egypt:</p> <p>“He added that each person says 100 Libyan dinars to the Awlad Ali smugglers on the Egyptian side so as to be conveyed to the border town of Imsaed via a smuggling network run by officers within the Egyptian army and intelligence services who receive a commission for each emigrant they smuggle”.</p>	
<p><b>‘Who speaks for Muslims? The Saudis, the Turks or the Germans?’ (2017)</b></p>	<p>‘According to Arabi 21, Abbas has been assured that the US embassy will only be relocated to West Jerusalem. So that’s okay then. Who exactly told Abbas this is not clear – but the message from his Arab borders is clear. If he sticks his neck out, they will not have his back’.</p>	Arabi21
<p><b>‘Yemen president says UAE acting like occupiers’ (2017)</b></p>	<p>‘According to Arabi 21, Bin Salman is said to have declared Riyadh’s support for “all the decisions, measures and arrangements that support legitimacy and put in order the security and military situation in Aden and the rest of the provinces”.</p>	Arabi21

<p><b>‘Jordan fears ‘turmoil’ as Saudis rush to embrace Israel’ (2017)</b></p>	<p>“Things in Syria are going to the benefit of Iran and its allies. The Jordanian approach was to try to open channels with Iran and Russia and to calm down the Iranians and have some sort of agreement in the south,” MEE’s source said. “But the Saudis are in full confrontation mode, destabilizing Lebanon. If Iran wants to retaliate, it could retaliate across the whole region, which could affect Jordan directly and that is the last thing Jordan would want them to do”. When passed by the Saudis, Jordan scaled back its diplomatic relations with Qatar, but notably did not cut them as Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates and Egypt did on the day the blockade was announced. Jordan did, however, close the office of <b>Al Jazeera</b>, the Qatari television network which Saudi has called on Doha to shut down.</p>	<p>Jordan did, however, close the office of al-Jazeera, the Qatari television network which Saudi has called on Doha to shut down.</p>
<p><i>The Anti-Terror Quartet</i></p>		
<p><b>‘The many faces of Sisi’ (2015)</b></p>	<p>‘On Saturday night the most significant of the leaks to date was broadcast, as they concerned conversations about Egypt’s Gulf donors. When the Turkey -based Egyptian satellite TV channel <b>Mekameleen</b> broadcast the audio</p>	<p>(the Turkey -based Egyptian satellite TV channel) Mekameleen</p>

	recordings, the satellite link was jammed. The contents quickly came out on YouTube.’	
<b>‘Why the Mekameleen tapes could topple Sisi’s government’ (2015)</b>	‘JP French rejected the possibility that the tapes, which had been broadcast by <b>Mekameleen</b> , a pro-Brotherhood satellite channel in Turkey, had been fabricated or manipulated electronically’.	Mekameleen (a pro-Brotherhood satellite channel in Turkey)
<b>‘The staying of the Saudi spider’ (2015)</b>	‘Bin Nayef, the son, has more recent scores to settle with Abu Dhabi’s ruler. <b>Erem News</b> , which like every Emirati news outlet is controlled by the royal court, questioned bin Nayef’s appointment as deputy crown prince. Saying that Salman failed to consult the <b>Allegiance Council</b> , the UAE mouthpiece noted: “The mechanism of choosing Mohammad Bin Nayef from among several prominent grandsons has attracted the attention of observers’.	Erem News (which like every Emirati news outlet is controlled by the royal court); Allegiance Council (the UAE mouthpiece)
<b>‘Audio forensics experts authenticate Sisi’s voice on leaked tapes’ (2015)</b>	‘After the tapes were aired by the Turkey-based Egyptian satellite TV channel <b>Mekamellen</b> , which supports the Muslim Brotherhood, Egyptian Prime Minister Ibrahim Nahlab responded saying the channel had an axe to grind. “Nobody in Egypt believes the channels of the Muslim	(Turkey-based Egyptian satellite TV channel) Mekamellen, (which supports the Muslim Brotherhood)

	Brotherhood,” Mahlab said. ‘They won’t be able to change the situation on the ground’.	
<b>‘Iran orders Hezbollah to target Saudi Arabia’ (2016)</b>	‘Shukr’s appointment comes despite earlier reports in the Saudi-owned <b>Asharq al-Awsat</b> suggesting that Badreddine’s nephew Mustafa Mughniyeh would be named as his successor’.	(Saudi-owned) <i>Asharq al-Awsat</i>
<b>‘UAE ‘funnelled [sic.] money to Turkish coup plotters’ (2016)</b>	‘Throughout the night of the coup on 15 July, pan-Arab media based in Dubai including <b>Sky News Arabic</b> and <b>Al Arabiya</b> reported that the coup against Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and the ruling Justice and Development party had been successful’.	(Pan-Arab media based in Dubai including) Sky News Arabic and al-Arabiya
<b>‘Sisi’s Egypt pushes migrants into the sea’ (2016)</b>	‘But the prediction of an Egyptian-backed intervention came true. On 14 February last year, <b>Al Arabiya News Channel</b> aired a video of Khalifa Haftar, a former Gaddafi general, announcing the suspension of parliament and government and presenting a five-point road map for the country. His coup was dismissed by the Libyan prime minister at the time, Ali Zeidan, who said Haftar “can say whatever he wants to say or dream of doing”.	Al Arabiya News Channel

<p><b>Three potential motives behind the tension between Qatar and its Gulf neighbours (2017)</b></p>	<p>‘The hacking of Qatar News Agency on 24 May was just the starting pistol. Within minutes of the hack at 12:14 am, <b>Al Arabiya TV</b> and <b>Sky News Arabia</b> quoted the text of the fake material. Within 20 minutes, the networks ran analyses, implications, quotes and tweets’.</p>	<p>al-Arabiya TV and Sky News Arabia (quoted the text of the <i>fake</i> material).</p>
<p><b>Three potential motives behind the tension between Qatar and its Gulf neighbours (2017)</b></p>	<p>‘The Saudi newspaper <b>al Eqtisadiah</b> tweeted that the tradition of transferring power in Qatar was from father to preferred son, rather than from father to eldest son. It further tweeted that 40 percent of the oil revenues were shared out among the al-Thani royal family.</p>	<p>(The Saudi newspaper) <i>al- Eqtisadiah</i></p>
<p><b>‘The Trump effect: How the political offensive against Qatar started’ (2017)</b></p>	<p>‘Fake news or not, the Saudi and Emirati-controlled media went to town. Saudi-owned <b>Al Arabiya</b>, <b>Al Ekhbariya</b> and the Emirati-co owned <b>Sky News Arabia</b> cancelled their schedules and gave the fake news piece wall-to-wall coverage throughout the night. The media coverage given to the fake news report was so swift and so complete, it could only have been pre-planned. It took some hours for the dozy Qataris to react with a denial, but even this was</p>	<p>(Fake news or not, the Saudi and Emirati-controlled media went to town. Saudi-owned) al-Arabiya, al- Ekhbariya (and the Emirati-co owned) Sky News Arabia</p> <p><b>al-Arabiya</b> (published) <b>“proof”</b> (that the emir’s speech was not hacked).</p>

	<p>ignored or not carried until the morning.</p> <p>The offensive against Qatar continued on Wednesday. <b>Al Arabiya</b> published “<b>proof</b>” that the emir’s speech was not hacked. The article however did not address the fact that the news ticker shown on the screen had been manipulated. The UAE’s foreign ministry announced it was banning all Qataris news websites.</p>	
<p><b>‘Why Hamas was not on the Saudi list of demands for Qatar’ (2017)</b></p>	<p>‘A pro-regime Egyptian newspaper <b>Al Fajer</b>, went further: Dahlan, it reported, will lead the government in Gaza, control the crossing with Egypt and Israel and the finance, while Hamas will keep the interior ministry and its employees will be treated as part of the administration. This may not materialise, but it at least shows the direction of travel’.</p>	<p>(A pro-regime Egyptian newspaper) <i>Al Fajer</i></p>
<p><b>‘July 3: The end of one revolution and the start of another’ (2017)</b></p>	<p>‘The week before, Abdulrahman al-Rasheed, the former general manager of the Saudi-owned <b>Al Arabiya TV</b>, wrote of Qatar: “It is threatening and warning that the confrontation will be similar to what happened at the ‘Safwan tent’ but we fear for Doha as it may be like the ‘Rabaa Square!’”</p>	<p>(Saudi-owned) Al Arabiya TV</p>

<p><b>‘Shariq quit Egypt election bid after threats of ‘sex tape’ and corruption slurs: Sources’ (2017)</b></p>	<p>‘The latest revelations come after <b>Mekameleen</b>, a Turkish-based Egyptian opposition television station, broadcast audio of conversations between an Egyptian security official and a prominent TV host, in which the official ordered him to prepare a show reel discrediting Shariq negotiations with him go wrong’.</p>	<p><b>Mekameleen</b>, (a Turkish-based Egyptian opposition television station)</p>
<p><i>MENA</i></p>		
<p><b>‘The tragedy of the Hajj goes deeper than sectarian politics’ (2015)</b></p>	<p>‘The numbers alone of those who perished are now the subject of bitter controversy. <b>Iran’s Press TV</b> published reports claiming that over 4,000 pilgrims had been killed. Indian and Pakistani authorities claimed that Saudis told foreign diplomats that over 1000 had been killed, while Saudi Arabia itself put the death toll of 769, although the figure is rising’.</p>	<p>Iran’s Press TV</p>
<p><b>For Saudi Arabia, it’s been Operation Shoot Yourself In The Foot (2017)</b></p>	<p>‘Only two months ago, the commander of the Sudanese Army’s rapid support force, Lieutenant General Mohammed Hamdan Hamidati, quoted a figure of 412 troops killed, including 14 officers to the Sudanese newspaper <b>Al Akhbar</b>’.</p>	<p>(Sudanese newspaper) al-Akhbar</p>
<p><i>International</i></p>		

<p><b>‘Mohammed bin Nayef’s ‘painkiller addiction’ story a Saudi hit job’ (2017)</b></p>	<p>‘There was one detail that <b>Reuters, the Wall Street Journal</b> and the <b>New York Times</b> omitted to mention when they published stories claiming that Mohammed bin Nayef had been deposed as crown prince of Saudi Arabia over an addiction to pain killing drugs. And that was the source of these claims.’</p>	<p>Reuters, <i>the Wall Street Journal</i>, <i>the New York Times</i></p>
<p><b>‘Saudi Arabia tried to host Taliban office, says former mujahidin’ (2017)</b></p>	<p><i>‘The New York Times</i> published leaked emails from the Emirati ambassador to Washington Yousef al-Otaiba which revealed that the UAE had originally sought to host the Taliban liaison office’.</p>	<p><i>The New York Times</i></p>

Source: Compiled by author using data from Hearst (2014j; 2015d; 2015e; 2015g; 2015h; 2015i; 2015j; 2015k; 2015l; 2015m; 2016c; 2016d; 2016e; 2017b; 2017c; 2017d; 2017e; 2017f; 2017g; 2017h; 2017i; 2017j; 2017k).



## Appendix I

Titles indicating a pro-Qatari agenda in Middle East Eye articles by  
Managing Editor from 15 April 2014 to 20 July 2018

Date	Title
<b>30.07.2014</b>	‘Saudi Arabia’s crocodile tears over Gaza’
<b>08.08.2014</b>	‘The bitter fruits of Egyptian mediation on Gaza’
<b>29.11.2014</b>	‘Saudi crapshoot in Yemen’
<b>21.11.2014</b>	‘Blowback in Yemen: Houthi advance is a Saudi nightmare’
<b>08.02.2015</b>	‘The many faces of Sisi’
<b>16.02.2015</b>	‘The frantic intrigue of Abdullah’s final hours’
<b>30.01.2015</b>	‘The slaying of the Saudi spider’
<b>30.06.2015</b>	‘Sisi is pushing Egypt to the brink’
<b>12.11.2015</b>	‘Sisi must go, before it is too late’
<b>21.11.2015</b>	‘The Emirati plan for ruling Egypt’
<b>01.03.2016</b>	‘Who are you, Sisi?’
<b>14.04.2016</b>	‘Sisi’s stature melting away’
<b>20.04.2016</b>	‘It’s open seasons on the Muslim Brotherhood’
<b>21.09.2016</b>	‘Sisi is a dead man walking’
<b>02.11.2016</b>	‘Saudi Arabia reaps what it has sowed’
<b>17.05.2017</b>	‘Why Saudi Arabia would rather pay a ransom to Trump than support its own people’
<b>21.06.2017</b>	‘Mohammed bin Salman, Saudi Arabia’s prince of chaos’
<b>25.11.2017</b>	‘For Saudi Arabia, it’s been Operation Shoot Yourself in The Foot’
<b>13.07.2018</b>	‘When will the Saudis learn that Trump is toxic?’

Source: Compiled by author using data from Hearst (2014a; 2014h; 2014k; 2014l; 2015b; 2015f; 2015m; 2015n; 2015o; 2016b; 2016f; 2016g; 2016h; 2016i; 2017h; 2017l; 2017m; 2018).

## Appendix J

### The mega-events hosted in Qatar

Past events	Annual events (year of introduction)
1988 Asian Football Cup	ATP Tennis Tournament Doha (1993)
1995 Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) U-20 World Cup	Qatar Masters Golf Tournament (2008)
1999 Handball World Junior C'ships	Fédération Internationale de Motocyclisme (FIM) Moto Motor Racing World C'ships (2004)
2004 Asian Handball C'ships	International Federation for Equestrian Sports (FEI) Equestrian Global Champion Tour (2008)
2004 International Table Tennis Federation (ITTF) World Team T. Tennis C'ships	Women's Tennis Association (WTA) Tour Tennis C'ships (2008)
2005 Asian Basketball C'ships	International Association of Athletics Federations (IAAF) Diamond League (2010)
2005 World Weightlifting C'ships	International Handball Federation (IHF) Handball Super Globe (2010)
2005 West Asian Games	Fédération Internationale de Volleyball (FIVB) Club World C'ships (2010)
2006 Asian Sailing C'ships	<b>Failed bids</b>
2006 Asian Games	2017 International Association of Athletics Federations (IAAF) World Athletic C'ships
2008 Asian Indoor Athletic C'ships	2016 Olympic Games
2008 Asian Youth Wrestling C'ships	2020 Olympic Games
2008 Asian Optimist Sailing C'ship	

2009 13 <sup>th</sup> Qatar Table Tennis C'ship	
2009 Asian Fencing C'ships	
2009 Fédération Internationale de Volleyball (FIVB) Club World C'ships	
2009 International Seed Federation (ISF) World Gymnasiade	
2010 International Associations of Athletics Federations (IAAF) World Indoor C'ships	
2010 International Sailing Federation (ISAF) World Junior 470 Sailing C'ships	
2011 Asian Football Cup	
2011 12th Arab Games	
2012 Asian Shooting C'ships	
2012 Fédération Internationale de Natation (FINA)/ARENA Swimming World Cup	
2013 FINA/ARENA Swimming World Cup	
2014 FINA Short Course World C'ships	
2015 International Handball Federation (IHF) Handball World C'ships	
2016 Union Cycliste Internationale (UCI) Road Cycling World C'ships	
2018 Fédération Internationale de Gymnastique (FIG) Artistic World Gymnastics C'ships	

Source: Reiche (2014:5).

## Appendix K

Sports team officials, coaches and assistant coaches accredited with sport federations by place of work and nationality between 2013/2014 and 2017-2018

Sports Team Officials Accredited with Sports Federations by Place of Work and Nationality, 2013/2014-2017/2018

Place of Work and Nationality	Total			Clubs			Teams/Associations			
	Year	Tot al	Non-Qatar is	Qatar is	Tot al	Non-Qatar is	Qatar is	Tot al	Non-Qatar is	Qatar is
	<b>2013/2014</b>	318	121	197	158	88	70	160	33	127
	<b>2014/2015</b>	670	388	282	532	364	168	138	24	114
	<b>2015/2016</b>	718	371	347	521	341	180	197	30	167
	<b>2015/2016</b>	718	371	347	521	341	180	197	30	167
	<b>2016/2017</b>	396	171	225	260	149	111	136	22	114
	<b>2017/2018</b>	604	367	237	501	345	156	103	22	81

Coaches Accredited with sport federations by place of work and nationality  
2013/2014-2017/2018

Place of Work and Nationality	Total			Clubs			Teams/Associations		
	Year	Total	Non-Qataris	Qataris	Total	Non-Qataris	Qataris	Total	Non-Qataris
2013/2014	921	819	102	631	544	87	290	275	15
2014/2015	984	953	31	651	641	10	333	312	21
2015/2016	886	856	30	599	582	17	287	274	13
2016/2017	696	680	16	461	455	6	235	225	10
2017/2018	826	787	39	637	612	25	189	175	14

Assistant coaches accredited with sports federations, by place of work and nationality, 2013/2014-2017/2018

Place of Work and Nationality	Total			Clubs			Teams/Associations		
	Year	Total	Non-Qataris	Qataris	Total	Non-Qataris	Qataris	Total	Non-Qataris
2013/2014	227	181	46	93	71	22	134	110	24

<b>2014/2015</b>	214	<b>167</b>	<b>47</b>	69	<b>53</b>	<b>16</b>	145	<b>114</b>	<b>31</b>
<b>2015/2016</b>	281	<b>227</b>	<b>54</b>	150	<b>118</b>	<b>32</b>	131	<b>109</b>	<b>22</b>
<b>2016/2017</b>	159	<b>130</b>	<b>29</b>	52	<b>42</b>	<b>10</b>	107	<b>88</b>	<b>19</b>
<b>2017/2018</b>	1,141	<b>988</b>	<b>153</b>	1054	<b>911</b>	<b>143</b>	87	<b>77</b>	<b>10</b>

Source: Planning and Statistics Authority (2017).

## Appendix L

### Member States of the OCA, UCI, FIG, and FIFA

#### Members of the Olympic Council of Asia (OCA)

<b>States-members</b>					
Afghanistan	Bangladesh	Bhutan	Bahrain	Brunei Darussalam	Cambodia
People's Republic of China	Hong Kong, China	Indonesia	India	Iran, Islamic Republic of	Iraq
Jordan	Japan	Kazakhstan	Kyrgyzstan	Korea, Republic of	Saudi Arabia
Kuwait	Lao People's Democratic Republic	Lebanon	Macau, China	Malaysia	Maldives
Mongolia	Myanmar	Nepal	Oman	Pakistan	Philippines
Palestine	Korea, Democratic People's Republic of	Qatar	Singapore	Sri Lanka	Syrian Arab Republic
Thailand	Tajikistan	Turkmenistan	Timor-Leste	Chinese Taipei	United Arab Emirates
Uzbekistan	Vietnam	Yemen			

Source: OCA (2018)

UCI Continental Confederations and National Federations

<b>Confederation</b>	<b>Member-state</b>
<b>Confederation Africaine de Cyclisme (CAC)</b>	Algeria
	Angola
	Benin
	Botswana
	Burkina Faso
	Burundi
	Cameroon
	Cape Verde
	Central African Republic
	Chad
	Comoros
	Congo
	Democratic Republic of the Congo
	Djibouti
	Egypt
	Eritrea
	Ethiopia
	Gabon
	Gambia
	Ghana
	Guinea
	Guinea-Bissau
	Ivory Coast
	Kenya
	Lesotho
	Liberia
	Libya
Madagascar	
Malawi	



	Mali
	Mauritania
	Mauritius
	Morocco
	Mozambique
	Namibia
	Niger
	Nigeria
	Rwanda
	Sao Tome and Principe
	Senegal
	Seychelles
	Sierra Leone
	Somalia
	South Africa
	Sudan
	Swaziland
	Togo
	Tunisia
	Uganda
	United Republic of Tanzania
	Zambia
	Zimbabwe
<b>Asia</b>	Afghanistan
	Bahrain
	Bangladesh
	Brunei Darussalam
	Cambodia
	Chinese Taipei
	Democratic People's Republic of Korea
	Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste
	Hong Kong, China

	India
	Indonesia
	Iraq
	Islamic Republic of Iran
	Japan
	Jordan
	Kazakhstan
	Kuwait
	Kyrgyzstan
	Lao People's Democratic Republic
	Lebanon
	Macao, China
	Malaysia
	Mongolia
	Myanmar
	Nepal
	Oman
	Pakistan
	People's Republic of China
	Philippines
	Qatar
	Republic of Korea
	Saudi Arabia
	Singapore
	Sri Lanka
	Syrian Arab Republic
	Tajikistan
	Thailand
	Turkmenistan
	United Arab Emirates
	Uzbekistan
	Vietnam

	Yemen
<b>Europe</b>	Albania
	Andorra
	Armenia
	Austria
	Azerbaijan
	Belarus
	Belgium
	Bosnia-Herzegovina
	Bulgaria
	Croatia
	Cyprus
	Czech Republic
	Denmark
	Estonia
	Finland
	Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
	France
	Georgia
	Germany
	Great Britain
	Greece
	Hungary
	Iceland
	Ireland
	Israel
	Italy
	Kosovo
Latvia	
Liechtenstein	
Lithuania	

	Luxembourg
	Malta
	Monaco
	Montenegro
	Netherlands
	Norway
	Poland
	Portugal
	Republic of Moldova
	Romania
	Russian Federation
	San Marino
	Serbia
	Slovakia
	Slovenia
	Spain
	Sweden
	Switzerland
	Turkey
	Ukraine
<b>Oceania</b>	Australia
	Cook Islands
	Fiji
	Guam
	New Zealand
	Vanuatu
<b>Pan America</b>	Anguilla
	Antigua and Barbuda
	Argentina
	Aruba
	Bahamas
	Barbados

	Belize
	Bermuda
	Bolivian Republic of Venezuela
	Bolivia
	Brazil
	British Virgin Islands
	Canada
	Cayman Islands
	Chile
	Colombia
	Costa Rica
	Cuba
	Curacao
	Dominica
	Dominican Republic
	Ecuador
	El Salvador
	Grenada
	Guatemala
	Guyana
	Haiti
	Honduras
	Jamaica
	Mexico
	Nicaragua
	Panama
	Paraguay
	Peru
	Puerto Rico
	Saint Kitts and Nevis
	Saint Lucia
	Saint Vincent and the Grenadines

	St Maarten
	Suriname
	Trinidad and Tobago
	United States of America
	Uruguay
	Virgin Islands, US

Source: UCI (2019).

Fédération Internationale de Gymnastique:  
Affiliated Federations

Afghanis tan National Gymnasti c Federatio n	Albanian Gymnastics Federation	Deferatio n Algerien ne de Gymnast ique	Federacio Andorrana e Gymnastica	Federacao Angolana De Gynastica	Confederat ion Argentina De Gymnasia
Gymnasti cs Federatio n of Armenia	Federacion Gimnastico Arubano	Gymnast ics Federatio n of America n Samoa	Gymnastics Australia	Oesterreichi scher Fachverban d Fuer Turnen	Azerbaijan Gymnastic s Federation
Gymnasti cs Federatio n of the Bahamas	Bangladesh Gymnastics Federation	Barbados Amateur Gymnast ics Associati on	Federation Royale Belge De Gymnastiqu e	Federation Beninoise De Gymnastiqu e	Bermuda Gymnastic s Asosociati on
Gymnasti cs Federatio	Belarus Gymnastics Association	Federaci on Bolivian	Brazilian Gymnastics Federation	Bahrain Gymnastics Association	Federation Bulgare De

n of Bosnia Herzegovina		a De Gimnasia			Gymnastique
Federation of Burkina Faso	Cambodia Gymnastics Federation	Canadian Gymnastics Federation	Cayman Islands Gymnastics Federation	Federation Congolaise De Gymnastique	Federation National De Gimnasia De Chile
Chinese Gymnastics Association	Federation Camerounaise De Gymnastique	Cook Islands Gymnastics Federation	Federation Colombiana De Gimnasia	Cape Verdean Gymnastics Federation	Federacion Deportiva De Gimnasia Costa Rica
Croatian Gymnastics Federation	Federacion Cubana De Gimnasia	Cyprus Gymnastics Federation	Czech Gymnastic Federation	Danmarks Gymnastik Forbund	Federacion Dominicana De Gimnasia
Federacion Ecuatoriana De Gimnasia	Egypt Gymnastics Federation	Federacion Salvadorena De Gimnasia	Real Federacion Espanola De gimnasia	Estonian Gymnastics Federation	Ethiopian Gymnastic Federation
The Gymnastics Federation of Fiji	Finnish Gymnastics Federation Svoli	Federacion Francaise De Gymnastique	British Gymnastics	United Georgian Gymnastics Federation	DTB Deutscher Turner-Bund

Hellenic Gymnastics Federation	Fed. Nacional De Gimnasia De Guatemala	The gymnastics Association of Hong Kong, China	Federacion Hondurena De Gimnasia	Hungarian Gymnastics Federation	Persatuan Senam Indonesia
Gymnastics Federation of India	Gymnastic fed. of the Islamic Rep. of Iran	Gymnastics Ireland	Iraqi Gymnastics Federation	Iceland Gymnastics Federation	Israel Gymnastic Association
Federazione Gimnastica Italia	Jamaica Amateur Gymnastics Association	Jordan Gymnastics Federation	Japan Gymnastics Association	Gymnastic Federation of Kazakhstan	Gymnastics Federation of the Kyrgyz Republic
Korea Gymnastics Association	Kosova Gymnastic Federation	Saudi Arabian Gymnastics Federation	Kuwait Gymnastic Federation	Latvian Gymnastics Federation	Libyan Gymnastics Federation
Federation Libanaise De Gymnastique	Turnverband Liechtenstein	Lietuvos Gimnastikos Federacija	Federation Luxembourgeoise De Gymnastique	Federation Malgache De Gymnastique	Federation Royale Marocaine De Gymnastique
Malaysia Gymnastics	Union of Gymnastics	Federacion Mexicana	Mongolian Gymnastics Federation	Federation of Gymnastics	Malta Gymnastic



cs Federatio n	Fed.of the Rep. of Moldova	a De Gimnasi a		Sports of Macedonia	s Federation
Gymnasti c Federatio n of Montene gro	Federation Monegasque De Gymnastique	Federaca o De Ginastica de Mocamb ique	Mauritius Gymnastics Federation (Suspended)	Myanmar Gymnastic Federation	Namibian Gymnastic Federation
Federaci on Nicaragu ense De Gimnasia	Koninklijke Nederlandse Gymnastiek UNIE	Nepal Gymnast ics Associati on	Gymnastics Federation of Nideria	Norges Gymnastikk -og Turnforbun d	Gymnastic s New Zealand
Pakistan Gymnasti c Federatio n	Federacion Panamena De Gimnasia	Federaci on Paraguay a De Gimnasi a	Federacion Deportiva Peruana De Gimnasia	Gymnastics Association of the Philippines	Palestinian Gymnastic s Federation
Papua New Guinea Gymnasti cs Federatio n	Polish Gymnastic Association	Gymnast ics Federatio n of Portugal	Gymnastics Assoc. Dem. People's Rep. of Korea	Federacion Puertorriqu ena De Gimnasia	Qatar Gymnastic s Federation
Federatia Romana De Gimnasti ca	South African Gymnastics Federation	Federatio n De Gymnast ique De Russie	Comite Nat. Promotion Gymnastiqu e Senegal	Seychelles Gymnastic Federation (Suspended )	Singapore Gymnastic s

Slovenia Gymnastics Federation	Federazione Sammarinese Ginnastica	Gymnastics Federation of Serbia	National Gymnastic Association of Sri Lanka	Sudanese Gymnastics Federation	Schweizerischer Turnverband
Slovenska Gymnasticka Federacija	Svenska Gymnastikfoer bundet	Eswatini Gymnastics Federation	Federation Syrienne De Gymnastique	Tonga Gymnastics Federation	The Gymnastics Association of Thailand
Gymnastics Federation of Turkmenistan	Chinese Taipei Gymnastic Association	Trinidad and Tobago gymnastics Federation	Federation Tunisienne De Gymnastique	Turkiye Cimnastik Federasyonu	Gymnastics Association of Uganda
Ukraine Gymnastics Federation	Federacion Uruguya De Gimnasia	USA Gymnastics	Uzbekistan Gymnastics federation	Federacion Venezolana De Gimnasia	Assoc. De Gym. De La Rep. Soc. Du Vietnam
St Vincent and the Grenadines Gymnastics Ass.	Yemen Gymnastics Federation	Gymnastics Zimbabwe			

Source: FIG (2018).

National football teams with official FIFA membership

<i>Confederations</i>	<i>Associations</i>
Confederation of African Football (CAF)	Algeria
	Angola
	Benin
	Botswana
	Burkina Faso
	Burundi
	Cameron
	Cape Verde Islands
	Central African Republic
	Chad
	Comoros
	Congo
	Congo DR
	Cote d'Ivoire
	Djibouti
	Egypt
	Equatorial Guinea
	Eritrea
	Eswatini
	Ethiopia
	Gabon
	Gambia
	Ghana
	Guinea
	Guinea-Bissau
	Kenya
	Lesotho
	Liberia
	Libya

	Madagascar
	Malawi
	Mali
	Mauritania
	Mauritius
	Morocco
	Mozambique
	Namibia
	Niger
	Nigeria
	Rwanda
	Sao Tome e Principe
	Senegal
	Seychelles
	Sierra Leone
	Somalia
	South Africa
	South Sudan
	Sudan
	Tanzania
	Togo
	Tunisia
	Uganda
	Zambia
	Zimbabwe
Confederation of North, Central American and Caribbean Association Football (CONCACAF)	Anguilla
	Antigua and Barbuda
	Aruba
	Bahamas
	Barbados
	Belize
	Bermuda

	British Virgin Islands
	Canada
	Cayman Islands
	Costa Rica
	Cuba
	Curacao
	Dominica
	Dominican Republic
	El Salvador
	Grenada
	Guatemala
	Guyana
	Haiti
	Honduras
	Jamaica
	Mexico
	Montserrat
	Nicaragua
	Panama
	Puerto Rico
	St. Kitts and Nevis
	St. Lucia
	St. Vincent and the Grenadines
	Suriname
	Trinidad and Tobago
	Turks and Caicos Islands
	US Virgin Islands
	USA
South American Football Confederation (CONMEBOL)	Argentina
	Bolivia
	Brazil
	Chile

	Colombia
	Ecuador
	Paraguay
	Peru
	Uruguay
	Venezuela
Oceania Football Confederation (OFC)	American Samoa
	Cook Islands
	Fiji
	New Caledonia
	New Zealand
	Papua New Guinea
	Samoa
	Solomon Islands
	Tahiti
	Tonga
	Vanuatu
	Asian Football Confederation (AFC)
Australia	
Bahrain	
Bangladesh	
Bhutan	
Brunei Darussalam	
Cambodia	
China PR	
Chinese Taipei	
Guam	
Hong Kong	
India	
Indonesia	
IR Iran	
Iraq	

	Japan
	Jordan
	Korea DPR
	Korea Republic
	Kuwait
	Kyrgyz Republic
	Laos
	Lebanon
	Macau
	Malaysia
	Maldives
	Mongolia
	Myanmar
	Nepal
	Oman
	Pakistan
	Palestine
	Philippines
	Qatar
	Saudi Arabia
	Singapore
	Sri Lanka
	Syria
	Tajikistan
	Thailand
	Timor-Leste
	Turkmenistan
	United Arab Emirates
	Uzbekistan
	Vietnam
	Yemen
	Albania

The Union of European Football Associations (UEFA)	Andorra
	Armenia
	Austria
	Azerbaijan
	Belarus
	Belgium
	Bosnia and Herzegovina
	Bulgaria
	Croatia
	Cyprus
	Czech Republic
	Denmark
	England
	Estonia
	Faroe Islands
	Finland
	France
	FYR Macedonia
	Georgia
	Germany
	Gibraltar
	Greece
	Hungary
	Iceland
	Israel
	Italy
	Kazakhstan
	Kosovo
Latvia	
Liechtenstein	
Lithuania	
Luxembourg	



	Malta
	Moldova
	Montenegro
	Netherlands
	Northern Ireland
	Norway
	Poland
	Portugal
	Republic of Ireland
	Romania
	Russia
	San Marino
	Scotland
	Serbia
	Slovakia
	Slovenia
	Spain
	Sweden
	Switzerland
	Turkey
	Ukraine
	Wales

Source: FIFA (2019).

Appendix M

Relations: France and Qatar versus France and the Anti-Terror Quartet

Between 2009-2018

France-Qatar relations	France – The Anti-Terror Quartet relations			
	Saudi Arabia	The United Arab Emirates	Bahrain	Egypt
<b>Political relations</b>				
<b>Security and defence cooperation; hydrocarbons issues; combat terrorism;</b>	Combating terrorism; Security and defence	Hydrocarbon issues; security and defence cooperation (the installation of permanent French military bases in Abu Dhabi); joint projects in the field of renewable energy.	States are looking for improving their relations	historical ly strong links; close defence cooperati on
<b>Bilateral visits: French presidents to Qatar/ The Anti-Terror Quartet</b>				
<b>2013, 22-23 June - President Hollande’s official visit to Qatar;</b>  <b>2017, 7 December - President</b>	2017 –President Macron’s visit to Saudi Arabia;	2017, 8-9 November – visit to the UAE by the President of the French Republic;	2009, 11 February – visit of President Sarkozy to Manama;	2016, 17-19 April – visit to Egypt by the President

<b>Macron’s visit to Qatar, along with two ministers;</b>				of the French Republic ;
<b>Bilateral visits: Qatar/The Anti-Terror Quartet leaders to France</b>				
<b>2013, 21 September - working visit on the situation in Syria to France by Amir Tamim;</b>	The Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia’s visit to France: 2018 – visit of Mohammad bin Salman al-	The Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi visit to France: 2017, 21 June – visit to France by the Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi, Mohammad bin Zayed al-Nahyan;	2012, 23 July; 2014, 28 August, 2015, 8 September - the visit of the King of Bahrain, Shaykh Hamad bin Isa al-Khalifa to France;	2017, 23-25 October –visit of President Sissi to France;
<b>2014, 23-24 June – Amir Tamim’s visit to France;</b>	Sa’ud to France;			
<b>2017, 15 September –Amir Tamim’s visit to France;</b>				
<b>2018, 5 and 6 July - Amir Tamim’s visit to France;</b>				
<b>Bilateral visits: French ministers visit to Qatar/The Anti-Terror Quartet</b>				
<b>2017, 15 July and 3 September –visit to Doha by the French Minister of Europe and Foreign Affairs;</b>	2017, 24 January - visit to Saudi Arabia of the French Minister of Foreign Affairs and	2017, 15 July – visit to the UAE by the Minister for Europe and	2016, 21 January –visit of the French Minister of State for Foreign	2017, 8 June – visit to Egypt by the Minister for

	International Development;	Foreign Affairs;	Trade to Bahrain;	Europe and Foreign Affairs;
	2017, 9 November – visit to Saudi Arabia by the President of the French Republic;	2017, 6 September – visit to the UAE by the Minister of Culture;		2016, 25-28 May – visit to Egypt by the Minister of State for Development and Francophonie;
	2017, 15-16 November - visit to Saudi Arabia by the French Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs;	2018, 10-11 February – visit to Abu Dhabi and Dubai by the French Prime Minister for the World Government Summit;		2016, 20 December – visit to Egypt by the Minister of State for European Affairs;
		2018, 4 September – visit to the UAE by the French Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs;		2016, 9-10

		2018, 25 September – visit to the UAE by the Minister for the Armed Forces;		March – visit of the Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Development;
<b>Bilateral visits: Qatar/ ‘Anti-Terror’ ministers/officials visit to France</b>				
	2017, 6 October – visit to France by the Saudi Minister of Foreign Affairs;	The UAE Investment Authority’s visit to France:		2018, 5 April – visit to France by the Minister of Culture;
	2018, 5 January – visit to France by the Saudi Minister of Foreign Affairs;	2017, 5 October – visit to France by the President of the Executive Affairs Authority (EAA) of Abu Dhabi and CEO of the Mubadala Investment		2017, 6 October – visit to France by the Minister of Foreign Affairs;

		Company for the tenth session of the strategic dialogue between the UAE and France;		2017, 26 July – visit to France by the Minister of Foreign Affairs;
				2016, 29 September – visit of the Minister of State for Foreign Trade, the Promotion of Tourism and French nationals Abroad;
<b>Economic relation</b>				
<b>Qatar/ ‘Anti-Terror’ Trade</b>				
<b>French exports to Qatar – EUR 2bn (by 2017);</b>	French exports to Saudi Arabia – EUR 4.14bn (by 2016);	French exports to the UAE – EUR 3.4bn	French exports to Bahrain – EUR 235m	France ranked 11 among

<p><b>French imports to Qatar – EUR 680m (by 2017);</b></p> <p><b>Since 2014 bilateral trade has totalled more than EUR 2bn every year;</b></p> <p><b>Qatar represents France’s eighth - largest trade surplus at EUR 1.3bn (by 2017);</b></p>	<p>French imports to Saudi Arabia - EUR 3.8bn (by 2016), including oil imports EUR 2.37bn (62.5% of overall imports);</p> <p>Trade balance: EUR 348m in 2016 (by 2016);</p>	<p>(the UAE is the France’s second-largest export destination in the Gulf) (by 2017);</p> <p>French exports to the UAE, includes non-agrifood consumer goods, equipment goods and transport equipment;</p> <p>French imports to the UAE – EUR 1.1bn (dominated by hydrocarbons);</p> <p>Bilateral trade: EUR 4.5bn;</p>	<p>(2014) (mainly supply of aircraft to Gulf Air, Bahrain’s national airline);</p> <p>French imports from Bahrain – refined oil and aluminium;</p> <p>A trade surplus – EUR 26.1m (the first half of 2016)</p>	<p>Egypt’s trade partners for 2016/17 fiscal year (according to the Central Bank in Egypt);</p> <p>Trade balance – EUR 2.5bn (in 2017);</p>
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Investments				
<p><b>Qatari investments in France: Qatari investments in France were estimated at approximately EUR 25bn in 2016;</b></p> <p><b>In 2013 – establishment of the bilateral investment fund ‘Future French Champions’ endowed with EUR 300m (partnership between Qatar Investment Authority sovereign fund and the French Caisse des Depots et Consignations);</b></p> <p><b>The presence of French businesses in Qatar: In areas of infrastructure (preparation of the 2022 FIFA World Cup), the environment,</b></p>		<p>The UAE investments in France: The UAE is the second largest investor in France among the GCC states, after Qatar;</p>		



energy, and new technologies;				
<b>Further economic cooperation</b>				
<b>Future economic cooperation between Qatar and France: 2017- signed emblematic contracts worth EUR 16bn in the areas of defence, transport, aviation and clean-up.</b>	Future economic cooperation between Saudi Arabia and France: in the areas of resource management, sustainable cities, health and training, tourism and energy, in investment;	More than 600 French companies working in the UAE		France's economic presence in Egypt: 160 subsidiaries of French companies;  Signed emblematic contracts : in transport sector; military field;
<b>Cultural, scientific and technical cooperation</b>				
<b>Qatar-French cooperation in higher education and research:</b>	Cultural, educational and linguistic cooperation between France and Saudi Arabia:	Cultural cooperation between the UAE and France:	Cultural cooperation between France and Bahrain:	Egypt-French cooperation in higher education

<p><b>Qatar has invited major worldwide academic institutions to establish a branch in Education City; 2020 – the year of French culture in Qatar;</b></p>	<p>by 2018 - 1400 Saudi students are studying in France under King Abdullah’s scholarship programme); 2016 - the signature of a scientific collaboration agreement between the King Abdulaziz City for Science and Technology and the French National Centre for Scientific Research; 2016, 21-24 November – implementation of a symposium in Riyadh; Academic, vocational and health training between France and Saudi Arabia:</p>	<p>2017 – inaugurated the Louvre Abu Dhabi museum; 2016 – The Abu Dhabi Conference on cultural heritage in conflict situations. As the result, the establishment of the International Alliance for the Protection of Heritage in Conflict Areas (ALIPH); Educational cooperation between the UAE and France: 2006 – creation of the Paris-</p>	<p>2011- an agreement between the Arabian Gulf University and ESSEC Business School enabled the establishment of the French-Arabian Business School (FABS).</p>	<p>n and research; Institut Francais (French Institute) in Egypt, which has three sites (Alexandria, Cairo and Heliopolis); The French Research Institute for Development (IRD) and the Centre for Social, Judicial and Economic Documentation</p>
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	<p>2011 – based on the signed intergovernmental agreement implementation of a medical specialist training programme; Cultural outreach and French archaeological missions in the Saudi Arabia.</p>	<p>Sorbonne University Abu Dhabi.</p>		<p>and Study (CEDEJ); The French Institute of Oriental Archaeology (IFAO), the Centre d’Etudes Alexandrines (CEAlex), the French-Egyptian Centre for the Study of the Temples of Karnak (CFEETK).</p>
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Source: Compiled by author using data from France Diplomatie (2017; 2018a; 2018b; 2018c; 2018d).

Appendix N

Relations: Germany and Qatar versus Germany and The Anti-Terror Quartet  
Between 2008-2018

Germany-Qatar relations	Germany– The Anti-Terror Quartet relations			
	Saudi Arabia	The United Arab Emirates	Bahrain	Egypt
<b>Bilateral visits</b>				
<b>September, 2018- the visit of the Amir of Qatar to Germany;</b>	30 April, 2017 – the visit of the Federal Chancellor to Saudi Arabia;	July, 2017- the visit of Foreign Minister of Germany to the UAE;	October, 2008 – the visit of the King Bahrain to Germany;	28-31 October, 2018 – the visit of the President
<b>September, 2017- the visit of Amir of Qatar to Germany;</b>	2010 - the visit of the Federal Chancellor to Saudi Arabia;	2015- the visit of Economic Affairs Minister of Germany to the UAE;	May, 2010- the visit of the German Federal Chancellor to Bahrain;	Egypt’s President to Germany;
<b>October, 2016- the visit of the Qatari Foreign Minister to Germany;</b>	2007 - the visit of the Federal Chancellor to Saudi Arabia;	August, 2015- visit of the UAE Foreign Minister to Germany;	April, 2010 – the visit of the President of the German Bundestag to Bahrain;	4 July 2018 – the visit of the Egyptian Foreign Minister to Germany;
<b>March, 2014- the visit of the Federal Economic Affairs and Energy Minister to Qatar;</b>	February, 2017- the visit of Saudi Arabian Foreign Minister to Germany;	May, 2017- visit of Federal Chancellor	November, 2011- the visit of the Bahrain Crown Prince and the	16-18 February, 2018- attendance at the Munich Security
<b>September, 2014- visit of the Amir of Qatar to Germany;</b>	June, 2017- visit of Saudi Arabian Foreign			
<b>June, 2013- visit of the Federal Foreign Minister to Qatar;</b>				

<p><b>April, 2013 –visit of Qatari Prime Minister and Foreign Minister to Germany;</b>  <b>2010 –visit of the Federal Chancellor to Qatar;</b>  <b>2010- visit of the Amir of Qatar to Germany;</b></p>	<p>Minister to Germany;  July, 2017- visit of German Foreign Minister to Saudi Arabia;</p>	<p>of Germany to the UAE;  May, 2016- visit of the Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi to Germany;</p>	<p>Minister of Foreign Affairs to Germany;  October, 2014- visit of the Bahrain’s Foreign Affairs Minister to Germany;  February, 2015- the attendance of the Munich Security Conference by the Foreign Minister of Bahrain;  March, 2014 – the visit of the German Bundestag Vice-President to Bahrain;</p>	<p>Conference by Foreign Minister of Egypt;  October, 2017- the German’s Federal Minister for Economic Cooperation and Development visited Egypt;  June, 2017- the visit of the Egypt’s President to Germany on the invitation of Federal Chancellor to attend the G20Africa Partnership</p>
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				<p>Conference;  March, 2017- the visit of the Federal Chancellor to Egypt;  June, 2017- the visit of the President of the Egyptian Parliament to Germany;</p>
<b>Economic cooperation</b>				
<b>Trade</b>				
<p><b>2017- EUR 2.5bn was the volume of trade exchange between two states;</b></p>	<p>Saudi Arabia is Germany's second vital Arab trading partner;  Germany is the third largest supplier of Saudi Arabian imports;  2016 – bilateral trade between Germany and</p>	<p>2016 – German exports to the UAE was worth EUR 14.5bn;  2016 - German imports from the UAE - EUR 0.9bn;</p>	<p>2016 – the volume of bilateral trade was EUR 369.6m;</p>	<p>2017- the joint volume of trade was EUR 6bn</p>

	Saudi Arabia was EUR 7.3bn; German imports from Saudi Arabia was EUR 622m;			
<b>EUR 25bn – Qatar’s investments in German companies; 112 companies are owned by joint Qatar-German interests; 27 companies in Qatar are 100% owned by German businesses; There are 64 German companies operating in Doha, such as Audi, Deutsche Bank, Siemens, Solar World, Allianz, BMW, Thyssen Krupp;</b>	Renewable energy and industrial diversification are main issues in Saudi’s Vision 2030 and National Transformation Program 2020, and these are the key fields of German competence.	2009 – the German - Emirati Joint Council for Industry and Commerce was launched; 900 German companies work in the UAE;	50 German companies have offices in Bahrain;	Joint agreement on partnership in foster sustainable economic development; the waste management and water sector; energy efficiency and renewable energy;
<b>Cultural, scientific and technical cooperation</b>				

<p><b>2017- the Qatar-Germany Cultural Year;</b>  <b>2017- Qatar opened the Arab Cultural House in Berlin;</b>  <b>2008-2009- the German International School Doha was expanded as a German-Qatari International School.</b></p>	<p>2006 – signed intergovernmental agreement;  German schools in Jeddah and Riyadh;  Establishment of the German Academic Exchange Service lector at King Saud University in Riyadh.</p>	<p>2006-the German Academic Exchange Service and the Goethe Institut have sustained offices in Abu Dhabi; 21 cooperation partnership between education institutions and universities.</p>	<p>2013 – the Berlin-Brandenburg Academy of Sciences and Humanities and the Arabian Gulf University in Bahrain co-founded the first joint Arab-German Young Academy of Sciences and Humanities.</p>	<p>2007- the German-Egyptian Year of Science and Technology;  Since November , 2011 – joint partnership in climate and environmental protection.</p>
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Source: Compiled by author using data from Federal Foreign Office (2017; 2018; 2019a; 2019b; 2019c), Pathak (2018), Qatar Embassy in Berlin (2017), Seetharaman (2018).



## Appendix O

### Relations: the UK and Qatar versus the UK and The Anti-Terror Quartet

Between 2016-2018

UK-Qatar relations	UK– The Anti-Terror Quartet relations			
	Saudi Arabia	The United Arab Emirates	Bahrain	Egypt
<b>Bilateral visits</b>				
<b>19 September, 2018 – the visit of the Lord Mayor of London, an ambassador for the UK’s financial and professional services industry, to Qatar;</b>	30 November, 2018 - the meeting between Crown Prince and the UK’S Prime Minister during the G20 summit in Buenos Aires;	November, 2018- the visit of British foreign secretary to the UAE;	6-7 December, 2016 - the UK’s Prime Minister May visited to Bahrain and attendance of the annual meeting of leaders from the GCC;	11 February, 2018 – the visit of British Trade Envoy to Egypt;
<b>24 July, 2018 – the visit of Shaykh Tamim to the UK;</b>	14-15 July 2018 – the visit of the Minister of the Middle East and North Africa to Saudi Arabia;	November, 2018- the visit of UK Secretary of State for Defence to the UAE;	16 June, 2017- the meeting between the UK Foreign Secretary and the Foreign Minister of Bahrain;	23 September, 2017 – the visit of UK’s Trade Envoy to Egypt;
<b>9 July 2017- the visit of the UK’s Foreign Secretary to Qatar;</b>	8-9 July 2018 – visit of the UK Chancellor to Saudi Arabia;	16 June, 2017- the meeting between the UK’s Foreign Secretary and the Deputy Foreign	2017- the meeting between the UK Foreign Secretary and the Foreign Minister of Bahrain;	25 February, 2017 – the visit of the UK’s Foreign
<b>12 June, 2017- the meeting between the Qatari Foreign Minister and the UK’s Foreign Secretary;</b>	7-9 March, 2018 – the visit of Crown	November, 2018- the visit of British foreign secretary to the UAE;	6-7 December, 2016 - the UK’s Prime Minister May visited to Bahrain and attendance of the annual meeting of leaders from the GCC;	11 February, 2018 – the visit of British Trade Envoy to Egypt;
<b>March, 2017- the visit of the Qatar’s</b>		November, 2018- the visit of British foreign secretary to the UAE;	6-7 December, 2016 - the UK’s Prime Minister May visited to Bahrain and attendance of the annual meeting of leaders from the GCC;	11 February, 2018 – the visit of British Trade Envoy to Egypt;

<b>Prime Minister to the UK;</b> <b>15 September, 2016- the visit of Shaykh Tamim to the UK;</b> <b>16 February, 2015 – the visit of Prince Charles to Qatar;</b> <b>29 October, 2014, the visit of the Amir of Qatar to the UK;</b> <b>17-20 February, 2014 – the visit of the Prince Wales to Qatar;</b> <b>23 August 2013, the visit of the Foreign Minister of Qatar to the UK;</b> <b>26-28 October 2010, the visit of the Amir of Qatar to the UK;</b>	Prince of Saudi Arabia to the UK; 25 January 2018 – the visit of Foreign Secretary to Saudi Arabia; November, 2018- the visit of British foreign secretary to the Saudi Arabia; 29 November, 2017 – the visit of Prime Minister to Saudi Arabia; 15 October, 2017 – the visit of the Minister for the Middle East to Saudi Arabia; 4 September, 2017- the visit of Saudi Foreign Minister to the UK and a meeting with	Minister of the UAE; 10 December, 2017 – the visit of the British foreign secretary to the UAE; 22 February, 2017- the visit of Minister for the Middle East and North Africa to the UAE; 30 April, 2013- the visit of the UAE President to the UK; November 24, 2010 – the visit of the Queen Elizabeth II to the UAE; October 6, 2011- the visit of the	King of Bahrain to the UK; 4 June, 2014 - the visit of Foreign Office Minister for the Middle East to Bahrain; 21 February, 2014 – the visit of the Prince Wales to Bahrain; 30 October, 2013- the visit of Bahrain’s Crown Prince to the UK; 6 August, 2013 – the visit of the King of Bahrain to the UK; 13 March 2013 – the visit of Minister for the Middle	Secretary to Egypt; 19 January, 2017- the visit of UK Minister of State for Security to Egypt; 7 February , 2016 – the visit of UK Trade Envoy to Egypt; 5 November, 2015 – the visit of the President of Egypt to the UK; 27 October, 2014 –
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	<p>UK's Prime Minister;</p> <p>16 June, 2017- the meeting between the UK's Foreign Secretary and the Foreign Minister of Saudi Arabia;</p> <p>5 April 2017 – the visit of Prime Minister to Saudi Arabia and meeting with the King Salman of Saudi Arabia;</p> <p>23 February, 2017 – the visit of the Minister for the Middle East and North Africa to Saudi Arabia;</p> <p>23 March, 2015- the visit of Foreign Secretary to Saudi Arabia;</p> <p>February, 2014 - the visit of the Senior Foreign</p>	<p>Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi to the UK;</p> <p>March 12, 2012 – the visit of UK Defence Secretary to the UAE;</p> <p>November 6, 2012 – the visit of UK' Prime Minister to the UAE;</p>	<p>East to Bahrain;</p> <p>12 December 2011 – the visit of the King of Bahrain to the UK;</p> <p>26 May 2011- a meeting between the UK's Foreign Secretary and the Crown Prince of Bahrain;</p>	<p>the visit of Egyptian Foreign Minister to the UK;</p> <p>20 October, 2011- the visit of the Deputy Prime Minister to Egypt;</p> <p>29 July, 2011- the visit of Minister for the Middle East and North Africa to Egypt;</p> <p>2 May, 2011- the visit of UK's Foreign Secretary to Egypt;</p>
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	Office Minister to Saudi Arabia; 17-20 February, 2014 – the visit of the Prince Wales to Saudi Arabia; March, 2013- the visit of the Prince of Wales and the Duchess of Cornwall to Saudi Arabia as part of official visit to the Middle East; March, 2011- the visit of visit of Foreign Minister of Saudi Arabia to the UK;			3 November, 2010 – the visit of British Foreign Secretary to Egypt;
<b>Economic relations</b>				
<b>Trade with the UK</b>				
<b>2016 - the UK exported GBP 3bn in goods and services to Qatar and imported GBP 2.2bn;</b>	2014 – UK exported GBP 7bn goods and services; 2014 – Goods exports were GBP 4.17bn;	2016 - the UK export to the UAE worth GBP 9.8bn (since 2009 was	2016 – total exports from the UK to Bahrain was GBP 505m; 2016 - total imports to the	2017 - Trade relations worth GBP 3bn;

<p><b>2016 – Qatar was the UK’s 32<sup>nd</sup> largest export market and 42<sup>nd</sup> largest source of imports;</b></p> <p><b>2016 - UK exports to Qatar peaked at GBP 3.0bn;</b></p> <p><b>2011 - UK imports from Qatar peaked at GBP 5.1bn;</b></p> <p><b>2011 - Trade in gas reached GBP 4.3.bn; 2017 – Trade in gas reached GBP 0.8bn;</b></p> <p><b>2017 - Trade in oil reached GBP 0.4bn;</b></p>	<p>Over 6000 UK firms actively export goods to Saudi Arabia;</p>	<p>increased by 37%);</p> <p>UAE is the UK’s fourth largest export market outside the EU;</p> <p>The presence of British companies in the UAE: over 5000.</p> <p>4762 British brands have invested in the UAE;</p>	<p>UK from Bahrain – GBP 267m;</p> <p>Over 500 active British commercial agencies and more than 90 branches of the UK companies in Bahrain;</p>	
<b>Investments:</b>				
<p><b>In 2016 – GBP 30bn;</b></p> <p><b>QIA holdings in the UK contain: 879 residential and commercial properties in London, such as</b></p>	<p>2018- Saudi government pledged to bring GBP 65bn to the UK over 10 years;</p> <p>The UK is the Saudi Arabian</p>	<p>Investment worth GBP 1bn helping to transform two neighbourhods in Manchester</p>	<p>N/A</p>	<p>2017 - investment in Benban solar project (EGP 1.7bn), a</p>

<p><b>Chelsea Barracks, Canary Warf Group, the Shard, the HSBC Tower, Harrods; stakes in the Savoy Hotel; Qatar Holding owns Claridge's, the Berkeley and Connaught, with an additional stake in the Park Lane, Intercontinental; 20% of London Heathrow airport; Qatar Airways has a 20% stake in International Airlines Group (IAG), owner of British Airways; 22% of Sainsbury's; 6% of Barclays;</b></p>	<p>second largest investor with 200 joint ventures, worth GBP 11.5bn;</p>	<p>– Ancoats and New Islington; Investment Authority: Gatwick Airport (GBP 125m), Thames Water (GBP 1.5bn), 42 Marriott hotels (GBP 640m), National Exhibition Centre: ExCel London (GBP 400m), United Group: Manchester City (GBP 483m spent on players), Manchester Life (GBP 1bn), Financial Group: Palace Street (GBP 310m),</p>		<p>joint - venture industrial complex for high quality medical suppliers and a new production facility for SEWS; BP invested USD 30 bn; 2016 - GlaxoSmithKline liquid line in Egypt (USD 800m); Vodafone bought a EGP 3.5bn 4G licence; Unilever</p>
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		<p>New Scotland Yard (GBP 360m), Mubadala Masdar: London Array (GBP 271m), Dudgeon wind farm (GBP 525m), Manchester student village (GBP 175 m);</p>		<p>opened a factory in Egypt (EGP 220 m investment); 12 February, 2017- the visit of UK's Trade Envoy and 40 delegates from British companies (including sectors of Energy, Environment, Healthcare, Food and Drink, Waste Management,</p>
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				Engineering, Construction) to Egypt;
<b>Defence cooperation</b>				
<b>December, 2017 – worth of GBP 6bn the two signed a statement of intent to supply 24 Typhoon fast jets and a package of missile and laser-guided bombs; The UK also utilises the RAF base as al-Udeid, and Qatari cadets train at Sandhurst every year; 2 May, 2018 – the joined celebration of the Royal Air Force (RAF) 100<sup>th</sup> Anniversary in Doha; also the establishment of joined UK/Qatari Typhoon Squadron;</b>	September, 2017- a signed Military and Security Cooperation Agreement; 2012- agreement between the UK and Saudi Arabia (as a result, the Royal Saudi Air Force received 25 primarily training aircraft, 22 BAE Systems Hawk Advanced Jet trainers, and 55 PC-21 advanced turboprop trainers);	Abu Dhabi Vision 2030 provides an opportunity for the UK defence companies to cooperate in aerospace, (defence) manufacturing and space sectors;	5 April, 2018- the UK opened the United Kingdom Naval Support Facility at a ceremony at Mina Salman port in Bahrain; 30 September, 2015 – the Defence Secretary visited a Royal Marine exercise and strengthen UK commitment to Bahrain;	11 July 2018 – Her Majesty’s Ship (HMS) Argyll of the British Royal Navy visited the Alexandria Naval base to facilitate future cooperation between UK and Egyptian Naval Officers, involvin



				g maritime security and training exercises in the Red Sea and the Mediterranean; 23 November, 2016 - Egypt and the UK joint naval exercise;
<b>Cultural, scientific and technical cooperation</b>				
<b>More than 130 joint projects between the UK universities have been awarded grants by the Qatar National Research Fund (QNRF); Science and Innovation</b>	July, 2008 – King Saud University (KSU) and the University of Leeds signed a research agreement; May, 2015 – King’s College London signed a Memorandum	British curriculum schools are in demand. Eleven UK universities are represented in the UAE; UAE exposure in the UK has	Bahrain’s exposure in the UK has enlarged in the following areas: water and energy; Institutional Links Programme: University of Bahrain and	15 October, 2018 – UK declared a GBP 12m fund to support education reform in Egypt;

<p><b>Network (SIN) in Qatar;</b>  <b>2013, Qatar-UK Year of Culture;</b></p>	<p>of Intent with King Saud University; The Science and Innovation Network (SIN) has supported the University of Leeds which is delivering a hosted MSc programme for the Exploration Department in Aramco.</p>	<p>enlarged in the following fields: water, energy, space, artificial intelligence; 2017- the UK-UAE Year of Creative Collaboration.</p>	<p>the University of Loughborough signed a research partnership agreement, that led to the launching of a permanent Research Centre for Sustainable Energy and Water at the University of Bahrain.</p>	<p>21 January 2016- signed cooperation between Alexandria University and London South Bank University and University of Dundee; New Gize University and University College London; Cairo University and King's College London;</p>
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				Sussex Universit y and Aston Universit y; the Arab Academ y for Science, Transpor t, and Maritime Transpor t with Brunel Universit y, Aston Universit y, Staffords hire Universit y and Cardiff Metropol itan Universit y.
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Source: Compiled by author using data from Chuter (2017), Department for International Trade (2015; 2016; 2017; 2018a; 2018b), Department for International Trade and Graham Stuart MP (2018), GOV.UK (2019a; 2019b; 2019c; 2019d; 2019e), Foreign and Commonwealth Office (2018), Parliament. House of Commons (2018), Prime Minister’s Office, 10 Downing Street and Rt Hon

(2018), Ramesh (2015), Thompson, Espinoza and Mance (2019), UK Science & Innovation Network (2018a; 2018b; 2018c; 2018d).

Appendix P

Relations: Spain and Qatar versus Spain and The Anti-Terror Quartet

Spain-Qatar relations	Spain– The Anti-Terror Quartet relations			
	Saudi Arabia	The United Arab Emirates	Bahrain	Egypt
<p><b>September, 2004 – the visit of the Amir of Qatar to Spain;</b></p> <p><b>November, 2003- the visit of the King of Spain to Qatar;</b></p> <p><b>2006- the visit of the Amir of Qatar to Spain;</b></p> <p><b>2010- the visit of the Amir of Qatar to Spain;</b></p> <p><b>2011- the visit of the Amir of Qatar to Spain;</b></p> <p><b>May, 2010- the visit of Spain’s Prime Minister to Qatar;</b></p> <p><b>March, 2005- the visit of the Qatar’s Minister of Economy and</b></p>	<p>April, 2017- the visit of the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia to Spain;</p> <p>January, 2017- the visit of the King of Spain to Saudi Arabia;</p> <p>17-19 May, 2014- the visit of the Spain’s King to Saudi Arabia;</p> <p>Between 2006 and 2014 – the King of Spain visited Saudi Arabia five times;</p>	<p>April, 2014 – the visit of the Spain’s King to the UAE;</p> <p>31 January, 2018 – the visit of the UAE Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation to Spain;</p>	<p>May, 2014- the visit of Spain’s King to Bahrain;</p>	<p>February , 2008- the visit of Spain’s King and Queen to Egypt;</p> <p>7 July, 2017- the visit of Egypt’s Investment and International Cooperation Minister to Spain;</p> <p>22 October, 2016- the meeting between the</p>

<p><b>Commerce to Spain;</b>  <b>2007- the visit of the Qatar’s Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to Spain;</b>  <b>2006- the visit of the Qatar’s Prime Minister to Spain;</b></p>				<p>Egypt’s President and Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs;  15 August, 2016 – the visit of Egypt’s Agriculture Minister to Spain;  10 May, 2016 – the meeting between the Egypt’s President and Spanish Defence Minister;  28 October, 2015 –</p>
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				<p>the meeting between Egypt's Army Chief and Spanish counterpart;</p> <p>14 October, 2015 – a meeting between Egypt's Minister of Defence and Military Production with his Spanish counterpart;</p> <p>30 April 2015 – the meeting between President</p>
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				of Egypt to the Spain's King; 13 April, 2015 - visit of Egypt's Foreign Minister to Spain; 13 March, 2015 – visit of the Spanish Deputy Foreign Minister to Egypt; 5 February , 2015 - visit of the Spanish Deputy Foreign Minister to Egypt; 16 Septemb
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				er, 2014 –visit of the Egypt’s Foreign Minister to Spain; 27 July 2014 – visit of the Spanish Foreign Minister to Egypt; Septemb er, 2009- visit of the Foreign Minister to Egypt; May, 2009 - visit of the Egyptian Minister of Transpor t to Spain;
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				4-8 April, 2009 – visit of the Minister of Culture to Egypt; 12-14 January, 2009 – visit of the Foreign Minister to Egypt;
<b>Economic relations</b>				
<b>100 Spanish companies established a presence in Qatar;</b>	N/A	Operation of the UAE-Spanish Joint Economic Committee;	2008 - the signed agreement to protect economic and trade cooperation between two states; 2014 – the Bahrain-Spain Business Forum;	2017-193 Spanish companies operate in Egypt with the investment rate worth USD 947m.
<b>Trade</b>				

<b>2017- bilateral trade volume was USD 1.3bn</b>	2017- the volume of trade USD 3.5bn	2017- Non-oil trade exchange was USD 2bn	N/A	The first half of 2017- Egyptian export to Spain was USD 344m; Egyptian imports from Spain was USD 550m; 2002 - signed the Egyptian - European partnership agreement;
<b>Investments</b>				
<b>QIA acquired an 8.6% share in Spain's energy giant, Iberdrola; including investments to other sectors;</b>	An investment fund worth USD 5bn was established; 2011- Spanish company won a contract to	2011- International Petroleum Investment Company, took over the Spanish oil	N/A	By 2017 – the Spanish investments in Egypt worth

<p><b>September, 2017 – agreement on launching an institutional framework promoting foreign direct investment in Spain; Collaborations and Qatar’s investments to Spanish Health System (signed direct billing arrangements to 82 hospitals in Spain;</b></p>	<p>develop the USD 7bn high-speed railway between Makkah and Madinah;</p>	<p>company Cepsa; 2015- the Spain’s direct investment to the UAE: 45 commercial companies, 112 commercial agencies and 2456 trademarks from Spain registered in the UAE;</p>		<p>EUR 947m; 193 Spanish companies operate in Egypt; Tourism investments worth USD 11m and 26 companies, investments in the financing sector worth USD 6m. Spanish investments: Damietta with investments of USD 300m and 6 companies</p>
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				es; Alexandria USD 343m and 16 companies; Suez with USD 86m and 3 companies; Giza with USD 60m and 39 companies; Cairo with USD 82m and 79 companies;
<b>Military cooperation</b>				
N/A	Spain is the fourth-biggest exporter of arms to Saudi Arabia; 2018- the signed deal of	2018- discussed future military cooperation;	2014 – a defence co-operation agreement was signed;	N/A

	sale of 400 laser-guided bombs worth EUR 9.2m to Saudi Arabia; 2018- the establishment of joint venture between the Saudi Arabian Military Industries company and the Spanish state-owned shipbuilding company.			
<b>Cultural, scientific and technical cooperation</b>				
<b>Exhibitions and musical concerts in the Complutense University in Madrid, in the framework of four Qatari weeks in Spain.</b>	2013- the exhibition ‘From Qurtuba to Cordoba’ in Riyadh.	2018- the signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), for partnership between Spain’s School of Diplomacy and the Emirates Diplomatic Academy.	2014- the signed Memorandum of Understanding.	Egyptian-Spanish relations are deeply rooted, given the contributions of Egypt and Andalusia in different areas,

				particu rly philosop hical and intellectu al fields between 8 <sup>th</sup> to 14 <sup>th</sup> centuries .
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Source: Compiled by author using data from Arab News (2018b), Arnold (2014), Bizbahrain (2014), Cultural Affairs & Missions Sector (2019), Emirates News Agency (2017), IPS (2018), Shoeb (2018), State Information Service (2017), Taha (2017), The Gulf Time Emirates Business (2018), Trade Arabia News Service (2014), Qatar Embassy in Madrid - Kingdom of Spain (2019).

## Appendix Q

### Relations: Russia and Qatar versus Russia and The Anti-Terror Quartet

Russia-Qatar relations	Russia – The Anti-Terror Quartet relations			
	Saudi Arabia	The United Arab Emirates	Bahrain	Egypt
<b>Bilateral visits</b>				
<b>March, 25-26 2018 –visit of Shaykh Tamim to Russia;</b>	October, 2017 - visit of the Saudi King Salman bin Abdulaziz to Russia;	April, 2017 – the visit of the Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi and Deputy Supreme Commander of the UAE’s Armed Forces Mohammad bin Zayed to Russia;	2017, 2018 - Representatives of the Russian Foreign Ministry attended the International regional summit on the Middle East ‘Manama Dialogue’;	2017, December –visit of President Putin to Egypt;
<b>July, 1<sup>st</sup> 2018 – short meeting between Shaykh Tamim and the Prime Minister Medvedev during the football match between Russia-Spain national teams at the World Cup 2018;</b>	May, 2017 – the visit of the Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman to Russia;	1 June, 2018 - visit of the Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi and Deputy Supreme Commander of the UAE’s Armed Forces	October 14-18, 2017 - the Bahraini parliamentary delegation led by Speaker al-Mulla participated in the 137th Assembly of	August – visit of Egypt’s Foreign Minister to Russia;
<b>July, 3<sup>rd</sup> 2018 – meeting in Moscow between Shaykh Tamim and Foreign Minister Lavrov;</b>	June, 2018 - visit of the Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman to Russia;	- visit of the Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi and Deputy Supreme Commander of the UAE’s Armed Forces	October 14-18, 2017 - the Bahraini parliamentary delegation led by Speaker al-Mulla participated in the 137th Assembly of	2017, May 29 – third round of talks of the foreign and defence ministers
<b>July, 15 2018 – meeting between Russian President Putin and Shaykh Tamim, and the</b>	9-10 September, 2011 –visit of the Russian Minister of	Armed Forces	Assembly of	



<p><b>ceremony of handing over the symbolic relay of the World Cup from Russia to Qatar; June 10, 2017 – talks between Lavrov and Mohammad al-Thani on the Gulf crisis in Moscow; 30 August, 2017 – the visit of the Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov to Qatar;</b></p>	<p>Foreign Affairs to Saudi Arabia; 1 December, 2017- a meeting between Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Russia and Saudi Arabia at the 3<sup>rd</sup> edition of Rome Med-Mediterranean Dialogue;</p>	<p>Mohammad bin Zayed to Russia; 28-29 August, 2017 – the visit of the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs to the UAE;</p>	<p>the Inter-Parliamentary Union in St. Petersburg; October-November 2017, a Russian delegation headed by Karelova, Deputy Speaker of the Federation Council of the Russian Federation, participated in the International Investment Forum of Entrepreneurs in Manama; June 4-5, 2018 - a Bahraini delegation led by the Shura Council First Deputy</p>	<p>of Russia and Egypt in the 2+2 format. Foreign Minister Lavrov and Defence Minister Shoygu were received by the President of Egypt al-Sisi; 2017, 13-18 October – the Egyptian delegation attended the 137<sup>th</sup> Assembly of the Inter-Parliamentary</p>
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			Chairman Fakhro participated in the International Forum on the Development of Parliamentarism in Moscow;	Union in Saint-Petersburg;
<b>Bilateral visits with the heads of federal subjects</b>				
<b>5-8 February, 2018 –visit of head of Ingushetia, Evkurov, to Doha.</b>	February, 2017 –visit of the President of Tatarstan Minnikhanov to Saudi Arabia; 19-21 August, 2018 – the visit of the President of the Chechen Republic, Kadyrov to Saudi Arabia; 20 November, 2018 – the visit of the President of the Chechen Republic, Kadyrov to Saudi Arabia;	November, 2018 –visit of the Chechen President, Kadyrov, to the UAE; April, 2018- the visit of the President of Tatarstan, Minnikhanov to the UAE; July, 2018 – the visit of the UAE Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation,	February and April, 2017- visit of Bahrain by Presidents of Chechen and Tatarstan Republics; 9-13 December, 2017 – the visit of the head of Komi Republic, Gaplikov to Bahrain;	October, 2018- visit of the Tatarstan President to Egypt;

	November, 2017 – the visit of the head of Ingushetia Republic, Evkurov to Saudi Arabia;	‘Abdullah bin Zayed to Tatarstan; 2017, April – a meeting between the Minister of Economy of the UAE Sultan bin Saeed al-Mansoori and the President of Tatarstan Minnikhanov , in the VII Annual Investment Meeting (AIM) 2017;		
<b>Economic relations</b>				
Trade (for 9 months of 2018 with comparison of nine months of 2017)				
<b>Russia-Qatar foreign trade: USD 65m increased by 39.30% (compared with nine months of 2017);</b>	Russia-Saudi Arabia foreign trade: USD 771m increased by 15.77% (compared with	The UAE-Russian foreign trade: USD 1bn increased by 17.06% (compared	N/A	Egypt-Russian foreign trade: USD 4bn increased by 14.17%

	nine months of 2017);	with nine months of 2017);		(compare d with nine months of 2017);
<b>Export</b>				
<b>Russian exports to Qatar: USD 36m increased by 25.12% (compared with nine months of 2017);</b>	Russian export to Saudi Arabia: USD 552m decreased by 0.80% (compared with nine months of 2017);	Russian exports to the UAE: USD 1bn increased by 15.10% (compared with nine months of 2017);	N/A	Russian exports to Egypt: USD 4bn increased by 15.14% (compare d with nine months of 2017);
<b>Import</b>				
<b>Russian import from Qatar: USD 28m increased by 62.94% (compared with nine months of 2017)</b>	Russian import from Qatar: USD 218m increased by 100,49% (compared with nine months of 2017);	Russian import from the UAE: USD 150m increased by 33.72% (compared with nine months of 2017);	N/A	Russian import from Egypt: USD 443m increased by 5.86% (compare d with nine

				months of 2017);
<b>The state's share of the foreign trade turnover of Russia</b>				
<b>Qatar's share of the foreign trade turnover of Russia: 0.0131% against 0.0114% (compared with nine months of 2017); 124<sup>th</sup> place (for nine months of 2017 was 124<sup>th</sup> place);</b>	Saudi Arabia's share of foreign trade turnover of Russia: 0.1541% against 0.1608% (compared with nine months of 2017); 67 <sup>th</sup> place (for nine months of 2017 was 67 <sup>th</sup> place);	The UAE's share of the foreign trade turnover of Russia: 0.2499% against 0.2578% (compared with nine months of 2017); 51 <sup>st</sup> place (for nine months of 2017 was 54 <sup>th</sup> place);	N/A	Egypt's share of foreign trade turnover of Russia: 0.9127% against 0.9655% (compared with nine months of 2017); 22 <sup>nd</sup> place (for nine months of 2017 was 21 <sup>st</sup> place);
<b>The state's share in Russian export</b>				
<b>The share of Qatar in Russian export: 0.0113% against 0.0117% (compared with</b>	The share of Saudi Arabia in Russian export: 0.1699% against	The share of the UAE in Russian export:	N/A	The share of Egypt in Russian export:

<p><b>nine months of 2017);</b>  <b>119<sup>th</sup> place (for nine months of 2017 was 119<sup>th</sup> place);</b></p>	<p>0.2206%  (compared with nine months of 2017);  61<sup>st</sup> place (for nine months of 2017 was 52<sup>nd</sup> place);</p>	<p>0.3381%  against 0.3783%  (compared with nine months of 2017);  44<sup>th</sup> place (for nine months of 2017 was 43<sup>rd</sup> place);</p>		<p>1.2678%  against 1.4182%  (compare d with nine months of 2017);  18<sup>th</sup> place (for nine months of 2017 was 19<sup>th</sup> place);</p>
<b>The state's share in Russian import</b>				
<p><b>The Qatar's share in Russian import: 0.0164% against 0.0109% (compared with nine months of 2017);</b>  <b>97<sup>th</sup> place (for nine months of 2017 was 101<sup>st</sup> place);</b></p>	<p>Saudi Arabia's share in Russian import: 0.1248%  against 0.0674%  (compared with nine months of 2017);  66<sup>th</sup> place (for nine months of 2017 was 75<sup>th</sup> place);</p>	<p>The UAE's share in Russian import: 0.0859%  against 0.0696%  (compared with nine months of 2017);  70<sup>th</sup> place (for nine months of</p>	<p>N/A</p>	<p>Egypt's share in Russian import: 0.2530%  against 0.2587%  (compare d with nine months of 2017);  50<sup>th</sup> place (for nine</p>

		2017 was 74 <sup>th</sup> place);		months of 2017 was 49 <sup>th</sup> place);
Investments				
<b>2017, September – QIA and Glencore International AG retained their 4.7 and 0.5 per cent shares in Rosneft; 2018, 28 March – thanks to signed agreement between Rosneft and the Qatar Foundation cooperation in the field of science and education, Rosneft opened an office of the International Center for research and development in Qatar; May, 2018 – agreement that Qatar Investment Authority will buy the 14.16 percent stake in Rosneft;</b>	In 2017 - during the King’s Salman visit was discussed plans to invest more than 25 different projects in Russia. Especially cooperation between the Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) and the Public Investment Fund of Saudi Arabia (PIF). In 2015 agreement between the PIF and RDIF was held for the joint investment of USD 10bn in infrastructure and other projects;	December, 2017 - Mubadala Investment Company committed investment of up to USD 6bn in Russia in infrastructure , ports, air ports, renewables; June, 2018- the signed Declaration of Strategic Partnership between the Russia and the UAE includes cooperation on economic, political, security,	February, 2018 – the first meeting of Interparliamentary Commission on bilateral trade-economic cooperation, including investments, cooperation in energy, agriculture, banking sectors;	21-23 May, 2018 – the eleventh meeting of the Joint Russian-Egyptian Commission for trade, Economic and Scientific-Technical Cooperation was held in Moscow; More than 400 enterprises with the

	In 2018 – Saudi Aramco and Russian Novatek PJSC signed an energy memorandum, agreement on collaboration on Novatek’s USD 20bn Arctic LNG-2 project;	cultural domain;		participation of Russian individuals and legal entities were registered in Egypt. 85% of them specialise in serving Russian inbound tourism;
<b>Cultural, scientific and technical cooperation</b>				
<b>2018, 24 February – the opening ceremony in Doha of the ‘Year of Culture’ between Qatar and Russia, with the participation of the Russian Minister of Culture.</b>	2017, October – in Moscow were implemented ‘Saudi Culture Days’	June, 2018- the signed Declaration of Strategic Partnership between the Russia and the UAE includes cooperation on economic, political, security,	2015-2017 – the implementation of the signed Programme of Cooperation between the Ministries of Culture for 2015-2017;	2017, May 22- 24 – Pope Tawadros II visited Russia where he met with the President Putin



		cultural domain;		and Patriarch Kirill;
<b>Security/ Defence cooperation</b>				
<b>2017, 25<sup>th</sup> October – the first in the history of bilateral relations was the visit of the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation Shoygu to Doha;</b> <b>2018, 22-23 February – Qatar’ Minister of State for Defence al-Attiya was in Moscow at the invitation of the Minister of Defence of the Russian Federation, Shoygu, to participate in the celebrations commemorating the 100th anniversary of the creation of the Red Army;</b>	October, 2017 – agreement on a GBP 3bn deal to supply Saudi Arabia with Russian air defence missile system, the S400;	June, 2018- the signed Declaration of Strategic Partnership between the Russia and the UAE includes cooperation on economic, political, security, cultural domain;	January 23-24, 2018 – the first meeting of Russian-Bahrain Interparliamentary Commission on military-technical cooperation;	September, 9-22 2017 – the joint antiterrorist exercises of the Airborne Forces of Russia and Egypt ‘Defenders of Friendship – 2017’;

<p><b>The Qatari side took part in the International Military-Technical Forum ‘Army-2018’ and the Army International Games ‘ArMI-2018’;</b></p> <p><i>Security cooperation:</i></p> <p><b>Both Saudi Arabia and Qatar discussed buying the S-400 system from Russia. Qatar and Russia signed a contract on providing Qatar with small arms, such as anti-tank weapons, Kalashnikov assault rifles.</b></p>				
<b>Cooperation in migration/tourism</b>				
<p><b>2017, June- the Qatari Interior Ministry’s Immigration Department listed Russia among</b></p>	<p>In 2018 -Saudi Arabia increased the quota of Russian citizens perform 2018</p>	<p>2017, 1 February – the new UAE visa regulations – allowing</p>	<p>Cooperation with compatriots residing Bahrain is implemented</p>	<p>11 April, 2018 – direct air communication between</p>

<b>countries whose citizens can obtain tourist visas at airport in Doha.</b>	Hajj - 20500 people.	Russian holders of ordinarily foreign travel passports obtain a single entry/exit visa valid for 30 days at all UAE border checkpoints.	through the Bahraini Association of Russian Speakers.	Moscow and Cairo was resumed.
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Source: Compiled by author using data from AIRR (2017), Carroll (2017), Embassy of the Russian Federation to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (2019), Frolovsky (2018), Katz (2018), Karmon (2018), Rahman (2017), Sanderson (2018), The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (2019a; 2019b; 2019c; 2019d; 2019e), The National (2018b), Trade-Economic Representation of the Republic of Tatarstan in Dubai (United Arab Emirates) (2018), Vneshnaya Torgovlya Rossii (2019).

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