Sympathy and Reflection in Hume’s Philosophy: Mind, Morals, Art and Politics

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Sympathy and Reflection in Hume’s Philosophy:
Mind, Morals, Art and Politics

By Byoungjae Kim
Submitted for the degree of Doctorate in Philosophy
Department of Philosophy
Abstract

Hume, as an “anatomist” of human nature, believes that “the science of man is the only solid foundation for the other sciences”. The naturalistic and experimental analysis of human nature, as it informs his epistemology, is the basis for other areas. Thus, in order fully to understand his philosophy, we need to shed light on the connection between Hume’s experimental analysis of human nature in epistemology, and his naturalistic account in ethics, aesthetics, and political philosophy. However, too often, writers on the latter are not always fully informed on his general philosophy – and vice versa. A principal aim of this research is to bring together investigation of his naturalistic epistemology, and his ethics, aesthetics and political philosophy.

This project brings close attention to bear on all of these areas, focusing on three key concepts: sympathy, general rule, and reflection. First, I examine the nature of sympathy. I argue against recent interpreters who use his concept of sympathy to construct a solution to the Problem of Other Minds. On my interpretation, Hume employs the concept of sympathy for his ethics, aesthetics and political philosophy, not for his epistemology. Second, I show that the concept of general rule plays an essential role in his philosophy. On my interpretation, Hume first establishes the general rules of human nature. He then establishes the general rules of his ethics, aesthetics and political philosophy. Third, I uncover the role of reflection in his philosophy. According to him, it is wrong to apply abstract reasoning to matters of fact; Instead, we should adopt the experimental reasoning that he terms “reflection” to observe and generalise matters of fact, thus establishing general rules in ethics, aesthetics and political philosophy. In this way, we can see the intimate connections between these diverse aspects of his philosophical writings.
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Submitted for the degree of Doctorate in Philosophy

The University of Durham

Department of Philosophy
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List of Abbreviations


Declaration

I confirm that no part of the material contained in this thesis has previously been submitted for any degree in this or any other university. All the material is the author’s own work, except for quotations and paraphrases which have been suitably indicated.

Byoungjae Kim
2018

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Introduction

Hume, as an “anatomist” of human nature, believes that “the science of man is the only solid foundation for the other sciences” (T intro.7, SBN xvi). The naturalistic and experimental analysis of human nature, as it informs his epistemology, is the basis for his ethics, aesthetics and political philosophy. Thus, in order fully to understand his philosophy, we need to shed light on the connection between Hume’s experimental analysis of human nature in epistemology, and his naturalistic account in ethics, aesthetics and political philosophy. However, too often, writers on the latter are not always fully informed on his general philosophy – and vice versa. A principal aim of this research is to bring together investigation of his naturalistic epistemology, and his ethics, aesthetics and political philosophy. This project brings close attention to bear on his epistemology, ethics, aesthetics, and political philosophy, focusing on the dynamic interaction among three key concepts – sympathy, general rule, and reflection – in Hume’s philosophy.

Recently, there have been attempts among Hume scholars to use his concept of sympathy to construct a solution to an epistemological issue called “the Problem of Other Minds”: the Wittgensteinian Interpretation and the Simulation Theory Interpretation. Both focus on the concept of sympathy as a solution to the Problem, claiming that, for him, sympathy produces the belief in other minds. I disagree with this line of interpretation. In my view, he introduces the concept of sympathy for establishing his ethics, aesthetics and political philosophy, not for solving epistemological issues. Chapter 1 critically examines these two interpretations and offers an alternative called “the Analogical Argument Interpretation”, which reconstructs Hume’s version of an analogical argument carried out not by our rational faculty of mind but by custom and imagination. On this interpretation, Hume does not think that sympathy generates the belief in other minds, but rather, sympathy presupposes that belief.

In the beginning of Book 3 of the Treatise, Hume says, “sympathy is a very powerful principle in human nature … that it produces our sentiment of morals” (T 3.3.1.10, SBN577). In order fully to understand why he puts the principle of sympathy at the centre of his philosophy, we must first understand the context where his moral philosophy diverges from his contemporary philosopher Hutcheson’s. For this reason, before scrutinizing Hume’s moral philosophy, Chapter 2 examines Hutcheson’s moral sentimentalism, which had been established as responding to Hobbes’s moral egoism on the one hand, and to Clarke’s moral rationalism on the other hand. The worries about moral sentimentalism arise in the difficulty of avoiding moral subjectivism. Hutcheson attempts to overcome this difficulty of resorting to the concept of moral sense. But the problem is that for him moral sense is one of many senses. This is the place where he is forced to introduce the supernatural apparatus, Divine Providence, which guarantees the authority of moral sense. Although he gives a naturalistic account of morality introducing sentimentalism in his moral philosophy, his moral
philosophy has its own limitation in that his main argument still includes the supernatural element.

In his letter to Hutcheson and the conclusion of the Treatise, Hume criticizes Hutcheson’s concept of what is “natural”, arguing that it is founded on final causes, that is, Divine Providence. And he instead suggests an “experimental method of reasoning” as a naturalistic way of establishing the foundation of morality. His experimental method of reasoning is characterized as founded on the reflective observation of experience, as opposed to that of purely speculative reasoning. In this context, Chapter 3 explores how Hume establishes the general rules of morality by the experimental method of reasoning. Given that he is a moral sentimentalist, the difficulty in applying the scientific method to the moral subject lies in the fact that our emotions, which are the source of morality, are not the object of scientific observation. If his “science of man” is designed to convey the introspective observation, it seems to be hard to avoid subjectivism, hence failing to establish the general rules of morality. This is the reason why he puts the concept of sympathy at the centre of his moral philosophy. Sympathy allows us to experience and observe others’ emotions, hence establishing the general rules of morality.

Although the principle of sympathy allows us to share others’ feelings, and accordingly we can approve or disapprove of the shared feelings, our natural sympathy itself cannot be the sole foundation for establishing the moral standard due to its lack of impartiality and objectivity. Chapter 4 explores how Hume overcomes the limitation of our natural sympathy as a source for establishing the moral standard by the use of general rules. In Book 1 of the Treatise, by conveying “the science of Man”, which is “the only solid foundation for the other sciences”, he establishes the general rules of human nature as a logic of probability. According to him, we ought to reflect on our natural sympathy with a particular group of people, which is limited due to its partiality, and extend it to mankind by the use of the established general rules. In the Treatise, Hume calls this “extensive sympathy with mankind” as opposed to limited sympathy. However, these terms do not appear in the second Enquiry. In this context, chapter 4 also suggests that there is a systemic way of understanding Hume’s concept of sympathy and its role in his moral philosophy consistently from the Treatise to the second Enquiry. In my view, he replaces “limited sympathy” with “sympathy”, and “extensive sympathy” with “humanity”. His settled view of sympathy, I would argue, is that sympathy is the process of emotional sharing with the real feelings of others, and that we feel humanity for others only when we sympathize with them.

The nature of Hume’s concept of sympathy is more clearly understood in contrast with Smith’s concept. Hume introduces the concept of sympathy as a cornerstone for his moral philosophy, not as a solution to the Problem of Other Minds. By contrast, for Smith, “sympathy” is a kind of umbrella term, covering two different areas of philosophy: epistemological and moral. Chapter 5 critically examines Smith’s project of solving the Problem of Other Minds and establishing his epistemology solely based on the principle of sympathy. First, his suggestion that we can form an idea of other minds by the principle of sympathy is rejected when we consider that he, as a classic philosopher, fails to overcome Cartesian dualism. Second, his aim to establish the self-sufficient moral standard, which replaces Hume’s inter-subjective moral standard formed by the use of general rules, ends up
with introducing a supernatural concept of “final cause” into his moral philosophy, which is ironical in that he stubbornly refused to accept Hutcheson’s supernatural concept of “moral sense”.

When Book I and Book II of the Treatise were published in 1739, the advertisement of the Treatise wrote: “The reader must only observe, that all the subjects I have there plannd out to myself, are not treated of in these two volumes. ... If I have the good fortune to meet with success, I shall proceed to the examination of Morals, Politics, and Criticism; which will compleat this Treatise of Human Nature”. According to this advertisement, he was planning to publish five volumes of the Treatise: “Of the Understanding”, “Of the passions”, “Of Morals”, “Of Politics”, and “Of Criticism”.

Following his original plan, Book 3. “Of Morals” of the Treatise was published in 1740. However, unfortunately, his original plan of writing other two volumes – “Of Criticism” and “Of Politics” – did not come to fruition. This is because of the commercial failure of the three volumes of the Treatise.

He memorably reflects in “My Own Life” about the reception of the Treatise: “Never literary attempt was more unfortunate than my Treatise of Human Nature. It fell dead-born from the press, without reaching such distinction, as even to excite a murmur among the zealots.”

Recently, many scholars try to understand Hume’s aesthetics and political thoughts by focusing on his essays such as “Of the Standard of Taste” and “Of the Origin of Government”. However, as we shall see, their understandings are limited since they narrowly focus on Hume’s discussions in his essays.

Given that his original plan was to include two more volumes “Of Criticism” and “Of Politics” in the Treatise, we need to understand his aesthetics and political thoughts more systematically in conjunction with his discussions in the Treatise. In this context, Chapters 6 and 7 attempt to place Hume’s aesthetics and political thoughts in his whole philosophical picture based on the understanding of his epistemology in the Treatise. As the interaction of three key concepts of sympathy, general rule, and reflection play a crucial role in establishing the moral standard, they also play the same essential role in establishing the standard of aesthetic taste and of politics.

According to Hume, “the chief business of philosophers” is to derive “general facts” from “particular facts” by the use of “experimental method of reasoning” (E 254). Following his principle that “the science of man is the only solid foundation for the other sciences”, he first establishes the general rules of human nature as a logic of probability in the Treatise (T intro. 7, SBN xvi). And he then establishes the general rules of his ethics, aesthetics and political philosophy by the use of general rules of human nature. It is important to note that this “chief business” requires the capacity of reflection. Although his naturalism that “Nature, by an absolute and uncontroulable necessity has determin’d us to judge as well as to breathe and feel” puts emphasis on the “authority of experience”, it also allows the mental act of reflection to play a normative role in establishing the general rules and using it in making judgments (T 1.4.1.7, SBN 183).
Chapter 1. Hume on the Problem of Other Minds

Hume is not often cited as a philosopher who posited a solution to the Problem of Other Minds, which is “the problem of how to justify the almost universal belief that others have minds very like our own” (Hyslop, 2014). He instead seems to assume the belief in other minds in his moral philosophy without justification. However, he needs to explain how we experience and respond to others’ affections, and hence generate moral sentiments, given how central the latter are to his moral theory.

Recently, two distinct interpretations of Hume’s solution to the Problem of Other Minds have been presented, which may be termed the Wittgensteinian Interpretation, and the Simulation Theory Interpretation. Both focus on the concept of sympathy as a solution to the Problem, claiming that, for Hume, sympathy produces the belief in other minds. However, both interpretations are mistaken because he distinguishes between the process of making a causal inference which allows us to form an idea of other minds and the process of sympathy which converts the idea into an impression, thus allowing us to experience the idea vividly. For him, the belief in other minds is related to the former, not the latter. Therefore, we should pay attention to this process which he calls “causal inference”.

This chapter proposes the Analogical Argument Interpretation, in which I will attempt to reconstruct Hume’s version of an analogical argument carried out not by our rational faculty of mind but by custom and imagination. In my view, when Hume says that it is by making a causal inference that we form an idea of another’s mental states, what he means by “causal inference” is an argument from analogy. Even though it is true that “an argument from analogy” was explicitly introduced by J. S. Mill, Hume’s discussion of the Problem of Other Minds is also implicitly based on it. The reason why he does not raise the Problem of Other Minds is that his version of an argument from analogy follows the same general rules which apply to the causal inference that generates the belief in the external world and self-identity.

1.1. Wittgensteinian Interpretation

In Book II and Book III of the Treatise, by introducing the concept of sympathy in his moral philosophy, Hume seems to open up an explanation of how we can “enter into” the mental states of others (T 2.2.5.14, SBN 362). According to him, sympathy is not a kind of feeling but a mechanism to experience others’ affections. He equates “the principle of sympathy” with “communication” (T

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1 This chapter has been published online in the British Journal for the History of Philosophy on the 29th of October in 2018 (DOI: 10.1080/09608788.2018.1524365)
2 Terence Penelhum says, “I can see no reason to think he is very much further on than Berkeley in his discussion of other minds” (Penelhum 2000, 53).
3 In Treatise 1.3.15, “Rules by which to judge of causes and effects”, Hume offers the form of the eight “general rules, by which we ought to regulate our judgement concerning causes and effects” (T 1.3.13.11, SBN 149)
2.1.11.2, SBN 317; T 2.3.6.8, SBN 427). Furthermore, he makes explicit the comparison between sympathy and the communication of motion from one object to another:

As in strings equally wound up, the motion of one communicates itself to the rest; so all the affections pass readily from one person to another, and beget correspondent movements in every human creature. (T 3.3.1.7, SBN 576)

Understanding Hume’s description of sympathy in the literal sense⁴ leads to a significant conclusion: that he rejects the Cartesian framework. According to Descartes, the only certain knowledge is that I exist as a thinking being. This is because I know directly what occurs in my own mind, but I do not know others’ mental states and even the existence of other minds in the same way that I know my own. If I can say that I know other minds at all, it should be only by making certain inferences from what is directly known to me, that is, the behaviour of others and the existence of my mind (Thornton 2004). However, Hume now seems to say that I can perceive others’ mental states directly through sympathy without making an inference of any kind. It seems that the concept of sympathy constitutes a rejection of the Cartesian framework.

Given that we understand the above description of sympathy in the literal sense, it seems to have affinities with Wittgenstein’s approach. According to him, for a child, moaning is a “primitive,” a “natural” expression of sensation (Wittgenstein 2001, § 244). When I see the child moaning, I directly see her pain because it is primitively or naturally expressed in her facial expression or bodily gesture. This natural expression of sensation is replaced by the verbal expression: “the verbal expression of pain replaces crying and does not describe it” (Wittgenstein 2001, § 244). That is, when someone says, “I am in pain”, this expression is like a moan of pain. Hence, when someone says, “I am in pain,” we directly see their pain because it is primitively or naturally expressed in their verbal expression as well:

‘We see emotions.’ – As opposed to what? – We do not see facial contortions and make inferences from them (like a doctor framing a diagnosis) to joy, grief, boredom. We describe a face immediately as sad, radiant, bored, even when we are unable to give any other description of the features. – Grief, one would like to say, is personified in the face.

Lorenzo Greco understands the above description of sympathy in the literal sense and offers a Wittgensteinian interpretation according to which Hume’s sympathy-based solution to the Problem of Other Minds shares the same intuition as Wittgenstein’s. Greco says, “So if one wished to name a figure reminiscent of Hume on this issue, Wittgenstein would seem to be a better choice than Descartes” (Greco 2012, 206). He emphasises that, for Wittgenstein, our reactions to the pains of others are “primitive” ones and we do not need any further cognitive process to recognise them (Greco 2012, 205).

Greco tries to find affinities between Hume and Wittgenstein by focusing on the concept of

⁴ I will use underlining for my own emphases.
directness. He pays attention to what Hume says about the resemblance of human beings (Greco 2012, 203):

Now ’tis obvious, that nature has preserv’d a great resemblance among all human creatures, and that (1) we never remark any passion or principle in others, of which, in some degree or other, we may not find a parallel in ourselves. The case is the same with the fabric of the mind, as with that of the body. However the parts may differ in shape or size, their structure and composition are in general the same. There is a very remarkable resemblance, which preserves itself amidst all their variety; and (2) this resemblance must very much contribute to make us enter into the sentiments of others, and embrace them with facility and pleasure.

(T 2.1.11.5, SBN 318)

From this passage, Greco argues that “This background resemblance is a ‘fact’ which is automatically felt by human beings, as if it were ‘infused over our mind’. It imposes itself without being the result of any conscious reasoning” (Greco 2012, 203). Thus, he concludes, “the role of sympathy is to account for that characteristic of human nature through which we are able to recognize each other directly as similar” (Greco 2012, 203).

However, the above passage does not seem to support Greco’s assertion that we directly recognise the resemblance by sympathy. In the passage, Hume makes two points (1) that we can “remark any passion or principle in others” only when we find the resemblance in ourselves, and (2) that finding the resemblance between ourselves and others helps us to sympathize with “the sentiments of others”. It is important to note that Hume does not say that we “recognize each other directly as similar” by sympathy, which Greco argues, but, on the contrary, says that finding the resemblance allows us to sympathize with “the sentiments of others”. Therefore, we can say that against Greco’s interpretation, Hume does not mention anything about “directness” in the above passage.

In my view, there is an important reason why we should understand Hume’s emotional-contagion-like description as a metaphorical explanation. According to Hume, in the strictly philosophical sense, sympathy always “proceeds from certain views and reflections”:

However instantaneous this change of the idea into an impression may be, it proceeds from certain views and reflections, which will not escape the strict scrutiny of a philosopher, tho’ they may the person himself, who makes them. (T 2.1.11.3, SBN 317)

Let us recall Hume’s distinction of two systems of philosophy: the vulgar system and the system of true philosophers. According to him, the vulgar obtain their beliefs “by their stupidity,” and the true philosophers “by their moderate scepticism” (T 1.4.4.10, SBN 224). Hence, we can say that for the vulgar, sympathy seems to work instantaneously like emotional contagion. An emotion seems to pass from one person to another person directly. They do not think that the operation of sympathy can be analysed any further because they unreflectively believe that their reactions to the pains of others are “primitive” ones. However, the strict scrutiny of the true philosophers would show us that the vulgar’s understanding of sympathy is wrong. According to them, the work of sympathy can be analysed as proceeding “from certain views and reflections”.

13
Furthermore, Hume says that sympathy operates “by the force of imagination” (T 2.3.6.8, SBN 427). A. E. Pitson says, “Hume makes it clear here that the transition by which the mind is carried from its own perceptions to those of others is one that is made by the imagination” (Pitson 2002, 152). The fact that an act of sympathy is made by the imagination implies that we can obtain the belief in the mental states of others with the help of the imagination as a medium. But then it follows that the Wittgensteinian interpretation is mistaken because for Hume, unlike Wittgenstein, we perceive other minds in an indirect way.

Greco would respond that this conclusion does not follow because the sympathetic process performed by the imagination is not an inferential process. According to him, “Sympathy is not a form of argumentation, but a psychological principle.” And it takes “the form of an exercise of the imagination” (Greco 2012, 204). When I see a certain behaviour or facial expression of others, sympathy immediately functions as an exercise of the imagination, and thus enables me to acknowledge the resemblance between my mental states and theirs. Hence, he concludes that “the experience of [sympathetic] contagion and the belief in other minds is causal, not inferential, and we acknowledge this resemblance among human beings well before we are able to conceptualise it” (Greco 2012, 205).

I object to Greco’s argumentation for two reasons. First, the Wittgensteinian concept of “directness” precludes not just “an inferential process” but also “the form of an exercise of the imagination.” According to Wittgenstein, we directly see grief because it “is personified in the face” as a primitive expression (Wittgenstein 1981, § 225). In order to know others’ emotions, we do not need the help of additional mental activity such as “conjecture, hypothesis, analogy, induction and the like” (Avramides 2001, 190). Second, as we shall see in the next section, for Hume, the operation of sympathy requires the preliminary process of “causal inference” which allows us to conceptualise another mind. Therefore, in my view, Greco’s assertion that we acknowledge another mind before we conceptualise it is mistaken. More details will follow in the next section. We now turn to the Simulation Theory Interpretation, which proposes one way of understanding the role of imagination in the mechanism of sympathy.

1.2. Simulation Theory Interpretation

As we have seen in the previous section, Hume emphasises that sympathy operates “by the force of imagination” (T 2.3.6.8, SBN 427). His emphasis on the role of imagination in the operation of sympathy seems reminiscent of the simulation theory, which has been suggested by contemporary scholars as a solution to the Problem of Other Minds. James Baillie proposes a simulation theory interpretation, emphasising the role of imagination in the operation of sympathy: “It is an operation of the imagination whereby a primary impression (such as behaviour indicating pain or pleasure) leads to an idea regarding the other’s experience” (Baillie 2000, 57). He continues:

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5 We will examine the nature of imagination in detail in Chapter 5.2.
Sympathy consists in the empathic capacity to detect the mental states of other persons, and, as a result, to undergo an experience similar to that of the person being considered. …

Sympathy is the capacity to simulate what others are experiencing, when we see or think of them. (Baillie 2000, 56)

From his understanding of sympathy, we can say that he interprets Hume’s treatment of the Problem of Other Minds as a simulation theory in the sense that we detect other minds in our imagination. According to Baillie, the reason why Hume does not perceive the Problem of Other Minds as an insoluble problem is because he thinks he has a solution called “sympathy”. We can have the “belief in the social world” by “simulating what others are experiencing” and “detecting the mental states of other persons” through sympathy (Baillie 2000, 60).

However, I think the simulation theory interpretation is mistaken because as we shall see, for Hume the operation of sympathy does not “lead to an idea regarding the other’s experience”, but rather, it presupposes the idea (Baillie 2000, 57). In order to clarify Hume’s position, we need to understand his exact usage of the term ‘sympathy’. Rico Vitz distinguishes Hume’s three different uses of sympathy (Vitz 2016, 313-314):

(1) Hume uses the term ‘sympathy’ “to identify a psychological mechanism: namely, the principle of sympathy, by which one ‘enters into’ the sentiment(s) of another.”

(2) He uses it “to identify a psychological process: namely, the sympathetic conversion of an idea of another’s sentiment into an impression of one’s own.”

(3) He uses it “to identify the affective product of this conversion process: namely, the sentiment of sympathy.”

And Vitz argues that although Hume’s uses of the term ‘sympathy’ are clearly distinguished in three different ways, he was not “aware of his varying uses of the term ‘sympathy’”, and “his failure to distinguish clearly (perhaps, to notice) the varying ways in which he uses the term is one of the fundamental reasons that there is significant disagreement among Hume’s commentators about his account of sympathy” (Vitz 2016, 328).

Vitz is mistaken in holding that Hume fails to distinguish his own varying uses of the term ‘sympathy’. In my view, the reason why there is significant disagreement among commentators is not because Hume is not aware of his varying uses of the term ‘sympathy’, but because they do not recognise the essential relation among them. For Hume, sympathy as a “psychological process”, which Vitz introduces as a second use of the term ‘sympathy’, that is, “the sympathetic conversion of an idea of another’s sentiment into an impression of one’s own,” is the key definition of sympathy. And the other two uses of the term ‘sympathy’ revolve around it.

Let’s take a closer look at Hume’s detailed account of the first use of the term ‘sympathy’ as a “psychological mechanism”:

When any affection is infused by sympathy, (1) it is at first known only by its effects, and by
those external signs in the countenance and conversation, which convey an idea of it. (2)
This idea is presently converted into an impression, and acquires such a degree of force and
vivacity, as to become the very passion itself, and produce an equal emotion, as any original
affection. (T 2.1.11.3, SBN 317)

In this passage, he makes an analysis of how the “psychological mechanism” of sympathy is made up
of two processes.

Process 1. We form an idea of the other’s affection by making a causal inference, and then

Process 2. We convert the idea of the other’s affection into the experience of the affection itself.

The first stage is the cognitive process to get an idea of the other’s affection by making a causal
inference. The second stage is the affective process to convert the idea into an impression, and this
second stage exactly matches what Vitz introduces as a second use of the term ‘sympathy,’ that is,
“the sympathetic conversion of an idea of another’s sentiment into an impression of one’s own.”

By the analysis of the “psychological mechanism” of sympathy, what Hume wants to say seems to be
that the mechanism of sympathy involves two different psychological processes: the cognitive and the
affective process, and that the affective process of ‘sympathetic conversion’ presupposes the cognitive
process of making a ‘causal inference.’ From this, we can say that although we commonly regard the
“psychological mechanism”, by which one ‘enters into’ the sentiment of another, as a primitive one
like an “emotional contagion”, which cannot be analysed, for Hume the mechanism of sympathy can
be analysed as two different processes and the real work of sympathy is actually confined to “the
sympathetic conversion of an idea of another’s sentiment into an impression of one’s own.”

It follows from this that for Hume, sympathy is mainly defined as the conversion of an idea into an
impression by imagination, and sympathy as a psychological mechanism can be simply understood as
a derivative definition. This is the reason why Hume defines sympathy as follows:

  Sympathy … is nothing but the conversion of an idea into an impression by the force of
  imagination. (T 2.3.6.8, SBN 427)

Therefore, we can conclude that although it is right that we can experience vivid passions, which are
similar to the original passions of others, with the help of the work of sympathy, it is not by sympathy
that we have the belief in others’ passions. Sympathy does not generate the belief in other minds, but
rather, sympathy presupposes that belief:

  No passion of another discovers itself immediately to the mind. (1) We are only sensible of
  its causes or effects. From these we infer the passion: And (2) consequently these give rise
to our sympathy. (T 3.3.1.7, SBN 576)

If my understanding of the work of sympathy is right, Baillie’s suggestion that Hume’s position
should be interpreted as a simulation theory is mistaken because Hume’s concept of sympathy has no
direct relation with the issue of other minds.
1.3. Causal Inference

We now need to ask what Hume means by “causal inference” when he says that it is by making a causal inference that we form an idea of another’s mental states. Let’s start from understanding his concept of “reasoning”. Annette C. Baier notes that Hume uses the concept of reason in two different senses: a narrow one and a broad one. She says, “Reason in Hume’s narrowest sense is this discerner of ‘intelligible’ relations of ideas.” (Baier 1991, 60). But, she continues, he “eventually uses ‘reasoning’ in a much broader way, to cover any sort of inference, or confident transition to a new belief” (Baier 1991, 60).

If we have this distinction in mind, when Hume mentions causal inference, we can understand it in a broad sense of reasoning. He explains as follows:

My intention … is only to make the reader sensible of the truth of my hypothesis, that (1) all our reasonings concerning causes and effects are deriv’d from nothing but custom; and that (2) belief is more properly an act of the sensitive, than of the cogitative part of our natures. (T 1.4.1.8, SBN 183)

In this passage, he emphasises two points. The process of causal inference is not the sort of pure cogitation, but the sensitive one (2). And custom plays a significant role in making a causal inference (1).

However, he does not think that custom by itself is sufficient to explain how we make a causal inference. Although custom leads us to project experienced constant conjunctions of events onto unobserved cases, for him causal inference is not merely what “transfers past to future”:

’tis evident, that the belief arises not merely from the transference of past to future, but from some operation of the fancy conjoin’d with it. This may lead us to conceive the manner, in which that faculty enters into all our reasonings. (T 1.3.12.22, SBN 140)

Our imagination allows us to make a causal inference to a new event which is not exactly the same kind of event we have repeatedly experienced if it only keeps resemblance: “From this principle I have accounted for that species of probability, deriv’d from analogy, where we transfer our experience in past instances to objects which are resembling, but are not exactly the same with those concerning which we have had experience” (T 1.3.13.8, SBN 147). Hence, we can conclude that the main two keys to understand his concept of causal inference are custom and imagination not as the sort of pure cogitation but as the sensitive.

1.4. Argument from Analogy

Based on our understanding of causal inference, let’s ask whether Hume’s account of causal inference concerning the belief in other minds is an example of the argument from analogy. For our purposes, it
is helpful to note that his concept of reasoning conforms neither to Aristotelian nor Fregean models, both of which are propositional or at least concern the constituents of sentences. The basic elements in his concept of reasoning were not propositions or premises but ideas, and the goal of reasoning was not to find the deductive validity of an argument but to explain the causal relations between ideas (Owen 1999, 2).

From this point of view, let us consider Mill’s classic statement of the argument from analogy (Mill 1867, 237-238). According to him, I perceive in my own case that body and mind are causally connected. And then, I find the same bodily behaviour in others as in myself. From these, I can infer that others’ bodily behaviour must be connected to their minds that are equally similar to my own. This is Mill’s classical version of the argument from analogy. And it can be translated into Hume’s terminology as follows:

(1) I find the causal relation between the ideas of my mental states and those of my bodily behaviour by internal observation.

(2) I see the same bodily behaviour in others as in myself.

(3) I infer the ideas of the mental states in others, which are unobserved, by analogy with those I observe to obtain in my own case.

Then, we can ask the question as to whether this sort of Hume’s version of the argument from analogy is applicable to Hume’s epistemological framework. Pitson’s answer to this question is very negative. He argues that, for Hume, the ‘general rules’ which apply to causal inference are that “one of the particulars involved on which causal inference is founded is past experience of the constant union of the relevant kinds of cause and effect”, but the analogical inference cannot meet the requirement of “general rules” simply because when we consider that one cannot be directly aware of the mental states of others, the bodily behaviour in others cannot be past experience of the constant union of my personal mental state and bodily behaviour (Pitson 2002, 151). From this, he concludes that, for Hume, the analogical inference cannot be a kind of causal inference.

However, when we recall Hume’s remarks that “the belief arises not merely from the transference of past to future, but from some operation of the fancy conjoin’d with it”, Pitson’s version of ‘general rules’ does not seem to be right (T 1.3.12.22, SBN 140). For Hume, the process of causal inference is determined not only by custom, but also by imagination. That means that even though I have one particular experience which is not exactly the same one as I have repeatedly experienced in the past, I can draw a causal inference with the help of imagination. Anik Waldow also objects to Pitson’s argument. She says, “it is plainly not true that every single Humean inference needs to be grounded in the perception of both the stipulated cause and its effect” (Waldow 2009A, 122):

For when by any clear experiment we have discover’d the causes or effects of any phaenomenon, we immediately extend our observation to every phaenomenon of the same kind, without waiting for that constant repetition, from which the first idea of this relation is deriv’d. (T 1.3.15.6, SBN 173-174)
Based on this passage, she concludes, “This clearly suggests that for the application of an inference it suffices that the case in question can be identified as the same kind of case in which both the alleged cause and effect have appeared in a constant conjunction. From like effects we then presume like causes” (Waldow 2009A, 122). Waldow’s objection is correct – Pitson’s ‘general rules’ which apply to causal inferences do not seem to be Hume’s ‘general rules’ any more.

One might raise an objection that the argument from analogy does not seem to work because there is an unavoidable asymmetry between perceptions of myself and those of others. Waldow says, “The perception of myself and another involves a shift in perspective, namely from the first-person to the third-person perspective” (Waldow 2009A, 77). I am aware of my feelings and bodily behaviour in a transparent and direct way from the first-person perspective while I only understand the bodily behaviour of others from the third-person perspective of observation. Although Hume allows that an act of causal inference can be applied to new experiences based on resemblance, different perspectives produce different perceptions and prevent the causal inference from working (Waldow 2009A, 77). In order to solve this problem, Waldow suggests that for Hume, sympathy, not causal inference, enables us to “bridge the gap between the first- and third-person perspectives” (Waldow 2009B, 120). According to her interpretation, even though there exists the perspective asymmetry between the experience of my own behaviour and the behaviour of another person, the imagination can find the general resemblance between them, and hence enables us to have the belief in other minds (Waldow 2009B, 127).

However, this objection to the classical version of the argument from analogy does not seem to be valid for Hume’s version of the analogical argument. It is important to recognise the difference between these two versions. The classical version of the argument from analogy works at the level of agents, which presupposes their own self-identity (Hamilton 1998, 164-165). By contrast, Hume’s version of the argument from analogy starts to operate at the level of perceptions, which does not presuppose the identity of a self. In my view, the problem of perspective asymmetry is not raised in Hume’s system because of his understanding of perceptions.

Let us consider Hume’s understanding of perceptions. His concept of perception has a unique feature. According to him, perceptions can be “separately existent”: “since all our perceptions are different from each other, and from every thing else in the universe, they are also distinct and separable, and may be consider’d as separately existent, and may exist separately, and have no need of any thing else to support their existence” (T 1.4.5.5, SBN 233). Given that “the definition of a substance is something which may exist by itself”, perceptions “are, therefore, substances, as far as this definition explains a substance” (T 1.4.5.5, SBN 233). Robert J. Fogelin calls this feature of perception “Hume’s radical atomism” (Fogelin 1985, 107). And Robert Adams names “the doctrine of the radical separability of perceptions” for this feature (Adams 1973, 65).

This feature of perceptions allows Hume to retain the third-person perspective when he makes internal observation on himself because for him, internal observation is a sort of second-order reflective perception, which is directed at ordinary perceptions (Allison 2008, 298; Stroud 1977, 130).
Since for him, all the mental activities are regarded as perceptions, our introspective or reflective observation should be also understood as one particular perception. Let’s suppose that now I reflect on my mind, which consists of a particular bundle of perceptions. Since the mental activity of reflection itself is also a particular perception, a statement that “I reflect on my mind” can be translated into his version of statement that “a reflective perception is presently occurring within the bundle of perceptions” (Pike 1967, 163). When we consider “the radical separability of perceptions,” we can say that there is the radical separability between the reflective perception and the particular bundle of perceptions. And this allows the second-order reflective perception to act as an observer and ascribe an identity to them from the third person perspective.

Someone might say that it is impossible for the reflective perception to avoid the first-person perspective because it is within the bundle of perceptions that it occurs. However, although it is true that the bundle of perceptions is “united together by certain relations” (T 1.4.2.39, SBN 207), these relations are not an intrinsic feature of the perceptions. They are formed by the a-posteriori observation on the certain pattern of their regularities. Hume says, “Now as every perception is distinguishable from another, and may be consider’d as separately existent; it evidently follows, that there is no absurdity in separating any particular perception from the mind; that is, in breaking off all its relations, with that connected mass of perceptions, which constitute a thinking being” (T 1.4.2.39, SBN 207). That is, a certain kind of relation cannot remove the radical separability of perceptions. Therefore, it makes sense to say that for him, the mental activity of introspective observation as a second-order perception takes the third-person perspective on the successive perceptions.

This is the reason why Hume holds that self-identity is “of a kind with that which we ascribe to vegetables and animal bodies” (T 1.4.6.15, SBN 259). When I introspect myself, I retain the third-person perspective for the ascription of an identity to myself. In Book 1 of the Treatise, he asks us to suppose that “we cou’d see clearly into the breast of another, and observe that succession of perceptions, which constitutes his mind or thinking principle” (T 1.4.6.18, SBN 260). According to him, we can ascribe an identity to another person’s mind by taking the third-person perspective on his perceptions: “whether in pronouncing concerning the identity of a person, we observe some real bond among his perceptions, or only feel one among the ideas we form of them” (T 1.4.6.16, SBN 259). After considering this supposition of the third-person perspective on another person, he says that “The case is the same whether we consider ourselves or others” (T 1.4.6.18, SBN 261). This means that, according to him, the third-person perspective model, which explains the ascription of an identity to another person, is equally applicable to ourselves (Shoemaker 1963, 153). That is, for him, there is no asymmetry between the first-person perspective and the third-person perspective when it comes to considering the identity of a person.

In addition, as James Harris points out, Hume’s answer to the question of liberty and necessity in Book 2 of the Treatise is formulated “from the standpoint of the observer” (Harris 2005, 66). According to Hume, we observe from the third-person perspective that “our actions have a constant union with our motives, tempers, and circumstances”; and accordingly we “acknowledge a necessity” (T 2.3.1.4, SBN 400). The will is also defined from the third-person perspective: “by the will, I mean
nothing but the internal impression we feel and are conscious of, when we knowingly give rise to any new motion of our body, or new perception of our mind” (T 2.3.1.2, SBN 399). Hence, it is clear that when Hume makes an internal observation on himself, he retains the third-person perspective.

Let us now return to the objection that the argument from analogy does not work because there is an unavoidable asymmetry between perceptions of myself and those of others. Waldow says, “it must be self-perception, that is, the perception of the constant conjunction between our passions and our behavioural expressions and the resemblance between the other’s behavioural expressions and our own that makes us associate after-images of our own passions in reaction to impressions of another person’s conduct” (Waldow 2008, 64). She seems to presuppose the idea of a state of mind that is necessarily my own. However, according to Hume, the idea of a state of mind that is regarded as my own is ascribed by the a-posteriori observation of a certain pattern to their regularities. For example, let’s suppose that whenever my friend is hit by someone, I feel pain. I would come to believe that his body is mine. For Hume, there is no asymmetry between perceptions of myself and those of others. Therefore, the objection of perspective asymmetry is mistaken because he retains the third-person perspective when he makes internal observation on himself. The problem of perspective asymmetry is not raised in his system.

At this point, I will introduce textual evidence to support the Analogical Argument Interpretation. In Treatise 1. 3.16. Of the reason of animals, Hume holds that it is by making an argument from analogy that we obtain the belief in animal minds. He writes as follows:

‘Tis from the resemblance of the external actions of animals to those we ourselves perform, that we judge their internal likewise to resemble ours; and the same principle of reasoning, carry’d one step farther, will make us conclude that since our internal actions resemble each other, the causes, from which they are deriv’d, must also be resembling. (T 1.3.16.3, SBN 176)

In this passage, he clearly uses the argument from analogy. However, Pitson does not accept this textual evidence as crucial. He points out that this analogical argument “starts not just from one’s own case but that of human beings (or ‘men’) generally”. And then he asserts that when Hume treats of animal minds, “the existence of other human minds … is already assumed” (Pitson 2002, 150). And he continues as follows:

what Hume is doing is to use analogical inference to extend the category of other minds to the case of animals on the basis of those respects in which their behaviour resembles ours. (Pitson 2002, 150)

However, we cannot find any reason why Hume already assumes the existence of other human minds before using the analogical argument for obtaining the belief in animal minds. As we have seen above, he retains the third-person perspective when he makes internal observation on himself, which means that there is no asymmetry between perceptions of himself and those of others including other animals. And our imagination allows us to make a causal inference based on the resemblance between my behaviour and animals’. There is no reason to confine the role of analogical argument to
“extending the category of other minds to the case of animals”.

Therefore, we can conclude that when Hume says that it is by making a causal inference that we form an idea of another’s mental states, what he means by ‘causal inference’ is an argument from analogy. Even though it is true that “an argument from analogy” was explicitly introduced by Mill, Hume’s discussion of the Problem of Other Minds is also implicitly based on it. The reason why he does not raise the Problem of Other Minds is that his version of an argument from analogy follows the same general rules which apply to the causal inference that generates the belief in the external world and self-identity. When he conveyed the experimental internal observation, he took a third-person perspective and it allowed him to apply an argument from analogy to the Problem of Other Minds in what seemed to him to be an easy and smooth way.

1.5. Vivacity, Causal Inference, and Sympathy

In the previous section, we saw that Hume could apply an argument from analogy to the Problem of Other Minds because for him there was no problem of perspective asymmetry. However, at this point, one question is raised. If there is no asymmetry between perceptions of myself and those of others, how can we recognise which perceptions are mine and which perceptions are others’? Hume’s answer to this question is by vivacity (T 2.1.11.5, SBN 318). According to him, the single scale of vivacity marks all the differences between impressions, ideas and beliefs (Dauer 1999, 83).

An anonymous referee of the British Journal for the History of Philosophy objects as follows:

I don’t think it can be justified that the only criterion that allows me to distinguish perceptions of another person from perceptions of the self is vivacity. In T 2.1.11.3 Hume says, “When any affection is infus’d by sympathy, it is at first known only by its effects, and by those external signs in the countenance and conversation, which convey an idea of it”. This clearly tells us that I form an idea of what another person is feeling on the basis of impressions of bodily behaviour that another person is performing in the sense that my own body is not perceived to do what the other person is doing. So content and the relations among the individual impressions do count.

I disagree with this objection for two reasons. First, it looks here as if the referee presupposes that for Hume, the divergent perspective is inbuilt in the experience of my behaviour and that of others. However, as we have seen in the previous section, Hume does not presuppose this kind of perspective asymmetry. It is important to note that the reason why he was able to use the argument from analogy as a solution to the Problem of Other Minds is because the divergent perspective is not inbuilt in his concept of perception. Otherwise, his argument from analogy would be problematic due to the perspective asymmetry problem.

Second, as we shall see in this section, Hume says that the difference among mere ideas, beliefs, and impressions is not in “content and the relations among the individual impressions”, which means that the divergent perspective is not inbuilt in them; But rather, it is the manner of conceiving them. And, according to him, the manner varies on how vividly I conceive them. Therefore, I would say that I very vividly conceive my bodily behaviour but I less vividly conceive that of others. It is right to say that “my own body is not perceived to do what the other person is doing”, but according to Hume, this is not because “content and the relations among the individual impressions” of the other person are different from mine but because the vividness of conceiving them is weaker than that of conceiving
Hume has clear distinctions among impressions, mere ideas, and beliefs in terms of vivacity. First, impressions are the most vivid form of perceptions: “Those perceptions, which enter with most force and violence, we may name impressions: and under this name I comprehend all our sensations, passions and emotions, as they make their first appearance in the soul” (T 1.1.1.1, SBN 1). Then, he distinguishes beliefs from conceptions, that is, mere ideas. He says, “Suppose a person present with me, who advances propositions, to which I do not assent, that Caesar dy’d in his bed, that silver is more fusible than lead, or mercury heavier than gold; ’tis evident, that notwithstanding my incredulity, I clearly understand his meaning, and form all the same ideas, which he forms” (T 1.3.7.3, SBN 95). According to Hume, the difference between conceptions and beliefs is not in the contents of them but in the manner of conceiving them: “as this difference lies not in the parts or composition of the idea, which we conceive; it follows, that it must lie in the manner, in which we conceive it” (T 1.3.7.2, SBN 95). And the manner varies on how vividly I conceive them: “So that as belief does nothing but vary the manner, in which we conceive any object, it can only bestow on our ideas an additional force and vivacity” (T 1.3.7.5, SBN 96). Then, he defines that “belief is nothing but a more forcible and vivid conception of an idea” (T 1.3.9.2, SBN 107). It follows from this that impressions are the most vivid form of perceptions, beliefs are a vivid form of perceptions, and mere ideas are perceptions that have, we might say, ‘zero-vivacity’.

On the basis of Hume’s distinction between impressions and beliefs in terms of vivacity, we can understand how he distinguishes perceptions of myself from perceptions of another without perspective asymmetry. The constant occurrence of impressions with the certain pattern of regularities produces the impression of myself. According to him, this impression of myself is a kind of feeling. In the Appendix, Hume summarises his view of self-identity in Book 1 of the Treatise:

If perceptions are distinct existences, they form a whole only by being connected together. But no connexions among distinct existences are ever discoverable by human understanding. We only feel a connexion or a determination of the thought, to pass from one object to another. It follows, therefore, that the thought alone finds personal identity, when reflecting on the train of past perceptions, that compose a mind, the ideas of them are felt to be connected together, and naturally introduce each other. (T App.20, SBN 635)

That is, according to Hume, I cannot find self-identity as a distinct perception by my understanding; Rather, I have the feeling of self-identity when reflecting on the bundle of perceptions since the vivacity of those perceptions that I have been constantly bombarded with generates the strong feeling of connection. Hence, Hume says that it is with “the vivacity of conception” that “we always form the idea of our own person” (T 2.1.11.5, SBN 318).

By contrast, in the case of others’ perceptions, when I see their facial expression or bodily gesture, I first make a causal inference from analogy and generate the belief in other minds. Here it is important to note that the causal inference from analogy does not generate a mere idea but a vivid idea of other

my bodily behaviour.
minds, that is, the belief in other minds since the vivacity, which I feel of myself, is transferred to the idea:7 “a present impression with a relation of causation may enliven any idea, and consequently produce belief or assent … this very instance of our reasonings from cause and effect will alone suffice to that purpose” (T 1.3.8.6-7, SBN 101). When I make a causal inference from analogy on the basis of resemblance, the vivacity of myself is transferred to the idea of other minds and it becomes the belief in other minds. Accordingly, I believe that those perceptions are theirs but I do not feel those are mine. Therefore, we can say that it is in terms of vivacity that we distinguish my perceptions from others': “’tis evident, that as we are at all times intimately conscious of ourselves, our sentiments and passions, their ideas must strike upon us with greater vivacity than the ideas of the sentiments of passions of any other person” (T 2.2.2.15, SBN 339). For my perceptions I have the most vivid feeling that they are mine, but for others’ perceptions I have a vivid belief that they are theirs.

The fact that for Hume vivacity is the only scale to distinguish perceptions of myself from perceptions of others leads to a very interesting conclusion when it comes to the role of sympathy. As we have seen, causal inference generates the belief in other minds, and thus allows us to distinguish perceptions of myself from perceptions of others. But sympathy erases the distinction between my mind and other minds by converting the belief into an impression.8 He says that when an idea is converted into an impression by sympathy, the idea “acquires such a degree of force and vivacity, as to become the very passion itself, and produce an equal emotion, as any original affection” (T 2.1.11.3, SBN 317). That is, when the idea of another’s passion is converted into the passion itself by sympathy, I do feel that the passion is mine, not others. Therefore, we can conclude that sympathy does not have a role to play in generating the belief in other minds, and hence making a distinction between perceptions of myself and of others. Rather, it erases the distinction between them, which

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7 Here is one difference between analogical inferences concerning other minds and ordinary causal inferences concerning external objects. The belief in other minds resulting from analogical inferences gains its vivacity from the vivacity, which I feel of myself, while ordinary beliefs resulting from causal inferences gain their vivacity from repetition and the habit of perceiving constant conjunctions: “’tis evident, that the idea, or rather impression of ourselves is always intimately present with us, and that our consciousness gives us so lively a conception of our own person. … Whatever object, therefore, is related to ourselves must be conceived with a like vivacity of conception” (T 2.1.11.4, SBN 317). And as we shall see in this section, when we find more peculiar similarity between me and others, the vivacity, that I feel of myself, is more strongly conveyed to others: “All these relations, when united together, convey the impression or consciousness of our own person to the idea of the sentiments or passions of others, and makes us conceive them in the strongest and most lively manner” (T 2.1.11.6, SBN 318).

8 Someone might say that if the account of sympathy implies that “I erase the distinction between my mind and other minds”, there is some danger that the very distinction between myself and the object of sympathy as separate persons starts to look flimsy. However, as we shall see in Chapter 4, Hume introduces two kinds of sympathy, which provides an answer to this problem. According to him, “limited sympathy” is the sympathy “limited” to another person’s present feelings. By contrast, “extensive sympathy” is the sympathy which is not “limited to the present moment” but extended to “the pains and pleasures of others, which are not in being, and which we only anticipate by the force of imagination” (T 2.2.9.13, SBN 385-386). And the feeling of another’s personal identity is produced not by “limited sympathy” but by “extensive sympathy”. Hence, “limited sympathy” producing “the very passion itself (of the object of sympathy)” would not pose a threat to the distinction between myself and the object of sympathy as separate persons. I thank Geoffrey Scarre for this comment.
have been made by an act of causal inference, by converting the belief into an impression.

If the function of causal inference and of sympathy are different from each other, one question can be raised. Under which conditions does the mechanism of sympathy take the place of causal inference? That is, when does the first stage of the mechanism of sympathy proceed to the second stage, thus feeling others’ pain as mine? And when does the first stage cease to proceed to the second stage, thus getting the belief in others’ pain without feeling it as mine? According to Hume, it depends on the resemblance between me and another person. He says that there are two kinds of resemblance among people: general resemblance and peculiar similarity. First, the general resemblance among people allows us to make a causal inference. He says, “nature has preserv’d a great resemblance among all human creatures … However the parts may differ in shape or size, their structure and composition are in general the same” (T 2.1.11.5, SBN 318). This general resemblance allows us to draw an analogical inference, hence allowing us to have the belief in other minds.

Second, the peculiar similarity allows us to sympathize with others. He says, “Accordingly we find, that where, beside the general resemblance of our natures, there is any peculiar similarity in our manners, or character, or country, or language, it facilitates the sympathy. The stronger the relation is betwixt ourselves and any object, the more easily does the imagination make the transition, and convey to the related idea the vivacity of conception, with which we always form the idea of our own person” (T 2.1.11.5, SBN 318). Therefore, when I simply find some general resemblance between me and others, I make only a causal inference and generate the belief in other minds and cease to sympathize with them. But when I recognise some peculiar similarity, I start to sympathize with others and erase the distinction between me and them.9

1.6. Conclusion

Recently, different interpretations of Hume’s solution to the Problem of Other Minds have been

9 In his essay, “Of the Standard of Taste”, Hume gives specific examples of how the peculiar similarity facilitates the sympathy (ST 244-246):

A young man, whose passions are warm, will be more sensibly touched with amorous and tender images, than a man more advanced in years, who takes pleasure in wise, philosophical reflections concerning the conduct of life and moderation of the passions. At twenty, OVID may be the favourite author; HORACE at forty; and perhaps TACTITUS at fifty. Vainly would we, in such cases, endeavour to enter into the sentiments of others, and divest ourselves of those propensities, which are natural to us. We choose our favourite author as we do our friend, from a conformity of humour and disposition. Mirth or passion, sentiment or reflection; whichever of these most predominate in our temper, it gives us a peculiar sympathy with the writer who resembles us. (ST 244)

In this passage, Hume argues that what makes us “enter into the sentiments of others” is “a conformity of humour and disposition”. Although all human beings share the general resemblance, a young man has his own peculiar humour and disposition. When he finds the peculiar similarity, he starts to sympathize with the writer.
presented. Although commentators have different approaches to the Problem, a common error in their Hume interpretation has been that they believe that the work of sympathy plays the significant role in producing the belief in other minds. This is due to their misunderstanding of the concept of sympathy, I believe. If my interpretation is right, sympathy does not generate the belief in other minds, but rather, sympathy presupposes that belief.

Even though I disagree with the idea that the work of sympathy generates the belief in other minds, however, I share their intuition that imagination plays a crucial role in producing the belief in other minds. Hume’s approach to the Problem of Other Minds goes with Wittgenstein’s in the sense that it does not require any intentional effort to access other minds. For Hume, the process of producing the belief in other minds is non-intentional and spontaneous because his version of the analogical argument operates based on custom and imagination which are determined by “nature” (T 1.4.1.7, SBN 183). However, his approach seems to be apparently different from Wittgenstein’s in the sense that Hume requires the medium of causal inference, while Wittgenstein just says, “We see emotions”. Therefore, we can summarise that, for Hume, although in order to get the belief in other minds we need to use his version of the analogical argument as a medium, the way to get the belief is non-intentional and spontaneous.

Now we have one last question. If Hume does not introduce the concept of sympathy to deal with the epistemological issue called “the Problem of Other Minds”, what is the role of sympathy in his philosophical system? As we have seen in the previous section, sympathy does not have a role to play in generating the belief in other minds, and hence making a distinction between the perceptions of myself and others. Rather, it erases the distinction between them, which have been made by an act of causal inference, by converting the belief into an impression. According to him, sympathy plays a distinctive role in his moral theory. I can share others’ feelings by erasing the distinction between my perceptions and others’ by sympathy. And accordingly I can approve or disapprove of the shared feelings. He says, “Thus it appears, that sympathy is a very powerful principle in human nature, that it has a great influence on our taste of beauty, and that it produces our sentiment of morals in all the artificial virtues” (T 3.3.1.10, SBN 577-8). The reason why the role of sympathy is so important in Hume’s moral theory is that it takes us out of our own interests and make us concerned for the good of others, thus producing moral sentiments (T 3.3.1.11, SBN 579).

Therefore, we can delineate his system as follows:

(1) On the epistemological level, by making a causal inference with the help of custom and imagination, we can obtain the belief in other minds.

(2) On the level of moral theory, we sympathize with others’ feelings, and hence generate moral sentiments.

We need to be cautious not to confuse his distinction between these two levels. As we have seen, for him, sympathy does not work on the epistemological level, but on the level of moral theory.

Now we can grasp that Hume introduces his concept of sympathy into his philosophy in order to
establish his moral philosophy, which we will now move on to. But before we do so, the next chapter first examines Hutcheson’s moral philosophy. As is well known, Hutcheson’s moral philosophy had a significant influence on Hume’s, and so we need to examine it first.
Chapter 2. Hutcheson on the Origins of Morality

As is well known, Hutcheson’s moral philosophy had a significant influence on Hume’s. In his moral philosophy, Hume extended and refined Hutcheson’s ideas, and in some cases altered them. Thus, before we start to scrutinise Hume’s moral philosophy, it would be good to examine Hutcheson’s moral philosophy because, I believe, Hume’s moral philosophy can be best understood by comparing it with Hutcheson’s.

This chapter deals with three issues in Hutcheson’s moral philosophy. First, we will examine Norton’s moral realist interpretation in which he argued that for Hutcheson, an agent’s benevolence is a real moral virtue and an observer’s moral sense plays a cognitive role in recognising the moral concomitant ideas which represent objective moral reality. However, as we shall see, there is no such moral concomitant idea in Hutcheson’s list of concomitant ideas. Thus, Norton’s moral realist interpretation is rejected. Although it is true that Hutcheson holds that human beings have ultimately benevolent motives in their mind, it is important to note that they are not objectively real moral dispositions but natural dispositions.

Second, we will scrutinise his theory of moral judgment. Given that for Hutcheson, “moral distinctions” are identified with the peculiar moral emotions felt by observers, there seem to be two ways of interpreting his theory of moral judgment. One interpretation is to understand him as a forerunner of emotivism. However, this interpretation is rejected because Hutcheson holds that the judgments, which express one’s sentiments, are meant to convey matters of fact, and, thus, have truth-values. According to him, a moral judgment does not just express a non-cognitive peculiar sentiment but refers to a mental state as a matter of fact. Thus, we can conclude that Hutcheson is not an emotivist, and hence should be understood as a cognitivist.

Third, we will examine his theory of moral motivation. The question is how Hutcheson’s observer-based evaluation moral theory can provide a plausible theory of moral motivation. Jensen is pessimistic concerning this question because he believes that Hutcheson’s moral sense theory causes an insoluble problem called “double desire paradox”. Hutcheson’s theory of moral motivation needs the help of desire to motivate moral acts because moral approval as a peculiar feeling of pleasure itself cannot motivate them. Thus, to desire to motivate moral acts means to desire the antecedent benevolent motive as a natural disposition which is approved by moral sense. But the antecedent benevolent motive is also a desire to do a benevolent act. Thus, we should say that what we mean by “desire the approved benevolent motive” is to desire to desire to do a benevolent act. This is the place where what Jensen calls the “double-desire paradox” problem is raised. However, I will argue that the problem is raised due to the wrong interpretation of Hutcheson’s mechanism of moral motivation. In my view, a modified version of the mechanism of moral motivation solves the problem.

After dealing with these three issues, I will examine the limitation of Hutcheson’s moral philosophy in the last section of this chapter. In my view, although Hutcheson gives a naturalistic account of morality introducing sentimentalism in his moral philosophy, his main argument still includes the supernatural apparatus, Divine Providence, which promotes the harmony between moral and interested obligation in human nature. And in the next chapter, I will scrutinise how Hume overcomes the limitation of Hutcheson’s moral philosophy. Let’s start from understanding the context in which Hutcheson’s moral theory emerged. It will help us to more completely
understand his moral theory.

2.1. Background of Hutcheson’s moral philosophy

Hutcheson’s moral philosophy was formed against other established moral philosophies of his time, which we need to understand. Two in particular were targeted by Hutcheson. The first one is the moral egoism of Thomas Hobbes. The first step to understand Hobbes’ moral philosophy is to know that it is intimately tied to his physics (Schneewind 1998, 84). According to him, the physical world should be conceived as composed of indivisible atoms. Thus, individual persons are to be understood as groups of atoms moving in persistent clusters. Based on this analysis of his physics, he defines desire and aversion in terms of the smallest motions, called “endeavour”, of the atoms that constitute us. When we are moved toward something, we can say that we desire it and, in this sense, we call it “good”. That is, we think something is good simply because the thought of it moves us to get it (Hobbes 1996, 37-40). Thus, for Hobbes, there is no such moral good based on its own value. According to him, selfishness is the sole operative human motive and the reason why we form societies is only because of our self-interest. Morals are only needed as a system to protect our own interests from others in the society where we live.

On the other hand, there was another type of moral philosophy obtaining when Hutcheson started to form his own moral philosophy, which is called moral rationalism as defended by Samuel Clarke. He proposed a mathematical model of morals, in which our rational cognition provides us both guidance and motivation, and our feeling is at most a hindrance to virtue (Schneewind 1998, 310). According to him, when we act in a morally good way, we need reasons to act arising not from desires but solely from knowledge of moral truths. The knowledge is kind of “necessary and eternal” relations of things to one another, which he puts in terms of “the fitness or unfitness of the application of different things or different relations one to another” (Schneewind 1998, 314). He compares them to logical or mathematical relations, and thus argues that demonstrative reasoning can both discover moral principles and provide motivation to act on them (Baillie 2000, 111).

Hutcheson opposed these two moral philosophical streams. On the one hand, he rejected Hobbes’ moral egoism. Hutcheson believed that human beings’ ultimate motives are not always self-interested and they, in many cases, desire the good of others, with no thought of profiting from it. Hutcheson calls this kind of disinterested motivational quality “benevolence”. On the other hand, he also refused to accept Clarke’s moral rationalism by introducing a concept of “moral sense”:

We must then certainly have other Perceptions of moral Actions than those of Advantage: And the Power of receiving these Perceptions may be call’d a Moral Sense, since the Definition agrees to it, viz. a Determination of the Mind, to receive any Idea from the Presence of an Object which occurs to us, independent on our Will. (Hutcheson 2004, 90)

According to Hutcheson, we have our “moral sense”, a faculty of mind, which is an “internal sense” distinguished from “other Sensations of Seeing and Hearing” (Hutcheson 2004, 23). It is by the moral sense that

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10 The concept of “moral sense” was first coined by Shaftesbury.
we can experience benevolent motives and approve of them as we experience external sensations by sight or touch. For Hutcheson, the moral approval of an agent’s benevolence by the moral sense is the root experience from which morality originates. He believed that the source of our morality is not our rational part of mind but our moral sense as a faculty of mind.

However, there is an ambiguity in this simple explanation of Hutcheson’s moral philosophy. Hutcheson puts emphasis on “benevolence” as human beings’ ultimate motives against moral egoism, while he stresses the role of “moral sense” in objection to moral rationalism. Thus, it is still unclear whether the ultimate origin of our morality is an agent’s benevolence or an observer’s approbation.

2.2. The Ontology of Morals

2.2.1. Moral Realist Interpretation

As mentioned above, Hutcheson objected to Hobbes’ moral egoism that self-interest is the sole operative human motive. Hutcheson believed that human beings’ ultimate motives are not always self-interested and that, in many cases, they desire the good of others, with no thought of profiting from it. He calls this kind of disinterested motivational quality as “benevolence”. Norton pays attention to this aspect of Hutcheson’s moral philosophy:

As a matter of fact, Hutcheson set himself to refute two views: those of the rationalists, to be sure, but also those of the morally sceptical egoists, Hobbes and Mandeville. Furthermore ... it can be shown that this opposition to the sceptical moralists led Hutcheson to adopt, perhaps necessarily, a cognitivist account of the moral sense. (Norton 1982, 60)

First, he characterises Hobbes’ moral egoism as moral scepticism in the sense that it denies “moral distinctions are founded in objective (independent, publicly available) features of the world (in contrast to observers)” and maintains that “there can be no such thing as a good reason for a moral judgment, that there are no valid moral arguments, that morality has no rational basis, and that the difference between right and wrong is merely a matter of taste, opinion, or convention” (Norton 1982, 12).

He, in contrast, interprets Hutcheson’s moral philosophy as moral realism, a reaction against Hobbes’ moral scepticism. According to this interpretation, moral distinctions solely rely on ontologically real features of the world in Hutcheson’s moral philosophy. Norton says, “The moral realists agreed in thinking that moral distinctions are objective, or that such claims as ‘That was an evil act’ or ‘Cook is a good person’ are assertions of moral fact whose truth or falsity depends upon objective (independent, publicly available) features of the world (in contrast to observers), and whose truth or falsity may be known (at least to those who have observed the act or person in question)” (Norton 1982, 12).

Furthermore, he maintains that “this opposition to the sceptical moralists led Hutcheson to adopt, perhaps necessarily, a cognitivist account of the moral sense” (Norton 1982, 60). According to him, “That the moral sense has a cognitive function is doubtless the more fundamental point” because “if there is no means by which
virtue can be known - no faculty capable of apprehending it - then his enterprise must have ended in failure” (Norton 1982, 72-73). And he continues, “To refute these sceptics effectively he would also need to show that man is equipped to discover and distinguish these features of reality” (Norton 1982, 73). To sum up, there are real virtues in the world, on which our moral distinctions are solely dependent, and our moral sense should be cognitive in that we are required to have a mental faculty to recognise it.

At this point, we can raise a question: what does Hutcheson mean by saying that the real virtue is recognised by our moral sense? In order to answer this question, we need to know how the moral sense works. According to Norton, the moral sense conveys two functions in Hutcheson’s moral philosophy:

Moral perception is much the same. It too depends upon nonrepresentative ideas, affections, or feelings which function as the signs of external reality. Of course, there is no moral organ, but (1) once we have by ordinary perception perceived certain human actions our moral sense responds with feelings of approbation or disapprobation. (2) Concomitant with these ideas, in addition to duration and number, are the moral concomitants, the ideas of virtue and vice, which are representative of external or objective moral reality. When we experience these kinds of ideas together (for again the feelings appear to be only logically prior) we have an idea of moral objects, or moral knowledge. (Norton 1982, 85-86)

First, it responds with feelings of approbation or disapprobation to the perceived certain human actions; secondly, it recognises the moral concomitants, the ideas of virtue or vice, which are representative of external or objective moral reality.

According to this interpretation, we cannot directly recognise the objective moral reality, which exists in the external world, because we do not have a “moral organ” to do it. Our moral sense can react only to “the moral concomitants, which are representative of external or objective moral reality”. That we feel approbation or disapprobation logically means that there are moral concomitants, the representative ideas of virtue and vice because only these moral concomitants can cause the moral sense to feel approbation or disapprobation. Thus, we can conclude that, according to Norton’s interpretation, the real virtue in Hutcheson’s moral philosophy is “benevolent affections” in agents but the way we know the moral reality of them is that the moral sense recognises the concomitant ideas of virtue or vice, which represent them.

2.2.2. Objection against Moral Realist Interpretation

Norton’s moral realist interpretation can be summarized as follows:

(1) There exist ‘sui generis moral qualities’ in an agent’s mind.11

(2) We have a “moral sense”, which is a cognitive mental faculty in the sense that it can recognise ‘sui generis moral qualities’.

(3) We recognise ‘sui generis moral qualities’ by our moral sense’s response to the moral concomitants, which

11 I borrowed this term from J. Martin Stanford (1985).
represent ‘sui generis moral qualities’.

In this section, I will critically examine these three assertions. By doing this, I believe we can have clear understanding about Hutcheson’s moral philosophy.

Let’s start from the assertion (2). According to Norton’s interpretation, the moral sense plays not only an evaluative role but also a cognitive role. His textual evidence is as follows: “The Apprehension of morally good Qualities, is the necessary Cause of Approbation, by our moral Sense” (Hutcheson 2002, 66). He presents this passage as an example to show that, for Hutcheson, “the moral sense is an apprehending sense” (Norton 1982, 76-77). According to him, the moral sense plays the role of “the apprehension of morally good Qualities.”

However, in An Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and Affections, with Illustrations on the Moral Sense, Hutcheson clearly says that “apprehension or opinion of the affections in the agent [is] inferred by our reason”, which is unfavourable to Norton’s interpretation (Raphael 1969, §371). Thus, it seems that Norton cannot say that an agent’s affection is recognised not by our reason but by our moral sense. Instead, he asserts, “Hutcheson concedes that the tendency of certain human actions ... and the ‘Affections in the Agent’ are inferred by reason, but he insists that there is, nonetheless, a function which must be performed by the moral sense” (Norton 1982, 84). That is to say, we get “the idea of the external motion, known first by sense”, and then infer “Affections in the Agent” from its tendency by our reason. But this inference cannot reveal that these “Affections in the Agent” are ‘sui generis moral qualities’. It is only by moral sense that we recognise the moral qualities. Therefore, what we need to check is whether or not Hutcheson holds that there are ontologically independent moral qualities, for “if there were not, the moral sense as a cognitive faculty would be superfluous and redundant” (Stafford 1985, 138).

In this context, let’s consider the assertion (1). Norton says, “Whether approbation or disapprobation is felt, the observer’s feelings or affections will have again served as the signs of objective reality, this time of objective moral reality.” (Norton 1982, 85). In An Inquiry into the Original of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue, Hutcheson says:

The Quality approved by our moral Sense is conceived to reside in the Person approved, and to be a Perfection and Dignity in him ... The admired Quality is conceived as the Perfection of the Agent, and such a one as is distinct from the Pleasure either in the Agent or the Approver; tho’ 'tis a sure Source of Pleasure to the Agent. The Perception of the Approver, tho’ attended with Pleasure, plainly represents something quite distinct from this Pleasure; even as the Perception of external Forms is attended with Pleasure, and yet represents something distinct from this Pleasure. This may prevent many Cavils upon this Subject. (Hutcheson 2004, 218)

In this passage, Hutcheson makes two points: first, when we feel moral sentiments, their intentional objects are the qualities in the agent; second, the objects are distinct from and independent of our moral sentiments. However, from these points, we cannot draw the conclusion that there exist ‘sui generis moral qualities’ in an agent’s mind. As J. Martin Stafford notes, that the intentional objects are independent does not imply that they

12 Hume also says, “no action can be virtuous or morally good, unless there be in human nature some motive to produce it, distinct from the sense of its morality” (T 3.2.1.7, SBN 479)
have a specifically moral nature (Stafford 1985, 138). Thus, there is no reason to suppose that Hutcheson believed in ‘sui generis moral qualities’. He mentions only that there are the qualities which excite our moral approval.

Although Hutcheson does not mention the “objective moral reality” in a direct way, there still remains a possibility to show that he concedes that there exists the “objective moral reality” in the external world. Norton asserts that “Hutcheson thought that there are concomitant ideas of morality” (Norton, 1982, 410). If this assertion is accepted and, as Norton says, “the moral concomitants ... are representative of external or objective moral reality”, then we can conclude that Hutcheson admitted that there exists “objective moral reality” in the external world. Thus, we need to examine Norton’s premise that moral concomitants represent objective moral reality.

Norton argues, “Concomitant with these ideas, in addition to duration and number, are the moral concomitants, the ideas of virtue and vice, which are representative of external or objective moral reality” (Norton 1982, 86). However, unlike Norton’s assertion, the concomitant ideas defined by Hutcheson do not seem to include “the moral concomitants”. Kenneth P. Winkler holds that “Hutcheson identifies six concomitant ideas: duration, number, extension, figure, motion, and rest” (Winkler 1996, 7). According to Hutcheson, these concomitant ideas are characterised as being perceived by more than one sense including an internal sense:

In the first kind are colors, sounds, tastes, odors, heat and color. In the second are duration, number, extension, figure, motion and rest. These can be perceived by more than one sense: indeed, certain of them are also perceived by an internal sense. Qualities of the first kind are properly called sensible; those of the second, are rather concomitant affections of sensation. (Hutcheson 1744, 48, translated by Winkler).

That is, we can perceive number or extension not only by our sight but also by our touch. Moral concomitants, which are postulated by Norton, are not only not in Hutcheson’s list of concomitants but also do not seem to be characterised as being perceived by more than one sense. According to Norton, they seem to be perceived only by moral sense.

When we consider Hutcheson’s account of concomitant ideas, it seems to be hard to accept Norton’s two assertions: first, Hutcheson believes in moral concomitants; second, moral concomitants represent objective moral reality. This is because Hutcheson does not include moral concomitants in his list of concomitant ideas, and concomitant ideas do not play the role of representing objective reality in the world. Therefore, we cannot accept Norton’s moral realist interpretation anymore. It is true that Hutcheson holds that human beings have ultimately benevolent motives in their mind. But they are not objectively real moral dispositions but natural dispositions:

… many are strongly affected with the Fortunes of others, who seldom reflect upon Virtue, or Vice in themselves, or others, as an Object: as we may find in Natural Affection, Compassion, Friendship, or even general Benevolence to Mankind, which connect our Happiness or Pleasure with that of others, even when we are not reflecting upon our own Temper, nor delighted with the Perception of our own Virtue. (Hutcheson 2002, 17-18)
In this passage, he makes a distinction between benevolence and virtue. According to him, the former is naturally given to us while the latter requires our reflection and moral evaluation. Thus, as Stafford and Winkler noted, we can conclude that Norton failed to distinguish between “objectively real features” and “objectively real moral features” (Stafford 1985, 138; Winkler 1985, 180).

At this point, it is important to note that even though we reject Norton’s moral realism interpretation, we do not need to conclude that Hutcheson’s moral theory entails moral scepticism. As we have seen, he rejects Hobbes’ moral scepticism. Actually, Hutcheson himself argues that his observer’s evaluation based moral theory does not diminish the “reality” of virtue and vice:

The *Perception of Approbation or Disapprobation* arising in the Observer, according as the *Affections of the Agent* are apprehended *kind* in their just Degree, or deficient, or malicious. This *Approbation* cannot be supposed an *Image of any thing external*, more than the *Pleasure of Harmony, of Taste, of Smell*. But let none imagine, that calling the *Ideas of Virtue and Vice Perceptions of a Sense*, upon apprehending the *Actions and Affections* of another does diminish their *Reality*, more than the like *Assertions* concerning all *Pleasure and Pain, Happiness or Misery*. (Hutcheson 2002, 177-178)

Thus, we can conclude that although Hutcheson does not accept the view that there is mind-independent moral reality in the external world, which is endorsed by Norton’s interpretation, he still believes that there exists mind-dependent moral reality. This is the reason why he can strongly object against Hobbes’s moral scepticism.

### 2.3. Theory of Moral Judgment

We have now examined the debate concerning the moral realism interpretation. And the conclusion is that according to Hutcheson, there is no “objective moral reality” in agents’ benevolent motives because they are merely natural dispositions. Rather, we should say that the source of morality is the spectator’s feeling of approbation or disapprobation. On the basis of this conclusion, let’s turn our attention to the nature of moral judgements in Hutcheson’s moral philosophy.

Moral realism logically entails moral cognitivism in that our moral sentences or judgments can refer to real moral properties in the world. For instance, when I utter a sentence “That act is right”, given that moral realism is right, the utterance is referring to the real moral property of the act. Thus, at first glance, the denial of moral realism seems to imply that Hutcheson’s moral philosophy should be understood as moral non-cognitivism because it denies that there exist real moral properties in the world.

However, the interpretation of Hutcheson’s theory of moral judgments is not that simple since the denial of moral realism itself does not necessarily entail moral noncognitivism. In this section, we will first examine the interpretation of Hutcheson as a non-cognitivist. According to this interpretation, he is an expressivist. And, then, we will scrutinise the cognitivist interpretation in which his theory of moral judgments is understood as an ideal observer theory.
2.3.1. Non-cognitivist Interpretation

Given that for Hutcheson “moral distinctions” are identified with the peculiar moral emotions felt by observers, there seem to be two ways of interpreting his theory of moral judgments. One interpretation is to understand him as a forerunner of emotivism. Emotivism is an ethical theory that “treats sentences like ‘Murder is wrong’ as ‘ejaculations,’ much like grimacing or saying ‘Ugh!’ or ‘Boo!’” (Camp 2018, 90). In Chapter VI of Language, Truth, and Logic, Ayer holds that there are only two types of statement which can make genuine truth claims, that is, empirical and analytic statement: “a sentence had literal meaning if and only if the proposition it expressed was either analytic or empirically verifiable” (Ayer 1952, 5). We can briefly say that an empirical statement has a truth-value if and only if it is verified by our experience and that an analytic statement has a truth-value by definition. However, according to his emotivism, a moral sentence “Stealing money is wrong” is not meaningful because it does not express any of two types of statement that have a truth-value:

If I say to someone, “You acted wrongly in stealing that money”, I am not stating anything more than if I had simply said, “You stole that money”. In adding that this action is wrong, I am not making any further statement about it. I am simply evincing my moral disapproval about it. It is as if I had said, “You stole that money”, in a peculiar tone of horror, or written it with the addition of some special exclamation marks. The tone, or the exclamation marks, adds nothing to the literal meaning of the sentence. It merely serves to show that the expression of it is attended by certain feelings in the speaker. (Ayer 1952, 107)

Thus, according to Ayer, our moral utterance does not assert any truth-value laden claim but expresses our “certain feelings”.

Let’s now think about the process of making the moral judgment “You acted wrongly in stealing that money” from Hutcheson’s perspective. In the first stage, we would contemplate an agent’s act and infer her malevolent motive by our reasoning. But as we have seen in the previous section, the malevolent motive is merely a natural trait of her character, not a moral one. Then, in the second stage, we would express our “particular kind affection or passion” toward the agent’s natural trait. According to Hutcheson, this “particular kind affection or passion” is moral sentiment, which is the source of morality. Those who interpret Hutcheson as an emotivist do not regard the expression of this “particular kind affection or passion” as truth-value laden statement. According to them, this is a non-cognitive moral expression of our attitude toward the agent’s natural trait of an agent’s character. Frankena holds that the interjectional theory, which is Broad’s term for emotivism, “insists that the emotion expressed or evoked is a unique moral emotion, not just any pro or con attitude, not even just the feeling of benevolence or sympathy” and Hutcheson “was holding an interjectional theory, in his first two books at least” (Frankena 1955, 366).

However, this interpretation is rejected convincingly by the textual evidence:

we know that by custom words or sounds are made signs of ideas and combinations of words signs of judgments. We know that men generally by words express their sentiments and profess to speak, as far as they know, according to what is matter of fact, so that their profession is to speak the truth. (Kivy 2003, 247; Hutcheson 1971, 212)

As Kivy points out, “in this context to ‘express’ one’s ‘sentiments’ means to express one’s opinions” (Kivy
Hutcheson here says that the judgments, which express one’s sentiments, are meant to convey matters of fact, and thus have truth-values. Unlike Ayer, Hutcheson believes that a moral judgment does not just express a non-cognitive peculiar sentiment but refers to a mental state as a matter of fact. Thus, we can conclude that Hutcheon is not an emotivist, and hence should be understood as a cognitivist.

2.3.2. Cognitivist Interpretation

The other way of interpreting Hutcheson’s theory of moral judgments is to understand him as a subjectivist. Subjectivism is distinguished from emotivism in that the former interprets ethical sentences as statements of fact, as reports of one’s mental state, and hence holds that they have truth conditions. Ayer says, “Whereas the subjectivist holds that ethical statements assert the existence of certain feelings, we [emotivists] hold that ethical statements are expressions of feeling which do not necessarily involve any assertions” (Ayer 2004, 103). Thus, unlike emotivists, subjectivists are cognitivists in that moral sentences have truth conditions by referring to the emotive mental states.

There are three different kinds of subjectivism. Let’s think about subjectivists’ interpretation of the following sentence:

(1) P is wrong.

(2) X disapprove(s) of P.

Statement (2) is the basic form of subjectivists’ interpretation of state (1). Subjectivism is classified as three kinds based on who X is (or are). First, if X is the speaker him/herself, it will be called “simple subjectivism”. Second, if X is a group of normal observers, it will be called “group relativism”. And lastly, if X is an ideal observer, it will be called the “ideal observer theory”.

Then, we can ask a question: what kind of subjectivism is Hutcheson’s moral theory? Kivy’s answer seems to be “simple subjectivism” because he rejects both “group relativism” and “ideal observer theory”.

According to him, Hutcheson cannot be a group relativist because he does not define observers’ peculiar feelings “in terms of a consensus of feelings”; he also cannot be regarded as an ideal observer theorist because of the lack of a qualified observer: “it is this concept that would, in the perceptual model, bear the weight of the standard of correctness and incorrectness that Hutcheson’s theory essentially ignores” (Kivy 2003, 251).

However, there is convincing textual evidence to support either “group relativism” or “ideal observer theory”.

Let’s take a close look at the following passage:

When we say one is obliged to an action, we … mean … that every Spectator, or he himself upon Reflection, must approve his Action, and disapprove his omitting it, if he considers fully all its Circumstances. (Hutcheson 2002, 146)

13 Kivy’s argument here is basically designed for interpreting Hutcheson’s aesthetics. But I think there is no problem to interpret his argument more broadly including the interpretation of Hutcheson’s moral theory since Kivy says, “I think similar considerations rule out recent attempts to prove that Hutcheson was an ethical non-cognitivist” (Kivy 2003, 247).
Jensen pays attention to this passage and holds that Hutcheson here makes an Is/Ought distinction, that is, between an observer’s personal response and every spectator’s ought-response: “every Spectator, or he himself upon Reflection, must approve his Action” (Italic: Jensen’s emphasis). According to his interpretation, Hutcheson makes a distinction between mere “liking” and “approval”: “Whereas liking or experiencing ordinary sort of pleasures do not necessarily presuppose reflection and judgment, approval clearly does” (Jensen 1971, p. 61). Jensen argues that for Hutcheson, we can correct our immediate emotional reaction to an agent’s act by reference “to dispositions rather than to occurrent emotions” (Jensen 1971, 53):

Our Reason does often correct the Report of our Senses, about the natural Tendency of the external Action, and corrects rash Conclusions about the Affections of the Agent. (Hutcheson 2002, 178)

Thus, our contemplation or reflection would allow us to refer to the emotional response of “every Spectator” and make a moral judgment. Jensen says that Hutcheson “clearly implies that moral discourse must reflect and require this sort of correction” (Jensen 1971, 63).

It is true that Jensen’s interpretation is still open to Kivy’s criticisms. Hutcheson does not seem to define observers’ moral emotions “in terms of a consensus of feelings”; he also does not specify the qualifications of the ideal observer (Kivy 2003, 251). Furthermore, it is not clear whether “every Spectator” designates “a group of normal observers” or “the ideal observer”. Thus, we should confess that Hutcheson’s theory of moral judgment, whether it is a “group relativism” or an “ideal observer theory”, is not mature. But we can call him a forerunner of the theory. And as Jensen says, “In doing so, he supplies the materials for the more extended treatment given to these issues by Hume”, We can expect how his moral theory is going to be developed in Hume’s moral theory (Jensen 1971, 63).

2.4. Theory of Moral Motivation

In Chapter 2.2, we examined Norton’s moral realist interpretation in which he argued that for Hutcheson, an agent’s benevolence is a real moral virtue and an observer’s moral sense plays the cognitive role of recognising the moral concomitant ideas which represent objective moral reality. However, as Winkler points out, there is no such moral concomitant idea in Hutcheson’s list of concomitant ideas. Thus, Norton’s moral realist interpretation is rejected. Although it is true that Hutcheson holds that human beings have ultimately benevolent motives in their mind, it is important to note that they are not objectively real moral dispositions but natural dispositions.

Given that benevolence is a natural disposition and an observer’s moral evaluation is the only source of morality, we need to ask what motivates us to do moral actions in Hutcheson’s moral theory. An agent’s benevolence cannot be the source of moral motivation since it is a natural disposition. Then, we should find the source of moral motivation from an observer’s moral evaluation. Thus, in this section, we will examine the case of self-approval in order to know whether or not an agent’s self-approval can be the source of moral motivation in Hutcheson’s moral theory.


2.4.1. Two Kinds of Obligation

Let’s start from introducing Hutcheson’s understanding of obligation. According to him, there are two kinds of obligation:

When we say one is obliged to an Action, we either mean, 1. That the Action is necessary to obtain Happiness to the Agent, or to avoid Misery: Or, 2. That every Spectator, or he himself upon Reflection, must approve his Action, and disapprove his omitting it, if he considers fully all its Circumstances.

The former Meaning of the Word Obligation presupposes selfish Affections, and the Senses of private Happiness: The latter Meaning includes the moral Sense. (Hutcheson 2002, 146)

The first kind of obligation can be called “interested obligation” in that it “presupposes selfish Affections, and the Senses of private Happiness”. If we have in mind the Is/Ought distinction, it seems to be awkward for Hutcheson to regard doing a self-interest motivated action as a kind of obligation since pursuing self-interest is part of human nature. He here seems to think that “interested obligation” is a kind of inherent constraint which forces us to pursue it:

Hence we may see the Difference between Constraint, and Obligation. There is indeed no Difference between Constraint, and the second Sense of the word Obligation, viz. a Constitution which makes an Action eligible from Self-Interest, if we only mean external Interest, distinct from the delightful Consciousness which arises from the moral Sense. (Hutcheson 2004, 181)

Thus, it seems to be more proper to say that we are constrained by the natural trait of pursuing self-interest rather than obliged: “when Sanctions of Rewards or Punishments oppose our moral Sense, then we say we are brib’d or constrain’d” (Hutcheson 2004, 182).

By contrast, the second kind of obligation can be called “moral obligation” since it is imposed by moral sense: “When any Sanctions co-operate with our moral Sense, in exciting us to Actions which we count morally good, we say we are oblig’d” (Hutcheson 2004, 182). It is important to note that Hutcheson does not say that “moral obligation” is for an agent to act from a benevolent motive but that it is for him to “approve his Action, and disapprove his omitting it”. Here we need to make a distinction between doing good to others and acting from a benevolent motive. As we have seen, for Hutcheson, benevolence is a natural disposition, that is, a value-neutral one. Thus, acting from a benevolent motive also seems to be regarded as a kind of inherent constraint even though it is distinct from a self-interest motive. Then, the question is whether or not my self-approval through moral sense itself can be a motive for doing the approved benevolent act. In order to answer this question, we need to understand the nature of approval and desire.

2.4.2. The Mechanism of Motivating Actions

Let’s think about what Hutcheson means by “moral obligation”: “When we say one is obliged to an Action, we … mean … That every Spectator, or he himself upon Reflection, must approve his Action, and disapprove his

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14 I borrowed these terms “interested obligation” and “moral obligation” from Jensen (Jensen 1971, 90).
omitting it, if he considers fully all its Circumstances. … The latter Meaning includes the moral Sense” (Hutcheson 2002, 146). According to him, I am obliged to do an action that I approve by moral sense. But the question is this: What imposes the obligation to do the action?; Or what is the moral motivation to do it? As we have seen, benevolence is not the source of the obligation or the moral motivation since it is a natural disposition. And furthermore, my benevolent motive should be antecedent to my approval because this approval is occasioned only when I already have the benevolent motive.

Then it seems to be obvious that approving of my action or my motive to act is the source of the motivation to do it. However, the problem is that for Hutcheson, approval is a peculiar feeling of pleasure, that is, a kind of pleasurable sensation which is produced by moral sense; and our actions are not motivated by sensations but by desires such as affections or passions. This seems to be the reason why he said, “any Sanctions co-operate with our moral Sense, in exciting us to Actions which we count morally good” (Hutcheson 2004, 182). Our moral sense can produce a peculiar feeling of pleasure called “approval”, but it alone cannot excite us to actions. Thus, any sanctions should cooperate with it in order to motivate actions. Then, what are the sanctions?

As many commentators point out, the sanctions seem to be desires (Jensen 1971, 94; Bishop 1996, 282):

> Desires arise in our Mind, from the Frame of our Nature, upon Apprehension of Good or Evil in Objects, Actions, or Events, to obtain for our selves or others the agreeable Sensation, when the Object or Event is good; or to prevent the uneasy Sensation, when it is evil. (Hutcheson 2002, 18)

That is, desires arise and motivate actions in order to obtain pleasure. Thus, the mechanism of motivating actions is as follows:

1. When I reflect on my benevolent motive to do good to others, my moral sense produces a peculiar feeling of pleasure called “approval”.

2. In order to obtain the peculiar feeling of pleasure called “approval”, I desire the approved benevolent motive.

Given that the antecedent benevolent motive as a natural disposition is a desire to do a benevolent act, what I mean by “desire the approved benevolent motive” is to desire to desire to do a benevolent act. This is the place where what Jensen calls the “double-desire paradox” problem is raised:

> Again, in his terminology, a desire to act virtuously is a desire to do what is approved. In turn, this approval is always occasioned by the presence of a benevolent motive. In cases of doing what we ought, we should therefore witness the operation of a sort of "double-desire" or "double-motive." That is, to act out of a desire for virtue, one would have to act out of a desire to act from a second desire. Paradoxically, I cannot act out of a sense of obligation unless I am already motivated by benevolence, and if I am already motivated by benevolence what need is there for a desire to be motivated by benevolence? Apart from the air of paradox surrounding this position one wonders nightmarishly if there might be further conjunctions taking the form of desires-to-desire-to-desire. (Jensen 1971, 94)

In the previous section, we tried to make a distinction between doing good to others and acting from a benevolent motive. Thus, we assumed that the desire to do good to others and the desire to act from a
benevolent motive should be distinguished. But the “double-desire paradox” now shows that these two desires cannot be separated.

However, this does not seem to be how the mechanism of motivating actions works because it is based on the “simple subjectivism” interpretation of Hutcheson’s theory of moral judgment. He does not say simply that when we say that one is obliged to an act, we mean that he must approve of his action, but that “When we say one is obliged to an Action, we … mean … That every Spectator, or he himself upon Reflection, must approve his Action, and disapprove his omitting it, if he considers fully all its Circumstances” (Hutcheson 2002, 146). As we have seen in the previous section, Hutcheson’s emphasis is on “every Spectator” or “he himself up on Reflection … if he considers fully all its circumstances”. This means that my “moral obligation” is not originated from my approval of my actual benevolent motive but from the hypothetical benevolent motive. Thus, we need to modify the mechanism of motivating actions as follows:

1. If I consider fully all the circumstances, I can imagine by reflection that when an ideal observer reflects on his benevolent motive to do good to others, his moral sense would produce a peculiar feeling of pleasure called “approval”.
2. In order to obtain the idealised peculiar feeling of pleasure called “approval”, I desire the approved hypothetical benevolent motive.

Given that this modified version of mechanism of motivating actions is right, the “double desire paradox” is not raised because I do not desire my own desire to do benevolent act but the hypothetical benevolent motive which is approved by an ideal observer.

Jensen would object to this interpretation because the ideal observer would have the same problem of “double desire paradox”. However, in my view, this problem is trivial because our main concern is how I, not an ideal observer, can have the “moral obligation”, thus motivating a moral action. Let’s say that an ideal observer faces the problem of “double desire paradox”. It would follow that for him, the desire to do a morally good action is reduced merely to the desire to do a benevolent act. Even though the benevolent motive is a natural disposition for the ideal observer, it does not mean that it is the same for me. The ideal observer approved of the benevolent motive and I now desire the ideal observer’s self-approved benevolent motive. The problem of “double desire paradox” is not raised for me as an agent.

In sum, to use the contemporary meta-ethical terminology, I would say that Hutcheson’s theory of moral motivation is “externalism” since for him, moral judgments, which refer to an ideal observer’s moral approval, themselves do not have any motivating power, and thus need the help of desires in order to motivate actions.

2.4.3. Harmony of Two Kinds of Obligation, and Divine Providence

Now we know how moral obligation, which is imposed by moral sense, motivates actions. But there remains one problem. As we have seen, Hutcheson introduces two kinds of obligation: interested and moral obligation. These two kinds of obligation are “independent and incommensurable” each other since they are imposed by different senses (Darwall 1995, 235): “We shall find these two grand determinations, one toward our own
greatest happiness, the other toward the greatest general good, each independent on the other” (Hutcheson 1969, 50). Thus, it is logically possible that moral obligation comes into conflict with interested obligation. For instance, let’s say, I found a wallet on a table in a café which someone mistakenly left behind; And there is a large amount of money in the wallet. On the one hand, I would have a self-interested motive: I could use the money for changing my laptop. On the other hand, my moral sense would approve of finding the person who left behind the money and giving it back to him.

In this case, the robust moral theory needs to give an account of “why we should be moral when morality conflicts with our other desires” (Gill 2006, 176). For Hutcheson, the difficulty is that moral sense is one of many senses. My interested obligation would be shaped and imposed by my external senses, whilst my moral obligation would be imposed by my moral sense. There does not seem to be any reason why moral obligation imposed by moral sense overrides interested obligation imposed by other senses. And Hutcheson actually does not seem to give priority to moral obligation over interested obligation:

When any Event may affect both the Agent and others, if the Agent have both Self-Love and publick Affections, he acts according to that Affection which is strongest, when there is any Opposition of Interests. (Hutcheson 2002, 143)

According to him, the only criterion is the strength of the affections which are obtained by moral sense and other senses. Thus, we could say that if the feeling of self-interest is stronger than moral affection, we do not need to be moral.

This is the place where the role of God is required in Hutcheson’s moral philosophy. According to Hutcheson, even though it is logically possible that morality comes into conflict with self-interest, such conflict would not actually occur in reality (Darwall 1995, 236; Gill 2006, 177):

If he [the agent] discovers this Truth, that “his constant pursuit of publick Good is the most probable way of promoting his own Happiness,” then his Pursuit is truly reasonable and constant; thus both Affections are at once gratify’d, and he is consistent with himself. (Hutcheson 2002, 143)

According to Hutcheson, carrying out moral obligation is the best way of promoting self-interest in the long run. I could use the money I found in the café and feel happy temporarily. But I would feel guilty of it, and thus I would not be happy any more in the long run. Thus, according to Hutcheson, there is actually no conflict between interested and moral obligation in practice. This is because God designed human nature so that “our greatest pleasures derive from the agent’s reflection on her own benevolence and from other pleasures derived from benevolent association with others” (Darwall 1995, 236; Gill 2006, 177). Thus, we can conclude that although Hutcheson gives a naturalistic account of morality introducing sentimentalism in his moral philosophy, his main argument still includes the supernatural apparatus, Divine Providence, which promotes the harmony between moral and interested obligation in human nature. We now move to the next chapter and see how Hume criticises the supernatural elements in Hutcheson’s moral philosophy and develop his own naturalistic moral philosophy.
Chapter 3. Hume’s Moral Philosophy

Hume introduces *A Treatise of Human Nature* with the subtitle “Being an Attempt to Introduce the Experimental Method of Reasoning into Moral Subjects”. It is not difficult to guess that the “Experimental Method of Reasoning” is his adoption of Newtonian method, since Hume says “’Tis no astonishing reflection to consider, that the application of experimental philosophy to moral subjects shou’d come after that to natural at the distance of above a whole century” (T intro. 7, SBN xvi). And he explains the “Experimental Method of Reasoning” at the end of the introduction of the *Treatise* as follows:

When I am at a loss to know the effects of one body upon another in any situation, I need only put them in that situation, and observe what results from it. … We must therefore glean up our experiments in this science from a cautious observation of human life, and take them as they appear in the common course of the world, by men’s behaviour in company, in affairs, and in their pleasures. (T intro. 10, SBN xix)

Thus, according to Hume, his experimental method of reasoning “must be laid on experience and observation” (T intro. 7, SBN xvi). This approach to moral subjects seems to show the view of reductive naturalism, which is defined by Strawson as “the naturalistic or objective view of human beings and human behaviour” that “undermines the validity of moral attitudes and reasons and displays moral judgment as no more than a vehicle of illusion” (Strawson 1985, 40). Hume seems to attempt to analyse moral properties and reduce them into natural properties.

The reductive naturalist reading, however, is denied by Wiggins. He argues that Hume’s ‘experimental method’ of reasoning does not entail reductive naturalism: “such an [reductive] analysis is in no way essential to the Humean type of naturalism or to the attempt to introduce the ‘experimental method’ into the moral sciences” (Wiggins 1993, 302). According to him, for Hume, moral judgments are “irreducible and *sui generis*”, and, hence, Humean naturalism allows for noncognitivism (Wiggins 1993, 302). Wiggins’s version of Humean naturalism can be called methodological naturalism: “A methodological naturalist is someone who adopts an *a posteriori*, explanatory approach to an area of human practice or discourse, such as epistemology, semantics, or ethics. This fits what Wiggins says about Hume” (Railton 1993, 315). That is, a methodological naturalist can take the experimental method into an area of moral practice and, thus, give an *a posteriori*, naturalistic explanation. But it does not define or analyse the ontological nature of moral properties.

In my view, reductive naturalism fits Hume’s tenet of scientific experimentalism more than methodological naturalism – especially if we have a closer look at his experimental method of reasoning which is revealed in his response to Hutcheson’s criticisms of a draft of the *Treatise*. Hutcheson seems to have criticised Hume’s philosophy for its lack of warmth: “What affected me most in your Remarks is your observing, that there wants a certain Warmth in the Cause of Virtue, which, you think, all good Men wou’d relish, & cou’d not displease amidst abstract Enquirys” (LI, 32). In his letter to Hutcheson, Hume explains his philosophy using the metaphors of “anatomist” and “painter”. According to him, an anatomist discovers “its most secret Springs &
Principles,” while a painter describes “the Grace & Beauty of its Actions” (LI, 33-34). That is, he regards himself as an anatomist of moral philosophy. And the metaphor of anatomist reminds us of reductive naturalism since the process of an anatomist’s discovering “its most secret Springs & Principles” looks like the process of reduction from supernatural properties to natural properties. That is, he wants to analyse and uncover the ontologically hidden aspect of moral properties.

Furthermore, in the same letter, Hume, as an anatomist who adopts the experimental method of reasoning, criticises Hutcheson’s concept of “natural”. Hume disagrees with Hutcheson’s definition of “natural” as founded on final causes, that is, the purpose of man:

I cannot agree to your Sense of Natural. Tis founded on final Causes, which is a Consideration, that appears to me pretty uncertain & unphilosophical. For pray, what is the End of Man? Is he created for Happiness or for Virtue? For this Life or for the next? For himself or for his Maker? Your Definition of Natural depends upon solving these Questions, which are endless, & quite wide of my Purpose. (LI, 33)

This means that unlike Hutcheson, Hume’s concept of “natural” does not presuppose any final cause such as the purpose of man or the maker of man. Thus, precluding any supernatural elements from the domain of moral practice, he attempts to find “all our principles as universal as possible, by tracing up our experiments to the utmost, and explaining all effects from simplest and fewest causes” (T intro. 8, SBN xvii).

In sum, Hume’s experimental method of reasoning can be characterised as follows:

(1) The metaphor of an anatomist’s discovering “its most secret Springs & Principles” shows that the experimental method of reasoning is the process of reduction from supernatural properties to natural properties.

(2) Hume’s denial of final causes shows that the experimental method of reasoning rules out supernatural elements from the domain of moral practice.

These characteristics reveal that the experimental method of reasoning is more focused on performing an ontological analysis than playing an explanatory role. Thus, unlike Wiggins, I would argue that Hume is at heart a reductive rather than methodological naturalist if we take the characteristics of his experimental method of reasoning seriously.

However, the reductive naturalist reading faces two problems: the observability problem and the normativity problem. First, there is the observability problem. It is important to note that his experimental method of reasoning is based on observation, which means that it is applicable only to observable objects. He says, “We must therefore glean up our experiments in this science from a cautious observation of human life, and take them as they appear in the common course of the world, by men’s behaviour in company, in affairs, and in their pleasures” (T intro. 10, SBN xix). But, given that Hume’s moral philosophy is a version of moral sentimentalism, it does not seem to be possible to apply the experimental method of reasoning into moral sentiments merely because they are not observable. If he wants to adhere to his tenet of reductive naturalism in his moral theory, he needs to explain how we can carry out the experiments by observing unobservable objects such as moral sentiments.

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Second, reductive naturalism faces the normativity problem. Hume believes that his naturalistic approach to moral philosophy does not undermine the normativity of the existing moral foundation. Rather, it can “give advice” and “become subservient to practical morality”:

An anatomist, however, is admirably fitted to give advice to a painter; and ’tis even impracticable to excel in the latter art, without the assistance of the former. We must have an exact knowledge of the parts, their situation and connexion, before we can design with any elegance or correctness. And thus the most abstract speculations concerning human nature, however cold and unentertaining, become subservient to practical morality; and may render this latter science more correct in its precepts, and more persuasive in its exhortations. (T 3.3.6.6, SBN 620-621)

However, at first glance, Hume’s reductive analysis of morality seems to pose a threat to the normativity of moral practice. This is the reason why Hutcheson “cannot pretend to assent to his [Hume’s] tenets” and criticises Hume’s moral philosophy as too “cold and unentertaining”. (Ross 1966, 71; T 3.3.6.6, SBN 621). Thus, Hume needs to show why his naturalistic approach to moral philosophy does not undermine the foundation of practical morality and how he is able to establish the normativity of moral practice in his own way.

This chapter argues that Hume is a reductive naturalist in his moral philosophy, and formulates his answers to the two problems: the observability problem and the normativity problem. In doing so, we will come to know that his concepts of reflection and sympathy play a significant role.

3.1. The Is-Ought Passage and the Experimental Method of Reasoning

Let’s start with a famous but controversial passage, which seems to conflict with the reductive naturalist reading. According to Hare, the passage shows “Hume’s celebrated observation on the impossibility of deducing an ‘ought’-proposition from a series of ‘is’-propositions” (Hare 1978, 29):

In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always remark’d, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes observations concerning human affairs; when of a sudden I am surpriz’d to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not. This change is imperceptible; but is, however, of the last consequence. For as this ought, or ought not, expresses some new relation or affirmation, ’tis necessary that it shou’d be observ’d and explain’d; and at the same time that a reason shou’d be given, for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it. But as authors do not commonly use this precaution, I shall presume to recommend it to the reader; and am perswaded, that this small attention wou’d subvert all the vulgar systems of morality, and let us see, that the distinction of vice and virtue is not founded merely on the relations of objects, nor is perceiv’d by reason. (T 3.1.2.27, SBN 469-470)

What Hume means to say in this passage is – Hare and Nowell-Smith argue – that the transition from an “is” to an “ought” is illegitimate:
Freely translated into modern terminology, what Hume means is this. In all systems of morality we start with certain statements of fact that are not judgements of value or commands; they contain human nature, that is to say about what men are and in fact do. We are then told that because these things are so we ought to act in such and such a way; the answers to practical questions are deduced or in some other way derived from statements about what is the case. This must be illegitimate reasoning, since the conclusion of an argument can contain nothing which is not in the premises, and there are no ‘oughts’ in the premise. (Nowell-Smith 1954, 37)

This is the standard interpretation of Hume’s “Is-Ought” passage. And Hare names Hume’s argument of this passage Hume’s Law (Hare 1954-1955, 303). The standard interpretation makes two points:

1. ‘Ought’-propositions cannot be deduced from ‘is’-propositions
2. The reason why the deduction is impossible is because ‘is’-propositions are matters of fact but ‘ought’-propositions are not.

Those who advocate the standard interpretation tie Hume’s Law up with Moore’s open question argument, which rejects the equating of moral properties with some non-moral properties. According to Nowell-Smith, the intuitionists who accept Moore’s argument also derive their argument from Hume:

The strength of intuitionism lies in its uncompromising insistence on the autonomy of morals. To put the point briefly and in my own way, practical discourse, of which moral discourse is a part, cannot be identified with or reduced to any other kind of discourse. Ethical sentences are not, as Moore so clearly shows, psychological or metaphysical or theological sentences. Almost all earlier theories had tended to reduce ethical concepts and sentences to those of some other subject, usually psychology; they tried to define words such as ‘good’ and ‘ought’ in terms, for example, of the satisfaction of desire or of pleasure and pain. Against all such attempts the intuitionists produce a crushing argument which is derived (surprisingly) from Hume (Nowell-Smith 1954, 36).

That is – the standard interpretation says – Hume, like Moore and the intuitionists, believes that there exist nonreductive moral properties. The standard interpretation would be compatible with (1) the non-cognitivist reading and (2) the methodological naturalist reading. First, the standard interpretation is supported by those who regard Hume as a non-cognitivist since according to them, for him, moral judgments are merely the expressions of the speaker’s peculiar emotive reaction: “moral distinctions depend entirely on certain peculiar sentiments of pain and pleasure” (T 3.3.1.3, SBN 574). That is, morality does not consist in a matter of fact. Hume says, “Morality … is more properly felt than judg’d of” (T 3.1.2.1, SBN 470). Second, the standard interpretation allows for the methodological naturalist reading. As we have seen, the aim of methodological naturalism is to give an a posteriori, naturalistic explanation. Thus, the gap between is and ought can remain intact even though we read Hume as a methodological naturalist.

However, the following passage in An Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals seems to support the cognitivist reading and the reductive naturalist reading, and, thus, conflict with the standard interpretation of the ‘is-ought’ passage. Let’s take a closer look at the passage:

The only object of reasoning is to discover the circumstances on both sides, which are common to
these qualities [the estimable or blameable qualities of men]; to observe that particular in which the estimable qualities agree on the one hand, and the blameable on the other; and thence to reach the foundation of ethics, and find those universal principles, from which all censure or approbation is ultimately derived. (EPM 1.10, SBN 174)

In this passage, Hume does not seem to accept the non-cognitivist view. Here he says, “The only object of reasoning is … to reach the foundation of ethics, and find those universal principles, from which all censure or approbation is ultimately derived.” Given that non-cognitivists regard moral judgments as the expressions of one’s attitude and do not attempt to establish moral principles by inferential reasoning, what Hume says in this passage leads us to regard him as cognitivist, not non-cognitivist. And he continues:

As this [the question concerning the general principles of morals] is a question of fact, not of abstract science, we can only expect success, by following the experimental method, and deducing general maxims [of morals] from a comparison of particular instances. The other scientific method, where a general abstract principle is first established, and is afterwards branched out into a variety of inferences and conclusions, may be more perfect in itself, but suits less the imperfection of human nature, and is a common source of illusion and mistake in this as well as in other subjects. Men are now cured of their passion for hypotheses and systems in natural philosophy, and will hearken to no arguments but those which are derived from experience. It is full time they should attempt a like reformation in all moral disquisitions; and reject every system of ethics, however subtle or ingenious, which is not founded on fact and observation. (EPM 1.10, SBN 174-175)

In my view, his assertion in this passage that we should apply the experimental method of reasoning to moral subjects, and thus “deducing general maxims [of morals] from a comparison of particular instances” supports the reductive naturalist reading, not methodological naturalist one. He is now arguing that we should analyse the ontological concept of morality “by following the experimental method” of reasoning, and, thus, deduce the general principles of morals. And, furthermore, he holds that the question concerning the general principles of morals is “a question of fact” which seems to conflict with the standard interpretation of the “Is-Ought” passage that an ought cannot be deduced from an is. Thus, in my view, there is a good reason to doubt the standard reading of the “Is-Ought” passage.

Let’s come back to the two points which the standard interpretation makes:

(1) ‘Ought’-propositions cannot be deduced from ‘is’-propositions

(2) The reason why the deduction is impossible is because ‘is’-propositions are matters of fact but ‘ought’-propositions are not.

There are two alternative interpretations to the standard interpretation. The first one disagrees with the first point which the standard interpretation makes: ‘Ought’-propositions cannot be deduced from ‘is’-propositions. The interpretative issue here is about how to interpret this sentence: “For as this ought, or ought not, expresses some new relation or affirmation, ’tis necessary that it shou’d be observ’d and explain’d; and at the same time that a reason shou’d be given, for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it” (T 3.1.2.27, SBN 469-470). The standard interpretation reads this
sentence as an ironical and rather rhetorical expression (MacIntyre 1959, 460; Sturgeon 2008, 518). Thus, it reads “necessary” as “impossible”, and “seems” as “is”: “For as this ought, or ought not, expresses some new relation or affirmation, ’tis impossible that it shou’d be observ’d and explain’d; and at the same time that a reason shou’d be given, for what is altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it”. However, we can read the sentence in a literal sense, not in an ironical and rather rhetorical expression: What Hume says is that it is conceivable to deduce ‘ought’-propositions from ‘is’-propositions. This reading does not seem to be implausible because it matches Hume’s expression of “deducing general maxims [of morals] from a comparison of particular instances” which we have seen above (EPM 1.10, SBN 174-175). However, this reading of rejecting the first point of the standard interpretation seems to be too strong because it erases the gap between “is” and “ought”. That is, it is not only reductive but also destructive about moral values or moral norms. It seems to be against Hume’s stance that his experimental method would “give advice to” and “become subservient to practical morality” (T 3.3.6.6, SBN 620-621).

The second alternative interpretation is to accept the first point of the standard interpretation, but deny the second point. That is, this interpretation suggests that although for Hume it is true that ‘ought’-propositions cannot be deduced from ‘is’-propositions, ‘ought’-propositions are also matters of fact as ‘is’-propositions are. The reason why the deduction is impossible is simply because ‘is’-propositions and ‘ought’-propositions are different kinds of matters of fact:

Take any action allow’d to be vicious: Wilful murder, for instance. Examine it in all lights, and see if you can find that matter of fact, or real existence, which you call vice. In which-ever way you take it, you find only certain passions, motives, volitions, and thoughts. There is no other matter of fact in the case. The vice entirely escapes you, as long as you consider the object. You never can find it, till you turn your reflection into your own breast, and find a sentiment of disapprobation, which arises in you, towards this action. Here is a matter of fact; but ’tis the object of feeling, not of reason. It lies in yourself, not in the object. (T 3.1.1.26, SBN 468-469).

In this passage, Hume says that “a sentiment of disapprobation” is “a matter of fact”, but it is “the object of feeling, not of reason”. That is, according to this interpretation, for him, there are two sorts of matters of fact: “the object of reason” and “the object of feeling”. And he puts a logical gap between is and ought between two sorts of matters of fact (Sturgeon 2008, 519).

According to this interpretation, Hume is a cognitivist in that he regards moral sentiments as matters of fact. But he is a subjectivist in that you can find them as matters of fact only when you “turn your reflection into your own breast”. This is the reason why Hunter asserts that “Hume’s analysis of moral judgments is mistaken” (Hunter 1962, 151):

For, among other things, it has the consequence that if one person says of an action that it is wholly virtuous and another person says of the same action that it is wholly vicious, these two people would not be contradicting each other, since one is saying the logical equivalent of ‘I [Smith] feel a peculiar sort of pleasure, and I do not feel a peculiar sort of pain, on contemplating this action’, while the other is saying the equivalent of ‘I [Jones] feel a peculiar sort of pain, and I do not feel a peculiar sort of
pleasure, on contemplating this action’, and both these statements could be true. If they were both true, and Hume's analysis were correct, then one and the same action would be both wholly virtuous and wholly vicious, which, in the ordinary senses of the words used, is absurd. (Hunter 1962, 151-152).

That is, according to this interpretation, although Hume regards “ought”-propositions as matters of fact, we cannot establish the standard of morals since our moral feelings are subjective.

I agree with the second alternative interpretation that for Hume, there are two sorts of matters of fact: “the object of reason” and “the object of feeling”, and he puts the logical gap between is and ought between two sorts of matters of fact. However, I disagree with Hunter’s assertion that it implies subjectivism. Hume clearly says that we can deduce general maxims [of morals] from a comparison of particular instances by following the experimental method (EPM 1.10, SBN 174-175).

Let’s start from his distinction between particular facts and general facts. According to him, Matters of Fact can be divided into particular facts and general facts. He, first, names our reasonings concerning causes and effects of matters of fact moral reasoning as opposed to demonstrative reasoning concerning the relation of ideas, in which “the steps of the argument proceed with absolute certainty based on the logical relations between the ideas concerned” (Millican 2007, xxxvii): “It is only experience, which teaches us the nature and bounds of cause and effect, and enables us to infer the existence of one object from that of another. Such is the foundation of moral reasoning, which forms the greater part of human knowledge, and is the source of all human action and behaviour” (EHU 12.29, SBN 164).

Secondly, he divides the objects of moral reasoning into particular and general facts:

Moral reasonings are either concerning particular or general facts. All deliberations in life regard the former … The science, which treat of general facts, are politics, natural philosophy, physic, chymistry, etc. where the qualities, causes, and effects of a whole species of objects are enquired into (EHU 12.30-31, SBN 165).

That is, the objects of our moral reasoning concerning particular facts are “all our deliberations in life,” while the objects of our moral reasoning concerning general facts are “the qualities, causes, and effects of a whole species of objects.”

Now, then, Hume examines whether or not morals and criticism can be properly the objects of moral reasoning:

Morals and criticism are not so properly objects of the understanding as of taste and sentiment. Beauty, whether moral or natural, is felt, more properly than perceived. Or if we reason concerning it, and endeavor to fix its standard, we regard a new fact, to wit, the general taste of mankind, or some such fact, which may be the object of reasoning and enquiry (EHU 12.33, SBN 165).

At first glance, morals and criticism do not seem to be the proper objects of moral reasoning because they are “the object of feeling, not of reason” (T 3.1.1.26, SBN 468-469). That is, they are felt rather than perceived. But according to him, we can still reason concerning “beauty, whether moral or natural” and try to fix its standard.
For him, our reasoning concerning morals is regarded as moral reasoning concerning general facts such as science because our endeavor to fix the standard of morals is concerning the general taste of mankind.

Thus, I argue that for Hume, one’s feelings of approbation or disapprobation are regarded as particular matters of fact. But they are obtained not by inferential reasoning but by feeling. At first glance, it seems to lead him to a subjectivist. However, he argues that we can still reason concerning the particular matters of fact of our own feelings of approbation or disapprobation and “fix its standard,” and, thus, “we regard a new fact, to wit, the general taste of mankind, or some such fact, which may be the object of reasoning and enquiry.” Thus, we now understand what he means by his assertion that “As this [the question concerning the general principles of morals] is a question of fact, not of abstract science, we can only expect success, by following the experimental method, and deducing general maxims [of morals] from a comparison of particular instances” (EPM 1.10, SBN 174-175). We reason and try to fix the principles of morals as general matters of fact by following the experimental method of reasoning concerning the particular matters of fact of one’s own feelings of approbation or disapprobation.

However, this reading raises one question. According to Hume, in order to “find a sentiment of disapprobation” as “a matter of fact” which is “the object of feeling, not of reason”, we should turn our reflection into our own breast (T 3.1.1.26, SBN 468-469). The question is this: given that the sentiments of approbation or disapprobation as particular matters of fact are my own feelings and that the only way of scrutinising them is introspection, how can we overcome subjectivism and, thus, deduce “general maxims [of morals] from a comparison of particular instances”? As Russell Hardin says, it seems that all of this is “strictly personal and it is not generalizable” (Hardin 2007, 14).

In my view, here is one of the important roles of Hume’s concept of sympathy. He explains the mechanism of sympathy as follows:

> When any affection is infus’d by sympathy, it is at first known only by its effects, and by those external signs in the countenance and conversation, which convey an idea of it. This idea is presently converted into an impression, and acquires such a degree of force and vivacity, as to become the very passion itself, and produce an equal emotion, as any original affection. (T 2.1.11.3, SBN 317)

That is, the mechanism of sympathy allows us to experience others’ feelings. It is important to note that for Hume, the essence of science is generalisation. Our scientific reasoning derives the general facts from the various particular facts by conducting observations and experiments on experience. As Hazony points out, “Less attention has been paid to the fact that for Hume, experience and observation are not, in and of themselves, science. They only provide the materials for science, which in fact advances only with our attempts to construct a scheme of simple, general concept (“principles” or “causes”) in terms of which the phenomena can be understood” (Hazony 2014, 161). According to Hume, experience and observation “are the only solid foundation we can give this science” (Ibid., p. xvi)). Hence, if we can experience and observe others’ feelings by the use of sympathy, we can conduct scientific reasoning, hence deducing general facts.

In this respect, we can say that Hume regards the feelings of approbation or disapprobation as matters of fact,
but it does not lead to subjectivism since we share others’ feelings of approbation or disapprobation as matters of fact with the help of the mechanism of sympathy. This is the reason why he argues that “by following the experimental method” we can deduce “general maxims [of morals] from a comparison of particular instances” (EPM 1.10, SBN 174-175). Therefore, I conclude that Hume treats the feelings of approbation or disapprobation as particular matters of fact and apply the experimental method of reasoning to them, and, thus, deducing the maxims of morals as general matters of fact. In my view, Hume is a cognitivist and a reductive naturalist, which means that the standard interpretation of the “is-ought” passage is mistaken.

3.2. Moral Cognitivism

“Morality … is more properly felt than judg’d of; tho’ this feeling or sentiment is commonly so soft and gentle, that we are apt to confound it with an idea” (T 3.1.2.1, SBN 470). It is understandable, given remarks such as the preceding, that Hume is commonly treated as a non-cognitivist. His theory seems to “deny the existence of moral knowledge and treat ‘judgments, not as cognitions, but as expressions of feelings’” (Radcliffe 2006, 354). However, as we have seen in the previous section, he introduces the experimental method of reasoning into moral subjects and treat moral sentiments as matters of fact. Thus, in my view, we should regard him as a cognitivist.

There are two interpretations which treat Hume as a cognitivist: the Common Sense Interpretation and the Ideal Observer Interpretation. The Ideal Observer interpretation understands Hume as a cognitivist by interpreting Hume’s “General Point of View” as the Ideal Observer’s Point of View. Against this interpretation, Sayre-McCord argues that we should understand Hume’s “General Point of View” not as the Ideal Observer’s Point of View but as the general tendency of society. According to him, the latter is accessible only to those who are characterized as “being well informed, impartial, consistent, and empathetic” (Kawall 2013, 2523), while Hume describes the General Point of View as accessible to all members of society.

In this section, I defend the Common Sense Interpretation which is endorsed by Sayre-McCord but argue that there is some change in Hume’s stance between his earlier work, the Treatise and his later works, his essay “Of the Standard of Taste” and the Enquiry. In his earlier work, as Sayre-McCord argues, he equates the General Points of View with the general tendency of society. By contrast, in his later work, he equates the General Points of View with the universal sentiments of mankind.

3.2.1. The Context: Two Objections against Sympathy, and General Point of View

Sympathy plays a distinctive role in Hume’s moral theory. As a powerful mental mechanism, it enables us to produce the moral sentiments (T 3.3.1.10, SBN 577-578). It takes us out of our own interests and, thus, enables us to evaluate others’ characters from a disinterested standpoint. Thus, it is by sympathy that we have a concern for others (T 3.3.1.10, SBN 579). Let’s call it a sympathy-based moral theory.

According to Hume, this kind of sympathy-based moral theory faces two serious objections. The first objection is that the intensity of sympathy varies with the psychological distance between ourselves and others. He says,
“we must be assisted by the relations of resemblance and contiguity, in order to feel the sympathy in its full perfection” (T 2.1.11.8, SBN 320). And he continues, “this sympathy is very variable… We sympathize more with persons contiguous to us, than with persons remote from us: With our acquaintance, than with strangers: With our countrymen, than with foreigners” (T 3.3.1.14, SBN 580-581). The second objection is that the operation of sympathy is limited to those who actually exercise their virtuous traits. If our moral sentiments were ultimately based on sympathy, we would entertain them only for those persons whose passions actually caused us to feel that unique species of sentiments.

Thus, if we make sympathy central to morality, the moral sentiments, which are produced by sympathy, may not then attain objectivity. As a solution to these two problems of sympathy, he introduces the concept of “General Point of View”. Although the result of sympathy is variable and its range is limited only to the actual passion, we can correct the variation and extend the limited range to all human beings by taking up the General Point of View.

In order, therefore, to prevent those continual contradictions, and arrive at a more stable judgment of things, we fix on some steady and general points of view; and always, in our thought, place ourselves in them, whatever may be our present situation. (T 3.3.1.15, SBN 581-582)

In this passage, Hume says that we can make a stable moral judgment by taking the General Point of View. And this is the place where the controversial interpretations of the General Point of View are raised.

### 3.2.2. Ideal Observer Interpretation

One interpretation of Hume’s moral judgment theory is the “Ideal Observer Interpretation”. Ideal observer theories are defined as “metaethical theories according to which the truth of moral judgments is determined by the attitudes of hypothetical ideal observers” (Kawall 2013, 2523). That is, “something is wrong if and only if an impartial spectator or ideal observer would disapprove of it” (Harman 1977, 44). The view of a Hypothetical Ideal Observer provides us a standard for our moral judgment. As the condition for the view to be the standard, the “ideal observer is defined to be disinterested, well informed, vividly aware of the relevant facts, and so forth” (Harman 1977, 44).

Those who interpret Hume’s moral judgment theory as an “Ideal Observer Theory” pay attention to Hume’s concept of the “General Point of View”. According to their interpretation, we should interpret the “General Point of View” as the view of an “Hypothetical Ideal Observer”. When he says, “we fix on some steady and general points of view; and always, in our thoughts, place ourselves in them, whatever may be our present situation,” they interpret it as follows: we can make a moral judgment by placing ourselves in thought in the Hypothetical Ideal Observer’s View (T 3.3.1.15, SBN 581-582). Radcliffe restates it as follows: “moral observers reflect about how they would feel if they were situated, contrary to fact, in a standard perspective disregarding their particular circumstances and then correct their judgments accordingly” (Radcliffe 1994, 45).

The Ideal Observer Interpretation has two attractive features. First, it allows Hume to make “the relatively minimal metaphysical commitments” to the existence of moral properties. Ideal Observers in the theory are not
the actual existence but the hypothetical one in our thoughts. That is, “[t]here is no commitment to non-natural moral facts (which are often seen as mysterious posits) …, nor is there a commitment to the actual existence of IOs [Ideal Observers] or any supernatural beings” (Kawall 2013, 2525). Second, it allows for a standard for moral judgment in Hume’s moral theory without a burden of metaphysical commitments. It is capable of “correcting our sentiments, or at least, of correcting our language” by taking the General Point of View because it works as a standard for moral judgment (T 3.3.1.16, SBN 582).

Even though the Ideal Observer Interpretation has these attractive features, there seems to be a problem about this interpretation. The problem is whether Hume’s “General Point of View” satisfies the requirements of Ideal Observer’s Point of View. Jason Kawall says, “IOs [Ideal Observers] are thus often characterized as being well informed (or even omniscient), impartial, consistent, and empathetic” (Kawall 2013, 2523). In order to accept the Ideal Observer Interpretation, the “General Point of View” needs to meet these requirements. Thus, although the Ideal Observer Interpretation has the attractive merits, we need to critically examine Hume’s account of the “General Point of View”.

3.2.3. The Problem of Ideal Observer Theory

Sayre-McCord defines “an Ideal Observer” as “an observer who enjoys, and responds equi-sympathetically in light of, full information about the actual effects on everyone of what is being evaluated (someone’s character, an action, an institutional practice, etc.)” (Sayre-McCord 1994, 204). And then he argues that there is no way for us to have access to the Ideal Observer’s Point of View because “[w]e have neither the psychological equipment nor the knowledge required” (Sayre-McCord 1994, 218). By contrast, he says, “Hume’s [General Point of View] is a standard both more human in scope and more accessible in practice than any set by an Ideal Observer.” And he holds that “its very accessibility, according to Hume, is crucial to its playing the distinctive role in practical life that gives point to its introduction and adoption” (Sayre-McCord 1994, 203).

Sayre-McCord supports his interpretation with Hume’s “narrow circle” argument in the Treatise, which has two implications. First, our concern, as an observer, is confined only to those in the narrow circle of an agent. We do not need to have “full information about the actual effects on everyone of what is being evaluated” which is required by an Ideal Observer. Hume says, “in judging of characters, the only interest or pleasure … is that of the person himself, whose character is examin’d, or that of persons, who have a connexion with him” (T 3.3.1.30, SBN 591). Second, we need to focus on the effects the tendencies of an agent’s character would normally have on those in the narrow circle because we have “differential access to the actual effects of a particular person’s character on the ‘narrow circle’” (Sayre-McCord 1994, 219). That is, in order to take up the General Point of View, we do not need to know “all the actual effects on all”, which the Ideal Observer Theory insists on, but we only need to know “the usual effects on the narrow circle” (Sayre-McCord 1994, 212). Hume says as follows:

Being thus acquainted with the nature of man, we expect not any impossibilities from him; but confine our view to that narrow circle, in which any person moves, in order to form a judgment of his moral character. When the natural tendency of his passions leads him to be serviceable and useful within his sphere, we approve of his character, and love his person, by a sympathy with the sentiments of those,
who have a more particular connexion with him. (T 3.3.3.2, SBN 602).

Thus, Sayre-McCord’s understanding of the General Point of View in the *Treatise* seems to be right because unlike an Ideal Observer’s View, the General Point of View is accessible to everyone.

However, there still remains the problem of disagreement. Kawall suggests that we imagine the situation that two observers attempt to take up the General Point of view in order to assess an agent’s action, and one of them successfully takes it up, while the other does not (Kawall 2006, 370). He holds that “both will presumably think they have taken up the GPOV [General Point of View], even if only one of them actually has done so. Surely they will still disagree about who has achieved the GPOV [General Point of View]” (Kawall 2006, 370). When we consider that the reason why we take up the General Point of View is to “prevent the continual contradictions”, the problem of disagreement might do damage to Hume’s moral theory.

Hume seems to recognise the problem of disagreement. In his essay “*Of the Standard of Taste*”, he complains that it is embarrassingly difficult to distinguish between true critics and pretenders when there is a disagreement:

> But where are such critics [true critics] to be found? By what marks are they to be known? How distinguish them from pretenders? These questions are embarrassing; and seem to throw us back into the same uncertainty, from which, during the course of this essay, we have endeavoured to extricate ourselves. (E 241)

The problem of disagreement might be a serious problem for Sayre-McCord’s proposed understanding of the General Point of View in the *Treatise*. However, at least in “*Of the Standard of Taste*”, Hume gives us a normative standard of judgment. He defines ‘a true judge’ as follows:

> Strong sense, united to delicate sentiment, improved by practice, perfected by comparison, and cleared of all prejudice, can alone entitle critics to this valuable character; and the joint verdict of such, wherever they are to be found, is the true standard of taste and beauty. (E 241)

If there is a true standard of judgment, then in order to solve the problem of disagreement, we can attempt to have access to the relevant information which the true standard gives us. Kawall says, “in the case of IO [Ideal Observer] theories, we can take important steps towards resolving disagreements – the most obvious of these is to ensure that all disputants have access to as much (and the same) relevant information as possible, while accounting as far as possible for potential biases and prejudices” (Kawall 2006, 371). Hume also says as follows:

> Where these doubts occur, men can do no more than in other disputable questions, which are submitted to the understanding: They must produce the best arguments, that their invention suggests to them; they must acknowledge a true and decisive standard to exist somewhere, to wit, real existence and matter of fact; and they must have indulgence to such as differ from them in their appeals to this standard. (E 242)

Thus, we can say that although it is unclear as to whether we can understand the General Point of View as the Ideal Observer’s Point of View in the *Treatise*, it seems to be clear that Hume’s definition of the ‘true judge’ in “*Of the Standard of Taste*” can be read as an Ideal Observer Theory.

One might say that there is no change in Hume’s stance in his moral theory regardless of his true judge
argument in his Aesthetics. Radcliffe says, “I have not brought aesthetic judgments into this discussion, partly because I find Hume’s discussion of them puzzling. His account of them in the Treatise seems to make them analogous to moral judgments, open for all to undertake, but his essay “Of the Standard of Taste”, makes one wonder whether Hume thinks matter of taste must be left to a handful of experts” (Radcliffe 2006, 361).

However, there is a change in Hume’s moral stance when one comes to the Enquiry. He writes that “in many orders of beauty, particularly those of the finer arts, it is requisite to employ much reasoning, in order to feel the proper sentiment: and a false relish may frequently by corrected by argument and reflection. … moral beauty … demands the assistance of our intellectual faculties, in order to give it a suitable influence on the human mind” (EPM 1.9, SBN 173). He also says as follows:

But in order to pave the way for such a [moral] sentiment, and give a proper discernment of its object, it is often necessary … that much reasoning should precede, that nice distinctions be made, just conclusions drawn, distant comparisons formed, complicated relations examined, and general facts fixed and ascertained. (EPM 1.9, SBN 173)

According to this passage, in order to take up the General Point of View, we need to meet the following conditions: “much reasoning should precede”, “nice distinctions be made”, “just conclusions drawn”, “distant comparisons formed”, “complicated relations examined”, and “general facts fixed and ascertained”. In this sense, the General Point of View in the Enquiry is not accessible to everyone, which is one of Sayre-McCord’s main criteria to distinguish it from the Ideal Observer’s View.

Furthermore, in the Enquiry, our concern, as an observer, is not confined to “the usual effects on the narrow circle”, which is Sayre-McCord’s other criterion to distinguish the General Point of View from the Ideal Observer’s View. In the Enquiry, Hume extends our concern from the general tendency of society to the “universal principle of the human frame” (EPM 9.6, SBN 272). He says that “the humanity of one man is the humanity of every one, and the same object touches this passion in all human creatures” (EPM 9.6, SBN 273). This means that there is the Universal Point of View that all persons could take if they wanted to make moral judgments. There is an interesting quotation by which we can recognise the change in Hume’s moral stance. It is the same quotation in the Enquiry as in the Treatise except for one added sentence.

Besides, that we ourselves often change our situation in this particular, we every day meet with persons, who are in a different situation from ourselves, and who cou’d never converse with us on any reasonable terms, were we to remain constantly in that situation and point of view, which is peculiar to us. The intercourse of sentiments, therefore, in society and conversation, makes us from some general inalterable standard, by which we may approve or disapprove of characters and manners. And tho’ the heart does not always take part with those general notions, or regulate its love and hatred by them, yet are they sufficient for discourse, and serve all our purposes in company, in the pulpit, on the theatre, and in the schools. (T 3.3.3.2, SBN 603)

Besides the fact that we ourselves often change our situation in this particular, we every day meet with persons who are in a situation different from us, and who could never converse with us were we to remain constantly in that position and point of view, which is peculiar to ourselves. The intercourse of sentiments, therefore, in society and conversation, makes us form some general unalterable standard, by
which we may approve or disapprove of characters and manners. And though the heart takes not part entirely with those general notions, nor regulates all its love and hatred, by the universal abstract differences of vice and virtue, without regard to self, or the persons with whom we are more intimately connected; yet have these moral differences a considerable influence, and being sufficient, at least, for discourse, serve all our purposes in company, in the pulpit, on the theatre, and in the schools. (EPM 5.42, SBN 229)

In this passage, he emphasises that the General Point of View is the universal standard of moral judgment. From this, we can say that while in the Treatise, he tends to rely on the general tendency of society as a standard of moral judgment, in the Enquiry, Hume attempts to set up a universal standard of moral judgment. Thus, we can conclude that Hume changed his moral stance between the Treatise and the Enquiry and that his final moral stance should be understood as the Ideal Observer Theory.

By now, the Ideal Observer Interpretation seems to be promising. However, I would argue that Hume’s concept of “universal principle of the human frame” does not support the Ideal Observer Interpretation (EPM 9.6, SBN 272).

3.2.4. The Concept of “Ideal” vs. “Universal”

It is true that unlike in his earlier work the Treatise, Hume puts emphasis on the concept of universality in his later works, Essays and the Enquiry. In his essay “Of Eloquence” he says as follows:

It is seldom or never found, when a false taste in poetry or eloquence prevails among any people, that it has been preferred to a true, upon comparison and reflection. It commonly prevails merely from ignorance of the true, and from the want of perfect models, to lead men into a juster apprehension, and more refined relish of those productions of genius. When these appear, they soon unite all suffrages in their favour, and, by their natural and powerful charms, gain over, even the most prejudiced, to the love and admiration of them. The principles of every passion, and of every sentiment, is in every man; and when touched properly, they rise to life, and warm the heart, and convey that satisfaction, by which a work of genius is distinguished from the adulterate beauties of a capricious wit and fancy (E 107).

And in his essay “Of the Standard of Taste” he says that the models and principles of aesthetics “have been established by the uniform consent and experience of nations and ages” (E 237). And consistently, in the Enquiry, he says, “it is the nature, and, indeed, the definition of virtue, that it is a quality of the mind agreeable to or approved by everyone, who considers or contemplates it” (EPM 8.1n). Thus, his emphasis on universality as a criterion of morality seems clear. And we can say the there is a clear contrast between his emphasis on universality in his later works and his emphasis on the general point of view as a general tendency in a narrow circle in his earlier work of the Treatise.

However, we need to make a clear distinction between the concept of “ideal” and “universal”. The Ideal Observer Theory implies a version of moral cognitivism, which means that our moral judgements are the beliefs
which are purely produced by our reasoning. It takes the hypothetical form of reasoning: “something is wrong if and only if an impartial spectator or ideal observer would disapprove of it” (Harman 1977, 44). That is, in the Ideal Observer Theory, in order to make a moral judgment, we need to become an ideal observer and make the hypothetical form of reasoning. By contrast, universality is not a quality which is required by a moral judge. Hume says that “universal principle” is “the human frame” (EPM 9.6, SBN 272). That is, universality can be found in everyone. And in order to find the universality, we do not necessarily need to be an ideal observer. It is true that if someone wants to make a moral judgment on the basis of universality of mankind, he must “depart from his private and particular situation, and must chuse a point of view, common to him with others: He must move some universal principle of the human frame, and touch a string, to which all mankind have an accord and symphony” (EPM 9.6, SBN 272). But he doesn’t need to be an ideal observer since universality is accessible to everyone.

Thus, I would say that although Hume made change of his stance in his later works, he still takes a Common Sense Theory, as opposed to an Ideal Observer Theory. That is, reasoning does not play a hypothetical or purely abstract role in making moral judgment. Rather, it is a kind of experimental method of reasoning. We can find the universality of mankind “by following the experimental method” (EPM 1.10, SBN 174-175). In the introduction of the *Treatise*, he says, “we must endeavour to render all our principles as universal as possible, by tracing up our experiments to the utmost” (T intro. 8, SBN xvii).

### 3.3. Theory of Moral Motivation

By now, we have understood that Hume is a reductive naturalist and a cognitivist. On my reading, although there is a gap between “is”-propositions and “ought”-propositions, it does not mean that “ought”-propositions are not matters of fact. According to him, “ought”-propositions are still matters of fact, but they are not the object of reason but of feeling. We can establish the standard of moral judgment “by following the experimental method” (EPM 1.10, SBN 174-175). But this understanding seems to raise a serious problem in his moral theory. It seems to conflict with the Humean theory of motivation. In this section, I will attempt to accommodate Hume’s moral cognitivism with his theory of moral motivation.

#### 3.3.1. The Metaethical Problem

According to Hume, “reason is perfectly inert” (T 3.1.1.8, SBN 458) and, thus, “reason alone can never produce any action, or give rise to volition” (T 2.3.3.4, SBN 414). He famously says as follows:

’Tis not contrary to reason to prefer the destruction of the whole world to the scratching of my finger. ’Tis not contrary to reason for me to choose my total ruin, to prevent the least uneasiness of an Indian or person wholly unknown to me. ’Tis as little contrary to reason to prefer even my own acknowledg’d lesser good to my greater, and have a more ardent affection for the former than the latter. (T 2.3.3.6, SBN 416)

My belief that I can prevent “the destruction of whole world” alone does not motivate myself to do this. I would
do this only when I have the desire to prevent “the destruction of whole world”. That is, we can say that in order for a belief to motivate an action, there should be a relevant pre-existing desire. This view is commonly called the Humean Theory of Motivation.

On the other hand, in the *Treatise 3.1.1*, Hume addresses the Motivation Argument: “Morals excite passions, and produce or prevent actions. Reason of itself is utterly impotent in this particular. The rules of morality, therefore, are not conclusions of our reason” (T 3.1.1.6, SBN 457). The Motivation Argument is most commonly recast as follows (Sayre-McCord 2008, 302):

(1) Moral judgments alone excite passions, and produce or prevent actions.

(2) No judgments based on reason, alone, can excite passions or produce or prevent actions.

(3) Therefore, moral judgments are not conclusions of our reason.

This reading of the Motivation Argument expresses a version of motivational internalism in that (1) moral judgments alone excite passions, and produce or prevent actions without any other external motive.

Given that both the Humean Theory of Motivation and the Motivation Argument are Hume’s genuine view, these seem to cause a serious problem for my interpretation of Hume’s moral theory. Here are three claims:

(1) Moral judgments express beliefs about matters of fact. – “cognitivism”

(2) Moral judgments alone excite passions, and produce or prevent actions. – “internalism”

(3) In order for a belief to motivate an action, there should be a relevant pre-existing desire. – the “Humean Theory of Motivation”

We cannot hold these three claims together without inconsistency. It is called the Moral Problem or the Metaethical Problem (McNaughton 1988, 22; Smith 1994, 11; Sayre-McCord 1997, 56). If we put both “internalism” and the “Humean Theory of Motivation” together, then “noncognitivism” would follow. But this conclusion is against my understanding of Hume as a moral cognitivist (1). Thus, in order to defend my interpretation of Hume as a cognitivist, I should reject one of two views: the Humean Theory of Motivation and the Motivation Argument. In the following session, I would argue that the Humean Theory is not Hume’s genuine view and that his genuine theory of motivation can accommodate moral cognitivism.

3.3.2. Hume’s Theory of Motivation: The Idea-Belief-Desire Model

It is important to note that the motivation argument in the *Treatise 3.1.1. “Moral Distinctions not derive’d from reason” is targeting moral rationalism:

Those who affirm that virtue is nothing but a conformity to reason; that there are eternal fitnesses and unfitnesses of things, which are the same to every rational being that considers them; that the immutable measures of right and wrong impose an obligation, not only on human creatures, but also on the deity himself: All these systems concur in the opinion, that morality, like truth, is discern’d merely by ideas, and by their juxta-position and comparison. In order, therefore, to judge of these
Moral rationalists propose a mathematical model of morals, in which our rational cognition provides us both guidance and motivation, and our feeling is at most a hindrance to virtue. Moral distinctions are a kind of “necessary and eternal” relations of things to one another, which they put in terms of “the fitness or unfitness of things”. Thus, we can “distinguish betwixt moral good and evil” from purely speculative reasoning as we perceive logical or mathematical relations.

In the next passage, Hume says, “Philosophy is commonly divided into speculative and practical; and as morality is always comprehended under the latter division” (T 3.1.1.5, SBN 457). He is now targeting moral rationalism and arguing that moral rationalists mistakenly put morality under the wrong category, that is, the speculative philosophy. This is the context where the Motivation Argument is introduced: “Morals excite passions, and produce or prevent actions. Reason of itself is utterly impotent in this particular. The rules of morality, therefore, are not conclusions of our reason” (T 3.1.1.6, SBN 457). Thus, we should understand that when Hume argues that “Reason or itself is utterly impotent” or “The rules of morality … are not conclusions of our reason”, he now uses moral rationalists’ speculative concept of reason, which is distinguished from the concept of experimental reason, which cannot operate alone without strong connections with experience.

Thus, I would argue that there are two different kinds of beliefs, each of which is produced by the speculative reasoning alone or the experimental reasoning concerning experience, respectively. And furthermore, I would argue that although the belief which is produced by the speculative reasoning alone cannot motivate actions, the belief which is produced by the experimental reasoning concerning experience can motivate actions. Let’s take a look at the following passage:

Nature has implanted in the human mind a perception of good or evil, or in other words, of pain and pleasure, as the chief spring and moving principle of all its actions. But pain and pleasure have two ways of making their appearance in the mind; of which the one has effects very different from the other. They may either appear in impression to the actual feeling and experience, or only in idea, as at present when I mention them. ’Tis evident the influence of these upon our actions is far from being equal. Impressions always actuate the soul, and that in the highest degree; but ’tis not every idea which has the same effect. (T 3.1.10.2, SBN 118).

In this passage, Hume says that there are two kinds of “the chief spring and moving principle of all its actions” – that is, ideas and impressions. And he continues that “Impressions always actuate the soul”, but every idea does not always actuate the soul. This means that there are some ideas which can actuate the soul. In the next passage, he introduces “a medium” version of ideas, which can “actuate the soul”:

Nature has, therefore, chosen a medium, and has neither bestow’d on every idea of good and evil the power of actuating the will, nor yet has entirely excluded them from this influence. … The effect, then, of belief is to raise up a simple idea to an equality with our impressions, and bestow on it a like influence on the passions. This effect it can only have by making an idea approach an impression in force and vivacity. … Wherever we can make an idea approach the impressions in force and vivacity,
it will likewise imitate them in its influence on the mind; and vice versa, where it imitates them in that influence, as in the present case, this must proceed from its approaching them in force and vivacity. Belief, therefore, since it causes an idea to imitate the effects of the impressions, must make it resemble them in these qualities, and is nothing but *a more vivid and intense conception of any idea.* This, then, may both serve as an additional argument for the present system, and may give us a notion after what manner our reasonings from causation are able to operate on the will and passions. (T 1.3.10.3, SBN 119)

That is, Hume makes a distinction between an idea and an impression, and, then, adds a medium between them. This medium is belief, which is defined as “a more vivid and intense conception of any idea”. According to him, because of its vivacity, beliefs “imitate the effects of the impressions”. That is, belief can motivate actions as an impression does.

Thus, I argue that the Humean Theory of Motivation, that is, the Belief-Desire model, cannot catch Hume’s subtle distinction among ideas, beliefs, and impressions. According to the Humean Theory of Motivation, belief alone cannot motivate. But according to Hume, an idea cannot motivate but belief can. Thus, I would name Hume’s Theory of Motivation as the Idea-Belief-Desire model. And in my view, moral rationalists’ speculative reasoning alone can produce only a bare idea, but the experimental reasoning concerning experience can generate vivid ideas, called belief. Given that Hume’s genuine theory of motivation is the Idea-Belief-Desire model, the Metaethical Problem is not raised since his theory of motivation accommodates moral cognitivism.

Then, we can ask how the experimental reasoning concerning experience can produce vivid ideas, which have motivating power. Given that “Nature has implanted in the human mind a perception of good or evil, or in other words, of pain and pleasure, as the chief spring and moving principle of all its actions” (T 3.1.10.2, SBN 118), when would an idea of good or evil in my mind become a vivid belief, and, thus, motivate? According to Hume, vivacity is transferred when we find resemblance between an idea of good or evil in my mind and a present impression of others: “I shall only infer from these practices, and this reasoning, that the effect of resemblance in enlivening the idea is very common; and as in every case a resemblance and a present impression must concur, we are abundantly supply’d with experiments to prove the reality of the foregoing principle” (T 1.3.8.4, SBN 100).

According to Hume, there are two kinds of resemblance among people: general resemblance and peculiar similarity. First, there is general resemblance: “nature has preserv’d a great resemblance among all human creatures … However the parts may differ in shape or size, their structure and composition are in general the same” (T 2.1.11.5). When my experimental reasoning could find the general resemblance between an idea of good or evil in my mind and a present impression of others, the idea of good or evil in my mind would get vivacity from others and become the belief of good or evil.

Second, there is peculiar similarity: “beside the general resemblance of our natures, there is any peculiar similarity in our manners, or character, or country, or language” (T 2.1.11.5). When my experimental reasoning could find the peculiar similarity between an idea of good or evil in my mind and a present impression of others, the mechanism would start to work and, thus, convert the idea of good or evil in my mind into an impression of good or evil:
The bare opinion of another, especially when enforced with passion, will cause an idea of good or evil to have an influence upon us, which would otherwise have been entirely neglected. This proceeds from the principle of sympathy or communication; and sympathy, as I have already observed, is nothing but the conversion of an idea into an impression by the force of imagination. (T 2.3.6.8, SBN 427)

Thus, I conclude that moral rationalists’ speculative reasoning alone can produce only a bare idea, which cannot motivate; by contrast, the experimental reasoning concerning experience can produce belief or even an impression, which can motivate, since the discovery of resemblance between my idea and others’ impression adds vivacity to the former. According to Hume, the mechanism of transferring vivacity from vivid impressions to ideas is a kind of inbuilt disposition: “We must also point out the connexion betwixt the relation and the will; and must prove that this connexion is so necessary, that in every well-dispos’d mind, it must take place and have its influence” (T 3.1.1.22, SBN 465).

3.4. Normativity and Reflection

For Hume, the spectators’ sentiments of pleasure or pain are the only source of morality. Any behaviour or any character does not have its own intrinsic value. Hume says, “As the means to an end can only be agreeable, where the end is agreeable” (T 3.3.1.9, SBN 577). That is, only those who can make us feel the sentiment of pleasure are good or virtuous.

Every quality of the mind is denominated virtuous, which gives pleasure by the mere survey; as every quality, which produces pain, is call’d vicious. This pleasure and this pain may arise from four different sources. For we reap a pleasure from the view of a character, which is naturally fitted to be useful to others, or to the person himself, or which is agreeable to others, or to the person himself. (T 3.3.1.30, SBN 591)

It seems that Hume’s moral theory is in line with Hobbes’ in the sense that it gives an interest-based account. According to Hobbes, morality is reduced to self-interest. That is, if I feel pleasure from something and desire it, we can call it “good”. However, Hume’s moral theory shows a significant difference in the sense that for him, moral sentiments are not based on selfishness. Hobbes holds that selfishness is the sole operative human motive and the reason why we form societies is only because of our self-interest. Morals are only needed as a system to protect our own interests from others in the society where we live. By contrast, Hume believes that our moral sentiments are not generated from our selfishness but from our capacity to sympathise with other’s interests or pleasure regardless of our own interest:

Wherever an object has a tendency to produce pleasure in the possessor, or in other words, is the proper cause of pleasure, it is sure to please the spectator, by a delicate sympathy with the possessor. … Now as the means to an end can only be agreeable, where the end is agreeable; and as the good of society, where our own interest is not concern’d, or that of our friends, pleases only by sympathy: It follows, that sympathy is the source of the esteem, which we pay to all the artificial virtues. (T 3.3.1.8,
In this sense, he says that “moral distinctions depend entirely on certain peculiar sentiments of pain and pleasure” (T 3.3.1.3, SBN 574-575).

At this point, the normativity question is raised. Why cannot all the sentiments of pain and pleasure be moral, and why ought only “certain peculiar sentiments of pain and pleasure”, which are generated by sympathy, to be moral? Hume’s concept of moral sentiment needs to be justified in order to establish his moral theory because in my interpretation, moral sentiments themselves are merely matters of fact, which are not the object of reason but of feeling. I believe that Hume himself had the normativity question in mind and prepared for his own answer. Let’s look at what his answer is.

3.4.1. Normativity as Reflexivity

Hutcheson believes that we have the “moral sense”, a faculty of mind, which is an “internal sense” distinguished from “other Sensations of Seeing and Hearing” (Hutcheson 2004, 23), and it exercises the normative power. It is by the moral sense that we can experience benevolent motives and approve of them as we experience external sensations by sight or touch. Hutcheson says as follows:

We must then certainly have other Perceptions of moral Actions than those of Advantage: And the Power of receiving these Perceptions may be call’d a Moral Sense, since the Definition agrees to it, viz. a Determination of the Mind, to receive any Idea from the Presence of an Object which occurs to us, independent on our Will. (Hutcheson 2004, 90)

However, we can raise a question why the moral sense responds only to benevolence among all the natural dispositions, thus generating moral sentiments. Hutcheson answers that the divine providence guarantees our moral sense to respond to the benevolent affections of agents:

If it be here inquir’d, “Could not the DEITY have given us a different or contrary Determination of Mind, viz. to approve Actions upon another Foundation than Benevolence?” There seems nothing in this surpassing the natural Power of the DEITY. … For if the DEITY be really benevolent, and desires the Happiness of others, he could not rationally act otherwise, or give us a moral Sense upon another Foundation, without counteracting his own benevolence Intentions. (Hutcheson 2004, 195-196)

That is, for him, the authority of the moral sense comes from God’s benevolent intentions. Only when we presuppose the supernatural apparatus like the divine providence, the moral sense can exercise its normative power.

However, if we do not accept this kind of supernatural apparatus, the moral sense cannot avoid losing its authoritative power. Hume compares Hutcheson’s moral-sense-based theory to his own sympathy-based theory as follows:
Those who resolve the sense of morals into original instincts of the human mind, may defend the cause of virtue with sufficient authority; but want the advantage, which those possess, who account for that sense by an extensive sympathy with mankind. (T 3.3.6.3, SBN 619)

According to him, the reason why he thinks that his sympathy-based theory is superior to Hutcheson’s is because his own theory can reflect on itself and approves of itself. And he believes that the normativity of his moral system derives from this reflexivity.

It requires but very little knowledge of human affairs to perceive, that a sense of morals is a principle inherent in the soul, and one of the most powerful that enters into the composition. But this sense must certainly acquire new force, when reflecting on itself, it approves of those principles, from whence it is deriv’d, and finds nothing but what is great and good in its rise and origin. (T 3.3.6.3, SBN 619)

Annette Baier says, “Successful reflexivity is normativity” (Baier 1991, 99-100), and continues, “The religious, in any case, do not take the moral point of view of an outside judge, external to the judged. It is bearing God’s survey, not bearing their own survey, that they aim at” (Baier 1991, 216). In this sense, Hutcheson’s moral theory fails “to meet the Humean test of successful reflexivity” (Baier 1991, 216). By contrast, Hume’s moral theory can “bear its own survey” (T 3.3.6.6, SBN 620). Baier explains how his theory can bear its own survey as follows:

We trust the “testimony” of our sense, more or less as we do the testimony of our fellows. We learn from experience, and from reflection on that experience, that most testifiers can, in some conditions and on some matters, speak falsely, and maybe that some few rarely speak truly. … We reflect together on what points of view we should take as standard, as ones from which we correct what appears from other points of view. (Baier 1991, 119)

That is to say, according to Baier, whether or not a moral theory bears its own survey depends on others’ affirmations of it and Hume’s sympathy-based moral theory bears its own survey by taking up the general point of view.

Christine Korsgaard also agrees with the idea that Hume attempts to establish “normativity as reflexivity” (Korsgaard 1996, 61). She says, “Now Hume clearly thinks that the understanding fails this test”, “But the moral sense passes the reflexivity test” (Korsgaard 1996, 62-63). However, she holds that after all, Hume’s moral theory fails to pass the reflexivity test. According to her, the aim of the reflexivity test is to establish the moral laws or principles, which we ought to follow:

According to Kant, as each impulse to action presents itself to us, we should subject it to the test of reflection, to see whether it really is a reason by determining whether we should allow it to be a law to us. And we do that by asking whether the maxim of acting on it can be willed as a law. … The test of reflective endorsement is the test used by actual moral agents to establish the normativity of all their particular motives and inclinations. (Korsgaard 1996, 76)

Korsgaard thinks that Hume’s moral theory does not meet this kind of strong requirement of the reflexivity test.
This is because by taking the reflexivity test, what we get in his moral theory is only “general rules” which are driven by custom and others’ affirmations in our society. But the general rules cannot play a normative role in our lives just as moral laws do. She says as follows:

The difficulty in this case is not, strictly speaking, a difficulty with the reflective endorsement strategy. It arises most immediately from something particular to Hume’s view: the fact that the moral sentiments are supposed to be influenced by “general rules.” Rules that do not hold in every case. Such rules cause us to disapprove of certain dispositions or character traits, which are themselves tendencies of a general kind. But that disapproval will be transferred to each and every exercise of the disposition in question only if we forget that the rules that cause it are merely general. (Korsgaard 1996, 88)

However, in my view, when Hume’s moral theory takes the reflexivity test, what it depends on is not general rules but its universality. We could say that his moral theory can bear its survey and pass the reflexivity test because he introduces the concept of universality in his theory.

### 3.4.2. Normativity as Universality

In Hume’s moral theory, the concept of sympathy plays a significant role. It makes us share others’ feeling and have a concern for others’ benefits regardless of our own interest. But, it is wrong to say that all the results of sympathy are moral sentiments. Only “certain peculiar sentiments of pain and pleasure” can be moral sentiments (T 3.3.1.3, SBN 574). This is because in order to be moral sentiments, it is required to pass the reflexivity test. Hume says as follows:

In order, therefore, to prevent those continual contradictions, and arrive at a more stable judgment of things, we fix on some steady and general points of view; and always, in our thought, place ourselves in them, whatever may be our present situation. (T 3.3.1.15, SBN 581-582)

We take up the general points of view by reflection and carry on the reflexivity test. Some results of sympathy fail to pass the test, and Hume calls them “Weak Sympathy” (T 2.2.9.17, SBN 388). The other results of sympathy successfully pass the test, and he calls them “Extensive Sympathy” (T 3.3.1.23, SBN 586).

At this point, let’s come back to Korsgaard’s doubt. She worries that Hume’s moral theory fails to pass the reflexivity test because she believes that Hume’s reflexivity test only depends on the “general rules” which “do not hold in every case” and, thus, cannot be moral principles. Thus, according to her, the results of “Extensive Sympathy” also cannot be moral sentiments in a strict sense.

However, Korsgaard’s doubt should be confined only to the *Treatise* because in his later work, the *Enquiry*, Hume changes his own moral stance and introduces the concept of “universality” in his moral theory. Thus, in my view, his moral theory in the *Enquiry* meets the requirement of Korsgaard’s version of reflexivity test because of the normative power of the concept of “universality”. Hume equates “moral sentiments” with
“universal sentiments” (E 9.8, SBN 274). He says, “The notion of morals, implies some sentiment common to all mankind”, and continues, “It also implies some sentiment, so universal and comprehensive as to extend to all mankind” (E 9.5, SBN 272). Thus, we can say that for Hume, the universality of sentiments is the source of normativity. And it pass the reflexivity test:

He must here, therefore, depart from his private and particular situation, and must choose a point of view, common to him with others; he must move some universal principle of the human frame, and touch a string to which all mankind have an accord and symphony. … The humanity of one man is the humanity of every one, and the same object touches this passion in all human creatures. (E 272-273)

However, one question is raised. Is Hume’s concept of the universality of sentiments the same as the Kantian version of universality? It is not. In my view, Korsgaard makes two mistakes. First, she misinterprets Hume’s reflective activity as the Kantian concept of reflexivity test. In my view, the former is a kind of experimental method of reasoning concerning experience, which we have seen in the previous section, whilst the latter is a formal, universal procedure of rationality. Second, she presupposes that the Kantian concept of normativity is the only source of normativity. It is true that Hume’s concept of reflective endorsement does not meet the Kantian requirement of normativity. However, we should bear in mind that Hume does not attempt to establish the Kantian concept of normativity. For Kant, the reason why universality can be the source of normativity is because it is the result of a formal, procedural reasoning. By contrast, for Hume, the reason why universality of sentiments can be the source of normativity is because it is found in experience by following the experimental method of reasoning.

3.5. Conclusion

On my reading, Hume is a reductive naturalist and a moral cognitivist. He introduces himself as an “anatomist” and his own philosophy as “science of human nature”. The title of his book, A Treatise of Human Nature, has the subtitle “Being an Attempt to Introduce the Experimental Method of Reasoning into Moral Subjects”. At first glance, Hume’s claim that there is a logical gap between “is”-propositions and “ought”-propositions seems to allow us to interpret him as a moral non-cognitivist. However, in my view, he still applies the experimental method of reasoning to the moral area. For him, “ought”-propositions are also matters of fact, but the difference between “is”-propositions and “ought”-propositions is that the former is “the object of reason” and the latter is “the object of feeling”. That is, although it is true that Hume claims that there is a logical gap between “is”-propositions and “ought”-propositions, it is not because he does not take a reductive naturalistic view on moral subjects, but because they are different kinds of matters of fact.

As we have seen, it is important to understand Hume’s distinction between particular facts and general facts. For him, the feelings of approbation and disapprobation are particular matters of fact which are not derived from reasoning but from feeling. But in order to generate general matters of fact, that is, general rules of morals, the feelings of approbation and disapprobation as particular matters of fact can be the object of reason. This is the reason why he says as follows:
Morals and criticism are not so properly objects of the understanding as of taste and sentiment. Beauty, whether moral or natural, is felt, more properly than perceived. Or if we reason concerning it, and endeavor to fix its standard, we regard a new fact, to wit, the general taste of mankind, or some such fact, which may be the object of reasoning and enquiry (EHU 12.33, SBN 165).

At first glance, morals and criticism do not seem to be the proper objects of moral reasoning because they are “the object of feeling, not of reason” (T 3.1.1.26, SBN 468-469). That is, they are felt rather than perceived. But according to him, we can still reason concerning morals and try to fix its standard. For him, our reasoning concerning morals is regarded as moral reasoning concerning general facts such as science because our endeavor to fix the general rules of morals is concerning the general taste of mankind.

The problem with this reading is that it seems hard to avoid subjectivism. The problem is this: given that the sentiments of approbation or disapprobation as particular matters of fact are my own feelings and that the only way of scrutinising them is introspection, how can we overcome subjectivism and, thus, deduce “general maxims [of morals] from a comparison of particular instances”? This is the place where one of the important roles of Hume’s concept of sympathy is raised. According to him, the mechanism allows us to feel “an equal emotion, as any original affection” of others. Thus, we can regard the feelings of approbation or disapprobation of not just myself but also others as matters of fact and, hence, “by following the experimental method” derive “general maxims [of morals] from a comparison of particular instances” (EPM 1.10, SBN 174-175).

Reading Hume as a moral cognitivist leads us to consider whether he is a common sense moralist or an ideal observer theorist. Especially his concept of universality of sentiments prompts us to regard him as an ideal observer theorist. But we should carefully make a distinction between two concepts of “universal” and “ideal”. As we have seen, the concept of “ideal” is a qualification which is required for moral judges. In order to make a moral judgement, we need to be able to an ideal observer. However, for Hume, the universality of sentiments are the one we should find by following the experimental method of reasoning concerning experience.

As we have seen, this reading of Hume as a moral cognitivist seems to raise the Metaethical Problem since his Motivation Argument and his Belief-Desire model prompt us to read him as a noncognitivist. In order to solve this problem, I argued that the Humean Theory of Motivation is not Hume’s genuine view. We need to be aware that he makes a distinction between a bare idea and a vivid belief. Although it is true that a bare idea alone is inert and cannot motivate, a vivid belief can motivate. Moral rationalists’ concept of speculative reasoning alone can produce only bare ideas. But Hume’s experimental method of reasoning concerning experience can produce vivid beliefs. Especially when our experimental reasoning finds not just general resemblance but particular resemblance, it triggers the mechanism of sympathy and, thus, converting the beliefs into impressions, which would motivate our actions.

Lastly, we raised the question concerning the source of normativity in Hume’s moral philosophy. My reading Hume as a reductive naturalist and a moral cognitivist would cause some worries as to whether we can find any source of normativity in his moral philosophy. Interestingly, Korsgaard tries to find a Kantian version of the source of normativity in Hume’s moral philosophy. First, she tries to understand Hume’s concept of reflective endorsement as a Kantian concept of self-legislative rationality. However, in my view, Hume’s concept of
reflection is a kind of experimental method of reasoning concerning experience. Thus, it by itself cannot be the source of Kantian normativity. Second, she presupposes that the Kantian concept of normativity is the only source of normativity. It is true that Hume’s concept of reflective endorsement does not meet the Kantian requirement of normativity. However, we should bear in mind that Hume does not attempt to establish the Kantian concept of normativity. For Kant, the reason why universality can be the source of normativity is because it is the result of a formal, procedural reasoning. By contrast, for Hume, the reason why universality of sentiments can be the source of normativity is because it is found in experience by following the experimental method of reasoning.
Chapter 4. Hume on Sympathy and Morality

In the beginning of Book 3 of the *Treatise*, Hume says, “sympathy is a very powerful principle in human nature … that it produces our sentiment of morals” (T 3.3.1.10, SBN577). And in the conclusion of Book 3, he concludes, “We are certain, that sympathy is a very powerful principle in human nature. … If we compare all these circumstances, we shall not doubt, that sympathy is the chief source of moral distinctions” (T 3.3.6.1, SBN 618). Thus we can say that Hume puts the principle of sympathy at the centre of his moral philosophy. Our first aim in this chapter is fully to understand the nature of sympathy and its role in Hume’s moral philosophy.

On the other hand, in the second *Enquiry*, the number of occurrences of the sympathy-related terms are significantly reduced. And Hume does not seem to regard the principle of sympathy as important in his moral philosophy in the second *Enquiry*. Rather he seems to put an emphasis on the importance of the principle of humanity in his moral philosophy. Thus, our second aim of this section is to answer the following question: Is there any change in Hume’s moral stance in the second *Enquiry*? My answer will be that there is no change in his moral stance. In my view, he has a consistent moral stance from the *Treatise* to the second *Enquiry*. That is, he puts the principle of sympathy at the centre of his moral philosophy both in the *Treatise* and the second *Enquiry*.

4.1. Contemporary Use of the Term “Sympathy” and “Empathy”

The term “sympathy” comes from the composite of the Greek prefix syn- meaning with or together and the Greek word *pathos* meaning feeling. That is to say, “sympathy” etymologically means feeling together. For instance, when someone feels a particular emotion, I feel the same one. In this sense, it can be called “fellow-feeling”, that is, “being affected by the feelings of another with a feeling similar to or corresponding to the other’s” (Hacker 2017, 359). Unlike the term “sympathy”, “empathy” is a recently coined term. The American psychologist Edward Titchener introduced the term “empathy” into English in 1909 as a translation of the German concept “Einfühlung” (or “feeling into”), which etymologically means to enter into somebody’s feelings (Debes 2015, 286). According to Stephen Darwall’s definition of empathy, which reflects its etymology, it is “the capacity to put oneself in another’s shoes” or “[i]maginative projection into another’s standpoint or simulation” (Darwall 2006, 44).

Although the term “sympathy” and “empathy” have different etymological origins, in ordinary language there does not seem to be a clear distinction between the usage of the term “sympathy” and “empathy”. Andrew Terjesen says:

In trying to set a distinction between these two terms, people will sometimes appeal to linguistic intuitions about the ways in which those words are used. Unfortunately, there no longer seem to be consistent intuitions about their usage, due both to the fact that different disciplines choose to cut the distinctions in different ways and to the inherent fuzziness of the term. For example, Tiwald describes ‘imaginative reconstruction’ and ‘simulation of feelings’ as things we associate with ‘sympathy’ (and
he is not alone in doing so), but for a number of people ‘sympathy’ can refer only to our attitude towards other people’s suffering. (Terjesen 2013, 242)

We frequently use both terms interchangeably, and regard them as including both knowing or feeling how someone feels and feeling or caring for someone.

However, it is also true that many scholars try to make a distinction between these terms: empathy is knowing or feeling how someone feels, and sympathy is feeling or caring for someone. Michael Slote says:

In colloquial terms, we can perhaps do this most easily by considering the difference between (Bill Clinton’s) feeling someone’s pain and feeling for someone who is in pain. Any adult speaker of English will recognize that ‘empathy’ refers to the former phenomenon and ‘sympathy’ to the latter. … Thus empathy involves having the feelings of another (involuntarily) aroused in ourselves, as when we see another person in pain. … However, we can also feel sorry for, bad for, the person who is in pain and positively wish them well. This amounts, as we say, to sympathy for them, and it can happen even if we aren’t feeling their pain (Slote 2007, 13).

That is, according to Slote, “empathy” refers to feeling someone’s pain, and “sympathy” to feeling for someone who is in pain. Stephen Darwall says:

Seeing the child on the verge of falling, one is concerned for his safety, not just for its (his safety’s) sake, but for his sake. One is concerned for him. Sympathy for the child is a way of caring for (and about) him. Sympathy differs in this respect from several distinct psychological phenomena usually collected under the term ‘empathy’, which need not involve such concern. … Empathy consists in feeling what one imagines he feels, or perhaps should feel (fear, say), or in some imagined copy of these feelings, whether one comes thereby to be concerned for the child or not. Empathy can be consistent with the indifference of pure observation or even the cruelty of sadism. It all depends on why one is interested in the other’s perspective. Sympathy, on the other hand, is felt as from the perspective of “one-caring”. (Darwall 1998, 261).

Paul Bloom and Peter Bazalgette also make the same distinction between “empathy” and “sympathy”. In his book Against Empathy, Bloom says, “I didn’t choose the word at random. The English word empathy really is the best way to refer to this mirroring of others’ feelings. It’s better than sympathy (in its modern usage) and pity. … Also, terms like sympathy and pity are about your reaction to the feelings of others, not the mirroring of them. If you feel bad for someone who is bored, that’s sympathy, but if you feel bored, that’s empathy. If you feel bad for someone in pain, that’s sympathy, but if you feel their pain, that’s empathy” (Bloom 2018, 40). In his book The Empathy Instinct, Bazalgette also says, “In this book I’ll use ‘sympathy’ only in its sense of ‘a feeling of compassion for the suffering of another.’ As for ‘empathy’, by that I mean something broader: ‘the ability to understand and share in another person’s feelings and experiences’” (Bazalgette 2017, 5). Thus, one way to distinguish empathy from sympathy is to understand empathy as knowing or feeling how someone feels, and sympathy as feeling or caring for someone.

For the purpose of clarifying Hume’s understanding of the concept of sympathy, I will accept this distinction
between the concept of empathy and of sympathy. Needless to say, this distinction is valid only in their contemporary usage since as I have said, the term “empathy” was introduced into English in the early 20th century. Before that time in English world, the term “sympathy” must have covered both of them.

4.2. The Usage of the Term “Sympathy” in the Treatise

In order to understand Hume’s concept of sympathy, we need to first clarify his usage of the term in the Treatise. Let us recall Vitz’s distinction (Vitz 2016, 313-314):

1. Hume uses the term ‘sympathy’ “to identify a psychological mechanism: namely, the principle of sympathy, by which one ‘enters into’ the sentiment(s) of another.” He says that it is “the principle of sympathy, by which we enter into the sentiments of the rich and poor, and partake of their pleasure and uneasiness” (T 2.2.5.14, SBN 362).

2. He uses it “to identify a psychological process: namely, the sympathetic conversion of an idea of another’s sentiment into an impression of one’s own.” He says, “Sympathy … is nothing but the conversion of an idea into an impression by the force of imagination” (T 2.3.6.8, SBN 427).

3. He uses it “to identify the affective product of this conversion process: namely, the sentiment of sympathy.” For instance, he says that a rich man’s possessions “produce an agreeable sympathy in us” (T 3.3.5.5, SBN 616).

Although Hume’s uses of the term ‘sympathy’ is clearly distinguished in three different ways, Vitz raises a suspicion as to whether Hume himself recognizes this:

I do not mean to imply that Hume was aware of his varying uses of the term “sympathy.” In fact, I suspect that he was not and that his failure to distinguish clearly (perhaps, to notice) the varying ways in which he uses the term is one of the fundamental reasons that there is significant disagreement among Hume’s commentators about his account of sympathy. (Vitz 2016, 328)

Vitz’s interpretation is problematic in that the issue thereby addressed, that is, the problem of Hume’s confusing usage of the term ‘sympathy’ is merely superficial. The real reason why there is “significant disagreement among Hume’s commentators about his account of sympathy” is because they do not recognize the essential relation among these three uses of the term ‘sympathy’ (Vitz 2016, 315). For Hume, sympathy as a psychological process, which Vitz introduces as a second use of the term ‘sympathy’, that is, “the sympathetic conversion of an idea of another’s sentiment into an impression of one’s own,” is the key definition of sympathy. And the other two uses of the term ‘sympathy’ revolve around it.

As we have seen in Chapter 1, the first use of the term ‘sympathy’ as a “psychological mechanism” is made up of two processes:15

15 “When any affection is infus’d by sympathy, it is at first known only by its effects, and by those external signs in the countenance and conversation, which convey an idea of it. This idea is presently converted into an impression, and acquires such a degree of force and vivacity, as to become the very passion itself, and produce an equal emotion, as any original affection” (T 2.1.11.3, SBN 317).
Process 1. We obtain an idea of the other's affection by making a causal inference, and then
Process 2. We convert the idea of the other's affection into an experience of the affection itself.

The first stage is the psychological process to get an idea of the other’s affection by making a causal inference. The second stage is the psychological process to convert the idea into an impression, and this second stage exactly matches what Vitz introduces as a second use of the term ‘sympathy,’ that is, “the sympathetic conversion of an idea of another’s sentiment into an impression of one’s own.” In my view, by the analysis of the “psychological mechanism” of sympathy, what Hume wants to say is that the mechanism of sympathy, by which one ‘enters into’ the sentiment of another, involves two different psychological processes of making a causal inference and ‘sympathetic conversion,’ and that the work of the psychological process of ‘sympathetic conversion’ presupposes the cognitive process of making a ‘causal inference.’ From this, we can say that according to Hume, although we commonly regard the psychological mechanism, by which one ‘enters into’ the sentiment of another, as an unanalyzable and primitive one like an “emotional contagion”, it is actually analyzed as two different processes, and the real work of sympathy is confined to his second use of sympathy as a ‘psychological process’, that is, “the sympathetic conversion of an idea of another’s sentiment into an impression of one’s own.” Thus, we can conclude that for Hume sympathy is mainly defined as the conversion of idea into an impression by imagination, and he technically uses the term “sympathy” as a ‘psychological mechanism’ in order to explain how the process of sympathy is generated.

Second, as Vitz points out, it is true that Hume also uses the term “sympathy” as referring to a kind of affection. Actually, we most commonly use the term “sympathy” this way in our everyday life. We say, “I feel sympathy for him” or “I send you my deepest sympathy”. Thus, Hume’s use of the term “sympathy” as a kind of affection itself is not problematic. The question is whether or not his different uses of the term “sympathy” cause any confusion for our understanding. Vitz’s answer is yes. As we have seen, he even suspects that Hume himself does not recognize his own different uses. I cannot agree with this view. An important point is that Hume defines ‘sympathy as an affection’ as “nothing but a lively idea converted into an impression” (T 2.2.9.13, SBN 385-386). Given that Hume makes a distinction between the vulgar system and the system of true philosophers, we can understand that the use of sympathy as an affection belongs to the vulgar system since this is our everyday unreflective usage and that the use of sympathy as a psychological process to convert an idea into an impression belongs to the system of true philosophers since it would give account of how to produce the sympathetic affection.

Thus, I would say that it is true that Hume uses the term ‘sympathy’ in three different ways, but these three uses are closely related and the key concept of sympathy as conversion process of an idea into an impression is central. If we catch the difference between Hume’s key concept of sympathy and the other two concepts of sympathy, we come to know that the difference between the uses are superficial. If so, we can ask a question. Why does he put this key concept of the conversion process of an idea into an impression at the centre of his understanding of sympathy? My answer is that the concept of sympathy as “the conversion of an idea into an impression” plays a pivotal role in bridging between the concept of “limited sympathy” and “extensive sympathy”. According to him, we can sympathize not only with another person’s real feelings at present, called “limited sympathy”, but also with hypothetical ones of the person, called “extensive sympathy”:
‘Tis certain, that sympathy is not always limited to the present moment, but that we often feel by communication the pains and pleasures of others, which are not in being, and which we only anticipate by the force of imagination. (T 2.2.9.13, SBN 385-386)

As Vitz points out, the psychological mechanism of sympathy allows us to enter into the sentiments of another, but this is only limited to the present sentiments. That is, the psychological mechanism of sympathy, which is introduced by Hume, does not give an account of all the phenomena of sympathizing with others. This is the reason why he puts not the psychological mechanism of sympathy but the process of converting an idea into an impress in the centre of his understanding of sympathy, I believe. Let’s see what he continues to say:

The bare mention of this is sufficient. Sympathy being nothing but a lively idea converted into an impression, ’tis evident, that, in considering the future possible or probable condition of any person, we may enter into it with so vivid a conception as to make it our own concern; and by that means be sensible of pains and pleasures, which neither belong to ourselves, nor at the present instant have any real existence. (T 2.2.9.13, SBN 385-386)

Thus, according to Hume, we don’t need to limit the work of sympathy only to sharing the real emotions of another at present. Rather, we can extend it to “pains and pleasures, which neither belong to ourselves, nor at the present instance have any real existence” since he defines that “Sympathy … is nothing but the conversion of an idea into an impression by the force of imagination” regardless of whether the idea is of a real emotion at present or of a hypothetical one (T 427, SBN 385-386).

4.3. Sympathy in the Treatise

In the Treatise, Hume puts the principle of sympathy at the centre of his moral philosophy. Given that for him, virtue is a character trait which is beneficial to society, sympathy is a tool to evaluate the usefulness or agreeableness of someone’s character to society. We could sympathize with the pleasure or pain of the recipients of someone’s actions, and thus evaluate the person’s character traits as virtuous or vicious.

However, as we shall see in detail in Chapter 4.3.2, the principle of sympathy itself cannot be a sole foundation for establishing his moral philosophy because it faces two objections. First, the result of our natural sympathy is variable with regard to the psychological distance. Our sympathy with my friends or family would be very strong, but our sympathy with strangers would be too weak. That is, our natural sympathy is subjective and not judicious. Let’s call this the judicious-spectator objection. Second, our natural sympathy is an “imperfect means” to evaluate someone’s character traits since it operates only when the person’s character traits are actually exercised. Someone would argue that even though someone does not activate his character traits due to the particular accidents or circumstances, his character traits are potentially beneficial to society. Thus, they would say, “Virtue in rags is still virtue” (T 3.3.1.19, SBN 584). We can call this the virtue-in-rags objection.

Hume’s answer is that we can overcome these two objections by correcting our natural sympathy by the use of general rules. In order to explain the process of correcting sympathy, he introduces three important concepts: limited sympathy, extensive sympathy, and general rules as a probability. In this section, I will try to clarify these concepts, and shed lights on their importance in his moral philosophy of the Treatise.
4.3.1. Limited and Extensive Sympathy in *Book 2*

In this section, we will focus on Hume’s two concepts of limited and extensive sympathy. We first analyse Hume’s example of a sleeping person in the fields, by which he explains his concepts of limited and extensive sympathy. Vitz’s analysis of this example is flawed, I believe. So, I will critically examine his interpretation, and then I will suggest my own analysis of this example. We will then try to figure out what exactly he means by them, what are their characteristics, and what are their roles in his moral philosophy.

Let’s start from his example of a sleeping person in the fields.

’Tis certain, that sympathy is not always limited to the present moment, but that we often feel by communication the pains and pleasures of others, which are not in being, and which we only anticipate by the force of imagination. For supposing I saw a person perfectly unknown to me, who, (1) while asleep in the fields, was (2) in danger of being trod under foot by horses, I shou’d immediately run to his assistance; and in this I shou’d be actuated by the same principle of sympathy, which makes me concern’d for the present sorrows of a stranger. (T 2.2.9.13, SBN 385-386)

In this passage, Hume describes the person in two different ways as follows:

Situation (1). The person is asleep in the fields at present.

Situation (2). The person is in danger of being trod under foot in the future.

Thus, I sympathize with the person in two different ways by the mechanism of sympathy. On the one hand, I sympathize with his present feelings in situation (1) that he is asleep in the fields at present. First, I make a causal inference from a cause (the person’s present situation, that is, “being asleep in the fields”) to an effect (“the present sorrows” of the person). And then, secondly, I convert an idea of “the present sorrows” of the person into the sorrows themselves by imagination.

On the other hand, I can sympathize with his hypothetical feelings in situation (2) that he is in danger of being trod under foot in the future. First, I make a causal inference from a cause (“the future possible or probable condition” of the person, that is, being trod under foot by horses) to an effect (the future pains of the person). And then, secondly, I convert an idea of the future pains of the person into the pains itself by imagination.

Vitz’s interpretation of this passage is different from mine. He seems to think that the man cannot have any negative feeling in situation (1) because he is sleeping: “When the spectator sees the man asleep in the field, the man apparently has no negative feelings. Thus, the sentiments with which the spectator sympathizes do not yet exist.” However, in my view, this interpretation is mistaken. According to Hume, the only way for me to have an idea of the man’s current mental state is to make a causal inference from his present situation. And the situation is like this: the man is sleeping in the field, which is usually cold and damp, not in the comfort of his room. And it seems to be enough for me to make a causal inference that he has negative feelings about his present situation of sleeping in the field. He might be asleep trembling and dreaming a nightmare. Thus, we can say that I make a causal inference from his present situation of sleeping in the field to his negative feelings, and then I sympathize with them.
My interpretation fits with Hume’s next passage.

When the present misery of another has any strong influence upon me, the vivacity of the conception is not confin’d to its immediate object, but diffuses its influence over all the related ideas, and gives me a lively notion of all the circumstances of that person, whether past, present, future; possible, probable, or certain. By means of this lively notion I am interested in them; take part with them; and feel a sympathetic motion in my breast, conformable to whatever I imagine in his. (T 2.2.9.14, SBN 386)

In this passage, Hume explains how I extend the first sympathy with “the present misery of another”, which is caused by sleeping in the field, to the second sympathy with “all the circumstances of that person, whether past, present, future”, which is the “danger of being trod under foot by horses”.

Someone might say that the man’s sleeping in the field might not be miserable. Rather, he might be enjoying the sunny day in the field. But, it is important to note that the above passage indicates that our sympathy is extended only when “the present misery of another has any strong influence upon me”. That is, if I did not sympathize with his present misery because he was in the happy circumstances of “sleeping in the field” at present, I could not extend my sympathy to his future circumstances of the “danger of being trod under foot by horses” due to the lack of vivacity of my sympathy with his present circumstances.

However, Vitz interprets the phrase of “the present misery of another” in a different way:

Lest we misunderstand Hume’s point, it is important to note that as he is using the phrase in this passage, “the present misery of another” does not necessarily refer to a sentiment that a person is feeling at a given moment. For instance, the “present misery” of the man asleep in the field is not a sentiment the man is currently experiencing; rather, it is the pain the spectator anticipates the man will experience in the near future. (Vitz 2016, 322)

Vitz here equates “the present misery of another” with the future pain of the person. This interpretation is problematic for two reasons. First, it is not supported by the text. In the same passage, Hume clearly distinguishes the person’s “present sentiments” from his future sentiments and puts emphasis on the importance of the present sentiments of the person which is caused by “his present condition”:

But however we may look forward to the future in sympathizing with any person, the extending of our sympathy depends in a great measure upon our sense of his present condition. ’Tis a great effort of imagination, to form such lively ideas even of the present sentiments of others as to feel these very sentiments; but ’tis impossible we cou’d extend this sympathy to the future, without being aided by some circumstance in the present, which strikes upon us in a lively manner. (T 2.2.9.14, SBN 386)

According to Hume, it is necessary to understand the person’s “present condition” in order to extend my “sympathy to the future.” Thus, Vitz’s interpretation that “‘the present misery of another’ does not necessarily refer to a sentiment that a person is feeling at a given moment’ is wrong.

Second, Vitz’s interpretation misses the point that Hume designs the example of a man sleeping in the field in order to introduce his distinction between two concepts: limited and extensive sympathy. As we shall see,
according to Hume, limited sympathy is defined as sympathizing with “the present sentiments of others”; By contrast, extensive sympathy is defined as sympathizing with another’s hypothetical “pains and pleasures” which do not “at the present instant have any real existence” (T 2.2.9.13-4, SBN 386). Vitz’s interpretation of equating “the present misery of another” with the future pain of the person blurs Hume’s distinction between sympathy with the actual feelings at present and sympathy with the hypothetical feelings in the past or future.

Based on his account of the example of a sleeping person in danger, Hume introduces two “different kinds of sympathy”: limited and extensive sympathy (T 2.2.9.15, SBN 387). When I sympathize with a person’s present feelings, this sympathy with the present feelings can be extended to the person’s hypothetical past and future feelings or not, depending on the vivacity of the present feelings. If the vivacity of sympathy with the person’s present feelings is strong enough, the vivacity is extended to the sympathy with the person’s hypothetical past and future feelings. Hume calls this extensive sympathy. If the vivacity of sympathy with the person’s present feelings is too weak, the vivacity ceases to be extended to the sympathy with the person’s past and future feelings and remains with the sympathy with the person’s present feelings. Hume calls this limited sympathy:

If I diminish the vivacity of the first conception, I diminish that of the related ideas; as pipes can convey no more water than what arises at the fountain. By this diminution I destroy the future prospect, which is necessary to interest me perfectly in the fortune of another. I may feel the present impression, but carry my sympathy no farther, and never transfuse the force of the first conception into my ideas of the related objects. (T 2.2.9.14, SBN 386)

In this sense, he says that “the extensive or limited sympathy depends upon the force of the first sympathy” (T 2.2.9.15, SBN 387).

If my interpretation of Hume’s example is right, we can derive four important characteristics from his concepts of limited and extensive sympathy. First, there is a clear distinction between the concepts of limited and extensive sympathy. The concept of extensive sympathy is qualitatively different from that of limited sympathy in the sense that whilst the latter operates with “the present sentiments of others”, the former works with the hypothetical “pains and pleasures, which neither belong to ourselves, nor at the present instant have any real existence” (T 2.2.9.13-4, SBN 386). That is, the limited sympathy can be understood as a sort of emotional contagion because I share another person’s real emotion by it. By contrast, the extensive sympathy cannot be understood as a sort of emotional contagion because its object is not a real emotion of the person but a hypothetical one which is constructed by the speculation of a sympathizer. Unfortunately, Vitz’s interpretation cannot grasp this crucial distinction between two concepts of limited and extensive sympathy since he equates “the present misery of another” with the hypothetical future pain of the person.

Second, when we have extensive sympathy with the hypothetical affections of a person, we use general rules in order to construct a probable idea of the person’s past or future affections. Hume says:

[T]he communicated passion of sympathy sometimes acquires strength from the weakness of its original, and even arises by a transition from affections, which have no existence. … We find from experience, that such a degree of passion is usually connected with such a misfortune; and tho’ there be an exception in the present case, yet the imagination is affected by the general rule, and makes us conceive a lively idea of the passion, or rather feel the passion itself, in the same manner, as if the
person were really actuated by it. (T 2.2.7.5, SBN 370-371).

In Treatise 1.3.15. “Rules by which to judge of causes and effects”, Hume introduces eight general rules by which we judge of causes and effects: “Since therefore ‘tis possible for all objects to become causes or effects to each other, it may be proper to fix some general rules, by which we may know when they really are so” (T 1.3.15.2, SBN 173). For instance, the fourth general rule is that “when by any clear experiment we have discover’d the causes or effects of any phenomenon, we immediately extend our observation to every phenomenon of the same kind, without waiting for that constant repetition, from which the first idea of this relation is deriv’d” (T 1.3.15.6, SBN 173-174). Thus, we can say that even though there is no real existence of a person’s future pain at present, we can construct an idea of the person’s future pain by using the general rules.

Third, whilst limited sympathy can be understood as mirroring the present feelings of others, extensive sympathy can be understood as a concern for others. According to Hume, the fact that I extend my sympathy to the person’s possible pains, which will be caused by horses in the future, is to start to have a concern for him. Hume says, “in considering the future possible or probable condition of any person, we may enter into it with so vivid a conception as to make it our own concern” (T 2.2.9.13, SBN 386). And he further explains the concept of extensive sympathy:

[T]he vivacity of the conception … diffuses its all the circumstances of that person, whether past, present, or future; possible, probable or certain. By means of this lively notion I am interested in them; take part with them; and feel a sympathetic motion in my breast, conformable to whatever I imagine in his. (T 2.2.9.14, SBN 386).

Thus, according to Hume, unlike limited sympathy, extensive sympathy is not a kind of mirroring of the real emotions of others, but a concern for them. When we feel the extensive sympathy, we “feel a sympathetic motion in my breast” thus having benevolence. Jennifer Herdt rightly points out this aspect:  

It is this “extensive” sympathy that gives rise to the desire for the person’s good fortune, which “counterfeits” love. When sympathy is weak, it remains “limited” to the double relation of ideas and impressions of the actual sufferings or joys of the moment. When it is strong it becomes “extensive,” encompassing not only sufferings and joys, but also desires, which give context and meaning to whatever is being felt. (Herdt 1997, 47)

Hume continues, “[a] certain degree of poverty produces contempt; but a degree beyond causes compassion and good-will. We may under-value a peasant or servant; but when the misery of a beggar appears very great, or is painted in very lively colours, we sympathize with him in his afflictions, and feel in our heart evident

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16 This distinction between the limited and the extensive sympathy reminds us of the contemporary distinction between the term “empathy” and “sympathy” in Chapter 4.2. As we have seen, in our contemporary usage, the term “empathy” means mirroring of others’ feelings and the term “sympathy” a concern for others. Thus, we would name Hume’s concept of limited sympathy “empathy”, and his concept of extensive sympathy “sympathy” in the contemporary sense.

17 See also Philip Mercer (1972) pp. 40-43.
touches of pity and benevolence” (T 2.2.9.16, SBN 387); “A barren or desolate country always seems ugly and disagreeable, and commonly inspires us with contempt for the inhabitants. This deformity, however, proceeds in a great measure from a sympathy with the inhabitants, as has been already observ’d; but it is only a weak one [a limited sympathy], and reaches no farther than the immediate sensation, which is disagreeable. The view of a city in ashes conveys benevolent sentiments” (T 2.2.9.17, SBN 388). What Hume wants to say with these two examples is that when we have limited sympathy with the misery of the beggar or of the inhabitants of a barren or desolate country, we would look at them with contempt because we merely mirror their miserable feelings, and thus have disagreeable feelings. But when we have the extensive sympathy with them, we start to have a concern for them.

Lastly, extensive sympathy starts to work only when vivacity is sufficiently supplied by limited sympathy with the present feelings of others. That is to say, in order to have a concern for others, we need to be fully engaged in their present conditions, and thus sympathize with their present feelings. Hume says, “however we may look forward to the future in sympathizing with any person, the extending of our sympathy depends in a great measure upon our sense of his present condition” (T 2.2.9.14, SBN386). This is an important point because it means that abstract maxims or mere speculations cannot trigger our concern for others by themselves. It is only when we have the real touch with the real emotions of the particular persons that we can have a concern for them. This is the reason why Hume asks us to “confine our view to that narrow circle”:

[T]he generosity of men is very limited, and that it seldom extends beyond their friends and family, or, at most, beyond their native country. Being thus acquainted with the nature of man, we expect not any impossibilities from him; but confine our view to that narrow circle, in which any person moves, in order to form a judgment of his moral character. (T 3.3.3.2, SBN 602)

According to Hume, when we confine our view to the narrow circle, we can have limited sympathy with its members strong enough to extend our sympathy and thus have a concern for them.

4.3.2. Extensive Sympathy as the Source of Morality in Book 3

The notion of extensive sympathy reappears in Book 3 of the Treatise. But there seems to be a distinction between the two types of extensive sympathy in Book 2 and Book 3. They can be contrasted as “extensive sympathy with a whole person” and “extensive sympathy with mankind” (T 3.3.6.3, SBN 619). Cunningham says, “In Book 3, ‘extensive sympathy’ refers to sympathy that potentially extends to any or all members of society, while in Book 2, ‘extensive sympathy’ refers to sympathy extending along the temporal dimension of a single human being—sympathy that extends beyond the communication of a passing mental state so as to produce an acquaintance with, or understanding of, the diachronic person” (Cunningham 2004, 243). Baier also points out the distinction between “the Book 2 sense of extending over a fair stretch of a person’s life” and “the Book 3 sense of extending to many people” (Baier and Waldow 2008, 68).

Hume puts the Book 3 sense of extensive sympathy at the centre of his moral theory:

[T]his sense must certainly acquire new force, when reflecting on itself, it approves of those
principles, from whence it is deriv’d, and finds nothing but what is great and good in its rise and origin. Those who resolve the sense of morals into original instincts of the human mind, may defend the cause of virtue with sufficient authority; but want the advantage, which those possess, who account for that sense by an extensive sympathy with mankind. According to the latter system, not only virtue must be approv’d of, but also the sense of virtue: And not only that sense, but also the principles, from whence it is deriv’d. (T 3.3.6.3, SBN 619).

As Brown and Herdt point out, it is clear that Hume has Hutcheson in mind in referring to “those who resolve the sense of morals into original instincts of the human mind” (Brown 2008, 238; Herdt 1998, 53). In the Illustrations Upon the Moral Sense, Hutcheson denies that we can apply moral attributes to our moral sense faculty: “none can apply moral Attributes to the very Faculty of perceiving moral Qualities; or call his moral Sense morally Good or Evil, any more than he calls the Power of Tasting, sweet, or bitter; or of Seeing, strait or crooked, white or black” (Hutcheson 2002, 149). By contrast, Hume here argues that his sympathy-based moral theory has the merit to permit “meta-levels of approbation” (Herdt 1998, 54).

Why then does Hume think that his moral theory, which permits meta-levels of approbation of sympathy, is superior to Hutcheson’s moral sense based moral theory? We can find his answer from his letter to Hutcheson:

I cannot agree to your Sense of Natural. Tis founded on final Causes, which is a Consideration, that appears to me pretty uncertain & unphilosophical. For pray, what is the End of Man? Is he created for Happiness or for Virtue? For this Life or for the next? For himself or for his Maker? Your Definition of Natural depends upon solving these Questions, which are endless, & quite wide of my Purpose. (LI, 33)

Hume here criticises Hutcheson’s sense of “natural”, which is “natural” is founded on final causes. As we have seen in the previous chapter, Hume wants to establish his moral theory without relying on any supernatural element. Thus, his notion of extensive sympathy and sympathy-based moral theory should be understood under his scheme of “science of man”.

Thus, Hume argues that the results of sympathy ought to be evaluated and corrected by taking up the general points of view, whilst Hutcheson holds that moral sense is guaranteed to generate objective evaluation since it approved by God:

Our situation, with regard both to persons and things, is in continual fluctuation; and a man, that lies at a distance from us, may, in a little time, become a familiar acquaintance. Besides, every particular man has a peculiar position with regard to others; and ’tis impossible we cou’d ever converse together on any reasonable terms, were each of us to consider characters and persons, only as they appear from his peculiar point of view. In order, therefore, to prevent those continual contradictions, and arrive at a more stable judgment of things, we fix on some steady and general points of view; and always, in our thoughts, place ourselves in them, whatever may be our present situation. (T 3.3.1.15, SBN 581-582)

That is to say, according to him, we are able to fully extend our sympathy by departing from our own peculiar point of view and taking up the general points of view, thus having “extensive sympathy with mankind”. Thus, in order to understand the nature of “extensive sympathy with mankind”, We need to examine Hume’s concept...
of “general points of view”.

(i) Hume’s System of the Sciences and General Rules as a Probability

In order fully to understand the relation between extensive sympathy and general points of view in his moral theory in Book 3, we need to address Hume’s whole philosophical picture. In the abstract of the *Treatise*, he says that “This treatise … of human nature seems intended for a system of the sciences” (T abstract 3, SBN 646). In the introduction of *Treatise*, he also writes that “we in effect propose a compleate system of the sciences, built on a foundation almost entirely new, and the only one upon which they can stand with any security” (T intro 6, SBN xvi). Thus, we can say that Hume wants to establish a complete system of sciences through his work of the *Treatise*.

Then what does Hume mean by a ‘system of the sciences’? According to him, “all the sciences have a relation, greater or less, to human nature” (T intro 4, SBN xv). He also says, “the science of man is the only solid foundation for the other sciences,” and he continues, “the only solid foundation we can give to this science itself must be laid on experience and observation” (T intro 7, SBN xvi). Thus, his ‘system of the sciences’ can be understood in two ways. First, he wants to establish a ‘system of the sciences’ on the foundation of his understanding of human nature. And, secondly, his understanding of human nature will be obtained by his scientific or experimental observation on experience: “We must … glean up our experiments in this science from a cautious observation of human life” (T intro 10, SBN xix).

He then goes on to divide “all the sciences” into two groups: sciences of logic and sciences of passions. First, he puts “Mathematics, Natural Philosophy, and Natural Religion” under the category of science of “logic” since these are performed by our reasoning. Thus, establishing the logic of reasoning will be the foundation for these sciences:

Even Mathematics, Natural Philosophy, and Natural Religion, are in some measure dependent on the science of MAN; since they lie under the cognizance of men, and are judg’d of by their powers and faculties. ’Tis impossible to tell what changes and improvements we might make in these sciences were we thoroughly acquainted with the extent and force of human understanding, and cou’d explain the nature of the ideas we employ, and of the operations we perform in our reasonings. And these improvements are the more to be hop’d for in natural religion, as it is not content with instructing us in the nature of superior powers, but carries its views farther, to their disposition towards us, and our duties towards them; and consequently we ourselves are not only the beings, that reason, but also one of the objects, concerning which we reason. (T intro. 4, SBN xv)

Second, he puts “Morals, Criticism, and Politics” under the category of science of “passions” since they “regard our tastes and sentiments” whilst the goal of logic is “to explain the principles and operations of our reasoning faculty”. Thus, giving an account of the mechanism of passions will be the foundation for these sciences. Hume writes almost the same passage both in the introduction and in the abstract of the *Treatise* as follows:
The sole end of logic is to explain the principles and operations of our reasoning faculty, and the nature of our ideas: Morals and criticism regard our tastes and sentiments: And politics consider men as united in society, and dependent on each other. In these four sciences of Logic, Morals, Criticism, and Politics, is comprehended almost every thing, which it can any way import us to be acquainted with, or which can tend either to the improvement or ornament of the human mind. (T intro 5, SBN xv-xvi)

The sole end of logic is to explain the principles of Operations of our reasoning faculty, and the nature of our ideas; morals and criticism regard our tastes and sentiments and politics consider men as united in society, and dependent on each other. This treatise therefore of human nature seems intended for a system of the sciences. The author has already finished what regards logic, and has laid the foundation of the other parts in his account of the passions. (T abstract 3, SBN 646)

In the introduction of the Treatise, Hume says that four sciences of Logic, Morals, Criticism, and Politics cover all the sciences. And then in the abstract of the Treatise, he writes that he has already finished what regards logic in Book 1, and had laid the foundation of Morals, Criticism, and Politics in his account of the passions in Book 2. That is, it seems that Book 1 treats the science of logic, which is the foundation for “Mathematics, Natural Philosophy, and Natural Religion”; Book 2 deals with the account of the passions, which is the foundation for “Morals, Criticism, and Politics”. Hazony says, “it is evident that Book I, which ‘explain[s] the principles and Operations of our reasoning faculty, and the nature of our ideas,’ is in fact that part of the Treatise that treats the science of logic; whereas the sciences of morals, criticism, and politics are themselves to be constructed on top of the foundation that is laid in Book II with Hume’s account of the passions” (Hazony 2014, 145). The following figure shows well Hazony’s understanding of Hume’s system of the sciences.

FIGURE 1. Hazony’s understanding of Hume’s system of the science

As is well known, Hume introduces his sceptical epistemology in Book 1, and it looks like “a very far cry indeed from the logic of the schools” (Sergeantson 2005, 191). But he says that Book 1 regards “science of
Thus we need to ask a question: What does he mean by “science of logic”? The answer is related to his understanding of the nature of our reasoning concerning causes and effects. According to him, “all our reasoning concerning causes are deriv’d from the experienc’d conjunction of objects, not from any reasoning or reflection” (T 1.3.15.36, SBN 172). That is, our pure reasoning or speculative reflection itself does not say anything about causes and effects of the external world. What we should do is to find probabilities between causes and effects by observing the experienced conjunction of objects. Thus, what Hume means by speaking of “science of logic” is a logic of probability concerning causes and effects. Serjeantson rightly points out that “Hume’s explication of what he calls in the Treatise ‘reasonings from cause and effect’—which historians of philosophy have tended to treat anachronistically as the ‘problem of induction’—was therefore intended by him as a contribution to a logic of probability” (Serjeantson 2005, 192).

Hume’s logic of probability is best summarized as general rules in Treatise 1.3.15. “Rules by which to judge of causes and effects”. He introduces eight general rules by which we judge of causes and effects, and they are “all the LOGIC I think proper to employ in my reasoning” (T 1.3.15.11, SBN 175). The reason why he introduces these general rules is that “Since therefore ’tis possible for all objects to become causes or effects to each other, it may be proper to fix some general rules, by which we may know when they really are so” (T 1.3.15.2, SBN 173). And they are his “science of logic” which is derived from his experimental observation of human nature as “one of the objects, concerning which we reason” (T intro. 4, SBN xv). This is the reason why he says that “The sole end of logic is to explain the principles and operations of our reasoning faculty, and the nature of our ideas” (T intro 5, SBN xv).

As we have seen, according to Hazony’s classification, there is a clear distinction between the “science of logic” in Book 1 and the “account of the passions” in Book 2; And “Mathematics, Natural Philosophy, and Natural Religion” are founded on the science of logic, that is, general rules in Book 1, and “Morals, Criticism, and Politics” are on the top of the foundation of Hume’s account of the passions in Book 2 (Hazony 2014, 145). However, Hazony’s classification does not seem to be accurate if we consider Hume’s account of “extensive sympathy”. As is noted in Chapter 4.3.1, Hume says that when we have extensive sympathy with the hypothetical affections of a person, we use the general rules in order to construct a probable idea of the person’s past or future affections. Hume says in Book 2 that “the imagination is affected by the general rule, and makes us conceive a lively idea of the passion, or rather feel the passion itself, in the same manner, as if the person were really actuated by it. (T 2.2.7.5, SBN 370-371). He also writes in Book 3 that “General rules create a species of probability, which sometimes influences the judgment, and always the imagination” (T 3.3.1. 20, SBN 585). Thus, given that general rules allow us to extend our sympathy and that extensive sympathy plays a crucial role in his moral philosophy, we could conclude that general rules as the “science of logic” are not just foundation for “Mathematics, Natural Philosophy, and Natural Religion” but also for “Morals, Criticism, and Politics”. In my view, for Hume, general rules as the “science of logic” are not specifically designed as a foundation for some particular sciences; Rather, it is a kind of fundamental foundation to establish all the sciences. Thus, I would borrow and revise Hazony’s figure of Hume’s system of the science as follows:
(ii) General Rules and Second-Order Reflection

Given that general rules play an important role in extending our sympathy, we need to know their nature more accurately. This section examines the nature and role of general rules in the process of belief formation. As we shall see, we are influenced by general rules in two ways: on the imagination and on the understanding. The first influence of general rules on the imagination would generate the misjudgements concerning the particular situations. Hence, the results of our natural (or limited) sympathy, which are based on the first influence of general rules on the imagination, will also be various. By contrast, the second influence of general rules on the understanding would “take a review of” the first influence of general rules on the imagination and correct the misjudgements (T 1.3.13.12, SBN 150). Hence, this reflective mental act of the second influence of general rules allows us to have the proper feeling of “extensive sympathy” by correcting the result of our natural (or limited) sympathy.

Let us start by recalling that for Hume, general rules are a logic of probability. And in Treatise 1.3.13 “Of Unphilosophical Probability”, he introduces two kinds of probability: philosophical and unphilosophical probability: “All these kinds of [philosophical] probability are receiv’d by philosophers, and allow’d to be reasonable foundations of belief and opinion. But there are others [unphilosophical probability], that are deriv’d from the same principles, tho’ they have not had the good fortune to obtain the same sanction.” (T 1.3.13.1, SBN 143). Accordingly, two influences of general rules are followed: one which produces philosophical probability, and the other which generates unphilosophical probability. Hume seems to regard the former as normative (Winkler 2016, 210): “We shall afterwards take notice of some general rules, by which we ought to regulate our judgment concerning causes and effects; and these rules are form’d on the nature of our understanding, and on our experience of its operations in the judgments we form concerning objects” (T 1.3.13.11, SBN 149).
However, given that both philosophical and unphilosophical probability are “deriv’d from the same principles” of the operations of custom, we need to ask what makes a crucial distinction between two different influences of general rules (T 1.3.13.1, SBN 143).

Let’s start from Hume’s distinction between belief and conception. According to him, believing something is different from merely conceiving it:

Suppose a person present with me, who advances propositions, to which I do not assent, that Caesar dy’d in his bed, that silver is more fusible than lead, or mercury heavier than gold; ’tis evident, that notwithstanding my incredulity, I clearly understand his meaning, and form all the same ideas, which he forms. (T 1.3.7.3, SBN 95)

The difference between belief and conception is not in the contents of them but in the manner of conceiving them: “as this difference lies not in the parts or composition of the idea, which we conceive; it follows, that it must lie in the manner, in which we conceive it” (T 1.3.7.6, SBN 95). And the manner varies depending on how vividly I conceive them: “So that as belief does nothing but vary the manner, in which we conceive any object, it can only bestow on our ideas an additional force and vivacity” (T 1.3.7.5, SBN 96). From this, he produces the definition that “belief is a lively idea produc’d by a relation to a present impression” (T 1.3.7.6, SBN 97).

The manner of conceiving ideas can be divided into two kinds. One of them is “by intuition or demonstration” (T 1.3.7.3, SBN 95). According to him, there are some particular propositions, which we conceive in the particular manner of intuition or demonstration. He says, “In that case, the person, who assents, not only conceives the ideas according to the proposition, but is necessarily determin’d to conceive them in that particular manner, either immediately or by the interposition of other ideas” (T 1.3.7.3, SBN 95). In the first Enquiry, he also says as follows:

Of the first kind [Relations of Ideas] are the sciences of Geometry, Algebra, and Arithmetic; and in short, every affirmation which is either intuitively or demonstratively certain. That the square of the hypothenuse is equal to the square of the two sides, is a proposition which expresses a relation between these figures. That three times five is equal to the half of thirty, expresses a relation between these numbers. Propositions of this kind are discoverable by the mere operation of thought, without dependence on what is anywhere existent in the universe. (EHU 4.1.1, SBN 25)

The other is “by custom or a principle of association” (T 1.3.7.6, SBN 97). Hume says, “Matters of fact, which are the second objects of human reason, are not ascertained in the same manner [as Relations of Ideas]” (EHU 4.1.2, SBN 25). This is because “in reasonings from causation, and concerning matters of fact, this absolute necessity cannot take place, and the imagination is free to conceive both sides of the question” (T 1.3.7.3, SBN 95). In the Enquiry, he says as follows:

That the sun will not rise to-morrow is no less intelligible a proposition, and implies no more contradiction than the affirmation, that it will rise. We should in vain, therefore, attempt to

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18 It is important to notice that Hume does not use the expression, “two kinds of general rules” but the expression, “two influences of general rules”. We will come back to this issue when we examine Hearn’s interpretation of general rules in this section.
demonstrate its falsehood. Were it demonstratively false, it would imply a contradiction, and could
never be distinctly conceived by the mind. (EHU 4.1.2, SBN 25-26)

He continues, “Reason can never satisfy us that the existence of any one object does ever imply that of another;
so that when we pass from the impression of one to the idea or belief of another, we are not determin’d by
reason, but by custom or a principle of association. … ’Tis a particular manner of forming an idea” (T 1.3.7.6,
SBN 97).

Thus, when it comes to “reasonings from causation, and concerning matters of fact”, there is no room for
demonstration or reason as “the mere operation of thought” to engage in conceiving an idea. According to him,
we make a causal inference and generate beliefs only by custom and imagination. He gives an account of the
concept of custom as follows:

Now as we call every thing CUSTOM, which proceeds from a past repetition, without any new
reasoning or conclusion, we may establish it as a certain truth, that all the belief, which follows upon
any present impression, is deriv’d solely from that origin. (T 1.3.8.10, SBN 102)

And when we have beliefs from causal inferences, custom cooperates with imagination: “Objects have no
discernable connexion together; nor is it from any other principle but custom operating upon the imagination,
that we can draw any inference from the appearance of one to the existence of another” (T 1.3.8.12, SBN 103).
But it is important to note that the operation of custom is “confirm’d by such a multitude of experiments, that it
admits not of the smallest doubt” (T 1.3.8.9, SBN 102). From this, we can conclude that “all probable
reasoning” concerning causal inferences are produced by the principle of “custom operating upon the
imagination” (T 1.3.8.12, SBN 103).

However, at this point, one problem is raised. If causal inferences are the process of “custom operating upon the
imagination”, it seems to be hard to warrant the beliefs obtained by them because of the nature of imagination.

He says that the imagination has the liberty “to transpose and change its ideas”:

The same evidence follows us in our second principle, of the liberty of the imagination to transpose
and change its ideas. The fables we meet with in poems and romances put this entirely out of
question. Nature there is totally confounded, and nothing mentioned but winged horses, fiery dragons,
and monstrous giants. (T 1.1.4.4, SBN 10).

The nature of imagination allows us to transpose and change its ideas, thus generating fictitious beliefs:

Where the vivacity arises from a customary conjunction with a present impression; tho’ the
imagination may not, in appearance, be so much mov’d; yet there is always something more forcible
and real in its actions, than in the fervors of poetry of eloquence. … A poetrical description may have
a more sensible effect on the fancy, than an historical narration. … But still the ideas it presents are
different to the feeling from those, which arise from the memory and the judgment. (T 1.3.10.10, SBN
631)

In this passage, he concludes that even though imagination produces beliefs with “a customary conjunction with
a present impression”, they can be fictitious and need to be distinguished from those of “the memory and
judgment”. Hence, it seems that according to Hume, both philosophical and unphilosophical probability are “deriv’d from the same principles” called “custom operating upon the imagination”.

Hume shows this problem by an example of “a man, who being hung out from a high tower in a cage of iron” (T 1.3.13.10, SBN 148):

[The man] cannot forbear trembling, when he surveys the precipice below him, tho’ he knows himself to be perfectly secure from falling, by his experience of the solidity of the iron, which supports him; and tho’ the ideas of fall and descent, and harm and death, be deriv’d solely from custom and experience. (T 1.3.13.10, SBN 148)

On the one hand, the man has a firm belief that he is “perfectly secure from falling” derived from the principle of “custom operation upon the imagination”, which is confirmed by “his experience of the solidity of the iron, which supports him”. But, on the other hand, he “cannot forbear trembling” due to the other beliefs of “fall and descent, and harm and death” derived from “the same principles” of “custom operation upon the imagination”.

Here the question is how two opposite conclusions are derived from the same principle. Hume summaries the difficulty as follows:

But why need we seek for other instances, while the present subject of unphilosophical probabilities offers us so obvious an one [instance of a man in a cage of iron], (1) in the opposition betwixt the judgment and imagination arising from these effects of custom? According to my system, all reasonings are nothing but the effects of custom; and custom has no influence, but by enlivening the imagination, and giving us a strong conception of any object. It may, therefore, be concluded, that (2) our judgment and imagination can never be contrary, and that custom cannot operate on the latter faculty after such a manner, as to render it opposite to the former. (T 1.3.13.11, SBN 149)

According to him, on the one hand, our judgment and imagination are in the opposition, but on the other hand, they can never be contrary. And these two views seem to conflict each other and cause a difficulty to his system.

In order to solve this difficulty, he introduces the concept of general rules: “This difficulty we can remove after no other manner, than by supposing the influence of general rules” (T 1.3.13.11, SBN 149). And he distinguishes two influences of general rules. The first influence of general rules is that we rashly apply general rules to particular cases:

A fourth unphilosophical species of probability is that deriv’d from general rules, which we rashly form to ourselves, and which are the source of what we properly call PREJUDICE. An Irishman cannot have wit, and a Frenchman cannot have solidity; for which reason, tho’ the conversation of the former in any instance be visibly very agreeable, and of the latter very judicious, we have entertain’d such a prejudice against them, that they must be dunces or fops in spite of sense and reason. (T 1.3.13.7, SBN 146-147)

Even though we do not have enough experience to make a judgment that an Irishman cannot have wit, and a Frenchman cannot have solidity, we rashly form general rules to ourselves. This is the first influence of general rules.
The second influence of general rules is that we form general rules to ourselves on the nature of our understanding, and then make a judgment:

We shall afterwards take notice of some general rules, by which we ought to regulate our judgment concerning causes and effects; and these rules are form’d on the nature of our understanding, and on our experience of its operations in the judgments we form concerning objects. (T 1.3.13.11, SBN 149)

Thus, we ought to regulate the first judgment under the first influence of general rules by the judgement under the second influence of general rules. He says, “In every judgment, which we can form concerning probability, as well as concerning knowledge, we ought always to correct the first judgment, deriv’d from the nature of the object, by another judgment, deriv’d from the nature of the understanding” (T 1.4.1.5, SBN 182). It is by this second influence of general rules that we ought to regulate our judgment concerning causes and effects.

Hence, one possible interpretation of Hume’s solution to the difficulty that both philosophical and unphilosophical probability are derived from the same principle is to make a distinction between two kinds of general rules. In this interpretation, Hume can retain his system that all reasonings are nothing but the effects of custom operating upon the imagination whilst he admits that there is a difference between imagination and judgment by breaking custom into rather rashly formed general rules and rationally formed general rules. That is, when the rashly formed general rules work with imagination, they produce false beliefs, but when the rationally formed general rules operate with imagination, they generate proper judgments.

This line of interpretation was first suggested by Thomas K. Hearn putting emphasis on the qualitative difference between the first and second kinds of general rules. He says, “The first sort of ‘rule’ … is the result of the effect of custom and resemblance on the imagination” (Hearn 1970, 410). And he continues, “rules of the second type are said to be formed ‘on our understanding, and on our experience of its operations in the judgments we form concerning objects. … The second sort of rules also have a reflective character; by that I mean that they are consciously formulated and adopted” (Hearn 1970, 410). That is, the first kind of general rules are “the result of mere propensities”, whilst the second kind of general rules are the result of reflective mental operations (Hearn 1970, 410). In this sense, he refers to the second kind of general rules as “reflective rules” (Hearn 1970, 410). This line of interpretation is by now widely accepted by commentators.19

However, this line of interpretation is hard to support by textual evidence. It is important to note that Hume never uses the expressions, “the first kind of general rules” and “the second kind of general rules”. What he uses are the expressions, “the first influence of general rules” and “the second influence of general rules”:

Thus our general rules are in a manner set in opposition to each other. When an object appears, that resembles any cause in very considerable circumstances, the imagination naturally carries us to a lively conception of the usual effect, tho’ the object be different in the most material and most efficacious circumstances from that cause. Here is the first influence of general rules [on the imagination]. But when we take a review of this act of the mind, and compare it [the imagination] with the more general and authentic operations of the understanding, we find it [the imagination] to be

19 For instance, Lorne Falkenstein (1997), Bennett Helm (1993), Kenneth Winkler (2016), and Costelloe (2007) accept this line of interpretation.
of an irregular nature, and destructive of all the most establish’d principles of reasoning; which is the cause of our rejecting it [the imagination]. This is a second influence of general rules [on the understanding], and implies the condemnation of the former. (T 1.3.13.12, SBN 149-150)

Hume here says that our general rules are set in opposition to each other not because there are two opposite kinds of general rules, but because the first influence of general rules on the imagination is rejected by the second influence of general rules on the understanding. That is, the contents of general rules are the same both in the first influence and in the second influence of general rules. The conflict comes from two different “act of the mind”: When the imagination rashly applies general rules to the object which is “different in the most material and most efficacious circumstances from” the cause, its application is reviewed and corrected by “the more general and authentic operations of the understanding”, which properly applies general rules to the cause. The influence of general rules is best explained by the concept of our “addiction of general rules” (Gill 1996, 34-38). In Book 3 of the Treatise, Hume gives a clear description of his conception of our “addiction to general rules”:

[W]e may observe, that the maxim wou’d here be false, that when the cause ceases, the effect must cease also. For there is a principle of human nature, which we have frequently taken notice of, that men are mightily addicted to general rules, and that we often carry our maxims beyond those reasons, which first induc’d us to establish them. Where cases are similar in many circumstances, we are apt to put them on the same footing, without considering, that they differ in the most material circumstances, and that the resemblance is more apparent than real. … [G]eneral rules commonly extend beyond the principles, on which they are founded. (T 3.2.9.3)

Since our imagination is easily influenced by general rules, that is, easily addicted to them, even when cause ceases, we apply them to the cases “similar in many circumstances” but different “in the most material circumstances”.

Therefore, we cannot accept this line of interpretation that Hume makes a distinction between the first and the second kind of general rules, and only the latter are genuine kind. In my view, both general rules are the very same kind of rules, which share the same contents, since they have been established “by a sufficient custom” (T 1.3.8.14, SBN 105). In this sense, I agree with Hickerson’s interpretation of general rules:

Unlike Hearn and Falkenstein, I do not think that we need to understand such conflicts as shaping up between two distinct rules or sets of rules with opposing contents, i.e. ‘a “second” general rule… that condemns a number of “first” ones’. Instead the difference that Hume had in mind between the ‘first’ and ‘second’ influence of the General Rules is precisely the voluntary act of reflection itself, i.e. reflection that may be upon the very same rule or set of rules otherwise only instinctually employed. (Hickerson 2013, 1147)

What makes the difference between “the first influence of general rules” and “the second influence of general rules” is whether we use our imagination or our understanding when it comes to dealing with general rules.

Hence, as an alternative interpretation of Hume’s solution to the difficulty that both philosophical and unphilosophical probability are derived from the same principle, I suggest that according to Hume, we already
have general rules as a “logic of probability” which have been established “by a sufficient custom” (T 1.3.8.14, SBN 105), but when we apply general rules to particular cases, we sometimes use the imagination and sometimes the understanding:

[T]his difficulty will vanish, if we consider, that tho’ we are here suppos’d to have had only one experiment of a particular effect, yet we have many millions to convince us of this principle; *that like objects, plac’d in like circumstances, will always produce like effect*; and as this principle has establish’d itself by a sufficient custom, it bestows an evidence and firmness on any opinion, to which it can be apply’d. The connexion of the ideas is not habitual after one experiment; but this connexion is comprehended under another principle, that is habitual; which brings us back to our hypothesis. (T 1.3.8.14, SBN 105).

That is, when we are situated in a particular circumstance, we use general rules, which are already established, but the influences of general rules diverge into two ways: first on the imagination, and second on the understanding. Although we are usually addicted to the first influence of general rules on the imagination unreflectively, those who have the capacity to reflect on the first influence of general rules, can fix it by the second influence of general rules on the understanding. This is the reason why Hume says, “The vulgar are commonly guided by the first, and wise men by the second” (T 1.3.13.12, SBN 150).

It follows from this that as Hickerson points out, Hume admits that the reflection as a voluntary and cognitive mental activity works at the higher level over the general rules, which have already formed by our natural propensities (Hickerson 2013, 1146-1147):

*We may correct this propensity by a reflection on the nature of those circumstances; but ’tis still certain, that custom takes the start, and gives a bias to the imagination.* (T 1.3.13.9, SBN 148)

*But when we take a review of this act of the mind, and compare it [the imagination] with the more general and authentic operations of the understanding, we find it [the imagination] to be of an irregular nature, and destructive of all the most establish’d principles of reasonings; which is the cause of our rejecting it [the imagination]. This is a second influence of general rules, and implies the condemnation of the former.* (T 1.3.13.12, SBN 150)

These passages show that we correct the first judgment by the reflection. And according to him, the work of reflection is to take a review of the act of the mind and compare the imagination with the more general and authentic operations of the understanding. From this, we can conclude that *the work of reflection is a conscious activity* as opposed to the unreflective use of the imagination.

At this point, someone might raise a doubt that *the notion of reflection as a conscious activity* conflicts with Hume’s claim that “Nature, by an absolute and uncontrollable necessity has determin’d us to judge as well as to breathe and feel” (T 1.4.1.7, SBN 183). If nature determines our judgments “by an absolute and uncontrollable necessity”, how can we exercise our mental act of reflection consciously, and hence corrects the former misjudgements? It is important to note that for Hume reason is not always inert: It is inert only when it operates alone. The role of reflection in this section is characterized as figuring out that a present particular case is properly categorized under the general rules. In order words, the mental act of reflection serves the general rules
which have been established by nature. To borrow Strawson’s expression, it is “Nature’s lieutenant rather than Nature’s commander (Strawson 1985, 13-14).

However, it is important to note that although our mental act of reflection serves the established general rules, it also plays a normative role in the process of making judgments. As we have seen, the way of being influenced by the established general rules is divided as two: on the imagination and on the understanding, and the latter always plays a normative role. In this sense, I agree with Strawson’s following view:

Our inescapable natural commitment is to a general frame of belief and to a general style (the inductive) of belief-formation. But within that frame and style, the requirement of Reason, that our beliefs should form a consistent and coherent system, may be given full play. … Though it is Nature which commits us to inductive belief-formation in general, it is Reason which leads us to refine and elaborate our inductive canons and procedures and, in their light, to criticize, and sometimes to reject, what in detail we find ourselves naturally inclined to believe. (Strawson 1985, 13-14)

Hence, it is true to say that Hume’s naturalism that “Nature, by an absolute and uncontrollable necessity has determin’d us to judge as well as to breathe and feel” puts emphasis on the “authority of experience”, but, at the same time, it allows our mental act of reflection to play a normative role in the process of making judgments (T 1.4.1.7, SBN 183; EHU 4. 20, SBN 36).

Let us return to his example of “a man, who being hung out from a high tower in a cage of iron” (T 1.3.13.10, SBN 148). If the man thought like the vulgar, he would allow general rules to have influence on the imagination, without reflecting on it, hence feeling frightened without hesitation because he would be simply overwhelmed by the present situation of “being hung out from a high tower”. He would not take a review of the act of his mind and compare the imagination with “the more general authentic operations of the understanding”. Hume says, “Our judgments concerning cause and effect are deriv’d from habit and experience; and when we have been accustom’d to see one object united to another, our imagination passes from the first to the second, by a natural transition, which precedes reflection, and which cannot be prevented by it” (T 1.3.8.13, SBN 147).

By contrast, if the man were wise, he would not allow general rules to have influence on the imagination, hence feeling safe because he would take a review of the imagination, and fix the first judgment by the second influence of general rules on the understanding. That is, the wise man is the person who has the capacity to reflect on the first influence of general rules from the higher level. It follows from this that the man in Hume’s example is vulgar, and he describes the man as follows:

The circumstances of depth and descent strike so strongly upon him, that their influence cannot be destroy’d by the contrary circumstances of support and solidity, which ought to give him a perfect security. (T 1.3.13.10, SBN 148)

If he were wise, he would adopt the second influence of general rules on the understanding, and make a judgment that the cage of iron is solid and supportive, and thus have the feeling of perfect security.

In sum, against Hearn’s line of interpretation, Hume does not make a qualitative distinction between the first and second general rules. In my view, the first and the second rules are qualitatively the same kind in the sense that both of them are formed as a logic of probability “by a sufficient custom” (T 1.3.8.14, SBN 105). Thus, our
focus should not be on the distinction between the first and second kinds of general rules but on the mental process of reflection itself.

(iii) Two Types of Extensive Sympathy

As we have seen in Chapter 4.3.1, we can sympathize with “affections, which have no existence” (T 2.2.7.5, SBN 370). Hume names it extensive sympathy. According to him, it is with the help of general rules that we can generate extensive sympathy:

The general rule still prevails, and by giving a bent to the imagination draws along the passion, in the same manner as if its proper object were real and existent. (T 2.2.5.12, SBN 362).

The imagination is affected by the general rule, and makes us conceive a lively idea of the passion, or rather feel the passion itself, in the same manner, as if the person were really actuated by it. (T 2.2.7.5, SBN 371).

And then, we have examined the nature of general rules in the previous section. According to Hume, there are two influences of general rules: one which generates philosophical probability and the other which generates unphilosophical probability. However, there is not qualitative distinction between them because both of them are derived from “the very same principle”, that is, the principle of imagination (T 1.3.13.12, SBN 150). Thus, what makes the real difference between two influences of general rules is our cognitive mental activity working at the higher level over them, which Hume calls “reflection” or “experimental method of reasoning”.

Now let’s come back to our original questions. How can we properly understand the notion of extensive sympathy in Book 3? And why is that so important for his moral theory? As we have seen, the type of extensive sympathy in Book 3 extends to “any or all members of society” whilst the type of extensive sympathy in Book 2 extends “along the temporal dimension of a single human” (Cunningham 2004, 243). And what Hume put at the centre of his moral philosophy is not “extensive sympathy with the diachronic person” in Book 2 but “extensive sympathy with mankind” in Book 3 (Cunnigham 2004, 243; T 3.3.6.3, SBN 619). According to him, the reason why the notion of “extensive sympathy with mankind” plays a crucial role in his moral philosophy is because it permits “meta-levels of approbation”, which would preclude any supernatural explanation (Herdt 1998, 54).

Let us recall two objections to his sympathy-based moral theory: “I must observe two remarkable circumstances in this affair, which may seem objections to the present system” (T 3.3.1.14, SBN 580). The first objection is that as sympathy is variable, our sentiments of morals as the result of sympathy must be also variable. He says, “We sympathize more with persons contiguous to us, than with persons remote from us: With our acquaintance, than with strangers: With our countrymen, than with foreigners” (T 3.3.1.14, SBN 580-581). But when it comes to moral judgments, we are supposed to “give the same approbation to the same moral qualities in China as in England” (T 3.3.1.14, SBN 581). He continues, “They appear equally virtuous, and recommend themselves equally to the esteem of a judicious spectator” (T 3.3.1.14, SBN 581). This is the judicious-spectator objection.

The second objection is that given that virtue is a character trait which is beneficial to society, sympathy is an “imperfect means” to capture this character trait of someone since sympathy operates only when their virtuous
traits are actually exercised. Someone would argue that “Where a person is possess’d of a character, that in its natural tendency is beneficial to society, we esteem him virtuous, and are delighted with the view of his character, even tho’ particular accidents prevent its operation, and incapacitate him from being serviceable to his friends and country.” (T 3.3.1.19, SBN 584). Thus, they would say, “Virtue in rags is still virtue” (T 3.3.1.19, SBN 584). This is the virtue-in-rags objection.

Hume’s solution to these objections is extensive sympathy. As we have seen, extensive sympathy solves the virtue-in-rags objection since we can sympathize with the diachronic person who possesses a virtuous character by extending our sympathy with the help of general rules. This is the Book 2 sense of extensive sympathy. It extends along the temporal dimension of a single human. However, this Book 2 sense of extensive sympathy cannot solve the judicious-spectator objection since it is still affected by psychological distance. If I sympathize with my acquaintances, my concern for them will be strong. If I sympathize with strangers, my concern for them will be weak. This is the place where the Book 3 sense of extensive sympathy is introduced. Hume calls it “extensive sympathy with mankind” (T 3.3.6.3, SBN 619).

Hume first responds to the judicious-spectator objection by arguing that we can be judicious by departing from our peculiar points of view and taking up general points of view:

Our situation, with regard both to persons and things, is in continual fluctuation; and a man, that lies at a distance from us, may, in a little time, become a familiar acquaintance. Besides, every particular man has a peculiar position with regard to others; and 'tis impossible we cou’d ever converse together on any reasonable terms, were each of us to consider characters and persons, only as they appear from his peculiar point of view. In order, therefore, to prevent those continual contradictions, and arrive at a more stable judgment of things, we fix on some steady and general points of view; and always, in our thoughts, place ourselves in them, whatever may be our present situation. (T 3.3.1.15, SBN 581-582)

We could become judicious by taking up general points of view by reflection. But this is a mere abstract thought and would not be morally efficacious.

However the general principle of our blame or praise may be corrected by those other principles, 'tis certain, they are not altogether efficacious, nor do our passions often correspond entirely to the present theory. 'Tis seldom men heartily love what lies at a distance from them, and what no way redounds to their particular benefit; as 'tis no less rare to meet with persons, who can pardon another any opposition he makes to their interest, however justifiable that opposition may be by the general rules of morality. Here we are contented with saying, that reason requires such an impartial conduct, but that 'tis seldom we can bring ourselves to it, and that our passions do not readily follow the determination of our judgment. (T 3.3.1.18, SBN 583)

That is, taking up general points of view by reflection would provide us the general rules of morality but they are not efficacious because as is well known, according to Hume, reason itself is inert. This is the place where sympathy is required. I need to convert a general point of view into my point of view by sympathy. I need to extend my sympathy to mankind. Hume calls this “extensive sympathy with mankind” (T 3.3.6.3, SBN 619).

Hume says,
Moral distinctions arise, in a great measure, from the tendency of qualities and characters to the interest of society, and that ’tis our concern for that interest, which makes us approve or disapprove of them. Now we have no such extensive concern for society but from sympathy. (T 3.3.1.11, SBN 579)

The person is a stranger: I am no way interested in him, nor lie under any obligation to him: His happiness concerns not me, farther than the happiness of every human, and indeed of every sensible creature: That is, it affects me only by sympathy. (T 3.3.1.25, SBN 588).

This reminds us of the fourth characteristic of extensive sympathy which I derived in Chapter 4.3.1: “Extensive sympathy starts to work only when vivacity is sufficiently supplied by limited sympathy with the present feelings of others”. We cannot extend our sympathy just by taking up general points of view by reflection. We need concrete circumstances as a source of vivacity. If I love my daughter, I could extend my sympathy to all the kids over the world. My sympathy with her would provide vivacity for extensive sympathy with them.

Thus, we could say that our reflection on general points of view allows us to derive the general rules of morality, thus becoming judicious spectators, but they are efficacious only when we sympathize with them. This is the reason why Hume says as follows:

This language will be easily understood, if we consider what we formerly said concerning that reason, which is able to oppose our passion; and which we have found to be nothing but a general calm determination of the passions, founded on some distant view or reflection. (T 3.3.1.18, SBN 583)

We would have a calm determination of the passions for mankind by extending our sympathy to them with the help of reflection.

According to Hume, when “we reap a pleasure from the view of a character, which is naturally fitted to be useful to others, or to the person himself, or which is agreeable to others, or to the person himself”, we regard the character as virtuous (T 3.3.1.30, SBN 591). And he adds, “the means to an end can only be agreeable, where the end is agreeable” (T 3.3.1.9, SBN 577). Thus we could say that the usefulness or agreeableness to mankind is an end and someone’s character is a means to the end; and extensive sympathy is a tool to evaluate the usefulness or agreeableness of someone’s character to mankind.

General rules as a logic of probability allow us to extend our sympathy in two different directions: one along the temporal dimension of a single human and the other across many people. And as we have seen, it is by extending our sympathy in two directions that we can reject both the virtue-in-rags objection and the judicious-spectator objection. Thus, Hume’s moral philosophy requires both the Book 2 and Book 3 senses of extensive sympathy in order to evaluate the usefulness or agreeableness of someone’s character to mankind. It is also notable that given that general rules are shaped by our experience, their influence need to be corrected by reflection. Hume says,

Moral distinctions depend entirely on certain peculiar sentiments of pain and pleasure, and that whatever mental quality in ourselves or others gives us a satisfaction, by the survey or reflection, is of course virtuous; as every thing of this nature, that gives uneasiness, is vicious. (T 3.3.1.3, SBN 574-5)

We will be able to fully extend our sympathy enough to evaluate someone’s moral character by reflecting the
influence of general rules. Hume introduces the notion of corrected sympathy as shorthand for extending sympathy by reflecting the influence of general rules: “correct its momentary appearance”, “correcting our sentiments”, and “correct those sentiments of blame” (T 3.3.1.15-17, SBN 582-583). But at first glance, it does not seem to be possible to correct our sentiments by the cognitive mental process of reflection. Louis E. Loeb says, “Just as we cannot change sensory appearances themselves, there is no general method for literally changing our feelings, the pleasures and pains that sympathy generates” (Loeb 2002, 134). Thus, when Hume says that we correct the sentiments of sympathy, what he means is that we correct the influence of general rules by reflection. By doing so, we could correct and extend our sympathy indirectly. Thus, his notion of corrected sympathy should be understood as shorthand for extending sympathy by reflecting the influence of general rules.

4.4. Sympathy and Humanity in the Second Enquiry

We have now examined Hume’s concepts of limited and extensive sympathy in the *Treatise*, which are essential to his moral theory. Limited sympathy allows us to experience the present feeling of another person. By contrast, extensive sympathy allows us to experience “affections, which have no existence” (T 2.2.7.5, SBN 370). General rules as a logic of probability allows us to extend our sympathy in two directions: one along the temporal dimension of a single human and the other across many people. Thus, we could feel “extensive sympathy with mankind”, “sympathy with public interest”, or “sympathy for the general interests of society” which is the foundation of morals (T 3.3.6.3, SBN 619; T 3.2.2.24, SBN 500; T 3.2.12.7, SBN 572). Although these two concepts of limited and extensive sympathy are contrasted as above, it is noteworthy that extensive sympathy starts to work only when vivacity is sufficiently supplied by limited sympathy with the present feelings of others. That is, our moral perspective is always developed from our particular experiences.

Given the importance of the contrast between limited and extensive sympathy in the moral philosophy of the *Treatise*, it is astonishing that those terms disappear in the second *Enquiry*. And furthermore, according to Beauchamp, the number of occurrences of the term “sympathy” and derivative forms of the term reduces from 172 in Book 2 & 3 of the *Treatise* to 30 in the second *Enquiry*; instead, the number of occurrences of the term of “humanity” increases from 11 in Book 2 & 3 of the *Treatise* to 60 in the second *Enquiry* (EPM lxiii). The standard view is that while the principle of sympathy is the foundation of morals in the *Treatise*, the principle of humanity is the foundation of morals in the second *Enquiry*. Thus, many scholars have tried to figure out the relation between sympathy in the *Treatise* and humanity in the second *Enquiry*. There are two interpretations with regard to the relation: the abandonment interpretation and no change interpretation. As we shall see, the abandonment interpretation is problematic. In my view, the principle of sympathy still plays an essential role in his moral theory in the second *Enquiry*. Thus, I will defend the no change interpretation.

4.4.1. The Abandonment Interpretation

Some scholars argue that Hume abandons the principle of sympathy and replaces it with the principle of humanity. In this section, we will examine Lewis Selby-Bigge and Nicholas Capaldi’s arguments which support
this view. According to Selby-Bigge, Hume abandons the principle of sympathy because he “may have felt that the machinery assigned to sympathy in Bk. II of the Treatise did not work very well” (Selby-Bigge 1978, xxvi). Selby-Bigge argues that in the Treatise, Hume could not establish the universality of moral judgements by correcting and extending our sympathy by the use of general rules since he could not explain how to obtain those corrective general rules:

In the Treatise the universality of our moral judgements and their detachment from private interest was accounted for by sympathy. But sympathy itself varies with time, place and person, and consequently requires correction, which is supplied by the use of general rules. How these corrective rules are obtained he does not explain in the Treatise, and indeed they seem to work in a circle with sympathy. (Selby-Bigge 1978, xxix)

Thus, according to Selby-Bigge, in the second Enquiry, Hume introduces the universality of moral judgements in a new way:

But in §§ 221-2 of the Enquiry he asserts the universality of moral judgements in quite a new style. ‘The notion of morals implies some sentiment common to all mankind which recommends the same object to general approbation and makes every man, or most men, agree in the same opinion or decision concerning it. It also implies some sentiment, so universal and comprehensive as to extend to all mankind, and render the actions and conduct even of persons the most remote, an object of applause and censure. These two requisites belong alone to the sentiment of Humanity.’ This sentiment is the only ‘universal principle of the human frame,’ and ‘can alone be the foundation of morals or of any general system of blame or praise.’ ‘One man’s ambition is not another’s ambition, nor will the same event or object satisfy both: but the humanity of one man is the humanity of every one, and the same object touches he passion in all human creatures.’ This may not be the ‘moral sense,’ but it certainly is not the doctrine of the Treatise. (Selby-Bigge 1978, xxix)

It seems to be true that Hume puts more emphasis on the “universality” of moral judgements in the second Enquiry than he does in the Treatise. But it is wrong to say that the universality of moral judgments in the sense that “the humanity of one man is the humanity of everyone” is not the doctrine of “extensive sympathy” of the Treatise.

First of all, Selby-Bigge is mistaken in holding that Hume does not explain how to obtain the general rules for correcting sympathy. He seems to believe that general rules of morality in Book 2 & 3 are not the same kind of general rules as a logic of probability in Book 1. Thus, he believes that Hume needs to explain how to obtain general rules of morality regardless of his full account of general rules as a logic of probability in Book 1. However, as we have seen in the previous section, general rules of morality are basically the same kind of general rules as a logic of probability in Book 1. According to Hume, we do not directly correct sympathy by the use of general rules. Rather we correct our belief about causal relations by the use of general rules, and thus indirectly correct sympathy by converting the corrected belief into a moral sentiment. As I emphasised in the previous section, general rules as a logic of probability is not just the foundation for his epistemology but also for his moral philosophy.

As we have seen, establishing general rules as a logic of probability is Hume’s foundational project of “the
science of man”. He wants to establish “all our principles as universal as possible” by observing our experience through the experimental method of reasoning:

For to me it seems evident, that the essence of the mind being equally unknown to us with that of external bodies, it must be equally impossible to form any notion of its powers and qualities otherwise than from careful and exact experiments, and the observation of those particular effects, which result from its different circumstances and situations. And tho’ we must endeavour to render all our principles as universal as possible, by tracing up our experiments to the utmost, and explaining all effects from the simplest and fewest causes, ’tis still certain we cannot go beyond experience. (T intro 8, SBN xvii)

In this passage, although he commits that he aims to establish universal principles, he makes a reservation about the “universality” since his experimental observation is confined by experience. By contrast, he seems to be more confident of his experimental method of reasoning in the second Enquiry:

As this [the question concerning the general principles of morals] is a question of fact, not of abstract science, we can only expect success, by following the experimental method, and deducing general maxims [of morals] from a comparison of particular instances. The other scientific method, where a general abstract principle is first established, and is afterwards branched out into a variety of inferences and conclusions, may be more perfect in itself, but suits less the imperfection of human nature, and is a common source of illusion and mistake in this as well as in other subjects. Men are now cured of their passion for hypotheses and systems in natural philosophy, and will hearken to no arguments but those which are derived from experience. It is full time they should attempt a like reformation in all moral disquisitions; and reject every system of ethics, however subtle or ingenious, which is not founded on fact and observation. (EPM 1.10, SBN 174-175)

Here Hume shows that in the second Enquiry, he follows the same experimental method of reasoning, thus “deducing general maxims [of morals] from a comparison of particular instances” as he does in the Treatise. Thus, we can conclude that in the Treatise, Hume might have hesitated to assert that general rules, which are established by following the experimental method, are universal since our experimental observation is confined only to experience, but he came to be more confident of the experimental method of reasoning in the second Enquiry, thus asserting that we can establish the universality of moral judgments by the use of general rules as a logic of probability. Thus, Selby-Bigge’s assertion that Hume introduces “the universality of moral judgements in quite a new style” in the second Enquiry since he could not explain how to obtain general rules of morality in the Treatise is mistaken. In my view, when he wrote the second Enquiry, he came to be more confident of “following the experimental method of reasoning, thus deducing general maxims [of morals] from a comparison of particular instances”, which he established in the Treatise.

Capaldi also contends that Hume abandons the principle of sympathy and replaces it with the principle of humanity in the second Enquiry. His argument is almost similar with Selby-Bigge, but he adds two examples of textual evidence to support his assertion that Hume abandons the principle of sympathy in the second Enquiry. The first one is from a footnote from the fifth section of the second Enquiry.

It is needless to push our researches so far as to ask, why we have humanity or a fellow-feeling with
others. It is sufficient, that this is experienced to be a principle in human nature. (EPM 5.17 n19, SBN 219)

Capaldi interprets this passage as indicating that “there will be no attempt to explain our humanity by reducing it to the sympathy mechanism” (Capaldi 1975, 181; Capaldi 1989, 240). However, the subsequent sentences in the footnote allow us to interpret it in a different way.

We must stop somewhere in our examination of causes; and there are, in every science, some general principles, beyond which we cannot hope to find any principle more general. No man is absolutely indifferent to the happiness and misery of others. The first has a natural tendency to give pleasure; the second, pain. This every one may find in himself. It is not probable, that these principles can be resolved into principles more simple and universal, whatever attempts may have been made to that purpose. … we may here safely consider these principles as original. (EPM 5.17 n19, SBN 219-220)

What he wants to say in this passage is that our experimental method of reasoning is enough to establish general principles. We can establish the principle of humanity that “No man is absolutely indifferent to the happiness and misery of others” by examining the causal relations between the happiness of others and our pleasure and between the misery of others and our pain. This reminds us of Hume’s principle of “extensive sympathy with mankind” in the Treatise. As we have seen, In the Treatise, he “endeavour[s] to render all our principles as universal as possible, by tracing up our experiments to the utmost, and explaining all effects from the simplest and fewest causes,” thus establishing the principle of “extensive sympathy with mankind” (T intro 8, SBN xvii). In my view, the principle of humanity and the principle of extensive sympathy are interchangeable, and the former is shorthand for the details of the mechanism of extensive sympathy. So, the principle of humanity does not need to be reduced to the principle of sympathy. In this sense, I agree with Vitz’s criticism of Capaldi’s interpretation:

Capaldi is right that Hume does not attempt to reduce the principle of humanity to the principle of sympathy in the Enquiry. Hume makes no such attempt at reduction in his later work because he treats these principles as original. The treatment he gives these principles in the Enquiry, however, is consistent with the one he gives them in the Treatise: he consistently regards each as a general principle and uses each to explain moral motivation and moral assessment. (Vitz 2016, 319-320)

As Hume puts the principle of humanity as the foundation for his moral philosophy in the second Enquiry, he puts the principle of extensive sympathy as the foundation for his moral philosophy. And in my view, these two principles are interchangeable.

Capaldi continues to introduce the second example of textual evidence to support his assertion that Hume abandons the principle of sympathy in the second Enquiry:

It is but a weak subterfuge, when pressed by these facts and arguments, to say, that we transport ourselves, by the force of imagination, into distant ages and countries, and consider the advantage, which we should have reaped from these characters, had we been contemporaries, and had any commerce with the persons. It is not conceivable, how a real sentiment or passion can ever arise from a known imaginary interest; especially when our real interest is still kept in view, and is often
Capaldi argues that the forgoing description is “a perfect description of sympathy mechanism in the Treatise” (Capaldi 1975, 181; Capaldi 1989, 240). He believes that this passage clearly shows that Hume commits his abandonment of the principle of sympathy since our sympathy with those in distant ages and countries is too faint and not efficacious.

However, the subsequent passage shows that Capaldi’s interpretation is mistaken:

A man, brought to the brink of a precipice, cannot look down without trembling; and the sentiment of imaginary danger actuates him, in opposition to the opinion and belief of real safety. But the imagination is here assisted by the presence of a striking object; and yet prevails not, except it be also aided by novelty, and the unusual appearance of the object. (EPM 5.14, SBN 217)

In this passage, unlike the previous passage, Hume now asserts that we are overwhelmed by the force of imagination when it is “assisted by the presence of a striking object”. It reminds us of Hume’s distinction between limited and extensive sympathy in the Treatise. As we have seen in Chapter 4.3.1, in the Treatise, he argues that extensive sympathy starts to work only when vivacity is sufficiently supplied by limited sympathy with the present feelings of others. That is, extensive sympathy alone cannot operate due to the lack of vivacity. This is exactly what Hume means when he says above, “It is not conceivable, how a real sentiment or passion can ever arise from a known imaginary interest.” The known imaginary interest” is not efficacious due to the lack of vivacity. Our extensive sympathy requires the source of vivacity. Thus, Capaldi’s interpretation of the above passage is mistaken. In the passage, Hume does not get rid of the principle of sympathy. Rather, he implicitly explains the relation between limited and extensive sympathy that extensive sympathy starts to work only when vivacity is sufficiently supplied by limited sympathy with the present feelings of others.

In sum, Selby-Bigge and Capaldi are mistaken in holding that in the second Enquiry Hume abandons the principle of sympathy and replaces it with the principle of humanity. In my view, although Hume does not use the terms “limited sympathy” and “extensive sympathy” any more in the second Enquiry, his distinction between limited and extensive sympathy still implicitly remains.

4.4.2. No Change Interpretation

As we have seen in the previous section, Hume does not seem to abandon the principle of sympathy in the second Enquiry. Even though he does not use the terms “limited sympathy” and “extensive sympathy” any more, those concepts are implicitly embedded in the second Enquiry. Although the number of occurrences of the sympathy-related terms are significantly reduced, they still appear frequently in the second Enquiry (EPM lxiii). Thus, the first thing we should do is to figure out what Hume means by “sympathy” in the second Enquiry.

Let’s start from Hume’s example of sympathy in the second Enquiry:

A man, who enters the theatre, is immediately struck with the view of so great a multitude participating of one common amusement; and experiences, from their very aspect, a superior
sensibility or disposition of being affected with every sentiment, which he shares with his fellow-creatures. He observes the actors to be animated by the appearance of a full audience, and raised to a degree of enthusiasm, which they cannot command in any solitary or calm moment. Every movement of the theatre, by a skilful poet, is communicated, as it were by magic, to the spectators; who weep, tremble, resent, rejoice, and are enflamed with all the variety of passions, which actuate the several personages of the drama. (EPM 5.24-26, SBN 221-2).

Hume describes here how we as a spectator sympathize with the actors’ present feelings. Here is another example:

When a person stutters, and pronounces with difficulty, we even sympathize with this trivial uneasiness, and suffer for him. And it is a rule in criticism, that every combination of syllables or letters, which gives pain to the organs of speech in the recital, appears also, from a species of sympathy, harsh and disagreeable to the ear. (EPM 5.37, SBN 224)

That is, when we watch a person stutter and pronounce with difficulty and sympathize with him, we feel the same suffering as he does. As Abramson and Debes rightly point out, in most passages of describing sympathy in the second Enquiry, Hume uses the term “sympathy” only to refer to the process of sharing another’s present feelings (Abramson 2000, 49; Debes 2007, 44). Debes characterizes this sense of sympathy as “sympathy qua sympathizing” (Debes 2007, 44). If we borrow a contemporary term, we might call it empathy.

An important point is that Hume’s description of sympathy in the second Enquiry is the same as his description of limited sympathy in Book 2 of the Treatise. As we have seen in Chapter 4.3.1, he defines limited sympathy as the process of sharing another’s present feelings, as opposed to extensive sympathy which is defined as sympathizing with another’s possible or probable feeling in the past or future by the use of general rules. It seems to be clear that although he does not use the term “limited sympathy” in the second Enquiry as he did in the Treatise, the term “sympathy” in the second Enquiry exactly refers to “limited sympathy” in the Treatise. Hume’s examples of “sympathy with the actors’ present feelings” and “sympathy with the stutter’s present suffering” in the second Enquiry would be the perfect examples of “limited sympathy” in the Treatise.

After introducing several examples of sympathy, Hume argues that we can have a warm concern for others only when we sympathize with others’ happiness or misery:

If any man from a cold insensibility, or narrow selfishness of temper, is unaffected with the images of human happiness or misery, he must be equally indifferent to the images of vice and virtue: As, on the other hand, it is always found, that a warm concern for the interests of our species is attended with a delicate feeling of all moral distinctions; a strong resentment of injury done to men; a lively approbation of their welfare. (EPM 5.39, SBN 225)

That is, if we could not sympathize with others’ present feelings, I can’t have any concern for them. Let’s have a look at another comment:

Virtue, placed at such a distance, is like a fixed star, which, though to the eye of reason, it may appear as luminous as the sun in his meridian, is so infinitely removed, as to affect the senses, neither with light nor heat. Bring this virtue nearer, by our acquaintance or connexion with the persons, or even by
an eloquent recital of the case; our hearts are immediately caught, our sympathy enlivened, and our cool approbation converted into the warmest sentiments of friendship and regard. These seem necessary and infallible consequences of the general principles of human nature, as discovered in common life and practice. (EPM 5.43, SBN 230)

Again, Hume here puts emphasis on the importance of sympathy in our moral practice. However virtuous a person’s character might be, if we only see it though the eye of reason, the virtue is like a fixed star far away, which does not have any impact on my concern. Only when I am connected with the person through sympathy, can I have a warm concern for him.

It reminds us of the relation between limited and extensive sympathy in the Treatise. As we have seen in Chapter 4.3.1, according to Hume, extensive sympathy starts to work only when vivacity is sufficiently supplied by limited sympathy with the present feelings of others. Furthermore, given that Hume uses the term “extensive sympathy” as a synonym of “concern for others” in Book 2 of the Treatise, we can say that Hume consistently argues that sympathizing with others is a necessary condition for having a concern for them both in the Treatise and in the second Enquiry. In this sense, I agree with Debes’s interpretation that for Hume, “humanity is activated through sympathy” (Debes 2007, 42); In other words, “Sympathy first, interest and humanity second” (Debes 2007, 50). Thus, we can conclude that even though he does not use the terms “limited sympathy” and “extensive sympathy” any more, those concepts are implicit in the second Enquiry. What he does in the second Enquiry is to replace the term “limited sympathy” with “sympathy”, and “extensive sympathy” with “humanity”.

At this point, one question is raised. If Hume does not abandon the principle of extensive sympathy, then why does he drop the term “limited sympathy” and “extensive sympathy” and instead use the term “sympathy” and “humanity”? In my view, the reason is that the concept of extensive sympathy is very ambiguous. On the one hand, he defines extensive sympathy as the process of experiencing others’ possible or probable feeling in the past or future. That is, extensive sympathy is the sympathy which is extended in a literal sense. This sense of extensive sympathy does not include any moral aspect. It just mirrors someone’s possible or probable feelings in the past or future. However, on the other hand, Hume makes a strong connection between extensive sympathy and our concern for others. He seems to think that if we start to extend our sympathy to others’ possible or probable feelings in the past and future, we cannot help having a concern for them. Herdt says, “It is this ‘extensive’ sympathy that gives rise to the desire for the person’s good fortune, which ‘counterfeits’ love” (Herdt 1997, 47). This sense of extensive sympathy contains its own moral aspect.

This ambiguity of the concept of extensive sympathy, I think, causes two similar but slightly different interpretations. Abramson proposes that “Hume’s second Enquiry ‘principle of humanity’ … is shorthand for the imaginative process described explicitly in the Treatise, and there named ‘extensive sympathy’” (Abramson 2000, 55). She seems to believe that Hume’s concept of extensive sympathy contains its own moral aspect. By contrast, Debes argues that “Extensive humanity … seems to follow from extensive sympathy” (Debes 2007, 40). Here he makes a clear distinction between the concepts of extensive sympathy and extensive humanity. He does not think Hume’s concept of extensive sympathy itself includes any moral aspect. In my view, both interpretations are acceptable due to the ambiguity of the concept of extensive sympathy. Rather, it shows why
Hume dropped the term “extensive sympathy” and replaced it with the term “humanity” in the second *Enquiry*, I believe. Thus, what Hume did in the second *Enquiry* is a terminological clarification: the term “sympathy” is to be used only for mirroring others’ emotions, and “humanity” only for moral concerns for others.

4.5. Conclusion

As we have seen, in the *Treatise*, Hume argues that limited sympathy is necessary for extensive sympathy. In the second *Enquiry*, he asserts that sympathy is necessary for humanity. If I use today’s terms, he consistently holds that empathy is necessary for having sympathetic concerns for others. Hume famously says, “‘Tis not contrary to reason to prefer the destruction of the whole world to the scratching of my finger” (T 2.3.3.6, SBN 416). Only when we empathize with others living in the world, we would have sympathetic concerns for them and worry about the destruction of the whole world more than about the scratching of my finger. According to him, merely abstract moral maxims are like “a fixed star” which is too far away, and thus would not have any impact on my moral practice (EPM 5.43, SBN 230); Empathy would allow us to bring those moral maxims down to our everyday life.

Hume’s assertion that empathy is necessary for having sympathetic concerns for others might be controversial. For instance, Jess Prinz argues that “empathy is not necessary for the capacities that make up basic moral competence: one can acquire moral values, make moral judgments, and act morally without empathy” (Prinz 2011, 213). And he continues, “Being concerned for someone is worrying about their welfare, which is something one can do even if one doesn’t feel what it would be like to be in their place. One can have concern for a plant, for example, and an insect, or even an artefact, like a beautiful building that has fallen into disrepair” (Prinz 2011, 211). There is an ongoing debate over whether empathy is necessary for morality or not. Hume’s argument might be wrong, and Prinz’s might be right. However, I do not want to jump into this ongoing debate now. What I want to do in this chapter is to establish the fact that Hume consistently argues that empathy is necessary for having sympathetic concerns for others both in the *Treatise* and in the second *Enquiry*. He would say that our indifference toward others would be melt down only when we empathize with them.

This chapter has scrutinised a systemic way of understanding Hume’s concept of sympathy. Now we move on to examining Smith’s concept of sympathy since I believe that the nature of Hume’s concept of sympathy is more clearly understood in contrast with Smith’s concept.
Chapter 5. Smith on Sympathy

In Chapter 1, against recent interpretations, I argued that Hume introduces his concept of sympathy not as a solution to the Problem of Other Minds, but as a foundation for his moral philosophy. And in the previous chapter, I suggested an interpretation that for Hume, our natural (or limited) sympathy is the source of vivacity but prejudiced, and hence in order to establish moral standards, it needs to be extended by the use of general rules. At this point, someone might complain that the role of sympathy is too limited in Hume’s moral philosophy and ask if there is an alternative way both of solving the Problem of Other Minds and establishing moral standards solely based on the principle of sympathy.

Adam Smith, one of Hume’s close friends, investigated this alternative way by differentiating his understanding of sympathy from Hume’s. Unlike Hume, for Smith, “sympathy” is a kind of umbrella term, covering two different areas of philosophy: epistemological and moral. He argues that the principle of sympathy plays an essential role both in solving an epistemological issue concerning the Problem of Other Minds, and in establishing the standard of his moral system. This chapter scrutinises the possibility and limitation of Smith’s alternative way of understanding of sympathy. By doing so, we may understand the nature of Hume’s concept of sympathy more clearly.

Smith, in the epistemological respect, is commonly understood as falling in the contemporary category of precursors of simulationism – that is, as a proto-simulationist. It seems undeniable that his insights into the concept of sympathy have had influence on contemporary simulationists. But if we critically examine both his concept of sympathy and his epistemological system, we can grasp that his solution to the Problem of Other Minds is not successful: His suggestion that we can form an idea of other minds “by conceiving what we ourselves should feel in the like situation” is rejected when we consider that he, as a classic philosopher, fails to overcome Cartesian dualism (TMS 9).

In the ethical respect, he attempts to establish his own moral system solely on his concept of sympathy. His aim is to set up a self-sufficient standard of morality, which replaces the concept of intersubjective propriety formed by using general rules. And this is the place where Smith’s moral philosophy diverges from Hume’s. In my view, Smith here goes too far. It is ironical that his ambitious aim ends up with introducing a supernatural concept of “final cause” into his moral philosophy in that he stubbornly refused to accept Hutcheson’s supernatural concept of “moral sense”.

5.1. Smith’s Concept of Sympathy

We start our scrutiny with Hobbes and Mandeville, philosophical egoists, since Smith’s concept of sympathy had been sophisticated in the process of responding to their understanding of sympathy. According to Hobbes, sympathy or fellow-feeling arises “from the imagination that the like calamity may befall himself” (Hobbes 1996, 43). That is, we feel pity or fellow-feeling for others because we can imagine the calamity happening to
us. Mandeville takes the same view as Hobbes that “[t]hose who have a strong and lively Imagination, and can make Representations of things in their Minds, as they would be if they were actually before them, may work themselves up into something that resembles Compassion” (Mandeville 1988, 290). According to him, pity is “a thing of Choice no more than Fear or Anger” and those who have the “weakest Minds” feel sympathy or pity for others (Mandeville 1988, 42). He continues as follows:

How oddly are we manag’d by Self-Love! It is ever watching in our Defence, and yet, to soothe a predominant Passion, obliges us to act against our Interest: For when Pity seizes us, if we can but imagine that we contribute to the Relief of him we have Compassion with, and are Instrumental to the lessening of his Sorrows, it eases us, and therefore pitiful People often give an Alms when they really feel that they would rather not. (Mandeville 1988, 291)

Hence, according to Hobbes and Mandeville, sympathy is reduced to a form of selfishness. Let’s call this the egoist interpretation of sympathy.

In his sermon “Upon Compassion”, in order to respond to the egoist interpretation that sympathy is reduced to a form of selfishness, Joseph Butler makes a distinction between two different kinds of sympathy: “substituting others for ourselves” and “substituting ourselves for others” (Herdt 1997, 34). He says as follows:

If there be really any such thing as the fiction or imagination of danger to ourselves from the sight of the miseries of others ... if there be anything of this sort common to mankind, distinct from the reflection of reason, it would be a most remarkable instance of what was furthest from his [Hobbes’s] thoughts, namely, of a mutual sympathy between each particular of the species, a fellow feeling common to mankind. It would not indeed be an example of our substituting others for ourselves, but it would be an example of our substituting ourselves for others. (Butler 1914, 86)

According to Butler, I do not merely imagine that the calamity would happen to me, but I more actively imagine that if I were you, how I would feel. Using his words, it’s not “an example of our substituting others for ourselves”, but it’s “an example of our substituting ourselves for others”.20

Like Butler, Smith also attempts to oppose the egoist interpretation that sympathy is reduced to a form of selfishness by making a distinction between imagining what I would feel if I were in the other’s situation and imagining myself as the other person:

But though sympathy is very properly said to arise from an imaginary change of situations with the person principally concerned, yet this imaginary change is not supposed to happen to me in my own person and character, but in that of the person with whom I sympathize. When I condole with you for the loss of your only son, in order to enter into your grief I do not consider what I, a person of such a character and profession, should suffer, if I had a son, and if that son was unfortunately to die: but I

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20 However, Butler’s emphasis on the intentional and reflective nature of imagination will be a serious barrier for him to solve the Problem of Other Minds. Herdt rightly points out that “Butler simply sidesteps what … was the original motivation for appeals to sympathy – the problem of understanding what is going on within the interiors of others. … Butler does not grapple with the question of how we acquire a ‘real perception’ or ‘sense’ of someone else’s distress, if not through sympathy in the first place” (Herdt 1997, 35). We will critically examine this issue in the next section.
consider what I should suffer if I was really you, and I not only change circumstances with you, but I change person and characters. My grief, therefore, is entirely upon your account, and not in the least upon my own. It is not, therefore, in the least selfish. (TMS 317)

Smith here argues that the feeling of sympathy which is produced by imagining myself as you is “entirely upon your account, and not in the least upon my own”, and thus it cannot be selfish. Let’s call this the simulationist interpretation in the sense that for him imagining myself to be another person allows me to detect the mental states of the person.

However, the difficulty in understanding Smith’s concept of sympathy is that his distinction between imagining myself in another’s situation and imagining myself to be the person is not so clear. Although he seems to endorse the latter as an objection to Hobbes and Mandeville’s claim, three examples after introducing the concept of sympathy seem to support the former: sympathy with a lunatic, with a sick infant, and with the dead. Let’s have a look at the example of sympathy with a lunatic:

Of all the calamities to which the condition of mortality exposes mankind, the loss of reason appears, to those who have the least spark of humanity, by far the most dreadful, and they behold that last stage of human wretchedness with deeper commiseration than any other. But the poor wretch, who is in it, laughs and sings perhaps, and is altogether insensible of his own misery. (TMS 12)

In this example of sympathy with a lunatic, we do not seem to imagine ourselves to be the lunatic. We seem to imagine ourselves in his situation, and thus feel “deeper commiseration than any other”. But it does not reflect his actual feeling:

The anguish which humanity feels, therefore, at the sight of such an object, cannot be the reflection of any sentiment of the sufferer. The compassion of the spectator must arise altogether from the consideration of what he himself would feel if he was reduced to the same unhappy situation. (TMS 12)

The other examples of sympathy with a sick infant and with the dead are also the same cases. A mother is terrified and moans when she sympathizes with her infant’s sickness. But, it turns out that the infant “feels only the uneasiness of the present instant, which can never be great” (TMS 12). We also sometimes sympathize with the dead and sink into melancholy. But it does not reflect the dead’s actual feeling simply because they do not feel anything at all. When we sympathize with the dead, what we do is actually imagine ourselves in their situation:

The idea of that dreary and endless melancholy, which the fancy naturally ascribes to their condition, arises altogether from our joining to the change which has been produced upon them, our own consciousness of that change, from our putting ourselves in their situation, and from our lodging, if I may be allowed to say so, our own living souls in their inanimated bodies, and thence conceiving what would be our emotions in this case. (TMS 13)

These examples of sympathizing with a lunatic, a sick infant, and the dead seem to support the view of imagining oneself in another’s situation rather than the view of imagining oneself to be the other person although Smith’s official view is the latter.
For this reason, Mercer argues that Smith fails to distinguish between two kinds of imagination: “Perhaps Smith’s most serious confusion stems from his failure to clarify whether sympathy involves imagining what one would feel if one were in the other’s situation or whether it involves imagining oneself as the other person” (Mercer 1972). Furthermore, Nanay argues that Smith does not have such a concept of imagining oneself to be another, which allows us to identify with her, and thus mirror her actual feelings. He believes that the above examples of sympathizing with a lunatic, a sick infant, and the dead are the supporting evidence for his argument: “In the examples above, there is an asymmetry between the mental states of the sympathizer and the person she is sympathizing with. If she were to take her imaginative episode as a reason to attribute the mental state she finds herself in to the other person, as the simulationists would suggest, she would be wrong” (Nanay 2010, 94-95).

In my view, however, this line of anti-simulationist interpretation is mistaken. According to Smith, the examples of sympathizing with a lunatic, a sick infant, and the dead are examples of what he calls “illusive sympathy” (TMS 71). Right after the example of sympathizing with the dead, he says, “It is from this very illusion of the imagination, that the foresight of our own dissolution is so terrible to us, and that the idea of those circumstances, which undoubtedly can give us no pain when we are dead, makes us miserable while we are alive” (TMS 12). And he elaborates on the concept of “illusive sympathy”:

If the injured should perish in the quarrel, we not only sympathize with the real resentment of his friends and relations, but with the imaginary resentment which in fancy we lend to the dead, who is no longer capable of feeling that or any other human sentiment. But as we put ourselves in his situation, as we enter, as it were, into his body, and in our imaginations, in some measure, animate anew the deformed and mangled carcass of the slain, when we bring home in this manner his case to our own bosoms, we feel upon this, as upon many other occasions, an emotion which the person principally concerned is incapable of feeling, and which yet we feel by an illusive sympathy with him. (TMS 71)

It is important to note that Smith here makes a clear distinction between sympathy with the real resentment and with the imaginary resentment, and that he regards only the latter as illusive sympathy. Thus, it seems to be clear that he makes a distinction between imagining oneself to be the other and imagining oneself in the other’s situation and that for him, the former is the source of sympathy with the real feelings and the latter is the source of sympathy with the illusive or imaginary feelings.21

In fact, Smith’s examples right after introducing the concept of sympathy support the simulationist interpretation:

When we see a stroke aimed and just ready to fall upon the leg or arm of another person, we naturally shrink and draw back our own leg or our own arm, when it does fall, we feel it in some measure, and

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21 It is worth to note that for Smith the concept of “illusive sympathy” has its own positive role which is given by nature. When it comes to the illusive sympathy with a sick infant, he says, “[w]ith regard to the future, it is perfectly secure, and in its thoughtlessness and want of foresight, possesses an antidote against fear and anxiety, the great tormentors of the human breast, from which reason and philosophy will, in vain, attempt to defend it, when it grows up to a man” (TMS 12). And he also concludes about the illusive sympathy with the dead that “from thence arises one of the most important principles in human nature, the dread of death, the great poison to the happiness, but the great restraint upon the injustice of mankind, which, while it afflicts and mortifies the individual, guards and protects the society” (TMS 13).
are hurt by it as well as the sufferer. (TMS 10)

The mob, when they are gazing at a dancer on the slack rope, naturally writhe and twist and balance their own bodies, as they see him do, and as they feel that they themselves must do if in his situation. (TMS 10)

Persons of delicate fibres and a weak constitution of body complain, that in looking on the sores and ulcers which are exposed by beggars in the streets, they are apt to feel an itching or uneasy sensation in the correspondent part of their own bodies. (TMS 10)

Smith introduces these examples saying that “[t]hat this is the source of our fellow-feeling for the misery of others, that it is by changing places in fancy with the sufferer, that we come either to conceive or to be affected by what he feels, may be demonstrated by many obvious observations” (TMS 10). Thus, against Mercer and Nanay, we cannot deny that he makes a clear distinction between imagining oneself in the other’s situation and imagining oneself to be the other person.

One question arises at this point: Why does Smith introduce not only the concept of imagining oneself to be the other person, but also the concept of imagining oneself in the other’s situation, and thus give some scholars like Mercer and Nanay ammunition to misinterpret his concept of sympathy? My answer is that this is because both concepts play a crucial role in constructing his moral theory. In The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Smith explains the process of obtaining the feeling of moral approbation as follows:

> When the original passions of the person principally concerned are in perfect concord with the sympathetic emotions of the spectator, they necessarily appear to this last just and proper, and suitable to their objects; and, on the contrary, when, upon bringing the case home to himself, he finds that they do not coincide with what he feels, they necessarily appear to him unjust and improper, and unsuitable to the causes which excite him. To approve of the passions of another, therefore, as suitable to their objects, is the same thing as to observe that we entirely sympathize with them; and not to approve of them as such, is the same thing as to observe that we do not entirely sympathize with them. (TMS 16)

According to Smith, imagining ourselves in the person’s situation on the first level, we can obtain the sympathetic emotions. But when he says, “we entirely sympathize with them,” our sympathy, which is distinguished from the sympathetic emotions, is “a second order feeling triggered by the discovery of emotional concord between the spectator involved in his imaginative change of position and the agent” (Fricke 2013, 182). For Smith, this ‘sympathy’ on the second level is the source of moral sentiments.

The above passage is interpreted by Maria A. Carrasco as including three steps: “complete identification, partial identification and comparison” (Carrasco, 2011, 15). She says,

> In order to be evaluative, ‘sympathy’ has to become a twofold process. First of all, I (the spectator) must completely identify with the agent: ‘I not only change circumstances with you, but I change persons and characters’ (TMS VII.iii.1.5); and then, in the second step, I only change positions or circumstances with the agent, keeping my self-identification (i.e. I do not change ‘persons and characters’). Finally, I compare the agent’s (attributed) feelings with those I imagine I would feel in that situation, and only if they coincide will I judge them as proper to what ‘the situation deserves’
This is what I will call ‘subjective propriety’. (Carrasco, 2011, 15)

From Carrasco’s account, we can delineate the process of sympathizing with the agent as follows:

Step 1. I feel the same emotions as the agent’s original ones by the complete identification.

Step 2. I feel the “sympathetic emotions” by the partial identification.

Step 3. I compare the agent’s original emotions and “sympathetic emotions” and, then, when I discover the emotional concord between them, I approve of the agent’s original emotions. That is, I entirely sympathize with them.

If Carrasco’s interpretation is right, we can say that the complete identification in step 1 requires me to imagine myself to be the agent, and the partial identification in step 2 to imagine myself in his situation. Thus, in order to feel sympathy as “correspondence between the imagined feelings of the spectator and the actual sentiments of the person primarily concerned”, we need to exercise both imagining myself in the agent’s situation and imagining myself to be the agent.

In my view, Carrasco’s interpretation seems to provide us with the best way of understanding Smith’s two kinds of imagination. However, some questions still remain: What does it mean by “the complete identification”? Is it really possible to make the complete identification by imagining oneself to be the other person? Nanay asks, “If our sympathy for the dead and the lunatic is illusive, how can we know that not all instances of sympathy are illusive? … Why should we accept that sympathy where I feel what the other person feels is more genuine than sympathy where this is not the case?” (Nanay 2010, 95-96). These questions look so crucial for establishing the validity both of Smith’s theory of mind and of his moral philosophy. So, we will try to answer these questions in the next section.

5.2. Imagination, Identification, and Simulation

In the first page of The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Smith famously suggests his own solution to the Problem of Other Minds:

As (1) we have no immediate experience of what other men feel, we can form no idea of the manner in which they are affected, but by conceiving what we ourselves should feel in the like situation. Though our brother is upon the rack, as long as we ourselves are at our ease, our senses will never inform us of what he suffers. They never did, and never can, carry us beyond our own person, and (2) it is by the imagination only that we can form any conception of what are his sensations. Neither can that faculty help us to this any other way, than by representing to us what would be our own, if we were in his case. It is the impressions of our own senses only, not those of his, which our imaginations copy. (3) By the imagination we place ourselves in his situation, we conceive ourselves enduring all the same torments, we enter as it were into his body, and become in some measure the same person with him, and thence form some idea of his sensations, and even feel something which, though weaker in degree, is not altogether unlike them. (TMS 9)
Smith here makes three claims:

(1) We have no immediate experience of what the other person feels.

(2) It is by the imagination that we can form an idea of what his sensations are.

(3) By the imagination we enter into his body and become the same person with him.

With these claims, he argues that we can form an idea of the other minds only by imagining ourselves to be him. Smith’s argumentation here seems to support Carrasco’s interpretation of imagining oneself to be the other person as a complete identification and of imagining oneself in the other’s situation as a partial identification.

However, in order to give credit to her interpretation, we need to clarify what exactly Carrasco means by “the complete identification” since it does not seem to be metaphysically possible for someone to be identical with the other even in imagination. That is, even in imagination, it seems that two distinct persons cannot be the same person because it would violate the necessity of identity (Kripke 2000, 95). This issue is raised by Bernard Williams in his well-known example of imagining oneself to be Napoleon:

> [S]uppose I conceive it possible that I might have been Napoleon – and mean by this that there might have been a world which contained a Napoleon exactly the same as the Napoleon that our world contained, except that he would have been me. What could be the difference between the actual Napoleon and the imagined one? All I have to take to him in the imagined world is a Cartesian centre of consciousness; and that, the real Napoleon had already. Leibniz, perhaps, made something like this point when he said to one who expressed the wish that he were King of China, that all he wanted was that he should cease to exist and there should be a King in China. (Williams 1973, 42-43)

Williams here shows that it is impossible to imagine oneself to be identical with another by using *reductio ad absurdum*. According to him, in imagination we can conceive that I am Napoleon, but the referent of “I” is merely “the Cartesian consciousness: an ‘I’ without body, past, or character” (Williams 1973, 41). And he continues, “it is impossible to see any more what would be subtracted from the universe by the removal of me” (Williams 1973, 42). That is, even though it is possible to imagine myself to be identical with Napoleon, the referent of “I” will be empty.

In his book *The Thread of Life*, Richard Wollheim raises another objection against the possibility of imagining oneself to be identical with another:

> I can say – there is such an idiom – that I imagine myself being Sultan Mahomet II. But in this idiom, appearances notwithstanding, identity does not occur: I am not saying that I imagine myself being identical with Sultan Mahomet II. And this we can see from the fact that, though identity is symmetrical, ‘imagining myself being Sultan Mahomet II’ and ‘imagining Sultan Mahomet II being me’ are not synonyms.... Identity is eliminated. (Wollheim 1984, 75)

Wollheim here argues that identity is a symmetrical relation, but when I imagine myself being Sultan Mahomet II, the relation between myself and Sultan Mahomet II is asymmetrical. Thus, he concludes that the possibility of imagining myself to be identical with Sultan Mahomet II is denied. As Steven Reynolds points out, the verb “am” of “I imagine that I am Sultan Mahomet II” is not the ‘am’ of identity but of representation: “to imagine
that I am Napoleon is not to imagine that Napoleon is me. The representation relation is asymmetrical; I may represent Napoleon although he does not represent me” (Reynolds 1989, 626). Thus, from Williams and Wollheim’s objections we can conclude that the possibility of imagining oneself to be completely identical with the other is denied. Despite what I may think I imagine, I cannot really imagine myself to be Napoleon, because such an identity is logically impossible.

Given that the complete identification between oneself and the other is metaphysically impossible in imagination, Carrasco’s assertion that one can make the complete identification by imagining oneself to be the other should be understood as a figurative sense. Let’s have a look at Carrasco’s explanation:

Phenomenologically, this evaluation through identification-sympathy can be explained as the superimposing of two maps. We all live our lives within an egocentric map, self-identified and with our particular circumstances. When we have to identify with another, ‘to enter into his breast’ or to imaginarily become the other person, we must re-center that map or, as Gordon puts it, to make ‘an imaginary shift in the reference of indexicals’. This is the job that actors usually do: they bracket out their self-identification to get completely absorbed in the role they are playing (personality, circumstances, etc.). (Carrasco 2011, 12)

According to her, to imagine oneself to be the other is to re-center one’s egocentric map on the person. That is, we can completely identify ourselves with the other by re-centering our egocentric map on the person in our imagination. Then, another question is following. What exactly does she mean by “re-centering our egocentric map on the other”? She is here borrowing Gordon’s concept of “re-centering one’s egocentric map” in order to interpret Smith’s concept of imagination. So, it would be good to listen to Gordon’s own explanation on this concept.

Gordon, one of the main proponents of simulationism, makes a distinction between “simulating oneself in O’s situation” and “simulating O in O’s situation” (Gordon 1995A, 55). And he argues that the latter allows us to re-center “my egocentric map” on the other person, thus detecting his mental states:

To simulate *Mr Tees* in his situation requires an egocentric shift, a recentering of my egocentric map on Mr Tees (Gordon, 1986). He becomes in my imagination the referent of the first person pronoun “I,” and the time and place of his missing the plane become the referents of “now” and “here.” And I, RMG, *cease* to be the referent of the first person pronoun: what is imagined is not the truth of the counter-identical, “RMG is Mr Tees”. Such recentering is the prelude to transforming myself in imagination into Mr Tees much as actors become the characters they play. Although some actors (“method” actors, for example) occasionally step back from the role they are playing and ask, “What would I myself do, think, and feel in this situation?” and then transfer their answer (with or without adjustments) to the character, the typical stance of modern actors is that of being, not actors pretend to be characters in a play, but the characters themselves. (Goldon 1995A, 55)

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22 Like Mercer and Nanay, Gordon argues that Smith misses the distinction between “imagining being in X’s situation” and “imagining being X in X’s situation” (Gordon 1995B, 741). But as we have seen, Gordon’s understanding is mistaken. In my view, Smith recognizes this distinction.
In this passage, Gordon makes a distinction between “pretending” and “recentering an egocentric shift.” According to him, the key difference is that in pretending, I, as an imaginer (or as an actor), remain to be the referent of the first person pronoun in my imagination (or in my acting), whilst in re-centering an egocentric shift, I cease to be the referent of the first person pronoun and become the other person (or the character) himself in my imagination (or in my acting).

Gordon argues that in imagining oneself to be the other person, there is no introspective process of identifying oneself with him. According to him, as modern actors adjust their perspectives and play the role of characters, we, as an imaginer, re-center our egocentric map on the other and simulate him. We do not need to introspect ourselves in order to identify with the other. Hence, for him, the metaphysical problem of the possibility of identification between oneself and the other is not raised in the process of imagining oneself to be the other person. According to him, the problem is a pseudo-problem.

At this point, it is important to note that Gordon’s rejection of introspectionism is part of the legacy of Wittgenstein’s philosophy (Gordon 1995A, 54). Wittgenstein’s criticism of an analogical argument as a solution to the Problem of Other Minds is well-known: “If I say of myself that it is only from my own case that I know what the word ‘pain’ means – must I not say the same of other people too? And how can I generalize the one case so irresponsibly?” (Wittgenstein 2001, 85e). According to him, any attempt to solve the Problem of Other Minds is solipsistic. Thus, he rejects both introspectionism and the Cartesian dualism with which it is often associated. Instead, he argues that we can communicate emotions by language since our shared “forms of life” are embodied in “language-games” (Malcolm 1967, 70): “What has to be accepted, the given, is – so one could say – forms of life” (Wittgenstein 2001, 192e). According to him, the notion of “forms of life” is primordially given to us. We first learn language-games, which are embedded in forms of life, and then specify our own emotions by using languages. Therefore, given that we share forms of life, we would be able to re-center our egocentric map as well by imagining being another since his perspective is open to us due to the language-games.

We have examined the nature of imagining oneself to be another. And I have argued that Gordon’s simulationist view that we can simulate another’s real emotions by imaging ourselves to be him is valid only when...

23 In this respect, Gordon rejects not only the theory theory but also the view of some simulationists like Goldman and Heal that “mental states like belief have intrinsic, introspectable qualities – qualia” (Davies 1994, 122).

24 This insight comes from Williams. In his writing “Imagination and the Self,” he says,

The mode of imagining appropriate to these fantasies, when they are not stopped in their tracks, is least misleadingly expressed as ‘imagining being Napoleon’: what this represents, the fantasy enactment of the role of Napoleon, is the only mode that has the power to sustain the speculations we have been discussing at all. And this mode, properly understood, does not introduce a further ‘me’ to generate these difficulties: there are only two persons involved in this, as I said, the real me and Napoleon. It is as unproblematic that I can imagine being Napoleon as that Charles Boyer could act the role of Napoleon. (Williams 1973, 44-45)

According to him, we do not need to assume the concept of “the Cartesian consciousness: an ‘I’ without body, past, or character” in order to solve the problem of the possibility of identity since it is merely a pseudo-problem (Williams 1973, 41). That is, I can imagine being Napoleon just as an actor plays the role of Napoleon.
Wittgenstein’s notions of “forms of life” and “language games” are presupposed. Now, I believe, we are ready
to come back to Smith. As we have seen, like Gordon, Smith argues that we can sympathize with another’s real
emotions by imagining ourselves to be him. He says, “By the imagination … we enter as it were into his body,
and become in some measure the same person with him, and thence form some idea of his sensations” (TMS 9).
And his explanation goes on as follows:

But though sympathy is very properly said to arise from an imaginary change of situations with the
person principally concerned, yet this imaginary change is not supposed to happen to me in my own
person and character, but in that of the person with whom I sympathize. When I console with you for
the loss of your only son, in order to enter into your grief I do not consider what I, a person of such a
character and profession, should suffer, if I had a son, and if that son was unfortunately to die: but I
consider what I should suffer if I was really you, and I not only change circumstances with you, but I
change person and characters. My grief, therefore, is entirely upon your account, and not in the least
upon my own. (TMS 317)

As Carrasco points out, by imagining oneself to be another Smith here seems to mean to re-center an egocentric
map on another. Then, a crucial question is raised. Is he ready to accept the Wittgensteinian notions of “forms of
life” and “language games”? In other words, does he reject both introspectionism and Cartesian dualism, which
are the obstacles to prevent our imagination from re-centering an egocentric map? Unfortunately, my answer is
no.

Let us remind ourselves of Hume’s solution to the Problem of Other Minds. In chapter 1, I argued that his
version of analogical argument as a solution to the Problem operates in his system because he denies the
Cartesian framework in two ways. First, he denies self-identity. According to him, mind is a bundle of
perceptions, and thus there is no such theory as a Cartesian consciousness. Second, he denies epistemic
asymmetry between first- and third-persons. Given that the Cartesian consciousness is denied, and mind is a
bundle of perceptions, a reflective perception can take a third-person perspective on the other members of the
bundle of perceptions as it does on other perceptions such as bodily perceptions or external perceptions. Thus, in
the “Liberty and Necessity” chapter both of the Treatise and of the first Enquiry, Hume argues that the constant
conjunctions of bodily motions and perceptions of the mind are observed “from the standpoint of the observer”
(Harris 2005, 66).

By contrast, however, Smith does not seem to tackle the issues both of the Cartesian consciousness and of
epistemic perspective asymmetry:

Smith ignores Hume’s argument for determinism in the “Liberty and Necessity” chapter – a striking
omission, for one who otherwise wrestles so often with Hume – and seems just to assume, throughout
his work, that we have free will of some sort. Smith also says nothing directly about the
deconstruction of personal identity in Part I of the Treatise, and seems just to assume, throughout
TMS, that we have a continuing self. Together, these points suggest that he saw the mind as sharply
different from the body. (Fleischacker 2012, 288)

Thus, it seems that Smith implicitly accepts Cartesian dualism by ignoring Hume’s relevant arguments. And as
we have seen, on the first page of The Theory of Moral Sentiments, he claims that “we have no immediate
experience of what other men feel” (TMS 9). That is, our feelings are private and accessible only to the person experiencing them (Fleischacker 2012, 303).

Therefore, we cannot give credit to Smith’s suggestion that we can simulate the other’s real feelings by imagining ourselves to be him in his situation. We could call him a “proto-simulationist”. It might be undeniable that he provided the contemporary simulationists with many insights. But we cannot conclude that his solution to the Problem of Other Minds is successful.

5.3. Ethical Role of Sympathy: Subjective Propriety

The previous section examined the epistemological role of sympathy in Smith’s philosophy. We have tried to answer the question as to whether Smith’s philosophical system would allow his concept of sympathy to solve the Problem of Other Minds. Unfortunately, my answer was negative: although he can be regarded as proto-simulationist, his project as a simulationist is not successful. This section moves on to the moral aspect of his concept of sympathy.

We start our scrutiny by comparing Smith’s and Hume’s understanding of sympathy, which differ in two respects. The first one is concerning the spectrum of sympathy. Hume tries to confine the role of sympathy in his moral philosophy, whilst Smith attempts to widen the role of sympathy in his moral philosophy. As we have seen in the previous chapter, although Hume introduces two kinds of sympathy, limited sympathy for another’s real feelings and extensive sympathy for another’s hypothetical feelings, in the Treatise, his settled view of sympathy in the second Enquiry is confined only to the former. That is, for him, sympathy works only with the real feelings of another person. By contrast, Smith’s concept of sympathy is not confined to working with the real feelings of another person. Rather, according to him, sympathy arises not only from the real feelings of another person, but also from her situation regardless of the real feelings. He says, “Sympathy … does not arise so much from the view of the passion, as from that of the situation which excites it” (TMS 12).

This contrast is well shown in Hume’s letter to Smith, which was written in 1759:

I wish you had more particularly and fully prov’d, that all kinds of Sympathy are necessarily Agreeable. This is the Hinge of your System, and yet you only mention the matter cursorily in p. 20.

Now it would appear that there is a disagreeable Sympathy, as well as an agreeable: And indeed, as the Sympathetic Passion is a reflex Image of the Principal, it must partake of its Qualities, & be painful where that is so. (LI 313)

In this letter, Hume asks Smith to elaborate why the latter thinks that “all kinds of sympathy are necessarily agreeable”. Hume seems to think that Smith’s concept of sympathy is problematic since he believes that some kinds of sympathy are disagreeable. As we have seen, in the second Enquiry, which was published in 1751, Hume clarified his concept of sympathy that it is the process of mirroring another’s present feeling. Since for him sympathizing with others means sharing others’ present emotions, it is natural for him to think that some kinds of sympathy are agreeable and other kinds disagreeable. Sometimes I share another’s happiness, which is agreeable, sometimes I mirror another’s sadness, which is disagreeable. Thus, for him, all kinds of sympathy cannot be necessarily agreeable.
Smith responds to Hume’s criticism by distinguishing the notion of “sympathy” and of “sympathetic emotion” (TMS 16). As we have seen in Chapter 5.1, for Smith, sympathetic emotions are the emotions that are obtained by imagining ourselves in another’s situation, which works on the first level. These sympathetic emotions can be agreeable or disagreeable because we can feel pleasure or displeasure in the person’s situation. By contrast, according to him, sympathy is the second-order feeling trigged by discovering emotional concord between our sympathetic emotion and the other’s real emotion. Thus, for him, all the results of ‘sympathy’ on the second level are agreeable because ‘sympathy’ works only when the ‘sympathetic emotions’ of the spectator is in concord with the original passions of the agent.

From Smith’s reply to Hume’s criticism, we come to know that for Smith, “sympathy” is a kind of umbrella term. It covers two different areas of philosophy: epistemological and moral. As Hacker points out, it seems that “Smith’s account of sympathy … weaves together a proposed resolution of the so-called problem of other minds, an analysis of the emotion of sympathy, and an explanation of the moral sentiments” (Hacker 2017, 364). By contrast, Hume introduces the concept of sympathy only as a cornerstone for his moral philosophy, not as a solution to the Problem of Other Minds. And its role is limited even in his moral philosophy. Thus, I agree with Philip Mercer’s view that “Smith’s concept [of sympathy] is altogether more catholic than Hume’s; from his copious illustrations it would seem that he wants to admit pity and compassion, fellow-feeling, infection, and even empathy, all as varieties of sympathy” (Mercer 1972, 85).

The second respect concerns the role of sympathy in moral philosophy. As we have seen in the previous chapter, for Hume, what determines our moral judgments is considerations of utility, and sympathy is a tool to consider the general utility for mankind. He says that when “we reap a pleasure from the view of a character, which is naturally fitted to be useful to others, or to the person himself, or which is agreeable to others, or to the person himself”, we regard the character as virtuous (T 3.3.1.30, SBN 591). And he adds, “the means to an end can only be agreeable, where the end is agreeable” (T 3.3.1.9, SBN 577). Thus we could say that the usefulness or agreeableness to mankind is an end and someone’s character is a means to the end; and sympathy is a tool to evaluate the usefulness or agreeableness of someone’s character to mankind.

By contrast, for Smith, what underlies our moral judgments is considerations of propriety. And sympathy as proper feeling for the situation itself is the end of his moral philosophy. As we have seen, for him, sympathy arises not only from the real feelings of another person, but also from her situation regardless of the real feelings. As we have seen, we will obtain “sympathetic emotions” by imagining ourselves in another’s situation. According to Smith, these “sympathetic emotions” become the standard for the propriety of the person’s original emotions. That is, if we approve of the agent’s original reaction, we will sympathize with him and regard his original reaction as “proper” to what the situation deserves, and if we disapprove of his original reaction we cannot sympathize with him and regard it as “improper” to what the situation deserves. Smith says, “When the original passions of the person principally concerned are in perfect concord with the sympathetic emotions of the spectator, they necessarily appear to this last just and proper, and suitable to their objects; and, on the contrary, when, upon bringing the case home to himself, he finds that they do not coincide with what he feels, they necessarily appear to him unjust and improper, and unsuitable to the causes which excite them” (TMS 16). Therefore, for Smith, given that sympathy is the second-order feeling trigged by discovering emotional concord between the spectator’s sympathetic emotions and the other’s real emotions, sympathy itself
is the end of moral philosophy.

We now grasp that unlike Hume, Smith attempts to establish his moral philosophy solely on his concept of sympathy. According to him, the mental activity of imagining myself in the other’s situation provides me with the standard for the propriety of the person’s original emotions. However, given that this standard is solely constructed by my own imagination, how can the so-called propriety avoid subjectivity in evaluation? In order to answer to this question, Smith moves to the concept of mutual sympathy, which allows us to obtain intersubjectivity.

5.4. From Subjectivity to Intersubjectivity

Worries about the subjectivity of propriety are resolved when Smith makes a leap with his concept of sympathy from the individual level to the social level. According to him, human beings are social beings, who enjoy the “pleasure of mutual sympathy” (TMS 13). He says, “nothing pleases us more than to observe in other men a fellow-feeling with all the emotions of our own breast; nor are we ever so much shocked as by the appearance of the contrary” (TMS 13). And he continues, “As the person who is principally interested in any event is pleased with our sympathy, and hurt by the want of it, so we, too, seem to be pleased when we are able to sympathize with him, and to be hurt when we are unable to do so” (TMS 15).

If my sympathy works only in one way, my standard for the evaluation of the other person will be subjective since it relies solely on my own perspective:

   My companion does not naturally look upon the misfortune that has befallen me, or the injury that has been done me, from the same point of view in which I consider them. They affect me much more nearly. We do not view them from the same station, as we do a picture, or a poem, or a system of philosophy, and are, therefore, apt to be very differently affected by them. (TMS 21)

But since we are social beings who enjoy the “pleasure of mutual sympathy,” we try to adjust our own perspectives. That is, our sympathy shows a two-way interaction:

   In order to produce this concord, as nature teaches the spectators to assume the circumstances of the person principally concerned, so she teaches this last in some measure to assume those of the spectators. As they are continually placing themselves in his situation, and thence conceiving emotions similar to what he feels; so he is as constantly placing himself in theirs, and thence conceiving some degree of that coolness about his own fortune, with which he is sensible that they will view it. (TMS 22)

In other words, according to Smith, when I imagine myself in the agent’s circumstances, I would speculate how I would react to other spectators if I were in the agent’s circumstances. This means that I will be influenced strongly by my expectations of how people ordinarily act and react. This process of mutual sympathy would allow us to reach a shared perspective. Thus, we can say that for Smith, since the process of imagining myself in the agent’s situation includes considerations of other spectators’ perspectives, the standard for evaluating the propriety of the agent’s behaviour, which is obtained by the imagination, is not subjective but intersubjective.
According to Smith, the considerations of other spectator’s perspectives are formulated as the “general rules” which are “derived from our preceding experience of what our sentiments would commonly correspond with, correct upon this, as upon many other occasions, the impropriety of our present emotions” (TMS 18). Thus, even in the case that I cannot entirely sympathize with a stranger’s deep sorrow from “the death of his father”, I can conditionally sympathize with him by the use of general rules. Smith calls this “conditional sympathy” (TMS 18).

Smith’s concept of “conditional sympathy” and his use of “general rules” remind us of Hume’s concept of “extensive sympathy” in the Treatise. As we have seen in the previous chapter, Hume argues that we can correct and extend our natural sympathy by the use of general rules. According to him, general rules as a logic of probability allow us to extend our sympathy not only along the temporal dimension of a single human, but also across many people, thus establishing intersubjective foundation for morality. Thus, it seems that when Smith says that we can conditionally sympathize with others by the use of general rules, he echoes Hume’s view that we can extensively sympathize with others by the use of general rules.

However, it is important to note that unlike Hume, Smith does not seem to be satisfied with the concept of intersubjective propriety, which is obtained by the use of general rules. And this is the place where Smith’s moral philosophy diverges from Hume’s. Smith wants to establish more stable foundation for morality than the concept of intersubjective propriety.

### 5.5. From Intersubjectivity to Self-sufficiency

Since Smith is not satisfied with the notion of intersubjective propriety, he introduces a new concept of praiseworthiness into his moral philosophy. In the Third Part of The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Smith makes a distinction between the concept of praise and of praiseworthiness:

> Man naturally desires, not only to be loved, but to be lovely; or to be that thing which is the natural and proper object of love. He naturally dreads, not only to be hated, but to be hateful; or to be that thing which is the natural and proper object of hatred. He desires, not only praise, but praise-worthiness; or to be that thing which, though it should be praised by nobody, is, however, the natural and proper object of praise. He dreads, not only blame, but blame-worthiness; or to be that thing which, though it should be blamed by nobody, is, however, the natural and proper object of blame. (TMS 113-114)

According to Smith, it is true that we require others’ sympathy with our attitude toward the agent. That is, we desire praise from others. However, according to him, even though there is no actual praise, we can pursue the praiseworthiness of our own actions or our reactions toward the agent.

Then, is his concept of praiseworthiness merely an internalized general rule of actual praise? No, it is not. If it is, there should not be any qualitative difference between them. But they show a qualitative difference. This qualitative difference is revealed in his response to Mandeville’s criticism. Smith first summarizes Mandeville’s argument concerning the concept of vanity as follows:
Dr. Mandeville considers whatever is done from a sense of propriety, from a regard to what is commendable and praise-worthy, as being done from a love of praise and commendation, or as he calls it from vanity. Man, he observes, is naturally much more interested in his own happiness than in that of others, and it is impossible that in his heart he can ever really prefer their prosperity to his own. (TMS 308)

According to Smith, Mandeville believes that all our behaviour springs from vanity, that is, from selfish motivation, whatever is done for the love of praise or for praise-worthiness.

Smith replies to Mandeville’s argument by claiming that those who desire praise are guilty of vanity, but those who pursue praiseworthiness are not:

I shall only endeavour to show that the desire of doing what is honourable and noble, of rendering ourselves the proper objects of esteem and approbation, cannot with any propriety be called vanity. Even the love of well-grounded fame and reputation, the desire of acquiring esteem by what is really estimable, does not deserve that name. The first is the love of virtue, the noblest and the best passion in human nature. The second is the love of true glory, a passion inferior no doubt to the former, but which in dignity appears to come immediately after it. He is guilty of vanity who desires praise for qualities which are either not praise-worthy in any degree, or not in that degree in which he expects to be praised for them; who sets his character upon the frivolous ornaments of dress and equipage, or upon the equally frivolous accomplishments of ordinary behaviour. (TMS 309)

Then what makes the qualitative difference between the concept of praise and of praiseworthiness?

Smith finds the answer to this question from the concept of “conscience”. He says that there are metaphorically two tribunals:

[T]hough man has, in this manner, been rendered the immediate judge of mankind, he has been rendered so only in the first instance; and an appeal lies from his sentence to a much higher tribunal, to the tribunal of their own consciences. (TMS 130)

That is, according to him, praise comes from the “immediate judge of mankind”, but praiseworthiness comes from a “much higher tribunal” called “their own consciences”.

Smith describes “their own consciences” using various expressions: “the supposed impartial and well-informed spectator”, “the man within the breast”, “the great judge and arbiter of their conduct”, the “inmate of the breast”, the “abstract man”, the “representative of mankind”, the “substitute of the Deity”, and “the supreme judge of all their actions” (TMS 130). And the most striking expressions among them are the great “demigod within the breast” and “God within us” (TMS 131; TMS 166). All of these expressions show that Smith’s concept of conscience is not merely an internalized version of general rules but an idealization of human being.

In my view, Smith here goes too far to establish the self-sufficient standard of morality which replaces the concept of intersubjective propriety. In order to establish the standard, he is inevitably required to introduce a supernatural concept of final cause into his moral philosophy.
5.6. Conclusion: The Irony of Smith’s Naturalism

It has been well recognized that in The Theory of Moral Sentiments Smith frequently mentions “the wisdom of God” or “final cause”. He seems to introduce the teleological explanation. According to him, there are “the two great purposes of nature, the support of the individual, and the propagation of the species”, and the former is operated by “efficient” cause, and the latter by “final cause” (TMS 87). And he gives us an example of “the watch-maker”:

The wheels of the watch are all admirably adjusted to the end for which it was made, the pointing of the hour. All their various motions conspire in the nicest manner to produce this effect. … Yet we never ascribe any such desire or intention to them, but to the watch-maker, and we know that they are put into motion by a spring, which intends the effect it produces as little as they do. (TMS 87)

His example is clearly referring to the teleological view. And he continues to explain the operations of mind in the same way:

[I]n accounting for those of the mind we are very apt to confound these two different things with one another. When by natural principles we are led to advance those ends, which a refined and enlightened reason would recommend to us, we are very apt to impute to that reason, as to their efficient cause, the sentiments and actions by which we advance those ends, and to imagine that to be the wisdom of man, which in reality is the wisdom of God. Upon a superficial view, this cause seems sufficient to produce the effects which are ascribed to it; and the system of human nature seems to be more simple and agreeable when all its different operations are in this manner deduced from a single principle. (TMS 87)

That is, according to Smith, our sentiments and intended actions are also governed by two different causes: “the wisdom of man” and “the wisdom of God”. He here contrasts the explanation by efficient cause as “a superficial view” to the explanation by final cause “in reality”.

The crucial question is whether the concepts of “the wisdom of God” or “final cause”, which Smith frequently refers to, serve any real purpose in his moral theory (Otteson 2002, 240). As Hobbes does, he might refer to them rhetorically. There is in fact a scholarly consensus that Smith’s teleological explanation does not do any real work in his moral philosophy. Smith’s concept of God can merely be replaced by the concept of nature.

However, as we have seen in the previous section, the qualitative difference between the concept of praise and of praiseworthiness is best understood when we accept Smith’s teleological explanation (Otteson 2002, 256; Hanley 2009, 141). Especially his expressions such as “the great demigod within the breast” and “God within us” support this reading.

Like Hume, Smith does not accept the concept of moral sense, “a unique cognitive capacity that is innate to all humans”, which was proposed by Hutcheson (TMS 134). Instead Smith attempts to give an account of the nature of moral practice on the basis of his understanding of sympathy. That is, according to him, we do not

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need to postulate any supernatural concept like moral sense in order to explain our moral practice. Our natural capacity to imagine myself being in others’ situation is enough to give an account of the nature of moral experience. Ironically, however, he ends up with introducing a supernatural concept of “final cause” into his moral philosophy in order to establish the self-sufficient standard of morality which replaces the concept of intersubjective propriety.

This chapter has critically examined Smith’s ambitious project of solving the Problem of Other Minds and establishing his epistemology solely based on the principle of sympathy. However, first, his suggestion that we can form an idea of other minds by the principle of sympathy is rejected when we consider that he fails to overcome the Cartesian dualism. Second, his aim to establish the self-sufficient moral standard, which replaces Hume’s inter-subjective moral standard formed by the use of general rules, ends up with introducing a supernatural concept of “final cause” into his moral philosophy. Hence, in this respect, we cannot say that Smith’s alternative way of understanding of sympathy is more successful than Hume’s way of understanding of sympathy. Rather, Hume’s suggestion that the limitation of the nature of sympathy ought to be corrected by the use of general rules seems to be more naturalistic and plausible.

Now we turn back to Hume’s philosophy. As we have seen in Chapters 3 and 4, Hume’s concepts of sympathy and reflection play a crucial role in his moral philosophy. However, we will learn that those concepts play the same crucial role in his aesthetics and political philosophy as well. Let’s first examine the role of sympathy and reflection in his aesthetics in the next chapter.
Chapter 6. The Role of True Judges and Rules of Art

When Book I and Book II of the Treatise were published in 1739, the advertisement of the Treatise stated: “The reader must only observe, that all the subjects I have there plann’d out to myself, are not treated of in these two volumes. ... If I have the good fortune to meet with success, I shall proceed to the examination of Morals, Politics, and Criticism; which will compleat this Treatise of Human Nature”. According to this advertisement, he was planning to publish five volumes of the Treatise: “Of the Understanding”, “Of the passions”, “Of Morals”, “Of Politics”, and “Of Criticism”. Following his original plan, Book 3, “Of Morals” of the Treatise was published in 1740. However, unfortunately, his original plan of writing other two volumes – “Of Criticism” and “Of Politics” – did not come to fruition. This is because of the commercial failure of the three volumes of the Treatise. He memorably reflects in “My Own Life” about the reception of the Treatise: “Never literary attempt was more unfortunate than my Treatise of Human Nature. It fell dead-born from the press, without reaching such distinction, as even to excite a murmure among the zealots.”

In Chapters 3 and 4, we have examined Hume’s moral philosophy. Following the principle that “the science of man is the only solid foundation for the other sciences”, he first established the general rules of human nature as a logic of probability in Book 1 (T intro. 7, SBN xvi). He then established the general rules of morals by the use of the logic of probability in Book 3. In this chapter and the next, I turn to the cases of art and political theory, and aim to show that the same principle plays an essential in his aesthetics and political philosophy.

This chapter examines Hume’s aesthetics based on his essay “Of the Standard of Taste”. He begins his essay by introducing subjectivism about taste which, according to him, “gives the sentiment of beauty and deformity, vice and virtue (EPM Appx. 1.21, SBN 294). Subjectivists would argue that there is “the great variety of taste” among us – we often disagree about whether something is beautiful or not. That is, our judgment of beauty on the basis of taste is subjective because “Beauty is no quality in things themselves; it exists merely in the mind that contemplates them; and each mind perceives a different beauty” (ST 230). Thus, according to them, it is impossible to establish the standard of taste due to its subjectivity.

Although Hume accepts that beauty does not exist in objects but in the mind, he himself does not advocate subjectivism. This is because he holds that there are good examples which show that there exists a standard of taste: “Whoever would assert an equality of genius and elegance between OGLILBY and MILTON, or BUNYAN and ADDISON, would be thought to defend no less an extravagance, than if he had maintained a mole-hill to be as high as TENERIFFE, or a pond as extensive as the ocean” (ST 230-231). Evidently, people would agree that Vincent’s paintings are more beautiful than a 3-year-old child’s. Thus, Hume argues that even though it is true that our aesthetic judgment is subjective in the sense that beauty does not exist in objects but in the mind, he holds that we can establish the standard of taste concerning beauty.

There are two influential interpretations of the standard of taste: the ideal critics interpretation and the elite critics interpretation. James Shelley defends the former, arguing that Hume’s standard of taste should be understood as perfection. According to him, a true judge is a perfect critic, not an actual person. In contrast, Paul Guyer holds that true judges are not ideal but real human beings – a kind of elite group that plays a canonical
role in establishing and leading a standard of taste in their contemporary society. This chapter argues that both interpretations have interpretative flaws, and moreover fail to place Hume’s aesthetics in his whole philosophical picture, due to their exclusive focus on his aesthetics.

A recent interpretation sheds light on the connection between Hume’s aesthetics and his general philosophical enterprise. According to Timothy Costelloe, we need to understand what Hume means by “general rules”, with which he equates the standard of taste. In order to clarify the meaning of general rules in Hume’s aesthetics, Costelloe scrutinizes the discussion of general rules in his epistemology, arguing that he distinguishes philosophical reflection from ordinary reflection. For Hume – Costelloe argues – philosophical general rules which are abstracted by philosophical reflection are qualitatively different from those which are formed by ordinary reflection in that the former but not the latter take a pure or ideal form. Costelloe concludes that just as philosophical general rules are characterized as an ideal form, so rules of art are also characterized as an ideal form which is abstracted by aesthetic reflection.

I defend Costelloe’s basic insight into the importance of understanding Hume’s notion of general rules, but argue that his understanding of philosophical general rules as an ideal form is mistaken because according to Hume, philosophical reflection itself can be erroneous. It is important to note that as we have seen in chapter 4, he characterizes general rules as a logic of probability in the Treatise. Thus, Costelloe’s subsequent assertion that rules of art formed by aesthetic reflection of true judges is an ideal form is also mistaken because aesthetic reflection of true judges can also be erroneous. For Hume, a hypothesis which has been built by scientific reflection needs to pass the test of empirical experiments in order to be established as a scientific theory. Similarly, he argues that in order for rules of art to get their own authority they should pass the test of mankind. Thus, I would argue that the role of reflection of true judges should be confined to observing the causal relation between certain qualities in objects and the sentiment of beauty of mankind. My conclusion is that a potential rule of art is confirmed as a rule of art when it passes the test of “the uniform consent and experience of nations and ages.”

6.1. Ideal Critics Interpretation

In his famous paper “Ethical Absolutism and the Ideal Observer,” Roderick Firth introduced his Ideal Observer Theory as a solution to a problem in metaethics. In response to the moral relativists’ view that ethical statements are relative, Firth proposes that ethical statements can be analysed dispositionally: “it construes ethical statements to assert that a certain being (or beings), either actual or hypothetical, is (or are) disposed to react to something in a certain way” (Firth 1952, 320). For example, a statement of the form ‘x is right’ can be analysed as follows: “such and such a being, if it existed, would react to x in such and such a way if such and such conditions were realized” (Firth 1952, 320). And then he introduces the concept of ideal observer to the dispositional analysis of the statement of the form ‘x is right’: “Any ideal observer would react to x in such and such a way under such and such conditions” (Firth 1952, 329). Here, the ideal observer that Firth introduces is omniscient with respect to non-ethical facts, omnipercipient, disinterested, dispassionate, consistent and, in other respects, normal (Firth 1952, 333-345). Because of these idealistic characteristics, the ideal observer cannot be an actual person: “it is to be expected, consequently, that any plausible description of an ideal
observer will be a partial description of God, if God is conceived to be an infallible moral judge” (Firth 1952, 333).

Firth’s dispositional analysis can be applicable to aesthetic judgments of the form “x is beautiful” in the same way as to ethical statements of the form “x is right”. That is, a statement of the form ‘x is beautiful’ can be analysed as follows: “such and such a being, if it existed, would react to x in such and such a way if such and such conditions were realized” (Firth 1952, 320). Interestingly, Hume seems to address the dispositional analysis of the causal relation between certain qualities in objects and the sentiment of beauty in observers:

The mind of man is so formed by nature that, upon the appearance of certain characters, dispositions, and actions, it immediately feels the sentiments of approbation or blame; nor are there any emotions more essential to its frame and constitution. (EHU 8. 35, SBN 102)

Though it be certain, that beauty and deformity, more than sweet and bitter, are not qualities in objects, but belong entirely to the sentiment, internal or external; it must be allowed, that there are certain qualities in objects, which are fitted by nature to produce those particular feelings. (ST 235)

In these passages, he seems to say that some objects are disposed by nature to produce the sentiments of approbation or blame as a causal response to certain qualities in objects in observers. He characterizes those observers as having the five traits: delicacy of taste, practice, comparison, freedom from prejudice, and good sense. And he calls a person who has these five traits a true judge (ST 241). Thus, it seems to be quite plausible to interpret a true judge as an ideal observer. In this sense, Stephanie Ross says, “Though rational reconstructions of Hume’s view by contemporary aestheticians can pull in different directions, there is good reason to view Hume as a progenitor of the IAO [ideal aesthetic observer] tradition” (Ross 2011, 516).

In his paper “Hume’s Double Standard of Taste,” James Shelley interprets Hume’s true judge as an ideal being like Firth’s ideal observers. According to Shelley, for Hume, a true judge is a perfect critic that an actual person cannot be:

We should also note that Hume generally refers to the five characteristics of true judges as “perfections” (pp. 236-241): as such they are not qualities which all of us possess to some degree or other, but like all perfections are qualities which are either possessed in full or not at all. … Because the five characteristics which they would possess are apparently the only ones required to free a person from the “imperfections” under which “the generality of men labour” (p. 241), we must acknowledge that any person combining all five would be a perfect critic – a “true judge” who can never be wrong. (Shelley 1994, 439-440)

Among the five characteristics, he pays attention to “delicacy of taste” in order to argue that a true judge is an ideal being. First, he introduces Hume’s definition of delicacy of taste: “Where the organs are so fine, as to allow nothing to escape them; and at the same time so exact as to perceive every ingredient in the composition: this we call delicacy of taste” (ST 235, his emphasis). By the definition of delicacy of taste, a true judge is not supposed to make any mistake at all when it comes to delicacy of taste.

Then, he examines Hume’s version of the parable of Sancho’s kinsmen in Don Quixote. He argues that Hume changed the original parable in order to show that actual human beings cannot be perfect by emphasizing “the
wrongness of the kinsmen’s verdicts” (Shelley 1994, 439):

In Cervantes’s tale we read that one wine-taster simply remarked that “the wine had the flavor of iron,” while the other said that “it had a stronger flavor of cordovan leather.” But in Hume’s account we read that one kinsmen “pronounces the wine to be good, were it not for the small taste of leather,” while the other “gives also his verdict in favor of the wine but with the reserve of a taste of iron” (p. 235). Thus in Don Quixote the kinsmen simply note the taste of the foreign substances, while in Hume’s essay each incorrectly asserts that the wine would be good if it weren’t for the presence of one of the foreign flavors. (Shelley 1994, 439)

According to his interpretation, Hume shows the imperfection of the kinsmen because both of them fail to catch the whole foreign substances. From this, he concludes, “So perhaps one reason Hume changes the parable is to indicate that true judges are ideal: if Sancho’s fabulous kinsmen do not possess delicacy of taste, nobody does; if they can sometimes be wrong, everybody can” (Shelley 1994, 439).

However, I think his argument goes too far. In my view, there is a logical gap between the statement that both of them fail to catch the whole foreign substances and the conclusion that true judges are ideal. That is, the conclusion that true judges are ideal does not follow from the statement that both of them fail to catch the whole foreign substances. It is true that both of kinsmen fail to catch the whole foreign substances. But it does not violate Hume’s definition of delicacy of taste: “Where the organs are so fine, as to allow nothing to escape them; and at the same time so exact as to perceive every ingredient in the composition: this we call delicacy of taste” (ST 235, his emphasis). This is because both of them demonstrated their own delicacy of taste in their own specific areas. We can naturally guess that one of the kinsmen is an expert about leather and the other an expert about iron. And both of them very successfully caught the taste of the foreign substances in their own areas.

According to Hume, there exist blameless disagreements between true judges. And I think both of the kinsmen’s statements are such cases. One kinsman “pronounces the wine to be good, were it not for the small taste of leather,” and the other “gives also his verdict in favor of the wine but with the reserve of a taste of iron” (ST 235), but their disagreements are blameless. Rather, their joint verdict becomes the true standard of taste of wine. In my view, the reason why Hume introduces the parable of Sancho’s kinsmen in Don Quixote is because he wants to put emphasis on the importance of the joint verdict of true judges: “The joint verdict of such [true judges], wherever they are to be found, is the true standard of taste and beauty” (ST 241). The following passage shows that Hume regards the verdict of Sancho’s kinsmen as the verdict of true judges:

To produce these general rules or avowed patterns of composition is like finding the key with the leathern thong; which justified the verdict of SANCHO’S kinsmen, and confounded those pretended judges who had condemned them. Though the hogshead had never been emptied, the taste of the one was still equally delicate, that of the other equally dull and languid. (ST 235)

Therefore, unlike Shelley’s interpretation that “one reason Hume changes the parable is to indicate that true judges are ideal” I believe that he introduces the parable in order to emphasize the role of the joint verdict of real true judges in establishing the standard of taste. Now we come to know that although Hume’s concept of true judge seems to have an affinity with Firth’s concept of ideal observer, there is a significant difference
between them in that Firth’s ideal observer is an ideal and hypothetical person but Hume’s true judge is a real person in a society.

Let me clarify my position at this point. I am not against describing true judges as ideal. As we have seen in the Quixote parable, both kinsmen deserve to be called ideal in the sense that both of them very successfully caught the taste of the foreign substances in their own areas. What I disagree with is Shelley and Firth’s concept of “ideal”. They define “ideal” as perfection, which is not achievable to any real human being. Hume says, “though the principles of taste be universal, and nearly, if not entirely the same in all men; yet few are qualified to give judgment on any work of art, or establish their own sentiment as the standard of beauty” (ST 241). And he continues, “some men in general, however difficult to be particularly pitched upon, will be acknowledged by universal sentiment to have a preference above others” (ST 242). It seems clear that Hume believes that there are a few real true judges in the world. So, let’s now think about the causal relation between certain qualities in objects and the sentiment of beauty in observers from the perspective of true judge as a real human being.

6.2. Elite Critics Interpretation

Unlike Shelley, Paul Guyer holds that true judges are not ideal but real human beings. He says that they “are clearly actual persons and not idealized roles to which we can aspire” (Guyer 2016, 518). And he continues that they are a kind of elite group that plays a canonical role in establishing and leading the standard of taste in their contemporary society. He pays attention to the following passage in Hume’s essay “Of the Standard of Taste”:

Though men of delicate taste be rare, they are easily to be distinguished in society by the soundness of their understanding, and the superiority of their faculties above the rest of mankind. The ascendant, which they acquire, gives a prevalence to the lively approbation with which they receive any productions of genius, and renders it generally predominant. Many men, when left to themselves, have but a faint and dubious perception of beauty, who yet are capable of relishing any fine stroke which is pointed out to them (ST 249).

In this passage, Hume seems to make a contrast between “men of delicate taste” and “the rest of mankind”. “Men of delicate taste” are rare and superior to the rest of mankind in their faculties. By contrast, “The rest of mankind” have only a faint and dubious perception of beauty but can relish any fine stroke which is pointed out to them by the “men of delicate taste”.

Guyer focuses on the superiority of true judges, which is characterized by the five traits: delicacy of taste, practice, comparison, freedom from prejudice, and good sense. Those who have these five characteristics are rare but play a canonical role in establishing and leading the standard of taste in their contemporary society:

His argument is that even though beauty is a matter of sentiment, not an objective property, there is nevertheless considerable uniformity among the sentiments of the best qualified critics throughout history, and the works that have withstood the test of critical time and come to constitute a canon will indeed be found enjoyable by the rest of us even though we do not have all of the attainments of those critics—once again, the many are “capable of relishing any fine stroke, which is pointed out to them” (Guyer 2016, 514).
Guyer’s argument can by summarized as follows:

(1) There is considerable uniformity among the sentiments of the best qualified critics throughout history.

(2) When some works have withstood the test of critical time, they come to constitute a canon.

(3) The rest of us will enjoy the works when they are pointed out as a canon to us by the critics.

Although the best qualified critics are rare, they can achieve considerable uniformity of their sentiments throughout history. They endorse some works as a canon on the basis of their shared sentiments. And then the rest of mankind start enjoying the works because they are pointed out as a canon by the best qualified critics.

In the statement (2) of his argument, Guyer says that the crucial requirement for some works to constitute a canon is to pass the test of critical time. And he describes the test of critical time as follows:

it is often the case that the true merits—and perhaps even more often—the true demerits of a work are not obvious to anyone in the first generation of its audience as well as producer, and that only the actual judgments of subsequent critics—not the timeless conclusions of an ideal observer—will establish the work’s canonical status. As Blair said, “Time overthrows the illusions of opinion,” or, as a more recent writer has put it, “Time is a reliable filter for passing fads and poor judgments, but time does not work this effect by itself, but only by the cumulative efforts of generations of actual critics” (Guyer 1993, 63).

Thus, according to Guyer, the test of critical time means “the cumulative efforts of generations of actual critics” through time. And it allows some works to enter the canon for the rest of mankind.

However, Guyer’s understanding of the test of critical time is mistaken because, according to Hume, the test is not carried out by the generations of actual critics but by the rest of mankind. Let’s take a close look at Hume’s account of the test of time:

And nothing has been experienced more liable to the revolutions of chance and fashion than these pretended decisions of science. The case is not the same with the beauties of eloquence and poetry. Just expressions of passion and nature are sure, after a little time, to gain public applause, which they maintain for ever (ST 242).

It is seldom or never found, when a false taste in poetry or eloquence prevails among any people, that it has been preferred to a true, upon comparison and reflection. It commonly prevails merely from ignorance of the true, and from the want of perfect models, to lead men into a juster apprehension, and more refined relish of those productions of genius. When these appear, they soon unite all suffrages in their favour, and, by their natural and powerful charms, gain over, even the most prejudiced, to the love and admiration of them. The principles of every passion, and of every sentiment, is in every man; and when touched properly, they rise to life, and warm the heart, and convey that satisfaction, by which a work of genius is distinguished from the adulterate beauties of a capricious wit and fancy (Of Eloquence 107).

Although it is true that in order for some works to enter the canon they need to be pointed out to the rest of
mankind by true judges, the crucial element which makes them constitute the canon is the rest of mankind’s universal approval on them. Hume says that the models and principles “have been established by the uniform consent and experience of nations and ages” (ST 237). We can say that when some works have withstood the test of the rest of mankind and have been approved by them through time, they enter the canon. Thus, against Guyer’s assertion, the test of critical time is not carried out by true judges but by the rest of mankind. The role of true judges should be confined in introducing some works which they regard as canonical to the rest of mankind.

This conclusion leads us to think about Guyer’s other assertion that “the standard of taste is represented not by majority rule but by the preferences of the most qualified critics” (Guyer 1993, 39):

It might seem as if it is a simple matter of majority rule: that is naturally pleasing which is usually pleasing. Just as the true color (or other secondary quality) of an object, though it is also a characteristic of our response to an object rather than an ontologically objective property of it, is that which is usually perceived, so the standard aesthetic response to an object would seem to be the most common response to it. … However, Hume does not reduce the normative to the normal, or the standard of taste to usual preferences, Rather, the “finer emotions of the mind are of a very tender and delicate nature, and require the concurrence of many favorable circumstances to make them play with facility and exactness, according to their general and established principles” (ST, p. 237); and it is not the preferences which are normally found but only those found in such favorable circumstances which determine the norm or standard of taste. Only “the joint verdict” of those whose preferences are formed in maximally favorable circumstances—which may be minimally frequent—“is the true verdict of taste and beauty” (Guyer 1993, 39).

If my interpretation that the test of critical time is not carried out by true judges but by the rest of mankind is right, the standard of taste cannot be established simply by the preferences of the most qualified critics because they need to be tested by the rest of mankind through time. Thus, Guyer’s assertion that “the standard of taste is represented not by majority rule but by the preferences of the most qualified critics” is also mistaken. The conclusion is the opposite. The standard of taste is represented not by the preferences of the most qualified critics but “by the uniform consent and experience of nations and ages” (ST 237). If Guyer’s understanding of the role of true judges is misguided, what is the proper understanding of it? Let’s think about it in the next section.

6.3. The Role of True Judges

In order to understand the role of true judges properly, we need to recognize Hume’s distinction between “particular facts” and “general facts” (EHU 12.30, SBN 164). According to him, Matters of Fact can be divided into particular facts and general facts. Let’s start from examining his distinction between Relations of Ideas and Matters of Facts.

In his book An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, Hume says “All the objects of human reason or enquiry may naturally be divided into two kinds, to wit, Relations of Ideas and Matters of Fact” (EHU 4.1). And
he first explains Relations of Ideas as follows:

Of the first kind [Relations of Ideas] are the sciences of Geometry, Algebra, and Arithmetic; and in short, every affirmation which is either intuitively or demonstratively certain. *That the square of the hypothenuse is equal to the square of the two sides*, is a proposition which expresses a relation between these figures. *That three times five is equal to the half of thirty*, expresses a relation between these numbers. Propositions of this kind are discoverable by the mere operation of thought, without dependence on what is anywhere existent in the universe (EHU 4.1, SBN 25).

That is, we can say that the knowledge of this relation can be attained by reasonings *a priori*.

By contrast, “Matters of fact, which are the second objects of human reason, are not ascertained in the same manner [as Relations of Ideas]” (EHU 4.2, SBN 25). This is because “in reasonings from causation, and concerning matters of fact, this absolute necessity cannot take place, and the imagination is free to conceive both sides of the question” (T 1.3.7.3, SBN 95). In the *Enquiry*, he says as follows:

*That the sun will not rise to-morrow* is no less intelligible a proposition, and implies no more contradiction than the affirmation, *that it will rise*. We should in vain, therefore, attempt to demonstrate its falsehood. Were it demonstratively false, it would imply a contradiction, and could never be distinctly conceived by the mind (EHU 4.2, SBN 56).

That is, “the knowledge of this relation is not, in any instance, attained by reasonings *a priori*; but arises entirely from experience, when we find, that any particular objects are constantly conjoined with each other” (EHU 4.6, SBN 27). When it comes to Matters of Fact, only experience has its own authority: “It is only experience, which teaches us the nature and bounds of cause and effect, and enables us to infer the existence of one object from that of another” (EHU 12.29, SBN 164). Thus, he concludes that “causes and effects [of matters of fact] are discoverable, not by reason, but by experience” (EHU 4.7, SBN 28).

Hume names our reasonings concerning causes and effects of matters of fact *moral reasoning*: “It is only experience, which teaches us the nature and bounds of cause and effect, and enables us to infer the existence of one object from that of another. Such is the foundation of moral reasoning, which forms the greater part of human knowledge, and is the source of all human action and behaviour” (EHU 12.29, SBN 164). And then he divides the objects of moral reasoning into particular and general facts:

*Moral reasonings are either concerning particular or general facts*. All deliberations in life regard the former ... The science, which treat of general facts, are politics, natural philosophy, physic, chymistry, etc. where the qualities, causes, and effects of a whole species of objects are enquired into (EHU 12.30-31, SBN 164-165).

That is, the objects of our *moral reasoning concerning particular facts* are all our deliberations in common life, while the objects of our *moral reasoning concerning general facts* are the qualities, causes, and effects of a whole species of objects, which are the subjects of science.

Now, then, Hume examines whether or not *morals and criticism* can be properly the objects of moral reasoning:

Morals and criticism are not so properly objects of the understanding as of taste and sentiment.
Beauty, whether moral or natural, is felt, more properly than perceived. Or if we reason concerning it, and endeavor to fix its standard, we regard a new fact, to wit, the general taste of mankind, or some such fact, which may be the object of reasoning and enquiry (EHU 12.33, SBN 165).

At first glance, morals and criticism do not seem to be the proper objects of moral reasoning because, from the perspective of particular facts in everyday life, beauty is something to be felt rather than perceived. But, from the perspective of general facts in experimental observation, we can still reason concerning feelings of beauty and try to establish “the general taste of mankind” as “a new fact”. That is, for Hume, although morals and criticism are not so properly the objects of moral reasoning concerning particular facts, they are the proper objects of moral reasoning concerning general facts.

Much attention should be given to Hume’s distinction between “moral reasoning concerning particular facts” and “moral reasoning concerning general facts”. In his essay “Of Commerce”, he gives a more detailed account of his distinction between them using the terms, “particular deliberations” and “general reasonings”:

When a man deliberates concerning his conduct in any particular affair, and forms schemes in politics, trade, economy, or any business in life, he never ought to draw his arguments too fine, or connect too long a chain of consequences together. … But when we reason upon general subjects, one may justly affirm, that our speculations can scarcely ever be too fine, provided they be just. … This therefore makes the difference between particular deliberations and general reasonings, and renders subtlety and refinement much more suitable to the latter than to the former. (E 254-255)

According to him, there are two types of people: “shallow thinkers” and “abstruse thinkers” (E 253). He explains, “the difference between a common man and a man of genius is chiefly seen in the shallowness or depth of the principles upon which they proceed” (E 254).

Hence, those who deal with general reasonings are abstruse thinkers since general reasonings are intricate and need “solid understanding”:

General reasonings seem intricate, merely because they are general; nor is it easy for the bulk of mankind to distinguish, in a great number of particulars, that common circumstance in which they all agree, or to extract it, pure and unmixed, from the other superfluous circumstances. Every judgment or conclusion, with them, is particular. They cannot enlarge their view to those universal propositions, which comprehend under them an infinite number of individuals, and include a whole science in a single theorem. Their eye is confounded with such an extensive prospect; and the conclusions, derived from it, even though clearly expressed, seem intricate and obscure. (E 254)

And he specifies abstruse thinkers as including philosophers and politicians: “it is the chief business of philosophers to regard the general course of things. I may add, that it is also the chief business of politicians; especially in the domestic government of the state, where the public good, which is, or ought to be their object, depends on the concurrence of a multitude of causes” (E 254). That is, the chief business of philosophers and politicians are to establish general rules concerning causal relationships among particular facts. From this, we can make a very good guess that Hume would also add that establishing “the general taste of mankind” is the chief business of true judges since if there are any persons who qualify as abstruse thinkers in the area of
aesthetics, they are true judges.

At this point, it is important to understand that the relation between art objects and our taste or sentiment of beauty is causal. As Jeffrey Wieand points out, “the object causes in us the sentiment of beauty. Hence Hume’s rules of art are causal rules” (Wieand 1984, 132). This is the reason why Hume says as follows:

It is evident that none of the rules of composition [or the rules of art] are fixed by reasonings a priori, or can be esteemed abstract conclusions of the understanding, from comparing those habitudes and relations of ideas, which are eternal and immutable. Their foundation is the same with that of all the practical sciences, experience; nor are they any thing but general observations, concerning what has been universally found to please in all countries and in all ages (ST. 231).

Hume here emphasizes that the foundation of the rules of art is the same with that of all the practical sciences. And what is required to establish the rules of art is make general observations on the causal relation between certain qualities in objects and the sentiment of beauty of mankind.

Hence, now we can derive the role of true judges. As scientists make observations on the causal relation between objects and try to generalize the rules of objects, true judges make observations on the causal relation between certain qualities in art objects and the sentiment of beauty of mankind and try to generalize the rules of art:

It appears, then, that amidst all the variety and caprice of taste, there are certain general principles of approbation or blame, whose influence a careful eye may trace in all operations of the mind. … In each creature there is a sound and a defective state; and the former alone can be supposed to afford us a true standard of taste and sentiment. If, in the sound state of the organ, there be an entire or a considerable uniformity of sentiment among men, we may thence derive an idea of the perfect beauty. (ST 238)

At the level of particular facts, it seems that there are “all the variety and caprice of taste”. But if true judges observe them at the level of general facts with “a careful eye”, they could establish “general principles of approbation or blame … in all operations of the mind” since the general principles are “not so much from the operation of each particular beauty, as from the durable admiration which attends those works that have survived all the caprices of mode and fashion, all the mistakes of ignorance and envy” (ST 237). Hence, we can conclude that, unlike Guyer’s assertion that the standard of taste is represented by the preferences of true judges, the standard of taste is represented by “the general taste of mankind” which is observed and generalized by true judges.

Some people might complain that this line of interpretation makes true judges causal experts, and that seems very odd. On this picture, they would argue, it doesn’t seem that true judges need to be good at anything other than establishing causal relationships and so do not even need to have a particular interest in art themselves. In my view, this objection seems flawed because in order for true judges to establish causal relationships between art objects and responses in art-perceivers, they need delicacy of taste and huge amount of practice in observing and comparing them, which usually require their particular interest in art themselves.

If we consider Henry Home’s aesthetic theory, we come to know that this line of interpreting true judges as
causal experts was a popular view at the time. As is well known, Henry Home, Lord Kames, was a relative of David Hume and was called by Hume the “best Friend, in every respect, I ever possesst” (NL 1745). And his aesthetic theory is known strongly influenced by Hume’s essay “Of the Standard of Taste” (Zuckert 2009, 148; Jones 2005, xv). His work Elements of Criticism, which was published in 1762, was extremely popular and influential at the time and for a century after, particularly in Germany (Zuckert 2009, 148; Jones 2005, xvii-xviii).

In Lectures on Logic, after arguing that aesthetics deals with “the laws of sensibility”, which are empirical, but logic deals with “the laws of the understanding and of reason”, which are a priori, Kant wrote:

The philosopher Baumgarten in Frankfurt had a plan for an aesthetic as a science. But Home, more correctly, called aesthetics critique, since it yields no rules a priori that determine judgment sufficiently, as logic does, but instead derives its rules a posteriori, and since it only makes more universal, through comparison, the empirical laws according to which we cognize the more perfect (beautiful) and the more imperfect” (Kant 1992, 530)

Kant here understands Home’s view as arguing that the empirical laws concerning aesthetics are established as universal a posteriori through observation and comparison, which means that, in this view, true judges are causal experts who establish the universal causal relationships through observation and comparison. Therefore, in my view, there is no reason to regard the causal expert interpretation as odd because at that time it was a popularly accepted view.

In sum, for Hume, true judges are causal experts dealing with mankind’s taste as general facts. That is, they try to establish general rules of arts by observing the relation between art objects and responses in art perceivers. Hence, we move to the next section and examine the general rules interpretation that for Hume, general rules of arts are the standard of taste.

6.4. General Rules Interpretation

As we have seen in Chapter 6.1 and 6.2, Shelley and Guyer focus on interpreting Hume’s concept of “true judge”, and their interpretations have flaws and fail to place Hume’s aesthetics in his general philosophy. However, a recent interpretation sheds light on the connection between Hume’s aesthetics and his general philosophical enterprise. Costelloe argues, “Commentators have not paid sufficient attention to the fact that Hume himself characterizes the standard in terms of a general rule, and have thus overlooked the possibility that clarifying this concept could shed light on the kind of standard Hume aims to discover” (Costelloe 2007, 21). Given that in his essay “Of the Standard of Taste,” Hume frequently equates the standard of taste with “rules of art” or “general rules of beauty”, in order to understand the concept of “rules of art” it is natural to ask what Hume means by “general rules”. For the clarification of the meaning of general rules in Hume’s aesthetics, Costelloe scrutinizes the discussion of general rules in his epistemology. I agree with the general direction of his strategy. Hence, this section critically examines Costelloe’s understanding of “general rules” in the Treatise and of “rules of art” in “Of the Standard of Taste”. And then my own understanding will be suggested.

Costelloe starts his argumentation by pointing out the fact that “commentators who focus on Hume’s
characterization of the standard in terms of a rule generally regard it as an inductive generalization, inferred from empirical observation about what has pleased and displeased across time and place” (Costelloe 2007, 5). However, according to him, they make this claim “without paying due attention to” the nature of Hume’s concept of general rules (Costelloe 2007, 5). Hence, he aims to differentiate his understanding of general rules from other commentators’ understanding of general rules as an “inductive generalization, inferred from empirical observation” by examining the nature of general rules in the *Treatise*, where we can find “Hume’s most elaborate discussion of general rules” (Costelloe 2007, 5).

According to Costelloe, there are three types of people in Hume’s system: the wise, the vulgar, and philosophers. And they are further divided into two groups: group of ordinary people and philosophers. The wise and the vulgar belong to the group of ordinary people, contrasted to the group of philosophers. The criterion of the distinction is whether they exercise “ordinary reflection” or “philosophical reflection”. Ordinary people correct their errors of judgment by exercising “ordinary reflection”, while philosophers establish general rules by the use of “philosophical reflection”:

> Philosophy … is a particular application of the general capacity to express formally the principles that organize common life. The difference is that whereas ordinary reflection enables individuals to correct errors of judgment, philosophy corrects by discovering principles, which, as in the case of the clock that will not go, *explain* the phenomenon in question. (Costelloe 2007, 12)

I agree with Costelloe’s distinction between the group of ordinary people, who exercise “ordinary reflection” and the group of philosophers, who use “philosophical reflection”. As we have seen in the previous section, Hume says, “Moral reasonings are either concerning particular or general facts. All deliberations [of ordinary people] in life regard the former … The science [of philosophers], which treat of general facts, are politics, natural philosophy, physic, chymistry, etc. where the qualities, causes, and effects of a whole species of objects are enquired into” (EHU 12.30-31, SBN 164). And his distinction between “particular deliberations” of ordinary people and “general reasonings” of philosophers in his essay “Of Commerce” supports Costelloe’s distinction, I believe (E 254-255).

After making the distinction, Costelloe clarifies the role of philosophers in Hume’s system:

> Thus when Hume delineates the eight rules by which we ought to judge of cause and effect, he is reflecting upon and making explicit what people do implicitly and as a matter of course when they make correct judgments about causal connection. This set of rules or “logic,” as Hume also describes it, is already supplied “by the natural principles of our understanding” (T 1.3.15.11, SBN 175), but is given expression as a set of philosophical rules in their second influence. (Costelloe, 12)

That is, for Hume, Costelloe argues, ordinary people already use general rules implicitly when they make judgments concerning causal connection, but those who establish them explicitly are philosophers.

On the basis of the clarification of the role of philosophers, Costelloe argues that the role of true judges in aesthetics can be explained in the same way if we consider, “delicacy of taste is analogous to judgment in relations of cause and effect, except correct aesthetic judgment – rules by which one ought to judge of beauty and deformity – are formed not on the faculty of understanding, but on that of *taste*” (Costelloe 2007, 13-14).
And he continues:

like the wise man who judges correctly of cause and effect, good taste consists in overcoming the natural weakness of the faculties and the “faint and dubious perception of beauty” that prevails in pre-reflective life (ST 243). It involves following general rules in their second influence that have their basis in experience, and which, grasped through reflection, correct the first influence of general rules that otherwise produces errors of judgment or bad taste. (Costelloe 2007, 14)

Ordinary people, whether they have good taste or not, would exercise general rules of art implicitly in making aesthetic judgments, but those who establish the general rules of art explicitly are true judges. Hence, he concludes, “[true judges’] judgments are manifestations or expressions of standards presupposed by everybody, and explicitly accepted by those with sufficient experience and an educated taste” (Costelloe 2007, 21).

According to him, the true judge can be regarded as “a personification of general rules” (Costelloe 2007, 21). I agree with this line of Costelloe’s argumentation since I believe true judges are the causal experts who establish general rules concerning causal relationships between art objects and responses in ordinary art-perceivers by observation and reflection.

However, I disagree with Costelloe’s characterization of general rules as “ideal”, as opposed to other commentators’ characterization of general rules as “an inductive generalization, inferred from empirical observation about what has pleased and displeased across time and place” (Costelloe 2007, 5). And, thus, I disagree with his interpretation of rules of art as an ideal form as well. Following Hearn and Helm, he distinguishes “philosophical general rules” formed by philosophers’ “philosophical reflection” from the general rules implicitly used in common life by ordinary people’s “ordinary reflection” (Costelloe 2007, 8-11).

According to him, although by reflection ordinary people can correct their prejudiced judgments, which are produced by “general rules in their first influence”, this process of correction need to be understood as exercising “ordinary reflection” in the sense that ordinary people’s reflection can make errors: “As Hume says, ‘review and reflection’ is often required to revise the ‘first opinion’ received from the ‘judgments of our sense’ (T 1.2.4.23, SBN 47), which make errors such as taking a stick in water to be bent, or objects of the ‘same’ size to be equidistant” (Costelloe 2007, 11).

By contrast, Costelloe argues, philosophers’ reflection is qualitatively different from “ordinary reflection”: “Philosophy differs from other reflection in its task of ‘ordering and distinguishing … the operations of the mind’ through ‘a superior penetration, derived from nature, and improved by habit and reflexion’ (EHU 1.13, SBN 13)”. Since philosophical reflection is qualitatively different from ordinary reflection, philosophical general rules formed by philosophical reflection have a qualitatively superior status to the general rules implicitly used in common life by ordinary reflection.

Costelloe then tries to articulate the concept of philosophical general rules by introducing Oakeshott’s definition of rules: “rules are ‘abridgments’ or ‘abstracts of some concrete activity’” (Costelloe 2007, 9). He says, “Since the rules are distilled from practices themselves, the knowledge thus presented takes a pure or ideal form:

26 Hearn names Hume’s second sort of general rules as “reflective rules” (Hearn 1970, 410). And Helm calls them “philosophical general rules” (Helm 1993, 128)
recipes in cookery books depict perfect dishes, as an English grammar presents the key for flawless composition” (Costelloe 2007, 9). And he continues, “since philosophical general rules are abridgments, they are by definition post hoc summaries of the activity they abridge, which they present in ideal form because in practice judgments are not unassailable and mistakes are routinely made” (Costelloe 2007, 13). As we have seen, just as philosophical general rules concerning cause and effect are formed by philosophical reflection, so rules of art are formed by the aesthetic reflection of true judges. Hence, according to him, just as philosophical general rules are characterized as an ideal form which is abstracted from a concrete activity of making judgments concerning cause and effect, so rules of art are characterized as an ideal form which is abstracted from a concrete activity of making aesthetic judgments concerning the causal relationship between art objects and responses in art-perceivers.

However, in my view, this line of characterization of general rules as “ideal” is rejected for two reasons. First, unlike Costelloe’s distinction, for Hume there is no distinction between the general rules implicitly used in common life by ordinary reflection and the philosophical general rules established by philosophical reflection. It is important to note that Hume never uses the expressions like “the first sort of general rules” or “the second sort of general rules”. These expressions were first used by Hearn and then accepted by many commentators.27 Rather, Hume uses the expressions, “the first influence of general rules” and “the second influence of general rules”:

Thus our general rules are in a manner set in opposition to each other. When an object appears, that resembles any cause in very considerable circumstances, the imagination naturally carries us to a lively conception of the usual effect, tho’ the object be different in the most material and most efficacious circumstances from that cause. Here is the first influence of general rules [on the imagination]. But when we take a review of this act of the mind, and compare it [the imagination] with the more general and authentic operations of the understanding, we find it [the imagination] to be of an irregular nature, and destructive of all the most establish’d principles of reasoning; which is the cause of our rejecting it [the imagination]. This is a second influence of general rules [on the understanding], and implies the condemnation of the former. (T 1.3.13.12, SBN 149-150)

Hume here says that our general rules are set in opposition to each other not because there are two opposite kinds of general rules, but because the first influence of general rules on the imagination is rejected by the second influence of general rules on the understanding. That is, the contents of general rules are the same both in the first influence and in the second influence of general rules. The conflict comes from two different “act of the mind”: When the imagination rashly applies general rules to the object which is “different in the most material and most efficacious circumstances from” the cause, its application is reviewed and corrected by “the more general and authentic operations of the understanding”, which properly applies general rules to the cause.

The influence of general rules is best explained by the concept of our “addiction to general rules” (Gill 1996,

27 To the best of my knowledge, Hearn first used the expressions, “the first sort of rule” and “the second sort of rule” for the first time in his paper “General Rules in Hume’s Treatise” (Hearn 1970, 410). And then this distinction between two sort of general rules has been widely accepted by other commentators such as Lorne Falkenstein (Falkenstein 1997), Bennett Helm (1993), Kenneth Winkler (2016), and Costelloe (2007).
34-38). In Book 3 of the *Treatise*, Hume gives a clear description of his conception of our “addiction to general rules”:

[W]e may observe, that the maxim wou’d here be false, that *when the cause ceases, the effect must cease also*. For there is a principle of human nature, which we have frequently taken notice of, that men are mightily addicted to *general rules*, and that we often carry our maxims beyond those reasons, *which first induc’d us to establish them*. Where cases are similar in many circumstances, we are apt to put them on the same footing, without considering, that they differ in the most material circumstances, and that the resemblance is more apparent than real. … *General rules commonly extend beyond the principles, on which they are founded.* (T 3.2.9.3, SBN 551)

Since our imagination is easily influenced by general rules, that is, easily addicted to them, even when a cause ceases, we apply them to the cases “similar in many circumstances” but different “in the most material circumstances”.

Therefore, we can conclude that unlike Costelloe’s interpretation, Hume does not make a distinction between the general rules implicitly used in common life by ordinary reflection and the philosophical general rules established by philosophical reflection. In my view both general rules are the very same kind of rules, which share the same contents. In this sense, I agree with Hickerson’s interpretation of general rules:

Unlike Hearn and Falkenstein, I do not think that we need to understand such conflicts as shaping up between two distinct rules or sets of rules with opposing contents, i.e. ‘a “second” general rule… that condemns a number of “first” ones’. Instead the difference that Hume had in mind between the ‘first’ and ‘second’ influence of the General Rules is precisely the voluntary act of reflection itself, i.e. reflection that may be upon the very same rule or set of rules otherwise only instinctually employed. (Hickerson 2013, 1147)

What makes the difference between “the first influence of general rules” and “the second influence of general rules” is whether we use our imagination or our understanding when it comes to dealing with general rules.

Second, Hume characterizes general rules not as a “pure or *ideal* form” but as a “logic of probability” (Costelloe 2007, 9; Serjeantson 2005, 192). According to Costelloe, philosophical general rules are defined as “post hoc summaries of the activity they abridge, which they present in ideal form because in practice judgments are not unassailable and mistakes are routinely made” (Costelloe 2007, 13). He analogizes philosophical general rules with “recipes in cookery books” which “depict perfect dishes” or “an English grammar” which presents the key for flawless composition” (Costelloe 2007, 9). That is, philosophical general rules themselves are unassailable but our judgments, which are the application of philosophical general rules, are error-prone in practice.

Hume takes general rules as having the form that “all A’s are B’s” (Winkler 2016, 201): the “universal propositions, which comprehend under them an infinite number of individuals, and include a whole science in a single theorem” (E 254). For instance, Hume’s fourth rule is that “The same cause *always* produces the same effect, and the same effect *never* arises but from the same cause” (T 1.3.15.6, SBN 173). The question is how we should understand Hume’s expressions “always” or “never” in this rule. Costelloe seems to understand them as ideal, and hence unassailable since they are *abstracted in ideal form by philosophical reflection*. In my view, his
interpretation is too strong. Hume calls general rules “logic”, but it must not be logic in the same sense as the logic in Aristotelian or Fregean deductive reasoning since his general rules as a logic deal with matters of fact, not relations of idea. Hence, as Serjeantson point out, Hume’s general rules must be understood as “a logic of probability” which is open to errors (Serjeantson 2005, 192).

After characterizing his eight general rules as “all the logic I think proper to employ in my reasoning”, Hume says:

perhaps even this [formulating eight rules explicitly] was not very necessary, but might have been supply’d by the natural principles of our understanding. Our scholastic head-pieces and logicians show no such superiority above the mere vulgar in their reason and ability, as to give us any inclination to imitate them in delivering a long system of rules and precepts to direct our judgment, in philosophy. All the rules of this nature [of our understanding] are very easy in their invention, but extremely difficult in their application; and even experimental philosophy, which seems the most natural and simple of any, requires the utmost stretch of human judgment. (T 1.3.15.11, SBN 175)

Costelloe interprets this passage as saying: “When Hume draws a distinction between the ‘logic’ he employs in his ‘reasoning’ and the ‘natural principles of the understanding’ (T 1.3.15.11), he separates rules in their first influence from rules in their second, and shows how the former are ‘supply’d by’ the latter” (Costelloe 2007, 112). I do not believe that Hume here separates philosophical general rules from the “natural principles of the understanding”. What he says here is that general rules as a logic are already imbedded in “the natural principles of our understanding”. Even “the mere vulgar” use the general rules as a logic implicitly “in their reason and ability”. The difficulty is in establishing those rules explicitly by observation and reflection. This is the role of philosophers and true judges.

In sum, although I disagree with Costelloe’s characterization of general rules as ideal, I agree with his understanding of the role of philosophers and true judges. Their role is in abstracting and establishing general rules explicitly, which are already used implicitly or unreflectively in ordinary people’s common life. Using Hume’s term, philosophers and true judges do “moral reasoning” concerning “general facts” (EHU 12.30, SBN 164).

6.5. The Problem of Two Standards of Taste

Let us now consider one related issue, called the problem of two standards of taste (Selley 1994, 437-438; Wieand 1984,129-131):

It is natural for us to seek a Standard of Taste; a rule, by which the various sentiments of men may be reconciled; at least, a decision, afforded, confirming one sentiment, and condemning another. (ST 229)

By “a rule” Hume refers to what Hume later calls the “rules of art”, while by “a decision” he refers to the “joint verdict” of “true judges” (Selley 1994 438; Wieand 1984, 131). That is, Hume here seems to suggest two different kinds of standard of taste, which seem to be different from each other: the rules of art and the joint verdict of true judges. Then, it is natural to ask which one is his genuine standard and why it is so.
Wieand holds that rules of art are the standard of taste since the joint verdict of true judges can be wrong (Wieand 1984, 139). According to him, rules of art are “causal rules” concerning how “the object causes in us the sentiment of beauty”, but they are formulated in an ideal form (Wieand 1984, 132):

A rule of art … specifies what properties of an object will cause the sentiment of beauty (or deformity) in persons who have good sense, delicacy of taste, are free from prejudice, who practice and make comparisons, and who are not subject to external hindrances or internal disorders. This is not an elitist theory; it is a theory which makes the standard of taste an expression of the best potentialities of human nature. (Wieand 1984, 136).

That is, rules of art are an expression of ideal conditions, under which particular properties of an object cause the sentiment of beauty in persons. However, according to him, the verdicts of real true judges cannot meet these ideal conditions because they can be wrong due to internal disorders or external hindrances in the actual world. Hence, he concludes that rules of art are the standard of taste, and the joint verdict of true judges are confined to “a good guide to what the rules are, and so function as a practical standard of taste” (Wieand 1984, 129).

Wieand then argues Hume’s Quixote parable supports his interpretation that the joint verdicts of true judges can be wrong: “The Quixote parable is instructive in this regard, because although Sancho’s kinsmen both have delicacy of taste, one fails to detect the taste of iron, the other the taste of leather” (Wienand 1984, 139). However, as we have seen in Chapter 6.1, the example of Quixote parable does not support Wieand’s argument because both Sancho’s kinsmen clearly catch the taste of the foreign substances in their own special areas, and hence their joint verdict that if there were not for the small taste of leather and of iron, the wine will be good is very successfully pronounced, which is justified when the hogshead is emptied and the key with the leathern thong is found (ST 235). Hence, Wieand’s interpretation of Hume’s Quixote parable seems flawed.

At this point, we could ask why Wieand believes that the real true judges’ mistakes are so defective as a standard of taste. This is because he characterizes rules of art as ideal conditions, which any real true judge cannot meet. I believe that this characterization is not what Hume meant. In my view, Hume believes that as a group of scientists successfully establish general rules concerning the relationship between cause and effect, a joint verdict of true judges can successfully establish rules of art concerning the causal relationship between art objects and responses in art-perceivers. For him, rules of art are an inductive generalization, which can be called “a logic of probability.”

By contrast, Shelley suggests that the joint verdict of true judges is the standard of taste since Hume doubts that rules of art can be established as the standard of taste:

But where are such critics to be found? By what marks distinguish them from pretenders? These questions are embarrassing; and seem to throw us back into the same uncertainty, from which, during the course of this essay, we have endeavored to extricate ourselves. But if we consider the matter aright, these are questions of fact, not of sentiment. (ST 241-242)

28 Shelley and Wieand share the same interpretation concerning Hume’s Quixote parable, which I believe is mistaken.
Shelley pays attention to Hume’s expression of the “uncertainty”. He points out that the “uncertainty” here is the uncertainty of establishing rules of art. According to him, the reason why Hume was so uncertain of establishing rules of art is because he thought that there is no way to “specify which properties please” by observations (Shelley 1994, 441). Hence, Shelley argues that Hume moves to appealing to the joint verdict of true judges because whereas he “only gives a procedure for formulating the rules of art, he actually specifies the five identifying properties of true judges, from whom we may obtain joint verdicts” (Shelley 1994, 443).

However, textual evidence does not seem to support Shelley’s interpretation. Hume says that there are actually established rules of art (ST 232; 237). He emphasizes that the best way of ascertaining a delicacy of taste is “to appeal to those models and principles, which have been established by the uniform consent and experience of nations and ages”, which means that there already exist established rules of art (ST 237). And he explains how to establish general rules: “Here then the general rules of beauty are of use; being drawn from established models, and from the observation of what pleases or displeases, when presented singly and in a high degree” (ST 235).

Shelley replies to this objection by arguing that Hume “is skeptical that these [established] ‘rules’ are correctly formulated” by pointing out the following passage (Shelley 1994, 444):

[T]hough poetry can never submit to exact truth, it must be confined by rules of art, discovered to the author either by genius or observation. If some negligent or irregular writers have pleased, they have not pleased by their transgressions of rule or order, but in spite of these transgressions: They have possessed other beauties, which were conformable to just criticism. … Did our pleasure really arise from those parts of his poem, which we denominate faults, this would be no objection to criticism in general: It would only be an objection to those particular rules of criticism, which would establish such circumstances to be faults, and would represent them as universally blameable. (ST 231-232)

Shelley argues that the underlined sentence above supports his assertion that Hume “is skeptical that these ‘rules’ are correctly formulated”. However, Shelley does not seem to recognise Hume’s distinction between particular and general rules. In this passage, Hume holds that the pleasure of “some negligent or irregular writers” would only be an objection to those particular rules of criticism, but would be “no objection to criticism in general”. It follows from this that Hume looks sceptical about establishing particular rules, but he is not sceptical in regard to establishing general rules of art. Rather, he is confident of the fact that the pleasure of “some negligent or irregular writers” would not violate the established general rules of art. Therefore, Shelley is mistaken in holding that Hume “is skeptical that these ‘rules’ are correctly formulated”.

Now let us return to my suggestion of understanding true judges as causal experts, which I believe is advantageous to reconciling two standards of taste. In my interpretation, true judges are those who establish rules of art. That is, the joint verdict of true judges and rules of art are like two sides of the same coin since what true judges establish by their verdict is rules of art. In this respect, my interpretation goes with Costelloe’s: “[true judges’] judgments are manifestations or expressions of standards presupposed by everybody, and explicitly accepted by those with sufficient experience and an educated taste” (Costelloe 2007, 21). That is, the true judge is, in a sense, “a personification of general rules” (Costelloe 2007, 21). Hence, I would argue that the issue of two standards of taste is not a real problem because if we properly understand the role of true judges,
we come to know that for Hume, the joint verdict of true judges can be equated with the rules of art. In this respect, the problem of two standards of taste is a pseudo-problem.

6.6. The Role of Sympathy

Lastly, let’s think about the role of sympathy in establishing rules of art. As we have seen in Chapter 6.3, Hume terms our reasonings concerning causes and effects of matters of fact moral reasoning. And he divides the objects of moral reasoning into particular and general facts. According to him, the objects of our moral reasoning concerning particular facts are all our deliberations in common life, while the objects of our moral reasoning concerning general facts are the qualities, causes, and effects of a whole species of objects, which are the subject of science.

We can think of three kinds of causal relations when it comes to the objections of moral reasoning concerning general facts. First, there is one kind of causal relation between two objects. Scientists or philosophers would examine this kind of causal relation between two objects and establish general facts which Hume calls general rules: “Since therefore ‘tis possible for all objects to become causes or effects to each other, it may be proper to fix some general rules, by which we may know when they really are so” (T 1.3.15. 2, SBN 173). Second, there is another kind of causal relation between two individuals. Moral philosophers would examine this kind of causal relation between two individuals and establish general facts which he calls general principles of morals: “As this [the question concerning the general principles of morals] is a question of fact, not of abstract science, we can only expect success, by following the experimental method, and deducing general maxims [of morals] from a comparison of particular instances” (EPM 1.10, SBN 174). Third, there is the other kind of causal relation between an object and an individual. Art critics would examine this kind of causal relation between an object and an individual and establish general facts which he calls general rules of art: the “foundation [of rules of art] is the same with that of all the practical sciences, experience; nor are they any thing but general observations, concerning what has been universally found to please in all countries and in all ages” (ST 236).

In order to establish general rules concerning causal relations, scientists, moral philosophers and art critics should have the capacity of reflection in common. This is because they need to observe particular causal events and distill general rules on the basis of their capacity of reflection. However, art critics (and moral philosophers) would have difficulty in observing particular causal events because the objects of their observation are unobservable human sentiments: “Morals and criticism are not so properly objects of the understanding as of taste and sentiment. Beauty, whether moral or natural, is felt, more properly than perceived” (EHU 12.33, SBN 165).

Then, how can art critics specify which qualities in art objects cause aesthetic sentiments in art-perceivers, hence establishing “the general taste of mankind” or “general rules of art”? This is the place where the role of sympathy is required. In my view, moral philosophers and art critics are required to have a delicate capacity to sympathize with others’ taste. In his essay “Of the Standard of Taste”, Hume gives several examples of sympathizing with others’ taste (ST 244-246). Here is one example:

A young man, whose passions are warm, will be more sensibly touched with amorous and tender
images, than a man more advanced in years, who takes pleasure in wise, philosophical reflections concerning the conduct of life and moderation of the passions. At twenty, OVID may be the favourite author; HORACE at forty; and perhaps TACITUS at fifty. Vainly would we, in such cases, endeavour to enter into the sentiments of others, and divest ourselves of those propensities, which are natural to us. We choose our favourite author as we do our friend, from a conformity of humour and disposition. Mirth or passion, sentiment or reflection; whichever of these most predominates in our temper, it gives us a peculiar sympathy with the writer who resembles us. (ST 244)

And after commenting that the difference of preferences due to “our own age or country” is “innocent and unavoidable”, Hume says, “A man of learning and reflection can make allowance for these peculiarities of manners; but a common audience can never divest themselves so far of their usual ideas and sentiments, as to relish pictures which no wise resemble them” (ST 245). That is, the true judge, a man of learning and reflection, need to have a delicate capacity to sympathize with different types of taste since they are meant to sympathize with various other people to ascertain what they like or dislike.

In the Treatise, Hume explicitly puts emphasis on the role of “delicate sympathy” in making aesthetic judgments:

How considerable a part this is of beauty will easily appear upon reflection. Wherever an object has a tendency to produce pleasure in the possessor, or in other words, is the proper cause of pleasure, it is sure to please the spectator, by a delicate sympathy with the possessor. Most the works of art are esteem’d beautiful, in proportion to their fitness for the use of man, and even many of the productions of nature derive their beauty from that source. Handsome and beautiful, on most occasions, is not an absolute but a relative quality, and pleases us by nothing but its tendency to produce an end that is agreeable (T 3.3.1.8, SBN 576-77).

Hume here makes two points. First, whether the works of art are beautiful or not is determined by “their fitness for the use of man”. The usefulness is an end. And the works of art are a means to meet the end. When they are useful or agreeable to the possessor, they are regarded as beautiful. Second, sympathy is a tool for the spectator to recognize “the proper cause of pleasure” in the possessor of the works of art.

Therefore, we can conclude that it is “by a delicate sympathy” that art critics (and moral philosophers) would be able to make indirect observations of individuals’ actual sentiments. In this sense, it is interesting to note that Hume uses delicacy of taste and delicacy of imagination interchangeably. When Hume says, “Whether any particular person be endowed with good sense and a delicate imagination, free from prejudice, may often be the subject of dispute, and be liable to great discussion and enquiry,” “a delicate imagination” means delicacy of taste (ST 242). Given that for Hume, sympathy is an act of the imagination, we could say that “a delicate sympathy” is “an essential part of taste” (ST 240). It follows from this that when Hume introduces delicacy of taste as one of five traits of true judges: delicacy of taste, practice, comparison, freedom from prejudice, and good sense, he has in mind the role of sympathy in establishing rules of art. As we have seen, the other four traits are those which scientists would require as well.

As we have seen, Hume’s principle that “the science of man is the only solid foundation for the other sciences” is still applied to his aesthetics. As he establishes the general rules of morals by the use of the experimental
method of reasoning, he establishes the general rules of art by the reflection on the observation: The “foundation [of rules of art] is the same with that of all the practical sciences, experience; nor are they any thing but general observations, concerning what has been universally found to please in all countries and in all ages” (ST. 231). We now move to the case of political theory in order to examine whether his principle that “the science of man is the only solid foundation for the other sciences” is also applied to political philosophy.
Chapter 7. Custom and Reflection:
The Antecedents of Conservatism in Hume’s Philosophy

In the previous chapters, I have argued that Hume’s principle that “the science of man is the only solid foundation for the other sciences” is applied to his moral philosophy and aesthetics. He established the general rules of human nature as a logic of probability in the *Treatise* (T intro. 7, SBN xvi). And he then established the general rules of morals and aesthetics. I believe that this line of interpretation is also applied to his political philosophy. Hence, in this chapter, I turn to his political theory, arguing that if we pay attention to Hume’s principle that “the science of man is the only solid foundation for the other sciences”, we can open up a systemic way of understanding his political philosophy.

In his book *Opinion and Reform in Hume’s Political Philosophy*, Stewart asks, “granted that it is difficult to change a person’s values, can the mores of a people be reformed? Can their moral system be improved by legislators and politicians? Or is their morality, their whole way of life, strictly a matter of custom?” And he continues, “To answer these questions, we must turn briefly to Hume’s epistemology” (Stewart 1992, 196). Other scholars also pay attention to Hume’s epistemology in order to understand his political views. In his essay “Bentham”, Mill says, “[Hume’s] absolute skepticism in speculation very naturally brought him round to Toryism in practice” (Mill 1969, 80). And McArthur points out that Hume’s conservative interpreters “argue that his epistemological skepticism provides the philosophical basis for rejecting certain basic principles of progressive thought” (McArthur 2016, 497-498).

There seem to be two reasons why writers make connections between Hume’s epistemology and his political philosophy. First, while Hume shows a radical but coherent epistemological point of view in both *A Treatise of Human Nature* and *An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding*, he does not seem to explicitly state his political philosophy in a coherent way. Thus, many scholars pay attention to Hume’s epistemology in order to find the cornerstone of his political philosophy, thus making it coherent. Second, the modern concept of conservatism only began to emerge after the French Revolution, after Hume’s death. Interpretation of his political stance from the modern point of view inevitably relies on speculation.

This chapter scrutinises the implication of Hume’s epistemological scepticism on his political thought. It addresses three current interpretations. First, Wolin regards Hume as a conservative by arguing that for him, reason is impotent, and custom is “the great guide of human life.” According to him, for Hume, reasoning is reduced simply to following custom. Secondly, however, Stewart rejects Wolin’s understanding of Hume’s concept of reasoning. According to Stewart, for Hume, reflection plays a significant role in experimental reasoning; given that autonomy is the essential element of liberalism, Hume is a liberal because Hume’s concept of reflection allows its own autonomy. Lastly, Livingston disagrees with Stewart’s interpretation. He argues that although it is true that reflection is a conscious mental activity, it is not autonomous, but “parasitic upon an unreflective order variously described as habit, custom, convention, prejudice, and common life” (Livingston 1995, 155). Thus, he holds that Hume is a conservative, not a liberal.

In my view, Livingston’s interpretation of Hume’s concept of reflection overlooks its importance in Hume’s
philosophy. It is obvious that for Hume, reflection is not merely “parasitic upon an unreflective order,” but relentlessly tries to correct the unreflective order such as “habit, custom, convention, prejudice, and common life.” In this sense, Livingston neglects the fact that reflection is a kind of second-order voluntary mental activity. Nevertheless, I would say that Livingston’s classification of Hume as a precursor of Burkean conservatism is still valid. This is because, for Hume, the role of reflection is confined to discovering collective wisdom among all the prejudices and participating in it. That is, our judgment from individual reflection ought to be vindicated by collective wisdom or experience. Thus, I conclude that if I borrow Andy Hamilton’s term, Hume should be classified as a proto-conservative in that he supplants individual with collective reason as Burke does (Hamilton 2016, 1.1)

7.1. Hume on Reason

Some scholars interpret Hume as a precursor of Burkean conservatism on the basis of his criticism of reason. Neiman says, “Burke used [Hume’s] claims about the impotence of reason and the mind’s subsequent dependence on custom and habit to argue against radical attempts to change the established order” (Neiman 2001, 294). According to Hume, it is wrong to apply abstract reasoning to matters of fact, that is, empirical sciences such as politics. In this section, we will examine his concept of reason and whether or not Hume’s understanding of reason allows us to regard him as a precursor of Burkean conservatism.

Before we start to scrutinise Hume’s understanding of reason, it would be good to specify the conditions under which a political philosophy can be called “conservatism”. Wolin suggests two conditions:

1. In its origins, conservatism was not so much (1) a defense of the existing order, which had been breached by the establishment of revolutionary regimes, as (2) a sustained attack on the rationalist currents which had come to dominate much of European thinking since the days of Hobbes, Descartes, and Newton. (Wolin 1954, 1000)

In this passage, he ascribes two conditions to conservatism:

(1) “a defense of the existing order, which had been breached by the establishment of revolutionary regimes.”

(2) “a sustained attack on the rationalist currents which had come to dominate much of European thinking.”

These two conditions are not the same. The first says that conservatism is a defence of the existing order against the attempt to change the world radically. It puts emphasis on the defence of “the existing order”. But the second explains that conservatism rejects the rationalists’ attempt to change the world on the basis of abstract reasoning. As Wolin continues, “Burke’s strictures against ‘men of theory’, Hegel’s condemnation of the ‘abstract reason’ of the French revolutionaries, and Metternich’s sarcasms about the ‘presumptuous man’ were all testimony to an almost unanimous rejection of the claims of reason to be the ultimate arbiter in political questions” (Wolin 1954, 1000).

Keeping two conditions of conservatism, let’s examine Hume’s understanding of reason. According to him, there are two kinds of reasoning: reasoning concerning relation of ideas and concerning matters of fact. And each kind of reasoning shows the different manner of conceiving ideas. In the case of reasoning concerning
relations of ideas, we conceive ideas “by intuition or demonstration”: “In that case, the person, who assents, not only conceives the ideas according to the proposition, but is necessarily determin’d to conceive them in that particular manner, either immediately or by the interposition of other ideas” (T 1.3.7.3, SBN 95). For instance, the proposition “three times five is equal to the half of thirty,” which expresses a relation between these numbers, can be demonstrated by abstract reasoning (EHU 4.1, SBN 25). Thus, according to Hume, when we deal with relations of ideas, we reason about them “by the mere operation of thought, without dependence on what is anywhere existent in the universe” (EHU 4.1, SBN 25).

In the case of reasoning concerning matters of fact, we conceive ideas “by custom or a principle of association” (T 1.3.7.6, SBN 97). Hume says, “Matters of fact, which are the second objects of human reason, are not ascertained in the same manner [as Relations of Ideas]” (EHU 4.2, SBN 25). This is because “in reasonings from causation, and concerning matters of fact, this absolute necessity cannot take place, and the imagination is free to conceive both sides of the question” (T 1.3.7.3, SBN 95). For example, according to him, it is in vain to attempt to demonstrate the falsehood of the proposition “the sun will not rise to-morrow” because the proposition itself does not “imply a contradiction” (EHU 4.2, SBN 25). The falsehood of the proposition can be justified only by experience: “It is only experience, which teaches us the nature and bounds of cause and effect, and enables us to infer the existence of one object from that of another” (EHU 12.29, SBN 164). Thus, according to Hume, when we deal with matters of fact, we reason about them by custom or a principle of association which is based on experience.

In sum, Hume distinguishes two different kinds of reasoning. On the one hand, when it comes to relations of ideas, reasoning works in the intuitive or demonstrative manner. He calls it abstract reasoning (EHU 12.34, SBN 165), which includes “the sciences of Geometry, Algebra, and Arithmetic” (EHU 4.1, SBN 25). On the other hand, when it comes to matters of fact, there is no room for demonstration or reason as “the mere operation of thought” to engage in conceiving an idea. This kind of reasoning deals only with “experience” (EHU 12.29, SBN 164). Hume calls this kind of reasoning experimental reasoning, which includes “history, chronology, geography, and astronomy” and “politics, natural philosophy, physic, chemistry, &c.” (EHU 12.30-31, SBN 164-165).

Keeping in mind Hume’s distinction between abstract and experimental reasoning, we see that it is wrong to apply abstract reasoning to matters of fact, that is, empirical sciences such as politics or history. This is because “in reasonings from causation, and concerning matters of fact, this absolute necessity cannot take place” (T 1.3.7.3, SBN 95). Thus, we cannot build up historical or political theories on the basis of abstract reasoning. One example is his rejection of Hobbes’s theory of the social contract. He argues that the theory of the social contract is not justified “by history or experience, in any age or country of the world” (E 471): “Almost all the governments, which exist at present, or of which there remains any record in story, have been founded originally, either on usurpation or conquest, or both, without any pretence of a fair consent, or voluntary subjection of the people” (E 471). Thus, he seems to regard Hobbes’s theory of the social contract as abstract reasoning. The ambitious dream to explain the origin of government on the basis of the hypothetical theory of the social contract cannot be supported by historical record.

Now let’s consider whether Hume’s understanding of reason suggests a conservative standpoint. The first
condition is that conservatism is a defence of the existing order against the attempt to change the world radically. The second condition is that conservatism rejects the attempt to change the world on the basis of abstract reasoning. His understanding of reason clearly meets the second condition. As we have seen, he distinguishes between abstract and experimental reasoning. Abstract reasoning deals solely with relations of ideas. It works in the intuitive and demonstrative way as “the mere operation of thought”, thus obtaining “absolute necessity” (EHU 4.1, SBN 25). However, when it comes to matters of fact, “this absolute necessity cannot take place,” and, thus, it is wrong to apply abstract reasoning to them (T 1.3.7.3, SBN 95). In this sense, we can expect that if he had experienced the French Revolution, he would have criticized its aim of changing the world on the basis of abstract idealism. He would say that we cannot make the better world from the foundation of abstract ideas. From this, at least we can say that he is in line with Burkean conservatism in his rejection of the application of abstract reasoning to matters of fact. Thus, it seems to be clear that Hume’s understanding of reason meets the second condition.

However, as we have seen, the second condition of conservatism does not imply the first one. That is, the rejection of “abstract reasoning” is not directly connected to the “defense of existing order.” In order to confirm that Hume is a conservative, we need to clarify whether his philosophy satisfies the first condition.

### 7.2. Hume on Custom

In the previous section, we noted that Hume believed that matters of fact require experimental, not abstract reasoning. In my view, it is very important to understand the nature of “experimental reasoning” in order to recognize whether he can be regarded as a conservative. The book, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, has the subtitle “Being an Attempt to Introduce the Experimental Method of Reasoning into Moral Subjects.” And this subtitle shows that he does not just distinguish between experimental and abstract reasoning, but also adopts the former as his methodology from which his whole project proceeds.

Let’s first examine Hume’s account of experimental reasoning. As we have seen, abstract reasoning deals with relations of ideas and works in the intuitive and demonstrative way as “the mere operation of thought”, thus obtaining absolute necessity (EHU 4.1, SBN 25). However, when it comes to matters of fact, we cannot expect that “this absolute necessity” takes place (T 1.3.7.3, SBN 95). Hume says, “If we reason *a priori*, anything may appear able to produce anything” because “No negation of a fact can involve a contradiction” (EHU 12.28, SBN 164). For instance, if we reason abstractly that “The falling of a pebble may, for aught we know, extinguish the sun; or the wish of a man control the planets in their orbits,” there is no contradiction (EHU 12.29, SBN 164). Thus, Hume concludes that the propositions are justified only by experience (EHU 12.29, SBN 164). That is, experimental, as opposed to abstract reasoning, inevitably requires the authority of experience.

The crucial question is, given that experimental reasoning requires the authority of experience, how much autonomy it has. That is, is experimental reasoning a kind of voluntary mental activity regardless of the authority of experience or a kind of customary associative mental process which is subject to experience? On this question, at first glance, Hume’s answer seems to be the latter. He seems to say that experimental reasoning is a kind of mental process of “custom or a principle of association” which operates under the influence of the
authority of experience (T 1.3.7.6, SBN 97). He says, “Reason can never satisfy us that the existence of any one object does ever imply that of another; so that when we pass from the impression of one to the idea or belief of another, we are not determin’d by reason, but by custom or a principle of association. … ’Tis a particular manner of forming an idea” (T 1.3.7.6, SBN 97). Also,

My intention … is only to make the reader sensible of the truth of my hypothesis, that (1) all our reasonings concerning causes and effects are deriv’d from nothing but custom; and that (2) belief is more properly an act of the sensitive, than of the cogitative part of our natures. (T 1.4.1.8, SBN 183)

In this passage, Hume makes two points. The process of causal inference is not pure cogitation, but sensation (2). And custom plays a significant role in making a causal inference (1). And these seem to show that the process of experimental reasoning is passive and mechanical.

If experimental reasoning concerning matters of fact is what is derived solely from custom, it seems to satisfy Wolin’s first condition of conservatism as “a defense of the existing order”. He says,

Thus what men described as cause-and-effect was not a deductive conclusion of reason but the product of experience: we have become accustomed to seeing a certain effect follow from a given cause, but, strictly speaking, there existed no logically necessary connection between the two. Facts were derived from observation, not from reason; hence reason could not be employed to prove or disprove the existence of a fact. Human behavior, in turn, was governed largely by unanalyzed experience or habits. ‘Custom,“ Hume concluded, “is the great guide of human life.” (Wolin 1954, 1001-1002)

In the first Enquiry, Hume clearly says, “Custom … is the great guide of human life” (EHU 5.6, SBN 44). As Stewart points out, this is “a favourite text of those who interpret Hume as a conservative” (Stewart 1992, 209). Thus, it seems that his philosophy can meet two conditions of conservatism. First, he defends “the existing order” by regarding custom as “the great guide of human life”. And, second, he shows a “sustained attack on the rationalist currents” by rejecting against applying abstract reasoning to matters of fact.

However, although it is true that for Hume, experience or custom is necessary for experimental reasoning, it is not its key element. This is because he puts emphasis on the role of reflection in making experimental reasoning.

7.3. Hume on Reflection: The Dynamics of Human Nature

At first glance, Hume seems to explain the process of obtaining beliefs through experimental reasoning in a passive and mechanical way. He says, “nor is it from any other principle but custom operating upon the imagination, that we can draw any inference from the appearance of one to the existence of another” (T 1.3.8.12, SBN 103). He does not seem to allow any voluntary and active mental process to involve in experimental reasoning. However, as we have seen in chapters 4 and 6, Hume’s experimental reasoning should be understood as a second-order voluntary mental activity called “reflection”. Stewart’s argument that Hume is not a conservative but a liberal is based on this understanding.

Let us first consider what Hume means by the concept of artificial virtues since his social and political concepts
such as fidelity to promises, justice, allegiance belong to them (Sabl 2015, 90). Hume distinguishes two kinds of virtues: natural and artificial. The natural virtues such as benevolence or generosity are the character traits by which we exercise the virtuous motives without depending on any “artifice and contrivance of men” (T 3.3.1.1, SBN 574). We have the natural tendencies to be generous or benevolent to others by nature.

The artificial virtues, by contrast, are the character traits that are encouraged in society due to our various artifices and conventions. The invention of the artificial virtues is explained by “our sympathy with the interests of society”: “sympathy is the source of the esteem, which we pay to all the artificial virtues” (T 3.3.1.9, SBN 577). Due to the principle of sympathy, we can go “much beyond our own interest”, and have a concern for others’ interests (T 3.3.1.9, SBN 577). Hence, our “extensive concern for society … from sympathy” allows us to invent the artificial virtues (T 3.3.1.11, SBN 579). According to him, “justice”, “allegiance”, “the laws of nation”, and “modesty”, “[a]ll these are mere human contrivances for the interest of society” (T 3.3.1, 9, SBN 577).

However, in order to be the sole source of artificial virtues, our natural capacity of sympathy has two problems. First, the result of our natural sympathy is variable. He says, “We sympathize more with persons contiguous to us, than with persons remote from us: With our acquaintance, than with strangers: With our countrymen, than with foreigners” (T 3.3.1.14, SBN 580-581). But regardless of the variation of our natural sympathy, when we consider “the interests of society”, we are supposed to “give the same approbation to the same moral qualities in China as in England” (T 3.3.1.14, SBN 581). He continues, “They appear equally virtuous, and recommend themselves equally to the esteem of a judicious spectator” (T 3.3.1.14, SBN 581). This is the judicious-spectator problem.

Second, given that artificial virtues are character traits which are beneficial to society, our natural sympathy is an “imperfect means” for evaluating the character traits of someone since it operates only when their virtuous traits are actually exercised. Someone would argue that “Where a person is possess’d of a character, that in its natural tendency is beneficial to society, we esteem him virtuous, and are delighted with the view of his character, even tho’ particular accidents prevent its operation, and incapacitate him from being serviceable to his friends and country.” (T 3.3.1.19, SBN 584). Thus, they would say, “Virtue in rags is still virtue” (T 3.3.1.19, SBN 584). This is the virtue-in-rags problem.

Hume solves these problems by introducing the concept of general rules. According to him, the correct use of general rules, which have been established “by a sufficient custom”, allows us to extend our sympathy in two different directions: one along the temporal dimension of a single human and the other across many people (T 1.3.8.14, SBN 105). Hence, it is by the correct use of general rules that we can solve both the virtue-in-rags problem and the judicious-spectator problem, hence having “extensive sympathy with mankind” (T 3.3.6.3, SBN 619).

In order fully to understand the correct use of general rules, we need to recall Hume’s distinction between two influences of general rules: on the imagination and on the understanding. According to Hume, the first influence of general rules is on the imagination. We rashly apply general rules to particular cases, and hence we make prejudicial judgments such as “An Irishman cannot have wit” or “a Frenchman cannot have solidity” (T 1.3.13.7, SBN 146-147). Our natural (or limited) sympathy is influenced by this first influence of general rules.
and hence it has the above two problems.

By contrast, the second influence of general rules is on the understanding. We “take a review of” the first influence of general rules, and hence we correct the first judgment (T 1.3.13.12, SBN 150): “In every judgment, which we can form concerning probability, as well as concerning knowledge, we ought always to correct the first judgment, deriv’d from the nature of the object, by another judgment, deriv’d from the nature of the understanding” (T 1.4.1.5, SBN 181-182). That is, it is by this second influence of general rules that we correct the first influence of general rules on the natural sympathy, hence extending sympathy with mankind. Given that the public interest is an end and all the artificial virtues are a means to the end, the correct use of general rules plays a crucial role in recognizing the proper artificial virtues as a means and evaluating them.

It follows from this that in order both to extend our sympathy with mankind and to figure out the proper artificial virtues such as justice or allegiance, we need the meta-level reflective mental act applied to the general rules: “We may correct this propensity by a reflection on the nature of those circumstances” (T 1.3.13.9, SBN 148). That is, it is by reflection that we correct the first influence of general rules on our natural sympathy.

According to him, it is by taking “a review of this act of the mind, and comparing it [the imagination] with the more general and authentic operations of the understanding” that we can extend our sympathy with mankind (T 1.3.13.12, SBN 150). Hence, we can say that our meta-level reflective mental activity plays a crucial role in inventing artificial virtues such as justice or allegiance for the interest of society.

However, someone might ask a question: If Hume believes that individuals’ reflective capacity plays an important role in inventing and evaluating artificial virtues for the public interest, why then does he put emphasis on the role of government: “the principal object of government is to constrain men to observe the laws of nature” (T 3.2.8.5, SBN 543)? If individuals have their own reflective capacity, and hence they are autonomous, then, why do they need government constraint in order to observe the law of nature? Hume’s answer is that like other “artifice and contrivance of men”, government is also “a mere human invention for the interest of society” (T 3.3.1.1, SBN 574; T 3.2.10.4, SBN 552).

Justice, allegiance, and fidelity to promises are virtues since they contribute to the interest of society, and they are artificial since they depend on the artifices and conventions which we construct in order to facilitate the interest of society. All the artifices and conventions are a means to achieve the interest of society as an end. Hence, only when we adhere to the established conventions, we can maximize the interest of society. However, our natural sympathy, which is under the first influence of general rules on the imagination, is always stronger than the “extensive sympathy with mankind”, which is under the second influence of general rules on the understanding since according to him, the latter is “a general calm determination of the passions, founded on some distant view or reflection” (T 3.3.1.18, SBN 584). This is the reason why Hume says, “General rules create a species of probability, which sometimes influences the judgment, and always the imagination. (T 3.3.1.20, SBN 585). And he continues:

Tho’ we may be fully convinc’d, that the latter object excels the former, we are not able to regulate our actions by this judgment; but yield to the sollicitations of our passions, which always plead in favour of whatever is near and contiguous. (T 3.2.7.2; SBN 537)

Although our reflective examination of general rules of justice, allegiance, and fidelity to promises guides us to
adhere to them, hence achieving the long-term goal of the interest of society, we are “overwhelmed by the prospect of short-term benefit” (Dees 2008, 389; Whelan 1985, 269).

However, according to Hume, we are not easily defeated by the “inclination to the present good” (T 3.2.7.6, SBN 536). Our reflective examination tries to find other ways around to overcome the weakness of our human nature:

This natural infirmity I may very much regret, and I may endeavour, by all possible means, to free myself from it. I may have recourse to study and reflection within myself; to the advice of friends; to frequent meditation, and repeated resolution: And having experienced how ineffectual all these are, I may embrace with pleasure any other expedient, by which I may impose a restraint upon myself, and guard against this weakness. (T 3.2.7.5, SBN 536-537)

Here is the place where Hume introduces the role of governments as a mean of realizing our long-term goal of the interest of society: “Government is a mere human invention for the interest of society. Where the tyranny of the governor removes this interest, it also removes the natural obligation to obedience” (T 3.2.10.4, SBN 552). Although it is true that “the principal object of government is to constrain men to observe the laws of nature”, the government constraint is valid only when it enhances the interest of society (T 3.2.8.5, SBN 543). And also the reason why for Hume allegiance is an artificial virtue is because it is a mean of achieving an end of the interest of society which is the conclusion of our reflective examination.

At this point, it would be helpful to introduce Hume’s distinction between the systems of philosophy. According to him, there are three different systems of philosophy: the vulgar system, the true philosophers’ system, and the false philosophers’ system. The vulgar obtain their beliefs “by their stupidity”, the true philosophers “by their moderate scepticism”, and the false philosophers “by an illusion”, (T 1.4.3.10, SBN 224). He says that the false philosophers who “abstract from the effects of custom, and compare the ideas” discover that there is no known connexion between objects (T 1.4.3.9, SBN 223). This is the case that they wrongly apply “abstract reasoning” to matters of fact, which we examined in the previous section.

In the case of the vulgar, they unreflectively accept custom: “’Tis natural for men, in their common and careless way of thinking, to imagine they perceive a connexion betwixt such objects as they have constantly found united together; and because custom has rendered it difficult to separate the ideas, they are apt to fancy such a

29 Here we can see how Hume’s account of the origin of government is different from Hobbes’s and Locke’s contractualism that the authority of government or allegiance are derived from promising in order to protect one’s own interest or liberty (Whelan 1985, 259; Mcarthur 2016, 490-491; Dees 2008, 394-395). According to Hume, the origin of government should be understood in the term of voluntary conventions, which are based on our natural mental capacities of sympathy and reflection to pursue the public interest:

Two men, who pull the oars of a boat, do it by an agreement or convention, tho’ they have never given promises to each other. Nor is the rule concerning the stability of possession the less deriv’d from human conventions, that it arises gradually, and acquires force by a slow progression, and by our repeated experience of the inconveniencies of transgressing it. (T 3.2.2.10, SBN 490)

And, he continues, “Government, therefore, arises from the voluntary convention of men: and ’tis evident, that the same convention, which establishes government, will also determine the persons who are to govern, and will remove all doubt and ambiguity in this particular” (T 3.2.10.2, SBN 554).
separation to be in itself impossible and absurd” (T 1.4.3.9, SBN 223). This is exactly the case that the vulgar rashly accepts the first general rules without reflection.

According to Hume, true philosophers assume “their moderate scepticism”: “Nothing is more requisite for a true philosopher, than to restrain the intemperate desire of searching into causes, and having establish’d any doctrine upon a sufficient number of experiments, rest contented with that, when he sees a farther examination would lead him into obscure and uncertain speculations” (T 1.1.5.6, SBN 13). They should reflect on custom and “take a review of this act of the mind, and compare it with the more general and authentic operations of the understanding” (T 1.3.13.12, SBN 150). Thus, the experimental reasoning, which the true philosophers make, cannot be reduced simply to following custom, which is what the vulgar do. Instead, it necessarily includes the voluntary and cognitive mental activity called reflection.

Therefore, I would say that our mental capacities of sympathy and reflection play a crucial role in Hume’s political philosophy. Especially, our mental capacity of reflection allows us to correct our natural sympathy, which is under the first influence of general rules on the imagination, and hence extend it to the interest of society. Unfortunately, however, Wolin ignores the importance of the role of reflection in Hume’s political philosophy – thus, interpreting him as a conservative: “he cautioned, there as a clear difference between ‘a poetical enthusiasm’ and ‘a serious conviction’ resting on ‘reflexion and general rules.’ Negatively, however, Hume’s labors worked towards the alteration of the future course of conservatism. With reason discredited, new premises could be fashioned from custom and sentiment” (Wolin 1954, 1004). But, as we have seen, for Hume “custom is far from king” (Smith 2005, 386).

Thus, in my view, Stewart’s understanding of Hume’s experimental reasoning is much more balanced:

> It is a grave mistake to focus so intensely on his refutation of the claims made for “reason alone” that his profound distrust of untested belief is ignored. We are not limited to a choice between reason and prevailing opinion; indeed, the declared purpose of the Treatise is practical: to explain the need for the deliberate application of the experimental method of reasoning to moral subjects and to attempt to use that method. *What is required is not abstract reasoning and not mere experience, but “reflection and experience”* (Stewart 1992, 204).

This understanding of Hume’s experimental reasoning allows Stewart to hold that “Hume is liberal, not conservative, in politics” (Stewart 1992, 4) because Hume’s concept of reflection seems to have its own autonomy, which is necessary in liberalism.

### 7.4. Conservative vs. Liberal Interpretation

Livingston agrees with Stewart that reforms are central to Hume’s philosophic project, and that he explores them with historical depth and subtlety (Livingston 1995, 152). But he disagrees with Stewart concerning the concept of conservatism. According to him, conservatism is a narrative concept that has “meaning only within the story of a political tradition” (Livingston 1995, 153). That is, the term ‘conservatism’ itself does not suggest any “substantial political doctrine” (Livingston 1995, 153). In that sense, the term ‘conservatism’ itself is *vacuous* (Livingston 1995, 154).
Someone might say that conservatism needs to be understood as a disposition rather than a doctrine. They would argue that human beings have an inclination or instinct to accept the status quo unreflectively. But, according to Livingston, any ideology in power could be conservative in this sense (Livingston 1995, 153).

Liberals and Marxists in power look with dark suspicion on any attempt at fundamental reform. It is in this sense that journalists described the hard-liners during the break-up of the Soviet Union as “conservatives.” But this is not what self-professed conservatives such as Michael Oakeshott and Margaret Thatcher would have called them, nor what the hard-liners called themselves. They understood themselves to be communists, not political conservatives. (Livingston 1995, 153-154)

Thus, Livingston holds that conservatism should not be regarded as a disposition to preserve established privileges because “Such dispositions are equally distributed among all ideologies in power” (Livingston 1995, 153-154).

This issue is a delicate one. If conservatism does not suggest any “substantial political doctrine” and is not characterized as a disposition to preserve the status quo, how should we understand it? According to Livingston, the concept of conservatism should be understood in the historical context. The emptiness of the term ‘conservative’ needs to be filled with the historical meaning (Livingston 1995, 154). And according to him, the French Revolution is the historical event in which two different philosophical values conflict each other: conservatism and liberalism.

By the time of the French Revolution a new mass philosophical consciousness had become established in Europe. … It was the presence of this new vulgar philosophical consciousness (“the people” as philosophers) acting out its world inversions, not in the philosopher’s closet but in the conduct of the French Revolution, that prompted the formation in France, Britain, and America in the early nineteenth century of political parties all using the term ‘conservative’ in the apparently vacuous way mentioned earlier. And that tradition has continued down to today. (Livingston 1995, 154)

According to Livingston, the French Revolution was caused by “philosophy” which “is a peculiar sort of reflection engaged in the sublime task of creating entire worlds out of thought, or the revolutionary task of destroying entire worlds, or the ironic task of deconstructing and inverting entire worlds” (Livingston 1995, 154). That is, the reflective reason of individuals allows themselves to do philosophical theorizing and, thus, destroy the existing world and create a new world out of thought. This is the spirit of radical liberalism called revolutionary Jacobinism.

Thus, he argues that the origin of conservatism should be viewed as “an insight into the emergence of a mass philosophical consciousness and its destructive possibilities” (Livingston 1995, 155). That is, conservatism can be understood as a self-conscious philosophical movement against philosophical theorizing. This is Burkean conservatism. Burke says, “no great human institution results from deliberation” (WS III, 128). He rejects the idea that we can change the world by philosophical theorizing. It is preposterous “to take the theories which learned and speculative men have made from that government, and then, supposing it made on those theories which were made from it, to accuse that government as not corresponding with them” (SW IV, 148). And he puts emphasis on the importance of experience for reforming the world:
I must see with my own eyes ... touch with my own hands not only the fixed but the momentary circumstances, before I could venture to suggest any political project whatsoever ... I must see the means of correcting the plan ... I must see the things; I must see the men. (WS III, 326)

On the basis of his understanding of both radical liberalism and Burkean conservatism, Livingston interprets Hume as a precursor of Burkean conservatism. He finds an affinity between Hume’s criticism of applying abstract reasoning to matters of fact and Burke’s rejection against philosophical theorizing:

For Hume, in Book I, Part iv of the *Treatise*, had already worked out a radical philosophical criticism of philosophy that was not philistine. Moreover, both Burke and DeMaistre present their criticisms of corrupt philosophizing with Hume in mind. (Livingston 1995, 155)

Livingston believes that as Burke did, Hume radically criticized the liberal’s ideology that the reflective reason of individuals allows themselves to do philosophical theorizing, and thus destroy the existing world and create a new world out of thought. Thus, according to Livingston, we should call him a conservative.

7.5. The Nature of Reflective Reason in Conservatism

Burkean conservatism does not simply deny the role of reasoning. As we have seen in the previous section, it can be defined as a self-conscious philosophical movement against philosophical theorizing. Thus, we could say that the role of reflective reasoning is essential even in conservatism. If this is so, there remain two questions: First, what is the nature of reflective reasoning in conservatism? Second, how is it different from that in liberalism?

In order to answer these questions, it would be good to start with considering Andy Hamilton’s crucial questions about Burkean conservatism:

A fundamental question is how far the “prejudice” that Burke advocates is non-rational. Was he anti-reason, or just against abstract reason? Did he supplant individual with collective reason? ... Burke is opposed not to reason, but to the arrogance of individual reason. (Hamilton 2016, 2.3)

According to Hamilton, Burke is not anti-reason because he is only against abstract reason. What he does is to supplant individual with collective reason. Then, how does Burke supplant individual with collective reason? We can answer this question by examining his view of prejudice.

Interestingly, Burke’s attitude toward prejudice is not negative. First, according to him, prejudice is more practical than abstract reasoning because the former is a kind of collective wisdom:

Prejudice is of ready application in the emergency; it previously engages the mind in a steady course of wisdom and virtue and does not leave the man hesitating in the moment of decision sceptical, puzzled, and unresolved. (WS VIII, 138)

As Burke admits, those who have “untaught feelings” endorse prejudices (WS VIII, 138). In this sense, prejudice itself does not seem to be admirable or virtuous. But, at least, in terms of practice, prejudice is much more useful and safer than simply pursuing abstract principle, which have not been vindicated in practice. As
Iain Hampsher-Monk points out, for Burke, “Prejudices are easier to deploy in moral practice than abstract principles” (Hampsher-Monk 2012, 201).

More importantly, Burke does not simply recommend us to accept prejudices unreflectively. He puts emphasis on the role of reflection in discovering the “latent wisdom” which prevails in prejudices: “Many of our men of speculation, instead of exploding general prejudices, employ their sagacity to discover the latent wisdom which prevails in them” (WS VIII, 138). Thus, we can say that what Burke endorses is not mere prejudice but “just prejudice” which is discovered by our reflective reason as having been vindicated by experience (WS VIII, 138). I think, this is a key element of Burkean conservatism. Conservatism is not simply to cherish all the prejudices unreflectively but to discover “just prejudice” by reflection, thus cherishing them. Thus, for Burke, the role of reflection is in figuring out collective wisdom among all the prejudices, as opposed to abstract reflection in liberalism by which liberals believe that they can make the better world.

We now seem to have a criterion to judge whether Hume is a conservative or a liberal. We can ask Hume the same question as Hamilton asked Burke. There are two questions. First, is Hume anti-reason, or just against abstract reason? As we have seen, he is just against abstract reason. In this sense, the answer is yes. He is in line with Burke. But the second question seems to be more controversial. Does Hume supplant individual with collective reason? Stewart would say no, but Livingston would answer yes. In order to answer the second question, we need to understand the nature of individual reflection in Hume’s philosophy.

Let’s take a close look at Hume’s view on prejudice. There is a delicate point in interpreting it. It is clear that Hume has a negative attitude toward prejudice. According to him, it ought to be corrected by reflection. As we have seen, he says that the first influence of general rules, which is “the source of what we call PREJUDICE”, ought to be regulated by reflection (T 1.3.13.7, SBN 146). Thus, we can say that for Hume, it is by individual reflection that we correct prejudice. At first glance, Hume’s view on prejudice seems to be delicately different from Burke in that Hume says that we ought to correct prejudice by reflection while Burke holds that we discover just prejudice by reflection. For Hume, individual reflection seems to play its own autonomous role in correcting prejudice. But Burke seems to limit the role of individual reflection to discovering collective wisdom among all the prejudice and participating in it. This delicate difference seems to allow us to classify Hume as a liberal and Burke as a conservative. And I believe this is the point which Stewart wants to make.

However, we should bear in mind the fact that according to Hume, there is no guarantee that our individual reflection is infallible. He argues that the confirmation of the judgement of individual reflection always comes from experience:

I suppose, that afterwards I examine my judgment itself, and observing from experience, that ’tis sometimes just and sometimes erroneous, I consider it as regulated by contrary principles or causes, of which some lead to truth, and some to error (T 1.4.1.9, SBN 184-185).

In this passage, Hume says that our judgment from individual reflection may turn out to be erroneous. And the sole criterion on the judgment is “observing from experience.” Thus, we could say that according to Hume, prejudice ought to be corrected by reflection, but only with the confirmation of experience, that is, collective wisdom.
Hume’s view on history would support this reading. As we have seen, for Hume it is wrong to apply abstract reasoning to the judgment concerning matters of fact. Instead, according to him, what individual reflection should do is to find the general point of view from history, which allows us to make a proper judgment of our present and future: “History keeps in a just medium betwixt these extremes, and places the objects in their true point of view” (E 568). That is, discovering collective wisdom from history by reflection would allow us to take a true point of view. For example, according to Hume, when “the tyranny of the governor removes” the public interest, we must rule out the tyrannical government as an exception from the normal governments, and hence prepare for the revolution against it on the basis of our reflection: “The common rule requires submission; and ’tis only in cases of grievous tyranny and oppression, that the exception can take place” (T 3.2.10.1, SBN 554). When it happens, our judgment of the current government as exceptionally tyrannical is derived from the reflection on the general point of view from history:

Our general knowledge of human nature, our observation of the past history of mankind, our experience of present times; all these causes must induce us to open the door to exceptions, and must make us conclude, that we may resist the more violent effects of supreme power, without any crime or injustice. (T 3.2.9.3, SBN 552)

Thus, in my view, Hume’s view on prejudice is the same with Burke’s in that the role of individual reflection is confined to discovering collective wisdom among all the prejudices and participating in it.

In conclusion, Livingston’s interpretation of Hume’s concept of reflection overlooks its importance in Hume’s philosophy: “reflection is parasitic upon an unreflective order variously described as habit, custom, convention, prejudice, and common life” (Livingston 1995, 155). As we have seen, it is obvious that for Hume, reflection is not merely “parasitic upon an unreflective order,” but relentlessly tries to correct the unreflective order such as “habit, custom, convention, prejudice, and common life.” For instance, as Crisp rightly points out, “When the overall harms of some element of common-sense morality, or some version of it, are salient, he recommends its abandonment, as in the case of the ‘monkish’ virtues—celibacy, self-denial, humility, solitude, and so on” (Crisp 2005, 172). In this sense, Livingston ignores the fact that reflection is a kind of second-order voluntary mental activity. Nonetheless, in my view, his assertion that Hume is a Burkean conservative is still valid because the role of reflection in Hume’s philosophy is confined to discovering collective wisdom among all the prejudices and participating in it. That is, our judgment from individual reflection ought to be vindicated by collective wisdom or experience. This is exactly what we mean by Burkean Conservatism.
Conclusion

On the interpretation offered here, Hume’s epistemological investigation in Book 1 of the *Treatise* lays the cornerstone of his ethics, aesthetics, and political philosophy. Following the principle that “the science of man is the only solid foundation for the other sciences”, he first establishes the general rules of human nature as a logic of probability in Book 1 of the *Treatise* (T intro. 7, SBN xvi). He then establishes the general rules of his ethics, aesthetics and political philosophy by the use of the logic of probability. Although I have shown in this dissertation that he builds up all “other sciences” on the established general rules of human nature in Book 1, one crucial objection to this interpretation still remains. The objection is concerning his scepticism in the conclusion of Book 1. After establishing his constructive general rules of human nature, he falls into the “total scepticism” (T 1.4.7.7, SBN 268). And the scepticism is specifically targeting the general rules of human nature, which he established as a logic of probability:

Mean while the sceptics may here have the pleasure of observing a new and signal contradiction in our reason, and of seeing all philosophy ready to be subverted by a principle of human nature, and again sav’d by a new direction of the very same principle. The following of general rules is a very unphilosophical species of probability; and yet ’tis only by following them that we can correct this, and all other unphilosophical probabilities. (T 1. 3.13. 12, SBN 150)

Hence, the objection is that in spite of his efforts to establish the general rules of human nature as a logic of probability in Book 1 of the *Treatise*, all his efforts are subverted by the sceptical argument.

One common way of understanding his scepticism in the conclusion of Book 1 is to regard it as paving a way to his naturalism in Book 2 and 3. That is, he establishes his constructive naturalism of Book 2 and 3 on his destructive scepticism of Book 1. For instance, Benedict Smith recently proposed a distinction between two different kinds of experience in Hume’s philosophy:

Hume means different things when he uses the term ‘experience’. One use is individualistic and introspectionist, experience of sense and memory which can be reached or recalled by turning reflection inwards, to the interior of our psychic domain. But Hume also invokes another sense of experience, less solipsistic and more social, experience of ‘common life and observation’. (Smith 2016, 29)

According to Smith, “individualistic and introspectionist” experience in Book 1 and “less solipsistic and more social” experience in Book 2 and 3 should be distinguished. Based on this distinction, he suggests, “Hume’s science of man is principally a study of human nature as articulated in the common course of our existence”. Hence all Hume’s constructive naturalism starts from “less solipsistic and more social, experience of ‘common life and observation’” in Book 2.

This line of interpretation is plausible in that it suggests a constructive direction of understanding Hume’s philosophy. But my worry is that it regards Hume’s project in Book 1 of the *Treatise* solely as sceptical and destructive. Given Smith’s interpretation that Hume’s science of man is conveyed only on “less solipsistic and
more social, experience of ‘common life and observation’” in Book 2, Hume’s constructive naturalism begins only from Book 2. We can say that Greco, Baillie, and Waldow, who argue that Hume’s concept of sympathy produces the belief in other minds, also follow Smith’s line of interpretation. They all attempt to connect Hume’s naturalism to the Wittgensteinian concept of “forms of life” or the Husserlian concept of “lifeworld” focusing on the social aspect of Hume’s concept of experience.

However, I believe that his scepticism in Book 1 of the Treatise is designed to criticize only those who enjoy speculative reasoning alone. In Treatise 1. 3.13. “Of unphilosophical probability”, he introduces the concept of “diminution of the evidence” as one kind of unphilosophical probability:

The argument, which we found on any matter of fact we remember, is more or less convincing, according as the fact is recent or remote; and tho’ the difference in these degrees of evidence be not receiv’d by philosophy as solid and legitimate; because in that case an argument must have a different force to-day, from what it shall have a month hence; yet notwithstanding the opposition of philosophy, ’tis certain, this circumstance has a considerable influence on the understanding, and secretly changes the authority of the same argument, according to the different times, in which it is propos’d to us. A greater force and vivacity in the impression naturally conveys a greater to the related idea; and ’tis on the degrees of force and vivacity, that the belief depends, according to the foregoing system. (T 1.3.13.1, SBN 143)

The process of overcoming the despair of the scepticism in the conclusion of Book 1 is a very demonstration of his concept of “diminution of the evidence”. At first glance, the argument of scepticism looks powerful, hence causing him to fall into despair. But the argument cannot be supported by everyday evidence, and hence loses its authority. By contrast, the general rules of human nature, which he established in Book 1, look defeated by the sceptical argument, but as time goes by, they are supported by everyday evidence since they are derived from his observation of everyday experience. Hume’s scepticism in the conclusion of Book 1 does not pose a threat to his constructive project of establishing the general rules of human nature as a logic of probability, but only to the speculative reasoning alone. Therefore, I would argue that Hume’s constructive naturalism already starts when he establishes the general rules of probability as a logic of probability.

Hence, the question is how the general rules of human nature as a logic of probability, which Hume established in Book 1, underpins his moral, aesthetic and political theories in Book 2 and Book 3 of the Treatise and other works. In order to answer this question, we need to understand the relation between his concept of the general rules of human nature in Book 1 and that of sympathy in Book 2 and Book 3, which has been neglected and underemphasized. For instance, Frederick Whelan confesses that he cannot link the generalizing faculty to the sympathetic capacity in Hume’s philosophy:

It is not clear … just how the generalizing faculty comes to be linked to the sympathetic capacity so as to overcome the natural variability of feelings. … Sympathy must be corrected and generalized, but this is not, as Hume occasionally implies, a spontaneous process; it requires the additional impact of training and education. Despite its important role throughout his moral psychology, therefore, sympathy is not the factor on which Hume must ultimately rely in his account of justice and
government. (Whelan 1985, 257)

In my view, he cannot link “the generalizing faculty” to “the sympathetic capacity” because he fails to understand Hume’s account of “extensive sympathy” in which he explains that we can correct and extend our natural (or limited) sympathy indirectly by the use of general rules.

In order to understand Hume’s account of “extensive sympathy”, we need to first understand his analysis of the mechanism of sympathy. As we have seen in Chapter 1 and 4, for Hume it is made up of two processes:

Process 1. We form an idea of the other’s affection by making a causal inference, and then
Process 2. We convert the idea of the other’s affection into the experience of the affection itself.

The first stage is the cognitive process whereby a subject acquires an idea of the other’s affection by making a causal inference. The second stage is the affective process by which the acquired idea is converted into an impression. At this point, it is important to understand that what Hume wants to establish by the analysis of the mechanism of sympathy above is that although, at first sight, sympathy seems to work instantaneously like emotional contagion, strict scrutiny would show that the operation of sympathy is analysed as proceeding “from certain views and reflections”:

However instantaneous this change of the idea into an impression may be, it proceeds from certain views and reflections, which will not escape the strict scrutiny of a philosopher, tho’ they may the person himself, who makes them. (T 2.1.11.3, SBN 317)

In my view, this is the place where the general rules of human nature as a logic of probability in Book 1 is linked to the principle of sympathy in Book 2 and 3. As we have seen Chapter 1, Greco, Baillie, and Waldow are mistaken in proposing that for Hume, sympathy produces the belief in other minds. Unlike their interpretations, Hume here holds the view that the mechanism of sympathy proceeds “from certain views and reflections”, i.e., sympathy operates by the use of general rules as a logic of probability.

Two kinds of sympathy, which are introduced by Hume in Book 2 and 3, are related to his discussion of “two influences of general rules” in Book 1. “Limited sympathy” is the sympathy “limited” to another person’s present feelings. By contrast, “extensive sympathy” is the sympathy which is not “limited to the present moment” but extended to “the pains and pleasures of others, which are not in being, and which we only anticipate by the force of imagination”, hence the name “extensive sympathy” (T 2.2.9.13, SBN 385-386).

According to him, there are two influences of general rules. According to him, the first influence of general rules is on the imagination. We rashly apply general rules to particular cases, and hence we make prejudicial judgments (T 1.3.13.7, SBN 146-147). Our limited sympathy is influenced by this first influence of general rules, narrowly sympathizing with the present feelings of another. By contrast, the second influence of general rules is on the understanding. We “take a review of” the first influence of general rules, which enables us to correct the first judgment (T 1.3.13.12, SBN 150). That is, it is by this second influence of general rules that we correct the first influence of general rules on the natural sympathy, hence feeling extensive sympathy with the character of the person.
In this way, according to Hume, we correct those “certain views and reflections”, from which the operation of sympathy proceeds, by the use of general rules, and hence indirectly correct sympathy by converting the corrected belief into an impression. This is the reason why Hume emphasizes that the source of morality is “a general calm determination of the passions, founded on some distant view or reflection” (T 3.3.1.18, SBN 584). In Chapter 3 and 4, I have shown that Hume responds to the two objections – the judicious-spectator objection and the virtue-in-rags objection – by introducing two kinds of extensive sympathy. In Chapter 6, I also have shown that true judges require not only the capacity of reflection but also that of “delicate sympathy”. Furthermore, in Chapter 7, I shed light on the fact that extensive sympathy plays an essential role in Hume’s political philosophy as well. According to him, our “extensive concern for society … from sympathy” allows us to invent the artificial virtues (T 3.3.1.11, SBN 579). He says that “justice”, “allegiance”, “the laws of nation”, and “modesty”, “[a]ll these are mere human contrivances for the interest of society” which is based on our extensive sympathy (T 3.3.1. 9, SBN 577). It follows from these that his understanding of the general rules of human nature as a logic of probability in Book 1 is strongly linked to the principle of sympathy in Book 2 and 3 and other works, which it was the purpose of this dissertation to demonstrate.

Therefore, we can say that Hume establishes all the sciences including morals, aesthetics, and political philosophy systemically and coherently on the basis of his scientific and naturalistic understanding of human nature. The coherence of his naturalistic system is illuminating given the comparison with his contemporary philosophers, Hutcheson and Adam Smith. As we have seen in Chapter 2, Hutcheson tries to establish the system of moral philosophy on the basis of the concept of moral sense. But, unfortunately, his attempts are not thoroughly naturalistic. He ends up embracing the supernatural apparatus – Divine Providence – in order to justify the authority of moral sense. On the other hand, we have scrutinized Adam Smith’s concept of sympathy in Chapter 5, on which he ambitiously attempted to ground both his epistemology and moral philosophy. However, his ambitious project ironically ends up both failing to overcome Cartesian dualism and introducing a supernatural concept of “final cause” into his moral philosophy. This critical comparison of Hume and other contemporary philosophers shows how Hume’s coherent reliance on his ‘experimental method’ enables him to consistently pursue the naturalistic way of establishing his moral, aesthetic and political philosophy.

Someone might complain that although my research successfully establishes the thesis that for Hume extensive sympathy, into which general rules as a logic of probability is incorporated, underpins his moral, aesthetic, and political philosophy, my interpretation of limited and extensive sympathy itself is too atomistic and mechanical. In this sense, they might say that other scholars’ interpretations seem more persuasive. For instance, someone might say that they are not convinced by my application of Hume’s analysis of extensive sympathy to the case of the man, asleep in a field, whom one sees is about to be trampled by horses because according to my interpretation, Hume’s distinction between limited and extensive sympathy seems too atomistic in the sense that he divides the whole status of the man into the present status, which produces only limited sympathy, and the future status, which generates only extensive sympathy. By contrast, they might say that Vitz’s understanding of Hume’s concept of sympathy seems more robust because when one sympathizes with the man, it is natural for one to have concern for his future, which means that the distinction between the present and future status of the man is not required.
I would respond that it is right that Vitz’s interpretation could embellish Hume’s concept of sympathy, hence making it more plausible, but this is the place where accuracy of the interpretation is required. We need to bear in mind the fact that accurate interpretation is a necessary prerequisite to the appraisal of Hume’s philosophy. In my view, Hume’s concept of sympathy deserves the criticism that it is too atomistic and mechanical since it is built up on top of his theory of ideas. That is, it is inevitable for Hume to face this kind of criticism unless he gives up his own theory of ideas, from which all his philosophical systems stem.

It is well known that, in the Appendix to the Treatise, Hume confesses that he fails to solve the issue of personal identity:

I had entertain’d some hopes, that however deficient our theory of the intellectual world might be, it wou’d be free from those contradictions, and absurdities, which seem to attend every explication, that human reason can give of the material world. But upon a more strict review of the section concerning personal identity, I find myself involv’d in such a labyrinth, that, I must confess, I neither know how to correct my former opinions, nor how to render them consistent. (T App.10; SBN 633)

That is, although he attempted to complete his “theory of the intellectual world” based on his theory of ideas, he recognized that he failed to do so when it comes to the issue of “personal identity”. Barry Stroud comments:

The exclusive emphasis the theory of ideas places on the mental ‘object’ – on what is thought or felt, and not on the subject ‘in’ whom those ‘objects’ exist – must inevitably lead to distortion or mystery. And in his treatment of personal identity Hume pushes the theory of ideas up to the edge of that abyss and finds that only the unacceptable notions of substance or a real connection among perceptions would save him. (Stroud 140)

Thus, according to Stroud, although Hume attempts to complete his theory of ideas by solving the issue of personal identity, he ironically ends up recognizing the limitation of that theory.

In the same vein, I think that my interpretation of Hume’s concept of sympathy reveals the limitation of his theory of ideas. That is, Hume’s version of the mechanism of sympathy is too atomistic and mechanical due to the limitation of his theory of ideas. Hence, my answer is that Vitz’s version of the mechanism of sympathy is more persuasive and plausible, but that is not Hume’s original version.

As Hume reflects on the scope and success of his theory, let us similarly reflect on some limitations of my own. In regard to Hume’s aesthetics and political philosophy, a fuller account should say more about the historical context in which Hume was writing. First, as we have seen in Chapter 6.3, Kant’s aesthetics was influenced by Henry Home’s aesthetic theory. And given that Home was a relative and the “best Friend, in every respect” of David Hume, there is circumstantial evidence that Hume’s aesthetic theory indirectly influenced Kant’s aesthetics—a point that would be well worth following up. Recently, Guyer has paid some attention to Hume and Kant’s concepts of imagination and understanding:

Hume does assume that aesthetic response involves perception, imagination, and conceptions of the contents, presuppositions, and purposes of particular works of art—in other words, both imagination
and understanding—but all functioning without any rules. Because Kant himself says little about what free play [between imagination and understanding] really is beyond suggesting that in this state the underlying goal of cognition—the unification of our manifolds of representation—is achieved without the application of any rule derived from a concept, it is not clear that their conceptions of the mental response leading to the sentiment of pleasure in beauty are completely unrelated. (Guyer 2016, 522)

Given that Hume’s aesthetics is established on the general rules of human nature, Guyer’s understanding that imagination and understanding function “without any rules” is very suspect. However, the project of comparing Hume’s and Kant’s aesthetics is beyond the scope of the present dissertation, though it may form the basis of a future project.

Second, in Chapter 7, following the principle that “the science of man is the only solid foundation for the other sciences”, I proposed a systemic way of understanding Hume’s political philosophy on the basis of my understanding of his epistemology (T intro. 7, SBN xvi). However, there is a missing part in my research. In order fully to construct his political philosophy, we need to investigate another of his major works, The History of England. But this is also beyond the scope of my current research. Recently, in his book Hume’s Politics: Coordination and Crisis in the History of England, Andrew Sable has scrutinized Hume’s political thoughts in detail, but I am not sure he fully reflects Hume’s systemic philosophy in his investigation. But that also is matter for a future project.
Bibliography


