Constructing One Another: Philodemus and Paul on Interdependence in Moral Formation

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CONSTRUCTING ONE ANOTHER: 
PHILODEMUS AND PAUL ON INTERDEPENDENCE IN MORAL FORMATION

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DEPARTMENT OF THEOLOGY AND RELIGION
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ABSTRACT

In this thesis, I argue that one gains fresh perspective on Paul’s understanding of believers’ interdependence in ‘constructing’ each other in 1 Corinthians by comparison with Philodemus’ vision for interdependence in reciprocal ‘therapy’. Pauline construction and Philodemean therapy are analogous instances of interdependent moral formation, both in concept and practice. Beyond previous comparisons, however, such a pairing is only fruitful if it is methodologically reoriented to both similarities and differences. This reorientation requires expanding the comparison to include additional dimensions of both figures’ perspectives, namely, their socio-economic locations (including their views of economic interdependence) and their theologies.

In the first half (chs. two to four), I examine Philodemus’ socio-economic location and theology in the course of describing interdependence in reciprocal moral therapy via frank criticism among friends (drawing from his treatise On Frank Criticism).

In the second half (chs. five to seven), I examine Paul’s socio-economic location and theology in the course of describing interdependence in reciprocal construction among believers in 1 Cor 8–10 and 12–14.

In the final chapter (ch. 8), I bring Paul and Philodemus into comparative perspective. I argue that, alongside their similarities (esp. in the practices of reciprocal formation), the two have qualitatively different understandings of moral formation and moral interdependence among community members. For Philodemus, one grows out of one’s need to receive formation from others into moral self-sufficiency. This trajectory correlates with the assumed economic self-sufficiency of Epicurean friends, and the moral self-sufficiency of the gods, which Epicureans can reach by means of perfected human character. For Paul, however, believers constantly depend on one another for moral formation, as they also do for economic support in their poverty. Paul cannot champion Philodemus’ moral self-sufficiency, because the moral life of a believer is one of interactive relationship with God, who continually reveals himself through other believers for their formation, yet always transcends all human moral character.
DECLARATION

This thesis is my own work, and no part of it has been previously submitted to Durham University or any other institution for a degree.
STATEMENT OF COPYRIGHT

The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. No quotation from it should be published without the author’s prior written consent and information derived from it should be acknowledged.
ABBREVIATIONS

Aside from those noted below, all abbreviations of ancient literature, academic journals, and monograph series follow the forms indicated in *SBL Handbook of Style: For Biblical Studies and Related Disciplines*, Second ed. (Atlanta, GA: Society of Biblical Literature, 2014).

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<tr>
<td>Vit.</td>
<td>Diogenes Laertius, <em>Lives of Eminent Philosophers</em></td>
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<td>KD</td>
<td>Epicurus, <em>Key Doctrines</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>VS</td>
<td>Epicurus, <em>Vatican Sayings</em></td>
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τῇ γνωστῇ ὑπὸ θεοῦ,
ἐν ἧ ἐνεργεῖ τὰ πάντα ὁ κύριος,
δι’ ἣς ζή τοῦ ὁμοόριστος
κατοπτριζόμενος τὸ μυστήριον
πεσὼν ἐπὶ πρόσωπον,

Ἀνδρεία.
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

‘Let all be done for construction’ (πάντα πρὸς οἰκοδομήν γινέσθω, 1 Cor 14:26). Paul thus summarizes his goal for all Corinthian believers’ speech and behaviour toward one another in gathered worship. As seen with special clarity in 1 Corinthians 12–14, reciprocal ‘construction’ (οἰκοδομή, οἰκοδομέω) is fundamental to believers’ lives in community, for Paul (see also, e.g., 1 Thess 5:11; Rom 15:2). God gives all believers different gifts to be shared for others’ ‘benefit’ (τὸ συμφέρον, 12:7). Construction is central to this benefit, particularly through gifted speech (14:1–5, 12). No believer can claim not to stand in need of the benefit which others offer through their gifts (1 Cor 12:21), including the varieties of constructing speech discussed throughout 1 Cor 12–14. Not only does Paul envision believers’ sharing in reciprocal construction, but he also understands such sharing as a form of interdependence among believers.

The present thesis is an investigation of this constructive interdependence. How is reciprocal construction conceived and practised such that believers need one another, according to Paul? What kind of interdependence does Paul envision for this construction, and why? Put succinctly, how and why do believers need one another for construction?

1.1. Central Claims

In the present thesis I make two interwoven claims. First, I argue that one may give a fruitful answer to these questions by comparing Paul’s vision for reciprocal construction to that of the Epicurean philosopher Philodemus. Paul’s construction is a kind of moral formation that is distinctively analogous to that which Philodemus envisioned among Epicureans. Making this claim involves critical appropriation of the landmark comparisons between the two by Abraham J. Malherbe and Clarence E. Glad.¹ Malherbe has drawn repeated attention to the

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similarities between Paul and Philodemus, but it is Glad who has offered the only monograph-length work to date comparing the two in detail. The focus of this study differs from Glad’s and Malherbe’s work. This study concerns Paul’s vision for believers’ own practices of construction among one another (particularly shown in 1 Cor 8–10, 12–14). This reciprocal, communal construction has received only passing treatment by both scholars, for they primarily aimed to understand Paul’s own attempts to form believers.

Second, gaining this new perspective requires a methodological reorientation of the comparison between Paul and Philodemus. For all their important contributions, Malherbe’s and Glad’s comparisons have distorted the picture of Pauline construction by interpreting his texts almost as though he were Philodemus, i.e., by interpreting Pauline construction as virtually identical to Philodemean philosophical therapy. This thesis, on the other hand, attends to similarities and differences. While they share distinctive similarities, I argue that Paul and Philodemus have qualitatively different understandings of interdependence in reciprocal moral formation, both conceptually and practically. These differences do not nullify the usefulness of the comparison, but are essential to it. In fact, the reorientation performed in this thesis is necessary for the Paul–Philodemus comparative project to bear further exegetical fruit. Furthermore, by allowing Paul and Philodemus to be different from one another, this comparison illuminates both figures anew as they stand in one another’s contrasting light.

These two claims require further elaboration as to their context and content. In what follows, I first provide context and initial justification for comparing Paul’s reciprocal construction and Philodemus’ reciprocal moral formation (1.2). Next, I review previous comparisons by Malherbe and Glad in greater detail (1.3) in order to prepare for the methodological discussion that follows (1.4). Finally, I offer an overview of the thesis chapter by chapter (1.5).

1.2. Context and Initial Justification

This study is an episode in the winding history of scholarly struggle to understand Paul’s texts by reading them in relation to Greco-Roman philosophy. The method and results of such comparison have been and remain deeply contested. Scholars have variously construed Paul’s relationship to philosophy. Some studies claim radical similarity; others claim


incommensurable difference. Some compare Paul across philosophical traditions, while others focus on Paul’s relationship to a particular philosophical tradition.

Despite this cloud of witnesses, the burden of justification weighs no less upon this study. Why compare? What makes it plausible that another comparison between Paul and Philodemus can be fruitful? Ultimately, the justification of any comparative project depends upon the helpfulness of its results. The proof is in the eating. Nevertheless, a number of considerations lend initial plausibility to the present project.

Several scholars have noted striking similarities between the nature of Pauline communities and that of ancient philosophical schools. In a seminal study which remains one of the best expressions of this view, Stanley Stowers argued for seven characteristics shared distinctively between the two: (1) these communities revolved around totalizing, exclusive worldviews with a unitary conception of ‘the good’; (2) the communities possessed an ethos.

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that was often counter-conventional (e.g., asceticism, ambivalence to civic virtue); (3) membership involved conversion, a radical reorientation of the self according to the community’s totalizing worldview; (4) this conversion required a ‘technology of the self’ by which this personal transformation happened; (5) central figures provided norming models for the community (e.g., Epicurus, Jesus); (6) the central practices of the community were ‘intellectual’ practices for articulating self-identity, among other functions (e.g., speaking, reading, writing, teaching, learning; even ritual meals entailed interpretation and use of a technology of the self); (7) the communities often exhibited nontraditional or radical social formations. Stowers does not claim that the ancient philosophical school is the best model for understanding Pauline communities (there was no uniform ‘school’ model anyhow), but that philosophical communities can be fruitful as comparanda for Pauline communities because of these similar characteristics.

Among various philosophical groups, Epicurean communities distinctively share a number of characteristics with Pauline communities. It seems Epicurean communities had a more robust communal life as an ‘alternative community’ than other philosophical schools. The best life involves leisured withdrawal with friends, perhaps involving cohabitation. Unlike most other philosophical schools, Epicurean communities held regular cultic celebrations and common meals as a constitutive part of communal life, like Pauline communities.

Particularly important for the present study is the communal practice of reciprocal moral formation via frank criticism (known especially via Philodemus’ treatise Περὶ Παρρησίας, or On Frank Criticism). This practice was relatively distinctive among philosophical schools in that it was a communal affair: all members were to take part reciprocally, giving and receiving critique from one another, even to the point of reporting one another.


another’s mistakes to the leaders of the community.\textsuperscript{11} Glad (following Malherbe) observes ‘a basic congruity between the Pauline communities and the Epicureans as it relates to the communal pattern of mutual participation by community members in exhortation, edification, and correction.’\textsuperscript{12} Glad has in mind 1 Corinthians 8–10, 12–14, Romans 14–15; 1 Thess 5; and Gal 6:1–4. In order to clarify my understanding of this analogy and its orienting role in the comparison of the present thesis, it is necessary first to review Malherbe’s and Glad’s comparisons in detail (1.3), and then outline the methodological reorientation of this study (1.4).

\textbf{1.3. Malherbe and Glad on Reciprocal Psychagogy in Paul}

Malherbe and Glad interpret Paul’s texts as though he drew from a Hellenistic tradition of philosophical therapy which they label ‘psychagogy’. Malherbe’s work has been influential in establishing the concept of this ancient tradition of therapy in New Testament studies. Thus, when Glad observes a similar pattern of ‘mutual participation by community members in exhortation, edification, and correction’, he interprets Paul to have a psychagotic understanding of these practices.\textsuperscript{13} Both view Paul as one who ‘is thoroughly familiar with the

\begin{enumerate}

\item Julie Giovacchini has rightly pointed to a number of continuities between Philodemus’ portrait of frank criticism and that of other figures (esp. Plutarch) which rule out the idea that Epicurean frank criticism was entirely distinct from that of other schools (Julie Giovacchini, “La Nouvelle Reconstruction du Rouleau du Franc-Parler de Philodème: Permet-Elle Encore de Postuler l’Existence d’une ΠΑΡΡΗΣΙΑ spécifiquement Épicurienne?” in \textit{Miscellanea Papyrologica Herculanensia}, eds. A. Antoni, et al. (Pisa: Fabrizio Serra, 2010), 294–314). Her arguments do not erase Philodemus’ relative distinctiveness, in my judgement.


\item Note the thesis statement of Glad’s monograph concerning Paul’s psychagogy in 1 and 2 Corinthians: ‘My thesis is that 1 Corinthians 9:22b, “I have become everything in turn to men of every sort,” is part of a tradition in Greco-Roman society which underscores, in the light of human diversity, the importance of adaptability in conduct and speech in the unreserved association with all and in the psychagotic adaptation to different human dispositions’ (Glad, \textit{Paul and Philodemus}, 1).
\end{enumerate}
traditions of his philosophic contemporaries and who knows these traditions first-hand.'\textsuperscript{14} As
Malherbe states with reference to 1 Thessalonians, ‘The letter reveals that in his founding and
nurturing of a church, Paul followed the methods of the moral philosophers.'\textsuperscript{15} Paul’s
dependence on this tradition is general, not specific to a particular representative of the
tradition. Glad, for example, does not argue for Paul’s direct genealogical dependence upon
Philodemus, but for his dependence on the widespread tradition of psychagogy, from which
Philodemus drew as well.\textsuperscript{16}

Malherbe defines psychagogy as a ‘well developed system of care’ for ‘intellectual,
spiritual, and moral growth,’ involving ‘spiritual exercises, psychotherapy, and psychological
and pastoral counseling,’ which a mature teacher uses to treat the illnesses of the immature.\textsuperscript{17}
The tradition begins in Plato, Aristotle, Xenophon, and Isocrates and lives on in the first
centuries BCE and CE in, e.g., Philodemus, Seneca, Plutarch, Epictetus, Musonius Rufus, and
Dio Chrysostom.\textsuperscript{18} Within philosophical texts concerned with this therapy, a routine \textit{topos} is
the adaptation of philosophical therapy to the needs and dispositions of the recipient,
especially those of immature students. Philodemus is especially important for the
reconstruction of psychagogy, especially that which is analogous to practices among believers
in Paul’s texts, for Philodemus’ treatise \textit{On Frank Criticism} provides a distinctive portrait of
psychagogic techniques used reciprocally by students of varying maturity, not just those used
by a sage.

It is helpful to clarify how Malherbe and Glad understand reciprocal psychagogy in
particular Pauline texts. As noted above, both scholars focus on Paul’s own psychagogy
toward believers, though they occasionally comment on communal practices of psychagogy.
Their portraits of reciprocal psychagogy share essentially the same characteristics as those of
Paul’s psychagogy toward other believers.

Malherbe identifies 1 Thess 5:12–15 as a key witness to reciprocal psychagogy among
believers.\textsuperscript{19} According to his analysis, several similarities with psychagogic conceptions and
practices emerge: (a) Paul commands all Christians in Thessalonica to engage in reciprocal
moral formation (\textit{νουθετήσεως, παραμυθείσθε, ἀντέχθεσθε, μακροθυμεῖτε}), recalling particularly

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{14} Glad, \textit{Paul and Philodemus}, 4. See also Malherbe, \textit{Paul and the Popular Philosophers}, 8.
  \item \textsuperscript{15} Malherbe, “Hellenistic Moralists and the New Testament,” 303.
  \item \textsuperscript{16} See Glad, \textit{Paul and Philodemus}, 9, 213–14 n. 93, 336.
  \item \textsuperscript{17} Malherbe, “Hellenistic Moralists and the New Testament,” 301. See Glad’s similar descriptions in
  \item \textsuperscript{18} See discussion also in Clarence E. Glad, “Frank Speech, Flattery, and Friendship in Philodemus,” in
    \textit{Friendship, Flattery, and Frankness of Speech}, vol. 82, ed. John T. Fitzgerald, Supplements to Novum
  \item \textsuperscript{19} For this summary I draw from three relevant publications, Malherbe, \textit{Paul and the Thessalonians};
    AB 32B (New York: Doubleday, 2000); Abraham J. Malherbe, “‘Pastoral Care’ in the Thessalorian Church,”
    \textit{NTS} 36 (1990): 375–91. To my knowledge, this passage is the only one that Malherbe develops at length on the
    subject of reciprocal psychagogy among believers.
\end{itemize}
the rotational psychagogy of Philodemus but also psychagogic practice in general; (b) Paul assumes that this care adapts to various psychological/emotional conditions of particular persons (5:14); (c) Paul assumes the category of weak persons, likely referring to those who are weak in terms of moral immaturity (5:14); (d) Paul calls believers to respect and love those who lead others in the community, much like Philodemus would, assuming that the more mature play a greater psychagogic role (5:12–13); (e) Paul assumes that leaders demonstrate love and care for those led, and that this love grounds believers’ trust in them, as does Philodemus (5:13); (f) Paul calls all to be at peace in themselves and not to return evil for evil, both of which are relevant for the tense situations involved in psychagogy, especially involving the immature (5:13b, 15).

Glad interprets that Paul, like Philodemus and other Hellenistic moral philosophers, encouraged mature believers to treat weaker, less mature believers by means of adaptive, rational therapy. In Glad’s reading of 1 Cor 8–10, those believers who ‘have knowledge’ were already at work in this task. They were attempting to correct the weak’s immature ‘conscience’ by harsh rational persuasion and by presenting themselves as models of the free consumption of idol food, pressuring the weak to do likewise. As in philosophical texts which discuss immature students (esp. those of Philodemus), Glad diagnoses the weak as ‘akratic’: they made decisions which created strife and uncertainty within themselves, i.e., they assented to the non-existence of idols, but could not eat food with cultic ties without a guilty self-perception, as if they had committed idolatry. Paul endorsed the more mature believers’ position on idol food in theory, along with their pedagogical role and intent, but did not endorse their destructive behaviour. Instead, Paul called those with knowledge not to criticize the weak harshly and to abstain from consumption of idol food which put pressure on the weak. Paul thus had a gentler, long-term therapeutic project in mind to lead the weak out of their weakness, i.e., to develop the weak’s immature character. Like Philodemus, Glad argues, Paul required adaptation to the weak in light of their instability as newly converted Christians who lacked a strong sense of Christian identity and the ability to endure harsh

26. I have chosen to rehearse Glad’s reading of 1 Cor 8–10, because this thesis studies 1 Cor 8–10 as well, and because he develops his reading of these chapters in greatest detail. Glad’s reading of 1 Cor 8–10 is basically the same as his reading of Rom 14–15, on which he also offers extended comment (see Glad, *Paul and Philodemus*, 213–35, 249–95). Glad only briefly discusses the other passages in which he identifies reciprocal psychagogy among believers (1 Thess 5; Gal 6:1–4; 1 Cor 12–14).
27. Glad reads τυπτομένης (8:10) and σιωδομηθήσεται (8:12) as indicating such behaviour (Glad, *Paul and Philodemus*, 277–95).
criticism. Those with knowledge should continue to instruct the weak on this issue, but should be gentle, patient and willing to sacrifice their freedom, bearing with the weak’s vulnerabilities as they grow out of them more gradually.

Both Malherbe and Glad use psychagogy as an explanatory matrix for Paul’s texts, and thus minimize differences between Paul and psychagogy. Paul uses the same ‘system of care’, shares the same ‘basic, self-orienting goal’ to ‘help people better themselves’ as, e.g., Philodemus. Malherbe thinks Paul and Philodemus are co-participants in psychagogy, even if they ‘differ in their own self-understandings and the consequences thereof for the ways in which they go about their shared task.’ In the first sentence of his Paul and the Thessalonians, Malherbe clarifies that his book ‘deals with Paul’s practice rather than his theology.’ Malherbe recognises that ‘Paul’s ministry cannot be fully understood apart from his theology’ but desires to focus only on the pastoral practice in itself in one locale. In light of his later methodological comments, it seems likely that Malherbe did not want Paul’s theology to prematurely shut down the possible gains of seeing Paul as a participant in psychagogy alongside philosophers (who had different theologies). Whatever the differences between them, they still have a shared task in a shared tradition. Both scholars would not deny that there are fundamental differences between Paul and Philodemus, particularly in theology, but both do not consider these differences to be obstacles for explaining Paul’s texts according to psychagogy.

Any comparison must relativise some differences in order to begin. The grave problem for Malherbe and Glad, however, is that the differences which they identify and marginalise are, arguably, differences of fundamental importance to Paul’s vision of moral formation, and of fundamental importance to what psychagogy means, by their own definitions.

Malherbe enumerates several differences between Paul and psychagogy in 1 Thess 5:12–15, several of which are theologically oriented. These include: (a) Paul issues universally reciprocal commands toward mutual care, and does not appeal to a defined class of teacher, in partial distinction with Philodemus (for whom teachers played a more structured role); (b) Paul has no expectation that one who receives care should express gratitude to the carer, for it is instead given to God (1 Thess 2:13); (c) psychagogic work is grounded in faith

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32. Malherbe, Paul and the Thessalonians, 1.
33. Ibid., 2.
34. Malherbe is a champion of seeking similarity in comparisons between Paul and Hellenistic philosophers, not in order to exclude difference, but so that those similarities become a wider frame in which to understand Paul. Jan N. Sevenster’s work on Paul and Seneca would have been more fruitful, in his view, if he had not focused so much on difference, and brought other philosophers into view. He concludes upon Sevenster’s failure, ‘Dissimilarity as the decisive criterion in comparison does not enrich our understanding of Paul’ (Malherbe, “Hellenistic Moralists and the New Testament,” 300).
35. Malherbe, Paul and the Thessalonians, 89.
36. Malherbe, Paul and the Thessalonians, 90; Malherbe, 1 and 2 Thessalonians, 327.
and ‘in the Lord’ (ἐν κυρίῳ; 1 Thess 1:3; 5:12), making the care itself a work of God;\textsuperscript{37} (d) the community itself is bound together in Christ as ἀδελφοί (1 Thess 5:12, 14);\textsuperscript{38} (e) Paul does not show a medical model by which some members cure others by virtue of personal maturity and skill;\textsuperscript{39} (f) Paul provides a theological basis for care in light of the coming Day of the Lord (5:1–11);\textsuperscript{40} (g) the goal of care is to live worthily of God in light of the coming Day of the Lord, not ‘the development of character or the fulfillment of human potential’ (5:1–11).\textsuperscript{41}

Glad’s monograph hardly discusses differences between Paul and Philodemus, but he briefly acknowledges two. These are essentially the same differences Malherbe identifies in (a) above, i.e., a more flexible participation by all in psychagogy, and (e) above, i.e., the lack of a therapeutic view of reason.\textsuperscript{42} Glad draws on an important essay by Stanley Stowers which argues the latter point. Put basically, Stowers argues that Paul cannot share a therapeutic view of reason, nor the therapeutic relationships it underwrites, because of his pessimistic epistemology and anthropology, and his prioritizing of community-building over individual therapy of the passions.\textsuperscript{43}

Malherbe and Glad maintain that Paul’s texts can be explained in terms of psychagogy, but both acknowledge that Paul’s conception does not fit psychagogy in a fundamental way: he does not have the therapeutic view of reason by which psychagogy operates (i.e., curing moral illnesses by philosophical argument).\textsuperscript{44} Malherbe acknowledges that this means Paul also does not have a therapeutic view of the relationships between believers involved in psychagogy (i.e., in which those who are more mature in reason and character care for the less mature), because God is also involved. Malherbe is also willing to concede, in the same trajectory, that the goal is not the development of character, but living worthily of God, though he does not spell out how these are distinct.

For his part, Glad untenably ascribes a therapeutic set of relationships to Pauline texts, and then, simultaneously, denies that Paul has a therapeutic view of reason, in agreement with Stowers (and Malherbe). On one hand Glad claims, ‘Paul does not elevate reason as the dominant criterion of community interaction as the therapeutic model does,’ and ‘Paul does not, like the wise Corinthians, use reason as a principle of social hierarchy.’\textsuperscript{45} On the other, he argues for social hierarchy in Pauline communities on the basis of personal maturity and instances of psychagogic function (both of which involve reason), and interprets that Paul

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{37} Malherbe, \textit{Paul and the Thessalonians}, 90.
\item \textsuperscript{38} Ibid., 93.
\item \textsuperscript{39} Malherbe, ‘“Pastoral Care”,’ 389.
\item \textsuperscript{40} Malherbe, \textit{1 and 2 Thessalonians}, 326–27.
\item \textsuperscript{41} Ibid., 308.
\item \textsuperscript{42} See Glad, \textit{Paul and Philodemus}, 213, 233–35.
\item \textsuperscript{43} See Stowers, “Paul on the Use and Abuse of Reason,” 284–86.
\item \textsuperscript{44} See discussion in Malherbe, ‘“Pastoral Care”,’ 389; Malherbe, \textit{1 and 2 Thessalonians}, 326; Glad, \textit{Paul and Philodemus}, 234–35.
\item \textsuperscript{45} Glad, \textit{Paul and Philodemus}, 234.
\end{itemize}
expected more mature believers to care for the immature ‘weak’ by gradually leading them out of their weakness, a softer form of psychagogy, but psychagogy nonetheless, necessarily involving therapy by reason.\textsuperscript{46} He does not elaborate at all on the inconsistency, and continues to claim that Paul can be explained according to psychagogy.

If Paul does not operate with a therapeutic model of care, in which the more mature care for the less mature by therapeutic reason oriented to the goal of their perfected moral character, then Paul no longer shares the core characteristics of psychagogy in the first place, by their own definitions (and by ample demonstration from Philodemus). Both scholars have been led into inconsistency by their failure to reckon properly with difference in their identifications of similarity.

As an illustration of this inconsistency, note Malherbe’s treatment of the phrase \(\mu\alpha\kappa\rho\omicron\theta\omicron\mu\epsilon\tau\epsilon\ \pi\omicron\rho\omicron\ \pi\alpha\nu\tau\alpha\zeta\) in 1 Thess 5:14. Malherbe states,

\textit{Makrothymein}, which does not appear in pagan psychagogy, is thus heavy with theological content. However, the idea that people in need of care should be treated with patience underlies the entire endeavor to benefit people. Just as a physician who diagnoses his patients repeats and modifies his treatment as he progresses, the counselor should be patient and repeat his therapy (Philodemus, \textit{On Frankness} 63, 64, 67, 69; Plutarch \textit{On How to Tell a Flatter from a Friend} 74D–E).\textsuperscript{47}

Malherbe does not explain the ‘theological content’ of \(\mu\alpha\kappa\rho\omicron\theta\omicron\mu\epsilon\tau\epsilon\), but instead explains the meaning in terms of the same therapeutic model he distinguishes as not applicable to Paul.

I argue that this slip is representative of Malherbe’s and Glad’s entire project. To identify Paul’s texts with psychagogy apart from consideration of fundamental differences is like saying the shoe fits when it’s only half-way on. This is a critical error that leads to the distortion of Pauline texts. Explaining Paul in terms of psychagogy without due consideration of differences is effectively to assume that Paul operated, e.g., with Epicurean theology, anthropology, and social history when it came to moral formation among believers (Epicurean, that is, given Philodemus’ foundational role in defining reciprocal psychagogy for Malherbe and Glad). I do not claim that Glad and Malherbe do not know the difference between Pauline and Epicurean theology. Rather, I claim that their comparative projects make an identification between Paul and psychagogy that practically assumes Paul was an Epicurean, for they do not allow Paul’s differences to factor properly into that identification.

One could still make the case that Paul is similar enough to be compared to psychagogy, but do so with the acknowledgement that Paul has qualitatively different conceptions of formation than those evidenced in psychagogy. This is precisely the project of


\textsuperscript{47} Malherbe, \textit{1 and 2 Thessalonians}, 320.
the present thesis. Stanley Stowers’ essay ‘Paul on the Use and Abuse of Reason’ has already made strides in this direction, and the present thesis seeks to contribute further. The goal is to understand Paul and Philodemus afresh by attention to both their similarities and differences. The questions of how and why the two differ are productive, not obstructive, of greater understanding.

1.4. Methodological Framework

My own comparison of Philodemus and Paul has much in common with that of Malherbe and Glad. My comparison launches from a similar analogy between Paul and Philodemus, as Glad puts it, ‘the communal pattern of mutual participation by community members in exhortation, edification, and correction.’\(^{48}\) I limit myself to just Paul and Philodemus in an effort to take as full an account as possible of each, avoiding a superficial consideration of ‘parallels’.\(^{49}\) Nevertheless, the comparison needs methodological reorientation if it is to provide further illumination of both Paul and Philodemus.

1.4.1. General Methodological Reorientation

The goal is to compare Paul and Philodemus again, this time allowing differences to shape the understanding of similarities. Accounting for these differences also requires expanding the comparison to include material which Malherbe and Glad left to one side. Accordingly, there are two main aspects of this reorientation: (1) the use of polythetic categories which allow differences to factor into similarities, and (2) the inclusion of theology and socio-economic location as dimensions of the comparison. Recent discussions of comparative method in the


\(^{49}\) Malherbe is well-known for his concerns in this regard. See Malherbe, “Hellenistic Moralists and the New Testament”. See also White and Fitzgerald, “Quod Est Comparandum: The Problem of Parallels”. In making this choice (which was partially constrained by the space limitations of this thesis), I do not claim that more wide-ranging comparisons are necessarily superficial. Rather, ideally this thesis can be integrated into wider comparative work between early Christian literature and Hellenistic/Post-Hellenistic philosophy. I have judged the limitations of a one-to-one comparison less important than avoiding the danger of superficiality in my own work that could arise from including other figures in the comparison.
study of religion provide helpful concepts for this reorientation, even if the present thesis does not have a thoroughgoing analytic framework derived from that field.  

Malherbe and Glad use psychagogy as a ‘monothetic’ category, i.e., a category defined by members sharing the same characteristics. They claim that Pauline formation has the same set of characteristics that psychagogy exemplifies, particularly as evidenced in Philodemus. Using psychagogy as a monothetic category is unhelpful because it renders differences beyond the allegedly shared psychagogic features to be irrelevant for comparative purposes. These differences are critically important to incorporate if the comparison is not to end in distortion, as noted above.

Instead, the comparison should operate by means of a polythetic category, i.e., one in which members fit into the category by their similarity to one another, by ‘family resemblance’, not by the possession of a set of identical characteristics. A polythetic category is far more helpful for present purposes as it allows for differences and similarities to exist side-by-side in the comparison.


53. Surely Malherbe and Glad would agree that Greco-Roman philosophers would differ in the details of their psychagogic programs. Perhaps they envisioned psychagogy as a polythetic class in this sense. However, when it comes to the practice of comparing Paul and Philodemus, I argue that they operate as though psychagogy were a monothetic class, for they do not account robustly for the ways in which Pauline texts do not fit within the category of psychagogy.
Apart from the problematic use of a monothetic category, the choice of the neologism ‘psychagogy’ as a label seems ill-suited as well. The Greek term from which psychagogy derives (ψυχαγωγία) does not refer to a singular program in the ancient world known as such.\(^{54}\) Moreover, ψυχαγωγία does not have positive value for either Paul or Philodemus vis-à-vis moral formation. It seems irrelevant to Paul, and Philodemus does not use it as a key term for moral formation, but rather to describe, e.g., the diverting effect of poems or music, both of which, for him, are not necessary to moral formation.\(^{55}\) It seems to me that the technical nature of the term psychagogy contributes to its use as a monothetic category.\(^{56}\) I have changed the name of the category to reinforce the methodological distinctions of this thesis.

In this thesis I replace ‘psychagogy’ with the polythetic category ‘moral formation’. I define ‘moral formation’ loosely as the development of individual moral character in accordance with a moral framework (involving, e.g., behavioural, affective, and volitional dispositions). Unlike psychagogy, ‘moral formation’ does not specify precisely, e.g., how such moral development works, the nature of moral character or dispositions, nor the shape of the wider moral framework.\(^{57}\) Instead, the category situates members in relation to one another so that a common set of questions can be asked of them, to which they can speak as much as possible in their own voice. In this way, the comparison can shed light in both directions, illuminating Paul and Philodemus anew by their similarities and differences from one another. Previous comparisons blocked this mutual illumination because they excluded differences in the effort to identify Paul with psychagogy. Shortly below I specify further how moral formation operates as a category for this thesis (1.4.2).

This comparison thus involves analogy, not genealogy.\(^{58}\) I do not compare because I believe that Paul directly appropriated Philodemus’ texts for his own communities, nor that

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54. As Kolbet notes about Malherbe’s neologism, ‘To use the term “psychagogy” in this manner to refer to a “well developed system of care” is to give the term a precise range of meaning that it did not have in antiquity.’ See Paul R. Kolbet, *Augustine and the Cure of Souls*, Christianity and Judaism in Antiquity 17 (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2010), 8.


56. Though note its polythetic use by Welborn, “Paul and Pain”.

57. Laura Dingeldein uses a generalized, ‘folk’ notion of virtue as a baseline category for comparative evaluation of Paul and a range of philosophers (Dingeldein, “Gaining Virtue, Gaining Christ,” 20–31, 323). Dingeldein argues that Paul on the whole does not demonstrate a philosophically precise system of moral formation in his letters, but he does draw on common philosophical notions and can be aligned conceptually to middle Platonism.

58. Glad wants to avoid any claim to direct genealogy from Philodemus to Paul, but he does claim that Paul drew upon psychagogy alongside Philodemus and other figures (Glad, *Paul and Philodemus*, 9, 213–14 n. 93, 336). Effectively, however, his comparison amounts to Paul drawing from Philodemus, for Philodemus plays a dominating role in the reconstruction of psychagogy. See discussion of this tension in Glad’s work in Margaret M. Mitchell, “Pauline Accommodation and ‘Condescension’ (συγκατάβασις): 1 Cor 9:19–23 and the History of Influence,” in *Paul Beyond the Judaism/Hellenism Divide*, ed. Troels Engberg-Pedersen (London; Leiden: Westminster John Knox, 2001), 300 n. 11.
Paul knew of Philodemus, nor that Paul appropriated some general form of ‘psychagogy’ that was ‘in the air’. Rather, I compare Paul and Philodemus because the two concern themselves with inculcating analogous practices among members of their distinctively similar communities in the ancient Greco-Roman world of the 1st centuries BCE and CE.\textsuperscript{59} Observing this analogy leads me to pursue the potential fruit of the comparison.

Alongside the shift to a polythetic category, the second aspect of reorientation is to widen the scope of comparison. Doing so provides further context for understanding Paul’s and Philodemus’ individual conceptions and practices of moral formation. This move is in general continuity with Malherbe’s methodological sensibilities toward deeply contextualised comparisons, but making the move provides further evidence that Paul’s conception of construction cannot be identified with psychagogy. Theology and socio-economic location are the two new areas of exploration. The rationale for both choices follows in turn.

Theology is a natural choice for the comparison because both Paul and Philodemus would claim that moral formation has everything to do with a proper relationship to the divine, and both imagine moral formation as a form of growing in moral likeness to God. Philodemus has a robust theology that deserves attention in any exposition of his understanding of moral formation, attention it has not received from Malherbe and Glad.\textsuperscript{60} Again, a polythetic relationship operates here: I do not propose that their theologies are the same, nor play the same role, e.g., that ‘relationship to God’ and ‘growing in likeness to God’ mean the same thing to both. Rather, I examine their theologies as a site of potential similarity and difference.

Like theology, attention to both similarity and difference in socio-economic location sheds further light on interdependence in reciprocal moral formation in both communities. Malherbe and Glad both base their comparisons upon similar social features of Pauline and Epicurean communities, pre-eminently upon communal practices of reciprocal moral formation. However, both do not consider how the two figures’ socio-economic locations and policies for sharing material resources might compare, nor how these characteristics might colour their individual conceptions of interdependent, reciprocal moral formation. It is particularly important to note the difference that being relatively affluent as a community (in Philodemus’ case) or relatively impoverished as a community (in Paul’s case) can make upon one’s relationships with other members.

\textsuperscript{59} Basing this comparison upon abstractly conceived behavioural features of these two communities, rather than on the freighted conception of psychagogy, aligns generally with William Paden’s attempt to base the study of religion in common, abstract sets of religious behaviours as sites for similarity and difference (without reducing religious belief to such behaviour). See William E. Paden, “Universals Revisited: Human Behaviors and Cultural Variations,” \textit{Numen} 48 (2001): 276–89.

\textsuperscript{60} Glad makes two insignificant references to Philodemus’ theological works, one reference to the character of a frank counsellor in \textit{On Piety}, and one reference to \textit{On Gods}, only to note that Philodemus wrote such a work (Glad, \textit{Paul and Philodemus}, 37 n. 83, 102 n. 3). To my knowledge Malherbe does not refer to Philodemus’ theological works in his expositions of psychagogy.
My study of socio-economic location does not entail the use of a specific analytical theory. Rather, my concern is simply to note how socio-economic location can function generally as a ‘plausibility structure’ for a construal of one’s formative relationships with others (and vice-versa).  

The four stages of comparison identified by Jonathan Z. Smith provide a useful tool to summarise the goal of this methodological reorientation. First, this thesis aims to provide a more robust description of moral formation in Paul and Philodemus individually by considering their theologies and socio-economic locations (i.e., the second aspect of reorientation just reviewed). Second, the fuller description leads into a more complete, reordered comparison which accounts for both similarities and differences, not simply the former, and not simply in terms of psychagogy (i.e., using a polythetic category). Third, as a product of the new comparison itself, the thesis presents a redescription of Paul and Philodemus in light of one another, in which both figures receive mutual illumination by the other’s contrasting presence. Finally, fourth, the comparison leads to a rectification of categories, i.e., in this case, it reveals the inadequacy of the monothetic category ‘psychagogy’ and supports the usefulness of the polythetic category ‘moral formation’.

It is important to note the scope of my methodological claims. These are local claims pertaining to the comparison at hand in the field of Pauline studies. I am not necessarily arguing that any comparison of Paul and Greco-Roman philosophers must always account for differences in the same way and to the same degree to which they are accounted for in the present project. Yet, I do hope that this comparison would serve as a case study that could lead to the improvement of other comparisons insofar as they suffer from similar problems, and I briefly indicate how this might happen in the conclusion.

In many ways the comparison presented here operates like two other recent comparisons: Jonathan A. Linebaugh’s comparison of Wisdom of Solomon and Paul’s letter to the Romans, and C. Kavin Rowe’s comparison of a handful of ancient Stoics and early Christians (Seneca, Epictetus, Marcus Aurelius, Paul, Luke, Justin Martyr). Linebaugh’s comparison brings together Wisdom of Solomon and Romans according to a number of topoi which arise from the concerns of both authors considered on their own terms (e.g., the relation

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of Jews to non-Jews, the relation between God’s justice and his grace, the interpretive logic behind the reading of scripture). Rowe’s comparison also brings together Stoic and Christian figures according to topoi central to the worldviews of each (e.g., God, death, humanity, nature, society, philosophy). Both scholars use these topoi as polythetic categories (even if they do not use this term) which function as sites for the observation of similarity and difference. They allow each text compared to speak to the particular issues from their own perspective, and then observe the similarities and differences.

Like Linebaugh, my comparison does not simply juxtapose two isolated readings of Paul and Philodemus, but provides a new, exegetically fruitful perspective for understanding the two in relation to one another in a way that would not be possible apart from the comparison.\textsuperscript{64} Philodemus’ central concerns in the conception and practice of reciprocal formation provide an exegetical vantage point from which to investigate Paul’s texts anew, tracking similarities and differences.

Rowe has a less sanguine view of the mutual illumination that emerges from his own comparisons and of the possibility that these results can contribute to any unitary scholarly project of comparing Stoicism and Christianity.\textsuperscript{65} This is due to his understanding of the limits of scholarly knowing.\textsuperscript{66}

My view of the Paul–Philodemus comparative project is more optimistic, even if I remain sympathetic to Rowe’s arguments. I intend this thesis to be a contribution to this project, even though my contribution involves a substantial reorientation of it as previously led by Malherbe and Glad. The project of comparing Paul and Greco-Roman philosophers necessarily involves interaction among scholars with varying perspectives, some of which may be irreconcilable (e.g., ‘interaction’ in the form of contest and dispute, as that between Rowe and Engberg-Pedersen). All participants sift through work that is inevitably bound to particular perspectives, but it is through dialogue with these perspectives that individual construals and contributions emerge. These construals may remain qualitatively different from one another (as my own construal is from Malherbe’s and Glad’s). There will be no measurable progress toward final completion that all can agree upon for all time. Yet, contributing to this idealized phantom of progress is not a condition of making a contribution to the project.

Also unlike Rowe, I am not advancing a philosophical argument about the limitations of scholarly comparison involving Paul and Philodemus, though again I have sympathies with

\textsuperscript{64} Linebaugh, \textit{God, Grace, and Righteousness}, 20–22.

\textsuperscript{65} For example, he observes that, in the light of Stoicism, Christianity does not have an adequate concept of fate in analogy to Stoic fortuna, and that Stoicism does not have an adequate concept of the ‘Fall’ in the light of Christianity. See Rowe, \textit{One True Life}, 202–3.

\textsuperscript{66} See the third part of his book, Rowe, \textit{One True Life}, 175–262.
his work in this trajectory.\textsuperscript{67} I leave open the question of whether and how mutually exclusive traditions of thought can eventually come to understand one another. Leaving this unresolved is possible for my project because I do not make claims that would require an answer to that question. Unlike, e.g., Troels Engberg-Pedersen, I do not claim to have discovered any fundamental identity between Philodemus and Paul, even if there is an abstract analogy between their conceptions and practices of reciprocal moral formation. I do not claim that I can transcend my own limited hermeneutical perspective, come to fully understand Paul and Philodemus, and then incorporate that understanding into an objective, encyclopaedic knowledge-base structured according to a rationality that is neither Stoic nor Christian, as Rowe claims that some scholars, including Malherbe, effectively do (whether they do or do not is a matter of interpretation).\textsuperscript{68}

Much of my concern in this thesis is to read Paul’s and Philodemus’ texts in an ‘emic’ mode, i.e., by inhabiting, as much as possible, the different worlds in which their texts mean what they mean for the communities they were trying to influence.\textsuperscript{69} However, in making this comparison, I unavoidably operate in an ‘etic’ mode, i.e., I am attempting to understand and communicate the meaning of Paul’s and Philodemus’ texts as a person who is not a member of a Pauline or Philodemean community for others who are not as well.\textsuperscript{70} My location as an interpreter inevitably colours my own frame of reference. I am a 21st century interpreter speaking in a specialised idiom to an audience constituted mainly by those who participate in the academic study of ancient texts (particularly Pauline texts). Yet I am also a Christian,

\textsuperscript{67}. An unresolved question for Rowe’s project is how one knows whether one is dealing with a conflict between ‘strong traditions’ (like Stoicism and Christianity, in his view), or just a conflict between traditions which share enough to allow for more understanding and possible development.

\textsuperscript{68}. See Rowe, \textit{One True Life}, 175–205. Rowe critiques Engberg-Pedersen for this, but Engberg-Pedersen denies the claim. See the discussion in a forthcoming volume \textit{The New Testament in Comparison}, based upon the proceedings of a conference held at Durham University (June, 2017), entitled ‘Comparing Traditions’ in which Rowe and Engberg-Pedersen participated.

On Malherbe’s work, Rowe comments (Rowe, \textit{One True Life}, 187), ‘to what degree difference in content means difference in thing — to whom is a spiritual exercise directed, for example? or in light of whom is it conducted? — is not given any extended thought.’ Malherbe certainly gives Paul’s theology extended thought, but this does not lead him to recognize the core problem of his comparative work which this discussion has highlighted.


\textsuperscript{70}. The inevitability of some kind of etic perspective in any academic study receives emphasis in Paul Roscoe, “The Comparative Method,” in \textit{The Blackwell Companion to the Study of Religion}, ed. Robert A. Segal (Malden; Oxford: Blackwell, 2006), 25–46; Clifford Geertz, “‘From the Native’s Point of View’: On the Nature of Anthropological Understanding,” in \textit{The Insider/Outsider Problem in the Study of Religion: A Reader}, ed. Russell T. McCutcheon (London; New York: Cassell, 1999), 50–63. It seems even Kavin Rowe must speak in some kind of etic mode, for he speaks as a modern Christian about ancient Christians and Stoics, and he assumes some form of shared rationality between himself and those who might read his book, who may stand in different traditions than his own. It is at least clear that Rowe wants to distance himself from any attempt to speak as a scholar in distinction from his identity as a Christian. This is a concern I also share. Rowe would attempt to respond to this critique by drawing upon resources from his tradition which make sense of how he can speak as he does.
living within a tradition identified with Paul and his texts, not Philodemus. The need for critical self-awareness of the dangers of distorting the evidence because of my Christian location is ever present.

1.4.2. Particular Decisions

Following Malherbe and Glad, the launching point of this study is the identification of an analogy between Paul and Philodemus with respect to the conception and practice of interdependent reciprocal moral formation. In what follows, I identify the relevant dimensions of this analogy.

Conceptually, a number of similarities arise alongside the basic understanding of these practices as a kind of moral formation. Participation in this reciprocal moral formation is constitutive of being a member in the community, and is necessary for all members’ ‘salvation’. In other words, for both Paul and Philodemus, community members are interdependent upon one another for salvation, they ‘save one another’ by their reciprocal participation in moral formation. Both figures’ conceptions of moral formation receive their shape in relation to their respective theologies. Both conceive of moral formation as fundamentally concerned with one’s relationship to the divine, to which one grows in likeness via moral formation. Both Paul and Philodemus conceive of members’ interdependence upon one another for moral formation like they conceive of members’ economic interdependence. In these ways, Paul and Philodemus have abstractly similar conceptions of similar practices.

With respect to practice, both Paul and Philodemus view formation as reciprocal, involving every member in giving and receiving. In both communities, members practise formation by, e.g., adaptation to the condition of others, the exercise of love, and the use of specialized, formative discourse involving a full range of formative effects, from encouragement to rebuke.

Each dimension of the analogy just sketched is a point of loose similarity from which one might trace differences to better understand Paul and Philodemus’ individual voices in comparative perspective. The scope of the analogy is vast, and I could not hope to reconstruct an exhaustive account of both figures here. This thesis focuses upon how both describe formative reciprocity and interdependence among members. Discussions of the nature of moral formation (e.g., its practices of giving and receiving, its relation to theology) serve to provide greater understanding of the interdependent reciprocity envisioned by Paul and

71. Despite my Christian location, I do not assume those who stand to benefit from my work must be Christian in order to do so. This is the case even if the ‘benefit’ gained from my work is judged and appropriated differently based on one’s perspective.

Philodemus (i.e., the nature of formative reciprocity, the nature of interdependence on one another for ‘saving’ moral formation, the relation between formative and economic reciprocity/interdependence). I have chosen to focus on the nature of reciprocity and interdependence because Paul and Philodemus share a distinctive similarity on this point in comparison to other ancient communities. This similarity provides the opportunity to ask detailed questions of two figures who already have a lot to say about formative interdependence between community members. Focusing on these questions is thus not an imposition of one figure’s concerns upon the other.

The choice of texts to compare reflects this focus. The main texts for comparison are Paul’s first letter to the Corinthians (particularly chs. 8–10 and 12–14) and Philodemus’ treatise On Frank Criticism. I adduce other texts from both figures insofar as it is exegetically helpful to do so (e.g., drawing upon other undisputed letters of Paul, and drawing upon Philodemus’ theological, economic, and other ethical works). The choice of On Frank Criticism is obvious as it is the text which directly witnesses to Philodemus’ conceptions of moral formation and its reciprocity among interdependent members.

In any exposition of Philodemus’ fragmentary texts, one must engage to some extent with other Epicurean texts, especially Epicurus’ own. Often other sources provide essential context for Philodemus’ discussion, and are vital for the restoration of lacunae. Given that Philodemus often helpfully interprets and applies early Epicurean texts in the course of his writing as he deems necessary, this study attempts to proceed from Philodemus’ understanding of Epicurean texts, where possible. Two other late Epicurean sources alongside Philodemus are Lucretius’ didactic poem De Rerum Natura (ca. mid first century BCE) and the text of an immense inscription carved into a stoa wall in Oenoanda by Diogenes (ca. mid second century CE). I have chosen not to integrate Lucretius’ or Diogenes’ texts with this study, given the complexity of such a task, and my intent to give Philodemus priority (one could say the same about non-Epicurean sources that are important witnesses as well, such as Cicero and Plutarch). Nevertheless, where references beyond Philodemus help to elaborate his perspectives, I include them.

There are a number of possible choices for a Pauline text beyond 1 Corinthians. I have chosen two texts from 1 Corinthians for a number of reasons. First, the choice of two texts from the same letter allows my presentation of Paul’s view to have greater exegetical depth. Second, unlike other texts that mention reciprocally formative practices among believers (e.g., Gal 5:13–6:10; 1 Thess 5:12–22), these chapters in 1 Corinthians offer greater detail due to their lengthier discussion.

73. For the purposes of this thesis I have limited myself to the undisputed Pauline letters out of a pragmatic concern to simplify the argument.
Among many viable choices within 1 Corinthians,\textsuperscript{74} chs. 8–10 and 12–14 seemed most relevant. Taken together, these chapters provide the opportunity to glean a coherent set of answers to the questions posed by this study. Chapters 8–10 concern how believers should relate to idol food so as to construct other believers, not destroy them. The choice of this passage is perhaps not obvious because it does not strictly deal with reciprocally formative speech. Yet the passage does offer an important window into Paul’s conception of believers’ constructive practices toward one another. First of all, these chapters provide his most detailed discussion of believers’ constructive adaptation to others, a key topic also for Philodemus. Second, these chapters provide important evidence for Paul’s theology of construction and the nature of believers’ interdependence upon one another for construction. Third, because these chapters feature importantly in Glad’s work (though focused on Paul’s own adaptation), re-examining them in this thesis offers the opportunity to display the differences in interpretation which my methodological reorientation enables. There are qualitative differences in what ‘moral formation’ and ‘adaptation’ mean between Paul and Philodemus on display here, I argue.

1 Corinthians 12–14 provide the greatest amount of relevant material. First, chs. 12–14 concern the reciprocal practice of constructing one another with gifts mediated by speech, some of which speech is similar in form and function to frank criticism (i.e., it involves exhortation, comfort, instruction, conviction, judgement, see 14:3, 19, 24–25). Of course not all of the gifts concern speech, and not all speech has the same form as frank criticism. Nevertheless, these chapters are the most sustained discussion of believers’ speech toward one another in Paul’s letters (disputed or undisputed), and he arguably has morally formative aims for such speech throughout. Second, these chapters contain Paul’s most sustained discussion of love as a constitutive element of constructing others. Third, these chapters provide central evidence for believers’ interdependence upon one another for receiving construction as the body of Christ. Fourth, these chapters witness to Paul’s theological construal of reciprocal construction. Fifth, Glad deals with these chapters only in passing in his monograph, though he reads them as involving reciprocal psychagogy, much like he does for 1 Cor 8–10 and Rom 14–15. On the contrary, these chapters contribute heavily toward my argument for qualitative difference between reciprocal moral formation in Paul and Philodemus. Chs. 12–14 show that the two have qualitatively different understandings of love, of reciprocity and interdependence in moral formation, and of the relationship of moral formation to the divine.

\textsuperscript{74} E.g., one might compare the morally formative aspects of communal meals, drawing 1 Cor 11:17–34 into comparison with evidence for similar meals in Philodemus and other Epicurean texts.
1.4.3. Limits of the Project

Inevitably this study has a number of limits. First, the narrow focus on 1 Corinthians limits its results. Despite this focus, I would argue that the results are central to Paul’s vision for reciprocal construction across his letters, even if I cannot demonstrate this claim here. Second, as noted above, the thesis does not present an exhaustive portrait of moral formation for both Paul and Philodemus. Paul and Philodemus would both have much more to say about practices of reciprocal formation beyond the use of speech and adaptation to others (such as formation by modelling/imitation, formation via shared participation in worship, common meals, and collaborative study of texts). For all that this thesis leaves unsaid (e.g., concerning the precise relationship between moral formation and Paul’s concept of salvation, the relationship between Paul’s and believers’ involvement in construction, the similarities and differences in moral psychology between Paul and Philodemus), it provides sufficient detail to support the conclusions made. Third, while I argue that the comparison leads to greater understanding of both Paul and Philodemus, the advance in understanding is different for both. On one hand, the comparison leads to a creative re-reading of Pauline texts. On the other, the comparison largely affirms current scholarly readings of Philodemus (with some specifications and adjustments), and corroborates those readings via similarity and difference in relation to Paul.

1.5. Thesis Overview

This thesis divides roughly into two halves, the first concerning Philodemus (chs. 2–4), the second concerning Paul (chs. 5–7). Each half discusses its respective figure on his own terms as much as possible, without direct comparison to the other. After an investigation of both figures, the thesis concludes with a final chapter bringing Paul and Philodemus into comparative perspective.

In the first half (chs. 2–4), chapters two and three prepare for the discussion of chapter four. Chapter two concerns Philodemus’ relatively elite socio-economic location and his conception of economic interdependence among Epicurean friends. The results of this chapter assist the exposition of formative interdependence between Epicurean friends in chapter four.

75. Glad’s monograph is also limited in its portrayal of Epicurean psychagogy by his focus on discourse as a means of moral formation. Of course speech is integral to Epicurean psychagogy, but it is not sufficient to account for the whole picture.

76. I do not consider Paul’s own efforts to construct believers in this thesis. By examining believers’ reciprocal construction without a detailed reconstruction of Paul’s own involvement in construction, I am not claiming that Paul’s own involvement is irrelevant. Rather, I focus on believers’ construction of one another because it has been far less studied. I assume that the results of this study could then be properly integrated into the wider picture of Pauline construction.
for I argue that economic and formative interdependence closely correlate. Chapter three concerns two main subjects: Philodemus’ conception of the gods’ involvement in moral formation, and his conception of human assimilation to the gods. The results of this chapter serve the exposition of moral formation generally in chapter four, and particularly the exposition of formative interdependence among Epicureans who strive after the model of the gods’ friendship. The fourth chapter offers an exposition of Philodemus’ view of reciprocal moral formation, i.e., its conception and practice via frank speech, adaptation, and love, with special attention to his understanding of formative reciprocity and interdependence among friends.

In the second half (chs. 5–7), chapter five prepares for the discussion of two case studies of reciprocal moral formation in Paul (ch. six on 1 Cor 8–10, ch. seven on 1 Cor 12–14). Chapter five discusses two main subjects: the relatively impoverished socioeconomic location of Paul and believers in his communities, and Paul’s vision for their economic interdependence. The results of this chapter prepare for tracing the correlation between economic and formative interdependence in chs. six and seven. Chapter six then examines Paul’s vision for reciprocal formation in 1 Cor 8–10, focusing on the nature of formation, the nature of adaptation as a means of forming the weak, and the nature of formative reciprocity and interdependence between both sides of the dispute (the weak and those with knowledge). Chapter seven concerns reciprocal formation in 1 Cor 12–14, again concerning the nature of formation, its reciprocity and interdependence among believers, with special attention to the practical role of speech and love in formation. Attention throughout to Paul’s theological construal of reciprocal moral formation is a centrepiece of both chapters six and seven.

The two halves of this thesis aim to bring the same set of questions to Philodemus and Paul, but the approach is slightly different to each, as one may have noticed. I have chosen to give Philodemus a separate chapter for his theology, while for Paul I trace his theology during a close reading of two texts. In part this difference is due to the nature of the texts involved. Philodemus has written extensive theological treatises separate from his discussion of moral formation in On Frank Criticism, and these deserve special attention both to appreciate their important role in his thinking and to remedy the lack of attention they have received in previous comparisons. Moreover, in what remains of On Frank Criticism, Philodemus does not comment extensively on theology, perhaps primarily because he did not view the gods as directly involved (this should not be taken as evidence of the irrelevance of his theology for moral formation). Paul on the other hand did view God as directly involved, and the passages examined here have sufficient theological material in them for present purposes.

Finally, in chapter eight, I place Philodemus and Paul side by side in comparative perspective. This chapter traces similarities and differences with respect to socio-economic location, economic interdependence, theology (esp. the involvement of the gods in moral formation and moral assimilation to the divine), formative practice (e.g., frank speech, adaptation, love), and lastly, formative interdependence among members. In this last chapter
(and indirectly throughout the thesis) I argue that Philodemus and Paul have qualitatively different understandings of moral formation and its reciprocity among interdependent members, differences which allow both to illuminate one another. Though there are several areas of qualitative difference which cannot be reduced to one, the heart of the difference between Paul and Philodemus is theological.

For Philodemus, I shall argue that moral formation is a matter of receiving moral resources from others in order to develop the individual moral character that sustains a life of ἀπαξίωσις, the greatest pleasure via the absence of pain. As one grows more mature, one grows into moral self-sufficiency, and needs formative help from others less. One grows to share qualitatively the same moral character, knowledge and pleasure which the gods themselves have. For Paul, moral formation involves the development of an individual’s character by receiving moral resources from others, but it cannot be described solely in those terms, because Paul does not have the same understanding of ‘character’ and ‘moral resources’ received from others. Moral formation fundamentally involves response to the transcendent God’s self-revelation to believers through others. This ongoing relationship with God and others constitutes a believer’s moral life, a relationship that can never be encompassed in an individual’s moral character or in moral resources received from others. A believer’s knowledge and moral character are always ‘in part’, qualitatively different from God’s on this side of the eschaton. Believers do not become morally self-sufficient. Rather, they always need to receive formation from others because to do so continually constitutes their moral lives in relation to God.
CHAPTER TWO: PHILODEMUS IN HISTORICAL AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES

This chapter, like the chapter following, prepares the way for chapter four’s discussion of reciprocal moral formation in Philodemus’s perspective. Before broaching that subject, it is important first to contextualise Philodemus historically. Who was Philodemus, and who were his Epicurean friends? After an initial answer to these questions, the bulk of this chapter focuses upon a particular dimension of Philodemus’ historical context. In the interest of illuminating Philodemus’ conception of morally formative interdependence in chapter four, I focus upon his conception of economic interdependence between friends in the present chapter. That Philodemus envisioned economic interdependence is uncontroversial. This chapter pursues the nature of this interdependence by exploring the socio-economic location of those involved. What was the socio-economic location of Philodemus and his friends, and what kind of economic interdependence did Philodemus envision for them?

In the course of this thesis (esp. in ch. four), I shall argue that Philodemus’ relatively affluent life of economic interdependence among relatively affluent friends reinforces his broadly similar conception of morally formative interdependence among friends (and vice-versa). This correlation between economic and formative interdependence receives discussion in chapter four, while the present chapter prepares for this discussion by specifying Philodemus’ vision for economic interdependence between friends in their particular socio-economic situation.

In the present chapter I argue that Philodemus and his philosophical friends exemplify characteristics typical of the Roman elite of their day. They lived well above the subsistence level, secure from the concerns of poverty, substantially leisured without the requirement to engage in labour themselves. Some of Philodemus’ Epicurean friends may have been more affluent than he was (e.g., his patron Piso). The poor, on the other hand, were excluded from full participation in this community, unless they were sponsored by someone of means.1 Philodemus assumed that he and his friends would give and receive gifts from one another, and that this reciprocity entailed economic interdependence. Yet because of their relative

1. Here I disagree with Elizabeth Asmis’ view that Philodemus follows Epicurus in leaving the door open to the poor, so to speak, even as he expands Epicurus’ teaching to allow for greater degrees of wealth for his Roman clientele (see Elizabeth Asmis, “Epicurean Economics,” in Philodemus and the New Testament World, eds. John T. Fitzgerald, Dirk Obbink, and Glenn S. Holland, NovTSup 111 [Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2004], 133–76). The argumentation for my position unfolds throughout this chapter.
affluence, Philodemus also assumed that every friend was economically self-sufficient, and would only depend on the help of others in the rare case of financial disaster.

In what follows, I first provide a basic historical overview of Philodemus’ life (section 2.1), then, second, discuss Philodemus’ and his friends’ socio-economic location (section 2.2), and third, examine his view of economic interdependence among these friends (section 2.3).

2.1. Historical Overview of Philodemus

Philodemus of Gadara was born around 110 BCE. Assuming from Philodemus’ dependence on the Epicurean sage Zeno of Sidon, and his expressed love for Zeno, Philodemus moved early in life from his native Gadara (modern Umm Qais in Jordan) to Athens, where he studied under Zeno, then scholarch of the Garden (who likely died around 75 BCE, with Phaedrus as his successor).

From Athens, Philodemus eventually made his way to Italy. In 55 BCE, Cicero, in his Against Piso (68–72), describes Philodemus as a Greek, Epicurean teacher and friend of L. Calpurnius Piso Caesoninus, who was consul in 58 BCE, proconsul of Macedonia from 57–55 BCE, and Julius Caesar’s father-in-law. According to Cicero, Philodemus met Piso in the latter’s adolescencia, and was a close friend from then on (Cicero, Pis. 68, with adolescencia possibly ranging from age fifteen to mid thirties, perhaps placing their meeting in the 70s BCE). Aside from this testimony, the following points of evidence witness to a patron/client relationship between the two: Philodemus wrote an epigram inviting Piso to an Epicurean dinner at Philodemus’ home, and gently asking Piso for his patronage (epigram 27 Sider);

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4. Strabo, Geogr. 16.2.29 lists Philodemus with Meleager, Menippus, and Theodorus the rhetor as notable Gadareans.

5. Sider, Epigrams, 6–7. Yet Cicero in Pis. 70 also describes that Piso was a senator (or imperator) whom Philodemus could not resist. The difference between Piso as senator and imperator is a textual issue. David Sider favours the reading of senator due to Piso’s reported adolescencia (assuming adolescencia would be incompatible with a role involving imperium, given the minimum age for consulship was 42), while Marcello Gigante favours imperator, making the date at which Philodemus met Piso significantly later, during the time of his consul/proconsulship in 58–55, and thus beyond his adolescencia. See discussion in Asmis, “Philodemus’ Epicureanism,” 2371, n. 7; Sider, Epigrams, 7, n. 17; Gigante, Philodemus in Italy, 68.
Philodemus dedicated his work *On the Good King according to Homer* to Piso.⁶ Among the papyri found in the enormous Villa dei Papiri in Herculaneum, near Naples, Philodemus’ works are the most numerous, and given the close connection between Philodemus and Piso, scholars have supposed that the villa belonged to Piso.⁷ Piso was likely not the only elite Roman with whom Philodemus shared friendship, as we know that Philodemus’ fourth book of his *On Rhetoric* was dedicated to C. Vibius Pansa Caetronianus, who was consul in 43 BCE.⁸

Philodemus likely spent most of his life as a philosopher on the Bay of Naples, and perhaps some time in Herculaneum at Piso’s villa. In *PHerc.* 312 col. 14 (discussed below in section 2.2.2), there appears to be a reference of uncertain date to Philodemus’ move to Naples and to Herculaneum, particularly to live alongside Siro, a fellow Epicurean teacher, and to engage in philosophy together.⁹ In 45 BCE Cicero finished his work *On Ends*, in which he pairs Philodemus with Siro, as ‘finest and most learned’ associates of Cicero’s literary Epicurean spokesperson, Torquatus (*cum optimis viros tum homines doctissimos*, *Fin.* 2.119). One may assume that Philodemus lived in the Villa dei Papiri in Herculaneum when Piso owned it, given Philodemus ties to Piso and to nearby Naples, though an epigram of Philodemus (ep. 27 *Sider*) seemingly refers to a separate home to which Piso is invited, one that Philodemus describes as a ‘simple hut’ (λιτή καλλίς, ep. 27.1, 8), like Siro’s *pauper agellus* in Naples (perhaps referred to by Vergil, *Catalepton* 8).¹⁰ Philodemus’ dedication of his work *On Flattery* to Plotius, Varius, Vergil, and Quintilius (*PHerc.* Paris. 2), and Horace’s own association with Vergil, Varius, and Plotius (*Sat.* 1.5.40–43; 1.10.81), suggest a union of

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6. See *Sider, Epigrams*, 5, n. 11; Asmis, “Philodemus’ Epicureanism,” 2372. Sider also lists two further pieces of evidence: Philodemus argues that the best financial way of life is to be a philosopher supported by those grateful for his teaching, i.e., a patron/client relationship (*On Household Management*, col. 23, 23–32); Catullus, in epigram 47, seems to refer to Philodemus as Socrates, who frequently dines at Piso’s home. Piso was not the only patron of Philodemus, as Philodemus dedicated his *On Rhetoric* to C. Vibius Pansa Caetronianus, but clearly the most significant relationship described by our sources is that between Philodemus and Piso (*Sider, Epigrams*, 7–8).

7. Though this claim has certainly not been without its opponents, given that the dedication to Piso on the manuscript of *On the Good King according to Homer* found in the villa is the only physical evidence linking Piso with the villa; see *Sider, Epigrams*, 14, n.7; Mario Capasso, “Who Lived in the Villa of the Papyri at Herculaneum – a Settled Question?” in *The Villa of the Papyri at Herculaneum*, ed. Mantha Zarmakoupi (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2010), 89–113.


10. On the discussion of this poem’s authenticity as Vergil’s, see *Sider, Epigrams*, 15, n.11. Marcello Gigante interprets that this home must have been in Rome, separate from the villa, given that he interprets another epigram to refer to Philodemus’ preferred meeting place at the villa’s belvedere overlooking the sea (ep. 29 *Sider*, referencing the άκρη, and location ἐν ἀπόψεις; Gigante, *Philodemus in Italy*, 55, 79). Sider agrees that the home referred to here must be separate from the villa, much like Siro’s home in Naples, but not that it must be in Rome; moreover, Sider disputes the reference to the belvedere in ep. 29 *Sider*, as άκρη could refer to Herculaneum itself, which had a promontory, as Strabo records (*Geogr.* 5.4.8; *Sider, Epigrams*, 154, 167).
literary and philosophical interests in Philodemus’ Epicurean environment in Naples. Philodemus may have continued teaching and writing after the reference from Cicero’s *On Ends* in 45 BCE, as one witness suggests, but the evidence for his remaining years runs dry after this point.

Philodemus was an important, prolific teaching figure within the Epicurean community in and around Naples in the first century BCE. The only writings known by a wide audience were his poetic and historical works; none of his dogmatic works have been explicitly cited by any ancient source, nor is it clear they were actually published. Generally, he sought in his work to bring Epicurean philosophy to his elite Roman audience (an audience discussed further below), and wrote widely on several subjects, focusing heavily on Epicurean ethics (subjects of his books included, e.g., history of philosophy, music, the character of a good ruler).

It seems Philodemus was a conservative Epicurean (as most Epicureans were), given his reverence for Epicurus and his frequent reliance on canonical texts, yet it is difficult to know just how ‘orthodox’ Philodemus was as an Epicurean in comparison to others, given the lack of data. It is clear that in some areas Philodemus constructively innovated in light of his context, as in *On Property Management*, in which he argues that a wise man would naturally prefer more wealth than just the little which Metrodorus and Epicurus taught. It seems best to interpret, based on the limited evidence, that Philodemus operates within Zeno’s interpretation of Epicurean teaching. As typical for an Epicurean, Philodemus frequently engaged in exegetical interpretation of these canonical texts and other founding figures, both


12. In his treatise *On Signs*, Philodemus refers to Antony, specifically to his bringing pygmies from Hyria to Rome, a reference used to date this work to 40 BCE, though Sider casts doubt on this witness (Sider, *Epigrams*, 11, n. 31). Smith and Asmis both treat 40 BCE as the end point of our evidence for Philodemus’ life (Asmis, “Philodemus’ Epicureanism,” 2372, n. 13; Martin Ferguson Smith, “Herculaneum and Oinoanda, Philodemus and Diogenes: Comparison of Two Epicurean Discoveries and Two Epicurean Teachers,” *Cronache Ercolanesi* 33 [2003]: 271).


14. See discussion of Philodemus’ work as a whole in Gigante, *Philodemus in Italy*, 20–45; Asmis, “Philodemus’ Epicureanism”.

15. For example, in *On Frank Criticism*, Philodemus explains that the most important thing for Epicureans is to obey Epicurus (fr. 45.7–10). See further examples of his reliance on founding Epicureans below.


17. See col. 16 of the same work, although Philodemus is clear that the sage will be able to live with little should that be necessary. See further discussion below in section 2.2.3, and discussions in Asmis, “Epicurean Economics”; Voula Tsouna, ed., *Philodemus: On Property Management*, WGRW 33 (Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2013), 95.

in confronting the arguments of non-Epicurean opponents, and in intra-Epicurean disputes.¹⁹
Several points of evidence illustrate disputes among Epicureans in which Philodemus engaged, often surrounding interpretive issues of canonical texts.²⁰

2.2. The Socio-Economic Location of Philodemus and his Friends

The following discussion of Philodemus’ socio-economic location proceeds in three stages. First, I argue that Philodemus’ position as a philosopher on the Bay of Naples suggests a cultural and social location among the Roman elite (section 2.2.1), with strong implications for an affluent socio-economic location for Philodemus and his friends. Second, I argue from a selection of Philodemus’ texts and other evidence that he and his friends had substantial education and a leisurely lifestyle (section 2.2.2). Third, I examine Philodemus’ philosophical discussion of wealth, in which he indirectly locates himself and his friends as relatively affluent (section 2.2.3).

2.2.1.

In the first century BCE, and especially after the Mithridatic Wars, it became far more common for elite Romans to spend time studying philosophy in Athens, while educated Greeks came in greater numbers to Italy to teach and seek patronage.²¹ Engaging with philosophy and literature was an important part of elite culture, and was a popular leisure activity for upper class Romans, whether via discussion, lectures, reading, writing, or performing or listening to poetry.²² Often such engagement occurred in the homes of the elite,

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²⁰. E.g.: in *PHerc.* 1005 (Προς τοις ...), Philodemus argues against opponents (some of whom were Epicureans) who misinterpret canonical Epicurean writings, and argues that Epicureans should be taught to read these works properly (see overview in Asmis, “Philodemus’ Epicureanism,” 2378–80); Philodemus followed Zeno of Sidon in interpreting Epicurus’ teaching against rhetoric to apply only to political and forensic rhetoric, not sophistic, epideictic rhetoric, against the interpretation of other Epicureans in Rhodes and Cos (*Rhetoric 2* col. 52.11–53.14; Martin Ferguson Smith, “Herculaneum and Oinoanda,” 271; Sedley, “Philosophical Allegiance,” 108–9); in *On Anger* col. 45.5–23, Philodemus claimed that other Epicureans, who supposedly ‘wanted to be faithful to the books’ (τοίς θρησκευόμενοις εἶναι θέλοντες), taught contrary to the works of Epicurus, Metrodorus, and Hermarchus when they maintained that the wise man will become fully enraged, rather than feel only natural anger with minimal disturbance (Philodemus’ preferred interpretation; translation by Tsouna, *The Ethics of Philodemus*, 229); Cicero in *Fin.* 1.25, 30–31, 66–70, witnesses to differences of Epicurean opinion over friendship, the virtues as ends, and proving the good.
and involved the participation of educated Greeks (whether as slaves or free clients). While philosophy was likely known widely, if only partially, among the general public, it seems that the investment of time and effort in pursuing Greek philosophy and literature was limited to the elite.

In the same century, the bay of Naples was likely the single most popular area outside Rome in which elite Romans engaged in seasons of leisure. The region’s combination of natural beauty, unique luxury amenities, and cultural vibrancy drew such visitors. Especially in this period, many luxurious, coastal villas built by elite Romans for entertainment, rest, and status-enhancement dominated the shoreline. Among many others attested, the following well-known Romans owned a villa in the area: Pompey (Cumae), Cicero (Pompeii, Cumae, Puteoli), Brutus (Cumae), Julius Caesar (Baiae), and Sulla (Cumae). The massive Herculanean Villa of the Papyri supposed to belong to L. Calpurnius Piso, Philodemus’ patron, fits neatly within this setting.

The bay area became an important philosophical and literary centre during this period, in part because of this area’s popularity with the elite. Neapolis was important in this regard, having retained a particularly Greek culture (including Greek language, clothing, and

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24. For Epicureanism, Cicero hyperbolically attests that the whole of Italy had been occupied by the school (Tusc. 4.3.7) because of the popular teaching (and Latin translation) of Epicureanism by C. Amafinius, Rabirius, and (later) Catius (see also Fam. 15.19.2; Acad. post. 1.2.5); Cicero remarks that even the slightly educated (mediocriter docti) know the tenets of Epicurus (Tusc. 2.7), and the indocti could follow Amafinius (Acad. post. 1.2.5–6); Catherine Castner, Prosopography of Roman Epicureans, Studien zur klassischen Philologie 34 [Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 1988], 7–11, 32, 63; Rawson, Intellectual Life, 49). Cassius likewise speaks of rustici Stoici who are similarly popular and less educated (Fam 15.16; 19). One could also note the popular mime with Epicurus, Socrates, Euripides, and Menander as characters, known by Cicero, Pro Gallio, fr. 2 Pucciano, cited in Rawson, Intellectual Life, 53.
25. Cicero remarks that his local Campanian friend and businessman Vestorius would be lost in a philosophical argument (Att. 14.12.3; D’Arms, Romans on the Bay, 63).
26. The ancient bay of Naples includes the towns from Cumae to Surrentum, including (starting from the northwest corner of the bay and moving east) Baiae, Bauli, Museum, Puteoli, Neapolis, Herculaneum, Pompeii, and Stabiae. Herculaneum was approximately 10km from Naples, easily accessible by road (Andrew Wallace-Hadrill, Herculaneum: Past and Future [London: Francis Lincoln Ltd., 2011], 93).
27. D’Arms, Romans on the Bay, 90. Cicero remarked that the town of Cumae was like a ‘little Rome’ (Att. 5.2; D’Arms, Romans on the Bay, 57).
28. See discussion in D’Arms, Romans on the Bay, 15–78.
29. Strabo remarks that buildings and plantations crowded the coastline in the bay to such an extent that it seemed like one continuous city (Geogr. 5.4.8). It is difficult to assign a specific date to Strabo’s description, though it was perhaps before 20 BCE (see discussion in Duane W. Roller, The Geography of Strabo [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014], 1–16). See also the discussion of the ideology of coastal villas in Annalisa Marzano, Roman Villas in Central Italy, Columbia Studies in the Classical Tradition 30 (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2007), 13–34; D’Arms, Romans on the Bay, 31–78; John H. D’Arms, Commerce and Social Standing in Ancient Rome (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981), 42–47, 78–94, and passim.
30. See the summary appendix catalogue 1 of ancient literary references to villas owned in the area during the late Roman republic (ca. 75–31 BCE) in D’Arms, Romans on the Bay, 165–91.
31. Strabo mentions that because of its Greek way of life, Neapolis was popular for many Romans and seeking rest and retirement in old age, as well as for those who made their living by teaching, τον ὑπὸ παιδίως ἐργασιμένον (Geogr. 5.4.7); see also D’Arms, Romans on the Bay, 67; Rawson, Intellectual Life, 21–25.
institutions such as the *ephebeia* and Greek magistracies) despite its becoming a Roman municipium after the social war. Neapolis hosted regular games that had pan-Hellenic importance even before Augustus’ later expansion of them. Neapolis was thus the town closest to Rome with the strongest Greek cultural environment. Herculaneum was significantly smaller than Neapolis (a few thousand inhabitants within 20 hectares, in comparison to 90 hectares for Neapolis), and though many would have spoken Greek there given the dominance of Neapolis, it was a more characteristically Roman municipium during this period (which it also became after the social war). A cluster of philosophical and literary figures are known with ties to Neapolis during this period, for example: the peripatetic Staseas lived in Neapolis, and the academic Aeschines was a Neapolitan native who later settled as a philosopher in Athens (Cicero, *De or.* 1.45; Diogenes Laertius, *Vit.* 2.64).

Particularly with respect to Epicureanism, concentrations of adherents stand out at Herculaneum and Neapolis. Aside from Piso and the circle involving Philodemus and Siro, we know of the following elite Romans with Epicurean sensibilities linked to the area: L. Papirius Paetus (*Fam.* 9.16; 9.20, who lived permanently in Neapolis), M. Fadius (or Fabius) Gallus (*Fam.* 9.25; 7.26, who owned a *fundus* near Herculaneum), and, less likely, Cassius Longinus in Naples (*Att.* 16.3.6). Cicero’s friend L. Papirius Paetus likely attended Epicurean lectures in Naples by Siro (cf. Cicero’s letter to Paetus, *Fam.* 9.26, ‘te consulo, qui philosophum audis’).

What was the socio-economic situation of a philosopher in the employ of an elite Roman, as Philodemus likely was of Piso, and perhaps Pansa? In this period, philosophers involved with Roman elites were usually free, Greek men, and were often dependent on gifts

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33. D’Arms, *Romans on the Bay*, 47.


38. D’Arms, *Romans on the Bay*, 66, with n. 102.

from their patrons in return for services. Concerning roles and tasks, evidence attests that philosophers functioned as repositories of philosophical and literary knowledge, often offering council or teaching members of the household. The socio-economic level of a philosopher was basically dependent upon his skill set, his renown, and the support given by his patron(s), and could thus vary widely. Some example are illustrative: Suetonius records that M. Pompilius Andronicus was an Epicurean grammarian who was unable to find patronage later in life, but was yet able to retire to live in otio at Cumae and write prolifically (Suetonius, Gramm. 8); Siro lived in Naples in a villula and pauper agellus (Catullus, Catalepton 8); Philodemus likely had his own home and may have lived in the villa of the papyri in Herculaneum under the patronage of Piso; two philosophers, a stoic and an academic, were sent by Augustus to govern the city of Tarsus (Strabo, Geogr. 14.675). Some philosophers may serve a patron until death (as the Stoic Diodotus on behalf of Cicero, see Brut. 309), while others might have only temporary relationships, e.g., as an advisor on certain political missions (as the Academic Antiochus of Ascalon on behalf of Lucullus). Some may live in a patron’s home (Diodotus), or in separate housing provided by their patron (Tiro, though a grammaticus, not a philosopher, was given an estate by Cicero, Fam. 16.21.7).

From this overview it seems clear that Philodemus operated in an elite Roman setting. Philodemus engaged in a profession designed to serve the philosophical interests of an elite clientele, in a location popular with elite Romans both for its leisure amenities and its Greek cultural flavour. Those with whom Philodemus shared his philosophy most likely also shared the same elite interests and capacities for learning philosophy in leisure. It is of course possible that Philodemus’ community included others drawn to philosophy beyond elite Roman circles, especially given the strength of Greek culture in Naples, but there is no direct evidence of this. Further evidence points rather in the same, elite trajectory. David Sedley

40. As a point of comparison for philosophers, see discussion of grammatici in this period, based primarily on Suetonius’ De Grammaticis in Rawson, Intellectual Life, 66–76.
41. For general discussion of philosophers as Roman clients, see M. L. Clarke, Higher Education in the Ancient World (London: Routledge & Kegan, 1971), 71–77; Miriam Griffin, “Philosophy, Politics, and Politicians at Rome,” in Philosophia Togata I: Essays on Philosophy and Roman Society, eds. Miriam Griffin and Jonathan Barnes (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 2–5; John Glucker, Antiochus and the Late Academy, Hypomnemata 56 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1978), 21–27; Rawson, Intellectual Life, 79–83. Miriam Griffin carefully argues that there are very few demonstrable instances in which a Roman politician was influenced to specific actions entirely by a particular philosophy (e.g., Cato the younger’s suicide, Marcus Aurelius); Griffin instead promotes the interpretation that Romans more often used philosophy as a framework to think through various options, whereas their value-system remained on the whole traditionally Roman (see Griffin, “Philosophy, Politics,” 32–37, passim). Relatedly, Elizabeth Rawson argues that philosophical advisors to Roman rulers did retain a particular (if idealized) role for offering frank speech in accordance with the virtues, even if this role was only rarely influential upon ruling Romans (Elizabeth Rawson, “Roman Rulers and the Philosphic Adviser,” in Philosophia Togata I: Essays on Philosophy and Roman Society, eds. Miriam Griffin and Jonathan Barnes [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989], 233–57).
42. D’Arms, Romans on the Bay, 64.
43. Griffin, “Philosophy, Politics,” 2.
44. Griffin, “Philosophy, Politics,” 2–3.
45. Rawson, Intellectual Life, 24, 81–82.
expresses the situation thus: ‘In settling on the Bay of Naples, rather than at Rome itself, he was not banishing himself to an obscure existence in the provinces, but working right at the intersection of the Greek and Roman worlds, where, as the example of Piso’s villa illustrates, the ear of the wealthy and powerful Roman elite might easily be won.’

2.2.2. Orienting Evidence regarding Philodemus’ Leisure and Education

Before delving into Philodemus’ teaching on wealth, it is helpful to present a number of specific witnesses to the elite level of leisure and education of Philodemus and his friends. This evidence provides further context for reading Philodemus’ discussion of wealth and for the final analysis of his socio-economic location and his view of economic interdependence among friends.

With respect to leisure, first of all, Philodemus’ extensive writing (at least 70 papyrus rolls found in the Herculaneum papyri have been ascribed to him by subscript) evidences a substantial amount of leisure needed to produce such a corpus. Secondly, the fragmentary witness of PHerc. 312 col. 14 is especially important as a testimony of the lifestyle of Philodemus:

... [ἐδ][όκει δ’ ἐπανελθὼν] μεθ’ ἡμῶν εἰς [τὴν Νεάπολιν πρὸς τὸν] [φύλαττον] Σιρόνα [καὶ τὴν] [κατ’ αὐτὸν ἐκέει διατάγμα] [καὶ τὰς φιλοσόφους ἐνεργεῖσαι ἀνέκει δι’ ηὗ [εἰς Ηρκλείῳ] [τε μεθ’ ἐτέρωσον συζητήσατι] ...
... he [Philodemus] decided to return with us to Naples and to dearest Siro and his way of life there and to engage in active philosophical discourse and to live with others in Herculaneum...  

Here we see Philodemus’ life on the bay of Naples defined as devoted to philosophical engagement with other like-minded individuals, entailing a sufficiently high level of leisure. Philodemus outlines the necessity of leisure for this way of life in *On Property Management*, col. 23, discussed further below in section 2.2.3.

With respect to education, firstly, Philodemus studied for several years in Athens under Zeno of Sidon before earning the friendship of Piso in Italy. The philosophical and literary skill of his writing attests to his elite education.

Secondly, Philodemus describes his ideals for the educational level of Epicureans, and particularly the Epicurean teacher, allowing us to envision the likely educational level of his own community. These ideals arise from Philodemus’ critical comments toward other, contemporary Epicureans and his portrait of the ideal Epicurean teacher in *PHerc.* 1005 (a work having the partially preserved title, Προς τοίς ...). Philodemus bemoans the fact that the majority of Epicureans do not know Epicurean writings well enough: ἀλλὰ τὸ σχετικότατον ἐκεῖν ἐστὶν [ἐπί τοῖς | πλέον] τῶν Ἐπικουρείων ὃ τὴν ἐν τοῖς βιβλίοις | ἄνενεργησίαν [ὑπαραίτητης] τοῦν ποιεῖται... ‘But the most shocking thing among the majority of Epicureans is this, namely, their unpardonable inactivity with respect to books...’ (col. 14.13–18). Elsewhere, Philodemus criticises those who consider themselves genuine readers of Epicurean texts, but only know extracts (ἔγλογάς, col. 4.13) and summaries (κεφαλαία, col. 4.15), and do not have any detailed knowledge of the philosophy (col. 4.2–18). Some Epicureans reportedly reviled the common philosophical conversation proper to Epicureans (καὶ τὰς ὁμιλίας τὰς ἐκάστους ἐκβλ[α]σφημοῦσι, col. 15.6–8), and considered texts which required explanation to be worthless (πονηρὸν, col. 20.2–15).

The ideal teacher, in contrast, is learned:

δὴναν[ται] μὲν τοῖς βιβλίοις | παρακολουθεῖν οἶ καὶ | τετυχ[έ]τες ἀγωγῆς


53. So too in *On Anger*, col. 45.16f., Philodemus refers to Epicureans who do not know the work of earlier Epicureans well enough to understand the issue of proper anger correctly.
While Philodemus does not argue that general education is necessary for being an Epicurean, it is clear that he considers literacy and philosophical education necessary to be an Epicurean teacher, given the technical ability needed to explain and write Epicurean treatises, and that such a teacher would help others to read, comprehend, and critique philosophical texts (col. 20.2–15). Philodemus’ comments in this vein are illustrative (col. 20.2–15), ‘... and with respect to the reading and the writing of books, it is possible to understand them, and not to consider that type of literature which requires explanation as something worthless. With proper training, people can be taught to recognize as incompetent a writer who exceeds the proper length, or who omits necessary subjects, or someone who conducts himself in a manner unbecoming to the argument at hand.’ These comments witness not only to Philodemus’ own educational level, but also to the expectations he had for his circle of friends, for Philodemus would have expected them to become learned in Epicurean texts with his assistance.

54. Translation adapted from Snyder with the help of Angeli’s Italian translation (Snyder, Teachers and Texts, 58). Immediately following this, Philodemus turns to discuss the less educated, but unfortunately we only possess the following (translation Snyder): ‘But those who serve as manual laborers or are ill-bred, and who have not learned letters ...’, ο[ι] δὲ δουλεύουσαντες ἐργατικῶς ἢ ἀνάγοντο καὶ γράμματα μὴ μαθόντες ..., (col. 16.16–18). Angeli supposes that Philodemus would likely have commented that these latter people will face obstacles to understanding and discussing texts. Angeli refers for similar comments in Epicurus’ discussion of similarly involved people. For example, Epicurus wrote his letter to Pythocles to provide an epitome for easy memory of his arguments concerning celestial phenomena, and thought they would be useful for those new to the philosophy and for those ‘who are involved too deeply in the business of some regular occupation’ (τοῖς εἰς ἁγιόλας βαθὺντες τῶν ἐγκυκλίων τινὸς ἑμπεισμοῦνοι, Ep. Pyth. 85; see also Ep. Hdt. 35). It does not seem that Philodemus’ friends would include the illiterate or manual labourers. See especially below, section 2.2.3.

55. Epicurus was particularly critical of general education, and certainly did not consider education a prerequisite for learning philosophy (Ep. Men. 122).

Thirdly, Philodemus dedicated his work *On Flattery* to Vergil, Plotius, Varius, and Quintilius (*PHerc. Paris. 2*). This witness implies that these elite Roman literati were likely students (and patrons?) of Philodemus. *On Flattery* (a subject often contrasted with frank criticism in ancient discussions) seems to support a reconstruction of Philodemus’ Epicurean community as one in which educated poetic performance and mutual literary critique were likely prevalent. Philodemus’ involvement with these figures (not to mention Piso and Pansa) acts as evidence to Philodemus’ elite social location.

Fourth, and finally, Philodemus attests to the relative scarcity of individuals attracted to the Epicurean way of life. In the course of describing the ideal Epicurean’s approach to wealth, Philodemus remarks, ‘nor is he lazy in getting for himself what is sufficient for him, he whose way of life is moderate and communal and whose reasoning doctrine is healthy and true, even if it does not easily attract just anybody’ (*On Property Management* col. 16.6–12). This is a striking comment to make given the wide popularity of Epicureanism in Italy across the social spectrum. That Philodemus thinks Epicureans are rare indicates that he assumes ‘authentic’ Epicureans are a select few, likely referring to high-calibre Epicureans, particularly those of the social, cultural, and economic elite, like himself and his patron Piso.

2.2.3. Philodemus’ Discussion of Wealth

Philodemus’ own writing on wealth and its proper use is essential for the present question. In what follows, I first offer an overview of Philodemus’ philosophy of wealth, then, second,
review evidence within this discussion for the socio-economic location of Philodemus and his friends.

In Philodemus’ work *On Property Management* (Περὶ οἰκονομίας, *PHerc.* 1424), Philodemus discusses how one manages wealth with a properly Epicurean set of virtues, beliefs, and practices. In the process, Philodemus interacts critically with Xenophon’s *Οἰκονομικός* and Pseudo-Aristotle’s *Οἰκονομικά* (attributed to Theophrastus by Philodemus), while drawing support from Metrodorus and Epicurus on the subject. I will not attempt to summarise the entire work, but will instead present evidence relevant for grasping an outline of Philodemus’ view of wealth and relevant to his socio-economic location.63

Philodemus believes there is an easily-obtainable level of ‘natural wealth’ (φυσικὸς πλοῦτος, col. 14.19) which should be maintained to provide for the satisfaction of necessary and natural desires of the Epicurean (e.g., basic food and clothing, cf. Epicurus’ summary in *Ep. Men.* 130). The one who lives this lifestyle is content with the simple fulfilment of natural and necessary desires alone, but naturally desires a more affluent way of living to fulfil natural but unnecessary desires (ῥέπει | ὑπὸ θυσία σκέψις μᾶλλον ἐπὶ | τὴν ἀργυρωτέραν, col. 16.4–6). This second point is Philodemus’ expansion of Epicurus’ position, adapted to his elite Roman audience.64 In the following I will seek to explain this position by tracking how Philodemus contrasts his view of wealth with others, and by presenting evidence for the actual level of wealth assumed by Philodemus, attending especially to evidence that will allow one to establish upper and lower limits of ‘natural wealth’.

On one hand, Philodemus opposes the Cynic embrace of acquiring only what is needed each day.65 Though the Cynic seeks to avoid the stress related to maintaining possessions beyond what is needed for each day, Philodemus argues that the increased pleasure of a stable economic existence free from the danger of painful deprivation mollifies the extra stress and work needed to maintain this higher level of wealth (col. 12–14).66 In what little remains of another treatise of his, *On Wealth*, it seems that Philodemus distinguishes Cynic mendicancy, described as deprivation of all things (πτωχεύσαν), from poverty, the deprivation of many things

65. The description of the person who embraces this lifestyle is described as [τὸ καθ’ ἡμέραν πορίζομαι][νυν], col. 12.39–41.
66. For Epicurus, too, the wise man would not be a Cynic, nor a beggar (οὐ δὲ κομιδή ... οὐ δὲ πτωχεύσαν, Diogenes Laertius, *Vit.* 10.119). Philodemus describes the life of the person who is deprived of basic necessities as one which is more disturbed (col. 13.27–29, [τὰ] Ὀστᾶται | [ἐμπάθεια]θεστέρως, [καὶ] στροφῶν | [ἐννοια]ς ἐνιὸν ὅξει | σ[θα]τ[α]).
Poverty as the deprivation of many things (πενία) is not to be feared; Philodemus can claim that the difference between wealth and poverty (πενία, possessing few things, not Cynic deprivation) is small (τὸ μ[ικρ]άν εἶ[ναι τὴν πλοῦτον πρὸς πε[νίαν] ὑπεροχὴν, col. 27.43–45). Along these lines, Philodemus asserts that the wise person’s way of life preserves the resources for what is natural and necessary even if one loses one’s wealth (κἂν πλοῦτον ἀποβάλῃ, col. 16.12–18), which presumably means falling to a state of poverty in which one possesses just a few things (πενία), but not to the level of Cynic deprivation. In this interaction with Cynicism, Philodemus assumes a limit to what he considers acceptable poverty for the Epicurean.

While Philodemus opposes the Cynic repudiation of wealth, he also takes care not to promote the love of money. Philodemus opposes the Epicurean’s possession and use of natural wealth to the person who engages in unlimited pursuit of wealth, who wastes wealth on unnecessary desires, and who has stressful, painful fears founded on false beliefs about wealth (exemplified by the lover of money, φιλοχρηστός, e.g., col. 17.13–14). While Philodemus thus indicates that the Epicurean will not strive to be maximally wealthy, there is no indication of how much wealth is too much in what remains of this treatise. We can, however, gain further specificity for the lifestyle Philodemus envisions from his discussion of the proper use of wealth.

Philodemus offers numerous illustrations of the ideal Epicurean lifestyle. Because the wise man judges all things, even wealth, by a hedonistic standard, he will not work for his
possessions more than he enjoys them (μὴ πλεῖστον ἡμῖν διὰ τὰ χρήματα ἐπίσημον, col. 18.43–44). The wise man will be generous with his money, especially in giving gifts to friends, but will leave himself a large enough amount to live on and preserve his wealth (col. 18.20–31, translation Tsouna): ‘In fact, if a person has lifted off himself the suffering involved in his activities concerning worthless things, and also the vexatious care about his belongings, he has not yet failed to leave himself a big enough difference, in the question of his property’s being preserved or not preserved, to suffice for the preservation and protection of his wealth.’ Yet, wealth is used painlessly (ἀφλοπον, col. 15.38–39) and purely (ἀκέραιον, col. 15.40) when there is no concern for how one might preserve it (col. 15.37–45); thus the wise man has no set budget (col. 24–25). Philodemus recognizes that it is difficult for such a person to acquire money starting with little, and difficult to keep it once acquired (col. 18.37–39), but wants to maintain that the Epicurean will be able to manage a life of generosity without beggaring himself.

This lifestyle also assumes the possession and management of a household with several slaves, especially in order to scrupulously manage one’s affairs (even if this is more painful than pleasurable for such a slave) and to contribute to income (col. 9–10; 19; 26.18–34). This ownership would likely require substantial wealth, given the costs of purchasing and providing for slaves, especially those highly skilled (a level of wealth akin to the middling groups between elite and subsistence level populations in the Roman empire).

Notably, the ideal lifestyle does not involve work at all on the part of the philosopher (φιλόσοφος δ’ οὔτε ἔργα ζεύγεται, col. 11.16–17) in contrast to the ordinary person (ἰδιώτη, col. 11.14–15). Philodemus does think it appropriate at times to manage one’s financial affairs with the assistance of friends and a skilled slave (col. 26), but it is inappropriate to be overly concerned about finances, just as it is inappropriate to engage in labour at all. As we will see next, these characteristics of the ideal lifestyle come together in Philodemus’ discussion of the best means of income.

70. Philodemus does seem to allow that the two categories of slaves given by Theophrastus (Pseudo-Aristotle), the steward and workman (τὰ ἐπιτροπον καὶ τοὺς ἐργαζόμενους), could both be free men just as well (col. 11.16–20), leading Elizabeth Asmis to argue that there is no necessity for the Epicurean to have slaves in Philodemus’ discussion (Asmis, “Epicurean Economics,” 166–67). Asmis sees this as part of Philodemus’ non-traditional conception of the household, as Philodemus also does not consider a wife to be necessary. While Asmis seems to be correct, this instance seems to be the only indication against the norm of slavery in a work which throughout assumes and discusses the proper management of slaves by the ideal Epicurean.


72. Philodemus entertains the possibility that the philosopher might work on occasion with a conditional sentence specifying how he will work ‘if he ever works’ (ἀν ἡμείς ἔργα ἔσονται ἀπὸ ζωῆς, col. 11.17–18), namely, by allocating resources so that they are not all endangered at once. Given the context from which Philodemus draws in Pseudo-Aristotle Oec. 1344b27–1345a17, it is clear that this ‘work’ Philodemus refers to is not personal labour with one’s hands or in a particular profession, but the work of managing a productive household of slaves and others working on one’s behalf.
An especially important passage relevant to Philodemus’ socio-economic context appears in his discussion of the best means of income in *On Property Management*, col. 23. In the passage, Philodemus interacts with Xenophon’s discussion, from which Philodemus quotes. At this point in his treatise, Philodemus has begun to offer some of his own thoughts on the best sources of income, following after but improvising beyond the work of Metrodorus, his Epicurean forerunner (ήμεις δὲ λέγομεν ἄκολου[θο]ντες, ‘let us say, following him...’ col. 22.17–18). The passage, col. 23.1–36, is as follows (translation Tsouna):


It is [utterly] ridiculous to believe that it is a good thing to earn an income from practicing the art of horsemanship. Earning an income ‘from the art of mining with slaves doing the labor’ is unfortunate, and as to securing income ‘from both these sources by means of one’s own labor,’ it is a mad thing to do. ‘Cultivating the land oneself in a manner involving work with one’s own hands’ is also wretched, while (cultivating it) ‘using other workers if one is a landowner’ is appropriate for the good man. For it brings the least possible involvement with men from whom many disagreeable things follow, and a pleasant life, a leisurely retreat with one’s friends, and a most dignified income to [those who are moderate]. Nor is it disgraceful to earn an income both from properties rented to tenants and from slaves who have skills or even arts that are in no way unseemly. However, these sources of income come second and third. The first and noblest thing is to receive back thankful gifts with ever reverence in return for philosophical discourse shared with men capable of

understanding them, as happened to Epicurus, and, [moreover], discourses that are truthful and free of strife and, [in short], serene, since in fact the acquisition of an income through [sophistical] and contentious speeches is [in no way] better than its acquisition through demagogical and slandering ones.

This passage reveals both the ideal socio-economic position of an Epicurean teacher, and the positions of those who are part of his Epicurean community. With respect to the ideal Epicurean, here we see again that he does not engage in personal labour, but might receive income from slaves and property ownership. Leisure and detachment from unpleasant engagement with the general public are essential. An elite level of education is assumed in order to share philosophical teaching with others.

With respect to the friends of the ideal Epicurean, one notices that the receipt of gifts in return for philosophical teaching presupposes that these supporters are δεκτικοί, i.e., capable of receiving this teaching. It seems there are three aspects of this capability. First, it involves a receptive psychological disposition, as indicated in Philodemus’ discussion of the dispositions of students receiving treatment in On Frank Criticism (often concerning their vicious dispositions, e.g., fr. 30; 65–66).\(^4\) In \(PHerc.\) 346, the author (likely Philodemus)\(^5\) notes that all the goods following from Epicurean philosophy come to those fit to receive them, \([\delta\acute{e}k\tau\iota\kappa\omega\zeta, \ PHer\]. 346, col. 5.13–14; see too Philodemus’ \(On\ Death,\) col. 18.1–5). Philodemus refers in \(On\ Rhetoric\) 8, \(PHerc.\) 832, col. 19.7–9 (2.29 Sudhaus) to some who ‘were not capable of receiving the best life’ (οὐκ ἔφυσαν τοῦ ἠρίστου βίου δεκτικοί).\(^6\)

Second, being ‘capable’ involved some basic level of educational resources to appreciate and learn the complexities of Epicurean philosophy. Thanks to Philodemus’ remarks observed above on the qualifications for an Epicurean teacher and his students (section 2.2.2), one senses that he had high standards. One remembers as well that the only known students of Philodemus were the elite band of poets including Vergil, Plotius, Varius, and Quintilius, to whom Philodemus dedicated his treatise \(On\ Flattery.\) At the very least this involved basic literacy and the ability to engage in complex philosophical argumentation.\(^7\)

Third, being a ‘capable’ friend involved possessing the economic resources necessary to enable learning from a philosopher in leisured withdrawal. The economic resources must be

\(^{4}\) See Tsouna, \(The Ethics of Philodemus,\) 104–10, and discussion in ch. four.

\(^{5}\) See discussion in Mario Capasso, \(Trattato Etico Epicureo (PHerc. 346)\) (Naples: Giannini Editore, 1982), 31–40.

\(^{6}\) See Henry, \(Philodemus, On Death,\) 41, n. 60. Perhaps also Epicurus’ obscure saying preserved in Diogenes Laertius, \(Vit.\) 10.117 is relevant here, which excludes the ability of becoming a sage to some based on the condition of the body and one’s θύνος: οὔδε μὴν ἐκ πάσης σῶματος ἕξως σοφόν γενέσθαι ἄν οὕδ᾽ ἐν παντὶ ἔθνει.

\(^{7}\) It seems unlikely that Philodemus engaged in teaching adults who were entirely illiterate to read, in light of the cumulative argument built in this essay. See on the issue of education in Philodemus Erler, “Orthodoxie und Anpassung,” 177–80; Snyder, \(Teachers and Texts,\) 59.
substantial indeed, for one must not only provide for one’s own leisure, but simultaneously provide as well for some portion of the sage’s income. Moreover, assuming the philosopher depended heavily on the gifts of such friends, the level of support would be substantially large, for it would have to supply adequately the lifestyle Philodemus assumes as natural for himself as an Epicurean. Philodemus thus valourises both his own affluent way of life as a philosopher and that of his patrons as ideally Epicurean.  

The contrast of the philosopher’s friends with those people who, by interaction with them, bring ‘many disagreeable things’ that counteract the pursuit of philosophy, seems instructive (e.g., slaves labouring with their hands in fields and mines). This group of friends who are ‘capable’ of receiving philosophical teaching is particularly reminiscent of the elite, Roman consumers of philosophy in the Bay of Naples: Philodemus’ patron Piso, and the group of literati also involved with Siro.  

Philodemus cites Epicurus’ lifestyle as the model of the best means of income. The following points of evidence are illustrative of Epicurus’ economic situation: (a) Epicurus taught that the sage would love the country life, should make money only from his wisdom;  

(b) from the possessions held at the end of his life, Epicurus was able to provide financially for the garden’s monthly festivals (including sacrifices and common meals), and for the ongoing basic living necessities of several friends and some of their children;  

c) friends of Epicurus donated financially in an ad hoc manner to Epicurus and the community (especially

78. So too Asmis, “Philodemus’ Epicureanism,” 2389.
79. Thus Asmis sees this work as adapted to the sensibilities of the Roman elite (Asmis, “Epicurean Economics,” 174–76).
80. Preserved in Diogenes’ discussion of Epicurus’ views in Vit. 10.120: on income: χρηµατει ἄλλ’ ἀπό µόνης σορίας, ἀπορθίσαντα, καὶ µόναρχον ἐν καιρῷ θεραπεύον; on the country: φιλαγρησίε.  
81. These possessions at least included: a substantial sum of income (Hermarchus was made κύριον τῶν προσόδων along with Amynomachos and Timokrates in Epicurus’ will, Diogenes Laertius, Vit. 10.20); the garden (which Epicurus reportedly purchased for 80 minae, Vit. 10.11); four slaves who were set free in his will (Vit. 10.21); Epicurus’ books, of which those he wrote numbered around 300 (Vit. 10.26); and a house in Melite, a deme of Athens, also given to Hermarchus (Vit. 10.17).
82. These include (see Diogenes Laertius, Vit. 10.7, 17–21): (1) the ongoing upkeep of the garden for others to live and study in (for which the food may have cost 1 mina per day, perhaps for 100–200 members, see Vit. 10.7, as interpreted by Michael Erler, “Epikur,” in Die hellenistische Philosophie, ed. Hellmut Flashar, Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie: Die Philosophie der Antike 4 [Basel: Schwabe Verlag, 1994], 70; Cyril Bailey, ed., Epicurus: The Extant Remains with Short Critical Apparatus Translation and Notes [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1926], 405; Horst Steckel, “Epikuros,” in Pauly’s Realenzyklopädie der klassischen Altertumswissenschaft: Supplementband XI, ed. Konrat Ziegler [Stuttgart: Alfred Druckenmüller, 1968], 585); (2) funds providing for regular common meals and funeral offerings for Epicurus’ father, mother, and brothers, a celebration of his birthday, the meeting of the community every month in honour of Epicurus and Metrodorus, and separate days celebrating his brothers, Polyaínos, and perhaps Pythocles (see Clay, “The Cults of Epicurus,” 88–100); (3) the future dowry and annual provisions for Metrodorus’ daughter after marriage to a fellow Epicurean within the community; (4) continued financial support for Nicanor and others who have grown old with Epicurus as part of the philosophical community (συγκαταγιράκτων µεθ’ ἡµῶν προειλλότο ἐν φιλοσοφί)].
those from Lampsakos; cf. Diogenes Laertius, *Vit.* 10.11; *PHerc.* 176 fr. 5, col. 12.8–10; Plutarch, *Adv. Col.* 1117B; *Suav. viv.* 1097C, and all but the poorest members seem to have paid annual contributions (one Philodemous source indicates Epicurus requested 120 drachmae per person per year; see Philodemus, *PHerc.* 1418 col. 30, 3–5), though property was not held in common as a rule (Diogenes Laertius, *Vit.* 10.11; Epicurus, *VS* 39).

In addition to his colourful depiction of the ideal Epicurean lifestyle, Philodemus helpfully provides us with a specific net worth he considers to be too low for the Epicurean. Philodemus recalls that in Xenophon’s *Oiκονοµικός*, a debate ensued between Socrates and the rich man Ischomachus concerning who was richer, with Socrates claiming that his five minae, representing the total worth of his home and all his possessions, made him richer than Ischomachus. Philodemus assesses this figure in a revealing way (*On Property Management* col. 5.4–14):


83. Epicurus’ request to an unknown recipient concerning cheese: πέµποι µοι τοµὸν κουµµίδιον, ἵνα ὅταν βούλοµαι πολυτελεύσασθαι δόνοµαι.
85. Epicurus’ appeal to Idemoneus of Lampsakos (Diogenes Laertius, *Vit.* 10.25), quoted by Plutarch: πέµπε σοι σκότος ἡµῶν εἰς τὴν τοῦ ἑρωύ σῶµατος ἑρποντας ὑπὲρ τοῦ αὐτοῦ καὶ τέκνων· οὕτω γὰρ µοι λέγειν ἐπέρρεται. Here Epicurus seems to refer to the Epicurean community as a ἑρωύ σῶµα.
87. See critical edition in Cesira Miletto, *Memorie Epicuree*, La Scuola di Epicuro 16 (Naples: Bibliopolis, 1997). Col. 30 reports a letter written from Epicurus to some disciples, ἐκατὸν γάρ | καὶ ἐκκόπη δ[η]πραξµ[α]ν[ε]ς καὶ τί ἐνν[α]ντον βούλομαι παρ’ ἐκατέτορον λαµβάνειν. ‘For I wish to receive only one hundred and twenty drachmae each year from each of you.’ This income is probably a major part of the income referred to in Epicurus’ will (προοδὸς; e.g., διήθεσαν δ’ Ἀµυνόµαχος καὶ Τιµοκράτης ἐκ τὸν ὑποχρεοφθ’ ἡµῖν προοδόν, Diogenes Laertius, *Vit.* 10.19; cf. 10.18, 20, 21). See discussion in Miletto, *Memorie Epicuree*, 275–84; Erler, “Epikur,” 70; Diskin Clay, “The Athenian Garden,” in *The Cambridge Companion to Epicureanism*, ed. James Warren (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 16. Col. 19 of the same work likely contains a letter from Epicurus to a disciple exhorting him to allow another Epicurean, Carneiscos to share in a recent source of income, which is not likely referring to regular dues for being a member of the community (following Miletto, *Memorie Epicuree*, 230).
88. The text of Epicurus, *VS* 39: Οὐδ’ ὁ τὴν χρείαν ἐπιζητῶν διὰ παντὸς φίλος οὐδ’ ὁ µηδὲτε συνάπτων· ὃ µὲν γὰρ καθηλεύει τῇ χάριτι τὴν ἁµοµην, ὃ δὲ ἀποκτείτω τὴν περὶ τοῦ µέλλοντος εὐελπιστεῖν.
89. Xenophon, *Oec.* 2.4–8. Ischomachus would have been worth far more given his elite status and responsibilities for public benefaction. Socrates describes particularly that his house and all his property would fetch five minae to a good buyer.
Surely, Socrates always had the characteristic of impracticality. Besides, as regards his claim that five minae seem to him sufficient for the necessary and natural needs of men, that prosperity in life is something empty, and that he does not need anything more in addition to those, it is impracticable and conflicts with reason.

Philodemus cannot equate the ideal life of an Epicurean with such a low net worth, because it would not allow a full life of generosity, ‘prosperity’ or ‘plenty’ (ευεπτηρία), and freedom from basic deprivations. Such a financial limitation is both practically impossible (ἀπορον τὸ ἕργο), and irrational (τὸ | νὸ μαχόμενον). Based on Socrates’ five minae, Sarah Pomeroy notes that in the fifth-century BCE, Socrates would have belonged to the lowest class, the thetes, too poor to afford armour needed for hoplite service, excluded from holding public office, but not destitute (see Aristotle, Pol. 1274a21–22; 1278a). It is very difficult to assess the value of Socrates’ five minae, not only because the value of the mina varied, but also because one cannot be sure how Philodemus assesses the value, whether according to Socrates’ fifth-century mina, or some equivalent of Philodemus’ own time. The figure of one mina being equivalent to one hundred drachmae is an imprecise scholarly generalization, as the ratio would change based on time and place. One can only place this amount in a general context. Epicurus purchased the original Garden for eighty minae (Diogenes Laertius, Vit. 10.11), and may have spent one mina per day feeding those who lived at the garden (perhaps 100–200 people; Vit. 10.7). Aristotle, in the fourth century, records that five minae was equivalent to five beds, or one house (Eth. nic. 1133b,25ff.). In W. Scheidel’s analysis of data from Roman Egypt from the late first century CE to the latter half of the second century CE, a family of four living at the subsistence level would earn ~ 450–500 drachmae per year (representing the income of a male unskilled labourer, with his wife working as a wet nurse, and their children working as well). If one were to suppose that Socrates’ five minae were the rough equivalent of five hundred drachmae (one minae to one hundred drachmae, noting the imprecision), and that an adult from such a family joined Epicurus’ garden, an annual one hundred and twenty drachmae contribution would equal ~20% of that family’s total annual income, a significant payment that would not be possible for this family living at subsistence level.

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94. This assumes as well that a person of such means would have been required to pay this amount, if any at all, given the evidence that some members had been supported directly by Epicurus (e.g. Nicanor, Diogenes Laertius, Vit. 10.20).
It seems clear that there is a limit to the poverty possible for an Epicurean on display here. This is important evidence for sketching Philodemus’ social location, as it indicates that Philodemus excludes from consideration a lifestyle that is at or just above subsistence, and anything below. Philodemus restricts the Epicurean life to those who have means to supply their own natural and necessary desires (which a subsistence-level budget cannot supply, apparently) while also having a life of leisure. Philodemus does not consider in his analysis those who must work to provide for basic living necessities, or are compelled to types of work that produce pain and do not provide necessary leisure for the Epicurean life. In excluding this group of people from consideration, Philodemus excluded the vast majority of the populace in the Greco-Roman world. Because there was no formal education requirement to be an Epicurean, it remained possible in theory that anyone could be part of the community, perhaps receiving financial help from others to do so. Epicurus’ slave, Mys, is a key representative of this possibility. One also cannot preclude the possibility that Philodemus’ circle of friends included those who could only partially live the Epicurean life due to restrictions related to wealth, education, or lack of leisured time. All available evidence, however, points away from that possibility, and toward a community of the social and economic elite.

Other comments from Philodemus also suggest that he was flippantly dismissive of those who do not share his own social and economic status. For example, Philodemus was willing to allow slaves to work so that the philosopher and his friends might enjoy leisure at the expense of their suffering under conditions unfit for a full Epicurean life. Furthermore, in his treatise On Death Philodemus starkly declares that for the vast majority of people who have not encountered Epicurean philosophy and remain in the grip of fear and pain due to false beliefs (i.e., fools, ἀφρόνες, col. 13.14), it would be more profitable (λυσιτελεστερόν, col. 13.15) for them to die young. It would be ‘not too unfitting’ (οὐκέταλλοφτιότερον for a fool to die even quickly after birth, rather than live a long life of suffering (col. 19.35–37).

95. Aristotle, like Philodemus, considers that the life of the lower class, because of the nature of their work, cannot realize the best life (οὐ γὰρ ὁλὸν τε ἐξήκοντοι τῆς ἀρετῆς ζῶντα βιον βάσιμον ἤ θητηκόν), and are thus excluded from full participation in some forms of merit-based oligarchies (Pol. 1278a21–22).

96. In his treatise On Frank Criticism, Philodemus refers in passing to slaves (οἱ κείται, col. 12a.8), though it is not clear from the context that this refers to members of the community (despite the cursory affirmation of slaves in the community based on this witness, without further argument, in Glad, “Frank Speech, Flattery, and Friendship in Philodemus,” 172, n. 48). Indeed, that this reference is to non-member slaves seems more likely given that the ‘slaves’ here are distinct from ‘the others’ (ἄλλοι, col. 12a.7), a designation often marking other, fellow students (as in col. 13a.10, τοῖς ἄλλοις φίλοις).


2.2.4. Concluding analysis

We must now bring together the preceding strands of evidence in a final analysis of Philodemus’ and his friends’ socio-economic location. The expressed ideals of the best economic life of the Epicurean philosopher with his friends do not necessarily prove the specifics of Philodemus’ circumstances. Philodemus’ *On Property Management* is first and foremost evidence for the lifestyle he valued for himself and his community. It is of course possible that Philodemus created this picture to align with the elite Roman values of his patrons, while the actual reality of Philodemus’ situation and those of his circle fell far short.\(^99\) It seems more plausible, however, to read this text as largely indicative of Philodemus’ own circumstances.

One can loosely mark upper and lower limits for Philodemus’ own socio-economic situation. The upper limit is less clear. In light of (a) Philodemus’ polemics against maximizing one’s income, against unlimited desires, and against involvement with public life, and (b) Philodemus’ ideal to give away his wealth and receive financial benefits from others, this evidence suggests that he did not share the economic level of the ruling Roman elite (e.g., *decuriones* and above). Notably, however, the values concerning wealth expressed here do not necessarily contradict the lifestyle of an elite patron with political commitments, though such commitments would restrict one’s leisured time with friends.

The lower limit seems far more concrete. Philodemus envisions an affluent, slave-owning lifestyle free from labour (aside from philosophical discussion and casual management of one’s household), and free from the deprivations of subsistence-level existence. Particularly given the ability to sustain this lifestyle without work, and the dismissals of manual labour and subsistence living, it seems Philodemus would sit above those who maintain a stable existence just above subsistence as craftspersons, traders, etc. Philodemus likely held a socio-economic position among the middling group consisting of approximately 6–12% of the population between the ruling elite and those just above, at, or below the subsistence level.\(^100\)

\(^99\) In doing so, Philodemus would essentially criticize himself for failing to live up to this ideal.

\(^100\) See the estimates in Scheidel and Friesen, “Size of the Economy,” which defines this middling group as consuming between 2.4 and 10 times subsistence levels, and controlling 15–25% of the empire-wide income (Scheidel and Friesen, “Size of the Economy,” 84–85). Usage of this data is limited by the fact that it does not concern the late Roman republic, during which Philodemus lived. The subsistence levels used here are from Scheidel’s analysis of Roman Egyptian data from the first to third centuries CE, suggesting an annual basic subsistence cost of the equivalent of 390kg of wheat; see Scheidel, “Real Wages.”. Another way of approximating Philodemus’ position would be to assign him to ES 4 in Longenecker’s scale of wealth. Admittedly the use of such a scale for Philodemus can only be approximate because the scale is meant to represent the early Roman empire. See Bruce W. Longenecker, *Remember the Poor: Paul, Poverty, and the Greco-Roman World* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2010), 53, and his appendix 1. Longenecker’s scale is largely based on Steven J. Friesen, “Poverty in Pauline Studies: Beyond the So-Called New Consensus,” *JSNT* 26 (2004): 341.
With respect to Philodemus’ community of friends, L. Calpurnius Piso represents the zenith of the scale, though it is not especially clear how involved he was in the community. Perhaps his political commitments did not permit him to fully realize the life of leisured friendship as presented by Philodemus. As to whether there was a lower boundary for involvement in Philodemus’ community, Asmis argues that Philodemus does not exclude the poor entirely from his circle, but merely shows that wealth has great advantages for the Epicurean. One issue here is the definition of ‘poor,’ for while Philodemus would embrace the idea that, at times, the Epicurean encounters poverty, and need not fear it, his comments elsewhere suggest that ‘poverty’ for him does not mean, like it does for the Cynics, subsistence-level living. ‘Poverty’ instead means having ‘a few possessions’ to be able to sustain natural and necessary desires, to have freedom from work, and to pursue philosophy with friends, with all of the financial commitments such relationships require. Philodemus’ ‘poverty’ is so rich as to be unattainable for the vast majority of the population. The bulk of the evidence suggests that members of Philodemus’ community would fit his description of affluent, educated friends of the philosopher in col. 23 above, embodied in, e.g., Piso and Vergil.

2.3. Economic Interdependence among Friends

Philodemus envisioned a kind of economic interdependence between Epicurean friends, as already hinted at in his portrayal of the philosopher’s ideal lifestyle. Such a position fits generally with the Epicureans’ willingness to embrace utility wholeheartedly in mature friendships (contra, e.g., Aristotle). This interdependence is a function of regular gift reciprocity among friends. For Philodemus, the desire to acquire wealth is the same as the desire to share freely with friends (col. 14.37–15.6), for life is naturally shared with friends (ὅι βίος ... κοινός, col. 16.8–9). The ideal Epicurean rouses others to share everything by his confidence in a few possessions (ἐτι | δὲ κατὰ τὸ παραστατικὸν | ἀνθρώπων ἀπὸ τοῦ πρὸς τὰ | ὀλία θάρσους διὰ τῶν τοῦ σοφοῦ λόγον εἰς τὸ παντὸς μεταδότας γίνεσθαι, col. 18.2–7). In Philodemus’ view, gifts to friends are not to be viewed as losses to one’s own property, but more valuable purchases than land, because such gifts are ‘the safest treasures with regard to the turns of fortune’ (πρὸς τὴν τύχην | ἁφαλέστατοι θησαυροί, col. 25.1–4). Lacking friends does not reduce one’s expenses, as one might think, but instead causes one to be without help (ὡςυνεργήτους, col. 24.21–22), to have a bad reputation (ὑπὸ | παντὸς καταφρονουμένους), and to receive fewer favours (ὧν’ εἰνοῖαι ἀπολυωρήτους, col. 24.19–24). This entails that acquiring friends is the means to have a substantial income and financial security (col. 24.27–29). One should share one’s wealth like one sows seeds in the ground in the hope of a future harvest.

102. The ‘sage’ here likely refers to Epicurus, but may refer to any authoritative Epicurean teacher.
One may begin to think that Philodemus has a purely instrumental view of friends, yet he also advises generosity to friends even in economic hardship: when a deep shortage of money occurs (συμβάσσης ἀδρας κοιλότητος, col. 26.5), one should reduce expenditures on oneself more than one’s friends (col. 26.54–9), presumably out of concern for them, and/or to maintain a sense of decorum. He also gives to friends based on the demands of noble character (καλοκα[γ]αθιας, col. 25.44), and indulges in unnecessary but harmless desires on occasion with friends (col. 26.1–4). The Epicurean not only gives generously to friends, but provides for friends’ lives posthumously (col. 27.5–12; recall Epicurus’ example above).

Philodemus conceives of Epicurean friendship as involving a form of economic interdependence, yet this interdependence obtains between friends who are relatively self-sufficient economically. The good Epicurean is never so constricted financially that he cannot give to his friends. Philodemus considers it a relatively straightforward matter to maintain one’s level of ‘natural wealth’, and the good Epicurean will do so, even if he does not have special expertise for it, and is not continually concerned for making more (col. 16). No Epicurean discussed in this text is destitute or living near the subsistence level, and all are able to withdraw into leisure without needing to work. It is just not workable to be poor and live a full Epicurean life, for Philodemus, unless one is ‘poor’ in Philodemus’ luxurious sense. Only on a rare occasion would it be absolutely necessary that one relies on one’s friends’ resources to live, for Philodemus and his friends do not face the troubles of subsistence-level living. For Philodemus, the Epicurean gives gifts mainly because such reciprocity is constitutive of friendship, which is essential for the best, most pleasurable life.

Giving gifts to others sustains a safety net of interdependence, and its constant presence in friendship provides freedom from fear and anxiety in the face of the unknown future. Yet, the net gets no real use most of the time, nor are Philodemus and his friends in much danger of falling into it. As I shall argue in chapter four, this kind of interdependence among self-sufficient friends bears remarkable similarities to Epicurean friends’ morally formative interdependence upon one another.

CHAPTER THREE: PHILODEMUS’ THEOLOGY OF MORAL FORMATION

Epicurean theology is not an oxymoronic sham, so Philodemus argues against his numerous detractors. Pious worship of the gods is fundamental to the best human life offered by Epicureanism. Accordingly, one must account for the divine in order to grasp properly Philodemus’ view of reciprocal moral formation. The burden of this chapter is to answer two main questions, ‘How does Philodemus envision the gods’ involvement in moral formation?’, and ‘How does Philodemus understand an Epicurean’s assimilation to the gods?’ In chapter four I draw upon the theology outlined in this chapter in order to describe Philodemus’ conception and practice of reciprocal moral formation.

As I shall show, the gods do not play a direct role in moral formation, for such a role is incompatible with their divine character. Rather, the gods are involved in moral formation only indirectly as objects of human thought, i.e., as models of the best life toward which humans strive. An Epicurean assimilates to the gods as he adopts their moral character and its consequent knowledge of the cosmos, and as he shares in their own perfect pleasure by personally attaining ἀταράξια, the state of highest pleasure due to the absence of pain. It is particularly, though not exclusively, through worship that this assimilation to the divine occurs.

In this presentation, I skirt the controversy over whether Epicureans have a ‘realist’ or ‘idealist’ conception of the gods (see excursus for discussion at the end of this chapter). My interests lie in the functions of Philodemus’ theology for moral formation, and the claims I make in this respect do not require a particular resolution to that controversy.

It is important first to offer a few orienting comments upon the texts which predominantly express that theology, On Gods and On Piety (section 3.1). Afterwards, I discuss Philodemus’ conception of the gods and their involvement in moral formation (section 3.2), and his conception of Epicurean assimilation to the gods (section 3.3).

3.1. Introduction to On Gods and On Piety

As typical with the Herculaneum papyri, charred fragments remarkably but poorly preserve the texts of Philodemus’ On Piety and On Gods, our two best sources for Philodemus’ theology. Many of these original fragments are now lost, due either to the method used to unroll the papyrus and create the first apographs, and/or to the deterioration of the remaining
fragments over time (there are two sets of these first apographs, the Oxonian and Neapolitan apographs, now housed in the Bodleian library and Biblioteca Nazionale di Napoli respectively). In what follows I give a brief description of each work.

Portions of the first and third books remain from the originally multi-volume work *On Gods* (*Περὶ θεῶν*, abbreviated henceforth as *D.*, from its Latin title *De diis*). The first book discusses the fear of the gods and death, and the third book discusses various aspects of divine existence (e.g., their friendship, their blessedness, their conversation [in Greek], their sleep). Hermann Diels produced the most recent complete edition of *On Gods* in 1916. Since that time no updated edition of the text has been made, though Holger Essler is currently working on a full edition of book three, of which he has published several sections.

The subscript of book one preserves (with partial reconstruction) the title and author as ΦΙΛΟ∆ΗΜ[ΟΥ] | ΠΕΡΙ ΘΕΩ[Ν], and the subscript of book three reads, with substantial reconstruction, ΦΙΛΟ∆ΗΜΟΥ | [Π]ΕΡΙ ΤΗ[Σ] ΕΥΣΤΑΘΟΥΣ ΤΩΝ | [Θ]ΕΩΝ, ΔΙΑΓΩΓΗ [ΗΣ]. Diels attributes the difference in book title from first to third as a function of the special content of book three, which particularly discusses various aspects of the gods’ existence.

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3. Despite the major contribution of Diels’ work, it was not done in concert with viewing the original papyri nor the original Oxonian apographs (a fact he acknowledges). Diels’ edition has drawn strong criticism, particularly from Knut Kleve, and for important reasons. Diels neglects break markers, he mistakes the transmission of individual letters, and he is overly ambitious in changing the apograph texts. Kleve remarks, ‘Ohne Übertreibung darf man sagen, dass es im Diels’schen Text kaum eine Zeile gibt, die ohne Fehler ist.’ See Knut Kleve, “Zu einer Neuausgabe von Philodemos, Über die Götter, Buch I (*PHerc.* 26),” *Cronache Ercolanesi* 3 (1973): 89.


Turning to On Piety (Περὶ ἐσθεβείας), this work first features a defence of Epicurus against charges of atheism and impiety, and second, a criticism of opposing views of piety as illustrated by selections from poets and philosophers ranging from Thales to Diogenes of Babylon.  Dirk Obbink’s two-volume edition of the entire work, the first part of which was published in 1996, argues for a wide-scale reconstruction of the column order over against previous editions. Based on stichometric evidence, the work was approximately 10,277 lines, or 343 columns long, requiring two papyrus rolls, of which only a portion is preserved (for the first part of the text, with which this chapter deals primarily, Obbink estimates that 50% of the work remains).

The title of the work is drawn from a comment near the end of the work in PHerc. 1428, stating that the preceding discussion was ‘an account on the subject of piety according to’ or ‘on behalf of Epicurus’ (τὸν περὶ τῆς ἐσθεβείας λόγον τῆς | κατ᾽ Ἐπικουρον, PHerc. 1428 col. 15.23 Henrichs). Concerning authorship, given that the colophon at the end of PHerc. 1428 preserves only ‘Φ…’, scholars have designated either Philodemus (ΦΙΛΟΔΗΜΟΥ) or Phaedrus (ΦΑΙ∆ΡΟΥ) as the author. While there are clear similarities between On Piety and Philodemus’ other works, especially in content, diction, pre-Atticist style, and avoidance of hiatus, the evidence is ultimately inconclusive due to the

8. See bibliography and discussion of previous editions in Obbink, On Piety, 24–37. To summarize generally, Obbink bases his reconstruction on: (1) a discovery of a physical ‘join’ between two papyri previously thought to be separate (particularly PHerc. 1077 and 1098, together forming the outer, initial portion of the first scroll of On Piety) and thus the discovery of a framework for ordering all other fragments; (2) a reversal of the traditional numbering of the papyri fragments in light of the original method of numbering and transcribing the papyrus scroll from the inside out, i.e., from the end of the scroll to the beginning (the original technicians cut the charred scroll in half lengthwise, then transcribed the innermost layers of papyrus from the two halves, progressively removing further layers as they transcribed). See discussion and lucid explanation in Obbink, On Piety, 37–62.
11. Phaedrus was an Epicurean philosopher (138–70 BCE) who took over the leadership of the Epicurean school in Athens after Zeno of Sidon, and who also wrote a work (perhaps On Gods or On Piety) requested from Atticus by Cicero for the latter’s writing projects in 45 BCE (Cicero, Nat. d. 1.93; Att. 13.39; see Kirk Summers, “The Books of Phaedrus Requested by Cicero [Att. 13.39],” CQ 47 [1997]: 309–11).
absence of Phaedrus’ work as a point of comparison. This study follows the traditional ascription of *On Piety* to Philodemus as the best hypothesis given the sparse evidence.

### 3.2. The Epicurean Gods and their Role in Moral Formation

During Philodemus’ argument that Epicurean piety leads to the development of a just society, he states that justice arises as others strive not to harm anyone, in imitation of the gods’ own non-interfering, non-harming happiness (εὐδαιμονίαν; *Piet*. col. 71.12–29[2043–2060]). Elsewhere he describes the Epicurean gods as ‘most worthy of emulation’ (ἀξιοζηλωτάτων (Piet. col. 45.9[1284])). In *On Gods* 3 col. 1.15–18, Philodemus assumes that the wise man will strive to approximate (συνεγγίζειν), touch (θηγεῖν), and associate with (συνείναι) the divine nature and character (see further discussion in section 3.3 below). In an intriguing passage, Philodemus affirms that Epicureans, unlike the Stoics, believe in a plurality of anthropomorphic gods, ‘not only all the gods of the Greeks, but many more besides’ (*Piet*. col. 362). Of course, Epicureans have a revisionist take on the gods, and would deny that the gods are actually like the way they are portrayed traditionally (see Epicurus, *Ep. Men.* 123–124). The present section sketches the character of the Epicurean gods and their role in moral formation, depending as much as possible on Philodemus’ texts, but adducing other Epicurean texts as needed.

In Epicureanism, one must have a proper conception of the gods in order to live the best life. An improper view of the gods, e.g., as directly intervening in the world in response to human action, will lead to a life of fear and ignorance, destroying any hope of achieving the peaceful pleasure of a life free from mental disturbance, the goal of an Epicurean life.

12. This applies also to the argument for Philodemean authorship from the apparent absence of Phaedrus’ works among the books preserved in the library at the Villa of the Papyri (see discussion in Obbink, *On Piety*, 88–99).

13. So too, e.g., Theodor Gomperz, Albert Henrichs, and Dirk Obbink (see Henrichs Henrichs, “Die Kritik der stoischen Theologie im PHerc. 1428,” 8–10; Obbink, *On Piety*, 98–99). Even if Phaedrus is the author of *On Piety*, what we know of Phaedrus seems to cohere with the general trajectory of Philodemus’ Epicureanism. This seems true particularly with respect to their relationship to Zeno of Sidon, who likely had a formative influence on both of them. Philodemus was his loyal student, and Phaedrus was his successor at the school in Athens. The author of *On Piety* appeals to the work of Zeno of Sidon for demonstrations (συνεγγυαι) of Epicurus’ fidelity to oaths and customary sacrifices (*Piet*. 51.19), while Philodemus’ work *OnFrank Criticism* consists of lecture notes from Zeno’s teaching (subscript, *PHerc.* 1471, cf. Obbink, *On Piety*, 80).

14. Translation Obbink, ad loc. The citation of *On Piety* pt. 1 in this chapter features Obbink’s column and line number, followed by Obbink’s running line number for the whole work in square brackets.


16. On the controversy over ‘realist’ and ‘idealist’ interpretations of Epicurean gods, see excursus below. It does not seem that a commitment on this question will determine the role of the gods in moral formation.

17. See Philodemus’ citation of Epicurus’ four-fold cure, or τετραφάρμακος in *PHerc.* 1005 col. 5.8–13: ‘Nothing to fear in god, nothing expected in death, easily got is the good, easily born the bad’(ἀφόβον ὁ θεός,
Conversely, adopting the correct conception of the gods entails adopting the Epicurean view of the universe and human life within it (including, e.g., physics, epistemology, cosmology, happiness), because the claims of Epicurean theology involve the whole system.\textsuperscript{18} Theology provides an essential piece of the conceptual orientation needed to strive after the best human life within this universe, a life which the gods model for humanity.

In what follows I examine four main characteristics of the gods: (1) their blessedness and (2) incorruptibility (taken as a pair in 3.2.1), (3) their lack of involvement with the human world (discussed in 3.2.2), and (4) their friendship among themselves (discussed in 3.2.3).

3.2.1. Blessedness and Incorruptibility

The gods have two fundamental characteristics, drawing from the first of Epicurus’ principle sayings (i.e., \textit{Κύρια Δόξα}, or \textit{Key Doctrines} 1; see also \textit{Ep. Men}. 123–124): their perfect blessedness and incorruptibility. Philodemus follows Epicurus in this respect: his definition of a pious person consists of one who preserves (\textit{σῶ[ς]ιον}, \textit{Piet.} col. 40.13[1142]) in his conception of the divine ‘the immortality and consummate blessedness of God’ (τητός) ἀθανάτος | καὶ[ι τ]ὴ}[n] ἀκραν μακαρικός τα τοῦ θεοῦ, \textit{Piet.} col. 40.10–12[1139–1141]), as opposed to the impious person who ascribes to the gods anything that contravenes these characteristics.\textsuperscript{19}

The gods’ blessedness refers to their existence in a perfect state of εὐδαιμονία according to an Epicurean framework (i.e., they exist in a state of perfect pleasure and freedom from all pain),\textsuperscript{20} while their incorruptibility refers to their natural ability to sustain this perfect state indefinitely. Both of these qualities involve the gods’ moral character. They are models of moral perfection in the perfect stability of their consummate happiness, for the virtues are necessary ingredients of such perfection. Therefore, the gods are perfectly self-sufficient
(αὐτάρκης) as individuals to provide their own perfect pleasure and maintain such a state (as Philodemus affirms in D. 3 fr. 84.4–5; 85.5–7).

3.2.2. Lack of Involvement in the Human World

Fundamental among the implications of the gods’ blessedness and incorruptibility is that they do not intervene in the human realm. This must be so because the blessedness of the gods (their perfect freedom from disturbance) requires that they be free from work (ἀλειτοφρήτως, Epicurus, Ep. Pyth. 97), and because ‘trouble and care and anger and kindness are not consistent with a life of blessedness, but these things come to pass where there is weakness and fear and dependence on neighbours’ (οὐ γὰρ συμφωνοῦσιν πραγματεύσαι καὶ φροντίδες καὶ ὀργαὶ καὶ χάριτες μακαριότητι, ἀλλὰ ἐν ἀσθενείᾳ καὶ φόβῳ καὶ προσδέσεις τῶν πλησίων ταῦτα γίνεται, Epicurus, Ep. Hdt. 77; cf. KD 1; VS 1). If they were directly involved, entailing the weaknesses described, this would contradict their fundamental characteristics according to Epicurean theology, and remove one of the key bases for a human life free from pain and fear (cf. Epicurus, Ep. Hdt. 73–78; Ep. Men. 123–124). Philodemus shares this basic understanding and its application to the issue of the gods’ non-intervention in the world (e.g., Philodemus, D. 1 col. 12). The happiness of the gods entails that they do not harm others, and indeed that they have no concern for the human world.

However, Philodemus (drawing explicitly on Epicurus) introduces complexity at this point, for while affirming that the gods are not involved directly in human affairs, he nevertheless desires to affirm that the gods do cause benefit and harm to humans in a certain way, as is typically thought of them. Referring to Epicurus and his founding circle, Philodemus remarks, ‘And they allow for the production of benefits from the gods for good people and harms for bad people’ (τὸ δὲ περ[αίνεσθαι ὁ]|φελίας ἐκ [θεῶν τοῖς] | ἀγαθοὶς καὶ[ι


22. Translation Bailey, ad loc.; Cyril Bailey, Epicurus.

23. Philodemus states that the gods’ blessedness itself comes from not harming anyone, ἐπιζεύγεσθαι εἰς ἀμπλαβής ἐκδικεῖτο τοῖς | σάνεν ἔργομένη (with the subject of ἐθεορέτῳ and ἔργομένη referring to the gods’ εὐδαιμονίαν preceding, Piet. col. 71.19–22[2050–2053]).

24. In D. 3 col. 7.3–10, though heavily reconstructed by Diels, Philodemus seems to apply the blessedness of the gods to rule out exercising care over humanity and the world, because such work would harm the tranquillity of the gods (εὐδαιμ., who are naturally without work or toil (ἀπ[όνους καὶ ἂ]κο[πους] εἰ[να] δὲ [λέγειν οἶκειος τοὺς θεοὺς). See also the similar application by Cicero’s Epicurean spokesman, who criticises the over-worked Stoic god in Cicero, Nat. d. 1.52–53; see discussion in Diels, Philodemos, Über die Götter, 1:54–55.
This affirmation is likely motivated by his desire to account for popular conceptions of the gods with his Epicurean perspective, and to carve a middle path between two extremes: the less-than-perfect, interventionist gods of traditional religion, and the god of Philodemus’ often Stoic opponents, who is the cause of no harm or benefit to humans at all. As part of his defence against the charge of Epicurean impiety, Philodemus affirms that there are in fact positive benefits and negative consequences for life based on one’s piety or impiety, and that Epicureanism offers the way toward the most pious and most beneficial life, both individually and for society as a whole (precisely what seemed to be at stake for some opponents of Epicureanism, as in Cicero, *Nat. d.* 1.2).

In order to resolve this tension between the gods’ involvement and non-involvement in Philodemus, it seems that one must interpret that such benefit and harm from the gods refers only to the consequences of human conceptions about the gods, whether true or false. Thus, the gods are not directly involved in human life, as though personally bestowing favours and punishing wrongdoers, but they are indirectly involved in that they model the *telos* of the best human life, a life which itself generates benefits as one imitates the gods. The gods indirectly harm humans in that they conversely illuminate the opposite of the best life and its self-generating evils.

This interpretation seems likely given that immediately after affirming the indirect involvement of the gods in col. 36 of *On Piety* (mentioned above), Philodemus clarifies that
humans need nothing from the gods: the good receive benefit from them ‘not out of weakness or because we have need of anything from God,’ [ὁ]ῶ κατ’ ἀσθένειαν, οὐ]ὁ δὲ καθάπερ [ἡμεῖς ἐκ[ το]θεὸν τι[νος δὲ]ο[ν, col. 36.22–25[1036–1039]]. Thus Philodemus seems to say that there is nothing humans need from the gods which is not already available for living the best life.

As an aside recalling the beginning of this chapter, the present discussion helps to clarify the mode of the gods’ involvement in moral formation: this mode consists only in human conceptions about the gods. Just as the benefit and harm from the gods is based only on human conception and appropriation of their model for human life, so too is the gods’ involvement in moral formation. Being perfect themselves, the gods obviously do not provide a model for how to progress in such formation, though their model does highlight human deficiencies. Several passages provide evidence for this role of the gods in human conception, foremost being Philodemus’ definition of piety (examined in part above, Piet. col. 40), which states that piety is fundamentally a matter of right human conception about the gods: ‘For pious is the person who preserves the immortality and consummate blessedness of God together with all the things included by us; but impious is the person who banishes either where God is concerned.’

Recognising that the gods present a model for humans, perhaps even in their non-intervention in the cosmos beyond themselves, it seems valuable to probe yet further, and clarify precisely why the gods’ cannot be involved in human affairs, to clarify what is at stake for the gods’ character in excluding direct involvement in the world. By probing further one may better understand or rather inappropriate the non-involvement of the gods.

29. Translation Obbink, ad loc., [ὅσιος] | γὰρ ὁ τὴν ἀθαν[ασίαν] | καὶ τήν ἄκραν μακρα[σύντε]ρ[ε]τα τοῦ θ[εο]ν | σύ[ς]τοι οὖν ἅπασιν[ι] τῶ[ν] φυσικῶν[ι]ν] ἄρ]ὲς ἡμῖν· ἄσκησις δὲ | παρ[θεό]ν δὲ ἐκ[α]θέ[ρ]ει[ον] [ἐξορ][ξεία, (Piet. col. 40.9–17[1138–1146]). See also the following: Epicurus’ injunction to Menoeceus to hold, concerning the gods, what is able to protect their blessedness and incorruptibility (πάντα δὲ τοῦ φυ[λα]τ[ε]ται αὐτοῦ δυνάμενον τὴν μετ’ ἀφθορίας μακρα[σύντε]τα παρ[ι] αὐτοῦ δόξ[ας], Ep. Men. 123); Epicurus’ warning that from failing to think of the gods rightly, ‘the inconsistency itself will produce the greatest disturbance in our souls’ (τὸν μέγιστον τό[ρ]ισθαι ἐν ταῖς ψυχ[ας] αὐτῆς ἡ ὑπελεινήσεις παράκαθεοσ, Ep. Hdt. 77; Philodemus’ reference to ‘our views’ on the gods as the ‘true cause of our tranquillity’ (trans. Obbink; ἡμῖν δὲ παρ[ά]συντε[ρ]εικα τῆς ἡμίου αὐτῶν αὐτ[ὴ]ρ[ε]ιας, Piet. col. 47.14–19[1348–1353]); Philodemus’ reference to Epicurus’ On Holiness, in which Epicurus calls followers to guard against personal defilement by guarding oneself mentally, attending to the best, divine life, and thus comporting oneself to it, col. 44.17–45.2[1263–1287], with commentary on this heavily reconstructed passage in Obbink, On Piety, 498–500; Philodemus remarks in On Music col. 4.6, ‘Let it suffice to say now that the divine needs no mark of honour, but that it is natural for us to honour it, in particular by forming pious notions of it, and secondly by offering with each individual usage the traditional sacrifices’ (the essential clause in Greek: ἡμῖν δὲ φωνικόν ἐστιν αὐτὸ τοῦ ταῦτα μᾶλλον οὐ[σίας ν] ὡσίας [ὁ]πολλ[η]ν[ι]ς; translation Obbink, On Piety, 391). See discussion on this general point in Obbink, On Piety, 9–11; Festugière, Epicurus and His Gods, 61. 30. One might recognize one possible result of the gods’ non-involvement: if humans imitate them strictly, then they too will not be involved in the lives of others beyond their concern for personal pleasure, and thus not involved in communal moral formation.
Immediately after Philodemus sets out his definition of piety as preserving the gods’ blessedness and immortality (entailing self-sufficiency and non-involvement with the world), he goes on to state, ‘And the person who sees also that the good and ill sent us by God come without any unhealthy anger or benevolence, declares that God has no need of human things’ (ὁ δὲ [ἐπινο]όν χωρίς | ὀργή[ς καὶ] χάρις | ἀσθενοῦσης τὰς ἐξ αὐτοῦ παράσκε[νος]] τῶν ἀ[γα]θῶν κα[ὶ] τὸ[ν κακ]ῶν ἀπο[φαί]νετ’ [αὐτὸν τῷ] ἀντ[ρο[πε][ν] μηδ[ε]ν[ῶ[ς προς]δείσθαι, Piat. col. 40.18–26[1147–1155]). 31 Philodemus’ reference to ὀργή and χάρις recalls the very first of Epicurus’ principle doctrines (KD 1), examined above.

Based on this passage, it seems the issue at stake for Philodemus is that the gods’ cannot be involved in a certain way, i.e., entailing weakness and dependence upon others (esp. upon humans), via ὀργή or χάρις. The nouns in the prepositional phrase χωρίς | ὀργή[ς καὶ] χάρις | ἀσθενοῦσης (Piat. col. 40.18–20 [1147–1149]) seem to refer to an inner state of the gods, corresponding with divine action toward humans, given that the immediate context concerns the gods’ sending good and evil to humans. Additionally, this inner state of ὀργή or χάρις and its corresponding action toward humans would seem to be in response to prior human action. This responsive anger or benevolence is at play earlier in col. 36 (the same context and discussion as col. 40), in which Philodemus reports that Epicurus and his early students claim divine benefits and harms correspond to good and bad people (τὸ δὲ περὶ[αινεσθαὶ ὁ]φελεια[ς κ]ε[κ [θεὸν τοῖς] | ἁγαθοὶς κα[ῖ βλάβας] | τοῖς κακ[οῖς κατα]λείπουσι[ν], Piat. col. 36.9–13 [1023–1027]). 32 I understand the use of χάρις here to refer to the gods’ feeling of ‘favour’ or ‘gratitude’ toward a human recipient on the basis of some past, pleasing behaviour, 33 thus in parallel to the feeling of anger or wrath towards humans on the basis of some irritating or affronting action. It seems the participle ἀσθενοῦσης would thus refer to both nouns. 34

But why is it that ὀργή, or χάρις involve weakness and dependence on others? To understand this connection, one must understand how Philodemus conceives of ὀργή and χάρις, which we can glean from Philodemus’ treatises on these very subjects. 35

In the case of anger, even the good, natural anger of the Epicurean sage, the emotion depends in large part on the concomitant judgements one makes concerning the magnitude of the offence by the perpetrator (e.g., against the natural, necessary goods of oneself or one’s

31. Translations Obbink, ad loc.
32. See also the Epicurean expectation of the greatest benefit from the gods for the pious recorded later in Piat. col. 81.11–21[2343–2353].
33. I.e., the meaning corresponding to LSJ, s.v. χάρις, 2.
34. See discussion in Obbink, On Piety, 485–87; Festugière, Epicurus and His Gods, 61, 71, n.66.
friends), and the appropriate punishment necessary to protect one’s natural goods (*On Anger* col. 37.20–38.9). ‘Empty’ anger (κενή ὀργή), however, judges falsely in these respects, either judging the offence to be greater than it actually is (due to a failure to value goods appropriately), or judging the appropriate punishment to be harsher than needed. For a god to respond in anger to a human must mean that the god has judged some natural, necessary good to be harmed by that person, but this judgement must be rooted in a false judgement of ‘need’ which cannot obtain for the gods, for they have all they need by definition.

In the case of χάρις, the connection to weakness and dependence on others seems to arise from the fact that expressions of χάρις, whether referring to unsolicited, beneficent gifts to others (especially friends), or to a grateful return gift, involve interdependence and reciprocity based on needs. In *On Property Management*, Philodemus argues that the sage will engage in generous, unsolicited beneficence to his friends as part of his income management, expecting a reciprocal gift in return; likewise, being stingy to others leads to poverty (col. 24–25; 26.3, examined above in ch. two). In *On Anger*, Philodemus seems to assume that the sage will feel gratefulness (εὐχαριστεῖς, εὐχαριστήσα) to those who have given him needed gifts, but a gratefulness measured to the value of the gift judged by an Epicurean framework (col. 46.18–35; 48.18–37). Though Philodemus’ work *On Gratitude* is very poorly preserved, it seems one can discern in it similar themes; the true friend is eager to provide for the needs of other friends. Thus, a god cannot express χάρις, because a god cannot receive any benefit from humans that is needed or valuable to them, to which an act of χάρις responds, nor can they engage in any interdependent relationship of reciprocity with them based on need.

It is less clear from these passages why a god could not self-sufficiently bestow χάρις to humans without being implicated in an interdependent, need-based reciprocal relationship with them. Yet, in this case, it seems that such an intentional act of χάρις would contravene the gods’ serene lack of concern beyond themselves, involving them in affairs which would proffer no potential pleasure, and generating concern which would detract from their pleasurable activity among themselves (Epicurus, *Ep. Pyth.* 97; *Ep. Hdt.* 77–78; Philodemus,

36. On healthy and unhealthy, or ‘natural’ and ‘empty’ anger, see discussion in Tsouna, *The Ethics of Philodemus*, 221–30. See also Tsouna’s helpful overview of the dispositional, cognitive and affective nature of emotions as ‘content-sensitive states’ in Philodemus, Tsouna, *The Ethics of Philodemus*, 38–44.

37. In *On Anger* col. 14.1–6, Philodemus argues that those who exercise empty anger actually imitate the traditional gods of Olympian mythology, seeking revenge for their own honour’s sake, naming Zeus (col. 16.12; 43.3); Apollo and Artemis (16.19–24); and perhaps Dionysius (16.24); see Tsouna, *The Ethics of Philodemus*, 211–12, n. 55.

38. See discussion in Tsouna, *The Ethics of Philodemus*, 231–34. Diogenes Laerterius records that the Epicurean school taught that the wise man alone will have gratitude to his friends, here using the word χάρις: μόνον τε χάριν ἔξεσαν τὸν σοφὸν (Diogenes Laertius, *Vit.* 10.118).

This issue receives further clarification in the discussion of divine friendship below.

A final text from *On Anger* provides further assistance in understanding the weakness of ὀργή and χάρις. Helpfully, the passage is an interpretation of Epicurus’ *KD* 1. In *On Anger* 43.14–41, Philodemus rehearses opponents’ criticisms of the Epicurean description of ὀργή and χάρις as weak. Opponents argue that if Alexander the Great, the greatest and strongest man, ‘was subject to frequent outbursts of anger and did favours for countless men’ (Ἀλέξανδρο[ν] ἐν θυμοῖς ἄθλητος για τοὺς πολλὰς συνεχημένους, καὶ κεχαρισμένους μυρίους, 43.25–29), how can Epicureans describe ὀργή and χάρις as weak (ἀσθενή, 43.18; ἐν ἀσθενείᾳ, 43.23)? Based on the context, it is difficult to determine precisely what is meant by χάρις here, but it seems to include both acts of beneficence generally, and favours offered in return for a prior, received benefit. Philodemus responds by embracing the idea that ὀργή and χάρις are natural to weakness; every human being has the weakness of ‘a disposition and nature receptive of death and pain’ (ἡ δεκτ[ι]κή κατασκευή καὶ φύσις θανάτου καὶ ἀλγηδόνων, 43.32–34). One may thus interpret confidently that Philodemus understands the contrast of *KD* 1 to refer to divine existence (blessedness, incorruptibility) and normal human existence (weakness, dependence on others, concern, trouble, fear, pain, death). Philodemus interprets that the presence of ὀργή and χάρις in human life arises from weakness, in that both involve the satisfaction of natural desires in a struggle over against pain and death. On one hand, anger is a natural response to another’s intentionally hindering the achievement of one’s natural desires; on the other, χάρις is either a natural response to another’s intentional satisfaction of one’s own needs, or a natural stance of beneficence to others for the reciprocal meeting of needs. This passage confirms the previous observations concerning the interrelationship between weakness, interdependence, ὀργή, and χάρις, and the exclusion of such from the gods in order to maintain their self-sufficiency.

### 3.2.3. Divine Friendship

The final aspect of the gods’ life analyzed here is their divine friendship. Our main source for friendship among the gods is Philodemus’ *On Gods* 3. As an integral part of their perfect divine life, the gods engage in friendship with one another, conversing with one another, even

42. Translation Tsouna, *The Ethics of Philodemus*, 225.
43. Thus the human life necessarily involves work, care, anger, gratitude, weakness (subjection to death and pain), fear, and dependence on others.
in Greek, or a language similar to it (D. 3 col. 14.6–14). This wise conversation is a means for ‘unspeakable pleasure’ for them (ἀφατον ἡδονήν, col. 14.6), given their mutually perfect character (Philodemus refers to the gods as dialogue partners similar in character, the σπουδάτοι).

Following the teaching of Hermarchus, Philodemus asserts that the indissoluble happiness of the gods cannot be without ‘speaking or conversing with one another,’ but is instead like human friendship in this respect (μή φωνοῦντας μηδ’ ἀλλήλων διαλεγομένους, ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἐνεοῖς ἀνθρώποις ὀμοίους, D. 3 col. 13.38–40).

Knowing Philodemus’ repeated concern to distinguish the gods from human weaknesses and needs for others of any kind, it is surprising to find that, as part of this divine friendship, Philodemus affirms the sharing of needs (χρεῖας, D. 3 fr. 83.2), feelings (τὰ πάθη, fr. 87.27 Essler), and mutual gratification (χαρίζοντας ... ἀλλήλων, fr. 85.2) among the gods. Philodemus claims that there is no obstacle against friendship among the gods, and indeed without such friendship, the gods would not be perfectly happy (οὐκ ἀν ἦσαν | τέλειοι κατ’ εὐδαμονίαν), though cautiously remarking immediately after this statement, ‘if indeed that is possible to say’. This friendship, Philodemus is eager to point out, does not operate with the same conditions as human friendship, for the gods are completely self-sufficient and engage in pleasurable friendship only on that basis. The gods choose to receive from others what they already have in themselves, namely, their own most perfect pleasure, and are not individually deficient, or dependent on other gods in any way (fr. 83.2–6; 85.2–7).

It seems unclear how to resolve this tension between the gods’ self-sufficiency and their necessary, happiness-perfecting friendships with other gods, and thus to understand why


45. See new critical edition of fr. 87.21–83.8 in Essler, “Freundschaft der Götter”.

46. The relevant text, as reconstructed by Diels, with the relative clause beginning with ὅτι being the most important portion: τὰς ... ἀλλήλων κοιμίζον]τα χρείας, ὅποι ἡ ἀπελάμβανεν, οὐκ ἂν ἦσαν | τέλειοι κατ’ εὐδαμονίαν, εἰ [λέγεται, καὶ μὴν κατὰ τοὺς ἐμποδίζοντα πρὸς] | τὴν τῆς φύλας ἂν αὐτοῖς ἀπόλημιν, D. 3 fr. 84.2–6.

47. Philodemus approximates this divine friendship in terms of human friendship by comparing it to the pleasure derived from one’s memory of a deceased friend, who no longer contributes to one’s external needs, but whose memory provides one with pleasure (D. 3 fr. 87.29–83.2 Essler). This passage has been newly edited by Holger Essler, making possible this new reading of the passage which was previously obscure (see Essler, “Freundschaft der Götter”). The analogy breaks down, however, for the gods are utterly self-sufficient, and do not derive any needed benefit from the pleasure of friendship. On the other hand, Epicurus taught that in human life, the pleasure from such memories provides needed security against pain (Epicurus, VS 34; 39). As noted above, Epicurus himself testifies to this in a letter written from his deathbed, in which he describes the pleasurable memory of Idomeneus’ past friendship, which enables him to endure the pain of his dysentery and strangury (Diogenes Laertius, Vitr. 10.22).

the gods engage in such friendship. 49 One answer may be that divine friendship is simply assumed; such friendship is an application of idealized human experience to the gods. For example, Philodemus supports his claim that the gods cannot lack conversation with one another by the argument that the gods cannot be envisioned as less able than humans, who enjoy the pleasures of speech and friendship despite their weaknesses (D. 3 col. 13.40–14.6). 50 The tension does not seem to be an issue for Philodemus. It at least seems clear that Philodemus denies that the gods have a need for one another rooted in personal, individual deficiency, and that Philodemus values (self-sufficient) friendship as a necessary, pleasurable component of even the best, divine life.

Returning briefly to the question of divine expressions of χαρίς, why may the gods show χαρίς to one another, but not to human beings? It seems that the answer lies in the character of the givers and recipients of χαρίς. 51 The gods may do favours for one another in a self-sufficient way because they do so effortlessly in a perfectly pleasurable, self-sufficient friendship with another god, and because their state of perfect happiness necessarily involves such pleasurable friendships with other gods. A god has something that is actually valuable to give to another god, unlike human beings. To show χαρίς to a human being, however, is not compatible with divine happiness, because such a relationship by definition involves a harmful friendship with someone who is naturally weak, prone to pain, and dependent on others (recall Philodemus’ interpretation of human weakness in On Anger col. 43.14–41 above). It seems that because god and human are unequal in nature, there cannot be friendship or acts of χαρίς between them. 52

3.2.4. Summary

In the preceding discussion we have seen that the gods model the telos of the best life in their blessedness and incorruptibility. The gods are utterly self-sufficient, morally perfect, and completely lack vulnerability to pain and deprivation. The gods are not directly involved, therefore, in the human world because they have no reason to be, as they cannot receive harm or benefit from humanity. Instead, the gods are involved only indirectly, simply as a function

49. Diels expresses his inability to solve this paradox, Diels, Philodemos, Über die Götter, 4:8.
50. A similar argument supports the statement that the gods speak Greek; Greek is the language of the wisest human beings, and thus the gods must speak it as well, or something similar to it.
51. The issue cannot be the act of demonstrating χαρίς per se, for the gods show favour to one another (χαρίζομαι ... ὄλληλοις, D. 3 fr. 85.2).
52. This is reminiscent of the contrast between the ideal friendship of the most virtuous and that of unequal friends in Aristotle’s conception. In an unequal relationship, the more virtuous side gives in such a way that it can never be repaid from the less virtuous (citing examples of parents to children, philosophers to students, and gods to men: Eth. nic. 9.1.1164b1–6; Eth. eud. 7.12.1245a15–19). Such a relationship for Aristotle is less than an ideal friendship. Philodemus appears to be arguing, roughly, that it is not in the gods’ nature or interests to engage in such unequal relationships.
of their existence. By reaching a correct conception of them, an Epicurean begins walking the path toward the best life. Conversely, failure to conceive of them properly leads to a life of suffering. The gods are not friends with humans, but they are friends with one another as an essential part of their own perfect happiness, though without any implication that the gods are somehow interdependent upon one another out of personal deficiency.

### 3.3. Assimilation to the Gods

Having outlined the model which the gods present for Epicureans, the second task is then to describe in what ways Epicureans can reach it, and in what ways they cannot. This section divides into two subsections, with the first concerning the divine characteristics of the best mortal life (3.3.1), and the second concerning the means of orienting oneself to the gods and thus living a ‘divine’ mortal life, particularly via worship (3.3.2). The goal here is not to give a comprehensive description of human moral maturity, but to illustrate the extent to which the divine model is applicable for Epicureans.

#### 3.3.1. Becoming like the Gods, insofar as Mortals Can

In this section, I explain what it might mean to Philodemus to become like the gods. In doing so, I must draw on other Epicurean sources beyond Philodemus, for his extant texts do not offer a sustained discussion of this. We begin with two particularly lucid references to the imitation of the gods in Philodemus, the first from *On Gods*, the second from *On Piety*.

As noted above, in *On Gods* 3 col. 1, Philodemus assumes that the wise man will strive to imitate the gods. Philodemus makes such an assumption in the midst of discussing whether gods and humans can be called friends. They cannot in any normal sense of the term, Philodemus argues (col. 1.6–9 Diels), ‘For it is not possible for those who are unacquainted to have knowledge of one another. Therefore, one may not say that the gods are truly friends of all of the sages in the world.’ (τοὺς γάρ ἀπείρους ὑμνητῶν ἀλλήλοις τε [εἴς] ἡ γνώσις ἀφικνεῖσθαι. Διότερο ὅ [π]ι[ντω]ν τῶν ἔτος τῇ [γή] ποι[φώ]ν [πί]λους ἂν τις ἐποιεῖ το[ὺς] θεο[ὺς] ἄλ[ηθε[ς]...). ⁵⁴

Yet, there is a sense in which the sage and the gods could be called friends. Philodemus continues the discussion in the same column after a lacuna of 4.5 lines:

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⁵⁴. See also Armstrong’s translation and discussion in David Armstrong, “Epicurean Virtues, Epicurean Friendship,” 127.

[lacuna] ... to the gods (?), and (insofar as) he (the sage) marvels at the (their) nature and disposition, and tries to approximate it even as if he yearns to touch (it) and to be joined with (it), one might call sages friends of the gods, and the gods friends of the sages. But it perhaps does not seem right for us to call these things friendship, so that it is better to consider the same matters, but not to force the words uselessly. (D. 3 col. 1.14–fr. 85.2 Diels)

Philodemus does not want to call it friendship, but he assumes that the sage has a relationship to the gods. This relationship is based in the sage’s own marvelling at the gods’ nature and disposition (likely involving all of their characteristics outlined above, i.e., their perfect moral character, their happiness, their incorruptibility, etc.), and his attempt to ‘draw near to’ or ‘approximate’ (συνεγγύηζε) the same.

Elsewhere, in On Piety, Philodemus argues that imitation of the Epicurean gods best leads to justice in society, against Epicureanism’s detractors. Philodemus remarks, ‘But those who believe our oracles about the gods will first wish to imitate their blessedness in so far as mortals can, so that, since it was seen to come from doing no harm to anyone, they will endeavour most of all to make themselves harmless to everyone as far as is within their power...’ (Piet. col. 71.12–27[2043–2058]; translation Obbink). This time the explicitly moral dimension of imitating the gods comes to the fore: imitation entails doing no harm to others, leading to justice. This imitation has a human limit, as Philodemus adds the qualification, ‘insofar as mortals can’ (ὡς θνητοῖς, col. 71.16[2047]; cf. Epicurus, Ep. Men. 135; VS 33). In what way can the characteristics of the gods be realized in human beings, and in what way can they not?

With respect to blessedness and incorruptibility, Epicureans can hope to attain qualitatively similar characteristics, allowing for differences based in humanity’s weak nature. As Epicurus promises Menoeceus concerning the benefits of his philosophy, ‘Train yourself and another like you in these and similar things night and day, and never, whether awake or asleep, will you be disturbed, but you will live as a god among men.’ (Diogenes Laertrius, Vit. 10.135). With respect to pleasure, gods and humans are most similar. Epicurus states that the greatest pleasure of the blessed life arises from the state of the absence of pain (ἄταραξία), a

55. See discussion in Obbink, On Piety, 566–70.
pleasure which cannot be increased through prolongation of time or the addition of other pleasures (Epicurus, Ep. Men. 124; 128–132; KD 3; 18–19). Philodemus seems to use the same argumentation in his treatise On Death: because of the limit of pleasure, those who have attained such pleasure are thus deprived of nothing by death (On Death col. 3.32–9). In this way, the fully realized pleasure of an Epicurean life is qualitatively the same as that of the gods, though a human life is vulnerable to pain (e.g., hunger), and needs external goods to protect and sustain this blessed life of pleasure, unlike the gods.

Despite the limitation of human corruptibility, Epicureans claimed a strong sense of self-sufficiency, and made claims to being ‘incorruptible’ as human beings. James Warren suggests that humans can be said to be indestructible like the gods in that they have an inalienable hold on happiness, like the gods, even if they are not eternal and impervious to pain, unlike the gods. One can gain the greatest possible security and control against the pains of the world as a mortal by mastering Epicurean philosophy and possessing the few, easily-procured external goods necessary for happiness (as exemplified by Epicurus’ ability to sustain a state of ἀπορραγία during his terminal dysentery and strangury, Diogenes Laertius, Vit. 10.22). Once attained, the Epicurean has the power to sustain it, for the knowledge and moral character on which it is based cannot be taken away from him. As Philodemus says, ‘the sensible man, having received that which can secure the whole of what is sufficient (ἀδόταρκες) for a happy life, immediately then for the rest (of his life) goes about laid for burial, and he profits by one day as (he would) by eternity’ (On Death col. 35.14–19; translation Henry).

The attainment of divine pleasure and incorruptibility necessarily involves assimilation to two other divine attributes: the gods’ moral character, and such character’s corresponding knowledge. The greatest pleasure from the absence of pain involves the elimination of pain-

57. As argued by James Warren, “Epicurean Immortality,” Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 18 (2000): 231–47; David Konstan, A Life Worthy of the Gods (Las Vegas: Parmenides, 2008), 127–33; Michael Erler, “Epicurus as Deus Mortalis: Homoiosis Theoi and Epicurean Self-Cultivation,” in Deus Mortalis, in Traditions of Theology: Studies in Hellenistic Theology, Its Background and Aftermath, eds. Dorothea Frede and André Laks, Philosophy Antiqua 89 (Leiden; Boston; Brill, 2002), 170. Warren and Konstan interpret in this vein Diogenes Laertius, Vit. 10.121, in which Diogenes explains that there are two kinds of happiness according to the Epicurean school, that of the gods, which cannot be increased, and that which involves the addition and subtraction of pleasures (implying that this characterizes human happiness). One might also point to Knut Kleve’s interpretation of a passage from D. 1, referring to the ‘unspeakable pleasure’ derived from human experience of the gods (ἀσφοτός; ἄδοίο::ς νοιτς, B1.28 Kleve); Kleve, “Unknown Paris,” 675), the same phrase used to describe the gods’ own pleasure from their wise conversation (D. 3 col. 14.6).
58. Philodemus asserts the self-sufficiency of the sage to maintain his ἀπορραγία against great pain in On Anger col. 41.39–42.20, for the sage has a proper (low) valuing of external goods; likewise, the sage can endure even a violent, unjust death without falling into distressing grief because of his proper mindset and the pleasure of his good life (On Death col. 33.37–34.15); see Tsouna, The Ethics of Philodemus, 227–28, 296–97. See also Epicurus, Ep. Men. 117, asserting the perfect stability of the wise man’s character (David Konstan, Life, 134). For an atomic explanation of the sage’s soul as physically stable, see David Konstan, Life, 140–43.
causing dispositions of character, such as disordered desires, false beliefs, and wild emotions. If humans can come to share qualitatively the same pleasure as the gods, then this must mean that they share a qualitatively similar moral character that eliminates pain and thus provides pleasure, with its accompanying set of objectively true conceptions of the cosmos. One comes to hold these self-evident conceptions either innately, or by repeatedly being struck by divine atoms continually streaming from the gods’ bodies. There may be quantitative differences due to human weaknesses, such as the vulnerability of sustaining such pleasure, of unavoidably making incorrect empirical judgements, etc., but these do not negate the qualitative similarities between human and divine moral character, knowledge, and pleasure. Similarly, Lucretius declared that Epicurus was a god (‘deus ille fuit, deus’, De rerum natura 5.8) in virtue of the fact that he discovered the truth of nature without imposing false conceptions, he led a life of moral purity, and maintained proper piety toward the gods.

Like the gods, blessed and incorruptible human beings provide moral models of the best human life. Michael Erler argues that the sage benefits others after he has first successfully achieved his own blessedness, entailing the piety, ethical lifestyle, and philosophical framework upon which this blessedness is based. Erler observes that Epicurus’ divinisation occurs, according to Lucretius, not because of his heroic deeds or beneficence to others, but because he pursued his own good through philosophy. The case of Epicurus shows that only by successfully imitating the gods in pursuit of his own best life was he an example for others, just as the gods maintain their own lives and only indirectly benefit others. In Philodemus, too, the mature are beneficial because of their maturity, and are thus examples for the development of others.

Like the gods, there is a certain limit to the sage’s involvement in the lives of others, a limit governed by whether particular engagements would jeopardize the sage’s vulnerable blessedness. One thinks of Philodemus’ assumptions that Epicureans will live in leisured retreat with friends. Here there is significant difference, however. If one held Epicureans strictly to the gods’ model, one would conclude that the true sage would likewise help no one

60. See also ch. four, 4.4.1.
65. Ibid., 177–78.
66. Recall the discussion in ch. two concerning Philodemus’ treatise On Property Management, esp. col. 22–23, in which he rules out work as unfitting for the ideal Epicurean, and considers associations with people who are not elite friends of the philosopher to be unpleasant.
directly. Yet Philodemus’ On Frank Criticism shows that such an interpretation cannot describe Philodemus’ view of the Epicurean teacher. The wise teacher tames others into love for themselves, even when they have no desire to be treated (fr. 86); the teacher attempts repeatedly to cure those who seem incurable (fr. 64; 69; fr. 84N); the wise seem to be ‘stung’ (δανκωμεθα, i.e., they have their faults exposed), until they can show that their students are pure (fr. 16). Nevertheless, it does seem there is a limit to this concern and responsibility for students who do not respond to treatment. Fr. 21 shows that the wise man uses all tools available to him, but at a certain point ‘does not at all labour over how that one will fare in life,’ (το δε πος | έκεινος ἐξε[σε] λομης, οὔδεν | πονε[ί], fr. 21.4–6), for a measure of responsibility lies also with the patient.

With respect to friendship, it seems that Epicureans progress toward an emulation of divine, self-sufficient friendship as they seek to achieve the self-sufficiency of the best life. This subject receives further discussion in ch. four. For example, passages in On Frank Criticism show that one ideally grows out of one’s need for moral formation from others in friendship (e.g., col. 8a–b; col. 14a; fr. 30). Like the gods, however, self-sufficiency never leads to isolation, for friends are sources of great pleasure, and greater pleasure insofar as they have achieved Epicurean mastery and share wise conversation among one another (just as the gods in D. 3 col. 14.6).

Yet there remains a qualitative difference between divine and human friendships, for human friendship is based on reciprocal giving and receiving of needed benefit, a weakness completely foreign to the gods. In On Gods 3 fr. 87, Philodemus contrasts humans to the gods on just this point: ‘So that even if association for (the supply of) external needs to make them (i.e., the gods) live together is not there, they share their affections, for it is not possible to hold together in association without any social intercourse at all. And certainly for us, the weak, who require friendship for external needs, we no longer have a need for friends who

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68. See On Frank Criticism, fr. 26.9; col. 8b.11; 17a.4; 21b.7–8; T4.1.
69. A key interpretive issue in this passage is whether the object of the cleansing work of the wise is the students (‘them,’ αυτο[να]), or ‘themselves,’ (αυτο[να]), in fr. 16.5. Voula Tsouna and the editors of On Frank Criticism support the ‘student’ reading, which would thus support the use of this passage as evidence of a teacher’s constant concern for the progress of his students (cf. David Konstan, et al., Philodemus: On Frank Criticism, SBLTT [Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1998], 37; Tsouna, The Ethics of Philodemus, 101).
70. Tsouna, The Ethics of Philodemus, 102.
72. Friendship is an ‘immortal good’ (αθανασις ομοθες), and is wisdom’s greatest acquisition for the blessed life according to Epicurus, VS 78; KD 27, respectively.
73. Essler interprets this passage as applicable also to humans, and interprets that human friendship approximates the divine through its pleasures (Essler, “Freundschaft der Götter,” 99).
74. Recall Philodemus, On Property Management col. 23–26, discussed in ch. two. Philodemus’ encourages generous beneficence to friends which secures one’s income and well-being through future reciprocal gifts from those friends.
have died...’ The fragment goes on to describe how the gods’ pleasurable relationships apart from any supply of needs are analogous to an Epicurean’s pleasurable admiration of a dead friend, the memory of whom gives pleasure to his friends even though the deceased cannot provide for their material needs.

From a divine perspective, friendship with imperfect and weak humans is irrelevant to their perfect happiness, and could possibly hinder it, but from a human perspective, friendship with other people despite their weaknesses (including moral imperfections) is a necessary good which secures the ‘divine’ human life. Martha Nussbaum notes this tension in seeking to imitate the gods’ detachment from human needs, arguing that truly becoming like the gods would result in a sacrifice of one’s humanity, radically changing one’s conception of the virtues, such as justice, bravery, generosity, and friendship.

One important consequence of this tension between the ideal life of gods and men is that the Epicurean sage becomes a nearer model for moral formation than the gods themselves. The sage exemplifies the best life of a human being, and can be imitated without qualification. Unlike the gods, the sage has grown from immaturity to maturity in the midst of human weakness, and can lead others to do the same. As we will see shortly, the morally formative worship of the gods championed by Philodemus also includes religious acts celebrating Epicurus, who was a ‘god’ in his time, and was honoured as such by his followers.

3.3.2. Worship as a Means of Assimilation to the Gods

Despite the fact that the gods’ model does not precisely fit human life, Epicureans remain committed to becoming like them insofar as they can as mortals. Worship is a central, though not exclusive, means to progress morally toward the best life, as well as to sustain it, according to Philodemus.

As a preliminary observation, it is certain that a new Epicurean student would receive the proper conceptions of the gods from the teaching and frank speech of other Epicureans, especially the more mature (discussed in ch. four). Philodemus explicitly refers to Epicurus as an example of this in On Frank Criticism fr. 6: ‘Therefore, Epicurus too, when Leonteus, because of Pythocles, did not admit belief in gods, reproached Pythocles in moderation, and wrote to him (Leonteus) the so-called ‘famous letter’ (fr. 6.4–11).’ In this way Philodemus applies Epicurus’ example of frank speech about the gods to his own day. Admittedly, this is

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the only extant reference to the gods in what remains of this work, but given the philosophical, ethical, and existential necessities to establish the Epicurean view of the gods over against false beliefs, it is certain that frank criticism was applied to this area of life, just as it was to anger, envy, and other issues. The existence of Philodemus’ theological works seems to point in this direction as well, given that they offer detailed arguments for use in teaching and frank criticism. Yet, in what remains of Philodemus’ On Piety, frank speech and teaching does not feature as significantly as worship for the formation of right conceptions of the gods. It does not seem warranted to conclude for this reason that worship was more important than frank criticism, for Philodemus’ aim in discussing worship in On Piety is to give an account of Epicurean piety to opponents who criticize Epicureans for impiety, rather than to explain formation vis-à-vis theology per se.

Such formative worship includes public worship of the gods, e.g., at civic festivals, as well as worship in Epicurean gatherings. Three representative passages from Philodemus give witness to the morally formative function of worship (Piet. col. 26, 27, 31). The worship of the gods provides occasion for improving or maintaining one’s conception of the gods, and thus deriving pleasure and other benefits from such conceptions. Philodemus offers these remarks on worship in the course of defending Epicurus defending Epicurus and his followers from opponents who either deny that they participate in public worship, or criticize their participation as disingenuous, given the lack of traditional reasons for worship in Epicurean theology.

In On Piety col. 27, drawing from Epicurus’ On Gods, Philodemus describes the wise man in the midst of public worship: he ‘holds pure and holy beliefs about the divine and has understood that this nature is great and august’ (27.6–12[759–765]), and he is ‘progressing to an understanding of it [divine nature], having its name the whole time on his lips’ (27.12–17 [765–770]). Obbink interprets that the occasion of festivals (ἐν δὲ ταῖς ἡρσίασι, including both public observances and more private, Epicurean gatherings) is an appropriate opportunity for educating or maintaining one’s conception of the gods. Obbink argues that Philodemus places this line of argument in the beginning of his Eclogae because it sets the stage for his subsequent defence of Epicurus, and because Epicurus explicitly describes festivals as a form of religious instruction in On Piety, col. 26, 27, 31).

80. This seems to be true even if the purpose of the works is not primarily for use in such instruction. See, e.g., Piet. col. 49, containing Philodemus’ rehearsal of an opponent’s view accusing Epicureans of despising festivals and mysteries as foolishness because the gods worshipped are not paying attention; see also Plutarch, Adv. Col. 1112C, discussed in Obbink, On Piety, 389–91, 397. Of Epicurus, Philodemus explicitly remarks in two places that he both kept all expected religious observances, and taught others to do the same: Piet. col. 26.5–12[730–737]; 28.8–15[790–797]; see Obbink, On Piety, 389–93.


82. Translation Obbink, ad loc.; ἐν δὲ ταῖς ἡρσίασι μι[α]λλοστ’ εἶ[σ]ε | ἡρσάνθειν αὐτής | μονομοι αὐτὸ τὸ | τούνομα πάντα | ἀνα στῶ τ’ ἔχειν. The pronoun αὐτής refers to its antecedent ταύτῃ τήν | φύσιν of col. 29.11–12, [764–765], which is the divine nature understood by the wise man. These two clauses are likely dependent on a concluding infinitive, as interpreted by Obbink, referring to the wise man’s action as he ‘embraces [something] with conviction more seriously; (πί[ς]τε σφοδ[ρο]ντέρος | κατα[σχε]τε[ν] τὴ[ν]...}, col. 29.17–19[770–772]).
time for ‘sorting out one’s concept of divinity,’ one’s ἐπίνου ἡμῶν of the gods (see the same concept referred to in Piet. col. 26 below).\(^{85}\) The reference to ‘having its name the whole time on his lips’ could refer to prayer (see Piet. col. 26 below), singing of cult hymns (PHerc. 1428 col. 11.15–33 Henrichs),\(^ {86}\) or dialogue about the gods during the festivities (perhaps assuming other Epicureans are present, either at the public festival or, more likely, as part of Epicurean ceremonies).\(^ {87}\) Based on the syntax of this passage, it seems that this verbal dimension of worship, with the true conceptions of the gods which it assumes, is the means for progressing one’s understanding of the divine nature.\(^ {88}\)

However, such public worship is not to be done in conformity with the popular conception of the gods. Philodemus makes this clear in On Piety col. 31, as he quotes again from Epicurus,

‘Let us sacrifice to the gods,’ he says, ‘devoutly and fittingly on the proper days, and let us fittingly perform all the acts of worship in accordance with the laws, in no way disturbing ourselves with opinions in matters concerning the most excellent and august of beings. Moreover, let us sacrifice justly, on the view that I was giving. For in this way it is possible for mortal nature, by Zeus, to live like Zeus, as it seems.’ (col. 31.9–26 [879–896]).\(^ {89}\)

Here it seems clear that the mature Epicurean takes no part in the popular ‘opinions’ (δόξαις) about gods even while publicly participating in sacrifice alongside the wider populace, but instead worships ‘justly’ (δικαίως) i.e., maintaining internally the correct, Epicurean view of the gods.\(^ {90}\)

In this passage we also have reference to the means by which a human Epicurean can live like a god, even like Zeus. Obbink interprets that the act of mental discipline against false views of the gods is the likeliest referent of ‘in this way’ (οὖτος), rather than interpreting that

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86. These portions of PHerc. 1428, or Piet. pt. 2, are edited by Henrichs, “Die Kritik der stoischen Theologie im PHerc. 1428.”
88. Thus the infinitive clause, διὰ τό | τοῖνομα πάντα | ἀνὰ στόμα ἔχειν adverbially modifies the preceding participial clause, μ[δ][α][ς]τ' ε[ί]ς | ἐπίνουν ἀντίς | βαδίζοντα.
90. The theme of true piety as a form of justice toward the gods is also found in Plato, Euthyphro 12E; Cicero, Nat. d. 1.116; see further discussion in Obbink, On Piety, 439–40. A late-second to early-first century BCE papyrus from Oxyrhynchos (POxy. 215) also witnesses to the same internal mindset which must be in place before worship, see POxy. 215, 1.1–2.19 and discussion in Dirk Obbink, “POxy. 215 and Epicurean Religious ΘΕΟΠΟΙΟΙ,” in Atti del XVII Congresso Internazionale di Papirologia, vol. 2 (Naples: Centro Internazionale per lo Studio dei Papiri Ercolanesi, 1984), 607–19.
the act of worship or public sacrifice in itself is such a means. In this sense, a mental defence is a form of maintaining in one’s mind the correct view of the gods, which is a key ingredient for living a divine life as a mortal Epicurean. However, sacrifice remains an important facilitating occasion for developing and/or maintaining one’s views of the gods, so Philodemus wants to say. It is unclear whether public worship is a necessary condition for maintaining or developing views of the gods, but it is clear that public worship outside the Epicurean community is a natural part of the mature Epicurean lifestyle, and one that brings pleasure for such a life from the opportunity to contemplate the gods.

Lastly, in col. 26 of On Piety, Philodemus draws from Epicurus’ work On Ways of Life to remark, ‘to pray is natural for us, not because the gods would be hostile if we did not pray, but in order that, according to the understanding of beings surpassing in power and excellence, we may realize our fulfilments and social conformity with the laws’ (col. 26.12–26[737–751]). Obbink’s reconstruction of the clause ‘in order that ... we may realize our fulfilments’ ([interpretation of ‘fulfilments’ supplies ‘our’, where in context]ὑπάρχειν κατὰ τὴν ἐπίστασιν[Epicureans progress toward the ‘fulfilment’ or perfection that the gods represent and which is the goal of Epicurean imitation. This prayer and its result is ‘natural’ (οἰκεῖον) for the Epicurean, in contrast to praying in order to pacify the gods.

This final passage also raises the question of the social nature of such worship, for prayer also achieves ‘social conformity with the laws’ (τοῖς νόμοις [συνεφηρής], involving not just prayer but all forms of civic religious observance, as Epicurus encourages in col. 31 above. It seems that Philodemus links the achievement of ‘fulfilments’ with social conformity. Obbink suggests that such involvement with other, non-Epicurean observances is in some way related to forming one’s ideas of the gods properly, for the gods themselves have human form and characteristics (as shown in D. 3 col. 12–14). Obbink remarks, ‘Without human association, and the knowledge, experience and observation of humans it brings, one might not properly form conceptions (i.e. in their full τελειότητις) of such divinities.’

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91. See Obbink, On Piety, 441 One may also point to Piot. col. 27 above, which attests that the sage already possesses correct knowledge of the gods before engaging in worship, though he progresses in such knowledge during worship (see also the same sequence in PΟξυ. 215, 1.1–2.19).

92. Note ‘particularly,’ (µ[ά]λοστι), in reference to the occasion of festivals in which progression in understanding of the gods occurs (Piot. col. 27.13[766], above).

93. Translation Obbink, ad loc.; προσέποθοικα γάρ ἐν τῷ Περί [ἐπεί] οἰκεῖον εἶναι [µετέκι θησιν, οὐχ ός | [θεόν]µενον τὸν | [θεόν] εἰ µὴ ποιήσῃ[θεόν], ὀλὰ κατὰ | τὴν ἐπίστασιν τῶν | ὡσεϊ καὶ αὐτοῖς διάνοισιν φύσεων | [ὑπάρχειν καὶ] τοῖς τελειότητις [προσοέσθησιν καὶ τοῖς νόμοις | [συνεφηρής]. The translation ‘our fulfilments’ supplies ‘our’, where in Greek there is no pronoun specifying whose fulfilments are realised (τοῖς τε τελειότητας).

94. Obbink’s translation ‘realize’ is perhaps misleading, in that γεινόσκω[µεν] should be understood in the sense of ‘perceive’ or ‘discern’ rather than ‘realize’ in the sense of ‘implement,’ or ‘bring about.’


explanation is perhaps a good start, but a fuller explanation remains unclear. Such an explanation will likely also help us to understand Philodemus’ contention, noted above, that Epicureans believe ‘not only all the gods of the Greeks, but many more besides’ (*Piet.* col. 362).

It seems clearer that the immature Epicurean stands far more in need of Epicurean friends, rather than in need of human society in general, against whose conceptions of the gods Epicureans defend themselves in public worship. These friends can teach the immature student about the gods and how to worship them rightly, and thus help them to progress in their understanding through worship. Once mature, the Epicurean does not seem to need others in order to worship the gods rightly, for he will always maintain the correct view of the gods (being self-sufficient), though he will still participate with others in public worship as a natural, pleasurable part of his lifestyle, thus living out his τελειότης.

Apart from public worship, however, Epicureans maintained a hero cult, celebrating numerous religious festivals throughout the year, including a monthly festival for Epicurus and Metrodorus, his eminent disciple and friend. Philodemus once wrote an epigram inviting his patron, L. Calpurnius Piso, to this monthly gathering (ep. 27 *Sider*). These festivals, provided for by Epicurus in his will (*Diogenes Laertius*, *Vit.* 10.18) entailed at least a sacrifice, a common meal, and discourse among the community. Friendly outsiders were invited, but Philodemus records that Epicurus was wary of turning the Epicurean observances into demagoguery (*PHerc.* 1232 fr. 8 col 1.12–15). Unlike at public festivals, Epicurean participants did not have to protect themselves against corrupting influences from non-Epicureans. These observances were meant to bind Epicurean communal identity together around their philosophy, but also to serve the participants by giving them models to follow after, particularly the model of Epicurus. Notably, the objects of veneration are never the gods, but successfully ‘divine’ models of the best human life striving to be like the gods. The character of these observances seems to signal that Epicurean meetings were more formative in an Epicurean sense, and involved a higher level of formative interaction between

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97. This explanation seems incomplete, for one might object that Epicurean friends could provide all that was necessary to know about the gods, including their quasi-human characteristics.
98. These observances included an annual birthday celebration for Epicurus, a monthly festival for Epicurus and Metrodorus, funerary offerings annually for his parents and brothers, a funerary offering for Epicurus’ friend and disciple named Polyaenus, and perhaps a cult of another eminent Epicurean, Pythocles or Apollodorus. The twentieth of the month, the day of Epicurus’ annual birthday celebration and monthly celebrations with Metrodorus, was typically used in civic religion for the celebration of gods, e.g. Apollo. Key sources for our knowledge about these observances are from Philodemus’ works *On Epicurus* (*PHerc.* 1232), fr. 8 col. 1, and *Piet.* col. 29; 51. Philodemus is our earliest source on the religious observances of Epicureans, particularly of the first generation, and other sources give evidence of Epicurean observances up to the time of Pliny the elder and Plutarch. See discussion in Diskin Clay, *Paradosis and Survival* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1998), 75–101; *Sider, Epigrams*, 156–57.
participants than civic worship. Yet qualified involvement in public worship was still a normal, beneficial, and necessary part of Epicurean life.

3.3.3. Summary

In section 3.3, we have seen that Epicureans have a relationship to the gods, but one that is constituted only by their own conceptions of the gods, not by any intended initiative from the gods themselves. Epicureans can indeed assimilate to qualitatively similar ‘divine’ attributes as they seek to imitate them. Epicureans can come to have qualitatively similar pleasure as the gods possess, and thus similar moral character and knowledge, even if human nature remains vulnerable to pain. Self-sufficient incorruptibility is an attainable goal, at least in the sense of having an inalienable hold on the best life no matter one’s difficult circumstances (not in the sense of having a divine nature impervious to pain). Like the gods, mature Epicureans model the best life to others, Epicurus being the central example. In some ways Epicureans mimic the gods’ retreat from the human world in their leisurely retreat from public life, but it is clear that the best human life is radically different from the gods’ lives, in that it involves full participation in intimate friendships with other, naturally weak humans, friendships which demand intense concern and labour for others (especially for others’ moral formation). Epicureans strive toward the model of the gods’ friendship, which involves perfectly virtuous, self-sufficient friends, but human friendships remain qualitatively distinct in that they involve interdependence upon one another due to human weakness. Worship of the gods and of Epicurean heroes provides several occasions for improving or maintaining one’s conception of the gods, and thus for living the best Epicurean life.

In the next chapter, I draw upon the theology outlined here in order to describe Philodemus’ conception and practice of reciprocal moral formation.

Excursus: Realist and Idealist Interpretations of Epicurean Gods

It remains controversial whether the Epicurean gods exist independently in a bodily state somewhere in the cosmos (the realist view), or whether they exist only insofar as humans think of them, i.e., as ‘thought-constructs’ (the idealist view). Epicurus clearly states that

101. The ‘thought-construct’ designation is from Long and Sedley, *The Hellenistic Philosophers*, 145. The first proponent of the idealist perspective was Schömann, *Schediasma de Epicuri Theologia* (Greifswald: F. G. Kunike, 1864); see further idealist-view bibliography from later nineteenth century scholars in Obbink, “‘All Gods Are True’ in Epicurus,” 214, n. 104. Recent proponents of the idealist view include, e.g., Dirk Obbink, Anthony A. Long; David N. Sedley; J. Purinton; proponents of the realist view include, e.g., Jaap Mansfeld, Dominic Scott, David Konstan, Michael Wigodsky, and Holger Essler. See Obbink, *On Piety*, 11–12, passim; Long and Sedley, *The Hellenistic Philosophers*, 144–49; J. Purinton, “Epicurus on the Nature of the Gods,” *
there are gods (θεοί μὲν γὰρ εἰσίν, Ep. Men. 123), and that they are living beings (τῶν θεῶν ζῴων ἄφθαρτον καὶ μακάριων, Ep. Men. 123), but this and other statements allow varying interpretations (e.g., from an idealist perspective, one might argue that these statements describe how one should think of them, not how they actually are). Both views seek to address two important challenges: there is no adequate explanation extant in Epicurus concerning how eternal gods can have atomically composite bodies in a universe in which no atomic composite is eternal (cf. Ep. Hdt. 73–74; Lucretius, De rerum naturae 3.806–823), nor is there a full explanation extant concerning the origin and formation of Epicurean knowledge about the gods as blessed and incorruptible. Central texts for the debate include especially the differing portrayals of the gods in KD 1, on one hand (with its scholion, as preserved in Diogenes Laertius, Vit. 10.139), and Cicero, Nat. d. 1.49, on the other. Epicurus’ remarks on the gods in Ep. Men. 123–124, and later texts from Lucretius and Philodemus play important roles as well.

We possess more writing about the gods from Philodemus than Epicurus, but even Philodemus’ views on the gods can be interpreted with both realist and idealist perspectives. Even though Philodemus presupposes that the gods are living beings (cf. ἄφθαρτον καὶ δεχοµένον [ἀειότα] ζῴων, D. 3 col. 12.22) who, in a divine manner, breathe, rest, eat, and converse with one another (D. 3 col. 12–14), one may yet object that this description is only how the Epicurean ought to conceive of them, rather than how they actually exist.

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102. Philodemus continues to address objections from opponents concerning the mechanics of divine bodily existence in such a universe, citing for support, e.g., Epicurus and Metrodorus; see, e.g., Piet. col. 2.7, and discussion in Obbink, On Piety, 287–88.

103. See discussion in Mansfeld, “Theology,” 454–56. E.g., the problem from physics is a counter argument against the realist view in, e.g., Long and Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers, 148; Obbink, “‘All Gods Are True’ in Epicurus,” 216. David Sedley in a recent essay seeks to provide further support for the idealist view by attempting to explain how knowledge of the gods arises by an innate preconception of the gods, in opposition to the realist interpretation that such knowledge comes from the externally existing gods themselves (see Sedley, “Epicurus’ Theological Innatism”). These two issues Konstan seeks to address from a realist perspective in David Konstan, “Epicurus on the Gods”. See also Holger Essler’s monograph, in which he argues throughout for a realist interpretation of the gods, in part by reconstructing the process of gaining knowledge about the gods on the basis of their specifically divine atomic composition; Essler, Glückselig und Unsterblich.

104. In his review of the debate, Essler helpfully organizes the realist and idealist views according to whether they prioritize KD 1, or Cicero, Nat. d. 1.49, though inevitably the debate involves the full corpus of Epicurean witnesses, early and late (see Essler, Glückselig und Unsterblich, 18f).

105. For this idealist objection to Philodemus’ overtly realist language, see Long and Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers, 149. For further Philodemean evidence in favour of the idealist view, see Obbink’s interpretation of Philodemus Piet. col. 12–13 in Obbink, On Piety, 321–35; see in contrast Essler’s realist reading of Philodemus, D. 3 col. 8–10, and his objections to idealist views in Essler, Glückselig und Unsterblich.
It does not seem that the gods’ mode of existence determines their involvement in moral formation, for the gods’ relationship to human morality consists in human conceptions about them, as argued above. Thus a decision on this knotty issue of their mode of existence does not seem necessary for the study to proceed.

106 Thus, the gods’ relationship to morality does not consist, e.g., in any directly causative, external relationship to humanity which might be called into question by their existence only as thought-constructs. Nor, however, does this relationship require an idealist view of the gods, as Obbink notes in Obbink, “‘All Gods Are True’ in Epicurus,” 214–15. For a realist view of the gods as indirectly related to human moral formation via the physics of divine atoms, see Essler, Glückselig und Unsterblich, 357–58.
CHAPTER FOUR: RECIPROCAL MORAL FORMATION IN PHILODEMUS

How did Philodemus envision reciprocal moral formation such that Epicurean friends needed to receive it from one another? How and why were Epicureans dependent upon one another for ‘salvation’, particularly via frank criticism, in his view? The concern of this chapter is to provide an answer for these questions.

This chapter has four main sections. First (4.1), I offer some introductory remarks on the main text considered here, Philodemus’ treatise Περὶ παρρησίας, or On Frank Criticism (henceforth abbreviated Lib., from its Latin title De libertate dicendi). Second, I provide a wider context for moral formation practices in Epicurean community, among which frank criticism is one particular mode (4.2). Third, I present the core evidence for the reciprocal practice of frank criticism by all members of the Epicurean community (4.3) in order to introduce, fourth, the wider discussion of frank criticism’s conception and practice (4.4). In this fourth and final section, I first offer a brief sketch of the Epicurean framework of moral formation (4.4.1), followed by discussions of how Epicureans give and receive frank criticism (4.4.2), the nature of frank criticism’s reciprocity (4.4.3), and the nature of Epicurean friends’ interdependence upon one another to receive moral formation via frank criticism.

4.1. Introduction to On Frank Criticism (PHerc. 1471)

It is perhaps best to begin at the end. The subscript of Philodemus’ treatise On Frank Criticism is as follows, with slight reconstruction: ΦΙΛΟΔΗΜΟΥ | ΤΩΝ ΚΑΤ ΕΠΙΤΟΜΗΝ ΕΞΕΙΡΓΑΣΜΕΝΩΝ ΠΕΡΙ ΗΘΩΝ ΚΑΙ ΒΙΩΝ ΕΚ ΤΗΣ ΖΗΝΩΝΗΣ ΣΧΟΛΩΝ | Ο ΕΣΤΙ ΠΕΡΙ ΠΑΡΡΗΣΙΑΣ. Translated, it reads: ‘Of Philodemus, of those (topics) treated fully in epitome concerning characters and ways of life, from the lectures of Zeno, that is, On Frank Criticism’. Several aspects of this subscript are instructive.


First of all, the term παρρησία refers to ‘frank speech’ or ‘frank criticism’ between friends who help each other to identify their faults and to grow morally into the best life. The practice of παρρησία was a hallmark of friendship, an indicator of honesty, trust, and mutual care, in contrast to flattery and insincere friendship. Philodemus’ treatise concerns how Epicureans engage in παρρησία, both toward other Epicurean friends and to all people (as shown by frequent references to teachers and students, as well as occasional references to frank criticism involving the rich, the old, and women). This papyrus is the only extant text from the ancient world with the title. Nevertheless, the topic was discussed widely, e.g., in other philosophical texts, not just by Epicureans. While Epicurean παρρησία was not unique, it was relatively distinctive in its openness for all members to engage in it, and for endorsing the practice of informing on other friends for their correction (fr. 50). Philodemus’ goals in writing the treatise, following Zeno, likely involved instructing Epicureans in its use, while also defending an Epicurean position from attacks by rival schools.

The work is one episode in Philodemus’ multi-volume series On Characters and Ways of Life. Which other books were included is disputed. Scholars have claimed that this series included On Slander (PHerc. Paris 2, the same treatise written to Vergil et al.), On Anger, On Flattery (PHerc. 1082), and On Not Living according to Chance (PHerc. 168). Philodemus refers to On Frank Criticism in two of these works (On Anger col. 36; On Flattery [PHerc. 1082] col. 1). Estimations based on handwriting have suggested that the papyrus was written between 75–50 BCE, but these estimates are uncertain. Perhaps On Frank Criticism was among the earliest of Philodemus’ ethical corpus.

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4. In PHerc. 1082, part of the work On Flattery, Philodemus distinguishes παρρησία between friends from that shown to all (discussed in Glad, Paul and Philodemus, 109–10).


6. Julie Giovacchini disputes the idea of a specifically Epicurean notion of frank criticism (Giovacchini, “La Nouvelle Reconstruction”). While she correctly notes these two qualities, she does not cogently argue against them. She identifies a similar concern for teachers to confess their faults in Plutarch (but this does not argue against the other elements of Epicurean openness to the participation of all members), and she attempts to downplay the importance of informing on others (but to no avail, for Philodemus’ caution toward the dangers of such a practice do not remove his endorsement of it).

7. See Giovacchini, “La Nouvelle Reconstruction”; Delattre, “Le Franc-Parler”.


The work is ‘in epitome’ (κατ’ ἐπιτομήν). Philodemus attempts to provide an overview of numerous topoi concerning the use of frank criticism. Several questions posed in the treatise offer some structure to his discussion, e.g., fr. 88: ‘How will we recognize the one who has endured frank criticism graciously and the one who is pretending (to do so)?, or col. 24a: ‘Why is it that old men are more annoyed (by frankness)?’ Philodemus makes reference to his epitome format in col. 7b, in which he seems to excuse himself from going into further detail concerning how a sage will be disposed to offer frank speech in additional situations, ‘It is hard work for those who are handling (a topic) by way of an epitome to be precise about every kind, in the manner of those who dispose of each (kind) exhaustively, [for example in what] way a wise man will be disposed when some are practising frankness...’ (col. 7b.6–13).

Philodemus indicates that his work draws upon the lectures of Zeno of Sidon which we know Philodemus attended in Athens. Yet, in the extant remains, Zeno’s name only appears in the subscript. Philodemus does not seem to rehearse precisely what Zeno said, but instead to synthesize those lectures for his own presentation, though it is very difficult to separate the two from one another with the present evidence. The treatise represents Philodemus’ vision for frank criticism among his own students, not only Zeno’s vision for the Athenian Garden.

The book is relatively well-preserved among the Herculaneum papyri, as we have the physical remains of approximately 50% of the scroll, though of course this does not translate into 50% of the text. Based on stichometric evidence, the papyrus was originally just under 12 meters in length, consisting of 205 columns of 33 lines each. This makes it one of the longest scrolls found among the Herculaneum library to date (e.g., Philodemus, On Rhetoric book 3 is the longest at 245 columns, and his On Poems book 5 has 203 columns). Of course the work as a whole was relatively short in comparison, as it did not span more than a single scroll.

‘Unrolled’ in 1808, the editio princeps of this carbonized papyrus was published in Naples in 1835 and 1843 by Antonio Ottaviano (Herculaneum Voluminum quae Supersunt V, Pars Prior et Altera), consisting of drawings of the papyrus fragments (Italian: disegni) which F. Casanova and his brother, G. B. Casanova, made between 1811-1817. Alexander Olivieri published the only critical edition of the work in 1914, based on the editio princeps.

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12. In their introduction, Konstan et al. erroneously claim that these questions are underlined in the papyrus, but it is rather Olivieri who underlines them (Olivieri, Philodemi ΠΕΡΙ ΠΑΡΡΗΣΙΑΣ Libellus, X; David Konstan, et al., On Frank Criticism, 8)
13. Translation Konstan et al.
14. As also understood by, e.g., Gigante, Philodemus in Italy, 24–26; Tsouna, The Ethics of Philodemus, 92; White, “Measure,” 104; White, “Ordering the Fragments”.
15. As estimated by White, “Ordering the Fragments”.
and autopsy of the papyrus.\textsuperscript{17} Despite having access to the papyri fragments in Naples, Olivieri’s edition has a number of weaknesses, both in his interpretation of the text, and his omission of material.\textsuperscript{18} Olivieri omitted fragments for which there were available disegni, and also omitted fragments which had not been drawn, but could provide important evidence for the ordering of fragments.\textsuperscript{19} Several scholars have made important contributions to the study of this text aside from Olivieri,\textsuperscript{20} but there remains no complete critical edition of the work (a task which W. B. Henry has undertaken, the editor of Philodemus’ \textit{On Death}, book 4). David Konstan and others (including Clarence Glad) helpfully produced the first modern translation in 1998, operating on the basis of Olivieri’s text (i.e., without viewing the scroll itself, but adding several of the fragments he omitted, and drawing upon the textual work of Philippson and Gigante).\textsuperscript{21}

Ordering the extant fragments is a central issue to the interpretation of this text, and much work remains to be done. At present we have the last 24 columns of the scroll in their proper order. Each of these columns consists of top and bottom fragments (e.g., col. 1a, 1b), with lines regularly missing in the middle of the column, because when it was opened the scroll was cut in two to aid the process (as is common among the Herculaneum papyri). Though these last 24 columns often remain very difficult to interpret, they provide the longest secure sequence of fragments that can be found in the extant remains.

The ordering for the rest of the fragments is far less secure (more than 100, many of which remain unedited). However, many of them show physical joins to one another, and make up tops or bottoms of columns, sometimes in succession. Recently, L. Michael White and Daniel Delattre have proposed reconstructions of many columns preceding the final 24, linking top and bottom fragments based on this papyrological evidence, at times with further substantiation in the text of the reconstructed columns.\textsuperscript{22} In this thesis I cannot critically assess these reconstructions for their papyrological validity, as I do not have the expertise or access

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{17} Olivieri, \textit{Philodemi ΠΕΡΙ ΠΑΡΡΗΣΙΑΣ Libellus}.
\item \textsuperscript{19} See White, “Ordering the Fragments.”
\item \textsuperscript{21} David Konstan, et al., \textit{On Frank Criticism}.
\item \textsuperscript{22} See White, “Ordering the Fragments”; Delattre, “Le Franc-Parler”; Delattre, “La Pratique Maîtrisée”.
\end{itemize}
to the scroll in order to do so. Yet I can, at least, engage with the reconstructed texts and contexts that they propose.

Because of the fragmentary nature of this text, the complexity of its text-critical problems, and my own lack of expertise, I have sought to found my reading on the best evidence available, i.e., those passages which require minimal reconstruction, and which have an established sequence (pre-eminently col. 1–24). I have cleaved closely to the consensus of other scholars, and have noted where my readings are controversial. This thesis operates under no pretensions of offering a critical edition of particular fragments, despite how needed this remains. My presentation of Philodemus follows the main interpretive trajectories already established (particularly those set by Gigante, Glad, and Tsouna). In general, I follow the text and translation as presented in the edition by Konstan et al., unless otherwise noted.

4.2. Reciprocal Moral Formation as Shared Inquiry (συζήτησις)

By far the majority of evidence concerning reciprocal moral formation in Philodemus involves the use of frank criticism to identify a particular fault and to provide the accused person assistance toward moral improvement. However, the practice of reciprocal frank criticism is just one mode of moral formation among Epicurean friends. In this section, I sketch other modes of moral formation among friends in order to provide a context for the particular role of frank criticism (examined in section 4.3 below).

All interactions between Epicureans could be subsumed under the project of ‘shared inquiry’ (συζήτησις), in which members strive to progress in Epicurean philosophy toward the best life together, as seen in the following passage from Philodemus’ treatise On Anger col. 19.12–28. Here Philodemus continues his description of the irascible person (ὁργίλος) as in the preceding columns,

... γεγονότων ἐνερξόντες ἀπροβάτους ἀνέγκη γίνεσθαι καὶ τῷ μήτῃ καθηητάς ἀνέχεσθαι μήτῃ συσχηματίζοντας, ἐν ἐπιτιμῶσι καὶ διορθῆσιν, ὡς τά [θ]ηριώδη τῶν ἐλκῶν οὐδέ τάς τῶν ἰησούτας φαρμάκων ὑπομένει προσωρηγόμεν — ἀλλά κάποιο ἐντέρος ἐπιστημώσιν, ἐνογότατα πρός ἑαυτοὺς ἀισχρῶς ὑποπτεῦειν, τά πάντα λέγεσθαι — μήτῃ εἶν οὗ ὑπέχειν, συζήτησις γαθοῦ.
...having become enemies [they are hindered from] devoting themselves to learning. And it is necessary that they make no progress, and endure neither the teachers nor the fellow-students, should they rebuke and correct, just as terrible ulcers do not endure the administration of the gentlest medicines — rather if they (teachers and fellow-students) rebuke others, (it is necessary that) they (the irascible) always suspect everything said toward them to be completely irrational — nor do they share in the good that comes by means of shared inquiry...

Generally speaking, the teachers’ and fellow-students’ correction of the irascible person in this text can be identified as instances of frank criticism. The benefit of such correction and the ‘good that comes by means of shared inquiry’ seem loosely distinguished in the text, but should be considered parts of a whole. Shared inquiry seems to refer rather generally to the collaborative study and application of Epicurean philosophy in pursuit of its goods, of which direct formation through frank criticism is one mode. The ‘good’ of συζήτησις is the benefit which friends contribute to one another in this shared pursuit of the best Epicurean life.

It is difficult to specify precisely how Epicureans give and receive the ‘good’ of συζήτησις, for Philodemus does not discuss it at length in what remains of his work. Συζήτησις has to do with moral formation, given that sharing in its benefits links contextually with making progress (the irascible person makes no progress in that they cannot receive the benefits of correction and shared inquiry). Moreover, Epicurus speaks of the benefit of συζήτησις in *VS* 74: ἐν φιλολόγῳ συζητήσει πλέον ἣνοσεν ὁ ἡττηθεὶς, καθ’ ὅ προσέμαθεν, ‘In philosophical shared inquiry, the inferior one gains more, insofar as he learns more.’ Apart from practices of frank criticism, how does Philodemus envision formation via shared inquiry? What are the other modes of formation are available, of which frank criticism is one instance?

In the most general sense, Epicurean life in community was συζήτησις, given that ‘shared inquiry’ is not just a matter of gaining technical knowledge, but also of living the best life together with philosophical rigor. Recalling the discussion of ch. two, the social setting for this shared inquiry is the leisured withdrawal from society with friends, with its regular symposia and freedom from work. While Philodemus and his friends may not have lived together in a ‘Garden’ on the Bay of Naples, as Epicurus and some of his disciples did outside

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of Athens, their life together as a community was no less robust. The community held regular hero cult observances for Epicurus and other eminent forebears, in which a shared meal, discourse, and sacrifices enacted and reaffirmed communal identity, and reoriented the community toward living in imitation of its humanly divine exemplars. By engaging in such Epicurean acts together, members led each other to affirm and act upon their shared identity as Epicureans. This redefinition of communal identity around Epicurean values could unite members as a family despite diverse social, cultural, and economic backgrounds. Since Philodemus considered the public worship of the gods as formative of one’s conception of the gods, as well as a means of living like them, Epicureans likely formed one another by worshipping together, especially during civic religious festivals in which they had to guard their minds from false views of the gods.

Concerning συζήτησις as philosophical study strictly considered, Philodemus’ community likely engaged in study by listening to lectures (given by, e.g., Philodemus or Siro), reading and interpreting philosophical texts with the help of a sage, and having philosophical conversations in the course of their common life. Συζήτησις in this community was especially text-centred, given (a) the trends toward text-centred philosophical activity in this post-Hellenistic philosophical period, (b) Philodemus’ concerns that Epicureans of his day were not well-versed in Epicurean literature, (c) his conception of the Epicurean teacher as a literary guide to his students, and (d) his own output of treatises for his students involving textual criticism and exegesis of canonical Epicurean works. These periods of study and

29. This could hold true even if Philodemus’ community was relatively elite in its composition. While slaves could have been part of Philodemus’ community (and Epicurus sets a precedent in this respect), the socio-economic and educational limitations upon community participation (given in On Property Management, col. 23) would still apply, as argued in chapter two.
30. In On Rhetoric 2 col. 52 (PHerc 1674) [col. 151 Longo Auricchio], Philodemus mentions contemporary Epicureans in Cos and Rhodes who lectured (στογνυ ... σχολαζ[ζόν]τον) to others on the topic that rhetoric is not an art, while Philodemus argued that sophistic rhetoric is an art, though other forms of rhetoric are not.
31. Philodemus’ Περί ομιλίας, or On Conversation indicates that the study of nature and perception were important matters of daily dialogue (see col. 7.4; 4.8–9), though much of what remains of this treatise seems to concern the issue of speaking or remaining silent in varying circumstances (critical edition: Filippo Amoroso, “Filodemo Sulla Conversazione,” Cronache Ercolanese 5 (1975): 63–76; see discussion in Tsouna, The Ethics of Philodemus, 122–23)
33. Epicurus himself wrote prolifically, but also wrote easily remembered epitomes for his students (see comments in Ep. Hdt. 35).
discourse are certainly the environment in which corrective frank criticism occurred, yet it seems plausible that this was not the only mode of formation, for shared study was not limited to correction of past mistakes. Study did feature input from skilled teachers to less mature students, but also perhaps more collaborative discussions (insofar as a member could contribute to collaboration, rather than simply receive instruction).34 For example, Philodemus encouraged conversation concerning the study of nature (φυσιολογία, On Conversation col. 7.2–4), which was a key component of making choices to bring oneself pleasure and avoid pain (see the treatise On Choices and Avoidances col. 13, likely composed by Philodemus).35 Such collaboration involved, e.g., discussing Epicurean philosophy proper, discussing what was most advantageous in a given circumstance according to hedonistic calculus, and/or processing together perceptions, thoughts, and emotions in relation to Epicurean empiricism and ethical ideals.36 This collaboration of course shades into the use of reciprocal frank speech, but the latter is generally distinct in that it concerns instances of direct correction and therapy of faults.

There were many ways in which Epicureans engaged in ‘shared inquiry’ together. Such shared study involved the less direct modes of formation just examined, as well as more direct instances of frank criticism. Having established the wider context in which frank criticism sits, we proceed to a detailed discussion of its conception and practice.

4.3. Core Evidence for the Communal Practice of Reciprocal Frank Criticism

Typically in Philodemus’ discussion it is the more mature, especially the teachers, who exercise frank criticism, but he occasionally indicates that everyone can take part, not simply those who are more mature. We have already seen this indication in On Anger col. 19, in which Philodemus notes that the irascible person listens neither to their teachers nor their fellow students should they try to correct or rebuke him (καὶ τοι μήτη καθηγητὰς | ἁνέχεσθαι μήτε συσχηλάζοντας, ἵν ἐπιτιμῶσι | καὶ διορθῶσιν). Along with this witness, the following two passages from Lib. comprise the clearest attestations in Philodemus’ writings to fully communal participation in frank criticism:

34. Though I know of no direct evidence for this, one may imagine that such collaborative discussions of philosophical issues among the more mature assisted Philodemus in his ethical treatise-writing, given as they are to the application of Epicurean philosophy to various features of human life.
36. Philodemus asserts of friendship in Lib. fr. 28.6–12: οὐδὲν | ἐστι τηλικῶτον ὦς τὸ ἔχει [v], ὃι τά[γ]κἀδι[τ]α τις ἔρει καὶ λεγ[οντος ἀκόισεται. σφο['][α γᾶρ ἡ φύσις ὃριζεται πρ['][]ς τιν['][]ς ἐκκαλύπτειν ἢ [v]οιτ... ‘...there is nothing so grand as having one to whom one will say what is in one’s heart and who will listen when one speaks. For our nature strongly desires to reveal to some people what it thinks.’
... distinguish themselves as most intelligent, reproach them gently and to their liking. But for the most part they are rebuked more sharply by the young.' Translation by David Konstan, et al., "On Frank Criticism, 50, with LSJ, ευφορία. However, such a translation seems less related to the context than a rendering like ‘patience’, which has a stronger social dimension, given that ‘goodwill’ among members is paired with ευφορία as a result of successful formative interactions, and that the subsequent clause describes the endurance of criticism from others as good. Gigante also disputes ‘contentment’ as a rendering, and opts for another rendering offered in LSJ, the ‘power of enduring easily’ (Gigante, Ricerche Filodemee, 72, n. 94). ‘Patience’ seems appropriate because it involves a social dimension, i.e., the capacity of bearing with others in friendship, enhanced by recalling times when others ‘saved’ oneself from pain.

Lib. fr. 79.1–7

... and considering being saved by one another as provisions for patience and great goodwill, since even to obey [at times] those who are younger in condition, and further to endure (their) admonishment graciously, are good and fitting... (Lib. fr. 36.1–9)\(^{39}\)

Lib. fr. 79 is one of several fragments which clarify the proper use of frank criticism by describing its improper use, often exemplified by the immature.\(^{40}\) On the basis of White’s and Delattre’s reconstructions, the immediately preceding column concerned, among other things, an immature student’s reporting of others’ errors in order to ingratiate a teacher (fr. 52).\(^{41}\) In this fragment, Philodemus speaks from the perspective of the teachers about a student needing treatment, and mentions that this treatment can be done either by ‘us’ or one of his fellow-students. Lib. fr. 36 is one of several witnesses to Philodemus’ concern for maintaining

\(^{37}\) Delattre reads, αὐτῶν, ‘by them’, with a possible reference to teachers, but notes uncertainty over all but the o in this word (Delattre, “La Pratique Maîtrisée,” 450).

\(^{38}\) The editors of On Frank Criticism have chosen ‘contentment’ to translate εὐφορία (David Konstan, et al., On Frank Criticism, 50), with LSJ, εὐφορία. However, such a translation seems less related to the context than a rendering like ‘patience’, which has a stronger social dimension, given that ‘goodwill’ among members is paired with εὐφορία as a result of successful formative interactions, and that the subsequent clause describes the endurance of criticism from others as good. Gigante also disputes ‘contentment’ as a rendering, and opts for another rendering offered in LSJ, the ‘power of enduring easily’ (Gigante, Ricerche Filodemee, 72, n. 94). ‘Patience’ seems appropriate because it involves a social dimension, i.e., the capacity of bearing with others in friendship, enhanced by recalling times when others ‘saved’ oneself from pain.

\(^{39}\) Translation adapted from David Konstan, et al., On Frank Criticism, 51.

\(^{40}\) E.g., in col. 1a.1–4, Philodemus introduces a topic of discussion concerning how to distinguish those who speak frankly ‘from a polite disposition’ (τὸν ἅπα διαθέσεως ἀστείας [μῷο]; [φιλολογία] or ‘from a base one’ (τὸν δ’[πο] φαιλότης). In col. 16a.5–12, Philodemus remarks that the teachers receive harsher rebuke from the young (i.e., immature): ἀλλοι δὲ καὶ συνεταιτότους [ἐμοίου] διαλαμβάνοντες καὶ πραξῶς μὲν αὐτοῖς | ἐπιτιμούσι καὶ πρὸς ἢμοί[ν] ὑπὸ δὲ τῶν [εἰ]ν | τὰ πολλὰ πικρὸ[ν]τερ[ε]ν[ε]ν | ἐπίπληθηνται[ν]. ‘Others, who distinguish themselves as most intelligent, reproach them gently and to their liking. But for the most part they are rebuked more sharply by the young.’ Translation by David Konstan, et al., On Frank Criticism, 115. See also fr. 80; col. 1a–2a; 14a; 15b; 16a–b.

healthy relationships among Epicurean friends (especially ‘goodwill,’ εὐνοοια) even during the exchange of direct criticism.42 ‘Saving one another’ from moral illness by frank speech strengthens friendships by promoting goodwill and patience toward others.

Some preliminary observations about these texts orient the subsequent discussion. First, each witness (including On Anger col. 19) distinguishes between two classes of Epicureans eligible to form others within one community: teachers and students. Second, in Lib. fr. 79 and On Anger col. 19, Philodemus assumes that the more mature person acts upon the less mature, who has an unresolved issue needing the intervention of another. Third, Philodemus champions a reciprocity of formation among all members regardless of maturity in Lib. fr. 36, but considers it important to clarify that this applies even to the situation in which a younger member offers the critique to someone more mature, thus indicating the abnormality of such a situation. Fourth, Philodemus describes this formative intervention as rebuking (ἐπιτιμάω, ἐπιπλήττω; On Anger col. 19), correcting (διορθῶ On Anger col. 19), admonishing (νοοθέτησις, Lib. fr. 36), treating (θεραπεύω, Lib. fr. 79), and saving (σώζω, Lib. fr. 36), all of which must be done properly (Lib. fr. 79), though this proper procedure is spelled out in much more detail elsewhere. Fifth, Philodemus indicates that formation must also be properly received to be effective, i.e., received with obedience, trust, and gracious endurance of criticism (Lib. fr. 36; On Anger col. 19).

The formative activities just described in these passages are identical to the therapeutic, saving criticism of wise Epicurean teachers discussed at length in Lib. The wise teachers use παρρησία (described in the same language, e.g., ‘rebuke’, ‘correct’, ‘admonish’) to ‘save’ and ‘treat’ others throughout.43 The less mature ‘obey’ and ‘endure admonishment’ from the more mature as part of the salvific, therapeutic process.44 For example, in fr. 40, the ‘only saviour’, the ‘one guide of right speech and [action]’ is the Epicurean teacher who speaks publicly and honestly about the failings of those he saves.45 The recipient, in contrast, ‘has given himself over to be treated’, and shows to the teacher everything about himself that needs treatment:

42. Fr. 25 speaks of teachers increasing goodwill toward themselves through frank criticism to those who receive instruction: ‘... and of how, through frankness, we shall heighten the goodwill towards ourselves of those who are being instructed by the very fact of speaking frankly’ (καὶ τοῦ πῶς διὰ παρρησίας ἐπιπληθοῦν τήν πρᾶξιν αὐτοῦ | εὖνοιν τὸν κατὰσκευαζομένους τὸν παρ’ αὐτῶν | περισσότερον τὸ περὶπαραρθήσθαι). Translation by David Konstan, et al., On Frank Criticism, 43. See also col. 1b; 10b; 11b; 17b.

43. See, e.g., διορθῶ in fr. 44.4; διορθοῦσι in fr. 55; ἐπιτιμάω in fr. 6.8; col. 16a.9; ἐπιπλήττος in col. 16a.11–12; ἐπιπλήτησις in col. 16b.7; νοοθέτωσι in fr. 23.4–5; 61.2; νοοθέτησις in fr. 77.6–7; θεραπεύω in fr. 44.8–9; 69.8; σώζω in fr. 34.5; 77.3–4.

44. See fr. 66.5–6, which describes a student’s process of conversion to obedience of wise admonition (‘he will obey the admonition,’ πεθαρμάχηται τῇ | νοοθετήσει). Graceful Glad interprets that this teacher is Epicurus, given the appellation ‘only saviour’, but this seems unlikely given the fragment’s concern about present teacher/student relationships, not relations to the ultimate teacher, Epicurus (Glad, Paul and Philodemus, 158, n. 209).
... [for it is necessary to show him his] errors forthrightly and speak of his failings publicly. For if he has considered this man to be the one guide of right speech and [action], whom he calls the only savior, and citing the phrase, ‘with him accompanying,’ he has given himself over to be treated, then how is he not going to show to him those things in which he needs treatment, and [accept admonishment]? (Lib. fr. 40)46

Similarly, Philodemus describes παρησία as a means for salvation and perfection in col. 6b. The Epicurean sages who have become ‘perfect’ (τέλειος) needed saving frank criticism in varying degrees on their way to perfection, and this in turn affects how much frank criticism they offer to others: ‘And if one has needed frankness minimally, while another has been saved by means of this, then the one applies less, the other more of that through which he became perfect’ (col. 6b.8–13).’ This helps to explain why some teachers differ in their exercise of frank criticism, a question raised earlier in col. 3a.

In these three texts (Lib. fr. 36, 79, and On Anger col. 19) Philodemus assumes that all members can directly form one another, using the same frank criticism that the wise normally do for the less mature. Thus, in order to understand how these mutually formative practices work in greater detail, one must draw on the discussion throughout Lib. concerning how the wise are to use frank criticism to treat and save others, and how such treatment is to be received. This is the subject of the next section.

4.4. The Conception and Practice of Reciprocal Frank Criticism

After first briefly describing the Epicurean framework by which frank criticism operates (4.4.1), I describe how Epicureans give and receive frank criticism (4.4.2), and the kind of reciprocity involved (4.4.3), in order to then clarify how and why Epicureans depend on each other for ‘salvation’ via moral formation (4.4.4).

46. Translation Konstan et al. Fr. 40: ... [χρη | γὰρ αὐτῶι δεικνύειν ἄνθυνος τὰς διαμαρτύρσις καὶ κοινωνίας εἴπατεν | ἃς ἔτοι οὐκ] ἡγηθηκήσας ἐνα τούτω[ν] ὁ θεραπεύων ἡγεῖται καὶ θεραπεύει | καὶ θεραπεύον | προσδέχεσθαι;...
4.4.1. The Epicurean Framework of Moral Formation

The activities of ‘treating’ and ‘saving’ others via frank criticism fit within the Epicurean analysis of the human problem and its solution through conversion to Epicurean philosophy. The problem is the failure to achieve the ideal, most pleasurable human life provided by the absence of pain (\(\alpha\tau\rho\alpha\zeta\iota\alpha\)). Without Epicurean philosophy, people suffer from various physical and psychological pains caused by false reasoning (\(\psi\varepsilon\nu\delta\sigma\omicron\omicron\iota\alpha\), On Anger col. 6.14–15), exemplified by, e.g., erroneous beliefs, ignorance, unlimited desires, out of control emotions, or harmful behaviour arising from vicious dispositions of character (\(\delta\iota\nu\theta\varepsilon\sigma\iota\zeta\)).

Epicureans claimed that they possessed the true, self-evident conceptions of the cosmos, conceptions which had been obscured over time as people falsely interpreted their perceptions of the world. Epicureans sought to base knowledge on induction from sense perception and empirical first principals (e.g., see Philodemus, On Signs, col. 16, 20, 32).

The Epicurean criteria for establishing truth are sense-impressions (the impressions themselves, not judgements based upon them), feelings (e.g., of pleasure and pain), and preconceptions (i.e., self-evident concepts formed from repeated perceptions of things).

Achieving the most pleasurable life necessarily involves internalizing these truths about the world and oneself, and thus gradually transforming one’s dispositions into virtues, i.e., healthy dispositions to reason correctly, feel emotions properly, pursue desires wisely, etc. (On Choices and Avoidances, 14.1–14). Conversion towards this ideal life involves memorizing Epicurean principles, applying these principles to one’s life with like-minded friends (especially with the help of a sage’s instruction and correction), and eventually learning to navigate life self-sufficiently in order to bring oneself true pleasure and avoid pain.

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47. This section is inevitably cursory. I am especially indebted to Voula Tsouna’s discussion of these topics, particularly with reference to Philodemus’ ethical treatise On Choices and Avoidances in Tsouna, The Ethics of Philodemus, 15–44. See also Susanne Bobzien, “Moral Responsibility and Moral Development in Epicurus’ Philosophy,” in The Virtuous Life in Greek Thought, ed. Burkhard Reis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 206–29; David Konstan, Life; Christopher Gill, The Structured Self in Hellenistic and Roman Thought (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 3–203.


49. Philodemus argued, against other Epicureans, that memorization of tenets was not sufficient for achieving the best life. One must be able to use the tenets to make correct calculations concerning what to choose and what to avoid in order to achieve \(\alpha\tau\rho\alpha\zeta\iota\alpha\) (On Choices and Avoidances, col. 11.7–20; see Indelli and Tsouna-McKirahan, Philodemus, On Choices and Avoidances, 160–66).
Central to Epicurean philosophical therapy is the ‘four-fold cure’ or τετραφάρμακος (Epicurus, KD 1–4). Philodemus recites the cure in PHer. 1005 col. 5.8–13: ‘Nothing to fear in god, nothing expected in death, easily got is the good, easily born the bad’ (ἀφοβον ὁ θεός, ἀν[ῶ]ποτον ὁ θάνατος καὶ τ’ ἀγαθὸν μὲν εὐκτητον, τὸ δὲ δεινὸν εὐεκκα[ρ]τέρητον).\(^\text{50}\) The wider structures of the Epicurean system specify how this cure operates. As reviewed in ch. three above, the gods are blessed and incorruptible, and thus do not involve themselves in human life, and so need not be feared. There is nothing to fear in death because there is no pain in it, one ceases to exist as one’s soul atoms dissipate from the body.\(^\text{51}\) One can gain and maintain a secure hold on the character and minimal external goods needed for maximal pleasure in this life, even during extreme physical pain leading to death.

4.4.2. Giving and Receiving Frank Criticism

With this framework in mind, we proceed to what the delivery of frank criticism practically entailed. The goal of frank criticism is to help another person identify their own painful, erroneous ways of thinking, feeling, desiring, and/or behaving, and to help the other person to grow out of their faults in accordance with Epicurean philosophy, with its proper, pleasurable rationality, emotions, desires, and behaviours.\(^\text{52}\) This persuasive method operates by philosophical argumentation delivered in doses of praise and blame, and may lead to the prescription of reformatory exercises.\(^\text{53}\)

Philodemus seems to summarize the persuasive process in Lib. col. 9a, in which he likely describes a formative encounter between two wise men (as also described in col. 8a–b):


... he will perceive that a [great] weakness or [dislike] for toil has befallen him, and the causes on account of which he has reasoned [falsely], and he will point (these) out to him and persuade him, and this itself will contribute much toward the recognition of

\(^{50}\) Translation Obbink, On Piety, 536.


\(^{52}\) See Tsouna, The Ethics of Philodemus, 92–93.

\(^{53}\) For example, Philodemus required ungrateful students to read aloud Epicurean treatises (On Gratitude col. 14.14–18; Tsouna, The Ethics of Philodemus, 77).
one another’s perfection.\textsuperscript{54}  

The majority of the discussion in \textit{Lib.} concerns, however, teachers adapting frank criticism to various students, not to other teachers. The sage adapts his persuasive technique to each recipient, ranging from a mixture of praise and blame to a simple, harsher form of criticism alone.\textsuperscript{55} Whether gentle or harsh, in every instance of frank criticism, the sage confronts the recipient with his failures in false thinking or harmful behaviour, sometimes publicly.\textsuperscript{56} On the basis of his knowledge and prior observations of the recipient, the sage makes a probabilistic inference concerning the nature of the issues needing treatment, and intervenes accordingly.\textsuperscript{57}  

Accompanying this criticism, the sage offers instruction, involving analysis of the problem and guidance toward healing.\textsuperscript{58} Philodemus is by no means unique in his persuasive technique or the exercises prescribed for healing; while his arguments often draw particularly upon Epicurean principles, other arguments are prevalent also in other schools (e.g., detachment from one’s desires, or the anticipation of death).\textsuperscript{59} The sage might use moral

\textsuperscript{54} Translation Konstan et al. See also fr. 78 (80N), in which Philodemus remarks, ‘For when each person reasons ([άκ]όστοι]ν γάρ λογισμένου), it will happen that he knows things that are [worth] nothing, but that the one who saves (others) [heals] everyone of this’ (τόν σώοι]ν[τί α δὲ τούτο πάντα] ] [άκ]οστοθεύ
du.\textsuperscript{55} The harsh form of criticism, which Philodemus describes as similar to insult (fr. 60), is used against those who are very resistant to change, and/or have progressed toward maturity (fr. 7, 10). The sage softens his criticism by, e.g., using kind names for the recipient (‘dearest’, ‘sweetest’, fr. 14), by not mentioning lack of progress (fr. 33), by mentioning the recipient’s good qualities and encouraging them to act in accordance with them (fr. 68), or by not criticising every fault of the recipient at once (fr. 70; 78/80N, as interpreted by Konstan et al. and Tsouna, \textit{The Ethics of Philodemus}, 112). See David Konstan, et al., \textit{On Frank Criticism}, 33, n. 26; Tsouna, \textit{The Ethics of Philodemus}, 96–98; Glad, \textit{Paul and Philodemus}, 143–44, n.165.\textsuperscript{56} The primary vocabulary used for the critical phase of frank criticism, with representative citations, are: ‘reproach’ (ἐπιτιμάω, fr. 6; ἐπιτιμήσῃς, col. 21a), ‘rebuke’ (ἐπιτιμάω, col. 16a; ἐπιπλήξεις, col. 16b), ‘admonish’ (νοοθέτεω, fr. 61; col. 17a; νοοθέτηρης, fr. 77). Other variants include, but are not limited to, ‘blame’ or ‘censure’ (μαρωμόμεν, fr. 13; κακίζω, fr. 77N; ψέγω, fr. 33); ‘point out’ errors (δείκνυμι, col. 9a), ‘sting’ (δάκνω, col. 8b), ‘deflate’ (κολοκθεῖ, col. 21b), etc. See Indices, p. 139f. in David Konstan, et al., \textit{On Frank Criticism}.\textsuperscript{57} See, e.g., fr. 1.8–9: a wise man speaks frankly by ‘conjecturing by reasonable arguments’, (στοχαζόμενος | εύλογος). See also the limitations of such conjectures in, e.g., fr. 57; 63.\textsuperscript{58} Philodemus assumes that frank criticism is instructional throughout \textit{Lib.}, but the remains of the text do not preserve a substantial form of constructive teaching. One may approximate such teaching by observing Philodemus’ other ethical writings. Throughout \textit{On Death}, for example, Philodemus treats various fears related to death, such as the fear of unjust execution (col. 34), of what one might look like when dead (col. 29), of dying far from home, or of leaving behind vulnerable dependents (col. 25–26). Philodemus instructs his reader how to overcame these fears in each case, drawing particularly (but not exclusively) on the Epicurean teachings concerning the limits of pleasure and the loss of perception and identity in death (Tsouna, \textit{The Ethics of Philodemus}, 240). Though instruction through treatises is different than the \textit{ad hoc}, personal instruction of frank criticism, the philosophical arguments and teaching used in both cases were likely very similar.\textsuperscript{59} See discussion of philosophical ‘exercises’ in Richard Sorabji, \textit{Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation} (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 211–52; Tsouna, \textit{The Ethics of Philodemus}, 74–87. Pierre Hadot, \textit{Philosophy as a Way of Life: Spiritual Exercises from Socrates to Foucault}, trans. Michael Chase; ed. Arnold I. Davidson (1987; repr., Oxford: Blackwell, 1995), 81–109; Nussbaum, \textit{The Therapy of Desire}. Martha Nussbaum attempts to isolate a genre of therapeutic argumentation used by Hellenistic philosophers (Nussbaum, \textit{The Therapy of Desire}, 16–47), but it is not clear that all of the arguments used by Philodemus or other Hellenistic philosophers are therapeutic in this narrow sense, nor operate only on a medical
portraiture to ‘set before the eyes’ a character type, such as the superstitious person, flatterer, greedy money-maker, or sage. Perhaps he will make a show of anger for persuasive effect, though this may not reflect his actual feelings. Softer correction might be the sage’s goal, achieved by recounting or confessing an illustrative mistake of his own (fr. 9; 55). Perhaps the sage will exercise his authority to pardon minor faults (fr. 20; cf. also fr. 4). If needed, the sage might endeavour to inculcate self-love in the person requiring treatment as an expression of the sage’s own love for him (fr. 44, col. 3b). Over time, the sage questions recipients of treatment regularly, and adapts to their developing character and needs.

What qualifications must a mature administrator of such criticism have? First of all, the one who offers critique must have the ability to judge the recipient correctly and accurately according to Epicurean principles. The sage has the ‘perfection of reason and prudence’ and an infallible knowledge of Epicurean preconceptions (προλήψεις), which together ground the student’s complete trust in him. Those whom the teacher treats may differ widely in personality, emotional state, age, gender, upbringing, social, cultural, and economic statuses, and level of maturity. The sage commands a mastery of the mature characteristics which

model of ethical argument (as noted by Tsouna, *The Ethics of Philodemus*, 60; and by David Sedley, “The Cure of Souls: A Course of Therapeutic Argument,” *TLS* 24 [June 1994]: 9–10).

60. See discussion in Tsouna, *The Ethics of Philodemus*, 86–87, 93, 204–9. See *On Anger*, col. 1–7, esp. 4.15–19: ... τεθέντα δὲ πρὸ ὀμμάτων | [ἐ]πιστρ[φ]εσ[έ]ς πρὸς τὴν | [[θ]εραπείαν παρασκευάζει, ‘... these having been placed before the eyes, correcting [them], it prepares [them] for therapy.’ The technique seems assumed in *Lib.*, but in some instances is present only as a reconstruction; see fr. 77 (78N); 11; 26; 29; 72.


63. Fr. 20.5–7 makes reference to pardon given by a teacher (τῆ[ν] μεριζομένην συνή[ν] ὁμήρου ἐν ὀῖς | διέπεσον...). See also the leniency concerning first-time errors in fr. 35 (Tsouna, *The Ethics of Philodemus*, 95–96).

64. The sage persistently ‘tames people into love for themselves’ (τιθάσει[ν] | προσκαρτερητικός ἀνθρώπων εἰς φιλ[ί]τητας | ἐπι[η]τέων, fr. 86.2–5) in the face of their indifference to treatment. Fr. 44 and col. 3b refer to the teacher as one who ‘loves’ those treated (έπαργοντο, fr. 44.7; φιλοῦσι, col. 3b.11).

65. The evidence for this practice is slightly oblique: fr. 42.9–10 makes reference to students disclosing errors ‘without the teacher interrogating’ (οὖν ἀνακρίνοντος τοῦ | καθηγουμένου[ν]); see also fr. 84.10.

66. E.g., the wise may increase the amount of frank criticism after having gained more information over time (col. 5b), or refuse to teach if he ‘suspects contempt’ (κατα[φ]ρόνησιν | ὅ[πο]στι), col. 13a.1–2).

67. As we saw above in ch. 2, Philodemus’ qualifications for the Epicurean teacher include, e.g., distinguished literary skill, a lifetime of study, authorship of philosophical treatises.

68. In fr. 56.4–14, Philodemus asserts this knowledge while addressing a concern that a teacher might make mistakes in offering therapy: νῆ[ν] οὐχ ἡμ[ῶ]ν | διαφημίζεται προερμημένοι[ν] ἵνα κατὰ λογισμὸν τελείωτη καὶ προφήτευσις | καθὸ δὲ καὶ τὸ μὴ | τυχεῖν τοῦ τέλους καὶ τὸ | παραληθέν [ἐκ] τῶν οὐ δύναμεν διὰ παντὸς | ἀνθρώπων φιλ[ί]τηταν, | διαφημίζεται καὶ ἐν παρα[φρενίστι] οὐκ ἀδικάτων, ‘Now it does not seem to us that we will slip up, having been outstripped in accord with the perfection of reason and prudence. But in respect both to not attaining perfection and to passing [from] things that cannot be permanently defended by a human being, one will slip and [it its not impossible] both in [frank criticism]...’.

69. For discussion of different recipients, including those who are ‘tender’ (ἄπαλός), ‘strong’ (ἰσχυρός), women, rich, or older, see, e.g., fr. 7; 10; col. 4a; 21b–24b.
every recipient should show, and a mastery of the permutations of erroneous reasoning in various types of recipients. The sage is not infallible in every respect, for sometimes he may unavoidably misinterpret signs, or act without full knowledge of the recipient’s circumstances simply because he is human (see, e.g., fr. 57; 63). His failures, however, should not deter him from further attempts at treatment, nor should they question the student’s complete trust in his saving therapy (fr. 4; 63–64).

Philonemus would classify the morally formative use of frank criticism as an art that requires particular expertise taught by Epicurean teachers, not a skill that can be picked up by just anyone. Specifically, it is a conjectural art (dealing in probabilities of outcome, not certainties), as Philodemus defines it in On Rhetoric 2 (PHerc. 1674) col. 38.2–15:

‘Now, art is considered and called by the Greeks a skill or disposition from observation of certain general and elementary principles which extend over the majority of cases to particulars, and an art comprehends something and accomplishes the sort of thing, such as few of those not knowing the art accomplish likewise, doing so firmly and surely or conjecturally.’

Evidence from Lib. in this trajectory includes references to the sage speaking frankly via ‘conjecturing by reasonable arguments’ (στοχαζόμενος | εὐ[λ]γωτας, see fr. 1), and to probabilistic inferences made in the course of care, in medicalised idiom (e.g., fr. 57; 63).

Throughout intervention, the personal character of the administrator of criticism is crucial, for it contributes to persuasion (fr. 16; 43), and guards against various obstacles which

70. In the context of a discussion concerning how sages differ in their applications of frank criticism to different pupils (shy, arrogant, etc., col. 4a), Philodemus reassures his reader that the sage οἱδὼν βοηθέρως [οῖς] πρὸς ἐκάτερον κοινότητας προσωπο[ι]σο[ντα]ί καὶ τελειωθεὶντες | ‘knows more deeply in regard to each [what kinds of] common traits they will exhibit even when they are perfected’ (col. 4b.2–6). The sage shows continuity with past Epicurean treatment of the same issues (col. 5b.8–9), just as one uses reports from history to gather empirical data (On Signs 20.31–21.3; Tsouna, The Ethics of Philodemus, 59).


73. For further discussion, see Gigante, Ricerche Filodeme, 63–69; Glad, Paul and Philodemus, 133–37. Julie Giovacchini disputes that παρηγορία per se is a conjectural art, as Gigante claims, and prefers to speak more generally of the sage’s healing activity as an art, as was medicine (Giovacchini, “La Nouvelle Reconstruction,” 298–99). The point remains that Epicurean moral formation via frank criticism is an art, not a knack picked up by just anyone. Asmis, Glad, and Tsouna also prefer not to call frank criticism an art, but a tool within the art of moral formation (Asmis, “Philodemus’ Epicureanism,” 2393, n. 56; Tsouna, The Ethics of Philodemus, 92–93; Glad, Paul and Philodemus, 135).
might obstruct the process. These threats involve, for example, the danger that the giver would lash out in anger at the recipient (particularly if the recipient resisted intervention), or would use criticism to manipulate the recipient for his own interests. Two columns (col. 1b–2a) seem to summarize the qualities of the person who exercises direct formation from a ‘good’ or ‘noble disposition’ (τὸν ἀπὸ διαθέσεως ἀστείας [παρὶ] ησιαζόμενον, col. 1a.1–3) in contrast to a base disposition (τὸν ἀδικοῦ φαύλης, col. 1a.3–4):


... everyone who bears goodwill and practices philosophy intelligently and [continually], and is great in character, and indifferent to fame, and least of all a politician, and clean of envy, and says only what is relevant, and is not carried away so as to insult or strut or show contempt [or] do harm, nor [uses] insolence or [flattering arts]...[nor without control] over his [tongue, nor] carping (for he is not [foolish] so as to be [enraged] if someone harms him slightly), nor irritable, nor harsh, nor bitter. (col. 1b.2–2a.9)

Other character traits of the ideal administrator of frank criticism include: persistence despite lack of progress (fr. 4; 11; 63–64; 69; 85); love for all recipients (fr. 44; 80; col. 3b; Tab. 3 H); a bright, friendly, gentle disposition, (... τ[η] δια[α]θ[ε]σ[ε]ι π[λη]ς τ[ις] τ[ου] ἑαυτοῦ τ[ου] τ[ων ὁ | καθηγοῦμενος ε[ίνη]]|μέροι καὶ φιλοφιλῶμ [καὶ | ἢ]|πιοι,..., fr. 85.6–10); pleasure in praising others, but lack of pleasure in criticising (fr. 78–79; col. 2b); and an awareness of personal shortcomings (col. 15b; 18b; fr. 55).

Yet, the success of direct formation does not depend solely on the expertise of the sage. Rather, healing and growth only occur when intervention is properly received. One may recall the discussion in ch. two concerning the capability needed to receive philosophical teaching from the sage (On Property Management col. 23). Philodemus occasionally discusses...
extreme instances in which students are unresponsive to the harshest intervention, even such that the sage no longer concerns himself for them (fr. 21; 69; 84; 59). Similarly, we have already seen in this chapter that the irascible person’s anger impedes the reception of intervention from others (On Anger col. 19).

Throughout On Frank Criticism, Philodemus details the ways in which criticism can backfire due to the recipient’s immature disposition (διάθεσις), e.g., criticism inflames passionate resistance, or disheartens and alienates recipients (e.g., fr. 30; 65–66). Ideally, the sage observes and adapts to these responses, and the obstacles to receiving formation are overcome. A formerly resistant recipient might embrace criticism and obey when his passions have ‘relaxed’ (ἀνέντος, 65.10) or ‘have been relieved’ (κοινωσθείς, 66.9). The sage may use various means of persuasion to help a recipient become more receptive, but the process of formation requires the recipient’s active participation as well.

The basic actions required from the recipient are to endure criticism, obey instruction, and remain open to further correction. Despite the fact that direct formation is thus unidirectional and not deliberative, successful reception entails far more than the recipient’s

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77. See Tsouna, The Ethics of Philodemus, 104–10; Glad, Paul and Philodemus, 137–52. In fr. 30.5–9, Philodemus describes an immature person whose disposition is so attuned to pleasures from external things, or so opposed to pain, that it leads him to ‘set himself against’ and ‘obstruct’ ‘because pain is present’ (τις ἀπὸ τῆς διάθεσιος ἀκείμενος τοῖς μεν | ἀντιτιθέμενος τὸ δὲ καταποθόμενον, ἀπὸ προσεῖν ὧδον[ν]ηρόν, see Tsouna, The Ethics of Philodemus, 107).

Also important is Philodemus’ description of the transition from resistance to acceptance of frank criticism in fr. 65–66. After first receiving intervention, such a recipient ‘disobeys’ (ἀπειθήσεσα, 65.9, 11; 66.2), he ‘attacks’ (προσβάλλει, 65.12), he ‘pretends that he will escape notice’ (ὁ[ν][α]δε ψεδεισα, 65.12–13), his passions ‘puff him up,’ ‘hinder’, and ‘distort’ him (τοῖς εκχανοσυντε[ν]θεος, 66.7–8; ἀντικροβοσυντε[ν], 66.8–9; τοῖς διαστρεφόντοντες, 66.11), he ‘opposes opinions to one another’ (ἀντι[κ]δοκε[υ]ν), 66.13), and he ‘wanders’ from obeying the criticism (το[υ]ν πλανεστέροτοτο ντεκέσον, 66.13–15). That the passions are the referent of ‘things disturbing’ (τοῖς διαστρέφοντοντες) is based on the preceding comment in fr. 66, that the passions ‘puff up’ and ‘hinder’ (see David Konstan, et al., On Frank Criticism, 72–73). With regard to ἀντι[κ]δοκε[υ]ν in 66.13, Konstan et al. suggest (without explanation) the meaning ‘he is on the lookout’, while Gigante proposes ‘l’opposizione di δέχεται a δέχεται’ in light of perceived similarities to ἀντιδοκεῖν, ἀντιδοκεῖται (Gigante, Ricerche Filodemee, 79–80).

78. Copious other examples of immature reception of intervention exist in Lib. A representative sample of qualities which exemplify failed reception include: indifference or lack of self-love (fr. 86), giving up on philosophy or submitting to a teacher without fruitfulness because of ‘being weak’ (fr. 59), disturbing passions and retaliation (fr. 65; 70; 31; 18, col. 10a), refusal to admit errors, lack of awareness of errors, or arrogant assumption that the sage is wrong or inferior (fr. 39; 65–66; 41; col 15b; 17a; 19b; 20a; 21a), mistrust of the sage and his motivations in offering criticism (col. 21a; 22a–24b).

79. On enduring, see fr. 31; 36; 38; 59; 88; col. 10a–b; 14b; 20a; 23b; on obeying, see fr. 36; 45; 64–66; on offering oneself for correction, see fr. 28; 39–42; 49; 73; 75–76; 81; 84.N.
80. In col. 13b.3–4, it seems there is a contrast of frank criticism with σουβήο[ν]δικήκον, or ‘deliberative’ speech, which Tsouna interprets to entail a contrast between open-ended dialogue or advice about what to in general, versus directive instruction and correction of a particular fault (Tsouna, The Ethics of Philodemus, 103). Glad interprets this column to be evidence of the mixing of praise and blame in criticism (Glad, Paul and Philodemus, 123, n. 90).
unthinking obedience. Rather, it requires active involvement, and assumes the recipient has some basic capacity to reason and apply Epicurean philosophy. The good recipient, e.g., has a desire to be healed (fr. 86), takes the initiative to offer his own errors for correction (fr. 42; 49; 51), judges rightly what is advantageous for himself (e.g., to offer himself for treatment, fr. 1; 49; col. 20b), appreciates the benefit of frank criticism (col. 17b), has an awareness of one’s errors and immaturity (fr. 42; 73; 75; col. 15b), accepts the validity and potential benefit of a given criticism with gratitude (fr. 39; col 8b; 10b; 14b), trusts others’ criticism as an expression of goodwill, friendship, and love (fr. 25; 41; 44; 74; col. 1b–2a; 3b; 13a), accepts responsibility for errors revealed by others (fr. 73; col. 21a), and accepts the relative superiority of the teacher’s philosophical expertise, character, judgement, and experience in relation to himself (fr. 44; col. 20a; 21a).

The wise demonstrate the ideal reception of criticism. In col. 10b.8–14, it seems Philodemus discusses the wise man receiving frank criticism from a philosopher outside the community.

\[ \ddot{a}l\dot{l}a\ \kai\ \dot{a}n\dot{e}x\dot{e}tai\ \kai\ |\ \dot{a}p\dot{o}d\dot{e}x\dot{e}tai\ \dot{t}h\ \v\dot{i}n\ \\dot{e}yn\dot{n}i\nu\nu,\ |\ \dot{a}f\dot{r}\ \dot{e}\zeta\ \d\ \p\dot{r}\dot{t}^{*}\ \dot{e}\varphi\dot{a}i\nu\nu\ \sigma\nu\nu[\dot{e}]\dot{p}\nu\nu\ \\dot{u}p\dot{e}\dot{d}e\dot{e}x\dot{e},\ \kai\ \dot{c}h\dot{a}r\dot{i}n\ \dot{e}[\dot{e}]\dot{e}i\ \kata\ \tau[\tau]\dot{h}[\sigma]\nu\nu\ \kai\ \dot{a}p\dot{o}\dot{r}[\dot{o}]\dot{g}\dot{i}\nu\nu\ \\dot{e}d\ \pe\dot{i}\dot{s}a\ \f\dot{i}l\dot{d}[\sigma\f\dot{r}o\nu]\ ...
\]

Rather, also he (the sage) will both tolerate it and accept the goodwill from which he (the other philosopher) exhibited whatever seemed advantageous, and he will have gratitude for this and will reckon that he (the philosopher) has persuaded (him)...

81. As emphasized by Tsouna, *The Ethics of Philodemus*, 62–63. Martha Nussbaum rightly emphasizes that there is a limit to how critical an Epicurean student should be toward the teachings of Epicurus, or toward a teacher who faithfully represents Epicurus, for if one were to call the fundamentals of the philosophy into question, one does the same for the entire project of formation and achievement of the best life (Nussbaum, *The Therapy of Desire*, 130–32). However, following Tsouna, it seems clear that Philodemus himself exercises critical thought toward opposing Epicurean or non-Epicurean viewpoints, trains others to do the same, and expects students to evaluate the content, delivery, and intent of frank criticism according to the principles he establishes. Surely this is the case with frank criticism by the less mature. It seems that the expected level of critical engagement toward other Epicureans increases as one gains mastery and maturity in Epicurean philosophy, while the less mature grow into this critical engagement from a position of trust in their mature guides.

82. This last point concerning the relative superiority of the teacher applies particularly in the typical master to student relationship. Yet, it also applies in the same way to frank criticism among equals (as among the wise), or to frank criticism by the immature upon the more mature, though superiority in these latter cases is always with respect to a particular issue in need of critique, rather than in general.

83. This interpretation of the context seems supported by the discussion in the preceding columns concerning frank criticism among the wise (from col. 8a and following, and especially in col. 10a); see David Konstan, et al., *On Frank Criticism*, 107, n.168; Tsouna, *The Ethics of Philodemus*, 117–18.

84. Translation modified slightly from Konstan et al. It seems ἀπολογίζομαι derives from ἀπολογήζομαι, rather than ἀπολογίζομαι, as implied by the translation of Konstan et al. (‘he will say in his defense that...’); see LSJ, s.v., ἀπολογίζομαι.
The wise cherish and derive pleasure from criticisms shared in goodwill and in concern for their benefit (see also col. 8b).

In sum, success in direct formation via frank criticism requires a level of maturity and skill in both the giver and the recipient, as well as an amiable relationship between the two. The administrator of direct formation catalyses growth by his skilled critique and correction according to the norms of Epicurean philosophy, and the recipient responds positively to the correction and takes a step forward in his progress toward maturity. The less mature require someone more mature to help them apply the principles of Epicureanism and grow, without whom they would languish in error and pain, for they do not yet have the ability to correct themselves as do the more mature.

4.4.3. The Reciprocity of Frank Criticism

In the preceding subsection, the texts discussed have mostly concerned teachers offering frank criticism to the less mature. Yet as claimed above in 4.3, Philodemus believed that all members ‘save one another’ by participating in frank speech, even if they are less mature (as seen in Lib. fr. 36; 79; On Anger col. 19). The focus of this section is to describe this open reciprocity of frank criticism among all members, especially those who are less mature.

It is important to recognize at the outset that there are limits to the reciprocity of frank speech, given the qualifications required for administering critique. Frank criticism is a philosophical art requiring for its performance some level of mature knowledge and character.

Because the corrector’s own maturity enables his critique over against another, frank speech assumes an unequal relationship between giver and recipient in relation to their maturity. Throughout Lib., the giver of direct formation is assumed to be better, more mature, than the recipient. In each instance, the giver must possess a legitimate criticism of another, and be able to direct the other to maturity, even if, apart from the particular instance of formation, the two are equal friends, or the giver is less mature on the whole than the recipient. The recipient stands in need of the giver because he possesses insight that the recipient does not have with respect to that particular issue (otherwise, the recipient would not have made the error, or would have corrected himself).

85. As noted in Glad, Paul and Philodemus, 160.
86. For example: in contrast to a bad teacher, the good teacher is ‘better’ than his students (κριτικός, fr. 44.7–8); the reason why some think they are fit for offering frank criticism is that they are more intelligent than others (συνετότεροι, col. 19a.8–9); a question which marks a sub-section asks why some do not endure criticism when it is clear that their teachers are more intelligent (συνετοτέροις, col. 20a.2); Philodemus responds in the same column that those who resist frank criticism think themselves to be far better (πολύ βαριτεύοντοις) in character (διαθέσεις) and perception of what is preferable (τῆς συνωφάν τοῦ κριτίκος), even if they are surpassed by their teachers’ theoretical knowledge; see the same sentiment of students in col. 21a.12, who think themselves wiser φρονιμώτεροι; the λαμπροι and older men also do not abide criticism because they think themselves wiser (φρονιμωτέροις), col. 22b.15.
Thus it seems that the sage receives critique almost exclusively from other sages, due to the subtlety of their mistakes, which require a similarly wise person to detect and treat (see further discussion in section 4.4.3 below). Moreover, it is only ‘sometimes’ that a sage will speak frankly to a sage (ποτε, col. 8a.1). Additionally, Philodemus does not allow students to attempt frank criticism upon the teacher whose responsibility it is to instruct them. Glad’s concern to emphasize the unrestricted reciprocity of frank criticism in this community does not adequately acknowledge these limitations. On occasion a friend might critique another who is more mature, but this would be the exception to the norm, and would require a sufficient level of maturity in the less mature critic.

Nevertheless, all members are, in principle, eligible to offer this formation for others, and are encouraged to do so as a sign of friendship and love. As Clarence Glad notes, Philodemus’ community exercises an openness in accepting friends of varying levels of maturity; one does not have to be perfect, or even mature, to join this community and be considered a friend. As one matures, so does one’s ability to judge what is advantageous for others, diagnose illness in others, and intervene with skill, restraint, and right intentions. The less mature may fall short of the ideal application of frank criticism in any number of ways, but they still participate in it. Moreover, their participation in frank criticism is not limited to

88. Tsouna, The Ethics of Philodemus, 118. That Philodemus separately discusses this scenario perhaps indicates its relative infrequency, for otherwise it would be obvious.
89. col. 12b.6–9: τὸν δ’ ὑπ’ αὐτὸν | κατασκευασμένον οὐ | πάνω μὲν άνέξετα παρήρματα... | ‘But he will not much tolerate the frankness of those who are to be instructed by him...’, translation of Konstan et al. Glad thinks that this column does not specify whom the students critique, and thus misses the importance of this column (Glad, Paul and Philodemus, 157, n. 205). However, that this column refers to students critiquing their teacher seems evident, for the students who offer frank speech are ‘those who are being instructed by him’, i.e., their teacher, who is the subject of the verb ‘tolerate’. Though heavily reconstructed, Konstan et al. (following Philippson) understand the subsequent column, 13a, to refer again to the teacher’s response to students.
90. See col. 13b–14a, in which a sage tolerates and praises the concern of another member who seems to remind him (or others) about proper behaviour (13b), but then teaches (13b.13) and advises (14a.6) this less mature member that he is ‘of those who are so much more inferior’ (τῶν τοσούτων καταδεεστέρων) and should ‘remember who he is and to whom he is speaking’ (translation Konstan et al.).
91. E.g., ‘the doctor might be a doctor in the morning and a patient in the afternoon’ (Glad, Paul and Philodemus, 160, see further 152–60). Glad’s statement is valid to some extent, so long as one understands that another doctor (i.e., a sage) treats the sage, rather than one of the sage’s ‘patients’. The sage also would likely not be suffering from as serious and debilitating a disease as is present in the immature. Martha Nussbaum’s description of this asymmetry of roles in medicalised, corrective formation remains accurate, despite her occasional failure to emphasize the engagement needed as a recipient of this formation (Nussbaum, The Therapy of Desire, 128–29).
92. Clarence Glad offers a detailed description of ancient discussions in Aristotle, Cicero, Plutarch, Maximus of Tyre, and Seneca concerning how many and of what character the wise person’s friends should be, and makes an important point of contrast in Philodemus’ willingness to act as friend to even the terminally ill and those not expected to recover from their sickness of mind and emotion (Glad, Paul and Philodemus, 166–74). It is naive, however, to interpret that Philodemus had no screening process for prospective members of his community, and that Philodemus has ‘faith in ordinary and common people’, (Glad, Paul and Philodemus, 172, see 172–75) as discussed in ch. 2, and as On Property Management, col. 23 makes clear. For further discussion, see Justin R. Allison, “Philodemus: Friend of the Many, or Friend of the Δεκτικοί?” Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter 18.2 (2017): 17–26.
the few occasions in which they function as the giver of critique. Three other modes of involvement, particularly by the less mature, provide further insight into how Epicurean friends shared reciprocally in frank criticism.

First of all, the most accessible way for the less mature to engage in frank criticism is to report the errors of others to a leader, who then intervenes directly. These could be conscious errors which the accused person seeks to hide, or unconscious errors only identified by another. Especially given the limitations of therapeutic conjectures based on empirical observations (fr. 57; 63; 66), the whole community functions together to observe and perceive errors in one another.92 Even the wise cannot see the ‘individual character’ (τὴν ἰδιότητα) of those who conceal themselves (fr. 14),93 and may fail to perceive that an individual has recovered (ἀναἰλασθῆν ἐφύγχημα, fr. 61.6–7), though it is clear to others. The clearest evidence for this practice occurs in discussions regarding the right motives and attitudes of one who reports others, so as to distinguish a true friend, who ‘desires that his friend obtain correction’ (τὸν ἐπιθυμοῦντα τὸν φίλον παρεχέν διορθώσως, fr. 50.4–6), from a slanderer (διάβολον, fr. 50.3), or one who wants to ingratiate a teacher by reporting (ἀπειρακτα ἀναθέοντες, fr. 52.10–11) what fellow students have said or done against the teacher (fr. 52).94 This practice seems especially relevant for less mature students who do not have the capacities for offering more direct formation, but are mature enough to identify errors and seek the good of other members in friendship.

Second, one may help others by confessing one’s errors publicly. Despite the immaturity revealed by a given mistake, public confession models several aspects of maturity (e.g., self-awareness, humility, honesty, willingness to receive treatment), and allows others to learn and grow from observing the treatment process in action. In fr. 43, Philodemus argues that even bad character can be helpful in forming others, for when one is honest about such qualities, ‘we are helped’ (βοηθούμεθα) through ‘sympathy’ (συνπαθίας) for those bad qualities, just as consistently good character makes frank criticism more effective.95 In fr. 53, Philodemus asks whether students ‘will declare things of their own and of one another to their

92. See Gigante, Ricerche Filodemie, 82. One may interpret the meaning of τὸ τινὰς μὴ τοὺς συναισθάνεσθαι τοὺς ἀμαρτίας in fr. 1.2–3 as referring to some who fail to ‘perceive errors in common’ (as do Gigante and Glad), rather than to some who fail to ‘perceive their own errors’ (as do LSJ, Konstan et al.), but this decision is not central to understanding communal perception in Philodemus’ community, given the other evidence.

93. As interpreted by Konstan et al.

94. In col. 17a, Philodemus seems to describe the arrogant person who calls upon a teacher to admonish another while thinking that he is himself free from error, or thinking that he may hide his own errors by pointing out the errors of others for correction. Fr. 76 may also contain a reference to this practice, but the text is heavily reconstructed.

95. Philodemus remarks concerning the persuasive power of consistent character: ‘For in fact if it is possible for you, having spoken frankly, to stay in the same [condition] – if you withhold nothing – [you will save] a man...’ (καὶ γὰρ εἰ μὲν ἐάν τι [τι] παρῃτῇ[θῇ] ἡμῖν ἢ[μ][η][θ][ε][ν] ἢ[μ][η][θ][ε][ν] ἢ[μ][η][θ][ε][ν] ἢ[μ][η][θ][ε][ν] ἢ[μ][η][θ][ε][ν] ἢ[μ][η][θ][ε][ν] ἢ[μ][η][θ][ε][ν] ἢ[μ][η][θ][ε][ν] ἢ[μ][η][θ][ε][ν] ἢ[μ][η][θ][ε][ν] ἢ[μ][η][θ][ε][ν] ἢ[μ][η][θ][ε][ν] ἢ[μ][η][θ][ε][ν] ἢ[μ][η][θ][ε][ν] ἢ[μ][η][θ][ε]... fr. 43.10–13). Fr. 47 may be relevant here, for Philodemus seems to say, ‘Therefore, it is advantageous to share things that are doubted,’ (fr. 47.7–8). However, the context is too fragmentary to be sure.
fellow-students’ (i.e., confess personal errors and matters of ‘ignorance’, ἀγνοο(ας).96 He seems to affirm that they should, but with caution, lest those who are too immature fail to benefit or in fact suffer harm by this honesty.97 The concern that some would fail to benefit (οὐτ’ ὁφελήσοντι, fr. 53.10–11) indicates that confession and honest discussion among students should benefit others.98 Teachers seem to engage in this personal confession to some degree as well. In fr. 81, Philodemus takes up the question, ‘whether a wise man will communicate his own (errors) to his friends with frankness’ (fr. 81.1–4).99 In fr. 55 the same discussion continues, as fr. 81 forms the top, and fr. 55 the bottom, of the same column:100 the teachers ‘[present] for frank criticism what concerns themselves in the presence of the students, to be put before Epicurus and for the sake of correction.’101 Philodemus seems to restrict this practice due to concerns about right motives, audience, and manner.102 Confessing to others, then, is a legitimate way to participate obliquely in frank criticism, but must be done with discretion.

Third, Philodemus’ On Death provides an example of the formative benefit provided by a progressing, but not yet mature, Epicurean. All members strive to obey Epicurus, and look to his model as a guide for living (Lib. fr. 45.7–10), but also commit to the ‘long-term

96. Fr. 53.3–6: εἰ καὶ πρὸς τοὺς | συνκατασκευαζόμενους | τὰ ἐστίν καὶ τὰ ἀλλήλων προσέπονται. The question posed here is likely a section heading in Philodemus’ treatise, as thought by Konstan et al., following Olivieri.

97. See fr. 53.7–12: πρὸς | τοῖς | τοῦ | συνκατασκευαζόμενοις | λέγειν τὰς | ιδίας | ἀγνοο|ς | εὐλαβεῖς | ἔκτενον. ἔννοι γὰρ οὐτ’ ὁφελήσοντι βάθους ἐστερήμενοι πρὸς | τὸ | πάντα | πάντων | καὶ | πᾶς | προοίμιος | τοῖς | τῶν | κατασκευαζόμενον | τὸν | συνκατασκεύασθαι | τοῖς | πᾶσι | μετὰ | πάρος | ρημάσια (fr. 81.1–4).

98. That this was a question worthy of separate consideration indicates that other statements about the students’ honesty and willingness to confess errors apply particularly to the student-teacher relationship, and that one’s honesty with other learning Epicureans was another issue.

99. The question of fr. 81.1–4 also likely functions as a sub-heading of the treatise according to Konstan et al., following Olivieri: εἰ σφοσ | τὰ περὶ] αὐτὸν ἀναθησίμε | τοῖς | φίλοις | μετὰ | παρο] | ρημάσια (fr. 81.1–4).

100. Confirming White’s and Delattre’s reconstructions (White, “Ordering the Fragments,” 42–43, 68–69; Delatte, “Le Franc-Parler,” 278). White does not discuss these two fragments in detail, but he links the preceding fragments in the same way (i.e., he identifies three columns composed of top and bottom fragments, 78/52, 79/53, 80/54, to which I now add 81/55, which Delattre claims exhibit a physical join). Recall that here I am using Olivieri’s fragment numbering (as used by Konstan et al.) not White’s or Delatte’s revised numbering, for consistency’s sake (e.g., White’s numbering is 80/52, 81/53, 82/54, 83/55).

101. Fr. 55.1–6: καὶ ἄλλος, παρρησία τὰ περὶ αὐτὸν ἐπὶ τῶν κατασκευαζόμενων, τίθεσθαι τι παρ’ ἐπικοινωνία καὶ γόννων διαφθοράς. That this is a referent to the activity of the teachers, rather than students, seems indicated because of the reference to the ‘students’ (τῶν κατασκευαζόμενῶν), rather than to the ‘fellow students’ as in other fragments which discuss student behavior (fr. 53; 75; 79), and to the reference at the end of the fragment to the “purifier of everyone” (either Epicurus, or the sage) who presents an error “for the sake of correction of the errors arising from foolishness.”

102. The text is very fragmentary, but it seems Philodemus does not allow ‘showing off’ (τὸ παρουσιασμὸν, fr. 81.10–11), nor a general audience (‘not to all, but to some’ or ‘to one’, οὐ πᾶσιν, ἀλλ’ ἐν [οίς], or ἐν [is] as supplied by Gigante, fr. 84N.4), nor ‘vulgarity’ (ἀπ[ρ]ο[δ]ο[λ]ος, fr. 84N.5). Tsouna interprets that fr. 82, which follows fr. 81 and 84N, discusses the same issue, and refers to the wise man’s confidence that he will benefit himself and others in speaking honestly about his mistakes (εἰ[ς]πρότεταν πεποιθήν, fr. 82.3–4; Tsouna, The Ethics of Philodemus, 118).
imitation’ of the more mature teachers (Lib. col. 5a.7–10, τὴν ἁπομιμήσιν δὲ τὴν πολυχρόνιον τῶν καθηγησιμένον). The ideal sage is such an example in every aspect of life, and less mature members can function as examples for others insofar as they live maturely, even if they fall short of being a sage. Even if the progressing person dies before reaching maturity, he is beneficial to the formation of others. In On Death, this topic arises in a larger discussion concerning how to think properly (i.e., without fear) concerning death, particularly the death of the young and those who have not fully achieved the best life (col. 12–20). Philodemus remarks,

Let us then for our part say, specifically concerning the case of one who is snatched away [when capable of progressing] in philosophy, that it is natural to be stung with respect to such a person, [but since] he transmits to others the plausibility of ... (the notion that?) ... they will progress in philosophy... (On Death col. 17.32–38)

The young person who died must be one who has already achieved substantial progress but has not yet become wise and attained ἄταραξία (as, e.g., Pythocles did by age 18, discussed in col. 12–13). Here the benefit given is a form of evidence which supports other Epicureans in similar circumstances, i.e., it gives the ‘plausibility’ or ‘reasonability’ (εὐλογία) that progression will occur in their lives.

In sum, the nature of reciprocity in frank criticism is a function of individual maturity. The immature are inferior in character to other, more mature members, and receive criticism from them in order to grow. Occasionally they might administer critique, but otherwise they participate by confessing their errors and receiving criticism, and by helping others identify their errors and referring them to the more mature. As one matures, one continues receiving corrective formation from the more mature, but one comes to engage in criticism more frequently and successfully toward others. Drawing nearer to full maturity, one is in a state of equality or superiority in relation to other friends, and thus receives critique from others less...


105. Translation adapted slightly from Henry, Philodemus, On Death, 41.

106. This interpretation is supported also by Tsouna, The Ethics of Philodemus, 274–75.
frequently and concerning less fundamental issues. Frank criticism is never abolished in a community due to human weakness and fallibility; even the sages receive critique graciously and confess their errors. Beyond frank criticism, all members form one another less directly through shared participation in communal life (i.e., study, shared meals, worship; see above section 4.2). As individuals in the community grow out of immaturity, the reciprocity of criticism increases. However, as we will see in the next section, individual independence and self-sufficiency also increases as friends mature, such that the degree and frequency of frank criticism seems to decrease among mature friends.

4.4.4. Interdependence in Moral Formation

If Philodemus claims that Epicureans are ‘saved by one another’ through frank criticism, even by the less mature, what kind of morally formative interdependence does he envision among friends? How and why do Epicureans need to receive moral formation from others, especially via frank criticism?

As already hinted at in the preceding section, I argue here that the reason why Epicureans need to receive formative criticism is that they lack sufficient personal moral resources. The kind and degree of one’s need for others, and the need for which particular others (questions pertaining to ‘how’ others are needed) all depend on the state of one’s moral character (whether mature or immature, or in between). Philodemus promotes humility and openness to receiving critique from others because it is possible for all members to offer formative benefit via frank speech. Nevertheless, he envisions that Epicureans eventually grow out of the need to receive critique from others, for they grow into moral self-sufficiency.

Several texts in Lib. indicate that Philodemus envisioned a trajectory from a profound need to receive frank criticism from others due to personal immaturity, to a diminished or eliminated need to receive from others due to personal maturity, with its self-sufficiency and capacity for self-correction. Describing an immature Epicurean, Philodemus remarks in fr. 30, ‘... but he pays less attention to his own injury who still is very much in need of external things (δὲ τε προσδεόμενος ἐτερί πάνω τὸν ἐξωθικὸν) and someone who, because of his condition (ἄπω της διὰ θεῖ[σ]εως), opposes one thing and obstructs another with [medicines], since pain is present.’ (translation Konstan et al.). Philodemus assumes self-sufficiency is the goal which

107. I focus narrowly on this particular kind of interdependence, and do not attempt to explain why friends are needed for Epicurean life in general (e.g., how the pleasures of friendship constitutes an individual Epicurean’s happiness, or how friends supply needed external goods for the maintenance of the best life). I side with those scholars who consider friendship to be choice-worthy in itself (see Epicurus, I’S 23), a necessary constituent of personal happiness. See A. A. Long, “Pleasure and Social Utility: The Virtues of Being Epicurean,” in From Epicurus to Epictetus (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 178–201; David Armstrong, “Epicurean Virtues, Epicurean Friendship”; Tsouna, The Ethics of Philodemus, 27–31; Essler, “Freundschaft der Götter”.

107.
this student fails to meet, at least at present. It is less clear what Philodemus meant by those external goods upon which this student depends, goods which the student could come to need less or not at all.

A number of possibilities suggest themselves, but based on Philodemus’ description of sages in col. 6b (examined above in section 4.3), it seems one could list frank criticism from others among these external goods. Discussing why Epicurean teachers differ from one another in their exercise of frank speech to various students, Philodemus offers the past experience of the sage as a reason: ‘And if one has needed frankness minimally, while another has been saved by means of this, then the one applies less, the other more of that through which he became perfect’ (col. 6b.8–13; translation Konstan et al.). Those who have become wise ‘needed’ (δεδεηµενος) frank criticism to varying degrees in the past, but are now perfect (τελειος ἐγενετο), indicating that, to some significant degree, they have grown out of their need for critique from others.

Yet, Philodemus elsewhere claims that the wise still make errors and receive critique from others. Therefore, Philodemus must refer in col. 6b to the sage’s former need to receive frank criticism from others concerning fundamental aspects of Epicurean maturity, as opposed to his present need for critique on smaller matters. The sage has grown out of his need for critique from others over issues of fundamental importance, for his character and knowledge of the cosmos are self-sufficient and cannot be taken away from him, having attained to divine blessedness and incorruptibility (as discussed in ch. 3).

Criticism over smaller matters seems to be in view in col. 8b, describing critiques exchanged between two sages (col. 8a was discussed above in section 4.4.2): ‘If then, the wise men recognize each other, they will be reminded pleasurably by one another (ηδόως | ὑπομνήσσονται πρὸς | ἀλλήλων) in the ways we have made clear, as also by themselves, and they will sting each other with the gentlest of stings and will acknowledge gratitude [for the benefit]’ (col. 8b, translation Konstan et al.). The ‘gentlest of stings’ (δηγµὸς | ἐνοτοῦς τῶν [ἡµῶν]τα·τον) would refer to light critique, in contrast to harsh criticism offered to the immature. Unfortunately this piece of evidence is less secure, given that the key word ‘gentlest’, is conjectured. Olivieri and Konstan et al. misleadingly display the word as not

108. Col. 14a initially seemed to contain a similar ascription of need to an immature student, as translated by Konstan et al. The column describes a teacher’s rebuke of student: ‘But he (the wise man) will advise (him) never to transfer to his life anything [but what is good], and (as one) of those who are so much more in need, both to remember who he is and to whom he is speaking.’ (col. 14a.1–6, translation Konstan et al.). The translation here of the student’s condition (‘so much more in need’, [καταδεητέρου]) is likely mistaken, and should be ‘inferior’, as in LSJ, s.v. καταδήθη, 1.2 (I owe this observation to W. B. Henry).

109. κἂν ὁ μὲν ἤκε[σ]τα | παρηρητα[κ] | ἐδεηθηµένος, ὁ δὲ διὰ ταύτης σεισμ[ο]νο[ς], ὁ μὲν ἢττον, ὁ [ὅτι] το[ὺ]λλον προσάγη τι[τ] | ὁ τελειος ἐγενετο, (col. 6b.8–13). The fragment continues, ‘Thus Polyaenus too, who had not needed it much, did not...’. The fragment ends after Philodemus reports the fact about Polyaenus, but the completed thought likely was that Polyaenus did not apply much frank criticism to others, as Konstan et al. and Tsouna suppose.
conjectured, but the *editio princeps* and Achille Vogliano’s observations confirm that this is Olivieri’s reconstruction.\(^{110}\)

Nevertheless, the text still witnesses obliquely to the concept that the exchange of critique among the genuinely wise would concern smaller matters, given that their exchange is pleasurable, not painful. As col. 2b shows, blaming others for their faults does not bring pleasure to the sage (unlike praising others); instead, it is like drinking wormwood (a sage does it ‘pleasurelessly’, ἀνδρός, col. 2b.7). Yet the interaction of the wise does not require unenjoyable criticism; because of their moral maturity, there is little to critique.\(^{111}\)

Interestingly, Philodemus points out that the sages’ ‘reminding one another’ is the same reminder which the wise also give to themselves (ἡδέως ὁπομυθήσονται πρὸς ἀλλήλων, ὡς καὶ ὤφ’ ἐκπατών, col. 8b.7–10). It seems Philodemus thus describes two relatively self-sufficient Epicureans who are capable of correcting themselves, but who nevertheless derive pleasure from one another in being reminded of Epicurean truths. This seems much like the sort of self-sufficient friendship which the gods model, seen in chapter 3. As Philodemus remarks in col. 13 of *On Gods* 3, ‘for good men, the sharing of discourse with men like them showers down on them unspeakable pleasure’, a pleasure the gods share as well in their conversations with one another.\(^{112}\)

Philodemus’ high valuation of self-criticism also supports the notion that Epicureans ideally grow out of their need for frank criticism from one another. Philodemus envisions students developing the skill of correcting themselves, and growing to need the correction of others less. In several instances, immature students exhibit an inability to see their own errors,\(^{113}\) in contrast to more mature students who model self-awareness in offering themselves for correction, or correcting themselves as an example before others (especially in the case of the wise).\(^{114}\)

One may see this contrast at play in *Lib.* col. 15b, in which Philodemus seems to contrast two sets of students, (a) those who correct themselves and thus need others less, and (b) those who are not aware of their own errors and stand in greater need of others to correct them:


\[^{111}\] Recall also the discussion concerning the limits of reciprocity above based on one’s moral character.


\[^{113}\] This theme is present in col. 17a, 18b, 19b, 21a, 23b. In col. 18b.13–14 particularly, Philodemus remarks that it is contrary to reason (παρ’ ὑμῖν γινοµενος κατηγορος, οτιν’ η διαµαµµενος) for some to believe they have not erred.

\[^{114}\] Fr. 51.2–5 refers to instances when ‘we’ (i.e., students) are ‘becoming accusers even of ourselves whenever we err’ (ἡ ορθή κα[τ’] ἐκπατήν γνωµένους κατηγοροῦσα, διὸν [τ]η διαµαµ’[τ]άνωµαιν). ‘We’ must refer to students in some sense, because Philodemus refers to a singular subject (‘he’) who ‘observes us’ confessing faults. Fr. 75 refers to students who present themselves for correction. Fr. 55 refers to a wise teacher who presents himself to Epicurus for the sake of correction, implying that the teacher himself will illustrate how Epicurus might respond to such an error, thus correcting himself.

...as to hear [the truth] ... [lacuna] ... they needed others, but since [it is necessary] that one not err, they made the second sailing,116 having corrected themselves. But there (i.e., in the other case), their obduracy too gives them trouble and the fact that they are not aware of their own errors, and, though they reproach others, that they believe that for the most part they have not erred. (col. 15.1–15)117

The beginning of this text is especially difficult. It is unclear how to relate the claim that ‘they needed others’ (presumably Epicurean students)118 to the claim that ‘they’ (presumably the same students) corrected themselves. Based on the contrast that appears to be posed between the two verbs ([ἀ]λλάδεν), it seems that the students’ self-correction should stand in contrast to their needing others (e.g., they exhibited how they did not need others, or needed others less).119 The column fragment goes on to describe, in contrast, those who are unaware of their own errors, and who do not correct themselves. Given the other witnesses to ‘need’ in Lib., it seems reasonable to understand that these latter Epicureans stand in greater need of others to reveal their faults, because they cannot do so themselves.

In these texts it seems the goal of moral formation is to grow into self-sufficiency and self-correction, and to grow out of the need to receive correction from others over fundamental issues of Epicurean philosophy. Even the wise make mistakes, but not mistakes that call into question their perfect, self-sufficient character. Their need for correction over the fundamentals is in the past, given their presently perfected self-sufficiency. The truly wise have attained divine pleasure and incorruption as mortals by means of their perfected character and knowledge, as discussed in ch. 3.

This trajectory toward friendships among self-sufficiently mature friends recalls the model of the gods’ friendship. The gods are individually self-sufficient and morally perfect,

115. Olivieri’s text reads οὖ instead of ω at this point (followed by Konstan et al.), but the editio princeps and Vogliano attest the latter, whom I follow here (Indelli and Longo Auricchio, “Vogliano,” 130).


117. Translation adapted slightly from Konstan et al.

118. Olivieri understands the subject to be the sages (“sapientes”, Olivieri, Philodemi ΠΕΡΙ ΠΑΡΡΗΣΙΑΣ Libellus, 54), but this seems overly specific. Moreover, in the top of the same column, immature Epicureans are the subject (col. 15a).

119. This contrast is presumably what led Olivieri to insert the negation οὖ in line 2, but this does not seem to be a correct reading of the papyrus.
and therefore engage in friendships of the utmost pleasure among themselves. It seems that analogous friendships are the goal for Philodemus. The exchange of critique among the wise in col. 8b seems to exemplify the pleasure of this relationship. Their encounter brings them both pleasure because of their perfected moral character.

Morally formative interdependence between mature Epicurean friends seems analogous to their economic interdependence as outlined in ch. 2 above. The practices of economic interdependence among affluent friends with relative economic self-sufficiency seems to provide conceptual support for a similar vision of ideal interdependence vis-à-vis moral formation. Both kinds of interdependent exchange support one another’s plausibility. The reasons that friends share in the reciprocity of gifts/frank criticism have more to do with the pleasure such reciprocity brings and the friendships it constitutes, rather than with meeting needs that arise from personal deficiency (even though the latter is acknowledged). Mature Epicureans are ‘rich’ and self-sufficient in moral character; they always have the necessary character to maintain the best life, just like they have sufficient ‘natural’ wealth.

Of course, the analogy does not hold in other ways. First of all, moral self-sufficiency is more secure than financial self-sufficiency, for even when disaster strikes, the ideal Epicurean can maintain his hold on ἀταραζία. It seems one can finally eliminate one’s need to receive criticism from others with respect to those issues required for attaining and maintaining ἀταραζία (even if one continues to receive critique on less important issues). Secondly, Philodemus does not speak of engaging in friendships with those who are destitute in On Property Management, while Lib. witnesses to Epicurean teachers who heavily invest their time and concern in students who are catastrophically ‘poor’ in moral character. Though all students can reach ἀταραζία, not all will. Insofar as one is not mature, one remains dependent upon others to receive needed moral correction, and this is for one’s own good. Philodemus aims to foster the trust and honesty which underwrite this interdependence, because it is the means of salvation from moral sickness.

In sum, Philodemus affirms morally formative interdependence between Epicurean friends. Students should entrust themselves wholly to their teachers. Dependence upon others to receive criticism is a normal and valued characteristic for an Epicurean student. ‘Saving one another’ by means of frank criticism strengthens bonds of friendship by promoting goodwill among friends. At the same time, Philodemus links dependence on others with moral immaturity. Ideally, Epicureans grow out of their need to receive frank criticism from others concerning fundamental aspects of ἀταραζία, because moral maturity entails perfected self-sufficiency. Epicureans can eventually receive sufficient moral resources from others such that they no longer need further help to maintain maturity, even if they still make minor mistakes. Perhaps not all Epicureans will attain to moral perfection, and would constantly depend on others’ help to live an Epicurean life in pursuit of its goods. The goal of moral self-sufficiency sits ever before them, however, exemplified in the ‘divine’ man Epicurus, who attained the gods’ own blessedness and incorruptibility.
CHAPTER FIVE: ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE AMONG BELIEVERS

With this chapter, we begin the study of Paul’s vision for interdependence in reciprocal construction. The present chapter prepares the way for the two case studies from 1 Corinthians which follow. I argue in the course of the thesis that Paul’s understanding of economic interdependence among believers correlates closely with his understanding of constructive interdependence. The two forms of interdependence align and mutually support one another’s plausibility. This chapter provides an overview of Pauline believers’ socio-economic locations and economic interdependence.

I argue that Paul himself and the majority of believers in his communities were poor, living in vulnerable negotiation of the subsistence level. In light of this situation, all believers were to participate in interdependent economic reciprocity with one another. This reciprocity included all believers, even those who had little to give, not simply the few who might have had economic stability. Economic reciprocity among poor believers was a ‘survival strategy’. Believers would give out of their individual deficiency in material resources in order to receive needed returns from others in the future. Paul’s notion of economic self-sufficiency follows accordingly: for most believers, economic self-sufficiency is ultimately a gift from God that is communally constituted through a network of reciprocal exchange with other believers over time.

I do not argue here that believers in Pauline communities were exclusively poor, but that they were mostly poor. Though it is a subject of much debate, especially in Corinth it seems possible that some believers were affluent (whether groups of believers, or individuals), and that the community as a whole had more resources than other communities (e.g., than those in Macedonia, 2 Cor 8:1–6). Rather than attempting to wade into that debate, I argue that Paul’s default conception of interdependent economic reciprocity among believers assumes a poor socio-economic location for those involved.

2. I do not assume that all believers actually did this, but that this was Paul’s vision for them. On the practical problems of realising such interdependence among the poor, see Theresa Morgan, *Popular Morality in the Early Roman Empire* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), esp. 160–69.
The chapter unfolds in two sections. First, I briefly discuss the rationale for the consensus that most believers, including Paul, lived in poverty, with a brief look at evidence for this, especially from 1 Corinthians (section 5.1). Second, I review the evidence for Paul’s general policy of interdependent economic reciprocity among poor believers, focusing particularly on 2 Corinthians 8–9 and 1 Thessalonians 4:9–12 (section 5.2). The chapter closes with a short summary (section 5.3).

5.1. The Impoverished Socio-Economic Location of Paul and his Communities

For all the heated debate over the socio-economic portrait of Pauline communities, scholars generally agree that the majority of believers were poor, i.e., living vulnerably just above subsistence, at subsistence, or below subsistence (e.g., in accordance with Friesen’s PS 5, 6 and 7).

This judgement concerning most believers’ socio-economic location seems secure, even if scholarly disputes remain concerning whether and to what degree some believers had more wealth.

In the early Roman empire, one could estimate that 80–90% of the populace lived within this negotiation of subsistence. Within this group there were widely differing circumstances, and it is difficult to define the proportions of people living in various grades or kinds of poverty, especially as adapted to particular locations (urban vs. rural, etc.). Longenecker estimates that 25% of people in an urban context lived below subsistence (his ES7), 30% at subsistence, with occasional dips below (his ES6), and 27% just above subsistence.


5. Longenecker estimates that 82% of urban dwellers lived in his ES 5–7, corresponding to Friesen’s PS 5–7 (Longenecker, Remember the Poor, 53), while Friesen estimates 90% (Friesen, “Poverty in Pauline Studies: Beyond the So-Called New Consensus,” 347). Drawing on Scheidel and Friesen’s 2009 essay, 90% of people had income ranging from a minimum of 25% of what is needed for subsistence (i.e., starvation) to a maximum of 25–66% above the subsistence level (i.e., minimal surplus beyond basic food, clothes, fuel, shelter; Scheidel and Friesen, “Size of the Economy,” 84).

6. The difficulty in measuring poverty is compounded by a limitation of poverty in terms of one factor, such as caloric intake or wheat consumption (and thus subsistence). See the trenchant comments on the difficulty of establishing what poverty means and how it should be measured in Walter Scheidel, “Stratification, Deprivation and Quality of Life,” in Poverty in the Roman World, eds. Margaret Atkins and Robin Osborne (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), esp. 54–59; Peter Oakes, “Constructing Poverty Scales for Graeco-Roman Society: A Response to Steven Friesen’s ‘Poverty in Pauline Studies’,” JSNT 26 (2004): 367–71.
subsistence (his ES5). Scheidel and Friesen offer two estimations, optimistic and pessimistic, for the whole of the Roman empire (i.e., not just urban populations).7 For the optimistic, 10% lived below subsistence, 55% lived at subsistence, and 19% lived just above subsistence. Pessimistically, the numbers run 22%, 60%, and 8%, respectively.8 These numbers and the categories to which they correspond can be misleading if one does not remember that being poor entailed being vulnerable to sudden shifts in position (e.g., rapid increase or decrease in work opportunities for a day labourer). For the purposes of this chapter, I do not attempt to define the degree of poverty for believers in Pauline communities beyond the following: (1) being ‘poor’ entailed living just above subsistence, at subsistence, or below subsistence; (2) being ‘poor’ entailed constant vulnerability to destitution, and thus the necessity of some form of material help from others to subsist (varying from constant to occasional dependence on others).

Paul himself can be located alongside poor believers in his communities. Of course, the question of Paul’s socio-economic location has a number of controverted dimensions, especially related to Paul’s education and its implications.9 At least it seems clear that in the course of Paul’s missionary work, he experienced instances of hunger, thirst, lack of shelter, and inadequate clothing (1 Cor 4:11; 2 Cor 11:27). At times he received material support from his communities (Phil 4:10–20; 2 Cor 11:8–9),10 and at other times he worked with his own hands without receiving such support (1 Thess 2:9; cf. 1 Cor 4:12). Paul was not secure from the constant danger of destitution, and his position likely fluctuated, as the positions of other poor believers may have.

Three points of evidence from 1 Corinthians suggest that most believers were poor. First, in 1 Cor 1:26, Paul identifies most Corinthian believers as not among ‘the powerful’ (δυνατοί), the ‘well-born’ (εὐγενεῖς), and instead aligns them with ‘the foolish things of the world’ (τὰ μωρὰ τοῦ κόσµου), ‘the weak’ (τὰ ἄσθενη), the ‘insignificant things of the world’ (τὰ ἄγενν τοῦ κόσµου), ‘the despised’ (τὰ ἐξουθενηµένα). Such a description likely involves a claim about most believers’ relatively low economic status, among other forms of status.11 Second, Paul’s rebuke in 1 Cor 11:21–22 presupposes that some believers were hungry when others ate their share of the Lord’s supper, implying that they depended on it for their sustenance (they were ‘those who have nothing’, τοῦς µὴ ἔχοντας, 1 Cor 11:22).12 It is

8. See the discussion of these numbers and others in Brookins, “Economic Profiling,” 75–77.
9. See, e.g., Longenecker, Remember the Poor, 301–10; Meggitt, Poverty, 75–97; Friesen, “Poverty in Pauline Studies: Beyond the So-Called New Consensus,” 350.
10. Ryan Schellenberg argues, against the consensus, that Paul did not refuse support from the Corinthian believers, but chose not to exercise his right to demand it from them when they offered none (Ryan S. Schellenberg, “Did Paul Refuse an Offer of Support from the Corinthians?” JSNT 40 [2018]: 312–36).
11. See, e.g., Theissen, Social Setting, 70–73; Meggitt, Poverty, 102–6.
uncertain whether this description is meant absolutely, or that some simply ‘had nothing’ on that particular occasion, but this passage at least suggests that some believers struggled to feed themselves regularly. Third, Paul directs believers to save for the Jerusalem collection week by week (1 Cor 16:2), implying that most believers’ income was immediately spent toward pressing needs. Paul does not assume believers had disposable surplus ready at any time, and thus resists the idea of collecting the contributions without advanced preparation.

5.2. Interdependent Economic Reciprocity among Poor Believers

As one who was poor speaking to believers who were poor, Paul envisioned all to engage in relationships of interdependent economic reciprocity with one another in their poverty. This kind of economic activity would be, Paul hoped, the default relationship among poor believers. Such activity is best called ‘swapping’ (so Schellenberg). All believers who were poor would ‘swap’ with one another, not just those who presently had stability above subsistence (i.e., PS/ES5). Making this claim involves correcting a scholarly misunderstanding, exemplified in the work of Bruce Longenecker, that poor believers would generally have had nothing to give unless they lived stably above subsistence. In this view, poor believers would primarily have been recipients of aid from the more affluent few. In making this correction I am particularly dependent on a recent essay by Ryan Schellenberg. There may have been wealthier believers who were able to give out of their surplus above subsistence to those negotiating subsistence (so Longenecker). However, the default practice among most believers who had no such surplus was to depend on one another by ‘swapping’ what little they had in the midst of fluctuating conditions at or near the subsistence level. The possible presence of wealthier believers would not necessarily change this default practice.

In his stimulating book Remember the Poor, Longenecker assumes that when Paul asks believers to give material support to others, he addresses primarily those who already

13. See, e.g., Friesen, “Poverty in Pauline Studies: Beyond the So-Called New Consensus,” 351; Thomas R. Blanton IV, “The Economic Functions of Gift Exchange in Pauline Assemblies,” in Paul and Economics: A Handbook, eds. Thomas R. Blanton IV and Raymond Pickett (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2017), 289. Wayne Meeks also remarks on this weekly savings plan, and assumes that this could not be carried out by the ‘destitute’, but rather fits ‘fairly well-off artisans and tradespeople’ who did not have disposable capital (Meeks, The First Urban Christians, 65). This reading arises from the same erroneous assumption as Longenecker’s, discussed below. Cf. Richard Last’s position that a regular contribution in itself does not necessarily entail the poverty of all contributors (Richard Last, The Pauline Church and the Corinthian Ekklesia: Greco-Roman Associations in Comparative Context, SNTSMS 164 [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016], 146).

14. Justin Meggitt proposed the label ‘mutualism’, but some have taken issue with this because of its idealistic connotations (see, e.g., Schellenberg, “Subsistence, Swapping,” 218). David Downs also identifies this practice of swapping as important to recognize in giving an account of early Christian economic behaviour (David J. Downs, Alms: Charity, Reward, and Atonement in Early Christianity [Waco: Baylor University Press, 2016], 17, 143–73).

have a stable, if fragile, economic base above subsistence (his ES5), and definitely does not address those who live below the subsistence level (his ES7).\textsuperscript{16} Concerning those in the middle (his ES6), Longenecker is vague. This vagueness seems to come from the description of ES6 itself, inherited from Friesen, which describes those who live ‘at subsistence level (and often below minimum level to sustain life)’.\textsuperscript{17} It seems Longenecker wants to maintain the conceptual ambivalence in ES6 because some at this level would have been relatively more protected (e.g., if they were part of a household) while others at the same level would not have been.\textsuperscript{18} Nevertheless, the category is problematic. Sometimes Longenecker suggests that Paul addressed those at ES6 as economic agents along with those at ES5 (e.g., 1 Thess 4:11–12; 2 Thess 3:12; 1 Cor 16:1–2); at other times he groups those at ES6 with those at ES7 who were unable to give (Acts 20:35; 1 Cor 11:22).\textsuperscript{19} Ultimately, however, Longenecker judges that Paul’s exhortations addressed believers who lived just above subsistence (ES5), not at or below subsistence (ES6 and 7): ‘In general, ES5 seems to be where his [i.e., Paul’s] own mental averaging of urban Jesus-groups gravitates most naturally.’\textsuperscript{20}

Longenecker’s erroneous assumption is that believers who are too near the subsistence level could only receive, not give. This assumption is problematic because it unrealistically excludes the economic agency of most believers to whom Paul, arguably, ascribes such agency despite their poverty.\textsuperscript{21} It may indeed be the case that at times believers had nothing to give, but their positions were subject to much fluctuation in and around subsistence, such that it is difficult to definitively locate believers in levels 5–7 and thus describe their ability to give. Problematic as well is the fact that other early Christian sources indicate that even the destitute shared with others (e.g., by fasting in order to give food to others; see, e.g., Herm. Sim. 5.3; cf. Did. 1.5–6; 4.5–8; 1 Clem. 55.2; 2 Clem. 4:1–3; 16).\textsuperscript{22} Moreover, modern anthropological research commonly observes similar phenomena of ‘swapping’ among the extremely poor.\textsuperscript{23}

With this misunderstanding identified, the present discussion focuses on the evidence from Paul’s epistles for interdependent economic reciprocity among even the poorest believers in Pauline communities. The best place to begin is by noticing two aspects of Paul’s rhetoric

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{16} Longenecker, \textit{Remember the Poor}, 253–58.\textsuperscript{17} Longenecker, \textit{Remember the Poor}, 45; Friesen, “Poverty in Pauline Studies: Beyond the So-Called New Consensus,” 341.\textsuperscript{18} Longenecker, \textit{Remember the Poor}, 54–55.\textsuperscript{19} See Longenecker, \textit{Remember the Poor}, 255–57.\textsuperscript{20} Longenecker, \textit{Remember the Poor}, 258.\textsuperscript{21} See illuminating discussion in Schellenberg, “Subsistence, Swapping,” 220–25.\textsuperscript{22} See discussion of these passages in Denise Kimber Buell, “‘Be not One Who Stretches Out Hands to Receive but Shuts Them When It Comes to Giving’: Envisioning Christian Charity When Both Donors and Recipients Are Poor,” in \textit{Wealth and Poverty in Early Church and Society}, ed. Susan Holman (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2008), 37–47; Downs, \textit{Alms}, esp. 188–91, 221–25.\textsuperscript{23} Pointing out this wider frame of reference, and the distortions caused by failing to attend to it, is the particular contribution of Schellenberg, “Subsistence, Swapping.”}
surrounding the Jerusalem collection in 2 Cor 8–9. First, Paul assumes that Corinthian believers gave what they could to the collection from a position of economic vulnerability, not stability.²⁴ He assures them that God is able to provide materially so that they can give in a position of economic ‘self-sufficiency’ (αὐτόρκεια, 2 Cor 9:8–11). To give was to create further risk, but also to trust that God would provide for their own needs despite that risk. Importantly, economic ‘self-sufficiency’ seems to be an ongoing gift from God, not simply a secure state in place prior to giving (note the future tense verbs of 2 Cor 9:10). Paul’s promise of God’s providence applies both to believers’ presently having something to give, and in the future, having enough to survive despite the personal loss incurred by the gift. The believers in Macedonia provide the model for the Corinthians in precisely this respect, for they gave generously out of their great poverty (ἡ κατὰ βάθος ζωη οἰκονομία, 2 Cor 8:2).²⁵ Paul recognizes that not all will give the same amount, and that the amount should accord with what one has (2 Cor 8:12), but he assumes all take part (note ἐκκαθοτος in 1 Cor 16:2; 2 Cor 9:7). The same pattern of giving from a position of economic vulnerability arises also in Phil 4:19, where Paul offers an assurance of God’s providence for the material needs of believers in Philippi who supported Paul.²⁶ These observations indicate that believers contributed to the Jerusalem collection from a position of economic vulnerability. All poor believers, not just those with relative economic stability above subsistence (PS/ES 5), are asked to give.

Second, Paul assumes that the Corinthian believers could also hope for eventual material reciprocity in their own time of need from the Jerusalem believers to whom they gave.²⁷ In this reciprocity there would thus be ‘equality’ (ἰσότητας, 2 Cor 8:14–15). To give to believers in Jerusalem was effectively to embrace an ongoing relationship of economic

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²⁵ Longenecker initially locates the Macedonian believers in ES7, among those who live below subsistence level, based on Paul’s description (Longenecker, Remember the Poor, 257). Yet his assumption that such believers could actually have had nothing to give leads him to suppose that their actual location was ES5 (those who live stably above subsistence level), and that Paul had rhetorically adjusted them downwards to serve his purposes in 2 Corinthians 8–9. It is far more plausible to interpret that the Macedonian believers actually gave what they could even while they struggled to subsist (i.e., even if they were not living stably above subsistence, ES5). Paul pointed to their example because there were many Corinthian believers who faced a similar scenario. Theissen argues that Paul could not exaggerate wildly about the Macedonian believers’ poverty because the Corinthian believers would soon meet their representatives (Gerd Theissen, “Social Conflicts in the Corinthian Community: Further Remarks on J. J. Meggitt, Paul, Poverty, and Survival,” JSNT 25 [2003]: 376; Friesen, “Poverty in Pauline Studies: Beyond the So-Called New Consensus,” 351–52).

²⁶ Downs seems to interpret, on analogy with Rom 15:26–27, that only spiritual blessings would accrue to the Philippian for their material gifts (Downs, Alms, 162–65). Yet it seems Paul assured them that God would also provide them a material return by supplying for their ‘every need’ (πᾶν θρησκευτικόν, 4:19). It remains true, of course, that Paul made no indication that he himself would provide this return. On this reading I am generally aligned with David E. Briones, Paul’s Financial Policy: A Socio-Theological Approach, LNTS 494 (London; New York: Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 2013), 113–14, against Ogereau’s critique of this point in Julien M. Ogereau, Paul’s Koinonia with the Philippians, WUNT 2,377 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2014), 42.

interdependence with them, despite its relatively long-distance nature, and the relative poverty of most individuals involved.28

While these texts demonstrate Paul’s approach to the Jerusalem collection, they do not directly speak to Paul’s vision for local economic relationships among believers. Most likely, however, Paul would have envisioned local relationships in an analogous way. Paul elsewhere exhorted believers generally to care for the material needs of other believers (e.g., Rom 12:13; Gal 6:6; 10; 2 Cor 9:13).29 One should understand these exhortations in line with his conception of interdependent economic reciprocity visible in 2 Cor 8–9. Indeed, precisely the sort of reciprocity seen in 2 Cor 8–9 obtained for the Thessalonian believers, as seen in 1 Thess 4:9–12.

In 1 Thess 4:9–12, Paul urged the Thessalonian believers to work ‘with their hands’ so that they would all ‘have need of no one’ (μηδένος χρείαν ἔχετε, 4:12). This goal of economic self-sufficiency is constituted communally, not individually.30 Paul’s goal was that the community would not stand in need of help from outsiders because believers would all share among one another (cf. 2 Thess 3:6–13; Eph 4:28).31 As in 2 Cor 8–9, it seems this sharing would have taken place among mostly poor believers.32 The amount which individuals could contribute varied, of course. Yet Longenecker assumes too much when he claims that here Paul primarily addressed those with a stability above subsistence (his ES 5), and could not have addressed the destitute (his ES 7).33 Rather, Paul’s directive applied to all believers, not only to those who already had a stable economic base, as was the case in 2 Cor 8–9. This pattern of communal economic self-sufficiency by the sharing of resources was likely Paul’s norm for other communities too, as it was part of Paul’s initial instruction for new believers (1 Thess 4:11).34

29. See the discussion of these and other passages in Longenecker, Remember the Poor, 140–56.
33. Longenecker, Remember the Poor, 255.
34. Longenecker, Remember the Poor, 255; Meggitt, Poverty, 161–63; Schellenberg, “Subsistence, Swapping,” 229–31.
5.3. Summary

The default way of life for believers was to engage in interdependent economic reciprocity with one another in the midst of their poverty, according to Paul. Paul conceived of economic self-sufficiency as an ongoing gift from God, constituted not individually but corporately by a group of believers who shared their resources. For most believers, participation in economic interdependence from a position of individual poverty was no less than a ‘survival strategy’. Such participation was also a necessary feature of their faith in God; it constituted their confession of the gospel of Jesus Christ (2 Cor 9:13), and it was an instance of their love for one another in accordance with God’s love shown to them in the gospel (1 Thess 4:9–10).
CHAPTER SIX: RECIPROCAL CONSTRUCTION IN 1 CORINTHIANS 8:1–11:1

This chapter offers the first of two case studies focused upon Paul’s vision for reciprocal moral construction among believers in 1 Corinthians. The burden of this case study and the next (ch. seven) is to describe how Paul envisioned constructive interdependence: how and why did believers need one another for moral construction?

Chapters six and seven mutually support one another. The Pauline portrait of reciprocal construction is not sufficient for present purposes without both of them. This chapter discusses several dimensions of Paul’s conception of moral formation that receive more detailed treatment in ch. seven, and in some ways the reading presented in this chapter depends on that treatment.

Gaining insight into believers’ constructive interdependence requires some examination of the conception and practices of reciprocal construction itself, and the two case studies pursue these matters as needed. Inevitably there will be aspects of Paul’s conception and practice of reciprocal construction that do not receive treatment. I do not attempt to provide a full description of Paul’s understanding of moral formation in these two case studies.

As I will argue, chapters 8–10 of 1 Corinthians provide insight into Paul’s conception of reciprocal moral construction among believers. Weak believers and those who adapt to them in love depend on one another for needed moral formation. These chapters also offer important evidence for Paul’s view of adaptation as a mode of constructing others, which was also a dimension of Philodemus’ therapeutic program (as reviewed in ch. four).\(^1\)

This chapter has five sections. I begin with an overview of the subject matter and historical situations described in 1 Corinthians 8:1–11:1, with special focus on the identity of the two groups discussed and the nature of the problem (6.1). With this foundation laid, I examine what adaptation practically entailed, and what qualifications were needed to adapt (6.2). This leads into the heart of the chapter, a discussion of how adaptation constructed the weak (6.3), and how the weak indirectly constructed those who adapted to them (6.4). The final section offers a summative description of constructive reciprocity and interdependence among believers in 1 Cor 8:1–11:1 (6.5), drawing upon the discussion in 6.3–6.4.

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1. The focus here is strictly on the morally formative effects of giving and receiving adaptation, as my intention is to isolate the effects deriving from the Corinthians’ interpersonal behaviour. Thus I do not take up other intended effects of Paul’s paraenesis in 1 Cor 8:1–11:1, e.g., the intended persuasion of the ‘knowers’ to reject participation in meals in temple precincts as idolatrous for themselves (10:1–22).
6.1. The Subject and Situations of 1 Cor 8:1–11:1

In these chapters, Paul discusses the nature and consumption of ‘idol food’ (εἰδολόθυτα) a term referring generally to any food sacrificed in a non-Christian cultic act, without defining the temporal or spatial relationship to that cultic act. These chapters are a literary and rhetorical unit, not consisting of separate letters, nor containing an unrelated digression in ch. 9.

Paul discussed idol food encountered in three settings: a meal in a temple complex (8:10; 10:14–22), a meal involving meat purchased in the macellum (10:25–26), and a meal hosted by a non-Christian (10:27).

Paul addressed two actual, identifiable sets of individuals defined by their ‘self-consciousness’ (συνειδησεις), knowledge (γνώσεις), and behaviour in relation to idol food.

The solution addressed past damaging behaviour between these groups, and involved a change in relationship and behaviour between them (described below).

6.1.1. The Knowers and the Weak

Some Christians consumed idol food freely, including in temple complexes as part of cultic acts (10:21–22), likely appealing to their knowledge of the non-existence of idols and their

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4. In 8:10, Paul refers to dining in a temple complex (e.g., the Corinthian Asklepion); in 10:14–22, Paul refers to participating in cultic acts, again in a temple complex, referring to sharing in libations made (ποιήμαν δαμασων), 10:21), and in the sacrificial altar of non-Christian cult (τραπέζης δαμασων), 10:21); see John Fotopoulos, Food Offered to Idols in Roman Corinth, WUNT 2,151 [Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2003], 69–70, 246–47; Schrage, 1 Korinther II, 446). The same cultic act could also occur at other public spaces or in private homes (see Fotopoulos, Food, 242). In 10:26–29, Paul envisions a meal hosted by non-Christians, likely not εν εἰδολολειοι (as this would contradict 8:10), but in a private home, though there were other possible locations.

monotheism as justification for this ‘right’ (ἐξουσία; 8:1b, 4, 5a). Despite its awkwardness, I label this group the ‘knowers’ or ‘those with knowledge’, rather than the ‘strong’, given that Paul did not use strength language to describe them in these chapters. The knowers were likely motivated to participate without reservation in meals involving idol food (whether explicitly cultic meals or not) in order to maintain and establish important social, economic, and cultural bonds with wider Corinthian society, as was normal practice. They may have ascribed theological value to this unhindered participation, and used their knowledge to distinguish themselves from others (if 8:8 contains Paul’s reversal of the values of the knowers).

The other group of believers did not have the same knowledge as the knowers (8:7a) in that their psychology did not allow this knowledge to enable unhindered consumption of idol food, not in the sense that they did not acknowledge God as the only God. They had a ‘weak’ or ‘vulnerable’ συνείδησις, described in 8:7. The συνείδησις is one’s ‘self-consciousness’, particularly that which retrospectively evaluates behaviour, and thus, for a Christian, monitors one’s self-understanding of moral responsibility to God (cf., e.g., Rom 2:15; 9:1; 2 Cor 1:12; 1 Cor 4:4). By having a weak συνείδησις, the weak were weak in two senses. First, their psychology was conditioned to judge consumption of food explicitly linked to non-Christian cultic acts as an act of worship to the gods of that cult. The knowers were not so conditioned. Second, they could be persuaded to eat idol food even though it meant idolatry for them. In 8:7, the phrase describing the συνείδησις as ‘being weak’ (ἀσθενής οὖσα), refers back to the

8. Whether 8:8a represents Paul’s voice or that of the Corinthians depends in part on one’s interpretation of whether παραστήσασα refers to a ‘bringing before God’ for judgement or for commendation. I interpret that Paul reverses the position of the knowers in 8:8bc (with C. K. Barrett, The First Epistle to the Corinthians, BNTC [London: A. & C. Black, 1968], 195–96). Thus, because there is no conjunction signaling a shift between 8:8a and 8:8bc, I interpret παραστήσασα to refer to benefit gained in God’s sight by eating food, which Paul dismisses (pace Fotopoulos, “Arguments Concerning Food,” 627–28).
act of idolatrous eating, ὡς εἰδολολήτων ἔσθιον ἐσθιούσιν). 10 The weak may also have been weak in that they were socially and economically disadvantaged (e.g., slaves), and thus were not only enticed but pressured to eat by other believers or by non-Christians who had authority over them. 11 However, whether this was the case is uncertain, given that Paul described their situation without direct reference to this status.

6.1.2. The Damage Caused to the Weak

The discussion of idol food was critical for Paul because the weak’s faith was in danger of destruction. By observing the knowers consuming idol food directly linked to cultic acts, whether at meals in a temple or in private spaces (8:10; 10:28–29a), the weak would have been at least encouraged, and at most pressured, to do the same. 12 Via their συνείδησις, the weak had a subjective awareness of their eating as sin, producing psychological pain and dissonance in their identity as believers in the one God (8:6). However, it is the weak’s relationship of responsibility to God (i.e., their faith) to resist idolatry that was the central issue of Paul’s concern, a relationship operative through their συνείδησις, but jeopardized by their idolatrous acts which weakened the function of their συνείδησις further. The language used to describe this harm to the weak is language of apostasy and eschatological destruction.

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10. Eckstein argues that the weakness of συνείδησις cannot refer to the latter, a weakness of conviction about future action (akrasia), for this imports a concept of conscientia antecedens, which does not apply for Paul’s concept of συνείδησις (Hans-Joachim Eckstein, Synseidesis, 243, 254–55; see also C. A. Pierce, Conscience in the New Testament, SBT 15 [London: SCM, 1955], 75–83). Whether one ascribes the instability of the weak to their weakness of συνείδησις, or to some other aspect of their character, the weak are vulnerable to being led into idolatry, and do not have sufficient personal resources needed to resist such influence. Several scholars root this instability of conviction in the weak’s συνείδησις, including Philip Bosman, Conscience in Philo and Paul, WUNT 2,166 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2003), 211; Paul W. Gooch, “Conscience’ in 1 Corinthians 8 and 10,” NTS 33 (1987): 248–51; Borgen, “‘Yes,’ ‘No,’ ‘How Far’?,” 50–51; Anthony C. Thiselton, The First Epistle to the Corinthians: A Commentary on the Greek Text, NIGTC (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2000), 643–44; Garland, 1 Corinthians, 383–84. Gardner understands the weak συνείδησις as a feeling of insecurity in relation to others, but this seems too general, and strays from the individual, morally evaluative function of συνείδησις (Paul D. Gardner, The Gifts of God and the Authentication of a Christian: An Exegetical Study of 1 Corinthians 8–11:1 [Lanham: University Press of America, 1994], 42–48).


12. I include the situation of 10:28–29a because I interpret that Paul remains concerned about the same weak Christians in this passage, who were also present at the meal hosted by a non-Christian (with e.g., Schrage, 1 Korinther II, 469f; Anthony C. Thiselton, “Realized Eschatology at Corinth,” NTS 24 [1978]: 786–88; Barrett, 1 Corinthians, 242; Hans-Joachim Eckstein, Synseidesis, 265; Fotopoulos, Food, 244–46). Zeller describes this view as the majority view, even as he sensibly allows for both a Christian and non-Christian informant, given Paul’s indeterminate language (Zeller, 1 Korinther, 346).
(8:9, 11, 13). The weakness of the weak’s συνείδησις was not simply a subjective problem of over-scrupulosity, and thus forced self-contradiction by those with knowledge. The knowers caused the weak to commit what was a genuine act of idolatry for them, and thus ‘polluted’ or ‘wounded’ the weak who were already particularly vulnerable to idolatry (the weak’s συνείδησις is the object of harm in 8:7, 10, 12). The harm caused to the weak involved both (a) causing them to sin before God (and thus to have a negative self-perception via their συνείδησις), and (b) weakening the function of their συνείδησις to accommodate further idolatry (they were actually ‘constructed’ to eat idol food, 8:10).

### 6.2. Adaptation to the Weak

As we shall see, Paul’s solution to the problem of idol food involved the knowers’ adaptation to the weak believers’ vulnerable condition. What practically did this adaptation mean, and what qualifications enabled it?

Paul urged those with knowledge to abstain from idol food in order to avoid harm to the weak. This is the core of their ‘adaptation’. A key question is how far this abstention goes. It seems clear that Paul ruled out the consumption of idol food in a temple complex, both for its pressure upon the weak (8:10), and because of the danger of idolatry for the knowers.

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13. The behaviour of the knowers was a ‘cause for stumbling’ in the weak’s relationship with God (πρόσκομμα, 8:9; cf. Rom 9:32–33; 14:21; Exod 23:33 LXX; 34:12; Sir 17:25), by it they were thus ‘being destroyed’ in their faith (ἀπόλλυται, 8:11; cf. 1 Cor 1:18; 10:9–10; 15:18; 2 Cor 1:15; 4:3, 9; Rom 2:12; 14:15), it ‘causes the weak to sin’ (σκανδαλίζει, σκανδάλιστο, 8:13; cf. Sir 9:5 LXX; Pss. Sol. 16:7; cf. σκάνδαλον, Lev 19:14 LXX; Judg 8:27; Ps 105:36; Wis 14:11; Pss. Sol 4:23; Matt 13:41; Rom 9:33; 11:9; 14:13).

14. As proposed in, e.g., Barrett, 1 Corinthians, 194–95; Schrage, 1 Korinther II, 256–59.

15. The danger of idolatry was real for both knowers and weak, but Paul defined idolatry in the nature of the meal and/or the συνείδησις of the participant, not in the food itself or in a particular location (see the distinction between food and idolatry in 10:19–20). See Dietrich-Alex Koch, “‘Alles, was έν μαχαλλω verkauft wird, etc.’: Die macella von Pompeji, Gerasa und Korinth und ihre Bedeutung für die Auslegung von 1Kor 10,25,” ZNW 90 (1999): 217; David G. Horrell, “Theological Principle or Christological Praxis? Pauline Ethics in 1 Corinthians 8.1–11.1,” JSNT 67 (1997): 100–101. I am in general agreement with recent interpreters who argue that Paul forbade the knowers’ conscious consumption of idol food due to the dangers of their own idolatry as well as harm to the weak (not just the latter), e.g., Cheung, Idol Food; Peter D. Gooch, Dangerous Food; Fotopoulos, Food, 236–37; against, e.g., Hurd, Origin; Borgen, “‘Yes,’ ‘No,’ ‘How Far?’,” 54–55; Jerome Murphy-O’Connor, “Freedom or the Ghetto? (1 Cor., VIII,1–13; X,23–XI,1),” RB 85 (1978): 543–74. However, Alex Cheung and John Fotopoulos assume the same danger of idolatry for the knowers as for the weak, and thus mishandle Paul’s references to a legitimate capacity to eat for the knowers, different from that of the weak (esp. 10:29a; see Cheung, Idol Food, 158–59; Fotopoulos, Food, 245–46). David Horrell and E. C. Still offer compelling readings which respect Paul’s concerns regarding idolatry for both the weak and the knowers, but also affirm some theological legitimacy to the position of the knowers, even if that right is ultimately given up for the weak, and even if it is impossible to define precisely what the line was between idolatrous and non-idolatrous participation (E. C. Still, “Paul’s Aim Regarding Eidolothyta: A New Proposal for Interpreting 1 Corinthians 8:1–11:1,” NovT 44 [2002]: 333–43; Horrell, “Christological Praxis?”, 83–104).
(10:14–22). In 8:13, using himself as an example, Paul appears to champion unqualified abstinence, declaring that he would permanently abstain from meat in general (κρέα) in order to avoid harming his fellow Christian. Paul spoke hyperbolically in 8:13, however, because he later directed all members to eat meat purchased in the macellum and served at meals hosted by non-Christians based on the theological reality that all food comes from and belongs to God (10:25–27; see Ps 23:1 LXX). This consumption was not to be a matter of moral responsibility involving the συνείδησις, because Paul assumed both marketplace meat and meat served by non-Christians were in themselves sufficiently distant from cultic acts, such that consumption did not constitute idolatry for the knowers, nor could it have led the weak to eat idolatrously (under the consumption of 10:14–22 and 8:10). However, these allowances were qualified, for if ever the cultic connection of the food was explicitly recognized, whether at a meal hosted by a non-Christian, or in the macellum, the knowers were to abstain in order to support the weak in their own abstinence from what would then be an idolatrous act for them (10:28–29a). I thus interpret the qualification of v. 28–29a to apply not only to v. 27, but to the whole of vv. 25–27.

It is important to recognise that the knowers’ adaptation to the weak could likely have carried considerable social costs. Cultic acts involving idol food were pervasive in ancient Roman Corinth. They occurred in various locations (e.g., private homes, public spaces, or temple precincts) and for various occasions (e.g., as part of weddings, birthdays, funerals, political celebrations, civic festivals, club or association gatherings, or simply the gathering of family or friends). This pervasiveness created pressure to participate in order to maintain normal social and economic bonds or to establish new relationships (e.g., in an effort to seek patronage). Therefore, abstinence entailed potentially severe limitations and losses in

16. It may be that some meals in temple precincts or elsewhere were only marginally cultic in nature, as opposed to partaking directly from the sacrificial altar, such that there was a theoretical legitimacy of the knowers to eat without committing idolatry (in my view, reflected in 10:29a), though one must beware of separating social gatherings too neatly from cultic gatherings; see discussion in Willis, Idol Meat, 63; Peter D. Gooch, Dangerous Food, 15–26; Jerome Murphy-O’Connor, Keys to First Corinthians: Revisiting the Major Issues [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009], 119–20; cf. critique of Gooch and Willis in Fotopoulos, Food, 67–70, 104–14, 176–78).

17. It is likely that not all meat sold in the market was meat previously sacrificed (against Lietzmann; see discussion in Gäckle, Die Starken und die Schwachen, 176–80; Koch, “Macella”). One could easily find out whether meat was previously sacrificed or not, though it is not clear whether one would know immediately or have to inquire (see e.g., Pliny, Ep., 10.96 with discussion in M. Isenberg, “The Sale of Sacrificial Meat,” CP 70 [1975]: 271–73).

18. I interpret the phrase μηδὲν ἀνακρίνοντες διὰ τὴν συνείδησιν in 10:25, 27 to refer to ‘not questioning’ the meat’s cultic history as a matter of one’s own responsibility to God, rather than a policy of attempting to maintain ignorance to protect oneself from one’s own συνείδησις (with, e.g., Gordon Fee, The First Epistle to the Corinthians, NICNT [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1987], 481–82; against, e.g., Christian Maurer, “Σύνοισα, Συνείδησις,” in TDNT, eds. Gerhard Kittel et al. [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1971 [1964]], 915).

19. Apparently, this would not be an idolatrous act for the knowers, given that their συνείδησις is not involved in 10:29a, but that of the weak. Just as in 8:7–13, in 10:28–29a Paul commands the knowers to abstain on behalf of the weak, indicating that the temple meal of 8:10 is not the only situation in which the weak could be harmed by the knowers’ free consumption.

relationships with outsiders. To avoid meals in temple precincts and to abstain for the weak in other circumstances likely made it impossible to participate as a fully ‘mainstream’ member of Corinthian society. Paul encouraged maintaining regular social involvement with outsiders, for he directed the Corinthians to accept invitations from outsiders, and, presumably, to remain with their hosts if possible even after refusing to eat idol food (see also 5:9–10). Yet, the restrictions over idol food at least would have strained, and at most could have jeopardized such involvement.

Paul assumed throughout that the knowers were able to adapt to the weak, but which particular resources were required? There is no discussion here of a unique skill or technique needed for adaptation to the weak, for adaptation consisted simply in abstaining from idol food. The knowers needed the ability to discern when a meal would be idolatrous for themselves and the weak, but Paul seems unconcerned to spell this out for his readers, and assumed that his directives were sufficient. There were no particular social or financial resources (or lack thereof) required to adapt, for Paul did not qualify the call to abstinence accordingly.

The closest one comes to a qualification for adaptation to the weak is simply the fact that the knowers were not weak in the same way; they ‘had knowledge’. That the knowers were not weak gave them the responsibility to care for those who were, along with the fact that their own harmful behaviour was a large part of the problem. It does not seem that having knowledge was an unambiguous marker of moral maturity which qualified the knowers to adapt to the weak as part of a therapeutic relationship. Again, adaptation was not an act of therapeutic skill. The act of abstaining ultimately required trust in God, expressed in the willingness to obey God in bearing the limitations and potential consequences for the sake of the weak. The faith of the knowers played a constitutive role in bringing benefit to the weak, just as their lack of faith resulted in the weak’s destruction.

21. See Peter D. Gooch, Dangerous Food, 27–46; Willis, Idol Meat, 7–64; Fotopoulos, Food, 176–78. Murphy-O’Connor raises the case of Erastus, named οἰκονόμος τῆς πόλεως in Rom 16:23, perhaps indicating a civic leadership position in Corinth (according to Murphy-O’Connor, an aedile; Murphy-O’Connor, Keys, 118–19). If Murphy-O’Connor’s reconstruction is correct (controversy over Erastus continues to rage), it is difficult to understand precisely how Erastus would have adopted Paul’s directives, given he must have participated regularly in civic festivals. This is part of the difficulty of the passage, given that Paul does not clearly define for modern readers the boundary between idolatrous and non-idolatrous participation, and the legitimate right of the knowers to eat.

22. Some occasions may have been distanced enough from cultic activity to allow Christian involvement without eating or other participation in idolatry, but Paul does not provide specifics concerning what events a Christian may attend (see discussion in Horrell, “Christological Praxis?” 100–101; Borgen, “Yes,” ‘No,’ ‘How Far?’,” 42–49).

23. While Fotopoulos rightly stresses the social limitations of Paul’s directives, it seems incorrect to suppose that the Corinthians would need to refuse virtually all invitations from non-Christians in order to uphold them (Fotopoulos, Food, 235); Paul seems to think dining with non-Christians remains possible and desirable (10:27; 9:21).
6.3. Constructing the Weak

How did adaptation in love construct the weak, according to Paul? My answer to this question develops out of critical interaction with two other solutions. Some scholars argue that adaptation to the weak would eventually lead them out of their weakness in knowledge and/or συνειδησίας. Other scholars deny that constructing the weak involves their moral formation, preferring instead to speak of construction as an enhancement of communal solidarity; a change in relationship, not a change in the weak’s character. I argue for a third position. Construction of the weak involves developing their moral character through a change in relationship with other believers. This moral development does not, however, involve growth out of their weakness. In the following, I rehearse and critique the first and second positions just mentioned (6.3.1, 6.3.2), and then present my own reading (6.3.3).

6.3.1. Constructing the Weak by Curing their Weakness?

Several scholars have interpreted that Paul intends the weak to develop internal resources sufficient to grow out of their vulnerability in some way by means of the knowers’ adaptation. There seems to be an inherent critique in the label ‘weak’, and in the language of ‘saving’ and ‘gaining’ others as the goal of adaptation in 9:19–23 and 10:33 applied to the relationship between the knowers and the weak. Perhaps the strongest basis for this interpretation is Paul’s command to eat whatever is sold in the marketplace and served at meals (10:25–27). In this reading, the command would have been spoken particularly to the weak in order to wean them from their weakness, their over-scrupulosity based on a lack of knowledge. Paul intended at least to relativise the weak’s tendency to make their position absolute, and at most to call the weak to abandon their scruples. The knowers’ unhindered consumption in these sanctioned circumstances would have thus reinforced Paul’s formative effort.

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24. E.g., Weiss, 1 Korinther, 264; Thiselton, 1 Corinthians, 783–86; Robert Jewett, Paul’s Anthropological Terms: A Study of Their Use in Conflict Settings, Arbeiten zur Geschichte des antiken Judentums und des Urchristentums 10 (Leiden: Brill, 1971), 428; Zeller, 1 Korinther, 344–45; Murphy-O’Connor, “Freedom or the Ghetto”, 568–571; Andreas Lindemann, Der erste Korintherbrief, HNT 9/1 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2000), 198.

25. E.g., Thiselton, 1 Corinthians, 783–86; Jewett, Paul’s Anthropological Terms, 428; Zeller, 1 Korinther, 344–45; Murphy-O’Connor, “Freedom or the Ghetto”, 568–571.

26. Jewett argues that 10:25 was a ‘radical obligation’ on the weak to abandon their scrupulosity (a policy of ‘what you don’t know won’t hurt you’), but also that Paul allowed the weak to stop eating once they discovered the food’s origins (Jewett, Paul’s Anthropological Terms, 428).

27. I disagree that the weak were overly scrupulous, and thus I do not find evidence here of Paul’s rebuke to the weak. It is at least clear that Paul’s directive in 10:25–27 cannot mean that the weak should have knowingly eaten food identified with cultic acts, otherwise he would have contradicted his advice given in 8:7–13 and 10:28–29a. The weak were not weak because they anxiously searched out the cultic origins of their food. Paul affirmed in 10:25–27 that all food purchased in the macellum was to be unrelated to the moral consciousness of both knowers and weak (unlike food consumed in a cultic act, as just discussed, 10:14–22), but
but in the same vein, Jerome Murphy-O’Connor suggests that the weak were ‘spiteful’ and ‘aggressive’, judging and reviling those with knowledge for their consumption, having absolutised their weakness (seen under the surface in 8:8; 10:29b–30, in analogy to Rom 14:3). By adapting to the weak, the knowers indirectly called their weakness into question, leading them to question themselves and mature further.

Clarence Glad has offered a sophisticated version of this reading, explaining Paul’s approach in terms of psychagogy, especially as modelled by Philodemus. Glad interprets that Paul encouraged mature believers to develop weaker, less mature believers by means of adaptive, rational therapy. In Glad’s reading of the historical circumstances, the knowers were already at work in this task. They were attempting to correct the weak’s immature συνειδήσεις by rational persuasion and by presenting themselves to the weak as models of the free consumption of idol food thus pressuring the weak to do likewise. As in philosophical texts which discuss immature students, Glad diagnoses the weak as ‘akratic’: they made decisions which created strife and uncertainty within themselves; they assented to the non-existence of idols, but could not eat food with cultic ties without a guilty self-perception, as if they had committed idolatry. Paul endorsed the knowers’ position towards idol food in theory, along with their pedagogical role and intent, but did not endorse their destructive behaviour. Glad summarises, ‘Paul does not question the right of the wise to guide the weak but rejects their pedagogy and mode of spiritual guidance.’ Instead, Paul called the knowers not to criticize the weak harshly and to abstain from the pressuring consumption of idol food as part of a gentler, long-term therapeutic project to develop the weak’s immature character. Like Philodemus, Glad argues, Paul required adaptation to the weak in light of their instability as newly converted Christians lacking a strong sense of Christian identity and the ability to endure harsh criticism. The knowers should continue to instruct the weak on this issue, but should be gentle, patient and willing to sacrifice their freedom, bearing with the weak’s vulnerabilities as they grow out of them more gradually.

this did not resolve the issue, for this freedom remained conditioned by the imperative to protect the weak when the cultic origin of the food was explicitly identified (10:28–29a). Other believers were to offer this support for the weak indefinitely.

29. Yet, unlike Romans 14:3, Paul never explicitly rebuked the weak for judging others, and Paul would have addressed this more explicitly if needed. While Paul’s rhetorical questions in 10:29b–30 may be read as a challenge to the weak’s burdening of the knowers in general, they can be read otherwise, and cannot independently support the interpretation that Paul intended the weak to grow out of their weakness. Horrell critiques Murphy-O’Connor’s view as overly psychologised and textually unfounded (Horrell, “Christological Praxis?” 105).
30. Glad (implausibly) reads τὸποτοντις (8:10) and οἰκοδομηθησατι (8:12) as indicating such behaviour (Glad, Paul and Philodemus, 277–95).
32. Glad, Paul and Philodemus, 278.
33. Ibid.
In response to this line of interpretation in all of the forms just reviewed, I argue that core aspects of Paul’s argument undercut the idea that his goal was to lead the weak out of their weakness. I focus on two such aspects here.

First, this reading runs against the grain of Paul’s contrast between knowledge and love (8:1–3). In the programmatic first three verses of chapter 8, Paul relativises any claims to knowledge made apart from or in conflict with the ultimate subject of knowing, God. True knowledge of anything, including idol food, cannot be independent of love for God, which is to be expressed in love for one’s siblings in Christ (8:2–3, 11–12; cf. 13:1–3). Insofar as the knowers have ‘destroyed’ their siblings in Christ by their knowledge-enabled ‘right’ (8:9), they have not loved their siblings nor expressed love for God. They have not come to ‘know as one ought to know’ (8:3); their knowledge is ‘nothing’ (see 13:2). In ch. 13, Paul further relativises all human knowledge as incomplete and indirect in contrast with complete human knowing only realized by God in the eschaton (13:9–12; see further discussion in ch. 7). Paul subordinates individual human knowing, including particular conceptions of idol food, to the greater value of love for God and for other believers who differ in these conceptions (8:7).

While partly affirming the theological position of the knowers that idols and idol food are nothing (8:4; 10:19, 25–26), in 8:8 Paul deems the consumption of idol food as inherently irrelevant for one’s relationship to God. Paul writes in 8:8, (NRSV) ‘Food will not bring us close to God. We are no worse off if we do not eat, and no better off if we do.’ Intrinsically, there is no theological difference between consumption and abstinence, and thus no theologically important difference between possessing or lacking the knowledge which enables consumption. This holds true even though Paul is interested to protect the weak and the knowers from situations in which intrinsically harmless differences in knowledge and intrinsically harmless food become harmful. What ultimately matters is maintaining faithfulness to God within one’s particular state of knowledge or συνείδησις. Paul argues throughout chapters 8–10 that the knowers should not insist on the primacy and infallibility of their own knowledge and behaviour with respect to idol food, but should give up their right for the sake of the weak, as Paul, and in fact Christ, have done (9:19–23; 10:31–11:1).

In sum, Paul does not valourize the knowers’ moral character (their knowledge and συνείδησις) over against that of the weak, but relativises their differences (8:8). If Paul intended the weak to become like the knowers in their relationship with idol food, his own argument provides no positive justification for it, and indeed militates against that goal.

Second, nowhere does Paul directly critique the weak or discuss the process by which the weak will gradually change internally in relation to idol food, either in their knowledge or συνείδησις, as a result of the knowers’ adaptation. Paul places responsibility for addressing the vulnerabilities of the weak upon the knowers, not upon the weak themselves. Moreover, he envisions a permanent change in the knowers’ behaviour for the sake of the weak. Paul alludes to this permanency in his hyperbolic statement that he would never eat any meat again to avoid causing a fellow believer to stumble (8:13), and he confirms it in 10:25–29a, in
which he assumes ongoing abstinence for the weak despite allowing freedom for purchasing meat in the macellum.\textsuperscript{34}

This general argument has led several scholars to conclude that construction in these chapters does not involve the weak becoming like the knowers, nor does construction operate according to a therapeutic model of care for the weak.\textsuperscript{35} If Paul did envision the weak to become like the knowers via adaptation, his argument seems incoherent.\textsuperscript{36}

6.3.2. Constructing the Weak as Constructing Solidarity, not Moral Formation?

Other scholars have interpreted that constructing the weak meant changing the weak’s external circumstances (i.e., removing harmful situations), particularly by developing loving relationships in the community, rather than some moral development of the weak.\textsuperscript{37} The knowers ‘saved’ the weak from potential harm by making it easier, not harder, for the weak to abstain and thus avoid idolatry. The knowers eliminated dangerous opportunities caused by their own behaviour, and provided support and solidarity for the weak when others encouraged or pressured them to eat idolatrously (10:27–29a).\textsuperscript{38} Margaret Mitchell reads the

\textsuperscript{34} This passage is fraught with interpretive difficulty and controversy. I interpret that the weak are in view as the informant of 10:28–29, and thus adaptation for them remains required even in light of 10:25–27. Regardless of one’s understanding of these verses, if one interprets that adaptation to the weak was no longer needed in any circumstance by the end of ch. 10, this would create tension with ch. 8 and ch. 9. I deem that reading less convincing than one which interprets Paul’s commands to entail ongoing abstinence for the weak.


\textsuperscript{36} Perhaps the most plausible version of this general trajectory is to interpret that Paul did not envision adaptation to lead to moral construction of the weak out of their weakness, but that an inevitable effect of this adaptation was that some weak believers would probably have gained greater resolve to resist idolatry and/or would have developed in their σωτείοντας within the protected environment created by the knowers’ loving adaptation. See Gäckle, \textit{Die Starken und die Schwachen}, 207–8; Hans-Joachim Eckstein, \textit{Syneidesis}, 275. While this seems plausible and cannot be excluded as a possibility, Paul did not explicitly describe this subsequent maturation of the weak, nor specify these results as the goal for the knowers’ adaptive abstinence. Rather, Paul commanded indefinite abstinence for weak believers, and seemed unconcerned whether believers had the knowledge that led to eating idol food in a legitimate way or not. Paul was most concerned for the weak to avoid idolatry, and thus to love God in their weakness (8:3) even if it meant that the weak depended upon others. Moreover, as Gäckle notes (especially concerning 1 Cor 12:22) and as I argue further below, the weak in their weakness actually play an important constructive role for others, not just in the exercise of spiritual gifts (1 Cor 12–14), but in the idol food issue as well (Gäckle, \textit{Die Starken und die Schwachen}, 208, 469–70).


\textsuperscript{38} Virtually all commentators explain the construction of the weak with reference to this avoidance of harm, other differences aside.
construction language as referring to the construction of unity over against factionalism, adducing ancient discussions of the topos in this idiom. Stanley Stowers argues that Paul does not operate with a therapeutic model of reason, because his goal for adaptation is to create unity in Christ, not to cure passions or cultivate individual virtue or knowledge. As he notes, ‘For Stoics and even Epicureans, the basic goal is the inner health of individuals. Community often seems to serve only an instrumental function toward that telos. For Paul, the goal is the community itself, a community of a certain quality to which the mutual enhancement of individuals is intrinsic.’ These interpretations are helpful, but incomplete, for it is difficult to understand how this change in relationship from disregard to loving concern does not also in some sense change the moral life of both the knowers and the weak, a life which these relationships partly constitute. It is true that Paul’s construction language at times has the community as its object, constructing ‘the body of Christ’ (e.g., 1 Cor 14:4, 5, 12), but in these chapters the implied object is the weak believers (8:1, 10; 10:23; cp. 14:17). The dichotomy between the development of relationships and the development of internal character is too hasty, and it does not reckon with the importance that relationships among believers have for their moral lives, in Paul’s perspective.

6.3.3. Constructing the Weak in their Weakness

I argue that constructing the weak involved a development in the weak’s moral character that arose by means of and in response to a new relationship with the knowers. Assuming Paul’s intentions were fulfilled, the most prominent change for the weak was their new relationship of dependence upon those with knowledge for assistance in maintaining their faith against idolatry. I argue that this change in relationship is most fruitful for understanding the construction of the weak. Constructing the weak did not involve developing their knowledge or συνείδησις vis-à-vis idol food, but it did involve growth in their moral character. The moral character of the weak developed in that dependence on the adaptation of the knowers became an indispensable, constitutive part of their moral lives as believers in God in their weakness. Through this dependence, the weak’s faith received protection by the elimination of dangerous circumstances, and received encouragement against idolatry in the future.

41. Stowers, “Paul on the Use and Abuse of Reason,” 286. Stowers does not develop what ‘mutual enhancement’ means nor how it is ‘intrinsic’ to Pauline community.
42. It would be incorrect to think that this external support solves the problem in itself without any involvement of the weak, for though the weak may be harmed less frequently by the knowers, they must still choose to abstain from idolatrous consumption at meals with the solidarity of other Christians, and there likely remain other circumstances in which they are pressured to eat idol food by non-Christians without the supporting presence of other Christians.
The weak exercised further trust in God by receiving help from the knowers, for the weak received their adaptation as God’s saving intervention. God called the knowers to faith and ‘fellowship’ (κοινωνία) in Christ with the weak (1:9; 2:5; 10:17). God provided the warrant and model for the knowers’ behaviour (the gospel of Christ’s death for the weak, 8:11; the model was Christ, modelled by Paul, 9:22–23; 10:33–11:1). Like Paul, the knowers ‘became weak’ (9:22), they ‘enslaved’ themselves to the weak (9:19) in order to save them, and thus became ‘partners’ of the gospel (συγκοινωνοί, 9:23). In so doing, the knowers’ demonstrated to the weak the meaning of the gospel of Christ’s death for them, their weak siblings in Christ. By helping the weak to have faith and resist idolatry in their weakness, the knowers, like Paul and Apollos, thus became ‘servants’ through whom the weak exercised faith (διάκονοι δι’ ὧν ἐπιστέψατε, 3:5), through whom God ‘causes growth’ in faith (3:5–9), through whom the weak are ‘being saved’ from the power of sin (σωζόμενος, 1:18), preserved blameless until the day of the Lord’s return (1:8). As Paul discusses later in 1 Cor 12 (discussed in ch. 7), the knowers’ gave the weak constructive benefit which they received in faith as God’s action on their behalf through their indispensable fellow-members of the body of Christ (12:7, 11, 12–27).

The weak’s experience of this divine intervention through the knowers was not a dispensable, external boost for their moral lives as believers. The weak could not and should not live out their faith independently from the knowers’ help. Rather, receiving in faith God’s salvation through the knowers was constitutive of what being a weak believer in God meant. Just as Paul saw his own adaptation to others as a constitutive element of his preaching, without which he would have obstructed the gospel (cf. ἔγκοπη, 9:12), so too the adaptation of the knowers was indispensable for this saving benefit of the weak. Without this new relationship with the knowers, their relationship with them lay broken, their κοινωνία in

43. The knowers did not ‘save’ the weak precisely in the same way that Paul described in 9:19–23, for the knowers helped weak Christians to maintain their faith, rather than come to faith for the first time. One need not interpret that Paul precisely modelled the knowers’ particular behaviours toward the weak in order to understand 9:19–23 as a model for them (i.e., interpreting that Paul referred particularly to ‘weak’ Christians in 9:22, as in ch. 8; that his ‘becoming weak’ referred particularly to adapting to them in the issue of idol food; or that ‘winning’ the weak [καταράνα] referred to reforming them [as in Matt 18:15; 1 Pt 3:1] rather than helping them come to faith for the first time). Paul may have referred to his becoming ‘weak’ in 9:22 in the sense of supporting himself by manual labour, for example, but his model still remained relevant for the knowers regardless of the precise meaning of ‘becoming all to all’ in 9:19–23.

44. The meaning of συγκοινωνοῦσα has been heavily debated. I interpret it to refer primarily to the role of sharing in the gospel’s power to save others as an instrument of its communication. This reading is in keeping with the parallelism of the ἐν clauses throughout 9:19–23, in which Paul’s concern is to ‘win’ and ‘save’ others. The role of sharing in the gospel’s communication does not entail that Paul or the knowers somehow detracted from the priority and efficiency of God’s saving work in the gospel, for God’s ‘partners’ and ‘co-workers’ (συγγραφεῖς, 3:9) remain ‘nothing’ by comparison with God who ‘causes growth’ (3:6–7), from whom they have received everything (4:6–7). However, being a συγκοινωνοῦσα could also imply the role of sharing in the gospel’s benefits, as Paul’s concern about being found θάνατος indicate (9:27). See Morna Hooker, “A Partner in the Gospel: Paul’s Understanding of His Ministry,” in Theology and Ethics in Paul and His Interpreters, eds. Eugene H. Lovering and Jerry L. Sumney (Nashville: Abingdon, 1996), 83–100; Dustin W. Ellington, “Imitating Paul’s Relationship to the Gospel: 1 Corinthians 8.1–11.1,” JSNT 33 (2011): 303–15.
Christ was disrupted, their faith in God was being destroyed by their idolatry, and they were separated from God’s saving initiatives for them through others in the body of Christ.

One might object that I have just described my preferred version of the second position reviewed above, in which constructing the weak meant establishing relational solidarity with them (thus giving them a needed external good) rather than changing their moral character in itself. However, to depend on the knowers’ adaptation was not to stall moral development by depending on some external good other than oneself. That construal of the moral life and its development assumes that genuine moral character operates only individually, and that the goal is moral self-sufficiency. For Paul, however, the goal is not moral self-sufficiency, but faithful response to God (this subject receives further discussion in ch. 7). By depending on other believers’ help, the weak did not avoid moral development, but embraced it, for they responded in faith to God’s saving intervention for them through others. Depending upon others did not hinder the weak’s maturity in faith; rather, in this case, dependence upon others in the body of Christ was the proper mode of mature faith in God for the weak.

In summary, the weak’s moral life developed in that it operated in a new mode of dependence on the knowers which strengthened their commitment to God against idolatry, and properly ordered their faith to God’s saving work for them in dependence upon the knowers and thus upon God himself. Dependence on the knowers partily constituted the moral life of the weak before God; to depend on God was to depend on the knowers for help. Maturity as weak believers involved dependence on others out of faith in God, not self-sufficiency.

6.4. The Weak’s Construction of the Knowers

Throughout these three chapters, Paul never calls the weak to action on behalf of others. It may seem odd, then, to find here a discussion of the weak’s moral construction of those with knowledge. I argue that adaptation to the weak had morally constructive effects for the knowers as well.

To understand how the knowers were to experience moral construction, one must identify the ‘before’ and ‘after’ of the experience, assuming they followed Paul’s directives. There is a danger of running beyond the evidence in a quest to define the inner states or beliefs of the knowers in order then to compare them with Paul’s arguments, and finally to sketch a picture of their supposed development. Our historical access to the knowers is only through Paul’s polemic against them.45 My reconstruction is based on Paul’s perspective. I offer the

45. For example, it may be that the knowers agreed with some of Paul’s arguments and theological values, but had a differing interpretation of what they entailed (e.g., what it meant to ‘construct’ others or to be ἀκροςκοπος to all people), or appealed to arguments Paul did not mention (e.g., Paul does not directly address the possible social and economic pressures the knowers faced to eat idol food).
following basic summary of the knowers’ circumstances based on the outline given at the beginning of this chapter: (a) the knowers considered themselves Christians, (b) they thought, however consciously or not, that abstinence from idol food for the weak was of less value for themselves than their unrestricted participation (whether of less value socially, economically, and/or theologically), and (c) they chose to act accordingly.

Roughly stated, Paul’s strategy was to persuade the knowers to abstain for the weak by arguing that the theological importance of doing so should determine their behaviour as Christians. According to Paul’s rhetoric, the knowers existed in a conflicted state of trusting God as believers, and yet sinning against God by their actions toward the weak. Paul’s argument throughout these chapters created a high-stakes, binary choice for the knowers: either sin against Christ in harming the weak, or adapt for the weak in obedience to the gospel.

By harming the weak, the knowers necessarily destroyed their own faith. For Paul, to continue on course was to continue sinning against Christ by destroying the weak (8:12), and thus to oppose the very God from whom the knowers have received everything (4:7), including their ‘right’ to eat idol food (8:4–6; 10:26). God had acted in the gospel to create and save the weak (1:18, 23–24; 3:5). Fellowship in the body and blood of Christ entailed fellowship with the weak as siblings (8:11–12; 10:16–17), such that to harm the weak was to harm one’s own relationship to Christ (and vice versa, as 1 Cor 5:6–13 makes clear). When Paul obliquely warned the knowers against being found ‘unapproved’ (ἀδόκιμος) in 9:27, Paul very likely had the knowers’ final destruction as Christians in view as the end result of their opposition to adapting for the weak (cf. the more explicit warning concerning their idolatry in 10:12, 20–22). Just as the weak’s idolatry fundamentally threatened their faith, so too the knowers’ refusal to adapt threatened theirs. Tracing the implications of Paul’s rhetoric, to fail to adapt is to fail to become ‘partners’ of the gospel (συγκοινωνοί, 9:23), it is to place an ἐγκοπη in the way of the gospel (9:12), it is to fail to do all for the sake of the gospel and glory of God (9:23; 10:31), it is to seek one’s own interests above others (10:23; 33), and it is to refuse to imitate Christ (and Paul, 11:1). Adaptation to the weak was not an option for the

46. With, e.g., Fee, 1 Corinthians, 440; Zeller, 1 Korinther, 324; Schrage, 1 Korinther II, 371–72; Garland, 1 Corinthians, 444–45; against, e.g., Schnabel, 1 Korinther, 518, 541–42; Thiselton, 1 Corinthians, 716–17. In 9:24–27, Paul continues his exemplary, first-person mode of discourse, challenging the knowers to endure hardship and discipline in their efforts to do all for the sake of the gospel (9:23), including to give up their right to abstain from idol food for the weak. The passage functions as an implied warning that failure to imitate Paul will result in failing to gain the ‘incorruptible crown’ at the end of the race (9:25), and in being found ‘unapproved’ (ἀδόκιμος; 9:27). It could be that Paul simply refers to being unapproved with respect to his apostolic role. Yet in 2 Cor 13:5, being ἀδόκιμος is opposed to being among those in whom Christ is present. In 10:9, Paul warns the knowers not to ‘test’ (μηδὲ ἐκπαιδεύσατε) Christ, as did the wilderness generation, resulting in God’s destruction of them (ἀπόλαυσαν; cf. Num 21:5–9). The ‘testing of Christ’ here surely refers to the knowers’ participation in cultic meals, as in 10:22 (so, e.g., Fee, 1 Corinthians, 456–57; Schrage, 1 Korinther II, 400–401). Yet, the knowers also ‘test Christ’ in that they sin against him by destroying their weaker brother (8:12). The warnings of ‘destruction’ and ‘fall’ in 10:9, 12 (cf. Rom 11:11–12) would remain relevant for that sin as well.
knowers if they wanted to continue in faith, according to Paul. Rather, adaptation was fundamentally constitutive for their faith; there could be no proper faith in God without it.

Before adaptation, the knowers did not fully understand the gospel’s meaning for their lives (they did not ‘know as one ought to know’, 8:2). Their knowledge enabling idol food consumption was ‘nothing’ (13:1–3) because they did not act in love toward the weak. They had domesticated the gospel to their own knowledge of idol food, and used that knowledge as the norm of their behaviour, rather than love. Adapting to the weak was the means by which the knowers grew in their understanding and obedience to the gospel. The transition for the knowers in adapting was basically one of repentance from sin, and trusting God more completely (cf. 1 Cor 3:1–4). This formative transition was abstractly the same as that of the weak, a transition from the danger of eschatological destruction to salvation by faith in God, realized for the knowers in their adaptation to the weak.

Therefore, the weak were not incidental to the knowers’ faith, but indispensable. Only by being in relationship with the weak could the knowers come to understand that their knowledge was relativised by the gospel, that their knowledge of idol food was not the norm for their Christian lives, but love. Simply by being vulnerable siblings of the knowers, the weak constitutively shaped the lived realities of their faith in God. The weak were necessary for the salvation of the knowers as the gospel drew them to faith in God over against their own sinful myopia.

6.5. Constructive Reciprocity and Interdependence

It remains to offer a summative overview of Paul’s vision for constructive reciprocity and interdependence between believers in these chapters.

Concerning constructive practice, there is no reciprocity of formative intervention in these chapters. Paul calls believers with knowledge to adapt to the weak, and does not ask the weak to reciprocate by taking up formative action toward the knowers. Paul’s vision for genuinely reciprocal constructive practice does not come to expression here, but in 1 Cor 12–14 (examined in ch. 7).

On the other hand, there is a form of reciprocity in that both the weak and the knowers receive construction from one another. The knowers construct the weak directly through their adaptation, while the weak construct the knowers indirectly simply by being weak, such that the knowers must adapt to their weakness. The evidence for this reciprocity of construction

47. One might propose solving the issue of 1 Cor 8:1–11:1 by cordonning off the knowers from the weak, but this would have been for Paul to sunder the fellowship established in Christ by the gospel (1:9–13; 10:16–17), which is at the heart of what the gospel entailed, and the means by which both knowers and weak came to understand what it meant to live their faith in God.
leads us to ask how and why both groups were interdependent upon one another for this construction.

The weak depended on the knowers for construction due to their personal deficiency in knowledge and συνειδήσις, which left them particularly vulnerable to idolatry via the consumption of idol food. They could not draw on their own moral resources to manage this weakness. Paul’s strategy did not aim at achieving their moral self-sufficiency. They needed others who did not share their deficiency, who could offer them support against idolatry. The knowers offered them protection from further harm, and supported their faith to avoid idolatrous consumption when otherwise faced with idol food. In doing so, they constructed the weak’s moral life by leading them to further trust in God. All indications in these chapters suggest that the weak’s dependence on others was the long-term solution; this dependence was a form of maturity in faith for weak believers. The weak’s moral life of faith in God was constituted by their continual dependence on their siblings in Christ for help, through whom God operated to save the weak from destruction.

The knowers likewise depended on the weak for construction due to their personal deficiency. The knowers were not deficient like the weak, but their lack of love demonstrated that they had failed to understand the meaning of the gospel of Christ’s death for the weak. Therefore, they too were not morally self-sufficient. Just as the weak sinned against God by their idolatry, the knowers sinned against God by their destruction of others. Therefore, they too were not morally self-sufficient. Just as the weak sinned against God by their idolatry, the knowers sinned against God by their destruction of others. Without the presence of the weak, the knowers did not have personal moral resources to recognize that they had resisted the gospel by domesticating it to their knowledge. The knowers’ moral life of faith in God required ongoing adaptation to the weak as a constitutive element. They depended upon the weak to live their moral lives, for by ongoing adaptation to the weak they were saved from their sin, and came to understand how love relativises their knowledge.

The nature of this interdependence in moral construction is analogous to believers’ economic interdependence, as discussed in ch. 5. Believers depended on one another for moral construction because they did not have the resources to live self-sufficiently on their own, just as they participated in economic interdependence in the midst of poverty. Like participation in economic interdependence, participation in constructive interdependence indicated maturity in faith. Doing so was an acknowledgment of the claims of the gospel and an acknowledgment of one’s dependence upon God. Just as the material goods needed for life were an ongoing gift from God through economic interdependence, so too God provided the necessities of believers’ moral lives as an ongoing gift through relationships of constructive interdependence. These structures of economic and constructive interdependence seem to reinforce each other (see further discussion in chs. seven and eight).

At several points in this chapter we have seen Paul’s theology of moral formation in operation. God defines the believer’s moral life from first to last. This is the case not just in providing norms for the moral life (e.g., love, prohibition of idolatry), but in ordering the moral life to be one of ongoing response in faith to God’s saving activity. The moral life is not
just about attaining individual moral character, but about interaction in relationship with a
God who is distinct from the individual and his moral character. This God has created a
community of believers through which he acts for salvation. These topics receive further
discussion in ch. seven.

Finally, it seems that there was no growth out of constructive interdependence. Just as
the weak did not grow out of their weakness and dependence on others, so too the knowers did
not arrive at a point when receiving construction from the weak was unnecessary. In neither
case was there a transfer of moral resources between believers that led to moral self-
sufficiency. No believer could come to the point at which he no longer needed others through
whom God acted to bring saving benefit. This dynamic of constructive interdependence is
much more apparent in 1 Cor 12–14, examined in ch. seven, but it is no less operative in the
present chapters.
CHAPTER SEVEN:
RECIPROCAL CONSTRUCTION IN 1 CORINTHIANS 12:1–14:40

This chapter offers the second case study focused upon Paul’s vision for reciprocal moral construction among believers in 1 Corinthians. Like ch. six, the aim here is to understand how and why believers need one another in moral construction. Unlike ch. six, this passage of 1 Corinthians provides Paul’s explicit reflections on the nature and practice of reciprocal moral construction, and on the nature of constructive interdependence among believers. Also unlike ch. six, here Paul offers his most sustained discussions of the roles of speech and love in constructing others.

As I will argue, these chapters demonstrate that constructing others is a morally formative process in which believers’ speech, offered in love, functions as a medium for the self-revelation of God by the Spirit (12:7). By constructing one another, believers facilitate one another’s relationships with God. This ongoing relationship with God by means of his revelation through others orients a believer’s moral life. Receiving construction involves critical reception of gifted speech in faith, responding both to the human speaker and to God. This process involves moral progress (construction is morally formative), but a believer’s relationship with God can never be encompassed in his moral character or in moral resources received from others. God is immanently involved in every instance of construction, but he also remains transcendent. God cannot be identified with human speech or moral character, because in the present, all believers know ‘in part’, i.e., their knowledge is qualitatively different than God’s own (13:8–13). Thus, believers always need to receive formation from others, because to do so continually constitutes their moral lives in relation to God. The specific practices and protocol for reciprocal construction described in ch. 14, driven by love, aim to protect permanent relationships of constructive interdependence among believers.

The structure of this chapter is as follows. First, I give a brief overview of the literary, historical and rhetorical shape of 1 Cor 12–14 (section 7.1). Next, I draw upon 1 Cor 12 to outline the contours of divine and human involvement in moral construction, thereby introducing a number of themes to be discussed throughout the chapter, particularly the transcendence and immanence of God vis-à-vis construction (section 7.2). In the next two sections I describe the process of giving and receiving constructive speech (sections 7.3 and 7.4). With respect to giving speech, I first define the content (‘what is said’, e.g., prophecy, teaching, etc.) and character (‘how it is said’, i.e., love) of constructive speech as presented especially in chs. 13–14 (section 7.3). Then with respect to receiving speech, I delineate the
effects and reception process for constructive speech in section 7.4. After having discussed the basic shape of giving and receiving constructive speech, the section also includes a discussion of the protocol for giving and receiving speech as discussed in 14:26–40. Finally, in the last section, I bring the whole of the chapter to bear on the question of the nature of construction and the need for others in it (section 7.5). The chapter concludes with a short summary (section 7.6).

7.1. Overview of 1 Corinthians 12–14

These three chapters of 1 Corinthians are a coherent whole meant to address practical issues in worship gatherings of Corinthian believers, issues particularly concerning the right expression of ‘spiritual gifts’. This applies no less to ch. 13, which is an integral part of Paul’s argument in these chapters, not an unrelated detour.¹

Paul seems to address a situation in which some believers used spiritual gifts to foster divisions among believers.² Some highly valued speaking in tongues, probably to the devaluation of other gifts and gifted persons (esp. the inability to speak or understand tongues).³ These believers were prone to speaking in tongues at gatherings without interpretation for others (14:1–19), and/or speaking generally without interruption, such that others could not contribute (14:27–33).

Practically, Paul wants to ensure that believers offer their spiritual gifts in love (ch. 14), i.e., to benefit or construct others, and do so in such a way that all may contribute (thus, e.g., tongues must be interpreted, and opportunities to speak must be shared in turn). His appeal for this behavioural change draws upon his arguments in chs. 12 and 13. The description of gifts and the gifted body of Christ in ch. 12 rules out any attempt toward self-promotion at the expense of others via spiritual phenomena: God is the lord and giver of all

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³ On the link of tongues with high status see, e.g., Martin, *The Corinthian Body*, 88–92.
the gifts in their diversity, not simply tongues; God has composed the community and works through its members so that everyone is indispensable to others in their diversity; God has ordered the community around reciprocal concern for one another, in which harm or benefit to one member is harm or benefit to all. Moreover, the gifts themselves are worth nothing apart from their use to benefit others in love, as Paul argues in ch. 13. In chs. 12–14, Paul aims to promote unity that serves the reciprocal benefit of all through the use of gifts in love. Conversely, he seeks to show that any other use of the gifts, especially to shore up status distinctions in the community, is a misuse that misunderstands the gifts and their Lord.

7.2. 1 Corinthians 12: Divine and Human Involvement in Construction

Before discussing the mechanics of giving and receiving construction, it is important to attend to Paul’s programmatic remarks in ch. 12 upon what construction via gifted speech is and what relationships it presupposes. As we shall see, construction has most of all to do with God, so describing the nature of constructive speech entails describing divine and human involvement in it.

Despite the diverse forms of constructive speech referred to in 1 Cor 12–14, all have the same basic character as human speech through which God acts to reveal himself. God gives each instance of constructive speech, and such speech is a divine self-manifestation by the Spirit for the common good (ἐκάστῳ δὲ δίδοται ἡ φανέρωσις τοῦ πνεύματος πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον, 12:7). God operates ‘everything in everyone’ (τὰ πάντα ἐν πᾶσιν, 12:6), in each person without exception (ἐκάστῳ, 12:7, 11; ἐν ἐκαστόν, 12:18) for the ‘good’ of all (12:7). Apart from God’s agency, obviously, there would be no divine self-revelation through this speech, and thus no constructive benefit (τὸ συμφέρον) accessible in the speech, for the self-revelation of the Spirit leads to benefit, not the human speech in itself. Constructive benefit

4. While there are leading figures in the community and thus elements of hierarchy (12:28), such leadership is defined by loving pursuit of the good of others (13:4–7; see also, e.g., 9:23; 10:31–11:1). See Martin, The Corinthian Body, 102–3.


6. I interpret ἡ φανέρωσις τοῦ πνεύματος as a subjective genitive construction because God and the Spirit are subjects in 12:6 and 12:11 (with, e.g., Schrage, 1 Korinther III, 146, n. 186). However, an objective genitive reading could have much the same sense, insofar as God is the giver of the manifestation of the Spirit (cf. Fee, 1 Corinthians, 589, n. 30).

7. I do not interpret τὸ συμφέρον exclusively to be a morally formative benefit (see, e.g., gifts of healing in 12:9), only that the morally formative benefit of Spirit-inspired speech must derive from this benefit given by God.

8. A similar relationship obtains in Paul’s description of his preaching to the Corinthians. The Corinthians’ faith is in the ‘power of God’, not ‘in human wisdom’ (2:5), because Paul’s speech was not just human speech but a ‘demonstration of the spirit and power’ (ἐποδέιξει πνεύματος καὶ δυνάμεως, 2:4). This ‘word of the cross’, which is a fully human message preached and exemplified by Paul, is the ‘power of God’ for those
results from encounter with God in and through believers’ speech, though Paul does not elaborate further upon how this works in 12:7 (though see discussion of 14:24–25 below). God does not just provide a moral model toward which believers strive apart from divine agency, but participates directly in every instance of construction in each believer (which is a kind of moral formation, as I argue below).

Grounding constructive benefit in encounter with God through believers’ speech does not render the human speaker, his speech, and the human relationships in which constructive interaction occurs irrelevant (as though God’s agency excluded or curtailed human agency). Rather, the self-manifestation of God is immanent within these particular human persons and the content and character of their interaction with one another. Paul envisioned a process of receiving human speech as God’s speech through critical evaluation (see discussion of 14:29 below). This discernment process assumes that the content and character of the human speech are not irrelevant but necessary for mediating God’s self-revelation. Thus, constructive speech is fully human speech that is also intelligible and credible as a self-manifestation of God based on its content and character.

In moral construction, God’s relationship with believers cannot be severed from their relationships with other believers, for to be in relation to God as a believer necessarily entails being a ‘member’ in a ‘body’ that belongs to God (the ‘body of Christ’, 12:27), a network of reciprocal concern for others (12:12–14, 25). God’s involvement does not displace or curtail being saved by it (1:18). So too in 1 Thessalonians 2:13, Paul locates the effectiveness of his preaching in God’s word (λόγον θεοῦ) mediated through his speech. It is God’s word that is ‘at work i


10. See discussion in Moberly, Prophecy and Discernment, 1–38, 169–220. It would be highly implausible if Paul conceived of this discernment as unrelated to the content and character of the speech (e.g., if this is true, how is there any humanly intelligible consistency in such speech so that it can be distinguished from what is not of God? Why then is Paul so concerned to shape believers’ expressions of love?). Rather, this process of discernment is a fully human process, involving human rationality and relationships, even as it is empowered by God. Paul offers concrete guidance for discerning this speech’s content and character, but these chapters do not set out precise criteria by which any speech might be definitively named as God’s (even the criteria of love and offering benefit to others require discernment). A main reason for this lies in the fact that this letter assumes a common frame of reference between Paul and the Corinthians that is no longer accessible.
believers’ relationships with one another in constructive interactions. Rather, God’s transcendent and immanent involvement through human relationships constitutes the human character of constructive interactions. God created the human relationships of the body (12:24, 28), and stands over them as lord (12:3–6). When a believer speaks by God’s spirit, she does not cease to speak as a human person to other persons in human relationship. When a believer receives constructive benefit from another, she interacts with the giver within their personal relationship. No one member can disqualify himself from the body because of difference from others (difference being constitutive of the body, 12:15–16). Nor can one member legitimately claim not to need another (12:21), or not to share in the good or harm other members receive (12:26). To disregard this bond with others is to harm oneself and to create a rift in one’s relationship with God, to ‘sin against Christ’, 8:12 (discussed in ch. six above). And yet, response to the constructive speech of another is not simply response to that human person, but first of all response to God who has spoken through that person (see discussion of 14:24–25 below). The ‘benefit’ comes from God’s self-revelation, which is immanent within yet remains distinct from human speech. All members relate to one another properly by faith in God who has established the body and is at work within it.

This orienting outline introduces God’s transcendent and immanent involvement in moral construction. In the rest of this chapter, I track this set of relationships and their practical entailments for reciprocal construction.

7.3. The Content and Character of Constructive Speech

Constructing others as a believer necessarily involves specific content (i.e., what is said, whether prophecy, teaching, etc.) and character (‘how’ it is said, i.e., in love, including loving emotional and volitional dispositions, loving awareness and concern for others involved, etc.). The burden of this section is to give an overview of these two aspects of constructive speech, as defined by 1 Cor 12–14.

11. Even 12:12, which makes an analogy between Christ himself and the ‘body’ of human relationships does not support a simple identity between them. Nor does the identification of believers as the σώμα Χριστοῦ (12:27) entail that Christ can be wholly identified with the human believers; rather, the believers together belong to Christ. See discussion in Schrage, I Korinther III, 210–16; Barrett, I Corinthians, 287–88; Thiselton, I Corinthians, 995–996.


13. In fact, all present human knowing (and thus gifted speech) is incomplete and unresolved (13:8–13), and will be abolished in comparison to God’s own knowing revealed in the eschaton (see discussion of ch. 13 below).
7.3.1. Content of Constructive Speech

There are several kinds of constructive speech discussed in ch. 12–14. In chapter 14, Paul champions prophecy above all (προφητεία, προφητεύω, 14:6, 24–25, 28–31), but he also expects other kinds of speech to be used, including song (ψαλμός, 14:26; cf. 14:16–17), teaching (διδαχή, 14:6, 26), revelation (αποκάλυψη, 14:6, 26), knowledge (γνώσις, 14:6), and tongues with interpretation (λαλεῖν γλώσσαν γλωσσαῖς, διερρήνευ, e.g., 12:10; 14:13, 26, 27–28, 39). Earlier in chapter 12, Paul names two other speech-based χαρίσματα, the ‘word of wisdom’ (λόγος σοφίας, 12:8), and ‘word of knowledge’ (λόγος γνώσεως, 12:8).

It seems that Paul was not concerned to provide an exhaustive and systematic discussion of the kinds of constructive speech in 1 Cor 12–14.14 It must be remembered that Paul began the discussion by claiming each of these different kinds of speech as a ‘manifestation of the Spirit’ through which God reveals himself for the good of all (12:7). This is true of all speech offered in love regardless of whether the form or content contains an explicit claim to speak for God or to reveal God (as is the case for prophecy particularly). Though some general comments can be made, it is impossible precisely to identify the form and content of each kind of speech in distinction from the others due to a lack of evidence.

One may attempt to infer the content of speech by the description of its effects. Yet this too leads only to a generalized picture in which each kind of speech shares similar effects despite presumed differences in form and content. These effects include: ‘exhortation and comfort’ from prophecy (παράκλησις, παραμονή, 14:2, cf. πάντες παρακάλωνται, 14:31), praise or thanksgiving to God so that another might say, ‘Amen’ (ευλογεῖο, ευχαριστεῖο, 14:16–17), ‘instruction’ of others by any intelligible speech (κατηχέω, 14:19; cf. all ‘learn’ through prophetic speech, μαθάνω, 14:31), and the ‘conviction’ and ‘judgement’ of others (ἐλέγχω, ἀνακρίνω, 14:24). Yet these effects are difficult to neatly separate from one another. Moreover, Paul has little concern to link systematically the kinds of speech with particular kinds of effects. For example, one naturally links songs to the effect achieved by allowing another to affirm one’s own praise and thanksgiving to God (14:16–17), but further correlations are not straightforward.

It seems most appropriate to understand all these effects as modes of ‘construction’. Any kind of speech can result in construction, even if the form, content, or precise mode of constructing differs. This at least seems to be the rhetorical goal of Paul’s discussion, i.e., to

14. On this I align with, e.g., Roy E. Ciampa and Brian S. Rosner, The First Letter to the Corinthians, Pillar New Testament Commentary (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2010), 573. Kinds of speech not explicitly mentioned in ch. 14 are the word of wisdom (1 Cor 12:8), ‘admonishment’ (νουθετεῖο, as expected in 1 Thess 5:14; Rom 15:14), παράκλησις and παραμονή that do not result from prophecy specifically (as in 1 Thess 5:11, 14; Rom 12:8), or corporate prayer beyond public thanksgiving or praise of God (1 Cor 11:4–5). Paul does not discuss prayer or songs as special gifts in ch. 12. Teaching does not appear until the list of 12:28, and then only as ‘teachers’. 
stress a common function and orientation for all despite the diversity of speakers and their speech forms. Whether the speech is a song or a revelation, whatever it might be, ‘Let all be done for construction’, Paul says (14:26). This means that the described effects of prophecy should not be understood as the exclusive domain of prophetic speech forms and content.\footnote{If one read ch. 14 in that way (e.g., that only prophecy can produce παραμωθία or παράκλησις) this would leave only ‘construction’ or ‘instruction’ as effects of other kinds of speech (in keeping with the general comments in 14:19, 26). This approach is surely too formal, for the particular effects ascribed to prophecy (in 14:2, 24, 31) appear elsewhere in Paul without specific reference to prophecy. ‘Exhortation and comfort’ (14:2) are expected of all believers generally in 1 Thess 5:11, 14, whereas ‘exhortation’ is a gift separate from prophecy in Rom 12:8. Roughly the same function of ‘convicting’ and ‘judging’ others (14:24) is expected of all in 1 Thess 5:14 (though using νουθετέω), and in 1 Cor 5:12 (though using κρίνω). Causing others to ‘learn’ (14:31) is synonymous with ‘instructing’ others, which is ascribed to all other intelligible speech in 14:19, not just prophecy.}

The injunctions to prophesy (12:31; 14:1, 39), then, command the use of prophecy specifically among other gifts, but also encourage the use of any speech that has the same function as prophecy, i.e., speech which reveals God to others and thus leads to their benefit (as all inspired speech does, 12:7). It seems ‘prophecy’ and ‘to prophesy’ in ch. 14 function as a synecdoche for all gifts which reveal God to others for their benefit.\footnote{With Hays, \textit{First Corinthians}, 237.}

Why then did Paul choose to promote \textit{prophecy} among the Corinthians (14:1, 5, 39), rather than some other gift, or no particular gift at all? It seems the primary reason is that prophecy’s form and content exemplify the basic character of all constructive speech as a self-revelation of God through human speech for the shared benefit of others (12:7). It is particularly with the form and content of prophetic speech that (1) one makes an explicit claim to speak for God, not oneself (i.e., to speak so as to reveal his will, purposes, demands, etc.) (2) to particular people in specific circumstances for their benefit. It is not that other forms of speech do not reveal God and thus provide benefit to others, but their form and content align less explicitly with these two characteristics. Prophecy also thereby serves as a useful tool to demote uninterpreted tongues, a key concern in this chapter (unlike prophecy, speaking in tongues seems directed to God, and without interpretation it is not of benefit to others). Other forms of speech are not dispensable, less beneficial, or less revelatory (even tongues), but they are less effective for Paul’s rhetorical purposes to orient the value system of gifts to their character as media of the activity of God for the benefit of others. With these introductory remarks in mind, a brief sketch of the form and content of each kind of speech mentioned in ch. 14 follows.

Prophecy is human speech that claims to speak to others on behalf of God.\footnote{See the definition of the 1973 SBL Seminar on Early Christian Prophecy: ‘The early Christian prophet was an immediately-inspired spokesperson for God, the risen Jesus, or the Spirit who received intelligible oracles that he or she felt impelled to deliver to the Christian community or, representing the community, to the general public.’ (cited in M. Eugene Boring, “Prophecy [Early Christian],” in \textit{Anchor Bible Dictionary}, ed. David Noel Freedman [New York: Doubleday, 1992], 496). The literature on the nature of early Christian prophecy is substantial. See, e.g., the surveys in David E. Aune, \textit{Prophecy in Early Christianity and the Ancient Mediterranean World} (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1983) 1–14; Antoinette Clark Wire, \textit{The Corinthian...}}}
conclusion of his extensive study, David Aune claims that the distinguishing characteristic of early Christian prophecy is this claim to speak for God, not any particular form or content of the speech itself (though there are observable tendencies in form and content which he enumerates).\textsuperscript{18} Prophetic speech occurs by means of revelation from God to the speaker (ἀποκάλυψις, 14:6, 26; cf. 2:10). For Paul, prophecy is addressed toward particular believers and their circumstances as they are gathered for worship. While there is no single set of content for prophecy, all prophecy is grounded in the revelation of God in Christ crucified (1 Cor 2:7, 10).\textsuperscript{19} David Aune and Ulrich Müller, among others, have noted 1 Thess 4:13–17, 1 Cor 15:51–52, and Rom 11:25–26 as passages which likely contain instances of Paul’s prophetic speech.\textsuperscript{20} Paul also speaks in a prophetic mode when he claims at the end of 1 Cor 14, ‘what I am writing to you is a command of the Lord’ (14:37). Prophecy can make claims about the future, but need not always do so.\textsuperscript{21} For Paul, prophecy is a deliberate act of the speaker and does not necessitate an absence or limitation of human agency to make room for God’s agency (cf. 14:32).\textsuperscript{22} Prophecy remains fully human, shaped by the experience, perception, and character of the human speaker.\textsuperscript{23} The speech can be spontaneous, based upon a revelation received immediately prior (as occurs in 14:30, which requires another speaker to


19. With, e.g., Tobias Niklas, “Paulus – der Apostel Als Prophet,” in \textit{Prophets and Prophecy in Jewish and Early Christian Literature}, eds. Joseph Verheyden, Korinna Zamfir, and Tobias Nicklas, WUNT 2,286 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2010), 94–95. Dautzenberg resists a complete identity of prophetic speech with kerygma, and resists understanding the ‘wisdom’ and ‘mystery’ of 1 Cor 2:6–16 to refer only to the revelation of God in Christ, rather than supplementary revelations as well (Gerhard Dautzenberg, \textit{Urchristliche Prophetie: Ihre Erforschung, ihre Voraussetzungen im Judentum und ihre Struktur im ersten Korintherbrief}, BWANT 6 [Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1975], 152, 302). Markus Bockmuehl similarly understands 1 Cor 2:6–10 to refer both to ‘the’ mystery of God’s salvation in Christ as a whole, as well as to individual dimensions of God’s present and future work that are reserved only for those mature enough to receive them (see Markus N. A. Bockmuehl, \textit{Revelation and Mystery in Ancient Judaism and Pauline Christianity}, WUNT 2,36 [Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1990], 157–66).


end his speech), but need not exclude a delay or prior preparation by the speaker. It is a form of interaction between believers in worship.

Teaching may be distinguished roughly from prophecy in that it does not explicitly claim immediate divine revelation for its speech. It is probable that teaching involved general paraenesis, scriptural interpretation, or instruction in Christian tradition. However, this description of teaching is exceedingly general and somewhat artificial given the lack of evidence. Attempts to disentangle the content of prophecy from that of teaching are unsuccessful. Speech ‘by means of knowledge’ (14:6), the ‘word of knowledge’, and the ‘word of wisdom’ (12:8) might be coordinated with teaching, but it is equally possible that these coordinate with prophecy.

The precise form or content of the ‘song’ or ‘psalm’ (ψαλμός) is even more difficult to determine. It may have been a prayer of praise to God (as 14:13–17 seems to show), could have involved instruments, and may have been from tradition (e.g., the psalms of the OT) or fresh composition.

Tongues and their interpretation are equally difficult to specify. It seems that tongues in ch. 12–14 involved an individual’s unintelligible, esoteric speech to God. When

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24. Forbes stresses the difference between unsolicited Christian prophecy and solicited Greco-Roman forms of prophecy (contra David E. Aune, Prophecy, 66–77; see Forbes, Prophecy, 304–7). Regardless of the validity of the comparative distinction, it is important to recognize that prophetic speech was a form of interaction with others in the community (the source of the speech from God need not make it less humanly attached to this interaction).

25. Eugene Boring clarifies this point well, even if it does not get us very far: ‘The prophet presents all that he utters as a prophet as the immediately inspired present address of the deity to his community. This message may well include material taken from tradition and the prophet’s own reflection, consciously or unconsciously, with or without reinterpretation, but it is not presented as material which a past authority once said, but as what the deity now says. The same material may be presented by the non-inspired teacher or preacher, but with the formal and functional difference that this claim to immediate inspiration is not made.’ (Boring, cited in Forbes, Prophecy, 226–27).


27. Aune makes the distinction and acknowledges its artificiality (David E. Aune, Prophecy, 202).

28. Forbes, e.g., insists that the difference remains clear in that prophecy delivers present revelation by means of supernatural knowledge apart from the prophet’s own ‘thought processes’ (particularly in predicting the future), whereas teaching (and evangelistic preaching) proclaims past revelation without the aid of supernatural knowing (Forbes, Prophecy, 228–29). Yet, teaching is as much a gift of the Spirit to reveal God as prophecy is, so no easy differentiation on these lines seems possible.

29. The wisdom of God is that which is divinely revealed through the Spirit (2:6); the person who is wise is able to judge a dispute between believers (6:5); the knowledge of 8:4–7 seems to be applied theological knowledge; the knowledge of 13:2; 14:6 seems coordinated with prophecy (see discussion in, e.g., Ciampa and Rosner, 1 Corinthians, 574–77; Dautzenberg, Urchristliche Prophetie, 156–59; Schrage, 1 Korinther III, 148–50).

30. See Eph 5:19; Col 3:16, and the detailed discussion in Schnabel, 1 Korinther, 830–33.

31. See 14:2. One must remember that Paul discusses ‘kinds of tongues’ (12:10), indicating that there may have been various instances of tongues that did not all share the same character (stressed by Thielson, 1 Corinthians, 970–72). The two most plausible alternative understandings are that tongues may also have involved speaking (and interpreting) unlearned human languages, or expressing the unconscious. See discussion in, e.g., Sung Bok Choi, Geist und christliche Existenz: Das Glossolalieverständnis des Paulus im Ersten Korintherbrief,
interpreted, tongues likely took the form of prayer to God (which others might affirm, as implied by 14:13–17).  

7.3.2. Character of Constructive Speech

Having discussed the content of constructive speech, it remains to discuss the character of such speech. In 12:31, Paul introduces love as a ‘way beyond comparison’ in relation to all gifts (καθ’ ὑπερβολὴν ὀδὁν, cf. 2 Cor 1:8; 4:7, 17), hinting that love is not simply a gift among others, but the mode in which they exist and function. In 1 Corinthians 13, Paul defines love and its relationship to gifts in preparation for his specific guidelines upon the pursuit of love and speech-based gifts for others in ch. 14. As will become clear, believers’ love differs from their knowledge and gifts because to ‘have love’ is not just to express loving action (e.g., giving all of one’s possessions away) as one way of constructing others alongside gifted speech. Love is instead the mode in which one offers all constructive speech and other gifts.

Despite the striking lack of reference to God or Christ in ch. 13, this reading proceeds from the understanding that a believer’s love derives from and participates in God’s own love for the believer in three relevant ways. First, God takes the initiative in Christ to express his love by ‘calling’ believers into relationship with himself (1 Cor 1:2, 9; 7:17, 27; 1 Thess 1:4). Believers are ‘beloved by God’ (1 Thess 1:4); they are those for whom Christ died (1 Cor 8:11). A believer’s love is a response to the prior initiative of God’s love (in 1 Thess 1:3–5, the believers’ love is a result of the gospel’s divine power; see also 1 Cor 8:3). Second, God defines what love is by showing that love definitively in Jesus’ self-giving death to save his sinful enemies (see 1 Cor 8:11; 10:33–11:1; Rom 5:8; 8:35, 39). Third, believers love only because of God’s agency by the Spirit to create and empower believers’ acts of love. In 1 Thessalonians, Paul prays that God would increase believers’ love for one another (3:12), and


32. Driving at the need for interpretation of tongues (14:13), Paul imagines a scenario in which a believer praises God in a tongue that is unintelligible to others, and thus fails to enable others to benefit from this praise (14:13–17). If this tongue were interpreted, it seems it would take the form of prayer to God, perhaps particularly a song (note use of ψαλλω in 14:15). It is also possible that interpretation yields intelligible speech similar to prophecy or teaching (as implied by 14:6). If Paul speaks in tongues to the Corinthian believers, he can only benefit them if he additionally speaks ‘by revelation, by knowledge, by prophecy, or by teaching’ (14:6). Perhaps these additional kinds of speech listed in 14:6 are examples of the form that ‘interpretation’ might take as well. See discussion in Forbes, _Prophecy_, 91–102; Dautzenberg, _Urchristliche Prophetie_, 234–38.


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claims they are ‘taught by God’ to love each other (4:9). The same divine involvement in believers’ love seems at play no less in 1 Corinthians (see Paul’s dialectic between his own and God’s agency in 1 Cor 15:10). These comments provide basic plausibility for the following reading of ch. 13, which features further discussion of this relationship between believers’ love and God’s love.

When Paul speaks of ‘love’ in 1 Corinthians 13, he refers to a believer’s love of other believers, because the ultimate goal is to help believers walk in the ‘way’ of love in their use of gifts (12:31; 14:1). Yet Paul’s comments upon the eschatological endurance of love lead one to question whether believers’ love participates in a love that transcends their own. Moreover, the description of love in vv. 4–7, strictly understood, depicts a perfect love, realized fully only by God in Christ. Nevertheless, throughout ch 13, love refers to a believer’s love for others, with the understanding that Paul’s conception of this love necessarily means it derives from and participates in God’s love in the ways outlined above.

The relationship between a believer’s love and her constructive speech emerges most clearly in vv. 1–3 and 8–13. These passages frame the description of love’s characteristics in vv. 4–7. The concrete expressions of love in vv. 4–7 demonstrate the proper relationship between love and the gifts as described in vv. 1–3 and 8–13. For this reason, I have postponed discussion of vv. 4–7 until after the examination of vv. 1–3 and 8–13.

### 7.3.2.1. 1 Corinthians 13:1–3

In 13:1–3, Paul claims that the gifts in themselves are useless and valueless unless one ‘possesses love’ (ἀγάπην ἔχω). Without love, the tongues-speaker himself becomes mere noise rather than one who delivers personal address to others (‘I have become a sounding brass or clashing cymbal’, 13:1). Without love, a person ‘is nothing’ (οὐθέν εἰμι), even though they may possess prophecy, knowledge of apocalyptic mysteries (as in 2:1, 7; 4:1; 15:51), knowledge of everything (‘all knowledge’), and miracle-working faith (13:2). The same applies even for the radically sacrificial behaviour of giving all of one’s possessions to

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36. See the phrase ‘is nothing’ also in 1 Cor 7:19, referring to the relativised value of circumcision and uncircumcision in comparison to the absolute value of ‘keeping God’s commandments’.

37. In 13:2, the scope of ‘all knowledge’ is contextually bounded by its pairing with ‘all mysteries’ as an object of the verb σῆκον, and also by the prior reference to prophecy, indicating that ‘all knowledge’ refers first to prophetic, revelatory knowledge as a special manifestation of the Spirit (as in 12:8). Yet to restrict the referent of ‘all knowledge’ in 13:2 to this kind of knowledge alone is not justifiable in light of the concern with knowledge and knowing in general in 13:8–13, to be argued below (with Schrage, *1 Korinther III*, 287–88).
others and oneself to death (13:3): without love, Paul says, ‘I gain nothing useful’ (οὐ δὲν ὑφέλομαι, 13:3).38

These verses claim that the exercise of love is the necessary condition for the beneficial use of gifts for others. Yet the role of love extends further. While Paul does not deny the value of the gifts, he grounds their value and even their existence exclusively in love. In Paul’s rhetoric, to take up the Spirit’s gifts without love results in an implosion: it brings about the nothingness of such behaviour and of such an acting self (the person becomes impersonal, meaningless noise, becomes ‘nothing’, 13:1–2).39 Not only are there no gifts apart from love (including ‘all knowledge’; see further below), there is no Christian self independent from being a self for others in love.

As will be further argued below in the discussion of 13:8–13, the love which grounds the existence and value of gifts is not less than a human set of dispositions and behaviours, though it is more. It must be more, because ‘love’ as a purely human set of dispositions cannot perform the role ascribed to it here in 13:1–3. The gifts are possibilities for believers created and sustained by God, not themselves (12:4–7). Thus, the ‘love’ which grounds the value and existence of these divinely-gifted capacities cannot be exclusively human, i.e., conceived independently from God’s activity in believers’ love, for believers have nothing that they have not received from God (1 Cor 4:7; their being ‘in Christ’ is ‘from God’, 1:30).

The relationship between love and gifts gains further clarity especially in 13:8–13. In these verses Paul develops the idea that ‘possessing love’ in 13:1–3 means to recognize the ways in which God conditions a believer’s life, particularly with respect to the ‘in part’ nature of the gifts, and indeed of all human knowledge.

7.3.2.2. 1 Corinthians 13:8–13

In 13:8, Paul contrasts love, which ‘never falls’ (οὐδὲπέπτει), and the gifts of prophecy, tongues, and knowledge. By the end of 13:12, the contrast has expanded to juxtapose love

38. I understand the passive verb ὑφέλομαι as referring to personal benefit or use ‘to me’ as part of a strategy to benefit others, but it could refer to ultimate soteriological benefit, as in 15:32 (for the latter, see Zeller, 1 Korinther, 410). It is unclear whether 13:3 originally read ἵνα καυχήσωμαι (‘so that I might boast’) or ἵνα καυθήσωμαι (‘so that I might be burned’), though the text-critical evidence favours the former. The internal evidence favours the latter for its greater sense (understood, e.g., as a possible reference to Dan 3), though difficulties remain (see discussion in Schrage, 1 Korinther III, 289–92; for internal support of the former as a plausible reading, see Zeller, 1 Korinther, 409–10).

with all present knowing as a believer, not just gifts per se.\textsuperscript{40} Love ‘never falls’, in the sense that it will not ‘cease’ (παύω) and be ‘abolished’ (καταργέω) in the eschatological future like the gifts and present, partial knowledge of God.\textsuperscript{41} This end is a future reality because (γάρ, v. 9) present knowing and prophesying is ‘in part’ (ἐκ μέρους, 13:9)\textsuperscript{42} in comparison to the future arrival of ‘that which is complete’ (τὸ τελεῖον), which abolishes what is partial (13:10). By the arrival of ‘the complete’ or ‘the perfect’, Paul speaks of the eschatological parousia, the ‘day of the Lord’ (see similar language used in 1 Cor 1:8; 4:5; 15:23–24), which brings the abolishment of present knowing by the establishment of a qualitatively different ‘knowing as we are known’ by God, as Paul elaborates in 13:12 (see discussion further below). The use of καταργέω recalls the present and eschatological destruction of the rulers of the present age (1 Cor 2:6; 15:24, 26). Throughout 13:8–13, God is the source of the gifts and partial knowledge, but also the one who renders them ‘partial’ by bringing about their end and establishing a different order of knowing altogether.

Paul develops this contrast between love and knowing with two illustrations. First, present gifts and knowing are ‘in part’ in that they are like a child’s ‘speaking’ (λαλέω), ‘understanding’ (ϕρονέω, cf. Rom 12:3; Acts 28:22), and ‘reasoning’ (λογίζομαι; cf. 1 Cor 4:1; 13:5; Phil 3:13). The present gifts will be abolished in the same way that a person, having become mature, ‘abolishes’ or ‘sets aside’ ‘what is childish’ (τὰ τοῦ νηπίου). The burden of the illustration is to show the qualitative discontinuity between mature and childish thinking (even if logically there remain forms of continuity). Paul Gooch rightly attends to the force of

\textsuperscript{40} Ian Scott argues that the referent of knowledge and knowing in vv. 8–13 is ‘almost certainly charismatic revelation, not the fruit of ordinary rational thought’ because if human knowing in general passed away, faith would too, given its close connection with knowledge (Ian W. Scott, Implicit Epistemology, 67). But this is to forget, as Gooch points out, that a different order of knowing ‘as we are known’ will obtain in the eschaton (13:12). It is also based on Scott’s vague distinction between believers’ ‘ordinary rational thought’ and their knowing by God’s special revelation, which is a feature of his work elsewhere. Scott misreads Gooch in his favour on this point (see Paul W. Gooch, Partial Knowledge, 144–45).

Fee argues that the knowledge of vv. 8–13 is not ‘ordinary human knowing or learning’, but ‘that special manifestation of the Spirit’, which ‘has to do especially with “knowing” the ways of God in the present age’ (referring to 12:8; 13:2; Fee, I Corinthians, 644). Yet, Fee interprets 13:12 to refer to the incomplete nature of our knowledge of God in general (Fee, I Corinthians, 648). Again the vague distinction is made between ‘ordinary human knowing’ and instances of supernatural knowing. It is unclear how instances of knowing God’s ways in the present can be separated from knowledge of God, self, and others in general. Gooch’s discussion is most helpful on this point: Paul does not simply denigrate the specific content or particular use of some gifts, but places all human knowing of God and all gifts (including Paul’s own) in their properly limited frame of reference. Paul’s argument about the superiority of love in contrast to all gifts would fall flat if he were only speaking of ‘knowing’ with reference to the particular content and instances of prophecy, tongues, or a ‘word of knowledge’. If that were true, then there could be present human knowing that is not conditioned in the same way by love and by the qualitative distinction revealed in the eschaton between God’s knowing and present human knowing. See Schrag, I Korinther III, 315, n. 214, and further discussion below.

\textsuperscript{41} For παύω in this sense, cf. Rom 11:11; 22; 14:4; I Cor 10:8, 12; Luke 16:17. One might understand ‘love never falls’ simply as a negative restatement of v. 7, but this does not appreciate ἀδελφός, signaling discourse development in 13:8, nor the inclusio formed with 13:13 (with Schrag, I Korinther III, 304–5).

\textsuperscript{42} See Philo, Leg. 1.78 for a similar contrast between φρονήσεις which is καθόλου, ‘universal’, identified as God’s, and that which is ‘particular’, merely human, ἐκ μέρους.
this image: it is not as though childish knowing differs from adult knowing only by lacking data (as though missing pieces of a jigsaw), but by having a qualitatively different epistemological perspective. The metaphor concerns cognitive activity in general (‘speaking’, ‘understanding’, ‘reasoning’), indicating that Paul discusses gifts and their cognitive entailments in general throughout 13:8–12 (not just prophecy, tongues, and instances of gifted knowing).

Second, in v. 12, Paul equates partial knowing and use of the gifts with indirect and unresolved sight: ‘now we see by means of a mirror, in a riddle’ (13:12a). The force of seeing ‘by means of a mirror’ is to describe present sight as mediated, indirect, and thus inferior in comparison to future, unmediated sight ‘face to face’ with God in the eschaton (13:12b; cf. Gen 32:31 LXX; Exod 33:11; Deut 5:4; 34:10; Ezek 20:35; Matt 18:10; Rev 22:4). The imagery likely draws on Num 12:8, in which God compares his revelation to Moses, which is ‘mouth to mouth’ (MT: פה פה פה) and ‘not in riddles’ (οῦ δι’ αἰνηγμάτων), with his revelation to other prophets through visions and dreams alone. Present knowing remains unresolved, like unsatisfactory attempts to solve a riddle. God is the intended object of the present gaze ‘by means of a mirror, in a riddle’, but what is seen is a puzzling reflection of God, not God in himself.

In the second half of v. 12, present knowing ‘in part’ contrasts with complete future knowing ‘as I have been truly known’ (i.e., known by God, cf. 1 Cor 8:3; Gal 4:9; Rom 8:28–30). As God brings the nullification of partial knowing in the parousia (13:10), so too God is the ultimate subject of complete knowing, i.e., the one on the basis of whose knowing a believer comes to know fully (e.g., to know God, self, others, etc.). As in 13:1–3, Paul

43. Paul W. Gooch, Partial Knowledge, 146–47.
44. Gerhard Dautzenberg argues that this sight refers particularly to prophetic vision (Dautzenberg, Urchristliche Prophette, 149–225); followed with some adjustments by Schrage, I Korinther III, 309–10. Dautzenberg’s position is well argued and plausible, but it does not seem that Paul’s concern is so narrowly focused on prophetic vision given the parallel between ‘seeing’ and ‘knowing’ in the two halves of v. 12, and the general language of v. 11 as discussed above (with, e.g., Wischmeyer, Der höchste Weg, 131–35; Zeller, I Korinther, 416–18; Schnabel, I Korinther, 778).
45. See discussion in Paul W. Gooch, Partial Knowledge, 147–51; Schrage, I Korinther III, 310–12.
47. Miguens proposes that in v. 12, present ‘seeing’ and ‘knowing in part’ is not sight of God or knowledge of God, but an intellectual understanding of the mysteries of the Christian faith (drawing upon 13:2, and seeking to respect the absolute use of the two verbs without an expressed object; Emanuel Miguens, “I Cor 13:8–13 Reconsidered,” CBQ 37 [1975]: 81–87). The difficulty with this distinction is that it is unclear how all knowledge of the Christian faith can be something other than a form of knowing God. Paul is comfortable to some degree to speak of ‘knowing God’ as shorthand for the transition from having no faith to having faith (Gal 4:8–9).
48. The adverb καθός here signals analogy between future human knowing and the knowing that God has, rather than signalling a cause-effect relationship between the two (as, e.g., in 1 Cor 1:6). It seems nevertheless logically required that God’s knowing be the basis for future human knowing. In Paul’s eschatological schema there is no other knowing available, for all other human knowing has been abolished. Yet in itself, καθός need not indicate this relationship.
49. The different order of knowing is also signaled by the change from γνώσκο to ἐπιγνώσκο (with, e.g., Zeller, I Korinther, 418).
thinks of a Christian self as constituted by relationship with God, shown in the reciprocity of knowing ‘face to face’ and the sole basis of future knowing as rooted in the knowledge that God possesses.\textsuperscript{50}

Throughout 13:8–12, Paul has advanced a qualitative difference between present knowing ‘in part’ and future knowing ‘as we are known’ by God. The difference between these two forms of knowing entails the abolishment, not the development, of present knowledge. This difference is not just between qualitative stages of a believer’s present human knowing, but the qualitative difference between human knowing and divine knowing. This is clear in 13:12, and intimated in 13:10 in that ‘the complete’ is a divine eschatological reality.\textsuperscript{51}

This qualitative difference in knowledge remains even when one recalls that present human knowing of God is Spirit-empowered. Believers do actually ‘see’ and ‘know’ God by the Spirit in the present, though in part (13:12). Paul is no sceptic. The Spirit, who knows the depths of God, has revealed God’s own wisdom to believers (2:10–12; cf. 1:30). The Corinthians have been ‘made rich in all knowledge’ in Christ (1:6). There is continuity between ‘now’ and ‘then’: the identity of believers and God will endure in some sense; the believers will be subjects of ‘knowing’ then, though in a different way; love between God and the believers will endure. Yet this continuity is not a possession of the believer alone, but is an ongoing work of God by the Spirit. All present knowledge remains ‘in a riddle’, ‘in part’.

To attend to this tension is precisely Paul’s goal. By maintaining a qualitative difference between present, Spirit-empowered knowing and future ‘knowing as we have been

\textsuperscript{50} See discussion in Wischmeyer, Der höchste Weg, 140–43.


Emanuel Miguens argues that 13:8–13 concerns development of knowledge within the present, from immature to mature faith, following the maturity distinctions present in 1 Cor 2:6; 3:1; 14:20 (Miguens, “1 Cor 13:8–13,” 87–91). Miguens rightly wants to retain the sense that future knowing will still be human knowing, but he wrongly infers that present knowing therefore develops into future knowing, and can never be qualitatively different, a kind of knowing as God knows. Commenting on καθιστάμενος in the clause ‘knowing as I have been truly known’ (13:12d), Miguens comments, ‘of course, it cannot mean the same degree of knowledge in God and in man’ (Miguens, “1 Cor 13:8–13,” 93). He gives no explanation for this assumption. However, a transition in knowing to the ‘same’ degree of knowing that God has himself (in some sense) is what Paul seems to be claiming. This remains the case even if humans cannot know as God knows in every way, for then they would transcend the creator/creature distinction and cease to be human (see Wischmeyer, Der höchste Weg, 141, n. 457). Miguens’ reading is unequal to account for the contrast between love and gifts in 13:8, for if the ‘then’ of 13:8–13 consists only in a later state of Christian maturity before the eschaton, it makes no sense to say the gifts will ‘then’ be ‘rendered inoperative’ (Miguens’ translation), ‘when Christian life attains a fullness where only agapē is the driving force in this development towards full manhood in Christ’ (Miguens, “1 Cor 13:8–13,” 96–97). In the present, Paul champions love and gifts, and does not expect the gifts to pass away before the eschaton (14:1, 39). See also the discussion of Miguens’ reading among Standaert, Ellis, and Murphy O’Connor in Benoît Standaert, “1 Corinthians 13,” in Charisma und Agape, ed. Lorenzo De Lorenzi (Rome: Benedictina, 1983), 139–42.
known’, Paul likely combats what he views as some Corinthian believers’ dysfunctional understanding of the gifts and knowing, i.e., an understanding that does not make a qualitative distinction between present knowing and God’s own knowing. This dysfunction perhaps took the wrong cues from the experience of God’s power to know him and to possess gifts by which God manifests himself to others. Insofar as believers failed to recognize their partial knowing, they failed to recognize the qualitative difference between themselves and their transcendent God.

In 13:13, Paul asserts that love ‘remains’ (µένει) with faith and hope. It seems that this statement refers to the present significance of love in light of its eschatological difference from gifts and knowing ‘in part’. Love ‘remains’ in the present as the fundamental mode (with faith and hope, cf. 13:7) in which believers’ partial knowing and gifts operate, because love ‘remains’ in the eschaton beyond present knowing (already in 13:8).

What does the eschatology of 13:8–13 entail for the present use of gifts and knowledge by believers? All interpreters must confront this question, even if one has an exclusively future understanding of µένει, for Paul intends to shape present relationships between believers in Corinth with his comments in 13:8–13. One may obviously dismiss the idea that Paul’s aim in 13:8–13 is to supplant the use of gifts in the present with the exercise of love. The first directive given on the basis of chapter 13 is to seek love and the gifts (14:1).

One may also reject the interpretation that love ‘remains’ in the sense that present acts of love, and believers’ moral character enabling them, have an absolute validity or authority unconditioned by the qualitative distinction between creature and creator, between present and eschaton. Paul’s aim in vv. 8–13 is not to claim human expressions of love in themselves to be sufficient for benefitting others. If love ‘remains’ beyond present knowing of God into the eschaton, then the ‘love’ which remains must transcend believers’ present expressions of love as well, for those expressions are conditioned by present partial knowing too (see, e.g., the link between love, knowledge, and perception in Phil 1:9; 2:2).

To ‘have love’ is not to realize God’s perfect love in the present, even if it necessarily involves loving moral agency in...
imitation of Christ. Paul’s argument does not promote a gifted human capacity in itself that can transcend the eschatological boundary he has drawn, even though he remains concerned to change concrete human behaviour. If this were Paul’s goal, he would be committing the same misstep that he seeks to correct, i.e., championing certain Spirit-empowered phenomena as having absolute value over others in the present. A believer’s acts of love in the present are no more Spirit-empowered; their gifts and present knowing are no less. Whether it is tongues or particular instances of kindness (or endurance, etc.), identifying one instance of believers’ behaviour as unconditioned by partial knowing in contrast to others is to cause divisions in the body, and thus to act without love for God or others.

As argued above, a believer’s gift or loving act in itself (whether speech, sacrificial behaviour, etc.) is a necessary but not sufficient condition for constructing another (13:3). Rather, all gifts, knowing, and expressions of love are media through which the Spirit works to effect construction. All such media are ‘in part’; they need not be identified with God’s perfect moral character or knowledge to be used in this way. These claims do not eliminate the significance of the believer’s action, render this action less human, nor entail an ‘anything goes’ approach to the character of this action. Rather, they properly situate the action theologically as God uses it within the divine economy of moral construction in the interdependent community.

Love ‘remains’, then, not primarily as a present behaviour or disposition belonging to the Spirit-empowered believer (it does involve this), but fundamentally as participation in a relationship beyond oneself with God and other believers. Participation in this relationship in the present ‘remains’ into the eschaton because its ‘remaining’ is not dependent upon some aspect of the believers’ ‘partial’ moral character or knowledge, but upon believers being known by God, i.e., being recipients of God’s love alongside others. In the present, believers participate in that love by modelling their lives with one another in accordance with the prior gift of God’s love, as seen in the characteristics describing love in 13:4–7.

55. Many commentators are concerned not to link love in 1 Cor 13 with a human virtue, especially Protestants; for general discussion see Jennifer A. Herdt, Putting on Virtue: The Legacy of the Splendid Vices (Chicago; London: University of Chicago Press, 2008). It is a complex task to discern precisely what is at stake in the claim that love here is not a virtue. In my understanding, Paul’s statements can be compatible with a virtue theory insofar as love is not reduced exclusively to a human disposition apart from God’s agency. Love is not just a virtue so construed. Yet, God’s involvement in believer’s acts of love is transcendent and does not render a believer’s loving behaviour less human (i.e., as not having the character of human moral agency which could be described by a virtue theory). Nevertheless, Paul’s concern to relativise human action in comparison to God’s agency points to a lack of concern for developing a moral psychology of love to ground its eschatological endurance. Because all knowing and loving is in part, the achievement of a particular state of moral character and psychology is not preeminent (but not irrelevant insofar as a believer must still act in love). See further discussion below.


57. See, e.g., Spicq, Agapè, Vol. 2, 115; Schrage, I Korinther III, 319; Söding, Das Liebesgebot, 144–45.
The characteristics of love parallel Paul’s own description of God and his love, further indicating the analogical relationship between believers’ love and God’s love. Believers seek to imitate God’s love for others whom he has loved, in the way God has loved them. Despite the lack of explicit reference to Christ here, believer’s love is christologically-shaped, in keeping with God’s definitive expression of his self-giving love in Christ. Already we have seen Paul refer to Christ’s dying for the benefit of others as a basis for adapting to those who are weak (1 Cor 8:11; 11:1; see ch. six). The Christ-imitating, self-limiting posture of love obtains in each predicate listed in 13:4–7.

As argued above, this list of love’s characteristics should be understood in relation to 13:1–3, 8–13. These qualities of love take shape in reference to Paul’s wider discussion in chs. 12 and 14, for which the proper relationship between love and knowledge is fundamental. First of all, these verses describe the character of those who acknowledge the limitations of their knowledge in part, unlike those who misuse the gifts in order to create status distinctions and divisions among believers. In this way, e.g., love is not ‘jealous’, it does not ‘boast’, it is not ‘arrogant’. Believers who love thus do not forget that they have nothing they have not received from God (1 Cor 4:7). Second, these verses describe the character of believers who use their gifts in accordance with the fact that God gave them to benefit others in the interdependent body of Christ (ch. 12). In this way, e.g., love ‘does not seek its own benefit’, it ‘rejoices with the truth’. Third, the qualities of love describe the believer who abides by the protocol for the loving use of gifts as described in ch. 14. This protocol includes speaking intelligibly for the benefit of others (and thus interpreting tongues, 14:1–19, 27–28), allowing others to critically judge one’s own speech (14:29), and restricting one’s own speech to allow all others to participate (14:29–33; e.g., love ‘endures all’). This protocol and its relation to love receives further discussion below. Just as love ‘does not act unfittingly’ in the exercise of gifts (οὐκ ἀσχημονεῖ, 13:5) believers who love do everything ‘fittingly’ (εὐσχημόνως, 14:40). By acting in accordance with this protocol, which is animated by recognition of one’s place in the body of Christ and one’s partial knowledge in relation to God, believers demonstrate love. Believers’ love may be called a ‘love beyond knowledge’, in that they love according to the values of God’s love, not their own, recognising their ‘partial knowledge’ and utter dependence upon God.

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58. See discussion in Wischmeyer, Der höchste Weg, 92–116; Söding, Das Liebesgebot, 133–43.
59. See Paul W. Gooch, Partial Knowledge, 156–57.
7.3.2.4. Summary

Section 7.3 has reviewed the content and character of constructive speech. Whatever its specific form and content, all speech serves to reveal God to others for their morally constructive benefit. Prophecy is Paul’s exemplar of such speech, but not to the exclusion of other forms.

Love, the character of constructive speech, is the necessary mode in which all such speech functions. The discussion of ch. 13 has a number of important ramifications for this chapter. God’s own love is prior to and determinative of believers’ love. The examination of partial knowing (vv. 8–13) further establishes the qualitative distinction made in 12:7 between all human knowing (with its derivative speech and action) and God’s self-revelation through that speech. Offered in love, believers’ gifts serve as media through which God reveals himself, and are not to be identified with God’s revelation itself. Believers exercise ‘love beyond knowledge’ as they act in accordance with God’s determination of value beyond their own, in recognition of their limited knowledge and utter dependence upon God.

7.4. The Effects and Reception of Constructive Speech

We turn now to discuss the effects of constructive speech in love and the dynamics of its reception. As previously said, ‘construction’ occurs when God encounters believers through particular instances of inspired speech (12:7). Construction is synonymous with ‘benefiting’ others (ὠφελέσω, 14:6), and is thus bound with the ‘shared benefit’, τὸ συμφέρον, worked by God, 12:7).\(^{60}\) The object of constructive speech should be others in the ἐκκλησία, as a whole and individually, not the self (see ἐκκλησία as object in 14:4–5; ὁ ἑτερος, 14:17; ἀλλος, 14:19). In what follows I provide an overview of the constructive effects described in ch. 14, followed by discussion of the process by which believers received construction.

7.4.1. The Effects of Constructive Speech

As noted above, the descriptions of constructing effects in ch. 14 conceptually blend together and cannot be easily distinguished from one another, just as with the content of constructive speech. Here there is no attempt to isolate particular modes of construction (e.g., to separate

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exhortation from judgement), but rather to understand all as part of a wider moral construction process.61

In 14:3, the one who prophesies speaks ‘exhortation’, and ‘comfort’ (παράκλησις, παραμυθία). It seems that παράκλησις refers generally here to the exhortation of others to concrete action in faithfulness to God (as in, e.g., 1 Thess 2:3; Rom 12:1; cf. παρακαλέω in 1 Cor 1:10; 4:16; 16:12, 15; 1 Thess 4:1, 10; 5:14).62 It could also have the sense of ‘encouragement’ or ‘comfort’ (as in, e.g., Phlm 7; 2 Cor 1:3–7; Rom 15:4), and would thus be essentially synonymous with παραμυθία, ‘comfort’ (for which see Phil 2:1; παραμυθέωμαι in John 11:19; 31; 1 Thess 2:12; 5:14). One finds prophetic speech with the intended effects of comfort and exhortation in 1 Thess 4:13–18 and 1 Cor 15:51–58, both referring to the resurrection of the dead. The verbs παρακαλέω and παραμυθέωμαι are coordinated in 1 Thess 2:12, along with ‘imply’ (μαρτύρομαι), summarily describing Paul’s exhortation toward the Thessalonian believers to ‘live worthily of God’ (τὸ περιπατεῖν ὑμᾶς ἀξίως τοῦ θεοῦ) as he introduced them to the gospel and instructed them in faith. In παράκλησις and παραμυθία, it seems one should envision speech that urges others to new actions or dispositions in faith, encourages or strengthens believers in their current course of faith, and/or offers comfort or support in difficulty.63

In 14:16–17, construction takes the form of prayer to God (in thanks, or in praise)64 so that another believer may say ‘amen’ in response (note also ψαλμός in 14:26).65 In keeping with Paul’s schema throughout chs. 12–14, the prayer offered to God (even in a tongue) in the presence of others should be understood as a gift to others, a medium of God’s self-revelation,

61. Paul’s discussion does not provide the distinctions needed to make such specifications. For a similar approach which lumps these phenomena together, see, e.g., Philip Vielhauer, Oikodome. Das Bild vom Bau in der christlichen Literatur vom Neuen Testament bis Clemens Alexandrinus, Reprint [1979], ed. Gunter Klein (Karlsruhe-Durlach: Tron, 1940), 87; David Hill, New Testament Prophecy, Marshalls Theological Library (London: Marshall, Morgan & Scott, 1979), 118–38; Müller, Prophetic, 19–46; Conzelmann, 1 Corinthians, 234.

62. In 14:8, Paul claims that unintelligible speech is like an indistinct trumpet blast that fails to communicate a call to battle. This seems to provide indirect evidence that constructive speech can call people to concrete action, in Paul’s imagination (as with παράκλησις in general).

63. Verbs coordinate with παρακαλέω elsewhere in Pauline and deutero-Pauline literature are ‘construct’ (οἰκοδομία; 1 Thess 5:11); strengthen (στηρίζω, 1 Thess 3:2; 2 Thess 2:17); ‘imply’ or ‘affirm’ (μαρτύρωμαι, 1 Thess 2:12); ‘ask’ or ‘beg’ (δέομαι, 2 Cor 5:20; 10:2; κροτάω, 1 Thess 4:1); ‘forgive’ (χαρίζωμαι, 2 Cor 7:); command (παραγγέλλω, 2 Thess 3:12); teach (διδάσκω, 2 Tim 6:2; cf. 1 Tim 4:13; Titus 1:9); ‘convict’ and ‘rebuke’ (ἐλέγξω, ἐπιτιμῶ, 2 Tim 4:2). In Phlm 9, παρακάλεσθαι is opposed to ‘command’ (ἐπιτάσσω, v. 8; cf. the contrast between ἐπιτάσσω and παρακάλεσθαι in 1 Tim 5:1, but also the coordination of παρακάλεσθαι and ἐλέγξω ‘with all authority’, μετὰ πάσης ἐπιταγῆς). This distinction should not be applied to 1 Cor 14, as though inspired speech could never take the form of a command.

64. God is the implied object in 14:16, as inferred from the discussion of prayer to God (θεὸς, 14:2), and similar usage elsewhere (Josephus, A.J. 7.380; Luke 1:64; 24:53; 1 Chr 29:10 LXX). There is significant overlap between thanksgiving and praise semantically, as blessing can be a form of thanks (as in Luke 2:28–32; 24:30; 1 Cor 10:16).

65. The ἵδωτής of 14:16 is rightly understood as another believer who is made into an ‘outsider’ by being unable to understand uninterpreted tongues (with e.g., Schrage, 1 Korinther III, 402; Elim Hiu, Regulations Concerning Tongues and Prophecy in 1 Corinthians 14.26–40, LNTS 406 [New York: T & T Clark, 2010], 62; Fee, 1 Corinthians, 673.)
and thus indispensable for the good of others. Admittedly, Paul is not concerned here to spell out how this works to construct others, nor to define how praise of God fits within the moral life of a believer. To say ‘amen’ entails an affirmation and appropriation of what has been said by the one who prays (as in OT usage, e.g., 1 Chr 16:36; Neh 8:6; Ps 41:13). The prayer is not an optional nicety, nor redundant with the praise or thanksgiving that could be offered without it, but is an indispensable and constitutive part of other believers’ worship of God. This instance of construction is most helpful for present purposes as evidence of the nature of construction in general, i.e., leading others to interaction with God.

In two instances, construction takes the form of instruction. These effects partially overlap conceptually with exhortation (14:3), and critique (14:24–25, examined below). In 14:19, Paul contrasts his wish to speak ‘five words with my mind’ (i.e., words intelligible to others) ‘so that I might instruct others’ (ινα καὶ ἄλλους κατηχήσω), rather than thousands in an unintelligible tongue. Virtually any form or content of speech is in view (which is Paul’s rhetorical point!), making it difficult to specify the nature of the instruction. In 14:31, all prophesy ‘so that all might learn and all might be exhorted’ (ινα πάντες μανθανοῦσιν καὶ πάντες παρακαλῶνται). The effect of learning from prophetic speech coordinates with ‘being exhorted’, without clear differentiation. At least these instances of learning and instruction further expand the possible effects of construction to include positive teaching, rather than simply affirmation of what is already understood.

Lastly, in vv. 20–25, the critical nature of constructive speech comes into view. Here Paul makes a pointed contrast between the effects of uninterpreted tongues and the effects of prophecy in an effort to persuade Corinthian believers to be ‘mature’ in their thinking about

67. To limit it to ‘dogmatic’ instruction seems overly specific (so Conzelmann, 1 Corinthians, 240). See the general use of the verb κατηχέω in Rom 2:18; Acts 18:25; 21:21. In Gal 6:6, Paul seems to refer to community leaders who ‘teach the word’ to others.
68. See μαθήματος in, e.g., Rom 16:17; 1 Cor 4:6; Phil 4:9, 11; Col 1:7. Schrage unsatisfactorily differentiates this instruction as ‘im Sinne praktischen Lernens’ (as in Phil 4:11; 1 Cor 4:6) without explanation or support (Schrage, 1 Korinther III, 455, n. 523).
tongues (14:20). If an outsider, a non-believer,\textsuperscript{70} observed a meeting in which all believers spoke in tongues without interpretation, they would declare, ‘You are mad!’ The declaration (μάνεσθε) could refer either to the claim that the believers are ‘out of their minds’ and thus not worthy of credibility, or it could refer to the claim that the believers are ‘raving’ with an inspired madness akin to other non-Christian Greco-Roman religious experiences.\textsuperscript{71} In both cases, the outsider does not receive benefit from encounter with God, but is rather turned away from God by being misdirected by the believers. The tongues would be unintelligible, and would make no positive contribution to the non-believer.\textsuperscript{72} If a non-believer visited when all prophesy to one another,\textsuperscript{73} however, he would be ‘convicted by all’ (ἐλέγχω)\textsuperscript{74}; ‘judged by all’ (ἀνακρίνω)\textsuperscript{75}, and ‘what is hidden in his heart becomes known’, i.e., he would become fully aware of the aspects of his life that conflict with the character of God.

‘What is hidden’ likely refers to the person’s inner life that is hidden from view, requiring God’s agency to clarify and evaluate (with either a positive or negative judgement to follow; see 1 Cor 4:5, where God’s judgement of τὰ κρυπτά leads to praise). This interpretation of ‘what is hidden’ assumes that the outsider did not previously think of himself as having sinned before God (it was hidden to himself, for he did not think in terms of his relation to God, being ἄπιστος). It could also refer to aspects of his life that he has actively...

\textsuperscript{70} T. J. Lang has argued that the ἄπιστοι of the Corinthian correspondence were individuals who shared intimate relationships with the believers (via, e.g., marriage, meals, participation in Christian gatherings, and legal arbitration) such that they sat on the border between insider and outsider; see T. J. Lang, “Trouble with Insiders: The Social Profile of the ἄπιστοι in Paul’s Corinthian Correspondence,” JBL (Forthcoming). Lang proposes that the ἄπιστοι of 14:20–25 is one who does not hold exclusive allegiance to God, but may be attempting to hold multiple religious allegiances at once as he negotiates relationship on the boundaries of the believing Corinthian community. Lang succeeds in pointing out that an ἄπιστος may in fact have strong ties to the community, but it is not clear that the ἄπιστοι form a defined group distinct from all other outsiders in every case. With respect to 14:20–25, it seems that the ἰδίωται and ἄπιστοι are effectively synonymous, referring generally to a person who is not loyal to God as revealed in the gospel, and thus an outsider, a non-believer (with, e.g., Paul Trebilco, “Creativity at the Boundary: Features of the Linguistic and Conceptual Construction of Outsiders in the Pauline Corpus,” NTS 60 [2014]: 187; Zeller, 1 Korinther, 431–32).

\textsuperscript{71} See discussion in, e.g., Schrage, 1 Korinther III, 410.

\textsuperscript{72} The tongues would thus serve as a ‘sign’ of their exclusion from the believing community, as Paul seems to indicate by his citation of Isa 28:11–12 in 14:21. I interpret Paul’s statement about tongues and prophecy functioning ‘as a sign’ for non-believers and believers, respectively (14:22), to refer to the differing effects of the two phenomena upon others (a sign of God’s judgement and thus disadvantage to others, or a sign of God’s agency for the benefit of others). See particularly the discussion in Schrage, 1 Korinther III, 406–9; Fee, 1 Corinthians, 680–83; Thiselton, 1 Corinthians, 1122–26.

\textsuperscript{73} It is most likely that the prophetic speech directly addresses other believers, and only indirectly addresses the visitor (other believers are the intended recipient of prophetic speech throughout ch. 14; against, e.g., Zeller, 1 Korinther, 432; Dautzenberg, Urchristliche Prophetie, 247). Neither the phrase ‘by all’ (Dautzenberg), nor the likelihood that a prophet would address particular sins (Zeller), requires that the speech be directly addressed to the visitor (of course it remains possible). It is also not necessary to suppose that those who speak prophetically have special knowledge of the visitor’s internal life by which they expose him (with, e.g., Schrage, 1 Korinther III, 412).

\textsuperscript{74} I.e., he is ‘exposed’ to facilitate recognition of his fault, cf. Matt 18:15; Luke 3:19; Ign. Phld. 7:1 (with, e.g., Dautzenberg, Urchristliche Prophetie, 248).

\textsuperscript{75} I.e., an ‘examination’ that results in identification of fault; see, e.g., 1 Cor 2:14–15; 4:3–4; 9:3; Lev 19:17 LXX; Jude 15 (with, e.g., Thiselton, 1 Corinthians, 1128; Dautzenberg, Urchristliche Prophetie, 248).
hidden, but can hide no longer (like ‘what is hidden out of shame’ in 2 Cor 4:2). In either case, I understand this effect of prophetic speech to be broadly analogous to the critical function of frank speech in Philodemus.

One might object to the use of 14:24–25 as evidence of typical constructive speech between believers because it seems this is an exceptional case involving an outsider. Is it the case that the same critical effect would obtain generally between believers? It seems rather that 14:24–25 is the paradigmatic case of construction, for it is the most detailed description of construction in chapter 14, and it dovetails precisely with the nature of gifted speech as a manifestation of God (12:7; note that the visitor responds first to God in worship, discussed further below). Insofar as one who is ἐπιστόμος comes to worship God, he has become an insider, a believer. The effects and reception of prophetic speech partly constitute this change. Moreover, the effects of 14:24–25 conceptually blur into the other effects of construction already discussed. There could also be, e.g., a critical function presupposed within the exhortative and instructive effects of construction. Elsewhere Paul assumes that believers in general would exercise a similar critical role toward one another (see 1 Cor 5 [κρίνω]; 2 Cor 2:6 [ἐξεκριμένα]; 1 Thess 5:14; Rom 15:14 [νουθετεῖον]). The fact that these other critical functions are not linked to spiritually gifted speech is not an indication that they are different in kind than the speech of 1 Cor 12–14.

Nor should one assume that this critical element of constructive speech applies only to new or immature believers. While there is growth in maturity as a believer, no one is protected from critique by their maturity, for all know in part, and all are addressed by the transcendent God in construction (see further discussion on this point in section 6 below).

In sum, generally speaking, construction includes all aspects of a morally formative process. Construction can range from comforting affirmation to searching criticism. It can involve strengthening another’s existing moral life and behaviour, or urging a radically new course. The one who constructs could simply offer a needed reminder, or provide fresh instruction (regardless of speech form, whether as a revelation from God, or as an instance of teaching, or with a song, etc.). These effects presuppose some kind of observable moral development (though the precise nature of this is not specified).

In all instances, construction relates others to God, because God orients the moral life of all believers and is personally active in the construction process to bring constructive benefit through his encounter with believers. It is especially in the reception of construction, to be discussed next, that this God-oriented process emerges most clearly.

76. 1 Cor 4:5; 2 Cor 4:2; Rom 2:16. See especially Stephen J. Chester, Conversion at Corinth: Perspectives on Conversion in Paul’s Theology and the Corinthian Church, SNTW (London; New York: T&T Clark, 2003), 114–25.
77. In Lib., fr. 42.6–12, Philodemus uses ἀνωκρινα to describe the teacher’s examination of students for yet-to-be-acknowledged faults, in contrast to faults voluntarily offered for correction by the students (fr. 42). See also ἐλεγχα in Lib., col. 16b.7–8, with reference to the exposure of pretence by frank speech, and ἔξελεγκται in col. 23a in reference to the rich who do not respond positively to those who ‘convict’ them.
7.4.2. Reception of Construction

In examining the reception of constructive speech, let us return to 14:24–25. These verses exhibit the same basic relational structure described in 12:7, i.e., God reveals himself through inspired speech for the benefit of others. I argue that these verses provide a paradigmatic description of receiving constructive speech for these chapters.

It is critical to observe the response of the visitor in v. 25. By means of the prophetic speech (οὗτος, ‘thereby’), the person ‘worships’ God (προσκυνέω), entailing a response of repentance and submission in faith. The former non-believer responds directly to those present who exposed his faults, but only as an expression of his worshipping response to God, and only to proclaim that God is among them.

This instance of construction, like Philodemean frank criticism, involves the identification of moral failure by others, the recipient’s acknowledgement of his failures, and his commitment to change in accordance with the guidance of others (14:24–25). However, prophetic speech claims to speak for God, and the recipient responds to God in responding to this speech. Responding to God necessarily entails ongoing relationships of trusting acceptance toward believers who speak for God, and who thus help one develop moral dispositions and behaviours in accordance with faithful response to God. Yet the visitor does not respond in faith to the believers themselves, nor does he simply commit to their God-oriented moral framework as a model toward which he should strive. Rather, he responds in faith to God himself who personally interacts with him in and through the speech of others.

Beyond 14:24–25, discerning reception of speech receives discussion also in 14:29. Here Paul turns to discuss guidelines for prophetic speech: ‘Let two or three prophets speak, and let the others judge’. This evaluation is not just acceptance of the speech as God’s

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78. This understanding of οὗτος is similar to instances in, e.g., 1 Cor 7:17, 36; 11:28; 1 Thess 4:17; Rom 5:12; Gal 6:12.
79. As for προσκυνέω in, e.g., Matt 18:26; Num 22:31 LXX.
80. I understand the participial phrase beginning ἀπεργέλλων ὅτι... as expressing the manner in which the non-believer ‘worships’ God (προσκυνήσει), just as does the phrase ‘falling on his face’ (προσώπων ἐπὶ πρόσωπον).
81. By this response it is likely that something of what was ‘hidden’ becomes known also to the community, for the previous content of prophetic speech would be indicative in some way (and it is unreasonable to exclude this, assuming there would be further conversation and relationship after the declaration). The constructive effect of prophetic speech is public, not private, but there still remains a distinction between the visitor’s encounter with God and his encounter with the community.
82. In Lib. fr. 41, Philodemus condemns those who hide (κρύπτω, λαθραιοπραγεῖο) their own faults as most unfriendly (ὡς ἠλθούσων, 41.3). They will gain no benefit from doing so, and they will be found out by the sage anyway. In fr. 79N, there is a potential reference to hiding faults in an unknown context, ‘... κρύπτειν τὰς ἁμαρτίας...’ (79N.8–9), with the reconstruction of Gigante, Ricerche Filodeme, 101–2.
83. As Chester argues, the response entails a shift in social belonging: now the moral life of the visitor is defined by reception of these believers’ claims about himself in relation to God as opposed to the moral claims of alternative social networks. See Chester, Conversion, 121–25.
84. The verb διακρίνω here likely refers to evaluative judgement, most similar to judging a dispute between two people (as it is used in 1 Cor 6:5).
speech, but a critical evaluation and appropriation of the speech’s content and character as God’s own for oneself and others. It seems ‘others’ in 14:29 refers to all others present, not simply to other prophets. In 1 Thess 5:21, the community as a whole is to ‘test everything’ (πάντα δὲ δοκιμάζετε). This command follows immediately upon the injunction not to ‘despise’ prophecy (προφητείας μὴ ἐξουθενέτε, 5:20), so prophetic speech is assumed as one object of communal evaluation. It does not seem likely that Paul would restrict evaluation of prophecy to other prophets in Corinth, but fail to specify this limitation in Thessalonika, even if there were some individuals with a particular gift of discernment.

The qualification enabling others to judge speech seems simply to be that they are believers who possess the Spirit (they are πνευματικοί, who ‘judge’ all things as a gift by God’s spirit, ἀνακρίνω, 2:15). Paul assumes that all are qualified to test everything in 1 Thess 5:21. While there are some individuals who specialize and perhaps lead in this discernment (cf. the gift of discernment in 12:10), all participate in critical reception together without exception. This discernment is fully human, but involves God’s agency as well. The moral and epistemological transformation by the Spirit that has occurred in becoming a believer enables each to participate in this discernment with others.

Although here Paul only speaks of prophecy and its reception, the same process of reception would apply to all instances of constructive speech, for all are media for the revelation of God (12:7). All speech faces the possibility that others might reject the speech as not revelatory of God. No one person can claim that their speech is above this judgement, because all know in part, and cannot avoid the qualitative difference between their speech and God’s revelation (a difference presupposed in the fact that it is human speech through which God reveals himself). The one who speaks cannot self-sufficiently manage the constructive speech and its effects, for she is not God, and it is God whose agency is determinative for

85. See discussion of the critical and hermeneutical dimensions of this discernment in André Munzinger, Discerning the Spirits: Theological and Ethical Hermeneutics in Paul, SNTSMS 140 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 52–64.

86. Those who see a communal discernment process here include Munzinger, Discerning the Spirits, 70–73; Schnabel, 1 Korinther, 838; Schrage, 1 Korinther III, 451; Forbes, Prophecy, 267. Aune recognizes the communal discernment of 1 Thess 5:21, but implausibly limits prophetic evaluation in 1 Cor 14:29 to prophets alone, whose prophetic gift is bound with discernment of prophetic speech (David E. Aune, Prophecy, 219–22).

87. Similarly general injunctions for critical judgement by all believers occur in Rom 12:2 and Phil 1:9–10.

88. The gift of ‘discerning spirits’ should be understood as the discernment of God’s transcendent presence (or absence) in any form of inspired speech, with, e.g., Thiselton, 1 Corinthians, 967; Schrage, 1 Korinther III, 156; Schnabel, 1 Korinther, 711–12. I disagree with Grudem’s understanding of discernment as distinguishing divine or demonic spirits generally (Wayne A. Grudem, The Gift of Prophecy in 1 Corinthians [Washington D.C.: University Press of America, 1982], 62–67). See especially the discussion in Munzinger, Discerning the Spirits, 45–98.

89. Aune suggests that discernment in 1 Thess 5:21 is not a ‘spiritual gift’, but a ‘fully rational procedure’ (David E. Aune, Prophecy, 219–20). This falls prey to a modernist natural/supernatural distinction, and it is not integrated into his discussion of the spiritual gift of discernment in 1 Cor 12:10; 14:29. Instead, see discussion in Munzinger, Discerning the Spirits, 141–88.
constructive benefit and its reception. The believer has no personal resources by which she can mitigate the vulnerability of her speech to critical reception, for this would be to transcend her knowledge ‘in part’ and thus effectively to become God. Even Paul’s claim to offer a command of the Lord must be critically received (14:37). Rather, it seems critical reception plays a constitutive role for constructive speech: all speech benefits others only through its critical identification as God’s speech by others.  

7.4.3. Further Protocol for Constructive Speech (1 Corinthians 14:26–40)

The protocol for constructive speech offered in 14:26–40 aims to ensure that all speech serves to benefit others, whatever its form (‘let all be done for construction’, 14:26). Construction thrives in the proper relational environment set out in these verses, an environment in which all is done for the benefit of others, all value each contribution in turn, and no one member curtails or excludes the contribution of another. This protocol recalls the characteristics of love in 13:4–7.

7.4.3.1. 1 Corinthians 14:27–33

Tongues are the first to receive practical guidelines (14:27–28). As Paul already argued, instances of tongues must be interpreted if spoken in the assembly so that they may construct others (14:28, see 14:1–25). Additionally, Paul desires no more than three instances of tongues (δῷο ή τὸ πλείστον τρεῖς) to be offered with interpretation, and wants each instance to be offered individually, not simultaneously (ἀνὰ μέρος). It seems that the maximum of three instances of tongues is the limit for the entire meeting, judging from the lack of a similar limitation upon prophetic speech (14:29). This would allow opportunity for those with other gifts to speak, assuming that Paul reacts against overuse of tongues to the exclusion of others.  

Individuating tongues allows for each contribution to be heard and valued for the indispensable gift that it is.

Similar protocol applies for prophetic speech (14:29–33). As reviewed above, all prophetic speech is subject to discernment by others, whether immediately after each prophecy, or after the delivery of two or three (14:29). Like tongues, believers prophesy individually in turn (καθ’ ἔνα, 14:31). Furthermore, a prophet must end his speech if God

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90. See Munzinger, *Discerning the Spirits*, 63.

91. It could also be the maximum number before their interpretation (so as to ensure each instance of tongues is able to construct others). See discussion in, e.g., Fee, *1 Corinthians*, 691; Hiu, *Regulations*, 109–10. It does not seem that Paul only disdainfully concedes a few ‘token’ instances of tongues, as argued by Wire, *Prophets*, 146–47.
makes a prophetic revelation to another (14:30; this is a demonstration of a prophet’s own ‘spirit’ being obedient to the prophet himself: πνεύματα προφητῶν προφήτας ὑποτάσσεται, 14:32). Paul establishes this protocol so that all may participate, so that no one person might exclude others from contributing (γάρ in v. 31 indicates the reason for the rule of v. 30).

Just as Paul indicated at the beginning of this section in 14:26, believers might use any number of speech forms to construct others. While the protocol here concerns tongues and prophecy particularly, the guidelines would apply, mutatis mutandis, to other forms of constructive speech. Of course, one cannot directly apply the limitations upon tongues to the other gifts, whether the need for interpretation or the limit to two or three instances in a meeting. Yet all gifts must be offered with concern to benefit others (of which the concern for translation is one instance), and even Paul’s preferred gift of prophecy can be used as a tool for excluding the contributions of others, and must be limited if it does so. Generally stated, the protocol of vv. 27–33 entails that (1) believers who speak must do so to construct others, (2) no believer may use their gift to exclude the contributions of others, and (3) all believers must give individual, valued attention and critical reception to each contribution.

The protocol of vv. 27–33 aligns the process of construction with proper order in constructive relationships. Paul grounds his guidelines in the character of God, who is not a God of ‘disorder’ (ἀκαταστάσεως) but of ‘peace’ (εἰρήνης; 14:33). The last charge given on the whole discussion since 12:1 is, ‘Let all be done fittingly and in order’ (πάντα δὲ εὐσχημόνως καὶ κατὰ τάξιν γινέσθω, 14:40). This necessary link between construction and relational order is simply an expression of the centrality of love for construction. Love ‘does not behave unfittingly’ (οὐκ ἀσχημονεῖ, 13:5). Love is concerned to benefit others with one’s speech, not oneself (13:5). Love recognizes one’s limited knowledge and the God-given, indispensable value of one’s fellow members. ‘Love beyond knowledge’, particularly as described in ch. 13, drives the relational protocol of construction.

7.4.3.2. 1 Corinthians 14:34–35

The notion that Paul championed the full participation of all in constructive speech in chs. 12–14 might seem to founder upon collision with 14:34–35. At first glance, it seems that here Paul absolutely silences women’s speech as another instance of the protocol established in vv. 27–33.

92. On 14:32, see discussion in, e.g., Zeller, 1 Korinther, 442–43. Precisely how one speaker comes to be silent and the other speaker begins is unclear, but it seems less likely that an immediate interruption is in view, though it is possible if there is a critical element within the second prophecy about the first (with, e.g., Hiu, Regulations, 131; Thiselton, 1 Corinthians, 1142).
Some attempt to distance these verses from Paul, either considering them a non-
Pauline interpolation (so, e.g., Dautzenberg, Fee, Hays, Conzelmann, Schrage, Lindemann),\(^93\) or a Corinthian quotation (so, e.g., Collins).\(^94\) The external textual evidence appears to attest the verses unanimously (though with transposition after v. 40 in Western texts), making the case for interpolation more difficult, but not impossible.\(^95\) Others attempt to understand the generalized prohibitions to refer to particular types of disruptive speech, especially speech disrupting particular relationships with men (e.g., speech critical of one’s husband or father, so Schnabel and Thiselton, or speech by married women particularly, so Schüssler Fiorenza).\(^96\) Still others take these verses at face value and interpret them as Paul’s absolute prohibition on women’s speech in contradiction to 11:5.\(^97\)

Among the options, the last would cause the greatest problems for the present reading of these chapters, yet it seems unlikely to be correct. Such a contradiction would render Paul’s discussion in ch. 11 rhetorically unworkable and theologically inconsistent with his discussion in chs. 12–14 (particularly with respect to the indispensability of all gifts and gifted persons). More attractive is the interpretation that vv. 34–35 are a Corinthian quotation refuted by Paul in v. 36, but sufficient textual signals in this direction are lacking. Rather, the verses most likely either are an interpolation, or only silence speech that is disruptive, not constructive.

The choice between these two remains open for present purposes. In either interpretation, one may avoid the problem that these verses are inconsistent with the full participation of all members in constructing others.

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Of these two options, it seems more likely that Paul silences a particular kind of disruptive speech in these verses, though it is difficult to be certain, and difficult problems remain. An interpretation of these verses according to the ‘disruptive speech’ option may run in the following way.

The precise nature of this disruptive speech is unknown, but it seems it cannot be constructive speech offered in love, for otherwise Paul would contradict his concern to promote the indispensability of all members’ gifts since ch. 12. Previously silenced speech includes uninterpreted tongues, and prophecy that effectively prohibits another from speaking (14:28, 30). In keeping with these examples, it seems Paul silenced speech that no longer had a claim to formative benefit, that no longer operated in love (at least from Paul’s perspective).

One might interpret that the demands of love in certain circumstances required women not to make their otherwise legitimate, constructive contributions, for love ‘does not act unfittingly’ (οὐκ ἄσχημον ἔσται, 13:5). Some scholars thus suppose these verses to exclude women from, e.g., speaking prophetically in a critical manner toward men (esp. men of a woman’s household), or taking part in the public discernment of their husbands’ speech (or the discernment of speech by any man to whose household women might belong).98

The trouble with such a reading is that up to this point, Paul has not indicated that love requires a silencing of critical speech in certain circumstances or relationships. Rather, all members are to be involved in offering speech which can have a constructively critical edge, and all discern such speech together (14:26, 29). Supposing Paul excluded women’s critical discernment of their husband’s speech (or their father’s speech), it is not clear how a woman might not speak critically toward her husband or other men by speaking prophetically (assumed in 11:5), or indeed by speaking with any gift, for all serve to reveal God and thus construct others.99 It seems wrongheaded to conclude of this passage, based on a short, selective survey of elite ancient sources on the public speech of women (e.g., Philo, Plutarch), that, for Paul, ‘Personal interaction between a married woman and other men was considered scandalous or, in Paul’s words, disgraceful’.100

The only clue to the kind of speech involved is the directive for women to question their husbands at home, not in the gathering (14:35). On this reading, the disruptive speech silenced could involve, e.g., asking questions in a disruptive, inappropriate way, or perhaps questioning prophets for further revelation.101 The concern in silencing such speech is to

98. E.g., Schnabel, 1 Korinther, 845; Thiselton, 1 Corinthians, 1158; Grudem, Prophecy, 245–55.
promote order and peace that protects the contributions of all members and fosters mutual benefit in love (as argued above concerning 14:30–33).

Such a reading is not without serious difficulties (especially the lack of evidence for its heavily construed reading of λαλεῖο). Nevertheless, between this reading and that of interpolation, there are two plausible understandings of these verses which maintain the thrust of chs. 12–14 toward the participation of all members in constructing others.

7.4.3.3. Summary

In this section, we have traced the effects and reception of constructive speech. Believers who construct others are engaged in a reciprocal, morally formative process. The effects of speech range from encouraging affirmation to exposing criticism, and involve real learning and development in the recipient as they are directed to respond faithfully to God. The effects and reception of speech in ch. 14 illustrate once more that construction operates according to God's transcendent and immanent involvement to reveal himself in human speech (12:7). In reception, all believers critically discern speech together, and no member can offer speech that doesn't require such discernment. In keeping with love oriented to relationship with God and others among the body of Christ, Paul establishes protocols for construction ensuring that (1) believers who speak must do so to construct others, (2) no believer may use their gift to exclude the contributions of others, and (3) all believers give individual, valued attention and critical reception to each contribution. Verses 34–35 can be understood to support, not impede, the concern for the indispensability of all in construction.

7.5. Interdependence in Moral Construction

It remains to specify the nature of believers’ need for one another in construction. This need follows from the nature and practice of reciprocal construction in general as indicated by chs. 12–14. This final section synthesizes the preceding exegetical work to focus upon this issue.

This chapter began by outlining God’s transcendence and immanence in relation to human believers’ constructive activity. Each instance of construction is a self-manifestation of God given in and through believers’ speech for the benefit of others (12:7). I have argued that chs. 13 and 14 support this reading. For Paul, human constructive activity cannot be identical with divine activity, for all now know in part (13:8–13) and all speech must be critically received as God’s word within human words (14:25). In manifesting himself, God transcends the human media of his self-manifestation. And yet God is also immanent within all believers’ constructive activity. There is no portion of human activity that God does not create or operate
God’s involvement to construct others does not render such activity less human, so as to compete in a zero-sum game with human involvement at any point.

God’s transcendent and immanent involvement in construction means that believers’ participation in construction, and indeed their moral lives, can never be self-sufficient. In other words, God’s involvement in believers’ moral lives and in moral construction can never be reduced to an individual’s relationship to his own moral character, or reduced to an interaction between believers apart from the agency of God. I do not mean with this claim that believers’ participation in construction is not fully human in its own right. Construction cannot be construction apart from relation to God, e.g., without being a response to God’s revelation, without dependence upon the agency of God (and thus the agency of other believers through whom God acts). God transcendently, non-competitively creates and operates human participation in construction. This applies to all aspects of believers’ involvement in construction, from constructing others to being constructed by others (e.g., the content and character of constructive speech, the discernment and reception of speech, the personal moral character that develops as a result of receiving construction, the human relationships of construction). Taking these two movements of construction in turn (constructing and being constructed), one may further specify the shape of a believer’s moral life in dependent relation to God and its concrete entailments for the nature and practices of construction.

7.5.1. Constructing Others

Already we have noted, believers’ relation to God determines the way in which they construct one another. God’s agency to reveal himself through each believer grounds the possibility of offering constructive speech, not the speaker’s personal moral resources or the content of such speech alone (12:7). Again, this is not to say that the moral character of the speaker and/or the content of the speech play no role in construction. Rather, it is to say that the role they play is to point away from themselves, to be media of God’s revelation to others, not to be identified wholly with that revelation itself. This role of revealing God requires ongoing dependence on the agency of God by the Spirit; it is not an autonomous spiritual capacity in the believer. As understood from the analysis of 14:25, and 29, the fact that all speech is subject to critical reception by others indicates believers’ lack of self-sufficiency in their attempts to form others. There is no speech for God that does not require critical reception by others. The speaker’s internal moral resources are unable to transcend present knowing in part (13:8–13), and thus render the content or character of constructive speech infallible and without need for discernment. In order for constructive speech to be such, the speaker is dependent on others to critically receive it as a manifestation of God.
As already noted, God’s dispersing his self-revelation to all believers opens the door for all to offer constructive speech, not just those with one particular state of moral maturity or knowledge. Paul’s protocol for protecting the contributions of all in 14:27–33 aims to respect the reality of God’s self-manifestation in all believers without exception.

7.5.2. Receiving Construction

In receiving construction, believers demonstrate a lack of self-sufficiency for the moral life in at least two senses. First of all, discernment of constructive speech, i.e., the self-revelation of God, is a communal affair empowered by the Spirit (14:29). All members participate in this reception together, even if some have a particular gift of discernment and thus lead others. Each individual depends upon a common framework for discernment learned from others, and interacts with the judgements of others. Just as no one is self-sufficient to reveal God and construct others, no one can exercise self-sufficient discernment apart from God’s agency and that of others through whom God reveals himself.

Second, even as believers develop morally, their character (e.g., their dispositions, knowledge, emotions, desires) remains dependent upon God and others for further construction. The sense of dependence I aim to explain here is not simply all believers’ permanent dependence on the Spirit for their moral life in general (though this is also the case), but believers’ permanent dependence on others and on God for positive moral construction, regardless of previous growth.

Instances of being constructed, e.g., learning or repenting, do indeed signal progression and real change in moral character. Yet this positive change in a believer does not reduce the remaining moral construction that others can give to him, as though making him incrementally more self-sufficient and less dependent on others or on God. The goal of being constructed morally as a believer, of imitating Christ (a form of assimilation to God), does not entail growing out of one’s need to receive moral construction from others insofar as one can do so (such that, e.g., one could track a believer’s progress in terms of greater and lesser need for moral construction from others). An inverse relationship between moral growth and dependence on others and on God is impossible, not just because of the ‘in part’ nature of moral character, but because of the ongoing, transcendent involvement of God in believers’ moral lives.

102. I do not deny by this claim that the development of internal moral character is a real part of believers’ construction. That there is continuity in God’s revelation in the construction process allowing for a sense of progress in a believer’s moral life seems clear, for the revelation of God in the gospel as a whole does not change (and Paul assumes as much in 14:20; see also 3:1–4; 1 Thess 3:10). Moreover, authentic constructive interactions presuppose that the community has discerned continuity with the gospel within them (and thus continuity with scripture as read in light of the gospel, etc.).
No positive development in human moral character can render future construction from others unnecessary, because the nature of construction involves response to the transcendent God who can never be identified with ‘partial’ human character. A believer can never be morally self-sufficient in this way, for the moral life does not consist of a believer’s self-relation alone (i.e., acting in accordance with one’s own mature or maturing moral character, having internalized the model of a moral exemplar). Rather, a believer’s moral life consists of ongoing response to others beyond oneself, ultimately to the transcendent God’s self-revelation through other believers.

No believer can develop morally, or so internalize God’s ongoing self-revelation through others as to render it no longer constitutive, or less than constitutive, of a believer’s moral life. Nor can a believer claim not to need certain effects of moral construction (e.g., to transcend or lessen the need for critique or teaching from others), or not to need construction offered in certain areas of a believer’s moral life (as though one had mastered avoiding idolatry, for example). Nor could one render others redundant by comparing their contribution with a particular leader’s (e.g., Paul) to show that their contributions added nothing essential. All such claims attempt to reduce the constructive good of encounter with God through others into human moral resources, to turn interaction with the transcendent God through others into self-relation. To do so would mean being God, and ceasing to know in part, on Paul’s schema. Moral character as a believer is always ‘in part’ in that it is always dependent upon God and other believers in this way; by definition, it can never be a secure self-possession.

Receiving construction assumes and sustains relationships of continual dependence upon others, and ultimately upon God, for the reception of further construction. The goal of believers’ moral lives is ongoing, faithful response to God alongside others, i.e., by God’s power remaining firm in faith together until the end (1 Cor 1:8; see also Phil 1:10). The goal is not the achievement of a particular moral state by which one may securely and self-sufficiently live the moral life and enjoy its benefits. That goal is impossible according to the reality of God’s transcendent involvement in construction, and the reality of moral character ‘in part’.


104. Paul and the unnamed visitor are in the same, permanent position of dependence upon God and others for positive moral construction as believers. No matter their progress, neither can turn interaction with the transcendent God through others into self-relation. To think the new believer cannot be of any morally constructive benefit to Paul because of his lack of learning and progress is to fail to reckon with the fact that Paul encounters the transcendent God in the new believer’s speech.

105. This, I suggest, is the theological basis for the judgement that Paul differs from the philosophers in that he is not concerned about the formation of character *per se*, as recognised by Malherbe and Glad.
All believers remain, whatever their progress, in a state of dependence upon God and all others for positive moral construction in order to live the moral life. One cannot faithfully respond to God without responding continually to his manifestation in each believer, regardless of one’s progress. This means that the concrete entailments of a believer’s response to God, and thus of a believer’s moral life, emerge over time in relationship with other believers until death or the eschaton. These entailments are not fully known in advance, but are continually discerned alongside others in response to God’s ongoing self-manifestation in the community. This interdependence in moral construction, then, extends permanently to all other believers, for God has chosen to manifest himself in all over time.

The nature of this interdependence in moral construction is, again, analogous to believers’ economic interdependence, as discussed in ch. five. These structures of economic and constructive interdependence seem to reinforce each other. Believers depend on one another for moral construction because they do not have the resources to live self-sufficiently on their own, as they participated in economic interdependence in the midst of poverty. Participation in the use of gifts was an acknowledgement of the claims of the gospel and an acknowledgement of one’s dependence upon God, as was the sharing of economic goods. The analogy breaks down however, in that one can never gain sufficient moral resources to live self-sufficiently, unlike economic resources. Also unlike poverty, lacking moral self-sufficiency is not a life-threatening problem to be overcome, but a fundamental reality of faith to be embraced by all believers (see further discussion in ch. eight).

7.6. Summary

This chapter has argued that God’s transcendent and immanent involvement in moral construction entails permanent moral interdependence among believers. God uses believers’ varied forms of speech offered in love as media through which he reveals himself to others for their constructive benefit. A believer’s moral life, and growth in that life, consists of ongoing response to the transcendent God’s self-revelation through others. Believers continually depend on one another for needed moral construction as they together depend upon God, because their moral character is always ‘in part’, qualitatively different from God’s. The specific practices and protocol for reciprocal construction, rooted in love, presuppose and protect relationships of moral interdependence between believers.
CHAPTER EIGHT: PAUL AND PHILODEMUS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

In this final chapter, I place Paul and Philodemus in comparative perspective. Drawing upon the previous chapters, here I offer a summative analysis of their similarities and differences vis-à-vis interdependence in moral formation. Alongside the similarities between Paul and Philodemus, there are significant qualitative differences in what moral formation entailed, and what kind of moral interdependence obtained between members. These differences emerge by comparing socio-economic locations, theological frameworks, and formative practices.

Therefore, the discussion of this chapter begins with a comparison of socio-economic location (section 8.1), of theology (section 8.2), and of formative practice (section 8.3). These three sections then inform the comparison of interdependence in moral formation (section 8.4). Finally, I conclude by stating my argument’s contribution to the Paul–Philodemus comparative project (section 8.5), and by offering brief reflections upon the implications of this thesis for other research (section 8.6).

8.1. Socio-Economic Interdependence

The practice of economically interdependent gift reciprocity was an ideal for both Paul and Philodemus. Both would assume this interdependence to have been a necessary feature of members’ relationships with one another.

According to Philodemus, an Epicurean is not economically self-sufficient. He gives gifts to others, among other reasons, in order to provide himself sure hope of receiving help from them in case of financial disaster, a possibility from which no one is absolutely protected. Yet Philodemus understood individuals to participate in this economic interdependence from a position of relative wealth. The Epicurean life, in his view, just was one that had ‘natural wealth’ for leisureed retreat from work. The kind of gifts exchanged were those given among Roman elites. Relationships of economic interdependence obtained between those who were relatively self-sufficient financially in comparison with most of the populace who negotiated subsistence-level living. There was an ineliminable, but limited, need to engage in gift reciprocity in order to receive financial support in the rare case of financial disaster. The greater need to engage in gift reciprocity arose from the fact that it was constitutive of pleasurable friendships, and thus the life of ἀταραξία. The need for exchange
emerges far more from the necessarily social nature of the most pleasurable life rather than from individual deficiency in economic resources.

Paul, in contrast, understood individual believers to participate in economic interdependence from a position of relative poverty. The majority of believers, with Paul, would have engaged in economic interdependence while hovering in and around the subsistence level. Economically insecure believers needed to engage in gift reciprocity, among other reasons, in order that they would receive needed reciprocation from others on a regular basis. The need for interdependent exchange emerged both from the social entailments of faith in God and from individual deficiency in resources.

Philodemus envisioned relatively limited economic dependence on others because he assumed all involved possessed relative economic self-sufficiency. Paul envisioned relatively greater economic dependence on others because he assumed all involved did not possess relative economic self-sufficiency. Their differing socio-economic locations align with their differing conceptions of economic interdependence. This difference in the nature of interdependence applies, *mutatis mutandis*, to interdependence in the sharing of morally formative goods as well, as will be discussed below. Yet, unlike this difference in economic interdependence, which is a matter of degree, I argue that their views of moral interdependence differ in kind.

### 8.2. Theology of the Moral Life

Piety was constitutive for the moral life of both Paul and Philodemus. The moral character of God and Christ provided a norming model for believers, just as the gods did for Epicureans. However, fundamental differences arise when one compares the two understandings of divine involvement in human moral life, and of human assimilation to divine moral character. These theological differences are decisively important for understanding each figure’s conception of interdependence in moral formation.

Philodemus’ gods do not involve themselves in human affairs. There is nothing to fear from them, for they by definition do not show χάρις or ὀργή toward humans. From their dwelling place far from the world, the gods model perfectly secure freedom from pain enjoyed within friendships with one another. The gods are morally perfect and absolutely self-sufficient. Despite necessarily sharing their pleasure in friendship with others, they individually transcend any need to receive from another (i.e., a need due to individual deficiency). Pious worship of the gods matters for the moral life because to revere them rightly is mentally to align oneself with and strive after moral perfection. Despite the importance of the gods’ moral model, in many ways the human sage is more important, because he demonstrates the ideal moral life within human weakness. The sage can actually share in the same kind of pleasure that the gods have as a result of his self-sufficient, perfected
moral maturity, though this pleasure is more vulnerable. The sage has an inalienable hold on happiness by virtue of his moral character. Furthermore, a mature Epicurean’s empirical knowledge of the cosmos and of the gods is not qualitatively different than the gods’ own knowledge. The sage thus assimilates to himself the gods’ own moral perfection, pleasure, and knowledge, acting as a ‘divine’ model to others as a human being.

Paul’s God is active in human life precisely in the ways Philodemus would deny. God defines believers’ lives according to his χάρις shown to them in Christ, and exercises his ὀργή upon the world as well (e.g., 1 Thess 1:10; 2:16; 5:9). Crucially, God is immanently and irreducibly involved in every instance of moral formation between believers. Believers’ moral lives consist of ongoing, faithful response to God as he reveals himself through other believers. God’s direct involvement in the lives of believers creates and sustains their morally formative interaction with one another, without which such interaction would be impossible (i.e., without becoming something other than Pauline moral formation). Believers’ love for one another in formation derives from God’s own love for them: God takes the initiative to love, God provides the norm for love in the self-giving love of Christ, and God’s Spirit empowers believers’ love.

And yet in all this involvement, God remains transcendent and qualitatively other than believers. All human knowledge and moral character involved in formative interactions with one another remain in part, qualitatively different than God’s own knowing to be revealed in the eschaton. All believers’ formative interactions are media through which God acts to reveal himself for formative benefit; these revelatory media cannot be qualitatively identified with God, no matter their mature moral character (e.g., even if the speaker is Paul). In the eschaton, believers’ present knowing will be abolished, not completed, by the revelation of God’s own knowledge.

This has important implications for Paul’s view of moral assimilation to God. Believers experience real moral progress in the imitation of Christ, but this progress never involves transcending a believer’s qualitative difference from God in character or knowledge. While believers imitate Christ in their acts of love for others (e.g., adapting to the weak in 1 Cor 8–10; pursuing love in the use of spiritual gifts in 1 Cor 14), their love participates, by the Spirit, in God’s love shown in Christ. In such participation, believer’s love is not qualitatively the same as God’s love, because of the limits of partial knowledge.

For the purpose of an Epicurean’s moral life (according to Philodemus), he relates to the gods only indirectly, i.e., by gradually internalizing the gods’ empirically-known moral model within his own character (most often with the help of others). Incrementally he grows toward their moral perfection and self-sufficiency within friendships with others. This divine-human relation takes place without direct interaction between the Epicurean and his gods, even in his worship of them. The relation consists exclusively in the development of the Epicurean’s own conception of the gods. This relation, moreover, is sufficient for the Epicurean’s moral life; there is no need for further, direct interaction with the gods, because
humans already have all that is necessary. The sage so embodies divine knowledge and moral character that additional revelation from the gods would be superfluous. Just as the gods have no need to be involved in the human realm, humans have no need for the gods’ direct intervention.

Paul’s theology, in contrast, orients a believer’s moral life to ongoing response to God who transcends the believer and her conception of him. Formative benefit derives from beyond oneself, i.e., from the self-revelation of God, not simply from human moral knowledge and character given to or received from another believer. As a believer grows morally, she can never so internalize God so as to turn her interaction with God into self-relation, to render her relation to God into a matter of her own cultivated conception of him. This God speaks in and through other believers, whose formative contributions thus cannot be rendered redundant or unnecessary by a believer’s moral progress.

These theologies are fundamentally opposed to one another. In Philodemus’ perspective, Paul’s God is an unnatural fiction, and Paul is a victim of his own ignorant superstition. Not only would the apostle be doomed to a life of misery by his theology, but he is responsible for dooming others to the same. Paul would be no more amenable to Philodemus’ theology. To accept God’s direct intervention in the world is to deny foundational tenets of Epicurean philosophy, especially one of the four claims in the tetrapharmakos, that there is nothing to fear from the gods.

Therefore, it is not simply that Philodemus ascribed relatively less need for divine involvement in moral formation, and Paul relatively more, as though the ‘goods’ provided by divine involvement and the nature of that involvement were qualitatively the same in the two theologies. Rather, both operated with qualitatively different understandings of divine-human relationship in the moral life: one in which the Epicurean related indirectly to the gods by internalizing their moral model, and another in which the believer interacted directly with a transcendent God who cannot be so internalized. The formative benefits derived from the divine qualitatively differ, because formative benefit derived from personal interaction with a transcendent God (Paul) cannot be rendered into formative benefit derived from human reflection upon gods who are not transcendent (Philodemus). Paul and Philodemus did not deal in an exchangeable ‘currency’ of moral resources on this point. This remains true even if, for Paul, personal interaction with the transcendent God led to a form of individual progress in moral character. All such character was ‘in part’, and presupposed the continual agency of God to constitute and sustain it in faithful response over time to God’s own ongoing self-revelation through others.

These qualitative differences in theology (in the nature of the divine, the nature of the divine-human relationship in moral formation, and the nature of formative benefit) play crucially important roles in Paul and Philodemus’ conceptions of interdependence in moral formation, to be examined below.
8.3. Formative Practice

Both Paul and Philodemus envisioned all members of their respective communities engaging in reciprocal practices of moral formation, especially practices involving speech. These practices involved similar morally formative effects, e.g., encouraging others to maintain their commitment, exposing others’ faults, or providing concrete moral instruction. Members used specialised speech to form others according to the specific worldview of both communities. Both thought reciprocal engagement in these formative practices was constitutive of ‘salvation’, and constitutive of being a member of the community. In what follows, I review the similarities and differences in the practices of giving (8.3.1.) and receiving (8.3.2.) moral formation.

8.3.1. Giving

I discuss the practices of giving moral formation in three sections. I first discuss the qualifications which enable one to offer formation, and then discuss two aspects of the way one offers formative benefit, i.e. adaptation and love.

8.3.1.1. Qualifications

For Philodemus, the qualification that enabled one to offer formative benefit is personal moral maturity. Treating others was an ability given by the mature Epicurean’s virtue and philosophical knowledge. Frank criticism was an art, in its mature form involving considerable expertise as one negotiated a therapeutic relationship. Those who were less mature could occasionally have something of benefit to offer, but predominately the mature played the formative role.

For Paul, personal moral maturity was also integral for offering formative benefit. Right content and character in formative speech were necessary ingredients. Yet this content and character were unavoidably ‘in part’, and could not provide formative benefit in itself (i.e., apart from the agency of God to reveal himself through it). The content and character of formative speech functioned instead within God’s agency as a medium for God’s self-revelation by the Spirit. No one person’s speech or character could be wholly identified with God’s own; all speech required critical discernment, even Paul’s. All members may offer an indispensably formative benefit by their speech, regardless of the maturity or skill level of the speaker, because formative benefit resides in gifts of God’s revelation (not simply in the content and character of speech) and because God acts to reveal himself in all believers without exception. It was not simply that the less mature, or those different in gifting from the
leaders, might occasionally offer beneficial formative speech to some individuals, but that all believers offered formative speech that was indispensable for all other members of the community, for it manifested the transcendent God.

8.3.1.2. Adaptation

A central dimension of the art of frank criticism, for Philodemus, was adaptation of speech to the particular needs of individuals. Adaptability assumed the skilled diagnosis of a wide variety of moral illnesses in recipients, and a therapeutic relationship in which the more mature gradually led the less mature recipient out of their illness.

Again there are similarities in Paul’s vision of moral formation. He himself engaged in similar kinds of adaptive criticism toward believers. Paul championed love in the form of adaptive care as a mode of ‘constructing’ others (1 Cor 8–10). Adaptation of some kind seems assumed in 1 Cor 12–14 as well, though it is less explicit. As described in 13:4–7, believers who love others demonstrate forms of adaptation in their patience, self-giving endurance, and pursuit of others’ good.

Situating adaptation within the involvement of God and partial human knowing leads to the conclusion that Paul construed adaptation differently than does Philodemus. As shown in 1 Cor 8–10, adaptation did not mean leading the recipient out of their psychological weakness and deficiency in knowledge. The knowers’ more flexible personal psychology and theological knowledge did not act as the norm for the weak in this case. The goal for the weak was not to achieve a psychological or knowledge-based benchmark, but to maintain their faith in God in their weakness. Adaptation was not temporary, but permanent.

In other circumstances, Paul certainly attempted to persuade believers out of their immaturity, often offering himself as the model (e.g., the knowers in 1 Cor 8–10). Similarly, Philodemus could label some differences between friends as irrelevant for the best life, just like Paul. The difference lies in the fact that Paul practiced adaptation with an awareness of ‘partial’ knowledge. Philodemus would have attempted to apply therapy to any form of false belief, however small. He operated with a singular model of human maturity embodied in Epicurus, to which all should conform without remainder. While Philodemus valued tolerance and adaptation to others, he could not follow Paul in relativising the weak’s difference in knowledge and moral psychology.

Moreover, unlike adaptation in Philodemus, the knowers came to understand what their faith meant by adapting to the weak. In doing so they found their knowledge relativised and discovered the entailments of their faith in God as they pursued the benefit of the weak (1 Cor 8–10). The weak were thus indispensable for their moral growth. Considered from Philodemus’ perspective, the formative benefits of administering adaptive therapy were marginal by comparison to the benefits of receiving therapy. Philodemus would agree with
Paul that a mature Epicurean would adapt in love to others, and choosing not to do so when one had the opportunity would indicate immaturity. Similarly, a maturing Epicurean would learn as he practised adaptive frank criticism toward others. Yet, for Philodemus, one adapted to form others because one already was sufficiently mature to do so, not in order to become mature.

Adaptation also seems less of a specialised psychological and rhetorical skill in Paul, because it was not philosophically and psychologically well-defined. This lack of definition was likely the result of Paul viewing human speech and knowing (and thus all adaptation) as in themselves insufficient to effect formative change. Paul assumed that all believers can love and adapt to others by God’s spirit, not simply the more mature. Paul seems unconcerned that all formative speech feature highly specific psychological adaptation to individual needs. Some instances of formative speech did not involve addressing a particular individual and their dysfunction, but addressed the community as a whole. This may be the case even for some critical instances of speech.

It remains the case that, at times, believers adapted to others individually in order to help them recover from moral failure (e.g., Gal 6:1). These circumstances are most similar to a relationship of adaptive therapy via frank criticism in Philodemus. While these cases merit further discussion beyond this thesis, a properly situated understanding of the formative relationships here would attend to God’s involvement, the insufficiency of the adaptive, formative speech in itself to effect change, and the need for critical reception of the formative speech. In these respects the situation of Galatians 6:1, for example, seems analogous to that of 1 Cor 14:24–25.

8.3.1.3. Love

Love necessarily governed the use of formative speech according to both Philodemus and Paul. The Epicurean teacher loves his students (Lib. col. 3b.11, φιλέω; col. 21a.10; φιλέω; fr. 44.3, φιλέω, 44.7, στέργω; 80.9–10, ἀγαπήσεις). The students gather together to learn in love (col. 13a, ἀγάπη; fr. 54.1–2, στοργή). Teachers endeavour to lead others into self-love (fr. 86.4, φιλότης).

At first glance there is considerable overlap conceptually, if less so lexically, between 1 Cor 13:4–7 and the description of the mature teacher’s character throughout Lib. Love, for Philodemus, is one of the outworking of the mature Epicurean’s character by which he successfully cares for others. Love follows from Epicurean maturity, while vices impede it. A mature Epicurean loves in accordance with his secure moral character and knowledge. His students can trust him as their ‘saviour’ because of the security of his knowledge and character, and his consequent love for them. For example: the Epicurean teacher is patient and kind to immature students in his pursuit of their benefit (fr. 46; 70–71; col. 5a; 10a); he does
not boast or inflate his importance, but admits his own wrongs (fr. 55; 81; 84N; col 10b; 15b; 18b); he is not driven to anger (e.g., fr. 12; col 2a); he is not envious (fr. 62; col 1b; 21a); the teacher is willing to forgive (fr. 20); the teacher enduringly attempts to cure the immature, hoping for success, even when faced with failure and personal mistreatment (fr. 4; 11; 12, 37–38; 63–64; 69; 85). Allowing his own framework to provide the details, Philodemus would affirm that the sage exhibits the qualities of love as expressed in 1 Cor 13:4–8a.

Paul, however, championed the exercise of love ‘beyond’ one’s own moral character and knowledge. Philodemus could follow no further when Paul contrasts love and present knowledge in 13:8b–13. For Paul, love is not less than a human moral disposition, but it is a disposition ordered to participation in relationships beyond oneself with others, and ultimately with God. This love operates not from the assured stability of one’s knowledge or character, but from an acknowledgement of the ways in which relationships with God and others relativise and condition one’s own partial knowledge. Even believers’ acts of love are ‘in part’. By acknowledging the limitations of one’s own knowledge in these ways, a believer acts in love, aligning with and participating in God’s love for others by the Spirit. ‘Love beyond knowledge’ derives from God’s own love in that his love is prior, his love norms human love, and his love empowers human love by the Spirit.

Because love beyond knowledge participated in God’s love, love played an expanded role in relation to formative speech. Love was not only necessary for the success of formative speech. Love was also necessary for such speech to be of any value at all, including the knowledge represented in the speech’s content (1 Cor 13:1–3). There is no moral resource or knowledge, nor even a moral self, that exists apart from its engagement in love for others. Because Paul’s conception of love is a love beyond one’s own knowledge, this means there is no moral resource or self apart from participation beyond oneself in relationship to God and his love for others by the Spirit. A believer’s moral knowledge derives from the revelation of God in Christ by the Spirit, and persists in the believer’s continual participation in Christ by the Spirit. Moral knowledge is not empirically discovered apart from direct divine involvement, nor can it be possessed self-sufficiently, i.e., apart from ongoing participation in God’s love toward those whom God has loved.

Paul’s ‘love beyond knowledge’ underwrites different formative practices than Philodemus’ ‘love in accordance with knowledge’. Already we have reviewed differences in the qualifications by which all believers offer formative speech, and differences in what adaptation entails, both of which are oriented to ‘love beyond knowledge’. The same orientation holds true for practices of receiving formation, examined next.
8.3.2. Receiving

With respect to practices of receiving formation, Paul and Philodemus again appear similar in two respects. First, both assume that all members regularly receive moral formation from others. Second, both consider active reception of formative speech a necessary part of formation; neither conceive of moral formation as somehow automatic apart from the agency of the recipient. I take these two in turn.

First, with respect to the practices of receiving formative speech from others more generally, Philodemus affirmed that all members, regardless of maturity, would receive frank criticism from others, for all are human and will err, even the sage. Yet, based on one’s maturity level, one received relatively more or less. The beginning Epicurean student overwhelmingly received formative care. He only occasionally might succeed in offering something of benefit to others insofar as he had matured enough to do so, and insofar as the recipients were of sufficient immaturity to need his care (e.g., other students). It was forbidden for the immature student to speak critically to his teacher. The sage, on the other hand, only received critique from others occasionally, and only insofar as others had sufficient maturity to do so. The sage would not receive critique upon his grasp of fundamentals, for he had mastered them. Along the path from immature student to sage, one grew to receive formative benefit from others less, to develop one’s capacity for self-critique, and to give formative benefit to others more.

Paul likewise affirmed that all receive formative speech, but had a different understanding of what this entailed. Paul envisioned that each member continually received from every other member of the community, like members of a body. Protocols ensured that each instance of speech was given individual attention by all, and that no one could effectively muzzle another’s speech. It may be that leaders (e.g., Paul) played a predominant role in offering formative benefit, but this was not to the exclusion or redundancy of the benefit others might give. All were indispensable to all others in that they revealed God for necessary formative benefit. These practices aligned with ‘love beyond knowledge’.

Our second point of comparison concerns what kind of activity was required by the recipient of formative speech. For Philodemus, frank criticism was not deliberative, but its reception nevertheless required active engagement in the recipient. A large part of this engagement was essentially the openness to receive and appropriate correction. Yet it was also the case that other members observed the treatment and could intervene if they discerned erroneous care. Moreover, the recipient likely had to exert some level of critical reflection on the treatment in order to appropriate it fully. Two possibilities can explain the failure of a sage’s use of frank criticism: the defective moral state of the recipient (in most cases discussed), or the sage’s unavoidable errors in perceptual judgement in the diagnostic process. For less mature Epicureans, there is a third possibility that their own vice has infected their frank speech. If a sage offers critique, therefore, discernment concerns only whether the
speech has properly diagnosed the state of the recipient. Discernment is not exercised over whether the speech itself is conceptually correct (because the sage’s understanding is infallible). If a less mature member offers criticism, however, those mature enough to do so would assist the recipient to discern its validity as well as its proper application.

For Paul, formative speech made a claim to speak for God, and was also not simply deliberative (and its form and content is not always a direct critique of another). Like Philodemus, no person’s speech was beyond necessary discernment by other members of the community. Yet the discernment exercised pertained not only to the right application of what was said, but to whether and how this speech, with its particular content and character, was in fact God’s speech to the community. No one’s speech transcended the need for this thoroughgoing discernment. Moreover, all members engaged in this discernment process regardless of personal maturity, for all took part as a gift by God’s spirit, though there were individuals who led in this process. This difference in discernment practice exemplified ‘love beyond knowledge’ by recognising the ‘in part’ nature of all speech, and recognising the claim that all have to participate in such discernment by God’s spirit.

8.4. Interdependence in Moral Formation

Both Paul and Philodemus envisioned community members’ necessary, reciprocal participation in one another’s salvation through processes of giving and receiving moral formation. However, Paul and Philodemus had qualitatively different conceptions of this interdependent, reciprocal formation. The previous discussion of similarities and differences in socio-economic location, theology, and formation practice provides vital assistance toward understanding these different conceptions.

The immature Epicurean initiate, being unable to cure himself, was dependent upon others for formative intervention in even the most fundamental aspects of the Epicurean life. His salvation consisted in his own freedom from pain by means of moral progress out of immaturity into a self-sufficiently virtuous and pleasurable life. Some persons were naturally gifted only to need minimal criticism to attain maturity, while others needed far more, but all needed some degree of help. As one grew, one came to need the formative intervention of others incrementally less, for one gradually became morally self-sufficient, coming to possess in one’s own character and knowledge sufficient moral resources for virtuous and pleasurable living. One came to internalize the model of the gods’ own moral perfection, as exemplified by the sage (above all, Epicurus). This gradual acquisition of moral resources meant that one grew to need others for formation only insofar as they had moral resources one had not yet assimilated. The possibility always remained open for further formation, even for the mature Epicurean. No one absolutely transcended the need to receive formative intervention from another. Epicureans would continually be formed by the wide range of their philosophical
activities together throughout their lives, not simply by the practice of frank criticism. Yet Philodemus also indicated that the sage was relatively self-sufficient in his moral maturity, and would only occasionally need formative intervention, and only on small matters. In general, for the more mature, only other equally mature Epicureans could give needed moral resources not already possessed, making unnecessary all less mature Epicureans who did not have these resources. Rather, the more mature overwhelmingly gave formative benefit to the less mature, rather than receiving it. In maturity, there was only a limited need to receive moral formation from others due to personal moral deficiency. Even if a mature Epicurean still needed others to constitute his pleasurable life in a variety of other ways, these needs would not contradict his relative moral self-sufficiency.

This goal of moral self-sufficiency, entailing the gradually limited need to receive formation from others, dovetails with Philodemus’ economics and theology. Philodemus conceived the mature Epicurean’s need for formative benefit from others in the same way that he conceived his need for others’ economic assistance: the mature Epicurean unavoidably needs others due to minimal personal deficiency, but only occasionally and in a limited way. The analogy breaks down in that the sage’s character is far more secure than his economic stability; the sage’s character can actually protect him from disaster even in the direst of circumstances (e.g., his character can securely provide him pleasure even in the face of immense, enduring pain). Nevertheless, Philodemus conceived of ideal moral and economic interdependence from a position of relative individual self-sufficiency.

The model provided by the gods also aligns with Philodemus’ conception of moral self-sufficiency. The gods partake in friendship with one another from a position of absolute self-sufficiency, made possible by their divinity. A god, by definition, does not have a need for other gods due to some personal deficiency, yet they engage in friendship with other gods for its unspeakable pleasure. Philodemus’ conception of the limited need to receive moral formation from others is precisely an attempt to model human friendships upon divine friendships. The goal for all Epicureans is to grow out of their moral need to receive from others into morally self-sufficient, pleasurable friendships. Indeed, moral self-sufficiency is a precondition for ideal friendships, for it protects such friendships from pain.

Paul, on the other hand, operated with a qualitatively different understanding of interdependence in moral formation. This difference in understanding aligns with the wider differences in theology and socio-economic location already examined. The entailments of this different understanding emerge in the differences in formative practice, reviewed above.

Believers need others for moral formation like they need others’ economic help. Paul conceives of moral interdependence as though each member participates from a position of relative individual lack. The group lives morally through continual exchange of needed moral benefit, toward which no person can claim self-sufficiency. Even though the analogy does not fit in a number of ways, the general correspondence between needed participation in economic and moral interdependence out of individual deficiency lends plausibility to my
reconstruction. The two conceptions of interdependence seem to mutually support one another. In order to more deeply understand Paul’s conception of the need to receive moral benefit from others, however, one must go beyond this conceptual link between moral and economic interdependence.

Two of the ways in which this analogy breaks down are instructive for the present question. First, one should not conclude from it that believers’ moral lives are simply more impoverished by comparison to Philodemus’ morally rich friends. One might think that there is only a quantitative difference between the two vis-à-vis the need to receive formative benefit from others. On this view, Paul simply set the limit for what can be achieved by personal maturity lower than Philodemus did. Believers gradually become morally self-sufficient as they receive from others, but to a lesser degree than their Epicurean counterparts, resulting in a greater degree of need to receive from others. Such a view is partially correct in that Paul does not share Philodemus’ anthropological optimism, but it overlooks important differences in Paul’s conceptions of formative benefit, of the moral life generally, and of the relationship between moral progress and one’s need to receive benefit from others.

Second, unlike poverty, lacking moral self-sufficiency is not a periodically life-threatening problem to be overcome, but a fundamental reality of faith to be embraced by all believers. Paul does not call all believers to embrace destitution, but he does call believers to embrace their lack of moral self-sufficiency as a positive feature of faith.¹

As observed above, the formative benefit which believers give to one another is different in kind than that which Epicureans share (and different in kind than economic resources). Believers do not simply give moral resources to be internalized by others, but mediate for one another interaction with the transcendent God. There is no quantity of human moral goods in themselves that can replicate a formative interaction with the transcendent God, on Paul’s view. All such goods are ‘in part’, to be abolished in the eschaton.

This difference in conception of formative benefit entails a different conception of the moral life, one in which formation derives from ongoing, faithful response to God, not simply from the internalization of moral resources. A believer does not simply need others for their moral resources, which by receiving he gradually becomes more self-sufficient and less dependent on others. Rather, a believer needs others because his relationship with God, and thus his moral life, is and always will be constituted by his interdependent relationship with other believers through whom God reveals himself. There is no possibility of rendering one’s ongoing relation to God through others into a form of self-relation, into an exchangeable commodity that no longer involves direct interaction with God through others. This shape of

¹. By ‘lack of moral self-sufficiency’, I do not mean, e.g., that believers could not act as moral agents at all as individuals, but that the moral life of a believer is always conditioned by relationship with others beyond oneself, ultimately with the transcendent God.
the moral life is what allows Paul to hold that there is no inverse relationship between moral progress and the need to receive formative benefit from others.

In sum, Paul’s conception of the need to receive formative benefit from others is qualitatively different than Philodemus’, because the two conceptions of formative benefit and of the moral life are finally incompatible. Believers do not need one another for mutual assistance in achieving self-sufficiently secure self-relation, as Philodemus conceives. Believers need to receive formative benefit from others because to do so continually constitutes their moral lives in relation to God. Moral interdependence is built into believers’ moral lives from first to last, for God has chosen continually to reveal himself for formative benefit through each other member of the community.

Believers participate necessarily in one another’s salvation not by helping each other attain to moral self-sufficiency by the exchange of moral resources, but by helping each other to respond to God’s self-revelation faithfully over the course of their lives. Believers cannot actually be said to ‘save’ one another in the same sense that Epicureans can, for (1) believers’ agency is encompassed within the prior agency of God, and (2) believers’ formative interactions do not save by their own moral resources alone, but by God’s self-revelation. Believers do not point one another to faith in themselves, but to faith in God. Moreover, growth in moral character is involved in salvation, but salvation can never be reduced to such growth. By God’s design, the entailments of believers’ faith in God emerge only over time as one learns to respond faithfully to God in and through loving relationships with other believers who are part of oneself in Christ’s body.

8.5. Conclusion

Despite the apparent similarities between Philodemus and Paul, the two have qualitatively different understandings of moral formation and moral interdependence. These qualitative differences in conception emerge from attention to the differences in their socio-economic locations, theologies, and formative practices.

If my comparative analysis is correct, the fruit that emerges from attention to differences alongside similarities speaks against the comparative enterprise as conducted by Malherbe and Glad. Both scholars effectively minimize differences in order to make the case for Paul’s similarity with Philodemus and Hellenistic moral philosophy in general (esp. via the category of psychagogy). Both scholars do not robustly consider how differences in socio-economic location, theology, and practice cast Paul’s understanding of moral formation among believers into a qualitatively different form than that provided by the analytical mould of psychagogy. By bracketing the sources of these differences from the comparative frame (esp. theology), their work produces a distorted picture of Pauline moral formation, one that practically assumes that Paul operated according to, e.g., Epicurean theology, anthropology,
and epistemology. My argument is not simply that there are some aspects of Paul’s vision that resist explanation by psychagogy, while other aspects are sufficiently explained. Rather, I have argued that the proper consideration of differences alongside the proposed similarities leads to the conclusion that Paul and Philodemus have qualitatively different understandings of moral formation as a whole. Some practices of moral formation are not qualitatively different (e.g., the use of speech, adaptation to others), but these practices find their distinctive shape in qualitatively different systems of moral formation.

The intention of the comparative work exhibited in this thesis is not to shut down comparison between Paul and Philodemus, but to contribute to the project anew. Identifying qualitative differences does not signal the end of comparison. By attending to differences alongside similarities, this thesis offers an alternative and, arguably, more complete form of ‘ redescribing’ Paul and Philodemus in light of each other, to use again the language of J. Z. Smith. The results of this redescription lead to the need for a ‘rectification’ of the category by which the two visions of moral formation have been compared, i.e., psychagogy. This category, as used by Malherbe and Glad, is too heavily freighted with assumptions about the nature and practice of moral formation. Psychagogy might still be useful as a comparative category, but only if its limitations are properly observed. It seems better to abandon psychagogy and instead use a polythetic category that allows for greater flexibility in individual conception and practice (as this thesis has used ‘moral formation’).

While the primary disciplinary environment of this thesis is the study of Paul, the comparison makes a contribution to Philodemus scholarship as well. Though this thesis has not provided a thoroughgoing reinterpretation of Philodemus, it has provided further evidence to establish and specify the current scholarly portrait of Philodemus’ moral formation (as found in, e.g., Gigante, Tsouna, Glad). The thesis does this by (1) the coordination of Philodemus’ socio-economic location and theology with his conception of moral formation, and by (2) the detailed comparison with Paul reviewed above. This thesis has also argued for the adjustment of certain details in our portrait of Philodemus, particularly, that Philodemus restricted participation in reciprocal formation for immature Epicureans (contra Glad), and that he indirectly restricted the poor from participation in the community of friends (contra Asmis).

With respect to Pauline studies, this thesis serves to confirm the validity and usefulness of comparison between Paul and ancient conceptions of moral formation as an exegetical tool for Paul’s texts, particularly for understanding both 1 Corinthians 8–10 and 12–14. While it would perhaps be possible to arrive at a generally similar understanding of these texts apart from the discussion in this thesis, the comparison with Philodemus provides analytical specificity and depth that is not available apart from the ‘conversation’ hosted between these two figures. Through similarity and difference, Philodemus’ conception and practice of moral formation help to define the particular shape of Paul’s own conception and practice, and vice-versa.
8.6. Implications for Wider Research

Currently there are many other comparative projects designed to shed light on Paul in relation to ancient philosophy. The results of my comparison contest some of the comparative conclusions made by others concerning Paul’s conception of the moral life. The results I have specifically in mind are my interpretations of a qualitative distinction between God and believers’ moral character, and of the nature of interdependence among believers. The following discussion cannot do justice to the complexity involved in other projects. Nevertheless, I suggest that some scholars’ comparative readings, like those of Malherbe and Glad, fail to account for the implications of Paul’s theological claims, particularly those in 1 Cor 12–14.

Troels Engberg-Pedersen has recently compared Epictetus and Paul with respect to the relationship between divine and human agency in the moral life. For Epictetus, God ultimately is the rationality of the cosmos. As Engberg-Pedersen notes, ‘The only difference between the rationality of the true human self and that of God is one of scope.’ There is thus a qualitative identity between God’s rationality and mature human rationality. Thus there cannot be self-sufficiency in relation to God, nor dependence upon God: ‘A local case of understanding [i.e., human rationality] cannot be ‘governed’ or ‘directed’ or in any way constrained against its will by the wider rationality of the world’, i.e., God.

Despite noting a key difference in their two theologies, Engberg-Pedersen claims that Epictetus and Paul align conceptually in the relation of divine and human agency and its implications for the moral life. The key difference is that Paul’s God is more ‘unpredictable’ than Epictetus’ God, because his ways are inscrutable (citing Rom 11:33–36), and because he delivers knowledge of himself through revelation rather than through reason and demonstration. However, while the two differ in the way that knowledge of God comes about, Engberg-Pedersen claims that the basic shape of the moral life in relation to God is the same. Once believers’ have knowledge of God by revelation, they possess qualitatively the same knowledge that God himself has. Engberg-Pedersen roots this claim in 1 Cor 2:10–16, where Paul claims that believers have the mind of Christ by the Spirit: ‘Sophia and nous: through the pneuma, received directly from God, believers are now in a state that is one of genuine knowledge; they fully know and understand what God has wanted them to

2. Engberg-Pedersen, Cosmology and Self in the Apostle Paul, 106–38.
3. Ibid., 116.
4. Ibid., 117.
5. Engberg-Pedersen, Cosmology and Self in the Apostle Paul, 117, emphasis original. Philodemus seems to have a stronger notion of the gods as distinct from human beings, but would agree that the mature Epicurean’s knowledge and moral character are on the same qualitative plane as the gods.
7. Ibid., 135.
understand; they have God’s knowledge.” While God is an unpredictable God, ‘once human beings have acquired the proper knowledge ... they will have a knowledge that will either dissolve this unpredictability or at least push it into a subsidiary position.’ Believers with the mind of Christ are not dependent upon God for knowledge, because they possess in themselves God’s own knowledge by his Spirit. They show the same lack of dependence upon God that Epictetus does, because they have qualitatively the same knowledge that God has: ‘the understanding of self-sufficiency in connection with this knowledge [of God] that we elaborated in our analysis of Epictetus may be brought over wholesale into Paul.’

Though Engberg-Pedersen cites 1 Cor 13:12 as a witness to the priority of God’s agency for human knowledge of God, he fails to reckon seriously with the epistemological and theological claims of these verses. Engberg-Pedersen elsewhere claims that there is indeed a dimension of progression in knowledge of God in Paul, but one that follows after an initial ‘complete cognitive transformation’, a progression that presupposes and expands qualitative identity in one’s physical and cognitive characteristics with God (by the Spirit).

One finds a similar perspective in David Litwa’s recent interpretation that the Pauline moral life in relation to God is best described in terms of deification. Litwa claims that believers do not assimilate only to the humanity of Christ, but become divine by sharing Christ’s divine characteristics. Deification does not mean a ‘fusion with the Godhead or loss of personality’, nor only a development in likeness to God, but involves ‘sharing in those distinctive qualities which make (a) God (a) God.’ Litwa argues that believers become morally divine (one among other modes of deification) insofar as they adopt Christ’s divine moral character, particularly his humility and self-subordination (drawing upon, e.g., Rom 15:1–8; Phil 2:6–8; 2 Cor 8:9). Humility is ‘just as basic to the divine identity of Christ as is immortality’, and so believers become God insofar as they assimilate to his moral character, no less than when their bodies are transformed into the same substance as God’s in the resurrection. Unlike the bodily transformation that occurs only in the eschaton, believers are presently now divine insofar as they are humble and self-subordinating (as Litwa argues based

8. Ibid., 136. Emphasis original.
11. He seems to puzzle honestly over 1 Cor 13:12: ‘Paul has apparently already been fully known, but will only himself come to know fully in the future. What does that mean?’ (emphasis original; Engberg-Pedersen, Cosmology and Self in the Apostle Paul, 238, n. 35).
13. Litwa, Transformed.
15. Ibid., 32.
16. Ibid., 225.
on the present tense of \( \mu \varepsilon \tau \alpha \mu \rho \omega \rho \sigma \theta \alpha \mu \varepsilon \theta \alpha \) in 2 Cor 3:18).\textsuperscript{17} One should not understand the Spirit’s involvement in the believer’s moral life as a transcendent, divine agent that is qualitatively distinct from human moral agency, because believers have ‘the mind of Christ’ (1 Cor 2:16);\textsuperscript{18} they have come to share the same Spirit with Christ; they are no longer merely human because the Spirit has come to possess them (1 Cor 3:4; 6:17; Gal 2:20).\textsuperscript{19} Litwa does admit that Paul has a notion of moral progression, drawing on Engberg-Pedersen, but this is best understood as an expansion of moral character that is already qualitatively the same as divine moral character by the Spirit.\textsuperscript{20} Against those who would deny a qualitative identity in divine moral character between the believer and Christ, Litwa asks, ‘Does sharing in Christ’s self-subordinating humility not mean sharing in Christ’s divine identity? And does not Christ’s divine humility define the nature of Paul’s God? ... If, for Paul, Christ’s virtue of self-subordinating love defines the identity of God, can one with the same virtue as Christ participate in Christ’s divine identity?’\textsuperscript{21}

I argue, however, that one most plausibly interprets Paul’s radically positive epistemological statements, such as ‘we have the mind of Christ’ (1 Cor 2:16) in dynamic relationship with those that stress the radical transcendence of God (1 Cor 13:8–13; Rom 11:33–36). The latter texts seem plainly to contradict Engberg-Pedersen’s and David Litwa’s claims that believers presently possess ‘God’s own knowledge (of himself),’\textsuperscript{22} or the ‘same virtue’ that Christ himself has\textsuperscript{23} without qualitative distinction.\textsuperscript{24} Present knowledge and moral character as a believer, while empowered by the Spirit, is qualitatively other than God’s own knowledge and character. There is no qualitative identity between divine and human moral character, nor progression into it prior to the eschaton (though there is a notion of moral progress, in my view). Rather, there is an abolishment and replacement of present knowing with God’s own knowing yet to be revealed.

Moreover, by acknowledging a qualitative distinction between God and believers’ moral character, one may make better sense of Paul’s vision for interdependence in moral

\textsuperscript{17} Litwa, \emph{Transformed}, 221–23. At other points Litwa claims that Paul’s understanding of deification is distinctive in that it occurs post-mortem (e.g., Litwa, \emph{Transformed}, 206, 287, 290), but here he seems to leave room for the idea of pre-eschaton deification in terms of moral character.

\textsuperscript{18} For a sophisticated and detailed treatment of 1 Cor 2:6–3:4 in the general interpretive trajectories of Engberg-Pedersen and Litwa, see Dingeldein, “Gaining Virtue, Gaining Christ,” 273–320.

\textsuperscript{19} Litwa, \emph{Transformed}, 211.

\textsuperscript{20} Ibid., 210.

\textsuperscript{21} Litwa, \emph{Transformed}, 223 While van Kooten does ascribe an explicitly platonic sense of moral assimilation to Christ in Paul, he does not go as far as Litwa in claiming deification by moral assimilation (van Kooten, \emph{Paul’s Anthropology}, 180–81).

\textsuperscript{22} Engberg-Pedersen, \emph{Cosmology and Self in the Apostle Paul}, 125.

\textsuperscript{23} Litwa, \emph{Transformed}, 223.

\textsuperscript{24} In other words, I would deny that Paul has any notion of ‘essential deification’, according to Blackwell’s categorisation and discussion. See Ben C. Blackwell, \emph{Christosis: Engaging Paul’s Soteriology with His Patristic Interpreters}, Rev. ed. (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2016), xix-xxix, 99–110.
construction. If there is no such qualitative distinction, this would undermine the need to receive moral construction from all other believers on the basis of God’s self-revelation through each one. Moral self-sufficiency in relation to other believers and to God would be a real possibility in some sense (or at least a lack of dependence based on qualitative identity with God). Epictetus or Philodemus would champion such a perspective on the moral life. For Paul, it has missed the point.

25. Litwa acknowledges that he does not account for the communal nature of the moral life in Paul in his monograph (Litwa, Transformed, 290).
26. Volker Rabens and Susan Eastman lead the way toward a more robust, relational understanding of the moral life for Paul, as argued in this thesis. See Rabens, Holy Spirit and Ethics; Eastman, Paul and the Person.
27. For example, in Dingeldein’s view, Paul aligns best with a middle Platonist perspective on the moral life, in which the more mature believers predominately care for the less mature, leading them into moral self-sufficiency. Dingeldein briefly treats 1 Cor 12–14 as witnessing to moral hierarchy in Paul’s communities, but does not reckon with these chapters’ witness to interdependent moral formation. See Dingeldein, “Gaining Virtue, Gaining Christ,” 254, 258.


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