English castle garrisons in the Anglo-Scottish wars of the fourteenth century

Cornell, David

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ABSTRACT:
ENGLISH CASTLE GARRISONS IN THE ANGLO-SCOTTISH WARS OF THE FOURTEENTH CENTURY

The military history of the castle has been dominated by architecturally based studies whilst little attention has been paid to the men who manned them in time of war. The aim of this thesis is to redress the balance by undertaking a detailed analysis of medieval wartime garrisons by concentrating on those retained by the English Crown during the Anglo-Scottish wars of the fourteenth century. During 1298-1314 and 1335-42 major Scottish castles were occupied by English garrisons while 1314-23 saw garrisons installed in the front-line castles of northern England and Roxburgh remained garrisoned by English troops from 1346 right through into the fifteenth century. Fortified garrison towns such as Berwick, Carlisle and Perth also played key roles but as this study concentrates on castle garrisons these only enter the discussion where they help illustrate a point or are integral to the aspect being illustrated.

To determine the role of the castle in warfare it is necessary to analyse the operational activities of garrisons yet the latter can only be truly understood by appreciating exactly what sort of an entity a castle garrison was. Only by comprehending the nature of garrisons can their operational effectiveness be properly addressed. This thesis therefore first details the infrastructure that underpinned these garrisons before discussing their operational activities.

In terms of size the fourteenth century garrisons equate to the largest retained by the English Crown during the entire medieval period. Their numbers do fluctuate in response to the immediate state and pressure of warfare but each major Scottish castle regularly had an approximate average of either eighty or 150 troops based within them suggesting two approximate tiers of wartime manning were in operation. The overall total of troops in garrison service, including those based within garrisoned towns, was between 1,100 and 1,600 in the first half of the century. The rapid reduction of garrisons upon periods of truce or peace reflects the burdensome cost of retaining such large forces.

A full range of medieval troop types was retained within these garrisons. Bannerets and knights accounted for approximately 1% whereas men-at-arms formed the mainstay throughout the century regularly accounting for between a third and a half of each individual garrison. During the early years of the century foot-soldiers represented between a half and two thirds of garrison troops but from 1314 they almost completely disappear from wartime garrisons altogether and feature intermittently after 1335. They were replaced by mounted troops, the first being the hobelar and the second the mounted archer, the latter accounting for 67% of the Roxburgh garrison in 1400. Clearly the latest troop types were immediately incorporated into garrisons and a conscious effort was undertaken to make garrisons totally mobile forces.

Despite serving within the same castle garrison troops consisted of various groups of men who frequently appear separately within financial accounts with the personal retinue of the constable being the most striking individual group. This process became more streamlined from mid-century when the Crown routinely recruited and retained garrisons by concluding an indenture with each constable, a practice that first occurred earlier in the century but only for short periods of time such as the winter months. Later in the century indentures contained detailed stipulations which were mostly financial in nature and made provision for specific differences in time of peace and of war.
All garrisons were paid by the Crown. Before the 1330s this was calculated on an individual basis with troops being paid at the accepted wage rates relevant to their status. Differences did occur, presumably due to variance in the costs of victuals at different locations, although there was an attempt to cut all wages during the truce of 1302. In the 1330s higher rates were allowed due to the necessity of war. Constables received the money at specified dates throughout the year and lump sums were not uncommon, usually being paid in relation to the constables' role as sheriffs, which prefigured the later lump sums paid out as necessitated by the indenture system. Frequent non-payment of money by the Crown led to constables taking on the burden and leaving the Crown with long-standing debts that it attempted to meet by various means and which were still owed several years later. Yet despite the war castles had an economic role and some continued to make money from their lands. Victualling was equally as critical as the payment of wages. Indeed victuals were frequently paid in lieu of wages. Berwick and Carlisle acted as supply bases and goods were shipped north where possible. Various means of obtaining victuals were employed depending upon the desperation of the situation and their impromptu seizure was not uncommon. Non-arrival of money or victuals could severely jeopardise the continued existence of garrisons.

The personal stature of the bannerets and knights who commanded the castle garrisons varied throughout the century with periods of hard warfare marked by the appointment of veteran commanders of national standing. Lulls saw men of a more local stature installed while the Percy family also came to have a significant influence over those who were appointed to Roxburgh from mid-century onwards. The type of men appointed consequently reveals the importance the Crown attached to the garrisons during various phases of the war. Surviving records also allow critical glimpses of the men-at-arms who served within garrisons and it is clear that an identifiable core of these men were engaged in long-term garrison service with movement both between castles and within their own personal status being a feature of this service. Protections from later in the century reveal that those serving within garrisons came from throughout the country with the majority from south of the Trent while it is also evident that the geographical origins of the constable directly affected the regional make up of the garrison.

In operational terms the defence of a castle by its garrison from within the walls was the severest test it could face. Scottish attacks by both siege and assault were meticulously planned and were especially effective within the hostile territory of Scotland. Garrisons could withstand these but that they frequently succumbed to them illustrates that an isolated castle relied on the external support of the wider military system to maintain its resistance with the lack of censure against constables who lost their castles evidence that contemporaries also recognised this fact. The role of the constable in guiding the defence and deciding when to enter into surrender negotiations highlights the critical role he played when forced onto the defensive. Beyond their walls garrisons undertook a wide-ranging spectrum of activities ranging from short-range defensive forays to ambitious long-range strikes and were able to launch these in co-operation with one another. Garrison troops also operated in conjunction with English field-armies and when necessity dictated participated in major battles. Communication both between garrisons and between garrisons and higher commanders was an ongoing feature with messengers frequently paid for carrying out such duties while the gathering and dissemination of intelligence was also an incessant activity practiced by garrisons and their commanders, information being gathered by means including spies, scouts and informers. However it must be
remembered that although garrisons undertook a wide range of activities beyond their walls these were encompassed within a clearly defined limit of what such a limited sized force could be expected to either achieve or oppose.

In summary it is clear that the English Crown invested tremendous effort and expense in maintaining these large garrisons as they were seen as essential for the active prosecution of the war against Scotland. The heavily garrisoned castles were meant to primarily operate aggressively. It is for this reason that they contained such large numbers and seasoned troops and also underwent a drive to make them fully mobile. In fact the castles and their garrisons were at their most vulnerable during periods when England was forced into prolonged defensive warfare and actually came into their own when England was strategically on the offensive. The study of the castle building has overemphasised the defensive, largely passive, role of castles in warfare; a study of their garrisons reveals that in the fourteenth century the English Crown attempted to utilise the castle as an aggressive instrument of war.
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### ABBREVIATIONS

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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<td>AA</td>
<td>Archaeologia Aeliana</td>
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<tr>
<td>BIHR</td>
<td>Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research</td>
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<tr>
<td>BL</td>
<td>British Library</td>
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<td>Bruce</td>
<td>The Bruce by John Barbour, ed. and trans. A.A.M. Duncan (Edinburgh, 1999)</td>
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<td>Calendar of Close Rolls</td>
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<td>CFR</td>
<td>Calendar of Fine Rolls</td>
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<td>Calendar of Patent Rolls</td>
</tr>
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<td>Dictionary of National Biography</td>
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<td>EHR</td>
<td>English Historical Review</td>
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<td>NCH</td>
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<td>Scalacronica</td>
<td>The Reign of Edward I, Edward II and Edward III as recorded by Sir Thomas Gray, ed. and trans. H. Maxwell (Glasgow, 1907)</td>
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<td>Wyntoun</td>
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Documents cited by reference number only are in The National Archives, London.
I.

THE GARRISON AS AN ENTITY
1. INFRASTRUCTURE

The importance of English garrisons in the fourteenth century Anglo-Scottish wars is reflected in their size. Much that has been written about garrisons has been centred on a study of the numbers involved and has stressed the extremely small number of people necessary to run a castle during peacetime, a skeletal garrison that amounted to little more than a domestic staff. This sense of a minimal garrison also existed in Wales in the great castles built by Edward I and due to the incongruity of such small numbers manning such large castles it is a noteworthy and often remarked feature of the period. This does not mean that the size of wartime garrisons has been totally neglected but for the majority of English castles they were never in a state of war in this period and this in turn marks out the castles that became the backbone of the English war against the Scots as particularly insightful into the size of wartime garrisons.¹

As this thesis is a military study of garrisons it concentrates on those retained within a garrison who were combatants, namely the knights, men-at-arms and foot-soldiers and, as the period progressed, hobelars and mounted archers. In analysing the numerical size of garrisons it is only these troops who contribute to the overall totals despite there being a host of non-combatants alongside them within the garrison whose varied roles supported and maintained both the soldiers and the castle.² The primary

² See pp. 73-5. In fact these were effectively semi-combatants as in the event of a direct attack on the castle they would no doubt have strenuously joined in its defence. Indeed anyone serving within a frontline castle was a potential combatant whatever their role, their essential difference to the combatants lay in their primary role lying elsewhere and their consequent lack of equipment and training.
role of these garrisons was military, they were a fighting force, and that contemporaries treated them as such is evident in the almost total absence of any reference to non-combatants in financial accounts and muster rolls, the very documents which form the basis of any analysis of numbers. As in this study the size of a garrison meant the number of fighting men contained within it. However the full picture should be borne in mind as non-combatants could swell the actual size of a garrison enormously as a rare survival from 1300 makes clear. On 28 February a return was made of the personnel within the garrison of Edinburgh which amounted to a total of 154 troops; the rarity is that the return includes a list of the non-combatants as well which more than doubled the overall size of the garrison to 347. Whether such numbers were commonplace, and 193 supporting staff does seem high, it is impossible to say without a broader range of evidence, yet what is certain is that all the numbers subsequently quoted would in actual fact be significantly higher than the troop total. The importance of this lies more in its implications for the greater demand their presence made on wages and victuals than in a military sense.

An overview of the numbers within the garrison of Roxburgh throughout the fourteenth century and within Edinburgh until its final loss in 1341 illustrate that the size of garrisons did not remain constant (figs. 1 and 2). The 154 strong garrison of Edinburgh in early 1300 had been almost halved to 85 by November of the same year and throughout 1301 and 1302 remained approximately the same size. It declined markedly in 1303 and by the summer of 1304 stood at a lowly 33. By the next recorded period of 1311/12 it reached its highest documented peak of 194 men. After Edinburgh’s recapture in 1335 its garrison remained remarkably constant at around the 120 mark, rising slightly in the summer of 1339 but having suffered a notable decline

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3 *CDS*, ii, no. 1132. Exceptional circumstances also swelled numbers such as the complete rebuilding of Edinburgh in 1335/6 with 85 men specifically brought in for this, *CDS*, iii, app. iv.
by the spring of 1341 when it fell once again to the Scots. Roxburgh traces a similar pattern with substantial numbers at the start of the century, including an exceptionally high 264 in 1300, the ensuing lowering to 31 in late 1302 no doubt due to the truce of that year, followed by another decline after December 1303 which saw it reach a low of a mere 27 men in May 1304 while a substantial 170 were present in 1311/12. Interestingly it had dropped to 123 by 1313 which suggests it was declining from then until its loss a year later as Edinburgh was similarly dropping before its loss in 1341. In mid-century the numbers were again high although they did vary with the garrison almost halved in October 1335 and having almost doubled again by June 1340. Roxburgh also provides figures for the second half of the century with 55 men considered enough in the decade after victory at Neville’s Cross, rising to a powerful 138 in 1381/2 following renewed hostility with Scotland and culminating in the massive 300 strong garrison of 1400.

Salient features can be drawn out from a comparison of the Edinburgh and Roxburgh garrisons. In early 1300 both were extremely well-manned, a decline set in during 1303 that brought them to a significant low in the spring/summer of 1304 but by 1311/12 they were once again heavily manned numbering in the high one hundreds. Their recapture in the 1330s brought in strong garrisons totalling around the mid-one hundreds which, except for a two year reduction in Roxburgh, remained relatively constant until their loss in the early 1340s. Quite clearly these noticeable trends reflect the nature of the war, the considerable fluctuation in numbers a reaction to the pressure of war at that time. The peaks in 1300, 1311/12 and the 1330s mirror the hard and intense warfare of these years. Similarly the decline and exceptional low of 1303/4 took place due to the apparent victory won by the English at that time and the belief that the Scots had been conclusively beaten, a belief also prevalent when the rather
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<th>Bnrs</th>
<th>Knts</th>
<th>Men-at-Arms</th>
<th>Hobelars</th>
<th>Cross-bowmen</th>
<th>Archers</th>
<th>Mtd. Archers</th>
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Figure 2: Numbers within the Roxburgh Garrison.

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moderate garrison totalling just 55 men was installed in Roxburgh in 1350, the decisive victory of Neville’s Cross fought only four years previously. The sudden drop in Roxburgh in October 1335, on the surface so unusual, was in fact also a response to the state of the war, the substantial garrisons that had been installed further north in the castles of Edinburgh and Stirling believed to be sufficient enough for a significant cut in the Roxburgh garrison. 4

The size of a garrison was therefore directly related to the immediate pressure of the war. It was also directly affected by economic necessity; the ruthless speed with which the government reduced garrisons, as in 1304 and Roxburgh in 1335, demonstrates that a sizeable garrison was not kept just for the sake of it and that there had to be a pressing reason for the retention of such a large body of men. It is precisely this that leads to such fluctuations in garrison size and not only explains these inconsistencies but marks the size of garrisons out as a highly instructive indicator as to the state of the war at a given time. A combination of economic imperative and the demands of war dictated the size of garrisons.

A more detailed study of garrison numbers reveals what effectively appears to be a two tiered system when under the pressure of immediate warfare. The upper level averages around the mid-one hundred mark and is evident in Edinburgh’s first extant total of 154 whilst Roxburgh begins on 164 and, after rising to 264, returns to a more normal 155 in July 1300. Similarly the powerful garrisons of 1311/12 fall within this higher tier; Roxburgh containing 170 men, Linlithgow 155 and Edinburgh setting its upper limit with 194. This is also true for mid-century (excepting the reduced Roxburgh garrison discussed above) with Roxburgh numbering 140 in 1335 and 132 in 1340/1, Edinburgh 120 in 1336/7 and 138 in 1339 and Stirling totalling 124 in late

1336. Although the size does vary in each case there is definitely a broad degree of consistency among these totals that places them approximately between the 120 to 190 mark. As the retention of such numbers of men indicates all the instances in which this level of manning are evident occurred during years of pressurised warfare.

However warfare was also prevalent during the second tier of garrison size. Here the size of garrisons stands at an approximate average of 80 with Edinburgh from November 1300 through until late 1302 a prime example, the garrison never varying from between 71 and 85 men. Roxburgh also enters this tier periodically; totalling 98 in the winter of 1301/2 and 76 in late 1335-37. In autumn 1301 Kirkintilloch also held a garrison of 88 men. Indeed, excluding the cutbacks of 1303/4 and Roxburgh in 1350 after Neville’s Cross and in 1400, the garrisons of both Edinburgh and Roxburgh contained numbers that approximate to the parameters of one of these two levels of manning. As with Kirkintilloch garrisons of other major English-held Scottish castles also on the whole fit into one of these tiers which implies that there were two generally recognised sizes of garrison that these castles retained whilst at war, one based around the mid-one hundred mark and the other around the 80s. There was no explicit rule that created these and it emerges only from noticeable patterns among the totals of garrisons. There was no stipulation that garrisons had to approximate to these sizes and it could be that it was just chance that so many did. However it seems more likely that these were generally accepted levels for front-line castles active in warfare, nothing more than rough guidelines but important all the same. Below these two tiers lay more minor numbers retained in phases of relative peace, such as in 1304.\(^5\)

A series of garrisons which as a whole do not fit so neatly are those recorded in the north of England in 1323 when they formed the mainstay of the English defence

\(^5\) These three approximate levels of manning reflect those that have been seen to have operated in the Anglo-Norman period with one level for peacetime and two upper levels for wartime. S. Morillo, *Warfare under the Anglo-Norman Kings* (Woodbridge, 1994), pp. 74-5.
against the Scots (fig. 3). Dunstanburgh with 130 men and Newcastle with 70 do fit the pattern but the 107 of Bamburgh and the 31 within Barnard castle sit slightly uneasily within the defined parameters. The reason for this most likely lies in the fact that these were not major castles inside Scotland and that this together with their geographical position influenced the size of their garrisons. This explains the small number in the most southerly Barnard castle and the quite considerable numbers in the major Northumberland castles of Dunstanburgh, Bamburgh and Warkworth. The 70 in Newcastle appears adequate due to the support readily available in the town. In fact Bamburgh and also Warkworth both fit into the overlapping area between the two levels of manning, a position which suggests a balance between the two and consequently something approaching an ideal size for an active wartime garrison.

There are a further two garrison totals that appear as anomalies in comparison to the rest. The figure of 264 men which constituted the Roxburgh garrison between late December 1299 and July 1300 is quite striking and means that during these months Roxburgh contained over a hundred more men than was usual. Immediately prior to this in early December 1299 its garrison numbered 164 and in July 1300 it fell to a similar size of 155; its overlarge size was consequently a temporary measure that lasted just six months and must surely have been enacted with the campaign of 1300 in mind, the extra 109 men leaving the garrison to join the king's army in July. The presence of these extra men was almost certainly an expedient for the campaign with the number of archers in July returning to the one hundred of 1299 although the crossbowmen remained increased by ten and the men-at-arms were significantly reduced. The second striking figure is the 300 men of the Roxburgh garrison in 1400. This is by far the largest throughout the period and towers over the 84 men present

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6 See p. 256.
nineteen years earlier in 1381/2. Renewed hostilities with Scotland accounts for the heightened strength of the garrison and its exceptional size would have been aided by the fact that apart from Berwick there was no other major English fortification that far north, indeed none other within Scotland, thus concentrating all available manpower and more importantly all available finance on its garrison. It was this that made possible the retention of such a sizeable and costly garrison at the end of the century.

Although Roxburgh reached its peak in 1400 by then the overall total of men serving within all garrisons would have been well below its highest point. Calculating such an overall total is rather problematic due to the need to find a specific date when the numbers within all the major garrisons are available. There are few documents such as that dating from September 1302 which list the number of men serving within every Scottish fortification held by the English and which actually states in a summary the overall total as calculated by contemporaries.\(^7\) The first total given is for the overall total based on the number of men who should be serving in these garrisons, a figure of 507, but the actual total due to men not being present is given as 467. A series of indentures follows for the keeping of these castles which reaches a similar total of 508. However these three calculations only include bannerets, knights and men-at-arms with no total being given for the foot of the garrison which, when taken from numbers in the document, constitute a body of 596 men. Adding these foot-soldiers to those who were mounted creates a combined total of approximately 1,100 men engaged in garrison service in the autumn of 1302. The next period for which an overall total can

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\(^7\) *CDS*, ii, no. 1324. The garrisons were those in which the troops were paid by the king or were serving for lands in Scotland and consisted of Dumfries, Lochmaben, Berwick, Roxburgh, Jedburgh, Selkirk, Peebles, Lanark and Carstairs, Edinburgh, Linlithgow, Kirkintilloch, Ayr, Bothwell and Dalswinton. It should be noted that none of these overall totals include the garrison of Carlisle due to the difficulty in finding matching dates.
be ascertained is from the garrison rolls of 1311/12. Here the major garrisons in Scotland amount to a total of 630 men including both mounted and foot-soldiers: the garrison of Berwick town contained an additional figure approaching 800 men, a staggering size more than double that of the other garrisons combined, which, when added to those garrisons, produces a total of approximately 1,430 men. The outstanding omission from these rolls is the garrison of Stirling which, based on the figures for the similar sized castles of Roxburgh, Edinburgh and Linlithgow, must have numbered something between 155 and 190, increasing the overall total to a figure approaching 1,600. The third and final period in which an overall total can be obtained from a range of castles is in the 1330s, the widest range coming in the years 1335/6. The overall total here, including both Berwick with 284 and Perth with a particularly substantial 481, emerges as a force of approximately 1,300 men.

Obviously calculating overall totals such as these can never be exact and those reached can only at best be a rounded estimate. Yet despite this the extent to which the overall figures for these three separate periods are broadly similar is remarkable; all at least amount to over one thousand men being actively engaged in garrison service with 1,100 the minimum and 1,600 the maximum, the 1,300 of 1335/6 appearing almost as a median between the two. All three periods are ones in which the Scottish war was being vigorously prosecuted by either the English or the Scots or by both and it follows that in times of active warfare there were between 1,100 and 1,600 troops engaged in manning these English-held front-line garrisons in the first half of the fourteenth century. The loss of the major Scottish fortifications in 1314 and again from

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8 *CDS*, iii, app. vii, pp. 393-412. The garrisons were Roxburgh, Edinburgh, Linlithgow, Bothwell, Livingston, Berwick castle and Berwick town. These figures are only approximate and calculated on those serving on the same date.

9 BL Cotton MS, Nero C. VIII, fos. 248r-251v. In this case dates from 1335 and 1336 have been used to obtain the widest range of garrisons without risking a distortion of the true numbers. The garrisons include Roxburgh and Berwick (February 1335), Edinburgh (September 1335), Stirling and Perth (October/November 1336) and Dunottar (May 1336).
1341 onwards naturally confines these totals to those two periods in which a series of major fortifications were in English hands. Outside of these periods the total of men engaged in garrisons would have been significantly lower only perhaps approaching one thousand at the end of the century with the large garrison of Roxburgh added to that of Berwick. More interesting is the number of men in garrison service after Bannockburn, a figure which can be obtained from the accounts for the payment of the garrisons of the north-eastern castles of England, now front-line garrisons, in 1323. In all these five major castles contained garrisons that together totalled 432 men. This is an extremely low number compared to the three periods discussed above especially as 1322/3 was also a period of active warfare. It demonstrates the extent to which the number of men in garrison service had been reduced in these years declining to roughly only a third of the total which was present both earlier and later and which appear to be the normal wartime total. However the numbers in each individual garrison in 1323 are appropriate to their size and this proves that it was a lack of strong fortifications in which to install garrisons that led to such a low overall total. The manpower was there but the bases were not, a fact which highlights the importance of the occupation of strong Scottish fortifications, particularly first-rate castles, to the English war effort.

Numbers alone therefore establish the critical importance of garrisons in the prosecution of the Scottish wars by England. Individual garrisons were routinely numbered around the eighties and mid-one hundreds with the whole of the garrison establishment totalling easily over a thousand men at one time. This was a powerful fighting force in terms of the medieval period and especially so with regard to garrisons throughout the Middle Ages. Such numbers incurred great expense to
support them in wages and victuals, the latter also necessitating an enormous logistical effort. It is strikingly clear that wartime garrisons in this period consisted of an extremely substantial number of fighting men and mark it out as a period in which the size of the English medieval garrison reached its apogee.\textsuperscript{11}

Having established the size of garrisons it is necessary to recognise that they contained the full variety of troop types that existed in this period and the next issue to address is the proportion of each of these within the garrisons. In defining these categories and their numbers a few words of clarification are necessary. Bannerets and knights, usually acting as constables, formed only a small section of garrisons but their rank alone necessitates a separate category for them. In some financial accounts they are routinely numbered among a block of men-at-arms with an ensuing note of how many were actually bannerets and knights.\textsuperscript{12} The classification of men-at-arms also includes those described as esquires and sergeants due to their inseparable similarity in military terms. The foot-soldiers are placed in the separate categories of crossbowmen and archers where this is possible and they have not been referred to together as foot-soldiers. Two new additions to the military establishment also appeared in this period, the hobelar in the first quarter of the century and the mounted archer in mid-century, with both entering into garrison service. These then are the types of troops of which garrisons consisted. Once again the limitation of evidence has necessitated the selection of several different periods allied with individual examples from Roxburgh later in the century to produce a representative overview (fig. 3).

As would be expected bannerets and knights constitute only a small fraction of garrison troops, less than 1\% of the garrison in most cases. Naturally there were exceptions such as Edinburgh in 1300 when they accounted for almost 6\% but this was

\textsuperscript{11} For a broader comparison of wartime numbers see J. S. Moore, 'Anglo-Norman Garrisons', and Prestwich, 'The Garrisoning of English Medieval Castles', \textit{passim}.

\textsuperscript{12} For example in the lists for Roxburgh, BL Cotton MS, Nero C. VIII, fo. 248r.
**Figure 3: Breakdown of Troop Types serving within Garrisons.**

[N.B. for ease of simplification most double figure percentages have been rounded off to the nearest whole number].

(i) **February 1300**

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<th>Men-at-Arms</th>
<th>Hobelars</th>
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(iii) **1311/12** (CDS, iii, app. vii, pp. 393-412)

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### (vi) Roxburgh

(respectively: CDS, iii, no. 1546; CDS, iv, no. 306; CDS, iv, no. 567)

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a rarity. The true backbone of the garrisons was the men-at-arms – mounted, armoured, well-armed and having received some training – and these consistently accounted for a significant proportion of garrisons. The overall numbers themselves are impressive with 217 present across the three major castles in 1311/12; when translated into a percentage of the total this figure comes out as 42%. In 1300 they accounted for 31% of the two selected garrisons combined and remarkably in late 1336 they constituted exactly the same as they did in 1311/12 with 42%. Similar figures emerge within Roxburgh in 1350 (44%) and 1400 (31%). These results indicate that men-at-arms consistently provided between a third and a half of individual garrisons from 1300 until 1400. This again is a broad summary and there are individual exceptions such as the high 52% in Linlithgow during 1311/12 and the low 23% present during early 1300 in Roxburgh together with the 63% in Roxburgh in 1381/2. The north-eastern garrisons of 1323 also exhibit a proportion well below this range with just 21% being men-at-arms. However the majority of garrisons do fall into this range such as Edinburgh (49%) and Kirkintilloch (30%) in the autumn of 1301, reaching a combined total of 40%. The actual numbers behind these percentages illustrate that men-at-arms could serve in extremely significant numbers, the 217 of 1311/12 accompanied by the 129 from only two garrisons in early 1300 and the 133 of three major garrisons in 1336. The number in some individual garrisons is also arrestingly large, 83 in Edinburgh during 1311/12 and a vast 94 within Roxburgh in 1400. It is evident from these figures that men-at-arms remained the mainstay of garrisons by contributing between a third and a half of their total number throughout the century, marking these troops out as outstanding in their consistent employment in garrisons during this period.

13 These figures for Roxburgh alone suggest a gradual decline in men-at-arms as the century progressed however the decline was in percentage only with a massive 94 men-at-arms in the garrison in 1400.
Before the 1320s the rest of the garrison consisted of foot-soldiers, both crossbowmen and archers, who constituted the remainder of the garrison. In early 1300 they made up 67% of the garrisons of Roxburgh and Edinburgh combined and 43% of the 1311/12 garrisons even though Linlithgow contained no archers at all. During the autumn of 1301 58% of the Edinburgh and Kirkintilloch garrisons combined were foot-soldiers and 61% of the Roxburgh garrison in 1301/2. The overall figure for 1311/12 is slightly distorted by the lack of archers in Linlithgow and more representative are the figures for Roxburgh and Edinburgh alone, respectively 55% and 42%. On average foot-soldiers made up between a half and two thirds of the early garrisons of the period which complements the proportion constituted by the men-at-arms and picks out the foot as frequently providing over half of the troops in these garrisons.

As mentioned the foot-soldiers themselves fall into two definable categories, crossbowmen and archers, with a specific reference usually being made with regard to this. On occasion the number given is referred to as that of the ‘foot’ of the garrison and, if no further information is added stating that a number of these were crossbowmen, then it is not possible to determine separate figures for the two categories. Fortunately most documents do make this specification and it is possible to identify the archers as on the whole being more numerous in garrisons than crossbowmen as the figures testify; in 1300 14% being crossbowmen and 53% archers, 23% as opposed to 35% in autumn 1301 and in 1311/12 within Roxburgh 19% of the garrison were crossbowmen and 36% archers. However Roxburgh is the only garrison to exhibit this in 1311/12; the overall figures place crossbowmen in the majority with 23% over the archers’ 20% while in Edinburgh there was one more crossbowman than archer. It is particularly noticeable that Linlithgow contained no archers but possessed
a substantial 45 crossbowmen. Edinburgh is also instructive with the majority of archers gradually decreasing from 1301 onwards until they were in equal numbers to the crossbowmen in 1302, falling below the latter in 1303 and actually disappearing from the garrison altogether for a time in 1304 (Fig. 1). There is a definite trend towards a reduction in the number of archers which culminates in the figures for 1311/12. In the cutbacks of 1303/4 the archers were the first to go from the garrisons and suffered the greatest reduction. Yet this was an underlying pattern rather than a wholesale change as the figures for Roxburgh testify with the number of archers remaining well above the crossbowmen in both 1311/12 and early 1313. In contrast crossbowmen remained relatively consistent with the large number of 119 present across the three major garrisons of 1311/12.

In light of this trend it is perhaps not surprising that archers almost totally disappear from garrisons in the years after Bannockburn but what is surprising is that crossbowmen suffer the same fate. After 1314 foot-soldiers became virtually non-existent within garrisons. The northern garrisons of 1323 contain only 20 ‘foot’ (unspecified) which were in Barnard castle, the four remaining garrisons not even having one foot-soldier between them, a figure that works out at a insignificant 4% of those garrisons combined, while in late 1336 foot-soldiers are entirely absent from the three major garrisons of Stirling, Roxburgh and Edinburgh. Their last appearance in the major garrisons of the 1330s is in the original garrison installed in Edinburgh upon its recapture in autumn 1335, the accounts testifying to the presence of 21 archers, forming 18% of the entire garrison.14 After Neville’s Cross in 1346 there were never any foot-soldiers, neither crossbowmen nor archers, in the one surviving garrison of Roxburgh. It is an exceptional feature of active wartime garrisons in this period that

14 The town of Perth continued to retain significant numbers of foot-archers in its garrison with 129 present in 1336 and 120 in 1337, BL Cotton MS, Nero C. VIII, fos. 250v-251v.
foot-soldiers go from being the predominant component in the early years to becoming relatively scarce, and by implication increasingly obsolete, by mid-century if not earlier.

The place of the foot-soldier within garrisons was taken by the incorporation of mounted troops the first of which was the hobelar. These lightly armed troops with uncovered horses first began to be retained in garrisons in 1302/3, in late 1301 at the earliest, but in a mere handful of numbers at the most. It is in 1311/12 that they come to the fore as a major element in garrisons with a total of 80 present across the three major garrisons, numbering between 21 and 30 in each garrison and amounting to 15% of these garrisons combined. By 1323 they accounted for an overwhelming 72% of the northern garrisons, a massive 330 split between the five northern castles with 60 in Newcastle, 80 in Warkworth, 90 in Bamburgh and one hundred in Dunstanburgh, Barnard castle the only one without any at all. This ground-breaking change occurred in the years following Bannockburn and is evident in the mobile forces first spread throughout the northern garrisons under Arundel in 1317. In 1323 the number of hobelars completely dwarfs even that of the men-at-arms who are relegated to only 21% of the overall total and whose numbers appear well reduced with only sixteen in Bamburgh and nine in Newcastle, although their combined total of 98 is still substantial. But without doubt by 1323 hobelars had risen from being an unknown force within garrisons in 1300 to entirely dominating them at the expense of foot-soldiers and even displacing the traditional proportion of men-at-arms, the magnitude of this change almost revolutionary in nature.

The figures from late 1336 suggest that the emergence of the hobelar as the mainstay of garrisons was ongoing albeit with their former overwhelming percentage somewhat tempered by men-at-arms regaining their former proportion. Once more
hobelars accounted for over half of these garrisons with a combined total of 180 hobelars which translates to 56%. Their continued presence in garrisons seems assured but their demise is as drastic as that of the foot-soldiers and even more sudden. After 1346 hobelars vanish completely from garrisons as indeed they ceased to exist in general having been a phenomenon of the first half of the fourteenth century. Their presence in the garrisons of the 1330s and into the early 1340s is extremely problematic and stems from inexact terminology and their apparent, almost inseparable, closeness to the latest and what was to prove the most decisive troop type to emerge in the century, the mounted archer. Edinburgh is typical of this awkwardness with 60 'hobelars and archers' present from late 1335 until 30 August 1337; by July 1339 these hobelars had vanished altogether with 71 mounted archers now appearing in the garrison, 60 of the latter serving in the spring of 1341 immediately prior to the loss of the castle. Roxburgh is similarly confused and offers the same clue as to the reason for this apparent incongruity. In October 1335 the 80 hobelars who had served there since February were reduced to 40 and these remained throughout 1336 and into 1337. The clue comes in 1340/1 when 50 'hobelars and archers' were in the garrison. The archers referred to in these cases are clearly mounted archers as their inclusion alongside hobelars indicates; these troops are both classed together and indeed received the same wage rate. In effect this depicts a transitional stage in which the hobelar and mounted archer co-existed before the latter replaced the former. It is the emergence of the mounted archer which explains the sudden disappearance of the hobelar from garrisons in mid-century.

It is the mounted archer then which comes to dominate the garrisons of the second half of the century from the late 1330s onwards. They constituted 51% of the Edinburgh garrison in 1339 and 55% in early 1341; 54% of the Roxburgh garrison in
1350, an unusually low 36% in 1381/2 and an extremely predominant 67% in 1400
when the garrison included the large total of 300 mounted archers. It is worth noting
that this 67% is reminiscent of the 72% hobelars accounted for in the northern
garrisons of early 1323 creating another link between the hobelar and the mounted
archer in terms of garrison service. That mounted archers took the role of both the
hobelar and foot-soldiers is evident in their average proportion of approximately 55-
60% being the same as that accounted for by hobelars, crossbowmen and archers
together in 1336 which produced a combined figure of 58% while ‘hobelars and
archers’ similarly accounted for 56% of the garrisons in 1336. In terms of garrisoning
the mounted archer therefore evolved from the changes that took place among the foot-
soldiers and was intimately connected with the advent and retention in significant
numbers of hobelars and consequently occupied the same proportion of garrisons that
all of the former had previously held combined.

The type of troops serving with garrisons naturally mirrors military
developments in general during this period, the emergence of the hobelar – and indeed
its demise - and of the mounted archer leading to them both being readily incorporated
into garrisons, these new troops installed in front-line garrisons almost as soon as they
came into existence and appearing in substantial numbers. Far from being conservative
in their composition garrisons were at the cutting edge of military development and
underwent transitions in composition themselves throughout the century resulting in
garrison forces that were fully mobile which made them a powerful mobile striking
force that was intended to operate outside the castle walls. Within the evolving
garrisons one element remained constant for the whole period, the men-at-arms
consistently providing between a third and a half of garrison troops, the 94 within
Roxburgh in 1400 illustrating that they were as strong if not stronger in number at the
end of the century as in the beginning. Whatever developments took place men-at-arms remained the solid backbone of garrisons throughout the century.

Discussion of the size of garrisons and of the proportion various troops contributed to them suggests that a garrison consisted of one large body of men serving as a single integral unit. This was not the case. A garrison was not composed of a solitary block of men all serving under exactly the same terms nor was their presence in the garrison necessarily for the same reason. Muster and account rolls reveal that men were categorised as belonging to a certain administrative grouping which explained their presence in the garrison and in which they invariably remained throughout their service in that garrison, a feature that was particularly true of the men-at-arms.

The clearest examples of this come from the early 1300s with the return for the garrison of Edinburgh in 1300 an illuminating starting point. The constable, the banneret John Kingston, had five esquires of his own retinue serving with him, whilst two other knights present had one esquire each and another five knights two esquires each. These esquires were serving in Edinburgh because of their personal service to their knightly lords. In addition there were twelve men-at-arms present who were not overtly connected to the constable or the knights plus the foot of the garrison as well. The seventeen esquires are therefore added to the twelve men-at-arms to calculate the full complement of men-at-arms in the garrison although their service and presence within it was of a different nature. An eighth knight, Walter de Sutton, was also in the garrison, his presence directly attached to that of the constable as he is described as a socius, a companion, of the latter. Similarly, in early 1302, of the 30 men-at-arms within Edinburgh twelve were of Kingston's personal retinue whilst in the autumn of that year there were ten men of his retinue in the garrison, another three provided by
Kingston for his lands in Scotland and a further 28 men-at-arms of which fourteen were serving for lands in Scotland. During the winter of 1301/2 Kingston had twelve men-at-arms of his retinue in Edinburgh, another knight had three men-at-arms and a further two knights two men-at-arms each. Two more men-at-arms were listed separately being described as 'esquires of the household' and were followed by yet another separate group of nine men-at-arms.

These examples from Edinburgh are typical of all early fourteenth century garrisons. In the autumn of 1301 the men-at-arms in Kirkintilloch consisted of three esquires in the retinue of William Francis, the constable, two from another knight in the garrison and a third knight providing three from his retinue. Linlithgow depicts a similar set-up with the constable, William Felton, having a personal retinue of fifteen esquires while the sheriff of Linlithgow, Archibald Livingston, had his own separate retinue of ten esquires, a further twenty men-at-arms serving for the lands in Scotland of eight knights whilst another ten men-at-arms were serving for their own lands in Scotland and on top of this there were also sixteen men-at-arms who were sergeants of the household.

Separate groupings are clearly evident in the garrison rolls of 1311/12. Edinburgh again serves as a typical example and only a few cases need be cited: men-at-arms being classed in separate groups although serving for the same length of time, one group of 24 and another of 17 both present for the year yet distinctly categorised separately; two hobelars served for the entire year as did another but entirely separate group of eleven; indeed in Edinburgh it also extends to the foot-soldiers with the bulk of the crossbowmen and archers, numbering 25 and 27 respectively, classed together

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15 CDS, ii, nos. 1132, 1286, 1321.
16 E101/68/1/15.
17 E101/9/16, m. 1.
18 E101/10/5, m. 2.
and serving for the year but with another entry in the rolls for another four crossbowmen and six archers who were also present for the year. The separation of foot-soldiers into various groups is unusual, as it is for hobelars, both normally being classed in their troop type as one unit with no separate grouping of troops of the same type. The rolls for the exceptionally large Berwick garrison illustrate more clearly the separate groupings which contributed men-at-arms to the garrison, the personal retinues of knights such as William and John Felton and Robert Grey standing out markedly as do further groups consisting solely of men-at-arms, such as that headed by the name of Robert Elvet, all quite definitely separate from one another, the latter implying the presence of a group of men-at-arms who may possibly have entered into an agreement to serve together. 19 The rolls for 1311/12 are full of individual groups, some serving for the same time and others for a whole range of periods, and plainly demonstrate that a garrison was not one single block of men but consisted of an assortment of smaller groupings making it a much more complex and varied body of men.

It is considerably more difficult to gauge whether this was also true of garrisons in mid-century and later. The rolls and accounts portray each component of the garrison as one single entity listing knights then men-at-arms and finally hobelars and mounted archers with the only exception occurring in the rolls for Edinburgh during 1335-6 and 1336-7 where knights have the number of men-at-arms in their retinue noted next to their name. 20 That constables and knights continued to retain their own esquires in the garrison in which they themselves were serving is without doubt but is only testified to elsewhere in this later period by some of the names of those amongst the men-at-arms being intimately connected to the person of the constable or

19 CDS, iii, app. vii, pp. 394, 397.
one of the knights. The routine omission of men being directly identified as belonging to a personal retinue is not due to this feature disappearing but is down to a change in the means by which garrisons were retained and the subsequent alteration in the paperwork which hides any identifiable retinues. Garrisons in the second half of the century laid greater onus on the constable for all aspects of the garrison, a situation ushered in by the widespread use of the indenture when appointing constables. However the personal retinue still remained a distinct feature as exemplified by Ralph, lord Greystoke, bringing his own following with him on his way to take up his office as constable of Roxburgh in 1380. The evidence from a series of protections for Roxburgh late in the century makes it clear that there was a definite link between the geographical basis of the constable and a proportion of the men serving within his garrison; indeed the greater individual responsibility placed on the constable by means of the indenture may well have increased the proportion of men in garrisons who were in the retinue of the constable or were associated with him in some way.

The indenture became predominant in garrisoning from the 1330s onwards with every constable of Roxburgh after Neville's Cross being appointed by indenture as was every keeper of Berwick and the wardens of the March. Indentures were usually intended to last for one year but it was possible for them to extend over a number of years, in 1393 Henry Percy's indenture as warden of the East March and Berwick to last for the next five years after the indenture of his father, the earl of Northumberland, for the same office expired having run for the previous five years. The earl of Westmorland's indenture giving him charge of the west March and Carlisle in 1405 was intended to last for seven years. The indenture of Richard Grey and Stephen

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21 See pp. 189-90.
22 Bower, vii, p. 397.
23 See pp. 205-12.
24 CDS, iv, no. 445; CDS, v, no. 929.
Lescrope as joint constables of Roxburgh dated 21 December 1400 perfectly illustrates the kind of stipulations a typical indenture contained. They were to keep the castle for three years maintaining a sufficient garrison, the exact numbers not being specified but to cost no more than 4,000 marks a year during war whilst building works were underway and 3,000 marks when these were finished. During periods of truce the wage bill was to be no more than 2,000 marks and the garrison was to number forty men-at-arms, including themselves, and eighty archers. In the event of the conclusion of a final peace their pay was to be arranged with the king. If there was a ‘royal’ siege of the castle, effectively by the Scottish host, the king was bound to rescue them after three months notice. Further clauses concerned more minor details such as maintaining the mills and not damaging the utensils of the kitchen or brewery. Similar clauses were contained within the indenture for Berwick in 1386, the garrison to cost £7,000 in time of war with the numbers of men-at-arms and archers specified as well as an order that the majority of these had to come from south of Richmond and Craven. The agreement of a truce meant a reduction of the garrison by a half but upon its end the garrison would return to its previous strength.25

Perhaps the best example of an indenture comes from the private castle of Lochmaben in 1371. The keeper, William de Stapelton, was to hold the castle for six years, receiving £200 for each of the first two years and 250 marks for the succeeding years being paid the half-year in advance. Stapelton was to have the grass, hay and wood of the castle at his own cost as well as the fishings for himself and his garrison. A third of the any financial gain Stapelton made from the castle’s lands and a third of any prisoners taken by the garrison were to go to the earl of Hereford, the owner of the castle, who was also to receive any prisoner valued at over £100 for which he would

25 CDS, iv, nos. 360, 568.
pay that sum to Stapelton and the earl was also to receive all profits of war made by
the men of Annandale which did not include those of the garrison themselves.
Stapelton's annual fee in the event of war would be 500 marks. The castle was always
to be victualled for half a year and if besieged to be relieved by the earl in half a year
and if not the keeper was entitled to surrender. Similarly if Stapelton was for a variety
of reasons unable to keep the castle then the earl would relieve him on three months
notice.\(^{26}\) Indentures consequently covered all aspects of garrisoning and were the
foundation on which garrisons from the mid-fourteenth century onwards were based.
They quickly became an all-encompassing contract between the two parties with
financial considerations, especially the distinction between periods of war and peace,
uppermost. However indentures were a two-way process with the constable able to
voice his own concerns in the clauses; an agreed period by which relief would come if
besieged was a common feature of later indentures and constables had their own
financial concerns, Thomas Ughtred carefully stipulating matters regarding pay and
victuals for his tenure as warden of Perth in 1338 and Richard Tempest in 1352 having
it written into his indenture as warden of Berwick that if he was not paid within a
month he would be free to leave his office after giving due notice.\(^{27}\)

The garrisons of the recaptured castles in the 1330s were also retained by
means of indentures with individual constables holding their office directly from them.
Typical is John Stirling's indenture on becoming constable of Edinburgh in October
1335 which stated that his yearly fee, presumably for the sheriffdom, was £20, the
number of men-at-arms, hobelars and archers in his garrison were explicitly specified
and were to be discharged should a garrison no longer be required. Stirling was also to
receive rebellious Scots into the king's peace. Interestingly Stirling ignored the

\(^{26}\) *CDS*, iv, no. 178.
\(^{27}\) *CDS*, iii, nos. 1283, 1567.
numbers stated in the indenture and installed an extra forty men, this being given retrospective and no doubt reluctant sanction by the king. 28 A more intriguing note is struck in 1337 when a number of officials, including the chancellor and chamberlain of Berwick, were to treat and agree with the constables of Edinburgh, Roxburgh, Stirling and Bothwell for their stay as constables of these castles. 29 This process would have resulted in the drawing up of indentures but the interest is in the fact that these officials were also to treat and agree with men-at-arms, hobelars and archers for their stay in Perth, a process which suggests an indenture was entered into by the officials with these soldiers for their service in the garrison rather than the more usual method by which constables supervised the personnel of their own garrisons. An echo of this occurs in February 1302 when a list of the numbers and names of men-at-arms who were to serve in Scottish garrisons was sent to the king, the sense of this being a loose form of indenture increased by it being accompanied by an indenture in which the Irish undertook to send men-at-arms and foot-soldiers to the king. 30

This raises the question of the extent to which indentures were used with regard to garrisons in the early fourteenth century. Such contracts for military service in general first appeared in 1270 and the Crown first entered into contracts with its own subjects for military service in the 1290s so by the time of the first garrisons such a system was still in its infancy. 31 There are hints that despite this the concept of using an indenture as the basis for garrison service was already in circulation as the proposal of 1298 from the abbot and convent of Jedburgh and Ivo de Aldeburgh to keep Jedburgh castle for five years with various clauses and for 5,000 marks per year implies. On 2 January 1300 Robert Clifford agreed to serve with thirty men-at-arms in

29 CDS, v, no. 767.
30 Ibid, no. 278.
Lochmaben castle alongside John de St. John for a fee of 500 marks and with a number of stipulations included in this indenture,\textsuperscript{32} in October 1298 two agreements concerning garrisons were agreed with Robert Hastangs, one dealing with his own garrison of Roxburgh which related to the delivery of victuals, the number of his garrison and his own pay until Pentecost whilst the other dealt with the munition and garrison of Jedburgh which was temporarily without a constable, the agreement made with Matthew Redman that he would remain as keeper of Dumfries castle with a set number of men from 1 August to 20 November 1304 for a fee of £60 is a clear case of an indenture being concluded with a constable for his stay and that of his garrison.\textsuperscript{33}

An attempt to determine whether all such agreements were indentures is complicated by agreements which appear to have a much looser basis. In October 1298 the king and council ordered set numbers of troops to remain in the Berwick garrison as had been arranged by the sheriffs of Roxburgh and Jedburgh and Simon Fraser and again in 1298 it was the king who issued instructions as to the number of men who were to be in the garrison of Dumfries while in 1301 it was Dumfries along with Lochmaben in which the king commanded specific numbers of men to be retained.\textsuperscript{34} It was doubtful these ever amounted to anything approaching an indenture but the specifying of numbers and sense of an agreement having been reached lend them a hint of similarity. This is also true of Thomas Gray agreeing to provide a further seventy troops for the Norham garrison in 1322 and the promises made by the king to the warden of Lochmaben in 1299/1303 when the latter agreed to take up the position and which, he protested, had not been kept.\textsuperscript{35}

\textsuperscript{32} Stevenson, ii, pp. 264-6, 407.
\textsuperscript{33} CDS, ii, nos. 1016, 1018; CDS, v, no. 376.
\textsuperscript{34} CDS, ii, nos. 1022, 1028, 1257.
\textsuperscript{35} CDS, iii, no. 772, CDS, iv, no. 1795.
The most conspicuous evidence that indentures were used in these early years comes in the form of files of indentures for the keeping of castles that date from February and August/September 1302. Those from February are all dated on the 12th of the month and each one accounts for a castle which means there were eleven indentures and each specified the number and type of men to be retained in the garrison and the duration of time the indenture was intended to last for. The second file totals thirteen indentures regarding the garrisoning of the same number of fortifications and once more specifies numbers and duration. This is conclusive proof that indentures were indeed used for garrisoning at this early date but, as with Redman’s indenture for Dumfries, the short time-span these indentures were intended to last for is most noticeable. Whilst Redman’s was for less than four months the files from 1302 were to last from February to Pentecost and August/September to Christmas respectively. John Kingston’s agreement to hold Edinburgh was noticeably longer, enduring from the end of November until Whitsun. The dating of the files also illustrates that both the periods covered by these brief indentures were outside of the main campaigning season and such general files do not exist for the campaigning season itself. The use of indentures was therefore originally a matter of practicality to see garrisons through what was considered a ‘dead’ period and which, by implication, was not as practical to use when the activity of the campaigning season came around.

In the early fourteenth century indentures were only a temporary expedient with regard to garrisons. Unfortunately a lack of evidence makes it impossible to accurately gauge their development from this to the all-encompassing indentures upon which garrisons came to be based by the 1330s. It is not possible to tell whether indentures were in use for the large garrisons of 1311/12 but the great amount of

36 CDS, ii, nos. 1286, 1321.
37 Prestwich, Armies and Warfare, p. 91.
personnel entering and leaving and serving for different dates is in stark contrast to the garrison accounts for the 1330s and suggests that indentures were not in widespread use in 1311/12. The first true example of an indenture that resembles those agreed later in the century is that concluded with the burgesses of Berwick in June 1317 when they agreed to keep their town themselves for 6,000 marks for an entire year and also that of 1316/17 agreed with William de Ros to keep Wark castle for either half a year or a year with a specified number of men, twelve men-at-arms at his own cost and the rest receiving specified wages which equated to those seen as standard for the day. 38 It is only after Bannockburn that indentures took on the wide-ranging importance they were later to translate into an overriding predominance with regard to the formation and installation of garrisons.

38 CDS, iii, no. 558, 576.
2.

FINANCE

The whole system of maintaining garrisons on a permanent or semi-permanent basis ultimately depended on the hard currency of money. It was the payment of wages which devoured the vast majority of this continuous outlay with further costs, such as the purchase of victuals, weaponry and clothing, together with building works being accounted for either in addition to the wages or being centrally provided. Money was essentially for the wages of the troops. Without money to pay the garrison soldiers there was no hope of retaining any semblance of a permanent military force in Scotland or northern England.  

It was an absolute priority that the wages of these garrison soldiers were paid especially as wages did not contribute to making a profit for their recipient but went solely to providing for their subsistence. Non-payment of wages consequently meant it was impossible for a soldier to remain in service.

Substantial sums were spent on wages by the Crown. In 1306/7 the cost of the wages for the garrison of Dumfries – consisting of eight knights, 28 men-at-arms, 20 crossbowmen, 40 archers and five non-combatants – was calculated at 60s. 4d. a day.  

The yearly total for the three knights, 37 men-at-arms and 40 hobelars of the Alnwick garrison in 1314/15 worked out at £1,252. 1d. This provides an insight into the tremendous cost the payment of large garrisons entailed and it becomes even clearer in the overall total of all the garrisons retained by the Crown. The wardrobe book of 1299/1300 reveals that, for that financial year, garrisons cost the greater part of all expenses with a total of £13,574 being spent on their maintenance while it has been

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1 There was an extremely short-lived and unsuccessful attempt to institute a form of castle-guard in the first few years of the century with a proportion of garrison troops serving for lands in Scotland, *CDS*, ii, nos. 1132, 1286, 1321; Prestwich, 'Garrisoning of English Medieval Castles', pp. 190-5.

2 *CDS*, v, no. 477.

3 Prestwich, 'Garrisoning of English Medieval Castles', p. 188. This total also includes more minor payments for works on the castle and compensation for horses.
estimated that the northern castle garrisons retained by the Crown in the years following Bannockburn cost £8,000 annually, £20,000 if the towns of Berwick and Carlisle are included. Quite clearly the maintenance of these large garrisons was enormously expensive and wages accounted for the overwhelming majority of money that needed to be paid out.

The permanent nature of garrisoning necessitated a constant flow of money and a well-organised administrative machine to deal with payment and to keep the complex and detailed accounts this entailed. In response a permanent extension of the royal wardrobe was created in Berwick with clerks such as John de Weston and James Dalilegh overseeing the costs of garrisoning. The detailed and finely kept account books of the ‘war wages’, vadia guerre, of John de Weston, paymaster of the Lothian garrisons between 1298 and 1304, provide the most outstanding source for the study of garrison personnel in this period, a lasting testimony to just how strictly these financial accounts were recorded and set down. As with all matters concerning money in the medieval state rigorous checks were kept on expenditure especially in an area so exposed to fraud as wages claimed for a multitude of individuals; as well as the detailed account books each constable submitted, usually yearly, an account, a compotus, in which the numbers and total cost of his garrisons’ wages were stated, the 1330s seeing yet a further check in the form of a royal clerk, John Swanlond, who, as well as overseeing the costs of building work on castles, was to oversee the payment of the garrison soldiers. The payment of wages owed to garrisons was expertly

5 For a further discussion of this administration see, M. Prestwich, War, Politics and Finance under Edward I (London, 1972), pp. 162-5.
6 E101/10/6; E101/11/1; E101/12/18.
7 Although in this sense he may have performed the same role as John de Weston had occupied earlier in the century.
scrutinised and painstakingly recorded by an administration set up for that very purpose.

These kind of detailed accounts make it clear that payment was being made to each individual who served within a garrison. It is for this reason that the names of the knights, men-at-arms, hobelars, mounted archers and, on a very few occasions, those of the crossbowmen and archers, appear in the accounts. The dates during which these men remained in a garrison are meticulously recorded and any movement from that garrison or a change in their own status were duly noted in the accounts. Although it seems that it was deemed preferable to include names it was just as acceptable for the numbers of each type of soldier within the garrison to be sufficient, a fact testified to by the frequency with which only the numbers of foot-soldiers appear. By this form of accounting payment was made to the constable based on a careful calculation of each individuals' wage; it was then down to the constable to pay each member of his garrison accordingly.

This system, based on the payment of each individual, was prevalent for the first half of the fourteenth century. It is clearly in evidence throughout this period appearing in Weston's account books during the early 1300s, in the extensive rolls recording the payment of garrisons in 1311/12, the compotus accounts for the northern castles in 1323 and still in use in the 1330s when William de Felton's garrison of Roxburgh is named in its entirety together with the pay due to each soldier. It was the accepted form for calculating and recording the payment of wages to garrisons from the last decade of Edward I into the reign of Edward III and by its emphasis on each individual was particularly onerous in the burden it placed on clerks to ensure they completed their financial accounts accurately as demonstrated by those

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8 CDS, iii, app. vii, pp. 393-412.
9 BL Stowe Ms 553, fols. 56v-63v.
10 E101/22/40.
for Roxburgh under Felton in the 1330s where dates, wage rates and the total sum to be paid have been crossed out and the correct details inserted; it is doubtful that such amendments were that uncommon.

This system of payment was able to function due to a recognised daily rate of pay for each individual which, as wages were for subsistence, was intended to meet the cost of their maintenance and consequently rose the higher in rank and status a soldier was according to the increased expense of his equipment.\(^{11}\) By the late thirteenth century acknowledged rates of pay had become accepted for each type of soldier: 4s. a day for a banneret; 2s. for a knight; 12d. (i.e. Is.) for an esquire, sergeant and man-at-arms; crossbowmen received 3d. and archers 2d.; hobelars and horse archers, when they came into existence, were both paid 6d.\(^{12}\) These rates were the same for those serving in field forces and in garrisons and were therefore standard for any form of paid military service and they remained at these rates for most of the fourteenth century. It also says something about the burden of garrison service that bannerets and knights were willing to accept pay at a time when many of such a status were unwilling to do so.

Due to the relative permanency of garrisons the financial accounts for garrison service provide one of the most in-depth insights into pay rates and the earliest accounts of this period immediately raise the question of exactly just how uniform these accepted rates of pay really were. A number of discrepancies are evident. In Edinburgh, whilst other garrisons were paid at the accepted rates, the men-at-arms were receiving only 10d. a day in late 1301 and into 1302, this incongruity all the more striking as the sergeants in Edinburgh were in receipt of the full 12d. during the same time. During the same period all but two of the men-at-arms in both the town and

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\(^{11}\) Although it is unlikely these rates met the real cost to each soldier, Prestwich, *Armies and Warfare*, p. 86.

\(^{12}\) Ibid, p. 84.
The castle of Berwick were on 10d. and the men-at-arms in Carstairs were also paid just 10d.\textsuperscript{13} There is no obvious reason for these discrepancies and it would seem that in the earliest years of the century pay rates for garrison soldiers were far from fixed and accepted.

However a clue to this fluctuation might be sought in another anomaly that disrupts the accepted pay rates during 1302. It is noticeable that from February 1302 esquires (valets) serving in Berwick town saw their wages drop from 12d. to 8d. a day. Even more conspicuous is the wholesale drop in pay rates in Roxburgh at the same time. Before 1302 those in the Roxburgh garrison received the accepted rates however in February this all changed; Robert Hastang, constable of the castle and a banneret, was in receipt of only 2s. 6d. a day rather than 4s., the wage of the knights fell to 16d. and that of the esquires and men-at-arms to 8d. In June the garrison of Jedburgh was being paid similarly; Richard Hastang, constable and knight, receiving 16d. and esquires and men-at-arms 8d. John Kingston, banneret and constable of Edinburgh, was on 2s. 6d., and from February knights in Edinburgh were on 16d. and esquires and men-at-arms 8d.; again from February men-at-arms in Bothwell were paid just 8d. Berwick town also experienced the same reduction from February; John Newenham, knight, dropping to 16d. and esquires and men-at-arms to 8d.; John Pencaitland, previously paid expressly high, also felt the drop, receiving only 12d.\textsuperscript{14}

It is clear that from February 1302 pay rates for garrisons were formally reduced for all those whose status was above that of the foot soldier. That this was a deliberate policy enacted by the Crown is evident in the reductions taking place at exactly the same time and in the lower pay rates being uniform across the garrisons: 2s. 6d. for a banneret, 16d. for a knight and 8d. for an esquire and man-at-arms.

\textsuperscript{13} E101/10/5.
\textsuperscript{14} E101/10/6.
However by late 1302 this deliberate reduction of wages was no longer in existence and pay rates rose back to what they had been before the wholesale changes of February, Roxburgh again receiving the accepted rates by December at the latest and Edinburgh seeing a return to its previous rates in November. This cut in pay was a temporary measure enacted during the Truce of Asnières which lasted from late January 1302 until the autumn, Edward I exploiting a relative hiatus in the Scottish war to ease the financial crisis that faced him at this time.\textsuperscript{15} If this was an attempt to set a precedent whereby two rates of pay were established, one for war and one for peace, then it proved unsuccessful as it was never repeated. In the autumn of 1302, with the end of the truce and the onset of winter, rates returned to their previous levels. Indeed it is in the months after this general reduction that the accepted rates of pay become more common for all garrisons; Edinburgh only returned to 10d. for men-at-arms for a brief period before it was brought into line, the men-at-arms receiving 12d. from November 1302 onwards. Jedburgh and the other previously lower paid garrisons followed suit.\textsuperscript{16}

This reduction did not extend to the foot soldiers of the garrisons but there is a separate discrepancy that disrupts the apparently accepted rates of pay for crossbowmen serving within garrisons. In 1301 the crossbowmen in both the castle and town of Berwick were on the normal 3d. but by 20 November 1302 whereas those within the castle were still receiving 3d. those in the town were paid 4d. Roxburgh is exactly the same, the crossbowmen in the castle being paid 3d. and those in the town 4d.\textsuperscript{17} In this case there is a definite difference in pay between men of the same status and role and who were serving in the same geographical location. It follows that there

\textsuperscript{15} For the truce and the financial crisis see M. Prestwich, \textit{Edward I} (London, 1988), pp. 494-6. It was a similar financial crisis in 1319 which led to a general reduction of the wages of the men-at-arms (to 10d.) serving on the border with the wardens of the march, \textit{Raimes}, p. 24.
\textsuperscript{16} E101/11/1.
\textsuperscript{17} E101/9/16; E101/10/6; E101/11/1; E101/12/18.
must have been some intrinsic difference between living in the town or the castle which warranted the additional 1d. a day. This almost certainly relates to the fact that wages were for the purpose of subsistence; it may have been more inexpensive living in the castle, those in the town may have had to pay some form of rent, there might have been some difference in the availability of food and drink. It is extremely unlikely that the extra pay was a form of compensation for the added danger of residing in the town rather than within the more secure walls of the castle although it cannot be entirely ruled out.

Further evidence that this difference was based on the cost of subsistence is provided when it is noted that the same discrepancy in pay also occurs between garrisons as well as between castles and towns in the same place. Crossbowmen in Edinburgh and Jedburgh were always paid at 3d. in contrast to those in the garrisons of Kirkintilloch and Linlithgow who were consistently on 4d. Even in 1311/12 those in Roxburgh were on 4d. whilst the Edinburgh crossbowmen were still paid 3d.\textsuperscript{18} Once again the reason for this must be in the need for subsistence, indicating that it was more costly to stay at Kirkintilloch and Linlithgow than within Edinburgh and Jedburgh, the rate of pay raised accordingly to compensate for the extra cost. In effect there were consequently two rates of pay for crossbowmen in garrisons, 3d. and 4d., the amount dependent on where the crossbowmen was stationed and the corresponding cost of subsistence. Such careful considerations illustrate the details officials considered in financing garrisons and an awareness of the difficulties of subsistence particular to each garrison. Yet this two tier pay rate only operated for crossbowmen; archers received 2d. regardless of where they were based, whether Edinburgh or Kirkintilloch, a castle or a town. The sheer number of archers manning garrisons may

\textsuperscript{18} CDS, iii, app. vii, pp. 406, 409.
have precluded this system being extended to them but it suggests that archers in some of the more costly garrisons would have found their daily lives a particularly arduous struggle to make ends meet.

These two different rates for crossbowmen also appear in the wardrobe book for 1299-1300 in which the great majority of crossbowmen whose wages are stated were being paid at 4d. a day. Those within Roxburgh – from how the account is written it would appear they were serving in the castle – were originally receiving 3d. but on 25 December 1299 this was raised to 4d. Robert Hastang’s *computus* for 1300 also reveals that the crossbowmen in Roxburgh were still in receipt of 4d several months later. This suggests that the two tier rate for crossbowmen also existed as a variable rate that was dependent on immediate conditions as well as the cost of subsistence within each garrison.

Another type of soldier for whom pay rates vary is the hobelar and this may be due to them being relative newcomers to garrisons although once again subsistence could well be the main factor. The accepted rate for a hobelar came to be fixed at a daily wage of 6d. but there are numerous instances in these early years when some hobelars were receiving 8d. The first noticeable occasion is in Kirkintilloch in late 1301 when three men-at-arms are singled out as being paid 8d. rather than the 12d. the others were on; it appears this was due to these men having uncovered horses and therefore being hobelars, the three continuing to receive this rate in 1302 and it is evident hobelars in Kirkintilloch were permanently on 8d. Similarly hobelars serving in Linlithgow were always paid 8d. At the same time those in Edinburgh were

20 *CDS*, v, no. 233.
21 E101/9/16, m. 1; E101/10/5, m. 2; E101/12/18.
22 E101/10/6; E101/11/1.
permanently paid 6d. as were those in both the town and castle of Roxburgh.  
Interestingly although the hobelars in Berwick town were on 6d. from 20 November-
29 November 1302 – receiving 4d. before their horses were valued – one of their
number, Adam de Lanark, was paid 8d, in this case his higher rate of pay surely
originating from either an enhanced status or special terms of service.

Indeed variation in pay rates due to specific circumstances or the identity of
certain individuals was not uncommon. John de Pencaitland was to expressly receive
20d. a day in Berwick, no doubt as he was the former Scottish constable of Jedburgh
who had surrendered that castle to the English and who afterwards evidently entered
into the service of Edward I; alongside him in Berwick was John Newenham, a knight
and official, who was also singled out for a higher rate, receiving 16d.  
The one
occasion in which foot archers in garrisons were in receipt of a higher wage was when
they also doubled as craftsmen such as masons or carpenters to undertake urgent
building works on their castle, the archers in Roxburgh being paid 2d. a day extra in
February 1302 whilst repairing the walls and houses of the castle, the supplementary
2d. to end when they had finished the walling.  
In cases such as these there is an
obvious reason for the receipt of pay that differs from the accepted rates.

The different rates paid to crossbowmen and hobelars are much less clear cut.
However it is surely no coincidence that both crossbowmen and hobelars received
higher wages in Kirkintilloch and Linlithgow, a fact which reinforces the theory that it
was more costly for soldiers to remain in these garrisons, the one contradiction being
that the hobelars in Roxburgh town were not on a higher rate although the
crossbowmen there were. Once again it is evident that rates of pay to garrison soldiers

23 E101/10/6; E101/11/1.
24 CDS, ii, no. 1086; E101/10/6, m. 1. The indenture for the force of men-at-arms to serve with the
wardens in 1319 contains many examples of men specified as receiving a higher wage due to various
reasons, Raimes, p. 24.
25 CDS, ii, no. 1286.
were not necessarily the accepted rates and that there was an element of fluctuation and flexibility in them.

These variable rates are rather unexpected and would have created interesting situations within the garrisoning community as men of a lesser status were on occasion paid the same as those considered to be above them. The period 1302-1303 is particularly striking when it is considered that vintenars of crossbowmen were receiving 6d., the same as hobelars were being paid in Edinburgh and Berwick, and during the wholesale wage reduction of 1302 these same vintenars, whose pay was not cut, were paid only 2d. less than esquires and men-at-arms and ordinary crossbowmen were receiving only 4d. less than the latter. It is in the years between 1301 and 1304 that the accepted rates of pay did finally become commonly accepted for garrison soldiers but only after variations and a temporary period of wholesale reduction had taken place. It is tempting to see the newly created garrison of Linlithgow as playing an important role in raising and establishing these rates in garrisons; from its first appearance in the accounts in 1303 all those serving there received the highest possible wage commensurate with their status including hobelars on 8d. and crossbowmen on 4d. Yet, as the 8d. for hobelars illustrates, there were still two different rates for hobelars and crossbowmen within garrisons in 1304 and beyond.

An absence of any surviving accounts prohibits a continuation of the detailed study of pay rates in the following years. The next substantive document is the account roll for the pay of several garrisons in 1311/12 and this reflects the trends noticed between 1300 and 1304 with a discrepancy between crossbowmen in Roxburgh, who received 4d., and those in Edinburgh and Berwick who were on the more usual 3d.,

26 E101/11/1, c.f. mm. 2-3.
although the pay of hobelars now appears to be a consistent 6d. across all garrisons. 27

In 1322 the men-at-arms in Barnard castle were only paid 8d., an echo of the imposed reduction of 1302, the lower rate of pay for men-at-arms serving with the wardens on the border in 1319 indicating that this too was the result of a serious deficit of money. 28 The last detailed garrison account of this type is that of William de Felton for Roxburgh from June 1340 until March 1342. 29 Although the accepted rates were paid to knights, esquires, men-at-arms and sergeants there are two interesting aspects to note concerning pay. The first concerns the watchmen in the castle who were paid 2d. a day between 4 June and 30 September 1340, received 3d. from 1 October 1340 until 3 June 1341 and then on 4 June were again on their former 2d. until 30 September. Unfortunately their pay after this is unclear but the existing evidence plainly depicts a two tier rate of pay for these watchmen, one that operated at a lower rate from June until the end of September and at the higher rate from October until June, timings which strongly suggest that the castle was believed to be more vulnerable during the long dark nights of winter and into spring, the watchmen being duly compensated for the greater and more serious work they would have to endure throughout this period. Upon the return of the shorter nights of summer the risk of attack lessened and consequently so did the pay of the watchmen. The second aspect to note is more wide-ranging in its implication, affecting as it does both the hobelar and the horse archer. Within the account these are classed together with no distinction between the two and their pay is a surprisingly low 4d. There is no previous record of hobelars regularly being paid at this rate before the 1330s and although the horse archer was a relative newcomer its pay rate was quickly established as 6d., the same as that of the hobelar. Exactly why they were only paid 4d. in Roxburgh in the early 1340s is unclear.

27 *CDS*, iii, app. vii, pp. 393-412.
28 BL Stowe MS 553, fo. 58v.
29 E101/22/40.
Additional information concerning this unusually low rate of pay is contained within the 1339/40 compotus of Thomas Rokeby for the castles of Edinburgh and Stirling. Included within this is a separate memorandum stating that the (horse) archers were allowed wages of 6d. a day ‘on account of the necessity of the war’ as Rokeby had sworn that they would not remain in the garrison for less. Here it is obvious that the nominal set rate for horse archers was less than 6d., most probably the 4d. that such men were receiving in Roxburgh. That 6d. came to be the accepted rate implies that these fluctuations within garrisons played an integral role in establishing this rate and that originally, at least with regard to garrisons, horse archers were actually paid only 4d. This is supported by evidence of pay from 1335-37. Horse archers in Thomas Roscelin’s newly installed garrison of Edinburgh were paid 4d. in 1335 as were those that entered into Stirling in 1337. The hobelar is more problematic; paid 4d. in Berwick (where the men-at-arms were incidentally on just 8d.) but 6d. in Stirling, Edinburgh and indeed in Roxburgh, this rate in the latter illustrating that hobelars there had actually suffered a pay cut by 1340. With the advent of the horse archer in the 1330s there was an evident disparity between their pay and that of the established hobelar, 6d. becoming accepted for the horse archer due to the precedent set by the hobelar after the ultimate redundancy of the latter from the 1340s onwards.

The concept of warfare necessitating a higher rate of pay is neatly encapsulated in the protest John Stirling, constable of Edinburgh, submitted in 1335. Stirling complained that whereas he was paying the hobelars of his garrison 6d. the chancellor would only allow 4d., a wage at which the hobelars refused to remain in the garrison. Again two rates of pay appear for the hobelar, 4d. undoubtedly the official rate but 6d. the more realistic and indeed more traditional rate. That there was some conflict.

30 CDS, iii, no. 1323.
31 BL Cotton MS, Nero C. VIII, fos. 248f.-249r.
between official rates can be seen in another protest of Stirling, the chancellor only willing to pay Edinburgh’s watchmen 3d. rather than the 6d. which he was paying them. Admittedly 6d. seems quite exorbitant but the point is that the constable had some flexibility in deciding his garrisons’ rates of pay although these did need official sanction for them to be ultimately paid out. The overall sense gained from Stirling’s protests is of a no-nonsense commander battling with officialdom to receive realistic wages for his men which reflected the proper cost of their service. Indeed there is an unmistakable feeling that there was an official policy to pay out as little as possible, the chancellor in Scotland only paying Stirling himself the wage of a knight despite him having been made a banneret on St. John the Baptist’s Day. 32

Consequently there were two factors which could alter the rate of pay: the cost of subsistence at a given garrison or the necessity of war, the latter a situation in which men could demand a higher rate for their continued service. 33 That garrison soldiers expected to be paid certain accepted rates is evident from the complaints made against the constable of Roxburgh, Richard Tempest, in 1362, when he was alleged to have retained in his garrison Scottish grooms and ‘other unfit persons’ in place of the proper men-at-arms and archers. Tempest was receiving the full amount for a properly manned garrison and was able to pay these impostors at a lower rate and rake off the rest of the money for himself. 34 It was a fraud impossible without impostors as regular garrison soldiers knew exactly what pay they should receive and would have demanded their expected wages. A similar fraudulent act, albeit with the roles slightly changed, was alleged to have taken place at Berwick in 1317. It was claimed that the chamberlain there was paying five pounds a day more than was needed to the garrison

32 CDS, iii, no. 1194.
33 Necessity of war could also mean victuals were in short supply and this could have been the reason men needed the extra pay, the issue again returning to that of subsistence.
34 CDS, iv, no. 64.
as some men drew their pay although they were not on duty for months, others who were being paid as men-at-arms and crossbowmen were not knowledgeable enough or equipped to perform their apparent roles, knights enrolled their grooms as men-at-arms and took their appropriate pay, there was even a claim that the chamberlain was paying people such as local townsmen and traders as men-at-arms even though they would prove useless if called upon to fight. Whether true or not these allegations demonstrate that pay rates remained clearly defined and that both those in charge – whether clerks of the Crown or constables – and the soldiers themselves were acutely aware of what these were for each type of soldier. Without them no such fraudulent scheme could have been contemplated. In fact in 1382 these rates were actually specified for the garrison of Roxburgh, knights receiving 2s., men-at-arms 12d. and mounted archers 6d., all exactly matching the accepted rates from the first half of the century. 36

However there is one area in these accounts where pay rates cannot be known for sure. In a number of accounts the constable receives a sum of money, sometimes termed a fee, with which he paid the men-at-arms in his own retinue. This payment of a lump sum in the first half of the century, a certum grosso, is almost wholly exclusive to situations in which the constable was also sheriff of the locality and it was therefore the appropriate fee for that sheriffdom. In autumn 1301 Robert Hastang, for the castle and sheriffdom of Roxburgh, paid ten men-at-arms of his own retinue from his certum and Richard Hastang, in Jedburgh, paid five from his certum while in 1302 John Kingston took payment ‘in gross’ for a knight and ten men-at-arms in his garrison of Edinburgh. It is evident that these payments were in respect of the office of sheriff as demonstrated in Linlithgow where the wages of the constable’s retinue are actually

35 CDS, iii, no. 553.
36 CDS, iv, no. 306.
stated as they were paid individually whereas the sheriff, Archibald de Livingston, was taking in gross for his ten men-at-arms, the separation of the office of constable and sheriff between two different individuals making it clear the payment related to the office of the sheriff. Similarly, in 1335, the indenture of John Stirling as constable and sheriff of Edinburgh included the payment of a sum described as the accustomed fee for the sheriffdom. In these circumstances the exact rate at which these men-at-arms were paid is unclear but it must be adjudged to have been largely the same as the rest of the garrison. An account for Carstairs appears to indicate that the constable’s retinue of men-at-arms was on 10d. each which was the same as the rest of the garrison and, although they were not paid from a certum, that the retinue of the constable of Linlithgow was paid at the same rate as the entire garrison strongly supports the idea that their wages were on a parity with others of their status within the garrison.

The amount of this certum rarely varied as demonstrated by the fact that it was sometimes referred to in documents as a ‘fixed sum’ of money. In February 1302 John Kingston was to receive £40 for the pay of his own retinue to keep the castle and sheriffdom of Edinburgh and Edmund Hastings in Berwick was also to be paid £40 that was to go to the payment of his retinue. The sums due as the certum for the octave of Hilary in 1302/3 were 40 marks for Robert Hastang in Roxburgh, 20 marks to Richard Hastang at Jedburgh, 100 marks to Kingston in Edinburgh while John de St. John was to be paid 200 marks for Dumfries and Lochmaben as well as for keeping Galloway and Annandale. In 1303/4 the constable of Dumfries, Matthew Redman, was to be paid a fee of £60 and for Dundee £40 was to be received by Thomas de

37 E101/9/16; E101/10/5.
39 CDS, v, no. 305.
40 CDS, ii, no. 1286.
41 CDS, v, no. 345.
Umfraville. These are just some of the recorded examples of a certum being paid to a constable and going largely towards the payment of wages to his personal retinue, an important financial contribution to garrisons even though it was related to the office of sheriff that the constable also occupied.

Payment of a fee for the keeping of the sheriffdom was thus a traditional arrangement but the demands of garrisoning in the climate of heavy warfare led to new measures being taken in 1302. During August, with the autumn and winter fast approaching, a series of indentures were concluded with various garrisons regarding their keeping until Christmas. Rather than remaining with the routine method of paying each soldier individually based on their duration of service fixed amounts were to be paid to a number of constables which they were to receive in advance and from which they would pay their men. William Francis, whose garrison of Kirkintilloch totalled 28 men-at-arms and 60 foot along with various others, was to be paid their wages in advance; pay for Alexander Balliol's men in Selkirk forest totalled £50 of which he received an advance of £20; John Kingston in Edinburgh was to be paid £60 for wages although it is unclear whether this sum was for his whole garrison or his ten men-at-arms. This approach was only used with a few garrisons whilst others, such as Linlithgow, were still paid based on the service of individuals, but its usage indicates there was a developing sense of flexibility in methods of payment of garrison wages.

This flexibility briefly appears elsewhere in these early years. Perhaps the most noticeable instances are the occasions on which garrison soldiers were actually paid in advance. An early example of this dates from October 1299 when William de Ponton was ordered to enter the garrison of Lochmaben with his men-at-arms, the king writing to Dalilegh that he was to pay Ponton and his men the wages that they would be due in

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42 BL Add MS 8835, fo. 37v.
43 CDS, ii, no. 1321.
advance ‘as has been paid to others in a similar position’, a statement that makes it clear this was not an unusual occurrence in certain circumstances. The kind of situation which necessitated an advance is described in another advance of payment to Lochmaben in early 1299, a request that a reinforcement of crossbowmen on their way to the garrison should receive fifteen days pay in advance at 3d. a day due to the ‘great dearness’ in the country as no victuals could be got there. Advance payment of wages continued to be used until mid-century with Thomas Gray receiving a month’s pay totalling £63 in advance in 1322 and in 1338 Thomas Rokeby was promised 300 marks in advance for keeping Edinburgh and Stirling although this was later specified as actually being ‘beyond his pay’. A similar system was put into operation at Lochmaben in 1300 to pay a force of 30 armed horsemen under Robert Clifford, a total of 500 marks being paid to him in three separate instalments. Perhaps the most interesting financial set-up was that concluded on 30 July 1304, John de Benestede and Walter de Bedwynd entering into an agreement with Matthew Redman that the latter would stay as keeper of Dumfries castle with a specified number of men from 1 August to 20 November, Redman receiving £60 for this from the king which would be paid in three equal instalments at the terms of Assumption, All Saints and St. Andrew’s.

The appearance of these arrangements, although sporadic before the 1340s, are extremely interesting as they point towards the system by which garrisons were paid in the second half of the century, albeit they prefigure this later system in a much more minor way. An offer to undertake the keeping of Jedburgh in 1298 by the abbot and convent of Jedburgh along with Ivo de Aldeburgh envisaged that they would keep the

44 CDS, v, no. 299.
45 CDS, ii, no. 1057.
46 CDS, iii, nos. 772, 1283, 1295.
48 CDS, ii, no. 376.
castle for five years meeting some of the costs themselves but also receiving 500 marks annually from the Crown, although this only ever remained a proposal it is a strikingly early example of the system that was to operate for royal garrisons after the battle of Neville’s Cross. The 300 marks Rokeby was to be paid also bears a close resemblance to this later system of payment. John Coupland became the constable of Roxburgh in the immediate aftermath of Neville’s Cross and an indenture from February 1350 survives in which he undertook to keep the castle for the duration of a year for a total amount of one thousand marks, the numbers he was to retain being specified and building works to be seen to at his own cost. By December 1357 Coupland was a warden of the March and keeper of Berwick, contracting to serve there with a sufficient garrison, receiving £2000 for all his claims. Earlier, in May 1346, the earl of Northampton’s castle of Lochmaben was the subject of an agreement in which Richard de Thirlwall undertook to remain as keeper for one year for a sum of £266. 3s. 4d. for all costs. It is Roxburgh that provides the best examples of this form of payment right up until the end of the century. Henry Percy was to be paid £500 a year for his ward of the castle and sheriffdom between 1355 and 1357. An indenture agreed in February 1385 with Thomas Swinburne and Richard Tempest, joint keepers of Roxburgh, specified that they were to keep the castle for one year for a sum of 4,300 marks. The financial arrangements agreed with the joint keepers in December 1400, Richard Grey and Stephen Lescrope, were more sophisticated; they were to receive 4,000 marks per annum until new building works and a fosse were finished, 3,000 marks a year once these were completed, dropping to 2,000 marks during periods of truce with the number to be retained in the garrison also specified for the last

49 Stevenson, ii, pp. 264-5.
50 CDS, iii, no. 1546.
51 Ibid, no. 1669.
52 Ibid, no. 1459.
53 Ibid, no. 1655; CDS, iv, no. 528.
situation. It is telling that the 2,000 marks is referred to as a pay rate in contrast to the individual pay rates so prevalent up until the 1340s, a clear sign that the constables had a much greater leeway in soldiers’ wages in time of war but also showing that the Crown still had a powerful say in what these rates of pay should be. This system of agreed sums for a period of one year coincides with a lessening interest of the Crown in the Scottish war and can also be explained by the relative scarcity of English garrisons in Scotland, Roxburgh and Berwick being the only ones of any note, the need for tight Crown control of expenses being somewhat reduced. It was a much simpler task for the Crown to handle with no detailed account books of wages necessary. The burden was neatly transferred to the constable and his officials.

Throughout the century, whatever the system of payment, the money itself was delivered to the constable in instalments at agreed points spread evenly through the year. The 1302 example of the garrisons of Selkirk, Jedburgh and Roxburgh receiving half their agreed total in advance and half at All Saints has already been mentioned and Matthew Redman’s agreement to hold Dumfries for a few months in 1304 envisaged three equal payments. There is a record from 1335 declaring that the sergeants and esquires at Roxburgh were owed the increment of £232 which was one quarter of their yearly pay. Robert Hastang’s compotus of January-November 1300 for Roxburgh details a total payment of over £686 from the paymaster John de Weston that Hastang had received ‘at divers times in this period’ and three payments each of £40, two of these made in May and October. In 1357 Henry Percy, receiving £500 per annum as keeper of Roxburgh, was due £936. 6s. 2d. for one and three quarter years and twenty days. The compotus for the earl Marshal as constable of Roxburgh in 1389/90

54 CDS, iv, no. 568.
55 CDS, v, no. 738.
56 Ibid, no. 233.
57 CDS, iii, no. 1655.
recorded that he was paid his annual sum of £500 in three separate, presumably approximately equal, instalments from the Exchequer.  

The money was either delivered to the constable at his castle or given to him or his representative at another relatively secure location and then brought to the castle. Two quite typical examples of this come in 1382 when Matthew Redman, keeper of Roxburgh, was paid £100 beyond the sum allowed for the garrison’s pay due to him keeping the castle personally, receiving the sum by the hands of Richard Redman, knight, and in 1311 when 100 marks for the pay of Philip Moubray’s garrison at Stirling was paid to his valet Alexander Moubray; the delivery of money by a member of the garrison, and indeed by an immediate relative of the constable, is a regular occurrence in surviving accounts and depicts just how carefully the transportation of money was dealt with. Indeed it cost money to deliver money; in 1299 20s. was spent on bringing £800 from the king’s treasury at Newcastle to Berwick for its munition and 13s. on £300 being moved from York to Berwick via Newcastle. By 1306 it was necessary for the royal official James Dalilegh to have an escort of three or four esquires, a precaution as he often moved with an amount of cash with him, acting in a similar way to Richard de Abingdon who in 1299 personally escorted silver to the value of £20 to Lochmaben for the wages of those serving in that region. The very real risk entailed in moving money across hostile territory comes across well in the blunt letter of Edward I written whilst wintering at Linlithgow in 1301. Desperate for money he states that he will not accept the excuse that it is dangerous to transport large quantities of coin; that it was far from a mere excuse is

58 CDS, iv, no. 413.
60 CDS, ii, no. 1086.
61 CDS, v, nos. 199, 204, 448, 263.
evident in the fact that the target of Edward's ire had by implication previously refused to send money to his king for that very reason.

Despite the dangers of moving money it was possible for prompt payment of garrison soldiers; when arrears of wages do occur, as they frequently do, it is due more to a dearth of ready money or, less often, to the inherent reluctance of the wardrobe and exchequer to expend the money it owed. The £50 owed to Richard Hastang and his six esquires in Jedburgh for the whole of the 29th year (20 November 1300 - 19 November 1301) and up to 11 February 1302 is an example that was repeated many times as demonstrated again in the 1320s when the wages of John Lilleburn's garrison at Dunstanburgh were six weeks in arrears, admittedly no way near the length of Hastang's wait but extremely serious in itself. The wardrobe accounts for the early fourteenth century are littered with payment of wages owing to small groups or individuals who had served in garrisons; in 1312 fourteen hobelars in Dumfries being paid a total of £93. 9s. for their service there between July 1311 and 31 March 1312 with ten crossbowmen in the same garrison receiving a sum of £33. 7s. 6d. for the same duration of service. In this case although payment was relatively prompt it does not alter the fact that these men were owed nine months wages. The detailed account keeping necessary to fulfil these arrears is evident in a file of 1302/3 in which a whole range of sums were owed to garrison foot-soldiers: 21 in Berwick town being due amounts from 30s. to 13s.; six archers in Edinburgh being owed half a mark each, two 22s. 9d. and a further two 50s. The difficulties encountered by individual garrison soldiers in obtaining their arrears of wages could be compounded by any event that disrupted the normal system of payment as is made clear from the numerous petitions

63 Ancient Petitions, pp. 28-9.
64 CDS, v, no. 572.
65 Ibid, no. 345.
for pay from members of John Stirling's garrison of Edinburgh following his capture along with a section of the garrison in February 1338; in November 1339 28 men who had been in this garrison were still owed sums varying from £9. 17s. to £64. 4s. 6d. 66

The non-payment of a garrison's wages often transferred this hefty financial burden onto the constable and resulted in the Crown being in quite substantial debt to some of these men. In 1304 John de Kingston and his garrison were owed over £56 for arrears of wages for the period 2 February - 24 April 1304; later that year the debt had grown to over £103 to also cover the period 25 April-20 August. 67 Documents such as these read as both the constable and his garrison being owed the money but later evidence suggests that the constable had actually covered the wages of his men and that the Crown's debt was consequently now entirely payable to him. The money owed to Ebles de Mountz is a case in point. It begins in 1308 when Mountz petitioned that a writ be issued to the chamberlain of Scotland to pay his wages and those of his garrison of Stirling for the past term; it is not known whether this was fully paid but in December 1312, now no longer constable of Stirling, the Crown owed £300 in arrears of wages and expenses to him from his time as constable; over three and a half years later this debt remained unpaid, Mountz now being due over £465 in arrears of pay from his time as constable of Stirling, a figure increased by compensation owed for horses he lost at Bannockburn; in fact Mountz was never to see the debt repaid as in May 1318 his widow and children were still receiving instalments from the Crown. 68

William de Fiennes, constable of Roxburgh, was another who did not live to see the debt owed to him settled, the £324. 4s. 2d. due for the arrears of his pay and that of his garrison still due when he was killed in February 1314. 69 In 1347 William de Felton

66 CCR, 1337-1339, pp. 555-6, 563; CCR, 1339-1341, pp. 10, 289.
67 CDS, v, nos. 384-5.
68 CDS, iii, nos. 70, 295, 495.
69 Parl. Writs., ii, p. 95.
was still attempting to have his account paid for his tenure as constable of Roxburgh for the period 1340-42, Felton having bitterly complained that the treasurer and barons had previously refused to accept the debt.\textsuperscript{70} John de Moubray, warden of Berwick, was due the sum of £1,231.10s. 8d. for almost one quarter of a year in late July 1340 but, in his own words, had not even received one penny; if the money was not forthcoming Moubray declared he would leave his office.\textsuperscript{71} A similar dissatisfied demand came from Stephen Lescrope in 1401/2. As keeper of Roxburgh it was agreed that he would receive 2000 marks a year yet he was unable to claim 500 marks due for the relevant period of the present year despite royal letters to the exchequer and he asked for yet another warrant ordering hasty payment as well as requesting that the assignments made by John Norbury, the late treasurer, also be allowed.\textsuperscript{72} Obtaining payment of an outstanding debt was an occupational hazard of being a constable and one that could be pursued for many years until it was fulfilled.

It was in response to these debts it owed that the Crown embarked on a wide variety of measures to try and fulfil its financial obligations. To pay off the substantial debt owed to Mountz the Crown ordered in July 1316 that £100 from the farm of Norwich should be paid to him until it was settled, the grant continuing for his widow and children less the £100 Mountz had received whilst still alive. Earlier, in December 1312, the £300 then owed to Mountz was to be met by a charge on the Tenth due from the clergy the following summer.\textsuperscript{73} The debt owed to Fiennes was to be partly met by a proportion of the talliage collected at Newcastle, the assessors there ordered to pay him £124. 4s. 2d. on 18 January 1313, a further £200 to come from the talliage of the city of York. This method continued into 1314 when, in February, the mayor and bailiffs of

\textsuperscript{70} CDS, iii, no. 1382.  
\textsuperscript{71} Ibid., no. 1338.  
\textsuperscript{72} CDS, v, no. 914.  
\textsuperscript{73} CDS, iii, no. 295.
Newcastle were commanded to pay Fiennes £100 from their talliage, the surviving document a sharp rebuke with the king stating his disapproval that the payment has not already been made.\(^7^4\) Similar measures were also implemented when the immediate payment of a garrison’s wages was a necessity. Money made from the sale of cattle and sheep sold at Lanercost in October 1306 was used to pay two members of the Edinburgh garrison in that year; in 1305 £65 needed to pay the wages of the garrisons of Dumfries and Lochmaben came from the sheriff of Wigtown from the farms of that county; the following year the sheriff of Cumberland was to immediately send money and victuals from his county to supply the royal castles; earlier, in 1303, the Fifteenth collected in Cumberland was to be used to pay the garrisons of Dumfries and Lochmaben.\(^7^5\) Thomas Rokeby was to receive £1000 in 1338 for his garrisons of Edinburgh and Stirling, the money coming from the customs of Kingston-upon-Hull and St. Botolph’s town.\(^7^6\) That a pardon for marrying without licence depended on Thomas de Veer maintaining 20 men-at-arms to defend Carlisle at his own cost for a specified period in 1316 illustrates the lengths the Crown was prepared to go to in order to find ways to finance its garrisons.\(^7^7\)

William Ridel obviously took matters into his own hands to ensure money for the upkeep of his garrison and castle at Bamburgh, ignoring arrangements whereby he was to provide sufficient security for local tithes to the value of £50 and seizing them by force.\(^7^8\) Ridel’s actions also hint at an often overlooked financial aspect of castles in that they had an economic function and indeed economic presence in the local landscape; in contrast to Ridel’s illegal move these were quite legitimate and stemmed from a castle being an entity that owned land in the surrounding town, village or

\(^{74}\text{Parl. Writs.}, ii, p. 95; \text{CDS, iii, no. 351.}\)

\(^{75}\text{CDS, v, nos. 331, 408, 414, 466.}\)

\(^{76}\text{CDS, iii, no. 1271.}\)

\(^{77}\text{Ibid., no. 468.}\)

\(^{78}\text{Dated between 1319 and 1323, Northern Petitions, pp. 252-3.}\)
countryside. An example occurs in 1303 in an apparent usurping of three bondages at Beadnall that belonged to Bamburgh castle. More detail of the demesne lands of the castle comes from 1322, when the tenants of Bamburgh stated that they had leased the castle demesne for up to 40 years, paying the constable 26 marks, and protesting that as each new constable now made them pay a large one off sum for his own use, they were considering leaving their land uncultivated. They said the king received no profit from these single payments and asked for a fixed rent for 20 years. By 1327 the people of Bamburgh were no longer able to pay their 26 marks rent as their land had been recently despoiled and the same was true in 1333. Lochmaben castle possessed profit making appendages which included the field of Ousby, the vills of Heghetage and Smalham as well as a lake and a park. During the early years of the war Edward I forcibly took possession of the manor of 'Veuz Roxburgh' to financially support the castle, the manor still being in royal hands in January 1314.

These economic attachments to a castle were traditionally there not just to cover expenses of daily upkeep and small peacetime garrisons but to actually make a profit for the owner whether it was the Crown or a private individual. By no means were these adequate for financing the large English garrisons required during the Anglo-Scottish wars and the destruction wrought by warfare, as shown at Bamburgh, also severely damaged their profit making capabilities. Yet any money that could be gained from them was vital and despite the war it appears these lands could still produce revenue. Despite the scarcity of money for his garrison Ridel was ordered to pay the countess of Angus £50 a year from the lordship of Barnard castle, an annual payment he was able to meet during 1319-1321 but which in 1323 reverted to being placed on the customs from Newcastle and Hartlepool after it fell into arrears. In 1330

79 Ancient Petitions, pp. 20-21, 119-121, 192, 199.
80 CDS, iv, no. 128.
81 CDS, iii, no. 347.
Ridel obtained a writ authorising these payments he had made from the issues of Langton and Newsham which totalled £193. The offer submitted in 1298 by the abbot and convent of Jedburgh and Ivo de Aldeburgh to keep the castle of Jedburgh was motivated by a desire to preserve the profits they took for themselves and the king as his farmers of Jedburgh forest, the constable of Jedburgh having informed the king he could not keep the castle without the forest, by which he meant the revenues from the forest. Despite the king subsequently directing that they were to remain as farmers the constable of Jedburgh still encroached into the forest and disturbed them. It was the potential profit which could be made that led men to request the keeping of castles for life, even those right in the midst of the war, Ebles de Mountz requesting in 1308 that his long unrewarded service be compensated for by the grant of the keeping of Stirling castle for life; as constable Mountz must have known it was still bringing in revenues despite the war.

This two-way process of finance with the constable receiving money from the Crown and also having to account for money he received from castle revenues was a feature he had to include in his annual compotus among the accounts of his receipts. That of Robert Hastang for Roxburgh between 14 January and 10 November 1300 includes the interesting fact that he made £13. 6s. 8d. from the sale of goods that remained after the last period of accounting and further sales of these brought in a significant £74. 17s. 2d. During 1335-37 William de Felton, as constable of Roxburgh, was in receipt of 500 marks that came from the fines of Lothian, Tevedale and Peebles, £200 of which he subsequently sent to the constable of Edinburgh,

82 Ancient Petitions, pp. 189-90; CDS, v, no. 724.
83 Stevenson, ii, pp. 264-6.
84 CDS, iii, no. 70.
85 CDS, v, no. 233.
Thomas Roscelin. A later constable of Roxburgh and sheriff of the same, Henry Percy, was advanced money in the 1350s to the value of £30. 6s. 8d. which came from the issues of the castle and sheriffdom during his ward. Despite warfare castles continued to produce revenue from their demesne lands and related sheriffdoms throughout this period and these directly contributed to alleviating the enormous burden of financing their garrisons.

The payment of wages to garrisons was fraught with problems throughout this period and was naturally most acute at times of hard-pressed warfare when it was needed the most. Pay was consistently based on accepted rates of which there was on the whole little divergence and which precluded any attempt to lessen the financial burden by a widespread cut in wages. Constables were far from immune to being on the wrong end in terms of finance, often in arrears for their own pay as well as that of their men and frequently waiting several years until they saw any form of monetary recompense. To meet the immediate costs of garrisoning and to fulfil the debts they had built up the Crown resorted to every conceivable means open to them, apportioning revenues such as tithes, fines, customs and fee farms to the payment of garrisons and long-standing debts. Surprisingly it was aided in this by castles to some extent still able to perform their local economic function in producing revenues, a function fitful and indeterminate due to the destruction of war but one that was still remarkable in the situation.

Exactly just how essential the payment of garrisons' wages was can be seen in the actions of garrisons themselves when pay was not forthcoming. The foot of the Berwick garrison descended into mutiny in 1301 abetted by a Gascon knight and some of his men-at-arms, threatening to kill any man-at-arms who tried to ride past them,
their grievance being that when the earls had been in town they had received only three days pay and were now a month in arrears. The remaining men-at-arms saved the situation by declaring they would defend the town, a decision which led the mutinous foot to agree that they would mount guard until the Friday and if no pay came by then they would leave the town. A sum of £200 soon arrived to pacify the foot but it was not the end of the dissension as there was disagreement between two knights over whether the garrisons of Roxburgh and Jedburgh should also receive a share of the money for their wages. In October 1315 a similar disaster loomed in Berwick again, the garrison stating that if no money or victuals arrived by All Saints they would leave the town to a man while in 1336 the eighteen weeks arrears of wages owed to the Edinburgh garrison meant that there was a very real danger that the garrison would leave if its pay was not seen to at once. The garrison of Alnwick effectively went on strike in 1317 with the fifty men-at-arms and sixty hobelars leaving the castle and staying in the town until their arrears of wages were satisfied, an act which their constable John Felton rightly feared placed the castle in great danger.

Such extreme actions must be seen in light of wages being essential for the subsistence of garrison soldiers rather than producing any profit and, in reality, probably not even meeting the costs of subsistence. This is why prompt payment of wages was so critical to garrisons; without them men faced the stark choice of either leaving or starving. Pay was consequently not something that could be owed indefinitely and paid when funds were available but was a cost that had to be met with an immediacy that stretched English finances to the limit and which has left a trail of late payments, emergency measures, arrears of wages and substantial debts that taken together form a significant body of evidence for the historian. The permanent cost of

88 CDS, ii, no. 1223.
89 CDS, iii, nos. 452, 1207.
90 Ancient Petitions, p. 158.
garrisons and the immediacy of their pay placed an unprecedented strain on the finances of fourteenth century England particularly in the first quarter of the century. Throughout the period it was the private wealth of the constable that often underpinned the continued financing of their own garrison without which the troops would have had no choice other than to desert their posts. On the whole constables could live with an outstanding debt owed to them for a period of time; garrison soldiers could not live without their pay which itself was stringently regulated by adherence to set pay rates which were considered necessary for their subsistence. Without their wages garrisons would almost immediately have ceased to exist and consequently their continued maintenance illustrates that the Crown, by both bureaucratic means and those more ad hoc in nature, managed to meet these vital financial demands.
3.

VICTUALLING

The process of providing victuals for garrisons was just as critical for their maintenance as that of finance and it is these two factors that together made it possible for garrisons to both exist and to function; money and victuals were the lifeblood of garrisoning. The exceptionally close ties between money and victuals, arising from the fact that wages were essentially for subsistence, has already been described and it follows that the vast majority of a garrison soldier's pay would be spent on the food and drink that were essential to his survival. However having the money to buy these was irrelevant if there was not a ready supply of victuals and without victuals soldiers would be forced to abandon their garrison to seek sustenance elsewhere. Indeed the closeness of pay and victuals is emphasised by the occasions on which victuals were provided in place of monetary wages. This can be seen in 1307 when significant quantities of wine, flour, wheat, malt and oats were described as being for the wages of the Perth garrison and in the 1320s when the constable of Dunstanburgh petitioned for the six weeks of pay owed to his garrison, the arrears particularly damaging as he and his garrison were paid in victuals at the same rate as those received instead of wages by soldiers at Newcastle.¹ Wages were essentially for the purpose of subsistence to such an extent that victuals could be received either in part payment or in lieu of them altogether. Victuals as wages may have solved the problem of sending money into Scotland but it did not alleviate the strain of providing vast quantities of victuals and as garrisons were by their very nature outposts the flow of victuals to supply them was problematic.

¹ *CDS*, v, no. 493; *Ancient Petitions*, pp. 28-9.
It was the same administrative machine set up to handle the finances of garrisons that also supervised the constant movement of victuals to them, a process which ran alongside large-scale victualling operations for major English summer campaigns, most notably during the reign of Edward I. In Carlisle during the first years of this administration James Dalilegh, who also supervised money there, was in charge of victuals and supplies. The greater importance of Berwick and the larger quantity of victuals that passed through there was reflected in the appointment of an official specifically for that job, the first office holder being Richard de Bromsgrove. By 1315 Ranulph de Benton held the position, now styled as keeper of the king’s stores at Berwick and assisted by two clerks, while the lessening of the immediacy of war combined with a greater emphasis on the constable running his own garrison is reflected in the multiple positions Robert de Clavering held in 1386, being not only keeper of provisions at Berwick but also keeper of artillery and clerk of works whilst holding both the senior positions of chamberlain and chancellor of Berwick. The centres of this administration were therefore once again the strategic towns of Berwick and Carlisle and both of these were designated as the major storehouses for victuals intended for garrisons in Scotland as well as for the sustenance of their own garrisons.

With these towns acting as supply bases the movement of victuals to garrisons radiated out from them. Whereas money seems to have mostly been transported into Scotland by land the larger quantities and greater volume demanded by victuals meant that the most frequent form of transportation was maritime in nature with the goods

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2 The infrastructure for providing victuals for these campaigns would have made it easier to supply garrisons however it is also true that the necessity of victualling these garrisons on a permanent basis would have created an experienced system and administrative staff for gathering and transporting victuals which in turn would have helped in the process of supplying victuals for the campaigns.

3 Prestwich, Edward I, p. 512; CDS, iii, no. 427; CDS, iv, no. 362.

4 Detailed studies of the quantity of victuals flowing through Berwick and Carlisle can be found in McNamee, The Wars of the Bruces, charts 3-6, and Watson, Under the Hammer, passim. After the loss of Berwick in 1318 Newcastle became the chief north-eastern storehouse, see Ancient Petitions, pp. 88-9.
being shipped towards their destination. Edinburgh was serviced by the nearby port of Leith, for example a hundred quarters of wheat, ten casks of wine and ten casks of salt being among the supplies landed there for the garrison in July 1298; victuals for Stirling entered the port of Blackness as was recorded in May 1311: Perth enjoyed the benefit of ships being able to dock there due to the navigability of the River Tay, 1060 pounds arriving there in 1312. Provisions to Edinburgh, Stirling and Perth were all to be delivered by ship in the summer of 1339.\(^5\) Wheat, flour and oats were carried by water from Skinburness to Annan for Lochmaben castle in late 1299 but a delay of 29 days followed before the goods could be moved overland to the castle, a groom being paid 1d. a day for keeping watch over them on the banks of the River Annan.\(^6\) Victuals destined for Edinburgh were moved by water in 1335, the constable complaining of the heavy charges that this entailed and the lack of recompense from the chancellor based in Berwick.\(^7\) However it was rare for the constable to have to pay for transportation with the costs usually being met by the government or the merchants selling the victuals, transportation for the victuals sent in September 1302 to Selkirk and Linlithgow being paid for by Bromsgrove or his clerk and by the king respectively,\(^8\) the constable of Dunstanburgh in the 1320s making a particular point of the fact that he had to transport victuals at his own cost and peril.\(^9\)

As Berwick was itself a port, as well as acting as a supply base from which goods could be shipped, it also served as a point of trans-shipment to which ships laden with victuals collected in England sailed to either en route to Scotland or to deliver their supplies to. In 1341/2 officers at Berwick impressed a ship with which they intended to supply Stirling with victuals, in this case the supplies clearly coming

\(^{5}\) CDS, ii, no. 997; CDS, iii, nos. 210, 287, 1314.
\(^{6}\) CDS, ii, no. 1115.
\(^{7}\) CDS, iii, no. 1194.
\(^{8}\) CDS, ii, no. 1324.
\(^{9}\) Ancient Petitions, pp. 28-9.
from the stores at Berwick and loaded aboard there; it also demonstrates the dangers of shipping goods, the vessel being taken and burnt by the Scots as it returned from Stirling and the crew held to ransom. Storms were another hazard with 16 quarters of wheat and 24 quarters of oatmeal lost in this way while being shipped from Skinburness in January 1313 while among the losses for 1306/7 was over £10 worth of wine and iron destined for Linlithgow and £4 of wine for Stirling. In 1299 55 casks of wine were saved from the wreck of the 'Holy Cross' of Lyme off Silloth. When Berwick itself was desperate for victuals in 1315 they were to come by ship from the port of Boston. The importance and indeed preference for supply by water is evident in 1300 when Edward I empowered John de St. John to retain a galley and its crew for the purpose of victualling the castle of Dumfries. In stocking castles for the oncoming winter of 1302 supplies for Linlithgow and Carstairs were to be shipped to the ports of Blackness and Leith respectively.

Although carriage by sea was the predominant means of transportation there was always an accompanying movement of supplies overland. During the summer of 1299 the constable of Lochmaben was ordered to aid with the carriage of supplies to his castle and in late 1298 Edward I himself gave directions for the conveyance of stores and the driving of cattle from Berwick to Edinburgh. It was natural that the movement of livestock would be on land although it was possible, if troublesome, to move them by ship. It is presumably with regard to the same supplies and livestock that the constable of Edinburgh entered into an indenture with the council which specified that they were to be delivered to Edinburgh partly by sea and partly by

10 CDS, iii, no. 1427.
11 CDS, v, nos. 577, 492(xv).
12 CDS, ii, no. 1115.
13 CDS, iii, nos. 452, 1427.
14 CDS, ii, nos. 1133, 1324.
land.\textsuperscript{15} There are numerous records of payment for the carriage of victuals such as those paid for conducting flour and other victuals to Roxburgh in 1301/2.\textsuperscript{16} Whichever method was used there was always the danger of attack by the Scots; the desperately starving garrison of Berwick saw two much needed supply vessels intercepted by Scottish ships in May 1316, the crew only just escaping with their lives, whilst in 1306 one tun and two ironbound barrels of beer were lost while being moved by land due to the Scots who wished to kill the carriers of the victuals.\textsuperscript{17}

The collection of the actual victuals was the responsibility of the government and its co-ordination rested with the administrative machine in existence at Berwick and Carlisle. Naturally those looked to for the providing of victuals were the merchants who dealt in foodstuffs and drink and the means by which they provided them took a number of forms. In many cases victuals were bought directly from a merchant either in England or in Scotland where the merchant had brought them north himself, shipping again the preferred transport. Supplies for Roxburgh were purchased by this method in 1335 with the keeper of victuals at Berwick, Robert de Tong, spending £12. 8s. on 31 quarters of wheat at 8s. a quarter, payment being made to William de Melchebourn, a merchant of Lynn. In 1307 the chamberlain of Berwick, John de Sandale, spent £11. 11s. purchasing victuals at Berwick that were sent to supply the Scottish castles. During the famine of 1316 the sergeant of the warden of Berwick bought the victuals that were aboard a merchant vessel in the port of Hartlepool for the sustenance of the Berwick garrison. Alternatively officials entered England to buy supplies, James de Dalilegh buying 64 casks of wine in the port of Whitehaven in Cumberland from an Irish merchant of Dundalk, the price of 36s. 8d. a cask set following a valuation by twelve freemen of the county in the presence of the merchant.

\textsuperscript{15} CDS, ii, nos. 1602, 1014, 1015.
\textsuperscript{16} Ibid, ii, no. 1602.
\textsuperscript{17} CDS, iii, no. 486; CDS, v, no. 475.
Similarly in 1318 it was the receiver of Newcastle who journeyed south to buy victuals including wheat and wine as well as iron and steel in London, Norfolk, Essex and Suffolk, his purchases to be sent by sea to provision Berwick castle. Another method was for burgesses of local Scottish towns, Scots themselves in most cases, to be given a safe conduct to enter England and buy the necessary victuals, selling them to English garrisons on their return. This can be seen in May 1310 when William de Drurigge, a burgess of Edinburgh, shipped wheat and beans destined for Berwick, Blackness or Perth, which were to be sold to the king’s lieges there. His authority came from the chamberlain for Scotland although this did not prevent him from being held by the king’s purveyors in Sandwich, a fact which illustrates just how far south he had ventured for victuals. It follows that the burgesses sent south were merchants themselves as was the case in the same month with William Cokyn, a merchant and burgess of Perth, who was granted a protection for his men and goods coming to England by leave of the English warden of Perth for the purpose of acquiring supplies for the warden and his garrison by trade and purchase. The danger such methods invited is recognised in a clause in the protection that stipulated it was void if they took supplies to Scots on their return.\(^{18}\)

When victuals were in extremely short supply or there was an increased demand then the pressure turned to the English counties to provide them, the burden falling as always upon the sheriff. This included the contentious issue of seizing victuals by means of the resented method of prises. The command addressed to the sheriff of Cumberland in 1306 is particularly unremitting in its content due to a belief that he had delayed in providing victuals as previously requested resulting in loss to the king and endangering of castles. It orders the sheriff on pain of forfeiture to deliver

\(^{18}\) *CDS*, ii, no. 1340; *CDS*, iii, nos. 146, 149, 511, 585; *CDS*, v, nos. 492(iv), 736.
all the victuals and money - corn being specifically mentioned - that he can for the purpose of supplying the king’s castles. Furthermore if any peril should come to these castles (presumably Dumfries and Lochmaben) then the blame would fall on the sheriff himself. In 1313 a clerk was sent from York to the sheriff of Essex and Hertfordshire to supervise and speed up the gathering of victuals that were to be sent to Berwick for the supply of Roxburgh. In both cases the sheriff was to include the expenses in his annual account. At the height of famine in 1315 the sheriff of Lincoln was meant to send provisions including wine from the port of Boston. During the 1380s a March Day held by the prior of Dax and Thomas Percy had as one of its objectives the provision of a number of items including victuals such as wheat and honey for the castles of Berwick and Roxburgh.

More extreme measures could be turned to if need be. It was not unusual for victuals to be taken without payment with the money to be paid later and although such an undertaking is frequently described as a loan exactly how much choice there was for those providing the goods is somewhat dubious. The king’s wardrobe recognised such debts to a variety of men in the spring of 1308. Two burgesses of Newcastle, a citizen and merchant of London called John de Hall along with William de Crathorn and William de Spatone, both burgesses of Berwick, were all owed for victuals ‘bought’ from them for the king’s garrisons, castles and towns in Scotland. In 1312 the mayor, bailiffs and ‘good men’ of Berwick were asked for and provided a loan of a £100 of victuals that was sent to the castle of Stirling and in mid-century the burgesses of Newcastle entered into an indenture with the receiver of the earl of Northampton which attested to their loan of £26. 13s. 4d. worth of victuals for the

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19 CDS, iii, no. 452; CDS, v, nos. 414, 586.
20 CDS, iv, no. 323.
earl’s castle of Lochmaben. Roles were slightly reversed in the late 1320s when the bishop of Durham was forced to borrow £233 from Edward II to stock Norham castle with provisions for its garrison, a debt which was still being paid off in 1332. The need to repay these loans, particularly when owed to merchants, is made clear in a letter dating from the late 1330s which describes the earls of Arundel and Salisbury having taken supplies from merchants and given them to the garrison of Perth for its sustenance. It is noteworthy that the names of these merchants had been recorded and the letter goes on to request that these men be paid so other merchants were not discouraged from coming to those parts. This pointedly demonstrates just how dependent garrisons were on merchants for their victuals. There even seems to have been an awareness of the plight of the Scots from whom goods had forcibly been taken without payment, John de St. John stating that he was heavily indebted to the poor people of all parts who pleaded for victuals which he had taken from them. Indeed such hard-nosed measures were not confined to Scotland, the sheriff of Cumberland and his bailiff taking oats from the prior of Carlisle for the garrison of Dumfries without payment or tally. The besieged garrison of Stirling receiving victuals from Evota of Stirling who procured them from the surrounding countryside, including her own land, was surely an uncommon example of native Scottish assistance; in this case it ultimately proved futile, the castle eventually falling and Evota being imprisoned by the Scots for ten weeks, losing her land in the town and being banished from Scotland.

As with money there were obviously times when victuals were in dangerously short supply and again as with a lack of money the absence of victuals led to men

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21 *CDS*, iii, nos. 79, 242, 1440.
22 *Ancient Petitions*, pp. 153-5.
23 *CDS*, iii, no. 1298.
24 *CDS*, ii, no. 1218; *CDS*, iii, no. 524.
25 *CDS*, iv, no. 1800.
deserting or threatening to desert their post, many of the Dumfries garrison deserting in 1312 due to a negligent supply of victuals from the central store at Carlisle. At the height of famine in 1315 the keeper of stores at Berwick and his two clerks were accused of actually attempting to profit from the severe food shortage, an inquisition being launched into the claim that they sold victuals from the store in Newcastle and that they used false measures and bought bad victuals for the garrison. This was an accusation of the utmost seriousness, the scarcity of victuals in Berwick being so great in February of the following year that a desperate foray for food met with a bloody defeat and many of those still in the garrison starved to death whilst guarding the walls. Towards the end of the year a vessel laden with victuals for Berwick was run into the port at Warkworth where the shortage of food led to the garrison from the castle there plundering it of its £60 worth of victuals. However these examples are noteworthy as they were relatively rare rather than normal occurrences. Unlike money there was usually at least one available means of obtaining victuals whether it be from crops and cattle on the castle demesne, from merchants, central stores, loans or from English counties (by prise if necessary) and, if need be, it could always be taken by force from the local area either by force or in a plundering raid. It was only when under siege or in the dreadful famine of 1315/16 that the supply of victuals actually dropped to a critical level.

In fact it reflects great credit on the administrative machine set-up to run the garrisons that there was usually an adequate supply of victuals even to the most isolated of castles. The level of detail that went into ensuring the required supplies were provided is clearly evident in the victualling estimates that exist for some of the early garrisons under Edward I. A detailed analysis of these has already been

26 CDSJ iii, no. 281.
28 For such raids see pp. 248-9.
undertaken and the salient point which emerges is that even at this early date victuals were calculated by a set standard of what it would take to feed a certain number of men for a set number of days. The quantity of food in these estimates may have been on the high side yet the diet was not particularly healthy and as these are only estimates there was almost certainly a difference between them and what the garrison actually received.  

The very existence of such estimates demonstrates the effort and work that was put into this complex and ever demanding logistical problem and this in turn helps to explain how these demands were on the whole successfully fulfilled. Further evidence of the efficient and careful running of the victualling of castles comes in the references to the king's store in several castles. In 1304 Robert Bruce, then in charge of the English-held castle of Ayr, was to receive for its garrison 60 quarters of wheat, 40 quarters of oats and two tuns of wine as well as a sum of silver, all coming from the king's store in the same castle. Two years earlier the king's store in Ayr was again to be used for the benefit of its garrison, Edward I ordering a clerk to deliver the victuals in his charge that were in the king's store.

These therefore were in effect separate stores of victuals held under the direct command of the king and not freely available to the garrison unless specific permission was forthcoming from the king and as such their existence strengthens the impression of a well-organised and efficient system of victualling being in operation.

The castle at Ayr provides another insight into the detailed calculations of victuals due to garrison soldiers. After a period of siege those in command at Ayr wrote to Dalilegh asking for the following: that one knight was to receive two quarters of wheat and one quarter of oats whilst another was due two quarters of wheat; Robert

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29 C.f Michael Prestwich, 'Victualling Estimates for English Garrisons in Scotland during the Early Fourteenth Century'. EHR, 82 (1967). However such estimates are not widespread which raises the possibility that these thorough estimates were experiments from the early years of garrisoning under Edward I.

30 CDS, ii, no. 1437; CDS, v, no. 303.
de Nekton and Simon de Vilers were due one quarter of oats; six men were to receive two bushels of wheat each, ten crossbowmen three bushels each and eleven archers two bushels each. These calculations based on the basis of each individual suggests this is a case of wages being paid in terms of victuals rather than money and this is confirmed when those who were to remain in the garrison were numbered, each crossbowman receiving one quarter of wheat and each archer four bushels, these victuals explicitly stated as being in lieu of their wages.\(^{31}\)

Another insight comes in a memorandum drawn up in November 1301 which lists the victuals in Dumfries castle for the sustenance of the garrison between 31 July and 10 November, a total of 55 people serving for 104 days. There were 48 quarters and six bushels of wheat and flour and two barrels of flour left from the previous constable’s tenure as well as 12s. 6d. worth of bread and, in addition, five quarters of wheat and seven barrels of flour were delivered from the store at Carlisle on 31 July. In all there were fourteen casks of wine and beer with one and a half casks of wine remaining from the previous constable. On 31 July the store at Carlisle provided eight casks of wine and six quarters of ground malt, three casks to be accounted for and for which the garrison had received the oats as above. Two quarters of beans came from Carlisle. The six barded horses in the garrison required 39 quarters of oats for the whole period which was estimated to be contained within 56 sacks and from which a further seventeen quarters were to be used in making malt for three casks of beer. Two bushels of salt were already present and two quarters came from Carlisle as well as 30 hogs, 2,900 herrings and 200 hard fish which complemented the 2,940 herrings, 150 hard fish (hakes) and six stones of lard already there. Twenty carcasses of oxen were intended to have been provided although the full number was still outstanding. On top

\(^{31}\) CDS, ii, no. 1293.
of all this £10 was due to buy fresh meat, fish and other ‘necessaries’ and there was to come from Carlisle ten quarters of salt, ten ‘bend’ of hay as well as 10 lb of wax. The costs can be seen in the victuals delivered to Kirkintilloch in 1305. Dalilegh’s clerk, as well as bringing money, delivered sixteen chalders of flour at 13s. 4d. a chalder, two chalders of salt valued at 55s. 4d. as well as 40 stones of iron. During 1400 the garrison of Roxburgh paid out £12. 10s. for 1,000 ‘stok fish’ and £42. 13s. 4d. for twelve casks of wheat flour at 66s. 8d. per cask which came from London.

Victuals received by a garrison were detailed in the annual *compotus* under the section marked ‘receipts’ as in the surviving account for Roxburgh from January to November 1300, the payments being deducted from the account. The sale of surplus goods remaining from the previous period of accounting is a rare occurrence but shows that nothing went to waste. The most illuminating way to give some idea of the various types of victuals garrisons were in receipt of is to concentrate on a specific example and one of the fullest is that which concerns the supplies of Stirling, Roxburgh and Dumfries in 1299/1300. As implied above fish was a major part of a garrison’s victuals and this is made clear in the account for Dumfries which contained 500 hake and the substantial total of 3,500 herring. Meat was also an essential component of the soldiers’ diet and is again in evidence at Dumfries with 30 bacon(s), fifteen cows and oxen along with three quarters of an ox and thirteen sheep with an additional three quarters. Roxburgh also illustrates the essential place of meat and fish in feeding a garrison, being in receipt of 40 oxen and bullocks and 597 salmon. The garrisons contain a combination of the victuals that would have been common to all throughout the period; casks of flour, oats, a mixture of barley and oats known as

33 *Ibid*, ii, no. 1686; *CDS*, iv, no. 567.
34 *CDS*, v, no. 233.
drageti, wheat, cheese, hard bread, beans and pease to name just several. Pepper and in particular salt feature heavily, the latter important for its qualities of food preservation. In addition to these Stirling contains items which are more surprising one of which is the fact that mustard was made in the castle. More remarkable is the presence of 20lb of cumin and 2lb of saffron, both which would have been used to add flavour to food in its preparation. Drinking needs were met mostly by wine with Roxburgh receiving 37 casks of which three were lost to ullage due to the weakness of the casks. Dumfries was in receipt of a variety of measures of wine from various sources which ranged between ten casks and one pipe and also received three quarters of malt with which it would have brewed beer.

These accounts also reveal details of the items in the castle from which the garrison ate and drank. The most detailed is Stirling where a clerk accounted for the purchase of four large metal bowls, a hundred metal dishes, a hundred and three metal plates and a further hundred metal cups/goblets. Dumfries also accounted for the purchase of cups/goblets, plates and dishes although there is a hint that some of these may have been wooden. Another aspect of victualling concerned the functioning of the garrison and ensuring it held enough raw materials for work, repairs and general maintenance of both the castle and the armour and weaponry of its garrison. It is in this regard that Roxburgh received 50 stones of iron, ten sheaves of steel and six quarters of sea coal. The supply of these items to garrisons was as commonplace as the food and wine they were in receipt of.

That various skilled jobs took place within a garrison which were essential to its survival has already been suggested by the supply of iron and steel that needed to be worked by skilled hands and the need for someone with a knowledgeable mind to make the mustard and mix in the cumin and saffron in the right amounts. Soldiers were
the mainstay of the garrisons and in muster rolls and accounts they appear as the only members of the garrisons while some accounts regularly range a little further to include such indispensable artificers as attilators (armourers/crossbow-makers), masons, carpenters, blacksmiths, watchmen and frequently chaplains. A front-line garrison would usually have a handful of these men permanently retained within them to attend to the ongoing maintenance of the castle. In reality there was a much larger supporting cast whose purpose was to support the soldiers of the garrison by undertaking specific and usually skilled everyday tasks within the castle and which effectively transformed it into a microcosm of a medieval town. Individual protections for those serving in the Roxburgh garrison in the 1380s provide a wealth of skilled men whose expertise was essential to a garrison. To aid with the preparation of food and drink there was a spicer and skinner along with a vintner, brewer, taverner and innkeeper; for the storage and supply of food there was a grocer and several merchants.

The return listing the garrison of Edinburgh in February 1300, unusual in that it includes all those within the garrison, reveals a similar group to that which the protections show. There was a pantryman, a cook and his boy, a baker and his boy, two brewers, a miller, a cooper, a granary man, a boy keeping the swine, a herdsman, a candle maker, an almoner, two clerks and a water carrier, a sea coal carrier and a bowyer and his boy. The 1380s protections also contain a good many additional roles beyond those relating to food and drink: a draper and a mercer whose trades dealt in cloth and fabrics and consequently concerned the clothing of the garrison; a glazier, a

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36 A garrison was expected to be responsible for a whole range of building works within its castle from minor repairs to the construction of wooden houses within the walls and the erection of wooden peels. More ambitious building works led to the stipulation that a set number of the garrison's foot-soldiers should be carpenters or masons while the entire foot of the Linlithgow garrison was drafted in to hasten its completion in 1302, CDS, ii, nos. 1286, 1321, The King's Works, i, p. 409.

37 See n. 39.

38 CDS, ii, no. 1132.
woodmonger and a refiner of metals responsible for general upkeep and maintenance; a shipman, a falconer and, more for the purposes of entertainment, heralds. The spiritual well-being of the garrison was also catered for with chaplains being something of a fixture in certain garrisons, in 1299/1300 Berwick castle containing such a figure and the 1380s protections including chaplains and a vicar who were retained in Roxburgh. Alongside the chaplain Berwick castle also possessed a washerwoman and among those in the Edinburgh garrison in late 1300 was a custodian of the wine and two carriers/carters. The buildings within the walls of a castle reflected the variety of skilled jobs and work that was undertaken with Bamburgh having stables, a slaughterhouse, a great kitchen, a great grange, a granary and a horse mill.

As the presence of a mercer and draper indicates an interest was taken in the clothing of garrison soldiers. The account for Stirling in 1299/1300 describes eighteen measures of cloth bought in York for the robes and stockings of the garrison. One cloth of blue was for the robes of the constable as well as two chaplains and a cleric there; one cloth striped was for four esquires; another thirteen cloths striped were for the robes of the garrison’s 52 archers. Three cloths of one unspecified colour and a thousand ells of linen, probably woven, were purchased in various locations for the stockings of the garrison. Thirty fur-lined surcoats were also bought for the esquires of the king’s household who were in the garrison and four lots of lambs wool for capes or hoods for the constable, chaplains and the cleric. Similarly in 1387 the constable of Roxburgh petitioned for and was granted permission to ship cloth for the livery of the soldiers of his retinue, the shipping from London to Newcastle and then by land to

39 CDS, v, nos. 4271, 4307, 4257, 4165, 4205, 4287, 4267, 4345, 4529.
40 Lib. Quot., p. 50; CDS, v, nos. 4577, 4303.
41 E101/68/1/(11).
43 Lib. Quot., p. 143.
Roxburgh free of custom or subsidy. The shipment contained twelve short cloths in two packs, two cloths of Raye (i.e. striped), sixteen pieces of cloths strutor of Essex and a piece of cloth of Raye of Candelwykstrete. These two examples, at opposite ends of the century, suggest that the provision of clothing for garrison soldiers, especially permanent soldiers or those of the constable’s or royal household’s retinue, was commonplace.

The constable of Roxburgh, Thomas Swinburne, also took the opportunity of the shipment to bring some of his own personal effects north. In a ‘clothsek’ were two worsted beds and within a barrel two of his saddles. It is clear from the inquiry into the losses of John Sampson, constable of Stirling when it first fell to the Scots, that the constable of a castle did not compromise in his home comforts despite his office and the subsequent risk to his property. Admittedly the majority of the goods he lost were practical military items such as haketons, gambesons, gauntlets, a hauberk and a haberchion, three swords, two sumpter saddles and two hackney saddles. Yet creature comforts were also in evidence and included: a gentleman’s bed and all its appurtenances totalling 53s. 4d.; two buckles of gold; eleven gold rings; three silk purses and ten silver spoons. Ralph, lord Greystoke, when captured whilst en route to taking up his office as constable of Roxburgh in 1380, had sent ahead wagons and carts containing many valuable furnishings, arms and his household goods, all under strong guard. His captor, George Dunbar, earl of March, having seized both Greystoke and his goods, took both to Dunbar castle where the hall and great chamber were adorned with Greystoke’s tapestries and ornaments and when Greystoke had supper with the earl that evening he was served from his own gold and silver vessels.

44 CDS, iv, no. 370.
45 CDS, ii, no. 1949.
46 Bower, vii, p. 397.
These socially distinctive items were the preserve of the constable and presumably the wealthier of the knights within a garrison. The metal vessels bought for Stirling and Dumfries were the everyday items used by the rest of the garrison and each castle held a ready supply of these. An inquiry of 1372 into items taken illegally from Bamburgh castle by the former constable mentions plates, dishes and leaden vessels, beds, chairs, table trestles, saddles, horse-shoes, bows and other necessaries for the custody of the castle. At about the same time was taken the principal table which had been situated in the great hall along with its trestles and also 24 mastic trees\textsuperscript{47} which had been within the castle walls. Also of critical importance to a garrison was a supply of fresh water and hence a well, the Bamburgh garrison making use of three wells in the town as well as one in the great tower itself with the all-important rope and bucket attached.\textsuperscript{48}

Naturally, as war was the primary, all-encompassing purpose of a garrison, there was a large amount of weaponry present as the losses of Sampson and the mention of bows in Bamburgh demonstrate. Crossbows and their quarrels were particularly abundant in garrisons due to their effectiveness as defensive weapons fired from the walls and additional fortifications. Linlithgow was strengthened in the autumn of 1301 with six crossbows ‘a tour’ with appendages and 2,000 quarrels for these, twelve crossbows of two feet with 3,000 quarrels and an additional 5,000 quarrels for crossbows of one foot which were already in the garrison. In anticipation of a Scottish attack in October 1298 the garrison of the castle of Newcastle built a springald themselves buying the necessary wood, iron, tin, brass, lard, string and canvas. They also put the projectiles for it together from the component parts,

\textsuperscript{47} These trees yield the resin mastic which is used to make varnishes and lacquers as well as acting as a substance to stop the flow of blood from skin tissue. Their presence in Bamburgh in such numbers adds yet another level to the sophistication with which garrisons were supplied and the extent to which they enjoyed a measure of self-sufficiency.

purchasing 102 quarrels, 40 heads and 40 iron feathers/flight as well as building a platform for the springald to stand on. Nearly every garrison possessed an engine of some sort such as the ballista in Newcastle for which stones were brought in as ammunition. To ensure the weaponry and especially any engines were maintained in effective working order the attiliator was a common presence in garrisons such as the attiliator called Roger who was in Bamburgh during the hard-pressed year of 1315 improving the ballistas, bows and other artillery.49

Victualling was only part of the laborious process of sustaining a garrison. Once the food and drink, clothing, raw materials and weaponry had arrived then there was a whole variety of skilled labour whose job it was to use and maintain these so as to support and therefore sustain the day to day existence of the garrison soldiers. Although their existence is rarely noted in payrolls, accounts and muster rolls, it is necessary to recognise that they were ever present and underpinned the daily existence of the garrisons. Their skills and trades also provide an insight into life within a front-line garrison as do the stray references to the everyday items the garrison used, picturing the garrison eating off their metal plates and dishes whilst seated at a large, probably communal, table. It gives a brief glimpse of the minutiae of life within a garrison and adds the human element which can so easily be forgotten, items such as the 20lbs of wax delivered to Stirling in 1299/1300 which would have been used for making candles and the dozen parchments and 2lbs of ink which have become the documents from which it is possible to attempt an analysis of these English garrisons of the fourteenth century.50

49 CDS, ii, nos. 1021, 1250; Bates, 'Border Holds', p. 244.
50 Lib. Quot., p. 143.
4.

CONSTABLES

Knights and bannerets may have constituted only the slimmest percentage of troops in a garrison but their importance far outweighed their numbers as the constable of a castle and its garrison came almost exclusively from their ranks. Being knights the constables were men of either national or local prominence and consequently their identity and careers are more accessible than those of the great majority of garrison soldiers with the names of these constables frequently appearing in printed primary sources of the period such as the Patent Rolls and Close Rolls; indeed brief but highly informative biographies of many of them can be found in Moor’s painstakingly researched volumes ‘Knights of Edward I’ and for the later years in Roskell’s ‘History of Parliament’. This is not to say that the careers of all constables encompassed by this study are readily accessible, gaps within careers often being present while some individuals are extremely difficult to identify altogether. However although many careers can and have been put together they remain as isolated careers of individuals rather than being considered collectively and studied as a group. That is the aim of this chapter; to bring together the disparate careers of these constables and to analyse the type of men who were appointed to such positions.

As a group or indeed as individuals relatively little has been written on constables of castles for the whole medieval period, a fact lamented by Shelagh Bond in 1967 and true to this day. Bond’s article, although specific to the special status of Windsor castle, addresses several important themes including the pay received by the constable and particularly focuses on the various duties of the office such as ensuring munitions and stores were plentiful and overseeing castle lands and finances. All are

significant issues however they concentrate on the office of the constable and the roles pertaining to it rather than focussing on the actual individuals who held that office. Bond’s comments on the change in the social status of those who held the constableship are more relevant here as is the article by Andrew Ayton discussing the career of William de Thweyt, deputy constable of Corfe castle, who, as well as holding that position, served in nine military campaigns in mid-century. It is the need to get beyond the office to the identity of the constables themselves that is of paramount importance here.

The most recent addition to this limited body of work on constables is that of Rickard, a study which provides near comprehensive lists of constables for the castles of England and Wales between 1272 and 1422 and which includes an interesting discussion of constables – particularly royal constables – as well as many useful statistical tables illustrating among other things castle ownership, joint constableships and those who served as constable on multiple occasions. Rickard also comments on the length of careers of constables, their level of experience, social rank and wages. Along with these good albeit brief discussions the real value of the work is the ability to use it as a reference source to follow the career of an individual if serving as a constable more than once and in different castles. As Rickard makes clear a pattern can be seen in which the same families and individuals can be seen either serving as constables or owning castles throughout this period. In light of the period Rickard covers it is unfortunate that the study is not extended to include Scottish castles occupied by the English during the wars of the fourteenth century, an extension that would discover whether the men appointed constable in these castles were from the

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same domestic groups and were moving from castles in a state of relative peace to those under conditions of war.\textsuperscript{5} A study of these constables with reference to the domestic castle commanders can be informative in itself.

In common with the rest of this thesis it is the constables of royal castles which form the basis for this chapter.\textsuperscript{6} These royal constables fall into different categories that are not always easy to determine. Many were constables in complete control of their castle and its garrison, some were custodians on behalf of an earl or sheriff while others still were appointed as deputies or attorneys. Frequently it is unclear exactly which position the man \textit{in situ} held. The terminology used in contemporary documents is often misleading and interchangeable, \textit{constabularis} and \textit{custos} the most used terms, interpretations of the latter varying between custodian, keeper and warden. It is impossible to attempt a definitive answer when each individual case is peculiar to itself.\textsuperscript{7} Yet whatever their formal title the important point is that these men were in immediate control of the castle and its garrison and were effectively its constable no matter what their title or basis of office.

The significance of the following study is that the men who are its subject were appointed to take charge of castles and garrisons that were at war, that were expected to be at the forefront of combat, which would be attacked at some point and which were central to both the prosecution of the war and any attempt at conquest. These were men at the sharp end, chosen specifically for the task. It is by looking at the type of man appointed, his background, experience and social status and how the office of

\textsuperscript{5} This omission by Rickard also leaves the tables concerning men who were constable of several castles in an unfinished state. C.f. William Felton (d.1328) whom Rickard records as constable of five castles but who in truth was constable of seven when Tibbers and Linlithgow are included, \textit{ibid}, p. 65, Table 2 xviii. (The table is also mistaken in stating his span of years for these offices as 44, ending in 1344, as he died in 1328. It was his son, also William, who was a constable in the 1340s).

\textsuperscript{6} For a brief outline of the sources see \textit{ibid}, p. 29.

\textsuperscript{7} \textit{Ibid}, pp. 29-30. For a short discussion of constables acting on behalf of others regarding Windsor, and an even shorter but useful definition of a constable, see Bond, 'Medieval Constables of Windsor Castle'. pp. 224, 227.
constable related to his previous or subsequent career that the office of a wartime constable can be investigated. Changes in the type of men being appointed can reveal alterations in the prosecution of the war, the intrusion of domestic politics, even developments within society as a whole. The constables of these castles provide an insight into the military involvement of the higher echelons of society in garrisoning whilst also illuminating the importance and purpose of garrisons themselves.

With such a large cast to cover this chapter will be split into three sections, the first covering the reigns of Edward I and Edward II from 1296-1314, the second encompassing 1314-23 and the third beginning in the 1330s and ending in 1402. By approaching each section in a loose chronological framework general themes and trends of the time will become more easily apparent and allow a detailed study to be undertaken of the men deemed to possess the appropriate skills for holding the critically important and precariously dangerous position of a castle constable in the Anglo-Scottish wars of the fourteenth century.

(i) c. 1296–c. 1314

The first series of appointments to captured Scottish castles took place in 1296 following the English victory at Dunbar on 27 April and the subsequent capture of the major Scottish castles with Edinburgh only holding out for eight days and the keys of a deserted Stirling castle merely handed over by the porter. The quick taking of these completely intact castles facilitated the appointment of constables to them as early as May whilst the process of conquest was still underway.

On 16 May, just over a fortnight after its fall, the town, castle and sheriffdom of Berwick were committed to the custody of the knight Osbert de Spaldington.8 It is

8 CDS, ii, no. 853.
interesting that although Spaldington was an experienced man in his late forties his background was as a justice rather than a military man who, although he had served as keeper of the sea off Scarborough in April 1296 and been involved in recruiting men for Edward I's Welsh campaign of 1294/5, had served as a justice throughout the 1290s in Portsmouth and Lambeth as well as acting as a justice of gaol delivery in Nottingham, Derby and Lincolnshire. There can be no doubt that his initial appointment to Berwick signals the intention of Edward I to transform the town into a centre for an embryonic government of Scotland under his own control. The first part of this process required turning Berwick into an English town or borough and the consequent governmental and legal requirements this entailed. Spaldington was therefore specifically selected for this position due to his experienced legal background and subsequent understanding of the intricacies of government.

Another appointment quickly followed as by 2 November 1296 Spaldington was recorded as keeper of the lands of the late Robert de Ros of Wark, a position which included Wark castle of which he was described as custos of on 28 January 1297 and held until 28 January 1298. Whilst in this office he was sent in May 1297 as a commissioner to treat with Scottish magnates on the issue of them serving overseas against the French. It is perfectly possible that Spaldington held this office in conjunction with his command of Berwick. The Scottish war consequently proved something of a career change for Spaldington, a justice whose lands lay not in the north but in Lincolnshire, his legal knowledge being utilised for the overseeing and safekeeping of sensitive front-line territories in a period of relative peace as well as being a commissioner to the Scots.

Another Lincolnshire knight, Thomas de Burnham, was also appointed a constable on 16 May 1296, being given custody of Jedburgh castle and Selkirk forest. As with many knights of this period the surviving evidence for Burnham concerns the many times he served as a domestic commissioner both before and after his constableship: in Lincolnshire on 20 December 1290 and several times later and he held commissions regarding the River Anholme in Lincolnshire in 1294 and concerning the River Ouse in 1298. He was mentioned as a knight of Lincolnshire in August 1295 and as a knight of the shire for Lincolnshire in 1300, 1301/2 and 1309. Burnham’s involvement in the Scottish war following his time as constable was wholly concerned with the raising of troops to serve there in both Yorkshire and Lincolnshire, acting as a commissioner of array for Yorkshire on 4 November 1297 and in 1301 being tasked with arranging the journey of troops from Lincolnshire to serve in Scotland as well as sending food for the army. He also acted as an assessor of the subsidy in Lincolnshire during March 1305. A protection exists dated 17 July 1277 which states that a Thomas de Burnham was going to Wales for the king. This date is two days after Edward I and his army reached Chester in the substantial campaign of that year that was to become the first Welsh war. It is not clear whether this was the same man appointed constable in 1296 or his father; what it does show is that there was a precedent of military service in the family. There is little evidence for why Burnham was considered particularly suited to being a constable.

The final constable recorded as being appointed in May 1296 presents something of a problem. On 14 May the custody of the castle, town and sheriffdom of

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10 CDS, ii, no. 853. Watson believes Spaldington may have continued as custodian and sheriff into 1297 and possibly until 1298 thus combining all these offices, Under the Hammer, pp. xxv, 40.
Roxburgh was committed to Walter Tuck. This record of his appointment seems to be the only extant mention of Tuck who does not figure in the rolls of the period nor in Moor's exhaustive volumes or within the *dramatis personae* listed by Watson in her detailed account of the war under Edward I. What this does demonstrate is just how fragmentary the evidence can be even for men from the higher stratum of society, a point already illustrated by the difficulty in determining the length of time Spaldington remained in charge at Berwick and the reasons behind Burnham's selection as constable of Jedburgh. Similar problems are common for the whole period.

All three of these appointments were enacted quickly whilst the subjugation of Scotland was still ongoing and it is no surprise to see a new and, it would seem, more considered selection of constables in the autumn of 1296 to accompany Edward I's ordinances for the settlement of Scotland. On 5 October 1296 Burnham was replaced as constable of Jedburgh and keeper of the forest and sheriffdom of Selkirk by the knight Hugh de Eland who was to remain in the office until 1302. A Hugh de Eland had acquired land in Lincolnshire in 1279 – although he did so without licence and the matter was taken to the king – and possessed £40 worth of lands in Yorkshire for which he was summoned to serve against the Scots in 1300 and 1301. A knight of the same name is recorded as having been taken prisoner at Boroughbridge in 1322 fighting against the king and in 1324 was fined £30 for his rebellion; if, as seems likely, this was the same man, he must have been in his thirties or forties when appointed to Jedburgh. As with Burnham it is difficult to see the reasons behind his selection on the limited evidence available but his lengthy stay indicates he was a good choice. Eland's ability as a constable appears to have been exploited as he seems to

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12 *CDS*, ii, no. 853.
14 *CDS*, ii, nos. 853, 1206, 1286.
have also held the constableship of Bamburgh simultaneously, being recorded as
constable of the latter in 1300.\(^{15}\)

If there are doubts about the reasons behind Eland's appointment there is
certainly none concerning the other three major appointments of autumn 1296. Robert
Hastang replaced Walter Tuck as constable of the castle and town of Roxburgh and of
the sheriffdom on 8 September 1296.\(^{16}\) Hastang held land in Staffordshire and Essex
and was a supremely experienced soldier having served against the Welsh in 1294,
against the Scots in 1296 and 1298 and in between had served in the Flanders
expedition of 1297. The latter coincides with the beginning of his tenure as constable
raising the possibility that he was absent from Roxburgh for a period of time in 1297.
Prior to becoming constable he had been staying in Ireland in October 1291 where,
although there was no warfare, he had been granted the new castle and town of
Balimakenegan in August 1290. Hastang remained as constable of Roxburgh until 26
October 1305 when he became sheriff of Peebles and subsequently served against the
Scots periodically until at least 1317.\(^{17}\) An experienced soldier and a significant
landowner Hastang was an ideal man to be placed in charge of Roxburgh.

In the same autumn the first English constables of the newly captured key
strategic castles of Stirling and Edinburgh were appointed and the men selected
accurately reflect the importance attached to these castles. On 8 September Richard de
Waldegrave took charge of the castle and sheriffdom of Stirling. A knight with
Northamptonshire lands he was closely associated with Anothony Bek, bishop of
Durham, going overseas with him in 1283, 1286 and 1294 as well as going to Scotland
for the king in 1290. In 1295 he had been staying on the Kent coast for its protection, a

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\(^{15}\) *Knights of Edward I*, i, p. 303; *Ancient Petitions*, pp. 20-1. Considering the lengthy career span it is
possible that two men are involved in the entry Moor makes for one individual, thus a father and son
both called Hugh.

\(^{16}\) *CDS*, ii, no. 853.

\(^{17}\) *Knights of Edward I*, ii, pp. 198-9, *CDS*, ii, nos. 1018, 1142, 1337, 1646, 1663, 1691, 1707.
duty he was removed from in October 1295 as he was engaged for the king elsewhere. However the outstanding feature of Waldegrave's career was his position as under-constable of the Tower of London and subsequently constable of the Tower in the early 1280s. Here for the first time in the Anglo-Scottish wars is a constable who was directly chosen for his experience, and presumably an acknowledged expertise, in commanding a formidable and nationally important fortress although the Tower occupied a largely administrative rather than military role. There can be no better illustration of the importance Edward I attached to Stirling castle than the appointment of Waldegrave as constable. That Waldegrave also had experience of overseas diplomacy and strong links with Bek, the latter being of critical importance in his appointment to Stirling, were important factors that would have enhanced his position as constable of Stirling. Waldegrave also achieved a darker distinction, being the first constable recorded as being killed whilst in office, slain with many of his garrison whilst engaged in the battle of Stirling Bridge in 1297.

Walter de Huntercombe, appointed on 5 October as constable of Edinburgh and sheriff of Edinburgh, Linlithgow and Haddington, combined the prodigious military and combat experience of Hastang with the direct experience of Waldegrave in commanding a castle that possessed an active, and in Huntercombe's case, military role. A knight owning manors in Oxfordshire, Bedfordshire, Essex and Northumberland, Huntercombe was summoned to serve against the Welsh in 1277 and 1282 as well as going to Wales for the king with the earl of Cornwall in 1287, being summoned to the council at Gloucester in the same year and again going to Wales for the king in October 1293. He had also served overseas in Gascony in 1294 and was to

18 CDS, ii, no. 853; Knights of Edward I, v, p. 137. Bek had also been constable of the Tower and it is evident that Waldegrave had been his deputy.
serve in Flanders in 1297, the latter raising the same possibility of temporary absence as in Hastang's case. Between 20 March 1284 and 5 October 1285 Huntercombe had been custos of Bere castle in Merioneth, Wales, with a garrison of thirty soldiers including ten crossbowmen, a castle in which he had a new chamber built during his tenure. On 4 June 1290 he was appointed custos of the Isle of Man. Aside from these extensive military commitments he had been keeper of Northumberland in 1271 and was summoned to parliament from 1295 until 1311. 20

The stature Huntercombe held is evident in his subsequent career going on to become captain of Northumberland, a commissioner of array in the same county, keeper of the marches of Northumberland as well as leading forces against the Scots in 1303 and serving against them in 1308 and 1310. The constableship of Edinburgh between 5 October 1296 and 25 November 1298 was therefore held by a highly experienced veteran of the wars in both Wales and Scotland who had also seen service overseas, a man who had commanded a castle and its garrison in the hostile environment of Wales and who was to play an integral part in the English war effort in the ensuing years. It should also be noted that Huntercombe held land in Northumberland which explains the number of appointments he held with regard to that county. He is the first constable to be recorded as holding land in this potentially exposed front-line county.

Here then, in the autumn of 1296, as Edward I organised the settlement of an apparently subjugated Scotland, a new type of constable to those appointed in May appears. The major castles are now held by knights or bannerets of national standing, men who owned several manors in various counties and possessed the wealth, prestige and retinues that accompanied this. They were experienced in both war and the

20 CDS, ii, no. 853; Knights of Edward I, ii, pp. 252-3. The garrison of Bere castle also contained a chaplain, attilator, smith, carpenter, mason, as well as janitors, watchmen and 'other necessary ministers', ibid, 'Castel-Y-Bere', Rickard, Castle Community, p. 305.
command of castles of national or military significance. They had the ear of the king and the power and authority to exert their influence in support of their position as constable rather than relying on their position as constable as an office to exert power from. In short Hastang, Waldegrave and Huntercombe were three experienced, capable and formidable commanders. That Edward I left men such as these as his most prominent constables after his settlement of Scotland indicates that he did not take lightly the possibility of Scottish resistance and that he expected these commanders to aggressively use their garrisons to deal with any insurgents effectively. It is telling that he did not leave a justice such as Spalding in charge of these castles but experienced commanders of national standing.

Whereas Hastang was to remain as constable of Roxburgh until October 1305 both Waldegrave and Huntercombe no longer held their position within two years of their appointment, Waldegrave being killed in 1297 and Huntercombe ordered to hand over Edinburgh on 25 November 1298. 21 The recapture of Stirling in 1298 after the resounding English victory at Falkirk was followed almost immediately by the appointment of a new constable on 8 August 1298. The new incumbent, the Yorkshire knight John Sampson, was to remain constable until the castle was lost under his command in January 1300, an indication that his appointment was a considered decision and not an ad hoc arrangement upon its capture as those in May 1296 appear to have been. 22 More than any other constable Sampson was a vastly experienced administrator having served in the 1280s as keeper of the Exchange in York, as mayor of York, as a commissioner in the same town as well as being an attorney for the archbishop of York and a justice of gaol delivery in Oakham. In the 1290s he had acted as an assessor of the subsidy in Yorkshire and had bought wool for the king.

22 Although the close siege of Stirling would have prevented Sampson being replaced even if Edward I had wanted to do so.
transporting it to the port of Hull. There is no evidence of active military service in Sampson’s career but, like his predecessor Waldegrave, he did have experience of commanding a castle, being constable of Scarborough castle for over five years from 2 June 1292 until 3 October 1297 – a castle he was granted to hold for life on 23 February 1301 but ceded on 13 May 1308 – while previously, in January 1297, he had been a commissioner regarding the site and state of Berwick and its port, a commission which would have dealt with surveying the fortifications of the town.23

As part of Edward I’s reshuffling of officials in the wake of Falkirk the constable of Edinburgh was changed, Huntercombe moving into other important offices and his successor, the banneret John Kingston, taking charge in November 1298. Whereas Sampson to an extent reflects the background of Waldegrave as a constable and administrator then Kingston’s experience is more that of the experienced veteran soldier as exhibited by Hastang. Kingston, possessing lands in Berkshire and Wiltshire, had served in Wales in 1277, 1282 and 1282 and had been summoned to serve in Flanders in 1297. His service in Wales had been under Ralph Pypard, transferring to the earl of Lancaster and then for John de Lenham and then the king respectively. This background of extensive campaigning combined with his high social rank led to his appointment to Edinburgh where he proved to be an extremely capable constable, retaining the position until at least 26 October 1305 when he was made one of the temporary custodians of Scotland, an appointment illustrating both the height of his social status and his successful tenure as constable of Edinburgh.24

23 CDS, ii, no. 1002; Knights of Edward I, iv, pp. 205-6; Rickard, Castle Community, p. 494 – it is possible that it is the same John Sampson who was a private constable of the castles of Cockermouth (1266-1267) and Skipton (1267-1269), pp. 153, 498.
24 Knights of Edward I, ii, p. 284; Barrow, Robert Bruce, p. 197. Kingston’s social stature and success as a commander was renowned enough for one of the great siege engines at Stirling in 1304 to be named after him.
Kingston approaches Huntercombe in terms of social status if not in land whereas Sampson equates more to Hastang and Waldegrave, yet both were still knights of national importance with appropriate experience in either warfare, castles or administration and as such were specifically chosen for their role as constable of a key strategic castle. In this they both continue the trend set in autumn 1296 although it is surprising that Sampson does not appear to have any significant combat experience which suggests he was selected solely for his administrative abilities. However Sampson does mirror the northern, in his case Yorkshire, basis evident in Huntercombe’s Northumberland connections, pointing to the beginnings of the link between knights of northern counties and the office of constable in Scotland.

Several more Scottish castles were taken in the wake of Falkirk including Caerlaverock and Tibbers, both going into private hands, along with the reduction of Lochmaben. However the most notable seizure was that of Jedburgh the siege of which took place in early October 1298. On 18 October Robert Hastang, constable of nearby Roxburgh, agreed an indenture for the munition and garrisoning of Jedburgh, a temporary measure of expediency upon the immediate capture of the castle. It was surely due to Hastang’s position as constable of Roxburgh and his good service there since 1296 that the interesting situation arises of his brother, Richard, becoming constable of Jedburgh. Unlike his brother there is little information to be found on Richard’s early career, he may well have served with Robert in Wales and overseas if old enough, but he was to remain in charge of Jedburgh until 26 October 1305 and went on to serve for the earl of Warwick in 1310, was a knight of the shire of

26 CDS, ii, no. 1016.
27 Although there is confusion as to the date of his constableship. Watson suggests that he was constable from 1298 and indeed he is stated as being constable on 15 July 1299 but there is a confusing entry dated 1301 in which the former constable, Hugh de Eland, is described as constable. The latter is surely misdated, c.f. Watson, Under the Hammer, pp. xxi, 69; Knights of Edward I, ii, p. 198, CDS, ii, no. 1206.
Warwickshire in 1321 and was summoned to the Great Council of 1324 as a knight of the same county. Whatever his background it is clear that Richard Hastang became constable due to the influence of his brother but it must be assumed that he would never have gained it if he was not capable of executing the role successfully and his length of tenure suggests that he was indeed a competent commander. It would be wrong to view his appointment as nepotism at the cost of ability; this was warfare rather than the relatively cosy atmosphere of the domestic castle constables that operated in England.

One representative of these domestic constables who did serve auspiciously as a constable in Scotland was William de Felton (d. 1328). He had served overseas in 1297 and was to do so again in 1301 but his main links were with Wales, leading the men of Anglesey to the battle of Falkirk in 1298, an engagement in which he lost a horse. Felton was something of a specialist with regard to castles being appointed constable of Beaumaris castle upon its inception in April 1295 and remaining constable during its construction by Master James of St. George until 1 April 1300. A muster roll exists that suggests Felton made his debut as a constable in the Scottish wars within the minor castle of Tibbers but Felton's invaluable expertise was soon put to better use; in the autumn of 1301 a garrison was created for the old palace at Linlithgow and Felton was brought in as constable, spending the winter of 1301/2 there with Edward I, a time in which the king decided to transform Linlithgow into a place of some strength. The appointment of Felton as early as autumn 1301, a man who had spent five years as constable of Beaumaris during its construction, indicates that this decision had been taken well before the new year and that Felton was appointed specifically with these building works in mind. Once again Master James of

\[28\] Knights of Edward I, ii, p. 198.
St. George was to supervise the works and it cannot be a coincidence that Edward I reformed the partnership that had safeguarded Beaumaris during its construction. Felton was constable of Linlithgow when the works officially finished in August 1302, the garrison of the rebuilt castle formally entering the garrison payrolls from 29 August 1302, Felton remaining in command until at least late 1305.29

The trend to notice in the years from 1298 until 1305/6 is the length of time for which these constables were remaining in office. Robert Hastang was the only constable from 1296 still serving and remained in command of Roxburgh for nine years. Those appointed in 1298 all served much longer than any of their predecessors; Kingston for at least seven or eight years, Richard Hastang for approximately seven years and Felton for approximately five years with the exception being Sampson due to the loss of Stirling whilst under his command. These men were all originally appointed as part of Edward I's attempt to settle the issue of Scotland and consolidate English dominance, a settlement that proved rapidly elusive and which was quickly replaced by a violent resumption of war with Scottish attacks punctuated by English expeditions occupying most of these years. Yet in the face of renewed hostilities the constables of these castles remained remarkably consistent at a time when great pressure was exerted on each of them and when any doubt or weakness about their capabilities would have seen them quickly removed from their office. It is consequently evident that Edward I chose those he appointed constable in and after 1298 with extreme care and that he intended them to be in the office for the long-term. It also appears that the king adopted a policy of maintaining consistency thus breeding familiarity between the constables who commanded the backbone of the English war effort in Scotland. At a time of incessant conflict in the war it is striking that these are

29 Knights of Edward I, ii, p. 9; Morris, The Welsh Wars of Edward I, pp. 263, 268, 287-8, 293; The King's Works, i, pp. 412-3; C47/22/3/32; E101/9/16, m. 1; E101/10/6, mm. 5-6; E101/12/38.
the very years in which there is a settling down and consistency in those who were constable.

The next major change occurred in October 1305 and was once again the result of Edward I's apparent subjugation of Scotland and the new arrangements for its settlement. John of Brittany, earl of Richmond and nephew of Edward I, became the new lieutenant of Scotland and consequently the de facto keeper of the castles of Roxburgh and Jedburgh. The order that brought these castles into his control was issued on 15 October 1305; Robert Hastang was instructed to hand over Roxburgh to either the new lieutenant or Robert de Maulay, Richmond's attorney, and likewise Richard Hastang was to deliver Jedburgh to Richmond or his attorney, Ebles de Mountz. This exchange had taken place by 25 October when Robert and Richard Hastang were referred to as being the late constables of their respective castles. Their replacements, the attorneys of Richmond, Maulay and Mountz, although appointed under Richmond and with the consent of Edward I, mark the transitional stage in constables between the latter and the reign of his son, Edward II.

Robert de Maulay was constable of Roxburgh from October 1305 until ordered to cede the castle by Edward II on 12 February 1309. There are few details of his previous career; Robert was the brother of Peter de Maulay and was a serviens of the earl of Lincoln in 1277 and witnessed a charter of the earl in 1285 as well as receiving a protection for staying in Scotland for Edward I in 1291. He held lands in Yorkshire in 1279 that had previously belonged to his brother. On 20 May 1308 Edward II thanked Maulay for his services and asked him to remain in Roxburgh, presumably in his capacity as constable. Maulay's loyal service and the expertise he acquired as constable of Roxburgh were noted by Edward II although interestingly they were not

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30 CFR, 1272-1307, p. 529; CDS, ii, no. 1707. John of Brittany, then governor of Aquitaine, was not able to take up his new position until February 1306.
31 He was described as 'late constable and sheriff' on 21 March 1310, Knights of Edward I, iii, p. 138
put to use in the Scottish war but to strengthen Edward’s domestic political position. In June 1310, ostensibly for his good service to both Edward I and Edward II, Maulay was granted the castle and manor of Bolsover in Derbyshire and in May 1314 he was constable of Horeston castle – a position he had held since at least May 1311 – and, as well as having carried out repairs on both castles, he was to safely guard both Horeston and Bolsover castles during the political turmoil of January 1312. Maulay was to hold Horeston until 15 March 1322 and it was quickly returned to his keeping on 13 May. He was custos of High Peak castle with Richard Damory from 16 January 1319, the castle being in the possession of Edward II’s children John and Eleanor. Maulay also served as custos of several manors at this time as well as having been a steward of Prince Edward, earl of Chester, in 1317, and he became a commissioner of array for Nottinghamshire and Derbyshire in 1322 when he was to assemble men for the Scottish expedition as well as mustering the Yorkshire levies on 11 March 1323.\(^\text{32}\)

In the case of Maulay the expected career path of a constable is inverted. Rather than gaining experience as a constable in England or Wales then utilising this in a front-line Scottish castle Maulay was brought away from the hard school of a war-torn castle and given charge of castles in Derbyshire, castles which Edward II saw as critical to control in his domestic crisis. With his experience as constable of Roxburgh and possession of land in Yorkshire Maulay’s career should have been as a commander in the war; that Edward II felt compelled to remove him from this critical arena illustrates the extent to which he felt threatened domestically. Maulay, as with many constables of castles in Scotland, can be seen as operating outside the domestic castle constables of England and this implies that Edward II placed more trust in someone

\(^{32}\) Knights of Edward I, iii, p. 138; Rickard, Castle Community, pp. 165, 167, 169. Horeston and Bolsover were both relatively close to the earl of Lancaster’s lands in the Midlands.
from outside of this group and raises the issue of just how distinct these front-line constables were from their domestic counterparts.

The appointment of Ebles de Mountz as constable of Jedburgh whilst acting as an attorney for Richmond introduces the career of one of the most interesting constables of this period. Indeed, given his past record, it is surprising that Mountz was appointed to Jedburgh rather than to the more important castle of Roxburgh. Mountz had served as a knight in the garrison of Edinburgh since at least 28 February 1300 - when he had served with one esquire, five grooms, two chargers and three hackneys - and had constantly remained in the garrison until 20 August 1304 when he departed to take up the sheriffdom of Peebles. Throughout these four years Mountz appears to have served as Kingston's deputy, his name appearing immediately after Kingston's on accounts and muster rolls which was traditional for a deputy, on several occasions being the only knight except for Kingston in the garrison and he is almost certainly the unnamed knight that sometimes appears in Edinburgh's accounts. This position of seniority within the garrison is confirmed by Mountz being appointed constable of Edinburgh on 1 March 1303; he was to retain this office for nearly a year until Kingston returned in February 1304 and Mountz left for Peebles.33

The evidence for Jedburgh is sketchy but Mountz was still constable on 13 June 1306 and almost certainly remained there into 1307; on 20 May 1308 the king thanked him and requested that he continue in his service which indicates he may still have been constable at that time. What can definitely be said is that he had left Jedburgh by 18 December 1308 as on that date he was appointed constable of Stirling castle where he was to remain until spring 1311.34 That Mountz was made constable of three different key strategic Scottish castles in only eight years is an unparalleled

33 CDS, ii, no. 1132; E101/11/1, mm. 19-20; named in garrison – E101/68/1/11, E101/11/1, E101/12/18, E101/12/20.
34 CDS, v, nos. 492, 512, 562; CDS, iii, nos. 70, 210; CFR, 1307-1319, p. 34.
record. The expertise and ability that underpinned these appointments and the status of Mountz as something special amongst the constables of this period is confirmed by a commission he was never to take up; on 22 February 1314 Edward II appointed him constable of Edinburgh.\textsuperscript{35}

The true significance of this is revealed when the timing of his appointment is put into context, the date exactly coinciding with the close siege of Edinburgh which culminated in it being stormed and taken by the Scots in March 1314. Although obviously unaware of the imminence of Edinburgh’s fall this does illustrate that the Crown was acutely aware of problems within the castle concerning a loss of confidence in the incumbent constable, Piers Lubaud, by his own garrison.\textsuperscript{36} In this critical, potentially disastrous situation, the man turned to was Mountz. In modern terminology Mountz appears here as a ‘fireman’ for Edward II, a role grounded in his unparalleled experience of front-line Scottish castles and which had included a year in charge of Edinburgh itself.\textsuperscript{37}

It was clearly the unparalleled expertise possessed by Mountz that marked him out for such a thankless task but there is an additional dimension that may well have contributed towards his selection and which is specifically related to Lubaud. The garrison of Edinburgh’s loss of confidence was exacerbated by Lubaud being a Gascon ‘foreigner’ and a cousin of the late and reviled Piers Gaveston. The background of Mountz, though also a foreigner in pedigree, was in marked contrast to that of Lubaud. The Mountz family were originally from Savoy and his father, also a knight named Ebles, had served as steward of Henry III’s household between 1262 and 1270, holding the constableship of Windsor castle from 1266 until January 1269 as well as

\textsuperscript{35} CFR, 1307-1319, p. 189.

\textsuperscript{36} Lubaud had undoubtedly already been overthrown by his garrison by 22 February but the Crown was unaware of this with Mountz’s commission ordering Lubaud to hand the castle over to Mountz.

\textsuperscript{37} Mountz also knew and would have been known by troops still serving in the garrison in 1314 who had served in it under him in the early years of the century.
being an important figure in the entourage of Edward I when he was still only a young prince in the mid-1200s. The Mountz family was one of the many Savoyard families that entered into English court circles under both Henry III and the young Edward I and Mountz himself maintained this intimate connection with the court by becoming an esquire of the household of Queen Eleanor, the wife of Edward I, in 1289-90. Mountz interweaved this household career with that of his constableships, becoming steward of Queen Isabella’s household in 1311 and travelling with her and Edward II to France in 1313, retiring from the post in February 1314 due to his intended appointment to Edinburgh. Having fought and lost a horse at Bannockburn he was part of the force of household knights and men-at-arms sent to reinforce Berwick in August 1314. His close association with Edward and Isabella continued in 1316 when he brought news to the king of the birth of his second son, John of Eltham. In 1317 Mountz was Edward’s envoy to the count of Bar and other continental magnates while in 1320 Mountz’s widow, Elizabeth, went overseas with Isabella. In his lifetime Mountz possessed land in Lincolnshire, was granted the manor of Shirlinge near Sandwich by Eleanor in 1290 and later, in 1312, for his good service to Edward I and to better serve Isabella, Edward II granted him the confiscated Templar manors of Bruere, Askeby, Rouston and Kirkeby in Lincolnshire.  

Mountz was appointed to Edinburgh at this time of crisis not just because of his immense experience but also due to his impeccable personal and family pedigree. He had loyally served Edward I and Eleanor as well as Edward II and Isabella whilst his father had served in the household of Henry III. Mountz was beyond reproach in terms of both experience and background and was thus a man whom the garrison would trust

implicitly and obey. The selection of Mountz to take charge of Edinburgh in 1314 was therefore based on political as well as military considerations and only he matched both of these essential requirements although he was ultimately appointed too late to take up the command and attempt to save Edinburgh.

The most striking feature of Mountz's career is that before becoming a constable he had served as a knight, as deputy constable, in the Edinburgh garrison for three to four years, effectively serving an apprenticeship in garrison command under Kingston. This was not a feature peculiar to Mountz. William Biset was his immediate predecessor as constable of Stirling being granted the office after the castle had been retaken in 1304. Biset had served in Flanders during 1297 and in early 1304 had become sheriff of Clackmannan residing at Tulliallan castle where by April, in dispute with Henry Percy over possession of the castle, he had spent money strengthening the walls and from where he harassed the Scottish garrison of Stirling situated several miles upstream, the boats of which he managed to capture in April. However the most interesting aspect of Biset is that he had served within the Linlithgow garrison for his lands in Scotland since autumn 1301, appearing in the rolls as a soldarius and frequently referred to as serving with four of his companion soldarii, eventually leaving the garrison on 6 June 1303 during a general re-organisation of men.39 Here again is something amounting to an apprenticeship in garrisons followed by a progression from command of a minor sheriffdom and castle to a major one. Biset was Scottish and his prominence was due to his position in Scottish society and the lands he held of the king. He was the first Scot to be made constable of an important English-held castle in Scotland.

39 Knights of Edward I, i, p. 96; Watson, Under the Hammer, pp. 189, 191; E101/9/16, m. 1, E101/10/5, m. 2, E101/10/6, m. 6, E101/11/1, mm. 2, 5, 9, 19. The date he became a knight is unclear and Biset may well have only been an esquire when made constable of Stirling, presumably being knighted whilst in office.
It is an interesting fact that the advent of Edward II's reign was not marked by a wholesale change among the constables of the Scottish castles at the heart of the war. Those appointed in the reign of Edward I kept their offices: Biset remained in Stirling until late 1308 when replaced by Mountz, a man who had already served as constable twice under Edward I and remained in charge of Jedburgh from 1305 until most probably 1308; Maulay was to hold Roxburgh from 1305 until 1310; Kingston may well have continued as constable of Edinburgh into the reign of Edward II. As with the aristocratic military commanders of the war on the whole the men Edward I had entrusted with these critical constableships were retained in the same capacity by Edward II and in the crisis of early 1314 it was to one of these that Edward turned to save Edinburgh. Similarly many of the constables associated with Edward II's reign can be found fighting within the garrisons of Edward I in the early years of the war. 40

This is a feature of one of the most intriguing constables under Edward II, Piers Lubaud, the Gascon knight overthrown by his own garrison in 1314. The first appearance of Lubaud in garrison service comes in February 1300 when he was listed as an esquire serving in Edinburgh under Kingston, and incidentally alongside Mountz, but the majority of his early service was spent as one of the many sergeant-at-arms in Linlithgow, most probably first appearing in the unfortunately faded roll of autumn 1301 and his name consistently present in the rolls and accounts up to and including 1304/5. By June 1306 he was constable of Linlithgow and had been knighted, his astounding meteoric rise from a mere sergeant to a knight and constable being directly down to the notorious favour of Edward II with the influence of Gaveston, Lubaud's cousin, undoubtedly lending a hand. 41 However, as with Maulay, Lubaud was

40 M. Prestwich, 'Isabella de Vescy and the Custody of Bamburgh Castle', BIHR, 44 (1971)
41 CDS, ii, no. 1132, E101/10/5, m. 2; E101/10/6, m. 6; E101/11/1, mm. 2, 5, 9, 25, E101/12/18, E101/12/38, CDS, v, nos. 475, 492; Vita Edvardi Secundi, ed. N. Denholm-Young (London, 1957), p. 48.
appointed constable whilst Edward I, whose dislike of his son’s attachment to Gaveston was to become manifest, was king. An explanation may be found in the fact that Edward I was gravely ill in 1306 and it was his son who led the army into Scotland, this expedition providing the future Edward II with the opportunity to influence the appointment of Lubaud. When and by whom Lubaud was knighted is also unknown but he was already a knight by the summer of 1306.\textsuperscript{42}

This undoubted favouritism does not necessarily condemn the suitability of Lubaud as a constable from the outset and, as with Gaveston, Lubaud on the whole appears to have been a brave and capable commander. Although the elevation of Lubaud was unseemly in its rapidity he did possess several years experience of service in front-line garrisons, in particular within Linlithgow, which would have provided him with knowledge of and a familiarity with the castle and garrison over which he was given command. Whether his new status aroused simmering resentment among the men he had once served alongside or who had previously been his seniors and whom he was now in command of can only be a matter of conjecture; the long duration of his constableship and the continuity of those serving under him suggest that Lubaud had few if any problems with the garrison accepting his new found authority.

In fact Lubaud was to remain as constable of Linlithgow for an unprecedented seven years with his tenure only ending with its loss to the Scots in 1313. He was absent during its fall as by then he was also constable of Edinburgh, a position he held as early as 1311/12, as well as being constable of the peel of Livingston from approximately the same date. These multiple constableships are the first of the period and are all the more remarkable in that one man was given command of two major

\textsuperscript{42} Edward, then still a prince, received stores from Lubaud at Linlithgow and Blackness between July and September 1306, the prominence of Lubaud illustrating he was already constable by then. He was not among those knighted at the Feast of the Swans in 1306, \textit{CDS}, v, no. 475.
fortifications and a minor but logistically important one in some of the most precarious and volatile years of the whole war. This multiplicity cannot but have aided the loss of Linlithgow and Livingston due to the absence of their commander. As the three were located within the same region it could be suggested that the multiplicity was an attempt at providing an overall commander to give greater co-ordination to the forces within them but it was surely more a symptom of Edward II's domestic troubles and his increasing reliance on only a handful of men whom he trusted to remain loyal to himself. It was this that led to Lubaud finding himself in charge of three garrisons that totalled a force of approximately four hundred men. The overthrow of Lubaud was more to do with the impossible task given him rather than a lack of ability or integrity on his part; his fate was sealed by the personal failures of Edward II more than any of his own. He remained loyal to the English cause to the last, entering into Bruce's service upon the fall of Edinburgh but being executed because it was believed he remained English at heart and was awaiting an opportunity to damage the Scottish war effort.

In 1310 William de Fiennes, a Frenchman from Bouglon, was constable of Roxburgh. He too was advanced into his position by Edward II, being knighted on 1 August 1311 whilst already constable and so having been appointed as a mere esquire, remaining in charge until the castle was taken by storm in 1314, an action in which he resisted courageously but was fatally injured by an arrow although still managing to negotiate the safe extraction of the surviving garrison before his death. There is no information on Fiennes before his appearance in Roxburgh although it is likely that he was related to the William Fiennes who had been a second cousin of Eleanor, the wife

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43 Calculated from CDS, iii, app. viii, pp. 393-412.
44 Bruce, pp. 398-9 n. 766. Duncan speculates that Lubaud may have betrayed the Scottish attack on Berwick in January 1316.
Fiennes is consequently another example of Edward II's narrowing base of men whom he believed he could rely on.

It is significant that in a period when the war was at its height and attacks on castles extremely likely the three major fortresses of Roxburgh, Edinburgh and Linlithgow were held by aliens, men who owed their commands more to the crisis in English domestic politics in these years than to events in the Scottish war. The selection of these constables was based primarily on political concerns rather than those of warfare. It is also interesting that two aliens, both favourites of Edward II, one of whom was related to Gaveston, were in office in such critically important castles when the Ordinances were promulgated and yet they were not themselves a target despite the Ordinances focussing on the removal of Gaveston and his following together with a raft of household officials including the constables of a number of English castles. Despite their backgrounds and the highly sensitive posts they held both Lubaud and Fiennes escaped the wrath of the Ordainers. Indeed the appointment of Fiennes was at the expense of a target of the Ordainers, Henry Beaumont, whose grant of the castle of Roxburgh for life on 21 March 1310 was exceptionally short-lived, Fiennes being in charge from 26 March 1310. It is clear that the politics of the reign were seriously affecting the constableships of the key English-held castles in Scotland.

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45 CDS, iii, app. vii, p. 406. As a young man Edward I, whilst a prince in Gascony in the 1250s, had his own administration of which the chancellor was one Michael de Fiennes, Prestwich, Edward I, p. 14.
47 There is no obvious reason why they were not targeted, particularly Lubaud with his familial connection to Gaveston. It may have been that the Ordainers were reluctant to interfere directly with the delicate situation that existed in the war. That Lubaud was not present at court may also have helped him avoid any censure.
48 CDS, iii, nos. 122, 129; CDS, iv, p. 400. It does not seem likely that Fiennes was acting as constable for Beaumont as there is no evidence whatsoever to support the idea that Beaumont had the keeping of Roxburgh from 1310-14.
Stirling, the fourth major fortress, was held between 1311 and its loss in 1314 by a Scottish knight, Philip de Moubray. Although a Scot his tenure of office excited no comment in the chronicles of the period even though it was Moubray's agreement with Edward Bruce that effectively led to Bannockburn. In modern eyes his subsequent career may well raise doubts about his loyalty; having surrendered Stirling castle he was rewarded by Robert Bruce for having kept to his agreement by being accepted into the household of the latter and went on to play a prominent role in Edward Bruce's Irish campaign in 1315 where Moubray is believed to have died. However, as with Lubaud, changing sides after capture was an accepted practice and Moubray's loyalty before 1314 is not in doubt. He lost a horse fighting alongside Aymer de Valence at Methven, a battle in which he purportedly seized the reigns of Bruce's horse, and again distinguished himself when ambushed by James Douglas near Ediford in 1307. Moubray went on to become constable of Kirkintilloch castle in 1309/10 before receiving the greater command of Stirling.\footnote{CDS, v, no. 472; Bruce, pp. 90-2, 98, 100-2, 290-5, 520, 674.} With his long record of active service in Scotland together with his Scottish antecedents and experience of not only leading troops but commanding Kirkintilloch Moubray can be seen as another experienced commander who had served his apprenticeship in the Scottish wars, working his way up from Kirkintilloch to the vital castle of Stirling.
(ii) c.1314-c.1323

The loss of castles in Scotland led to the castles of northern England, which had hitherto played a minor role in the wars, now becoming front-line royal garrisons and it was in these years following Bannockburn that a new type of constable emerged, a change determined by the castles in which these garrison forces were now concentrated. The greatest concentration of these castles was in Northumberland and the fragmentary records for these in the years after Bannockburn and into the 1320s allow a glimpse of the men who served as constable within these now extremely important fortifications.

Roger de Horsley serves as an introduction to this new type of constable. He was constable of the royal castle at Bamburgh on 4 December 1315 but only lasted a matter of weeks being replaced on 20 December, an accusation of extortion whilst constable hastening his removal. However this had little effect on his career as by 6 February 1318 he was again constable of Bamburgh and held this office for nine years until 8 February 1327. Horsley was also briefly constable of Dunstanburgh for nearly two weeks in March 1322, undertaking this position styled as a royal steward. There is also evidence that Horsley was in charge of Berwick castle after leaving Bamburgh in 1327. Nor was his role just confined to being a constable: in 1321 he was to advise the sheriff of Northumberland on the best way to destroy Harbottle castle; in 1323 he was appointed to the commission that was to investigate the seizure of Norham castle; he was summoned to the Great Council in 1324 and in January 1326 he was given the task of blockading part of the Northumberland coast to prevent the landing of French emissaries.1

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All of Horsley’s appointments were therefore concerned with Northumberland and it comes as no surprise that he was a knight of Northumberland, holding land in the county and in 1318 being paid 40 marks a year from Bamburgh castle until the king provided him with lands to that value in the county. The traits of these new constables are in evidence in Horsley’s career; a knight of local – Northumbrian – standing rather than national and operating within that locality in contrast with the national figures who commanded the first-rate castles of Scotland. This sets the pattern for the rest of the constables Edward II appointed after Bannockburn.

Although these men mark a change in constable type on the whole they exhibit one key similarity with their predecessors; experience of fighting against the Scots. As Northumbrians it is natural that they should be veterans of the Anglo-Scottish wars and in certain cases documentation supports this. The pay books reveal that Horsley was serving in the Berwick garrison as a soldarius in 1303 and the assumption must be that he had continued in service, whether continuously or intermittently, right through until the appointments as constable came after Bannockburn.

Similar lengthy service – in this case particularly garrison based – can be seen in the career of William Ridel. He served as a knight under William Latimer in the mounted force based in Roxburgh town from at least September 1301 until 21 December when he moved to the garrison of Berwick town where he remained with four of his esquires into the summer of 1302. It was whilst serving with Latimer that Ridel was captured by the Scots but fortunately for him he was freed in exchange for a captured Scottish knight rather than face a hefty ransom. His relationship with Latimer continued throughout the years as in 1311 he consented to the transfer to Latimer of

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3 E101/11/1, m. 15.
lands to which he had bought control of the minority from the king for the princely sum of 700 marks; Ridel was thus a man of some substance.

He was a knight of Northumberland and served as a commissioner on a variety of local matters from 1312 into the 1320s and was commissioner of array in Northumberland in December 1321 when he was to raise 500 foot for the 1322 expedition. Ridel’s first appointment as a constable was as royal constable of Norham, the dates of this are imprecise but he appears to have left the office on 14 August 1314. His command of castles continued with his office as sheriff of Northumberland in 1315, Newcastle castle automatically coming under his authority. He remained as custos of the castle from 3 May until 16 October 1315 and again from 3 August 1317 until 12 October 1319. There appears to have been a slight overlap between this appointment and his following one as constable of Barnard castle, supervising the latter, whilst it was in wardship, with his office there lasting from 27 September 1319 until 6 July 1323.4

An experienced local knight with some wealth Ridel combined a multitude of regional offices with his various constablistships. In Ridel and Horsley a new breed of constable appear as a direct response to the altered situation after Bannockburn and the increased importance of the north, and Northumberland in particular, as the battlefield of the war. Veterans who had fought in the time of Edward I they were able and loyal commanders.

Loyalty to Edward II is questionable in two further constables. John de Lilleburn was constable of Mitford castle for the earl of Pembroke in 1316 and went on to be constable of Dunstanburgh twice; for the king between 2 January and 6 July 1323 and then as a private constable in 1326. Another knight of Northumberland his

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4 E101/10/6, m. 4; E101/11/1, mm. 2, 4, 8, 22, *Knights of Edward I*, iv, pp. 122-3; Rickard, *Castle Community*, pp. 70, 187, 366. Interestingly, although still constable of Newcastle castle, in January 1318 he had been serving in the Berwick garrison with twelve esquires, *Knights of Edward I*, iv, p. 122.
ambition and avarice are revealed in the several pardons he received for activities of an extremely dubious nature: he was pardoned on 16 October 1313 for participating in the campaign in which Gaveston had eventually been executed; in 1317 he was accused of receiving ransoms for prisoners that were not his to ransom; he obtained a pardon in 1318 for holding Knaresborough castle against the king and surrendering it to the Scots as well as being suspected of involvement in the robbery of the cardinals by Gilbert de Middleton, an act for which he was styled the 'king's enemy and rebel.' In spite of these less than salubrious activities Lilleburn continued to enjoy important offices which culminated in his appointment as constable of Newcastle, a post which he first relinquished on 30 June 1328, occupied again from 13 August 1328 until 5 December 1330 and then until 8 October 1331 and to which he returned from 29 June 1339 until 6 July 1339.5

A constable Lilleburn would have known well, and who had an equally chequered career, was Roger Maduit. He too was a Northumbrian and received permission to crenellate his manor house there in 1310 however he also held land in Yorkshire. The dark stain on Maduit's career came when he fought against the king at Boroughbridge in 1322, despite having been a knight of the king's household, being tainted in the aftermath as a 'king's enemy and traitor'. He was pardoned with unseemly quickness on 15 April 1322 and extraordinarily by 15 September was appointed as constable of Dunstanburgh castle; within months of fighting against his king Maduit had been entrusted with a key northern castle. His Lancastrian links to the rebel earl's former castle must have been a major influence in this ostensibly unusual decision. Maduit remained as constable until 2 January 1323 and subsequently went on to become constable of Newcastle (14 December 1332–15 June 1334), constable of

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5 Knights of Edward I, iii, pp. 40-1; Rickard, Castle Community, pp. 356, 357, 365, 366, 367. Lilleburn was thus a true survivor, serving the earl of Lancaster, Edward II, Roger Mortimer and Edward III. That his personal interests came well ahead of any loyalty is without doubt.
Prudhoe castle whilst it was in wardship (3 September 1325–11 February 1327) and then royal constable of Wark-on-Tweed until 20 May 1328.  

Former adherents of Lancaster Lilleburn and Maduit have a sinister edge to their loyalty to Edward II and the question of why these men were not permanently removed from holding such an important office as constable is raised. However their actions must be seen in the context of the troubles that beset the war-torn region of northern England after Bannockburn and the local politics within that region. Complaints concerning oppression and draconian purveyance were also levelled against such loyal and dependable men as Horsley and Ridel. It is all too easy to dismiss the constables appointed after Bannockburn as men inferior in status, ability and loyalty to those that had gone before them. Illustrative of the apparent malaise that afflicted these new constables are the actions of the most infamous of them all, Jack le Irish. A valet of the royal household he was appointed constable of Barnard castle when it fell into wardship in August 1315 and his tenure included not only complaints regarding oppression and extortion but the extraordinary kidnapping of Lady Clifford.  

Le Irish was not typical of these constables, especially in not being Northumbrian, but his notoriety has come to represent these men.

The last word on these constables should perhaps go to a man whose career and loyalty was impeccable. Knighted in 1302/3 John Felton served under his father William in the garrison of Linlithgow through 1303 until at least April 1304 and may well have been serving there from the appointment of his father as constable in 1300/1. During 1311/12 he served in the Berwick town garrison. A knight of the king’s

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household he became *custos* of Alnwick castle during Henry Percy’s minority, taking charge on 26 November 1314 and remaining in this office until the castle was handed to Percy in 1318; a short interval in Felton’s command was brought about by his capture by the Scots on 27 November 1317. There must be some doubt as to whether he immediately returned to Alnwick as on 6 December 1317 he was described as constable of Newcastle. In 1318 he was a commissioner to receive the Northumberland rebels into the king’s peace.

Although the Felton family had Northumberland land and connections John was made *custos* of Burgh Manor in Norfolk on 18 July 1318 and he was summoned to the Great Council of 1324 as a knight of Norfolk. More importantly there appears to be a connection between the Felton family and Shropshire and the subsequent career of John suggests this was indeed the case as he was given command of castles in this area. He was constable of Ellesmere castle (8 September 1320–19 June 1321); Redcastle, also in Shropshire, for part of the wardship of James Audley (18 January 1322 until at least 16 February 1322); Hodnet castle in Shropshire (22 January–24 March 1322); he was appointed keeper of the castles of the rebels in Shropshire on 23 December 1322 and on 20 March 1326 was granted for life for his good service the castle of Lethinhales in Herefordshire. In addition to his many offices involving castles Felton was ordered to deliver to the widow of the earl of Lincoln all her castles and lands (1322), stayed in Wales on behalf of the Despensers (1321) and travelled overseas for the king, to Gascony (1318) and Aquitaine (1324), as well as occupying the post of marshal of the army in the build up to the expedition under preparation for the war of St. Sardos in 1324/5.

The greatest testimony to the loyalty and professionalism of Felton is the pardon he received from Queen Isabella and the future Edward III on 4 January 1327
for not surrendering the castle of Caerphilly to them even though he was threatened with forfeiture of life and limbs, lands and goods. The expertise Felton had acquired as a castle constable throughout his career is clearly illustrated in his constableship of Caerphilly in the culminating crisis of the reign of Edward II; not only was Caerphilly one of the most advanced castles of its time it was also where Edward II himself had briefly taken refuge when Isabella and Mortimer were pursuing him.⁹

If le Irish represents the worst side of these constables of northern castles then John Felton portrays the best and indeed is more typical than le Irish. John de Fenwyk, another Northumbrian, who was constable of Bamburgh (on 6 February 1318) and then sheriff of Northumberland and constable of Newcastle (12 October 1319–3 July 1323), had served with John Felton as his esquire in the Berwick garrison in 1311/12 and in 1324 Fenwyk’s wife, Eleanor, was in remainder to William de Felton.¹⁰ It is well to remember that these constables, as knights of Northumberland, had personal and family connections that interlaced their local community and weaved them together as a cohesive force. They were all experienced veterans of the Anglo-Scottish wars – some if not all with garrison service – and after Bannockburn were fighting to protect their own lands. They may represent a break in the pattern of men appointed as constables in comparison to the constables of the first-rate Scottish castles but this should not be taken as meaning they were any less effective.

⁹ Knights of Edward I, ii, p. 8; CDS, iii, app. viii, p. 394; Rickard, Castle Community, pp. 203, 348, 414, 419. A. Ayton, Knights and Warhorses: Military Service and the English Aristocracy under Edward III (Woodbridge, 1999 edition), p. 91 n. 42; P. Somerset Fry, Castles of Britain and Ireland, (Devon, 1996), pp. 300-1. Felton’s removal from the arena of northern England and the Anglo-Scottish wars in order for his expertise to be transferred to the domestic insurrections Edward II was facing is thus very similar to that of Robert Maulay described earlier.

¹⁰ Knights of Edward I, ii, p. 10, CDS, iii, app. viii, p. 394. Fenwyk was also one of the knights amongst the household force sent to reinforce Berwick in the immediate aftermath of Bannockburn in August 1314 as was John de Felton and Ebles de Mountz, E159/101, m. 156.
Records for both garrisons and constables are almost non-existent throughout the bulk of the 1320s and it is not until English forces under Edward III began the occupation of Scotland in the wake of the battles of Dupplin Moor and Halidon Hill in the mid-1330s that evidence – in fact particularly good evidence – becomes available. In 1335 and 1336 garrisons were placed in the slighted ruins of the once formidable castles of Edinburgh, Stirling and Roxburgh. New constables were placed in command but their tenure was to be short-lived; by early 1342 all three castles had again been lost to the Scots. It therefore seems logical to first address the constables of this short period as a group before moving on to look at those throughout the rest of the century.

The first castle to be re-occupied was Edinburgh. On 13 September 1335 Thomas Roscelin was installed as constable. He was not a northern based knight, his lands instead being centred in Norfolk, nor was he only of local importance; Roscelin’s support of the earl of Lancaster against Mortimer had led to his exile in 1328 and he had been maintained by Lancaster whilst on the continent. Roscelin was finally pardoned on 4 December 1329, his estates restored and his return to England recorded in 1330. An opponent of Mortimer, a supporter of Lancaster and consequently of Edward III, there seems little doubt that this loyalty was repaid by his installation as constable. However this was not the only factor in his appointment; a man at least in his forties by this date, Roscelin would have been a veteran of the conflicts of the reign of Edward II - both domestic and external – and thus an experienced soldier. As noted he was well-connected, living in exile with the earl of Lancaster and interestingly Henry Beaumont, the latter the leading force among the Disinherited as well as the true

1 Some preliminary work has already been carried out on these particularly full garrison documents, P.W. Leaver, ‘A long way from Home? English Garrisons in Scotland, 1335-42’ (unpublished University of Hull MA thesis, 2001.)

2 Nicholson has the first date of Roscelin entering the castle as 8 September, Edward III and the Scots, p. 223.
victor of Dupplin Moor and who by the mid-1330s was making his claim to the earldom of Buchan a reality.³

Experienced and well-connected, moving on a national rather than a local stage and without strong northern territorial connections, as a constable Roscelin has more in common with the constables appointed by Edward I than those that appeared after Bannockburn. Yet his term as constable of Edinburgh was to be extremely short-lived; only a month after his appointment, on 13 October, formal letters of appointment for a new constable were made out and a delay of a few weeks meant that it was not until 2 November 1335 that Roscelin actually left Edinburgh.⁴ Whether the appointment had only been intended as a temporary measure is uncertain as Roscelin left because he was required to join an expedition further into Scotland led by Lancaster, Roscelin charged with leading an advance force that was to take and refortify Dunnottar castle; his links to Lancaster and his experience – albeit brief – in securing and refortifying Edinburgh no doubt singling him out for this task. All that can be definitely said is that Roscelin was removed from being constable as his expertise was needed elsewhere and that the refortification of another castle was his primary task suggests this may have been his area of expertise. Dunnottar was to be Roscelin’s last action; he was killed in the engagement.⁵

His replacement as constable is one of the more intriguing figures of this brief period. John Stirling, a Scot, first appears as Edward Balliol’s sheriff of Perth in May 1334 and it was most probably in this capacity that he commanded the Anglo-Scottish force besieging the castle of Loch Leven in the preceding month of March. An adherent of Balliol he was one of six pro-Balliol knights captured by the Scots on 8

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⁵ Wyntoun, vi, pp. 58–62; Scalacronica, p. 101. There is a suggestion that the burning of Aberdeen by Edward III was in retaliation for Roscelin’s death, Leaver, ‘Long way from Home’, p. 43.
September 1334 and held prisoner in Dumbarton until payment of a hefty ransom. It was Stirling's harsh imprisonment and ransom that brought about a subtle but critically important change in his career; on 8 October 1335 Edward III granted him two Northumberland manors as an indemnity for his long captivity and ransom and two days later an indenture was agreed in which Stirling was made sheriff of Edinburgh and constable of Edinburgh castle. The manors – in England not Scotland – and the indenture brought him into the direct service of Edward III rather than serving the latter through Balliol. Rather than a Scot fighting for a Scottish faction Stirling was now in effect a Scot fighting for the English king.

The decision of Edward III to appoint him as sheriff and constable of this key strategic site was obviously based on the unquestionable loyalty Stirling had shown to the Balliol cause and his experience as a commander and an administrator in the siege of Loch Leven and as sheriff of Perth. That he was a Scot may also have helped his appointment rather than hindered it; Edward III may have seen an element of propaganda in appointing a Scot and adherent of Balliol to such an important office, an attempt to avoid the image of an English conquest so as to win over the Scots in the region. Without a doubt Edward III did not believe he was taking a gamble in appointing Stirling and his trust was to be amply rewarded with Stirling proving to be a particularly vigorous and active constable, not only supervising the major rebuilding of the castle but withstanding close siege and executing daring sorties. In fact his aggressiveness as a constable was eventually his undoing; besieged by a Scottish force Stirling led a party of his garrison on a sortie that ended in defeat and his own capture

6 Nicholson, Edward III and the Scots, pp. 169, 225–6, 225 n. 3; Wyntoun, vi, pp. 28–37; Bower, vii, pp. 97–103, p. 214 n. 1, CDS, iii, nos. 1183, 1186. His name in documents is usually spelt the same as the medieval spelling of the town of Stirling, hence Stryvelyn. The evidence suggests Stirling may have had Northumberland, and hence English, connections in the early 1330s in that he appears to have already been married to his first wife, Barnaba Swinburne, by this date.
by William Douglas. His constableship ended upon his capture, the most likely date being 18 March 1338.7

Stirling's term as constable and sheriff of Edinburgh signalled the beginning of an auspicious military career under Edward III. His second term of imprisonment was over quickly and by the summer of 1338 he was serving in the Low Countries alongside Edward III and went on to participate in several more continental campaigns in the 1340s, culminating in the Crécy - Calais campaign of 1346/7 in which, by now a banneret, he was one of the lords listed as being permitted to have his banner displayed. Stirling interspersed these years with Scottish campaigns and he was made sheriff of Northumberland in 1344 and was custodian of the town of Berwick from January 1345 until February 1346.8 This service was rewarded by the continued favour of Edward III which mostly took the form of grants of land, wardships and royal approval of Stirling marrying Northumberland heiresses on two occasions. As with the two manors granted to Stirling in 1334 all of these rewards concerned the north of England and the vast majority centred on Northumberland itself; by the time of his death Stirling not only owned numerous manors in Northumberland but also several properties in Newcastle, a manor in Cumberland, another in Yorkshire and it seems that at some point he had also owned land in Norfolk. It can only be speculation as to why he was given a powerful landed base in Northumberland - if it was his wish so as to be near his native Scotland or if it was the idea of Edward III - but what can be said is that his interests were exclusively northern. Although Stirling served on numerous overseas expeditions he remained a northerner, albeit an adopted one, and it was as a

7 His sortie and capture appear to have occurred on 18 March 1338 as this is the date repeated in documents relating to pay owed to Stirling and his garrison after his release from captivity, see CCR, 1337 – 1339, pp. 454, 563, CCR, 1339 – 1341, pp. 10, 289.
representative of Northumberland that he was called to parliament from 1363 onwards. 9

Indeed a rather unusual aspect of Stirling’s career is the extent to which he was engaged in continental campaigns whilst possessing a northern power-base. In the 1330s and 1340s most northern knights remained in the north to deal with the Scottish threat thereby missing out on the more lucrative French expeditions; ironically Stirling was to miss the one profit-making battle of the Scottish war, Neville’s Cross, as he had just fought at Crécy. After his quick release in 1338 Stirling did not return to Edinburgh nor even to the Scottish war but went overseas almost immediately. By August 1338 his position as constable of Edinburgh had been given to one of the most famous northern knights of the day, Thomas Rokeby. 10

The rise of Rokeby both in prominence and wealth had been facilitated rather uniquely when he had won the reward of £100 a year offered by the young Edward III to the esquire who found the location of the Scots during the ill-fated Weardale campaign of 1327 and he had been knighted on the spot. A Yorkshireman he had links to the Percy family, going overseas with Henry Percy in 1331, and between 8 June and 26 October 1336 he commanded the royal escort in Scotland; on the last date, 26 October, he became constable of Stirling castle. In 1337 Rokeby had his first experience of juggling two important offices when he was also made sheriff of Yorkshire. Perhaps it stood him in good stead for the onerous responsibility and workload that bore down on him in 1338 when he became constable of Edinburgh as well as of Stirling. It is to the credit of Rokeby’s abilities as both a commander and

9 CIPM, xv, nos. 142–6; GEC, v, no. 407–8. On entering into the service of Edward III it appears Stirling was not in possession of any Scottish lands, presumably they had been confiscated by the Scots. He was granted land in Scotland by Edward III in 1336 but these fell to the Scots and in lieu of them he received 200 marks a year from the customs of Newcastle and Hartlepool, see CDS, iii, no s 1209, 1397.
10 Rokeby was in charge by August at the very latest. Upon John Stirling’s untimely capture William de Montagu, besieging Dunbar castle, led a strong force to Edinburgh and installed a new constable with a sufficient garrison; this was undoubtedly a temporary constable, Lanercost, p. 312.
administrator that he maintained both castles through several years of Scottish attacks and sieges, his position as constable of these two critical first-rate Scottish castles unique and quite remarkable. He held both castles until they were eventually lost to the Scots, Edinburgh falling to assault on 16 April 1341 and Rokeby finally surrendering the hard-pressed and closely besieged castle of Stirling on 10 April 1342.\textsuperscript{11} The loss of both castles under his charge did no harm to Rokeby's subsequent career; the circumstances of their loss absolved him from any blame.\textsuperscript{12} Throughout the remaining months of 1342 Rokeby continued to serve in Scotland and on the border bringing with him various groups of soldiers numbering between nineteen and thirty men. In 1343 he was again made sheriff of Yorkshire and remained sheriff for seven years, an office that allowed him to take a leading role in the battle of Neville's Cross in 1346 and which also saw him escort the captured Scottish king, David Bruce, to the Tower in December of that year. He was made a banneret and in 1348 served as escheator for Yorkshire. Rokeby's career then took a sudden shift when in December 1349 he became justiciar of Ireland. He remained as justiciar until his death in 1357 with only a brief interlude from July 1355 until July 1356. This unexpected move to Ireland may well have been in response to the relative quiet of Scotland after Neville's Cross and was directly related to the administrative and military abilities Rokeby had exhibited as sheriff and in particular as constable of two heavily-garrisoned and vitally important castles.\textsuperscript{13}

The final constable of this short period was William de Felton, the son of the William who had provided such sterling service as a castle constable under both Edward I and Edward II. During his Scottish campaign of 1334/35 Edward III used the

\textsuperscript{11} CDS, iii, nos. 936, 1323; DNB, xlix, pp. 152–153.

\textsuperscript{12} See pp. 227–36.

\textsuperscript{13} CDS, iii, nos 1387, 1399, 1400, 1474, 1475, 1512; R. Frame, 'Thomas Rokeby, Sheriff of Yorkshire, the Custodian of David II', \textit{The Battle of Neville's Cross}, eds. M. Prestwich, D. Rollason (Stamford, 1998), pp. 50–6. Frame discusses Rokeby's career in detail.
ruins of Roxburgh castle as his headquarters and when he left on 2 February 1335 Felton took charge as constable as well as leasing the office of sheriff of Roxburgh. He remained as constable during the rebuilding of the castle and throughout years of incessant warfare until the castle was lost to assault on 30 March 1342 whilst Felton himself was absent on business in England. He subsequently represented Northumberland in at least four parliaments and from March 1342 onwards he was escheator and sheriff of Northumberland, still being sheriff in April 1343, and was serving on the border in 1346. The lands of the Felton family had grown by this time – largely due to the profits of their public offices – and William held an extensive number of manors in Northumberland as well as individual manors in Durham, Northamptonshire and Nottinghamshire. With his power firmly based in Northumberland William proved a capable northern constable in the tradition of his family.\textsuperscript{14}

Taking these constables as a specific group the most striking feature is the stability of their term as constable. Excepting Roscelin's very short tenure it can be seen that the constables'hip was seen as an office in which these men would serve for a number of years; Stirling remaining in charge of Edinburgh for two years and five months until his capture, Felton holding Roxburgh for the entire seven years it was in English hands, Rokeby similarly in command of Stirling for the entire five and half years and in charge of Edinburgh for almost three years until its loss to the Scots. Although they were appointed whilst the process of English conquest was still underway this was no \textit{ad hoc} arrangement and that they were to remain in their office for so long demonstrates that the appointment of constables for these important castles had been carefully considered, a measured decision made by Edward III himself.

\textsuperscript{14} Nicholson, \textit{Edward III and the Scots}, pp. 182, 189; \textit{CDS}, iii, nos. 1204, 1240, 1381, 1382, 1408, 1463; \textit{Roskell}, iii, p. 64.
This raises the question of why these individuals were selected; are there any common traits among these constables? The trend of constables possessing northern lands – in being northern knights and lords – which was particularly evident in the years after Bannockburn is also prevalent here, again with the exception of Roscelin. No doubt Felton owed his selection to being a scion of the great northern family of castle constables whose record of service in Wales, Scotland and the north stretched back into the reigns of both Edward I and Edward II. It is reasonable to suppose that he had experienced warfare against the Scots and garrison service due to his family background. Roscelin was also an older and experienced figure however his prominence can be seen as emanating from his opposition to Mortimer and his connections with Lancaster and interestingly perhaps also with Beaumont.

Stirling and Rokeby are altogether different; they were both younger men with less experience of command and their constableships were to be an early step in careers of royal service which would propel both men onto bigger and better things. They shared an aggressiveness that would have appealed to Edward III while another attraction may well have been that neither man was already endowed with wealth or substantial lands. Edward was thus able to reward them with these, to personally be responsible for their rise in status and prominence, not only to strengthen the bonds of loyalty but to emphasise that these determined warriors were his men. This also adds an element of propaganda to their appointment, a factor already described in relation to Stirling being a Scot but even more strikingly evident in Rokeby with respect to his fame originating in the Weardale campaign. The latter had been an acute embarrassment for Edward III and Rokeby’s name would have been synonymous with this; by making Rokeby constable of Stirling – the key to Scotland – there is an
unmistakable sense of Edward III symbolically projecting the message that the infamous Weardale campaign was now avenged.

Edward III therefore made a careful selection of the men whom he wanted to be constable of these ruinous Scottish castles in the early years of his reign, men capable of defending them and overseeing their rebuilding. All of these constables had a military background as was appropriate with the 1330s being a time of incessant warfare with the castles they commanded at the very heart of the conflict. The added element of propaganda cannot be discounted either, although obviously not at the expense of placing the castle in incapable hands. However this stability also indicates a more dangerous development that was to ultimately put these castles in jeopardy. By the late 1330s and early 1340s Edward III had focussed his attention on war against France and had begun to take his eyes off Scotland, an occurrence only too clearly seen in placing Rokeby in the unenviable position of being constable of both Stirling and Edinburgh. It was not to retain stability among the constables of these castles that Rokeby was also given Edinburgh but because it was easier than having to appoint a new constable. It was a matter of convenience and probably cost-cutting; that John Stirling did not return to Edinburgh but went overseas starkly illustrates Edward’s new focus. Although capable men Rokeby and Felton were not able to hold out as they became increasingly isolated and faced impossible odds with no external help forthcoming. Their abilities as constables are evident in the fact that in such a hopeless situation they were prepared and able to hold out for so long.

The shattering defeat of the Scots at Neville’s Cross in 1346 was not followed up by an attempted re-conquest of the entire Scottish kingdom and nothing illustrates this more clearly than the absence of a drive to reoccupy the key castles of Edinburgh and
Stirling even though this time they were still intact. A handful of castles in the Lowlands, such as Lochmaben, came once again into English possession but into private hands; such ownership once more leaving the historian with scant documentation. The only major Scottish castle to be occupied by the English and taken into royal control was Roxburgh and as such it is the sole castle for which a significant proportion of evidence has survived in terms of constables and garrisons. The final part of this study of castle constables consequently becomes a study of the constables of Roxburgh from 1346 until 1403.

The first constable appointed was John Coupland who became keeper of the castle in November 1346. This is the clearest example of symbolism and propaganda having a considerable influence on the choice of constable. Coupland was the hero of Neville’s Cross, a mere valet who captured the Scottish king, David Bruce. The two front teeth Coupland lost in the process were well worth the rewards; the rank of banneret and an annuity of £500 for life with another £100 for remaining with the king with his twenty men-at-arms. The hero of the hour Coupland was installed as constable of Roxburgh within a month of Neville’s Cross; not only was this another reward for Coupland’s capture of the king but his tenure as constable was a symbolic reminder to all of the great success of English arms at Neville’s Cross and also demonstrated what a determined and successful valet could gain serving Edward III in his wars.\footnote{\textit{CFR 1337-1347}, p. 494; \textit{CDS}, iii, no. 1478. Coupland appears to have received his rank and annuity on 20 January 1347 and thus had been constable for at least a month before his rewards were made formal; this confirms that Edward III made him constable primarily for his great service at Neville’s Cross.}

As was the case with Rokeby although propaganda played a significant role in Coupland’s appointment he was also a capable constable. Indeed Coupland’s previous career can be reconstructed in some detail. In 1337 he served with the army on the Scottish campaign and showed his inclination for heroics by saving the earl of
Salisbury from capture at the siege of Dunbar, walking into a trap in place of Salisbury and becoming a prisoner himself. This selfless action appears to have gained the favour of Edward III as Coupland was soon a valet in royal service with an annuity of £20 and as such he served in Flanders under Salisbury in the summer of 1338. He then returned to the north and served in Salisbury’s castle of Wark joining William Felton in defeating a Scottish incursion in 1340. In 1339 reference is made to Coupland’s long and faithful service to the king.16 A valet of the royal household, a veteran of both Scottish and continental warfare, experienced in serving within a border garrison and two notable acts of heroism were the solid foundations upon which his appointment as constable of Roxburgh were based.

Not a family of distinction the Couplands were a minor northern family firmly based in Northumberland. The family seat was the manor of Coupland in Northumberland and as he rose in status and wealth it was to Northumberland that Coupland looked to build up his lands. Already in 1344 he had petitioned for the grant of numerous forfeited lands in Northumberland; in 1347 part of his £500 annuity was coming from lands the king had granted him in York and Lancaster as well as Cumberland and Westmorland. In 1340 Coupland had shown his ruthless desire for land by having his cousin Joan Mautalent disinherited claiming that she was a bastard. This rapacity for land was finally to be Coupland’s undoing; from 1358 onwards, in league with the royal official William de Nessfield, Coupland embarked on a programme of accusing numerous Northumberland landowners of treason during the reign of Edward III in an attempt to have their lands confiscated and seize them.

himself. It was these underhand dealings that led to Coupland's murder on 20 December 1363 whilst serving as constable of Roxburgh.\(^{17}\)

This streak of ruthlessness was reflected in Coupland's aggressiveness as constable, including a particular vendetta against William Douglas. Coupland was especially keen to demonstrate that the town of Roxburgh and region of Tevitodale were loyal to the English. His aggressive reputation went before him and when Berwick town was taken by the Scots in November 1355 it was to Coupland that the English borderers turned for help and advice. His regional standing led to him being sheriff and escheator of Northumberland for at least six and a half years - overlapping with his duties as constable and raising the question as to the extent to which he was actually resident in Roxburgh - and his status is still evident with his arms displayed on two northern castles.\(^{18}\) He also served as custodian of Berwick from 1357 but was removed in June 1362. In fact his term as constable of Roxburgh falls into two periods, 1347 until 1355 and then 1362 until his murder in 1363. Coupland's tenure as constable is remarkable for the frequency with which orders for him to surrender the office were issued.\(^{19}\)

John Coupland had strong credentials that led to his appointment as constable of Roxburgh and his loyalty to Edward III can never be questioned. However his chequered career as constable was down to his ruthless self-seeking ambition, his northern power-base and the relative freedom from Scottish attacks due to the shattering Scottish defeat at Neville's Cross. The dangers of appointing a northern

\(^{17}\) M. Dixon, 'John de Coupland - Hero to Villain', *Neville's Cross*, pp. 36-49; *CDS*, iii, no.s 1344, 1513; *NCH*, xi, pp. 216-218. One of the victims of these false retrospective forfeitures was the former constable of Edinburgh John Stirling, his wife's family, the Swinburnes, being accused of supporting Bruce. The land was only briefly confiscated, *CDS*, iv, nos 2, 4.


\(^{19}\) *CDS*, iii, no. 1669. *Rot. Scot.*, i, pp. 801, 807, 841, 847, 864; for frequent dismissals for just a few examples see *Rot. Scot.*, i, pp. 692, 693, 714, 718, 740.
constable rather than the merits are seen here for the first time. Rather than using his northern lands and connections to ensure the security of Roxburgh Coupland was using his office as constable of Roxburgh to enhance his own power in the north; he was exploiting his position as constable almost exclusively for his own gain in terms of power. The declining interest of Edward III in events in the north and Scotland was the same as in the late 1330s but this time there was no significant Scottish threat to keep constables focussed on their office. It has been remarked as unusual that Coupland, unlike his contemporaries, never built his own castle to express his new social standing; from his treatment of his constableship of Roxburgh it would seem that Coupland believed Roxburgh to be his castle. In effect Coupland was creating his own fiefdom based on possession of Roxburgh and the military force contained within it.

In between his two terms as constable there were two further constables of Roxburgh. For just a year, from 1356 until 1357, the castle was directly overseen by the Percy family with Henry Percy as constable. Richard Tempest was then constable before Coupland regained the office in 1362. As with Coupland and Percy before him Tempest was a northerner albeit the Tempest family lands were concentrated in Yorkshire rather than Northumberland however Tempest was granted the manor of Hetton in Northumberland in 1351. The mainstay of the Tempest landholdings were in the West Riding and Richard had previously held the position of constable of Scarborough castle. The family was an old and established one and was well-connected in the north of England, particularly with the Percy family; it is telling that

20 A. King, ‘War, Politics and Landed Society’, p. 162. This interest in the practicality and reality of power rather than its fineries is also suggested by Coupland being a banneret yet never being knighted, in fact being exempted from knighthood for life in November 1358, possibly a unique situation, cf. King, p. 162. That Coupland may have had some interest in Roxburgh or believed he possessed a claim to land in the area is suggested by Edward III having granted him land in the ville of Ormeston in the county of Roxburgh in the late 1330s, the land being returned to its rightful owner in February 1339, CDS, iii, no. 1304.
Hetton was granted to Richard by Henry Percy in recognition for his good service to the latter and that Tempest was one of the executors of Henry Percy's will. In 1374 Tempest was one of a number of prominent northern gentry present at a feast in the great Percy seat of Alnwick castle and as such witnessed a deed granted by Henry Percy.\(^\text{21}\)

This close connection to the Percy family is the most important feature of Tempest's relatively uneventful term as constable. The second most important feature dates from after his constableship had ended and is an inquiry launched on 28 January 1362 into his conduct whilst constable. He was alleged to have oppressed people 'under colour of his office', taken provisions by force without payment and to have maintained an inadequate garrison which had placed the castle in great danger. There is no record as to the outcome of this inquiry but whatever the result it did not prevent Tempest from becoming keeper of Berwick several months later on 8 June 1362.\(^\text{22}\) As illustrated by the career of Coupland shady activities did not disqualify a man from further appointments and the undertaking of such an inquiry points to some substance in these allegations. Whereas Coupland was exploiting his constableship to carve out his own fiefdom Tempest was exploiting it to line his own pockets. Again the lack of concern from Edward III combined with the absence of any serious Scottish threat led to the constable being tempted to take advantage of his position. That an inquiry was launched at least shows that there was something in place to safeguard such an important castle; abuse of the position of constable may have been easy and tempting in the circumstances but it did not go totally unchecked.

\(^{22}\) *CDS*, iv, nos. 64, 69. John Stirling was one of the four commissioners appointed to undertake this inquiry.
The next constable for whom there is evidence is Alan del Strother who was to be constable for the lengthy term of approximately fourteen years, from at least 1364 until 1377 or 1378. Like the Tempest family the Strothers were an old and established family but unlike the Tempests they were firmly based in Northumberland with their lands based around Kirknewton. Although one of the pre-eminent Northumberland families in the fourteenth century the last decades of the reign saw their position being overtaken by families such as the Feltons. It has been suggested that the rise of these other families was driven by Percy patronage and this in turn raises doubt as to whether Strother had close links to the Percies. Further reservations surface in the Strother family having links with both the earl of March and the relatives and heirs of the earl of Pembroke; Strother himself was a sub-contractor for March’s expedition to Brittany in 1375. He had been a bailiff of Tynedale in 1344 and was so again in 1376/77 and he also served as escheator of Northumberland. In December 1363 Strother was one of the five commissioners appointed to inquire into the murder of John Coupland; this is perhaps not surprising when it is noted that Strother and Coupland were brothers-in-law.23

An old and well-connected Northumberland family with a tradition of military service this was obviously the background upon which the selection of Alan as constable of Roxburgh was based. A competent administrator as with Tempest there is nothing that marks Strother out as an experienced military man or constable that made him particularly suited to such an office. One factor that may have played a part was that Strother was not so closely connected to the Percies as most other Northumberland families although it appears he was not entirely devoid of such connections.

23 Border Societies, pp. 186, 191; CDS, iv, nos. 14, 95, 187, 238.
The increasing dominance of the Percy family in the north of England and particularly in Northumberland during the second half of the century had undoubtedly stretched not only to influencing official appointments in Northumberland but also to the choice of constable of Roxburgh. On four occasions between 1347 and 1403 either the Percy earl of Northumberland or one of his brothers was constable and although there is no direct evidence for it there may have been several times when they were the official 'constable' of the castle and the incumbent their custodian rather than full constable. Six further constables, including Tempest, had very close Percy connections; although most of these men appear to have been constables in their own right their connections make them just the type of men that the Percies would have appointed as their custodians. As noted already Henry Percy had been constable immediately following John Coupland's first term of office, albeit for only one year; Thomas Percy, the earl of Northumberland's brother, was constable after Strother, holding the office from 1377 or 1378 until 1381; the earl of Northumberland himself directly held the constableship in 1384 and again between 1394 and 1396. This theme of Percy influence is the most dominant and repetitive aspect concerning the constables of Roxburgh throughout the latter half of the fourteenth century.

Matthew Redman, constable of Roxburgh between 1381 and 1382, is a further example of the reach of the Percy affinity. The Redman family was firmly based in Westmorland and Matthew had consequently been keeper of the West March in 1380. However he went on to become JP in Northumberland on five occasions, commissioner of array twice as well as holding other civil offices in that county. Redman's offices in Northumberland came directly from his Percy connections. It was the Percy acquisition of the Lucy inheritance in Cumberland that brought Redman into their powerful orbit. Redman's career was thus advanced by this connection and he can
be seen serving amongst those in the Percy retinue in 1384 and most famously playing a leading and heroic role at the battle of Otterburn in 1388. This Percy link is believed to have been established by 1381 when in June of that year Percy refused John of Gaunt entry to castles the former held in his custody; Roxburgh appears to have been one of these and Redman as constable followed Percy’s orders. Clearly Redman’s appointment as constable owed a great deal to this Percy connection.  

Redman himself was another experienced career soldier serving on the border. In the 1370s he had served on campaign, ironically with John of Gaunt, and before becoming keeper of the West March had been defending Berwick castle in 1379 and was keeper of Carlisle castle immediately before his appointment to Roxburgh. In the case of Redman his record of service was split between his native north-west and the north-east; the latter, including his appointment as constable of Roxburgh, directly a result Percy influence. However his appointment was not just based on connections; Redman was experienced having served on campaign, within the castles of Berwick and Carlisle and as keeper of the West March before taking charge of Roxburgh, his subsequent career fighting at Otterburn illustrating his abilities as a commander.

Redman’s successor at Roxburgh shared a number of similarities. Thomas Blenkinsop, constable from 1382 until 1384, was also from a Westmorland family and in 1380 he and his heirs were granted the hereditary constableship of Brough castle in Westmorland. His links with Northumberland came from his marriage around 1369 to Margaret del Strother, daughter of Alan del Strother, the former constable of Roxburgh. This provided only a minor landholding but in 1380 her brother, also Alan, died, leaving two Northumberland manors. Marriage with the Strother family also

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24 Border Societies, pp. 20, 84, 181-2. The order issued by John of Gaunt that Redman’s goods and chattels should be distrained to compensate Archibald Douglas for damage done during the truce has been seen as an attempt by Gaunt to avenge this humiliation, ibid, p. 182.
25 CDS, v, no. 4060.
provided Blenkinsop with links to the Percys with whom he was negotiating for a quantity of wool in 1381 and for whom he was collecting compensation for the infringement of a truce, being one of the royal commissioners charged with this task. Six months after leaving Roxburgh Blenkinsop and Amand Monceux indented to keep Carlisle with fifty men-at-arms and 100 mounted archers. In his own testimony Blenkinsop, as a witness for Lord Scrope, declared that his experience of fighting had been earned on the border since he had taken up arms in 1356 at about the age of twenty; as with many of these northern-based constables Blenkinsop was very much a veteran by the time he became constable. He had been knighted by 1386 but the date can be no more definite; there is the possibility that he was only an esquire when constable of Roxburgh. Having been an MP for Cumberland Blenkinsop was in the process of attending the 1388 Merciless Parliament representing Westmorland when, during a recess, he was captured in the north by the Scots and died in captivity. 26

Once more the same features are repeated; a northern figure, experienced in warfare and, although again in this case without immediate Northumberland connections, these were developed through marriage into a prominent Northumberland family that had a history of service with the Percys.

In February 1385 the first joint constables of Roxburgh took office. One of these two was Richard Tempest, the great-nephew of his namesake who over twenty years before had been removed from Roxburgh for alleged embezzlement. As with his great-uncle this Richard was a Yorkshireman possessing considerable influence in both the North and West Ridings. He began his long military career by fighting against the Scots when he was just fifteen; he served with John, Lord Neville, in an expedition to relieve Bordeaux and was part of the force John of Gaunt led into Scotland in 1383. As

26 *Roskell*, ii, pp. 250 – 251; *CDS*, iv, no. 320.
constable during the Scottish campaign of 1385 Tempest along with his fellow constable undertook to serve on the expedition and once his term at Roxburgh finished in February 1386 he was made keeper of Berwick castle, an office which he held from April 1386 until May 1387, and then served as deputy keeper to the earl of Northumberland from at least 1 December 1390 into the early months of 1395. Tempest remained on the border between 1387 and 1390, his taste for the martial life exemplified by Richard II granting him a special licence to hold a tournament with the Scots in June 1387. In February 1397 he was the deputy of John, earl of Huntingdon, half-brother of Richard II, who had been made warden of the West March.

As a Tempest there were naturally strong links to the Percys and as noted he served as the earl of Northumberland’s deputy of Berwick castle for five years. Indeed Tempest was in receipt of an annuity of twenty marks from the earl and his support of the Lancastrian usurpation in 1399 has been seen as being heavily influenced by his adherence to the Percys. However this was not a blind and total loyalty: in 1403 Tempest not only failed to support the Percy rebellion but served with 72 armed men against the rebels in Wales and must have fought against the Percys at Shrewsbury. He remained a prominent northern figure serving on numerous commissions and holding civil offices, representing Yorkshire in parliament. An able and experienced commander Tempest’s tenure of Roxburgh can be seen as both an appointment of a capable man and a natural step in a career carved out of border warfare. The particularly soldierly essence Tempest was imbued with is neatly captured towards the end of his active career, in 1415, at the age of sixty, he indented to serve Henry V in France with six armed men and eighteen archers in the Agincourt campaign.27

27 Roskell, iv, pp. 573–5.
This flavour of active soldiers in charge of Roxburgh rather than administrators is enhanced by the second man who served as constable alongside Tempest, Thomas Swinburne, a knight who has been described as 'one of the foremost military captains of his day.' Swinburne was to have three terms as constable of Roxburgh; the first alongside Tempest from February 1385 until February 1386, the second as sole keeper between February 1386 and 12 July 1388 and finally as keeper for the earl Marshal from 1389 to approximately 1390. In contrast to the majority of later fourteenth century constables Swinburne's career quickly took him away from the north of England; having been bailiff of the duke of York's lordship of Tynedale before February 1390 he went on in the 1390s to be warden of Guines castle, captain of Calais and keeper of Hammes castle. In the early 1400s he became constable and steward of the lordship of Clare, was the lieutenant of the earl of Northumberland whilst the latter was constable of England, was an envoy to various countries including France and Castile, became sheriff of Essex and Hertfordshire and his illustrious career culminated in his appointment as mayor of Bordeaux (1405-1411) and as captain of the critically important Fronsac castle in 1409 until his death in 1412.28

Undoubtedly Swinburne was a fine soldier and commander, his appointment as constable of Roxburgh coming early in his career and proving an invaluable experience for his later appointments. Indeed particularly striking is the number of castles he was placed in charge of, encompassing some of the most important wartime castles of the day. That Swinburne had a peculiar talent for command of castles is evident in his appointment along with John Pelham in 1409 to make a special survey of Calais and all other castles and forts in the nearby marches. Swinburne's appointment as captain of Fronsac was in response to the petition he made to the

council of its dangerous state; among men of the highest level Swinburne was seen as the man for such a difficult yet important job.

The politics of the reigns of Richard II and Henry IV weigh heavily in Swinburne’s career. Both Swinburne and his father, Robert, had links with Thomas Percy and as with Tempest it was under the earl of Northumberland that Swinburne served in Scotland in 1385. However Swinburne’s term as constable of Roxburgh, intended to last until 1390, was cut short in 1388 when the earl of Northumberland complained that he had not been reimbursed for a breach of the truce by Swinburne; in 1390 his term as bailiff of Tynedale was under investigation. Although his relations with the Percys must have consequently been somewhat shaky Swinburne’s early removal as constable of Clare in July 1403 was surely down to his Percy connections and their rebellion in that year, suggesting that these connections were still alive.

Swinburne also gained the favour of Richard II due to his support of the victims of the Appellants. In 1388 he stood surety for Michael and Edmund de la Pole, brothers of the exiled royal favourite, the earl of Suffolk, and in 1389/90 Swinburne married Elizabeth, the widow of another victim, Thomas Trivet. Elizabeth was a favourite of Richard’s and for this and Swinburne’s support of the Appellants’ victims Richard opened the way for the appointments to Guines, Hammes and Calais. Swinburne was most likely overseas when Richard II lost his crown but Henry IV was happy to use such an experienced soldier when in autumn 1403 he served against the Welsh rebels and then began diplomatic missions from Calais. The willingness of Swinburne to serve overseas and leave the north was due to the fact that although he possessed a Northumberland manor he also possessed one in Essex; the lands of his wife were also largely in the south. Indeed he had little interest in his northern holdings
which included those he acquired from the Felton inheritance, his mother having been a daughter of William Felton (d. 1367).

The circumstances of Swinburne’s second term as commander of Roxburgh are of special interest concerning the politics of 1388 and the Merciless Parliament. Although Swinburne was prematurely removed as constable in 1388 by May 1389 he was back in command, presumably until 1390. However this time he was styled ‘keeper for the earl Marshal’; on 1 June 1388 Thomas Mowbray, earl of Nottingham and earl Marshal, was made warden of the East Marches, captain of Berwick and constable of Roxburgh castle for two years. A leading Appellant this was an attempt by Richard II to win Mowbray back to his cause by giving him public office. The choice of Swinburne as his keeper of Roxburgh is a telling one; he was not only appointed for his immediate experience of this office but because he was associated with the victims of the Appellants and thus royal favour. There may also have been an attempt to placate the Percys in Mowbray’s actions, the latter having taken the office the Percys traditionally held. Alternatively Swinburne may have been forced on Mowbray to ensure he did not politically misuse his constableship of Roxburgh.

As with his co-constable Tempest the constableship of Roxburgh was an early step on a larger military career, an exceptionally illustrious career in Swinburne’s case, becoming mayor of Bordeaux and constable of Fronsac castle. This joint constableship marks the return of a strong martial edge to the office of constable. Swinburne in particular is important in his mainly southern base and his active participation in the divisive politics of the day. With the appointment of Tempest and especially Swinburne there is the sense of a re-invigoration of the office of constable of Roxburgh, pulling it away from the northern backwater it had idled towards in the

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1350s, 1360s and 1370s, a change prompted by a gradual renewal of the war in the 1380s following the death of Edward III in 1377.

The constable of Roxburgh between Swinburne’s departure in 1388 and return in 1389 was Thomas Umfraville. A member of the prominent northern Umfraville family Thomas fits the mould of most of the later constables of Roxburgh. He possessed landed estates in Northumberland, Durham and Yorkshire and had extremely strong Percy connections as his widowed aunt, Maud, had married Henry Percy, first earl of Northumberland, in the 1380s. In the late 1380s Umfraville served on various commissions in Northumberland including a survey of Bamburgh castle and an inquiry into the discipline of the Berwick garrison as well as becoming sheriff of Northumberland (1 December 1388–15 November 1389), an office he held whilst also constable of Roxburgh, subsequently undertaking various diplomatic missions in Scotland. Immediately prior to becoming constable Umfraville had fought alongside the Percys at Otterburn, indeed Otterburn was one of his Northumberland holdings. Although he had been an MP during the Merciless Parliament Umfraville had some sympathy with the victims, standing bail for Robert Clifford (the future bishop of Worcester and London) and for an associate of Clifford’s. A northern, local figure, and on the whole holding civil rather than military office, Umfaville is in stark contrast to Swinburne and is reminiscent of the administrative constables of Roxburgh.30

In the mid-1390s John Stanley served as constable, ‘keeper’, of Roxburgh. There is an element of difficulty in identifying exactly which John Stanley this was with the most likely candidate being a knight of the king’s household who before and after his constableship held offices in Ireland. In 1389 this Stanley received 100 marks a year for life from the king and a further forty in 1397, the latter whilst he may have

30 Roskell, iv, pp. 686-8.
been constable. A justice of Chester prior to the constableship upon leaving Roxburgh
he was Controller of the Household and from December 1399 until July 1401 held the
auspicious position of Lieutenant of Ireland; by 1414 he was the lord of the Isle of
Man. Having been made Steward of the Household of Henry IV he also received the
office of Steward of Macclesfield which his father had held. This reflects his northern
family links; indeed in 1403 he was granted the forfeited lands of his nephew, William
de Stanley, who had participated in the Percy rebellion of that year. Stanley had an
impressive career, his dedicated service to the Crown standing out markedly.31

On 14 January 1399 Stanley concluded an indenture with Robert Umfraville in
which the latter undertook to become the ‘keeper’ of Roxburgh castle, a position
Umfraville no longer held by September 1399. The younger brother of Thomas, the
former constable, Umfraville had the same connection to the Percys and indeed served
as Hotspur’s keeper of Roxburgh. Although not in possession of the large estates his
late brother held the few lands Umfraville did possess were in the north and he closely
supervised the Umfraville heir, Gilbert, the young son of his brother following the
untimely death of Thomas. Umfraville already held Harbottle castle when constable of
Roxburgh and he immediately won the favour of the new king, Henry IV, when he
soundly defeated a Scottish invasion force during Henry’s first parliament in 1400; for
this he was made a knight of the garter. Later in the same year he defeated another
force at Redeswire and by December 1402 was a king’s knight receiving an annuity of
£40.

Serving as sheriff of Northumberland twice (1400–01 and 1404–05)
Umfaville’s Percy connections were evidently not unbreakable and he played no part
in their rebellion; after the battle of Shrewsbury he was given charge of Warkworth

31 It is unusual that his entry in the Complete Peerage fails to include a period as constable of Roxburgh,
the years when he held this office being left merely as a gap, GEC, v, 248–50. As a Stanley the
constable, whatever his precise identity, was very definitely a Lancashire figure of national prominence.
castle where he appointed the former Percy retainer and later famous chronicler John Hardyng as constable. As well as undertaking missions as an envoy into Scotland Umfraville was made chamberlain and receiver of customs at Berwick for life (1404); became a vice-admiral of England plundering along the Forth in 1410; in the same year he led a commission of array and took a force into Scotland plundering and burning the town of Jedburgh; he was appointed constable of Roxburgh for six years in 1411; in 1415, as constable, he defeated a Scottish force and then participated at Harfleur and Agincourt; he fought a Scottish force in 1417 and helped negotiate a seven year truce with the Scots in 1429/30.32

Umfrawille's first term as constable was succeeded by the second joint constableship which was held by Stephen Lescrope and Richard, lord Grey of Codnor. Lescrope's father was Richard, first Baron Scrope of Bolton and chancellor of England; he was still alive whilst Stephen, his third son, was constable, dying in 1403. Father and son were both loyal to Richard II, Stephen one of the few faithful to the end, but he readily accepted Henry IV on his usurpation, Stephen leaving Roxburgh in 1401 to become deputy lieutenant in Ireland where he won a notable victory in 1407 but died of plague the following year. In 1397, under Richard II, Lescrope had been a justice of Munster, Leinster and Uriel; whether this experience in Ireland adequately equipped him for his duties as constable of Roxburgh is unclear although it obviously led to his return to Ireland under Henry IV. Through his father Lescrope had northern connections - a brother, Richard, was the archbishop of York by 1398 - and by his own marriage to a Tiptoft family co-heiress he gained land in Yorkshire near Doncaster and also obtained Castle Combe in Wiltshire.33

33 DNB, xxxiii, pp. 143–4; Roskell, iv, p. 324. Lescrope's widow went on to marry John Fastolf.
Richard, lord Grey, was of a similar family with a history of royal service. He had been summoned to parliament from 1393; in 1395 he had served in Ireland with 50 men and 60 horse and received an annuity of 80 marks for life; following his period as constable of Roxburgh in 1401 he was made admiral of the Fleet from the mouth of the Thames to the north and a Knight of the Garter in about 1404; in 1405 he was keeper of Brecknock castle in Wales and Horston castle in Derbyshire and in the same year was king's chamberlain and joint deputy Constable and Marshal of England; he became constable of Nottingham castle in 1406 and near the end of his life in 1417 was appointed captain of Argentan castle in Normandy. These are merely the main highlights of his high-profile career, one spent in the service of the Crown. His lands and those of his wife were concentrated in the East Midlands, holding lands in Northamptonshire, Derbyshire, Lincolnshire and Leicestershire.

The last constable of the period was Ralph Neville, first earl of Westmorland. In 1402 he was given the traditional Percy office of Captain of Roxburgh castle, a position he continued to hold into 1404. This appointment was entirely political in nature, a conscious attempt to counter-balance the dominant power of the Percys in the north at a time when the latter were increasingly disaffected with Henry IV; in fact Neville’s appointment has been cited as one of Hotspur’s grievances against the Crown. That such a move was considered necessary clearly illustrates the extent to which the constableship of Roxburgh had become associated with the Percys. It is likely that Neville installed a ‘keeper’ to run the castle for him on a day to day basis however there is no remaining reference to such an individual. Neville’s strong northern power-base ensured the security of Roxburgh not only against the Scots but

34 As with Stanley Grey's entry fails to record his term as constable of Roxburgh, GEC, ii, pp. 127-9.
against any hint of sympathy with the Percy rebellion in 1403, however unlikely such a show of sympathy from the garrison might have been.\textsuperscript{35}

In all there were seventeen men who served as constable of Roxburgh castle between 1347 and 1403.\textsuperscript{36} It is telling that from 1347 until 1377 there were only five changes of constableship in 30 years; in contrast thirteen changes took place between 1377 and 1403.\textsuperscript{37} This accurately reflects the general malaise that took hold of the office of constable of Roxburgh for the last thirty years of the life of Edward III, a combination of continental distractions and then old age leading to a disinterest in Scotland. This along with a relatively weak and sporadic Scottish threat meant that the office of constable of Roxburgh became much less of a front-line command in a war zone; it was slipping towards becoming a military backwater. Coupland’s two terms as constable were of eight and then two or three years, Strother was in charge continuously for thirteen years; in the circumstances it is not surprising that some constables exploited their position albeit in different ways.

The accession of Richard II marked a turning point with conflict against Scotland resuming and in response the position of constable of Roxburgh regained its former character of a front-line and active command. This is reflected in the regular changes of constable and the appointment of military minded men such as Matthew Redman and Thomas Swinburne. Changes also took place in response to the political climate of the day, Richard II installing the earl Marshal as warden and constable and in the 1390s moving John Stanley, untainted by Percy connections, into the office, Henry IV similarly appointing strong royal servants in the persons of Stephen Lescrope and Richard, lord Grey.

\textsuperscript{35} DNB, xxxx, pp. 272-7.
\textsuperscript{36} Including each joint constable and counting two terms as constable by the same man as just one
\textsuperscript{37} The five changes between 1347 and 1377 involving only four different constables due to John Coupland’s two separate terms.
The effect of appointing men from outside of Yorkshire and the north-east was intended to limit the burgeoning power of the Percys. There can be no doubt that as well as holding the position of constable of Roxburgh themselves on several occasions they were instrumental in deciding who was appointed and indeed it has been shown that the majority of these constables had strong Percy connections. This in turn illustrates the extent to which the office of constable of Roxburgh had become a post for northern knights, in particular those of Northumberland, an extension to the public offices available for men of the county. This in turn led to many of the constables being related by marriage with brothers, cousins and uncles of constables in turn being constables themselves. It was not necessarily an attractive post to those who were not northerners as Swinburne’s quick readiness to focus elsewhere shows; John of Gaunt and the earl Marshal both found that as wardens of the march without a northern power base they were unable to execute their job effectively.\textsuperscript{38} Even if the government did not wish it to be so, for practical reasons the constable was predominantly northern and this trend continued into the fifteenth century. The type of man appointed constable in the second half of the fourteenth century can therefore be seen to accurately reflect both the state of the war and the domestic politics of England and it was as a result of these, and the number of troops retained permanently within the Roxburgh garrison, that the constableship was increasingly held by men of substantial national standing as the century drew to a close.

\textsuperscript{38} C.f. Tuck, ‘Richard II and the Border Magnates’, \textit{passim}. 
5.

**GARRISON SERVICE**

Whereas constables have not previously been studied as a specific group with regard to their role the majority of those who served in garrisons – the multitude of esquires, men-at-arms, hobelars, mounted archers, crossbowmen and foot-archers – remain largely anonymous with little if any attempt having been made to identify them. The lack of any substantial body of work on military service, as opposed to that of military obligation, of men below knightly status is common for the entire medieval period and has only recently begun to emerge as a subject of serious academic study. In terms of the fourteenth century the research to date has focussed on identifying the men who constituted the military community during the reign of Edward III.¹ The concept of such a community pre-supposes a body of men continually involved in military service over a period of years and this consequently takes on extra importance with regards to garrisoning as it was one of the few permanent or semi-permanent military institutions in which these men could find ready employment. If there was such a community then its members will be found amongst those serving in garrisons.

Identifying the men who served within garrisons takes on an additional significance beyond the importance of the study of the military community itself.² It addresses the question of whether the English garrisons in the Anglo-Scottish wars were made up of a singular group of men who were constantly engaged in garrison service rather than any other form of military service, in effect specialising in this field of service. If this is so then, by the permanent nature of garrisons, these men were to all intents a standing army in the pay of the English Crown. The exercise of attempting

¹ The key work for this period is Ayton, *Knights and Warhorses*, passim.
² As Ayton notes, 'There are few aspects of medieval English history as worthy of investigation, yet as neglected, as military service,' *Knights and Warhorses*, p. 1.
to identify the service of these men is consequently of great importance in developing an understanding of garrisoning in this period. Such a study also reveals the individual careers of these soldiers and the movement and flexibility inherent in garrison service and by implication within the military community as a whole.

However there is a good reason why such prosopographical studies are so scarce even excluding the sheer difficulty and painstaking effort such an exercise entails. The single greatest problem is in finding documents that can illustrate service; one document that identifies individuals serving in a garrison at one single moment in time reveals nothing about the extent of the service of these individuals. To research service it is essential to have more than one document, ideally several, which cover a number of consecutive or near consecutive years and from which duration of service and individual careers can be unravelled. As there is no secondary body of work which contains these names it is to the surviving documents that attention must be turned, in particular accounts for the wages of garrisons, muster rolls and protections granted to individual soldiers. ³

The survival of consecutive documents limits the detailed study of garrison service to two separate periods in the fourteenth century, 1300-1304/5 and 1334-42. The latter is the most comprehensive and straightforward comprising as it does of a near unbroken series of muster rolls for the major fortresses of Roxburgh, Stirling and Edinburgh.⁴ In contrast the earlier series of documents are more miscellaneous in their composition being disparate muster rolls and accounts. These are frequently imprecise in date, on occasion name only certain sections of the garrison and sometimes omit a garrison altogether. However the evidence from these is invaluably pulled together by the existence of three outstanding account books compiled by John de Weston of the

³ For a comprehensive discussion of the benefits and pitfalls of using these sources see ibid, ch. 5.
⁴ In addition there are rolls covering the garrisons of the towns of Berwick and Perth.
wages paid to royal garrisons in Scotland in 1301-2, 1302-3 and 1303-4. Indeed from these it is possible to view garrison service on an almost monthly, and at times weekly, basis which provides a unique and unparalleled insight into these early fourteenth century garrisons. Another important survival is a lengthy muster roll which includes the names of those serving in several garrisons – Berwick town and castle, Roxburgh town and castle, Edinburgh, Linlithgow, Bothwell and Livingston – which dates from 1311-12. By using this roll in conjunction with the earlier documents an attempt at gauging garrison service in a more long-term context can be undertaken, analysing the rolls to determine whether soldiers from the early garrisons were still serving almost a decade later. The only identifying feature is in the name and although there is an inherent shortcoming in this the lack of any other recognisable information means it is the only one that can be used. It is this lack of information which means the most that can be gained is information about parts of the careers of a proportion of the military community. In this case it is fortunately enough to determine patterns of service within garrisons.

The search for the career of an individual can also be extended to service beyond the garrisons, searching for their name among the vadia guerre of expedition forces or armies, in horse inventories and among the retinue rolls of commanders; there is a range of singular documents where a recognisable name might be found but such research is as much a matter of chance as much as anything else. One source that does reveal the names of individuals in military service is the lists of protections granted to men leaving their county or town to take up service. These are particularly

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5 Respectively E101/10/6, E101/11/1 (a particularly fine account book) and E101/12/18. Unfortunately the latter does not continue until the end of the regnal year on 19 November 1304 but ends in the spring and summer with the reductions in garrison personnel which took place at that time. N.B. Due to the large number of entries for each garrison in these account books reference to individual manuscript numbers are only given if they concern a specific detail or individual.
6 Reproduced in depth in CDS, iii, app. vii, pp. 393-412.
7 Ayton, Knights and Warhorses, p. 139.
useful for those serving in garrisons in the later years of the fourteenth century and the number of protections for those serving at Roxburgh in the 1380s and 1390s makes it possible to attempt a preliminary study of garrison service at that time. The protections also reveal, albeit fragmentarily, the careers, or in some cases hint at the careers, of individuals in the second half of the century. Although limited in its scope the evidence for garrison service allows study from three well spaced periods throughout the century.

There is another serious limitation in assessing garrison service apart from the lack of surviving documentary evidence. A glance at the accounts and rolls reveals that although the names of the men-at-arms and hobelars are included those below them in status, the foot-soldiers who made up the bulk of the garrison in the first quarter of the century, the crossbowmen and archers, remain almost totally nameless. It is rare for these infantry soldiers to appear in any form other then their mere numbers. So scarce are their names that it is impossible to find even the few near consecutive lists that are necessary to begin an analysis of garrison service. Where names do exist all that can be done is to interpret them with reference to the garrison in its entirety and, as will be seen, this can still yield important results.

Those whose record of service in garrisons it is possible to trace are therefore the esquires, sergeants, men-at-arms and hobelars; the muster rolls from mid-century also allow the service of mounted archers to be followed. The term man-at-arms encompasses various levels of wealth and status but the majority were of sub-knightly class and in mid-century it has been calculated that over 75% of an army was comprised of soldiers classed as men-at-arms; it was these men who have accurately been described as the experienced and reliable backbone of English royal armies and
garrisons. Esquires (scutiferri) were of an equivalent status as a man-at-arms (soldarius) as were the sergeants-at-arms of the royal household but as the accounts and rolls class men in these set ranks so this chapter will retain these classifications where necessary. However even among men of this status there are occasions when some of these also remain nameless. This problem arises from the component groups of men-at-arms that comprised a garrison. It is almost impossible to find the names of those who served for lands in Scotland, whether the lands were their own or those of their lord. In the case of the latter only the name of their lord is given followed by the number of men he was obliged to provide. This was routine procedure as it was with those serving in the retinue of the constable himself or that of a knight of the garrison; again these men appear as mere numbers after the name of their lord. As will be seen having these names, especially those serving with the constable, can be particularly revealing. Whilst these two groups remain either hidden or at best fitfully revealed it is still the men-at-arms of the garrisons for which there is the greatest evidence of their record of service.

These then are the parameters within which this study of garrison service is constrained; a limited body of men confined to those of a role and status above that of the foot-soldier and restricted to two main periods in which their service can be viewed over a number of consecutive years together with a later period in which several isolated careers can be picked out. By working within these limitations and using these separate periods as case studies it is possible to determine the patterns of English garrison service in the Anglo-Scottish wars.

8 Ayton, Knights and Warhorses, p. 5.
9 A good example of this is Linlithgow in late 1301 when fifteen unnamed men-at-arms were with the constable, another ten unnamed with a knight (in this case the sheriff) and a further unnamed nineteen who were supplied by knights who owed their service for lands in Scotland; a total of forty-four men-at-arms remaining nameless in this one document, E101/9/16, m. 1.
The earliest comparable documents from which service can be determined concern the garrison of Edinburgh. The first is a list of the garrison, excluding foot-soldiers, dating from between 27 November 1300 and Pentecost 1301 which names fifteen men-at-arms who were serving in the garrison whilst eleven esquires of John Kingston and three esquires of Ebles de Mountz remain nameless. Unfortunately the dating of the second document, a roll of garrisons in Scotland, is only listed as belonging to the 29th year (20 November 1300-20 November 1301) but the inclusion of Kirkintilloch in this roll firmly dates it to the autumn of 1301. This provides the names of twelve men-at-arms and two sergeants serving in Edinburgh as well as ten nameless men-at-arms with Kingston, one unnamed knight (obviously Ebles de Mountz) and another seventeen men-at-arms who were serving for lands their lords held in Scotland and consequently remain unidentified. It is likely that those serving in Kingston’s retinue remained constant between the two periods in question despite a reduction by one. However it is to the named men-at-arms, the soldarii, that attention must be turned and this reveals the startling fact that of the original fifteen there is only one, Philip de Northbury, who is still present amongst the twelve soldarii in autumn 1301. In the space of several months, at most under a year, fourteen men-at-arms had left the garrison and eleven different men had taken their place. There was no change in constable over this period and Mountz remained as deputy. This striking turnover in garrison soldiers is however

10 E101/68/1/11.
11 E101/9/16. Kirkintilloch was taken by the English in summer 1301, Watson, Under the Hammer, p. 143.
misrepresentative and indeed is outstanding in being the only surviving example in which such a wholesale change occurs in such a short period of time.\textsuperscript{12}

In fact it is the continuity among the men serving in the garrison which is the most remarkable feature that the ensuing documents for Edinburgh reveal. The next document is a list of garrisons that dates from approximately September 1302 and the twelve soldarii listed as serving then and the two sergeants are exactly the same as those who were in the garrison a year earlier in autumn 1301.\textsuperscript{13} Two months later, in November 1302, these twelve men were still the same although between 12 February 1302 and 1 September 1302 four men, Hugo de Abercorn, Robert Walingford and Hugo and Godfrey de la Mare, disappear from the account only to reappear in September. A Peter de Spalding enters into the garrison accounts during their absence but himself disappears on their return as does Robert de Derby, the latter interestingly a member of the garrison from the earliest roll along with Northbury.\textsuperscript{14} Here are revealed the first signs of movement within a garrison. The detailed account books depict the changes that took place to the garrison as 1303 progressed yet in November of that year six of the twelve were still in the garrison and two others, Stephen de Walton and the sole survivor from the earliest roll, Philip de Northbury, had only left it on 29 September 1303 and 28 August 1303 respectively.\textsuperscript{15} The latest firm date which names the garrison covers the period 9 December 1303 until 20 August 1304 and among the eleven men-at-arms named there remain four from the garrison of autumn 1301, namely Alan de Walingford, Robert de Walingford, Roger de Sutton and Walter

\textsuperscript{12} Subsequent rolls and accounts reveal that at least eight of these original fifteen remained in garrison service, a fact which illustrates the pattern of movement and continuity within garrison service although failing to exhibit the trait of continuity within one particular garrison. That a significant change in garrison personnel had taken place in Edinburgh during early 1300 can be seen in a return of February which refers to fourteen archers of the old garrison and 46 archers of the new garrison, \textit{CDS}, ii, no. 1132.

\textsuperscript{13} E101/10/5, m. 1.

\textsuperscript{14} E101/10/6.

\textsuperscript{15} E101/11/1.
de Eynhou. Another veteran of the garrison in August 1304 was Robert de Derby who
had served intermittently in Edinburgh from before autumn 1301, possibly as early as
late 1300.  

It is clear that there is a definite consistency of service within the Edinburgh
garrison between autumn 1301 and the last extant date of August 1304. The twelve
men-at-arms who entered in 1301 remained an almost constant core of the garrison
throughout the entirety of 1302 and into the summer of 1303. In November 1303 half
of their number still remained within the garrison and four continued service into at
least August 1304. The two sergeants, George de Saunford and Benedict de Fletwik,
also remained a constant presence until December 1303. Around this core of long-term
service movement did take place with men both entering and leaving the garrison but
these too served within the garrison for a length of time that measured in months or
even years. The twelve who formed the long-term core of the garrison served for at
least two years whilst some remained for at least three and possibly even more. This
consistency in personnel and their duration of service within the same garrison are the
salient features an analysis of these documents reveals.

This consistency and length of service is paralleled throughout all garrisons.
Kirkintilloch provides one of the clearest examples of this continuity within garrison
service. The first list of its garrison occurs in autumn 1301 after its capture in the
preceding summer and contains the names of twenty-one men-at-arms.  

These remain
almost remarkably constant and in the last available account for the garrison that ends
on 28 April 1304 there remains in Kirkintilloch eleven men-at-arms of the original
garrison who had thus served within it for approximately two and a half years, the

16 E101/12/18.
17 E101/9/16, m. 1. Although three of these appear to be hobelars and two are specified as being part of
Sutton’s retinue.
18 E101/12/18.
whole period for which it had been an English possession. In Roxburgh, between the first and last dates available, November 1301 to August 1304, of the twenty-seven men-at-arms originally recorded there were six who served there for the entire duration which amounted to nearly three years of service in the same garrison. Another three men-at-arms had served until December 1303, a period of just over two years.\(^{19}\)

Linlithgow is an unusual example in that only a handful of men-at-arms are named and these were serving for their lands in Scotland. Of the few names identifiable in autumn 1301 two, Philip de Morteyn and Patrick le Sauser, remained until April 1304 as did Ralph de Benton who was present in September 1302 and almost certainly in the faded roll for autumn 1301. Much more telling is the continuity of service among the abnormally large number of sergeants serving in the Linlithgow garrison. The faded roll names sixteen sergeants in 1301 but only the names of four of these are legible. However the following roll for September 1302 also contains sixteen names which include the four legible names from 1301 and it must be presumed that the sixteen were the same in both instances. If so then these sixteen remained constant between autumn 1301 and September 1302 and subsequently up until 25 December 1302. Eight of these remained in the garrison until November 1303, by March 1304 this had been reduced to six and in late 1304/05 two were still present.\(^{20}\) These men left the garrison as its numbers were cut rather than due to changes within its personnel.

In each castle between the years of 1301 and 1304/5 it is clear that the garrison retained a solid core of men-at-arms which remained in that particular garrison for a length of time measuring several months at the minimum and averaging at over two years. It was not uncommon for men to serve in a garrison continuously for three or four years and the upper limit of this duration is dictated by the availability of

\(^{19}\) E101/10/6, E101/12/18.

\(^{20}\) E101/9/16, m. 1; E101/10/5, m. 2; E101/11/1; E101/12/18; E101/12/38.
documents; the evidence suggests continuous periods of service would have lasted longer than four years and underpins the fact that garrison service was largely undertaken by a recognisable group of men-at-arms whose service was long-term and could include a particular attachment to a specific garrison.

Whether this remarkable pattern of continuity was also true for the foot of the garrisons is impossible to gauge due to the absence of information from a range of garrisons as is available for analysing men-at-arms. Indeed there is only one instance when it is possible to compare the foot of a garrison and this arises with the rolls for Kirkintilloch in autumn 1301 and September 1302 when the crossbowmen and archers of the garrison are named on both occasions. The level of continuity is exact; not only are the nineteen crossbowmen and nineteen archers the same on each occasion but the order in which their names have been written down is exactly the same.\(^{21}\) In a period of one year there was no change at all among the foot of the garrison. That this equates to the same level of remarkable continuity exhibited by men-at-arms in this period is evident in that the same two rolls have the names of the nineteen men-at-arms in Kirkintilloch and the twenty in Carstairs recorded in exactly the same order for 1301 and 1302.\(^{22}\) Such precise levels of continuity begin to raise the suspicion that these rolls are not entirely reliable, that the identical order of names may be the result of a clerk copying down the earlier roll in an attempt to save time and effort.\(^{23}\) Any suspicion is dispelled by the accounts for the men-at-arms in Kirkintilloch in November 1302. Again the nineteen names are written in the same order but now with an important difference; two of the names included in the previous rolls are absent and in the exact place each name occupied in the list two new names have been written.\(^{24}\)

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\(^{21}\) E101/9/16, m. 1; E101/10/5, m. 2.
\(^{22}\) E101/9/16; E101/10/5, mm. 1-2.
\(^{23}\) For such practice of 'neat' accounting by clerks see Ayton, *Knights and Warhorses*, pp. 148-154.
\(^{24}\) E101/11/1, m. 3.
The noting of this change in personnel demonstrates that this account has been updated and is no mere clerk's copy. As it dates from only two months after the September roll it in turn proves that this was not a copy and consequently that the exact continuity in Kirkintilloch and Carstairs is correct. That the continuity of the men-at-arms in Kirkintilloch was matched by that of the foot indicates that long-term and continuous service in one garrison was a feature that could encompass all soldiers who served in garrisons.\textsuperscript{25}

Having established that there was a particularly strong element of continuity with men serving in the same garrison for a number of years it is now necessary to concentrate on the movement of men into, out of and around this core. An aspect of this has already been touched upon with regard to Edinburgh where four men-at-arms disappear from the garrison accounts only to reappear several months later. Hugo de Abercorn, Robert de Walingford and Hugo and Godfrey de la Mare have all disappeared by 12 February 1302 but all return to the garrison on 1 September 1302 and all remain at least until December 1302.\textsuperscript{26} There are numerous individual cases in which a man-at-arms briefly leaves and then returns to the same garrison. Peter de Spalding, after entering the Edinburgh garrison on or before 12 February 1302, served until 31 August and then left, his name returning to the accounts when he re-entered on 25 December 1302 and he proceeded to remain until he left again on 9 December 1303.\textsuperscript{27} Exactly where these men went to during their absence is impossible to tell but what it does demonstrate is that their attachment both to garrisoning and to a particular garrison persisted even during an absence of several months, an attachment that saw

\textsuperscript{25} That some foot-soldiers might well have been long-standing garrison troops is tantalisingly hinted at in 1298 when the constable of Edinburgh, John Kingston, referred to crossbowmen serving in Edinburgh who had previously been in the garrison at Bourg and Blaye, Stevenson, ii, p. 301.
\textsuperscript{26} E101/10/5, m. 1; E101/10/6, m. 5; E101/11/1.
\textsuperscript{27} E101/10/6, mm. 2, 4; E101/11/1, m. 9; E101/12/18.
their eventual return. The arrival of Robert de Derby back in Edinburgh after over a year away from the garrison reinforces this point.

However the most important aspect these exits and returns highlight is the attachment of these men-at-arms to garrison service itself rather than to a specific castle. Although they left Edinburgh they did not necessarily leave garrison service: as the evidence will show the most likely destination to which these men went was another garrison. Continuity in garrison service is not restricted to men remaining in the same garrison but to them remaining within garrisons. Before attempting to determine any such patterns of movement it is logical to first address the factors which led to changes taking place within a garrison.

The account for Kirkintilloch mentioned above in which the names of two men-at-arms, Henry de Inge and Adam de Sutton, are missing and their exact position in the list taken by two new names, Robert Jolif and Robert de Driburgh, leads to the inescapable conclusion that this is a case where replacements have been brought into the garrison. This is one of the main reasons for the alteration of personnel within garrisons with soldiers both leaving and entering in the same process, replacements immediately instated into the garrison to keep up the number of men the garrison was required to contain. Exceptionally neat and precise account keeping allow Jolif and Driburgh to be confidently picked out as replacements but some accounts are more explicit on this issue. The account book for 1303 describes on several occasions the newcomers as entering loco, 'in place of,' a previously serving soldier within the garrison. On 1 September Thomas de Yinele entered loco of William de Walesby who had departed six days earlier on 26 August; on 24 June Henry le Bataille, a hobelar, entered loco another hobelar, Cadmer de Hibernia, who had left the previous day; four

28 E101/10/5, m. 2; E101/11/1, m. 3.
men-at-arms entered in June *loco* another four who were no longer in the garrison.\textsuperscript{29} These replacements normally enter the accounts the very day after the previous incumbent has departed or at the most within a handful of days. This indicates a well organised system of garrisoning in which the dates on which soldiers were due to leave were known in advance and their replacements lined up in readiness; alternatively it could suggest well organised accounting practices to ensure the maximum amount for was paid out for wages.

As with those who left and then returned to a garrison the reasons why men departed from garrisons are rarely stated. The majority would have moved to continue in military service elsewhere but some would have left to return home, to leave military service or due to ill-health or old age; the departure of others would have occurred in a more final way in that they had died whilst in garrison service. Most men who left Kirkintilloch are described as *recesserunt*, 'having left,' the garrison, a vague term that reveals nothing about their reasons for leaving or their destination but which does illustrate they were moving on and that some kind of system of movement was in operation. Kirkintilloch also provides the only evidence for this early period of the replacement of men-at-arms who had been killed in garrison service. On 24 June 1303 four men-at-arms entered the garrison, their arrival being in place of, *loco*, 'those who had been killed above.' There is no record in the accounts of any men-at-arms being killed. However only one group of four men-at-arms left the garrison and their last date of service was 23 June, the very day before the replacements entered. In contrast to others who left the garrison these four are not termed as having left, *recesserunt*, instead the 23 June is referred to as being their last inside, *finiti infra*, the garrison. It is clear that these four men – William Wisse, Meredith Wales, Richard le Vaus and

\textsuperscript{29} E101/11/1, m. 22.
Simon de Kingslond – had been killed whilst in garrison service.\textsuperscript{30} The names of replacements appearing the next day raises questions concerning how it was possible to immediately replace such a sudden and unexpected loss. It is likely that accounting practices were responsible for this neat and seamless dating to ensure full payment of wages.\textsuperscript{31}

The arrival of reinforcements was another regular feature that altered the personnel of a garrison as well as increasing it in size. On 25 December 1302 five men-at-arms, including Peter de Spalding and Robert de Derby, entered the Edinburgh garrison. The names of these five are written together in the accounts and are visibly distinguishable from the men-at-arms already serving there. While the period of accounting for the latter begins on 26 December that for the five men-at-arms starts on 25 December. These facts identify these men as new arrivals and that they were reinforcements is revealed in the statement included in the accounts that they were there by order, \textit{per preceptum}, of John de Segrave. In the following accounting periods these men are included with the rest of the men-at-arms in the garrison illustrating that their addition to the garrison was not a temporary measure. It was also by order of John de Segrave that the first hobelars, seven of them in total, entered the Edinburgh garrison, their arrival also taking place on 25 December.\textsuperscript{32} A reinforcement of seven men-at-arms entered Roxburgh town on 18 February 1303 and another two arrived on 17 March; in both cases they were originally entered separately in the accounts and the date on which they entered is specified as the first on which they began receiving

\textsuperscript{30} E101/11/1, m. 22.
\textsuperscript{31} The clerk may well have left the dead men in the accounts until their replacements entered the garrison thus ensuring an immediate replacement in the accounts and avoiding the inclusion of an awkward number of days without payment that would create greater work when balancing the accounts.
\textsuperscript{32} E101/11/1, mm. 9, 18.
wages. Two additional hobelars entered service in Roxburgh town on 18 February and a further lone reinforcement on 17 March.\textsuperscript{33}

A further factor which altered the personnel within a garrison occurred when the constable or a knight of the garrison either entered or left its service with the subsequent effect this had on their personal retinue. Again Kirkintilloch provides an example of this when one of the three knights in the garrison, John Gymming, departed from Kirkintilloch taking his two men-at-arms with him. Three men-at-arms entered in place of them, in this case a man-at-arms replacing a knight.\textsuperscript{34} The most revealing occasion concerning alterations among the personal retinues within a garrison occur during the brief replacement of John Kingston as constable of Edinburgh by his deputy Ebles de Mountz, Kingston leaving and Mountz taking charge in March 1303 and Kingston returning and retaking the constableship in February 1304. Mountz had served in the garrison since at least 1300 and had once had three esquires with him. Immediately prior to becoming constable there was one esquire serving in his retinue and upon his appointment on 1 March 1303 a second esquire entered into his retinue. On 1 May, two months after Mountz’s appointment, Eustace Danesi, his valet, began to receive payment and another valet, Richard de Lisle, was paid from 13 May. Also on 1 May William le Skirmisher became part of Mountz’s retinue; up until then he had been a man-at-arms in the garrison first entering as one of the five reinforcements on 25 December 1302. From 17 May these three and an Edmund Walraunt are stated as being Mountz’s valets and from 30 September another valet, Richard Walraunt, joined

\textsuperscript{33} E101/11/1, m. 17.
\textsuperscript{34} E101/11/1, m. 22. Intriguingly these three replacements were William Wisse, Richard le Vaus and Simon de Kingselond, all who would meet their deaths just over six months later as three of the four men from Kirkintilloch that were killed. It is peculiar that they entered the garrison together and were all killed at approximately the same time. It is also unusual that only one man-at-arms replaced a knight, to keep the total of wages the same it was more normal for two men-at-arms to enter thus the 2s. wage of the knight being split equally.
their number, entering the garrison in place of Stephen de Walton, a man-at-arms who had served in Edinburgh since autumn 1301.\textsuperscript{35}

The appointment of Mountz as constable led to new personnel entering the garrison as part of his personal retinue. Two features in particular stand out; the incorporation of an existing man-at-arms of the garrison, Skirmisher, into Mountz's own personal retinue and the replacement of a man-at-arms with a valet who also entered his personal retinue. The appropriation of Skirmisher may have been due to a connection with Mountz as they had been serving together in Edinburgh since late December and the arrival of Richard Walraunt also hints at a personal connection with Edmund Walraunt already having been brought in as a valet and Richard having served there with Mountz in 1300/1. Mountz had been serving in the garrison for a number of years yet his elevation led to the creation of a retinue consisting of five valets four of whom were not previously recorded as being among the garrison.

The temporary change of constable at Edinburgh also illustrates that the personal retinue of a constable or knight of a garrison went with him wherever service led, a fact already demonstrated by Gymming's two men-at-arms leaving Kirkintilloch when he departed. On the first day of his constableship Mountz admitted into the garrison seven men-at-arms who belonged to the retinue of John Kingston.\textsuperscript{36} The names of these men do not previously appear in the garrison accounts however it is evident that they had been serving in the garrison being among the twelve unnamed esquires of Kingston's retinue. Their 'admittance' by Mountz was therefore only a matter of form and etiquette with regard to the retinue of another lord; in reality these seven men never actually left the garrison but remained in it continuously. That Kingston left just over half his retinue behind demonstrates that his absence was only

\textsuperscript{35} E101/11/1, mm. 19-20.
\textsuperscript{36} E101/11/1, m. 19.
ever envisioned as a temporary measure. Despite this his prolonged absence still led to the departure of five esquires from the garrison for almost a year. On his return in 1304 Kingston took charge of Edinburgh with eight unnamed esquires in his retinue; it is likely these would include the five who had previously left Edinburgh with him. The seven he left behind remain classed among the men-at-arms rather than rejoining his retinue. On Kingston’s return in February Mountz left to take up the sheriffdom of Peebles and he took with him the five valets he had added to his retinue whilst constable.³⁷

A change within a garrison of the constable or even a knight could result in men both entering and leaving the garrison. Although the example described above is the best remaining documented case for this period it deals with a temporary change, albeit of nearly a years duration, and with a new constable who had already been a member of the garrison for a number of years. That alterations took place within such a limited scope provides an insight into the extent of the alterations that could happen when a completely new constable took charge of a garrison. The formal ‘admittance’ of men into a garrison when in reality they were already serving there as unnamed esquires within a personal retinue raises the possibility that men who appear to enter a garrison may already be there and alternatively that those who suddenly disappear from the accounts and rolls could have entered into an unnamed retinue. This is only a possibility when there is no supporting evidence such as when first in receipt of wages or having specifically left, recesserunt, the garrison. It adds another consideration to the whereabouts of men like Peter de Spalding with his peculiarly fitful presence in Edinburgh during 1302.

³⁷E101/12/18.
Perhaps the most obvious means by which personnel changed was when the numbers of men serving in a garrison were reduced. The account book for 1304 contains many examples of this, a wholesale cut-back in garrison numbers that had started in late 1303 continuing into 1304 to such an extent that the accounts for that year finish at various dates during the spring and summer.\textsuperscript{38} Linlithgow perfectly illustrates these reductions. From September 1302 until June 1303 the number of sergeants consistently totalled between sixteen and seventeen, it then declined to seven, to six by late November 1303 and eventually to just two in March 1304.\textsuperscript{39} In such a case as this there is little if any actual change among the personnel with reductions removing men from the original sixteen and seventeen until only two of them remained. Reductions do not alter the personnel of a garrison so much as they cut down its number thereby reducing the original garrison.

Garrison service within a particular castle therefore encompassed an element of fluidity but was firmly underpinned by a foundation of long-term service. Within each garrison there was a solid core of men-at-arms who had served together for a period of up to three or more years. Movement took place around this core; replacements and reinforcements entered the garrison, others departed, a new constable or knight brought in new faces among his retinue or, if leaving, would take familiar faces with them, while numbers could also be cut and men subsequently left with no option but to leave. To understand the pattern of garrison service it is important to recognise that although it was stable it was not static; although there was long-term service men were not inextricably attached to a particular garrison.

This is immediately evident when attention is turned away from the narrow focus of service within a single garrison and opened out to a study encompassing all

\textsuperscript{38} C.f. E101/12/18.  
\textsuperscript{39} E101/11/1; E101/12/18.
the major garrisons. As has already been observed continuity in garrison service is not exclusively limited to service within a particular garrison but expands to cover service in any garrison. The very phrase 'military community' expresses the strong element of interchange necessary to create such a community, the idea that the men who comprised it moved around in the same military world rather than remaining separate and static. Examples of movement among those serving in garrisons have already been shown; the question is the extent to which this happened and whether it was a regular feature of garrison service.

The only method by which this can be determined is to undertake a detailed study of the accounts and rolls and look for the recurrence of names of men-at-arms appearing in a different garrison to that which they were previously recorded in. Although this is a time-consuming business it does not take an excessively long time to compile numerous examples of men-at-arms who moved between garrisons. One of the first is Thomas de Ramesey, a member of the Edinburgh garrison from its earliest roll, who had served there at least until Pentecost 1301 and who had entered into the newly created garrison of Kirkintilloch by the autumn of that year.\(^{40}\) John Unthank served in Carstairs from autumn 1301 until at least Pentecost 1302 and subsequently appears as one of four reinforcements sent to Kirkintilloch on 24 June 1303, a garrison where he was still serving in April 1304.\(^{41}\) In autumn 1301 Walter Chilton had recently entered the Edinburgh garrison where he served until 25 December 1302; on that very same date he makes his first appearance in Roxburgh where he was still present a year later in December 1303.\(^{42}\) The man-at-arms who can be attributed with the greatest movement in these years is Adam de Sutton: he served in Kirkintilloch in autumn 1301; Jedburgh from 20 November 1301 until 11 February 1302; in Bothwell between

\(^{40}\) E101/68/1/11; E101/9/16, m. 1.
\(^{41}\) E101/9/16, m. 2; E101/68/1/25/D; E101/11/1, m. 22, E101/12/18.
\(^{42}\) E101/9/16, m. 1; E101/11/1, m. 8; E101/12/18.
12 February and 10 June 1302; by September 1302 he was back in Kirkintilloch, although he appears to have been elsewhere between November 1302 and 1 February 1303 but then returns, and was still serving in the garrison on the last available date of 28 April 1304.\textsuperscript{43}

As well as individuals moving between garrisons a detailed analysis reveals several men-at-arms moving simultaneously. Particularly instructive are those who moved to Bothwell from a number of garrisons in early 1302. Bothwell had fallen to the English by 22 September 1301 having already been granted in anticipation to Aymer de Valence in the preceding August.\textsuperscript{44} As such it was a castle in private hands that was to be garrisoned by its owner and consequently would not feature in official rolls and accounts. Yet there is one entry for Bothwell in Weston’s account book, an entry that covers the dates 12 February until 10 June 1302, and in which the names of twelve men-at-arms are given.\textsuperscript{45} Five of these men are especially interesting. John de Ascheburne was serving in Kirkintilloch in autumn 1301, he then made the move to Bothwell in February and was back in Kirkintilloch by September 1302 where he was still serving in April 1304.\textsuperscript{46} Three of these five came from the Jedburgh garrison. Adam Chettelkinde served in Jedburgh between 20 November 1301 and 11 February 1302 as did William Menaunt and the highly mobile man-at-arms Adam de Sutton; on the very next day, 12 February, they began service in Bothwell where they remained until June. Chettelkinde was back in Jedburgh by at least May 1303, Menaunt was in Berwick by December 1302 where he was still serving in May 1303 and as already mentioned Sutton was in Kirkintilloch by September 1302.\textsuperscript{47} The fifth man was John

\textsuperscript{43} E101/9/16, m. 1; E101/10/6, mm. 1, 3; E101/10/5, m. 2; E101/11/1; E101/12/18.
\textsuperscript{44} Watson, \textit{Under the Hammer}, p. 121.
\textsuperscript{45} E101/10/6, m. 3.
\textsuperscript{46} E101/9/16, m. 1; E101/10/6, m. 3; E101/10/5, m. 2; E101/11/1; E101/12/18.
\textsuperscript{47} E101/10/6, mm. 1, 3; E101/10/5, m. 2; E101/11/1, mm. 2, 7, 21. An extreme scarcity of records for the names of the Jedburgh garrison hinder any further analysis concerning that garrison.
de Herle who also served in Bothwell between February and June and who in June 1303 was settled in Linlithgow as one of William Felton's personal retinue. It is likely that Herle originally came to Bothwell from Linlithgow as Felton's personal retinue was reduced from fifteen to eleven at that time.\textsuperscript{48}

Therefore five of the twelve men brought into Bothwell in June 1302 can definitely be placed as having been serving in other garrisons immediately prior to this move. Having served in Bothwell they then returned to either their former or another garrison. The reason for the inclusion of these men among the accounts is revealed in an indenture of 12 February 1302 in which it was agreed that Valence was to retain seventeen of his own men-at-arms in Bothwell while the king would provide another thirteen whose wages he would pay at 8d. a day.\textsuperscript{49} The twelve men named in Weston's account were those the king was supplying and paying; it is unclear why there is not a thirteenth name. To provide these men they were stripped from other garrisons. The number of men-at-arms in Jedburgh was reduced from nine to five in February 1302 and of this reduction three of the four removed from Jedburgh entered into Bothwell.\textsuperscript{50}

This was not a reckless shuffling of numbers as a truce, the Treaty of Asnières, was in existence from 26 January 1302 and lasted until November 1302.\textsuperscript{51} The subsequent movements of these men illustrates that they had departed from Bothwell by at least autumn 1302 and consequently that their stay in Bothwell was a temporary measure enacted during the truce to help consolidate the occupation of that castle. It is almost certain that all twelve of the men-at-arms who entered Bothwell had previously been serving in garrisons and continued to do so afterwards; a likelihood reinforced by the fact that another of these twelve, Adam de Doxford, was, like Menaunt, in Berwick by

\textsuperscript{48} E101/10/6, m. 3; E101/11/1, m. 25; E101/10/5, m. 2.
\textsuperscript{49} CDS, ii, no. 1286.
\textsuperscript{50} E101/10/6, mm. 1, 3; CDS, ii, no. 1286.
\textsuperscript{51} Watson, Under the Hammer, p. 138. It was also during the temporary security of this truce that wages were reduced and building works undertaken.
December 1302. These activities categorically prove a pattern of movement from garrison to garrison and one that was centrally controlled.

Carstairs was also taken during the summer of 1301 and as with Bothwell movement into and out of this garrison can be traced in the records. The first entry for the garrison, dating from autumn 1301, names twenty men-at-arms two of whom were Hugo de Langeton and Robert Belton; both of these men had previously been serving in the Edinburgh garrison before Pentecost 1301, members of the earliest list for that garrison. This goes a long way to explaining the near total change in the personnel of Edinburgh during 1301 by showing that two of these men had been moved to the new garrison of Carstairs and suggests that the rest of the Edinburgh garrison was likewise dispersed into other garrisons. The evidence of another original member, Robert de Derby, which has already been mentioned, proves that these men remained in garrison service. There was also movement out of Carstairs. William Corbridge was serving there in November 1301 until Pentecost 1302; when he next appears he is in Roxburgh from 25 December 1302 and is still present there in December 1303. John de Belton served in Carstairs in the autumn of 1301 but he is not among those, such as Corbridge, who remained until at least Pentecost 1302.

As will shortly be seen John de Belton later appears in the large Berwick town garrison and the well-documented movement of men into Kirkintilloch in the spring and summer of 1303 goes some way to illustrating the role Berwick held in relation to the other English garrisons. Richard de Inge and Edward de Kincardine were two of the four who entered Kirkintilloch in June 1303 to replace the four men-at-arms who

52 E101/10/6; E101/11/1, m. 7.
53 E101/9/16, m. 2; E101/68/1/11.
54 E101/9/16, m. 2; E101/68/1/25D; E101/12/18.
55 E101/9/16, m. 2; E101/68/1/25D.
had been killed; both had previously been serving in Berwick town. 56 A lone reinforcement who entered on 17 May, John Murrok, had come straight from the Berwick garrison. 57 Robert Jolif arrived as a replacement in November 1302; between 20 November 1301 and 11 February 1302 he too had been one of the Berwick town garrison and had returned there by 1 February 1303. 58 In these cases Berwick was acting as a pool of manpower from which other garrisons could obtain replacements and reinforcements as and when they were needed.

Another aspect of Berwick's role is evident in 1303. On 27 May payments were made to 41 men-at-arms who had come to the king at Roxburgh to participate in the campaign of that year. 59 Fortunately thirty-seven of these men are named and they make extremely interesting reading. Nineteen can be identified as men who had been serving or who were subsequently to serve in garrisons. More intriguingly still twelve of these nineteen had previously been part of the Carstairs garrison. Six of these had served in Carstairs from the first record in autumn 1301 until the last in September 1302. In total over half of the 20 men-at-arms who had comprised the Carstairs garrison joined the king at Roxburgh in May 1303. It is also clear that the force of 41 men-at-arms of which they were a part was in fact from Berwick; in April 1303 the king ordered John de Weston to warn the Berwick garrison to be at Roxburgh in May on the day the levies were to muster there for the campaign. 60 That this was indeed a force from Berwick is confirmed by the presence of men-at-arms recognisable as

56 E101/11/1, mm. 2, 22.
57 E101/11/1, m. 22. See note below.
58 E101/10/6; E101/11/1, mm. 8, 10, 23. Jolif and Murrok however present problems in the latter account book. Murrok is recorded as entering Kirkintilloch on 17 May 1303 but is still paid as one of the Berwick garrison until 24 May 1303. Jolif is recorded as remaining in Kirkintilloch until 31 January 1303 but according to the account for Berwick has returned there by 26 December 1302 and remains in the garrison until May 1303. The discrepancy of several days in the case of Murrok suggests an accounting error and this must also be the reason for the contradictory period of over a month with regard to Jolif, the latter a significant error in the accounts.
59 BL Add Mss 8835, fos. 90r-105r, CDS, v, no. 472(s).
60 CDS, ii, no. 1356.
serving in that garrison: Edward de Kincardine has already been shown as serving in
Berwick; William Weston had been there between at least 20 November 1301 and 11
February 1302; John Pencaitland had been in Berwick for several years. In fact
Berwick was the only garrison ordered to provide soldiers for this campaign.

The reason for the incorporation of so many of the Carstairs garrison into that
of Berwick was not due to a stripping of numbers but to the actual loss of Carstairs in
late 1302. The suspicion aroused by their presence in this force of 41 men-at-arms is
conclusively confirmed by a remarkable entry in Weston’s account book. On 25
December 1302 nineteen men-at-arms entered the Berwick town garrison; not only are
all theirs names recognisable but the entry ends with the explicit statement that they
had come from the garrison of Carstairs and the note in the margin that names their
entry simply reads Tarres (Carstairs). That they were first at wages on 25 December
reveals that the castle had fallen in late December and was therefore one of the ‘castles
and towns’ John de Segrave reported on 20 January 1303 as having been taken by the
Scots. They remained in Berwick town, now classed with the other men-at-arms,
until at least late May 1303. The most striking aspect is that the Carstairs garrison was
kept intact and its members retained in garrison service. John de Belton had obviously
retuned to Carstairs prior to its fall as he was among those who entered Berwick; on 9
December 1303 he began service in Edinburgh. As the subsequent careers of some of
these Carstairs men-at-arms show Belton remained in garrison service and he did so
continuously due to the men from Carstairs being brought into the Berwick garrison; it
was seen as important that men engaged and experienced in garrisoning should
continue in that particular occupation.

61 E101/10/6, m. 1; E101/11/1, m. 2.
62 E101/11/1, m. 7.
63 CDS, ii, no. 1342. This date of late December places its loss shortly before that of Selkirk.
64 E101/11/1, m. 7; E101/12/18.
In this case Berwick clearly acted as an intake for extra, to some extent surplus, manpower. It provided a secure location for men who were without or had left a garrison and was somewhere in which they could remain both in pay and in garrison service, a facility beneficial to both the individual man-at-arms and the Crown. Berwick can be seen as being the hub of the system of garrison service, taking extra men in, maintaining them and then recycling them to other garrisons when needed. Evidence of the latter can again be seen with men who had served in Berwick and in the force that met the king at Roxburgh; Thomas Yinele left Berwick to enter Kirkintilloch on 1 September 1303 and Richard Walraunt re-entered Edinburgh on 30 September 1303.65

Bothwell and Carstairs plainly show a redeployment of men-at-arms engaged in garrison service. In late 1301 and early 1302 there was a movement of experienced garrison soldiers out of established garrisons and into newly acquired fortifications such as Kirkintilloch and Bothwell. There was also a wholesale redeployment during the truce of 1302 the aim of which was to consolidate new acquisitions and on the termination of the truce in November there was another movement of men either back to their previous garrisons or to a different one. There was a redistribution of those from Berwick who had joined the king at Roxburgh: as noted Kincardine entered Kirkintilloch; Thomas Yinele also joined that garrison on 1 September 1303; Richard Walraunt returned to Edinburgh as a valet of Mountz on 30 September.66 Such wholesale movements had to have been controlled and organised centrally to ensure they were executed with co-ordination. The incorporation of the entire Carstairs garrison into Berwick and the eventual dispersal of its individuals into other garrisons also required careful organisation as did the movement of individuals and the need to

65 E101/11/1, mm. 20, 22.
66 BL Add Mss 8835, fos. 90r-105r.; E101/11/1, m. 22, E101/11/1, m. 20.
keep track of their whereabouts. Above all it demonstrates that movement between
 garrisons was a normal and accepted routine for the men-at-arms who were engaged in
garrisoning and whether they moved as an individual or as part of a group it was a
regular and ongoing feature of garrison service in these years.

There was also another form of movement within garrisons, one that functioned
vertically within an individual garrison rather than the horizontal movement between
garrisons. As noted previously on 26 December 1302 three men-at-arms entered
Kirkintilloch in place of John Gymmng and his two esquires. One of these
replacements, William Wisse, is especially of interest when the rare rolls of the entire
garrison for autumn 1301 and September 1302 are consulted. In both documents Wisse
was a member of the garrison however he was not serving as a man-at-arms but as one
of the garrison’s nineteen crossbowmen. Here one of the vacancies created in the
garrison was filled by the elevation of an existing member of the garrison from the
position and status of a crossbowman to that of a man-at-arms. Nor was this Wisse’s
only advancement whilst in garrison service as before becoming a crossbowman in
Kirkintilloch he had been a vintenar of nineteen archers in the garrison of Berwick
town between 20 November and 23 December 1299. One of his fellow crossbowmen
in Kirkintilloch in autumn 1301 and September 1302 had been Thomas Norreys and on
24 June 1303 he too appears in the same garrison now as a man-at-arms, a status he
still held in 1319. Norreys’ elevation occurs when he is listed as one of the four
replacements for those who had been killed; as with Wisse neither man actually left the
garrison but technically entered the garrison on that date in their new role and
receiving commensurate pay. Intriguingly Wisse was one of those killed and Norreys
became a man-at-arms the very next day; there is a definite hint here that the elevation

67 E101/9/16, m. 1; E101/10/5, m. 2; E101/11/1, m. 22.
68 Lib. Quot., p. 146.
69 E101/9/16, m. 1; E101/10/5, m. 2; E101/11/1, m. 22; Raimes, pp. 21-2.
of Norreys was directly in place of Wisse, that there was a policy of raising men from
the ranks practiced by the constable, William Francis, the demise of one crossbowman
who had been raised to a man-at-arms immediately replaced by the creation of another.

This process of elevation in status within a garrison is illustrated more
explicitly in the accounts for Linlithgow and those raised to the status of men-at-arms
come from the more commensurate group classed as hobelars rather than the more
lowly foot serving as crossbowmen. Five hobelars had served in Linlithgow since at
least 1 September 1302 – Robert de Winepol, Robert Paulyn, Richard Daneport, Adam
de Humberland and John de Hibernia – but on 26 December 1302 the status of
Winepol and Hibernia suddenly changed. From that date they were to be classed as
men-at-arms, were to receive the appropriate wages of 12d. a day rather than the 8d. of
a hobelar and their horses were valued as covered.70 Hibernia was still serving as a
man-at-arms in Linlithgow on the last extant date of 1304/571 whereas Winepol, after
serving from his elevation on 26 December until the end of the accounting period of 6
June 1303, disappears from the garrison; in fact he did not even serve for the whole of
this period being described as absent, vacabat, for 24 days. This rather patchy record is
explained when it is realised that Winepol was the royal clerk of the works for the
major refit of Linlithgow, taking up this position on the death of the previous clerk in
early 1302 and holding it until the major works finished in December 1302. During
June, July and August 1303 Winepol was engaged on the king’s business which
included travelling from Linlithgow to Berwick to collect money for the wages of the
workers at Linlithgow.72 His elevation to the status and pay of a man-at-arms was

70 E101/11/1, m. 9. For the formality of a horse having to have been officially valued before the pay rate
of a man-at-arms could be received, see Ayton, Knights and Warhorses, pp. 90-92.
71 E101/12/38.
72 E101/11/1, m. 19; The King's Works, i, pp. 413-414; CDS, v, no. 472(i). Winepol received £6 6s. 8d
for the 'other business' he undertook for the king.
consequently due to his role as clerk of the works and the good service he had duly performed in supervising the finances of these extensive works.

The elevation of hobelars to replace men-at-arms is a constant theme within Linlithgow. After Winepol disappears from the accounts in June one of his former counterparts as a hobelar, Adam de Humberland, became a man-at-arms although on this occasion there is no statement detailing his rise in status, on 7 June 1303 another five hobelars came into Linlithgow and at some point between April 1304 and winter 1304/5 Humberland had risen to become a man-at-arms and he still retained this status in 1311/12. As the difference between a hobelar and a man-at-arms was mainly based on the value of the horse and the finer aspects of equipment there was not necessarily a significant difference between the two in practice and this accounts for the regularity with which hobelars rose in status in Linlithgow and indicates that such a phenomenon was a not an uncommon occurrence.

However a change in status was not always permanent nor was it always upwards. Adam de Humberland is a case in point: he served as a hobelar between September 1302 and 7 June 1303; from then until 13 March 1304 he was a man-at-arms; on that date he returned to being a hobelar and was still a hobelar on 28 April 1304; yet this was not the end of his drop in status as in 1304/5 he was in the garrison serving as a crossbowman. Indeed in the 1304/5 roll for Linlithgow alongside Humberland two more names stand out among the twenty crossbowmen; Richard de Daneport, who had been a long-serving hobelar in the garrison from September 1302, and William de Blatherne who had entered the garrison as a hobelar on 7 June 1303.

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73 E101/10/5, m. 2; E101/10/6; E101/11/1.
74 E101/11/1, m. 25; E101/12/18; E101/12/38, CDS, iii, app. vii, p. 411.
75 Ayton, Knights and Warhorses, p. 92.
76 E101/10/5, m. 2; E101/11/1; E101/12/18; E101/12/38. Between then and 1311/12 he had regained his former status.
77 E101/10/5, m. 2; E101/10/6; E101/11/1; E101/12/18; E101/12/38.
Here three hobelars have been lowered to the status of crossbowmen at some point between late spring 1304 and 1305. This development was due to the significant cut in garrison numbers that was enacted in 1304 as a result of the perceived English victory in the war against the Scots. It is interesting here that there was a definite policy to retain these three men in the garrison which extended to finding a place for them among the crossbowmen; in turn the three men were content to accept this so as to remain in garrison service.

Once again it is apparent that garrison service was a flexible and fluid system which included the regular movement of men between garrisons and the ability for those within a garrison to be elevated or lowered in status as opportunity and necessity dictated. These patterns of movement occurred within a stable framework of long-term service, both in garrison service as a whole and within a particular garrison, men remaining as garrison soldiers for the entire three to four years the documents cover. It is clear from these rolls and accounts that there was a garrisoning community, that there is an identifiable body of men between 1301-1304/5 to whom garrison service was their sole occupation.

The extent to which this body of men was engaged in garrison service can be set in a longer context by two means. The first, and most revealing, is to compare the names of those who served in these early years with the rolls for 1311/12 which name the knights, men-at-arms and hobelars serving in several garrisons in Scotland which encompass Berwick, Roxburgh, Edinburgh, Linlithgow, Bothwell and Livingston. In all there are approximately 43 men from these earlier years still serving within garrisons in 1311/12 with their service, assuming the likelihood that they remained in garrisons throughout, therefore of a duration of at least six and at most twelve years.

78 CDS, iii, app. vii, pp. 393-412.
This is a considerable number of men and demonstrates a strong element of continuity in garrison service. Another equally striking feature in 1311/12 is that of these 43 men 25 were serving in the exact same garrison within which they had primarily served in 1300-1304/5. This feature becomes all the more remarkable when broken down to individual garrisons: ten out of the eleven veterans in Linlithgow had previously served there; twelve out of thirteen in Edinburgh; three out of three in Roxburgh. In these three garrisons, out of 27 veterans, there was a total of 25 who were serving in the same garrison in both periods. There were also sixteen veterans in Berwick however none of these had been serving there in 1300-05 but had been members of various garrisons.\textsuperscript{79}

It is doubtful that all of these veterans had remained in the same garrison between 1300-1304/5 and their next appearance there in 1311/12. A few examples will suffice: Patrick Sauser appears to have left Linlithgow after April 1304 but was back there in 1311/12; similarly Raymond Caillou left Linlithgow in June 1303 before re-appearing there in 1311/12; Hugo de Abercorn left Edinburgh in December 1303 but was back there in 1311/12; John de Cley was in Edinburgh in 1311/12 yet had departed from that same garrison in March 1304.\textsuperscript{80} The tendency of names to disappear and then reappear has already been observed and over such a number of years it must be presumed that this was the case for some if not all of these long-serving garrison soldiers; it also follows that although they may have briefly departed from a particular garrison they never actually left garrison service throughout this period.

Admittedly when the numbers of those serving in garrisons in both periods is put into the context of all the men-at-arms listed in the roll of 1311/12 their proportion...
is not large; only 16% in Edinburgh, 14% in Linlithgow and a rather low 6% in Roxburgh. The particularly sizeable garrisons retained in 1311/12 go some way to explaining this, the number of men-at-arms dwarfing some of the garrisons of 1300-1304/5. New men were needed to make up the numbers of these garrisons alongside the veterans of garrison service. Another important factor in considering these percentages is that there is no evidence for the men who manned garrisons between 1305 and 1311/12 and these would undoubtedly account for a significant proportion of those listed in 1311/12. Although a share of the men who had served in 1300-1304/5 would, for a variety of reasons such as age, health and death, no longer be serving in 1311/12, taking the above factors into account the percentage of veterans who remained serving is significant. Indeed, in practical terms, the continuous core of garrison service they represented lent the garrisons they were based in a wealth of experience that far outweighed their number.

These men also maintained continuity in garrison service in 1311/12 by means of a more personal nature in that members of their family were serving in these later garrisons. In fact the service of men from the same family was an established feature in garrisons between 1300 and 1304/5 with the rolls and accounts littered with men-at-arms sharing a surname: the most noticeable were the brothers William and John Cotes who served together in the Roxburgh garrison from 1301 and remained there side by side into at least 1304; Edinburgh contained both Adam and Robert de Walingford as well as Hugo and Godfrey de la Mare, Adam and Roger de Sutton, Robert, Adam and William Colle de Derby and also John and William Disteford, serving together in

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81 As in most examples in which careers are pieced together this is based on surnames being the same and the logical assumption that men sharing a surname and serving side-by-side were from the same family. This method – the only one possible – in fact limits the study of family involvement as it does not allow for links through maternal ties or marriage; many men in the garrison and indeed the military community would have been tied through such links.

82 E101/68/1/11, E101/9/16, m. 1; E101/11/1, mm. 8, 20.
Carstairs were Robert, John, Richard and Marmaduke Belton, Adam and Robert de Broughtone and Hugo and John de Langeton; amongst the sergeants in Linlithgow were John and Simon de Vilers and John de Vilers junior; another of the sergeants in Linlithgow was William de Hull and among Felton’s retinue was a John de Hull. As would be expected family connections were strong among personal retinues and this important aspect is revealed on one of the few occasions in which the retinue of a constable is individually named: with William Felton in Linlithgow were John and Richard de Felton as well as John, Hugo and Robert de Herle; in Edinburgh whilst constable Mountz brought both Edmund and Richard Walraunt into his retinue.

Family connections in garrisoning were not the exclusive preserve of men-at-arms. Whilst the two Cotes brothers were serving as men-at-arms in Roxburgh a third family member, Thomas de Cotes, was a hobelar in the same garrison; Roxburgh also contained Robert de Castro, man-at-arms, and William de Castro, hobelar. Entering Linlithgow separately but at approximately the same time in November 1302 were Robert and Hugo Yueldey, a hobelar and vintenar of archers respectively. Whilst William Wisse was still a crossbowman in Kirkintilloch there was an archer named Adam Wisse; also in Kirkintilloch were two crossbowmen called Roger and Walter de London and Henry and Sampson de Kingston, both archers. Two of the crossbowmen in Linlithgow were Adam and John le Mareschal; another two le Mareschal’s were Robert and Walter, respectively a crossbowman and archer in Edinburgh; in the same garrison was Simon de Ramesey, archer, and Thomas de

83 E101/9/16, m. 2.
84 E101/11/1, mm. 2, 25.
85 E101/11/1, m. 25.
86 E101/11/1, m. 20.
87 E101/11/1, m. 21.
88 E101/11/1, m. 20.
89 E101/10/5, m 2.
90 E101/12/38.
Ramesey, man-at-arms. In Berwick there was an archer, Alan Forester, and a crossbowman, William Forester; another archer was Edmund de Algate and a builder in the garrison was Thomas de Algate.

Garrisons were therefore interlaced with family connections even in the earliest years of their creation between 1300-1304/5. The 1311/12 roll is invaluable in demonstrating the development of these families which were involved in garrison service. By 1311/12 the Herle family had increased its level of service from three to five members with William and Alan de Herle now serving with Robert and Hugo in Linlithgow while John was in Edinburgh; also still in Edinburgh were John and William Disteford but now accompanied by Thomas; alongside them was Hugo de Abercorn, a veteran of the garrison from 1301-4, now with William de Abercorn. John de Hellebeck, who had served in Linlithgow as part of Felton’s retinue, had been joined there by Richard de Hellebeck; Robert and Henry Ascheburne were in Linlithgow, surely related to John de Ascheburne who had been an ever present member of the Kirkintilloch garrison. Having served for several early years in Edinburgh Peter de Spalding was in Berwick with Richard de Spalding; John de Enefeld, previously a sergeant in Linlithgow, and David de Enefeld were in Berwick; Stephen de Ocle, presumably a relative of Thomas who had served in Edinburgh, was in Berwick as was John Walraunt, surely a relation of those in Mountz’s retinue, Edmund and Richard. Henry Bentley, who had served in Kirkintilloch, was now in Berwick with William de Bentley. The Felton family had several more men in service with Robert and Owen in William’s retinue in Berwick and Henry serving there in John’s retinue. This expansion of garrison service within particular families is nicely illustrated by a son following his father into service in 1311/12; Godfrey Ampelford,

91 E101/68/1/11.
92 E101/9/18.
who was a veteran of Carstairs and Berwick, now in Berwick with another Godfrey who, it is stated, was his son.93

Family service within garrisons can be seen to have taken a firm foothold as early as 1300-1304/5 and to have developed and grown by 1311/12. Within garrison service as a whole and particularly within individual garrisons members of the same family can be found serving together and, more pertinently, mark a growing vocation or tradition of service in which sons were following their fathers into garrison service once old enough to take up arms. The veterans of 1300-1304/5 did not only bring experience to the garrisons of 1311/12 but also their relations; this was one of the means by which the increased demand to fill the large garrisons of these years was met. This represents another strand of continuity within garrison service.

The second means by which the service of this early body of identifiable garrison men-at-arms can be set in a more long-term context is to make use of the various miscellany of rolls and lists of names after 1311/12. These are few in number but one of the most relevant is the surviving indenture drawn up for the terms of service of the wardens of the Marches in 1319 and which lists the men-at-arms who were to serve in this force.94 There are several familiar names: Thomas Norreys, the former crossbowman turned man-at-arms from Kirkintilloch, still serving as a man-at-arms in the Marches eighteen years later;95 Henry de Bentley, who had served in Kirkintilloch from autumn 1301, had been in Berwick in 1311/12 and by 1319 was serving in the retinue of the warden John Cromwell;96 also serving were William and John Cotes, the former stalwarts of Roxburgh. Including these there are seven men-at-arms serving with the wardens in 1319 who can be identified among those who had

93 CDS, iii, app. vii, pp. 394, 396, 397, 399, 410, 411, 412.
94 Raimes, pp. 21-2.
95 E101/9/16, m. 1; E101/10/5, m. 2; E101/11/1; Raimes, p. 21.
96 E101/9/16, m. 1; E101/10/5, m. 2; E101/11/1; Raimes, p. 21.
served in garrisons up to eighteen years previously in 1300-1304. Their presence is explained by the loss of the major Scottish castles in 1313/14 and consequently the loss of the garrisons in which they had traditionally served. That they had found employment with the wardens in 1319 illustrates these men remained on the border searching for, and in this case finding, a role similar to that which they had previously been engaged in. Thomas de Bradford was another man-at-arms who served with the wardens in 1319 and who had previously been in the Carstairs garrison, entering into Berwick and joining the king at Roxburgh. Bradford is noteworthy as he can be identified among the lists of knights and men-at-arms of England drawn up in 1324 where he features as a man-at-arms of Northumberland.

By use of the wardrobe book for 1299-1300 the careers of some men can be traced a little further back. Before entering the new garrison of Kirkintilloch in 1301 Henry de Bentley, whose career is covered above, had been one of several constables with uncovered horses who had been in charge of 900 archers in Berwick during July 1300. Alan de Walingford was in Berwick during November 1300, entered Edinburgh in late 1301 where he remained into 1304 and where he was also recorded as serving in 1311/12. John Bagpuz was another ever present member of the Edinburgh garrison from autumn 1301 until December 1303; he had previously served in Berwick with 22 fellow men-at-arms from 24 October 1300 and had returned to Berwick by 1311/12. It is clear that careers could stretch over a lengthy period. John

97 E101/9/16, m. 2; E101/10/5, m. 1; E101/11/1; BL Add Mss 8835, fos. 90r-105r, Raines, p. 21; Parl. Writs, ii, pp. 636-58. The 1324 list is surprisingly devoid of any recognisable men of the garrison community. For a brief comment on the shortcomings of this list as well as its uses see M. Prestwich, 'Cavalry Service in Early Fourteenth Century England', War and Government in the Middle Ages, ed. J. Gillingham, J.C. Holt (Woodbridge, 1984).
98 Lib. Quot., p. 148. Bentley was therefore another soldier who had risen in status whilst in garrison service, his elevation to a man-at-arms occurring between July 1300 and autumn 1301.
99 Lib. Quot., p. 147; E101/9/16; E101/10/5; E101/10/6; E101/68/1/15, E101/11/1, E101/12/18, E101/12/20; E101/12/11; CDS, iii, app. vii, p. 410.
100 Lib. Quot., p. 147; E101/9/16, E101/10/5, E101/10/6; E101/68/1/15, E101/11/1, E101/12/18, CDS, iii, app. vii, p. 399.
de Belton first appears on 17 May 1303 in Edinburgh, serving until 19 November and then returning from 9 December into 1304; in 1311/12 he was in Edinburgh and by 1319 had found service with the wardens of the March. In 1319 John de Enefeld was one of the men-at-arms with the wardens; he had previously been a sergeant in Linlithgow from at least 1301 until 12 March 1304, had moved to Berwick by 1311/12, returned to Berwick in August 1314 as part of the force sent to reinforce it against the Scots after Bannockburn and, as a further point of interest, was one of two sergeants-at-arms watching over the corpse of Edward II in 1327. John de Luca, another long-serving sergeant in Linlithgow, was also in the force of reinforcements sent to Berwick in August 1314. Although, due to the limited availability of evidence, there are significant gaps in the given examples it is possible to build up an overview of the careers of certain men-at-arms and it is one that demonstrates garrison service for these men extended over many years.

The early rolls and accounts also reveal further details about certain men-at-arms involved in garrisoning who are mentioned in other documentation including chronicles. They reveal that William Prendergest, pardoned by Edward II for all his offences on 25 January 1315 due to his gallant but ultimately unsuccessful service in holding Jedburgh against the Scots, had previously entered Edinburgh as a hobelar by order of John de Segrave on 25 December 1302 and had been among the Berwick garrison during 1311/12, information that clearly depicts Prendergest as another long-serving garrison soldier. Raymond Caillou is described by Barbour as a Gascon

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101 E101/11/1; E101/12/18; E101/12/20; E101/12/11; CDS, iii, app. vii, p. 410; Raimes, p. 21.
102 E101/9/16, m. 1; E101/10/5, m. 2; E101/10/6; E101/11/1; CDS, iii, app. vii, p. 397; Raimes, p. 22. E159/101; I. Mortimer, The Greatest Traitor: The Life of Sir Roger Mortimer (London, 2004), p. 186.
103 E101/9/16, m. 1; E101/10/5, m. 2; E101/10/6; E101/11/1; E159/101, m. 156. This force sent to Berwick includes men who had fought at Bannockburn and it is therefore likely that Enefeld and Luca had also fought there.
104 E101/11/1, m. 18; CDS, iii, app. vii, p. 394; CDS, iii, no. 418. Prendergest was therefore another hobelar turned man-at-arms.
knight who, against orders, led a section of the Berwick garrison on its desperate and ill-fated foray to counter starvation on 14 February 1316, an undertaking in which Caillou was killed. In fact, as A.A.M. Duncan notes, he was a sergeant in Linlithgow in 1311/12 and to this information can be added the fact that he had also been present in Linlithgow as a sergeant from at least September 1302 and had left that garrison on 6/7 June 1303. Caillou then is one of the few men for whom there is conclusive evidence that he was killed whilst in garrison service.\(^{105}\) Particularly of interest is the career of Peter de Spalding due to its dark and treacherous ending. He entered Edinburgh as a man-at-arms on 12 February 1302 and, despite a brief interval between 1 September and 25 December, remained there until 8 December 1303 and in 1311/12 appears in the Berwick garrison. Spalding was still in Berwick in 1318 and this is known as he was the traitor bribed by the Scots to allow them to scale the section of wall where he was on guard at night. This treacherous act led to the fall of the town and subsequently the castle as well as to Spalding’s own death although at whose hands is unknown.\(^{106}\) The burgesses of Berwick who employed Spalding to defend their town had no reason to suspect him due to his impressive record of garrison service; his betrayal of Berwick is all the more astounding in light of his previous career.

The petition of Lucas de Barry submitted between 1314 and 1319 highlights a career not contained in the rolls and accounts.\(^{107}\) Barry, a valet of the king’s household, related that he had served in Lochmaben under John de St. John for three years, under

\(^{105}\) Bruce, pp. 566-571 (also p. 566, n. 325); E101/11/1, m. 19, CDS, iii, app. vii, p. 411.

\(^{106}\) E101/11/1; E101/12/18; Bruce pp. 616, 620, 626. Barbour misnames him as Simon Spalding and refers to him as a burgess of Berwick, pp. 616-617, n. 1. 23. James Douglas apparently offered Spalding the massive sum of £800 to undertake this act of treachery. Barbour implies Spalding remained with the garrison that held out in the castle who, upon their surrender, handed him over to the Scots having implicated him in a plot to kill Robert Bruce; whatever the reality Spalding’s treachery led directly to his death, Bruce, p. 616, n. 56; p. 626, n. 192-199.

\(^{107}\) CDS, iii, no. 682.
John de Castre in the garrison of Dumfries and also in the peel of Linlithgow when it was besieged. Twice he had been taken prisoner and heavily ransomed. By the king's command Barry stated he had been in Douglas castle under Robert Clifford when it had been attacked by James Douglas and Robert Bruce in 1307 and that he had served Edward II all through his Scottish wars until Bannockburn where he had been taken prisoner and ransomed so heavily he had been forced to sell or lease all of his lands. This full and arduous career is authenticated by one brief entry in the Linlithgow accounts; on 26 February 1303 one Luc' Barri entered Linlithgow, serving for one month and leaving on 27 March 1303. The extensive garrison career culminating in Bannockburn that is related in this petition is one not revealed in the existing accounts and rolls and illustrates that the number of men engaged in garrison service was much larger and more consistent than that which can be reconstructed working with the limited surviving evidence.

Despite these restrictions there is clear evidence about those, in particular the men-at-arms, who performed garrison service in the early years of the fourteenth century. The most striking feature is that even in the earliest years an identifiable body of men manned these garrisons. This group remained relatively stable with men regularly serving for several or more years in the same garrison. There was also a pattern of movement within this identifiable garrison community with men moving between garrisons and, although less frequent, the movement of men in terms of an alteration in their own personal status within a garrison. The extent of the service of these men is again evident in 1311/12 when many were still serving but now with additional members of their family alongside them, a feature which shows that despite the absence of actual evidence there was continuity in those engaged in garrison

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108 E101/11/1, m. 19. A rather unfortunate piece of timing on Barry’s part! This places the first siege of Linlithgow within the same one month period, an attack that has only ever previously been dated to ‘early’ 1303, c.f. The King’s Works, i, pp. 414-15.
service between 1300-1304/5 and 1311/12. Most striking of all is the length of time these men remained in garrison service with over 40 serving for at least six to twelve years and where further evidence is available there are several cases of men engaged for approximately eighteen years. If it had not been for the wholesale loss of Scottish castles in 1313/14 there would have been many more examples of such exceptionally long-term service.

A large number of men-at-arms who took up garrison service entered into a long-term commitment. Indeed it is natural that they should seek the lengthy service that garrisoning offered as it provided them with a virtually permanent paid position in military service which lasted throughout the seasons and year after year which consequently gave them the means for their own subsistence. Garrison service quickly established itself as a military profession and as such right from the start these men effectively became professional garrison soldiers. However it must be remembered that this service provided them with the means to subsist but little else; in the first quarter of the fourteenth century it was a particularly dangerous and violent profession. John de Ryhull was serving in Carstairs around Pentecost 1302 and having survived the loss of that castle entered into Berwick with the rest of the garrison in 1303; eleven years later his career in garrison service – and his life – came to an abrupt end when he was slain during the Scottish assault on Roxburgh in 1314.109 The dangers for the long-serving garrison soldier in these years were immediate and daunting; heavy ransom at best, maiming or death at worst. Yet despite this garrison service for these men had become and remained a way of life.

Another member of the ill-fated Carstairs garrison neatly summarises the attachment of these men to garrison service despite its dangers. In 1305/6 Godfrey de

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109 E101/68/1/(25D); E101/11/1, m. 7; CDS, iii, no. 358.
Ampelford requested the grant of a bailliary, constabulary or forestry in England or Scotland as a reward for serving the king all through his Scottish war. He had lost all his possessions at the onset of the war whilst in Banff castle. An ever present member of the Carstairs garrison from 1301 he too had entered into Berwick on the loss of Carstairs and had been part of the force that joined the king at Roxburgh for the 1303 campaign. Whilst in Carstairs he had been maimed of an eye. Garrison service had lost Ampelford both his possessions and an eye leaving him an impoverished and disfigured man-at-arms. It is not known whether his request was successful but what is clear is that he remained in garrison service and was in Berwick in 1311/12. This time he had his son serving alongside him. 110 Despite all he had suffered, the hardships and the risks, Ampelford believed garrison service offered enough in terms of subsistence to expose his son to its dangers. A permanent position with regular wages brought many men into garrison service and provided it with a remarkable degree of continuity in service right from the very earliest years.

110 CDS, ii, no. 1880; E101/9/16, m. 2; E101/68/1/25(D); E101/10/5, m. 1; E101/11/1, m. 7; CDS, iii, app. vii, p. 396.
(ii) Garrison Service in Mid-Century

The three first-rate Scottish castles of Edinburgh, Roxburgh and Stirling were retaken and rebuilt by the English in the mid-1330s and immediately upon their recapture substantial garrisons were installed within them. Although by May 1342 all three had again fallen to the Scots the intervening years during which garrisons were retained within them have left a rich seam of accounts and rolls from which an analysis of garrison service can be attempted. Although most are not as detailed as Weston’s pay books it is possible to analyse the evidence from mid-century in relation to the patterns of service that have been seen to exist in the early years of the century and to assess whether a core of long-term service was still a prevalent feature of these garrisons.

During these years the constables of both Stirling and Roxburgh, respectively Thomas Rokeby and William de Felton, remained in command throughout and as the constable has been seen to have an influence on the personnel of a garrison it is logical to first assess the continuity of service within these castles. The first roll for Stirling covers January 1336-7, the second 16 July 1339 - 26 January 1340 with the third following on and ending with the loss of the castle in April 1342. In each roll the entire garrison is named and the total number of men-at-arms amounts to 82, 53 and 58 respectively. The gap between the first and second rolls is approximately two and a half years yet 20 men-at-arms appear on both rolls which indicates they had been present in the garrison throughout that time, their presence from 1336 until January 1340 equating to almost four years continuous service. Seven of these men-at-arms are still present on the final roll and consequently had remained within the Stirling garrison for approximately six years, serving from the reoccupation of the castle until

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1 They are as follows: E101/19/21 (Edinburgh, 1335); E101/19/24 (Edinburgh 1335-6, 1336-7); E101/19/27 (Roxburgh, 1335, 1336-7); E101/19/40 (Stirling, 1336-7); E101/22/20 (Edinburgh and Stirling, 1339-40); E101/23/1 (Edinburgh 1340-1, Stirling 1340-2), E101/22/40 (Roxburgh, 1340-2). A general analysis of these garrisons has been carried out, see Leaver, ‘A Long Way from Home?’, and p. 112 above, n. 1.
its surrender. Another two men-at-arms who featured in the first roll reappear in the final roll having been absent during 1339-40; this suggests service in another garrison and indeed one of these men, Edmund de Hastings, appears in the Edinburgh garrison in 1339-40. Clearly an element of long-term service was therefore present within the Stirling garrison.

However it is also evident that there was a great deal of transient service within the garrison with the most notable feature being the departure of thirteen of the 20 men-at-arms who had served from 1336 until 1340 all of whom appear to have left garrison service entirely after four years of service. The turnover of personnel is also substantial with only 20 of the original 82 men-at-arms still serving four years later which means that by July 1339 there were 33 new men-at-arms in the garrison. Again, although there is continuity between those serving in 1339-40 and 1340-2 with 21 men-at-arms appearing in both rolls (including the seven who served throughout), this still means that 32 had left by 1340 with 37 brought in as replacements during 1340-2. This constant change in personnel is the dominant feature of the men-at-arms within the garrison but it does exist around a definite core of long-term service and the co-existence of the two is reminiscent of the core of stability surrounded by movement which was the key feature of the garrisons of the early fourteenth century.

Roxburgh exhibits a similar pattern of service. The earliest evidence is a financial account detailing the men-at-arms serving in the garrison broken down into several six week periods encompassing 16 March - 22 November 1335. The first period names 23 men-at-arms and fifteen of these served until 22 November, another four remained until October while two who entered on 26 April were still present in November which altogether amounts to a substantial degree of continuity over these

2 E101/19/40, m. 12; E101/22/20, m. 3; E101/23/1, m. 5.
3 E101/19/27, mm. 6-8.
eight months. This detailed account is followed by a roll listing the names of the
garrison for 1336 - January 1337 and although it is a virtually consecutive document
only twelve men-at-arms from 1335 remain in the garrison with a significant turnover
of personnel having taken place with 26 men-at-arms entering the garrison. There
follows a gap of approximately three years until the rolls for 1340-2 and just two men-
at-arms from 1335-7 are still present, John Blese and John Scot both having served in
Roxburgh, presumably continuously, for seven years from its recapture until its loss to
assault on 30 March 1342. There are a further ten men-at-arms from the roll of 1336-7
present with six remaining until the loss of the castle and four leaving at various dates
between late 1341 and early 1342 and who had therefore served in Roxburgh for
approximately six years. John Coupland, later to become constable of Roxburgh, was
present in 1336-7, absent in 1340-1 but had returned by 1341-2 again suggesting a
more long-term commitment to garrison service. The final roll actually contains two
accounts, the first from 4 June 1340 - 3 June 1341 and the second following on until
the end of March 1342. The latter contains 75 men-at-arms and of these a massive 69
are from the former roll which totalled 70 men-at-arms and which demonstrates a
remarkable degree of continuity over these years.5

In contrast to Stirling and Roxburgh three different constables commanded
Edinburgh between 1335 and 1341 which was not a factor likely to promote continuity
of service. Four rolls exist for Edinburgh and only one man-at-arms, Roger de
Coddeford, appears in all four serving under each constable with a record of service of
over five years from the capture of the castle until its loss while another four men-at-
arms served for between five and six years from October 1335 until the castle’s loss.6

The most striking feature of Edinburgh is the near wholesale change in personnel in

4 E101/19/27, m. 9.
5 E101/22/40, m. 2.
6 E101/19/21, mm. 1; CDS, iii, pp. 360, 363; E101/22/20, m. 3; E101/23/1, m. 4.
October 1335 which marked the changeover from Thomas Roscelin to John Stirling. Of the 34 named men-at-arms listed as serving with Roscelin in September only six remained under Stirling in October with 28 having left the garrison after just one month’s service. This may partly be explained by these 34 men being classed as Roscelin’s retinue but the near complete removal of the original 1335 garrison is similar to events in Roxburgh and suggests that the men immediately tasked with consolidating the retaken castles were those readily available and that they were not intended to garrison the castles in the long-term. Yet even under John Stirling a significant turnover of men-at-arms continued with only 25 of the 59 present in 1335-6 appearing among the 63 retained during 1336-7 which translates to over half the men-at-arms leaving and 38 entering which is a substantial degree of change considering these were consecutive years under the same constable and indeed this is remarkably similar to the proportion of continuity and change seen later in Edinburgh between 1339-40 and 1340-2.

Rokeby was in command by the time of the roll covering July 1339 - January 1340 and considering the two year gap since the previous roll along with the change of constable it is not surprising that only twelve of the 63 men-at-arms from 1336-7 were still in Edinburgh and, with the new garrison also totalling 63 men-at-arms, 51 new men-at-arms had consequently entered with just 19% of the garrison’s men-at-arms having served under John Stirling. A consecutive roll for 1340-1 follows and of the 49 men-at-arms listed there are 28 from the previous roll with slightly over half of those from 1339-40 remaining in the garrison. The almost equal rates of continuity and change are again reminiscent of the same rolls for Stirling however both contrast with the overwhelming degree of continuity within Roxburgh between 1340-1 and 1341-2.

7 Two knights also remained the same. E101/19/21, m. 1; CDS, iii, p. 360.
8 CDS, iii, pp. 360-3.
9 E101/22/20, m. 3; E101/23/1, m. 4.
As with service during the early years of the century the pattern of a core of continuity surrounded by change is common among the men-at-arms serving in all three garrisons during mid-century. However the substantial size of these garrisons combined with the men-at-arms being named in their entirety enables a complete analysis and this emphasises the striking rate of turnover in their ranks even in consecutive years when the constable remained the same. The movement of men-at-arms into and out of garrisons appears to be at a greater volume than in the early years nor do large numbers of these men move into other garrisons. Yet despite this there is still a core of long-term service measured in years during which significant groups of men remained in the same garrison and, although smaller in proportion to those on the move, these experienced garrison soldiers were carving out a professional career in wartime garrisons.

In mid-century these conclusions can further be set into the context of the garrison as a whole as the majority of the rolls also name the hobelars and archers, the latter mainly mounted, within the garrisons. Of most immediate interest is that of Edinburgh under Roscelin in September 1335 where the archers appear in two separate groups, 33 being from the West Riding of Yorkshire and 29 from York itself, both groups led by individuals who are classed and paid among the men-at-arms, this itself being a unique occasion in which the rolls specify men as coming from a definite area.\textsuperscript{10} That they were drafted in from their localities suggests that their appearance in the garrison was a temporary measure enacted to secure the castle and this is borne out by just one of these archers, John Plumpton from York, remaining in October when John Stirling took command. These archers were paid for 49 days service and then

\textsuperscript{10} E101/19/21, m. 1. All those from York were mounted.
departed, presumably back to their homes. That all but one left Edinburgh together with the large-scale change among the men-at-arms at this date demonstrates how wholesale the turnover in personnel was when the castle changed constable. The rolls for 1335-6 and 1336-7 name 67 and 58 mounted archers respectively and 30 appear in both which is in direct contrast to the near total change in 1335 and indicates that a significant proportion of those who entered under John Stirling did so on a more long-term basis, serving for two years. In 1339-40, after a gap of two years and with Rokeby now constable, only two of these 30 remained in the garrison while nineteen of the 71 archers serving in 1339-40 were also present in 1340-41. As the latter indicates there was an even greater turnover in personnel among the archers yet there is still a definable thread of long-term service averaging two years and exemplified by John Plumpton who remained in Edinburgh until its loss thus serving for almost six years.12

There is slightly more continuity among the mounted archers in Stirling where six served for approximately all six years. Including these there are twelve of the 80 archers from 1336-7 amongst the 59 for 1339-40 and of the latter seventeen were present amongst the 65 of 1340-2.13 In 1336-7 40 hobelars were in Roxburgh and by 1340-1 five of these were still present while another two from 1336-7 had rejoined them by 1341-2 which amounts to a length of service of between five and six years. The accounts for the hobelars and mounted archers in Roxburgh in 1340-1 and 1341-2 are astonishingly consistent with 49 of the 50 present in the former appearing in the latter which displays the same remarkable degree of continuity as the same garrison’s men-at-arms in these years with nearly all serving for at least two years until Roxburgh

11 Suggesting that they were undertaking the traditional required service of approximately forty days.
12 E101/19/24, mm. 12, 23; E101/22/20, m. 3; E101/23/1, m. 4.
13 E101/19/40, m. 12; E101/22/20, m. 3; E101/23/1, m. 5.
fell. In summary the hobelars and mounted archers display the same coexistence of continuity and change that was prevalent among the men-at-arms and which points towards a large movement of men into and out of garrisons that operated around a smaller core of longer service which ranged from between two to six years with the upper limit set by the loss of the castles themselves. Stirling serves to encapsulate this core of long-term service in that seven men-at-arms, six mounted archers and another two soldiers served throughout its entire occupation, these fifteen men serving for approximately six years in the one garrison.

The two additional soldiers who served continuously within Stirling were Alex de Gipthorp and John de Harlowe. In 1336-7 both appear among the large number of watchmen in Stirling but by 1339-40 they were classed among the mounted archers where they remained throughout 1340-2. Obviously they underwent a change of role but whether this involved a change in status is unclear as the pay rate of a watchman and mounted archer were frequently identical. Indeed Gipthorp and Harlowe are noteworthy as there is little if any movement in status or role among the garrisons of mid-century and there is certainly no clear evidence of hobelars or mounted archers rising to become men-at-arms or of the latter declining in status. In contrast to the earlier years there is no evidence of any such vertical movements within these garrisons and the large volume of men-at-arms entering and leaving the garrisons indicates that there was no shortage of availability among troops of this type and that garrisons brought them in if needed rather than promoting them from within.

The rolls are more productive in providing evidence of the horizontal movement of men between garrisons. A notable figure is Roger Banastre, leader of the archers from York, who entered Edinburgh in 1335 and who had moved to Stirling by

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14 E101/19/27, m. 9; E101/22/40, m. 2.
15 E101/19/40, m. 12; E101/22/20, m. 3; E101/23/1, m. 5.
January 1336 where he was classed among the men-at-arms. John de Leche and John Wythe were both hobelars/archers in Edinburgh during 1335-7 who subsequently moved to Stirling, Leche appearing in the latter by 1339-40 and now classed as a watchman and Wythe having moved by 1340-2. Hugo Martell was a mounted archer of the Stirling garrison in 1336-7 and had moved to Edinburgh by 1339 where he served until 1341, his movement reversing that of the three described above. The previously mentioned man-at-arms Edmund de Hastings was in Stirling during 1336-7, Edinburgh between July 1339-40 and by 1340-2 had returned to Stirling. This interchange of personnel between Edinburgh and Stirling should be expected as by 1339 Rokeby had also become constable of Edinburgh and it is natural that he would find it expedient to transfer men between the two garrisons. Martell is a case in point, featuring as the first mounted archer in both rolls for Edinburgh which indicates that he was the senior archer within the garrison and that Rokeby had transferred him from Stirling to become de facto leader of the Edinburgh archers. Interestingly this interchange does not extend to Roxburgh and only one garrison soldier, the hobellar/ archer William de Spens, moved between Roxburgh and these garrisons. Indeed Spens' six years of service extended across all three major garrisons serving within Roxburgh during 1336-7, Edinburgh 1339-40 and Stirling 1340-1, a record unique to Spens alone in mid-century.

Considering the size of these garrisons and the detailed evidence for their personnel it is clear that movement between garrisons was not as pronounced as earlier in the century. Again, as with changes in role and status, the mid-century garrisons appear to have lost something of the circulating community of garrison soldiers which

16 E101/19/21, m. 1; E101/19/40, m. 12.
17 E101/19/24, mm. 12, 23; E101/22/20, m. 3; E101/23/1, m. 5.
18 E101/19/40, m. 12; E101/22/20, m. 3; E101/23/1, m. 4.
19 E101/19/40, m. 12; E101/22/20, m. 3; E101/23/1, m. 5.
20 E101/19/27, m. 9; E101/22/20, m. 3; E101/23/1, m. 5.
existed earlier, the high proportion of turnover among their ranks seeing new troops enter the garrison from outside this community while those that departed did not necessarily go to another garrison but either served in the field or returned home. The only pattern of movement that can be detected is that between Stirling and Edinburgh which is directly related to the fact that Rokeby was joint constable of both castles. It is also evident that no discernible groups moved between garrisons with the only evidence for this again coming from Rokeby’s joint constableship when ten mounted archers moved to Edinburgh from Stirling in January 1340.21 There is a sense that for significant proportions of these men garrison service was more transient than before being a temporary phase of their military service.

Yet this is not to deny that a core of long-term service undoubtedly existed and for these troops garrisoning was as much a family profession as it had been for those veterans serving in the century’s early years. Familial relationships between those serving in garrisons, particularly within the same garrison, are extremely numerous and reference to several examples from Roxburgh is sufficient to illustrate this. Among the men-at-arms serving in 1340-1 were Andrew Baddeby and his son Edward; Edward de Letham and his son Alex; Thomas de Thes’ and his son William along with Gregory and Adam del Horne. The hobelars and archers included Nicholas de Knaresdall and his son William and Thomas de Chireden and his son William while in 1341-2 John and Adam Taillour were hobelars as were John Tywe, John Tywe junior, Hugh Tywe and John son of Ralph Tywe. That sons were subsequently joining their fathers in garrison service can be seen in three men-at-arms who had served in Roxburgh since 1336-7 being accompanied by their sons in 1340-2: Roger Corbet now with Richard alongside him, Thomas de Whitfeld joined by his son Robert and Thomas de Espeley

21 E101/19/40, m. 12; E101/22/20, m. 3.
by his son William while among the hobelars/archers was John de Esplee who was surely another family member.\textsuperscript{22} Quite clearly for many of those to whom garrison service was effectively a profession it also remained a family occupation.

Links can also be seen between the soldiers of the garrisons and their constables. During the tenure of John Stirling as constable of Edinburgh the garrison contained the men-at-arms Alexander and Gilbert Stirling and Thomas Medilton (Middleton) while among the archers were William and Robert Medilton. Another archer was Robert de Bothecastre (Bewcastle) and among the men-at-arms was Mongow de Bothcastre.\textsuperscript{23} All of these had clear connections to John Stirling with the Middleton family being his relations by marriage while the Cumberland manor of Bewcastle was a possession of Stirling’s through marriage and this personal relationship is reinforced by none of these men remaining in Edinburgh under Rokeby. In 1336-7 Rokeby’s castle of Stirling contained Thomas Rokeby, man-at-arms, while in 1339-40 Thomas de Rokeby ‘nepos’ and John de Rokeby appear as men-at-arms in his new command of Edinburgh. The lands of Rokeby were centred near Barnard Castle and the man-at-arms Robert de Castro Bernard served in Edinburgh during 1339-41, William de Bernardcastell, archer, in Stirling during 1339-40 and Thomas de Bernardcastell was a watchman in Stirling throughout 1340-2. Just south of Barnard Castle is Bowes and the Stirling garrison in 1340-2 contained an archer called William de Bowes.\textsuperscript{24}

Immediately prior to becoming constable of Stirling in 1336 Rokeby had been serving with the king’s army in Scotland with an individually named retinue of five men-at-arms and nine archers and it is logical to assume that these men would feature

\textsuperscript{22} E101/19/27, m. 9; E101/22/40, m. 2.
\textsuperscript{23} CDS, iii, pp. 360-3; E101/19/24, mm. 12, 23.
\textsuperscript{24} E101/19/40, m. 12; E101/22/20, m. 3; E101/23/1, m. 5.
among his garrisons. The first man-at-arms was the same Thomas de Rokeby who served in Stirling in 1336-7 and, appearing as the first named man-at-arms, occupied a position of seniority among these men, most probably acting as deputy constable. The name under his in Stirling is John de Ark, another man-at-arms who had served in Rokeby's retinue, and who again occupied a position of seniority in Stirling. He remained in Stirling during 1339-40 when Rokeby and his fellow knights moved to his new command of Edinburgh and, in the absence of any knights, Ark features as the first named individual which indicates that he was commanding Stirling on behalf of Rokeby, a likelihood enhanced by his apparent connections to Rokeby due to his service among the latter's personal retinue. John de Lincoln served in Rokeby's retinue and subsequently remained in Stirling as a man-at-arms but by 1339 had left garrison service. The fourth man, Thomas Hunt, served in Stirling throughout 1336-7 and 1339-40 before transferring to Rokeby's second command of Edinburgh during 1340-1. Strangely the fifth man-at-arms, William de Shirburn, appears to have never served in any garrison and nor did any of the nine archers which suggests that they did not possess close links to Rokeby despite serving within his retinue.

Another interesting figure serving under Rokeby is Gilbert de Carlisle who first appears as the sixth named man-at-arms in Stirling in 1336-7. By 1339, after the knights, he was the second named man-at-arms in Edinburgh however by 1340-1 Rokeby and his knights had retuned to Stirling and Gilbert de Carlisle now appears as the first named man in the Edinburgh garrison indicating that he was Rokeby's deputy there when it was lost to the Scots in 1341. The intriguing feature about the senior positions of command apparently occupied by Ark and Carlisle is that Rokeby did not

25 E101/19/40, m. 11.
26 E101/19/40, mm. 11-12; E101/22/20, m. 3.
27 E101/19/40, m. 12; E101/22/20, m. 3; E101/23/1, m. 4.
28 Ibid.
appoint any of the knights who served with him to command the castle from which he was absent, three knights residing with Rokeby in Edinburgh during 1339-40 while Ark was the senior man in Stirling and two knights serving in Stirling alongside Rokeby during 1340-1 while Carlisle was the senior figure in Edinburgh. Clearly both men-at-arms were experienced garrison soldiers, in effect having served a similar apprenticeship to those appointed constable of the castles of northern England after 1314, and both were men whom Rokeby trusted to obey his orders and exercise authority over those they commanded. That both Ark and Carlisle were appointed rather than the knights of the garrison indicates that it was not unusual for a constable to appoint such trusted men-at-arms as de facto commander of a garrison during his own personal absence.

Finally attention must be turned to the annotations made to the rolls themselves to search for further details about these garrisons. The roll for Stirling dated 1336-7 reveals that one knight, four men-at-arms and one watchman all left on 13 June 1336 while the same day also saw two knights, eight watchmen and a substantial reinforcement of 40 men-at-arms enter the garrison. One watchman died on 22 June 1336 but there are no other recorded deaths nor is there any evidence to indicate any movement among the archers. In the six months of 1339 detailed in the following roll there is no evidence of any movement throughout the entire garrison which contrasts with the same roll’s account for Edinburgh which notes that a knight and five men-at-arms left the garrison on 20 September 1339.29 The roll for 1340-1 includes a group of 25 men-at-arms which entered Edinburgh on 1 March 1341 and 30 archers who entered on 20 January 1341. Strangely no movement out of the garrison is recorded nor apparently did anyone die despite this being a period when the castle was

29 E101/19/40, m. 12; E101/22/20, m. 3. One of the men-at-arms had previously entered Edinburgh on the same date as the knight John de Whitfeld.
increasingly at the forefront of the war. The same roll for Stirling is more detailed with thirteen men-at-arms and 26 archers entering the garrison on 30 June 1341 and fifteen men-at-arms and twelve archers entering the garrison on 20 January 1342 with a further four men entering individually on various dates. Most interesting are the deaths recorded in Stirling of which the most prominent was the knight John de Stricheley who died on 10 October 1341 while William Brumpton, man-at-arms, died on 26 January 1341; three archers who died are all listed together at the end of the roll, one dying in 1340 and the other two in 1341.\textsuperscript{30} The accounts for Roxburgh during 1340-2 are notable for the detailed reference to various dates on which men, either individually or in groups, left the garrison in late 1341 and early 1342, evidence that the strength of the garrison was declining in the months immediately preceding its loss. However no reinforcements are specified as entering Roxburgh nor are any of the garrison recorded as dying in the course of these two hard pressed years.\textsuperscript{31}

In many ways the annotated details included in these rolls are enigmatic in what they reveal about garrison service. The apparent uniformity in the composition of the Edinburgh garrison between January 1340 and April 1341 with no one leaving certainly seems dubious especially as reinforcements were entering the garrison while the six months of 1339 in which there was no movement whatsoever within Stirling is similarly doubtful. The sheer scarcity of deaths among the garrisons is particularly strange considering these were men at the forefront of the war and yet the account for Stirling is quite specific that only five members of the garrison died in the two years between January 1340 and April 1342 while the almost total absence of any record of deaths for Edinburgh and Roxburgh is extremely mysterious. When compared to the account books of John de Weston for the early years of the century there is an

\textsuperscript{30} E101/23/1, mm. 4-5.  
\textsuperscript{31} E101/22/40, mm. 2.
unmistakable sense that the rolls of mid-century do not quite give a fully detailed and accurate account of the intricacies of garrison service in these years.32

What these rolls do show is that the garrisons of mid-century were very reminiscent of those of the early century in terms of their patterns of service with a large number of men serving for between one and two years together with a smaller but invaluable core of men undertaking long-term service which in over twenty cases encompassed the entire six years during which these castles were reoccupied by English garrisons. Operating in conjunction with this was a substantial number of troops whose service measured from between a month to a year and to whom garrison service was only ever a temporary employment. It is this transient element of garrison service which is most noticeable in mid-century with its regular large-scale turnover in personnel which was so frequent that it inhibited fluid movement both between garrisons and in individual status and prevented it from approaching the extent to which such movement was prevalent in the earlier garrisons. As the annotated accounts show this turnover of personnel was again centrally organised with groups of men leaving and entering the garrisons together on set dates although the scale and frequency of the turnover in mid-century suggests that this was a more common feature of the mid-century garrisons. However it is important that this should not obscure the clear element of long-term service within these garrisons which saw fathers bring their sons into garrisoning and in which garrison service was still a profession which could no doubt count amongst its ranks some of the most experienced men-at-arms of the English realm.

32 A comparison of these rolls with the wardrobe account for the same period contains similar enigmatic discrepancies. For instance whereas the wardrobe book largely matches the numbers contained in Edinburgh during September 1335 those for 1335-6 vary significantly: 5 knights as opposed to 7; 55 men-at-arms compared to 83; 67 hobelars rather than 60. If the wardrobe book excludes those men-at-arms classed as the constable’s companions then there is still a discrepancy of six. This problematic mix of near matches and large discrepancies is true for all garrisons when these rolls are considered alongside the wardrobe accounts, see BL Cotton MS, Nero C. VIII, fos. 248v-249r.
(iii) Garrison Service in the Later Fourteenth Century

The survival of consecutive documents that allow a detailed analysis of garrison service in both early- and mid-century are extremely rare chance survivals and do not occur again after the 1340s. There are a handful of accounts and rolls for Roxburgh in which the garrison is named but these are separated by a significant number of years and are nothing approaching consecutive; as such singular documents they provide no information that can significantly aid the study of garrison service.¹ To gain an insight into service in this period it is therefore necessary to turn to another source of evidence, the protections which name the men-at-arms who were serving in the last remaining stronghold other than Berwick, the castle of Roxburgh.

Letters of protection come with their own particular problems as a source of information. The most obvious is that they reveal the intention of men to serve in a certain place or with a certain captain and do not necessarily mean that that service did in fact subsequently take place. This problem is exacerbated by men with property fraudulently taking out protections in order to delay legal proceedings against them while never actually intending to undertake the claimed military service. Indeed the provenance of protections as a source for garrison service in this later period might seem to be cast into doubt when it is realised that the later fourteenth century, and garrisons in particular, were prone to such unreliable practices. However it appears that the prominence of evidence for these trends was due to a tightening up of procedures to protect against them and consequently despite the susceptibility of protections to

¹ There is a retinue roll of Roxburgh for 1380-1382 (E101/531/29) and then another for 1399-1401 (E101/42/40). The former is during the constableship of Matthew Redman and there is a roll immediately prior to this when Redman was in charge of Carlisle castle but any useful comparison of these men is prohibited by the poor quality of the latter roll (E101/39/11).
fraud and the fact that they describe intentions rather than actual service there is little reason to fundamentally distrust the information they convey.\(^2\)

The relevant protections appear on the Scottish Rolls\(^3\) and although these cover the entire century there are significantly more that concern garrisons in the later decades of the century. As the incompleteness of protections is one of their greatest shortcomings,\(^4\) whether it be for a garrison, a retinue or an army, it is not unusual that these protections only name some of those who served and do not come near to allowing any kind of reconstruction of the entirety of the garrison at a given time. Instead where the name of a man can be found in more than one protection a snapshot of their career is briefly glimpsed and a thorough reading of the protection lists reveals several men who were engaged in garrison service. Again this only illuminates a part of their career leaving unfilled gaps but it is from the multiple protections of these men that the pattern of garrison service later in the century can be provisionally determined.

The protections provide a total of 32 men, almost exclusively men-at-arms, for whom there is more than one entry and more than one appearance in a garrison. Out of these 32 there are two men, Nicholas de Rigby of Lancashire and Robert de Belyngham (possibly from Bellingham in Northumberland) whose careers stand out markedly from all others (fig. 4). Rigby has the greatest number of protections, a substantial total of nine, that run from November 1384 until September 1397, extending over a period of thirteen years. Each protection is for service in either the Berwick or Roxburgh garrison and at times they run consecutively throughout these years, a separate protection appearing for each year between 1386 and 1390. All of the protections were for a year and in 1387-9 they fit perfectly with each one dated

\(^2\) These ideas and the limitations and uses of protections are comprehensively covered in Ayton, *Knights and Warhorses*, pp. 157-161.
\(^3\) Calendared in *CDS*, v, pt. ii, pp. 395-579.
\(^4\) Ayton, *Knights and Warhorses*, p. 159.
Figure 4:

Protections Illustrating Garrison Service in the Later Fourteenth Century

**Robert de Belyngham:**

*(CDS, v, no. 3935)* 26 November, 1364. Defending Roxburgh castle with Alan del Strother; for one year.

*(Ibid., no. 3978)* 28 April, 1372. Defending Berwick castle; for one year.

*(Ibid., no. 3988)* 9 May, 1373. Defending Jedburgh castle; for one year.

*(Ibid., no. 4023)* 24 May, 1376. Defending Berwick castle with Henry, Lord Percy, keeper; for one year.

*(Ibid., no. 4090)* 11 February, 1382. Defending Berwick castle with William de Risseby, keeper; for one year.

**Nicholas de Rigby (of Lancashire):**

*(CDS, v, no. 4148)* 3 November, 1384. Defending Berwick castle with the earl of Northumberland; for one year.

*(Ibid., no. 4253)* 17 July, 1386. Defending Berwick town with Thomas Talbot (and Richard Tempest); for one year.

*(Ibid., no. 4297)* 23 February, 1387. Defending Berwick town with Richard Tempest; for one year.

*(Ibid., no. 4345)* 18 February, 1388. Defending Roxburgh castle with Thomas Swinburne, keeper; for one year.

*(Ibid., no. 4388)* 11 February, 1389. With the earl of Northumberland, captain of Berwick castle; for one year.

*(Ibid., no. 4448)* 28 January, 1390. Defending Berwick castle with the earl of Northumberland; for one year.

*(Ibid., no. 4496)* 11 July, 1394. Defending the town and castle of Berwick with the earl of Northumberland; for one year.

*(Ibid., no. 4530)* 4 July, 1396. Defending Berwick town with Henry Percy, the son, keeper of town; for one year.

*(Ibid., no. 4555)* 24 September, 1397. Defending Roxburgh castle with John Stanley, keeper; for one year.
between 11-23 February while those for 1394 and 1396 also tie together, both dating from July and suggesting another, now lost, protection for 1395. There is an element of overlapping in those for 1386 and 1387 – the former dated July and to last for a year and the latter breaking this year of service being dated in February – and similarly for the last two years of 1396 and 1397. This inconsistency in the full year not always elapsing before the appearance of another protection does not mean they are unreliable but more accurately reflects the fact that there had been an alteration in service, in this case a change in the captain of the fortification with Tempest taking over from Talbot in 1387 and in 1397 a change of fortification with Rigby entering into Roxburgh. These nine protections provide the fullest account of a career in garrisons in this later period.

It is certainly a striking career. Rigby can be seen to have been almost permanently engaged in garrison service and the assumption must be that in the few gaps that do exist in these years he was also present in garrisons. His service extended over a period of at least thirteen years and was limited to the two major fortifications still in English hands, seven of his protections being for Berwick and two for Roxburgh. Rigby’s movement between the two is indicative of a man whose profession was garrisoning these fortresses against the Scots and proves conclusively that garrison service as a career, indeed as a profession, existed in the last decades of the fourteenth century.

The career of Robert de Belyngham supports this. After Rigby he is the individual attributed with the most protections, a total of five, three of which encompass service in Berwick, one for Roxburgh and the other a rare record of service in Jedburgh. There are only two consecutive protections, the dates of which are late April 1372 and early May 1373, these being followed by a gap of three years until the
1376 protections and then another gap of six years until the last extant date of February 1382. Another blank of six years exists between the 1372 protection and the first in which Belyngham is named, serving in Roxburgh and dated late November 1364. These voids of information in Belyngham’s career deny any confident attempt at determining the permanency of his service in garrisons other than to say that it is likely he was continuously engaged in the mid-1370s. However, as with Rigby, it is clear that whether permanent or semi-permanent Belyngham was involved in garrison service over a period of at least eighteen years. There is no doubt that the surviving protections of these two men provide definite evidence of long-term garrison service.

Other careers are suggestive of long-term service. William Ripon, parson (without doubt occupying the role of chaplain within the garrison), had a protection for service in Roxburgh dated 30 April 1371 and a second dated 24 May 1373, the latter for Berwick and intended to last for a year. These dates suggest continuous service between 1371 and 1374 albeit in different garrisons. There is also a third protection from 23 April 1377 again for a year in Berwick; the month tallies with those in the previous protections and suggests continuous service but additional information in the 1377 protection raises considerable doubt about this as Ripon is described as ‘lately parson of St. Martin’s in Mikelgate, York’. This implies that Ripon’s service was not completely continuous and that after his earlier service in garrisons he had spent a period of time as parson in York before once again returning to garrison service. The three protections of Henry Strother, esquire, date from November 1394, June 1400 and March 1403 respectively. The two gaps of six and then three years make it impossible to deduce the permanency of his service however each protection is for Roxburgh and each time the castle was under a different keeper. Despite the significant blanks it is

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5 *CDS*, v, pt. ii, nos. 3972, 3989, 4033.
6 *Ibid*, nos. 4499, 4601, 4667.
difficult to avoid the conclusion that Strother was a permanent soldier of the Roxburgh garrison, the protections widely-spaced evidence of what was in fact continuous service in that garrison.

There are a further six men whose protections span a significant number of years but with no information in between. All but two of these cases are based on only two existing protections. John Skelton, an esquire of Newcastle, had a protection for one year’s service in Roxburgh in February 1401 and another for Berwick seventeen years later in March 1418. As an esquire from Newcastle it would be no surprise to find that Skelton had a long record of service in these garrisons and it is entirely possible that it could extend over seventeen years yet on the basis of a mere two protections garrison service could just as easily have been an occasional and possibly infrequent activity in which Skelton was engaged. This vagueness and ambiguity fits for the remaining five men. The protections of John Toppeclif, citizen of York, are for Roxburgh in 1389 and subsequently Berwick in 1399; those of John Lukke of Bristol are both for Roxburgh and dated 1390 and 1397; John Bermyngham, minstrel/herald, plied his trade in Roxburgh in 1389 and 1396; two consecutive protections exist for Thomas Muschance in Roxburgh dated February 1347 and April 1348, a third, also for Roxburgh, comes from April 1364; Robert Cristendome, a bowyer from York, had protections for Berwick in June 1388 and July 1389 but his first was for service in Roxburgh 24 years previously in 1364.

Naturally these present insurmountable problems. There is the possibility that some of these may represent long-term garrison service over seven years, ten years, in

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7 Ibid, nos. 4630, 4721.
8 Ibid, nos. 4402, 4593.
9 Ibid, nos. 4453, 4543.
10 Ibid, nos. 4400, 4529.
11 Ibid, nos. 3804, 3833, 3955.
12 Ibid, nos. 3958, 4375, 4430.
the final case upwards of twenty years. It is also possible that the protections depict the few occasional years in which these men were engaged in garrisons. The most that can be said is that for these men garrisoning was a factor which re-occurred in their lives and was a military institution which they had a certain attachment to.

The remaining sixteen men are much less problematic. Once again fourteen of these are based on just two protections and the remaining two on three. These illustrate permanent service over a maximum of a few years. A number of them run consecutively: those of Thomas Cooke, of Skeldergate in York, were for a year in Roxburgh dated 23 May 1376 and a year in Berwick from 11 May 1377,\textsuperscript{13} for William Melton, of Kirby in Leicestershire, from 17 October 1387 for a year in Roxburgh and 16 June 1388 for a year in Berwick;\textsuperscript{14} the three of James Radclyf, dated 20 February 1387, 25 February 1388 and 11 February 1389, all for one year and respectively regarding service in Berwick, Roxburgh and then Berwick again.\textsuperscript{15} It is clear from this evidence that Cooke and Melton served at least two continuous years in garrisons and Radclyf three. A number of others have one year gaps between protections: Nicholas Ruggeley, of Cannokbury in Staffordshire, having one for a year in Roxburgh on 9 November 1387 and the second again for Roxburgh dated 9 October 1389,\textsuperscript{16} two for John Yolstones, of Lancashire, dating from February 1389 for six months in Berwick and from October 1389 in Roxburgh for a year while an earlier protection is dated 'ý February 1387 for a year in Berwick;\textsuperscript{17} John Lynford, of Buckinghamshire, having one for a year from 29 October 1387 and a second from 26 November 1389, both for service in Roxburgh.\textsuperscript{18} In such cases the likelihood is that despite the gaps in the

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{13} \textit{Ibid}, nos. 4022, 4036.
\item \textsuperscript{14} \textit{Ibid}, nos. 4314, 4369.
\item \textsuperscript{15} \textit{Ibid}, nos. 4294, 4349, 4388.
\item \textsuperscript{16} \textit{Ibid}, nos. 4326, 4431.
\item \textsuperscript{17} \textit{Ibid}, nos. 4288, 4393, 4431.
\item \textsuperscript{18} \textit{Ibid}, nos. 4319, 4443.
\end{itemize}
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records these men were also serving continuously within garrisons, an assumption reinforced in these three instances by the distance of their place of origin from the garrisons in which they served; it is unlikely they would be making the same long journey twice in alternate years unless there were special circumstances.\(^{19}\)

The evidence these sixteen provide is therefore one of continuous garrison service over a period of two or three years. Without doubt a proportion of these sixteen would have been men engaged in a level of service that extended to a career of several or more years as exemplified by those of Rigby and Belyngham. Taken as a whole the evidence protections provide for these 32 men is indicative of garrison service in the earliest years of the century with a significant number of men serving for a length of time measured in years and accompanied by revealing examples of men serving for periods of ten years or more, the eighteen years of service of Belyngham a striking echo of the longest identifiable careers in the first quarter of the fourteenth century. In the later decades of the century the garrisons of Roxburgh and Berwick were permanent features of military service and had been for many years so it should come as no surprise to find that they were manned by men to whom such service had effectively become a profession. The limitations in the evidence that protections provide concerns the extent to which men of this kind were prevalent in garrisons; what they do make clear is that such long-term and continuous service did exist in the later fourteenth century.

In the examples already given it is also evident that there is the same sense of central stability and peripheral movement within garrisons as that which has been seen to exist earlier in the century. This is best illustrated by the careers of Belyngham and Rigby who combined their stable garrison service of eighteen and thirteen years with

\(^{19}\) For the possibility of just such a circumstance see the example of John Swan.
service in three and two different garrisons respectively, each moving between these garrisons on at least three separate occasions. In the course of these movements Belyngham and Rigby each served under approximately five different keepers. Various patterns of movement can also be distinguished in other careers and mirror those from the garrisons of mid-century. There are men serving in the same castle alongside the same constable: John Broun in Roxburgh with John Stanley in 1396 and 1398; Alan Katerall in Roxburgh with Thomas Swinburne in both 1386 and 1388; William Robtot, again in Roxburgh with Swinburne, in 1386 and 1387. Alternatively there are men serving in the same castle but under different constables: John Bermyngham's two recorded years in Roxburgh under Thomas Umfraville and seven years later under John Stanley; William Essh remained in Roxburgh in 1361 and 1362 first serving under Richard Tempest and then John de Coupland. There are also cases in which men appear to have moved with the constable: Thomas Rokeby was in Richard Tempest's Roxburgh garrison in 1361 and by 1363 had followed Tempest to his new command of Berwick; Richard del Croke served under the younger Richard Tempest in Berwick in February 1387 but the intended full year of this protection was cut short by another from June 1387 for service in Roxburgh under Thomas Swinburne, the latter holding the constableship along with Tempest. There are another three careers which followed the movement of Tempest from Berwick to Roxburgh, bringing these men from the Berwick garrison into Roxburgh. These various movements reflect those of mid-century and advocate the belief that the men-at-arms of the garrison community were the same mixture in both cases being a combination of permanent

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20 *CDS*, v., pt. ii., nos. (Broun) 4537, 4569; (Katerall) 4212, 4345; (Robtot) 4245, 4308.
21 *Ibid*, nos. (Bermyngham) 4400, 4529; (Essh) 3946, 3949.
22 *Ibid*, nos. (Rokeby) 3947, 3953; (Croke) 4294, 4307, 4386.
23 The other three men are Robert Holt, James Radclyf and William Worthynton.
garrison soldiers and those serving due to their links with the constables of the garrisons.

Despite the limited evidence these protections provide they conclusively demonstrate that there was a recognisable garrison community in the later decades of the century and one that possessed attributes recognisable in those of both early- and mid-century. This idea of community is again reinforced in this period by the presence of families being engaged in garrison service. The Nowell family of Rede in Lancashire exemplify this. There exist two individual protections for Richard Nowell – on both occasions for Roxburgh under Thomas Swinburne in 1386 and 1387 – and four for John Nowell dated January 1386, November 1386, February 1387, March 1388 and February 1390, all of which are for service in the Berwick garrison.24 On each protection for these two men they are described as being the 'son of Laurence' and therefore Richard and John were obviously brothers. There is another protection which dates from February 1348 for the service in Berwick of a Richard Nowell; this cannot be the same Richard due to the large interval of time nor is he described as the son of Laurence25 however it is possible that he was an elder generation of the same family. What this does show for certain is that two brothers were serving simultaneously in different garrisons and that the tradition of garrison service within the Nowell family may have stretched over forty years in length. Consequently the service of the Nowell family in garrisons, possibly covering two or three generations, is a singular survival in terms of evidence although based on family links for service in early- and mid-century it is unlikely that such familial attachment to service was exceptional. Robert Holt, who moved from Berwick to Roxburgh with Tempest, was

24 CDS, v, pt. ii, nos. 4217, 4278, 4290, 4338, 4353, 4453.
25 Ibid, no. 3830.
joined by his brother John when he returned to Berwick in 1389, the protection stating that Robert and John were both the sons of Geoffrey.26

The fleeting glimpse the protections reveal of the careers of these 32 men perfectly illustrates just how partial the reconstruction of military service in the fourteenth century is. They provide no more than a narrow insight into garrison service in the later years of the century and although it is possible to draw from them the conclusions described above the evidence is not substantial enough to deliver a definitive analysis of garrison service at this time. Viewed in the context of evidence gathered from service in the two earlier periods similar patterns and traits within service can be seen to exist as does the concept of these men belonging to a garrisoning community. The relative lack of evidence in these later years is due to a lack of accounts and rolls in which names are given and to the limitations inherent in using protections as a source of information.

However, although protections have their own particular shortcomings, they compensate for this in having their own particular benefit to the historian. As will have been seen in some of the examples given above many of these protections specify exactly where the individual undertaking garrison service came from. This information may take the form of the individual’s county being stated possibly alongside their town or village while on occasion only their town or village is included. This makes protections of singular importance in addressing the issue of the geographical origins of those in garrison service. It is possible to try and identify men by their surnames but this is by its very nature an inexact method devoid of any degree of certainty.27 Rolls and accounts contain no reference to this important information and make it impossible

26 Ibid, no. 4387.
27 A truth illustrated by a member of Swinburne’s garrison of Roxburgh, William Wysbech, who was in fact from London and another man of the Roxburgh garrison, John Berwick, who came from Surrey. Ibid, nos. 4284, 4577.
to attempt an analysis of this kind in the two earlier periods so such a study is exclusively confined to this later period. Within these years two groups of protections stand out as being particularly well suited to such an exercise.  

The first are those which relate to the periods when Thomas Swinburne was constable and then keeper of Roxburgh, a time frame which approximates to 1386-88 and then, as the lieutenant of the earl Marshal, 1389-90. Dating from these periods there exist 62 protections for Roxburgh in which the geographical origins of each individual is identifiable. When these are broken down into separate regional categories the results are extremely interesting (fig. 5). By far the most striking outcome is that only 34% of these 62 came from north of the Trent and that the vast majority, two thirds of the total, were actually from regions south of the Trent. A more detailed breakdown is even more revealing. Out of the 21 men identifiable as northern twelve were from Lancashire alone, a proportion amounting to 57% of the northern total. When compared with all 62 individuals Lancashire accounts for a significant 19% coming second only to the south of England (excluding London) with 26%. London is the third greatest provider of men at 16% of the overall total and, if included with the south, creates a combined contribution amounting to 42%, approaching a half of all 62 protections. Those from the north-eastern counties of England, the region closest to the garrisons, amount to a modest 15%, lower than the 18% of the Midlands and only higher than the minimal 6% from Wales.

28 All of the examples used in the following analysis are based on place names which can be positively identified, either by county, county and town or village, or by the existence of only one town or village of that name in the whole country. If there is any element of doubt the example has not been included nor have any surnames been used as an indicator of county, town or village e.g. William Bamburgh is excluded as, despite the Northumberland connotations of his name, no place is actually specified.

29 The first year Swinburne was joint constable with Richard Tempest, see pp. 129-33.

30 Where there is more than one protection for the same individual it is still only counted as a single example.
Figure 5: Geographical Breakdown of Roxburgh Protections

Thomas Swinburne Protections

Wales: 6%
Lancashire: 19%
London: 16%
North-East: 15%
South: 26%
Midlands: 18%

John Stanley Protections

Wales: 0%
Lancashire: 33%
London: 10%
North-East: 14%
South: 24%
Midlands: 19%

Protections Combined

Wales: 5%
Lancashire: 23%
London: 14%
North-East: 14%
South: 26%
Midlands: 18%
These results are extremely revealing. They reflect the stipulations that were contained in a number of indentures of the 1380s and 1390s which were explicit in stating that a significant proportion of the garrison had to be recruited from further south however these clauses drew the southern limit of the line from which they could be drawn as the northern boundary of north Yorkshire;\textsuperscript{31} the preponderance of men from regions south of the Midlands is particularly noteworthy. There is no doubt that men from the north-eastern regions – Yorkshire, Durham and Northumberland – were heavily engaged in garrison service in both Roxburgh and Berwick but this is not reflected in the existing protections. Six of these eight north-eastern protections concerned men from Yorkshire, one from Humberside and one from Northumberland. This apparently inexplicable dearth of protections for Durham and especially Northumberland raises the possibility that men-at-arms from these regions did not necessarily seek protections due to the proximity of their homes and the garrisons.\textsuperscript{32} The prominence of men from London in these protections is another surprising aspect particularly as in the late 1380s these garrisons were accepted institutions in the north and largely regulated by the northern magnates and gentry.

It is possible to explain some of these results by taking the connections of the constable, Thomas Swinburne, into consideration.\textsuperscript{33} The first point to note is that although Swinburne had land in northern England he also possessed land in the south, the manors of Little Horkesley and East Mersea in Essex were both held by his father whilst Thomas was constable. More relevant here though are the London possessions of Thomas. Through his mother, Agnes Felton, in 1380 he took possession of all the Felton properties in London including the valuable ‘Coppidhalle’ which had a number

\textsuperscript{31} CDS, iv, no. 360. All but 20 men-at-arms and 20 archers within a garrison of over a hundred in Roxburgh in 1386 were to be ‘strangers’ from the southern side of the county of Richmond and Craven.

\textsuperscript{32} However if Robert de Belyngham was indeed from Northumberland his five protections would go some way to disproving this theory.

\textsuperscript{33} His career is covered in greater depth pp. 131-3.
of shops annexed to it.\textsuperscript{34} It can be no coincidence that of the ten protections of men described as citizens of London all but two of them were also specified as being engaged in a skilled trade including a clothier, woodmonger, mercer and draper.\textsuperscript{35} Swinburne was utilising his London connections to bring to Roxburgh the skilled men necessary for a garrison to function effectively. It is extremely likely that some if not all of these men were from the shops annexed to the ‘Coppidhalle.’ This explains the high proportion of Londoners in the Roxburgh garrison whilst Swinburne was constable. However the large number of men from the south outside of London cannot be so easily explained as Swinburne’s landed connections were limited to Essex and only one of these southerners also came from Essex.\textsuperscript{36} The counties of Kent, Suffolk and Somerset all provided men for the garrison and two came all the way from Cornwall. There is nothing in Swinburne’s territorial possessions that explains their presence in the garrison.

A number of unifying features are distinguishable amongst some of the garrison. The two Cornishmen, John Argom and John Tresvellak, are named together in one protection that dates from 17 October 1386 and which was intended to last for a year;\textsuperscript{37} this suggests they previously knew one another before entering the garrison together where they subsequently served alongside one another. A similar familiarity is evident with regard to William Melton of Kirby in Leicestershire and William Wheitley also of Kirby, although in this case the former entered Roxburgh on 17 October 1387 and the latter a month later on 15 November.\textsuperscript{38} Three of the significant Lancashire contingent also share close geographical connections: Adam Robinson was from Singleton and so presumably was Adam Singleton of Lancashire, the third man,
John Latimer, being from Barton by Kirkham, Kirkham lying only a handful of miles from Singleton. The four men who contribute the figures for Wales can also be explained by Swinburne's connections. This again came from Swinburne's Felton relatives who had links to land in this area, a Felton being listed among the knights of Wales in the list of 1324. In addition there is still a village named Felton just to the north-east of Hereford and in Shropshire the villages of West Felton and Felton Butler lay a few miles either side of Knockin, the village from which the Shropshire soldier in the garrison, the knight John Lestrange, was specified as being from. This maternal link also explains the presence of Duncan de Felton in the Roxburgh garrison in 1386.

The four cases in which men had a protection for service in Roxburgh under Swinburne in both his first period as constable and subsequently when reappointed as keeper imply that there was a personal link between these individuals and Swinburne and that on his reappointment he brought them back into his garrison. It is possible that these men remained in the garrison in the intervening period when Thomas Urfraville was in charge but the timing of the second protections makes this seem unlikely. John Swan is a case in point. A grocer from Mertok in Somerset his first protection for Roxburgh dates from 15 June 1386 and his name next appears in a protection dated 10 May 1389. The latter is the first extant protection from Swinburne's second term in charge and logically it follows that one of Swinburne's first acts was to bring Swan back into the garrison as he valued his previous service which, on the evidence of Swan's trade, would have involved the provisioning and storing of victuals within the castle. This would fit with the evidence assembled above which illustrates that the

39 Ibid, nos. 4203, 4339, 4416.
41 CDS, v, pt. ii., no. 4316.
42 Ibid, no. 4222. The name of Duncan also has Scottish overtones.
43 Ibid, nos. 4241, 4415.
personal connections and ties of the constable could significantly affect the geographical orbit which garrison soldiers came from and the individual personnel within the garrison.

The second group of protections again concerns the garrison of Roxburgh this time under the constableship of John Stanley, the dates of which approximate from early 1396 until February 1399.\textsuperscript{44} There are 21 protections from which a place of origin can be positively identified and they are instructive not just as a preliminary survey of the garrison ten years later but also in placing the results from the 62 protections of Swinburne's constableship into a broader context. The outcome of the regional breakdown of these 21 protections is again revealing (fig. 5). Once more the majority of the garrison came from south of the Trent but this time the difference is much less, the south only 53% compared to 47% for those from the north of the Trent. The figure of 24% from the counties south of the Midlands excluding London is comparable to the 26% of the previous results although the London total has diminished from 16% to 10% under Stanley. This drop also lowers the southern total including London from 42% to 34%, the Midlands total is slightly up on before at 19% as opposed to 18% but the north-eastern contribution is minimally lower than before coming in just 1% below on 14%. This means that it is the remarkable number of protections from Lancashire that shortens the divide between the north and the south in their contribution of soldiers to the Roxburgh garrison. Of those from north of the Trent an astounding 70% were from Lancashire and this Lancastrian domination extends to the entire 21 protections where they account for 33% of the total which amounts to one whole third of the surviving protections from the constableship of Stanley.

\textsuperscript{44} For these dates see pp. 134-5.
Once again the background of the constable, in this case Stanley, can go some way to explaining these results, specifically the presence of so many men from Lancashire. Although determining precisely which John Stanley this constable was is exceptionally problematic it is certain that as a Stanley he held lands and possessed connections in Lancashire.\(^{45}\) Indeed the most likely candidate was a justice of Chester prior to becoming constable of Roxburgh and he subsequently inherited his father's position as Steward of Macclesfield and became Surveyor of the forests of Macclesfield, Mare and Mondrem in Chester and in 1403 was appointed Governor of the City and County of Chester.\(^{46}\) There was a clear affinity between the knightly Stanley family and Lancashire and it was this connection which brought an exceptionally large number of Lancastrians into the Roxburgh garrison during the constableship of John Stanley.

There is no evidence that Stanley held any lands other than in his Lancashire heartland and this is important in placing the results of Swinburne's protections into context. Under Stanley there are no protections from Wales or from Hereford or Shropshire and the number from London is significantly reduced. This is proof that it was Swinburne's connections to these areas which brought men from them into his garrison. It is also evident that neither man possessed any strong links in the Midlands yet under both their constableships this region provided a consistently respectable proportion of men; there are seven men from Coventry alone when both groups of protections are combined. Although Swinburne had land in Essex and London his southern interests were confined to these areas and in no way explain the large percentage of men from across the southern counties evident in the protections; Stanley had no southern connections. It follows that these regions, the south and the

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\(^{45}\) His identity is discussed in pp. 134-5.

\(^{46}\) GEC, v, no. 248-50.
Midlands, were providing men for the Roxburgh garrison on a regular basis irrespective of the identity and connections of the incumbent constable as opposed to the previous areas in which the numbers of men they provided were intimately linked to the person of the constable himself.

The combining of these two sets of results affords a test group of 83 protections from the late 1380s and late 1390s. Such a joint total provides a more representative illustration of the regional make up of the garrison by tempering the effect of the constable on the personnel of the garrison. The most noticeable feature of these combined results is that the counties south of the Trent provided more men than those to the north, 63% as opposed to 37%, almost two thirds of all 83 protections. Of this 63% the large majority of 40% came from London and counties south of the Midlands. These results reflect the indentures which stipulated that the majority of a garrison should come from further south but it is surprising that they came from so far south. The northern total is just as interesting in itself when it is considered that of its 37% an overwhelming 23% came from Lancashire, a result which translates as 61% of all soldiers from the north coming from Lancashire alone. This peculiarly high level of Lancastrian service is exhibited in the individual career of Nicholas de Rigby and demonstrates that Lancashire was a fertile recruiting ground for the Roxburgh garrison over twenty years before it was acknowledged as such for the army which fought in Normandy under Henry V.47

The protections of the late fourteenth century provide an insight into garrison service not available in the earlier periods. An analysis of the regions which were supplying men for the garrison opens a new aspect to the study of garrison service. The importance of the person of the constable in influencing those who constituted the

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47 C.T. Allmand, Henry V (Yale, 1997 edition), p. 208. It also supports the view of the north-western counties contributing substantial numbers to armies both in the mid- to late-fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries, ibid, p. 209, n. 21.
garrison is especially noticeable as is the fact that certain areas consistently provided a proportion of men irrelevant of the identity of the constable. It was a mixture of men from both of these that went into making up the personnel of a garrison. Indeed the most outstanding feature revealed here is that garrison service was not confined to the north or even extended southwards only to the Midlands but that it encompassed the whole of England with the largest regional majority coming from the southern counties and London. Garrison service was not regional in nature but national, recruiting men from all over the kingdom, and consequently it was a feature that could touch the lives of all those aspiring to military service. Those who did serve in these later garrisons were just as much an identifiable community as in earlier years and included men for whom garrison service was a profession which extended over several years. Service in garrisons was an important feature of the military landscape as much in the last decades of the fourteenth century as it had been in the very earliest years of the wars.
II.

THE GARRISON IN ACTION
DEFENCE FROM WITHIN THE WALLS

In February 1314, on the night of Shrove Tuesday, sixty Scottish knights crawled towards the stout walls of Roxburgh castle, the dark cloaks that covered their armour apparently leading an English watchman to mistake them for cattle or oxen. Throwing a rope ladder up against the wall its crook of iron clattered as it fastened into an embrasure; before the watchman could cry out the first Scot had scaled the ladder and with his drawn knife stabbed and killed him. As he dispatched another guard the rest of the Scots – led by James Douglas – clambered up the ladder and, regrouping, they burst into the great hall where the English garrison was celebrating the feast day with dancing and singing. The English, caught unawares, fled to the great tower where they doggedly held out for the night but, realising the desperation of their situation, the constable took terms of surrender the next day and handed the castle over to the Scots.¹

In this way one of the strongest and most heavily-garrisoned English-held castles in Scotland fell to the Scots.

This account by Barbour is probably the best known description of a castle falling to the Scots and in many ways serves as a classic exemplar for the fall of English-held castles in Scotland. The plucky, courageous Scots, outnumbered and ill-equipped, striking swiftly under the cover of night, catching the garrison unawares as the Englishmen feasted and celebrated. The unmistakable sense of risk about the whole thing, the drama of being seen but mistaken for cattle, the clatter of the iron crook of the ladder, of just being able to silence the watchman in time; a bold and daring attack with little forethought or planning which relied solely on surprise and breath-taking

¹ Bruce, pp. 380-6.
The implication for the garrisons that succumbed to such attacks is one of incompetence and this condemnation has been believed to be true of many English garrisons in the wars. They had the numbers, the equipment and the enormous advantage of defensive fortifications yet still they failed to hold out against the much weaker Scots. This is the common background against which the defensive capabilities of garrisons are seen to have been impotent and it cuts garrisons dead at their roots, bringing into question the most basic function of a garrison; its ability to defend the fortification in which it was based. To many this may seem the raison d'être of a garrison, the one duty it had to accomplish above all else. An inability to hold their fortification in the face of the enemy becomes an irreversible condemnation clearly demonstrating their impotence; if they could not defend their own base then they were good for little else.

This raises issues of extreme concern with regard to the English garrisons considered here. Alongside the great debacle of Bannockburn nothing resonates so powerfully of English military failure than the apparent ease with which Scottish forces were able to seize English held fortifications - including major fortresses such as Edinburgh and Roxburgh - throughout the first half of the fourteenth century. In the first quarter of the century so many fell to Robert Bruce that the total has been declared as impossible to fathom and the feat described as 'one of the great military enterprises of British history.' Nor was it only Bruce between 1306 and 1318 who proved spectacularly successful at this; William Wallace managed to seize his fair share in the preceding years and between 1336 and 1342 the great castles of Edinburgh, Roxburgh

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2 Barrow, Robert Bruce, p. 369.
and Stirling as well as many smaller fortifications once again fell to the Scots. There seems to have been a catastrophic failure among the English garrisons in defending their own fortifications, a humiliating inability to withstand the irregular and frequently ill-equipped Scottish forces that opposed them. There is an undeniable sense that blame should be attached to these great swathes of losses, that they should never have fallen as they did. Indeed of Edinburgh and Roxburgh in 1314 it has been stated that, "Well guarded, these castles should have proved more than a match for ill-equipped besiegers. In fact, they fell within the space of a single Lent." It is to the condemnation of the garrisons that they did.

That this happened is not in contention; the question is how it happened. Were garrisons — and by implication castles — inherently susceptible to attack in the Anglo-Scottish wars? Was it a failure on the part of the English garrisons or does it signify a general European trend in which castles were becoming less secure from attack? In more practical terms what were the expectations and capabilities of a garrison under the ultimate pressure of attack? Only by analysing why so many castles fell to the Scots can these important questions that strike at the heart of garrisoning in its most basic operational role be answered.

The reasons most frequently advanced to explain the two main periods of losses are vague generalisations; ascribing the first to the inadequacies and domestic distractions of Edward II and the second to the increasing continental distractions of Edward III. Although both did have their affect they reveal nothing of the processes by which the castles actually fell. To understand the reasons for the losses it is necessary to analyse how the Scots went about taking these castles, the methods and tactics that they employed. By addressing these it is possible to gauge the forces and pressures

3 Ibid, p. 195.
garrisons had to endure and their strengths and weaknesses as perceived by their contemporaries, the defensive capabilities of garrisons being drawn out in the process.

Unfortunately such a study relies almost exclusively on chronicle evidence and the unreliable and often dramatic nature that this often follows. The capture of castles by Robert Bruce and his associates is only described in depth by Barbour and the spectacular successes of Bruce are only matched by the equally spectacular renditions Barbour provides of them. Such embellishments were a convention of medieval chroniclers going back as far as Orderic Vitalis, an element of legend or *chanson* prevalent when describing the capture of castles. Yet this does not deny the basic truth of the details they reveal if the drama and embellishments are stripped away. Barbour’s account of Roxburgh is a good example of this and a number of important details can be drawn out of his account: the reliance on the cover of darkness and surprise; thorough preparation in constructing the ladder and knowing where to place it; a co-ordinated plan where the assaulting soldiers were well-drilled enough to crawl slowly towards the castle and silence the guards; the attack itself timed to coincide with Shrove Tuesday when the garrison would be celebrating and off their guard. Planning, preparation and intelligence are all in evidence in this apparently *ad hoc* attack. By approaching the chronicles in this manner the truth about the ability of garrisons to defend their fortifications will become clearer.

Barbour may have claimed they were ‘*mony wys*’ for men to take castles and peels but essentially there were three; assault, siege and treachery. The drama of Barbour’s accounts of Bruce’s successes between 1306 and 1318 are made possible by

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4 M. Chibnall, ‘Orderic Vitalis on Castles’, * Anglo-Norman Castles*, ed. R. Liddiard (Woodbridge, 2003), p. 150. J. Sumption makes the same point concerning the young Du Guesclin tricking his way into Fougeray castle with his men disguised as wood-cutters, *Trial by Fire* (London, 1999), p. 33. There are also unmistakable classical overtones especially with regard to Odysseus tricking his way out of the cave in the *Odyssey*.

5 *Bruce*, p. 369. These were by no means mutually exclusive for example an assault could take place during a siege as happened at Edinburgh in 1314.
the tactic repeatedly made use of; the surprise assault. Not only was this used against Roxburgh (1314) but also against the castles of Brodick (1306/7), Turnberry (1307), Inverness (1307), Douglas (1306, 1307), Forfar (1308), Berwick (1312), Linlithgow (1313) and Edinburgh (1314). The town of Perth was sensationaly taken by sudden assault (1313) and Berwick was similarly attacked (1316, 1318) with this first period ending with the assault on Norham castle (1327). In fact so repetitive did this tactic become that it has been reduced to a simple formulaic description: the essential factor of surprise; going in under the darkness of night; forcing entry on the most suitable section of the walls by means of rope ladders fitted with grappling hooks. 6

This formula not only fits for all the attacks mentioned above – except Linlithgow and Berwick (1316) – but also for the assaults on Edinburgh (1341), Roxburgh (1342) and the town of Berwick (1355). 7 All assaults went in under the cover of night; prefabricated scaling ladders were used to mount the walls; surprise was essential to their success as demonstrated by the only two failures amongst all these attacks – Berwick (1312) and Norham (1327) – proving unsuccessful due to the loss of surprise as the attack was about to go in. By reducing these assaults to such a simplistic formula the implication is that time after time garrisons were easily outwitted and overcome with embarrassing ease. This is not necessarily the case; as with Roxburgh (1314) rather than looking at a simplistic overview of the assault it is necessary to delve deeper into the complexities that underlay these assaults.

The most revealing details come from Barbour’s accounts of the early attempts of Bruce and his followers against smaller Scottish castles in the years before 1312 after which scaling ladders began to be frequently used. The years from 1306 until 1312 were the first attempts of Bruce and his men to seize castles, the trial and error

6 Barrow, Robert Bruce, p. 193.
they experienced effectively proving an apprenticeship in assaulting castles, and consequently a study of these years reveals the tactics they learnt to be necessary in mounting an effective assault.

From the outset it is obvious that the direct initial target of attack was never the castle itself but the garrison within it. This is in evidence at Brodick (1306/7) where the Scots ambushed a section of the garrison carrying victualls to the castle killing at least thirty and then driving a sortie from the remaining garrison back into the castle where it only just managed to prevent the Scots from entering by blocking the entrance;\(^8\) at Turnberry (1307) where two thirds of the 300 strong garrison, lodged in a village outside the castle, was attacked so fiercely by the Scots that those in the castle dared not venture out to come to their aid; at Douglas where on two separate occasions a significant section of the garrison was lured out of the castle – once by driving the cattle away forcing the garrison to pursue them and once by sending men carrying sacks of victualls past which some of the garrison then tried to seize – and then ambushed;\(^9\) again at Douglas during the infamous ‘Douglas Lardner’ of 1308 when the castle was seized after the Scots attacked almost the whole garrison whilst its members were in the local kirk on Palm Sunday.\(^10\)

It is clear these ambushes were carefully planned. Vulnerable times were chosen, sections rather then the whole of the garrison were taken on, ruses to draw some of the garrison out of the castle were utilised; in short a conscious attempt was made to attack the garrison outside of the castle and on terms favourable to the attackers. Careful planning suggests detailed reconnaissante being carried out before any such assault and there is ample evidence for this. Before assaulting Brodick (1306/7) the Scots hid and watched the movements of the garrison, noting how the

\(^8\) Bruce, p. 166.
constable, John Hastings, frequently left the castle to hunt; the vulnerability of
Turnberry’s garrison was recognised by a spy named Cuthbert whom Bruce had sent to
spy out Carrick; James Douglas watched in secret to see whether the keeper of
Douglas castle came out easily and, seeing that he did indeed venture out carelessly
with his men, undertook an ambush on them. Before embarking on an assault the
Scots observed the garrisons and their constables from a distance to glean all the
intelligence they could which would contribute towards a successful attack. In fact
they often started with an advantageous knowledge of the area and land themselves,
particularly so for James Douglas when facing his own castle of Douglas, and neatly
summarised by Barbour when describing Bruce agreeing to attack Brodrick, putting
the words into Bruce’s mouth that, ‘For I knaw rycht weill the countre And the castell
rycht sua knaw I.’

Planning and reconnaissance were accompanied by thorough preparation. Men
were disguised as victuallers, were hidden and remained silent ready to mount a savage
ambush, drove off cattle and were able to storm en masse into a kirk. Painstaking
preparation is much more evident in the assaults after 1312 when the presence of
specially crafted ladders for scaling walls came into widespread use. These did not just
materialise but required the acquisition of materials and prefabrication as well as
knowledge of how to raise them on the walls. Interestingly there were two types of
scaling ladder, those used at Perth being constructed of wood and those at Berwick and
Roxburgh of rope, the uniqueness of these rope ladders plainly evident in the lengthy
and highly detailed description given of these ‘ladders of wonderful construction’ in
Lanercost and the fact that they were put on display to the people of Berwick. As

13 Ibid, pp. 378-9 n. 365-72; Lanercost, pp. 200-2. Forfar in 1308 was the first castle in this period
recorded as having its walls scaled by Scots on ladders but as Barbour makes no comment on these
Scottish targets became more ambitious the use of these ladders and consequently the need for thorough preparation became an essential feature in Scottish assaults.

This hallmark of thoroughness and forethought evident in the Scots early assaults on castles was carried through into the later and more spectacular assaults. That assaults were still based on these traits can be seen with Roxburgh (1314). The assault was by no means the *ad hoc* attack it at first appears to be: Douglas and his men had been in Ettrick forest for some time making sporadic attacks 'night and day' on the garrisons of Roxburgh and Jedburgh, an activity which would have allowed both a full reconnaissance of the castle and garrison as well as an assessment of the garrison's strength and capabilities; the assault was deliberately timed for Shrove Tuesday when most of the garrison would be distracted by celebrations; a special prefabricated ladder for assault was assembled; the attackers each had a black cloak to camouflage them in the darkness of night during which the assault took place; watchmen were quickly silenced and the whole force stormed the great hall.\(^{14}\)

Reconnaissance, intelligence gathering, careful planning and timing, pinpointing and exploiting weaknesses, thorough preparation; they are all evident here. These were the solid foundations that underpinned Scottish assaults and demonstrate that garrisons which fell to assault were not by implication incompetent but on the receiving end of highly developed, premeditated and organised attacks.

Assault was therefore not the romantic reckless escapade that chroniclers, especially Barbour, frequently depict, but something that relied on more mundane but exact preparations. It is Barbour's quixotic details that obscure the remarkable ladders and the assault was an impromptu attack by foresters it appears these were ordinary ladders, *Bruce*, p. 334. Intriguingly a chronicle dealing with the 1100s, the *Chronicle of Princes*, states that Cilgerran castle in Wales was captured in 1165 by ladders with hooks on the ends placed against the walls. As with Roxburgh (1314) these ladders were the idea of an obscure man among the attacking force, J.R. Kenyon, 'Fluctuating Frontiers: Normano-Welsh Castle Warfare c.1075 to 1240', *Anglo-Norman Castles*, p. 253.

\(^{14}\) *Bruce*, pp. 378-86.
complexity of the efforts that went into these assaults. For instance the tale that
Edinburgh was assaulted when a Scot, William Francis, revealed he knew a route up
the north side of the rock on which the castle stood, a side considered unscalable, one
he had used in his youth to secretly visit a sweetheart in the town below at night.\textsuperscript{15}
When it is considered that the Scots had been besieging the castle for several weeks
prior to this assault it was surely in this period that efforts were made to scout a route
up the relatively unguarded north side to facilitate an entrance to the castle. That
\textit{Lanercost} and the \textit{Scalacronica} simply state that Edinburgh was seized by the scaling
of the north side which was considered impregnable and thus less guarded reveals the
basic truth of the assault;\textsuperscript{16} William Francis is a romantic embellishment of Barbour.

Garrisons were not repeatedly caught out by such melodramatic assaults but by
carefully planned, intimately organised, calculated attacks based on days, maybe
weeks, of reconnaissance and preparation. When the assault came it was co-ordinated
and swiftly efficient. Garrisons were continually assessed, their routines watched, the
character of the constable deduced, weaknesses and vulnerabilities noted. Ruses,
trickery and disguise were carefully employed to lure or distract the garrison, to split it
up and ambush it. That some of these early assaults, such as Brodick, failed to gain the
castle illustrates that this was a learning process for the Scots, albeit a bloody one, and
it was over several years experience that they became practiced and effective in
assaulting castles. This was the daunting character of the assaults that garrisons were
faced with.

Another way of facilitating an assault was to encourage treachery, to have a
man inside the fortification who would provide the attackers with entrance. The
calamitous loss of Berwick in 1318 was in no small part due to Peter de Spalding,

\textsuperscript{15} \textit{Ibid}, pp. 388-90.
\textsuperscript{16} \textit{Lanercost}, p. 204; \textit{Scalacronica}, p. 51
apparently a burgess of the town and definitely a soldier of the garrison, who arranged for the Scots to scale the section of the town wall where he would be on watch; in return he would receive a reward of £800.\textsuperscript{17} In 1384 the humiliating loss of Berwick castle was down to the earl of Northumberland's deputy in charge there being bribed by the Scots.\textsuperscript{18} In more spectacular terms in 1314 the constable of Bothwell, Walter fitz Gilbert, handed his castle straight over to the Scots in the aftermath of Bannockburn, an act which led to the capture of many notable Englishmen who had fled there after the battle including the earl of Hereford.\textsuperscript{19} Following an abortive Scottish siege of Stirling in late May 1337 the constable of the English-held castle of Caerlaverock, Eustace de Maxwell, handed the castle over to the Scots, an act considered especially traitorous as Edward III had just supplied him with a large sum of money, flour and wine.\textsuperscript{20} The latter two examples clearly demonstrate the dangers for the English of appointing Scottish constables, their nationality heightening the threat of treachery. Such treachery was an accepted means of gaining access into fortifications but appears a relatively rare method in the loss of the castles under discussion here.

Although the tactic of assault seems to be predominant under Bruce this was far from the case and the more traditional method of the siege was used in equal measure. It is often assumed that Bruce reverted to assaults as he was not in possession of the equipment required to mount a set-piece siege but as William Wallace had already proven sieges could be successful without any equipment, embarking not on a physical attack on the castle with siege engines but by undertaking the long and drawn-out process of surrounding the castle and denying it access to victuals or

\textsuperscript{17} Bruce, pp. 616-9; for Spalding's long record of service within garrisons see p. 176.


\textsuperscript{19} Lanercost, pp. 209-10; Bruce, pp. 514-6.

\textsuperscript{20} Lanercost, pp. 303-4. As previously noted the alleged treachery of Lubaud during the siege of Edinburgh in 1314 is without any foundation.
reinforcement, aiming to starve the garrison into submission. By these means Wallace eventually took the powerful castles of Stirling and Bothwell in 1300: when the English army retreated in 1298 Wallace and his followers 'set themselves down' before the English-held castles in Scotland and took many of them 'through famine in the castles'; 21 forced to leave his siege of Dundee castle to face the English at Stirling Bridge he entrusted the burgesses of the town with continuing the siege on pain of life and goods, the castle capitulating on his victorious return. 22

Bruce certainly made frequent use of this type of prolonged siege. The earliest known instance was the castle of Elgin in 1307/08 and considering another six castles in Scottish localities fell in this year it is reasonable to assume at least some of these were besieged; 23 Dunstaffnaghe was taken in 1309 after a siege; 24 although Edinburgh was taken by assault in 1314 this attack went in only after the castle had been besieged for several preceding weeks; 25 Perth was similarly taken by an assault launched following a period of close siege; 26 Dumfries (1313) was starved into surrender and the ensuing surrender of the castles of Buittle and Caeverlock shortly afterwards suggests they too had been subject to siege; 27 Berwick castle was besieged after the town fell (1318) and Wark and Harbottle also succumbed to siege in the same year; 28 in 1327 Norham, Alnwick and Warkworth were all besieged; 29 most famous of all was the siege of Stirling castle (1314) which ultimately led to Bannockburn. Dramatic assaults may well be predominant in the chronicles but in reality the lengthy set-piece was used to wear down garrisons just as often and with the same success.

21 Lanercost, p. 165.
22 Wyntoun, v, p. 308; Bower, vi., pp. 84-7.
23 Bower, vi., p. 435, n. 35-6.
24 Bruce, p. 366; Bower, vi, p. 345.
25 Bruce, pp. 386-96.
26 Ibid, pp. 334-41.
27 Barrow, Robert Bruce, pp. 194-5.
28 Lanercost, p. 220.
29 Bruce, p. 742, Bower, vii., p. 35; Scalacronica , p. 82.
It is telling that in the 1330s and 1340s, when in possession of siege engines, the Scots took the vast majority of castles by siege; it always remained preferential to the more risky and dangerous option of assault. The sieges undertaken in these years were more active, using siege weapons to batter the walls and garrison, a development that meant some sieges could be over relatively quickly. These active sieges were almost all successful and were used against numerous castles in just a handful of years: Dundarg (1334); Cupar (1335, 1339); Dunottar, Kinneff, Lauriston (all 1336); St. Andrews, Leuchars, Bothwell (all 1337); Edinburgh (1337, 1341); Stirling (1337, 1342); also later successfully against Lochmaben (1385). Siege engines were used in almost all cases and the success rate illustrates why the Scots adopted this method almost to the exclusion of assault.\(^{30}\)

The set-piece siege was therefore an eventuality that garrisons could expect to face sooner or later. This was a pressure altogether different from a sudden and unexpected assault; morale, determination and tenacity over a period of days and weeks, maybe even months, were demanded of the garrison in this situation. That garrisons could hold out for a lengthy period is evident in the siege of Bothwell castle in 1300-1. Here the constable, Stephen de Bramptone, and his garrison held out for just over fourteen months in the most desperate conditions; a close siege had resulted in many of his men dying and those still alive were ravaged with famine when an assault finally took the castle.\(^{31}\) Thomas Gray, as constable of Norham, endured two lengthy sieges, one of seven months and the other of almost a year, holding out on both occasions as the garrison was able to be resupplied.\(^{32}\)

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\(^{30}\) It is easy to miss this significant change in Scottish methods due to the dramatically successful assaults on the two major castles of Edinburgh (already besieged) and Roxburgh, the drama of which obscures the fact that these were the only two castles to be attacked by these means in this period.

\(^{31}\) CDS, ii, no. 1867. It seems likely that Bothwell was besieged after Stirling had fallen and so it probably eventually fell in the spring of 1301, Watson, Under the Hammer, p. 98.

\(^{32}\) Scalacronica, p.64.
1318 the castle garrison remarkably held out for eleven weeks before surrendering on terms due to lack of victuals and no prospect of relief\textsuperscript{33} while in 1337 Stirling held out against a two month siege throughout April and May.\textsuperscript{34} Edinburgh was also unsuccessfully besieged in June 1337; intriguingly there exists fragmentary evidence indicating that this siege may have been fitfully ongoing from then until the castle’s surrender in 1342, broken only by a brief period of truce in 1340.\textsuperscript{35} If a siege of such lengthy duration is true then the ability of Rokeby and his garrison to hold out is little short of spectacular.

Naturally garrisons could not hold out forever; as with Bothwell there came a point when the garrison became so weakened it was unable to offer further resistance. Yet Bothwell is an unusual example in that most castles surrendered rather than reach a stage of such hopeless desperation. The question therefore is on what basis was it considered acceptable for a constable to offer terms of surrender when besieged. It is instructive to compare how Stirling held out in 1337 with its surrender only five years later, Thomas Rokeby being the constable on both occasions. When it was besieged in 1337 the castle was not only well supplied with men and victuals but the Scots believed Edward III was rapidly advancing towards them with an army; in 1342 Edward III was in France with an army and thus there was scant hope of a strong force coming to Stirling’s relief.\textsuperscript{36} A second factor was that in 1342 victuals were running extremely low – \textit{‘That that had na thing for till eit’} – due to the length and closeness of the siege.\textsuperscript{37} It was the lack of victuals and no immediate prospect of relief, together a hopeless situation, which convinced Rokeby his only option was to surrender.

\textsuperscript{33} Lanercost, p. 220; Scalacronica, p. 58; Barbour incorrectly states that the castle only held out for six days, Bruce, p. 626, n. 192-9.
\textsuperscript{34} Bower, vii., p. 131; Lanercost, p. 303; Wyntoun, vi., p. 94.
\textsuperscript{35} Bower, vii., pp. 238-239, n. 18-22.
\textsuperscript{36} Bower, vii., p. 145.
\textsuperscript{37} Wyntoun, vi, pp. 132-6.
These are recurring themes that decided the outcome of a siege and can be seen in those previously mentioned. Norham was able to hold out as further supplies reached the castle, Berwick castle surrendered after eight weeks as victuals ran out and Wallace's close sieges took castles due to lack of victuals, famine becoming rife amongst the garrisons, combined with little hope of relief as the sieges were timed to coincide with the English army's return into England. Ironically, despite his melodramatic style, it is Barbour who succinctly summarises the three critical factors that decided the outcome of a siege. Explaining why James Douglas destroyed Douglas castle rather than occupying it Barbour states that Douglas simply did not possess the means to withstand the inevitable siege, writing:

\begin{quote}
And it is to peralous thing  
In castell asegyt to be  
Quhar want is off thir thingis thre,  
Vitaill or men with that arming  
Or than gud hop off rescuing.  
\end{quote}

Victuals, manpower and the prospect of relief were the three essential elements that dictated the success or failure of a siege. Naturally these are inter-linked; as victuals decline manpower is weakened leading eventually to a garrison ripe for the taking. If there was seen to be no hope of relief then a constable would usually surrender before things became desperate. The truth that these three factors were critical can be seen in the events of 1314. The inability of the Scots to take Edinburgh by siege was down to the fact it was so well supplied with men and victuals that, 'it dred na manyns mycht,' and this was true of Roxburgh as well, there being enough victuals for a Shrove Tuesday celebration. It may well have been the inability of the force besieging Edinburgh to take the castle that led Douglas to decide on an assault on Roxburgh; that

38 Bruce, p. 211.  
Edinburgh also had to be taken by assault is proof that these castles were well-manned and supplied and consequently were impervious to siege. In contrast Stirling was short on victuals which lead the constable to agree to terms of surrender if relief did not come by an agreed date.\(^40\) It is clear that the three factors of victuals, manpower and relief helped dictate the events of 1314.

A fourth factor which also played a role was the fear that Scottish success bred in garrisons. In 1337 the garrison of Bothwell was aware of the wholesale Scottish capture of castles throughout 1336 and 1337, an apparently inexorable run of success accomplished with the aid of well-equipped siege-train and in particular a certain siege-engine known as 'Bostour'; it was mainly through their fear of the ferocity of this weapon that the garrison of Bothwell and several other castles hastily surrendered.\(^41\) Scottish success could therefore undermine the will of a garrison to resist and once one surrendered others would follow. Just one month after Perth fell to assault in 1313 Dumfries surrendered and this resulted in the ensuing surrender of Caeverlock and Buittle.\(^42\) The surrender of Dundee occurred upon the news of the English defeat at Stirling Bridge and the loss of Edinburgh and Roxburgh could not fail to influence the constable of Stirling castle into agreeing conditional terms of surrender. Such fear was bred by Scottish success and English failure to come to the aid of the garrisons. Yet fear was never a factor on its own; although it is highlighted

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\(^{40}\) *Ibid*, p. 402, n. 810-30. On 25 March 1314 victuals were to be bought and shipped to Stirling castle by Thomas Sanser, *serviens*, with a stipulation that four Scots, two of whom were relations of the constable, were to ensure the goods were taken to the garrison and not to the Scots. The siege must have been underway by then and it is doubtful the victuals reached the beleaguered garrison. The loss of Linlithgow in 1313 and Livingston shortly afterwards, both essential staging posts on the overland route to Stirling, would explain why it was short of victuals. If these supplies were unable to get through they would surely have gone to Edinburgh and Roxburgh which explains why these were relatively well-stocked in 1314, *Rot. Scot.* i, 121a, 111b.

\(^{41}\) Both Bower and Wyntoun single out an engine of this name, one that seems to imply some kind of battering ram capable of breaking through walls, *Bower*, vii, p. 125, *Wyntoun*, vi., p. 92.

\(^{42}\) Barrow, *Robert Bruce*, p. 194.
in the case of Bothwell it needs to be noted that the garrison of Bothwell had also consumed nearly all their victuals nor was there any hope of relief.\textsuperscript{43}

\textit{Lanercost} advances another reason for the surrender of Bothwell claiming it was due to the absence of the constable, the castle having been committed to Robert Ufford who at the time of its fall was attending parliament where he was invested as earl of Suffolk, stating that it was due to his absence that the garrison surrendered so quickly.\textsuperscript{44} The implication is that the captain left in charge was neither as strong nor as capable as the constable and exerted less authority over the garrison. Bothwell is not the only example: in 1358 Berwick was lost whilst the warden of the town, William, baron Greystoke, had left his post to personally attend the king in France;\textsuperscript{45} Wark castle was taken in 1400 when the owner, William Grey, was absent being elsewhere on the king’s service;\textsuperscript{46} William Felton, constable of Roxburgh, was in England when the castle was taken by assault in 1342 whereby ‘he eschapit the deid’;\textsuperscript{47} Edinburgh was unsuccessfully besieged by the Scots whilst the constable, John Stirling, was absent;\textsuperscript{48} it was during an absence of Thomas Gray from Norham that one of his men betrayed the outer bailey of the castle and consequently the second ward and great tower were forced to hold out for three days until the Scots left fearing the return of Gray from the south;\textsuperscript{49} Edinburgh fell to a daylight assault in 1341 whilst the constable, Thomas Rokeby, was resident at his other command of Stirling and in 1313 Linlithgow was similarly taken when the constable was in Edinburgh which was another castle under his command.

\textsuperscript{43} \textit{Wyntoun}, vi, p. 92.
\textsuperscript{44} \textit{Lanercost}, p. 301. \textit{Wyntoun} has the captain who decided upon surrendering as William de Villers, a ‘worthy man’ who held the tower. In contrast Bower gives Villers as the one Englishman killed during the siege, \textit{Wyntoun}, vi., p. 92; \textit{Bower}, vii, p.125.
\textsuperscript{45} \textit{CD’S}, iv, no. 3.
\textsuperscript{46} \textit{Ibid}, no. 542.
\textsuperscript{47} \textit{Wyntoun}, vi., pp. 160-164.
\textsuperscript{48} \textit{Lanercost}, p. 308.
\textsuperscript{49} \textit{Scalacronica}, p. 64.
The similarities between the last two events are striking, indeed so striking that the latter has had doubt cast on its authenticity so closely does it resemble the details of the fall of Edinburgh in 1341.\textsuperscript{50} The Scottish made use of a ruse at Edinburgh, pretending to be merchants from England and gaining access into the castle,\textsuperscript{51} with Rokeby resident at Stirling and a captain subordinate to him at Edinburgh it is entirely possible that the Scots exploited this confusion, maybe claiming that Rokeby knew the merchants with their victuals were expected or indeed that they had been organised by Rokeby himself. It was the confusion created by the lack of the presence of the constable himself that made this audacious daylight assault possible. When it is considered that in 1313 the constable of Linlithgow, Piers Lubaud, was absent as he was also simultaneously constable of Livingston and Edinburgh, the same tactic of daylight attack appears perfectly feasible. Again a captain was in charge at Linlithgow and it is revealing that it appears it was not the constable or even the captain that arranged for the husbandman to enter the peel but the soldiers of the garrison.\textsuperscript{52} The lack of firm authority in the absence of Lubaud appears to have left the garrison unwary and undisciplined thereby facilitating the daylight assault that quickly seized this well-manned peel. The absence of the constable could prove fatal to a garrison’s ability to hold its fortification.

The absolutely critical role of the constable in holding his garrison together in the face of an enemy attack is a constantly recurring theme under both siege and assault. Constables were studied so as to ascertain and exploit their weaknesses, if considered strong leaders then attacks were timed to coincide with their absence, the

\textsuperscript{50} Duncan notes the similarity although he does not question the reliability of both assaults however he does believe the name of the husbandman Barbour provides as being instrumental in taking Linlithgow. William Bunnock, may well be borrowed from the 1341 loss of Edinburgh in which William Bullock was a leading participant, \textit{Bruce}, p. 368, n. 150, n. 153.

\textsuperscript{51} \textit{Bower}, vii., pp. 145-147; \textit{Wyntoun}, vi., pp. 138-144.

\textsuperscript{52} \textit{Tha'i off the pele had wonryn hay And with this Bunnok spokyn had thai To lede thar hay}, \textit{Bruce}. pp. 370-1.
lack of absolute control exercised by a captain allowed for a confusion of command, indeed ambushes were undertaken to capture the constable as Thomas Gray found on two occasions when constable of Cupar. The authority and level of esteem constables could be held in by their garrison is evident in Scottish attempts to exploit this relationship. When John Stirling was captured with over twenty of his garrison in 1338 William Douglas brought them before Edinburgh castle. As well as promising those inside life, limb and goods if they surrendered Douglas also threatened that if they did not then Stirling would be drawn at the tail of horses and hanged on a gallows before the gate while the other prisoners would be beheaded before the eyes of the garrison. Despite these threats the garrison refused to surrender replying that the castle belonged to the king; Douglas' bluff being called Stirling and the prisoners were taken to Dumbarton castle.

This tactic required the captured constable to be a figure of authority who was respected by his garrison. Yet the most startling incident that reveals exactly how critical a strong and respected constable was to a garrison under attack was the extraordinary overthrow of Piers Lubaud by his own garrison in early 1314. Besieged by the Scots the garrison of Edinburgh were apparently suspicious of Lubaud as he had spoken to the Bruce and the siege was set so close. This combined with him being a Gascon and a cousin of Gaveston led to the garrison overthrowing Lubaud and appointing one of their own as constable. Undoubtedly these were contributing factors in their mistrust of Lubaud but overriding these must have been the knowledge that as constable he had already lost Linlithgow and Livingston to the Scots. This record would have been enough to convince the garrison to adopt this radical move to increase their own defensive ability and thus their own safety. It is telling that the

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53 Scalacronica, pp. 48-9.
54 Lanercost, p. 312. This blackmail tactic was also tried by the English during their siege of Dunbar at that time; once again there was no surrender and the threat was not carried out.
garrison appointed another constable from amongst themselves who they believed was imbued with the qualities an effective constable should possess; a man who was wary, wise and active and who would use his knowledge, strength and cunning to try and hold the castle.\textsuperscript{55} It was this constable who rallied the garrison against the surprise assault. He was at the forefront of the savage fighting, leading by example; so pivotal was he to the engagement that Barbour claims it was only upon his death that the Scots were able to win the castle, the garrison finally breaking when he was slain. Barbour stating that if he had not been killed then Thomas Randolph, leading the Scots, would have been in mortal danger.\textsuperscript{56} Similarly it was Fiennes who was in the thick of the fighting during the Scottish assault on Roxburgh, holding out overnight in the tower where he was mortally wounded by an arrow,\textsuperscript{57} and Bramptone who held the remnants of his garrison together over eighteen months of arduous siege. A garrison needed to trust and believe in their constable; this was why Ebles de Mountz was earmarked to take over from Lubaud, the former being a knight with a strong loyal pedigree who had served in the Edinburgh garrison for many years and knew a number of those still serving there.\textsuperscript{58} An effective constable could make or break the ability and will of a garrison to resist attack.

Siege brought with it another onerous responsibility to the constable; the decision of if and when to agree to terms of surrender. The tempting knowledge that by surrendering good terms could be guaranteed, saving life and limb and maybe even the goods of the garrison, rather than enduring the grim fate of a siege presented a fine balance. Despite the temptations of conditional surrender no garrison surrendered without holding out for a period of time. As with Thomas Rokeby at Stirling it was

\textsuperscript{55} Bruce, p. 378.  
\textsuperscript{56} Ibid, pp. 394-396.  
\textsuperscript{57} Ibid, pp. 378-386.  
\textsuperscript{58} See pp. 96-9.
only as time passed and victuals ran low that he looked to conclude terms. The
garrisons that did surrender having agreed conditions were: Stirling (1314, 1342); Bothwell (1337); Berwick castle (1318); Wark and Harbottle (1318); Lochmaben (1384). In the cases of Stirling (1314), Wark, Harbottle and Lochmaben the conditions included a clause that stipulated the garrison would surrender by a specific date if the castle had not been relieved by then. By entering into the latter a constable would be attempting to cover himself from any recriminations that may follow the surrender of his castle, in effect a get-out clause that protected him from any litigation afterwards.

Constables were aware that recriminations could follow the loss of their castle. Alexander Balliol had all his lands and goods confiscated upon losing Selkirk peel in January 1303 due to being under the king’s suspicion, having to wait until 26 March 1305 until they were returned due to petition by the council and in consideration of Balliol’s good services.\(^59\) The greatest recriminations came in 1318 when Berwick was lost after Edward II had entrusted its keeping to the burgesses at their own request. Enraged, he ordered all the goods of the county that were at Kingston-on-Hull to be seized, he had the leading burgesses of Berwick retained as hostages and certain townsmen taken prisoner.\(^60\) In 1358 William baron Greystoke was pardoned by Edward III at the request of the queen for leaving his post as warden of Berwick in 1355 whereupon the town fell to the Scots as he had left to attend the king in person during the war in France;\(^61\) in 1400 William Grey was also pardoned for the loss of his castle of Wark as he had been absent on the king’s service.\(^62\) There were also pardons for the loss of Bewcastle by John Middleton in 1401\(^63\) and in 1385 two pardons for the

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\(^{59}\) *CDS*, ii, no. 1649.
\(^{60}\) *CDS*, iii, no. s 593, 594; *Northern Petitions*, pp. 65-70.
\(^{61}\) *CDS*, iv, no. 3.
\(^{63}\) *Ibid*, iv, no. 585.
earl of Northumberland for allowing Berwick castle fall to the Scots. The loss of Lochmaben in 1384 led to the constable, Alexander Fetherstonhalgh, being arrested and transported under guard to Windsor castle where he faced an inquest into the reasons why he had surrendered the castle.

In light of the number of castles lost in the fourteenth century it is remarkable how few recriminations there were. None of the three major castles of Edinburgh, Roxburgh and Stirling feature in royal inquests; despite being lost a number of times, including instances of surrender, there was no blame attached to the constables who lost these castles, many of whom went on to hold further important commands. In fact the handful of cases in which there were repercussions usually had another reason other than a purely military one with domestic politics often involved. Alexander Balliol’s treatment seems intimately connected with his name and Scottish antecedents when it is considered that the garrison in Selkirk forest had withdrawn from their post leaving his garrison isolated; at the same time as he lost his peel the fortification at Carstairs was also lost but no action was taken against the constable, Walter Burghdon, who instead he took up another position. That the majority of incidents where blame was attached come from the last two decades of the century is due to the Good Parliament of 1376 in which accusations were brought against the king’s chamberlain alleging he had sold the fortress of St. Sauveur to the French and prevented the relief of the castle of Becherel. Although these accusations were a device to remove the chamberlain they effectively politicised the issue of castles being lost to the enemy

64 Ibid, iv, no. 333.
65 Ibid, iv, nos. 327, 331, 342. Fetherstonalgh’s treatment seems harsh in light of the fact no one was willing to be constable of Lochmaben due to its perilous state nor had any relief arrived before the date he agreed to surrender by. The integrity of the castle defences were certainly precarious at the time. Wyntoun, vi, pp. 288-91; Bower, vii., pp. 395-97.
66 The closest this comes is the letter absolving Fiennes from any blame, his loyalty called into question more to avoid paying a debt to his widow than due to any real suspicion, CDS, v, no. 600.
67 From 31 January 1303, immediately after the loss of Carstairs, he was serving in the Berwick garrison with nine of his esquires, E101/11/1, m. 4.
hence the need to pardon those in charge of Wark and Bewcastle. The charges brought
against the earl of Northumberland for losing Berwick followed this precedent but
were instigated by John of Gaunt as part of an ongoing battle for power between the
two men rather than there being a real sense that the earl was to blame. 69

This lack of blame and recrimination clearly illustrates that the constables and
by association their garrisons were not considered by contemporaries to be at fault in
the loss of their castles to the Scots throughout the fourteenth century. Action taken
against constables was so minimal as to be almost non-existent: Thomas Rokeby was
never held responsible for the loss of Edinburgh or surrender of Stirling; no blame was
ever attached to Philip Moubray or Piers Lubaud even though they served Bruce
afterwards. 70 Pardons later in the period appear due to the sensitivity of the issue in the
charged political climate. That virtually no blame was attached to constables and their
garrisons for the loss of castles makes it is clear that contemporaries recognised it was
not due to their negligence or defensive inability that these losses occurred but that it
was due to something entirely beyond their control; the failure of the military system
that was essential to their survival.

It is a mistake to view this period as one in which garrisons were unable to
effectively defend their fortifications. If supplied with the necessary requirements –
manpower, victuals and the prospect of relief – then garrisons could and indeed did
hold out in the face of Scottish attacks. It was the responsibility of the military system
to provide these basic requirements and without them there was only so much a
garrison could do; the great crime was not that the garrisons should have held out
longer but that they should have been saved sooner. 71 Garrisons that fell to surprise
assaults should not be condemned either; the painstaking reconnaissance, planning and

70 The Vita's taint of treachery against Lubaud is without foundation, see pp. 101-2.
71 A similar sentiment is expressed by Watson, Under the Hammer, p. 98.
thorough preparation that went into Scottish assaults made them a formidable method of attack and it was this not the weakness or indiscipline of garrisons that made them successful. Indeed it was the ostensibly simple nature of these assaults that made them so dangerous, a garrison only being aware of the assault when the attack actually went in. That garrisons were beaten by this method should come as no surprise when it is considered that major French fortresses in the 1350s have been seen as being extremely vulnerable to surprise attacks by night; escalade may have been a new peril in France in the late 1340s but it was a tried and tested feature of the Anglo-Scottish wars by then.72

It is telling that, apart from the opportunistic attacks on English castles later in the century, the castles of northern England remained largely impervious to siege and assault. Scottish attacks were mounted against them but almost without exception they failed comprehensively. It was the very fact that these castles were in England which resulted in their garrisons repelling these attacks; external support was at once more immediate and constant along with intelligence on the presence of the enemy and their activities. Although it is true that the Scots never embarked on such an intensive offensive against English castles as they did against the occupied Scottish castles it was undoubtedly the difficulty of operating in hostile territory and an inability to effectively isolate these English castles which precluded their systematic seizure by the Scots. This highlights the crucial importance of external support to garrisons and the near insurmountable straits garrisons in occupied Scottish castles found themselves in when denied this support and effectively left isolated in hostile territory.

The extent to which attacks on garrisons and their fortifications can be regarded as a routine danger during this period needs finally to be addressed. There were two

72 Sumption, Trial by Fire, pp. 46, 98.
major periods in which such attacks proliferated and which taken together only amount
to eighteen years, approximately twenty when Wallace's actions are also taken into
consideration. To those serving in garrisons in these periods an enemy attack by siege
or assault was a very real day-to-day threat and it is this ever present threat of attack
which is important; from the late 1290s until Neville's Cross in 1346 the frightening
prospect of a Scottish attack would never have been far from the minds of garrison
soldiers. Even after Neville's Cross there was always the danger of a sudden assault or
siege like those which befell Berwick castle in 1378 and 1384.

The Scalacronica intriguingly hints that the attacks known to historians may
only be half the story. Thomas Gray was twice ambushed outside his castle of Cupar,
had to fight off a Scottish attack on Norham, was twice besieged in Norham for
lengthy periods while in another attack the outer bailey of his castle was taken. The
incidents the Scalacronica describes are reminiscent of the attack which the constable
of Lochmaben, Tilliol, recounted in a letter,\(^73\) it is only the chance survival of this
letter that reveals this attack.\(^74\) In fact Scottish attacks of varying type and intensity
seem to have been more regular and widespread than existing evidence suggests. As
Gray says of Norham it would 'tax anyone to work out the history of that castle' due to
the 'combats, feats of arms, hardships through lack of supplies, sieges' to which it was
exposed, these numerous attacks occurring in just eleven years.\(^75\) The history of each
front-line castle would be the same complicated story and for the garrison the life-
threatening danger of attack was indeed a daily reality.

Castles fell in spite of the dogged efforts of garrisons to hold them not because
of some inherent inability within garrisons when faced with attack. Credit should be
given to the Scots rather than blame cast onto garrisons. What must be stressed is that

\(^73\) See pp. 275-6.
\(^74\) See chapter on intelligence and communications.
\(^75\) Scalacronica, pp. 48-9, 61-4.
in all these attacks on castles it was the constable and his garrison which was targeted. Siege engines could damage walls but the days of gunpowder weapons which could attempt to dismantle a castle around the garrison had not yet arrived. Consequently it was not the frailty of stone and mortar which was exploited to seize a castle but the human weakness of flesh and bone. The garrison was the weakest point of a castle's defences. As such it was exposed to all the violence and pressure the attackers could bring against it. This should be remembered when assessing the ability and willingness of a garrison to maintain the defence of its castle.

Yet despite this the loss of castles throughout the period was not brought about by a general reluctance or inability of their garrisons to defend them but was due to the garrisons becoming isolated from the external support of the English military system, the support of which was essential for their survival. Denied supplies, reinforcement and the prospect of relief it was not so much a case of whether the castle would fall but of when. That contemporaries recognised this fact can be seen in the lack of official censure against constables for the loss of their castles. The swathe of English-held Scottish castles lost in the wars was not, as often stated, the fault of the garrisons but rather was down to a failure of the infrastructure upon which their continued survival rested. In this context praise must been given to garrisons for their tenacity in continuing to oppose the enemy when finding themselves increasingly isolated. The defence of its fortification may have been the most basic role of a garrison but it was also the most demanding; on the defensive and pinned behind its own walls a garrison experienced the severest test of its strength and commitment it was ever likely to face.

76 It is also evident in the indentures which, in the case of a siege, stipulated a time by which relief should arrive and if this passed then the constable was free to negotiate the surrender of the castle, that agreed between the Crown and the keepers of Roxburgh in 1400 stating that in the event of a 'royal' siege then a relieving army should appear within three months. **CDS**, iv, no. 568.
7.

BEYOND THE WALLS

Although it was the garrison which manned the castle defences when under attack this
was by no means their solitary area of operational activity; the military role of the
garrison was also aggressive, conducting a wide range of operations beyond the
confines of the castle walls encompassing both strategically offensive activities and,
when part of a defensive strategy, tactically offensive operations. The origins of the
castle were aggressive in nature with a principal mechanism being its function as a
fortified base from which troops could dominate the surrounding countryside.1 Yet
despite this the capability of English garrisons operating in the field has been cast into
serious doubt. A detailed analysis of the Scottish invasions of 1138 and 1173-4 has
revealed that forays by the northern garrisons to resist these were a particularly rare
occurrence and that their limited size precluded any engagement outside their castle
walls.2 More pertinently for the period in question here it has been observed that
garrisons were neither large enough nor mobile enough to halt Scottish raids and that
they were less valuable as a defence against invading armies than might be expected.
Indeed garrisons were unable to protect the demesne land of their own castle while the
occurrence of forays has been seen as occasional with only some evidence for them
being undertaken.3 In light of these facts the question is raised as to whether these
garrisons were able to perform this key aggressive role in this period.

The documents frequently cited by historians to illustrate the failure of
garrisons to undertake this role are the letters that Edward II sent to the constables of

1 M. Strickland, ‘Securing the North: Invasion and the Strategy of Defence in twelfth-century Anglo-
165; idem, Armies and Warfare, pp. 206, 210-11.
Bamburgh, Warkworth, Dunstanburgh and Alnwick in September 1322. Edward severely reprimanded them for failing to act against a Scottish raiding party, stating his disbelief at their failure to harass the enemy and that the raiding force has so far not been subject to challenge or damage from the garrisons. The reason for Edward’s ire was twofold; firstly the Scots were infesting the neighbourhood of the castles themselves and secondly the enemy force was small, not more than a hundred men-at-arms and a hundred hobelars, a force the garrisons together could easily outnumber. In no uncertain terms he commanded the constables to do better and make some exploit on the enemy. 4 These letters have been misrepresented; their importance is not in showing garrisons to be incapable of aggressive action but that such activity was an expected and regular activity in which they should be engaged, in fact so regular that their inaction on this occasion is greeted by disbelief and a stern rebuke. It is telling that in the same month Edward thanked the constable of Norham for his intelligence concerning the Scots; the latter escaped censure due to his obvious activity. 5 The reasons for Edward’s anger are also instructive; the Scots being in the neighbourhood of the castles and relatively small in number. Being superior in number and not having to stray far from their castles were consequently circumstances in which a garrison should be acting aggressively. Although unable to halt a major invasion force garrisons were expected to take on significant Scottish raids in the field.

Contemporary Scottish commanders certainly did not dismiss the threat a garrison could pose as their strategy in 1327 demonstrates. Three battles invaded England, one immediately investing Norham and another investing Alnwick while a third under Bruce raided Northumberland with impunity. Upon Bruce’s return unsuccessful attempts were made to take these castles but it is clear that the priority

4 CDS, iii, no. 783.
5 Ibid, no. 787. Edward II was in Durham at the time and would have been in receipt of the latest intelligence about this force.
had been to block these garrisons in their castles so they could not operate in the Scottish rear. Similarly in late 1297 Carlisle was besieged for a month by a section of the invading Scottish host while the bulk of the army under Wallace continued further south and ravaged northern England. Tellingly both Wallace and Bruce thought it necessary to detach part of their army to neutralise the active threat of the garrisons and it follows that the Scots certainly thought the garrisons capable of significant offensive action.

These then were contemporary attitudes of Edward II, Bruce and Wallace to the offensive abilities of garrisons and it is clear that garrisons were expected to undertake an active role beyond their walls. Further proof is contained more formally within orders and indentures concerning garrisons. The file of indentures for the keeping of castles in Scotland in late 1302 include several which specifically refer to the making of forays, stating that if such a foray is made out of the constable's bailiwick then he and his men would be paid full wages for its duration. These forays were not to be instigated by individual constables themselves but by command of the king or his lieutenant thus envisioning centrally controlled and by implication co-ordinated aggressive operations. These stipulations for making forays were written into the indentures for Edinburgh, Jedburgh, Roxburgh and Berwick and clearly demonstrate that garrisons were to be used aggressively. Earlier in 1298 instructions were given to the commanders of Berwick stating that soldiers there under the king's pay were not to make a foray without an aid from the garrison of 30 men-at-arms and 500 foot with the added stipulation that the leader of the foray had to be the warden of the town at one time and the constable of the castle at another, in short one of them must remain within the garrison. In the same year further evidence of the intention of conducting

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6 CDS, ii, no. 1321.
7 Ibid, no. 1022.
offensive operations comes in the form of a memorandum issued to those in command at Roxburgh, Jedburgh and Berwick with regard to making forays against the Scots. These clearly defined and formal instructions leave no doubt that garrisons were intended to operate in the field during the early years of the war and reveal just why Edward II was so furious in 1322.

So far the evidence assembled reveals that garrisons were expected to operate aggressively whenever a suitable opportunity arose. The question to address now is the extent to which these expectations and orders were carried out in practice. To achieve this it is first necessary to recognise that forays were not solely the province of the orders of the king or his lieutenant but could be determined by the initiative of the constable himself. It was ultimately the responsibility of the constable to ensure the aggressive role of his garrison was performed when the opportunity arose.

The first glimpse of garrisons operating in the field is in the survival of several letters chiefly concerning the constable of Roxburgh, Robert Hastang. In 1298 he informed the king of his intention to attack a Scottish force when it returned to the Scottish border and in 1301 he was involved in the arrangements for a foray against robbers in the woods around Roxburgh which was to involve the Jedburgh garrison and troops under Alexander Balliol and Hugh de Audley. It was these same men along with Walter de Huntercombe who arranged a meeting in September 1300 to plan how best to secure the March although nothing could be concluded as only Audley and the Hastang brothers turned up; in this case the ‘securing of the march’ must surely have involved provisions for co-ordinated aggressive action. Robert Hastang was involved in attacks on the Scots in 1298, seven horses being lost when Hastang and his garrison were ‘making sallies’ against the Scots, the wording clear that the garrison

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8 Ibid, no. 999.
9 Ibid, nos. 1221, 1226, 1227.
10 Stevenson, ii, pp. 417-8.
made multiple attacks. Detailed arrangements were made in December 1298 for a co-
ordinated foray involving a combined force which, amongst others, included troops
from the garrisons of Jedburgh, Roxburgh, Edinburgh, Berwick and Norham. John
Kingston, constable of Edinburgh, was to decide when these forces should assemble at
Edinburgh to undertake a foray to aid Stirling which they would mount 'all together.' Robert Tilliol, constable of Lochmaben, requested one hundred armed horse under a
good commander so he and his garrison could move against the Scots infesting the
surrounding countryside in September 1301, the lack of troops 'to ride upon' the Scots
leading to the area rising up against the English. In a separate letter Tilliol declares his
garrison have no fear of these Scots and relates that the knight William de Heriz, 'one
of our companions' and by implication a member of the garrison, was taken by the
Scots during a sally by the garrison. Kingston also requested reinforcements to
enable him to make a raid, his garrison at Edinburgh being insufficient for the purpose;
in response the king ordered Simon Fraser to be ready to support him with 20 barded
horses.

Here then in the early years of the war garrisons can be seen engaged in and
planning aggressive activities many of which were strategically defensive in nature. In
direct contrast to Edward II's criticism of inactive garrisons in 1322 there were two
occasions on which constables were so determined to mount forays that they requested
reinforcements to facilitate this. The freedom of the individual constable to initiate
forays is also evident in these accounts; Tilliol determined to put down the local
country and the foray Kingston needed reinforcements for being explicitly described as
a raid he wished to make. Constables would have been under the same remit that was

11 CDS, ii, no. 1007.
12 Stevenson, ii, pp. 339-41.
14 CDS, ii, no. 1034.
15 The aggressive activities of Kingston and Hastang suggest this was not mere posturing on their part.
given to Patrick Dunbar in 1298 when he was appointed captain of the forces and castles in the east march, one that instructed him to undertake forays when he and the officers under his command saw fit opportunity. Such aggressive operations can be seen to encompass a wide spectrum of activities undertaken by garrisons ranging from local, tactical actions in defence of their castle, to long-range forays of strategic importance. It is to this various range of activities that attention needs to be focussed.

At the lowest end of the spectrum of aggressive activity by a garrison was the mounting of sorties against an enemy that was attacking their castle, in effect a counter-attack to preserve the integrity of the castle. The sally from Lochmaben in which Heriz was captured is a prime example of this. Another was the opportunistic foray of the constable Robert Manners against the Scottish watch that was encamped before Norham in 1327, Manners exploiting the flooded river which separated the watch from the main Scottish force. The Scalacronica details several occasions on which Thomas Gray’s garrison of Norham executed the defence of their castle in the field: when William Marmion, complete with his gilded war helm, sallied forth the garrison mounted a foray to support him putting the Scottish force arrayed before Norham to flight and cutting down those they caught in a pursuit over several miles; a Scottish attempt to seize cattle from the vicinity of Norham resulted in a foray by part of the garrison and then a further attack by Gray which drove the Scots across the Tweed with pursuit only prevented as the garrison was not mounted; an attempt to ambush Gray when he was in charge of Cupar castle ended with Gray getting back into the castle where ‘he found his men sallying forth’ in support, an action which would again have resulted in putting the Scots to flight. That Norham was considered to be the most perilous place in the country and it was to here that Marmion went to prove

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16 CDS, ii, no. 1025.
his valour demonstrates that it was routine for the garrison to defend the castle in the
field; he would have won little renown if the garrison permanently remained behind its
walls.\(^{18}\) These brief counter-attacks, limited in scope and distance but of tremendous
importance, were the tactically offensive operations which garrisons would have
engaged in most frequently of all.

At the opposite end of the spectrum were much more ambitious and audacious
operations which could have significant strategic implications the most spectacular of
which was that undertaken by John Stirling, constable of Edinburgh, in May 1336.
Receiving intelligence that Cupar castle was besieged by the Scots Stirling took 40
men-at-arms and 80 archers from his garrison at Edinburgh and secretly crossed the
Forth in 32 boats. Setting fire to two villages – to make his force seem larger – Stirling
and his men descended on the Scots whilst the garrison of Cupar also sallied out
against the besiegers; panicked and believing the English army had arrived the Scots
fled leaving behind their siege engines, arms and stores. Having pursued the Scots and
killed those they could catch Stirling and his force returned to Cupar where they seized
the abandoned baggage and burnt the siege engines. Stirling’s men then returned to
Edinburgh, the whole escapade taking only four days.\(^{19}\) This raid was astonishingly
successful achieving the double victory of relieving Cupar castle and destroying
precious Scottish siege engines.

Comparable to this are the aggressive actions of Robert Umfraville whilst
constable of Roxburgh in the late 1390s and early 1400s. His most famous exploit took
place in 1399 when a Scottish force raided across the border destroying Wark castle
and harassing Northumberland, a raid timed to exploit the distraction of the ongoing
parliament that was to officially crown Henry IV. Acting on his own initiative

\(^{18}\) Scalacronica, pp. 48-50, 61-4.
\(^{19}\) Lanercost, pp. 296-7; CDS, iii, p. 354.
Umfraville moved with his garrison against the Scots and routed them at Fulhope-law in Coquetdale, destroying the enemy and taking many prisoners. To recognise Umfraville’s decisive action Henry IV invested him as a Knight of the Garter. The next year, 1400, Umfraville again led his garrison against a major Scottish incursion, this time routing them at Rede-swire where important prisoners again fell into his hands. On two separate occasions Umfraville therefore actively sought out, took on and defeated Scottish raiding forces with his garrison; this is a classic example of a garrison acting aggressively to secure the surrounding area.

These engagements demonstrate that although a garrison could not halt a Scottish army it could oppose an element of an army or a strong Scottish raiding force. In June 1340 a Scottish force invaded across the border but the men of the March failed to oppose it and it was a combined force from the garrisons of Roxburgh, Wark and Norham that eventually fell on the Scots as they returned to the border loaded with booty, the English force taking 80 prisoners. In the late 1340s William Douglas and his men entered Ettrick forest in the vicinity of Roxburgh where John Coupland was constable. Coupland gathered men from his garrison – ‘a very large armed band’ – and moved into the area to reclaim Teviotdale to English allegiance however Douglas’ men proved stronger and put Coupland’s band to flight. A Scottish force under Alexander Ramsay based itself ‘underground’ at Hawthornden in c.1338 from where it raided seizing fodder and prisoners. To end this torment the ‘garrisons of the English march’, complemented by reinforcements, ‘secretly gathered’ and surprised the Scots in open country. A feigned Scottish retreat followed by a counter-attack won the day with

20 Hodgson, part ii, ii, pp. 48-49; Northumberland Families, 2 vols. (Newcastle-upon-Tyne, 1968, 1970), i, p. 214. Henry IV no doubt gained popular mileage out of rewarding Umfraville with this honour, an astute political ploy at the start of Henry's reign. Umfraville was also keeper of Harbottle and may well have used troops from this garrison in conjunction with those from Roxburgh.
22 Wyntoun, v, p. 186; Bower claims Coupland was jealous of Douglas' success, Bower, vii, p. 271.
many English troops being captured including Robert Manners, the English leader.\textsuperscript{23} A more successful note was struck by a chance encounter in 1335. Returning from a plundering expedition in Scotland a company drawn from English garrisons – the Roxburgh garrison is specifically mentioned – encountered a Scottish band that was escorting the Count of Namur back to the border; in the ensuing fight William Douglas was forced to flee and the earl of Moray was captured.\textsuperscript{24}

This chance encounter adds another level to the spectrum of aggressive activities undertaken by garrisons; a foray for plunder and booty. The garrison force was returning from Scotland where it 'had seized booty' in a 'plundering expedition'.\textsuperscript{25} In 1337/38 a section of the Edinburgh garrison drove a large number of beasts away from Calder Muir while the foray in which the constable, John Stirling, was captured is described as one in which he and his garrison were aiming to take 'some booty'.\textsuperscript{26} A raid along the Firth of Forth by the captain of Berwick in 1388 had as its aim the making of profit from such booty.\textsuperscript{27} In 1298 John Kingston ordered his garrison to secure all the beasts in the locality of Edinburgh.\textsuperscript{28} One of the charges alleged against Andrew Harclay in 1319 was that on receiving the order to muster the county array to make a sortie he had sent messengers to tell the local men not to come as he would soon be in charge himself. The result of this was that news of the intended foray spread to those around Hermitage, the target of the attack, and consequently they removed their goods in anticipation.\textsuperscript{29}

\textsuperscript{23} Bower, vii, p. 47. Exactly which garrisons were involved is unfortunately impossible to deduce.
\textsuperscript{24} Bower, vii, p. 115; Lanercost, p. 293.
\textsuperscript{25} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{26} Bower, vii, p. 133; Lanercost, p. 308. Though it was also a sortie to defend the besieged castle.
\textsuperscript{28} Stevenson, ii, p. 304.
\textsuperscript{29} CDS, iii, no. 675.
depriving the enemy and profiting the garrison and appear to be a frequent activity of garrisons situated in hostile territory.

Rather than seeking profit the starving garrison of Berwick undertook a desperate raid for victuals on St. Valentine’s Day, 1316. Prisoners and cattle were taken in a foray that extended to within two leagues of Melrose Abbey but disaster struck on their return when they were attacked at a ford by the Scots losing all the supplies, most of their horses and more significantly 20 men-at-arms and 60 foot. The raid had been launched against the orders of the warden and the weakened garrison stood in severe peril.\(^30\) It was to avoid just such a situation that provisions were made regarding the mounting of forays in orders and indentures; a defeated sortie could mean potential disaster for the castle in which the attacking force was based. The danger Edinburgh was in following John Stirling’s capture has already been described\(^31\) while Norham was endangered in 1355 when Thomas Gray was captured along with men of his garrison when they stood and fought against a Scottish ambush sprung by William Douglas after Gray and his men had been drawn away from their castle by William de Ramsay’s band who had plundered the town of Norham.\(^32\) This ruse by the Scots has unmistakable echoes of those conducted against local Scottish castles between 1306 and 1312 which themselves underscore the fact that garrisons were apt to act aggressively if the chance arose and take the field against their enemy. Being lured into a trap was a danger garrisons acting aggressively always faced but the numerous incidents of them mounting such actions illustrates it did not curb their willingness to act aggressively.

\(^{30}\) \textit{CDS}, iii, no. 477. The term ‘looting’ appears somewhat misplaced considering the privations of the garrison, \textit{Bruce}, pp. 566-70.

\(^{31}\) See p. 232.

\(^{32}\) \textit{Bower}, vii, p. 279; \textit{Wyntoun}, vi, p. 206.
Indeed the capture of constables is an indicator in itself of the extent to which garrisons operated in the field. As noted John Stirling and Thomas Gray were both taken whilst engaged in forays while Robert Hastang was captured near Roxburgh castle in 1301 and John Felton, when constable of Alnwick, was taken prisoner in 1317.\textsuperscript{33} Another indicator are the frequent payments for restoration of horses killed in the king’s service that were made to garrison soldiers and which are often included among payments of wages to the garrison. The payroll for 1311/12 is an excellent example. In Roxburgh alone eight horses were lost in service, one of which was a warhorse valued at £20, and the garrison of Linlithgow lost eleven horses in the king’s service valued altogether at a substantial total of £99.13s.4d. which included a warhorse worth £20 and two of £10. The Edinburgh garrison lost the extraordinary total of seventeen horses including one valued at £20 and another of exceptional quality worth £40.\textsuperscript{34} The numbers lost and the fact that quality warhorses were among these clearly indicates that these losses were the result of action beyond the walls of the castle. Surviving pay accounts are littered with similar restoration payments and are proof that garrisons were regularly engaged in aggressive operations.

The most emphatic evidence that garrisons widely operated in the field comes from the number of mounted soldiers stationed within the garrisons. To be effective beyond their walls garrison soldiers needed to have mobility (i.e. to be mounted); foot-soldiers could operate effectively within sight of the castle walls but horses were needed for anything more.\textsuperscript{35} The sizeable numbers of mounted soldiers retained within garrisons has already been illustrated. Knights, men-at-arms and sergeants each possessed more than one horse and these traditional mounted soldiers were complemented in garrisons first by the emergence of the hobelar and then, from the

\textsuperscript{33} Watson, \textit{Under the Hammer}, p. 139; Moor, \textit{Knights of Edward I}, ii, p. 8.
\textsuperscript{34} CDS, iii, app. vii, pp. 407-8, 410, 412.
\textsuperscript{35} As Thomas Gray and his soldiers found out when defending Norham, see above.
1330s, by the mounted archer. In 1311/12 the Roxburgh garrison could muster approximately 76 mounted soldiers and Linlithgow up to 113; in 1322, at its peak, Bamburgh could put into the field 107, Warkworth 101 and Dunstanburgh 95. John Stirling’s garrison at Edinburgh in 1335/36 contained 71 ‘hobelars and archers’ as well as several knights and a large number of men-at-arms; these archers would have been mounted archers and as such were the highly mobile troops that enabled Stirling to undertake his audacious foray. Large numbers of mounted soldiers were not present merely to defend the walls of their castle, a task that could and in all likelihood was routinely accomplished on foot as Thomas Gray’s defence of Norham illustrates, but were there in a primarily aggressive capacity. A multitude of mounted soldiers was an extra cost and burden in terms of expense and fodder but it was deemed necessary to ensure garrisons possessed a powerful aggressive capability. The only reason large numbers of hobelars and mounted archers were a permanent component of garrisons was because they allowed garrisons to effectively undertake field operations.

It is also incorrect to assume that foot-soldiers held back these mounted troops as many forays were conducted by a section of the garrison rather than its entirety. This was a matter of security for the castle as well as to ensure mobility. John Stirling’s ill-fated foray that ended with his capture consisted of two or three knights and about 20 men-at-arms, an indication that only a small component of the garrison was involved and none of the mounted archers. Occasionally almost the entire garrison was involved in an operation well beyond the castle; John Stirling’s audacious Cupar sortie involving 40 men-at-arms and 80 archers while in 1322 the entire garrisons of Warkworth and Dunstanburgh were called into action at Byland. In the

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36 Lanercost, p. 312; Bower’s claim that Stirling had 500 men fighting for him in this action is wholly erroneous, Bower, vii, p. 139.
37 CDS, iii, p. 354.
38 BL Stowe Mss 553, fos. 56r-57r.
early years of the century the preponderance of foot-soldiers was dealt with by the mobile elements of several garrisons operating in conjunction with one another as seen in the planning of the 1298 foray to relieve Stirling. Garrisons were therefore never hindered in their mobility by the presence of foot-soldiers within their ranks if a foray called for rapid movement.

Dedicated strike forces also co-existed within the garrisoning network. Berwick was used in early 1306 as a base from which Aymer de Valence launched mounted expeditions and in 1299 several officers and their men assembled at Carlisle to await a foray from that town. The best example of a permanent fast-moving strike force is that commanded by William Latimer which was based in the town of Roxburgh for several years and which numbered 38 men-at-arms in 1301.\(^{39}\) In autumn 1302 this force, now of 20 men-at-arms, is specifically described as being ‘appointed to ride when necessary from Roxburgh in divers parts of Scotland’. At the same time John Segrave agreed to make forays from Berwick ‘when necessary’ with a troop of 30 men-at-arms.\(^{40}\) Also in autumn 1302 a force of 71 men-at-arms which was to make mounted expeditions was based in the castles of Dumfries and Lochmaben under John de St. John.\(^{41}\) Andrew Harclay’s force based in Carlisle lost horses in engagements on Stainmoor and at Penresax in 1314 and suffered further losses in forays undertaken between June and October 1315.\(^{42}\) Highly mobile strike forces such as these were based in towns held by the English due to the greater space and resources that could sustain them there and complemented the mobile elements of the castle garrisons in facilitating fast-moving field operations.

\(^{39}\) E101/9/16.  
\(^{40}\) CDS, ii, nos. 1777, 1081, 1321.  
\(^{41}\) Ibid, no. 1324; E101/10/5.  
\(^{42}\) CDS, iii, no. 516.
That co-operation and communication existed between garrisons allowed them to formulate and undertake field operations in concert and consequently to attempt more ambitious operations. The letters of Hastang and Audley detailing preparations for forays to be undertaken between several garrisons have already been mentioned. The foray of December 1298 to aid Stirling was to consist of the following number of soldiers: Simon Fraser, 20 mounted men; Alexander Balliol, 10; Walter de Huntercombe, in charge of Northumberland, 30; earl Patrick, 10; the Jedburgh garrison, 10; Roxburgh garrison, 40; Berwick town, 30; Edinburgh garrison, 30 'at the least'; Norham garrison, 20. Here then five separate garrisons were to provide the bulk of the force for one large-scale co-ordinated foray of real strategic significance and the commander who was to decide on the gathering of these forces was the constable of Edinburgh, John Kingston, with Edinburgh itself selected as the place of muster. It was the Roxburgh and Jedburgh garrisons that made up part of the force that moved against robbers in 1301 and chiefly the combination of the Wark and Norham garrisons that defeated the returning Scottish raiding force in 1340. Edward II's reprimand of 1322 explicitly commands the guilty garrisons to send out spies and to do some exploit 'in concert with other garrisons."

Another form of co-operation can be seen in garrisons coming to the aid of one another. As the 1298 foray was to relieve pressure on Stirling castle so the main purpose of John Stirling's foray in 1336 was the relief of Cupar castle. After the siege of Alnwick had been lifted in 1327 and the Scots had moved on against Warkworth and Norham, Henry Percy tried to draw the Scots away by launching a counter-raids into Teviotdale. In 1315 on three occasions Roger Damory led a detachment from

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43 Strickland’s conclusion that the northern castles formed no cohesive network in the twelfth century and operated as largely independent, self-contained units, is confined to those periods when a major Scottish army was operating in the area thus inhibiting communication, 'Securing the North', p. 212.
44 Stevenson, ii, p. 341; Watson, Under the Hammer, p. 76.
45 CDS, ii, nos. 1226, 1227; CDS, iii, no. 783.
Knaresborough to assist forces further in the north. Here then garrisons were operating effectively as a network, helping each other when possible and undertaking field operations together. The proximity of certain castles facilitated this co-operation as did the individual relationships of constables – in terms of being related to or knowing one another – as did the appointment of a lieutenant of Scotland in overall control of two or more castles and the distribution of royal forces in several fortifications like those spread throughout 19 different fortifications under Arundel in 1317. Even when hard-pressed under the strain of warfare garrisons were able to cooperate with one another in the form of planning and mounting offensive operations together or coming to the aid of each other. This capacity for co-operation enhanced the aggressive capabilities of garrisons allowing for more ambitious and far-reaching operations in the field.

In fact garrisons were no strangers to working in conjunction with field forces as well; the arrival of an English army in their vicinity did not automatically relegate them into a passive and redundant role. In reality garrisons were frequently called upon as pools of manpower from which to draw extra soldiers for specific operations. Approximately 93 men-at-arms, five hobelars, three crossbowmen and 1,400 archers were drawn from the garrisons of Berwick, Roxburgh, Jedburgh and Lochmaben for Edward I's campaign of 1300 and the army that mustered in July of the following year included a complement of 272 garrison soldiers comprising of: 110 from the garrison of Berwick; 100 archers and 32 hobelars from Roxburgh and Jedburgh; 20 archers from Edinburgh. Again in 1303 41 soldiers from the Berwick garrison were ordered

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48 CDS, ii, no. 1229; Watson, *Under the Hammer*, pp. 107, 119.
by the king to be at Roxburgh in May on the day appointed for the levies to muster there for the expedition of that year.49

The most detailed evidence of garrisons undertaking this kind of activity comes in the Wardrobe Book of Henry de Abingdon for 1303-4. Interestingly there are two sections containing payments for garrisons; one is the normal set of financial accounts for garrisons staying within their castles but the other is contained within the section detailing payments for the retinues which constituted the army that served in Scotland during the spring and summer of 1304. It can be seen that during this period a total of 266 garrison soldiers served as part of the army being drawn from the garrisons of Berwick, Linlithgow, Kirkintilloch, Edinburgh, Jedburgh, Roxburgh and Lochmaben. The primary objective of this campaign was the siege of Stirling castle which lasted from late April until July and although there is variation among the dates for which components of the various garrisons were serving with the army all but two fall between May and July, the two exceptions extending until August. The numbers drawn from individual garrisons range from a mere four crossbowmen from Jedburgh to a substantial force of 94 foot-soldiers from Linlithgow. The duration of service varies from just seven days for the 34 archers of Edinburgh up to a period of slightly over three months, 10 May until 15 August, for the forces from Linlithgow while 24 crossbowmen and their vintenar from the Berwick garrison remained with the army from 1 May until 21 August.50

The scale and complexity of the involvement of garrisons serving alongside the army is revealed in these accounts for the payment of wages. The large garrisons of Berwick and Linlithgow provided significant numbers of troops for the duration of the campaign whilst other garrisons provided just as important albeit smaller numbers. The

49 CDS, ii, no. 1356.
50 BL Add Mss 8835, fo. 90; CDS, ii, no. 1599, refers to these garrison forces extremely briefly although it adds Dumfries and rather unhelpfully ‘others’ also supplied troops.
dates during which components of garrisons served with the army also varied from garrison to garrison. This was the basis of the organisation by which significant numbers of garrison soldiers served alongside the army in the field, a role for which they were effectively classed and received wages as another component of the army despite their identity as garrisons. At the end of their period of army service they returned to their original garrisons. Although 1304 was a time of English dominance which allowed garrisons to be moved with more freedom this same set-up must have operated for the components of garrisons serving in the preceding years. Indeed winter was a notoriously dangerous time for garrisons yet the Berwick garrison provided three constables and 120 archers that remained with the remnants of the army from 23 December until 12 January. The separate section in the accounts for garrison forces serving in the field as part of the army proves that such activity was not an unusual occurrence and arrangements for special payment for this were already in place.

Service as a part of an army could therefore either involve numbers in their hundreds drawn from a range of garrisons or alternatively a smaller number from perhaps one or two garrisons. Only chance survivals of records and a piecing together of these can reveal the extent of these operations. During 1300 there were 57 men-at-arms assigned to stay in the garrison of Roxburgh but on 6 July 39 of these left to join the king’s army and on the same day ten of the 40 crossbowmen and 60 of the 160 archers also departed to join up with the army. On 4 July, of the 21 men-at-arms within Jedburgh, 12 left to meet up with the army. Similarly eight constables with 900 archers under their command left the Berwick garrison on 23 July to go to the king’s army.51 This considerable movement of men from garrisons to the army in July 1300 indicates just some of the components that made up the large garrison force mentioned above.

that was engaged in the campaign of that year; once again the variance in dates and numbers is evident although the inclusion of these men amongst the normal garrison accounts indicates that improvements in allotting the pay of such men had taken place by 1304, possibly as early as 1301 as their inclusion in the army payroll of that year suggests.

This pattern of making use of garrisons as a pool of manpower to support a field-army is evident in the first quarter of the period but has changed towards its close. At the English siege of Berwick in October 1319 there were 157 troops from Barnard castle and 24 hobelars from Norham present52 while the desperate battle at Byland in 1322 saw 215 garrison troops involved.53 In 1385 Henry Percy, the warden of Berwick, and the joint constables of Roxburgh, Thomas Swinburne and Richard Tempest, were ordered to attend the king for twenty-nine days whilst the latter personally led an army into Scotland. Percy was to provide 100 men-at-arms and 200 archers and the constables of Roxburgh 40 men-at-arms and 80 archers however in both cases these men were to be 'beyond their garrison', in other words in addition to their garrisons.54 Here garrisons are not acting as reserves from which to draw extra men; the garrison remains in place whilst extra troops have to be raised by the constables from outside of the garrison to complement the field-army. Although the Roxburgh garrison was well-manned Richard II was keen it should stay that way and his specific order that both it and Berwick should not contribute men signifies that the retention of the castle was of overriding importance.

It is tempting to interpret this specification that the garrison should not be used as part of an argument that claims garrisons lost their aggressive character towards the end of the fourteenth century. The order of 1385 and the developing entanglement of

52 CDS, iii, no. 668.
53 BL Stowe Mss 553, fos. 57v-58r.
54 CDS, iv, no. 340.
political repercussions for the loss of castles are easily linked together to suggest that constables were unwilling to run the risks of offensive action, risks that could involve the loss of their castle.\textsuperscript{55} In 1385 even the king appears more concerned with the safety of Roxburgh than gaining a ready and experienced body of troops for his army. Yet this is to ignore certain facts. In the later fourteenth century the only major fortress in English hands apart from Berwick was Roxburgh hence Richard II's concern for its safeguard. In these circumstances, and with few garrisons in existence, there was little reason for the garrison of either Roxburgh or Berwick to go on the offensive as part of the army. However they did engage in offensive operations themselves as the raid from Berwick in 1388 and Umfraville's forays from Roxburgh demonstrate. Clearly these garrisons never lost their aggressive spirit or role.

One intriguing question remains concerning the field operations of garrisons; did they participate in any of the battles of the Anglo-Scottish wars? There is almost no direct evidence for this but in light of the regularity with which garrisons acted as a component of an army or field-force it would seem extremely likely. One of the few engagements for which there is definite proof is that of Humbleton in 1402 where it has been noted that amongst those present at the battle were the lieutenant of Roxburgh and the constable of Dunstanburgh, the chance mention of their names implicit in placing sections of both garrisons at the battle.\textsuperscript{56} The loss of two warhorses by John Kingston in the engagement at Methven in 1306 almost certainly places elements of the Edinburgh garrison there.\textsuperscript{57} Frequently it is only through guesswork, probability and ambiguous statements that further participation in battles can be looked for. Richard de Waldegrave, constable of Stirling, was certainly killed during the battle of

\textsuperscript{55} See pp. 234-6.
\textsuperscript{57} \textit{CDS}, v, no. 472(t).
Stirling Bridge in 1298 and a letter describing the aftermath in which the writer claimed that he and other Englishmen attempting to escape from the rout rushed into Stirling castle and were thus able to keep it from falling to the Scots clearly infers that some if not all of the garrison had been engaged and either killed or wounded in the battle.\textsuperscript{58} Bannockburn raises a similar probability of the Stirling garrison playing a part in a battle which was fought immediately before them although there is no evidence with which to support this, any such argument relying on the precedent of hard-pressed garrisons sallying out to aid a relieving force as the Cupar garrison ventured out to aid John Stirling’s men.

However there is a strong possibility that elements of the Berwick garrison were involved at Bannockburn. Edward II’s desperate need for foot-soldiers occurred whilst in Northumberland and it is unlikely that the significant number of foot-soldiers in Berwick went unnoticed. On 17 August there was a substantial reinforcement of the Berwick garrison when a royal household force of 21 knights, 85 esquires and fifteen sergeants-at-arms were ordered there by the king,\textsuperscript{59} an emergency measure which indicates Berwick may also have contributed troops of this stature to the army that fought at Bannockburn. In light of this circumstantial evidence and the situation immediately prior to Bannockburn it would be surprising if significant numbers of troops from the Berwick garrison were not a component of the army that fought at Bannockburn. That the constable of Bamburgh was taken prisoner at Bannockburn suggests elements from other Northumberland garrisons may also have been present.\textsuperscript{60}

\textsuperscript{58} Stevenson, ii, p. 232. Barrow relates that Waldegrave along with most of his garrison was slain in the battle, \textit{Robert Bruce}, p. 130, n. 3.

\textsuperscript{59} E159/101, mm. 156-7. There is the possibility that the call for reinforcements for Berwick was to ensure it was in effect over-manned so that there was no possibility of losing it as it would surely be the next objective of the Scots. However the urgent tone of the demands for foot-soldiers and the extraordinary reinforcement of knights and esquires being almost all from the king’s household suggests a more desperate situation.

\textsuperscript{60} \textit{Ancient Petitions}, pp. 61-2.
Along with Humbleton the only other battle at which it is certain garrisons were present is that at Byland which took place on 14 October 1322. On that date Ralph Neville, in charge of Warkworth, took his whole garrison of 40 men-at-arms and 80 hobelars to the ‘fight’ at Byland; the next day he is recorded as having 80 hobelars but only 34 men-at-arms. Similarly the constable of Dunstanburgh, Roger Maduit, took his entire garrison of 18 men-at-arms and 77 hobelars to Byland from which he left with all his men-at-arms but only 64 hobelars. In this case not only is there documentary evidence that these two garrisons participated in the battle but also proof that they suffered casualties in the engagement. Their involvement at Byland was due to the desperate situation caused by the unexpected arrival of a Scottish army which caught out Edward II’s disorganised force that was moving south. Suddenly aware of the danger Edward quickly ordered these nearby garrisons to come and supplement his beleaguered force. He also looked towards Carlisle for help, ordering Harclay to muster the necessary troops. The ready pool of seasoned troops provided by garrison soldiers led to their deployment in this desperate battle and it is likely the immediate readiness of such a pool led to their use in more engagements than the surviving records reveal.

Clearly there was a wide spectrum of aggressive activities that garrisons undertook throughout this period ranging from local counter-attacks to defend against an immediate attack on their castle to ambitious forays that could have strategic implications as well as participation in major set-piece battles. The evidence for the regularity of these actions in the field comes from the circumstantial details of horses lost and constables captured as well as being retrieved from financial accounts and the description of individual actions in chronicles. Just as important is that factors which

61 BL Stowe Mss 553, fos. 57v-58v. Seven of Ralph Neville’s men-at-arms were knights.
62 Bruce, p. 684; n. 353.
could be seen to deny garrisons their offensive capability have been discounted; they
did operate together, co-ordinating their actions, mounting forays as a combined force,
while they were also numerous and mobile enough to strike effectively at the enemy.
By the start of the 1320s garrisons had been honed into fast-moving strike forces.
Whether acting in concert or on own their own garrisons could use their aggressive
capabilities to accomplish tasks of tactical and strategic importance. Nor did they lose
their aggressive role when an English field-army was operating in their theatre rather
they acted as a key source of support and reinforcement, complementing it by sections
becoming involved in the operations of the army in Scotland and effectively operating
as a temporary field-force.

This is not to deny the over-riding importance of field-forces which remained
the principal mechanism of both offensive and defensive warfare. Indeed several of the
notable forays by garrisons took place when an army was in the immediate vicinity, for
example the Edinburgh garrison’s foray to Cupar, which suggests that there was a
greater freedom to act aggressively when field-forces were in the region. Garrisons
were always an interrelated component of a military system of which the host or field-
army was the main factor. This is the key to understanding the field role of garrisons
when operating alone; the need to recognise their limitations. They were never able to
halt a Scottish army or major raiding force, were unable to lift a siege themselves and
land right up to the walls of the castle itself could be plundered and destroyed by the
Scots. Yet garrisons were not expected to be able to oppose these kinds of threats.
There is no contemporary criticism directed at constables who failed to act against
forces much larger than their own. Garrisons had a wide variety of aggressive roles to
fulfil but these came within a clearly defined spectrum which constables were careful
not to overstep as to do so could be fatal not only to the garrison but also the castle.
There was a fine balance to be struck in time of close warfare between ensuring the safety of the castle and undertaking attacks; it was more valuable for a constable to ensure the preservation of his garrison for aggressive actions after a Scottish army had passed rather than to throw it helplessly into its path.

The true importance of Edward II’s letter of 1322 is not his immediate condemnation of the garrisons but the implicit reason for his surprise and severity; that garrisons did engage in aggressive actions as a matter of course. This letter is written after several of the most severe years of war for the English yet its wording leaves no question that garrisons fulfilled their various field duties beyond their castle walls throughout these violent years. Rather than illustrating the aggressive impotency of garrisons the letter portrays the normality and frequency of such operations. Edward’s letter is remarkable for its novelty; throughout the war garrisons remained actively engaged in the variety of aggressive operations that they were expected to fulfil by operating in the field on a regular basis.
In August 1299 Robert Hastang, constable of Roxburgh, sent a letter to Edward I. A reading of this leaves no doubt that it is a detailed intelligence report concerning a high-level meeting of Scottish leaders and their ensuing activities.\(^1\) The degree of information conveyed is extremely wide-ranging. Names, places, dates, numbers, arrangements, intentions; they are all here. As an intelligence report on the Scottish commanders and their activities – both political and military – it is extremely detailed and comprehensive. Having written all this information in his letter Hastang immediately sent it to the king where it would have proved indispensable in updating the English commanders on their enemy.

Hastang’s letter is an exceptional example of the intelligence that a constable could obtain when resident in his front-line fortress, especially those located in Scotland. As with field operations this was a role expected of a constable, an integral part of his duties both in time of war and truce, an obligation to be aware of activities in his immediate vicinity and to convey these to the appropriate authority. Indeed it was such an accepted function that it is hardly ever referred to in contemporary documents and is only mentioned at critical times or if there was a complete failure to provide any intelligence. Edward II, on hearing that Norham castle was besieged in 1322, wrote to the constable Thomas Gray ‘praying’ him to send reports of the Scots ‘from day to day’ and ‘from time to time’.\(^2\) Gray must have responded by sending reports of Scottish activity in Northumberland as in a letter sent several days later the king refers to the ‘sure intelligence’ he has received from Gray. This letter is Edward’s

\(^1\) *CDS*, ii, no. 1290.  
\(^2\) *CDS*, iii, no. 777.
severe rebuke to the constables of Bamburgh, Warkworth, Dunstanburgh and Alnwick; not only does he demand they undertake an attack on the Scottish force but he declares his disbelief that they have no proper scouts or ‘espial’ operating from their garrisons and to remedy this by acting in concert to send out ‘spies.’ Even despite these shortcomings Edward is sure the constables are still aware the Scots are infesting the area, as each constable ‘well knows.’ In 1301, with a Scottish force on the move, Edward I issued instructions to the sheriff and constable of Roxburgh, the constable of Jedburgh, Alexander Balliol and Hugh de Audley to send out scouts to watch for the Scots and each warn the other and the country of the movement of this enemy force. The expected frequency of such intelligence is hinted at in a letter of Alexander Balliol to the king when he writes that Edward should ‘not take it amiss’ that he has not given him news more quickly, a sentiment echoed by a letter of 1300 that refers to Edward being ‘much surprised’ that a constable has not provided him with intelligence. The rarity of these direct references to intelligence gathering and the ready rebuke when it was not seen as being done demonstrates that it was perceived as a routine activity of a constable and also an essential one that was expected to be ongoing with prompt and frequent dissemination to the king and his commanders.

This rarity makes it easy to overlook such an important duty but it also illustrates the lack of direction a constable received concerning the need to provide intelligence. There were no specific standing orders on the gathering of intelligence and unlike clauses in indentures for making forays there was no commensurate provision for intelligence activities. It was down to the individual constable to use his own initiative in pursuit of what could prove to be information of the highest

3 *Ibid*, no. 783.
4 *CDS*, ii, no. 1230.
6 See the file of indentures for the keeping of castles in late 1302 where both forays and building works are specifically referred to but not a word on intelligence, *CDS*, ii, no. 1321.
importance and he could employ any means he saw fit to achieve this. Essentially there were three methods of actively obtaining intelligence; spies, scouts and informers. Unfortunately these terms are not clear cut, ambiguity existing in the exact means referred to, the words for a spy and scout being used interchangeably while some terms used could alternatively mean a spy, scout, messenger or herald. This complication is compounded by a lack of evidence concerning true spies due to the pre-requisite secrecy such men operated under. Faced by this dilemma of terminology it is to the nature of the information gathered that attention must be turned in order to determine the means by which it was obtained.

Robert Hastang’s letter is so detailed it must have been the product of someone inside the Scottish camp. Only a person present among the Scottish forces at the meeting would know the in-depth intricacies of the disagreement. Indeed Hastang actually refers to it being his ‘spy’s account’ and it is reasonable to believe that in this case the ‘spy’ was of the type understood by the modern definition of the term; a person accepted by the enemy as one of their own yet working for the other side. By the detailed nature of the intelligence he supplied John Kingston employed such spies from his base at Edinburgh. In 1300 he tells of a Scottish parliament at Rutherglen that took place on 10 May in which again there was a dispute and during which Ingram de Umfraville was elected as one of the guardians in place of the earl of Carrick. Although the contents of a letter sent in the following year by Alexander Balliol are inconclusive in determining whether actual spies were being used he does write that he ‘still has his spies among them’ the phrasing of which certainly suggests spies in the modern sense of the term, a likelihood increased by Balliol being a Scot and

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8 CDS, v, no. 220.
consequently having little difficulty in finding Scots who could blend in with the enemy without suspicion.\textsuperscript{9} It is reasonable to assume that when the intelligence provided is highly detailed or contains information on Scottish politics or future intentions then a spy in the covert sense has been employed by the constable. Documentary evidence for spies is almost completely non-existent but there were many such men employed by the English – and by the Scottish – in the wars and constables of castles would certainly have been at the forefront as employers of these men.\textsuperscript{10}

A significant amount of intelligence undoubtedly emanated from covert spies but in assessing the surviving evidence it becomes exceptionally difficult to separate their reports from those obtained by informers and rumour. When John Kingston reported that prominent Scots including the earl of Buchan and Bishop of St. Andrew’s had crossed the Forth to Glasgow and were then intending to go towards the borders Kingston refers to this last intention with the phrase ‘as is reported among them and their people who are in the forest.’ Again, when relating his suspicions of Simon Fraser, Kingston states ‘it was reported’ that there was a treaty between a Scottish force and Fraser; the additional comment that they ate and drank and were on the best of terms fitting well as a colourful anecdote of popular rumour.\textsuperscript{11} In this case doubts over Fraser’s loyalty were accurate illustrating that in the murky world of Scottish allegiances it was just as important to keep a careful eye on your supposed allies as well as your enemies. The intention of the Scots to collect a large force with which to approach the marches in 1301 was reported by the keeper of Lochmaben, Robert Tilliol, using the phrase ‘as we understand,’ the clear implication being that this

\textsuperscript{9} \textit{Ibid}, no. 257.
\textsuperscript{10} Chronicles such as \textit{The Bruce} abound with dramatic incidents of spying, ‘Spies and Spying in the Fourteenth Century’, p. 74.
\textsuperscript{11} \textit{Stevenson}, ii, pp. 301-3.
important news originated either from a rumour or an informer. Intelligence gathered via rumour or informers could easily blend with that from spies and on many occasions a combination of all three would go into building up the intelligence picture. The nature and detail of the contents and the phrasing of the constable can be used as an approximate guide but no more than that.

It is usually easier to differentiate intelligence gathered by these methods from that obtained by scouts although such men are still referred to as spies in many contemporary documents. Reports from scouts provided the bulk of information that constables received regarding the immediate area of their castle and the surrounding country. In the autumn of 1301 Robert Hastang had ‘spies’ watching for the return of a Scottish force to the border that had conducted a raid into northern England; although Hastang called these men ‘spies’ the nature of their task, waiting and watching in the countryside, makes it clear they were in fact scouts. Simultaneously Alexander Balliol claimed he would know two days in advance of this force issuing from Galloway – as with Hastang he would have had scouts out watching and waiting – and Edward I instructed Balliol, Audley and the constables of Roxburgh and Jedburgh to send out scouts to keep watch and give warning; indeed Edward II specifically castigated the northern garrisons in 1322 for apparently having no scouts readily available. In September 1301 the keeper of Lochamben reported that John de Soules and the earl of Buchan were at Loudon and Simon Fraser at Stanhouses, stating that he knew this information ‘for certain’. This is good solid intelligence of the type obtained by scouts. In fact scouts could gather a range of intelligence on their travels which alongside the location, disposition and movement of Scottish forces could include the

13 CDS, ii, no. 1230.
14 CDS, iii, no. 783.
15 Stevenson, ii, p. 431.
sounding out of Scottish intentions, listening for local rumour and perhaps even speaking to informers. Thus Hastang's scouts sent to watch for the return of Soules' force were also to ascertain the condition of the Scottish troops and their immediate plans. However the main role of scouts remained the task of quietly observing enemy movements and activities; the men who shadowed a Scottish force as it moved to Dalswinton and reported that it was heading towards Nithsdale and Galloway were undoubtedly scouts operating out of Lochamben. Further proof that all garrisons were expected to possess scouts is implicit in the orders for garrisons to co-operate in gathering information, a task clearly requiring scouts and presupposing that every garrison could provide such men. The great majority of intelligence a constable received and duly reported came from scouts, a much more regular and reliable method than the use of spies, informers or rumour.

Scouts needed to move swiftly and unobserved through the countryside to within sight of the enemy and consequently lightly armed men riding uncovered horses were employed in this role. The type of soldier ideally suited for this role was the hobelar. A fine example of how such men operated comes from late July 1299. Robert Clifford, constable of Lochamben and warden of Annandale, refers to an Irish hobelar called Richard le Bret whom Clifford has retained to spy the 'passings and haunts' of the enemy 'by night and day' and who had been constantly engaged in this duty for six weeks and three days. This is exactly the type of soldier that performed the role of a scout for constables.

The example of le Bret also illustrates the problematic nature of the relationship between scouts and garrisons. Clifford's purpose in writing of le Bret is to request payment for the latter in both money and victuals so he does not depart for

16 Ibid, p. 434.
17 Ibid, p. 432.
want of sustenance. This places le Bret apart from the regular garrison troops and those retained by Clifford as warden and more importantly demonstrates he was not in receipt of the regular wages and victuals as they were. The image of le Bret as a solitary entity operating apart from the regular troops is clear. As such he was not formally classed as a member of the regular garrison. This sense of a separation of intelligence specialists from other troops is also evident in the financial account for Stirling submitted retrospectively by the constable, John Sampson, for the year 1299. Included amongst his expenses was the payment of 9d. to ‘divers spies’; these were more likely to have been scouts rather than covert spies but the important feature to note is that these men are paid separately under a specific heading that acknowledges their special task of intelligence gathering. As such they are singled out as a group apart from the rest of the garrison.

This creates the impression that scouts and spies had little if any official attachment to a garrison even though employed by the constable. Spies certainly operated outside the remit of garrisons as secrecy was essential to keep their identity hidden and their effectiveness unimpaired. The responsibility for them rested solely with the constable; Edward I told Alexander Balliol that if he had provided spies then they should remain under his own control. Informers were no doubt treated in a similarly removed manner and the example of le Bret and the separate payments in Sampson’s accounts indicate that some scouts were also treated with a similar sense of separation.

However there is clear evidence that scouts were regularly classed as a formal component of garrisons. Their presence is revealed in the garrison rolls for 1300-5 by

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19 CDS, ii, no. 1084.
20 Ibid, no. 1949. In this case there is no confusion that ‘spies’ could refer to messengers as the latter are mentioned separately.
21 CDS, v, no. 257. As discussed previously these men employed by Balliol were almost certainly covert spies.
the striking appearance of either just one or a handful of men with uncovered horses. In such small numbers there was no effective military role they could possibly fulfil except for scouting and carrying messages. The most outstanding examples of this occur in the financial accounts for 1304/5. In the garrison of Kirkintilloch there was a total of 101 men but only one of these, Richard Meynel, was classed a soldier with an uncovered horse; in Linlithgow there were only four men with uncovered horses, specifically termed as hobelars, out of a garrison numbering over 120 while in the previous months when the garrison had totalled over 140 there had been only seven hobelars; Edinburgh contained six hobelars amongst a garrison of over 70. In late 1304 the Roxburgh garrison contained eight hobelars out of a total strength of 115; Linlithgow numbered over 100 men in 1304 but of these only four were hobelars and most striking of all out of the 221 men garrisoning Lochmaben and Dumfries in 1303 there were just three hobelars. 22 Although minimal as a proportion of the total garrison these men with uncovered horses were purposefully retained throughout a whole range of garrisons. Their presence was without doubt to undertake scouting missions and carry messages; in such small numbers they were unable to provide any other role and as lightly armed horsemen were ideally suited the role. Indeed in 1311 le Bret can again be glimpsed, this time acting not as a scout but receiving 2s. for taking privy seal letters to the constables of Dumfries, Caerlaverock and Buittle. 23 In contrast to le Bret the majority of these scouts are classed as an integral component of the garrison, appearing on the muster rolls and accounts and receiving their pay and victuals with the rest of the garrison. That it was not deemed necessary to specify these men as scouts on muster and payrolls indicates that it was general practice to have men with uncovered horses.

22 E101/12/18, E101/10/6; CDS, ii, no. 1417. The trend of retaining increasing numbers of hobelars in garrisons throughout the first quarter of the century obscures the minimal numbers of these early years which singles them out as scouts however in later years they would still be employed in this role when necessary.

23 CDS, v, no. 562.
uncovered horses retained within garrisons to routinely perform the important role of scouts.

That hobelars were also ideally suited to carrying messages meant that they were not only instrumental in obtaining intelligence but were vital for its quick dissemination to other garrisons and commanders. This was a two way process. Garrisons would only have intelligence on their own immediate vicinity and without a flow of information back and forth would be lacking in the appreciation of the larger strategic picture, an essential image to possess in the midst of war. The difficulties of sending news and of receiving it were particularly pronounced when a castle was under siege yet this was a time when up to date intelligence was at a premium. When Berwick castle was closely besieged in the late 1290s and victuals began to run out a soldier of the garrison swam the Tweed with letters requesting assistance in his shoes and upon reaching Norham he returned via the Tweed with promises of a speedy relief.24 In 1299 when the castle of Stirling was hard pressed by siege the constable, John Sampson, spent 12s. on messengers whom he sent to the king in England, one of these losing his horse in the process of delivering 'news of the castle and the country.'25

As mentioned Thomas Gray, besieged in Norham in 1322, was instructed by Edward II to send regular reports of the activities of the Scottish force. This letter was itself prompted by intelligence which the king had previously received, Edward stating that he 'hears' Norham is under siege, information no doubt contained within another report from forces, quite likely garrisons, in Northumberland. The two-way process of intelligence being sent and received is also evident in this letter; Edward informing Gray that he is presently at Newcastle collecting together his forces.26

Stevenson, ii, pp. 228-9.

CDS, ii, no. 1949

CDS, iii, no. 777. There must have been a limit to the information sent to constables during incessant warfare due to the danger of the messenger and his letter being intercepted by the Scots.
loss of his horse that befell Sampson's messenger was a common danger as was the loss of a messenger himself and this was recognised by constables multiplying the number of messengers when important intelligence was to be conveyed; Alexander Balliol promised to send two or three messengers when he had news of the Scots issuing from Galloway.  

Communication between constables of castles situated in the same region was a frequent occurrence and this task also fell to messengers sent out from the garrisons. Robert Hastang sent letters via messenger to the constables of Jedburgh and Selkirk as well as to the keeper of Selkirk forest and Walter de Huntercombe. There is also evidence of a regular exchange of letters between John Kingston and Simon Fraser. In terms of communication the most numerous recorded examples are the messengers sent by the king to the constables. The account books of the wardrobe contain many references to the payment of messengers who travelled to castles in the king’s service with those of John Droxford which cover 1305-6 including a messenger sent to the constable of Ayr and another to the constable of Roxburgh. Edward I also sent several messengers to a number of castles including Edinburgh, Stirling, Linlithgow, Roxburgh, Jedburgh and Selkirk, informing them of the vital news of John Comyn’s death and the rebellion of Robert Bruce, ordering the constables to fortify their castles and providing instructions to ensure their safekeeping. Channels of communication consequently existed between outlying castles and between these and the higher commander and which were regularly in use. The one hindrance was the speed at which a message could be conveyed; the fast relay of intelligence over a substantial

27 CDS, ii, no. 1230.
28 Stevenson, ii, pp. 303, 434.
29 CDS, v, nos. 472, 492.
30 It was these channels that allowed garrisons to operate in co-operation with one another.
distance was a problem constables could not overcome and no doubt frequently rendered important intelligence redundant and outdated by the time it was received.31

One way to circumvent this was for the constable to act on his own initiative and exploit the intelligence by the aggressive use of his own garrison. As discussed previously this was only possible if the situation favoured the garrison and it could achieve a broad spectrum of results ranging from the tactical to the strategic. The necessity for a garrison to appreciate the opposition it would face in an aggressive action makes it clear that before any such engagement was decided upon the constable had gathered comprehensive local intelligence on the enemy.32 John Stirling’s audacious relief of Cupar by his Edinburgh garrison would have been planned and decided upon by making use of the latest local intelligence which would have shown the operation was within the capability of the garrison; there was probably little time for the information to be passed on so that more forces could be involved. Individual aggressive actions of garrisons would be firmly based on local intelligence in an attempt to ensure tactical success.

Equally important was the sharing of intelligence between two or more parties to enable more ambitious operations. The detailed preparations for the combined garrison force that was to aid Stirling in December 1298 included a preliminary gathering of intelligence. The constables of Roxburgh and Edinburgh, the keeper and sheriff of Berwick, Walter de Huntercombe and Simon Fraser were each to ‘spy out and cause to be spied out all the news possible about the enemies and their plan’ and having done this they were to make known to the constable of Edinburgh, John Kingston, what each had been able ‘to spy out or ascertain.’ Kingston would then plan

31 There was no posting system of fresh horses to aid messengers from Scotland or northern England heading south, the first system being set up in 1372 running between Dover and London, ‘Spies and Spying in the Fourteenth Century’, p. 85.
32 "Intelligence was important in the formulation of strategy; it was also important in achieving tactical success,” Prestwich, Armies and Warfare, p. 215.
Robert Hastang, constable of Roxburgh, planned a meeting with several local commanders including his brother Richard, constable of Jedburgh, a meeting at which Hastang’s spies would attend having observed the return of John de Soules force, their latest intelligence being immediately used by the commanders to plan their attack. This transmission of intelligence also flowed between garrisons and field-forces. Shortly before the ill-fated battle of Roslin in 1303 two men rode by night from the English force encamped there to the garrison at Linlithgow to seek news of the nearby Scottish army and then returned to report this information to their commander. Ralph de Manton. Immediately prior to Bannockburn, upon the arrival of the English army near Stirling, the constable of the besieged castle, Philip Moubray, rode out to meet the English commanders advising them that Bruce and his army were in the woods and that ‘pots’ had been dug on the old Roman road in the forest.

In fact there is an important difference between the gathering of intelligence described so far and the cases of Roslin and Bannockburn. The previous examples have described an aggressive, intrusive form of intelligence gathering, actively seeking information by sending out scouts and spies and by employing informers. Roslin and Bannockburn delineate another method by which garrisons could provide important intelligence, a more passive and subtle process. The information relayed emanated from the mere presence of the castle and its garrison in a sensitive area, intelligence coming from those based within the castle itself complemented by their local knowledge. At the most basic level a constable and his garrison would have extensive knowledge of their immediate vicinity which could prove tactically invaluable should

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33 Stevenson, ii, pp. 339-41.
34 Ibid, pp. 433-5.
35 CDS, v, no. 472.
36 Bruce, pp. 430-3; Traquair, Freedom’s Sword, pp. 185-6.
an enemy or English force be operating in that area, particularly so if a clash between the two was imminent. There is no better example of this than an event prior to Bannockburn. The English army had reached Northumberland before Edward II was made aware of the arrangement agreed for the surrender of Stirling castle. This was related to him by the constable, Philip Moubray, in person on 26/27 May 1314 at Newminster. Instantly, on 27 May, orders went out for large quotas of infantry as the army was now marching for the relief of Stirling castle where Moubray had described the land around the castle as being ‘strong’ and ‘marshy’ and consequently inaccessible to cavalry.\(^{37}\) Although in this case the constable’s forewarning proved to be in vain the incident perfectly illustrates how critical the local knowledge of a constable and his garrison could be in terms of tactical planning.

Another intelligence role cast in this passive mode was the ability of several castles to monitor the movement of a hostile force that was in their vicinity. An excellent example of this occurred in September 1301 with a number of letters already quoted being from this month and recounting the activity of a Scottish force under the command of John de Soules and Ingram de Umfraville. On 10 September, from Lochmaben, Robert de Tilliol informed the king that on Thursday his castle had been attacked by this Scottish force that he believed consisted of four bannerets, twelve score men-at-arms and approximately 7000 foot; they had burnt the town, attacked the peel and lodged at Annan where they had burnt and pillaged the surrounding country. The following day the Scots attacked again and Tilliol claimed the garrison managed to inflict significant casualties. He reported that the Scots then left, moving to Dalswinton and then towards Galloway and Nithsdale where they intended to collect a greater force and approach the English march. Three days later Robert Hastang, at

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\(^{37}\) Bruce, p. 402, n. 810.
Roxburgh, informed the king he had sent scouts to watch for the return of this force and stated his intention to attack it. Tilliol’s letter must have reached Edward I quickly as Hastang refers to the king’s letter which had reached him ‘this day’ (13th) but which had arrived only after he had sent out his scouts, the letter instructing him to watch for the return of the Scots and almost certainly written based on the intelligence related in Tilliol’s letter. On 21 September, from Selkirk castle, Alexander Balliol wrote that he has heard from the king’s letters that Soules and a great company of Scots had gone towards Galloway. Balliol here informs the king his spies are among these Scots and he will provide information on them. Finally, on 30 September, come the instructions from the king for the constables to send out scouts to warn each other and the country of the Scots approach and the reply of the constables that they would know in advance when the force came out of Galloway.38

The route of this powerful Scottish force could therefore be followed by Edward I and his commanders by means of the regular intelligence reports coming from the front-line castles it passed. In this case scouts were also used to actively gather intelligence but there still remained a largely passive element of news generated by those observing from the walls of the castles. Another interesting aspect of this particular episode is that there is little if any sharing of intelligence between constables and that this was not the correct procedure is evident in Edward’s later order that the castles should ensure they warned each other as well as the country. These letters vividly illustrate how castle garrisons could monitor the progress of a hostile Scottish force that was operating in their midst and would have been a regular feature of the period.

38 CDS, ii, nos. 1220, 1221, 1230; CDS, v, no. 257; Stevenson, ii, pp. 432-5.
The presence of garrisons in regional localities also enabled them to obtain intelligence on the local political climate. It was this type of important information that was contained within a comprehensive letter sent in 1307 from the Forfar garrison, a report most probably written by the constable himself. It details the increasing support for Bruce in the region and the efforts of false preachers in propagating this together with the advice that men-at-arms must be sent to areas loyal to the king, particularly Ross, otherwise Scots will join Bruce due to the lack of protection. The accuracy of this intelligence was without doubt; it was sent in May 1307 and on Christmas night 1308 the castle was stormed by the Scots and the garrison killed. That the assault came from local foresters demonstrates just how perceptive this intelligence was about the regional population. Similarly in 1301 Tilliol reported that those in the country around Lochmaben were rising up due to the lack of English soldiers to ride against the Scots; his ominous warning seems to have provoked no immediate response as in a second letter Tilliol repeated it and warned that now the Scots who had come into the king’s peace were going over to the enemy again.

Yet despite their abilities in intelligence gathering there was one area where garrisons repeatedly suffered a catastrophic failure; they were never able to be forewarned of an assault on their own castles. Although aware of the growing hostility around them the garrison of Forfar was unprepared for the actual assault when it came and this was true for all the castles stormed by the Scots. Indeed only on one occasion was a garrison warned of an imminent attack; when the Scots suddenly assaulted Norham in 1327 on the night of Edward III’s coronation they were bloodily repulsed by the garrison with this conspicuous success being achieved as the constable, Robert

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39 *CDS*, ii, no. 1926. That the report came from the garrison of Forfar castle is based on its content and the fact that at this time the garrison was mainly composed of Englishmen amid an increasingly hostile Scottish population. The request for men-at-arms and the addressee being a ‘high official’ illustrate the writer held an important position which indicates he was constable of the castle, *Bruce*, pp. 334-5.

40 Stevenson, ii, pp. 431, 433.
Manners, had been forewarned of the assault by a certain Scot within the garrison. A night attack on Berwick castle in 1312 was only foiled by chance when the garrison was alerted by a barking dog. These incidents are the exceptions that prove the rule, demonstrating how effective an advanced warning could be in defending against Scottish assaults, a form of attack that ultimately relied on the element of surprise to ensure its success. Admittedly these were intelligence failures of the great magnitude but they also serve to demonstrate the limitations of garrisons in gathering intelligence. There was no sophisticated, all-pervasive intelligence network in place that could detect every move and plan of the Scots. Except for the use of a covert spy garrisons picked up on obvious local events such as the unconcealed movements of a body of troops and the local political mood. However a plan to consciously keep them devoid of information, if such a pre-requisite proved necessary, could be regularly achieved as the assaults on castles testify.

When constables did provide intelligence the news itself was not necessarily the only information they were to include in their report. Whilst besieged in Norham Thomas Gray was also instructed to include his own counsel on how to act in relation to the activity of the Scottish besieging force. In 1298, when sending their individual intelligence reports to John Kingston in preparation for the foray to aid Stirling, the constables and commanders were to include their own council based on the information they were in possession of and the foray was to be ultimately planned according to their advice. Constables were therefore required to analyse and assess their intelligence and include their advice on how best to proceed within their intelligence report. Similarly constables were able to make requests to remedy

41 Lanercost, p. 256.
42 Ibid, p. 201.
43 CDS, iii, no. 777.
44 Stevenson, ii, p. 340.
situations they deemed potentially dangerous; in 1299 John Kingston asked that the victualling of Stirling be seen to having become aware of its perilous state while the requests of Tilliol to provide extra men-at-arms for the area around Lochmaben have already been mentioned. Naturally, as commanders on the spot, the tone of the language employed by these men could become quite stringent as in 1300 when Hugh de Audley wrote 'for God's sake employ some counsel so the sheriffdom of Peebles is better defended.' Audley was writing in reply to a letter that expressed surprise that he had given 'no intelligence of what we have done, or of what we expect should be done,' a statement that proves unequivocally constables were to assess their intelligence and present their conclusions within their report.

This statement also leads into another aspect of information that was classed as intelligence and was vital to send in reports; namely 'intelligence of what we have done.' Just as important as what the enemy was doing was news of what the garrison was actually doing. The letters of Kingston and Hastang detailing meetings, attempts to co-ordinate their activities and preparations for forays were all essential in keeping the higher command aware of what was going on. Although the brief mention of a planned muster of several commanders on the border due to a Scottish threat appears as an afterthought in a report of Alexander Balliol it was in fact essential information in keeping those in overall charge up to date. A detailed report to the king in the 1340s, almost certainly from William de Felton, constable of Roxburgh, contains what would have been vital intelligence relating a serious engagement between English and Scottish forces. The location of the battle is described together with which English forces were present and an approximation of Scottish casualties. The simultaneous repulse of a Scottish attack on the town of Roxburgh is reported as is the death or

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45 *Ibid*, pp. 304, 418; *CDS*, v, no. 256. Audley was keeper of Selkirk forest and thus held a similar position to that of a constable.
capture of three brothers who had repeatedly plagued the castle. In this particular case Felton emphasises his own role in the engagement whereas separate accounts apportion the weight of credit elsewhere; *Murimuth's Chronicle* attributing victory to the men of the March who were not in the Crown's pay and the *Scalacronica* unsurprisingly highlighting the role of Thomas Gray. It is to be expected that such reports were coloured by the writer's bias and need for personal enhancement in a climate where prestige was paramount but the main substance of the report still remained correct. In a period when communication was delayed by distance and garrisons frequently acted on their own initiative news of what the garrisons were doing themselves was just as vital a form of intelligence as that of enemy activity.

Contemporaries, especially chroniclers, make little mention of intelligence being present in warfare, both in terms of field-forces and garrisons. However it is interesting that the encounter between plundering garrison forces and a Scottish force in 1335 is singled out as a matter of chance, Bower explicitly stating that the English force was returning unexpectedly and encountered the Scottish troops who had escorted the count of Namur back to the border. The element of chance is clear in this account. It is worth comparing this with Wyntoun's description of English garrison forces moving against Alexander Ramsey's men who were encamped around Hawthornden in the 1340s. He writes that the English constables 'herd say' of the whereabouts of Ramsey's men, although this may again suggest an element of chance in reality the co-ordinated effort of several English garrisons in planning and undertaking a deliberate attack on this encampment would not have taken place

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46 *CDS*, v, no. 809; King, 'War, Politics and Landed Society', p. 92.
47 A good example being a letter of 1297 sent to the king relating how the constable of Stirling had been killed and that the writer had installed a new constable with a number of good troops to keep the castle, *Stevenson*, ii, pp. 232-3.
48 *Bower*, vii, p. 115.
49 'The castellwartis on the Marche herd say /How in thar land lyand were thai,' *Wyntoun*, v, p. 148
without considerable intelligence having been sought and assessed beforehand. Spies, informers and rumour may have played their part and scouts would certainly have been used. That this whole painstaking process is dismissed in the two simple words of the chronicler illustrates just how easily the intelligence activity of garrisons can be overlooked. The English were obviously well-informed and in possession of accurate intelligence as they took the trouble and risk of assembling their forces and taking on Ramsey's men. The outcome is also revealing; a bloody encounter and an English defeat. Intelligence could only win part of the battle.

Castles and their garrisons were clearly at the forefront of intelligence gathering in the Anglo-Scottish wars. Although their effectiveness in this area was to an extent dictated by the lengths each constable was prepared to go to castles and garrisons, by their very nature of being a permanent base in front-line territory, were particularly sensitive to the latest developments and would be among the first to obtain important intelligence. It was then down to the constable to build on this by the use of scouts, informers and spies. Front-line castles provided windows onto Scottish activity which were invaluable for the English prosecution of the war. When Lanercost refers to the handing over to the English of four castles that were 'overlooking the frontier of the realm' the emphasis on sight is extremely apt; one reason the English wanted these castles was to obtain a view of what was taking place in these sensitive areas.⁵⁰ They acted as listening posts, as early warning centres to counter Scottish attacks and raids. Adequate warning could be instrumental in combating Scottish movements; in the summer of 1298 John Kingston complained that despite having told Simon Fraser to give advance warning of a Scottish advance he had failed to do so, an omission that

⁵⁰ The four castles were Berwick, Roxburgh, Jedburgh and Edinburgh, Lanercost, p. 125.
meant the regional garrisons were unable to remove this threat themselves, one that they would have been capable of opposing if given the appropriate warning. 51

A constable was expected to absorb intelligence from this natural exposure to information and also to actively seek it out. Written in 1298 the phrase 'to spý out and caused to be spied out' is particularly accurate in its sense of a proactive and intrusive gathering of intelligence. 52 Scouts were the chief exponents of intelligence gathering and were members of the regular garrison whereas spies and informers operated independent of the garrison. Intelligence was to be sent quickly to the higher command but also to be shared between garrisons while reports were also to contain the assessment and advice of the constables who had accumulated the information. Frequent updates of the garrisons' own activities were also essential items of intelligence that needed to be sent to commanders. Constables were well aware of their responsibility regarding intelligence and were regularly involved in this duty; those that failed Edward II were left in no doubt as to the seriousness of their neglect. Indeed every member of a garrison – whether a knight, an archer or a carpenter – would be extremely sensitive to any intelligence; in their exposed positions one day it might just save their lives.

51 Stevenson, ii, pp. 302-3.
III.

CONCLUSION
This thesis began with the premise that before the operational activities of wartime garrisons could be discussed the nature of the garrisons themselves had to be understood. Their nature was addressed in the first five chapters and this revealed a number of key characteristics. The sheer size of garrisons meant that their continued maintenance consumed vast amounts of money and victuals, two of the most scarce and precious commodities of the period. To provide these the bureaucratic machinery of medieval England had to be utilised to such an extent that dedicated supply bases were established together with a garrison paymaster. During the first quarter of the century in particular the unprecedented demands of these garrisons almost stretched the state’s resources to breaking point with garrisons near desertion on several occasions yet despite this the provision of money and victuals never actually ceased irrecoverably; the retention of the Berwick garrison through the apocalyptic famine of 1315/16 is a tribute to the innate strength of the English state.

The maintenance of large garrisons in Scotland was therefore underpinned by the resources of the developing English state which provided the basics without which the garrisons could not exist, a fact which signals the critical role they were seen to occupy. However this constant strain also made garrisons a vehicle of development with the desire to streamline the continual burden of their maintenance leading to the widespread use of indentures by mid-century. These were first in use for garrisons in the last years of the thirteenth-century and intermittently under Edward II, early contracts extending over a short period of time, in particular covering the winter period when no army or campaign was normally in existence. Indentures drastically cut down
the work of the bureaucracy placing the responsibility of the tedious day-to-day minutiae of running a garrison on the constable. So successful was this system that it became routine for the establishment and maintenance of garrisons and its success no doubt significantly contributed to the adoption of indentures for military recruitment in general in the fourteenth century.

As they led the way in the use of indentures so garrisons were also at the forefront of military developments in the period with both the hobelar and the mounted archer appearing within them at a very early date in relation to their foundation as troop types. It is evident that garrisons were no mere backwater but were at the cutting edge of military development, taking on the changing military trends as they happened and evolving with the times, providing evidence that garrisons were an active military force not passive, static defenders shut behind their walls, a fact conclusively demonstrated by their general evolution in the period towards increased mobility resulting in garrisons containing totally mobile forces.

Although dependent on the resources of the state for their survival the daily life of garrison troops was maintained by a host of semi-combatants who were skilled in tasks necessary for everyday survival and who were present in such numbers that they could double the overall size of the garrison. Their presence is all too easy to overlook but they were essential to the survival of garrisons and lend an element of self-sufficiency to garrisons; so long as the raw materials and ingredients were available they could provide for themselves. In contemporary terms these skilled personnel combined with the number of troops meant that garrisons resembled something approaching a medium sized settlement with its own particular way of life. Placed in this context it is clear that the creation and maintenance of a large garrison was an enormous undertaking that went much deeper than just stationing troops in a castle.
All of these aspects distinguish exactly what comprised a garrison and illustrate their complex nature. However, with these essential supporting elements in place, a garrison's operational effectiveness was solely dependent on the military personnel retained within it. The commanders varied over time, their experience, abilities and status fluctuating in sympathy with the prevalent state of the war and domestic politics while the frequent appearance of commanders of national standing emphasises the importance of the garrisons. Yet it is with regard to the backbone of the garrisons, the men-at-arms, that a most important discovery has been made. This is the remarkable consistency with which the same men remained in garrison service whether in the same garrison or moving between them. Even when garrisons in Scotland were in their infancy men-at-arms saw them as an opportunity for regular, semi-permanent paid service, lasting so long as the garrisons remained in existence. In effect garrisoning became a career for these men and in consequence it is not an exaggeration to see them as professional garrison soldiers. Such consistency in service is clear between 1300 and 1311/12 and a similar element is strongly indicated in both mid-century and within Roxburgh in the 1380s; men-at-arms undertaking long-term service remained at the core of these garrisons throughout the period. A more transient, short-term level of service co-existed around this yet even this commonly still amounted to at least several months of service. There is too little evidence to comment on the patterns of service of those troops below men-at-arms in status but familial relationships and, in the earlier period, the movement of men between troop types suggests that long-term service was a feature that extended throughout garrisoning. However it is the semi-permanent core of men-at-arms at the heart of garrison service that must be emphasised.

In understanding the elements that went into making a garrison it is quite clear that garrisons were seen by contemporaries as being of critical importance in the war
against Scotland. The great cost and burden that they inflicted on the state was deemed worth the effort and resources expended on them. In this sense garrisons were most definitely a national undertaking in that they consumed money and victuals from throughout the country and, as the protections from the 1380s demonstrate, they were also a national undertaking in terms of the regions from which their troops originated, a feature that must be true for the whole period considering the large numbers serving in the first half of the century. The rapidity with which garrisons were cut-back when the opportunity arose sharply illustrates the great strain they placed on the country: the extreme difficulty for the medieval state in keeping garrisons heavily manned on a semi-permanent base cannot be overstated. That the Crown was determined to maintain these large and burdensome wartime garrisons clearly illustrates that they believed them to be absolutely essential in prosecuting the war.

Yet despite the enormous resources and faith invested in them by the Crown the English garrisons in the Anglo-Scottish wars of the fourteenth century may at first appear to fallen some way short of repaying this faith. The greatest condemnation is that, in the aftermath of Bannockburn, they were incapable of preventing the ravaging of northern England, failing even to protect their own demesne lands. Equally damaging is the refrain that they were wholly ineffective against strong Scottish raiding forces or field-armies, meekly allowing such bodies of men free passage while remaining behind the relative safety of their own fortifications. The powerful garrisons installed in Scotland do not escape damning criticism; they can be seen as lacking in the most fundamental role of a garrison, that of holding their castle in the face of an enemy attack, great swathes of them falling between 1311 and 1314 and in mid-century with the method by which the former were mostly taken, surprise assault, adding a criticism all of its own. There is an unmistakable sense that these castles
should not have fallen, that they should have held out.¹ In short garrisons neither led to the conquest and occupation of Scotland nor proved effective in defending northern England against devastating raids. The two main periods during which English garrisons were based in Scotland both ended with a gradual loss of the occupied castles and ultimately battles of considerable significance, namely Bannockburn and Neville’s Cross. In this respect garrisons appear to have contributed little to the war effort.

To establish the validity of these criticisms they need to be considered in relation to the nature of the garrison. In doing so it is evident that there was a potentially fatal weakness inherent in a garrison in that it was ultimately dependent on outside help for its basic survival in terms of money and victuals and, if needed, reinforcements. A garrison had to strike a fine balance between being manned by sufficient numbers but not so many as would prove difficult to keep adequately victualled. Considerations of victualling limited the size of garrisons yet an undermanned garrison was operationally ineffective and in danger of losing its castle. It is notable that issues of manning, in terms of reinforcements, and of victuals are two of the three areas Barbour picks out as being essential for holding a castle and consequently potential weaknesses. Barbour also specifies that the prospect of relief must be real, another requirement that came from outside of the garrison itself. These essentials were not the responsibility of either the constable or his garrison but belonged to higher ranking commanders and bureaucrats. Garrisons could not survive in isolation and it is no coincidence that it was in periods when England was strategically on the defensive and garrisons were left bereft of constant outside support for prolonged periods that they fell to the Scots.² By understanding that garrisons were not isolated entities expected to survive without support but were part of a larger

¹ The most concise summary of these criticisms is in Prestwich, Armies and Warfare, pp. 209-11.
² ‘Without adequate supplies even the strongest and most heavily manned castle must fall’ (my italics). Brown, English Castles, p. 190.
system which was crucial to the underpinning of their existence the criticism of the loss of castles is set into context and can be seen as a failing of the system that supported them rather than an inadequacy inherent within the garrisons themselves.

The point that must be borne in mind is that garrisons, as with any military force, had their limitations. Pinned behind their walls they required support, they could not survive indefinitely in isolation. Such realistic limitations have also been forgotten when garrisons are criticised for failing to intercept Scottish field-armies or to oppose strong Scottish raiding forces; garrisons, whether operating alone or in concert with one another, were not expected to halt such powerful enemy forces and to state otherwise is to misunderstand their role. The much quoted letter of Edward II used to criticise the northern garrisons actually specifies the type of enemy forces garrisons were expected to deal with, namely those which were not overly substantial in number and which were unsupported, isolated and in a known locality. Against such forces there are numerous examples of garrisons making sorties and it is evident that constables were free to take aggressive action whenever they believed a suitable opportunity presented itself. The available evidence indicates that they undertook forays much more frequently than has been previously realised to the extent that they were regular operations routinely carried out by garrisons. As the Scalacronica indicates garrisons even preferred to undertake the defence of their castle in a tactically offensive manner rather than from behind the walls. Garrisons conducted a whole spectrum of tactical and strategic operations in the field ranging from the defence of their castle to ambitious long-range forays. The letter also makes it plain that garrisons were expected to co-operate and work together. Additional evidence strongly supports this; the regular communication by letter between garrisons, the meetings between constables and co-ordinated forays all provide evidence of extensive co-operation.
That men-at-arms circulated between garrisons and formed an identifiable common
community reinforces this sense of widespread co-operation.

The belief that garrisons did not regularly work in co-operation with one
another centres on the argument that castles were not conceived as forming part of an
interconnecting network when they were originally built and that only in such a
deliberately constructed system was it possible for garrisons to support one another.³
There was certainly no overall master-plan allowing for mutual support in Scotland
and northern England. However there is no doubt that English garrisons, particularly
those in Scotland, did effectively operate as a network. The great concentration of
castles in Lothian, including Edinburgh, Linlithgow, Jedburgh and Roxburgh, meant
that they were in close proximity with the latter two particularly near one another
while Linlithgow and Edinburgh were virtually neighbouring garrisons and the peel at
Livingston allowed overland transit of goods to Stirling. In the west the garrisons of
Lochmaben and Dumfries were routinely classed as one. Situated near the coast many
of these castles were supplied by sea as Edward I had ensured his great network of new
fortresses in Wales could be. The garrisons south of the Forth were therefore not
isolated and could quite easily operate as a cohesive network as too could those
concentrated in Northumberland when northern England became the front-line.

There was also extensive co-operation between garrisons and English field-
forces. It is evident that garrisons were expected to play an active role in support of
any campaign in their region or indeed beyond it. The level of involvement varied
between a small proportion of the garrison being called to almost the entire garrison;
whichever, it is clear that garrisons had an important role to play in conjunction with

³ Brown, English Castles, pp. 216-7; Strickland, ‘Securing the North’, pp. 210-11; Prestwich, Armies
and Warfare, pp. 206-9; J.H. Beeler, ‘Castles and Strategy in Norman and Early Angevin England’,
field-forces and one which could be defensive as well as offensive as the participation of the northern garrisons at Byland in 1322 illustrates. The strength of the link between garrisons and field-forces can be seen in the practice of garrisons being bolstered by the intake of troops from these forces during the winter period and their departure with the return of the campaigning season, a practice that both kept field-forces in being and strengthened garrisons during the period when they were most vulnerable to attack. Indeed it is misleading to view the personnel of garrisons and field-armies as two wholly distinct groups; many garrison troops may well have started out serving in a field-army and garrisons operating outside their walls can arguably be seen as a field-force. By breaking this artificial distinction the heavy involvement of garrisons with field-forces can be seen to be a natural and expected interplay between the two.

It is within this connection between garrisons and field-forces that the key to understanding the apparent defensive inability of garrisons against substantial enemy forces can be found. Following on from the pioneering and incisive analysis of crusading warfare by R.C. Smail several recent works on the strategy of defence have highlighted that it was a combination of garrisons with a powerful relieving field-force which provided a true and effective defence. Contemporary commanders knew the limitations of what a garrison could openly oppose and it was the field-army which was the primary instrument of defence, an argument borne out by the decisive defeat inflicted on the Scots at Neville's Cross. This does not mean that garrisons were obsolete; they could still harry sections of the enemy force, attack its rear, cut supply lines and, if besieged, hold out and effectively pin down the enemy. Yet theirs was a subsidiary role and an effective defence ultimately depended on the quick raising of a

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4 Morillo, Anglo-Norman Warfare, p. 94.
powerful relieving field-force without which garrisons could only remain behind their walls and hope to retain their castles; defensive strategies may have been based on castles\(^6\) – and by implication garrisons – but they were only based on them not ultimately reliant on them. It was the lack of such relieving forces during 1311-14 and in the late 1330s and early 1340s which greatly contributed to the loss of castles and unopposed Scottish raids, periods which coincided with the Scottish war becoming a secondary consideration for both Edward II and Edward III. The situation was exacerbated by the peculiar type of warfare the Scots waged in northern England in which their aim was not the traditional one of annexing territory but of raiding and extorting blackmail thus bypassing one of the key characteristics of the castle, that of holding land. It was in response to this warfare that wardens were appointed with mobile forces between 1315 and 1319, a large proportion of their mounted troops being based in the front-line northern castles and the rest remaining with the warden as a relieving field-force ready to move to any trouble-spots. This was a sophisticated if costly answer to the problems of defence and proves that it was the combination of mobile garrisons and a field-force which provided the only effective means of defence, one that was to be executed in a tactically offensive manner as the increasingly mobile garrisons of the early 1320s and 1330s demonstrate.

All the evidence so far points to garrisons, and by association their castles, being at their most ineffective when forced into a prolonged defensive. Yet with the traditional assumption being that they were primarily defensive in nature their obvious limitations in this area questions whether this really was their primary role. Indeed the inescapable argument running through all the evidence is that these garrisons were actually intended to primarily be aggressive forces operating in the field. They were

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not meant to be confined within their walls defending the castle from attack: this may have been their most basic role but it was not their raison d'être. Such a desperate situation was an emergency measure, an unnatural state for a garrison to find itself in rather than a natural one.7 Troops pinned behind their walls were at best a neutralized force and at worst in a potential death-trap.8 For a garrison to find itself under siege or assault was an accepted eventuality in time of war but it was not expected that this would last over an extended period of time with no help forthcoming. Based in hostile territory, unsupported and forced into a prolonged defensive it was only a matter of time until a castle fell. In such a situation a garrison was in its most vulnerable state. The lack of censure to constables who lost their castles in such circumstances makes it clear that they were not expected to be capable of holding out indefinitely.9

The reality is that English garrisons in this period were intended to be primarily aggressive forces with castles as their base of operations rather than being bodies of troops installed in castles primarily to protect the latter from attack. They were not static, defensive forces, undertaking the odd offensive operation when the opportunity arose; garrisons were active forces, expected to operate aggressively beyond the confines of their castle walls in both offensive and defensive operations. This is the reason why garrisons remained at the forefront of military trends and why they continued developing towards becoming totally mobile forces. The experienced and long-serving troops of a garrison were also surely too scarce a commodity to be wasted solely for the purpose of defending the castle walls, being among the most seasoned semi-permanent soldiers the English realm possessed. The natural area of operations

7 Morillo, Warfare under the Anglo-Norman Kings, p. 95.
8 Ibid, p. 96. As demonstrated most notably by the number of leading Scots captured within Dunbar castle in 1296 and the prominent English prisoners, including the earl of Hereford, taken in Bothwell castle when seeking refuge after Bannockburn.
9 As do the indentures which stipulate a constable could surrender his castle if relief had not arrived within an agreed period.
for a garrison was in the field either acting alone or in concert with other garrisons or
field-armies, functioning in a strategically offensive manner or, if on the defensive, in
a tactically offensive manner. It was for these aggressive capabilities that so much
money and effort was expended in maintaining them and it was when operating in
conjunction with a field-force that garrisons really proved their effectiveness. It was
the failure of the Crown to support them with regular field-forces that blunted their
aggressive ability and forced them into a prolonged defensive leaving them isolated
and confined within the prison of their own walls with the inevitable loss of their
castles ultimately following this transition that placed garrisons in their most
vulnerable state.

That acting aggressively was the predominant characteristic of these garrisons
is reflected in the difference between the size of garrisons in Scotland and
subsequently those on the front-line in northern England in the first half of the century.
In overall terms those in Scotland were more heavily manned and the periods in which
the numbers of those serving in garrisons peaks occurs during the occupation of the
Scottish castles. Contrastingly when the northern castles of England became the front-
line in the years immediately following Bannockburn their garrisons were on average
of a much smaller scale. So minimal were the northern garrisons maintained by the
Crown immediately after Bannockburn that a recent historian of the period has
described this as unpardonable neglect on the part of Edward II, an argument
supported by Edward II not using his right of rendability to take important northern
castles into the hands of the Crown. ¹⁰ However defeat at Bannockburn coupled with
the wholesale loss of Scottish castles had decisively turned the war for England into a
desperate defensive one; the aim now was not to aggressively pursue the conquest and

¹⁰ McNamee, Wars of the Bruces, pp. 143-4. The prominent private northern castles that did come under
Crown authority did so accidentally due to minorities and were accepted reluctantly as demonstrated by
the quick return of Alnwick to Henry Percy though he was still not of age.
subjugation of Scotland but to hold on to the north of England. This could simply be achieved by retaining the northern castles in English hands. Large garrisons were not necessary for the effective defence of a castle from attack with relatively small numbers able to hold off much greater forces throughout the medieval period and with the war now being fought in England the Scots were denied the advantage of home territory which had been so important in the taking of Scottish castles. That the largest and most powerful garrisons are to be found in Scotland during the vigorous English prosecution of the war there reflects the fact that these garrisons were essentially aggressive forces routinely operating in the field, intended to function as they had done in Anglo-Norman times as cornerstones of conquest and occupation.

However the most conclusive evidence that these garrisons were primarily aggressive is their development into totally mobile forces. A central argument against the ability of garrisons in the field is their perceived lack of mobility and with regard to the early years of the century this is to an extent true. The large number of foot-soldiers meant that the full power of the garrison could not necessarily be brought to bear in forays and the mobile men-at-arms of the garrisons were therefore supplemented by dedicated mounted strike forces such as that based in Roxburgh town under William Latimer. This all changed after Bannockburn as first hobelars and then mounted archers were retained instead of foot-soldiers which consequently transformed entire garrisons into becoming fast-moving strike forces. Particularly telling is the large number of mounted archers present in the garrisons of both mid-century and towards the end of the period; if these garrisons were intended to be defensive then foot-soldiers would have easily sufficed but instead the Crown took on the expense and difficulty of maintaining mounted troops because only they could provide the field

12 Prestwich, Armies and Warfare, p. 206.
capability that the Crown wanted these garrisons to exercise. The maintenance of fully mounted garrisons was for no other purpose than to enable them to operate in the field.

One of the main reasons garrisons are presumed to be primarily passive defensive entities is due to their intimate association with that great symbol of the Middle Ages, the castle. Defence was an intrinsic consideration of the castle builder and even today their monolithic remains retain a sense of the impregnable with any onlooker immediately questioning how such a building could ever be taken. The vast majority of military architecture that featured on the castle building was defensive and this predominant feeling encompasses all connected with the castle including their garrisons. Yet this emphasis on impregnable solid defence was inherent in the very nature of the castle and to appreciate the role of the castle in warfare it is necessary to concentrate on its purpose rather than its structure.

The conclusions reached concerning the role and activities of garrisons therefore provide important insights into the role of the castle in warfare. It has already been stated that castles were meant to keep garrisons in relative security functioning as a heavily defended forward base rather than garrisons merely being present to just defend the castle building and it follows that the housing of aggressive garrisons was one of the main roles of a castle, a fact which immediately lends an emphatic aggressive aspect to the castle itself. This should not be a surprise as castles were originally an instrument of aggression, key weapons in the process of conquest under the Anglo-Normans, used to secure newly won territory and acting as a base from which further inroads could be made. One of the greatest examples is that of Château-Gaillard, the foremost castle of its age, for which a penetrating recent revision of its role has concluded that it was not built to defend the route to Rouen but as a forward
base from which Richard I could recover the Vexin.\textsuperscript{13} Similarly the great castles constructed by Edward I in Wales were built on such a capacious scale as they were intended to house field-forces operating in the region while the extensive network of castle garrisons retained in Normandy in the early fifteenth century saw them frequently used as field-forces and the attachment of permanent field companies to a number of garrisons following the reforms of 1434 illustrates that field operations were synonymous with these garrisons. It is also telling that the garrisons of castles closer to the French border were more mobile in their composition thus exploiting their aggressive potential. Clearly castles formed the basis of sophisticated systems of offence as well as of aggressive defence. The use of major castles as forward bases for conquest and occupation again explains why the greatest garrisons of the period were in the Scottish castles from which the conquest and subjugation of Scotland was attempted, a war fulfilling the true purpose of the castle as an active front-line instrument of war.\textsuperscript{14}

Rather than being deliberate defensive networks many castles were initially conceived as instruments of offence and it is this offensive aspect, both strategically and tactically, which has recently been emphasised by several historians. In analysing the defensive role of the castles of northern England in the twelfth century Matthew Strickland relates their very definite limitations in this area to the fact that they were indeed initially instruments of offence.\textsuperscript{15} John France has definitively stated that it is a mistake to see the castle as simply a defensive structure; that it was a secure base from

\textsuperscript{13} An offensive system which also linked in with the new naval base of Portsmouth, J. Gillingham, \textit{Richard I} (Yale, 2002 edition), pp. 301-5; see also \textit{idem}, 'Richard I, Galley-Warfare and Portsmouth: The beginnings of a Royal Navy', \textit{Thirteenth Century England} 17, ed. M. Prestwich, R.H. Britnell, R. Frame (Woodbridge, 1997). Again, despite its impregnable look, Château-Gaillard was primarily aggressive with its defensive attributes inherent.


\textsuperscript{15} Strickland, 'Securing the North', pp. 214-20.
which to launch attacks, especially if the garrison contained mounted troops, and he identifies that the real strength of the castle lay in the garrison based within it.16 Similarly Stephen Morillo has recognised that defending the castle walls was an emergency measure for a garrison, that for garrisons offensive operations were more important than defensive ones and that it was only heavily manned garrisons which were capable of executing such aggressive operations.17 Allen Brown was at pains to stress that castles were offensive as well as defensive and that the former could well be argued to be their primary role with their real military value being found in their function as a base and consequently he emphasised the importance and preponderance of mounted troops within garrisons.18 As these statements make clear the full aggressive potential of the castle could only be realised by the garrison based within it and only by maintaining a powerful garrison equipped to perform the role of a strike force was the English Crown able to transform the front-line Scottish castles they occupied into true instruments of war.19 It was for this reason that questions of garrisoning and victualling have been seen to dominate those of architecture during the reign of Edward II as these were the ones that mattered in a state of incessant warfare when castles were very much in the front-line.20

However there was a duality of role in the castle acting as a forward base for not only did it function as a base for the garrison but also as a supporting base for field-forces which were operating in the area. Castles acted as storehouses of victuals for these field-forces as well as providing them with local intelligence and, if needed,

16 France, Western Warfare, pp. 78, 104.
17 Morillo, Warfare under the Anglo-Norman Kings, pp. 74-5, 95-6.
19 It is Smail who aptly describes castles as offensive weapons, Crusading Warfare, p. 215.
20 Prestwich, 'Castles in the Reign of Edward II', p. 176. The argument that the reign of Edward II was a depressing one for the castle in which its military importance declined is more concerned with domestic conflict rather than the Scottish war in which castles clearly retained the same critical military importance they had always possessed.
acting as a refuge of relative security. Exactly how critical castles were to field-forces is starkly demonstrated by the campaign of 1314. The absence of any English campaign after 1311 allowed Bruce to seize and destroy innumerable fortifications in Scotland held by the English with Linlithgow being the first significant loss in Lothian falling in late 1313. These losses were due to the breakdown of the system which required the presence or real threat of a relieving army. At this time Edward II announced a muster for a campaign in the following summer. The response of Bruce was to immediately try and take the first-rate castles of Edinburgh, Roxburgh and Stirling. This was not primarily motivated by a fear that the English army would strengthen and consolidate these garrisons and castles but through a realisation of what such a substantial army could potentially accomplish basing itself on these castles. The enormous support they could provide to the army would make a powerful English campaign in Scotland a dangerous reality. It was vital for the Scots to deny them to the English. This was why the seizure of these castles suddenly became so urgent that the desperate method of assault was turned to in an attempt to accelerate the process of their capture. By taking these major castles the English campaign could be irreparably damaged before it had even begun, these castles providing an invaluable advantage for a campaign in hostile territory.

A key feature of the Scottish policy of destroying castles was to ensure there were no bases that could provide the necessary support for further English campaigns. Without the possession of castles in Scotland there could be no hope of English success as witnessed by the hopeless floundering of the 1322 campaign when the Scottish strategy of retreat and scorched earth forced the English army to turn back due to a lack of supplies and no strategic direction, two of the essential commodities.

Their destruction also denied the English the ability to ‘lord it over the land’ (Lanercost, p. 204) as well as denying them places of safety from the Scots. C.J. Rogers, War Cruel and Sharp (Woodbridge, 2000), p. 61 n. 86.
castles gave to an invading field-army. It was no coincidence that this hopeless campaign took place when the English did not hold any castles in Scotland. Castles effectively acted as a strong bridgehead for campaigns and for control, the keystones of conquest, and it was for this reason that the earliest campaigns of Edward III in Scotland had as one of their central aims the capture, rebuilding and garrisoning of the major Scottish castles without which no attempt at the conquest and control of Scotland was possible, the same castles which Edward I had been quick to seize when war broke out in the 1290s and from which he had attempted to subjugate Scotland.

In 1314 and 1322 the issue of the castle providing essential support for a field-force comes to the fore, one which was dependent on the castle itself rather than the garrison and it is on this basis that Morillo has argued that it is possible to distinguish the role of the castle from that of its garrison. He suggests that such support is an integral aspect of the castle building irrespective of the garrison while he also conjectures that a garrison operating outside of its castle walls should be judged as a field-force. However such a distinction is artificial as it is not possible to separate the castle from the garrison, the building from the troops. Each was integral to the other. The garrison was always active whether in the field, gathering intelligence or maintaining the castle defences. When a field-force was present the garrison acted in co-operation with it along with the castle providing it with support. Nor can garrisons operating outside of their walls be totally classed as field-forces as they were first and foremost garrison forces and at the end of operations returned to their castles. The installation of large garrisons in the major Scottish castles was to allow these garrisons to control the surrounding area and to maintain an unceasing and aggressive war from them which arose from their ability to undertake determined and sustained attacks thus

\[\text{Morillo, *Warfare under the Anglo-Norman Kings*, p. 94.}\]
allowing constant pressure to be exerted. Such activities merged completely with the function of the castle as a supporting base. The aggressive role of the castle encompassed both those of support and the activities of garrisons and any distinction between the two is only possible in a purely academic sense; to contemporaries the military value of the castle would have been seamless.

Having analysed exactly what a garrison was in this period it has become possible to fully understand their operational roles and capabilities and this in turn has enabled the role of the castle in warfare to be addressed in a new light. In both cases the overriding conclusion is that in this period they were primarily aggressive entities intended to project power beyond the walls. Garrisons and castles were also inextricable components of a sophisticated military system with an administration of supply and reinforcement at its core which was critical to their survival as was co-operation with field-forces; they were not meant to operate in isolation or to defend themselves and the surrounding area for extended periods of time without support. The perceived failures of garrisons and castles in the warfare of this period was down to a breakdown in this system and the prolonged periods in which they were left vulnerable in an unnatural state of almost permanent defence. These failures were not down to some intrinsic fault within garrisons and castles themselves and it follows that there was no decline in the military importance of the castle in the Anglo-Scottish wars of the fourteenth century.

Castles were most effective when engaged in aggressive warfare beyond their castle walls and to reach their full potential in this they had to be heavily manned and ideally comprise of a totally mounted force. It was the presence of such a garrison that

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23 Smail, *Crusading Warfare*, pp. 209, 213.
24 The breakdown of such a system is also indicated by the many small fortifications built in Northumberland which are indicative of a fragmentation of governmental power and control, Sumption, *Trial by Fire*, p. 385.
realised the full potential of the castle as such a potent instrument of war and it was in this active and aggressive manner that the English Crown attempted to use the garrisons it retained during the Anglo-Scottish wars of the period. The advent of the hobelar and then the mounted archer actually increased this potential as the century progressed. In contrast it was when forced into bouts of prolonged and increasingly isolated defence that castles and garrisons were at their most vulnerable and ineffective, the weakness of their reliance on an external system of support coming to the fore. It is only from a detailed study of garrisons as opposed to castles that the primacy of active field operations over defending the walls emerges, the predominance of the latter in terms of historiography due to the architecturally based studies of castles that have held sway for so long.

In recognising the capabilities and limitations of garrisons and castles it is essential to appreciate that they operated as part of a much more complex system, one that encompassed the entire military establishment of medieval England. As medieval warfare itself has recently been reclaimed as being capable of displaying sophisticated strategy and tactics so garrisons and castles should be accepted as being integral components of such highly developed methods of warfare in which they were both part of the system that made this warfare possible as well as being dependent on the system for their own survival and effectiveness. Only by completely understanding the structure and nature of English garrisons of this period does such a sophisticated and involved relationship become evident. It is also clear that it is only by embracing a more wide-ranging study of the castle than just its actual design and construction can the true role of the castle in medieval warfare begin to be truly understood.
The role of the castle in terms of occupation and conquest may be long recognised but it has never been addressed in detail.\textsuperscript{25} Indeed very little attempt has been made to explain exactly how contemporaries went about harnessing and utilising the castle as an effective instrument of war and the aim of this thesis has been to explain how the English Crown attempted to do so during the Anglo-Scottish wars of the fourteenth century. In doing so it has reinforced the argument that it is the aggressive role of the castle, combined with its defensive strength, which explains its military importance.\textsuperscript{26} The ultimate power of this defensive strength has long been recognised as an inherent and integral feature of the castle building itself; as this thesis has shown the real extent of its aggressive role resided in the potential invested within its garrison of operating beyond the castle walls. In this period the English Crown clearly saw the castle functioning as the potent aggressive weapon of war in which its very origins lay.

\textsuperscript{25} Strickland, 'Securing the North', p. 220.
\textsuperscript{26} Brown, \textit{English Castles}, p. 199.
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